)f California 
 Regional 
 Facility
 
 SANTA BARBATE STATE COLLEGE LIBRAE?
 
 INTERVENTION 
 
 IN 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 By 
 ELLERY C. STOWELL 
 
 AUTHOR OF THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR OF 1914 
 
 But war s a name which -wire iheir subjects wise 
 Kings would not play at COWPER 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. c. 
 
 JOHN BYRNE & CO. 
 
 1921
 
 Copyright, 1921, by Ellery C. Stowell 
 All Rights Reserved 
 
 Published November, 1921
 
 lA 
 
 BARBARA STATC COLLEGE LIBRAE 
 
 To 
 
 THE SPIRIT OF 
 HIGH IDEALISM AND PRACTICALITY 
 
 BY WHICH 
 
 IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 AND 
 
 THE OBSERVANCE OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 
 THE Two BRANCHES OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AMITY 
 
 WERE GUIDED TOWARD 
 THE COMMON AIM OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
 
 BY 
 
 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND SIR EDWARD GREY 
 THIS BOOK is DEDICATED
 
 PKEFACE 
 
 The purpose of this book is to set forth the occasions 
 when a state is justified in employing force or the 
 menace of force to influence the conduct of another 
 state. It is no part of this purpose to discuss the 
 means or machinery which exists or may be organized 
 to secure the enforcement of the correct principles, for 
 this subject is a matter of international procedure to 
 which a succeeding volume will be devoted. No sub- 
 ject in the whole range of man's relations merits a 
 more careful consideration than does the question of 
 the justice of international intervention. Unless the 
 law is understood, statesmen cannot rightly guide 
 the nations. But the decision as to the justice of the 
 grounds of intervention or non-intervention in any par- 
 ticular instance must in a democracy be determined 
 by the prevailing opinion of its citizens. Each citizen, 
 therefore, bears his part of this supreme responsi- 
 bility. 
 
 In entering upon an examination of the law and 
 practice of intervention, it is of particular importance 
 to remember that International Law is discovered in 
 the general practice of all the states. 
 
 It will be found that the rule of conduct which 
 general practice recognizes as correct does not justify 
 a selfish insistence upon the right of each state to act 
 absolutely independently even within its own domain, 
 nor does it authorize any state lightly to interfere with 
 the independence of a neighbor. The law of inter- 
 vention lies between the extremes of absolute inde- 
 pendence on the one hand and unregulated inter- 
 ference on the other. I have tried to trace the line of
 
 vi PREFACE 
 
 this happy mean in the light of the precedents drawn 
 from actual practice. 
 
 This investigation has resulted in the formulation 
 for the first time as far as I am aware of a rule 
 of transcending practical importance for the preser- 
 vation of a just peace among nations, namely: That 
 no state shall unreasonably insist upon its rights or 
 pursue its interests to the detriment of the op- 
 posing rights and interests of other states. The re- 
 fusal to evince a spirit of considerate compromise 
 or adjustment upon the basis of the relative import- 
 ance of the conflicting rights and interests is a viola- 
 tion of international law, which justifies an appeal to 
 intervention. 
 
 Viewed in their proper perspective of subordination 
 to this general rule, all the other just grounds of inter- 
 vention can be discovered and defined so that all states 
 of good will may give heed to the law and cooperate 
 to check the transgressions of the evil-doer. 
 
 Intervention in the relations between states is, it 
 will be seen, the rightful use of force or the reliance 
 thereon to constrain obedience to international law. 
 
 E. C. S. 
 Washington, October 11, 1921.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 INTERPOSITION 
 
 1. Enforcement of International Law . . 1 
 
 2. Redress 9 
 
 3. Expiation 21 
 
 4. Indemnity 35 
 
 5. Security 36 
 
 6. Punishment 37 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 7. Counter-Intervention 45 
 
 8. Humanitarian Intervention 51 
 
 (a) Persecution 63 
 
 (b) Oppression 86 
 
 (c) Uncivilized Warfare 125 
 
 (d) Injustice 139 
 
 (e) Suppression of the Slave Trade 195 
 
 (f) Humanitarian Asylum 205 
 
 (g) Foreign Commerce 257 
 
 9. International Police Regulation 277 
 
 10. Supervision 297 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 11. Interference 317 
 
 12. Violation of Sovereignty 322 
 
 13. Assistance 329 
 
 14. Support of Revolution 345 
 
 15. Prevention 355 
 
 16. Self -Preservation 392 
 
 17. Balance of Power 414 
 
 18. Conquest 431 
 
 19. Treaty Rights .438
 
 viii CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 POLITICAL ACTION 
 
 20. Imperfect Rights and Duties 447 
 
 21. Political Influence 450 
 
 22. Adjustment 451 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 23. The Rule of Reason 455 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY, 461 
 
 INDEX, 543
 
 CHAPTER I 
 INTERPOSITION 
 
 1. ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 The real value of any system of law depends upon 
 the efficacy of its machinery of enforcement. The legal 
 maxim : No right without a remedy, applies also to the 
 law of nations, which is not without remedies to protect 
 rights from injury. They are not, it is true, the same 
 as those employed in our municipal law; for the law 
 of nations controls individuals through their govern- 
 ments, which it holds responsible for the observance 
 of the law. Hence it follows that international remedies 
 must usually be directed in first instance against the 
 delinquent government. 
 
 SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 This control of the government over individuals is 
 carried out through the instrumentality of territorial 
 sovereignty, which is thus seen to be the very heart of 
 the system. Each independent state is, as it were, the 
 agent of the law of nations to enforce international 
 law within the territorial jurisdiction over which it 
 holds sway. In the absence of a strongly organized 
 central authority, no other system is practical. The 
 independent states of which international society is 
 composed are jealous of any interference with their 
 liberty of action within their own territory, and sover- 
 eignty is the only system of enforcing the law which 
 
 does not interfere. Perhaps it would be more accurate 
 
 i
 
 2 INTERPOSITION 
 
 to say that sovereignty is the system which reduces 
 this outside interference to a minimum. 
 
 INTERPOSITION 
 
 International commerce and travel lead to the es- 
 tablishment of large numbers of aliens within the con- 
 fines of each independent state. Their rights and 
 privileges are placed under the protection of interna- 
 tional law, and each sovereign state in fulfilling its 
 obligations under the law is bound to provide that they 
 suffer no injury. Even in the most civilized state some 
 instances of injustice will occur, but the injured for- 
 eigner who has sought in vain to secure redress through 
 the means afforded by the state where he is sojourning 
 may bring his grievance to the representatives of his 
 own government, and request their interposition in his 
 defense. 
 
 Interposition may be defined as justifiable action un- 
 dertaken by a state to induce another state to respect 
 its rights under international law, including the rights 
 of its nationals. 1 The protection of nationals through 
 interposition thus plays the part of a useful check upon 
 the exercise of sovereignty, which might otherwise be 
 inclined at times to disregard international law. 2 For 
 sovereignty is not, as some believe, a right to act with 
 absolute independence. It is no more than a presump- 
 
 *It is important to use the term ' ' interposition ' ' in the sense 
 of intervention to secure redress for the failure to recognize 
 the international law rights of the intervening state and those 
 for the protection of whose interests it is responsible, gener- 
 ally its nationals. This use is sanctioned by present practice. 
 Formerly it was customary to use ' ' diplomatic intervention. ' ' 
 "Interposition" is also currently used for intervention or 
 interference between two states or factions in conflict. This 
 use leads to confusion, and should be avoided. 
 
 2 Hall has noted this balance between territorial sovereignty 
 and the right of other states to protect their nationals. (W. 
 E. Hall : Foreign Jurisdiction of the British Crown, 5, p. 4.)
 
 ENFORCEMENT 3 
 
 tion that any action which a state may take within its 
 own territory in the furtherance of international law 
 is correctly taken. So strong is this presumption that 
 before any other interested nation may interpose in 
 favor of a national it must show beyond a reasonable 
 doubt that he has been deprived of some of his rights 
 under international law. When once the evidence is 
 sufficient to overcome the presumption of legality of 
 the action of the sovereign, the situation is reversed 
 the interposing state now has the law of nations on its 
 side and by that law is justified in insisting upon its 
 rights. 3 If milder measures prove unavailing, the in- 
 terposing state may use whatever force is reasonably 
 necessary to secure the recognition of its rights. 
 
 SELF-HELP 
 
 It sometimes happens that a weak or harassed gov- 
 ernment is unable or unwilling to compel its nationals 
 to observe international law. In such a situation, the 
 state whose nationals or whose interests are endan- 
 gered may act directly to compel the observance of in- 
 
 8 "The right of the government to intervene [interpose] for 
 the protection of its citizens in foreign lands and on the high 
 seas never was doubted; nor was such action withheld in 
 proper cases." (J. B. Moore: American Diplomacy (1905) 
 131). This eminent authority has always regarded the pro- 
 tection of nationals as a right of the citizen which the govern- 
 ment is obligated to undertake in so far as the superior in- 
 terests of the nation will allow. 
 
 Compare this with Professor Borchard's statement (Diplo- 
 matic Protection, p. 13) : "If these rights of an alien are 
 violated without proper redress in the state of residence, his 
 home state is warranted by international law in coming to 
 his assistance and interposing diplomatically in his behalf." 
 (Cf. ibid. 399-400.) 
 
 Sir Travers Twiss is still more emphatic and considers that 
 a nation may not forego insistance upon its rights. (Law 
 of Nations, Vol. II, p. 5.) 
 
 See also remarks of Lord Cromer : Ancient and Modern Im- 
 perialism, p. 3-4.
 
 4 INTERPOSITION 
 
 ternational law. Action so taken is called " self -help, " 8 * 
 and is a remedy which supplements interposition. The 
 annals of international relations are full of interesting 
 instances of self-help. In 1831, when the authorities 
 of what is now the Republic of Argentina failed to im- 
 pose upon the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands a 
 proper respect for the rights of American whalers re- 
 pairing thither, the Government of the United States 
 had recourse to self-help and administered directly a 
 well-merited punishment. The derelict condition of 
 authority over these islands was terminated by Eng- 
 land again taking possession of them, notwithstanding 
 the protest of the Buenos Aires Government. The Gov- 
 ernment of Argentina has long persisted in maintain- 
 ing that the United States was in some measure to 
 blame for this result. In his annual message of De- 
 cember 8, 1885, President Cleveland said: 
 
 ''The Argentine Government has revived the long 
 dormant question of the Falkland Islands, by claiming 
 from the United State indemnity for their loss, at- 
 tributed to the action of the commander of the sloop- 
 of-war Lexington in breaking up a piratical colony on 
 those islands in 1831, and their subsequent occupation 
 by Great Britain. In view of the ample justification 
 
 8a Since recourse to self-help is never had except in cases 
 where it is necessary for the preservation of the most impor- 
 tant that is the vital interests of the state, there is here, 
 as elsewhere, a tendency to confuse the purpose with the 
 means and to speak of the remedial action of self-help as 
 self-preservation or self-defense. Self-help is only one of the 
 methods of employing such means as are found best adapted 
 to secure respect for the rights of a state. In self-defense 
 and for self-preservation, states often have recourse to meas- 
 ures of force by way of self-help. 
 
 The term self-help is often used to denote the system of 
 self -enforcement of the law, which is characteristic of inter- 
 national relations. A better term is interposition (see above 
 p. 2).
 
 ENFORCEMENT 5 
 
 for the act of the Lexington and the derelict condition 
 of the islands before and after their alleged occupation 
 by Argentine colonists, this Government considers the 
 claim as wholly groundless." (Moore's Digest, vol. I, 
 p. 298. The incident is also discussed ibid. p. 876-890, 
 and in Stowell and Munro : International Cases, vol I, 
 p. 208-217.) 
 
 An interesting instance of collective action in 
 the nature of self-help was that taken by the Euro- 
 pean powers against the Prince of Chosu in 1864. The 
 Tycoon was unable, himself, to make this unruly vassel 
 observe the treaties, but he did not oppose the direct 
 action of the government intervening to enforce a com- 
 pliance. In fact, the Shogun's Government agreed to 
 pay the cost of the expedition, thus indicating that the 
 action might be considered as taken for the pur- 
 pose of fulfilling the obligation incumbent upon the 
 local sovereign. 4 
 
 In 1837, the Canadian authorities crossed into the 
 State of New York at Niagara and destroyed the 
 Steamer Caroline, in which the Fenians were prepar- 
 ing to invade Canada. In the affray, one man was 
 killed, and later when one McLeod boasted within the 
 State of New York of his participation in this case, he 
 was promptly arrested and indicted for murder. The 
 British authorities demanded his release on the ground 
 that, after the British Government had accepted full 
 
 4 See P. J. Treat : The Early Diplomatic Relations between 
 the United States and Japan ; Moore 's International Law Di- 
 gest, vol. V, p. 749-750. 
 
 The matter of the obligation of the territorial sovereign to 
 pay for intervention undertaken by way of cooperation to 
 establish order arose also in connection with the intervention 
 of the United States in Cuba, 1906-1909. (See Foreign Rela- 
 tions, 1911, p. 132-135.) The Cuban Government contended 
 that it was not obligated to reimburse the United States for 
 the expense of this undertaking.
 
 6 INTERPOSITION 
 
 responsibility for McLeod's act, any discussion of the 
 matter must be conducted between the governments 
 concerned. The incident was settled by the acquittal 
 of McLeod and the enactment of federal legislation 
 to enable the federal authorities thenceforth to release 
 any person held under similar circumstances. 5 
 
 In the wars which have been fought over and about 
 Chinese territory, the weakness of the Celestial Em- 
 pire has given rise to interesting questions of self-help, 
 as when Japan, at the time of the war with Russia in 
 ] 904, entered the harbor of Shanghai and destroyed the 
 Russian vessel Reshitelni, which had taken refuge 
 there (Westlake, vol. II, p. 239). Similarly, in 1914, 
 the British cruisers destroyed the German warship 
 Dresden when lying within the territorial waters of 
 Chile (Stowell and Munro: Cases, vol. II, p. 274-8). 
 In the absence of any adequate authority to insure the 
 observance of neutrality, it is difficult to condemn these 
 acts without qualification, high-handed as they unques- 
 tionably were. It may, however, be doubted whether 
 the military advantage which results from such a 
 course offers compensation sufficient to balance the 
 shock to the public opinion of the world. 
 
 NATIONAL CONTROL 
 
 These, then, are the three methods of procedure for 
 the enforcement of international law: sovereignty; 
 interposition; and self-help. They form a system ef- 
 fective throughout the inhabited portions of the globe. 
 But international commerce makes use of the sea and 
 bids fair soon to traverse the regions of the air. There 
 are no officials of any state to exercise dominion over 
 the high seas or the upper air. Hence it has been 
 found necessary to supplement territorial sovereignty 
 
 6 See Stowell and Munro, vol. I, p. 121-3.
 
 by a projection of itself, which we may call " national 
 control." Through national control, jurisdiction is 
 extended over vessels traversing sea and air. The 
 territorial sovereign from whom the national con- 
 trol emanates is internationally responsible for the 
 observance of international law on board the vessel 
 that flies its flag. Should any state fail to fulfil this 
 obligation, the difficulty may be met by the injured 
 state through recourse to interposition or even self- 
 help, as discussed above. 6 
 
 COOPEEATION 
 
 International law, as perpetuated through an evolu- 
 tion centuries old, has other methods of enforcement 
 to facilitate in certain exceptional circumstances the 
 workings of its system of territorial sovereignty. One 
 of these we may designate as "cooperation" for ex- 
 ample, when a state, acting for the common good, pun- 
 ishes a pirate, even when its own immediate interests 
 are not concerned. Similarly, in fulfilment of their 
 obligations under cooperation, states make provision 
 for the reciprocal extradition of fugitives from jus- 
 tice. 7 
 
 6 The case of the Virginius involved this principle. See 
 Stowell and Munro: International Cases, vol. I, p. 368-371; 
 Westlake : International Law, vol. I, p. 171-3. Cf . Westlake, 
 vol. I, p. 167, for discussion of the nature of jurisdiction on 
 the high sea. 
 
 7 This is shown by the following extract from an article by 
 Roy Emerson Curtis on "The law of hostile military expe- 
 ditions as applied by the United States" (American Journal 
 of International Law, April, 1914, p. 225-6) : 
 
 "The Government of the United States has been accus- 
 tomed to cooperate with foreign governments in the matter of 
 the investigation of possible violations of the law, and occas- 
 ionally it has supplied information of importance to other 
 states in warding off attacks of expeditions which this govern- 
 ment might not be able to repress. In 1884, the Canadian
 
 8 INTERPOSITION 
 
 I quote from Alpheus H. Snow the following extract 
 relative to the suppression of the slave trade as a good 
 illustration of cooperation: "In 1841 Great Britain, 
 Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia entered into a 
 treaty open to all the powers for the suppression of the 
 slave trade by granting to each a reciprocal limited 
 right of visitation, search, and capture of ships en- 
 gaged in the slave trade, restricted to certain identified 
 naval vessels, carefully regulated and confined to de- 
 limited areas of the ocean. In 1842 the United States 
 entered into a similar treaty with Great Britain, which 
 was supplanted by a treaty of April 7, 1862, for the 
 more effectual suppression of the slave trade." (Al- 
 pheus H. Snow: The Question of Aborigines in the 
 Law and Practice of Nations, p. 97.) 
 
 COMBINATION 
 
 Practical considerations and local characteristics 
 have divided the world into the independent portions 
 which we designate as states, but in many respects the 
 
 Government sought information from the United States con- 
 cerning the basis of rumors circulated in the press of this 
 country that a Fenian invasion was in preparation. The au- 
 thorities investigated and made a report of the situation to 
 the British minister (MS. Notes to Great Britain, XIX: 438, 
 Moore's Digest, vol. VII, p. 931). The raids of the Garza 
 bandits on the Mexican boundarj^ and the natural obstacles 
 to preventing them, called forth the suggestion from the Mexi- 
 can Government that it would be well for the War Depart- 
 ment of each country to inform the other of what forces it 
 proposed to assign to preserve the peace on its frontiers, and 
 what system it proposed to adopt for the attainment of this 
 end, so that, by both acting in concert, the purpose of both 
 governments might be more easily accomplished. The United 
 States concurred in this suggestion." (Foreign Relations, 
 1893, p. 442, and p. 446-7.) The United States would not go 
 to the extent of making an "alliance" for such purposes. 
 (Foreign Relations, 1886, p. 57.) For other instances of co- 
 operative action, see Stowell and Munro : International Cases, 
 vol. I, chapters IX, X, XI.
 
 REDRESS 9 
 
 interests of humanity are one, and upon occasion the 
 governments of the independent states sink their jeal- 
 ousies to form a "combination" for the regulation of 
 matters beyond the scope of their separate action. As 
 an example we may take the international commission 
 established to govern the navigation of the Danube. 
 To take a more recent example, by the Treaty of Peace, 
 Fiume was placed under international control. Simi- 
 larly, international unions, such as the Universal Pos- 
 tal Union of Berne, are constituted to govern world 
 relations in some particular matter. 8 
 
 2. EEDBESS 
 
 The purpose of interposition is to obtain redress, 
 by which is meant the exaction from the delinquent 
 state of expiation for any hurt to honor and prestige ; 
 of indemnification for material injury, and of reason- 
 able security against the repetition of the offense. The 
 offending state is punished by enforced compliance 
 with these requirements, or by such reasonable severity 
 as the circumstances may justify. 
 
 The idea of redress was primarily based upon re- 
 venge, and it is necessary to remember this in trying to 
 understand the history of the evolution of all legal pro- 
 cedure. 
 
 To understand revenge it is necessary to analyze it 
 into its component parts. The first of these is the im- 
 pulse to do something to alleviate the physical or men- 
 tal anguish inflicted by the injury counter-injury upon 
 the offender being virtually instinctive, as is shown by 
 the presence of the same motives among animals. 9 
 
 8 For many instances of international combination and treaty 
 stipulations relative thereto, see Annuaire de la Vie Inter- 
 nationale, Brussels, 1908-1909; and Paul S. Reinsch: Public 
 International Unions, 1911. 
 
 9 George J. Romanes (Animal Intelligence, 4 ed., London, 
 1886, p. 387-9), relates some remarkable instances where ele-
 
 10 INTERPOSITION 
 
 An impulse so widespread and so persistent must ob- 
 tain a presumption in favor of its usefulness to animal 
 creation. Even the weak are shielded by revenge from 
 a large measure of imposition of injustice which they 
 would otherwise be made to endure from more power- 
 ful neighbors. One is reminded of the legend under the 
 thistle on the Scottish arms, ''Nemo me impune laces- 
 set" [Let no one assail me with impunity]. 
 
 The motive which we have been discussing is evi- 
 dently individual and selfish. The sweets of revenge 
 assuage the feelings of the individual without regard 
 to the effect his revenge may have upon his fellows. 
 Perhaps the best name we can give to the fulfilment of 
 this subjective craving is satisfaction. 
 
 The more primitive egotistical craving for satisfac- 
 tion, however important and useful in preserving re- 
 spect for the personality of an individual, is often in 
 conflict with the general interests of the community, 
 since the individual in his pursuit of revenge may en- 
 gender strife weakening to the society of which he is 
 a part. This evil existed in the case of family and 
 tribal feuds, in which the avengers were constantly em- 
 broiling the community in order to gratify their more 
 selfish lust for revenge. 10 The realization of this dan- 
 ger led primitive political organizations to restrict the 
 free play of this passion for revengeful satisfaction by 
 requiring a certain form of procedure for its applica- 
 
 phants have avenged themselves upon their tormentors after 
 nursing their wrath for a long period. He also gives other in- 
 stances of vindictiveness in animals. See Romanes's index. 
 
 10 In this case, the desire of preserving a good name in the 
 tribe also had a part, and actuated the avengers, but satis- 
 faction would seem to have been the element most difficult to 
 bring into harmony with the requirements of public safety.
 
 REDRESS 11 
 
 tion, and by prohibiting acts of vengeance at certain 
 times and places. 11 
 
 The League of the Iroquois adopted comprehensive 
 regulations to eliminate private vengeance between the 
 tribes of the confederation. 12 Modern society replaces 
 vengeance by penal statutes and the regular procedure 
 of its law courts. 13 Police officials and the officers of 
 the courts take appropriate action to punish the trans- 
 
 "The Law of the Talion, as set forth in the Mosaic Law and 
 ancient codes, is such a restriction. The codes of the Germanic 
 tribes contain elaborate provisions which served this purpose. 
 Sanctuaries were recognized as affording asylum to fugitives 
 from the wrath of the avenger. 
 
 12 "The wars among the Indian tribes arise almost always 
 from individual murders. The killing of a tribesman by the 
 members of another community concerns his whole people. 
 If satisfaction is not promptly made, war follows, as a matter 
 of course.* The founders of the Iroquois commonwealth de- 
 creed that wars for this cause should not be allowed to rise 
 between any of their cantons. On this point a special charge 
 was given to the members of the Great Council. They were 
 enjoined (in the figurative language employed throughout the 
 book) not to allow the murder to be discussed in a national 
 assembly, where the exasperation of the young men might 
 lead to mischief, but to reserve it for their own consideration ; 
 and they were required as soon as possible to bury all ani- 
 mosities that might arise from it. The figure employed is im- 
 pressive. They were to uproot a huge pine-tree the well- 
 known emblem of their League disclosing a deep cavity, be- 
 low which an underground stream would be swiftly flowing. 
 Into this current they were to cast the cause of trouble, and 
 then, replacing the tree, hide the mischief forever from their 
 people." (Horatio Hale: The Iroquois Book of Rites, Phila- 
 delphia, 1883, p. 68-9.) 
 
 134 'At length the pursuit of revenge (Blutrach) is punished 
 by the state, and what was once a sacred duty is thereby trans- 
 formed into a crime. " (Translated from Post: Ethnologische 
 Jurisprudenz, p. 261.) 
 
 * [Bale's note] Relation, of 1636, p. 119. "C'est de la que 
 naissent les guerres, et c'est un sujet plus que suffisant de 
 prendre les armes centre quelque village quand il refuse de 
 satisfaire par les presents ordonnez, pour celuy qui vous 
 aurait tue quelq'un des vostres. " (Brebeuf, on the Hurons.)
 
 12 INTERPOSITION 
 
 gressor. We are accustomed to regard our criminal 
 procedure as intended to warn evildoers and to pre- 
 serve society from their misdeeds, but a closer exami- 
 nation will show that it still retains many indications 
 of its original purpose, which was to preserve the pub- 
 lic peace. For example, many misdeeds go unpunished 
 unless the wronged individual lodges a complaint and 
 calls into action the machinery of the law. 1 * Although 
 punishment by the courts has been substituted for re- 
 venge, in some countries duels are still in vogue. When 
 we turn to the family of nations, we shall find that the 
 government often has to yield to popular cries for re- 
 venge. 15 This primitive lust for revenge is still an im- 
 portant factor in international relations. 
 
 In municipal affairs, where private revenge has been 
 so largely replaced by the strong arm of the law, re- 
 venge retains only the illicit and anti-social function of 
 satisfying individual resentment. The avenger acts to 
 
 14 An indication of this is perhaps to be found in the law of 
 libel, according to which the truth of a defamatory statement 
 is no defense in a criminal action. (See "Libel," Encyclo- 
 paedia Britannica, 11 ed., vol. 3, p. 537 ; Hugh Fraser : The 
 Law of Libel and Slander, p. 233.) 
 
 Another indication may well be the old system of trial by 
 compurgators, who swore to their belief in the innocence of the 
 accused. (See Beeves: History of English Law, American 
 edition, 1880, vol. I, p. 205. See also Century Dictionary, 
 under "Compurgator.") In ancient times, the compurga- 
 tors would evidently bring to the accused something more than 
 a moral support. It was logical in view of this system of com- 
 purgators that ancient law should take no account of the 
 casual witness who might have chanced to see the act under 
 consideration. 
 
 15 In his electioneering campaign, Lloyd George gained many 
 adherents by promising to bring the Kaiser to trial in London, 
 and to make Germany pay to the last penny. See J. M. 
 Keynes: The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 139- 
 145.
 
 REDEESS 13 
 
 relieve his wounded feelings and so to let down the 
 tension which has resulted from the causal act. 16 
 
 The second of the component parts of revenge is in- 
 timately associated with the social life of the communi- 
 ty and is the expression of the effort to reacquire the 
 loss of standing (prestige) which has resulted from the 
 infliction of some injury. The action taken under this 
 impulse aims to reestablish prestige. The word which 
 best serves to designate this is "rehabilitation." 17 
 These two purposes, satisfaction and rehabilitation, 
 are so entangled in revengeful action that it is very 
 difficult to separate them in any particular instance. 
 They are, nevertheless, quite distinct. 
 
 PRESTIGE 
 
 In primitive communities the organization to mete 
 out justice was naturally rudimentary, and revenge 
 was relied upon as the best protection of the weak from 
 the iniquities of the strong. The subconscious reali- 
 zation of social advantage would lead the community 
 to approve and to urge the avenger on. The man who 
 did not avenge an injury would lose the respect of the 
 community. He would lose standing, that is prestige. 
 Whenever there is a loss of prestige, the individual 
 who has suffered will be stimulated to action adequate 
 to regain his position in the society in which he lives. 
 When an individual loses a part of the good opinion 
 which he has previously enjoyed, he is hurt in his own 
 self-esteem. Because of his social instincts and nur- 
 ture he cannot avoid looking upon himself in the light 
 
 16 It is recognized as a device of practical psychology to al- 
 low a dangerous individual to enjoy a cheap revenge in order 
 to drain off his venom and prevent some more pernicious mani- 
 festation. 
 
 17 Among the meanings of rehabilitate, the Century gives: 
 "To reestablish in the esteem of others or in social position 
 lost by disgrace; restore to public respect."
 
 14 INTERPOSITION 
 
 of the public opinion of the community, and he is cer- 
 tain to incur the condemnation of his fellows if he al- 
 lows an insult to pass unrequited. 18 
 
 Governments, like individuals, suffer directly from 
 any affront to their honor which means a loss of pres- 
 tige. A nation's strength depends upon many factors, 
 amongst which is prestige. It is not possible accurate- 
 ly to estimate the number or relative importance of 
 these factors. Nevertheless, this prestige of a nation 
 is, from a practical point of view, among its most 
 precious possessions. When international obligations 
 are entered into, a nation's prestige carries conviction 
 that it will fulfil them faithfully. The rate of interest 
 it has to pay to individuals for loans depends in great 
 part upon the general confidence in the intention and 
 ability of the government to meet the payments when 
 due. Prestige lends influence to any diplomatic action 
 in which a state may be engaged. The glory of national 
 prestige is reflected in a curious manner over every in- 
 dividual of the nation, and contributes to his success in 
 all parts of the world. The prestige of a nation in- 
 spires every national with an inward feeling of pride 
 in the association of his fellow nationals under an hon- 
 
 18 In Oriental countries, individual loss of prestige is called 
 losing face, and it is considered a most serious matter, as the 
 following incident from the Life of Tennyson indicates : " . . 
 The conversation then reverted to China. My father [Lord 
 Tennyson] observed that he thought the Chinese, who live on 
 a very little, could imitate everything, and had no fear of 
 death, would, not long hence, under good leadership be a great 
 power in the world. Lord Napier agreed with him, and said 
 that their contempt of death had on one occasion come pain- 
 fully home to himself. A whole family had drowned them- 
 selves in a well, whether out of pique or fear he did not know, 
 because he himself had refused to accept a dog which he had 
 petted and they had offered to him. 'No incident,' he added, 
 'ever impressed me with so much horror.' ' Hallam Tenny- 
 son : Memoirs of Lord Tennyson, 1898, vol. II, p. 328. Cf . A. 
 H. Smith: Chinese Characteristics, chap. I, "Face.")
 
 REDRESS 15 
 
 ored government and gives him an added self-confi- 
 dence which also contributes directly to his success. 
 
 The elements which go to make up the estimate of 
 prestige in any particular nation must vary. Individu- 
 als more highly developed intellectually and socially 
 will admire the administrative efficiency of the govern- 
 mental machinery of the state, the faithfulness with 
 which it meets its international obligations and assists 
 in the spread of enlightened policies capable of substi- 
 tuting bonds of union between the different communi- 
 ties of the world in place of narrow race or national 
 antagonisms. They will rejoice in anything that con- 
 tributes to the ability of such a state to expand its in- 
 fluence in its work of civilization and general enlight- 
 ment. 
 
 The ignorant individual makes his estimate of the 
 prestige of another country principally from the extent 
 of its territory upon the map, and its military prowess, 
 as shown in recent wars. He also take~ into account 
 the number and wealth of the individuals of the state 
 with whom he comes in contact. Of course, many other 
 factors enter into this estimate, such as popular songs, 
 histories, pictures, or legends relating to the country. 
 Upon such a basis will be formed that popular respect 
 and approval which constitutes national prestige in 
 other countries. Of all these factors of national pres- 
 tige, military strength is by far the most important. 
 The possession of this military strength makes it pos- 
 sible to prevent the forcible violation of the nation's 
 rights, and the general understanding that any such 
 attempt would be quickly resented and effectively re- 
 sisted is, under present conditions, the best insurance 
 of the peaceful enjoyment of a nation's rights. The 
 complexity of international relations makes it difficult 
 for the whole body of citizens to know what the rights 
 of a nation are under international law, and to realize
 
 16 INTERPOSITION 
 
 when these rights have been violated, but everyone 
 understands that his state has a right to a courteous 
 treatment from every other state, and any failure in 
 this respect is immediately resented as an insult. If 
 redress is not exacted for any lapse from courtesy, all 
 perceive that the force looked upon as an insurance 
 against just such an occurrence was in reality para- 
 lyzed, and part of the prestige of the insulted state is 
 lost. Throughout the world will prevail a feeling of 
 contempt for the pusillanimous conduct of the state 
 which swallowed the insult. The ensmng loss of pres- 
 tige will affect the state in the subsequent carrying out 
 of its foreign policy and hamper its nationals through- 
 out the world. 19 The case of the Trent and the Fashoda 
 incident (1898) illustrate the importance which the 
 most advanced states attach to the maintenance of 
 their national prestige. In the case of the Trent, Presi- 
 
 19 It is not perhaps the failure to punish the offender which 
 causes the loss of prestige, so much as the belief that the fail- 
 ure to punish indicates a weakness of physical strength or of 
 character. When the capacity to smite is evident, but the 
 blow magnanimously withheld, the effect upon the imagina- 
 tion of the offender may perhaps be greater. 
 
 President David P. Barrows of the University of California, 
 in his ' ' Decade of American Government in the Philippines, ' ' 
 p. xiii, notes that the Philippine Insurrection was brought to 
 
 an end in the spring and summer of 1901, " when the 
 
 Filipino 'zone commanders,' who for many months had been 
 exercising practically independent authority in the different 
 provinces of the Archipelago, were captured or forced to sur- 
 render. They were all promptly paroled and allowed to re- 
 turn to their homes. Not one of these revolutionary leaders 
 ever broke his parole or took up arms against the United 
 States." 
 
 In the course of a discussion which I had with President 
 Barrows, relative to the necessity for the use of force to sup- 
 press sedition, he referred to the magnanimous treatment 
 accorded the Filipinos, and thought they were more impressed 
 by the tremendous power of the United States expressed in 
 this way, than they would have been by severe treatment.
 
 KEDRESS 17 
 
 dent Lincoln and the Prince Consort did much to avoid 
 popular irritation by toning down the language of the 
 diplomatic correspondence, but war would probably 
 have resulted had it not been for the happy cooperation 
 of Secretary Seward and Lord Lyons to avoid any 
 action hurtful to American prestige. (See Newton's 
 Life of Lord Lyons, vol. I, p. 60-66). 
 
 A careful reading of the correspondence relative to 
 the Fashoda incident indicates that peace was pre- 
 served only because France was allowed to make a 
 retreat which did not seem too humiliating. 
 
 This appears from the dispatch of M. Delcasse, Min- 
 ister of Foreign Affairs, to the French representative 
 at London, October 3, 1898, in which he quotes ver- 
 batim his remarks to the British Ambassador, as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 "We were the first," said I, "to reach Fashoda and 
 we took it from the barbarians from whom you, two 
 months later, took Khartum. To ask of us to evacuate 
 Fashoda before entering into any discussion would be 
 equivalent to the presentation of an ultimatum. That 
 being so, who that knows France could doubt our an- 
 swer? You are not ignorant of my desire for an un- 
 derstanding with England, an understanding as advan- 
 tageous for England as for France, nor are my con- 
 ciliatory sentiments unknown to you. I state them to 
 you thus freely because I know, and because you, your- 
 self, are certain that they will not lead me to exceed the 
 limit set by national honor. To reach an understand- 
 ing between the two countries, I am able to make sacri- 
 fices of material interests, but in my hands the national 
 honor shall rest secure. There is not anyone who, in 
 my position, will employ a different language, and per- 
 haps another might not be as well disposed. ' )2 
 
 20 Extract translated from French Yellow Book, Documents 
 Diplomatiques. Affaires du Haut-nil et du Bahr-el-Ghazan, 
 2
 
 18 INTERPOSITION 
 
 Roosevelt, in a letter of August 14, 1906, to Henry 
 White, then Ambassador at Rome, said of the Kaiser 
 (Scribner's, April, 1920, p. 394-5) : "Moreover, where 
 I have forced him to give way I have been sedulously 
 anxious to build a bridge of gold for him, and to give 
 him the satisfaction of feeling that his dignity and 
 reputation in the face of the world were safe. ' ' 
 
 Norman Angell, in his interesting and stimulating 
 book, "Europe's Optical Illusion," has marshalled 
 arguments to prove that a victor in a modern war as, 
 for instance, Germany after the Franco-German War 
 was, he believes, powerless to reap any economic ad- 
 vantage from the conquest. He points out that a civil- 
 ized state cannot exterminate the inhabitants of a con- 
 quered territory and operate it for the profit of its 
 nationals, and he makes a good case to show that the 
 burdens resulting from a heavy war indemnity are felt 
 more by the state that receives than by the state that 
 pays. But he entirely leaves out of account the great 
 the vastly important factor of national prestige. Ger- 
 many's victory in the Franco-German War brought her 
 a great increase in national prestige. It allowed Prus- 
 sia to secure the lead of the other German states and 
 gave to Bismarck's diplomacy a strong support. It in- 
 spired the German nation with a confidence in itself, 
 the results of which are shown in its growth, organiza- 
 tion, and industrial development. Wherever Germans 
 have gone they have carried additional confidence and 
 received additional marks of respect because of their 
 victory in 1870. The intellectual classes of the world 
 were indirectly influenced by the German success and 
 flocked to her universities, while France, with all she 
 
 1897-8, p. 16; cf. also Parliamentary Papers, 1898, Egypt. 
 [C. 9054] [C. 9055]. Under cover of a general settlement of 
 their frontiers in Northern Africa, France withdrew her claim 
 to Fashoda.
 
 REDRESS 19 
 
 had to teach, was for a time almost ignored. It would 
 be hard to find any other explanation or any justifica- 
 tion for the sudden collapse of French prestige, for 
 France was then what she has recently shown herself to 
 be; but she suffered a great loss of prestige, and 
 French influence was dimmed for a generation. In the 
 course of years there came about a gradual readjust- 
 ment of political vision and intellectual values, until, in 
 her glorious resistance to German aggression, France 
 has regained the relative position in world influence 
 which she merits. It is impossible to estimate in dollars 
 and cents what those years of prestige meant to Ger- 
 many. Similarly, it would be impossible to estimate for 
 Japan the value of the prestige she gained through her 
 victory over Russia. We are able to give one concrete 
 instance she has saved millions of dollars in her inter- 
 est charges by refunding her debt. Though poor and 
 burdened by taxation, she could, after her war with 
 Russia, borrow upon better terms than she could be- 
 fore. In the course of the succeeding years the sum 
 total of the gain from the prestige consequent upon a 
 successful conflict may be many times greater for the 
 victor than the cost of the loss of life and property, 
 even including such indirect injury as results from ar- 
 rested development caused by a prolonged war. 
 
 The maintenance of a country's honor means the 
 maintenance of its prestige, and even from a material 
 point of view, honor may be considered as its most 
 precious possession. This does not mean that a hasty 
 recourse to force and a brutal castigation need be un- 
 dertaken upon slight provocation. 21 
 
 "Professor T. E. Holland (Jurisprudence, 4th ed., 1888, 
 p. 327-8) makes "Reputation" one of what he calls "ante- 
 cedent international rights," and says relative thereto, "Of 
 the right to a good name, it has been well said that ' the glory 
 of a nation is intimately connected with its power, of which
 
 20 INTERPOSITION 
 
 In exceptional instances, public opinion may approve 
 of failure to exact retribution. If the offending state 
 is evidently at the mercy of a stronger aggrieved state, 
 an isolated offense allowed to pass unavenged will ap- 
 pear magnanimous and the public will often admire the 
 self-control which the stronger evinced. This noble 
 sentiment is sometimes carried to an extreme. There 
 is a tendency on the part of impractical idealists to be 
 too ready to consider the failure to exact redress as 
 magnanimity. Magnanimity is out of place when it 
 is likely to be mistaken for fear or weakness and en- 
 danger the security of the community through repe- 
 tition of the offense. 
 
 An individual, it has been said, seeks redress to re- 
 cover the loss of self-esteem in other words, his es- 
 timate of what he has lost in the opinion of the com- 
 munity. 22 To regain his own self-esteem, he must be- 
 
 it is a considerable part. It is this distinction which attracts 
 to it the consideration of other peoples, which makes it respec- 
 table in the eyes of its neighbors. A nation the reputation of 
 which is well established, and especially one the glory of which 
 is striking, finds itself sought by all sovereigns. They desire 
 its friendship and fear to offend it. Its friends, and those who 
 wish to become such, favor its enterprises, and its detractors 
 do not venture to show their ill-will. ' ' 
 
 Sir James Macintosh has well said : "A nation may justly 
 make war for the honor of her flag, or for dominion over a 
 rock, if the one be insulted and the other be unjustly invaded ; 
 because acquiescence in the outrage or the wrong may lower 
 her reputation, and thereby lessen her safety." (Macintosh: 
 History of the Revolution of 1688, London, 1834, p. 301.) 
 
 "The estimate of the community in a large number of cases 
 gives the average extent of the retaliation or revenge, which 
 must be inflicted to achieve rehabilitation, but in any par- 
 ticular case, the individual will be guided necessarily by his 
 own subjective view of what is requisite. If he exacts an ex- 
 aggerated revenge, counter-retaliation and the condemnation 
 of his fellows will act as a check upon similar offenses in the 
 future. Instead of rehabilitation, his excesses will cause him 
 a still further loss of prestige.
 
 EXPIATION 21 
 
 lieve that he has recovered the former good opinion in 
 which he was held by his fellows. What has been said 
 about individuals in a community is in the main true 
 of nations. An intentional injury or insult offered to 
 a state or to those whom the state is bound to protect 
 affects the self-esteem of the entire population because 
 they feel that the respect in which their state was held 
 by others is diminished as long as such an affront is 
 submitted to. 
 
 After this short account of the origin of redress from 
 revenge and the force of the motive to secure rehabili- 
 tation for the loss of prestige, we shall be better able 
 to take up the consideration of the nature of expiation, 
 the first of the three purposes comprehended in action 
 taken to secure redress. The other two, as we have 
 said above, were indemnification for material injury, 
 and security against a repetition of the offense. 
 
 3. EXPIATION 
 
 When an international offense has caused material 
 loss, obvious and practical considerations impel the 
 injured state to insist upon an adequate indemnity. 
 But the injurious acts may also have caused a hurt to 
 national honor or prestige ; in some instances, injuries 
 of this nature may be the only issue involved. 
 
 A hurt to national honor and prestige generally re- 
 sults from an intentional disregard of rights, and may 
 be actuated by one of the following motives : 
 
 1st. The desire to pick a quarrel. 
 
 2nd. The belief that the injured state is too pusil- 
 lanimous to resent the wrong done it. 
 
 3rd. The belief that the injured state is not strong 
 enough to retaliate. 
 
 If the motive is to pick a quarrel, experience shows 
 that there is usually little advantage in delaying the
 
 22 INTERPOSITION 
 
 retaliatory action which the injury warrants, and the 
 sentiment of mankind still applauds the prompt taking 
 up of the defiance. Even if there be superior consider- 
 ations which should justify a refusal to engage in the 
 conflict, public opinion will surely register its disap- 
 proval of the abnegation and the state will, from a pop- 
 ular view-point, suffer a loss of honor and prestige. 
 
 The same consequences will result in those instances 
 when the failure to exact redress is due to the craven 
 spirit upon which the injuring state counted. 
 
 As regards the third class of instances, when the in- 
 sulted state is really greatly inferior in strength, the 
 failure to take up arms for redress will not necessarily 
 result in a loss of honor. It will, however, make very 
 clear how inferior is the military strength of the in- 
 sulted state and its political prestige will suffer. 23 
 
 Sir Edward Creasy has well expressed this: "A 
 state has," he says, "the right to repel and to exact 
 redress for injuries to its honor. This also is a right 
 of self-preservation. For, among nations, as among 
 individuals, those, who tamely submit to insult, will be 
 sure to have insults and outrages heaped upon them 
 until the sense of intolerable wrong drives them into 
 physical contest under probably disadvantageous cir- 
 cumstances, and after they have deprived themselves 
 of that general sympathy which manly and consistent 
 conduct will always obtain for even the unsuccessful 
 brave. Without doubt vainglory and bluster are as 
 detestable in a nation as in a private person. True 
 honor consists in combining self-respect with respect 
 
 23 In those instances where the insulted state is conspicu- 
 ously superior in strength to the insulter, a failure to exact 
 redress may enhance prestige. This will be the case when, in 
 the opinion of the public, such abnegation takes on the aspect 
 of magnanimity.
 
 EXPIATION 23 
 
 for the feelings and rights of others." 24 (Sir Edward 
 S. Creasy : First Platform of International Law, Lon- 
 don, 1876, p. 153). 
 
 To prevent the loss of honor and prestige, the in- 
 jured state must demonstrate that it has brought the 
 insulter to book, and thereby rehabilitated itself. If 
 the insulter offers resistance, his complete subjection 
 by the sword would be the necessary consequence ; but, 
 in general, matters do not proceed to this length. The 
 insult given in hot blood is repented of, or the certainty 
 that the injured state will marshal a superior force for 
 requital begets fear and counsels conciliation. Or it 
 may be that the lowering clouds of war make the con- 
 temner afraid to engage in a controversy which will 
 offer his rivals an undisturbed opportunity to advance 
 their designs. In many instances an innate sense of 
 justice and of self-respect will lead the wrong-doer to 
 recognize as unworthy any effort to sustain his act. 
 It then becomes the aim of the provoking state to avoid 
 the consequences of its act, and'to arrest the measure 
 of redress. The accomplishment of this purpose is 
 known as "expiation" that is the acknowledgment 
 of the wrong done by acts expressing contrition. 25 
 
 24 Creasy gives the following supplementary note: 
 
 "The single Greek word AW&S simply and eloquently ex- 
 presses all this, and much more. 
 
 "In making serious contumely to honor a cause for hostile 
 proceedings, international law follows the Koman civil law, 
 according to which, ' Dignitas quoque hominis in jure consider- 
 atur,' and 'Injuria' in the form of contumely is described as 
 'Injuria non bonis damnum factum intelligitur, sed contra 
 personse dignitatem.' See Warnkoenig : Institutiones Juris 
 Romani Privati, 126 and 986." 
 
 26 The significance of these acts is the ceremonial placing of 
 the offender in the position where he would ultimately be when 
 justly vanquished by the wronged state. The ceremony by 
 expressing this situation proclaims to the world that the result 
 may be considered to have taken place. Both parties thereby 
 save a futile expenditure of blood and treasure.
 
 24 INTERPOSITION 
 
 Expiation may be expressed in various ways, ac- 
 cording to the nature of the offense and the situation of 
 the parties. 
 
 International rehabilitation, to be adequate, must 
 meet the views of international society. In practice, 
 when there has been any hurt to honor or prestige, re- 
 habilitation is usually sought through the exaction of 
 an apology. A good instance of an apology is found in 
 the following dispatch of February 6, 1858, from Count 
 Walewski, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to 
 Count de Persigny at London. Notwithstanding the 
 courteous tone of the dispatch, feeling ran high in 
 France against England because of the asylum she 
 afforded for political agitators. 
 
 Lord Palmerston had been turned out of power when 
 he attempted to secure the adoption of legislation 
 which would prevent Great Britain from offering so 
 unrestricted an asylum to political conspirators 
 against neighboring sovereigns, and when the French 
 Government saw the consequences of this attempt and 
 the outburst of national anger, they were willing to 
 drop the matter and to help Disraeli, who had succeed- 
 ed Lord Palmerston, by sending the conciliatory dis- 
 patch which arrived in time to be read to the House of 
 Commons on its reassembling on March 12, after ad- 
 journment. 26 As translated, the dispatch reads as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 "M. le Comte: The account you give me of the effect 
 produced in England by the insertion on the Moniteur 
 
 26 See Buckle's Life of Disraeli, vol. IV, p. 123. 
 
 John Stuart Mill writes Giuseppe Mazzini, February 21, 
 1858 (Letters, vol. I, p. 201), " . . .When I began writing to 
 you I thought that this country was meanly allowing itself to 
 be made an appendage to Louis Bonaparte's police for the 
 purpose of hunting down all foreigners (and indeed English 
 too) who have virtue enough to be his avowed enemies. But 
 it appears we are to be spared this ignominy ; and such is the
 
 EXPIATION 25 
 
 of certain addresses from the army, has not escaped 
 my attention, and I have made a report of it to the 
 Emperor. You are aware of the sentiments by which 
 we have been influenced in the steps we have adopted 
 with Her Britannic Majesty's Government on the oc- 
 casion of the attack of the 14th of January [attempted 
 assassination of Napoleon III], and of the care we have 
 taken, in applying for its concurrence, to avoid every- 
 thing that could bear the appearance of pressure on 
 our part. All our communications manifest our con- 
 fidence in its sincerity ('loyaute'), and our deference 
 for the initiative being taken by it; and if, in the en- 
 thusiastic manifestations of the devotion of the army, 
 words have possibly been inserted which have seemed 
 in England to be characterized by a different sentiment, 
 they are too much opposed to the language which the 
 Emperor's Government has not ceased to hold that of 
 Her Britannic Majesty, for it to be possible to attribute 
 them to anything else than inadvertence, caused by the 
 number of those addresses. The Emperor enjoins you 
 to say to Lord Clarendon how much he regrets it. 
 
 "I authorize you to give a copy of this dispatch to 
 the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs." 
 (Parliamentary Papers, 1857-8, vol. 60, p. 127 [2317]). 
 In other instances, an apology is incorporated in a 
 treaty: Great Britain, in Article I of the Treaty of 
 Washington (May 8, 1871), agreeing to submit the 
 Alabama claims to arbitration, expressed her regret 
 "for the escape, under whatever circumstances, of the 
 Alabama and other vessels from British ports and for 
 
 state of the world ten years after 1848 that even this must be 
 felt as a great victory." 
 
 To Pasquale Villari, March 9, 1858, he writes in similar 
 vein, and says the Palmerston Ministry was overthrown be- 
 cause of its attempt to drag the nation in the mud and make 
 it a branch of the French police (Ibid, vol. I, p. 202-3).
 
 26 INTERPOSITION 
 
 the depredations committed by those vessels." This 
 expression of regret is very remarkable for the clear- 
 ness with which it is stated, and since this apology and 
 agreement to arbitrate avoided a serious conflict with 
 the United States, it is most honorable to Great 
 Britain. 
 
 The general recognition of the obligation to apolo- 
 gize for any affront to a foreign state or its represen- 
 tatives is illustrated by the following extract from the 
 report of an incident from Wadowice, Galicia, in the 
 Westminster Gazette, February 19, 1908 : 
 
 * * Judgment was pronounced to-day in the trial, which 
 began in the District Court here yesterday, of Wanda 
 Dobrodzicka, a young Russian woman charged with 
 having thrown a bomb at General Skallon, Governor- 
 General of Warsaw, on May 18th, 1906. 
 
 "The indictment set forth the existence of a very 
 skilfully devised plot to kill the Governor-General. As 
 he very seldom left the castle it was necessary to do 
 something to compel him to come out. Accordingly 
 one of the conspirators, in the uniform of a Eussian 
 officer, grossly insulted the German Vice-Consul. It 
 became necessary, therefore, for the Governor-General 
 to pay a personal visit to the Vice-Consul to express 
 his regret, officially, at such an occurrence. This was 
 exactly what the conspirators had reckoned upon, and 
 they laid their plans accordingly. Wanda Dobrodzicka, 
 who was only twenty years of age, was, it was alleged, 
 entrusted with the task of killing the Governor. Ac- 
 cording to the prosecution, she took up her position on 
 a balcony which he would pass, and when his carriage 
 came she hurled a bomb at it. The bomb, however, 
 failed to explode." (Oppenheim: International Inci- 
 dents, p. 43-4). 
 
 An apology freely offered in recognition of a wrong
 
 EXPIATION 27 
 
 which is regretted does honor to him who makes it, no 
 less than to him who receives the amend. 
 
 SALUTE OF THE FLAG 
 
 Another form of honorable amend is the salute of 
 the national flag. From an official source, we take the 
 following extract from a letter of July 21, 1866, ad- 
 dressed by the commander of the U. S. S. Nipsic to the 
 Brazilian Vice-President in the port of Bahia where 
 the seizure of the Florida had unjustifiably been made 
 in violation of Brazilian sovereignty and neutrality : 
 
 "Sir; The undersigned, commanding the steamer 
 Nipsic, has the honor to inform your excellency of his 
 arrival in this port, and to make known to your excel- 
 lency that the principal object of the visit of the un- 
 dersigned at this time is to carry out the instruction 
 of the government of the United States to fire a salute 
 of twenty-one (21) guns to the flag of Brazil, and thus 
 to make the 'amende honorable' for an offense com- 
 mitted by a United States officer, which was at once 
 disavowed by the government of the United States. 
 
 "Ever prompt to do justice, the government of the 
 undersigned, so long ago as October 28, 1865, issued the 
 above instructions, but which, from some irregularity, 
 were sent to Valparaiso, and were only received by the 
 commander-in-chief of the United States squadron on 
 this station on the arrival of the late mail. 
 
 * ' Therefore, if it be agreeable to your excellency, the 
 undersigned will hoist the Brazilian flag at the fore- 
 mast-head of this vessel, and fire a salute of twenty-one 
 guns, at noon to-morrow, the 23rd instant. 
 
 ' l The undersigned, in executing this duty, begs leave 
 to express to your excellency the undersigned's sincere 
 hope, that with the dying echoes of the last gun will 
 also expire any unkind feelings that may exist in Bra-
 
 28 INTERPOSITION 
 
 zil from the cause which has given rise to this cere- 
 monial. ' ' 
 In his answer of the same date, the President of the 
 
 Province said : ' * and believing in the sentiments 
 
 which Mr. Francis B. Blake manifests, I have only to 
 assure him that the offended honor of the country hav- 
 ing been thus satisfied, not a vestige of resentment can 
 remain against a government which, in so solemn a 
 manner, proclaims to the civilized world that it does 
 not measure the right of the offended to a satisfaction 
 by his power to exact it, but, on the contrary, highly ap- 
 preciates the just rights of a people which has so well 
 known how to value the close bonds of friendship and 
 consideration which have hitherto attached, and will 
 continue to attach still more, two nations which in- 
 habit the same continent." (Diplomatic Correspond- 
 ence, 1866, Part II, p. 317-8; cf. also Moore's Digest, 
 vol. VII, p. 1090-1). 27 
 
 EXPIATORY MISSIONS AND MONUMENTS 
 
 An interesting incident occurred in the reign of 
 Queen Anne. In reparation for the arrest of M. Mat- 
 tueof, Peter the Great's Ambassador, it was found dif- 
 ficult to inflict upon the culprits any adequate punish- 
 ment. 
 
 The laws were acknowledged to be inadequate to the 
 situation. Another method was hit upon, therefore, 
 for affording Russia that undoubted satisfaction which 
 for many months she had been so persistently demand- 
 ing. In the six weeks' jubilee following the Tsar's 
 return from his victorious campaign against Charles 
 
 27 Another interesting incident illustrating the procedure in 
 such cases is afforded by the Magee Incident between Great 
 Britain and Guatemala. 
 
 See E. C. Stowell: The Magee Incident, John Byrne and 
 Co., Washington, 1920.
 
 EXPIATION 29 
 
 XII, Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Russian Court, 
 specially invested for this single mission with extraor- 
 dinary and plenipotentiary powers, apologized in 
 open audience in the Queen's name to Peter the Great. 
 Even his words of address were significant. "Most 
 High and Most Potent Emperor ! " he began ; and con- 
 tinuing after a brief rehearsal of the case, he testified 
 to "the sorrow and the just and high abhorrence" 
 which the Queen had for "that rash deed" against the 
 Russian Ambassador. He begged excuse for the defect 
 and insufficiency of the ancient British Constitution, 
 most instantly desiring that, "entirely putting the same 
 in oblivion," His Tsarish Majesty might "again gen- 
 erously continue" his high affection to the Queen and 
 her subjects. 
 
 At the conclusion of this address, which was spoken 
 in English, translations in German and Russian were 
 read in a loud voice. The Ambassador then placed 
 in the Emperor's hands an autograph letter from the 
 Queen, which the Emperor entrusted to his Grand 
 Chancellor before making a brief speech of acknowl- 
 edgment. 
 
 It was on February 9, 1710, at a conference of the 
 Emperor's ministers presided over by this same Grand 
 Chancellor, that suitable conclusions to the whole mat- 
 ter were formulated. It was arranged that M. Mat- 
 tueof, then Ambassador at The Hague, should advise 
 Queen Anne of what had taken place at the Russian 
 Court and of the gracious clemency of the Tsar and of 
 his desire that Her Majesty would pardon the offend- 
 ers. It was requested, however, that Her Majesty her- 
 self write an appropriate letter to M. Mattueof, upon 
 receipt of which so the arrangement ran M. Mat- 
 tueof would in due form ask for his letters of recall, 
 which he had not obtained in his haste to leave England 
 some eighteen months before. The ambassador, fur-
 
 30 INTERPOSITION 
 
 ther, was to be reimbursed for all the costs and dam- 
 ages which he had been ' * obliged to be at, and to suffer, 
 on account of the said affront. ' ' And finally, when all 
 these preliminaries had been effected, it was agreed 
 that Peter the Great should acquaint the Queen that he 
 was ' ' content with the f oresaid satisfaction. ' ' ( This ac- 
 count of the Mattueof incident is taken textually from 
 Stowell and Munro: International Cases, vol. I, p. 
 6-7). 
 
 After the repression of the Boxer uprising, article I 
 of the conditions contained in the joint note of Decem- 
 ber 22, 1900, signed by the representatives of the eleven 
 intervening powers, provided for the dispatch of an 
 extraordinary mission to Berlin to express regret for 
 the murder of Baron von Ketteler, the German Minis- 
 ter, and further required the " erection on the place 
 where the murder was committed of a commemorative 
 monument suitable to the rank of the deceased, bearing 
 an inscription in the Latin, German, and Chinese lan- 
 guages, expressing the regrets of the Emperor of China 
 for the murder." And article IV exacted that expia- 
 tory monuments be erected "in each of the foreign or 
 international cemeteries which had been desecrated." 
 (Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 244; Stowell and Munro: 
 Cases, vol. I, p. 114.) 
 
 In a note of November 7, 1906, Secretary Koot pro- 
 posed to the Persian Government in regard to the ex- 
 piation for the murder of one Mr. Laboree: "In like 
 cases, which have occurred elsewhere within recent 
 years, notably in the Chinese Empire, a practical solu- 
 tion of the problem has been found and one which may 
 be followed with singular appropriateness in the pres- 
 ent case. It is that the money penalty exacted in pun- 
 ishment of the crime shall be devoted to the erection of 
 a permanent memorial structure, such as a hospital or 
 school, to stand as a monument in reprobation of the
 
 EXPIATION 31 
 
 crime and as a beneficent augury of a better state of 
 things to come. Such a memorial building erected in 
 the neighborhood of the murder, with an appropriate 
 inscription, would serve as a lasting lesson in favor of 
 law and order, besides doing a work of good among 
 the Persian people." (Foreign Relations, 1907, Part 
 II, p. 943-4.) It does not appear that this humane sug- 
 gestion was adopted. 
 
 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 
 
 Rehabilitation may be secured by the exaction of 
 money damages made sufficiently large to indicate the 
 penalizing nature of the payment. Such a payment is 
 comparable to wergild, which in the historical develop- 
 ment of municipal law was at first an alternative for 
 revenge, but later became an enforced substitute. In 
 the case of injury resulting from loss of prestige, it is 
 impossible to render an exact estimate in money. But 
 since the injury is psychological, and the expiation 
 need only be of such a nature as to satisfy public opin- 
 ion, exemplary money damages suffice in many instan- 
 ces. There seems to exist a subconscious realization 
 of the advantage of this form of expiation, which main- 
 tains peace, and perhaps this influences the community 
 to encourage the pecuniary composition of offences. A 
 similar evolution may be noted in regard to that sur- 
 vival of private warfare the duel. The necessity of 
 protecting the peace of society from interruptions by 
 private vengeance has led the United States and Eng- 
 land, where a sense of social obligation is highly devel- 
 oped, to enforce the prohibition against dueling, and 
 to countenance suits for civil damages for certain of- 
 fences such as the alienation of a wife 's affections. In 
 such instances, private revenge has taken the form of 
 pecuniary claims presented before the tribunals. The 
 same evolution in international relations may have the
 
 32 INTERPOSITION 
 
 effect of replacing forcible measures to redress insults 
 to honor by demands for exemplary damages, the 
 amount of which might be submitted to arbitration. It 
 cannot be said that we have gone very far on this road, 
 but the advantage of the maintenance of peaceful rela- 
 tions which would result from the establishment of 
 such a procedure would be very great, and as the re- 
 dress to the country's honor is psychological, as has 
 been noted above, money damages could be made to 
 take the place of peremptory demands for salutes or 
 other direct acknowledgments of a fault. When the 
 award resulting from the investigation or arbitration 
 was not made immediately and paid forthwith and con- 
 sidered as a debt of honor, there would be the highest 
 possible justification for immediate recourse to force, 
 and the state so employing force would have behind 
 it the enlightened public opinion of the whole world. 
 The continuation of the same process which led in mu- 
 nicipal law to the adoption of wergild in place of pri- 
 vate revenge should be encouraged in relations be- 
 tween nations. 28 
 
 Certain states which hold their honor lightly may be 
 
 28 Certain affronts to honor are hard to express in terms of 
 money damages, and in France and Germany it has been custo- 
 mary to settle such matters by duels. But in Anglo-Saxon 
 countries the duel has almost entirely disappeared. French 
 and Germans have been wont to view with contempt what they 
 consider the securing of money damages for injury to a man 's 
 personal honor. They have not taken sufficiently into account 
 that the real punishment lies in the condemnation of society. 
 The newspaper publicity given the trial enhances the punish- 
 ment for any such offense, and a verdict for money damages 
 gives the official seal of the judiciary as proof of the wrong 
 done. But in the case of a duel, the dormant barbaric instincts 
 of mankind are so aroused by the associations gathering about 
 a personal combat, that the dishonorable and sometimes de- 
 graded offense is forgotten and is covered over by the romance 
 and glamor of the social respectability of a duel.
 
 EXPIATION 33 
 
 more chastened by the exaction of exemplary pecuni- 
 ary damages than by an abasement, however abject. 
 
 It will depend upon circumstances whether a mere 
 apology may be considered efficacious to prevent a rep- 
 etition of an offense. 
 
 When Great Britain, in 1874, insisted that Guatemala 
 must pay damages for the assault upon the British Vice 
 Consul at San Jose, the Guatemalan Minister for For- 
 eign Affairs, in his note of August 31, replied: 
 
 "I regret to have to insist in denying the force of 
 this argument of Lord Derby. My government cannot 
 understand that the injury done by Gonzales to Magee 
 is understood as done to the British nation; and, in 
 granting that it is so, it is surprised to see that your 
 government desires that the honor and dignity of Eng- 
 land should be indemnified with money. The question 
 of honor and satisfaction is arranged by the salute to 
 the British flag, stipulated for in Article II of the pro- 
 tocol, as is customary between civilized nations. The 
 honor of these and of their governments cannot be in- 
 demnified by money, whatever the sum may be that is 
 offered. National offenses have no price. 
 
 "My government, whilst it further considers this 
 point, insists that it owes to yours no indemnity, and 
 with this view, trusts that you will transmit to the 
 proper department the observations contained in this 
 dispatch, in order that, in conformity with the stipu- 
 lations of the protocol, the negotiations on this point 
 may be opened in a formal manner." 29 
 
 But when the British representative presented an 
 
 ^Parliamentary papers, 1875, vol. 82 ; also, E. C. Stowell : 
 The Magee Incident, John Byrne and Co., Washington, 1920. 
 
 Compare the incident of 1895 between Great Britain and 
 
 Nicaragua, when a peremptory demand for an indemnity for 
 
 treatment of British subjects was enforced by the occupation 
 
 of Corinto. (Foreign Relations, 1895, Part II, p. 1025-1034.) 
 
 3
 
 34 INTERPOSITION 
 
 ultimatum demanding an immediate payment, Guate- 
 mala complied. 
 
 The inadequacy of an apology which is merely per- 
 functory is illustrated by the incident which oc- 
 curred at Lagos, August 18, 1759. British warships 
 violated Portuguese neutrality near the fortress of 
 Lagos, in Algarve, by destroying and capturing the 
 French Squadron which had taken refuge there. The 
 British Government expressed regrets and indicated a 
 willingness to send a special expiatory mission, but 
 refused to punish Admiral Boscawen and resented the 
 intimations of Portugal that the two captured ships 
 should be restored. (Moore's Arbitrations, vol. II, p. 
 1126-1130.) 
 
 DISAVOWAL 
 
 Since governments do not act directly, but always 
 through the agency of officials, it sometimes happens 
 that the latter exceed their instructions, in which event 
 their government may avoid a certain measure of re- 
 sponsibility by disavowing their acts and by inflict- 
 ing an appropriate punishment. The apprehensions 
 and even cowardice of governments sometimes lead 
 them to take advantage of this facility to extricate 
 themselves from embarrassing situations, without a 
 very nice regard for the justice of their action towards 
 an officer who has attempted to fulfil their wishes, but 
 in recent times officials are becoming very careful to 
 confine their acts strictly within the limits of their in- 
 structions, so that the responsibility devolves upon 
 their government. The consequence is that a disa- 
 vowal becomes much more humiliating to a govern- 
 ment. Nevertheless, it is sometimes indicated as the 
 only escape from disaster. 
 
 In the preceding pages we have already referred to 
 several instances in which the acts of officials were
 
 INDEMNITY 35 
 
 disavowed by their governments: namely in the case 
 of the Florida's violation of Brazilian neutrality and in 
 the matter of the offensive statements which had ap- 
 peared in the Moniteur. 
 
 4. INDEMNITY 
 
 When the unjustifiable act of a state or the nationals 
 for which it is responsible has injured the material 
 interest of another state, international justice and 
 the maintenance of international peace require that 
 the loss should be made good. The amount recovered 
 for this purpose is generally called an indemnity. 30 
 
 Indemnity covers reparation: that is, the replacing 
 of the injured state in the situation in which it stood 
 before, as when by the articles of Part VIII of the 
 Treaty of Versailles, Germany was required, in as far 
 as her resources would allow, to make provision for the 
 payment of the cost of repelling the unjustifiable at- 
 tack, including the war losses of the residents of the 
 territory unjustly invaded. 
 
 "Compensation" means the making good! of the 
 other losses which are not covered by restitution and 
 the restoration of the property to its condition before 
 the war. Such other losses would include that result- 
 ing from the deprivation of the use of the property, 
 and the cessation of profit. 30a 
 
 In how far the payment of indirect damages result- 
 ing from an international offence may be placed upon 
 
 30 Indemnity is also used to designate the incidental expenses 
 incurred by a state when it is necessary to employ force for 
 defense or for the vindication of its rights. Used in this sense, 
 indemnity corresponds in international relations to the costs 
 awarded in suits at law. 
 
 308 In the Delagoa Railway arbitration this question was 
 discussed. See Stowell and Munro : International Cases, vol. 
 I, p. 347 passim.
 
 36 INTERPOSITION 
 
 the state that has caused the loss is a matter upon 
 which no agreement has been reached. 
 
 In a controversy which is not pushed to the ultimate 
 decision of force, the compromise solution which gen- 
 erally settles it does not ordinarily give much consider- 
 ation to the more indirect or remote consequences of 
 the injurious act. This is equally true when the matter 
 is referred to arbitration, for the arbitrators are bound 
 reasonably to interpret and follow the delegation of 
 authority with which the arbitrating governments cove- 
 nanted to clothe them. 
 
 Thus in the matter of the Alabama claims, the Ameri- 
 can claims for indirect losses were not allowed. 31 But 
 if war, instead of arbitration, had settled the contro- 
 versy, there would have been no legal objection to the 
 collection of the indirect losses, provided that the re- 
 sult of the recourse to arms had been sufficiently favor- 
 able to the United States. 32 In principle, however, the 
 innocent state that has suffered injury through the 
 fault of another has a right to be saved whole from the 
 harmful consequences of that fault. 33 
 
 5. SECURITY 
 
 Redress would be indeed incomplete if there were no 
 guarantee against the repetition of the offense which 
 caused the unjustifiable injury. It is of importance to 
 the injured state, and to the society of states, that such 
 
 31 Cf. Moore's Arbitrations, vol. I, p. 624-646. The action 
 of the arbitration tribunal must be considered as a precedent 
 against the award of indirect damages. 
 
 32 For a discussion of indemnity, see Borchard : Diplomatic 
 Protection, 175, 176, 177, p. 416, 419. 
 
 83 Article 1382 of the French Civil Code declares: "Any 
 act by which a person causes damages to another binds the per- 
 son by whose fault the damage occurred to repair such dam- 
 age." (Quoted from E. Blackwood Wright: The French 
 Civil Code, London, 1908, p. 256.)
 
 PUNISHMENT 37 
 
 reasonable conditions be exacted as will provide securi- 
 ty against the commission of another similar of- 
 fense. 34 
 
 "For," as Vattel truly says, "a state which has re- 
 ceived an injury has the right to provide for its future 
 security by depriving the offender of the means of do- 
 ing harm." (Bk. Ill, ch. Ill, 45, Carnegie Transla- 
 tion, p. 250.) 
 
 In fixing the terms, the avarice and apprehensions of 
 the victor are balanced by compassion and the fear of 
 the intervention of other powers to preserve a healthy 
 disposition of power. 
 
 6. PUNISHMENT 
 
 Among the purposes comprehended in the recourse 
 to measures of force is punishment. The principal ob- 
 
 34 In a letter of October 29, 1870, John Stuart Mill wrote 
 a French correspondent that, in spite of the great sympathy in 
 Great Britain for the misfortunes of France, and the desire 
 that she might come out of them as favorably as the circum- 
 stances would allow : ' ' here it is felt that France owes a large 
 reparation to Germany for the great sacrifices of her most 
 precious blood which an unjust aggression have imposed upon 
 her." (Translated from Mill's Letters, vol. II, p. 275.) 
 
 In a letter of the previous month (September 30), to Sir 
 Charles Dilke, he condemned the French for "one of the 
 wickedest acts of aggression in history," and considered that 
 the Germans had "a, just claim to as complete a security as 
 any practicable arrangement can give against the repetition of 
 a similar crime," and although he expressed repugnance "to 
 the transfer of a population from one government to another, 
 unless by its own express desire," he wished he could settle 
 the terms of peace so that "the disputed territory [Alsace and 
 Lorraine] should be made into an independent self-governing 
 State, with power to annex itself after a long period (say 
 fifty years) either to France or to Germany; a guarantee for 
 that term of years by the neutral powers (which removes in 
 some measure the objection to indefinite guarantees), or, if 
 that could not be obtained, the fortresses being meanwhile gar- 
 risoned by German troops." (Letters of John Stuart Mill, 
 1910, vol. II : p. 274.)
 
 38 INTERPOSITION 
 
 ject of punishment is to protect the community by de- 
 terring the culprit and all others from similar offenses. 
 In a more primitive condition of society, crimes are 
 avenged or punished by the victim or his relatives, and 
 the fear of retaliation or the blood-feud acts as a pro- 
 tection to the community against the prevalence of 
 crime. As society developed, the continuation of these 
 feuds became so disturbing to the peace of the com- 
 munity that it was found necessary to subject the pro- 
 cedure to be followed in avenging them to a careful 
 regulation. In the course of time, private revenge has 
 been almost entirely done away with, and the modern 
 state punishes, as we have said, for the security of so- 
 ciety. Although the first aim is to protect the com- 
 munity from the repetition of the offense, the refor- 
 mation of the criminal himself has recently become one 
 of the principal concerns of our system of penal legis- 
 lation and administration. 35 
 
 The lack of any well defined international organiza- 
 tion leaves to the separate member states the punish- 
 ment of international transgressions. This system of 
 self -enforcement of the law is, as was said above, some- 
 times called self-help. When a state exacts redress for 
 
 35 " Where formerly only the accomplished deed was con- 
 sidered, the purpose of punishment is now taken into account. 
 Such purpose is not to inflict a punishment for what has been 
 done, as if in satisfaction of a sentiment of individual or col- 
 lective vengeance, but to bring about a certain result. The 
 Germans call this aspect of punishment (in contrast to the 
 ' Vergeltungsstraf e, ' which in the classic view was a punish- 
 ment by way of compensation or retribution) the 'Zweck- 
 strafe,' which we can hardly render more closely than by the 
 phrase, ' punishment for a purpose. ' Yet the term does scant 
 justice to the important movement inspired by Ihering, and 
 to the significance therein attached to the conception of the 
 final purpose ('Zweck'), the consideration of which was to re- 
 animate the dead bones of the law." (Saleilles: The Indi- 
 vidualization of Punishment, [Translation] Boston, 1911, p. 
 8-9.)
 
 PUNISHMENT 39 
 
 the injury to its prestige or interests, it protects society 
 by making it certain to all who harbor evil designs that 
 the transgressor will be brought to book. 
 
 In a few instances, the states have united to punish 
 some extraordinary crime against their law. The best 
 example of this collective intervention for the purpose 
 of punishing the guilty state is that of China after the 
 Boxer outrages, when the combined forces of the 
 powers occupied Peking and addressed a joint note to 
 the Chinese government. In this note, dated Decem- 
 ber 22, 1900, and signed by the representatives of 
 eleven states, were set forth the conditions which must 
 be fulfilled before the occupation of Chinese territory 
 by the cooperating states would be terminated, con- 
 ditions "which," so the note ran, "they deem indis- 
 pensable to expiate the crimes committed and to pre- 
 vent their recurrence." (Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 
 244.) 
 
 PUNISHMENT OF LESS CIVILIZED NATIONS 
 In how far it is justifiable and expedient to employ 
 measures of unusual severity against nations that are 
 less mindful of their international obligations is one of 
 the most difficult problems of international law. Lord 
 Elgin has been very severely criticized for burning the 
 Summer Palace in retaliation upon China for her re- 
 fusal to carry out the treaties she had signed and her 
 treacherous treatment of the British negotiators. Lord 
 Elgin recognized the criticism which his act would 
 arouse, but considered that it was impossible in any 
 other way to bring home to the Chinese the superior 
 force at the command of the Europeans and their abili- 
 ty to command respect for their rights. A more re- 
 cent example of drastic action was the French bom- 
 bardment of Casablanca in 1907 in punishment for the 
 treatment of Europeans in that place.
 
 40 INTERPOSITION 
 
 In 1854, when the inhabitants of Greytown insulted 
 the American Minister, a warship was sent to demand 
 redress, and when this was not forthcoming, the naval 
 officer in command, acting on his own responsibility, 
 bombarded and burned down the town. Professor 
 John Bassett Moore gives the following account of 
 this latter incident: "Greytown, a community then 
 lying outside the acknowledged boundaries of Nica- 
 ragua, in what was known as the Mosquito Coast, main- 
 tained an independent existence under the authority 
 of the Mosquito King, who was understood to enjoy the 
 patronage of the British Government. As the result 
 of a controversy with Nicaragua concerning limits, 
 which involved the question of jurisdiction over Punta 
 Arenas, property belonging to the Accessory Transit 
 Company, an organization of American citizens hold- 
 ing a charter from Nicaragua, was on various occa- 
 sions seized or destroyed at that point by the Greytown 
 authorities, and for these acts damages were demand- 
 ed. There was, however, another complaint which was 
 supposed to affect the 'dignity' of the United States. 
 At that time the United States was represented in Cen- 
 tral America by a minister named Solon Borland, from 
 Arkansas, a man of spirit who had served in the Mexi- 
 can War. One day the Greytown authorities attempted 
 to arrest the captain of an Accessory Transit steamer, 
 then lying at Punta Arenas, when Mr. Borland hap- 
 pened to be aboard. The captain resisted, and in the 
 scrimmage that ensued, Mr. Borland seized a musket 
 and gave to the captain successful support. Great ex- 
 citement ensued at Greytown; and it was presently 
 fanned to a flame by the announcement that Mr. Bor- 
 land intended to call upon the resident United States 
 commercial agent in the evening. A suggestion from 
 the latter that this visit be considerately omitted, Mr. 
 Borland, his blood still up, scornfully rejected; and
 
 PUNISHMENT 41 
 
 while he was in the agent 's house, a violent commotion 
 in the street denoted the presence of a mob. Mr. Bor- 
 land, nothing daunted, promptly appeared in the gal- 
 lery and warned the tumultuous assemblage to dis- 
 perse. But his oratory was suddenly checked by a blow 
 in the face from a bottle, thrown by some one in the 
 crowd, who, after draining from the flask the last in- 
 spiring drop, used it as a missile. For the redress of 
 these accumulated grievances, Captain Hollins, of the 
 U. S. S. Cayane, was dispatched to Greytown. Lack- 
 ing specific instructions as to procedure, he made upon 
 the local community demands which it was either un- 
 willing, or unable, or without adequate opportunity to 
 meet, and, the time limit having expired, first bombard- 
 ed and then burned the town, utterly destroying it. 
 This somewhat fierce and drastic punitive measure 
 created a sensation throughout the civilized world. I 
 have in my collections a pamphlet on the case, pub- 
 lished in France, on the cover of which is an arm up- 
 lifted in vengeance and bearing an incendiary torch." 
 (Political Science Quarterly, 1915, vol. XXX, p. 390-2, 
 quoted in Stowell and Munro : International Cases, vol. 
 I, p. 119-121.) 
 
 In view of the many instances in which bombard- 
 ment and drastic measures have been employed, it is 
 hard to deny that there is a presumption of legality in 
 their favor. Nevertheless, such brutality seems to be 
 in conflict with the humanitarian principles which gov- 
 ern all nations in their relations with one another. A 
 French work on the law of nations expressed the opin- 
 ion that it will rarely be found that a nation capable of 
 profiting from such lessons will incur the risk of receiv- 
 ing them. (See Funk-Brentano et Sorel: Droit des 
 Gens, p. 229-230.) 
 
 When the territorial sovereign is too weak or is un- 
 willing to enforce respect for international law, a state
 
 42 INTERPOSITION 
 
 which is wronged may find it necessary to invade the 
 territory and to chastise the individuals who violate its 
 rights and threaten its security. Our relations with 
 Mexico afford many instances of such expeditions, gen- 
 erally spoken of as punitive expeditions. 
 
 Whenever it is possible to inflict directly upon the in- 
 dividuals who are responsible the punishment they de- 
 serve for the violation of international law, the ends 
 of justice will be better served. When an entire people 
 is made to suffer for some delinquency for which it is 
 indirectly responsible through the action of its officials, 
 a deep feeling of resentment may be engendered, while 
 the very individuals who are responsible may escape 
 the penalty calculated to restrain others from a like of- 
 fense. Ordinarily, of course, the government respon- 
 sible will be expected to punish the officials guilty of 
 the violation, and when it is too weak to undertake this 
 task, the injured government may, as has been said 
 above, cooperate by having recourse to measures of 
 self-help. There are many such instances of punitive 
 expeditions to punish guilty individuals. 36 
 
 When the offenders are officials of the government or 
 when a government assumes the responsibility for the 
 offenses by preventing punishment, the punitive ex- 
 pedition must be directed against the governmental 
 authorities. An interesting case occurred in Central 
 
 36 An account of the instances in which the United States has 
 considered it necessary to punish less civilized communities for 
 outrages against American citizens will be found in the mem- 
 oranda prepared by Solicitor J. R. Clark of the Department of 
 State, October 5, 1912, entitled, "Right to Protect Citizens in 
 Foreign Countries by Landing Forces." The incident of the 
 Falkland Islands in 1831 (see above 1, and Moore's Digest, 
 vol. V, p. 878 f.) affords an excellent example of a just retri- 
 bution which was inflicted with the most scrupulous regard 
 to the rights of the government claiming to be sovereign. The 
 firmness and moderation with which the culprits were pun- 
 ished deserves commendation.
 
 PUNISHMENT 43 
 
 America. President Zelaya of Nicaragua summarily 
 executed, December 17, 1909, two Americans, Groce and 
 Cannon, who had participated in a revolt against his 
 authority. 
 
 Partly in consequence of this rash and lawless act, 
 Secretary Knox, in a note dated December 1, informed 
 the representative of Nicaragua that ' ' the President no 
 longer feels for the Government of President Zelaya 
 that respect and confidence which would make it ap- 
 propriate hereafter to maintain with it regular diplo- 
 matic relations, implying the will and the ability to re- 
 spect and assure what is due from one state to an- 
 other. ' ' And the representative was informed that his 
 passport was enclosed, for use in case he desired to 
 leave the country (Foreign Eelations, 1909, p. 456, 
 passim.) 
 
 Thereafter Zelaya 's position in Nicaragua became 
 untenable, and he was forced to flee to Europe. 
 
 Still more recently, after the Villa raid on Columbus, 
 President Wilson ordered a punitive expedition into 
 Mexican territory to capture the bandit. Upon the pro- 
 test of Mexico the expedition was withdrawn. (See J. 
 B. Moore: Principles of American Diplomacy, p. 227 
 
 f.) 
 
 The principle of personal responsibility is recog- 
 nized by the stipulations of the Versailles Peace Treaty 
 of June 28, 1919, which makes provision for the trial of 
 ex-Emperor William and other German officials ac- 
 cused of responsibility in undertaking the war and of 
 violations of international law in the course of the con- 
 duct of military operations (Articles 227-230). 
 
 RESTRAINING INFLUENCE OF PUNISHMENT 
 The restraining influence which any punishment 
 will have upon the offender and upon others is one of 
 those psychological factors which defy analysis and, in
 
 44 INTERPOSITION 
 
 the absence of an international code, there is no meas- 
 ure of the degree of punishment which is reasonable to 
 effect the object in view. Whenever public opinion is 
 aroused over some flagrant transgression, the popular 
 demand for revenge or satisfaction influences respon- 
 sible statesmen to seek a punishment in excess of that 
 which would be necessary to prevent a repetition of the 
 offense. Because of this lack of regulation in inter- 
 national affairs, the Law of the Talion, or retaliation, 
 is widely applied. The fear of redress or reprisals is 
 ever present to those who conduct international affairs, 
 although it is difficult to estimate the importance of 
 this influence in any particular instance. But as this 
 relates more to means and methods we cannot discuss 
 it here. 
 
 In international, as in national affairs, there are cer- 
 tain minor offenses for which it is difficult to impose a 
 sufficiently severe restraining punishment without mak- 
 ing the penalty out of all proportion to the offense. In 
 such cases, it is essential to take action by way of an- 
 ticipation to prevent the commission of the injury, or 
 quickly to compel the offender to desist. Action taken 
 for such a purpose is more in the nature of police ad- 
 ministration or international police patrol.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 1 
 
 7. COUNTER-INTERVENTION 2 
 
 In every community whose conduct is in any measure 
 controlled by law and in the absence of law there can 
 be no community provision must be made for the 
 effective enforcement of the law. Before the estab- 
 lishment of a special constabulary entrusted with its 
 enforcement, we usually find that every member is 
 expected himself to seek redress for the injuries which 
 he may have received. Sympathy of public opinion is 
 the most that he is entitled to expect from those not im- 
 mediately concerned, except when some outrageous 
 crime arouses the whole community to action. But 
 even in matters of less serious import, the collective 
 action of the community makes itself felt in the insist- 
 
 ir The meaning of "international police" is more fully con- 
 sidered below, 9. Here we need only note that it is used in 
 the sense of justifiable action to enforce a compliance with the 
 provisions of international law. 
 
 2< ' Interposition " is more generally in use than "counter- 
 intervention, ' ' but since ' ' interposition ' ' has lately been adopt- 
 ed as the term to cover action of a government undertaken in 
 defense of the rights of nationals, it will be preferable to avoid 
 confusion by employing "counter-intervention." Whenever 
 a state justly intervenes to oppose an unjustifiable interfer- 
 ence, "intermeddling" may be used to designate unjustifiable 
 interference, which is an attempt to prevent other states 
 from settling their own affairs in their own way. Hall 
 uses " counter-interf erence " (Hall: International Law, 4 ed., 
 93, p. 306). Creasy uses "counter-intervention" (Creasy: 
 First Platform, p. 306; cf.'Rougier: Guerres Civiles, 80, 
 p. 338). 
 
 45
 
 46 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 ence that the parties shall observe the recognized forms 
 of procedure. Such a system of procedure for the en- 
 forcement of law is certainly expeditious and inex- 
 pensive for the community, but it is apt to leave insuf- 
 ficiently protected matters of general concern, especial- 
 ly in those instances when no one state is sufficiently 
 interested to undertake alone the burden of the en- 
 forcement of the law. A still more serious defect of 
 this system is that it leaves the weak without the means 
 to bring the strong transgressor to justice. 
 
 In the society of nations there still exists, as we have 
 seen, no organized constabulary, and each nation is 
 expected to take what action it may find justifiable and 
 expedient to secure redress for whatever injury an- 
 other may have done it. Under present conditions, this 
 procedure has many advantages, and in any event it is 
 the only method practicable until the sovereign states 
 shall be ready to give up a larger measure of the free- 
 dom of their action, and establish a more perfect or- 
 ganization. 
 
 In the meantime, international law must depend 
 mainly upon interposition, that is, the action of the 
 separate states to secure redress for their own injuries. 
 Whenever a separate state acts for this purpose, it will 
 also vindicate international law, and help to secure for 
 it the respect it deserves. In practice this system is 
 found to work very well. The explanation is simple- 
 each one of the really independent states has been able 
 to maintain this proud position only by the fact of its 
 ability to interpose effectively to secure redress when- 
 ever any of its international rights were injured. In 
 the case of an independent state too weak itself to inter- 
 pose for the redress of its own injuries, there must 
 have been some powerful and friendly state so inter- 
 ested in the maintenance of the weaker state 's nominal 
 independence as to be ready to cooperate with the lat-
 
 COUNTER-INTERVENTION 4? 
 
 ter to help it secure redress. In those other instances 
 of general concern when no state is sufficiently inter- 
 ested to undertake an intervention for the purpose of 
 vindicating international law, or when a friendless in- 
 jured state is so conspicuously inferior in strength as 
 to make such action impossible, international law rec- 
 ognizes the right and the obligation of all the other 
 states to cooperate to vindicate the law of nations. 3 
 This principle is, however, not so generally recognized 
 as it should be. There are not a few writers of first 
 authority who deny it altogether.* The confusion 
 
 3 " Third states," writes Westlake, "may therefore step in, 
 in support of justice or of their interests so far as consonant 
 with justice." (International Law, vol. I, p. 320; cf, ibid, 
 p. 317.) 
 
 Hall expresses the same opinion: "When a state grossly 
 and patently violates international law in a matter of serious 
 importance, it is competent to any state, or to the body of 
 states, to hinder the wrongdoing from being accomplished, or 
 to punish the wrongdoer. Liberty of action exists only within 
 the law. The right to it cannot protect states committing in- 
 fractions of law, except to the extent of providing that they 
 shall not be subjected to interference in excess of the measure 
 of the offence; infractions may be such as to justify remon- 
 strance only, and in such cases to do more than remonstrate 
 is to violate the right of independence. Whatever may be 
 the action appropriate to the case, it is open to every state to 
 take it. International law being unprovided with the sup- 
 port of an organized authority, the work of police must be 
 done by such members of the community of nations as are able 
 to perform it." (Hall: International Law, 4 ed., 1895, 12, 
 p. 57-8 ; cf . Oppenheim : International Law, 2 ed., vol. I, 9, 
 p. 13; Lorimer: Institutes of the Law of Nations, vol. I, p. 
 10 ; Lawrence : Principles, 4 ed., 1910, 64, p. 127 ; Sheldon 
 Amos : Political and Legal Remedies for War, p. 187-8 ; Vat- 
 tel : The Law of Nations, Introduction, 22, Carnegie Trans- 
 lation, p. 8; ibid. II, ch. I, 4, p. 114) ; Stapleton: Interven- 
 tion, p. 125 ; Rossi (Archives de droit et legislation, 1837, vol. 
 I, p. 372.) 
 
 4 Woolsey, discussing " whether a state is bound to aid 
 
 other states in the maintenance of general justice," although 
 he himself recognizes the obligation of cooperation, writes:
 
 48 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 arises principally, I believe, from the failure to remem- 
 ber that the recognition of the obligation to intervene 
 for the vindication of international law still allows 
 every independent state to exercise its sovereign right 
 of decision as to when and how its obligation shall 
 be fulfilled. In international relations, it is not possible 
 to place upon independent states the same requirement 
 to help in the enforcement of law as we recognize to rest 
 upon each citizen in municipal law. 5 In our national or 
 municipal law, every citizen is expected to respond to 
 the summons of the sheriff and risk his life in helping 
 to enforce the law. But he has behind him for his pro- 
 tection an organized force able to avenge him if in- 
 jured, and to punish him if he refuses to comply. Fur- 
 
 "The prevalent view seems to have been that, outside of its 
 own territory, including its ships on the high seas, and beyond 
 its own relations with other states, a state has nothing to do 
 with the interests of justice in the world. Thus laws of ex- 
 tradition and private international law are thought to origi- 
 nate merely in comity. Thus, too, crimes committed by its 
 own citizens abroad it is not bound to notice after their return 
 home. Thus, again, contrabrand trade is held not to begin 
 within the neutral's borders, and outside of them, as on the 
 high seas, concerns the belligerent alone. And again, when 
 a nation commits a gross crime against another, third parties 
 are not generally held to be bound to interfere. This is the 
 most received, and may be called the narrow and selfish view." 
 (Woolsey: International Law, 20-b, 5th ed., 1878, and later 
 editions. It is interesting to observe how in his first edition, 
 1860, Woolsey had not yet reached so firm a conviction as to 
 the obligation to intervene in support of international law. ) 
 
 6 In the continuation of the extract from Hall which we have 
 given in a preceding note, that author states : ' ' It is however 
 for them [the intervening states] to choose whether they will 
 perform it or not. The risks and the sacrifices of war with 
 an offending state, the chances of giving umbrage to other 
 states in the course of doing what is necessary to vindicate the 
 law, and the remoter dangers that may spring from the ill- 
 will produced even by remonstrance, exonerate countries in 
 all cases from the pressure of a duty. " (Hall: International 
 Law, 4 ed., 1895, 12, p. 58.)
 
 COUNTER-INTERVENTION 49 
 
 thermore, the life of one individual is of small moment 
 in the community, provided the correct principles pre- 
 vail for the guidance of all men. For a nation, the con- 
 ditions are not comparable. The force on the side of 
 law may temporarily be less than the might arrayed 
 against it, and there is no machinery to compel any 
 state to incur the burden of enforcing the law. Civiliza- 
 tion might not be best served if the states which had 
 reached the highest degree of development should light- 
 ly risk the fruits of their culture whenever their com- 
 mon law was violated. 
 
 Even though the other states may be slow to inter- 
 vene with arms to vindicate the law of nations when 
 their national interests are not sufficiently involved, 
 the transgressor is sure to incur the efficacious penalty 
 of discrimination from other states. Of small effect in 
 each isolated instance, the sum total of all the discrimi- 
 nations of all the states will weigh heavily against the 
 transgressor. 
 
 Governments usually go as far in enforcing the law 
 as public opinion will support. It is therefore neces- 
 sary to educate the public, first, as to the nature of in- 
 ternational law, and, second, as to the obligation their 
 state is under to make greater sacrifices to insure its 
 enforcement. Under present conditions the obligation 
 to intervene for the vindication of the law cannot be 
 made absolute, but must be left to the discretion of 
 each state. Reasonable action by way of remonstrance 
 and discrimination will generally be taken in support 
 of the innocent, as opposed to the transgressor. Oc- 
 casionally a government will go further and intervene 
 by force of arms for the vindication of the law. Such 
 intervention is legal. It is commendable, but it must be 
 confessed that it has generally been actuated by politi- 
 cal considerations. The enforcement of the law is, to 
 say the truth, never far removed from politics. Even
 
 50 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 in our local affairs we are careful to place the enforce- 
 ment of the law in the hands of political appointees or 
 of officials elected at the polls, and it would not be diffi- 
 cult to furnish a long list of instances where political 
 considerations have prevented the law from being en- 
 forced. 
 
 In international affairs, the enforcement of law 
 usually waits until some powerful state is sufficiently 
 interested to have it vindicated. But the interests of 
 the great states are now so widespread that it will 
 rarely happen that not one will be found to demand the 
 enforcement of the law; and in this way the motive 
 of self-interest has now become still more potent to 
 keep the actual system working in a manner reason- 
 ably satisfactory. 
 
 RESISTANCE TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAW 
 
 The recognition of the right to employ force to vindi- 
 cate the law carries with it necessarily a corresponding 
 obligation on the part of all the nations not to interfere 
 with the recognized and orderly procedure for the en- 
 forcement of the law. Consequently, any state that has 
 been guilty of a wilful violation of the law of nations 
 in its refusal to make adequate redress has no right 
 to resist such reasonable force as may be necessary to 
 vindicate the law and obtain redress. Although we 
 can hardly expect that a government which refuses to 
 recognize its transgression, and to make amends, will 
 refrain from offering such resistance as it may have 
 in its power, this principle of the illegality of resistance 
 to force lawfully employed for the vindication of inter- 
 national law is incontrovertible. 6 Vattel well says : 
 
 6< ' The right of protection over citizens abroad, which a state 
 holds, may cause an intervention by right to which the other 
 party is legally bound to submit. And it matters not whether 
 protection of the life, security, honor, or property of a citizen
 
 HUMANITAEIAN INTERVENTION 51 
 
 " Defensive war is just when it is carried on against 
 an unjust aggressor. That needs no proof. Self-de- 
 fense against an unjust attack is not only a right which 
 every nation has, but it is a duty, and one of its most 
 sacred duties. But if the enemy, in carrying on an 
 offensive war, has justice on his side, the nation has no 
 right to resist, and defensive war is then unjust. For 
 the enemy is only acting on his right ; he has taken up 
 arms to obtain justice which was refused him; and it 
 is an act of injustice to resist one who is exercising his 
 right. 
 
 1 'The only thing left to do in such a case is to offer 
 due satisfaction to the invader. If he is unwilling to 
 accept it, the state has the advantage of having won 
 over justice to its side, and it may thenceforth justly 
 resist his attack, which has now become unjust, since 
 the grounds for it are removed. " (Vattel: The Law of 
 Nations, Bk. Ill, ch. II, < 35, 36, Carnegie Translation, 
 p. 246.) 
 
 8. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
 
 Intervention for humanity, or humanitarian inter- 
 vention 7 as it is more properly called, is also an in- 
 stance of intervention for the purpose of vindicating 
 the law of nations against outrage. For it is a basic 
 principle of every human society and the law which 
 governs it that no member may persist in conduct which 
 is considered to violate the universally recognized 
 
 abroad is concerned." (Oppenheim: International Law, 2 
 ed., 1912, vol. I, 135, p. 192.) 
 
 7 This is the expression used by Hall (4 ed., p. 304). ''Hu- 
 manitarian," "for humanity" and "on the ground of hu- 
 manity" are in general use. Moore (Digest, vol. VI, p. 3) 
 uses removal of "abhorrent conditions." "Against im- 
 moral acts" is sometimes employed.
 
 52 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 principles of decency and humanity. 8 In our national 
 law, the offender is arrested and punished for disorder- 
 ly conduct. In certain associations he would be ex- 
 pelled, but international society cannot so easily be rid 
 of the culprit. It is necessary either to assume the 
 
 8 That the flagrant and persistent violation of the recognized 
 principles of humanity is a violation of international law, as 
 well as of international morality, is indicated by the preamble 
 of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs 
 of War on Land, which declares : "Until a more complete code 
 of the laws of war is issued, the high contracting parties think 
 it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations 
 adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under 
 the protection and empire of the principles of international 
 law, as they result from the usages established between civil- 
 ized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements 
 of the public conscience." 
 
 The presumption in favor of the rectitude and legality of 
 the action of the sovereign will not be impaired by an occasion- 
 al abuse and instance of inhumane action. We must admit 
 that international law does not afford any machinery for cor- 
 recting such occasional abuses. In the absence of an effective 
 sanction under international law to remedy these occasional 
 abuses, we might not be justified in classing them as violations 
 of international law. They are, nevertheless, violations of 
 international morality. The example indicates the important 
 distinction which must always be drawn between international 
 morality, which is a matter left to the conscience of the sepa- 
 rate states and to the citizens responsible for the government 's 
 conduct, and international law, which is law because there ex- 
 ists an effective procedure which is generally employed to en- 
 force it. 
 
 Rougier, in his interesting study of humanitarian interven- 
 tion, considers that it is necessary to find a law for the enforce- 
 ment of which intervention is undertaken (Revue generate, 
 1910, vol. 17, p. 478), and he finds this law in the solidarity of 
 mankind. It is much simpler and more in accord with the 
 fundamental principles to recognize that such cases of inter- 
 vention are instances in which international law is being en- 
 forced, since international law includes certain universally 
 recognized rules of decent conduct in the treatment of human 
 beings, and guarantees to them a minimum of rights. This 
 question is more fully discussed hereafter.
 
 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 53 
 
 burden of the administration of the territory, or to con- 
 strain the unworthy sovereign to mend his ways. 
 
 Professor Arntz saw this clearly and recognized as 
 one of two grounds justifying intervention in the in- 
 ternal affairs of another state the situation when its 
 institutions "make impossible the regular coexistence 
 of the states" (Revue internationale, 1876, vol. 8, p. 
 674). The importance of humanitarian intervention 
 and the inadequate consideration which it has received 
 oblige us to enter into a somewhat full discussion of the 
 principles as indicated by the practice of states. 
 
 Humanitarian intervention may be defined as the 
 reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of pro- 
 tecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment 
 which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to ex- 
 ceed the limits of that authority within which the sov- 
 erign is presumed to act with reason and justice. 9 
 
 Westlake states the basic idea of humanitarian inter- 
 vention and at the same time refutes the sterile doc- 
 trine of absolute non-intervention: "In considering 
 
 9 Rougier defines intervention on the ground of humanity as 
 follows: "The theory of intervention on the ground of hu- 
 manity is properly that which recognizes the right of one state 
 to exercise an international control over the acts of another in 
 regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to the laws 
 of humanity. It applies also to the effort to place this action 
 upon a juridical basis." (Translated from Theorie de 1'in- 
 tervention d 'humanite ; Revue generate du droit international 
 1910, vol. 17, p. 472.) 
 
 Professor Arntz gives the following definition: "When a 
 government, although acting within its rights of sovereignty, 
 violates the rights of humanity, either by measures contrary 
 to the interests of other States, or by an excess of cruelty and 
 injustice, which is a blot on our civilization, the right of in- 
 tervention may lawfully be exercised, for, however worthy 
 of respect are the rights of state sovereignty and indepen- 
 dence, there is something yet more worthy of respect, and that 
 is the right of humanity or of human society, which must not 
 be outraged." (Translation taken from F. W. Payn: Crom- 
 well on Foreign Affairs, p. 72. The French original will be 
 found in Revue du droit international, 1876, vol. 8, p. 675.)
 
 54 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 anarchy and misrule as a ground for intervention the 
 view must not be confined to the physical consequences 
 which they may have beyond the limits of the territory 
 in which they rage. Those are often serious enough, 
 such as the frontier raids in which anarchy often boils 
 over, or the piracy that may arise in seas in which an 
 enfeebled government can no longer maintain the rule 
 of law. The moral effect on the neighboring popula- 
 tions is to be taken into the account. Where these in- 
 clude considerable numbers allied by religion, language 
 or race to the populations suffering from misrule, to 
 restrain the former from giving support to the latter 
 in violation of the legal rights of the misruled state 
 may be a task beyond the power of their government, 
 or requiring it to resort to modes of constraint irksome 
 to its subjects, and not necessary for their good order 
 if they were not excited by the spectacle of miseries 
 which they must feel acutely. It is idle to argue in such 
 a case that the duty of the neighboring peoples is to 
 look on quietly. Laws are made for men and not crea- 
 tures of the imagination, and they must not create or 
 tolerate for them situations which are beyond the en- 
 durance, we will not say of average human nature, 
 since laws may fairly expect to raise the standard by 
 their operation, but of the best human nature that at 
 the time and place they can hope to meet with. ' ' (West- 
 lake: International Law, vol. I, p. 319-320.) 
 
 President Roosevelt in 1904 wrote: "Brutal wrong- 
 doing, or impotence, which results in the general loos- 
 ening of the ties of civilized society may finally require 
 intervention by some civilized nation, and in the West- 
 ern Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore its 
 duty." (J. B. Moore: Principles of American Diplo- 
 macy, p. 262; cf. similar statement in Roosevelt's An- 
 nual Message, December 6, 1904.) 
 Similarly, that great political thinker, Captain Ma-
 
 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 55 
 
 ban, referring to the parable in the Bible, wrote : ' ' that 
 the possession of power is a talent committed in trust, 
 for which account will be exacted; and that, under 
 some circumstances, an obligation to repress evil ex- 
 ternal to its borders rests upon a nation, as surely as 
 responsibility for the slums rests upon the rich quarters 
 of a city." (Mahan: Some Neglected Aspects of War, 
 1900, p. 107.) 
 
 The legality of humanitarian intervention has the 
 support of many authorities. The author of the Vin- 
 dicae Contra Tyrannos, published in 1579 at the time 
 of the religious wars in France, justifies interference 
 "in behalf of neighboring peoples who are op- 
 pressed on account of adherence to the true religion 
 or by any obvious tyranny" (W. A. Dunning: Political 
 Theories from Luther to Montesquieu, p. 55). Since 
 that time, a host of authorities have incidentally 
 touched upon humanitarian intervention and recorded 
 their approval of it. Only one of these, as far as I am 
 aware, has made a thorough study of this important 
 institution. 10 The list of the authorities who recognize 
 the legality of humanitarian intervention includes: 
 Grotius, Wheaton, Heiberg, Woolsey, Bluntschli, West- 
 lake, and many others. 11 
 
 10 Antoine Rougier: La. theorie de I'intervention d'hu- 
 manite, Revue generate, 1910, vol. 17, p. 468-526. 
 
 "For the convenience of the student, we have listed here 
 some of the more important references to these expressions of 
 opinion. Some of them will be found also quoted in the pages 
 of this volume : Grotius, Bk. II, ch. XX, XL ; Vattel, Bk. II, 
 56 (but cf. Ibid, 7, 55); Heiberg: Nichtintervention, 
 p. 14-15; K. von Rotteck (see H. von Rotteck: Einmischung- 
 srecht, p. 11, 36); Heffter: Volkerrecht, 45; Woolsey: 
 International Law, 1 ed., 1860, 42, p. 91 ; Ibid, 50, p. 111- 
 112; Woolsey, 6 ed., 43, p. 45, paragraph two; Ibid, 51, p. 
 55; Ibid, 116, p. 178, last paragraph; Ibid, 20 a, p., 19; 
 Bluntschli: Volkerrecht, 478, note, 471 and note; Arntz 
 and Rolin-Jacquemyns : in Revue de droit international, vol. 
 8, 1876, p. 675 ; Creasy : First Platform of International Law,
 
 56 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 In 1625 Hugo Grotius wrote : * * There is also another 
 question, whether a war for the subjects of another be 
 just, for the purpose of defending them from injuries 
 inflicted by their ruler. Certainly it is undoubted that 
 ever since civil societies were formed, the rulers of 
 each claimed some especial right over his own subjects. 
 Euripides makes his characters say that they are suf- 
 ficient to right wrongs in their own city. And Thucy- 
 dides puts among the marks of empire, the supreme 
 authority in judicial proceedings. And so Virgil, Ovid, 
 and Euripides in the Hippolytus. This is, as Ambrose 
 says, that peoples may not run into wars by usurping 
 the care for those who do not belong to them. The Cor- 
 inthians in Thucydides say that it is right that each 
 state should punish its own subjects. And Perseus 
 says that he will not plead in defense of what he did 
 against the Dolopians, since they were under his au- 
 thority and he had acted upon his right. But all this 
 applies when the subjects have really violated their 
 duty ; and we may add, when the case is doubtful. For 
 that distribution of power was introduced for that 
 case. 
 
 "But the case is different if the wrong be manifest. 
 If a tyrant like Busiris, Phalaris, Diomede of Thrace, 
 practises atrocities towards his subjects, which no just 
 
 308, p. 297 ; Hall : International Law, 4 ed., 92, p. 302-3 
 (Hall bears unwilling testimony. Cf. Ibid, 92, p. 302-3) ; 
 Sheldon Amos: Political and Legal Remedies for War, p. 
 158; T. S. Woolsey: America's Foreign Policy, p. 75-6; E. 
 J. Phelps, formerly American Minister to England, in the 
 New York Herald, March 28, 1898 ; W. E. Lingelbach : Inter- 
 vention in Europe, in Annals of the American Academy of 
 Political and Social Science, July, 1900, vol. 16, p. 25 ; A. 
 Fillet: Principes de droit international prive, Paris, 1903, 
 p. 171; Rivier: Principes, vol. I, p. 256; Kebedgy: Inter- 
 vention, p. 78 f . ; A. Rougier, in Revue generate du droit in- 
 ternational public, vol. 17, 1910, p. 475, passim; Hodges: In- 
 tervention, p. 91 f.
 
 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 57 
 
 man can approve, the right of human social connection 
 is not cut off in such a case. So Constantine took arms 
 against Maxentius and Licinius; and several of the 
 Eoman emperors took or threatened to take arms 
 against the Persians, except they prevented the Chris- 
 tians being persecuted on account of their religion." 
 (Grotius: De Jure Belli et Pacis, Bk. II, chap. XXV, 
 VIII, < 1, 2, Whewell's Translation, Vol. II: p. 438- 
 
 In a recent work by Professor Edwin M. Borchard, 
 we find a clear and emphatic statement. Bef erring to 
 the minimum of rights which individuals enjoy under 
 international law, this author remarks: "This view, it 
 would seem, is confirmed by the fact that where a state 
 under exceptional circumstances disregards certain 
 rights of its own citizens, over whom presumably it has 
 absolute sovereignty, the other states of the family of 
 nations are authorized by international law to inter- 
 vene on the grounds of humanity. When these 'human' 
 rights are habitually violated, one or more states may 
 intervene in the name of the society of nations and may 
 take such measures as to substitute at least tempor- 
 arily, if not permanently, its own sovereignty for that of 
 the state thus controlled." (Edwin M. Borchard: The 
 Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, New York, 
 1915, p. 14.) 
 
 After the reader has examined the instances which 
 we shall present, he can hardly fail to agree with the 
 conclusion of Professor Theodore S. Woolsey, who 
 studied this question in relation to the intervention of 
 the United States in Cuba. Mr. Woolsey writes: 
 ' * That intervention on the ground of humanity is justi- 
 fiable is a matter of precedent, then, as well as a theory. 
 And so far as facts go, our action in behalf of Cuba is 
 as fair an instance of it as any of the earlier exam-
 
 58 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 pies." (Theodore S. Woolsey: American Foreign 
 Policy, New York, 1898, p. 75-6.) 
 
 Certain other publicists have, it is true, looked askance 
 at humanitarian intervention, and even gone so 
 far as to deny its legality. 12 Starting from the premise 
 of the independence of states, they fear to recognize 
 the right of another state to step in as a policeman, 
 even though a neighbor state should treat its nationals 
 in a barbarous manner. Instead, they would proclaim 
 as sacred and inviolable the right of every state to 
 regulate its internal affairs and then condone as 
 excusable violations of the law such corrective inter- 
 
 12 Among the authorities who deny the legality of humani- 
 tarian intervention are the following : Angelius Werdenhagen 
 (according to Esmein's statement in Nouvel revue historique 
 de droit francais et etranger, vol. 24 (1900), (p. 574), in his 
 criticism of the work of Bodin; Vattel: Bk. II, 7, 55. 
 (But cf. Ibid, 56.) Nassau Senior, in 1843, discussing the 
 rights of subjects against their princes, declares, "Accord- 
 ing to modern international law, it appears to be doubtful 
 whether a nation has any rights against its sovereign; it is 
 certain that, if it had any, they are rights which no third party 
 is justified in supporting." (Edinburg Review, April, 1843, 
 vol. 156, p. 365. On the following page (p. 366) Senior criti- 
 cizes the manner in which the plea of humanity is made to 
 cloak selfish designs.) See also, Phillimore: Commentaries, 
 1 ed., 1854, vol. I, 394, p. 441-2; (It is hard to discover 
 Phillimore 's real opinion). Mountague Bernard : Non-inter- 
 vention, p. 16-20; Halleck: International Law, ch. IV, 9, 
 p. 86-7; ch. XIV, 21, p. 340 (quotes Phillimore, but recog- 
 nizes the influence of humanitarian considerations) ; Strauch: 
 Interventionslehre, p. 13-14 ; Gareis : Institutions des Volker- 
 reehts (1888), 26, p. 84; Funk-Brentano et Sorel: Precis, p. 
 223; Rougier, who affirms the existence of a legal right of 
 humanitarian intervention, nevertheless remarks upon the 
 danger with which it is beset. He writes : "It must be recog- 
 nized that the ground of humanity is the most delicate of the 
 causes which may be expected to justify the right of inter- 
 vention and that it raises juridical difficulties in regard to 
 the basis and the extent of this right." (Translated from A. 
 Rougier: Theorie de 1 'intervention d'humanite, Revue gen- 
 erate, vol. 17 (1910), p. 478.)
 
 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 59 
 
 vention as another state, urged on by public opinion, 
 might undertake. 13 
 
 But why, we may ask, should the independence of a 
 state be more sacred than the law which gives it that 
 independence? Why adopt a system which makes it 
 
 13 It may be of interest to the reader to refer to the authors 
 who deny the legality of humanitarian intervention in law, but 
 who condone it to a greater or less degree in practice. 
 
 In the first place, there is Vattel, whom we have given in the 
 preceding note as an authority opposed to the legality of inter- 
 vention on the ground of humanity: yet we might transfer 
 him to the opposite camp, for he no sooner denies the right 
 
 " to force him [the erring sovereign] to follow a wiser 
 
 and juster course, ' ' than he adds, ' ' Prudence will suggest the 
 times when it [a foreign state] may interfere to the extent of 
 making friendly representations." (Vattel, Bk. II, 55, Car- 
 negie translation, p. 131). But as a diplomat and practical 
 man of affairs, Vattel must have known that such "represen- 
 tations" are always irritating, and hence not made unless 
 there is the possibility which may become a probability that 
 they will be followed up by stronger measures. Consequently, 
 we must consider this remark to be either without significance, 
 or a justification, of humanitarian intervention when it can be 
 undertaken in such a manner as to be beneficial and effective, 
 and this qualification is always understood as limiting every 
 obligation to undertake intervention. What Vattel says in re- 
 gard to the right to intervene in a civil war (Bk. II, 56, Car- 
 negie translation, p. 131) may also be regarded as a qualifi- 
 cation of his denial of humanitarian intervention. 
 
 In a list of the alleged grounds of intervention which Pro- 
 fessor Bernard puts in the form of interrogations, he asks, 
 "May intolerable scandals to public morality, heinous crimes 
 against humanity and justice, obstinate and fruitless civil 
 wars, authorize great powers to step in and assume, for the 
 public good, a kind of police jurisdiction over the offending 
 state?" (Non-intervention, p. 24.) But instead of a categori- 
 cal answer, Bernard only gives us some general observations 
 which apply to all the grounds of intervention. If we combine 
 what Bernard says on pages 7 and 24, we find that he admits 
 that there may, no doubt, be cases in which the principle that 
 states are members of a community united by a social tie 
 ought to prevail over the principle that states are severally 
 sovereign or independent. Yet, with apparent lack of consis- 
 tency, he argues, "...but the more closely we examine the
 
 60 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 necessary to gloss over constant violations of the very 
 principles which are declared to be most worthy of re- 
 spect from all? If, where such intolerable abuses do 
 occur, it be excusable to violate at one and the same 
 
 matter, the clearer, I think, will be our conviction that the 
 first and highest interest of the great commonwealth of States 
 itself is the independence of its several members, the stronger 
 our reluctance to admit exceptional cases." (Ibid, p. 24.) 
 
 In another place where Bernard discusses the alleged bene- 
 fits of intervention, he declares, "But, in fact, good is hardly 
 ever done by it good, I mean, in any degree commensurate 
 with the evil. On the contrary, even when it dethrones a 
 tyrant, puts an end to a ruinous anarchy, or stanches the ef- 
 fusion of blood, in a civil war it has a direct tendency to pro- 
 duce mischief worse than it removes." (Ibid, p. 9.) 
 
 Now, on the whole, this would seem to be a condemnation 
 and denial of the legality of humanitarian intervention. Yet 
 Bernard indicates that he does not mean to apply his remarks 
 
 to states " which labor under an incurable incapacity to 
 
 govern." (Ibid, p. 7.) Now since it is in the case of such 
 states that humanitarian intervention is usually applied, this 
 concession robs Bernard's statement of much of its force. 
 
 Sir Vernon Harcourt must probably be classed as one of the 
 authorities who adopts the doctrine of moral justification, for 
 in his discussion of intervention, he declares: "Intervention 
 is a question rather of policy than of law. It is above and be- 
 yond the domain of law, and when wisely and equitably han- 
 dled by those who have the power to give effect to it, may be the 
 highest policy of justice and humanity." (Historicus: Let- 
 ters on Some Questions of International Law, 1863, p. 14.) 
 
 Hall (4 ed., 92, p. 302-5; also p. 307-8) must probably be 
 classed as an authority who denies the right of humanitarian 
 intervention, but he seems to admit that the weight of au- 
 thority and the practice of states is at variance with his views. 
 He implies (p. 304) that even had his view been adopted, in- 
 tervention would be legal when "the whole body of civilized 
 states have concurred in authorizing it." That is to say, in 
 order to avoid abuse, he would restrict certain classes of inter- 
 vention, including that for humanity, to instances when they 
 were undertaken by the collectivity of the more important 
 powers. Any intervention underaken by a separate power 
 would then, he thinks, have had to be justified "... as 
 measures which being confessedly illegal in themselves, could 
 only be excused in rare and extreme cases in consideration of 
 the unquestionably extraordinary character of the facts caus-
 
 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 61 
 
 time the independence of a neighbor and the law of 
 nations, can such a precedent of disrespect for law 
 prove less dangerous to international security than the 
 recognition of the right, when circumstances justify, to 
 
 ing them, and of the evident purity of the motives and conduct 
 of the intervening state. ' ' 
 
 But even this qualification is not left unqualified, for Hall 
 seems to take back what he has said. A few pages further along 
 ( 95, p. 308), he writes, "There is fair reason, consequently, 
 for hoping that intervention by, or under the sanction of, the 
 body of states on grounds forbidden to single states, may be 
 useful and even beneficent. Still, from the point of view of 
 law, it is always to be remembered that states so intervening 
 are going beyond their legal powers. Their excuse or their 
 justification can only be a moral one. ' ' When the master be- 
 comes thus involved in contradiction, I submit that there is, to 
 use his own expression, "... fair reason . . " to consider that he 
 has attempted to defend a bad cause. 
 
 We catch a reflection of Hall's errors in Oppenheim's dis- 
 cussion of humanitarian intervention (International Law, 2 
 ed., vol. I, p. 194-5). After admitting "that the Powers have 
 in the past exercised intervention on these grounds [humani- 
 ty], there is no doubt," he asserts, that it "may well be 
 doubted . . " " . . whether there is really a rule of the Law 
 of Nations which admits such interventions." "Yet," he 
 adds, "on the other hand, it cannot be denied that public 
 opinion and the attitude of the powers are in favor of such 
 
 interventions " In a footnote, he refers to Hall ( 
 
 91 and 95), "where the merits of the problem are discussed 
 from all sides. " 91 is probably an error for 92. 
 
 Lawrence: Principles of International Law, 4 ed., 66, p. 
 129, has stated this doctrine so persuasively as almost to over- 
 come its inconsistency. He writes: 
 
 "Should the cruelty be so long continued and so revolting 
 that the best instincts of human nature are outraged by it, 
 and should an opportunity arise for bringing it to an end and 
 removing its cause without adding fuel to the flame of the 
 conflict, there is nothing in the law of nations which will 
 brand as a wrongdoer the state that steps forward and under- 
 takes the necessary intervention. Each case must be judged 
 on its own merits. There is a great difference between de- 
 claring a national act to be legal, and therefore part of the 
 order under which states have consented to live, and allowing 
 it to be morally blameless as an exception to ordinary rules. 
 A state may, in a great emergency, set aside everyday re-
 
 62 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 ignore that independence which is the ordinary rule of 
 state life? In any event, we find support for the view 
 we hold from the weighty authorities to whom we have 
 referred, and we may feel still more certain of our 
 ground after we have examined the various instances 
 in which the powers have intervened to prevent a neigh- 
 bor from continuing to commit such abuses as consti- 
 tuted a violation of the universally recognized and gen- 
 erally respected rules of decent state conduct. And 
 when so acting, the intervening states have proclaimed 
 the legality of their course. 
 
 States have most frequently undertaken intervention 
 wholly or partially on the ground of humanity in some 
 one of the circumstances which we shall now pass in 
 review. 14 
 
 straints ; and neither in its case nor in a corresponding case of 
 individual conduct will blame be incurred. But, nevertheless, 
 the ordinary rule is good for ordinary cases, which, after all, 
 make up at least ninety-nine hundredths of life. To say that 
 it is no rule because it may laudably be ignored once or twice 
 in a generation, is to overturn order in an attempt to exalt vir- 
 tue. An intervention to put a stop to barbarous and abom- 
 inable cruelty is 'a high act of policy above and beyond the 
 domain of law.' ' 
 
 "Perhaps we should here refer to another attempt to dis- 
 cover a satisfactory basis for recourse to humanitarian inter- 
 vention: The doctrine of "international nuisance" is built 
 upon the analogy of the common law right to remove a nui- 
 sance. In his "Principles of American Diplomacy" (p. 208), 
 Professor John Bassett Moore adopts this view. The inter- 
 vention of the United States in Cuba, he declares, " . . .rested 
 upon the ground that there existed in Cuba conditions 
 so injurious to the United States, as a neighboring nation, 
 that they could no longer be endured. Its action was analo- 
 gous to what is known in private law as the abatement of a 
 nuisance. On this ground the intervention was justified by 
 the late Alphonse Rivier, one of the most eminent publicists in 
 Europe, and on this ground its justification must continue to 
 rest." (John Bassett Moore: The Principles of American 
 Diplomacy, New York, 1918, p. 208.)
 
 PERSECUTION 63 
 
 8 (a). PERSECUTION 
 
 Governmental persecution may be sufficiently gross 
 to amount to inhumane conduct. Particularly frequent 
 have been the instances of intolerance, that is, the 
 denial to large numbers of persons of the liberty to 
 profess their religion. 
 
 The French occupation of Syria from August, 1860, 
 to June, 1861, was an incident typical of humanitarian 
 intervention to prevent religious persecution. The 
 Druses, in May, 1860, had massacred some six thou- 
 sand Christian Maronites without any efforts on the 
 part of the Porte to fulfil its obligations to protect the 
 victims. Further massacres ensued shortly after, and 
 stirred the sympathy of Europe. It was felt that the 
 
 But the analysis of the principles governing this case and 
 the study of precedents do not support this view. As far as 
 the United States was concerned, there is no reason to believe 
 that it would not have been possible to endure for several 
 years more the distressing conditions in the neighboring isle, 
 and the advantage of respecting the principle of non-inter- 
 ference in the affairs of a neighbor and the avoidance of a 
 war would have been more than ample to outweigh the incon- 
 veniences of the Cuban situation. The diplomatic correspond- 
 ence relative to Cuba (Foreign Relations, 1896, 1897, 1898) 
 does not bear out the assertion that the intervention of the 
 United States was principally actuated by the motive of self- 
 interest. Had self-interest been really the basis of the action 
 taken, intervention in Cuba would have been merely an in- 
 stance of interposition in defense of American rights. ' ' Inter- 
 national nuisance" is not a happy designation for the reason 
 that self -execution, which is characteristic of the abatement of 
 a nuisance, is in international law the usual method for en- 
 forcing rights. We shall again have occasion to refer to this 
 intervention. 
 
 Other authorities who recognize humanity as a just ground 
 of intervention would prevent the abuses which in their 
 opinion are likely to result therefrom by limiting it to the 
 collective action of several states. Still others believe that 
 the action of the intervening state can only be justified when 
 it is disinterested. Desirable as it is that humanitarian inter- 
 vention should be, whenever possible, both disinterested and 
 collective, this cannot be made a condition for the justification
 
 64 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 obligation of intervening could not b<j avoided, and on 
 August 3, 1860, the ambassadors of the five great 
 powers and Turkey signed at the Quai D'Orsay a pro- 
 tocol (agreement) for the dispatch of troops to Syria 
 and the policing of the coast of Syria by the warships 
 of the signatory powers. In its form the agreement 
 provided for cooperation with Turkey because certain 
 powers wished to sustain in every way the rights of 
 Turkish sovereignty. For the same reason, care was 
 taken in the agreement to preserve the collective char- 
 acter of the action, although in fact France supplied 
 the 6000 troops necessary, and was the power most 
 active in insisting that action be taken to succor the 
 victims of Mohammedan fanaticism. The fear that 
 France might take advantage of her intervention to 
 secure special advantages was met by the adoption of 
 a protocol of the same date (August 3) by which the 
 representatives of the powers declared the disinter- 
 estedness of their governments and their intention not 
 to seek "any territorial advantage, any exclusive in- 
 
 of the action taken. In the first place, because the practice of 
 states is not in accord with this theory. States are not gener- 
 ally willing to incur the burdens of intervention, even on the 
 appealing ground of humanity, unless they are also actuated 
 by other and more selfish considerations. In the second place, 
 the adoption of this rule would lead to so many violations as 
 to indicate and in time to establish a contrary rule in harmony 
 with those precedents. Furthermore, collective intervention 
 is often too unwieldy and too tardy to serve as a practical 
 method of procedure. But these are, property speaking, ques- 
 tions of international procedure which do not fall within our 
 discussion of the grounds upon which intervention is justified. 
 We shall, therefore, defer their consideration until, in another 
 volume, we are able to consider the means by which interven- 
 tions are carried out. 
 
 Certain authorities (Bernard: Non-intervention, p. 7; 
 Strauch: Interventions Lehre, p. 14; Gareis: Volkerrecht, 
 26, p. 85; F. de Martens: Volkerrecht [Bergbohm's Trans- 
 lation] vol. 1, 76, p. 303; E. D. Dickinson: Equality of
 
 PERSECUTION 65 
 
 fluence, or any commerical concession for their sub- 
 jects which might not be granted to the subjects of all 
 the other nations. ' ' Another safeguard was the limita- 
 tion of the period of occupation to six months. At that 
 time, the British Government was particularly suspi- 
 cious of the designs of Napoleon III and very anxious 
 to get the French out of Syria as soon as possible. To 
 the objection that there was danger of further outrages, 
 the British Ambassador replied that the presence of 
 foreign vessels would exercise a sufficient moral in- 
 fluence to restrain the evil passions of the inhabitants 
 of the Lebanon, and that in any event, nothing could be 
 easier than to land a part of their crew, if necessary. 
 (Cf. Protocol of February 19, 1861, LeClerq: Traites 
 de la France, vol. 8, p. 172.) But the Russian Ambassa- 
 dor did not feel that this measure would suffice, and 
 thought it necessary to prolong the occupation. At a 
 later conference of the representatives of the five 
 powers, held March 15, 1861, the Russian Ambassador 
 supported the French proposal to prolong the occupa- 
 
 States, p. 261-2) consider that humanitarian intervention is 
 to be applied only in the case of semicivilized states that do 
 not enjoy a full international status. It is true that these 
 states are most frequently subjected to the corrective action 
 of humanitarian intervention, but when by exception a civi- 
 lized state transgresses the dictates of humanity, it also may 
 be constrained to reform its conduct. 
 
 Professor Kebedgy remarks: "In addition to the great 
 difficulty of tracing with any degree of accuracy the line of 
 demarcation between civilized states and those which are not, 
 this restriction would seem to be useless, for why should we 
 tie our hands in advance, if perchance atrocities should come 
 to be committed by the sovereign or the government of a state 
 which would be called civilized? And beside might it not 
 be said that by this fact alone the state in question approxi- 
 mated very closely the condition of barbarous states, and 
 that it would consequently lose all title to respect for its inde- 
 pendence?" (Translated from Kebedgy: Intervention, p. 
 84-5.) 
 
 5
 
 66 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 tion for three months. "This, in his opinion, was a 
 measure which would allow the great powers to re- 
 spond to the urgent appeal made to them on the ground 
 of humanity and at the same time to protect the general 
 interests of Europe and of Turkey." The proposal 
 was adopted and at the expiration of the period agreed 
 upon the French withdrew, and on June 9, at Constan- 
 tinople, the representatives of the powers agreed to the 
 regulations for the administration of the Lebanon. 15 
 
 Although the Sultan gave his official consent to 
 this occupation, it was none the less a measure to 
 which he only consented through constraint and a de- 
 sire to avoid worse. It is therefore an instance of in- 
 tervention, and one in which the states were actuated 
 by motives of humanity to prevent religious persecu- 
 tions which took the form of massacres of the Christian 
 Maronites. 
 
 Moser (J. J. Moser: Versucht der neuesten europai- 
 schen Volkerrechts, 1778, part 6, chap. 6, p. 96-7) gives 
 as an illustration of intercession an instance in which 
 the representations addressed by the British and Neth- 
 erlands Governments to Maria Theresa were so vigor- 
 ous as to exceed mere intercession and to border on 
 intervention in favor of the Jews of Prague. Moser 
 reproduces Lord Harrington's instructions of March 
 5, 1745, to the British Minister at Vienna in which he 
 directed him to continue to make the strongest efforts 
 
 15 This account is based on that given in Raymond Robin : 
 Des Occupations, p. 281-5, and The Life of the Marquis of 
 Dufferin, vol. I, p. 98-121. In the American Historical Review 
 for January, 1921, p. 326, Dr. F. S. Bliss reviews Scheltema's 
 The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in 1860. 
 Bliss refers to Shurchill's The Druses and the Maronites. 
 The documents are given in Le Clerq: Traites de la France, 
 vol. 8, pp. 79, 101, 170, 210, 273-8. Cf. also Ashley's Life of 
 Palmerston: Vol. II, p. 212, showing the anxiety of the 
 English to get the French out of Syria.
 
 PERSECUTION 67 
 
 to prevail upon the Queen to revoke the decree expell- 
 ing the Jews from Prague. The dispatch alludes to the 
 representations made by the Dutch Government rela- 
 tive to the same matter. (Moser quotes from Mercure, 
 1747, vol. I, p. 363.) 
 
 In recent times, the oppression of the Jews and the 
 many instances of outrage which they have been made 
 to suffer afford the best example of intolerance. The 
 persecution of the Roumanian Jews has elicited a series 
 of remarkable interventions. In 1867, when certain 
 Jews in Boumania were made the victims of outrages, 
 Lord Stanley in his dispatch of June 14 to the British 
 representative instructed him: "Her Majesty's Gov- 
 ernment trust that your expectations may be realized, 
 but you will not relax your exertions to induce the Wal- 
 lachina Government to protect the Jews from perse- 
 cution, whatever shape it may assume, or whatever 
 pretence may be alleged for it. You will call special 
 attention to the observation of the Prefect of Jassy, 
 that he must obey the orders of the Minister of the In- 
 terior, unless overriden by orders from Bucharest, and 
 you will urge the issue of direct orders, such as will 
 admit of no excuse if they are disregarded. You will 
 press on the Prince that the attention of Europe is di- 
 rected to the cruelties practised on the poorer Jews in 
 Moldavia, and that the impression on foreign govern- 
 ments will be most unfavorable if effectual measures are 
 not taken to put an end to them, whether they originate 
 in arbitrary acts on the part of local authorities, or in 
 the uncontrolled license of the Christian population of 
 the province." (Parliamentary Papers, 1867, vol. 74 
 [3890].) 
 
 From Paris, the French Consulate at Jassy had re- 
 ceived the following telegram of instructions: "The 
 persecutions begun against the Jews at Jassy cause 
 here a just and general indignation. Take prompt and
 
 68 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 energetic steps to put a stop to an iniquity which is a 
 dishonor to the Roumanian Government." (Ibid.) 
 The Israelite Community at Jassy, on June 16, made 
 the following report of conditions : * * The persecutions 
 continue, though they make less noise. Commercial 
 Jews traveling with passports not in order are thrown 
 into chains. They seize upon individuals everywhere 
 they find them, always under the excuse of their being 
 vagrants. 
 
 "The people continue their hostile and menacing 
 meetings; and if the process of the projected extirpa- 
 tion of the Jews is no longer done so openly, thanks to 
 the intervention of the High Powers, it nevertheless is 
 continued more quietly by the authorities, who deem 
 the will of the Minister to be higher than the law. 
 
 1 * Bratiano has planned the destruction of our race in 
 this country." (Ibid.) 
 
 Under the date of April 10, 1872, Secretary of State 
 Fish instructed Mr. Peixotto, the American Consul at 
 Bucharest : 
 
 "This government heartily sympathizes with the 
 popular instinct upon the subject, and while it has no 
 disposition or intention to give offense by impertinent- 
 ly interfering in the internal affairs of Roumania, it is 
 deemed to be due to humanity to remonstrate against 
 any license or impunity which may have attended the 
 outrages in that country. You are consequently autho- 
 rized to address a note to the minister of foreign affairs 
 of the Principalities, in which you will embody the 
 views herein expressed, and you will also do anything 
 which you discreetly can, with a reasonable prospect 
 of success, toward preventing a recurrence or continu- 
 ance of the persecution adverted to." (Moore's Di- 
 gest, Vol. VI, p. 360; Foreign Relations, 1872, p. 688.) 
 
 A month later (May 13, 1872), Mr. Fish approved 
 the action of Mr. Peixotto in joining in a remonstrance
 
 PERSECUTION 69 
 
 addressed by the representatives of the foreign powers 
 at Bucharest to the representative of the Principalities 
 against the recent maltreatment of Israelites. The 
 dispatch in part read : 
 
 "The Department approves your taking part in that 
 remonstrance. Whatever caution and reserve may 
 usually characterize the policy of this government in 
 such matters may be regarded as inexpedient when 
 every guarantee and consideration of justice appear to 
 have been set at defiance in the course pursued with 
 reference to the unfortunate people referred to. You 
 will not be backward in joining any similar protest, or 
 other measure which the foreign representatives there 
 may deem advisable, with a view to avert or mitigate 
 further harshness toward the Israelites residents in, 
 or subjects of, the Principalities." The remonstrance 
 was signed by the representatives of Austria-Hungary, 
 France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, and the 
 United States. (Moore's Digest, vol. VI, p. 360; For- 
 eign Relations, 1872, p. 691.) 
 
 In 1902, Secretary Hay called the attention of the 
 powers to Roumania's violation of the Treaty of Ber- 
 lin and her unjustifiable oppression of the Jews. In 
 this instance, the American Secretary of State alluded, 
 it is true, to the interests of his government on the 
 ground that Roumania's action in driving to our shores 
 a horde of miserably equipped immigrants placed a 
 burden upon this country, but this alleged ground of 
 action was somewhat far-fetched, since the United 
 States could easily have overcome this inconvenience 
 by passing legislation to exclude destitute immigrants. 
 As the correspondence indicates, Secretary Hay's in- 
 tention was to demand justice for the oppressed Jews 
 in conformity with the principles of international law 
 and the dictates of humanity. This action was taken, as 
 he said in his dispatch of August 11, 1902, to Mr. Me-
 
 70 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Cormick, "not alone because it [the United States] has 
 unimpeachable ground to remonstrate against the re- 
 sulting injury to itself, but in the name of humanity" 
 (Foreign Relations 1902, p. 45; cf. p. 42-5). The con- 
 text shows that this latter was the real ground of the 
 protest which the American representative was in- 
 structed to present to Roumania. A peculiar force was 
 given to this action through its communication to the 
 principal European powers. The answer from the Brit- 
 ish Government, dated September 2, 1902, contained the 
 following promise of action: "His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment will place themselves in communication with the 
 other powers signatory of the treaty of Berlin, with a 
 view to a joint representation to the Roumanian Gov- 
 ernment on the subject. ' " a (Foreign Relations 1902, p. 
 550). But the other powers seem to have done no more 
 than to acknowledge receipt of the communication and 
 to give it, as the German Minister said, ' * such consider- 
 ation as its importance deserves." (Foreign Rela- 
 tions, 1902, p. 442; cf. pp. 420, 684, 910-15, 936, 1048.) 
 
 In Russia also, the Jews have frequently been sub- 
 jected to outrages from the populace. Horrible riots, 
 
 10 Sir William White's Life and Correspondence, edited by 
 H. Sutherland Edwards, pp. 156-161, 168, indicates how vig- 
 orously Lord Salisbury championed the Jewish cause and how 
 he would not let Sir William present his credentials, already 
 prepared, as British Minister, until Roumania complied with 
 the terms of Article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin relative to the 
 treatment of the Jews. This account justifies the Roumanian 
 Government and condemns the intervention of Great Britain, 
 which it attributes, without supplying any documentary evi- 
 dence, to a desire to support France (pp. 18-19, 86-90). From 
 the same work, we quote the following account of the vigorous 
 intervention of the British Government in favor of the Ser- 
 vian Jews: "Not content with working through its own 
 agents, the Foreign Office once went so far as to instruct Lord 
 Augustus Loftus at Berlin to call the attention of Prince Bis- 
 marck to the disabilities weighing upon the Jews in Servia. " 
 (Ibid, p. 87.)
 
 PERSECUTION 71 
 
 or pogroms, occurred after the assassination of Alex- 
 ander II, due to the belief of the masses that the Jews 
 were largely responsible for the crime. (See Foreign 
 Relations, 1882, p. 446-452). By their government, too, 
 these unfortunate people were also subjected to many 
 vexatious and discriminatory regulations which inter- 
 fered with their freedom of travel and with the choice 
 of the occupations in which they might engage. (See 
 Andrew D. White 's report, Foreign Relations, 1894, p. 
 525-35.) 
 
 Deeply stirred by these barbarous and arbitrary 
 acts, the United States intervened 17 diplomatically to 
 the extent of making representations against the treat- 
 ment of the Jews, and attempted to use its diplomatic 
 influence in favor of toleration (Foreign Eelations, 
 1880, p. 873; 1882, p. 451), but this action was at first 
 carefully limited. When Secretary of State Evarts 
 was requested by Hebrews in the United States "to 
 make such representations to the Tsar's Government, 
 in the interest of religious freedom and suffering hu- 
 manity, as will best accord with the most emphasized 
 liberal sentiments of the American people, " he instruct- 
 ed Mr. Foster, the American Minister: 
 
 1 'You are sufficiently well informed of the liberal 
 sentiments of this government to perceive that when- 
 ever any pertinent occasion may arise its attitude must 
 always be in complete harmony with the principle 
 of extending all the rights and privileges, without 
 distinction on account of creed, and cannot fail, there- 
 fore, to conduct any affair of business or negotiation 
 with the government to which you are accredited, which 
 may involve any expression of the views of this govern- 
 
 "Whether the action of the United States is to be consid- 
 ered an intervention or merely intercession will depend upon 
 the definition given to these words. (See discussion under 
 11.)
 
 72 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 ment on the subject, in a manner which will subserve 
 the interests of religious freedom. It would, of course, 
 be inadmissible for the government of the United 
 States to approach the Government of Russia in criti- 
 cism of its laws and regulations, except so far as such 
 laws and regulations may injuriously affect citizens of 
 this country, in violation of natural rights, treaty obli- 
 gations, or the provisions of international law, but it is 
 desired that the attitude of the minister, as regards 
 questions of diplomatic controversy, which involve an 
 expression of view on this subject, may be wholly con- 
 sistent with the theory on which this government was 
 founded." (Foreign Relations, 1880, p. 873.) 
 
 But the United States approached the matter more 
 vigorously from another direction, that is, through in- 
 terposition to secure for American Jews established in 
 Russia or Jews of Russian origin returning thither 
 after naturalization the same treatment as other 
 Americans would receive. 18 The result of acquiescence 
 in this demand would have been to accord foreign Jews 
 in Russia a treatment better than that received by Rus- 
 sian Jews, and would have made it very difficult to per- 
 sist in the severe discriminations against the Jews. In 
 the form of a reasonable request that all American 
 citizens be treated with equal regard, it was really an 
 
 18 Another phase of this same question arose from the refusal 
 of Russian consuls in the United States to vise the passports 
 of Jews wishing to visit Russia. The Government of the 
 United States took the ground that this refusal of a vise tak- 
 ing place upon American territory was a violation of the 
 principle of equality which must prevail under American 
 jurisdiction. (See Foreign Relations, 1893, p. 536, passim; 
 ibid, 1895, Part II, p. 1065, passim; ibid, 1897, p. 442-3.) No 
 doubt the United States was in a position to enforce compli- 
 ance with this review, but the practical result could only have 
 been to subject all Americans wishing to enter Russia to vex- 
 atious delays at the frontier. (See Foreign Relations, 1895, 
 Part II, p. 1065.)
 
 PERSECUTION 73 
 
 insistence upon a favored treatment for certain class- 
 es of Americans in Russia. The serious purpose of the 
 American Government to force this issue was shown 
 by a strong appeal in 1881 to the British Government 
 for cooperative action upon the ground that aliens in 
 Russia were " brought under the harsh yoke of bigotry 
 or prejudice which bows the necks of the natives, ' ' and 
 that " enlightened appeals were disregarded and were 
 met with intimations of a purpose still further to bur- 
 den the unhappy sufferers, and so to necessarily in- 
 crease the disability of foreigners of like creed resort- 
 ing to Russia." Secretary Elaine considered that it 
 became "in a high sense a moral duty to our own citi- 
 zens and to the doctrines of religious freedom we so 
 strongly uphold to seek proper protection for those 
 citizens and tolerance for their creed in foreign lands, 
 even at the risk of criticism of the municipal laws of 
 other states." Accordingly he instructed Mr. Lowell, 
 our Minister at London, to * ' approach the British Gov- 
 ernment in the direction of urging similar or concerted 
 representations with the United States in behalf of 
 the amelioration of the condition of the Jews in Rus- 
 sia," and the American Charge at St. Petersburg was 
 similarly instructed freely to acquaint the British Am- 
 bassador with what was being done. (Secretary Blaine 
 to Mr. Lowell, Nov. 22, 1881; to Charge Hoffman, Nov. 
 23, 1881, manuscript instructions quoted in Moore's 
 Digest, Vol. VI, p. 352-3.) 
 
 However great the sympathy of the British Govern- 
 ment may have been with the purpose of the action, the 
 delicacy of the relations of the European powers doubt- 
 less made such cooperation impossible, and the British 
 Government declined to ask an equal treatment for all 
 British subjects. The serious objection of Russia to 
 any move in the nature of that suggested by the Ameri- 
 can Government was shown by a note published in the
 
 74 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Agence Generate Russe, objecting to collective action, 
 Basing its action on still another ground, the Govern- 
 ment of the United States complained to the Russian 
 Government of its harsh treatment of the Jews, which 
 forced them to emigrate in large numbers to this coun- 
 try. In his instructions to the American Minister, Feb- 
 ruary 18, 1891, Secretary of State James G. Elaine 
 spoke of the action taken by the Russian Government 
 as a step which "would not only wound the universal 
 and innate sentiment of humanity, but would suggest 
 the difficult problem of affording an immediate asylum 
 to a million or more of exiles without seriously derang- 
 ing the conditions of labor and of social organization in 
 other communities. ' ' Mr. Elaine observes : * * The Gov- 
 ernment of the United States does not assume to dic- 
 tate the internal policy of other nations, or to make 
 suggestions as to what their municipal laws should be 
 or as to the manner in which they should be adminis- 
 tered. Nevertheless, the mutual duties of nations re- 
 quire that each should use its power with a due regard 
 for the results which its exercise produces on the rest 
 of the world." (Foreign Relations, 1891, p. 737-9; cf. 
 Ibid, 1894, p. 534.) The American representative was 
 directed to read this instruction to the Russian Minis- 
 ter of Foreign Affairs. President Harrison, in his an- 
 nual message, December 9, 1891, said: "This govern- 
 ment has found occasion to express in a friendly spirit, 
 but with much earnestness, 19 to the government of the 
 Tsar, its serious concern because of the harsh measures 
 now being enforced against the Hebrews in Russia." 
 Referring to the effect of these measures to drive them 
 to America, the President continued: "The banish- 
 
 19 The use of the word "earnest" has usually been regarded 
 as conveying a warning of a very serious intention to follow 
 up the representations in as far as the exigencies of the politi- 
 cal situation should allow.
 
 PERSECUTION 75 
 
 ment, whether by direct decree or by not less certain 
 indirect methods, of so large a number of men and 
 women is not a local question. A decree to leave one 
 country is, in the nature of things, an order to enter 
 another some other. This consideration, as well as 
 the suggestions of humanity, furnishes ample ground 
 for the remonstrances which we have presented to 
 Russia, while our historic friendship for that govern- 
 ment cannot fail to give assurance that our represen- 
 tations are those of a sincere wellwisher." (Foreign 
 Relations, 1891, p. XIII.) 
 
 Notwithstanding the effort to make it appear that 
 the United States was justified in protesting because 
 of the injury which Russian persecutions caused this 
 country, the humanitarian purpose shows through the 
 disguise which was adopted, either for the purpose of 
 sparing Russia's feelings, or because of the prevail- 
 ing prejudice against any intervention in the inter- 
 nal affairs of a neighboring state. In the very protest, 
 it was stated that other countries have closed their 
 doors to this Jewish immigration (President Harri- 
 son's Message, Dec. 9, 1891, Foreign Relations, 1891, 
 p. XII, cf. 745), and the United States could have 
 adopted a similar policy had this apprehension really 
 been the principal motive of the protests. 
 
 That the real motive was humanitarian intervention 
 is indicated in Secretary of State Frelinghuysen 's in- 
 struction of April 15, 1882, to Mr. Hoffman : 
 
 "The prejudice of race and creed having in our day 
 given way to the claims of our common humanity, the 
 people of the United States have heard, with great re- 
 gret, the stories of the sufferings of the Jews in Russia. 
 It may be that the accounts in the newspapers are ex- 
 aggerated, and the same may be true of some private 
 reports. Making, however, due allowance for misrep- 
 resentations, it can scarcely be doubted that much has
 
 76 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 been done which a humane and just person must con- 
 demn. 
 
 ' * The President, of course, feels that the government 
 of the Emperor should not be held morally responsible 
 for acts which it considers wrong, but which it may 
 be powerless to prevent. 
 
 "If that be true of this case, it would be worse than 
 useless for me to direct you, as the representative of 
 the United States, to give official expression to the feel- 
 ing which this treatment of the Jews calls forth in this 
 country. Should, however, the attitude of the Russian 
 Government be different, and should you be of the opin- 
 ion that a more vigorous effort might be put forth for 
 the prevention of this great wrong, you will, if a favor- 
 able opportunity offers, state, with all proper defer- 
 ence, that the feeling of friendship which the United 
 States entertains for Russia prompts this government 
 to express the hope that the Imperial Government will 
 find means to cause the persecution of these unfortu- 
 nate fellow-beings to cease. 
 
 1 1 This instruction devolves a delicate duty upon you, 
 and a wide discretion is given you in its execution. 
 However much this Republic may disapprove of affairs 
 in other nationalities, it does not conceive that it is its 
 right or province officiously and offensively to inter- 
 meddle. If, however, it should come to your knowledge 
 that any citizens of the United States are made victims 
 of the persecution, you will feel it your duty to omit 
 no effort to protect them and to report such cases to 
 this Department." (Foreign Relations, 1882, p. 451.) 
 After the great exodus of Jews from Russia to the 
 United States, it was natural that the sympathy for the 
 hard lot of the Russian Jews should have been deep- 
 ened, and the urgent earnestness of the protests in- 
 creased. The most notable instance was President 
 Roosevelt's unofficial action relative to the Kishenef
 
 PERSECUTION 77 
 
 Massacres (1903). 20 From Thayer's Life of Roosevelt, 
 we take the following account: " Russian mobs ran 
 amuck and massacred many Jews in the city of Kishen- 
 ef . The news of this atrocity reached the outside world 
 slowly: when it came, the Jews of Western Europe, 
 and especially those of the United States, cried out in 
 horror, held meetings, drew up protests, and framed 
 petitions asking the Tsar to punish the criminals. 
 Leading American Jews besought Roosevelt to plead 
 their cause before the Tsar. As it was well known that 
 the Tsar would refuse to receive such petitions, and 
 would regard himself as insulted by whatever nation 
 should lay them before him by official diplomatic 
 means, the world wondered what Roosevelt would do. 
 He took one of his short cuts, and chose a way which 
 everybody saw was most obvious and most simple, as 
 soon as he had chosen it. He sent the petitions to our 
 Ambassador at Petrograd, accompaning them with a 
 letter which recited the atrocities and grievances. In 
 
 20 Francis Rey gives an outline of the events, based upon 
 French sources, and rather minimizing the seriousness of the 
 action. See Revue generale de droit international, vol. XI, 
 (1904), p. 88-94; cf. also Rougier, ibid, vol. 17, 1910, p. 476-7 ; 
 also Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 712-715. 
 
 Hershey (International Law, p. 153, note 17) remarks: 
 "The protests of Secretary Hay and President Roosevelt 
 against the treatment of the Jews in Roumania and Russia in 
 1902 and 1903 were not interventions in the proper sense of 
 this term. One is surprised to see Merignhac (Traite II: p. 
 299 and n.) so characterize them." Roosevelt's action in 1903, 
 it is true, was intercessory, but the intention was to influence 
 Russia and Roumania by bringing to bear against them the 
 public opinion of the world, and perhaps also, if the occasion 
 should serve, the collective action of other powers. The danger 
 which might result from the irritation which would be aroused 
 was accepted by the United States, and in the case of Russia, 
 stronger measures than words were eventually adopted, for 
 the treaty of 1832 was later abrogated. Action such as this 
 exceeds intercession, and is a diplomatic protest of a very 
 pronounced character.
 
 78 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 this letter, which was handed to the Russian Secretary 
 of State, our government asked whether His Majesty 
 the Tsar would condescend to receive the petitions. 
 Of course, the reply was, no, but the letter was pub- 
 lished in all countries, so that the Tsar also knew of the 
 petitions, and of the horrors which called them out. In 
 this fashion, the former ranchman and Eough Rider 
 outwitted, by what I may call his straightforward guile, 
 the crafty diplomats of the Romanoffs.'* (William 
 Roscoe Thayer: Theodore Roosevelt, (1919), p. 229- 
 230.) 
 
 Finally, public opinion in America became thorough- 
 ly aroused, and on December 17, 1911, the American 
 Ambassador officially notified the Russian Government 
 of the termination of the treaty of 1832. In a previous 
 interview with Mr. Sazanoff, the American Ambassa- 
 dor explained the American viewpoint in regard to the 
 contemplated abrogation of the treaty, and said that 
 the action of the House of Representatives "was un- 
 questionably influenced by a sincere conviction that 
 such action might have far-reaching results in inducing 
 Russia to abandon not only restriction of foreign Jews, 
 but restriction of her own Jews, ..." (Foreign Re- 
 lations, 1911, p. 695-9.) 
 
 When the Russian Minister received the notice of the 
 termination of the treaty, he expressed "emphatically 
 his surprise at the action of the Government of the 
 United States, which he regarded as most unfriendly" 
 (ibid, p. 698), and he refused to permit the Ambassador 
 "even to explain in full" (ibid, p. 699) Secretary 
 Knox's suggestion in regard to the public announce- 
 ment to be made of the action taken ; and thus did the 
 Government of the United States, in the presence of
 
 PERSECUTION 79 
 
 all the world, mark its disapproval of Russia's inhu- 
 mane treatment of an unprotected people. 21 
 
 An interesting case of humanitarian intervention to 
 protect the Jews of Frankfort from the abusive ex- 
 actions of the Prussians in 1866 is referred to in the 
 Memoirs of Sir Robert Morier, from which we quote 
 the following : ' * Morier took up his new post at Frank- 
 fort the day before the Diet left that Imperial City 
 never to return. Though there for a short time only, 
 it proved long enough for him to be able to join in tak- 
 ing steps to stop the Prussians levying blackmail on the 
 Jews of that city, Frankfort having been treated with 
 an untold degree of harshness, with a view of terrifying 
 the other free cities of Germany into acquiescence in 
 the conditions of the new [North German] Constitu- 
 tion. These measures were unimportant enough in 
 
 21 Mr. Arthur K. Kuhn, in a pamphlet entitled ' ' Internation- 
 al Law and the Discriminations Practiced by Russia under the 
 Treaty of 1832," has pointed out that after Russia, in 1862, 
 had adopted the practice of discrimination against subjects 
 of the Jewish faith, Lord Granville first took a vigorous stand, 
 declaring that: "The treaty between this country (Great 
 Britain) and Russia of the 12th January, 1859, applies to all 
 Her Majesty's subjects alike, without distinction of creed." 
 (British State Papers, Vol. 73, p. 833.) 
 
 Mr. Kuhn remarks : ' ' For some reason which does not clear- 
 ly appear, Lord Granville afterwards surrendered his position 
 in the matter and followed the precedent of 1862 and insisted 
 only that British subjects should be placed on the same footing 
 as Russian subjects of the same 'class.' He did not admit the 
 correctness of the principle as a guide for the interpretation 
 of the treaty ; he simply did not desire to overrule his prede- 
 cessor. Indeed, he clearly enunciated the choice of principle 
 which was involved, for he says : ' The treaty is no doubt open 
 to two possible constructions : the one, that it only assures to 
 British subjects of any particular creed the same privileges as 
 are enjoyed by Russian subjects of the same creed ; the other, 
 that the privileges are accorded to all alike without regard 
 to the religious body to which they belong.' (British State 
 Papers, Vol. 73, p. 845.) It has since become apparent that 
 diplomatic considerations induced Great Britain to refrain
 
 80 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 themselves, but sufficiently delicate to earn for him the 
 public, as well as private approval of Lord Stanley, 
 who had become Foreign Secretary on the fall of the 
 Russell Cabinet in July." (Memoirs of Sir Robert 
 Morier, Vol. II, p. 84.) 
 
 Turkey's persecutions of the Armenians have added 
 another instance in which the United States has felt 
 constrained by the obligations of a common humanity 
 to intervene diplomatically. This action is of especial 
 interest since it took place at a critical moment of the 
 war, when American intervention might well have had 
 
 from insisting on the construction of the treaty which she her- 
 self deemed correct. 
 
 "In striking contrast to the weak position finally taken by 
 the British Government upon this question, prompted prob- 
 ably by considerations of policy and expediency, rather than 
 of international legal justice, was the attitude taken at the 
 same time by the United States with reference to the same con- 
 tention. ' ' 
 
 The Department of State took a similar stand in regard to 
 the protection of Jews in Switzerland. To quote from the 
 same source: "Prior to the Constitution of Switzerland of 
 1874, under which religious equality is now guaranteed as 
 effectually as in the United States, subjects of Jewish faith 
 were prohibited from establishing themselves in certain Can- 
 tons and were under heavy disabilities in others. Represen- 
 tations were made to Switzerland by several European coun- 
 tries, as well as by the United States, in reply to which these 
 Cantons maintained the right to impose the same disabilities 
 on subjects of foreign nations with which Switzerland had con- 
 cluded treaties of friendship, commerce and intercourse, as 
 were imposed on natives of the same class in Switzerland. In 
 opposition to this contention, Mr. Seward, our Secretary of 
 State, entered into voluminous correspondence with Mr. Fay, 
 the American representative in Switzerland, instructing him 
 to insist upon the rights of American Jews, notwithstanding 
 the disabilities under which the particular Cantons had placed 
 Jews of Swiss origin." 
 
 Further along, Mr. Kuhn remarks: "France, at that time, 
 was particularly energetic in demanding full treaty rights to 
 its citizens of Jewish faith. In 1851, Louis Napoleon, through 
 the French Minister at Berne, sent a note in which he stated
 
 PERSECUTION 81 
 
 the most serious consequences for the Turkish Govern- 
 ment and those responsible for the frightful horrors 
 perpetrated upon the defenseless Armenians. The New 
 York Evening Post, October 5, 1915, prints the follow- 
 ing report from Washington: "The Turkish Govern- 
 ment will be formally notified that unless the massacre 
 oi Armenians ceases, friendly relations between the 
 American people and the people of Turkey will be 
 threatened. Instructions to that effect had gone today 
 to Ambassador Morgenthau at Constantinople for 
 presentation to the Foreign Office. Officials here made 
 
 that France would expel all Swiss citizens established in 
 France in case the two Cantons (Basle City and County) 
 would insist on carrying out their law prohibiting the estab- 
 lishment of French citizens of the Jewish faith on their terri- 
 tory. (Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums, December 15, 
 1851; January 1, 1852; S. M. Strook, op. cit., pp. 12-13.) 
 The matter was finally referred to a commission of the Senate 
 of the Second Empire and in 1864 a report was made through 
 the chairman of the commission, Ferdinand de Lesseps, in the 
 following terms: 
 
 'No distinction may be recognized in the enjoyment of 
 civil and political rights between a French Jew and a 
 French Catholic or Protestant. This equality of rights 
 must also follow a citizen beyond the frontier; and the 
 principles of our Constitution do not authorize the Gov- 
 ernment to protect its subjects in a different manner ac- 
 cording to which faith he professes. ' ( See Debats Parle- 
 mentaries, 1909, p. 3779.) 
 
 ''As a result of this movement, the French Government 
 finally repudiated the prior treaties which were unsatisfactory 
 in failing to guarantee equal treatment to all French citizens, 
 and a new treaty was obtained from Switzerland in which such 
 a guarantee was expressly made by recognizing 'the right of 
 French subjects, without distinction of faith or worship, to 
 travel, sojourn, and transact all lawful business, as freely as 
 Swiss Christian residents of other Cantons may do. ' ( Foreign 
 Relations, 1864, p. 401.) 
 
 "The victory which French diplomacy had won over the 
 illiberalism of the Swiss Cantons solved the problem of the 
 United States Government as well." 
 6
 
 82 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 it plain, however, that the message did not threaten a 
 rapture in the diplomatic relations between the two 
 countries. 
 
 "The Ambassador's instructions are merely to in- 
 form Turkey that the American people already are so 
 stirred by the reported massacres that a continuance of 
 the atrocities might result in a break in the friendly re- 
 lations between the two peoples. 
 
 "It was explained at the State Department that the 
 instructions to Ambassador Morgenthau direct him to 
 offer his good offices in behalf of the Armenians, and to 
 state to the Turkish Government that reports of atroci- 
 ties upon Armenians are causing unfriendly criticism 
 among the people of the United States." 
 
 The Council of the League of Nations has recently 
 invited the United States to accept a mandate for the 
 supervision of Armenia. 22 
 
 22 The report of the American Military Mission to Armenia, 
 dated October 16, 1919 (printed in International Conciliation 
 Pamphlet No. 151), gives an account of the treatment of the 
 Armenians, from which the following extracts are taken : 
 
 "The Russo-Turkish War ended in 1877 by the treaty of 
 San Stefano, under which Russia was to occupy certain 
 regions until actual reforms had taken place in Turkey. This 
 treaty, through British jealousy of Russia, was torn up the fol- 
 lowing year and the futile treaty of Berlin substituted, asking 
 protection but without guaranties. Meantime there had been 
 the convention of Cyprus, by which that island passed to Great 
 Britain, and the protection of Turkey was promised for the 
 Armenians in return for Great Britain 's agreement to come to 
 the aid of Turkey against Russia. A collective note of 
 the powers in 1880 was ignored by Turkey. Then followed the 
 agreement of 1895, which was never carried out, and the 
 restoration of the constitution of 1876 in 1908. A further 
 agreement in 1914 was abrogated at the entrance of Turkey 
 in the war and the last of the series is a secret treaty of 1916 
 between Great Britain, France, and Russia, the existence and 
 publication of which rest on Bolshevik authority, by which 
 Armenia was to be divided between Russia and France. Mean- 
 while there have been organized official massacres of the Ar-
 
 PERSECUTION 83 
 
 We might also class as instances of religious perse- 
 cution the severities to which the Greeks were subjec^- 
 ed before the intervention of the powers brought them 
 freedom (1827), and the Bulgarian atrocities (1876), 
 which were the immediate cause and a sufficient justifi- 
 cation of Russia's intervention. But other motives 
 than religious persecution seem more justly entitled to 
 claim the honor of having actuated these interventions. 
 
 We cannot pass over without remark the religious 
 persecutions of the Reformation, and the many inter- 
 ventions to which religious sympathies gave rise, but it 
 is difficult to consider them as true instances of humani- 
 tarian intervention to prevent unusual persecution, for 
 such persecutions seem at that period to have been the 
 rule rather than the exception. We ought therefore to 
 compare them with those modern interventions of the 
 Holy Alliance to support Legitimacy, and the interven- 
 
 menians ordered every few years since Abdul Hamid ascended 
 the throne. In 1895, 100,000 perished. At Van in 1908, and 
 at Adana and elsewhere in Cilicia in 1909, over 30,000 were 
 murdered. The last and greatest of these tragedies was in 
 1915. Conservative estimates place the number of Armenians 
 in Asiatic Turkey in 1914 over 1,500,000, though some make 
 it higher. Massacres and deportations were organized in the 
 spring of 1915 under definite system, the soldiers going from 
 town to town. The official reports of the Turkish Government 
 show 1,100,000 as having been deported. Young men were 
 first summoned to the government building in each village and 
 then marched out and killed. The women, the old men and 
 children were, after a few days, deported to what Talaat Pasha 
 called "agricultural colonies," from the high, cool, breeze- 
 swept plateau of Armenia to the malarial flats of the Eu- 
 phrates and the burning sands of Syria and Arabia. The dead 
 from this wholesale attempt on the race are variously estimated 
 from 500,000 to more than a million, the usual figure being 
 about 800,000. 
 
 ' ' Driven on foot under a fierce summer sun, robbed of their 
 clothing and such petty articles as they carried, prodded by 
 bayonet if they lagged, starvation, typhus and dysentery left 
 thousands dead by the trail side. The ration was a pound of 
 bread every alternate day, which many did not receive, and
 
 84 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 tions of the Wilson administration to support constitu- 
 tional Government, which is equivalent to saying that 
 they are not interventions at all, but interferences of a 
 political complexion for the extension of certain opin- 
 ions, to be justified, if at all, by the circumstances in 
 each case and the results achieved. 
 
 Sir Frederick St. John, in his Reminiscences of a 
 Retired Diplomat (p. 16-17), gives the following ac- 
 count of the action which the British Mission in Tus- 
 cany about 1855 took to prevent the religious persecu- 
 tion of the Protestants. It serves also to illustrate the 
 care that was taken to give an aspect of friendly inter- 
 cession to what was substantially intervention: 
 
 ' ' My office of private secretary relieved me from the 
 routine duties in the chancery, and my occupations were 
 chiefly of a social character, such as those above de- 
 scribed; but I was occasionally employed in more seri- 
 ous matters, such as contributing to the relief of vic- 
 tims of the religious persecution which was then [about 
 1855] so rampant in Tuscany. The method employed 
 was the following: Instances of imprisonment of per- 
 sons discovered to have attended Bible meetings, at 
 that time held in all parts of the grand duchy, were ver- 
 
 later a small daily sprinkling of meal on the palm of the out- 
 stretched hand was the only food. Many perished from thirst 
 or were killed as they attempted to slake thirst at the crossing 
 of running streams. Numbers were murdered by savage 
 Kurds, against whom the Turkish soldiery afforded no pro- 
 tection. Little girls of nine or ten were sold to Kurdish 
 brigands for a few piasters, and women were promiscuously 
 violated. At Sivas an instance was related of a teacher at the 
 Sivas Teachers ' College, a gentle, refined Armenian girl, speak- 
 ing English, knowing music, attractive by the standards of 
 any land, who was given in enforced marriage to the beg of a 
 neighboring Kurdish village, a filthy ragged ruflfian three times 
 her age, with whom she still has to live, and by whom she has 
 borne a child. In the orphanage there maintained under 
 American relief auspices there were 150 "brides," being girls, 
 many of them of tender age, who had been living as wives in
 
 PERSECUTION 85 
 
 bally reported to me by the members of the central com- 
 mittee of proselytes, with every detail as to name, date 
 and locality ; this was for the information of my chief, 
 who thereupon would call on the Tuscan minister whom 
 it concerned, and adjure him for the sake of Tuscany 's 
 good name to order the liberation of the prisoners, be- 
 fore the foreign press could get wind of the occurrence 
 and publish it to the world. I cannot now recall a 
 single case of failure ; and I attribute the great success 
 of Lord Normanby in this matter to his unequalled 
 prestige in the country of his adoption as a residence, 
 as well as to his great intimacy with the Grand Duke 
 who, with all his bigotry, was known for his kind 
 heart and dread of giving any cause for scandal. I 
 must mention that such was the fear of detection, that, 
 although I received weekly visits from members of the 
 proselyte and proselytising brotherhood during my 
 three years of service as a medium of communication, 
 I was never visited twice by the same individual ; while 
 several times I was approached by persons whom I had 
 known by sight, but had never suspected of Protestant 
 proclivities. ' ' ( Sir Frederick St. John : Reminiscences 
 of a Retired Diplomat, London, 1905, p. 16-17.) 
 
 Moslem homes and had been rescued. Of the female refugees 
 among some 75,000 repatriated from Syria and Mesopotamia 
 we were informed at Aleppo that forty per cent, are infected 
 with venereal disease from the lives to which they have been 
 forced. The women of this race were free from such diseases 
 before the deportation. Mutilation, violation, torture and 
 death have left their haunting memories in a hundred beauti- 
 ful Armenian valleys, and the traveler in that region is seldom 
 free from the evidence of this most colossal crime of all the 
 ages. Yet immunity from it all might have been purchased 
 for any Armenian girl or comely woman by abjuring her re- 
 ligion and turning Moslem. Surely no faith has ever been 
 put to harder test or has been cherished at greater cost." (In- 
 ternational Conciliation Pamphlets, No. 151, p. 280-1.) 
 
 ' ' Testimony is universal that the massacres have always been 
 ordered from Constantinople." (Ibid, p. 285.)
 
 86 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 8 ( b ) . OPPRESSION 
 
 The cruel and unnecessary suppression of the na- 
 tional institutions and aspirations of a subject people 
 is an abuse of power which shocks the civilized world 
 in every fibre. The indignation of public opinion spurs 
 on to action governments even which are sluggish and 
 without ambitions. This reluctance is sometimes due 
 to the fear that intervention in defense of the rights 
 of nationality or self-determination may be turned 
 against them to encourage portions of their own em- 
 pires to seek an inconveniently great degree of inde- 
 pendence of status. It is natural, therefore, that gov- 
 ernments should prefer to urge other grounds to justi- 
 fy the humanitarian intervention which they have un- 
 dertaken. 23 
 
 Formerly, religious sentiment was closely connected 
 with the racial characteristics and the nationalistic 
 aspirations of a people. In consequence, political op- 
 pression and attempts to assimilate or suppress alien 
 races generally took the form of religious persecution. 24 
 
 "Napoleon III made intervention in favor of nationality, 
 that is for self-determination, a guiding principle of his foreign 
 policy, and to it he owed much of the success of his earlier 
 years. His most serious errors were his departures from this 
 policy, as his interference in Mexico and his attempt to pre- 
 vent German unity. The Italians have pushed this theory to 
 the utmost extreme. 
 
 "During the French wars of religion, the Catholic publicists 
 argued that the Protestants were not really French (Esmein, 
 La theorie de 1'intervention Internationale chez quelques pub- 
 licistes francais du XVIe siecle, in Nouvelle revue historique 
 de droit francais et etranger, 1900, vol. 24: 549-574.) Even 
 today nationality in countries under Turkish rule is confound- 
 ed in the popular mind with acceptance of Mohammed. Be- 
 fore the war, the Russian peasant had something of this atti- 
 tude towards all who were not of the orthodox religion, and 
 we often find a survival of this prejudice in certain persons 
 who consider the racial origin or religion of a Jew as deter- 
 mining his status, rather than the nationality to which he 
 belongs.
 
 OPPRESSION 87 
 
 In truth, persistent religious persecution has survived 
 only in those countries like Turkey or Russia that re- 
 gard those who profess another faith in the light of 
 aliens. In the nineteenth century, the great growth of 
 national states and the keen rivalries of great powers 
 led certain of the less developed and more reactionary 
 powers like Russia and Prussia to attempt the com- 
 plete absorption of the peoples or nations under their 
 jurisdiction. A similar desire to preserve her influ- 
 ence led Austria to block the efforts of the people of 
 the small Italian states to achieve their national unity. 
 These various attempts at the suppression of the na- 
 tionalistic aspirations of a subject people have shocked 
 the moral sense of Europe. If on the one hand inter- 
 national law cannot be said to have recognized the right 
 of a people who possess distinct national characteris- 
 tics to be independent, or even to be granted an autono- 
 mous regime, on the other hand it may be said that in- 
 ternational law does not allow these aspirations to be 
 suppressed with unrestricted severity. 
 
 Whatever justification can be found for the interfer- 
 ence of the American Government in the Irish troubles 
 of 1848 must rest upon the right of self-determination. 
 Under date of September 4, 1848, Mr. Isaac Toucey, 
 Secretary of State ad interim, sent Minister Bancroft 
 the following instructions : ' * It is the wish of the Presi- 
 dent and, he instructs you to urge upon the British Gov- 
 ernment the adoption of a magnanimous and merciful 
 course towards those men who have been implicated in 
 the late disturbances in Ireland." (Executive Docu- 
 ment No. 19, 30 Congress, Bancroft Collection, New 
 York Public Library, Vol. 33, p. 242.) 
 
 In America also an active propaganda meetings, 
 collection of funds, and fitting out of the agitators 
 was carried on without any repression from the gov- 
 ernmental authorities, to the great irritation of the
 
 88 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 British Government, which proceeded to employ meas- 
 ures of reprisal against Americans traveling in Ire- 
 land. Several Americans were imprisoned and 
 searched under secret orders which were not disclosed. 
 This action was taken apparently by way of retaliation 
 against Americans. (Cf. Bancroft Collection of Docu- 
 ments on Foreign Relations, New York Public Library, 
 vol. 33; cf. also Parliamentary Papers, 1852, vol. 54, 
 Buol to Palmerston, refers to this discrimination 
 against the United States.) 
 
 The motive of the interference of France and Great 
 Britain in the affairs of Naples, 1857, was the protec- 
 tion of the political agitators who were striving for 
 Italian national unity and freedom from Austrian 
 tutelage. 24 * 
 
 24 * But since it was the agitators who were trying to effect 
 a revolution, and since the Neapolitan Government was merely 
 attempting to hold its own, there was no active suppression 
 of national institutions. Cruel treatment, when confined to 
 political prisoners, may possibly be considered some day as a 
 ground for humanitarian intervention, but as yet it has not 
 been so recognized. 
 
 In this connection it is interesting to note what Lord Pal- 
 merston had written his brother a few months previously: 
 "You may assure the King of Naples, if you see him, that I am 
 anxious to renew with Naples that friendly footing of mutual 
 relations which existed in the time of some of his ancestors, 
 but that such a state of things is impossible unless he changes 
 his system of policy, foreign and domestic. 
 
 "We do not presume to dictate to him on either of these 
 branches, but we are entitled to say on what conditions our 
 good-will is to be obtained, and the course of events seems to 
 show that the good-will of England is a matter of some import- 
 ance even to states as far removed from our shores as Naples 
 is." (Ashley : Palmerston, II, p. 78 ; cf. the remarks of Count 
 Walewski, Congress of Paris, Protocol of April 8, 1856. 
 
 John Stuart Mill was evidently justified in his belief "that 
 Palmerston really hoped by holding the King of Naples up 
 to shame before all Europe to force him to change his conduct 
 somewhat. But he didn't know his man"; comments the 
 philosopher. (Free translation from Mill's Letters, Vol. I, p. 
 195.)
 
 OPPRESSION 89 
 
 In 1863, Great Britain, France, and Austria made 
 concurrent representations or protests to Russia in 
 regard to her oppressive treatment of her Polish sub- 
 jects. 
 
 The intricate nature of the prolonged negotiations 
 complicated by the divergencies of view between the 
 separate powers cannot unfortunately be fully con- 
 sidered within the limits of the space at our disposal 
 and we must refer the reader to the sources we have 
 examined for the verification and amplification of our 
 statements. 25 
 
 Alexander I of Russia at the Congress of Vienna 
 planned to reconstitute the Kingdom of Poland under 
 his own suzerainty, but England objected because she 
 feared the preponderance of Russia on the Continent. 26 
 
 25 This brief account of the deplorable events of the humani- 
 tarian intervention of the powers in favor of the Poles was 
 prepared from the following works and documents: French 
 Yellow Book, 1863, Affaires de Pologne ; Parliamentary Papers, 
 1863, Vol. 75, Poland [3150] ; British State Papers, Vol. 37, 
 p. 1416-44; Ibid, Vol. 53, p. 766-918; Spencer Walpole's Life 
 of Lord John Russell Vol. II, p. 380-384, Ashley's Life of Lord 
 Palmerston Vol. II, p. 230-33, Annual Summaries reprinted 
 from The Times [London] Vol. I (1893) p. 161-5.; Europais- 
 cher Geschichtskalender by H. Schulthess 1863, p. 245-71. 
 
 26 In the reports which Viscount Castlereagh sent to Lord 
 Liverpool from Vienna, 1814-1815, he indicates very clearly 
 that his opposition to the Russian design of incorporating the 
 occupied Polish territory into a separate monarchy under 
 the sovereignty of Russia was due to the interest of his coun- 
 try in maintaining the balance of power and in preventing 
 Russia from acquiring a predominance upon the Continent. 
 Viscount Castlereagh evidently found Austria and Prussia 
 little desirous of resisting the Russian designs. In his dis- 
 patch of January 11, 1815, to the Earl of Liverpool, Viscount 
 Castlereagh remarks : "I am convinced that the only hope of 
 tranquility now in Poland and especially of preserving to 
 Austria and Prussia their portions of that kingdom, is for the 
 two latter to adopt a Polish system of administration as a
 
 90 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 At the same time English public opinion wished to se- 
 cure for the Poles some adequate guarantee for the 
 preservation of their national institutions. It was 
 eventually agreed to include in the Final Act articles 
 in which Russia, Prussia, and Austria made certain 
 
 defense against the inroads of the Russian policy." (Parlia- 
 mentary Papers, 1863, vol. 75, [3188], No. 14.) 
 
 In the same dispatch Viscount Castlereagh encloses a mem- 
 orandum which he placed officially on record to give the views 
 of the British Minister on the matter. With slight amend- 
 ments, Lord Castlereagh addressed this in the form of a cir- 
 cular note to the plenipotentiaries of the Conference. He re- 
 fers to the desire of his court to see a free and independent 
 state under a distinct dynasty established in Poland. The 
 unwillingness of Austria and Prussia to oppose the Russian 
 plan is alluded to, and the sincere hope expressed that none 
 of the evils which he has feared "... may result from this 
 measure to the tranquility of the North, and to the general 
 equilibrium of Europe, which it has been his painful duty to 
 anticipate. ' ' 
 
 The memorandum further expresses the hope that " . . .the 
 illustrious Monarchs to whom the destinies of the Polish nation 
 are confided, may be induced, before they depart from Vienna, 
 to take an engagement with each other to treat as Poles, under 
 whatever form of political institution they may think fit to 
 govern them, the portions of that nation that may be placed 
 under their respective sovereignties. The knowledge of such 
 a determination will best tend to conciliate the general senti- 
 ment to their rule, and to do honor to the several Sovereigns in 
 the eyes of their Polish subjects. This course will consequent- 
 ly afford the surest prospect of their living peaceably and 
 contentedly under their respective Governments. 
 
 "If such should happily be the result, the object which His 
 Royal Highness the Prince Regent has most at heart, namely, 
 the happpiness of that people, will have been secured ; and it 
 will only remain for His Royal Highness most anxiously to 
 hope that none of those dangers to the liberties of Europe may 
 ever be realized which might justly be apprehended from the 
 reunion of a powerful Polish Monarchy with the still more 
 powerful Empire of Russia, if at any time hereafter the mili- 
 tary force of both should be directed by an ambitious and war- 
 like Prince." (Parliamentary Papers, 1863, vol. 75, [3188] 
 No. 14.)
 
 OPPRESSION 91 
 
 promises in regard to the treatment of their annexed 
 Polish possessions. 27 
 
 The Russian Tsar in fulfilment of his promise grant- 
 ed the Poles a constitution, but in 1830 when the French 
 Revolution shook Europe, the Poles rose in insurrec- 
 tion and demanded their independence. The uprising 
 was suppressed and the constitution abolished. Lord 
 Palmerston, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was 
 supported by the Government of Louis Philippe in in- 
 terceding for the Poles and in registering a mild pro- 
 test. 28 
 
 27 Article 1. The Duchy of Warsaw, with the exception of 
 the provinces and districts which are otherwise disposed of 
 by the following Articles, is united to the Russian Empire. 
 It shall be irrevocably attached to it by its Constitution, and 
 be possessed by His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, 
 his heirs and successors in perpetuity. His Imperial Majesty 
 reserves to himself to give to this State, enjoying a distinct 
 administration, the interior improvement which he shall judge 
 proper. He shall assume with his other titles that of Tsar, 
 King of Poland, agreeably to the form established for the 
 titles attached to his other possessions. 
 
 The Poles, who are respective subjects of Russia, Austria, 
 and Prussia, shall obtain a Representation and National Insti- 
 tutions, regulated according to the degree of political consider- 
 ation, that each of the Governments of which they belong shall 
 judge expedient and proper to grant them. (Article I, of the 
 Final Act of the Treaty of Vienna, Herstlet : Map of Europe 
 by Treaty, Vol. I, p. 216.) 
 
 28 In the diplomatic correspondence (see British State Pa- 
 pers, vol. 37, under Russia), Lord Palmerston admitted that 
 because of the delicacy of the internal situation, the British 
 Government wished to avoid giving any offense to Russia. 
 Under these circumstances the lion roared as gently as a 
 sucking dove. 
 
 In his instructions of March 22, 1831, Lord Palmerston 
 wrote : 
 
 "Your Lordship will, of course, be careful not to take any 
 step on this business which could lead to any unfriendly dis- 
 cussions with the Russian Government, with whom His Maj- 
 esty's Government are, under present circumstances, more 
 than ever desirous of keeping up the closest relations of friend- 
 ship." (British State Papers, Vol. 37, p. 1418.)
 
 92 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 In the early sixties the Polish question again became 
 acute, and the Russian Government attempted to an- 
 ticipate the (taming revolt by drafting the Polish lead- 
 ers into the army in violation of the constitution of 
 1861 which the Russian Government had granted the 
 Poles. 29 This arbitrary act infuriated the Poles and 
 incited all who were able to escape to engage in an 
 internecine war for Polish independence. 
 
 Liberal Europe was aroused and the pressure of 
 public opinion as well as other political considerations 
 induced the Liberal Powers to enter a vigorous pro- 
 test against the Russian measures of repression. 
 France and Great Britain were later joined by Austria. 
 The latter had little sympathy for the grounds upon 
 which the western powers based their intervention but 
 she feared the growing intimacy of Russia and Prussia 
 and wished to avoid a dangerous isolation in which she 
 would find no counterbalancing support. Austria had 
 another motive. She was also glad to purchase im- 
 munity from agitating her own Poles by the more lib- 
 eral policy which she adopted in her treatment of 
 them. 30 
 
 Without entering any further into the interesting 
 details of this important instance of humanitarian in- 
 tervention, undertaken for the purpose of preventing 
 the oppression of the Poles, we may now consider what 
 the evidence is to show that this was a veritable in- 
 stance of intervention, in which the protesting powers 
 
 29 Lord John Russell referring to Russia's justification for 
 this act appropriately remarked: "No argument can make 
 it right to turn conscription into proscription." (British 
 State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 780.) 
 
 30 The main lines of the Austrian policy are disclosed in the 
 diplomatic correspondence. (See British State Papers, Vol. 
 53, p. 797, 813, 829-831, 834-841, 859-862, 910-911.)
 
 OPPEBSSION 93 
 
 indicated by their acts their evident expectation of con- 
 straining Russia to modify her treatment of the Poles. 
 
 That the action of France, England, and Austria was 
 an instance of intervention relying upon the armed 
 force of the cooperating states and not a mere inter- 
 cession such as occurred in 1832 is shown by the fol- 
 lowing circumstances: 
 
 In the first place the language employed in the notes, 
 especially the official statements of the British Sec- 
 retary for Foreign Affairs, was so minatory as to 
 seem a presage of war in the event the Russian govern- 
 ment should not yield. 31 
 
 31 In the diplomatic intercourse of great states language such 
 as that employed by Earl Russell the British Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs can have but one meaning: It re- 
 quires that the power to whom it is addressed yield to the 
 menace politely conveyed but hardly veiled. Otherwise war 
 must result unless the protesting or threatening power prefers 
 an ignominious retreat. Since the traditions of Great Britain 
 gave no indication that she would choose the path of humili- 
 ation, the real significance of Earl Russell's words was clear 
 to all. (See notes of March 2, April 10, and June 17 in the 
 British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 805-7, 863-6, 897-901.) 
 
 Amply sufficient as was the menacing language of the Brit- 
 ish notes to indicate presumably the intention of that govern- 
 ment to employ force if necessary, this impression was greatly 
 strengthened by what Earl Russell said to the Baron Brunnow, 
 the Russian Ambassador, in the course of an informal conver- 
 sation relative to the note of April 10th about to be dispatched. 
 "Her Majesty's government," declared Earl Russell, "had no 
 intentions that were otherwise than pacific. Still less any 
 concert with other powers for any but pacific purposes. 
 
 "But the state of things might change. The present over- 
 ture of Her Majesty's government might be rejected, as the 
 representation of the 2nd March had been rejected by the Im- 
 perial Government. The insurrections in Poland might con- 
 tinue and might assume larger proportions ; the atrocities on 
 both sides might be aggravated and extended to a wider range 
 of country. If, in such a state of affairs, the Emperor of Rus- 
 sia were to take no steps of a conciliatory nature, dangers and 
 complications might arise not at present in contemplation." 
 (British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 866-7.)
 
 94 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 In the second place the efforts made to organize a 
 collective action on the part of the cooperating powers 
 when Russia had disregarded the first separate repre- 
 sentations of France and Great Britain affords still 
 stronger evidence that there was a serious intention 
 to constrain Russia to heed the representations ad- 
 dressed to her. 
 
 Any implication of menace, which the statements 
 relative to Poland might contain, would naturally be 
 greatly increased by giving them the collective support 
 of several powers. England, France and Austria 
 reached an agreement to present their respective notes 
 of protest to the Russian Government upon the same 
 date. 32 
 
 This concurrent action lacked, it is true, some of the 
 force which it would have possessed if the powers had 
 shown their unity of council and purpose by presenting 
 identic notes. 33 But in this instance the effect of 
 
 32 The British Government wished to organize a collective 
 action which should exercise the desired constraint upon 
 Russia, but apparently did not wish to be committed to a joint 
 intervention with France alone. Austria would not consent 
 to joint action, but did agree to a concurrent and simultaneous 
 presentation of notes which each of the three powers had 
 previously communicated to the others. (For the diplomatic 
 history of this interesting procedure, see British State Papers, 
 Vol. 53, p. 809, 811, 812-13, 813-14, 815, 830, 837, 840, 844, 849, 
 850, 859, 861-2, 881-2, 890, especially 861-2.) 
 
 38 Rarely in the annals of diplomacy has a more incongruous 
 crew united for a common undertaking. France had just been 
 trying to build up a political understanding with Russia and 
 wished in consequence to deflect her intervention toward 
 Prussia on the ground of the latter 's interference in the mat- 
 ter. (See British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 809, 812, 826.) 
 Great Britain was desirous of preventing the Russification of 
 the Polish provinces, because she was apprehensive of an in- 
 crease of Russian power and because she sympathized with the 
 Poles. But the British Government distrusted the French 
 designs on the Rhine and were unwilling to engage with 
 France alone in any joint action against either Prussia or
 
 OPPRESSION 95 
 
 their concurrent action was somewhat increased by the 
 supporting representations which certain of the smal- 
 ler states, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, made in 
 response to the invitations of the intervening powers. 34 
 It is not possible to consider the action of these 
 smaller states as intervention, since they were unwil- 
 ling to appear to go beyond the ordinary friendly rep- 
 
 Russia. (British State Papers, vol. 53, p. 837, 867 ; cf. Mem- 
 oirs of Ernest, Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Vol. IV, p. 116, 
 ibid, p. 127; Count Vitzthum's Reminiscenses, Vol. II, p. 
 234, 240, 260.) 
 
 Another cause of dissension was that Great Britain wished 
 the concurrent action of the powers to be based upon Russia's 
 violation of Article I of the Final Act of Vienna (British State 
 Papers, Vol. 53, p. 863-4, cf. 806, 834, 836, 866). The French 
 Emperor whose very accession to the throne might be con- 
 sidered a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, even although he 
 yielded somewhat to British insistence and referred to the 
 action taken at Vienna (British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 
 827-8), could hardly be desirous of defending treaties which 
 had been dictated to France (British State Papers, Vol. 53, 
 p. 875). 
 
 Strangest of all was Austria's concurrence in view of her 
 recent (1846) annexation of Cracow in violation of Articles 
 VI and IX of the Final Act (see R. Robin; Occupations, p. 
 238-242), and in view of Russia's interference in 1849 to as- 
 sist her in suppressing the Hungarian revolution. Could Aus- 
 tria, one of the original partitioning powers of Poland, give 
 much support to an action in favor of the Poles? 
 
 These various causes of dissension between the three inter- 
 vening powers deprived their concurrent representations of 
 some of the force which they would otherwise have had. 
 
 34 Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden responded to the in- 
 vitation of France and Great Britain (British State Papers, 
 Vol. 53, p. 812, 862, 890) to join in making representations in 
 behalf of the oppressed Poles and these states cooperated to 
 the extent that they believed expedient. (British State Pa- 
 pers, vol. 53, p. 844-5, 850, 851, 874-5, 880, 886.) 
 
 The United States had declined to intervene on the ground 
 of its policy of " non-intervention in European affairs" (Dip- 
 lomatic Correspondence, 1863, Part I, p. 667).
 
 96 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 reservations which are free from any thought of ulti- 
 mate recourse to arms. 35 
 
 We have said enough to show that the concurrent 
 representation of the cooperating powers might rea- 
 sonably and presumably be regarded as an interven- 
 tion by the Russian Government itself and by public 
 opinion in all other states including the intervening 
 states. 
 
 Henry Adams, then in London with his father, the 
 American Minister, wrote May 8, 1863, ' * . . . and the 
 Polish question is becoming so grave that we are let 
 up a little" (A Cycle of Adams Letters 1861-5, Vol. I, 
 p. 296). 
 
 35 The Swedish Government in reply to the invitation or 
 polite suggestion made an appeal in behalf of the Poles, but 
 as Count Manderstrom explained to the British representa- 
 tive at Stockholm "he had thought it better to abstain from 
 entering into any particulars regarding Polish reform. Since 
 what might be advisable coming from England might be the 
 contrary coming from Sweden. ' ' Count Manderstrom further 
 said "that, in fact, though he did not think Her Majesty's 
 Government wrong to enter upon such details, he thought the 
 Swedish Goverment right to abstain from them." (British 
 State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 886.) 
 
 The representations of the Italian Government were still 
 more gentle, if we may rely upon Prince Gortchakoff's State- 
 ment. (British State Papers, Vol. 53, 880; but cf. ibid, p. 
 875.) 
 
 The first representations which the French Government 
 made at St. Petersburg (Drouyn de Lhuys to the Due de 
 Montebello, Feb. 18, 1863, British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 
 827-8, cf. p. 809, 787) cannot be considered as anything more 
 than intercession, since there was not at the time it was pre- 
 sented any indication of an intention to insist. Perhaps had 
 Bismarck not interfered the French Government would not 
 have consented to take further action against Russia notwith- 
 standing French sympathy for the Poles. 
 
 Similarly in 1831-2, the British Government did no more 
 than intercede for the Poles and closed the correspondence 
 with a mild protest couched in the most friendly language. 
 (See British State Papers, Vol. 37, p. 1418, 1428-9, 1436, 1439- 
 1444.)
 
 OPPRESSION 97 
 
 For a moment Russia felt really apprehensive, 36 and 
 Prince Gortchakoff expressed a willingness to consider 
 the representations of the intervening powers, and by 
 his language seemed expressly to invite suggestions as 
 to the best solution of the difficulty upon the basis of 
 and in conformity with the provisions of the Treaties 
 of Vienna (British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 892, 896-7, 
 cf. 898). It was not long, however, before Prince 
 Gortchakoff became convinced that Great Britain would 
 not fight for Poland and that Earl Russell's peremp- 
 tory words would not be sustained by the ministry or the 
 British public. 37 He must also have calculated upon the 
 
 30 Lord Napier reporting to Lord Russell the promulgation 
 of an Imperial manifesto promising reforms and pardons to 
 certain of the insurrectionists concluded: "How far it has 
 been prompted by the expectation of foreign intervention I 
 am not able to affirm with confidence ; I am inclined to think 
 it may have been accelerated by such apprehensions, but it 
 is also plainly consistent with policy, as well as with the be- 
 nevolent disposition of the sovereign." (British State Papers, 
 Vol. 53, p. 883.) 
 
 37 Earl Russell might perhaps have achieved a diplomatic 
 success through the mere presentation of emphatic notes if he 
 had had the loyal support of his subordinate, Lord Napier, 
 then British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Lord Napier 
 seems to have been more eager to preserve peace with Russia 
 than he was to cherish his country's honor. At the moment 
 when Russia was most apprehensive he assured his Russian 
 friends that Great Britain would not make war for the Polish 
 cause. (See The M. P. for Russia, Reminiscences and Corre- 
 spondence of Madame Olga Novikoff, edited by W. T. Stead, 
 1909, p. 64 passim.) If he acted upon his own responsibility 
 in snowing Prince Gortchakoff Earl Russell's note before he 
 presented it officially he helped the Russian Vice-Chancellor 
 to humiliate his chief (see Lord Redesdale: Memories, Vol. 
 I, p. 224-5, quoted below). One authority states that Napier 
 explained to Gortchakoff that the note was merely a humane 
 expression and that it would entail no further consequences. 
 (St. von Kozmian, Das Jahr 1863, Authorized German Edition 
 by S. R. Landau, p. 297.) 
 
 In his eagerness to assure Russia that his government did 
 not mean what Earl Russell's language fairly implied Lord 
 7
 
 98 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 estrangement between the Western Powers and the 
 advantage Russia derived from Prussia's assistance. 
 It was likewise apparent that Austria did not want 
 war if she could avoid it. 
 
 This was Gortchakoff 's opportunity to pay back 
 Earl Russell in his own coin. He left the British note 
 unanswered for some time and then declined to accede 
 to the suggestion which the intervening powers had 
 made. The note which Baron Brunnow was instructed 
 to deliver to Earl Russell left only the choice of an 
 humiliating acquiescence or recourse to arms. (See 
 British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 901-907, cf. 907-910, 
 917). As Lord Russell himself recognized "...the 
 question came to be whether the three powers should 
 together urge their demands by force or relinquish the 
 attempt." (Spencer Walpole's Lord Russell, Vol. I, 
 p. 383) . But the recollections of the Crimean war were 
 still too vivid and the distrust of France too deep for 
 the British ministry to pick up the gauntlet. 38 
 
 Napier may have encouraged Prince Gortchakoff to play at 
 the same game of bluster as the British Secretary. In any 
 event he was fittingly alarmed at the possible consequences of 
 the Russian reply and begged from Prince Gortchakoff some 
 conciliatory assurances which should make it possible for his 
 government to swallow the affront. (British State Papers, 
 Vol. 53, p. 910.) 
 
 38 Lord Redesdale has left us an interesting account of the 
 melancholy, though ludicrous, end of this fiasco : 
 
 "Lord Russell climbed down not handsomely. In a dis- 
 patch to Lord Napier of the llth of August he said : 'If Rus- 
 sia does not perform all that depends upon her to further the 
 moderate and concilatory views of the three Powers,' Great 
 Britain, Austria and France, 'if she does not enter upon the 
 path which is opened to her by friendly counsels, she makes 
 herself responsible for the serious consequences which the 
 prolongation of the troubles of Poland may produce.' 
 
 "And that was the lame and impotent conclusion of a 
 game of brag and insolent bluster which had been carried on 
 for many months. The fizzling out of a damp squib ! 
 
 "But there is one story which Mr. Hennessy, Conservative 
 member for King's County, told in the House of Commons,
 
 OPPRESSION 99 
 
 And thus disappeared all hope of effective action to 
 prevent the Russian Government from oppressing the 
 
 and was never contradicted, which is too good and too char- 
 acteristic to be omitted I take it verbatim from Lord Salis- 
 bury's essay on Foreign Politics, p. 202. 
 
 " 'When Prince Gortchakoff's last defiance had arrived, 
 and the Government had made up their minds to practise the 
 better part of valor, Lord Eussell made a speech of Blair- 
 gowrie, and being somewhat encouraged and cheered by the 
 various circumstances of consolation which are administered 
 by an entertainment of that kind, he recovered after dinner 
 somewhat of his wonted courage, and under the influence of 
 the valor so acquired he proclaimed that, in his opinion, Russia 
 had sacrificed her treaty right to Poland. Having made the 
 statement thus publicly, he felt that he could not do less than 
 insert it into the dispatch to Prince Gortchakoff, with whom it 
 was proposed to terminate the inglorious correspondence. He 
 flattered himself, indeed, that so hostile an announcement, 
 while not leading actually to a war, might enable him to ride 
 off with something like a flourish, which his friends might con- 
 strue into a triumph. 
 
 " 'And so the dispatch was sent off, formally bringing the 
 correspondence to a close, and concluding with the grandiose 
 announcement that, in the opinion of the British Government, 
 Russia had forfeited the title to Poland which she had acquired 
 by the Treaty of Vienna. But even this modest attempt to 
 escape from disgrace was not destined to succeed. When the 
 dispatch reached St. Petersburg it was shown to Prince Gort- 
 chakoff before being formally presented. ' You had better not 
 present this concluding sentence to me,' is reported to have 
 been the Prince's brief but significant observation. The hint 
 was taken, the dispatch was sent back to England and sub- 
 mitted anew to the Foreign Secretary. Doubtless with disgust, 
 but bowing to his inexorable destiny, he executed this new act 
 of self-abasement. The offending sentence was erased by its 
 author with the resolution of a Christian martyr. In this 
 form it was sent back to Russia; and it still bears, as pub- 
 lished to the world, in the bald mutilation of the paragraph 
 with which it concludes and in the confusion of its dates, the 
 marks of its enforced and reluctant revision. ' 
 
 " 'The confusion of the dates is very significant. The 
 dispatch was originally dated in September and refers to the 
 dispatch of August llth, as of the llth ultimo. As accepted 
 by the Prince it was dated in October, but still refers to the 
 August dispatch as of the llth ultimo.
 
 100 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Poles by denying them a reasonable degree of auton- 
 omy and the continued enjoyment of their national 
 language and institutions. The government of the 
 "autocrat of all the Russias" unchecked by the Liberal 
 Powers and aided by Prussia crushed out the desperate 
 resistance of the Polish patriots. 
 
 The net result of the false start of the powers was to 
 humiliate Great Britain 39 and to mislead the unfortu- 
 nate Poles, who might reasonably believe that the 
 Liberal Powers would not withdraw after they had so 
 far committed themselves by the peremptory and cate- 
 gorical language of their representations. 40 
 
 " 'The humiliation of England was complete. We had 
 threatened and we had not performed. We had encouraged 
 the Poles to believe that they might count upon our protection, 
 and when we found that something more than brave words 
 would be needed, we deserted them. That was the view taken 
 abroad of Lord Russell 's policy. It was treated with derision 
 and contempt. In Russia there was at that time a very strong 
 feeling of friendliness towards the English. But it was a 
 social friendship, not a political appreciation, and I believe 
 that was largely, perhaps one might say entirely, due to the 
 great personal charm and popularity of Lord and Lady 
 Napier. As a power to be reckoned with we had ceased to 
 exist.' ' (Lord Redesdale: Memories, Vol. I, p. 224-5.) 
 
 39 See Reminiscences of Count Vitzthum, edited by Henry 
 Reeve, vol. II, p. 250 ; Correspondence of Sir William White, 
 edited by H. Southerland Edwards, p. 54-5. 
 
 40 It would have been well for Lord John Russell had he 
 taken pattern from Lord Palmerston's conduct of the Polish 
 negotiations of 1831-33. July 3, 1832, in his instructions to 
 Lord Durham, then on a mission to St. Petersburg, Palmers- 
 ton warned him that the remonstrances of Great Britain and 
 France, lacking as they did the support of Austria and Prussia, 
 "... could not be effectual unless they had been supported by 
 a threat of war a threat to the execution of which so many 
 obstacles were opposed both by the general state of Europe 
 and by the negotiations in which, in concert with Russia, 
 Great Britain has been, and still, is, engaged." 
 
 "In adverting, therefore, to the affairs of Poland," wrote 
 Lord Palmerston in the same dispatch, "great delicacy and 
 caution will be required. It would be inconsistent with the
 
 OPPRESSION 101 
 
 It remains for us to show that the intervention of 
 Great Britain, France, and Austria is to be classed as 
 humanitarian. It cannot be doubted that the wish to 
 protect the Poles from Russian oppression and to se- 
 cure for them a reasonable recognition of their national 
 aspirations was the motive back of the governmental 
 initiative of the Western or Liberal Powers. It is rea- 
 sonable to assume that this was the original impulse 
 which caused the intervention when we note the ex- 
 traordinary sympathy shown for the Polish insurrec- 
 tionists in all parts of Europe. 
 
 The people of England and France and of the other 
 countries of Europe had not forgotten the ruthless 
 manner in which Nicholas I, in 1832, had crushed out 
 the Polish uprising. Everywhere the Polish patriots 
 found a strong and popular support. The excitement 
 aroused in England, says Lord Redesdale, amounted 
 to intoxication (Memories, Vol. II, p. 217). In the of- 
 ficial representations which Napoleon III made at St. 
 Petersburg, the question of Poland is spoken of as one 
 which by exception is supported by all factions in 
 France (British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 827). From 
 Stockholm, the British representative reported that 
 Prince Czartoriski was given a warm welcome at a 
 great banquet attended by two hundred of the notable 
 citizens, and that he was received by the sovereign 
 (Ibid, p. 853-8). From Berne came the report of Swiss 
 sympathy and indignation at the brutal conscription of 
 the Polish leaders (Par. Papers 1863, Vol. 75 [3150] 
 No. 94). It was to be expected that Italy, the propon- 
 ent of the rights of nationalities, would be deeply 
 moved by the events in Poland (British State Papers, 
 Vol. 53, p. 875, cf. ibid, p. 880). 
 
 power and dignity of the British Empire to insist too strongly 
 upon points which, from the considerations stated above, it 
 might be inexpedient, if not impossible, to enforce by arms. ' ' 
 (British State Papers, vol. 37, 1848-49, cf. p. 1439-1440.) 
 
 SANTA BARBARA STATE COLLEGE 
 
 LIBRA*,
 
 102 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Evidently this sentiment in favor of the insurrec- 
 tionists was too widespread and too profound to be 
 ignored by governments dependent upon popular sup- 
 port. 41 
 
 41 A few extracts from the Diplomatic Correspondence will 
 show how conscious the governments were of this strong pub- 
 lic sentiment in favor of the Poles. 
 
 The French note of February 18 contains the following 
 passage: "But the Polish question more than any other is 
 privileged to arouse in France the keenest sympathy of all 
 parties. In this respect they are unanimous; the language 
 employed by the most zealous defenders of Monarchy and re- 
 ligious doctrines differs only but slightly from that of the 
 most advanced democratic organs. What can we answer to 
 statements which are based upon public law [international 
 law] and which do no more than appeal to the most incontro- 
 vertible principles. Not only are we powerless to reply to 
 such articles, but, deriving as we do our strength from public 
 opinion, we are obliged to take into account opinions which 
 this country has entertained for so many years." (British 
 State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 827.) 
 
 The subsequent note, presented April 17th, declares: "The 
 insurrection of which the Kingdom of Poland is at present 
 the theatre has awaked in Europe a lively anxiety, in the midst 
 of a repose which no near event seemed likely to disturb. The 
 lamentable effusion of blood of which this contest is the cause, 
 and the painful incidents which mark it, are exciting, at the 
 same time, an emotion as general as it is profound." (Ibid, 
 p. 862, Translation in Parliamentary Papers, 1863, Vol. 75, 
 Poland, [3150] No. 136.) 
 
 The British note dated April 10, but presented at the same 
 time as the French note, alludes incidentally to the pressure 
 of public opinion: "The general sympathy which is felt for 
 the Polish Nation might of itself justify Her Majesty's Gov- 
 ernment in making, in favor of the Polish race, an appeal to 
 the generous and benevolent feelings of His Imperial Ma- 
 jesty." (Ibid, p. 863.) 
 
 Further along in the same note: "The disturbances which 
 are perpetually breaking out among the Polish subjects of 
 His Imperial Majesty necessarily produce a serious agitation 
 of opinion in other countries of Europe, tending to excite 
 much anxiety in the minds of their Governments, and which 
 might, under possible circumstances, produce complications 
 of the most serious nature." (Ibid, p. 865, cf. similar ex-
 
 OPPRESSION 103 
 
 Unfortunately the cooperating powers did not un- 
 derstand the perfect justification which humanitarian 
 considerations could give to their concurrent interven- 
 tion. The inevitable consequence of this misunder- 
 standing was that they weakened the force of their 
 action and wasted their strength in futile efforts to dis- 
 cover some other common ground upon which to base 
 their demands. But despite all their efforts Great 
 Britain and France did not, as will be seen, succeed in 
 discovering any ground other than that by which they 
 set so little store humanity. 
 
 Neither England or France could base its action on 
 the ground that the events in Poland were a menace to 
 national peace and security such as to justify interven- 
 tion on the generally admitted ground of self-preser- 
 
 pressions in the Austrian note prepared for concurrent pres- 
 entation, ibid, p. 861.) 
 
 In his note of August 11, Lord John Russell in reply to the 
 complaints of Prince Gortchakoff , said : " It is true, however, 
 that lively sympathy has been excited in Europe in favor of 
 the Poles. In every considerable State where there exists a 
 national representation, in England, in France, in Austria, 
 in Prussia, in Italy, in Spain, in Portugal, in Sweden, in Den- 
 mark, that sympathy has been manifested. Wherever there 
 is a national administration, the administration has shared, 
 though with prudence and reserve in expression, the feelings 
 of the legislature and the nation." (Ibid, p. 913.) 
 
 Even in Prussia, where the government had adopted Bis- 
 marck's policy of cooperation with Russia to crush out the 
 Polish insurrection, there was a strong movement in favor of 
 the Poles. In the Prussian House of Representatives, Herr 
 Waldeck said, in the course of his scathing denunciation of 
 Bismarck 's policy : ' ' There was a policy which Prussia might 
 have followed; she might in a friendly manner have offered 
 her advice to Russia, and warned her of the dangers she in- 
 curred by abandoning the road of legality and ordering the 
 barbarous conscription which has called forth the present re- 
 bellion." (British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 794, cf. ibid, p. 
 789.)
 
 104 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 vation, 42 for it was easy for the Russian vice-chancellor 
 to point out that the prolongation of the insurrection 
 was due to the material assistance and the moral sup- 
 port which the Poles received from abroad. 43 
 
 The failure of the intervening powers to police their 
 territory and to prevent the Polish patriots from using 
 it as a base of hostile operations would have to be justi- 
 fied before they were at liberty to blame Russia for 
 negligence to which they were themselves patently 
 contributory. 44 
 
 42 See below 16. In the opinion generally held by states- 
 men of that period national security or self-preservation was 
 a sufficient and the strongest justification for action which 
 otherwise would have been reprehensible interference. We do 
 not wish to appear to approve of this argument, but merely to 
 point out that it was not in point. 
 
 The peculiar situation of Austria permitted her alone to 
 derive support from this argument of national security, and 
 she did in fact use it with much force. (See British State 
 Papers, vol. 58, p. 860-1.) Earl Russel referring to the Aus- 
 trian justification on this ground remarks with seeming acqui- 
 escence: "The freedom of France and England from appre- 
 hensions of this kind is dwelt upon with marked distinctness. ' ' 
 (Ibid, p. 813.) 
 
 43 See British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 833, 880-881, 895. 897, 
 903, 907. Cf. Earl Russell's attempted rejoinder, ibid, p. 913. 
 Phillimore discusses the obligation of States to police their 
 territory and to prevent its use as a base of hostile prepara- 
 tions. See Phillimore 's Commentaries, 1 ed. 1854, Vol. I, 
 217, p. 228-230. This question is considered below under 15. 
 An accusation of a similar nature was made by Russia in 1832, 
 namely that the Polish insurrection was only sustained by the 
 hope of foreign intervention. (Cf. Nesselrode to Lieven Jan. 
 3, 1832. British State Papers, Vol. 37, p. 1434.) 
 
 44 If it should first be shown that intervention was justi- 
 fiable upon some other ground, such as the violation of treaty 
 rights or humanity, the failure of the intervening powers to 
 police their territory could then be defended as in the nature 
 of a passive or constructive intervention, or else it might have 
 been regarded as retaliatory. As we shall later show that 
 humanity was the real justification, we may rightly consider 
 that this failure of the government to prevent its territory from
 
 OPPRESSION 105 
 
 For the reasons just given, the Western Powers could 
 not make much of a case when they appealed to Rus- 
 sia to refrain from prolonging a condition which was 
 likely to disturb the peace of Europe. 45 Here also it 
 was necessary to find some ground to justify the hos- 
 
 serving as a base from which to carry on operations of war- 
 like resistance to the Russian Government was a justifiable 
 instance of negative or passive humanitarian intervention. 
 We might say humanitarian intervention by indirection, or 
 constructive humanitarian intervention. 
 
 There was perhaps some subconscious feeling of this justi- 
 fication for the failure to police the territory when in his 
 note of August 11, 1863, Earl Russell, in reply to the com- 
 plaints of Prince Gortchakoff , remarked : ' ' Unless the general 
 feeling in Poland had been estranged from Russia, the moral 
 and material assistance afforded from abroad would have 
 availed the insurgents little." (Ibid, p. 913.) 
 
 45 In his representations of March 2, 1863, Earl Russell 
 added to the treaty as a ground of justification the interest of 
 European peace. He wrote : ' ' Great Britain, therefore, as a 
 party to the treaty of 1815, and as a power deeply interested 
 in the tranquility of Europe, deems itself entitled to express 
 its opinion upon the events now taking place. ' ' (British State 
 Papers, Vol. 53, 805-6.) 
 
 The British note of April 10 contained the following : ' ' The 
 condition of things which has now for a long course of time 
 existed in Poland is a source of danger not to Russia alone, 
 but to the general peace of Europe." (Ibid, p. 865.) 
 
 The French concurrent note presented at the same date con- 
 tained similar statements as to the regrettable complications 
 likely to result from prolonged disturbances in Poland. (Ibid, 
 p. 862.) 
 
 The Austrian note may perhaps have been the source of this 
 attempt to find some common ground of action for Earl Rus- 
 sell in his instructions of April 4 to the British Ambassador 
 at Paris wrote: "But the latter part [of the communicated 
 Austrian note] appears to Her Majesty's Government very 
 important. It shadows forth ulterior consequences which, ac- 
 cording to the present views of the Russian Government, are 
 too likely to be realized. These consequences, it is declared, 
 may be calamitous to all Europe, and the conflicts which may 
 then be revived may give rise, it is said, to complications to be 
 regretted." (British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 850. The 
 Austrian note is given ibid, p. 861 ; cf. also p. 859.)
 
 106 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 tile use of their territory by the insurgents before they 
 could blame Russia for the disturbance of the Euro- 
 pean peace. Until they had absolved themselves they 
 were to be regarded as in part responsible for the dis- 
 turbance of which they complained, and this defect in 
 their logic was not lost upon Prince Gortchakoff. The 
 Russian vice-chancellor remarking upon Lord Rus- 
 sell's appeal to Russia as a member of the Society of 
 European States to fulfil her duties of comity towards 
 the other states, replied that Russia was too directly 
 interested in the peace of Poland not to appreciate its 
 international obligations. "It would be difficult," he 
 added, ' ' to affirm that she had in this respect met with 
 a scrupulous reciprocity." At the close of this note 
 he appealed to the powers who desired to see Poland 
 pacified to strive on their part to check the spread of 
 moral and physical disorders in Europe and thus to 
 remove the principal source of the disturbances which 
 alarm them for the future (see British State Papers, 
 Vol. 53, p. 897, Cf. 833, 880-1, 895, 903, 907). 
 
 Russia's disregard of the stipulation contained in 
 Article I of the Final Act of Vienna seemed to offer a 
 justifiable basis for representations in behalf of the 
 Poles. The British Government that had been mainly 
 instrumental in securing the adoption of this Article 
 in 1815, referred to it in 1863 as it had in 1832 and 
 made it the principal ground of protest against Russian 
 tyranny. (See British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 806, 
 834, 836, 863-4, 898, 912-916, 918. For action in 1831-2, 
 see ibid, Vol. 37, p. 1417, 1422, 1430, 1437, 1439-1444.) 
 
 Unfortunately this basis of action was neither wise 
 in policy nor sound in law. It was not politically ex- 
 pedient because the French Government could not be 
 expected to show much enthusiasm in supporting the 
 provisions of a treaty which was known to have been 
 dictated to France at the sword's point. There had,
 
 OPPRESSION 107 
 
 furthermore, been so many modifications and viola- 
 tions of the Treaty of Vienna that no one could be cer- 
 tain what provisions were still in force and in how 
 far any power was justified in making counterbalanc- 
 ing modifications to compensate for those which were 
 inimical to its own interests. The most serious legal 
 objection to the argument based upon the treaty was 
 the obvious fact that a treaty cannot create a right of 
 interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign in- 
 dependent state even though the government thereof 
 signs and ratifies the act or sponsion which attempts 
 in express words to confer such a right. 46 
 
 46 For a fuller discussion of this question, see below 19. 
 It is nevertheless true that a reasonable restriction of the rights 
 of a sovereign state may be incorporated in a treaty and en- 
 forced by other states when such restriction is recognized as 
 necessary for the security of all the states (see 9 and 17). 
 But it is evident from the diplomatic correspondence at the 
 time of the negotiation of the treaty that the stipulation in 
 question was not adopted as a result of any general under- 
 standing that it was for the common interest. It was adopted 
 for two other reasons : firstly and mainly, because Great Bri- 
 tain feared Russia's preponderance in the east of Europe, (see 
 British State Papers, Vol. 37, p. 1417-1420), and secondly, in 
 order to assure to the Poles reasonable recognition of their na- 
 tional aspirations. How secondary this latter consideration 
 was to Great Britain, who was mainly instrumental in securing 
 the insertion of the article, is shown by her efforts to secure a 
 complete partition of the Polish provinces rather than to per- 
 mit the organization of a quasi-independent Poland under the 
 sovereignty of Russia. (See Parliamentary Papers, 1863, 
 Vol. 75 [3188] cited above.) 
 
 It would thus appear that the main reason for the insertion 
 of the provisions in regard to Poland was to serve the political 
 object that England and France had in view, namely to pre- 
 vent Russia from acquiring full military control of Poland. 
 (See also British State Papers, Vol. 37, p. 1417-1418.) Even 
 though Russia signed the treaty, it could not give other powers 
 a right of interference on political grounds. 
 
 We shall revert again to the value of the article as a basis 
 of humanitarian intervention. In regard to the value of the
 
 108 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Although the Governments seem not to have under- 
 stood this principle of international law, their ignor- 
 ance could not save them from confusion and contra- 
 diction when they attempted to make the treaty a justi- 
 fication for acts which they would otherwise have con- 
 sidered as constituting an unjustifiable interference in 
 the internal affairs of Kussia. 
 
 It is not suprising that Prince Gortchakoff was wil- 
 ling to meet the British Government on this ground 
 which was to be sure no terra firma, but a veritable 
 quagmire (British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 896, 897; 
 ibid, Vol. 37, p. 1419, 1421, 1424, 1431-2). With a foot- 
 
 treaty as a basis of action it will be of interest to quote certain 
 passages from the diplomatic correspondence : 
 
 "In an ordinary case of civil war between a sovereign and 
 his subject, foreign states can have no grounds for interfer- 
 ence, even by advice or remonstrance; but there are circum- 
 stances peculiar to the Kingdom of Poland which make it in 
 this respect an exception to the general rule." (Palmerston 
 to Lord Heytesbury, March 22, 1831; British State Papers, 
 Vol. 37, p. 1416.) 
 
 "His Majesty's Government is fully sensible of the delicacy 
 of the questions at issue, involving, as they do, the relations 
 between a sovereign and his subjects; matters upon which, 
 under ordinary circumstances, and when those relations are 
 not interwoven with the stipulations of treaties, the most well- 
 meant and friendliest interposition must at best be of doubtful 
 expediency." (Palmerston to Lord Heytesbury, March 12, 
 1832, British State Papers, Vol. 37, p. 1436.) 
 
 But Lord Heytesbury seems to have had some understand- 
 ing of the limits of interference based upon a treaty, for in 
 his report of October 1, 1831, he writes : 
 
 ' ' Indeed, it might be impossible for foreign powers to guar- 
 antee a particular and unchangeable form of government to 
 any country." (British State Papers, Vol. 37, p. 1423.) And 
 further along in the same report Lord Heytesbury indicates 
 of how little value he considered the Article as a basis for pro- 
 test: 
 
 1 ' I have, ' ' writes the British Ambassador, ' ' been constantly 
 assured in reply, that the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna 
 will be strictly attended to, but this assurance amounts to lit- 
 tle or nothing, for the stipulations themselves amount to little 
 or nothing. ' ' ( Ibid, p. 1424. )
 
 OPPRESSION 109 
 
 ing so insecure Earl Russell could hardly succeed in 
 his battle of words to find a legal justification for the 
 British intervention. 47 
 
 But when all the specious grounds of support for 
 intervention on the basis of the Treaty of Vienna have 
 been refuted, it is still possible to consider the pro- 
 visions of Article I of the Final Act as Russia's prom- 
 ise that she would grant to the Poles such reasonable 
 recognition of their rights of self-government and 
 nationality as should accord with the prevalent senti- 
 ments of humanity. Viewed in this light, Article I of 
 the Treaty of Vienna would not authorize an unjusti- 
 fiable interference in the internal affairs of an inde- 
 pendent state, but would be merely the formulation of 
 the rights which international law guarantees to a sub- 
 ject people. In the event of a failure to grant this 
 minimum of right, any state would have the right, and 
 all the nations would have the obligation, in so far 
 as the circumstances would allow, to undertake an 
 intervention on this ground of humanity. That is for 
 the purpose of compelling the transgressing suzerain 
 
 47 Earl Russell seems to have been so ignorant of the funda- 
 mental principles of international law that he was not able 
 even to refute the preposterous argument advanced by Russia 
 that the treaty provision in favor of the Poles had been abro- 
 gated by the right of conquest after the suppression of the in- 
 surrection of 1832. (British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 864; 
 cf. ibid, vol. 37, p. 1417, 1428, 1432, 1438.) Professor Rossi 
 in his review of Wheaton's work criticizes that writer for 
 speaking of the ' ' reconquest ' ' of Poland. ' ' One does not, ' ' says 
 Rossi, "conquer oneself" (Archives de droit et de legislation, 
 Vol. I, p. 356 ; Stapleton : Intervention, p. 136-7, in a some- 
 what ambiguous statement, falls into the same error as Whea- 
 ton and Russell.)
 
 110 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 to fulfill his internationally recognized obligations to- 
 wards the Poles. 48 
 
 Again we are brought back to humanity as the basis 
 of the action against Russia which the British Govern- 
 ment vainly thought to find in the treaty alone. 
 
 Notwithstanding these attempts to find a ground of 
 justification more satisfactory than humanity, the in- 
 tervening powers did, withal, concurrently and some- 
 times incidentally, refer to considerations of humanity. 
 But they did it hesitatingly almost shamefacedly 
 as though this, the only juridical basis upon which 
 their action could be defended, was not one which 
 
 48 Even in 1832 when Great Britain and France had no in- 
 tention of doing more than intercede by friendly council in 
 favor of the Poles, the existence of Article I was of great value 
 as a formulation of Russia's obligation towards the Kingdom 
 of Poland. This appears in Lord Heytesbury 's report to Lord 
 Palmerston of January 2, 1832, in which he wrote : 
 
 ' ' It must not, however, be concluded that our efforts in favor 
 of the Poles have been entirely thrown away. It will be suf- 
 ficient to cast our eyes towards the Russo-Polish provinces 
 not included in the Kingdom of Poland, and, consequently, 
 out of the reach of foreign intervention, to be convinced of the 
 contrary. In the Kingdom of Poland, setting out of the ques- 
 tion those accused of assassination and the officers of the three 
 corps of Kaminski, Rybinski, and Ramorino, who form a class 
 apart, and who are now gradually returning to their homes, 
 upon consenting to renew their oaths of allegiance, there are 
 not above 20 individuals excluded from the amnesty, or who 
 will suffer for their political conduct. But in the Russo-Polish 
 provinces incorporated with the Empire, confiscation of prop- 
 erty, exile, or deportation to Siberia are the general lot. Not 
 an individual has been suffered to escape who took any active 
 part in the Revolution. This different measure of punish- 
 ment, though it speaks little, perhaps, in favor of the clem- 
 ency of this Government, shows clearly the effect of foreign 
 intervention. We may not have gained much; but we, at 
 least, have the consolation of reflecting that the course pur- 
 sued would have been infinitely more severe had we not taken 
 the line we did." (British State Papers, Vol. 37, p. 1430.)
 
 OPPRESSION 111 
 
 they cared to present as the real justification of their 
 intervention. 49 
 
 It is to be regretted that the right of intervention 
 upon the ground of humanity should have been so little 
 understood. If the cooperating powers had justified 
 their action upon the ground of humanity to prevent 
 the oppression of the Poles, they might have overcome 
 every argument of Russia, and they would have had 
 back of them a very strong popular support in all parts 
 
 49 Earl Russell in his note of March 2, to the Russian Gov- 
 ernment expressed similar views: ''However much Her 
 Majesty's Government might lament the existence of such a 
 miserable state of things in a foreign country, they would not, 
 perhaps, deem it expedient to give formal expression to their 
 sentiments, were it not that there are peculiarities in the 
 present state of things in Poland which take them out of the 
 usual and ordinary condition of such affairs." (Ibid, p. 806.) 
 The peculiarities referred to were, of course, the provisions of 
 the Treaty of Vienna. 
 
 Lord Russell, in his note of April 10 to Russia, repudiates 
 completely any right of intervention upon grounds of human- 
 ity alone when he admits that in the absence of treaty stipu- 
 lations the constitutional rights of the Poles might have been 
 declared forfeited after the suppression of their revolt. 
 (British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 864.) 
 
 In a preceding portion of this same note Earl Russell may, 
 perhaps, be considered by implication to deny humanity as a 
 basis for intervention when he indicates that the sympathy 
 of public opinion would have justified an "appeal" that is, 
 friendly intercession "to the generous and benevolent feel- 
 ings of His Imperial Majesty." Similar disclaimers of any 
 right of intervention on the ground of humanity made in 
 1832 will be found in an extract already quoted. (See Pal- 
 merston to Lord Heytesbury March 12, 1832, British State 
 Papers, Vol. 37, p. 1436.) 
 
 In his note of February 21, to the French Ambassador at 
 London, M. Drouyn de Lhuys remarks of the disturbances 
 prior to Prussia's interference by the signing of the Aven- 
 sleben Agreement : ' ' The lamentable incidents of the resist- 
 ance of the population to a measure of internal administration 
 could as yet only be regarded from a humanitarian view- 
 point." The "only" is here significant. (British State Pa- 
 pers, Vol. 53, p. 809.)
 
 112 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 of Europe. On this firm foundation, the intervening 
 governments could have cooperated to secure the ends 
 which they had in view. All the subtle and specious 
 exchange of arguments could have been brushed aside, 
 and Russia by her acts would have stood forth as a 
 transgressor of the law of nations until such time as 
 she was ready to conform to that law by granting the 
 Poles a reasonable autonomy and recognition of their 
 national aspirations. 
 
 Even although the intervening governments were un- 
 mindful of the true justification of their intervention, 
 the statesmen directing the affairs of the intervening 
 states seem to have felt out the law which they did not 
 understand. By their acts they were carrying out un- 
 wittingly what we must consider to be clearly an in- 
 stance of intervention on the ground of humanity. 
 Gropingly and in a blundering fashion the cooperating 
 powers felt their way along the right path. In their 
 notes amidst irrelevant and extraneous verbiage we 
 find embedded the arguments necessary to justify their 
 action upon humanitarian grounds. 
 
 To make this clear and to state more precisely the 
 grounds of the action taken, we need only to reproduce 
 a few extracts selected from the various notes of pro- 
 test. 
 
 The repeated reference to humanitarian considera- 
 tions which we find in the representations of the cooper- 
 ating powers were not confined to any one of the classes 
 of acts which may be considered to justify humanitari- 
 an intervention, but the principal aim of their action 
 was to prevent the oppression of the Poles through the 
 abusive denial to them of a reasonable degree of au- 
 tonomy and the right to the retention of their language 
 and racial or religious institutions. 80 
 
 "^PROLONGED DISTURBANCES: In addition to pro- 
 tests against the oppression of the Poles, the intervening
 
 OPPRESSION 113 
 
 As a fitting conclusion to this examination we can do 
 no better than to reproduce the attempts to formulate 
 and define the nature of Russia's obligation to refrain 
 from the oppression of her Polish subjects : 
 
 states justified their action upon the ground of the recurrence 
 and prolongation of disturbances in Poland : 
 
 The French note of April contained the following: "The 
 characteristic of the agitation in Poland, M. le Due, that 
 which makes their exceptional gravity, is that they are not 
 the result of a passing crisis. Effects which are reproduced 
 in almost every generation cannot be attributed to purely ac- 
 cidental causes. These convulsions, which have become peri- 
 odical, are the symptom of an inveterate evil ; they bear witness 
 to the impotence of the combinations which have been hitherto 
 devised in order to reconcile the kingdom of Poland with the 
 situation which has been created for it." (British State Pa- 
 pers, Vol. 53, p. 862 ; Translation in Parliamentary Papers, 
 Vol. 75, Poland [3150] No. 136.) 
 
 The British note presented at the same time declared : ' ' The 
 disturbances which are perpetually breaking out among the 
 Polish subjects of His Imperial Majesty necessarily produce 
 a serious agitation of opinion in other countries of Europe, 
 tending to excite much anxietj 7 in the minds of their Govern- 
 ments, and which might, under possible circumstances, pro- 
 duce complications of the most serious nature." (Ibid, p. 
 865.) 
 
 In the previous British note of March 2nd, we find : ' ' Since 
 1832, however, a state of uneasiness and discontent has been 
 succeeded from time to time by violent commotion and a use- 
 less effusion of blood." (Ibid, p. 806.) 
 
 ANARCHY : Still another ground of justification was the 
 anarchy in Poland and the violations of the rules of civilized 
 warfare. 
 
 This ground was taken by Earl Russell in his conversation 
 with Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador. "In a former 
 conversation," writes Earl Russell in his dispatch of April 
 10, "I had said to him that I could not be surprised that men 
 driven to despair should commit wild deeds of revenge, or 
 that the ferocious disciples of Mazzini should be guilty of as- 
 sassinations ; but that the acts of atrocity committed by the 
 disciplined army of Russia excited, on the part of Her 
 Majesty's Government, surprise as well as horror. Baron 
 Brunnow had replied that dreadful crimes of savage cruelty 
 had been perpetrated by the insurgents, and had given rise to 
 8
 
 114 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 The first document is Article I of the Final Act of 
 the Congress of Vienna (see above, p. 91) in which the 
 Poles were promised a constitutional union with Russia 
 and a "distinct administration." The Poles were 
 
 acts of retaliation. He informed me yesterday that General 
 Berg would take command of the Russian army in Poland. He 
 said that General Berg was an able commander, and was likely 
 by his military arrangements to put an end to the insurrection. 
 I replied that if General Berg was, as I believed, an officer of 
 high repute, I hoped he would restore discipline in the Russian 
 army in Poland, and punish those acts of insubordination and 
 barbarous violence, which had hitherto been unrestrained. 
 Baron Brunnow denied the truth of the stories in circulation 
 upon this subject. (British State Papers, vol. 53, p. 866.) 
 
 We quote another passage from the same dispatch in which 
 Earl Russell relates how he qualified the assurances which he 
 had just given Baron Brunnow as to the pacific nature of the 
 communication about to be made to Russia: 
 
 "But the state of things might change. The present over- 
 ture of Her Majesty's Government might be rejected as the 
 representations of the 2nd of March had been rejected by the 
 Imperial Government. The insurrection in Poland might 
 continue and might assume larger proportions; the atroci- 
 ties on both sides might be aggravated and extended to a wider 
 range of country. If in such a state of affairs the Emperor 
 of Russia were to take no steps of a conciliatory nature, dangers 
 and complications might arise not at present in contempla- 
 tion." (British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 866-7.) 
 
 The Spanish Government in their appeal to Russia ' ' to pur- 
 sue a conciliatory and merciful course" cited their own ex- 
 perience of civil wars, and remarked "that popular discon- 
 tents cannot be suppressed by severity alone." (British State 
 Papers, Vol. 53, p. 874.) 
 
 From Vienna Lord Bloomfield reported: "Much has been 
 said of the want of discipline amongst the Russian troops 
 in Poland, and to the almost total disregard of the authority 
 of the officers are attributed most of the frightful massacres 
 that are each day reported in the newspapers." (British 
 State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 841.) In the same report Lord 
 Bloomfield inclosed a translation from the Fremden Blatt 
 giving details of these atrocities. (Ibid, p. 840-842.) 
 
 Lord Palmerston's instructions of November 23, 1831, to 
 Lord Heytesbury contained the following criticism of methods 
 employed by Russia in suppressing the insurrection of 1831-2 :
 
 OPPRESSION 115 
 
 further promised "Representation and national in- 
 stitutions " which were, it is true, by the terms of the 
 Act to be " regulated according to the degree of politi- 
 cal consideration that each of the governments to which 
 they belong shall judge expedient and proper to grant 
 them." 51 
 
 ' ' From the submission of the Poles to the arms of His Im- 
 perial Majesty, Europe looks for the reestablishment of law 
 and justice, and not for acts of retaliation and vengeance; 
 since whatever excuse such acts may find in the troubles of an 
 intestine war, they could not be palliated if resorted to by a 
 power which has subdued all opposition, and which cannot 
 plead for its measures the necessity of any pressing emer- 
 gency." (British State Papers, Vol. 37, p. 1428.) 
 
 Secretary Seward wrote to Mr. Motley, July 14, 1863 : ' ' The 
 European states suffer long and forbear much with a nation 
 that falls under the affliction of civil war, if it be only near 
 home. They are very intolerant of a nation, on this continent, 
 that suffers its domestic wrangles to break the peace of the 
 world." (Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Part II, p. 926.) 
 
 HUMANITY : In certain passages of the diplomatic corre- 
 spondence we find allusions to humanity as the justification 
 for the representations without any specifications as to the 
 particular action considered to violate the principles of hu- 
 manity. (See British State Papers, Vol. 37, p. 1426; Ibid, 
 Vol. 53, p. 813.) 
 
 51 In his note of August 11, Earl Russell wrote: "The Em- 
 press Catherine in 1772 promised to the Poles the maintenance 
 of their religion. The Emperor Alexander I in 1815 prom- 
 ised to the Poles national representation and national adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 "These promises have not been fulfilled. During many 
 years the religion of the Poles was attacked, and to the pres- 
 ent hour they are not in possession of the political rights as- 
 sured to them by the Treaty of 1815 and the constitution of the 
 same year." (British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 913.) 
 
 Discussing Russia 's obligation under Article I with especial 
 reference to the terms "representation" and "national insti- 
 tutions," Prince Gortchakoff in a conversation reported by 
 Lord Napier remarked " . . .that under this Article the Rus- 
 sian Government remained the absolute arbiter of the form in 
 which the representation and national institutions of Poland 
 should be framed. The Emperor Alexander I, using his in- 
 disputable prerogative in a liberal and even in an enthusiastic
 
 116 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 The overt acts by which Russia oppressed the Poles 
 were well described by Lord Palmerston in a dispatch 
 to Lord Durham, July 3, 1832 : 
 
 "The Treaties of 1815, to which Russia was a party 
 (not only the General Act of Congress of Vienna, but 
 the separate Treaty between Russia and Prussia), 
 clearly stipulate that the nationality of the Poles shall 
 
 sense, had, some time after the conclusion of the Treaty re- 
 ferred to, spontaneously granted to the Kingdom of Poland a 
 Representative Constitution which had not proved consistent 
 with the peace and welfare either of Poland or Russia. That 
 Constitution had never been imparted to foreign Powers as 
 involving the execution of international engagements. We all 
 know under what circumstances it had perished. What the 
 Emperor Alexander did in the plenitude of his power, his 
 successor in the exercise of the same power could revoke. The 
 present Emperor, ever faithful to the principles of govern- 
 ment which he applied in Russia, had applied these principles 
 in Poland too, and perhaps in a larger measure than had been 
 granted in any other portion of his dominions. The political 
 Constitution proclaimed in Poland in the year 1861 embodied 
 a complete autonomy, national institutions with a modified 
 representation adapted to the form of political existence in 
 force under the Imperial Government. Poland was now ruled 
 by institutions purely Polish. There was a directing Minister, 
 a Pole, entertaining national sentiments of the most decided 
 character; a Council of Administration composed of Poles; 
 a Council of State containing Poles taken from the several 
 ecclesiastical and civil orders of the community, and embody- 
 ing some representative elements, in which general laws for the 
 welfare of the Kingdom were elaborated; there were pro- 
 vincial, district, and municipal councils in descending order, 
 all purely elective, charged with the local and material inter- 
 ests of the country. This national representation was not cast 
 in the same mould as that which was designed by the Em- 
 peror Alexander, or that which existed in England, but it 
 formed, nevertheless, a system of national and representative 
 institutions adapted to the condition of Poland and its rela- 
 tions with Russia. Her Majesty's Government, composed of 
 practical statesmen, the representatives of a practical nation, 
 would not surely contend that there was only one valid and 
 useful form of political institutions equally applicable to all 
 countries, that, namely, which existed in England, and which
 
 OPPEESSION 117 
 
 be preserved. But statements have reached His Maj- 
 esty's Government which, if true, tend to show a de- 
 liberate intention on the part of the Russian Govern- 
 ment to break down the nationality of Poland, and to 
 deprive it of everything which, either in outward form 
 or in real substance, gives to its people the character 
 of a separate nation. 
 
 ' ' The abolition of the Polish colors ; the introduction 
 of the Russian language into public acts ; the removal 
 to Russia of the national library, and public collections 
 containing bequests made by individuals upon specific 
 condition that they never should be taken out of the 
 Kingdom of Poland; the suppression of schools and 
 other establishments for public instruction; the re- 
 moval of a great number of children to Russia on the 
 pretence of educating them at the public expense ; the 
 transportation of whole families to the interior of 
 Russia; the extent and severity of the military con- 
 scription; the large introduction of Russians into the 
 
 was successful there. Nor would Her Majesty's Government, 
 which professed non-intervention as the rule of their foreign 
 policy, deviate from that principle now by interfering in the 
 domestic concerns of another State. The Kingdom of Poland 
 enjoyed an absolute administrative independence. Even the 
 Department for Polish Affairs in the Russian capital had been 
 abolished. The only institution common to the two countries 
 now was the army. The new institutions granted to Poland, 
 alluded to above, opened a wide field of activity and material 
 prosperity to the country. But this was not all. The Imperial 
 Government, in restoring the educational establishments of the 
 Kingdom, had offered to the people the resources of intellec- 
 tual culture and satisfaction. If to these institutions we added 
 the guarantee by which they were all preserved, the personal 
 character of the Emperor, who cherished an equal solicitude 
 for the good of all his subjects, we should have a sufficient 
 security for the future welfare of Poland, though the scheme 
 might exclude the peculiar form of Representative Government 
 applied in Great Britain, and perhaps exclusively appropri- 
 ate to its condition." (British State Papers, vol. 53, p. 834-5.)
 
 118 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 ^-*PP 
 
 public employments in Poland; the interference with 
 the National Church ; all these appear to be symptoms 
 of a deliberate intention to obliterate the political 
 nationality of Poland, and gradually to convert it into 
 a Russian province." (British State Papers, vol. 37, 
 p. 1440.) 
 
 In response to Prince Gortchakoff 's intimation that 
 Russia was ' * ready to enter upon an exchange of ideas 
 upon the ground and within the limits of the Treaty 
 of 1815," Earl Russell before making any definite 
 proposals found it "essential" so he said to point out 
 that there were "two leading principles upon which," 
 as it appeared to the British Government, "any future 
 government of Poland ought to rest" (British State 
 Papers, Vol. 53, p. 898). 
 
 Earl Russell states the first of these to be: " . . .the 
 establishment of confidence in the government on the 
 part of the governed" (Ibid, p. 898). Earl Russell 
 then referred to the views of Alexander I relative to 
 Poland and laid particular emphasis upon the expres- 
 sion " . . with a national administration congenial to 
 the sentiments of the people, ' ' which the Tsar had used 
 in describing his plan for erecting the Duchy of War- 
 saw ' ' together with the Polish provinces formerly dis- 
 membered into a kingdom under the dominion of Rus- 
 sia" (British State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 898). 
 
 "The next [second] principle of order and stabili- 
 ty," Earl Russell considered to be: " . . .the suprem- 
 acy of law over arbitrary will" (Ibid, p. 899). Con- 
 tinuing, Earl Russell said: "Where such supremacy 
 exists, the subject or citizen may enjoy his property or 
 exercise his industry in peace, and the security he feels 
 as an individual will be felt in its turn by the govern- 
 ment under which he lives.
 
 OPPRESSION 119 
 
 " Partial tumults, secret conspiracies, and the inter- 
 ference of cosmopolite strangers will not shake the 
 firm edifice of such a government 52 . (Ibid, p. 899.) 
 
 Under the circumstances then existing Earl Russell 
 stated that it appeared to his government that ''noth- 
 ing less than the following outline of measures should 
 be adopted as the basis of pacification. 
 
 ' ' 1. Complete and general amnesty. 
 
 * * 2. National representation, with powers similar to 
 those which are fixed by the Charter of the 15th-27th 
 November, 1815. 
 
 "3. Poles to be named to public offices in such a 
 manner as to form a distinct national Administration, 
 having the confidence of the country. 
 
 "4. Full and entire liberty of conscience; repeal of 
 the restrictions imposed on Catholic worship. 
 
 52 This statement of Earl Russell does not seem quite in har- 
 mony with his frank admission to the Austrian Ambassador, 
 Count Apponyi, that it might be necessary ultimately to re- 
 store the independence of Poland (British State Papers, Vol. 
 53, p. 831; cf. similar statement by Gortchakoff, ibid, p. 833). 
 In the course of this same conversation as reported by Earl 
 Russell himself he also outlined his ideas as to what was nec- 
 essary to pacify Poland as follows: "Russia could only gov- 
 ern Poland in one of two ways. The one was that of the Em- 
 peror Nicholas, that of keeping her submissive and degraded ; 
 extinguishing her language ; compelling her by force to change 
 her religion. This mode was repugnant to all received notions 
 of justice and clemency. 
 
 ' ' The other was the mode of Alexander I : protecting her 
 from the hatred and revenge of the Russians, by giving her 
 the guarantee of popular institutions and a local administra- 
 tion entirely separate from that of Russia. 
 
 "Nothing less would suffice. The late conscription was a 
 proof of it. The law of recruitment of 1859 was a fair and just 
 law; but it was wanting in some formality, and when it 
 suited the despotism of Russia to substitute an arbitrary, un- 
 just, and cruel measure for the equal law which had been pro- 
 claimed, there was not a moment's hesitation in doing so. I 
 conceived there was no middle line between a system of oppres- 
 sion and a system of free and just government." (British 
 State Papers, Vol. 53, p. 831, Cf. ibid, p. 865, 874.)
 
 120 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 "5. The Polish language recognized in the Kingdom 
 as the official language, and used as such in the admin- 
 istration of the law and in education. 
 
 "6. The establishment of a regular and legal system 
 of recruiting. 
 
 "These 6 points might," Earl Russell added, "serve 
 as the indications of measures to be adopted, after 
 calm and full deliberation. 
 
 "But it is difficult, nay, almost impossible, to create 
 the requisite confidence and calm while the passions of 
 men are becoming daily more excited, their hatreds 
 more deadly, their determination to succeed or perish 
 more fixed and immovable" (British State Papers, 
 vol.53, p. 899-900). 
 
 The British Government speaking through Viscount 
 Castlereagh, Viscount Palmerston and Earl Russell 
 defined the limitations which international law placed 
 upon Russia to prevent the oppression of her Polish 
 subjects and to assure to them a reasonable recogni- 
 tion of their national institutions and aspirations. 
 
 In so far as these limitations to prevent that abusive 
 use of power which we call oppression were correctly 
 stated they will apply to and will limit the action of 
 any empire over the alien races and peoples held under 
 its paramount authority. 
 
 It is natural to apply them now to Ireland and to see 
 in how far Great Britain has herself observed the rules 
 which she proposed in the case of Poland. 
 
 The United States, in 1898, intervened in Cuba on 
 the ground of humanity to put an end to the shocking 
 treatment which the military authorities were inflict- 
 ing upon the non-combatant population in their futile 
 efforts to suppress the insurrection. 53 This humani- 
 tarian intervention was undertaken in response to the 
 
 63 "And, thirdly, there is the argument based upon the 
 claims of humanity. So long as the rules of civilized warfare
 
 OPPRESSION 121 
 
 widespread feeling that the stubborn and prolonged 
 resistance of the Cubans justified their claim to a larger 
 measure of independence than Spain seemed willing to 
 
 were observed, so long, that is, as the non-combatant popula- 
 tion was not interfered with, there was little choice between 
 the two parties. Occasional atrocities might be committed 
 by either side, but neither side was so conspicuous a sinner as 
 to warrant outside interference. The Cubans at least held 
 their own. But there came a change of policy. The non-com- 
 batant country population was forced to settle within the 
 range of the guns of the Spanish intrenched in the towns, and 
 there, destitute of food, or of the means of growing or getting 
 food, it starved." (T. S. Woolsey, America's Foreign Policy, 
 p. 63-4; see also Moore's Digest, VII : 212 f.) 
 
 The correspondence relative to the treatment of the Cuban 
 insurrectionists during the long struggle of 1868-1878 touches 
 upon the same question of humanitarian intervention. Secre- 
 tary Fish even went so far as to take the initial steps look- 
 ing toward a collective action by the powers. See Secretary 
 Fish's dispatch No. 266 to Mr. Gushing, 1875, printed by 
 Chadwick (Diplomatic Relations with Spain, p. 375). Cap- 
 tain Mahan says of the action of the United States in 1898 : 
 "...when we ourselves last year, rejected intermediation, 
 loosed the bonds from Cuba, and lifted the yoke from the neck 
 of the oppressed." (Some Neglected Aspects of War, p. 44; 
 cf. ibid, p. 74-5.) 
 
 In a campaign speech (August 28, 1920), President then 
 Senator Harding, quoting from his speech in the Senate 
 (April 4, 1917), said of American intervention in Cuba : "We 
 unsheathed the sword some eighteen years ago for the first 
 time in the history of the world in the name of humanity, and 
 we gave proof to the world at that time of an unselfish nation. ' ' 
 (Reported in the N. Y. Sun, August 29, 1920.) Mr. Harding 
 was probably referring to the extraordinary disinterestedness 
 of our action when he called this humanitarian intervention 
 the first instance in the history of the world, for certainly he 
 must have been aware of the many other instances of humani- 
 tarian intervention which have occurred. 
 
 This intervention has sometimes been classed erroneously 
 I believe as an instance of self-help for the purpose of re- 
 moving an international nuisance. We have already entered 
 into a discussion of this theory, see above 8.
 
 122 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 accord. 54 The United States had other grounds for 
 intervening, as will generally be found to be the case 
 in instances of intervention for humanity. 65 
 
 The most recent case in which a popular appeal for 
 intervention on the ground of humanity to prevent 
 what is alleged to be the ruthless suppression of rea- 
 sonable nationalistic aspirations is that of Ireland. 
 The student will find it interesting to apply the lan- 
 guage of the intervening powers in Poland in 1863 to 
 the case of Ireland in 1921. There have been undoubted 
 
 "... it is probable that endless negotiation would never 
 have brought Sagasta and the Queen Regent to an admission 
 of Cuban independence." (T. S. Woolsey: America's For- 
 eign Policy, p. 83.) 
 
 65 " These are the three justifying reasons, then, for inter- 
 vention for the attempt by national action, to heal this open 
 sore : the burden of neutrality ; the dictates of our commer- 
 cial interests; the call of humanity. Any one of these is 
 strong; together they are very nearly convincing." (T. S. 
 Woolsey, America's Foreign Policy, p. 64-5.) 
 
 The Joint Resolution of Congress approved April 20, 1898, 
 justified the American intervention in the following words : 
 
 "Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for 
 more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own 
 borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the 
 United States, have been a disgrace to civilization, culminating 
 as they have in the destruction of a United States battleship, 
 with two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while 
 on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer 
 be endured . . . . " 
 
 It is further to be noted that this same resolution, instead 
 of referring to the rights of the United States to redress, pro- 
 ceeds, after the recognition of the independence of Cuba, to 
 declare, "Second, that it is the duty of the United States to 
 demand and the Government of the United States hereby de- 
 mand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its 
 authority and government of the island of Cuba, and with- 
 draw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. ' ' 
 
 The diplomatic correspondence exchanged between the two 
 governments shows clearly that the motive of humanity was 
 never lost from view, although it is true that the United States 
 repeatedly referred to its own interests as a justification for 
 the numerous protests which it presented to the Spanish Gov- 
 ernment.
 
 OPPRESSION 123 
 
 injustices and abuses of force to record in the long and 
 miserable history of British rule in Ireland. There 
 have been periodic outbreaks and insurrections, and 
 usually there have been acts of reprisal and barbarity 
 on both sides, so that we may fairly say that the pre- 
 sumption that Great Britain has treated Ireland with 
 due consideration is shaken to such a degree as to per- 
 mit other states to examine the question whether it is 
 not incumbent upon them to intervene. To answer this 
 query it will be necessary to decide whether the fault 
 lies with Great Britain for the continuance of an un- 
 just treatment or for the failure to act with sufficient 
 promptness in according necessary reforms. 56 
 
 The Irish element in the United States and their 
 sympathizers, including of course all the strongly anti- 
 British groups, have brought to bear upon the govern- 
 ment a powerful influence for intervention, but it would 
 appear that they have met with no success beyond the 
 adoption of resolutions in Congress. At the time of the 
 discussion of the ratification of the Versailles Peace 
 Treaty with Germany, the following reservation (No. 
 
 56 The answer to this question will vary with the examiner 's 
 prejudices. Perhaps an unbiased observer would find that 
 the British Government has been generous and expeditious in 
 reforms and projects for granting the fullest possible measure 
 of autonomy to the Irish. We have to remember that Eng- 
 land's national security requires that she should prevent Ire- 
 land 's serving as a fulcrum for the lever of any hostile power. 
 Furthermore, the principles of justice repel the idea that the 
 less numerous but more thrifty and prosperous Protestants 
 should be handed over to the control of the Catholic majority. 
 There is another consideration, which is the determination of in 
 how far Irish support of Great Britain's enemies in the last 
 war should give her reason to pause in granting larger oppor- 
 tunities for mischief in the event of another war. It is doubt- 
 ful, if Ulster were not given over, whether the Irish would be 
 satisfied with any measure short of absolute independence, and 
 an independence of which they should have all the advantages 
 and none of the burdens.
 
 124 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 15) was amongst those adopted: "In consenting to 
 the ratification of the Treaty with Germany the United 
 States adheres to the principle of self-determination 
 and to the resolution of sympathy with the aspirations 
 of the Irish people for a government of their own choice 
 adopted by the Senate June 6, 1919, and declares that 
 when such government is attained by Ireland, a con- 
 summation it is hoped is at hand, it should promptly 
 be admitted as a member of the League of Nations." 57 
 
 We shall discuss the justification of such action more 
 fully when we consider the limits which the principle of 
 non-interference imposes (see below, 13.) 
 
 Sir Edward S. Creasy has formulated the ground 
 of justification for intervention in favor of self-de- 
 termination : 
 
 "Where we intervene in behalf of a grievously op- 
 pressed people, which has never amalgamated with its 
 oppressors as one nation, and which its oppressors 
 have systematically treated as a alien race, subject to 
 the same imperial authority, but in other respects dis- 
 tinct, the distinction being the distinction between the 
 privileged and burdened, between honored and de- 
 graded, between fully protected and ill protected by 
 law in primordial rights of security for person and 
 
 57 The above resolution was offered by Senator Gerry, on 
 March 18, and adopted by a vote of 38 yeas to 36 nays, and it 
 became Reservation No. 15 to the treaty. An attempt by 
 Senator Thomas to add to the reservation a declaration of 
 sympathy with Korea was rejected by a vote of 34 yeas to 
 36 nays. A motion by Senator Lodge to amend it by omitting 
 the clause declaring the adherence of the United States to the 
 principle of self-determination was rejected by a vote of 37 
 yeas to 42 nays, and upon being later moved in the Senate 
 by Mr. Calder the same motion was laid on the table by a vote 
 of 51 to 30. Senator Sterling attempted in the Senate to 
 strike from the reservation the words "a consummation it is 
 hoped is at hand ' ' but the attempt failed by a vote of 70 to 
 11." (Note by George A. Finch: International Conciliation 
 pamphlets No. 153, p. 407-8.)
 
 UNCIVILIZED WAEFARE 125 
 
 property and the distinction being hereditary, per- 
 manent, and practical. 
 
 ''And even when a case appears to fall within this 
 third class of exceptions, we must scrutinize it very 
 carefully, before we admit it to that character; and 
 great care must be taken lest there be a violation of the 
 principles of rights of property, of dominion, or of 
 Empire, whether acquired by compact or by prescrip- 
 tion..." 
 
 * * Before we approve of Intervention in behalf of an 
 oppressed subject race, it ought to be clear that the 
 non-amalgamation of the two races has been due en- 
 tirely to the haughty injustice of the dominant race, 
 and that no fair hope of equal laws and equal franchises 
 has been held out to the subjugated and down-trodden 
 nation. Unless these limitations to the exception are 
 strictly attended to, interventions in behalf of what it 
 is now common to term oppressed nationalities are 
 likely to prove the sources of as much unjust war and 
 misery to mankind, as have ever been brought about by 
 interventions in behalf of what used to be termed the 
 right divine of kings, and of the sacred cause of legiti- 
 mate government." (E. S. Creasy: First Platform of 
 International Law, p. 303-4.) 
 
 It will be noticed from the context that Creasy im- 
 plies that intervention would only be justifiable when 
 undertaken to help an oppressed race to resist new acts 
 of tyranny and encroachments upon its rights, but no 
 state would be justified in inciting a subject people to 
 revolt against existing wrongs or inveterate abuses. 
 
 8(c). UNCIVILIZED WARFARE 
 
 We have already seen that violations of the laws of 
 war, in a conflict between nations are, when sufficiently 
 serious or numerous, a just ground for the intervention
 
 126 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 of third states. In the case of civil wars or insurrec- 
 tions, similar violations have frequently led to inter- 
 vention on the ground of humanity. Even Hall (4 ed., 
 92, p. 303), who is so severe a critic of humanitarian 
 intervention, seems to admit internecine war as a cause 
 which would be an exception to the general rule that 
 "a state must be allowed to work out its internal 
 changes in its own fashion." 
 
 Sheldon Amos, speaking of insurrection, says: 
 "Gross acts of inhumanity persisted in on either side 
 may, on grounds of humanity, properly precipitate in- 
 tervention." (Amos: Political and Legal Remedies 
 for War, 1880, p. 158. See also Heffter, Europaeisches 
 Voelkerrecht, 46.) 
 
 The collective intervention of England, France and 
 Russia to put a stop to the long civil war in Greece 
 (1827) was timed to prevent the complete sub- 
 jugation of the Greek people, and for that reason 
 the motive of the intervention would seem to have been 
 to protect the rights of self-determination, rather than 
 to put an end to the conflict and the uncivilized methods 
 by which it was conducted. 58 But it has usually been 
 classed as an instance of humanitarian intervention 
 upon this latter ground, and in deference to the many 
 
 58 The case of Greece is precisely similar to that of Belgium. 
 Greece never achieved a de facto independence; on the con- 
 trary, at the moment of the European intervention, the Greek 
 patriots were on the point of succumbing. The European 
 Powers did not recognize, they saved Greece. As a matter of 
 European policy, they thought fit to act in a manner decidedly 
 hostile towards Turkey. The battle of Navarino may have 
 been an 'untoward event,' but it was the natural and almost 
 inevitable consequence of a forcible intervention to prevent the 
 Turkish Government from reducing its subjects to submis- 
 sion." (Historicus [Sir Vernon Harcourt] on International 
 Law, 1863, p. 6.)
 
 UNCIVILIZED WARFARE 127 
 
 authorities who have considered it as such we will so 
 treat it. 59 
 
 In 1875 and 1876, Europe was deeply stirred by a re- 
 currence in Turkey of persecutions and outrages. Mr. 
 Morley has described the situation as follows : * ' Fierce 
 revolt against intolerable misrule slowly blazed up in 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a rising in Bulgaria, not 
 dangerous in itself, was put down by Turkish troops 
 dispatched for the purpose from Constantinople, with 
 deeds described by the British agent who investigated 
 them on the spot, as the most heinous crimes that had 
 stained the history of the century. The consuls of 
 France and Germany at Salonica were murdered by 
 the Turkish mob. Servia and Montenegro were in 
 arms. Moved by these symptoms of a vast confla- 
 
 59 Strauch (Interventionslehre, p. 277), says the powers in- 
 tervened because of the way in which Ibrahim Pasha conduct- 
 ed the war. 
 
 Oppenheim says: "Thus Great Britain, France, and Rus- 
 sia intervened in 1827 in the struggle between revolutionary 
 Greece and Turkey, because public opinion was horrified at 
 the cruelties committed during this struggle. " (International 
 Law, Vol. I, p. 194 ; cf . also Creasy : First Platform of Inter- 
 national Law, p. 300-301 and notes.) 
 
 Stapleton expresses a similar opinion : "It was not until 
 the mode in which hostilities were conducted by the Turkish 
 general, Ibrahim Pacha, became at variance with the recog- 
 nized rules of civilized warfare, so as to give every European 
 State a right of war against Turkey, that he entertained the 
 idea of a forcible intervention. It was evident that the Pacha 
 was carrying on a war of extermination wherever there was 
 the slightest resistence, he massacred all the males, and sent 
 the women and children into slavery in Egypt. He was labor- 
 ing to blot out of existence a whole Christian people, and to 
 establish a new Barbary State on the shores of the Mediter- 
 ranean, in the very midst of Europe. Mr. Canning held this 
 to be a casus belli, giving all nations a right to interfere by 
 force, and accordingly he consented to the Greek treaty, which 
 admitted of a forcible interference, if necessary to prevent the 
 consummation of this atrocious design." (A. G. Stapleton: 
 Intervention, p. 32.)
 
 128 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 gration, the three imperial courts of Russia, Austria, 
 and Germany agreed upon an instrument imposing on 
 the Turk certain reforms, to be carried out under 
 European supervision. To this instrument, known as 
 the Berlin memorandum, England, along with France 
 and Italy, was invited to adhere (May 13). The two 
 other Powers assented, but Mr. Disraeli and his cabinet 
 refused a proceeding that, along with more positive 
 acts, was taken by the Turk and other people to assure 
 the moral support of Great Britain to the Ottoman, and 
 probably to threaten military support against the Rus- 
 sian. 
 
 "This rejection of the Berlin memorandum in May 
 marked the first decisive moment in British policy." 
 (Morley : Life of Gladstone, Vol. II, p. 548-9.) 
 
 The atrocities committed by the Turks stirred the 
 sympathy of the people in all parts of Europe. In 
 Russia the sentiment for intervention was especially 
 strong because of the deep religious feeling of the 
 masses and the traditional hatred of the Turk. Fur- 
 thermore, the Russian Government in lending its sup- 
 port might with reason expect to secure some rights 
 of protection over the Christian population of Turkey 
 an aim it had long cherished. But in Great Britain 
 the Disraeli government was not willing to see Turkey 
 in any danger of coming under the control of Russia, 
 and Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs, turned a deaf ear to all appeals for coopera- 
 tion to organize collective intervention on the ground 
 of humanity. 
 
 The governments of Russia, Austria, and Germany 
 tried at first to draw up a plan of reform, and sub- 
 mitted it to Great Britain, France, and Italy. The two 
 latter accepted, but Lord Derby hesitated until it was 
 found that the Sultan was willing to accept the project 
 (Andrassy Note, January 31, 1876). Then came the
 
 UNCIVILIZED WARFARE 129 
 
 murders of the French and German Consuls at Salon- 
 ica, and the three imperial governments agreed upon 
 the Berlin memorandum. It was accepted by France 
 and Italy, but Lord Derby declined and the memoran- 
 dum was never presented. 
 
 Early in July, 1876, Servia and Montenegro, pre- 
 viously restrained by Russia, declared war on Turkey. 
 In the course of the negotiations for an armistice, Rus- 
 sia mobilized 200,000 men on the Turkish frontier. The 
 next step was a conference of the powers in Constanti- 
 nople, December, 1876, to January, 1877, at which Lord 
 Salisbury represented Great Britain. This conference 
 broke up without reaching any result. 
 
 After the close of the conference, the Porte entered 
 into negotiations with the revolted provinces of Servia 
 and Montenegro. The great powers meanwhile signed, 
 March 31, 1877, an agreement known as the London 
 Protocol, which set forth the conclusions of the powers 
 relative to the pacification of the Turkish provinces. 
 But Lord Derby accompanied his signature with the 
 following declaration: "Inasmuch as it is solely in 
 the interests of European peace that Her Britannic 
 Majesty's Government have consented to sign the 
 protocol proposed by that of Russia, it is understood 
 beforehand that in the event of the object proposed 
 not being attained, namely, reciprocal disarmament on 
 the part of Russia and Turkey, and peace between 
 them, the protocol in question shall be regarded as 
 null and void." (Foreign Relations, 1877, p. 573.) 
 After such an invitation, it was not to be expected that 
 the Turkish government would do other than reject the 
 terms of the powers. 
 
 The Disraeli government was evidently sparing no 
 effort to shield the Turk and to minimize the crimes of 
 
 9
 
 130 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 which he was guilty. 60 Lord Granville wrote Glad- 
 stone (February 27, 1877, Life of Lord Granville by 
 
 80 The important confidential correspondence recently pub- 
 lished in the 6th volume of Buckle 's Life of Disraeli shows that 
 the British Premier was unfortunately committed to defend- 
 ing Turkey against the outcry at the Bulgarian atrocities be- 
 fore he knew the truth of the accusations. It was natural that 
 he should rely upon being informed by the British Ambassador, 
 Sir H. Elliott (Buckle's Life of Disraeli, vol. VI, p. 64), of 
 all that was going on in the Balkans. In a letter of Decem- 
 ber 2, 1876, Disraeli wrote to Sir Stafford Northcote relative 
 to the popular demonstrations in favor of the oppressed Chris- 
 tians : 
 
 "Elliot's stupidity has nearly brought us to a great peril. 
 If he had acted with promptitude, or even kept himself, and 
 us, informed, these 'atrocities' might have been checked. As 
 it is, he has brought us into the position, most unjustly, of 
 being thought to connive at them. 
 
 "But when we have committed a mistake, or find ourselves 
 in difficulties, the best thing is to turn them into 'commodi- 
 ties,' as Falstaff says, or something like it. The 'atrocities' 
 will permit us to dictate to the Porte. That was the meaning 
 of the telegram respecting which you wrote to me. It is to 
 be hoped, that the leading part, which England may take, in 
 obtaining an armistice, and afterwards in the preliminaries, 
 will make the excited 'Public' forget, or condone, the Ellio- 
 tiana. 
 
 "I hope this may be effected long before your meeting." 
 (Buckle: The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, 1920, vol. VI, p. 
 51.) 
 
 In a letter the next day to Lord Salisbury, he remarks: 
 "Had it not been for those unhappy 'atrocities' we should 
 have settled a peace very honorable to England, and satis- 
 factory to Europe. 
 
 "Now, we are obliged to work from a new point of depar- 
 ture, and dictate to Turkey, who has forfeited all sym- 
 pathy..." (Ibid, p. 52.) 
 
 See Queen Victoria's opinion. (Ibid, p. 64.) 
 
 But having taken his stand, Lord Beaconsfield was, as the 
 above letter indicates, too consummate a politician to be will- 
 ing to weaken his prestige for the mere purpose of rectifying 
 his mistake. Thenceforth we find that he continues to mini- 
 mize the misdeeds of the Turk, although he admits that there is 
 necessity for reform.
 
 UNCIVILIZED WARFARE 131 
 
 Lord Edward Fitzmaurice, Vol. II, 1905, p. 164), " 
 
 Derby last Tuesday again attributed the 'horrors' to 
 the feebleness of the Turkish Government, whereas it 
 was the only thing in which they have shown any 
 energy. ' ' 
 
 Russia declared war and invaded Turkey to perform 
 her manifest duty of protecting the Christian popula- 
 tion of Turkey from the inhumane treatment to which 
 they were being subjected. 81 The Gortchakoff circular 
 dispatch of April 7-19, giving the reasons for Russia's 
 making war, discussed the ill-treatment of the Chris - 
 
 The correspondence also shows how slow the leaders of the 
 opposition, Lord Granville and Lord Hartington, were to take 
 up the question. They supported rather than opposed the 
 Turkophile policy of the government, and seem to have lacked 
 sympathy with the popular issue which Gladstone raised. 
 (Ibid, p. 26 passim, p. 118.) 
 
 61 Russia was of course strongly actuated by her desire of 
 acquiring new territory in the Balkans. With this object in 
 view, she had signed a secret agreement with Austria. 
 (Buckle: Life of Disraeli, 1920, vol. VI, p. 115-6.) It is this 
 consideration which leads Professor Woolsey to write : ' ' Thus, 
 too, Eussia intervened, in 1877, in behalf of Bulgaria. It was 
 based in theory upon religious sympathy and upon humanity. 
 It was a move, in fact, upon the Straits and Constantinople, 
 in pursuance of Russia's century-long program." (T. S. 
 Woolsey: America's Foreign Policy, 1898, p. 74.) 
 
 But even though conquest may have been the motive of the 
 Russian Government, humanitarian intervention to prevent 
 the inhumane treatment of the Christians was the justification 
 of Russia's intervention. 
 
 Mr. Buckle, who writes with a sympathetic pen, thus de- 
 scribes what Disraeli believed should be the attitude of his 
 government : ' ' It could not intervene, as in the Crimean War, 
 on Turkey's behalf, owing to her misconduct and the conse- 
 quent alienation from her of popular sympathy in Britain. 
 It should therefore adopt a position of neutrality in the war, 
 but of watchful and conditional neutrality, and should 
 at the outset obtain a pledge from Russia to respect British 
 interests in Turkey, such as Constantinople, Egypt, and the 
 Suez Canal." (Buckle: Life of Disraeli, 1920, vol. VI, p. 
 134.)
 
 132 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 tian population and the futile efforts of the powers to 
 persuade Turkey to inaugurate reforms, and concluded : 
 "In assuming this task, our august master fulfils duties 
 imposed upon him by the interests of Russia, whose 
 peaceful development is hindered by the permanent dis- 
 turbances of the East. His Imperial Majesty has the 
 conviction that he responds at the same time to the 
 sentiments and interests of Europe." (Foreign Rela- 
 tions, 1877, p. 586.) 
 
 Lord Derby in reply, March 1, 1877, defended the 
 Turkish government and blamed Russia for not allow- 
 ing further opportunity for negotiations. He also 
 charged that Russia by thus intervening alone had 
 violated the treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856. Lord 
 Derby's dispatch concludes: "In taking action against 
 Turkey on his own part, and having recourse to arms 
 without further consultation with his allies, the Em- 
 peror of Russia has separated himself from the Euro- 
 pean concert hitherto maintained, and has, at the same 
 time, departed from the rule to which he himself had 
 solemnly recorded his consent. It is impossible to fore- 
 see the consequences of such an act. Her Majesty's 
 Government would willingly have refrained from mak- 
 ing any observations in regard to it; but as Prince 
 Gortchakoff seems to assume, in a declaration ad- 
 dressed to all the governments of Europe, that Russia 
 is acting in the interest of Great Britain and that of the 
 other powers, they feel bound to state, in a manner 
 equally formal and public, that the decision of the Rus- 
 sian Government is not one which can have their con- 
 currence or approval." (Foreign Relations, 1877, 
 p. 587.) 
 
 The Bulgarian atrocities brought Gladstone from 
 his retirement to champion the cause of the down- 
 trodden Christians, but for many reasons he did not 
 succeed in overturning the policy of the government
 
 UNCIVILIZED WARFARE 133 
 
 until the general election, when the return of the Liber- 
 al party may in some measure be considered as a vote 
 of censure on Disraeli's failure to allow England to 
 support her part of the burden of intervening to pre- 
 vent the abominable atrocities perpetrated by the 
 Turks on the Christians under their sway. 82 The Eng- 
 
 62 A decade before these events, Lord Lyons, when British 
 Ambassador to Constantinople, in a letter to Lord Stanley of 
 April 10, 1867, gives us the following account of the condition 
 of the Christians in Turkey, and the intolerance of which they 
 were the victims : 
 
 "Reports from the Consuls on the treatment of the Chris- 
 tians will have been pouring in upon you. The greater part 
 of the grievances of the Christians are the result of bad gover- 
 ment and bad administration of justice, and affect Mussul- 
 mans and Christians alike. Their peculiar grievances are their 
 practical exclusion from the high offices of the State, the re- 
 jection in many cases of their evidence in the Law Courts, 
 and what is most intolerable, the position in which they stand 
 socially and politically with regard to the Turks. The Turks 
 will not look upon them as equals and cannot trust them. In 
 fact the Christians cannot feel loyalty to the Government be- 
 cause they are not trusted and employed ; and they cannot be 
 trusted and employed because they are not loyal to the Gov- 
 ernment. It is a perfect example of a vicious circle. It is 
 useless to deny that the position of a Christian subject of the 
 Porte is a humiliating position, and it is vain to expect that 
 within any reasonable time the Christians will look upon the 
 existing Government as anything but an evil to be endured 
 or possibly even upheld as a less evil than revolution, but 
 nothing more." (Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplo- 
 macy, by Lord Newton, Vol. I, p. 167.) 
 
 The motive put forward for the various interventions in 
 Turkey has usually been the safety of Europe, but in certain 
 instances, among which was this one, the real motive has been 
 humanity. Professor J. B. Moore gives this as an example 
 of intervention to put an end to intolerable conditions 
 (Moore's Digest, Vol. IV, p. 3). Freeman Snow (in the sylla- 
 bus to his valuable Cases and Opinions on International Law, 
 1893, p. xxiii) classes it in the same category with the case 
 of Greece, 1826. Morley in his Life of Gladstone, speaking of 
 this incident says (Vol. II, p. 555) : "Humanity was at the 
 root of the whole matter; and the keynote of this great cru- 
 sade was the association of humanity with a high policy worthy
 
 134 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 lish historian, J. R. Green, well says in a letter quoted 
 by Morley : "I begin to see that there may be a truer 
 wisdom in the 'humanitarianism' of Gladstone than in 
 the purely political views of Disraeli. The sympathies 
 of people with peoples, the sense of a common hu- 
 manity between nations, the aspirations of nationali- 
 ties after freedom and independence, are real political 
 forces ; and it is just because Gladstone owns them as 
 forces, and Disraeli disowns them, that the one has 
 been on the right side, and the other on the wrong in 
 parallel questions such as the upbuilding of Germany 
 or Italy. I think it will be so in this upbuilding of the 
 Sclave." 83 (John Morley, Life of Gladstone, Vol. II, 
 p. 561.) 
 
 of the British name." Captain Mahan, who is known as an 
 Anglophile nevertheless speaking with approval of Russian 
 intervention, says: ".. .when Russia, in 1877, acting on her 
 own single initiative, forced by the conscience of her people, 
 herself alone struck the fetters from Bulgaria." (A. H. 
 Mahan: Some Neglected Aspects of War, p. 44; cf. also p. 
 48.) 
 
 68 Lord Blachford, a practical statesman of long experience, 
 whom it is said Lord Granville wished to become permanent 
 Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and whose talent 
 and grasp of mind Cardinal Newman considered preeminent, 
 discusses Russia's intervention in a letter dated May 15, 1878 : 
 
 "1. I dare say you are right in saying that there is a large 
 section which upholds war against the Turks as 'a crusade' 
 the ' Pall Mall ' is always saying so. But I never myself hap- 
 pened to see any person in the flesh who advocated it or to 
 read any printed or written paper in which it was avowed or 
 could be inferred. 
 
 "2. I dare say that the feelings of Russians are partly 
 crusading, partly Panslavist just as my feelings might be 
 partly sportsmanlike and partly domestic, if I shot a wolf 
 which was tearing to pieces my brother but the basis of my 
 action would be the desire to save a human being from a sav- 
 age brute. The English who felt strongly about Bulgarian 
 atrocities were neither Slav nor ' Orthodox. ' 
 
 "3. As you allow of a war for 'suffering humanity' you of 
 course do not agree with the passage of Mackintosh which you
 
 UNCIVILIZED WARFARE 135 
 
 quote (unless you explain it away) neither do I. a It seems 
 to me transparently rhetorical. It is plainly much more 
 wicked to attack on insufficient grounds a prosperous and 
 virtuous government than a corrupt and desolating one. In 
 one you injure the people, in the other only the rulers and 
 their armies, with (supposed) benefit to the people. It is 
 also plainly a subject of regret that a good government should 
 be destroyed, while it may be a subject of just and stern re- 
 joicing that, by whatever agency, a bad one should be de- 
 stroyed, and its subjects transferred to those by whom they 
 will be better used. 
 
 "4. Of the past history of Russia I know next to nothing. 
 I only see with my eyes on maps the respective annexations 
 of England and Russia during the last century and a quarter, 
 and am astounded at the fact that England should assume 
 the position of accuser in this respect. 
 
 "5. I am disposed to look leniently on our minister's omis- 
 sion to notice the hint about Bessarabia. So long as inde- 
 pendent Roumania lies between Turkey and Russia I cannot 
 see why 50 or 60 miles more or less of sea coast should signify. 
 Russia's crime (which is very disgusting) is in taking it 
 against the mill of her ally, which did not appear till the 
 Treaty of S. Stefano (and perhaps does not now much con- 
 cern us; unless we want a quarrel). 
 
 "6. I agree with you in not confining the delinquencies of 
 England to a single act (the Berlin Memo.). I begin by hat- 
 ing with my whole soul, what may be called our traditional 
 policy (avowed by Palmerston and Beaconsfield) of bolster- 
 ing up, for our own purposes, such a desolating and loath- 
 some oppression (I conceive these words to be chosen with 
 accuracy) as Turkey. Then I think it was our bounden duty 
 to retrieve the tremendous error of guaranteeing the 'inde- 
 pendence and integrity' of such an oppressor as soon as the 
 Seraglio put itself in the wrong by not giving effect to the 
 provisions of the Hatti Humayun of the Treaty of Paris. 
 This duty arose probably very soon after the Treaty, but may 
 be said (by an apologist) to have escaped notice, in so far as 
 
 aThe passage is in Mackintosh's Essay on the Partition of Poland; 
 "There is no political doctrine more false or more pernicious than that 
 which represents vices in its internal government as an extenuation of 
 unjust aggressions against a country, and a consolation to mankind for 
 the destruction of its independence. As no government is without great 
 faults, such a doctrine multiplies the grounds of war, gives an unbounded 
 scope to ambition, and furnishes benevolent pretexts for every sort of 
 rapine ' '
 
 136 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 it merely appeared in reports and official documents. It was 
 allowed to slip out of sight. 
 
 ' ' But three years ago this duty forced itself upon our notice 
 by the Herzegovinian revolt, and the English Ministry adopted 
 a course of action by which they did not merely neglect, but 
 deliberately repudiated it, taking 'independence and integri- 
 ty' as the key of their policy, not in one case or another, but 
 time after time. The Constantinopolitan conference was an ex- 
 ceptional incident, almost avowedly forced on the Govern- 
 ment by the Bulgarian agitation made abortive by parallel 
 communications with Turkey and at the close of which the 
 Government (by the appointment of Layard and other mat- 
 ters) have come back to what I should call 'their vomit,' that 
 is to say a course of obstructive special pleading, hiding the 
 reconstruction of what is intolerable, under the phrase (which 
 I see you adopt) 'the faith of treaties.' I say this because it 
 is too evident to be denied that our present proceedings are 
 such as to enable Turkey to prepare for a fresh struggle, 
 that in case of such a struggle we have her as an ally, and that 
 in case of such an alliance we must necessarily repay the Sul- 
 tan and his Ministers by replacing them more or less in pos- 
 session of the authority of which Russia threatens to deprive 
 them. 
 
 "On the main point, I think the great difference between 
 v.s is that I am thoroughly impressed by the belief that Turkey 
 is incorrigible, while Russia is in process of improvement. 
 These things both of them come to my mind with the clear- 
 ness of the sun. And the suggestion of allowing Turkey a 
 year for improvement appears to me like allowing a notorious- 
 ly bankrupt debtor a month's respite, during which he will 
 remove his goods, and at the end of which the creditor (Rus- 
 sia) will have to recommence an expensive litigation which, 
 when the dilatory plea was urged, was on the point of being 
 brought to a hearing, sure to end in a success. I should be 
 very sorry to stand godfather to the motives of Russian states- 
 men. I dare say they are as selfish as our own profess to be. 
 But they have this advantage that their interests (so far as 
 the liberation of the Turkish provinces go) coincide with the 
 interests of humanity with which our own (alleged) inter- 
 ests conflict. And the result is that their present position, 
 as viewed in future history, is on the road to grandeur ours 
 on the road to meaness. " (Letters of Lord Blachford, edited 
 by Marindin, London, 1896, p. 389-391 ; see ibid, pp. 295 ; 
 441, for references to Granville and Newman's estimate of 
 Blachford.)
 
 UNCIVILIZED WARFARE 137 
 
 The violation of the laws of civilized warfare have 
 led to several other interventions. 64 In 1835 the British 
 Government intervened to prevent the Carlists from 
 shooting their prisoners. (See Abdy's Kent, p. 244, 
 note 2; British State Papers, Vol. 24, p. 396-416.) 
 When the Nicaraguan Revolutionists under Zelaya 
 bombarded Managua (1893) without notice, killing and 
 injuring persons near the American legation, a strong 
 protest was presented against this as an "act of bar- 
 barism," but when General Zelaya justified the act on 
 the ground that Managua was a fortified place from 
 which the enemy had. . ."fired on his forces who wish- 
 ing to avert hostilities in reality remained in front of 
 the city several hours without firing," and that they 
 had detained a flag of truce, the American Minister ac- 
 cepted the explanation as a reasonable one. (Moore's 
 Digest, Vol. VII, p. 181-2.) 
 
 The following incident which occurred in Italy may 
 perhaps be considered typical of this class of inter- 
 ventions : "On the failure of Lord Minto 'a mediation, 
 the Sicilians proceeded to decree the separation of the 
 crown of Naples and Sicily, and proposed to the Duke 
 of Genoa to become their king, which he, however, de- 
 clined. The King of Naples, on the arrival of this 
 news, despatched ships and troops against Messina 
 and Palermo. The bombardment of these towns was 
 attended by such acts of violence and cruelty on both 
 sides that the English and French fleets interfered to 
 procure an armistice. The period for cessation of hos- 
 tilities expired, however, without any arrangement 
 being arrived at. The fight was renewed; and the 
 
 tu We do not consider here interventions which vindicate the 
 law of war between independent states, which have been con- 
 sidered in the preceding section (7). Such interventions 
 are, of course, ordinary instances of the vindication of the law 
 of war, and are not matters of internal concern, as in the case 
 of civil conflicts. In both classes of cases, however, humani- 
 tarian considerations enter as a motive of governmental action.
 
 138 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Sicilian revolt was finally put down by the middle of 
 the year 1849." (Extract from Ashley's Lord Pal- 
 merston, Vol. I, p. 57 ; Cf . Stapleton : Intervention, p. 
 84-5.) 
 
 In these cases in which the insurrectionists are sub- 
 jected to cruelties not permitted by the laws of war, 
 there is, as we have seen, a just ground for humani- 
 tarian intervention, quite apart from any consideration 
 of material injury done to neighboring states and 
 their nationals, but when prolonged strife and anarchy 
 seriously affect the latter, there arises still another 
 justification for intervention by way of impeachment 
 of the effective sovereignty of the titular government 
 over the territory in question. (See discussion rela- 
 tive to the recognition of insurgents and belligerents, 
 14.) 
 
 To conclude our consideration of humanitarian inter- 
 vention to put an end to civil wars which are conducted 
 in a manner to shock public opinion, we shall quote 
 from John Stuart Mill's article discussing interven- 
 tion: "A case requiring consideration is that of a 
 protracted civil war, in which the contending parties 
 are so equally balanced that there is no probability of 
 a speedy issue; or if there is, the victorious side can- 
 not hope to keep down the vanquished but by severities 
 repugnant to humanity, and injurious to the permanent 
 welfare of the country. In this exceptional case it 
 seems now to be an admitted doctrine, that the neigh- 
 boring nations, or one powerful neighbor with the 
 acquiescence of the rest, are warranted in demanding 
 that the contest shall cease, and a reconciliation take 
 place on equitable terms of compromise. Intervention 
 of this description has been repeatedly practiced dur- 
 ing the present generation, with such general approval, 
 that its legitimacy may be considered to have passed 
 into a maxim of what is called international law."
 
 INJUSTICE 139 
 
 (John Stuart Mill: Dissertations and Discussions, vol. 
 Ill, p. 172. "A Few Words on Non-intervention," re- 
 printed from Fraser's Magazine, December, 1859, p. 
 773-4.) 
 
 8(d). INJUSTICE 65 
 
 Humanitarian intervention has frequently been em- 
 ployed for the protection of individuals against an 
 abusive treatment, either the arbitrary confiscation of 
 their property or the restraint of their personal liberty 
 without justification in law. When the authorities of 
 an independent state persist in administering the law 
 with injustice and cruelty so excessive as to constitute 
 an intolerable abuse and to shock the opinion of other 
 states, it has led in certain instances to intervention on 
 what we may properly designate as the ground of de- 
 nial of justice. 
 
 The dangers and burdens which the repression of an 
 occasional abuse would entail, as well as the remem- 
 brance of the fact that every state has given some 
 causes of complaint, prevents intervention except in 
 the case of persistent abuses or extraordinary crimes., 
 To this latter category belongs the assassination of 
 King Alexander and Queen Draga of Servia. 
 
 EXTRAORDINARY CRIMES 
 
 On the night of the 10th of June, 1903, a military up- 
 rising occurred at Belgrade. Officers made their way 
 into the Konak and massacred King Alexander and 
 Queen Draga, and hacked them with savage ferocity. 
 According to the official report of the autopsy, the 
 King received forty wounds and the Queen sixty-five. 
 
 85< ' Injustice " is a somewhat vague term for which we might 
 substitute "denial of justice," or "abusive treatment of indi- 
 viduals."
 
 140 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 (See the Temps of June 17, 1903.) General Zinzar 
 Markovitch, President of the Council, and General 
 Pavlovitch, Minister of War, the two brothers of the 
 Queen, Nicolas and Nicodeme Lunjevitch, were also 
 among the number of the victims. 06 
 
 The horror caused by these events throughout Eu- 
 rope was profound, and the condemnation was unani- 
 mous. An ordinary conflict between the two opposing 
 factions, the Obrenovitches and the Karageorgevitches, 
 would not have astonished Europe. There were causes 
 enough, as Europe well knew, to explain the revolution 
 at Belgrade, but that was no justification for the scenes 
 of carnage which took place on the night of the 10th 
 of June. To have deposed King Alexander would have 
 been reasonable, not so his assassination. 67 
 
 The governments joined in the general reprobation 
 of the murder itself. M. Delcasse, the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, as soon as he was informed of what 
 had occurred, called upon the Servian Minister to ex- 
 press to him the profound condolences of the French 
 Government. (See Journal des Debats of June 13, 
 1903). A similar course was adopted by the King of 
 Greece, his ministers, and the diplomatic corps ac- 
 
 66 This account of the assassination of King Alexander and 
 Queen Draga is based upon that given by Professor Jules 
 Basdevant in the Revue generate de droit international, 
 vol. XI, 1904, p. 105-114. Professor Basdevant discusses the 
 juridical principles involved, as well as the events. We have 
 translated and quoted textually, for the most part, the por- 
 tions which contains Professor Basdevant 's statement of the 
 facts, but have omitted his comments and discussion, for 
 which the reader is referred to the original. As his source, 
 M. Basdevant refers mainly to the Journal des Debats for 
 June, 1903. 
 
 G7 M. Basdevant remarking that "It is not necessary to go 
 back to the precedents of the Borgias' time," draws a com- 
 parison between this instance and that of Tsar Paul I, who 
 also was assassinated by his officers. M. Basdevant might have 
 added : "with the connivance of his successor."
 
 INJUSTICE 141 
 
 credited to him. Court mourning was ordered in Rus- 
 sia, in Spain, and in Roumania. Several of the states 
 that recognized the government of Peter I expressed 
 their condemnation of the events of the night of June 
 10. In the House of Commons, the Prime Minister, Mr. 
 Balfour, stigmatized the act as a crime which dishon- 
 ored the capital of Servia. In the House of Lords, 
 Lord Lansdowne discussed the means by which the 
 Government might seek to ''express its indignation." 
 In the Hungarian Chamber, similar sentiments were 
 expressed. But in the Italian Senate, Admiral Moriii 
 made a declaration which may be considered to express 
 the views of the different powers. * ' The government, ' ' 
 said he, " shares the sentiments of horror which this 
 tragic occurrence has aroused in Italy as in all parts of 
 the civilized world. Nevertheless, even though this 
 feeling dominates all other impressions in the presence 
 of this terrible tragedy, the Government must remem- 
 ber that the events which took place at Belgrade, not- 
 withstanding their atrocity, relate to internal affairs." 
 It was not for other states to take notice of them. Simi- 
 lar views were expressed by Count Goluchowski be- 
 fore the Budget Commission of the Austrian Delega- 
 tion. (See Temps, January 13). This was also the 
 opinion of the powers. But if the other states were not 
 called upon to take action to secure the adequate pun- 
 ishment of the culprits, should they hold aloof from the 
 new government established in Servia? This was a 
 question which soon arose. 
 
 A provisional government was soon formed under 
 the presidency of M. Avokoumovitch, and it under- 
 took to maintain order until the election of a new 
 sovereign by the nation. In a communication to the 
 press, the provisional government expressed the con- 
 viction that by so doing it would secure "for the new
 
 142 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 order of things the sympathy of the European pow- 
 ers." But the latter refused to recognize the provis- 
 ional government and to enter into official relations 
 with it. They directed their representatives at Bel- 
 grade to limit their action to the protection of their 
 nationals. This course could be adopted without incon- 
 venience, since it was not expected to be prolonged be- 
 yond a brief period, and it would give satisfaction to 
 public opinion, which accused the provisional govern- 
 ment of complicity in the murders, because of the fact 
 that it was established so soon after the murder, and 
 because it contained among its members some of those 
 who had participated in the conspiracy. 
 
 The situation was changed after the Skoupchtina 
 had chosen Peter Karageorgevitch king by unanimous 
 vote. 68 
 
 The powers then decided to recognize him, and they 
 did so without delay, but not all of them with an equal 
 grace. The Tsar and the Emperor of Austria led the 
 way and congratulated Peter I upon his election. The 
 King of Italy and the Prince of Montenegro were also 
 among the first to express their good wishes, as was 
 to be expected on account of family ties. The other 
 powers quickly followed the example of the two em- 
 pires most directly interested in Balkan affairs. They 
 acknowledged the receipt of the announcement of King 
 Peter's accession to the throne, and addressed their 
 felicitations to him. Great Britain was somewhat 
 slower than the others to recognize the new King. 
 Edward VII delayed his reply for five days. 
 
 The different views of the powers were made evident 
 by the instructions which they gave to their diplomatic 
 
 "Professor Basdevant, discussing the recognition of Peter 
 I of Servia, states that to refuse to recognize the complete com- 
 petency of a state to choose its chief would amount to an inter- 
 vention.
 
 INJUSTICE 143 
 
 representatives at Belgrade. The full powers of these 
 diplomats had come to an end with the death of Alex- 
 ander I, the sovereign to whom they had been accred- 
 ited. This was explained by Mr. Balf our in the House 
 of Commons, and Lord Lansdowne in the House of 
 Lords. It had been suggested in the press, and the 
 English statesmen had considered the recalling of their 
 agents from Belgrade to indicate their condemnation, 
 but this was not done, and the members of the diplo- 
 matic mission were allowed to remain for the purpose 
 of reporting upon events, and protecting national in- 
 terests. 
 
 After the election of Peter I, and before his entry 
 into Belgrade, the Russian Minister renewed official 
 relations by a visit to the Servian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, and he was present, with the Austrian Minis- 
 ter, when the king arrived to take the oath of office. 
 The representatives of the other powers did not take 
 part in this ceremony. They had received orders from 
 their governments not to appear. Several of them 
 even left Belgrade. Great Britain, in this instance, 
 also went further than the others in expressing disap- 
 probation, since her minister was the first to leave. 
 
 In the instructions which the powers had given to 
 their ministers they committed no impropriety. The 
 diplomatic agents upon the death of the king had lost 
 their official character, and their absence from this cere- 
 mony was natural. But even though they kept within 
 the limits of the law, the effect of this absence was to 
 manifest the sentiments of reprobation which the 
 powers entertained because of the crime of June 10. 
 Nevertheless, as Peter I was the recognized King of 
 Servia they did not delay in renewing the letters of 
 credence of their representatives at Belgrade. Certain 
 of the powers, although they did not consider that they 
 should concern themselves with what was a question of
 
 144 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 internal affairs, felt, nevertheless, that they ought to 
 express their opinions and give their advice to the 
 Servian Government. Emperor Francis Joseph, in 
 his telegram in reply to the announcement of the elec- 
 tion of Peter I, wished that he might " happily accom- 
 plish the noble mission which was confided to him by 
 helping his country to recover the good opinion which 
 she had lost in the eyes of the civilized world in con- 
 sequence of the odious and universally abhorred crime 
 recently committed. ' ' The Russian Government, in its 
 official organ, Messager du gouvernement, published a 
 communication in which the Government of the Tsar 
 demanded the punishment of the assassins, and Edward 
 VII, in his telegram of June 30th, expressed to Peter I 
 his hope to see reestablished the reputation of his coun- 
 try upon which recent events had left so regrettable a 
 stain. 
 
 The counsel of the powers was without effect. Not- 
 withstanding the good intentions manifested by King 
 Peter upon his election, the regicides were not prose- 
 cuted because a decision of the Skoupchtina during the 
 interregnum had covered them by an amnesty. This 
 fact and the favors shown to the officers who had par- 
 ticipated in the assassination led to a new military 
 plot w r hich, however, did not succeed. In several Eu- 
 ropean capitals, the Servian officers were ostracized. 
 At St. Petersburg the officers who were sent to escort 
 the returning children of King Peter were not received, 
 on the ground that they had been implicated in the as- 
 sassination of the former sovereigns. A rumor even 
 was circulated that when King Peter expressed a desire 
 to visit the German Court, Emperor William had re- 
 plied that he would refuse to receive the patron of 
 regicide officers. Finally, the entire diplomatic corps 
 left Belgrade to avoid coming in contact with the regi- 
 cide officers who were attached to the person of the
 
 INJUSTICE 145 
 
 King during the reception on New Year's day. To 
 lessen the effect of this action, the King thought best to 
 absent himself also from his capital on the pretext that 
 he was celebrating at Tapoli the centenary of the war 
 of deliverance. The Charges d 'Affaires at Belgrade 
 merely wrote their names in the visitor's book at the 
 palace. 
 
 Some months after the occurrence of these events, 
 the American Secretary of Legation at Athens, in a dis- 
 patch of April 7, 1904, reported to Secretary Hay: 
 " . . . the transfer of several of the officers concerned in 
 the murder of the late King and Queen. ' ' The dispatch 
 concludes as follows: "The result of this measure has 
 been that the chief objection of the powers against 
 renewing diplomatic relations with Servia has been re- 
 moved, and Russia immediately announced the appoint- 
 ment of M. Goubastoff, at present minister to the Vati- 
 can, to succeed M. Tcharykoff as minister at Belgrade. 
 Italy has also informed King Peter that the Italian 
 minister will immediately ask for an official reception, 
 and it is expected that the other countries will soon 
 follow the example of Italy and Russia." (Foreign 
 Relations, 1904, p. 800.) 
 
 Although an occasional instance of intervention in 
 the case of an extraordinary crime or transgression 
 may properly be classed as humanitarian and justified 
 in law, ordinary intervention to prevent injustice is in 
 practice restricted to instances in which a government 
 has been guilty of persistent misconduct or a prolonged 
 neglect to remedy unjust conditions within its juris- 
 diction. 
 
 A typical instance of action to remedy persistent in- 
 justice was the collective intervention of the powers in 
 Morocco in 1909 because of the employment of torture 
 
 to obtain evidence from witnesses. 
 10
 
 146 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 PEBSISTENTLY ABUSIVE TREATMENT 
 
 From Professor Antoine Rougier, we borrow the fol- 
 lowing interesting account of the collective interven- 
 tion of the powers in Morocco : 
 
 "During the summer of 1909, Moulay-Hafid under- 
 took a successful campaign against the Eoghui, or 
 claimant to the throne of Morocco, Bou-Hamara. The 
 Roghui and a number of his adherents fell into the Sul- 
 tan 's hands. He declared his prisoners guilty of re- 
 bellion, and punished them with the utmost severity, 
 so as to impress the native population. The most usual 
 punishment passed upon the rebels was to cut off their 
 hands and feet. The punishments often involved the 
 most refined torture, terminating in a slow death. The 
 traditional torture with salt which had been given up in 
 Morocco many years ago was reintroduced. As for 
 the Roghui, while waiting for his sentence, he had been 
 shut up in an iron cage like a wild beast and displayed 
 to the gibes of the populace. 
 
 ' * These acts, reported by the press, aroused the sym- 
 pathy of Europe. A certain number of the members 
 of the French Parliament addressed themselves to the 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs and asked that France 
 should intervene in Morocco to put an end to these 
 scenes of cruelty, and to save the Roghui from the pun- 
 ishment which apparently was reserved for him. The 
 minister willingly consented and gave instructions to 
 this effect to the French Minister at Tangiers, M. Reg- 
 nault. Similar opinions were expressed in most of the 
 countries of Europe. The Spanish Minister for For- 
 eign Affairs, in particular, gave corresponding instruc- 
 tions to his representative to the Sherifian Govern- 
 ment. (See Journal des Debats, Aug. 29, 1909.) 
 
 "As early as August 30, 1909, two consuls at Fez, 
 those of France and England, M. Gaillard and Mr.
 
 INJUSTICE 147 
 
 MacLead (see Matin, September 4, 1909) had ad- 
 dressed remarks to the Sultan in a purely friendly and 
 private capacity, and in accordance with the informal 
 and unofficial instructions of their respective govern- 
 ments. When Moulay-Hafid seemed little disposed to 
 give heed to them, the members of the diplomatic corps 
 at Tangiers drafted a collective letter in which they 
 demanded that the Sultan abandon torture in Morocco, 
 namely all bodily punishment producing mutilations or 
 slow death, and that in the future he observe ' the laws 
 of humanity.' This letter was carried by a special 
 messenger and it was delivered to the Sultan by the 
 Consular Corps at Fez, presided over by the dean of 
 the corps, and when it was delivered it was accom- 
 panied by verbal representations." (See Journal des 
 Debats of September 4, 10, 11, and 15, 1909.) 
 
 "This second proceeding [demarche], undertaken by 
 the representatives of the European powers, undoubt- 
 edly amounted to a diplomatic intervention in Sherifian 
 affairs [administration]. The result in any event was 
 unfortunate. The Sultan gave to the assembled con- 
 suls all the assurances for which they had asked and 
 he solemnly promised to observe in the future the laws 
 of humanity. Soon after their departure he ordered 
 the Boghui, his enemy, to be immediately put to death, 
 and addressed a long memorandum to a paper in Tan- 
 giers (La Depeche marocaine of Sept. 10, 1909) to 
 justify the measures of repression employed against 
 the adherents of Bou-Hamara. 69 The Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, in making a report of this incident to 
 the Council of the Ministers, could do no more than 
 
 69 This note is discussed in the Matin of Sept. 10, 1909, and 
 in the Petit Parisien of Oct. 19, 1909. 
 
 Upon the basis of the facts as given above, Rougier enters 
 upon an interesting discussion of the legality of humanitarian 
 intervention, of which he says, this is an instance.
 
 148 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 recognize the failure of the European intervention. 70 
 (Translated from A. Rougier in Revue gen {'rale de 
 droit international public, vol. 17 (1910), p. 98-9.) 
 
 From the reminiscences of an experienced diplomat, 
 we draw another illustration : Sir Frederick St. John, 
 British Minister to Central America in the early eigh- 
 ties, convinced himself after a careful examination that 
 the then President of Guatemala, Barios, was a blood- 
 thirsty tyrant who did not hesitate to make away with 
 his victims and to subject them to the most revolting 
 cruelties. The British Minister was deeply stirred by 
 what he learned, and convinced that there was justifi- 
 cation for a report to the Foreign Office of what was 
 going on in Guatemala. "When my report reached 
 home," writes Sir Frederick, "it was printed and com- 
 municated to several Continental Governments, with 
 the object of concerting as to what steps should be 
 taken in common ; but, with one exception, none of my 
 foreign colleagues corroborated my statements; not- 
 withstanding that they had been the principal source 
 whence I derived my information, which, from a much 
 longer residence than mine, and a wider and more in- 
 timate acquaintance with the natives, they were quali- 
 fied to give." One of the diplomatic representatives 
 was sufficiently disloyal to communicate Sir Freder- 
 ick 's report to President Barios who behaved with such 
 insolence to the British Minister that his government 
 ordered him by telegraph, "to leave the country at 
 once, and come home." "The reason of this repudia- 
 tion," remarks Sir Frederick, "was obvious. None of 
 
 70 In his article on the Theory of Humanitarian Interven- 
 tion, published in the same Revue (ibid, p. 477), M. Rougier 
 refers to this incident and remarks that in the month of Sep- 
 tember, 1909, the powers who had signed the Act of Algeciras, 
 in a diplomatic note addressed to the Sultan of Morocco, 
 based their action squarely on the right [la theorie] of hu- 
 manitarian intervention.
 
 INJUSTICE , 149 
 
 my foreign colleagues were in the regular diplomatic 
 service, and must have felt that, if recalled by their 
 Governments, they would receive no appointment else- 
 where. 
 
 "My own position was different; but, on the other 
 hand, I exposed myself to the suspicion that I had been 
 actuated by a desire to obtain another post. I can only 
 affirm that nothing was farther from my thoughts. I 
 had just set up a very costly establishment on my mar- 
 riage, and it was my interest to remain for some time 
 at my post and recover from my excessive outlay. ' ' 
 
 When the British Minister left Guatemala, the 
 American Minister, Mr. Hall, accompanied him for a 
 considerable distance, evidently for the purpose of 
 shielding him against outrages from the local authori- 
 ties on account of the report which he had made to his 
 government. 
 
 "On arriving in London," writes Sir Frederick, "I 
 reported myself at the Foreign Office, where it at once 
 became evident to me that my account of what was 
 going on in Guatemala met with little credence ; and I 
 was advised by an 'Assistant Under-Secretary of 
 State' Ho go to the country and rest.' He afterwards 
 informed a relative of mine that I was suffering from 
 1 President on the brain. ' 
 
 "I pondered over this official non-medical opinion, 
 and came to the conclusion that my foreign colleagues 
 at Guatemala were wise in their generation in withhold- 
 ing from their governments the information I had, in a 
 thoughtless moment, given to mine, and of which they 
 were as cognizant as myself." (Sir Frederick St. 
 John: Reminiscence of a Retired Diplomat, p. 231-6.)
 
 150 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
 Intervention to prevent injustice cannot legally be 
 made a ground for interfering in the internal political 
 affairs of an independent state to establish represen- 
 tative institutions or any other form of constitution or 
 government. However morally justifiable interference 
 for such a purpose may be, it remains an act of policy 
 and must be defended as such. But an interfering 
 government is ever prone to consider and to assert that 
 its interference in favor of constitutionalism or legit- 
 imacy is an intervention justifiable according to the 
 principles of international law. 
 
 In recent decades, when absolutist governments have 
 considered themselves fortunate to preserve their pos- 
 sessions, the liberal states, such as England, and more 
 recently the United States, have interfered in favor 
 of representative institutions. 70 " 
 
 When Secretary Knox notified the Nicaraguan 
 Charge of the refusal of the United States to continue 
 the recognition of Zelaya 's Government, among the rea- 
 sons given in the note of December 1, 1909 (Foreign Re- 
 lations, 1909, p. 455; Cf. Moore's Principles of Di- 
 plomacy, p. 266), was: "It is equally a matter of com- 
 mon knowledge that under the regime of President 
 
 7 'Stapleton criticizing Palmerston says: "In speaking of 
 our forcible interference in the affairs of Spain and Portugal 
 in 1834, he [Palmerston] observed, 'We looked upon the ques- 
 tion, not as a simple choice between one Sovereign and another, 
 but (as it was in reality) absolute government on the one 
 hand and constitutional government on the other;' and then 
 having argued to prove that constitutional government in the 
 Peninsula was advantageous to British interests, he claimed 
 great merit for having been above all 'narrow-minded preju- 
 dices' in determining 'on an act of forcible interference for 
 the purpose of giving those countries the blessing of consti- 
 tutional government.' ' (A. G. Stapleton: Intervention, p. 
 109-110.)
 
 INJUSTICE 151 
 
 Zelaya republican institutions have ceased in Nica- 
 ragua to exist except in name. " It is only fair to state 
 that this was but a part of the description of intoler- 
 able conditions which were the real and a sufficient 
 justification for the intervention of the United States. 
 President Wilson seems to have gone much further, 
 and to have made interference to preserve constitution- 
 alism a basic principle of his administration. Upon 
 this ground, he refused to recognize General Huerta 
 when he was de facto in control of Mexico City and a 
 great part of the country. 71 (Cf. J. B. Moore, Princi- 
 
 71 The recently published diplomatic correspondence rela- 
 tive to Mexican affairs in 1913 (Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 
 692f.) discloses a succession of acts of interference by the 
 American Government in the internal affairs of Mexico, made 
 necessary by the peculiar relations between the two states. 
 But the action of President Wilson in regard to outlawing the 
 Huerta Government was unusually drastic. By Secretary 
 Bryan, the following circular instruction, dated November 7, 
 1913, was sent to certain of the American diplomatic repre- 
 sentatives : "While the President feels that he cannot yet an- 
 nounce in detail his policy with regard to Mexico, nevertheless 
 he believes that be ought, in advance thereof, to make known 
 to the government to which you are accredited bis clear judg- 
 ment that it is his immediate duty to require Huerta 's retire- 
 ment from the Mexican Government, and that the Government 
 of the United States must now proceed to employ such means 
 as may be necessary to secure this result; that, furthermore, 
 the Government of the United States will not regard as bind- 
 ing upon the people of Mexico anything done by Huerta since 
 his assumption of dictatorial powers, nor anything that may 
 be done by the fraudulent Legislature which he is about to 
 convoke. The President hopes that the government to which 
 you are accredited will see fit to use its influence to impress 
 upon Huerta the wisdom of retiring in the interest of peace 
 and constitutional government. 
 
 ' ' You will convey the foregoing to the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs." (Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 856.) 
 
 The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs considered that 
 "... Huerta was no worse than the others and the only per- 
 son in sight apparently strong enough to restore order of some 
 kind." (Ibid, p. 857.)
 
 152 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 pies of American Diplomacy, p. 213-238. See also cor- 
 respondence, Mexico, in Foreign Relations, 1913). 
 More recently the Tinoco Government in Costa Rica 
 was regarded as beyond the pale, apparently because it 
 had acquired control through force and not in accord- 
 ance with constitutional provisions and election. 72 
 
 Sir Edward Grey was informed by Ambassador Page that 
 ''he might consider Huerta 's elimination certain, the ques- 
 tion now being: Shall he be eliminated with or without the 
 moral support of the British Government? Sir Edward's last 
 words were 'It is a very grim situation.' ' (Ibid, p. 857.) 
 But in a later interview, November 11, (ibid, p. 860), Sir 
 Edward Grey promised to instruct Sir Lionel Garden, the 
 British Minister, that if Huerta asked for British aid or 
 showed by act that he expected it, Garden should inform him 
 that he should not have it, but ' ' Sir Edward stopped short at 
 saying that without such act or request from Huerta he would 
 instruct Garden to take the initiative in approaching him." 
 (Ibid, p. 860.) 
 
 The Government of Panama replied, that "as the efforts of 
 President Wilson to restore constitutional government in Mexi- 
 co is generous and noble, the Panaman representative has been 
 instructed to say that Panama sympathizes with those efforts. ' ' 
 (Ibid, p. 861.) Some other Latin American countries made a 
 favorable response. 
 
 72 The New York World of August 3, 1920, printed the fol- 
 lowing report from Washington : ' ' The United States has ex- 
 tended formal recognition to the present Government of Costa 
 Rica, it was announced to-day by the State Department. On 
 Jan. 27, 1917, Federico Tinoco overthrew the constitutional 
 Government of Costa Rica, forcing President Gonzalez to leave 
 the country. The United States refused to recognize -*the 
 Tinoco Government on the ground that it did not represent 
 the will of the people. In August, 1919, Tinoco left Costa 
 Rica, and a month later his government fell. He got out ahead 
 of the crash. 
 
 "After the constitutional succession was reestablished Julio 
 Acosta was chosen by an overwhelming majority and was in- 
 augurated as constitutional President on May 8 of this year. 
 In making the announcement Secretary of State Colby said : 
 
 ' ' ' President Wilson 's policy has been completely vindicated 
 and Costa Rica is now organized in accordance with the prin- 
 ciples laid down by the Government of the United States when 
 recognition was refused to the Tinoco regime.' '
 
 INJUSTICE 153 
 
 Sir Henry Maine, in his Lectures on International 
 Law (p. 63), has remarked upon the tendency to inter- 
 fere in constitutional affairs : 
 
 "Before, however, the European peace finally broke 
 up, the current had turned in the other direction ; and 
 Great Britain, whose foreign affairs were now directed 
 by Lord Palmerston, employed its influence to assist 
 states which desired to obtain Constitutions. In ad- 
 dition to the desire for popular government the spirit 
 of nationality had now come into play; and the ulti- 
 mate result was the intervention of Napoleon III in 
 Italy and the destruction of the Italian despotisms. 
 Therefore all the Powers in Europe, during the peace, 
 did in turn act upon principles from which the infer- 
 ence might be drawn that they denied the right of a 
 state under certain circumstances to adopt what politi- 
 cal Constitution it pleases; nevertheless," he adds, 
 ' ' this rule of law in the long run prevailed. ' ' 
 
 From Professor Lingelbach's discussion of the prin- 
 ciples of intervention, we quote the following passage : 
 "In the Quadruple Treaty of 1834 73 the two countries 
 [Great Britain and France] guaranteed their aid 
 against Don Carlos and Don Miguel, the representa- 
 tives of the reactionary and despotic tendencies in 
 Spain and Portugal, affording a striking illustration 
 of how these two states, in their eagerness to support 
 constitutionalism, went almost as far in interfering in 
 the internal affairs of other states as did Metternich 
 himself. The claim to the right of intervention in sup- 
 port of constitutionalism must rest on precisely the 
 same principle as do the acts of the Holy Alliance." 
 (W. E. Lingelbach: The Doctrine and Practice of In- 
 tervention in Europe, Annals of the American Acad- 
 emy of Political and Social Science, 1900, vol. XVI, 
 p. 16.) 
 
 "Professor Lingelbach refers to Hertslet, vol. II, No. 171.
 
 154 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 What is politics to-day may become the law of to- 
 morrow, but as yet there is under international law no 
 right of intervention to foster or to impose representa- 
 tive institutions. 
 
 FAVORED TREATMENT FOR ALIENS 
 
 In many instances the great and highly civilized 
 states have interposed to secure for their nationals a 
 better treatment than certain backward states were ac- 
 cording their own nationals. To justify this course, the 
 theory has been advanced that the state which admits 
 aliens may be assumed to promise and guarantee them 
 those rights which are recognized as indispensable for 
 all human beings in civilized states. 
 
 Sir Eoundell Palmer (later Lord Selborne) ably 
 stated this view in a speech on the * ' Greek Massacre, ' ' 
 which he delivered in the House of Commons May 20, 
 1870: "With regard to all Englishmen travelling in a 
 friendly State pretending to civilization, we have a 
 right to look for the observance and the enforcement 
 by that State of the principle which is briefly stated by 
 Chancellor Kent, in his * Commentaries on Public Law, ' 
 where he says ' that when foreigners are admitted into 
 a State upon free and liberal terms, the public faith 
 is pledged for their protection.' That does not, of 
 course, mean that an exceptional protection, greater 
 than that which well-constituted governments ordinar- 
 ily extend, and ought to extend to their own citizens, is 
 pledged to the citizens of foreign States; but it does 
 mean that those foreigners who come within their lim- 
 its have the public faith pledged to them for the protec- 
 tion of a bond fide settled government, capable of re- 
 pressing violence, outrage, and crime, in that manner 
 and in that degree in which human governments in 
 civilized countries ordinarily are capable of discharg-
 
 INJUSTICE 155 
 
 ing those functions. And it is manifest that if foreign- 
 ers were not entitled to look for that protection, all pos- 
 sibility of respecting the independent territorial sover- 
 eignty of foreign States would be at an end, and every 
 nation would be compelled to apply its own power for 
 the protection of its own citizens in foreign countries. ' ' 
 (Hansard, vol. 201, p. 1123, quoted by Creasy: First 
 Platform of International Law, p. 307 and 336.) 
 
 It seems hardly fair however for the advocates of the 
 theory of perfect rights and absolute independence to 
 destroy the child of their imagination by creating by 
 implication and construction an undertaking on the 
 part of an independent state to guarantee to aliens ad- 
 vantages which it is unwilling or unable to accord its 
 own citizens. In refutation of such a theory and in de- 
 fense of the right of sovereignty, it would be a sufficient 
 answer to quote from Secretary of State Marcy's in- 
 structions of April 6, 1855, to the American repre- 
 sentative at Vienna: "The system of proceeding in 
 criminal cases in the Austrian government, has, un- 
 doubtedly, as is the case in most other absolute coun- 
 tries, many harsh features and is deficient in many 
 safeguards which our laws provide for the security of 
 the accused ; but it is not within the competency of one 
 independent power to reform the jurisdiction of others, 
 nor has it the right to regard as an injury the appli- 
 cation of the judicial system and established modes of 
 proceedings in foreign countries to its citizens when 
 fairly brought under their operation. All we can ask 
 of Austria, and this we can demand as a right, is that, 
 in her proceedings against American citizens prose- 
 cuted for offences committed within her jurisdiction, 
 she should give them the full and fair benefit of her 
 system, such as it is, and deal with them as she does 
 with her own subjects or those of other foreign powers. 
 She cannot be asked to modify her mode of proceed-
 
 156 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 ings to suit our views, or to extend to our citizens all 
 the advantages which, her subjects would have under 
 our better and more humane system of criminal juris- 
 prudence." In the course of these same instructions, 
 Marcy said: "That feature in the criminal law of 
 Austria which interdicts to the accused under arrest 
 intercourse and free communication with his friends is 
 certainly revolting to our notions of justice and hu- 
 mane treatment, but it is not peculiar to that govern- 
 ment. Several other countries in Europe have the 
 same provision in their system of criminal law ... I am 
 not attempting to justify the Austrian criminal 
 code, . . . ; but condemnable as it may be, we have not 
 the right to alter or suspend it, nor can we convert the 
 fair application of it to one of our citizens when 
 brought within its jurisdiction into an international of- 
 fence." 74 (Manuscript instruction given in Moore's 
 Digest, Vol. VI, p. 275.) 
 
 74 The following extract from Daniel Webster's report to 
 President Fillmore on the Thrasher Case expressed the same 
 opinion, although that case, relating to the right of a citizen 
 domiciled abroad to the interposition of his government, was 
 not directly in point. The Secretary of State said : 
 
 "Our citizens who resort to countries where the trial by 
 jury is not known, and who may there be charged with crime, 
 frequently imagine, when the laws of those countries are ad- 
 ministered in the forms customary therein, that they are de- 
 prived of rights to which they are entitled, and therefore may 
 expect the interference [interposition] of their own Govern- 
 ment. But it must be remembered, in all such cases, that they 
 have of their own free will elected a residence out of their 
 native land, and preferred to live elsewhere, and under another 
 government, and in a country in which different laws prevail. 
 
 ' ' They have chosen to settle themselves in a country where 
 jury trials are not known; where representative government 
 does not exist ; where the privilege of the writ of habeas cor- 
 pus is unheard of, and where judicial proceedings in criminal 
 cases are brief and summary. Having made this election they 
 must necessarily abide its consequences. No man can carry the
 
 INJUSTICE 157 
 
 Without contradicting Marcy's correct statement of 
 the legal principle under international law, Elihu Root 
 is the authority for a statement of the right of aliens 
 to a favored treatment in the exceptional circumstances 
 which we are considering. In his Presidential Address 
 before the tenth meeting of the American Society of 
 International Law, in the course of his discussion of 
 "The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing 
 Abroad," Mr. Root said: 
 
 "There is a standard of justice, very simple, very 
 fundamental, and of such general acceptance by all 
 civilized countries as to form a part of the international 
 law of the world. The condition upon which any 
 country is entitled to measure the justice due from 
 it to an alien by the justice which it accords its own 
 citizens is that its system of law and administration 
 shall conform to this general standard. If any coun- 
 try's system of law and administration does not con- 
 form to that standard, although the people of the coun- 
 try may be content or compelled to live under it, no 
 other country can be compelled to accept it as furnish- 
 ing a satisfactory measure of treatment to its citizens. 
 In the famous Don Pacifico case, Lord Palmerston 
 said, in the House of Commons : 
 
 " 'If our subjects abroad have complaints 
 against individuals or against the government of a 
 foreign country, if the courts of law of that country 
 can afford them redress, then, no doubt, to those 
 courts of justice the British subject ought in the 
 first instance to apply ; and it is only on a denial of 
 justice, or upon decisions manifestly unjust, that 
 the British Government should be called upon to in- 
 
 aegis of his national American liberty into a foreign country, 
 and expect to hold it up for his exemption from the dominion 
 and authority of the laws and the sovereign power of that 
 country, unless he be authorized to do so by virtue of treaty 
 stipulations." (Moore's Digest, vol. II, p. 88.)
 
 158 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 terfere. But there may be cases in which no con- 
 fidence can be placed in the tribunals, those tri- 
 bunals being, from their composition and nature, 
 not of a character to inspire any hope of obtaining 
 justice from them. It has been said: "We do 
 not apply this rule to countries whose govern- 
 ments are arbitrary or despotic, because there the 
 tribunals are under the control of the government, 
 and justice cannot be had; and, moreover, it is 
 not meant to be applied to nominally constitutional 
 governments, where the tribunals are corrupt." 
 
 " 'I say, then, that our doctrine is, that, in the 
 first instance, redress should be sought from the 
 law courts of the country ; but that in cases where 
 redress cannot be so had and those cases are 
 many to confine a British subject to that remedy 
 only, would be to deprive him of the protection 
 which he is entitled to receive 
 
 11 'We shall be told, perhaps, as we have already 
 been told, that if the people of the country are 
 liable to have heavy stones placed upon their 
 breasts, and police officers to dance upon them; 
 if they are liable to have their heads tied to their 
 knees, and to be left for hours in that state ; or to 
 be swung like a pendulum, and to be bastinadoed 
 as they swing, foreigners have no right to be bet- 
 ter treated than the natives and have no business 
 to complain if the same things are practiced upon 
 them. We may be told this, but that is not my 
 opinion, nor do I believe it is the opinion of any 
 reasonable man. ' 
 
 "Nations to which such observations apply must be 
 content to stand in an intermediate position between 
 those incapable of maintaining order, and those which 
 conform fully to the international standard.'" 5 (Pro- 
 
 7S ' ' It is very desirable, ' ' said Mr. Root, ' ' that people who go 
 into other countries shall realize that they are not entitled to 
 have the laws and police regulations and methods of judicial 
 procedure and customs of business made over to suit them, or 
 to have any other or different treatment than that which is 
 accorded to the citizens of the country into which they have
 
 INJUSTICE 159 
 
 ceedings of the American Society of International Law, 
 1910, p. 21-2.) 
 
 If we accept Mr. Boot's statement and how can we 
 do otherwise the difficulty disappears. The conse- 
 quence of this rule is that the law of nations is recog- 
 nized supreme, and requires every state that would pre- 
 serve its independence to remove the grounds which, 
 under the supreme law of nations, would justify an in- 
 tervention. 76 
 
 If space would permit, we might amplify this dis- 
 cussion, but this is unnecessary if the reader is con- 
 vinced that: In accordance with the principles of in- 
 ternational law, every state is required to police its 
 own territory in such a manner as to secure for all its 
 inhabitants, nationals as well as aliens, a reasonable 
 protection and the enjoyment of a minimum of rights, 
 recognized by that law as absolutely indispensable for 
 
 gone; so long as the government of that country maintains, 
 according to its own ideas and for the benefit of its own citi- 
 zens, a system of law and administration which does not vio- 
 late the common standard of justice that is a part of inter- 
 national law; and so long as, in conformity with that 
 standard, the same rights, the same protection, and the same 
 means of redress for wrong are given to them as are given to 
 the citizens of the country where they are. ' ' ( See Elihu Root, 
 in Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 
 1910, p. 26.) 
 
 76 The defenders of the theory of perfect rights and absolute 
 independence may avoid this horn of the dilemma by recog- 
 nizing that the states which do not observe this requirement 
 are in a separate class of partially sovereign states, but if this 
 theory should be adopted, it would then be necessary to make 
 constant modifications in the list of states completely inde- 
 pendent, for any state against which a justifiable intervention 
 upon this ground took place would have to be dropped. This 
 second horn of the dilemma is no less painful than the first.
 
 160 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 all civilized human beings." The failure to meet this 
 obligation is a delinquency which justifies interposition 
 
 "Borchard: Diplomatic Protection, p. 13-14; 14 notes 1, 
 and 2. 
 
 Discussing the justification for the protection of nationals 
 in other states, W. E. Hall (Foreign Jurisdiction of the Brit- 
 ish Crown, 5) declares that this interposition, although he 
 does not use this term, "... gives the means of guarding them 
 against the effect of unreasonable laws, of laws totally out of 
 harmony with the nature or decree of civilization by which 
 a foreign power affects to be characterized, and finally of an 
 administration of the laws bad beyond a certain point. When 
 in these directions a state grossly fails in its duties ; when it is 
 either incapable of ruling, or rules with patent injustice, the 
 right of protection emerges in the form of diplomatic remon- 
 strance, and in extreme cases of ulterior measures. ' ' 
 
 Secretary Bayard, in his instruction of August 24, 1886, to 
 the American Minister to Peru, relative to the killing by 
 government troops of an American non-combatant, Owen 
 Young, in violation of the law of war, wrote : "It cannot be 
 admitted that in every case the rights of a foreigner in that 
 country [Peru] may be measured by the extent of the pro- 
 tection to person and property which a citizen might obtain. 
 In times of civil conflict .... it not infrequently happens that 
 citizens of a country are compelled to endure injuries which 
 would afford ample basis for international intervention [inter- 
 position], if they were inflicted on a foreigner." (Moore's 
 Digest, Vol. VI, p. 252 ; cf. p. 759.) Without the qualification 
 relative to the extreme case of a civil war, this would be a 
 good statement of the rule of law as exemplified by practice. 
 
 Professor Eugene Wambaugh, in a carefully prepared ad- 
 dress on "The Place of Denial of Justice in the Matter of 
 Protection" (Proceedings of the American Society of Inter- 
 national Law, 1910, pp. 126-137) gives the rules which he con- 
 siders to constitute good practice, the second of which reads : 
 "The alien is entitled to no more enlightened procedure than 
 is accorded to the citizen, unless that procedure is so cruel or 
 unjust as to lose the right to be termed judicial," which 
 amounts to saying that the alien does have a right to a favored 
 treatment when the procedure is so cruel or unjust that it can 
 no longer be rightfully termed judicial. 
 
 We have seen above ( p. 80-81 ) how the French Government 
 insisted that French Jews in Switzerland should be exempted 
 from the disabilities and discriminations then imposed by 
 Switzerland upon her own Jews.
 
 INJUSTICE 161 
 
 of the alien's government to secure redress. The 
 natives of the delinquent state, when they are subjected 
 to abuse, are expected to revolt and establish a govern- 
 ment able to maintain them in their rights, and it is 
 only exceptionally that other states may be expected 
 to intervene to help them to obtain their rights. 
 
 Interposition to secure a privileged treatment or 
 status for aliens brings out in bold relief the obligation 
 of every state to accord a minimum of rights to all 
 those under its jurisdiction, and when the failure to 
 fulfil this obligation in so far as concerns its own 
 nationals causes a misery which shocks public opinion 
 in neighboring states, it leads to, and affords a justi- 
 fication for humanitarian intervention. 
 
 Unless this obligation we have been considering were 
 a part of the law of nations, it would not be logical for 
 another state to demand for its own citizens a better 
 treatment than could be secured by the natives. There 
 is something so patently unjust about the claim to ex- 
 act for aliens a better treatment than for those who 
 possess the territory that some writers have wished to 
 apply the principle of national treatment to all foreign- 
 ers who enter the territory voluntarily, but they fail 
 to perceive that the state which sinks below a certain 
 standard is only allowed to maintain its precarious 
 independence upon the condition that at least it live 
 up to its international obligations to the degree of pro- 
 tecting aliens in the enjoyment of a minimum of se- 
 curity to their lives and property. The great states 
 are constantly exerting pressure to maintain their 
 nationals in the enjoyment of this minimum, but they 
 are sometimes restrained from action by their own 
 political embarrassment or a belief that the govern- 
 ment of the state in question is unable to secure for 
 their nationals the minimum they are entitled to de- 
 mand. In this latter event, there arises a just ground 
 11
 
 162 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 for intervention by way of self-help to secure the pro- 
 tection which is due, and this serious step usually leads 
 to annexation or the extension of some form of super- 
 vision over the backward state. 
 
 Interposition to secure a favored treatment for 
 aliens has shown how clearly international law recog- 
 nizes the obligation of every government to administer 
 justice in so far as is reasonably possible under the cir- 
 cumstances. Those states that are not able to guaran- 
 tee the irreducible minimum to their own citizens are 
 required to do so in the case of aliens or else to confess 
 that they are not entitled to rank as independent states 
 fulfilling the obligations of international law. 
 
 TREATMENT OF ABORIGINES 
 
 The concurrent and cooperative representations of 
 Great Britain and the United States to the Belgian 
 Government (1906-09) in behalf of the aborigines of 
 the Kongo constitute one of the most remarkable in- 
 stances of humanitarian intervention. 
 
 On December 2, 1905, Mr. Henry Lane Wilson, the 
 American Minister at Brussels, transmitted to the Sec- 
 retary of State, then the Honorable Elihu Root, a copy 
 of "La Verite sur le Kongo," "containing," as Mr. 
 Wilson said "... a resume in the English language of 
 the report of the special commission to investigate the 
 administration of King Leopold in the Kongo. " " The 
 report," states Mr. Wilson, "seems to be made in a 
 spirit of perfect fairness, and the findings of the com- 
 mission will doubtless be accepted as unprejudiced and 
 just conclusions." 
 
 A mere reading of this report without any knowl- 
 edge of the facts justifies the favorable impression 
 which it had created upon the American Minister. It 
 recognized certain inevitable abuses which must occur
 
 INJUSTICE 163 
 
 in any organization such as that of the Kongo. It 
 justified the necessity for enforced labor to compel the 
 payment of taxes, and it congratulated the adminis- 
 tration on its humanitarian action in refraining from 
 supplying alcohol to the natives who " would have over- 
 come their innate laziness in order to procure it." 
 (Foreign Eelations, 1905, p. 88.) 
 
 Reference was made to the favorable opinion of 
 * ' Messrs. Stapleton and Millman, two missionaries set- 
 tled in the Falls district," who declared that "they 
 were perfectly satisfied with the moral and material 
 condition of the country." The prevalence of certain 
 barbaric customs, such as the mutilation of the dead, 
 was remarked upon, but the administration of the 
 Kongo was praised for its efforts to eradicate these 
 abuses, and for its success in repressing the ravages of 
 the Arab slave dealers. The report stated that "the 
 obligation to work, if not excessive, and if applied in a 
 paternal and equitable way, violence being always omit- 
 ted, will be an efficient manner to civilize and transform 
 the native population." (Ibid, p. 92.) 
 
 On February 20, 1906, Secretary Boot, in reply to a 
 letter which he had received from Mr. Denby relative 
 to the treatment of the natives of the Kongo, declared : 
 " . . . the United States has no treaty right of inter- 
 vention. We could not rightfully summon or partici- 
 pate in any international conference looking to inter- 
 vention, adjudication, or enforcement of a general ac- 
 cord by other African powers against the Kongo 
 State. ' ' ( Foreign Relations, 1906, Part I, p. 88-9. ) 
 
 The Belgian Minister at Washington cabled his Gov- 
 ernment a summary of Mr. Root's letter, and shortly 
 thereafter, the American Minister at Brussels notified 
 his Government of the satisfaction which the letter 
 above referred to had afforded the Belgian Govern- 
 ment. In his report, Mr. Wilson said : ' ' The full text
 
 164 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 has been printed by almost every respectable news- 
 paper in Belgium, and the editorial comments have 
 been uniformly expressive of high appreciation and 
 approval of the position assumed by Mr. Root. 
 
 * ' I inclose a copy and translation of an editorial ex- 
 cerpt from Independence Beige, the leading daily paper 
 of Brussels, and also a translation of a part of an 
 article by Kurt Wolff in the German magazine Handel 
 und Industrie, bearing upon the subject treated by 
 Mr. Root in his letter to Mr. Denby. 
 
 "The Kongo Government are greatly pleased with 
 the attitude of the United States, as outlined by Mr. 
 Root, as it has recently had to meet attacks not only 
 from foreign sources, but also from Belgium. It has 
 issued a pamphlet in English containing Mr. Root's 
 letter, and has had the same translated into French 
 and German." (Foreign Relations, 1906, Part I, p. 
 94.) 
 
 A few months after this, on April 12, 1906, Senator 
 Morgan presented an appeal to Congress from the 
 Kongo Reform Association on behalf of the natives 
 of the Kongo, which was printed and distributed as a 
 Senate Document (No. 316, 29th Congress, 1st Ses- 
 sion). To this were annexed a number of statements 
 from missionaries in the Kongo State and affidavits 
 purporting to reproduce the evidence which certain 
 witnesses had already given before the Commission of 
 Inquiry appointed by King Leopold, which evidence, 
 notwithstanding the ex parte character of the Commis- 
 sion the Kongo Government had "failed to make ac- 
 cessible to the public and to other governments" (Ibid, 
 p. 2). The evidence submitted was of a nature to show 
 that the aborigines of the Kongo engaged in collecting 
 rubber had been subjected to a barbarous treatment in 
 order to terrorize them into bringing in the required
 
 INJUSTICE 165 
 
 supplies of rubber. 78 The appeal of the Kongo Eef orm 
 Association, signed by a distinguished and philan- 
 thropic group of citizens, 79 urged the necessity of in- 
 ternational action. The report declared : 
 
 ".With reference to the condition thus disclosed we 
 would respectfully urge that international action is a 
 necessity. The Kongo Government evidently is dis- 
 qualified for dealing satisfactorily with the existing 
 situation, in view of its alleged responsibility for the 
 wrongs reported, and of its acknowledged commitment 
 to maintenance of the system of territorial monopoli- 
 zation to which it is declared these wrongs are directly 
 traceable." (Senate Document 316, p. 2.) 
 
 While it was admitted that the United States did not 
 "share the supervisory powers belonging to the signa- 
 tories of the General Act of the Berlin conference," it 
 was, the appeal declared, " . . .equally clear. . " that the 
 attitude taken by the United States permitted it with 
 perfect propriety to "... suggest to the powers the 
 importance of meeting again for consideration of the 
 grave reports now current, . . " As regards the powers 
 and obligations of the United States under the Brus- 
 sels act, the Committee pointed out that the Brussels 
 conference "represented a joint cooperative effort for 
 relief of conditions in the Kongo territory. While deal- 
 ing primarily with measures for 'repression of the 
 African slave trade,' it was animated by a purpose of 
 
 78 See Senate Document No. 316, p. 6-30 ; also report of the 
 American Consul-General at Boma, Senate Document No. 147, 
 61st Congress, 1st Session, p. 35-40. 
 
 79 The names of the signers who honored their country and 
 themselves by their appeal were : G. Stanley Hall, Samuel B. 
 Capen, Benjamin F. Trueblood, John R. Gow, Wm. E. Hunt- 
 ington, Herbert S. Johnson, Frederick B. Allen, Edward H. 
 Clement, Edward M. Hartwell, Thomas Lacey, Charles F. 
 Dole, Edward W. Capen, Edwin D. Mead, Everett D. Burr, 
 Charles Fleischer, Thomas S. Barbour; Hugh P. McCormick 
 ( Corresponding Secretary ) .
 
 166 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 larger scope disclosed by the declaration of its aim of 
 'effectively protecting the original population of 
 Africa and securing for this vast continent the bene- 
 fits of peace and civilization. ' (Ibid, p. 3.) All the 
 powers were alike committed, in the opinion of the 
 Committee, "to the cooperative purpose represented 
 by the conference," (Ibid, p. 3) and amongst them 
 the United States since it was a signatory of the Gen- 
 eral Act of Brussels. The appeal of the Committee 
 continues : 
 
 "We recall that the President of the United States, 
 in making publication of the General Act of Brussels, 
 states that it was duly ratified, together with the pro- 
 tocol of January 2, by the United States Government, 
 and adds that the Act is "made public to the end that 
 the same, and every article and clause thereof, may be 
 observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United 
 States and the citizens thereof. 
 
 "We would urge that under the General Act of Brus- 
 sels our government is entitled to suggest to the pow- 
 ers the propriety and importance of instituting an in- 
 quiry to determine whether the government of the 
 Kongo State, by its permission of conditions repro- 
 ducing the worst horrors of the slave trade, is not in 
 violation of the spirit, and of certain specific engage- 
 ments, of its agreement under the Act of Brussels; 
 and that it may inquire further whether the system of 
 monopolization of territory and products maintained 
 and enforced by the Kongo Government is not itself 
 fatally hostile to the discharge of the engagements con- 
 tracted by that Government in the Act of Brussels and 
 thus fatal to the purpose of the powers as represented 
 by that Act. It would further appear that our govern- 
 ment, having the power, is under obligation to take this 
 course in view of the extreme gravity of current re- 
 ports.
 
 INJUSTICE 167 
 
 "It is noteworthy that in its treaty with the Kongo 
 State our Government makes mention of the obliga- 
 tions which that state has contracted by virtue of the 
 Act of Brussels and indicates its desire to facilitate 
 discharge of these obligations. (Art. X.)" (Senate 
 Document 316, p. 4.) 
 
 After stating what were considered to be viola- 
 tions of the rights of commerce granted to American 
 citizens by the treaties with the Kongo State, the Com- 
 mittee expressed in the following words its belief in 
 the justification of humanitarian intervention on the 
 part of the United States: "It is apparent that yet 
 another form of action is open to our government, 
 which has certain rights by virtue of its membership in 
 the family of nations. The reserved right belonging to 
 individuals and nations to protest against iniquity and 
 to intervene for the protection of helpless victims 
 of oppression is inalienable with our government." 
 (Ibid, p. 4.) 
 
 They further drew attention to the advantage which 
 the United States derived from its disinterested situa- 
 tion : l l The position of our government, as defined by 
 its relation to the conferences, would seem to give us a 
 unique advantage, in that we have conspicuously de- 
 clined to accept any form of political benefit in this 
 territory, and may, therefore, act for the protection of 
 its people without suspicion of other than high and 
 generous motives. We recall that in entering the con- 
 ference at Berlin our representative, Mr. Terrell, said : 
 
 " 'The Government of the United States has 
 wished to show the great interest and deep sym- 
 pathy it feels in the great work of philanthropy 
 which the conference seeks to realize. Our country 
 must feel beyond all others an immense interest 
 in the work of this assembly. ' ' ' (Senate Document 
 316, p. 5.)
 
 168 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 The Committee also quoted the following words of a 
 prominent member of the Conference, relative to the 
 cooperation of the United States: 
 
 "We attach the highest value to the cooperation 
 of the United States in our work. We know that 
 their traditional policy is to stand aloof from the 
 treaties and political arrangements of European 
 nations, but the work which we are carrying on is 
 purely humanitarian ; its only object is the extinc- 
 tion of the slave trade and the improvement of the 
 negro's lot, an object for which the United States 
 has so often poured out blood and treasure." 
 (Ibid, p. 5.) 
 
 The Committee concluded: "With an unfaltering 
 confidence that the action taken by our Government 
 will be in accord with these generous sentiments, and 
 that through it this people, disfranchised of the sacred 
 right of life, liberty, and the pursuits of happiness, 
 may rise at length from their low estate to that place in 
 the commonwealth of nations for which development 
 under a just rule may fit them, our communication is 
 respectfully submitted." (Senate Document 316, p. 
 5.) 
 
 It would seem that the carefully gathered testimony 
 of this distinguished group of philanthropists, and the 
 incontrovertible statement of the principles which they 
 set forth as a basis for the action of the United States, 
 must have influenced Secretary Root, for not long 
 after, he completely changed the attitude he had previ- 
 ously taken, when in reply to Mr. Denby he refused to 
 intervene (see above), and on December 10, 1906, he 
 sent the following instructions to the American Charge 
 at London: "Moved by the deep interest shown by 
 all classes of the American people in the amelioration 
 of conditions in the Kongo State, the President has ob- 
 served with keen appreciation the steps which the 
 British Government is considering toward that hu-
 
 INJUSTICE 169 
 
 manitarian end. You will say so to Sir Edward Grey, 
 inviting from him such information as to the course 
 and scope of the action which Great Britain may con- 
 template under the provisions of the General Act of 
 the Kongo and in view of the information which the 
 British Government may have acquired concerning the 
 conditions in Central Africa, and you will further ex- 
 press to Sir Edward Grey the desire of the President 
 to contribute by such action and attitude as may be 
 properly within his power toward the realization of 
 whatever reforms may be counseled by the sentiments 
 of humanity and by the experience developed by the 
 past and present workings of Kongo administration. 
 The President's interest in watching the trend toward 
 reform is coupled with the earnest desire to see the full 
 performance of the obligation of articles 2 and 5 of the 
 General Africa slave-trade Act of Brussels of July 
 2, 1890, to which the United States is a party, in all 
 that affects involuntary servitude of the natives." 80 
 (Foreign Relations, 1907, Part II, p. 793.) 
 
 80 The powers intervening for the protection of the Abo- 
 rigines in the Kongo district principally relied on articles 2 
 and 5 of the Brussels act. Article 5 related to the punish- 
 ment of persons taking part in the capture of slaves, the per- 
 petrators of the mutilation of adults and male infants, and the 
 organizers and abettors of man-hunts. Article 2 of the Brus- 
 sels Act, more frequently referred to, reads as follows : 
 
 "The stations, the cruisers organized by each Power in its 
 inland waters, and the posts which serve as ports for them 
 shall, independently of their principal task, which is to pre- 
 vent the capture of slaves and intercept the routes of the Slave 
 Trade, have the following subsidiary duties : 
 
 "1. To serve as a base and, if necessary, as a place of refuge 
 for the native populations placed under the sovereignty or the 
 protectorate of the State, to which the station belongs, for the 
 independent populations, and temporarily for all others in 
 case of imminent danger ; to place the populations of the first 
 of these catagories in a position to cooperate for their own de- 
 fence; to diminish intestine wars between tribes by means of 
 arbitration ; to initiate them in agricultural works and in the
 
 170 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 On February 15, 1907, the Senate adopted the fol- 
 lowing resolution introduced by Senator Lodge : 
 
 "Whereas it is alleged that the native inhabitants 
 of the Basin of the Kongo have been subjected to in- 
 human treatment of a character that should claim the 
 attention and excite the compassion of the people of 
 the United States : Therefore, be it 
 
 "Resolved, That the President is respectfully ad- 
 vised that in case he shall find that such allegations 
 are established by proof, he will receive the cordial 
 support of the Senate in any steps, not inconsistent 
 with treaty or other international obligations, or with 
 the traditional American foreign policy which forbids 
 participation by the United States in the settlement of 
 political questions which are entirely European in their 
 scope, he may deem it wise to take in cooperation with 
 or in aid of any of the powers signatories of the treaty 
 of Berlin for the amelioration of the conditions of such 
 inhabitants." (Foreign Relations, 1907, Part II, p. 
 806-7.) 
 
 The gravamen of the charge against the Kongo au- 
 thorities, as summed up in the American memorandum 
 
 industrial arts so as to increase their welfare ; to raise them to 
 civilization and bring about the extinction of barbarous cus- 
 toms, such as cannibalism and human sacrifices. 
 
 "2. To give aid and protection to commercial undertakings ; 
 to watch over their legality, especially by controlling contracts 
 of service with natives; and to lead up to the foundation of 
 permanent centers of cultivation and of commercial estab- 
 lishments. 
 
 "3. To protect, without distinction of creed, the Missions 
 which are already or may hereafter be established. 
 
 "4. To provide for the sanitary service, and to grant hos- 
 pitality and help to explorers and to all who take part in 
 Africa in the work of repressing the Slave Trade. ' ' 
 
 The General Act of the Conference of Berlin of February 
 26, 1885, also made provision for the protection of the aborig- 
 ines of the region in question, but since the United States had 
 not become a party to the Berlin Act, it based its action upon 
 the articles of the Brussels Act.
 
 INJUSTICE 171 
 
 of a later date (April 7, 1908), was as follows: "The 
 dissatisfaction with the present administration of the 
 Kongo has grown very largely out of its policy toward 
 the native races a policy which was doubtless not in- 
 tentionally cruel nor purposely at variance with the 
 acts of Brussels and Berlin, but which, in the opinion 
 of competent investigators, is enslaving, degrading, 
 and decimating the native population. It may be ad- 
 mitted that there has been much exaggeration of the 
 true condition of affairs and that many charges have 
 been refuted, but the fact nevertheless remains that 
 conditions prevail which were neither contemplated 
 nor anticipated when the Independent Kongo State 
 was called into existence by the powers." (Foreign 
 Eelations, 1908, p. 560.) 
 
 The testimony of the acts of brutality which aroused 
 public opinion and evoked official protest was disclosed 
 in the official reports published by the British and 
 American Governments. It confirmed the statements in 
 the appeal of the Kongo Reform Association. This 
 evidence showed the extreme cruelty and injustice of 
 the treatment of the natives, who were compelled, under 
 the severest penalties to bring in a certain amount of 
 rubber as a payment of taxes. 81 
 
 81 See the testimony published in Senate Document No. 316, 
 59th Congress, 1st Session, and Senate Document No. 147, 61st 
 Congress, 1st session, and in Foreign Relations, 1908. 
 
 Consul General Smith's report from Boma, dated March 
 21, 1908, contains the following: "I have the honor to call 
 your particular attention to the conditions brought about by 
 the excessive rubber tax imposed on the unfortunate natives 
 in this district. The similarity between these conditions and 
 those existing in the region visited by myself are worthy of 
 note. It is no uncommon thing for the rubber gatherers to be 
 eaten by leopards, which abound in many regions of the State, 
 and I well recall the case of a native who had been thus eaten 
 and whose remains what was left of them were brought to 
 the State post at Yambata while I was there. The so-called
 
 172 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Separately and concurrently, the British and Ameri- 
 can representatives at Brussels made emphatic and 
 repeated representations, and urged the adoption of 
 reforms which should, in the opinion expressed by the 
 Government of the United States in the memorandum 
 above referred to, have for their object : 
 
 "1. The exemption of the native population from 
 excessive taxation. 
 
 ' ' 2. The inhibition of forced labor. 
 
 "3. The possibility of the natives becoming holders, 
 in permanent tenancy, of tracts of land sufficiently 
 large to afford sustenance. 
 
 "4. To make it possible for traders and settlers of 
 all nationalities to secure unoccupied tracts of land, 
 needed for the prosecution and development of peace- 
 ful commerce, at reasonable prices, in any part of the 
 Kongo. 
 
 "5. The procurement and guaranty of equal and ex- 
 act justice to all inhabitants of the Kongo through the 
 establishment and maintenance of an independent ju- 
 diciary." (Foreign Eelations, 1908, p. 560-561.) 
 
 Early in 1907, the British Government had expressed 
 its desire that Belgium should annex the Kongo 82 in 
 order that the Free State might be placed under the 
 
 police expeditions mentioned in the report are nothing more 
 than armed raids for nonpayment of rubber taxes and for the 
 purpose of securing laborers to work on the railroad from 
 Kindu south to Fortes d'Enfer." (Foreign Relations, 1908, 
 p. 551.) The evidence collected by the British Consul, Sir 
 Roger Casement, and published by the British Government is 
 referred to in the corespondence. 
 
 82 The British opinion relative to the annexation of the 
 Kongo is indicated in Charge Carter's report of Dec. 12, 1906. 
 (Foreign Relations, 1907, Part II, p. 793-4. Cf. Minister 
 Wilson's report of February 7, 1907, Foreign Relations, 1907, 
 Part II, p. 806.)
 
 INJUSTICE 173 
 
 parliamentary control of Belgium. It is easy to un- 
 derstand the reluctance of King Leopold of Belgium 
 to do this. To let his right hand know, as it were, what 
 his left was doing. The demand that Belgium should 
 annex the Kongo found support in Belgium also, where 
 opinion had been aroused by the evidence of the atroci- 
 ties committed in the Kongo. Those who urged annex- 
 ation did so on the ground that this would establish a 
 responsible parliamentary government for the regions 
 in question, and put an end to the abuses of uncon- 
 trolled and irresponsible exploitation of the natives 
 for purely commercial purposes. 
 
 Although we do not find in the diplomatic corre- 
 spondence any indication that the intervening govern- 
 ments intended actually to have recourse to force, 83 
 
 83 Secretary Root, in his instruction to Minister Wilson, 
 January 15, 1907, writes : ' ' Our attitude toward Kongo ques- 
 tion reflects deep interest of all classes of American people in 
 the amelioration of conditions. The President's interest in 
 watching the trend toward reform is coupled with earnest de- 
 sire to see full performance of the obligations of articles 2 and 
 5 of slave-trade act, to which we are a party. We will cheer- 
 fully accord all moral support toward these ends, especially 
 as to all that affects involuntary servitude of the natives. It is 
 the President 's desire to contribute by such action toward the 
 realization of whatever reforms may be counseled by the senti- 
 ments of humanity and by the experience developed by the 
 past and present workings of the Kongo administration. The 
 Belgian Parliament having adopted principle of annexation 
 and appointed a committee to arrange details, it is alike proper 
 that the wish of the President for substantial improvement of 
 conditions in the Kongo be made known, and that he should 
 for the present observe an expectant attitude, as we under- 
 stand is the policy of some of the powers signatories to the 
 act of Berlin." (Foreign Relations, 1907, Part II, p. 799-800. 
 Cf. similar instructions to the American Charge dated De- 
 cember 10, ibid, p. 793.) 
 
 Sir Edward Grey suggested the advisability of giving the 
 Belgian Government "...a private hint as to the attitude 
 which our two Governments might in certain contingencies be 
 compelled to adopt." (Foreign Relations, 1907, Part II, p. 
 825.)
 
 174 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 the language employed was of a nature to make Bel- 
 gium understand that if it did not give heed to the em- 
 phatic protests of the intervening powers, and make an 
 effort to reform the abuses in the Kongo, the super- 
 visory powers might call a conference, at which it was 
 possible that they might either partition the Kongo 
 Free State, or place it under some other sovereign. 
 
 The Belgium Government also could not fail to un- 
 derstand that unless it put an end to the abuses in 
 question, it would incur the condemnation of two 
 powerful governments, and that the whole Belgian 
 people would be pilloried as accomplices of the inhu- 
 manity of the Kongo regime. It would be said that 
 Belgium was really responsible for the continuance of 
 the barbarous treatment of the aborigines. That the 
 purpose of these representations was intervention, and 
 not merely a proffer of friendly advice, is shown by the 
 pains taken to give the action of the powers a collective 
 form. 84 This is all the more significant in view of the 
 
 8 *At different periods of this discussion, the American Gov- 
 ernment appears to have varied somewhat in the degree of 
 intimacy of the collective action which it was willing to take 
 with Great Britain. 
 
 January 23, 1908, Minister Wilson reports: "Visited Bel- 
 gian minister for foreign affairs in company with Sir Arthur 
 H. Hardinge and made representation in accordance with our 
 several instructions." (Foreign Relations, 1908, p. 540. 
 These instructions were that each representative should sepa- 
 rately present the representations of his own government. 
 Cf. instructions of March 19, ibid, p. 550-551.) 
 
 February 28, 1908, Charge Carter reports Sir Edward Grey 
 as hoping that if further action was necessary it might be 
 "... a joint representation of both our governments, and to 
 that end he would duly inform you of the line he proposed 
 to take, so that the representations in question might be iden- 
 tical. 
 
 "He said he welcomed the fact of our working together in 
 this matter, and that the amount of good we were able to do 
 in the Kongo was vastly increased and far greater than their 
 isolated action would be our action being disinterested was
 
 INJUSTICE 175 
 
 traditional policy of the United States not to take part 
 in joint representations of any kind. 
 
 open to no suspicion in any quarter and that he was prepared 
 to go with us as far as we would wish. ' ' ( Foreign Relations, 
 1908, p. 544.) 
 
 Ambassador Bryce, in his note to the Secretary of State, 
 March 23, 1908, wrote: "I am now directed by His Majesty's 
 Government to inform you that they are very sensible of the 
 advantages attaching to the cooperation of the United States 
 Government in their efforts to bring about a more satisfactory 
 state of affairs in the Kongo, and I am to add an expression 
 of their cordial thanks for the communication of Mr. Smith's 
 report and the consent given to the publication of extracts 
 from it in the papers to be submitted to Parliament." (For- 
 eign Relations, 1908, p. 553.) 
 
 April 1, 1908, Secretary Root instructed Minister Wilson: 
 "You may independently and coincidently express our views 
 in the same sense as Great Britain does." (Foreign Rela- 
 tions, 1908, p. 556.) 
 
 On February 8, 1908, Secretary Root informed the British 
 Ambassador "... that the department has this day instructed 
 by telegraph the American minister at Brussels to join in 
 representations in the same sense as those proposed to be made 
 by Sir Edward Grey." (Foreign Relations, 1908, p. 562.) 
 The same day, he telegraphed Minister Wilson: "You will 
 in conference with the British minister and in your repre- 
 sentations to the Belgian Government support the line pro- 
 posed to be adopted by the British minister for foreign af- 
 fairs." (Ibid, p. 563.) That this instruction was carried out 
 is indicated in Minister Wilson 's dispatch of April 17 : 
 
 "Upon receipt of these instructions, I immediately sought 
 an interview with Sir Arthur Hardinge, and informed him that 
 I had been instructed to 'support the line proposed to be 
 adopted by the British minister for foreign affairs,' and that 
 I would be glad to have his views as to the course which should 
 be adopted. 
 
 "After some discussion it was agreed that on the Monday 
 following Sir Arthur should have an interview with M. Davig- 
 non, and hand in his memoranda, and that the presentation of 
 the memorandum from this legation should follow after an 
 interval of three or four days. It was also agreed that in the 
 course of his interview he would advise M. Davignon of the 
 exchange of views which had taken place between the British 
 Embassy in Washington and the Secretary of State, and would
 
 176 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Even though it is true, as the diplomatic correspond- 
 ence shows, that the intervening governments con- 
 stantly based their protests upon the failure of the 
 Kongo to fulfil treaty stipulations, the true ground of 
 action was, nevertheless, humanitarian. This is shown 
 by the articles of the treaty and by the references to 
 
 intimate that in all probability a communication in support of 
 the British propositons would be received from this legation. 
 
 "In performance of this program Sir Arthur saw M. 
 Davignon on Monday afternoon, and immediately afterwards 
 sent me a note reporting the substance of the interview. 
 
 "Yesterdaj* (Thursday, 16th) I visited the foreign office 
 and in the absence of M. Davignon, who was in attendance 
 on the discussion of the Kongo annexation bill in Parliament, 
 I delivered the memorandum (which I had prepared and pre- 
 viously submitted to my British colleague) to the Chevalier 
 van der Elst, secretary general of the foreign office, after hav- 
 ing first verbally informed him of its contents. A copy of the 
 memorandum is herewith inclosed." (Foreign Relations, 
 1908, p. 568-9.) 
 
 In the memorandum which Minister Wilson presented he 
 supported the representation of the British Government rela- 
 tive to forced labor, but in regard to the "... reference to 
 arbitration of all purely commercial and economic ques- 
 tions, the American Government limits itself at this time to an 
 expression of the hope that the Belgian Government may see 
 its way clear to frankly and promptly accept a proposition so 
 reasonable and so entirely in accordance with the rapidly 
 growing practice of civilized nations." (Foreign Relations, 
 1908, p. 569.) The memorandum closed with an expression 
 of concurrence with the propositions submitted by the British 
 Government, and the hope that they would receive the careful 
 attention and consideration of the Belgian Government. 
 
 April 29, Secretary Root instructed Minister Wilson : 
 "Keeping in touch with the British minister, you will con- 
 tinue to cooperate with him in this matter where the interests 
 of the two Governments are identical, though resting on differ- 
 ent treaties. The department will await your further re- 
 ports." (Foreign Relations, 1908, p. 572.)
 
 INJUSTICE 177 
 
 humanity throughout the correspondence, 85 and by the 
 emphasis which is laid upon the disinterested character 
 of the American action. 86 If the United States had no 
 national interest to serve, humanity stands forth as the 
 sole ground of her intervention. 
 
 On March 10, 1908, Minister Wilson made the fol- 
 lowing report relative to the proposed treaty of an- 
 nexation: " Referring to my No. 306, with which are 
 transmitted copies and translations of the amended 
 treaty of annexation of the Kongo, the 'expose des 
 motifs' of the ministry, and the royal decree suppress- 
 ing the Foundation of the Crown, I have the honor 
 to advise the Department that the results secured 
 through the conclusion of this convention would appear 
 to be such as should satisfy international opinion and 
 allay the opposition which existed in Belgium to the 
 project of annexation as conceived by the original 
 treaty. 
 
 "The celebration of this treaty and its subsequent 
 ratification by the Belgian Parliament will assure two 
 definite and important results, which stand out clearly 
 in the foreground. 
 
 85 The powers intervening in the Kongo relied principally 
 upon Articles 2 and 5 of the Brussels Act, which has been al- 
 ready referred to. Great Britain also based its protests upon 
 the violation of the Act of the Conference of Berlin, signed 
 February 26, 1885. But the United States was not a party 
 to this Act. 
 
 Some of the instances where considerations of humanity 
 were referred to as a ground for the representations of the 
 powers will be found in the documents from which we have 
 quoted. See, amongst others, Foreign Relations, 1907, Part 
 II, p. 793, 794; Ibid, 1908, p. 541, 542, 550, 560. See also 
 Senate Document No. 316, p. 5. 
 
 86 The disinterestedness of the intervention of the United 
 States is referred to in Foreign Relations, 1908, p. 544, 561. 
 See also Senate Document No. 316, p. 5. 
 12
 
 178 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 " First, the Domain or Foundation of the Crown 
 which is only another name for the regime implanted 
 by the King in the Kongo, which, it is alleged, is re- 
 sponsible for the conditions which have provoked in- 
 ternational protest and action is suppressed, and the 
 Sovereign's autocratic rule of these regions, through a 
 system of secret bureaucracy, is ended. 
 
 1 'Second, the Government of the Kongo, through a 
 responsible ministry with parliamentary control of the 
 budget, in accordance with a colonial law framed under 
 the pressure of an active and vigilant Belgian, as well 
 as international opinion, should make it certain that 
 these regions, with the native population and vast nat- 
 ural resources, will be ruled and administered in har- 
 mony with the beneficent prescriptions of the Berlin 
 and Brussels acts. 
 
 " Assuming that the treaty of annexation will be ap- 
 proved by Parliament, the first of these objects has 
 been attained, and from the constitution of the com- 
 mittee of seventeen, and the evident temper of the 
 dominant majority in Parliament which has doubt- 
 less been quickened in its conscience by the influence 
 of public opinion in America and England the second 
 will not be long delayed. 
 
 "It does not appear to me that the terms upon which 
 Belgium acquires the Kongo are of great importance 
 from an international standpoint. 
 
 "These are considerations which it would appear 
 have to do only with Belgian interests. Our interest in 
 the Kongo question being purely humanitarian in char- 
 acter, we have been concerned only in the abolition of 
 the regime which is held to be responsible for condi- 
 tions repugnant to civilization and to the humanitarian 
 spirit of this age, and in the substitution therefor of a
 
 INJUSTICE 179 
 
 constitutional government to be interpreted and exe- 
 cuted in a spirit of benevolence and humanity. 
 
 " There was some dissatisfaction with the treaty 
 when it was first laid before Parliament, owing to the 
 apparent intention to give the King absolute control 
 of the expenditure of the $10,000,000 voted to him in 
 recognition of his work in the Kongo. 
 
 "This objection, however, was met by a declaration 
 of the prime minister that each annual installment of 
 this sum was to be approved upon by Parliament, in 
 accordance with the Belgian constitution. 
 
 1 'I am of the opinion that the treaty, as now sub- 
 mitted, will receive a substantial majority in Parlia- 
 ment, and that future consideration of the Kongo ques- 
 tion will relate to the character of the colonial law." 
 (Foreign Relations, 1908, pp. 549-550. ) 87 
 
 A recent intervention on the ground of humanity 
 very similar to the intervention in the case of the 
 Kongo was undertaken by Great Britain and the 
 United States because of the Putumayo atrocities in 
 the rubber districts in the wilds of Peru. 
 
 The Department of State, as early as 1907, received 
 from the American Consul at Iquitos information of 
 the inhumane treatment of the Peruvian aborigines 
 employed in collecting rubber in the Putumayo district 
 on the upper Amazon. 
 
 The reasons which the Department of State con- 
 
 87 This account is based upon the somewhat voluminous cor- 
 respondence contained in Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 87-93; 
 ibid, 1906, Part I, p. 88-105 ; ibid, 1907, Part II, p. 791-829 ; 
 ibid, 1908, p. 537-593; Affairs in the Kongo, Senate Docu- 
 ment No. 147, 61st Congress, 1st Session; Alleged Conditions 
 \n Kongo Free State, Senate Document No. 316, 59th Congress, 
 1st Session. In Foreign Relations, 1909, p. 400-414 and For- 
 eign Relations, 1910, p. 686-693, will be found some further 
 correspondence relative to fulfilment by the Belgian Govern- 
 ment of the expected reforms in the annexed territory.
 
 180 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 sidered as a sufficient excuse to intervene upon the 
 ground of humanity were later stated by Secretary 
 Knox when, on February 4, 1913, he transmitted for 
 presentation to Congress the evidence of the atrocities 
 which had been committed : 
 
 "This report," wrote Mr. Knox, "while exhibit- 
 ing the condition of virtual slavery to which the native 
 tribes were subjected, showed that the cruelties so dis- 
 closed were not the work of American citizens, nor af- 
 fected American interests, and it would seem, did not 
 call for representations to any of the three govern- 
 ments concerned in the disputed territory. Indeed, 
 the prospect that the controversy as to the sovereignty 
 in that quarter was about to enter on an acute state 
 might have made it a delicate matter for a neutral gov- 
 ernment to impute territorial responsibility to any 
 one of them." (Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 1242.) 
 
 Acting Secretary of State Wilson, in his instructions 
 of April 6, 1912, to Mr. Stuart J. Fuller, Ameri- 
 can Consul at Iquitos, informs him of the subsequent 
 events which had led the Department of State to re- 
 open the American Consulate at Iquitos, and to under- 
 take an investigation of the treatment of the aborigi- 
 nes in the Putumayo district. We quote this docu- 
 ment in full: 
 
 "In arriving at the decision to reopen the American 
 Consulate at Iquitos, Peru, the Department has had 
 primarily in view the advisability of securing informa- 
 tion as to the labor conditions along the affluents of the 
 upper Amazon, and particularly the Putumayo River. 
 Reports transmitted to the Department by Mr. Eber- 
 hardt formerly American Consul at Iquitos, during 
 1907 and 1908 indicated that those directing the gather- 
 ing of rubber in the territory claimed by Peru to be 
 within her jurisdiction were responsible for practices
 
 INJUSTICE 181 
 
 of exploitation of the native Indians which threatened 
 the complete extinction of the primitive races. Sub- 
 sequent to the receipt of the reports of Mr. Eberhardt 
 by the Department the British Government, which was 
 in possession of information concerning the horrible 
 condition existing in the forests of the Putumayo with- 
 in the concession of a British corporation, directed His 
 Britannic Majesty's Consul General at Rio de Janeiro, 
 Sir Roger Casement, to make personal examinations of 
 the situation. Previous to this time this government 
 had been in consultation with the British Embassy at 
 Washington, with a view to cooperation in representa- 
 tions to the Government of Peru in order that the Pe- 
 ruvian Government might undertake a thorough in- 
 vestigation of the subject and obtain such first-hand in- 
 formation regarding the brutal extermination of the 
 native inhabitants of one of the important outlying 
 Provinces of Peru as would impel it to take the reme- 
 dial measures that the circumstances appeared impera- 
 tively to demand. Owing to the imminence during the 
 early months of 1910 of an outbreak of hostilities be- 
 tween Ecuador and Peru because of conflicting claims 
 of these countries regarding the territory of which the 
 Putumayo region was a part, the Government of the 
 United States at that time deemed it wise to postpone 
 communication with the Government of Peru on the 
 matter until the outstanding dispute, which it was then 
 hoped was approaching settlement, had been termi- 
 nated. It was felt that, the international situation hav- 
 ing become tranquilized and the question regarding the 
 title over the upper Amazon region decided, such rep- 
 resentations as the Government of the United States 
 might determine to make in the matter would more cer- 
 tainly produce the results which it was desired to bring 
 about.
 
 182 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 "During the early part of 1911 the Department was 
 informed, through the British Embassy at Washington, 
 that as a result of the efforts of the British Minister at 
 Lima, acting under instructions from his government, 
 the Peruvian Government had appointed a commission 
 to proceed to the Putumayo region and report on con- 
 ditions there found to exist. The Department, to which 
 the cause of the defenseless natives of the Putumayo 
 had so strongly appealed for humanitarian reasons, 
 had received information from time to time of the 
 views of the British Government in the matter and in 
 regard to the steps which the British Minister at Lima 
 had been instructed to take. During the months of 
 April and May of the past year the British Ambassador 
 at Washington transmitted, for the confidential infor- 
 mation of the Department, copies of three reports of 
 His Britannic Majesty's Consul General at Rio de 
 Janeiro, which presented the horrible details collected 
 by personal observation of the methods employed in the 
 collection of rubber by the employees of the rubber 
 company in the Putumayo district. These reports re- 
 late the appalling brutalities and atrocities from which 
 the native rubber gatherers of the forest of the Putu- 
 mayo were suffering. Copies of these pamphlets and 
 other reports of more recent dates are attached for 
 your information and for the files of the Consulate. 
 
 "On the 17th of July last the American Minister at 
 Lima was instructed to express to the Peruvian For- 
 eign Office, at a favorable opportunity, the pleasure that 
 was felt by this Government upon learning of the steps 
 initiated by Peru, inspired by the high ideals of serv- 
 ing humanity, to put an effective end to the excesses 
 in the Peruvian rubber forests of the Amazon Valley 
 by dispatching a judicial investigating commission to 
 the Putumayo. The Minister was also directed to ex-
 
 INJUSTICE 183 
 
 press the hope that adequate and vigorous measures 
 would follow to put an end to the reported barbarous 
 system in vogue, which threatened to accomplish the 
 complete extinction of a defenseless people. It was at 
 this time pointed out that Peru would undoubtedly un- 
 derstand the friendly spirit prompting a mention of 
 this matter by the Government of the United States 
 and would realize that there was no disposition or in- 
 tention present to offend by referring to a matter con- 
 cerning the internal affairs of Peru. 
 
 "It has subsequently developed from information 
 before the British Government, that the action taken 
 by the Peruvian Government in organizing this com- 
 mission has almost entirely failed of its object. The 
 corrupt influence of those responsible for the condi- 
 tions in the Putumayo has been seemingly so powerful 
 as to defeat the laudable ends of the Central Govern- 
 ment. As a result a few of the underlings have been ar- 
 rested while no serious effort has been made to appre- 
 hend or punish the leaders. It is alleged that the local 
 administrative and judicial authorities residing at 
 Iquitos have afforded such improper protection to 
 those guilty of the atrocities systematically practiced 
 upon the natives as to make it impossible to bring the 
 criminals to justice without a thorough carrying out of 
 drastic administrative local reforms. Unless the Cen- 
 tral Government of Peru takes a vigorous and earnest 
 stand it is to be apprehended that the practices which, 
 it is understood, have been temporarily suspended as a 
 consequence of the measures already taken by the Gov- 
 ernment, may be resumed in all their former intensity 
 until the native tribes will have become completely 
 exterminated. 
 
 ' ' The Department has been in recent close communi- 
 cation with the British Foreign Office, following sev- 
 eral personal conferences with Sir Roger Casement at
 
 184 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 the Department. It appeared that the British Govern- 
 ment was seriously contemplating the publication of 
 the evidence on the Putumayo in its possession in the 
 belief that such publicity might provide an effective 
 remedy to the shocking situation. However, at the sug- 
 gestion of this Government, the publication of the re- 
 ports was withheld pending further representations to 
 the Government of Peru on the subject. The Depart- 
 ment therefore, informed the American Minister at 
 Lima of the apparently well-founded rumor that no 
 really serious efforts are being made to prosecute those 
 responsible for the atrocities in the Putumayo, and to 
 instruct the Legation to cooperate with the British Le- 
 gation in taking the matter up again unofficially and 
 informally with the Peruvian Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs. In these representations the American Min- 
 ister was directed to advise the Government of Peru 
 that it was understood that the official reports on the 
 situation in the Putumayo probably could not be with- 
 held much longer from publication, the details of which 
 inevitably would be exploited in all parts of the world 
 by the press. The American Minister was directed 
 to say that unless drastic and effective action demand- 
 ed by the circumstances was taken by Peru previous 
 to the publication of this evidence, which appeared im- 
 minent, such an exposure of the situation as almost 
 surely must follow might induce public opinion of the 
 world to believe that Peru had shown herself unable 
 effectively to exercise sovereign rights over a region 
 to which Peru lays claim and the ultimate rights to 
 (sic) which Peru desires to submit for determination 
 to arbitration. 
 
 "The British and American representatives at Lima 
 had a conference during the early days of February 
 with the Peruvian President and Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs. The Peruvian Government stated that it was
 
 INJUSTICE 185 
 
 endeavoring by all means within its power to bring to 
 justice those charged with the crimes in the Putumayo, 
 and welcomed suggestions as to a system of reforms 
 which would guarantee adequate protection to the In- 
 dians within its jurisdiction. The difficulties of the 
 problem presented to the central administration were 
 emphasized the unsatisfactory communication be- 
 tween Lima and Iquitos; the difficulty of finding men 
 worthy of being intrusted with the administrative func- 
 tions in that outlying region; the barrier presented 
 by the topographical character of the wild region of the 
 upper Amazon ; and the almost absolute impossibility 
 of counteracting the influence of those identified with 
 the continuation of the present iniquitous system. 
 
 "Under the circumstances at present existing and 
 after careful consideration of the reports which were 
 received from the American Legation at Lima and the 
 information transmitted by the British representative, 
 kindly furnished through the British Embassy here, 
 the Department has informed Ambassador Bryce that 
 it deferred to the judgment of the British Government 
 in fixing the time for the publication of the Casement 
 reports. The Embassy at the same time was informed 
 that the Department could not but believe that the Pe- 
 ruvian Government should properly regard any pub- 
 licity given to the matter as in accord with the pur- 
 poses so frequently enunciated by the Peruvian Gov- 
 ernment of doing everything within its power to put an 
 end to the inhuman treatment of the Indian popula- 
 tions. Further, it was felt by the Department that the 
 publication was strongly recommended in view of the 
 efforts that are being made to procure funds by public 
 subscription making it possible to establish in the 
 Putumayo region missions for work among the In- 
 dians. The British Government now states that it will
 
 186 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 proceed with the immediate publication of the reports 
 in its possession regarding the situation of the Putu- 
 mayo. 
 
 ' ' You will make yourself thoroughly conversant with 
 the local situation upon arriving at your post and keep 
 the Department fully and promptly informed regard- 
 ing this subject, in which the Department is taking the 
 keenest interest. 
 
 "You will, upon consultation and cooperation with 
 the British Consul at Iquitos, make arrangements to 
 visit, at intervals which may in your judgment appear 
 advisable, the rubber stations along the Putumayo 
 region in order that the Department may have before 
 it your views, based upon personal observation. For 
 this purpose a special allowance of not to exceed $500 is 
 hereby granted you." (Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 
 1243-6.) 
 
 The method and object of the investigation by Mr. 
 Stuart J. Fuller, the American Consul at Iquitos, are 
 given in his report of July 31, 1912, as follows : 
 
 "When I have been asked, and a reply seemed neces- 
 sary or politic, I have stated that I have neither desire 
 nor instructions to interfere in any way whatsoever 
 with the administration of justice or the internal af- 
 fairs of Peru, but that in the course of duty it falls to 
 me as a consul to keep my Government informed as to 
 labor as well as other commercial conditions in the dis- 
 trict in which I may be stationed, no matter what part 
 of the world, and that I shall report on these in the 
 Putumayo as well as in the other rivers of the district ; 
 and that as public subscriptions are being collected 
 abroad by persons with the same high ideal of serving 
 humanity that has actuated the Peruvian Government 
 in the steps it has inaugurated to put an end to excesses 
 in the Putumayo region, for the announced purpose of
 
 INJUSTICE 187 
 
 sending missionaries to that region, information is de- 
 sired as to the condition that American citizens com- 
 ing on this mission may meet with and the conditions 
 under which the money will be expended." 88 (Foreign 
 Relations, 1913, p. 1263.) 
 
 In the same report, Consul Fuller says of the concur- 
 rent investigation by the British Consul, Mr. George 
 Babbington Mitchell, who accompanied him : 
 
 "My British colleague has based his action in the 
 matter on four grounds : 
 
 1 ' 1. The responsibility of an English company, still 
 in existence though in process of liquidation, for the 
 atrocities in the past and their share in the responsi- 
 bility for conditions in the present. 
 
 "2. The presence in the region of British subjects. 
 
 "3. The collection in Great Britain of subscriptions 
 with the object of sending missionaries to the region. 
 
 "4. The general idea of serving humanity by re- 
 porting to his government the true conditions, to be 
 published if they see fit." (Foreign Relations, 1913, 
 p. 1263.) 
 
 The Peruvian Government and the companies in con- 
 trol of the rubber district put what obstacles they could 
 in the way, to prevent the consuls from procuring from 
 
 88 Consul Fuller 's statement cannot be considered as a frank 
 description of his real purpose. The investigation, according 
 to the statement of the Consul himself, was undertaken in op- 
 position to the real wishes of the Peruvian Government. (See 
 Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 1262.) 
 
 We note here an embarrassment evidently due to the unfor- 
 tunate and unfounded belief that intervention upon the 
 ground of humanity is not justifiable in international law. 
 We find this same erroneous opinion expressed by Secretary 
 Knox in his letter of February 4, quoted above. The British 
 Government does not appear to have fully concurred in this 
 opinion, since the British Consul gives humanity as one of the 
 grounds justifying him in undertaking the investigation.
 
 188 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 the natives themselves full information of the actual 
 conditions in the district. 89 
 
 89 Cf. Acting Secretary of State Wilson's comment quoted 
 above upon Peru's conduct of her own investigation. (For- 
 eign Relations, 1913, p. 1244.) 
 
 In his report of July 31, 1912, Consul Fuller writes : 
 
 "Although I am unable to point out at present anything 
 specific, still my impression is now that the government is no 
 more anxious to have us make a trip to the Putumayo or to see 
 personally the conditions existing there than the company is, 
 so that we should probably gain no more information from a trip 
 on one of the government launches than from that of the com- 
 pany." 
 
 In the same report he writes : 
 
 "In making our arrangements with the company, we in- 
 sisted on paying our passage and stated that we also wished 
 to pay for anything that we might find it necessary to buy up 
 the river, although they offered us free passage and all we 
 might need." 
 
 Further along he remarks : 
 
 "The local situation remains much the same as it was two 
 weeks ago, so far as the Iquitos public in general is concerned. 
 The tone of the articles that have been appearing in the public 
 press has produced, however, a feeling of irritation and resent- 
 ment at what they privately characterize as meddling on the 
 part of the United States and England among the Government 
 officials here, but to both Consul Michell and myself they have 
 continued studiously courteous. The officials are undoubtedly 
 becoming nervous in regard to the situation. 
 
 "My British colleague and I called on the acting prefect 
 and applied for some document in the nature of a passport, 
 to be addressed to the local authorities, and this he said he 
 would be glad to give us. He also suggested sending a mili- 
 tary aide to accompany us, and though we were by no means 
 enthusiastic over this proposition I fear that we may not be 
 able to avoid it." (Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 1262; Cf. p. 
 1244-5, quoted above.) 
 
 Consul Fuller closed his report of August 6 as follows : 
 
 "I regret that both the company and the Government adopt- 
 ed the course of preventing us from seeing the actual con- 
 ditions wherever possible, but trust that the course I pursued 
 in the matter may meet with the department's approval." 
 (Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 1278.)
 
 INJUSTICE 189 
 
 From the reports of Consuls Eberhardt, Fuller, 
 Mitchell, and Casement, the prevalence of horrible con- 
 ditions in the Putumayo district was established be- 
 yond any possibility of doubt. 90 
 
 We do not wish to dwell upon the appalling brutali- 
 ties to which the Peruvian aborigines were subjected. 
 Consul Eberhardt, in his report (1907) explains how 
 the indebtedness of the Indians for the food which was 
 supplied them resulted in a system of peonage, and 
 these peons, held in a bondage of debt, could be trans- 
 ferred from one employer to another. If the poor 
 Indian attempts to run away, he is tracked in the for- 
 est by hostile Indians who bring him back, dead or 
 alive. Consul Eberhardt relates all manner of cruelties 
 practiced upon these peons: the beating and kicking 
 of Indian women, the dashing of a baby's brains 
 against a tree because it " . .seemed to interfere with 
 her [the mother's] bringing in a sufficient amount of 
 rubber..," the disemboweling of a pregnant woman 
 with the stroke of a sharp machete, and other hor- 
 rors of a similar nature. (Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 
 1247-9. Cf. Ibid, p. 1242-4. See also "Slavery in 
 Peru," House Document No. 1366, 67th Congress, 3rd 
 Session.) 
 
 Testimony of similar atrocities are published in the 
 reports of the other consuls. 
 
 Consul Fuller gives the following account of the 
 labor situation in Peru: "In the second place, for a 
 full comprehension of the existing situation it is neces- 
 sary to examine into the general labor situation 
 throughout this part of Peru. An important factor in 
 this phase of the situation is found in the ancient, 
 deep-rooted, and almost universal attitude of the Pe- 
 
 90 See Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 1242, 1244, 1246-9; see 
 also "Slavery in Peru," House Document No. 1366, 62nd 
 Congress, 3rd Session.
 
 190 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 ruvians, who, while they may not approve of cruel 
 and inhuman treatment, generally regard the Indians 
 as placed here by Providence for the use and benefit 
 of the white man and as having no rights that the 
 white man need respect. 
 
 * ' This attitude of the people has found concrete ex- 
 pression in the universal system of peonage, an old 
 institution, well established, recognized by law, and 
 which has come to be the basis on which the rubber 
 business (the sole industry of trans-Andean Peru) al- 
 most entirely rests. The system of advancing sup- 
 plies, necessities and luxuries, to peons and rubber 
 gatherers is universal in this part of Peru and has led 
 to the establishment of what is virtually a slave trade. 
 The trades encourage the " patrons" operating rubber 
 sections to continually enlarge their spheres of oper- 
 ations, so that they will have more rubber to sell and 
 can buy more imported goods. Labor being compara- 
 tively scarce and expensive throughout the district, it 
 is to the patron 's interest to get those working for him 
 hopelessly into his debt, which means that he can retain 
 their services as peons until they pay this off. It is 
 difficult to maintain that this system of servitude is 
 not recognized, since it is universal and, while never 
 discouraged by the authorities, is certainly in many 
 cases upheld. 
 
 "It simply means that the native who is unable to 
 pay for the advance he has been encouraged to take is 
 seized by the patron who designedly advanced him 
 more than he could pay for, and is compelled to work 
 off the debt. As he must be lodged and fed in the mean- 
 while, the cost of this is added to his old debt, and, by 
 further advances, care is taken to keep the debt at a 
 point where it can never be overtaken. As these claims 
 are transferable, the person of the debtor being also 
 transferred to the new creditor, the Indians and their
 
 INJUSTICE 191 
 
 families are really bought and sold, passing from hand 
 to hand under a system that bears a striking resem- 
 blance to actual slavery." (Report of Oct. 28, 1912, 
 Foreign Relations 1913, pp. 1251-2.) 
 
 The Indians are, according to Consul Fuller 's report, 
 " . . mild, docile, inoffensive, and childlike, just as 
 they are reported to have been by Robuchon the ex- 
 plorer, by Consul Eberhardt, and by Sir Roger Case- 
 ment." (Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 1269.) He re- 
 marks, "I doubt whether they know the difference be- 
 tween proper treatment at the hands of the whites and 
 maltreatment, for the simple reason that the first idea 
 of the white man they had was bad usage. In case of 
 any trouble they would not be likely to appeal to the 
 authorities. They would not understand how, and 
 they have no conception of government. The only way 
 to protect them is to watch over them and their inter- 
 ests." (Ibid, p. 1269-1270.) 
 
 In his report of October 28, 1912, Consul Fuller re- 
 marks: "As to the past, the truth is that the district 
 was the ash barrel of both Peru and Colombia, and the 
 concessionaires, jthougji cognizant of this, were so 
 anxious to make money that they took into their employ 
 without investigation any of the ashes who professed 
 a willingness to work. The deplorable result is al- 
 ready known to the Department. It was due to the 
 criminal negligence of the Peruvian and British con- 
 cerns, who in turn controlled the district, and the total 
 absence of Government supervision. The British di- 
 rectors who entrusted the conduct of their business 
 here entirely to Peruvian hands cannot rely on that 
 as relieving them from responsibility in the matter." 
 (Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 1278). 
 
 After it was evident that the Peruvian Government 
 would not undertake any adequate measures of reform 
 from sentiments of humanity, the hope seems to have
 
 192 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 been entertained that the fear of losing the territory in 
 question might stimulate the zeal of the Government, 
 and check the gross outrages committed by the agents 
 of the companies upon the aborigines. (Ibid, p. 1245, 
 p. 1273-4.) 
 
 Peru was given to understand that her claim to the 
 sovereignty of the regions in question might be im- 
 peached with success by the other claimant govern- 
 ments if it were admitted that Peru could not police the 
 territory to which she laid claim. (Ibid, p. 1245.) 
 
 For the purpose of bringing the pressure of public 
 opinion to bear upon Peru, the British Government had 
 proposed to publish the Casement report containing 
 evidence of the atrocities committed in the Putumayo 
 district, and after the American Government withdrew 
 its objections, a blue book was issued, July, 1912. 91 The 
 
 01 This blue book is reproduced in House Document 1366 on 
 ' ' Slavery in Peru, ' ' 62nd Congress, 3rd Session. It contains a 
 note which Secretary Knox addressed May 24, 1912, to the 
 British Charge in which, at the last moment, the Secretary 
 suggested that the publication of the evidence be deferred in 
 view of the new legislation promised by Peru. 
 
 Secretary Knox wrote: ''In view of this positive manifes- 
 tation of the purposes of the Government of Peru, I have the 
 honor to inquire whether His British Majesty's Government 
 might not be of the opinion that it would be most conducive to 
 the attainment of the ends desired to postpone for the present 
 the publication of the correspondence transmitted with your 
 note under acknowledgment. ' ' (Slavery in Peru, House Docu- 
 ment No. 1366, 62nd Congress, 3rd Session, p. 441.) 
 
 In consideration of the evidence of the bad faith and pro- 
 crastination of the Peruvian Government then before Secre- 
 tary Knox, it is hard to understand what good purpose could 
 have been served by this delay. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey, in his reply, June 27, 1912, said : "I am 
 unable to fall in with Mr. Knox 's view that publication might 
 with advantage be deferred, as I am convinced that an au- 
 thoritative account of the facts of the case cannot but assist 
 the Peruvian Government in their reforming efforts and direct 
 them to the proper channels." (Ibid, p. 442.)
 
 INJUSTICE 193 
 
 London Times, in an editorial of July 15, 1912, com- 
 mented severely upon the atrocities revealed in this 
 publication (Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 1240). 
 
 The House of Representatives took notice of this 
 statement, and in a resolution of August 1, 1912, di- 
 rected the Secretary of State, ' ' if not incompatible with 
 the public interest, to transmit to the House of Repre- 
 sentatives all information in the possession of his De- 
 partment concerning the alleged existence of slavery in 
 Peru, and especially all information tending to show 
 the truth or falsity of the following statement made in 
 an editorial in the London Times of July fifteenth, 
 nineteen hundred and twelve: 'The bluebook shows 
 that in an immense territory which Peru professes to 
 govern the worst evils of the plantation slavery which 
 our forefathers labored to suppress are at this moment 
 equaled or surpassed. They are so horrible that they 
 might seem incredible were their existence supported 
 by less trustworthy evidence.' " (Foreign Relations, 
 1913, p. 1240.) 
 
 In response to this resolution, Secretary Knox trans- 
 mitted the correspondence and documents from which 
 we have been quoting in the preceding pages. 
 
 February 6, 1913, Ambassador Bryce addressed the 
 following note to the Secretary of State: 
 
 "Sir: With reference to previous correspondence 
 relative to the Putumayo atrocities, I have the honor 
 to transmit to you, herewith, two copies of a dispatch 
 from His Majesty's Consul at Iquitos reporting on the 
 recent visit to the Putumayo district, which he carried 
 out in the company of the United States Consul, Mr. 
 James Fuller. 
 
 "In communicating this report to you I am to ask 
 you to be so good as to furnish His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment with a copy of Mr. Fuller's report on the visit and 
 to favor me with the expression of your views on the 
 
 13
 
 194 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 general question and on the action which the two Gov- 
 ernments should or can now take. 
 
 "I am also to inform you that in the opinion of His 
 Majesty's Government the Peruvian Government 
 should be given an opportunity of offering any obser- 
 vations they may desire to make on the reports of the 
 two Consuls before these reports are published." 
 (Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 1287-8.) 
 
 In his reply, Secretary Knox said : 
 
 1(1 Before transmitting this correspondence to the 
 President, the Department of State conferred with 
 the Peruvian Minister, apprizing him of the general 
 tone of Mr. Fuller's findings. Mr. Pezet thereafter 
 described the measures recently adopted by the Pe- 
 ruvian Government with a view towards ending the 
 mistreatment of the Putumayo Indians and made re- 
 newed assurances, on behalf of his Government, to the 
 effect that it would henceforth rigorously inforce law 
 and order throughout the rubber-producing district of 
 Peru. 
 
 "In your excellency's note under acknowledgment 
 you were good enough to ask for an expression of my 
 views regarding the Putumayo question and the action 
 now called for thereon. In reply I may say that, in 
 view of the rigorous policy apparently animating the 
 present administration in Peru, the remoteness of the 
 district and the attendant obstacles in the way of ef- 
 fective reform I am of the opinion that any further 
 action on the part of His Majesty's Government or of 
 the American Government would appear inopportune, 
 at least at the time being, inasmuch as it might be in- 
 strumental in stirring up public sentiment in Peru to 
 such an extent as to hinder whatever real desire now 
 exists there for bettering the conditions under which 
 the Indians labor." (Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 
 1288.)
 
 SLAVE TRADE 195 
 
 Again on September 10, 1913, the British Ambassa- 
 dor, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, wrote the Secretary of 
 State: 
 
 ' ' On February 25 Mr. Knox forwarded to my prede- 
 cessor a Congressional document containing, among 
 other correspondence regarding the Putumayo ques- 
 tion, the report of the American Consul at Iquitos, Mr. 
 Fuller, on conditions in that region of Peru. 
 
 1 'I need not recall to your mind the particulars of 
 this question which has engrossed the attention of our 
 two governments for the last two years, but I have now 
 been instructed by Sir E. Gray to inquire what con- 
 clusions you have arrived at in regard to Mr. Fuller's 
 report. 
 
 "I should therefore be much obliged if you could 
 give me your views on the question and could indicate 
 to me the policy which you think it best to adopt in the 
 present position of affairs. ' ' ( Foreign Relations, 191 3, 
 p. 1289.) 
 
 No further action is disclosed in the correspondence 
 published in Foreigtn Relations for 1913, recently 
 published by the Government. For some reason not 
 stated in the correspondence, the Department of State 
 at that time was unwilling to cooperate with Great 
 Britain in undertaking a humanitarian intervention 
 which would have had a salutary effect upon Peru and 
 other countries which, in violation of international law, 
 condone and protect the perpetrators of atrocities 
 upon defenseless aborigines. 
 
 8(e). SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE 
 
 Several decades before slavery itself was recognized 
 as contrary to international law, the slave trade was 
 held to be illegal by a consensus of opinion on the part
 
 196 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 of the powers who undertook measures of cooperation 
 for its suppression. 92 The willingness of the great 
 
 92 The slave trade was a natural adjunct of slavery when the 
 latter was fully recognized as an institution of the law of 
 nations, but the manifest and frightful cruelties which were 
 inseparable from the commerce in human beings came to be 
 considered by a consensus of the civilized powers as so gross a 
 violation of humanity as to justify the exercise of constraint 
 against any state which tolerated it under its flag. In other 
 words, the slave trade became illegal and a sufficient justifi- 
 cation for humanitarian intervention against any govern- 
 ment countenancing it. 
 
 The late Alpheus H. Snow has made a thorough study of 
 the history of the abolition of the slave trade (in his The 
 Question of Aborigines in the Law and Practice of Nations, 
 chap. VII, p. 85-100), and reaches the conclusion that " . . .un- 
 doubtedly ' the slave trade, ' in the technical sense, is now con- 
 trary to the universal, or common, law of nations. A state 
 which should authorize its citizens to engage in it would, it 
 would seem, clearly violate the law of nations. A state which 
 should even tolerate traffic in slaves, as a social institution, in 
 any place under its sovereignty, would undoubtedly at the 
 present time subject itself to international repressive or puni- 
 tive action, unless it could show, in its own defense, that it had 
 done, and was doing, everything possible to abolish the traffic. ' ' 
 
 Hall lends his authority to this view. He writes (Inter- 
 national Law, 4 ed, 108, p. 343) : "Thus a compact for the 
 establishment of a slave trade would be void, because the per- 
 sonal freedom of human beings has been admitted by modern 
 civilized states as a right which they are bound to respect and 
 which they ought to uphold internationally." 
 
 One is surpised to read in Westlake (International Law, 
 vol. I, p. 170) : "Thus for the detection and suppression of 
 the slave trade, there is no right of visit and search by general 
 law, but only by treaty between states whch have conceded it 
 to one another in their just hatred of that traffic, which, how- 
 ever abominable, has never been regarded as an international 
 offense." (Cf. Woolsey, 6 ed., 215-218, p. 370-378). The 
 offense, it is true, is primarily one for repression by each 
 sovereign and not like piracy, one which may be punished by 
 all the states, but it is, nevertheless, an offense against inter- 
 national law for the suppression of which each government is 
 responsible, and a failure to fulfil this obligation is in itself 
 an international offense.
 
 SLAVE TRADE 197 
 
 powers to intervene to suppress the slave trade has 
 been shown upon several occasions. Layard, the Brit- 
 
 The following excerpts from the notes and correspondence 
 of Sir Frederick Rogers [later Lord Blachford] indicate the 
 zeal with which the British Government under Lord Palmer- 
 ston used its influence to repress the slave trade. 
 
 "The English nation, while its own interests are not very 
 visibly and gravely concerned, has a strong vein of philan- 
 thropy, but it is in regard to negro slavery that this feeling 
 has so taken hold of the people, and is so powerfully organized 
 as to become a political influence. Partly on this account and 
 partly also, I doubt not, from genuine conviction, Lord Pal- 
 merston had taken up this particular question, and felt him- 
 self bound to assist, if possible, certain plans of the French 
 Government for conducting an immigration from the West 
 Coast of Africa to the French negro colonies, which was sup- 
 posed to have hitherto covered a disguised slave trade. 
 
 "The French Government, pressed by its planters, did not 
 venture simply to suppress this, and, I take it for granted, 
 replied to a remonstrance by pointing to our own coolie emi- 
 gration (which it had for some time been my special function 
 to superintend ) . At any rate, Lord Palmerston, then Premier, 
 and Lord Clarendon, then at the Foreign Office, suggested to 
 the French that, if they would give up their African emigra- 
 tion, they might be allowed to take coolies from India to their 
 colonies on the same terms (mutatis mutandis) as those on 
 which they were taken to English colonies. Neither the India 
 Office, nor the Colonial Office, much liked this arrangement, 
 because it appeared probable that, since we had not been 
 more than able to protect the coolies in our own colonies, we 
 should be less than able to protect them in those of France ; 
 and so the evil of quasi-slavery might exist, the responsibility 
 of it merely being transferred from the Foreign Office (which 
 was bound to protect the Africans) to us, or rather to the 
 India Office, which was bound to protect the Indians." 
 (Marindin: Letters of Lord Blachford, p. 170-171.) 
 
 Sir Frederick Rogers sums up a long harangue of Persigny 
 relative to the relations between France and England in their 
 bearing on the negotiation in hand : ' ' The sense is this. The 
 French Government have promised their colonies to revive the 
 slave trade (in substance), the English make such a row about 
 this that it may lead to war or something like it, unless the 
 dispute is evaded. The French Government is too far pledged 
 to give in visibly, whether wrong or right. But if you will let 
 us get emigrant laborers from India instead of buying slaves in
 
 198 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 ish Ambassador at Madrid, when approached by the 
 American representative in regard to humanitarian 
 
 Africa, we will give up the African enterprise and tell our 
 colonists that we have made a capital bargain for them, and 
 so we shall be out of the mess altogether." (Ibid, p. 175.) 
 
 In reference to the space allotment for coolie emigrants, Sir 
 Frederick Rogers writes: "I was much amused at one point 
 which 1 tried to make. The French pack their emigrants and 
 ships twice as close as we do, and yet they have had very good 
 passages. Of course they object to imposing on themselves our 
 strict law, and I wanted to come to some compromise, so I 
 tried to find what would pacify them, and suggested 50 cubical 
 feet par personne. This posed old Persigny, who wanted to 
 know what it meant ; and betook himself in a vague perplexed 
 way, like a puzzled linen-draper, to a measuring tape which 
 he began to pull out, and measure distances in the air as if 
 that would help him. So I explained that 50 cubical feet was 
 6 feet long l l / 2 feet broad and 5y 2 feet high, or to make the 
 matter more intelligible, if he would imagine the whole ground 
 pretty well covered with human beings lying at full length, 
 and 5y 2 feet of height above them, that would be the thing 
 'and,' I added, 'I don't think you can well give a man less 
 than that. ' I shall not easily forget the mixture of disgust and 
 astonishment and amusement with which he burst out 'Sacre- 
 Dieu! non! they will all be sick' (or rather 'seek') 'too,' on 
 which I began to repent me of having given in so much, and 
 tried to retrieve a point or two, with what success remains to 
 be seen." (Ibid, p. 178-9.) 
 
 An extract from another letter shows how large an account 
 was taken of public opinion in regard to the commerce in 
 human beings: "He read me a long list of the 'Minister of 
 Marine's' objections to what I may call my requirement, that 
 the French should collect emigrants for themselves instead of 
 throwing it on the British Government, and of his own reply 
 which was characteristic and amusing. The civil deference 
 with which the objections of the ' Marine ' were magnified and 
 evaded was very French; and an elaborate argument that 
 the cordial and bona fide cooperation of the English Govern- 
 ment might be counted upon because the success of the scheme 
 was the only way in which Lord Palmerston could escape from 
 allowing the French emigration from Africa and so incurring 
 the pressure of public opinion, 'which is so susceptible a cet 
 egard' and of 'la Societe" Biblique' (which was made to fig- 
 ure as a great political power), was wonderfully character- 
 istic of a French view of English manners." (Ibid, p. 180.)
 
 SLAVE TRADE 199 
 
 intervention in Cuba, expressed a readiness to support 
 the views of the United States, saying that England 
 also had abundant cause to intervene in Cuba on ac- 
 count of the slave trade (Callahan: Cuba and Inter- 
 national Relations, 1899, p. 423). 
 
 At the close of his career in 1864, Lord Palmerston, 
 then Prime Minister, wrote the following letter to Sir 
 John Crampton, the British Ambassador at Madrid : 
 
 "I have been reading your account of your represen- 
 tation to the Spanish minister about the slave trade, 
 carried on for the supply of Cuba. Your arguments 
 are perfectly just, and your statements are all borne 
 out by facts. If you have occasion to talk with him 
 again on these matters, you may say, as a proof that 
 the feeling against the slave trade is not confined in 
 England to enthusiasts and West Indian proprietors, 
 that there are no two men in England more determined 
 enemies of the slave trade than Lord Russell and my- 
 self, and certainly we are neither of us bigoted en- 
 thusiasts nor West Indian proprietors, but we have 
 both labored assiduously and with much success for 
 the extirpation of that abominable crime. 
 
 "During the many years that I was at the Foreign 
 Office, there was no subject that more constantly or 
 more intensely occupied my thoughts, or constituted 
 the aim of my labors ; and though I may boast of hav- 
 ing succeeded in accomplishing many good works and 
 among them materially assisting the Spaniards to get 
 rid of their tyrannical dynasty, and to establish Parlia- 
 mentary Government yet the achievement which I 
 look back to with the greatest and the purest pleasure 
 was the forcing the Brazilians to give up their slave 
 trade, by bringing into operation the Aberdeen Act of 
 1845. The result, moreover, has been greatly advan- 
 tageous to the Brazilians, not only by freeing them 
 from a grievous crime, but by very much improving
 
 200 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 their general condition..." 93 (The Life of Vicount 
 Palmerston, by Evelyn Ashley, II: 263-4). 
 
 In 1862-1864, the British Government intervened to 
 prevent the importation into Peru of Polynesians as 
 laborers under conditions of extreme cruelty approxi- 
 mating a condition of slavery. 
 
 93 The British representative, February 12, 1863, addressed 
 the following note to the Brazilian Government: 
 
 "Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the effect 
 of the new regulations for the government of negroes in the 
 Itapura establishment is, practically to consign to forced servi- 
 tude for six years men, women, and children who are free ac- 
 cording to the showing of the Brazilian authorities themselves ; 
 and Her Majesty's Government consequently feel themselves 
 bound to require that these Africans, who were liberated 
 under British auspices, shall not be subjected to the regula- 
 tions in question." (Parliamentary Papers, 1863, vol. 73, 
 Correspondence Respecting Liberated Slaves in Brazil, 
 [3189].) 
 
 Ashley, writing of Lord Palmerston 's efforts to suppress the 
 slave trade and to discourage slavery says: "For nothing 
 will Lord Palmerston be more honorably remembered than 
 for his long and succesful efforts for the suppression of the 
 slave trade and the discouragement of slavery. From the 
 moment that he was called to the Foreign Office in 1830, he 
 entered warmly into the subject, and with his whole heart 
 labored for their extinction. He sought to engage all maritime 
 states in one great network of treaties for the combined an- 
 nihilation of this nefarious traffic in human beings, and to a 
 large extent he succeeded. Some of the Spanish and other 
 diplomatists used to be quite surprised at what they thought 
 his craze, and were fain to humor him on, what they consid- 
 ered, so insignificant a matter. When action succeeded to 
 negotiation as, for instance, in the decisive blow dealt in 
 1840 at the Portuguese slave dealers by the destruction of 
 their barracoons on the West Coast of Africa he never al- 
 lowed any consideration for the susceptibilities or anger of 
 foreign Governments to induce him to halt in his course. On 
 the contrary, when the countrj T , sick with deferred hopes and 
 aghast at the expense of the necessary squadrons, seemed, at 
 one moment, disposed to flinch, his earnest language, con- 
 veying lofty aspirations, maintained its spirit and strength- 
 ened it for renewed efforts." (Ashle} r 's Life of Palmerston, 
 vol. II, p. 228.)
 
 SLAVE TRADE 201 
 
 The British Minister, in his report of May 29, 1863, 
 enclosed a copy of a declaration of the Diplomatic and 
 Consular body at Lima, in regard to the abuses com- 
 mitted on the Polynesians. The declaration as trans- 
 lated into English read as follows : 
 
 "The Diplomatic and Consular Corps resident in 
 Lima met on the 13th of May, 1863, in this city, and 
 declared : 
 
 1 * 1. That the Diplomatic and Consular Corps deplore 
 as deeply as the Government of Peru, the horrible 
 abuses committed in the Polynesian Islands by expe- 
 ditions that tried to obtain laborers, in violation of the 
 laws and of the licenses given to bring those laborers 
 to this Republic. 
 
 "2. That they are happy to express their satisfaction 
 at the suitable measures taken by the Government of 
 Peru to prohibit said traffic, carried on in violation of 
 the laws and of the licenses conceded. 
 
 "3. That they are also happy to assure their respec- 
 tive Governments, that the measures taken by the Gov- 
 ernment of Peru have supported morality, justice, and 
 humanity. 
 
 * * In continuation, they decided that this act be copied 
 in the records of the diplomatic corps, and that after 
 being signed, a copy be presented to his Excellency the 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of the 
 Council of Peru, by the Charges d 'Affaires and Con- 
 suls-General of France and the United States of Col- 
 ombia ; every member of said corps, moreover, sending 
 a copy to his own government. ' ' 
 
 "(Signed) 
 
 CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Envoy Extraordinary and 
 Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States 
 of America. 
 
 THOMAS ELDREDGE, Charge d' Affaires and Consul- 
 General of Hawaii. 
 
 BARBAR/ VIE COLLEGE LIBRA&%
 
 202 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 EDMUND P. DE LESSEPS, Charge d' Affaires and 
 Consul-General of France. 
 
 WILLIAM STAFFORD JERNINGHAM, Charge d' Affaires 
 and Consul-General of Great Britain. 
 
 JUAN DUARTE DA PONTE RIBEYBO, Charge d' Af- 
 faires of Brazil. 
 
 PBOSPERO PEREIRA GAMBA, Charge d' Affaires and 
 Consul-General of the United States of Colom- 
 bia. 
 
 CELEDONIO URREA, Charge d' Affaires of Ecuador. 
 
 J. CANEVARO, Consul-General of Italy. 
 
 W. BRAUNS, Consul-General of Hamburgh. 
 
 G. ESCARDO, Consul-General of the Argentine Con- 
 federation. 
 
 A. EVARISTO DE ORNELLAS, Consul-General of Por- 
 tugal. 
 
 J. GILDEMEISTER, Consul-General of Bremen. 
 
 A. GREULICH, Consul of Frankfort. 
 
 TH. MULLER, Consul of Prussia and Hanover. 
 
 F. OYAGUE, Consul of Venezuela." 
 
 In the form of a congratulation that the system had 
 been abolished, this declaration evidently was intended 
 to register a formal disapproval of the traffic. Not- 
 withstanding this, the British Charge, in the same 
 note in which he enclosed the declaration above given 
 remarked: "None of these being British subjects, I 
 do not see how far I am authorized in interfering ex- 
 cept by moral reprobation of acts evidently inhumane 
 in their consequences, and which ought to be properly 
 punished by those to whom it legally pertains to inflict 
 the deserved castigation. " 
 
 But the British Minister for Foreign Affairs took a 
 different view. Lord John Eussell in his instructions 
 of March 18, 1864, wrote : 
 
 "In your dispatch of the 12th May last you inclosed 
 to me a note from the Peruvian Government, stating 
 that that Government had abolished the system which 
 had been adopted for the introduction into Peru of
 
 SLAVE TRADE 203 
 
 natives of the Polynesian Islands, and which had given 
 rise to such horrible abuses. 
 
 "I received this intelligence with satisfaction, and 
 approved of the steps taken by you in carrying out the 
 instructions which you had received from me in the 
 matter. 
 
 ' 'You will continue to bear the subject in mind, as it 
 is not impossible that, although the system has been 
 abolished, steps may be taken indirectly to carry out 
 the objects contemplated by the parties concerned, thus 
 causing fresh evils and crimes. In such case, it will 
 be your duty again to remonstrate on the part of Her 
 Majesty's Government, and I shall be glad to learn that 
 your diplomatic and consular colleagues have cooper- 
 ated in your representation. ' ' (Parliamentary Papers, 
 1864, vol. 66 [3307].) 
 
 In 1888-89, the European powers instituted a pacific 
 blockade of the coasts of Zanzibar, generally stated to 
 have had the purpose of preventing the exportation of 
 slaves (see T. E. Holland: Studies in International 
 Law, p. 139-140 ; Hogan : Pacific Blockade, p. 130-137.) 
 
 But P. L. McDermott, an official of the British East 
 Africa Company gives the following account based 
 upon the official documents and his own knowledge of 
 the events recorded: "An important consequence of 
 the troubles on the German coast was the establishment 
 by Great Britain and Germany of a joint blockade of 
 the mainland coast of the Zanzibar dominions osten- 
 sibly 'against the importation of arms and the ex- 
 portation of slaves.' In a despatch from the Foreign 
 Office, dated November 1st, Colonel Euan-Smith was in- 
 formed 'that Her Majesty's Government had agreed 
 with that of Germany, in view of the rebellion against 
 his (the Sultan's) authority which had broken out on 
 the mainland under the influence of the slave-dealers, 
 to establish, in conjunction with his Highness, a block-
 
 204 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 ade over the coast of his continental dominions, in 
 order to cut off the importation of munitions of war to 
 his insurgent subjects, and to put a stop to the ex- 
 portation of slaves.* This diplomatic phraseology, 
 however, obscured the main object of the blockade as 
 well as the causes which gave rise to it. The rebellion 
 had broken out, not against the authority of the Sul- 
 tan, but against that of the German Company, and had 
 no connection indeed had not before been alleged to 
 have any connection with the business of the slave- 
 dealers. Nor, indeed, from the antecedent attitude of 
 German subjects on the mainland (between whom and 
 their Government natives could not be expected to dis- 
 tinguish) towards slavery and the slave trade was 
 there any reason for the slave-dealers to apprehend 
 much interference with their special traffic as a conse- 
 quence of the establishment of German administra- 
 tion." 94 
 
 Even before the states of Europe had formally recog- 
 nized the illegality of slavery itself, they had given 
 evidence, by their practice of granting asylum to fugi- 
 tive slaves, that they did in reality so regard it. 
 
 The Act of Brussels, relative to the African Slave 
 Trade, was signed July 2, 1890, by the representatives 
 of the principal powers and the states most concerned 
 in the slave trade. The preamble declared the purpose 
 of the stipulations of the convention as follows : 
 
 "Equally animated by the firm intention of putting 
 an end to the crimes and devastations engendered by 
 the traffic in African slaves, of effectively protecting 
 the aboriginal populations of Africa, and of assuring 
 
 "British East Africa, or Ibea, A History of the Formation 
 and Work of The Imperial British East Africa Company, 
 compiled with the authority of the directors from official docu- 
 ments and the records of the company, by P. L. McDermott, 
 London, 1893, p. 17-8.
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 205 
 
 to that vast continent the benefits of peace and civil- 
 ization ; 
 
 "Wishing to give a fresh sanction to the decisions 
 already taken in the same sense and at different periods 
 by the powers; to complete the results obtained by 
 them; and to draw up a collection of measures guar- 
 anteeing the accomplishment of the work which is the 
 object of their common solicitude;. . " 
 
 In one hundred articles, provision is made for carry- 
 ing out these humanitarian aims of the signatory 
 powers. 
 
 This important convention has been of great service 
 in facilitating the cooperative action of the powers in 
 putting an end to the ancient and accursed traffic in 
 slaves. 95 
 
 8(f). HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM" 
 
 r '' : " 
 
 FUGITIVE SLAVES 
 
 The illegality of the institution of slavery under in- 
 ternational law has not been recognized as clearly as 
 has the illegality of the slave trade. All the great and 
 all the civilized states have, it is true, abolished slavery 
 from their territory until it is now at last restricted to 
 
 95 In the case of the Kongo, discussed above, the articles of 
 the Brussells Act were appealed to in order to protect the 
 aborigines. 
 
 Phillimore (Commentaries, vol. I, Part III, ch. XVII) has 
 an interesting account of slavery and the slave trade. 
 
 96 We have departed somewhat from the rigid logic of our 
 classification to adopt a designation which cannot be consid- 
 ered as a purpose to justify intervention at all. For asylum 
 is one of the means of carrying out humanitarian interven- 
 tion. Nevertheless, in practice, the asylum which is afforded 
 in legations and warships has generally been restricted to 
 escaped slaves and political refugees, so that we might have 
 written out our title "as humanitarian intervention for the 
 protection of escaped slaves and political refugees. ' '
 
 206 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Turkey, Persia, and a few minor Mohammedan States ; 
 but slavery of itself has not even yet been formally 
 declared to be contrary to international law. It is still 
 tolerated in those backward countries either because 
 it would not be for the best interests of the population, 
 including the slaves, to eliminate it forthwith, or be- 
 cause the powers have been deterred from extirpating 
 it by the expense, or by the political consequences of 
 the reform. Nevertheless, we may safely affirm that 
 slavery to-day is contrary to international law, and a 
 justifiable ground for humanitarian intervention, when- 
 ever the powers are assured that such action is prac- 
 ticable. 97 
 
 97 Creasy, discussing the report of the Royal Commission on 
 Fugitive Slaves, quotes with approval the opinion of Sir 
 George Campbell that ''the time has come when this country 
 may fairly say we will under no circumstances aid in the en- 
 forcement of slavery, we will have nothing to do with this 
 nefarious and accursed thing, ' ' and adds : ' ' Let it always be 
 remembered that the institution of slavery is contrary to the 
 first principles of general public law, as taught by the greatest 
 founders and expounders of jurisprudence. I refer to the 
 maxims of the great masters of the Golden Age of Roman Law, 
 that slavery is contrary to Natural Law ; that by Natural Law 
 all men are free and equal, but that slavery was introduced as 
 a general institution by the practice of nations. Slavery ex- 
 isted for the reason given by Grotius for the temporary ex- 
 istence of much International Law, 'quia placuit gentibus' 
 [because it pleased the nations]. But now we may say with 
 honest pride that 'displicet gentibus' [it displeases the na- 
 tions]. We may not be justified in using penal or coercive 
 measures towards the miserable minority that yet adhere to it ; 
 but we are fully justified in declining to be their bailiffs or 
 accomplices. The evidence collected by this Royal Commis- 
 sion shows conclusively the strong, the growing sentiments of 
 civilized States that slavery is no longer to be upheld or en- 
 forced ; that when a slave gains access to a free country ' the 
 air makes free,' and that the public ships of civilized nations 
 will not give back the fugitive slave, who once has gained the 
 shelter of the free flag, to punishment or to bondage. 
 
 "There is no need to prepare new forms of reply if de- 
 mands for the surrender of such fugitives should again be
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 207 
 
 Although the great states have not intervened with 
 force of arms to put an end to slavery, they have had 
 recourse to a limited, we might say a negative form of 
 intervention which has consisted in granting to fugitive 
 slaves an asylum on their warships. 
 
 More than two centuries ago, we find isolated instan- 
 ces of such asylum, which were then, strictly speaking, 
 violations of the law of nations, although they were 
 morally justifiable as protests against a law out of 
 harmony with the humane sentiments professed by all 
 civilized states. 
 
 Richard Hill, envoy to the Duke of Savoy, in a letter 
 from Genoa, dated January 10, 1705, writes: "Sir, it 
 is a great mortification to me, and to all the Queen's 
 officers here, to see one of the Queen's subjects, and a 
 warrant officer in the fleet, in chains in the Duke of 
 Tursis's galleys. This poor man was gunner of the 
 Newport, and being deluded and invited into a galley, 
 was chained to an oar, and being treated like a slave, 
 because one of the Duke of Tursis's slaves had de- 
 serted, and saved himself aboard one of the Queen's 
 ships. I have been negotiating this poor man's liberty 
 ever since I am here, but as yet without success. " (Cor- 
 respondence of Richard Hill, ed. by W. Blackley, Lon- 
 
 made. We may appeal to and may adopt the noble words of 
 our old sea-hero, Lord St. Vincent, when the Lords of the Ad- 
 miralty in 1798 forwarded to him the complaints of some 
 foreign slave-owners, whose slaves had obtained refuge on 
 board of British men-of-war in the port of Malta, which then 
 was foreign territory. Lord St. Vincent told the British 
 Admiralty, 'that from the days of the renowned Blake to this 
 hour it has been the pride and glory of the officers of His 
 Majesty's navy to give freedom to slaves wherever they car- 
 ried the British flag; and God forbid that such a Divine 
 maxim should fade under me.' ' (Quoted in report on Fugi- 
 tive Slaves, appendix, p. 224, Creasy: First Platform of In- 
 ternational Law, p. 696-7.)
 
 208 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 don, 1845, Vol. II, p. 676-7.) It appears from the cor- 
 respondence that the fugitive slave above referred to 
 was treated as a deserter, and at the first port touched 
 at was given his liberty and a passport to go whither 
 he wished. 
 
 In the course of time, the slave trade was abolished, 
 and the great states either directed their officers to 
 grant fugitive slaves an asylum, or authorized them to 
 use their discretion. Sir George Campbell was cor- 
 rect in his statement, made in 1876, that the granting 
 of asylum was in conformity with "the great majority 
 and weight of opinion of the most important coun- 
 tries." 98 
 
 In 1876, public opinion was deeply stirred to learn 
 that the instructions issued to naval officers authorized 
 them, when in foreign ports of slave holding states, to 
 deliver over to the local authorities slaves who had 
 sought an asylum under the British flag. The conse- 
 quence was that Disraeli's Government appointed a 
 remarkable commission of statesmen and jurists to 
 investigate and report upon the matter. 
 
 This Royal Commission on Fugitive Slaves, in the 
 course of their report, stated: "It may, we conceive, 
 be safely affirmed that a ship of war entering the waters 
 of a friendly state is by the common practice of nations 
 regarded as exempt, speaking generally, from the juris- 
 diction of the local authorities, and is at the same time 
 under an international obligation, speaking generally, 
 to respect the local law. 
 
 "We are unable, however, to report that the extent 
 of the immunity on the one hand, or the limits of the 
 obligation on the other, have been so clearly and com- 
 
 98 See dissenting opinion, Sir George Campbell, Royal Com- 
 mission's Report on Fugitive Slaves, which we have given in 
 the preceding note.
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 209 
 
 pletely settled by international usage that they can be 
 stated with absolute confidence and precision. There is 
 room for a difference of opinion with respect to them, 
 and such a difference of opinion exists. In like manner, 
 with reference to the principles of international law 
 applicable to the reception of fugitiv.e slaves, a differ- 
 ence of opinion exists, ..." 
 
 In view of this difference of opinion, the commission 
 considered it best "to refrain from attempting a defi- 
 nition." Instead they concurred in certain recom- 
 mendations and they expressed their belief that if these 
 recommendations were adopted" the measures neces- 
 sary for giving effect to them would not afford rea- 
 sonable cause of complaint to foreign countries." 
 
 The report then discusses the practice of other na- 
 tions with reference to the reception of fugitive slaves. 
 Portugal and Holland surrendered them; Italy and 
 Germany aparently did not; while the Secretary of 
 the Navy of the United States gave as his opinion "that 
 at present, no officer would for a moment think of giv- 
 ing up a slave who had taken refuge on board his vessel 
 in order that he might return to his condition of slav- 
 ery. ' ' 
 
 The French and Russian officers were allowed a wide 
 discretion and responsibility. From evidence laid be- 
 fore the Commission, it appeared ' ' that in former years 
 Britain's naval officers deemed themselves entitled to 
 exercise a wide discretion with reference to cases of 
 slaves seeking refuge on board their ships." Of late 
 years, the Commission found that this discretion had 
 been limited, but that the instructions issued had "ma- 
 terially varied in character. ' ' 
 
 Coming to the main point, that is, "in what cases 
 a slave ought to be retained on board a ship, ' ' the Com- 
 mission reported: "Naval officers should be instructed 
 
 14
 
 210 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 that although ships of the Royal Navy should not be 
 made a general asylum for fugitive slaves, they are not 
 debarred from using their own discretion in retaining 
 such fugitives on board and affording them protection 
 on the principles which we shall proceed to recommend 
 for their guidance." 
 
 "In the exercise of this discretion, the officer should 
 be guided, before all things, by considerations of hu- 
 manity. Whenever in his judgment humanity requires 
 that the fugitive should be retained on board, as in 
 cases where the slave has been, or is in danger of being 
 cruelly used, he should retain such fugitive." 
 
 The fourth of the recommendations which the Com- 
 mission made in the belief they would indicate ' ' the best 
 course to promote the humane and enlightened policy" 
 which Great Britain had "consistently pursued" with 
 a view to the mitigation and eventual abolition of 
 slavery is a repetition of what has been quoted: "In 
 dealing with this question, the officer should be guided, 
 before all things by considerations of humanity. When- 
 ever, in his judgment, humanity requires that the slave 
 should be retained on board, as in cases where the 
 slave has been, or is in danger of being cruelly used, 
 the officer should retain him. In other cases he should 
 do so only where special reasons exist." (Parliamen- 
 tary Papers, 1876, vol. 28, Report of the Royal Com- 
 mission on Fugitive Slaves [c.-1516] p. XVIII.) 
 
 In the other recommendations of the Commission 
 there is evident the same humanitarian purpose, and 
 the same evident intention to authorize the naval of- 
 ficer to intervene to the extent of affording an asylum 
 when necessary to protect the fugitive slave from in- 
 humane treatment. 
 
 On the other hand, the report states : "Naval officers 
 should understand that, whilst entrusting them with 
 this discretion, their government does not claim a right
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 211 
 
 to interfere actively with the institutions of slavery 
 in countries where it is upheld by the local law, ..." 
 and in another place the Commission emphasized the 
 inconvenience which would result from such an at- 
 tempt, and they consider that "... it must always be 
 remembered that states within whose territories slav- 
 ery continues to exist can refuse to admit British ships 
 of war into their ports and waters, should they deem 
 this extreme measure necessary to the protection of 
 national or private interests." 99 
 
 The distinguished group of jurists who signed the Re- 
 port on Fugitive Slaves recommending that the Brit- 
 ish officers should be authorized to offer an asylum 
 when necessary to prevent the cruel treatment of the 
 fugitive slave believed apparently that the granting 
 of this asylum would be a violation of "the theory 
 of international law. ' n But like practical Englishmen, 
 they threw over their theory when it proved embar- 
 rassing. 
 
 If the Commission were right in adhering to the 
 theory of the perfect right of every state to do as it 
 
 "This was in conformity with the above-quoted views of the 
 majority of the Commission relative to the status of public 
 vessels in foreign ports. 
 
 *The fifth recommendation of the report reads as follows : 
 "5. Respect for the local law ought not, however, to be car- 
 ried to such an extent as to make British naval officers acces- 
 sory to acts of cruelty ; and in cases in which they have rea- 
 son to believe that such acts have been, or, unless protection 
 is afforded him, probably will be, practiced upon a slave found 
 on board their ships, or asking permission to come on board, 
 they ought to be authorized to afford protection to the slave, 
 although such conduct may be opposed to the theory of inter- 
 national law. A rigid adherence to that theory by the com- 
 manding officers of British ships in foreign territorial waters, 
 in all cases whatever, would be neither practicable nor de- 
 sirable. ' '
 
 212 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 deemed best within its own territory, then Lord Chief 
 Justice Cockburn, a member of the Commission, was 
 consistent in refuting the conclusion that the "harbor- 
 ing" of a slave "was not a violation of the local law," 
 and we can sympathize with the separate opinion ex- 
 pressed by six distinguished members of the Commis- 
 sion, 3 that Great Britain had "no right to force its 
 own laws on an independent state, nor (except in such 
 extreme cases as those hereinafter referred to) to au- 
 thorize its subjects to violate the law of the latter be- 
 cause it disapproves of that law. . . " 
 
 Following out consistently the theory that each 
 sovereign state was supreme within its jurisdiction, 
 they were logical in considering that "although slavery 
 had happily become abhorrent to the British nation, 
 and has been abolished in British territories, yet the 
 rights conferred upon the owners of slaves by the 
 laws of their own countries have been, on more than 
 one occasion since the abolition of slavery by this coun- 
 try, recognized and enforced by English courts of 
 justice. Upon this fact, as well as upon the principles 
 of international law, we think that the commanding of- 
 ficers of British ships of war, in foreign territorial 
 waters would do wrong if they afforded protection to 
 all slaves indiscriminately who might be found on board 
 their ships. ' ' 
 
 But in the conclusion which they reach, and in the 
 recommendation with which they concur the Commis- 
 sioners desert logic, and declare that "a rigid adher- 
 ence to that theory by the commanding officers of Brit- 
 ish ships in foreign territorial waters, in all cases what- 
 
 2 See separate opinion filed by the Lord Chief Justice and 
 printed with the report. 
 
 8 A. E. Cockburn, T. D. Archibald, Alfred Hy. Thesiger, H. 
 T. Holland, J. F. Stephen, H. C. Rothery.
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 213 
 
 ever, would be neither practicable nor desirable." 
 (5th Recommendation, quoted in the preceding note.) 
 It would seem that a theory of international law, the 
 observance of which in so important a matter was 
 neither practicable nor desirable, should be modified 
 and be made to recognize that humanitarian interven- 
 tion is a just ground for overriding local regulations 
 when the latter are not in conformity with those princi- 
 ples of justice which are recognized and enforced by 
 all the civilized states. 
 
 Sir Robert Phillimore, Professor Mountague Ber- 
 nard, and Sir Henry S. Maine, three international 
 jurists of high repute, who were members of the Royal 
 Commission on Fugitive Slaves, did not adopt the rea- 
 soning of the Commission, although they signed the 
 report and joined jn approving the recommendations 
 which it contained. They filed a separate opinion ex- 
 pressing their conviction that the officer who gave an 
 asylum to a fugitive slave would not violate inter- 
 national law, nor the local law to which he could not be 
 considered as subjected. The importance of this opin- 
 ion justifies us in laying it before the reader: 
 
 "We should have been content to sign the report 
 without expressing any opinion, beyond what is con- 
 tained in it, on the first question. But since it has been 
 thought right that opinions should be expressed on that 
 point, we will state the considerations which in our 
 view justify, so far as international law is concerned, 
 the conclusions of the report, confining ourselves to 
 such considerations, and not entering into a detailed 
 examination of precedents or authorities. 
 
 "At the same time, we think that a careful and dis- 
 criminating examination of such authorities would sup- 
 port the views we are about to express.
 
 214 INTERNATIONAL POLICE. 
 
 "The question is substantially this: what instruc- 
 tions the government may, without doing violence to 
 any international obligation, give to its officers respect- 
 ing the reception of fugitive slaves in foreign waters! 
 
 '*[!.] It is true, as a general proposition, that a 
 naval officer, entering with the ship under his command 
 the waters of a friendly state, ought to respect the 
 local laws, and to refrain from lending his assistance 
 to any violation of them. It is right that he should 
 receive instructions to this effect, and such instructions 
 British officers now receive. They are directed by the 
 Queen's Regulations to 'cause all those under their 
 orders to show due deference to the established rights, 
 ceremonies, customs, and regulations' of the places 
 they have occasion to visit ; and they are prohibited in 
 general from receiving on board, whilst lying in the 
 ports of a foreign country, persons who may seek ref- 
 uge for the purpose of evading the local laws to which 
 such persons may have become amenable. 
 
 * * The foregoing proposition, however, is only a gen- 
 eral expression of what, in given circumstances, one 
 maritime state may fairly and reasonably expect at 
 the hands of another ; and it would be an error to re- 
 gard it as a canon of international law, absolute, inflex- 
 ible, and admitting no qualification. It admits, and 
 indeed requires, at least one material qualification. 
 Where the execution of the local law would be plainly 
 repugnant to humanity or justice, the sovereign with 
 whose commission the ship sails cannot reasonably be 
 held bound to instruct his officers to enforce the law, 
 or permit it to be enforced, on board of her. He may 
 rightly instruct them not to enforce it there, and not to 
 permit it to be enforced. ' ' 
 
 "It is a general assumption, on which governments 
 must habitually act, that the laws of civilized states, 
 framed to secure public order and private rights, will
 
 HUMANITAEIAN ASYLUM 215 
 
 not so operate as to be in conflict with humanity or 
 justice. But this general assumption must and does 
 sometimes give way, whether from the necessary im- 
 perfection of human laws, or from particular defects 
 which cannot be immediately removed in the institu- 
 tions of particular states, or from real differences of 
 national sentiment as to what is humane or just dif- 
 ferences which the progress of civilization, tending 
 though it does continually to produce a general uni- 
 formity, has not yet entirely effaced. In cases of this 
 kind, which though exceptional, are by no means 
 rare it is not a sufficient answer to point to the local 
 law and to the sovereign authority which enacted it. 
 Where British subjects are interested, this country 
 deems it no infringement of an international obliga- 
 tion to insist, against the local law, on its own view of 
 what justice or humanity demands, and even, if need 
 be, to exact redress by force. Where no British inter- 
 est is involved, the British Government has the right 
 to say at least that the authority delegated by it to its 
 officers shall not be used to do what is plainly inhuman 
 or unjust. 
 
 "This qualification of the general rule is demanded 
 by the national self-respect of every state which com- 
 missions a ship of war; and it is consistent with the 
 ordinary principles on which the intercourse of civil- 
 ized states proceeds. 
 
 ' l That there is no unqualified obligation to assist or 
 permit on board a ship of war the enforcement of the 
 local law is assumed in the instructions which British 
 naval officers receive with regard to political refugees, 
 and has been assumed in the cases where, before the 
 issue of those instructions, the refusal to give up a 
 refugee has been approved by the British Government. 
 A political refugee may be an object of partisan ran- 
 cor and passion ; but he is also commonly a criminal in
 
 216 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 the eye of the local law, the administration of which is 
 in the hands of a government inimical to him. 
 
 "Laws which uphold slavery are local not only in 
 the sense that they have legal force in particular coun- 
 tries, but in the further sense that they create a status 
 not recognized in other countries. The right to own 
 a slave as property in a slave-holding country may be 
 recognized elsewhere, and it has been recognized in 
 English courts of justice ; but the right to compel the 
 obedience of a slave cannot be enforced in any place 
 where slavery is not legal. But this is far from being 
 the whole account of the matter, though it may perhaps 
 be all that a court of law could properly take notice of. 
 The state, in judging what instructions (as between 
 itself and other states) it may rightly give to its of- 
 ficers, is not confined to the considerations which might 
 be urged before a court of law. Slavery is not only an 
 institution of this strictly local character, but, so far as 
 it operates to keep human beings forcibly and against 
 their will in the condition of mere objects of property, 
 is regarded by nearly the whole of Christendom as re- 
 pugnant to justice. In, Brazil and Cuba it survives 
 only because the total and immediate abolition of it 
 involving, as this would, the destruction of a large 
 mass of proprietary rights has not hitherto been 
 found practicable. The deliberate conviction of Great 
 Britain on the subject has been shown in many ways, 
 by her legislation, by the sacrifices she has undergone, 
 by the uniform and unremitting exertions of her Gov- 
 ernment. It is an institution also which, from its na- 
 ture, cannot by any restraints of law or custom be so 
 regulated and controlled as to prevent it from some- 
 times operating in ways repugnant to humanity, and 
 that not alone by the infliction of mere bodily suffer- 
 ing.
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 217 
 
 " International law, it is to be observed, is not sta- 
 tionary ; it admits of progressive improvement, though 
 the improvement is more difficult and slower than that 
 of municipal law, and though the agencies by which 
 change is effected are different. It varies with the 
 progress of opinion and the growth of usage ; and there 
 is no subject on which so great a change of opinion has 
 taken place as slavery and the slave trade. Bynker- 
 shoek, in one of his latest works, published in 1737, 
 maintains that, as a conqueror may in the exercise of 
 an extreme right do what he pleases with his captive, 
 he may, though the practice has fallen into desuetude, 
 put him to death, or, as a consequence of that right, 
 may sell him into slavery. (Quaest, Juris Publici, Bk. 
 i. c. 3.) Such a doctrine would now be held not merely 
 unlawful, but atrocious ; and the trade in negro slaves, 
 which was formerly competed for as a legitimate source 
 of profit, has in a great number of treaties been as- 
 similated to the crime of piracy. 
 
 " These considerations are sufficient to justify Great 
 Britain in instructing her officers not to enforce slave 
 laws, or permit them to be enforced, on board her ships 
 of war in foreign territorial waters, either altogether 
 or in particular circumstances in which the claims of 
 humanity or justice assert themselves more plainly 
 and imperatively than in others. Which of these two 
 courses she should adopt may be a question of pru- 
 dence, and perhaps also of humanity itself ; but we do 
 not think it can be solved by reference to a positive rule 
 of international law. Against either of them slave- 
 holding states have, as is pointed out in the report, an 
 extreme remedy in the power of excluding British ves- 
 sels from their ports. But in exerting that power, 
 should they deem it necessary to do so, they would be 
 protecting themselves or their subjects, not against
 
 218 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 a violation of international law, for there would be 
 none, but only against apprehended loss. 
 
 "It is difficult, no doubt, in practice, to draw with 
 theoretical precision the line of demarcation between an 
 active interference with slavery and the refusal to en- 
 force the master's right over his slave. An officer who 
 declines to give up a fugitive does to some extent inter- 
 fere with the local institution of slavery. He not only 
 protects from injury, but takes away from the slave- 
 owner, the terrified man or helpless girl who by the 
 local law is a marketable object of property; and it 
 makes little practical difference to the owner none 
 whether the slave has scrambled on board with the 
 officer's leave or without it. But in these cases it may 
 fairly be said that he interferes no more than he in- 
 evitably must unless he is to be actively instrumental 
 in forcing the fugitive back into slavery ; if he were to 
 go further, to incite slaves to escape, hold out to them 
 inducements to do so, or use force or contrivance to 
 liberate them, this would be an interference of a dif- 
 ferent kind. In the Recommendations of the Report 
 this distinction is kept in view, and an officer who 
 should be careful to observe it would find little difficulty 
 in doing so. ' ' 
 
 Turning next to a careful consideration of the jurid- 
 ical situation of public vessels in foreign ports, the 
 separate statement of opinion concludes as follows :* 
 
 4 [We have omitted from the text Section II of this separate 
 statement of opinion which deals with the so-called extra- 
 territorial rights of public vessels in foreign ports, but we in- 
 clude it in this footnote because of its juridical value.] 
 "II. In the foregoing remarks it has been assumed, 
 "1. That a commanding officer on board his ship, even when 
 she is lying within the territorial waters of a foreign State, 
 is to be regarded, not as in subjection to the authority and 
 laws of that state, but exclusively as a subject of his own Sov- 
 ereign and an officer of his own government.
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 219 
 
 "[III.] In conclusion, we are of opinion that Her 
 Majesty's Government may, without transgressing any 
 international obligation, give such instructions to of- 
 ficers commanding Her Majesty's ships with respect 
 to the disposal of fugitive slaves who may seek refuge 
 on board their vessels as the Government may judge 
 most consonant to humanity and prudence. 
 
 " Officers acting on such instructions would be re- 
 sponsible to the authority from which they received 
 their orders, and would not be responsible to the for- 
 eign territorial authority. 
 
 "Her Majesty's Government could not deny to any 
 foreign Sovereign the right to interdict the entrance of 
 
 "2. That the laws of the foreign State cannot be forcibly 
 executed on board unless by his order or permission as com- 
 manding officer. 
 
 "It is necessary to say a few words on these two assump- 
 tions, and in doing so to advert to the distinction between a 
 ship owned by private persons and employed by them for pur- 
 poses of trade or pleasure, and a ship commissioned by the 
 State and employed in the public service. 
 
 "A private vessel is not, according to the present practice 
 of States, what a ship has been called by a great authority 
 (Lord Stowell) 'a mere moveable. ' She is also a floating habi- 
 tation, subject to the law and jurisdiction of the State under 
 whose flag she sails, a jurisdiction which covers all persons 
 on board, of whatever nationality, enjoying the protection of 
 the flag, which follows her everywhere, and is not interrupted 
 even when she is in the territorial waters of a foreign Power. a 
 According to French authorities and French practice, this 
 jurisdiction is treated as exclusive in all such matters as do not 
 affect the rights of persons not belonging to the ship, nor the 
 peace and order of the port. But in all other matters, if not in 
 these, it is universally admitted that the ship and all on board 
 of her are amenable to the law of the country in whose waters 
 she happens to be, although the question may arise (as it has 
 lately arisen) whether that law ought to be held enforceable 
 in the case of vessels navigating within the range of coast- 
 water and not lying in port. 
 
 Reg. v. Sattler, D. and B. C. C. 525; Keg. v. Anderson, 1 C. C. B. 
 Law Rep., 161.
 
 220 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 British ships of war into his ports, although it might 
 not admit that the exercise of the right was under the 
 
 "A person therefore who enters a foreign port in a private 
 ship becomes, while there, temporarily a subject of the for- 
 eign State, owing a 'local allegiance' to its laws, though he 
 is also, when on board, subject to the jurisdiction of the coun- 
 try which extends to him the protection of its flag. He can- 
 not therefore refuse to obey the local laws, for subjection to a 
 law allows no discretionary choice between obeying and not 
 obeying it. Nor can the claim of the local officers of justice 
 to board the ship, search her, and take out of her anyone who 
 has become amenable to those laws be disputed or resisted. 
 
 "Ships of war, on the other hand, have a recognised im- 
 munity, which places them, when within foreign waters, in a 
 condition materially different from that of a private and un- 
 commissioned vessel. So much as this is admitted on all hands. 
 A long succession of writers, English, French, German, and 
 American, referring to this immunity as established by usage 
 and general consent, have described it as an exemption from 
 the 'law,' the 'jurisdiction,' or the 'law and jurisdiction,' 
 of the foreign State, or by other equivalent phrases ; language 
 which, though leaving somewhat to argument and inference, 
 has nevertheless a plain and natural meaning. 1 * Some of these 
 writers have been judges, some diplomatists, one an officer in 
 the naval service of France, whose book has a deserved repu- 
 tation for lucidity of statement as well as for sense and moder- 
 ation. Whatever value we may be disposed to assign to testi- 
 mony of this kind, it is, for the last half century at least, sub- 
 stantially unanimous. The general practice of Governments, 
 and the general belief or impression current in every naval 
 service, appear to have been in accordance with it. No one, 
 it is true, disputes, or has disputed, the right of every sov- 
 ereign State to exclude foreign ships of war altogether from its 
 ports, or to attach such conditions as it may think expedient 
 to the admission of them. During maritime wars very strin- 
 gent conditions have been frequently imposed by neutral Pow- 
 ers on the admission of belligerent ships : for example, in the 
 more recent of such wars, when ships of both belligerents have 
 been in a British port at the same time, one has not been al- 
 
 bOrtolan: Diplomatic de la Mer, L. II, ch. x, xiii; Heffter: Euro- 
 paisches Volkerrect der Gegenwart, s. 79 ; Bliintschli : Droit International 
 Codifi6, art. 321; Calvo: Droit International, I, 383, 2nd Ed.; Twiss: 
 Law of Nations, 1, 228; Woolsey: International Law, a. 54; Halleck: 
 International Law, p. 171; Field: Draft Outlines of an International 
 Code, art. 309. For the opinion of Kent, see Commentaries, 156 and 
 note.
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 221 
 
 circumstances necessary or reasonable, and might in- 
 deed, should it think proper to do so, reciprocally ex- 
 clude from its own ports the vessels of any Power 
 which had recourse to this measure." 
 
 Slavery has given rise to other passive or negative 
 forms of intervention. The cooperative action of ex- 
 tradition has sometimes been refused in the case of 
 
 lowed to put to sea until after the lapse of twenty-four hours 
 from the departure of the other. It need hardly be said that 
 regulations as to mooring and anchoring, observance of sani- 
 tary precautions, and the like, are everywhere usual, though 
 not everywhere the same. Nor has it been contended that a 
 Sovereign, by permitting the entrance of a foreign vessel, 
 abandons the right to repel or arrest by force, if need be, 
 actual or threatened violence towards his subjects, or those 
 under his protection; and this right has been occasionally 
 exerted. But we do not know of an instance within this period 
 in which a right has been conceded or asserted to take a person 
 or thing from on board a ship of war by legal process with- 
 out leave of the officer in command, or to hold the officer, or 
 any of those under his command, personally amenable to the 
 local jurisdiction for acts done on board in contravention of a 
 local law. Nor are we aware that this state of things has pro- 
 duced any practical inconvenience. 
 
 "It has been suggested that, whilst the vessel herself as an 
 object of property should be free from process, and the disci- 
 pline of the ship as well as the cognizance of any offences 
 which one member of the ship's company might commit 
 against another should be left to her own authorities, no 
 further exemption should be allowed. The condition of a man- 
 of-war seeking the accommodation of a foreign port would 
 then be not very different from that which the law of France 
 assigns to a private vessel, except as regards the immunity 
 from proceedings in rent. She would be liable to be boarded 
 and searched by the local authorities : persons who had sought 
 refuge in her either from slavery or from the rage of a vic- 
 torious faction could be seized and carried ashore, even if 
 they had come on board in a place out of the jurisdiction : the 
 captain himself indeed might be taken from his own quarter- 
 deck on a charge of having offended against some local regula- 
 tion. A privilege so curtailed if it be a privilege at all ap- 
 pears to be but imperfectly adapted for securing to maritime 
 Powers undivided control over their ships of war or for pre- 
 venting hazardous conflicts of authority. But, whether ex-
 
 222 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 slaves. The case of John Anderson is an example of 
 this form of humanitarian intervention. 
 
 "In September, 1853, John Anderson, a negro slave, 
 born in the United States, ran away from his master. 
 About three weeks later, he met and spoke to a planter 
 named Diggs, who recognized him. Anderson asked 
 Diggs where Charles Givens lived, saying he belonged 
 to M 'Donald, and wanted Givens to buy him that he 
 
 pedient or not, it is certainly different from the understand- 
 ing which we believe to exist universally at present, and on 
 which naval officers and their Governments have thought them- 
 selves entitled to rely. 
 
 "This suggestion has been urged by two Italian jurists, 
 Lampredi and Azuni. 'A nation,' says the former, 'which 
 resolves to act vigorously will not make the least difference 
 between a merchant vessel and a ship of war, whenever long 
 custom or a privilege accorded has not established the con- 
 trary, and thus set a limit to the exercise of its sovereign 
 rights.' But he admits himself to be in opposition to many 
 writers, and his opinion does not appear to be shared by the 
 present Italian Government.* 1 
 
 "Lampredi, in the chapter referred to, asserts the positions 
 that a ship at sea is to be regarded as a mere vehicle 
 (vettura per mare), and two ships meeting one another at sea 
 as vehicles meeting in an unoccupied desert ; and hence that 
 the persons on board are not protected by the flag, but solely 
 as individuals by the law of nature, which makes every man 
 free and independent except in regard to his legitimate Sov- 
 ereign. It is evident that according to these positions a slave, 
 a refugee, a person liable to conscription or impressment, or 
 any other subject, might be forcibly taken out of a foreign 
 ship by the Power claiming him not only in territorial waters 
 but on the high seas. 
 
 "A like limitation of the privilege is favored by Pinheiro- 
 Ferreira. But this author, an avowed theorist, maintains also 
 (in his Annotations on Martens) that ambassadors should be 
 deemed liable to criminal and civil process. It has some sup- 
 port likewise in a dictum of Mr. Justice Best in 'Forbes v. 
 Cochrane,' and in the far greater authority of Lord Stowell. e 
 
 cDel Commercio dei Popoli Neutral! in Tempo di Guerra, ch. x (pub- 
 lished in 1788). 
 
 dLetter of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs in appendix [of 
 the Report of the commission]. 
 
 cLetter in Appendix [of the Report of the commission].
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 223 
 
 might be near his wife. Diggs charged him with being 
 a runaway slave, and refused to let him go. The law of 
 Missouri declared that any slave found more than 
 twenty miles from his home should be deemed a runa- 
 way, and that any person might apprehend a negro 
 being, or suspected of being, a runaway; and it pro- 
 vided a reward for so doing. Diggs, however, told An- 
 derson to come and get his dinner, and he would then 
 
 It must be observed, however, that that whole subject of the 
 national sovereignty over ships has undergone much discus- 
 sion, not only since Lampredi but since the time of Lord Stow- 
 ell ; and that the effect of those discussions has been to carry 
 the jurisdiction of a State over vessels entitled to use its flag 
 to a more advanced point, and place it on a firmer basis, than 
 it had reached in 1820. 
 
 "It may be that should the extent of the privilege ever be- 
 come a question in courts of law, some qualifications of it might 
 be allowed, the necessity or expediency of which there has not 
 hitherto been occasion to consider. A concurrent jurisdiction 
 might be held to exist for some purposes, as in matters of civil 
 status. Courts of law are accustomed, in dealing with such 
 questions, to proceed very much, as speculative writers do, on 
 considerations of general convenience; and some questions 
 might easily be suggested as to which it would be hazardous to 
 predict what answer they would receive. But the matter re- 
 ferred to this Commission is one upon which any decisions 
 that could be pronounced by courts of law could have but an 
 indirect bearing. As between State and State, the right which 
 every naval commander in foreign waters has hitherto be- 
 lieved himself to possess of saying, ' My ship is the castle of my 
 sovereign under my command ; no one enters it, and no force 
 can be exerted in it, unless by my permission; and for the 
 orders I give here I am not amenable to any foreign juris- 
 diction,' appears to us to be sustained by usage and opinion, 
 and, we may add, by convenience. The privilege of the ship 
 is the privilege of the Power whose flag she displaj^s and in 
 whose service she is employed. And the responsibilities of the 
 officer who in foreign waters acts in obedience to instructions, 
 to the detriment (should this be so) of the foreign country or 
 any of its people are assumed, and would be wholly borne, by 
 the Government which instructed him. ' '
 
 224 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 go with him to Givens. On the way, Anderson tried 
 to make his escape, and Diggs then called to four ne- 
 groes who were with him to give chase, saying they 
 should have the reward. Anderson, being overtaken, 
 drew a knife, threatening to kill any one who touched 
 him. The negroes kept off, but Diggs struck at him 
 with a stick, which caught in a bush and broke, and then 
 Anderson stabbed him in the breast. Diggs, turning to 
 flee, caught his foot in a tree and fell, and Anderson 
 then stabbed him in the back, and after being chased a 
 short distance by the negroes, succeeded in making his 
 escape to Canada. Diggs shortly after died of his 
 wounds. Anderson lived unmolested in Canada until 
 1860, when he was recognized, and was arrested on the 
 application of the officers of the State of Missouri." 
 (Sir Edward Clarke: The Law of Extradition, 3 ed., 
 London, 1888, p. 95 to 96.) 
 
 When the case came to trial on a habeas corpus the 
 chief justice held that the fact that, if acquitted, Ander- 
 son would be returned to slavery, was not material 
 (Ibid, p. 97). The prisoner was later released by the 
 courts chiefly on technical grounds. (See J. B. Moore: 
 Extradition, Vol. 1, p. 642.) 
 
 In the meantime, however, "the case had created 
 much excitement in England, and the Secretary for the 
 Colonies addressed a dispatch to the Governor of Can- 
 ada, instructing him not to issue his warrant for the 
 extradition of Anderson, even if the judgment of the 
 Queen's Bench were upheld on appeal. Her Majesty's 
 Government, he said, were not satisfied that the decis- 
 ion of the Court at Toronto was in conformity with the 
 views of the treaty which had hitherto guided the au- 
 thorities in this country; and they desired an oppor- 
 tunity of further considering the question, and, if pos- 
 sible, of conferring with the Government of the United 
 States upon the subject." (Clarke, Ibid, p. 98.)
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 225 
 
 Clarke in a footnote (Ibid, p. 217) remarks: " 
 
 The crime charged against him [Anderson] upon the 
 facts stated was murder by the law of England as well 
 as by that of the United States. The question whether 
 the circumstances showed sufficient provocation to re- 
 duce it to manslaughter, was one for the jury, and one 
 with which the Canadian courts had nothing to do. 
 Nor had these courts any right to inquire into the jus- 
 tice or policy of the legislative enactment under which 
 the arrest was attempted to be made. That was a mat- 
 ter for the consideration of the foreign country, and 
 could not, however it was resolved, affect the nature of 
 the crime. An illustration may be given in the English 
 Act, 14 & 15 Viet., cap. 19, by which if three poachers 
 are out together at night armed, any person is author- 
 ized to apprehend them. It is very probable that 
 American judges would disapprove of that Act, as part 
 of what they might consider an iniquitous system of 
 game laws ; but, so long as it remains upon the English 
 Statute-book, a poacher killing a person so attempting 
 to apprehend him would unquestionably be guilty of 
 murder, and England would have an indisputable right 
 to claim him under the treaty. So far as this question 
 was decided in the case of Anderson, it was decided 
 rightly. This was in the decision of the Queen's Bench 
 (Canada) in favor of the surrender, ante, p. 95. See 
 also Reg. v. Sattler, 1 Dears and Bell, C. C., 525." 
 
 This principle, to which Sir Edward Clarke refers, 
 applies only in a case like that of the poachers in which 
 the legislation in question may be considered as a rea- 
 sonable exercise of the Sovereign powers of the state. 
 In the case of slavery, however, this is not the case, 
 for slavery being contrary to international law, not 
 only is no state obligated to help another state to en- 
 force it, but it is in duty bound to intervene within rea- 
 son by affording a refuge to the escaped slave. 
 
 15
 
 226 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Justice M'Lean of the Canadian Court of Queen's 
 Bench was correct in the view he expressed in his dis- 
 senting opinion that "as the law of Canada did not 
 recognize slavery, Anderson could not be held to have 
 committed murder in resisting unlawful detention." 
 (Clarke: Extradition, 3 ed., p. 98. ) 5 
 
 The relations between the United States and Great 
 
 5 Professor Moore discussing the question of the condition 
 of the fugitive as a ground for refusing extradition, says : 
 "This question frequently arose under the treaty of 1842, 
 during the existence of slavery in the United States. Prior to 
 the conclusion of that treaty, when at various periods the sur- 
 render of fugitive criminals was granted as an act of comity 
 by Canada and by some of the States of the United States, 
 the Canadian Government refused to recognize offences which 
 grew out of the relation of master and slave. Thus, on July 
 21, 1829, Mr. Van Buren, then Secretary of State, wrote to 
 Mr. Vaughan, British minister, stating that the governor of 
 Illinois had transmitted evidence that one Paul Vallard had 
 stolen a female mulatto slave and fled to Canada. Mr. Van 
 Buren, while saying that he was aware that there was no 
 ground in public law for a formal application, requested Mr. 
 Vaughan to employ his good offices. Subsequently Mr. Vaughan 
 replied, enclosing an extract from a report of the executive 
 council of Lower Canada, which was as follows : ' In former 
 cases the committee have acted upon the principle, which now 
 seems to be generally understood, that, whenever a crime has 
 been committed, and the perpetrator is punishable according 
 to the lex loci [law of the locality] of the country in which 
 it was committed, the country in which he is found may right- 
 fully aid the police of the country against which the crime was 
 committed in bringing the criminal to justice ; and, upon this 
 ground, have recommended that fugitives from the United 
 States should be delivered up.' But (the report concluded) 
 the offence must be one of those mala in se, universally admit- 
 ted to be crimes in every nation. Canada did not recognize 
 slavery. She did not admit that property could be had in a 
 human being, and consequently could not give Vallard up, 
 even if he were in Canada, which did not appear." (J. B. 
 Moore : Extradition, Vol. 1, 440, p. 671-2. Professor Moore 
 refers to MSS. Notes, British Legation, Vol. 15. The case of 
 John Anderson is discussed, Ibid, p. 672-4, and referred to, 
 Ibid, pp. 637, 642, 647, 677.)
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 227 
 
 Britain were troubled from time to time by the refusal 
 of the latter to extradite or to punish slaves who had 
 mutinied against the officers of American vessels trans- 
 porting them, and taken refuge in the Bahamas or other 
 British ports. 
 
 We take verbatim the following concise statement of 
 the case of the Creole from the account given in Stow- 
 ell and Munro's Cases 6 : 
 
 In the course of the thirties in a number of instances 
 (The Comet, Encomium,, Enterprise, and Hermosa), 
 when American vessels transporting slaves from one 
 American port to another were driven by stress of 
 weather or other accident to take refuge in British 
 ports, the local authorities had liberated their human 
 cargo in spite of the vigorous protests of the American 
 Consuls. Because of this action the United States made 
 vigorous protests to the British Government without 
 receiving the redress it claimed. 
 
 In 1840 the Senate adopted a resolution declaring 
 that, where a vessel on the high seas, in time of peace, 
 engaged in a lawful voyage, was forced by stress of 
 weather or other unavoidable circumstances into the 
 port of a friendly power, the country to which she be- 
 longed lost "none of the rights appertaining to her on 
 the high seas, either over the vessel or the personal 
 relations of those on board. ' ' 
 
 The excitement created by these incidents culminated 
 in the case of the brig Creole, which sailed from Hamp- 
 ton Roads for New Orleans on the 27th of October, 
 1841, having on board one hundred and thirty-five 
 slaves. On the night of the 7th of November a portion 
 of the slaves revolted, wounded the master, chief mate, 
 
 'Copied verbatim from Stowell and Munro: International 
 Cases, vol. I, p. 249-253. The account there Driven is based 
 upon the documents given by Professor J. B. Moore (Digest 
 of International Law, vol. II, p. 350-361). We have omitted 
 quotation marks in order to avoid confusion.
 
 228 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 and two of the crew, and murdered one of the passen- 
 gers, and having secured possession of the vessel, 
 ordered the mate, under pain of death, to steer for 
 Nassau, where the brig arrived on the 9th of Novem- 
 ber. The slaves were afterwards liberated, under cir- 
 cumstances disclosed below in the opinion of Mr. Bates, 
 umpire of the mixed commission under the treaty be- 
 tween the United States and Great Britain of 1853, to 
 which commission the cases of the Enterprise, Her- 
 mosa, and Creole were ultimately submitted, on claims 
 for damages. 
 
 In the cases of the Comet and Encomium, which re- 
 spectively occurred in 1831 and February, 1833, Great 
 Britain in the latter part of President Van Buren's 
 Administration paid an indemnity of $116,179.62. But 
 in the cases of the Enterprise, Hermosa, and Creole, 
 which occurred after August 1, 1834, when the act of 
 Parliament of August 28, 1833, for the abolition of 
 slavery in the British colonies took effect, the British 
 Government refused to acknowledge any liability on 
 the ground that the slaves on entering British juris- 
 diction became free. The United States, on the other 
 hand, maintained that if a vessel were driven by neces- 
 sity to enter the port of another nation the local law 
 could not operate so as to effect existing rights of 
 property as between persons on board, or their per- 
 sonal obligations or relations under the law of the coun- 
 try to which the vessel belonged. In the case of the 
 Creole this argument was emphasized by the fact that 
 the vessel was brought into British jurisdiction by 
 means of a crime against the law of the flag. The case 
 gave rise to animated discussions in the British Parlia- 
 ment as well as in the Congress of the United States, 
 and came near breaking up the negotiations between 
 Mr. Webster and Lord Ashburton in 1842.
 
 HUMANITAEIAN ASYLUM 229 
 
 Bates, umpire in the case of the Creole under the con- 
 vention between the United States and Great Britain 
 of February 8, 1853, rendered the following opinion : 7 
 
 * ' This case having been submitted to the umpire for 
 his decision, he hereby reports that the claim has grown 
 out of the following circumstances : 
 
 "The American brig Creole, Captain Ensor, sailed 
 from Hampton Roads, in the State of Virginia, on the 
 27th October, 1841, having on board one hundred and 
 thirty-five slaves, bound for New Orleans. On the 7th 
 
 Notwithstanding the deservedly high authority of Umpire 
 Bates, we must question the correctness of the decision which 
 he reached in this case. The defect in his reasoning was due 
 to his failure to recognize that slavery was contrary to the 
 law of nations. Holding a different opinion, as we have just 
 seen, Umpire Bates declared that " . . . slavery, however odious 
 and contrary to the principles of justice and humanity, may 
 be established by law in any country; and, having been so 
 established in many countries, it cannot be contrary to the 
 law of nations. ' ' 
 
 Clarke, discussing this case, remarks : ' ' The law authorities 
 in England were unanimously of opinion upon this case that 
 they [the slaves] could not be given up in the absence of an 
 Act of the English Parliament giving power to the executive. 
 
 "For this reason the extradition clause of the Ashburton 
 treaty, which has already been quoted, while it took immediate 
 effect in America and Canada, did not come into operation in 
 England until August, 1843, when the Act 6 and 7 Viet., c. 76, 
 was passed. Some objection was made to this Act in the 
 House of Commons, where fears were expressed that advan- 
 tage might be taken of the treaty to get back fugitive slaves on 
 pretended charges of robbery. The Attorney-General (Sir 
 F. Pollock), being appealed to on the subject, said that, upon 
 a charge of crime being made against a fugitive, his personal 
 status in the country from which he had fled would be wholly 
 immaterial." (Sir Edward Clarke: The Law of Extradition, 
 3 ed., 1888, p. 125.) 
 
 This refusal of the amendment to exclude slaves from the 
 operation of the act might perhaps be considered as a legis- 
 lative interpretation of the law of nations, in which event, 
 it might have been expected to have some influence in fixing 
 the responsibility of the British Government in the case of the 
 Creole.
 
 230 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 November, at nine o'clock in the evening, a portion of 
 the slaves rose against the officers, crew, and passen- 
 gers, wounding severely the captain, the chief mate, 
 and two of the crew, and murdering one of the passen- 
 gers; the mutineers, having got complete possession 
 of the vessel, ordered the mate, under threat of instant 
 death should he disobey or deceive them, to steer for 
 Nassau, in the island of New Providence, where the 
 brig arrived on the 9th November, 1841. 
 
 * * The American Consul was apprised of the situation 
 of the vessel, and requested the governor to take meas- 
 ures to prevent the escape of the slaves, and to have the 
 murderers secured. The consul received reply from 
 the Governor, stating that under the circumstances he 
 would comply with the request. 
 
 "The consul went on board the brig, placed the mate 
 in command in place of the disabled master, and found 
 the slaves all quiet. 
 
 "About noon twenty African soldiers, with an Afri- 
 can sergeant and corporal, commanded by a white of- 
 ficer, came on board. The officer was introduced by 
 the consul to the mate as commanding officer of the 
 vessel. 
 
 "The consul, on returning to the shore, was sum- 
 moned to attend the governor and council, who were 
 in session, who informed the consul that they had come 
 to the following decision: 
 
 " '1st. That the courts of law have no jurisdic- 
 tion over the alleged offenses. 
 
 " *2d. That, as an information had been lodged 
 before the governor, charging that the crime of 
 murder had been committed on board said vessel 
 while on the high seas, it was expedient that the 
 parties, implicated in so grave a charge, should 
 not be allowed to go at large, and that an investi-
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 231 
 
 gallon ought therefore to be made into the charges, 
 and examinations taken on oath ; when, if it should 
 appear that the original information was correct, 
 and that a murder had actually been committed, 
 that all parties implicated in such crime, or other 
 acts of violence, should be detained here until 
 reference could be made to the Secretary of State 
 to ascertain whether the parties should be deliv- 
 ered over to the United States Government ; if not, 
 how otherwise to dispose of them. 
 
 * ' ' 3d. That as soon as such examinations should 
 be taken, all persons on board the Creole, not im- 
 plicated in any of the offenses alleged to have been 
 committed on board the vessel, must be released 
 from further restraint.' 
 
 "Then two magistrates were sent on board. The 
 American Consul went also. The examination was 
 commenced on Tuesday, the 9th, and was continued on 
 Wednesday, the 10th, and then postponed until Friday, 
 on account of the illness of Captain Ensor. On Friday 
 morning it was abruptly, and without any explanation, 
 terminated. 
 
 "On the same day, a large number of boats assem- 
 bled near the Creole, filled with colored persons armed 
 with bludgeons. They were under the immediate com- 
 mand of the pilot, who took the vessel into the port, 
 who was an officer of the government, and a colored 
 man. A sloop or larger launch was also towed from the 
 shore and anchored near the brig. The sloop was filled 
 with men armed with clubs, and clubs were passed from 
 her to the persons in the boats. A vast concourse of 
 people were collected on shore opposite the brig. 
 
 "During the whole time the officers of the govern- 
 ment were on board they encouraged the insubordina- 
 tion of the slaves.
 
 232 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 "The Americans in port determined to unite and 
 furnish the necessary aid to forward the vessel and 
 negroes to New Orleans. The Consul and the officers 
 and crews of two other American vessels had, in fact, 
 united with the officers, men, and passengers of the 
 Creole to effect this. They were to conduct her first to 
 Indian Quay, Florida, where there was a vessel of war 
 of the United States. 
 
 "On Friday morning, the consul was informed that 
 attempts would be made to liberate the slaves by force, 
 and from the mate he received information of the 
 threatening state of things. The result was, that the 
 attorney-general and other officers went on board the 
 Creole. The slaves, identified as on board the vessel 
 concerned in the mutiny, were sent on shore, and the 
 residue of the slaves were called on deck by direction 
 of the attorney-general, who addressed them in the 
 following terms : ' My friends, ' or ' my men, you have 
 been detained a short time on board the Creole for the 
 purpose of ascertaining what individuals were con- 
 cerned in the murder. They have been identified and 
 will be detained. The rest of you are free, and at lib- 
 erty to go on shore, and wherever you please. ' 
 
 "The liberated slaves, assisted by the magistrates, 
 were then taken on board the boats, and when landed 
 were conducted by a vast assemblage to the superin- 
 tendent of police, by whom their names were registered. 
 They were thus forcibly taken from the custody of the 
 master of the Creole, and lost to the claimants. 
 
 "I need not refer to authorities to show that slavery, 
 however odious and contrary to the principles of jus- 
 tice and humanity, may be established by law in any 
 country ; and, having been so established in many coun- 
 tries, it cannot be contrary to the law of nations.
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 233 
 
 1 'The Creole was on a voyage, sanctioned and pro- 
 tected by the laws of the United States, and by the law 
 of nations. Her right to navigate the ocean could not 
 be questioned, and as growing out of that right, the 
 right to seek shelter or enter the ports of a friendly 
 power in case of distress or any unavoidable neces- 
 sity. 
 
 "A vessel navigating the ocean carries with her the 
 laws of her own country, so far as relates to the per- 
 sons and property on board, and to a certain extent, 
 retains those rights even in the ports of the foreign 
 nations she may visit. Now, this being the state of the 
 law of nations, what were the duties of the authorities 
 at Nassau in regard to the Creole? It is submitted the 
 mutineers could not be tried by the courts of that 
 island, the crime having been committed on the high 
 seas. All that the authorities could lawfully do, was 
 to comply with the request of the American Consul, 
 and keep the mutineers in custody until a conveyance 
 could be found for sending them to the United States. 
 
 "The other slaves, being perfectly quiet, and under 
 the command of the captain and owners, and on board 
 an American ship, the authorities should have seen 
 that they were protected by the law of nations ; their 
 rights under which cannot be abrogated or varied, 
 either by the emancipation act or any other act of the 
 British Parliament. 
 
 "Blackstone, 4th volume, speaking of the law of 
 nations, states: 'Whenever any question arises, which 
 is properly the object of its jurisdiction, such law is 
 here adopted in its full extent by the common law. ' 
 
 "The municipal law of England cannot authorize a 
 magistrate to violate the law of nations by invading 
 with an armed force the vessel of a friendly nation that 
 has committed no offense, and forcibly dissolving the
 
 234 INTERNATIONAL POLICE! 
 
 relations which by the laws of his country the captain 
 is bound to preserve and enforce on board. 
 
 ' * These rights, sanctioned by the law of nations, viz : 
 the right to navigate the ocean, and to seek shelter in 
 case of distress or other unavoidable circumstances, 
 and to retain over the ship, her cargo, and passengers, 
 the laws of her own country must be respected by all 
 nations; for no independent nation would submit to 
 their violation. 
 
 " Having read all the authorities referred to in the 
 arguments on both sides, I have come to the conclusion 
 that the conduct of the authorities at Nassau was in 
 violation of the established law of nations, and that the 
 claimants are justly entitled to compensation for their 
 losses. I therefore award to the undermentioned par- 
 ties, their assigns, or legal representatives, the sum set 
 opposite their names, due on the 15th of January, 
 1855." The total amount awarded was $110,330. (Ex- 
 tracted and condensed from Moore: Digest of Inter- 
 national Law, vol. II, pp. 350-61.) 
 
 Sir Frederick St. John, who was at the time attached 
 to the British Embassy at Constantinople, gives the 
 following account of how the British Ambassador gave 
 an asylum in the Embassy to a slave girl to save her 
 from the harsh provisions of Turkish law : 
 
 "A curious incident occurred in the summer of 1880 
 while the Embassy was at Therapia. One of the drago- 
 mans came up the Bosphorus from town specially to 
 report than an odalisk (a slave lady) from the harem 
 of the deposed Sultan Murad had escaped from the 
 house of a pasha, in whose custody she had been placed, 
 taken refuge in the British Embassy palace, and threat- 
 ened to stab herself should an attempt be made to 
 expel her. 
 
 ' ' Mr. Goschen directed that I should at once accom- 
 pany our dragoman back to town and interview the
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 235 
 
 lady. I found a very beautiful, delicate-looking young 
 Circassian, dressed in European clothes, which she had 
 borrowed from the wife of our Embassy porter in ex- 
 change for the garb of the poorest of beggar-women, 
 in which she had arrived. I put her, by means of the 
 dragoman, through an interrogatory, and this was her 
 story. On the deposition of the present Sultan's broth- 
 er she was, as above stated, placed with the family of a 
 pasha holding office at court; but finding life intoler- 
 able in such custody (no particulars were given me) 
 she determined to escape and take refuge at the Brit- 
 ish Embassy. So, after exchanging dresses with an 
 old woman engaged to wash down the stone stairs at 
 early dawn, she sallied forth, for the first time in her 
 life alone, into the streets, and, not knowing the way, 
 wandered about for hours, till so exhausted that she 
 entered a coffee-shop and, holding out a coin, asked 
 that a carriage might be fetched, as she felt too ill to 
 walk, and thus reached the Embassy. 
 
 1 ' Having concluded her story, she repeated to me the 
 threat that any attempt to expel her should be followed 
 instantly by self-immolation; and by way of empha- 
 sizing her determination she half unsheathed a gleam- 
 ing weapon wherewith to carry out the ghastly threat. 
 
 ' ' I had heard enough, so I withdrew from her pres- 
 ence and hurried back to Therapia, where the Ambas- 
 sador and his family had just commenced dinner. I 
 was invited to join in the meal, and while so engaged I 
 recounted my interview to eager listeners. 
 
 ' * It was decided that I should next morning return to 
 Pera in the ambassadorial coach, with an assortment 
 of ladies' garments, including a hat and thick veil, 
 wherewith the better to disguise this interesting refu- 
 gee as I conducted her to the landing-place at Galata, 
 where a British man-of-war's steam-launch would be
 
 236 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 in readiness to convey her up the Bosphorus to Ther- 
 apia. 
 
 ' * On quitting the Ambassador 's residence, and on re- 
 joining after dinner my colleagues in the secretaries' 
 house at the other end of the Embassy gardens, I went 
 over the same ground with reference to my interview 
 with the beautiful odalisk, whose charms I exaggerated 
 not more than five per cent, over the truth (being only 
 on one side Irish) ; but it was enough to make each one 
 of them regret that he had not been the one selected 
 (by a discriminating chief) to carry out so delicate a 
 mission. 
 
 1 * On my arrival in town the next morning, an eleven 
 miles' drive, I intimated to the lady, through the por- 
 ter's wife, what had been the Ambassador's decision 
 which was that she should reside in the Embassy house 
 at Therapia till otherwise determined. On her accept- 
 ance of my proposal I directed the porter to extract a 
 certain bundle out of the carriage, and then withdrew. 
 
 " After the lapse of twenty minutes or so I was in- 
 vited by the porter 's wife to reenter the room, where I 
 found a perfectly unrecognizable and fashionably 
 dressed European lady, with whom I reentered the car- 
 riage and drove down to Galata ; but it was a market 
 day, and the narrow alley leading from the main street 
 to the landing-place was so crowded with vendors and 
 their wares that we were forced to alight and walk the 
 rest of the distance. 
 
 "This was the critical moment. I made her take 
 my arm, and, as we threaded our way though a Mo- 
 hametan crowd, I became painfully conscious that were 
 I followed by a spy, and denounced as eloping with a 
 lady from the palace, my shrift would be but short. 
 Vendors and purchasers were, however, far too inter- 
 ested in their deals to heed a passing giaour couple, and 
 so we safely reached the spot where the steam-launch,
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 237 
 
 with more than the usual number of bluejackets 
 armed to the teeth was in waiting. 
 
 "After assisting the veiled one to embark, and see- 
 ing the steam-launch well off, I returned to the carriage 
 and drove to the Porte at Stamboul where, as previ- 
 ously instructed, I informed Artin Bey, the secretary- 
 general of the Foreign Department, of all that had oc- 
 curred. He is a most intelligent Armenian, with a 
 wonderful volubility of speech, but what I had to im- 
 part to him simply paralyzed his tongue. I can see 
 him now, gaping at me in silence as I left the room. 
 
 "In the afternoon of the following day he arrived 
 at Therapia, charged by the reigning Sultan, Abdul 
 Hamid, to see Mr. Goschen and demand the release of 
 the absconded one. I was present at the interview. 
 He assured the Ambassador, from the Sultan, that if 
 the lady were returned she should be forgiven for her 
 escapade and every care taken of her. Mr. Goschen 
 replied that only with her free consent should the Sul- 
 tan 's wish be complied with. 
 
 "Artin Bey thereupon besought Mr. Goschen that he 
 might be allowed to speak with the lady. After some 
 hesitation the request was granted, on condition that I 
 was present at the interview which lasted two hours, 
 during the whole of which time Artin Bey appeared to 
 use all the eloquence at his command to induce the lady 
 to obey the Sultan's behest, but in vain. To every 
 fresh appeal, while reclining on a cushion with her face 
 to the wall for she was unprovided with a yashmak 
 the lady replied with a shake of the head, as the tears 
 streamed down her cheeks. At last he rose and depart- 
 ed, evidently much disconcerted, 'but returned the 
 next day with further offers from the Sultan. She was 
 to choose her own residence, her own attendants, and 
 receive an ample allowance. To these conditions, after 
 a three hours' interview, during the whole of which
 
 238 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 time I was present, she at last agreed; and, on her con- 
 sent being communicated to Mr. Goschen, he made the 
 condition that before the lady departed he should be 
 furnished with a document, signed by the Ottoman 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the effect that the Sul- 
 tan promised never to give cause to the Ambassador to 
 regret having surrendered the lady, whose residence 
 should be made known to the Embassy, in order that in- 
 quiries might from time to time be instituted, and the 
 fact ascertained that she was contented and happy. 
 
 ' * On the following day Artin Bey returned, this time 
 in a special steamer; and, after submitting the docu- 
 ment in the form required, departed with the lady. 
 From all we heard afterwards she appears never to 
 have had cause to regret having accepted the Sultan's 
 offers." (Sir Frederick St. John: Reminiscences of a 
 Retired Diplomat, p. 194-8.) 
 
 In view of the growing abhorrence of slavery and the 
 numerous precedents denying its legality, it is easy to 
 understand the disappointment of the United States 
 at its failure to secure the sympathy of the European 
 powers in the war to prevent secession and the estab- 
 lishment of a slave-holding state determined to per- 
 petuate that institution. 
 
 The Senate of the United States, in its report of 
 February 28, 1863, relative to the offer of Napoleon III 
 of "mediation," expressed "regret that foreign 
 powers have not frankly told the chiefs of the Rebel- 
 lion that the work in which they are engaged is hate- 
 ful, and that a new government such as they seek to 
 found, with slavery as its corner stone, and with no 
 other declared object of separate existence, is so far 
 shocking to civilization and the moral sense of man- 
 kind that it must not expect welcome or recognition in 
 the commonwealth of nations. ' ' The President was re- 
 quested to transmit this declaration and protest to the
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 239 
 
 American representatives abroad for communication 
 to the governments to which they were accredited. 8 
 
 8 In a letter to John Lothrop Motley, dated January 26, 
 1863, John Stuart Mill writes: "But a decided movement in 
 your favor has begun among the public since it has been evi- 
 dent that your Government is really in earnest about getting 
 rid of slavery. I have always said that it was ignorance, not 
 ill-will which made the majority of the English public go 
 wrong about this great matter. Difficult as it may well be for 
 you to comprehend it, the English public were so ignorant of 
 all the antecedents of the quarrel that they really believed what 
 they were told, that slavery was not the ground, scarcely even 
 the pretext, of the war. But now, when the public acts of 
 your government have shown that now at least it aims at entire 
 slave emancipation, that your victory means that, and your 
 failure means the extinction of all present hope of it, many 
 feel very differently. When you entered decidedly into this 
 course, your detractors abused you more violently for doing 
 it than they had before for not doing it, and the Times and 
 Saturday Review began favoring us with the very arguments, 
 and almost in the very language, which we used to hear from 
 the West Indian slaveholders to prove slavery perfectly con- 
 sistent with the Bible and with Christianity. This was too 
 much : it overshot the mark. The Anti-Slavery feeling is now 
 thoroughly rousing itself. Liverpool has led the way by a 
 splendid meeting, of which the Times suppressed all mention, 
 thus adding, according to its custom, to the political dishonesty 
 a pecuniary fraud upon its subscribers. But you must have 
 seen a report of this meeting ; you must have seen how Spence 
 did his utmost, and how he was met ; and that the object was 
 not merely a high demonstration, but the appointment of a 
 committee to organize an action on the public mind. There are 
 none like the Liverpool people for making an organization of 
 that sort succeed if once they put their hands to it. The day 
 when I read this I read in the same day's newspaper two 
 speeches by Cabinet Ministers: one by Milner-Gibson, as 
 thoroughly and openly with you as was consistent with the 
 position of a Cabinet Minister; the other by the Duke of 
 Argyll, a simple Anti-Slavery speech, denouncing the pro- 
 slavery declaration of the southern bishops, but his delivering 
 such a speech at that time and place has but one meaning. I 
 do not know if you have seen Cairnes's Lecture, or whether 
 you are aware that it has been taken up and largely circulated 
 by religious societies, and is at its fourth edition. A new and 
 enlarged edition of his great book is on the point of publication,
 
 240 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 An amusing incident showing some of the incon- 
 veniences of international intercourse between states 
 of unequal culture appears from the following letter 
 which Mr. Hammond of the Foreign Office sent to Lord 
 Lyons May 30, 1867: 
 
 "We should like to know as soon as possible at what 
 time we may calculate on seeing the Sultan and what 
 members of his family or of his government he brings 
 with him, and the rank and description of his suite and 
 their numbers. It is to be hoped they will not be too 
 numerous, and that as he is to be lodged in the Palace, 
 the usual habits of Orientalism will for the time be laid 
 aside and the services of his Harem be dispensed with 
 during his visit. It would shock the people in this 
 country to hear of the Sultan being attended by persons 
 not proper to be mentioned in civilized society, and no 
 small inconvenience might result if he was known to 
 have slaves in his suite, for it would be impossible to 
 answer for the enthusiasts of Exeter Hall with so fair 
 an opportunity before them for displaying their zeal 
 and doing mischief." (Lord Newton's Life of Lord 
 Lyons, vol. I, p. 172.) 
 
 In fit conclusion, we wish to quote here once again 
 Hall's opinion that ". . .the personal freedom of hu- 
 man beings has been admitted by modern civilized 
 states as a right which they are bound to respect and 
 
 which they ought to uphold internationally." (W. E. 
 Hall: International Law, 4 ed., 108, p. 343.) 
 
 Slavery has now almost entirely disappeared and is 
 not likely much longer to constitute a problem in inter- 
 national law, but the principles upon which humanita- 
 rian interventions for the prevention of involuntary 
 
 and will, I have no doubt, be very widely read and powerfully 
 influential." (The Letters of John Stuart Mill, edited by 
 Hugh S. R. Elliot, vol. I, p. 277-9.)
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 241 
 
 servitude have so frequently been based seem destined 
 to play an important role in the future, by reason of the 
 close analogy between the condition of slavery and that 
 economic thraldom in which human beings are made to 
 toil beyond the limits of reasonable endurance. It has 
 sometimes happened that laborers, including pregnant 
 women, and children of tender age, have been forced by 
 economic pressure to work in sweatshops and elsewhere 
 under conditions which shock the right sentiment of 
 humanity. The same irresistible force of public opin- 
 ion which in the past has demanded intervention to re- 
 press the abhorrent slave trade and to discountenance 
 slavery will probably drive on governments to adopt a 
 similar course and to intervene for the purpose of re- 
 forming the conduct of states where the conditions of 
 labor are so intolerable as to shock the humane senti- 
 ments of other states. 
 
 We shall see further along an application of this kind 
 of intervention in the legislation adopted by certain 
 states for the purpose of compelling other states to 
 protect passengers voyaging under their flag and pre- 
 vent an abusive or inhuman treatment of seamen. 
 
 POLITICAL REFUGEES 
 
 Asylum has often been granted in warships and le- 
 gations to political refugees. In certain states which 
 are subject to frequent revolutions and periods of tur- 
 moil when factional animosities prevail over all con- 
 siderations of justice and patriotism, it has been cus- 
 tomary to offer an asylum in legations and consulates 
 to political fugitives. 
 
 It may be argued that this is justifiable as an inter- 
 vention on the ground of humanity to prevent the un- 
 necessary slaughter of men whose qualities of leader- 
 ship are needed by the country. On the other side it is 
 
 16
 
 242 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 argued that this intervention tends to preserve the 
 refugees to fight another day, and so to prolong the 
 miseries of the whole country in order to save a few 
 lives. 
 
 From Professor Moore 's interesting study of Asylum 
 in Legations and in Vessels, we take the following ex- 
 tract summarizing certain instances of political asylum 
 granted in certain European States in time of disturb- 
 ance: "During the disorders at Naples in 1849, Lord 
 Palmerston said that while it 'would not be right to 
 receive and harbor on board of a British ship of war 
 any person flying from justice on a criminal charge, or 
 who was escaping from the sentence of a court of law, ' 
 yet a British man-of-war had always been regarded as 
 a safe place of refuge for persons fleeing 'from perse- 
 cution on account of their conduct or opinions, ' wheth- 
 er the refugee 'was escaping from the arbitrary acts 
 of a monarchical government or from the lawless vio- 
 lence of a revolutionary committee.' (British State 
 Papers, vol. 50, p. 803.) In August of the preceding 
 year the Duke of Parma, whose life was threatened, 
 was embarked at Civita Vecchia on the British man-of- 
 war Hecate, (Ibid, vol. 41, p. 1316), and in the same 
 month the British admiral ordered H. M. S. Bulldog 
 to the same port to receive the Pope, should commo- 
 tions render it desirable for His Holiness to seek refuge 
 on board (Ibid, vol. 41, : 1324). During the revolution 
 in Greece in 1862, King Otho and his queen were af- 
 forded protection on the British Frigate Scylla (Ibid, 
 vol. 58: 1034), while a member of the cabinet and his 
 family were received on the Queen and several persons 
 were sheltered on the French man-of-war Zenobie. The 
 instructions given by Vice-Admiral Sir William Mar- 
 tin on that occasion to the commanders of British ships 
 of war declared that their duty was 'limited to the pro- 
 tection of the lives and property of British subjects
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 243 
 
 and to affording protection to any refugees whom you 
 may be informed by Her Majesty's minister would be 
 in danger of their lives without such protection. ' (Ibid, 
 vol. 58, p. 1057.) Under these instructions, the recep- 
 tion of refugees by the British commanders was care- 
 fully restricted (Ibid, p. 1087)." 
 
 A rather exceptional instance of asylum in a battle- 
 ship was that which the British Government was ready 
 to offer the Pope shortly after the outbreak of the 
 Franco-German war to carry him safely to England. 
 Had the Pope actually taken refuge on a British war- 
 ship, it might have been classed as an instance of hu- 
 manitarian intervention to prevent any danger to the 
 person and dignity of the head of the Roman Catholic 
 Church. (See Parliamentary Papers, 1871, vol. 72 [c. 
 247] p. 4-5.) 
 
 It is in certain states of America that this form of 
 humanitarian intervention has most frequently been 
 employed. In some instances, the states concerned 
 have made energetic protest. On the whole the United 
 States has tended to support the opinion which is 
 against the granting of political asylum. 
 
 The French Government expressed a different view, 
 when in the case of four ex-ministers of Peru who 
 sought refuge in the French Legation, Nov. 6, 1865, M. 
 Drouyn de Lhuys instructed the French consul 
 temporarily in charge of the legation that the 
 right of asylum was too much in conformity with feel- 
 ings of humanity for France to consent to abandon it, 
 but that it was solely requisite to facilitate the depar- 
 ture from the country of persons who could not remain 
 there without personal danger and danger to the 
 country itself. (Extract quoted from Sir Ernest 
 Satow: Diplomatic Practice, London, 1917, vol. I, 
 291-2; J. B. Moore: Asylum, Political Science Quar-
 
 244 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 terly, March, 1892, vol. vii, p. 29-37, gives a more full 
 account.) 
 
 Mr. Hovey, who was the American Minister to Peru 
 shortly thereafter, during the revolutionary distress 
 which still prevailed, was so impressed with the abuses 
 which asylum covered that he refused to grant it until 
 his government should expressly instruct him to do so. 
 Mr. Hovey 's views are expressed in his dispatch to Sec- 
 retary Seward, January 28, 1867 : 
 
 "In my dispatch No. 4, dated December 28th, 1865, 
 I addressed the Department of State in relation to the 
 question of diplomatic asylum, stating that I should 
 refuse to exercise that power until I was otherwise 
 directed. I have not as yet received an answer to that 
 communication, and have concluded from your silence 
 that the government approved my course. 
 
 "On the 12th day of the present month I received a 
 note from his excellency Senor Don Toribio Pacheco, 
 minister of foreign affairs, inviting me to a conference 
 for a definite agreement as to the principles of inter- 
 national law in relation to this important subject. 
 Being indisposed at the time I addressed a note to his 
 excellency, in which I reiterated the substance of my 
 No. 4, above referred to, alluding therein to the au- 
 thorities of Wheaton, Woolsey, and Polsin, denying 
 the doctrine of asylum, but saying to his excellency 
 that if other foreign ministers were permitted to exer- 
 cise the right in Peru, I should expect to be entitled 
 to the same. 
 
 "Being invited to a diplomatic conference of the 21st 
 instant, I attended the same, and offered the following 
 resolutions : 
 
 * ' 1. The diplomatic body here assembled resolve that 
 they, and each of them, jointly and severally, acknowl- 
 edge and recognize Peru as a Christian nation.
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 245 
 
 ' * 2. As each Christian nation should, by internation- 
 al law, be entitled to all the rights properly claimed by 
 others, therefore 
 
 "Resolved, That Peru is entitled to the same rights 
 and privileges, through her diplomatic agents abroad, 
 that we, as representatives near the government of 
 Peru, are respectively entitled to here, and that we 
 cannot, in justice, claim more than our respective gov- 
 ernments accord to the representatives of Peru. 
 
 ' ' 3. Therefore resolved, That we recognize the law of 
 nations, as relating to the question of asylum, to be the 
 same as practiced in the United States, and in England, 
 France, and other Christian nations of Europe. 
 
 "The representatives present, of France, England, 
 Brazil, Bolivia, Chili, and Italy, contended for the right 
 of asylum, and opposed the resolutions. 
 
 "The Peruvian government insists on being placed 
 upon a footing with civilized nations of the world. You 
 will thus see that I have alone supported the position 
 assumed by the authorities of Peru. I do not believe 
 that the history of Peru can furnish a single example 
 where the innocent have been shielded by asylum; 
 nearly all the cases of which I have heard are those 
 applying strictly to citizens of Peru charged with con- 
 spiracy or treason. 
 
 "One case, that of Captain Carwell, an Englishman, 
 turned upon the point of his contempt of court in an 
 order made for the delivery of property. Refusing 
 to obey the warrant of the court, he fled for protection 
 to the English legation, from whence, after eleven 
 months, he made his escape, still refusing to obey the 
 orders of the court, and taking with him the property 
 in dispute. 
 
 "Another case, which transpired shortly before my 
 arrival, was that of General Canseco, vice-president of 
 the republic, charged with conspiracy against the gov- 
 ernment; he remained in the legation of the United
 
 246 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 States some three or four months, where he was in daily 
 communication with his co-conspirators. At length he 
 agreed with President Pezet to exile himself to Chili 
 upon the payment of one year 's salary ; he received the 
 pay, was permitted to depart, landed in two days upon 
 the coast of Peru, and a few weeks afterward returned 
 with an invading army to the walls of Lima. 
 
 "The third case involves the question now pending 
 between France and Peru, and arose by asylum being 
 given by the French legation on the 20th of December, 
 1865, to three Peruvians, charged by the central court 
 with peculation, conspiracy, and treason. 
 
 ' * Two of the same gentlemen applied to me and were 
 refused. This gave rise to my dispatch No. 4, already 
 alluded to, on this question. 
 
 ' * The French charge d 'affaires, Mr. Emile Vion, re- 
 fused to acknowledge the right of the government to ar- 
 rest them, although the officers of the law demanded 
 them under writs from the central court. The charge 
 d'affaires referred the case to the Emperor of France, 
 and his action was approved; but the charge d'affaires 
 was ordered to solicit the settlement of the question of 
 asylum by the Peruvian government and the diplomatic 
 corps resident in Lima. As no person arrested by the 
 government upon any charge has as yet suffered the 
 extreme penalty, it is apparent that the plea of cruelty 
 or barbarity cannot be sustained as the cause for giv- 
 ing asylum. Peruvians were dealing with Peruvians, 
 and should, in my opinion, have been left to their own 
 laws and courts. The practice of giving asylum has 
 been and still is a prolific source of revolutions in, and 
 the instability of, the South American republics. The 
 traitor, who would for his own ambition steep his coun- 
 try in blood, feels assured that if he fails in his rebel- 
 lion he has only to flee to the house of some minister, 
 and that there he will find a refuge beyond the reach of
 
 HUMANITAEIAN ASYLUM 247 
 
 justice. Thus encouraged, and the high crime of trea- 
 son varnished over with the soft name of ' ' political of- 
 fence," he launches recklessly into his ambitious 
 schemes, and the country is kept in continual commo- 
 tion. If there should be a single unfriendly minister to 
 the government here, (and there always is), his lega- 
 tion at once becomes the asylum and headquarters for 
 the conspirators against the government. Is it strange, 
 then, that revolutions here are so common? In my opin- 
 ion, that man will prove a benefactor to South America 
 who breaks down this ancient relic of barbarism and 
 aids in bringing the guilty to the quick punishment of 
 the laws against which they may have offended. 
 
 "With childlike faith Peru trusts, at least for moral 
 aid, to the United States, and I submit that, by placing 
 her upon a level with other Christian nations, the 
 chances of her advancement would be greatly increased, 
 as permanent governments would more securely fol- 
 low." (Diplomatic Correspondence, 1867, Pt. II, p. 
 736-8.) 
 
 But the international practice of the principal states 
 has continued to recognize the legality of political 
 asylum in certain states of Latin America, and the two 
 most recently published volumes of the Foreign Rela- 
 tions of the United States show that that Government 
 also recognized by its practice the legality of humani- 
 tarian asylum when used in a nonpartisan manner to 
 save the life of political refugees and to permit them 
 to escape from the country. 
 
 The general practice of the United States in regard 
 to what Secretary Knox designated as "temporary 
 refuge, ' ' in contradistinction to * ' permanent asylum, ' ' 
 was embodied in his instructions to the Consul General 
 at Guayaquil, Ecuador, April 5, 1910, as follows : "You 
 may in your discretion afford temporary refuge where
 
 248 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 such is necessary in order to preserve innocent human 
 life." (Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 399, note.) 
 
 Early in January, 1912, it would appear that the 
 American Minister advised the Consul General at 
 Guayaquil, and the Commander of the Yorktown "to 
 receive no political refugees," but in his dispatch of 
 January 30, 1912, Secretary Knox instructed the 
 American Minister: 
 
 "You are correct in assuming that what is technical- 
 ly known as 'the right of asylum' in a strict sense is 
 not claimed by this government. However, there is an 
 evident distinction between this case and that where 
 temporary refuge is given within the residence of a 
 consular or diplomatic representative in order to pre- 
 serve innocent human life. The general practice of the 
 Department on the subject of temporary refuge is em- 
 bodied in an instruction to the Consul General at 
 Guayaquil which you will find in the files of the Le- 
 gation. [See instruction of April 5, 1910, above.] 
 
 "In the case of temporary refuge, the Department 
 finds it expedient to give a certain latitude to the judg- 
 ment of the official who is called upon to determine, 
 within his discretion, the course recommended by broad 
 considerations of humanity in each individual case. It 
 is accordingly the general rule of the Department to 
 place all emphasis upon the responsibility of the con- 
 sular or diplomatic officer in the matter and to permit 
 him, within these limitations, at his discretion to af- 
 ford temporary refuge where such is necessary to pre- 
 serve innocent human life." (Foreign Relations, 1912, 
 p. 399.) 
 
 In his dispatch of March 18, 1912, the American 
 Charge, Bingham, at Quito, Ecuador, reports the dis- 
 turbed condition of affairs, and the possibility of fur- 
 ther violence resulting in a "state of affairs closely
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 249 
 
 resembling anarchy." Charge Bingham's report con- 
 tinues : 
 
 "As a proof that much anxiety is felt by all classes, 
 I have the honor to inform the Department that several 
 individuals have requested asylum in this legation in 
 case of further disturbance in Quito. To everyone who 
 has asked for asylum I have replied that the Depart- 
 ment of State deprecates the granting of asylum ex- 
 cept where it is absolutely necessary from the point of 
 view of humanity, to save life ; that I could not discuss 
 a hypothetical question of future danger but must de- 
 cide each case on its merits as it arose ; and I strongly 
 urge the individuals in question to adopt every other 
 means of securing their safety in case of trouble in- 
 stead of coming to this Legation, as I desired to hold 
 absolutely aloof from all internal question. ' ' (Foreign 
 Relations, 1912, p. 406.) 
 
 In China, during the disturbances of 1911, the Ameri- 
 can Vice Consul at Foochow telegraphed: "The right 
 of asylum may be requested by the mandarins. In- 
 structions requested." (Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 
 173.) 
 
 Acting Secretary of State Adee replying the same 
 day that this arrived, November 7, 1911, sent the fol- 
 lowing instructions : ' ' The right of consular asylum is 
 not claimed by this government, but you may use your 
 discretion as to granting temporary lefuge where such 
 is necessary to preserve innocent human life, carefully 
 avoiding action that might appear partisan." (Ibid, 
 p. 174.) 
 
 Three days later, the American Charge Williams at 
 Peking telegraphed: "Asylum at the Legation has 
 been asked by the Emperor and Empress Dowager, 
 which I strongly urge be granted." (Foreign Rela- 
 tions, 1912, p. 174.) To this, Secretary of State Knox 
 replied with the accustomed formula: "In accordance
 
 250 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 with the uniform policy of this government you may 
 at your discretion afford temporary refuge where such 
 is necessary to preserve innocent human life, 9 first as- 
 certaining that your colleagues believe safety of the 
 legation quarter not thereby endangered." (Ibid, p. 
 174.) 
 
 On October 24, 1912, the American Consul at Vera 
 Cruz, Mexico, telegraphed for instructions: "No for- 
 eigners hurt or property destroyed. City in the pos- 
 session of Federals. Diaz is a prisoner; if asylum is 
 asked for will be refused. " (Ibid, p. 924.) Secretary 
 Knox, who had received the American Charge's report 
 of October 27, 10 repeated the portion of the American 
 Consul's telegram regarding asylum for General Felix 
 Diaz, and instructed the Charge as follows : * * The De- 
 partment presumes there will be no occasion either to 
 grant or to refuse asylum to Diaz, since he is held a 
 prisoner by Mexican Federal forces. You will inform 
 the Consul at Vera Cruz, however, that the position of 
 the Department with regard to asylum is as follows: 
 'The Government of the United States does not claim 
 what is technically known as the right of asylum in the 
 strictest sense. There is, however, an evident distinc- 
 tion between cases of this kind and cases in which tem- 
 porary refuge is given in order to preserve innocent 
 human life. In cases of the latter kind the Department 
 of State finds it expedient to give a certain latitude to 
 the judgment of the officer who is called upon to de- 
 termine within his discretion the course recommended 
 
 'Exactly what is meant by ' ' innocent human life ' ' does not 
 appear from the correspondence, nor are we informed whether 
 Mr. Williams considered that this designation would apply to 
 and include the Empress Dowager. 
 
 10 The American Charge, in his dispatch of October 27 had 
 reported as follows: 
 
 "Both Mexicans and foreigners have crowded this Em- 
 bassy asking that I take some action with President Madero in
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 251 
 
 by broad considerations of humanity in each individual 
 case. It is accordingly the general rule of the Depart- 
 ment of State to place all emphasis upon the responsi- 
 bility of the officer concerned and to permit him within 
 these limitations, at his discretion, to afford temporary 
 refuge where such is necessary to preserve innocent 
 human life. ' " (Ibid, p. 925-6.) 
 
 behalf of Diaz, some insisting that he should not be executed ; 
 others that such execution be postponed. I have replied to 
 one and all that the embassy could not under any circum- 
 stances take action or make representations, as his case was 
 one of Mexican internal politics. 
 
 "Similar visits of committees from their colonies with pe- 
 tition to take some action for the sake of humanity have been 
 received by the other members of the Diplomatic Corps, who 
 have been much excited over the reported determination to 
 execute Diaz. The wife of the Spanish Minister (acting Dean 
 of the Diplomatic Corps), herself a Mexican by birth, went to 
 see the Maderos, but was coldly received. The British Min- 
 ister was very active for a time, saying that of course he could 
 not act in the name of his government without instructions, 
 but was acting for his colony. German and French Ministers 
 will do nothing. 
 
 ' ' Madero has made a speech, in reply to a manifestation, in 
 which he concludes : ' General Diaz will be punished with all 
 rigor. And I know very well that it is the wish of the nation 
 that the blood of the guilty wash out the blood shed by General 
 Diaz on June 25, 1879." (Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 924.) 
 
 Relative to the occurrences of 1879, John W. Foster relates 
 an interesting incident which took place at the time that he 
 was minister to Mexico, during the interregnum before Gen- 
 eral Diaz arrived in Mexico City. Mr. Foster had invited 
 members of the American Colony to the legation, and they 
 came armed. Mr. Foster relates: "Our vigil passed with 
 only two interruptions. A Senator called at an early hour to 
 ask if he might become my temporary guest. He had been a 
 champion in Congress of the Lerdo regime and showed much 
 bitterness towards the Diaz movement, and feared that he 
 might be exposed to insult, if not danger, from excited parti- 
 sans of Diaz before order was established. He was my personal 
 friend and I was glad to give him a room in my house. In the 
 early hours of the morning General , a gallant old soldier,
 
 252 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 One year later, when General Diaz found "tempo- 
 rary refuge" on the American warship Wheeling, Sec- 
 retary of State Bryan in a letter of October 28, 1913, to 
 the Secretary of the Navy, explained the attitude of the 
 Department of State: 
 
 "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 letter of this date transmitting a copy of a telegram 
 received by you from Admiral Fletcher, at Vera Cruz, 
 with reference to the action of the U. S. S. Wheeling 
 in taking on board General Diaz and two friends, and 
 Williams, American correspondent of the New York 
 Herald. 
 
 "In this connection I beg to advise that, while the 
 rule governing such cases is that it is the duty of 
 American men-of-war to protect American citizens, it 
 is, as a general rule, against the policy of this govern- 
 ment to grant asylum in its ships to the citizens of 
 foreign countries engaged in political activity, especial- 
 ly when such asylum is for the purpose of furthering 
 their political plans. Temporary shelter to such per- 
 sons, when they are seeking to leave their country, has 
 sometimes been conceded on grounds of humanity, but 
 
 a former Minister of War, my near neighbor, for a similar 
 reason also asked to become my guest, and brought with him 
 his favorite war-horse, the companion of many campaigns, a 
 noble animal. I gave the General my best chamber and quar- 
 tered the charger in the Legation patio. My two distinguished 
 guests remained with me for forty-eight hours only, but an 
 amusing and somewhat embarrassing condition was developed. 
 These two gentlemen, while both hostile to the Diaz movement, 
 were bitter personal enemies, and could not be brought to- 
 gether at my table or in my family circle. So they were volun- 
 tary recluses in their own apartments during their stay. The 
 practice of resort by public men to legation asylum is quite 
 common in Latin-American States in time of disorder and 
 revolution, but my experience in this instance was unique, in 
 that the Legation at one and the same time afforded protection 
 to public men, bank treasurers, and war-horses." (John W. 
 Foster: Diplomatic Memoirs, vol. I, p. 81.)
 
 HUMANITABIAN ASYLUM 253 
 
 even this is done with great circumspection lest advan- 
 tage be taken of it to further the political fortunes of 
 individuals with the result of involving us in the do- 
 mestic politics of foreign countries. 
 
 "In this case you will please direct the commander 
 of the Wheeling to furnish Williams, the American cor- 
 respondent of the New York Herald, who, we take it for 
 granted, is not a citizen of Mexico, asylum on the Ameri- 
 can ship until he can secure passage to the United 
 States. In the case of General Diaz and his two 
 friends, you will give them temporary asylum until 
 they can find a ship to take them away from Mexico, it 
 being taken for granted that they do not desire to re- 
 main in Mexico. They will, of course, understand that 
 while they are on an American ship they cannot use 
 it as a basis for political activity." (Foreign Rela- 
 tions, 1913, p. 854-5.) 
 
 We learn from the report of the American Consul at 
 Matamoras, of April 7, 1913, that he permitted Gen- 
 eral Estrada to remain with him for sixteen days. 
 The Consul explained his action as follows : ' ' The old 
 General could not get across the river without great 
 danger, and I thought it an act of humanity to protect 
 him. I have refused others protection but I deemed 
 his case a very meritorious one. I hope and trust that 
 I did not commit a great wrong." (Ibid, p. 789.) 
 
 In reply, Mr. Carr, writing for Secretary Bryan, 
 instructed the Consul as follows: " While the Depart- 
 ment is not inclined to disapprove your action under 
 the circumstances as you explain them, it is not en- 
 tirely clear that it was necessary for such protection to 
 be extended over so long a period of time, especially 
 in view of the proximity of the international border. 
 
 "In this connection it seems pertinent to invite 
 your attention to the Department's standing instruc- 
 tions that, while indisposed to direct its representa-
 
 254 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 tives to deny temporary shelter to any person whose 
 life may be immediately threatened, this government 
 does not sanction the usage of asylum and enjoins upon 
 its representatives the avoidance of all pretexts for its 
 exercise. 
 
 "Your action therefore in similar cases which may 
 arise in the future should be limited to the affording 
 of protection only when it appears to be absolutely nec- 
 essary for the preservation of life 11 and should be in 
 the nature of temporary refuge. It should be distinctly 
 understood that the protection extended should be 
 strictly limited as indicated, and that no promise of 
 shelter should be given in advance of an emergency 
 seeming to call therefor." (Foreign Kelations, 1913, 
 p. 796-7.) 
 
 If any further evidence were needed conclusively to 
 demonstrate the existence in certain states of South 
 America of a well recognized practice of granting 
 asylum in the case of political refugees, we might give 
 the incident of President Leguia, of Peru, who was 
 deposed by a revolution. In his dispatch of July 27, 
 1913, the American Minister reported that President 
 Leguia, whose residence was attacked by a mob 
 "asked for and was offered asylum at the legation in 
 protection of innocent human life, if he could make his 
 escape." But the President and his son were arrested 
 and placed in the penitentiary. Secretary Bryan on 
 August 4, 1913, instructed the American Minister to 
 "leave undone nothing" he could properly do to save 
 the lives of the President and his son and the Vice- 
 President. 
 
 The American Minister's report of July 31 gives the 
 following information: "Vice-President Leguia [a 
 brother of the President] has been given asylum by the 
 
 "It will be noticed that Mr. Carr has dropped the limitation 
 that the life saved should be "innocent."
 
 HUMANITARIAN ASYLUM 255 
 
 Italian Minister, who informed the Foreign Office on 
 July 26 of the rumored attempt on the life of ex-Presi- 
 dent Leguia, who is still a prisoner. The representa- 
 tions of the Italian Minister were supported by the 
 British and Brazilian Ministers and my own, asking 
 for an ample guard. The Under Secretary of State 
 assured me later that he had communicated these rep- 
 resentations to the President." (Foreign Relations, 
 1913, p. 1142.) 
 
 On August 10, ex-President Leguia was permitted to 
 sail with his son for Panama. In his dispatch of Au- 
 gust 19, the American Minister reported as follows to 
 the Secretary of State regarding the asylum which had 
 been granted by the representatives of Italy and 
 France : 
 
 "I have been favored by the Italian Minister with 
 a copy of his note addressed to the Foreign Office, dated 
 July 25, 1913, informing the Peruvian Government 
 that Vice-President Roberto Leguia had taken refuge, 
 and been given asylum, in that Legation on that 
 day. It will be noted that such asylum was sought the 
 same night on which the residence of the former Presi- 
 dent was attacked. The French Minister also informed 
 me that another brother, Carlos Leguia, Vice-Presi- 
 dent of the Senate, had asked for, and been offered 
 asylum in the French Legation, provided he found 
 that the necessity therefor should exist. 
 
 "The Peruvian Foreign Office replied to the Italian 
 Minister on July 29 stating that no order for the ar- 
 rest of the Sefior Leguia in question had been issued. 
 It was then that the latter left the Italian Legation. 
 I have learned that the Italian Minister, in addition to 
 writing the Foreign Office, personally asked for and was 
 furnished a guard of half a dozen soldiers, who were 
 placed within the Legation residence.
 
 256 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 "I have sought this information because it will pre- 
 serve written evidence of the recognition by the Peru- 
 vian Government of the right of a political refugee 
 to seek and be accorded asylum in the legation of a 
 foreign country, which may prove of value in the fu- 
 ture and serve as a precedent." (Foreign Relations, 
 1913, p. 1145.) 
 
 In many of the instances in which fugitives have 
 been received in legations and consulates to save their 
 lives from mob violence, the action taken was not 
 necessarily opposed to the will of the de facto gov- 
 ernment, but it is sometimes hard to draw the line be- 
 tween mob violence and revolutionary activity. 
 
 It cannot be denied that political asylum in legations 
 and warships is a form of humanitarian intervention 
 which easily opens the door to interference in the 
 political affairs of the state. It is hard to separate 
 political offences from ordinary crimes, and this often 
 leads to friction between the local authorities and the 
 foreign official who has taken the fugitive under his 
 protection. 12 
 
 12 Millard's Review, in its number of August 21, 1920, dis- 
 cussing the Presidential Mandate for the arrest of the Anfu 
 leaders, states that nine out of the 10 leaders were in the Jap- 
 anese Legation at Peking, and quotes the French daily paper 
 of Peking as having called the place in which they were living 
 the "Hotel Obata." (Millard's Review, Aug. 21, 1920, p. 
 625.) 
 
 The same Review, in a later number, (September 18, 1920, 
 page 112) carries a picture reproducing a cartoon by a Rus- 
 sian artist in Shanghai, showing the "Chinese Anfu 'traitors' 
 in their present role as 'guests' of the Japanese Legation in 
 Peking. ' ' Over this illustration, there is the title ' ' Mr. Obata 's 
 Anfu guests." 
 
 Japanese conduct is criticized in an article too long for us 
 to quote in full. It is stated that Mr. Obata, Japanese Minister 
 to China, having learned that the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 intended to ask for the extradition of the Anfu leaders on the 
 ground that they were not political offenders, and that they
 
 FOREIGN COMMERCE 257 
 
 As soon as any state demonstrates its capacity to 
 fulfil all the obligations of international law, and to 
 preserve throughout its territory a reasonable respect 
 for law and property, it will acquire the confidence of 
 other states. We may expect that in the course of 
 time, humanitarian asylum will disappear from Latin 
 America as completely as it has vanished from Europe. 
 
 As yet, however, the most powerful and civilized 
 states have not considered that this form of interven- 
 tion can be abolished in the case of those less civilized 
 states where revolutions are frequent and the ensuing 
 executions and cruelties constitute a reproach not only 
 to the participants, but also to those who refuse to in- 
 tervene to help the victims. 
 
 8(g). FOREIGN COMMERCE 
 
 There is still another field of application for humani- 
 tarian intervention, which relates to the commerce of 
 other states and it is therefore of considerable impor- 
 tance. Action of this kind gives rise to questions of 
 great delicacy, and necessitates the closest juridical 
 
 had committed criminal offenses, sent to the Minister of For- 
 eign Affairs, under date of August 27th, the following note : 
 
 "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Ex- 
 cellency's note, dated August 22, replying to my note of 
 August 9, on the subject of Mr. Hsu Shu-Cheng and others 
 who are in the Imperial Legation Guard Compound. 
 
 ' ' In that note it is stated that your government is unable to 
 accede to the contents of my previous note and that you will 
 make further communication to me based upon judicial evi- 
 dences. 
 
 ' ' I now have the honor to state in reply that in view of the 
 facts that the Presidential Mandate looking to the arrest of 
 the individuals in question was issued on political grounds, 
 and that this legation is giving them refuge as political offend- 
 ers, I shall not be in a position to comply with the request of 
 extradition, irrespective of any criminal offences with which 
 they may be charged." (Ibid, p. 112-113.) 
 17
 
 258 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 reasoning. We find three forms of application, name- 
 ly: Eegulation of Foreign Shipping ; Denial of Trans- 
 it; Prohibition of Entry. 
 
 EEGULATION OF FOREIGN SHIPPING 
 
 Certain legislative enactments undertake to compel 
 foreign states to adopt for their vessels regulations 
 which will protect the lives of passengers and guaran- 
 tee the humane treatment of all seamen. 
 
 The manner in which this humanitarian object has 
 been achieved is well illustrated in the case of the 
 Plimpsoll Act, by which Great Britain undertook to 
 penalize vessels entering or leaving her ports loaded 
 beyond the point of safety. 13 
 
 As finally enacted, 24 of the Merchant Ship Act, 
 1876, reads as follows: 
 
 "After the first day of November, one thousand 
 eight hundred and seventy-six, if a ship, British or 
 foreign, arrives between the last day of October and 
 the sixteenth day of April in any year at any port in 
 the United Kingdom from any port out of the United 
 Kingdom, carrying as deck cargo, that is to say, in any 
 uncovered space upon deck, or in any covered space 
 not included in the cubical contents forming the ship 's 
 registered tonnage, any wood goods coming within the 
 
 following descriptions the master of the ship, and 
 
 also the owner, if he is privy to the offense, shall be 
 liable to a penalty not exceeding five pounds for every 
 hundred cubic feet of wood goods carried in contra- 
 vention of this section, and such penalty may be re- 
 covered by action or on indictment or to an amount not 
 exceeding one hundred pounds (whatever may be the 
 
 13 For a concise account of this legislation, see Stowell and 
 Munro : International Cases, vol. I, p. 439-445. We have bor- 
 rowed a few extracts from this account.
 
 FOREIGN COMMERCE 259 
 
 maximum penalty recoverable) on summary convic- 
 tion." (English Law Reports (1876), Statutes, vol. 
 XI, pp. 502-03.) 
 
 When this provision of the Act of 1876 was called to 
 the attention of the United States, "The Department 
 of State," to borrow the words of Professor J. B. 
 Moore, "replied that, as attention was thus particu- 
 larly called to the questions under section 24, it seemed 
 proper to state that the right to impose penalties on 
 the master or owner of an American vessel, sailing 
 from a port of the United States, for the manner in 
 which the cargo was laden or stored, was of so doubt- 
 ful a character that, however wise or beneficent the 
 intent of the act might be, the Government of the 
 United States 'cannot but invite the attention of Her 
 Majesty's Government particularly thereto, before 
 further steps are taken in Great Britain to enforce 
 obedience to the law in these particular cases, and be- 
 fore any steps be taken toward the enforcement of fines 
 in these or similar cases. ' 
 
 "The representations of the United States 'appear 
 to have received the careful attention of the Govern- 
 ment of Great Britain, and toward the close of the year 
 1877, the minister of the United States at London re- 
 ceived a note from Lord Derby, justifying the provis- 
 ions of the act adverted to, which had been specially 
 made the subject of complaint, as not inconsistent with 
 the principles of international law, or with the practice 
 of nations in such matters/ and expressing the hope 
 that the United States would 'yield the provisions of 
 the act mentioned a friendly support, by enjoining its 
 observance on the part of American shippers and own- 
 ers of vessels, in the interest of humanity/ The sub- 
 ject thereafter 'failed to become one of special action 
 on the part of the United States.' " (Moore's Inter- 
 national Law Digest, Vol. II, 204, p. 282-3.)
 
 260 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 The Act of 1876 was consolidated without modifica- 
 tion in 1894, and Parliament in 1906 passed an act 
 amending the Merchant Shipping Acts by the addition, 
 amongst others, of several provisions affecting foreign 
 shipping. The British loadline provisions were made 
 to apply to foreign ships "while they are within any 
 port of the United Kingdom, ' ' the power to detain un- 
 safe ships of foreign nationality was extended to in- 
 clude cases of defective equipment, and power was 
 given to apply rules as to life-saving appliances to for- 
 eign ships "provided that His Majesty may by Order 
 in Council direct that these provisions shall not apply 
 to any ship of a foreign country in which the provisions 
 in force relating to life-saving appliances appear to 
 His Majesty to be as effective as the provisions of Part 
 V of the principal act, on proof that these provisions 
 were complied with in the case of that ship." (Stat- 
 utes (1905-06), pp. 248-49.) But the most significant 
 extension of jurisdiction in 1906 was that laid down in 
 the section relating to foreign ships carrying cargoes 
 of grain, as follows : 
 
 "If after the first day of October, one thousand nine 
 hundred and seven, a foreign ship laden with grain 
 cargo arrives at any port in the United Kingdom hav- 
 ing the grain cargo so loaded that the master of the 
 ship, if the ship were a British ship, would be liable to 
 a penalty under the provisions of Part V of the princi- 
 pal act relating to the carriage of grain, the master of 
 that foreign ship shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 
 three hundred pounds. 14 (Statutes (1905-06), p. 248. 
 The two preceding paragraphs are copied from Stowell 
 and Munro's Cases, vol. I, p. 442-3.) 
 
 "From the testimony of the President of the American Sea- 
 men's Union, Mr. Andrew Furuseth, given before the Senate 
 Committee, we take the following extract : 
 
 "MB. FURUSETH. I want to call attention to this : That one 
 of the things that was advocated by some of the members sit-
 
 FOREIGN COMMERCE 261 
 
 The Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915, popularly known 
 as the La Follette Act, contains several provisions 
 which like the British Acts above referred to, exercise 
 by means of penalties imposed within American juris- 
 diction a certain control over foreign vessels, even 
 when they are outside of American waters. Section 
 13 of the Act in part provides : 
 
 "That no vessel of one hundred tons gross and up- 
 ward, except those navigating rivers exclusively and 
 the smaller inland lakes and except as provided in sec- 
 tion one of this Act, shall be permitted to depart from 
 any port of the United States unless she has on board 
 a crew not less than seventy-five per centum of which, 
 in each department thereof, are able to understand 
 any order given by the officers of such vessel, nor un- 
 less forty per centum in the first year, forty-five per 
 
 ting on the commission of 1906, the report of which you have, 
 was that the laws (British) governing English seamen should 
 be made applicable to foreign vessels. 
 
 "SENATOR BURTON. I noticed that. They would not agree 
 with the conclusions unless they were made applicable to for- 
 eign ships. 
 
 "MR. FURUSETH. Exactly. As a matter of fact, the laws 
 dealing with deck load, the laws dealing with freeboard, the 
 laws dealing with everything that has to do with safety of life 
 among passengers, and . . . among the employees, . . . apply to 
 foreign seamen in foreign vessels while in English ports. 
 Thus, if an American vessel is lying in a port of England and 
 one man gets hurt, he can sue the American vessel in the Eng- 
 lish court under the British compensation act now, . . . and 
 Parliament gave to the board of trade definite authority to 
 detain vessels that were undermanned or unseaworthy by rea- 
 son of being undermanned, and they exercise that authority 
 not only over native vessels, English vessels, but they exercise 
 it over foreign vessels . . . Here is a circular issued by the board 
 of trade to the boarding officers, giving them instructions how 
 the vessels must be manned as a minimum." (Synopsis of 
 Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee of Com- 
 merce of the Senate relative to involuntary servitude imposed 
 upon seamen, p. 43.)
 
 262 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 centum in the second year, fifty per centum in the third 
 year, fifty-five per centum in the fourth year after the 
 passage of this Act, and thereafter sixty-five per cen- 
 tum of her deck crew, exclusive of licensed officers and 
 apprentices, are of a rating not less than able seamen. ' ' 
 (Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915, Sec. 13.) 
 
 Further along the same section provides : ' * The col- 
 lector of customs may, upon his own motion, and shall, 
 upon the sworn information of any reputable citizen 
 of the United States setting forth that this section is 
 not being complied with, cause a muster of the crew 
 of any vessel to be made to determine the fact ; and no 
 clearance shall be given to any vessel failing to comply 
 with the provisions of this section:" 
 
 Section 14 of the Seamen's Act in part provides: 
 "That foreign vessels leaving ports of the United 
 States shall comply with the rules herein prescribed as 
 to life-saving appliances, their equipment, and the 
 manning of same." Then follows a detailed set of 
 regulations specifying the type and number of the 
 life-saving appliances, etc. Detailed regulations are 
 also set out in regard to the qualifications and number 
 of men for the manning of the boats, muster rolls and 
 drills, and the duties assigned by the muster list to the 
 different members of the crew are carefully specified. 
 
 "Before the vessel sails," declares the Act in this 
 same section, "the muster list shall be drawn up and 
 exhibited, and the proper authority, to be designated 
 by the Secretary of Commerce, shall be satisfied that 
 the muster list has been prepared for the vessel. It 
 shall be posted in several parts of the vessel, and in 
 particular in the crew's quarters." 
 
 The owner of any vessel who neglects or refuses to 
 provide and equip his vessel with the lifeboats, etc., 
 as specified in the Act, is subjected to a fine, as is 
 "... every master of a vessel who shall fail to comply
 
 FOREIGN COMMERCE 263 
 
 with the requirements of this section, and the regula- 
 tions of the Board of Supervising Inspectors, approved 
 by the Secretary of Commerce, authorized by and made 
 pursuant hereto." (Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915, 
 14.) 
 
 In so far as these regulations are reasonably neces- 
 sary to provide for the security of international pas- 
 senger travel, the United States is justified by the 
 principles of humanitarian intervention, which we have 
 above discussed, in using its sovereign authority over 
 foreign vessels temporarily sojourning in the harbors 
 of the United States to compel a compliance with them, 
 and it will not be a valid objection in international law 
 that the United States does in effect so use its sov- 
 ereign authority to regulate the action of the vessels in 
 question, even when they are without the jurisdiction 
 of the United States and upon the high seas. 
 
 The United States would be amply justified in re- 
 fusing entry to any and all foreign vessels failing to 
 regulate their commerce so as to provide for the securi- 
 ty and humane treatment of passengers and crew. It 
 is evident that the same result may be obtained by a 
 less drastic method of penalizing, while within the 
 jurisdiction of the United States, those foreign vessels 
 that fail to make reasonable provision for the security 
 and humane treatment of passengers and crew. 
 
 Section 16 of the Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915, 
 applies to the arrest and imprisonment of officers and 
 seamen deserting from merchant vessels. It reads as 
 follows : 
 
 "That in the judgment of Congress articles in trea- 
 ties and conventions of the United States, in so far as 
 they provide for the arrest and imprisonment of of- 
 ficers and seamen deserting or charged with desertion 
 from merchant vessels of the United States in foreign 
 countries, and for the arrest and imprisonment of of-
 
 264 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 fleers and seamen deserting or charged with desertion 
 from merchant vessels of foreign nations in the United 
 States and the Territories and possessions thereof, and 
 for the cooperation, aid, and protection of competent 
 legal authorities in effecting such arrest or imprison- 
 ment and any other treaty provision in conflict with 
 the provisions of this Act, ought to be terminated, and 
 to this end the President be, and he is hereby, request- 
 ed and directed, within ninety days after the passage 
 of this Act, to give notice to the several governments, 
 respectively, that so much as hereinbefore described 
 of all such treaties and conventions between the United 
 States and foreign governments will terminate on the 
 expiration of such periods after notices have been 
 given as may be required in such treaties and conven- 
 tions." (Act of March 4, 1915, 16.) 
 
 The testimony of Mr. Andrew Furuseth, President of 
 the Seamen's Union of America, describes the pur- 
 poses of this provision as follows : 
 
 " . . .Giving the foreign shipowner the right to ship 
 his men, as he unquestionably has in his own port, to 
 come here, and then giving him the right to use the 
 machinery of the American police and courts to compel 
 the performance of a contract to labor, you are giving 
 to the foreign shipowner a privilege you have refused 
 to your own citizens long ago, and by so doing you are 
 putting a preferential against American shipping. 
 That has been the situation in the past, and if it is per- 
 mitted to go on will be sufficient in the future to make 
 any competition with the foreign shipowner in the 
 actual ocean trade impossible. If you apply the true 
 American principles of equal freedom, if you apply the 
 system of free soil, making free men, which the Su- 
 preme Court, in all probability, would apply if it were 
 taken to it to-day ; if you accepted that proposition and 
 that idea, and carried it out, and made the law, as you
 
 FOREIGN COMMERCE 265 
 
 make it here, applicable to foreign seamen while under 
 the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States, he 
 will have to pay as much for his seamen as you will 
 have to pay for your seamen, and all the discrimination 
 against the American shipowner will fall away. 
 
 "But it will go further than that. A vessel coming 
 from Europe and staying in New York three days will, 
 in order to secure herself, pay about the New York 
 wages from the European port from which she goes. 
 Who is hurt? The foreign shipowner? Yes. Why is 
 he hurt? He is hurt in something he had no right to. 
 He had no right to a specific privilege over the Ameri- 
 can shipowner in taking cargoes or passengers out an 
 American port; and we believe and our belief is 
 based on years of experience that this will equalize 
 the cost of operation and will do a little more than that, 
 because the foreign shipowner whose ship is in the 
 United States has his ship in a foreign port, while the 
 American shipowner has his ship in the home port, and 
 any shipowner will tell you that it costs more to do it 
 in a foreign port than in the home port where it is 
 under his own supervision." (Extract from the testi- 
 mony given by Mr. Furuseth in Synopsis of Hearing 
 before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Com- 
 merce of the United States Senate relative to involun- 
 tary servitude imposed on seamen, p. 5.) 
 
 Speaking at the same hearing in opposition, Mr. 
 Robert Dollar, President of the Dollar Steamship Co. 
 of San Francisco, said : " . . . Gentlemen, do you under- 
 stand thoroughly what this means ? It means that any 
 contract that a sailor may make in a foreign country 
 is abrogated when he comes here. It is a provision for 
 a breach of contract by any sailor coming to this coun- 
 try. . .Representing over 3,000 merchants of the Cham- 
 ber of Commerce of San Francisco, who are not in- 
 terested in shipping, I protest against the passage of
 
 266 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 this clause. Outside of the trouble of changing some 
 21 treaties, causing ill feeling between foreign nations 
 and ourselves, it will seriously affect the carrying of 
 our products by materially increasing the rate of 
 freight and causing the dear American public to foot 
 the bill, as we will have to depend on foreign ships to 
 move our products in the foreign trade for many years 
 to come." (Ibid, p. 5-6.) 
 
 It was formerly recognized by all of the nations that 
 they were obligated, even in the absence of treaty 
 stipulations, to cooperate for the arrest and detention 
 of deserting seamen. During the Revolutionary Wars, 
 when Great Britain was engaged in conflict with 
 France, there was much friction between the United 
 States and Great Britain because of the refuge which 
 their deserting seamen found in our ports. The United 
 States contended that in the absence of a treaty they 
 were not bound to deliver over the deserters. 15 
 
 The practical importance of the view expressed by 
 the United States was lessened by the numerous trea- 
 ties in which the obligation to deliver deserting sea- 
 men was included, but the enforcement of the Act of 
 March 4, 1915, will put an end henceforth to the cooper- 
 ation of the United States in this matter, since it di- 
 rects the President to abrogate conflicting articles of 
 treaties (see 16 above.) 16 It would, however, appear 
 that President Wilson did not comply with the pro- 
 visions of the Act relative to the abrogation of the 
 articles of the treaties in question." 
 
 15 See Moore's Digest, vol. IV, 622, p. 417f. 
 
 "Congress, by the Act of December 2, 1898, repealed the law 
 that authorized the arrest of deserters from vessels of the 
 United States in the ports of the country. (Moore's Digest, 
 vol. II, p. 418.) 
 
 17 It has been stated that President Wilson's objection was 
 based upon the ground that it was not competent for Congress 
 to advise the executive to give notice of the abrogation of 
 separate articles of a treaty.
 
 FOREIGN COMMERCE 267 
 
 As indicated by the testimony of Mr. Andrew Furus- 
 eth, President of the organization which was most in- 
 fluential in securing the adoption of this legislation, 
 one of the purposes of the application of Section 16 of 
 the Act to foreign vessels is to force the payment to 
 foreign seamen of a scale of wages sufficiently high to 
 prevent them from deserting when they reach the ports 
 of the United States. 18 
 
 It is a question open to serious doubt whether the 
 United States has a right to use its sovereign power 
 for such a purpose. It must, however, be borne in mind 
 that this section of the Act has the declared purpose of 
 
 18 In an interview which I had Mr. Andrew Furuseth, 
 relative to the purpose of this legislation which he had been so 
 instrumental in securing, the President of the American Sea- 
 men's Union repudiated absolutely any belief in the right of 
 a state under international law to intervene in the affairs of 
 another. It was his opinion, based evidently upon a wide 
 reading and study of the authorities, that every state has 
 within its own jurisdiction, including therein its ports and 
 harbors, the right by virtue of its sovereignty to impose what- 
 ever regulations it may judge best, except in so far as this 
 liberty of action may have been restricted by treaties. This 
 was the opinion expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in the 
 case of The Exchange (7 Cranch, 136) , in which he said : 
 
 ' ' The jurisdiction of the nation is necessarily exclusive and 
 absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by 
 itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an 
 external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty 
 to the extent of the restriction and an investment of that sov- 
 ereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose 
 such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and 
 complete power of a nation within its own territories must be 
 traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow 
 from no other legitimate source. ' ' ( Quoted in Moore 's Digest 
 of International Law, vol. II, p. 308.) 
 
 Nevertheless, I have no doubt that humanitarian interven- 
 tion will later be appealed to by organizations similar to the 
 Seamen's Union when they perceive that the doctrine that 
 every state may do what it chooses in its own territory can 
 no longer be maintained. The theory of absolute sovereignty
 
 268 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 putting an end, within American jurisdiction, to the 
 arrest of deserting seamen. If it be established that 
 the detention and arrest of deserting seamen is no 
 longer in accord with the prevalent sentiments of hu- 
 manity, upon this basis, the United States would find 
 a justification for refusing its cooperation. In such 
 an instance as this, where the United States is called 
 upon to arrest individuals and to deliver them by force 
 over to their foreign employers, there can be little 
 doubt that the opinion of the United States itself in 
 regard to the reasonableness of the use it has made of 
 its sovereign power should be presumed to be correct. 
 Nevertheless, it is evident that this refusal of cooper- 
 ation will have a serious effect upon any foreign vessel 
 which touches, even occasionally, at an American port, 
 and that the foreign nations might have some cause for 
 protest on the ground that it constituted a departure 
 from the ancient and generally recognized procedure 
 of all states. 19 
 
 is refuted by the statement of Mr. Root, in the Proceedings 
 of the American Society of International Law of April 27, 
 1918, p. 18-19. Cf. also discussion above under 7 and below 
 under 9. Some other indications of this principle of the 
 limitation which international law places upon sovereignty in 
 this matter of the jurisdiction over shipping will be found in 
 Moore's Digest of International Law, vol. II, p. 273, 274, 277, 
 287, 290, 295, 353-4. The exemption from the local law of 
 vessels that are driven into foreign ports by distress is another 
 limitation which international law places upon the absolute 
 control of the sovereign. (See Moore's Digest, vol. II, 208, 
 p. 339f.) 
 
 19 It may be argued that the extradition and delivery of sea- 
 men is, in the United States, based upon treaty stipulations, 
 but even so, the generally recognized obligation of cooperation 
 for the delivery of deserting seamen, and the difficulties which 
 a refusal of this cooperation will cause, might be said to lay 
 upon the United States the obligation to fulfil this duty by 
 negotiating treaties containing the appropriate provisions.
 
 FOEEIGN COMMERCE 269 
 
 Dana, in a note to Wheaton, defines with precision 
 the limitation which international law places upon the 
 exercise of jurisdiction over foreign merchant vessels. 
 He says: ''The state of international law on the sub- 
 ject of private vessels in foreign ports. . .may be said 
 to be this : So far as regards acts done at sea before 
 her arrival in port, and acts done on board in port, by 
 members of the crew to one another, and so far as re- 
 gards the general regulation of the rights and duties 
 of those belonging on board, the vessel is exempt from 
 local jurisdiction; but, if the acts done on board af- 
 fect the peace of the country in whose port she lies, or 
 the persons or property of its subjects, to that extent 
 that state has jurisdiction. The local authorities have 
 a right to visit all such vessels, to ascertain the nature 
 of any alleged occurrence on board. Of course, no 
 exemption is ever claimed for injuries done by the ves- 
 sel to property or persons in port, or for acts of her 
 company not done on board the vessel, or for their per- 
 sonal contracts or civil obligations or duties relating 
 to persons not of the ship's company. 20 (Richard H. 
 Dana's edition of Wheaton, 95, note 58; quoted in 
 Moore's Digest of International Law, vol. II, p. 297-8.) 
 
 20 The provisions of the Act of June 26, 1884, which pro- 
 hibited the prepayment of seamen hired in American ports 
 was applied to foreign vessels. This was evidently a proper 
 matter for the local authority to regulate, and did not control 
 the foreign vessel when without the port and jurisdiction of 
 the United States. (See Moore's Digest of International Law, 
 vol. II, p. 307-310.) 
 
 In the case of the Strathearn Steamship Company, Limited, 
 v. Dillon, (252 U. S. ; printed in American Journal of Inter- 
 national Law, July, 1921), the Supreme Court of the United 
 States upheld the constitutionality of section 4 of the Seamen 's 
 Act of March 4, 1915. Mr. Justice Day, speaking for the 
 court, said in the course of his opinion delivered March 29, 
 1920: "Upon the authority of that case [Patterson v. Bark 
 Eudora, 190 U. S. 169], and others cited in the opinion therein,
 
 270 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 DENIAL OF TRANSIT 
 
 From the New York Times of July 7, 1921, we quote 
 the following Washington dispatch: 
 
 "Despite diplomatic protest, Attorney General 
 Daugherty has upheld the ruling of his predecessor 
 that alcoholic liquors cannot be transported across ter- 
 ritory of the United States in transit from one foreign 
 country to another. The opinion was sent to the Cus- 
 toms Division of the Treasury to-day, and a conference 
 of custom officials was held to determine methods of 
 enforcing it. 
 
 "Protests against this interpretation of the prohi- 
 bition amendment and enforcement law were filed some 
 months ago by the British Embassy in behalf of Cana- 
 dian citizens and by the Italian Embassy after At- 
 torney General Palmer had rendered an opinion on 
 February 4th that such transit of liquor was unlawful. 
 In view of the diplomatic representations following the 
 change of Administration, the case was reopened and 
 hearings held at the Department of Justice. 
 
 "Considerable study of customs regulations and 
 practices will be entailed by the decision, it was said, 
 since other commodities moving through the same 
 traffic lanes are not objectionable [unobjectionable] 
 under the laws of the United States." 
 
 An examination of the opinion of February 4, 1921, 
 above referred to will show that the acting Attorney 
 General did not consider the question of in how far it 
 was the intention and the right of Congress to deny 
 transit to certain articles. The text of the opinion as 
 
 we have no doubt as to the authority of Congress to pass a 
 statute of this sort, applicable to foreign vessels in our ports 
 and controlling the employment and payment of seamen as a 
 condition of the right of such foreign vessels to enter and 
 use the ports of the United States."
 
 FOREIGN COMMERCE 271 
 
 communicated by Acting Attorney General Frank K. 
 Nebeker to the Secretary of the Treasury, was as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 ' ' Sir : This will acknowledge receipt of your request 
 for an opinion as to whether the Eighteenth Amend- 
 ment to the Constitution and the National Prohibition 
 Act prohibit or affect in any way * in transit ' shipments 
 of liquor for beverage purposes touching at the ports 
 of or moving through the United States when originat- 
 ing in and destined to foreign countries under the pro- 
 visions of section 3005 of the Revised Statutes as 
 amended by the Act of May 21, 1900 (31 Stat. 181). 
 
 "Section 3005, Revised Statutes, as amended is as 
 follows : 
 
 " 'All merchandise arriving at any port of the 
 United States destined for any foreign country may be 
 entered at the custom-house, and conveyed, in transit, 
 through the territory of the United States, without the 
 payment of duties, under such regulations as to ex- 
 amination and transportation as the Secretary of the 
 Treasury may prescribe. ' 
 
 " Section 3 of Title II of the National Prohibition 
 Act (41 Stat. 308) provides: 
 
 " 'No person shall on or after the date when the 
 eighteenth amendment to the Constitution of the 
 United States goes into effect, manufacture, sell, bar- 
 ter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish or pos- 
 sess any intoxicating liquor except as authorized in 
 this Act . . . ' 
 
 "By virtue of this provision any and all dealings in 
 intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes within the 
 jurisdiction of the United States are prohibited, except 
 in so far as authority therefor may be found elsewhere 
 in the Act. Nowhere therein is transportation for bev- 
 erage purposes authorized; except that the prohi- 
 bitions of section 20 of Title III (41 Stat. 322), which
 
 272 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 prohibits the importation or introduction into and the 
 manufacture, sale, transportation, etc., within the 
 Canal Zone, are made inapplicable to liquor in transit 
 through the Panama Canal or on the Panama Railroad. 
 By expressly excepting transportation through the 
 Panama Canal and on the Panama Railroad it is to be 
 assumed that Congress intended that transportation 
 elsewhere should be prohibited. 
 
 "By virtue of section 33 of Title II (41 Stat. 317), 
 the possession of liquor for beverage purposes is per- 
 mitted in the home, provided same is for the personal 
 consumption only of the owner thereof and his family 
 and bona fide guests. No other possession for bever- 
 age purposes being authorized, no other possession is 
 lawful. 
 
 ' ' In the absence of express authorization, in order to 
 arrive at the conclusion that liquor for beverage pur- 
 poses arriving at any port of the United States des- 
 tined for any foreign country may be entered at the 
 customhouse and conveyed, in transit, through the ter- 
 ritory of the United States, it would be necessary to 
 hold either that such liquor while in transit is neither 
 possessed nor transported within the United States, 
 or that the Prohibition Act does not apply to liquor 
 not intended for beverage consumption within the 
 United States. Neither of these positions is tenable. 
 The word transport as used in the Act must be pre- 
 sumed to have its usual meaning, viz, to carry or to 
 convey from one place to another, the taking up of 
 persons or property at some point and putting them 
 down at another (Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsyl- 
 vania, 114 U. S. 196) ; and whether the possession dur- 
 ing transportation be in the carrier (which I think it 
 is) or in the owner, both transportation and possession 
 are within the territory of the United States. In the 
 second place the Act is not in terms limited to liquor
 
 FOBEIGN COMMERCE 273 
 
 intended for beverage purposes within the United 
 States. By section 1 of Title II (41 Stat. 307) liquor' 
 and 'intoxicating liquor' are defined to include any 
 liquors containing over one-half of one per cent of 
 alcohol by volume which are fit for beverage purposes ; 
 and by section 2 the manufacture, sale, etc., of such 
 liquors are prohibited except as authorized, regardless 
 of the place where they are intended to be consumed. 
 This is obvious from the prohibition upon their ex- 
 portation. 
 
 " Having arrived at the conclusion that liquor in 
 transit through the United States would be both trans- 
 ported and possessed in violation of the National Pro- 
 hibition Act, it is not necessary for the purposes of this 
 opinion to determine whether the procedure estab- 
 lished by section 3005, Revised Statutes, would involve 
 either prohibited importation or exportation. 
 
 1 'The National Prohibition Act applies to all the 
 territory of the United States that is not otherwise ex- 
 cepted from its operation, and extends to all waters 
 within its territorial limits, including a marine league 
 from the shore ; within those waters the manufacture, 
 sale, transportation, possession, etc., is prohibited. 
 
 "My conclusion therefore is that the provisions of 
 section 3005, Revised Statutes, do not apply to intoxi- 
 cating liquors for beverage purposes, and that the 
 National Prohibition Act prohibits 'in transit' ship- 
 ments of such liquors touching at the ports of or mov- 
 ing through the United States, though same originate 
 in and are destined to foreign countries." (Opinions 
 of Attorneys General, Vol. 32, p. 419-422.) 
 
 PROHIBITION OF ENTRY 
 
 In the cases arising from the enforcement of the 
 Eighteenth [Prohibition] Amendment upon foreign 
 
 18
 
 274 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 vessels within the territorial waters of the United 
 States, prohibition of entry has been interwoven with 
 the matter of transit, as is shown by the following 
 Washington dispatch printed in the New York Times 
 of July 14, 1921: 
 
 "Protests against enforcement by customs officials 
 of a section of the Volstead Prohibition Enforcement 
 act which subjects to seizure foreign vessels coming 
 within the three-mile limit with liquor aboard are 
 reaching the State Department. Inquiries have come 
 also from various embassies and legations, which in- 
 dicate that foreign Governments are becoming con- 
 cerned at threatened interference with their shipping. 
 
 "It is pointed out that a British ship bound from 
 Halifax to Jamaica could not put into any American 
 port for fuel or supplies without risk of seizure if she 
 carried spirits in her cargo, under the construction 
 which has been given to the law by the recent decision 
 of Attorney General Daugherty, affirming an opinion 
 of his predecessor. 
 
 "Furthermore it is expected by the shipping inter- 
 ests that another opinion, withdrawing the present 
 privilege of sealing up the bar supplies on the ocean 
 liners within the three-mile limit, is coming, in which 
 case these vessels also would be subject to seizure if 
 they carried liquors for the use of passengers. 
 
 "Finding that the State Department can do nothing 
 in the matter, shipping representatives are now direct- 
 ing their inquiries to the Treasury and Department of 
 Justice. It is understood that they are seeking a stay 
 in the execution of the new orders to permit a test case 
 in the courts. ' m 
 
 21 The distinct question of the right to police marginal waters 
 beyond the three-mile limit when necessary to prevent smug-
 
 FOREIGN COMMERCE 275 
 
 The New York Times of August 5, prints a special 
 report from Washington which contains the following 
 statement: "It was learned at the Department of 
 Justice that there, is an understanding among the Fed- 
 eral District Attorneys in coast cities that there will be 
 no interference with liquor-carrying ships until the set 
 case brought at the instance of the Cunard Line has 
 been settled. This case concerns the question of * liquor 
 in transit,' in other words the right of a ship to touch 
 at an American port if her bar is sealed when she 
 enters the three-mile limit. The Department of Jus- 
 tice will aid the expedition of this suit and will throw 
 no legal obstacles in the way of its completion, instead 
 endeavoring to bring it to a conclusion as soon as pos- 
 sible." 
 
 gling is involved in the recent (Aug. 1, 1921), seizure of the 
 British schooner, the Henry L. Marshall, outside the three- 
 mile limit in the vicinity of Atlantic City. 
 
 This schooner, according to the account in the New York 
 Times, Aug 3, 1921, made a practice of lying outside the three- 
 mile limit and selling liquor to purchasers who came out in 
 motor boats. The captain, Eris Anderson, was reported as 
 having boasted that ' ' these Federal men can 't do anything to 
 me but make it uncomfortable. ' ' Captain Anderson was also 
 quoted "as having admitted making a prior trip to Montauk 
 Point with a cargo of liquor. On this trip he had 2,000 cases 
 of liquor he was said to have sold to visitors. ' ' 
 
 According to the Times, Assistant United States District 
 Attorney Clark said: 
 
 " It is our position that we have a right to seize a vessel out- 
 side of the three-mile limit if there is evidence of a conspiracy 
 to violate our customs laws and the Volstead act. While the 
 actual sale of liquor outside of the three-mile limit is not in 
 itself illegal, yet if it can be shown that persons from this 
 country go out there to buy contraband then conspiracy has 
 been established. ' ' 
 
 The New York Times of August 5, gives further particulars 
 and states that the members of the crew of the Marshall were 
 held in $5,000 bail.
 
 276 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 The prohibition or restriction, upon humanitarian 
 grounds, of the entry of goods, is alluded to by Staple- 
 ton, who writing in 1866 complains of the action of the 
 British Parliament: 
 
 "By the. Act slave-grown sugar was admitted into 
 English markets on equal terms with sugar produced 
 by free labor. 
 
 ' ' The effect of this has been, as predicted at the time, 
 that most of our West Indian colonies have been 
 ruined: and, as was strongly pressed by the late Sir 
 Robert Peel as a certain result, Cuba and other slave- 
 trading States have carried on the slave trade with 
 previously unexampled vigor, and flourished under its 
 operation." (A. G. Stapleton: Intervention, 1866, p. 
 265-6.) 
 
 In all these instances in which the state has made use 
 of its authority to exclude or to regulate foreign com- 
 merce for the purpose of enforcing regulations of a 
 humanitarian nature, there is evidently danger of a 
 serious conflict between the two States. 
 
 On the one hand the local authority has a right to 
 insist that the rights of aliens and foreign commerce 
 shall not be unreasonably used within its jurisdiction 
 to thwart or prevent the enforcement of all reasonable 
 laws. 
 
 But on the other hand the local authorities should 
 not impose unreasonable conditions upon aliens or 
 shipping temporarily within its jurisdiction. 
 
 Where it is merely a question of preventing the ad- 
 vent of foreigners from interfering with the due en- 
 forcement of the local law, there is usually little diffi- 
 culty in reaching some reasonable interpretation or ad- 
 justment. But when the object of the territorial sov- 
 ereign is to make use of transit or temporary sojourn 
 as a leverage to compel foreigners and foreign ship- 
 ping to modify their own regulations, the act ceases to
 
 POLICE REGULATION 277 
 
 be one of self-defense and sovereignty and becomes 
 virtually either an act of intervention or of interfer- 
 ence. 
 
 Under ordinary circumstances such an act would be 
 an interference which other independent states would 
 not tolerate and it would be corrected by recourse to 
 appropriate measures of retaliation. 
 
 When, however, the purpose is humanitarian, so that 
 the act in question may be defended upon the ground 
 that it is necessary for the protection of the interests of 
 all the states and of mankind in general, the practice of 
 states shows this to be a justification. The question is 
 however new and the limits of the conflicting rights 
 have not as yet been described. 
 
 9. INTERNATIONAL, POLICE REGULATION 22 
 
 The powers which control any society must ever be 
 on the watch to protect it from danger. It is not pos- 
 sible to define exactly beforehand the nature of the 
 
 The various kinds of action which are in the nature of 
 international police, or closely related to it may be classed as 
 follows : 
 
 (1) Action undertaken to compel the observance of the law 
 of nations. It is in this sense that we have used International 
 Police as the heading of this chapter. (For the use of police 
 in this sense see Westlake : Vol. I, p. 317.) 
 
 (2) Action undertaken to prevent the violation by a state 
 of the law when such an occurrence seems likely, especially 
 when the penalties imposed after the commission of the offense 
 are inadequate to protect the interests of society. This is 
 really an extraordinary procedure for the enforcement of the 
 law, just as in our municipal law we have injunction to pre- 
 vent the violation of the law when the court believes that the 
 ordinary remedial processes are inadequate. Hall (Inter- 
 national Law, 4th ed., 95, p. 309 note) calls this "preventive 
 interference. ' ' 
 
 (3) "International Police Regulation," which is closely 
 related to the power of prevention and to every exercise of a 
 police power, is the action of making and enforcing regulations
 
 278 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 peril which may arise. In international, as in national 
 affairs, those in authority must be allowed to exercise a 
 wide discretion over life and property when they be- 
 lieve it necessary for the protection of the common 
 safety. This exercise of discretion is called police 
 
 necessary to prevent future violations. The publication of 
 such regulations gives to all due notice and thereby tends to 
 reduce the inconvenience and arbitrary character of the force 
 which it may subsequently be necessary to employ. 
 
 (4) "Police patrol" or "international police patrol" is the 
 preventive action which one or more states take to forestall 
 and effectively to punish violations of international law by 
 individuals. Such, for example, are the fisheries police of 
 the North Sea (see Paul S. Reinsch: Public International 
 Unions: Ginn and Co., Boston, 1911, p. 62) ; the protection 
 of the submarine cables (Ibid., p. 63) ; African Slave Trade 
 and Liquor Traffic (Ibid., p. 64) ; the repression of the white 
 slave trade (Ibid., p. 64) ; the South American police conven- 
 tion (Ibid., p. 66). 
 
 (5) Action for the purpose of restricting the exercise by a 
 state of certain of the rights it ordinarily enjoys when such 
 liberty is considered dangerous to the safety of all the states. 
 This last is perhaps the most characteristic form of the ex- 
 ercise of police power and is the action in international rela- 
 tions with which we are in this section principally concerned. 
 When necessary to the safety of all the states, the exercise of 
 police power justifies the curtailment or even denial of any of 
 the rights of a state and its citizens, and in theory would go 
 even to the limit of justifying the annihilation of a community, 
 if such extreme action could be shown to be the only means to 
 preserve international society. The exercise of this police 
 power is in practice very closely associated with the ordinance 
 power above referred to as police regulation, and for this rea- 
 son we employ the more usual term of International Police 
 Regulation for our section heading instead of International 
 Police Restriction. 
 
 In our municipal [national] law, "police" is often used to 
 designate the minor matters which are left to lesser, i. e., 
 "police officials." In this sense, we have "police ordinances" 
 and "powers of police." But even in this field, we perceive 
 the essential or underlying idea of a power which cannot be 
 completely regulated and provided for in advance by the su- 
 perior authorities.
 
 POLICE REGULATION 279 
 
 power and justifies any curtailment of the rights which 
 are ordinarily enjoyed by the separate states, provided 
 the action to be taken seems reasonably necessary for 
 the protection of the common safety. The determi- 
 nation of what is necessary is perforce left to the de- 
 cision of those in authority. In international affairs 
 this means that the decision must be left to those 
 powers who exercise a paramount direction over world 
 affairs, that is, to the great world powers. Some- 
 times they act in concert. Each of the world powers 
 also has a particular region outside of Europe where 
 it often exercises this police power as if by a tacit man- 
 date from the other powers. 22 * 
 
 The aim of the political system of the nations is well 
 expressed in Senator Fessenden's definition, intended, 
 it is true, to apply only to the United States (Life of 
 Fessenden, Vol. I, p. 52) : "The great principle of their 
 political system," he said, "was the largest liberty of 
 thought and the greatest freedom of individual action 
 consistent with social order." 
 
 Although we define police action as a justifiable cur- 
 tailment of rights, we might in almost all the instances 
 in which it is applied consider it rather as the preven- 
 tion of that abusive use of a recognized right which by 
 reason of the abuse thereof becomes unlawful. 
 
 Westlake, denying that the right of sovereignty per- 
 mits a belligerent to lay even in his own territorial 
 waters floating mines which do not become innocuous 
 as soon as they get loose, remarks that "... the right 
 of a state in the waters subject to its sovereignty can 
 certainly not rank higher than that of a private owner 
 in the land or water which is his property," and he 
 
 22a The executive action of the great powers in concert or 
 acting separately within a particular region or sphere of in- 
 fluence is more fully discussed in the following section. ( 10).
 
 280 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 adds, "But no principle is more firmly established in 
 the science of law than that which says to an owner 
 sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas [so use thine own 
 as not to injure another]." (International Law, Vol. 
 II, p. 313.) 
 
 Phillimore begins his chapter on Intervention with 
 the following observation : "In all systems of private 
 jurisprudence, provision is made for the placing upon 
 the abstract right of individual property such restrict- 
 ions as the general safety may require. The maxim, 
 1 expedit enim reipublicae, ne quis sua re male utatur, 2 * 
 belongs to the law of all countries (Inst. I, VIII, 2). 
 The Praetorian Interdict of the Roman, the Injunction 
 of the English Law, give effect to this principle by 
 preventing the mischief from being done, instead of 
 endeavoring to remedy it when done. Some analagous 
 right or power must exist in the system of Interna- 
 tional Jurisprudence." (Phillimore, 1 ed., Vol. 1, 1854, 
 386-7, p. 433.) 
 
 A good illustration of this preventive action was the 
 exclusion of the Bonapartes from the throne of France. 
 (Angeberg: Congres de Vienne, II, p. 1183-4. Cf. 
 Westlake : International Law, vol. I, p. 318 ; Stapleton : 
 Intervention, p. 139.) 
 
 In his notes to the passage just quoted, Phillimore 
 gives references to the "Digest" of the instances 
 where property is subjected to restriction on account 
 of the general good. He also gives a quotation from 
 Ahrens (Cours de Droit naturel ou de Philosophic du 
 Droit, Brussels, 1844, p. 296), which when translated 
 
 2S The English translation is : " And this decision is just, as 
 the welfare of the State demands that no one should make a 
 bad use of his own." (Institutions of Gaius and Justinian, 
 translated by T. Lambert Means, London, 1882, p. 269.) 
 
 Cf. works of Edmund Burke, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 
 1894, Vol. 5, p. 321-322, Letters on a Regicide Peace, Letter I. 
 See also Hall : International Law, 4th ed., 95, p. 309 note.
 
 POLICE REGULATION 281 
 
 reads : * * Every right has its limits : it is limited by the 
 corresponding rights of all the members of a so- 
 ciety. " 23a 
 
 23a lt is the purpose of intervention to vindicate the rights 
 of the other states when any state takes advantage of its in- 
 dependence to use its rights in an abusive manner, that is with- 
 out regard to the interests of its neighbors. The situation 
 when the abusive action endangers a particular state is dis- 
 cussed below under 16, Self -Preservation. We are here con- 
 cerned only with abuses which injuriously affect all of the 
 states. Grotius shows in many of the passages we quote in 
 this section and elsewhere (see 7) that he always placed the 
 rights and interests of international society above those of 
 states considered separately. 
 
 The judicious Hooker writing about 1592 set forth in a 
 remarkable passage the supremacy of international law : 
 
 "Now, besides that law which simply concerneth men, as 
 men, and that which belongeth unto them as they are linked 
 with others in some sort of Politique Society, there is a third 
 kinde of law which toucheth all such several bodies Politique, 
 so far forth as one of them hath publique commerce with an- 
 other. And this third is the Law of Nations .... The strength 
 and vertue of that law is such, that no particular nation can 
 lawfully prejudice the same by any their several laws and 
 ordinances, more than a man by his private resolutions the 
 law of the whole Commonwealth or State wherein he liveth. 
 For as civil law, being the act of the whole body Politique, 
 doth therefore over-rule each several part of the same body; 
 so there is no reason that any one Commonwealth of itself 
 should, to the prejudice of another, annihilate that whereupon 
 the whole world hath agreed." (Eccl. Policy, 1, 10, as quoted 
 by Professor J. S. Reeves in American Journal of International 
 Law, July, 1921, Vol. 15, p. 365.) 
 
 Giinther, one of the founders of the positive system of inter- 
 national law, writes: "The closer union in which the Euro- 
 pean nations stand today, for they may certainly be considered 
 as members of a great and equal society especially in matters 
 which concern the common interests makes it necessary in 
 accordance with the fundamental principles of international 
 law (Freinnlligen Volkerrecht) that each nation in its con- 
 duct observe its obligation to international society and refrain 
 from using the liberty it enjoys therein in such a manner as 
 obviously to disturb the peace and security of this great so- 
 ciety, or to give the other members any reasonable ground for
 
 282 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 But there are, as we have said, instances where po- 
 lice action is necessary, irrespective of any abuse of a 
 right. In our municipal law, the fire marshal may 
 dynamite any house when in his opinion it is necessary 
 to save the city. 24 
 
 mistrust or apprehension." (Giinther: Volkerrecht Vol. I, 
 1787, p. 282; cf. ibid, p. 295-6.) 
 
 When two or more nations engaged in war violate the fun- 
 damental rules recognized by international law as governing 
 the conduct of hostilities, there is, as we have seen above (7), 
 a just ground for intervention to vindicate the law of nations. 
 And again, when the manner of conducting a civil war is so 
 barbarous as to shock neighboring nations and to serve as a 
 reproach to civilization, third states have, as we have also seen 
 ( 8, c,), a right of intervention upon the ground of humanity. 
 There is, however, still another ground of action, namely: 
 when an unnecessary war between two independent states or 
 a civil war unreasonably prolonged threatens the peace and 
 security of international society, such conduct on the part of 
 the warring states may rightfully be regarded as an instance 
 of the abusive use of their liberty and their sovereignty. In 
 accordance with the practice of states, the danger which such 
 an abusive action causes to the security of states is sufficient 
 justification for intervention. 
 
 Karl Heller (Die Frage der Zulassigkeit der Volkerrecht- 
 lichen Intervention, 1915, p. 6) says that Glafey is the first to 
 observe that "when the warring parties welter in blood with- 
 out end a third may intervene with arms and attempt to im- 
 pose peace by force." (Ad. F. Glafey: Recht der Vernunft, 
 1739, Bk. 6, Chap. I, p. 97.) 
 
 Professor Kebedgy recognizes the justification of such inter- 
 vention to prevent any state from using its sovereignty in a 
 manner so abusive as to endanger the security of the other 
 states. Quoting Professor Arntz' letter to Rolin Jaequemyns 
 (revue de droit international et de legislation comparee, Vol. 
 8, 1876, p. 674) he gives as an illustration the case of a state 
 which possessed of the monopoly of a sovereign remedy against 
 a widespread malady should refuse to allow the drug to be 
 exported for the benefit of other nations (Kebedgy: Inter- 
 vention, p. 86). 
 
 24 The action of the powers to compel Holland to desist, when 
 she was at the point of subjugating the revolting Belgian 
 Provinces, was a curtailment of the sovereign right of the
 
 POLICE REGULATION 283 
 
 President Angell, in his Phi Beta Kappa address, 
 asks : * * May not the great powers, if they see a small 
 
 Netherlands to settle its own internal affairs. Assuredly there 
 never was a greater abuse of force than that employed by 
 France and England to compel the Dutch to submit unless the 
 coercive measures were justified by the superior needs of Euro- 
 pean peace. The moment was a critical one and the interven- 
 tion was successful in preserving Europe from another general 
 war which was seriously threatened. Upon this ground the ac- 
 tion of the European concert has generally been justified (see 
 Pitt Cobbett : Cases on International Law, 3 ed., Vol. I, p. 347- 
 8 ; cf . Rossi 's remarkable analysis of the principles applicable 
 to this instance in Archives de droit et de legislation, Brussels, 
 Vol. 1, 1837, p. 369-70) . In the protocol of February 19, 1831, 
 the great powers assembled in conference at London, formu- 
 lated the principle which was the justification of their united 
 action : ' ' Every nation ' ' declares the protocol ' ' has its sepa- 
 rate rights, but Europe also has rights given her for the main- 
 tenance of the peace and order of society." (Translated from 
 LeClerq: Traites de la France, Vol. 4, p. 15. The French 
 original reads: "Chaque nation a ses droits particuliers ; 
 mais 1'Europe aussi a son droit; cest 1'ordre social qui le 
 lui a donne.") 
 
 Professor J. B. Moore gives the following brief account pf 
 the protest of Great Britain and France at the blocking of 
 Charleston harbor. Although Secretary Seward wrote Minis- 
 ter Dayton: "In making these explanations, I must not be 
 understood as conceding to foreign states a right to demand 
 them" (Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, p. 316), it might 
 be considered that by making explanations he did, in fact, to 
 some extent at least, concede the right. Professor Moore 
 writes : 
 
 ' ' February 14, 1862, Lord Stanhope, in the House of Lords, 
 called attention to the report that a second squadron of ships 
 laden with stone was about to be sunk by the United States 
 in Maflfit's channel at Charlestown, South Carolina. He ob- 
 served that the sinking of large ships laden with stone on 
 banks of mud at the entrance of a harbor could only end in 
 its permanent destruction and was not justified by the laws 
 of war, and declared that the British Government was well 
 entitled to protest against the act. Earl Russell replied that 
 he considered the destruction of commercial harbors a most 
 barbarous act, that the French Government took the same 
 view, and that they had decided to remonstrate with the Gov- 
 ernment of the United States. On February 28, Earl Russell
 
 284 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 power pursuing a policy dangerous to the general 
 peace of all or of several, justly intervene to prevent it, 
 
 stated that he had received a dispatch from Lord Lyons to 
 the effect that Mr. Seward had stated that there had not been 
 a complete filling up of Charleston Harbor and that no more 
 stones would be sunk there. 
 
 "The subject had been discussed between Mr. Seward and 
 Lord Lyons, and Mr. Seward had made explanations to the 
 effect that artificial obstructions in the channels of rivers 
 leading to ports had been regarded as an ordinary military 
 appliance of war; thatj it was not conceived that such ob- 
 structions could not be removed ; and, that, upon the termina- 
 tion of the war, there would be cast upon the Government the 
 responsibility of improving the harbors of all the States. After 
 these explanations were given, Mr. Seward ascertained and 
 stated that between the channels at Charleston which had been 
 obstructed there still remained two the Swash channel and 
 a part of Maffit 's channel neither of which had been nor was 
 intended to be artificially obstructed and which were to be 
 guarded by the blockading naval forces. Mr. Seward ob- 
 served that, in making these explanations he was not to be 
 understood as conceding to foreign states a right to demand 
 them. They were accepted by the French, as well as bv the 
 British Government." (Moore's Digest of International Law, 
 Vol. 7, p. 855-6, 1286, Professor Moore gives references to 
 authorities and to other instances in which the question of the 
 right to obstruct channels has arisen.) 
 
 For the discussion of the justification of intervention to 
 preserve the Balance of Power on the ground of the right 
 of the society of states to curtail the rights of the separate 
 states for the preservation of peace, see discussion in 17; 
 cf . also Giinther : Volkerrecht, Vol. I, p. 333, 358, 359-60 ; cf . 
 ibid p. 298 ; Gentz, Fragmente aus der neusten Geschichte des 
 Politischen Gleichgewicht in Europa. St. Petersburg, 1806. 
 
 Kamptz in his partisan effort to sustain the right of the 
 Holy Alliance to interfere in the internal affairs of the states 
 of Europe for the purpose of preventing constitutional changes 
 by means of a revolution takes the ground that they have the 
 right to prevent changes which endanger "the peace and se- 
 curity of the community of European states or the well recog- 
 nized rights of other states" (Volkerrechtlicher Erorterung 
 des Rechts der Europaischen Machte in die Verfassung eines 
 Einzelnen Staats sich zu mischen, Preface p. VII). A little 
 further along he declares such action to be "as necessary and 
 beneficial for the great community of states as is police in each 
 separate state" (Ibid p. VIII-IX).
 
 POLICE REGULATION 285 
 
 as any government checks the violence of one of its own 
 citizens ? ' ' 
 
 It is evident that a power so vast is in danger of 
 being abused. If it is unwisely used to interfere un- 
 necessarily with the independence of the less powerful 
 sovereign states, it will constitute a menace to society 
 no less serious than that which it is intended to ward 
 off. 
 
 With a view to preventing abuse, it has been pro- 
 posed to restrict the exercise of this power to col- 
 lective action, but just as in the case of humanitarian 
 intervention the suggestion is full of difficulties, such as 
 the delay inevitable in organizing any collective action. 
 Furthermore the tendency of states to roll off the bur- 
 den of police action upon the state whose security is 
 more directly threatened cannot easily be overcome. 
 The state immediately threatened cannot delay action 
 indefinitely, and other states sometimes affect indif- 
 ference, feeling secure in the knowledge that their in- 
 terests will be protected by the state most directly con- 
 cerned. 
 
 Hall (4th ed., 95, p. 308) intertwines his discussion 
 of international police with humanitarian intervention, 
 but he selects for favorable comment two instances of 
 international police carried out by collective action: 
 the formation of Belgium (1833), and the arrange- 
 ments adopted by the Congress of Berlin (1878). 
 "Still," he concludes, "from the point of view of law, 
 it is always to be remembered that states so interven- 
 ing are going beyond their legal powers. Their excuse 
 or their justification can only be a moral one. ' ' Presi- 
 dent Angell (Phi Beta Kappa address on the European 
 
 The erroneous conclusions which Kamptz draws and the 
 abusive application of this principle by the Holy Alliance in 
 no way affects the correctness of the principle. It does, how- 
 ever, indicate the danger of abuse which is inherent in it.
 
 286 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Concert, p. 9), has drawn attention to the error into 
 which Hall falls. After repeating the extract given 
 above, Dr. Angell observes: "I venture to ask in re- 
 spect to the last two sentences I have quoted from Mr. 
 Hall whether, if the acts of intervention under con- 
 sideration in any given case have an excuse or justifi- 
 cation which is a moral one, the states performing them 
 can be going beyond their legal powers, provided by 
 the phrase * legal powers' we mean powers allowable 
 under international law. For how do we determine 
 what powers are thus allowable except by finding the 
 moral sense of nations as expressed in their usages! 
 and the moral sense of Europe appears plainly to be 
 that the great powers may infringe upon the inde- 
 pendence and equality of the minor states, if such in- 
 fringement is essential to the preservation of the gen- 
 eral good. If such infringement is justifiable on moral 
 grounds, is it not by that fact to be regarded as justi- 
 fiable in international law I'" 5 
 
 It is a matter for regret that the writers on inter- 
 national law have not examined International Police 
 Action with the care the importance of the subject war- 
 rants. 
 
 The most frequent application of "international 
 police ' ' is intervention to prevent an unnecessary war 
 or to bring a conflict to an end by imposing a settle- 
 ment. A well known instance was the intervention of 
 Great Britain and France to compel Holland to acqui- 
 esce in the settlement which the powers had reached 
 relative to the separation of Belgium. (Pitt Cobbett: 
 Cases, 3 ed., vol. I, p. 347.) Again in 1886 the powers 
 blockaded the coasts of Greece to prevent that state 
 
 26 We must agree that Dr. Angell 's criticism of Hall is well 
 founded, but since Hall 's remarks were mainly intended to ap- 
 ply to humanitarian intervention we have discussed his state- 
 ment in a footnote of the preceding section (8).
 
 POLICE REGULATION 287 
 
 from making war on Turkey. (Ibid, p. 348.) Similarly 
 the powers intervened to save Greece from the victo- 
 rious Turks when they imposed the peace settlement of 
 Sept. 18, 1897. (Ibid, p. 348.) 
 
 Provisions in regard to the limitations of armament 
 and the guarantees of the independence and integrity 
 of states when adopted for the preservation of inter- 
 national peace and security (see 17), are instances 
 of international police. 
 
 The justification of President Roosevelt's inter- 
 vention in favor of Panama rests upon the principles 
 we have been discussing. Colombia as every one knew 
 could not build the canal herself and might therefore be 
 required to permit some other power or powers to un- 
 dertake the task which was so manifestly beneficial to 
 the commerce of all the nations. 26 
 
 26 "By the rules of right and justice universally recognized 
 among men and which are the law of nations, the sovereignty 
 of Colombia over the Isthmus of Panama was qualified and 
 limited by the right of the other civilized nations of the earth 
 to have the canal constructed across the Isthmus and to have 
 it maintained for their free and unobstructed passage." (Ex- 
 tract from address by Hon. Elihu Root on ' ' The Ethics of the 
 Panama Question ' ' before the Union League Club of Chicago, 
 Feb. 22, 1904, printed in Senate Document, 471, 63rd Con- 
 gress, 2nd Session, p. 39.) 
 
 This obligation is based upon the fundamental principle 
 that all of the nations are required to cooperate for the pur- 
 pose of facilitating international commerce. This was the 
 principle which justified the United States and the other 
 powers in forcing their way into Japan and in compelling her 
 to negotiate and sign treaties providing for commercial re- 
 lations. The right to use international rivers which pass 
 through another state rests upon the same basis. ( Cf . Wool- 
 sey: International Law, 6th ed., 62, p. 79-83.) 
 
 Grotius clearly recognizes the right to use the territory of 
 another state. He justifies the right of transit for the purpose 
 of traffic with a remote nation, or in the prosecution of a just 
 war. "The reason," he says, "is the same as above; that 
 ownership might be introduced with the reservation of such 
 a use, which is of great advantage to the one party and of no
 
 288 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Colombia was sovereign over the territory in ques- 
 tion, but sovereignty does not, as we have seen, permit 
 a state to make an abusive use of its rights. Undoubt- 
 edly, Colombia would have had the right to attempt in 
 the first place to build the Canal herself, and if she 
 could not or would not do this, she had a right to de- 
 mand that any power undertaking the work should 
 compensate her reasonably for the territory required 
 and for any damage to her possessions. 
 
 Instead of adopting this course, the Colombian Gov- 
 ernment kept putting obstacles in the way of the 
 United States, who was seeking an agreement with 
 Colombia in order that she might acquire upon reason- 
 
 disadvantage to the other; and the authors of ownership are 
 to be supposed to have intended this." (Grotius, Bk. II, ch. 
 II, XIII, 1, Whewell's translation, vol. I, p. 243; cf. also 
 Vattel, Bk. II, 123, Carnegie translation, p. 150.) Whewell 
 states: "Gronovius in a long note gives very strong reasons 
 why this right of transit cannot be held, and cases in which it 
 has been negatived. ' ' But this objection really applies only to 
 warlike transit, which is now recognized as a violation of neu- 
 trality. At the time when Grotius wrote, military transit was 
 recognized and was a good example of the limitation of sov- 
 ereign right for the benefit of what was then considered the 
 interest of all the states. The principle upon which Grotius 
 then based the right of military transit has not disappeared be- 
 cause this particular application has become antiquated. 
 
 In the same chapter Grotius sets forth his theory of the 
 common right which all men have in property which has be- 
 come private. Even those who do not accept this theory in its 
 entirety will find it a valuable argument in the support of the 
 superior right of the community over the property held by 
 the separate members. (Bk. II, ch. II, I to XI, Whewell's 
 Translation, vol. I, p. 237-240.) 
 
 The United States was justified in intervening to secure 
 the abolition of the Danish Sound Dues. ( See Woolsey : In- 
 ternational Law, 6th ed., p. 77-8.) This is a good example of 
 the principle, even though the Danish vested interests were 
 recognized and purchased in the form of a payment, in return 
 for which Denmark was obligated to maintain the necessary 
 lighthouses, etc.
 
 POLICE REGULATION 289 
 
 able terms Colombia 's acquiescence in the undertaking 
 to build the canal. This abusive action of the Colom- 
 bian Government would have amply justified the 
 United States in seizing the needed territory. In that 
 event the additional cost of the military operations 
 would justly have been chargeable to Colombia's ac- 
 count and any balance left after deducting these costs 
 from the value of the land seized would have belonged 
 to Colombia. 
 
 The action of the Roosevelt administration was not 
 so drastic. The same legitimate result was attained by 
 recognizing the Republic of Panama and signing with 
 that country a satisfactory treaty for the construction 
 of the Canal. If Colombia had not given the United 
 States just ground for intervening, the premature 
 recognition of Panama and the policing of the Isthmus 
 to prevent Colombia from landing troops and sup- 
 pressing the revolt would have been unjustifiable acts 
 of interference. As it was, however, they were only 
 milder means of enforcing the right of the United 
 States acting for all the states to build the Canal. 
 
 In enforcing this right, the United States was acting 
 as the agent or mandatory of all the states of the world. 
 So acting, President Roosevelt had a right to employ 
 such force as was reasonably necessary to attain the 
 legitimate purpose in view. The premature recogni- 
 tion of the Republic of Panama, which was itself an 
 act of intervention, and the additional act of interven- 
 tion to prevent the suppression of the revolt, were as 
 we have just said milder measures than the direct seiz- 
 ure of the territory and the forcible overcoming of 
 Colombia's resistance. 
 
 In the discussion of this question, much emphasis 
 has been laid on the obligation assumed by the United 
 States in article 35 of the Treaty of 1846 to guarantee 
 
 19
 
 290 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 the integrity of Colombia. This obligation applied 
 only to protect Colombia from foreign aggression. 27 
 
 In the preceding discussion, we have been consider- 
 ing the question of the Canal as though Colombia had 
 been completely sovereign over the territory, through 
 which it was to pass. This was not the case. Over the 
 Isthmus the United States had acquired, with the as- 
 sumption of the burden of police certain rights of su- 
 pervision. 28 
 
 This supervisory control did not give the right to ap- 
 propriate the Canal Zone, but it gave the supervisory 
 state a strong justification for whatever action might 
 be reasonably necessary for the complete fulfilment of 
 the trust to which it was committed. 
 
 The United States has been accused of instigating 
 the Panama revolution from which it so greatly bene- 
 fited. This mere assertion has divided the country 
 somewhat along the line of political cleavage between 
 
 27 For an extremely able and thorough discussion of the 
 Treaty of 1846, and Article 35, which contains the provisions 
 relative to the guaranty of transit, see William C. Dennis: 
 The Panama Situation in the Light of International Law, in 
 American Law Register (Published by the Department of Law, 
 University of Pennsylvania), vol. 52, May, 1904, p. 265-306. 
 Cf. Travers Twiss : The Law of Nations, Vol. I, 231, p. 367- 
 379, where the nature of a treaty of guarantee is considered. 
 
 28 The effects of this supervision are considered in the fol- 
 lowing section. The diplomatic correspondence relative to 
 the Isthmus shows the nature of the American supervision. 
 The United States had assumed, with the acquiescence of 
 Colombia, onerous obligations for the police of the territory in 
 question and in so doing, the United States was fulfilling obli- 
 gations which were Colombia's, but from which Colombia was 
 in a certain measure excused by her weakness. This police, 
 or supervisory power, over the Isthmus for the purposes of 
 international commerce gave to any action to facilitate this 
 commerce (as the building of the Canal) the benefit of a prima 
 facie presumption that it was justifiable. Another power, in- 
 tervening for the same laudable purpose, would not have been 
 entitled to this same presumption.
 
 POLICE REGULATION 291 
 
 the two camps of those who supported President 
 Roosevelt and his policies on the one hand, and those 
 who disapproved on the other. No shred of evidence 
 has ever been adduced to show that the United States 
 did instigate the revolution. 29 
 
 The failure to understand the true nature of police 
 action has led many well-meaning individuals, some of 
 them jurists of high standing, to condemn the action of 
 President Roosevelt. They have seen no further than 
 
 29 It would seem that this wide-spread opinion is based in 
 part upon Roosevelt 's statement in his speech to the students 
 of the University of California, at Berkeley, Cal., March 23, 
 1911 : "I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started 
 it. If I had followed traditional conservative methods I should 
 have submitted a dignified state paper of probably two hun- 
 dred pages to the Congress and the debate would have been 
 going on yet. But I took the canal zone, and let Congress de- 
 bate, and while the debate goes on the canal does also. ' ' 
 
 In his Autobiography Roosevelt has described his conduct 
 more fully and exactly: 
 
 "From the beginning to the end our course with Colombia 
 was straightforward and in absolute accord with the highest 
 standards of international morality. Criticism of it can come 
 only from misinformation, or else from sentimentality which 
 represents both mental weakness and a moral twist. To have 
 acted otherwise than I did would have been on my part be- 
 trayal of the interests of the United States, indifference to the 
 interests of Panama, and recreancy to the interests of the 
 world at large. Colombia had forfeited every claim to con- 
 sideration; indeed, this is not stating the case strongly 
 enough; she had so acted that yielding to her would have 
 meant on our part that culpable form of weakness which 
 stands on a level with wickedness. As for me personally, if I 
 had hesitated to act and had not in advance discounted the 
 clamor of those Americans who have made a fetish of disloy- 
 alty to their country, I should have esteemed myself as de- 
 serving a place in Dante's Inferno beside the faint-hearted 
 cleric who was guilty of " il gran rifiuto. ' ' ( Extract from the 
 Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt and printed in Senate 
 Document No. 471, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 61.)
 
 292 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 the right of Colombia as the sovereign of the Isthmus 
 to do with it as she liked. 30 
 
 Those who entertain such sentiments have urged and 
 supported the agreement to pay Colombia $25,000,000 
 indemnity ; but with a strange contradiction this pay- 
 ment is not to be accompanied with any apology for the 
 offense which it acknowledges. 
 
 Assuredly it is hard to defend such a payment. If 
 the United States recognizes that it was at fault, it 
 should apologize. If there be a reasonable doubt of 
 the matter, arbitration is an honorable solution. 
 
 In the absence of any juridical or any ethical obli- 
 gation to compensate Colombia, a donation of $25,000,- 
 
 30 Senator Cullom relates how President Roosevelt sent for 
 Senator Hoar when he was present to discuss with him the 
 question of the Panama Canal. 
 
 ' ' The President wanted the Senator to read a message which 
 he had already prepared in reference to Colombia's action in 
 rejecting the treaty and the canal in general; which message 
 showed clearly that the President had never contemplated 
 the secession of Panama, and was considering different meth- 
 ods in order to obtain the right of way across the Isthmus from 
 Colombia, fully expecting to deal only with the Colombian 
 Government on the subject. The President was sitting on the 
 table, first at one side of Senator Hoar, and then on the other, 
 talking in his usual vigorous fashion, trying to get the Sena- 
 tor's attention to the message. Senator Hoar seemed adverse 
 to reading it, but finally sat down, and without seeming to pay 
 any particular attention to what he was perusing, he remained 
 for a minute or two, then arose and said : 
 
 " ' I hope I may never live to see the day when the interests 
 of my country are placed above its honor. ' 
 
 "He at once retired from the room without uttering an- 
 other word, proceeding to the Capitol. 
 
 "Later in the morning he came to me with a typewritten 
 paper containing the conversation between the President and 
 himself, and asked me to certify to its correctness. I took the 
 paper and read it over, and as it seemed to be correct, as I 
 remembered the conversation, I wrote my name on the bottom 
 of it. I have never seen or heard of the paper since." (Cul- 
 lom, Shelby M. : Fifty Years of Public Service, p. 212-213.)
 
 POLICE REGULATION 293 
 
 000 will be open to misinterpretation, and since the 
 honor of the United States is concerned it would be 
 neither wise nor just. 31 
 
 Discussing in an address before the Union League 
 Club of Chicago the ''Ethics of the Panama Question," 
 Mr. Root did more than cover the ethical grounds of 
 justification for President Roosevelt's act. He also 
 laid down the fundamental juridical principle which 
 governs all action of a similar nature. Mr. Root said 
 in part : 
 
 ' ' It frequently happens in affairs of government that 
 most important rights are created, modified, or practi- 
 cally destroyed by gradual processes, and by the indi- 
 rect effect of events ; and that only an intimate knowl- 
 edge of the process enables one to realize the change 
 until some practical question arises which requires 
 everyone interested to study the subject. If the typical 
 New Zealander, ignorant of our political history, were 
 to read our Constitution and laws, he would suppose 
 that a presidential elector in the United States is en- 
 titled to exercise freedom of choice in his vote for 
 President, and he would be quite certain that we were 
 guilty of gross injustice in the treatment which we 
 should certainly accord to an elector who voted for 
 anyone but the candidate of his own party. In forming 
 this judgment, he would be misled by the form and ap- 
 
 31 The apparently equitable basis upon which one opinion 
 in support of the treaty rests, is that the United States should 
 not by the exercise of force directly, or by indirection, gain 
 at the expense of Colombia. But Colombia rejected the basis 
 of reasonable compensation, and it may well be questioned 
 whether other obstreperous states should be encouraged in an 
 unreasonable resistance to action for the common good, as 
 they would be if they could in last analysis rely upon the 
 power that had been resisted to make good the cost. Such a 
 practice would not tend to support and develop the settle- 
 ment of international controversies upon the basis of juridical 
 principles.
 
 294 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 pearance of things which he found upon the statute 
 book, and would misjudge a people who were acting in 
 accordance with the substance and reality of things as 
 they knew them to be. In the same way, they are in 
 error who assume that the relations of Colombia to the 
 other nations of the earth as regards the Isthmus of 
 Panama were, in truth, of unqualified sovereignty and 
 right of domestic control according to her own will, 
 governed and protected by the rules of international 
 law, which describe the attributes of complete sov- 
 ereignty ; that the relations of Colombia to the people 
 of Panama were, in truth, those appearing in the writ- 
 ten instrument called the Constitution of Colombia; 
 or that the rights and duties of the United States in re- 
 gard to the Isthmus were confined to the simple duty of 
 aiding Colombia to maintain her control over the Isth- 
 mus, and the simple right to ask from Colombia privi- 
 leges which that country was entitled to grant or with- 
 hold at her own pleasure. 
 
 "The stupendous fact that has dominated the history 
 and must control the future of the Isthmus of Panama 
 is the possibility of communication between the two 
 oceans. It is possible for human hands to pierce the 
 narrow 40 miles of solid earth which separate the Car- 
 ibbean from the Bay of Panama, to realize the dreams 
 of the early navigators, to make the pathway to the 
 Orient they vainly sought, to relieve commerce from 
 the toils and perils of its 9,000 miles of navigation 
 around Cape Horn through stormy seas and along 
 dangerous coasts with its constant burden of wasted 
 effort and shipwreck and loss of life, and to push for- 
 ward by a mighty impulse that intercommunication be- 
 tween the distant nations of the earth which is doing 
 away with misunderstanding, with race prejudice and 
 bigotry, with ignorance of human rights and oppor- 
 tunity for oppression, and making all the world kin.
 
 POLICE REGULATION 295 
 
 " Throughout the centuries since Philip II sat upon 
 the throne of Spain, merchants and statesmen and hu- 
 manitarians and the intelligent masses of the civilized 
 world have looked forward to this consummation with 
 just anticipations of benefit to mankind. No savage 
 tribes who happened to dwell upon the Isthmus would 
 have been permitted to bar this pathway of civilization. 
 By the universal practice and consent of mankind they 
 would have been swept aside without hesitation. No 
 Spanish sovereign could, by discovery or conquest or 
 occupation, preempt for himself the exclusive use of 
 this little spot upon the surface of the earth dedicated 
 by nature to the use of all mankind. No civil society 
 organized upon the ruins of Spanish dominion could 
 justly arrogate to itself over this tract of land sov- 
 ereignty unqualified by the world's easement and all 
 the rights necessary to make that easement effective. 
 The formal rules of international law are but declara- 
 tions of what is just and right in the generality of cases. 
 But where the application of such a general rule would 
 impair the just rights or imperil the existence of neigh- 
 boring States or would unduly threaten the peace of a 
 continent or would injuriously affect the general 
 interests of mankind, it has always been the practice of 
 civilized nations to deny the application of the formal 
 rule and compel conformity to the principles of justice 
 upon which all rules depend. The Danubian Princi- 
 palities and Greece and Crete, and Egypt, the passage 
 of the Dardanelles, and the neutralization of the Black 
 Sea are familiar examples of limitations in derogation 
 of those general rules of international law which de- 
 scribe the sovereignty of nations." (Extract from ad- 
 dress by Hon. BHhu Root on "The Ethics of the Pana- 
 ma Question," before the Union League Club of Chi- 
 cago, Feb. 22, 1904, printed in Senate Document 471, 
 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 37-38.)
 
 296 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 The subject of supervisory or paramount control 
 is considered in the following section, but in relation 
 to the question of Panama we may here appropriately 
 quote a letter which President Roosevelt on January 
 18, 1904, addressed to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, at the 
 British Foreign Office, London : 
 
 "I have been having most interesting times. I have 
 succeeded in accomplishing a certain amount which I 
 think will stand. I believe I shall put through the 
 Panama treaty (my worst foes being those in the Sen- 
 ate and not those outside of the borders of the United 
 States) and begin to dig the canal. It is always diffi- 
 cult for me to reason with those solemn creatures of 
 imperfect aspirations after righteousness, who never 
 take the trouble to go below names. These people 
 scream about the injustice done Colombia when Pana- 
 ma was released from its domination, which is pre- 
 cisely like bemoaning the wrong done to Turkey when 
 Herzegovina was handed over to Austria. It was a 
 good thing for Egypt and the Soudan, and for the 
 world, when England took Egypt and the Soudan. 
 It is a good thing for India that England should 
 control it. And so it is a good thing, a very 
 good thing, for Cuba and for Panama and for 
 the world that the United States has acted as it has 
 actually done during the last six years. The people 
 of the United States and the people of the Isthmus and 
 the rest of mankind will all be the better because we dig 
 the Panama Canal and keep order in its neighborhood. 
 And the politicians and revolutionists at Bogota are 
 entitled to precisely the amount of sympathy we extend 
 to other inefficient bandits. ' ' ( Theodore Roosevelt and 
 His Time, shown in his own letters, by Joseph Bucklin 
 Bishop, New York, 1920, Vol. I, p. 297.) 
 
 In most of the instances of recourse to international 
 police power, it will be found that the action is taken in
 
 SUPERVISION 297 
 
 regard to some state over which there has grown up in 
 some sort an habitual control as was the case in regard 
 to the Isthmus of Panama. 
 
 10. SUPERVISION 
 
 International law is based upon the principle of ter- 
 ritorial sovereignty and looks to those communities 
 which have the ability to maintain their independence 
 for the enforcement of international law within the 
 jurisdiction over which they are recognized as sov- 
 ereign. The states which fulfil this expectation are 
 recognized as independent and as full members of the 
 society of nations. But international relations are 
 complicated by the presence of a considerable number 
 of states who, notwithstanding the formal recognition 
 of their full legal status as members of the society of 
 states, are not in fact always able to fulfil satisfactorily 
 the requirements which international law imposes 
 upon them, either because they are unable to exact 
 from other states a due regard for their international 
 rights or because within their own jurisdiction, they 
 are unable to maintain order and to secure for aliens 
 the peaceful enjoyment of the rights to which they are 
 entitled. 32 
 
 32 No entirely satisfactory term can be found to express the 
 relationship considered in this section. Various words have 
 been employed, such as "hegemony," "primacy," "police 
 jurisdiction" (Bernard: Non-intervention, p. 24), "tutelage 
 ibid, p. 8 ; cf . Moore : Asylum in Legations, Political Science 
 Quarterly, Vol. 7 (1892) p. 16), "surveillance" (A. H. Snow: 
 The Question of Aborigines in the Law and Practice of Na- 
 tions, p. 21, 27), "next friend," "international patron" 
 (ibid, p. 21), "international guardianship" (ibid, p. 21). 
 "Client State" (Lawrence: Principles, 4th ed., 39, p. 66, 
 64, p. 126). 
 
 Professor Bernard well depicts this condition of statehood : 
 "All men are not in fact completely free, nor are all states
 
 298 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 It is evident that the neighboring states suffer the 
 principal inconvenience from this situation. Their ex- 
 tensive relations with the state in question oblige them 
 more frequently to have recourse to force to secure re- 
 dress for the violation of their rights, and they are 
 constantly a prey to apprehension lest some powerful 
 state, claiming to seek redress, acquire a dangerous 
 political control over these adjacent territories. States 
 of the second rank are not able to offer any effective 
 opposition to such designs, but if amongst the neigh- 
 bors of the delinquent state (incapacitated state), there 
 be one of the first rank, it will never permit a distant 
 rival to establish its influence and control so near at 
 hand. But it is difficult to interfere with the action of 
 any state seeking reasonable redress, unless the inter- 
 completely sovereign. There may be states in name, which are 
 not such in reality Governments which labor under an in- 
 curable incapacity to govern, and which a makeshift policy 
 keeps alive under an irregular and capricious tutelage, in 
 order to avoid, on the one hand, the embarrassments which 
 would be occasioned by their fall, and to prevent, on the other, 
 as far as possible, (for such, efforts often come too late,) atro- 
 cious barbarities and gross oppressions. To such cases the 
 principle does not apply, and the hopeless infirmity which 
 makes interference necessary is an evil that we have to deal 
 with in the best way we can. Again, there is the anomalous 
 thing called a 'Protected State' a relation which almost 
 necessarily involves more or less of falsehood, in which you 
 have on the one side a galling or corrupting dependence, and, 
 on the other, power without definite responsibility and re- 
 sponsibilities without effective control." (Mountague Ber- 
 nard: The Principles of non-intervention (1860), p. 7-8); 
 Westlake's (International Law, 1:121-144) study of "Colon- 
 ial Protectorates" and ''Spheres of Influence" is also of inter- 
 est. 
 
 "Supervision" seemed on the whole to best express the re- 
 lationship. I have recently been gratified to find that the 
 late Alpheus H. Snow used this same designation in the proj- 
 ect of a code of the Law of Nations published in the pro- 
 ceedings of the American Society of International Law (1911, 
 p. 330).
 
 SUPERVISION 299 
 
 f ering neighbor state is willing to assume a certain re- 
 sponsibility to supervise the incapacitated state and to 
 see that it fulfils its obligations. If the great power 
 that exercises this supervision is careful to refrain 
 from all unnecessary interference in the internal af- 
 fairs of the state in question, the incapacitated state 
 will generally recognize that the supervising state 
 shields it from falling a prey to the rapacity of some 
 other less considerate power. In the course of time, 
 and as a result of the recognition of the mutual advan- 
 tage of this relationship, the state of the first rank will 
 be established de facto in a position of supervision or 
 control over its weaker neighbor. 33 Even though this 
 situation receive not recognition in international law, 
 in practice it will be taken into account by the govern- 
 ments of all the states. 
 
 There are various degrees of this supervisory con- 
 trol. The United States exercises such supervision 
 over the states of Central America, and in some meas- 
 ure over South America as well. This is what is some- 
 times spoken of as a regional control. 34 
 
 33 This process recalls the beneficium and commendatio of the 
 feudal system. 
 
 34 For a short account of the Monroe Doctrine brought up to 
 date, see John Bassett Moore: Principle of American Diplo- 
 macy, p. 238-269 ; Bibliography, p. 268. Professor Moore says 
 (ibid, p. 258-9), "The 'Monroe Doctrine' has in reality be- 
 come a convenient title by which is denoted a principle that 
 doubtless would have been wrought out if the message of 1823 
 had never been written the principle of the limitation of 
 European power and influence in the Western Hemisphere." 
 The void filled by this limitation on Europe is filled by the 
 counterbalancing hegemony of the United States. 
 
 A study of the history of American Diplomacy indicates that 
 there has been a tendency on the part of the United States 
 to use this paramount position to protect the weaker and more 
 backward American States from European dictation and all 
 coercion above and beyond what was reasonable to obtain 
 redress. Even when measures of force have been reasonably
 
 300 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Other states exercise a similar authority over ad- 
 jacent states that are not by their own unaided efforts 
 
 employed, the satisfaction exacted has not been allowed to in- 
 clude the cession of territory or the establishment of a super- 
 vision over the finances or other internal affairs of the de- 
 linquent state. In place thereof, the United States exerts itself 
 to arrange a satisfactory settlement without, nevertheless, as- 
 suming or shouldering the responsibility by guaranteeing the 
 payment. In a less conspicuous manner, this government has 
 exercised diplomatic pressure to prevent wars and restrict the 
 revengeful acts of warring factions. As regards territory in 
 proximity to its frontiers or to the Canal (perhaps also all 
 American territory), the United States is understood to pro- 
 hibit even a voluntary transfer to any European country. 
 This perhaps affords the clearest evidence of the regional con- 
 trol of the United States. Professor Moore, in the work above 
 referred to, and in his ' ' Digest of International Law, ' ' supplies 
 the evidence in support of these assertions. More recently, 
 President Wilson's administration has extended the scope of 
 this regional control so as to forbid the establishment of new 
 governments by crimes and in violation of constitutional prin- 
 ciples, notably in the case of Huerta (see Moore: Principles 
 of American Diplomacy, p. 217-225) and still more recently 
 in that of the Tinoco Government in Costa Rica. (See World, 
 August 3, 1920.) Whatever difference of opinion may exist as 
 to the justification and wisdom of this policy, its effect to bring 
 the states in question more closely under the supervisory con- 
 trol of the United States can hardly be questioned. 
 
 The relation of the United States to the little African Re- 
 public of Liberia is described by Alpheus H. Snow in his 
 scholarly consideration of ' ' The Question of Aborigines in the 
 Law and Practice of Nations" (Government Printing Office, 
 Washington, 1919, p. 21) : "The American negro settlements 
 on the west coast of Africa maintained a precarious existence 
 and an indefinite international status. They resembled colo- 
 nies of the United States to some extent, but the United States, 
 on account of the Monroe doctrine, denied itself sovereignty 
 over them, and asserted their independence under its patron- 
 age. Their international independence was at last recognized 
 and the State of Liberia came into existence. The United 
 States has stood in the position of 'next friend,' or inter- 
 national patron, disclaiming sovereignty or control of any 
 kind, but holding itself morally obligated to use its good of- 
 fices on behalf of Liberia in all international complications. 
 It has thus maintained a species of international guardianship
 
 SUPERVISION 301 
 
 able effectively to maintain their full international 
 status. 
 
 a benevolent surveillance without claim of sovereignty or 
 responsibility. ' ' 
 
 Professor Delbriick, discussing President Wilson's inter- 
 vention policy in Mexico, said in the course of an interview 
 (New York Sun, Nov. 9, 1913) : " Other questions, however. 
 are involved. Who gave the United States the overlordship of 
 the Western Hemisphere? By what right, moral or other- 
 wise, does the United States interfere in Mexico and dictate 
 who is to be President? No right exists. There is no ques- 
 tion but might, which is not changed by the fact that the 
 people themselves and civilization in general probably will be 
 served thereby." 
 
 Prof. Hershey (Essentials of International Law, 142, p. 
 152-3) discusses "The Primacy of the United States in Ameri- 
 ca. ' ' He considers that " it is a primacy essentially political in 
 its nature, which has no legal basis whatsoever, but rests upon 
 certain maxims enumerated by the fathers of the Republic, 
 and applied by American statesmen." 
 
 Bertrand Russell (Why Men Fight, p. 108) says: "The 
 South American Republics are sovereign for all purposes ex- 
 cept their relations with Europe, in regard to which they are 
 subject to the United States: in dealings with Europe, the 
 army and navy of the United States are their army and navy. ' ' 
 
 An English writer expresses the following opinion: "The 
 Monroe Doctrine is nothing more than the expansion of the 
 natural sense of guardianship felt by the United States as the 
 predominant power in that part of the world for the minor 
 states whose institutions are more or less modelled on their 
 own, which is aroused when a likelihood arises of interference 
 with their liberty or institutions on the part of a foreign 
 power." (F. W. Payn: Cromwell on Foreign Affairs, p. 85.) 
 
 In his remarkable study of this relationship between states 
 in different stages of political and social development, Al- 
 pheus H. Snow (Question of Aborigines in the Law and Prac- 
 tice of Nations, p. 196) considers that the trusteeship of the 
 superior state "... is for conservation and elevation of status. 
 A conservator or guardian can find in the private law no war- 
 rant for altering for the worse the social status of the incom- 
 petent person or the ward. His duty is to alter it, if possible, 
 for the better. 
 
 "When the United States extended its sovereignty over 
 Cuba, the Philippines, and Porto Rico, as the result of the 
 Spanish War, the public sentiment was strongly against 'im- 
 
 
 BARBARA STATE COLLEGE LIBRA*!
 
 302 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Captain Mahan, referring to the parable in the 
 Bible (Matthew XXVI, 14-29) maintains "that the pos- 
 
 perialism' and in favor of the doctrine that 'the Constitution 
 follows the flag.' In developing a conception of the law of 
 nations which should take account of this public sentiment the 
 American Government based itself upon the conception of a 
 trusteeship implied in sovereignty. By recognizing this 
 trusteeship under the law of nations, through acts of the gov- 
 ernment declaratory of the trust, the relationship between the 
 United States and the countries to which its sovereignty was 
 extended was established as being social and not imperial, and 
 the spirit of the Constitution was made to follow the flag and to 
 permeate the spirit of the peoples within whose territories 
 the flag had been raised by the power of the United States in 
 conformity with the existing law of nations. ' ' 
 
 In a campaign speech (New York Herald, Aug. 29, 1920) 
 President Harding, inveighing against what he considered the 
 abuse of this power, said : ' ' Nor will I misuse the powers of 
 the Executive to cover with a veil of secrecy repeated acts of 
 unwarrantable interference in domestic affairs of the little 
 republics of the western hemisphere, such as in the past few 
 years have not only made enemies of those who should be our 
 friends, but have rightfully discredited our country as their 
 trusted neighbor." 
 
 "The following extract is from a letter of Hon. E. J. Phelps, 
 written at the time of our intervention in Cuba: "The idea 
 that this country, or any other, is justified in undertaking a 
 moral or political supervision over the affairs of its neighbors, 
 and in correcting by armed invasion the faults of their insti- 
 tutions or the mistakes of their administration, or administer- 
 ing charity to them by force, is absolutely inadmissible and 
 infinitely mischievous." (E. J. Phelps, Letter in New York 
 Herald, March 29, 1898.) 
 
 Lord Eustace Percy, one of the ablest of the younger Brit- 
 ish diplomatists, stationed several years at Washington, dis- 
 cusses with a frankness which gives added value to his remarks 
 the relations of the United States to her weaker neighbors : 
 
 "In the last few years the United States has been driven 
 into a policy of expansion in Nicaragua, in Hayti, and in Santo 
 Domingo ; but her motives have been, not financial, but strate- 
 gic and humanitarian. From the strategic point of view she 
 cannot tolerate chronic misgovernment in any of the states 
 lying within and on the flank of the 'south coast line' to which 
 she has now pushed forward her strategic frontier the line 
 through the Caribbean from Cuba to Colon and Panama. And
 
 SUPERVISION 303 
 
 session of power is a talent committed in trust, for 
 which account will be exacted, and that, under some 
 
 even if it had been possible on grounds of expediency to ig- 
 nore such misgovernment, the humanitarian attitude which 
 has been her boast would have made inaction impossible. 
 
 "The Nicaraguan policy of the United States displays the 
 same features as her Cuban record. She has exerted her in- 
 fluence, has intervened, has withdrawn has, in short done 
 everything but assume direct and permanent responsibilities. 
 She aided and abetted the expulsion from Nicaragua of the 
 dictator Zelaya; she then, in 1910, went very near interven- 
 tion for the overthrow of Madriz, whom she regarded as 
 Zelaya 's legatee, and when the expulsion of that gentleman 
 failed to lead to a restoration of stable government, she ac- 
 tually intervened in 1912, and sent marines to Managua. The 
 opposition of the Senate defeated President Taft's first at- 
 tempt to deal with Nicaragua as his predecessor had dealt 
 with Santo Domingo and President Wilson found at the out- 
 set of his administration that he was responsible for a Nica- 
 raguan government placed in power by American bayonets, 
 but with no means of controlling or maintaining it. This, 
 indeed, is still the position at the present day. The United 
 States has recently gone so far as to conclude an agreement 
 with the Nicaraguan Government by which she acquires a 
 naval base in the Bay of Fonseca, an option on the construc- 
 tion of any inter-oceanic canal across Nicaraguan territory, 
 and a measure of control over Nicaraguan finances. There, 
 however, she has stopped. She has not taken over the foreign 
 relations of Nicaragua and has done little to regularise the 
 relations of this small republic either with the outside world or 
 with its Central American neighbors. ' ' (Lord Eustace Percy : 
 The Responsibilities of the League, p. 90-92. Hoddr and 
 Stoughton, London, 1919.) 
 
 A few pages further on, Lord Eustace writes : 
 
 ' ' The United States has therefore responsibilities for Cuba. 
 Foreign nations can call on her to secure their just rights in 
 the island. Cuba is made a sort of dependency of the United 
 States, and the United States has shown that she is fully alive 
 to considerations of what may be called strategic imperialism, 
 by acquiring naval stations on the shores of Cuba at Guan- 
 tanamo and Bahia Honda. 
 
 "Moreover, the Platt amendment has not remained a dead 
 letter. In 1906, the United States made use of her powers 
 under Clause 3 by occupying the island and she remained 
 there for three years. During this second occupation she
 
 304 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 circumstances, an obligation to repress evil external to 
 its borders rests upon a nation, as surely as responsi- 
 bility for the slums rests upon the rich quarters of a 
 city." (A. H. Mahan: Some Neglected Aspects of 
 War, p. 107.) 
 
 went considerably deeper in laying the foundations of govern- 
 ment than she had first attempted to do. The whole of Cuban 
 law underwent a radical revision, and when the second evacu- 
 ation took place in 1909, Americans had become much more 
 keenly conscious how serious was the task of securing good 
 government for the people they had freed. Many people con- 
 versant with Cuban conditions thought the evacuation pre- 
 mature, and experience has more or less borne out their appre- 
 hensions. Till 1913 the government of Cuba remained thor- 
 oughly bad. Public opinion in the United States became in- 
 creasingly convinced, especially during the negro risings of 
 1912, that a third occupation would be necessary. An im- 
 provement has taken place since the election of President 
 Menocal in 1913, but a serious doubt has grown up in the mind 
 of thoughtful Americans whether their policy is really ade- 
 quate. Cuba is a ward, she is not wholly and solely responsible 
 for her own actions, she has recognized the United States as 
 her guardian. But this guardianship is only potential. In 
 ordinary times it is in abeyance, and takes no stronger re- 
 form [a form] than that of diplomatic lectures." (Ibid, p. 
 85-7.) Professor Moore has given a brief and clear account 
 of the relations between the United States and the republics 
 to the south of us. ( J. B. Moore : Principles of American Di- 
 plomacy, p. 400-408; cf. also Dickinson: The Equality of 
 States, 1920, p. 246-7.) 
 
 In the ancient Hindoo philosophy, we find an interesting 
 statement of the objections incident to political control of one 
 state by another. Benoy Kinnar Sarkar, in his article discuss- 
 ing the doctrine of Mandala (American Political Science Re- 
 view, August, 1919, p. 400) quotes Shookra to the effect that 
 "Great misery comes of dependence on others. There is no 
 greater happiness than that from self rule," and Kautila's 
 remark on ' ' Foreign rule ' ' to the effect that such a ' ' country 
 is not treated as one's own land, it is impoverished, its wealth 
 carried off, or it is treated as a 'commercial article.' ' Mr. 
 Sarkar remarks that this description recalls John Stuart Mill 's 
 metaphor of the "cattle farm" applied to the "government 
 of one people by another. ' '
 
 SUPERVISION 305 
 
 The supervisory relationship is held by some to af- 
 fect the equality and the independence of the states 
 concerned, but this effect does not flow from the re- 
 gional control itself, but the regional control is merely 
 a recognition and a result of a condition which exists 
 de facto. It is of first importance for the successful 
 development of international law and the harmonious 
 conduct of international relations that this supervisory 
 control should be more fully understood and recognized 
 as a part of international law. 
 
 The following unimportant incident illustrated this 
 need of a better recognition of the correct principle: 
 When the French landed men in Hayti during the dis- 
 turbance in 1915, the account in the New York Sun, 
 June 23, stated: "As a result of the French having 
 landed men, it became necessary for the United States 
 to send a bigger ship and an officer of higher rank than 
 the Descartes and her commander." If the supervi- 
 sory control of the United States in Hayti were to be 
 fully recognized in international law, such a matter of 
 ceremonial procedure would give way to the more di- 
 rect authority of an American commander whatever 
 might be his rank or the size of his ship. 
 
 In practice this regional control is found to adapt 
 itself so perfectly to the practical application of the 
 principles of international law that this system, which 
 was at first a mere compromise applied in special in- 
 stances has now become an important part of our in- 
 ternational system. 35 
 
 35 See Stowell's Diplomacy of the War of 1914, p. 497-502. 
 Palmerston in a letter to Lord John Russell, Aug. 9, 1847, 
 frankly states the true status of Portugal and the reason why 
 its separate existence has been preserved. He writes, " . . . , 
 and it is only by maintaining Portugal in its separate exist- 
 ence, and in its intimate and protected state of alliance with 
 England, that we can be sure of having the Tagus as a friendly 
 instead of its being a hostile naval station." (Ashley's Life 
 of Palmerston, vol. I, p. 20.) 
 20
 
 306 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 Although this relationship of regional control has 
 not yet received that formal recognition which entitles 
 it to rank as law, it is so generally applied in practice 
 as to approximate law, and to make almost certain the 
 attainment of that status in the not distant future. For 
 the present, in international practice, whenever it is a 
 question of relations with a state within a regional con- 
 trol, it is important to remember: 
 
 (1) That the rule of noninterference does not apply 
 in actual practice to the relations between the para- 
 mount state and its wards unless due allowance is made 
 for the effect of this regional control. 
 
 (2) That any interference by a third state, that is 
 a state outside this regional control, with a state in- 
 cluded therein will probably, and not unreasonably, be 
 regarded by the paramount state as an unjustifiable 
 interference with its vital interests. 
 
 (3) That notwithstanding the foregoing, any state 
 may, when its international law rights are denied, pro- 
 ceed against the delinquent state to obtain redress, 
 provided always that a reasonable opportunity is af- 
 forded to the paramount state to undertake itself the 
 burden of exacting on the part of its ward a compli- 
 ance with its international obligations. Whenever the 
 paramount state is unwilling or unable to induce its 
 ward to fulfil its international obligations, the injured 
 state may interpose directly on its own account. 
 
 THE EUROPEAN CONCERT 
 
 The development of regional control or hegemony 
 of a great power is the natural course of development, 
 as is shown by the position of the United States on the 
 American Continent, and of Great Britain, France, and 
 Japan in Asia and in parts of Africa. Before the war, 
 Germany exercised a like influence over certain neigh-
 
 SUPERVISION 307 
 
 boring states. 36 But in Europe the great powers have 
 not been able to develop this particular control or su- 
 pervision over smaller and more backward states be- 
 cause of the proximity of the great states to one an- 
 other, and because of the keen rivalry between them. 37 
 
 The balancing of rival interests which has blocked 
 the action of any single state in Europe has made neces- 
 sary combined or collective intervention for the regula- 
 
 36 See Stowell : Diplomacy of the War of 1914, p. 496-502. 
 
 "This is the explanation of the following statement from 
 
 Lawrence : " We may, therefore, say that the supremacy 
 
 of the Great Powers is felt only in matters which are connected 
 more or less intimately with European politics, though they 
 may not belong geographically to Europe." (Lawrence: Es- 
 says on Some Disputed Questions in Modern International 
 Law, p. 229.) 
 
 Had Holland been in Asia and situated near a state like 
 Germany, it would have fallen under German control, but in 
 Europe Great Britain blocked the road. It was natural that 
 the Dutch, in the conduct of their foreign affairs, should defer 
 sufficiently to Great Britain to sustain British interest in the 
 continuance of Dutch independence, but, if Great Britain on 
 her part should presume too far upon this deference, the gov- 
 ernment of the Netherlands corrected this excess by inclining 
 toward Germany. By a similar policy of balance, other small 
 states of Europe have been able to maintain their inde- 
 pendence. They escape the dictation of a single power, and 
 are only compelled to accept the decrees of the powers acting 
 collectively. The position of Portugal is somewhat anomalous, 
 and may properly be classed as within the British sphere of in- 
 fluence. 
 
 Professor Edwin D. Dickinson, in his remarkable study 
 entitled, "The Equality of States in International Law," in 
 the course of his discussion of the action of the European Con- 
 cert, comments upon the status of Greece : " . . . but the truth 
 is that for nearly a century the great powers have governed 
 the affairs of Greece in a series of conferences in which that 
 state has not participated. " (E.D.Dickinson: The Equality 
 of States, p. 302.)
 
 308 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 tion and settlement of matters of common concern. 88 
 The most powerful states have found it expedient or 
 necessary to have recourse to such collective action so 
 frequently that it became customary to speak of them 
 in their collective capacity as the European Concert. 88 
 
 In the Balkans we find the best expression of this con- 
 certed action of the European powers to regulate in- 
 
 38 " whereas when the Great Powers guaranteed the 
 
 neutrality of Belgium, they fixed the international status of 
 the newly-created kingdom, and made its neutralization a 
 principle of public law. The consent of the lesser states was 
 not asked ; but they were tacitly assumed to be bound by the 
 acts of their more powerful neighbors. Similarly in such mat- 
 ters as recognition of independence, admission of another state 
 to the rank of a Great Power, and reception of a semi-civilized 
 state into the family of nations, the Great Powers act on be- 
 half of others as well as themselves. They speak in the name 
 of Europe, and bind it by their decisions. " (Lawrence: Es- 
 says on Some Disputed Questions in Modern International 
 Law, p. 231-2.) 
 
 Professor Pillet, discussing the fundamental rights of states, 
 recognizes the control of the principal powers over the conduct 
 of international affairs. He writes: ''The principal states 
 known as the Great Powers have acquired the direction of the 
 important interests which are of common concern. They de- 
 cide upon the improvements to be made in the positive law of 
 nations, they regulate the affairs which are of general inter- 
 est, they take action to obviate great dangers which threaten 
 them all. The Great Powers have, therefore, an evident su- 
 periority in fact which tends to become a superiority in law, 
 by reason of the continually increasing deference with which 
 their decisions are observed by the states concerned, even 
 though they might, speaking from a strictly legal viewpoint, 
 disregard decisions in regard to which they have not been con- 
 sulted. (Translated from Revue generate du droit interna- 
 tional public, Vol. 5, p. 71. Professor Pillet refers to Alfred 
 Chretien, Principes de droit international public, p. 171.) 
 
 Cf. also H. von Rotteck's (Recht der Einmischung, p. 95-6) 
 interesting remarks about the role of the European Concert; 
 Giinther (Volkerrecht, Vol. I (1787), p. 296) alludes to this 
 right of action. 
 
 39 President Wilson, in his war message to Congress says: 
 ' ' A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except 
 by a partnership of democratic nations. ' '
 
 SUPERVISION 309 
 
 ternational affairs and to prevent the outbreak of war 
 with its menace for the security of all the states. For 
 centuries the Turkish Empire had been disintegrating. 
 Russia and Austria were gnawing at its vitals. Their 
 procedure was to defend the Christian populations 
 against the oppressions of the Turks and to seek to in- 
 corporate them within their own empires, but the other 
 European states, who were not willing to allow this in- 
 crease of power to Austria and Russia, threw their in- 
 fluence toward the preservation of the Turkish Empire, 
 and, when this was impossible, they insisted upon the 
 establishment of small independent states. 40 For many 
 
 40 Professor Holland, in his book, The European Concert in 
 the Eastern Question, has collected the important documents 
 relative to this matter, and supplied brief historical introduc- 
 tions. In an introductory chapter, he says : 
 
 ' ' The assumption of a collective authority on the part of the 
 powers to supervise the solution of the Eastern question in 
 other words, to regulate the disintegration of Turkey has 
 been gradual. Such an authority has been exercised tenta- 
 tively since 1826, sj^stematically since 1856. It has been ap- 
 plied successively to Greece, to Egypt, to Syria, to the Danu- 
 bian principalities and the Balkan peninsula generally, to cer- 
 tain other of the European provinces of Turkey, to the Asiatic 
 boundaries of Turkey and Russia, and to the treatment of the 
 Armenians." (Holland: The European Concert in the East- 
 ern Question, p. 2.) 
 
 Another writer, F. W. Payn, remarks: "The relation of 
 the powers at the Berlin Conference to the Petty States which 
 they then called into existence are those of guardian and ward. 
 'If uncontrolled by Europe, the animosities and jealousies of 
 Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs, and Macedonians, preventing them 
 from acting in concert and leading to internecine conflicts, 
 might quickly lead to the reimposition of the Turkish yoke 
 upon her former provinces or more probably to an inter- 
 national conflict for the partition of Turkey, disturbing the 
 peace of the world and fatal to the independence of these little 
 States.' ' (F. W. Payn: Cromwell on Foreign Affairs, p. 
 85.) 
 
 Rolm-Jaequemyns, in his study of the oriental question 
 (Revue de droit international et de legislation comparee, Vol. 
 8, (1876), p. 367-9) recognized the right and the obligation of
 
 310 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 years Great Britain protected the Turkish Empire 
 against Austria and Russia until Germany took its 
 place and pursued a similar policy. The result has 
 been to place Turkey de facto in the position of a ward 
 of Europe, obliged to conform to the will of a European 
 Concert when it could speak with the force based upon 
 the agreement of the great powers, but when, after the 
 dissolution of the Dreibund, or Kaiserbund (1888), as 
 it was sometimes called, Russia and Austria became 
 partisans of rival political systems or groups, the 
 powers of Europe then found it expedient to substitute 
 for the previous European Concert a dual control in 
 which Austria and Russia should act for the two rival 
 alliances or political groups of Efurope. The other 
 powers counted upon this machinery to maintain the 
 status quo, for it was evident that these antagonists 
 could not agree on anything except it were a measure 
 necessary to prevent war or to protect the general in- 
 terests. 
 
 Aside from the rights of the Concert corresponding 
 to that of a paramount state in its sphere of influence, 
 the European Concert has an added authority which 
 comes from the fact that its action is collective. 41 
 
 the European powers to intervene in the Balkans to protect 
 the inhabitants from Turkish misrule. 
 
 41 When action is collective, the overwhelming force back of 
 the decision gives it in fact a deference similar to a precept 
 of law, and we may also regard the nations acting collectively 
 as the nations in conclave. Now a conclave of the nations 
 has always been recognized as the means of defining and 
 enforcing the law of nations, just as anciently and before the 
 development of more permanent and more highly differen- 
 tiated institutions, the gathering of the people interpreted 
 the law, and made provision for its execution. Hall recog- 
 nizes (4th ed., 95, p. 307), that "a somewhat wider range of 
 intervention than that which is possessed by individual states 
 may perhaps be conceded to the body of states, or to some of 
 them acting for the whole in good faith with sufficient 
 warrant."
 
 SUPERVISION 311 
 
 MANDATES 
 
 Everyone knows the elementary principle of admin- 
 istrative law that although it is for the many to advise, 
 performance should be left to one, and the Concert of 
 Europe has shown a tendency to conform to this rule 
 in the substitution of the dual Balkan control for the 
 old Concert. Following along this same line of rea- 
 soning, France's landing troops in Syria in 1860 has 
 been often spoken of as the carrying out of a man- 
 date from Europe. 42 The victory of the Allies has af- 
 forded an occasion to carry this idea still further, and 
 to recognize the mandates of certain powers to super- 
 vise the affairs of certain designated states or terri- 
 tories. They act as the agents, that is mandatories, of 
 the collectivity of powers making the assignment. 43 It 
 
 42 See R. Robin: Des Occupations, p. 281-5. We discuss 
 this incident more fully below 8 (a). 
 
 Because France was the tacit mandatory of Europe, Guizot 
 was justified in declaring: "When Charles X, in 1830, de- 
 clared hostilities against the Dey of Algiers, that could not 
 be called on our part a defensive war ; yet was it, nevertheless, 
 legitimate. In addition to the insult we had to revenge, we 
 also satisfied a great and lawful interest, not only French, but 
 European, by delivering the Mediterranean from the pirates 
 who had infested it for ages." (Guizot, Memoirs, Translated 
 by J. W. Cole, London, 1861, Vol. 4, p. 100.) 
 
 Professor Kebedgy draws a distinction between action as a 
 mandatory and the ordinary intervention of a single state. A 
 power acting in the capacity of a mandatory that is as the 
 delegate of the powers is, he says permitted to act ' ' only with 
 the consent of the others and within the limits of the authori- 
 zation. ' ' ( Translated from Kebedgy : Intervention, p. 82. ) 
 
 43 See Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
 which is in part a codification of principles long acted upon. 
 Cf. Secretary Colby's note to Earl Curzon of November 20, 
 1920, relative to the British mandate over the Mesopotamian 
 oil fields (published in the press November 26, 1920), in 
 which he speaks of "the establishment of the mandate prin- 
 ciple" as "a new principle": but the treaty only gives a
 
 312 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 would, perhaps, be accurate to say as the mandatory of 
 Europe, since these same powers exercise, for the pres- 
 ent at least, a paramount control over European af- 
 fairs. 
 
 These so-called mandates, if prolonged and associ- 
 ated with a particular state or region, would approxi- 
 mate the regional control discussed above, and to the 
 extent of the terms of the recognition thereby accord- 
 ed, the supervision of any power within the region of 
 its control now exercised de facto will become de jure 
 an institution of the public law of nations. 44 
 
 verbal recognition to an institution which has long existed in 
 practice, although it has heretofore been an expedient of a 
 somewhat exceptional nature. 
 
 A few other instances where mandatory is used in this sense 
 are Lawrence : Some Disputed Questions in Modern Interna- 
 tional Law, p. 230; Hershey: Principles of International 
 Law, p. 151. 
 
 "Nevertheless, mandates may be assigned for the control 
 of regions which have hitherto had no intimate relationship 
 with the paramount or trustee state, as was indicated by the 
 offer to the United States of a mandate over Armenia. 
 
 President Wilson in his message to Congress, May 24, 1920, 
 advising that the United States accept the proffered mandate 
 over Armenia, quoted from the appeal of the San Remo con- 
 ference a portion which dwells upon the advantageous posi- 
 tion of the United States to undertake the task because of its 
 
 disinterested situation ' ' because they believe, ' ' so the 
 
 appeal read, "that the appearance on the scene of a power 
 emancipated from the prepossessions of the Old World will 
 inspire a wider confidence and afford a firmer guarantee for 
 stability in the future than would the selection of any Euro- 
 pean power." (Congressional Record, May 24, 1920, p. 
 7533.) 
 
 The American Military Mission to Armenia, known as the 
 Harboard Mission, in its report dated October 16, 1919, 
 gives an account of the frightful treatment to which the 
 Armenians have been subjected, and considers under what 
 conditions one of the great powers might undertake as a 
 mandatory the supervisory control of the country. This re- 
 port contains a valuable statement of the nature of the task, 
 and formulates reasons for and against the acceptance by the
 
 SUPERVISION 313 
 
 The exercise by a great state of police and super- 
 visory powers over a small state seems at first appear- 
 ance to impinge upon the equality of the small state, 
 and to interfere with that independence to which it is 
 entitled under the law of nations. There is, however, 
 no violation of international law since the supervising 
 state can only use its authority to compel the super- 
 vised state to fulfil its international obligations. Any 
 supervisory action not reasonably necessary to this end 
 is an abuse of force, and is not rightly classed as police 
 or supervisory action. 45 
 
 The state may be worthy of respect for its culture 
 and for its influence, yet lack the material resources or 
 traits of character necessary to enable it unaided to 
 discharge its international obligations. We should 
 recognize that the state supervised may possibly be, in 
 certain respects at least, superior to the supervising 
 power. In any event, no good can come of denying the 
 facts of international relations and trying to sustain a 
 theoretical equality of states which has no foundation 
 in practice nor in law when the true principles of in- 
 ternational law are correctly understood and applied. 46 
 
 In international law, rights are always correlative 
 with duties, and no state can expect to retain the right 
 
 United States of the mandate, should it be offered. In the 
 enumeration of the motives which may influence this country 
 in reaching a conclusion, we find a good statement of certain 
 of the motives which are generally present and often potent 
 to induce states to intervene in the internal affairs of other 
 states. 
 
 45 In the case of mandates under the Covenant of the League 
 of Nations Article 22 seeks to prevent such abuse of power 
 by the requirement that "the mandatory shall render to the 
 Council an annual report in reference to the territory com- 
 mitted to its charge." 
 
 46 Dr. T. J. Lawrence, discussing the Concert of Europe, 
 touches upon this question :
 
 314 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 of sovereign decision, called independence, when by its 
 conduct it makes clear that it cannot fulfil the inter- 
 
 "If, then, the principles and rules of the law of nations 
 are really to be deduced from the practice of nations when- 
 ever that practice is consistent and uniform, it is time, I 
 think, to give up the doctrine of equality in deference to the 
 stern logic of established facts. For many years Europe has 
 been working around again to the old notion of a common 
 superior, not indeed a Pope or an Emperor, but a Committee, 
 a body of representatives of her leading states. During the 
 greater part of the present century England, France, Austria, 
 Prussia and Russia, have exercised a kind of superintendence 
 over European affairs under the name of the Great Powers, 
 and in 1867 Italy was invited to join them. An examination 
 of the history of a few important international transactions 
 will show the growth of what is called the Concert of Europe, 
 and will enable us to discern in some degree the nature and 
 limits of its functions. It will at the same time reveal to us 
 a difference in kind as well as in degree between the rights of 
 sovereign states under modern International Law. (T. J. 
 Lawrence : Some Disputed Questions in Modern International 
 Law, 209-210.) 
 
 G. F. de Martens (Precis, 119), over a century ago, spoke 
 "of states of small or medium size which, however sovereign 
 they may be in theory, are affected in their freedom to enter 
 into agreements out of regard to powers that keep them in a 
 very real dependence while they preserve the outward appear- 
 ance of a formal independence." 
 
 Sheldon Amos refers to this question ' ' in order, " as he re- 
 marks, "to show that a purely legal dogma of an abstract 
 equality cannot take the place of true political equality." 
 (Remedies for War, p. 63.) 
 
 Westlake remarks: 
 
 "The rights of equality and independence are often reck- 
 oned among the inherent rights of states. With regard to the 
 first, semi-sovereign or dependent states are manifestly un- 
 equal to sovereign or independent ones, and even the latter 
 are ranked for ceremonial matters in an order of precedence, 
 while it is not pretended that they are or ought to be equal 
 to one another in the influence which accompanies strength. 
 Their equality consists in the fact that in the received prin- 
 ciples and rules of international law, other than those of a 
 ceremonial nature, no distinction is made between great states 
 and small, so that the influence of strength is only lawful
 
 SUPERVISION 315 
 
 national law obligations of an independent and sov- 
 ereign state. In so far as the state under tutelage is 
 
 when exerted in modes which the right of self-defence does 
 not authorize those on which it is exerted to resist. Thus 
 considered, and there is really no other way of considering it, 
 the equality of sovereign states is merely their independence 
 under a different name." (Westlake: International Law, 
 Vol. I, p. 321.) 
 
 The recently published study on ''The Equality of States 
 in International Law/' by Professor Edwin D. Dickinson of 
 the University of Michigan, has given us a thorough and 
 scientific study of this doctrine of equality. This is a work 
 of unusual merit and is almost certain to correct the pre- 
 vailing misconceptions as to state equality. Mr. Dickinson, 
 in his conclusion, writes : 
 
 "The principle of equality has an important legal signifi- 
 cance in the modern law of nations. It is the expression of two 
 important legal principles. The first of these may be called 
 the equal protection of the law or equality before the law. 
 States are equal before the law when they are equally pro- 
 tected in the enjoyment of their rights and equally compelled 
 to fulfil their obligations. Equality before the law is not 
 inconsistent with the grouping of states into classes and the 
 attributing to the members of each class of a status which is 
 the measure of capacity for rights. Neither is it inconsistent 
 with inequalities of representation, voting power, and con- 
 tribution in international organizations. The second prin- 
 ciple is usually described as equality of rights and obligations 
 or more often as equality of rights. The description is a 
 heritage from theories of natural law and natural right. 
 What is really meant is an equality of capacity for rights. 
 Equality in this sense is the negation of status. If applied 
 without qualification in international organizations it requires 
 equal representation, voting power, and contribution. 
 Equality before the law is absolutely essential to a stable 
 society of nations. If it is denied the alternatives are uni- 
 versal empire or universal anarchy. Equality of capacity 
 for rights, on the other hand, is not essential to the reign of 
 law. Strictly speaking, it has never been anything more than 
 an ideal in any system of law. Among states, where there is 
 such an utter want of homogeneity in the physical bases for 
 separate existence, there are important limitations upon its 
 utility even as an ideal. " (Dickinson : The Equality of States 
 in International Law, pp. 334-5.)
 
 316 INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
 
 able to fulfil its duties, let it lay claim to exercise the 
 corresponding attributes of independence, and let the 
 trustee state, supported by the public opinion of the 
 other states, and if need be by their intervention, hasten 
 to help and not to retard this progress toward full in- 
 dependence and sovereign statehood. When a state 
 ignores its obligations, be it in even an isolated in- 
 stance, it is liable to encounter the interposition of the 
 state it has wronged, or the intervention of other states 
 who perceive that such conduct constitutes an assaalt 
 upon the principles sacred to them all, and necessary 
 to the preservation of international society. So re- 
 garded, all justifiable intervention is a case of super- 
 vision instituted for the governance of a particular 
 matter. In the succeeding sections, we shall examine 
 the occasions in which such intervention is justifiable.
 
 CHAPTER HI 
 
 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 11. INTERFERENCE 
 
 We have seen that there are certain cases when a 
 state is warranted in using force, either to secure re- 
 dress for an injury, or to protect international society 
 by enforcing respect for law and by preventing the 
 abuse of a right. Such instances of intervention are of 
 frequent occurrence, but we have still to examine cer- 
 tain other instances before we shall be in a position to 
 decide whether the grounds upon which recourse to 
 force is defended are to be condemned as unjustifiable 
 interference. Interference as between states may be de- 
 fined as the unwarranted reliance upon force to con- 
 strain an independent state to adopt or to refrain from 
 a particular course of action. 
 
 Since interference may result from menace as well as 
 from the employment of actual force, it is important to 
 distinguish between counsel offered in a friendly spirit, 
 and similar ' ' advice ' ' which carries with it a threat of 
 execution by force. 47 This distinction gives us no diffi- 
 culty. It is only necessary to bear in mind that whether 
 
 47 The same distinction based upon the absence of constraint 
 hold as regards intercession, good offices, and mediation, the 
 consideration of which must be reserved for a later volume 
 on the procedure for the settlement of international con- 
 troversies. 
 
 Westlake remarks : " the tender of advice to a foreign 
 
 government, even about the internal affairs of its state, is not 
 
 317
 
 318 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 force is actually used or not, there is interference when- 
 ever an independent state is in fact restrained from 
 the free exercise of its sovereign rights under inter- 
 national law by an intimation, however covert, of an 
 intention to employ force to influence its action. 48 
 
 intervention and violates no right, though it is generally 
 injudicious. Statesmen must remember that though govern- 
 ments and states are different, and it is to states that the rights 
 given by international law belong, yet it is governments that 
 they have to live with and whose susceptibilities they will 
 therefore find it needful to consult." (Westlake: Interna- 
 tional Law, Vol. I, p. 320-321.) 
 
 "Usually the intimation is not given in so crude a form as 
 to amount to a threat of force. A word to wise governments 
 is sufficient, and from even the slightest hint, a small state 
 understands what its greater neighbor wishes. A refusal to 
 acquiesce will bring into play against it the wide reaching 
 influence of the great state, and unless the smaller state can 
 counter by some retaliatory action sufficiently important to 
 act as a deterrent, it must expect to feel the full weight of 
 the great state's hostility exercised in a peaceful but un- 
 friendly manner. The consequences may be very disastrous 
 to the small state. The smaller state usually yields perforce 
 to the dictation of the greater, and avoids the disagreeable 
 consequences which would result from an insistence upon its 
 rights. We have then a veritable instance of interference, 
 but it is one which neither of the states concerned cares to 
 proclaim as such. 
 
 The essential object of investigation in any instance ought 
 to be to discover whether an undue influence has been exerted 
 upon the government to induce it to adopt a desired course 
 in such a manner as really to affect its freedom of action. 
 
 The mere fact that a particular course is adopted by a 
 small state from fear that otherwise the great neighbor will 
 make it suffer does not constitute an act of interference unless 
 the great state has given an intimation or warning which 
 thereby attaches to the act a greater certainty of a disagree- 
 able consequence. 
 
 The anticipation that the greater state may use force is the 
 ordinary condition of interstate life, but an intimation to 
 the effect that force will be used is an attempt to control the 
 weaker state by duress. Should an intimation be disregarded
 
 INTERFERENCE 319 
 
 In discussing interference, the writers generally con- 
 fine themselves to internal affairs, but there would seem 
 
 under such circumstances, it is almost certain that the inter- 
 fering state will make an especial effort to let the other state 
 pay the penalty of its temerity. 
 
 Halleck perceives that a menace of force may constitute 
 an interference. He says: " Armed intervention, [i. e., 
 forcible interference] on the contrary, consists in threatened 
 or actual force, employed, or to be employed, by one state in 
 regulating or determining the conduct or affairs of another." 
 (Halleck: International Law, ch XIV, 12, p. 335.) 
 
 But so keen an observer as Stapleton would make the 
 actual employment of force the criterion of interference. 
 This is to confuse the means with the purpose, as so frequently 
 occurs. He says: 
 
 ''Of all the principles in the code of international law, the 
 most important the one on which the independent existence 
 of all weaker states must depend is this : No state has a right 
 FORCIBLY to interfere in the internal concerns of another 
 state, unless there exists a casus belli against it. For, if every 
 powerful state has a right at its pleasure forcibly to interfere 
 with the affairs of its weaker neighbors, it is obvious no weak 
 state can be really independent. The constant and general 
 violation of this law would be, in fact, to establish the law 
 of the strongest. 
 
 "This principle as here laid down is the true principle of 
 'non-intervention' [non-interference]. But by leaving out 
 the word forcible, and by then applying it, without limitation 
 or explanation, much confusion respecting it has arisen. 
 
 "It is essential, therefore, that it should be correctly de- 
 fined; for, taking it in the broad sense in which it is some- 
 times taken, as forbidding all kinds of intervention [interfer- 
 ence] in the internal affairs of neighboring states, it is neither 
 defensible in theory nor harmless in practice." (A. G. 
 Stapleton : Intervention and Non-intervention, London, 1866, 
 p. 6.) 
 
 Professor Kebedgy (Intervention, p. 9) with a similar opin- 
 ion, quotes Kant's Essay on Perpetual Peace to the effect 
 that: "No state should forcibly mix in the constitution and 
 government of another state." 
 
 As regards the statement that the actual use of force is not 
 an essental idea of interference, we cannot do better than 
 quote Sir Robert Morier's answer to the Duke of Cambridge,
 
 320 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 to be no sufficient reason for insisting upon this limita- 
 tion. 49 No doubt interference in international affairs 
 is generally a more serious offense, and will be found 
 
 who did not see how Great Britain could intervene to stop 
 the Franco-German war without an army: "I ventured to 
 observe that there were certain moves on the political chess- 
 board which necessarily led to checkmate, and that good 
 players did not go on playing after these were executed." 
 (Memoirs of Sir Robert Morier, II, 153.) 
 
 Russia interfered at Olmiitz (1850) just as surely as if 
 force had been employed. France, Germany and Russia 
 interfered between Japan and China in 1896, just as surely 
 as if the ships of war assembled in Chinese waters had belched 
 forth their fire. 
 
 Pellegrino Rossi states this principle clearly, although his 
 definition of interference is restricted to internal affairs, and 
 does not include intermeddling in foreign relations. He says, 
 "There is said to be intervention [interference] when a state 
 mixes in the internal affairs of another state for the purpose 
 of modifying its political system. That the intervening 
 [interfering] state acts through menace, through invasion, or 
 through any other means of constraint, and whether upon its 
 own initiative, or upon the request of one of the parties that 
 divide the state where the intervention [interference] takes 
 place, is of slight importance." (Translated from Rossi's 
 article on Intervention in Archives de droit et de legislation, 
 Vol. I, (1837), p. 357.) 
 
 Frederick de Martens says: "Intervention [interference] 
 takes place by means of diplomatic notes or by force of arms ' ' 
 (Bergbohm's German Edition, Vol. I, p. 299). 
 
 De Floeckher writes: "Intervention [interference] exists 
 from the moment that notice of the demand is given to the 
 state upon which it is made, and it is not necessary that it be 
 enforced for the state often yields to the pressure brought to 
 bear upon it." (de Floeckher: Intervention, p. 4, cf. also 
 Geffcken in Holtzendorff's Handbuch, Vol. IV, p. 131-2.) 
 
 Professor Berner also perceives that the actual use of force 
 is not essential to constitute intervention. (Berner article on 
 Intervention in the Deutsches Staats-Worterbuch (1861), Vol. 
 V, p. 341.) 
 
 49 Some of those who limit intervention to internal affairs are 
 Rossi: Intervention, Archives de droit, (1837), p. 357; H. 
 von Rotteck : Recht der Einmischung, 1845, p. 17 ; Bernard : 
 Intervention, 1860, p. 1 ; Carnazza Amari ; Non-intervention,
 
 INTERFERENCE 321 
 
 to be less frequently extenuated by circumstances. 
 Nevertheless, the use of force or the reliance thereon 
 to dictate a sovereign state's conduct of foreign af- 
 fairs is just as certainly an act of interference. Inter- 
 ference abroad, equally with interference at home, 
 hinders a state in the exercise of the rights which be- 
 long to it by virtue of its sovereignty, independence, 
 and equality. 
 
 It follows then that non-interference in foreign as 
 well as internal affairs is the correct rule of state con- 
 duct. But no state has a right to make an abusive use 
 of its independence and to insist that it may pursue its 
 selfish course without regard to the consequences for 
 its neighbors. International law, guided by the experi- 
 ence and practice of states, has qualified the general 
 rule of non-interference to admit certain other grounds 
 of intervention which have been recognized as justi- 
 fiable and more worthy of consideration than would be 
 an insistence upon pushing to an abusive extreme the 
 right of unrestricted independence of action in the con- 
 duct of a state *s internal and external affairs. 
 
 In the following sections, we shall now consider the 
 various grounds upon which states justify their en- 
 croachments upon the independence of their neighbors, 
 and we shall be particularly interested to define any of 
 these grounds of action before which the rule of non- 
 interference gives way to recognize a just ground of 
 intervention. 
 
 in the Revue de droit internatioml (1873), Vol. V, p. 353; 
 Rougier : Les Guerres Civiles, 1903, p. 328. 
 
 Among the authorities who expressly include external af- 
 fairs as well as internal are Vidari: Intervento, 1868, p. 5; 
 Kebedgy: Intervention, 1890, p. 37; The Standard Diction- 
 ary; Cavalieri: Intervento, 1913, p. 8. 
 21
 
 322 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 12. VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 Without attempting to exercise constraint, a state 
 will sometimes attempt to perform within the juris- 
 diction of another state acts of sovereignty, that is acts 
 of authority which may under international law be per- 
 formed only by the local sovereign. 50 Within another's 
 jurisdiction, no state may perform any acts of authori- 
 ty unless permission has either been given by the local 
 sovereign, or derived from some undisputed principle 
 of international law. The performance of any act of 
 authority constitutes a violation of sovereignty, and is 
 an offense which no really independent self-respecting 
 state will tolerate. 51 
 
 There is a similar violation of sovereignty if a state 
 attempts through penal enactments to compel indi- 
 viduals, while outside its own jurisdiction, to obey its 
 commands in disrespect of the provisions of the local 
 law wherever they may be. These two classes of in- 
 stances are sometimes spoken of as acts of interfer- 
 ence, but they are not the same as the other acts of inter- 
 ference discussed in the preceding section. For the of- 
 fended sovereign is not constrained, but insulted, and 
 immediately demands redress for the injury. If it 
 should happen that the injured state meekly accepts 
 the insult, then the violation of sovereignty merges into 
 
 50 The action we are discussing does not include what we 
 have called self-help (see above 1), for self-help is really 
 cooperation. 
 
 51 As examples of violations of sovereignty which are cur- 
 rently spoken of as interference, we may take the case of 
 Crampton, the British Minister in the United States, who, at 
 the time of the Crimean War, was given his passports for 
 violating American neutrality and sovereignty in inducing 
 recruits to proceed to Canada for enlistment in the war 
 against Russia. (See Crampton 's Case, Stowell and Munro: 
 International Cases, Vol. II, pp. 278-285.)
 
 VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY 323 
 
 interference, for we may consider that it is virtually 
 constraint that causes the injured state to forego its 
 demand for redress. 
 
 There are other acts somewhat analogous, although 
 they cannot be classed as violations of sovereignty, 
 as when, for example, foreign representatives try to 
 exert an indirect influence upon the government to 
 which they are accredited, in order to induce it to con- 
 form to some desired policy. This may be done 
 through the medium of the press, or through individu- 
 als of influence in government circles. There is also 
 said to be interference when the agents of a foreign 
 government pass over the heads of those with whom 
 they are expected to negotiate in an attempt to bring 
 pressure to bear upon the government to induce it to 
 conform to their wishes. 
 
 This indirect influence is always resented by the gov- 
 ernment against which it is directed, even when it does 
 not consider that the mano3uvre has been successful, 
 and by general agreement, the rules of international 
 law and diplomatic intercourse have come to set bounds 
 to the political activity of foreign agents. To overstep 
 them is to be guilty of a disrespect to the local sov- 
 ereign and in a lesser degree to commit an infraction 
 of its sovereign rights. 52 A good name for these lesser 
 infractions would be "contempt of sovereignty." 53 
 
 "Another British Minister, Lord Sackville West, in 1888 
 was peremptorily dismissed by Grover Cleveland because he 
 was shown to have advised a correspondent, supposedly of 
 British origin, to vote for the reelection of Cleveland. 
 (Stowell and Munro: International Cases, Vol. 1, p. 10.) 
 Such a serious transgression as this was a violation of interna- 
 tional law, and not merely a disregard of international comity 
 or courtesy. 
 
 58 An illustration of such violation or contempt of the 
 sovereign authority of the receiving state was the action of 
 Ambassador Bernstorff, or his agents, in publishing a warning
 
 324 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 Even though there be no use of force in those in- 
 stances of interference which constitute a disregard or 
 disrespect of sovereignty, there is an insult which un- 
 less it be redressed, will lessen the respect, and hence 
 the independence and equality of the state in question. 
 A self-respecting state will not willingly submit to such 
 treatment, and constraint only can explain the sub- 
 mission of a state which is willing to purchase safety 
 at the expense of its honor. 
 
 Another less flagrant incident of such disrespect was 
 recently reported in the press: Dr. Julio Bianchi, 
 Minister of Guatemala, called upon Senator Moses, a 
 member of the Foreign Relations Committee in refer- 
 ence to a Senate resolution "asking the State Depart- 
 ment to explain this [U. S.] government's attitude 
 towards the treatment accorded former President Es- 
 trada Cabrera of Guatemala by the new government in 
 the Central American republic." (New York Times, 
 Dec. 12, 1920, p. 14.) Shortly thereafter, in a communi- 
 cation to the Department of State, Minister Bianchi of- 
 fered an explanation of his conduct, and added "that 
 he regretted the incident, and promised that it would 
 not be repeated. ' ' (New York Times, Dec. 24, 1920.) 
 
 A similar incident to the above occurred about this 
 same time. The first Secretary of the British Em- 
 bassy, during the illness of the Ambassador, dis- 
 patched directly to the Chairman of the Senate Com- 
 mittee investigating cable communication "a denial of 
 the testimony given by a witness before the committee 
 that the British Government censored cable messages 
 to the United States from Great Britain. ' ' (New York 
 
 in the newspapers, advising passengers not to embark upon 
 the Lusitania. Of course such a warning could properly 
 emanate from no government but that of the United States. 
 It does not benefit the cause of peace or national honor to 
 tolerate such conduct on the part of a foreign diplomat.
 
 VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY 325 
 
 Times, Dec. 24, 1920; Of. Washington Star, Dec. 23, 
 1920; Washington Post, Dec. 26, 1920.) To judge by 
 the statements in the press, the State Department con- 
 sidered it necessary to notice these departures from the 
 usual procedure of diplomatic intercourse. 
 
 Governments are particularly sensitive to any re- 
 marks made in regard to political matters under dis- 
 cussion in the legislature. It is evident that a foreign 
 representative must be allowed to communicate po- 
 litely and discreetly to the minister of foreign affairs 
 the consequences which he believes will result from the 
 adoption of the proposed measure but he must not go 
 one step further and state what his government will 
 do, or give publicity to his views, for he then attempts 
 either to impose the views of his own government, or 
 he usurps advisory functions in the place of the con- 
 stituted authorities. Professor Moore states this well 
 recognized rule: "It is not permissible for one sov- 
 ereign to address another sovereign on political ques- 
 tions pending in the latter 's domains, unless invited to 
 do so." 54 (Digest, VI: 5.) 
 
 "Col. Repington relates the incident of the former Kaiser's 
 letter to Lord Tweedmouth, dated February 2, 1908, in which 
 William II tried to allay the apprehension caused Great 
 Britain by Germany 's naval plans. Col. Repington was prob- 
 ably justified in considering this as an attempt to influence 
 in German interest a British Minister at a most critical 
 moment before the estimates for the Navy were coming on in 
 Parliament. The Kaiser's action was severely criticized in 
 the Times, but the English press in general seems to have been 
 inclined to minimize the matter. (Col. Charles A. Repington: 
 Vestigia, London, 1919, p. 284-292.) 
 
 The same writer tells how, because he criticized certain well- 
 known defects of the German Army, the Kaiser, ' ' ordered his 
 new Ambassador, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, to see 
 Colonel Seely, then Secretary of War, and to demand my 
 dismissal from the position of editor" of The Army Review, 
 an organ of the British General Staff. "The Ambassador," 
 writes Col. Repington, "received a very crisp answer for his
 
 326 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 After Viscount Grey returned from his mission to 
 the United States, he published a letter in the London 
 Times in which he discussed the ratification of the 
 League of Nations Covenant. He explained the con- 
 stitutional functions of the Senate in regard to treaties 
 and the reason for the opposition to certain provisions 
 of the League Covenant, and he lent his support in 
 favor of certain modifications to meet these objections. 
 Now President Wilson had been insisting that there 
 must be no modification of the articles, and Lord 
 Grey's letter could not help annoying him, but there 
 was absolutely no possible ground upon which to base 
 a complaint. Lord Grey had done no more than ex- 
 plain informally for the British public what it was 
 right that they should be told. If the real purport was 
 to inform the Senate that the British Government was 
 less insistent upon an unamended treaty than was 
 President Wilson, it was an able piece of diplomacy, 
 a worthy example of the art. (See press reports : Feb. 
 6, 1920.) 
 
 The Sun and New York Herald (Feb. 6, 1920) gives 
 the following interviews with Senator Hitchcock, 
 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
 and generally regarded as President Wilson's spokes- 
 man: 
 
 1 * Senator Hitchcock insisted the Grey letter has been 
 greatly overrated as to its importance and effect on 
 the Senate situation. He issued a call for a conference 
 of Democrats friendly to ratification to be held Satur- 
 day afternoon. 
 
 impudence, but never knew how he had scored off me. My 
 intention had been to give up this work when the Staff journal 
 was in going order, and as this moment had come I wished to 
 pass on the work to some one else. But it was impracticable 
 for Colonel Seely or for me to submit to German dictation, 
 and therefore I had to remain on for six months or so, much 
 against my will."
 
 VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY 327 
 
 "Admitting that he had received a number of com- 
 munications from the White House, Senator Hitch- 
 cock said none had borne on the general proposition of 
 the treaty. 
 
 " 'Has there been any change in the President's at- 
 titude?' he was asked. 
 
 " 'I do not think I can tell you that,' was the reply. 
 'But I do not think the Grey letter will have much 
 effect. It may affect the men who have thought the 
 Allies would reject the treaty if we attached the Lodge 
 reservations to it, but I never have believed they would 
 object if we left the reservation subject to acceptance 
 by acquiescence. There would have been danger if we 
 had left in the preamble the requirement that the reser- 
 vations be accepted in writing. 
 
 " 'The Grey letter seems to have been written for 
 several purposes. One was to allay the feeling in 
 Great Britain against the United States. Another was 
 to help procure ratification here by making clear that 
 Britain had no objection to the Lodge reservations. 
 Nearly everybody had understood that. 
 
 " 'Before he left Washington I talked with Lord 
 Grey and learned that his government did not seek six 
 votes for the Empire and had little concern about 
 them ; but the British Government felt it would be em- 
 barrassed in its relations with the colonies and domin- 
 ions if. they were disfranchised. To declare that 
 America would not be bound by any decision in which 
 it took part would be equivalent to disfranchisement. 
 I do not think Britain is concerned how many votes we 
 have, but she does object to depriving her dominions of 
 their votes. 
 
 ' ' ' Publication of the Grey letter in the press was an 
 extraordinary proceeding for a government official. 
 He could not do it here and he did it for a purpose. It 
 seems to have been intended to placate British feelings
 
 328 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 against the United States and I do not regard it as a 
 discourteous act. Lord Grey observed every propriety 
 while here. ' 
 
 The New York Times (February 6, 1920), states: 
 
 "The one definite conclusion obtained from the 
 White House announcement of to-day was that officials 
 close to the President feel that Lord Grey, who still 
 holds the rank of Special Ambassador to the United 
 States, although he has returned to London, adopted 
 a rather exceptional course in publicly expressing 
 views which he must have known were in entire discord 
 with the public utterances of the President in regard to 
 the treaty situation. 
 
 1 * The fact that Lord Grey, in his letter to the London 
 Times, states that he spoke as an individual and not in 
 the role of representative of his Government, has not 
 been looked upon as materially changing the situation 
 developed, especially in view of the fact that, as pub- 
 lished in the New York Times on Monday, he showed 
 to more than one Senator, during his visit here, a cable- 
 gram from Premier Lloyd George in which the latter 
 stated that the Lodge reservations were satisfactory, 
 and that England wanted the United States to enter 
 the League of Nations. 
 
 "The publication of this information by the New 
 York Times has attracted almost as much interest as 
 the Grey communication to the London Times itself. 
 There has been no effort to deny that such a cablegram 
 existed and made its appearance in Washington at 
 some of the conferences which Lord Grey held with 
 Republican and Democratic Senators. In fact, several 
 Senators have admitted either seeing or hearing of the 
 cablegram and Senator Borah has had his version of 
 the text of the now famous message included in the 
 Congressional Record as part of an address attacking 
 the League.'*
 
 ASSISTANCE 329 
 
 13. ASSISTANCE 
 
 The efficacy of international society is, as we have 
 seen, dependent upon the cooperation by the states 
 whenever such cooperation is required to preserve the 
 existence of a member state or to enable its government 
 to fulfil its obligations under international law. It is 
 not to be expected that any state will expend in this 
 cooperation so great a portion of its resources as to 
 endanger its own security or to prove an intolerable 
 burden. The amount of the sacrifice which the cooper- 
 ating state will make for this purpose will depend part- 
 ly upon the benefits which it expects ultimately to de- 
 rive from its effort, and partly upon its regard for the 
 common good. The hope of enjoying a similar benefit 
 when the circumstances are reversed also enters into 
 the calculation. Reasoning a priori from this indis- 
 putable premise, international law would appear to 
 justify states in coming to the assistance of a sister 
 state to help it to suppress rebellion and preserve its 
 orderly life. History affords us many precedents and 
 certain of the older authorities also support this view. 55 
 
 55 "It was customary," writes Rougier, "in the 16th and 
 17th centuries to stipulate in peace treaties that in the event 
 that one of the contracting states should find itself involved 
 in a rebellion, the other states would refuse to the insurgents 
 every manner of succor ; cease all commerce with them ; and 
 deliver them into the hands of their sovereign. " (A. Rougier : 
 Guerres civiles, p. 374 ; refers to De Olivart : Del reconocim- 
 iento de belligerancia y sus effectos immediatos, Madrid, 
 1895, p. 4; for interesting details relative to the Anglo- 
 Spanish treaty of November 15, 1630, and the Franco-Spanish 
 treaty, Pyrenees, 1659.) 
 
 As similar in principle, we may refer to the treaty of March 
 15, 1834, between Austria, Prussia and Russia for the ex- 
 tradition of political offenders, including those who had risen 
 against their governments. (British State Papers, vol. 53, 
 1862-3, p. 872-3; cf. ibid, p. 871-2.)
 
 330 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 Even as late as 1860, Theodore D. Woolsey, whose 
 opinions are still highly esteemed, wrote : " . . . there is 
 nothing in the law of nations which forbids one nation 
 to render assistance to the established government in 
 such case of revolt, if its assistance is invoked. This 
 aid is no interference, and is given to keep up the pres- 
 ent order of things, which international law takes 
 under its protection." 56 (Woolsey: Introduction to 
 International Law, 1st ed., 1860, 41, p. 89 ; also 6th 
 ed., 42, p. 43.) 
 
 But this theory has a serious imperfection. It does 
 not work in practice. By the test of actual experience, 
 it has been tried and found wanting. 57 The assistance 
 which a state accords its struggling neighbor has been 
 found to deepen the hostile feelings of the factions, to 
 discredit the sovereign, and to render it suspect of de- 
 pendence upon the will of the helping state. 
 
 By other states the transaction is regarded with ut- 
 most jealousy, since it often presages a close alliance, 
 and the state rendering assistance likewise becomes the 
 target of all the disappointed parties in the assisted 
 state. Its action engenders undying hatred. For all 
 these reasons, assistance for the purpose of suppress- 
 
 56 Geffcken quotes Guizot as saying that the French inter- 
 vention in Spain, "... in spite of its success, brought no good, 
 either to Spain or to France. It delivered Spain over to the 
 incapable and incurable despotism of Ferdinand VII, without 
 putting an end to revolutions, and substituted the ferocities 
 of the absolutists in place of the anarchists. Instead of the 
 maintenance of French influence beyond the Pyrenees being 
 assured, it was injured and destroyed." (Translated from 
 Holtzendorff: Handbuch des Voelkerrechts, vol. IV, 143.) 
 
 Russia's interference to assist Austria to crush the Hun- 
 garian uprising had much to do with arousing public opinion 
 against the intermeddler, who was punished at Sebastopol. 
 In this case, it might be said that Russia interfered to serve 
 a national interest in assisting to suppress an uprising in close 
 proximity to her Polish provinces. 
 
 "See Bluntschli : Voelkerrecht, 474.
 
 4 . ASSISTANCE 331 
 
 ing insurrection can no longer be justified as in accord 
 with the approved practice of civilized states, and since 
 it has been condemned in practice, assistance may 
 properly be classified as unjustifiable. It is therefore 
 an instance of interference. 58 
 
 Funck-Brentano and Sorel point out that a govern- 
 ment exceeds its authority when it calls upon foreign 
 help: 
 
 "When a state intervenes [interferes] to sustain the 
 internal government of another state, in accordance 
 with the wishes of the latter, the intervention [inter- 
 ference] results from an alliance; but this alliance is 
 of a peculiar nature, for the government which asks or 
 accepts the intervention [interference] of a foreign 
 state itself attacks the sovereignty of the state which 
 it directs. Such a government demonstrates its in- 
 capacity to make its authority respected by the sub- 
 jects of the state, and it declares by implication that it 
 has allowed the sovereignty of the state to perish. 
 States are not states, are not sovereign, and are not 
 
 58 Bluntschli contradicts what he has said ( 474) and falls 
 into error by declaring that ' ' intervention is authorized when 
 the state itself either requests a friendly power to intervene 
 or accepts an offer to do so." (Translated from Lardy 's 
 French edition, 475.) 
 
 But Hall remarks: "As interventions, in so far as they 
 purport to be made in compliance with an invitation, are 
 independent of the reasons or pretexts which have been 
 already discussed, it must be assumed that they are based 
 either on simple friendship or upon a sentiment of justice. 
 If intervention on the ground of mere friendship were allowed, 
 it would be idle to speak seriously of the rights of independ- 
 ence. " Further along, Hall declares that if the intervention 
 "be directed against rebels, the fact that it has been neces- 
 sary to call in foreign help is enough to show that the issue 
 of the conflict would, without it, be uncertain, and conse- 
 quently that there is a doubt as to which side would ultimately 
 establish itself as the legal representative of the state." (In- 
 ternational Law, 4 ed., 94, p. 307.)
 
 332 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 independent unless they maintain order within, and 
 secure respect for their territory. States only exist as 
 the representatives of nations and the defenders of 
 their interests. A state that appeals to foreign sup- 
 port against its own subjects fails in its duty, since in- 
 stead of defending the nation against foreigners, it 
 invites foreigners to violate its independence, and it ex- 
 ceeds its rights, since it no longer acts as a represen- 
 tative of the nation." (Translated from Funck-Bren- 
 tano et Sorel: Droit des Gens, p. 219-220.) 
 
 But an invitation would evidently not be essential if 
 the action to suppress revolution could be justified as 
 taken to protect all of the states against a great and 
 imminent danger. 59 This was the basis of the inter- 
 ference policy of the Holy Alliance to suppress revolu- 
 tions. Metternich states this program of the Holy Al- 
 liance in a circular dispatch of May 12, 1821. 
 
 "Useful or necessary changes in the governments of 
 states must emanate only from the free will and the 
 thoughtful and enlightened initiative of those whom 
 God has made responsible for power. 
 
 "They (the powers) will consider void, and contrary 
 to the principles of the public law of Europe, all pre- 
 tended reforms brought about by revolution, or by 
 force." 60 (Circular, May 12, 1821, Martens: Nouv. 
 Recueil, vol. V, p. 644; Lingelbach: Intervention in 
 Europe, p. 12.) 
 
 The British Government, championing non-interfer- 
 ence, had opposed these doctrines of assistance to legit- 
 
 69 See discussion above, under 9. 
 
 60 See Sheldon Amos : Remedies for War, p. 265-7 ; W. A. 
 Phillips: The Confederation of Europe, p. 218-233; and it 
 was to oppose this broad assertion of a right to interfere that 
 Castlereagh issued his famous circular of January 19, 1921.
 
 ASSISTANCE 333 
 
 imate government. 61 But even the British Govern- 
 ment mildly interfered itself by delaying the recog- 
 nition of the revolutionary government in Naples, and 
 by criticizing the manner in which it had come into 
 power. 62 
 
 This was an exception and on the whole the British 
 Government threw its influence against the legitimacy 
 doctrine which would excommunicate revolutionary 
 government. 
 
 On January 19, 1821, Viscount Castlereagh addressed 
 the following circular to the British ministers at For- 
 eign Courts: 
 
 1 * I should not have felt it necessary to have made any 
 communication to you, in the present state of the dis- 
 cussions begun at Troppau and transferred to Laybach, 
 had it not been for a Circular Communication, which 
 has been addressed by the Courts of Austria, Prussia 
 and Eussia, to their several Missions, and which, His 
 Majesty's Government conceive, if not adverted to, 
 might (however unintentionally) convey, upon the sub- 
 ject therein alluded to, very erroneous impressions of 
 the past, as well as of the present, sentiments of the 
 British Government. 
 
 "Lord Liverpool's government in 1815 objected to the 
 introduction of the words 'souverain legitime' [legitimate 
 sovereign] into a draft of a treaty with the restored govern- 
 ment in France." (Bernard: Non-intervention, p. 15.) 
 
 62 In answer to Lord Grey's speech in the House of Lords, 
 February 19, 1821, attacking the government for interfering 
 to assist the King of Naples, Lord Liverpool denied that his 
 government had interfered, or that ground for interference 
 had been given, (referring evidently to forcible interference), 
 but declared that the circumstances made " indispensably 
 necessary that the government should publish its disapproval 
 of those proceedings. In the first place that revolution was 
 effected by a military mutiny; and, in the next, the Spanish 
 Constitution was adopted under the most extraordinary cir- 
 cumstances." (Hansard's Debates, 2nd Series, vol. 4, p. 
 764.)
 
 334 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 "It has become, therefore, necessary to inform you, 
 that the King has felt himself obliged to decline be- 
 coming a Party to the measures in question. 
 
 "These measures embrace 2 distinct objects: 
 
 "1st. The establishment of certain general princi- 
 ples for the regulation of the future political conduct of 
 the Allies, in the cases therein described ; 
 
 ' ' 2ndly. The proposed mode of dealing, under these 
 principles, with the existing affairs of Naples. 
 
 ' * The system of measures proposed under the former 
 head, if to be reciprocally acted upon, would be in direct 
 repugnance to the fundamental Laws of this Country. 
 But, even if this decisive objection did not exist, the 
 British Government would, nevertheless, regard the 
 principles on which these measures rest, to be such as 
 could not be safely admitted as a system of interna- 
 tional law. They are of opinion that their adoption 
 would inevitably sanction, and, in the hands of less 
 beneficent Monarchs, might hereafter lead to a much 
 more frequent and extensive interference in the in- 
 ternal transactions of States, than they are persuaded 
 is intended by the August Parties from whom they pro- 
 ceed, or can be reconcilable either with the general in- 
 terest, or with the efficient authority and dignity of In- 
 dependent Sovereigns. They do not regard the alliance 
 as entitled, under existing Treaties to assume, in their 
 character as Allies, any such general powers, nor do 
 they conceive that such extraordinary powers could be 
 assumed, in virtue of any fresh diplomatic transaction 
 amongst the Allied Courts, without their either at- 
 tributing to themselves a supremacy incompatible with 
 the rights of other States, or, if to be acquired through 
 the special accession of such States, without introduc- 
 ing a federative system in Europe, not only unwieldy 
 and ineffectual to its object, but leading to many most 
 serious inconveniences.
 
 ASSISTANCE 335 
 
 "With respect to the particular Case of Naples, the 
 British Government, at the very earliest moment, did 
 not hesitate to express their strong disapprobation of 
 the mode and circumstances under which that Revolu- 
 tion was understood to have been effected; but they, 
 at the same time, expressly declared to the several Al- 
 lied Courts, that they should not consider themselves as 
 either called upon, or justified, to advise an interfer- 
 ence on the part of this Country : they fully admitted, 
 however, that other European States, and especially 
 Austria and the Italian Powers, might feel themselves 
 differently circumstanced ; and they professed, that it 
 was not their purpose to prejudge the question as it 
 might affect them, or to interfere with the course which 
 such States might think fit to adopt, with a view to their 
 own security; provided only, that they were ready to 
 give every reasonable assurance, that their views were 
 not directed to purposes of aggrandizement, subversive 
 of the Territorial system of Europe, as established by 
 the late Treaties. 
 
 "Upon these principles, the conduct of His Majesty's 
 Government, with regard to the Neapolitan Question, 
 has been, from the first moment, uniformly regulated, 
 and Copies of the successive Instructions sent to the 
 British Authorities at Naples, for their guidance, have 
 been, from time to time, transmitted for the informa- 
 tion of the Allied Governments. 
 
 "With regard to the expectation, which is expressed 
 in the Circular above alluded to, of the assent of the 
 Courts of London and Paris to the more general meas- 
 ures proposed for their adoption, founded, as it is al- 
 leged, upon existing Treaties, in justification of its 
 own consistency and good faith, the British Govern- 
 ment, in withholding such assent, must protest against 
 any such interpretation being put upon the Treaties in 
 question, as is therein assumed.
 
 336 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 "They have never understood these Treaties to im- 
 pose any such obligations; and they have, on various 
 occasions, both in Parliament and in their intercourse 
 with the Allied Governments, distinctly maintained the 
 negative of such a proposition: that they have acted 
 with all possible explicitness upon this subject, would 
 at once appear from reference to the deliberations at 
 Paris in 1815, previous to the conclusion of the Treaty 
 of Alliance; at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818; and, sub- 
 sequently, in certain discussions which took place in 
 the course of the last year. 
 
 "After having removed the misconception to which 
 the passage of the Circular in question, if passed over 
 in silence, might give countenance ; and having stated 
 in general terms, without however entering into the 
 argument, the dissent of His Majesty's Government 
 from the general principle upon which the Circular in 
 question is founded; it should be clearly understood, 
 that no government can be more prepared than the 
 British Government is, to uphold the right of any State 
 or States to interfere, where their own immediate se- 
 curity, or essential interests, are seriously endangered 
 by the internal transactions of another State. But, as 
 they regard the assumption of such right as only to be 
 justified by the strongest necessity, and to be limited 
 and regulated thereby, they cannot admit that this 
 right can receive a general and indiscriminate applica- 
 tion to all revolutionary movements, without reference 
 to their immediate bearing upon some particular State 
 or States, or be made prospectively the basis of an Alli- 
 ance. They regard its exercise as an exception to gen- 
 eral principles, of the greatest value and importance, 
 and as one that only properly grows out of the circum- 
 stances of the special case ; but they, at the same time, 
 consider, that exceptions of this description never 
 can, without the utmost danger, be so far reduced to
 
 ASSISTANCE 337 
 
 rule as to be incorporated into the ordinary diplomacy 
 of States, or into the Institutes of the Law of Nations. 
 
 "As it appears that certain of the Ministers of the 
 3 Courts have already communicated this Circular Dis- 
 patch to the Courts to which they are accredited, I leave 
 it to your discretion to make a corresponding communi- 
 cation, on the part of your Government; regulating 
 your language in conformity to the principles laid 
 down in the present Dispatch. You will take care, how- 
 ever, in making such communication, to do justice, in 
 the name of your Government, to the purity of inten- 
 tion which has no doubt actuated these August Courts, 
 in the adoption of the course of measures which they 
 are pursuing. The difference of sentiment which pre- 
 vails between them and the Court of London on this 
 matter, you may declare, can make no alteration what- 
 ever in the cordiality and harmony of the Alliance on 
 any other subject, or abate their common zeal in giving 
 the most complete effect to all their existing Engage- 
 ments." (British State Papers, 1820-1, Vol. 8, p. 
 1160-2.) 
 
 For a time Metternich was able to organize the con- 
 tinental monarchs for the purpose of interfering to in- 
 sure themselves against the dangers of revolution, but 
 even Russia sympathized with the Greek revolt and 
 would not help to suppress it. 63 The Revolution of July 
 (1830) in France gave the doctrine of interference to 
 assist the "legitimate" government a fatal blow, al- 
 though it was a long time before the reactionary powers 
 entirely abandoned the policy of suppressing revolu- 
 tion. 64 
 
 68 See W. A. Phillips: The Confederation of Europe, p. 
 234f. 
 
 64 Metternich protested, in September, 1830, against "the 
 presumption of the French Government for its own conven- 
 ience, to set up a new law of nations, which was nothing more 
 than a complete overturning of all the rules which had until 
 22
 
 338 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 In 1843, Nassau Senior remarks upon the views of 
 Austria, Prussia, and Russia as to the illegality of in- 
 surrection against the "supreme, never ceasing, indi- 
 visible authority of a king," and continues, "They 
 further assert that, by international law, all third par- 
 ties are justified in interfering to enable a sovereign 
 to retain or recover his authority. Whether they 
 should or should not actually interfere, they have con- 
 sidered it a matter of discretion to be governed by the 
 circumstances of each case ; but we are not aware that 
 any one of them has ever abandoned, or doubted, or 
 even limited that right." (Edinburgh Review, April, 
 1843, vol. 156, p. 365.) But on the same page, Senior 
 states that England "denies that third parties can law- 
 fully interfere to force a people to obey their sover- 
 eign." (Ibid, p. 365-6.) 
 
 In some instances, the British Government went 
 further than a mere denial, as is shown by the follow- 
 ing instructions of March 2, 1863, which Lord Russell, 
 then Minister for Foreign Affairs, dispatched to the 
 British Representative at Berlin : 
 
 ' ' The Convention which has been concluded between 
 Russia and Prussia, relating to the affairs of Poland, 
 has caused considerable uneasiness in this country. 
 
 ' ' The Powers of Europe were disposed to be neutral 
 in the contest between the Russian Government and the 
 Polish insurgents. 
 
 "Prussia has departed from this course. 
 
 "My inquiries, as well as a dispatch from Lord 
 Napier, have led me to believe that the Convention con- 
 tains : 
 
 then guided the diplomacy of European states. ' ' (Lingelbach : 
 Intervention in Europe, in Annals of the American Academy, 
 Vol. 16, (1900), p. 14, citing Geffcken in Holtzendorff 's Hand- 
 buch des Volkerrechts, Vol. IV, p. 143.) But even before this, 
 action by France, England had opposed the doctrine of 
 legitimacy and restoration.
 
 ASSISTANCE 339 
 
 "1. An agreement that Russian troops, upon cross- 
 ing the frontier of Prussia, shall not be disarmed, as 
 would be required according to international usage, 
 but shall be allowed to retain their arms, and to remain, 
 and to act as an armed body in Prussian territory. 
 
 ' ' 2. A permission for Russian troops to pursue and 
 capture Polish insurgents on Prussian territory. 
 
 1 ' Count Bernstorff defended this Convention, and de- 
 clared that it was not an engagement invoking inter- 
 vention [interference] in the contest between Russia 
 and the Poles. 
 
 1 'But it is clear that if Russian troops are to be at 
 liberty to follow and attack the Polish insurgents in 
 Prussian territory, the Prussian Government makes 
 itself a party to the war now raging in Poland. 
 
 "If Great Britain were to allow a Federal ship-of- 
 war to attack a Confederate ship in British waters, 
 Great Britain would become a party to the war between 
 the Federal Government of the United States and the 
 Confederate. 
 
 "It is obvious that by this Convention Prussia en- 
 gages to become a party in the war against the Poles 
 without any apparent necessity for so doing. For Her 
 Majesty's Government have not heard that any disaf- 
 fection prevails in the Polish provinces of Prussia. 
 
 "It is but too probable that this Convention will irri- 
 tate the Polish subjects of Prussia, tend to excite dis- 
 affection where it has not hitherto existed, and thus ex- 
 tend the insurrection. 
 
 "Upon viewing this Convention in all its aspects, 
 therefore, Her Majesty's Government are forced to 
 arrive at the conclusion that it is an act of intervention 
 [interference] which is not justified by necessity; 
 which will tend to alienate the affections of the Polish 
 subjects of the King of Prussia ; and which, indirectly,
 
 340 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 gives support and countenance to the arbitrary con- 
 scription of Warsaw. 
 
 "You will read this dispatch to M. Bismarck, and 
 you will ask for a copy of the Convention between Prus- 
 sia and Russia. 
 
 "It is possible that the Government of Prussia and 
 Russia, aware of the objections to which this Conven- 
 tion is liable, and seeing the ill consequences it may 
 produce, may be disposed to cancel it, or to put an end 
 to its operation. 
 
 "In that case you will inform me what steps have 
 been taken with that view." (British Foreign State 
 Papers, 1862-3, vol. 53, p. 807-8. ) 65 
 
 65 Three days later, Lord Russell seems to have considered 
 the convention less offensive (see British State Papers, 1862- 
 3, vol. 53, p. 814.) 
 
 In reference to this convention, it is interesting to read the 
 remarks of Representative Waldeck in the Prussian Chamber, 
 February 18, 1863, in which he severely criticized Bismarck's 
 interference to assist Russia in suppressing the Polish insur- 
 rection. (British Foreign State Papers, 1862-3, vol. 53, p. 
 793-4.) 
 
 In his despatch of February 21, 1863, the British Minister 
 at Berlin especially drew Lord Russell's attention to Repre- 
 sentative Waldeck 's speech, "first, because it has excited 
 special attention, and has highly exasperated the semi-official 
 organs of the Government; and secondly, because it fairly 
 represents the feelings of a great portion of the Liberal party 
 in regard to the proposed intervention. 
 
 "To mark still more its sense of what the exigencies of the 
 present moment demand, the Party of Progress has drawn up 
 a resolution to the effect that 'the House do declare that the 
 interests of Prussia require that the Government should ab- 
 stain from rendering any assistance, or showing any favor 
 either to the Russian Government or to the insurgents, and 
 that consequently neither of the parties engaged be admitted 
 upon Prussian territory without being previously disarmed.' 
 
 "This resolution has been submitted to a committee of 21 
 members, and will be brought before the House as soon as the 
 committee have drawn up their report upon it.
 
 ASSISTANCE 341 
 
 We still occasionally find instances of assistance of 
 a less pronounced or drastic nature than is the forcible 
 invasion of a neighboring territory, as for example, 
 when a state makes no protest when a neighbor block- 
 ades territory in the control of insurgents for the pur- 
 pose of suppressing a revolt without according recog- 
 nition of belligerency. 68 Sometimes such complaisance 
 
 "The language of the Liberal press is unanimous in con- 
 demning the policy of the Government, but it is so much an 
 echo of what has been said in the Chamber that a reproduction 
 of it would only be a repetition of what is given in the en- 
 closed report. 
 
 "A circular addressed by the President of Police at Breslau 
 to the Silesian press is not uninteresting as showing the pos- 
 sible proportions which the intervention may take. It warns 
 the newspapers against giving any indications of the move- 
 ments of the troops, saying that all the advantages of sudden 
 concentration would be thereby lost, 'whether such would be 
 required for the defence of the frontier or for direct action 
 in the neighboring State ("zu einem directen auftreten im 
 Auslande"). 
 
 " It is further worthy of notice, in connection with this sub- 
 ject, that Thorn and other important towns situated in the 
 Polish districts have sent up deputations, principally com- 
 posed of Germans, to protest against the rumors put about 
 to the effect that the districts from which they come were 
 disturbed, or that the inhabitants apprehended danger." 
 (British Foreign State Papers, 1862-3, vol. 53, p. 789-790.) 
 
 06 Lord Lyons, in a letter of March 26, 1861, relates how 
 "Mr. Seward asked whether England would not be content 
 to get cotton through the northern ports, to which it could 
 be sent by land." (Lord Newton: Lord Lyons, I, 1913, 31.) 
 
 Notwithstanding Lord Lyons 's objection, five days later Mr. 
 Seward told him : "I differ with my predecessor as to de facto 
 authorities. If one of your ships comes out of a southern port 
 without the papers required by the laws of the U. S., and is 
 seized by one of our cruisers and carried into New York and 
 confiscated, we shall not make any compensation." (Ibid, 
 33.) 
 
 Notwithstanding Seward 's insistence, Great Britain recog- 
 nized the belligerency of the Confederate States. 
 
 Holland (Studies in International Law, p. 138-140) gives 
 the following instances of acquiescence in blockade without
 
 342 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 is an act of assistance no less effective than an armed 
 intervention would be. Another form of assistance 
 which may be effective in suppressing insurrection is 
 an embargo upon the shipment of arms, such as the 
 government of the United States has sometimes pro- 
 claimed on its Mexican frontier. Such an order is sure 
 to handicap the operations of the insurgents, and it is 
 likely to lead to and justify reprisals. 67 Still another 
 
 such recognition : Russia 's blockade of Circassia in 1826, and 
 Turkey's blockade of Crete, 1866-68, and also of 1897. The 
 same authority says (ibid, p. 145) : "Third Powers may more 
 fairly be called upon to make this sacrifice when the blockade 
 has a high political object, as in a case of intervention, or is a 
 measure of self-preservation, such as the suppression of a 
 rebellion. ' ' 
 
 6T " . . . In order to prevent the giving of aid to the enemies 
 of the government at the City of Mexico, the Congress of the 
 United States adopted a joint resolution empowering the 
 President to stop the exportation of arms and munitions of 
 war. President Taft approved this resolution on March 14, 
 1912, and on the same day put it into effect. The export of 
 military supplies for the Mexican government continued to 
 be lawful." (J. B. Moore: The Principles of American 
 Diplomacy, 1918, p. 216.) 
 
 Yet a few months previous [January 25, 1911], Hon. 
 Wilbur J. Carr, writing for Secretary Knox, had set forth 
 the principles in regard to the export of contraband. "You 
 should in this connection have also clearly in mind that it is 
 not illegal, being against neither the international laws of 
 neutrality nor the rules of our neutrality statutes, to trade 
 in arms and ammunition during a war or during a revolu- 
 tion; that trade in such materials is merely trade in con- 
 traband of war; and that the persons engaging therein are 
 subject to no other penalty than the confiscation of the ma- 
 terials in which they are trading. Therefore, so long as our 
 customs laws are complied with in the matter of the commer- 
 cial shipment of arms and ammunition into Mexico it is not 
 clear in what way we may legally interfere with traffic in 
 such materials on this side of the border. If the Mexican 
 Government desires to exclude such materials from her ter- 
 ritories, it is clearly her duty and not ours to accomplish 
 such exclusion." (Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 399. Cf. 
 Ibid, 415-6; 433.)
 
 ASSISTANCE 343 
 
 interference by way of assistance is to grant a right of 
 transit for the purpose of facilitating the suppression 
 of an insurrection. 68 After the United States had 
 recognized Carranza's Government, permission was 
 given to the Mexican troops to traverse our territory. 
 It was not surprising that the Villa faction had re- 
 course to reprisals. On March 9, 1916, Villa, at the 
 head of fifteen hundred Mexicans, raided the town of 
 Columbus, New Mexico, killing several persons and 
 committing various acts of destruction. 69 
 
 To reconcile this conflict of opinion and disparity of prac- 
 tice, it is necessary to remember what has been said above 
 under 10, relative to the supervision of less developed states. 
 The United States cannot always apply the rules of interna- 
 tional law in Mexico as if she were dealing with a completely 
 independent state instead of with one subject to a certain 
 supervision. 
 
 68 In the New York Sun (April 17, 1920), it was reported 
 from Washington that the United States Government had 
 refused to allow Carranza to transport troops across United 
 States territory to attack rebels in Sonora. The dispatch 
 stated: "The precedent established when troops were rushed 
 across American territory for the purpose of defeating Villa 
 at Agua Prieta will not be followed." 
 
 Relative to the above incident, I have prepared the follow- 
 ing account from my notes of documents read to me, and of 
 verbal statements made at the Department of State, in May 
 1920, but I have not yet received a copy of the documents 
 which I requested: 
 
 October 19, 1915, the Mexican Government asked permis- 
 sion for transit from Laredo and Eagle Pass to Agua Prieta, 
 Sonora, via Douglas "for the purpose of affording fuller pro- 
 tection to foreigners and natives in the northern part of the 
 State of Sonora, now menaced by certain forces of Francisco 
 Villa, and to make it an easier task for my government to 
 defend that section of the republic." October 22, the United 
 States acknowledged the Mexican note and gave permission 
 for a group of four or five thousand men, unarmed, arms and 
 ammunition to be sent as baggage, and a small detachment of 
 American troops to act as an escort. 
 
 09 For a brief account of these events, see J. B. Moore: 
 Principles of American Diplomacy, p. 227f.
 
 344 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 After it has been shown that interference for the 
 purpose of assisting a government in the suppression 
 of revolt is contrary to international law, it is not nec- 
 essary for us to discuss interference either for the pur- 
 pose of the ' ' restoration ' ' 70 of a deposed sovereign, or 
 the * ' reintegration " to their former sovereign of 
 provinces which have established their independence. 
 
 Interference for restoration and reintegration evi- 
 dently violates the de facto principle of sovereignty 
 still more seriously than does interference merely for 
 the suppression of revolt. Consequently their illegality 
 needs no demonstration and we may now pass on to 
 consider the nature of state action which is the oppo- 
 
 70 Every generation in European history has had its deposed 
 monarchs to show how ineffectual was the sentimental doc- 
 trine of legitimacy and the related constitutional principle 
 of the divine right of kings to prevent the recognition of the 
 de facto revolutionary governments. 
 
 Nevertheless we find many instances of the persisting 
 strength of this idea of legitimacy, as when the Dutch and 
 French gave asylum to Charles II and his adherents. Per- 
 haps on the same grounds the Dutch were not very active in 
 bringing to punishment the murderers of Cromwell's am- 
 bassador, and shamelessly allowed the regicide judges to be 
 extradited after the restoration of Charles II. (See Sir 
 George C. Lewis: Extradition, p. 48 note.) Cromwell's 
 Ambassador to Sweden was instructed to protest (1682) 
 against the reception of the representative of the Stuart 
 Pretender. (John Thurloe: State Papers, vol. I, p. 228.) 
 
 According to a Berne despatch of July 27, 1920 (New York 
 Times, July 29, 1920), the socialist press of Switzerland con- 
 demns the government for the favorable treatment accorded 
 royal personages in refuge. The dispatch states that a gov- 
 ernment report discloses that "Switzerland has two laws for 
 strangers desiring to enter and dwell within her gates one 
 for royal and princely personages and their suites, and an- 
 other for ordinary individuals. ' ' 
 
 For the purpose of historical investigation and the critical 
 analysis of the instances of interference, this division of 
 assistance into (1) Suppression, (2) Restoration, (3) Rein- 
 tegration, should prove convenient.
 
 SUPPORT OF REVOLUTION 345 
 
 sition of assistance, that is, the support of revolution- 
 ists against their government. 
 
 14. SUPPORT OF REVOLUTION 
 
 Interference in support of insurrection against the 
 recognized government can hardly hope to find justifi- 
 cation from the principles of international law. 71 On 
 
 71 "No state," declares Theodore D. Woolsey, "is authorized 
 to render assistance to provinces or colonies which are in 
 revolt against the established government. For if the exist- 
 ence and sovereignty of a state is once acknowledged, nothing 
 can be done to impair them ; and if the right of interference, 
 in favor of liberty for instance, be once admitted, the door 
 is open for taking part in every quarrel." (Introduction 
 to International Law, 1st ed., 1860 41, p. 89.) 
 
 It is not necessary to refer to the host of authorities that 
 have reiterated the illegality of interference in internal ques- 
 tions. Sir Henry Maine (quoting Mr. Hall) remarks: 
 " 'Thus with regard to the first power or right which is 
 alleged to reside, by the nature of the case, in a sovereign 
 state, the power of organizing itself in such a manner as it 
 may choose, it follows that such a state may place itself under 
 any form of government that it wishes, and may frame its 
 social institutions upon any model. To foreign states, the 
 political or social doctrines which may be exemplified in it, 
 or which may spread from it, are legally immaterial.' 
 
 "This is correct law, and in our day I do not doubt that 
 to most minds it would seem plain that, the condition of 
 Sovereignty being taken for granted, these rights so stated 
 follow. But, as a matter of fact, confining ourselves to this 
 branch of state powers, none have been more violently denied 
 or disputed; and if they were preserved it is far less owing 
 to their logical connection with the definition of state Sover- 
 eignty, than from the fact that, from the very first, the posi- 
 tion that they exist has been plainly stated by the interna- 
 tional lawyers. And the fact that these rights have been 
 preserved is a signal tribute to the importance of International 
 Law. It happens that the long peace which extended from 
 1815 to 1854 was, both at its beginning and at its end, all 
 but broken up by the denial of these simple rights of which 
 I have been speaking." (Sir Henry S. Maine: International 
 Law, 2nd ed., p. 61.)
 
 346 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 the contrary, international law undoubtedly lays upon 
 every state an obligation to forbear from interference 
 
 Even when France came to the help of the American 
 Revolutionists, "... the French Manifesto states that the King 
 of France neither was, nor pretended to be, a judge of the 
 disputes between the King of England and his colonies; and 
 that he took up arms to avenge his injuries, and to put an 
 end to the tyrannical empire which England has usurped, and 
 pretends to maintain, upon the ocean." (Annual Register, 
 vol. 22, p. 390, quoted by Senior: Edinburgh Review, April, 
 1843, vol. 156, p. 337.) 
 
 John Stuart Mill, in a letter to Pasquale Villari, June 30, 
 1857, wrote: "The English Government will never aid a 
 people to overthrow its government, however detestable it 
 may appear. You have seen how the English Government 
 did not oppose French intervention in Rome, Russian inter- 
 vention in Hungary, and even during the war against Russia, 
 it was not willing to stir up Poland. Is that not conclusive f ' ' 
 (Freely translated, Mill's Letters, vol. I, p. 195.) 
 
 Mill's opinion is borne out by Seward's plaint in his in- 
 structions to Minister Motley dated July 14, 1863 : 
 
 "If your speculations concerning the Polish revolution are 
 correct, as I believe they are, then it will be seen that a loca- 
 tion within the immediate sphere of European politics, like 
 that of Russia, has some advantages as well as some disad- 
 vantages. The European states suffer long and forbear much 
 with a nation that falls under the affliction of civil war, if it 
 be only near home. They are very intolerant of a nation, 
 on this continent, that suffers its domestic wrangles to break 
 the peace of the world. The Poles are not yet recognized by 
 either France or Great Britain as a belligerent. They talk 
 of intervention in behalf of Poland, but they do not act." 
 (Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Part II, p. 926.) 
 
 In his speech on the recognition of the independence of the 
 revolted Spanish Colonies, Sir James Mackintosh, before the 
 House of Commons, June 15, 1824, said: "With respect, 
 indeed to the State Papers laid before us, I see nothing in 
 them to blame or to regret, unless it be that excess of tender- 
 ness and forbearance towards the feelings and pretensions of 
 European Spain which the Dispatches themselves acknowl- 
 edge." (Miscellaneous Works of Sir James Mackintosh, vol. 
 Ill, p. 439.) 
 
 In the case of Cuba, where strife was almost chronic, the 
 United States pushed forbearance to an extreme limit.
 
 SUPPORT OF REVOLUTION 347 
 
 during a reasonable period while the lawfully estab- 
 lished government is attempting to reassert its au- 
 thority. That this forbearance entails a considerable 
 burden and loss is no adequate ground for interfering 
 until a period reasonable under all the circumstances 
 has been allowed for the reestablishment of the au- 
 thority of the recognized government. 72 And, even 
 after the lapse of this interval, the presumed continu- 
 ance of friendly sentiments should prevent any state 
 from recognizing the revolting government unless the 
 protection of important interests require it. A decent 
 respect for the ties and relationships which bind to- 
 gether all the nations should make every state delay 
 rather than hasten any proffer of aid. 73 This obligation 
 of forbearance does not relate only to armed invasion, 
 but requires the state authority to refrain from all un- 
 friendly acts or encouragement to the insurrectionists. 
 This obligation of forbearance also requires states to 
 police their frontiers and to prevent the organization 
 and departure of hostile expeditions. Political refuge 
 must not be abused and allowed to screen actual prepa- 
 
 72 The misery which the blockade of the Southern ports of 
 the Confederacy caused the cotton spinners of Manchester 
 was not considered by the British Government as a sufficient 
 ground for intervention. 
 
 73 During the Sonderbund conflict in Switzerland (1846), 
 which arose in part over the question of the expulsion of the 
 Jesuits, France and the reactionary powers espoused the 
 cause of the revolting cantons and threatened to impose upon 
 Switzerland the arbitration of the Pope. This support of the 
 revolt was so patently an unjustifiable interference in the 
 internal affairs of Switzerland that Lord Palmerston was able 
 to thwart it by diplomacy alone until Switzerland had over- 
 thrown the Sonderbund. This is a striking example of the 
 respect paid to international law in a case where the States 
 interfering in violation of law were much more powerful than 
 it defenders. See Ashley's Life of Palmerston, vol. I, pp. 
 5-16. Cf. also the somewhat prejudiced account in Sir Robert 
 Morier's Memoirs, vol. I, pp. 38-60.
 
 348 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 rations for attack (see 1, 15) and legations and 
 warships abroad must not be made use of to facilitate 
 the operations of conspirators (see 8(f ) ). 
 
 The obligation of reasonable forbearance is put to 
 the test in the matter of recognition. The recognition 
 of a de facto government without unreasonable delay 
 after it has firmly established its authority is a funda- 
 mental principle of international law, and until such 
 time as we shall have a more complete organization of 
 the states of the world, it will be difficult to conduct 
 international relations upon any other basis. 74 Never- 
 theless, the feeling of mutual trustfulness and security 
 requires that every state should be able to rely upon 
 its neighbors not to impeach its sovereignty, nor to 
 withdraw in any manner the recognition which has 
 once been accorded except when necessary for the pur- 
 pose of protecting the important interests of the State 
 that recognizes the new government. When these con- 
 ditions are fulfilled, then recognition should only be 
 given after the insurrectionists have firmly established 
 their de facto independence and have maintained them- 
 selves beyond the period in which it is reasonable to ex- 
 pect the other states to support the inconvenience of 
 the conflict. 
 
 The same requirements apply also to what is often 
 a first step of recognition that is, recognition of bel- 
 ligerency. Recognition, when justified by the pressing 
 need of the state to deal with de facto authorities is not 
 interference. It is merely the exercise of an undoubted 
 right. But any state that goes beyond the limits of 
 what is required to secure the adequate protection of 
 its immediate interests is guilty of a violation of the 
 sovereignty of a sister state. Such an interference in 
 the internal affairs of another state must be branded as 
 
 74 See Westlake: International Law, vol. I, p. 57-8.
 
 SUPPORT OP REVOLUTION 349 
 
 contrary to the law of nations. 75 . "Premature recog- 
 nition" writes Professor J. B. Moore, "constitutes an 
 act of intervention [interference], committed in favor 
 of insurgents or of a conqueror. The recognition of 
 the United States of America by France was in reality 
 an act of intervention [interference] in support of rev- 
 olution (cf. Moore's Principles of American Diplomacy, 
 p. 13), as is shown by Article II of the treaty. Great 
 Britain recognized the Kingdom of Italy before Francis 
 II was entirely dispossessed." (Moore's Digest, Vol. 
 I, p. 73.) Premature recognition is an unwarranted im- 
 peachment of sovereignty and is always an assault upon 
 the rights of the parent state. 
 
 75 As long as the sovereign state is conducting military oper- 
 ations to regain its supremacy over the territory recognized 
 as belonging to it under the law of nations, there is, as we 
 have said above, a presumption against the interference of 
 any state, even on the grounds of protecting its interests, but 
 when the sovereign state seems exhausted, and is unable or 
 unwilling to prolong its efforts to reestablish its authority, 
 the presumption in its favor is lost, and those states whose 
 interests are affected by this unfortunate condition of affairs 
 are justified in recognizing the revolutionary de facto govern- 
 ment. Funck-Brentano and Sorel discuss the question of 
 premature recognition: ''A nation which revolts against the 
 state of which it is a part, and wishes to establish an inde- 
 pendent state, engages in a civil war, and places itself outside 
 of the public law of the state. A foreign state which inter- 
 venes [interferes] in support of this nation commits an act 
 of war against the state to which it belongs, and steps outside 
 the law of nations in time of peace. If interventions 
 [interferences] of this kind, such as that of France in support 
 of the United States in the reign of Louis XVI, appear legiti- 
 mate, it is because instead of considering them in relation 
 to international law, they are regarded only from a political 
 viewpoint. Such an act, in accord with a wise and generous 
 policy, is seen to have produced beneficial results. But this 
 policy is none the less contrary to the principle of interna- 
 tional law in time of peace, and if good resulted, it was only 
 after a long and bloody war." (Translated from Funck- 
 Brentano and Sorel: Precis du droit des gens, p. 221.)
 
 350 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 But when after a protracted struggle, neither side 
 is able to vanquish the other, or to preserve the tran- 
 quility of the territory over which it claims jurisdic- 
 tion, there arises a just ground for impeachment of 
 sovereignty. In such a condition of anarchy it is per- 
 missible for the powers to intervene and adopt such 
 measures as seem best calculated to reestablish order 
 and to secure respect for international law throughout 
 the land. 
 
 A protracted civil conflict usually degenerates into a 
 condition of internecine warfare, and as such justifies 
 humanitarian intervention (see 8(c)) ; or the execu- 
 tive of the directing powers, acting in concert or sepa- 
 rately as mandatories ( 10), may consider that the 
 freedom of sovereignty and the ensuing anarchy make 
 it necessary to impeach the sovereignty of the state 
 over the territory in question. 76 
 
 A prolonged struggle is almost certain seriously to 
 injure the commerce of all other states, and to impose 
 
 78 Upon the ground of anarchy, intervention has been jus- 
 tified by many writers. Professor Strauch, after expressing 
 the opinion that no state is justified in intervening in the 
 case of a revolution in another state, declares that interna- 
 tional law has no concern with the form of government each 
 state may adopt, but he considers that the government, what- 
 ever its form, must be able to preserve order and fulfil its 
 obligations. "When conditions of anarchy prevail," Pro- 
 fessor Strauch declares, "other states have an undoubted 
 right to intervene without waiting for an invitation." (Freely 
 translated from Strauch 's article on Intervention, in 
 Bluntschli's Staatsworterbuch, vol. II, 1871, p. 278.) 
 
 Although the discussion of intervention in civil wars by 
 Funck-Brentano and Sorel (Precis du droit des gens, p. 222) 
 is not a juridical piece of reasoning, it is interesting and 
 suggestive. These authors consider that a civil war puts an 
 end to all authority, and that "in this condition of anarchy, 
 foreign states recognize no other law than that of necessity." 
 If, according to these authors, they find one of the parties 
 capable of organizing a government, they recognize it, or 
 they may act as their interests and obligations require.
 
 SUPPORT OF REVOLUTION 351 
 
 upon the nearer ones great burdens of police in the 
 fulfilment of their obligations; in addition, vigilance 
 and military preparation are often necessary in order 
 to be ready to protect national interests. After a rea- 
 sonable period of forbearance to allow the sovereign 
 an opportunity to reestablish its authority, there aris- 
 es, as we have indicated above, a right of intervention 
 to prevent further injury to national interests. These 
 grounds for intervention anarchy, humanity, and in- 
 tolerable injury to the interests of other states com- 
 bine in many instances to constitute the very strongest 
 justification for recourse to such measures as are nec- 
 essary to put an end to the strife. Certain authorities, 
 perhaps not entirely free from national bias, maintain 
 that interference to help a subject race to secure its 
 freedom is not interference at all. How weak is the 
 force of logic against these enthusiastic proponents of 
 national emancipation ! 77 They ignore the fact that in- 
 ternational law is a society of recognized states and has 
 no place for tribes, races, or nations which aspire to be 
 accepted into the good fellowship until such time as by 
 force of arms or by diplomacy an actual independence 
 has been achieved. 
 
 No state can remain permanently strong which con- 
 tinues needlessly to oppress a subject people. The au- 
 thority exercised over them must be tempered with 
 humanity, or control will sometime surely be lost. But 
 unless the sovereign is guilty of gross inhumanity, par- 
 ticipation in the struggle by another state is as we have 
 
 "See Mamiani: Rights of Nations; or, the New Law of 
 European States applied to the Affairs of Italy, p. 40-144, 
 where the right of intervention in a civil war is denied, but is 
 permitted to help a subject people, as in the case of the Dutch 
 against the Spaniards; the Swiss against Burgundy, etc. 
 This alleged ground of intervention has been considered under 
 8 (b).
 
 352 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 said, an act purely political and as such it must be 
 judged. The evaluation of such interference requires 
 the balancing of the benefits against the dangers and 
 inconveniences, and the verdict which public opinion 
 expresses needs to be checked up by consequent events. 
 An invitation from the insurgents can certainly have 
 no more legal effect to justify interference in their sup- 
 port than when it comes from the recognized govern- 
 ment, and since unrecognized insurrectionists have no 
 legal standing, any appeal they may make must be con- 
 sidered solely from a political or moral viewpoint. 
 Such appeals are often helpful to the interfering state 
 as a defense against the imputation that it has har- 
 bored designs of conquest, and when the invitation 
 comes from both the parties in conflict, mediation is 
 properly undertaken; but in this latter event, if the 
 proffered suggestion is enforced, mediation disap- 
 pears, and we have an instance either of assistance or 
 support of revolution, as the case may be. 78 
 
 78 See Bluntsehli: Volkerrecht, 477; Halleck: Interna- 
 tional Law (1861), p. 339, ch. XIV, 20. Halleck refers to 
 Phillimore, vol. I, CCCXCV, but the latter 's discussion is 
 confused. 
 
 After Macintosh has stated (History of the Revolution of 
 1688, p. 301-2), with charm of style and accuracy of reason- 
 ing, the grounds which justify a people in rising against a 
 tyrant, he adds: "Whenever war is justifiable, it is lawful 
 to call in auxiliaries." But it does not necessarily follow 
 that the appeal will justify another state in intervening ; even 
 though revolution be justifiable by the test of certain prin- 
 ciples, it remains a matter to be determined by the people of 
 each state, and does not concern international law, except 
 when its course is marked on either side by tyranny and 
 oppression so great as to justify intervention on grounds of 
 humanity. 
 
 The acts of James II were sufficient to justify revolution, 
 but it seems hardly possible to regard them as grounds for 
 humanitarian intervention by foreign states, and unless we 
 can find another justification, we must consider the invasion
 
 SUPPORT OF REVOLUTION 353 
 
 It has frequently happened that states with hostile 
 design have incited the disaffected elements in a neigh- 
 bor 's territory to rise in revolt. This has been con- 
 demned as a violation of international law, but is it a 
 violation of international obligation when a just ground 
 for war exists and this milder measure with hostile in- 
 tent may achieve the result without an invasion of terri- 
 tory by foreign troops! Or, when an invasion is neces- 
 sary, is it not laudable to secure within the territory of 
 the transgressor the cooperation of a portion of the 
 
 of William of Orange as an interference, contrary to the law 
 of nations. 
 
 Vattel writes: "But if a prince by violating the funda- 
 mental laws, gives his subjects a lawful cause for resisting 
 him, if, by his insupportable tyranny he brings on a natural 
 revolt against him, any foreign power may rightfully give 
 assistance to an oppressed people who ask for its aid." (Vattel, 
 bk. II, 56, Carnegie Translation, p. 131.) 
 
 When the conditions are such as afford grounds for humani- 
 tarian intervention, an appeal for foreign aid may be helpful 
 to justify the intervening state by securing public sympathy 
 and by showing the real situation. 
 
 This is the real significance of the statement by Vattel 
 and certain other authorities that intervention in a civil war 
 is justifiable when one of the parties appeals for support. 
 See H. von Rotteck: Einmischungsrecht, p. 11 (No. 5); 
 Martens : Precis, 74 ; Heffter : Volkerrecht, 46. In those 
 instances when the appeal for intervention is not justified 
 upon the ground of humanity, Hall is perfectly correct in 
 declaring: "When intervention so undertaken is directed 
 against the existing government, independence is violated by 
 an attempt to prevent the regular organ of the state from 
 managing the state affairs in its own way." If we except 
 the instances in which humanitarian intervention is justified, 
 we must agree with his concluding statement: "If, again, 
 intervention is based upon an opinion as to the merits of the 
 question at issue, the intervening state takes upon itself to 
 pass judgment in a matter which, having nothing to do with 
 the relations of states, must be regarded as being for legal 
 purposes beyond the range of vision." (International Law, 
 4 ed., 94, p. 306-7.) 
 
 23
 
 354 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 population to help to enforce respect for the law that 
 has been violated? 
 
 Formerly when the majority defended the divine 
 right of kings and blamed any revolt against their au- 
 thority as a crime they might expect other sovereigns 
 to refrain from complicity in a revolt, but the right of a 
 people to revolt against tyranny is now a recognized 
 principle of international law. 79 
 
 To Professor Sheldon Amos, we owe the following 
 concise and so far as I know, the best statement of 
 the principles governing state action in support of 
 revolutionists : 
 
 "It may be considered that, so far as direct and 
 forcible intervention in the internal affairs of a Foreign 
 State is concerned, the positive, as well as the negative, 
 side of the doctrine is now pretty clearly established; 
 that the mere strength, extent, or organization of an in- 
 surrectionary movement furnish no justification for 
 interference either on one side or the other ; the dura- 
 tion of an anarchial condition, coupled with the ap- 
 parent improbability of order ever being restored, may 
 
 "Incitement to revolt as a means of overcoming the resist- 
 ance of a transgressor cannot here be given the attention which 
 its importance merits, and must be reserved for a volume now 
 in preparation relative to the means of enforcing interna- 
 tional law. 
 
 It may well be that the salutary principle of limiting acts 
 of hostility to the period of a declared war should prevent 
 all law-abiding states from committing certain overt acts such 
 as the shipment of arms to conspirators, and the furnishing of 
 other supplies. 
 
 "It is in violation of the Law of Nations," writes Vattel, 
 "to call on subjects to revolt when they are actually obeying 
 their sovereign, although complaining of his rule." (Vattel, 
 Bk. II, 56, Carnegie translation, p. 131.) 
 
 France furnished the American Revolutionary emissaries 
 with money and supplies before she openly committed the 
 hostile act of recognizing the independence of the Revolu- 
 tionists while the conflict was still in doubt.
 
 PREVENTION 355 
 
 justify interference on the ground of the interest which 
 all states are presumed to have in the stability and in- 
 tegrity of each state; and gross acts of inhumanity 
 persisted in on either side may, on grounds of humani- 
 ty, properly precipitate intervention." (Sheldon 
 Amos: Political and Legal Remedies for War, p. 
 157-8.) 
 
 15. PREVENTION 
 
 p -* 
 
 Every state has the right, when necessary for its de- 
 fense, to anticipate the attack which another state pre- 
 meditates and prepares. The authorities almost with- 
 out exception recognize this right of prevention, or 
 preventive war. 
 
 Lord Bacon, in his " Essay on Empire," writes: 
 ' ' Neither is the opinion of some of the schoolmen to be 
 received, that a war cannot justly be made but upon a 
 precedent injury or provocation ; for there is no ques- 
 tion but a just fear of an imminent danger, though 
 there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of war." 
 (Phillimore: 1854, vol. I, p. 433.) 
 
 Grotius considers that "the first cause of a just war 
 is an injury not yet done which menaces body or 
 goods." (Grotius, Bk. II, ch. I, sec. II, 3, Whewells's 
 translation, Vol. I, 203.) But to Sir Edward Creasy 
 we are indebted for the most perfect statement of the 
 principle : "A state 's right to security means not only 
 the right to defend itself against actual direct attack, 
 but the right to preserve itself from injury by antici- 
 pating attack in cases where it is manifest that attack 
 is intended, and that such attack cannot be prevented 
 by any pacific measures, which do not involve undue 
 self-abasement and loss of real national dignity. In 
 such cases (as in those of quarrels between individu- 
 als) the real aggressor is not he who first employs
 
 356 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 force, but he who renders the employment of force nec- 
 essary." 80 (Creasy: First Platform of International 
 Law, 1876, p. 150.) 
 
 But preventive war commenced without sufficient 
 cause under a misapprehension as to the existence of 
 the hostile design will itself constitute, in fact if not in 
 intent, attack upon the innocent state. It will also be 
 an unjustifiable interruption of the peace of nations. 
 
 We may appropriately follow Grotius 's example and 
 quote Cicero's remark: "That most injuries proceed 
 from fear. He meditates hurting another fearing that 
 if he do not so, he will suffer some evil." (Grotius, 
 Book II, ch. 1. V, Whewells's translation, Vol. I, p. 208- 
 210.) 
 
 If unreasonable apprehensions are made the basis 
 for an unnecessary war, the peace of all the states 
 will be destroyed. To obviate this inconvenience, many 
 attempts have been made to formulate the conditions 
 when recourse to prevention is justifiable. 
 
 The text writers supply us with many definitions of 
 the danger which would justify preventive action, but 
 they do no more than to paraphrase what has been 
 said above in regard to the meaning of danger. They 
 do not attempt to set forth either the causes of the 
 
 80 0ther references are : Vattel, Bk. II, 50 ; Bk. Ill, 26. 
 Professor T. E. Holland writes: "The right of a state to 
 exist in safety calls for no remark. Its violation or threat- 
 ened violation gives rise to the remedial right of self- 
 preservation." (Holland: The Elements of Jurisprudence, 
 4 ed., 1888, p. 328.) 
 
 Probably the writers who appear to controvert the right of 
 intervention for prevention were not objecting to the antici- 
 pation of an attack actually in preparation, but only wished 
 to deny the alleged right of attacking an innocent state on 
 the ground that it was necessary for self-preservation; for 
 example, H. von Rotteck : Recht der Einmischung, 1845, 
 p. 24-5. (See discussion of "Necessity" in the following sec- 
 tion 16.)
 
 PREVENTION 357 
 
 peril or circumstances in which it may reasonably be 
 presumed to exist. 
 
 Vattel declares that "a nation must have received 
 an injury, or be clearly threatened with one before it 
 is authorized to take up arms as having a just ground 
 for war." (Vattel, Law of Nations, Bk. II, 42, Car- 
 negie translation, p. 248.) 
 
 Lord Castlereagh, in his note on the affairs of Spain, 
 considers that the intervening state must be threatened 
 with * ' that direct and immediate danger, which has al- 
 ways been regarded, at least in our own country, as 
 constituting the only case which justifies foreign inter- 
 vention." (De Martens, Rec. Supp. X. I. 176, quoted 
 in Manning: Law of Nations, p. 135.) 
 
 It adds nothing to the precision of such definitions 
 that nations should be cautioned against undertaking 
 preventive action in doubtful cases, as when Vattel 
 declares that a state "may even anticipate the other's 
 design, being careful, however, not to act upon vague 
 and doubtful suspicions, lest it should run the risk of 
 becoming itself the aggressor. " (Vattel: Bk. II, 50, 
 Carnegie translation, p. 130.) 
 
 Chancellor Kent informs us that "the danger must 
 be great, distinct, and imminent, and not rest on vague 
 and uncertain suspicion." 81 
 
 Since it is the evidence of a preparation for attack 
 which justifies the remedial action of prevention, the 
 first step is to find a definition of attack. 
 
 8 'But this same eminent authority discloses the little 
 juridical value which he attaches to this definition when he 
 tells us that ' ' every nation has an undoubted right to provide 
 for its own safety, and to take due precaution against distant 
 as well as impending danger, ' ' and continues : ' ' The right of 
 self-preservation is paramount to all other considerations. A 
 rational fear of an imminent danger is said to be a justifiable 
 cause of war." (Kent's Commentaries, 12 ed., vol. I, p. 23. 
 Kent refers to Huber, De jure civitatis, lib. 3, c. 7, sec. 4.)
 
 358 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 Westlake gives us a definition when he asserts the 
 right of a state to defend itself by preventive means 
 "against attack by another state, threat of attack, or 
 preparations or other conduct from which an intention 
 to attack may reasonably be apprehended. In so do- 
 ing it will be acting in a manner intrinsically defensive 
 even though externally aggressive. In attack we in- 
 clude all violation of the legal rights of itself or its 
 subjects, whether by the offending state or by its sub- 
 jects without due repression by it, or ample compensa- 
 tion when the nature of the case admits compensation. 
 And by due repression we intend such as will effectual- 
 ly prevent all but trifling injuries (de minimis non 
 curat lex), even though the want of such repression 
 may arise from the powerlessness of the government 
 in question." 82 (Westlake: International Law, vol. I, 
 p. 312-3.) 
 
 From the point of view of international law, rather 
 than from that of any particular state, we might say 
 that recourse to preventive action is only permissible 
 when overt acts have been committed, reasonably in- 
 dicative of an intention to attack, and when there is 
 peril in delay. 
 
 When it cannot be said that there is peril to the in- 
 dependence of the state concerned in putting off re- 
 
 82 Hall expresses the same idea less concisely : "If the safety 
 of a state is gravely and immediately threatened either by 
 occurrences in another state, or aggression prepared there, 
 which the government of the latter is unable, or professes 
 itself to be unable, to prevent, or when there is an imminent 
 certainty that such occurrences or aggression will take place 
 if measures are not taken to forestall them, the circumstances 
 may fairly be considered to be such as to place the right of 
 self-preservation [prevention] above the duty of respecting 
 a freedom of action which must have become nominal, on the 
 supposition that the state from which the danger comes is 
 willing, if it can, to perform its international duties. ' ' (Hall : 
 International Law, 4 ed., 11, p. 57.)
 
 PREVENTION 359 
 
 course to preventive action, the matter is not one of 
 sufficient importance to interrupt the peace of na- 
 tions. 83 
 
 When overt acts have been committed, and when de- 
 lay would endanger the existence of the state, inter- 
 national law recognizes that the menaced state is fully 
 justified in having recourse to preventive war. 
 
 It is not possible to define in advance the nature of 
 the circumstances which will in every case constitute 
 a peril in delay, any more than it is possible to draw up 
 an exhaustive list of acts which may be considered as 
 indicative of an intention to attack. In every instance 
 there is a question of fact to be decided by an exami- 
 
 83 Lawrence writes: "Governments constantly submit to 
 small inconveniences rather than resort to hostilities; and 
 an evil that is not sufficiently grave to warrant a recourse to 
 the terrible arbitrament of battle is not sufficiently grave to 
 warrant intervention. (T. J. Lawrence: Principles, 4 ed., 
 1910, 65, p. 128.) 
 
 Creasy says: "We may add that, inasmuch as in most 
 cases 'probability is a man's guide of life' (Bishop Butler), 
 probabilities must be studied with care proportioned to the 
 importance of the subject." (Creasy: First Platform of 
 International Law, 289, p. 283.) Creasy supports this 
 statement by summarizing the words of Vattel which, as 
 written by the latter were: "A nation's whole existence is 
 at stake when it has a neighbor that is at once powerful and 
 ambitious. Since it is the lot of men to be guided in most 
 cases by probabilities, these probabilities deserve their atten- 
 tion in proportion to the importance of the subject-matter; 
 and, if I may borrow a geometrical expression, one is justified 
 in forestalling a danger in direct ratio to the degree of prob- 
 ability attending it, and to the seriousness of the evil with 
 which one is threatened. If the evil in question be endurable, 
 if the loss be of small account, prompt action need not be 
 taken ; there is no great danger in delaying measures of self- 
 protection until we are certain that there is actual danger of 
 the evil. But suppose the safety of the state is endangered ; 
 our foresight can not extend too far. Are we to delay avert- 
 ing our destruction until it has become inevitable?" (Vat- 
 tel, Bk. Ill, 44, Carnegie translation, p. 249.)
 
 360 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 nation of all the circumstances, which are usually in- 
 volved and complicated. Nevertheless, it is possible 
 to analyze and classify the instances which have oc- 
 curred in state practice in order to formulate a few 
 rules to serve as a guide in reaching a correct conclu- 
 sion. We shall first consider whether certain specified 
 overt acts may reasonably be considered as indicative 
 of an intention to attack. 
 
 A sudden and excessive increase of armament has 
 been considered by certain writers to be sufficient evi- 
 dence of hostile designs. Sir Robert Phillimore re- 
 ferring to G. F. de Martens, says that: " armaments 
 suddenly increased to an extraordinary amount are cal- 
 culated to alarm other nations, whose liberty they ap- 
 pear, more or less, according to the circumstances of 
 the case, to menace. " (Phillimore, 1st ed., vol. I, 212, 
 p. 226.) 
 
 But it is not always possible to decide whether the 
 military preparations are for defense or offense. Sir 
 Henry Maine writes: "A state may take what meas- 
 ures it pleases for its own defense; and a state may 
 adopt whatever commercial system it thinks most 
 likely to promote its prosperity. That a state has these 
 powers is not now denied, and would not, I think, be 
 disputed; but nevertheless if the existence of these 
 rights had not now for two centuries been affirmed by 
 International Law, I think they would have turned out 
 to be full of pretexts for war. Even at this moment 
 the patience of states is hardly tried by the way in 
 which their neighbors act upon the principle. Take 
 France and Germany. Rarely in the history of the 
 world have there been such achievements of military 
 engineering as are exemplified in the fortresses which 
 line the long border of the two countries. Every one 
 of those fortresses is just as available for attack as for 
 defense ; and knowing what men are, it is really won-
 
 PREVENTION 361 
 
 derful that no complaint has at present been made of 
 the mere fact of their construction. Take again two 
 dependencies of European countries, which are really 
 great countries standing on a footing of their own 
 British India and Asiatic Russia. These are not coun- 
 tries in which fortresses are, or are likely to be, con- 
 structed in any large number. The conditions of cli- 
 mate and other difficulties render them defenses of no 
 great value; but either power is engaged at vast out- 
 lay in creating a system of railways within its own 
 countries; and we can see even now that any fresh 
 railway constructed within the border of the one coun- 
 try gives rise at least for criticism and private com- 
 plaint on the part of the other. I do not think we can 
 doubt that if International Law had not been perfectly 
 clear and precise on the subject of these rights, alleged 
 to flow from the sovereignty of states, they would con- 
 duce to every variety of complaint followed by every 
 variety of war. What really enables states to exercise 
 their sovereignty in this way is nothing but the legal 
 rule itself. ' ' ( Sir Henry S. Maine : International Law, 
 p. 64-5.) 
 
 Creasy, epitomizing and paraphrasing the words of 
 Vattel, approves of his opinion in making arrogance of 
 conduct on the part of a powerful state a justifiable 
 ground for preventive action: "If the preponderant 
 state commits acts of injury against its neighbors or 
 any of them, or if by the arrogance of its pretensions, 
 the tone of its public dispatches and manifestoes, or by 
 any other manner of conduct, beyond the mere increase 
 of its strength, it clearly threatens to attack or oppress 
 its neighbors, then other states are justified in com- 
 bining together, and in making war on it, so as to pre- 
 vent it from committing disturbance of the general 
 security of the commonwealth of civilized nations, or of 
 the security and independence of any of them."
 
 362 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 (Creasy, First Platform, p. 285; based upon Vattel, 
 Bk. ch. Ill, p. 349.) From the context it is evident 
 that Vattel intended to offer advice as to the prudent 
 course to follow, rather than lay down the basis for a 
 legal presumption. 
 
 When, however, a great state gives evidence of an 
 intention to enter upon a course of conquest with the 
 aim of acquiring universal dominion, it goes without 
 saying that the imminence of the peril justifies other 
 states in declaring war to prevent the accomplishment 
 of the design. 
 
 CONCENTRATION AND MOBILIZATION 
 
 The tremendous armaments of all the great powers 
 in the past make it difficult to characterize any such 
 military preparations as indicative of hostile designs. 
 They are generally justified on the ground of their 
 necessity for the protection of widely dispersed posses- 
 sions, or for the maintenance of the relative influence 
 of the state in world affairs. 
 
 But when a state makes military preparations which 
 are evidently a part of offensive operations to be un- 
 dertaken against a neighboring state that is not itself 
 pursuing a similar course, there is good ground for sus- 
 pecting the purpose of the preparations. Prior to the 
 war, Germany constructed railway lines to facilitate 
 the concentration of troops on the Belgian frontier. 
 This act alone might have been no more than a reason- 
 able preparation to prevent disaster in case France 
 should try to surprise Germany by an attack through 
 Belgium, but when the German preparations were seen 
 to include no corresponding measures of defense at 
 other points along its frontier where it might be ex- 
 pected that France would be most likely to attack, they
 
 PREVENTION 363 
 
 took on the aspect of a hostile concentration for an 
 unjustifiable attack upon France through Belgium. 84 
 
 France might reasonably have made this armament 
 a ground for preventive action against Germany had 
 she found it expedient to do so. 
 
 Russia, just previous to 1914, secured French loans 
 and employed them to lay a network of lines for mobili- 
 zation along the German frontier, and to increase the 
 size of her army. It would have been hardly reason- 
 able to consider this a threatening concentration in 
 preparation for a surprise attack because it was known 
 that Russia would still require a period many times 
 greater than Germany to effect her mobilization. The 
 laying of railways and the increase of her army were as 
 necessary for Russia 's defense as for an attack. 
 
 But when one of two rival powers mobilizes or con- 
 centrates its forces in such a manner that when the 
 
 84 Col. Repington, in his "Vestigia," 1919, p. 304-7, refers 
 to his articles in the London Times of January, 1911, in which 
 he discussed the transference of the German base of concen- 
 tration from the Metz and Strassburg line in the direction 
 of the Belgian frontier. In view of the powerful German 
 defenses on the French line, and the German tactics of en- 
 velopment, Colonel Repington said that it was apparently 
 clear that "the axis of the future attack on France had been 
 shifted to the north, and that a great, if not the main attack 
 would be based upon the line Cologne-Coblentz, and that the 
 neutrality of Belgium was threatened by this new departure 
 of German strategy." 
 
 He considered that his reading of German intentions was 
 supported by the German theories of enveloping attack, and 
 by the practice of German generals at manoeuvres. Colonel 
 Repington also states: "I also showed that General von 
 Falkenhausen in a book which he had recently published, had 
 calmly assumed as a matter of course that the territory of 
 both Belgium and Holland would be violated by the contend- 
 ing armies, and that this general had placed his 1,250,000 men 
 on a front of 250 miles, which was again much in excess of 
 the length of the French frontier. ' ' (Lt. Col. Charles a Court 
 Repington: Vestigia, 1919, p. 306.)
 
 364 NON-INTEEFERENCE 
 
 operation is accomplished it will have overcome certain 
 strategical advantages which its rival possessed before 
 the initiation of these operations, it is certain that the 
 other will immediately have recourse to preventive war 
 unless it can rely upon the fairness of the mobilizing 
 power to reach some equitable adjustment of their 
 difference. It may, perhaps, observe a similar forbear- 
 ance when it is assured of the support of the other 
 states. 
 
 The situation existing between Germany and Russia 
 prior to the outbreak of the war was always one of 
 strategic tension due to this inequality of rate of mo- 
 bilization. Since Germany could mobilize in four days, 
 while Russia was thought to require three or more 
 weeks, it is evident that the moment Russia commenced 
 mobilization, Germany would lose a portion of her 
 strategical advantage every day that she delayed an 
 attack. 85 
 
 If there was any probability of war, it would not have 
 been reasonable to expect Germany to do no more than 
 to mobilize and patiently to wait while Russia used the 
 succeeding days to put herself in battle array. 86 
 
 85 See Stowell's The Diplomacy of the War of 1914, p. 184f., 
 where this matter is fully discussed. 
 
 Many of the writers on the War of 1914 have failed to 
 understand the consequences of what we might call unequal 
 mobilization. 
 
 86 This statement is not intended, by any means to defend 
 the justice of Germany's declaration of war against Russia. 
 As I have shown in my study of the events preceding the out- 
 break of the war, Germany gave Russia good and sufficient 
 cause to believe that she was making preparations for war, 
 and that she intended to force the issue. Consequently, 
 Russia was fully justified in mobilizing, and Germany was 
 entirely to blame for so acting as to give Russia just cause 
 for recourse to preventive measures. 
 
 From recent disclosures of Russian documents, we learn 
 how the Tsar was influenced by his love of peace and his 
 confidence in the German Emperor to give the insensate order
 
 PREVENTION 365 
 
 If space would permit, we should like to examine the 
 instances in which this same question of the dislocation 
 of the strategical equilibrium has been involved. 87 
 
 When increased armaments or strained international 
 relations compel a neighboring state to undertake by 
 way of precaution burdensome counter-measures, there 
 is a tendency to regard the conduct of the state that has 
 
 that mobilization be countermanded after it had once begun. 
 Any intelligent and patriotic Russian officer must have felt 
 amply justified in disobeying such a command issued by a 
 sovereign of the poor Tsar's intelligence. 
 
 8T A good illustration is furnished by the Russo-Japanese 
 War of 1903-4. Japan did her best to avert a conflict, but 
 Russia was uncompromising, and began to dispatch her forces 
 to the Far East. Under the circumstances, Japan was justi- 
 fied in commencing by way of preventive war the attack which 
 was thrust upon her. She was not, however, entirely blame- 
 less in doing so without a clearer statement of her intention. 
 For a fuller consideration of this particular point, see Stowell 
 and Munro: International Cases, vol. II, p. 26-34. 
 
 A similar situation arose when President Roosevelt dis- 
 patched the American fleet on its tour round the world. There 
 was, of course, no hostile intention in this act, but the result 
 would be to place our ships in the Pacific. Japan decided at 
 once that she would not make an issue of the California diffi- 
 culty, and relations improved. 
 
 As I write, the question of the union of the American fleet 
 in the Pacific is alluded to in the press. When this shall 
 have been accomplished, it is evident that Japan's relative 
 position in the Pacific will be less than it was before. If 
 relations were seriously strained between the two countries, 
 this act, although it is legitimately related to the necessities 
 of American defense, might precipitate a conflict. 
 
 When President Kruger sent his ultimatum to Great 
 Britain, he was probably of the opinion that if he delayed, 
 Great Britain would increase her forces in South Africa, and 
 that the Transvaal Republic would be obliged to fight at a 
 greater disadvantage, or accept such terms of settlement as 
 the British Government might be willing to offer.
 
 366 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 caused the inconvenience as internationally repre- 
 hensible, and a just ground for preventive action. 88 
 
 "With reference to the news of the disaster of Isandlwana 
 in the Zulu War, which had recently reached London, Lord 
 Blachford, in a letter dated February 26, 1879, wrote : 
 
 "My expression about being at war 'with everybody every- 
 where' was a rough and unjust one, as is sometimes the case 
 when one thing leads you to give vent to a pent-up impatience 
 about another. 
 
 "What was in my mind was this : In Natal, in Afghanistan, 
 in Turkey we are always assuming at least there are a quan- 
 tity of people who assume that, because this or that state or 
 potentate is an inconvenience to us, making us keep more 
 troops or ships than we like, or unsettling trade, or threaten- 
 ing the balance of power, that is at bottom a sufficient reason 
 for trying to disable them, and the only question is one of 
 waiting for a pretext. This I take it was the old theory of 
 foreign policy, which I, for one, flattered myself was ex- 
 ploded or nearly so, and it is one which, if carried out to its 
 full extent, would keep us engaged in disabling everybody, 
 the U. S. because they will evidently one day threaten our 
 naval supremacy, Prussia, Russia, France, with their great 
 armies and ambitious objects; Italy and Greece with their 
 prospects with regard to the Mediterranean trade, and so on. 
 
 "And the revival of this kind of Chauvinism, jingoism, or 
 whatever you choose to call it, which is and always has been 
 the great enemy to the peace of the world, keeps me, I confess, 
 in that state of disgust which one feels at a thing which you 
 find to your surprise is not too stupid to be formidable, like 
 what I suppose Cobdenites feel towards the resuscitation of 
 protection. 
 
 "But of course I must admit that the question is one of 
 degree, and that there is a point at which you must take 
 measures to clip the wings of a neighbor who is at once power- 
 ful and ill-intentioned." (Letters of Lord Blachford, edited 
 by G. E. Marindin, 1896, p. 393.) 
 
 Sir George Cornewall Lewis, answering a letter from Lord 
 Palmerston, takes up the same idea which Sir Robert Peel 
 had expressed in the House of Commons, (see Morley's Life 
 of Cobden, p. 358), and argued that it was not a wise matter 
 of policy to attempt to insure against all these dangers by 
 counter-armament. Although the discussion in these letters 
 was relative to a question of national policy, its broad inter- 
 national bearing justifies me in reproducing them here.
 
 PREVENTION 367 
 
 INNOCENT GROWTH 
 
 Since international law does not authorize interven- 
 tion to prevent a neighboring power from conscious 
 
 " November 22, 1860. 
 "My dear Lewis, 
 
 "You broached yesterday evening what seems to me a 
 political heresy, which I hope was only a conversational para- 
 dox, and not a deliberately adopted theory. You said you 
 dissented from the maxim that prevention is better than cure, 
 and that you thought that, instead of trying to prevent an 
 evil, we ought to wait till it had happened, and should then 
 apply the proper remedy. Now I beg to submit that the 
 prevention of evil is the proper function of statesmen and 
 diplomatists; and that the correction of evil calls forth the 
 action of generals and admirals. Evils are prevented by the 
 pen, but are corrected by the sword. They are prevented by 
 ink-shed, but can be corrected only by blood-shed. The first 
 is an operation of peace ; the second, the action of war. 
 
 "It seems to me to be no valid argument to say that meas- 
 ures taken to prevent an evil may by possibility lead to war, 
 when it can be shown to be far more probable that the evil, 
 if it happens, will lead to that result. 
 
 ' ' There are endless instances of serious conflicts which might 
 have been prevented by timely vigor and negotiation, and an 
 equal number of cases in which timely vigor and activity have 
 averted dangerous consequences. If the Duke of Wellington 's 
 Government, in 1830, had not been swayed by the same 
 timidity which prevailed in the Cabinet yesterday, the French 
 would not now have had Algeria a possession which, when- 
 ever we have a war with France, will give us trouble and 
 cause us much annoyance. If Lord Aberdeen's Government 
 had shown less timidity when the Russians prepared to in- 
 vade the Danube Principalities, it is pretty certain that we 
 should not have had the Russian war; but it is needless to 
 multiply examples to prove what appear to me to be self- 
 evident propositions. 
 
 "Yours sincerely, 
 
 "PALMERSTON." 
 
 "Kent House, November 23, 1860. 
 "My dear Lord Palmerston, 
 
 " As a medical maxim, it is true universally that prevention 
 is better than cure ; but it seems to me that this maxim must
 
 368 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 preparations for war such as arming to the teeth and 
 fortifying its frontier, it cannot be expected that it 
 
 be applied with discretion in political, especially in foreign, 
 politics. If the evil is proximate and certain, or highly 
 probable, no doubt a wise statesman will, if he can, prevent 
 it. But with respect to remote and uncertain evils, the sys- 
 tem of insurance may be carried too far. Our foreign rela- 
 tions are so numerous and so intricate, that if we insure 
 against every danger which ingenuity can devise there will 
 be no end of our insurances. Even in private life it is found 
 profitable for those who carry on operations on a large scale 
 not to insure. One thing, according to the received though 
 not very precise saj r ing, insures another. A man who has 
 one or two ships, or one or two farmhouses, insures. But a 
 man who has many ships, and many farmhouses, often does 
 not insure. 
 
 ' ' We keep in every country of the world a paid agent, often 
 of great activity and intelligence, whose time in general is 
 only half employed, and whose business it is to frighten his 
 own government with respect to the ambitions and encroach- 
 ing designs of foreign governments. I am not seeking to 
 undervalue the services of diplomatic and consular agents. 
 I know that, on the whole, they are of great benefit to the 
 country which employs them; but it is natural and proper 
 that they should keep a sharp look-out for the machinations 
 of foreign governments, and that their imagination should 
 sometimes be stronger than their reason. If their advice was 
 listened to, we should be perpetually taking expensive pre- 
 cautions against remote and problematical risks. 
 
 ' ' Generally, I think that our foreign policy is too timorous ; 
 that we are apt to be scared by bug-bears, and to underrate 
 the power of England, and the fear of it entertained by for- 
 eign nations. I do not believe that the possession of Algeria 
 by France is any real disadvantage to us. It acts as a con- 
 stant drain on the military and financial resources of France, 
 and in the event of a war would necessarily fall into our 
 hands, if we were able to obtain and maintain the empire of 
 the sea. The possession of Egypt and Malta did nothing for 
 France in the late war. 
 
 "If an evil is certain and proximate, and can be averted 
 by diplomacy, then undoubtedly prevention is better than 
 cure. But if the evil is remote and uncertain, then I think 
 it better not to resort to preventive measures, which insure 
 a proximate and certain mischief. The evil may probably 
 never occur ; the cure may perhaps be simple and inexpensive,
 
 PREVENTION 369 
 
 will permit interference with a state's enjoyment of its 
 right to grow and to develop its resources, even though 
 the increase of territory and resources should give a 
 preponderance of power. 
 
 Grotius in his great work, "War and Peace," pub- 
 lished in Latin in 1625, wrote : "There is an intolerable 
 
 and may not imply hostilities. It seems to me that our for- 
 eign relations are on too vast a scale to render it wise for us 
 to insure systematically against all risks; and if we do not 
 insure systematically, we do nothing." 
 "Believe me, 
 
 ' ' Yours very sincerely, 
 
 "G. C. LEWIS." 
 (Ashley's Life of Palrnerston, vol. II, 1876, p. 331-4.) 
 
 The same opinion was held by Cobden, who, Morley writes, 
 "opposed war, because war and the preparation for it con- 
 sumed the resources which were required for the improvement 
 of the temporal condition of the population. Sir Robert Peel 
 had anticipated him in pressing upon Parliament the danger 
 to European order arising from military expenditure. Heavy 
 military expenditure, he said, meant heavy taxation, and 
 heavy taxation meant discontent and revolution. That wise 
 statesman had courageously repudiated the old maxim, Bellum 
 para si pacem veils. A maxim that admits of more con- 
 tradiction, he said, or one that should be received with greater 
 reserve, never fell from the lips of man. What is always still 
 more important, Peel was not afraid to say that it is im- 
 possible to secure a country against all conceivable risks. If 
 in time of peace you insist on having all the colonial garrisons 
 up to the standard of complete efficiency, and if every fortifi- 
 cation is to be kept in a state of perfect repair, then no amount 
 of annual expenditure can ever be sufficient. If you accept 
 the opinions of military men, who tell a Minister that they 
 would throw upon him the whole responsibility in the event 
 of a war breaking out, and predict the loss of this or the 
 other valuable possession, then the country must be over- 
 whelmed by taxation. It is inevitable that risks should be 
 run. Peel's declaration was, and must at all times remain, 
 the language of common sense, and it furnished the key to 
 Cobden 's characteristic attitude towards a whole class of 
 political questions where his counsels have been most per- 
 sistently disregarded." (Morley: Life of Richard Cobden, 
 1881, p. 357-8.) 
 
 24
 
 370 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 doctrine in some writers, that by the Law of Nations 
 we may rightly take arms against a power which is in- 
 creasing, and may increase, so as to be dangerous. Un- 
 doubtedly, in deliberating of war, this may come into 
 consideration, not as a matter of justice, but as a mat- 
 ter of utility; so that if the war be just on other ac- 
 counts, it may, on this account, be prudent ; and this is 
 what the arguments of authors come to. But that the 
 possibility of suffering force gives us the right of using 
 force, is contrary to all notion of equity. Such is 
 human life, that we are never in complete security. 
 We must seek protection against uncertain fears from 
 Divine Providence, and from blameless caution, not 
 from force." (Grotius, Bk. II, ch. I, XVII, Whe- 
 well's translation, vol. I, p. 224-5.) 
 
 Emer de Vattel, in his Law of Nations, 1758, ex- 
 pressed a similar view: "We are here presented with 
 a celebrated question which is of the greatest impor- 
 tance. It is asked whether the aggrandizement of a 
 neighboring state, in consequence of which a nation 
 fears that it will one day be oppressed, is a sufficient 
 ground for making war upon it ; whether a nation can 
 with justice take up arms to resist the growing power of 
 that state, or weaken the state, with the sole object of 
 protecting itself from the dangers with which weak 
 states are almost always threatened from an over- 
 powerful one. The question presents no difficulties to 
 the majority of statesmen; it is more perplexing for 
 those who seek at all times to unite justice with pru- 
 dence. 
 
 ' ' On the one hand, a state which increases its power 
 by all the efforts of a good government does nothing 
 but what is praiseworthy; it fulfils its duties toward 
 itself and does not violate those which it owes to other 
 nations. The sovereign who by inheritance, by a free 
 election, or by any other just and proper means, unites
 
 PREVENTION 371 
 
 new provinces or entire kingdoms to his states, is 
 merely acting on his right, and wrongs no one. How 
 would it be right to attack a state which increases its 
 power by lawful means ? A nation must have received 
 an injury, or be clearly threatened with one before it is 
 authorized to take up arms as having a just ground for 
 war. On the other hand, we know only too well from 
 sad and frequent experience that predominant states 
 rarely fail to trouble their neighbors, to oppress them, 
 and even to subjugate them completely, when they have 
 an opportunity of doing so with impunity. Europe was 
 on the point of being enslaved for lack of timely op- 
 position to the growing power of Charles V. Must we 
 await the danger? Must we let the storm gather 
 strength when it might be scattered at its rising! 
 Must we suffer a neighboring state to grow in power 
 and await quietly until it is ready to enslave us? Will 
 it be time to defend ourselves when we are no longer 
 able to ? Prudence is a duty incumbent upon all men, 
 and particularly upon the rulers of nations, who are 
 appointed to watch over the welfare of an entire people. 
 Let us try to solve this important question conformably 
 to the sacred principles of the Law of Nature and of 
 Nations. It will be seen that they do not lead to weak 
 scruples, and that it is always true to say that justice is 
 inseparable from sound statesmanship. 
 
 "First of all, let us observe that prudence, which is 
 certainly a virtue very necessary in sovereigns, can 
 never counsel the use of unlawful means in order to 
 obtain a just and praiseworthy end. Do not object 
 here that the welfare of the people is the supreme law 
 of the state; for the welfare of the people, the com- 
 mon welfare of nations, forbids the use of means that 
 are contrary to justice and honor. Why are certain 
 means unlawful? If we look at the matter closely, if 
 we go back to first principles, we shall see that it is
 
 372 IsON-INTERFEKENCE 
 
 precisely because the introduction of such means would 
 be hurtful to human society, a source of evil to all na- 
 tions. Note in particular what we said in treating of 
 the observance of justice (Book II, ch. V). It is, there- 
 fore, to the interest and even to the welfare of all na- 
 tions that we must hold as a sacred principle that the 
 end does not justify the means. And since war is only 
 permissible in order to redress an injury received, or 
 to protect ourselves from an injury with which we are 
 threatened, it is a sacred rule of the Law of Nations 
 that the aggrandizement of a state cannot alone and of 
 itself give any one the right to take up arms to resist 
 it." (Vattel: Bk. Ill, 42-43 ; Carnegie translation, 
 p. 248.) 
 
 The most eminent of all of the modern international 
 jurists, John Westlake, nearly three centuries after 
 Grotius, has given us a concise statement which covers 
 the right to grow and to arm : * * The natural growth of 
 a nation in power, and even the increase of its arma- 
 ments in a fair proportion to its population and wealth 
 and to the interests which it has to defend, must be 
 looked on without jealousy, and without any attempt to 
 check it, by those nations which by an inferiority of 
 character or situation are destined to a decline in rela- 
 tive power." 89 (Westlake: International Law, vol. I, 
 1910, p. 316-7.) 
 
 The protection of the general prosperity of nations 
 is the primary aim of international law. It can never 
 seek to arrest progress and prosperity in order to fa- 
 
 89 A few of the authorities who express the same view that 
 innocent growth is not a just ground of intervention are: 
 G. F. de Martens: Precis, Bk. IV, ch. I, 120; Kliiber, 
 Europaisches Volkerrecht 41; Wheaton; Elements, Part 
 II, ch. I, 3 ; Woolsey : International Law, 1860, 42, p. 91 ; 
 Twiss; Law of Nations, vol. I, 101, p. 147-8 ; Crease^' : First 
 Platform, 163, p. 152-3.
 
 PREVENTION 373 
 
 cilitate the task of preventing possible injustice, but 
 must hope to find some other means of restraining the 
 abuses of power. The right of every independent 
 state to employ the means at its disposal to develop its 
 resources and to arm for protection against attack is 
 as clear as any right of international law. 
 
 CONSTRUCTIVE ATTACK 
 
 To justify preventive action, it is not essential that 
 the hostile preparations should be undertaken by the 
 government itself. Whenever a government lends its 
 countenance to individuals who are making hostile 
 preparations within its territory, or even when the 
 government does no more than fail to fulfil the obli- 
 gations which international law imposes upon it to 
 police its territory and to suppress the fitting out of 
 hostile expeditions, it becomes responsible for the 
 illicit acts which it has tolerated, or failed to prevent. 90 
 
 90 Phillimore has accurately discussed this principle : 
 "In all cases where the territory of one nation is invaded 
 from the country of another, whether the invading force be 
 composed of the refugees of the country invaded, or of sub- 
 jects of the other country, or of both the government of the 
 invaded country has a right to be satisfied that the country 
 from which the invasion has come, has neither by sufferance 
 nor reception (patientid aut receptu) knowingly aided or 
 abetted it. She must purge herself of both these charges, 
 otherwise, if the cause be the feebleness of her government, 
 the invaded country is warranted in redressing her own 
 wrong, by entering the territory, and destroying the prepara- 
 tions of war therein made against her ; or, if these have been 
 encouraged by the government, then the invaded country has 
 a strict right to make war upon that country herself ; because 
 she has afforded not merely an asylum, but the means of hos- 
 tility to the foes of a nation, with whom she was at peace. For 
 it never can be maintained, that however much a state may 
 suffer from piratical [sic] incursions, which the feebleness 
 of the executive government of the country whence they issue 
 renders it incapable of preventing or punishing, that, until
 
 374 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 No doubt the best intentioned state cannot always 
 prevent the abuse of its territory and its use as a base 
 for hostile expeditions against a friendly state. But in 
 that event, as we have seen, the state whose security is 
 threatened has the right to intervene directly by way 
 of self-help, and to remove the menace to its security. 
 Should the state who was unable to police its own terri- 
 tory attempt to oppose this reasonable recourse to pre- 
 ventive action, it becomes itself responsible for the 
 hostile preparations made on its territory, and pre- 
 ventive war then becomes justifiable against the gov- 
 ernment itself. 91 
 
 When a state feels itself menaced by plots and prepa- 
 rations in a neighboring state, it is inclined to hold the 
 latter responsible, even though the government itself is 
 
 such government shall voluntarily acknowledge the fact, the 
 injured State has no right to give itself that security, which 
 its neighbor's government admits that it ought to enjoy, but 
 which that government is unable to guarantee. 
 
 "It must be admitted that there is a practical acknowledg- 
 ment of such inability, which, as much as a voluntary confes- 
 sion, justifies the offended country in a course of action which 
 would under other circumstances be unlawful." (Philli- 
 more: International Law, vol. 1, 1854, 218, p. 230.) 
 
 Phillimore supports his own opinion by a quotation from 
 Burlemaqui which was itself based upon the opinion of 
 Grotius (Bk. II, ch. xxi) and from Heineccius (Praelectiones) 
 on the same chapter of Grotius : ' ' Now it is presumed that a 
 sovereign knows what his subjects openly and frequently com- 
 mit; and as to his power of hindering the evil, this likewise 
 is always presumed, unless the want of it be clearly proved." 
 
 This matter is treated by Vattel with his customary elegance 
 of expression, and with a juridical accuracy which this author 
 does not always display. (Vattel, Bk. II, 72-8.) 
 
 91 See discussion of self-help 1 above; see also Hall: In- 
 ternational Law, 4 ed., 84, p. 282 ; ibid, 91, p. 299. 
 
 The same principle justifies the use of force against vessels 
 under another flag when they are engaged in filibustering ex- 
 peditions. (See Westlake: International Law, vol. I, p. 168- 
 172, 313.)
 
 PREVENTION 375 
 
 not implicated and when it has done its best to police 
 its territory. Dissatisfaction with the result some- 
 times leads the menaced state to demand that more 
 stringent laws be passed to permit of a greater vigi- 
 lance. The other may be justified, however, in consid- 
 ering that the existing regulations go as far as is pos- 
 sible without interfering with the rights of its citizens 
 and subjecting them to unreasonable restrictions. The 
 precedents of international practice have to be con- 
 sulted for the purpose of defining the obligations which 
 international law imposes upon every state for the 
 police of its territory. But when a government re- 
 frains from using the authority which it possesses, its 
 conduct is either so unfriendly or so culpably negligent 
 as to render it directly responsible for the hostile acts 
 preparing against its neighbor, and to justify the latter 
 in intervening to compel the delinquent state to reform 
 its conduct. 92 
 
 . 92 Westlake justifies intervention in the internal affairs of 
 another state to prevent attack and he defines attack as we 
 have said to include all violation of the legal rights of a state 
 or of its subjects, "whether by the offending state or by its 
 subjects without due repression by it, or ample compensation 
 when the nature of the case admits compensation. And by 
 due repression we intend such as will effectually prevent all 
 but trifling injuries (de minimis non curat lex), even though 
 the want of such repression may arise from the powerlessness 
 of the government in question." (Westlake: International 
 Law, vol. I, p. 313.) 
 
 If, in place of this juridical opinion, we were to accept 
 the extreme view of Funck-Brentano and Sorel, we should be 
 forced to conclude that any state could make an excuse of the 
 defects of its own legislation to avoid responsibility. These 
 authors write: "Intervention most frequently occurs when 
 the actions of the government of a state or of its subjects 
 are made the basis of a diplomatic complaint. The motives 
 for this intervention are usually attacks in the press against 
 foreign governments, and the existence of secret societies and 
 conspiracies. As long as a state only demands from another 
 state the strict and loyal enforcement of the latter 's laws, it
 
 376 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 Phillimore discussing this matter remarks: "Upon 
 the same principle, though a nation has a right to af- 
 ford refuge to the expelled governors, or even the lead- 
 ers of rebellion flying from another country, she is 
 bound to take all possible care that no hostile expedition 
 is concerted in her territories, and to give all reason- 
 able guarantees upon this subject, in answer to the re- 
 monstrances of the nation from which the exiles have 
 escaped. During the time when the residence of the 
 Pretender in France within the vicinity of England, 
 gave reasonable alarm to the British Government, the 
 removal of his residence to a place of less danger to 
 
 does not exceed its rights, and does not commit an act of 
 intervention in the interior affairs of the state; it merely 
 asks for the respect which is due it in the form which is com- 
 patible with the constitution of the state to whom the request 
 is addressed. Intervention begins when the demanding state 
 declares that the institutions of the foreign state are not ade- 
 quate to assure the state making the representations the re- 
 spect to which it has a right and the security of which it is in 
 need, and when it demands a modification. Even in diplo- 
 matic form, such an intervention is a violation of the law of 
 nations in time of peace. It is so clearly a violation, and is 
 based so truly upon force ancl upon force alone, that there is 
 no case in which it has been employed other than by strong 
 states against weaker states ; nevertheless, it is the weak states 
 which are most often likely to find it necessary to employ it : 
 the press and secret societies of the great states are much more 
 dangerous to the security of the small states than the journal- 
 ists and conspirators in the little states are to the great." 
 ( Translated from Funck-Brentano et Sorel : Precis du Droit 
 des Gens, p. 218-9.) This exaggerated statement is of value 
 as an indication of the basis of the sovereign right of each 
 state to adhere to its own institutions. 
 
 Sir George Cornewall Lewis (Extradition, 1859, p. 65) 
 declares that "the law of England recognizes the principle of 
 protecting a foreign government by its own municipal regu- 
 lations." In footnotes, he gives several references. 
 
 Phillimore (1 ed., Vol. I, 213, p. 227), well states the right 
 of self-help in the case of culpable negligence and asylum for 
 hostile expeditions, and (Ibid, 214, p. 227) quotes Vattel. 
 (Vol. Ill, ch. VII, 133.)
 
 PREVENTION 377 
 
 Great Britain formed the subject of the stipulations 
 of various Treaties. If the hostile expedition 
 of the present Emperor of the French in 1842, against 
 the then existing monarchy of France, had taken place 
 with the sanction of connivance of the British Govern- 
 ment, England would have been guilty of a very gross 
 violation of International Law; and she showed at 
 the time a wise and just anxiety to purge herself from 
 any such suspicion. But though the strange and al- 
 most unparalleled vicissitudes of fortune afterwards 
 compelled the very monarch, against whom that ex- 
 pedition had been directed, to take refuge in this coun- 
 try, the then representative of the executive of France, 
 though the leader of that expedition, had no cause of 
 complaint, either on this ground, or because other po- 
 litical refugees, professing all shades and kinds of 
 opinion, resided in safety in England; which, before 
 it was their refuge, had so often been, and indeed still 
 is, the theme of their vituperation." 93 (Sir Robert 
 Phillimore: Commentaries Upon International Law, 
 1854, vol. I, 217, p. 228-230.) 
 
 Condorcet, in an exposition of motives, prepared in 
 1792 for the French National Assembly, declared : ' ' By 
 protecting the assemblages of the emigrants, by per- 
 mitting them to menace our frontiers, by showing 
 troops in readiness to second them on the first success, 
 by preparing a retreat for them, by persisting in a 
 threatening league, the King of Hungary obliged 
 France to make preparations of defense ruinous in 
 their expense, exhausted her finances, encouraged the 
 audacity of the conspirators dispersed through the de- 
 partments, excited uneasiness among the citizens, and 
 thus fomented in them and perpetuated trouble. Never 
 
 93 The reader will remember that we discussed above, under 
 8 (f) this question of political asylum.
 
 378 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 did hostilities more really justify war ; and to declare 
 was only to repel it." (Annual Register, vol. 34, 1792, 
 p. 265.) 
 
 HOSTILE PROPAGANDA 
 
 An interesting question arises when the action al- 
 leged to be a menace is confined to hostile propaganda, 
 such as an incitement to revolt. Vattel was right : "It 
 is in violation of the Law of Nations to call on subjects 
 to revolt when they are actually obeying their sov- 
 ereign, although complaining of his rule." (Vattel, 
 Bk. II, 56, Carnegie translation, p. 131.) Such con- 
 duct is a violation of the sovereign rights of a friendly 
 state, and justifies whatever reasonable action may be 
 necessary to secure redress. Nevertheless, it is not 
 customary for the great civilized states to make acts of 
 propaganda a ground of complaint, provided that none 
 but private citizens participate in them, and that the 
 acts, however hostile in sentiment, are confined to dem- 
 onstrations such as parades, mass meetings, etc. 94 
 
 Professor Manning and many others have applied 
 this rule to the French Convention's proclamation of 
 November 19, 1792. He says : "When the French Con- 
 vention announced themselves as the enemies of all 
 constituted authorities, and proclaimed, in November, 
 1792, that 'they would grant fraternity and succor to 
 
 94 The Greek war of independence, the Polish insurrections 
 of 1832 and 1863, the Hungarian uprising of 1849 (see Moore's 
 Principles of American Diplomacy, p. 202f), and the Boer 
 War of 1898-99, called forth mass meetings and very warm 
 expressions of public opinion throughout the civilized world. 
 In as far as these demonstrations were merely popular, they 
 offered no ground for protest on the part of the governments 
 concerned, but could only serve as a helpful warning of a 
 general disapprobation which any wise government would 
 take into account.
 
 PREVENTION 379 
 
 any people who were disposed to recover their lib- 
 erty, m it cannot be doubted that, if there were a proba- 
 bility of these declarations being carried into effect, it 
 was not only the right, but the duty, of neighboring 
 governments to arm in their own defense ; and, if there 
 were no other method of averting the threatened ag- 
 gression, encounter the partial evil to the community, 
 war, great as that evil is, rather than submit to that 
 total ruin of the community which must result from the 
 forcible propagation of anarchy." (Commentaries on 
 the Law of Nations, revised by Sheldon Amos, p. 134.) 
 
 " 'If, 1 wrote Mr. Canning in 1823, 'if the end of the 
 last and the beginning of the present century saw all 
 Europe combined against France, it was not on account 
 of the international changes which France thought 
 necessary for her own political and civil reformation, 
 but because she attempted to propagate first her prin- 
 ciples and afterwards her dominion by the sword.' 
 (Quoted from Bernard: Non-intervention, p. 12-13.) 
 
 Lord Grey, discussing non-intervention [interfer- 
 ence], said in 1821 (Parliamentary Debates, House of 
 Lords, Feb. 19, 1821, cited by Bernard, Non-interven- 
 tion, p. 13) : "When the government of one nation 
 holds out encouragement to the subjects of another to 
 resist its authority, or offers assistance to rebellious 
 projects, a state of things occurs which admits a de- 
 parture from the general principles of international 
 law." Professor Bernard comments: "In truth it is 
 no departure from them, for the revolution by becom- 
 ing aggressive has ceased to be 'internal,' and the 
 measures of self-defense which it justifies are not inter- 
 vention [interference], but war." (Bernard: Non- 
 intervention, 1860, p. 13.) 
 
 95 Manning's reference is to Alison, Hist. French Rev. I, 
 433, 434.
 
 380 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 Prior to the outbreak of the War of 1914, Austria- 
 Hungary complained that the Servian Government en- 
 couraged the propaganda of the Servian press and of 
 the patriotic societies for the annexation of parts of 
 the Austrian Empire inhabited by people of the Ser- 
 vian race. It was probably impossible for the Servian 
 Government to have attempted to suppress a movement 
 so widespread, or to have openly repudiated it. But 
 it was not shown that the government did not do all in 
 its power to keep the agitation within such reasonable 
 limits as it was able. No doubt hostile propaganda 
 such as prevailed in Servia might have been considered 
 a ground of remedial self-help, even to the extent of 
 war, had Austria 's security demanded it. But in view 
 of Austria's overwhelming superiority, this justifi- 
 cation was lacking. A respect for the peace of Europe 
 might also have been expected to stay Austria's re- 
 course to force. 96 
 
 The very active propaganda carried on by the Bolshe- 
 viki of Russia is an excellent example to illustrate these 
 principles, and in this connection it will be of interest 
 to examine that portion of Secretary Colby's note of 
 August 10, 1920, in which he took occasion to discuss 
 the grounds upon which the Wilson Administration re- 
 fused to recognize or have any dealings with the Soviet 
 Government of Russia : * * It is not possible for the gov- 
 ernment of the United States to recognize the present 
 rulers of Russia as a government with which the rela- 
 tions common to friendly government can be main- 
 tained. This conviction has nothing to do with any 
 particular political or social structure which the Rus- 
 sian people themselves may see fit to embrace. It rests 
 upon a wholly diff erent set of facts. These facts, which 
 
 96 See discussion above of Hostile Expeditions. The Austro- 
 Servian question is examined in E. C. Stowell: Diplomacy 
 of the War of 1914, p. 77-8.
 
 PREVENTION 381 
 
 none dispute, have convinced the Government of the 
 United States, against its will, that the existing regime 
 in Russia is based upon the negation of every principle 
 of honor and good faith, and every usage and conven- 
 tion, underlying the whole structure of international 
 law; the negation, in short, of every principle upon 
 which it is possible to base harmonious and trustful 
 relations, whether of nations or of individuals. The 
 responsible leaders of the regime have frequently and 
 openly boasted that they are willing to sign agreements 
 and undertakings with foreign powers while not having 
 the slightest intention of observing such undertakings 
 or carrying out such agreements. This attitude of 
 disregard of obligations voluntarily entered into, they 
 base upon the theory that no compact or agreement 
 made with a non-Bolshevist government can have any 
 moral force for them. They have not only avowed this 
 as a doctrine, but have exemplified it in practice. In- 
 deed, upon numerous occasions the responsible spokes- 
 men of this power, and its official agencies, have de- 
 clared that it is their understanding that the very ex- 
 istence of Bolshevism in Russia, the maintenance of 
 their own rule, depends, and must continue to depend, 
 upon the occurrence of revolutions in all other great 
 civilized nations, including the United States, which 
 will overthrow and destroy their governments and set 
 up Bolshevist rule in their stead. They have made it 
 quite plain that they intend to use every means, in- 
 cluding, of course, diplomatic agencies, to promote 
 such revolutionary movements in other countries. 
 
 "It is true that they have in various ways expressed 
 their willingness to give * assurances' and 'guarantees' 
 that they will not abuse the privileges and immunities 
 of diplomatic agencies by using them for this purpose. 
 In view of their own declarations, already referred to, 
 such assurances and guarantees cannot be very seri-
 
 382 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 ously regarded. Moreover, it is within the knowledge 
 of the Government of the United States that the Bol- 
 shevist Government is itself subject to the control of 
 a political faction, with extensive international rami- 
 fications through the Third Internationale, and that 
 this body, which is heavily subsidized by the Bolshevist 
 Government from the public revenues of Russia, has 
 for its openly avowed aim the promotion of Bolshevist 
 revolutions throughout the world. The leaders of the 
 Bolsheviki have boasted that their promises of non- 
 interference with other nations would in no wise bind 
 the agents of this body. There is no room for reason- 
 able doubt that such agents would receive the support 
 and protection of any diplomatic agencies the Bolshe- 
 viki might have in other countries. Inevitably, there- 
 fore the diplomatic service of the Bolshevist Govern- 
 ment would become a channel for intrigues and the 
 propaganda of revolt against the institutions and laws 
 of countries, with which it was at peace, which would 
 be an abuse of friendship to which enlightened gov- 
 ernments cannot subject themselves. 
 
 "In the view of this Government, there cannot be 
 any common ground upon which it can stand with a 
 power whose conceptions of international relations are 
 so entirely alien to its own, so utterly repugnant to its 
 moral sense. There can be no mutual confidence or 
 trust, no respect even, if pledges are to be given and 
 agreements made with a cynical repudiation of their 
 obligations already in the mind of one of the parties. 
 We cannot recognize, hold official relations with, or 
 give friendly reception to the agents of a government 
 which is determined and bound to conspire against our 
 institutions ; whose diplomats will be the agitators of 
 dangerous revolt; whose spokesmen say that they 
 sign agreements with no intention of keeping them."
 
 PREVENTION 383 
 
 (Printed in International Conciliation Pamphlet, No. 
 155, October, 1920.) 
 
 In a note of August 14, 1920, the French Charge at 
 Washington reiterated the opinions expressed by Sec- 
 retary Colby, and declared that his government could 
 have no official relations with the present rulers of 
 Eussia. He also stated that after mature examination, 
 the French Government had "recognized a Russian 
 Government which declares that it accepts the same 
 principles" which means as the context shows, the 
 same as those expressed by the French and American 
 Governments in regard to Russia and Poland. (Ibid, 
 p. 470.) 
 
 During the past months, sympathizers with the Irish 
 insurrection have been holding mass meetings and 
 parading about the streets of Washington, and pulling 
 down British flags in the streets of New York. Some 
 of the most ardent agitators picketed the British Em- 
 bassy until the police authorities stepped in. The fed- 
 eral authorities have not intervened except to protect 
 the British Embassy, nor does it appear that the Brit- 
 ish Government has entered any protest. 
 
 On St. Patrick's Day, John F. Harrigan, State Presi- 
 dent of the Massachusetts Council of the American 
 Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic, 
 telegraphed President Harding, "In the name of 125,- 
 000 citizens" of the State, to "demand action"... 
 "now," and that he revoke the orders of the officers 
 at Boston who had refused to allow men in uniform 
 to parade when they were informed that the above 
 mentioned association intended to participate. 
 
 After President Harding had conferred with his 
 Cabinet, his Secretary, Mr. Christian, sent the follow- 
 ing reply: "Your telegram has been called to the at- 
 tention of the President and he directs me to say in 
 reply that army and navy commanders have authority
 
 384 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 to direct the forces under their command. The gov- 
 ernment raises no issue about the fitness of your cele- 
 bration of evacuation day and the spirit of St. Patrick's 
 day is felt throughout our country, but the naval and 
 military forces of the nation can have no part in any 
 demonstration which may be construed as influencing 
 the foreign relations of the republic." (Washington 
 Post, March 18, 1921.) 
 
 To have adopted any other course would have 
 amounted to an interference in the internal affairs of a 
 friendly state. 
 
 It is not enough that a state should refrain from in- 
 citing to revolt. It must, as we have already seen, be 
 careful not to attempt to use its agents or its influence 
 directly to carry on a propaganda abroad, even though 
 it may believe this to be for the best interest of the 
 other state. 97 
 
 9T This duty of refraining from any violations of the sover- 
 eignty of the other state is discussed above, 12. 
 
 The limits within which a state should restrict its efforts 
 at propaganda, political or religious, are indicated in a letter 
 Frederic Rogers (Lord Blachford) wrote regarding the ap- 
 pointment of missionary bishops in the Turkish Empire: 
 
 "My dear Lord Bishop, I am rather afraid of being mis- 
 understood about your Bill, a copy of which has just reached 
 me. 
 
 "I, of course, think it is a just claim of the English Church 
 to be allowed to consecrate Missionary Bishops, and as a 
 Churchman I shall be extremely glad if your particular Bill 
 passes as it stands. 
 
 "But I think that in your Bill the State is entitled to take 
 this objection the Bill proposes to invest a Bishop in a 
 Mahomedan country say of Mecca with a statutory relation 
 to the Church of England, that is to say, to attach him re- 
 motely, but really, to the constitution of this country of which 
 the Church is a part. 
 
 "Now, this Bishop of Mecca is not a mere Bishop of English 
 congregations, but a Missionary Bishop bound in that capacity 
 to make war upon Mahomedanism, which is, on the other 
 hand, part of the political constitution of the Ottoman Empire.
 
 ] PREVENTION 385 
 
 DOCTRINE OF CONTAGION 
 
 The advent of a revolutionary government in a neigh- 
 boring state or the prevalence within its borders of 
 peculiar beliefs and practices cannot be considered by 
 
 "Now, the Ottoman Empire having been to a certain extent 
 admitted into the family of nations, is it according to the 
 comity of nations that the English Parliament should take 
 under its wing an organized attack on the constitution of 
 that Empire? The Pope, no doubt, does it in England, but 
 first he does it under shelter of certain principles of tolera- 
 tion, which we profess, and which it appears to me are 
 sufficient to cover his aggression ; and next we, notwithstand- 
 ing, quarrel with him for doing it. 
 
 "You will answer that the Crown may, under your Bill, 
 prevent any such complications by refusing its assent to the 
 creation of any Bishopric which is calculated to cause them. 
 
 "This is one of those answers which is good or bad accord- 
 ing to the animus of the person to whom it is addressed. A 
 rash or careless Minister may authorize the erection of an 
 Anglican Bishopric in a place where its erection would be 
 politically unjustifiable. The question is whether the ad- 
 vantage (of setting the Church going in a missionary direc- 
 tion) justifies the risk of an ill-advised appointment causing 
 a complication with a foreign country. 
 
 "Personally, I think it does (and therefore wish well to 
 your Bill), but if I held the well-being of the English Church 
 a matter of little importance to this country I should think 
 differently, and should think that the Parliament had a right 
 to some more distinct guarantee (to speak as a politician) 
 against the abuse of the powers of consecration. 
 
 "Even personally I prefer our colonial principle of pro- 
 ceeding, the principle, namely, of leaving Bishops to conse- 
 crate in virtue of their inherent spiritual powers, and leaving 
 the consecrating and consecrated to arrange for themselves 
 what shall be their relation to each other. In this case, the 
 State is subject to no responsibility (colonial Bishops being 
 no part of the Constitution), and is therefore entitled to no 
 control over the missionary operations of the Church. 
 
 "I should therefore have liked best to see a Bill (though 
 it would have been perhaps very difficult to draw one) which 
 would merely have permitted the Church to create an Episco- 
 pate beyond the limits of the Queen's Dominions, leaving the 
 relations of that Episcopate to be formed by mutual consent 
 without any statutory aid or the necessity of any Royal assent. 
 25
 
 386 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 their mere example so to endanger the security of other 
 states as to justify intervention. 
 
 To quote from Professor Bernard: "It may be said 
 with confidence, I think, that interference in the in- 
 ternal affairs (as we have defined them) of a foreign 
 State never can be a necessity, unless it be a self-made 
 necessity. As long as what is passing in your neigh- 
 bor's house does not directly concern you, there cannot 
 be that pressing call for self-defense, that clear, formid- 
 able, imminent danger, which the plea assumes. Peo- 
 ple of sickly constitution may take fright at the possi- 
 bility of infection, and misgoverned countries may be 
 agitated by every turbulent movement elsewhere ; but 
 in a despotically governed country there is no such 
 right to uphold a despotism, nor in a republican coun- 
 try to maintain a republic, as would warrant an inter- 
 ference with the clear indisputable right of surround- 
 ing nations to change their institutions at pleasure. 88 
 
 "But I repeat, in default of this, I should consider your 
 Bill as likely to be of great advantage, and wish it success." 
 (Letters of Frederic Lord Blachford, edited by George Eden 
 Marindin, 1896, p. 234-6.) 
 
 98 In regard to propaganda of objectionable doctrines, 
 Heiberg, who may be called the dean of authorities upon the 
 subject of intervention, remarks: "A state which can be 
 ruined in this wise, must either be tottering, and out of touch 
 with higher civilization [Kultur], or the ideas and danger- 
 laden system which has gained recognition in the state from 
 which the danger threatens must have truth in them. " (Trans- 
 lated from Nicht-Intervention, 1842, p. 15-16.) Heiberg 
 refers to the views of the elder Rotteck against interference 
 on account of revolutionary troubles, which called forth a 
 counter opinion from one Dr. Trummer, who considered that 
 states are so nearly affected by what happens across their 
 borders that intervention cannot always be avoided. 
 
 Ott's French edition of Kluber ( 237, p. 308) contains an 
 interesting note (e) condemning interference because of the 
 fear, real or alleged, of "a moral invasion, an intellectual 
 contagion, a political epidemic." References to other au- 
 thorities are also given,
 
 PREVENTION 387 
 
 (Bernard: Non-intervention, 1860, p. 12-13, quoting 
 Canning, Debates, House of Lords, Feb. 19, 1821.) 
 
 The wars of the French Revolution were ushered in 
 with an appeal to the doctrine of contagion. In the 
 manifesto issued August 4, 1792, by the Emperor of 
 Germany and the King of Prussia they declare their in- 
 tention of destroying in France "every spark of insur- 
 rection, which might continually threaten and endanger 
 the welfare of all sovereigns, and all nations." (An- 
 nual Register, 1792, p. 236, 252.) This recalls the 
 witty retort of a Frenchwoman in sympathy with the 
 Revolution : "What you believe to be a conflagration is 
 only an illumination." (Krug: Dikapolitik, 1824, p. 
 332.) 
 
 The Holy Alliance of the autocratic powers under 
 the leadership of Metternich attempted to enforce the 
 doctrine and to suppress revolutionary movements in 
 the European states upon the ground of preventing the 
 danger to their own security from the spread of revolu- 
 tion. The Preliminary Protocol of Troppau contained 
 the following declaration: "States which have under- 
 gone a change of government due to revolution, the re- 
 sults of which threaten other states, ipso facto cease 
 to be members of the European Alliance, and remain 
 excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees 
 for legal order and stability. If, owing to such alter- 
 ations, immediate danger threatens other states, the 
 powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need 
 be by arms, to bring back the guilty state into the bosom 
 of the Great Alliance." 99 (W. A. Phillips: The Con- 
 federation of Europe, p. 222.) 
 
 "After Westlake has justified "the decision of the great 
 powers in 1815 to exclude Napoleon from the throne of France, 
 as a man the experience of whose conduct precluded belief 
 in any protestations of peacefulness which he might make," 
 he remarks: "With this must be strongly contrasted the at-
 
 388 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 W. A. Phillips, in his "Confederation of Europe," 
 relates how seriously Alexander I of Russia was in- 
 
 tempt which during a few years after the congress of Vienna 
 was made by the continental great powers to rule Europe on 
 the principle of legitimacy. In the circular dispatch which, 
 on the occasion of the insurrection at Naples, the courts of 
 Austria, Russia and Prussia dated from Troppau, 8 Decem- 
 ber 1820, they said that 'the powers have exercised an incon- 
 testable right in occupying themselves with taking in common 
 measures of security against states in which the overthrow 
 of the government by a revolt, even could it be considered 
 only as a dangerous example, must have for its consequence 
 a hostile attitude against all constitutions and legitimate 
 governments. ' This was to assert a right of self-preservation 
 against the contagion of revolution ; to deny to a nation the 
 right of establishing for itself free institutions, by force if 
 they cannot otherwise be attained, lest the example should be 
 dangerous to autocratic governments in other countries. The 
 true principle was expressed by Canning, when on 31 March 
 1823, on the occasion of the French intervention against the 
 government which had been established by insurrection in 
 Spain, he wrote to the British ambassador at Paris: 'No 
 proof was produced to his majesty's plenipotentiary of the 
 existence of any design on the part of the Spanish govern- 
 ment to invade the territory of France, of any attempt to 
 introduce disaffection among her soldiery, or of any project 
 to undermine her political institutions; and so long as the 
 troubles and disturbances of Spain should be confined within 
 the circle of her own territory, they could not be admitted 
 by the British Government to afford any plea for foreign 
 interference. If the end of the last and the beginning of the 
 present century saw all Europe combined against France, it 
 was not on account of the internal changes which France 
 thought necessary for her own political and civil reformation, 
 but because she attempted to propagate first her principles, 
 and afterwards her dominion, by the sword.' ' (Westlake: 
 International Law, Part I, Peace, p. 318-319.) 
 
 Westlake adds the following in a footnote : ' ' We quote the 
 last sentence only for the principle, without implying anything 
 as to the historical accuracy of the judgment passed by Can- 
 ning on the wars of the French revolution, further than that 
 it was certainly a true judgment so far as concerns the part 
 taken in those wars by Great Britain. (Ibid.) Bernard as 
 we have indicated above quotes from this same speech with 
 approval. (Bernard: Non-intervention, p. 12-13.)
 
 PREVENTION 389 
 
 fluenced by the news of the revolt of his favorite regi- 
 ment in October, 1820. This incident may serve to il- 
 lustrate the excesses into which unfounded apprehen- 
 sions may lead autocratic power in the defense of a 
 cherished doctrine : * * This regiment, ' ' writes Mr. Phil- 
 lips, "of which as Cesarevich he had been Colonel-in- 
 chief , had supplied the guard at the Michael Palace on 
 the night of Paul's murder and had since been treated 
 by Alexander with special favor. A military power 
 such as Russia, as the Emperor explained to Welling- 
 ton, could not afford to tolerate military revolutions in 
 other countries, the example of which might prove in- 
 fectious; and now his worst fears were realized. In 
 vain it was pointed out to him, by all those best able to 
 judge, that no political motives underlay the action of 
 the soldiers, who had been goaded to revolt solely by 
 the intolerable tyranny of their colonel, a stupid and 
 cruel Prussian martinet. Alexander insisted that the 
 mutiny was the outcome of the conspiracy of the Car- 
 bonari, who had spread their network over all Europe 
 and covered even the soil of Holy Russia. Crowning 
 proof of his own folly ! In the person of Napoleon he 
 had thought to overthrow the Beast; and behold! it 
 was not incarnate in one man, but a 'many-headed 
 monster thing' of which, in his blindness, he had him- 
 self encouraged the growth. At least his eyes were 
 opened, by the Providence of God, before it was too 
 late, and his duty was clear. To the servants of the 
 Evil One no mercy must be shown ; he set aside as too 
 lenient the sentences passed by the court-martial on 
 the ringleaders of the mutiny two corporals and five 
 poor privates and ordered that they should receive 
 six thousand strokes apiece. Thus in Holy Russia at 
 least the Lord's will could be done. As for Europe at 
 large, to Alexander God's will was now equally clear. 
 He searched the Scriptures, and found in the most un-
 
 390 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 likely places in the stories of Nebuchadnezzar and of 
 Judith and Holofernes, and in the Epistles of St. Paul 
 Divine lessons applicable to the perils of the hour. 
 To the principle of Evil, bastard brood of Voltairean 
 philosophy falsely so called, must be opposed the prin- 
 ciple of Faith, which found its supreme expression in 
 that revelation of the Most High the Holy Alliance. 
 Stripped of its verbiage, this meant that in Alexander's 
 view the Alliance was henceforth to be used as a force 
 purely conservative, if not reactionary." (W. A. Phil- 
 lips: The Confederation of Europe, p. 219-221.) 
 
 Whatever authority the doctrine of contagion may 
 have once derived from the great force of the combined 
 power of the Holy Alliance interested in enforcing it 
 has now entirely disappeared. In place of this attempt 
 to legalize interference, international law recognizes 
 that no state has a right of intervention merely on the 
 ground that the doctrines preached in another country 
 or the pernicious example of its institutions endanger 
 the state's security. 
 
 Notwithstanding the complete recognition of the il- 
 legality of interference of the kind we have been dis- 
 cussing, governments responding to the currents of 
 public opinion are certain to transgress the rule in the 
 future as they have done in the past. The difficulty in 
 preventing this lies in finding any adequate check upon 
 the waves of popular emotion which the government of 
 even the most enlightened of the modern states are 
 powerless to resist. 1 
 
 Nassau Senior, discussing interference of this kind, points 
 out the flimsy basis upon which it is justified, declaring that 
 the circumstances which create the "supposed inconvenience 
 or danger arising to other nations from events occurring in 
 the interior of a country" are "incapable of definition, and 
 generally incapable of proof. If," he continues, "we ex- 
 amine the statements of evils suffered or apprehended from 
 the domestic affairs of independent nations, on which the
 
 PREVENTION 391 
 
 John Stuart Mill touches upon the real cause of the 
 vitality of this false doctrine of contagion when in a 
 letter discussing the settlement of international differ- 
 ences, he writes: "When the nations of Europe shall 
 have given up national hatreds and schemes of national 
 aggrandizement, and when their institutions shall be 
 sufficiently assimilated to prevent any of the govern- 
 ments from seeing in the greatness and prosperity of 
 another state a danger to its power over its own people, 
 they will probably be all so sincerely desirous of peace 
 that they will never dream of any other than an ami- 
 cable settlement of any accidental differences that may 
 still arise. And every step taken in the improvement 
 of the intelligence and morality of mankind brings this 
 happy result a little nearer." (The Letters of John 
 Stuart Mill, edited by Hugh S. E. Elliot, London, 1910, 
 vol. II, p. 296.) But that day seems as far removed as 
 is the abandonment of interference to check abhorrent 
 doctrines and to suppress hated institutions. 
 
 In conclusion, we will reaffirm the correct view by 
 quoting the concise statement of Hall: "When how- 
 ever the danger against which intervention is levelled 
 does not arise from the acts or omissions of the state, 
 
 most remarkable modern interventions have been founded, 
 we shall find them in general too vague to be susceptible of 
 refutation, or too frivolous to deserve it ..." 
 
 "A remarkable similarity runs through all the state papers 
 in which this right of intervention is asserted. They gen- 
 erally begin by disclaiming the wish to interfere with the 
 affairs of any independent state; they then state the incon- 
 veniences suffered by their own frontiers, in consequence of 
 the disturbed state of their neighbors; they add that the 
 doctrines professed, and the examples held out, are subversive 
 of the general tranquility of Europe, and particularly of that 
 of their own dominions: and they therefore propose to take 
 military possession of the disturbed country, with no views 
 of aggrandizement, but simply in self-defense." (Nassau 
 Senior : The Law of Nations, Edinburgh Review, April, 1843, 
 p. 334-6.)
 
 392 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 but is merely the indirect consequence of the ex- 
 istence of a form of government, or of the prevalence 
 of ideas which are opposed to the views held by the 
 intervening state or its rulers, intervention ceases to 
 be legitimate. To say that a state has a right to ask a 
 neighbor to modify its mode of life, apart from any at- 
 tempt made by it to propagate the ideas which it rep- 
 resents, is to say that one form of state life has a right 
 to be protected at the cost of the existence of another ; 
 in other words, it is to ignore the fundamental principle 
 that the right of every state to live its life in a given 
 way is precisely equal to that of another state to live its 
 life in another way." (Hall: International Law, 4 
 ed., 91, p. 299-300.) 
 
 16. SELF-PRESERVATION 
 
 There are some writers who assert that when a state 
 believes that the preservation of its existence can be 
 effected by the disregard of the rights of innocent 
 states, it is justified in seeking safety at the expense of 
 others. 2 But this doctrine of necessity strikes at the 
 
 2 We should remember that the preservation of a govern- 
 ment is by no means the same thing as the preservation of a 
 nation or state. Even when the state itself is destroyed, the 
 people may find happiness under another flag. These con- 
 siderations should help to secure a better recognition of the 
 obligation to sacrifice the existence of the state rather than 
 to disregard the sacred terms of a treaty. Again I quote 
 the noble words of Westlake : " . . . . patriotism should not 
 allow us to forget that even our own good, and still less that 
 of the world, does not always and imperatively require the 
 maintenance of our state, still less its maintenance in its 
 actual limits and with undiminished resources." (Westlake: 
 International Law, vol. I, p. 312.) 
 
 When we speak of the existence of the state, we are always 
 making a mere supposition, for no one really knows what will 
 endanger the existence of the state. We should always read 
 "interests of prime importance" when the preservation of 
 the state is discussed.
 
 SELF-PRESERVATION 393 
 
 very root of international society, and makes the pres- 
 ervation of the separate states of greater importance 
 than the preservation of the community of states. 
 Needless to say, it is not supported by the weight of 
 authority, nor by the practice of states. 
 
 For the purpose of refuting this doctrine, Westlake 
 (vol. I, p. 309) quotes the following extract from Eivier 
 (Principes du droit des gens, vol. I, p. 277) : "When," 
 Rivier says, "a conflict arises between the right of self- 
 preservation of a state and the duty of that state to 
 respect the right of another, the right of self-preser- 
 vation overrides the duty. Primum vivere. A man 
 may be free to sacrifice himself. It is never permitted 
 to a government to sacrifice the state of which the des- 
 tinies are confided to it. The government is then au- 
 thorized, and even in certain circumstances bound, 
 to violate the right of another country for the safety 
 (salut) of its own. That is the excuse of necessity, an 
 application of the reason of state. It is a legitimate 
 excuse. ' ' 3 
 
 3 Machiavelli endorsed this doctrine of necessity as a com- 
 plete justification in "The Prince" (1676, eh. xviii) where he 
 wrote : "A prince, therefore, who is wise and prudent, cannot 
 or ought not to keep his parole when the keeping of it is to his 
 prejudice, and the causes for which he promised removed. 
 Were men all good this doctrine was not to be taught, but 
 because they are wicked and not likely to be punctual with 
 you, you are not obliged to any such strictness with them; 
 nor was there ever any prince that wanted lawful pretence to 
 justify his breach of promise. " (Quoted from T. J. Lawrence : 
 Documents Illustrative of International Law, p. 3-4.) 
 
 On the whole, Vattel cannot be said to support the doctrine 
 of necessity in its absolute form. (Cf. Bk. Ill, 43; Bk. II, 
 
 Kliiber (Europaischer Volkerrecht, 44) gives an emphatic 
 endorsement of the doctrine, and gives several references in 
 notes. 
 
 G. F. de Martens (Precis, 74, 78) permits interference 
 when necessary for the security of the state.
 
 394 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 "We will here pause to remark," writes Westlake, 
 "that an argument which may be good as between a 
 
 Professor Franz von Liszt, of the University of Berlin, in 
 the year of our Lord 1920, still supports the doctrine of 
 necessity (Volkerrecht, 11 ed., Berlin, 1920, p. 180-1). 
 
 At first view, we appear to find a considerable weight of 
 modern authority defending the doctrine of absolute neces- 
 sity, that is, the right of a state to do anything which it finds 
 necessary for the preservation of its existence, even though 
 it disregard the most sacred rights of its innocent neighbors. 
 But on closer inspection, we find that very few really intend 
 to support this stand. What many of these authorities have 
 in view is the right of a state to disregard the inviolability of 
 a sovereign state's territory when the latter fails to police it 
 and prevent its serving as a base for hostile expeditions. The 
 invasion of the territory in such circumstances is not a viola- 
 tion of sovereignty, but a cooperation with the sovereign for 
 the policing of his territory. It is unlawful for him to resist 
 reasonable action of this nature, and he will do so at his costs 
 and peril. (See above 1 and 15.) 
 
 This seems to be the idea at the bottom of Hall's somewhat 
 confused statements. (Cf. International Law, 4 ed., 11, 
 83, 85, 91.) On the whole, his authority is opposed to this 
 absolute doctrine of necessity. 
 
 Phillimore stumbles in the same manner. (See vol. I, 
 213, p. 227.) 
 
 Lawrence, defending action under necessity, is evidently 
 intending to justify both preventive action by self-help, and 
 acts of military necessity (Principles, 4 ed., 1910, 65, p. 
 127.) 
 
 Oppenheim (International Law, 2 ed., vol. I, 129-130, 
 p. 184-6; 138, p. 195; vol. II, 413, p. 532), betrays in 
 the confusion of his words the insecurity of his premises. 
 
 See also Twiss (vol. I, p. 149-150) ; Guizot (Memoirs, vol. 
 IV, p. 5) ; Kent (Commentaries, 12 ed., vol. I, p. 23.) 
 
 As we have indicated, the value of the evidence which many 
 of these text writers bring to the support of the doctrine of 
 necessity is weakened and neutralized by the conflicting views 
 which they express. 
 
 Those authorities who would allow every independent state 
 to be the sole judge of when the preservation of its existence 
 against impending danger justifies an invasion of a neighbor- 
 ing state may present some theoretical difference between the 
 advocates of the extreme doctrine of necessity, but in practice, 
 either doctrine would make possible the same disregard of
 
 SELF-PRESERVATION 395 
 
 state and a government entrusted by it with its des- 
 tinies is not necessarily good between it and that gov- 
 ernment together and another state; or we may put 
 it that no state can entrust its government with wider 
 powers than itself possesses." 4 (Westlake: Inter- 
 national Law, vol. I, p. 310.) 
 
 the rights of innocent weaker states, and may therefore be 
 considered as two forms of international anarchy. See dis- 
 cussion in section 15 regarding Castlereagh 's note on the af- 
 fairs of Spain; cf. also his Circular of January 19, 1821 
 (British State Papers, Vol. 8, p. 1160), in which this doctrine 
 was expressed (quoted in Creasy, p. 293). Calvo calls these 
 "wise principles" (Le Droit International, 1 ed., vol. I, 97, 
 p. 201.) 
 
 Evidently influenced by Castlereagh, Wheaton (Elements 
 of International Law, Part II, eh. I, 12, p. 106), referring 
 to the sovereign's right to establish whatever form of govern- 
 ment it chooses, declares: "No foreign state can lawfully 
 interfere with the exercise of this right, unless such inter- 
 ference is authorized by some special compact, or by such a 
 clear case of necessity as immediately affects its own inde- 
 pendence, freedom, and security. ' ' 
 
 ^Opposed to the doctrine of absolute necessity, that is, the 
 right of a state to do anything and to disregard any right or 
 rights when it believes it necessary for the preservation of 
 its existence, are the following authorities: 
 
 Grotius points out that reason justifies the principle of 
 self-preservation, but he considers we must "proceed to that 
 which, though subsequent in origin, is of greater dignity ; and 
 must not only accept it, if it be offered, but seek it with all 
 care." ( Grotius : De Jure Belli et Pacis, Bk. I, ch. II, I, 
 2, Whewell's translation, p. 30; cf. Ibid, Bk. II ch. I, IV, 
 1.) In other places where Grotius appears to justify vio- 
 lation of law upon the ground of necessity, he seems really 
 to mean the right to disregard less important rights (Bk. II, 
 ch. II, VI, 2; Bk. II, ch. VI, V; Bk. II, ch. II, IX). 
 
 Creasy (First Platform, p. 282, note) quotes approvingly 
 Acton's translation of Mamiani's "Rights of Nations" (p. 
 192) : "Though it be infallibly true and certain that it is the 
 duty of every human society to save itself, and though we be 
 allowed also to affirm that there exists between them a tacit 
 agreement to help and protect each other for the sake of their 
 common safety, this must always be understood with some dis-
 
 396 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 President Wilson, in his War Message of April 2, 
 1917, expressed the opinion of what the " heart and 
 conscience of mankind demanded" when he said rela- 
 tive to Germany's disregard of the "meager" re- 
 strictions of international law in her ruthless subma- 
 rine warfare: "This minimum of right the German 
 Government has swept aside under the plea of retali- 
 ation and necessity and because it had no weapons 
 which it could use at sea except these [submarines] 
 which it is impossible to employ, as it is employing 
 them, without throwing to the wind all scruples of hu- 
 manity or of respect for the understandings that were 
 supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world." 
 
 Germany 's doctrine of necessity is contrary to inter- 
 national law, not because of the undoubted popular con- 
 demnation of her course throughout the world, but be- 
 cause the states of the world, in response to sentiments 
 of the same nature, have in their practice refused to 
 recognize this doctrine, and have restricted their con- 
 duct within the limits traced by international law. 
 
 From the point of view of international law as shown 
 by the practice of states, the law of nations is supreme. 
 No state can live by itself nor enter the community of 
 
 cretion, and never extended beyond the limits of rectitude 
 and justice. No sanctity, no grandeur of purpose, not even 
 any necessity or extreme pressure of an emergency, can 
 suffice to justify the resort to means which are not good. 
 Let our diplomatists, both of the old school and the new, 
 take care to remember this, that the observance of a principle 
 is beyond measure more important than the peace, order, and 
 safety of a single or of several States." 
 
 See also, E. C. Stowell: Diplomacy of the War of 1914, 
 p. 445-456, 640-650. Ott's Edition of Kliiber ( 44, p. 307) 
 has an important note controverting Kliiber 's opinion in 
 support of the doctrine of necessity.
 
 SELF-PRESERVATION 397 
 
 states without recognizing the supreme obligation of 
 fulfilling the law of nations. 5 
 
 The strength and vigor of international society is, 
 however, derived from the strength of the separate 
 states, and international law would be untrue to the 
 purposes of its creation if it did not express for the 
 guidance of states in their practice such rules as best 
 conserve the strength of the separate states without 
 
 5 Hauterive, in his note to Vattel (Edition by Hauterive, 
 Vol. I, p. 432-3, Bk. II, 120) says that "necessity" is of the 
 same nature as inadvertence and insanity in that they remove 
 man's volition. In such cases, it is evident that much, if not 
 all, of the deterring effect of punishment will be removed and 
 hence there will be no rational ground for retributive punish- 
 ment. Nevertheless, the law will have been disregarded, and 
 this will justify action to restore the rights of the wronged 
 state. 
 
 Westlake has shown the fallacy of this assertion : ' ' When, ' ' 
 he says, ' ' a small injury is inflicted in obedience to an almost 
 irresistible impulse, the law may overlook it, but in principle 
 we may not hurt another or infringe his rights, even for our 
 self-preservation, when he has not failed in any duty towards 
 us." 
 
 "Self -preservation, when carried beyond this point, is a 
 natural impulse, an effect of the laws to which human nature 
 is subject in the stage of advancement to which it has as yet 
 attained. But the office of jural law is not to register and 
 consecrate the effects of the laws of nature [i. e. of human 
 nature], but to control them by the introduction of the prin- 
 ciple of justice, where an unreflecting submission to the 
 tendencies which in their untamed state they promote would 
 be destructive of society. In that way human nature itself 
 has been gradually improved, and we may hope will continue 
 to be so." (Westlake: International Law, Vol. I, p. 311 ; Cf. 
 ibid, p. 307-317.) 
 
 Relative to necessity as an excuse, it may be of interest to 
 refer to the somewhat confused reasoning of certain writers : 
 H. V. Rotteck (Einmischungsrecht, p. 20-25) ; Oppenheim 
 (vol. II, p. 53); Lawrence (Principles, 4 ed., 1910, 65). 
 Rotteck says action on account of necessity does not become 
 lawful, but is excused.
 
 398 NON-INTEEFBRENCE 
 
 destroying the supremacy and practicability of inter- 
 national law. a 
 
 When from the practice of states we seek to discover 
 how this happy result has been achieved, we turn first 
 for assistance to the observation of the most trust- 
 worthy authorities. But since this doctrine of neces- 
 sity is a matter which has led many of the writers 
 astray, we cannot rely upon their conflicting statements 
 and must needs base our conclusions at first hand upon 
 the evident facts and the practice of states, and test 
 them by showing that they are in conformity with the 
 fundamental principles of international law. 
 
 We have previously established (see above 9) that 
 the rights of each state, as they are ordinarily under- 
 stood and exercised, may be curtailed or even entirely 
 denied when necessary for the common peace and se- 
 curity of the society of nations. 
 
 Now when we see that the strength and prosperity 
 of all the states is dependent upon the preservation of 
 the prosperity of the separate members, the same 
 principle of international police would appear to justify 
 a reasonable curtailment of the rights of any state in 
 order to preserve the existence of one of the other 
 member states. 
 
 In principle and reasoning a priori, this rule is sound, 
 and in practice we find that it is acted upon. 7 
 
 Every state that is mindful of the obligations of 
 mutual helpfulness and cooperation would not refuse to 
 permit a reasonable disregard of its minor rights when 
 necessary for the preservation of the existence of a sis- 
 
 6 The rules of international law are in the main derived 
 from, or indicated by, the concurrent practice of states, and 
 like all inductive generalizations, can be only approximately 
 accurate. But when once a rule has been formulated, it 
 receives for that reason a greater respect, and tends to make 
 the practice of states conform to the terms in which it has 
 been stated. 
 
 7 See above 9.
 
 SELF-PRESERVATION 399 
 
 ter state. 8 Conduct other than this would constitute an 
 abuse of right, since it would be an unreasonable insis- 
 tence upon the right in question to the detriment of 
 that for the preservation of which the right was pri- 
 marily intended. 
 
 Stated from the point of view of the intervening 
 state, international law, in denying the right of a state 
 to destroy another even when necessary for its own 
 preservation, does not deny that every state may, when 
 necessary for the preservation of its existence, disre- 
 gard less important rights of other states. This is the 
 true doctrine of necessity. 
 
 Elvery state is required by international law to re- 
 frain from every abusive use of its sovereignty and in- 
 dependence in order that the rights of every other state 
 to the maintenance of its independent existence may 
 not be imperiled. The purpose of the observance of 
 this rule is to preserve unimpaired the strength of in- 
 ternational society, which is itself derived from the 
 strength of the separate states and their continued in- 
 dependent existence. 9 
 
 8 See also below 22. Disraeli well understood this as is 
 shown by the following remark which he made: ''If the 
 government of the world was a mere alternation between ab- 
 stract right and overwhelming force, I agree there is a good 
 deal in that observation; but that is not the way in which 
 the world is governed. The world is governed by conciliation, 
 compromise, influence, varied interests, the recognition of the 
 rights of others, coupled with the assertion of one 's own ; and 
 in addition, a general conviction, resulting from explanation 
 and good understanding, that it is for the interest of all parties 
 that matters should be conducted in a satisfactory and peace- 
 ful manner." (G. E. Buckle: Life of Disraeli, Vol. V, p. 
 460461.) 
 
 9 Some writers condemn the attempt to establish a hierarchy 
 of rights, but this is to misunderstand the real significance 
 of this doctrine of necessity. There would be no hierarchy 
 of rights if such right were accurately and completely formu-
 
 400 NON-INTERFEEENCE 
 
 From this examination, we perceive that a state is 
 justified when necessary for the preservation of its 
 existence and the rights essential thereto, in disregard- 
 ing rights of another state which are not essential to 
 the existence of the latter. Expressed from the point 
 of view of the obligation of the state whose rights are 
 disregarded, this is the rule of mutual self-sacrifice 
 reasonably incumbent upon all the nations in the inter- 
 est of their common welfare, or, more briefly, this may 
 be called the principle of the relativity of rights and 
 it is a rule the observance of which is essential to pre- 
 vent intolerable abuses of right. 
 
 The same idea is expressed in the maxim : summum 
 jus summa injuria, which may be freely translated: 
 the insistence upon the literal and absolute fulfilment 
 of one's legal right works supreme injustice. Grotius 
 advises that concessions be made in order to avoid war, 
 and quotes Ambrose as saying : * ' . . . for a good man to 
 relax somewhat of his rights, is not only a point of 
 liberality, but often of convenience." (Grotius, Bk. 
 II, ch. XXIV, II, 3-4, Whewells's translation, vol. II, 
 p. 415-6.) Elsewhere Grotius makes application of 
 the same idea when he recognizes the right of taking 
 property in case of necessity, but adds : "... such lib- 
 erty is not granted, if the possessor be in like neces- 
 sity." (Grotius, Bk. II, ch. II, VIII, Whewells's trans- 
 lation, vol. I, p. 240.) 
 
 Ferdinando Galiani has recognized this rule, and 
 stated Has" the combination of the greatest benefit to 
 
 lated, but since, in view of our lack of juridical experience 
 and science, this is not yet possible, every right as formulated 
 must be understood to be subject to certain fundamental or 
 guiding principles, as Westlake has said in a passage already 
 quoted : "... No principle is more firmly established in the 
 science of law than that which says to an owner sic utere tuo 
 ut alienum non laedas." [So use thine own as not to injure 
 another.] (Westlake: International Law, vol. II, p. 313.)
 
 SELF-PRESERVATION 401 
 
 oneself with the least damage to others and recipro- 
 cally the least damage to oneself, combined with the 
 greatest benefit of others." (De Doveri, Naples, 1782, 
 p. 20-22, translated from the French, quoted in a note 
 to Pradier-Fodere's Vattel, Paris, 1863, vol. II, p. 104, 
 Bk.II,ch.V,119.) 10 
 
 Westlake (vol. I, p. 312-313) alludes to this same 
 principle negatively when he justifies anticipatory 
 action to prevent "all violation of the legal rights;" 
 but he denies that recourse to force may be had for this 
 purpose in the case of "trifling injuries," and he adds : 
 1 1 de minimis non curat lex ' ' or, the law does not take 
 account of trifles. 11 
 
 The right of angary is an application of the same 
 principle of the relativity of rights, and it justifies the 
 seizure of innocent neutral property in time of war, 
 
 10 In the same note, Pradier Fodere quotes Jouffroy 
 (Catechisme de Droit Naturel, 1841, 107, p. 41) as declar- 
 ing: "When in a case of urgent necessity a person violates 
 the rights of another in the belief that there is no other means 
 to save his innate rights, he does not do wrong provided that 
 he is justified in believing (pent presumer) that the other to 
 protect those rights would spontaneously have done the same. 
 That is to say, 1st, when to defend one of the rights essential 
 to the preservation of a man's dignity, he violates a right of 
 another less essential to humanity; 2nd, when he is able to 
 make the reparation which he owes." 
 
 "Speaking of intervention to ward off imminent danger, 
 Lawrence (Principles, 4 ed., 65, p. 127-8) says: "It must 
 be sufficiently important in itself to justify the expenditure 
 
 of blood and treasure to repel it Governments constantly 
 
 submit to small inconveniences rather than resort to hos- 
 tilities." 
 
 Perhaps it is fair to say that the criticism, whether well 
 founded or not, that fell upon Lord Palmerston because of 
 his interposition in the Don Pacifico affair was based upon the 
 ground of the relative insignificance of the claims which 
 Palmerston sent a fleet to collect from Greece. ( See Hogan : 
 Pacific Blockade, p. 105-115, for an account of the facts of 
 this intervention.) 
 26 
 
 *ANTA BARBARA STATE COLLEGE
 
 402 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 and the seizure of any property generally when neces- 
 sary for the preservation of the state. The right of 
 undisturbed possession yields to the superior need in 
 as far as is necessary to meet it. But the extremity of 
 the appropriating state does not stand in the way of the 
 payment of adequate compensation 12 and even of resti- 
 tution when the need is past. 
 
 A very wide recognition of the principle of the rela- 
 tivity of rights is shown by the authorities who justify 
 the disregard of the territorial inviolability of a neigh- 
 boring state when necessary for self-preservation and 
 in order to ward off an imminent peril. Even though 
 the real justification for this irruption into neighboring 
 territory is, as we have seen, based upon another and 
 quite distinct principle, 13 these opinions bear testimony 
 
 "Cf. Twiss, vol. I, p. 149 ; Grotius, Bk. II, ch. II, VIII ; 
 Stowell and Munro: International Cases, Vol. II, p. 544-557. 
 When possible, the same principle would require payment 
 prior to ex-appropriation. An interesting case of angary 
 was the seizure of the Dutch vessels in the ports of the United 
 States during the recent war. ( See J. W. Garner : Interna- 
 tional Law and the World War, vol. I, p. 174-6.) 
 
 Grotius (Bk. II, ch. II, VII, VIII, IX, Whewell's transla- 
 tion, vol. I, p. 239-240) justifying certain alleged "pristine 
 rights" of all mankind and declaring that they are revived 
 by necessity, warns that ' ' this liberty go not too far. ' ' First, 
 he cautions us to endeavor to avoid using it, and by way of 
 illustration he adds : ' ' Plato allows a man to take water from 
 his neighbor's well, if in his own he has dug down to the chalk, 
 seeking water ; and Solon, if he has dug his own ground forty 
 cubits. For as Plutarch says, he thought that necessity was 
 to be relieved, not idleness encouraged; and Xenophon says 
 to the Sinopians, If we are not allowed to buy, we must take ; 
 not from contempt of Rights, but from necessity. ' ' 
 
 "Secondly, such liberty is not granted, if the possessor be 
 in like necessity ; . . . . Lactantius says, that he does not do 
 amiss who abstains to thrust a drowning man from a plank, 
 or a wounded man from his horse, even for the sake of his own 
 preservation. So Cicero ; and Curtius. 
 
 "Thirdly, that when it is possible, restitution be made." 
 
 13 That is, self-help. See above, 1 and 15.
 
 SELF-PRESERVATION 403 
 
 to the recognition of the existence and vitality of the 
 principle of relativity. 14 
 
 It is certainly a defect in the practical application of 
 this principle that to each state is left the liberty of 
 deciding in first instance whether its own rights are, 
 relatively to the rights of others, of such an importance 
 as to justify recourse to force to preserve them. 15 
 
 We must, however, remember that this is the system 
 of sovereignty, and as we have explained, the only one 
 which is practical under present conditions. * * The con- 
 scientious judgment of the state," says Westlake, "act- 
 ing on the right thus allowed must necessarily stand in 
 the place of authoritative sanction, so long as the pres- 
 ent imperfect organization of the world continues." 
 (Westlake, vol. I, p. 313.) 
 
 The decision which the state thus makes in its own 
 case is not conclusive, and if arbitrary and evidently 
 unreasonable that is in contradiction to the law the 
 
 "Some of the authorities who express this view are Twiss 
 (vol. I, 102, p. 149), Phillimore (Commentaries, 1 ed., vol. 
 I, 213, p. 227), and Lawrence (Principles, 4 ed., 65, p. 
 127.) 
 
 Halleck (International Law, ch. IV, 25, p. 95), criticising 
 Phillimore 's view, points out the contradiction in his reason- 
 ing, but does not appear himself to seize the principle of 
 relativity for which Phillimore is groping. 
 
 We find what is really another recognition of the principle 
 of relativity, although it is also based upon an erroneous in- 
 terpretation of principle: I refer to the alleged right of 
 transit, or passage for troops across neutral territory. (See 
 Vattel, Bk. II, ch. IX, 123. Pradier-Fodere 's edition sup- 
 plies interesting notes to this passage and to the following 
 sections relating to the right of "innocent passage" vol. II, 
 p. 108-116.) 
 
 15 The failure to distinguish between a liberty of each state 
 to make this decision subject to such rectification as the pro- 
 cedure of international law provides and an absolute or per- 
 fect right to decide as it chooses has caused much confusion. 
 We shall revert to this matter later on.
 
 404 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 other states will either counter-intervene or make the 
 transgressor feel the weight of their disapproval. 18 
 
 We have seen that, according to international law, 
 the plea of self-preservation or necessity is not an ade- 
 quate justification for the overriding of rights of an- 
 other state in order to survive. The plea of self-pres- 
 ervation only permits such recourse to force as is nec- 
 essary to compel other states to fulfil their obligations 
 of mutual helpfulness and cooperation. We must now 
 discuss one or two situations of peculiar difficulty 
 which arise in practice. 
 
 MILITARY NECESSITY may be defined as the right of a 
 belligerent to disregard certain rules of the law of war 
 when justified by a legitimate military purpose. For 
 instance, the obligation to respect the rights of prop- 
 erty, whether in occupied territory or elsewhere, gives 
 way to such need as the military authorities may have 
 to effect the purpose of their operations, but military 
 necessity does not justify a violation of the rules of 
 honorable warfare, however extreme the need. The 
 hope of salvation for the state defending its existence 
 cannot justify, upon the plea of necessity, any depar- 
 ture from the fundamental laws which have been 
 learned by experience, and adopted by all the states as 
 essential to prevent war from degenerating into an in- 
 discriminate slaughter, like the contests of beasts. 
 There is no doubt a certain latitude, but this is a ques- 
 tion which is more properly considered under the laws 
 
 16 The limitation which some authorities put upon justifiable 
 action for self-preservation is really a question of the reason- 
 ableness of satisfaction. (Cf. Halleck, ch. IV, 5, p. 84.) 
 
 Whenever international law gives a right of action for 
 redress, the right is limited to what is reasonably required 
 for satisfaction, compensation, and security.
 
 SELF-PRESERVATION 405 
 
 of war and the limits of military reprisals. 17 The doc- 
 trine of military necessity from the point of view of 
 neutrality is of particular interest. In how far may 
 the state acting for self-preservation go in disregard- 
 ing neutral rights? 
 
 MILITARY NECESSITY AND NEUTRAL BIGHTS 
 
 Military necessity in relation to neutral rights is 
 probably the most intricate of all the questions which 
 we shall have to discuss, and it has not as far as I am 
 aware been satisfactorily treated by any of the writers 
 upon the law of nations. To understand the appli- 
 cation of the principles, it is first necessary to under- 
 stand the nature of neutrality. We have already seen 
 that every state is obligated to do what it is reasonably 
 able to help to enforce international law, and to repel 
 aggression against its sister states. Now since the im- 
 perfect system of international law leaves to each state 
 the exercise of its discretion as to where and how it 
 should act, it may well happen that an injustice be done 
 the innocent party in strife through a failure of other 
 states to be reasonably active in the discharge of their 
 obligation to cooperate for the enforcement of justice. 
 When such a miscarriage of justice occurs, the injured 
 state will have just cause of complaint against neutral 
 
 17 The laws of war carry with them their own sanction, and 
 the belligerent who violates them will be in danger of de- 
 grading the conflict to a war of extermination which may 
 work the destruction of both parties, but will tend surely to 
 eliminate the transgressor from the ranks of respectable 
 states. The states that survive today are those that have 
 shown a proper regard for the laws of war, or at least, to 
 state a truism, we may say that they have shown a respect 
 for the laws of war adequate to permit their survival. 
 
 In addition to this automatic sanction of common ruin, 
 there is also the possibility of intervention by neutral states. 
 (See above, 7.)
 
 406 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 states, and since states have ever been prone to regard 
 their own cause as just, they have generally been ready 
 to penalize neutral states who fail to intervene in sup- 
 port of what the belligerent considers justice, i. e., his 
 own cause. In this atmosphere has grown de facto a 
 right of neutrality for those states only that were suf- 
 ficiently strong to insist upon enjoying that status. As 
 an obligation corresponding to this right of neutrality, 
 the neutral state was bound to enforce upon both bel- 
 ligerents alike the respect of its neutrality. The point 
 to note clearly is that the right of a state too weak to 
 make its neutrality respected by all the belligerents can 
 be based only upon the sanction of other states cooper- 
 ating to make it respected. In the absence of such a 
 collective sanction, a belligerent who fears that his ad- 
 versary will take advantage of the weakness of a neu- 
 tral state will not dare to wait until by the violation of 
 the neutral territory the war has been won. In this 
 situation, the belligerent who has ground for appre- 
 hension will anticipate and offer the neutral too weak 
 to defend his neutrality the choice of being with him 
 or against him. 
 
 It is reasonable to believe that the bitter lesson 
 taught by the recent war will make powerful neutrals 
 quicker to intervene for justice in future wars, in which 
 event a small power in a precarious position may be 
 allowed to remain neutral even when unable to defend 
 its neutrality against an unscrupulous belligerent. 
 
 Let us hope that the time has come when a weak 
 neutral can rely on the support of other states. In any 
 event, we may expect to find in practice a better respect 
 of neutral rights on the part of belligerents. 
 
 But even now and until the advance is reasonably 
 certain, there is some justification for belligerents pro- 
 ceeding as far in the disregard of neutral rights as 
 neutrals and other states will tolerate, provided always
 
 SELF-PRESERVATION 407 
 
 that such disregard does not amount to an act of bad 
 faith or inhumanity, which is contrary to the funda- 
 mental and always controlling precepts of international 
 law. 
 
 Grotius took this view as the following extract 
 shows : 
 
 " Hence we may collect how he who carries on a 
 righteous war may lawfully seize a place situate in a 
 land which is not at war ; namely, if there be a danger, 
 not imaginary, but certain, that the enemy will seize 
 that place, and thence do irreparable damage: and 
 next, on condition that nothing be taken which is not 
 necessary for this purpose of caution, for example, the 
 mere custody of the place, leaving to the true owner 
 the jurisdiction and the revenues : finally, if it be done 
 with the intention of restoring the custody to the true 
 owner as soon as the necessity is over. ' ' (Grotius : De 
 Jure et Pacis, Bk. II, ch. II, X, Whewells 's translation, 
 vol. I, p. 240-241.) 
 
 Vattel, with a reckless disregard of consistency with 
 his previously expressed opinion (see Bk. Ill, 43) 
 declares: "Imperative necessity may also warrant a 
 belligerent in seizing temporarily a neutral town and 
 placing a garrison there, for the purpose either of pro- 
 tecting himself against the enemy or of anticipating 
 the designs of the enemy upon the same town, when the 
 sovereign is unable to defend it." (Vattel: The Law 
 of Nations, Bk. Ill, ch. VII, 122, Carnegie translation, 
 p. 275.) 
 
 Hall discusses this situation somewhat fully: "The 
 right of self-preservation in some cases justifies the 
 commission of acts of violence against a friendly or 
 neutral state, when from its position and resources it 
 is capable of being made use of to dangerous effect by 
 an enemy, when there is a known intention on his part 
 so to make use of it, and when, if he is not forestalled,
 
 408 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 it is almost certain that he will succeed, either through 
 the helplessness of the country or by means of intrigues 
 with a party within it. The case, though closely anal- 
 ogous to that already mentioned, so far differs from 
 it that action, instead of being directed against persons 
 whose behavior it may be presumed is not sanctioned 
 by the state, is necessarily directed against the state 
 itself. The state must be rendered harmless by its ter- 
 ritory being militarily occupied, or by the surrender 
 of its armaments being extorted. Although therefore 
 the measures employed may be consistent with amity 
 of feeling, it is impossible to expect, as in the former 
 case, that a country shall consider it more important 
 that the threatened state shall be protected than that 
 its own rights of sovereignty shall be maintained in- 
 tact, and while the one state may do what is necessary 
 for its own preservation, the other may resent its 
 action, and may treat it as an enemy. So long how- 
 ever as this does not occur, and war in consequence 
 does not break out, the former professes that its oper- 
 ations are of a friendly nature ; it is therefore strictly 
 limited to such action as is barely necessary for its ob- 
 ject, and it is evidently bound to make compensation 
 for any injury done by it. 18 
 
 18 Hall adds the following note: "Grotius (De Jure Belli 
 et Pacis, lib. ii. c.ii, 10) gives the occupation of neutral 
 territory, under such circumstances as those stated, as an 
 illustration of the acts permissible under his law of necessity ; 
 and the doctrine of Wolff (Jus Gentium, 339), Lampredi 
 (Jr. Pub. Univ. Theorem, pt. iii. cap. vii. 4), Kliiber ( 44), 
 Twiss (i. 102), etc., covers the view expressed in the text; 
 its best justification, however, is that the violation of the 
 rights of sovereignty contemplated by it is not more serious, 
 and is caused by far graver reasons, than can be alleged in 
 support of many grounds of defensive intervention, which 
 have been acted upon, and have been commonly accepted by 
 writers. For defensive intervention, see 91." [The pas- 
 sage from Grotius above referred to is that which we have 
 just quoted. E. C. S.]
 
 SELF-PRESERVATION 409 
 
 ' * The most remarkable instance of action of the kind 
 in question is that which is presented by the English 
 operations with respect to Denmark in 1807. At that 
 time the Danes were in possession of a considerable 
 fleet, and of vast quantities of material of naval con- 
 struction and equipment; they had no army capable 
 of sustaining an attack from the French forces then 
 massed in the north of Germany ; it was provided by 
 secret articles in the Treaty of Tilsit, of which the 
 British government was cognizant, that France should 
 be at liberty to take possession of the Danish fleet and 
 to use it against England; 19 if possession had been 
 taken, France 'would have been placed in a command- 
 ing position for the attack of the vulnerable parts of 
 Ireland, and for a descent upon the coasts of England 
 and Scotland;' in opposition, no competent defensive 
 force could have been assigned without weakening the 
 Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Indian stations to a de- 
 gree dangerous to the national possessions in those 
 regions; the French forces were within easy striking 
 distance, and the English government had every reason 
 to expect that the secret articles of the Treaty of Til- 
 sit would be acted upon. Orders were in fact issued 
 for the entry of the corps of Bernadotte and Davoust 
 into Denmark before Napoleon became aware of the 
 dispatch, or even the intended dispatch, of an English 
 expedition. In these circumstances the British gov- 
 ernment made a demand, the presentation of which was 
 supported by a considerable naval and military force, 
 that the Danish fleet should be delivered into the cus- 
 tody of England; but the means of defense against 
 French invasion and a guarantee of the whole Danish 
 
 19 Hall is in error here. The British Government may have 
 had information which led them to expect that the treaty 
 would be made, but the British Expedition was decided upon 
 before the treaty was signed.
 
 410 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 possessions were at the same time offered, and it was 
 explained that 'we ask deposit we have not looked for 
 capture; so far from it, the most solemn pledge has 
 been offered to your government, and it is hereby re- 
 newed, that, if our demand be acceded to, every ship of 
 the navy of Denmark shall, at the conclusion of a gen- 
 eral peace, be restored to her in the same condition and 
 state of equipment as when received under the pro- 
 tection of the British flag.' The emergency was one 
 which gave good reason for the general line of conduct 
 of the English government. The specific demands of 
 the latter were also kept within due limits. Unfortu- 
 nately Denmark, in the exercise of an indubitable right, 
 chose to look upon its action as hostile, and war en- 
 sued, the occurrence of which is a proper subject for ex- 
 treme regret, but offers no justification for the harsh 
 judgments which have been frequently passed upon 
 the measures which led to it. " (Hall: International 
 Law, 4th ed., 1895, 85, p. 284-7.) 
 
 20 Hall adds the following in a note: "Alison, Hist, of 
 Europe, VI: 474-5; De Garden, Hist, des Traites de Paix, 
 X: 238-243 and 325-331. Writers who still amuse them- 
 selves by repeating the attacks upon the conduct of England, 
 which were formerly common, might read with profit the 
 account of the transaction given by the best French historian 
 who has dealt with the Napoleonic period (Lanfrey: Hist, 
 de Napoleon ler, IV: 146-9), [and Professor T. E. Holland's 
 addition to Hall's note] and the comments on the English 
 policy by Captain Mahan of the U. S. Navy, ' Influence of Sea 
 Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,' II: 277." 
 
 Nassau Senior, a loyal Englishman of the highest standing, 
 remarks : ' ' Such was the pretence on which we seized Copen- 
 hagen in 1807; but who will now venture to defend that 
 occupation?" (Nassau Senior: Article in Edinburgh 
 Review, April, 1843, vol. 156, p. 328.) 
 
 Travers Twiss is in agreement with Hall. He writes: 
 ' ' Urgent and indisputable danger may even authorize a nation, 
 to occupy the territory of a neutral nation in order to prevent 
 the execution of an enemy's intention to occupy it for the
 
 SELF-PRESERVATION 411 
 
 Hall has not included what was perhaps the most 
 significant incident connected with these events. The 
 
 purposes of carrying on its hostilities with greater advantage, 
 whenever the nation to which the territory belongs is unable 
 or unwilling to defend it. But the exercise of this right, 
 which Kliiber (Pt. II, 44) regards as a right of necessity, 
 entails the obligation to make compensation to the neutral 
 state for any damages which may have accrued to it." 
 (Travers Twiss: The Law of Nations, vol. I, 1861, 102, 
 p. 150.) 
 
 And Westlake who has given us the best refutation of the 
 so-called doctrine of necessity, avoids Hall's misstatement of 
 facts but reaches the same conclusion: "Perhaps the most 
 memorable instance of political action on the ground of self- 
 preservation, justifiable in our opinion, is that of the seizure 
 of the Danish fleet by England in 1807. After the treaty of 
 Tilsit there was good reason for believing that Napoleon and 
 the czar Alexander, in order to obtain a great increase of 
 naval power against England, intended to compel Denmark, 
 by force if necessary, to join them in the war. The British 
 government demanded of Denmark the surrender of her fleet, 
 offering the most solemn pledge that on the conclusion of a 
 general peace it should be restored in the same condition and 
 state of equipment as when received. And on meeting with 
 a refusal it caused the fleet to be captured by force of arms. 
 Such a case is essentially similar to that of a belligerent 
 having sure information that his enemy, in order to obtain a 
 strategic advantage, is about to march an army across the 
 territory of a neutral clearly too weak to resist, in which 
 circumstances it would be impossible to deny him the right 
 of anticipating the blow on the neutral territory. The prin- 
 ciple that the legal rights of a state are not to be violated 
 without its own fault is not really infringed, for when a 
 state is unable of itself to prevent a hostile use being made of 
 its territory or its resources, it ought to allow proper measures 
 of self -protection to be taken by the state against which the 
 hostile use is impending, or else must be deemed to intend that 
 use as the necessary consequence of refusing the permission. 
 It is a principle of jurisprudence that every one is presumed 
 to intend the necessary consequences of his actions. We can- 
 not therefore subscribe to the condemnation which many con- 
 tinental writers have pronounced on the conduct of England 
 in 1807." (Westlake: International Law, Vol. I, p. 315- 
 316.)
 
 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 British plenipotentiary, desirous of limiting the harsh 
 ness of the measures so as not to humiliate the Danes 
 unnecessarily, had agreed to withdraw the British 
 forces from the captured island of Zealand within a 
 short period. But in view of the hostility of Denmark, 
 which was naturally to be expected, the retention of 
 this position became a matter of the greatest military 
 importance. Nevertheless^ the British Government 
 honorably carried out the unfortunate terms of their 
 plenipotentiary, which they might, with some justifi- 
 cation, have regarded as a sponsion. Evidently in their 
 minds the faithful observance of a treaty took prece- 
 dence over military necessity even in a case of such 
 urgency as the one under consideration. 21 
 
 The principle which Westlake formulates is correct, but 
 we may question its application in the present instance. For 
 why should Denmark be held responsible for the evil conse- 
 quences to others which might be expected to result from the 
 commission of an assault upon her own rights 1 Before West- 
 lake 's principle can apply, it must be shown that Denmark 
 was herself a secretly active or negligently complaisant party 
 to Napoleon 's designs. England 's defense must rest on other 
 grounds which are discussed in the text. 
 
 Lawrence remarks: "In all probability men will differ as 
 long as International Law is studied, about the seizure of the 
 Danish fleet by Great Britain in 1807." (T. J. Lawrence: 
 The Principles of International Law, 4 ed., 65, p. 127-8.) 
 
 "September 22, 1807, Lord Castlereagh wrote Lord Cath- 
 cart, "We are, above all things, anxious to preserve our char- 
 acter for good faith untainted, but ..." and he went on to 
 explain the desirability of reoccupying Zealand as soon as it 
 might honorably be done. ( Castlereagh 's Correspondence, 
 Dispatches, and Other Papers, ed. by C. W. Vane, Marquis 
 of Londonderry, 2nd Series, London, 1851, vol. VI, p. 179-181, 
 184.) 
 
 Mr. Ponsonby twitted the government for withdrawing from 
 Zealand. "Why," he asked, "so shabby in our iniquities? 
 When we imitated the atrocities of the ruler of France, why 
 not imitate the grandeur and magnificence of his designs!" 
 (Parliamentary Debates, vol. X, p. 265.) Canning defended 
 the conduct of the Government (ibid, p. 278), but in a letter
 
 SELF-PRESERVATION 413 
 
 The case of Copenhagen has often been referred to 
 by German sympathizers as exactly comparable with 
 that of Belgium, but the two cases obviously are not 
 based upon the same principles. Firstly, in the case of 
 the invasion of Belgium, Germany's own uncompro- 
 mising we might say aggressive conduct made war 
 inevitable and created the necessity, if such there was. 
 Secondly, it would appear that the war might have been 
 fought without invading Belgium, and hindsight has 
 shown how much wiser were those of the Kaiser's 
 advisers who urged another plan. But after all, these 
 two reasons are of lesser moment than those which fol- 
 low. Thirdly, Germany had solemnly pledged her 
 word to defend the neutrality of Belgium, whereas, in- 
 stead of keeping faith, she treacherously invaded the 
 territory of an innocent nation. Fourthly, Germany 
 unworthily attempted, by bearing false witness, to 
 make her own people and neutral nations believe that 
 the invasion was justified by prior violations of Bel- 
 gian territory, into which, Germany declared, French 
 troops had penetrated. Thus, Germany herself violated 
 a treaty into which she had entered with a full knowl- 
 edge of all the circumstances and from which she had 
 for many years derived advantage. 
 
 In honorable contrast with this conduct, England 
 may be justly proud of the scrupulousness with which 
 in 1807 her Government refused to make necessity a 
 ground for repudiation of the agreement into which 
 they entered, we might say unwittingly. It would not 
 necessarily follow that the precedents of a hundred 
 
 of September 23, 1807, to Mr. Ross, his private secretary, he 
 complained of the agents who had made the agreement. 
 (Letters of the First Earl of Malmesbury, London, 1870, vol. 
 II, p. 51. Cf. Diaries and Letters of Sir George Jackson, 
 1872, vol. II, p. 218, Rose Canning and Denmark, in English 
 Historical Review, 1896, p. 90.)
 
 414 NON-INTERFEEENCE 
 
 years ago should be made the models of to-day, but in 
 a situation similar to that which faced England in 
 1807, when the autocracies of France and Russia com- 
 bined to compass her ruin, I believe that any intelligent 
 government would disregard the neutrality of a power 
 too weak to prevent itself from becoming an involun- 
 tary instrument for the carrying out of the enemy's de- 
 signs. 
 
 If a high-minded and intelligent government would 
 follow the precedent of 1807, we should praise and not 
 blame England for it. But it is to be hoped that a 
 nearer sense of the obligation which rests upon all 
 of the states to defend the independence of any one of 
 them from attack will henceforth render such an act of 
 prevention at one and the same time unnecessary and 
 inexpedient. 
 
 17. BALANCE OF POWER 
 
 Among independent states, the maintenance of the 
 political equilibrium is a matter of constant attention. 
 It is almost as instinctive for the statesman incessantly 
 to make the countless little moves which are necessary 
 for the purpose as it is for an individual to call into 
 play the different muscles which maintain his balance 
 and keep him erect. 22 
 
 Since every state that is not increasing its relative 
 influence in international affairs is anxious at least to 
 preserve existing advantages, it is natural that this 
 
 "Polybius, Let. I, Cap. 83, cited by W. A. Phillips in his 
 article on the Balance of Power, Encyclopedia Brittanica, 
 vol. Ill, p. 235, writes: "Nor is such a principle to be 
 despised, nor should so great a power be allowed to any one 
 as to make it impossible for you afterwards to dispute with 
 him on equal terms considering your manifest rights." 
 
 In the article just referred to, Phillips says : " In its essence, 
 it is no more than a precept of common sense born of experi- 
 ence and the instinct of self-preservation."
 
 BALANCE OF POWER 415 
 
 similarity of purpose should constitute a basis for 
 cooperative action. The supporters of the policy of 
 conservation would preserve the political equilibrium 
 of states by the maintenance of existing relations, 
 that is, they defend the status quo. The weaker states 
 that fear to be swallowed up by the great states are 
 generally of this persuasion, and sometimes this group 
 will be found to include a great state possessed of 
 greater territory than it can expect to defend by its 
 unaided force against the encroachments and cupidity 
 of its rivals. 
 
 A different method is advocated by a second group 
 composed of states of great power and insatiable land 
 hunger who wish to acquire new territories without the 
 danger and expense of war. They would apportion 
 among themselves the territory of any state upon which 
 they have cast their covetous eyes. The best instance 
 of the application of this method of maintaining the 
 political equilibrium was the partition of Poland at the 
 end of the eighteenth century. But this doctrine of 
 partition in order to maintain the balance of power 
 is nothing but another name for conquest. It can make 
 no claim to the recognition of international law, since 
 its purpose is to build up the territories of the great 
 powers through the spoliation of their weak and un- 
 offending neighbors. In practice the partition of the 
 coveted territories does not meet the basic test of law. 
 It is not generally effective in maintaining peace. On 
 the contrary, it sows the seeds of greater discord. 23 
 
 23 In the event that a small state is unable to fulfil its 
 international obligations, so that its territory becomes a cause 
 of disturbance for neighboring powers and an international 
 nuisance, the surrounding powers would be justified in taking 
 such reasonable action as is necessary to police the territory 
 and to remove the cause of disturbance. See above 9, and 
 under 15.
 
 416 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 The brazen doctrine of partition has had an inter- 
 esting history of its own. The first crude method of 
 equal division was improved upon so as to permit the 
 carving up of the seized territory in such a manner as 
 to preserve the proportionate strength of the partition- 
 ing powers. 24 
 
 As evidence of the prevalence of this doctrine, we 
 may quote from so liberal a thinker as Sir Robert 
 Morier, who was in general no admirer of Napoleon 
 III. He writes his father from Vienna, June 20, 1866 : 
 "That, if there should result from this war [Austro- 
 Prussian] great territorial changes such as to alter 
 very gravely the relative strength of the military mon- 
 archies of Europe, France should expect some corre- 
 sponding advantages, is so absurdly fair that it is in- 
 conceivable to me that even that dullest of corniferi, 
 John Bull, should shake his foolish head at it.*' 25 (Me- 
 moirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier, vol. II, p. 67.) 
 
 In this connection, and in view of subsequent events, 
 it is interesting to read what Lord Palmerston wrote 
 Lord Clarendon, March 1, 1857 : "As to the Emperor's 
 schemes about Africa, the sooner Cowley sends in his 
 grounds of objection the better. It is very possible 
 that many parts of the world would be better governed 
 by France, England, and Sardinia than they are now ; 
 and we need not go beyond Italy, Sicily, and Spain for 
 examples. But the alliance of England and France had 
 derived its strength not merely from the military and 
 naval power of the two states, but from the force of the 
 
 "See Charles Dupuis: Le principe de 1'equilibre, p. 41. 
 
 25 The project of a partition of Belgium in the handwriting 
 of Benadetti was given out by Bismarck and published in the 
 London Times upon the outbreak of the Franco-German War. 
 It did much to alienate the sympathy of England and to 
 lessen her desire of intervention. (See International Relations 
 by the correspondent of "The Times" [Blowitz] at Berlin, 
 Vol. II, p. 190f.)
 
 BALANCE OF POWER 417 
 
 moral principle upon which that union has been found- 
 ed. Our union has for its foundation resistance to un- 
 just aggression, the defense of the weak against the 
 strong, and the maintenance of the existing balance of 
 power. How, then, could we combine to become un- 
 provoked aggressors, to imitate, in Africa, the partition 
 of Poland by the conquest of Morocco for France, of 
 Tunis and some other state for Sardinia, and of Egypt 
 for England! and, more especially, how could England 
 and France, who have guaranteed the integrity of the 
 Turkish Empire, turn round and wrest Egypt from the 
 Sultan! A coalition for such a purpose would revolt 
 the moral feelings of mankind, and would certainly be 
 fatal to any English Government that was a party to 
 it. Then, as to the balance of power to be maintained 
 by giving us Egypt. In the first place, we don't want 
 to have Egypt. What we wish about Egypt is that 
 it should continue attached to the Turkish empire, 
 which is a security against its belonging to any Euro- 
 pean power. We want to trade with Egypt, and to 
 travel through Egypt, but we do not want the burthen 
 of governing Egypt, and its possession would not, as a 
 political, military, and naval question, be considered, 
 in this country, as a set-off against the possession of 
 Morocco by France. Let us try to improve all these 
 countries by the general influence of our commerce, 
 but let us all abstain from a crusade of conquest which 
 would call down upon us the condemnation of all the 
 other civilized nations. 
 
 ''This conquest of Morocco was the secret aim of 
 Louis Philippe, and is one of the plans deposited for 
 use, as occasion may offer, in the archives of the French 
 Government." (Ashley: Life of Palmer ston, vol. II, 
 p. 125-6.) 
 
 The tenet of the first school that which defends the 
 rigid maintenance of the status quo may not appear 
 27
 
 418 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 so abhorrent, but it has no greater justification in in- 
 ternational law than the doctrine of conquest, called 
 partition. The latter in any event does allow the states 
 of exuberant strength to acquire new territories, while 
 the former would put the world in a strait-jacket. 26 
 We must therefore relegate these two time-honored doc- 
 trines to the sphere of politics of which they are an 
 interesting, if not happy, expression. Unfortunately, 
 many of the writers upon international law have failed 
 to perceive this, and have been led into a regrettable 
 confusion. They have done much to obscure the under- 
 standing of the balance of power. 27 
 
 26 We must remember that the maintenance of the body of 
 independent states is justified as an instrument of human 
 peace and progress, but it would be the height of intellectual 
 arrogance to assume that any existing relationship was the 
 end of human achievement. It is impossible to arrest the 
 march of progress by any combination to maintain the status 
 quo. Hence it would be as ineffectual as immoral to attempt 
 to enforce any rule which should forbid to the independent 
 states of the world a gradual growth and evolution toward 
 more perfect forms. Lorimer (Institutes of the Law of 
 Nations, 1884, vol. II, p. 197-208) points out that the doctrine 
 of the balance of power was set up by the states in order to 
 maintain the status quo, and from this point of view he levels 
 at it a searching and destructive criticism which everyone 
 should read. But Lorimer and other writers, with the pos- 
 sible exception of Nassau Senior, seem not to have observed 
 that the recognition of the doctrine of the balance of power 
 by the states and the enforcement of it in practice have had 
 other legitimate and valuable results which we note further 
 along. 
 
 27 In regard to the attempt to justify the partition treaties 
 of 1698 and 1700 for the partition of the Spanish succession, 
 Creasy refers to what Lord Macaulay has written, and re- 
 marks: "A zealot for William III will probably think that 
 defense successful. To others it may appear that the direct 
 gross injury of violently dismembering an unoffending state 
 against its will, far outweighs any speculative good that can 
 be effected by preventing a possible disarrangement of the 
 political equilibrium of Europe." (First Platform of Inter- 
 national Law, p. 287.)
 
 BALANCE OF POWER 419 
 
 Other writers have added to the confusion of the 
 discussion by classing under the balance of power 
 
 But I cannot share Sir Edward Creasy 's high opinion of 
 Macaulay's argument, and I think an examination will bear 
 me out. 
 
 Lord Macaulay's justification of the partition treaty is as 
 follows : 
 
 "It has been said to have been unjust that three states 
 should have combined to divide a fourth state without its own 
 consent; and, in recent times, the partition of the Spanish 
 monarchy which was meditated in 1698 has been compared 
 to the greatest political crime which stains the history of 
 modern Europe, the partition of Poland. But those who hold 
 such language cannot have well considered the nature of the 
 Spanish monarchy in the seventeenth century. That mon- 
 archy was not a body pervaded by one principle of vitality 
 and sensation. It was an assemblage of distinct bodies, none 
 of which had any strong sympathy with the rest, and some 
 of which had a positive antipathy for each other. The 
 partition planned at Loo was therefore the very opposite 
 of the partition of Poland. The partition of Poland was the 
 partition of a nation. It was such a partition as is effected 
 by hacking a living man limb from limb. The partition 
 planned at Loo was the partition of an ill-governed empire 
 which was not a nation. It was such a partition as is effected 
 by setting loose a drove of slaves who have been fastened 
 together with collars and handcuffs, and whose union has 
 produced only pain, inconvenience and mutual disgust. There 
 is not the slightest reason to believe that the Neapolitans 
 would have preferred the Catholic King to the Dauphin, or 
 that the Lombards would have preferred the Catholic King 
 to the Arch-duke. How little the Guipuscoans would have 
 disliked separation from Spain and annexation to France we 
 may judge from the fact that, a few years later the States of 
 Guipuscoa actually offered to transfer their allegiance to 
 France on condition that their peculiar franchises should be 
 held sacred. 
 
 "One wound the partition would undoubtedly have in- 
 flicted, a wound on the Castilian pride. But surely the pride 
 which a nation takes in exercising over other nations a blight- 
 ing and withering dominion, a dominion without prudence 
 or energy, without justice or mercy, is not a feeling entitled 
 to much respect. And even a Castilian who was not greatly 
 deficient in sagacity must have seen that an inheritance claimed
 
 420 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 counter-intervention by third states to prevent a state 
 which has vanquished its rival from disturbing the 
 
 by two of the greatest potentates in Europe could hardly pass 
 entire to one claimant; that a partition was therefore all 
 but inevitable; and that the question was in truth merely 
 between a partition effected by friendly compromise and a 
 partition effected by means of a long and devastating war. 
 
 "There seems, therefore, to be no ground at all for pro- 
 nouncing the terms of the Treaty of Loo unjust to the Em- 
 peror, to the Spanish monarchy considered as a whole, or to 
 any part of that monarchy." (The History of England from 
 the Accession of James II by Thomas Babington Macaulay, 
 Chapt. XXIV, p. 363-4.) 
 
 Answering the charge that the partition of the Spanish 
 Monarchy, contemplated by the Treaty of Loo, 1698, was to 
 be compared with the partition of Poland, which he charac- 
 terizes as ' ' the greatest political crime which stains the history 
 of modern Europe," Macaulay defends the conduct of the 
 governments concerned on the ground that there was no senti- 
 ment of national unity between the different parts, and that 
 it was an advantage to certain regions to free them from the 
 Spanish yoke. He considers that the only hurt was to Spanish 
 national pride, but this he did not consider was sufficient 
 cause to restrain the action of the powers. 
 
 But Macaulay does not appear sufficiently to have taken 
 into account the national rights of the Spanish people. The 
 greatness of Spain was in part due to the energy and sacri- 
 fices of the Spanish people, and in part to the fortunate in- 
 heritance of their sovereigns of foreign territory. As a 
 matter of right, it is not clear that the political aims of 
 England and Holland were a sufficient justification for the 
 partition. There was, however, a just ground for preventing 
 Louis XIV from effecting a combination between the two 
 states by placing a scion of his house on the Spanish throne. 
 
 It is probably true, as Macaulay declares, that had the 
 Spanish King died that year, the Treaty of Loo would have 
 been observed by Louis XIV, and have preserved the peace 
 of Europe. The certainty of avoiding a great European war 
 might, as a matter of expediency, seem to permit the powers 
 to disregard Spanish national pride and the sovereign rights 
 of Spain. But it is not certain that peace could not have 
 been preserved by some other means, and it is by no means 
 certain that France would have accepted the treaty. Subse- 
 quent events showed that this serious interference with Spanish
 
 BALANCE OF POWER 421 
 
 political equilibrium by an unjust annexation of terri- 
 tory. Any and all of the states are of course justified 
 and obligated to do what is reasonably possible in pre- 
 venting the conqueror from exacting an unreasonable 
 satisfaction, such as an excessive annexation of terri- 
 tory. In those instances when other states have been 
 apprehensive that the excessive annexation would dis- 
 turb the political equilibrium, they have naturally been 
 especially active in preventing it. But such interven- 
 tions from a legal viewpoint were no more than ordi- 
 nary instances of counter-intervention for the vindi- 
 cation of the law and the prevention of conquest. Ig- 
 noring this, statesmen and many of the text-writers 
 have regarded this action entirely from the point of 
 view of the political motive which inspired it. They 
 have therefore classified it by its political motive as an 
 instance of action to maintain the balance of power in- 
 stead of by its juridical purpose as counter-interven- 
 tion. 28 
 
 rights which the allied powers agreed to upon the supposition 
 that the king was moribund was unavailing. It did not pre- 
 vent the war. It may not be unreasonable to suggest that 
 the result of the partition treaty was to embitter the strife 
 and cause a prolongation of the disastrous conflict. Louis 
 XIV may have found some justification for his repudiation 
 of a treaty which contemplated an illegal act, especially when 
 he had been constrained to give his consent to it. Thus it is 
 evident the vices in the original treaty bore bitter fruit. 
 
 A recent and striking instance of partition on the ground 
 of the maintenance of the balance of power was Great Britain 's 
 acquisition of Wei-Hai-Wei to balance Russia's occupation 
 of Port Arthur. (See Robin: Occupations, p. 524-5.) 
 
 28 Strauch recognizes the right of intervention for the 
 preservation of the balance of power when it is endangered 
 by the acquisition of territory as the result of war. (Inter- 
 ventionslehre, p. 11 ; see also Vattel, Bk. Ill, 49.) 
 
 A careful reading of Fenelon's interesting discussion of 
 the right and expediency of forming offensive and defensive
 
 422 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 A similar confusion has been made where states have 
 combined against a power that has given evidence by 
 its conduct that it was preparing to subjugate its 
 neighbors in the hope of acquiring a commanding posi- 
 tion in world affairs. We have already referred to the 
 justice of thwarting these designs by way of preven- 
 tion. Essentially this is action for self-defense, al- 
 though it is anticipatory in form. 
 
 When the discussion of the balance of power ranges 
 over these four classes of state action without dis- 
 tinguishing them carefully one from another, we can- 
 not wonder that no very clear understanding of the 
 juridical principles applying to intervention for the 
 preservation of the balance of power has been reached. 
 
 It is interesting to follow the history of the doctrine 
 of the balance of power, as M. Charles Dupuis has done 
 
 alliances against a power which threatens to become pre- 
 ponderating shows that he was considering more particularly 
 the obligation to organize a collective counter-intervention 
 against a great power which should attack a weaker neighbor. 
 (The French text is quoted by Phillimore: Commentaries, 
 1 ed., 1854, vol. I, p. 520-525.) 
 
 Halleck's discussion of the balance of power treats mainly 
 of action to prevent conquest. ( Halleck : International Law, 
 ch. XIV, 13-18, p. 335-8.) 
 
 Sheldon Amos says that the balance of power " .... is, in 
 fact, now little more than a convertible expression for the 
 policy of maintaining the territorial integrity and inde- 
 pendence of the smaller states." (Sheldon Amos: Remedies 
 for War, p. 201.) 
 
 No doubt this theory has been useful to check the too rapid 
 absorption of the small powers by their great neighbors. For 
 centuries England has saved Portugal, Belgium, Holland, 
 Denmark, and other small states from extinction, and this 
 is perhaps the explanation of Sheldon Amos's sweeping 
 statement.
 
 BALANCE OF POWER 423 
 
 for us so admirably in a recent volume. 29 But we are 
 here primarily concerned in finding out what the law 
 of intervention relative to this matter now is ; and for 
 this purpose, we are obliged to examine the practice of 
 states. What states now do and have done in the past, 
 and justified on the ground that the purpose of their 
 intervention was lawful must be presumed to be so. 
 
 Among the modern writers who have studied this 
 question, not a few have recognized that intervention 
 for the preservation of the balance of power is justi- 
 fiable. 30 Probably those who condemn the balance of 
 power are thinking solely of the doctrines of partition 
 
 29 Charles Dupuis: Le Principe d'equilibre et le Concert 
 Europeen de la paix de Westphalie a 1 'acte d 'Algesiras, Paris, 
 1909. Formerly, when public opinion was not so well instructed, 
 the balance of power was made to justify the forcible annexa- 
 tion of territory, and the partition of weaker states. Among 
 the older writers generally we find a tendency to defend the 
 balance of power without a sufficient consideration of the 
 means employed for this end. "For a long time," writes 
 Dr. Lawrence, "this doctrine was accounted axiomatic. It 
 had only to be stated to be accepted. To preserve the balance 
 of power, states kept up standing armies, entered into weari- 
 some negotiations and waged incessant wars. But of late 
 years it has fallen into disrepute, and those who still maintain 
 it set it forth in a greatly modified form. They are content 
 to argue that civilized states have duties to perform to the 
 great society of which they are all members, and that they 
 should act in concert against any aggressive member of it 
 whose unsocial conduct endangers the welfare of the whole. 
 It is possible," he adds, "to accept this doctrine and yet 
 hold that the theory of a balance of power is untenable." 
 (T. J. Lawrence: Principles, 2 ed., 85, p. 126.) It is in- 
 teresting to see how much this statement has been modified 
 in the fourth edition (1910, 67, p. 133). In this revision, 
 Lawrence justifies the action above described on the ground 
 of self-preservation and preservation of society. 
 
 30 Nassau Senior has given us a careful study of interven- 
 tion for the maintenance of the balance of power, based upon 
 the practice of the European States. He reaches a favorable 
 conclusion, and declares that "this right of intervention" is
 
 424 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 and the status quo, which cannot, as we have seen, be 
 defended. 31 
 
 "a privilege of the weak against the strong," and considers 
 that ' ' the circumstances which give rise ' ' to this form of inter- 
 vention "are tolerably definite and must always be evident." 
 (Nassau Senior: The Law of Nations, Edinburgh Review, 
 April, 1843, p. 334 passim.) 
 
 Professor Lingelbach says: "Whatever may be said of the 
 doctrine of the balance power from an ethical standpoint, the 
 facts of history show that it has been a factor to which the 
 theoretical right of independence has constantly yielded. The 
 principle underlying the doctrine and practice has been, that 
 the existing distribution of territory and power among the 
 principal states at any one time is so essential to law and order 
 in the society of nations that a disturbance of the status quo 
 constitutes a valid ground for intervention." (American 
 Academy of Political and Social Science Annals, vol. XVI, 
 July, 1900, p. 10, cf. p. 24-5.) 
 
 Professor Pillet, in his study of the Fundamental Rights of 
 States, declares that the "balance of power is a condition 
 which all peoples have an equal public interest in establishing 
 and maintaining. Hence there exists a veritable right to the 
 maintenance of the balance of power, and it is one the pursuit 
 of which may be supported by the best reasons, since in this 
 manner, each one speaks only for the common interests." 
 (Translated from A. Pillet: Fundamental Rights of States, 
 in Revue generate du droit international public, vol. V, p. 253.) 
 
 An Italian considers that the balance of power is a " . . 
 system which corresponds to the philosophy of law and to 
 the concept of history." (Memoria del Prof. Ercole Vidari: 
 Principio di intervento, p. 73-4; cf. p. 80.) 
 
 31 " Furthermore, " declares Professor Krug, "the ostensible 
 equilibrium is a thing so weak, fragile, and unreliable that 
 the striving to attain it has done more to bring on war than 
 to preserve peace." (Translated from Krug: Dikapolitik 
 Leipzig, 1824, p. 373.) 
 
 Hermann von Rotteck does not consider that the principle 
 of the balance of power is a legal basis, but declares that it 
 serves as an "excuse" for the most unjust actions, and he 
 considers that the powers "often made use of it to satisfy 
 their designs of conquest." (H. von Rotteck: Recht der 
 Einmischung, 1845, p. xx-xxi.) 
 
 Westlake considers that nothing " . . .savoring of the prin- 
 ciple of the balance of power ought now to remain, except
 
 BALANCE OF POWER 425 
 
 Turning to the practice of states, we find that a 
 continuing and controlling majority of the states of 
 international society have acted upon the belief that 
 their interests would be best maintained by preventing 
 anyone of their number from suddenly acquiring so 
 great an accession of territory or resources as to dis- 
 turb the relations of other states, and to endanger the 
 continuance of the independence of some of them. 32 
 
 such precautions as in particular cases may commend them- 
 selves to a cool head not easily alarmed." (International 
 Law, vol. I, p. 316.) 
 
 Oppenheim (International Law, vol. I, p. 193) declares: 
 " It is necessary to emphasize that the principle of the balance 
 of power is not a legal principle and therefore not one of 
 international law, but one of international policy." 
 
 Similar opinions are expressed by Wheaton (International 
 Law, Dana's ed., 63) ; Bonfils: Droit international public, 
 3 ed., 1901, 250, p. 134) ; Wilson and Tucker (International 
 Law, 2 ed., 39, p. 76). 
 
 That Hall does not discuss this question is perhaps an 
 indication that he did not consider it a matter of law such 
 as to justify its inclusion in his treatise. 
 
 32 G. F. de Martens, writing in 1788 of an aggrandizement 
 dangerous to neighboring states, says : "... there are cases 
 when the law of nature [justice] cannot prohibit such states 
 from watching over the maintenance of an equilibrium amongst 
 them and from opposing before it is too late even with the 
 force of arms either separately or united either a dispropor- 
 tionate aggrandizement irrespective of its lawfulness, or the 
 weakening of another which might serve as a counterpoise." 
 (Precis 12.) 
 
 Nassau Senior writes: "Interferences, therefore, to pre- 
 serve the balance of power, have been confined to attempts 
 to prevent a sovereign, already powerful, from incorporating 
 conquered provinces into his territory, or increasing his 
 dominions by marriage or inheritance, or exercising a dic- 
 tatorial influence over the councils of an independent state." 
 (Nassau Senior: The Law of Nations, Edinburgh Review, 
 April, 1843, p. 329.) 
 
 Phillimore states as one of the grounds of intervention, 
 which "the reason of the thing and the practice of nations 
 appear to have sanctioned," action taken "to preserve the 
 balance of power; that is, to prevent the dangerous
 
 426 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 In practice, the states have intervened severally and 
 collectively to enforce respect for this principle. 
 
 aggrandizement of any one state by external acquisitions." 
 (Commentaries, 1 ed., 1854, vol. I, 387, p. 434.) 
 
 Woolsey seems to hold a similar opinion, and writes that 
 "it matters not whether the actual ratio of power between 
 states is in danger of being disturbed by unjust or by just 
 means, provided only the means are political, not economical 
 and strictly internal. If, for instance, the sovereign of a 
 powerful state should in a just way seat one of his family 
 on the throne of a neighboring state, the justice of the trans- 
 action would not be a sufficient protection against the inter- 
 ference of other powers." (T. D. Woolsey, 1 ed., 1860, 43, 
 p. 92, 6 ed., 44, p. 45.) 
 
 The treaty of Utrecht declared that France and Spain 
 should not both be ruled by members of the Bourbon family. 
 
 The same question arose when France, in 1870, was not 
 willing that a Hohenzollern should be made King of Spain. 
 
 An alliance between two or more states approaches and 
 shades into the combination of states which, as we have seen, 
 justifies objection when it endangers the equilibrium of the 
 other states. But in practice, alliances do not prove to be 
 as close as a real combination, and any attempt to prohibit 
 them would lead to wars which the principle of the balance 
 of power wishes to prevent. It is also true that they usually 
 have no great duration, unless they serve as a necessary 
 measure of defense. Occasionally they may serve the pur- 
 pose of aggression, but the only practical and effective 
 countermeasure is an opposing defensive alliance between 
 the states who consider that their security is menaced. 
 
 Westlake is an eminent authority who denies that interven- 
 tion is justified to prevent accessions of territory except ' ' for 
 the sake of justice," by which he evidently means to prevent 
 the conqueror from stripping the vanquished of territory 
 beyond the limits of what may be considered as a reasonable 
 satisfaction. Westlake significantly adds: "Of course every 
 state in turn which exacts a cession of territory after a suc- 
 cessful war, or seeks to profit by the marriage or inheritance 
 of its monarchs, denies that a third power has any voice in 
 the matter. But every state in turn claims a voice in such 
 matters when it deems it to its interest to do so." (West- 
 lake: International Law, vol. I, p. 317, note.) 
 
 Vattel propounds a curious theory that although combina- 
 tion is perfectly legitimate, it may be considered as a sufficient
 
 BALANCE OF POWER 427 
 
 Why, it will be asked, is this prohibition permissible 
 when the insistance upon the status quo is not! At 
 first view it might seem that the lawful acquisition of 
 territory through the succession of a sovereign, or 
 through the combination or annexation of two states, 
 was no different in principle from a dangerous prepon- 
 derance of power which results from gradual growth 
 and increase of wealth and resources. It would, how- 
 ever, be futile to attempt to prevent increase of power 
 through growth. The natural force of human growth, 
 which is more fundamental than the regulating enact- 
 ments of nations, would rend asunder any system 
 which attempted to prevent a state from using the ad- 
 vantages of its foresight, self-denial, and wealth to 
 continue its state growth. But the right of increase by 
 growth, which cannot be denied, may be reasonably 
 regulated, so as to prevent disastrous consequences to 
 others, and the states in practice have not hesitated to 
 subject the exercise of any of the rights of sovereignty 
 to such reasonable restrictions as they judged to be 
 for the best common interest. 33 
 
 evidence of designs of conquest when each of the two nations 
 is able alone to maintain itself in security. (Vattel, Bk. Ill, 
 44, Carnegie translation, p. 247.) 
 
 33 This right of reasonable regulation has been more fully 
 considered above, 9. 
 
 Fenelon points out that all the states compose a sort of 
 society and commonwealth [republique generate] . He argues 
 that "to prevent a state from becoming too powerful was not 
 to do a wrong, but to protect oneself and one 's neighbors from 
 subjection, and in a word to work for liberty, tranquillity, 
 and the public safety. ' ' Referring to the vast acquisitions of 
 territory of the House of Austria, Fenelon continues: "All 
 Europe was justified in fearing universal monarchy under 
 Charles V, especially after Francis I was defeated and made 
 prisoner at Pavia. There can be no doubt that a nation that 
 had no direct cause of difference with Spain was justified 
 [en droit], for the freedom of all [liberte publique], in check- 
 ing this rapid growth of power which seemed on the point of
 
 428 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 Reasonable regulation of the exercise of the rights 
 of an independent state has often taken the form of a 
 restriction upon armament and fortification. 34 
 
 A special and important form of the restriction of 
 armament is the neutralization of a portion of the ter- 
 ritory of a state. 35 This application of the principle 
 has been extended to place an entire state under the 
 regime of neutralization. 36 
 
 Regulation has been attempted with more or less 
 success in regard to the form of government, 37 and the 
 
 swallowing up everything." That individuals do not have 
 this same right, Fenelon considered was because " . . there are 
 written laws and magistrates to suppress injustice and violence 
 between families unequal in wealth; but among nations they 
 do not exist." (Fenelon: Works, vol. xxii, p. 306 f., quoted 
 by Phillimore, 1854, vol. I, p. 520-525.) 
 
 What Fenelon says covers the principle of reasonably re- 
 stricting the exercise of the rights of independent states for 
 the common good, but the force of these arguments, as such, 
 is impaired by the later statement that ' ' offensive leagues must 
 be directed against violations of the peace, or the detention 
 of territory of one of the allies, or against other acts of a 
 similar nature known to have been committed." (Quoted by 
 Phillimore, 1 ed., 1854, vol. I, p. 522.) 
 
 That action for the preservation of the balance of power 
 is in the nature of international police would seem to be the 
 underlying thought of Travers Twiss, when he says: "The 
 right of confederacy under the natural right of nations is at 
 the foundation of the right of intervention in the interest 
 of what has been termed, since the Peace of Utrecht (1713), 
 the balance of power.''' (Travers Twiss: The Law of Na- 
 tions, 1861, vol. I, p. 152.) 
 
 34 Phillimore (Commentaries on International Law, 1 ed., 
 1854, vol. I, 211, p. 225-6) recognizes that there is a certain 
 right of restricting the liberty of armaments essential "for 
 the sake of the general welfare and peace of the world." 
 
 "See Oppenheim : International Law, 2 ed., Vol. II, 72, p. 
 88; Westlake: Vol. I, p. 27-30. 
 
 39 See Oppenheim : International Law, 2nd ed., Vol. I, 95, 
 p. 147; C. W. Wicker: Neutralization, 1911. 
 
 "Such, for example, as the restriction upon the organiza- 
 tion of the German Empire, included in the articles of the 
 Treaty of Westphalia.
 
 BALANCE OF POWER 429 
 
 capacity to enter into certain treaties. From the nat- 
 ure of things, such provisions must be of comparatively 
 short duration, but they may be of great value in tiding 
 over difficulties and putting an end to wars. That they 
 continue to form an integral part of the existing law 
 of nations is evidenced by the articles of the recent 
 Peace Treaty of Versailles. 38 
 
 The regulatory restrictions (presumably reasonable) 
 which the states of the world in their executive capacity 
 have imposed upon individual states with the object 
 of preserving international peace are usually found 
 in the acts of the great congresses or conferences, such 
 as Westphalia and Vienna. The powers of first rank 
 assembled in conference have effectively exercised the 
 executive authority of international society, and the 
 treaties which they have signed and proclaimed for 
 the government of all the states nonsignatory, as well 
 as signatory, have" included in express words such re- 
 strictions as they considered reasonable and necessary 
 to effect the purpose in view. 39 
 
 38 See Edwin D. Dickinson: The Equality of States in 
 International Law, 1920, chapter entitled, "The Equality of 
 States in the Peace of Paris," p. 336-378. 
 
 39 The collective intervention of France and Great Britain 
 to compel the Netherlands to submit to the separation of 
 Belgium, 1831-32, has sometimes been classed as an instance 
 of intervention for the maintenance of the balance of power. 
 It was a good instance of political action undertaken for the 
 maintenance of the political equilibrium by the liberal powers, 
 but was in violation of the settlement adopted at Vienna, 
 since it prevented Holland from recovering territory there 
 assigned to her partly in compensation for that which had 
 slipped from her control during the Napoleonic wars. As 
 Sir Vernon Harcourt (Historicus), pointing out that the case 
 of Belgium was not one of recognition but one of intervention, 
 remarks : ' ' Anyone who will be at the trouble to examine the 
 history of that transaction, will see that Belgium did not 
 pretend, nor did anyone assert on its behalf, that it had 
 achieved a de facto independence. On the contrary, it is
 
 430 NON-INTBEFERENCE 
 
 These treaties are usually known as treaties of guar- 
 antee, because the signatory powers promise to inter- 
 vene to enforce them. 40 
 
 International law, as evidenced by the practice of 
 states is seen to justify a power when intervening for 
 the preservation of international peace and tranquillity, 
 to prevent an acquisition of territory dangerous to the 
 security of the other states, and to enforce respect for 
 such reasonable restrictions as are imposed upon the 
 exercise of the sovereign rights of certain states. This 
 action, so necessary for the enforcement of inter- 
 national law and the maintenance of order, will be 
 thought by many to be no more than mere abuse of 
 force. In consequence of this error, they may some- 
 times be inclined to obstruct justice by resisting the 
 
 perfectly notorious that after the battle of Louvain, the Dutch 
 army, but for the armed interference of France, would have 
 reoccupied Brussels. The powers of Europe, which in 1815 
 had assigned Belgium to the Crown of Holland, thought them- 
 selves entitled in 1830, in the same European interest, to 
 recast their own plan." (Letters of Historicus, p. 5.) From 
 a juridical point of view there was a certain justification for 
 the intervention of the western powers since they put an end 
 to an unnecessary struggle and imposed upon the disputants 
 a settlement which was likely to be more permanent in that 
 it removed a source of constant irritation. 
 
 When the great powers ride over the rights of smaller 
 powers, it is not always easy to distinguish between proper 
 regulation in the interests of European peace and unjustifiable 
 interference the purpose of which is to leave the great powers 
 freer in the pursuit of their own political aims. The latter 
 is merely another and milder instance of the application of 
 the partition policy which we have so severely criticized 
 above. 
 
 40 These treaties of guarantee are the record of the agree- 
 ment between the signatory states to intervene in defense 
 of the balance of power where it is endangered in the par- 
 ticular manner specified. The treaty does not create a new 
 right or ground for intervention but merely provides for the 
 fulfilment of existing rights by recourse to the action necessary 
 for enforcement.
 
 CONQUEST 431 
 
 powers that are attempting to preserve and protect the 
 interests of all the states by maintaining the conditions 
 necessary to preserve peace and order. A correct un- 
 derstanding of the principles governing intervention 
 for the preservation of the balance of power is, there- 
 fore, a matter of great practical importance. 
 
 18. CONQUEST 
 
 Conquest is the forcible seizure, or the enforced ces- 
 sion of territory or rights from a state without the 
 authorization of international law. 41 Otherwise ex- 
 
 41 Bernard sees this essential idea that force used to secure 
 an unjust advantage is conquest. In his discussion of inter- 
 ference to enforce ''one of those reversionary claims which 
 once abounded in Europe," he says: "The forcible vindica- 
 tion of such rights, when they fall into possession, is not 
 intervention, but conquest." (Bernard: Non-intervention, 
 1860, p. 13; cf. Hall: International Law, 4 ed., 91, p. 300.) 
 
 Coleman Phillipson, in his Termination of War and 
 Treaties of Peace, ' ' eh. II, entitled, ' ' Termination of War by 
 Conquest and Subjugation," uses the term "complete subju- 
 gation ' ' in place of what we call conquest. For him conquest is 
 merely effective military occupation. He writes: "But in 
 the case of subjugation the debellatio of the Romans not 
 only have the occupying forces acquired effective possession 
 of the territory concerned, but the adversary has been re- 
 duced to impotence and submission, or has been practically 
 annihilated or, at all events, all his organized resistance has 
 disappeared and the victorious Government has clearly mani- 
 fested its intention to hold the said territory permanently 
 under its dominion. " (Phillipson: Termination of War and 
 Treaties of Peace, 1916, p. 9, ch. II.) 
 
 Hall (International Law, 4 ed., 204, p. 587) uses "con- 
 quest" as including this firm possession. It may well happeii 
 that a state acquire territory by conquest or otherwise, with- 
 out completely subjugating it, as when Japan acquired 
 Formosa, inhabited in part by unsubjugated tribes. Annex- 
 ation we take to be the extension of sovereignty over new 
 possessions accompanied by the indication of such intention. 
 Consequently we reject as confusing and inaccurate Phillip- 
 son's "three steps, conquest, subjugation, and annexation."
 
 432 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 Other writers confuse the annexation of territory with 
 conquest. Halleck, although he states that "hostilities were 
 commenced by the Mexicans, and the Americans had suffered 
 innumerable wrongs before the commencement of the war," 
 considers that the war of the United States against Mexico 
 was a war of conquest. The reason he gives is that the 
 United States considered that indemnity for the past and 
 security for the future could only be secured by retaining a 
 portion of Mexico's territory. Halleck adds: "In its essen- 
 tial features it was, therefore, a war of conquest. ' ' ( Halleck : 
 International Law, 1861, p. 332, ch. XIV, 8.) 
 
 Reasonable indemnity and security is not conquest, but 
 would of course become so if they were simply made the 
 pretext for an unjust acquisition of territory. Sir Robert 
 Morier, in a letter of January 5, 1870, discussing Germany's 
 conduct wrote: 
 
 "But I maintain we have no right when we sit in judg- 
 ment on a contemporary political event to appeal to Utopian 
 laws, or to apply a code which, although it may have been 
 already elaborated and accepted by a select few, has not yet 
 had time to become the common law of mankind. It is absurd 
 to maintain that territorial cessions, as such, have been 
 definitely erased out of this international common law. Wars 
 undertaken for the purpose of conquest undoubtedly have, 
 and it is because the war of 1870 was really a war of this 
 kind, and was felt to be but a link in an ascending series of 
 such wars waged by France, that it raised such universal in- 
 dignation amongst all right-minded people. A cession of 
 territory demanded by the aggrieved party as a penalty to be 
 paid by the unsuccessful aggressor, and on proof given that 
 such cession is necessary to guard against a renewal of aggres- 
 sion, is not only not erased from the modern international 
 code, but was solemnly placed on record in the treaty of peace 
 with Russia in 1856. There is, moreover, a striking parallel 
 between the principles which ruled our action on that occasion, 
 and that which rules the action of Germany in demanding 
 Alsace. In both cases the desideratum was, and is, the re- 
 moval of the aggressor from the banks of a river which had 
 before constituted his frontier, and the placing of the 
 aggressed in full possession of both banks of the river." 
 (Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier, 1911, vol. II, 
 p. 223.) 
 
 When a powerful state has a weaker at its mercy, it may 
 not be necessary actually to employ force in order to secure 
 the coveted territory, and even if the acquisition of the
 
 CONQUEST 433 
 
 pressed, conquest is a violation of international law. 42 
 History furnishes many examples of conquest, and 
 
 territory wrested from the possessor is confirmed by a formal 
 treaty, the act remains none the less one of conquest when- 
 ever force is relied upon unjustly to constrain the owner to 
 make the cession. 
 
 * 2 Every system of law has for its main purpose to guarantee 
 the peaceful enjoyment of rights. It cannot, therefore, justify 
 conquest, but we must remember that the law is not law unless 
 it is enforced sufficiently to make it respectable and valuable 
 to those who observe it and help to support it. In its earlier 
 stages law could not hope to be respected if it were to rigidly 
 condemn conquest, for the instinct of conquest is too deep in 
 the human heart. Even now, international law cannot hope 
 to do more than to repress the worst evils of unlimited recourse 
 to force. The old rule was that conquest was lawful when 
 made in consequence of a just war. 
 
 As an illustration of the prevalence of this doctrine we quote 
 the following portion of Professor Callahan's summary of 
 Secretary of State Everett's note of December 1, 1852, rela- 
 tive to Cuba, addressed to the British representative : ' ' The 
 United States was not seizing islands in the Mediterranean, 
 and she would not take Cuba by force except in a just war. 
 She had no desire to be a disgrace to civilization. ' ' ( See Calla- 
 han: Cuba and International Relations, 1899, p. 234-5.) 
 
 Franciscus Victoria of Salamanca in the sixteenth century, 
 declared : ' ' Extension of empire is not a just cause of war. ' ' 
 (Victoria's Relationes, De Indis et de Jvre Belli Relectiones, 
 Carnegie translation, p. 170. The first edition of the Relec- 
 tiones was printed at Lyons, 1557.) 
 
 The illegality of conquest is recognized by many other 
 authorities. Vattel, referring to "purposes which may fur- 
 nish lawful reasons or unjust pretexts, but which are at least 
 capable of being construed as just," observes: "For this 
 reason I do not offer conquest or the desire to usurp the 
 property of another as one of the purposes of offensive war; 
 such a purpose, lacking even the semblance of right, is not 
 the object of formal war, but of brigandage, of which we shall 
 speak in its proper place." (Vattel: The Law of Nations, 
 1758, Bk. Ill, ch. 1, Carnegie translation, p. 236.) 
 
 John Stuart Mill considers it an "affront to the reader" 
 to discuss war of conquest even as a result of lawful war. (A 
 Few Words on Non-intervention, Frazer's Magazine, May, 
 1859, p. 773; Cf. Grotius, Bk. II, ch. I, I, 3-4.)
 
 434 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 certain writers like Bemardi and Steinmetz have un- 
 blushingly advocated it, 43 but no modern government, 
 
 The illegality of conquest is best shown by the practice of 
 states, which furnishes many instances of counter-intervention. 
 It is true that the powers do not come to the support of the 
 state unjustly attacked at the moment when war breaks out. 
 The aggressor may be trusted to choose the moment so that 
 they will not find this convenient. Occasionally the powers 
 intervene to prevent an attack. They did so in 1875 to 
 check Bismarck's onslaught on France, but usually they wait 
 for an opportune moment when the warring states are ex- 
 hausted by the struggle. England intervened diplomatically, 
 for example, in 1871 to prevent Prussia from exacting as 
 great a pecuniary indemnity as she purposed. This is not 
 a perfect sanction; it is, however, the most effective which 
 international law has yet been able to invent. 
 
 "When a state great and powerful in the course of its 
 development has for its expansion a real need for the terri- 
 tory of a small state, it does not seem to me that the conquest 
 of the latter can be contrary to the interests of humanity." 
 (Steinmetz: Evolution Collective, p. 245.) In a contrary 
 sense, see Phillipson : Termination of War, p. 29-30. 
 
 Professor Amos S. Hershey writes: "Several leading au- 
 thorities refuse to recognize conquest as a legal mode of 
 acquiring territory, but this view is in contradiction with the 
 facts of historical development and international practice. 
 Whatever may be said as to the desirability of abolishing the 
 so-called right of conquest, and however desirable that the 
 validity of titles based upon fraud and violence be denied, 
 we cannot substitute our wishes for realities or create rules 
 of international law by ignoring the practice of nations." 
 (Hershey: Essentials of International Law, p. 180-181.) 
 
 Rivier expresses similar views, and remarks, "Conquest 
 justifies itself by its existence, like war, of which it is a natural 
 consequence ; and I do not believe, notwithstanding the noble 
 and touching words which are spoken and printed, that any 
 statesman directing important international affairs seriously 
 thinks of abolishing it." (Translated from Rivier, vol. I, 
 1896, p. 181.) 
 
 Coleman Phillipson (Termination of War, p. 19) falls into 
 the same error. The writers who express this opinion have 
 failed to understand the difference between the acceptance 
 of de facto possession, whatever its origin, as a basis for recog- 
 nition, and the acceptance of the legality of conquest per se.
 
 CONQUEST 435 
 
 however strong or however ill-intentioned, has dared 
 to proclaim a war of conquest or to justify conquest as 
 such. Whenever conquest was the motive, some other 
 pretext has been alleged to cover it. 44 
 
 Lord Palmerston, in a letter to Lord Clarendon in 
 1853, gives us the following remarkable description of 
 the older methods of conquest as employed by the Rus- 
 sian Government: "The policy and practice of the 
 Eussian Government has always been to push forward 
 
 "Almost any of the justifiable grounds for intervention 
 may serve as a pretext for unjustifiable conquest. The reason 
 for this lies in the wide measure of discretion which every 
 state enjoys in deciding when it has reason to employ force. 
 In a preceding note, we have referred to instances of conquest 
 which result from the attempt to enforce reversionary claims 
 to succession. (See Bernard: Non-intervention, 1860, p. 13.) 
 
 Exaggerated demands for indemnity is another pretext, and 
 humanitarian intervention is so good a cover for illicit designs 
 of conquest, that in the eyes of some authorities it taints the 
 whole institution. They would, in consequence, cancel 
 humanitarian intervention from the list of justifiable grounds 
 of intervention. 
 
 Another disguised form of conquest is a lease for a long 
 term of years, with so complete an exercise of authority as 
 to constitute a virtual annexation. ( See Westlake : Interna- 
 tional Law, vol. I, p. 135-6.) This form of annexation is 
 particularly advantageous because in the event of other na- 
 tions raising too strong an objection, the lease can be canceled 
 without so serious a hurt to national susceptibilities as would 
 result from the retrocession of territory formally annexed. 
 
 A particularly dangerous and popular pretext for conquest 
 is the doctrine of nationality or self-determination, which 
 claims a right for the people of similar race, language, etc., 
 to unite under the same national authority. 
 
 Bernard asks : ' ' Is it lawful to invade and conquer, without 
 a quarrel, the territories of a friendly sovereign, provided you 
 are able to affirm that you believe the conquest will be agree- 
 able to his subjects, and can obtain a vote in your favor when 
 it is virtually complete? It seems to be an opinion now in 
 fashion that nationality in such a case is a sufficient plea. I 
 own that I can hardly imagine a doctrine more subversive 
 of morality, or more dangerous to freedom. " (Bernard : Non- 
 intervention, 1860, p. 26.)
 
 436 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or 
 want of firmness of other Governments would allow it 
 to go, but always to stop and retire when it was met 
 with decided resistance, and then to. wait for the next 
 favorable opportunity to make another spring on its 
 intended victim. In furtherance of this policy, the 
 Russian Government has always had two strings to 
 its bow moderate language and disinterested profes- 
 sions at Petersburg and at London ; active aggression 
 by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggres- 
 sions succeed locally, the Petersburg Government 
 adopts them as a 'fait accompli' which it did not in- 
 tend, but cannot, in honor, recede from. If the local 
 agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the 
 language previously held is appealed to as a proof 
 that the agents have overstepped their instructions. 
 This was exemplified in the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, 
 and in the exploits of Simonivitch and Vikovitch in 
 Persia. Orloff succeeded in extorting the Treaty of 
 Unkiar-Skelessi from the Turks, and it was represent- 
 ed as a sudden thought, suggested by the circumstances 
 of the time and place, and not the result of any previous 
 instructions; but having been done, it could not be 
 undone. On the other hand, Simonivitch and Vikovitch 
 failed in getting possession of Herat, in consequence 
 of our vigorous measures of resistance; and as they 
 failed, and when they had failed, they were disavowed 
 and recalled, and the language! previously held at 
 Petersburg was appealed to as a proof of the sincerity 
 of the disavowal, although no human being with two 
 ideas in his head could for a moment doubt that they 
 had acted under specific instructions." (Ashley: Life 
 of Lord Palmerston, 1876, vol. II, p. 25-26.) 
 
 In this polite age, conquest is usually effected under 
 the guise of an indemnity for a war proclaimed to have 
 been undertaken in defense of international law rights.
 
 CONQUEST 437 
 
 In some instances the cession of territory is exacted as 
 security against the recurrence of the offenses alleged 
 to have justified recourse to arms. 
 
 It is not necessary to enter into any further discus- 
 sion of conquest as a justifiable purpose of war, but 
 the question as to the legality of conquest has been 
 much confused because of the failure to perceive the 
 distinction between the illegality of conquest and the 
 legality of the consequences which often result di- 
 rectly from a conquest. It is of primary importance 
 to international society that every territory should 
 have a responsible master able to police it for the main- 
 tenance of peace and for the fulfilment of international 
 law. It is not yet practicable to hold the title to im- 
 portant territory in abeyance because it has been il- 
 legally acquired. 45 For the same reason that a certain 
 
 45 The illegality of conquest permits any and all states to 
 intervene with force in as far as is necessary to counteract 
 it. This is no interference, but a true example of the vindica- 
 tion of the law such as we discussed above under 7. (See 
 Westlake, vol. I, p. 317.) 
 
 But if the circumstances are such that none of the powers 
 avails itself of the presumption justifying counter- 
 intervention to defend the state which is attacked, practical 
 considerations require that the results of the conflict be ac- 
 cepted as a fact and the right of counter-intervention, not 
 having been exercised at the time, must be considered to 
 have lapsed. Such a rule shocks our sense of justice, but is 
 necessary to the preservation of the society of states, without 
 which all justice would disappear. When the nations in their 
 wisdom shall have established a more perfect union, it may be 
 possible to prevent all aggression and compel the despoiler 
 to disgorge. Under present conditions, the security of inter- 
 national society would be seriously jeopardized and its re- 
 sources uselessly dissipated by any attempt at a delayed 
 rectification of wrongs which the nations had not the will or 
 the power to prevent at the time of their commission. 
 
 This is the reason for the adoption of the principle of uti 
 possidetis when wars are terminated without a treaty of peace. 
 (Cf. Phillipson: Termination of War, p. 7; cf. Westlake, 
 vol. I, p. 65.)
 
 438 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 period of adverse possession gives title to land in our 
 common law, any territory acquired by conquest is 
 presumed legally to belong to the conqueror as soon as 
 forcible opposition to the conquest ceases and the other 
 states refrain from publicly impugning the title. 46 
 
 There is evidently a great field for the further grad- 
 ual restriction of the more injurious forms of conquest. 
 This progress must be based upon a clearer definition 
 and understanding of the nature and function of the 
 derivative forms of conquest. We may expect the 
 powers gradually to become nicer in regard to the 
 recognition of title resting merely upon firm possession 
 after conquest. 47 In the course of time we may also 
 expect that conquest will be defined more carefully and 
 rigidly, so as to place under the ban certain disguised 
 and more refined methods now used to obtain by force 
 what belongs to another. 
 
 19. TREATY RIGHTS 
 
 It is often erroneously stated that a right of inter- 
 vention arises from a treaty. This is a misunderstand- 
 
 46 Cf. Hall, 4 ed., p. 588, 204. It is the custom of many 
 writers on international law to class those cases where the 
 acquisition of territory has been confirmed by treaty as or- 
 dinary cessions of territory, without distinction as to whether 
 they are based upon conquest or not. Perhaps a sense of 
 international decency has exercised some influence in this 
 matter, since the territorial growth of all the great states is 
 marked by acts of conquest, even though the decent clothing 
 of a treaty has been thrown about them. A treaty has gen- 
 erally terminated the violent opposition to a conquest, but it 
 cannot transform what was really a conquest into an instance 
 of voluntary cession. The treaty does, however, evidence the 
 fact of the firm possession. 
 
 47 It is interesting to examine Secretary of State Blaine 's 
 plan proposed before the International American Confer- 
 ence (1889-90) for declaring conquest in America illegal. 
 (See Moore: Digest, Vol. I, p. 292-3.)
 
 TREATY RIGHTS 439 
 
 ing. Treaties do not create rights, they record them. 4Ta 
 The procedure of international law allows each state 
 a very wide discretion in judging how far the circum- 
 stances will permit it to go in the fulfilment of its obli- 
 gations to enforce international law, and this uncer- 
 tainty reacts on other states, who are deeply concerned 
 in knowing how the state will interpret its obligations 
 and what policies it will pursue. To obtain this assur- 
 ance, states enter into agreements recorded in treaties 
 that they will or will not act in a particular manner. 48 
 Evidently such an agreement must look to the perform- 
 ance of acts which are in themselves legal under inter- 
 national law. Otherwise to fulfil the treaty would be 
 to violate international law, and this no nation may 
 justly promise or require. Treaties which record an 
 agreement to interfere in the internal affairs of the 
 signatory or of other sovereign states are without any 
 standing in international law, and cannot be made to 
 justify the interference which they contemplate. No 
 state can retain its independent status if it agrees to 
 transfer to another the liberty to interfere for the pres- 
 ervation of a particular form of government. 49 Such 
 
 47a ' ' Treaties are unable to create anything, they simply show 
 what the powers consider and recognize as the law based on 
 custom." (Translated from J. de Louter: Le droit inter- 
 national public positif, 1920, Vol. I, p. 54.) 
 
 "A guarantee secures a right, but never gives it originally 
 its force." (Translated from G. Quabbe: Die Volkerrecht- 
 liche Garantie, Breslau, 1911, p. 13; cf. K. G. Idman: Le 
 Traite de grantie en droit international, Helsingfors, 1913, p. 
 81-2.) 
 
 48 We may give as an example the agreement of Louis XIV 
 not to give any further asylum to the Stuart Pretenders (Sir 
 George Cornewall Lewis: On Foreign Jurisdiction and the 
 Extradition of Criminals, p. 68.) 
 
 "Mountague Bernard, discussing the alleged right to inter- 
 vene "when a right to interfere is secured by contract, as it 
 may be when the intervening state has guaranteed the main- 
 tenance of a particular dynasty or of particular institutions,
 
 440 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 an agreement would be equivalent to a signing away of 
 international sovereignty, and would, if duly entered 
 
 or by virtue of a protectorate or a federal pact" (Bernard: 
 Non-intervention, 1860, p. 11), considered that this excep- 
 tion to the general rule of non-intervention [non-interference] 
 "may be disposed of in a few words," which he proceeds to 
 supply: "A guarantee of a throne to a family, or of a par- 
 ticular form of government to a people, such a guarantee, 
 for instance, as that of the Protestant Succession in England, 
 of the power of the Stadtholders in Holland, of the Braganza 
 dynasty in Portugal, of monarchical institutions in Greece, 
 does not, unless by express words or clear implication, extend 
 to internal troubles; and, even when it does, gives to the 
 state undertaking it no right to interfere, unless called upon 
 to do so. Of a general agreement creating such a right whilst 
 the state which yields it remains nominally independent, I 
 do not hesitate to say that it is one into which no government 
 is authorized to enter. No government is authorized to de- 
 grade by compact the country it rules into a condition of 
 real vassalage, whilst retaining the name and responsibilities 
 of independence. 'It is impossible to imagine,' wrote Lord 
 Aberdeen in 1828 to the Brazilian Envoy, who asked assist- 
 ance against Don Miguel on the strength of our ancient 
 treaties with Portugal, 'it is impossible to imagine that 
 any independent state could ever intend thus to commit the 
 control and direction of its internal affairs to the hands of 
 another power.' The separate and secret article annexed to 
 the Treaty of the 12th of June, 1815, between the Emperor 
 of Austria and the King of the Two Sicilies, whereby the 
 latter promised that he would admit, in re-establishing the 
 government of his kingdom, no change incompatible either 
 with old monarchical institutions or with the principles 
 adopted in the Austro-Italian provinces, was defended in 
 1821 by Lord Liverpool as 'in perfect consonance with the 
 spirit of ancient treaties, founded on the clearest principles 
 of international law, and which had formed part of it from 
 the beginning of time. ' I venture to affirm, on the contrary, 
 that it was a vicious engagement, out of which no rights could 
 arise. The question is less simple, and the principle more 
 feebly applies (if it applies at all), where, as in the case 
 already mentioned of a 'protected' state, or in that of a 
 member of a federal commonwealth like the German, there 
 is a partial loss or surrender of independence. The Austrian 
 intervention in Hesse Cassel in 1850 derived some color, 
 though no justification, from the fact that, for the sake of
 
 TREATY RIGHTS 441 
 
 into and acquiesced in by all the interested states, 
 amount to the establishment of a supervisory control 
 
 a perpetual defensive alliance and from the sense of a com- 
 mon nationality, the minor German States have substantially 
 submitted themselves to an indefinite, and therefore mis- 
 chievous, control by confederates more powerful than them- 
 selves." (Bernard: Non-intervention, 1860, p. 14-15; cf. 
 Hall, 1 ed., 1880, 93, p. 248; ibid, p. 306.) 
 
 Twiss, who devotes a considerable space to the discussion 
 of treaties guaranteeing a particular form of government, 
 emphatically declares that "a convention of guarantee nude 
 and absolute does not apply to the case of political changes." 
 (Travers Twiss, Law of Nations, vol. I, 1861, 231, p. 367- 
 379.) 
 
 Halleck remarks: "But, in treaties of equal alliance, be- 
 tween independent and sovereign states, will a stipulation of 
 mediation or guaranty justify generally the interference of 
 one state in the internal affairs of another, contrary to the 
 wishes of the latter ? If the interference is in itself unlawful, 
 can any previously existing stipulation make it lawful? We 
 think not; for the reason that a contract against public 
 morals has no binding force, and there is more merit in its 
 breach than in its fulfilment. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, 
 pt. 2, ch. 1, 13-16; Kluber, Droit des Gens, pt. 2, tit. 1, 
 ch. 2, 48; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, 393; Poison, 
 Law of Nations, sec. 5 ; Bello Derecho International, pt. 
 1, cap. 1, 7.)" (Halleck, International Law, ch. IV, 8, 
 p. 86.) 
 
 Creasy quotes this passage from Halleck with approval 
 (First Platform, 320, p. 306-7.) 
 
 Theodore D. Woolsey, in the fifth and last edition of his 
 Introduction to International Law, which he revised himself, 
 adds the following explanatory note: "If the principles of 
 intervention cannot stand, treaties of guaranty, which con- 
 template such intervention, must be condemned also; for 
 they have in view a resistance, at some future time, to the 
 endeavors of third parties to conquer or in some way control 
 the guaranteed states in question. An agreement, if it in- 
 volve an unlawful act, or the prevention of lawful acts on 
 the part of others, is plainly unlawful." (International 
 Law, 5 ed., 1878, 43, p. 44.) 
 
 Hall (International Law, 1 ed., 1880, p. 248, 93, 4 ed., 
 p. 305-6) expresses the same idea. 
 
 But some of the most respectable of the older writers fall 
 into the error of supporting a contrary view. See F. de
 
 442 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 or protectorate. 50 A change of such serious import 
 cannot be presumed to be intended, and any govern- 
 
 Martens, Volkerrecht [Bergohm's translation], 76; Kliiber, 
 Droit des gens, 1 ed., 1819, 51. 
 
 Even so late as 1910, we find in T. J. Lawrence's fourth 
 edition of his valuable Principles of International Law ( 64, 
 p. 126) this persistent error. He writes: "If a state has 
 accepted a guarantee of any of its possessions, or of its 
 reigning family, or of a special form of government, it suffers 
 no legal wrong when the guaranteeing state intervenes in 
 pursuance of the stipulations entered into between them, 
 though it may suffer moral wrong when those stipulations 
 are in restraint of functions it ought to exercise freely, for 
 example, the choice of its rulers." (T. J. Lawrence: Prin- 
 ciples of International Law, 4 ed., 1910, 64, p. 126.) 
 
 Professor Lingelbach criticises Lawrence's view that inter- 
 vention when based upon a treaty is always legal. (See 
 W. E. Lingelbach: Intervention in Europe, Annals of the 
 Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. XVI, July, 
 1900, p. 24.) 
 
 Among the writers who deny the right of interference in 
 constitutional affairs even when based upon a treaty are : Rossi 
 (Archives de Dr&it, 1837, p. 375) ; Rotteck (Einmischung, 
 1845, p. 26) ; Milovanowitch (Des traites de garantie en droit 
 international, 1888, p. 38-39) ; Quabbe (Die Volkerrechtliche 
 Garantie, 1911, p. 13) ; Louter (Droit international public 
 positif, 1920, Vol. I, p. 519.) 
 
 Other older authorities who recognize a treaty as giving a 
 right to intervene are: Giinther (Volkerrecht, Vol. I, 1787, 
 p. 287-8) ; Kamptz (Volkerrechtiche Erorterung, 1821, p. 
 32-5) ; Krug (Dikapolitik, 1824, p. 329-30.) 
 
 50 Article III of the treaty of May 22, 1903, between the 
 United States and Cuba provides: 
 
 "The government of Cuba consents that the United States 
 may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of 
 Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government ade- 
 quate for the protection of life, property, and individual 
 liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to 
 Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, 
 now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of 
 Cuba." (Malloy: Treaties, vol. I, p. 364.) 
 
 This permission to the United States "to exercise the right 
 to intervene" merely recognizes the supervisory capacity of 
 the United States. It is therefore perfectly legitimate, but
 
 TREATY EIGHTS 443 
 
 ment which should promise to another such liberty of 
 interference would be acting ultra vires, that is, beyond 
 its powers, unless it were shown that the nation as a 
 whole had, after due consideration, intended to accept 
 the inferior status of a protected state. 
 
 There are, however, instances in which treaties rela- 
 tive to interference in the internal affairs of fully sov- 
 ereign states are in accord with international law, and 
 must be considered as valid. We refer to stipulations 
 which evidence the agreement of the concert of powers 
 to restrict the exercise of rights of sovereignty for the 
 defense of the interests of international society, as, for 
 example, when the Great Powers excluded Napoleon 
 from the throne of France. 51 
 
 at the same time it indicates the partially dependent status 
 of Cuba. 
 
 President Wilson's administration, during the winter of 
 1914-15, sounded the representatives of South American 
 countries relative to the conclusion of a treaty, one of the 
 articles of which, as published in the press, provided for 
 ' ' the mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and of political 
 independence under republican forms of government." 
 (Moore: Principles of American Diplomacy, p. 406-8.) 
 
 Of course, it is hardly to be expected that the states of 
 South America would intervene in the internal affairs of 
 the United States for any purpose whatsoever, and such a 
 treaty, although equal or mutual in form, would amount to 
 a guaranty accorded by the United States to the lesser con- 
 tracting powers, and as such it would be indicative of the 
 relation of protector to protected state. Any right of inter- 
 ference in the internal affairs of the states concerned would 
 not necessarily arise from the treaty, but from the inferior 
 status of certain of these states, of which the treaty would be 
 but the formal expression. 
 
 51 Such an exercise of the power of international police 
 regulation is as we have seen ( 9) valid only when it is 
 reasonably necessary. But a treaty signed by an over- 
 whelming majority of the states, or even by a concert of 
 powers which exercises certain executive functions is prima 
 facie valid.
 
 444 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 In conclusion, we may summarize the results of our 
 discussion: whenever the justification of intervention 
 
 The treaties of Westphalia and Utrecht, for example, con- 
 tain provisions relative to the internal affairs of certain 
 states and authorize intervention therein. The provisions 
 were rightly considered as justifiable efforts to preserve the 
 peace of Europe and the independence of all the states. 
 
 The treaty by which the powers agreed to exclude Napoleon 
 from the throne of France was, under the circumstances, a 
 perfectly proper exercise of international police power. But 
 not so the treaty signed by Austria, Prussia, and Russia for 
 the partition of Poland, for it was not done in the interest 
 of Europe. France and England did not consent, and the act 
 itself was evidently undertaken more to sate the greed of the 
 partitioning powers than to insure the peace and security of 
 Europe. 
 
 Because general treaties providing for the reasonable exer- 
 cise of international police are legal, it does not follow that 
 other treaties which contemplate interference by a particular 
 state are likewise legal. On the contrary they are without 
 any legal foundation whatever, unless they merely confirm 
 a supervisory relationship such as has long existed between 
 England and Portugal and now exists between the United 
 States and Cuba. (Cf. Bernard: Non-intervention, p. 15, 
 relative to the German Confederation.) The failure to 
 understand this important distinction has led several of the 
 most respectable authorities into the error of justifying inter- 
 ference in constitutional questions when the action was in 
 fulfilment of a treaty stipulation. (See F. de Martens: 
 Volkerrecht [Bergbohm's translation], 76; Heffter: Volker- 
 recht, 45.) Hall also is confused (see International Law, 4 
 ed., 91, p. 300.) Later writers have fallen into the opposite 
 error of passing over international police regulation, and de- 
 nying any right to intervene in constitutional matters. In con- 
 sequence of this erroneous premise, they reach the false con- 
 clusion that all treaties purporting to give this right are 
 illegal. 
 
 Hall is not free from this confusion, although he perceives 
 that the treaties to which he refers were probably once in 
 conformity with international law. He remarks: "It may 
 perhaps at one time have been an open question whether a 
 right or a duty of intervention could be set up by a treaty 
 of guaranty binding a state to maintain a particular dynasty 
 or a particular form of government in the state to which the 
 guaranty applied. But the doctrine that intervention on
 
 TREATY RIGHTS 445 
 
 is based upon a treaty, it is necessary first to show that 
 the purpose of the treaty was legitimate. Treaties 
 
 this ground is either due or permissible involves the assump- 
 tion that independent states have not the right to change their 
 government at will, and is in reality a relic of the exploded 
 notion of ownership on the part of the sovereign. According 
 to the views which are now held as to the relation of mon- 
 archical or other governments to the states which they repre- 
 sent, no case could arise under which a treaty of the sort 
 could be both needed and legitimate. As against interference 
 by a foreign power the general right of checking illegal 
 intervention is enough to support counter interference; and 
 as against a domestic movement it is evident that a contract 
 of guaranty is made in favor of a party within the state and 
 not of the state as a whole, that it therefore amounts to a 
 promise of illegal interference, and that being thus illegal 
 itself, it cannot give a stamp of legality to an act which 
 without it would be unlawful." (W. E. Hall: International 
 Law, 4 ed., 1895, 93, p. 305-6.) Continuing in a footnote, 
 he says: "Some treaties, e. g., the Treaties in 1713, by which 
 Holland, France, and Spain guaranteed the Protestant suc- 
 cession in England (Dumont, viii. i. 322, 339, 393), and the 
 Final Act of the Germanic Confederation, arts. 25 and 26 (De 
 Martens, Nov. Rec. v. 489), contains guaranties which clearly 
 extend to cases arising out of purely internal troubles; most 
 treaties of guaranty, however, are directed against the pos- 
 sible action of foreign powers." Hall also gives several of 
 the references which we have cited above, showing the care 
 with which he has considered this question. (See also 
 Halleck, ch. IV, 8, p. 86; Twiss, vol. I, 231.) 
 
 Although G. F. de Martens (Precis [ed. 1821], 78) seems 
 likewise to err, we see in a later portion of his work ( 115) 
 that he only considers a treaty to authorize interference in 
 matters which are not essential to the independence of the 
 State. 
 
 Bluntchli avoids both pitfalls by a guarded statement : "It 
 may happen that a state intervenes when the rights which 
 have been accorded to it by treaty are affected by changes 
 which occur in the constitution of another state. It may not, 
 however, do so unless international law authorizes it to defend 
 the rights in question. Thus the overthrow of the dynasty, 
 or a change in the order of succession due to a revolution, 
 are questions of constitutional, but not of international law. ' ' 
 (Translated from Bluntchli: Das Moderne Volkerrecht, 
 1868, 479, note 2.)
 
 446 NON-INTERFERENCE 
 
 which have the support of a majority of the states are, 
 however, to be presumed to be a sufficient justification 
 for the acts they contemplate, unless it be shown that 
 the provisions of the treaty constitute an unreasonable 
 curtailment of the rights of an independent state not 
 necessary for the peace and security of international 
 society.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 POLITICAL ACTION 
 
 20. IMPERFECT RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
 
 If the wisdom of man were perfect, he would dis- 
 cover and formulate perfect laws for the government 
 of nations; but imperfections are inevitable, and an 
 unwise law will check progress, lead to abuse, and finally 
 be disregarded or replaced by a better. But we must 
 have laws for the nations, since without them inter- 
 national intercourse were impossible. The laws which 
 are adopted must not be so rigid or so extensive as to 
 exceed the juridical experience of the law-givers. In 
 other words, it is not yet possible to regulate too defi- 
 nitely the whole of the relations of the states, and the 
 rules which are adopted will be found to be more prac- 
 tical if they have a certain margin for play or a certain 
 room for variation in the manner in which they are 
 fulfilled. 
 
 The system applied by states in practice will be 
 found to coincide with that we have outlined, reason- 
 ing abstractly. The necessary play or elasticity we 
 find to lie mainly in the discretion which each inde- 
 pendent state at present enjoys as to the manner in 
 which it will fulfil its international obligations. 
 
 This play or elasticity in the enforcement of inter- 
 national law is an inevitable consequence of the system 
 of self -execution, sometimes less accurately called self- 
 help, and partly for this reason, perhaps, this archaic 
 method of procedure is still preserved in international 
 relations. At one time, before the juridical wisdom of 
 
 447
 
 448 POLITICAL ACTION 
 
 our ancestors made it possible to form a more complete 
 governmental organization, we used to employ the 
 same system in our civil affairs. 
 
 An independent state sufficiently powerful to benefit 
 from this system of self -execution is given a great op- 
 portunity to follow its own judgment in determining in 
 the first place what its international rights and obli- 
 gations are, and in the second place how and when these 
 obligations should be fulfilled and these rights main- 
 tained. A great state is thus able to serve its selfish 
 ends, and in the guise of fulfilling and defending the law 
 to find a pretext for the protection of its own interests. 
 Furthermore a state may enter into agreements with 
 other powers in regard to the manner in which rights 
 will be pressed, and this again may serve to foster or 
 protect its special interests. 
 
 The recognition of a new state or government affords 
 a good example : When the inhabitants of an area suf- 
 ficiently large and advantageously situated for the 
 practical purposes of maintaining national independ- 
 ence are organized under a government firmly estab- 
 lished in its control of the territory in question, and 
 when this government is capable and willing to fulfil 
 the obligations of an independent state, international 
 law declares that this state which exists de facto should 
 be recognized de jure as a member of the international 
 society. The denial of recognition to the de facto state, 
 possessing de facto qualifications for the recognition of 
 independence, may and usually will result in a recourse 
 to reprisals for the purpose of enforcing its right. It 
 is evident, however, that the decision as to when the 
 qualifications requisite for statehood have been ful- 
 filled cannot be set down with absolute precision, con- 
 sequently it is free to every state to give or withhold its 
 recognition, and in reaching this decision, it may be 
 guided by selfish considerations.
 
 IMPERFECT RIGHTS AND DUTIES 449 
 
 The course which a state adopts for the protection 
 of its national interests and the particular interpreta- 
 tion of international rights and obligations, which 
 national sympathy or national interests dictate, are 
 spoken of as policies of the government in question. 
 Sometimes when they are persistently followed, not- 
 withstanding changes in the personnel of the govern- 
 ment, these policies are said to be national or state 
 policies. Otherwise, they are merely temporary poli- 
 cies, what we call administration policies. 
 
 President Wilson, for example, did his utmost to 
 commit the American Government to a policy of con- 
 tinued participation in the settlement of European dif- 
 ferences. Under President Harding, the Executive and 
 Legislative branches of the Government, so far as the 
 latter has a part in the determination of our foreign 
 policy, seem to concur in their firm resolve to adhere 
 to the traditional policy of the United States, and to 
 avoid in as far as possible participating in the settle- 
 ment of European political controversies. 
 
 Enough has been said to indicate how much room is 
 still left for the discretional or political action of each 
 independent state. Within these limits, the state which 
 is sufficiently powerful to make use of this liberty of 
 action may determine the policy which it will adopt, 
 and in a large measure it may be expected to choose 
 this policy with a view of protecting its important in- 
 terests. 
 
 The condition which we have just described means 
 that many of the rights and duties of states are still im- 
 perfect in the sense that their fulfilment depends upon 
 the will of the interested parties and impartiality is not 
 sufficiently guaranteed by an effective sanction. Ob- 
 viously this is a defect, but it is one which cannot be 
 remedied until the nations are sufficiently wise to per- 
 
 29
 
 450 POLITICAL ACTION 
 
 feet their law and until they are willing whenever the 
 occasion arises to make the sacrifices necessary to en- 
 sure its enforcement. 
 
 21. POLITICAL, INFLUENCE 
 
 It might perhaps be thought that the place allowed to 
 governmental discretion in the fulfilment of the state's 
 international obligations and the insistence upon its 
 rights would afford an ample opportunity for the 
 powers to protect their interests, without any depar- 
 ture from the strict limits of legal action. Neverthe- 
 less, the states enjoy still other means to guard over and 
 to foster interests which appear of a sufficient impor- 
 tance to warrant the effort. Every powerful state makes 
 use of its political influence to induce its neighbors, 
 especially its weaker neighbors, to adopt the course 
 which the powerful state believes will prove most ad- 
 vantageous to itself. This influence is, as we have said, 
 especially potent with the smaller states, who fear to 
 give offense. To ignore the suggestion from a great 
 state may cause the latter to seek at the first opportu- 
 nity a pretext for employing its superior force against 
 the weaker, or what is more likely to occur it may 
 lend its influence covertly to support the internal ene- 
 mies of the government until they overthrow and 
 replace it with one more pliant to the foreign will. 
 Even though the great state do no more than to insist 
 upon the meticulous observance of the letter of its strict 
 rights in all their relations, the resulting inconveniences 
 and annoyance might prove intolerable for the weaker 
 state. The continuance of international intercourse 
 always presupposes a neighborly spirit of give and 
 take. Whenever a great state relies upon its superior 
 force to make its weaker neighbor line up to the strict- 
 est interpretation of its rights while it continues to
 
 ADJUSTMENT 451 
 
 allow itself the habitual latitude in fulfilling its recip- 
 rocal obligations, the weaker state must surely yield 
 unless it find as champion some other powerful state. 
 
 The smaller and weaker states recognize this situ- 
 ation before matters proceed too far and yield with 
 good grace to a reasonable dictation in matters of 
 policy whenever they find themselves without the count- 
 erbalancing support of a rival great state. The practi- 
 cal consequence is to bring the smaller states within the 
 political orbit of their most powerful neighbor. This 
 mutual bond of protection and dependence offers a 
 large opportunity to the paramount state for the exer- 
 cise of political direction in all matters which in its 
 judgment are important for the health and growth of 
 this political affiliation. 
 
 It will be evident to all how large a place political 
 action still holds in the intercourse of independent 
 states, equal though they be as regards the rights which 
 have been recognized as a part of their common that 
 is international law. 
 
 22. ADJUSTMENT 
 
 Since the object of international law is the preserva- 
 tion and prosperity of the society of states, it follows 
 that the rights which it has recognized for the protec- 
 tion of each state are subject always to the restriction 
 or proviso that they be not used to the detriment of the 
 others. 
 
 Otherwise stated, each state is obligated not to insist 
 upon its own right when it will thereby cause a dispro- 
 portionate injury to the interests and prosperity of 
 others. The conflict between the opposing rights or be- 
 tween rights and interests is to be settled on a basis of 
 a reasonable compromise. Just what this compromise
 
 452 POLITICAL ACTION 
 
 is in any particular case is a matter of fact to be de- 
 termined by the states concerned in the same manner as 
 the determination as to the grounds of intervention pre- 
 viously discussed. When either state proves unreason- 
 able and gives evidence of an uncompromising spirit 
 such as to prevent the adjustment of the conflict, a right 
 of intervention upon this ground arises. 
 
 It is not the right to decide when the protection of in- 
 terests requires recourse to force which is the ground 
 of this action, for that is a matter of individual or sub- 
 jective appreciation which cannot override the right of 
 another state to insist upon the respect of its sovereign- 
 ty and independence. But when these rights of sov- 
 ereignty or independence are abused, there arises an 
 offence against the common interest of all the states. 
 For the common interest and prosperity depend upon 
 the prosperity of the individual member. If one mem- 
 ber state refuses to depart somewhat from its technical 
 or formal rights of sovereignty and independence in 
 order to facilitate for a sister state the conservation of 
 its important interests, there is an abuse, an antisocial 
 uncompromising spirit which is a justifiable ground of 
 intervention. 
 
 It has long been recognized as a precept of interna- 
 tional morality that every state should evince a spirit 
 of reasonable compromise for the adjustment of all 
 controversies which threaten to disturb the peace of 
 nations, but the study of international relations shows 
 that this obligation is something more than a precept 
 of morality the fulfilment of which is left to the con- 
 science of the separate states. It is a legal duty 
 rightly recognized as a rule of international law, since
 
 ADJUSTMENT 453 
 
 it meets successfully the tests of its jural character, 
 in that it is observed by the states in their practice 
 and enforced by appropriate action. When once we 
 perceive that the obligation to agree to a reasonable 
 compromise is a rule of international law which all the 
 states are obligated to intervene to enforce, we have 
 brought every political controversy within legal limits 
 and we are able to set bounds to the hitherto uncon- 
 trolled freedom of political action. 
 
 The recognition of the principle of the obligation to 
 compromise one's rights and interests upon a reason- 
 able basis to preserve the peace brings all recourse to 
 force under the domain of law, and permits other states 
 to counter-intervene against a state that has shown an 
 uncompromising attitude or abusively insisted upon 
 its rights. Gradually through experience and through 
 a better understanding of the principles of political 
 science it will be possible to lessen the uncertainty in 
 regard to the basis of a reasonable adjustment. 
 
 To those who would reject this principle of interven- 
 tion to enforce respect for the right of reasonable ad- 
 justment we can only point out that the alternative is to 
 permit every state in the exercise of its full and unre- 
 stricted discretion to decide when it is necessary to em- 
 ploy force for the defense of its rights and interests 
 and to decide for itself to what degree it will push its 
 insistence thereon. This is the doctrine of perfect 
 rights, and covers for those who accept it the intolerable 
 doctrine of absolute necessity, that is, the right of 
 every state to disregard any right where it believes it 
 necessary for the preservation of its existence. What 
 rational being will discard a system admittedly imper-
 
 454 POLITICAL ACTION 
 
 feet, it is true, as regards its definition, but capable of 
 gradual improvement and ultimate perfection, for a 
 system which enthrones brute force and recognizes doc- 
 trines of international anarchy?
 
 CHAPTER V 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 23. THE RULE OF REASON 
 
 In the foregoing pages we have analyzed the various 
 grounds upon which intervention may justly be under- 
 taken to defend international law rights either by way 
 of interposition or international police. We have at- 
 tempted to draw the line between the due exercise of 
 sovereignty which the law of nations recognizes and the 
 abusive insistence upon independent action without 
 consideration of the equally important rights of other 
 states and the interests of the common weal. Whether 
 the state is acting in the defense of a recognized right 
 or in pursuit of its interests, there is no absolute or 
 perfect right, but all rights are to be asserted with due 
 regard to the preservation of the independence, secur- 
 ity, and prosperity of neighboring states. Rights 
 which have been given for the common good of all the 
 states may not be perverted to menace international 
 security. 
 
 Finally as a result of our investigation of what we 
 may call rights in political action, we laid down a rule 
 of the broadest application: that the employment of 
 force under international law, whether it be to defend 
 rights or to protect and foster interests, is always lim- 
 ited by the condition that there shall first have been 
 made a reasonable effort to reach an amicable adjust- 
 ment. 
 
 It remains for us to define what effort is "reason- 
 able." 
 
 455
 
 456 CONCLUSION 
 
 Every state we have seen has a sovereign right to de- 
 cide when its rights are menaced and when its vital 
 interests are in jeopardy. If it were likewise at liberty 
 immediately to employ its force upon the warrant of 
 this sovereign determination, there would be no secur- 
 ity for any state and international law would be an 
 empty word. 
 
 To keep within the bounds of law every state that em- 
 ploys its might to defend its rights or to protect its in- 
 terests against the abusive insistence upon alleged 
 right by another must first justify its action before its 
 sister states ; it must second observe all the delays and 
 forms of procedure customary in international prac- 
 tice; and it must third outwardly at least evince a 
 disposition to adopt any suggestion or compromise 
 which gives promise of a peaceful solution without sac- 
 rificing its own important interests or the means to en- 
 force them. 
 
 In each one of these steps the state itself has in first 
 instance the sovereign right to decide whether it has 
 fulfilled the law, but at each step also the family of 
 states are free nay they are bound in as far as the 
 circumstances will permit, to correct any erroneous or 
 unjust decision. 
 
 In international society, as in every society which is 
 at the .stage of self -execution, there must always be 
 such an appeal from the subjective (sovereign) decision 
 of the individual state judging the rectitude of its own 
 conduct to the forum of general public opinion to the 
 consensus of opinion of all the states. 
 
 In this manner the application of the law of inter- 
 vention is guided by the opinion of all of the states 
 fixing the limits of the reasonable discretion which each 
 state may enjoy in acting for the defense of its own 
 rights and interests. This builds the whole system of
 
 THE RULE OF REASON 457 
 
 international law upon the foundation of what the con- 
 sensus of the states judge to be reasonable under the 
 rule of reason. 
 
 In those questions where there is no consensus of 
 opinion but only opposing views supported by forces 
 approximately equal, there can be no rule of law. 
 
 The nations are then not ready to recognize the 
 opinion of either group as the rule of law. They must 
 muddle along by some half-way measure. The states 
 must expect to accept some compromise to govern each 
 of such differences as it arises or to try a temporary 
 expedient until such time as the partisans of the op- 
 posed views are better informed as to the limits of their 
 rights and as to the relation of the forces with which 
 the opposing opinions can be sustained. 
 
 Upon this basis of appeal to the tribunal of inter- 
 national reason as interpreted and supported by the 
 consensus of opinion in a preponderating majority of 
 the states, the just peace of nations rests. Upon this 
 basis the majority of the states do in ultimate analysis 
 insist that the law of nations be observed. In those 
 other non-legal or extra-legal relations which are desig- 
 nated as political, there is likewise a supreme and guid- 
 ing one might better say limiting rule of law to guide 
 state action: namely that every state shall evince a 
 broad spirit of tolerance an attitude of live and let 
 live. This guiding rule may be formulated, as we have 
 seen above, as the legal obligation that states in their 
 political controversies shall observe the rule which 
 enjoins upon them to agree to a reasonable compromise 
 of their differences. 
 
 If we have succeeded in defining the legal grounds of 
 intervention, including that of intervention justified 
 upon the ground of the refusal to agree to a reasonable 
 adjustment or compromise, we have made it possible 
 for the enlightened public opinion of the states con-
 
 458 CONCLUSION 
 
 cerued and of the whole world to support the govern- 
 ments that reasonably observes the law. 
 
 For generations it has been the custom of govern- 
 ments to justify their recourse to force before their 
 nationals, and it will be no small guarantee of the ob- 
 servance of the law when governments understand that 
 their explanations and excuses must stand the test of 
 reason by which is meant unprejudiced examination 
 of the alleged grounds of action in all the states of the 
 world. To-day when the nations are so dependent one 
 upon the other, and when all recognize the importance 
 of insisting upon the respect for the law of nations, 
 states will be quicker to intervene in vindication of their 
 law than formerly they were. The motive-spring of 
 this salutary action will ever remain enlightened pub- 
 lic opinion in each state. As long as public opinion has 
 this directing influence, the citizen himself must assume 
 his part of the responsibility for the faithful observ- 
 ance of international law. To meet this responsibility 
 fully he must be ready to commend his government for 
 its just action, to condemn it for its violations of inter- 
 national law, and to lend his support for the adoption 
 of a policy of enlightened self-interest which neither 
 sacrifices essential interests to quixotic and ill-balanced 
 impulses, nor yet is unmindful of the common interest 
 of all the states to maintain peace and to preserve the 
 health and rightful independence of each of the states 
 separately ; so that all humanity may continue uninter- 
 ruptedly its march toward the goal anticipated by the 
 poet: 
 
 Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle-flags 
 
 were furl'd 
 In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world. 
 
 There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm 
 
 in awe, 
 And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 OF 
 INTERVENTION
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY OP INTERVENTION 
 
 The following list of books and articles relative to 
 intervention is arranged alphabetically, substantially 
 in accordance with the pattern of the cards printed by 
 the Library of Congress. The indication of the classi- 
 fication or "book numbers" will make it possible for 
 students using libraries which employ this system to 
 obtain the book desired with the least effort, and by 
 noting the card number on the left hand side, they may 
 purchase separate cards for each item, from the 
 Library of Congress. 
 
 References to the principal bibliographies on inter- 
 vention will be found in a foot note, but none of these, 
 so far as I am aware, is extensive or critical. 1 
 
 1 The following works contain bibliographies or bibliographical notes: 
 
 Berner in Bluntschli's Staatsworterbuch, 1860, Vol. V, p. 354. Has 
 some valuable comments. 
 
 Bernard, 1860; Non-intervention, p. 10 note. 
 
 Hodges, H. F. ; Intervention, p. 263-71. Incomplete and not 
 important. 
 
 Geffcken, in Hollzendorff 's Handbuch, Vol. IV, p. 131. 
 
 Kraus, H. : Die Monroedoktrin, p. 369 note (1) has references on 
 intervention. Kraus gives other bibliographical notes of value. 
 
 Library of Congress typewritten list on Intervention. This is the 
 most complete list which has appeared to date, but it lacks a number 
 of important works not yet to be found in the Library of Congress 
 collection, and it makes no comment upon the merits of the respective 
 works. 
 
 Library of Congress has also printed Bibliographies containing lists 
 on Mediation, Balance of Power, etc. 
 
 Oppenheim, L. : International Law. Second Edition, Vol. I, p. 188, 
 3d ed., Vol. I, p. 221. 
 
 Bivier, A.: Droit des Gens, Vol. I, 389-404. 
 
 Rotteek, H. von: Recht des Einmischung, 1845, p. 7-8, note. One 
 of the best bibliographies. 
 
 461
 
 462 INTERVENTION 
 
 It has seemed, therefore, desirable to add a few words 
 of comment upon the character and merits of the prin- 
 cipal works. These superficial indications are by- 
 products of my investigations, jotted down at differ- 
 ent times in a sketchy, fragmentary manner, without 
 any uniformity of treatment, and they are submitted 
 for what they may be worth. No claim is made that 
 they represent the compiler's final judgment upon the 
 respective merits of the works discussed. 
 
 It is to be hoped that other investigators will reform 
 them, or submit suggestions and comments, in the event 
 of the publication of a later edition. 
 
 A system of stars has been used to indicate the 
 relative merits of the more important works. Four 
 stars indicate those that are considered to be the most 
 meritorious. 
 
 Under certain of the incidents of intervention in- 
 cluded in the list will be found a few of the books and 
 articles which discuss the facts and the justification 
 for the action taken. It did not, however, seem desir- 
 able to confuse a bibliography devoted to the principles 
 of intervention with a large number of w r orks devoted 
 almost exclusively to a consideration of diplomatic 
 incidents and discussions. 
 
 Except when the contrary is stated, I have tried to 
 examine each item of this bibliography with such care 
 as its importance appeared to justify. In the case of 
 works which are not in the Library of Congress, I have 
 indicated some other library where they are available, 
 and when I have not discovered them in this country, 
 the European repository has been mentioned. 
 
 The trained librarians on the staff of the Library 
 of Congress, The Harvard Law Library, the Library 
 of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, The New York 
 Bar Association, Columbia Law School, and the New
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 463 
 
 York Public Library have been generous with their 
 assistance. In addition to the libraries above men- 
 tioned I have examined the card catalogues of the fol- 
 lowing: State Department; The University of 
 Pennsylvania; The Pennsylvania Historical Society, 
 The Library Company of Pennsylvania, Princeton 
 University, Yale University, Boston Athenaeum. 
 
 Without the spirit of cooperation and assistance 
 which Mr. Herbert Putnam has inspired in every de- 
 partment of the Library of Congress, this bibliography 
 could not have been made so complete, and to him I 
 wish particularly to express my appreciation. 
 
 [Aldebert,] 
 
 De 1 'intervention [Dissertation, Paris] 
 Paris, V, Giard and E. Briere, 1902, ii-\-152p. 
 
 This work is cited by Jean Lagorgette: Le Bole de la Guerre, 
 p. 230, and appears to relate to public law, but when I obtained 
 a copy from abroad I found it related solely to intervention in 
 private law. 
 
 H-fr*Amos, Sheldon, 1835-1887. [Barrister-at-Law; late 
 Professor of Jurisprudence in University College, 
 London.] 
 
 Political and Legal Remedies for War. 
 London, 1880, ii+364 p., 23 cm. 
 
 10-16358 JX1948.AG 
 
 [A New York edition of the same date by Harper and Bros, 
 is smaller in size and type, and inferior in general makeup. The 
 indexing of the material is the same in both.] 
 
 One of the very few serious studies of the problem of the 
 restriction of the unnecessary use of force. It is original, judi- 
 cious in treatment, suggestive, and in the main also it is sound. 
 
 +Angell, James Burrill, 1829-1916. 
 
 The European concert and the Monroe Doctrine. 
 A discourse before the Phi beta kappa Society of
 
 464 INTERVENTION 
 
 Harvard University, June 28, 1905. 16 p., 23 cm. 
 
 [Harvard Law Library] 
 
 A14-1083 
 
 Valuable because of the broad diplomatic experience of the 
 author and his unprejudiced examination of the question of the 
 European concert and its supremacy, but the treatment is some- 
 what superficial. 
 
 Annuaire de 1'institut de droit international. See; 
 Institut de droit international, Annuaire. 
 
 10-16478 Eevised JX24.I4 
 
 Anonymous. 
 
 Legal opinions and observations on the corre- 
 spondence lately addressed by the acting French 
 consul in Lisbon to the Portuguese Government. 
 London, no date, 50 p., 8. 
 
 [Harvard Law Library] 
 
 Anonymous. 
 
 Specific answers to the several demands of the 
 acting French consul in Lisbon to the Portuguese 
 Government in his note of March 28, 1831. 
 London, no date, 15 p., 8 . 
 
 [Harvard Law Library] 
 
 Anonymous. 
 
 Particulars and corresponding documents re- 
 lating to the French aggression on Portugal. 
 London, no date. 44 p., 8 . 
 
 I have not examined this work. 
 
 Anonymous [under pseudonym of Stephanus Junius 
 Brutus, accredited to Hubert Languet or 
 Duplessis-Mornay] . 
 
 Vindiciae contra tyrannos [Grounds of Rights 
 against Tyrants].
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 465 
 
 1579, and often thereafter. The Library of Con- 
 gress has an edition printed at Basle 1589. 
 
 9-10598 JC.143.M3.1589 
 
 See W. A. Dunning: Political Theories, Luther to Montesquieu, 
 p. 47. Prof. Dunning and Prof. Coker refer to Encyclopedia 
 Brittaniea ' ' Lanquet ' ' and Janet : Histoire de la science 
 politique, Vol. II, p. 31, note 2. They used the edition of 1595, 
 bound with Machiavelli 's Prince. Esmein, who uses an edition 
 of 1600, says (in Nouvelle revue historique de droit francais et 
 etranger, 1900, p. 557), "It is one of the most original and 
 powerful of the writings about religion (doctrine) and political 
 controversy of that fecund period." F. W. Coker (Readings in 
 Political Philosophy, Xew York, 1914, p. 207-221) has translated 
 a portion, and Esmein gives French translations of other portions 
 of the four questions considered. The fourth is: "Whether it is 
 the right and duty of princes to interfere in behalf of neighbor- 
 ing peoples who are oppressed on account of adherence to the 
 true religion, or by any obvious tyranny. ' ' Prof. Dunning 
 Political Theories (p. 55) says: "The answer is affirmative on 
 both branches of the question, and the ground is, in the one case, 
 unity of the Christian Church; in the other, the unity of humanity, 
 involving respectively, duty to God and duty to one 's neighbor. ' ' 
 This latter Prof. Dunning remarks strongly presents "an en- 
 lightened view of international solidarity. ' ' 
 
 Anonymous. 
 
 De justa reipublicae Christianae in reges 
 impios et haereticos authoritate justissima que 
 catholicorum ad Henricum Navarraeum et 
 quemcunque haereticum a regno Gallico re- 
 pellandum confederatione. 
 Paris, Guillaume Bichon, 1590. 
 
 Esmein (in Nouvelle revue historique de droit franfais et 
 etranger, 1900, p. 553) calls this "a curious little book inspired 
 by a fierce passion and sometimes expressing the highest ideals. ' ' 
 He says it supplied the Leaguers with arguments to justify war 
 against the French Protestants (Calvinists) and the calling in 
 of foreign aid on the ground that the Protestants were not French, 
 and that it was a duty of other nations to repel them. 
 
 30
 
 466 INTERVENTION 
 
 Anonymous [See: Kamptz, Karl C. A. H. von]. 
 
 Volkerrechtliche Erorterung des Recht der 
 Europaischen Machte in die Verfassung eines 
 einzelnen Staats sich zu mischen. 
 Berlin, 1821, xvi+214 p., 8. 
 
 [Harvard Law Library and 
 Yale University Library] 
 
 * Anonymous. By "R. Q." 
 
 A review of the preceding work by Kamptz. 
 in Hermes, 1821, Vol. XI, p. 142-156. 
 
 Contains an important discussion of intervention and severely 
 criticizes Kamptz 's work. 
 
 Anonymous. By "M. M. D. et R." 
 
 Traite sur le droit d 'intervention. 
 Paris, 1823. 
 
 Cited by Rotteck (Einmischung, 1845, p. 8) ; in 
 Bluntschli's Staatsworterbuch, 1860, Vol. V, p. 
 354; Also Heffter, 44, note. 
 
 I was unable to consult this work. 
 
 Anonymous. By "Decimus." 
 
 Intervention and its fruits; a letter to Her 
 Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
 London, Saunders and Otley, 1841, 32 p. 
 
 [New York Library] 
 
 Interestingly written attack upon Palmerston's policy regard- 
 ing Turkey. The author advises England to hold aloof and let 
 Russia occupy the Dardenelles, and France occupy Egypt. Defends 
 policy of complete non-intervention. 
 
 Anonymous. 
 
 An Appeal, on behalf of the British subjects 
 residing in and connected with the river Plate, 
 against any further violent interventions by the
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 467 
 
 British and French Governments in the affairs 
 of that country. 
 London, 1846. 8. 
 
 [Hague Peace Palace] 
 
 I was unable to consult this work. 
 
 * Anonymous. 
 
 Non-intervention, A Humbug, 
 in Spectator of July 3, 1847, and reprinted in 
 Living Age, 1847, vol. 14, p. 284-286. 
 
 Points out how frequently intervention occurs, and declares 
 it is often a duty. Thinks no guiding rule is possible. 
 
 Anonymous. 
 
 Intervention anglo-franc.aise dans le Rio de la 
 Plata. Missions de MM. de Deffaudis et 
 Walewski. 
 Paris, 1848. 8. 
 
 [British Museum, 8175.e.] 
 
 I was unable to consult this work. 
 
 Anonymous. 
 
 Intervengao estrangeira, ou documentos his- 
 toricos sobre a intervenc.ao armada de Franca, 
 Hespanha e Inglaterra nos negocios internos de 
 Portugal no anno de 1847. Vol. 1. 
 Porto, 1848. 8. 
 
 [British Museum, 8042. aaa.25] 
 
 I was unable to consult this work. 
 
 Anonymous. 
 
 Intervention franchise dans les affaires d 'Italic 
 en 1859. 
 Paris, 1859. 86 p. 
 
 [New York Library, 
 British Museum, 8032.h] 
 
 Political pamphlet: reasons why France undertook war 
 (p. 77); results of the war (p. 73). Does not discuss principles 
 of intervention.
 
 468 INTERVENTION 
 
 Anonymous. 
 
 Le principe de non-intervention. 
 Paris, 1860. 16 p., 8. 
 
 [Boston Athenaeum Library] 
 
 Relates to Russian intervention in Bessarabia. This article is 
 of no juridical value. 
 
 Anonymous. [Harcourt's letters in the Times, 1863, 
 were signed "Historicus."] See under Harcourt. 
 
 Anonymous. 
 
 Intervention: A Duty or a Crime. 
 London, 1864. 8. 
 
 [British Museum, 8092. aaa] 
 
 I was unable to consult this work. 
 
 [Anonymous.] 
 
 L 'intervention militaire anglaise sur le con- 
 tinent. 
 Paris and Nancy, Chapelot, 1912. 27 p., 8. 
 
 [Listed in Berlin Cards, B.12.1819] 
 
 This pamphlet does not relate to intervention, but discusses 
 the military cooperation of England and France in the event of 
 a war with Germany. 
 
 Anonymous. 
 
 Our Policy in Nicaragua, by "A Friend of 
 Justice. ' ' 
 
 in North American Review, January, 1913, vol. 
 197, p. 50-61. 
 
 AP2.N7 v. 197 
 
 Condemns interference of United States in the civil conflict 
 in Nicaragua. Does not discuss the principles of intervention.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 469 
 
 Anonymous. 
 
 Intervention. Non-intervention theory and 
 practice. The true tradition, 
 in London Times, May 17, 1919. 
 
 An argument justifying intervention in Eussia against 
 Bolshevists and pointing out that Great Britain has not observed 
 the doctrine of non-intervention. Refers particularly to the view 
 expressed by George III. 
 
 H-* Arntz, E. R. N. [Professor of Law, University of 
 Brussels.] 
 
 The views of Prof. Arntz in regard to restric- 
 tions to be applied to intervention, especially 
 humanitarian intervention, are quoted by Rolin- 
 Jaequemyns 
 
 in Revue du droit international et de la legislation 
 comparee, 1876, vol. 8. p. 675. 
 
 1-7465 JX3.E4 Vol. 8 
 
 Professor Arntz would restrict such intervention to collective 
 action of the powers. In his "Programme du cours de droit des 
 gens fait a 1 'Universite de Bruxelles," (1882), Arntz discusses 
 intervention (p. 69-84). After stating that non-intervention in 
 internal affairs is the rule (p. 75), he gives three exceptions: 
 (1) treaty stipulation; (2) when the institutions are a menace; 
 (3) on the ground of humanity, but he would limit the latter to 
 collective action (p. 77-8). 
 
 Rougier (Rev. Gen. Vol. 17, p. 473) refers to this passage and 
 states that Professor Arntz was the first to establish the theory 
 of intervention on the ground of humanity, but Arntz himself 
 refers to Woolsey as having previously set forth his views (Pro- 
 gramme du cours de Droit des Gens 1882, p. 78), and the latter 
 (Woolsey: International Law 1860, p. 111-12) quotes from 
 Wheaton's Elements, part II, Chap. 1, 10 Fedozzi (archivio 
 giuiridico, Vol. 62, 1899, p. 518) says Arntz was the first to 
 attempt to find a juridical basis for intervention. This ignores 
 H. von Rotteck's work published in 1845. Arntz also refers to 
 Hall as holding similar views. 
 
 Balance of Power. 
 
 A valuable list of works on the Balance of Powec will be found 
 in the Library of Congress: List of References on (p. 49-57)
 
 470 INTERVENTION 
 
 Europe and International Politics, 1914. L. C. card, 14-30010 
 compiled under the direction of Hermann H. B. Moyer. 
 
 A few of the more important works dealing with this par- 
 ticular purpose are: 
 
 Donnandieu, Leonce: Essai sur In theorie de I'SquUibre. Paris, 
 1900. 
 9-3782 JX1318.D7 
 
 Dupuis, CJutrles, 1863: Le principe d'equilibre. Paris, 1909. 
 9-27064 D217.D8 
 
 Baldwin, Simeon E. 
 
 The limits of active intervention by a state to 
 secure the fulfilment of a contract in favor of its 
 own citizens entered into by them with other 
 states. 
 
 in 28th Report of the International Law Asso- 
 ciation, London, 1908, p. 180f. 
 
 Justifies interposition and advocates obligatory arbitration as 
 a substitute. 
 
 Barrillon, Francois Guillaume. 
 
 Politique de la France et de 1'humanite dans le 
 conflit Americain. 
 Paris, 1861. 40 p., 25 cm. 
 
 8-10496 E469.B27 
 
 On the basis of humanity, the author advises France to take 
 the initiative of an armed and collective intervention based, first, 
 upon the abolition of slavery and second, upon the independence 
 of the Confederate States. The article has no scientific value. 
 
 Bartholet. 
 
 Du droit d 'intervention. 
 1873. 
 
 I was unable to consult this work. It is cited by Geffcken 
 (Heffter's 7 ed.), $ 44, p. 107.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 471 
 
 Becherowsky. 
 
 L 'intervention et la peninsule balkanique, 1892. 
 
 I was unable to consult this work. It is cited by E. Robin: 
 Occupations, p. 281. 
 
 Benton, Elbert Jay. 1871 
 
 International Law and Diplomacy of the 
 Spanish-American War. 
 
 Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1908. 300 
 p., 20y 2 cm. (The Albert Shaw lectures on diplo- 
 matic history, 1907.) 
 
 8-9495 E723.B47 
 
 Discusses the various grounds upon which intervention in Cuba 
 was justified and gives a few references to the views of some of 
 the authorities (p. 81-108). The question is examined in a broad 
 and fair spirit, but the treatment is superficial and indicates 
 a lack of comprehension of the principles of international law. 
 The historical side of the question is carefully covered. 
 
 ****Bernard, Mountague, 1820-1882. [Chichele Professor 
 of International Law and Diplomacy, Oxford.] 
 
 On the Principle of Non-intervention. A lecture 
 delivered in the hall of All Soul's College. 
 Oxford and London, J. H. and J. Parker, 1860. 
 Pamphlet, 1+36 p., 23 cm. 
 
 10-17439 1 JX4478.B5 
 
 Prof. Bernard argues that intervention in internal affairs is con- 
 trary to international law. The argument is more philosophical 
 than legal, and is confined to a consideration of intermeddling in 
 the internal affairs of another state. Interposition and counter- 
 intervention are not discussed. Also discusses supervision over 
 smaller states. Bernard counsels absolute nonintervention. It is 
 one of the ablest works on the subject, and has exercised a very 
 great influence on other writers and through them on the theory 
 of international law and the conduct of international relations. 
 Harcourt [Historicus] seems to have been influenced and later 
 Hall, Lawrence, and Oppenheim. Bernard was one of few Eng- 
 lish writers who appear to have been familiar with the German 
 authorities, and the only one who had given the subject of inter- 
 vention serious consideration. He gives n bibliography of in- 
 tervention (p. 11).
 
 472 INTERVENTION 
 
 H-H-Berner 
 
 Intervention [article on] 
 
 in Deutsches Staats-Worterbuch of Blunt scUli, and 
 Brater, Stuttgart and Leipsig, 1860. Vol. V., p. 
 341-354. 
 
 One of the best discussions of intervention. Berner recognizes 
 the general principle of nonintervention, but admits reasonable ex- 
 ceptions: balance of power; continued acts of inhumanity ("In 
 final analysis, Man is the highest right before which all other right 
 must incline."); counter-claim [counter-intervention]; neces- 
 sity. He appends a valuable bibliography, which we have utilized. 
 
 Berra, F. A. 
 
 Teorici de las intervenciones. 
 in Neuva Revista de Buenos-Ayres. Vol V., p. 
 397-465. 
 
 I was unable to consult this work. 
 
 *Bignon, Louis Pierre Edouard, baron, 1771-1841 . 
 
 Les cabinets et les peuples, depuis 1815 jusqu'a 
 la fin de 1822 ; par M. Bignon. 
 2d ed. (revised and corrected), Paris. Becliet 
 aine, 1823. 
 
 18-5011 D383.B5 
 
 A well-written contemporaneous attack upon the arrogant pre 
 tensions of the Holy Alliance to interference in the internal af- 
 fairs of other states. Discusses intervention policy of the powers 
 toward Italy, Greece, and Spain. Very anglophobe (p. 382) ; 
 criticizes England for merely proclaiming the doctrine of non- 
 interference, and not trying to protect the states against interfer- 
 ence. H. v. Botteck (Einmischung, p. 26) cites this work with high 
 praise. 
 
 *Birkbeck, W., Lt. 
 
 The principle of Non-intervention. 
 No date or place of publication indicated. 4 p., 8. 
 
 [in New York Public Library] 
 
 Birkbeck in these four pages shows that he has carefully con- 
 sidered part of the subject. He emphasizes the need of definition
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 473 
 
 of the terms employed (p. 4), and prefers those in Abdy's Kent. 
 Strongly defends the right of intervention to defend the law, even 
 when national interests are not immediately concerned. 
 
 ***Bluntschli, Johann Kaspar, 1808-1881. 
 
 French translation entitled, Le droit interna- 
 tional codifie, by M. C. Lardy, from the German 
 edition of 1868. 
 Paris, 1870 and 1895. 
 
 10-16547t JX1268.B451895 
 
 Louis Kenault, in his Introduction to the Study of International 
 Law, says it is one of the few books which must always be 
 consulted. This statement I have found to be particularly true 
 for intervention. See: Violations of international law and the 
 means to prevent them, 462-500, p. 247-269. I have also used 
 the German original. 
 
 Bodin, Jean, 1530-1596. 
 
 Les six livres de la republique de I. Bodin 
 Angeuin. Ensemble une apologie de Rene 
 Herpin. 
 
 Paris, I du Puis, 1583, 1060 p., 18 cm. First pub. 
 1576, Latin edition De republica Libri Sex, 1586. 
 
 7-14933 
 
 See W. A. Dunning: Political Theories, Vol. I, 1910, p. 86. 
 Bodin admitted the right of a foreign sovereign to intervene 
 upon humanitarian grounds. See criticisms of this doctrine by 
 Werdenhagen (below under Werdenhagen). 
 
 *Bompard, Raoul. 
 
 Le Pape et le droit des gens. 
 Paris, H. Rousseau, 1888, 228 p., 8. 
 
 [Harvard Law Library] 
 
 Discusses intervention and the interest and rights of European 
 states in the affairs of the Papal states (p. 109-127) ; gives an 
 account of the various interventions, from 1796-1870, which have 
 concerned the Papal states (p. 127-184). This work is important 
 because the opinions expressed about intervention are based upon 
 study of documents and the practice of states, even though the 
 position of the Pope is exceptional.
 
 474 INTERVENTION 
 
 Borchard, Edwin M. 
 
 The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 
 or the Law of International Claims. 
 New York, 1915. xxxvii+988 p., 24y 2 cm. 
 
 15-1459 B, Revised JX4231.P8.B6 
 
 The best work on interposition for the redress of wrongs to 
 nationals a veritable mine of information. 
 
 Bourgeois, J. 
 
 Le principe de non-intervention a propos d'un 
 livre recent. 
 
 in Revue general de droit Internationale, 1897, 
 Vol. IV, p. 746-757. 
 
 JX.3.B56.vol.4 
 This is really a review of a book on the French Bevolution. 
 
 Brewster, Benjamin Harris. 
 
 Paper furnished by the Attorney-General, in 
 1883, upon the subject of intervention and also 
 upon the subject of the Monroe Doctrine. 
 Washington, Government Printing Office, 1884. 
 8 p., 8. 
 
 [New York Public Library] 
 
 This is not important. 
 
 Bringolf, Hans. 
 
 Volkerrechtliche vertrage als quelle von inter- 
 ventionen bei internationalen verwickelungen. 
 [Inaugural dissertation, Griefswald University.] 
 Grief swaLd, J. Abel, 1899, 1+47 p., 8. 
 
 l-G-419 JX4481.B7 
 
 British State Papers. 
 
 1-4026 JX103.A3 
 
 The principal collection of British source material: treaties 
 and diplomatic correspondence with all other states.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 475 
 
 Brocher de la Flechere. 
 
 Solidarite et souverainete. 
 
 in Revue de droit international et de legislation 
 comparee, 1894, vol. 26, p. 415f. 
 
 JX.3.K4.vol.26 
 
 Not important. It is a discussion of an anonymous book on 
 " L 'intervention et la peninsule balkanique." The latter is 
 based upon the nationalistic ideas of Carnazza-Amari. The article 
 criticizes them and considers intervention in Turkey necessary 
 because Turkey failed to live up to her obligations and en- 
 dangered the peace of Europe. Quotes Guizot: "No state has 
 the right to intervene except when its own safety makes it 
 unavoidable. ' ' 
 
 Callahan, James Morton, 1864 
 
 Cuba and International Relations. 
 1899. 
 
 99-3745, Revised. F1783.C215 
 
 See below under Cuba, 1868-1878. 
 
 Calvo, Charles, 1824-1906. 
 
 Le droit international. 
 
 2 ed. (1st French edition), 1870; 4th ed., 5 vols., 
 1887-88; a supplementary volume, 1896. 
 
 10-15585 JX2984.D5 1896 
 
 Intervention is discussed in vol. I, livre III, $$ 107 ff., p. 264. 
 Calvo discusses intervention and especially the interventions 
 against Argentina and Mexico. Superficial and prejudiced and 
 not always reliable, as Calvo is, he has nevertheless exercised a 
 considerable influence. This may be in part due to the easily 
 read French which he has chosen as his medium and the fact of 
 his being a South American diplomatist. He was, I believe, the 
 first to publish in French a complete treatise upon International 
 Law supported by a comprehensive discussion of the incidents. 
 The interest of the work is enhanced by means of carefully chosen 
 and well connected extracts. Unfortunately, Calvo does not give 
 specific references, but supplies bibliographies in a footnote at 
 the end of each section. These references show the industry and 
 wide reading of the author, and facilitate the researches of 
 others. I have found one or two valuable references. The student 
 of the principles of Intervention need expect little assistance 
 from Calvo.
 
 476 INTERVENTION 
 
 Carnazza Amari, Giuseppe, 1837- 
 
 Nouvel expose du principe de non-intervention, 
 in Revue du droit international et de legislation 
 comparee, 1873, Vol. V, p. 352-389, 531-565. (Book 
 printed with same title in Italian, 1873.) 
 
 JX.3.R4,V.5 
 
 Good statement of the views of the Italian nationalistic school. 
 Denies legality of intervention for balance of power, and for 
 humanity, but approves when it is to help national independence 
 [self-determination], or when undertaken against intervention 
 itself [counter-intervention]. 
 
 Carnazza Amari, Giuseppe, 1837 
 
 Nuova esposizione del principio del non inter- 
 vento. Discorso inaugurate pronunziato dal 
 professore G. Carnazza Amari per 1'apertura 
 degli studi della Regia universita di Catania; 
 anno 1872-1873. 
 
 Catania, Stabilimento tipografico Caronda, 1873, 
 124 p., 22y 2 cm. 
 
 11-12683 JX4481.C3 
 
 See French edition (preceding item) for criticism and notes. 
 
 Carnazza Amari, Giuseppe, 1837 
 
 Traite de droit Internationale public. [Trans- 
 lation from Italian.] 
 Paris, 1880. 
 
 11-34126 JX2858.T4 
 
 Vol. I, ch. VI, "Du principe de non-intervention," p. 495-605, 
 expresses the ideas previously published in his ' ' Nuova esposizione 
 del prineipio del non intervento. ' ' 
 
 Cass, Lewis. 
 
 Non-intervention. 
 
 Reprint of speech in the Senate, Feb. 10, 1852. 
 16 p., 8. 
 
 [Boston Public Library] 
 
 "Apropos of the situation in Hungary. Justifies intervention 
 and discusses the consequences and principles of a diplomatic 
 protest against the action of another state.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 477 
 
 *Cavagliere, Arrigo. 
 
 L'intervento, nella sua definizione giuridica; 
 saggio di diritto internazionale. 
 Bologna, L. Beltrami, 1913. 164 p., 24y 2 cm. 
 
 14-17732 JX4481.C4 
 
 After Cavagliere has discussed the various theories in regard 
 to the juridical basis of intervention he expresses his opinion 
 against the legality of intervention when undertaken by a single 
 state (p. 46-60).' 
 
 When, however, the particular interests of the individual state 
 are of vital importance, Cavagliere thinks the right to defend 
 them on the ground of necessity rests upon a juridical basis and 
 permits, by way of exception, the disregard of the subjective 
 rights of the other state (p. 47-8). For the protection of lesser 
 interests this authority considers that retorsions may be em- 
 ployed (p. 49). But he recognized the right of the collectivity of 
 states to intervene for the protection of the interests of all the 
 states. The remainder of the study (p. 60-164) is a discussion 
 of collective intervention. 
 
 Cimbali, Eduardo, 1862 
 
 II non-intervento ; studio di diritto inter- 
 nazionale universale. 
 Rome, 1889. 275 p., 8. 
 
 [Harvard Law Library 
 Columbia Law Library] 
 
 Follows extreme views of Italian nationalistic school. Defends 
 right to intervene to free an oppressed nation (p. 89). This he 
 thinks is not intervention, because he defines intervention as just 
 such an oppression of a people of another race. After discussing 
 intervention, non-intervention, and the two together, Cimbali takes 
 up the alleged exceptions which justify intervention (p. 125-255) 
 and concludes that there is not one case in which intervention is 
 justified and that it ought always to be condemned (p. 261). He 
 states this view as follows: "II non-intervento, dunque, che 
 constituise la pid perfetta e scrupolosa quarentegia della indi- 
 pendenza nazionale dei populi e un diritto assoluto inviolabile" 
 (p. 262).
 
 478 INTERVENTION 
 
 ** Clark, Joshua Reuben, Jr. 
 
 Eight to protect citizens in foreign countries 
 by landing forces. Memorandum by the Solicitor 
 for Department of State. 
 
 [Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1912?} 
 70 p., 2Sy 2 cm. 
 
 13-35233 JX4175.U6 
 
 The appendix contains a chronological list of occasions on 
 which the Government of the United States has taken action by 
 force for the protection of American interests, including certain 
 instances in which similar action has been taken by other gov- 
 ernments in behalf of their nationals. 
 
 Discussion of grounds of intervention. The Solicitor finds that 
 the views of the authorities and the practice of states justify, 
 as in accord with the principles of international law, the use of 
 force in foreign territory when necessary to the protection of the 
 lives and property of citizens. Since, he argues, international 
 law is ipso facto a part of our law, this authorizes the executive 
 to use force for this purpose. The study is also one of the most 
 complete relative to the views of the authorities as to grounds of 
 intervention in international law. It is one of the most important 
 studies of intervention. 
 
 *Cobbett, Pitt. 
 
 Cases and Opinions on International Law. 
 London, 1909, vol. I, Peace; 1913, vol. II, War 
 and Neutrality. 2 vols., 22y 2 cm. 
 
 10-20525 Revised JX68.C72 
 
 Contains illuminating notes to the accounts of the incidents 
 which make this work equally valuable as a commentary or as a 
 collection of cases. The analysis of every question upon which 
 this keen writer touches is worthy of attention. 
 
 H-Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicholas Caritat, 
 Marquis de 
 
 Drafted the Statement of Motives adopted by 
 the French Assembly, September 22, 1792.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 479 
 
 Annual Register, 1792, vol. 34, State Papers, 
 
 p. 263-272. 
 
 17979-3 D2.A7 
 
 In this Statement of Motives, the Assembly justifies its treat- 
 ment of Louis XVI, and blames Austria and Prussia for viola- 
 tions of international law in allowing the emigrants to make 
 hostile preparations within their territory (p. 264). They also 
 blamed Austria for violating the treaty of alliance, and signing 
 a contradictory treaty with Prussia in an attempt to separate 
 the king from the French people and to war upon the latter. 
 "Never," the statement declares, "did hostilities more really 
 justify war, and to declare it was to repel it" (p. 265). Lingel- 
 bach (Intervention in Europe, p. 11) says: "This document 
 formulates the principle of non-intervention [non-interference] 
 on political grounds, and stands in strong contrast to the practice 
 of Europe during this period." 
 
 Conrotte, Manuel. 
 
 La intervencion de Espana en la independencia 
 de los Estados Unidos de la America del Norte. 
 Madrid, v. Sudrez, 1920. 2986 p., 23y 2 cm. 
 
 20-22891 E249.C73 
 
 I have not examined this book. 
 
 Constant de Rebecque, Henri Benjamin, 1767-1830. 
 [Benjamin Constant.] 
 
 L 'esprit de conquete. 
 
 Paris, 1813. Reedited with a preface by Albert 
 Thomas, Paris, Libraire Grasset, 61 rue des Saint- 
 Peres, 1918, 62 p., 17y 2 cm. 
 
 20-1196 JC381.C72 
 
 Cox, Isaac Joslin. 
 
 American Intervention in Florida, 
 in American Historical Review, January, 1912, 
 p. 290-311. 
 
 This article is historical and does not enter into consideration 
 of legal principles.
 
 480 INTERVENTION 
 
 Cox, Isaac Joslin. 
 
 The Mexican Problem: Self -Help or Inter- 
 vention. 
 
 in Political Science Quarterly, June, 1921, vol. 36, 
 p. 226- 
 
 Does not discuss principles of intervention. 
 
 Crawford, Price W. H. 
 
 The intervention of Bulgaria and the Central 
 Macedonian Question. 
 London, 1915. 
 
 [in Naval War College Library] 
 
 Does not discuss or concern the principles of intervention. 
 5-26345 JX2514.F5 
 
 **** Creasy, Sir Edward Shepard, 1812-1878. 
 
 First Platform of International Law. 
 London, 1876, XV+710 p., 23 cm. 
 
 Chapter IX (p. 278-359), deals mainly with interposition, inter- 
 vention, and interference. Creasy, in his discussion of these 
 questions, is broad of view, and shows a thorough study of the 
 authorities, but he is not so sure nor so profound as Westlake. 
 Nevertheless, his study is illuminating and one of the best in 
 English. 
 
 Cuba, 1851-1854. 
 
 The diplomatic correspondence between the United States and 
 Great Britain and France is of great importance from a juridical 
 point of view. It relates to conquest, counter-intervention, inter- 
 national police, international cooperation, self-help, collective in- 
 tervention, and the Monroe Doctrine. See also SouU Pierre. 
 Many important documents will be found in Moore's Digest, Vol. 
 VI, $ 906, p. 56-60. 
 
 Cuban Insurrection, 1868-1878. 
 
 The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States is im- 
 portant as relating to humanitarian intervention. See Moore 's 
 Digest, Vol. VI, $ 907, p. 61-105. 
 
 CaUahan, James M.: Cuba and International relations, 1899 
 [is mainly devoted to the diplomatic history of the insurrection
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 481 
 
 of 1868-78. Chap. XIII is entitled : ' ' Ten years war steps toward 
 intervention," p. 412-52, but does not discuss the principles and 
 the right of humanitarian intervention. The same is true of 
 Chap. XIV relative to intervention in 1898.] 
 99-3745 Kevised F1783.C215 
 
 Latane, John H.: Intervention of the United States in Cuba 
 in North American Review, March, 1898, p. 350-61 [This article 
 relates entirely to the insurrection of 1868-78, gives an account 
 of Secretary Fish's threat of intervention on the ground of 
 humanity and protracted struggle and relates how he attempted 
 to secure cooperation of Great Britain without success. This 
 negotiation was kept secret 20 years till published as a Con- 
 gressional document.] 
 
 See also Curtis, George Tichnor: The case of the Virginius 
 considered with reference to the law of defense, 1874. [This 
 was an incident of the insurrection.] 
 11-25163 F1785.C91) 
 
 The Library of Congress lists, Butler, B. F. : Speech in the 
 House of Eepresentatives, June 15, 1870. 
 9-28807 F1785.B98 
 
 Cuban Insurrection, 1895-1898. 
 
 One of the most important instances of humanitarian inter- 
 vention. The intervention of the United States has been unjustly 
 criticized by many writers or inaccurately justified upon the 
 ground of removal of a nuisance. See discussion in text under 
 8. 
 
 For diplomatic correspondence, see Moore 's Digest, Vol. VI, 
 908, 909, p. 105-236. See also under Benton; Falck, H. E.; 
 Fedozzi; Hershey; Hengstler; Institute de Droit International; 
 Phelps; Le Fur; Phelps; Quesada; Woolsey, T. S. 
 
 Barrows, Samuel June: Intervention for Peace, Freedom, and 
 Humanity, Speech in House of Representatives, April 28, 1898, 
 13 p. 8. 
 1-4892. 
 
 Becarra, Eicardo: Cuestion palpitante; un poco de historia 
 a proposito de la independencia de Cuba y Puerto Rico, y la 
 doctrina Monroe y la intervencion norte-americana en Cuba .... 
 Caracas, 1898. 
 9-21914 F1786.B38 
 
 Butler, Charles Henry: Intervention the proper course. 
 12-5427 E721.B98 
 
 31
 
 482 INTERVENTION 
 
 Denby, Charles: The doctrine of intervention (in The Forum, 
 Vol. XXVI, p. 385-92) [merely advocates protection of Amer- 
 ican interests and prophesies annexation of Cuba of no scientific 
 value]. 
 
 Vesjardins, Arthur: L 'insurrection Cubane et le droit des gens 
 in I!, rut de Paris July 15, 1896, Vol. 4, p. 347-383 condemns the 
 action of the United States as a violator of international law and 
 thinks the purpose is to secure the annexation of Cuba. 
 
 Gmteras, John: The United States and Cuba; a review of 
 documents relating to the intervention of the United States in 
 the affairs of Spanish- American colonies, Philadelphia, 1895, 18 p. 
 6-27946 F1786.G97 
 
 Robinson, Albert Gardner: Cuba and the intervention, New 
 York, 1905, 359 p. 
 5-7752 F1786.E66 
 
 Washburn, William Drew, Jr.: Cuba and Spain. Our plain 
 duty. Minneapolis, 1898, 8 p. 
 
 [in Boston Public Library] 
 
 * Curtis, George Ticknor, 1812-1894. 
 
 The case of the Virginius considered with ref- 
 erence to the law of self-defense. 
 New York, 1874, 40 p., 23y 2 cm. 
 
 11-25163 F1785.C99 
 
 Important because this was one of the first works to recognize 
 the principles of self-help involved in the Virginius controversy. 
 
 * Curtis, Roy Emerson 
 
 The Law of Hostile Expeditions, 
 in American Journal of International Law, 1912, 
 vol. 8, p. 1-37, 224-255. 
 
 A scholarly examination of this phase of what we have called 
 self-help, with references to the precedents in American diplo- 
 matic history. 
 
 [Davenant, Charles.] 1656-1714. 
 
 Essays upon : I. The balance of power. II. The 
 right of making war, peace, and alliances. IIL
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 483 
 
 Universal monarchy. To which is added an 
 appendix containing the records referred to in 
 the second essay. 
 London, 1701. 
 
 7-10865 H33.D25 [vol. 4] 
 
 Decimus [pseudonym], 
 
 Intervention and its fruits; a letter addressed 
 to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs. 
 London, Sounders and Otley, 1841. 32 p. 
 
 [New York Public Library] 
 
 Decimus 's interestingly written attack upon Palmerston's policy 
 regarding Turkey advises the government to hold aloof and let 
 Russia occupy Dardenelles and France, Egypt. Defends policy 
 of complete non-intervention. 
 
 *** Dickinson, Edwin De Witt, 1887 
 
 The Equality of States in International Law. 
 Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1920. 
 xiii-\-424 p., 23 cm. 
 
 21-99 JX4003.D5 
 
 Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. 
 
 Causes of International War. 
 London, The Swarthmore Press, Ltd.; New York, 
 Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. 110 p., 18y 2 cm. 
 
 20-22614 JX1952.D53 
 
 I have not consulted this book. 
 
 Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. Sec 
 Foreign Relations. 
 
 Doane, George Washington, bp., 1799-1859. 
 
 Influence, without Intervention; the Duty of 
 our Nation to the World : the oration, at Burling-
 
 484 INTERVENTION 
 
 ton College, on the seventy-sixth anniversary of 
 American independence, and sixth, of the found- 
 ing of the college, July 5, MDCCCLII: 
 Burlington, N. J., J. Rodgers, 1852. 
 
 19-3099 E286.B9G 
 
 Defends the policy of non-intervention against the popular 
 sentiment of that period. 
 
 Ducrocq, Louis. 
 
 Represailles en temps de paix ; blocus pacifique, 
 suivi d'une etude sur les affaires de Chine (1900- 
 1901) [These, University de Paris]. 
 Paris, Pedone, 1901, 237 p., 25 cm. 
 
 6-40438 JX4471.D8 
 
 This work although it discusses the means for carrying out 
 intervention, is also important for study of the grounds of inter- 
 vention. 
 
 Dunn, Arthur Wallace. 
 
 Uncle Sam on Police Duty, 
 in American Revieiv of Reviews, April, 1911, vol. 
 
 43, p. 462-5. 
 
 AP2.R4V.43 
 
 A popular and interesting article showing the role of the 
 United States in policing the Americas. 
 
 H-Dupuis, Charles, 1863 
 
 Le principe d'equilibre et la concert Europeen 
 de la paix de Westphalie a 1'acte d'Algesiras. 
 Paris, Perrin et cie, 1909, 525 p., 23 cm. 
 
 9-27064 D217.D8 
 
 A remarkable study of the Balance of Power, which should 
 not be overlooked. The author is known as a scholar whose 
 erudition is balanced by his sense of the necessities of practical 
 politics.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 485 
 
 Elmore, Alberto A. 
 
 Ensayo sobre la doctrina de la intervencion 
 internacional. 
 
 Lima, Impr. de "El Comercio," 1896. 52 p., 
 20y 2 cm. 
 
 16-11357 JX4481.E4 
 
 Engelhardt, E. 
 
 Le droit d 'intervention et la Turquie. 
 in Revue de droit international et de legislation 
 comparee, 1880, vol. 12, p. 363-388. Reprinted 
 Paris, 1880, 64 p., 8. 
 
 10-31105 JX3.E.56 Vol. 12 
 
 [Reprint in Harvard Law Library] 
 
 Engelhardt recognizes the right to intervene to abolish the 
 slave trade (p. 10). Restrictions upon sovereignty (p. 11). 
 Studies the nature of the various interventions in Turkey, espe- 
 cially since 1856 (p. 13f), and concludes (p. 61) that Turkey is 
 under the guardianship of the principal European powers. ' ' C 'est 
 a dire qu'elle est en tutelle [Depeche du due Decazes du 10 
 Janvier, 1876] et que la surveillance journaliere dont elle est 
 1 'objet dans ses affaires interieures a reduit a peu pres a neant 
 son autorite souveraine. ' ' [Depeches de Lord Derby du 14 
 Juillet et du 27 Septembre.] 
 
 *Esmein, Adhemar, 1848 
 
 La theorie de 1 'intervention international chez 
 quelques publicistes francais du XVIe siecle. 
 in Nouvelle revue historique, de droit francais et 
 etranger, vol. 24, p. 549-574. 
 
 [New York Public Library, 
 Harvard Law Library] 
 
 Falck, Horace Edgar, 1879 
 
 Diplomatic Relations Preceding- the War of 
 
 1898.
 
 486 INTERVENTION 
 
 in Johns Hopkins University Studies in History 
 and Political Science, Series XXIV, Nos. 1-2, 1906. 
 95 p. 
 
 6-10943 H31.56 Vol. 24 
 
 This is really a study of American intervention in Cuba. It 
 first sets forth views of authorities some of the most weighty 
 being omitted then analyzes the various grounds upon which 
 intervention in Cuba was justified: destruction of the Maine; 
 injury to commerce; self-preservation; . protection of property 
 an3 lives of American citizens in Cuba; humanity; and reaches 
 the conclusion that the circumstances did not justify intervention 
 on any of these grounds. 
 
 **Falcke, Horst P. 
 
 Le blocus pacifique authorized translation 
 
 of German by Ant. Contat, 
 
 Leipszig, 1919, Rossbergsche Verlagsbuch hand- 
 lung [1st German edition, 1891.] 
 
 A19-1536 
 
 [Not in Library of Congress. 
 In Carnegie Endowment Library] 
 
 Is a work of first importance, as the author gives carefully 
 prepared accounts of many important incidents. 
 
 H-Fedozzi, Prospero, 1872 
 
 Saggio sul intervento. 
 
 Separately bound extract from, Archivio giuri- 
 dico, 1899, Vol. 62, New Series, Vol. 3, p. 3-46; 
 247-280. 
 
 [In Library of Congress, Law Periodicals] 
 
 Divides his study into two parts: (I) the psychological and 
 philosophical bases of intervention; and (II) the juridical founda- 
 tions for intervention. He considers that nations fight for ideas, 
 and that by intervention they extend the beliefs they cherish. 
 As examples, he discusses the propaganda of the Revolution. 
 The Cuban intervention, he considers was for the United States 
 a matter of civilization and not economics. In Part II, he 
 analyzes the classes of instances of intervention and the judicial 
 nature of each category. He gives an interesting explanation
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 487 
 
 of the errors into which the nationalist school of Italy has fallen, 
 particularly Carnazza Amari. The study shows much research, 
 acumen, and fairness, and is clearly expressed, but the author 
 appears to ignore some of the most important works, especially 
 those in English and German. 
 
 Fievee, J. 
 
 De 1'Espagne, et des consequences de 1 'inter- 
 vention armee. 
 3 ed., Paris, 1823, 8. 
 
 [Peace Palace Library] 
 
 I was unable to consult this work. 
 
 *F16ckher, Adolph von, 1867 
 
 Les consequences de 1 'intervention, 
 in Revue generate de droit Internationale public, 
 1896, vol. 3, p. 329-333. 
 10-31105 JX3.K56, Vol. 3 
 
 Explains (p. 329-331) that force is the means of carrying out 
 an intervention and distinguishes between the justice of an inter- 
 vention and the means to carry it out. Eefutes the doctrine of 
 Heilborn that there is no need of a just cause of war, and there- 
 fore no need of a just cause for intervention. Discusses (p. 332- 
 333) the just limits of the terms of peace. He thinks a state 
 has a right to make war to defend legitimate interests and goes 
 so far as to permit it to make w r ar to secure new advantages 
 indispensable for the development of the State, and thinks "such 
 action is in the nature of a veritable necessity" (p. 333). Not- 
 withstanding the injustice of an abuse of force, the author 
 recognizes that new rights arise from the treaty of peace. 
 
 H'Flockher, Adolph von, 1867 
 
 De 1 'intervention en droit international. 
 Paris, A. Pedone, 1896. 70 p., 25 cm. 
 
 9-8132 JX4481.F6 
 
 This is a valuable discussion of intervention in which the 
 author brings out certain characteristics of the use of force in 
 international relations, but is not able entirely to free himself 
 from the existing confusion in regard to the use of terms. He 
 defines intervention objectively as a mixing by one government
 
 488 INTERVENTION 
 
 in the affairs of another for the purpose of imposing its will. 
 Yet further on, Flockher restricts intervention in cases where 
 force is used for the protection of interests. (Cf. Berner, p. 341.) 
 The book is especially valuable because the author has carefully 
 examined the German authorities, Geffcken, Heilborn, Strauch, 
 and others. 
 
 Foelix. 
 
 Intervention d'un etat dans les affaires 
 interieures d'un autre. [A review of Wheaton's 
 Elements of International Law.] 
 in Revue de droit francais et etranger, 1837, vol. 
 4, p. 161-179. 
 
 [In Harvard Law Library] 
 
 Foelix praises Wheaton for including a study of questions 
 previously passed over in silence, and especially the intervention 
 of a state in the internal affairs of another state. This review is 
 not important from a scientific point of view. 
 
 Foreign Relations of the United States. 
 
 10-3793 JX233.A3 
 
 This official publication of the Government continuing the 
 Diplomatic Correspondence 1861-1913 contains selected portions 
 of the correspondence with foreign governments. It is a most 
 valuable source of information, especially in the earlier years 
 when more important material was made public. There is an 
 index volume up to 1899. The Index, prepared by Miss Adelaide 
 Hasse, of a portion of the material prior to the Diplomatic 
 Correspondence (1861) is valuable. 
 
 Frankfurter, Felix, [Professor of Law, Harvard 
 University]. 
 
 Haiti and Intervention, 
 in The New Republic, December 15, 1920, p. 71-2. 
 
 A well written, brief comment on the intervention of the United 
 States in Haiti, 1915-20. Professor Frankfurter admits the im- 
 possibility of absolute non-intervention and advocates making 
 intervention of the United States in other American States sub- 
 ject to the control of a pan-American council.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 489 
 
 *** Fugitive Slaves. 
 
 Report of the Royal Commission on the Sur- 
 render of Fugitive Slaves. 
 Parliamentary Papers, 1876, vol. 28, [c-1516-I]. 
 
 Most valuable for the study of the basic principles of 
 humanitarian intervention. 
 
 **Geffcken, Friedrich Heinrich, 1830-1896. 
 
 Das Recht der Intervention. 
 Hamburg, 1887. 50 p., 24 cm. 
 Reprint of his article in Holtzendorff 's Handbuch, 
 Vol. 4, p. 131-168. 
 
 9-3625 JX4481.G4 
 
 Gericke, Josef Lodewijk Hendrik Alfred. 
 
 De jure interventionis ante rerum conversionem 
 in Gallia usurpato. [Inaugural dissertation, 
 Leyden.] 
 
 Lugduni Batavorum, C. C. vander Hoek, 1834. 
 iv.+149 p., 22 cm. 
 
 10-17441t JX4478.G5 
 
 Gover, John M. 
 
 Notes of Intervention [Interposition], 
 in Law Magazine and Review, 1894-1895, vol. 20. 
 [in Library of Congress, Law Periodicals] 
 
 Not important. 
 
 Greece, 1827 
 
 The intervention of the powers in support of the Greek insur- 
 gents was mainly upon the ground of humanity. Of the numer- 
 ous works we only refer to the following. Almost every writer 
 on international law or European history discusses this incident. 
 
 Phillips, Walter Alison: The War of Greek independence. 
 New York 1897. 
 
 4-17CG913 BF.805.P58
 
 490 INTERVENTION 
 
 H-H-Grotius, Hugo, 1583-1645. 
 
 De jure belli et pacis . . . accompanied by an 
 abridged translation, by William Whewell. 
 London, J. W. Parker, 1853. 3 vols., 22 cm. 
 
 8-36441 JX2093.E5 1853 
 
 The original edition published in 1625 will be found in the 
 Harvard Law Library. 
 
 *Guizot, Francois Pierre Guillaume, 1787-1874. 
 
 Memoires pour servir a Phistoire de mon temps. 
 Paris, Michel Levy Freres. 1858-67. 8 vols., 
 2iy 2 cm. 
 
 9-20829 DC255.G8A2 
 
 Since Guizot directed the foreign policy of France for a con- 
 siderable period and was responsible for some of the most in- 
 excusable instances of interference his excuses and reflections 
 are of particular interest, quite apart from Guizot's real merit 
 as a writer. 
 
 K-frGriinther, Karl Gottlob 
 
 Europaisches Volkerrecht. 
 
 Altenburg, Richterschen Buckhandhung, Vol. I, 
 1787, Vol. II, 1792. 
 
 JX23H.E8 
 
 This is one of the most scientific and most practical of the text 
 books upon international law, and a proof is the careful con- 
 sideration of intervention. Giinther like Grotius recognizes the 
 obligation to intervene in support of the law (I: 296) and in 
 general emphasizes the superior right of the society of states over 
 the rights of the separate nations (Vol. I, p. 296, 282; Vol. II, 
 p. 289, note ( e) ) . Upon this basis he recognizes the right of transit 
 (Vol. II, p. 224-6) and also the right of action to preserve the 
 balance of power (Vol. I, p. 322, 333, 358, 359, 360, 365). Par- 
 ticularly brilliant is his answer to the objections raised against 
 the balance of power (Vol. I, p. 370-2). To the balance of power 
 he devotes many pages (Vol. I, p. 321-389). In several places 
 he seems to support action upon humanitarian grounds (Vol. II, 
 p. 333, 334, 335, note (g), 286), but he does not justify the use 
 of force for this purpose. Giinther repeatedly and emphatically 
 asserts the right of every independent state to settle its govern-
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 491 
 
 mental and other internal affairs without interference (Vol. I, 
 p. 280, 284-7, 293-4; Vol. II, p. 368-9, 373-9, 395, 400-4, 407-13, 
 417-18, 436). But he declares: "a due regard for the ties of 
 international fellowship requires that in as far as possible all 
 direct damage to other nations should be avoided and all that 
 constitutes a continuing danger or cause for apprehension re- 
 moved." (Vol. I, p. 289.) He recognizes the now discarded 
 right to insist upon treaty rights of succession (Vol. II, p. 393) 
 and in general fails fully to perceive the limits of the rights 
 which treaties of guaranty can give (Vol. II, p. 379-8; cf. Vol. I, 
 p. 287-8; Vol. II, p. 381, note (&;). But he sees that interfer- 
 ence in a civil strife is only permissible when both sides request 
 it (Vol. I, p. 288, but cf., p. 287). 
 
 Giinther appears to recognize the executive and directing control 
 of the great states acting for the maintenance of peace and the 
 protection of their common interests (Vol. I, p. 295-6). We 
 should also note his painstaking efforts to establish some limit 
 upon treacherous and abusive military preparations by recog- 
 nizing a right to demand explanations (Vol. I, p. 289-313). 
 
 Giinther is rich in bibliographical notes and references to the 
 incidents of practice upon which as a follower of the positive 
 school he builds his system. On the whole it is one of the best 
 studies and deserves to be consulted by all investigators. 
 
 ***Hall, William Edward, 1836-1894. 
 
 International Law. 
 
 London, 1880. 4 ed. [containing last corrections 
 of the author], London, 1895. 
 
 3-23670 JX2524.T7 1895 
 
 $ 83-95 relate to intervention. The value of Hall's work is 
 too well known to require comment. His is one of the best dis- 
 cussions of the subject in a general text-book, but is not free 
 from inconsistencies, perhaps in part due to national bias and 
 the effort to justify British policy on a basis of juridical prin- 
 ciples. He pushes to an extreme the doctrine of necessity, and 
 minimizes the right of humanitarian intervention. I have used 
 the 4 ed. Later editions, even that of A. Pearce Higgins (7 ed., 
 London, 1917), do not amplify the discussion of intervention. 
 Happily Higgins has reverted to Hall's arrangement by sections, 
 which Attlay had abandoned.
 
 492 INTERVENTION 
 
 ***Halleck, Henry Wager, 1815-1872. 
 
 International Law. 
 New York, 1861. 
 
 3-32038 JX2475.16.1861 
 
 Intervention is discussed, pp. 81-97, 289-334. Valuable because 
 of the practical and original treatment and full references to 
 authorities. The views expressed sixty years ago are more in 
 accord with present opinion than those of many later writers. 
 
 *** Harcourt, Sir William George Granville Venables 
 Vernon, 1827-1904. 
 
 [Published under pseudonym "Historicus".] 
 Letters on some questions of international law. 
 Eeprinted from the Times with considerable ad- 
 ditions. 
 
 London and Cambridge, Macmillan & Co., 1863. 
 xmi-\-212 p., 22 cm. 
 
 10-19738 JX4521.H3 
 
 Under a pseudonym, Sir Vernon Harcourt, in his well-known 
 letters of " Historicus, " reprinted from letters that appeared 
 in the London Times, discusses various problems of neutrality 
 raised by the Civil War. Amongst those considered are prema 
 ture recognition and the obligation of non-intervention [non 
 interference]. In a preface the author refers to his discussion 
 of the international doctrine of recognition as "the only parts 
 of this publication which attempts anything like original investi- 
 gation" and the result is a real contribution upon which suc- 
 ceeding writers have largely relied. Sir Vernon Harcourt says of 
 the letter on intervention that it is of "rather a political than a 
 juridical cast. ' ' We might add that he has confined his discussion 
 to the political instances of interference rather than to juridical 
 intervention. If we bear in mind that his generalizations apply 
 mainly to instances of political interference in the internal affairs 
 of other states, his valuable discussion of this phase of the 
 subject will prove of great assistance. He does not take up 
 interposition for the protection of, the rights of nationals under 
 international law nor collective intervention to vindicate the 
 law. If other authors who have discussed the whole range of 
 intervention had been equally searching in their analysis, we 
 should not find the subject in its present chaotic condition, but 
 unfortunately, many of the authorities have applied Sir Vernon
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 493 
 
 Harcourt 's generalizations intended to apply only to interference 
 in international affairs to all phases of intervention without 
 sufficient discrimination. The three letters on recognition, pp. 
 1-37,- and the letter on "The perils of intervention," pp. 39-51, 
 is as has been said the portion of interest for the study of 
 intervention. 
 
 [Harris, Norman Dwight, 1870 ] 
 
 Intervention and Colonization in Africa. 
 Boston, 1914. 
 
 15-1468 DT31.H3 
 
 Does not discuss or bear upon the principles of intervention. 
 
 Hautefeuille, Laurent Basile, 1805-1875. 
 
 Le principe de non-intervention et ses appli- 
 cations. 
 
 Paris, 1863, 67 p., 8 . What appears to be the 
 same article was printed in the Revue Conteni- 
 poraine, July 31, 1863, 2nd series, vol. 34, p. 211. 
 
 {in New York Bar Association Library, 
 Boston Public, and Boston Athenaeum] 
 
 In the form of a scientific study of the principles of non- 
 intervention, this is really a clever apology for Louis Napoleon's 
 failure to intervene effectively in Poland. Hautefeille attempts 
 to justify as a proper instance of permissible diplomatic inter- 
 vention the offers of mediation so called between the North and 
 the South then in Civil War. (Cf. the biting satire with which 
 "Historicus" ridicules Napoleon's suggestions.) This pamphlet 
 must be considered either insincere or prejudiced to an unusual 
 degree, but for the well-informed reader it contains much which 
 is entertaining and something also of value. 
 
 For instance, the criticism of the essential interests as a 
 justification for interference (p. 48) and (p. 53) his characteriza- 
 tion of the treaty of February 8, 1863, as an actual intervention 
 [interference] in the Polish question; p. 54 he makes some wise 
 reflections about the importance of secret counsels or repre- 
 sentations. 
 
 ***Heffter, August Wilhelm, 1796-1880. [Professor of 
 Law, Berlin University.]
 
 494 INTERVENTION 
 
 Das Europaische Volkerrecht der Gegenwart 
 aus den bisherigen Grundlagen. 
 1st edition, 1844, translated into French by Berg- 
 son, Paris, 1857. After the author's death, 
 Geffcken prepared 3 more editions. The edition, 
 Berlin, 1881, adds nothing to the text of the 4th 
 edition, 1861, relative to intervention ( 44-46) 
 except a note p. 109. 
 
 20-3758 [2 edition] JX2787.E3.1843 
 
 This is one of the best text-books to consult upon the subject 
 (See $$ 44f). The list of references in the notes shows careful 
 study. Geffcken 's note (7 ed., p. 109) criticizes Heffter's state- 
 ment of the right to intervene to end or to forestall civil wars. 
 
 *** Heiberg, Dr. 
 
 Das Princip der Nichtintervention in seiner 
 Beziehung auf die aussere and inner organisation 
 des Staats. 
 Leipzig, Otto Wigand, 1842. 
 
 [Columbia Law Library] 
 
 Heiberg sees in the revolution of 1830 the triumph of the 
 principle of non-intervention [non-interference] giving expres- 
 sion to the rights of peoples as opposed to the former principle 
 of intervention [interference] (pp. 3-11). 
 
 He goes on to discuss the principle of non-intervention [non- 
 interference], which he finds alone can allow each people the 
 freedom necessary to conform to the law of nature. He asserts 
 that man is capable of this adjustment, since man has life and 
 movement as part of an ever developing nature, or the ^ver 
 creating spirit (p. 12). 
 
 In reference to intervention for humanity, Heiberg says: The 
 foundation of all civilized states is the higher union which is 
 attained through the maintenance of general peace and through 
 the development of the social conditions [Kulturzustandt] of the 
 peoples. "When these actual cosmopolitan interests, which rest 
 upon assured rights and reciprocally recognized principles, are 
 endangered and ignored intervention often becomes unavoidable. ' ' 
 (pp. 14-15.) But Heiberg quotes with approval the elder Rotteck 
 against interference in revolutionary troubles of a neighboring 
 state, and criticizes Dr. Trummer's reply in which the latter
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 495 
 
 argued that a state eould not remain indifferent to the errors 
 prevailing on the other side of its frontiers against the propaga- 
 tion of these doctrines, (p. 15.) Heiberg remarks: "A state 
 which can be ruined in this wise, must either be tottering, and out 
 of touch with higher civilization (Kultur), or the ideas and danger- 
 laden system which has gained recognition in the state from which 
 the danger threatens must have truth in them (p. 16). 
 
 The remainder of the study from page 27 on is devoted to a 
 consideration of the rights of the German princes, as opposed 
 to the rights of sovereignty of Germany. 
 
 *Heller, Karl 
 
 Die Frage der Zulassigkeit der volkerrecht- 
 lichen Intervention. 
 
 Dissertation, Erlangen University, Borna, Leip- 
 zig, 1915, viii+34 p., 8. 
 
 [Harvard Law Library] 
 
 This is a well arranged study of the admissible grounds of 
 intervention which are enumerated, p. 12-30. Of especial interest 
 is his discussion of humanitarian intervention, p. 24. The works 
 show wide reading of the German authorities. Heller's plan 
 of treatment is more comprehensive than is generally found, and 
 he goes at the problem in the correct way but the work is not 
 carried sufficiently far to give it the value which we might 
 expect on account of the ability of the author. 
 
 Hengstler, L. T. 
 
 The Principle of Intervention. (Lecture de- 
 livered in an extension course, San Francisco, 
 November, 1898.) 
 
 University of California Chronicle, Berkeley, 
 1898, p. 521-538. 
 
 [New York Public Library, in Library of 
 Congress [LD739 Vol. I], but not analyzed] 
 
 An interesting popular discussion of the justification for inter- 
 vention from a common sense point of view. It is to be regretted 
 that the author did not make a thorough study of the question. 
 
 Hermant, Joseph. 
 
 La revolution hongroise de 1848, Les nation-
 
 496 INTERVENTION 
 
 alites, leurs luttes et leuis revendications, 1 'inter- 
 vention polonaise et 1 'intervention russe. 
 Paris, Rousseau, 1902. xiii-\-428 p., 8. 
 
 [New York Bar Association Library] 
 
 Hermes, oder Kritisches Jahrbuch der Literatur. 
 
 Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1819-31. 35 vols., pi., 
 23 cm. Quarterly, 1819-24; irregular, 1825-31. 
 
 Vol. XI, p. 142-156, contains an important review of Kamptz's 
 work, signed "E. Q. " See Kamptz. 
 
 7-3737 AP30.H6 Vol. XI 
 
 Hershey, Amos Shartle, 1867- 
 
 Intervention and the recognition of Cuban in- 
 dependence. 
 
 In The annals of the American Academy of 
 Political and Social Science. Philadelphia, 1898. 
 Vol. xi, p. 353-380. 
 
 CD 16-199 H1.A4. Vol. 11 
 
 A superficial discussion. 
 
 Hershey, Amos Shartle, 1867- 
 
 Incursions into Mexico and the Doctrine of Hot 
 Pursuit. 
 
 In American Journal of International Law, July, 
 1919, vol. 13, p. 557. 
 
 Hertslet, Sir Edward, 1824-1902. 
 
 The Map of Europe by Treaty; showing the 
 various political and territorial changes which 
 have taken place since the general peace of 1814. 
 With numerous maps and notes. 
 London, Butter-worths [etc.} 1875-91. 4 vols., 
 maps (part fold), 25^ cm. Vol. 4: Printed for 
 H. M. Stationery office by Harrison and Sons. 
 
 10-15038 JX626 1875
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 497 
 
 Herve, Frangois-Edouard, 
 
 Intervention. 
 
 In Block's Dictionnaire generate de la politique, 
 Vol. II, 1874. 
 
 9-10566 JA62.B7 
 
 An ill-considered article. Herve concludes a superficial account 
 by condemning intervention absolutely. He seems to be thinking 
 principally of intervention on the grounds of humanity. 
 
 Heyne, G. J. 
 
 Reges a suis fugati externa ope in regnum 
 reducti. 
 Goettingen, 1791, folio. 
 
 This work is cited by A. de Floeckher: L 'intervention, p. 34. 
 I have not been able to consult this work. 
 
 ** Hobart, Vere Henry Hobart, Lord, 1818-1875. 
 
 Political Essays. 
 
 London and Cambridge, Macmillan & Co., 1866. 
 152 p., 23 cm. [Originally published in " Mac- 
 millan' s Magazine," December, 1864, vol. 2, p. 
 114-123.] 
 
 All-2730 H35.H68 
 
 Hobart makes an effort to find a rule of conduct regarding 
 intervention. He first discusses when intervention would be 
 justifiable if feasible without expense, and then considers the 
 price which should be paid. He advocates recourse to interven- 
 tion in those cases when it is justifiable, and when the cost is not 
 out of proportion to the result to be obtained. He also advocates 
 remonstrance ("moral intervention") even when recourse to 
 force is not intended. He adopts Mamiani's doctrine of nation- 
 alistic intervention, and regards the struggles of nationalities on 
 the same plane as those between independent states. The study 
 is valuable, particularly as an early effort to establish some 
 sound and practical rule of conduct to govern state action. 
 Noteworthy, also, is his discussion of the right to intervene in 
 defense of international law. 
 32
 
 498 INTERVENTION 
 
 *Hodges, Henry Green, 1888 
 
 The Doctrine of Intervention. 
 Princeton, The Banner Press, 1915. 
 
 17-18355 JX4481.H6 1915a 
 
 This doctrinal dissertation from the University of Pennsylvania 
 has the usual defect of immaturity, and was evidently not based 
 upon a thorough study of the authorities. Nevertheless, the 
 author has considered the problem in an intelligent manner, and 
 is one of the few who have attempted a comprehensive classifica- 
 tion of the grounds of intervention. The consideration of the 
 justification for humanitarian intervention (p. 91) may be con* 
 sidered characteristic of the whole work. He appreciates the 
 importance of this institution, and foresees for it a greater 
 development in the future. He then refers to several writers of 
 lesser merit, without mentioning Kougier, Arntz, Bernard, and the 
 German writers who have studied the question more profoundly. 
 The treatment cannot be considered juridical. 
 
 *Hogan, Albert Edmond. 
 Pacific Blockade. 
 Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1908. 183 p., 23 cm. 
 
 9-6476 JX4494.H7 
 
 Contains valuable accounts of incidents of intervention in those 
 cases when pacific blockade has been used. Many comments of 
 interest. 
 
 Holland, Thomas Erskine, Sir, 1835 
 Studies in International Law. 
 London, 1898. 
 
 4-14210 JX2531.S3 1898 
 
 Pacific Blockade is discussed, p. 130-150. 
 
 Humanitarian Intervention. 
 
 For especial consideration of humanitarian intervention see 
 Eougier; Snow; Arntz; Fugitive Slaves; Woolsey, T. S.; Amer- 
 ican Foreign Policy, p. 74-6 passim; and under Cuba 1868-1878; 
 Cuba 1895-98; Greece 1827. Many other references will be found 
 in the text $ 8 to $ 8(g). Consult also index.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 499 
 
 Hungarian Revolution, 1848-1852. 
 
 Eussia's interference raised the question of the obligation of 
 " counter-intervention by other states. This also led to the dis- 
 cussion of the difference between the right and the obligation 
 to intervene and the question of protest without armed inter- 
 vention. In the matter of the Hungarian refugees in Turkey, 
 England intervened to prevent their enforced extradition. 
 
 Boardman, Henry A.: The new doctrine of intervention tried 
 by the teachings of Washington, 1852. 63 p. [An interesting and 
 powerful argument against intervention in favor of Hungary.] 
 10-25312 E429.B66 
 
 Doane, George Washington, bp., 1799-1859; Influence without 
 intervention, 1852. [Not important.] 
 19-3099 E286.B96 1852 
 
 Goepp, Charles: "E Pluribus Unum" a political tract on 
 Kossuth and America. 36 p. 
 10-25311 E429.G59 
 
 Hermant, Joseph: La Revolution Hongroise de 1848, Les Nation- 
 alites leurs luttes et leurs revendications ; L 'Intervention polon- 
 aise et 1 'intervention russe, Paris (Arthur Rousseau) 1902 XIII 
 
 [New York Bar Association Library] 
 
 Eeid, William Bradford: A few thoughts on Intervention by a 
 citizen of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1852, [opposes intervention 
 in favor of Hungary]. 
 11-14820 E429.K32 
 
 Sproxton, Charles, 1890-1917: Palmerston and the Hungarian 
 revolution, Cambridge University Press 1919. XI-^.148 p. [A 
 very important study which shows how Palmerston did intervene 
 to prevent Russia and Austria from constraining Turkey to de- 
 liver over the Hungarian refugees.] 
 20-286 DB936.S7 
 
 U. 8. Dept. of State. Affairs of Hungary 1849-1850. Gov- 
 ernment Printing Office 1918, 64 p. Senate Document No. 282, 
 65 Congress, 2d Session. 
 18-26872 DB938.A5 1918 
 
 U. S. Dept. of State. The Austro-Hungarian question, Corre- 
 spondence between Mr. Hiilseman and Mr. Webster. Washington, 
 1851. 23 p. 
 11-34452 E429.U58 
 
 The following speeches were made in the Senate relative to 
 intervention in favor of Hungary:
 
 500 INTERVENTION 
 
 Bell, John, April 13, 1852. On Non-intervention in the affairs 
 of Europe. 16 p. [Condemns meddling.] 
 10-25151 E429.B43 
 
 Case, Lewis, January 4, 1850. On Suspending diplomatic rela- 
 tions with Austria. 8 p. 
 11-24457 E429.C34 
 
 Cass, Lewis, February 10, 1852. Non-intervention. 16 p. 
 [Discusses the consequences of protesting against the action of 
 another state and defends the right and utility thereof.] 
 
 [Reprint in Boston Public Library] 
 
 Clemens, Jeremiah, December 10, 1851. On Mr. Seward's reso- 
 lution relative to Louis Kossuth. 
 10-25149 E429.C62 
 
 Clemens, Jeremiah, February 12, 1852. ' On Non-intervention. 
 8 p. [Refutes arguments of Kossuth and opposes intervention 
 against Russia. Is not important.] 
 
 [Reprint in Boston Public Library] 
 
 Clarke, John H., February 9, 1852. On the subject of inter- 
 vention. 
 
 [Reprint in Boston Public Library] 
 
 Cooper, James, April 28, 1852. On Non-intervention. 23 p. 
 [Reprint in Boston Public Library] 
 
 Hunter, Robert M. T., January 31, 1850. On suspending 
 diplomatic relations with Austria. 7 p. 
 10-25150 E429.H94 
 
 Jones, James C., March 18, 1852. On Non-intervention. 16 p. 
 20-18467 E429.J77 
 
 Miller, Jacob W., February 26, 1852. In defense of American 
 policy of Non-intervention. 7 p. 
 
 [Reprint in Boston Public Library] 
 
 Reward, William H., March 9, 1852. On the proposed protest 
 of the United States against the armed intervention of Russia in 
 the Hungarian revolution. 16 p. 
 
 [Reprint in Boston Public Library] 
 
 Stockton, Kobert F., February 2, 1852. On Non-intervention, 
 8 p., 8. 
 19-20271 E.429.S86 
 
 Smith, William B., in the House of Representatives December 
 15, 1851 [spoke in opposition to Kossuth and intervention in 
 favor of Hungary], 16 p. 
 
 11-24458 E429.S66
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 501 
 
 *Hyde, Charles Cheney, 1873 [Professor of Law, 
 Northwestern University]. 
 
 Intervention in Theory and in Practice. 
 Illinois Law Review, May, 1911, vol. 6, p. 1-16. 
 Also printed in Law Students' Helper, 1911, 
 vol. 19. 
 
 An objective study of the policy of the United States in regard 
 to intervention, with careful consideration of the instances. 
 Professor Hyde discusses the practice of the United States, and 
 gives full references to sources. He concludes his discussion with 
 a statement of the cases when the United States may be expected 
 to intervene. This is one of the best short considerations. No 
 attempt is made to discuss the fundamental principles, but Mr. 
 Hyde traces in broad lines the theory as it has influenced the 
 practice of the United States Government. 
 
 Institut de droit international. 
 
 Report presented by M. Desjardins on inter- 
 vention and recognition in the case of insurrec- 
 tion. 
 In Annuaire, 1898, vol. 17, p. 71-95. 
 
 10-16478 JX24.I4. Vol. 17 
 
 This report bears upon the Cuban question which was a question 
 of general interest at that time. 
 
 Intervention for Humanity: See Humanitarian Inter- 
 vention. 
 
 Kamarowski, Count 
 
 The Principle of Non-Intervention [in Russian] 
 Moscow, 1874. 
 
 F. de Martens includes this in his bibliography, cited also by 
 Donnadieu. I was unable to find it in this country. 
 
 **[Kamptz, Karl C. A. H. von], 1769-1849, [published 
 anonymously]. 
 
 Volkerrechtlicke Erorterung des Rechts des 
 Europaischen Machte in die Verfassung eines 
 einzelnen Staats sich zu mischen. 
 
 BARBARA STATE COLLEGE
 
 502 INTERVENTION 
 
 Berlin Nicholaischen Bitchhandlung, 1821. 
 XVI+214 p., 8\ 
 
 [Harvard Law Library] 
 [Yale University Library] 
 
 This work attempts to justify interference in the internal 
 affairs of independent states on the ground that revolutionary 
 changes even if only by their example endanger the peace and 
 security of other states that is of the whole structure of inter- 
 national society. This indefensible policy which had at that time 
 recently been adopted by the Holy Alliance under the guidance 
 of Metternich is supported with all the skill of an expert partisan. 
 Kamptz, the anonymous author, is sound in his premise that "the 
 peace and security of the community of European States " is a 
 sufficient ground for action, and again he is correct in declaring 
 that intervention for such a purpose is for the society of states 
 as necessary as is police action within each of the separate states 
 (cf. Preface, p. VII, VIII), but he nowhere shows that a con- 
 stitutional change or revolution does constitute such a danger. 
 Kamptz sets down with lucidity the fundamental proposition 
 that every independent state is free to settle its internal affairs 
 as may seem to it best (p. 1) and he supports this principle by a 
 great and learned array of authorities and documents. But as he 
 briefly states: "This independence of the European States is 
 certainly not unconditional" (p. 3, par. 2). He then points out 
 still without the possibility of dispute that independence must 
 be used in such a manner as not to injure the common interests 
 of all the states. This he reminds us is no sacrifice of the rights 
 of a state for in return it benefits from the same restriction 
 placed upon the other states. So far so good. It is only when 
 Kamptz proceeds to apply this rule and to make an effort to 
 justify interference to prevent constitutional changes through 
 revolutions that he parts company with law and indulges in what 
 appears to be a highly prejudicial if not insincere effort to 
 support the arbitrary policy of his government (Prussia) and 
 the Holy Alliance. 
 
 The plan of the argumentation is admirable and worthy to 
 serve as a model. After he has laid down his proposition clearly 
 and defended it by a brief argumentation and supported it by 
 such a judicious, we might better say prejudiced, but none the 
 less impressive, selection of authorities, he devotes the re- 
 mainder of the book (p. 85-214) to a discussion of the instances 
 which have occurred in history to show that the states in their 
 practice have interfered upon the grounds which it is the avowed 
 intention of this work to justify.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 503 
 
 The anonymous review in Hermes (Vol. XI, p. 142-156) 
 severely criticizes the author of this work and his insincerity and 
 prejudice in his selection of references to the authorities. H. von 
 Eotteck (Recht der Einmischung, 1845, p. 9-10) criticizes Kamptz 
 severely as a creature of Prussian bureaucracy preparing an 
 excuse for the anticipated action of the Congress of Verona, 
 and concludes, "Let us leave Herr von Kamptz who hardly needs 
 refutation. ' ' 
 
 Notwithstanding the defects we have noted, the work is of 
 value if used cautiously by one familiar with the principles and 
 the authorities. 
 
 Professor Kebedgy modestly lays claim (p. 28) to undertake 
 merely an elementary essay upon intervention. Nevertheless, he 
 has given us a valuable study, albeit not a complete one, since 
 we find for instance no consideration of counter-intervention. 
 His analysis is accurate and fine. The definition which he gives, 
 page 29, follows Bluntchli, to whom he refers. Pages 29 to 38 
 give interesting analyses of the cases of non-intervention and 
 contain the gist of Professor Kebedgy 's views. On page 40 he 
 lays down the general principle that intervention is illegal and 
 then admits certain exceptions when "absolutely necessary," and 
 (page 42) he considers that states have a right to intervene for 
 their self-preservation. Justifying intervention by virtue of a 
 treaty he does not explain that treaties do not create the right 
 (p. 70f). He goes carefully into humanitarian intervention 
 (p. 78f) but would limit it to collective action or to mandatory 
 action by which the discretionary action of the intervening state 
 is eliminated (p. 82). He next takes up to deny the right of 
 intervention in civil war in response to an appeal from the state 
 and upon religious grounds. The remaindeer (p. 104-217) is 
 devoted to a study of the instances in which the powers have 
 intervened in Turkey. 
 
 ** Kebedgy, Michel S. 
 
 De 1 'intervention, theorie generale et etude 
 speciale de la question d 'Orient. [Doctoral dis- 
 sertation, University of Paris.] 
 Paris, A. Giard, 1890. 224 p., 25 cm. 
 
 9-8119 JX4481.K5 
 
 **Kluber, Johann Ludwig, 1762-1837. 
 
 Droit des gens moderne de 1 'Europe, avec un 
 supplement contenant une bibliotheque choisie du
 
 504 INTERVENTION 
 
 droit des gens. Nouv. fid. rev., annotee et com- 
 
 pletee par M. A. Ott. 2 ed. 
 
 Paris, Gwllaumin et cie. [etc.] 1874. xxxi\-\- 
 
 573 p., 22y 2 cm. 
 
 9-188857 JX2804.D6 
 
 *Kraus, Herbert. 
 
 Die Monroedoktrin in ihren Beziehungen zur 
 amerikanischen Diplomatic und zum Vb'lkerrecht. 
 Berlin, J. Guttentag, 1913. 480 p., 24 cm. 
 
 13-25349 JX-1425.K77 
 
 Herbert Kraus's "Monroedoktrin," is a painstaking and re- 
 liable investigation, well adapted to present the matter to the 
 German scholars and others familiar with the German language. 
 With this object in view, a short study of the diplomatic history 
 of the question is included and the various instances where 
 European countries have employed force in their dealings with 
 the American States are carefully chronicled. It is only inci- 
 dentally that the author takes up the question of intervention. 
 Nevertheless, in the section devoted to the Monroe Doctrine and 
 intervention, pp. 369-98, Kraus shows his familiarity with the 
 authorities and supplies valuable bibliographical notes for inter- 
 vention, non-intervention, self-help, self-preservation, balance of 
 power, etc. These notes have an additional value because of the 
 author's familiarity with the German authorities, to whom refer- 
 ences are given. Selected bibliographies of the works on inter- 
 national law and of those relative to the Monroe Doctrine are 
 included. The work is brought down to May, 1913. 
 
 ***Krug, Wilhelm Traugott, 1770-1842. 
 
 Dikaopolitik, oder neue Restaurazion der 
 Staatswissenschaft mittels des Rechtsgesetzes. 
 Leipzig, bei T. H. F. Hartmann, 1824. X+420 p., 
 8. 
 
 [In my own Library] 
 
 Krug enters upon a discussion of the legal justification of 
 intervention. After carefully drawing the line between mediation 
 and intervention, he takes up the grounds which he considers 
 justify intervention. But the context shows that he is only 
 considering the ground for interference in constitutional affairs
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 505 
 
 and in civil disputes. He states that interference in the latter 
 case is only justifiable in two eases: First, when it is based upon 
 a treaty (p. 329-330) and Second, when an intentionally hostile 
 propaganda is carried on in a neighboring state (p. 330-332). 
 Krug then takes up by way of illustration of the first instance 
 the justification for Russia's pending intervention in Turkey 
 (p. 332-8). Thereafter he comes to what is evidently the purpose 
 of all his preliminary statement of principles, namely: the dis- 
 cussion of French intervention in Spain (p. 338-364). His 
 analysis of this instance is very interesting. He states and 
 refutes the grounds alleged to justify French interference, and 
 defines the limit of action which was justifiable on the grounds 
 of national interests and security. 
 
 Discussing the necessity which drives a nation to make war, 
 Krug denies that there can be a national physical necessity and 
 considers that it has its source in a desire to extend dominions 
 and gain in prestige (p. 66-67). He remarks that all states 
 entering upon war declare that they do so to secure their rights 
 (p. 370) and when they make peace they swear an eternal friend- 
 ship, although this eternity is always of short duration, since 
 they always find new occasions for war. All of this goes to show 
 the place which the idea of society of the states, based upon 
 law, holds, but this can only gradually be reached like every 
 ideal (p. 371). He enters upon a remarkable discussion of the 
 causes and motives for war and the hopes of attaining the ideal 
 of peace. The nature of the balance of power is considered 
 (p. 372f). Just war and the right of self-defense is taken up 
 (p. 375f). Other questions, such as indemnity, and the right 
 of the victor over conquered territory are also discussed. This 
 is one of the most philosophical and comprehensive consider- 
 ations which had appeared at that date. 
 
 Latane, John Holladay, 1869 
 
 The Diplomatic Relations of the United States 
 and Spanish America. 
 
 Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1900. 294 
 p., 20y 2 cm. 
 
 1-2466 JX1428.S7L3 
 
 Latane, John Holladay. 
 
 Intervention of the United States in Cuba, 
 in North American Review, March 1898, vol. 166, 
 p. 350-361. 
 
 AP2.N7. vol. 166 
 Relates to Cuban insurrection of 1868-1878, which see.
 
 506 INTERVENTION 
 
 Laveleye, Emile, baron de, 1822-1892. 
 
 On the causes of wars and the means of re- 
 ducing their number. 
 
 in Cobden Club Essays, Second Series, 1871-1872, 
 p. 1-55, London, 1872. 
 
 6-43714 H31.C55 
 
 Laveleye lists the causes of war. This list serves as well for 
 
 the causes of recourse to other means of constraint, but his 
 
 arrangement indicates that he does not go very deeply into the 
 question. 
 
 * Lawrence, Thomas Joseph, 1849 1919. 
 
 The Principles of International Law. 
 4th edition, Boston, 1910. xxi+745 p., 21 cm. 
 
 10-26825 JX2542.P3 1910 
 
 Suggestive, simple, clear and sound for the most part but not 
 uniformly juridical or consistent. 
 
 Le Fur, L. 
 
 fitude sur la guerre hispano-americaine de 1898 
 envisagee an point de vue du droit international 
 public. 
 Paris, A Pedone, 1899. xlii+316 p., 24y 2 cm. 
 
 2-126 M2 E723.L49 
 
 Criticizes U. S. intervention in Cuba as unjustifiable. Says 
 intervention on ground of humanity only justified when intervener 
 is disinterested (p. 42-43). 
 
 Levides, S. M. 
 
 Le droit d' intervention des grandes puissances 
 a propos du conflit greco-roumain. 
 in Revne generate de droit international public, 
 1906, vol. 13, p. 582-588. 
 10-31105 JX3.R56 
 
 Criticizes Roumania and advocates collective intervention of 
 powers. Not important.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 507 
 
 Limburg, Stirum, J. P. van Tets. 
 
 Over de Volkenrechtelijke interventie. 
 Ley den: Klein, 1895, 93 p., 23 cm. Thesis, Ley den, 
 1895. 
 
 [Columbia University Library, 
 Harvard Law Library] 
 
 ***Lingelbach, William Ezra, 1871- 
 
 The doctrine and practice of intervention in 
 Europe. 
 
 in The Annals of the American Academy of 
 political and social science, Philadelphia, 1900, 
 vol. 16, No. 1, p. 1-32. 
 
 CD 17-41 H1.A4 
 
 Based upon the paper read before the Eouen Conference of the 
 International Law Association, 1900 Eeport, p. 106-116; an 
 article, original, sound, and constructive; it shows that Inter- 
 vention is a valuable sanction to enforce international law, and 
 points out that, being the instrument of a political government, 
 it is given a political tinge to correspond with the sentiments of 
 the epoch. 
 
 Liszt, Franz von, 1851-1919. [Professor of Law, Ber- 
 lin University.] 
 
 Das Volkerrecht. 
 
 10 ed. } Berlin, 1910; 11 ed., 1918. [An unaltered 
 reprint is dated Berlin, 1920.] 
 
 20-20582 JX3445.V4 1920 
 
 The consideration of intervention is not very exhaustive, but 
 is important because of the ability of this author, his high stand- 
 ing as a learned and scientific jurist, and also because of his 
 influence on German thought. The Carnegie Endowment for 
 Peace announces a French translation. 
 
 Liverpool, lord. 
 
 Debate in House of Lords, February 19, 1821, 
 relative to justification of conduct towards Naples.
 
 508 INTERVENTION 
 
 in Hansard's Debates, New Series, vol. IV, p. 
 760-771. 
 
 Justification for interference Proper to remonstrate in cer- 
 tain cases when interference is not justifiable Denies that there 
 was a refusal by the Government to recognize the Naples 
 Government. 
 
 Lorimer, James, 1818-1890. 
 
 The Institutes of the Law of Nations. 
 Edinburgh and London, 1883-1884. 2 vols. 
 
 5-394 JX2548.15 1883 
 
 Important discussions of the basic principles of intervention 
 and of the balance of power. 
 
 Lynden van Sandenburg, Frederik Alexander Carel 
 van. 
 
 Eenige beschouwingen over interventie in het 
 internationaal recht. 
 
 Utrecht, P. den Boer, 1899. [Disseration, Utrecht 
 University.] 
 
 D-297 JX4481.L9 
 
 ^Mackintosh, Sir, James, 1765-1832. 
 
 History of the Revolution in England in 1688. 
 [Completed and published posthumously.] 
 London, 1834. clxxvi, 734 p., 28 cm. 
 
 2-28671 DA435.M18 
 
 In Chapter IX discusses right of revolution, and compares to 
 the right of making war; lays down principles (p. 297), remarks 
 upon perils of calling in auxiliaries (p. 302-3). In Chapter X 
 discusses interference. Creasy probably refers to Chapter X 
 when he says: "For a complete exposition of the causes which, 
 and which alone, justify insurrection and foreign intervention 
 on behalf of the insurgents, see Mackintosh's 'Review of the 
 Causes of the Revolution of 1688,' chap, ix [X]. Students of 
 Ethics, of History, and of International Jurisprudence cannot 
 bestow too much attention to this chapter, which is the gem of 
 all Mackintosh's works." (Creasy: First Platform of Inter- 
 national Law, p. 297 note.)
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 509 
 
 "The first portion of this volume, consisting of the fragment 
 by Sir James Mackintosh, was published separately under . . . title : 
 View of the reign of James II, Lond. 1835." (Lowndes: 
 Bibliographer's manual of Eng. lit.) 
 
 Maine, Sir Henry James Sumner, 1822-1888. 
 
 International Law; a series of lectures deliv- 
 ered before the University of Cambridge, 1887. 
 London, J. Murray, 1888. 4 p. I., 234 p., 23 cm. 
 (The Whewell lectures, 1887.) 
 
 4-3855 JX2555.16 1888 
 
 *Mamiani della Rovere, Terenzio, conte, 1799-1885. 
 
 Bights of Nations, or The New Law of Euro- 
 pean States applied to the Affairs of Italy. 
 [Translated from the Italian (Turin, 1859), and 
 edited with the author's additions and corrections, 
 by Roger Acton.] 
 London, 1860. 
 
 10-17147 JX2897.D3 1860 
 
 Mamiani, in his dedication of the English edition, calls it an 
 English version of an Italian book of English principles, and 
 the English edition is dedicated to Lord John Russell in memory 
 of his despatch addressed to the courts of Paris and Vienna, the 
 sixteenth of August, 1859, prohibiting the intervention of any 
 foreign force to put down the will of the people in central 
 Italy 
 
 About one-third of the book is devoted mainly to a discussion 
 of intervention. Mamiani 's Avork must be considered important 
 because it is often referred to, and has influenced others, in part 
 no doubt, because there were not at that time so many books 
 available to English readers dealing with the subject of inter- 
 vention. 
 
 Page 140f., Mamiani denies the right of intervention in a 
 civil war, but permits such intervention when the war is waged 
 by a subject people, as in the case of the Dutch against the 
 Spaniards, the Swiss against Austria and Burgundy, etc. (p. 144). 
 
 In chapter X, discussing the maintenance of equilibrium in the 
 states of Europe, he criticizes intervention for that purpose, 
 seeming to fear that the maintenance of the European equilibrium
 
 510 INTERVENTION 
 
 might stand in the road of the consummation of national 
 aspirations. 
 
 Chapter XI defends the principle of non-intervention. 
 
 Chapter XII begins with a declaration that "It is now time 
 for us to examine those peculiar cases in which, more especially, 
 it is sought at the present day to find a right of intervention, 
 those cases, namely, in which revolutions and political changes in 
 the interior of a state are deemed pernicious to the security and 
 the tranquility of other states, and chiefly of those adjacent 
 to it." 
 
 He then proceeds to examine whether there are exceptions to 
 this principle. Mamiani recognizes the right of intervention 
 against intervention, discussing intervention on the ground of 
 humanity (p. 182), and so hedges around the right of interven- 
 tion claimed by Grotius as practically to deny it Rougier 
 
 speaks of Mamiani as a founder of a theoretical school which 
 placed the doctrine of non-intervention upon the plane of an 
 intangible dogma and says that he had as a brilliant disciple 
 Carnazzi Amari. (Eevue gne>ale, vol. 17, p. 297.) 
 
 Bernard (Non-intervention, pp. 18-19) says of this work: 
 "Count Mamiani is a man who has suffered and labored much 
 Tor the regeneration of Italy. He has been an insurgent, a 
 prisoner, an exile, was President of Ministers during Pius the 
 Ninth's short attempt at Parliamentary government, remained 
 at Rome, I believe, till the French entered it, has since been an 
 active member of the Sardinian Parliament, and in January last 
 became Minister of Public Instruction under Victor Emmanuel. 
 He has this year (? 1860) published a thoughtful and eloquent, 
 though not very closely reasoned, book, entitled ' ' A New European 
 Public Law," the scope and drift of which are such as we might 
 expect from the antecedents of the writer, that is, it shares with 
 some of the best existing books on international law the defect 
 of having been composed to support a foregone conclusion. 
 
 Hall (4 Ed.) quotes Mamiani with approval in footnotes to his 
 discussion of intervention. He refers to Mamiani at least four 
 times. 
 
 H-frManning, William Oke. 
 
 Commentaries on the Law of Nations. [A new 
 edition revised with supplementary matter by 
 Sheldon Amos.] 
 London, 1875. [First published in 1837.] 
 
 10-17126 JX2558.C7 1875 
 
 For a discussion of intervention, see Bk. Ill, ch. I, p. 91-102 ; 
 Bk. IV, ch. I, p. 131-141. The careful revision and notes of
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 511 
 
 Amos give this work an additional value for the study of inter- 
 vention. 
 
 Marckart, Jo. Guil. 
 
 De jure atque obligatione gentium succurendi 
 injuste oppressis. 
 Harderov, 1748. 
 
 Cited by Heffter: Volkerrecht, 4 ed., 46, p. 95. I was unable 
 to consult this work. 
 
 Martens, Fedor Fedorovich von, 1845-1909. 
 
 Traite de droit international. Tr. du russe par 
 Alfred Leo. [Also into German by Bergbohm, 
 1883-6. 2Vols.] 
 
 Paris, Chevalier-Marescq et tie., 1883-87. 3 v. 
 221/2 cm. 
 
 1-18881 JX2951.T5 
 
 Often referred to because of the prominence of the author. 
 The discussion of intervention is biased and incomplete. It is 
 of value as the exponent of Russian policy under the old regime. 
 
 H-frMartens, Georg Friedrich von, 1756-1821. 
 
 Precis du droit des gens moderne de 1 'Europe. 
 Augmente des notes de Pinheiro-Ferreira. 
 Paris, Guillaumin et tie., 1864. 2 vols., 18 cm. 
 [1st ed. was published in French in 1788.] 
 
 10-17086t JX2324.P3 1864 
 
 De Martens' Precis is generally recognized as one of the earliest 
 and also as one of the best texts of the positive school which 
 bases international law upon the principles as shown by the 
 practice of states and not deduced apriori from principles dog- 
 matically asserted. Upon this basis de Martens denies the right 
 of interference in internal affairs (Ed. 1821, 116, p. 215; 
 $ 117, p. 216), save in certain exceptional cases, and he does not 
 include permission to interfere on the ground of constitutional 
 objection to provisions and changes (Ed. 1821, $ 73, p. 137; 
 79, p. 138; $ 78, p. 146). De Martens recognizes that even 
 a guarantee of the previous constitution does not authorize in- 
 terference ( 78, p. 146). De Martens recognizes the right to 
 intervene to prevent religious persecution (i. e. humanitarian
 
 512 INTERVENTION 
 
 intervention: on the ground of intolerance) but he recognizes 
 that in practice political considerations govern recourse to this 
 action (Ed. 1821, $ 114, p. 211). It is especially profitable to 
 read what de Martens says in regard to the Balance of Power 
 and the right of growth ($$ 120-4, p. 219-231). A sense of 
 measure and the needs of statecraft derived from practical 
 experience and combined with extraordinary learning place de 
 Martens in the first rank of publicists. 
 
 Martin, Charles Emanuel. 
 
 The Policy of the United States as Regards 
 Intervention. 
 
 New York, 1921. In Columbia University Studies 
 in Political Science, No. 211, 1921, vol. 93. 173 p., 
 22^/2 cm. 
 
 21-3655 JX4481.M3 
 
 Restricted to a discussion of the policy of the United States, 
 this work does not particularly consider the principles governing 
 intervention. 
 
 Martinet, Andre. 
 
 La seconde intervention franchise et le siege 
 d'Anvers, 1832. 
 Brussels, 1908. 8. 
 
 [Hague Peace Palace Library] 
 
 I was unable to consult this work. 
 
 *Maxey, Edwin, 1869. [Professor of Law, West Vir- 
 ginia University.] 
 
 International Law with Illustrative Cases. 
 St. Louis, 1906. 
 
 6-11647 JX3151.I5 1906 
 
 For a discussion of intervention, see ch. IV, p. 338-342. 
 Professor Maxey gives a very concise and accurate summary of 
 the views generally accepted. His book is listed for this reason. 
 Professor Maxey denies the validity of intervention for humanity 
 (p. 341). 
 
 Mexico, 1861-1868. 
 
 This instance was in part interposition for redress and in part 
 a political interference by France against which the counter-
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 513 
 
 intervention of the United States was directed. It is of little 
 value for the study of the principles. 
 
 Duniway, Clyde A.: Eeason for the withdrawal from Mexico in 
 American Historical Association Report, 1902, Vol. I, p. 313-28. 
 
 Blavehot : Intervention franchise au Mexique, Paris, 1911, 3 vols. 
 [New York Bar Association Library] 
 
 Many other references will be found in the Library of Con- 
 gress Bibliography on ' ' Arbitrations, ' ' p. 101-114. 
 
 Mexico, 1911-1921. 
 
 Relates to interposition for redress; Interference in the in- 
 ternal affairs of Mexico ; Delayed recognition ; The supervisory 
 capacity of the United States; Self -Help and Collective Action. 
 Only two works of importance have come under my eyes: 
 
 Moore, John Bassett: Principles of American Diplomacy, New 
 York, 1918, p. 213-38 [gives a succinct but noteworthy account 
 of the events and of the policies of the Wilson Administration 
 towards Mexico up to 1917]. 
 
 Schoenborn, Walter: Die Besetzung von Vera Cruz. 
 
 Hodges: Intervention [comments favorably upon the policy of 
 the Wilson Administration towards Mexico]. 
 
 Inman, Samuel Guy: Intervention in Mexico, foreword by 
 Professor William R. Shepherd. New York, Association press, 
 1919. 
 19-13639 F1234. 1 57 
 
 Anonymous: Nicaragua and Mexico in Nation, September 12, 
 1913, vol. 95, p. 326 (A P 2, N 2, V. 95) [condemn landing of 
 American troops in Nicaragua and opposes intervention in 
 Mexico.] 
 
 Anonymous: Our duty in Mexican disorder, in Literary Digest, 
 September 21, 1912, Vol. 45, p. 455-456 (A P 2, L 58, v. 45). 
 [Interesting resume and extracts from press commenting on the 
 situation in Mexico and the pros and cons of intervention.] 
 
 Bell, Enoch F.: Intervention and the Mexican Problem in The 
 Journal of International Relations, October, 1919, pp. 138-150. 
 [A well written article arguing against armed intervention and 
 pointing out the peaceful methods of helping Mexican progress. ] 
 
 Culberson, Charles A.: Brief in support of Senate resolution 
 of April 20, 1911, relative to intervention in affairs 'n Mex:co. . 
 Washington, 1911. 7 p., S3 cm. (U. S. 62d Cong., 1st sess. Senate. 
 Doc. 25). 
 11-35422 JX1428.M5A4 1911 
 
 Hershey, Amos S.: Mexico and International law. In Inde- 
 pendent, ApriJ 6. 7.077, rol. 70. p. 708-711. (A P 2, I ;"3 v. 70) 
 33
 
 514 INTERVENTION 
 
 [Interesting popular discussion of the obligations and rights of 
 the U. S. in regard to Mexico. Quotes Root with approval as 
 denying the right to collect contract debts by force]. 
 
 Turner, John Kenneth: What we should do about Mexico. In 
 Nation, December 13, 1919, pp. 740-74S. 
 
 Turner, John Kenneth: Why we should leave Mexico alone. In 
 Nation, November 29, 1919, pp. 680-682. 
 
 Tarle, A. de: L 'Intervention Militaire des Etats-Unis au 
 Mexique. In Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, May 1, 1912, 
 Vol. SS, p. 526-538 [Discusses the military situation of the 
 United States in the event of intervention in Mexico]. 
 
 The Library of Congress in a typewritten list gives the follow- 
 ing additional items from the Congressional Record: Slayden, 
 James L.; Stone, William J.; Murray, William H.; Sherwood, 
 Isaac E., and the debate of August 21, 1913, in the Senate. 
 
 H-H-Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873. 
 
 A Few Words on Non-intervention, 
 in Frazer's Magazine, May, 1859, p. 766-771; also 
 in Mill's Dissertations and Discussions, London, 
 1868, vol. Ill, p. 153-178. 
 
 8-4265 AC8.M48 
 
 A strong argument for veritable non-intervention in all cases. 
 
 Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873. 
 
 The Letters of John Stuart Mill; edited, with 
 an introduction, by Hugh S. R. Elliot. 
 London, 1910, 2 vols., 231/2 cm. 
 
 A 10-473 
 
 For remarks on intervention, see vol. I, p. 195; vol. II, pp. 
 24, 305. 
 
 Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine relates especially to counter-intervention 
 and the right of preventive action. It is also closely connected 
 with the ill-defined supervision of the United States over less 
 developed states of Central and South America. Unfortunately 
 the numerous works upon the subject do not generally appear to 
 have discussed the principles of intervention. For this reason
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 515 
 
 I did not think it profitable to attempt to make a complete 
 examination of the material. The student is referred to the 
 account given by Professor John Bassett Moore: Principles of 
 American Diplomacy, p. 269, and Herbert Kraus: Die Monroe- 
 doktrin. The Library of Congress supplies a large collection of 
 cards upon this topic. 
 
 H-frMoore, John Bassett, 1860 
 
 A Digest of International Law. 
 Washington, 1906. 8 vols. 
 
 6-35196 JX237.M7 
 
 Volumes V, VI, and VII contain documents and comments of 
 
 first importance for the study of the theory and practice of 
 
 international intervention. Vol. VI is devoted entirely to Inter- 
 vention. 
 
 ***Moore, John Bassett, 1860 
 
 The Principles of American Diplomacy. 
 New York, 1918. xv+477 p., 8. 
 
 18-2711 JX1407.M8 1918 
 
 Brings the author's American Diplomacy, 1905, down to date. 
 Discusses the American Policy of "Non-Intervention" p. 197-238. 
 For references, see p. 269. Discusses Monroe Doctrine, p. 238-69. 
 Bibliography, p. 269. 
 
 Morillon, Charles, de. 
 
 Du principe d 'intervention en droit interna- 
 tional public et des modifications qu'il a subies an 
 cours de 1'histoire. 
 Dijon, Imprimerie regionale, 1904. 182 p., 25 cm. 
 
 8-29311 JX4481.M7 
 
 H-Moser, Johann Jakob, 1701-1785. 
 
 Versuch des neuesten europaischen Volkerrechts 
 in Friedens-und Kriegs-zeiten. 
 Frankfurt, 1770-80. 10 v. in 12. 20y> cm. Vol. 
 9-10 each in two parts. 
 
 10-16946t JX2333.V5 1777
 
 516 INTERVENTION 
 
 Moser in the sixth part of his "Versuch" (p. 96-7, 184, 312) 
 passes in review the right of independent states to be free from 
 interference (p. 313, 318, 398-9) and enumerates, rather dog- 
 matically, it is true, certain of the rightful causes of action. 
 These he supports with instances drawn from the experience of 
 states since 1740. Among the exceptions to the general rule of 
 non-interference, Moser recognizes as grounds of intervention or 
 "meddling" (mengen, as he calls it) the following: When a 
 constitution is guaranteed and when the action is based upon a 
 treaty (p. 314-15) ; when an invitation is freely extended by the 
 sovereign, but he qualifies this in cases where the state is divided 
 into two contending factions (p. 323). Although Moser in his 
 discussion of the relations of states, due to religious matters 
 (p. 184-312; cf. 157-183) excludes interference upon religious 
 grounds (p. 166-7 passim) he recognizes the right to intervene 
 when necessary to protect individuals from persecution for their 
 religion (p. 184) and he declares that "when one or more 
 religions beside the state religion are permitted or tolerated in 
 a state, the state religion may not make use of its privileges to 
 injure the legally acquired rights of the other religions, either in 
 spiritual or worldly matters" (p. 167). In general he recog- 
 nizes the right of intercession and peaceful representation by a 
 foreign state to prevent persecution (p. 96-7) and he reproduces 
 by way of precedent and illustration the very forcible instruc- 
 tions addressed by Lord Harrington March 5, 1745, to the British 
 Minister at Vienna to continue to make the strongest efforts to 
 prevail upon the Queen to revoke the decree expelling the Jews 
 from Prague. It appears that the Netherlands had likewise made 
 representations against this act. (p. 96-7, Moses cites Mereure; 
 1745, Vol. I, p. 363). This is a clear and early instance of 
 humanitarian action in favor of the Jews. In this connection 
 we may refer to Moser 's recognition of the right of each sovereign 
 state to receive within its own territory fugitives who have left 
 their native land because of persecutions on account of their 
 religion or beliefs (p. 176-8). Another ground of intervention 
 which Moser enumerates is when disorder and anarchy cause 
 injury or constant apprehension to neighboring states (p. 320), 
 or when there exist circumstances which justify apprehension of 
 attack (prevention). Upon this head Moser remarks that the 
 states of Europe would not be justified in placing too great a 
 reliance upon their neighbors, but he thinks that the peaceful 
 intentions of republics are guaranteed by their constitutions, 
 their [lack of] strength and their interests, and proved by 
 experience (p. 400). An interesting discussion of the obligation 
 of the sovereign, in the interest of the preservation of peace, to 
 try to give the requisite assurances to quiet the apprehension of
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 517 
 
 his neighbors (p. 319-406) is supported by instances drawn from 
 the practice of states (p. 406-420). Moser's positive method is 
 that which has been followed by later writers and the fact that 
 he intends to and does derive his views of intervention from 
 existing state practice places him as an early authority of the 
 highest rank. 
 
 Ninagawa, A. 
 
 Intervention. 
 
 in Japanese Journal of International Law, 
 November 1912, vol. XI. 
 
 Manuscript English translation may be consulted in the 
 Carnegie Endowment for Peace Library, 2 Jackson Place. 
 
 Ninagawa only tries to get a definition for intervention. He 
 sees the confusion of the authorities, but does not himself reach 
 a perfectly clear comprehension of intervention. 
 
 Nys, Ernest. 
 
 Le concert europeen et la notion du droit inter- 
 national, 
 in Revue de droit international, 1899. 
 
 Oliva, Giuseppe, 
 
 Del diritto d'intervento. 
 Messina, 1881. 285 and appendix 45 p., 8. 
 
 [New York Bar Association Library 
 and Harvard Law Library] 
 
 Olivi, Luigi, 1847 
 
 La questione sul diritto d'intervento. Dinanzi 
 alia scienza. 
 
 in Archivio giuridico, Pisa, 1880, vol. 24, p. 560- 
 574. 
 
 [In Library of Congress, Law Periodicals] 
 
 Oppenheim, Lassa Francis Lawrence, 1858-1919. 
 
 International Law, a Treatise. 
 3d ed., London, 1912. 2 vols. [3 ed., vol. 1, 1920, 
 edited by Ronald F. Roxburgh.] 
 
 12-9559 Additions JX3264.I6 1912
 
 518 INTERVENTION 
 
 F. W. 
 
 Cromwell on Foreign Affairs, together with 
 four essays on international matters, one of which 
 is entitled: " Intervention Among States." 
 London, C. J. Clay and Sons, 1901. 
 
 2-12277 DA45.P2 
 
 The third paper is entitled ' ' Intervention Among States. ' ' 
 The author contributes an original investigation of the subject. 
 He has examined the principal authorities and perceives how 
 impossible it is to find any guiding consensus of opinion. His 
 own analysis and classification is suggestive and should not be 
 overlooked. It is, however, based upon the somewhat dangerous 
 presumption that the affairs of the states grouped in international 
 society must in certain respects bear close analogies to individuals 
 in a modern state. Proceeding on this basis, Payn points out 
 that a large body of the individuals of our state do not directly 
 manage their own affairs since they are under a legal disability. 
 He divides them into two classes: Those who are the normal 
 subjects of this disability, such as women and children, and 
 the abnormal, such as imbeciles, convicts, and bankrupts. The 
 application of this classification to various states leads, he thinks, 
 to the conclusion that the interventions against Turkey in 1840 
 and against China in 1900 were in the nature of action taken to 
 restrain dangerous lunatic states. Another series of interventions 
 Payn considers to have been undertaken on behalf of the minor 
 states in different stages of weakness, imbecility, and decay. 
 The list of instances which he enumerates includes the intervention 
 in Portugal in 1826, in Greece in 1827, in Belgium 1830-32, 
 Quadruple Alliance in Portugal 1834, in Turkey 1840, 1854 and 
 1877, and he reaches the conclusion that: 
 
 "All the cases in this group have one feature in common. 
 The interventions were undertaken on behalf of minor states in 
 different stages of weakness, imbecility and decay, and in every 
 case it is arguable that the intervention was in the main for the 
 benefit of the State in the affairs of which it occurred, and was 
 salutary in its effects on that State. ' ' 
 
 Mr. Payn sums up his views as follows: 
 
 "In order to discuss the subject with even the possibility of 
 arriving at any tangible and profitable result, we submit that 
 three stages are necessary, viz.: (1) a consideration of the 
 analogy which undoubtedly exists between the phenomena of the 
 lives of individuals in a modern civilized State; (2) a con-
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 519 
 
 sideration of the principal modern instances of intervention as 
 illustrating that analogy; (3) a deduction of the principles 
 of intervention based upon that analogy. ' ' 
 
 Even if we are not ready to give to the analogy between states 
 and individuals all the weight that the author believes it is 
 entitled to, we must agree that he has adopted the correct course 
 in basing his principles upon a careful consideration of the 
 instances. He cites as authorities, Hall, Walker, Arntz, and 
 criticizes the "Chinese Wall" theory of state life advocated by 
 Carnazza Amari, pp. 75-78. He also commends the book of 
 Chancellor Kent, p. 78. 
 
 Phelps, Edward John, 1822-1900, [formerly American 
 Minister to Great Britain]. 
 
 Letter on Cuban Intervention, 
 in Neiv York Herald, March 9, 1898. 
 
 This article is important, not as a correct appreciation of fact 
 or principle, but because of the support it lent to the prejudices 
 of writers on the Continent who condemned the American inter- 
 vention. For an indication of its contents, see under Cuba, 
 1895-98. Mr. Phelps was appointed Professor of Law at Yale 
 University and was elected President of the American Bar 
 Association. 
 
 **Phillimore, Sir Robert Joseph, bart, 1810-1885. 
 Commentaries upon International Law. 
 London, 1854, 4 vols., 22 cm. 3d. ed. 1879-89. 
 
 10-15576 JX2565.C4 1879 
 
 Intervention is discussed in 1st ed., vol. 1, Part III, Ch. X, 
 XI, XVII, Part IV, ch. I, p. 433-483, 2d ed., 1871, Preface, p. 
 VII-XV This work is very useful as a collection of material 
 and in part for its discussion, but Phillimore does not grasp the 
 principles of intervention. He even confuses mediation and 
 intervention, vol. I, p. 442-3. From his discussion of intervention 
 on religious grounds it is hard to discover what view he takes. 
 Of self-help he has given us an excellent discussion. 
 
 ** Phillips, Walter Alison, 1864 
 
 The Confederation of Europe; a study of the 
 European alliance, 1813-1823, as an experiment 
 in the international organization of peace. [Six 
 lectures delivered in the university schools,
 
 520 INTERVENTION 
 
 Oxford, at the invitation of the delegates of the 
 common university fund. Trinity term, 1913.] 
 London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1914. xv-\-315 
 p., 231/2 cm. 
 
 14-8401 D363.P5 
 
 Mr. Phillips has also written a concise statement (about 500 
 words) of the Balance of Power in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
 11 ed., vol. Ill, p. 235. 
 
 Poucel, Benjamin, 1807-1872. 
 
 Les otages de Durazno ; souvenirs du Rio de la 
 Plata pendant 1 'intervention anglo-franc.aise de 
 1845 a 1851. 
 
 Paris, A. Faivre; Marseille, Camoin, 1864. vii-\- 
 351 p., 25 cm. 
 
 3-11096 F2846.P87 
 
 Not important. 
 
 Pourcher, Charles. 
 
 Essai d 'etude du droit d 'intervention en Tur- 
 quie applique au probleme balkanique. [Disser- 
 tation, University of Paris.] 
 
 Clermont Ferraud, Dumont, 1904. 208 p., 24 cm. 
 [Columbia University Library] 
 
 Pradier-Fodere, Paul Louis, Ernest, 1827-1904. 
 
 Traite de droit international public europeen 
 & americain, suivant les progress de la science et 
 de la pratique contemporaines. 
 Paris, 1885-1906, 8 vols. 
 
 6-32700 JX2725.T7 1885 
 
 This author devotes a part of Vol. I, (p. 546-678) to the 
 discussion of intervention. He shows that he has thoroughly 
 covered the literature and that he is conversant with the important 
 instances, but his treatment is superficial. He adds little or 
 nothing to the understanding of the principles, at the same time 
 ho a voids many of the errors and pitfalls.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 521 
 
 H-Pradt, Dominique Georges Frederic de Riom de Prol- 
 hiac de Fourt de, abp. of Machlin, 1759-1837. 
 
 Le vrai systeme de 1 'Europe relativement a 
 1'Amerique et a la Grece. 
 Paris, 1826. 8. 
 
 This is a plea for the recognition of the Latin American 
 republics and the support of Greece to achieve her independence. 
 Ch. XX, (p. 128-47) is entitled "Le droit d 'intervention. " 
 
 XXXI ' ' Du droit d 'intervention dans les affaires de la Grece. ' ' 
 The theory of ' ' moral contagion ' ' is discussed and intervention 
 on this ground condemned (p. 142). The grounds of intervention 
 are summed up and their justification denied (p. 146). This 
 work is more than the political pamphlet it appears to be. The 
 references are to a copy in the New York Public Library bound 
 with Pradt's "Guaranties a demander a 1'Espagne, " Paris 1827. 
 Von Listz refers to "Les Cabinets et les peuples depuis 1815 
 jusqua la fin de 1822" (3 ed.) Paris 1823. The Library of 
 Congress lacks this but has Pradt's "L 'Europe et L'Amerique 
 en 1821," Paris 1822. [Card 8-10921, Class D.383.p6.] 
 
 Quabbe, Georg. 
 
 Die Volkerrechtliche Guarantie [A portion of 
 Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht by Brie and 
 Fleischmann]. 
 Breslau, 1911. 
 
 11-14728 JX4171.A863 
 
 This work was awarded a prize by the Law faculty of the 
 University of Breslau (1909). The author supplies a valuable 
 bibliography (p. VII-IX). He adds some notes to this (p. 6-8). 
 
 Quesada, Antonio Miro. 
 
 La intervencion Americana en Cuba. [Disser- 
 tation, Universidad de Lima.] 
 Lima, Peru. 20 p., 18 cm. 
 
 [State Department Library, 
 Cuban Pamphlets 5, No. 16] 
 
 I did not think it necessary to consult this work. 
 
 Quintana, Manuel. 
 
 Discursos Parlamcntarioa sobro ol dorecho de 
 intervencion.
 
 522 INTERVENTION 
 
 
 
 Buenos Aires, Boulosa, 1902. 
 
 [Harvard College Library, SA5016.13] 
 
 I did not think it necessary to examine this work. 
 
 "R. Q." [Pseudonym]. 
 
 An important review of Kamptz's work, 
 in Hermes [a German periodical], vol. XI, p. 
 142-156. 
 
 7-3737 AP30.H6 Vol.11 
 
 Reynolds, William B. 
 
 Intervention. 
 Fort Leavenworth, 1898. 21 p. 
 
 [New York Public Library] 
 
 I did not think it necessary to consult this work. 
 
 ***Rivier, Alphonse Pierre Octave, 1835-1898. 
 
 Principes du droit des gens. 
 Paris, A. Rousseau, 1896. 2 vols., 22y 2 cm. 
 Rivier also published in Germany, 1889, his Lehr- 
 buch des Volkerrechts. 
 
 2-19974 JX2739.P9 
 
 Kivier has a reputation deservedly high in all countries. The 
 student should not fail to consult him. Westlake (vol. I, p. 306) 
 says of Rivier, "... one of the most accomplished jurists who 
 have employed themselves on international law. " J. B. Moore 
 (Principles, p. 208), "...one of the most eminent publicists in 
 Europe. ' ' 
 
 H-frRobin, Raymond. 
 
 Des occupations militaires en dehors des occu- 
 pations de guerre (etude d'histoire diplomatique 
 et de droit international). [Doctoral disserta- 
 tion reprinted with introduction by Louis 
 Renault, p. i-iv.] 
 
 Paris, L. Larose and L. Tenin, 1913. viii+824 p., 
 26 cm. 
 
 15-7007 JX5003.R6
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 523 
 
 University of Paris theses, published the same year, with a 
 preface by Louis Benault, pp. I-V. 
 
 This is the most complete treatment of the subject of occupa- 
 tion with which we are familiar. M. Eobin's careful study of 
 those international incidents which have led to occupation of 
 foreign territory is of great assistance for the study of inter- 
 vention. Although the author has not devoted himself par- 
 ticularly to the matter of intervention, he has given it, inci- 
 dentally, his careful consideration. A full index and table of 
 contents makes it easy to locate the material. Professor Louis 
 Renault, who never was given to mere compliment, is enthusiastic 
 in his praise of this volume, which he calls a mine of informa- 
 tion. (See Preface by Louis Eenault.) We are especially in- 
 debted to M. Eobin for his accounts of those instances which 
 involve occupation for the guarantee of payment, occupation or 
 intervention as a mandatory, and collective occupation or 
 intervention. 
 
 *Rolin-Jaequemyns, Gustave, 1835 
 
 Le droit international et la phase actuelle de la 
 question d 'orient [International Law and the 
 present situation of the Near Eastern question], 
 in Revue de droit international et de legislation 
 comparee, 1876, vol. 8, pp. 295-385. 
 
 1-7465 JX3.E4.Vol.8 
 
 A very important study which must have exercised some influ- 
 ence upon the action of the powers at the time. E-J considers 
 the situation in the Near East as a menace to the peace of Europe, 
 and concludes (p. 347) that the powers acting collectively derive 
 from history and from treaties the right to unite to preserve 
 the peace of Europe and to protect the interests of humanity. 
 This study elicited from Professor Arntz a valuable letter which 
 Eolin-Jaequemyns publishes (ibid, p. 675-682) with further dis- 
 cussion. [See under Arntz.] Eolin-Jaequemyns would seem to 
 place the Near East in a special category in regard to the right 
 of intervention. Hall (4 ed., 95, p. 308, note) criticizes this 
 view when set forth by the same author in regard to the Graeco- 
 Turkish conflict of 1885-6. (Revue de droit international, vol. 
 18, p. 603.)
 
 524 INTERVENTION 
 
 H-Rolin-Jaequemyns, Gustave, 1835 
 
 Note sur la theorie du droit d 'intervention, 
 in Revue du droit international et de legislation 
 comparee, 1876, vol. 8, p. 673-682. 
 
 1-7465 JX3.R4.Vol.8 
 
 In addition to the preceding article which was called forth by 
 the letter of Professor Arntz herein printed with further dis- 
 cussion by Bolin-Jaequemyns. 
 
 Rolin-Jaequemyns, Gustave, 1835 
 
 La question d 'orient en 1885-86. 
 in Revue du droit international et de legislation 
 comparee, 1885, vol. 18, pp. 378-432, 506-535; con- 
 tinued under the title, Le conflit greco-turc en 
 1885-86, ibid, p. 591-626. 
 1-7465 JX3.R4.Vol.18 
 
 Discusses collective intervention and the control of the Balkans 
 by the concert of Europe. Blames the jealousies of powers for 
 unsatisfactory condition. Considers that collective intervention in 
 the Orient is on a different place from elsewhere (p. 605). Hall 
 (4 ed., 95, p. 308, note) criticizes this view. 
 
 **** Rossi, Pellegrino. 
 
 Intervention. 
 
 in Archives de droit et de legislation, (Brussels) 
 1837, vol. I, p. 353-375. 
 
 [In Library of Congress, Law Periodicals] 
 
 Written apropos of the appearance of Wheaton's Elements 
 of International Law, London, 1836. This brief study of the 
 theory and practice of intervention is to be ranked with that by 
 Senior as among the very best. The juridical basis for inter- 
 vention is laid down in a masterly fashion. Although the inci- 
 dents are treated with a too evident bias in favor of the Monarchy 
 of July, every word is illuminating. Everything considered, it is 
 perhaps the discussion of intervention which has best known how 
 to insist upon the fullest respect for the principles of international 
 law without disregarding the reasonable requirements of practical 
 statecraft. Hidden away in a little known and short lived 
 magazine this valuable article appears to have escaped the notice 
 of all but a few investigators.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 525 
 
 H-H-Rotteck, Hermann Rodecker von, 1816-1848. 
 
 Das Recht der Einmischung in die inneren 
 Angelegenheiten eines fremden Staates vom ver- 
 nunftrechtlichen, historischen und politischen 
 Standpunkte erortert. 
 
 Freiburg i. B., A. Emmerling, 1845. xxviii-\- 
 104 p., 2iy 2 cm. 
 
 10-5804 JX4481.R7 
 
 This work seems to be the first to undertake a systematic and 
 comprehensive study of intervention. Eotteck defines interven- 
 tion by the postulate, "No state has a right to intermeddle in 
 the internal (that is the constitutional) affairs of another state. ' ' 
 (p. 7; cf. p., 16-17.) He enumerates the alleged exceptions 
 (p. 10-11), and in the following pages (11-47), takes them up 
 seriatim. He attempts to refute them or to show that they are 
 not really exceptions. The remainder of the work examines the 
 incidents which have occurred, and discusses the primacy of 
 the great powers. Rotteck denies the right to intervene on the 
 ground that changes in a neighboring state, constitute a danger 
 for internal affairs (p. 22-3). In discussing the doctrine of 
 necessity (p. 20-25), he says that necessity does not make legal, 
 but excuses violations. Humanitarian intervention should be 
 considered as a violation of law, but sometimes excused, or even 
 applauded, as we excuse a crime (p. 36). Bernard, Mill, and 
 Hall have adopted this latter doctrine. Berner classes this as 
 one of the best treatments. Rotteck, he says, has shown in- 
 telligence and learning, but places too much emphasis on the 
 principle of non-intervention. I would add that Rotteck is 
 remarkably fair, but not a close reasoner. 
 
 ****Rotteck, Karl Wenzeslaus Rodecker von, 1775-1840. 
 [Grossherz, Bad. ' Hofrath und Professor.] 
 
 Lehrbuch des Vernunftrechts und der Staats- 
 wissenschaften. 
 
 Stuttgard, Gebruder Franckh, 1829-35. 4 vols., 
 21 cm. 
 
 10-23478t JC233.R85 
 
 Berner rates it as one of the most important works taking into 
 account the historical development and fundamental principles. 
 Vol. Ill is devoted in part (p. 1-166) to a study of foreign 
 relations and international law.
 
 526 INTERVENTION 
 
 ** Rougier, Antoine. 
 
 Les guerres civiles et le droit des gens. 
 Paris, Larose, 1903. 569 p., 8. 
 
 6-27289 JX4541.R7 
 
 Intervention in civil wars is discussed, pp. 315f. 
 
 Rougier, Antoine. 
 
 L 'intervention de 1 'Europe dans la question de 
 Macedoine. 
 
 in Revue generate du droit international public, 
 1906, vol. XI U, p. 178-200. 
 10-31105 JX3.R56.Vol.13 
 
 *** Rougier, Antoine. 
 
 La theorie de 1 'intervention d'humanite. 
 in Revue generate du droit international public, 
 1910, vol. XVII, p. 468-526. 
 10-31105 JX3.R56.Vol.17 
 
 Is a very thorough consideration of the question which does 
 much to clear up the theory. Rougier first shows the weakness 
 in the postulate of the absolute independence and equality of 
 States, and consequently overcomes the strongest argument in 
 support of the doctrine of Non-intervention. He then examines 
 whether there is any law of humanity in support of which inter- 
 vention may be undertaken and finds it in the law of solidarity. 
 He next discusses who may intervene and well says that the 
 generally accepted idea of collective intervention adds nothing 
 to the justice of the action. Finally, he advocates intervention 
 by a disinterested power. He does not seem to consider that 
 such a requirement would remove intervention from practical 
 politics. 
 
 The various instances of intervention on the ground of humanity 
 are noted and tersely analyzed. The article is of first rate 
 importance for the study of this part of the subject. 
 
 ** Rougier, Antoine. 
 
 Maroc: La question de 1 'abolition des supplices 
 et Pintervention europeenne. 
 in Revue generale de droit international public, 
 1910, vol. XIX, p. 98-102. 
 
 10-31105 JX3.R56.Vol.19 
 
 I have translated a portion of this in the text. See $ 8 (d).
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 527 
 
 Royal Commission: See, Fugitive Slaves. Report on, 
 1876. 
 
 * Russell, Bertrand Arthur William, 1872. [M. A., 
 F. R. S., Sometime Fellow and Lecturer in Trinity 
 College, Cambridge.] 
 
 Why Men Fight, A Method of Abolishing the 
 International Duel. 
 New York, 1917, 272 p., 19y 2 cm. 
 
 17-1513 HN389.R96 
 
 Written mainly before 1915, to judge by the footnotes. Eussell 
 makes a valuable contribution to the study of the causes of war 
 and the means to avoid it. This he finds in a substitution of 
 creative "impulses" (instincts) for "impulses of possession." 
 In the main, it is a fair and objective study. Nevertheless, 
 the author seems to take for granted that all men condemn the 
 competitive evolution of war, which Steinmetz considered the 
 purpose and justification of war, almost its sanctifieation. Kussell 
 is the most objective of the subjective pacifists I have encountered. 
 No student of politics should fail to read this work. 
 
 Russell, John Russell, 1st earl, 1792-1878. 
 
 Public address discussing policy of government 
 relative to intervention, 
 in London Times, September 28, 1863. 
 
 Discusses Polish question, and excuses failure of Great Britain 
 to intervene; declares intervention in Mexico was for the pro- 
 tection of British rights only; conduct towards United States 
 neutral and fair. Cited by Abdy's Kent, p. 48. 
 
 *Russell, John Russell, 1st earl, 1792-1878. 
 
 An Essay on the History of the English Gov- 
 ernment and Constitution from the reign of Henry 
 VII to the Present Time. 
 
 New edition, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 
 1865. 
 
 [Harvard Law Library] 
 
 Certain phases of intervention are discussed in the introduction 
 (p. Irxxi-xciii), and Russell makes an attempt at definition
 
 528 INTERVENTION 
 
 (p. Ixxi-lxxii). See criticism of this by Stapleton (p. 10-15), 
 who perhaps misunderstands Russell 's careless language. Russell 
 discusses Denmark's rejection of England's suggestions for com- 
 promise (p. xcii) ; but compare Sir Robert Morier (vol. I, 
 p. 385-392), who gives the real reason why Denmark refused. 
 
 Salvioli, Giuseppe, 1857- 
 
 Le concept de la guerre juste d'apres les ecri- 
 vains anterieurs a Grotius. [Translated by 
 Georges Hervo.] 
 Paris, 1918, 128 p., 17 cm. 
 
 19-19535 JX4508.S3 
 
 Schonborn, Walther, 1883 
 
 Die Besetzung von Veracruz (zur Lehre von 
 den volkerrechtlichen Selbsthilfeakten) mit einem 
 Anhang: Urkunden zur Politik des Prasidenten 
 Wilson gegeniiber Mexiko. 
 Berlin [etc.}, W. Kohlhammer, 1914. 
 
 16-15253 F1234.S36 
 
 Schubert. 
 
 Ueber die Lehre der politischen Intervention. 
 Cited by H. von Kotteck (Recht der Einmischung 
 1845), p. 8. 
 Kdnigsberg, 1831. 
 
 I was unable to consult this work. 
 
 ****Senior, Nassau William, 1790-1864. 
 
 Review of Wheaton's International Law. 
 in Edinburgh Review, 1843, vol. 156, p. 334-358. 
 
 AP4.E3 Vol.156 
 
 In an article in the Edinburgh Review, Mr. Nassau Senior 
 discusses Wheaton 's book which had recently appeared. The 
 article is more than a review. It is a valuable commentary on 
 certain portions of international law. Mr. Senior devotes especial 
 attention to the question of intervention and discusses the action 
 taken to preserve the balance of power and to dictate in regard 
 to internal affairs. He points out that the former is the weapon
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 529 
 
 of the weak against the strong and is difficult to organize. From 
 this, he concludes, it is not likely to be often resorted to or 
 abused. Interference in the internal affairs is, on the contrary, 
 the weapon of the strong against the weak. Mr. Senior discusses 
 several instances in European history and reaches the following 
 conclusion on pp. 365-66: 
 
 "It does not appear that interference for the mere purpose 
 of preventing the oppression of subjects by their prince, is now 
 held lawful by any nation 
 
 "On the other hand it appears to be the opinion of Eussia, 
 Austria and Prussia, that the rights of a sovereign against his 
 subjects are whatever he may think fit to claim 
 
 ' ' England admits the validity of every established government, 
 whether depending on usage, on popular revolt, or on royal 
 usurpation. Subject to the universal exception, that every state 
 has a right to protect itself against great mischief, or even 
 imminent danger, arising out of the domestic affairs of another, 
 she denies that international law allows one state forcibly to 
 interfere in the internal affairs of another, on any pretext or 
 to any extent whatever. She denies that third parties can law- 
 fully interfere to force a people to obey their sovereign; as she 
 denies that they can lawfully interpose to force a sovereign to 
 respect the liberties of his people." 
 
 Senior's discussion is one of the best which has appeared. It 
 probably has not exerted as large an influence as it deserves 
 because the back files of a magazine are not always accessible, 
 but he is cited by several authorities (Moore's Digest VI: 3; 
 Creasy, p. 297). 
 
 H-Snow, Alpheus Henry, 1859-1920. 
 
 The Question of Aborigines in the Law and 
 Practice of Nations. 
 
 Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 
 1919, 218 p., 23y 2 cm. 
 
 20-13103 JV305.S6 
 
 See Chapter XIV, p. 187-201, "The Doctrine of 'Intervention 
 for Humanity' and its Effect on the Development of the Law of 
 Nations regarding Aborigines." 
 
 Soule, Pierre, 1802-1870. 
 
 Speech on Non-intervention, in the U. S. Senate, 
 March 22, 1852. 
 
 34
 
 530 INTERVENTION 
 
 Washington, J. T. Towers, 1852. 46 p., 22% cm. 
 
 10-25145 E429.S72 
 
 Recalling various precedents in American diplomatic history, 
 Soul6 argues that the United States should vigorously oppose the 
 action of Great Britain in policing the sea about Cuba to prevent 
 the landing of hostile expeditions on that island. 
 
 Sproxton, Charles, 1890-1917. 
 
 Palmer ston and the Hungarian Revolution. [A 
 dissertation which was awarded the Prince Con- 
 sort prize, 1914.] 
 
 Cambridge, University Press, 1919. xi+148 p., 
 front (port.) 20 cm. 
 
 20-286 DB936.S7 
 
 An excellent account of the political history of the Hungarian 
 Revolution and the connected question of the refugees in Turkey. 
 Palmerston's fear that a weakened Austria would remove a 
 counterpoise (pp. 37, 77) is given as the motive of his refusal to 
 oppose Russian interference. Palmerston was consistent in sup- 
 porting Italy against Austria since he considered Italy a weak- 
 ness for Austria (p. 38). Napoleon III refusal to intervene was 
 due to his desire to secure the support of the Northern powers 
 by a revision of the treaties of 1815 (pp. 99-100) and on the 
 very eve of invading Hungary Nicholas declared he would recognize 
 the French Republic (p. 101). Responding to the pressure of 
 public opinion, Palmerston exerted pressure on Turkey to prevent 
 the extradition and to secure the liberation of the refugees, 
 (p. 111.) 
 
 Stambler, Bernard. 
 
 L'histoire des Israelites roumains et le droit 
 d 'intervention. [Doctoral dissertation, Univer- 
 sity of Paris.] 
 Paris, Jouve et tie., 1913. 315 p., 25 cm. 
 
 15-10261 DS135.R7S7 
 
 Stambler 's book is principally devoted to a study of the Jews 
 in Roumania and the law of nationality. Intervention is con- 
 sidered (p. 197-225, more especially the right of the United States 
 to protest (1902) against the treatment of the Jews. The author
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 531 
 
 does not consider that the action of the United States constitutes 
 an intervention, and denies the right to intervene on the grounds 
 of humanity. The bibliography of the question of the Jews in 
 Roumania (p. 309-312) touches but incidentally works upon 
 intervention. Eeviewed in revue de droit international et de 
 legislation comparee 1914, Vol. 46, p. 88. 
 
 **Stapleton, Augustus Granville, 1800-1880. 
 
 Intervention and Non-intervention; or, The 
 Foreign Policy of Great Britain from 1790 to 
 1865. 
 London, J. Murray, 1866. ix+308 p., 23 cm. 
 
 10-17440t JX4478.S8 
 
 Under the cover of a scientific discussion of the principles 
 governing intervention Stapleton launches into a bitter partisan 
 attack upon Palmerston and his policy of interference in support 
 of liberalism on the Continent. But the very method of attack 
 requires Stapleton to lay down the fundamental principles of 
 action undertaken to constrain other states to adopt a desired 
 course, and this discussion is of real scientific value notwith- 
 standing the errors into which Stapleton falls. He defines (p. 6) 
 the true rule of non-intervention [non-interference] as follows: 
 
 "No State has a right FORCIBLY to interfere in the internal 
 concerns of another State, unless there exists a casus ~belli against 
 it. For, if every powerful State has a right at its pleasure 
 forcibly to interfere with the internal affairs of its weaker 
 neighbors, it is obvious no weak State can be really independent. 
 The constant and general violation of this law would be, in fact$ 
 to establish the law of the strongest. 
 
 "This principle as here laid down is the true principle of 
 'non-intervention.' But, by leaving out the word forcible, and 
 by then applying it, without limitation or explanation, much 
 confusion respecting it has arisen. 
 
 "It is essential therefore that it should be correctly defined; 
 for, taking it in the broad sense in which it is sometimes taken, 
 as forbidding all kinds of intervention in the internal affairs of 
 neighboring States, it is neither defensible in theory nor harmless 
 in practice." 
 
 Stapleton does not perceive that intervention or interference 
 would have no effect the moment that his rule was sufficiently 
 well recognized to restrain the action of would-be law-abiding 
 states. His formula is the reductio ad absurdum which we find 
 so frequently in the followers of Cobden. Palmerston himself 
 refuted this doctrine when in 1832 he wrote:
 
 532 INTERVENTION 
 
 "In" adverting, therefore, to the affairs of Poland, great 
 delicacy and caution will be required. It would be inconsistent 
 with the power and dignity of the British Empire to insist too 
 strongly upon points which, from the considerations stated above, 
 it might be inexpedient, if not impossible, to enforce by arms." 
 (British State Papers, vol. 37, p. 1439-1440.) 
 
 We must, however, give Stapleton credit for perceiving the 
 folly of a general condemnation of all intervention or interference 
 which is not undertaken in defense of clearly recognized rights 
 (see discussion of political action in our $$ 20-23). He is also 
 to be commended for basing his attack and his criticism upon a 
 careful analysis of the grounds of the various instances of 
 intervention. The remainder of the book (pp. 37-308) discusses 
 with marked partisan bias the foreign policy and interventions 
 of the British Government from 1790-1865. The appendix (pp. 
 279-308) contains valuable documents. 
 
 ^Stockton, Robert Field, 1795-1866. 
 
 Speech on Non-intervention, delivered in the 
 U. S. Senate, February 2, 1852. 
 Washington, Printed by J. T. Towers, 1852. 8 p., 
 23 cm. 
 
 19-20271 E429-S86 
 
 Stowell, E. C. and Munro, H. F. 
 
 International Cases, Vol. I, Peace ; Vol. II, War 
 and Neutrality. 
 Boston, Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1916. 
 
 16-9557 JX68.S8 
 
 Contains concise accounts of some of the more important inci- 
 dents of intervention and interference. 
 
 Strauch, Hermann [Professor, Heidelberg]. 
 
 Intervention. 
 
 in Blimtschli's Staatsworterbuch (Loning's edi- 
 tion). Zurich, 1871, vol. II, p. 274 f. 
 
 9-200741 JA.63.B8 
 
 Cf. below this author's more complete study of intervention, 
 1879.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 533 
 
 H-H-Strauch, Hermann [Professor, Heidelberg].. 
 
 Zur Interventionslehre ; eine volkerrechtliche 
 Studie. 
 Heidelberg, 1879. 39 p., 8. 
 
 [State Department Library, 
 Harvard Law Library, 
 Boston Athenaeum] 
 
 This little pamphlet prepared in honor of Professor 
 Bluntschli's fifty years of teaching is probably the most complete 
 and most rigidly scientific discussion of intervention in any 
 language. For Strauch intervention is a right of the community 
 of states to prevent any abuse of independence which endangers 
 the common security, including necessarily all serious violations 
 of the law of nations. He recognizes the right of third nations 
 to intervene in such cases as he recognizes the right of individual 
 states to intervene in internal matters when the latter are in such 
 a condition as to endanger the rights of other states. 
 
 But Strauch excludes humanitarian intervention because he 
 thinks such questions are not matters which concern the community 
 of states. Every state, however, is free to check the barbarous 
 or inhumane conduct of any other state which does not enjoy 
 a fully independent status. Any attempt of another state to 
 oppose such corrective action is, according to Strauch, a political 
 matter. 
 
 Strezoff, G. 
 
 L 'intervention et la peninsule balkanique [Dis- 
 sertation, University of Geneva]. 
 Geneva, 1893. 252 p., 23 cm. 
 
 [Columbia University Library] 
 
 Tanoviceano, Jean. 
 
 De 1 'intervention au point de vue du droit inter- 
 national. [Dissertation, University of Paris. 
 Bound with and following a dissertation on 
 Roman Law, "De 1'infantia."] 
 Paris, 1884. 153 p., 8. 
 
 [Harvard Law Library, 
 New York Public Library] 
 
 Holland (Studies, p. 174) says: "Roumania in the person of 
 M. Tanoviceano, has produced an international jurist of no small
 
 534 INTERVENTION 
 
 merit. His treatise, De V intervention, is the best book on the 
 subject." I cannot find that the work is of unusual merit. 
 
 Trevilla Paniza, Diego. 
 
 La intervencion por causas financieras. [Doc- 
 toral dissertation.] 
 
 Granada, Tip. P. Ventura Traveset, 1910. 71 p., 
 21 cm. 
 
 16-3712 JX1393.D8T7 
 
 Discusses intervention and the Drago doctrine. I did not 
 examine this work. 
 
 Trummer, Dr. K. 
 
 Anti-Rotteck. Eine Reihe von Fragmenten 
 iiber des Prof. v. Rottecks Lehrbuch des Ver- 
 nunftrechts. 
 Hamburg, 1836. 
 
 [Reichstag Library, Berlin] 
 
 Cited by Heiberg (p. 15), who indicates that Trummer was 
 an advocate of wide latitude in interference. 
 
 U. S. : Solicitor of the Department of State. 
 
 Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries 
 by Landing Forces. 
 See Clark, Joshua Reuben, Jr. 
 
 Ureria y Sanz, Rafael de. 
 
 Nuevas orientaciones del principio de inter- 
 vencion, doctrina de Drago. 
 
 Madrid, Est. tip. de los hijos de R. Alvarez, 1910. 
 71 p., 24 cm. 
 
 11-25359 JX4481.U8 
 
 A preliminary study of intervention, followed by a consider- 
 ation of the Drago doctrine. Good for Drago doctrine, but of no 
 particular value for intervention. 
 
 Urien, Carlos M. 
 
 El derecho de intervencion y la doctrina de 
 Monroe (antecedentes historicos).
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 535 
 
 Buenos Aires, Impr. J. Peuser, 1898. 174 p., 
 171/2 cm. 
 
 9-19546 JX1425.U8 
 
 Valverde, Antonio L. 
 
 La intervencion ; estudio de derecho inter- 
 nacional publico con emprologo del Sr. Eafael 
 Montoro. 
 
 Habana, Ruis y hermano, 1902. x-\-195 p., 8 . 
 Obra premiada por el colegio de abigados de la 
 Habana en el certamen de 1900 a 1901. 
 
 [New York Library, 
 Harvard Law Library] 
 
 One of the most extensive studies of the text-book authorities. 
 The author (p. 74) concludes that the Italian school is wrong in 
 considering intervention as always illegal, but thinks intervention 
 is a political matter, and that it is impossible to fix its limits 
 exactly as some writers claim to do. The remainder of the book 
 considers the instances of intervention. The study is careful, 
 but does not add to the understanding of the deeper problems of 
 the subject. 
 
 H-Vattel, Emmerich de, 1714-1767. 
 
 The Law of Nations [Le droit des gens; ou 
 Principes de la loi naturelle appliques a la con- 
 duite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains 
 1758], C. G. Fen wick's English translation, with 
 an introduction by Albert de Lapradelle. 
 Washington, Carnegie institution of Washington, 
 1916. 3 vols. 26 cm. (Vol. 3 contains the trans- 
 lation.) [In Carnegie Classics of International 
 Law.] 
 
 16-17762 JX2414.A1 1916 
 
 Ercole. 
 
 Memoria del Prof. Ercole Vidari. Del principio 
 di intervento e di non intervento.
 
 536 INTERVENTION 
 
 Milan, Amminestrazione del Politecnico, 1868. A 
 reprint from "II Politecnico." 81 p. Signed 
 Pavia, December 22, 1867. 
 
 [Harvard Law Library] 
 
 This is one of the best of the early studies of the subject, and 
 shows the author's scientific spirit by a fair analysis, at a time 
 when the national aspirations of Italy were distorting men's 
 vision, as shown in Mamiani 's work. 
 
 Vie, Louis. 
 
 Des principales applications du droit d 'inter- 
 vention des puissances europeennes dans les 
 affaires des Balkans depuis le traite de Berlin de 
 1878 jusqu'a nos jours, fitude de droit interna- 
 tional public et d'histoire diplomatique. [In- 
 augural dissertation, University of Toulouse.] 
 Toulouse, Impr. Lagarde et Sebille, 1900. 158 
 p., 4. 
 
 1-6411 JX4481.V6 
 
 Wachter, Alfred von. 
 
 Die volkerrechtliche Intervention als Mittel der 
 Selbsthiilfe. [Dissertation at Erlanger Uni- 
 versity.] 
 Munich, J. Kramer, 1911. 67 p., 8. 
 
 [New York Public Library 
 Berlin Card, U.12.946] 
 
 A painstaking, but somewhat immature study, as shown by 
 the failure to appreciate the relative value of the authorities, 
 some of the most important of which are omitted. It is not an 
 important work. 
 
 * Warner, Horace Everett, 1839 
 
 The Ethics of Force. 
 Boston, Ginn & Co., 1905. v+126 p., 20 cm. 
 
 5-19064 JX1953.W36 
 
 "This little volume had its origin in a series of papers read 
 to the Ethical club of Washington, D. C., at the time just pre- 
 ceding and following the Spanish war." ( Pref.)
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 537 
 
 Library of Congress analysis of contents: I. Introduction. 
 II. The ethics of heroism. III. The ethics of patriotism. IV. 
 Can war be defended on the authority of Christ? V. Can war 
 be defended on the grounds of reason? VI. Some objections. 
 
 One of the few rational discussions upon the theme of the 
 irrationality of war, by one who knows from experience whereof 
 he speaks. 
 
 Werdenhagen, Angelius. 
 
 Synopsis in sex libros. Johan Bodini de Re- 
 publica, tpuroiropfiov generate et necessarium. 
 Amsterdam, 1645. 
 
 Esmein, in Nouvelle revue historique de droit frangais et 
 etranger, 1900, p. 574, says this author corrected Bodin's logic: 
 ' ' He only admits the repression of a tyrant by a neighboring 
 king when the territory of the latter has been invaded by the 
 tyrant. ' ' Esmein remarks that this is the denial of all right 
 of intervention in internal affairs. We should take note of this 
 as an early exposition of the doctrine of absolute non-intervention. 
 
 I have not examined this work. 
 
 Westlake, John, 1828-1913. 
 Reprisals and War. 
 in Law Quarterly Review, April, 1909, p. 127-136. 
 
 A very searching examination of the principles governing the 
 use of force without war. Also published in The Collected Papers 
 of John Westlake on Public International Law, Cambridge [Eng.], 
 1914. [15-9571 JX2588.C7 1914.] 
 
 Westlake, John, 1828-1913. 
 International Law. 
 
 Cambridge, England, Part I, Peace, 1st ed., 1904; 
 2 ed., 1910. Part II, War, 1st ed., 1907; 2 ed., 
 1913. 
 11-1990 JX2588.I 6 1910 
 
 These two volumes contain the best and most comprehensive 
 discussions of the principles of intervention. Westlake is the 
 student 's surest guide. Especially important are vol. I, ch. XIII, 
 "Political Action of States," (p. 300-327); "Self-defense 
 [self-help] on the open sea in time of peace" (p. 171-176); 
 "Recognition of new states arising from insurrections" (p. 57f ) ;
 
 538 INTERVENTION 
 
 vol. II, ch. I, p. 1-31, "War and forcible measures short of war; " 
 Ch. VII, (p. 190-198), "The Theory of Neutrality." It is 
 interesting to compare these opinions with Westlake's Chapters 
 on the Principles of International Law, Cambridge, 1894, for we 
 see how carefully the author had gone over what he had written 
 a decade before. 
 
 Wharton, Francis, 1820-1889. 
 
 De 1 'assistance prete a une insurrection 
 etrangere. 
 Referred to in Clunet's Journal, 1883, p. 375-377. 
 
 Discusses the insurrection in Naples. Of no particular 
 importance. 
 
 *Wheaton, Henry, 1785-1848. 
 
 Elements of International Law: with a sketch 
 of the history of the science. 
 London, B. Fellowes, 1836. 2 vols., 22 cm. 
 
 5-29661 
 
 In reviews of Wheaton, Pellegrino Rossi and Nassau Senior 
 have both criticized Wheaton for his defective treatment of 
 intervention and each critic has been himself stimulated to write 
 remarkable studies of this subject. Indirectly we owe to Wheaton 
 the best discussions of intervention which have appeared in 
 English and French. 
 
 Wheaton, Henry, 1785-1848. 
 
 History of the Law of Nations in Europe and 
 America ; from the earliest times to the treaty of 
 Washington, 1842. 
 
 New York, Gould, Banks & Co.; [etc., etc.} 1845. 
 xiv+797 p., 241/2 cm. 
 
 5-29665 JX2495.H2 1845 
 
 "Originally written and published in the French language as 
 a Mmoire in answer to the following prize question proposed by 
 the Academy of moral and political sciences in the Institute of 
 France: 'Quels sont les progres qu'a fait le droit des gens en 
 Europe depuis la paix de Westphalie?' " Pref.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 539 
 
 Wildman, Richard. 
 
 Institutes of International Law. 
 London, W. Benning & Co., 1849-50. 2 vols., 
 22 cm. 
 
 10-17173t JX2592.I5 1849 
 
 ***Woolsey, Theodore Dwight, 1801-1889. 
 
 Introduction to the Study of International Law. 
 Boston and Cambridge, J. Munroe & Co., 1860. 
 xvii+486 p., 19^/2 cm. Preface is dated May 17. 
 6th ed., rev. and enl. by Theodore Salisbury 
 Woolsey, New York, C. Scribner's Sons, 1901. 
 xix+527 p., 21 cm. 
 
 10-17164t JX2498.I6 1860 
 
 4-4618-4 JX2498.I6 1901 
 
 At this period, so important for the development, of the law 
 
 governing intervention, this American work takes advanced 
 
 ground. Especially interesting are 18-23, 41-50; p. 21-28, 
 
 .18-112. There have been many later editions of this useful work. 
 
 *** Woolsey, Theodore Salisbury, 1852 
 
 America's Foreign Policy. 
 
 New York, The Century Company, 1898. x-\-294 
 p., 19 cm. 
 
 98-428-4 Revised. JX1415.W7 
 
 Is a collection of articles on diplomatic incidents considered 
 from the point of view of the principles justifying the action 
 taken, and therefore of great value for a study of the justifiable 
 grounds for intervention. It is one of the best discussions of 
 Intervention in Cuba, (p. 25-100), and shows an understanding 
 of the fundamental principles. Of especial value is Professor 
 Woolsey 's consideration of humanitarian intervention. 
 
 *Wright, Quincy. 
 
 Effects of the League of Nations Covenant, 
 in American Political Science Review, November, 
 1919, p. 556-576. 
 
 Discusses the obligation to intervene to vindicate the law and 
 considers that the establishment of such an obligation is due to 
 the League of Nations.
 
 540 INTERVENTION 
 
 Zeballos, E. C. 
 
 Intervention armee europeenne en Venezuela a 
 la suite de reclamation. 
 
 in Bulletin Argentine de droit international prive, 
 1903. Vol. I, p. 145-177. 
 
 Discusses the limits of the right of interposition for protection 
 of national rights.
 
 INDEX
 
 INDEX 
 
 The following page references are mainly to subjects, but the pages where 
 authorities are quoted are also indicated, and the reference is generally 
 enclosed in parenthesis when it is no more than a mere citation. The Bibli- 
 ography should be consulted for critical notes in regard to many of the 
 authorities herein listed. 
 
 Aborigines (see also Humanitarian 
 Intervention) : humanitarian in- 
 tervention to prevent abuse of, 
 162-195; G. B. intervenes to 
 prevent importation of Polynes- 
 ians into Peru, 200-203. 
 
 Absolute independence (see also 
 Perfect rights) : inconsistency of 
 theory of, 155; 159 n; 212- 
 213. 
 
 Abusive: use of property rights, 
 280 /; insistence upon rights; 
 obligation to refrain from, 399 
 passim, 452 ; 455. 
 
 Adjustment (see also Compro- 
 mise) : obligation to agree to, 
 451-453 ; right of intervention 
 to enforce reasonable, 452-453; 
 reasonable effort to reach amic- 
 able, must precede recourse to 
 force, 455-456. 
 
 Aerial jurisdiction: 6-7, 7 n. 
 
 Ahrens: (280). 
 
 Algeria: 368 n. 
 
 Aliens: right of, to minimum of 
 security, 154-162 ; humani- 
 tarian intervention to secure 
 favored treatment, 154-162. 
 
 Alsace-Lorraine : settlement of, 
 proposed by Mill (1870), 37 n. 
 
 Alcoholic liquors: transit of, de- 
 nied by U. S., 270-273. 
 
 Amos, Sheldon: (47 n) ; (56 n) ; 
 126; 314 n; 322 n; 354; 422 n. 
 
 Anarchy: as basis for interven- 
 tion (Poland 1863), llo n; as 
 justification of intervention to 
 impeach sovereignty, 350, 351 ; 
 doctrine of perfect rights and 
 absolute independence leads to, 
 453. 
 
 Anderson : extradition, case of, 
 221-226. 
 
 Angary: 401-402. 
 
 Angell, Norman: fallacy of at- 
 tempt of, to ignore prestige, 18. 
 
 Angell, President: 283 /. 
 
 Apology (see also Expiation) : of 
 France (1858), to G. B., 24-25; 
 G. B. to V. S. (1871) 25; inci- 
 dent at Wadowice, 26; honor- 
 able nature of, 26-27; of Eus- 
 sian official for insult to German 
 Consul (1906), 26; for seizure 
 of Florida (1866), 27; for in- 
 sult to Peter the Great's Am- 
 bassador (1710), 28-30; in- 
 adequacy of mere, 34; when 
 obligation to make, 292. 
 
 Appeal : from sovereign decision 
 to forum of opinion of all the 
 states, 456. 
 
 Argentina: Falkland Islands, 4. 
 
 Armament : prevention of excessive, 
 362-366; futility of excessive 
 counter-armament, 366-369 n. 
 
 Armenia: 80, 82-85 n; 312-313 n. 
 
 Arntz, Prof. : views as to when 
 intervention in internal affairs 
 is justified, 52; 53 n; (55 n) ; 
 282 n. 
 
 Asylum (see also Humanitarian 
 asylum) : to slaves, 204; con- 
 stitutes a means of carrying 
 out humanitarian intervention, 
 205 n; humanitarian, 257-277; 
 abusive use of, constitutes con- 
 structive attack, 373-378. 
 
 Assistance : to foreign govern- 
 ment against insurrection, dis- 
 cussed 329-345; justified by 
 older writers, 329-330; reasons 
 against, 330-331; constitutes 
 unjustifiable interference, 331; 
 invitation does not justify, 
 331 n; justifiable to suppress 
 common danger, 332 ; policy of 
 
 543
 
 INDEX 
 
 the Holy Alliance, 332; legiti- 
 macy, doctrine of, 332 /. 
 Autonomy: effect of suppressed 
 revolt upon guarantee of, 109 n; 
 statement of right of, 112-120; 
 Poland, 112-120; Ireland, 120. 
 
 Balance of Power: discussion of, 
 414-431, G. B.'s attitude regard- 
 ing Poland, 89-90 n; effect of, 
 in Europe upon independence 
 of small states, 307 n', parti- 
 tion, 415-418; by defense of 
 status quo, 415; confused by 
 discussion of counter-interven- 
 tion to prevent excessive satis- 
 faction, 420-421; confused with 
 justifiable action by way of pre- 
 vention, 422 ; definition of right 
 of intervention to preserve, as 
 based upon practice, 425-426; 
 right to prevent preponderance 
 through sudden accessions, 425. 
 
 Barios, President: cruelties prac- 
 ticed by, 148-149. 
 
 Barrows, President David P; ef- 
 fects of magnanimity, 16 n. 
 
 Basdevant, Jules: 140 n; 142 n. 
 
 Base of hostile operation: afforded 
 to Polish insurgents, 104; ob- 
 ligation to prevent, 104 n. 
 
 Bates: opinion of in Creole case 
 criticized, 229 n. 
 
 Bayard, Secretary : 160 n. 
 
 Belgian independence: nature of 
 action to establish, 282-283 n; 
 approved by Hall, 285; cited as 
 example, 286 ; Lawrence 's re- 
 marks on action of concert re- 
 garding, 308 n ; Hareourt on 
 recognition of, 429 ?i. 
 
 Belgium, violation of: compared 
 with bombardment of Copen- 
 hagen, 413. 
 
 Bernard, Mountague: (58 n) ; 59- 
 60 n; (64 n); 213; 297 n; 
 297-298 n; (320 n); 379; 386; 
 388 n; 431 n; 435 n; 439-441 n; 
 444 n. 
 
 Berner: 320 n. 
 
 Bernsdorf, Ambassador: 323 n. 
 
 Best, Justice : 222 n. 
 
 Bismarck: effect of Polish policy, 
 96 n; Polish policy denounced, 
 103. 
 
 Blachford, Lord: justifies Rus- 
 sian intervention in Bulgaria, 
 134-136 n ; views on slave trade, 
 
 197 ?i ; negotiations negarding 
 
 coolie labor, 197-198 n.; defines 
 
 limits of religious propaganda 
 
 abroad, 384-3 85 n; futility of 
 
 preventive wars, 366 n. 
 Blackstone: 233. 
 Blaine, Secretary : 438 n. 
 Bluntschli : (55 n) ; (220 n) ; 
 
 (330 n); 331 n; (352 n) ; 445 n. 
 Bodin, Jean: (58 n). 
 Bolsheviki: condemnation of, 381- 
 
 383. 
 Bombardment : of Greytown as 
 
 punishment (1854), 40-41. 
 Bonfils: (425 n.). 
 Borchard, Edwin M. : 3 n ; 36 ; 
 
 57; (160u). 
 Bosnia : 127. 
 Boxer uprising: expiation for, 
 
 30 /. 
 
 Brazil: 27, 199. 
 Brussels, Act of: 204-205. 
 Bulgaria: 83, 128-136. 
 Burke, Edmund: prevention of 
 
 mischief, 280 n. 
 Burlemaqui: (374 n). 
 Bynkershoek: 217. 
 
 Callahan, J. M.: 433. 
 
 Calvo: (220); 395 n. 
 
 Campbell, Sir George: 208. 
 
 Canning, George: 379. 
 
 Carnazza Amari: (320 n). 
 
 Caroline : 5. 
 
 Carr, Wilbur J.: 253; 342 n. 
 
 Casablanca: bombardment of, 39. 
 
 Castlereagh, Viscount : 89 n ; 
 332?i; 333/; 357; 395 n; 412. 
 
 Catherine II: 115 n. 
 
 Cavagliere: (321 n). 
 
 Charlestown : 283 n. 
 
 China: 30; 39; 249 /; 256 n. 
 
 Chosu, Prince of: Collective action 
 against, 5. 
 
 Chretien, Alfred: (308 ?i). 
 
 Citizens: Responsibility of for 
 conduct of government: 456. 
 
 Civil war (see also Protracted 
 Civil War) : delicacy of inter- 
 ference in, 108 n ; right to in- 
 tervene first recognized by 
 Glafey, 282 n. 
 
 Clark, J. R,, Jr., 42 n. 
 
 Clarke, Sir Edward: 223 /; 229 n. 
 
 Cobbett, Pitt: (283 n) ; (286). 
 
 Cobden, Richard : 369 n. 
 
 Cockburn, Lord Chief Justice: 212. 
 
 Colby, Secretary: 321; 380-382.
 
 INDEX 
 
 545 
 
 Collective action (see also Euro- 
 pean Concert) : punishment of 
 Prince of Chosu (1864), 5; 
 against China (1920), 39; in 
 Lebanon to prevent persecution 
 of Maronites (1860), 63-66; lim- 
 itation of humanitarian interven- 
 tion to, 63 -64 ft; in Syria, 65; in 
 favor Roumanian Jews (1867), 
 67; to prevent persecution of 
 Eoumanian Jews (1867), 68-69; 
 U. S. asks Gt. B. to take, against 
 Eussia, 73 ; of Gt. B., France, 
 and Austria in favor of Poland, 
 89 / ; effect of, to increase sig- 
 nificance of menacing language, 
 94; concurrent notes to Russia 
 (1863), 94; Gt. B. fears joint 
 action with France, 94; identic 
 notes, importance of, 94; Fish 
 tries to effect, relative to Cuba, 
 121 ft; in Greece (1827), 126; 
 Bulgaria (1876) 127 /; France 
 and Gt. B. against Naples, 137; 
 in Morocco (1909), 146-148; 
 Gt. B. and U. S. cooperate in 
 regard to Putumayo, 186 ; tradi- 
 tional policy of U. S. regarding 
 joint action, 174; proposal to 
 restrict international police regu- 
 lation to, 285; of European 
 concert, 306-311; greater au- 
 thority of states in, 310 n. 
 
 Colombia: action of U. S. in re- 
 gard to Panama, 287-297. 
 
 Comity: opinion that obligations 
 of international cooperation are 
 based upon, 47-48 n. 
 
 Commerce (see also Commercial 
 Relations) : foreign, humani- 
 tarian intervention through regu- 
 lation of, 257-277. 
 
 Commercial Relations : right to 
 compel Japan to enter into, 
 287 n. 
 
 Compensation : 35. 
 
 Compromise (see also Adjustment, 
 Conciliation, Relativity) : ob- 
 ligation to agree to reasonable, 
 of rights and interests, V (Pre- 
 face) ; reasonable, all just 
 grounds of intervention subor- 
 dinate to obligation of, VI 
 (Preface) ; 36; right to counter- 
 intervene against state not show- 
 ing spirit of, 451-453 ; obliga- 
 tion to agree to reasonable, 456; 
 obligation to accept, before re- 
 35 
 
 course to force, 456; to be 
 adopted for cases without rule 
 of law, 457; obligation to con- 
 form to reasonable, 457; rea- 
 sonable rule which requires 
 states to agree to, 457. 
 
 Compuigators: purpose of, 12 n. 
 
 Concert (see also European Con- 
 cert) : 306-311. 
 
 Conciliation, International : see 
 Compromise. 
 
 Concurrent action : presentation 
 of notes to Russia, 94; see 
 Kongo, intervention of Gt. B. 
 and U. S., 162-179. 
 
 Condorcet: 377-378. 
 
 Conferences: powers of the nations 
 in, 310n; exercise executive au- 
 thority, 429. 
 
 Conquest: Russian argument re- 
 garding effect of, op treaty, 
 109 n; modification of law per- 
 mitting enslavement, 217; par- 
 tition another name for, 415 ; 
 Morier justifies compensation, 
 416; obligation of third states 
 to prevent excessive satisfaction, 
 420-421; defined, 431-438; an- 
 nexation not always conquest, 
 432 n; wars for conquest un- 
 lawful, 432 n ; authorities recog- 
 nizing illegality of, 433 n ; forms 
 of, 435 n ; Russian system of, 
 435-436; indemnity cover for, 
 436-437; illegality of not to be 
 confused with legal consequences 
 of, 437; uti possidetis, 437 n; 
 438. 
 
 Costa Rica: 152 n; 300. 
 
 Constitutionalism: interference to 
 maintain, 150-154; interferences 
 of Wilson administration in 
 favor of, 84. 
 
 Constructive attack: 373-378; 
 abusive asylum, 373 n, right to 
 meet, by self-help, 374. 
 
 Constructive intervention: use of 
 territory as base justified as, 
 104 n. 
 
 Consul: apology of Russian offi- 
 cial for insult to German, 26 ; 
 refuse vise of passports, 72 . 
 
 Contagion: doctrine of, 385-392; 
 illegality of interference based 
 upon, 390 passim. 
 
 Contempt of sovereignty: sug- 
 gested as designation, 323.
 
 54G 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Contributory negligence: effect 
 upon right of representations, 
 104. 
 
 Cooperation: expenses for inter- 
 vention in Cuba, 5; to prevent 
 Fenian expedition, 7-8 n; of 
 powers to suppress slave trade 
 (1841), 8; of United States 
 and Mexico to prevent frontier 
 raids (1893), 8n; Palmerston 
 overthrown for attempt to pre- 
 vent conspiracies, 25 n. 
 
 Copenhagen, bombardment of: dis- 
 cussion of, 407-414; compared 
 with violation of Belgium, 413. 
 
 Counter- Armament (see also In- 
 surance, Prevention) : futility 
 of policy of, when pushed to 
 extreme, 366-369 n. 
 
 Counter-Tntervention : 45-51 ; ob- 
 ligation to undertake, 47-49 ; 
 authorities who deny obligation, 
 47-48; effect of public opinion, 
 49. 
 
 Counsel: given to Servian gov- 
 ernment, 144. 
 
 Crampton, Sir John : 199, 322 n. 
 
 Creole case: 227/. 
 
 Creasy, Sir Edward S.: 22-23; 
 45?i; (55 n); 124; 206 n; 355- 
 356; 359; 361; (372 n) ; 
 395 n; 418-419, n; 441 n. 
 
 Crimes: extraordinary, interven- 
 tion justified in the case of, 
 139-146; in Servia, 139-146. 
 
 Cromer, Lord : 3 n. 
 
 Cuba: expenses for intervention 
 in, 5; justice of intervention in 
 (1898), 57-58; rests on doc- 
 trine of "international nui- 
 sance, ' ' says Moore, 62 n ; refu- 
 tation of Moore's view, 62-63 n; 
 intervention of U. S. in, 120; 
 humanitarian intervention (1898) 
 in, 120-122; protection of 
 American interests, 122 n ; U. S. 
 supervisory action in, approved 
 by Roosevelt, 296 ; Lord Eustace 
 Percy considers Cuba depend- 
 ency of U. S., 303-304 7i ; for- 
 bearance of the U. S. in the case 
 of, 346. 
 
 Curtis, Poy Emerson : 7 n. 
 
 Damages (see also Exemplary 
 damages): exemplary, 31-34; 
 obligation to pay, 36; indirect, 
 36. 
 
 Dana, R. H.: 269. 
 
 Danish Sound Dues: 288 n. 
 
 Decision of sovereign: subject to 
 control of other states, 403-404. 
 
 Delagoa Railway Arbitration: 35. 
 
 Delays: obligation to observe all 
 reasonable, before recourse to 
 force, 456. 
 
 Delbruck, Prof.: 301 n. 
 
 DelcassS: 17; 140. 
 
 Denial of Justice (see also In- 
 justice) : intervention on the 
 ground of, 139. 
 
 Dennis, William C.: 290 n. 
 
 Dickinson, E. D. (64 n) ; (304 n); 
 307 n; 315 n; 429 n.. 
 
 Dictation: weaker states submit 
 to reasonable, 451 ; small 
 states yield to, 451. 
 
 Diplomacy: Roosevelt's action in 
 behalf of Jews on Russia, 76- 
 77 ; method used to prevent per- 
 secution of Protestants in Tus- 
 cany, 84-85; personal influence 
 of Lord Normanby, 85 ; Napier 
 communicates note informally 
 before presentation, 99 n. 
 
 Diplomatic corps: at Lima, action 
 regarding importation of Poly- 
 nesians, 201-202. 
 
 Diplomatic intervention: formerly 
 used in place of interposition, 
 2n. 
 
 Disavowal : 34-35. 
 
 Discretion: (see also Sovereignty) : 
 in enforcing international law, 
 must be left to governments, 49 ; 
 effect of diplomatic considera- 
 tions cause demand for equal 
 treatment of Jews, 79-80 n ; of 
 state in fulfilling obligations, 
 403 ; opportunity for states in 
 fulfilling obligations and insist- 
 ing upon rights, 447-448 ; in 
 fulfilling obligations, affords 
 necessary elasticity (447) ; rea- 
 sonable, of sovereign fixed by 
 opinion of all the states, 456. 
 
 Discrimination : effect of, upon 
 small states, 318 n. 
 
 Disinterestedness : Harding re- 
 marks on, of U. S. in Cuba 
 (1898), 121 n; of U. S. in 
 Kongo, 167 ; of U. S. action in 
 Kongo, 177; of U. S. and man- 
 date over Armenia, 312. 
 
 Disraeli: 24 n; 128-136; 130 n; 
 399 n.
 
 INDEX 
 
 547 
 
 Disturbances, prolonged: as justi- 
 fication for intervention (Poland 
 1863), 112-113 n; Cuba, 121. 
 
 Draga, Queen: assassination of, 
 139 /. 
 
 Dresden: destruction of, in the 
 nature of self-help, 6. 
 
 Druses: persecution of Maronites, 
 63-66. 
 
 Duel: 31-32. 
 
 Dunning, W. A. : 55. 
 
 Dupuis, Charles : 416, 423 n. 
 
 Easement: the doctrine of inter- 
 national, defended by Koot, 295. 
 
 Egypt : 296 ; 368 n. 
 
 Equality: U. S. considers refusal 
 to vise passports of Jews vio- 
 lation of, 72 n ; Lord Granville 
 insists that treaty of 1859 gives 
 equality of treatment to all 
 British subjects, 79 n; of treat- 
 ment, U. S. demands, for all 
 Americans, 72; France secures 
 for French Jews in Switzerland, 
 81 n. 
 
 Equality of states: criticism of 
 theory of, 314-315/1; as regards 
 international law, 451. 
 
 Esmein : 86 n. 
 
 European Concert (see also Col- 
 lective Action) : 306-310. 
 
 Exclusion of warships: nature of 
 right, 217. 
 
 Executive authority: of interna- 
 tional society, 429. 
 
 Exemplary damages: 31-34; com- 
 pared with wergild, 31. 
 
 Expenses: reimbursement of, for 
 punishment of Prince of Chosu, 
 5; reimbursement of, for inter- 
 vention in Cuba, 5. 
 
 Expiation: 21-35, right to exact, 
 21-23; apology, 24-27; salute 
 of flag, 27-28 ; missions and 
 monuments, 28-31; exemplary 
 damages, 31-34; disavowal, 
 34-35. 
 
 Expulsion : U. S. objects to en- 
 forced immigration of Jews, 69, 
 74-75. 
 
 Extradition: refusal of, in case 
 of slave (Anderson case), 221- 
 226; in Creole case, 227-234; 
 refusal to deliver Anfu leaders, 
 256 n ; of seamen, 268 passim. 
 
 Extraordinary crimes: interven- 
 tion justified in the case of, 139- 
 
 146; assassination of King 
 Alexander and Queen Draga, 
 139-146. 
 
 Extraterritoriality (see also Asy- 
 lum, Warships) : Circassian 
 slave received in British em- 
 bassy, 234-238. 
 
 Falkland Islands: instance of, 4. 
 
 Fashoda: incident, 17. 
 
 Favored treatment for aliens: 
 humanitarian intervention to se- 
 cure, 154-162. 
 
 Fenelon: 421-422 n; 427 n. 
 
 Fenian expedition against Canada 
 (1884) : cooperation to prevent, 
 7-8 n. 
 
 Fessenden: 279. 
 
 Field: (220 n). 
 
 Filibustering expeditions : right to 
 use self-help to prevent, 3 74 71. 
 
 Floeckher de: 320?;. 
 
 Florida: incident of, 27-28. 
 
 Forbearance: SewarJ's remarks, 
 115 n; obligation of foreign 
 states during civil war, 346-347 ; 
 obligation ceases with protracted 
 struggle, 350 /. 
 
 Force: purpose to set forth oc- 
 casions where recourse to, to 
 influence state conduct, is justi- 
 fied, VI (Preface) ; right to 
 use, to overcome resistance to 
 law, 50-51; obligation to ob- 
 serve delays before recourse to, 
 453 n ; obligation to demon- 
 strate right before having re- 
 course to, 456; rule governing 
 employment of, in international 
 relations, 455 ; publication of 
 reasons before recourse to, af- 
 fords sanction, 457. 
 
 Foreign commerce: humanitarian 
 intervention through regulation 
 of, 257-277. 
 
 Foster, John W.: 251-252 n. 
 
 Franco-German war (1870) : pres- 
 tige from, 18-19. 
 
 Frankfort : 79. 
 
 Fugitive slaves: refusal to deliver, 
 205-241. 
 
 Funk-Brentano and Sorel : 41 ; 
 (58 n); 331-332; 349n;350n; 
 375-376 n. 
 
 Furuseth, Andrew: 261 /. 
 
 Galiani, Ferdinando: 400-401. 
 Gareis: (58 n) ; (64 n).
 
 548 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Garner, J. W.: (402 n). 
 
 Geffcken: 330 n; (338 n). 
 
 Gentz : 284 n. 
 
 George, Lloyd : 12 n. 
 
 Germany: 18; 27; 204; 413. 
 
 Gladstone: champions cause of 
 Bulgarians, 132 passim. 
 
 Glafey, Ad. F. : first to recognize 
 right to intervene in protracted 
 civil strive, 282 n. 
 
 Good offices: used to cover pro- 
 test, 82. 
 
 Gortchakoff : 97 /. 
 
 Government, form of: restriction 
 upon in common interest, 428- 
 429. 
 
 Granville, Lord: 79 n; 130. 
 
 Greece: 83; intervention in 1827, 
 126-127; status of, 307 n. 
 
 Green, J. B. : on humanitarian 
 intervention in favor of self- 
 determination, 134. 
 
 Grey, Lord (1821): 379. 
 
 Grey, Sir Edward (Viscount) : 
 limited support of interference 
 against Huerta, 152 n ; com- 
 ment of, on U. S. attitude to- 
 ward League of Nations, 326- 
 329. 
 
 Greytown : 40. 
 
 Groce and Cannon: incident, 43. 
 ' Gronovius : 288 n. 
 
 Grotius: (55 n) ; 56-57; 281; 
 287 n; 288 n; 355; 369-370; 
 395 n 400 n; 407; 408 n. 
 
 Growth (see also Prevention) : 
 innocent; right of, 367-373; 
 right to regulate, to prevent dis- 
 turbance of balance of power, 
 427. 
 
 Guarantee : of Alsace-Lorraine, 
 by neutral powers, suggested by 
 Mill, 37 n; treaty of 1846, 290; 
 treaties of, 430, 439-440 n; Wil- 
 son proposes treaty of, for 
 American states, 443. 
 
 Guatemala: 28 n; 33; 148 /. 
 
 Giinther: limitation upon abuse 
 of sovereignty, 281-282 n; 
 (284n); 442 n. 
 
 Guizot: 311 n; 330 n; (394 n). 
 
 Hale, Horatio: 11 n. 
 
 Hall, W. E.: 2n; 45; 47 n; 48 
 51 n; (56 n); 60-61 n; 196 n 
 240; 277 n; (280 n) ; 285 
 286; 310 n; 331 n; 353 n 
 358 n; (374 n); 391-392 
 
 394 n. 408 n; 409-410; 425 n; 
 
 431 n; (438 n) ; 441 n; 444- 
 445 n. 
 
 Halleck, H. W. : (58 n) ; (220 n) ; 
 319 n ; (352 n); 403 n; 422 n; 
 
 432 n; 441 n; (445 n). 
 Hammond : 240. 
 
 Harcourt (Historicus) : 60 n; 
 429-430 n. 
 
 Harding, President: 121; 302 n; 
 383-384; 449. 
 
 Harrington, Lord: 66. 
 
 Hauterive : 397 n. 
 
 Hay, Secretary: 69. 
 
 Hayti: 302 n; 305. 
 
 Hciberg: (55 n) ; 386 n. 
 
 Heineccius: 374 n. 
 
 Heffter: (55 ) ; (220 n) ; 
 (353 n); (444 n). 
 
 Heller, Karl: 282 n. 
 
 Hershey, A. S.: 77 n; 301 n; 
 (312 ?i ) ; 434. 
 
 Herzegovina: 127; 13671,; 296. 
 
 Hesse Cassel : 440 n. 
 
 High Seas: jurisdiction over, 6-7, 
 7n. 
 
 Historicus: see Harcourt. 
 
 Hodges, H. G. (56 n). 
 
 Hogan : 401. 
 
 Holland: see Netherlands. 
 
 Holland, T. E.: 19 n; 203;. 309 n; 
 356 7i ; 410 n. 
 
 Holy Alliance: Gt. B. opposes in- 
 terference policy of, 332-337; 
 attempts to enforce doctrine of 
 contagion, 387. 
 
 Hooker: limitation upon sover- 
 eignty, 281 n. 
 
 Hostile expeditions: Fenian in- 
 vasion of Canada Caroline af- 
 fair, 5; cooperation to prevent, 
 7-8 n ; Palmerston 's efforts to 
 prevent conspiracies (1857), 24- 
 25 n. 
 
 Hostile operations, base of: af- 
 forded Polish insurgents, 104; 
 obligation to prevent, 104 n. 
 
 Hostile propaganda: 378-384; of 
 Irish sympathizers, 383 ; limits 
 upon religious propaganda 
 abroad, 384-38571. 
 
 Huber: (357 n). 
 
 Huerta : 151 ; 300 n. 
 
 Humanitarian asylum: 205-257. 
 
 Humanitarian intervention: 51- 
 277; definition, 51, 53; not 
 justified for occasional abuses, 
 52; legality of, 55-58; action
 
 INDE.X 
 
 549 
 
 of U. S. in Cuba legal, 57-58; 
 authorities who deny legality, 
 58; Eougier considers rests 
 upon the solidarity of mankind, 
 53 n ; approved by author of 
 ' ' Vindicae Contra Tyrannos, ' ' 
 55; Grotius, 56; Borchard, 57; 
 Woolsey, T. S., 57; Werden- 
 hagen denies legality, 58 n ; 
 Vattel 's opinion, 59 n ; Ber- 
 nard 's opinion, 59-60 n; Har- 
 eourt's, 60 n; Hall's, 60 n; 
 Lawrence's, 61 n; authorities 
 who condone, 59-62 ; doctrine of 
 ' ' international nuisance ' ' re- 
 futed, 62 ; limitation to col- 
 lective action, 63-64; in the 
 case of semi-civilized peoples, 
 64-65; to prevent oppression, 
 86-125; to prevent uncivilized 
 warfare, 125-139 ; to prevent in- 
 justice, 139-195; not justified 
 on ground of occasional abuse, 
 139 ; to punish extraordinary 
 crimes, 139-146; to prevent per- 
 sistently abusive treatment, 146- 
 150; to ensure constitutional 
 government, 150-154; to secure 
 favored treatment for aliens, 
 154-162 ; to prevent abusive 
 treatment of aborigines, 162- 
 195 ; to suppress the slave trade, 
 195-205; by means of humani- 
 tarian asylum, 205-257 ; through 
 regulation of foreign commerce, 
 257-277; asylum to slaves con- 
 stitutes negative form of, 207 ; 
 passive, by excluding ships and 
 imports, 270-277. 
 
 Humanity: laws contrary to, 
 ought not to be observed on for- 
 eign warships, 214. 
 
 Identic notes: superior to con- 
 current, 94. 
 
 Idman, K. G.: (439 n). 
 
 Impeachment of sovereignty: of 
 Russia over Poland, in Russell's 
 note, 99 n ; intervention in 
 Poland justified on ground of 
 prolonged disturbances, 112- 
 113 n; 138; of Peru in Putu- 
 mayo, 192 ; premature recogni- 
 tion constitutes unwarranted, 
 349; in the case of anarchy 
 and protracted struggle, 350- 
 351. 
 
 Imperfect Rights: and duties, 
 447-449. 
 
 Imports: Stapleton favors exclu- 
 sion of slave-grown sugar, 276. 
 
 Incitement to revolt: when justifi- 
 able as auxiliary of interven- 
 tion, 353 ; Amos gives defini- 
 tion, 354-355; hostile propa- 
 ganda, 378-384; used against 
 weak states to influence action, 
 450. 
 
 Indemnity: 35-36; payment of, 
 to Colombia not justified, 292. 
 
 Independence {see also Absolute 
 independence, Perfect rights) ; 
 no state justified in insisting 
 upon absolute, V (Preface). 
 
 Indirect damages: 35-36. 
 
 Individual: protection of rights 
 of, 139; responsibility for con- 
 duct of government, 457. 
 
 Injustice : as a ground for humani- 
 1 tarian intervention, 139-195. 
 
 Insurance: against attack, futility 
 of, 366-369 n. 
 
 Intercession: whether action to 
 prevent persecution of Russian 
 Jews was, or intervention, 71 n; 
 Hershey criticizes Merignhac 's 
 views relative to action in 
 favor of Russian Jews, 77; of 
 Lord Palmerston in favor of 
 Poles (1830), 91; representa- 
 tions of small states for Poland 
 not intervention, 95-96. 
 
 Interests: protection of vital, a 
 ground for invention (Castle- 
 reagh) : 336; facilities of 
 states to protect, 450; import- 
 ant, of other states, obligation 
 to yield technical rights to con- 
 serve, 451. 
 
 Interference (see also Non-inter- 
 ference) : of Wilson adminis- 
 tration in favor of constitution- 
 alism, 84; in favor of political 
 agitators in Naples (1857), 88; 
 definition of, 318; opinions of 
 authorities, 318 /, often wrongly 
 confined to internal affairs, 319- 
 321; distinguished from "vio- 
 lations of sovereignty, ' ' 322 ; 
 treaty cannot give right of, 
 439-443. 
 
 International law (see also Vindi- 
 cation of International Law) : 
 discovered in general practice of 
 states, V (Preface) ; refusal to
 
 550 
 
 INDEX 
 
 compromise on basis of relative 
 importance of rights and inter- 
 ests, violation of, VI (Preface) ; 
 distinction between, and inter- 
 national morality, 52 ; not sta- 
 tionary, but admits progressive 
 improvement, 217; part of law 
 of England, 233; Angell criti- 
 cizes Hall 's definition of, 286 ; 
 based upon territorial sover- 
 eignty, 297; importance of, 
 345 n, 347 n ; primary purpose 
 of, 372-373; effect of formula- 
 tion of rules, 398 n ; rules of 
 must not be too rigid, 447 ; 
 system of, must be elastic, 447 / ; 
 purpose of, 451 ; includes ob- 
 ligation to agree to reasonable 
 compromise, 452-453 ; system of, 
 built upon what is reasonable 
 in opinion of all the states, 456 ; 
 political questions not covered 
 by, 457; conduct of state wheti 
 no guiding rule of, 457 ; no rule 
 possible when opinion divided, 
 457; nature of control over 
 political action, 457. 
 
 International Police: 45-317. 
 
 International Police Regulation : 
 277-297. 
 
 International rivers: right to use, 
 nature of, 287 n. 
 
 International security : superior to 
 rights of separate states, 455. 
 
 Interposition: discussed, 1-44; de- 
 fined, 2 ; use of, for counter- 
 interrention, 45. 
 
 Intervention (see also Humani- 
 tarian Intervention, Interposi- 
 tion, International Police) : 
 defined, VI (Preface); 316; 
 law of, lies between absolute 
 independence and unregulated in- 
 terference, V (Preface) ; means 
 or machinery not discussed, V 
 (Preface) ; justice of grounds 
 of, rests upon public opinion, 
 V (Preface; ; to secure redress 
 for national rights called "In- 
 terposition," 2; all just ground 
 of, subordinated to rule of rea- 
 sonable compromise, VI (Pref- 
 ace) ; justified upon refusal to 
 compromise, VI (Preface) ; re- 
 imbursement for expenses of, in 
 Cuba, 5; constructive, by use of 
 territory as base for Polish in- 
 
 surgents, 104 n; negative or 
 passive humanitarian, 105 n; 
 distinguished from interference, 
 316; right of, to enforce obli- 
 gation, of reasonable compro- 
 mise, 454; application of the 
 law of, guided by opinion of all 
 the states, "555. 
 
 Intolerance (see also Persecution) : 
 treatment of Christians in Tur- 
 key (1867), 133 n. 
 
 Invitation : effect of, to justify 
 assistance in case of insurrection, 
 331-332; from insurgents can- 
 not justify interference, 352 ; 
 practical value of, 352-^53. 
 
 Ireland: American interference in 
 (1848), 87-88; application to, 
 of principles laid down in regard 
 to Poland, 120 ; discussion of 
 rights of, 122-126; propaganda 
 of Irish sympathizers in U. S., 
 383-384. 
 
 Iroquois: League of, regulates 
 private vengeance, 11. 
 
 Italy: 88; 95; 96 n; 134. 
 
 Japan: victory over Russia, pres- 
 tige from, 19. 
 
 Jews: of Prague, persecution of, 
 by Maria Theresa, 66-67; per- 
 secution in Roumania, 67-70; 
 persecution in Russia, 71-79; 
 persecution of by Prussia in 
 Frankfort, 79; in Switzerland, 
 80-81 n. 
 
 Joint action: representations in 
 Kongo, 173 ; U. S. tries to se- 
 cure in Cuba, 198-199. 
 
 Justification: see Statement of 
 reasons. 
 
 Jouffroy: 401 n. 
 
 Kamptz : 284 n ; 442 n. 
 Kebedgy, M. S.: (56 n) ; 65 n; 
 
 282 n; 311 n; 319 n; (321 n). 
 Kent: 154; (220 n) ; 357; 
 
 (394 n). 
 
 Keynes, J. M. : 12 n. 
 Kishenef massacres (1903): 76- 
 
 78. 
 Kliiber; (372 n) ; (386 n); 393 n; 
 
 396; (408 n.); 411 n; (442 n). 
 Knox, Secretary: 43; 78; 150; 
 
 ISO/; 247 /. 
 Kongo: intervention of Gt. B. 
 
 and U. S. to prevent abuse in, 
 
 162-179.
 
 INDEX 
 
 551 
 
 Kongo Eeform Association: ap- 
 peal for intervention, 164 /. 
 
 Korea : Senate refuses to declare 
 sympathy for, 124 n. 
 
 Kozmian, b. von: (97 n). 
 
 Krug, W. T.: 387; 424 n; 442 n. 
 
 Kruger, President: 365 n. 
 
 Kuhn, Arthur K.: 79-81 n. 
 
 Labor: enforced (see also Aborig- 
 ines) : arrest of seamen, 264 
 passim. 
 
 Laboree: suggested expiation for 
 murder of: 30-31. 
 
 Lampredi: 222; (408 n). 
 
 Law: purpose of, to preserve 
 peace, 433 n. 
 
 Law of War: intervention to 
 prevent violation of, 125-126; 
 137 n; 282 n. 
 
 Lawrence, T. J.: (47 n); 61-62 n; 
 297 ; 307 7i ; 308 n; (312 n) ; 
 313-314 n; 359 n; 394 n; 
 (397 n); 401 n; (403 n) ; 
 4127i; 423n; 442 n. 
 
 Lebanon : intervention of powers 
 to protect Maronites: 63-66. 
 
 Legations: and Consulates, asy- 
 lum in, 243-257. 
 
 Legitimacy: doctrine of, and 
 Holy Alliance, 332-338. 
 
 Lewis, Sir George Cornewall: 366- 
 369 n; 376 n; 439 n. 
 
 Limitation of Armaments: na- 
 ture of, when imposed, 287, 428. 
 
 Lingelback, W. E.: (56 71); 153; 
 42471. 
 
 Liberia : 300 n. 
 
 Liszt, Franz von: 394 n. 
 
 Lorimer, James: (47 n). 
 
 Louter, J. de: 439 n; (442 n). 
 
 Lusitania : publication of warn- 
 ing "contempt of sovereignty," 
 323-324. 
 
 Lyons, Lord: 17; 133 n; 240; 
 284 n. 
 
 Macaulay, Lord: 418-421 n. 
 
 Aiachiavelli : 393 n. 
 
 Mclntosh, Sir J ames : 20 n ; 135 n ; 
 
 346 n; 35271. 
 McDermott, P. L.: 204 n. 
 McLeod: instance, 5. 
 Magee: incident, 28. 
 Magnanimity : President Barrows 
 
 discusses effect of, 16; when out 
 
 of place, 20. 
 
 Mahan, Capt. A. H.: 54-55; 134 n; 
 303-304; 41071. 
 
 Maine, Sir Henry S.: 153; 213; 
 345 n ; 360-361. 
 
 Mamiani: 351 n; 395-396 n. 
 
 Mandala: doctrine of: 304 n. 
 
 Mandates: 311-316; U. S. in- 
 vited to accept, for Armenia, 82. 
 
 Mandatory: (see also mandates) ; 
 Eussia's action in Bulgaria 
 (1877) not for interests of 
 other powers, 132 ; Mill refers 
 to action of one nation acting 
 with acquiescence of others, 
 138 ; U. S. in Panama, acting 
 as, for all states, 289; Hall's 
 reference to action as, 31071. 
 
 Manifesto (see also Statement of 
 reasons) : 455. 
 
 Manning, Oke: 378-379. 
 
 Marcy, Secretary of State: denies 
 aliens enjoy favored treatment, 
 155. 
 
 Maronites; persecution of, by 
 Druses, 63-66. 
 
 Martens, F. de: (164 n) ; 320 n; 
 (444n). 
 
 Martens, G. F. de : 314 n ; (353 n) ; 
 (360); (3727!.); 393 n; 425 n; 
 442 n; 44571. 
 
 Means, T. L.: 280 n. 
 
 Memorial builaing: as expiation, 
 30-31. 
 
 Menace: see Threats. 
 
 Merchant Shipping Act : 258 /. 
 
 Metternich: 332; 337; 387. 
 
 Mexico: interference of President 
 Wilson to prevent recognition of 
 Huerta, 151-152 n ; intervention 
 policy of U. S. in, 301 n; as- 
 sistance afforded U. S. 1912 by 
 embargo on export of arms, 
 342 7i ; permission to cross 
 American territory, 343-344. 
 
 Military necessity: 404-405. 
 
 Military preparations: effect and 
 prevention of, 362-366. 
 
 Mill, John Stuart: 24-26; repara- 
 tion due Germany for French 
 aggression (1870) 37 n; Alsace- 
 Lorraine settlement, 37 n ; 8871; 
 justifies intervention to stop 
 prolonged civil war, 138; 239 n; 
 304 n; 346 n; 391; 433 n. 
 
 Millard's Review: 25671. 
 
 Milovanovitch: (442n). 
 
 Missions: expiatory, 28-30.
 
 INDEX 
 
 Mobilization: significance of mili- 
 tary preparations and right to 
 prevent, 362-367. 
 
 Monroe Doctrine: J. B. Moore on, 
 
 Monuments: expiatory, 30-31. 
 
 Moore, J. B.: 3n; 36; 40-41; 
 43; (51 n); "international 
 nuisance," 62 n; 133 n; 224 f; 
 226n; 242; 259; 268n;283/; 
 (297 n); 299 n; 300 n; 304; 
 (342 n); 343 n; 349; (378 n) ; 
 443 n. 
 
 Morality : international, distinc- 
 tion between and international 
 law, 52 n ; Hall considers, as 
 justification of police action, 
 285; Hall criticized by Angell, 
 286; violation of international 
 law justifiable, 207 ; obligation 
 to compromise differences, 452. 
 
 Morier, Sir Robert: 78; 319- 
 320 n; (347 n) ; 416; 432 n. 
 
 Morley, John: 127; 133 n. 
 
 Moser, J. J.: 66. 
 
 Napier, Lord. 14 n; 97 n. 
 
 Naples: 88; 137; 333. 
 
 Napoleon III: 65; 86 n; 153; 
 238. 
 
 j. ational control: nature of, 6-7. 
 
 Nationalities (see also Oppression, 
 Self-Determination) : Napoleon 
 III action in Italy, 153 ; opin- 
 ion in favor of interference on 
 behalf of, 351 ; criticism of, 
 351; doctrine of, often pretext 
 for conquest, 435 n. 
 
 Necessity (see also Self -Preserva- 
 tion) : Castlereagh considers 
 justifies interference, 336; doc- 
 trine of, 393 / ; why contrary 
 to international law, 396; true 
 doctrine of, defined, 399 ; mili- 
 tary necessity, 404-405 ; mili- 
 tary necessity and neutral rights, 
 405-414 ; absolute, perfect 
 rights covers doctrine of, 453. 
 
 Negative intervention : 105n; asy- 
 lum to fugitive slaves consti- 
 tutes, 207; refusal to extradite 
 slaves, 221 /. 
 
 Netherlands: 66; 282 n.. 
 
 Neutrality: military necessity and 
 neutral rights, 405-414. 
 
 Neutralization: 428. 
 
 Newton, Lord: 240. 
 
 Nicaragua : 33 n ; 43 ; 302 n. 
 
 Nicholas II : 364-365 n. 
 
 Non-interference (see also Inde- 
 pendence) : discussion (of the 
 principle of, and various excep- 
 tions in which intervention is 
 justified, 317-446; does not 
 justify abusive use of independ- 
 ence, 321; Gt. B. opposes 
 policy of Holy Alliance, 332- 
 333. 
 
 Non-intervention : Westlake re- 
 futes doctrine of, 53-54; British 
 policy, 117 7i. 
 
 Normanby, Lord: (85). 
 
 Notice: see Statement of reasons. 
 
 Nuisance: doctrine of interna- 
 tional refuted, 62; intervention 
 in Cuba (1898) erroneously 
 justified as removal of 121 n; 
 when a state becomes, justifies 
 police action, 415 n. 
 
 Obata: 256 n. 
 
 Olmutz : 320. 
 
 Oppenheim: 26; (47 n) ; 50-51 n; 
 61 n; 394 n; (397 n) ; 425 n; 
 428 n. 
 
 Oppression (see also Support of 
 Revolution): 86-125; formerly 
 confused with religious persecu- 
 tion, 86 ; humanitarian interven- 
 tion to prevent, 86-125; of 
 Poles, statement of basis of the 
 intervention (1863), 112; state- 
 ment of acts which constitute, 
 (Poland, 1863), 112, 112-120; 
 Cuba, 120-121; humanitarian 
 intervention to prevent justified 
 by Green, 134; limits of right 
 to intervene to prevent, 351-352. 
 
 Ortolan: (220 n). 
 
 Ostracism: William II refuses to 
 receive King Peter, 144. 
 
 Otto, King: given refuge on Brit- 
 ish warship, 242. 
 
 Ott's Kliiber: 386 n; 396 n. 
 
 Pacific Blockade: Zanzibar, 203- 
 204 n. 
 
 Pacifico Case: 157; 401. 
 
 Palmer, Sir Roundell: 154-155. 
 
 Palmerston, Lord: instructions re- 
 garding intercession for Poland, 
 100 n; interferes to favor con- 
 stitutional government, 153 ; 
 action to suppress slave trade,
 
 INDEX 
 
 553 
 
 199-200; interference to secure 
 constitutional government in 
 Spain, 199; constrains Brazil 
 to abolish slave trade, 199-200; 
 action to prevent interference 
 in Sonderbund, 347 n. 
 
 Panama: nature of Eoosevelt's 
 action in regard to, 287-297. 
 
 Parma, Duke of: 242. 
 
 Partition: policy of, to maintain 
 balance of power, 415 / ; equiva- 
 lent to conquest, 415; Pal- 
 merston criticizes French policy 
 of, 417-418; partition treaties 
 of 1698 and 1700 defended by 
 Macaulay, 418-421 n. 
 
 Passive Intervention (see also 
 Negative Intervention) : use of 
 territory by Poles may be re- 
 garded as instance of, on ground 
 of humanity, 105 n. 
 
 Passports of Jews: refusal of 
 Russian consuls to vise, 72 n. 
 
 Patrol, International Police: 278 n. 
 
 Payn, F. W.: 53 n; 301 n; 309. 
 
 Peace: preservation of, object of 
 criminal procedure, 12; main- 
 tenance of, as a ground of inter- 
 vention (Poland 1863;, 105; 
 settlement, instances and nature 
 of intervention to effect, 286; 
 preservation of: obligation to 
 compromise rights and interests 
 for, 453 ; maintenance of inter- 
 national, rests upon appeal to 
 international reason, 457. 
 
 Peel, Sir Robert: 366 n; 369 n. 
 
 Percy, Lord Eustace: discussion 
 of U. 8. supervision over Amer- 
 ican states, 302-304 n. 
 
 Perfect rights: favored treatment 
 of aliens inconsistent with, 155; 
 covers doctrine of absolute 
 necessity, 454. 
 
 Persecution: 63-86; of Maronites 
 by Druses, 63-66; of Jews, 66- 
 82; of Armenians, 80-82, 82- 
 85 n ; of Reformation, 83 ; in 
 Tuscany, 84-85; formerly con- 
 fused with oppression, 86. 
 
 Persia: 30. 
 
 Persigny : 197 n. 
 
 Persistently abusive treatment: as 
 a basis for humanitarian inter- 
 vention, 146-149. 
 
 Peru: 178 /; 200 /; 243 /; 254 /. 
 
 Peter, King: 142 passim. 
 
 Peter the Great's Ambassador: in- 
 cident, 28-30. 
 
 Phelps, E. J. (56 n) ; 302 n. 
 
 Phillimore, Sir Robert: (58 ft); 
 (205ft); 213; 280; (352 ft) ; 
 360; 373-374 n; (376ft); 376- 
 377; (394ft); (403ft); 425 ft; 
 428ft. 
 
 Phillips, W. A.: 332ft; (337 n) ; 
 387; 388-390; 414ft. 
 
 Philnpson, Coleman: 431ft; 
 434ft; 437ft. 
 
 Fillet: (56ft); 308 n; 424ft. 
 
 Plimpsoll Act: 258-261. 
 
 Poland: oppression of, 89-120. 
 
 Police, International (see Inter- 
 national Police) : 45-317. 
 
 Police patrol: 278ft. 
 
 Policy: definition of, 449; nature 
 of, 449; questions of, not cov- 
 ered by international law, 457; 
 of enlightened self-interest, 458. 
 
 Polish insurrection: Prussia in- 
 terferes to assist Russia, 338-341. 
 
 Political action (see also Discre- 
 tion) : discussion of, 447-454; 
 nature of control of interna- 
 tional law over, 452-453; 457. 
 
 Political controversies: limits of, 
 set by international law, 452- 
 453; obligation of international 
 law to conform to reasonable 
 compromise in, 457. 
 
 Political influence: 450-451. 
 
 Political refugees: right to refuse 
 delivery from war vessels, 215; 
 must not be allowed to abuse 
 asylum, 347-348. 
 
 Pope: refuge ready on British 
 warship, 242; 243. 
 
 Port Arthur: 421ft. 
 
 Portugal: 34; 35; 95; 153; 
 200; status of, 305 n; 307 n. 
 
 Pradier-Fode>e : 403 n. 
 
 Premature recognition : of Pan- 
 ama constituted intervention, 
 289. 
 
 Prestige: 13-21; loss of, 13-14; 
 nature of national, 14-16 ; re- 
 sulting from victory, 18-19; 
 reputation, 19. 
 
 Prevention : discussion of inter- 
 vention to prevent aggression, 
 355-392 ; concentration and 
 mobilization, 362-366; insurance 
 against attack criticized by Lord 
 Blachford and Lewis, 366-369 n;
 
 554 
 
 INDEX 
 
 innocent growth, right of, 367- 
 373; constructive attack, 373- 
 378; hostile propaganda, 378- 
 384; contagion, doctrine of, 
 385-392. 
 
 Prevention of mischief, 280. 
 
 Preventive war: see Prevention. 
 
 Private warfare: 31-32. 
 
 Procedure: criminal, primary ob- 
 ject of, 12. 
 
 Prohibition of entry: 273-276. 
 
 Protest: spoken of as "good of- 
 fices," (1915), 82; Palmerston 
 (1832) warns against empty 
 threats, 100-101 n; important 
 effect of, for Poles (1830), 
 110 n. 
 
 Protracted civil war: justification 
 for intervention Poland (1863), 
 112-113 n; Cuba, 121-122; right 
 to impeach sovereignty in case 
 of, 350-351. 
 
 Prussia: interferes to assist Bus- 
 sia suppress Polish insurrection, 
 038-341. 
 
 Publicity: obtained for Kisheneff 
 protest, 76-77; effort to influ- 
 ence Peru by, 192; report on 
 Mandates required, 313; ob- 
 ligation to state reason before 
 recourse to force, 458. 
 
 Public opinion: justice of grounds 
 of intervention rest upon, V 
 (Preface) ; sympathy of, for 
 Poles, 101 /; approval of mag- 
 nanimity, 20; effect of, in sup- 
 port of counter-intervention, 49; 
 enforcement of international law 
 dependent upon, 49; effect of, 
 on action to prevent slave traffic, 
 198 n ; of all the states con- 
 stitutes appeal from sovereign 
 decision, 456; enlightened, salu- 
 tary effect of, 458; influence 
 of, to secure respect for law, 458. 
 
 Punishment: Gt. B. refuses to 
 punish officers for action at 
 Lagos (1759), 34; 37-44; of 
 less civilized nations, 39-43 ; re- 
 straining influence of, 43-44; 
 purpose of, 38, 38 n; of in- 
 dividuals by way of self-help, 
 42 ; personal responsibility 
 recognized by Treaty of Ver- 
 sailles, 43 ; expulsion of Zelaya 
 after execution of Groce and 
 Canon (1909), 43. 
 
 Punitive expedition: see Punish- 
 ment. 
 
 Putumayo atrocities: humanitarian 
 intervention of Gt. B. and U. S., 
 179-195. 
 
 Quabbe, Georg: 439 n; (442 n). 
 
 Katification: Gt. B., for act of 
 McLeod, 5-6. 
 
 Beason, rule of: 455-458. 
 
 Seasonable : compromise, conflict 
 between rights and interests to 
 be settled upon basis of, 451 ; 
 adjustment: method of reach- 
 ing learned by experience, 451- 
 452 ; international law based 
 upon what is, 456-457. 
 
 Becognition: of Zelaya withdrawn 
 (1909), 43; of Greece (1827), 
 126 n ; of the post-regicide gov- 
 ernment in Servia, 141 /; with- 
 drawal of by Secretary Knox, 
 in case of Zelaya 'a government, 
 150-151; President Wilson re- 
 fuses in case of Huerta, 151- 
 152 n ; resolution regarding eon- 
 federate states, 238-239; of 
 Panama : nature and purpose of, 
 289; of insurrectionary govern- 
 ment, when justified, 348; of 
 belligerency, conditions which 
 justify, 348-349 ; premature, 
 349 ; premature constitutes un- 
 warranted impeachment of sov- 
 ereignty, 349; of U. S. by 
 France, 349; discretion in ac- 
 cording, 448-449. 
 
 Bedesdale, Lord: (97 n) ; 98 n; 
 101. 
 
 Bedress: 9-21. 
 
 Beeves : 12 n. 
 
 Befugees (see also Asylum) : see 
 Fugitive slaves, 205-241 ; see 
 Political refugees, 241-257. 
 
 Befusal : to vis4 passports of 
 Jews (1895), 72 n. 
 
 Begional control (see also Super- 
 vision, Mandates) : 299 ; ap- 
 proximation of mandates to, 
 312. 
 
 Behabilitation : 13 ; what con- 
 stitutes adequate, 24. 
 
 Beimbursement : expenses of in- 
 tervention against Prince of 
 Chosu, 5; for intervention in 
 Cuba, 5.
 
 INDEX 
 
 555 
 
 Eeinsch, P. S.: dn; 278 n. 
 
 Reintegration : assistance for pur- 
 pose of reestablishing control 
 over lost territory not justifiable, 
 344. 
 
 Relativity (see also Adjustment; 
 Compromise) : principle of, 400- 
 404. 
 
 Eeligious persecution: see Perse- 
 cution, Intolerance. 
 
 Remedies, international : 1. 
 
 Reparation: 35; due Germany 
 for French aggression (1870), 
 37 n. 
 
 Repington: 325-326 n; 363 n. 
 
 Representations : regarding Ar- 
 menian persecutions (1915), 81- 
 82. 
 
 Reprisals: Elgin burns Summer 
 Palace, 39; France threatens 
 Switzerland with, to secure 
 rights of French Jew, 81 n; 
 seizure of English gunner as, 207. 
 
 Reputation: 19. 
 
 Reshitelni: destruction of, by way 
 of self-help, 6. 
 
 Resistance: right to overcome, 
 50-51. 
 
 Responsibility of citizens: for 
 conduct of government, 458. 
 
 Restoration: assistance for pur- 
 pose of restoring government 
 not justifiable, 344. 
 
 Retaliation: (see Talion, law of) ; 
 in international, 44; abrogation 
 of treaty with Russia, 78 ; Amer- 
 icans searched in Ireland by way 
 of (1848), 88; use of territory 
 by Poles might be justified as, 
 104 n. 
 
 Retorsion (see also Retaliation) : 
 British minister withholds recog- 
 nition (1879), 70. 
 
 Revenge: redress based upon, 9; 
 first component of satisfaction, 
 9-10; nature of, 10; restricted 
 by the Iroquois, 11; trial of 
 Kaiser, 12 ; satisfaction and re- 
 habilitation, 13 ; failure to ex- 
 act, consequences of, 13-16; 
 magnanimity, 16; check upon 
 excessive, 20 n. 
 
 Revolt (see also Support of revo- 
 lution) : where it is justifiable 
 to incite to, 125; incitement 
 to, no evidence of U. S. in 
 Panama, 290-291. 
 
 Rey, Francis: (77 71). 
 
 Rights (see also Perfect rights) : 
 abusive insistence upon, 399 
 passim; of states, restriction 
 upon, 451 ; technical or formal, 
 obligation of states to depart 
 from, 452 ; no absolute or per- 
 fect, 455. 
 
 Rivers, international: nature of 
 right to use, 287 n. 
 
 Rivier, A.: (56); 58 n; 393; 
 434 n. 
 
 Robin, Raymond: (66 n) ; (31). 
 
 Rolin-Jaequemyns: 309-310 n. 
 
 Romanes, George J. : 9 n. 
 
 Roosevelt: 18; 54; 76-79; 287 /; 
 action in Panama justified, 291- 
 292 passim; 296 /; 365 n. 
 
 Root, Elihu: 30 /; rights of 
 aliens to minimum of security, 
 157-159; 163 /; 268 n; nature 
 of action in Panama, 287 n; 
 293; doctrine of international 
 easement, 295. 
 
 Rossi, Pellegrino: (47 n) ; (283 n) ; 
 320 n ; 442 n. 
 
 Rotteck, H. von: (320 n) ; (353 n) ; 
 356; 397 n; 424 n; (442 n). 
 
 Rotteck, K. von: (55 n) ; 386 n. 
 
 Rougier, Antoine: (45 n); 52- 
 53?i; (55 n) ; (56 n); 58 n; 
 (77 n); 146 /; (321 n); 329 n. 
 
 Roumania: 67. 
 
 Royal Commission on Fugutive 
 Slaves: 206 n; appointment of, 
 208; report of, 208. 
 
 Rule: of obligation to agree to 
 reasonable compromise of rights 
 and interests for common good, 
 V (Preface). 
 
 Russell, Lord: criticism of, 98 n; 
 action of, for Poland compared 
 to Palmerston 's, 100 n; con- 
 tempt for foreign policy of, 
 100 n ; ignorance of principles 
 of international law, 109 n; 202. 
 
 Russell, Bertrand: 301 n. 
 
 Russia: 6; 26; 28 /; 65; 70; 
 72; 77; 83; 89/; 131 passim; 
 intervention in favor of Bul- 
 garians, 128, 136. 
 
 Sackville West, Lord : 323 n. 
 St. Vincent, Lord: 207 n. 
 Saleilles: 38. 
 
 Salute of flag: 27-28; Florida in- 
 cident, 27-28.
 
 556 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Sanction: effective, lacking to 
 guarantee impartial fulfilment, 
 449-450; ultimate, based on ap- 
 peal to international reason, 
 457; guarantee of justice af- 
 forded by publication of reason 
 before recourse to force, 458. 
 
 Santo Domingo: 302 n. 
 
 Larkar, Benoy Kinnar : 304 n. 
 
 Satisfaction: first component of 
 revenge, 9-10; one of the com- 
 ponents of revenge, 13 ; exces- 
 sive: obligation of third states 
 to prevent conqueror from ex- 
 acting, 420-421. 
 
 Satow, Sir Ernest : 243. 
 
 Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915: 
 261-268. 
 
 Security: 36-37. 
 
 Self -Determination (see also Na- 
 tionality, Oppression ) : Mill 's 
 suggestion for settlement of 
 Alsace-Lorraine in 1870, 37 n; 
 reluctance of governments to 
 favor, 86; public opinion 
 favors, 86; American interfer- 
 ence in Ireland (1848), 87-88; 
 international law does not recog- 
 nize right of autonomy, 87; Pol- 
 ish national institutions, 90; 
 promise of by Russia to Poles 
 in Act of Vienna, 109 ; denial 
 of, in the case of Poland (1863), 
 112; 112-120; adherence to 
 principle of by Senate, 124 n ; 
 Creasy 's statement of limits of, 
 124-125 ; intervention in Greece 
 (1827) really case of, 126; 
 Green approves policy of sup- 
 porting, 134; evils of national 
 dependence, 304n; interference 
 in favor nationalities, 351. 
 
 Self -Execution : reason why per- 
 sists in international relations, 
 447-448. 
 
 Self -Government : see Autonomy, 
 Oppression, Self-Determination. 
 
 Self -Help: 3-6; Falkland Islands 
 (1831), 4-5; punishment of 
 Prince of Chosu (1864), 5; 
 Caroline or McLeod affair, 5-6 ; 
 Dresden (1914), destruction of, 
 6; destruction of Reshitelni, 6; 
 punishment of individuals by 
 way of, 42 ; intervention in 
 Cuba (1898) erroneously classed 
 as, to remove nuisance, 12 In.; 
 
 does not constitute violation of 
 sovereignty, 322 n ; justified in 
 case of constructive attack, 374; 
 erroneously used for self- 
 execution, 447. 
 
 Self-interest : enlightened, policy 
 of, should be supported, 458. 
 
 Self -Preservation : self-help classed 
 as, 4; Polish insurrection did 
 not endanger safety of France 
 and England, 103-104; Austria 
 affected by Polish insurrection, 
 104 n ; justification for inter- 
 vention, 104n; as a ground of 
 intervention, 392-414; dangers 
 of permitting discretionary ac- 
 tion for, "454. 
 
 Semi-Civilized nations: see Aborig- 
 ines, Humanitarian intervention. 
 
 Senior, Nassau : 58 n ; 346 n ; 
 390-391 n; 418 n ; 423-424 n; 
 425. 
 
 Servia : 139 /. 
 
 Severity (see also Magnanimity) : 
 ineffectual, to suppress revolt, 
 114 . 
 
 Shipping : regulation of foreign, 
 on ground of humanity, 258- 
 269. 
 
 Slave Trade: humanitarian inter- 
 vention to suppress, 19,5-205. 
 
 Slavery: contrary to international 
 law, 206; status of, under in- 
 ternational law, 214 /. 
 
 Smith, A. H.: 14 n. 
 
 Snow, Alpheus H. : 8 ; views on 
 slave trade, 196 n ; uses ' ' super- 
 vision, ' ' 298 n ; nature of super- 
 visory power, 301-302 n. 
 
 Snow, Freeman: (133 ?i). 
 
 Solidarity: of mankind, Rougier 
 considers basis of humanitarian 
 intervention, 53 n. 
 
 Sonderbund : Palmerston thwarts 
 interference, 347 n. 
 
 Sovereignty (see also Contempt of 
 sovereignty, Violation of sov- 
 ereignty, Discretion): 1; pre- 
 sumption of legality in ease of 
 action of sovereign, 3 ; presump- 
 tion that local laws are not in- 
 humane, 215 ; may be overcome, 
 215; presumption in favor of 
 legislation of, 268; limitation 
 upon, Hooker's view, 281 n; 
 Kebedgy 's, 282 n ; nature of 
 Colombia's, over Panama, 288;
 
 INDEX 
 
 557 
 
 of Colombia over Panama, dis- 
 cussed by Eoot, 293-295; right 
 of state to act upon conscien- 
 tious judgment, 403 ; check of 
 other states over decisions of, 
 403-404; due exercise of, 455; 
 obligation upon other states to 
 correct the erroneous Decision 
 of each state, 455; right of 
 state to decide when rights and 
 interests are endangered, 456. 
 
 Soviet government (see also Bol- 
 sheviki) : 380-383. 
 
 Spain: 95; 153; 199. 
 
 Sponsion: attempt of govern- 
 ment to give right of interfer- 
 ence, 107. 
 
 Stapleton, A. G. (47 n) ; 109 n; 
 150 n; 276; (280); 319 n. 
 
 Statement of reasons: of recourse 
 to force, 456-458. 
 
 Status quo: defense of, to main- 
 tain balance of power, 415; no 
 standing in international law, 
 417-418. 
 
 Stead, W. T.: (97 n). 
 
 Stowell, E. C.: (305 ) ; (307 n) ; 
 364 n; (380 n); (396 n). 
 
 Stowell, Lord: 219 n; 222 n. 
 
 Strauch: (58 n) ; 350 n; 421 n. 
 
 Sudden accessions of power: right 
 of intervention to prevent, 425- 
 426. 
 
 Summer Palace: burning of, as 
 reprisal, 39. 
 
 Supervision (see also European 
 Concert, Mandates): 297-316; 
 Eoosevelt on obligation of 
 United States in Western Hemi- 
 sphere, 54; right of U. S. over 
 Panama, 290; presumption in 
 favor of U. S. acting in Pan- 
 ama, 290 n ; Eoosevelt approves 
 instances of, 296; origin of 
 bond of protection and depend- 
 ence, 4ol. 
 
 Support of revolution (see also 
 Oppression): 345-355; con- 
 trary to international law, 345. 
 
 Supreme Court, U. S.: 269. 
 
 Sweden : 95 ; 96 n. 
 
 Switzerland : 80 n. 
 
 Syria: 63. 
 
 System of self-execution (some- 
 times called "self-help") : de- 
 fects of, 45-46 ; advantages of, 
 46. 
 
 Talion (see also Eetaliation, Ee- 
 prisals, Eetortion) : law of, 
 11 n; law of, applied in inter- 
 national relations, 44. 
 
 Temporary refuge (see also Asy- 
 lum) : U. S. distinguishes be- 
 tween, and asylum, 247 ; 247-252. 
 
 Tennyson, Lord: 14 n; 458. 
 
 Territorial sovereignty: violations 
 of, when justified, 402-403. 
 
 Thrasher 's case : 156 n. 
 
 Tinoco government : President 
 Wilson refuses to recognize, 
 152 n; 300 n. 
 
 Threats (see also Protest) : France 
 makes of reprisals to secure 
 rights of French Jews in Switz- 
 erland, 81 n; menacing lan- 
 guage (Poland 1863), 93. 
 
 Transit: denial of, on ground of 
 humanity, 270-273; right of, 
 recognized by Grotius, 287 n; 
 illustration of relativity of 
 rights, 403 n. 
 
 Treat, P. J.: 5 n. 
 
 Treaty: cooperation to suppress 
 slave trade, (1841), (1842), 
 (1862), 8; instances of treaties 
 for ' ' combination, ' ' references 
 for, 9 n ; of Washington, May 8, 
 (1871); apology of Gt. B. for 
 escape of Alabama (1871), 25- 
 26; expiation for Boxer out- 
 rages (1900), 30; quadruple 
 (1834), 153; of U. S. and 
 Colombia (1846): 289-290. 
 
 Treaty as basis of intervention 
 (see also Guarantee) : Poland, 
 106 /; cannot create right of 
 intervention in internal affairs, 
 107; when constitutes reason- 
 able restriction, 107 n; Heytes- 
 bury on impossibility of guar- 
 anteeing particular government, 
 108 n; as basis of guarantee, 
 109; value of to facilitate in- 
 tervention, 110; in Kongo, 163, 
 165-166, 169, 176; purpose of 
 treaties, 439 ; treaties to inter- 
 fere not legal, 439-443 ; legality 
 of stipulation for common good, 
 443-444. 
 
 Trent: case of, 16-17. 
 
 Trummer, Dr. : 38(i n. 
 
 Turkey: 63-65; 82; 296; col- 
 lective control of, 309 n; organ- 
 ization of dual control, 310.
 
 INDEX 
 
 Twiss, Sir Travers: 3 n; (220 n) ; 
 (372 n); (394 n) ; (402 n) ; 
 (403 ); 408 ; 410-411 n; 
 428 n; 441 ; (445 n). 
 
 Uncivilized warfare: 125-139; as 
 justification for intervention 
 (Poland 1863), 113-115 n; in 
 Cuba, 121; as a ground for 
 humanitarian intervention, 125- 
 139. 
 
 Uncompromising attitude (see also 
 Adjustment, Compromise) : 
 rightful consequences of unrea- 
 sonable obstruction by Colom- 
 bia, 293 n. 
 
 United States: obligation of, in 
 Western Hemisphere, 54; action 
 to prevent persecution oi Jews, 
 67-79 ; objects to enforced im- 
 migration of Eussian Jews 
 (1891), 74-75; refuses to inter- 
 vene for Poland (1863), 95 n; 
 policy of, regarding European 
 affairs, 95 n ; moves to secure 
 joint action in Cuba, 198-199. 
 
 Vattel: (47 n); 50-51; (55 n); 
 59 n; (288 n) ; 353 n; 354 n; 
 (356 n); 357; 359; 361; 370- 
 372; 374 n; 376 n; 378; 393; 
 403 n; 407; 426-427; 433 n. 
 
 Vessels, public (see also Com- 
 merce) : status of, in foreign 
 ports, 218 /, and passim; de- 
 nial of entry, to enforce pro- 
 hibition, 273-276. 
 
 Victoria, Francisco: 433 n. 
 
 Vidari: (320); 424 n. 
 
 Vienna, Congress of: final act of, 
 91. 
 
 Vindication of international law: 
 obligation not sufficiently under- 
 stood, 47-48. 
 
 Vindieiae Contra Tyrannos: ap- 
 proves of humanitarian inter- 
 vention, 55. 
 
 Violation of sovereignty: defini- 
 tion of, 322 ; instances of, 
 322 /; does not include self- 
 help, 322 n ; limits of propa- 
 ganda abroad, 384-385 n. 
 
 Virginius: self-help, 7. 
 
 Vis4: Russian consuls refuse, of 
 passports of Jews, 72 n. 
 
 Wambaugh, Eugene : 160 n. 
 
 War (see also Laws of war, Un- 
 civilized warfare, Preventive 
 war, Protracted civil war) : 
 laws of, 282 n. 
 
 Warnkoenig : 23 n. 
 
 Warships: enforcement of laws 
 contrary to humanity, 214; ex- 
 clusion, 217. 
 
 Webster, Daniel : 156 n. 
 
 Wei-Hai-Wei: 421 n. 
 
 Werdenhagen, Angelius: views on 
 humanitarian intervention, 58 n. 
 
 Wergild: compared with exem- 
 plary damages: 31. 
 
 Westlake, John: 47 n; 53-54; 
 (55); 196 n; (277 n) ; 279- 
 280; (298n); 314-315 n; 317 n; 
 345 n; (348 n) ; (374 n); 
 375 n; 387-388 n; 392 n; 393; 
 394-395; 397 n; 400 n; 401; 
 403; 411 n; 424-425 n; 426 n; 
 (428 n); 435 n; 437 n. 
 
 Wheaton: (55); 109 n; (372 n) ; 
 395; 425 n. 
 
 Whewell: 288 n. 
 
 Wicker, C. W.: (428 n). 
 
 Wilhelm II : Lloyd George 's prom- 
 ise, 12 n ; trial of, 43 ; Tweed- 
 mouth letter discussed, 325 n. 
 
 Wilson, President : 43 ; policy of 
 interference to maintain con- 
 stitutional government, 151-152 ; 
 interference in Mexico, 151 n; 
 Panama supports President Wil- 
 son against Huerta, 152n; in- 
 terferes to prevent recognition 
 of Tinoco government, 152 n ; 
 266 n; 300 n; 301 n; 303 n; 
 396; proposes to guarantee ter- 
 ritory of American states, 443 ; 
 policy of, participation in Euro- 
 pean affairs, 449. 
 
 Wilson and Tucker : 425 n. 
 
 Woolsey, T. D. : 47-48 n; (196n); 
 (220 n); (287 n) ; (288 n) ; 
 426 n; 441 n. 
 
 Woolsey, 'i'. S. : justifies humani- 
 tarian intervention in Cuba, 57- 
 58; grounds of intervention 
 Cuba (1898), 122 n. 
 
 Wolff: (408n). 
 
 Zanzibar: action of powers to 
 
 prevent slave trade, 203-204. 
 Zelaya: 43; 150; 303 n.
 
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