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 INDIAN 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL 
 
 REFORM 
 
 VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY 
 
 BY 
 
 VINCENT A. SMITH 
 
 C.I.E. ; M.A. ; HON. LiTT.D. (DUEL.); I.C.S. RETD. 
 
 AUTHOR OF ' THE EARLY HISTOHY OF INDIA ', ' THE OXFORD 
 HISTORY OF INDIA ', ETC. 
 
 Price Three Shillings and Sixpence net 
 
 HUMPHREY MILFORD 
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK 
 
 TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPE TOWN BOMBAY 
 
 1919
 
 INDIAN 
 CONSTITUTIONAL 
 
 VIEWED IX THE LIGHT OF HISTORY 
 
 BY 
 
 VINCENT A. SMITH 
 
 C.I.E. ; M.A. ; Ho*. Lirr.D. (DuBL.); I.C.S. RETD. 
 
 AUTHOR OF ' THE EARLY HISTORY OF INDIA ', ' THE OXFORD 
 HISTORY OF INDIA ', ETC. 
 
 HUMPHREY MILFORD 
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK 
 
 TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPE TOWN BOMBAY 
 
 1919
 
 PRINTED AT OXFORD, ENGLAND 
 
 BY FREDERICK HALL 
 PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
 
 PKEFACE 
 
 THE authors of the Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms 
 (1918) insist that ' full and public discussion is necessary 7 . 
 and ask that their proposals may be allowed to ' benefit by 
 reasoned criticism both in England and India, official and 
 non-official alike '. That comprehensive invitation dis- 
 penses with the necessity of apology for intervention in 
 the discussion by any person equipped to a reasonable 
 degree with qualifications entitling him to form and express 
 an opinion on the subject. My official experience during 
 twenty-nine years in revenue, ' settlement '. executive, 
 judicial, and administrative duties gives me some title 
 to deal with the question of reform from the point of 
 view of an officer who has had in his time practical know- 
 ledge of the working of the government machine. The 
 study of Indian history in all its branches for almost half 
 a century entitles me to speak with some authority con- 
 cerning the historical background which lies behind the 
 stage on which the drama of present-day politics is played. 
 It is simply impossible to understand modern India even 
 tolerably well without a moderate acquaintance with the 
 past in which the roots of the present are so deeply buried. 
 The authors of the Eeport, in their haste to give India the 
 benefit of up-to-date democratic formulae, have shown little 
 regard to the lessons of history. The defects of the Keport 
 in that respect, which have been noticed by several critics, 
 forced themselves upon my attention, and I could not help 
 
 A2 
 
 2004974
 
 4 PREFACE 
 
 feeling that my special knowledge might possibly be of 
 service if placed at the disposal of readers interested in the 
 reform problem, while unskilled in that unpopular subject, 
 Indian History. My inclination would lead me to continue 
 my life-long studies and to avoid the muddy waters of 
 current politics. But India has done much for me, and now, 
 before my working days come to an end, I should like to do 
 something for India, by contributing my mite towards the 
 solution of the dangerous problem which Parliament must 
 solve one way or another without long delay. It is un- 
 necessary to dilate upon the dangers of the experiments 
 advocated by the Secretary of State, the Viceroy, and many 
 reformers of less note. The rather lurid language of the 
 Report about the ' disaster ' and ' misery ' which will follow 
 on the failure of their plans is even stronger than any 
 words I should care to use. It is evident that their con- 
 fidence' lacks robustness. Perhaps Mr. J. A. R. Marriott, 
 M.P., may not be altogether wrong when he calls the 
 scheme of the Report ' a Gargantuan gamble '. If there be 
 any truth in that view, which is not inconsistent with the 
 rhetoric of the authors, it is permissible to remark that the 
 Indian Empire is a large stake to play with. 
 
 It is wrong to suppose that the Report ' holds the field ', 
 and that the issue is ' the Report or nothing '. That view 
 is wholly erroneous, as will be apparent to anybody who has 
 read, as I have done, the numerous books by H.H. the Aga 
 Khan. Mr. Vyasa Rao, and other authors, not to speak of the 
 multitude of speeches, articles, and pamphlets pouring con- 
 tinually from the press. 1 The Report omits much that 
 needs consideration and includes much that could be spared. 
 
 1 A very useful work for reference is Indian Constitutional Documents 
 (1600-1918"), by Pancbanandan Das Mukherji, 2nd ed., vol.i, 803 pages, 
 vol. ii, 100 pages : Thacker, Spink & Co., Calcutta, 1918 ; price 13 rupees.
 
 Kecent events, and above all the Great War, fraught as 
 it is with incalculable consequences, render a change in the 
 method of governing India imperative. That cardinal fact 
 is acknowledged by me quite as heartily and sincerely as it 
 is by Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford. But I do not feel 
 bound to admire the whole of their work or to accept their 
 principles without demur. These principles, on the contrary, 
 demand the most searching scrutiny and, in my personal 
 opinion, are largely erroneous. I agree that ' self-govern- 
 ment ' and the increased employment of Indians in the 
 public service, as stated in the ' Pronouncement ', are objects 
 not only desirable, but attainable within certain limits. 
 The emphasis laid upon those limits in this essay is imposed 
 by the historical method of treatment and should not be 
 misunderstood. It does not imply hostility to reasonable, 
 practical reforms. I say frankly that I think it is a mistake 
 to seek the distant 'goal of responsible government' at 
 present. The premature chase after 'responsible govern- 
 ment ' is the cause of nearly all the illogical and contradic- 
 tory recommendations of the Keport, as its authors confess 
 in paragraph 354. If they had postponed the consideration 
 of ' responsible government ' to a more convenient season 
 they would have done much better. They have run to some 
 extent ahead of the ' Pronouncement ' which they profess 
 to follow. ' Responsible government ' in the English parlia- 
 mentary sense may or may not be a suitable ' goal ' for Indian 
 politicians, but, however that may be, it is better left alone 
 just now. Even without it the reformers have plenty to do. 
 
 Chapters 3 and 4 of this essay treat faithfully and candidly 
 of certain disagreeable, inconvenient facts, which are shirked 
 or slurred over by the authors of the Report. It is no use 
 to pretend blindness to awkward realities which are not
 
 6 PEEFACE 
 
 affected by the pretending. Only the truth can make us 
 free. . The excessive optimism of the Secretary of State and 
 the Viceroy, as illustrated by the quotations in Chapter 5, is 
 not justified by the realities of the situation. 
 
 In the concluding chapter I have attempted to indicate 
 methods by which genuine, useful reforms seem to be 
 attainable. 
 
 My whole adult life for fifty years has been dedicated 
 to India, and the sole purpose of this little book is to offer 
 some help, however small, to the persons, especially the 
 members of both Houses of Parliament, who are responsible 
 for the final decision which concerns India so deeply, and 
 England also. I do not very much care whether particular 
 suggestions are accepted or not. The essential thing is that 
 the whole of the facts, agreeable or disagreeable, convenient 
 or inconvenient, should be faced squarely, and that the 
 decision should be based upon truth, not upon illusion. 
 The 'Maya', which 'sends forth an imaged world, just 
 as a magician produces illusive effects', permeates the 
 Keport. 
 
 V. A. S. 
 
 OXFORD, Dec. 18, 1918.
 
 I. 
 
 ' That sound public opinion, which it is so essential to 
 carry along with every branch of our free government, has been 
 very partially exercised with regard to Indian affairs. The 
 problem of the best mode of governing that country is so 
 difficult to be solved, the interests affected by it so remote and 
 complicated, that few have given it any deep attention ' (Sir John 
 Malcolm, The Political Histoiy of India, 1826, vol. ii, p. 114). 
 
 II. 
 
 ' Hitherto they [scil. " the voiceless millions of India "] have 
 regarded the official as their representative in the councils of 
 government ; and now we have to tear up their faith by the roots, 
 to teach them that in future they must bring their troubles to the 
 notice of an elected representative further, that they have the 
 power to compel his attention. We have to bring about 
 the most radical revolution in the people's traditional ideas 
 of the relation between ruler and ruled, and it will be 
 a difficult and even dangerous business, for it is neither safe 
 nor easy to meddle with traditional ideas in India. Unless 
 the political changes now in contemplation are accompanied by 
 an educational campaign directed to awaking in all classes alike, 
 but especially in this particular class, a sense of citizenship, 
 disaster will certainly result ' (from an official report quoted 
 without dissent in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, paragraph 137, 
 p. 113). 
 
 III. 
 
 ' It would be a disaster for India to be forced into the 
 narrow form of constitutionalism that developed, with its 
 essential condition of two great rival parties, in England 
 through historical and natural causes, but is now confessedly in 
 need of reform. . . . Constitutional government has succeeded 
 only where it has been cast in a form natural to the history 
 and development of the people. . . . Why should India be
 
 8 
 
 forced to imitate a system of government evolved through many 
 centuries in a geographically small country with two historical 
 parties? . . . We want self-government, we want responsible 
 government in the widest sense of the term that of ultimate 
 responsibility to the people but we do not want our nascent 
 national institutions to be put into swaddling clothes, 
 be cause one word [scil. "responsible"] instead of another 
 [sell, "self-"] was chosen by the British "War Cabinet for 
 its public declaration ' (His Highness the Aga Khan, India in 
 Transition: Philip Lee Warner, London, 1918, pp. 165, 166). 
 
 N.B. The thick type is not in the originals.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 1. THE GENESIS AND AUTHORITY OF THE 'PRONOUNCE- 
 
 MENT' OF AUGUST 20, 1917 .... 11 
 
 2. THE HISTORICAL INDIAN IDEAL OF GOVERNMENT . 18 
 
 3. DIVERSITY AND CONFLICTS OF RACES AND RELIGIONS 25 
 
 4. CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES . ... .33 
 
 5. ' VAIN VISIONS ' 48 
 
 6. THE PROPOSALS OF THE REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
 FROM OTHER SOURCES ..... 57 
 
 7. CRITICISM 78 
 
 8. CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 92 
 
 INDEX . .115
 
 CHAPTER 1 
 
 THE GENESIS AND AUTHORITY OF THE 
 4 PRONOUNCEMENT' OF AUGUST 20, 1917 
 
 Need of discussion. The authors of the Report on Indian 
 Constitutional Eefonn (1918), cited as ' the Report ', declare 
 that iu a matter of so great intricacy and importance it is 
 obvious tli at full and public discussion is necessary '. That 
 declaration, which looks so frank, appears from various 
 indications to be really subject in the minds of its authors 
 to the limitation that the discussion should be restricted to 
 details, while the main theorems of the document should 
 not be disputed. The Report purports to set forth a highly 
 complicated plan devised in pursuance of the ' pronounce- 
 ment ' of August 20, 1917, to which a sort of sacrosanct 
 character is ascribed by Mr. Montagu. His unusual and 
 rather unconstitutional procedure actually has succeeded in 
 giving his utterance an importance beyond its intrinsic 
 merits. 
 
 Flan of tnis essay. It will be convenient in the first 
 place to reprint the text of the ' pronouncement ' ; next, to 
 examine the story of its genesis, so far as revealed, and 
 then to discuss the extent to which the promises made by 
 His Majesty's Government on August 20. 1917, are binding 
 on succeeding Governments, on Parliament, or on the nation. 
 The consideration of those matters involves the question of 
 the interpretation of the pledge given by the War Cabinet. 
 When those preliminary discussions have been disposed of 
 in this chapter, the next three chapters will be devoted to 
 the frank historical statement of certain Indian peculiarities
 
 12 GENESIS AND AUTHORITY OF THE 
 
 which condition all possible reforms. The fifth chapter 
 collects certain rhetorical passages in the Eeport which 
 are in most obvious conflict with realities. The sixth 
 chapter gives a summary of the concrete proposals put forth 
 by the authors of the Keport and other writers. That 
 summary is followed by a critical discussion, and the essay 
 is concluded by an attempt to assemble various constructive 
 suggestions which seem to be practicable. 
 
 The ' Pronouncement '. The text of the ' pronounce- 
 ment' of August 20, 1917, is : 
 
 ' The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which 
 the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of 
 increasing the association of Indians in every branch of the 
 administration and the gradual development of self-governing 
 institutions with a view to the progressive realization of 
 responsible government in India, as an integral part of the 
 British Empire. 
 
 ' They have decided that substantial steps in this direction 
 should be taken as soon as possible, and that it is of the 
 highest importance, as a preliminary to considering what 
 these steps should be, that there should be a free and 
 informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at 
 Home and in India. His Majesty's Government have accord- 
 ingly decided, with His Majesty's approval, that I should 
 accept the Viceroy's invitation to proceed to India to discuss 
 these matters with the Viceroy and the Government of 
 India, to consider with the Viceroy the views of Local Govern- 
 ments, and to receive the suggestions of representative 
 bodies and others. I would add that progress in this policy 
 can only be achieved by successive stages. The British 
 Government and the Government of India, on whom the 
 responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the 
 Indian peoples, must be judges of the time and measure of 
 each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation 
 received from those upon whom new opportunities of Service 
 will thus be conferred and by the extent to which it is found 
 that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility. 
 Ample opportunity will be afforded for the public discussion 
 of the proposals, which will be submitted in due course to 
 Parliament.'
 
 'PRONOUNCEMENT' OF AUGUST 20, 1917 13 
 
 Its origin. We cannot expect to obtain access to the 
 recent confidential correspondence between the Government 
 of India and the Secretary of State. Failing that, we must 
 fall back upon the authoritative statement made by Lord 
 Curzon of Kedleston in the House of Lords on October 24, 
 1918. His lordship explained the genesis of the ' pronounce- 
 ment ' in these words, according to the report in The Times : 
 
 'That announcement was the result of prolonged corre 
 spondence with the Government of India, of close and 
 repeated examination at home, and of an amount of labour 
 which must have rarely been expended upon a public 
 announcement. I imagine that as much care was devoted 
 to the declaration, perhaps more than to the famous declara- 
 tion of Her Majesty Queen Victoria in 1858 a declaration 
 which, if I remember rightly, was framed by Lord Derby 
 and corrected and amended by Her Majesty's own hand. 
 
 ' Without claiming for a moment that this announcement 
 was therefore invested with a pontifical character, it had 
 a seriousness and intended weight which your lordships 
 would not dispute. 
 
 ' Lord Crewe has said that the declaration no doubt 
 sprang from the circumstances of the war. I can quite 
 believe that had the war not occurred the declaration would 
 not have been made either in that particular form or at that 
 particular time. The war has altered the whole atmosphere 
 of life, and it is inconceivable that it should have passed 
 through its tragic course without leaving much more than 
 a ripple upon the surface of the Indian nation and without 
 stirring its depths.' 
 
 Lord Curzon's exposition is elucidated by a passage in the 
 Report (paragraph 287), which records that 
 
 meanwhile the difficulties of administration in India 
 were rapidly increasing. Lord Chelmsford's Government 
 felt that without the declaration of policy for which they 
 were pressing, it was impossible for them to act effectively 
 on a directed course. The announcement of August 20 
 cleared the situation, and was hailed with almost as much 
 relief by the authorities as satisfaction by the politicians.' 
 
 The matter has been carried somewhat further by the
 
 14 GENESIS AND AUTHOEITY OF THE 
 
 joint declaration of the Prime Minister and Mr. Bonur Law 
 published on November 22, 1918, that 
 
 ' the Cabinet has already defined in unmistakable language 
 the goal of British policy in India to be the development of 
 responsible government by gradual stages. To the general 
 terms of that declaration we adhere and propose to give 
 effect.' 
 
 That ministerial announcement did not interest the 
 constituencies or influence the tenure of a single seat at the 
 election held on December 14, 1918. 
 
 By putting together all the official statements we learn 
 that the ' pronouncement ' originated in the administrative 
 difficulties of the Government of India during the war ; 
 that it was intended to afford ' satisfaction to the'politicians ' ; 
 that its phraseology was decided after prolonged corre- 
 spondence with India and repeated consultations in London : 
 that the substance of the declaration, although not invested 
 with a 'pontifical character', is a serious programme of 
 Cabinet policy, accepted in its ' general terms ' ; and that the 
 Cabinet now in office, which is likely to remain in power, 
 intends to give effect to its declared policy. Lord Curzon's 
 language, while somewhat modifying Mr. Montagu's rhe- 
 toric, cannot have much effect in sobering the extravagant 
 hopes raised by previous overstatement of the intentions and 
 aims of the Government. The terms ' self-government ' and 
 ' responsible government ' were not defined in the course of 
 the debate in the House of Lords. Their meaning will be 
 analysed in Chapter 7 of this essay. 
 
 Mode of enunciation. The ' pronouncement ', which the 
 Secretary of State describes in grandiose style as ' the most 
 momentous utterance ever made in India's chequered 
 history ', was given to the world in a curiousty unpretentious 
 way, as if its authors desired to avoid notice. Some private 
 member asked a question about Mr. Montagu's intended 
 tour, and received in answer 'the most momentous utter-
 
 'PRONOUNCEMENT' OF AUGUST 20, 1917 15 
 
 ance '. At that time the House of Commons was tired, the 
 session was drawing to a close, and the minds of all men 
 were absorbed in the war. The statement aroused no 
 interest in the British public, and remained practically un- 
 noticed in England. If such hiding of the light was 
 intentional, the device succeeded completely. The reception 
 of the ' pronouncement ' in India was very different. As 
 we have seen, it was instantly welcomed with effusion by 
 both Lord Chelmsford and the ' politicians '. All of them pro- 
 ceeded to make the most of the ' clarion call ', also described 
 as ' the greatest landmark in the history of India '. Expecta- 
 tions of the agitating classes were raised to the highest pitch, 
 and great pains were taken to establish the answer to a ques- 
 tion as amounting to a formal engagement, binding not only 
 on the Cabinet which gave the answer, but on all succeeding 
 ministries, on Parliament, and even on the constituencies 
 which had never heard of the matter. Mr. Curtis went so 
 far as to declare that because the ministerial answer to 
 a question on an Indian subject failed to provoke a vote of 
 censure, that is ' equivalent to its acceptance by the 
 Imperial Parliament and electorate '. 
 
 The authority of the ' pronouncement '. Never before 
 has the answer to a question in the House had to carry such 
 a weight of alleged authority. As Sir Harry Stephen 
 correctly argues, ' according to all precedent Mr. Montagu's 
 "pronouncement" bound no one outside the Government, 
 and was as far from being a national promise as are the 
 contents of a King's Speech '. That exposition of the 
 constitutional position is still, in December, 1918, strictly 
 accurate. The utterance means no more than that the 
 existing Cabinet, if it remains in power, is bound to introduce 
 an India Bill drawn in accordance with the ' general terms ? 
 of the answer given on August 20, 1917. 
 
 But dexterous pulling of the strings in India has modified 
 the actual situation by deliberate exaggeration of the signi-
 
 16 GENESIS AND AUTHORITY OF THE 
 
 ficance of the ' pronouncement ', which, as already mentioned, 
 has been worked so as to encourage aspirations and raise 
 expectations which cannot possibly be gratified. The 
 authorities who have countenanced such exaggeration have 
 assumed a grave responsibility, and have laid themselves 
 open to the suspicion of trying to prejudge the issue before 
 it can be submitted to Parliament in constitutional form. 
 The tortuous procedure adopted justifies Sir Harry Stephen 
 in saying that the Secretary of State has managed to ' deal 
 a blow at Parliamentary Government in England while 
 preparing the way for Eesponsible Government in India'. 
 In consequence of the methods employed by Mr. Montagu it 
 has been impossible to raise a direct issue in Parliament. 
 All the reformers in India seem to be persuaded that both 
 Houses of Parliament stand fully committed not only to the 
 exact terms of the ' pronouncement ' as an inspired oracle, 
 but also to the main proposals of the Eeport. As a matter 
 of fact, that Eeport binds nobody, and has not even been 
 considered by the Cabinet (December, 1918). The Under 
 Secretary of State declared officially in the House of Lords 
 in October that the scheme elaborated in the Eeport ' does 
 not necessarily commit the Government nor the country '. 
 Notwithstanding that explicit declaration it is clear that 
 strenuous efforts are being made in India to treat the 
 recommendations of Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford as 
 almost equivalent to an Act of Parliament, subject only to 
 amendment in minor details. 
 
 The machinations to prejudge the questions at issue, and 
 to represent them as decided long before even the drafting 
 of a Bill, much less its passing, deserve the severe language 
 which has been applied to them. 
 
 Unfettered debate. The ' pronouncement ' and the 
 Eeport, when completed, must be read and debated together. 
 They cannot be separated, and neither has any claim to be 
 regarded as a chose jugee. Parliament and the public should
 
 'PRONOUNCEMENT' OF AUGUST 20, 1917 17 
 
 not be juggled out of their right to free, unfettered discussion 
 of both principles and details. No minister is entitled to 
 gag debate in advance. Debate must not be ' cabin'd, 
 cribb'd, confin'd' by any formula. The omnipotence of 
 Parliament in matters political being unquestioned, and the 
 authority of an Act of Parliament being supreme, the highest 
 interests of both India and England require that the decision 
 in this matter, which will really be ' momentous ', should be 
 based on the fullest possible knowledge, formed after ex- 
 haustive debate, and free, so far as human infirmity permits, 
 from the stain of party spirit. 
 
 The authors of the Keport, while well aware of the penalty 
 involved in failure, profess to believe that their plans must 
 succeed merely because Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford 
 desire that they should. A spirit of credulous and yet 
 frightened optimism disfigures the whole Eeport. As Lord 
 Sydenham of Combe justly observes, ' they absolutely admit 
 the most striking facts opposed to their notions, and then 
 ignore those facts when they come to make concrete pro- 
 posals '.
 
 CHAPTEK 2 
 
 THE HISTOKICAL INDIAN IDEAL OP 
 GOVERNMENT 
 
 Vedic folk-motes. Popular assemblies, with functions 
 like those of the Homeric agora or the modern Afghan 
 jirga, decided the affairs of the small Indo-Aryan tribes 
 in remote Vedic times, thousands of years ago. When the 
 caste system gradually developed, impairing the unity of 
 the people, and tribal organization was largely replaced by 
 territorial kingdoms, the royal power necessarily increased, 
 and the expression of the public will by general assemblies 
 became impossible. No Indian institution in historical 
 times can be traced back to the Vedic folk-motes. 
 
 Kingless nations. Long afterwards, at the time of 
 Alexander's invasion in the fourth century B. c., and down 
 to about the fifth century of the Christian era, we hear of 
 sundry peoples or nations in Northern India who enjoyed 
 forms of republican government. Little is on record con- 
 cerning details, but, so far as is known, the republics seem 
 to have been usually under the rule of oligarchies. The 
 Licchavis of Tirhut, one of the most famous of the re- 
 publican peoples, almost certainly were Mongolian hill-men 
 akin to the Gurkhas and Tibetans. Perhaps all the kingless 
 nations belonged to the same category. However that may 
 be, all the popular or oligarchical constitutions faded away, 
 without leaving any mark on the general course of Indian 
 history. 
 
 Statecraft. The theory and practice of government have 
 been favourite subjects with Hindu authors for much more
 
 than two millenniums. The earliest extant treatise, com- 
 posed in the fourth centuiy B.C., avowedly is based upon 
 a long series of lost works, some of which must have been 
 at least two or three centuries prior in date. Kautilya, the 
 author of the most ancient book known, makes merely 
 a passing allusion to the kingless nations, and devotes his 
 text to the elaboration of the theoiy afld practice of monarchy. 
 Many later writers continued the discussion of the same 
 subject. 
 
 The King. All authors agree in representing as the 
 centre and mainspring of the body politic the King or 
 Kaja, who was often appointed in early times by some 
 kind of election. The principle of hereditary succession 
 gradually grew in strength, and, as a rule, the royal authority 
 was transmitted from father to son, as long as a dynasty 
 lasted. 
 
 The King, however appointed, invariably enjoyed auto- 
 cratic powers. If a Hindu, he was supposed to follow the 
 counsels of wise ministers and reverend Brahmans offered 
 in accordance with the sacred scriptures. If a Muhammadan, 
 he was supposed similarly to owe allegiance to Koranic law 
 and tradition. But in practice a masterful king was always 
 able to free himself from the trammels of law, subject to 
 the risks of revolt, dethronement, and death. History tells 
 of many such monarchs. Akbar, who had ceased to be 
 a Musalman during the last twenty-three years of his life, 
 is the most conspicuous instance. No form of government 
 except the autocratic was recognized as being suitable to 
 Indian conditions. Akbar's able and learned secretary 
 emphatically affirmed that autocracy was the only known 
 remedy for a world of confusion and hornets, and, as 
 a matter of fact, no materials for the construction of any 
 other system of government then existed. SivajT the Maratha, 
 in the latter part of the seventeenth century, always retained 
 supreme power in his own hands, although he consulted 
 
 B2
 
 20 THE HISTORICAL INDIAN 
 
 an organized cabinet of ministers and was deferential to 
 Brahmans from religious motives. The decadent rulers 
 of the eighteenth century preserved the tradition of auto- 
 cracy, which was the sole form of government in India 
 when the British entered on the scene. The autocracy, 
 which even Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford desire to 
 preserve for the Government of India (Report, p. 231), has 
 a long history. 
 
 Duties of the King. Both Hindus and Muhammadans 
 recognized that the King had duties as well as rights, and 
 that if he was from one point of view the master, he was 
 from another the servant of the State. A recent Hindu author 
 justly observes that 'the conception of the King as servant 
 of the State was one of the basic principles of political 
 thought in Ancient India'. The idea finds frequent ex- 
 pression in literature, most emphatically, perhaps, in the 
 declarations of Asoka. That idea led to the corollary that 
 the ideal monarch should work hard and freely sacrifice his 
 personal convenience for the benefit of his people, whom 
 he should regard as his children. The parental relation 
 involved the necessity of chastisement when the children 
 misbehaved. 
 
 A strong executive. Authors of text-books and unani- 
 mous public opinion were agreed that the executive 
 must justify its existence by being strong. The art of 
 government was compendiously described as being the Law 
 of Punishment (Dandamti), and the books are full of ad- 
 monitions to the King to use his vast powers firmly, justly, 
 and impartially, without undue tenderness to the evil-doer. 
 Saith Manu : 
 
 ' Dread of the rod alone restrains the bad, 
 Controls the good, and makes a nation happy . . . 
 The King must therefore punish fearlessly; 
 Else would the strong oppress the weak . . . 
 That King is equally unjust who frees 
 The guilty or condemns the innocent ' (Monier Williams).
 
 IDEAL OF GOVERNMENT 21 
 
 Stern justice. Popular resentment was not aroused by 
 the infliction of cruel penalties, provided that they were 
 imposed impartially without respect of persons. In the 
 seventeenth century, Jahanglr, whose sentences showed 
 appalling ferocity, was reputed a just ruler, because he never 
 spared a prince more than a peasant. AurangzSb, on the 
 other hand, while admired for his religious devotion, was 
 condemned as a sovereign because, ' from reverence for the 
 injunctions of the Law, he did not make use of punishment, 
 and without punishment the administration of a country 
 cannot be maintained '. 
 
 The small and influential class commonly described as 
 ' educated India ' has, as we all know, veiy different ideas 
 of government. 
 
 Indian tradition. But it is important for even advanced 
 reformers to remember that their notions run counter to 
 a deep stream of Indian tradition which has been flowing 
 for thousands of years. Ninety-nine out of a hundred 
 Indians, whether Hindus or Muhammadans, cherish as 
 their ideal of government that of the virtuous Raja, who 
 works hard, is easily accessible, is sternly and impartially 
 just, yet loves his people as a father loves his children, 
 and is guided by the advice of wise ministers based upon 
 immemorial tradition. Executive weakness, unjust par- 
 tiality, and departure from tradition are regarded with 
 substantial unanimity as among the worst possible faults 
 of a government. 
 
 Personal government. The ordinary men and women 
 of India do not understand impersonal government. Talk 
 about elective councils and 'diarchies' is as unintelligible 
 to them as the binomial theorem. They crave for govern- 
 ment by a person to whom they can render loyal homage, 
 which easily passes into worship. That craving is gratified 
 in the Native or Protected States, where every subject 
 knows who his ruler is. Even a ruler whom European
 
 22 THE HISTOEICAL INDIAN 
 
 criticism may condemn often enjoys the obedient loyalty 
 of his people. 
 
 The Grown and India. The history of British India 
 and the peculiar relations of the Indian governments with 
 the democracy of Great Britain forbid the full realization of 
 the popular Indian ideal in these times. But the now acknow- 
 ledged supremacy of the Crown offers an opportunity for the 
 exhibition of the traditional Indian loyalty to a person, 
 which should be sedulously kept open. The Indian people 
 have enjoyed the privilege of seeing face to face their King* 
 Emperor, the successor of Kama, Asoka, and Akbar. Their 
 heartfelt loyalty should not be quenched by the cold water 
 of democratic theory. Mr. Lovat Fraser truly remarks 
 that 
 
 'the Crown has become the link to which his subjects 
 in every clime readily attach themselves ; and the King's 
 journey symbolizes the inauguration of a new era. It 
 demonstrates to the whole world the reality and solidity 
 of British rule in India, deriving as it does its main 
 strength, not from the force of arms, but from the loyal 
 acquiescence of princes and peoples in the supremacy of 
 a British monarch.' 
 
 As I have said elsewhere, 'the intense and profound 
 emotion which greeted the Sovereign and his gracious con- 
 sort was the spontaneous, heartfelt offering of India to 
 their royal persons'. An eyewitness felt that the solemn 
 assembly at Delhi was ' the ultimate expression of the 
 potent force of kingship, which in that resplendent scene 
 reached a height we may never see again '. 
 
 A real danger exists that the influence of that 'potent 
 force' may be whittled away by embittered controversy 
 between Extremists, Moderates, and the rest, or smothered 
 in the smoke of deplorable racial jealousies. 
 
 Antiquity of tradition. Reformers are apt to forget the 
 immeasurable antiquity of Indian tradition. The ancient
 
 IDEAL OF GOVERNMENT 23 
 
 scriptures are neither obsolete nor dead. They still express 
 the inmost thoughts of the voiceless myriads of to-day as 
 truly as they record the sentiments of their ancestors in 
 the distant past. No passing wind of doctrine can shake 
 the rock of Indian tradition. The shadows flee away, 
 the wall remains. The fly on the rim buzzes for a moment, 
 the wheel of life rolls on. Truly, 'it is neither safe nor 
 easy to meddle with traditional ideas in India '. 
 
 The King-Emperor. One of the gravest defects in 
 the Report is its failure to say a word about the King- 
 Emperor or to show the slightest appreciation of the im- 
 mense political value of the loyal homage to his person 
 which all ranks in India are eager and proud to tender. 
 That willing loyalty, if fitly recognized, will go far to 
 neutralize the disjunctive effects of the differences in race, 
 religion, language, caste, and customs on which an historical 
 survey of the possibilities of Indian Reform necessarily lays 
 stress. Many years ago, in 1899, Sir Theodore Morison 
 recorded the just observation that ' if a great statesman ever 
 had the opportunity of constructing the whole edifice of 
 government afresh, he would assuredly seize upon the 
 loyalty of the people to the Queen as the cardinal fact upon 
 which to found the fabric of Empire ; he would recognize 
 that the Queen is beyond all comparison the greatest political 
 force in India ' (Imperial Eule in India, p. 53). 
 
 The ' golden link '. Although it may not be ' impossible ', 
 as Thucydides suggested it to be, for a democracy to rule 
 an empire, the undertaking undoubtedly is difficult. The 
 difficulty is not insuperable, and the necessary co-operation 
 of the full-grown British democracy with the Indian peoples 
 steeped in monarchical tradition can be best achieved by 
 using to the utmost practicable extent the golden link of 
 the Crown. To quote the language of the Prime Minister : 
 'If Parliament rise to its great opportunities, then the 
 Empire and the Throne which has won added respect,
 
 24 HISTORICAL IDEAL OF GOVERNMENT 
 
 stability, and lustre through the action of its occupant 
 during these trying times will be firmly established on 
 the only solid basis, that of a happy, a prosperous, and 
 a contented people.' 
 
 The Aga Khan, who sees a vision of a great South Asiatic 
 Federation headed by a regenerated India, is right when 
 he says that 'happily the Imperial Crown provides the 
 venerated centre round which the great States of the Empire 
 can unite '. 
 
 Whether that vision of a Federation be ever realized or 
 not, methods certainly can be devised which will preserve 
 the inestimable sentiments of loyalty to and affection for 
 the Sovereign felt by all classes of the Indian population, 
 and will do much to bind India and England together in 
 a real union destined to last for centuries. 
 
 But the methods for attaining that end are not exactly 
 those of the Report.
 
 CHAPTER 3 
 
 DIVERSITY AND CONFLICTS OF RACES AND 
 RELIGIONS 
 
 Conflict of races and religions. India has been the 
 battle-ground of races and religions from time immemorial. 
 The conflict is not yet ended, and it is impossible for states- 
 men to make wise provision for government at the present 
 day unless they realize vividly the secular duration of such 
 conflict, the persistence of ancient feuds for centuries, and 
 the extreme difficulty of preserving the peace. 
 
 Smothered fires. Somebody is certain to argue that 
 at a time when the Moslem League is co-operating with the 
 National Congress, when many indications point to a grow- 
 ing sentiment in favour of unification, and sanguine hopes 
 are expressed that ancient animosities may disappear, so 
 that all sections of the Indian population may be welded 
 into one great nation, it is not right to rip up old sores or to 
 remind people of the existence of bitter hostility between 
 different classes of the population. Unhappily the truth is 
 that sanguine anticipations of the early realization of a 
 common political identity are not justified either by the 
 facts of history or by observation of present conditions. 
 The old sores still fester, the smothered fires still smoulder, 
 and the superficial appearance of unity is delusive. Silence 
 about facts does not alter the facts. Statesmanship is con- 
 cerned with what is, not with what ought to be. Nothing is 
 gained in the end by prophesying smooth things or evading 
 the frank recognition of unwelcome realities. Idealist re- 
 formers, including the authors of the Report, display a
 
 26 DIVERSITY AND CONFLICTS OF 
 
 marked tendency to dispose of such realities by a few slight 
 passing allusions and to indulge in aspirations for improve- 
 ment wholly unwarranted by the facts. If the rulers of 
 India shut their eyes and make believe that all is well when 
 it is not well, the realities of the situation will assert them- 
 selves, with results disastrous to all concerned. 
 
 Misfits. Lord Bryce observes concerning the majority 
 of the South American republics so called that ' the con- 
 stitutions did not suit the facts, and the facts had to prevail 
 against the constitutions '. It seems to me that India is in 
 imminent danger of being clothed with a constitution which 
 does not fit the facts, and that the task of stating in plain 
 language the historical record and the actual conditions 
 demanding extreme caution should be undertaken with the 
 purpose of helping Parliament, the final arbiter, to find the 
 best solution of an exceedingly complex problem. 
 
 Survivals. Far away in the dim past we can discern 
 the early stages of the armed conflict between the immigrant 
 Indo-Aryan tribes and the indigenous inhabitants of the 
 country, Dravidians and others, as well as the prolonged 
 and still unfinished contest between the ideas of Brahmanicul 
 Hinduism and those of the aboriginal religions. The Indo- 
 Aryan victory seems at first sight to be complete both 
 on the battle-field and in the world of ideas, but closer 
 scrutiny reveals the survival of many notions, practices, and 
 customs, alien and hostile to Brahrnanical thought and feel- 
 ing. If all reference to Islam, Christianity, and other 
 foreign religions be put aside for a moment, it may be said 
 that India, excepting uncultured tribes, is essentially Hindu, 
 the land of the Brahmans. The unity underlying the 
 obvious diversity of India may be summed up in the word 
 Hinduism. 
 
 The modern Hindu revival, the fruit in no small measure 
 of the labours of European scholarship, tends to increase 
 the sentiment striving for political unification, which un-
 
 RACES AND RELIGIONS 27 
 
 doubtedly is a living and potent force. Nevertheless, an 
 immense mass of pre-Hindu beliefs and practices continues 
 to exist. The religious unity even of Hindu India is so far 
 from complete that opportunities for conflict abound, and 
 form a serious obstacle to political unification. 
 
 Various national types. The diversity of the Indian 
 peoples is apparent to the most casual observer. ' L'Inde 
 est un monde,' as a French author neatly expresses the 
 fact. Although in India, as in other lands, much com- 
 mingling of blood has taken place, in spite of caste restric- 
 tions, the national types of the various peoples persist. The 
 Tamils, Marathas, Bengalis, and Rajputs, to name but a 
 few, have each their distinct histories, traditions, and 
 customs. 
 
 While Hindu India possesses a single sacred language, 
 the Sanskrit, which is a powerful factor in the incomplete 
 unity of Hinduism, the number of vernacular languages and 
 dialects is almost past counting. That diversity of speech 
 implies deep divergence in ideas, and history teaches that 
 such divergence going back for millenniums is an almost 
 insurmountable barrier against close union, political or 
 social. 
 
 The attractive vision of a League of Nations binding 
 together the peoples of Europe, or even those of the whole 
 world, in an alliance consecrated to perpetual peace is 
 admittedly difficult of realization. The welding together of 
 all the peoples of Hind into one great Indian nation is little 
 less difficult. 
 
 Throughout the ages, until a century ago, when the 
 British peace was imposed with general assent, we find 
 India divided among the diverse races, usually hostile 
 one to the other, and consequently parcelled into innumer- 
 able unstable states continually at war. The great settle- 
 ment of 1818 cast oil upon the waters and stilled the storm. 
 But the waves still heave and swell. The forces which
 
 28 DIVERSITY AND CONFLICTS OF 
 
 wrecked society in the eighteenth century are still working 
 only a little way below the surface. 
 
 It seems advisable to illustrate such general reflections 
 by citing a few historical instances of racial and religious 
 conflict which suggest lessons applicable to the problems of 
 to-day. 
 
 Tolerance the rule. Indians justly pride themselves on 
 the assertion that religious opinion in their land is free, and 
 that most indigenous rulers have shown statesmanlike 
 tolerance for all creeds. Ordinarily persecution did not 
 occur, and adherents of different religions managed to live 
 together peaceably. 
 
 Persecution of Jains. But from time to time severe 
 persecutions deliberately carried out by kings have occurred 
 and are on record. Jainism, which was the dominant 
 religion in the peninsula for about a thousand years, but is 
 now almost non-existent in that region, seems to have 
 owed its decay largely to systematic persecution. At 
 Madura, in the seventh century, a king who had been con- 
 verted by his wife from Jainism to the Brahmanical Saiva 
 faith, persecuted his former co-religionists with such savage 
 fury that he executed 110 less than eight thousand of them 
 by the slow torture of impalement. The atrocity is com- 
 memorated not only by certain paintings on the walls of the 
 Madura temple and sculptures elsewhere, but, as a Hindu 
 scholar (Mr. T. A. Gopinatha Kao) informs us, by a festival 
 (utsava) still celebrated at Madura under the name of the 
 ' impalement of the Jains '. Even after twelve centuries the 
 local sectarian rancour is so bitter that the anniversary of the 
 cruel execution is regarded by orthodox Hindus as a proper 
 occasion for festivities. In Northern India riots have been 
 often occasioned by the public performance of Jain cere- 
 monies. 
 
 Fights of devotees. Fierce fights between rival Hindu 
 sects, especially between bodies of fakeers or devotees, used
 
 EACES AND RELIGIONS 29 
 
 to be common, and were not interfered with by the 
 authorities. 
 
 On one occasion of such a fight at ThanSsar, Akbar, 
 so far from interfering, sent some of his own soldiers to join 
 in the fray, until about a thousand men were engaged and 
 a score killed. He regarded the affair as good sport. 
 Similar conflicts on a scale even larger continued to occur in 
 the eighteenth century. 
 
 At Hardwar in 1760, ' on the great bathing day, the rival 
 mobs of gosains and bairagis had a long battle, in which 
 1,800 men are said to have perished. In 1795 the Sikh 
 pilgrims slew 500 of the gosains.' Improved police arrange- 
 ments now forbid the occurrence of such catastrophes. 
 But the spirit which caused them is as rampant as ever, and 
 any laxity in the highly skilled and elaborately organized 
 control now exercised by European officers would inevitably 
 result in a repetition of the old-fashioned scenes of blood- 
 shed. 
 
 Religion exploited. Grievances absolutely unconnected 
 with religion are often exploited by agitators and utilized 
 as pretexts for inflaming the fanaticism of the mob, which is 
 easily led to regard an unpopular innovation by casteless and 
 ceremonially impure rulers as being an intentional outrage 
 on religious sentiments. Thus, atBareilly in Rohilkhand, 
 in 1816, a proposal to introduce a house-tax for municipal 
 purposes was misrepresented in that way and was made the 
 occasion for an outbreak which cost more than 300 lives. 
 A still more conspicuous example of the method is afforded 
 by the Tra van core rebellion of 1808, when an astute minister 
 named Velu Tampi, who had political disputes with the 
 Resident, used them as the text for an inflammatory pro- 
 clamation which set the whole State on fire by persuading 
 the people that their religion and caste were in danger, 
 although, as a matter of fact, neither was threatened in any 
 way. A Hindu author tells us that ' the whole country rose
 
 30 DIVERSITY AND CONFLICTS OF 
 
 like one man. Their religious susceptibilities were touched, 
 which in a conservative country like Travancore is like 
 smoking in a powder magazine.' 
 
 The rebels immediately murdered thirty European soldiers 
 in cold blood. When encountered by a large force of 
 regular troops they fought a battle in which they lost 
 700 killed. Yet there was not the shadow of justification 
 for the minister's cunning appeal to the religious feelings of 
 the peasantry. The application of those cases to present- 
 day conditions is not far to seek. Modern anarchists know 
 how to improve on the old-fashioned crude methods for 
 exploiting fanaticism and make use of scientifically planned 
 organization. The confession of Barindra Kumar Ghosh, 
 recorded in the Eowlatt Commission Report, contains the 
 words : 
 
 ' I returned to Bengal convinced that a purely political 
 propaganda would not do for the country and that people 
 must be trained up spiritually to face dangers. . . . As 
 I thought that some people of India would not be made 
 to do any work except through religion, I wanted, &c.' 
 
 The result was a long series of murders and gang robberies 
 committed by young enthusiasts who believed their crimes 
 to be justified or even demanded by their religion. 
 
 Dangerous agitation. The masses invariably translate 
 political propaganda into terms which they can understand. 
 The highly organized political agitation carried on in villages 
 and small towns for the last four years, as described in the 
 Manchester Gruardian special number of March 28, 1918 
 (pp. 32-3), must produce a formidable outburst of racial and 
 religious animosity. The evidence indicates that such 
 animosity has been grievously inflamed already, and might 
 easily become uncontrollable. 
 
 Hindus and Muslims. The extreme ferocity displayed 
 by the Muhammadan armies for centuries, and constantly 
 approved by Muslim chroniclers, is well known to all
 
 RACES AND RELIGIONS 31 
 
 students of Indian history. The Hindus retaliated with 
 equal violence on the rare occasions when they got the 
 chance. Those long-past horrors are not forgotten, nor can 
 it be said truly that the spirit which caused them is dead. 
 I sleeps, but is very easily aroused by some trivial incident, 
 as all magistrates know. The joint acceptance in December, 
 1916, of a scheme of reform by the Congress and the 
 All-India Moslem League is far from having ' solved the 
 greatest internal problem which India had ', as Mr. Jinnah 
 boldly claims that it did. Sores ten centuries old are not so 
 easily healed. While everything that tends to bridge over 
 the gulf between Hindu and Muslim is to be welcomed, the 
 wise man will hesitate before he accepts a frail thread 
 as a solid bridge. The All-India Moslem League, the organ 
 of a few lawyers, mostly of the Shia sect, does not represent 
 the 66^ millions of Indian Muhammadans, many of whom 
 have repudiated it. Serious Hindu and Muhammadan riots 
 in modern times have been innumerable. 
 
 Benares, Bombay, and Bihar. One of the most notable 
 outbreaks occurred at Benares in 1809, when one half of the 
 population was armed against the other and the rival mobs 
 were excited to demoniac passion. The Bombay riots of 
 1893 were equally grave. The Hindu attack on the Musal- 
 man villages of the Patna, Gaya, and Shahabad or Arrah 
 districts in Bihar in 1917 was the most formidable outbreak 
 of the kind recorded, so far as I know. The special Court of 
 Commissioners declared in December of that year that ' these 
 disturbances were the result of a deliberately planned and 
 widely extended conspiracy in the [Shahabad] district to 
 loot, terrorize, and crush the Muhammadan minority '. 
 More than a hundred villages in the Shahabad district alone 
 were plundered, and many scores of respectable Muham- 
 madan women were stripped naked and put to open shame. 
 The leaders in the disgraceful attacks were men of good 
 local position and considerable education. These crimes
 
 32 CONFLICTS OF RACES AND RELIGIONS 
 
 occurred after the adhesion of the All-India Moslem League 
 to the Congress programme. The Report barely alludes to 
 those organized outrages which have been justly described as 
 the Bihar or Arrah War. During the autumn of 1918 Hindu- 
 Muhammadan conflicts on a large scale, attended with 
 considerable bloodshed, have occurred in Calcutta and near 
 Hardwar.
 
 CHAPTER 4 
 
 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 
 
 The mystery of caste. ' India ', as Dr. John Wilson 
 truly observed, 'is emphatically the land of mystery. It 
 has been a land of mystery to distant strangers, to friendly 
 and hostile visitors, and even to its own inhabitants.' The 
 greatest Indian mystery is the institution known to modern 
 writers as Caste. 
 
 The Keport displays inadequate recognition of the exist- 
 ence and significance of that mystery, which is referred to by 
 mere passing allusions in five passages only (paras. 132, 140, 
 149, 152, and 228). As Sir Harry Stephen truly observes, 
 ' how Kesponsible Government is to be adapted to Caste the 
 Report does not say '. The passage in para. 149 (page 123), 
 which speaks of ' everything that breaks down the barriers 
 between communities, and makes men regard each other as 
 neighbours and not as the wearers of some caste or creed 
 insignia, hastens on the day when self-government within 
 the Empire will be attained ', betrays an inability to conceive 
 the real nature of the institution. It would be unreasonable 
 to expect that the authors should be able to master the inner 
 nature of Indian society, to which their European experience 
 offers no parallel. Nobody even modei-ately well informed 
 on the subject could use the language quoted, which implies 
 that caste is contemplated by the authors as a thing external 
 capable of being laid aside. The caste of an Indian is not 
 to him a matter of insignia to be worn or doffed at pleasure. 
 It is bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh.
 
 84 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 
 
 Caste facts. Apart from the deficiencies of the Report, 
 which are of the kind to be expected, it is absolutely 
 necessary that politicians who dream of an Indian democracy 
 should at least try to realize what caste means. Caste is 
 peculiar to India, the analogies or resemblances of institutions 
 in other countries being faint and remote. If the politicians 
 fail to recognize the extent to which that peculiar institution 
 stands in their way, they must fail in their attempt to 
 democratize India, because the facts are so strong that even 
 an Act of Parliament, or a dozen Acts of Parliament, cannot 
 shake them. The fact of caste must be faced boldly and 
 without evasion by every would-be reformer. 
 
 Magnitude. In the first place it is essential to visualize 
 the magnitude of the institution. The Indian population 
 which maybe classed fairly as Hindus, bound by the laws of 
 caste, numbers considerably more than 200 millions. 
 
 Although nothing could be more inconsistent with the 
 spirit of Islam than is the exclusive caste system, Indian 
 Muhammadans, numbering about 66^ millions, have been so 
 largely infected by their Hindu environment that, if the 
 majority of them be included, we may affirm with confidence 
 that at least 250 millions of people, amounting to about one- 
 sixth of the estimated population of the world, are held 
 firmly in the trammels of caste. 
 
 + 3,OOO castes. Those 250 millions are divided into 
 about 3,000 castes, or water-tight social compartments, 
 without reckoning innumerable sub-castes. Although the 
 exact number of existing castes cannot be determined, for 
 reasons too complex for exposition in this place, it is 
 certainly true that in the year 1918 the castes in existence 
 must be about 3,000, more or less, as estimated by Ketkar. 
 The precise figure does not matter. It would be a figure of 
 that order, if it could be ascertained. 
 
 What, then, do we mean by saying that Indian society is 
 broken up into some 3,000 castes ?
 
 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 35 
 
 In order to answer that question we must form a clear 
 notion of what we mean by ' a caste ' and by ' the caste 
 institution '. 
 
 Definition of caste. The word caste (casta) is Portu- 
 guese; the thing is so peculiarly Indian that it separates 
 India from the rest of the world far more impassably than 
 deserts, seas, or mountains. A good working definition 
 of the institution is given by Sir Charles Gough, who 
 states that ' caste may be generally described as the theory 
 and practice of hereditary social distinctions carried to 
 the extremest limits and confirmed by the sanctions of 
 religion '. 
 
 An elementary fact often forgotten is that in India the 
 unit of society is the family, not the individual as in modern 
 England. Remembering that fundamental proposition, we 
 may define ' a caste ' as being 'a group of families internally 
 united by peculiar rules for the hereditary observance of 
 ceremonial purity, especially in the matters of diet and 
 marriage '. 
 
 The same rules fence off the group from all other similar 
 groups, each of which is regulated by its own inherited 
 customs. 
 
 New castes. In modern times it is impossible for any 
 person or family to be transferred from one caste to another. 
 New castes may and not infrequently do spring up in 
 various ways, but every individual and family must ordi- 
 narily remain in the caste as determined by birth. In the 
 cases where caste is lost by breach of the rules, the seceders 
 may found a new caste. Hindu opinion, for instance, re- 
 gards communities of Christian converts as such new castes. 
 In spite of the efforts of missionaries, who for many years 
 past have been almost unanimous in requiring converts to 
 break their old caste, experience shows that it is usually 
 impossible for converts, whether won individually or by 
 ' mass movements ', to renounce the idea of caste, which is 
 
 c2
 
 36 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 
 
 in their blood. The sentiment continually crops up in one 
 form or another. 
 
 Muhammaclan castes. The Indian Muhammadans, in so 
 far as they are descended from Hindu converts, similarly 
 retain their ancient caste organization and continue to be 
 saturated with the notions of their remote ancestors. Few 
 Muslims in India, whatever be their origin, are able to keep 
 themselves quite free from caste prejudices. For example, 
 they are, as a rule, unwilling to eat with Europeans, as 
 Turks, Persians, and Arabs freely do. 
 
 Caste species. The Hindus have not any name for the 
 caste institution because they regard it as an essential part 
 of the divine order of nature. It is out of the question for 
 a Hindu to think of himself otherwise than as a member of 
 some particular caste or species of Hindu mankind. He 
 calls a caste jat, which means ' species '. The families 
 making up the jat are not necessarily descended from 
 a common ancestor, and, in Northern India at all events, 
 rarely are so descended. Caste k in the north is not very 
 largely concerned with race, meaning descent. The castes 
 of the Peninsula, on the other hand, may be generally 
 described as petrified tribes. 
 
 Although community of occupation is the basis of some 
 castes, many admit of great occupational variety. Each 
 caste community becomes in practice a distinct species, 
 whoever the ancestors may have been, and whether the 
 lawful occupations pursued by its members be few or many. 
 The distinctness of the species rests upon the effective 
 operation of its rules for the preservation of ceremonial 
 purity in diet and marriage. 
 
 Dominance of caste. No Indian can escape from the 
 influence of the caste idea, which is ' the soul as well as the 
 body of Hinduism '. A Hindu author lays down the pro- 
 positions, which are true and supported by general opinion, 
 that it is by means of caste distinctions that the Hindu
 
 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 37 
 
 religion has been so well preserved ; they are the chief 
 support of that religion, and when they give way there can 
 be no doubt that the Hindu religion will perish. Hinduism 
 is primarily an extremely ancient social system based upon 
 and inseparable from the caste institution, which is regarded 
 as being of divine origin. That system assumes and pre- 
 supposes as a divinely revealed axiom the congenital and 
 eternal distinction and inequality of the different groups. 
 Whatever may happen, the Brahman must remain at the 
 top of the structure, fed, cherished, protected, and honoured 
 by his inferiors, that is to say, by everybody else, be he 
 prince or peasant. 
 
 Unity of Hinduism. Nearly all Hindus agree in vener- 
 ating Brahmans, in professing obedience to certain sacred 
 scriptures, in honouring certain major deities, in respecting 
 the sanctity of cows, in reverencing the same holy places, 
 and so on. 
 
 In that sense Hinduism may be called a religion as well 
 as a social system. The Indian religious traditions preserved 
 and the modes of worship practised from the Himalaya to 
 Cape Comorin have sufficient features in common to warrant 
 Hindus in feeling conscious of a considerable degree of 
 religious unity as against the rest of the world. 
 
 No Hindu creed. But Hinduism is not a religion in the 
 sense that either Christianity or Islam is. It has no prophet- 
 founder and no creed. It. is merely the social and religious 
 expression of the Hindu ideal of duty (dharma) as developed 
 during the course of several millenniums. 
 
 No Hindu is required to obey any one prophet or to con- 
 fess to any particular creed. So long as he eats the diet and 
 marries the woman prescribed by the rules of the caste into 
 which he was born, he may believe or disbelieve what he 
 pleases. 
 
 Caste ethics. The text-books, while recognizing certain 
 elementary virtues as binding upon all men, are emphatic
 
 38 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 
 
 in asserting that each group of castes has special duties and 
 morals of its own. Individual castes often have each their 
 own standard of duty. What is right for one caste or group 
 of castes may be quite wrong for another caste or group. 
 That principle rests upon the abstract doctrines of Hindu 
 philosophy about rebirth, &c., which cannot be discussed in 
 this place. The practical result is that Hinduism recognizes 
 many conflicting moral standards or codes of ethics, because 
 the members of each caste or group of kindred castes look to 
 the public opinion only of their own caste-fellows, which is 
 not necessarily in accordance with the Ten Commandments 
 or any other statement of universal moral law. When the 
 special caste conception of duty (dharma) comes into conflict 
 with the general moral law, the caste duty prevails. That 
 is the explanation of Thuggee, temple prostitution, and 
 various other forms of crime or immorality, organized 
 either on a caste basis or on an analogous system. The 
 Thug stranglers were convinced that they worked with divine 
 sanction under the protection of a goddess, and were never 
 troubled by remorse because the practices sanctioned by 
 their brotherhood conflicted glaringly with ordinary ^morality. 
 Ordinary Hindus often acquiesced in that view and were 
 willing and ready to protect the Thugs. Other examples 
 might be cited. Those observations have a direct bearing 
 upon all attempts to form an Indian nationality, not to 
 speak of an Indian democracy. A population broken up 
 into sections differing not only in blood, language, social 
 customs, and creed, but also in their ideas of morality, does 
 not readily coalesce into a political unity. Such coalescence, 
 if ever attained, must be deferred to a distant future. 
 
 A guiding principle. ' Caste interferes, in short, with 
 all the relations and events of life, and with what precedes 
 or follows, or what is supposed to precede and follow life. 
 It reigns supreme in the innumerable classes and divisions 
 of the Hindus, whether they originate in family descent, in
 
 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 39 
 
 religious opinions, in civil or sacred occupations, or in local 
 residence ; and it professes to regulate all their interests, 
 affairs, and relationships. Caste is the guiding principle of 
 each of the classes and divisions of the Hindus viewed in 
 their distinct or associated capacity ' (J. Wilson). 
 
 ' Custom ', as Manu lays down, ' is the highest dharma ', 
 or ' transcendent law of duty '. Immemorial custom fortified 
 by revelation is the basis of caste. The institution, with 
 roots fastened securely in the prehistoric past and accepted 
 as an essential element in the divine ordering of the world, 
 is reverenced alike by the superiors who command and by 
 the inferiors who obey. 
 
 So ineradicable is the idea of caste that the lowest ranks 
 of society, the sweepers, scavengers, and others who perform 
 the basest offices, and are regarded as standing outside the 
 pale of Hinduism, have formed caste organizations of their 
 own, quite independent of those recognized by Hindu 
 tradition. Such ' outcaste castes ', to use an unavoidably 
 paradoxical term, govern themselves by rules of almost 
 incredible strictness and complexity. 
 
 English delusions. Half a century ago English people 
 interested in India commonly cherished the belief that caste 
 was destined to disappear within a measurable period, as the 
 result of secular education combined with missionary effort. 
 For instance, the able author of the Le Bas prize essay, 
 published in 1853, ventured to prophesy : 
 
 ' It will die away by degrees, as the people become better 
 educated and more enlightened. The institution of schools 
 on a liberal plan for the benefit of the rising generation in 
 the upper, as well as the lower ranks of life, will do more 
 probably to removing the prejudices of the natives, in regard 
 to caste and religion, than direct attempts at conversion.' 
 
 The perilous delusion that the multiplication of schools, 
 colleges, or other European institutions will lead to the 
 withering or extinction of caste still survives, and unfortu-
 
 40 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 
 
 nately disfigures the Eeport. That delusion underlies the 
 whole of paragraph 149 already cited, which treats of ' the 
 duty of the educated classes to the ryots ' in terms not to 
 be reconciled with notorious facts. It crops up again in 
 paragraph 152, where the authors gravely suggest that 
 representative institutions in India ' will help to soften the 
 rigidity of the caste system'. They are even sanguine 
 enough to ' hope that those incidents of it which lead to the 
 permanent degradation and ostracism of the lowest castes 
 will tend to disappear in proportion to the acceptance of the 
 ideas on which the new constitution rests '. The stupendous 
 rashness of such phrases, which might be merely startling in 
 a magazine article, becomes highly dangerous when the 
 phrases are put forth by the Secretary of State and the 
 Governor-General as justification for their policy and as part 
 of the foundation for an Act of Parliament. Can the 
 authors of the Eeport seriously believe that the multiplication 
 of elections and ballot-boxes can affect the relative position 
 of the Brahman and the low-caste man ? If they do believe 
 that they can believe anything. Have they observed that 
 the active working of the elective system in the Calcutta and 
 Bombay Corporations has softened the rigidity of the rules 
 of caste in those cities? Certainly nobody else has noted 
 such a phenomenon or dreamt of any connexion between 
 the two things. 
 
 Origin of the illusion. The illusion that the caste 
 institution is destined to weaken or disappear within 
 a comparatively short period seems to rest chiefly upon 
 a vague unreasoning faith that things wished for must 
 happen. So far as it has any basis of fact the hypothesis 
 seems to have been suggested partly by the well-known 
 laxity in certain respects of the few Hindus who visit 
 Europe or America, and partly by observation of the more 
 general relaxation of certain rules or practices for the sake 
 of convenience." For example, the necessities of cheap rail-
 
 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 41 
 
 way travelling compel people to crowd into carriages and 
 touch one another closely for many hours, regardless of 
 scruples dating from times when railways were not thought 
 of. Similarly, the immense practical advantages of a copious 
 supply of good water from stand-pipes in the larger towns 
 are permitted to outweigh the ceremonial pollution which 
 undoubtedly takes place. Ingenious pundits are not slow 
 to find texts or to invent legal fictions in order to justify the 
 deviation from ancestral custom. Many other cases of 
 a like kind might be cited, as may be read in Ketkar's 
 book. 
 
 Superficial modifications. But such merely superficial 
 modifications of caste regulations dictated by imperative 
 reasons of convenience do not touch the essence of the 
 institution or weaken in the slightest degree the innate, 
 inherited sentiment of caste exclusiveness. The Brahman 
 who rides in a third-class carriage or drinks pipe-water does 
 not think any better of his low-caste neighbour than when 
 he travelled on foot and drank from a dirty well. The 
 caste sentiment, so far from weakening, grows stronger 
 in the higher castes, because caste and Hinduism are not 
 two things but one thing, indivisible, and the revival of 
 Hinduism in modified forms during recent years is notorious. 
 A Hindu revival carries with it the stimulation of the caste 
 sentiment essential to Hinduism. 
 
 Caste will endure. The foregoing discussion leads in- 
 evitably to the conclusion that prophecies or hopes of the 
 weakening or disappearance of caste within a measurable 
 period are futile. So long as Hindus continue to be Hindus, 
 caste cannot be destroyed or even materially modified. 
 
 The deep waters of Hinduism are not easily stirred, and 
 ripples on the surface leave the depths unmoved. The 
 caste institution has lasted for three thousand years or more 
 because it suits Hindus and has become part of their nature. 
 For the same reason in all probability it will still endure for
 
 42 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 
 
 untold centuries. Nevertheless, it is difficult to contradict 
 the saying of Mr. Archer that ' caste is a vice which affects 
 India, all India, and in its extreme development, nothing 
 but India. Its tyranny will have to be broken before India 
 can become a nation among other modern nations.' Ke- 
 f owners must, I am convinced, make the best they can 
 for many generations of an extremely inconvenient antique 
 institution which accords ill with modern conditions, and is 
 avowedly irreconcilable with the ideas of equality and 
 fraternity. The Hindu scriptures beyond question exalt the 
 Brahman as ' the lord of all classes ', and denounce all 
 notions of the brotherhood of man, or equality before 
 the law. The Brahman will continue to spurn the low- 
 caste man, who will continue to submit and to regard the 
 Brahman as a god. 
 
 Caste and patriotism. The reality of the obstacle pre- 
 sented by such facts to the development of a tolerably homo- 
 geneous Indian nation, not to speak of a modern democracy, 
 needs no further exposition. The saying of a French author 
 that a Hindu ' n'a pas d'autre patrie que la caste ' if it goes 
 a little beyond the truth is not far from it. Another 
 French writer observes that ' the caste system permits the 
 juxtaposition of political and social elements, but does not 
 produce their fusion ; they mingle, but they do not combine '. 
 Sir Harry Stephen affirms correctly that ' the whole idea of 
 politics apart from religion is foreign to India ; religion 
 comes first and pervades everything, and in all social 
 relations finds expression in the laws of caste '. 
 
 Caste and law. In March, 1858, when Sir Colin Camp- 
 bell finally recovered Lucknow, he found sundry rebel 
 proclamations, one of which expresses in admirably dis- 
 tinct language the essential opposition between the British 
 policy of guaranteeing the equality of all men before the law, 
 and the Indian doctrine that inequality, being of divine 
 appointment, should be recognized by law and accepted as a
 
 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 43 
 
 governing principle determining the procedure and decisions 
 of courts. The proclamation states accurately the practice 
 of the indigenous governments, which was in accordance 
 with the rules of the Hindu law books. The words were : 
 
 'All the Hindoos and Mohammedans know that man 
 loves four things most : (1) his religion and caste ; (2) his 
 honour ; (3) his own and his kinsmen's lives ; (4) his 
 property. All these four are well protected under native 
 rulers ; no one interferes with any one's religion ; every one 
 enjoys his respectability according to his caste and wealth. 
 All the respectable people Syed, Shaikh, Mogul, and 
 Patan, among Mohammedans; and Brahmins, Chatrees, 
 Bys, and Kaeths, among the Hindus are respected accord- 
 ing to their castes. No low-caste people like chamars, 
 dhanook, and passees [soil, leather-dressers, village watch- 
 men, etc.] can be equal to and address them disrespectfully. 
 No one's life or property is taken unless for some heinous 
 crime. 
 
 ' The British are quite against these four things they 
 want to spoil every one's caste, and wish both the Moham- 
 medans and Hindoos to become Christians. Thousands 
 have turned renegades, and many will become so yet ; both 
 the nobles and low caste are equal in their eyes ; they 
 disgrace the nobles in the presence of the ignoble ; they 
 arrest or summon to their courts the gentry, nawabs, and 
 rajahs at the instance of a chamar, and disgrace them.' 
 
 The document expresses faithfully the present-day senti- 
 ments of all high-caste Indians, not excluding those who 
 now pose as democrats. It also emphasizes vividly the 
 extent to which Indian Muhammadanism has been corrupted 
 by the Hindu caste spirit. 
 
 Brahmans. The most essential feature of the caste 
 organization is the high rank claimed by and generally 
 conceded to the Brahmans, who number about ten millions. 
 
 The ancient author of the Institutes qf Manu, whose 
 authority is recognized all over India, lays down the 
 propositions that
 
 44 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 
 
 ' A Brahman, whether learned or unlearned, is a mighty 
 divinity ' (ix. 317). 
 
 ' By his origin alone a Brahman is a deity, even for the 
 gods ' (xi. 85). 
 
 ' The Brahman is the lord of all classes ' (x. 3). 
 
 A saying or syllogism, which has ' gained universal cur- 
 rency in India ', emphasizes and justifies those propositions : 
 
 ' The whole world is under the power of the gods, 
 The gods are under the power of the mantras (magic 
 
 formulae), 
 
 The mantras are under the power of the Brahman ; 
 The Brahman is therefore our God ' (J. Wilson, i. 25). 
 
 We need not be surprised that men who are believed by 
 themselves and others to be superior even to the gods 
 should display arrogance towards the members of other 
 castes, and regard the ' outcaste castes ' as hardly human. 
 Brahman arrogance is much more marked in the South than 
 in the North and there leads to extreme oppression of the 
 ' untouchable ' classes, who are, for instance, hindered in the 
 free use of the public roads lest their shadow should pollute 
 a passing Brahman. Even now the Cherurna cultivators in 
 Malabar have to assert their right to use the highways, which 
 was denied them under Hindu rule. 
 
 In the Travancore State a Pulayan was, and probably 
 still is, forbidden to enter a village. The regulations re- 
 quired that a Sudra, or common Hindu, should not approach 
 a Nambudri Brahman nearer than three feet. The distance 
 to be kept by an outcaste might be as much as twenty 
 or thirty paces. The exact regulations varied in different 
 localities, but the spirit of all was one. Under the British 
 government the extremities of Brahman oppression have 
 to be restrained, because the law makes no distinction of 
 persons. The last considerable Brahman government in 
 India, that of the Peshwas, was extremely harsh both 
 to the outcastes and to the wild tribes like the Bhlls.
 
 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 45 
 
 ' Untouchables.' It is no wonder that the eighteen 
 millions of ' untouchables ' in the Madras Presidency alone 
 should seek to escape from their intolerable position by 
 frequently embracing Christianity in large numbers at 
 a time. Similar ' mass movements ' occur in the Punjab, 
 and a like attraction is exercised by Islam in Eastern 
 Bengal. The addresses presented to Mr. Montagu offer 
 abundant evidence of the terror felt by the non-Brahman 
 classes at the prospect of the Brahman domination opened 
 up by the suggested constitutional changes. History justifies 
 their fears. 
 
 Minorities and majorities. In the countries of Western 
 Europe protection against the tyranny not infrequently prac- 
 tised by democracies is required by minorities. Ingenious 
 politicians seek to provide the required protection by elaborate 
 devices for proportional representation and so forth. 
 
 Such devices are difficult to work and notoriously ineffec- 
 tive. The saying that ' minorities must suffer ' has abundant 
 justification in the facts of constitutional history. 
 
 In India, as the authors of the Eeport unwillingly 
 acknowledge (e.g. in para. 155 and elsewhere), huge majori- 
 ties require protection against the arrogance of a small high- 
 caste and chiefly Brahman minority supported, as is believed, 
 by divine sanction. 
 
 The facts are incontrovertible and merit far more promi- 
 nence than they have received in the Keport. It cannot 
 be too often repeated that sonorous phrases and the conven- 
 tional language of parliamentary democracy cannot alter the 
 facts, nor will copy-book maxims restrain the passions of 
 mankind. 
 
 Caste animosity. The government finds it nearly as 
 difficult to preserve the peace between the castes as between 
 the creeds. In the South, especially, where the castes are 
 more distinctly tribal than they are in the North, the ani- 
 mosity between different castes reaches an almost incredible
 
 46 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 
 
 height. It never dies out, and a feud, begun perhaps a 
 thousand or two thousand } 7 ears ago, is still as hot as ever. 
 A curious and unexplained division of the non-Brahman 
 castes into ' right-hand ' and ' left-hand ' groups is peculiar 
 to the Peninsula, and is known to have existed in the 
 eleventh century of the Christian era. Probably it is many 
 ages older than that. The animosity between the two sets 
 of castes never wanes and is frequently raised to boiling 
 point by incidents which appear to other people to be 
 absolutely trivial and insignificant. Such trifles suffice 
 to provoke violent affrays and to harass the police of the 
 Madras Presidency with never-ceasing anxiety. An astonish- 
 ing example of an ancient feud surviving to the present day 
 is recorded by the Madras Epigraphist, a Hindu scholar, in 
 his Keport for 1916-17. An inscription in the Tinnevelly 
 district dating from A.D. 1452, and referring to a document 
 nearly a century older, records the decree of the Vellala 
 caste concerning the penalties to be inflicted on the members 
 of a lower caste, the Vellai-Nadar, who had given offence. 
 The decree of the assembly provided for the immediate 
 execution of three persons, and the killing of twenty-three 
 others wherever they might be found. No member of the 
 Vellai-Nadar community was to be allowed to enter a Tamil 
 district, and many other stringent disabilities were imposed. 
 The learned Epigraphist comments that ' the natural [soil. 
 innate] hatred which the Vallalars of the present day still 
 entertain for the Nadars or Shanars in the Tinnevelly 
 district could possibly receive some explanation in the light 
 of the facts of this curious record '. The lapse of seven 
 centuries has not been enough to heal a feud which even at 
 the time of the battle of Crecy probably was of immemorial 
 antiquity. Yet the idealists are sanguine enough to think 
 that futile wishes, solemn admonitions, and contested elec- 
 tions will do in a few years what seven centuries have 
 failed to effect. sancta simplicitas !
 
 CASTE AND CASTE DISPUTES 47 
 
 Summary. The inquiry has established the propositions 
 that the institution of caste is at least three thousand years 
 old ; that it is universally believed to be of divine origin ; 
 that it concerns 250 millions of people, more or less ; that it 
 involves the division of the whole Hindu population and 
 a large part of the Muslim and Christian minority into 
 about 3,000 distinct hereditary castes, without reckoning 
 sub-castes ; that no Hindu can escape from the dominion of 
 caste ; that Hinduism and caste being one and indivisible, 
 the institution cannot be abolished, and will still last for 
 centuries ; that the supremacy of the Brahman will continue 
 to be acknowledged ; that superficial modifications in the 
 details of practice do not affect the caste spirit, which has 
 been strengthened by the Hindu revival ; that the doctrine 
 of the equality of all men before the law is opposed to the 
 Hindu scriptures and the practice of Hindu governments ; 
 that caste animosities, which are most bitter in the South, 
 dating back for a thousand years or more, are as virulent as 
 ever at this day ; and that, consequently, peace and order 
 require for their preservation a strong and impartial 
 executive. 
 
 Those propositions state conditions which underlie all 
 projects of constitutional reform, and for that reason deserve 
 the earnest attention of reformers and of Parliament. No 
 legislation can change them, and their gradual automatic 
 relaxation must be deferred to a time so distant as to 
 be beyond the vision of practical politics.
 
 CHAPTER 5 
 
 'VAIN VISIONS' 
 
 Forebodings. The sanguine prophecies in which the 
 authors of the Keport so freely indulge recall the 'vain 
 visions ' beheld by the misguided soothsayers of Israel who 
 daubed with untempered mortar the wall that they had 
 built. Should the building of the new Indian constitution 
 be proceeded with solely on the lines of the Report, it is 
 difficult to avoid forebodings that the wall built with the 
 untempered mortar of English parliamentarism may suffer 
 the fate predicted by Ezekiel and be ' brought down to the 
 ground so that the foundation thereof shall be discovered ', 
 dragging with it in its fall the builders ' consumed in the 
 midst thereof '. 
 
 If it be true that the visions guiding the plans of the 
 Secretary of State and his colleague are in the nature of 
 a dream or mirage, the structure erected under such guidance 
 must needs be insecure. While the details of the machinery 
 of government may be varied freely without incurring 
 serious risk, a complex mechanism constructed on erroneous 
 principles necessarily breaks down. When the constructive 
 plan is sound, the pattern of the wheels and springs is 
 susceptible of endless modification, but no skill in the 
 manufacture of individual parts can compensate for error in 
 the design of the mechanism as a whole. The authors of 
 the Keport, who display an uncanny ingenuity in elaborating 
 the racks and pinions of their clockwork, are not equally 
 successful in providing the motive power needed to make 
 the clock go. Careful examination of the passages in the
 
 'VAIN VISIONS' 49 
 
 Report which disclose the hopes and intentions of its authors 
 is much more profitable than minute criticism on their 
 ingenious concrete proposals, which are certain to be largely 
 modified. 
 
 ' The basis of the whole system.' Some such passages 
 are so astonishing that they invite the denunciation heaped 
 upon them by certain critics. But it is better to refrain 
 from strong language and to allow the extracts to speak for 
 themselves, with the minimum of comment. 
 
 Paragraph 131, dealing with ' the basis of a system of 
 responsibility ', states that ' the system [soil, of responsible 
 government in the English parliamentary sense] presupposes 
 in those who work it such a perception of, and loyalty to, 
 the common interests as enables the decision of the majority 
 to be peaceably accepted. This means that majorities must 
 practise toleration and minorities patience. 
 
 'There must, in fact, be, not merely a certain capacity for 
 business, but, what is much more important, a real percep- 
 tion of the public welfare as something apart from, and with 
 superior claims to, the individual good. The basis of the 
 whole system is a lively and effective sense of the sanctity 
 of other people's rights.' 
 
 The dry comment of Dr. T. M. Nair that ' in India we 
 have not got as far as that yet' might be developed and 
 illustrated to an indefinite extent. Readers of Chapters 3 
 and 4 in this book will find many reasons for regarding the 
 ideal of the authors of the Report as a ' vain vision '. Suppose 
 that the ' basis ' gives way, will not the ' whole system ' fall 
 like the wall daubed with untempered mortar ? 
 
 ' The faith.' The principles enunciated in paragraph 
 144 devoted to the 'justification of an advance' are still 
 more startling than the ill-founded expectations noticed 
 above. The authors assert that ' the placid, pathetic con- 
 tentment of the masses is not the soil ' on which to grow 
 the plant of ' Indian nationhood '. Inasmuch as ' the faith 
 that is in ' them rests on the dogma that such ' nationhood
 
 50 'VAIN VISIONS' 
 
 within the Empire represents something better than anything 
 India has ever attained ', they believe that in ' deliberately 
 disturbing ' the contentment of the masses they are 'working 
 for her highest good '. 
 
 The authors, when writing in that fashion, follow the 
 lead given by their mentor, Mr. Curtis, who boldly declares 
 that 'you must have the nerve to see Indian electorates 
 hurt others the helpless as well as themselves. It is the 
 only way in which the spirit of trusteeship can be called 
 into being and made to grow.' He, like his official pupils, 
 cherishes 'the hope that the people of India may have 
 learned such trust in each other that minorities will not 
 insist ' on protecting themselves by machinery designed to 
 limit the power of the majority. Mr. Curtis maintains that 
 ' only by suffering a people will learn the faculty of self-help 
 and a genuine electorate be brought into being'. 
 
 It is difficult to comment with restraint on such dangerous 
 doctrine. Supposing it to be true that the Indian masses 
 generally are contented, why is such contentment 'pathetic' ? 
 Contentment, so far as it exists, is to be deliberately 
 disturbed by the rulers of India in order to promote the 
 ideal of Indian nationhood, the formation of a genuine 
 electorate, and the development of the faculty of self-help. 
 Do the high officials charged with the government of India, 
 who propose deliberately to disturb the contentment of three 
 hundred millions of Asiatic people, mostly ignorant, super- 
 stitious, fanatical, and intensely suspicious, realize what 
 they are doing ? Have they counted the cost ? Once the 
 disturbance of content has been fairly started among the 
 untutored masses, no man can tell how far the fire may 
 spread. Discontent will not be directed to the political 
 objects so dear to Mr. Montagu and Mr. Curtis. It will be 
 turned fiercely upon the casteless, impure foreigner, and, 
 inflamed by the cry of ' religion in danger ', will attract 
 every disorderly element and renew the horrors of 1857 or
 
 'VAIN VISIONS' 51 
 
 the great anarchy of the eighteenth century. The lesson of 
 history cannot be mistaken. Serious disturbance of con- 
 tentment in India results invariably in an outburst of 
 religious fanaticism. Any excuse, a house-tax, a canal rate, 
 a sanitary regulation, is good enough to serve as the match 
 to the conflagration. The Prime Minister's ideal of ' a happy, 
 a prosperous, and a contented people ' is the true one for 
 India as for England. 
 
 Is it a light thing to promise * suffering ' as the first-fruits 
 of political reform ? The sufferers will turn and try to rend 
 the government, to which they will ascribe their pain. 
 ' God help a government of educated Indians ', as Sir John 
 Hewett remarks, ' when the people come to realize that they 
 are being badly governed by it.' If, in order to obtain the 
 blessings of contested elections, we must have the nerve to 
 watch the helpless being hurt by the strong, is it not possible 
 that the blessing may be bought at too high a price ? Is the 
 prospect of oppression and disorder thus held out likely to 
 win the approval of sane, practical members of Parliament ? 
 It is legitimate for the critic to combine the outspoken 
 cynicism of the utterances of Mr. Curtis with the more 
 plausible phrases of the authors of the Eeport, because the 
 propositions stated so nakedly by the amateur constitution- 
 maker are implied in the principles enunciated by his official 
 pupils. 
 
 The ryot. The long paragraph dealing with the ' political 
 education of the ryot ' is so manifestly opposed to all 
 experience and so remote from realities that it is best 
 refuted by reprinting it. 
 
 Political education of the ryot. 
 
 146. Let us begin with the ryot, because his is the most 
 difficult case. When local bodies are developed some of 
 his class will have a vote on local questions. He will 
 thus begin to discover that if there is no school near his 
 village or no road to take him to market, the right way 
 
 D2
 
 52 'VAIN VISIONS' 
 
 to procure these benefits is, not as heretofore by asking 
 the Collector for them, but by voting for the local board 
 member who is most likely to get them for him. The 
 process will be an up-hill one ; it will take time ; and very 
 probably advance can only come through previous failure. 
 The rural voter will perhaps find himself cajoled or bought 
 or coerced into voting in a way that does himself no good. 
 But eventually it will dawn upon him, as it has done upon 
 the agricultural classes elsewhere, that because he has a vote 
 he has the means of protecting himself and that if those who 
 claim to represent him neglect his interests he can discard 
 them. As his political education proceeds he will come to 
 apply the lesson learned in local affairs to the affairs of 
 Government also. It will occur to him eventually that, if 
 landlords are oppressive and usurers grasping and sub- 
 ordinate officials corrupt, he has at his command a better 
 weapon than the lathi or the hatchet with which to redress 
 his wrongs. He will gradually learn that though the 
 Government is far off he can take a remote part in deter- 
 mining its action, and he will find that because the infinite- 
 simal power which he wields is in the aggregate effective the 
 Government becomes more sensitively alive and responsive 
 to his needs. But his rate of progress will always depend 
 upon the measure of assistance which he receives ; and we 
 look to both officials and candidates to feel a responsibility 
 for helping him. Finally, he will come to realize that if he 
 is to deal effectively with the more clever and better educated 
 men who represent him in the councils he must acquire 
 learning ; and education, which he rejected so long as it 
 merely seemed to him to clash with his material interests 
 by depriving him of his children's labour and then unfitting 
 them to follow the plough after him, will acquire in his 
 eyes a new attractiveness when it presents itself to him as 
 a factor in the process of getting better tenure or easier 
 advances for himself. The present times are favourable to 
 growth. The minds of India's peasant soldiery who have 
 returned from abroad will never again work quite in the old 
 way, and they will relate their experiences to many who 
 stayed at home. But we feel no doubt that in learning to 
 rise to his new responsibilities the Indian peasant voter will 
 need all the help that other people, officials and non-officials 
 alike, can give him.
 
 'VAIN VISIONS' 53 
 
 Detailed criticism appears superfluous. It may suffice to 
 say that not one of the prophecies has any chance of fulfil- 
 ment. 
 
 The landed aristocracy. Paragraph 147, treating of 
 the obligations of the landed aristocracy, also quoted in full, 
 is equally contemptuous of notorious facts. 
 
 Obligations of the landed aristocracy. 
 
 147. The natural and acknowledged leaders in country 
 areas are the landed aristocracy. They generally represent 
 ancient and well-born families, and their estates are often 
 the result of conquest or grants from some mediaeval 
 monarch. By position, influence and education, they are 
 fitted to take a leading part in public affairs. Some of 
 them are beginning to do so ; and our aim must be to call 
 many more of them out into the political lists. They are 
 conservative like the ryot, but like him they also will learn 
 the need to move with changing times. They also, when 
 they perceive that the protection of interests which are 
 dear to them depends upon doing so, will find out how to 
 organize, and to argue and to make speeches. It will be 
 no very easy task for them. They stand upon a concep- 
 tion of social order which is not easily reconcilable with 
 the hustings and the ballot-box. But undoubtedly they 
 are called to take their place in the new regime, and to 
 recognize that political life need not impair their dignity 
 and self-respect. Like the representatives of their class in 
 other countries they must learn to fulfil the responsibili- 
 ties of their position in a new way. After all they start 
 with considerable advantages, inasmuch as they have com- 
 mand both of means and position. We must give them 
 a special measure of representation, if they need it, at the 
 outset ; but it may be that their political education, like the 
 ryot's, will come mainly by pressure of events. 
 
 How can Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford know that 
 the Eajas and Nawabs ivill or must do the things demanded 
 of them ? Most assuredly they will not do anything of 
 the kind. The sentence warning them that their political 
 education has to come mainly by pressure of events seems
 
 54 'VAIN VISIONS' 
 
 to be a veiled threat of the ' suffering ' predicted by 
 Mr. Curtis. 
 
 A precedent. The idealism of the authors is nothing 
 new. Similar fantastical expectations of what might be 
 done by reformed landholders were formulated long ago in 
 1792-3 by Lord Cornwallis, and served as the basis of the 
 policy on which the Permanent Settlement was founded. 
 The Governor-General's sententious fatuities imposed even 
 on ministers so able as Pitt and Dundas, who were ignorant 
 of Indian conditions. The warning voice of Sir John Shore 
 was unheeded and the zemindars of that day were ruined. 
 Lord Cornwallis, who was ready to see them suffer, wrote : 
 
 ' If there are men who will not follow this line of conduct 
 when an opportunity is afforded them by the enaction of 
 good laws, it surely is not inconsistent with justice, policy, 
 or humanity to say that the sooner their bad management 
 obliges them to part with their property to the more 
 industrious, the better for the State. 
 
 ' It is immaterial to Government what individual possesses 
 the land, provided he cultivates it, protects the ryots, and 
 pays the public revenue.' 
 
 Is it intended now that the ' pressure of events ' should 
 drive out the aristocrats who may decline to comply with 
 the new ' good laws ' ? 
 
 Few persons free from personal interest in the business 
 would deny that the Permanent Settlement legislation was 
 a mistake. It certainly caused an enormous amount of ruin 
 and misery for many years. In 1802 the Collector of 
 Midnapore wrote that the new system 
 
 ' has in the course of a very few years reduced most of the 
 great zemindars of Bengal to distress and beggary, and 
 produced a greater change in the landed property of Bengal 
 than has, perhaps, ever happened in the same space of time, 
 in any age or countiy by the mere effect of internal regula- 
 tions '. 
 
 That extensive misery was caused by the unpractical
 
 'VAIN VISIONS' 55 
 
 idealism of Lord Cornwallis, who asked from the landed 
 aristocracy what it had not to give. His successors, who 
 make on the landed aristocracy of to-day demands equally 
 incapable of realization, are doomed to similar disappoint- 
 ment. The Rajas and Nawabs most assuredly will not ' find 
 out how to organize, and to argue, and to make speeches '. 
 They cannot change their nature any more than their pre- 
 decessors could do so in the eighteenth century. So far as 
 they are concerned the scheme will fail. How far they 
 may be compelled to pay in ' suffering ' for their inability to 
 adopt English electioneering customs remains to be seen. 
 
 ' Our aim.' The solemn warnings contained in para- 
 graphs 150 and 151 cannot possibly be of the slightest use. 
 Can any sane man believe that angry passions will be 
 soothed by exhortations to contending factions that the 
 cause of political progress 
 
 ' ought to be dearer to them than their own sectional 
 interests. So long as the latter are paramount any form of 
 self-government to which India can attain must be limited 
 and unreal at best. But our aim is that it should be com- 
 plete and real, and to this end, as we have stated it, our 
 reforms are designed.' 
 
 The aspirations of the authors are immaterial unless they 
 lead to practical results. The question is how the reforms 
 will work in this present imperfect world, not how they 
 might work in an ideal world which never has existed or 
 will exist. 
 
 Quotations of passages filled with platitudinous exhorta- 
 tion or impracticable idealism might be largely multiplied, 
 but one more must suffice. 
 
 The classes and the masses. Innumerable petitions, 
 addresses, pamphlets, and articles give forcible expression to 
 the fears entertained by huge populations that reforms 
 carried out on the lines of the Keport may result in placing 
 the majority of the people under the heel of a tyrannous 
 Brahman oligarchy.
 
 56 'VAIN VISIONS' 
 
 understand', certain memorialists argue, 'that our 
 Rulers want our nation to be a self-supporting democracy ; 
 but we humbly submit that political liberty cannot prove 
 a boon to a nation where the classes do not scruple to inflict 
 the worst sort of injustice on those who are mostly ignorant 
 and who, moreover, have been taught from times immemo- 
 rial to bear it all as a matter of religious duty. And yet 
 this is the real state of things in this country.' 
 
 The anxiety expressed in that extract and in many similar 
 papers is fully justified by the facts of history and modern 
 experience. 
 
 The reply of the authors of the Eeport is that they do not 
 intend to create an oligarchy. As said before their intention 
 does not matter, the question is what will be the practical 
 effect of their proposals. Their words (paragraph 262. 
 page 213) are : 
 
 ' We regard the development of a broad franchise as the 
 arch on which the edifice of self-government must be raised ; 
 for we have no intention that our reforms should result 
 merely in the transfer of powers from a bureaucracy to an 
 oligarchy.' 
 
 Thus the only security offered is a broad franchise. 
 Little argument is needed to prove the inadequacy of that 
 security in Indian conditions. Experience shows that the 
 franchise will be used unwillingly and sparingly, that 
 electioneering will fall chiefly into the hands of glib lawyers, 
 and that the mass of voters will be as clay in the hands of 
 the potter, if they can be induced to record their votes at 
 all. We may apply the maxim of Bagehot that a very 
 large constituency is ' the necessary, almost the legitimate, 
 subject of electioneering management'. That is the expe- 
 rience everywhere. It offers but cold comfort to the non- 
 Brahman memorialists. 
 
 Is it too much to expect that the readers of this chapter 
 will agree that the authors of the Eeport are at times misled 
 by l vain visions ' and in so far are unsafe guides?
 
 CHAPTER 6 
 
 THE PEOPOSALS OF THE EEPOKT AND 
 SUGGESTIONS FEOM OTHEE SOUECES 
 
 Five main heads of the Report. The Eeport, as all 
 students of it know to their cost, is long and contains much 
 matter of various kinds. Its specific recommendations, 
 however, may be condensed into a comparatively small 
 space. They may be classified under five main heads, 
 namely, those referring to (1) the Government of India, 
 its constitution, and its relations with the Secretary of State 
 and Parliament ; (2) the Provincial Governments, with an 
 elaborate scheme for dividing their jurisdiction between 
 ' transferred ' and ' reserved ' subjects ; (3) local self-govern- 
 ment ; (4) the public services, more especially the Indian 
 Civil Service ; and (5) franchise. 
 
 Summary of head 1. The lucid summary printed by 
 Mr. Marriott, M.P., in the Nineteenth Century for September, 
 1918, gives the best short account of the recommendations 
 under head 1, and I therefore take the liberty of reprint- 
 ing it. 
 
 ' 1. The Government of India. 
 
 1 The authors propose : (i) to give to the Imperial Parlia- 
 ment a more direct participation in Indian government by 
 (a) putting the salary of the Secretary of State upon the 
 Parliamentary Estimates ; and (b) setting up at the begin- 
 ning of each session a Select Committee of the House of 
 Commons which shall present an annual report to the 
 House on Indian affairs ; (c) providing for a formal review, 
 at stated intervals, of Indian policy ; (ii) to keep the (Cen- 
 tral) Government of India responsible to Parliament alone,
 
 58 PEOPOSALS OF THE EEPOET AND 
 
 but to reorganize the Government by (a) enlarging the 
 Legislative Council to 100 members and giving it a majority 
 of elected members ; (6) setting up a Council of State or 
 Second Chamber, half official, half non-official, which in 
 matters certified as essential by the Government shall " have 
 the last or the only word " ; (c) instituting a Privy Council 
 of India " as a means of honouring and employing ripe 
 wisdom or meritorious service " ; (d) giving greater elasticity 
 " both in respect of size and distribution of work to the 
 Governor-General's Executive Council and admitting thereto 
 a Second Indian member ", and finally (e) instituting a 
 Council of Princes as a permanent consultative body, which 
 should be invited to appoint annually a small Standing 
 Committee to which the Viceroy might refer any difficulties 
 affecting the Native States.' 
 
 2. Provincial Governments. 
 
 Summary of head 2. For exhibiting the proposed com- 
 plicated constitution of Provincial Governments, it is conve- 
 nient to utilize the official summary appended to the Eeport, 
 omitting certain minor clauses for the sake of brevity. 
 
 THE PROVINCES, 
 
 Para. 189 23. The Provincial Governments to be given 
 the widest independence from superior control in 
 legislative, administrative, and financial matters 
 which is compatible with the due discharge of 
 their own responsibilities by the Government of 
 India. 
 
 215, 218, 24. Responsible government in the provinces 
 219, 238, to be attained first by the devolution of responsi- 
 260 bility in certain subjects called hereafter the 
 transferred subjects (all other subjects being called 
 reserved subjects), and then by gradually increas- 
 ing this devolution by successive stages until com- 
 plete responsibility is reached. 
 
 Provincial Executives. 
 
 214, 218, 25. The Executive Government in a province to 
 
 220 consist of a Governor and Executive Council, a 
 
 Minister or Ministers nominated by the Governor
 
 SUGGESTIONS FEOM OTHEE SOURCES 59 
 
 from the elected members of the Legislative Coun- 
 cil, and an additional Member or Members without 
 portfolios. 
 
 26. The Executive Council to consist of two Para. 218 
 Members, one of whom will be an Indian. 
 
 Reserved subjects to be in the charge of the 218 
 Governor and the Members of the Executive 
 Council. 
 
 27. The Minister or Ministers to be appointed 218, 219 
 for the term of the Legislative Council, and to have 
 charge of the transferred subjects. 
 
 28. The additional Member or Members to be 220 
 appointed by the Governor from among his senior 
 officials for purposes of consultation and advice 
 only. 
 
 29. The Government thus constituted to de- 219, 221 
 liberate generally as a whole, but the Governor to 
 
 have power to summon either part of his Govern- 
 ment to deliberate with him separately. De- 
 cisions on reserved subjects and on the supply for 
 them in the provincial budget to rest with the 
 Governor and his Executive Council : decisions 
 on transferred subjects and the supply for them 
 with the Governor and the Ministers. 
 
 Provincial Legislatures. 
 
 31. In each province an enlarged Legislative 225, 232, 
 Council with a substantial elected majority to be 233 
 established. The Council to consist of (1) mem- 
 bers elected on as broad a franchise as possible, 
 
 (2) nominated including (a) official and (&) non- 
 official members, (3) ex-officio members. The 
 franchise and the composition of the Legislative 
 Council to be determined by regulations to be 
 made on the advice of the Committee described in 
 paragraph 53 by the Governor-General in Council, 
 with the sanction of the Secretary of State, and 
 laid before Pai-liament. 
 
 32. The Governor to be President of the Legis- 236 
 lative Council with power to appoint a Vice- 
 President.
 
 60 PROPOSALS OF THE REPORT AND 
 
 Para. 254 33. The Governor to have power to dissolve 
 the Legislative Council. 
 
 237 34. Resolutions (except on the budget) to have 
 
 effect only as recommendations. 
 
 233 35. Nominated official members to have free- 
 
 dom of speech and vote except when Government 
 otherwise directs. 
 
 252 39. Legislation on all subjects normally to be 
 
 passed in the Legislative Council. Exceptional 
 procedure is provided in the succeeding para- 
 graphs. 
 
 252 40. The Governor to have power to certify that 
 
 a bill dealing with reserved subjects is essential 
 either for the discharge of his responsibility for 
 the peace or tranquillity of the province or of any 
 part thereof, or for the discharge of his responsi- 
 bility for reserved subjects. The bill will then, 
 with this certificate, be published in the Gazette. 
 It will be introduced and read in the Legislative 
 Council, and, after discussion on its general prin- 
 ciples, will be referred to a grand committee ; but 
 the Legislative Council may require the Governor 
 to refer to the Government of India, whose de- 
 cision shall be final, the question whether he has 
 rightly decided that the bill which he has certified 
 was concerned with a reserved subject. 
 
 The Governor not to certify a bill if he is of 
 opinion that the question of the enactment of the 
 legislation may safely be left to the Legislative 
 Council. 
 
 252 41. The grand committee (the composition of 
 which may vary according to the subject-matter 
 of the bill) to comprise from 40 to 50 per cent, of 
 the Legislative Council. The members to be 
 chosen partly by election by ballot, partly by 
 nomination. The Governor to have power to 
 nominate a bare majority (in addition to himself), 
 but not more than two-thirds of the nominated 
 members to be officials. 
 
 253 42. The bill as passed in grand committee to be 
 reported to the Legislative Council, which may 
 again discuss it generally within such time limits
 
 SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES 61 
 
 as may be laid down, but may not amend it 
 except on the motion of a Member of the Execu- 
 tive Council or reject it. After such discussion 
 the bill to pass automatically, but during such 
 discussion the Legislative Council may record by 
 resolution any objection felt to the principle or 
 details, and any such resolution to be transmitted 
 with the Act to the Governor-General and the 
 Secretary of State. 
 
 43. Any Member of the Executive Council to Para. 254 
 have the right to challenge the whole or any part 
 
 of a bill on its introduction, or any amendment 
 when moved, on the ground that it trenches on 
 the reserved field of legislation. The Governor 
 to have the choice then either of allowing the 
 bill to proceed in the Legislative Council, or of 
 certifying the bill, clause, or amendment. If 
 he certifies the bill, clause, or amendment the 
 Governor may either decline to allow it to be 
 discussed, or suggest to the Legislative Council 
 an amended bill or clause, or at the request of 
 the Legislative Council refer the bill to a Grand 
 Committee. 
 
 44. All provincial legislation to require the 254 
 assent of the Governor and the Governor-General 
 
 and to be subject to disallowance by His Majesty. 
 
 45. The veto of the Governor to include power 254 
 of return for amendment. 
 
 46. The Governor- General to have power to 254 
 reserve provincial Acts. 
 
 Finance. 
 
 47. A complete separation to be made between 200, 201 
 Indian and provincial heads of revenue. 
 
 48. Provincial contributions to the Government 206 & 256 
 of India to be the first charge on provincial reve- 
 nues. 
 
 49. Provincial Governments to have certain 210, 211 
 powers of taxation and of borrowing. 
 
 50. The budget to be laid before the Legislative 256 
 Council. If the Legislative Council refuses to 
 accept the budget proposals for reserved subjects
 
 62 PROPOSALS OF THE REPORT AND 
 
 the Governor in Council to have power to restore 
 the whole or any part of the original allotment, 
 on the Governor's certifying that, for reasons to 
 be stated, such restoration is in his opinion essen- 
 tial either to the peace or tranquillity of the 
 province or any part thereof, or to the discharge of 
 his responsibility for reserved subjects. Except 
 in so far as he exercises this power, the budget to 
 be altered so as to give effect to resolutions of the 
 Legislative Council. 
 
 Modification of Provincial Constitutions. 
 
 Para. 260 52. Five years after the first meeting of the new 
 Councils the Government of India to consider any 
 applications addressed to it by a provincial Govern- 
 ment or a provincial Legislative Council for the 
 modification of the list of reserved and trans- 
 ferred subjects. In such cases the Government 
 of India with the sanction of the Secretary of 
 State to have power to transfer any reserved sub- 
 ject, or in case of serious maladministration to 
 remove to the reserved list any subjects already 
 transferred and to have power also to order that 
 the salary of the Ministers shall be specifically 
 voted each year by the Legislative Council. The 
 Legislative Council to have the right of deciding at 
 the same or any subsequent time by resolution 
 that such salary be specifically voted yearly. 
 
 3. Local Self-government. 
 
 Summary of head 3. The authors of the Report have 
 not much to say concerning local self-government in areas 
 smaller than a province, that is to say, in divisions, districts, 
 cities, towns, and rural circles. 
 
 They give at the close of paragraph 188 their ' first 
 formula', which is: 'There should be, as far as possible, 
 complete popular control in local bodies, and the largest 
 possible independence for them of outside control.' 
 
 That proposition is developed by some remarks in
 
 SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES 63 
 
 paragraphs 192-197, with an intimation that the subject is 
 under the consideration of the governments in India. 
 
 4. TJie Public Services, especially the Civil Service of India, 
 commonly called the Indian Civil Service. 
 
 Summary of head 4. The thorny subject of the ser- 
 vices is dealt with, not very comprehensively or satis- 
 factorily, in paragraphs 313-327. The official summary 
 is as follows : 
 
 64. Any racial bars that still exist in regula- Para. 315 
 tions or appointments to the public services to be 
 abolished. 
 
 65. In addition to recruitment in England, 316 
 where such exists, a system of appointment to all 
 
 the public services to be established in India. 
 
 66. Percentages of recruitment in India, with 316, 317 
 definite rate of increase, to be fixed for all these 
 services. 
 
 67. In the Indian Civil Service the percentage 317 
 to be 33 per cent, of the superior posts, increasing 
 annually by 1 per cent, until the position is 
 reviewed by the Commission (paragraph 56). 
 
 68. Rates of pay to be reconsidered with refer- 318-321 
 ence to the rise in the cost of living and the need 
 
 for maintaining the standard of recruitment. In- 
 cremental time-scales to be introduced generally 
 and increments to continue until the superior 
 grade is attained. The maximum of ordinary 
 pension to be raised to Rs. 6,000 payable at the 
 rate of Is. 9d. to the rupee, with special pensions 
 for certain high appointments. Indian Civil Ser- 
 vice annuities to be made non-contributory, but 
 contributions to continue to be funded. Leave 
 rules to be reconsidered with a view to greater 
 elasticity, reduction of excessive amounts of leave 
 admissible, and concession of reduced leave on 
 full pay. The accumulation of privilege leave up 
 to four months to be considered. 
 
 69. A rate of pay based on recruitment in India 322 
 to be fixed for all public services, but a suitable
 
 64 PEOPOSALS OF THE REPORT AND 
 
 allowance to be granted to persons recruited in 
 Europe or on account of qualifications obtained in 
 Europe, and the converse principle to be applied 
 to Indians employed in Europe. 
 
 It does not seem necessary to give a formal summary 
 of the remarks of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy 
 concerning the Native or Protected States, commissions 
 in the army, and certain other matters touched on in 
 the Report. 
 
 Various suggestions from other sources will now be 
 collected. 
 
 Head 5. It will be convenient to treat the fifth subject, 
 the franchise, in connexion with those suggestions. The 
 authors of the Report have not much to say on the matter, 
 which has been handed over to a committee operating 
 in India. The Report remains incomplete pending the 
 result of the investigations of that committee. 
 
 Proposal of a Royal Viceroy. The Aga Khan (p. 77, &c.) 
 would have the Viceroy when practicable the son or 
 brother of the Sovereign, holding office on a non-political 
 tenure. His Prime Minister should be appointed for the 
 same term of office, about five years, and ' the Viceroy and 
 Prime Minister would choose their British and Indian 
 colleagues of the Cabinet'. The business of the Empire 
 would be for the most part conducted by the Prime Minister 
 and his colleagues, so that the Viceroy would be free to 
 make extended tours, to 'set the tone of Indian and not 
 merely high official society, and to generally encourage the 
 development of social life in the provinces '. He should be 
 the patron of the arts, and the source of all honours. 
 
 Mr. Vyasa Rao (pp. 75-85, 352) agrees that the Viceroy, 
 as the direct representative of the Sovereign, should be 
 a prince of the blood royal, and that he should be in imme- 
 diate contact with the ruling princes of India. But, instead 
 of entrusting the administration to a Prime Minister,
 
 SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES 65 
 
 Mr. Vyasa Rao would prefer to place it in the hands of 
 a Governor-General, taking precedence after the Viceroy, 
 and so to preserve the ancient statutory office of Governor- 
 General. He argues that the combination in one person of 
 the two distinct offices of Viceroy and Governor-General 
 is inexpedient. 
 
 A Senate. The Aga Khan looks forward to a federal 
 constitution presided over by the Government of India, 
 vested with powers of general control, and retaining in its 
 own hands the army, navy, foreign relations, and certain 
 other depai'tments. After the establishment of a federal 
 constitution, embracing the Protected States as well as 
 British India, the small amount of centralized legislation 
 necessary would be best effected by a Senate comprising 
 representatives both of the States and the Provinces. ' The 
 Government of India would be the connecting bond between 
 great national provinces and principalities, united for 
 common purposes, but varying in organic and natural 
 unity, representing their diversified history, races, religions, 
 and languages.' His Highness believes that India when 
 thus federated would attract to itself the neighbouring nations 
 and become the leading partner in an immense South 
 Asiatic^Federation. 
 
 Reference to Secretary of State. Mr. Vyasa Rao would 
 retain the Imperial Legislative Council for British India, 
 restricting the actual voting to non-official members, while 
 the official members should be entitled to join in the debates, 
 but not to vote. Thus the undignified spectacle of the official 
 Noc voting to order would be avoided, and in the event of 
 the non- official verdict being rejected by the Government of 
 India the difference should be referred to the Secretary of 
 State for final decision, or alternatively to a Board of Arbitra- 
 tion in London. In that way deadlocks due to conflict be- 
 tween the legislature and the executive would be obviated, 
 and an official majority of votes need not be maintained.
 
 66 PROPOSALS OF THE REPORT AND 
 
 India Office. All reformers, including Mr. Montagu and 
 Lord Chelmsford, are agreed that the minute control now 
 exercised by the India Office should be materially relaxed, 
 and that the Government of India, however constituted, 
 should be given greater freedom of action than it now 
 enjoys. Such freedom is in no way dependent on the form 
 of internal constitution adopted for the Government of 
 India. The further suggestion is made by Mr. Vyasa Rao 
 that the Council of the Secretary of State should be abolished 
 and replaced by a small Committee of the India Office, 
 entrusted with the business of the Office, except the patronage, 
 which the Secretary of State should retain in his own hands. 
 Mr. Vyasa Rao desires that the India Office should ' become, 
 when the Council ceases to exist, an office of record and an 
 agency for the transaction of business on behalf of the 
 Secretary of State and the Government of India, maintained 
 out of Indian revenues '. Any control necessary should be 
 exercised by Parliament through the responsible minister, 
 the Secretary of State, who should be 'unfettered by the 
 shackles ' of the Council, and free to exercise his discretion 
 independently (p. 318). 
 
 Provincial finance. All parties seem to be agreed that 
 the finance of the Provincial Governments should be dis- 
 entangled from that of the Government of India. The 
 financial proposals of the Secretary of State and Viceroy are 
 contained in paragraphs 200-211 of the Report. Mr. Vyasa 
 Rao proposes that each provincial administi'ation should pay 
 to the Supreme Government a fixed percentage of its income, 
 so that each province may defray its upkeep and the 
 development of its resources, while making a fair contribu- 
 tion for imperial purposes. The principle of the final 
 separation of imperial from provincial finance being 
 accepted, the details can be worked out by experts and in 
 debate on the India Bill which must be introduced. Re- 
 formers of Indian birth are eager to secure the admission that
 
 SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES 67 
 
 the Government of India, however constituted, ' should be 
 free to pursue in fiscal questions the policy most advan- 
 tageous for the country '. No claim is more popular or 
 pressed with greater insistence. 
 
 The necessities of Indian conditions plainly require the 
 reservation by the Government of India of extensive execu- 
 tive powers to be exercised on due occasion. The Report 
 (paragraph 289) frankly recognizes the fact that the Supreme 
 Government must be provided with 'the machinery of 
 autocracy ' to be used in ' essential cases '. 
 
 His Highness the Aga Khan, who would entrust the 
 control of finance and legislation, especially in the provinces, 
 to elective assemblies, is convinced that ' a strong and 
 independent executive ' is required everywhere. 
 
 Provincial governments. All parties are agreed that 
 the government of the major provinces should consist of 
 a Governor and Executive Council, such council being 
 appointed, if it does not already exist. While it is recognized 
 that several of the existing provinces are inconveniently 
 large for the efficient working of a government on lines 
 more popular than at present, the Aga Khan is strongly 
 opposed to a suggestion for breaking up the existing 
 provinces into smaller units, based on race, language, and 
 other national characteristics. He proposes in lieu of that 
 arrangement certain adjustments of boundaries. He is 
 opposed to the detachment of Burma from the Indian 
 Empire, which is advocated by many people, including 
 Mr. Curtis and the author of this book. Mr. Vyasa Rao 
 would retain Burma as part of the Indian Empire, giving it 
 Presidency rank, like Madras, Bombay, and Bengal. 
 
 The authors of the Report propose an arrangement under 
 which the subjects within the jurisdiction of each provincial 
 government shall be divided into two classes, ' transferred ' 
 and ' reserved '. The plan, sometimes described as 'diarchy ', 
 was borrowed from Mr. Curtis and has not found general
 
 68 PROPOSALS OF THE REPORT AND 
 
 favour with other reformers, or public opinion. In this 
 place it is sufficient to say that the proposed machinery is 
 excessively intricate and admittedly difficult to work. 
 
 The Aga Khan would be content with an enlarged elective 
 assembly ' to control finance and legislation ', and ' a strong 
 independent executive, responsible to the Viceroy and 
 Secretary of State for tenure of office and appointment '. 
 If the elective assembly should reject a Government bill, he 
 suggests that the bill simply should be dropped. 
 
 His idea that a ruling prince might be invited to leave his 
 own territories and assume charge of a province in British 
 India is not likely to be realized. 
 
 His Highness would like to see a Senate or second 
 chamber of notables constituted for each province. 
 
 Mr. Vyasa Rao is of opinion that the governor or 
 lieutenant-governor of a province ordinarily should not be 
 a member of the Civil Service of India, ' the best available 
 British and Indian talent ' being utilized to fill the appoint- 
 ments, and that the Presidency form of government should 
 be the model. 
 
 General agreement exists that the provinces should be 
 much more autonomous than they now are, autonomy 
 meaning freedom from the detailed administrative and 
 financial control of the Government of India. 
 
 Local self-government. The Aga Khan, after noting 
 the ill success in Russia of plans for working local self- 
 government in connexion with a centralized bureaucracy, 
 observes that 
 
 'happily the constant friction arising from the Russian 
 experiment has not been reproduced in India, for the good 
 and simple reason that the real power has never been out of 
 the hands of the bureaucracy '. 
 
 He holds that the existence of an elective assembly at the 
 head-quarters of the provincial government secures local 
 co-operation, and that it is necessary that the application of
 
 SUGGESTIONS FEOM OTHER SOURCES 69 
 
 popular control in the State should precede real local self- 
 government in the smaller areas. Lord Crewe expressed 
 the same idea in the House of Lords on October 24, 1918, 
 when he doubted if the encouragement of local self-govern- 
 ment should not ' begin at the top '. 
 
 ' That ', he said, ' was undoubtedly what we had done in 
 this country. We started with something like a free and 
 liberally elected Parliament in 1832, and it was not until 
 two generations afterwards that we established county, 
 district, and parish councils.' 
 
 The Aga Khan makes the practical suggestion that in 
 order to give life to local self-government each province-state 
 should be equipped with a ministry similar in function to 
 the English Local Government Board, which, as Lord Ripon 
 intended, ' should revise and check the acts of local bodies, 
 but not dictate them '. That reasonable arrangement is very 
 different from the unworkable ' diarchy ' of the Report. 
 His Highness believes that an elastic system could thus be 
 built up, reaching down to the village pancliayat of elders. 
 
 Mr. Vyasa Rao approaches the problem from another 
 point of view, and, in agreement with Lord Morley, would 
 make ' the village a starting-point of public life '. While 
 recognizing the truth that modern conditions make it ' well- 
 nigh impossible ' to restore the village organizations of 
 ancient times, he believes that village autonomy can be 
 revived, and all small causes and local matters left to the 
 panch for disposal, without the intervention of lawyers. 
 His proposal is not inconsistent with that of the Aga Khan, 
 but he does not refer to the fact that nearly a century ago 
 an attempt to restore panchayats in the Madras Presidency 
 was not a success, because the people did not care to use 
 them. 
 
 Public services. We now turn to the more difficult and 
 controversial subject of the Public Services, and more 
 especially of the Civil Service of India, the corps d'e'lite now
 
 70 PKOPOSALS OF THE EEPOKT AND 
 
 (Government of India Act, 1915) called the Indian Civil 
 Service, which at present has the largest share of the 
 government in its hands, and is admitted to hold a most 
 honourable record. 
 
 The recommendations in the Keport cannot be said to 
 grapple firmly with the problem. They deal chiefly with 
 comparatively minor matters concerning pay, pension, and 
 leave. The general remarks and sententious advice of the 
 Secretary of State and the Viceroy will be found in para- 
 graphs 323-327. 
 
 Indian Civil Service. Everybody seems to beagieed 
 that it is desirable, if possible, to maintain for many 
 years to come the specially trained Indian Civil Service as 
 a body of experts, qualified by training and experience to 
 undertake heavy responsibilities in the course of their 
 career. Nobody seems to want at present to abolish the 
 District Officer, otherwise called Magistrate and Collector, 
 or Deputy Commissioner, who is the mainstay of the adminis- 
 tration. Mr. Vyasa Rao would like to see him aided by an 
 advisory District Assembly, meeting twice a year, and chiefly 
 devoted to the ventilation of local grievances. It is evident 
 that the changed conditions contemplated by reformers 
 may make the career of an Indian Civil Servant so un- 
 attractive that it may be impossible to induce men of the 
 requisite character and ability to join the Service. The 
 authors of the Keport see that danger, and endeavour to 
 avert it by their proposals above mentioned. But they 
 touch only lightly on the real difficulties, which go deeper 
 than questions of pay, pension, and leave. 
 
 Project of a training college. Mr. Archer treats the 
 subject with more insight in the ' postscript-proem ' (dated 
 May, 1917) prefixed to his book, India and the Future. He 
 sees the truth that the object should be to catch the young 
 men who feel a call to India, and not merely those who go 
 solely for the sake of the material prospects offered. He
 
 SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES 71 
 
 advocates the establishment of a reformed Haileybury 
 College, where all youths destined for the Indian Services 
 generally would be trained together, without distinction of 
 race or colour ; where all the students would feel themselves 
 dedicated to the service of India, and would be trained ' in 
 a place where India should always be present, predominant, 
 enthroned '. I have held the same opinion for many years 
 past and am glad to learn that it has the powerful support 
 of Lord Sydenham of Combe. 
 
 Sir John Hewett draws a gloomy picture of the effect of 
 the ' reforms ' on the services, and gives good reason for 
 believing that the Indian Civil Service, in particular, has 
 been ' going down the hill ', at least since 1908. The con- 
 dition of the Indian Medical Service also is far from 
 satisfactory. 
 
 Sec. 87 of Charter Act of 1833. In all discussions 
 of Service questions it is of the highest importance to bear 
 in mind constantly the binding provisions of section 87 
 of the Charter Act of 1833, which runs : 
 
 ' No native of the said territories nor any natural-born 
 subject of His Majesty resident therein shall by reason 
 of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of 
 them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employ- 
 ment under the Company.' 
 
 That comprehensive statutory enactment is still in force 
 and cannot be affected by the action of any Secretary of 
 State or Viceroy. Its provisions were emphasized by the 
 Directors, who laid down the principle that ' no subject 
 of the King, whether of Indian, British, or mixed descent, 
 shall be excluded either from the posts usually conferred on 
 our uncovenanted servants in India, or from the covenanted 
 service itself, provided he be otherwise eligible, &c.' The 
 terms apply equally to all persons domiciled or resident in 
 India, whether Europeans or others. Any proposal to 
 impose a statutory obligation that any particular office
 
 72 PROPOSALS OF THE REPORT AND 
 
 should be held by an ' Indian ', in the sense of the old word 
 ' native ', is equivalent to the disqualification of Europeans 
 in virtue of their 'religion, place of birth, descent, colour, 
 or any of them '. The proposals made by the Public 
 Services Commission and by the authors of the Report 
 frequently offend against that canon, especially in requiring 
 a fixed ' Indian ' percentage in the Civil Service. Such 
 proposals clearly introduce new racial distinctions in contra- 
 vention of the Act and of the clear declaration by the 
 authors of the Report (paragraph 315) that they would 
 ' remove from the regulations the few remaining distinctions 
 that are based on race, and would make appointments to all 
 branches of the public service without racial discrimination '. 
 They have failed to see that their recommendations over 
 and over again introduce fresh racial discrimination in a 
 novel form as against Europeans or persons of European 
 descent. 
 
 If, in future, as proposed by the Report, many first 
 appointments now made in England are to be made in 
 India, they must be open to all classes alike. Any formal 
 rule excluding Europeans or Anglo-Indians (otherwise called 
 Eurasians), 1 Jews, or any other class, infringes the Act of 
 1833, which ' Indians ' in the narrower sense have been 
 accustomed to regard as their Magna Carta. That principle 
 is often disregarded by amateur reformers as well as by the 
 authors of the Report. It is needless to give instances. 
 
 A sharp distinction must be drawn between customary 
 practice and a formal rule purporting to have the effect 
 of law. For instance, it may properly become an ordinary 
 practice to appoint a certain proportion of ' Indians ' to 
 Executive Councils, always provided that they are ' qualified 
 
 1 The use of the term 'Anglo-Indians' for 'Eurasians', commonly 
 supposed to be a perverse innovation made by Lord Hardinge of 
 Penshursf, is nearly a century old (Sir John Malcolm, Pol. Hist, of 
 India, 1826, vol. ii, pp. 260-4).
 
 SUGGESTIONS FEOM OTHER SOURCES 73 
 
 by their education, ability, and integrity', as required by 
 Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858, but a formal rule 
 that so many members must be 'Indians' imposes a racial 
 qualification with the correlative racial disqualification, and 
 consequently is ultra vires as being opposed to both the Act 
 of 1833 and the proclamation of 1858. Those enactments 
 require the preservation of freedom in the choice of fit 
 persons without any racial bar. Mr. Vyasa Rao rightly 
 urges the necessity of giving ' full and free ' play to both 
 the British and the ' Indian ' elements in the Services. 
 
 Various suggestions. The Aga Khan's suggestion that 
 non-official persons should be appointed occasionally as 
 district officers does not seem to be practicable for various 
 reasons. His proposal that Commissioners of Divisions, 
 where they exist, may be abolished, would effect a small 
 financial saving and deserves consideration. 
 
 The Madras Presidency manages to get on without such 
 officers, but something may be said in defence of their 
 retention in the other Presidencies. They were first 
 appointed by Lord William Cavendish-Bentinck about 
 1830. 
 
 Mr. Vyasa Rao deduces two principles on which to base 
 the reorganization of the Services, namely (1) the absolute 
 and entire abolition of all racial disability, which has been 
 dealt with sufficiently, and (2) ' the fashioning of the services 
 in regard to pay, prospects, and pension so as to meet the 
 actual needs of the country, and not so as to furnish a 
 selection of offices and openings for men of British birth '. 
 That principle, also, may be accepted as sound. The 
 difficulty lies in the application and the ascertainment 
 of ' the needs of the country ', so long as a considerable 
 British element is necessary. 
 
 The same author works out a scheme for reorganization, 
 but I do not propose to go into details, which require 
 examination by a competent committee. When an Indain
 
 74 PROPOSALS OF THE REPOET AND 
 
 Bill comes to be drafted, the difficult problem will have 
 to be faced and solved somehow. The solution certainly 
 will not coincide exactly with any of the tentative schemes 
 proposed by individuals. It may be that in course of time 
 the Indian Civil Service, notwithstanding its glorious 
 record, may become superfluous, but that time is not yet. 
 
 5. Franchise. 
 
 Franchise. Questions relating to the franchise cannot be 
 treated in any detail with advantage until the Commissions 
 at work in India shall have reported, but even now certain 
 large issues may be considered. 
 
 Female franchise. The Aga Khan maintains, with 
 his accustomed boldness, that ' no scheme of political re- 
 form based on the co-operation of the people with the rulers 
 can or will succeed, if it is vitiated by the radical defect 
 of closing the door to women on the irrational ground of sex, 
 and not accepting equal qualifications as conferring equal 
 rights '. 
 
 Inasmuch as the franchise in India must necessarily 
 be restricted in many ways, he sees no difficulty in the 
 admission of women. The suggestion does not appear to 
 have been made by anybody else, and few people are likely 
 to accept the proposal of His Highness. 
 
 Representation of interests. General agreement exists 
 that the conditions of India preclude the universal demarca- 
 tion of purely territorial areas for constituencies as the basis 
 of the franchise. While we may be permitted sometimes to 
 feel doubts about the suitability of elective representation in 
 India at all, elections by small constituencies to seats in 
 Legislative Councils having been legalized since 1909, the 
 assumption may be made that Parliament will sanction and 
 require a considerable development of the use of elections. 
 
 Purely territorial demarcations of electoral areas being 
 admittedly impracticable, the possible modifications of such
 
 SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES 75 
 
 areas are two only, namely (1) the representation of distinct 
 ; interests ', which Mr. Vyasa Rao terms ' institutional ', and 
 (2) the representation of communities, generally described 
 as ' communal '. The representation of special interests, 
 such as Chambers of Commerce, the mill industry, the 
 talukdars of Oudh, &c., has been recognized in the Morley- 
 Minto reforms, and seems destined to stay. That arrange- 
 ment, in addition to its obvious convenience in India, has 
 the historical advantage of being in accord with ancient 
 English practice, as described by Bagehot (English Const., 
 6th ed., p. 173), who states correctly that our ancestors 
 
 laboured to give a character to the various constituencies, 
 or to many of them. They wished that the shipping trade, 
 the wool trade, the linen trade should each have their 
 spokesman ; that the unsectional Parliament should know 
 what each section of the nation thought before it gave 
 the national decision.' 
 
 It may be assumed that such sectional or ; institutional ' 
 representation will be continued in India as a practical 
 necessity. Mr. Vyasa Rao, indeed, would give the principle 
 a wide extension. He does not share the love of the authors 
 of the Report for ' direct representation ' of the individuals 
 in each constituency, which he does not advocate at present. 
 On the other hand, he holds it to be necessary that the 
 representation of institutions and interests should be direct, 
 without any filtration through Provincial Councils. 
 
 'Communal' representation. The subject of 'com- 
 munal ' representation is far more controversial, and the 
 system undoubtedly is liable to weighty objections. Lord 
 Morley unwillingly consented to give the Muhammadan 
 community separate representation, a precedent now found 
 to be extremely inconvenient. The Muhammadans will not 
 surrender their privilege, so that Mr. Vyasa Rao's advice 
 that it should be withdrawn or ' wiped out ' cannot be 
 adopted. In fact, the Secretary of State and the Viceroy
 
 76 PROPOSALS OF THE REPORT AND 
 
 propose to extend the privilege to the Sikhs, a much less 
 easily defined community. It is extremely difficult to 
 define a Sikh for electoral purposes. It is practically 
 certain that but for the existence of the Sikh regiments 
 with their strong esprit de corps the Sikhs before now 
 would have been for the most part merged in Hinduism. 
 
 Where is communal representation to stop? Every 
 creed, sect, and social section obviously cannot claim 
 separate representation. The arguments against the system 
 are stated forcibly by Mr. Vyasa Rao. On the other hand, 
 the claim to such representation is pressed most insistently 
 by many classes and communities, who fear the domination 
 of Brahmans, lawyers, and so forth. 
 
 The Aga Khan strongly supports the claim to communal 
 representation, which he would extend widely, so that each 
 of the religions and races would ' provincially be a millet, to 
 use the Turkish term, and each would have a fair share in 
 the assembly directly elected '. He would allow special 
 representation, for instance, to the huge mass of the non- 
 Brahmans of Madras, whose contentions are upheld vigor- 
 ously by the Indo-British Association. That body advo- 
 cates the adoption of the ' communal principle ' generally, so 
 that all large communities, or groups of communities, may 
 be represented by their own members. The principle is 
 held to be essential in a caste-ridden country. 
 
 The ' Spectator '. The Spectator, while willing to accept 
 the suggestions of the Association, would prefer to summon 
 ' a purely native body ', a sort of Indian National Con- 
 vention, and ask that body to frame a plan, including 
 specific suggestions for breaking down caste and providing 
 adequate securities for minorities of various kinds. That 
 plan is impossible, as will be apparent to anybody who 
 takes the trouble to read carefully Chapter 4 in this book. 
 The Spectator holds that ' nothing will be done of permanent 
 value in the direction of Indian self-government till the
 
 SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES 77 
 
 caste system is got rid of, or so greatly modified as to 
 be harmless. Such a change, it is argued, cannot be 
 imposed from outside, and can be effected, if at all, only by 
 the ' general assent of the majority of the Indian peoples '. 
 That aspiration is a ' vain vision ', because the required 
 ' general assent ' cannot forcibly be attained. Hindus, with 
 few exceptions, do not wish to abolish caste, and cannot 
 imagine themselves in a casteless condition. 
 
 Various proposals. The Indo-British Association and 
 Lord Sydenham of Combe would seek to progress along the 
 path of ' self-government ' and to move towards ' the goal of 
 responsible government ', by the ' geographical method ', 
 explained as follows : 
 
 'In every province place one or two districts wholly 
 under the Indian members of the different services. This 
 has been done in Bengal, but the experiment is inconclusive 
 because of the want of a revenue system. If, after a period 
 of trial, this system is proved to work well, other districts 
 can be similarly staffed. Later a Commissioner's division 
 can be so handed over, and the process, if shown to be 
 successful, can be continued until a whole province comes 
 under Indian rule in the future.' 
 
 It seems unnecessary to discuss certain constitutional 
 schemes worked out by Mr. Curtis and other people, which 
 have been examined at length in the Report, and deservedly 
 rejected. 
 
 The principal suggestions for reform made officially and 
 otherwise having been reviewed, a few pages will be devoted 
 to criticism, chiefly of the principles and proposals of the 
 Report.
 
 CHAPTEK 7 
 
 CEITICISM 
 
 A CONSIDERABLE amount of criticism both on the Report 
 and on suggestions from other quarters has been included 
 in the earlier chapters of this book, but some remarks of 
 a critical nature remain to be made, which possibly may 
 prove helpful to the authorities with whom the final 
 momentous decision must rest. 
 
 Principle of the Report. The most fundamental enun- 
 ciation of principle in the Report is that expressed in 
 paragraph 7 in the following words : 
 
 ' The policy, so far as Western communities are con- 
 cerned, is an old and tried one. Englishmen believe in 
 responsible government as the best form of government 
 that they know; and now in response to requests from 
 India they have promised to extend it to India also under 
 the conditions set out in the announcement. We need not 
 dwell on the colossal nature of the enterprise, or on the 
 immense issues of welfare or misery which hang upon its 
 success or failure.' 
 
 That enunciation may be analysed into two propositions, 
 namely (1) that a policy, assumed to have been successful in 
 Western communities, can be applied to India ; and (2) that 
 such a policy ought to be applied to India, even at the 
 request of an admittedly small body of Indians, because 
 Englishmen believe it to be intrinsically the best. 
 
 The second proposition may be considered first. Few 
 Englishmen either know or care much about India. The 
 ignorance of the bulk of the new constituencies on the sub-
 
 CRITICISM 79 
 
 ject is abysmal, and the mere fact that voters steeped in 
 ignorance may believe their own favourite institution to be 
 suitable for a country concerning which they know prac- 
 tically nothing is no reason for forcing their crude prejudices 
 upon a helpless dependency. It is the business of leaders 
 to lead, and it is the plain duty of well-informed statesmen 
 to guide their less instructed countrymen, who should not 
 be left to follow blindly the dictates of their prepossession 
 in favour of democratic formulae supposed to be of universal 
 application. The prepossession undoubtedly exists and con- 
 stitutes a grave danger in present conditions. It is in- 
 dispensable that the democracy should be given guidance 
 when dealing with subjects out of the range of its expe- 
 rience. The belief of the ordinary British voter that 
 ' responsible government ' is the best possible form of 
 government for any country is in reality wholly irrelevant. 
 
 The true issue. The true issue is whether or not such 
 government is for the good of India and also of England. 
 We must assume that the close political connexion of the 
 two countries will subsist for many years, and that conse- 
 quently benefits or injuries done to India will react upon 
 England. While proposals of reform must contemplate 
 primarily the good of India, their reflex action upon England 
 should not be overlooked. If ' responsible government ' in 
 the parliamentary sense be not really suitable for India and 
 yet should be forced upon her by doctrinaire politicians, 
 both India and England Avill feel the ill effects. If states- 
 men come to the conclusion that such government, whatever 
 be its merits elsewhere, cannot be fitted to India, and they 
 decline accordingly to force it upon that land, their decision 
 will be readily accepted both by the rank and file of the 
 members of parliament and by the constituencies, who will 
 not hesitate to follow the guidance on a difficult and un- 
 familiar subject offered by trusted leaders. 
 
 It might not be difficult to make a strong case for the
 
 80 CRITICISM 
 
 contention that even in Western communities 'responsible 
 government ' has not been an invariable success, but there 
 is no need to go into that question. Assuming ' responsible 
 government' to be the best for Western Europe, ought it to 
 be extended to India, which has little in common with 
 European nations ? If my readers have succeeded in 
 grasping the statements of fact made in Chapters 2, 3, 
 and 4 of this book they can hardly fail to realize the 
 immensity of the gulf which separates India from Europe 
 in matters political. 
 
 A ' new structure '. All parties are agreed that nothing 
 like ' responsible government ' now exists or ever has existed 
 in India. It follows that the new constitution as proposed, 
 aiming at and striving gradually to attain ' the goal of 
 responsible government ', must be an absolute breach of all 
 tradition and continuity. It is a purely foreign invention 
 exported from England. The authors of the Eeport frankly 
 admit that it is so when they say (paragraph 101) that ' the 
 old structure does not admit of development . . . we must, 
 therefore, create a new structure '. That is ' a large order ', 
 if an expressive slang phrase may be excused. Obvious 
 prima facie objections exist against tearing up by the roots 
 old institutions in an Asiatic country inhabited by three 
 hundred millions of people, and replanting the ground with 
 a delicate ' new structure ' imported ready made from 
 Europe. The undertaking is bold, and may be described as 
 rash, perhaps even as reckless. Certainly it is dangerous. 
 
 Cautions. Might it not be wiser to accept the principle 
 enunciated by an ardent and radical reformer, and to be 
 content with a scheme designed to give the least possible 
 occasion for controversy by reason of sudden and abrupt 
 breach with the past? Especially, if, as seems possible, 
 such a scheme can be brought into operation quickly, the 
 superior wisdom of the more cautious course appears to be 
 self-evident.
 
 CRITICISM 81 
 
 The introduction of foreign political machinery seems to 
 be hardly consistent with 'self-government', while action 
 based upon abstract doctrines is notoriously apt to fail in 
 practice. Prudence suggests the expediency of confining 
 the inevitable changes to moderate adaptations of existing 
 machinery. 
 
 The Report, as already noted, ignores the existence of the 
 King-Emperor and makes no attempt to utilize the fervent 
 Indian sentiment of loyalty to His Majesty's person, which, 
 when rightly viewed, presents a golden link uniting the 
 British democracy with the princes and peoples of India. 
 Those reasons and many others which might be elaborated 
 at wearisome length indicate that the fundamental principle 
 of the Report needs searching examination. 
 
 We are thus led to consider the precise meaning of the 
 terms ' self-government ' and ' responsible government '. 
 
 ' Self-government.' The premiss that India must 
 remain ' within the Empire ', and subject to parliamentary 
 control for an indefinite number of years, although not 
 necessarily for ever, rules out the meaning of ' independence ' 
 for the term ' self-government '. 
 
 No responsible politician, Indian or British, proposes that 
 within any time now in sight the political connexion be- 
 tween India and England should be severed in such a way 
 as to leave India absolutely alone with the obligation to 
 defend herself by her own army and navy unaided, as well 
 as to provide a complete civil government. That being 
 clearly impossible, ' self-government ' must mean something 
 much less than complete national independence. A large 
 measure of ' self-government ' or ' autonomy ' in a limited 
 sense can be arranged any day by means of legislation or 
 executive order, simply by relaxing the excessively minute 
 control now exercised by the Secretary of State and the 
 India Office. That kind of ' self-government ' is absolutely 
 independent of the internal form of the Government of
 
 82 CRITICISM 
 
 India, and could be granted if every member of that govern- 
 ment was an Englishman, and if the powers of the govern- 
 ment were autocratic in the strictest sense. All parties are 
 agreed that the external control over the Government of 
 India ought to be relaxed. But such relaxation would not 
 satisfy the demand for ' self-government ', which is under- 
 stood to imply the government of India by Indians, so far 
 as may be. The reformers of Indian birth ardently desire 
 that a much larger proportion of the higher offices should 
 be held by Indians than is now the case, and that general 
 policy, especially in the fiscal domain, should be directed to 
 meet Indian rather than British opinion. 
 
 The government and administration of India by born 
 Indians is only partially attainable. It has been in process 
 of gradual realization for a long time past, and public 
 opinion, British and Indian, is in favour of the extension and 
 quickening of the process within the limits imposed by 
 essential conditions. 
 
 Conditions. One of those conditions is that the naval 
 and military defence of India is an imperial concern and 
 must remain so for a period beyond the ken of present- 
 day politics. Another is that the main lines of policy must 
 conform to the ideas of the British nation, a requirement 
 which involves the retention of a substantial British element 
 in the administration, especially in the higher grades. 
 That limitation of 'self-government ' is frankly acknowledged 
 in the Eeport. A third necessity is that a reasonably high 
 standard of good and progressive government must be 
 maintained with regard to the interests of both India and 
 England. The doctrine, favoured by the authors of the 
 Report, that learners in the school of political evolution 
 should be suffered to make mistakes and endure ' growing 
 pains ' involves grave dangers and must not be pushed 
 too far. 
 
 ' Geographical method.' The ' geographical method '
 
 CRITICISM 83 
 
 for the extension of ' self-government ' (ante, p. 77), as 
 advocated by Lord Sydenham of Cornbe, is unacceptable 
 because it would accentuate racial animosities, as well 
 as for other reasons. 
 
 ' Responsible government ' in England. The term 
 ' responsible government ' is more difficult, obscure, and 
 controversial. 
 
 In modern English politics it means that the Executive 
 Government, composed of members of both Houses of 
 Parliament, is responsible to the House of Commons, and 
 must go out of office when it loses the confidence of that 
 House. Such loss of confidence is usually expressed by 
 an adverse vote deliberately given on a subject which 
 the Government decides to treat as a test question. The 
 defeated Government is bound to resign. When the ministry 
 of party A goes out, another ministry formed from party B 
 comes in. The arrangement postulates the existence of 
 rival organized parties. It further requires that all the 
 principal members of the Executive Government should be 
 also members of either House of Parliament, and that either 
 of the organized parties should be prepared to supply a body 
 of persons qualified to form a capable administration. That 
 definition exactly describes the practice as before the war, 
 but that deadly struggle has somewhat complicated the 
 situation by the introduction of coalition governments and 
 the suspension of ordinary party politics. The tendency, 
 however, is towards the restoration of the party system 
 as soon as peace is declared. In fact, British politicians do 
 not know how to work any other system. 
 
 Indian conditions. It is obvious that similar con- 
 ditions in India do not exist, never have existed, and are not 
 likely to come into existence within any time that can 
 be foreseen. Whether or not it is desirable that they 
 should ever be brought into being in India is a purely 
 speculative matter which need not be discussed. It is 
 
 F2
 
 84 CRITICISM 
 
 certain that 'the goal of responsible government' mentioned 
 in the ' pronouncement ' cannot mean for India exactly 
 what it means to the ordinary member of Parliament. 
 
 Nobody in his senses can expect to live to see the 
 time when the Imperial Legislative Council or Assembly 
 at Delhi shall have expanded into a Parliament with organ- 
 ized parties, capable of supplying from its own members not 
 only one complete ministry, but also an alternative one. 
 
 Definition in the Report. What then is the meaning 
 of the phrase 'the goal of responsible government'? 
 
 It is not easy to say. It certainly cannot bear the 
 ordinary parliamentary signification. The authors of the 
 Eeport, eager to bring the phrase into their programme, 
 have invented a new definition for Indian purposes. Their 
 scheme of ' diarchy ' for provincial governments provides 
 that ' transferred subjects ' shall be in charge of Indian-born 
 ministers selected from the provincial legislative council or 
 assembly, who should be appointed for the duration of that 
 body, namely, three j^ears, and be compelled to seek re- 
 election after that time. For that reason they are described 
 as being ' responsible to their constituents ' (ante, p. 59). 
 The definition will be found in paragraphs 189 and 215, 
 as follows : 
 
 189. ' When we come to the provincial Governments the 
 position is different. Our objective is the realization of 
 responsible government. We understand this to mean, first, 
 that the members of the executive government should be 
 responsible to, because capable of being changed by, their 
 constituents : and, secondly, that these constituents should 
 exercise their power through the agency of their repre- 
 sentatives in the assembly. These two conditions imply in 
 their completeness that there exist constituencies based on 
 a franchise broad enough to represent the interests of the 
 general population, and capable of exercising an intelligent 
 choice in the selection of their representatives ; and, secon- 
 darily, that it is recognized as the constitutional practice 
 that the executive Government retains office only so long as
 
 CRITICISM 85 
 
 it commands the support of a majority in the assembly. 
 But in India these conditions are as yet wanting i. . . The 
 considerations of which we took account in Chapter VI 
 forbid us immediately to hand over complete responsibility. 
 We must proceed therefore by transferring responsibility 
 for certain functions of government while reserving control 
 over others. From this starting-poijpit we look for a steady 
 approach to the transfer of complete responsibility. We 
 may put our second formula thus : 
 
 ' The provinces are the domain in which tlie easier steps 
 toivards the progressive realization of t responsible government 
 should be taken. Some measure of responsibility should be given 
 at once, and our aim is to give complete responsibility as soon as 
 conditions permit. . . . 
 
 215. 'We start with the two postulates that complete 
 responsibility for the government cannot be given imme- 
 diately without inviting a breakdown, and that some 
 responsibility must be given at once if our scheme is to have 
 any value. We have defined responsibility as consisting 
 primarily in amenability to constituents, and in the second 
 place in amenability to an assembly. We do not believe that 
 there is any way of satisfying these governing conditions 
 other than by making a division of the functions of the 
 provincial Government, between those which may be made 
 over to popular control and those which for the present must 
 remain in official hands.' 
 
 The object avowed is to drag in the formula ' responsible 
 government' somehow, and the result is an unheard-of 
 definition of the term. The" responsibility to constituents ' 
 invented by the authors of the Report obviously is unreal, 
 a mere piece of lip-service to a formula. When the almost 
 universally condemned and wholly unworkable ' diarchy ' is 
 dropped, as it must be, ' responsibility to constituents ' goes 
 with it. 
 
 Other opinions. Little help is to be derived from 
 Dr. T. M. Nair's attempt at a definition, which is: 'The 
 Government is responsible to the representatives of the 
 People, and not of small sections of it.' 
 
 When the Agu Khan was writing in 1917, after the
 
 86 CRITICISM 
 
 ' pronouncement ', but before the publication of the Report, 
 he showed his consciousness of the inconveniences lurking in 
 the phrase * goal of responsible government '. The principal 
 part of his observations is quoted in the extract on the 
 fly-leaf. He has no difficulty in proving that ' responsible 
 government ' in the English parliamentary sense is a product 
 of the party system and a purely insular piece of mechanism. 
 Other nations, notably the United States of America, 
 manage to make their executive governments responsible 
 to the people by methods of a totally different kind. There 
 is nothing so sacred in the peculiar English method as to 
 make it universally applicable to countries where the con- 
 ditions differ completely from those of Great Britain. 
 
 An interpretation. We thus arrive at the practical 
 conclusion that Indian reformers need not be in a hurry to 
 reach forward to the distant ' goal of responsible govern- 
 ment ', whatever be the meaning attached to that elusive 
 catchword. They have plenty to do in trying to grasp the 
 more solid object of ' self-government ', to the utmost 
 attainable extent, subject to the limitations explained above. 
 The phrase ' responsible government ', in so far as it can be 
 applied practically to Indian institutions, must needs be 
 used in a somewhat indefinite sense, as connoting a govern- 
 ment sensitive to Indian public opinion expressed through 
 elective assemblies and other channels. The circumstances 
 of the present time are such that the Government of India 
 is likely to feel its responsibility to Indian public opinion 
 too much rather than too little. If it should ever display 
 any signs of insensibility or irresponsibility, the control of 
 Parliament, and especially the check exercised by the 
 proposed sessional committee, will amply suffice to keep 
 it up to the mark. 
 
 The somewhat tedious although indispensable discussion 
 of definitions being thus ended, we pass to other topics. 
 
 Periodical commissions. If the Secretary of State and
 
 CEITICISM 87 
 
 the Viceroy be allowed to have their way, and frequent com- 
 missions of inquiry into the working of the revised constitu- 
 tion are to overhaul the constitutional machinery every few 
 years, the unhappy Government of India will never have a 
 moment's rest. It will be unable to feel any assurance 
 as to the form which it will be made to assume, and it will 
 be so busy trying to justify its existence that it will have 
 little time for its proper work. Sir J. P. Hewett, who 
 knows his subject from the inside, tells us that ' the real 
 trouble about the Government of India is that for the last 
 ten years or more it has ceased to attempt to govern ', or, in 
 other words, to fulfil the purpose for which it exists. What 
 will it be like if it has to pretend to do its duty under the 
 whip of nearly continuous commissions ? 
 
 The resulting agitation and intrigues would be unceasing, 
 while the paralysis of the executive would be all but com- 
 plete. Yet India as a whole, and each Indian province 
 or district, urgently needs a strong executive at all times. 
 The lessons of history and experience to that effect are 
 so plain to read as hardly to need detailed exposition. Some 
 of the reasons why an executive swift and decisive in action 
 is indispensable will be found in the earlier chapters of 
 this essay. 
 
 Council of State. The Report proposes to secure the 
 necessary support for the Government of India, if it should 
 be confronted with a hostile Legislative Assembly, by 
 means of needlessly complicated devices. The unedifying 
 spectacle of the official majority in the Legislative Council, 
 as now constituted, voting to order collectively as a Hoc 
 is rightly disliked. The authors of the Report propose to 
 give up the official majority in the Imperial Legislative 
 Council or Assembly, and to obtain compensation by the 
 creation of a Senate or Council of State, which apparently 
 should ordinarily have an official majority of one only, 
 a rather narrow margin. Measures deemed essential by the
 
 88 CEITICISM 
 
 Government of India would be ' certified ' under an elaborate 
 system of procedure and carried in the Council of State, 
 whether the Legislative Assembly objected or not. Surely 
 such a cumbrous device is unnecessary. The suggestion 
 for referring to the Secretary of State cases of conflict 
 between the Legislative and the Executive (ante, p. 65) is 
 infinitely simpler and more workable. The creation of the 
 Council of State seems to be superfluous. 
 
 Detailed criticism of the fantastic ' diarchical ' scheme of 
 provincial government may be dispensed with. Sir J. P. 
 Hevvett points out that under it the position of the Governor 
 would be intolerable. His government would be exposed to 
 perpetual intrigue and deprived of all effective power. 
 
 Fiscal autonomy. The strongly expressed desire of 
 Indian politicians for fiscal liberty has been briefly alluded 
 to. The aspirations of ' educated Indians ' on the subject 
 are fairly summarized in paragraphs 341 and 842 of the 
 Keport. The demand is for a protective tariff, and for 
 the concession of India's right to decide the matter for her- 
 self, whether her views be deemed economically sound 
 or not. The authors of the Report refrain from making 
 any recommendation on the matter because they understand 
 that the fiscal relations of the British Empire will be con- 
 sidered after the war by a conference at which India will be 
 represented. If the English nation deliberately makes up 
 its mind to grant to India the utmost practicable measure of 
 ' self-government ', or 'self-determination', to use a still 
 more fashionable phrase, it is not easy to see how fiscal 
 autonomy can be refused. 
 
 Economy v. progress. Indian politicians almost without 
 exception call for financial retrenchment, especially by 
 reducing the military budget and the larger salaries drawn 
 by high officials. Their lack of experience in government 
 on a great scale leads them commonly both to underrate the 
 military necessities of the country and to exaggerate the
 
 CRITICISM 89 
 
 financial results of the savings so insistently demanded. 
 The defence of the country would be ill provided for if 
 it were at the mercy of the loudest talkers on the subject of 
 finance. The current view among the ' educated Indian ' 
 class is clearly voiced by Mr. M. K. Gandhi, who is reported 
 to have said (Englishman, Calcutta, July 20, 1918) : 
 
 'The watchword of our reform councils will have to 
 be, not increase for the growing needs of a growing country, 
 but a decrease of financial burdens which are sapping the 
 foundation itself of a genuine growth. This fundamental 
 fact is recognized.' 
 
 The speaker certainly interpreted correctly the ordinary 
 sentiment of his class. The allusion to ' increase for the 
 growing needs of a growing country ' apparently is directed 
 against the views of the Aga Khan, who, almost alone among 
 Indian reformers, denounces boldly the appalling backward- 
 ness of India in education, sanitation, public health, scientific 
 development, and, in fact, in almost everything, while he at 
 the same time sees clearly that expenditure on an imperial 
 scale is required to bring his country up to date. Such 
 expenditure cannot be defrayed from relatively small econo- 
 mies. It can be met only by additional revenue, the 
 raising of which His Highness openly advocates. I wish I 
 could agree with him in thinking that ' elective assemblies ' 
 will be willing and able to raise by fresh taxation the 
 immense sums required to enable India to take her place 
 among well-equipped modern nations. The exact contrary 
 I believe to be the truth. The general Indian sentiment is 
 not in favour of progress at the cost of taxation. Stagnation 
 is preferred, and the initiative of progressive measures 
 comes from above. The necessity for liberal expenditure on 
 the development of the resources of India is fully discussed 
 in the Report of the Indian Industrial Commission, a bulky 
 document which reached London in December, 1918. The 
 subject, although intimately connected with constitutional
 
 90 CKITICISM 
 
 reform and the Indian aspirations for fiscal autonomy, 
 cannot be pursued further in this place. 
 
 Cow-killing. Innumerable other recommendations or 
 suggestions more or less closely associated with the proposed 
 constitutional changes have been made by the authors of the 
 Eeport or the writers of books and pamphlets. It is impos- 
 sible to notice and criticize them all. One only, the 
 demand for the prohibition of cow-killing and the sale 
 of beef, requires mention, because that measure is passion- 
 ately desired by practically all Hindus, who constitute the 
 great majority of the population. If India could and should 
 be governed under the conditions of ordinary democracy, 
 which vest supreme power in the majority, it is unquestion- 
 able that the prohibition in question would be promulgated 
 at the earliest possible opportunity. It is equally beyond 
 question that such an enactment would be violently and 
 fiercely resisted by the powerful Muslim minority of more 
 than sixty-six millions. 
 
 It would also be opposed strenuously, although probably 
 without violence, by the British army, the Christians in 
 civil life, and several other important communities. Not- 
 withstanding those certainties, Mr. Vyasa Kao ventures 
 to declare it to be ' imperative that the slaughter of cows 
 should be absolutely prohibited '. That cannot be done. 
 The measure demanded so categorically would set all India 
 in a blaze from one end to the other. It is useless to argue 
 about the matter, or to invent more or less plausible economic 
 arguments in support of the passionate Hindu sentiment. 
 The question is, and for many centuries has been, governed 
 by passion alone on both sides and reasoning is impotent. 
 I have studied closely the history of the Hindu veneration 
 of the cow from remote Vedic times, when beef used to 
 be eaten on various special occasions, until the present day, 
 when that diet is regarded with horror, and I could say 
 much on the subject. But the less said the better. Almost
 
 CRITICISM 91 
 
 any observation is apt to rouse a storm of angry controversy. 
 The one thing beyond all doubt is that the boon which 
 Hindus would value above any conceivable reform in political 
 institutions cannot be granted. 
 
 The case is a striking illustration of the frequent incom- 
 patibility between Hindu traditional ideas and the conditions 
 of modern life. It also illustrates better than anything 
 else can do the imperious necessity for a strong, impartial 
 government, in a position above all sections and able to 
 protect the liberty of minorities. Home Kule in the sense 
 of government by a pure majority, which in India would 
 mean pure Hindu Kule, cannot be.
 
 CHAPTEK 8 
 
 CONSTEUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 
 
 Constructive suggestions necessary. Merely destruc- 
 tive or analytical criticism of erroneous propositions or rash 
 innovations is futile unless accompanied and supplemented 
 by constructive suggestions of a practicable character. The 
 Keport is not the only possible solution of the problem 
 of Indian constitutional reform. Everybody being agreed 
 that changes in the direction of self-government within 
 certain limits must be brought into operation, it is the 
 bounden duty of all true friends of India to give what help 
 may be in their power to the high authorities vested with 
 the responsibility of decision. Such suggestions as are 
 offered in this chapter are submitted for consideration with 
 all deference and without dogmatism. If the language 
 anywhere should seem dogmatic, the appearance is due only 
 to a desire for concise expression. Small room exists for 
 originality. Most of the conceivable proposals have been 
 advocated by one person or another, and the writer of this 
 essay has little of his own to add. 
 
 Reserved powers. Many limitations and guiding prin- 
 ciples, as explained at considerable length in Chapter 7, 
 must be constantly borne in mind by all would-be reformers. 
 In addition to those observations it should be remembered 
 that the Government of India must retain in its own hands, 
 for use on special occasions, powers frankly described as 
 ' autocracy ' in the Keport. That document reserves to the 
 Government of India at least eight ' autocratic' powers, 
 namely, (1) to repress anarchy ; (2) to deal impartially with
 
 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 93 
 
 religious hostilities ; (3) to protect the ryot ; (4) to help the 
 ' depressed classes ', while giving them needful protection ; 
 (5) to defend sectional interests, especially the immense 
 personal and material interests of the British and Anglo- 
 Indian or Eurasian communities ; (6) to give all proper 
 support and protection to the members of the Services ; 
 (7) to defend India by sea and land ; and (8) to exercise 
 a general overriding power over all legislation. 
 
 I am not disposed to quarrel with any of those reserva- 
 tions, although it may be permissible to doubt if the 
 Government of India will be in a position to fulfil all 
 the promises thus implied. 
 
 Limitations. The limitations on complete self-govern- 
 ment are, as already observed, imposed by inevitable con- 
 ditions and are, in one sense of the term, independent of the 
 form given to the administration, whether that of all India 
 or that of a province. Proof has been adduced that any- 
 thing like ' responsible government ' in the English parlia- 
 mentary sense is unthinkable within any period that can 
 be now foreseen. 
 
 The Government of India, that is to say, the Governor- 
 General in Council, as recognized by statute, is subordinate 
 in its corporate character to Parliament through the Secre- 
 tary of State. 
 
 Governor-General and Viceroy. The head of the 
 government combines two distinct functions in his person. 
 As Governor-General in Council, and in certain cases as 
 Governor-General acting independently of his Council? 
 he is subject to the control of the Secretary of State, and 
 is sometimes even described as the agent of that high 
 officer. As Viceroy he is the personal representative and 
 Vicegerent of his Sovereign Lord, His Imperial Majesty 
 the King-Emperor. The title of Viceroy, which is unknown 
 to the statute book, was used for the first time in Queen 
 Victoria's proclamation of 1858. It has now come into
 
 94 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 
 
 popular use as the ordinary designation of the head of 
 the government, and the legal title of Governor-General 
 or Governor-General in Council is rarely heard. But that 
 change of practice does not affect the fact that the head of 
 the government is both Governor-General and Viceroy. 
 He has distinct duties to perform in each capacity, and 
 the distinction, which is not merely technical, requires to be 
 emphasized in the revised constitution. It is essential to 
 remember that even after the assumption of the direct 
 government of India by the Crown in 1858, material 
 changes in the relations of the Sovereign with the princes 
 and peoples of India were introduced by the Royal Titles 
 Act of 1876 and subsequent events culminating in the 
 solemn ceremonial at Delhi in December, 1911. Those 
 constitutional changes, which are ignored in the Report, 
 should be regarded as forming an essential element in the 
 reformed constitution. It is also fitting and of practical 
 importance that the distinction between the functions of the 
 Governor-General and those of the Viceroy should receive 
 formal and public recognition. 
 
 British India and the States. India consists of British 
 India and of a multitude of Native or Protected States, 
 enjoying autonomy in a greater or less degree. The States 
 occupy about two-fifths of the total area. Their relations 
 with the Government of India are determined by various 
 instruments, which take the form of treaties in the more 
 important cases. Those relations have arisen out of a long 
 series of historical events, and, as a rule, cannot be altered 
 without the express consent of the parties concerned. The 
 large States, like the Nizam's Dominions, Mysore, Kashmir, 
 and certain others, enjoy almost complete autonomy in the 
 management of their internal affairs. The Government of 
 India is bound ordinarily to abstain from interference in 
 such affairs, while the rulers of the States, on their part, 
 take no share in the administration of British India.
 
 CONSTKUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 95 
 
 But the war has brought some of the princes into direct 
 communication and working co-operation with the highest 
 imperial authorities in London, so that those princes who 
 have been admitted to the innermost councils of the British 
 Empire are necessarily in a position to influence the policy 
 of the Indian Empire. Indeed, certain princes have been 
 consulted by the Government of India recently on matters 
 concerning British India. 
 
 The rulers of the States all willingly acknowledge the 
 duty of paying homage to the King-Emperor, and recognize 
 that His Imperial Majesty is represented in India by his 
 vicegerent the Viceroy. They also have constant com- 
 munications more of a business character with the Governor- 
 General in Council, and so indirectly with the Secretary 
 of State and Parliament. The Protected States, although 
 legally distinct from British India, are associated intimately 
 with that area in a thousand ways. For instance, the 
 currency, railway, telegraph, post office, and other depart- 
 ments of British India cannot be disentangled from the 
 same departments operating in the States. The complica- 
 tions thus indicated have a considerable bearing upon any 
 scheme of constitutional reform for British India. Although 
 no such scheme can be applied directly to the States, 
 nevertheless it concerns them in its operation. The Eeport 
 devotes Chapter X (paragraphs 296-312) to discussion of the 
 relations of the Government of India with the States. 
 
 Evolution. When we consider the extreme complexity 
 of the problem of constitutional reform due to the fact that 
 all the conditions indicated and others not mentioned have 
 to be kept in mind, it will seem obvious to most people that 
 the delicate mechanism of the existing Indian constitution 
 should be exposed to the least possible disturbance, and that 
 reform should take the shape of evolution rather than of 
 revolution. 
 
 Provincial reforms. As regards the provinces, general
 
 96 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 
 
 agreement exists that the Governor should be given an 
 executive council, if he has not one already ; that, provided 
 fit persons are available, at least one member of each execu- 
 tive council should, as a matter of practice, be of Indian 
 birth ; and that the existing legislative councils should 
 be enlarged and made more representative. The definite 
 separation of provincial from imperial finance is similarly 
 approved, and a relaxation of the control exercised by the 
 Governments of India over the provincial governments is 
 conceded. Those propositions appear to be unobjectionable. 
 
 Franchise. It may be taken as settled that the appoint- 
 ment of councillors by means of election will be largely ex- 
 tended, and that the franchise will be considerably widened. 
 It is not likely that it will be extended to women. Discus- 
 sion of details must be reserved pending the receipt of 
 supplementary reports from the commissions now (Decem- 
 ber, 1918) operating in India. One franchise question only, 
 concerning which the recommendation of the Report is open 
 to objection, will be noticed presently. 
 
 The writer's suggestions. Subject to the foregoing 
 general observations, I feel justified in submitting certain 
 substantive suggestions, mostly selected from those made by 
 other people, which commend themselves to my judgement. 
 They are offered in the hope that they may aid in the 
 formation of sound public and parliamentary opinion, which 
 is the necessary preparation for the drafting of a good India 
 Bill. A few suggestions recorded in earlier chapters need 
 not be repeated here. 
 
 Scrutiny of the Report. In October, 1918, when the 
 Cabinet declined to submit the Report in its present state of 
 incompleteness pending the receipt of the supplements to 
 the scrutiny of a joint committee of both Houses of Parlia- 
 ment, Lord Curzon of Kedleston announced that such 
 a committee would not be called into existence until after 
 the second reading of the Government's India Bill. At the
 
 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 97 
 
 same time he held out hopes that means might be found to 
 secure a preliminary hearing of objections. The Report 
 will not be considered by the Cabinet until it is completed 
 by the supplementary reports expected to reach England in 
 the spring. 
 
 It seems right that facilities should be granted for a 
 close scrutiny of the principles and proposals of the com* 
 pleted Report before it is adopted as the basis of a Govern- 
 ment Bill, oi', at any rate, before the second reading. The 
 precise nature of the machinery approved for the needed 
 scrutiny is of minor importance. If the scrutiny is deferred 
 until after the second reading of the Bill, the Government 
 and Parliament will then be committed to all the main 
 provisions of the measure, and further discussion will be 
 confined to details. While all parties are agreed on the 
 necessity of reform in the direction of self-government and 
 the extended employment of Indians in the public service, 
 excessive haste is to be deprecated, and it is desirable that 
 the Bill in its main outlines should be non-contentious as 
 far as possible. 
 
 Periodical commissions. If, as seems probable, the 
 suggestion of the Report (paragraph 295) be adopted, and a 
 Sessional Committee be appointed, whether of the House of 
 Commons only, or preferably of both Houses, it would seem 
 wise to drop the proposals for sending out frequent com- 
 mittees or commissions ' to deal with the political progress 
 of India ' (paragraphs 288, 294). Such commissions would 
 not only harass the Government of India beyond endurance, 
 as already observed, but in all probability would hinder the 
 ' political progress ' of the country. That somewhat tender 
 plant should be allowed to grow in peace, and suitable 
 arrangements to meet changed conditions can be made when 
 actually required. A binding undertaking to appoint a com 
 mission of inquiry at a definite time a few years hence tends to 
 unsettle men's minds and to stimulate pernicious agitation. 
 
 a
 
 98 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 
 
 Burma. The separation or ' divorce ', as Mr. Curtis calls 
 it, of Burma from the Indian Empire appears to be judicious 
 in the interests of both India and Burma. It would be 
 advantageous to India for many reasons, one being that the 
 government of the Indian Empire is overloaded and has 
 more work to do than it can manage efficiently. The with- 
 drawal of Burma from the control of the Delhi government 
 would give immense relief. Very few persons concerned in 
 the administration of India proper possess any considerable 
 knowledge of Burma or understand the peculiar conditions 
 and needs of that vast territory. The Burmese Empire, as 
 it used to be called, has little in common with India. The 
 absence of caste in Burma is in itself a fundamental differ- 
 ence. The Burmese culture or form of civilization is more 
 allied to the Chinese than to the Indian. The principal 
 elements of the population are Mongolian, and the religion is 
 Buddhism of the Ceylon type. The manners, customs, and 
 temperament of the people are absolutely different from 
 those of the Indian peoples. It would be extremely difficult 
 to devise a scheme of constitutional reform on modern lines 
 which should suit Burma even tolerably. The absolute 
 exclusion of the Burmese territories from consideration 
 would simplify materially the problems of reform, which are 
 difficult enough when India alone is the subject of experiment. 
 
 The histories of India and Burma rarely touch. The 
 British conquest of the Burmese Empire was effected in 
 three instalments in the years 1826, 1852, and 1886. Prior 
 to those dates the contact between India and Burma in 
 historical times was of the slightest possible character, 
 being almost confined to border raids and fights with 
 Arakanese pirates. No historical sentiment would be 
 violated by the proposed divorce. 
 
 Burma, potentially one of the richest countries in the 
 world, unquestionably would gain by being freed from the 
 rather step-motherly care of the Government of India.
 
 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 99 
 
 It is notorious that Burmese affairs receive but a small 
 share of attention from the overburdened officials at Delhi or 
 Simla, and it is certain that a government in Burma, when 
 released from Indian shackles, would be able to do far more 
 for the country than the Governor can do now. Although 
 the Aga Khan is opposed to the suggested separation, 
 he does not offer any substantive reasons for maintaining 
 the existing ill-matched union. 
 
 If separation be decided on in principle, all subsidiary 
 difficulties about finance, military or naval requirements, 
 and the public services can be overcome. No large change 
 can be effected without a good deal of trouble, and elaborate 
 demonstrations that the severance of the Burmese chain 
 would result in a crop of temporary difficulties need not 
 stand in the way of a highly advantageous reform. 
 
 The Province of Burma, the former Burmese Empire, 
 is a huge chai'ge as it stands, but it might be judicious 
 to place the whole of the Malay peninsula, so far as it 
 is subject to British control, under the same government. 
 The Governor of Burma would then become a Governor- 
 General, aided by a Governor or Lieutenant-Governor of the 
 Malay peninsula, and other officers of similar rank in the 
 Burmese provinces. As the country progressed, it is prob- 
 able that before many years had elapsed the Governor- 
 General of Burma would have four or five governors or 
 lieutenant-governors under his control. 
 
 Ceylon. After the conquest of the Dutch settlements, 
 the island of Ceylon, excepting the kingdom of Kandy, 
 remained for a short time, from 1796 to 1798, a dependency 
 of Madras. If Lord Wellesley could have had his way 
 it would then have come permanently under the rule of the 
 East India Company, but his plans were disallowed. In 
 1815 the whole island, including the dominions of the 
 recently deposed king of Kandy, passed under the dominion 
 of King George III, and since that date it has been a Crown 
 
 G>2
 
 100 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 
 
 Colony, controlled by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
 The Government of India has no concern with its affairs. 
 The Aga Khan would like to include the colony in the 
 Indian Empire, but very grave objections probably would 
 be taken to that arrangement by the people concerned. 
 Ceylon is closely connected with Burma by the bond of 
 religion, and it is possible that it might be expedient to 
 attach the island to the Governor-Generalship of Burma. 
 Change, however, does not appear to be urgently required, 
 and the question of transfer, if ever raised definitely, can 
 wait for leisurely investigation. 
 
 H.M. the King-Emperor. The principle of utilizing 
 to the fullest possible extent the genuine feelings of loyalty 
 to H.M. the King-Emperor entertained by all classes of 
 Indians probably will be acknowledged to be sound. It 
 seems right that India should have her own flag, and that 
 on all great occasions of ceremony both the flag of India 
 and, if permitted, the Koyal Standard should be flown. The 
 latter when used, of course, should be given precedence over 
 the Viceregal standard. Other symbolical arrangements 
 in accordance with ancient Indian tradition could be made 
 which should make plain to all beholders that the Viceroy 
 was acting on such occasions as the personal representative 
 of his Sovereign, and not merely as the head of the imper- 
 sonal Government of India. For instance, the placing of an 
 empty throne bearing the imperial crown behind and above 
 the Viceregal chair of state would be intelligible to every- 
 body and agreeable to custom. 1 Other similar expressions 
 of the living authority of the absent Sovereign could be 
 easily devised and worked out. Systematic arrangements 
 should be made to bring home to pupils in schools and 
 colleges the personality of the King-Emperor by portraits 
 and other means. A simple, well-written account of the 
 
 1 Such a symbolical presence of the Sovereign might be held to 
 justify flying the Royal Standard.
 
 CONSTEUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 101 
 
 lives of His Majesty and of the Queen might be prepared in 
 the principal vernacular languages and circulated widely. 
 If it is once admitted that it would be wise to make a 
 serious effort in the direction indicated, ways and means will 
 be easily found. 
 
 Royal Viceroy. The most important conceivable measure 
 in furtherance of the idea would be the appointment of 
 a prince of the blood royal as Viceroy. That proposal, 
 warmly advocated by both His Highness the Aga Khan and 
 Mr. Vyasa Kao, undoubtedly commends itself to Indian 
 feeling, and its adoption would go a long way towards 
 abating the natural dislike for foreign rule. 
 
 The appointment of a Royal Viceroy involves necessarily 
 the corollary that the Viceroy should be relieved of most of 
 the administrative work for British India which he now 
 performs in his capacity of Governor-General in Council. 
 
 Viceregal duties. The Eoyal Viceroy should retain 
 control of honours, dignities, pardons, and the department 
 dealing with the Native or Protected States. A large part of 
 his time would be occupied by personal intercourse with 
 their rulers. If either a Council of State or an advisory 
 Council of Princes, or both bodies, should be constituted, 
 as suggested in the Eeport, the Viceroy would naturally 
 preside. At present the Foreign Department of the Govern- 
 ment of India always is retained by the Governor-General in 
 his own hands, and is not made over to a member of council, 
 as is each of the other principal departments. The Foreign 
 Secretary, under the direction of the Governor-General, 
 deals both with the Protected States and with really foreign 
 affairs. The time seems to have come when the affairs 
 of the Protected States should no longer be considered 
 as those of foreign territory. The changes in the relations 
 between the Crown and the Princes wrought by the Koyal 
 Titles Act and subsequent events have made the old. 
 fashioned arrangements an anachronism and practically
 
 102 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 
 
 inconsistent with the altered conditions. The suggestion 
 may be offered that a States Secretary should be appointed 
 distinct from the Foreign Secretary. The results of the 
 war promise to increase materially the foreign connexions 
 of the Government of India, and to give abundant occupa- 
 tion for a separate Secretary or Minister. The retention by 
 the Viceroy as such of the department of Foreign Affairs in 
 the strict sense probably would be advisable. Two sugges- 
 tions are tendered concerning the machinery by which the 
 Koyal Viceroy might be relieved of the ordinary administra- 
 tion of British India. The Aga Khan proposes that that 
 class of business should be made over to a Prime Minister 
 appointed by the Crown for the same term of office as 
 the Viceroy, and assisted by other ministers selected by 
 the Viceroy and Prime Minister. The Viceroy would con- 
 tinue to hold the statutory office of Governor-General, 
 but would perform its functions through his deputy, the 
 Prime Minister. Thus, so far as British India is concerned, 
 his position would be nearly that of a constitutional 
 monarch. If the Viceroy as such should retain personal 
 control of the Protected States and also of foreign relations, 
 he would have two ministers of his own, the States Secretary 
 and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Probably it would 
 be expedient that in his capacity as Viceroy the head of the 
 Government should correspond with the Prime Minister of 
 the United Kingdom, and not with the Secretary of State 
 for India, copies of his dispatches being supplied to the 
 India Office for information. 
 
 A separate Governor-General. The plan recommended 
 by Mr. Vyasa Rao is more ambitious and involves a wider 
 divergence from usage. He would recommend the appoint- 
 ment of a separate Governor-General, taking precedence 
 after the Viceroy. Either arrangement seems to be feasible, 
 but it is difficult for any person who has not shared in 
 the work of the highest authorities to form a valuable
 
 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 103 
 
 opinion concerning the exact way in which the necessary 
 change should be carried out. If the principles be conceded 
 that the distinction between the two offices of Viceroy and 
 Governor-General should be clearly recognized and that 
 the viceregal appointment should be held ordinarily by 
 a prince of the blood royal, relieved from the general 
 administration of British India, the consequential arrange- 
 ments can be put into workable form without much difficulty 
 by persons equipped with the needful experience. 
 
 Ministers of either the Viceroy or the Governor-General, 
 corresponding in function to the members of the existing 
 Imperial Executive Council, should not be eligible for pro- 
 motion or transfer to another appointment. The present 
 system of frequently selecting the rulers of provinces from 
 members of the Government of India is open to grave 
 objections. 
 
 The viceregal officers who have been referred to as the 
 States Secretary and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
 would be actually ministers, whatever their official designa- 
 tion might be. 
 
 The proposed reform in any shape, like all reforms worth 
 having, would cost money, but it would be well spent. The 
 Government of India as at present constituted is admittedly 
 overworked and undermanned. It retains far too many 
 traces of the archaic and obsolete machinery dating from the 
 times of the East India Company. 
 
 Importance of the reform. So far as I am able to 
 judge of matters lying outside the range of my personal 
 experience, the reforms sketched above, whatever shape they 
 might ultimately assume, would be of the highest possible 
 significance and would do much to make all India feel that 
 it had won its rightful place ' within the Empire ' under the 
 direct rule of a venerated Sovereign. 
 
 An unusually sympathetic and well-informed observer, 
 the Key. W. E. S. Holland, has justly said that ' .the heart
 
 104 CONSTKUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 
 
 of India is passionately set upon self-expression as a nation '. 
 That legitimate sentiment, which finds almost insuperable 
 difficulties in uttering itself through the foreign mechanism 
 of parliamentarism, on which the Eeport lays undue stress, 
 would obtain adequate utterance by means of the ' great 
 constitutional device, pregnant with enduring possibilities of 
 good ' outlined in the foregoing pages. 
 
 Sentiment. In Ireland and India, countries which have 
 much in common, notwithstanding the enormous difference 
 of scale, the magic power of sentiment has been too often 
 ignored by unimaginative statesmen, entangled in the 
 wheels of parliamentary machinery and absorbed in the 
 struggle for materialistic progress. 
 
 The British community. The immense British in- 
 terests, both personal and material, in India require more 
 sympathetic consideration than they have received in the 
 Eeport. Modern India is the creation mainly of British 
 energy and capital, working alike in the official and economic 
 domains. The important British community, including 
 both pure Europeans and the Anglo-Indians or Eurasians of 
 mixed descent, rightly demands adequate recognition of 
 itself as constituting one of the principal elements in the 
 population, and carrying weight in the national councils far 
 greater than that indicated by its mere numbers. Such 
 recognition, somewhat grudgingly and imperfectly con- 
 ceded in paragraph 232 of the Keport, is qualified by observa- 
 tions which seem to be hardly consistent with the con- 
 cession. The authors, when discussing the representation 
 of minorities, say that for 
 
 ' the representation of other minorities we should prefer 
 nomination. Even in the case of the general European 
 community, whose material interests in the country are out 
 of all proportion to their numerical strength and on whose 
 behalf it may be argued that no departure from principle is 
 involved, inasmuch as unlike all other communities named
 
 105 
 
 they are not an integral part of the population of India, we 
 prefer to rely upon nomination. Special electorates will no 
 doubt be required for the representation of the planting and 
 mining interests, for the chambers of commerce, and possibly 
 also for the universities ; but we desire that the number 
 of such electorates should be as restricted as possible, and 
 that minority interests should, where necessary, be repre- 
 sented not by class or interest electorates but by nomi- 
 nation.' 
 
 That recommendation is vigorously and indignantly 
 opposed by the parties most concerned, who have expressed 
 their objections on more than one occasion, supporting them 
 by arguments which may be fairly called conclusive. Surely 
 it is unreasonable that the one section of the popula- 
 tion thoroughly acquainted with representative government 
 in theory and practice should be debarred from the privilege 
 of electing their representatives. Parliament is not likely 
 to reject the just claim of the British community. The 
 assertion that that community does not form ' an integral 
 part of the population of India ' is inexact and should not have 
 been made. 
 
 Diarchy. It is to be hoped that the almost universally 
 condemned scheme for dividing each provincial government 
 into two sections, which is the most controversial proposal 
 in the Keport, will be dropped quietly. Discussion has 
 shown that the scheme, conveniently labelled 'diarchy', 
 could not be worked without intolerable friction (unless 
 Bombay be an exception, as is claimed). The elimination 
 of that unfortunate proposal, dictated by the over-logical 
 pursuit of a doctrinaire theory, would materially facilitate 
 the passage of the India Bill. 
 
 Local administration. As regards local administration, 
 the proposition that local bodies should be allowed reason- 
 able liberty cannot be formally disputed. But in India, 
 where frightful epidemics are of constant occurrence, the 
 obligation to preserve a decent sanitary standard in towns at
 
 106 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 
 
 any rate is an imperial one. Burdwan, an important town 
 in Bengal, with about 35,000 inhabitants, has lately ex- 
 hibited such a deplorable example of municipal inefficiency 
 and pecuniary corruption that the town council has been 
 suspended. Strict control is indispensable, and it appears 
 necessary that local administration in each province should 
 be efficiently controlled by a special minister or similar 
 official at head-quarters. His designation is immaterial. 
 Whenever a competent person of Indian birth can be found 
 let him be appointed by all means, but no racial qualification 
 is permissible by law, and regard for the public health 
 imperatively requires efficiency in control. 
 
 Panchayats. It may possibly be feasible to revive 
 village autonomy to a certain extent on the lines suggested 
 by Mr. Vyasa Kao. The provincial governments presumably 
 would be willing to try the experiment, if it offers a reason- 
 able prospect of success. The difficulty may arise among 
 the villagers themselves. Unpaid service is not popular in 
 India, and it is not unlikely that suitors may prefer recourse 
 to the courts they know and may be unwilling to dispense 
 with the aid of lawyers, on which they are accustomed 
 to rely. 
 
 Indian Civil Service. The most thorny subject, perhaps, 
 is that of the Services, and especially that of the Civil Service 
 of India, now called the Indian Civil Service. The dis- 
 cussion of Section 87 of the Charter Act of 1833 (ante, p. 71) 
 may be referred to with advantage, and the reader is asked 
 to remember that the law absolutely forbids racial qualifica- 
 tion or disqualification under any pretext. That funda- 
 mental principle, although often forgotten or ignored, must 
 govern all lawful proposals. 
 
 The general administration of the country at the present 
 time being now, as it has been since the eighteenth century, 
 mostly in the hands of the members of the Indian Civil 
 Service, an able, highly trained body of experts with a most
 
 CONSTKUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 107 
 
 honourable record, it is admitted by all writers that it would 
 be impossible to carry on the administration and initiate 
 a great scheme of constitutional reform without the aid 
 of that body. The time when such a corps d' elite can be 
 summarily discarded obviously has not come yet and, so far 
 as can be foreseen, is not likely to come for many years, if 
 the life of the Service can be preserved as long. Competent 
 critics perceive clearly, as they could not fail to perceive, 
 that it will be very difficult to keep the Civil Service in 
 existence under the conditions foreshadowed by the Report. 
 The attractions of the Service undoubtedly must be seriously 
 diminished. Even now such moderate attractions as exist 
 have little charm, and first-class men believe that they can do 
 better in other professions. While India urgently wants 
 the Civil Service for an indefinite time, it is quite possible 
 that the Service may die of inanition, simply from lack of 
 competent British recruits. The difficulties of recruitment 
 have been enhanced immensely by the^ war, and there 
 is grave reason to fear that the quality of the men engaged 
 has deteriorated. 
 
 Judicial functions. A reform or change insistently 
 pressed for many years past is the separation of judicial 
 from executive functions. At present many officers exercise 
 both, in accordance with immemorial Indian tradition. The 
 change, if carried out to the extreme logical result, would 
 completely transform the Indian Civil Service. The existing 
 arrangements provide congenial careers for men of diverse 
 tastes. All the young officers begin their service as Assis- 
 tant Magistrates and Collectors, performing a great variety 
 of duties, including judicial business in their capacity of 
 magistrates and also in most provinces as revenue and rent 
 courts. Excluding certain fortunate persons who become 
 Secretaries to Government or attain other eminent positions 
 outside of the regular line, the members of the Service, after 
 gaining a few years of general experience, usually are called.
 
 108 CONSTKUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 
 
 upon to decide between a judicial and an administrative 
 career. The judicial type of man rises in the ordinary course 
 to the rank of District and Sessions judge, whose office has not 
 any equivalent in England. If exceptionally lucky he may 
 become a High Court Judge. His fellow civilian of the 
 more active executive type often does not go beyond the 
 rank of District officer, whose duties resemble in many 
 respects those of a French prefet ; but certain more 
 successful men attain to high appointments of various 
 kinds, some becoming rulers of great provinces, and others 
 ministers in the Government of India. Most of the appoint- 
 ments referred to were formerly reserved by law (Act of 
 1861) for members of the Service, but since 1870 the 
 exclusive privileges of the Service have been gradually 
 reduced, and many outsiders have been given appointments 
 which used to be reserved for its members. 
 
 Even still, notwithstanding numerous changes, the 
 greater part of the higher administrative and executive 
 posts is held by the Indian Civil Service. ' Civilians ', 
 as the members are commonly called in India, also fill many 
 of the High Court and District Judgeships. For a long 
 time past a strong tendency has been manifested in favour of 
 increasing the Indian element in the judicial branch of the 
 Service. Many reformers urge that all judicial appointments 
 should be made from the legal profession as in England. If 
 that recommendation be adopted and Judgeships cease to be 
 open to the Indian Civil Service, the attractions of the 
 Service will be very materially diminished, and the judicial 
 type of man will no longer compete for an appointment. 
 
 If the separation of judicial and executive functions be 
 completed in eveiy direction, it will be necessary to appoint 
 a large number of separate magistrates, and a multitude of 
 other officials in the ' temporarily settled ' provinces, to try 
 rent and ' revenue ' cases, which are very different from ordi- 
 nary civil court causes, and require special knowledge of rural
 
 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 109 
 
 economy, as possessed by numerous members of the Indian 
 Civil Service and rarely found elsewhere. Incidentally, 
 it may be observed that the change will involve large extra 
 expense. The District officer, the history of whose office as 
 the local representative of government goes back to remote 
 antiquity, would thus cease to be a magistrate or to hear rent 
 and ' revenue ' cases. His duties would be confined to 
 action as the executive agent of the government for collecting 
 land revenue and taxes, and for the general supervision 
 of certain branches of the administration within his district. 
 The functions of his assistants in all grades would be 
 similarly circumscribed. Such specialization of function, 
 which is the normal practice in Europe, would involve 
 a complete departure from immemorial Indian tradition, and 
 certainly would be disliked intensely by the great mass of 
 the people. But it is not unlikely that the 'educated 
 classes ' will succeed in forcing the change, to which they 
 attach much importance. If so, the post of District officer, 
 which many members of the Service consider the most 
 interesting that a man can hold, will no longer possess any 
 charm. If again, as the Aga Khan suggests, the office 
 of Commissioner be abolished in the provinces where it 
 exists ; and if further, as Mr. Vyasa Kao proposes, members 
 of the Indian Civil Service are to be debarred from becoming 
 rulers of provinces, it is not easy to see why any young 
 Englishman of ability and ambition should enter the 
 Service. 
 
 Dilemma. Thus we are brought face to face with the 
 dilemma that while India badly wants the Service with its 
 high standard of ability, its expert training, and its noble tra- 
 dition, in order to carry on the administration and start the 
 ' reforms '. those very reforms threaten to dry up the sources 
 from which the Service is supplied. No solution of the 
 impasse is visible, and it seems desirable that the question 
 of keeping the Indian Civil Service in effective existence
 
 110 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 
 
 or allowing it to expire should be faced squarely and 
 thoroughly investigated by a small authoritative committee 
 in England. The cases of the Educational, Police, and 
 Medical services also require special discussion by a similar 
 method for various reasons in each case. The purely 
 technical branches of the public service, such as Telegraph, 
 Forests, Public Works, &c., present easier problems, which 
 can be- solved by strict attention to the principles of fair play 
 without racial discrimination in any form, of selection of 
 the best men, and of offering such material advantages 
 as will attract really good officers, whatever may be their 
 colour. India cannot afford to be served badly by cheap, 
 half-trained departmental officials. 
 
 Haileybury redivivum. One measure only, so far as 
 I can see at the moment, promises well for the future 
 of the Services in India, if the Government can be persuaded 
 to adopt it, which does not seem likely. That is the plan so 
 eloquently advocated by Mr. Archer (ante, p. 70) for the 
 establishment of a great training college, which might be 
 described as a revived, enlarged, and modernized Hailey- 
 bury. In such a college the probationers for the Indian 
 Civil Service, if any, and all the youths destined for other 
 branches of the public service should receive their training. 
 At the Universities India is regarded as a subject devoid of 
 general interest, and the young men destined for the Indian 
 services who pursue their special studies at a University 
 never learn to feel that India should have the first place in 
 their thoughts. The whole atmosphere of their surround- 
 ings discourages such a sentiment, and in fact prevents its 
 birth. The students at the proposed college, on the con- 
 trary, would feel that they were dedicated to India, and that 
 they were working ' in a place where India should always 
 be present, predominant, enthroned'. I have shared Mr. 
 Archer's opinion independently for a great many years, and 
 am glad to see that it has the support of Lord Sydenham of
 
 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS ill 
 
 i 
 
 Combe. To my thinking the reform would be so valuable 
 that even if it cost a million sterling it would be worth the 
 money. But I know that the idea has powerful opponents, 
 and so I must leave the "matter, with some faint hope that 
 it may at one time or another receive the favourable con- 
 sideration hitherto denied. 
 
 Summary. After so much discussion and criticism it is 
 advisable to sum up the results, even at the cost of a certain 
 amount of repetition. 
 
 The necessity for extensive change in the old-fashioned 
 method of governing India is admitted. 
 
 Eeform should follow the lines of evolution, not of 
 revolution. 
 
 Burma should be separated from the Indian Empire. 
 
 The limits of practicable change are narrowly fixed by 
 barriers of hard facts. The caste institution is, perhaps, the 
 most intractable of such barriers. The facts cannot be 
 altered by words, even those of an Act of Parliament. If 
 a candid statement of realities be found disagreeable, that is 
 the fault of the realities, not of the pen which records them 
 faithfully. 
 
 The term ' self-government ' has two meanings. Re- 
 garded as meaning the release of an Indian administration, 
 Imperial or Provincial, however it may be constituted 
 internally, from excessive supervision, it is readily attainable 
 by the agency of legislation or executive order. Regarded 
 as meaning the direction of policy and administration by 
 born Indians, it is subject to many limitations, and is 
 difficult of attainment, which is conditioned by the internal 
 constitution of the administration and by the personnel 
 of the Services. 
 
 The ' goal of Responsible Government ' is a distant vision, 
 which, in my opinion, should be left alone for the present. 
 If that course should be followed much embarrassment 
 would be avoided. The contradictions and makeshift devices
 
 112 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 
 
 which disfigure the Keport are due almost entirely to the 
 premature chase after ' responsible government '. It is 
 possible that in Bombay, the most advanced province as 
 a whole, something in the nature of ' responsible govern- 
 ment ' may be feasible at a date much earlier than in other 
 provinces. 'Self-government' and the increased employ- 
 ment of Indians in the public service are quite enough 
 to occupy all the time of the present-day reformer. 
 
 Section 87 of the Charter Act of 1833 must be obeyed 
 strictly and impartially. Special care should be taken to 
 avoid the creation of new and illegal racial disqualifications 
 as against Europeans, using that term in a wide sense. 
 
 The control exercised by the Secretary of State and the 
 India Office over tke Government of India should be 
 materially relaxed, and that Government should be allowed 
 far more liberty than it enjoys now. In this connexion the 
 burning question relates to fiscal policy, because India 
 demands power to impose a tariff, as an act of ' self-determi- 
 nation ', and a matter of right. 
 
 The Government of India should be ' responsible ' in the 
 sense of being sensitive to Indian public opinion, and of 
 being so constituted as to allow that opinion full expression. 
 
 Nevertheless, the conditions are such that the Government 
 of India must retain extensive ' autocratic ' powers. 
 
 The internal constitution of that Government need not 
 necessarily follow precisely the lines of the Eeport, which 
 at this date (December, 1918) is not binding in any way 
 on the Cabinet, Parliament, or the nation. 
 
 The fact that 'the heart of India is passionately set 
 on self-expression as a nation ' should be frankly recognized. 
 Although, for reasons expounded in this book, anything like 
 complete national unity is unattainable; the sentiment which 
 reaches out towards that goal is legitimate, ennobling, and 
 worthy of encouragement 'within the Empire'. It has 
 been partially gratified by various recent executive measures,
 
 CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 113 
 
 which have given Indian statesmen their full share in 
 shaping the destinies of the British Empire. India should 
 have her national flag. 
 
 The authority of the Crown, that is to say, of a living, 
 personal Sovereign, is the most potent unifying force 
 operating in India. The distinction between the Viceroy 
 and the Governor-General should be legally acknowledged 
 and publicly manifested. The Viceroy should be ordinarily 
 a Prince of the blood royal, and be relieved of the greater 
 part of the administration of British India, as vested by 
 law in the Governor-General in Council. If the Prince 
 should also be Governor-General, he would perform his 
 duties as such through a Prime Minister or deputy Governor- 
 General. If another person be appointed Governor-General, 
 he would rank below the Viceroy. Either scheme seems to 
 be feasible. Suitable means should be devised and used to 
 emphasize the reality of the Eoyal authority, especially as 
 regards the Protected States. Their affairs should no 
 longer be managed by the Foreign Secretary, but should be 
 conducted by a separate States Secretary. The procedure 
 should be in accordance with the changes which have taken 
 place since 1858. 
 
 The Imperial Legislative Council should be expanded 
 into a much larger Legislative Assembly, mainly elected. 
 The official majority should be abandoned, the number of 
 officials attending the meetings and entitled to speak but 
 not to vote being regulated by practical requirements. 
 Only non-official members should vote. Differences on im- 
 portant questions between the executive government and 
 the Assembly should be referred either to the Secretary of 
 State or to a Board of Arbitration in England. The Council 
 of State or Senate as proposed in the Eeport is not wanted. 
 
 If ornamental bodies, such as an Indian Privy Council or 
 an Advisory Council of Princes, be created, they cannot 
 do either much good or much harm. 
 
 H
 
 114 CONSTKUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS 
 
 The Governor of each important province should have 
 an Executive Council, and his Legislative Council should be 
 enlarged on the same lines as the Imperial Council. 
 Differences between the Executive and the Legislature 
 should be referred to the Government of India for final 
 decision. 
 
 The franchise should be extended, but details must remain 
 open for the present. Purely territorial constituencies are 
 impracticable. Territoriality must be modified by both 
 ' communal ' and ' institutional ' representation. In some 
 cases it may even be necessary to grant communal repre- 
 sentation to majorities as well as to minorities. 
 
 The concession of greater liberty to local bodies must 
 be guarded by strict supervision in the interests of the 
 public health and for other reasons. 
 
 The most difficult problem is that of the Services, and 
 especially of the Indian Civil Service. That corps d'elite 
 is at present indispensable, while at the same time its very 
 existence is threatened. The consideration of the dilemma 
 should be made over to a small authoritative committee 
 sitting in London. The method of selecting probationers 
 for the Soudanese service is an improvement on the purely 
 examination test by which admission is gained to the Indian 
 Civil Service. Either the same committee or similar bodies 
 should examine the cases of the Police, Educational, and 
 Indian Medical Services. 
 
 All probationers and candidates for the Indian appoint- 
 ments made in England should be trained together at 
 a special college, preferably situated at Oxford. 
 
 Such a foundation need not clash with the School of 
 Oriental Studies in London. There is room for both.
 
 INDEX 
 
 Aboriginal religions, 26. 
 
 Afghan jirga, 18. 
 
 Aga Khan, H.H. the, author, 4 ; 
 quoted, 8, 24, 64, 65, 68, 73, 76, 
 89, 99, 102. 
 
 Agora, Homeric, 18. 
 
 Akbar, an autocrat, 19 ; a pre- 
 decessor of the King-Emperor, 
 22 ; enjoyed fight at Thanesar, 
 29. 
 
 Alexander the Great, invasion of, 
 18. 
 
 Anglo-Indians, or Eurasians, 72, 
 104. 
 
 Arbitration, Board of, 65, 113. 
 
 Archer, Mr. W., quoted, 42, 70, 
 110. 
 
 Aristocracy, the landed, 53. 
 
 Arrah, Hindu outrages in, 81. 
 
 Asoka, 20, 22. 
 
 Aurangzeb, failure of, 21. 
 
 Autocracy, in Indian literature, 
 19 ; in the Keport, 20, 92, 112. 
 
 Autonomy. See Self-government. 
 
 Bagehot, quoted, 75. 
 
 Bairagis, 29. 
 
 Bareilly, outbreak at, 29. 
 
 Beef, eating of, 90. 
 
 Bengal, permanent settlement in, 
 54. 
 
 Bengalis, 27. 
 
 Bentinck, Lord William Caven- 
 dish-, 73. 
 
 Bihar, Hindu outbreak in, 31. 
 
 Bombay, 40, 105, 112. 
 
 Brahmans, India the land of the, 
 26 ; position of, 42-5. 
 
 British community, 104. 
 
 Bryce, Lord, quoted, 26. 
 
 Buddhism, 98. 
 
 Burdwan, 106. 
 
 Burma, separation from India of, 
 67, 97-9. 
 
 Calcutta, religious riots at, 32 ; 
 corporation, 40. 
 
 Campbell, Sir Colin, 42. 
 
 Caste, and caste disputes, 33-47, 
 facts, 34 ; definition of, 35 ; 
 dominance of, 36 ; ethics of, 37 ; 
 a guiding principle, 38 ; de- 
 lusions concerning, 39 ; will 
 endure, 41 ; and patriotism, 
 42 ; proclamation concerning, 
 43 ; Brahman position in, 43 ; 
 tyranny of, 45 ; animosity, 45 ; 
 right and left hand, 46 ; sum- 
 mary of facts of, 47. 
 
 Ceylon, religion of, 98 ; govern- 
 ment of, 99. 
 
 Chambers of Commerce, 75, 105. 
 
 Charter Act of 1833, section 87 of, 
 71, 112. 
 
 Chelmsford, Lord, 5, 13, 15, 17, 
 20, 53, 66. 
 
 Cheruma caste, 44. 
 
 Christianity, 26, 35, 37, 45. 
 
 Civil Service, Indian, 63, 69-74, 
 106-11, 114. 
 
 College, for training public Ser- 
 vants, 70, 110. 
 
 Commission, Public Service, 72. 
 
 Commissioners of divisions, 73, 
 109. 
 
 Commissions, periodical, 86, 97. 
 
 Commons, House of, 97. 
 
 ' Communal ' representation, 75. 
 
 Congress, National, 25, 31. 
 
 Constitutional government, 7. 
 
 Cornwallis, Lord, idealism of, 54. 
 
 Council, of State, 87, 101, 113 ; of 
 Princes, 101, 113. 
 
 Cow-killing, 90.
 
 INDEX 
 
 Cows, sanctity of, 37. 
 Crewe, Lord, quoted, 13, 69. 
 Crown, the, and India, 22-4, 113. 
 Curtis, Mr., quoted, 15, 50, 51, 54, 
 
 67, 77, 97. 
 Curzon of Kedleston, Lord, 13, 14, 
 
 96. 
 Custom, 39. 
 
 Dandaniti, 20. 
 
 Delhi, ceremonial at, 22, 94. 
 Democracy, 23. 
 Devotees, fights of, 28, 29. 
 Dharma, Hindu ideal of duty, 37. 
 ' Diarchies ', 21, 67, 105. 
 Discussion, needed, 3, 11, 17. 
 District Officer, 70, 108, 109. 
 Dravidians, 26. 
 Dundas, 54. 
 
 East India Company, 99, 103. 
 Education, backward, 89. 
 Educational service, 110, 114. 
 Election, general, 14 ; in India, 
 
 74. 
 
 Epidemics, 105. 
 Ethics, of caste, 37. 
 Eurasians, 72, 104. 
 Europeans, 72, 104. 
 Evolution v. revolution, 95, 111. 
 Examination test, 114. 
 Executive, need of strong, 87, 91 ; 
 
 Councils, 61, 96, 114. 
 Ezekiel, quoted, 48. 
 
 < Extremists ', 22. 
 
 Fakeers, or devotees, 28. 
 Family, unit of society, 35. 
 Federation, South Asiatic, 24. 
 Female franchise, 74, 96. 
 Fiscal autonomy, 88. 
 Flag, of India, 100. 
 Foreign Secretary, 102, 103. 
 Forest department, 110. 
 Franchise, a broad, 56 ; questions, 
 
 74, 96, 114. 
 Fraser, Mr. Lovat, quoted, 22. 
 
 Gandhi, Mr. M. K., quoted, 89. 
 
 < Geographical method ', 77, 82. 
 George III, King, 99. 
 Gopinatha Rao, Mr., quoted, 28. 
 
 Gosains, 29. 
 
 Gough, Sir Charles, quoted, 35. 
 
 Government, of India, 57, 92, 98, 
 112 ; provincial, 58-62, 67 ; local 
 self-government, 62, 68, 105. 
 
 Governor, of province, 68, 114. 
 
 Governor-General, 93, 101-3. 
 
 Gurkhas, 18. 
 
 Haileybury College, "71, 110. 
 
 Hardinge of Penshurst, Lord, 72 n. 
 
 Hardwar, fights of devotees at, 
 29 ; religious riots at, 32. 
 
 Hewett, Sir John, quoted, 71, 87. 
 
 High Courts, 108. 
 
 Hindu, revival, 26 ; and Muham- 
 madan conflicts, 30-2. 
 
 Hinduism, meaning of, 26 ; in- 
 complete unity of, 27, 87. 
 
 Holland, Rev. W. E. S., quoted, 
 103. 
 
 Home Rule, 91. 
 
 India, national types of, 27 ; a land 
 of mystery, 33 ; the heart of, 
 112; Bill, 15, 96, 105; Office, 
 66, 81, 112. 
 
 Indians, in government, 5, 12, 
 82, 111. 
 
 Indo-Aryan tribes, 18, 26. 
 
 Industrial Commission, 89. 
 
 ' Institutional ' representation, 75. 
 
 Ireland, and India, 104. 
 
 Islam, 26, 37. 
 
 Jahanglr, stern justice of, 21. 
 Jains, persecution of, 28. 
 Jews, 72. 
 Jirga, Afghan, 18. 
 Judgeships, 108. 
 
 Randy, kingdom of, 99. 
 
 Kashmir, 94. 
 
 Kautilya, ancient author, 19. 
 
 Ketkar, author, 34, 41. 
 
 King, the, in Indian literature, 
 
 19-23. 
 King-Emperor, the, 22-4, 81, 93, 
 
 100. 
 Kingship, potent force of, 22. 
 
 Law, Mr. Bonar, quoted, 14.
 
 INDEX 
 
 117 
 
 Lawyers, 106. 
 League of Nations, 27. 
 Legislative Council (Assembly), 
 
 of India, 65, 84, 87. 
 Licchavls, of Tirhut, 18. 
 Local administration, 105. 
 Lords, House of, debate in, 13, 
 
 14, 16, 69, 96. 
 Loyalty, 22, 24. 
 Lucknow, 42. 
 
 Madras, panchayats in, 69 ; non- 
 Brahmans in, 76 ; Ceylon once 
 a dependency of, 99. 
 
 Madura, Jains impaled at, 28. 
 
 Malabar, caste rules in, 44. 
 
 Malay peninsula, 99. 
 
 Malcolm, Sir John, quoted, 7, 
 72 n. 
 
 Mantra, or magic formula, 44. 
 
 Manu, quoted, 20, 39, 43. 
 
 Marathas, 27. 
 
 Marriott, Mr. J. A. R., quoted, 4. 
 
 ' Mass movements ', 35, 45. 
 
 ' Maya ', or illusion, 6. 
 
 Medical, Indian service, 71, 110, 
 114. 
 
 Midnapore, zemindars ruined in, 
 54. 
 
 Military defence, 82. 
 
 Minorities and majorities, 45, 49, 
 104, 114. 
 
 ' Moderates ', 22. 
 
 Mongolian hill-men, 18. 
 
 Montagu, Mr., 5, 11, 14, 15-17, 20, 
 45, 50, 53, 66. 
 
 Morison, Sir Theodore, quoted, 23. 
 
 Moslem League, 25, 31. 
 
 Muhammadan, armies, 30 ; num- 
 bers, 34 ; castes, 36 ; represen- 
 tation, 75. 
 
 Mukhcrji, Panchanandan Das, 
 author, 4 n. 
 
 Mysore, 94. 
 
 Nadar caste, 46. 
 Nair, Dr. T. M., quoted, 49. 
 Nambudri Brahman, 44. 
 Nation, Indian, 27, 104, 112. 
 Native States. See Protected 
 
 States. 
 Nizam's Dominions, 94. 
 
 Nomination, 104. 
 
 Oriental Studies, School of, 114. 
 Outcaste castes, 39, 44. 
 Oxford, 114. 
 
 Panchdyat, village, 69, 106. 
 Panjab, ' mass movements ' in, 45. 
 Parliament, 6, 11, 16, 17, 23, 47, 
 
 51, 57, 86, 93, 96, 97, 105. 
 Patna district, 31. 
 Patriotism, and caste, 42. 
 Permanent settlement, 54. 
 Persecution, rare, 28. 
 Personal government, 21. 
 Peshwas, the, 44. 
 Pitt, 54. 
 
 Police service, 110, 114. 
 Prefet, French, 108. 
 Prime Minister, quoted, 14, 23, 
 
 51. 
 
 Princes, Council of, 113. 
 Privy Council, Indian, 113. 
 ' Pronouncement ' of August 20, 
 
 1917, 5, 11-17. 
 Prostitution, temple, 38. 
 Protected, or Native States, 21, 
 
 94, 95, 101. 
 Provincial governments, 58-62, 
 
 67, 84, 95, 96, 111. 
 Public Works department, 110. 
 Pulayan outcaste, 44. 
 Punishment, law of, 20. 
 
 Queen Victoria, 13, 23, 73, 93. 
 
 Races, conflicts of, 25-7. 
 
 Racial jealousies, 22. 
 
 Raja, the ideal, 21. 
 
 Rajputs, 27. 
 
 Rama, hero, 22. 
 
 Religions, conflicts of, 25-32. 
 
 Republics, ancient Indian, 18 ; 
 
 South American, 26. 
 ' Responsible government ', 8, 12, 
 
 14, 16, 49, 78-80, 83-6, 111. 
 Rowlatt Commission Report, quoted, 
 
 30. 
 
 Royal Titles Act, 94, 101. 
 Russia, 68. 
 Ryot, the, 51.
 
 INDEX 
 
 Saiva faith, 28. 
 
 Sanitation, backward, 89. 
 
 Sanskrit language, 27. 
 
 Scientific development, 89. 
 
 Secretary of State, for India. 40, 
 57, 65, 66, 70, 81, 86, 88,' 93, 
 112 ; for the Colonies, 100. 
 
 1 Self-government ', 8, 14, 81, 86, 
 92, 111. 
 
 Senate, proposed, 65, 87, 115. 
 
 Sentiment, magic power of, 104. 
 
 Services, public, 69, 106-11, 114. 
 
 Sessional Committee, 97. 
 
 Settlement, permanent, 54 ; of 
 1818, 27. 
 
 Shahabad district, 31. 
 
 Shanar caste, 46. 
 
 Shla sect, 31. 
 
 Sikh, pilgrims, 29 ; representa- 
 tion, 76. 
 
 Sivajl, an autocrat, 19. 
 
 Soudanese service, 114. 
 
 South American republics, 26. 
 
 Spectator, the, quoted, 76. 
 
 Standard, Royal, 100. 
 
 Statecraft, Hindu, 18. 
 
 States Secretary, 102, 103. 
 
 Stephen, Sir Harry, quoted, 15, 
 33, 42. 
 
 Sudra, or common Hindu, 42. 
 
 Survivals, 26. 
 
 Sydenham of Combe, Lord, 17, 77, 
 83. 
 
 Tamils, 27. 
 Tariff, 88, 112. 
 Taxation, 89. 
 
 Telegraph department, 110. 
 Thanesar, devotees' fight at, 29. 
 Thucydides, referred to, 23. 
 Thugs, ideas of, 38. 
 Tibetans, 18. 
 Tinnevelly, caste in, 46. 
 Tolerance, Indian, 28. 
 Traditional ideas, 7, 21, 22, 107. 
 Travancore, rebellion in, 29 ; caste 
 rules in, 44. 
 
 United States of America, 86. 
 Universities, Indian, 105 ; British, 
 
 110. 
 ' Untouchables ', 45. 
 
 Vedic folk-motes, 18 ; times, 90. 
 Vellala caste, 46. 
 Velu Tampi, minister, 29. 
 Viceroy, Royal, 64, 101 ; title of, 
 
 93. 
 Victoria, Queen, declaration of, 
 
 13, 73, 93. 
 Village life, 69. 
 Vyasa Rao, Mr., author, 4 ; quoted, 
 
 64-70, 73, 75, 90, 102, 109. 
 
 War, the, effects of, 95. 
 
 Wellesley, Lord, 99. 
 
 Women, and the franchise, 74, 96.
 
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