AT LOS ANGELES RETIREMENT < >F COLONEL F. B. BUNNY. R.A. A SUCCESSOR APPOINTED. Notification has been received at the Bar- racks, High Wycombe, that the Wat- have appointed Lt.-Colonel A. M. Balfour, R F A., to succeed Colonel F. B. Bunny m the command of No. 4 Artillery Training School. Col. F. B. Bunny, who was on the retired list, was requested last June D War Office to volunteer his services in tprm iiiK No. 4 Training School, R.F.A. (T.), at High Wycombe. This service Colonel Bunny gladly undertook. The time has now ar- rivi'd whPti Col. Bunny's services an- ' BRANCH, F CALIFORNIA, tARY, tES, CALIF. <,).(. \KI. T. B. , li.\.' longer required. The War Office have thanked Col. P.unny for having come for- ward at a time when his services were ur- gently required, and have noted him for further re-employment if and when an op- P It ^interesting to note that Colonel Bunny retired from the Royal Artillery in August, 1910, after completing 38 years' service m the Royal Artillery, 17 of which were spent in India. During his services, Col. Bunny- served in the Horse. Field, Siege, and Garri- son Artillery, and on the Regimental Staff. his last appointment before coming to High Wycombe being at Portsmouth, where i command of the Royal Garrison Ar- tillery, Southern Command. MTTTTSBV r.Rir.KF.T. SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEMS BY CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, PH.D. Professor of Sociology, University of Missouri Author of "Sociology in its Psychological Aspects," "Introduction to Social Psychology," " The Social Problem." NEW EDITION 45512 AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY NEW YORK CINCINNATI CHICAGO BOSTON ATLANTA COPYRIGHT, 1910, 19131 1919. BY CHARLES A. ELLWOOD Entered at Stationers' Hall, London ELLWOOD, SOCIOLOGY E. P. 12 PREFACE FOR TEACHERS THIS book was originally written as an elementary text * in sociology for use in high schools, colleges, and reading circles where it is desired to combine the study of sociology with a study of current social problems on the one hand, and to correlate it with a course in economics on the other. SK The generous reception and wide use which the book has ^ enjoyed since its publication seem to indicate that there is a demand for a simple, concrete text in sociology in which methodological discussions are reduced to a minimum and the facts are drawn as far as possible from contemporary social life. The original plan of the book has not been departed . from; but when the Federal Census of 1910 necessitated ^ extensive alterations in the book, the opportunity was ^ taken to give it a somewhat thorough revision. Not only were statistics brought down to date wherever possible, ' but upon the advice of teachers using the book as a text, considerable new material was incorporated. Two entirely new chapters, one on "The Bearing of Modern Psychology upon Social Problems," and the other a "Theoretical Sum- mary," were added. It is hoped that these will aid in bringing out more clearly the theoretical implications of the concrete problems studied; but as noted in the text, they may be omitted in brief courses of study, such as those of reading circles. No chapter was added on the development of economic institutions, as several had suggested, since it is intended that the study of this 3 4 PREFACE text should be accompanied, or followed, by a study of economics. Again after the Great War, the book has been revised and enlarged without altering its plan and organization. The purpose of this revision has been to relate the text to the problems of reconstruction now confronting the nation, to bring statistics down to date so far as possible, and to revise the lists of supplementary readings. Thus as in earlier editions those who wish to do wider reading on the problems treated in this text will find a series of suitable references at the end of each chapter. The first reference mentioned under the heading "For brief reading" is es- pecially commended to those who can lay out but a brief course of parallel readings. The fundamental method of the book has not been changed. The book aims to illustrate the working of the chief factors in social organization and evolution, and so the elementary principles of sociology, by the study of concrete problems, especially through the study of the ori- gin, development, structure, and functions of the family considered as a typical human institution. In spite of some criticism, I have, therefore, continued to make large use of the family as the simplest and, in many ways, the most typical form of human association to illustrate socio- logical principles. I am firmly convinced, after more than a dozen years of experience in teaching sociology to un- derclassmen, that this is a sound method. One might say, indeed, that the study of the family is to sociology what the study of the cell, or cytology, is to biology, if one were not afraid of being accused of employing the organic anal- ogy ! While there are many things in human association which the student cannot perceive through the study of PREFACE 5 the family, yet it does reveal in a most unmistakable way all of the fundamental biological and psychological factors in the social life. I would especially commend the study of the history of individual families through several gener- ations as a form of sociological investigation, suited to elementary students, which will bring out clearly the bio- logical and psychological forces shaping our Social life. This method, now employed so extensively by students of eugenics, is capable of indefinite expansion on the psycho- logical side, if attention is paid to the interests, ideals, and traditions of individual families. The making of such family monographs, together with the making of one or more community surveys, might, indeed, well be made the necessary laboratory or field work in an elementary course of sociology. To bring out the factors and principles of the social life not illustrated by the family, a number of other concrete social problems are studied. These have been selected to illustrate the more important remaining sociological prin- ciples. They have also been selected mainly from contem- porary American society, not merely because it is " prac- tical " to do so, but also because the United States affords the greatest sociological laboratory, for American students at least, that can possibly be found. How foolish it would be for American students of sociology to shut themselves up to the uncertain material afforded by cultural anthro- pology and ethnology when they have such a wealth of concrete sociological data all about them ! For the ele- mentary student, at any rate, there can be no doubt as to the wisdom of approaching sociological principles through the study of the concrete problems of the contemporary social life with which he is familiar, rather than through 6 PREFACE the study of some hypothetically reconstructed primitive society. While all scientific methods should be used by the sociologist, the observation, description, and statistical study of contemporary society are surely the most impor- tant for the beginner. I wish again to express my indebtedness in the prepara- tion of this book to my former teachers, especially to Professor Willcox of Cornell University and to Professors Small and Henderson of the University of Chicago. Much of the substance and method of this book was derived from their instruction. My main sources are also indicated in the lists of references. CHARLES A. ELLWOOD. UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI. CONTENTS CHAPTER I PAGE THE STUDY OF SOCIETY 9 CHAPTER II THE BEARING OF THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROB- LEMS ." 29 CHAPTER III THE BEARING OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS . . 57 CHAPTER IV PRIMARY GROUPS: THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY IN HUMAN SOCIETY 76 CHAPTER V THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY 93 CHAPTER VI THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY no CHAPTER VII THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY 131 CHAPTER VIII THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY 145 7 8 ' CONTENTS CHAPTER IX PAGE THE GROWTH OF POPULATION 181 CHAPTER X THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM 211 CHAPTER XI THE NEGRO PROBLEM 246 CHAPTER XII THE PROBLEM OF THE CITY 275 CHAPTER XIII POVERTY AND PAUPERISM 299 CHAPTER XIV CRIME 326 CHAPTER XV SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY 354 CHAPTER XVI EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 371 CHAPTER XVII THEORETICAL SUMMARY 388 INDEX 409 SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEMS CHAPTER I THE STUDY OF SOCIETY What is Society? Perhaps the great question which so- ciology seeks to answer may be this question which we have put at the beginning. Just as biology seeks to answer the question "What is life?"; zoology, "What is an animal?"; botany, "What is a plant?"; so sociology seeks to answer the question "What is society?" But just as biology, zoology, and botany cannot answer their questions until those sciences have reached their complete development, so also sociology cannot fully answer the question "What is society? " until it reaches its final development. Never- theless, some conception or definition of society is necessary for the beginner; for hi the scientific discussion of any problem we must know first of all what we are talking about. Before we can study the social problems of to-day from a sociological point of view, then, we must understand in a general way what society is, what sociology is, and what the relations are between sociology and other sciences. The word "society" is used popularly to designate a variety of more or less permanent human groups. A word used scientifically, however, must be given a definite mean- 9 10 THE STUDY OF SOCIETY ing corresponding to observed facts. Now we observe in the first place that collective or group life is not peculiar to man, but characterizes many animals and plants as well. Mere collective or group life, however, is not in itself social life. A clump of grasses, a forest of trees, a colony of bac- teria, or a group of protozoa may show interdependence in the life activities of their separate units, but we .do not usually call them " societies," because, so far as we know, their individuals do not have conscious relations. Such groups of lowly organisms do, however, show the first mark of social life hi that they carry on certain life activities in common. But interdependence in life activities constitutes what we call "comradeship" or "society" only when it reaches the conscious or mental plane. The second mark of social life, accordingly, is the exist- ence of conscious relations among the members of a group. The group life is carried on by means of mental interactions; that is, the interdependence in life activities is more or less guided and controlled by conscious processes. Using the term in a concrete sense, then, we may say that a society is any group of individuals who carry on a common life by means of conscious relations. We say "conscious relations," because it is not necessary that these relations be specialized into imitative or sympathetic, economic or political relations to make society or social life. Society is constituted by the mental interaction of individuals and exists wherever two or more individuals have reciprocal conscious relations to each other. Dependence upon a common economic environment, or mere contiguity in space, on the other hand, is not sufficient to constitute society. It is mental interdependence, the contact and THE STUDY OF SOCIETY II overlapping of our inner selves, which makes possible that form of collective life which we call "society." Groups of plants do not constitute true societies unless it can be shown that they have some degree of mental life. On the other hand, there is no reason for withholding the term society from many animal groups. These animal societies, however, are very different in many respects from human society, and are of interest to us only as certain of their forms throw light upon human society. Certain faulty conceptions of society are prevalent, against which the beginner must be warned. In the writings of European sociologists the word society is often used as nearly synonymous with the state or nation. Now the state or nation is a group of people politically organized into an independent government, and it is only one of many forms of human society. To identify society with the state leads to many errors, both in theory and in practice. Another conception of society would make it synonymous with the cultural group or civilization. A society, accord- ing to this conception, is any group of people that have a common civilization, or that are bearers of a certain type of culture. Christendom, for example, would constitute a society. But cultural groups again are only one form of human society. Nations and civilizations are very imposing forms of human society, and hence they have attracted the attention of social thinkers hi the past to the neglect of the more humble forms. Any form of association, or social group, if studied from the point of view of organization and development, whether it be a family, a neighborhood group, a city, a nation, a party, or a trade union, will serve to reveal many of the 12 THE STUDY OF SOCIETY problems of sociology. All forms of association are of in- terest to the sociologist, though not all are of equal im- portance. The natural, genetic social groups, which we may call "communities," serve best to exhibit sociological prob- lems. Through the study of such simple and primary groups as the family and the neighborhood group, for example, the problems of sociology can be much better attacked than through the study of society at large or association in gen- eral. In this text we shall take the family as the simplest and in many ways the most typical form of human associa- tion, to illustrate concretely the laws and principles of social organization and development in general. From what has been said it may be inferred that society as a scientific term is nearly synonymous with the abstract term association, and this is correct. Association, indeed, may be regarded as the more scientific term of the two; at any rate it indicates more exactly what the sociologist deals with. A word may be said also as to the meaning of the word social. The sense in which this word will gen- erally be used in this text is that of a collective adjective, referring to all that pertains to or relates to society in any way. The word social is much broader than the words in- dustrial, political, moral, religious, and embraces them all; that is, social phenomena are all phenomena which involve the interaction of two or more individuals. Phases of Social Life. Social life in its broadest sense, as we have seen, includes the group life of the animals be- low man. Social evolution begins with animal association. But the social life of man has developed many complex phases not shown by animal social life, such as industry, art, government, science, education, morality, and religion. THE STUDY OF SOCIETY 13 Collectively these are known as "culture" (which is the scientific term for civilization in the broadest sense); and the development of culture is what distinguishes the social life of man from the social life of brutes. On account of the importance of these various phases of culture in human social life many thinkers have made the mistake of at- tempting to explain social organization and evolution through these. It has been especially popular of late to attempt to interpret the social life of man through his industrial life. But industry, art, government, morality, religion, and all other phases of civilization are products of the social life of man. Beneath them lies the biological and psychological fact of association. This is equivalent to saying that industry, government, morality, religion, and the like, in order to be understood, must be viewed from the social standpoint and interpreted as products of man's social life rather than vice versa. It should be added that the individual and society are correlatives. We have no knowledge of individuals apart from society or society apart from individuals. What we do know is that human life everywhere is a collective or associated life, the individual being on the one hand largely an expression of the social life surrounding him and on the other hand society being largely an expression of individual character. The reasons for all these assertions will appear as we develop our subject. What is Sociology? The science which deals with human association, its origin, development, forms, and functions, is sociology. Briefly, sociology is a science which deals with society as a whole and not with its separate aspects or phases. It attempts to formulate the laws or 14 THE STUDY OF SOCIETY principles which govern social organization and social evolution. This means that the main problems of sociology are those of the organization of society on the one hand and the evolution of society on the other. These words, or- ganization and evolution, however, are used in a broader sense in sociology than they are generally used. By organi- zation we mean any relation of the parts of society to each other. By evolution we mean, not necessarily change for the better, but orderly change of any sort. Sociology is, therefore, a science which deals with the laws or principles of social organization and of social change. Put in more exact terms, this makes sociology the science of the origin, development, structure, and functioning of social groups. Certain faulty conceptions of sociology have greatly impeded its progress as a science. We must not conceive of sociology, for example, as an encyclopedic science of all social phenomena; for there are manifestly other sciences of social phenomena, such as economics and politics. Again, it is wrong to conceive of sociology as the science of human institutions; for there are other sciences dealing with human institutions and, besides, the non-institutional activities of our social life are scarcely less important sociologically than the institutional. Finally, it is extremely inadequate to conceive of sociology as a study of social evils and their remedies. The development of sociology is indispensable for the correction of social evils, for the elimination of social maladjustments; but it must study primarily the laws of normal social organization and evo- lution rather than the abnormal elements in our social life; for the abnormal is an incident, a faulty development, within the normal. By understanding the laws of social THE STUDY OF SOCIETY 15 normality, however, we may be able to correct the ab- normal. The distinction between the sciences, however, is one of problems. Thus by understanding what the problems of sociology are, we shall be able to understand its relations to other sciences. The Problems of Sociology. The problems of sociology i fall into two great classes: first, problems of the organiza- tion of society; second, problems of the evolution of society. The problems of the organization of society are problems of the relations of individuals to one another and to in- stitutions. They include not only problems of group struc- ture, but also problems of group functioning. Such are, for example, problems of group unity, and so of national unity; or again, of the influence of various factors in phys- ical nature or in the human mind upon social organization. These problems may be considered as problems of society in a hypothetically stationary condition, or at rest. For this reason Auguste Comte, the founder of modern sociology, called the division of sociology which deals with such prob- lems Social Statics. But the problems which are of the most interest and importance in sociology are those of social evolution. Under this head come all problems of social origins and of social change. Especially important practically among these are the problems of social progress and of social retrogression; that is, the causes of the advance of communities, nations, and civilizations to higher types of social life, and the causes of social decline. The former problem, social progress, is in a peculiar sense the central problem of soci- ology. The effort of theoretical sociology is to develop a 1 6 THE STUDY OF SOCIETY scientific theory of social progress. The study of social evolution, then, that is, of social changes of all sorts, as we have emphasized above, is the vital part of sociology ; and it is manifest that only a general science of society like sociology is competent to deal with such a problem. Inas- much as the problems of social evolution are problems of change, development, or movement in society, Comte pro- posed that this division of sociology be called Social Dy- namics. The Relations of Sociology to Other Sciences. 1 (A) Relations to Biology and Psychology. In attempting to give a scientific view of social organization and social evolution, sociology has to depend upon the other natural sciences, particularly upon biology and psychology. It is manifest that sociology must depend upon biology, since biology is the general science of life, and human society is but part of the world of life in general. It is manifest also that sociol- ogy must depend upon psychology to explain the interac- tions between individuals, because these interactions are for the most part interactions between their minds. Thus on the one hand all social phenomena are vital phenomena and on the other hand nearly all social phenomena are on the mental plane. Every social problem has, in other ( words, its psychological and its biological sides, and sociol- ogy is distinguished from biology and psychology only as a matter of convenience. The scientific division of labor necessitates that certain scientific workers concern them- selves with certain problems. Now, the problems with 1 For a fuller discussion of the relations of sociology to other sciences, see my advanced texts, Sociology in its Psychological Aspects and Introduction to Social Psychology (published by D. Appleton & Co.). THE STUDY OF SOCIETY 1 7 which the biologist and the psychologist deal are not the problems of the organization and evolution of society. Hence, while the sociologist borrows his principles of inter- pretation from biology and psychology, he has his own distinctive problems, and it is this fact which makes sociol- ogy a distinct science. Sociology is not so easily distinguished from the special social sciences, such as politics and economics, as it is from the other general sciences. These sciences occupy the same field as sociology, that is, they have to do with social phenomena. But in general, as has already been pointed out, they are concerned chiefly with certain very special aspects or phases of the social life and not with its most general problems. If sociology, then, is dependent upon the other general sciences, particularly upon biology and psychology, it is obvious that its relation to the special sciences is the reverse ; namely, these sciences are dependent upon sociology. This is only saying practically the same thing as was said above when we pointed out that industry, government, and religion are but expressions of human social life. In other words, sociology deals with the more general biological and psychological aspects of human association, while the special sciences of economics, politics, and the like, generally deal with certain products or 'highly specialized phases of society. (B) Relations to History. 1 A word may be said about the relation of sociology to another science which also deals with human society in a general way, and that is history. 1 For a discussion of the practical relations between the teaching of history and of sociology, see my paper on " How History can be taught from a Sociological Point of View," in Education, January, 1910. 1 8 THE STUDY OF SOCIETY History is a concrete, descriptive science of society which attempts to construct a picture of the social past. Sociol- ogy, however, is an abstract, theoretical science of society concerned with the laws and principles which govern social organization and social change. In one sense, sociology is narrower than history inasmuch as it is an abstract science, and in another sense it is wider than history because it concerns itself not only with the social past but also with the social present. The facts of contemporary social life are indeed even more important to the sociologist than the facts of history, although it is impossible to construct a theory of social evolution without taking into full account all the facts available in human history, and for this reason we must consider history one of the very important methods of sociology. Upon its evolutionary or dynamic side sociology may be considered a sort of philosophy of history ; at least it attempts to give a scientific theory which will explain the social changes which history describes concretely. (C) Relations to Economics. Economics is that special social science which deals with the wealth-getting and wealth-using activities of man. In other words, it is con- cerned with the commercial and industrial activities of men. As has already been implied, economics must be considered one of the most important of the special social sciences, if not the most important. Yet it is evident that the wealth-getting and wealth-using activities of man are strictly an outgrowth of his social life, and that economics as a science of human industry must rest upon sociology. Sometimes in the past the mistake has been made of sup- posing that economics dealt with the most fundamental THE STUDY OF SOCIETY 19 social phenomena, and even at times economists have spoken of their science as alone sufficient to explain all social phe- nomena. It cannot be admitted, however, that we can explain social organization in general or social progress in terms of economic development. A theory of progress, for example, in which the sole causes of human progress were found in economic conditions would neglect political, reli- gious, educational, and many other conditions. Only a very one-sided theory of society can be built upon such a basis. Economics should keep to its own sphere of explaining the commercial and industrial activities of man and not attempt to become a general science dealing with social evolution.- This is now recognized by practically all economists of standing, and the only question which remains is whether: economics is independent of sociology or whether it rests upon sociology. The view of the most advanced economic thinkers of the present day is that economics should rest upon sociology. That economics does rest upon sociology is shown by many; considerations. The chief problem of theoretical economics is the problem of economic value. But economic value is but one sort of value which is recognized in society, moral and aesthetic values being other examples of the ; valuing process, and socially prevalent values express* the collective judgment of some human group. The problem of economic value, in other words, reduces itself to a problem in social psychology, and when this, is said it is equivalent to making economics dependent upon sociology, for social psychology is simply the psycho- logical aspect of sociology. Again, industrial organization and industrial evolution are but parts or phases of social 20 THE STUDY OF SOCIETY evolution in general, and it is safe to say that industry, both in its organization and in its evolution, cannot be understood apart from the general conditions, psychological and biological, which surround society. Again, many non- economic forces continually obtrude themselves upon the student of industrial conditions, such as custom, invention, imitation, standards, ideals, and the like. These are general social forces which play throughout all phases of human social life and so show the dependence of industry upon society in general, and, therefore, the dependence of economics upon sociology. Much more might be said in the way of concretely illustrating these statements, but the purpose of this text precludes anything but the briefest and most elementary statement of these theoret- ical facts. (D) Relations to Politics. We have already said that the state is one of the chief forms of human association. The science which treats of the state or of government is known as political science or politics. It is one of the oldest of the social sciences, having been more or less sys- tematized by Aristotle. The problems of politics are those of the origin, nature, function, and development of govern- ment. It is manifest that politics, on both its practical and its theoretical side, has many close relations to sociology. While the state or nation must not be confused with society in general, yet because the state is the most imposing, if not the most important, form of human association, the relations of politics and sociology must be very intimate. On the one hand, political scientists can scarcely under- stand the origin, nature, and proper functions of govern- ment without understanding more or less about the social THE STUDY OF SOCIETY 21 life generally ; and, on the other hand, the sociologist finds that one of the most important facts of human society is that of social control, or of authority. While political science deals only with the organized authority mani- fested in the state, which we call government, yet inas- much as this is the most important form of social control, and inasmuch as political organization is one of the chief manifestations of social organization, the sociologist can scarcely deal adequately with the great problems of social organization and evolution without constant reference to political science. An important branch of political science is jurispru- dence, or the science of law. This, again, is closely related with sociology, on both its theoretical and its practical side. Law is, perhaps, the most important means of social control made use of by society, and the sociol- ogist needs to understand something of the principles of law in order to understand the nature of the existing social order. On the other hand, the jurist needs to know the principles of social organization and evolution in general before he can understand the nature and purpose of law. (E) Relations to Ethics. 1 Ethics is the science which deals with the right or wrong of human conduct. Its problems are the nature of morality and of moral obligation, the validity of moral ideals, the norms by which conduct is to be judged, and the like. While ethics was once consid- ered to be a science of individual conduct it is now generally 1 For a full statement of my views regarding the relations of sociology and ethics, see my article on "The Sociological Basis of Ethics," in the International Journal of Ethics, April, 1910. 22 THE STUDY OF SOCIETY conceived as being essentially a social science. The moral and the social are indeed not clearly separable, but we may consider the moral to be the ideal aspect of the social. This view of morality, which, for the most part, is in- dorsed by modern thought, makes ethics dependent upon sociology for its criteria of Tightness or wrongness. Indeed, we cannot argue any moral question nowadays unless we argue it in social terms. If we discuss the Tightness or wrongness of the drink habit, we try to show its social con- sequences. So, too, if we discuss the Tightness or wrong- ness of such an institution as polygamy, we find our- selves forced to 'do so mainly in social terms. This is not denying, of course, that there are religious and metaphysical aspects to morality, these are not necessarily in conflict with the social aspects, but it is saying that modern ethical theory is coming more and more to base itself upon .the study of the remote social consequences of conduct, and that we cannot judge what is right or wrong in our complex society unless we know something of the social consequences. Ethics must be regarded, therefore, as a normative science to which sociology and the other social sciences lead up. It is, indeed, very difficult to separate ethics from sociology. It is the business of sociology to furnish norms and standards to ethics, and it is the business of ethics as a science to take the norms and standards furnished by the social sciences, to develop them, and to criticize them. This text, there- fore, will not attempt to exclude ethical implications and judgments from sociological discussions, because that would be futile and childish. THE STUDY OF SOCIETY 23 (F) Relations to Education. Among the applied sciences, sociology is especially closely related to education, for education is not simply the art of developing the powers and capacities of the individual; it is rather the fitting of individuals for efficient membership, for proper function- ing, in social life. On its individual side, education should initiate the individual into the social life and fit him for social service. It should create the good citizen. On the social or public side, education should be the chief means of social progress. It should regenerate society, by fitting the individual for a higher type of social life than at present achieved. We must have a socialized education if our present complex civilization is to endure. Social problems touch education on every side, and, on the other hand, education must bear upon every social problem. It is evident, therefore, that sociology has a very great bearing upon the problems of education ; and the teacher who comes to his task equipped with a knowledge of social conditions and of the laws and principles of social organization and evolution will find a significance and meaning in his work which he could hardly otherwise find. (G) Relations to " Home Economics." " Home econom- ics," or domestic science, is another good example of an applied social science which rests upon sociology. So far as it deals merely with the physical problems of the house- hold group, such as nutrition and sanitation, it rests upon chemistry, physiology, bacteriology, and other physical sciences. But so far as it deals with the higher life of the family, with the " home " in the true sense, it must rest upon sociology. Sociology comes in, then, to give a point of view and of approach ; for the practical problems of the 24 THE STUDY OF SOCIETY family life cannot be properly viewed unless the function of the family in human society is understood, and even something is known of the origin and evolution of the family as a form of association. (H) Relations to Social and Philanthropic Work. 1 If social and philanthropic work is to be scientific, it must rest chiefly upon sociology. The elimination of hereditary defectiveness, the overcoming of the social maladjust- ments of individuals, and the correction of faulty social and industrial conditions the three great tasks of sci- entific social work all require great knowledge of human society. While economics and political science furnish in- dispensable facts for the social worker, the general laws of normal social life, or human living together, must be sought in sociology. Sociology stands hi much the same rela- tion, therefore, to scientific social work as biology does to medicine, and hence the social worker requires thorough equipment in sociology that he may approach his tasks aright. Whether social work aims to be remedial, that is, to restore to normal social life dependents, defectives, and delinquents; or preventive, that is, to remove the causes of social misery; or constructive, that is, to develop a higher degree of social welfare for all, it must take into account at every step the laws which govern human relations, the principles of social normality, the causes of social maladjust- ment, and the agencies of social progress; and these must be sought fundamentally in sociology. 1 Additional reading on this topic may be found in the author's articles on "Philanthropy and Sociology" in The Survey, June 4, 1910, and on "Social Facts and Scientific Social Work" in The Survey, June 8, 1918. THE STUDY OF SOCIETY 2 5 The Relations of Sociology to Social Reconstruction. 1 The last sentence indicates briefly the bearing of sociology upon problems of social reconstruction. The Great War has left our civilization torn and divided. At the same time it has revealed fatal weaknesses in our institutions. Social readjustments along many lines have become neces- sary. Hence many programs of reconstruction have been presented. To judge between these the citizen needs to know the fundamental principles of social organization and of social progress the laws of social survival, of social efficiency, and social harmony. We no longer build bridges without consulting bridge engineers; neither should we attempt to build institutions without the fullest use of expert knowledge. To judge the many social programs of the present, then, the citizen needs a knowledge of sociology. Among the many party programs put forward as a basis for social reconstruction at the present time, for example, is socialism; and of socialism there are many varieties, from the extreme revolutionary class socialism, which is now popularly known as Bolshevism from the party name of its Russian advocates, to the relatively conservative type of socialism exemplified in the platform of the British Labor Party. Now, while sociology has no logical connection with socialism or any other party program, it is evident that the various forms of socialism cannot be properly understood or intelligently criticized without knowledge of sociology. This is true of all party programs, but it is especially true 1 Additional reading on this topic (which may be best taken up, however, after Chapter VIII) may be found in the author's book on The Social Problem (published by The Macmillan Company). 26 THE STUDY OF SOCIETY of socialism, for in many of its forms it rests upon a par- ticular social philosophy or theory of social evolution, namely, the theory that all social evolution is determined by economic conditions. Just how we shall regard the philosophy of revolutionary socialism in the light of scientific sociology, we shall see in a later chapter; in this introduc- tory chapter we are concerned only to notice that the socialist program and all other social reconstruction pro- grams of the present need to be tested by sociological knowledge. It is not simply proposals and programs which need to be tested by the citizen; many new social experiments which are now being tried throughout our civilization manifestly depend for their success upon a general diffusion of social intelligence. Democracy itself, indeed, is such an experiment. Democracy means a social life in which the opinion and will of every normal adult counts in the determination of social policies. Obviously the success of democracy depends upon the possibility of vast masses of men forming rational opinions and executing rational decisions as a group. That is possible only through social and political education. We must educate for democracy if we wish it to succeed; and that means that we must diffuse knowledge not merely of the machinery of demo- cratic government, but of social conditions which must be dealt with by such government and of the duties of citizens in regard to such conditions. It is obvious that sociology, if it is to be impartial, must not be developed in the interest of any class, party, or particular reform. Rather it must aim at the discovery of the full truth regarding human relations. But this truth THE STUDY OF SOCIETY 27 when discovered will be the means of deciding the wisdom or unwisdom of any proposed reform or program of social reconstruction. Thus scientific truth is practical in the deepest sense. Only unbiased knowledge can lead us aright; and hence to learn to lay aside class, party, or personal bias and to see social facts as they are is the only method by which we can hope to build a better human world. The physical sciences have enabled man to attain to a considerable mastery over physical nature, and thus have greatly benefited humanity. The development of the social sciences, we have every reason to believe, will enable man to control his own nature and his social life; and this, as the Great War has shown us, is even more important for his happiness and welfare. The ultimate aim of soci- ology, then, as of all other science, is mastery over life and its conditions; and hence its practical aim is nothing less than to replace the policy of drift which our civilization has thus far largely followed in social matters by a policy of conscious, scientific mastery over the conditions of our social existence. It is only upon such a scientific basis that social reconstruction can be successful. SELECT REFERENCES For brief reading: HAYES, Introduction to Study of Sociology, Chaps. I-II ELLWOOD, Introduction to Social Psychology, Chap. I. Ross, The Foundations of Sociology, Chaps. I-II. For more extended reading: BLACKMAR and GILLIN, Outlines of Sociology, Bk. I, Chaps. I-III. BOGAEDUS, Introduction to Sociology, Chap. I. DEALEY, Sociology, Its Simpler Teachings and Applications, Chap. I. 28 THE STUDY OF SOCIETY ELLWOOD, Sociology in its Psychological Aspects, Chaps. I-V. GIDDINGS, Elements of Sociology, Chap. I. GIDDINGS, Principles of Sociology, Chaps. I-TV. GILLETTE, Sociology, Chap. I. SMALL, General Sociology, Chaps. I-III. SPENCER, The Study of Sociology. WARD, Outlines of Sociology, Chaps. I-VL American Journal of Sociology. CHAPTER II THE BEARING OF THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS SINCE Darwin wrote his Origin of Species all the sciences in any way connected with biology have been profoundly influenced by his theory of evolution. It is important that the student of sociology, therefore, should under- stand at the outset something of the bearing of the theory of evolution upon the social problems. We may note at the beginning, however, that the word evolution refers to two distinct, though related, theories. The first is Darwin's doctrine of descent; the second is Spencer's theory of universal evolution. Let us note somewhat in detail what the theory of evolution means in the first of these senses. The Darwinian Theory of Descent. Darwin's theory of descent is the doctrine that all forms of life now existing or that have existed upon the earth have sprung from a few simple primitive types. According to this theory all forms of animals and plants have sprung from a few primi- tive stocks, though not necessarily one, because even in the beginning there may have existed a divergence between the primitive forms of life. So far as the animal world is concerned, then, this theory of evolution amounts to the assertion of the kinship of all life. From one or more simple primitive unicellular forms have arisen the great multitude of multicellular forms that now exist. 29 30 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS Popularly, Darwin's theory is supposed to be that man sprang from the apes, but this, strictly speaking, is a mis- conception. Darwin's theory necessitates the belief, not that man sprang from any existing species of ape, but rather that the apes and man have sprung from some common stock. It is equally true, however, that man and many other of the lower animals, according to this theory, have come from a common stock. As was said above, the theory is not a theory of the descent of man from any particular animal type, but rather the the- ory of the kinship, the genetic relationship, of all animal species. It is evident that if we assume Darwin's theory of descent in sociology we must look for the beginnings of many peculiarly human things in the animal world below man. Human institutions, according to this theory, could not be supposed to have an independent origin, or human society in any of its forms to be a fact by itself, but rather all human things are connected with the whole world of animal life below man. Thus if we are, according to this theory, to look for the origin of the family, we should have to turn first of all to the habits of animals nearest man. This is only one of the many bearings which Darwin's theory has upon the study of social problems; but it is evident even from this that it revolutionizes sociology. So long as it was possible to look upon human society as a distinct creation, as something isolated, by itself in nature, it was possible to hold to intellectualistic views of the origin of human institutions. But some one may ask : Why should the sociologist accept Darwin's theory? What proofs does it rest upon? What THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 31 warrant has a student of sociology for accepting a doc- trine of such far-reaching consequences? The reply is, that biologists, generally, during the last fifty years, after a careful study of Darwin's arguments and after a careful examination of all other evidence, have come substantially to agree with him. There is no great biol- ogist now living who does not accept the essentials of the doctrine of descent. Five lines of proof may be offered in support of this doctrine, and it may now be well for us, as students of sociology, briefly to review these. (1) The homologies or similarities of structure of differ- ent animals. There are very striking similarities of struc- ture between all the higher animals. Between the ape and man, for example, there are over one hundred and fifty such anatomical homologies; that is, in the ape we find bone for bone, and muscle for muscle, corresponding to the structure of the human body. Even an animal so remotely related to man as the cat has many more resemblances to man in anatomical structure than dissimilarities. Now, the meaning of these anatomical homologies, biologists say, is that these animals are genetically related, that is, they had a common ancestry at some remote period in the past. (2) The presence of vestigial organs in the higher animals supplies another argument for the belief in common descent. In man, for example, there exist over one hundred of these vestigial or rudimentary organs, as the vermiform appendix, the pineal gland, and the like. Many of these vestigial organs, which are now functionless in man, per- form functions in lower animals, and this is held to show 32 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS that at some remote period in the past they also func- tioned in man's ancestors. (3) The facts of embryology seem to point to the descent of the higher types of animals from the lower types. The embryo or foetus in its development seems to recapitulate the various stages through which the species has passed. Thus the human embryo at one stage of its development resembles a fish ; at another stage, the embryo of a dog ; and for a long time it is impossible to distinguish between the human embryo and that of one of the larger apes. These embryological facts, biologists say, indicate genetic relation between the various animal forms which the embryo in its different stages simulates. (4) In the earth's crust are found the fossil remains of extinct species of animals which are evidently ancestors of existing species. Until the doctrine of descent was ac- cepted there was no way of explaining the presence of these fossil remains of extinct animals in the earth's crust. It was supposed by some that the earth had passed thrqugh a series of cataclysms in which all forms of life upon the earth had been many times destroyed and many times re-created. It is now demonstrated, however, that these fossils are related to existing species, and sometimes it is possible to trace back the evolution of existing forms to very primitive forms in this way. For example, it is possible to trace the horse, which is now an animal with a single hoof, walking on a single toe, back to an animal that walked upon four toes and had four hoofs and was not much larger than a fox. It is not so generally known that it is also possible to trace man back through a series of fossil human remains that have been discovered in the THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 33 earth's crust to the time when he is apparently just emerg- ing from some apelike form. The fossil man of Java, Pithecanthropus erectus, discovered by Dr. Eugene Dubois in 1892, was a creature of less than two thirds the brain capacity of modern man and with many apelike character- istics. Thus we cannot except even man from the theory of evolution and suppose that he was especially created, as Alfred Russel Wallace, Darwin's contemporary and co- laborer, and others, have supposed. (5) The last line of argument in favor of the belief that all existing species have descended from a few simple primitive forms is found in the fact of the variation of animals through artificial selection under domestication. For generations breeders have known that by carefully selecting the type of animal or plant .which they have desired, it is possible to produce approximately that type. Thus have originated all the breeds or varieties of domestic plants and animals. Now, Darwin conceived that nature also exercises a selection by weeding out those individuals that are not adapted to their environment. In other words, nature, though unconscious, selects in a negative way the stronger and the better adapted. Animals vary in nature as well as under domestication from causes not yet well understood. The variations that were favorable to survival, Darwin argued, would secure the survival, through the passing on of these variations by heredity, of the better adapted types of plants and animals. The natural process of weeding out the inferior or least adapted through early death, or through failure to reproduce, Darwin called "natural selection", and likened it in its effect upon organisms to the artificial selection which 3,4 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS breeders consciously use to secure types of plants or ani- mals that they desire. A great addition to Darwin's theories has been made by the Dutch botanist, Hugo de Vries, who has shown that the variations which are fruitful for the production of new species are probably great or discontinuous variations, which he terms "mutations," instead of the small fluctuat- ing variations which Darwin thought were probably most important hi the production of new species. De Vries's theory in no way affects the doctrine of descent, nor does it take away from the importance of natural selection in fixing the variations. The doctrine of descent, therefore, stands in all of its essentials to-day unquestioned by men of science, and it must be assumed by the student of sociology in any attempt to explain social evolution. Spencer's Theory of Universal Evolution. A second meaning given to the word evolution is that which Spencer popularized in his First Principles. This is a philosophical theory of the universe which asserts that not only have species of animals come to be what they are through a process of development, but everything whatsoever that exists, from molecules of matter to stars and planets. It is the view that the universe is in a process of develop- ment. Evolution in this wider sense includes all existing things whatsoever, while evolution in the sense of Darwin's theory is confined to the organic world. While the theory that all things existing have through a process of orderly change come to be what they are, is a very old one, yet it was undoubtedly Spencer's writings which popularized the theory, and to Spencer we also owe the attempt in his Synthetic Philosophy to trace the working of evolution in THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 35 all the different realms of phenomena. The belief in uni- versal evolution which Spencer popularized has also come to be generally accepted by scientific and philosophical thinkers. While Spencer's particular theories of evolution may not be accepted, some form of universal evolution is very generally believed in. The thought of evolution now dominates all the sciences, physical, biological, psychological, and sociological. It is evident that the student of society, if he accepts fully the modern scientific spirit, must also assume evolution in this second or uni- versal sense. The Different Phases of Universal Evolution. It may be well, in order to correlate our knowledge of social evolu- tion with knowledge in general, to note the different well- marked phases of universal evolution. (1) Cosmic Evolution. This is the phase the astron- omer and the geologist are particularly interested in. It deals with the evolution of worlds. In this phase we are dealing merely with physical matter, and it is supposed that the active principle which works in this phase of evolution is the attraction of particles of matter for one another. This leads to the condensation of matter into suns and their planets, and the geological evolution of the earth, for example. Laplace's nebular hypothesis is an attempt to give an adequate statement of the cosmic phase of evolution. While this hypothesis has been much criticized of late, in its essentials it seems to stand. We are not, however, as students of society, concerned with this phase of evolution. (2) Organic Evolution. This is the phase of evolution with which Darwin dealt and which biology, as a science of 36 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS evolution of living forms, deals with. The great merit of Darwin's work was that he showed that the determining factor in this phase of evolution is natural selection ; that is, the extermination of the unadapted through death or through failure to reproduce. Types unsuited to their environment thus die before reproduction. The stronger and better fitted survive, and thus the type is raised. Natural selection may be regarded, then, as essentially the determining force in this phase of evolution. (3) The Evolution of Mind. This might be included in organic evolution, but all organisms do not apparently have minds. It is evident that among animals those that would stand the best chance of surviving would not be simply those that have the strongest brute strength, but rather those that have the keenest intelligence and that could adapt themselves quickly to their environment, that could see approaching danger and escape it. Natural selection has, therefore, favored in the animal world the survival of those animals with the highest type of intelli- gence. It cannot be said, however, that natural selection is the only force which has created the mind in all its various expressions. J (4) Social Evolution. By social evolution we mean the evolution of groups, or, in strict accordance with our def- inition of society, groups of mentally interacting indi- viduals. Groups are to be found throughout the animal world, and it is in the human species, as we have already seen, that the highest types of association are found. This is not an accident. Association, or living together in groups, has been one of the devices by which animal species have been enabled to survive. It is evident that THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 37 not only would intelligence help an animal to survive more than brute strength, but that ability to cooperate with one's fellows would also help in the same way. Consequently we find a degree of combination or cooperation almost at the very beginning of life, and it is without doubt through cooperation that man has become the dominant and supreme species upon the planet. Man's social instincts, in other words, have been perhaps even more important for his survival than his intelligence. The man who lies, cheats, and steals, or who indulges in other unsocial conduct sets himself against his group and places his group at a disadvantage as compared with other groups. Now, natural selection is continually operating upon groups as well as upon individuals, and the group which can command the most loyal, most efficient membership, and has the best organization, is, other things being equal, the group which survives. Natural selection is, then, at work in social evolution as well as in general organic evolution. But social evolution has also a new and distinct factor at work which we may call association, cooperation, or coadapta- tion. Moreover, the social life of man shows a distinct phase of social evolution, the evolution of culture or civilization. This is an evolution not of hereditary traits, but of acquired habits, and is based upon man's higher intelligence, his power of articulate speech, and his consequent greater capacity to learn. Thus while the factors which are at work in the lower phases of evolution are also at work in the higher phases, these latter show new and distinct factors. Factors in Organic Evolution. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the factors which are at work in organic evolution 45512 38 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS generally are also at work in social evolution. We need, therefore, to note these factors carefully and to see how they are at work in human society as well as in the animal world below man. While these factors are not all of the factors which are at work in social evolution, still they are the primitive factors, and are, therefore, of fundamental im- portance. Let us see what these factors are. (i) The Multiplication of Organisms in Some Geometric Ratio through Reproduction. It is a law of life that every species must increase so that the number of offspring exceeds the number of parents if the species is to survive. If the offspring only equal in number the parents, some of them will die before maturity is reached or will fail to reproduce, and so the species will gradually become extinct. Every spe- cies normally increases, therefore, in some geometric ratio. Now, this tendency to reproduce in some geometric ratio, which characterizes all living organisms, means that any species, if left to itself, would soon reach such numbers as to occupy the whole earth. Darwin showed, for example, that though the elephant is the slowest breeding of all animals, if every elephant lived its normal length of life (one hundred years) and to every pair were born six off spring, then, at the end of seven hundred and fifty years there would be nineteen million living elephants descended from a single pair. This illustration shows the enormous possi- bilities of any species reproducing in geometric ratio, as all species in order to survive must do. That this tendency to increase in some geometric ratio applies also to man is evident from all of the facts which we know concerning human populations. It is not infrequent for a people to double its numbers every twenty-five years. THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 39 If this were continued for any length of time it is evident that a single nation could soon populate the whole earth. Malthus, an English economist at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was the first to study systematically this multiplication of human populations in some geo- metric ratio and its consequences. He argued from it that there was always a tendency for population to outstrip food supply, and that this was a permanent cause of social misery. Consequently he held that if better wages, and so a larger food supply, were given to the lower economic classes of society, they would multiply so much more rap- idly that worse poverty would result than before. While we shall see in a later chapter that Malthus carried his theory too far, yet there is no doubt that under certain conditions in human society there is a tendency for popu- lation to press against food supply, and that to this multi- plication of numbers in human society is due the com- petition of our social and economic life, as in the world of life at large. (2) Heredity. Heredity is the factor in organic evolu- tion which insures the persistence of the species or racial type. It is that aspect of the phenomenon of reproduction which we recognize by saying, "Like begets like." Essen- tially, heredity is the transmission of traits from parents to offspring. Much has been written upon heredity in the past, but only recently have the laws or principles of heredity come to be clearly understood by biologists. Heredity is not less a fact of human society than of the animal world. Racial heredity especially is one of the most significant facts of human society; while even family heredity counts in its influence far more than some have 40 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS supposed. Biologists generally hold that heredity affects in man not only his physical traits, but also his mental and moral traits, so far as these latter are dependent upon the inborn structure of the brain and nervous system. This brings us to the questions, What traits are trans- missible? and, How are they transmitted? That certain things are given us by nature, and that others come to us through nurture, or from the influence of our environment, has long been known. Throughout the world of life certain traits of organisms are inherent in their nature, given in the germ, as we say; while other traits are modifications acquired during the lifetime of the individual. Hence the contrast between inborn and acquired traits, a contrast which is of the utmost significance; for probably only inborn traits are transmitted by heredity. We cannot go far into the biological theory of heredity in this book. Certain facts and general principles, how- ever, may be pointed out which will save much confusion in the study of social problems. The student of sociology should especially bear in mind three biological facts: (i) The germ cells, out of which the new individual arises, are a separate series of cells, distinct from the body cells. (2) Although the germ cells are separate from the body cells, the body nevertheless affords the environment of the germ cells, and furnishes them with nutrition. (3) In bi-parental reproduction, inheritance is equal from both parents. From the first fact follows directly Weismann's law of the non-transmissibility of "acquired traits." On account of the separateness of the germ cells from the body cells, there is no way by which specific bodily modifications can be transmitted to offspring. Modifications produced in THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 41 organs through use or disuse are not, therefore, transmis- sible. For example, the blacksmith who develops a strong biceps muscle in his work, does not transmit this modifica- tion to his children. It must not be supposed, however, that the body has no influence upon the germ cells; for it furnishes their nutri- tion. If the body is poisoned by a drug such as alcohol, or by the toxins produced by certain diseases, this will affect the germ cells, and the offspring may inherit, on this account, a weakened vitality or a degenerate constitution. This, however, is not the transmission of a specific, acquired trait, but is only the effect of the poisoning or malnutrition of the germ cells in the body of the parent. It is sometimes erroneously supposed that Weismann's theory comes to this, that no matter what the parent individual does, it will not affect his offspring; but from what has been said above, it will be seen that this supposition is a gross mis- understanding of the doctrine of the non-transmissibility of acquired traits. Mendel's law of heredity follows directly from the third fact mentioned, that inheritance from both parents is equal, and from the further fact that hereditary traits are seem- ingly transmitted as units. It is impossible within our space to explain this very important biological law. It will suffice to say that in consequence of this law there is apparently no permanent blending of different traits, in a series of genera- tions, but that, on the contrary, contrasted traits tend to segregate in definite and regular proportions. For example, if albinos (persons without pigment in hair, eyes, or skin) intermarry with normal persons, their children in the first generation will be apparently all normal persons. But if 42 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS these children of albinos and normal persons intermarry among themselves, their offspring will be one-fourth albinos and three-fourths apparently normal persons. And if these latter intermarry, one-third will have only normal offspring, while two-thirds will have offspring again in the proportion of one-fourth albinos and three-fourths ap- parently normal. This shows that of the second genera- tion one-fourth were albinos, one-fourth pure normals, and one half hybrids which appeared to be normal but were in fact not so, so far as their germ cells were concerned. Mendel's law thus shows us the manner of transmission of hereditary traits in individual cases. It is highly impor- tant for the sociologist, especially in his study of the results of the crossing of races and of normal with abnormal stocks. To sum up, the factor of heredity in evolution preserves the continuity of the racial or family type, but the minute, personal traits of the individual are not transmissible, and especially not those which are acquired; in a word, nothing is inherited except the characteristics of the stock, the traits which are inherent in the germ plasm. These hereditary traits, however, not only determine to a large extent the physical characteristics of the adult individual, but also, to a lesser degree, his mental and moral character. (3) Variation. This factor in organic evolution means that no two individuals, even though born of the same parents, are exactly like each other. Neither do they exactly conform in their type to Mendel's law, as theoret- ically they should do. Every new individual born in the organic world, then, while it resembles its parents and belongs to its species or race, varies within certain limits. This variation so runs through organic nature that we are THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 43 told that there are no two leaves on a single tree exactly alike. Such variation is of two sorts: First, variations in degree, relatively minute, fluctuating variations which are probably not transmissible by heredity; secondly, varia- tions in quality, or discontinuous variations, also called "mutations." It is these latter which are fruitful for evolution, as they persist in the stock. The causes of this variation are not yet well understood, but the evident result is that individuals are born unequal; for some indi- viduals vary in favorable directions, others in unfavorable directions. Some are born strong, some weak; some in- ferior, some superior. It is evident that variation characterizes the human species quite as much as other species, and indeed the limits of variation are wider, probably, in the human species than in any other species. Man is the most variable of all animals, and human individuality and personality owe not a little of their distinctiveness to this fact. No more in human society than in the animal world are individuals born alike, or with equal natural endowments. From a biological point of view there is no truth hi the old belief that all men are born equal. It is only in a moral sense that we may hold that men are equals. (4) The Struggle for Existence. Individuals in all spe- cies, as we have seen, are born in larger numbers than is necessary. The result is that a competition is entered into between species and between individuals within the species for place and for existence. This competition or struggle results in the dying out of the inferior, that is, of those who are not adapted to their environment. The grad- ual dying out of the inferior or unadapted through com- 44 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS petition results in the survival of the superior or better adapted, and ultimately in the survival of the fittest or those most adapted. Thus the type is raised, and we have evolution through natural selection, that is, through the elimination of the unfit. Some have thought that this struggle for existence which is so evident in the animal world does not take place in human society. This, however, is a mistake. The struggle for existence in human society is not an un- mitigated one, as it seems to be very often in the animal world, but it is nevertheless a struggle which has the same consequences. In the human world the competition, ex- cept in the lower classes, is not so much for food, as it is for position and for supremacy. But this struggle for place and power results in human society in the weak and inferior going to the wall, and therefore ultimately in their elimination. In all essential respects, then, the struggle for existence goes on in human society as it does in the animal world. This means that in society, as in the animal world, progress depends upon the elimination of unfit individuals. The unfit in human society, as we shall see, are especially those who cannot adapt themselves to their social environment. Progress in society, in a certain sense, waits upon death, as it does in all the rest of the animal world. Death is the means by which the stream of life is purged from its inferior and unfit elements. The struggle for existence is especially illustrated in the world of human industry. Not only do individuals lose place and power because they are unadapted to their environment, but also economic groups, such as corpora- tions, show the natural competition or struggle for existence THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 45 sometimes in its most intense form. The result in all cases is the weeding out of the least adapted and the survival of the better adapted. Thus through competition and the survival of the better adapted is secured in industry the evolution of higher types of industrial organization, in- dustrial methods, and the Like, just as higher types are secured in the same way in the animal world. But in economic matters as in other social affairs cooperation continually comes in to modify competition and to lift it to a higher plane. A word of caution is perhaps necessary against con- fusing the economic struggle as it exists in modern society with the natural struggle under primitive conditions. It is evident that in present society the economic struggle has been greatly changed in character from the primitive struggle, and therefore can no longer have the same results. Laws of inheritance, of taxation, and many other artificial economic conditions have greatly interfered with the natural struggle. The rich and economically successful are, therefore, by no means to be confused with the bio- logically fit. On the contrary many of the economically successful are such simply through artificial advantageous circumstances and from the standpoint of biology and sociology they are often among the less fit, rather than the more fit, elements of society. (5) Another Factor in Organic Evolution is Cooperation, or altruism. As Henry Drummond has said, this is the struggle not for one's own life but for the lives of others. Really, however, it is a device which enables a group of individuals to struggle more successfully with the adverse factors in their environment. Something of cooperation, 46 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS that is, a group of individuals carrying on a common life, is found almost at the beginning of life, and, as we rise in the scale of animal creation, the amount of coopera- tion and of altruistic feelings which accompany it very greatly increases. Perhaps the chief source of this cooper- ation is to be found in the rearing of offspring. The family group, even in the lower animals, seems to be the chief source of altruism. At any rate, sympathetic or altruistic instincts grow up in all animals, probably chiefly through the necessities of reproduction. It is only in human social life that cooperation, or al- truism, attains its full development. Human society is characterized by the protection it affords to its weaker mem- bers, and in human society the natural process of eliminat- ing the inferior often seems reversed. As Huxley has pointed out, human society tries to fit as many as possible to survive, and we may add, not only to survive, but to live well. Altruism and its resulting cooperation have come especially to characterize human social evolution. To some extent this is due, no doubt, to the necessities of group survival; for only that nation, for example, can survive that can maintain the most loyal citizenship, the best institutions, and the largest spirit of self-sacrifice in its members. Human social groups, therefore, try to fit as many individuals as possible for the most efficient membership, and this necessitates caring for the tempo- rarily weak, and also for the permanently incapacitated, in order that the sentiments of social solidarity may be strengthened to their utmost. It is evident, then, that all the factors at work in organic evolution are at work also in social evolution, though in THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 47 some part modified and varying in degree. The struggle for existence in human society, for example, has been greatly modified from the condition in the early animal world, while cooperation, or altruism, is much more highly developed. Nevertheless, the factors of organic evolu- tion are at work in social evolution and must be taken into full account by the student of social problems. Social evolution rests upon organic evolution. Salient Features of Social Evolution from the Biological Standpoint. In order to sum up and make clear some of the principal applications of the biological principles just stated, let us consider briefly some of the salient fea- tures of social evolution from the biological standpoint. The Origin of Society. Social evolution is rooted in the necessities of organic existence. By biological necessity most species of animals live in groups. The processes of both nutrition and reproduction in all higher forms of life involve more or less association of members of the same species. The association of the sexes and of parents and offspring is necessary among higher animals for the reproduction, care, and rearing of offspring. Among these, too, some degree of association is usually necessary for the procuring of an adequate food supply and for pro- tection against enemies. Thus the basis of social evolution has been this necessary interdependence among organisms of the same species in the organic processes of life. Life, then, has never developed in an isolated way, each indi- vidual by himself. From the very start there has been unity, group life, among individuals of the same species. The Struggle for Existence in Human Society. From the very beginning there has been no such thing as unmitigated 48 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS individual struggle among animals. Nowhere in nature does pure individualism exist in the sense that the indi- vidual animal struggles alone, except perhaps in a few solitary species which are apparently on the way to ex- tinction. The assumption of such a primitive individual struggle has been at the bottom of many erroneous views of human society. The primary conflict is between species. A secondary conflict, however, is always found between the members of the same species. Usually this conflict within the species is a competition between groups. The human species exactly illustrates these statements. Primitively its great conflict was with other species of animals. The supremacy of man over the rest of the animal world was won only after an age-long conflict between man and his animal rivals. While this conflict went on there was apparently but little struggle within the species itself. The lowest groups of which we have knowledge, while con- tinually struggling against nature, are rarely at war with one another. But after man had won his supremacy over nature and the population of groups increased so as to encroach seriously upon food supply, and even territorial limits of space, then a conflict between human groups, which we call war, broke out and became almost second nature to man. In other words, war was occasioned very largely by numbers and food supply. To this extent at least war primitively arose from economic conditions, and it is re- markable how economic conditions have had a part in bring- ing about all the great wars of human history. The Social Effects of War. Along with the obvious de- structive effects of war have gone certain effects upon the evolution of human groups which we must note. War has THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 49 been the chief agency of group selection among mankind in the past, and as such it has had an immense effect upon human social evolution. We may note five chief effects : (1) Intergroup struggle gave rise to higher forms of social organization because only those groups could succeed in competition with other groups that were well organized, and especially only those that had competent leadership. (2) Government, as we know it in history, was very largely an outcome of the necessities of this intergroup struggle, or war. As we have seen, the groups that were best organized, that had the most competent leadership, would stand the best chance of surviving. Consequently the war leader or chief soon came, through habit, to be looked upon as the head of the group in all matters. More- over, the exigencies and stresses of war frequently neces- sitated giving the war chief supreme authority in times of danger, and from this, without doubt, arose despotism in all of its forms. The most primitive tribes are republican or democratic in their form of government; but it has been found that despotic forms of government rapidly develop where a people are continually at war with other peoples. (3) A third result of war in early society was the creation of social classes. After a certain stage was reached groups tried not so much to exterminate one another as to con- quer and absorb one another. This was, of course, after agriculture had been developed and slave labor had reached a considerable value. Under such circumstances a con- quered group would be incorporated by the conquerors as a slave or subject class. Later, this enslaved class may have become partially free as compared with some more recently subjugated or enslaved classes, and several classes 50 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS in this way could emerge in a group through war or con- quest. Moreover, the presence of these alien and subject elements in a group necessitated a stronger and more centralized government to keep them in control, and this was again one way in which war favored a development of despotic governments. Later, of course, economic condi- tions gave rise to classes, and to certain struggles between the classes composing a people. (4) Not only were social and political organization and the evolution of classes favored by intergroup struggle, but also the evolution of morality. The group that could be most efficiently organized would be, other things being equal, the group which had the most loyal and most self- sacrificing membership. The group that lacked a group spirit, that is, strong sentiments of solidarity, and harmo- nious relations between its members, would be the group that would be apt to lose in conflict with other groups, and so its type would tend to be eliminated. The morality which war developed, however, was a narrow, or " group" morality; and it was autocratic rather than democratic. Thus while loyalty, mutual aid, and honor were enforced within the tribe, war encouraged the disregard of the rights of all outside; and while war developed habits of obedience, service, and self-sacrifice on the part of all members of the group, it led to the disregard of the life and personality of individuals. (5) A final consequence of war among human groups has been the absorption of weaker groups and the growth of larger and larger political groups until in modern times a few great nations dominate the population of the whole world. That this was not the primitive condition, we Si know from human history and from other facts which indicate the disappearance of a vast number of human groups in the past. The earth is a burial ground of tribes and nations as well as of individuals. In the competition between human groups, only a few that have had efficient organization and government, loyal membership, and high standards of conduct within the group, have survived. Philologists estimate that for every living language there are twenty dead languages. Remembering that one lan- guage not infrequently stands for several groups with re- lated cultures, we can get an inkling of the immense num- ber of human societies that have perished in the past in this intergroup competition. War, however, is a barbarous means of competition and selection between groups. While once war selected well the stronger, more efficient, more socialized groups, modern wars produce a "reversal of selection" in society, killing off the socially fittest, and tend to rebarbarize moral standards. Hence, higher civilization must find a better method of deciding the competition between groups. Competition. Even though war passes away entirely, nations can never escape competition. While the com- petition may not be upon the low and brutal plane of war, it will certainly go on upon the higher plane of commerce and industry and will probably be on this higher plane quite as decisive in the life of peoples in the future as war was in the past. While the primary struggle within the human species has been in the historic period between nations and races, this is not saying, of course, that struggle and competition has not gone on within these larger groups. On the con- 52 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS trary, a continual struggle has gone on between classes, first perhaps of racial origin and later of economic origin. Also there is within the nation a struggle between parties and sects and sometimes between "sections" and com- munities. Usually, however, the competition within the nation is a peaceful one and does not come to bloodshed. Again within each of these minor groups that we have mentioned struggle and competition in some modified form goes on between its members. Thus within a party or class there is apt to be a struggle or competition between factions. There is, indeed, no human group that is free from struggle or competition between its members, unless it be the family. Competition and Cooperation. Evidently, competition and cooperation are twin principles in the evolution of social groups. While competition characterizes in the main the relation between groups, especially independent political groups, and while cooperation characterizes in the main the relation of the members of a given group to one an- other, still competition and cooperation are correlatives in practically every phase of the social life. Some degree of competition, for example, has to be maintained by every group between its members if it is going to maintain high standards of efficiency or of loyalty. If there were no com- petition with respect to the matters that concern the inner life of groups, it is evident that the groups would soon lose efficiency in leadership and in membership and would sooner or later be eliminated. It follows from this that competition and cooperation are both equally important in the life of society. It has been a favorite idea that competition among human beings should be done away with, and that cooperation should be THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 53 substituted to take its place entirely. It is evident, how- ever, that this idea is impossible of realization. If a social group were to check all competition between its mem- bers, it would stop thereby the process of natural selection or of the elimination of the unfit, and, as a consequence, would soon cease to progress. If some scheme of arti- ficial selection were substituted to take the place of natural selection, it is evident that competition would still have to be retained to determine who were the fittest. A society that would give positions of trust and responsibility to individuals without imposing some competitive test upon them would be like a ship built partly of good and partly of rotten wood, it would soon go to pieces. What people may rightfully object to is, not competition, but unregulated or unfair competition. In the interest of solidarity, that is, in the interest of the life of the group as a whole, all forms of competition in human society should be so regulated that the rules governing the competition may be known and the competition itself public. It is evident that in politics and in business we are very far from this ideal as yet, although society is unquestionably moving toward it. The Necessity of Selection in Society. This leads us to emphasize the continued necessity of selection in society. No doubt natural selection is often a brutal and wasteful means of eliminating the weak in human societies, and no doubt human reason might devise superior means of bring- ing about the selection of individuals which society must maintain. To some extent it has done this through sys- tems of education and the like, which are, in the main, selective processes for picking out the most competent 54 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS individuals to perform certain social functions. But the natural competition, or struggle between individ- uals, has not been done away with, especially in economic matters, and it is evidently impossible to do away with it until some vast scheme of artificial selection can take its place. Such a scheme is so far in the future that it is hardly worth talking about. The best that society can apparently do at the present time is to regulate the natural competition between individuals, and this it is doing increasingly. The Sociological View of Morality. A word in conclusion about the nature of moral codes and standards from the social point of view. It is evident that moral codes from the social point of view are simply formulations of standards of conduct which groups find it convenient or necessary to impose upon their members. Even morality, in an idealistic sense, seems from a sociological standpoint to be those forms of conduct which conduce to social harmony, to social effi- ciency, and so to the survival of the group. Groups, how- ever, as we have already pointed out, cannot do as they please. They are always hard-pressed in competition by other groups and have to meet the standards of efficiency which nature imposes. Morality, therefore, is not any- thing arbitrarily designed by the group, but is a standard of conduct which necessities of social survival require. In other words, the right, from the point of view of natural science, is that which ultimately conduces to survival, not of the individual, but of the group or of the species. This is looking at morality, of course, from the sociological point of view, and in no way denies the religious and metaphysical view of morality, which may be equally valid from a differ- ent standpoint. THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 55 Limits of Freedom or Variation in Human Society. Finally, we need to note that natural selection does not necessitate in any mechanical sense certain conduct on the part of individuals or groups. Rather, natural selection marks the limits of variation which nature permits, and within those limits of variation there is a large amount of freedom of choice, both to individuals and to groups. Human societies, therefore, may be conceivably free to take one of several paths of development at any particular point. But in the long run they must conform to the ultimate conditions of survival; and this probably means that the goal of their evolution is largely fixed for them. Human groups are free only in the sense that they may go either backward or forward on the path which the conditions of survival mark out for them. They are free to progress or to perish. But social evolution in any case, in the sense of social change either toward higher or toward lower social adaptation, is a necessity that cannot be escaped. Sociology and all social science is, therefore, a study not of what human groups would like to do, but of what they must do in order to survive, that is, how they can control their environment by utilizing the laws which govern universal evolution. From this brief and most elementary consideration of the bearings of evolutionary theory upon social problems it is evident that evolution, in the sense of what we know about the development of life and society in the past, must be the guidepost of the sociologist. Human social evolution, we repeat, rests upon and is conditioned by biological evo- lution at every point. There is, therefore, scarcely any sanity in sociology without the biological point of view. 56 THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS Yet social evolution must not be confused with organic evolution. Social evolution is essentially psychic, and organic evolution is only its basis. SELECT REFERENCES For brief reading: CONKLIN, Heredity and Environment, Chaps. IV, VI. ELLWOOD, Introduction to Social Psychology, Chap. II. THOMSON, Darwinism and Human Life, Chaps. V, VI. For more extended reading: CHAPDJ, An Introduction to Social Evolution, Chaps. I-IIL CONN, Social Heredity and Social Evolution, Chap. I. CRAMPTON, The Doctrine of Evolution, Chap. VII. DARWIN, Descent of Man, Chaps. I-V. GrooiNGS, The Principles of Sociology. GILLETTE, Sociology, Chaps. II-V. KELLOGG, Darwinism To-day. KELSEY, The Physical Basis of Society, Chaps. I-VL MARETT, Anthropology. OSBORN, Men of the Old Stone Age. THOMSON and GEDDES, Evolution. WALTER, Genetics. On the religious aspects of evolution: DRUMMOND, Ascent of Man. FISKE, The Destiny of Man. FISKE, Through Nature to God. CHAPTER III 1 THE BEARING OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS WHEN mind or consciousness appeared in organic evo- lution the whole balance of the world of life was changed. Thereafter the determining factors in the life-process became more and more the inner and mental, not the outer and physical. Accordingly, to understand human society we must understand something of the mental life of man, for the interactions of individuals in human society are chiefly interactions of their thoughts, feelings, and will. Hence, psychology, the science of our mental life, must be the immediate basis of the larger part of sociology. Knowl- edge of the psychology of human conduct, of behavior, is accordingly indispensable to the student of sociology. Modern Functional Psychology. The earlier develop- ments of psychological science laid a great deal of stress upon the analysis of the structure or content of the individ- ual mind, that is, upon the analysis of the states of con- sciousness into their constituent elements. While this part of psychology is recognized to be of very great importance for the understanding of the mind in itself, it is not so important to the sociologist, for he deals with the person in action. What the sociologist needs is a science of the mind 1 In a brief course of study this chapter may be omitted. 57 58 MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS in action. This is usually called functional psychology. It deals with individual human conduct or behavior in the widest sense, thus furnishing the basis for explaining the interactions of individuals and the evolution of social organ- ization. Modern functional psychology is in its point of view broadly biological; that is, according to modern psychology, mind is not something apart from life, but is a functioning element in the life process. It is subject, like everything else in life, therefore, to the laws of organic evolution which we have just considered. The fundamental attributes of our mental life are not acquired by the individual in his lifetime, but are as much determined by natural selection as the general characteristics of our bodies. Thus our impulses, our feelings, desires, and interests so far as they are inborn are in the long run determined by natural selec- tion. The thought of evolution thus dominates modern psychology as well as modern biology and sociology; but it must be borne in mind, of course, that natural selection is merely the elimination of the least favorable variations and is thus a framework within which a very large amount of free variation is possible; and that only very indirectly has natural selection anything to do with the habits which the individual acquires within his lifetime. The Function of the Mind. All biologists and psy- chologists are agreed that the brain is primarily an adaptive organ. Now, whatever may be the exact relation of mind and body, this means that the function of those higher neural processes which involve consciousness is primarily to aid the organism in adaptation, especially when the process is rapid and complex. Mental processes, in other words, MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 59 are chiefly concerned with the guidance and control of complex activities. Not all bodily activities or acts are accompanied by consciousness; but wherever the purely physiological mechanism is insufficient to secure the proper adaptation of the organism to its environment, then con- sciousness appears, to contrcl and direct movement. All the aspects of the mind present themselves, therefore, from one point of view, as devices to secure the superior adapta- tion of the organism to the environment. As Professor Angell says, "Mind seems to be the master device by means of which the adaptive operations of organic life may be made more perfect." It would be a mistake, however, to think that the mind is concerned merely with the passive adaptation of the organism to the environment, that is, bending and shaping activities to meet the requirements of the enviroment. On the contrary, in its higher development the mind is equally concerned with the adaptation of the environment to the needs of the organism. This results from what is known as the spontaneity or self-activity of the organism. The old conception of human nature, that is, that the individual is passive with reference to his environment and that his behavior is entirely determined by environmental stimuli, is quite entirely given up by modern biology and psychology. The new conception is that the organism is essentially active, that it is a relatively independent center of energy whose activities are directed to sustaining and maintaining itself. These activities of the organism spring from its own organic needs, such as nutrition and repro- duction, and are directed to the satisfying of those needs. Accordingly, the immediate sources of activity must be sought within the organism and not outside. Activities or actions spring from the physiological impulses within the individual organism. And the higher we ascend in the animal scale, the more pronounced becomes this tendency to expend energy, which biologists call the katabolic tend- ency. Hence, the act begins within in the physiological impulse, but the development of the act depends upon the stimuli which the environment affords. Now, it follows that the organism is not to any such extent in subjection to its environment as the older social theorists supposed. No activity could develop, to be sure, without some stimulus from the environment. The organ- ism is, therefore, dependent upon the environment for the development and continuance of its activities. But the beginning of the activity is in the self-activity of the organ- ism, and the stimulus which is attended to is selected by the organism from among a countless number. Only in- directly, therefore, through natural selection and acquired habit, is the individual organism in subjection to its en- vironment. Natural selection has fixed in us certain innate or hereditary reactions to stimuli, but even these are not hard and fast in man and the higher animals; while acquired habits create certain pathways in the nervous system which favor persistent forms of activity. But in man conscious choice plays a leading part in determining what habits the individual shall have. The mind is, therefore, essentially selective in its work- ings. Its whole business is to select from among the stimuli which surround an organism, those which are needful for the maintenance and development of its activities. The basis of this selection is the inner organization of the organ- MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 61 ism, that is, its instincts and acquired habits. Thus it builds up the activities which are needful for maintaining and developing life. The mind presents itself, therefore, as a delicate apparatus for mastering the environment. In the highest development of mental life the subjection to the environment becomes less and less, that is, the power of transforming the environment becomes greater and greater. This is the case with man. It is by might of intelligence that he has conquered the world. Bearing in mind the fact that the environment to which the human individual has to adapt himself is above all a social environment of other individuals and that the social life consists of a series of complex reciprocal relations or adaptations between individuals, the social significance* of the mind becomes manifest. It is evident that the function of the human mind is especially to adjust in- dividuals to one another in a common life, to act as a link between individuals, and to further their better mutual adaptation to one another in the process of living together. Different levels or aspects of the functioning of the mind in human behavior are conveniently distinguished for the sake of clearness in psychological and sociological analysis. These are the instinctive, the habitual, the feel- ing, the intelligent, and the rational levels. All of these are found in human social behavior. The Native Impulses, or the Instincts. First of all come those hereditary reactions which psychologists call the native impulses or the "instincts." In man, and in all of the higher animals, there is a highly developed nervous system with multitudes of connections between 62 MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS its elements. These are pathways for nervous currents. Now, many of these connections are inborn are a part of our human heredity. Hence among our nervous re- actions to external stimuli are certain reactions more or less definitely preorganized by heredity. The larger part of these preorganized reactioi_s have been fixed in the species through the operation of natural selection in the same way in which the bodily characteristics of the species have been established. These the psychologists call the "instincts." Instincts are thus not acquired by the individual, but are the psychological expression, on the side of behavior, of his racial heredity, and like other inborn traits are transmitted from generation to generation with but little variation. In man, however, the instincts differ from those of the lower animals. Not only has man more instincts on account of the more complex hereditary structure of his nervous system, but for this reason they are more variable and alterable. In many of the lower forms of life, such as the insects, the instincts give rise to very fixed forms of behavior. In man there are few, if any, such fixed forms of behavior due to instinct, owing to his much more complex hereditary nervous structure and to the fact that the larger part of the connections in his nerv- ous system are acquired during the lifetime of the indi- vidual. The instincts in man are variable also owing to individual differences in nervous structure. Again, in man those complex hereditary reactions which we term "instincts" pass through the higher nervous centers which are concerned with consciousness, and hence are more or less subject to those higher controls over behavior -.vhich MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 63 we term "feeling" and "intelligence." Finally, as the instincts get their development only through appropriate stimuli in the environment, the more artificial environment of man may greatly influence their expression or even repress them altogether. For all of these reasons those activities which predominantly spring from instinct are more modificable and alterable in man through experience than in any other animal. Nevertheless, because the human instincts furnish the nucleus of activities by which the individual begins to master his world, and because all later adaptations are more or less influenced by these original reactions, they are exceedingly important as the basis of man's mental and social life. They are the activities which do not need to be learned, but are in us apart from training and ex- perience by virtue of our human heredity. The instincts are the origin of certain simpler relations between individuals and so furnish the beginnings of social organization. This may be seen in such typical human instincts as sexual and parental love. Other typi- cal instincts usually recognized by psychologists are gre- gariousness, imitativeness, constructiveness, acquisitive- ness, self-assertion, combativeness, and curiosity. All of these are sufficiently in evidence in human society. It should be pointed out, however, that there is no single social instinct which can be invoked to explain the origin, much less the development, of man's social life, since many instincts must have been concerned in bringing and keep- ing individuals together even in the primitive forms of association. Nevertheless, sociability itself must be con- sidered an instinctive rather than an acquired trait. Hu- 64 MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS man society, then, is rooted in human instincts, and the instincts are at the basis of man's social as well as of his mental life. Accordingly, we must always seek in sociology beneath habits, customs, and traditions in society the original instinctive impulses and reactions of individuals. Since these represent the innate or biological element, and furnish the original basis for the relationships of individu- als, they may well be characterized as the primary social forces. No program of social reconstruction can possibly succeed which does not take into consideration these original proclivities of human nature; on the other hand, when their control is understood, they will present no insuperable obstacle to any rational program of social reconstruction. Hence the guidance and control of these native reactions through the education of the individual and through the appropriate organization of social life is one of the great practical problems of human society. Acquired Habits. Instincts are inborn, while habits are acquired. Instincts might perhaps be termed race habits, while habits in the strict sense are modifications of inherent activities acquired by individuals or groups of individuals during their lifetime. As we have already seen, instinctive reactions become modified by experience; that is, the hereditary tendencies of the individual are adapted to new situations and new ways of reacting are thus acquired. These new ways of reacting, when they no longer need attention and drop more or less out of consciousness, become habits in the strict sense of the word. The earlier formed habits become, of course, the basis for later ones through their modification by adaptation, MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 6$ just as instinctive reactions are modified. Thus are built up the countless habits of the mature individual. This process of building up habits out of instincts, or previously formed habits, is from a psychological standpoint the essence of mental growth both in the individual and in society. Acquired habits in time come to be second na- ture, as we say, and are not less powerful in determining conduct than the original instinctive reactions. This is as true of society as it is of the individual. Acquired habit, therefore, plays a great part in human society. The character of the adult individual is very largely the result of the habits acquired through early environment and education. The organization of society is also at any given time almost wholly the result of habit; for social organization is the whole mass of reciprocal adjustments which individuals of a group maintain among themselves, and these are largely habitual. The psy- chological fact of habit is thus the main carrier of all those forms of social life and organization which rise above the merely instinctive level. Thus habit forms the chief raw material for cultural evolution. Man's capacity to acquire an indefinite number of habits made it possible for him to take on civilization through building up social usages, customs, traditions, and institutions. All of these are forms of habit with varying degrees of social sanction attached to them. Usages, or "folkways," are simply the similar habits of a group of people, usually handed down from generation to generation. The "mores," or customs, of a people are the folkways which have been reflected upon and sanctioned by the group, and hence set up as standards. Institutions are simply more 66 MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS highly developed and systematized, more definitely sanc- tioned and established social habits; while social traditions are habitual ways of thinking and feeling handed down from generation to generation. Thus the social order at any given time is largely a matter of habit, and the prob- lem of its reconstruction is the problem of building up new habits adapted to new life conditions to replace old habits which are no longer adapted. The whole mental and social life of man centers about the psychological facts of habit and adaptation. If we lived in a slowly changing world, we should need no other controls over activity than instinct and habit; but inas- much as we live in a rapidly changing world we need the higher, inner forms of control over behavior which we call "feeling," "intelligence," and "rationality." Feeling. By feeling we mean the agreeable or dis- agreeable tone which accompanies conscious states. It is practically synonymous with pleasure and pain, using those words in a broad way. Feeling, then, is the "me-side" of activity, or, more accurately, it is the subjective valuation wliich the organism gives to an activity. When the activity is one which has on the whole in the past history of the organism been advantageous the resulting feeling is usually pleasurable. On the other hand, when the activity is one which has been disadvantageous, the feeling is disagreeable or painful. Feeling, because it is the me-side of activity, is subject to all the variations to which the individual organism is subject. Conditions of health, habit, and personal idiosyn- crasies often make that which is agreeable to one person disagreeable to another. Hence, pleasure and pain are not MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 67 good guides as to the lightness or wrongness of actions. The majority of our feelings are attached to our instincts in the forms of emotions. They powerfully reenforce, there- fore, the instinctive activities. Now, the instincts, as we have already seen, are the result of selection in the past history of the species. They and the feelings at-, tached to them, or the emotions, are not therefore good guides in the complex life of the present. The instincts, and their correlated emotions, need, therefore, to be con- trolled and guided by the reason. They are, however, rough monitors which indicate to us without the labor of thought the organically advantageous or disadvanta- geous. A mistake of the psychology of the early part of the nineteenth century was its claim that pleasure and pain are the sole springs of action. But, as we have seen, feeling is the accompaniment and not the antecedent of activity. Feeling does, however, modify activity. If the feeling tone raised by the activity is pleasureable, the activity is reen- forced, but if it is disagreeable or painful, the activity tends to be inhibited. This is, however, something very different from saying that pleasure and pain are the sole sources of activity. Nevertheless, it is evident that in securing changes in activities in human society it is well if possible to enlist the feelings on the side of those changes. This can best be done by connecting the change with some instinctive impulse. Now, the instinctive impulses which are most favorable to social change are the altruistic or sympathetic impulses. Hence it is that the sympathetic feelings can usually be appealed to in bringing about any reform or progressive 68 MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS change in society. Sympathy, by which we mean fellow feeling, or altruistic feeling, is, therefore, the aspect of feeling which is most socialized, and has most to do in furthering social reforms and the reconstruction of civiliza- tion upon a basis of justice and humanity. The appeal to feeling is justifiable in society, therefore, only when it is an appeal to our sympathetic or altruistic feelings, and even these need the control of our intelligence. Neverthe- less, sympathetic or altruistic feeling, because it tends to harmonize individuals in their relations and to establish mutual good will, must be regarded as one of the founda- tions of higher civilization. Intelligence. Intelligence is the objective, cognitive side of the mind which has to do especially with the adapta- tion of the activities of the organism to the environment. Instinct and feeling have, as we have seen, chiefly refer- ence to the organism and its past environment, while in- telligence on the other hand is turned outward toward the rest of the universe, and so stands more for the present and the future. It functions to evaluate and control activities with reference to the environment. Knowledge, ideas, values, in other words, play the decisive role in adapting the organism to its environment. It is probable that intelligence was developed as an aid in carrying out the instincts and in satisfying the demands of feeling. Nevertheless, in man it can and does act in- dependently of these. The instincts and feelings, as we have already seen, are very insufficient guides in the com- plex social life of the present. Hence, the need of a higher instrument of adaptation than that which instinct or feeling can furnish. Therefore nature has developed in man the MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 69 intellect, and the chief distinction between man and the lower animals is that he has passed through many more stages in intellectual evolution. Man's intellect has been developed, in other words, to control activities in individual and collective life which cannot be controlled in any other way. It is for this reason that man has developed a higher phase of intelligence which no other animal possesses, which we call the "reason." Rationality. The reason, or rationality, is that phase of mind which is the supreme device for controlling activity and modifying the environment. The power of abstract thought, of calculation or reasoning, has enabled man to build up a distinctive social life, characterized by "culture," or "civilization." Language, religion, government, science, morality, and education, all these distinctive features of human society, as well as many others, have depended for their development upon this evolution of man's intellectual nature. While it is a mistake to search for primitive social origins in man's reason, or to think that human society is mainly a product of reflective thought, yet later social devel- opments and movements take on more and more a rational character. Reflective thought, which probably played such an insignificant part in primitive society, becomes in the highest social development the decisive element, because upon it depends the control, not only of the forces of phys- ical nature, but also of the feelings and impulses of human nature. All this is illustrated by the part which invention and discovery have played in social development. Invention and discovery hardly exist below the human level, hence animal societies are not progressive. On the other hand, 70 MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS civilization in human societies has been built up largely through invention and discovery. The invention of tools, weapons, labor saving devices, the improvements in com- munication and transportation, along with scientific dis- covery of the properties and nature of things, have been the material means by which human progress has been effected. But it should be remembered that invention is not confined , to the putting together of material forces in new ways, nor ' is discovery confined to the understanding of the workings of physical nature. Quite as important phases of invention and discovery have been the making of new institutions and forms of association, the discovery of new possibilities in human living, and especially the development of social standards by which individual and social activities have been standardized and controlled. Moral development in human society has depended, therefore, very largely upon intellectual processes. .Moral ideas and ideals especially have exerted a powerful influence on social relationships. Since new ideas are the creation of exceptional minds, and, since they may become powerful instruments in social prog- ress, it is evident that the individual has also his place as a factor in social evolution. In the higher stages of social development, therefore, the human reason plays an increasingly important part. When we remember that all the achievements of science, all of the conquests of the practical arts, all man's mastery over nature and self, are products of his reason, we can scarcely deny the very large part which must be assigned to the intellect in human social evolution and progress. Hope for the social future, moreover, manifestly lies in the possibility of the increasing dominance of intelligence MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 71 in our social life. Mastery over the conditions of our social existence can come only through increasing knowl- edge. This means, in effect, that only science is adequate to guide the reconstruction of our social life. In proportion as we build our social life upon ascertained facts and laws of human living together, we shall be successful; in pro- portion as we build upon mere emotionalism, blind tradi- tion, or party prejudices, we shall fail. Only in the de- velopment and maintenance of the rational level of behavior lie the safety and security of civilization. The Social Character of Mind. It is evident from what has been said that the mind as a whole enters as an active factor into our social life. The forces at work in human social relationships consist not simply of feeling elements, such as desire, but also of all the impulses and intellectual elements which go to make up the mental life of the individual. Beyond this, of course, are also the influence of physical factors, such as heredity, variation, and natural selection, and back of these are the conditions of the physical environment, such as climate, soil, food, and geographical conditions. The physical factors, how- ever, manifest themselves chiefly in our social life through the psychological elements of impulse, feeling, and intelli- gence. The main thing for the elementary student of sociology to note is that the factors at work in our social life are very complex, and that it is impossible to interpret human society aright through paying attention to only one of these. Our views of the human social life must be large enough, in other words, to include the working of all possible factors. The view of society which will be 72 MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS presented in this book, therefore, is a synthetic one as opposed to the many one-sided theories which are now prevalent regarding human institutions. Such a view we get even from a study of the individual mind, because such study shows that human consciousness is very largely a reflection of the complex social medium in which it has been developed and that the mind itself is therefore socially conditioned in all of its aspects. This is true even of the instincts and emotions with which we are equipped by heredity, because careful study of human instincts shows that they presuppose a social medium for their evolution. Even our most abstract thought is in the nature of conversation, and therefore presupposes mental interaction, or society. Man's mental and social life are, therefore, largely one. Mental interaction, intercommunication, is as necessary for the mind as for social life. If mind is the chief organ of adaptation for individuals, so intercommunication is the means of adjustment between individual minds. The whole mental and social life, therefore, grows together. Through intercommunication society carries on a collective mental life, and the individual mind gets its development largely by participating therein. These statements must not be interpreted to mean that the individual's mental life is wholly submerged in that of his group. Biological variation and the self-active character of the individual prevent this. So far as science can discover there is no complete social determinism of individual consciousness and behavior. While the indi- vidual gets his development, both physical and psychical, in the main, from his connection with a larger life, the MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 73 life of his species and of his group, this does not prevent him from developing variations of his own, both physically and mentally. If this were not so, social progress would be impossible, save through the action of natural selection upon groups. As it is, the individual's variations, origi- nalities, and inventions may be taken up by the group through suggestion and imitation and become the acquired habits of the whole group. Thus the individual reacts upon his group. Human society is, then, not a simple mass, but is made up of relatively independent, autono- mous individuals. The key to its activities is not, there- fore, in some principle which simply applies to the mass as a whole, but rather in the laws and principles of indi- vidual behavior. The Active Factors in Association. We may now briefly summarize what is said in this and in the preceding chapter about the active factors, or forces, which make human society what it is. We have paid no especial at- tention to the forces of the geographic environment, because they work in human society chiefly through natural selec- tion and external stimuli. Some sociologists have made the mistake of representing the geographic factors of climate, soil, etc., as directly at work in the social life; but this is rarely the case. Usually they affect social life only indirectly as they affect the impulses, feelings, and ideas of individuals and through acting as selective agencies in human life. Nevertheless, for this very reason, we must include them among the original active factors in the social life of man. As original active factors in human association, we must, then, recognize the following: 74 MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS I. The physical factors: (a) Geographic environment, including climate, food, soil, natural resources, topography, etc. (b) Biological forces, heredity, variation, selection, etc. II. The psychical factors: (a) Impulses, both hereditary (instinctive) and acquired (habitual). (b) Feelings, both hereditary (emotions) and acquired (habitual), (d) Intellectual elements, including sensation, perception, and ideation (conception, imagination, reasoning, etc.). Derived, complex social factors, compounded out of these simple original factors, are very numerous and have never been very satisfactorily classified, though many attempts have been made. Such are beliefs, desires, interests, and values, which are compounds of varying proportions made up of impulses, feelings, and intellectual elements. Their great importance in the social life will be manifest as we take up different problems. Such are also economic goods and the technology of civilization, such as roads, houses, tools, and machinery. These may be regarded as modifications of the geographic environment, effected by man's operations upon physical nature. We shall have occasion to see how these affect every social problem directly or indirectly. Finally there are the institutions of society, such as the family, government, law, morality, religion, and education. While these are very complex in origin, they react upon society. They must also, accordingly, be regarded as active factors in the social life of man. Summary. Social life is made up of adaptations between individuals, of coadaptations of individuals to one another. But the master device for controlling the complex adaptations of life is the mind; hence mind is also MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 75 the chief instrument for maintaining and perfecting that complex of adaptations between individuals which is our social life. Social life has been created by mind, and in man is largely an intermental life. Intercommunication is the chief means of making interadjustments between individuals, just as the mind is the chief organ of adapta- tion in the individual. Hence all phases of social and mental life are intertwined. Back of these, however, we must recognize the physical and biological factors. But a sociology which is to be put to practical use must show the significance of the various mental factors for our social life; for it is these factors which can be most easily modi- fied and controlled. SELECT REFERENCES For brief reading: COOLEY, Social Organization, Chaps. I-IL EIXWOOD, Introduction to Social Psychology, Chap. III. McDouGAix, Introduction to Social Psychology, Chaps. I-IV. For more extended reading: BOGARDUS, Essentials of Social Psychology, Chaps. I-IV. COOLEY, Human Nature and the Social Order, Chaps. I-VT. HOBHOCSE, Mind in Evolution, Revised Edition, Chaps. I-VL JAMES, Psychology, Briefer Course, Chaps. X, XXV. Ross, Social Psychology. THORN-DIKE, Elements of Psychology, Part III. THORN-DIKE, The Original Nature of Man, Chaps. I-XL TROTTER, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, pp. 1-65. WAILAS, The Great Society, Chaps. H-XL \ CHAPTER IV PRIMARY GROUPS: THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY IN HUMAN SOCIETY Forms of Association. We may conveniently dis- tinguish between different types of social groups or forms of association. There is first of all the distinction between temporary and permanent groups. It is evident that the permanent groups are more important both practically and for the purposes of scientific study. The temporary groups, moreover, are usually parts of larger permanent groups. Another distinction which we may make is that between voluntary, purposive groups and involuntary, genetic groups. The former are found only in human society and are asso- ciations of persons for special purposes. Such are parties, religious sects, trade unions, industrial corporations, clubs, and the like. The latter are natural groupings, such as the family, the neighborhood, the city, the state or province, and the nation. They may be, and usually are, called communities, since they are composed of in- dividuals who carry on all phases of a common life. Vol- untary, purposive associations always exist within some community, whether large or small. Groups which we call "communities" are, therefore, more embracing, more stable, less artificial and specialized than purely voluntary groups. For this reason communities are of more interest to the sociologist than specialized voluntary groups, and 76 PRIMARY GROUPS 77 sociology is In a peculiar sense a study of the problems of community life. A still more important distinction between groups for sociological purposes is that between primary and secondary groups. Primary groups are those which involve more or less intimate, face-to-face, personal relations. Such are the family, the neighborhood, and the play group. Sec- ondary groups, on the other hand, are those which do not necessarily involve face-to-face association. Such are the state, the nation, the political party, and the religious sect. They are secondary because they are not original but are the creations of high civilization. Primary groups, on the other hand, are found in all stages of human development. They are of most interest sociologically, because they exhibit social life at its maxi- mum intensity, and because they are the bearers of the most vital elements in social life, especially the traditions of civilization. Another very important distinction for sociological purposes among the forms of human association is that between the sanctioned, or institutional, and the unsanc- tioned, or non-institutional, forms. Those groupings and relations of individuals which have been reflected upon, approved, and established, or instituted, by a large com- munity we call institutions. Such are the family, property, the state, the church, and the school. As institutions are dependent on reflective thought and organized authority, they are not found, in the strict sense, below the human level. Then* extreme importance in human society is indicated by the fact that they are forms of association which have been reflected upon, sanctioned, and estab- 78 PRIMARY GROUPS lished by human communities. They embody the chief consciously recognized values in the social life. Hence ^ sociology is largely a study of institutions in their relations to the social life. To begin our study of sociology it is evident that we should have, if possible, a more or lesVpermanent, natural, group which is at the same time both a primary group and an institution.^ There is one such group in human society the family^ It is for this reason that we select the family as the group with which to begin our study of the concrete problems of human society because it illustrates in a simple way so many phases of social life. .jj-Many sociologists would begin with some other social group, such as the nation or the neighborhood; but the nation is not a primary group and is too large and complex to begin with, while the neighborhood is not institutional- ized a.nd fails also to illustrate clearly the problems of social origin and development. The study of the family, on the other hand, furnishes clear illustration of the princi- ples and forces involved in social origins, social develop- ment, and social organization. But before we consider the family as a human institution, let us note the social function of primary groups in general. The Social Function of Primary Groups. The in- timate, face-to-face groups of men have always been the chief medium for the development of human social life; for in them social life is most vividly realized. They form the natural environment for the development of the social traits of the individual. Psychologically the stimulus of the presence of other individuals seems necessary for the development of those instincts, habits, feelings, ideas, and PRIMARY GROUPS 79 standards which make for social solidarity. Hence the primary groups are the chief means for socializing the individual. / The face-to-face association of primary gpbups, more- over, is the chief means of preserving and passing along social tradition /- that is, the knowledge, ideas, and values handed down from the past. While civilized society has devised specialized institutions for preserving and trans- mitting social tradition, such as schools, libraries, and museums, yet the continuity of the social life on its psychic side would be very imperfect if society had to depend on such specialized institutions. The primary groups are the chief bearers of social tradition because they furnish the environment of the child from its earliest years. In them the child learns his language, and with his language he gets the fundamental knowledge, beliefs, and standards of his civilization. Moreover, the meaning of essential traditions is clearer in these groups to the young, because they are accompanied usually by the actual behavior correlated with the traditions. In other words, primary y groups are also the main carriers of custom, in the sense of sanctioned habits of behavior. A certain tradition regarding government or morality, for example, when accompanied by observable actions, can be gotten by the child better than he can get it from the printed page or even the spoken word. The chief importance of primary groups in our social life, however, is that they are the source of primary social ideals. 1 ^ They furnish the "patterns" which we attempt to realize in our social life in general. Thus Professor Cooley says we get our notions of love, freedom, justice, and the 80 PRIMARY GROUPS like from such simple and widespread forms of society, since "in these relations mankind realizes itself, gratifies its primary needs, in a fairly satisfactory manner, and from the experience forms standards of what it is to expect from more elaborate association." \He adds that the ideals of both democracy and Christianity have sprung naturally \ from the primary groups. The very ideal of social solidarity itself comes from the unity experienced in such groups. Now, all progress in civilization is essentially a following out and development of "patterns." In the material realm, for example, we have been able to develop the steam engine and the flying machine by following out and im- proving certain patterns. So in social relations we get our primary patterns from the primary groups, and then strive ^ to realize them in the wider social life. Hence the great significance of these groups for understanding the whole development of human society and of civilization. The Family as a Primary Group. The family is the simplest group in human society capable of maintaining itself. It is in an especial sense, therefore, the primary social group. As its members, husband and wife, parents and children, have then* places largely fixed in the group by their organic natures and relations, the family seems to be almost as much a biological structure as a social group. For this reason it presents especially clearly the biolog- ical forces operating in our social life. The family is not a product of other forms of association, but rather furnishes the possibilities of these. Containing as it does both sexes and all ages, it is not only capable of reproducing itself and society, but of illustrating and developing practi- cally all essential human relationships. Thus the relations THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY 8r of superiority, subordination, and equality, which enter so largely into all social organization, are illustrated in the family in the relations of parents to children, of children to parents, of parents to each other, and of children to one another. Indeed, all essential relations of social niter- dependence are so fully illustrated in the family that it has often been justly called " society, j^miniature." For this reason the work of the family in the social life has often been compared to that of the cell in the biological organism. Without pushing this analogy, however, it is evident that families do enter very largely as units into our social and industrial life, and we shall see that the char- acter of our social life is very largely determined by the * functioning of the family. The full evidence for this con- clusion can be given only through the consideration of the origin, historical development, and present condition of the family; but a brief survey of the functions of the family in human society will suffice to show it to be the most im- portant of human institutions. We shall consider these functions under three heads. The Primary Function of the Family is continuing the life of the species; that is, the primary function of the family is reproduction in the sense of the birth and rearing of children. While other functions of the family have been delegated in a large measure to other social institutions, it is manifest that this function cannot be so delegated. We know of no human society in which the birth and rear- ing of children has not been the essential function of the family. In present society, at least, the stream of life must flow through the family. The constitution of the family, therefore, determines the heredity of the child as well as rV^ :' & \ - 82 THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY its care and upbringing. If the family performed no other function than this of producing the new individuals of society and furnishing them physical care and nurture until maturity is reached, it would still be the most important of all human institutions. * From a sociological point of view the childless family must be judged a failure. While the childless family may be of social utility to the individuals that form it, nevertheless from the point of view of society such a family has failed to perform its most important function and must be considered, therefore, to that extent socially a failure. The Function of the Family in Conserving Social Pos- sessions. The family is still the chief institution in society for transmitting from one generation to another social pos- sessions of all sorts, and, therefore, of conserving the social order. Property in the form of land or houses or personal property, society permits the family to pass along from gen- eration to generation. Even the material equipment for industry, that is, capital, is so transmitted in present society. Thus under present conditions the child gets its material possessions, its economic equipment, for its start in life mainly from its family group. While this transmission by the family of the material goods of society from one genera- tion to another is obviously of the highest social importance, even more important is its function of transmitting the spiritual possessions of the race. The family is the chief institutional vehicle of social tradition, because the child gets its language mainly in the family; and in social tradi- tion is embodied all the beliefs, standards, and values of civilization regarding industry, government, law, religion, morality, the family, and general social life. THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY 83 i/ The Family as a School. So much does the child get his essential social traditions from the family, that many edu- cators hold that the most essential things in social educa- tion can never be given in the public schools, but must be given in the home.- This is especially true of religious and moral instruction. The real foundations of moral character are laid while the child is yet of tender age in the family circle. In the family the child first learns the meaning of authority, obedience, loyalty, love, service, and all the human virtues. If the child fails to get proper moral stand- ards and ideals from his family life, he gets them with greater difficulty, if at all, from society later. The same is true regarding political ideas and standards. If the child fails to learn in his family life loyalty to his country, respect for law, and the ideals of good citizenship, there are good prospects of his being numbered among the law- less or unpatriotic elements of society later. Even habits.-- of work must be learned by the child largely in the family. Thus the rudiments of morality, of religion, of govern- ment, of law, and even of industry are transmitted in the family and learned by the child in his family group. The family, in brief, furnishes the immediate environ- ment of the child of tender age. Thus it is charged by so- V ciety not only with producing its new individuals but with training them in the most essential relations and values of life. It is the group which has the greatest power to social- ize the individual and to adjust him to the requirements even of a high civilization. If it fails to perform this important task, the chances are that unsocialized individuals will abound, and that social anarchy will in time come to re- place social order. 84 THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY V Thus the family is the great conserving agency in society to preserve social order and to transmit from generation to generation both the material and the spiritual possessions of the race. The Function of the Family in Social Progress. While the conservative functions of the family in social life are very obvious, the part which it plays in social progress has often been overlooked and even denied. Now, social prog- ress, we shall see later, depends mainly upon two things: the accumulation of knowledge and the accumulation of altruism regard for others in society. It is, of course, through the latter that the family life plays a part in social progress. The family is the chief generator of altruism in society, and increasing altruism is necessary for the success of those more and more complex forms of cooperation which characterize higher civilization and upon which it depends. It is chiefly in the family that children learn to love, to be of service, to sacrifice for others, and to respect one another's rights. If the family fails to teach the spirit of service and self-sacrifice to its members, it is hardly probable that they will get much of that spirit from society at large. The amount of altruism in society, therefore, has a very close relation to the quality of its family life. Family affection is the natural root of altruism in society at large. If the family life is the chief teacher of altruism to the individual, and if society depends upon increasing altruism for each forward step in moral progress, then the family life plays a most important part in social progress. There is another way also in which the altruism and solidarity of the family play a most important part in social evolution. All human history has, from one point THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY 85 of view, been a struggle to transfer the altruism and soli- darity of the family to successively larger and larger groups of men. In other words, as we have already seen, the family is the primary group which has furnished the main moral "patterns" which society at large has set before itself as its goal. Our primary social ideals, in the main, come from the family. Thus the ideal of human brother- hood is manifestly derived from the family. So also the ideals of love, service, self-sacrifice for the sake of service, and the like, in society at large. Higher civilization has set these ideals, which the family life has furnished, before it as the goals of progress. *-Thus we have a brief presentation of the claim of the family to be regarded not only as the primary, but also as the most important institution of human society. While primarily its function is the birth and proper rearing of children, yet in performing this function it has become the chief medium for carrying and nourishing the essential values of civilization. It has been the cradle of civilization in the past, and something like its organization at best seems to be the normal goal which men set up for society at large to realize.,/ The nation whose family life decays, therefore, rots at the core; for its chief spring of social and civic virtue dries up.-s/C The Family and Industry. The family is so depend- ent upon industrial conditions in performing its functions, and industrial conditions so react upon the family life, that a word must be said about the interrelations of these two before we undertake to trace the origin and develop- ment of the family as a human institution. The Domestic Arts. Primitively all industry centered 86 THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY in the family. Modern industry is but an enormous ex- pansion of primitive housekeeping; that is, the preparation of food and clothing and shelter by the primitive family group for its own existence is the germ out of which all modern industry has developed. The very word economics means the science or the art of the household. In primitive communities and in new settled districts the family often carried on all essential industrial activities. It produced all the raw material, manufactured the finished products, and consumed the same. This development of household arts greatly aided the development of human culture and at the same time integrated the family, as it made the family a more or less self-sufficing economic unit. The family was in this stage of social and industrial development a more complete miniature society or com- munity, and the tradition grew up that these domestic arts must be maintained in the home if the family was to retain its integrity. But with the growth of a complex civilization there has come a great industrial division of labor, and the family has delegated industrial activity after activity to some other institution until at the present time the modern family performs scarcely any industrial activities, except the preparation of food for immediate consumption. Even this in modern cities seems about to be delegated to some other institution. All that need be said at present about the delegation of the industrial activities of the family to other industrial institutions is that the movement is not one which need cause any anxiety so long as it does not interfere with the essential function of the family, namely, the birth and THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY 87 proper rearing of children. Even though children can no longer learn the domestic arts and the rudiments of in- dustry in their home life, still it is possible through man- ual, industrial, and domestic science training in our public schools to teach these to all children. And the removal of arts and industries from the home, even such essential industries as the preparation of food, is not to be regarded as necessarily evil. Jt may be a boon if it gives more tune to the parents, especially to the mother, for the proper care and bringing up of the children. The Wages of Men. This removal of industries from the home, however, while theoretically to be welcomed, has in practice under present economic conditions not always had the beneficent effect of giving more time to parents for the proper care of their children and of securing a better home life. On the contrary, the removal of in- dustries from the home has often been followed by the removal of both parents and children, the rendering of the family's economic situation precarious, and the practical disintegration of home life. The wages of the male worker outside of the home have too often tended to conform to the single man's standard, /though government statistics show that the earnings of the husband constitute 80 per cent of the total income of the average wage-earner's family hi the United States. Thus the census statistics of 1910 showed that the average yearly wage of all male wage earners engaged in manufactures in the United States was only $517.91, although researches by experts estab- lished at nearly the same time the fact that the least in- come on which a family consisting of two parents and three young children could maintain a decent standard of living 88 THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY was, for the city of New York, $825 a year, and for smaller cities $650 a year. In the year 1915 another investigation showed that four fifths of the heads of wage-earning fami- lies received less than $800 a year, while it was estimated that, on account of the rise in the cost of living, from $950 to $1200, according to locality, was necessary to maintain a decent standard of living for a family of five. Evidently I modern industry has been quite regardless of the family, "* and has in many instances made it very difficult to main- tain a proper home life./ The Labor of Women. This has been all the more the case because in many instances married women, often mothers, have gone into factories to supplement the in- sufficient income of the family, v Under such circumstances the home has often become a mere lodging place, children have been neglected and allowed to grow up on the streets and hence as unsocialized individuals. In 1910 women wage earners formed over 21 per cent of the total bread winners in the United States. Of the eight million women wage earners, 1,772,000 were employed in manufacturing industries. However, only about 15 per cent of all the women at work for wages in 1910 were married. In foreign countries the proportion is much larger, and since 1914 j the number has undoubtedly increased greatly in the United States. It is too late to stop this movement, but the labor of married women should be strictly regulated by the state. They should be excluded from certain in- dustries, their hours of labor, wages, and conditions of work should be prescribed, and above all, their employ- ment for a given period before and after the birth of children should be prohibited; for it has been found that wherever THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY 89 mothers of very young children are employed outside of the home, there is an abnormally high rate of infant mor- tality. Even the labor of young unmarried women in factories has many dangers to the family; for they are by such work but poorly prepared for the duties of wif ehood and mother- hood and in some cases their health may be impaired. These evils can be met, however, by greater attention to education in the domestic arts in our schools and by stricter regula- tion of the conditions of the labor of women by the state in all respects. The Labor of Children. Perhaps the climax of the en- croachment of modern industry upon the home comes when it takes young children out of the home and puts them to work. About two million children under fifteen years of age were employed in the United States in 1910 outside of their families, though only about one fourth of these were in factories, shops, stores, and mines. The labor of children outside of the home has sprung very largely from the insufficiency of family income noted above. While child labor is often defended as having the merit of giving the child some industrial training, yet careful and extensive investigations show that its net result is to dwarf the child in body and mind, to lower the wages of adults, and above all, to deprive the child of that education which alone can prepare him for efficient citizenship. The drafting of chil- dren who have not yet completed their work in the grades into industry must be regarded, therefore, as altogether an evil. Yet the remedy for these evils is not to put industrial work back in the home. That, under modern conditions, , 00 THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY produces what we call "the sweat shop," which is perhaps a worse evil than any we have described. The remedy is rather in so organizing industry that it will not needlessly encroach upon our family life in securing adequate wages, reasonable hours, wholesome conditions of work in industry. This means that our industry must be organized about our family life rather than our family life about industry. /The Subordination of Industry to the Family Life is tecessary, therefore, from a social point of view. Industry, as we have seen, was primitively an adjunct of the family life, and all modern industry, if rightfully developed, should be but an adjunct to the family life. Industrial considera- tions must be, therefore, subordinate to domestic considera- tions, that is, to considerations of the welfare of parents and their children in the family group. One trouble with modern society is that industry has come to dominate as an independent interest that oftentimes does not recognize its reasonable and socially necessary subordination to the higher interests of society. There can be no sane and stable family life until we are willing to subordinate the requirements of industry to the requirements of the family for the good birth and proper rearing of children. This means that the securing of a normal family life for all classes, rather than mere economic prosperity, should be the first consideration in all attempts at social reconstruction. But the full significance of a normal family life for human wel- fare and how it can be secured will be evident only when we have considered the origin, history, and present con- dition of the family. Summary. Primary, or face-to-face groups are the key to the understanding of our social life; for in them social THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY 91 life is at its maximum. They perform three chief functions: (i) they socialize the individual; (2) they are the chief carriers of custom and tradition; (3) they are the source of primary social ideals or "social patterns." The family is the chief primary group and the most important of human institutions, since it controls largely the birth and the rearing of children. Because the family involves such a close association of both sexes and all ages and enlists so many of the forces that make or mar social life, it illus- trates the problem of human relations the " social- prob- lem" hi the clearest possible manner. The good and evil of our family life are sure to reflect themselves through- out society. If what has been said regarding the impor- tance of the family as an institution is at all true, then it is evident that the securing of a normal family life for all classes must be the central aim of scientific social recon- struction. y\ll that is involved in a "normal family life" will become evident, however, only as we proceed to the survey of all of our social problems. SELECT REFERENCES For brief reading: COOLEY, Social Organization, Chaps. III-V. ELLWOOD, Introduction to Social Psychology, Chaps. IV, V. GILLETTE, The Family and Society, Chap. I. For more extended reading: ADLER, Marriage and Divorce, Chap. I. BOSANQUET, The Family, Part II. DEALEY, The Family in its Sociological Aspects, Chap. I. KELLEY, Modern Industry, Chap. I. MACLEAN, Women Workers and Society, Chap. III. ROWE, Society, Its Origin and Development, Part II. SALEEBY, Parenthood and Race Culture, Chap. IX. 92 THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY SMALL and VINCENT, Introduction to the Sttidy of Society, Bk. IV, Chap. I. SMITH, Introduction to Educational Sociology, Chap. IV. TOWNE, Social Problems, Chaps. IV-VI. Brief bibliography on social surveys and family monographs (see Preface of this book, p. 5) : ARONOVICI, The Social Survey. BYINGTON, What Social Workers Should Know about their own Com- munities. ELLWOOD, The LePlay Method of Social Observation, (Family Mon- ographs) in American Journal of Sociology, Vol. II, p. 562 f. ELMER, Technique of Social Surveys. TAYLOR, The Social Survey (in University of Missouri Bulletins). See also Bibliography of Social Surveys published by Sage Foundation. CHAPTER V THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY WE must understand the biological roots of the family * before we can understand the family as an institution, and especially before we can understand its origin. Let us note, then, briefly the chief biological facts connected with the family life. The Biological Foundations of the Family. (i) The Family rests upon tJie Great Biological Fact of Sex. While sex does not characterize all animal forms, still it does char- acterize all except the simplest forms of animal life. These simplest forms multiply or reproduce by fission, but such asexual reproduction is almost entirely confined to the uni- cellular forms of life. It may be inferred, therefore, that the higher animal types could not have been evolved with- out sexual reproduction, and something of the meaning or significance of sex in the whole life-process will, therefore, be helpful in understanding all of the higher forms of evo- lution. Biologists tell us that the meaning or purpose of sexual reproduction is to bring about greater organic varia- tion. Now variation, as we have seen, is the raw material upon which natural selection acts to create the higher types. The immense superiority of sexual reproduction over asexual reproduction is due to the ijact that it multiplies so greatly the elements of heredity in each new organism, for under sexual reproduction every new organism has two parents, four grandparents, and so on, each of which perhaps 93 94 THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY contributes something to its heredity. The biological mean- ing of sex, then, is that it is a device of nature to bring about organic variation. From the point of view of the social life we may note also that sex adds greatly to its variety, enrich- ing it with numerous fruitful variations which undoubtedly further social evolution. The bareness and monotony of a social life without sex can readily be imagined. While the differences between the sexes have been mainly elaborated through the differences of reproductive function, yet these differences have come to be fundamental to the whole nature of the organism. In the higher animals, therefore, the sexes differ profoundly in many ways from each other. Biologists tell us that the chief difference between the male and female organism is a difference in metabolism, that is, in the rapidity of organic change which goes on within the body. In the male metabolism is much more rapid than in the female; hence the male organism is said to be more katabolic. In the female the rapidity of organic change is less; hence the female is said to be more anabolic. Put in more familiar terms, the male tends to expend energy, is more active, hence also stronger; the female tends more to store up energy, is more passive, conservative, and weaker. These fundamental differences between the sexes express themselves in many ways in the social life. The differences between man and woman, therefore, are not to be thought of as due simply to social customs and usages, the different social environment of the two sexes, but are even more due to a radical and fundamental difference in their whole nature. The belief that the two sexes would become like each other in character if given the same environment is, therefore, erroneous. THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY 95 That these differences are original, or inborn, and not acquired, may be readily seen by observing children of dif- ferent sex. Even from their earliest years boys are more active, restless, energetic, destructive, untidy, and disobe- dient, while little girls are quieter, less restless, less destruc- tive, neater, more orderly, and more obedient. These different innate qualities fit the sexes naturally for different functions in human society, and there is, therefore, a natural ^division of labor between them, which indeed may be said to be the fundamental division of labor in human society. The causes which produce sex in the individual are prob- ably beyond the control of man. Sex seems to be a form of Mendelian inheritance, 1 and is determined by the nature of the germ cells which unite to form the new individual. While the number of the two sexes at maturity varies in different species according to obscure factors, in practically all of the higher species, man included, they are relatively equal. In human society much depends upon this relative numerical equality of the two sexes. Hence it is fortunate that man does not know how to control the sex of offspring, for if he did the numerical equality of the two sexes might be disturbed and serious social results would follow. (2) The Influence of Parental Care. Sex alone could , never have produced the family in the sense of a relatively 'permanent group of parents and offspring. We do not begin to find the family until we get to those higher types where we find some parental care. In the lowest types the relation between the sexes is momentary and the sur- vival of offspring is secured simply through the pro- duction of enormous numbers. Thus the sturgeon, a 1 See Castle's Heredity, Chapter X. 96 THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY low type of fish, produces between one and two million of eggs at a single spawning, from which it is estimated that not more than a dozen individuals survive till matur- ity is reached. Thus sexual reproduction of itself neces- sitates no parental care and in itself could give rise in no way to the family; but quite low in the scale of life we begin to find some parental care as a device to protect immature offspring and secure their survival without the expenditure of such an enormous amount of energy in mere physiological reproduction. Even among the fishes we find some that watch over the eggs after they are spawned and care for their young by leading them to suitable feeding grounds. In such cases a much smaller number of young need to be produced in order that a few may survive until maturity is reached. In the mammals the mother, obviously, must care for the young for some time, since mammals are animals that suckle their young. But this care of the young by a single parent only fore- shadows the family as we understand it. Among the mam- mals it is not until we reach the higher types that we find care of offspring by both parents, a practice, however, which is common among the birds. It is evident that as soon as both parents are concerned in the care of the off- spring they have a much better chance of survival. Hence, natural selection favors the growth of this type of group life and develops powerful instincts to keep male and female together till after the birth and rearing of offspring. Such we find to be the condition among many of the higher mammals, such as some of the carnivora, and especially among the monkeys and apes and man. If it is allowable at this point to generalize from the THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY 97 facts given, it must be said that the family life is essentially a device of nature for the preservation of offspring through a more or less prolonged infancy. The family group and the instincts upon which it rests were undoubtedly, there- fore, instituted by natural selection. Summing up, we may say, then, the animal family group owes its existence, first, to the production of child or immature forms that need more or less prolonged care; secondly, to the pro- longation of this period of immaturity in the higher ani- mals, and especially in man; thirdly", to the development,, parallel with these two causes, of parental instincts which keep male and female together for the care of the off- spring. It is evident, then, that the family life rests, not upon sex attraction, but upon the fact of the child and the corresponding psychological fact of parental instinct. The family, then, has been created by the very conditions of life itself and is not a man-made institution. The Origin of the Family in the Human Species. Two great theories of the origin of the family in the human species have in the past been more or less accepted, and these we must now examine and criticize. First, the tradi- tional theory that the human family life was from the beginning a pure monogamy. Secondly, the so-called evolutionary theory that the human family life arose from confused if not promiscuous sex relations. The first of these theories, favored both by the Bible and Aristotle, held undisputed sway down to the middle of the nineteenth century. Then, after the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species in 1859, certain social theorists began to put forward the second theory in the name of evolution. In order that we may see precisely what the origin of the human 98 THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY family life was, and its primitive form, we must now pro- ceed to criticize these two theories, especially the last, which is known as the hypothesis of a primitive state of promiscuity. The Habits of the Higher Animals. We have already spoken of the origin of the family group in the animal world generally, but it must be admitted that there are some difficulties in arguing directly from the lower animals to man. Man is so separated from the lower animals through having passed through many higher stages of an independent evolution that in many respects his life is peculiar to itself. This is true especially of his family life. If we survey the whole range of animal life and then the whole range of human life, we find that there are but two or three striking similarities between the family life of man and that of the brutes, but a great many striking dissimilarities. The similarities may be summed up by saying that man exhibits in common with all the animals the phenomena of courtship, that is, of the male seeking to win the female, also the phenomenon, of male jealousy, and we may perhaps add an instinctive aversion to crossing with other species. These characteristics of his family life man shares with the brutes below him. There are, however, many things peculiar to the human family life that are found in no animal species below man. The most striking of these differences may be mentioned, (i) Man has no pairing season, as practically all other animals have. (2) The number of young born in the human species is on the whole much smaller than in any other animal species. (3) The dependence of offspring upon parents is far longer in the human species than in any other THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY 99 species. (4) Man has an antipathy to incest or close inbreeding which seems to be instinctive. This is not found clearly in any animal species below man. (5) There is a tendency among human beings to artificial adornment during the period of courtship, but not to natural ornament to any extent, as among many animal species. (6) The indorsement of society is almost invariably sought, both among uncivilized and civilized peoples, before the estab- lishment of a new family usually through the forms of a religious marriage ceremony. (7) Chastity in women, especially married women, is universally insisted upon, both among uncivilized and civilized peoples, as the basis of human family life. (8) There is a feeling of modesty or of shame as regards matters of sex among the human beings. (9) In humanity we find, besides animal lust, spiritual affection, or love, as a bond of union between the two sexes. None of these peculiarities of human family life are found in the family life of any animal species below man. It might seem, therefore, that man's family life must be re- garded as a special creation unconnected with the family life of the brutes below him. But this view is hardly prob- able, rather is impossible from the standpoint of evolution. We must say that these peculiarities of human family life are to be explained through the fact that man has passed through many more stages of evolution, particularly of intellectual evolution, than any of the animals below him. If we examine these peculiarities of man's family life carefully, we will see that they all can be explained through natural selection and man's higher intellectual development. That man has no pairing season, has fewer offspring born,. 100 THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY and a longer period of dependence of the offspring upon parents, and the like, is directly to be explained through natural selection; while seeking the indorsement of society before forming a new family, sexual modesty, tendencies to artificial adornment, and the like, are to be explained through man's self-consciousness and higher intellectual development, also through the fuller development of his social instincts. The gap between the human family life and brute family life is, therefore, not an unbridgeable one. That this is so, we see most clearly when we consider the family life of the anthropoid or manlike apes man's nearest cousins in the animal world. All of these apes, of which the chief representatives are the gorilla, orang- utan, and the chimpanzee, live in relatively permanent family groups, usually monogamous. These family groups are quite human in many of their characteristics, such as the care which the male parent gives to the mother and her offspring, and the seeming affection which exists between all members of the group. Such a group of parents and offspring among the higher apes is, moreover, a relatively permanent affair, children of different ages being frequently found along with their parents in such groups. So far as the evidence of animals next to man, therefore, goes, there is no reason for supposing that the human family life sprang from confused or promiscuous sex relations in which no permanent union between male and female parent existed. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe, as Wester- marck says, that human family life is an inheritance from man's apelike progenitor. The Evidence from the Lower Human Races. The evidence afforded by the lowest peoples in point of culture THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY IO1 even more clearly, if anything, refutes the hypothesis of a primitive state of promiscuity. The habits or customs of the lowest peoples were not well known previous to the nineteenth century. Therefore it was possible for such a theory as the patriarchal theory of the primitive family to remain generally accepted, as we have already said, down to the middle of the nineteenth century. This was the theory that the oldest or most primitive type of human family life is that depicted in the opening pages of the Book of Genesis, namely, a family life in which the father or eldest male of the family group is the absolute ruler of the group and practically owner of all persons and property. The belief that this was the primitive type of the human family life was first attacked by a German-Swiss philologist by the name of Bachofen in a work entitled Das Mutlcrrccht (The Matriarchate), published in 1861, in which he argued that antecedent to the patriarchal period was a matriarchal period, in which women were dominant socially and politically, and in which relationships were traced through mothers only. Bachofen got his evidence for this theory from certain ancient legends, such as that of the Amazons, and other remains in Greek and Roman literature, which seemed to point to a period antecedent to the patriarchal. In 1876 Mr. J. F. McLennan, a Scotch lawyer, put forth, independently, practically the same theory, basing it upon certain legal survivals which he found among many peoples. With Bachofen, he argued that this matriarchal period must have been characterized by promiscuous rela- tions of the sexes. In 1877 Mr. Lewis H. Morgan, an American ethnologist and sociologist, put forth again, 102 THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY independently, practically the same theory, basing it upon an extensive study of the North American Indian tribes. Morgan had lived among the Iroquois Indians for years and had mastered their system of relationship, which previously had puzzled the whites. He found that they traced relationship through mothers only, and not at all along the male line. This method of reckoning relationship, moreover, he found also characterized practically all of the North American Indian tribes, and he argued that the only explanation of it was that originally sexual relations were of such an unstable or promiscuous character that they would not permit of tracing descent through fathers. From these theories sociological writers put forth the conclusion that the primitive state was one of promiscuity, or, as Sir John Lubbock called it in his Origin of Civilization, one of " communism in women." Post, a German student of comparative jurisprudence, for example, summed up the theory by saying that " monogamous marriage origi- nally emerged everywhere from pure communism in women, through the intermediate stages of limited communism in women, polyandry, and polygyny." Even Herbert Spencer in his Principles of Sociology, while he avoided accepting such an extreme theory, asserted that in the beginning sex relations were confused and unregulated, and that all forms of marriage polyandry, polygyny, monogamy, and promiscuity existed alongside of one another and that monogamy survived through its being the superior form. Before giving a criticism in detail of this theory let us note whether the evidence from the lowest peoples con- firms it. The lowest peoples in point of culture are not THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY 103 the North American Indians nor the African Negroes, but certain isolated groups that live almost in a state of nature, without any attempt to cultivate the soil or to control nature in other respects. Such are the Bushmen of South Africa, the Australian Aborigines, the Negritos of the Philippine Islands and of the Andaman Islands, the Veddahs of Ceylon, and the Fuegians of South America. Now all these peoples, with a possible exception, 1 practice monogamy and live in relatively stable family groups. Their monog- amy, however, is not of the type found in patriarchal times or among civilized peoples, but is a simple pairing monogamy, husband and wife remaining together indefi- nitely if children are born, but separating easily if childless. Westermarck in his History of Human Marriage shows un- doubtedly that nothing approaching promiscuity existed among these lower peoples. Promiscuity is apt to be found at a higher stage of social development, and is especially apt to be found among the nature peoples after the white man has visited them and demoralized their family life. But in all these cases the existence of promiscuity is mani- festly something exceptional and abnormal. Perhaps civilized peoples such as the Romans of the decadence have more nearly approximated the condition of promis- cuity than any savage people of which we have knowledge. At any rate, the lowest existing savages found in the nine- teenth century had definite forms of family life, and the type usually found was the simple pairing monogamy mentioned above. 1 The Australian Aborigines. For the evidence for the existence of pro- miscuity among them, see Spencer and Gillen's Native Tribes of Central Australia; also Professor J. G. Frazer's Totemism and Exogamy, Vol. IV. 104 THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY Objections to the Hypothesis of a Primitive State of Promiscuity. We may now briefly sum up the main criticisms of this theory of a primitive state of promis- cuity, not only as we may derive them from inductive study of the higher animals and the lower peoples, but also as we may deduce them from known psychological and bio- logical facts or principles. (1) In the first place, then, the animals next to man, namely, the anthropoid apes, do not show a condition of promiscuity. (2) The evidence from the lower peoples does not show that such a condition exists or has ever existed among them. (3) A third argument against this hypothesis may be gained from what we know of primitive economic condi- tions. Under the most primitive conditions, in which man had no mastery over nature, food supply was relatively scarce, and as a rule only very small groups of people could live together. The smallness of primitive groups, on account of the scarcity of food supply, would prevent anything like promiscuity on a large scale. (4) A fourth argument of a deductive nature is that the jealousy of the male, which characterizes all higher animals and especially man, would prevent anything like the existence of sexual promiscuity. The tendency of man would have been to appropriate one or more women for himself and drive away all rivals. Long ago Darwin argued that this would prevent anything like the exist- ence of a general state of promiscuity. (5) A fifth argument against this theory may be got fro^i the general biological fact that sexual promiscuity tends to pathological conditions unfavorable to fecundity, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY 105 that is, fertility, or the birth of offspring. Physicians have long ago ascertained this fact, and the modern prostitute gives illustration of it by the fact that she has few or no children. Among the lower animal species, in which some degree of promiscuity obtains, moreover, powerful instincts keep the sexes apart except at the pairing season. Now, no such instincts exist in man. Promiscuity in man would, therefore, greatly lessen the birth rate, and any group that practiced it to any extent would soon be eliminated in competition with other groups that did not practice it. (6) We have finally the general social fact that promis- cuity would lead to the neglect of children. Promiscuity means that the male parent does not remain with the female parent to care for the offspring and, therefore, in the human species it would mean that the care of children would be thrown wholly upon the mother. This means that the children would have less chance of surviving. Not only would promiscuity lead to lessening the birth rate, but it would lead to a much higher mortality in children born. This is found to be a striking fact wherever we find any degree of promiscuity among any people. Hence, promiscuity would soon exterminate any people that practiced it extensively in competition with other peoples that did not practice it. From all of these lines of argument, without going over the evidence in greater detail, it seems reasonable to con- clude with Westermarck " that the hypothesis of a primi- tive state of promiscuity has no foundation in fact and is essentially unscientific." The facts put forth in support of the theory do not justify the conclusion, Westermarck says, that promiscuity has ever been a general practice Io6 THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY among a single people and much less that it was the prim- itive state. Promiscuity is found, however, more or less in the form of sexual irregularities or immorality among all peoples; more often, however, among the civilized than among the uncivilized, but among no people has it ever existed unqualified by more enduring forms of sex relation. Moreover, because promiscuity breaks up the social bonds, ( throws the burden of the care of children wholly upon the mother, and lessens the birth rate, we are justified in concluding that promiscuity is essentially an antisocial practice. This agrees with the facts generally shown by criminology and sociology, that the elements practicing promiscuity to any great extent in modern societies are those most closely related with the degenerate and criminal elements. Those elements, in other words, in modern society that practice promiscuity are on the road to ex- tinction, and if a people generally were to practice it there is no reason to believe that such a people would meet with any different fate. The Earliest Form of the Family Life in the Human Species, therefore, is probably that of the simple pairing monogamous family found among many of the higher animals, especially the anthropoid apes, and also found* among the lower peoples. This primitive monogamy, however, as we have already seen, was not accompanied by the social, legal, and religious elements that the historic monogamic family has largely rested upon. On the con- trary, this primitive monogamy rested solely upon an in- stinctive basis, and, as we have seen, unless children were bora it was apt to be relatively unstable. Permanency in family relations among primitive peoples depended largely THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY 107 upon the birth of children. Thus we find confirmed our conclusion drawn some time ago that family life rests pri- marily upon the parental instinct. That it still so rests is shown by the fact, as we shall see later, that divorce is many times more common among couples that have no children than among those that have children. Some General Conclusions, both of theoretical and of practical bearing, may here be pointed out. We have seen that the biological processes of life have created the family, and that the family, as an institution, rests upon these biological conditions. Hence it is not too much to say, first, that the family is not a man-made institution; and, secondly, that it rests upon certain fundamental instincts of human nature. Both of these statements are also true to a certain extent of human society in general. There is a sense in which social organization is not wholly man-made, and we have already seen that human insti- tutions rest to some extent upon human instincts. This is not saying, of course, that man has not modified and may not modify social organization and human institutions through his reason, but it is saying that the essential elements in human institutions and in the social order must correspond to the conditions of lif e generally and to the instincts which natural selection has implanted in the species. To attempt to reorganize human society or to reconstruct institutions regardless of the biological conditions of life, or regardless of human instincts, is to meet with certain failure. A practical conclusion which may be drawn also is that those people who advocate sexual promiscuity in present society, or free love, as they please to style it, are advocat- ing a condition which would result in the elimination of any 108 THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY group that practiced it. Promiscuity, or even great in- stability in the family life, as we have already seen, would lead to the undermining of everything upon which a higher civilization rests. The people in modern society who advocate such theories as free love, therefore, are more dangerous than the worst anarchist or the most revolu- tionary socialist. In other words, the modern attack upon the family is more of a menace to all that is worth while in human life than all attacks upon government and property, although it is not usually resented as such; and it is one of the most serious signs of the times that many intellectual people have indorsed such views. We must reempha- size, therefore, the fact that the family is the central insti- tution of human society, that industry and the state must subordinate themselves to its interest. Neither the state nor industry has had much to do with the origin of the family, and neither the state nor industry may safely determine its forms independent of the biological require- ments for human survival. Moreover, it is evident that human society from the beginning has in more or less in- stinctive, and also in more or less conscious, ways attempted to regulate the relations between the sexes with a view to controlling the reproductive process. While material civilization is mainly a control over the food process, moral civilization involves a control over the reproductive process, that is, over the birth and rearing of children; and such control over the reproductive process, which has certainly been one of the aims of all social organization in the past, whether of savage peoples or of civilized peoples, evidently precludes anything like the toleration of promiscuity or even of free love. THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY 109 SELECT REFERENCES For brief reading: GOODSELL, The Family as a Social and Educational Institution, Chap. II. HOWARD, History of Matrimonial Institutions, Vol. I, Chaps. I, III. WESTERMARCK, History of Human Marriage, Chaps. I-VI. For more extended reading: GEDDES and THOMSON, Sex, Chaps. V, VII, IX. HEINEMAN, Physical Basis of Civilization, Chaps. IV-VTI, LETOURNEAU, The Evolution of Marriage and the Family. LUBBOCK, The Origin of Civilization, Chaps. I-TV. MCLENNAN, Primitive Marriage, Chaps. V-VIII. MORGAN, Ancient Society, Part II, Chaps. I-V. PARSONS, The Family, Lectures I, II, VI. STARCKE, The Primitive Family. SPENCER, Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, Part HI. THOMAS, Source Book for Social Origins, Part IV. CHAPTER VI THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY THE family as an institution has varied greatly in its forms from age to age and from people to people. This is what we should expect, seeing that all organic structures are variable. Such variations hi human institutions are due partly to the influences of the environment, partly to the state of knowledge, and partly to many other causes as yet not well understood. The family illustrates in greater or less degree the working of these causes of variation and of change in human institutions. The Maternal and Paternal Families. As regards the general form of the family we have to note first of all the two great forms which we may characterize respectively as ' ' the maternal family " and " the paternal family. " As we have already seen, Bachofen, Morgan, and others discovered a condition of human society in which relationship was traced through mothers only, and in which property or authority descended along the female line rather than along the male line. Further investigation and research have shown that up to recent times, say up to fifty years ago, one half of all the peoples of the world, if we reckon them by nations and tribes rather than by numbers, practiced this system of reckoning kinship through mothers only, and passed property and authority down along the female line. Ethnologists and sociologists have practically concluded, from the amount of evidence now collected, that this ma- THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY III ternal or metronymic system was the primitive system of tracing relationships, and that it was succeeded among the European peoples by the paternal system so long ago that the transition from the one to the other has been forgotten, except as some trace of it has been preserved in customs, legends, and the like. Among many tribes of the North American Indians this metronymic or maternal system was peculiarly well- developed. Children took their mother's name, not their father's name; belonged to their mother's clan, not their father's clan; and the chief transmitted his authority, if hereditary, not to his own son, but to his eldest sister's son. The relatives on the father's side, indeed, were quite ignored. Frequently the maternal uncle had more legal authority over the children than their own father, seeing that the children belonged to his clan, that is, to their mother's clan. Now, Bachofen claimed not only that in this stage was kinship reckoned through mothers only, but that women were dominant socially and politically; that there existed a true matriarchy, or rule of the mothers. Do the facts support Bachofen's theory? Let us see. The Wyandot Indians, a branch of the Iroquois, were a typical maternal or metronymic people. Among them, without any doubt, the women had a position of influence socially and even politically which often is not found among peoples of higher culture. For example, among the Wyandots the govern- ment of the clan was in the hands of four women councilors (Matrons), who were elected by all the adults in the clan. These four women councilors, however, elected a Peace Sachem, who carried out the will of the clan in all matters H2 THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY pertaining to peace generally. Moreover, the councilors of the several clans, four fifths of whom were women, met to- gether to form the Tribal Council; but in this Tribal Council the women sat separate, not participating in the delibera- tions, but exercising only a veto power on the decisions of the men. In matters of war, however, government was in- trusted to two war chiefs elected from the tribe generally, the women here only having the right to veto the decision of the tribe to enter upon the warpath. Thus we see that while the women of the Iroquois Indians had a great deal of social and political influence, the actual work of govern- ment was largely turned over by them to the men, and especially was this true of directing the affairs of the tribe in time of war. There is no doubt, however, that in the mater- nal stage of social evolution women had an influence in domestic, religious, and social matters much greater than they had at many later stages of social development. Among the Zuni of New Mexico, for example, another well- developed maternal people, marriage is always arranged by the bride's parents. The husband goes to live with his wife, and is practically a guest in his wife's house all his life long, she alone having the right of divorce. In- deed, among all maternal peoples the rule is that the husband goes to live with the wife, and not the wife with the husband, the children, as we have already seen, keep- ing the mother's name and belonging to her kindred or clan. Nevertheless we cannot agree with Bachofen that a true matriarchy, or government by women, ever existed. On the contrary, among all of these maternal peoples, while the women may have much influence socially and THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY 113 politically, the men, on account of their superior strength, are intrusted with the work not only of protecting and providing for the families and driving away enemies, but also largely with the work of maintaining the internal government and order of the people. Strictly speaking, therefore, there has never been a matriarchal stage off social evolution, but rather a maternal or metronymic stage. We have already said that this stage was probably the primitive one. How are we to explain, then, that primitive man reckoned kinship through mothers only? Was this due, as Morgan thought, to a primitive practice of pro- miscuity which prevented tracing relationships through fathers? The reply is, that among the many maternal peoples now well known, among whom relationships are traced through mothers only, we find no evidence of the practice of general promiscuity now or even in remote times. The North American Indians, for example, had quite definite forms of the family life and were very far removed from the practice of promiscuity, though they traced relationship through mothers only. It is evident that the causes of the maternal family and the maternal system of relationship are not so simple as Morgan sup- posed. What, then, were the causes of the maternal system? It is probable that man in the earliest times did not know the physiological connection between father and child. The physiological connection between mother and child, on the other hand, was an obvious fact which required no knowledge of physiology to establish; therefore, nothing was more natural than for primitive man to recognize that the child was of the mother's blood, but not of the 114 THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY father's blood. Therefore, the child belonged to the mother's people and not to the father's people. If it be asked whether it is possible that there could be any human beings so ignorant that they do not know the physiolog- ical connection between father and child, the reply is, that this is apparently the case among a number of very primitive peoples, even down to recent times. It is not infrequent among these peoples to find conception and childbirth attributed to the influence of the spirits, rather than to relations between male and female. While, there- fore, a social connection between the father and the children was recognized, leading the father to provide in all ways for his children, as fathers do whether among civilized or uncivilized peoples, yet the blood relationship between the father and the child could not have been clear in the most primitive times. Perhaps an even more efficient cause, however, of the maternal system was the fact that the mother in primitive times was the stable element in the family life, the constant center of the family. The husband was frequently away from home, hunting or fighting, and oftentimes failed to return. Nothing was more natural, therefore, than that the child should be reckoned as belonging to the mother, take her name and belong to her kindred or clan. More- over, after the custom of naming children from mothers and reckoning them as belonging to the mother's clan was established, it could not be displaced by the mere discovery of the physiological connection between the father and the child. On the contrary social habits, like habits in the individual, tend to persist until they work badly. We find, therefore, the maternal system persisting among peoples THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY 115 who for many generations had come fully to recognize the physiological connection of father and child. Indeed, the maternal system could never have been done away with if social evolution had not brought about new and complex conditions which caused the system to break down and to be replaced by the paternal system. The Paternal and the Patriarchal Family. At a cer- tain stage, then, we find a great change in the organization of the family, which probably took place slowly and largely unconsciously. The family life becomes definitely organized about the male element, and the maternal system disap- pears. At first the paternal family appears with children taking the father's name and property and titles passing along the male line. Then there develops that extreme form of the paternal family which we know as the patriar- chal family, in which the authority of the husband and father has become supreme and the position of the wife and children has been reduced, if not to that of property, at least to that of subject persons. Classical pictures of patriarchal family life may be found in the pages of the Old Testament. What, then, were the causes which brought about the breakdown of the maternal system and the gradual development, first of a paternal, and then of a patriarchal system? Some of these causes we can clearly make out from the study of social history. (i) War was unquestionably a cause of the breakdown of the maternal system through the fact that women were captured in war, held as slaves, and made wives or concu- bines by then- captors. These captured wives were regarded as the property of the captor. Any children bom to them were, therefore, also regarded as the property of the captor. Il6 THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY Furthermore, these captured wives were separated from their kindred, and their children could not possibly belong to any clan except their husband's. Manifestly this cause could not have worked in the earliest times, when slave captives were not valuable; but as soon as slavery became instituted in any form, then women slaves were particularly valued, not only for their labor, but because they might be either concubines or wives. It is evident, then, that war and slavery would thus indirectly tend to undermine the maternal system. (2) Wife purchase would operate in the same way. Among peoples that had developed a commercial life as well as slavery it early became the practice to purchase wives. It is evident that these purchased wives would be regarded as a sort of property, and the husband would naturally claim the children as belonging to him. Among certain North American Indians we find exactly this state of affairs. If a man married a wife without paying the purchase price for her, then her children took her name and belonged to her clan; but if he had purchased her, say with a number of blankets, then the children took his name and belonged to his clan. (3) The decisive cause, however, of the breakdown of the maternal system was the development of the pastoral stage of industry. Now, the grazing of flocks and herds requires considerable territory and necessitates small and compact groups widely separated from one another. Hence, in the pastoral stage the wife must go with the husband and be far removed from the influence and authority of her own kindred. This gave the husband greater power over his wife. Moreover, the care of flocks and herds accen- THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY 117 tuated the value of the male laborer, while primitively woman had been the chief laborer. In the pastoral stage the man had the main burden of caring for the flocks and herds. Under such circumstances nothing was more natural than that the authority of the owner of the family property should gradually become supreme in all matters, and we find, therefore, among all pastoral peoples that the family is itself a little political unit, the children taking the father's name, property and authority passing down along the male line, while the eldest living male is usually the ruler of the whole group. (4) After all these causes came another factor ancestor worship. While ancestor worship exists to some extent among maternal peoples, it is usually not well- developed for some reason or other until the paternal stage is reached. Ancestor worship, being the worship of the departed ancestors as heroes, seems to develop more readily where the line of ancestors are males. It may be sug- gested that the male ancestor is apt to be a more heroic figure than the female ancestor. At any rate, when ancestor worship became fully developed it powerfully tended to reenforce the authority of the patriarch, because he was, as the eldest living ancestor, the representative of the gods upon earth, therefore his power became almost divine. Religion thus finally came in to place the patriarchal family upon a very firm basis. Thus we see how each of these two great forms, the maternal family and the paternal family, arose out of natural conditions, and therefore they may be said to represent two great stages in the social evolution of man. It is hardly necessary to point out that civilized societies Il8 THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY are now apparently entering upon a third stage, in which there will be relative equality given to the male and the female elements that go to make up the family. Polyandry. We must notice now the various forms of marriage by which the family has been constituted among different peoples and in different ages. Marriage, like the family itself, is variable, and an indefinite number of forms may be found among various peoples. We shall notice, however, only the three leading forms, polyandry, polygyny, and monogamy, and attempt to show the natural conditions which favor each. It is evident that if we assume that the primitive form of the family was that of a simple pairing monogamy, the burden is laid upon us to show how such different types as polyandry and polygyny arose. Polyandry, or the union of one woman with several men, is a relatively rare form of marriage and the family, found only in certain isolated regions of the world. It is particularly found in Tibet, a barren and inhospitable plateau lying north of India and adjoining China proper on the west. It is also found in certain other isolated moun- tainous regions in India, and down to recent times also in Arabia. In none of these places does it exist exclusively, but rather alongside of monogamy and perhaps other forms of the family. Thus in Tibet the upper classes practice polygyny and monogamy, while among the lower classes we find polyandry and monogamy. In all these regions where polyandry occurs, moreover, it is to be noted that the conditions of life are harsh and severe. Tibet is an exceptionally inhospitable region, with a climate of arctic rigor, the people living mainly by grazing. THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY 119 Under such circumstances it is conceivably difficult for one man to support and protect a family. At any rate, the form of polyandry which we find in Tibet suggests that such economic conditions may have been the main cause of its existence. Ordinarily in Tibet a polyandrous family is formed by an older brother taking a wife, and then, admitting his younger brothers into partnership with him. The older brother is frequently absent from home, looking after the flocks, and in his absence one of the younger brothers assumes the headship of the family. Under such circumstances we can see how the natural human instincts which would oppose polyandry under ordinary circumstances, namely, the jealousy of the male, might become greatly modified, or cease to act altogether. Cer- tain other conditions besides economic ones might also favor the existence of polyandry, such as the scarcity of women. Summing up, we can say, then, that this rare form of the family seems to have as its causes: (i) In bar- ren and inhospitable countries the labor of one man is some- times found not sufficient to support a family. (2) Also there probably exists in such regions an excess of males. This might be due to one of two causes : First, the practice of exposing female infants might lead to a scarcity ofj women; secondly, in such regions it is found that from causes not well understood a larger number of males are born. It may be noted as a general fact that when the conditions of life are hard in human society, owing to famine, war, or barrenness of the soil, a larger number of male births take place. We may therefore infer that this would disturb the numerical proportion of the sexes in such regions. (3) A third cause may be suggested as 120 THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY having something to do with the matter, namely, that habits of close inbreeding, or intermarriage, might perhaps tend to overcome the natural repugnance to such a rela- tion. Moreover, close inbreeding also, as the experiments of stock-breeders show, would tend to produce a surplus of male births, and so would act finally in the same way as the second cause. Polygyny, l or the union of one man with several women, is a much more common form of marriage. It is, in fact, to be found sporadically among all peoples and in all ages. It has perhaps existed at least sporadically from the most primitive times, because we find that at least one of the anthropoid apes, namely, the gorilla, practices it to some extent. It is manifest, however, that it could not have existed to any extent among primitive men, except where food supply was exceptionally abundant. In the main, polygyny is a later development, then, which comes in when some degree of wealth has been accumulated, that is, sufficient food supply to make it possible for one man to support several families. Polygyny came in espe- cially after women came to be captured in war and kept as slaves or wives. The practice of wife capture, indeed, and the honor attached to the custom, had much to do in making the practice of polygyny common among cer- tain peoples. Wherever slavery has existed, we may also note, polygyny, either in its legal form or in its illegal form of concubinage, has flourished. Polygyny, indeed, is closely 1 The word "polygamy" is too broad in its meaning to use as a scientific term for this form of the family. " Polygamy ' ' comes from two Greek words meaning "much married;" hence it includes "polyandry" (having several husbands) and "polygyny" (having several wives). THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY 121 related with the institution of slavery and is practically coextensive with it. In the ancient world it existed among the Hebrews and among practically all of the peoples of the Orient, and also sporadically among our own Teu- tonic ancestors. In modern times polygyny still exists among the Mohammedan peoples and to a greater or less degree among all semicivilized peoples. It exists in China in the form of concubinage. It even exists in the United States, for much evidence seems to show that the Utah Mormons still practice polygyny to some extent, although it may be doubted whether polygynous unions are being formed among them at the present time. Two facts always need to be borne in mind regarding polygyny: First, that wherever it is practiced it is rela- tively confined to the upper and wealthy classes, for the reason that the support of more than one family is some- thing which only the wealthy classes in a given society could assume. Secondly, it follows that under ordinary circumstances only a small minority of a given popula- tion practice polygyny, even in countries in which it is sanctioned. In Mohammedan countries like Turkey and Egypt, for example, it is estimated that not more than five per cent of the families are polygynous, while in other regions the percentage seems to be still smaller. The reason for this is not only the economic one just mentioned, but that everywhere the sexes are relatively equal in num- bers, and therefore it is impossible for polygyny to become a widespread general custom. If some men have more than one wife it is evident that other men will probably have to forego marriage entirely. This is not saying that under certain circumstances, namely, the importation of large 122 THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY numbers of women, a higher per cent of polygynous families may not exist. It is said that among the negroes on the west coast of Africa the number of polygynous families reaches as high as fifty per cent, owing to the fact that female slaves are largely imported into that district, and that they serve not only as wives, but do the bulk of the agricultural labor, the male negro preferring female slaves, who can do his work and be wives at the same time, to male slaves. But such cases as these are altogether exceptional and manifestly could not become general. Summing up, we may say that the causes of polygyny are, then: (1) First of all, the brutal lust of man. No doubt man's animal propensities have had much to do with the existence of this form of the family. Nevertheless, while male sensuality is at the basis of polygyny, it would be a mistake to think that sensuality is an adequate explanation in all cases. On the contrary, we find many other causes, chiefly, perhaps, eco- nomic, operating also to favor the development of polygyny. (2) One of these is wife capture, as we have already seen. The captured women in war were held as trophies and slaves, and later became wives or concubines. Among all peoples at a certain stage the honor of wife capture has alone been a prolific cause of polygyny. (3) Another cause, after slavery became developed, was the high value set on women as laborers. Among many barbarous peoples the women do the main part of the work. They are more tractable as slaves, and consequently a high value is set upon their labor. As we have already seen, these female slaves usually serve at the same time as con- cubines, if not legal wives of their masters. THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY 123 (4) Another cause which we can perhaps hardly appre- ciate at the present time is the high valuation set on chil- dren. We see this cause opera ting particularly in the case of the patriarchs of the Old Testament. Under the pa- triarchal family great value was set upon children as neces- sary to continue the family line. Where the device of adoption was not resorted to, therefore, in case of barren- ness or the birth exclusively of female children, nothing was more natural than that polygyny should be resorted to in order to insure the family succession. In the pa- triarchal family also a high valuation was necessarily set upon children, because the larger the family grew the stronger it was. (5) Finally, religion came to sanction polygyny. The religious sanction of polygyny cannot be looked upon as one of its original causes, but when once established it re- acted powerfully to reenforce and maintain the institution. How the religious sanction came about we can readily see when we remember that very commonly religions confuse the practice of the nobility with what is noble or com- mendable morally. The polygynous practices of the no- bility, therefore, under certain conditions came to receive the sanction of religion. When this took place polygyny became firmly established as a social institution, very difficult to uproot, as all the experience of Christian missionaries among peoples practicing polygyny goes to show. We may note also the general truth, that while religion does not originate human institutions or the forms of human association, it is preeminently that which gives fixity and stability to institutions through the supernatural sanction that it accords them. 124 THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY Some judgment of the social value of polygyny may not be out of place in connection with this subject. Admit- ting, as all students of social history must, that in certain times and places the polygynous form of family has been advantageous, has served the interests of social survival and even of civilization, yet viewed from the standpoint of present society it seems that our judgment of polygyny must be wholly unfavorable. In the first place, as we have already seen, polygyny is essentially an institution of bar- barism. It arose largely through the practice of wife capture and the keeping of female slaves. While often adjusted to the requirements of barbarous societies, it seems in no way adjusted to a high civilization. Polygyny, indeed, must necessarily rest upon the subjection and deg- radation of women. Necessarily the practice of polygyny must disregard the feelings of women, for women are jealous creatures as well as men. No high regard for the feelings of women, therefore, would be consistent with the practice of polygyny. Finally, all the evidence that we have goes to show that under polygyny children are neg- lected, and, at least from the standpoint of a high civili- zation, inadequately socialized. This must necessarily be so, because in the polygynous family the care of the chil- dren 'rests almost entirely with the mother. While we have no statistics of infant mortality from polygynous countries, it seems probable that infant mortality is high, and social workers in communities with polygynous fam- ilies quite generally testify that delinquent children are especially found in such households. Fatherhood, in the full sense of the word, can hardly be said to exist under polygyny. p 114 THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY 125 Those philosophers, like Schopenhauer, who advocate the legalizing of polygyny in civilized countries, are hardly worth replying to. It is safe to say that any widespread practice of polygyny in civilized communities would lead to a reversion to the moral standards of barbarism in many if not in all matters. That polygyny is still a burning question in the United States of the twentieth century is merely good evidence that we are not very far removed yet from barbarism. Monogamy, as we have already seen, has been the prevalent form of marriage in all ages and in all countries. Wherever other forms have existed monogamy has existed alongside of them as the dominant, even though perhaps not the socially honored, form. All other forms of the family must be regarded as sporadic variations, on the whole unsuited to long survival, because essentially incon- sistent with the nature of human society. In civilized Europe monogamy has been the only form of the family sanctioned for ages by law, custom, and religion. The lead- ing peoples of the world, therefore, practice monogamy, and it is safe to say that the connection between monogamy and progressive forms of civilization is not an accident. What, then, are the social advantages of monogamy which favor the development of a higher type of culture? These advantages are numerous, but perhaps the most important of them can be grouped under six heads. (i) The number of the two sexes, as we have already seen, is everywhere approximately equal. This means that monogamy is in harmony with the biological con- ditions that exist in the human species. The equal number of the two sexes has probably been established through 126 THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY natural selection. Why nature should favor this pro- portion of the sexes can perhaps be in part understood when we reflect that with such proportion there can be the largest number of family groups, and hence the best possible conditions for the rearing of offspring. (2) Monogamy secures the superior care of children in at least two respects. First, it very greatly decreases mortality in children, because under monogamy both husband and wife unite in their care. Again, monogamy secures the superior upbringing and, therefore, the superior socialization of the child. In the monogamous family much greater attention can be given to the training of children by both parents. In other forms of the family not only is the death rate higher among children, but from the point of view of modern civilization, at least, they are inferiorly socialized. (3) The monogamic family alone produces affections and emotions of the higher type. It is only in the mono- gamic family that the highest type of altruistic affection can be cultivated. It is difficult to understand, for exam- ple, how anything like unselfish affection between husband and wife can exist under polygyny. Under monogamy, husband and wife are called upon to sacrifice selfish desires in the mutual care of children. Monogamy is, therefore, fitted as a form of the family to foster altruism in the highest degree, and, as we have seen, the higher the type of altruism produced by the family life, the higher the type of the social life generally, other things being equal. It is especially to the credit of monogamy that it has created fatherhood in the fullest sense of the term, and therefore taught the male element in human society the THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY 127 value of service and self-sacrifice. Under polygynous con- ditions the father cannot devote himself to any extent to his children or to any one wife, since he is really the head of several households, and therefore, as we have already noted, father- hood in the fullest sense scarcely exists under polygyny. (4) Under monogamy, moreover, all family relation- ships are more definite and strong, and thus family bonds, 'and ultimately social bonds, are stronger. In the polygy- 1 nous household the children of the different wives are half brothers and half sisters, hence family affection has little chance to develop among them, and as a matter of fact between children of different wives there is constant pulling and hauling. Moreover, because the children in a polygynous family are only half brothers this immensely complicates relationships, and even the line of ancestors. Legal relations and all blood relationships are, therefore, more entangled. It is no inconsiderable social merit of monogamy that it makes blood relationships simple and usually perfectly definite. All of this has an effect upon society at large, because the cohesive power of blood relationship, even in modern societies, is something still worth taking into account. But of course the main influence of all this is to be found in the family group itself, because it is only under such simple and definite relations as we find in the monogamous family that there is ample stimulus to develop the higher family affections. (5) From all this it follows that monogamy favors the development of high types of religion and morals, family affection being an indispensable root of any high type of ethical religion. That form of the family which favors the development of the highest type of this affection will, 128 THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY therefore, favor the development of the highest type of religion. We see this even more plainly, perhaps, in ancient times than in the present time, because it was monogamy that favored the development of ancestor worship through making the line of ancestors dear and definite, and thus monogamy helped to develop this type of religion, which became the basis of still higher types. (6) Monogamy not only favors the preservation of the lives of the children, but also favors the preservation of the lives of the parents, because it is only under monogamy that we find aged parents cared for by their children to any extent. Under polygyny the wife who has grown old is discarded for a young wife, and usually ends her days in bitterness. The father, too, under polygyny is rarely cared for by the children, because the polygynous household has never given the opportunity for close affec- tions between parents and children. That monogamy, therefore, helps to lengthen life through favoring care of parents by children in old age is an element in its favor, for it adds not a little to the happiness of life, and so to the strength of social bonds, that people do not have to look forward to a cheerless and friendless old age. In brief, the monogamic family presents such superior unity and harmony from every point of view that it is much more fitted to produce a higher type of culture. From whatever point of view we may look at it, therefore, there are many reasons why civilized societies cannot afford to sanction any other form of the family than that of monogamy. The Causes which Determine the Form of the Family and Society. As we have already seen, the form of the THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY 1 29 family is undoubtedly greatly influenced by the form of industry. This is so markedly the case that some sociolo- gists and economists have claimed that the form of the family life is but a reflection of the form of the industrial life; that the family in its changes and variations slavishly follows the changes in economic conditions. That such an extreme view as this is a mistake can readily be seen from a brief review of the causes which have produced certain types of family life in certain periods. Thus, the maternal type of the family cannot be said by any means to have been determined by economic conditions. On the contrary, primarily the maternal family, as we have seen, was determined by certain intellectual concep- tions, namely, the absence of knowledge of the physio- logical connection between father and child, though the economic conditions of primitive life tended powerfully to continue the maternal family long after intellectual conditions had changed. Again, it has been said that the patriarchal family owed its existence entirely to a form of industry, namely, pastoral industry, but, as we have seen, other factors also operated to produce the patriarchal type of the family, such as war, religion, and perhaps man's inherent desire to dominate. Moreover, religion continued the patriarchal family in many cases long after pastoral industry had ceased to be the chief economic form. So too with the forms of marriage. While polygyny has been claimed to be due entirely to economic causes, we have seen that these so-called economic causes have only been the opportunities for the polygynous instincts of man to assert themselves. These polygynous instincts of man have asserted themselves more or less 13 THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY under all conditions of society, but under certain condi- tions, when there was an accumulation of wealth, and especially with the institution of slavery, they had greater opportunity to assert themselves than elsewhere. Thus the basic cause of polygyny is not economic, but psycholog- ical; and given certain moral and economic conditions of society, these polygynous tendencies assert themselves. Monogamy, on the other hand, is fundamentally deter- mined by the biological fact of the numerical equality of the sexes. This is doubtless the main reason why monogamy has been the prevalent form of the family everywhere. Certain moral and psychological factors which go along with the development of higher types of culture have, however, powerfully reenforced monogamy. It is doubt- ful if economic conditions can to any extent be shown to have equally reenforced the monogamic life. Our conclusion must be, then, that the family and all other forms of association are determined, not by the in- dustrial life alone, though that is very influential, but by all the active factors in human association, geographic, economic, intellectual, and moral or cultural. SELECT REFERENCES For brief reading: DEALEY, The Family in Its Sociological Aspects, Chaps. II, HE. GILLETTE, The Family and Society, Chap. III. WESTERMARCK, History of Human Marriage, Chaps. XX-XXIL For more extended reading: HOWARD, History of Matrimonial Institutions, Vol. I, Chaps. II, IV. PARSONS, The Family, Chap. VII. WAKE, Development of Marriage and Kinship, Chaps. IV-VII. CHAPTER VII THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY WHILE we cannot enter into the historical evolution of the family as an institution among the different civilized peoples, still it will be profitable for us to consider the history of the family among some single representative people in order that we may see the forces which have made and unmade the family life, and incidentally also to a great degree, the general social life of that people. We shall select the ancient Romans as the people among whom we can thus best study in outline the development of the family. While the family life of the ancient Hebrews is of particular interest to us because of the close connec- tion of our religion and ethics with that of the Hebrews, yet in the family life of the ancient Romans constructive and destructive factors are more clearly marked and, therefore, the study of ancient Roman family life is best fitted to bring out those factors. The ancient Romans were among the earliest civilized of the Aryan peoples, and their institutions are, therefore, of peculiar interest to us as representing approximately the early Aryan type. What we shall say concerning Roman family life, more- over, will apply, with some modifications and qualifica- tions, to the family life of other Aryan peoples, especially the Greeks. The Greeks and the Romans, indeed, were so closely related in their early culture that for the purpose of institutional history they may be considered practically one people. Without any attempt, then, to sketch the 132 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY history of the family as an institution in general, let us note some of the salient features of the family life of the ancient Romans. The Early Roman Family. (i) Ancestor Worship as the Basis of the Early Roman Family. What we have said thus far indicates a close connection between the family life and religion among all peoples. This was especially true of the early Romans. It may be said, indeed, that ancestor worship was the constitutive principle of their family life. Among them the family seemed to have lost in part its character as a purely social institution and to have become specialized into a religious institution. At any rate, the early Roman family existed very largely for the sake of perpetuating the worship of ancestors. Of course, ancestor worship could have had nothing to do with the origin of the family life among the Romans. The type of their family life was patriarchal, and we have already noticed the causes which brought about the existence of the patriarchal family. But while ancestor worship had nothing to do with the origin of the family, once it was thoroughly established it became the basis of the family life and transformed the family as an insti- tution. The early Romans shared certain superstitions with many primitive peoples, which, if not the basis of ancestor wor- ship, powerfully reenforced it. They believed, for exam- ple, that the soul continued in existence after death, and that persons would be unhappy unless buried in tombs with suitable offerings, and that if left unburied, or without suitable offerings, the souls of these persons would return to torment the living. Inasmuch as in the patriarchal HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY 133 family only sons could perform religious rites, that is, could make offerings to the departed spirits, these super- stitions acted as a powerful stimulus to preserve the family in order that offerings might continue to be made at the graves of ancestors. / Thus, as we have already said, among the early Romans the family was practically a religious institution with' ancestor worship as its constitutive principle. It is sup- posed by de Coulanges that in the earliest times the dead ancestors were buried beneath the hearth. At any rate, the hearth was the place where offerings were made to the departed ancestors, and the flame on the hearth was believed to represent the spirit of the departed. The house under such circumstances became a temple and the whole atmosphere of the family life was necessarily a religious one. (2) The, Authority in the Early Roman Family was vested, as in all partiarchal families, in the father or eldest living male of the family group. Under ancestor worship he became the living representative of the departed ances- tors, the link between the living and the dead. Here we may note that the family was not considered as constituted simply of its living members, but that it included also all of its dead members. Inasmuch as the dead were more numerous and were thought to be more powerful than the living, they were by far the more important element in the life of the family. The position of the house father, as representative of the departed ancestors, and as the link be- tween the living and the dead, naturally made his authority almost divine. Hence, the house father was himself, then, almost a deity, having absolute power over all persons 134 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY within the group, even to the extent of life and death. This absolute power, which was known in the early Roman family as the " patria potestas," could not, however, be exercised arbitrarily. The house father, as representative of the departed ancestors, was necessarily controlled by religious scruples and traditions. It was impossible for him to act other than for what he believed to be the will of the ancestors. Disobedience to him was, therefore, disobedience to the divine ancestors, and hence was sacri- legious. (3) Relationship in the Early Roman Family was deter- mined by community of worship, inasmuch as only descend- ants upon the male side could perform religious rites, and inasmuch as married women worshiped the household gods of their husbands' ancestors ; therefore, only descend- ants on the male side could worship the same ancestors and were relatives in the full religious and legal sense. These were known as " agnates." Later, some relationship on the mother's side came to be recognized, but relatives on the mother's side were known as " cognates," and for a long time property could not pass to them. Indeed, in the earliest times the property of the family, as we have already implied, was kept as a unit, held in trust by the eldest living member of the family group for the good of all the family. In other words, the house father in earliest times did not possess the right to make a will but the property of the family passed intact from him to his eldest male heir. (4) The Marriage Ceremony among the Early Romans was necessarily of a religious character. It was consti- tuted essentially of the induction of the bride into the wor- HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY 135 ship of her husband's ancestors. But before this could be done the bride's father had first to free her from the worship of her household gods, in later times a certifi- cate of manumission being given not unlike the manumis- sion of the slave. After the bride had been released from the worship of her father's ancestors, the bridegroom and his friends brought her to his father's house, where a ceremony of adoption was practically gone through with, adopting the bride into the family of her husband. The essence of this ceremony, as we have already said, was the induction of the bride into the worship of her husband's ancestors through their both making an offering on the family hearth and eating a sacrificial meal together. After that the wife worshiped at her husband's altar and had no claim upon the household gods of her father. (5) Divorce. Under such circumstances it is not sur- prising that marriage was practically indissoluble. A wife who was driven out of her husband's household or deserted was without family gods of any sort, having no claim upon those of her husband, and became, therefore, a social out- cast. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that divorce was practically unknown. It is said, indeed, that for five hundred and twenty years after Rome was founded there was not a single divorce in Rome. While this may be an exaggeration, it is historically certain that divorce was so rare in early Rome as to be practically unknown. (6) Adoption. In case of a failure of sons to be born there was no taking of a second wife, as among the Hebrews. Polygyny was unknown in early Rome. The Roman de- vice to prevent the failure of the family succession was adoption. Younger sons of other families were adopted 136 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY if no sons were born, and these adopted sons, taking the family name, became the same legally as sons by birth. Inasmuch as the position of younger sons in the patriarchal household was not an enviable one there was never lack of candidates for the position of eldest son in some family group in which no sons had been born. Not only was the early Roman family life the most stable that the world has ever known, but it was also of a relatively pure type. Chastity was rigidly enforced among the women, but of course, as in all primitive peoples, was not enforced among the men. Still it was expected that the married men at least should remain relatively faithful to their wives. On the whole, therefore, the early Roman family life must be judged to have been of a singularly high and stable type. While the position of women and children in the early Roman family was one of subjection, the family itself was nevertheless of a high type. (7) The Decadence. But it was inevitable that this type of family should decay, and this decay began comparatively early. Inasmuch as the early Roman family was based upon ancestor worship, a religion which was fitted for relatively small isolated groups, it was inevitable that the family life should decay with this ancestor worship. How early the decay of ancestor worship began it is impossible to say. Perhaps the nature gods, Jupiter, Venus, and the rest, existed alongside of ancestor worship from the earliest times. At any rate, we find their worship growing rapidly within the period of authentic history and under- mining the domestic worship, while at a still later period skeptical philosophy undermined both religions. Along with the decay of ancestor worship went many economic HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY 137 and political changes which marked the dissolution of the patriarchal family. Let us see what some of the first steps in this decadence were. (8) Steps in the Decadence, (a) One of the earliest steps toward the breaking down of the patriarchal family which we find is the limiting of the power of the house father. This took place very early as soon as the Council of Elders, or Senate, was formed to look after matters of collective interest. Gradually the paternal power dimin- ished, until it was confined to matters concerning the family group proper. (6) A second step was when the right to make a will was conceded. This right, as we have seen, did not exist in the earliest Roman times, but with the development of property and of a more complex economic life the house father was given the right to divide his property among his children, at first only on the male side, but later among any of his children, and still later to bequeath it to whom he pleased. (c) Thus women came to be given the right to hold property, a thing which was unknown in the earliest times; and becoming property holders, their other rights in many respects began to increase. Originally the wife had no right to divorce her husband, but in the second century B.C. women also gained the right of divorcing their husbands. (cT) The rights of children were increased along with the rights of women, particularly of younger children. (e) The right of plebeians to intermarry with the noble families became recognized. All of these changes we should perhaps regard as good in themselves, but they 138 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY nevertheless marked the disintegration of the patriarchal family. The decay of the family life did not stop with these changes, however, but went on to the decay of the family bonds themselves. Later Roman Family Life. By the beginning of the Christian era the relations between the sexes had become very loose. Men not only frequently divorced their wives, but women frequently divorced their husbands. Indeed, a complete revolution passed over the Roman family. Marriage became a private contract, whereas, as we have seen, in the beginning it was a religious bond. Many loose forms of marriage were developed, which amounted practically to temporary marriages. In all cases it was easy for a husband or wife to divorce each other for very trivial causes. Among certain classes of Roman society the instability of the family became so great that we find Seneca saying that there were women who reckoned their years by their husbands, and Juvenal recording one woman as having eight husbands in five years. Women and children achieved their practical emanci- pation, as we would say. Women, especially, were free to do as they saw fit. Marriages were formed and dis- solved at pleasure among certain classes, and among all classes the instability of the family life had become very great. Along with all this, of course, went a growth of vice. It is not too much to say that the Romans of the first and second centuries A.D. approached as closely to a con- dition of promiscuity as any civilized people of which we have knowledge. Causes of the Decadence. When we examine the causes HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY 139 of this great revolution in Roman family life from the austere morals and stable family of the early Romans to the laxity and promiscuity of the later Romans, we find that these causes can perhaps be grouped under four or five principal heads, (i) First among all the causes we must put the destruction of the domestic religion, namely, ancestor worship, through the growth of nature worship and skeptical philosophy. The destruction of the domestic religion necessarily shattered the foundations of the Roman family, since, as we have already seen, there was the closest connection between the family life of the early Romans and ancestor worship. But it is not probable that ancestor worship was destroyed merely through the growth of nature worship and of skeptical philosophy. As we have already seen, it was a religion which was mainly adapted to isolated groups. Changes in economic and political conditions, therefore, were to some extent prior to the decay of the domestic religion. (2) Changes in economic conditions, that is, in the form of industry, were, then, among the more important causes of the decay of the early Roman family. The patriarchal family belonged essentially to the pastoral stage of indus- try, and as soon as settled agricultural life, commerce, and manufacturing industry developed, this destroyed the isolated patriarchal groups, and so also in time affected even the religion which was their basis. Again, the growth of cities going along with these changes in the methods in obtaining a living destroyed the old conditions under which the family had been the social and political unit. (3) We have therefore as a third cause the breaking up of old political conditions. Family groups were welded 140 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY into small cities and the authority of the patriarch was destroyed. Legislation designed to meet the new social conditions, especially such as we have already noted in the steps of the decadence, profoundly affected the whole family group and weakened family bonds. (4) The growth of divorce and of vice may be put down as a fourth cause of the decay of the Roman family. Some may say that this was an effect of the decay of the Roman family rather than a cause, but it was also a cause as well as an effect, for it is a peculiarity of social life that what is at one stage an effect reacts to become a cause at a later stage ; and this was certainly the case with the growth of divorce and vice in Rome, in its effect upon the Roman family. Moreover, much of this came from Greece through imita- tion. The family life had decayed in Greece much earlier than it had in Rome, and when Rome conquered Greece it annexed its vices also. While the most radical social changes do not usually come about merely through imi- tation, yet the imitation of a foreign people is frequently, in the history of a particular nation, one of the most potent causes in bringing about social changes. It was certainly so in the case of the growth of divorce and vice in Rome. The Causes of Social Change. We see that the causes of the decay of the Roman family life were very complex. This is true of all important social changes. It is impossible to reduce the causes of these changes to any single principle or set of causes. While changes in economic conditions were undoubtedly very influential in bringing about the profound changes in the Roman family, still we have no ground for re- garding the economic changes as determinative of all the rest. We know as yet little of the development of industry HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY 141 in antiquity. What little we do know, however, furnishes good ground for claiming that changes in the methods of getting a living are among the most influential causes of social change in general; but there is nothing which war- rants the sweeping generalization of Karl Marx and his followers, "that the method of the production of the mate- rial life determines the social, political, and spiritual life s process in general." On the contrary, the evolution of the Roman family clearly shows moral and psychological fac- tors at work quite independent of economic causes. The decay of ancestor worship, for example, cannot be wholly attributed to the change in the method of getting a living. The very growth of population and accompanying changes in political conditions probably had quite as much to do with the undermining of ancestor worship. Moreover, while religion may not be an original determining cause of social forms, it is, nevertheless, as we have already seen, especially that which gives them stability and per- manency, so much so that the life history of a culture is frequently the life history of a religion. The decay of religious ideas and beliefs, therefore, from any cause, frequently proves the important element working for social change in all societies. So, too, changes in politi- cal conditions, especially changes in law through new leg- islation, frequently prove a profound modifying influence in societies. Lastly, there are certain moral causes in- herent in the individual, oftentimes involving perverted expressions of instinct, which lead to profound social changes. Such was the vice which Rome copied very largely from Greece, but which proved the final solvent in its family life. 142 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY In general we may say, then, that there is no single principle which will explain the evolution of the family from the earliest times down to the present. Any attempt to reduce the evolution of the family to a single principle, or to show that it has been controlled by a single set of causes, must inevitably end in failure. The economic determinism of Marx and his followers, the ideological conceptions of Hegel, the geographical influences of Buckle and his school, and like explanations, are all found wanting when they are applied to the actual history of the family. It is not different with the theories of recent sociologists, who would strive to explain all social changes through a single principle. Unilateral sociological principles, such as "Habit," "Environment," "Imitation," and "Conscious- ness of Kind" will not go further in explaining the changes in the family life than some of the older principles that we have just mentioned. Human life is, indeed, too complex to be explained in terms of any single principle or any single set of causes. The family in particular is an organic struc- ture which responds first to one set of stimuli and then to another. Now it is modified by economic conditions, now by religious ideas, now by legislation, now by imitation, and so on through the whole set of possible stimuli which may impinge upon and modify the activity of a living organism. So it is with all institutions. The Influence of Christianity upon the Family. While we cannot study further the evolution of the family in any detail, still it is necessary, in order to avoid too great dis- continuity, to notice in a few sentences the influence of Christianity upon the family in Western civilization. Early Christianity, as we have already seen, found the HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY 143 family life of the Greco-Roman world demoralized. The reconstruction of the family became, therefore, one of the first tasks of the new religion, and while other circumstances may have aided the church in this work, still on the whole it was mainly the influence of the early church that recon- stituted the family life. From the first the church worked to abolish divorce, and fought as evfl such vices as con- cubinage and prostitution, that came to flourish to such an extent in the Pagan world. Only very slowly did the early leaders of the church win the mass of the people to accept- ing their views as to the permanency of the marriage bond. In order to aid in making this bond more stable the early church recognized marriage as one of the sacraments, and, as implied, steadily opposed the idea of the later Roman Law that marriage was simply a private contract. The result was, eventually, that marriage came to be regarded again as a religious bond, and the family life took on once more the aspect of great stability. After the church had come fully into power in the Western world, legal divorce ceased to be recognized and legal separation was substituted in its stead. Thus the church succeeded in reconstituting the family life upon a stable basis, but the family after being recon- stituted, was of a semipatriarchal type. Nothing was more natural than this, for the church had no model to go by except the paternal family of the Hebrew and Greek and Roman civilization. Nevertheless, the place of women and children in this semipatriarchal religious family estab- lished by the church was higher on the whole than in the ancient patriarchal family. The church put an end to the exposure of children, which had been common in Rome, and protected childhood in many ways. It also exalted the 144 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY place of woman in the family, though leaving her subject to her husband. The veneration of the Virgin tended par- ticularly to give women an honored place socially and religiously. Only by the advocacy and practice of jis.cetic___ doctrines may the early church be said to have detracted from the social valuation of the family. On the whole the reconstituting of the family by the church must be regarded as its most striking social work. But the thing for us to note particularly is that the type of the family life created by the church was what we might call a semi- patriarchal type, in which the importance of husband and father was very much out of proportion to all the rest of the members of the family group. It was this semi- patriarchal family which persisted down to the nineteenth century. SELECT REFERENCES For brief reading: GOODSELL, The Family as a Social and Educational Institution, Chaps. IH-VI. FUSTEL DE COULANGES, The Ancient City, Chaps. I-X. For more extended reading: HEARN, The Aryan Household. HOWARD, History of Matrimonial Institutions. LECKY, History of European Morals, Chap. V. SCHMIDT, Social Results of Early Christianity. On the early Hebrew family: McCuRDY, History, Prophecy, and the Monuments, Vol. II. SCHAEFFER, Social Legislation of the Primitive Semites, Chaps. I-III. On the early Teutonic family: GUMMERE, Germanic Origins, Chaps. V, VI. CHAPTER VIH THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY PASSING over the changes which affected the family during the Middle Ages, and the still more striking changes which came through the Reformation, let us now turn to the study of the problem of the family in the modern world. Peculiarities of Modern Civilization. We must note first some of the great movements which have made modern civilization what it is in its moral aspects. The first of these is the rise of individualism and the decline of author- ity. This movement began, or rather had its first manifesta- tion, in the Protestant Reformation. In the latter years of the eighteenth century it culminated in the French Revolution, and in the subsequent rise of political democ- racy among all European peoples. This growth of in- dividualism and decline of authority has continued down to the present, until both religious and political authority are perhaps less in the civilized world of to-day than ever before in the history of Western civilization. The result of this upon the family has been that the author- itative type of the family has tended to disappear. The religious theory of the family which prevailed during the Middle Ages, but which was more or less undermined by the Reformation, has given place among large classes of the population to the view that marriage is a private con- tract. This view of the family has even been embodied to a large extent in our laws. 145 146 THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY The second great influence which has affected modern civilization is the revolution in industry, owing to the in- vention of machinery and the rise of the factory system. This has tended, as we have already seen, to destroy the economic functions of the family and to individualize its members in their economic activities. The individual, in other words, has become the unit in production as well as the political unit. This has tended to destroy the social cohesion between the members of the family group and has even to some extent placed the sexes in competition with each other. A third influence greatly affecting modern civilization has been the enormous growth of wealth which has resulted from the introduction of machine industry. While this wealth has not extended to all classes of society, it has emancipated certain classes from the fear of want, a factor which in the past put an effective restraint upon conduct. The growth of wealth, in other words, has favored, in cer- tain classes at least, lower moral standards, and increasing laxity in family relations. Owing to these and many minor causes the nineteenth century was a period of great social change and unrest. It was a period of social disintegration and of social recon- struction, as yet far from complete. Now, in such periods jof social disintegration, confusion and instability in insti- tutions are apt to manifest themselves, until some new basis for a stable social order can be found. While the forces making for social dissolution manifested themselves com- paratively late in the family, the modern family has sud- denly found itself confronted with the need of social read- justment and in the midst of change and confusion. THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY 147 The Problem of the Family. Thus it happens that we find the family life at the beginning of the twentieth cen- tury in a more unstable condition than it has been at any time since the beginning of the Christian Era. Now, any great instability of the family is manifestly inconsistent with the idea of permanent monogamy. Hence the problem of the modem family is whether permanent monogamy shall continue to exist or to be the standard in Western civilization. There are many who do not hesitate to say that the family, in its present form of permanent monog- amy, will soon pass away. While such a statement is wholly unwarranted from a scientific standpoint, the student of the family cannot fail to see that the crux of the problem of the modem family lies in its instability. The legal expression of the instability of the family is to be seen in divorce. If the whole problem of the modern family centers in the matter of its instability, then the study of the divorce movement should throw more light upon the condition of the modern family than the study of anything else. Just how far we have gone already toward getting rid of permanent monogamy as the standard in modern society will be more or less evident from the divorce statistics. However, the student must bear in mind that l divorce statistics never adequately measure the instability of the family life, for divorce is only the legal expression of such instability. In every community a certain number of marriages are dissolved without the formality of legal divorce. Among the very poorest class in American cities, it is found that illegal desertion is about four times as common as legal divorce. Hence it would probably be not far from the facts if we should add 20 per cent to 148 THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY the number of divorces granted to get an approximate measure of the real instability of the family in American society. As we have just implied, the instability of the modern family is most evident in the United States. This is due in part to the freedom with which legal divorce has been granted in the United States ; but it is also due in part to the fact that American society has exaggerated the in- dividualism and industrialism which are characteristic of Western civilization in general. Hence, although the dis- integration of the family characterizes more or less all modern civilization, it is particularly American conditions that will concern us, because they illustrate best the tendencies of modern society in respect to the family. Without devoting too much time to the consideration of divorce statistics in their technical aspects, let us note, then, some of the main outlines of the modern divorce movement in this and other civilized countries. Statistics of Divorce in the United States and Other Civilized Countries. For a long time the United States has led the world in the number of its divorces. Already in 1885 this country had more divorces than all the rest of the Christian civilized world put together. These statistics of the number of divorces granted in different civilized countries in 1885 (taken from Professor W. F. Willcox's monograph on The Divorce Problem) are of sufficient interest to cite at length : United States 23,472 France 6,245 Germany 6,161 Russia 1,789 P Austria 1,718 Switzerland 920 Denmark 635 Italy 556 THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY 149 Great Britain and Ireland 508 Roumania 541 Holland 339 Belgium 290 Sweden 229 Australia 100 Norway 68 Canada. . 12 It will be noted that in this particular year (1885), when the United States had 23,472 divorces, all the other coun- tries mentioned together had only 20,131. For 1905, / twenty years later, the following statistics are available: United States 67,976 Germany n,i47 France 10,860 Austria-Hungary 5,785 Roumania 1,7*8 Switzerland 1,206 Belgium 901 Holland 900 Italy (1904) 859 Great Britain and Ireland .... 821 Denmark 549 Sweden 448 Norway 408 Australia 339 New Zealand 1 26 Canada 33, It is evident from the above figures that the United States has more than kept its lead over the rest of the world in this matter of dissolving family ties, for it would seem probable from these figures that in 1905, when the United States had nearly 68,000 divorces, all the rest of the Christian civilized world put together had less than 40,000. Moreover, the divorce rates of the different countries tell the same story. In 1905 in France, there was only one divorce to every thirty marriages; in Germany, but one to every forty-four marriages; in England, but one to every four hundred marriages. Even in Switzerland, which has the highest divorce rate of any country of Europe, there was only one divorce in 1905 to every twenty-two marriages. Let us compare these rates with that of the United States, and particularly with the rates of several of the states that lead in the matter of divorces. In iQQ_tbere was in the United States about one divorce 4 150 THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY to every twelve marriages, but the states of Washington, Oregon, and Montana had one divorce to every five mar- riages; Colorado and Indiana had one divorce to every six marriages ; Oklahoma, California, and Maine had one divorce to every seven marriages ; New Hampshire, Arkan- sas, Texas, Missouri, and Kansas, one divorce to every eight marriages. While these rates are those of the states in which divorces are most numerous, yet, nevertheless, the number of states in which the divorce rates range from one to every six marriages to one to nine marriages are so numerous that they may be said to be fairly representative of conditions generally in a large proportion of the whole country. The divorce census for 1916, moreover, the re- turns of which are only for that one year, showed a divorce rate in that year for the United States as a whole of one divorce to every nine marriages, while in two far Western states the rate exceeded one divorce to every three mar- riages. Increase of Divorces in the United States. Not only does the United States lead the world in the number of / its divorces, but apparently divorces are increasing in this country much more rapidly than the population. In 1867, the first year for which statistics for the country as a whole were gathered, there were 9937 divorces in the United States, but by 1916, the last year for which we have statistics, the total number of divorces granted in this country, yearly, had reached 112,036. Again, from 1867 to 1886 there were 328,716 divorces granted in the United States, but during the next twenty years, from 1887 to 1906, the number reached 945,625, or almost a total of 1,000,000 divorces granted in twenty years. Again, from THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY 151 1867 to 1886 the number of divorces increased 157 per cent, while the population increased only about 60 per cent; from 1887 to 1906 the number of divorces in- creased over 1 60 per cent, while the population increased only slightly over 50 per cent. Thus it is evident that divorces are increasing in the United States three times as fast as the increase of population. It becomes, there- fore, a matter of some curious interest to speculate upon what will be the end of this movement. If divorces should continue to increase as they have during the past forty years, it is evident that it would not be long before all marriages would be terminated by divorce instead of by death. In 1870, 3.5 per cent of all marriages were ter- minated by divorce; in 1900, 8.1 per cent were terminated by divorce, and in 1916, about n per cent. Professor Willcox has estimated that if this increasing divorce rate continues, by 1950 one fourth of all marriages in the United States will be terminated by divorce, and in 1990 one half of all marriages. Thus we are apparently within measurable distance of a time when, if present tendencies continue, the family, as a permanent union between husband and wife, lasting until death, shall cease to be. At least, it is safe to say that in a population where one j half of all marriages will be terminated by divorce the social conditions would be no better than those in the Rome of the decadence. We cannot imagine such a state of affairs without the existence alongside of it of widespread promiscuity, neglect of childhood, and general social demoralization. Without, however, stopping at this point to discuss the results or the effects of the divorce movement upon society, let us now consider for a moment 152 THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY how these divorces are distributed among the various elements and classes of our population. Distribution of Divorces. It is usually thought by those who have observed the matter most carefully that divorce especially characterizes the wealthy classes and the laboring classes, but is least common among the middle classes. We have no statistics to bear out this belief, but it seems prob- able that it is substantially correct. The divorce statistics which we have, however, indicate certain striking differences in the distribution of divorces by classes and communities. (1) The divorce rate is higher in the cities than in their surrounding country districts. The statistics show, for example, that in many cities in the Central West the divorce rates are much higher than in the states in which they are situated. Exceptions to this generalization are cities in which a large proportion of the population are Roman Catholic or of foreign birth. (2) The census statistics show that apparently the divorce rate is about four times as high among childless couples as among couples that have children. This doubtless does not mean that domestic unhappiness is four times more common in families where there are no children than in families that have children, but it does show, nevertheless, that the parental instinct is now, as in primitive times, a powerful force to bind husband and wife together. (3) While we have no statistics from this country telling us exactly what the distribution of divorces is among the various^religious denominations, still we know that because the Roman Catholic Church is strongly against divorce, divorces are- very rare in thatjlejiomination. In Switzer- land, where the number of divorces among Protestants and THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY 153 Catholics has been noted, it is found that divorces are four times as common among Protestants as among Catholics. Some observers in this country have claimed that divorces are most common among those of no religious profession, next most common among Protestants, next among Jews, and least common among Roman Catholics. (4) From this we might expect, as our statistics indicate, that the divorce rate is much higher among the native whites in this country than it is among the foreign born, for many of the foreign born are Roman Catholics, and, in any case, they come from countries where divorce is less common than in the United States. (5) For the last forty years two thirds of all divorces have been granted on demand of the wife. This may indicate, on the one hand, that the increase of divorces is a movement connected with the emancipation of woman, and on the other hand it may indicate that it is the husband who usually gives the ground for divorce. (6) The census statistics show three great centers of divorce in the United States. One is the New England States, one the states of the Central West, and one the Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast states. These three centers are also typical centers of American institutions and ideas. The individualism of the New England, the Central West, and the Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast regions has always been marked in comparison with some other sections of the country. But during the last twenty years divorce has also been increasing rapidly in the Southern states, and we now find such states as Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma well up toward the front among the states with a high divorce rate. 154 THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY This distribution of divorces among the various elements and classes of the country suggests something as to the causes of divorce, and this will come out fully later in a dis- cussion of the causes of the increase of divorce. The Grounds for Granting Divorce. There are no less than thirty-six distinct grounds for absolute divorce recog- nized by the laws of the several states, ranging from only one ground* recognized in New York to fourteen grounds recog- nized in New Hampshire. For this reason some have sup- . posed that many of the divorces in this country are granted on comparatively trivial grounds. Several states have, for example, what is known as an " Omnibus Clause," granting divorce for mere incompatibility and the like. But the examination of divorce statistics shows that very few divorces are granted on trivial grounds. On the con- trary, most divorces seem to be granted for grave rea- sons, such as adultery, desertion, cruelty, imprisonment for crime, habitual drunkenness, and neglect on the part of the husband to provide for his family. These are usually recognized as grave reasons for the dissolution of the mar- riage tie. None of them at least could be said to be trivial. Professor Willcox showed that for the twenty year period, 1867 to 1886, over ninety-seven per cent of all divorces were granted for these six principal causes. Moreover, he also showed that over sixty per cent were granted for the two most serious causes of all, adultery and desertion. Again, of the one million divorces granted from 1887 to 1906 over ninety-four per cent were granted for the six principal causes and over fifty-five per cent for adultery and desertion, while in still other cases adultery and desertion figured in combination with other causes (a total of over THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY 155 sixty- two per cent in all). Therefore, it seems probable that in nearly two thirds of the cases the marriage bond had already practically been dissolved before the courts stepped in to make the dissolution formal. We must conclude, therefore, that divorce is prevalent not because of the laxity of our laws, but rather because of the decay of our family life ; that divorce is but a symptom of the disin- tegration of the modern family, particularly the American family. In other words, divorce is but a symptom of more serious evils, and these evils have in certain classes of American society apparently undermined the very virtues upon which the family life subsists. This is not saying that vice is more prevalent to-day than it was fifty years ago. We have no means of knowing whether it is or not, and there may well be a difference of opinion upon such a subject. It is the opinion of some eminent authorities that there has been no growth of vice in the United States along with the growth of divorce, but this would seem to be doubtful. The very causes for which divorce is granted suggest a demoraliza- tion of certain classes. While there may not have been, therefore, any general growth of vice in the United States along with the growth of divorce, it is conceivable that it may have increased greatly in certain classes of American society. Be this as it may, it is not necessary to assume that there has been any growth of vice in the American population, for if actual moral practices are no higher than they were fifty years ago that alone would be a sufficient reason to explain considerable disintegration of our family life. It is an important truth in sociology that the moral- ity which suffices for a relatively simple social life, largely I 1 THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY ral, such as existed in this country fifty years ago, is not lUfficient for a more complex society which is largely urban, such as exists at the present time. Moreover, recognized moral standards within the past fifty years have largely been raised through the growth of general intelligence. It follows that immoral acts, which were condoned fifty years ago and which produced but slight social effect, to-day meet with great reprobation and have far greater social consequences than a generation ago. This is particularly true of the standards which the wife imposes upon the hus- band. For centuries, as we have already seen, the husband has secured divorce for adultery of the wife, but for centu- ries no divorce was given to the wife for the adultery of the husband; and this is even true to-day in modern England, unless the adultery of the husband be accompanied by other flagrant violations of morality. Conduct on the part of the husband, which the wife overlooked, therefore, a gene- ration ago, is to-day sufficient to disrupt the family bonds and become a ground for the granting of a divorce. Even if vice, then, has not increased in our population, if moral practices are no higher to-day than fifty years ago, we should expect that this alone would have far different con- sequences now than then. The growth of intelligence and of higher and more complex forms of social organization necessitates realization of higher standards of conduct if the institutions of society are to retain their stability. But there are grave reasons for believing that there has ieen in certain classes of society a decay of the very virtues upon which the family rests, for the family life requires not only chastity, but even more the virtues of self-sacrifice, loyalty, obedience, and self -subordination. Now there is THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY 157 abundant evidence to show that these particular virtues which belong to a self-subordinating life are those which have suffered most in the changes and new adjustments of modern society. We have replaced these virtues largely by those of self-interest, self-direction, and self- assertiveness. Causes of the Increase of Divorce in the United States. i Let us note somewhat more in detail the causes of the increased instability of the American family during the past four or five decades. We have already in a rough way indicated some of these causes in studying the dis- tribution of divorce and the grounds upon which it is granted. But the causes of the instability of the family so affect our whole social life and all of our institutions that they are well worth somewhat more detailed study. (1) As the first of these causes of the increase of divorce in the United States we should put the decay of re- ligion, particularly of the religious theory of marriage and the family. As we have already seen, no stable family life has existed anywhere in history without a religious basis, but within the last few decades religious sentiments, beliefs, and ideals have become largely dissociated from marriage and the family, and the result is that many people regard the institutions of marriage and the family as a matter of personal convenience. This decay of the religious view of the marriage bond has, however, had other antecedent causes, partly in the moral and intellec- tual spirit of our civilization, partly in our industrial con- ditions. (2) We should put, therefore, as a second cause of the increase of divorces in this country the growing spirit 158 THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY of individualism. By individualism we mean here the spirit of self-assertion and self-interest, the spirit which leads a man to find his law in his own wishes, or even in his whims and caprices. Now, this growing spirit of individual- ism is undoubtedly more destructive of the social life than anything else. It makes unstable all institutions, and espe- cially the family, because the family must rest upon very opposite characteristics. Our laissez-faire democracy, our industrial organization, and our unsocialized education have all been responsible to some extent for making the in- dividual take his own interests and wishes as his law. (3) Moreover, this individualism has spread within the last fifty years especially among the women of the popu- lation, and has produced a great movement, known in its moderate phases as the "Woman's Movement" and in its more radical phases as "Feminism." The woman's move- ment has accompanied and in part effected the eman- cipation of women legally, mentally, and economically. The result is that women, as a class, have become as much individualized as the men, and oftentimes are as great practical individualists. No one would claim that the emancipation of woman, in the sense of freeing her from those things which have 1 prevented the highest and best development of her per- sonality, is not desirable. But this emancipation of woman has brought with it certain opportunities for going down as well as for going up. Woman's emancipation has not, in other words, meant to all classes of women, woman's elevation. On the contrary, it has been to some, if not an opportunity for license, at least an opportunity for self- assertion and selfishness not consistent with the welfare THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY 159 of society and particularly with the stability of the family. We may remind ourselves once more that the Roman women achieved complete emancipation, but they did not thereby better their social position. On the contrary, the emancipation of woman in Rome meant woman's degradation, and ultimately the demoralization of Roman family life. While this is not necessarily an accompani- ment of woman's emancipation, still it is a real danger which threatens, and of which we can already see many evidences in modern society. As in all other emanci- patory movements, the dangers of freedom are found for some individuals at least to be quite as great as the dangers of subjection. That the woman's movement has had much to do with the growth of divorce in this country gains substantiation from the fact that many of the leaders of that movement, especially the more radical like Mrs. Oilman and Miss Ellen Key, have advocated free divorce, and their inculca- tion of this doctrine certainly could not have been without some effect. But the woman's movement would have perhaps failed to develop, or at least failed of widespread support, if it had not been for the economic emancipation of woman through the opening to her of many new industrial callings and the securing for her a certain measure of economic inde- pendence. This, again, while perhaps a good thing in itself, has, nevertheless, facilitated the growing tendency to form unstable family relations. But this economic independence of woman, we need hardly remark, is the necessary and, indeed, inevitable outcome of modern in- dustrial development. 160 THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY // (4) The growth of modern industrialism must, then, be regarded as one of the fundamental factors which has brought about the increase of divorce in the United States. By industrialism we mean manufacturing industry. As we have already noticed, the growth of manufacturing industry has opened a large number of new economic callings to woman and has rendered her largely economically independent of family relations. Moreover, the labor of women in factories has tended to disrupt the home, partic- ularly in the case of married women, as we have already seen. For the laboring classes it has tended to make the home only a lodging place, with little or no development of a true family life. Again, such labor has set the sexes in competition with each other, has tended to reduce their sexual differences and to stimulate immensely their individ- ualism. Finally, inasmuch as modern industrialism has tended to destroy the home, the result has been the pro- duction of unsocialized children, and especially of those that had no tradition of a family life. Girls, for example, through industrialism, have failed to learn the domestic arts, failed to have any training in homemaking, and there- fore when they came to the position of wife and mother, they were frequently not fitted for such a life, and through their lack of adjustment rendered the homes which they formed unstable. (5) Closely connected with the growth of modern indus- trialism is the growth of modern cities, and, as we have already seen, divorce is usually much more common in the cities than in the rural districts. The growth of the cities, in other words, has been a cause of the increase of divorce. City populations, on account of the economic THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY 161 conditions under which they live, are peculiarly homeless. A normal home can scarcely exist in the slums and in some of the tenement districts of our cities. Again, in the city there is perhaps more vice and other immorality, less control of the individual by public opinion, and more opportunity, on account of close living together and high standards of living, for friction, both within and without the domestic circle. (6) The higher standards of living and comfort which have come with the growth of our industrial civilization, especially of our cities, must also be set down as a cause of increasing instability of the family. High standards of living are, of course, desirable if they can be realized, that is, if they are reasonable. But many elements of our population have standards of living and comfort which they find are practically impossible to realize with the income which they have. Many classes, in other words, are unable to meet the social demands which they suppose they must meet in order to maintain a home. To found and main- tain a home, therefore, with these rising standards of liv- ing, and also within the last decade or two with the rising cost of living, requires such a large income that an in- creasingly smaller proportion of the population are able to do this satisfactorily. From this cause, undoubtedly, a great deal of domestic misery and unhappiness results, which finally shows itself in desertion or in the divorce court. It is evident that higher standards of taste and higher standards of morality may also operate under certain circumstances to render the family life unstable in a similar way. 162 THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY ,/ (7) Directly connected with these last mentioned causes is another cause, the higher age of marriage. Some have thought that a low age of marriage was more prolific in divorces than a relatively high age of marriage. But a low age of marriage cannot be a cause of the increase of divorce in the United States, because the proportion of immature marriages hi most classes is steadily lessening, that is, the age of marriage has been increasing, and all must admit that along with the higher age of marriage has gone increasing divorce; and there may possibly be some connection between the two facts. As we have already seen, the higher standards of living make later marriage necessary. Men in the professions do not think of marriage nowadays until thirty, or until they have an independ- ent income. Now, how may the higher age of marriage possibly increase the instability of the family? It may do so in this way. After thirty, psychologists tell us, one's habits are relatively fixed and hard to change. People who marry after thirty, therefore, usually find greater difficulty in adjusting themselves to each other than people who marry somewhat younger; and every marriage necessarily involves an adjustment of individuals to each other. This being so, we can readily understand that late marriages are more apt to result in faulty adjustments in the family relation than marriages that take place in early maturity. (8) Another cause of the increase of divorce in the United States that has been given is the popularization of law which has accompanied the growth of democratic institutions. Law was once the prerogative of special classes, and courts were rarely appealed to except by the THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY 163 noble or wealthy classes; but with the growth of demo- cratic institutions there has been a great spread of legal education, especially through the modern newspaper, and consequently a greater participation in the remedies offered by the courts for all sorts of wrongs, real or im- agined. Many people, for example, who would not have thought of divorce a generation ago, now know how divorce may be secured and are ready to secure it. How- ever, it would seem as though this cause of the increase of divorce might have operated to a greater extent twenty- five or thirty years ago than it has during the last two decades, for it cannot be said that since the nineties there has been much increase of legal education among the masses, or much greater popularization of the law. (9) Increasing laxity of the laws regarding divorce and increasing laxity in the administration of the laws has certainly been a cause of increasing divorce in the United States, though back of these causes doubtless lie all the other causes just mentioned, and also increasing laxity in public opinion regarding marriage and divorce. To assume that laxity of the laws and of legal administration has no influence upon the increase of divorce in a pop- lation is to go contrary to all human experience. The people of Canada and of England, for example, are not very different from ourselves in culture and in institutions, yet there is almost no divorce in England and in Canada as compared with the United States. Canada has a v few dozen divorces annually, while we have over seventy thousand. Unquestionably the main cause of this great difference between Canada and the United States is to be found in the difference of their laws. This is not saying, 164 THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY however, that instability of the family does not charac- terize Canada and England as well as the United States, even though such instability does not express itself in the divorce courts. Interesting statistics have been collected in numerous places in the country to show the laxity of the adminis- tration of the divorce laws. In many of the divorce courts of our large cities, for example, it has repeatedly been shown that the average time occupied by the court in granting a divorce is not more than fifteen minutes. In other words, divorce cases are frequently rushed through our divorce courts without solemnity, without adequate investigation, with every opportunity for collusion between the parties, so as to favor a very free granting of divorces. On the other hand, about one fourth of all the applications for divorce which come to trial are refused by the courts, showing that the courts are not so lax in all cases as they are sometimes pictured to be. Moreover, the divorce courts have two excuses for their laxity. First, the divorce courts are always greatly over- burdened with the number of cases before them; and, secondly, public opinion, which the courts as well as other phases of our government largely reflect, favors this laxity. This is shown by the fact that public opinion stands back of the lax divorce statutes of many states, all efforts to radically change these statutes having failed of recent years. (10) Our study of the family has accustomed us to the thought that the family is an institution which, like all other human institutions, undergoes constant changes. Now at periods of change in any institution, periods of THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY 165 transition from one type to another, there is apt to be a period of confusion. The old type of institution is never replaced at once by a new type of institution ready-made and adjusted to the social life, but only gradually does the new institution emerge from the elements of the old. In the meantime, however, there may be a considerable period of confusion and anarchy. This social principle, we may note, rests upon the deeper psychological principle, that old habits are usually not replaced by new habits without an intervening period of confusion and uncertainty. In other words, in the transition from the old habit to the new habit there is much opportunity for disorganization and disintegration. It is exactly so in human society, because social institutions are but expressions of habit. Now, the old semipatriarchal type of the family, which prevailed down to the beginning of the nineteenth cen- tury, the type of the family which we might perhaps properly call the monarchical type, has been disappearing for the past one hundred years, is in fact already practi- cally extinct, at least in America, but we have not yet built up a new type of the family to take its place. The old semipatriarchal family of our forefathers has gone, but no new type of the family has yet become general. A democratic type of the family in harmony with our democratic civilization must be evolved. But such a democratic type of the family can be stable only upon the condition that its stability is within itself and not with- out. Authority in various coercive forms made the old type of the family stable, but a stable basis for a new type of the family has not yet been found, or rather it has not been found by large elements of our population. Un- 1 66 THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY questionably a democratic ethical type of the family in which the rights of every one are respected and all members are bound together, not through fear or through force of authority, but through love and affection, is being evolved in certain classes of our society. The problem before our civilization is whether such a democratic ethical type of the family can become generalized a e white and 3855 negroes. During the year 1910 there were 493,934 persons committed to prisons or to juvenile reformatories upon sentence or for non-payment of fines 14,147 being juvenile delinquents. Omitting those committed to prison for non-payment of fines, there were 200,873 committed during 1910 upon sentence. During the year 1904 the number committed upon sentence was 149,691, while 81,772 prisoners were serving sentences on June 30, 1904. These prison statistics, however, give us little idea of the actual amount of crime in the United States, because they include only the persons committed to prison to serve sentences and do not include the vast number who escape the meshes of the law or who simply pay fines, or whose sentences are suspended. It is estimated by competent authorities, basing their estimate upon the number of known convictions of crime in certain large cities, that there are not less than 1,000,000 convictions for crime annually, in the United States including, of course, convictions for both felonies and misdemeanors. That this is not an excessive estimate may be indicated by the fact that in the state of New York alone in 1910, there were 95,444 persons committed to prison (of whom 48,270 were committed after conviction in the courts) while in 1915 the total number committed was 121,110. All these figures, however, fail to give us any very correct idea of the amount of serious crimes in the United States the prison statistics because they understate the matter, the statistics of convictions because they overstate. A peculiarity about serious crimes in the United States, CRIME 331 it must be remembered, is that so many persons escape through the meshes of the law, and this is particularly true in the case of the characteristic American crime of homicide. Our census authorities estimate that only about one third of those guilty of this crime are convicted in our courts. Thus the census showed that in 1910 there were 2902 persons in the United States committed to prison upon sentence for homicide, while the estimated total number of homicides committed was about 9000 (the Chi- cago Tribune statistics give 8975) that year. For a number of years the death rate from homicide has increased in the registration area. Thus it was 5 per 100,000 population in 1906, and 7.1 per 100,000 in 1916, but this increase was due largely to the addition to the registration area of Southern and Western states where the homicide rate is high. How- ever, the homicide rate in thirty-one of the largest cities rose from 5 per 100,000 in the decade 1895-1904 to 8.1 in the decade 1905-1914. The homicide rate varied in the United States hi 1916 all the way from i per 100,000 in the rural districts of Maine to 33.5 in the cities of Montana. Among the negroes of the cities of South Carolina the homicide rate was 47.6 in 1916. In individual cities of the registration area the rate was much higher, being highest in 1915 in Memphis, Tenn., where the rate was 85.9. The number of homicides is far greater hi the United States than in other civilized countries, with the exception of Italy, Spain, and some other countries of the Mediterranean region. England, for example, had only two hundred and eighty-seven cases of homicide in 1909 as compared with our about nine thousand, although England's population was about 35,000,000 as against over 90,000,000 for the 332 CRIME United States. The greatest number of these homicides take place in the Southern and Western states, Montana leading, according to the statistics of 1916, with South Caro- lina second. This suggests that to some extent our high homicide rate is due to the survival of frontier conditions in a large number of the states, although it is probably even more due to American individualism and lawlessness, the tendency of every man to take the law into his own hands. There can be no doubt that the amount of serious crime in the United States is relatively high, although there is no reason to believe that the serious crimes against property are proportionate to the serious crimes against persons. The Cost of Crime in the United States. The Hon. Eugene Smith, a lawyer of New York city, in a paper read before the National Prison Association in 1900, estimated that the criminal population of the United States costs not less than $600,000,000 annually. He based his estimate upon the cost of crime in New York city and other large cities of the country. He found that the probable expenses of government in the United States attributable to crime, that is, the cost of police, criminal courts, prisons, and other institutions connected with the prevention and repression of crime, amounted to about $200,000,000 per year. This is the amount paid by the taxpayers for the repression and extirpation of crime annually. In addition there is the cost of the criminal class through the destruction of property, their plunder, and the like. Mr. Smith estimated that there were no less than 250,000 dangerous criminals in the United States and that each such criminal cost the people of the United States, on the average $1600 annually. Accordingly, the 250,000 criminals would cost a total of CRIME 333 $400,000,000 annually, which, added to the $200,000,000 paid out in taxes for the repression of the criminal class and protection against crime, makes a total of $600,000,000 paid out every year by the people of the United States as the cost of supporting the criminal class. While this figure seems enormous, it is now at this date probably an underestimate rather than an overestimate of the total cost of crime. We may compare the amount with certain other figures. The cost of the public school system in the United States in 1916 was about $600,000,000; the annual value of our wheat crop and of our cotton crop, 1912-1916, averaged about $800,000,000. It is evident that the problem of crime is worthy of serious study even from a financial standpoint alone. Is Crime Increasing? How we answer this question will, of course, depend upon the length of time considered. We have no statistics going back further than fifty years in this country. Moreover, it is entirely possible to hold that while crime has decreased during the historic era among civilized peoples, it has increased during the last twenty-five or fifty years. All .statistics of crime in the United States seem to show that it has increased. In 1850 for example, the number of prisoners was 6737 which was one prisoner to every 3442 of the population. But the census of 1850 was seriously defective, and we would better take the census of 1860 as the basis of our com- parison. In 1860 the census showed a total prison popu- lation of 19,086, which was one prisoner to every 1647 of the population. In 1890 the census showed 82,329 pris- oners in the total population, which was one in every 757. In other words, between 1860 and 1890 the total popu- 334 CRIME lation of the country just doubled, while the number of prisoners quadrupled. The value of these statistics has often been questioned, but it has been questioned chiefly by people who have not taken other corroborative evidence into account. The chief corroborating evidence is to be found in the statistics of prisoners in our state prisons from 1880 to 1910. Now only those are sent to state prisons who are guilty of felo- nies, and the length of term of sentence in our state prisons has steadily shortened during the last twenty-five years, while within the last few years the practice of suspending sentence on probation for first felons has been largely in- troduced. We should expect, therefore, a decrease in the state prison population in proportion to the general popula- tion. But we find that the number in state prisons rose from 30,659 in 1880, to 45,233 in 1890, an increase of 47.5 per cent, while the general population increased only 24.86 per cent. Again the number rose in 1910 to 67,871, an increase of 50 per cent, while the general population increased about 47 per cent. Apparently, therefore, the amount of serious crime in the United States increased more rapidly than the population till about 1890, and since then has stood practically stationary. Corroborating evidence is also found in the statistics of negro crime (prob- ably the main element in the increase) , which increased very rapidly from 1870 to 1890. Other evidence has been cited, but the statistics of our state penitentiaries may be con- sidered conclusive when all facts are taken into considera- tion. 1 There is apparently no escape from the conclusion 1 See the writer's article on this question in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. I, pp. 378-385; also an article in Vol. Ill, pp. 754-769. CRIME 335 that serious crime during the last sixty years has increased more rapidly than the population. For several years prior to the Great War the statistics of most European countries indicated an increase in minor offenses, as did also some fragmentary American statistics. During the War, however, crime decreased in most of the bel- ligerent nations. England is the only country in which over a long term of years there has been apparently a decrease in proportion to population of both serious crimes and minor offenses. This decrease of crime in England must be attrib- uted largely to England's excellent prison system, and also to the swiftness and certainty of English courts of justice. The Causes of Crime. The causes of crime may be classified best, as we classified the causes of poverty, into objective and subjective. Objective causes are those outside of the individual, in the environment; subjective causes are causes in the individual, whether in his bodily make-up or his mental peculiarities. The Objective Causes of Crime. The objective causes of crime may be divided into causes in the physical environ- ment and causes in the social environment. The causes in the physical environment are relatively unimportant, but are worthy of note as showing "how many various factors enter into this social phenomenon of crime. Climate and season seem to be the two chief physical factors that influence crime; and in connection with these we have two general rules, abundantly verified by statistics; namely, crimes against the person are more numerous in southern climates than crimes against property; and again crimes against the person are more numerous in summer than in winter, while crimes against property are more numerous 33 6 CRIME in winter than in summer. All this is of course simply an outcome of the effect of climate and season upon general living conditions. The causes of crime in the social environment are of course much the most important objective causes of crime, and, many students think, altogether the most important causes of crime in general. Let us briefly note some of the more important social conditions that give rise to crime. (i) Conditions connected with the family life have a great influence on crime; indeed, inasmuch as the family is the chief agency in society for socializing the young, perhaps domestic conditions are more important in the production of crime than any other set of causes. We can- not enter into the discussion of the matter fully, but we have already seen in former chapters that demoralized homes contribute an undue proportion of criminals. It is estimated by those in charge of reform schools for delin- quent children that from 85 to 90 per cent of the children in those institutions come from more or less demoralized or disrupted families. Illegitimate children notoriously drift into the criminal classes, while dependent children who grow up in charitable institutions are prone also to take the same course. Domestic conditions have of course an influence on the criminality or non-criminality of adults. This is best shown perhaps by the fact that the great proportion of criminals in our prisons are unmarried persons. Thus the United States prison census of 1910 showed that 68.6 per cent of all prisoners were single per- sons. Statistics from other countries are practically the same. This means that, on the one hand, the family life CRIME 337 is a preventive of crime, and on the other that the socially abnormal classes who drift into crime are not apt to marry. (2) Industrial conditions also have a profound influence upon criminal statistics. Economic crises, hard times, strikes, lockouts, are all productive of crime. Quetelet, the Belgian statistician, thought that the general rule could be laid down that, as the price of food increases, crimes against property increase, while crimes against persons decrease. At any rate, increase in the cost of the necessities of life is very apt to increase crimes of certain sorts. The various industrial classes show a different ratio of criminality. In general among industrial classes the least crime is committed by the agricultural classes, while the most crime is committed by the unemployed or those with no occupation. The census of 1910 showed that 49.4 per cent of all prisoners committed that year were unskilled non-agricultural laborers or persons of no occupation. (3) Urbanization and other conditions concerning the distribution and density of the population have an in- fluence upon crime. In general there is more crime in the cities than in the country districts. The statistics of all civilized countries seem to show about twice as great a percentage of crime in their large cities as in the rural districts. (4) The influence of race and nationality seems to be marked in criminal statistics. We have already noted that the ratio of criminality among the negroes in the United States is from four to five times higher than among the whites. We have also seen that among our recent immigrants the Southern Italians have a pronounced tend- 338 CRIME ency to crime, especially serious crime. Among our older immigrants the Irish, on the other hand, owing largely to their love of liquor, have a pronounced tendency toward minor offenses. Even in 1910, 29.9 per cent of all foreign- born committed to prison were Irish, while the Irish consti- tuted but i o.i per cent of the total foreign-bom population. (5) Defects in government and law are among the most potent causes of crime. These are so numerous that we cannot attempt even to mention all. It is obvious that such things as too great leniency on the part of our judges and shortness of sentence if convicted; difficulty or uncer- tainty in securing justice in criminal courts; costliness of obtaining justice in our civil courts; bad prison systems in which first offenders and hardened criminals mingle; lack of police surveillance of habitual criminals; corrupt methods of appointing the police; partisanship in the ad- ministration of government, and the like, all conduce to crime. And many of these things, we may add, have been especially in evidence in America. (6) Educational conditions have undoubtedly a great influence upon crime. While education in the sense of school education could never in itself stamp out crime, still defective educational conditions greatly increase crime. This is shown sufficiently by the fact that illiter- ates are much more liable to commit crime than those who have a fair education. The prison census of 1910 showed that 12.8 per cent of the prisoners were illiterate, while only 8.2 per cent of the general population fifteen years of age or over were illiterate; and of the major offenders a still higher per cent were illiterate. The defects in our educational conditions which espe- CRIME 339 daily favor the development of crime in certain classes are chiefly: lack of facilities for industrial education, lack of physical education, and lack of specific moral instruction. The need of these three things in a socialized school system need not here be more than emphasized. The influence of the press as a popular educator must here be mentioned as one of the important stimuli to crime under modern conditions. The excessive exploita- tion of crimes in the modern sensational press no doubt conduces to increase criminality in certain classes, for it has been demonstrated that crime is often a matter of suggestion or imitation. When a large part of the space in our daily newspapers is taken up with reports of crime and immorality, as it is in some cases, it is not to be won- dered at that the contagion of crime is sown broadcast in society. (7) The influence of certain social institutions in pro- ducing crime must be mentioned. Here comes in especially the lack of opportunities for wholesome social recreation among our poorer classes, particularly in our large cities. Lacking these, the masses resort to the saloon, gambling- houses, cheap music and dance halls, and vulgar theatrical entertainments while their children have to play in the streets. The influence of all of these conditions is un- doubtedly to spread the contagion of vice and crime. (8) The influence of manners and customs upon crime cannot be overlooked. The custom in certain communi- ties, for example, of carrying concealed weapons undoubt- edly has much to do with the swollen homicide statistics of the United States. Vicious and corrupting customs, such as compulsory social drinking, and the like, undoubtedly 340 CRIME greatly influence crime. Even the luxury and extrava- gance of the rich might easily be shown to have a demoral- izing effect, both upon the upper and the lower classes of society. The list of causes of crime in the social environment might be indefinitely extended until the student would perhaps think that practically everything was a cause of crime in one way or another; and it is true that everything that depresses men in society is a cause of crime. How- ever, if the student has gained an impression of the great complexity of the causes of crime, that is the main thing. A question may here be raised whether it is possible to reduce all the causes of crime to causes in the social environ- ment that is, all subjective causes to objective. Many writers have contended that this is possible, but we shall see that there are causes in heredity and causes in psycho- logical conditions, to say nothing of some possible free will in individuals, which cannot be derived from social conditions and which would produce crime quite independ- ent of objective social conditions, unless these subjective factors were also controlled. There is no reason to believe that a perfectly just social organization which did not attempt to control heredity and the moral character of individuals would succeed in eliminating crime. On the t contrary, biological variation alone arising from influences independent of the environment would produce a certain amount of crime. Crime, in other words, is, to a certain extent, like pauperism, an expression of the elimination of the inferior variants in society, and will continue to exist as long as we allow the process of evolution by natural selection to go on. CRIME 341 Nevertheless, it is true in a certain sense, as Lacassagne says, that " every society has the criminals it deserves;" that is, every society could, by taking proper means, practi- cally eliminate crime and the criminal class. This would have to be done, however, by something more radical than a mere reorganization of human society in an industrial' way. Three things are necessary for society practically to eliminate crime: first, the correction of defects in social conditions, particularly of economic evils in society; second, the proper control of physical heredity by a rational system of eugenics; third, the proper education and train- ing of every child for social life from infancy up. The Subjective Causes of Crime. In order to see all that is involved in the above program let us study somewhat the subjective causes of crime. These may be divided into biological and psychological. Among the biological causes of crime, and one which certainly cannot be reduced to the environment, is sex. As we have already seen, crime is a social phenomenon which is chiefly confined to the male sex. In 1910, for example, 94.5 per cent of the prison popu- lation in the United States were males, and in the statistics of convictions it is estimated that ninety-one men are con- victed for every nine women. The statistics for all civilized countries show practically the same conditions, although in most European countries the proportion of female prisoners is somewhat higher, owing, undoubtedly, to certain influ- ences in the social environment. Another subjective factor in crime, which again cannot be reduced to environment, is age. Practically all crime falls in the active period of life, and the bulk of it between the ages of twenty-one and forty years. The average of 342 CRIME men in our state penitentiaries is frequently not above twenty-seven or twenty-eight years. Other subjective biological conditions that cause crime may be summed up under the word "degeneracy." These abnormal conditions, however, we shall examine later. Among the psychological conditions of the individual that give rise to crime the most common are habits, aims, and ideals. Of peculiar interest among personal habits that have an influence upon crime is intemperance, and this is such an important cause of crime that we must stop to examine it in some detail. It is often said that 95 per cent of the crime of our country results from this cause alone. The Committee of Fifty, however, investi- gated the cases of 13,402 convicts with reference to this matter, and found that intemperance was a cause of crime in the cases of 49.95 per cent. It was a chief cause of crime, however, only in the cases of 31.18 per cent. In the remaining cases the intemperance was that of ances- tors or associates. Other investigators have found that intemperance figures as a cause of crime in from 60 to 80 per cent of the cases, but these investigations were not so full as that of the Committee of Fifty, and it is safer to conclude, for the present at least, that intemperance figures as a cause in about fifty per cent in the cases of serious crime. The wonder is that any one cause could figure in so many cases when there are so many varied influences in society depressing men. Of course intemper- ance can, as has already been said, in large part be ascribed to the influence of external stimuli in the environment, but it has also causes in the biological and psychological CRIME 343 make-up of certain individuals that cannot be easily re- duced to environmental factors. Influence of Physical Degeneracy upon Crime. By de- generacy we mean, to use Morel's definition, " a morbid deviation from the normal type." That is, degeneracy is such an alteration of organic structures and functions that the organism becomes incapable of adapting itself to more or less complex conditions. Ordinary forms of degeneracy that are well recognized are feeble-mindedness, chronic insanity, chronic epilepsy, congenital deaf-mutism, habitual pauperism, and the like. Now there can be no doubt that criminality in some of its forms is related to these func- tional forms of degeneracy. Even ordinary people have noticed its similarity to insanity, while Lombroso has traced an elaborate parallel between criminality and epi- lepsy. Without accepting extreme views, it may be claimed that criminality is, in some cases, a form of biological degeneracy for the following reasons: (1) The investigations of criminal anthropologists have established the fact that criminals as a class present a much larger number of structural and functional abnormal- ities than does the average man. The prisoners in our state prisons, for example, with few exceptions, could not measure up to the requirements laid down by the United States Army authorities for the enlistment of soldiers. (2) Investigations, like that of the Kallikak family by Dr. Goddard, have established the fact that criminals, paupers, imbeciles, drunkards, prostitutes, and other de- generates frequently spring from the same family stock. A very large percentage of the prisoners in our prisons have come from more or less degenerate family stocks. 344 CRIME (3) Criminals more often show other forms of degen- eracy than criminality than does the average population; that is, criminals often belong to one of the well-recognized degenerate classes, such as imbeciles, epileptics, and insane. These three arguments may be considered to be con- clusive proof that criminality is in some cases a mani- festation of physiological degeneracy; but they do not show that the bulk of criminals come from physiologically degenerate stocks. On the contrary it is highly probable that the marks of physiological degeneracy are not to be seen in from more than 25 to 35 per cent of our criminal class. These marks of degeneracy of course especially characterize defective or "born" criminals, but to some extent they are found among the habitual criminals also. The Influence of Heredity on Crime. A word must be said about the influence of heredity on crime. The student will remember that, according to the modern theory of heredity, acquired characters, or characteristics, are not transmissible. Accordingly, when we find crime running in a family for generations, as in the Jukes or Kallikak families, we must assume either that the criminal tendency is trans- mitted by the social environment or that it is due to some congenital variation in some ancestor. In other words, if a person is a criminal by hereditary defect, if the tendency to crime is born in him, as it may be in the defective crim- inal, he will transmit the tendency toward crime to his offspring; but if a normal person becomes a criminal by acquired habit he will transmit no tendency toward crime to his children, although his children may of course ac- quire the tendency from their social environment. CRIME 345 This is not saying, however, that in such cases as habitual drunkenness and habitual vice an impaired constitution may not be transmitted to offspring. But this, strictly speaking, is not the transmission of any specific acquired characteristic, but only a general transmission of impaired vitality which may show itself in crime and in various forms of degeneracy. The germ cells are of course a part of the body, and anything that profoundly impairs the nutrition of the body generally, such as alcoholism and constitutional diseases, may also impair the nutrition of the germ cells, and result in a weakened constitution in offspring. Lombroso's Theory of Crime. Lombroso, and the Italian school of criminologists generally, attribute crime chiefly to atavism, that is, reversion to primitive types. They claim that the criminal in modern society is merely a biological reversion to the savage type of man; that the criminal constitutes therefore a distinct " anthropological variety"; and that there is a marked "criminal type" which can be made out even before a person has committed a crime. They say further that the criminal type is marked physically by having five or more of the stigmata of degeneration, and that it is marked mentally by having the characteristics of the savage or nature man. We cannot stop to criticize in full this completely biological theory of crime which is offered by Lombroso and his followers. Undoubtedly crime has biological roots, and these we have attempted to point out in discussing the influence of degeneracy upon crime. But to claim that the criminal constitutes a well-marked " anthropological variety " of the human species, as Lombroso argues, is 346 CRIME to set up a claim for which there is no foundation. What Lombroso thinks are the marks of the criminal are simply the marks belonging to the degenerate classes in general. That is, they are found among the insane and feeble-minded, for example, as well as in some classes of criminals. There is then no criminal type which clearly separates the criminal from other classes of degener- ates, and which will mark a man out as belonging to the criminal class even before he has committed a crime. Lombroso and some of his school have altogether over- emphasized the physical and anatomical side of the study of the criminal, and slighted the sociological side of such study. Moreover, Lombroso's statements, which he makes in very general terms, apply, if they apply at all, not to criminals as a class, but only to what he called "born" criminals, as indeed he himself acknowledged. Remedies for Crime. The remedies for crime are dealt with by the subsidiary science of penology, which may be regarded as a branch of scientific philanthropy. We can only direct the student's attention here to the vast literature on the subject and remark that the cure for crime consists not in some social panacea or in social revolution, but in dealing with the causes of crime so as to prevent the existence of the criminal class. In a general way, we have already indicated in discussing the remedies for poverty and pauperism what the steps must be to eradicate crime. In order practically to wipe out crime in society, as we have already said, three things are necessary. First, every individual must have a good birth; that is, heredity must be controlled so that only those who are physically and mentally sound are allowed to marry and CRIME 347 reproduce. The difficulties of doing this we have already noted. Second, every individual must have a good train- ing, both at home and at school, so as to adjust him properly to the social life. His education must fit him to take his place among other men, make him able to take care of himself, and to help others; and make him, in every possible way, acquainted with the social inheritance of the race. Last but not least, just social conditions must be provided. Everything in the social environment must be carefully looked after in order to insure the best devel- opment of the individual and to prevent his environment from being in any way a drawback to him. These things, if it were possible to bring them about, would wipe out crime, or, at least, minimize it to the lowest terms. Of course, this cannot be done in a generation, perhaps not in many generations, but it is evident that the problem of crime is in no way an insoluble problem in human society. With time and care and scientific knowl- edge, crime, as well as poverty and pauperism, could be wiped out. But curative measures are important, also, in dealing with the criminal, and each distinct class must be dealt with differently. We noted in the beginning of the chapter the three great character types in the criminal class: the defective criminal, in whom the tendency toward a life of crime is inborn; the habitual criminal, who acquires the habit of crime from his surroundings; and the single offender, who, while committing a single offense, never becomes a criminal in the strictest sense. These three distinct classes of criminals, whom we might style the degenerates, the derelicts, and the accidental offenders, 348 CRIME need to be recognized in our criminal law and to be dealt with differently by our criminal courts and correctional institutions. The defective criminal can scarcely be adjusted to normal social life. He is, as we have al- ready seen, usually more or less feeble-minded. Refor- mation in the fullest sense of the word is almost out of the question in his case. The proper policy for society with reference to the defective criminal class, which constitutes but a small portion of our total criminal population, would be segregation for life. Prac- tically, of course, this may have its difficulties until we perfect our means of discovering slight mental defects in individuals which make them incapable of social ad- justment, but practically, also, we have found means of recognizing this type by such marks as incorrigibility, recidivism, and the stigmata of degeneracy. The habitual criminal, who originally was a normal person, can be, at least in the early part of his career, fully reformed. Children and adolescents, even though habit- ual offenders, are easily susceptible of reformation, but this is difficult with the adult habitual offender past thirty years of age who has a long criminal record behind him. Like the defective criminal, he is scarcely capable of reformation. Hardened habitual offenders, and especially professional criminals, should, therefore, be sentenced upon indeterminate sentences, terminable only when adequate evi- dence of their reformation has been secured. This can best be accomplished by what is known as the " habitual crim- inal act," providing that persons guilty of three or four felonies shall be sent to prison for life, to be released only upon satisfactory evidence of reformation. CRIME 349 The single offender, who is usually a reputable citizen who commits crime through passion or through great temptation, can usually best be dealt with outside of prison walls. The young single offender, if not properly handled, may be easily transformed into an habitual criminal. On the whole, a young single offender who has had no criminal record is, perhaps, best dealt with by the system of pro- bation which we will note later. On the other hand, certain single offenders past thirty years of age, such as bribe-givers and bribe-takers, society may have to punish in order to make an example of. Exemplary punishment is, undoubtedly, still necessary in some cases, and in the main it should be reserved for this class of mature offenders in society who have otherwise lived reputable lives. Just how far exemplary punishment should be used in society as a deterrent to crime is a disputed question among penol- ogists. Whether, as in cases of homicide, it should ever go to the extent of capital punishment or not depends very much upon the civilization of the group. In a civilization like ours, where blood vengeance is so often demanded by mobs, it is probably unwise, for the present at least, to seek the abolition of capital punishment for murder in the first degree. The Prison System. Every state should have at least six distinct sets of institutions to deal with the criminal class. 1. County and city jails for the detention of offenders awaiting trial. 2. Reform schools for delinquent children under sixteen years of age who require institutional treatment. 3. Industrial reformatories for adult first offenders 350 CRIME between sixteen and thirty years of age who require institu- tional treatment. 4. Special reformatories for vagrants, inebriates, and prostitutes. 5. A hospital prison for the criminal insane. 6. County and state penitentiaries for incorrigible, hard- ened criminals. If any one of these sets of institutions is lacking in a state, it is impossible for the state to deal properly in a remedial way with the problem of crime. All these institu- tions, of course, need to be manned by experts and equipped in the best possible way. The present condition of our jails, of our penitentiaries, and to some extent of our reform schools, frequently makes them schools of crime. Nothing is more demoralizing in any community than a bad jail where criminals of all classes are herded together in idleness. Again, the administration of some of our state penitentiaries with an eye to profit only, makes them places for the deformation of character rather than for its reformation. Again, the lack of special institutions to deal with habitual vagrants, drunkards, and prostitutes, is one of the great reasons why we find it so difficult to stamp out crime. Into the details of the organization, construction, and management of these institutions we cannot go in this book. It is sufficient to say that all these institutions should furnish specialized scientific treatment for the various delinquent classes with which they deal, and to do this they should aim to reproduce the conditions and discipline of free life as far as possible. These institutions, in other words, with the exception of the penitentiaries and other institutions for segregation, CRIME 351 should aim at overcoming defective character in individuals. Their work is mainly, therefore, a work of remedying psy- chical defects in the individual which prevent his proper adjustment to society. In the case of penitentiaries, however, the work is one mainly of segregation, of pro- viding humane care under such conditions as least to bur- den society, and at the same time give such opportunity as there may be for reformation. Substitutes for Imprisonment. We have already noted that some classes of offenders may be reformed outside of prison walls. This is especially true of children, of the younger misdemeanants, and of those who have committed their first felony. It has been found that by suspending sentences in such cases, giving the person liberty upon certain conditions, and placing him under the surveillance of an officer of the court who will stand in the relation of friend and quasi-guardian to him, that reformation can, in many cases, be easily accomplished. This is known as the probation system. It has been characterized as " a reformatory without walls." Originating in Massachusetts, it has been increasingly put into practice of recent years in many states with much success. The system, however, will not work well without trained probation officers to watch over those who are given conditional liberty. The practice of placing upon probation without probation officers is a questionable one and is liable to bring in dis- repute the whole system. Probation is not mere leniency, as some suppose, but is rather a system of reformation in line with the most scientific approved methods. Coupled with probation should often go fines and res- titution to injured parties. In such cases, when the person 352 CRIME is placed upon probation, the fine or restitution may often be paid in installments, and it has been found to have a decidedly reformatory effect upon the character of the offender. Fines without probation are, however, but little more than retribution, or exemplary punishment. Delinquent Children. The treatment of delinquent, children constitutes a special problem in itself. It has recently come to be well recognized that criminal tendencies nearly always appear in childhood, and that if we can over- come these tendencies in the delinquent child, we shall largely prevent the existence of an habitual criminal class. Strictly speaking, of course, the child is a presumptive rather than a real criminal. The delinquent child is so- cially maladjusted and is scarcely ever to be considered an enemy of organized society. Delinquent children should be dealt with, therefore, as presumptive rather than as genuine criminals. In general, therefore, they should not be arrested, should not be put in jail with older offenders, and should be tried by a special court in which the judge representing the state plays the role of a parent. For the most part, delinquent children may be dealt with, as we have already seen, by putting them upon probation under the care of proper probation officers. When the home surroundings are not good, such children may often be placed in families and their reformation more easily secured than if placed in institutions. In any case, they should never be sent to the reform school except as a last resort. The parent or guardian, also, should be held responsible for the delinquency, of the child if he is con- tributory thereto by his negligence or otherwise. We may sum up this chapter, then, by repeating that CRIME 353 the problem of crime is in no way an insoluble problem in human society, though, perhaps, a certain amount of occasional and accidental crime will always exist. The solution of the problem, as we have seen, only demands that man should secure the same mastery over his social en- vironment and over human nature that he has already practically achieved over physical nature; and the gradual development of the social sciences will certainly make this possible some time in the future. SELECT REFERENCES For brief reading: LEWIS, The O/cnder, Chaps. I, II. BOIES, The Science of Penology, Chaps. VIII, IX. WINES, Punishment and Reformation, Revised Edition, 1919. For more extended reading: ASCHAFFENBURG, Crime and Its Repression. BARROWS, The Reformatory System in the United States. ELLIS, The Criminal. FERRERO, Lombroso's Criminal Man. FERRI, Criminal Sociology, trans, of 1917. FLEXNER and BALDWIN, Juvenile Courts and Probation. HEALY, The Individual Delinquent. LEESON, The Probation System. LOMBROSO, Crime, Its Causes and Remedies. MORRISON, Crime and Its Causes. PARMELEE, Criminology. TRAVIS, The Young Malefactor. Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology. Prisoners and Juvenile Delinquents in 1910, Census Bureau. CHAPTER XV SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY THERE have been many "short cuts" proposed to the solution of social problems. Among these the various schemes for reorganizing human society and industry, brought together under the general name of "socialism," have attracted most attention and deserve most serious consideration. In criticizing the most conspicuous of these schemes of social reconstruction, Marxian or "scien- tific" socialism, it should be understood at the outset that there is no intention of questioning the general aims of socialists. Those aims, as voiced by their best rep- resentatives, are in entire accord with sound science, religion, and ethics. That humanity should gain collec- tive control over the conditions of its existence is the ultimate and highest aim of all science, all education, and all government. No student of sociology doubts that human society has steadily moved, though with interrup- tions, toward a larger control over its own processes; and no sane man doubts that such collective control over the conditions of existence is desirable. These general aims, which the socialists share with all workers for humanity, are not in question. What is in question is the social philos- ophy which lies back of revolutionary socialism and also the methods by which it proposes to solve the social prob- lem. In order to criticize socialism we must see a little .354 SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY 355 more exactly what socialism is, both in the narrow and in the broader senses, and what it proposes to do. Socialism Defined. As a recent socialist writer has declared, socialism, like Christianity, is a term which has come to have no definite meaning. It is used by all sorts of people to cover all sorts of vague and indefinite schemes to improve or revolutionize society. In the broadest sense, we may define socialism as the name of a political and economic program which aims at the public ownership of all or of a majority of income-producing property. More narrowly, however, the word has been used partic- ularly to designate the program and social theories of the party founded by Karl Marx and his associates. Prior to the Great War, at least, Marx's theories dominated the socialist parties of both Continental Europe and America. Thus the theories of the Bolsheviki or Maximalist party in Russia were those of radical Marxian socialism. 1 In gen- eral, Marxian socialism seeks to solve the social problem by means of a proletarian revolution which will put the ownership of the means of production (capital) in the hands of the laborers. Other forms of socialism, more moderate in their character, would simply aim at a gradual realiza- tion of the following program: (i) the common owner- ship of the means of production (land and principal industries); (2) common management of the means of production (industry) by democratically selected author- ities; (3) distribution of the product by these common 1 Bolshevism, or the doctrines of the Bolsheviki, should of course not be confused with the Soviet government in Russia (Soviet is the Russian word for Council), which is a government by the representatives of occupational groups. 350 SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY authorities in accordance with some democratically ap- proved principle; (4) private property in incomes (con- sumption goods) to be retained. But Marxian socialism does not stop with this political and economic program, but develops a whole social philos- ophy, which has perhaps been more widely taught than any other. It is for this reason that we are concerned with it. Briefly this social philosophy advocates (i) " economic determinism," (2) the class struggle view of history, and (3) a cataclysmic theory of social evolution. The Theoretical Basis of Marxian Socialism. Marxian socialism is frequently called scientific socialism, because its followers believe that it rests upon a scientific theory of social evolution. This theory is best stated in Marx's own words, as he gives it in his Critique of Political Economy, namely, that "the method of the production of the mate- rial life determines the social, political, and spiritual life process in general." We find it stated in other words, though in substance the same, by Engels, Marx's friend and coworker. Engels says, "In every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch." In other words, according to Marx and his followers, the economic element in human society determines all other elements; if the other elements cannot be fully derived from the economic, their form and expression are at least determined by the economic. This is the so-called "materialistic conception of history" upon which Marxian socialists believe their program to SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY 357 have a firm scientific foundation. 1 The followers of Marx, indeed, declare that with this principle Marx explains social evolution quite as fully as Darwin explained organic evolution through natural selection; and they do not hesitate to compare Marx's work in the social sciences with Dar- win's work in the biological sciences. It may certainly be agreed that this social philosophy which is best characterized as "economic determinism,'' is the logically necessary foundation of Marxian socialism. If the change of the economic or industrial order of human society is going to work such wonders as the Marxists claim, then it must follow that the economic element is the fundamental and determining element in the social life. If what is wrong with human society is chiefly wrong eco- nomic conditions, then the changing of those conditions should, of course, change the whole social superstructure. It would seem, therefore, that the dominantly economic program of Marxian socialists must stand or fall with the economic interpretation of social organization and evolu- tion which Marx proposed. If it can be shown that an economic philosophy of society is essentially unsound, then the proposition to regenerate human society simply by economic reorganization is also unsound. Let us see whether the positions of the Marxian socialists are tenable in the light of the sociological principles which have been emphasized in the previous chapters of this book. 1 In several utterances of his later years Marx qualified considerably his " materialistic conception of history," but the more radical or revolutionary wing of his followers have always adhered to the extreme form of the theory. 358 SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY Criticism of Marxian Socialism. The student has already been told that human society is a complex of living organisms, responding now this way, now that, to external stimuli in the environment. These stimuli in the environ- ment we have roughly, but inaccurately, spoken of as causes, though they are not causes in a mechanical sense. The responses which are given to these stimuli by individ- uals and groups vary greatly according to heredity, in- stincts, and habits, the inner nature, in other words, of the organisms composing society. Now, the stimuli in the environment which give rise to the activities of individ- uals and societies, though not in any mechanical way, may be classified into several great groups, such as the economic, the reproductive, the political, the religious, and so on. The economic stimuli would be those that have to do with the processes of production, distribution, and con- sumption of wealth; that is, the economic stimuli are those which are concerned with economic values. Now, while the student has been barely introduced to the psychological theory of human society, he probably knows enough of in- dividual human nature to see that there is no reason in the nature of things why one's responses to economic stimuli, those connected with economic values, should determine his response to all other stimuli; and this is what scientific sociology and scientific psychology exactly find ; namely, that there is no reason for believing that economic stimuli determine in any exact way, or to any such extent as Marx thought, responses to other stimuli. It is true that our habits of response to a certain class of stimuli affect to a certain extent our habits of response to all other classes. Thus it follows that the economic phase of human soci- SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY 359 ety affects to a very great degree all other phases of human society. But this is simply the doctrine of the unity of personality and the interdependence of all phases of the social life, and it is very different from Marx's theory that the economic determines all the other phases; for under the doctrine of social interdependence we can see it is quite as reasonable to state that the religious and political phases of the social life determine the economic as it is to state that the economic determines the political and religious. Let us bring the discussion down to more concrete terms. The student has seen that in every social problem there are a multitude of factors or stimuli (causes) at work, and that in no problem is the economic factor so all important that it may be said that the other factors are simply subsidiary. On the contrary, in such a problem as crime the methods of production and distribution of material goods, while important factors in the problem of crime, in no way determine that problem; and ideal conditions of the production and distribution of wealth would in no way solve the problem of crime. So, too, the negro problem is hardly touched by the question of the forms of industry or the economic organization of society. We might go on with a whole list of social problems and show that in every case the economic factor is no more important than many other factors, and that the economic reorganization of society would in some cases scarcely affect these problems at all. The social problem, therefore, - the problem of the relations of men to one another, is not simply nor fundamentally an economic problem; rather it is fundamentally a biological and psychological problem, if you please, a moral problem. 360 SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY This brings us to a second criticism of socialism, namely, that it proposes to reorganize human society upon an economic basis, not upon a sociological basis. The program of the Marxist looks forward to the satisfaction of economic needs, but it has failed to take into account all the require- ments for social existence. It would be far more scientific to reorganize society upon the basis of the needs of the family than to reorganize it simply upon the basis of industry. The reproductive process which the Marxian socialists ignore, or leave unregulated almost entirely, is far more important for the continued existence of human society than all its economic processes, if by the repro- ductive process we mean the rearing as well as the birth of offspring; and if by the economic process we mean merely the forms and methods of the production and distribution of material goods. In other words, the Marxist program leaves the future out of account, and aims simply to satisfy the present generation with a just distribution of material goods. If it could be shown that a just distribution of material goods would insure the future of the race and of civiliza- tion, then, of course, the Marxist plea would be made good. But this is just what is doubtful. On the whole, it must be said that the Marxist program is based upon the wishes and desires of the adult, not upon the needs of the child or of the race. The extreme emphasis which Marxian socialism throws upon economic and industrial conditions in human society is, therefore, not justified by the scientific facts which we know about collective human life. Rather it must be said that this is the vital weakness of Marxian socialism, - SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY 361 that it over-emphasizes the economic element. Of course, we are not saying that control over economic conditions is not necessary to collective control over the general con- ditions of existence, which society is undoubtedly aiming at, but it is saying that conceivably collective control over the social life process might be upon some other basis than the economic. It might emphasize, for example, the health and continuity of the race, or individual moral character, far more than the distribution of economic values. Marxian socialism proposes simply to carry a step further our already predominatingly economic social or- ganization by frankly recognizing the economic as the basis of all things in the social life. A dominantly economic socialism is, therefore, rightfully judged as materialistic. It is really an expression of the industrial and commercial spirit of the present age. When the perspective of life becomes shifted again to the more important biological and spiritual elements in life, socialism will lose its dominat- ingly economic character, or it will cease to exist. It must be emphasized here that all the material and economic progress of the modern world has not added greatly to the happiness or betterment of man. It is true that material progress is important, yes, neces- sary for spiritual progress. But material progress alone does not lead to spiritual progress, and therefore mere material progress can never add anything to the real happiness and social betterment of the race. On the contrary, it is possible to conceive of a society in which every one has an economic surplus, a society rolling in wealth, approximately equally divided, and yet one in which human misery in its worst forms of vice and crime, 362 SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY pessimism and self-destruction, prevail. It is an old truth, and one which cannot be too often emphasized, that making men " better-off " does not necessarily make them " better," but the modern socialist often becomes angry when this is mentioned to him. It is therefore a matter of comparative indifference, from the standpoint of the happiness and ultimate survival of the race, whether eco- nomic goods are distributed relatively evenly in human society or not. We say comparative indifference, because, of course, no one can be indifferent to the material needs of life, inasmuch as they are the basis of its higher develop- ment. But after a certain minimum is assured it is ex- tremely doubtful whether a surplus will be of benefit or not, and this minimum necessary for the higher spiritual development of the social life can be secured through the reform of present society without trying the doubtful social revolution which the socialists advocate. A third criticism of Marxian socialism is that it stands for the internecine or conflict theory of society. The implica- tion of Marx's economic determinism is, of course, an egoistic theory of human nature. Hence if the economic interests of classes conflict, class war must result. Human history has been nothing but a series of class conflicts, ac- cording to the Marxians, and must continue to be such as long as one class controls the means of livelihood of another class. Class war can be abolished, they say, not through ethical ideals of brotherhood, but through the seizure of po- litical power by the dispossessed classes, the abolishment of classes, and equalization of economic conditions for all. This brings us to a fourth criticism of Marxian socialism, that traditionally Marxian socialism has been revolutionary SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY 363 socialism; it has looked forward to a proletarian revolution, which sJtall transfer the ownership of all capital to the working classes, as the solution of the social problem. In brief, it proposes to invoke the power of one class, the workers, over other classes to secure economic justice. Marx's own formula was "evolution through revolution." As to how this revolution is to be brought about, Marxian socialists differ. Some say through peaceful political means; others say, by force if necessary. Whether brought about peace- fully or by force, however, it is evident that if this revolu- tion were suddenly accomplished it is highly uncertain whether its results would be permanent. For all that we have learned concerning human society leads us to say that social organization at any particular time is very largely a matter of habit. Now collective habits are less easily changed than individual habits, because any change in collective habits practically necessitates the consent of all the individuals who make up the social group. Hence groups usually change their "habits," their "mores," slowly. We know also that even in individual life old habits are not easily supplanted by new ones and that there is always a tendency to revert to the old. All his- torical evidence shows that revolutions are always followed by periods of reaction, and that this reaction is usually proportionate to the extent and suddenness of change in social organization. Nor is it true that normally social evolution or develop- ment takes place through cataclysmic changes "revolu- tions." Great social changes have often come about, it is true, suddenly, but if they have been of a progressive character it has been because men have suddenly learned 364 SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY from some crisis. Progressive social changes involve learn- ing by the whole group, and normally they are brought about by public discussion, by the deliberate formation of a public opinion and of a group will. This is usually a gradual process. Profound social changes, in other words, require preparation in individual character and proceed by a series of gradual steps. The slow progress of Christianity and democracy illustrates this. When social changes are brought about suddenly by the exercise of the power of one class over other classes, the only probable result will be the collapse of the new order sooner or later because it rests upon insufficient foundations in individual character. Thus a lasting radical social reconstruction by means of revolu- tion is scarcely possible. But the great menace of Marxian socialism is its implied threat of force. The logic of Marxian socialism leads straight to revolution by force if its program cannot be realized by peaceful political means. The student can hardly fail to see the close connection between the doc- trines of Marxian socialism and the practical program of the Bolshevist party in Russia. Actual war between classes is the natural result ot such doctrines. As to revolution by force, sociology can offer but one judgment, and that is that it is the most costly method of change which a nation can employ. It is a justifiable method only when a governing class is hopelessly out of adjustment with its group, when its power is a mere survival blocking the path of progress. Revolution by force is objectionable as a method of social reconstruction because it stimulates so greatly the forces of social disorder. Russia illustrates this; but in a more urban, and so more fragile civilization like SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY 365 that of the United States, its effect would probably be even more frightful. Moreover, in a democracy, where political power is in the hands of the people, revolution by force is particularly unnecessary and objectionable as a method of change. The method of democracy is government through discussion, the formation of a public opinion, and of a group will; and this sociology finds to be the normal method of social change. The social problem is a prob- lem of right, not of might, and it can be solved only by discussion, rationality, and good will. This is the scientific method of social reconstruction, therefore, and not revolution. It is not the place in this book to take up the practical objections to Marxian and other forms of socialism. These practical objections are for the most part of a political and economic nature, and they accordingly can be better dealt with in treatises on politics and economics than in one on sociology. It is perhaps sufficient to say that the political and economic objections to socialism must be accorded not less weight in any practical view of the matter than the sociological objections. Government, for example, exists in human society to regulate, and not to carry on directly, social activities. It may carry on successfully certain industries which have been reduced to routine, which require little initiative, or which for public reasons are more conveniently conducted by the state in its various branches. But if under state socialism the state in its various branches or forms were to own and manage all productive industry, it is extremely probable that such an experiment at the present time would break down of its own weight, since the state would be attempting 366 SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY that which, in the nature of things, as the chief regu- lative institution of society, it is not fitted to do. But it is not our purpose, as has just been said, to go into the political and economic objections to Marxian or other forms of socialism. To understand these the student must consult the leading works on economic and political science. Non-Marxian Forms of Socialism. All that has been said thus far regarding socialism applies only to Marxian socialism. Brief mention must be made of other forms, though their adherents are not nearly so numerous as those of Marxian socialism. The moderate socialists, in general, repudiate economic determinism, the class struggle theory of history, the hedonistic ethics, and the revolutionary methods of Marxian socialism. This is especially true of the moderate English socialists. Such socialism, in other words, disregards the whole social philosophy which has hitherto been made more or less a part of the socialist movement, especially by the Marxians. The moderate socialists limit their socialism to the practical proposal of the ownership and control of a majority of all business by the workers or by society collectively, and the political and economic changes necessitated by such ownership. Moreover, the moderate socialists do not claim that the carrying out of their program would usher in a social mil- lennium or even solve the social problem. They claim that such economic reorganization of society is simply the most important step toward the solution of the social problem. It must be said that the sociological objections which have been urged against Marxian socialism do not apply as against this moderate type of socialism which makes itself SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY 367 sponsor for no particular social philosophy. The objections to the program of moderate socialism, in other words, are wholly of a practical nature, and therefore they fall within the realm of economic and political objections, rather than of sociological. On the other hand, more extreme forms of socialism than the Marxian type have developed within recent years. These extreme forms of socialism are known on the con- tinent of Europe, generally, as Syndicalism. Syndicalism, unlike Marxian socialism, would not rely at all upon political methods, but rather upon the use of such methods as "the general strike," and various forms of violence, such as the destruction of capital. Syndicalism aims at accomplishing its results, in other words, not by peaceful revolution, but by the use of violence, if that is necessary. The syndicalists, however, avow themselves to be socialists, and aim at the cooperative carrying on of industry by groups of workingmen. The chief representatives of Syndicalism in the United States are the Industrial Workers of the World. The Russian Bolsheviki also in some respects approximate the program of the syndicalists. Thus we see that socialism tends to divide itself into a moderate group and an extreme group, with the moderate Marxians at the present time occupying a midway position. Whether the socialists will become united in their social philosophy and in their program in the near future it is im- possible to say. At present they seem united only in their opposition to the existing order of society and in their com- mon belief in the essential doctrine of socialism, namely, the doctrine of the common ownership and management of the instruments of production. 368 SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY The Program of Scientific Social Reconstruction. Cer- tain steps sociology and the social sciences already indicate as necessary for a normal social life. These steps, however, aim not at the destruction of the existing social order, but at removing certain demonstrated causes of social malad- justment which exist in present society; and as in the solu- tion of special social problems we have seen reason to reject "short-cuts" and "cure-alls," so in a scientific reconstruc- tion of human society we have good reason to reject the social revolution which the followers of Marx advocate, and to offer as a substitute in its stead some social re- forms which will make more nearly possible a normal social life. Perhaps the necessary steps for bringing about such a normal social life have never been better summed up than by Professor Devine in his book on Misery and its Causes. Rather than offer a program of our own we shall therefore give a brief resume of the conditions which Professor Devine names as essential to normal social life, believing that these offer a program upon which all sane social workers and reformers can unite. Professor Devine names ten conditions essential to a normal social life: (1) the securing of a sound physical heredity, that is, a good birth for every child, by a rational system of eugenics ; (2) the securing of a protected childhood, which will assure the normal development of the child, and of a protected motherhood, which will assure the proper care of the child; (3) a system of education which shall be adapted to social needs, inspired by the ideals of rational living and social service; (4) the securing of freedom from prevent- able disease; (5) the elimination of professional vice and SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY 369 crime; (6) the securing of a prolonged working period for both men and women; (7) a general system of insurance against the ordinary contingencies of life which now cause poverty or dependence; (8) a liberal relief system which will meet the material needs of those who become acci- dentally dependent; (9) a minimum standard of life for all sufficiently high to insure full nourishment, reasonable recreation, proper housing, and the other elementary neces- sities of life; (10) a social religion which shall make the service of humanity the highest aim of all individuals. It is sufficient to say, in closing this chapter, that if these ten essentials of a normal social life could be realized and there is no reason why they cannot be there would be no need to try the social revolution which Marxian socialism advocates. The scientific reform of taxation is the method by which the economic inequalities of our present social order can be overcome and such a normal social lif e be made possible for all. The experience of the War points clearly to the way how to secure ample funds for the social purposes mentioned by Professor Devine. There can be no question that the ultimate aim of the social sciences is to provide society with the knowledge necessary for collective control over its own life-processes. Sociology and the special social sciences are aiming, there- fore, in an indirect way to accomplish the same thing which Marxian socialism aims at accomplishing through revolution. There would seem to be no danger in trusting science to work out this problem of collective control over the conditions of existence. There are no risks to run by the scientific method, for it proceeds experimentally, adequately testing theories by facts as it goes along. The 370 SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY thing to do, therefore, for those who wish to see "a human- ity adjusted to the requirements of its existence," is to en- courage scientific social research along all lines. With a fuller knowledge of human nature and human society it will be possible to indicate sane and safe reconstructions in the social order, so that ultimately humanity will control its social environment and its own human nature even more completely than it now controls the forces of physical nature. But the ultimate reliance in all such reconstruction, as we will try to show in the next chapter, must be, not revolution, not even legislation, but education. SELECT REFERENCES For brief reading: CROSS, The Essentials of Socialism, Chap. IV. MCDONALD, The Socialist Movement, Chap. VTI. SPARGO, Bolshevism. For more extended reading: BERNSTEIN, Evolutionary Socialism. ELY, Socialism and Social Reform. OILMAN, Socialism and the American Spirit. GUYOT, Socialistic Fallacies. HUNTER, Socialists at Work. KIRKUP, History of Socialism. SCUDDER, Socialism and Character. SPARGO, Socialism, Revised Edition. WELLS, New Worlds for Old. On Syndicalism: BROOKS, American Syndicalism. BRISSENDEN, A History of the American Bolsheviki, the I. W. W. CHAPTER XVI EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS As has just been said, &e~i$Rma,te reliance in all social reform or social reconstruction must be upon the education of the individual. Social organization can never be more complex or of a higher type than the individual character and intelligence of the members of the group permits. At any given stage of society, therefore, the intelligence and moral character of its individual members limits social organization. Only by raising the intelligence and char- acter of the individual members of society can a higher type of social life permanently result. Another fact to which the student needs his attention called is thatpll progress in human society, it follows, from what has just been said, depends upon the relation between one generation and its successor./ Only as new life comes into society is there opportunity to improve the character of that life. If at any given time intelli- gence and character limit the possibilities of social organ- ization, then it is equally manifest that only in the new individuals of society can that intelligence and character be greatly improved. There are, of course, two possible ways of bringing about such improvement: first, through the selection of the hereditary elements in society, eliminating the unfit and preserving the more fit; but, as we have repeatedly pointed 371 37 2 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS out, such a scheme of artificial selection is far in the future, and in any case its inauguration would have to depend upon the second method of improving individual character, which is through education and training. As we have --insisted, not only may the natural instincts and tendencies of individuals be greatly modified by training but through education the habits and hence the character of individuals can be controlled. Therefore the main reliance of society in all forward movements must be upon education, that is, upon artificial means of controlling the formation of char- acter and habit in individuals. The finality of education in social betterment can be, perhaps, further illustrated by Reconsidering for a moment some T)f the social problems which we have just studied. Take for example the problem of crime. There are only three possible means, as we have already seen, of elimi- nating crime from human society : first, through changes in individual human nature, brought about by biological selection, that is, through a system of selective breeding, eliminating all who show any criminal tendencies. This method would, perhaps, eliminate certain types of crimi- nals as we have already seen, namely, those m whom the hereditary tendency to crime is dominant. A second means of attacking the problem of crime would be by improving social and economic conditions by means of the inter- ference of the organized authority of society in the form of the state. Legislation and administration directed to social ends might accomplish much in reducing the temp- tations and opportunities for crime in any group. The correction of evils in social and industrial organization would, no doubt, again greatly lessen crime but it is en- EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 373 tirely conceivable, from all that we know of human nature and human society, that crime might still persist under a just social and industrial organization. Crime could be com- pletely eliminated only through a third means, namely, the careful training of each new individual in society as he came on the stage of life, so that he would be moral and law-abiding, ' respecting the rights of others and the institutions of society. Moreover, neither selective breeding nor governmental inter- ference in social conditions could accomplish very much in eliminating crime unless these were backed by a wise sys- tem of social education. Now what is true of crime is equally true of all social problems. They may be approached from either of three sides: first, from the biological side, or the side of physi- cal heredity; second, from the side of social organization, or the improvement of the social environment; third, from the side of individual character, or the psychical ad- justment of the individual to society. As Professor Ward and many other sociologists have emphasized, it is this latter side which is the most available point of attack on all social problems; for when we have secured a right attitude of the individual toward society all social problems will be more than half solved. Thus, as we said at the , beginning of this book, education has a bearing upon every social problem, and every social problem also has a bearing upon education. Just how important this recipro- cal relationship between education and social life is, we can appreciate only when we have considered somewhat more fully the nature of social progress. The Nature of Social Progress. Social progress has been defined in many ways by the social thinkers of the past. 374 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS Without entering into any formal definition of social progress, we believeJ:hat it will be evident to the reader of this book thatAocial progress consists, for one thing, in the more complete adaptation of society to the condi- tions of life. We regard those changes as progressive whether they be moral, intellectual, or material, which I bring about a better adaptation of individuals to one { another in society, and of social groups to the requirements of their existence. Social progress means, in other words, the adaptation of society to a wider and more universal i environment.^ The ideal of human progress is apparently adaptation to a perfectly universal environment, such an adaptation as shall harmonize all factors whether internal or^external, present or remote, in the life of humanity. >cial progress means, therefore, greater harmony among the members of a group. It means also greater efficiency of those members in performing their work. Finally, it means greater ability on the part of the group to survive. Social progress includes, therefore, the ideals of social har- mony, social efficiency, and social survival. Things which do not ultimately conduce to these ends can scarcely be called progressive.1 Now it is evident that adaptation on the part of indi- viduals and groups to the requirements of life may be in part accomplished by biological selection, that is, by eliminating the least adapted. But selection is, after all, a very clumsy and imperfect instrument for securing the highest type of adaptation. Again, it is evident that a cer- tain degree of adaptation can be secured through the con- straint of government and law; but only a relatively low type of adaptation can be secured in such an external EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 375 way. It is finally evident, therefore, that the highest type of adaptation in either individual or social life can be secured only by training the intelligence and moral charac- ter of individuals so that they will be sufficient to meet the requirements of existence. Another feature of social progress which we have not yet mentioned in this chapter, though we have noted it repeatedly in earlier chapters, is the increased complexity of social organization. This increased complexity is in \ part due to the mere increase in numbers. It is also due to the various processes themselves by which wider and. more universal adaptation is brought about in society. Thus, while every useful mechanical invention aids man to conquer nature, it at the same time increases the com- plexity of social life. Now in a more complex society there is more opportunity for conflicts of habit between individuals, more opportunity for social maladjustment, and therefore more opportunity for the failure of some part or all of the group in achieving a social life characterized by harmony, efficiency, and capacity for survival. Hence, the adaptation of individuals in the large and complex groups of modern civilized societies becomes a greater and greater problem. The regulative institutions of society, such as government, law, religion, and education, have to grapple with this problem of adjusting individuals to the requirements of an increasingly complex social life. No doubt religion, government, and law have a great function to perform in increasing social regulation, but they can only perform it effectively after they enlist edu- cation on their side. The Social Function of Education. We are now pre- 376 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS pared to understand the meaning of educational systems in civilized society and to see what the true function of education is. / Education exists to adapt individuals to their social lire. It is for the purpose of fitting the indi- vidual to take his place in the social group and to add something to the life of the group. Educational systems exist not to train the individual to develop his powers and capacity simply as an individual unit, but rather to fit him effectively to carry on the social life before he actively \participates in it. In other words, the social function of education is to guide and control the formation of habit and character on the part of the individual, as well as to develop his capacity and powers, so that he shall become an efficient member of society. This work is not, at least in complex civilizations like our own, one which we carry on simply in order to achieve social perfection, but it is rather something which is necessary for the survival of large and complex groups./ Otherwise, as we have pointed out, the conflicts in the acquirement of habit and char- acter on the part of individuals would be so great that there would be no possibility of their working together harmoniously in a common social life. Just so far as the system of education is defective, is insufficient to meet social needs, in so far may we expect the production of . individuals who are socially maladjusted, as shown in pauperism, defectiveness, and crime. /0r Education is, then, the great means of controlling habit V and character in complex social groups, and as such it is the chief means to which society must look for all sub- stantial social progress. It is the instrument by which x human nature may be apparently indefinitely modified, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 377 * and hence, also, the instrument by which society may be perfected. The task of social regeneration is essentially a task of education.^ Education as a Factor in Past Social Evolution. Does past social history justify these large claims for education as a factor in social development? It must be replied that the history of human society undoubtedly substantiates this position, but even if it did not, we should still have good ground for claiming that education can be such an all-powerful factor in the social future. The sociological study of past civilizations, however, shows quite con- clusively that all of them have depended in one way or another upon educational processes, not only for con- tinuity, but largely, also, for their development. As we have already seen, the life history of a culture or a civili- zation is frequently the life history of a religion. But religious beliefs, together with the moral and social beliefs, which become attached to them, were effectively trans- mitted only through the instruction of the young. The religious element did scarcely more than afford a power- ful sanction for the moral and social beliefs upon which the social organization of the past rested; hence, when we ascribe great importance to the religious factor in social evolution, we also ascribe, at the same time, great impor- tance to education, because it was essentially the edu- cational process, together with religious sanction, which made possible most of the civilizations and social progress of the past. Indeed, we have no record of any people of any very considerable culture that did not employ educational processes to the largest degree to preserve and transmit 378 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS that culture from generation to generation. Culture has been passed down in human history, therefore, essentially by educational processes. These educational processes have controlled the formation of habits and character, of ways of thinking and ways of acting, in successive gen- erations of individuals. The educational processes have had much more to do, therefore, with the civilizations and social organization of the past than industrial conditions. Industrial conditions have been rather relatively external factors in the social environment to which society has had to adapt itself more or less. In the same way, political authority has. rested on, and been derived from, the social traditions rather than the reverse. It is therefore not too much for the sociologist to say, agreeing with Thomas Davidson, that education is the last and highest method of social evolution. The lowest method of evolution was by selection, and that, as we have already emphasized, cannot be neglected. The next method of social evolu- tion apparently to develop was the method of adaptation by organized authority, and, as we have already seen, organized authority in society, or social regulation by means of authority, must indefinitely persist and perhaps increase, rather than diminish; but the latest and highest method of social evolution is not through biological selec- tion nor through the exercise of despotic authority, but through the education of the individual, so that he shall become adjusted to the social life in habits and character before he participates in it. Human society may be modified, we now see, best through modifying the nature of the individual, and the most direct method to do this is through education. EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 379 The Socialized Education of the Future. If what has been said is substantially correct, then education should become conscious of its social mission and purpose. The educator should conserve education as the chief means of social progress, and education should be directed to pro- ducing efficient members of society. The education of the future must aim, in other words, not at producing lawyers, physicians, engineers, but at producing citizens. Education for citizenship means that there must be radi- cal reconstruction in the educational processes of the pres- ent. The education of the nineteenth century aimed at developing largely power and capacity in the individual as such. Its implicit, and oftentimes its avowed, aim was individual success. The popularity of higher edu- cation in the nineteenth century especially rested upon the cult of individual success. It became, therefore, largely commercialized, and emphasized chiefly the pro- fessions and occupations which best assured the individual a successful career among a commercial and industrial people. It is needless to say that the individualistic, commer- cialized education of the latter years of the nineteenth century very often failed to produce the good citizen. On the contrary, with its ideal of individual power and success, it frequently produced the cultured freebooter, which our modern industry has so often afforded examples of. Education, instead of being a socializing agency and the chief instrument of social regeneration, became an individualizing agency dissolving the social order itself. It is this education which in part produced our present social problems. 380 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS Very slowly our educators are becoming conscious of the fact that this type of education is a social menace, and that our educational system needs reformation from bottom to top in order to become again equal to the social task imposed upon it by the more complex social con- ditions of the twentieth century. Hence the demand for a socialized education, which is proceeding, not only from sociologists and social workers, but from the progressive leaders of education itself. What the socialized education of the future should be we can outline only in its more essential and general character- istics. The curriculum is the vital thing in education, and the consideration of what sort of curriculum is demanded by the social situation, from elementary school to university, will serve better perhaps to define socialized education than a formal definition. First of all, let us recall that in man the chief organ of adaptation, both in his physical and in his social life, is the mind. The freeing of the mind, the development of its powers, and the disciplining of it to social use has been, in general, the fundamental aim of modern education; and this aim a socialized education would fully reaffirm. Only it would throw the accent upon the social purpose involved in this aim. Through the freeing of the mind, the development of its powers, and the disciplining of these to social use, a social life which is plastic, adaptable, and progressive is practically assured. Hence a socialized educa- tion means, first of all, a liberalizing and liberating educa- tion of the mind; and subjects which are especially adapted to achieve this end should receive primary consideration. Secondly, a socialized education will aim at the diffusion EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 381 of definite social information. We cannot solve our social problems without more social intelligence; and the surest way to secure social intelligence is to have more social and political education in our schools. We live in a social world more than in a world of material objects. Our chief adjustments must be made to men and to institutions, not to things. Human relationships, in other words, make or mar the world we know. They count for more in human happiness than everything else put together. We can no longer trust common sense to adjust the individual to this world of human relationships; for our civilization has be- come such a complex system of relationships that no one can play his part in it well without a very considerable amount of general and specific social information. There- fore, the study of the relationships of men to one another must be the essential element in a system of social education. Such studies as history, government, economics, ethics, and sociology must occupy a larger place in the education of the future if we are to secure a humanity adjusted to the requirements of its existence. Moreover, many new experiments are being tried through- out our civilization which depend for their success upon a general diffusion of social intelligence. Democracy is such an experiment. The attempt to establish democracy with- out providing adequate social and political education for the mass of citizens must result in disaster. If we want democracy to succeed, we must educate for democracy. It is treason to our democratic institutions to send forth from our schools young men and women who know little or nothing of the responsibility, duties, and privileges of citizens in a democracy, and of the social conditions and 382 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS ideals which are necessary for the success of democratic society. In a socialized education, then, social and polit- ical studies will occupy the most conspicuous place in the curriculum. All this implies that the older idea that education can be given regardless of content is, from the social point of view, a great mistake. Social knowledge is necessary for intelligent and efficient social service, and education should have efficiency in service as its chief end. Therefore, socio- logical knowledge in the broadest sense should be required in the education of every citizen, and particularly of those who are to become social leaders. Professor Ward has ably argued that if sufficient information of the facts, conditions, and laws of human society could be given to all, that alone would bring about in the highest degree social progress. Whether we agree or not that the mere giving of infor- mation will of itself lead to progressive or dynamic action in society, it must be admitted that right social information is indispensable for right social action. As Professor Cooley has said, "We live in a system, and to achieve right ends, or any rational ends whatever, we must learn to understand that system." Hence, the commanding place which so- ciology and the social sciences should occupy in the edu- cation of all classes. In the higher education, the social sciences should be especially emphasized, because it is those who receive higher education who become the leaders of society, and it is important, no matter what occupation or profession they may serve society in, that they understand the bearings of their work upon social welfare. They must know their duties as citizens and understand how society may best be EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 383 served. In other words, our higher education should put to the front the ideal, not of individual power and success, but of social service; and this means that, in addition to the technical or professional education which the more highly educated are given, there must be given them a sufficient knowledge of social conditions and the laws and principles of social progress to enable them to serve society rightly. Intelligent social service, we repeat, cannot exist without social knowledge. But a socialized education cannot stop with the giving of mere information regarding social facts. Its third task will be to point out and seek to inculcate social values, standards and ideals, as soon as adequate scientific knowl- edge of social facts has been ascertained on which to base scientific social standards and ideals. Thus as soon as we have ascertained the conditions and effects of such a matter as child labor, we have the knowledge on which we can base and inculcate a scientific standard regarding it. If this were not so, social education would be useless. The ap- proach to moral education must be through the social sciences. Morality cannot be taught as an abstraction. The trouble with most of the instruction in morality in our schools in the past is that it has been divorced from the facts of our social life. If we will base such instruction upon scientific social knowledge, we can as readily incul- cate ideals regarding government, law, sanitation, family life, business, and human relations generally as we can standards of vocational excellence. Socialized education means, then, moral education; for it means education into social, national, and humanitarian ideals; not simply into those ideals as they are, but as they 384 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS ought to be in the light of full knowledge regarding human relationships. It will aim, not simply at the development of the individual, but "to create social solidarity by means of a social type marked by service." It will lead directly to that consecration of life to the service of humanity which is the essence of true religion. Fourthly, socialized education will make adequate pro- vision for the vocational training of every citizen, no matter how poor he may be. To be a good citizen or to serve humanity at large, one must be usually self-supporting, must find one's work in the world, and be able to do it well. We are beginning to perceive that the service ideal of life demands that everybody in normal health be occupied at some useful work, and that in a democracy there is no place for a class of idlers. Moreover, we are also beginning to perceive that all service, all constructive labor, is of social value, and perhaps more nearly of equal social worth than we had supposed. Socialized education would of course be a failure if it did not culminate in the individual's finding his life work, his proper vocation in society. But enthusiasts in vocational education have often made one of two mistakes. First, they have often wished to vocationalize the whole educational system, or to place specialized vocational training too early in the curriculum. But specialized vocational training should come at the end of a socialized curriculum, not at its beginning; it should be its crown, not its foundation. Preceding all vocational education should come the liberation of the mind, the understanding of social facts, and the apprecia- tion of social values. The second mistake which some enthusiasts for vocational education make is that they EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 385 confuse it with socialized education in general. But voca- tionalization is only a part of the process of socialization. To mistake the part for the whole would be an unpardon- able error, for it would land us in worse difficulties than before. An efficient lawyer, or farmer, or engineer, the common experience of life shows, is not necessarily a good citizen. To think that good citizenship consists simply in vocational excellence is to misconceive the whole nature of the social life and of socialized education. Vocational education obviously can be made safe for democracy and higher civilization only by attaching it to a general pro- gram of socialized education. A large part of our grade work, our high school work, and our undergraduate work in college should therefore be kept free from vocational training. We must, however, have a system of vocational education, open even to the child of the humblest citizen, as the crown of our whole educational system ; but we must never forget that all men in a democracy are citizens first before they are members of any calling, trade, or profession. Of course, much more is involved in the socialization of education than these changes in the curriculum. The teacher, for example, must have the social point of view* and be imbued with the spirit of social service. The, teacher should realize that he is a social creator and that, at bottom, his work is nothing less than the shaping of the social future. But the attitude of the teacher goes back largely to the training he has received in the high schools, colleges, and universities. It is upon these latter that the responsibility must rest for socializing our education and making it a conscious agency of social reconstruction; for they train the teachers and the educational leaders. It 386 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS is not our purpose, however, to trace in detail all that is involved in the socialization of education, but rather merely to point out the essential marks of a socialized education and the need of it as the only basis for enduring social progress. Summary on Education and Social Reconstruction. - Social education is the foundation and essential means of all other methods of social reconstruction in a democracy. It is the distinctive method of social evolution in its higher, more conscious phases, and is the only means by which human society can perfect itself. But social education must be scientific, that is, it must diffuse knowledge "of social facts and laws and of methods by which social evils may be overcome. It must also be imbued with the hu- manitarian spirit, taking the ideal of social service as its chief end. Such social education, as a foundation for progressive policies along every line, is the only way out in our civilization. It alone can transform our "mores" into those of a higher humanitarian civilization. It will insure the development of true moral freedom in our social life ; for social science implies searching but impersonal criticism of social institutions and public policies. It will check the exaggerated individualism which hitherto, as we have seen, has been one of the most menacing tendencies of our civilization; for social education will show the sol- idarity of society and the interdependence of all its parts. Finally, it will lessen the practical materialism of modern civilization; for it will throw emphasis upon the importance of the relations of men to one another. The social sciences, aiming at the control of Social conditions and of social progress, necessarily emphasize the higher life of man, and EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 387 they therefore set before the student the goal, not of ma- terial achievement or individual success, but of the service of mankind. SELECT REFERENCES For brief reading: TODD, Tlicorics of Social Progress, Chap. XXXIII. SMITH, Educational Sociology, Chaps. I, XIV. ELLWOOD, The Social Problem, Revised Edition, Chap. VI Fur more extended reading: BAGLEY, Educational Values. BAGLEY, The Educative Process. BETTS, Social Principles of Education. DEWEY, Democracy and Education. GILLETTE, Vocational Education. KING, Education for Social Efficiency. KING, Social Aspects of Education. MORGAN, Education and Social Progress. ROBBINS, The School as a Social Institution. WARD, Applied Sociology, Chaps. VIII-XII. WARD, Dynamic Sociology, Vol. II, Chap. XIV. WHITE and HEATH, A New Basis for Social Progress. V CHAPTER XVII 1 THEORETICAL SUMMARY WE shall now try briefly to summarize the theoretical principles which have been more or less brought out in the discussions of the preceding chapters. Of course, for any adequate treatment of the principles of social organization and evolution, the student must turn to the standard texts on sociological theory. This book, however, would be incomplete without directing the student's attention, in some measure at least, to the theoretical principles implied in our concrete discussions. The Origin of Society. We have tried to show that society is something which springs from the very processes of life itself. It is not something which has been invented or planned by individuals. On the contrary, life, in its higher forms at least, could not exist without association. The processes of both nutrition and reproduction in all higher forms of life involve a necessary interdependence among organisms of the same species. From the very be- ginning of life, almost, the association of the sexes has been necessary for reproduction and for the care and rearing of offspring. Likewise, some degree of association has always been necessary for the procuring of an adequate food supply and for protection against enemies. Thus, society has grown spontaneously out of the necessities of the life-process. It has grown out of both of the fundamental phases of the life-process, the food process and the reproductive process. 1 In a brief course of study this chapter may be omitted. 388 THEORETICAL SUMMARY 389 No greater error could be made in sociology, therefore, than to assume that society is the result of the coming together of individuals developed in isolation. On the contrary, society, in the sense of a group of organisms carrying on a common life by means of mental interaction, is an expression of the original and continuing unity of the life-process of the associating organisms. While the interaction of individ- uaf organisms in its lowest phases was probably purely physical, yet it was out of such interaction that the mental interaction which we call association, or society, arose. Control over food supply necessitated association among animals because a food supply can be more easily secured by groups of cooperating individuals than by isolated individuals. Natural selection operated, therefore, from the beginning of life, in favor of groups and toward the elimination of individuals living relatively isolated. More- over, it would especially favor those groups in which the interaction between individuals was quick and sure, in other words, those in which the powers of mental inter- stimulation and response were developed. It is not an accident, therefore, that the most successful, and, in general, the higher animals, live in groups. Such collective control over the food process established primarily by natural selection becomes one of the great bases for social organization, and in humanity such associa- tion for providing food supply has given rise to society's industrial institutions. Defense against enemies has been, of course, another phase of the life-process which has favored the development of association. Really, however, this is very largely the negative side of the food process. It needs no argument to 39 THEORETICAL SUMMARY show that such defense can be much better undertaken by groups of individuals than by isolated individuals, and that natural selection, therefore, must have operated all along in this way to favor group life. However, the activities connected with nutrition have probably not played so large a part in the genesis of associa- tion as the activities connected with reproduction. The birth and care of offspring are essential phases of life, and in all but the lowest forms of life they involve the cooperation of at least two individuals. In our study of the family, we have seen how sexual reproduction and parental care gave rise to the family group. We have also seen the great part which the family group has played in producing all other forms of association. All of the great regulative and moral institutions in humanity, for example, seem to have had their origin, more or less, in the life of the family group. It is not too much to say that society, in the intimate and sympathetic sense, had its beginnings in the family, espe- cially in the relation of the child to the mother. The Origin of Human Society. We have already noticed that there are vast differences between human society and animal association. What has just been said applies to the origin of animal association in general and not specifi- cally to the origin of human society. What, then, is the origin of human society? The only reply that can be given is that it is an evolution from animal association. Despite the great differences between animal association and human society which were illustrated in discussing the contrasts between the family life of man and of brutes, the only scientific conclusion which we can reach is that human society has been developed through long ages of THEORETICAL SUMMARY 39! selection from animal association. What makes human society distinct and peculiar in itself, indeed, as we have al- ready pointed out, is the intellectual element in it. Upon the two great differences between man and the other ani- mals, articulate speech and the power of abstract thought, rest the chief differences between animal and human society. For, as we have seen, when we examine human social or- ganization carefully, we find in it the same instinctive | elements which we find in the higher animals. But, in ad- dition, we find many intellectual elements such as language, self-consciousness, morality, religion, and all the other prod- ucts of man's higher intellectual faculties. Peculiar human instincts may give human society its distinctive character to some extent, but this distinctive character is more largely attributable to man's much higher intellectual development. Nevertheless, we must not conclude that human society is in any sense an artificial and rational construction. There is every evidence that human institutions for the most part have not had a premeditated, reflective origin, but have sprung up spontaneously from the needs of life. Many, indeed, have developed down to the present time with but little premeditated guidance. Nevertheless, with the advance of social evolution, the intellectual and spiritual elements have played an increasingly important part, and there is good ground for believing that they can play a con- trolling part in the future. Human society is modifiable, then, in the same sense and in the same degree in which human nature is modifiable. While it is not a contract, as was once thought, which can be made over to suit the pleasures of the parties thereto, neither is it a machine of the gods which man cannot modify. 392 THEORETICAL SUMMARY The Process of Social Development. The process of social development is necessarily in part like that of organic evolution, in part like that of individual mental growth, since it is made up of both organically hereditary and in- dividually acquired elements. However, if we neglect that part of social development which is brought about through the working of the factors in organic evolution (variation, heredity, and selection), then the social process presents itself as a continuous adaptation and readaptation in the relations of individuals brought about by mental processes. The adjustments between individuals, as we have seen, necessarily must constantly change, not only on account of changing conditions in the environment but also because of the expansive character of life itself. Now, the adjustments or coadaptations between individuals which exist at any given time are the social order or or- ganization of that particular time and place. Such Co- adaptations between individuals give rise to persistent forms of social activities, which we may term social habits, also called by some writers " folkways." As long as such persistent social activities, crystallized into institutions of law, government, religion, morality, and industry, work well, they usually receive but little attention. Accom- panying these persistent activities, or social habits, are, of course, uniform ways of thinking and feeling in the group ; and these habits of thought and feeling, as well as habits of action, are passed along by tradition or customary imita- tion from generation to generation. Habits cannot exist in society any more than in the in- dividual without continually being modified. Groups of individuals have to continually adjust themselves to new THEORETICAL SUMMARY 393 conditions in the environment, and so the relations between individuals themselves must also change. Hence, social kl habits must change. Now these changes in the adaptation of individuals to one another and of the group to its en- vironment are brought about mainly by processes of mental interaction. That is, communication, suggestion, sym- pathy, imitation, and other forms of mental interaction t bring about uniformity of ideas, feelings, and opinions within the group, both with reference to the old conditions and with reference to the new adaptation which must be made. Hence, we see at once the great function in the social life of such processes as public criticism, discussion, the formation of public opinion, the selection of leaders and programs for action. All these processes, and so also com- munication, suggestion, and imitation in general, have manifestly reference to building up new types of adaptation between the individuals of the group, or between the group and its environment. Thus the development of our social life, so far as it is not brought about by the factors in organic evolution, is very like the process of mental growth or development in the individual. Just as in individual life there is a con- stant replacement of habits which are no longer workable, for are outgrown, so in our social life there is a continual replacement of old institutions and customs by new institu- tions and ways of living. So the process of social develop- ment is like the learning process in individuals. Just as in the individual superior adaptations can be made only by processes of attention, discrimination, the association of ideas, and judgments of value, so in the social group processes of communication, discussion, the formation of 394 THEORETICAL SUMMARY public opinion and of social values work to the same end. Moreover, as in the individual we find the highest con- sciousness in the transition from one habit to another, so in social life we also find the greatest use of mental interac- tion in the transition from one form of institution or associa- tion to another. The student can readily illustrate all this from what has been said regarding the historical development of the family, . and also from the social life of the present in which he lives, because all of our present social problems are due to the difficulties of effecting transition from one type of social adjustment to another. In discussing divorce, for example, we especially pointed out that the present disintegration and confusion in our family fife is due to the fact that the old type of family, which answered very well the needs of our forefathers, is no longer adapted to modern condi- tions, and that there is difficulty, in some classes of our population at least, in coming to an agreement regarding what shall be the new type of family. Social life thus develops largely through the continual interchange of opin- ions, ideas, and ideals as well as through the copying of activities and feelings by individuals. It is impossible in this text to go in detail into the numer- ous factors which make up the process of social develop- ment. It may be pointed out, however, that imitation manifestly comes in wherever uniform, concerted action in the group is necessary or desirable. Imitation serves to diffuse uniform activities throughout a group. Hence, the imitative tendency in man is a very great factor in- deed in the social life, because all social activity has in it this element of uniform, concerted action among individuals. THEORETICAL SUMMARY 395 Sympathy and understanding are two other closely related factors which have much to do with the social life. Sym- pathy brings about uniformity of feeling and therefore aids in securing uniformity of activity. Through sympathetic understanding individuals are able to coordinate their activities more harmoniously ; thus successful social adjust- ment depends in very great measure upon sympathy and understanding between associates, and for this reason all social groups seek to cultivate sympathy and understanding among their members. Finally, conflict is also a method of social adjustment. However, conflict of the more serious sort is relatively an abnormal thing within the group, and arises only because the members of the group have failed to adjust themselves harmoniously to one another. The Theory of Social Order. Social order differs from social organization. Social organization may refer to any condition or relation of the elements of a social group; but by social order we mean a settled and harmonious relation between the individuals or the parts of a society. The problem of social order is then the problem of har- monious adaptation among the individuals of the group; and the question arises, how do the relationships become settled and harmonious ? It is evident that all the factors which shape social organization must enter more or less into this problem of the determination of the conditions which make for settled and harmonious relationships among individuals. Social order, like social organization, therefore, will rest more or less upon the instincts and the acquired habits of the group. Harmonious relationships between individuals are furthered, of course, by certain native tendencies of individual human 396 THEORETICAL SUMMARY nature, such as the sexual and parental instincts, the gre- garious instinct, sympathy, and imitation. The acquired habits of social groups, also, whether we call them custom, tradition, usages, or folkways, make for settled and har- monious relationships between individuals. In animal groups and in the lowest human groups, social order is almost entirely an outcome of the working of instinct and habit. But in practically all human groups, except the very lowest, we find another factor working for social order, namely, regulative institutions. While a natural, spontaneous social order may be furnished by instinct, sympathy, custom, and tradition, the actual social order which we find in human groups is achieved rather by con- scious means of social control over the individual. The chief of these regulative institutions in human society are those which we group under the names of government, law, religion, morality, and education. Government and law are perhaps the oldest of the agencies consciously em- ployed to secure social control over the individual. While government probably began, as we have seen, as a means of control in time of war, more and more government has extended its control over all other phases of social activity. Some modern socialists would apparently make government absorb and direct all social activities. While such an extension of the functions of government must be regarded as unsound in theory and unwarranted in practice, yet there can be no doubt that, inasmuch as the purpose of govern- ment is to regulate, its functions are " co-extensive with human interests." Government and law, instead of being less needed in the future, will probably be more needed. The anarchistic THEORETICAL SUMMARY 397 ideal of no government is without any good scientific foundation. Nevertheless, government and law are, by themselves, relatively inadequate means of social control in very complex societies, because the control which they exert over the individual must necessarily be over gross external acts. Such social control does not go deep enough to secure a type of social order which is adequate for modern social life. Hence society needs, in order to achieve any high type of social order, not simply a well-developed governmental and legal system, but also highly developed systems of religion, morality, and education. Religion, like government, is one of the oldest means of control in human societies. As we have already seen, the religious sanction when added to institutions gives them a stability and capacity to survive such as hardly anything else does. Personal religion prevents too wide a variation in the character and conduct of individuals. So we may agree with Professor Ward in declaring religion to be " the force of social gravitation which holds the social world in its orbit." When religious beliefs decay, the social order associated with them most frequently decays also. Hence the belief that society in the future may be able to do without religion is as unwarranted as the belief that society may be able to do without government. Instead of religion becoming less necessary as society advances, it becomes more necessary for the simple reason that there is more necessity for social control in complex societies. The church, instead of being an outworn institution in human society, therefore has before it a field of social usefulness in the present larger than in any past stage of social de- velopment. One of the greatest practical needs of modern 398 THEORETICAL SUMMARY society, from the standpoint of social order, is a religion adapted to the requirements of modern life. Now, as has just been implied, religion secures its social effects chiefly by giving sanction to ethical standards and ideals. It ought not to be necessary, therefore, to argue the need of ethical standards and ideals as a means of social control in modern society. The moral, as we have seen, is nothing but the social raised to an ideal plane. Proper moral ideals in individuals and proper moral prac- tices, or virtues, of themselves, would ultimately guarantee the harmonization of relationships between individuals, for the virtues are what mainly bind men together in har- monious relationships. As we have already seen, higher types of morality are needed as societies become more complex. The simple virtues that suffice for a rural popu- lation, living under simple conditions, are found to be no longer adequate for complex, urban populations. A stable and harmonious social order cannot exist in complex groups without high character in individuals. Now, this character depends largely upon the conscious moral ideals which the individual accepts. Hence, the great importance of moral ideals in society. Of all the methods of social control, however, the education of the individual is the most effective. Human character is formed mainly in the plastic periods of childhood and adolescence. Now, education furnishes the ultimate and most subtle form of social control because it controls, as we have seen, the formation of habit and character in individ- uals. Moreover, education has this advantage over all other forms of social control, that it is best adapted to secure a progressive social order. Government, law, religion, and THEORETICAL SUMMARY 399 even moral ideals tend to become static, but education can as easily adapt itself to the higher social order which should be as to any social order which exists. An education which adapts the young to the social life before they partici- pate in it, is therefore the wisest means of social control which human societies can devise. It is evident that all these different regulative institu- tions must be developed to the highest possible efficiency in order to secure the type of social order which modern societies demand. One other factor, however, deeper even than these, must be emphasized, and that is the factor of like-mindedness in individuals which Professor Giddings has made so much of in his sociological theories. Without such like-mindedness as is furnished by likeness of instinct, habits, feelings, desires, and interests in the population, Y social order would be impossible.- But beyond this, social order demands a fundamental likeness in the beliefs, opinions, and ideals of individuals. Here comes in the whole problem of social assimilation. Now, present society is radically divided as to its ideals of life. Long ago Comte pointed out that no stability in our institutions could be assured as long as there was disagreement regarding the fundamental maxims of our social life. One of the greatest tasks of the social sciences, therefore, must be to bring men to more unanimity, more genuine unity, in their opinions regarding the meaning and ideals of life. The Theory of Social Progress. We have already dis- cussed the nature and causes of progress in the chapter on " Education and Social Progress." It is only necessary here to add a few words as to the relative importance of cer- 400 THEORETICAL SUMMARY tain factors in progress, a topic which we have more or less considered throughout this book. Accepting the general idea that we may regard those changes as progressive in society which secure a more harmonious adjustment of individuals to one another and a better adaptation of social groups to the requirements of their existence, then we have the further question, what factors determine that changes I shall be progressive rather than retrogressive in their nature, and how may these factors be controlled? This, as we have seen, is the great practical problem to which sociology leads up, and it has received many different answers from the social thinkers of the past. On the one hand we have thinkers who find the active factors in social progress exterior to the individual, and even some who find them to be entirely outside of society. According to the geographical determinists, the determining factors in human progress have been certain conditions of climate, food, and soil. This geographical theory received perhaps its fullest expression in the writings of Henry Thomas Buckle, who endeavored to show that the geograph- ical conditions in Europe alone were such as to favor the development and persistence of a high type of civilization. Later theorists of the same general school have held that the pressure of population upon food supply is what gives rise to invention, discovery, control over nature, and all the other phenomena of civilization. But progressive evolution, we need only remark, does not always take place in society when physical conditions are favorable, nor have the most favorable physical conditions prevented in the past social retrogression. We must rather regard geographi- cal conditions, not as determining factors in progress, so THEORETICAL SUMMARY 401 much as opportunities or stimuli to social progress in certain directions. Another set of thinkers have held that race, or biological conditions, are the determining factor in the progress of society. According to this theory, all the sources of social progress are given in the biological make-up of the individual. If individuals receive the right equipment by heredity, are of the right blood or breed, social progress will take care of itself. The more extreme eugenists sometimes make statements which resemble these ; but as we have already seen, the control of physical heredity can solve only a small part of our social problems. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that race, any more than geographical conditions, is a very important active factor in progressive changes in human society. Race is important, not as an active factor in progress, but as a condition of progress. The potentialities of progress must, of course, be in the stock before they can be developed ; but in human society so much comes, not by the way of physical heredity, but by the way of acquired habit and intelligent adaptation, that we must beware of laying too much stress upon the im- portance of the biological element. For example, our ances-tv tors, three thousand years ago, were probably of better I\ stock, physically, than we civilized men of to-day, yet they were also probably barbarians or savages. Social progress evidently comes more through the acquirements of individ- uals, passed on by social tradition, than from purely biological elements. The biological element at most fur- nishes merely the potentialities for social progress. We have already discussed economic determinism, or the economic theory of social progress, in criticizing Marxian 402 THEORETICAL SUMMARY socialism; also throughout the book we have emphasized the importance of economic factors as conditions and ./ stimuli to progress. Of all the factors outside of the in- dividual, economic factors are without doubt the most im- portant, in modern social life, in furthering progressive or retrogressive changes. Nevertheless, from a scientific point of view, economic conditions must be regarded like geographical and biological conditions as simply furnishing a basis for social progress, rather than as the active element in progress. In other words, even the most perfect eco- nomic conditions would be but a preliminary step to make room for the higher mental and moral adjustments which constitute true social progress. Philosophers and religious and moral teachers have for ages emphasized that the active agency in human progress is man's intellect, and that the character of human social life depends largely upon ideas and ideals. Much ridicule has been poured upon this so-called ideologic il theory of progress by the advocates of materialistic theories, such as geographical and economic determinism. But, if the in- tellect is the supreme device to control individual and social adjustment, the ideological theory still deserves serious consideration even from the most rigorous scientific stand- point. Many of the advocates of this ideological theory have, however, laid it open to serious criticism by making thought, ideas, and ideals not so much instruments of social progress, as the social reality itself. Such ideological theorists have lost sight of the concrete life of societies, nations, and civilizations, and their theories deserve to be called one-sided. We can cordially recognize the im- portance of intellectual elements, ideas, and ideals in our THEORETICAL SUMMARY 403 social life without indorsing such a purely intellectualistic view of human society. The social life of animal groups is modified but little, if at all, by intellectual elements, but almost wholly by the influence of the physical environment ; for this reason animal societies do not progress at all, or very slowly. This fact alone shows that the capacity for progress in human society rests upon man's higher intellectual development, that is, upon ideas and ideals. However, it is the interaction of man's intellect with the physical and economic environment which produces prog- ress, and not the abstract evolution of ideas. We have repeatedly insisted that the ultimate reliance in social reconstruction must be the education of the young, and Professor Ward, in his Dynamic Sociology, has demon- strated once for all that education is the initial or proxi- mate means of progress in human society. Yet education, if it is not of the right sort, can block all social progress, as we have already seen. Education itself must be controlled by certain ideas and ideals as to the meaning or purpose of our social life. Moreover, education is not so much a factor in progress as a method of progress. What, then, is the sociok gical thec -y of progress ? The sociological theory of progress mist be synthetic. Sociology finds some truth in all the one-sided theories of progress, but it regards them when taken singly as partial and inad- equate. This is not saying that all factors in social evolution, and in social progress, are of equal importance. Perhaps we may agree with Professor Dealey that race|\ economic organization, and education are the three vital! \ things in social progress, given favorable natural resources ;\ 1 U but it is certain that two of these, economic organiza- 404 THEORETICAL SUMMARY tion and education, must be guided and controlled by ideas and ideals, and could not become effective without the aid of government, law, and religion ; all of which is again equivalent to saying that any scientific theory of social progress must be synthetic. Social policy, in other words, must be broadened so as to give proper attention to all factors in the social life, and social reform movements. must be not one-sided, but broad enough to give due recog- nition to each factor of importance, if any sort of satis- factory social adjustment is to be reached. The Nature of Society. Three great historical theories of the nature of society have been more or less held by the social thinkers of the past, and are, to some extent, still held by thinkers of the present. These theories are the contract, the organic, and the psychological theories of society. Let us, finally, briefly consider these three theories of the nature of society. The contract theory of society is the view that the unity of the social life is wholly a matter of agreement or under- standing between individuals. According to this theory social organization is primarily an intellectual construction, depending upon expressed or implied agreement, explicit or implicit contract, between individuals. This theory would make the unity of the family life, for example, to consist essentially in contract. Marriage and the family would be simply relations which rest upon the agreement of individuals; so, also, all the other institutions of society. The manifest weakness of this theory as a theory of social origins has led many of its recent advocates to modify it to this extent : They say that while society and its institu- tions may not have originated in contract, they should THEORETICAL SUMMARY 405 nevertheless now rest upon the basis of contract or agree- ment. Marriage and the family, for example, may not have originated in contract, but in the future these insti- tutions should be based wholly upon contract or the mutual agreement of individuals. We have already pointed out the inadequacy of this view by showing the large part which biological elements and psychological elements other than the intellectual play in our social life. As we have seen, the foundations of society and of practically all institutions are far deeper than intellectual agreement. This has been true, not only of the social past, but it will also hold in the social future. Society is not, and in its nature cannot be, merely an intellectual construction, for it is a phase of the life-process, and in the life-process biological factors and forces are fundamental. The organic theory of society is largely a reaction from the contract theory. It is the theory that society instead of being merely a product of intellectual agreement is wholly a product of the operation of the blind forces of organic nature ; that it is a growth which has come about through the operation of biological laws. The unity of society is, therefore, according to the organic theory, in no wise differ- ent from the unity which we find in the biological organism. Society, according to this view, is essentially an organic struc- ture, subject to the general laws of organic growth and decay. This pure biological theory of society, likening it to a biological organism, has rarely been held exactly in the way just stated. Most of the writers that have adhered to the organic theory have modified it in some way. Neverthe- less, even such a writer as Herbert Spencer, who argues at length that society is an organism or a superorganism, / 406 THEORETICAL SUMMARY represents society as a sort of superhuman organic struc- ture, which we might presume to describe but hardly to control. The organic theory is still further modified by other writers till it becomes little more than a means of em- phasizing the unity and interdependence of the social life. When this is all that is meant by the organic theory, there is little to criticize in it, except that it often suggests mislead- ing analogies ; for the resemblances between society and a biological organism, which the organic theory assumes, are very far from being established. The organic theory, however, in the history of sociological thought served to emphasize that human social life is a phase of organic life in general; that in it biological processes and forces are fundamental; that the unity of society is an expression of the original and continuing unity of the life-process; and to this extent it performed an indispensable service. However, the leading sociologists of the present accept the psychological theory of society, as it is called ; that is, that the unity of the social life is a matter neither of mere intellectual agreement nor of the operation of blind forces of organic nature, but of the interaction and interdependence in function of individual minds in all their phases. As we have already said, a society is a group of individuals carrying on a collective life by means of mental interaction. Social unity is constituted by this process of reciprocal mental adaptation, not on the intellectual side alone, but equally on the sides of instinct, habit, and feeling. The social life is, then, a psychical process, not, to be sure, in the sense that it is purely subjective, but in the sense that its significant and controlling elements are mental. The psychological theory of society leaves, therefore, ample THEORETICAL SUMMARY 407 room for all other factors which must be considered, and may be held, when fully developed, to represent the synthetic or final stage in the development of psychological theory. The social life is, then, a process. It is a process of living together. In this process of living together, social groups must necessarily act as units, and so become functional unities. The psychical elements of impulse, feeling, and thought and their expressions in communication, imi- tation, suggestion, and other types of mental interaction are the necessary means by which this process of living together is carried out; so they are the vital, constituent elements of society. If societies may be styled organisms in any sense, they are, therefore, preeminently psychical or moral organisms. They must be understood, if under- stood at all, not in terms of mechanical causation, but in terms of life needs and life purposes. We said above that education itself, if it is to be pro- gressive, must be controlled by certain ideas and ideals as to the meaning or purpose of our social lif e. What, then, is its meaning? Not wholly within the individual life, for that is temporary; not in any minor group, for that is but a fragment of social life, a part of a larger whole. The mean- ing of our social life must rather be sought in the develop- ment of humanity as a whole. All the great and lasting movements of human history and of our own time have just this meaning that they are strivings for the development of a humanity all of whose elements shall be harmoniously adjusted to one another, and to the requirements of exist- ence. Accordingly, not the development of self or the dominance of any class or group, but the development of humanity, should become the real end of social endeavor. 408 THEORETICAL SUMMARY This end is alone truly synthetic and constructive, because it includes the development of the individual in accordance with the requirements of a progressive social life and the development of all classes, nations, and races who go to make up the whole of humanity. For the individual, the ideal of life becomes, according to this view, a life of service in which he shares in and strives to realize a higher life for all humanity. SELECT REFERENCES For brief reading: ELLWOOD, The Social Problem, Revised Edition, Chap. VII. ELLWOOD, Introduction to Social PsycJwlogy, Chaps. XII-XV. BLACKMAR and GILLIN, Outlines of Sociology, Bk. VII. For more extended reading: COOLEY, Social Organization. COOLEY, Social Process. ELLWOOD, Sociology in its Psychological Aspects. GIDDINGS, Principles of Sociology. GIDDINGS, Descriptive and Historical Sociology. HAYES, Introduction to Study of Sociology. HOBHOUSE, Social Evolution and Political Theory. MAC!VER, Community. KELLER, Societal Evolution. Ross, Foundations of Sociology. Ross, Social Control. TODD, Theories of Social Progress. SMALL, General Sociology. WALLAS, The Great Society. INDEX Abbott, Grace, 244. Abnormal classes, 24, 299, 302. Accidents, industrial, 200, 308, 310. Acquired traits, 40-42, 64-66, 74, .3i5,344- Active factors in association, 73, 401. Adaptation, biological, 33, 36, 58. Adaptation, social, 55, 61, 72, 74, 374, 375, 392. Adler, Felix, 91, 179. Agriculture, 139, 281, 283, 293. Altruism, 45-47, 67, 84, 126, 178. Americanization, 238-240, 267. Ancestor worship, 117, 132-136, 139. Andaman islanders, 103. Angell, J. R., 59. Animal family life, 96, 97, 98-100. Animal societies, 10, 36, 47, 389. Apes, family life of, 100, 120. Archer, W., 273. Aronovici, C., 92. Aristotle, 97. Aschaffenburg, P. F., 353. Association, n, 12, 13, 36, 37, 47, 73, 96, 388. forms of, n, 12, 76-79, no, 128. Atavism, 345. Australian aborigines, 103. Bachofen, J. J., 101, no, in, 112. Bagehot, W., 213. Bagley, W. C., 387. Bailey, W. B., 210. Baldwin, R. N., 353. Beliefs, 73, 79, 82. Bernstein, E., 370. Betts, G. H., 387. Biological conditions of social life, 16, 17, 34, 38-56, 58, 73, 93, 1 86- 210, 360, 388-392, 401. Biological point of view in sociology, 47, 55- Biology, 16, 29, 58, 246, 401. Birth rate, decrease of, 183-190, 199. causes of decrease in, 191-197. in cities, 289. Blackmar, F. W., 27, 179, 408. Bogardus, E. S., 75, 244, 407. Boies, H. M., 353. Bolshevism, 25, 355, 364, 367. Bonar, J., 210. Booth, Charles, 301. Bosanquet, Mrs. Helen, 91. Brawley, B., 273. Brissenden, P. F., 370. Brooks, J. G., 370. Buckle, H. T., 246, 400. Calhoun, A. W., 180. Capital, 355. Chapin, F. S., 56. Character, individual, 13, 43, 65, 72. Charitable institutions, 320-323. Charity, 309, 319-324. Child, influence of the, 82, 96, 97, 152, 177- Child labor, 89, 178. Child welfare, 82-90, 168, 177, 179, 203. Childlessness, 82, 152, 196. Chinese immigration, 241-243. Christianity, influence on family, 142-144. evolution of, 80, 364. Cities, growth of, 139, 160, 275-298. causes of growth in, 282-288. minor causes of, 286-288. Citizenship, education for, 25-27, 240, 379-387- City, the problem of the, 275-298. City life, social conditions of, 288- 293, 300, 337- the reconstruction of, 292-296. 409 INDEX Civilization, it, 13, 37, 65, 69, 79, 85, 108, 124, 125. modem, 145-148. Classes, social, evolution of, 49, 302. Climate and season, influence of, 71, 73, 118, 200, 306, 335. Coadaptation, social, 37, 74, 392. Commerce, 285. Commons, J. R., 215, 231, 244. Communication, 72, 75. Communities, 12, 76. Competition, 44^45, 48, 51-54- Comte, Auguste, 15. Conflict, 43-45, 48-52, 362. Congestion of population in cities, 206. Conklin, E. G., 56. Conn, H. W., 56. Consciousness, social role of, 10, 57> 59, 61, 71, 391, 392, 407. Contract theory of society, 30, 138, 145- Control, social, 361, 368-370, 376. Cooley, C. H., 75, 79, 91. Coolidge, Mrs. Mary Roberts, 245. Cooperation, 37, 45-47, 52, 84, 206, 207. Crampton, H. E., 56. Crime, 326-353, 359, 373- among foreign bom, 228, 338. among negroes, 258, 329. definition of, 326. extent of, in United States, 320- 33.2.. statistics of, 329-335. increase of, 33_3~335- cost of, in United States, 332. causes of, 335-344- influence of physical degeneracy on, 343. influence of heredity on, 344. Lombroso's theory of, 345. remedies for, 346-352. Criminals, classification of, 327-329, 347- Criminology, 326. Cross, Ira B., 370. Cultural evolution, 37, 65, 69, 80, 85- Cultural groups, n, 51, 102. Culture, defined, 13, 69. Curriculum in education, 380-385. Custom, 65, 79, 94, 101, 213. Darwin, 29, 31, 33, 56, 97, 207, 357. Darwin's theory of descent, 29-34. Davidson, Thomas, 378. Dealey, J. Q., 27, 91, 130, 180, 403. Death rate, decrease of, 185, 186- 188. causes influencing, 198-203. of negroes in United States, 260, 261. in cities, 200. De Coulanges, Fustel, 133, 144. Defects, individual, 303, 308, 310, 313, 315-316, 317-318, 343, 348. Degeneracy, in cities, 290, 291. and pauperism, 314-317. and crime, 343. Delinquent children, 330, 352. Democracy, 26, 80, 158, 165, 234, 364, 386. education for, 26, 381. Dependence. See Poverty. Dependent children, 321, 322. Depressed classes, genesis of, 302- 304- Desertion, family, 147, 312. Devine, E. T., 325, 368, 369. De Vries, Hugo, 34. Dewey, J., 387. Discussion, public, 179. Disease, 194, 205. Divorce, 135, 138, 140, 143, 147~i74- statistics of, 148-151. distribution of, in United States, 152, 153- grounds for granting, 154-157. causes of increase in, 157-166. remedies for, 169-175. Domestic arts, 85-87, 175. Dowd, Jerome, 273. Drummond, Henry, 56. Du Bois, W. E. B., 256, 273. Dugdale, R., 314, 325. Economic conditions, 19, 39, 45, 48, 50, 82, 84-90, 104, 117, 119, 120, 122, 129, 139, 141, 146, 160, INDEX 411 168, 177, 185, 188, 191, 193, 199, 203, 205-210, 215, 224, 239, 202, 283-288, 306, 337, 353- 370, 402. Economic determinism, 129, 141, 142, 209, 356-360. Economics, 18, 19, 86. Education, and social- progress, 23, 371-387, 403- as a means of social reconstruc- tion, 26, 174, 176, 240, 270-273, 347, 368, 371-387, 398, 403- of women, 89, 160, 175, 195. of the negro, 263-264, 268-273. relations of sociology to science of, 23- social function of, 375-378. as a factor in social evolution, 377, 378, 386. socialized, 175, 368, 379-386. vocational, 384, 385. Educational conditions of cities, 292. Educational system, defects in, 158, 309, 339, 379- Efficiency, social, 25, 46, 52, 382. Elberfeldt System, 320. Elimination of unfit, 34, 43, 50, 53, 302-304, 317, 340, 371. Ellis, H., 353. Elmer, M. C., 92. Ellwood, C. A., 27, 28, 56, 91, 92, 1 80, 210, 386, 408. Ely, R. T., 370. Emotions, 67, 71, 74. England, birth rate of, 187, 188. crime in, 331, 335. Epileptic, the chronic, 316-317. Ethics, 21, 22, 166, 177, 383. Eugenics, 209, 235. Evolution, definition of, 14. current meanings of, 29, 34. bearing of, upon social problems, 20-56. Spencer's theory of, 34. phases of universal, 35-37. cosmic, 35. organic, 36-46. factors in, 37-46. mental, 36. cultural, 37, 65, 69. Evolution, social, 15, 25, 36, 37, 45, 47rSS, 57, 65, 70, 72, 392-395- factors m, 38, 46, 71, 73, 74. survey of, 47-55, 392~395- bearing of, upon poverty and de- pendence, 302-304. Fairchild, H. P., 210, 244. Fairlie, J. A., 298. Family, the, 12, 46, 76-179. functions of, in social organiza- tion, 76-85, 91. the primary social institution, 77, 80, 85. the normal family, 90, 176-178. function in conserving the social order, 82, 83. as a school for socializing the in- dividual, 83. function of, in social progress, 84, 85- and industry, 85-90, 129, 160^ origin of, 93-*9- biological foundations of, 93-97. origin of, in human species, 97-103. the earliest form of, in human species, 106. the forms of, 110-130. historical development of , 131-144. influence of Christianity upon, 142-144. instability of modern, 147-179. reconstruction of, 166-179. decrease in size of, 189-197. Family life, 76-179. differences between that of man and of the brutes, 98-100. of the lower human races, 100-107. Roman, 131-140. decay of modern, 147-151, 155-166. as affecting crime, 167, 336. Fay, E. A., 315. Feeble-minded, the, 316, 317, 321, 327- Feeling, 66-68. Feminism, 158. Ferrero, G. L., 353. Ferri, E., 353. Fiske, John, 56. Flexner, B., 353. 412 INDEX Food process, 47, 108, 388. Force, limits of, 364, 365. Forms of association, 76-79. France, birth rate, 188, 199. Freedom and social evolution, 55. Freedom of speech, 179, 386. Free love, 107, 108. Friedman, E. M., 180. Functional psychology, 57. Galpin, C. J., 298. Geddes, P., 56, 109, 298. I Geographic influences, 71, 74, 118, 248, 285, 306, 335. ; George, Henry, 302. Giddings, F. H., 28, 56, 408. Gillette, J. M., 28, 91, 130, 298, 387. Gillin, J. L., 27, 179, 408. Gilman, Mrs. C. P., 159. Gilman, N. P., 370. Goddard, H. H., 325, 343. Goodsell, Miss W., 109, 144, 180. Government, 12, 17, 20, 49, 69, 74, 82, 396. defects in, 309, 338. nature of, 365, 396. Greek family, 131, 140. Groups, primary, 76-80. Groups, social, 10-12, 14, 36, 45, 48, 5, 73, 76-8o, 389. Gulick, S. L., 245. Gummere, F. B., 144. Guyot, I., 370. Habits, acquired, 37, 64-66, 79, 142, 165, 174, 372, 376, 396. social, 65, 114, 165, 392. . Hall, Prescott F., 245. Hart, A. B., 273. / Hayes, E. C., 27. Healy, W., 353. Hearn, W. E., 144. Hebrews, 121, 131, 135, 144. Hegel, G. W. F., 142. Heineman, T. W., 109. Henderson, C. R., 325. Heredity, 39-42, 81, 315, 327, 344, 346, 37i, 392, 401. racial, 235, 243, 246-248, 401. of the negro, 248-250. Heredity, and pauperism, 315, 316. and crime, 344, 345. History and sociology, 17. Hobhouse, L. T., 408. Hoffman, F. L., 260, 274. Homicide in United States, 331. Hourwich, I. A., 245. Howard, G. E., 109, 130, 144, 180. Howe, F. C., 298. Human nature, 58, 59, 62, 69, 73, 107, 313- Hunter, Robert, 325, 370. Huxley, T. H., 46. Ideals, sources of, 70, 79, 80, 85, 90. importance of, 85, 174, 383. Illiteracy, of immigrants, 226-228, 236. of negroes, 263. and crime, 338. Imitation, 63, 73, 140, 142, 214, 339, 394- Immigration, problem of, 211-245. history of, into United States, 214- 217. changed character of, 217, 218. distribution of, 218-224. social effects of, 224-229, 239. into other countries, 230. restrictions on, 231-236, 238. measures for Americanization, 238- 240. Asiatic, 240-244. Imprisonment, substitutes for, 351. Impulses, native, 61-64, 74- Indians, North American, 102, 103, 110-113, 6. Individual, the, 13, 23, 42, 48, 78, 146, 207, 308, 313, 317. and society, 13, 73, 213, 371. Individualism, 48, 145, 148, 158, 331, 386. Industrial conditions, among the negroes, 262. and poverty, 306-308. and crime, 337. Industrialism, 146, 148, 160, 279. Industry, 13, 18, 44, 51, 85, 108, 140, 146. INDEX 413 Industry, and the family, 85-90, 129, 146, 1 60. pastoral, 116. centralization of, 284. See also Economic conditions. Infant mortality, 202. Insane, the, 317, 321, 343, 344. Instincts, human, 61-64, 97> IO 7> 2 47- Institution, definition of, 65, 77. Institutions, bases of human, 63, 65, 72, 84, 107, 165. Intellect, 68-71, 391. Intelligence, 36, 61, 68, 70, 382. Interaction, mental, 10, 36, 57, 72, 389, 393,.407- Intercommunication, 72, 75, 393, 407. Insurance, social, 369. Intemperance, as cause of poverty, and crime, 342. Invention, 20, 69, 73. James, W., 75. Japanese immigration, 241, 244. Jenks, J. W., 245. Johnston, Sir H., 276. Jukes family, 314, 344. Juvenile court, 177, 352. Kallikak family, 314, 343, 344. Keller, A. G., 181. Kelley, Mrs. Florence, 91. Kellogg, V. L., 56. Kelsey, Carl, 56, 210. Key, Miss Ellen, 159. King, Irving, 387. Kirkup, T., 370. Labor, 86-90. of children, 89, 178, 307. of women, 88, 160. Lacassagne, 341. Language, 51, 69, 79, 82, 391. Lauck, W. J., 245. Law, relations to sociology, 21. nature of, 21, 325, 396. criminal, 329, 338. Laws, social, 13, 209, 210. Leadership, social, 166, 179, 382, 393. Lecky, W. E. H., 144. Leeson, Cecil, 353. Letourneau, C., 109. Lewis, B. G., 353. Lichtenberger, J. P., 179. Literacy test, 236. Lombroso, 343, 345, 353. Love, sexual and parental, 63, 84, 97, 390. Lubbock, J., 102. McCurdy, J. F., 144. McDonald, J. R., 370. McDougall, W., 75. McLennan, J. R., 101, 130. Maclver, R. M., 408. MacLean, Miss A. M., 91. Maladjustment, social, 14, 24, 304, 327, 378. Malthus, T. R., 39, 204, 302. Malthus, theory of population, 205- 208. Man, fossil remains of, 33. social instincts of, 37, 46, 63. Mangold, G. B., 210, 325. Marett, R. R., 56. Marriage, 102, 103, 118-129, *34> 138, 143, 149, 169, 173, 175, 201, 316. ceremony, 99, 134. forms of, 118-129. higher age of, 162. Marx, Karl, 141, 142, 302, 355, 357, 358,359; Marxian socialism, theoretical basis of, 356, 357- criticism of, 358-365. Mass as a social factor, 181-184. Materialistic conception of history, 356. Maternal family, 110-115. Matriarchy, 101, 110-113. Mayo-Smith, R., 201, 210, 245. Mendelian inheritance, 40, 41, 318. Merriam, G. S., 274. Migration, causes of, 211, 212. as factor in social evolution, 212- 214. Miller, K., 274. Millis, H. A., 245. Mind, function of, 58-61. 414 INDEX Mind, social character of, 71-72. Mohammedan peoples, 121. Monogamy, 97, 100, 102, 103, 106, 118, 125-128, 147. Morality, 12, 22, 50, 54, 69, 70, 79, 82,383,398. Mores, the, 65, 174, 177, 179, 298. Morgan, A., 387. Morgan, L. H., 101, 109, no, 113. Mormans of Utah, 121, 124. Morrison, W. D., 353. Multiplication, 38. Municipal socialism, 294-296. Murphy, E. G., 274. Mutation, 34, 43. Native impulses, 61-64. Nature of society, 10, 30, 391, 404. Nature peoples, 103, 266. Nearing, S., 325. Negritos, of Philippine Islands, 103. Negro, racial heredity, 246-250. influence of slavery on, 250. statistics of, in United States, 251- 265. increase of, 252-253, 261. social condition of, 255-260. industrial condition of, 262. political condition of, 263. proposed solutions of problem, 263-273. Neo-Malthusianism, 209. Newman, Dr., 203. Newsholme, A., 210. Normal social life, 14, 24, 91, 177, 368. Order, social, 83, 395~399- Organic theory of society, 405. Organization, social, 14, 49, 63, 65, 78, 107, 371, 379, 389, 395. Origin of the family, 93-108. of government, 49. of races, 248. of society, 47, 388-391. Osborn, H. F., 56. Page, T. N., 274. Parental care, 95-97, 126. Parental instinct, 97-107. Parmelee, Maurice, 353. Parsons, Mrs. E. C., 130. Pastoral industry, 116-117. Paternal family, 115-118. Patriarchal family, 115-117, 132- 135, 137, H3- Pauperism, definition of, 299. and degeneracy, 314. Penology, 326, 346. Philanthropy, scienti6c, 24, 316. Philosophy of history, 18. Philosophy of socialism, 356. Political science, 20. Polyandry, 118-120. Polygamy, 120. Polygyny, 120-125, 135- Popenoe and Johnson, 273. Population, growth of, 181-210. distribution of, 278-281. Post, L. F., 102. Poverty, definition of, 299. among foreign born, 229. and pauperism, 299-325. extent of, in United States, 300- 301. causes of, 305-314. remedies for, 316. Press, as an educational agency, 179, 237, 339. influence of, on crime, 339. Preventive agencies, 313. Primary groups, 12, 77-80, 91. Prison statistics, 329-330. Prison system, 349-351. Probation, 351. Progress, social, 44, 84, 361, 371- 387, 399-44- Promiscuity, theory of primitive, 97, 101-106. objections to theory of, 104-106. Property, private, 77, 82. Psychology, relations of sociology to, 16. bearing upon social problems, 57- 74- theory of human society, 358. Public charity, 319-323. Public discussion, 179, 364, 365, 393. Public opinion, 174, 179, 237, 364, 365, 393- INDEX 415 Race as a factor in social evolution, 246. Races, intermixture of, 255-257. Rapid transit, 296. Rationality, 69-71. Reconstruction, social, 25, 26, 64, 71, 91, 107, 166, 175, 178, 209, 236, 265, 293, 364, 365, 368, 371, 379-386. of the family, 166-179. of population policy, 209. of immigration policy, 236-245. of negro policy, 265-273. of our city life, 293-298. of education, 379-387. Reformation of criminals, 348, 350- 352- Registration area, 290. Religion, 117, 123, 127, 139, 141, 157, 292, 369. Religious conditions of cities, 292. Reproduction, 38, 81, 96, 108, 181, 360. Restriction of immigration, 231-238. Reuter, E. B., 256, 273. Revolution as means of social recon- struction, 355, 363-365, 368, 369- Richmond, Miss Mary E., 325. Robbins, C. L., 387. Roberts, P., 245. Roman family, 131-144. Romans, 103. Ross, E. A., 27, 75, 408. Rowe, H. K., 91. Rowe, L. S., 298. Rowntree, B. S., 301, 325. Rural problems, 281-282. Saleeby, C. W., 387. Schaeffer, H., 144. Schmidt, 144. Schopenhauer, Arthur, 125. Science, purpose of, 27, 369. Scudder, Miss V., 370. Selection, artificial, 33, 53, 234-238, 371,372. natural, 33, 36, 53, 55, 261, 304, 378. Sex, 93-95, 201,341. Sexes, differences between, 94, 95, 341- numerical equality of, 95, 121, 125, 130, 225. Slavery, 49, 115, 120, 122. Small, A. W., 28, 408. Smith, W. B., 274, 325. Smith, W. R., 92. Social, meaning of term, 12. Social causes, 115, 129, 140, 142, . 197, 313, 34, 358. Social change, 14, no, 140-142, 146, 392-395. Social development, process of, 392. Social dynamics, 16. Social evolution. See Evolution. Social instincts, 37, 46, 63. Social life, 10, 12, 13, 37, 63, 77, 78, 79, 81, 92, 388, 393. Social order, theory of, 395-399. Social organization, 14, 49, 63, 65, 78, 107, 371, 379, 389, 395. Social patterns, 80, 85, 9-1. Social phenomena, defined, 12. Social problem, denned, 91, 168, 359, 365- Social progress, 44, 84, 361, 371-387. . 399-44- Social reconstruction, 25, 26, 64, 71, 91, 107, 166, 175, 178, 209, 236, 265, 293, 364, 365, 368, 371, 379- .386. Social research, 369. Social retrogression, 15, 85, 138, 198, 364, 376, 400. Social science, 17, 22, 27, 382. Social service, 83, 84, 273, 382-385. Social statics, 15. Social surveys, 5, 92. Social values, 19, 78, 82, 85, 383, 393. Social work, 24, 368. Socialism, relations to sociology, 24- 26. in the light of sociology, 354-370. theoretical basis of, 356. criticisms of, 358. substitute for, 368-369. Socialization, 79, 83, 233, 379-386. of education, 379-386. Society, definition of, 9-13. 4i6 INDEX Society, the study of, 9-27. products or phases of, 12-13. origin of, 388-391. nature of, 404-408. Sociology, definition of, 13-14. faulty conception, 14. problems of, 15, 16. statical, 15. dynamical, 16. relations to other sciences, 16-24. to biology, 1 6. to psychology, 16. to history, 17. to economics, 18, 19. to politics, 20. to law, 21. to ethics, 21, 22. to education, 23. to philanthropy, 24. to social reconstruction, 25-27. to socialism, 25-26. and social practice, 23-27. bibliography of, 27, 28. applied, 316. Spargo, J., 370. Spencer, Herbert, 28, 34, 102, 109, 207. Spencer's theory of universal evolu- tion, 34, 35. Standards of living, 161, 192. Starcke, C. N., 109. Steiner, E. A., 245. Stone, A. H., 274. Struggle for existence, 43-45, 47- 48, 51. 33- Survival, social, 37, 46, 51, 105, 107, 108, 187, 202, 374, 376. Thomas, W. I., 109. Thompson, W., 210. Thomson, J. A., 56. Thorndike, E. I.., 75. Tibet, ti8, 119. Todd, A. J., 180, 387. Towne, E. T., 92. Trade, 285. Tradition, social, 66, 79, 82, 213. Travis, T., 353. Trotter, W., 75. Turkey, 121. Uniform divorce and marriage law, 169. Urban population, distribution of, 279-281. Variation, 33, 42, no, 303, 327, 340. Veddahs, 103. Vice, 138, 140, 141, 155, 194, 256, 259,3ii,3i4,345- Vital statistics, 185-186, 189, 190. of negro, 260. Vocational education, 384, 385. Vogt, P., 298. Wages, 87, 177, 192, 232, 302, 369. Wake, 1 20. Wallace, A. R., 33. Wallas, Graham, 75, 408. War, 48-51, 115, 199. War, the Great, 25, 183, 188, 199, 23 1 , 236, 355, 369. Ward, Lester F., 28, 373, 382, 387, 397, 43- Warne, F. J., 244, 245. Warner, A., 325. Washington, Booker T., 256, 263, 267, 274. Weber, A. F., 297, 298. Weismann, 40, 315. Wells, H. G., 370. Westermarck, 100, 103, 105, 109, 130. White and Heath, 387. Wife capture, 115, 116, 122. Wife purchase, 116. Wilcox, D. F., 298. Willcox, W. F., 148, 151, 180. Wilson, W. H., 298. Wines, F. H., 353. Woman, position of, 112, 115, 120, 124, 136, 138, 158, 159. Woman's movement, 158, 159, 195. Zueblin, C., 298. Zuni Indians, 112. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY This book is DUE on the last date stamped below FormL-9 lOm-S, '39(7752) DC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY A 000 529 098 6 HM51 E47s 1919 \NCH, LIFORNIA, ALIF.