1^1 II ^Simmov^ aWEUNIVERJ/a ^lOSANCEl^ o ^ .^ILIBRARYOc^ ^rii^oNvsoi^"^ "^/^aaMNn-awv^ ^oim-^^"^ < . _ o o "^/SaJAINn-JWV ^^fcmm/f^ '^^o-mmn^ -v^UIBRAF ^^tllBRARYQc ^^OdilVjdO'^- AWt-yNlVERS//, t>AavaaiH^^ >&Aavaan# NIVERS//, '''^il^^NVSOl^"^ ^W£UNIVERi'//i 'A- s>:lOSANCElfj> ^llIBRARYd?/: ^.OFCAIIFO/?^ ^ ,^V\EllNIVERS//) v;^lOSANCElfj"^ "^momov^ %a3AiNn-3WV' \WEUNIVERS//, o ^lOS-ANCElfj;. ^HIBRARYOc. ^^l-UBRARYO- .^fCAlIfO/,'; "^AaMiNajuv" ^(?Aavaan# -^OAavaani^ \\.mm\W/, ^ n APPENDICES PAGE (h) Lord Roberts's Opinion of the Territorial Force — and Others ... 163 (c) Some Leaders of Industry ... ... 169 (d) Some Press Views of the National Service League's Campaign ... 171 V. Musketry 177 VI. Principal Terms of Enlistment in the Regular Army ... ... ... ... 178 VII. The Failure of Compulsory Service Pro- posals to Secure Support in the Houses of Parliament ioo 132 70 57 72 24 26 THE CASE FOR Section 2. — The Regular Army The requirements for the oversea garrisons are met, as they can only be met, by a long service* voluntary army. There are two alternative policies by which this army might be maintained. The first is to make the foreign service army a separate branch of the force with no other function except to maintain the overseas' garrisons, the recruits being merely trained in depots in England and then sent out. The other policy, which has now been adopted for many years, is that of having only one regular army, with units at home linked with units abroad, and periodically changing duties. The latter system has many advantages over the former. The training of the men before being sent abroad as drafts is much more effective when they are part of a unit than when merely at a depot, and it automatically provides an organised force of long service regulars at home and a large reserve available for any purpose for which they may be required, while the alternation between home and foreign service ensures a unity in training and tactics, and makes the army more attractive. The possibilities of alternative systems are discussed in Chapter VI., and the present purpose is merely to point out the results which the present system produces. These results are the provision and maintenance of:— (i) The garrisons enumerated on page 19, amount- ing in all to a little over 120,000; (2) About 130,000 men of all arms with the colours at home ; * The periods of service at present are given in Appendix VI. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 27 (3) A reserve of 138,000 men who have completed their service with the colours, but are liable to be recalled for service. The two latter classes are organised to provide a com- posite force of all arms of six infantry divisions and a cavalry division, about 166,000 of all ranks. This force is usually known as the Expeditionary Force, though the name is somewhat unfortunate, as suggest- ing that its sole function is an expedition abroad. The reserve is utilised to bring up the units to their war establishment. After providing for this we are left with a few units not allotted to the Expeditionary Force, and the balance of the men with the colours not passed for foreign service and of the regular reserve, amounting to about 100,000 men. The chief function of these will be to provide drafts to replace casualties, but since they will only be gradually required, and plainly could not be sent overseas at a time when the sea was not cleared of the enemy, they must be reckoned as available in the early stages of a war, at any rate for home defence. Being practically without oflficers, and not organised into units, their utility is limited, but they could undoubtedly contribute towards the home garrisons required, or might be utilised to bring the Special Reserve units up to strength. Section 3. — The Special Reserve The Special Reserve has replaced the Militia. It is liable to be called out for service at home or abroad, the men being given a preliminary continuous training of six months, and afterwards coming out annually for training for about three weeks. The establishment for 28 THE CASE FOR which the organisation is adapted is 90,000, but the strength is only about 60,000. The primary function of the Special Reserve, like that of the Regular Reserve, is for the assistance of the Expeditionary Force, but it differs in being organised into units capable of being employed intact and not merely as drafts. But the Special Reserve must also be counted as available for home defence during the early stages of a war. Section 4. — The Territorial Force The Territorial Force is enlisted for home defence, though a considerable number have volunteered for foreign service, and no doubt many more would be willing to do so if required. Its establishment is about 315,000, and the strength on September 30th, 1913, was 249,393. The training and value of the Force is discussed in detail in Chapter IV., but one important feature of the Force which is frequently overlooked may be mentioned here — namely, that the peace establishment is also the war establishment; that is to say, the elements which cannot be improvised, the regular staff and the equipment, are complete for the full establishment of 315,000. The strength in time of peace is, therefore, not the full measure of the power of the Force. Just as the Expeditionary Force is made up to strength in time of war by the inclusion of the Regular Reserve, so in the case of the Territorial Force, although the only men who are actually liable by law to be called out are those in the Territorial Reserve, there are every year thousands of men who leave the Force on the expiration of their term of engagement, many of v^^hom may be relied VOLUNTARY SERVICE 29 upon to rejoin in time of emergency.* As many of these men as are required will find uniform, arms, equipment, and places ready for them, and will be but very little below the standard of those actually serving. Section 5. — The National Reserve The National Reserve consists of men who have completed their terms of service in some branch of the Army and have enrolled themselves as an expres- sion of their willingness to serve in case of great emergency. Some have taken on a definite obligation, though only an obligation of honour, to serve either at home or abroad. Others prefer to reserve entire freedom, hut the existence of the Force means that the nation knows where to lay its hands on a large reserve of men trained to arms to whom to appeal in case of emergency. The War Office has — and rightly — resisted a certain pressure towards treating the National Reserve as a third line force to stand by itself. To do so would be to stereotype an organisation ill- adapted for the necessary restrictions, and difficult to assimilate to up-to-date methods, and would necessi- tate the provision of a staff for which the material does not exist. As a loose reserve the Force may prove of considerable value. Individuals may provide drafts for Regular units; others may rejoin their old Terri- torial units to bring local companies up to strength, and companies may be organised well qualified for *The propriety of relyinp on these men to volunteer again for Home Defence can hardly be denied by the National Service League, which relies entirely upon Volunteers for Foreign Service for the power of expansion beyond the Regular Army which its sup- porters urge as one of the needs which is not sufficiently met at present. 30 VOLUNTARY SERVICE certain garrison and similar duties, thus relieving units belonging to the organised field forces. It is the custom of many writers to dissipate the Special Reserve and Territorial Force for garrison duties, and to discount these garrisons entirely in reckoning the forces available in the field. But, as will be suggested later, the existence of the National Reserve may do much to render such dissipation unnecessary. In conclusion, the following table of the military forces of the Crown, exclusive of those in India and the Dominions or Colonial stations, shows, even after making a liberal deduction for ineffectives, a strength which is by no means inconsiderable : — Regular Army with the Colours .. • 125,209 Army Reserve ... • i45>090 Special Reserve . 61,427 Territorial Force ... • 249,393 Territorial Force Reserve 1,669 National Reserve • 215,451 Total 798,239 The part which these forces will respectively play in the problem of home defence is discussed in Chapter V. CHAPTER III VOLUNTARY AND COMPULSORY ARMIES Part I. — Inherent Characteristics No small part of the controversial efforts of the advocates of compulsory service is devoted to attempts to depreciate the superiority which the ordinary mind is disposed to attribute to the volunteer over the com- pulsorily raised army. Their persistence is not sur- prising. The instinct which, when there is a dangerous duty to be performed, calls for volunteers in preference to imposing ^.he task upon the nearest man, seems so obviously sound, that a good deal of reasoning is needed to show that it is all a stupid mistake. Hence it is that we are treated to lessons in history, ranging from 400 B.C. to the twentieth cen- tury, to convince us of so difficult a thesis. But it is no easy matter to trace the influence of a factor which never operates by itself, but is always complicated by other factors, often of equal importance. The pages which follow attempt no such task as that of proving that the voluntary spirit always and everywhere prevails. They aim at pointing out the features which characterise certain types of armies, at showing that, broadly, history emphasises the importance of these features, and at demonstrating the conclusion that the type of armies thus indicated as best fitted for the needs of the central government of the British Empire are those which we, in fact, possess. ^ \32 THE CASE FOR Section i. — Types of Soldiers As a preliminary, certain terms need definition. The expressions " Regular," " Militia," and " Volunteer," were so long used to indicate particular branches of the British Forces, that specialised meanings are sometimes attached to them, and con- fusion is often introduced by using the words with complete disregard of the sense in which they are employed. For instance, we find that in Fallacies and Facts, in order to deprive the Territorial Force of any possible credit which might attach to the title " volun- teer," a dictum is quoted to the effect that " a volun- teer who asks more from the State than his arms, except on active service, is no volunteer." When, later on in the same volume, we find that the voluntary service which the Territorial gives is described as a " blood tax," we may well ask in what Wonderland are we living where the same man is first condemned for asking too much and then commiserated as the victim of a cruel exaction. Small wonder that such con- tradictory premises lead to strange conclusions ! Let us, then, be clear as tQ^the distinctions ex- pressed by the terms we use. [The first distinction is that between a volunteer, and a pure compulsory system. In the first, a man enters into a contract by his own choice — a choice, may be, in which influences other than the love of fighting play a prominent part — but still a choice. In the latter, no one has the oppor- tunity of saying " Yes " or " No." The law deter- mines his obligation. Intermediate between these two lies the system in which a limited number is demanded and substitution allowed."^ VOLUNTARY SERVICE 33 Another, and quite different, distinction is that between the Regular* and the .Militia-man. The former, until he passes into a Reserve, is part of a standing army, a soldier, and nothing else; the latter is normally in civilian occupation, called from it, perhaps, for intermittent periods of training, but exclusively a soldier only when called out in an emergency. These distinctions give rise to six types. (1) The \^olunteer Regular — e.g., as found in the British Regular Army. (2) The Substitute Regular in a Conscript System — e.g., as found in the French Army for a time before 1870. (3) The Compulsory Regular — e.g., as found in the present French or German Armies. (.1) The Volunteer Militiaman — e.g., as found in the British Territorial Army. (5) The Substitute Militiaman in a Conscript System „ — e.g., as found in the so-called "Regular Militia " of the early nineteenth century. (6) The Compulsory Militiaman — e.g., as found in Swiss and Norwegian Armies. Now, it is obviously fallacious to compare, say, (1) with (6), and deduce the superiority of the voluntary spirit, or to compare (3) with (4), and draw the opposite conclusion. It is also — though less obviously — fallacious to make any comparison without reference *The word "Regular" is here used so as to include the m«n serving in an army of the French or German type. So used, it doet not necessarily imply the characteristic of being a professional, in which respect such armies represent really a compromise between a professional Regular Army and an entirely unprofessional Militia. 34 THE CASE FOR to the nature of the campaign, the leadership, or the racial characteristics of the raw material. Section 2. — The Need for the Volunteer Regular Certain general features may, however, be noticed. The Volunteer Regular, for instance, who is offered a contract, may be asked to undertake a more onerous obligation, both as to the length and conditions of his service, than can be required under a pure compulsory system to which the nation at large is asked to submit, and, further, the numbers taken can be limited to requirements without resort to the ballot or any similar expedient. The Volunteer Regular, in fact, adopts arms as his profession. Hence such an army is far excellence the instrument of a Government which may have to carry on wars at a distance, or of a nature in which the populace takes only a limited interest. So, when the author of the later chapters of Fallacies and Facts, beginning with a singular dis- regard of the fact that none of the voters who can impose a compulsory system are young enough to be liable to the training, commends the compulsory system, and goes on to describe it as " a vow made by the free choice of the individual will," he is blind, not only to the fallacy of assuming that it requires a unanimity of the individual wills to pass an Act of Parliament, but also to the fallacy of supposing that a majority of the individual wills is likely to be pre- pared to prescribe a general liability to the conditions of service which a world-wide Empire requires that a small minority should accept. For the British Empire such an instrument as only VOLUNTARY SERVICE 35 a Volunteer Regular Army can provide is a paramount necessity. It does not, of course, follow that a com- pulsory army for home defence is thereby excluded, though the difficulty, if not impossibility, of com bining such an army with a Volunteer Regular Army large enough for our needs is one of the strongest argimients against recourse to compulsion. But it does follow that much of the eloquence expended in commending the compulsory system is mere nonsense. The author just quoted may be pleased to declare that " war, under modern conditions, is an action which either ought never to be committed, or an action in which every able-bodied citizen, without exemption of any kind, should par- ticipate to the utmost degree, sharing alike its dangers and its allurements, its glory and its shame." He may condemn the English system as " hopelessly and for ever wrong " because it provides otherwise. But, since he cannot prescribe a system by which every able-bodied citizen is to share, say, the dangers of the continual small wars on the Indian frontier, or even of such a war as that fought in South Africa, the only conclusion which he can ask us to draw is that the British Empire is " hopelessly and for ever wrong," and that our Indian and Colonial garrisons must be recalled forthwith — a conclusion hardly likely to be endorsed by his collaborator, Lord Roberts. If we look abroad, we find the same lesson. Custavus Adolphus or Napoleon may have been able to win victories with their conscript armies,* but how long did they retain the fruits ? France and Germany * Tn neither case were the victorious armies raided on the system of universal compulsion. 3B 36 THE CASE FOR to-day resort to voluntary service to maintain their comparatively small foreign forces ; Russia finds difficulties, even at home, in inducing the men raised by compulsion to re-engage as non-commissioned officers. Even where the compulsory system has not been abandoned for foreign service, the results are not encouraging as the instances quoted later will show. Section 3.— T/ie Quality of the Volunteer Army But the greater utility of the Volunteer Regular Army does not depend merely on the fact that a con- tract of service may be made to cover liabilities which a compulsory system must usually exclude. There is a difference in quality — and here we touch upon certain factors which affect a Militia as well as a Regular Army, and particular care is needed to distinguish between the types of army to which certain arguments are applicable. Under a compulsory system where no substitution is allowed, the army produced is bound to contain a larger proportion of men for whom military service either possesses no attraction or is positively dis- tasteful. The importance to be attached to this factor varies according to the conditions of service of the force, and the purpose for which it is designed. For example, when we compare volunteer and compulsory regular armies, it may be legitimate to argue that the period which has to be spent under military discipline in the case of the latter will go a long way towards eliminating in the men with the colours any active hostility to the service which may have existed VOLUNTARY SERVICE 37 initially. But tlic argument applies with less force to Reserves, and lias vcr}- little relevance at all to a militia system. In tiiat case there is only a compara- tively short recruit training, and the men for the active army, when called out for fighting, are drawn direct from a life in which civilian habits and outlook have had plenty of time to regain an influence which has at most suffered only a temporary interruption. Again, it is argued, not without justification, that in many cases lack of employment is a powerful recruiting agent for a professional army, so that the choice does not necessarily predicate either patriotism or a love of fighting, and that the average soldier under a compulsory system is of a higher class than in a pro- fessional army. Whether any deduction can be drawn that the ultimate fighting capacity of the former is likely to be superior may be doubted, as the disposition which is attracted by a soldier's life may itself be the cause of a poor start in civilian occupa- tion.* In any case this argument also has no applica- tion to a volunteer militia of the type of the Territorial Force w'here material advantages are not the motive for enlisting, and frequently a considerable sacrifice of time and pleasure is involved. It is, moreover, in the case of the unprofessional army that the quality of the raw material is of more particular importance. The professional soldier has time to acquire much of what may possibly be lacking at the start, and if his pro- * Lord Haldane stated, in a sj^eech on November 24th, 1913, that he had asked man after man of the recrnits at the depdts, "What brought yon here?" and the answer generally came to this: *' I wanted to see a bit of soldiering." The contribntion to the ranks made by generations of military families is another valnable asset 433-i99 38 THE CASE FOR gress is slower it is no great matter. Military service is his profession, and the professional tradition, ambition to succeed, and every other influence which touches him, all prompt him to do his best. But in the case of the unprofessional soldier, keenness, energy, intelligence, and patriotism are of paramount importance. Thus, although Lord Percy, in his eagerness to depreciate voluntary service, may taunt the army in which he holds a commission,* and though humbler individuals may be expected to raise their hats to an army in which he would have had to serve in the ranks, we may still be permitted to doubt whether the average British Regular may not fulfil the purpose for which he is needed better even than the heir to a dukedom, and to point out that in any case Lord Percy must look elsewhere for an insult suitable for the Territorial Force. Another feature must be noticed. For the com- pulsory army the cause in which it is fighting is a vital matter. Apart altogether from actual limitations on the services for which it may be employed, the com- pulsorily raised army is apt to set limits of its own. The system under which the soldier in such an army serves is based on the conviction of a national necessity. To use it on a service as to which no such conviction exists is an experiment — one on which an inspiring leader may venture, and perhaps succeed — but none the less a hazard. With the professional volunteer army the matter is different: the individuals * The privilege of undertaking voluntary service would, there- fore, seem to resemble somewhat the privilege of entering the workhouse." — Times, June 7th, 1913. VOLUNTARY SI- R\ ICE 39 who compose it have adopted war as their business, not this war or that, but war anywhere and every- where, and the business must be carried through. This limitation on the powers of a compulsory army is, of course, in a sense characteristic also of the unpro- fessional volunteer army, but so long as the objects for which volunteers are enlisted are limited to occasions of evident national peril, the question does not arise. Section 4. — Regular and Militia Armies So far the distinctions to which attention has been directed have been mainly distinctions between the professional and the unprofessional armies, or between the volunteer and compulsory soldier, whether pro- fessional or not. Certain distinctions between the Regular and the Militiaman have been referred to for the purpose of indicating their bearing on the course of the argument, but a word must be said on the ques- tion of the difference in training. In the technical military duties, it goes without saying that the Regular is better trained than the Militiaman, but it is not in such technical superiority that the difference really lies. A man of ordinary intelligence, willing to learn, can be taught in a surprisingly short time; but the capacity to apply his knowledge under the stress of war is a different matter. It is in this, and the habits and frame of mind which are summed up under the term " discipline " that the Militiaman is likely to contrast least favourably with the Regular. And this contrast is one which cannot be eliminated by mere adjustment of the length of a preliminary period of 40 THE CASE FOR recruit training. No doubt the longer the period of such training the more advanced will be the standard of technical efficiency, but the change from the civilian to the military life will be none the less abrupt. In considering the application of so-called " universal " compulsory training to a Militia, in addition to the disadvantage of including in the ranks a proportion of unwilling men, a further practical difficulty occurs. Under a v^oluntarj system, in which it is not necessary that every able-bodied man should be trained, the organisation may be localised by assigning a par- ticular unit of a particular branch of the service as the quota of a certain district, and the training may be carried on to a certain extent throughout the year. Under a so-called universal compulsory system, every available man must, in theory, be trained and fitted into the military organisation, and though to a certain extent local organisation and continuous training may be possible,* the difficulty is apt to lead to the short cut of simply calling up the men for recurring periods and fitting them into units in the easiest way. The result is that the continuous association in civilian life as well as at parades for military instruction, competitions between individuals and local units, etc., which afford the nearest approach to association as an embodied force, can hardly be attained except under a voluntary system which possesses the required elasticity. This is one factor of importance in its effect on the value of a militia force : there are others which may be mentioned : The presence of regular officers on the * In Australia variations in the conditions of service and even complete exemptions have been found necessary on a considerable scale. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 41 staffs and in the higher commands who have held those positions during the peace training; the zeal and intelHgence of the men ; the enthusiasm evoked by the cause; the attitude of the civil population; the character of the campaign ; above all, the period which has elapsed between embodiment and employment on active service. Spxtion 5. — Summary of Characlcristics of the Types Considered We may now summarise the features which have been indicated as characteristic of different types of armies. The Volunteer Regular Army is the real profes- sional army, the instrument best fitted, if not the only instrument, for general service, and least dependent upon external influences. It is a voluntary army, and the notion of patriotic duty, if not necessarily innate, is highly developed by the professional spirit and tradition. The Conscript Regular Army, where substitution is allowed, in some respects approximates to the first in its professional character, but the professionalism is far from complete, the standard is lower, and a con- siderable disruptive element exists. The pure Compulsory Regular Army approaches the \'olunteer Regular Army in training and discip- line; the average intelligence is high; the notion of dutv to the community animates a considerable pro- portion, but the presence of unwilling men is a source of weak'ness, and, in proportion as the service for which it mav be required fails (o appeal to the sense of national duty, the value falls rapidly. 42 THE CASE FOR The Compulsory Militia is subject to the same shortcomings, in accentuated form ; the defects which training as a Regular may eradicate will persist, and the army will, when first embodied, be subject to all the disadvantages which an abrupt change from civil to military life entails. The Voluntary Militia, though faced with the latter drawback, consists almost exclusively of men who have enlisted from the notion of duty or the deter- mination to be in the fight if there is one. Spirit may, therefore, go some way to make up for what the Regular acquires by habit ; progress after embodiment will be more rapid and efficiency largely dependent on the organisation in peace and the handling in war. Part II. — The Verdict of History Section i . — The Need for a Professional Army The verdict as to the need for a professional army for foreign service is hardly open to doubt. Critics, it is true, occasionally point to the tendency to pro- fessionalism as a prelude to Imperial disruption, but it would be more to the point if they could instance an Empire preserved on any other system. It has already been noted that France and Germany resort to the volunteer for foreign service. Spain failed in Cuba. In Manchuria, not only did Russia fail, but the contrast in fighting capacity between the Siberian and European reservists was noticeable.* Even the * Kuropatkin has told us how poorly the reservists from European Russia fought when compared with the Siberian Reservists, v/ho were defending their own frontier, and explains that the distance from their homes had become so great that the Europeans were no longer sustained by the national idea. — Com- fulsory Service, p. 53. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 43 energy of the Japanese Army flagged after Mukden, and Italian experience in Abyssinia, and even in Tripoli, is not exactly encouraging to the advocates of compulsion for service abroad. On the other hand, throughout the South African War, no war weariness impaired the value of the British Regular Army. Their business was to carry on, and they did it. The instances given have been selected from modern times, because the pure compulsory regular army is, substantially, a modern institution ; as we go further back the conscription of a limited number, the practice of substitution or the impress- ment of a certain number into a professional volunteer army obscure the issue. The history of the Napoleonic armies, indeed, affords an example of the transition from one type in the direction of the other; as the net was spread wider, we find occasions when the pro- fessional soldier had actually to be employed, not in fighting, but in keeping men called up by a national levy from deserting. Skctiox 2. — The Pressed Men The conduct and the fate of the unwilling soldier in a compulsory army is not a pleasant subject, but it is one which those who depend upon armies raised by compulsion study with a view to the possibilities of the future. We may, if we choose, nourish the belief that the nation at large possesses some innate superiority, so that the man who at present declines to volunteer will become a hero under compulsion. Indeed, by a curious appreciation of cause and effect, Lord Roberts actually supports his theory that com- 44 THE CASE FOR pulsory training will increase the number of volunteers for foreign service, by reference to a statement that, whereas one in five of the voluntary Militia, and one in fifteen of the Yeomanry and Volun- teers came forward for service in South Africa, only one man in a thousand volunteered from the civil population.* But it would be w^ell if those who con- template raising an army in this country by compul- sion for a policy war on the Continent would examine, say, Meckel's account of what he saw at the battle of VVorth :— " During our advance, while only the whistle of an occasional bullet could be heard, we saw six men in a long queue, cowering behind a tree; afterwards I saw this sight so frequently that I became used to it. . . . I was already used to the sight of the dead and wounded, but not prepared for what now met my eyes. The field was literally strewn with men who had left the ranks and were doing nothing. Whole battalions could have been formed with them. From our posi- tion we could count hundreds; some were lying down, their rifles pointing to the front as if they were still * Fallacies and Fads, p. 22. In fact, one in three of the Volun- teers expressed his willingness to go if required, and one in seven actually went. Having regard to the amount of training the Volunteers had received, the suggestion, coming from Lord Roberts, that it was confidence in his military capacity which induced the Volunteer to come forward is distinctl}' humorous. Another remark- able reference (p. 31) is that to Mr. Fortescue's figures of the number of militiamen who volunteered to join the Regular Army between 1805 and 1813. Had the fact been stated, as shown by Mr. Fortescue, that these volunteers were drawn exclusively from the " Regular Militia " of whom go per cent, were substitutes and not from the " Focal Militia " raised on a truly compulsory basis without sub- stitution, the only conclusion which could have been drawn would have been that the fighting spirit only existed in the men who were serving by choice and not by compulsion. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 45 in the fighting line and were expecting the enemy to attack at any moment. . . . All these men gazed at us without showing the least interest. The fact tliat we belonged to another army corps seemed to be a sufiicient excuse for treating us with blank indiffer- ence. I heard them say : ' These fellows, like the others, are going to let themselves be shot.' The men next to me bore on their shoulder straps the number of a famous regiment."* And at Worth, be it noted, the German army outnumbering the French by nearly two to one, almost immediately established superiority in artillery, and was ultimately victorious; so that the scene depicted does not represent the mere demoralisa- tion of a routed army. In the same battle in the fighting in the Niederwald, out of 7,350 who entered the wood in the course of the final and successful attack, some 500 went forward in the first line, 2,500 in the second line an hour later, while nearly 3,000 unwounded men remained in the wood, in no forma- tion, out of action. But, perhaps, the most significant instance of the difference between the volunteer and the pressed man is to be found in the American Civil War. In the early stages the capacity of the Volunteers for bearing losses, badly as they were led, was such as has scarcely, if ever, been equalled since. Later, not only was it necessary to recall Meade from his pursuit of Lee to enforce the conscription ; but, even when brought to the front, the conscripts — making every allowance for the " bounty jumper " — were far inferior. "The war of secession," wrote Colonel Henderson, " affords the most ample evidence of the * Meckel, A Summer A'igfii's Dream. 46 THE CASE FOR truth of the old proverb that one volunteer is worth three pressed men . . . the conscript soldiers, as well as those who sold themselves for enormous bounties fell short in every respect of the volunteers. They were more liable to panic, less forward in attack, more prone to insubordination, less stubborn in de- fence, and it was the common opinion in the North that they were even inferior to the negroes." " These opinions," adds Brigadier-General Kemball, " may seem strange at the present day ; but it is worth noting that compulsory service has to be combined with thorough training and iron discipline to neutralise the disadvantage of having in the ranks men who fight, not unwillingly, but under compulsion."* Section 3. — The Question of Training If we turn to the contrast between trained and un- trained troops, it is curious to find that the instances now most in fashion with the compulsory school are both instances where the defeated troops were almost entirely raised under compulsion, the French in the later stages of the Franco-German War and the Turkish 2nd Redifs in the Balkans. It is curious also that the desired deduction can only be drawn by making tlie examination so cursory as to ignore the most relevant factors. True it is that the German armies, better led, better trained, and better arm.ed, were ultimately victorious over the army of the Loire, and if the instance were only cited to prove the ultimate * Army Review, January, 1912, p. 270. \ OLUNTARY SERVICE 47 fate of an ill-armed,* hastily improvised, untrained force directed by Generals who distrusted their armies, i* might be relevant. But to fail to detect in the narrow margin by which at times the army missed success, in the achievements of Chanzy who, almost alone, knew how to handle raw troops, or in such in- cidents as the recapture by the Western Volunteers under Gougeard of a lost position in the midst of a rout at Le Mans, the possibilities of the voluntary spirit under conditions less hopeless than those which combined against the army of the Loire, is strangely to misread history. To draw a deduction from that heroic failure as to the fate of the Territorial Force which starts with the organisation, the arms, the equipment, the staff and regular commanders accus- tomed to handle it in peace, which the People's Army never acquired, is only admirable in its audacity. The Balkan War affords an even more significant lesson. If the blame is to be cast on the Redif train- ing, it is to be noted that it was in general rather more than that which is proposed by the National Service League. But the real source of the trouble may be detected in the book of that very correspondent whose remarks have been circulated to every Territorial officer by an anonymous benefactor for no other pur- pose, apparently, than to shake their determination to do their duty in the system under which they serve. It was not merely cowardice, but often a positive desire to be fighting on the other side which led to the whole- sale desertion. And what of the other armies? They were principally raised by compulsion, it is true, but a war of liberation had long been a national passion, * There were seventy different types of rifle in use. 48 THE CASE FOR and the spirit which animated the troops was far more akin to the voluntary spirit than the sort of discipline* which, according to Lord Roberts, can alone win battles. The Bulgarian army had had the longest training. Irresistible in the war of liberation, it collapsed in the war of policy. In the Greek army, v/hich performed, perhaps, the finest feats of endur- ance, about one-third had had no military training before the outbreak of war, and were under no practical compulsion to serve. Making every allowance for extraneous factors, it would be difficult to find a more convincing example of the futility of the notion that a mere taste of compulsory training can create an army unless there exists already the enthusiasm — which is really the voluntary spirit — than the failure of the Turkish Redifs, the rise and fall of the fortunes of. the Bulgarian army, and the achievements of the Greeks. If we desire to look nearer home, we may note that the Imperial Light Horse, embodied on October 8th, 1899, fought with distinction on the 21st, that the C.I. v., embodied on January 4th, 1900, were pronounced by Sir Ian Hamilton to have been on June I2th equal in fighting efficiency to a Regular battalion, and that the same General states of the Volunteer Companies that in a comparatively brief period they became the acknowledged equals of their comrades in the line, and of the troops sent by the Colonies. "'Good wine needs no bush'; and it would be superfluous indeed were I to recapitulate the deeds of these corps who, in their first encounters with the * i.e., as the context clearly shows (Message to the Nation, p 49), discipline in the old sense of automatic self-effacement, produced by rigid training, rather than conscious self-control. VOLUNTARY SEK\ ICE 40 enemy, were assuredly neither more highly trained nor disciplined than our existing Territorials." History, indeed, can furnish us with no example of an army parallel to that which we possess in the Territorial Force, but this much of guidance it seems to give us in deciding whether to abandon our volun- tary system : that nothing but a voluntary professional army will enable us to meet our Imperial obligations; that for a policy war, a compulsory militia as such is a useless instrument, that even as a source of individual \olimteers, for drafts for foreign service, it would furnish probably only men disposed to take up soldier- ing as a profession who would be equally well obtained through our existing Special Reserve or Regular depots; that, lastly, for the troops behind our Regular Army, it is not a matter of a few- months' training long before the occasion arises, that will serve our purpose. Either we must rely upon the " thorough training and iron discipline " which alone can make soldiers out of unwilling men, or else upon the voluntary spirit which, effectively armed, equipped, and organised, can be sufficiently trained to meet our needs. CHAPTER IV THE TERRITORIAL FORCE IHE Territorial Force differs from the old Auxiliary Forces, which it replaced, in four important respects. It is really organised for war, which the old haphazard Yeomanry and Volunteer regiments never were, it is better equipped, it is better led, and it is far better trained. Compulsionists are fond of saying that the Territorial swstem has " broken down." The wish is, no doubt, father to the thought. The real fact is that the progress made has been satisfactory and adequate, and in some respects even surprising. It is true that we ha^•e not ^"et got out of the system all that it is certainly capable of producing, especially in the matter of numbers, but we are a conservative people, and having regard to the violence of the transition made b}- the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act of 1907, on the one hand, and the cold water poured upon it by the compulsionists on the other, the wonder is, not that it is not yet completely one with our national life and habits, but that it enjoys the popularity and secures the large measure of de\-oted support from citizens, in all walks of life, that it does. In a word, the system has justified itself bevond all expectation; for the finishing touches v.e must wait patientlv for the educative effects which it is steadily having, not only upon employers and employed, but also upon the pro- VOLUNTARY SERVICE 51 fessional army itself. The Territorial Force can only reach the zenith of what it is possible for it to achieve when the whole country, and not merely the majority of its voters, is convinced of the folly of compul- sion ; as soon as that is done and the voluntary system is accepted by military men and politicians alike as the only possible system for our Empire with its own special and peculiar problems, there will be no lack of officers and men to lill its ranks. Until that time comes, it must train itself, as it is doing, to set an example and despise the criticisms of ignorance and prejudice. Section i. — Organisation THE TERRITORIAL FORCE AS A MILITARY FORMATION The Territorial Force is organised into independent units of all arms, while certain other troops, mainly fortress artillery and engineers, are allotted to coast defence. Its field or fighting organisation follows, therefore, exactly on the lines of that laid down for the Regular Army — that is to say, it is permanently formed into units representing the highest number of men which, according to the views of our General Staff, can be commanded in the field by one general. These large units are called divisions, and consist of infantrv, artillery, mounted troops, and auxiliary services in their proper proportions, having each an approximate war strength of 18,000 men, commanded in peace by those who will lead them in war. 52 THE CASE FOR But whereas the field troops of the Regular Army or Expeditionary Force consist of six divisions and one cavalry division (consisting of four cavalry brigades, each of three regiments, or a total of twelve cavalry regiments in all), the field troops of the Terri- torial Force consist of fourteen divisions of infantry and fourteen mounted brigades. It provides, there- fore, for more than twice the number of divisions of all arms, and more than three times the number of mounted troops than the Regular Army at home.* The smaller units (infantry battalions. Yeomanry regiments, artillery brigades, etc.) are commanded by Territorial Force officers qualifying for their appoint- ments by a series of examinations for promotion from grade to grade, written and practical, and by selection for fitness to undertake these duties by the General Officer responsible in the various commands. The higher units, such as divisions, infantry brigades, cavalry brigades, are commanded, almost without exception, by Regular officers on the active list. The staffs of the divisions and brigades are found by Regular officers, it being an almost essential condition of their appointment that they should have graduated at the Staff College. Details of the establishment of the Territorial Force of the field are set forth in the * It is sometimes alleged that the Territorial Force has no horses. This is not the case. It is true that in peace time a large proportion of the horses are hired for the training in camp, and that one horse may thus attend in the same year the camps of two or more regiments. But on mobilisation for war the horses required both for the Regular Army and for the Territorial Force will be " impressed," and a register of all suitable horses has now been taken and is kept up to date in each county. This register shows a total of 462,919 serviceable horses now in the country, of which only 42,769 will be required for the Regulars and 83,697 for the Territorials on mobilisation. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 53 Appendix. In addition to the field troops of the Terri- torial Force there are a certain number of army troops. These troops are not allocated to brigades or divisions, and their employment on mobilisation will be as directed by army headquarters. The third category into which the Territorial Force is divided is the coast defence troops. These troops are allotted on mobilisa- tion to the defended ports, leaving the field armies as above free for operation as mobile units from a central position against the enemy from whatever direction he may come. The whole of these troops, whether allotted to coast defence or otherwise, have definite duties allotted to them on mobilisation and definite war stations to which to proceed as soon as the alarm is given. The whole business of assembling them, providing them with transport and warlike stores, and entraining them to their war stations has been worked out in detail, and each oflficer, non-commissioned officer and man will know exactly what he has to do on receiving" the order to mobilise. The plans are thus all ready drawn up so that the Chief of the General Staff at the War Office has only to press a button and mobilisation takes place. Moreover, as the Territorial Force is raised on a strictly local basis, and stands ready clothed and equipped, and has the same " estab- lishment " in peace as it has in war, it can be con- centrated at its war stations in three days, whereas the Regular Army, which has its Reservists to collect from all parts of the United Kingdom, clothe and equip them at the depots, and dispatch them to the colours, cannot be mobilised within a week at the very earliest. 54 THE CASE FOR CONTRAST WITH THE VOLUXTKER SYSTEM The organisation of the Territorial Force into a real army came about as follows: The 1907 Act raised a National Citizen Army (as opposed to a Regular Professional Army) organised on the Conti- nental plan by a voluntary system of recruitment, and instead of decrying this lack of patriotism for not submitting to compulsion, Britons are entitled to claim that the fact that Great Britain is an island and the voluntary spirit have enabled them to succeed in doing what none of the Continental nations— with the possible exception of France during the early stages of the French revolutionary wars — have ever attempted. Moreover, the Act was no revolution, it was only a wise adaptation of a long-continued process of evolution, brought about partly by the patriotism and energy of the old Volunteer Force, and partly by the old Militia tradition. As regards the first, the transformation of the old light companies or corps of Volunteer riflemen into a Field Army com- plete in itself was a gradual process brought about by the good sense of the \'^olunteers themselves. Whether we consider the' early movement of 1750 or the Volunteers of the Great War with France, or, again, the third \"'olunteer movement of 1858, the reason why the Volunteers of those days never attempted to do more than light troops of irregular riflemen is to be found in the theory, prevailing amongst all militarv men throughout the hundred years in question, that the infantry of the line were to be held in reserve for the decisive occasions of set VOLUNTARY SERVICE 55 battles and were to be covered, whether on the move or at the lialt, by skirmishers. It was found that ei\ilian Volunteers of good education and practice in field lore not only made admirable troops, but more often than not excelled the steadier and more discip- lined formations in this kind of warfare. When, therefore, the crises of the Seven-^'ears' War or of the Great W^ar with I*" ranee, or the dubious intentions of Napoleon III., demanded the expansion of our military strength beyond the limits of the Regular forces, it was natural and sensible of the general public to offer their services in the guise of auxiliary companies of rifle volunteers. But from i860 to the end of the nineteenth century the great increase of numbers placed on the battlefield, due principally to the intro- duction of compulsory service, demanded a high level of field organisation in order that a much greater number of men could be controlled and directed by a single mind. Throughout all these years, therefore, the leading spirits in the \"()lunteer Force were con- sistently pressing more and more towards regular formations. The Rifle Companies accordingly amal- gamated themselves into administrative battalions in the late 'seventies, and later on these battalions, in their turn, were formed into brigades. Engineer companies sprang up, and in some of the more pro- gressive regiments the foundations of army service corps and medical troops were also laid. In the matter of field artillery the volunteers were lacking (the cavalry of the home armv having always been pro- vided for by the Yeomanry force). It was found, indeed, thnf vohmteer nrtillerv were eyceedin""lv useful 56 THE CASE FOR for the service of guns of position, and companies of artillery were established at practically all stations along the coast. Not unnaturally, however, the authorities were disinclined to encourage any attempt on the part of amateurs to be admitted into the arcana of field gunnery, and the very few volunteer field batteries which were allowed reteived scant official encouragement, and were armed, down to the year 1900, with muzzle-loading guns, first issued to the British Army during the year of the Crimean War. The org^anisation of the Territorial Force into divi- sions of all arms by the Act of 1907 made the provision of the requisite artillery unavoidable, and as the pro- vision of Regular batteries was out of the question, both on the score of expense and also owing to the im- possibility of finding sufficient recruits for such a service, the experiment had, perforce, to be made of raising a Territorial artillery. As will be shown when we come to deal with the training and war value of the Territorial Force, the result has been admittedly surprising, and has surpassed the expectation even of its warmest supporters. The point to be insisted on here is that the organisa- tion of our citizen soldiers into a Field Army on the European model has not been a futile attempt to force upon an unwilling nation something which, without compulsion, they know themselves unable to perform ; but, on the contrary, it signified a grant to them of recognition as a serious contribution to the defences of the Empire which for years their representatives of the Volunteer Force had striven to obtain. The conversion of the Militia into the Special Reserve under the Art of 1907 set a seal on the gradual VOLUNTARY SERVICE 57 pr(x-ess of twenty years, and involved the enlistment of all its officers and men under an obligation to find drafts to replace casualties for the Regular Army in time of war, and consequently a liability to service overseas during warfare. In times of peace, at least 50 per cent, of the men who enlist in the Special Reserve go on into the Line as soon as the phvsical training received in the Special Reserve training depots allows them to pass the standard required. In time of war, by the terms of the Act, the liabilities of the Special Reserve become identified with those of the Line battalions. The service thus done to the Regular Army and the increased power given to it of serving with efficiency in any part of the Empire was itself of in- calculable value, and but for the existence of the Special Reserve as a feeder to the Arm^^ not only in war, but also in time of peace, the absolutelv irreducible nimibers that are required for our overseas' service could not ])e obtained. It remained, however, to provide for the now vanished Militia some efficient substitute in the way of a home defence army. This was done bv the creation of the Territorial Force, which was intended to absorb the best elements in the Volunteer Force. The superior class of men which it attracted, the high standard of education and, therefore, of adaptability and keenness, of the men wlio composed the rank and file; its popularity even with many sections of the population who were still old-fashioned enough to hold it to }ye a disgrace to the familv if a son or a brother enlisted in the Army; and the widespread nitnre of an organisation which, thanks to the almosl 58 THE CASE FOR unaided effort of the citizens of this country them- selves, had (in contradiction to the Mihtia centred at a barracics in a single county town) its representatives in everv town, and in almost every considerable village throughout Great Britain ; these were the elements to which were added the longer periods of training and the revival of countv responsibility. Thus whereas prior to Lord Haldane's Act the Volunteers had been administered entirely by their commanding officers, and were, in a sense, proprietary corps for which the county in which they were raised was in no way officially responsible, the Act now definitely imposed upon the county the responsibility for raising and equipping them, and for the provision of the necessary drill stations and rifle ranges. The Lords Lieutenant, who had in old days administered the Militia, found their lapsed responsibilities revived in connection with the new Force, and, subject to a personal power of delegating this responsibility to some nominee of their own, became, ex-officio, the Presidents of the so-called " County Associations." Thus it is that our Home Defence Army has " broadened slowly down from precedent to precedent," and is entitled, as it deserves, to receive the whole-hearted support of all Britons. THE QUESTION OF NUMBERS The total number of men required to place the Territorial Force in the field at its full strength of officers and men is 11,253 officers and 301,611 men. The actual number of men serving on Januarv ist. 1914, is 239,819, showing a deficiencv of 61,792. This deficiency is, no doubt, serious, and it is very (iesirable that it should be made p-ood at the earliest VOLUNTARY SERVICE 59 possible moment. Meanwhile, there arc three miti- gating features. In the iirst place, as already pointed out, the peace establishment of the Territorial Force is also its war establishment — i.e., the number of men shown as being needed to serve with the colours in times of peace is the actual number of men required to bring the respective units into the field at war strength. In this respect the Territorial Force stands alone among the armies of the world, with the excep- tion of the Indian Armv. Continental armies raised on the compulsory basis and the British Regular Army at home retain with the colours, largely for reasons of expense, onlv a proportion varving from one-third to two-thirds of the men who will be required for service in time of war. Hence mobilisation in the Continental sense and in the sense that it is understood in the Regular Army means the calling up of men who ha\e finished their colour service and passed into civil life as reservists. Now, when a war unit consists as to one-third only of men who have recentlv been serv- ing with the colours and as to two-thirds of reservists called up from civil life, who mav have left the colours five years ago, it will clearly take some further time before these units can recover that solidarity and feel- ing of confidence of the men in their officers and of the officers in their men which is the hall-mark of good fighting troops. The Territorial troops may, indeed, be, and, of course, are, less well-trained than the actual men serving with the colours whether on the Continent of Europe or in the Regular Army at home. On the other hand, they all stand on the same footing, and are comrades and associates in the closest sense of the term. 6o THE CASE FOR In the second place, the figures for recruiting show that the present deficiency is due mainly to the reaction in the two years following the boom in the spring of 1909. As a man enlists for four years, the effect of a reaction only becomes apparent three or four years later, when the time of the recruits taken during the boom expires, unless they re-engage. A very small increase in the present rate of recruiting will maintain the force as near full strength as is possible. See Appendix VI. Next, it is a delusion to suppose that the Territorial Force is without reserves of any kind from which to draw the twenty per cent, who at the present strength are required to bring the eighty actually serving up to war strength. There cannot be any doubt that this proportion, and extra men that may be required to take the places of newly joined recruits, will easily be forthcoming either from the first category of the National Reserve (of which later), or from ex- Territorial soldiers who have recently completed their term of service and returned to civil life, but who in the extreme emergency of threatened invasion would immediately return to the comrades they had only recently left. These men w'ill be the associates in civilian life of those whom they rejoin. There will be far less difference between them and the men serving than between the ordinary regular and reservist, so that there will be very little of the loss of homogeneity pointed out above as a drawback to an army largely dependent on reserves. Moreover, there will be an almost endless reserve supply of such men to replace any casualties that may subsequently occur, or any voluntary drafts which the Territorial Force may, as VOLUNTARY SERVICE 6i the Volunteers did during the South African War, send out to replace casualties in the Regular Army itself.* SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICES Behind the Territorial troops proper stand two preparatory and two supplementary or auxiliary ser- vices which, as now organised into a definite relation to ni Hilary objects, should prove of the greatest possible value, and are still capable of a good deal more development, as experience may suggest and the energy of those concerned with them allow. These are the Officers' Training Corps and the Cadet Batta- lions, on the one hand, the function of which is to prepare the youth of the country to serve as officers and in the ranks, and the National Reserve and Voluntary Aid Detachments on the other, the first of which constitutes a considerable reserve for bringing units up to war strength on mobilisation, and per- forming certain duties which would otherwise cause a drain on the field army, and for providing drafts to fill the wastage of war, and the second upon which we can only rely for the care of the sick and wounded. THE officers' TRAINING CORPS The object of the Officers' Training Corps * Out of a total of 204,743 Volunteers on the Rolls on November 1st, 1899, 71,758 volunteered to go to South Africa, and 29,049 actually went. It must be remembered, moreover, that no general appeal was made for their services ; in contradistinction to the Yeomanr}', the Volunteers were told they might go an a favour, not asked to go as a duty. In consequence, many Commanding officers actually discouraged their men from going, conceiving it to be the first duty of the Volunteers to replace the Regular garrisons at home. See, for the evidence of these figures, the Spectator, March nth, 1905, pp. 361-2 ; April 8th, 1905, pp. 508-9. 02 THE CASE FOR (O.T.C.)> created by Royal Warrant of June, 1907, out of the old Public School and University Volun- teers, is to supply subaltern officers for the Special Reserve and Territorial Force in peace time, and also to make good any deficiencies that may be apparent on mobilisation for war. The corps consists of two divisions — the University contingents, or Senior Division, and the School contingents, forming the Junior Division. Any university or school may offer to provide a contingent if it will unreservedly accept the regulations for the corps. The corps is organised and controlled under the personal supervision of the Director of Military Training at the War Office. Its officers are on the unattached list of the Territorial Force, and have the same rights, terms of service, and allowances, and the same liabilities on embodiment. The cadets have no legal liability for service, but a record of all efficient cadets is kept. When an efficient cadet leaves school details of his service are sent, if he goes to a University, to the officers commanding the O.T.C. contingent there, and the names of efficient senior cadets or of junior cadets passing straight into business to the County Association in whose area they reside. When a senior cadet leaves his contingent without taking a commission forthwith, the War Office obtains the record of his permanent address and pro- fession, and will call upon him to volunteer for service in time of need. Regular officers are appointed as adjutants to Universities and schools, or groups of Universities and schools. The training is carried out under these adjutants, the officers of the O.T.C. them- selves are under the Director of Military Training, and large combined training camps are held during the VOLUNTARY SERVICE 63 summer vacation. Cadets can qualify for direct com- missions by obtaining certilicates of proficiency at an examination, the standard of which is very high, designed to produce officers really capable of supply- ing subalterns for vacancies in any branch of the service. The scheme during the first four years of its opera- tion has JDeen very fairly successful , as will be seen from the following table giving the number of ex- cadets who, up to date, have accepted commissions in the Special Reserve or Territorial Force.* In addition to those who have actually accepted commissions it must be remembered that there are a large number of others who have passed through the O.T.C. and have received the training qualifying them for •ubaltern rank; although some have now passed into civil life, and, for reasons good or bad, have not seen their way to serve in time of peace, while others are serving in the ranks, it is certain that they would come forward in sufficient numbers to fill gaps on mobilisa- tion for war. THE CADET BATTALIONS Tn addition to the Cadet Battalions and companies which form part of the O.T.C, there is an increasing number of ordinary Cadet Battalions and Companies all over the United Kingdom. They are recognised * Appoin Special Ri ted to sserve. Appointed If) Territorial Force igoq IS Not available. 1910 1911 83 '59 553 Not available. 1912 i9'3 ^^3 285 343 449 64 THE CASE FOR by the War Office, and administered by County Asso- ciations, who draw a small grant on their behalf. They form a valuable link between the boyhood of a locality and the units found by that locality for the Territorial Force, and a very large number of their ex-cadets are now passing regularly each year into the Home Army. No mention is made here of the Boy Scouts' Organisation, or of such of the Boys' Brigades as have decided not to apply for recognition as cadets, through which, of cour^ie, the vast majority of the boys of this country pass at one time or other of their boyhood. The primary object of these valuable voluntary organisations is not military, and they, therefore, not only do not receive, but will not accept official recognition by the military authorities. Nevertheless, they are a striking testimony to the popularity of voluntary service in the country when wisely and sympathetically administered, and cannot fail to react favourably both upon the discipline and the numbers of all the branches of the Imperial Forces. THE NATIONAL RESERVE Any officer or man who has served in the Army or Navy, or has done efficient service either in the old Auxiliary Forces or in the present Territorial Force is eligible to enrol himself in the National Reserve. This valuable corps is administered by the County Associa- tions, and is commanded by retired officers of dis- tinction. It is di\"ided into three categories, com- prising :— - I. Men whose age and physical condition would fit them for immediate service with the field armies of the VOLUNTARY SERVICE 65 Territorial Force on mobilisation for war, and who are willing to take an engagement to that effect. 2. Men who are not available for field work, but would be useful in war time either for work at the training dep6ts or for embodiment at the garrison and fortress towns. 3. Men who have passed altogether beyond mili- tary age, and who join the National Reserve for the purpose of meeting old comrades and encouraging the military spirit in the districts in which they reside. The value of these men as recruiters for all branches of His Majesty's Service is potentially incalculable. It remains for the authorities to work out a system in detail under which they can be utilised to the best possible advantage. THE VOLUNTARY AID DETACHMENTS Voluntary Aid Detachments are being organised throughout the country to supplement the medical organisation of the Territorial Force, which already includes medical establishments and units, sufficient for the immediate requirements of the whole of the combatant troops on the march and in action, and for general hospitals. The object of the detachments is to provide, in the event of war in the home territory, trained personnel and material for the equipment of clearing and stationary hospitals; improvised, tem- porary, and permanent ambulance trains; entraining and rest stations ; private hospitals and convalescent homes. Detachments are either men's with an establishment of fifty-six, or women's with an estab- lishment of twenty-three, of whom all (except four 66 THE CASE FOR cooks) must possess certified knowledge of first-aid. The men's duties are mainly as stretcher-bearers and handymen ; the women perform nursing duties. The detachments are organised and administered on a military pattern through the Territorial County Associations by the agency, chiefly, of the British Red Cross Society ; but also of the St. John Ambulance Brigade. No part of the expenses of the detachments is borne by Army funds until after mobilisation. The total number of detachments raised by the British Red Cross Societies in England, Wales, and Scotland in November, 1913, was 1,859, of which 379 were men's. The total personnel was 54,039, of whom 16,436 were men. The total number raised by the St. John Ambulance Brigade was 25,554. The St. John Ambulance Brigade also includes the following auxiliary and civil medical organisations : — Royal Naval Auxiliary Sick Berth Reserve ... 1,015 Military Home Hospitals Reserve 1,821 Bearer Companies, R.A.M.C 363 Voluntary Aid Detachments (268 units) ... 10,228 The Territorial Branch, St. John Ambulance Association supplies a further ninety-eight Detach- ments w'ith a membership of 2,251, making a total of 12,479 in St. John Detachments alone. THE COUNTY ASSOCIATIONS The Territorial Force, together with the affiliated organisations above specified, is administered by the Territorial Force Associations for each county, set up by the Act of 1907 and commonly known as the County Associations. These Associations are composed of the VOLUNTARY SERVICE 67 Lord Lieutenant or his nominee as President, a Chair- man and Vice-Chairman elected by the Association, and a paid permanent Secretary. The members of the Association are in part elected and in part co-opted; they consist of the Commanding Officers of all units in the county, of civilian members nominated by the County Council, of the iMayors of the larger boroughs, and other principal county officials. In addition to the co-opted members representing various sections of the county, whether employers or employed, there is also in each a leaven of military members chosen from among retired Regular or Territorial officers resident in the county. To these Associations certain grants are paid from Army funds for the administration of their units in time of peace, and particularly for their clothing and equipment, the provision of drill hall and ride ranges, and of transport and horses for the annual training. In addition, the Associations are responsible for the conduct and expenses of recruiting, of travelling on duty within the boundaries of the county, and for musketry practice, etc. The clothing and equipment include reserves of clothing against the event of mobilisation and maintenance of mobilisation stores. The arms for the troops are found by the Army Ordnance Department direct, while the actual expenses of training, whether in camp or week-end camps for individual officers and N.C.O.'s, are paid from the War Office to the General Officers Command- ing " as training grants," and are administered by the officers responsible for training. It has been mentioned that the County Associa- tions are responsible for recruiting. The method by which the quota for each county was arrived at was as SB 68 THE CASE FOR follows : On the introduction of the scheme the General Staff took a survey of the entire country, of the male population in each county, on the one hand, and on the other of the numbers of men actually enrolled in the Yeomanry or Volunteers in the various districts. Guided thus, partly by the numbers which voluntary service had given us in the past, as corrected by the number of men held to be required for home defence in the absence of the Regular Army abroad, they arrived at the fourteen divisions and fourteen mounted brigades given on page 52, plus coast defence troops, with a total war strength of some 320,000 officers and men. As already pointed out, they then made the peace establishment of these units identical with their war establishment, and proceeded to allocate a number of Yeomanry regiments, infantry battalions, artillery batteries, etc., to each county according to its population, and having regard to the numbers of men it had given in the past. In the case of the very small counties, parts only of Yeomanry regiments or in- fantry battalions were called for. The allocation was made after prolonged consultation with the County Associations themselves as to which various branches of the Service should be represented and in what strength, and is even now subject to minor changes as experience may suggest — within the limits of the authorised field establishments. This business of allocation, naturally difficult, in many cases involved the destruction of existing infantry units and their con- version into artillery or other arms. In other cases it meant the raising of new units altogether. Moreover, there was an undue, though praiseworthy, inclination to attempt to induce those districts and counties which VOLUNTARY SERVICE 69 had not done their duty in the past to find something Hke their proper proportion of men, while on the other hand the more mihtary and patriotic counties found themselves asked to provide fewer men than they had in the past. This involved the break up of many old battalions, or their fusion into one another, with the immediate effect of destroying the accuracy of the old arithmetical laws of addition. Thus a battalion, numbering 500, when added to one numbered 800, produced not 1,300 men but more often 300, owing to the pardonable disgust of the old members of each battalion at losing their old identity and traditions. Moreover, there was, and perhaps is still, an undue desire to preserve the exact numbers and war establishments fashionable in the Regular Army for the time being, which forced sound old corps into a bed of Procrustes and caused them pain and dislocation. The periods of enlistment were also unnecessarily rigid and for- bidding, and the differentiation of pay which places the infantry in a position of inferiority vis-d-vis the other arms has also damaged the popularity of that important arm. These difficulties are, however, very well understood by County Associations, and their rectification involves that spirit of compromise and discussion between the civilian authorities on the one hand and the military authorities on the other, which is one of the best possibilities opened out to us by the Territorial scheme. Meanwhile, they go far to explain how it is, not only that the war establishments were not reached at once, but that in many cases they have not been reached even yet. 70 THE CASE FOR Section 2. — Administration LEADERSHIP One of the chief defects of the old Auxiliary Forces — the Yeomanry, Militia, or Volunteers — was, not only that they had no higher organisation than com- panies and battalions, but also that they possessed no officers really capable of commanding any higher units, and no staff officers at all. The Territorial scheme has given us fourteen divisional generals, four- teen mounted brigade, and fifty-six infantry brigade commanders. Practically all of these are Regular soldiers of the required rank, and so, too, are their due proportion of brigade majors and staff officers. In addition, there are a number of carefully selected officers of the Regular artillery who command and train the artillery units of the Force. The selection of all these officers is very carefully made, and their subsequent promotion in the Regular Army, when they return to it, will depend upon the way in which they carry out their duties with the Territorial Force.* These officers command their Territorial units both * The fo11n:ving shows some of the appointments now held in the Regular Army by soldiers who have been successfully com- manders of Territorial Units : Lieutenant-General Sir H. Mackinnon, late Director-General Territorial Force at the War Office, now General Officer Commanding Western Command ; Major-General E. C. Bethune, late commanding West Lancashire Division, now Director-General Territorial Force, War Office ; Major-General Sir Francis Lloyd, late commanding Welsh Division, now General Officer Commanding London District; Brigadier-General C. J. Briggs, late commanding South Eastern Mounted Brigade, now commanding ist Cavalry Brigade, Alder- shot ; Brigadier-General F. L. Maxse, late commanding 3rd London Infantry Brigade, now commanding ist Infantry Brigade, Aldershot. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 71 in peace and in war, and when mobilisation is ordered there is no chance of their being carried off to other duties. The units will take the field with experienced generals and staffs, under whom they have trained, and whom they accordingly know and respect. This is a very great advance upon the old haphazard system under which retired military officers or very senior Volunteers or Yeomen were given infantry brigades from year to year, or for the period of camp only, the regiments having, so to speak, to fend for themselves during the whole of the rest of the year.* The appointment of Regular officers to active com- mands in the Territorial Force has this further advan- tage, that it brings the officers of the Regular Army into close association with those of the Territorial Force and thereby, while helping to break down that feeling of jealousy between the two sections of the military forces which was so detrimental to the old Auxiliary Forces, it has an educative and broadening effect upon both parlies to the contract. It is a little doubtful at present whether these Regular officers hold their appointments with the Territorial Force long enough to become real experts on its training and to solve problems which are, of course, quite different from those of the professional troops to which they have been accustomed. It is also doubtful whether • Writing in the year 1891, Colonel G. F. R. Henderson said: " The Volunteer Force as at present constituted is an excellent school of physical training. But this is hardly the purpose for which it is maintained. Give it capable officers, trained company leaders and an educated staff, raise the standard of efficiency, exact a physical test, and it will become the strong arm of a free people, a safeguard against invasion, and an efficient substitute for conscription." — (Science of War, p. 229.) Every one of these reforms has been set on foot by the Act of 1907, and almost all are accomplished. 72 THE CASE FOR serving, as they now do, under the orders of the Regular commander in all matters of administration and training, enough scope has been left to the energy and initiative of the Commanding Officers of the Force itself. Certainly, the arduous labour of the Territorial officer receives far from its due proportion of official recognition. These, however, are matters of detail only, which can, and will, be solved by time, goodwill, and experience ; and, meanwhile, it is an unquestionable advantage, when we come to take stock of the fighting value of the Territorial Force, that it should be led and staffed by men of the same stamp and training as those who hold similar appointments in the Regular Ex- peditionary Army. TRAINING The training of the Territorial Force reaches a standard which is, according to the military corre- spondent of the Times, at least twice as high as that given to the old Volunteers. While perpetuating the admirable system of weekly drills all the year round and of musketry practice, outside the camp period, which had been inaugurated by the riflemen of the old Volunteer Force, the 1907 Act added a much more prolonged period of continuous training in annual camp, and so introduced what was best in the old Militia. The minimum attendances at such weekly drills at their home stations are for recruits, forty in the first year of their service (for artillery, forty-five) and after the first year, ten (for artillery, twenty). But the minimum required by regulation by no means represents the number actually attended; the average Territorial does annually about twice the minimum. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 73 Moreover, the very generous provision of drill halls, with miniature ranges attached, that is now being made all over the country, not only makes the weekly drills much more practical, but brings them within reach of many in the rural districts who, prior to their erection, had no opportunity of serving at all. In addition, the money now provided for week-end camps, regimental tours, and courses of instruction generally, has very materially enhanced the individual training of the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks. The Yeomanry and Volunteers had, up to the South African War, been allowed to train eight days only in camp, and subsequently four days of camp was the required minimum for individual efficiency. The Act of 1907 increased the minimum attendance to eight days, unless special leave of absence is obtained, while all units are required to be under canvas as units for fifteen days. During the first six years of the existence of the Territorial Force the following is the percentage of men who attended camp for eight and fifteen days respectively : — For 8 days. For 15 days. 1908 35% ••• 53% 1909 29% ... 62% 1910 30% ... 62% 1911 29% ... 59% 1912 26% ... 61% 1913 22% ... 67% It is to be noted that when compared with the figures for the Volunteer Force, the number of day's 74 THE CASE FOR attendances in camp by individuals have been far more than doubled since the institution of the Territorial scheme. While it is true that in some parts of the country fifteen days' continuous training in camp is still a great difificulty to some of the men, and more particularly to their employers, nevertheless it may confidently be expected that a practical way out will be obtained, and there is no doubt that the ultimate object of the Territorial as regards camp attendance — namely, that every man shall, with rare exceptions, attend for the full fifteen days — will ultimately be realised. It is to be noted further that while the annual training of the Militia consisted of periods varying at different times from a fortnight to a month, at least one week of this was taken up by musketry, and, further, that during the rest of the year the regiment as such ceased to exist and may be said to have hibernated. The Territorial Force, as already said, suffers from neither of these disabilities ; even the man who cannot attend camp at all in any particular year, may still render himself efficient at the weekly drills and on the rifle range. Criticism is often directed to the number who obtain leave of absence from camp, but it is usually towards the end of a man's service that leave has to be obtained, and for a man who has attended, say, two or three camps, to miss one is not a very serious matter. Cases of exemption for two consecutive years are almost unknown. In many instances it is actually the most efficient men who are absent, because their abilities render them too valuable to be spared from their civil employment. One point should be noted in this connection which at first sight is paradoxical enough, but on closer VOLUNTARY SERVICE 75 examination gives us a most instructive insight into the ethos or psychology of the voluntary system and of its possibilities in war. This is that the more technical and difficult the arm of the service, the better the class of man who has come forward for service in that arm, and the more astonishing the measure of hard work and devotion given to it. Thus the first result of the bold determination to do anything with mere amateurs in so expert an arm as Horse and Field Artillery has been to call up the very best elements amongst the young men of the day, and has thereby acquired for the Territorial Force a class of men who would very probably never have joined less expert arms like the Infantry, where the business of soldiering for the private soldier is apt, at first sight, to appear so simple as to suggest to energetic minds that it must necessarily be dull. The gunners of the Territorial Force are very largely recruited from men who are engineers by profession, while the drivers belong to that class of men not yet extinct in this country who are fond of horses and realise how much more difficult and therefore more attractive is the business of driving horses in a gun team than of merely riding them as Yeomanry cavalry. So, again, some of the Engineer units of the Territorial Force, and especially the telegraph and wireless companies, are quite as good at their work as their comrades in the Royal Engineers, while the Army Service Corps and the Medical Detachments give scope for activities which are in a very large degree of a civilian and business nature and not of a purely military order. Service in the Infantry is no doubt less attractive, and the proportion of strength to establishment is 76 THE CASE FOR lower. For this arm, particularly, it is important that some further financial provision should be made, as the Council of Territorial Force Associations has recommended, so that neither employers nor employed should be losers by the latter's attendance at camp. But as the high numbers and comparative efficiency of the more expert arms show^, the main problem is not one of money at all. It is rather one of obtaining a whole-hearted conviction on the part of all citizens, not only as to the vital importance of the duties which a home army has to perform, but as to the value of the service rendered by the Territorial Force, and of securing, by the greater education of our people in problems of defence, a general consensus of opinion that the voluntary system is the only possible system for Great Britain and her Empire. Then, and then only, will the man who gives up his time to service in the Territorial Force stand on quite a different footing towards his employer and towards public opinion generally, than he who neglects his business for athletics or, still more, for the enervating atmosphere of the cinema theatre or the marine parade. There is still a very large section of the population which at the present moment gives nothing like the support it should do to the Territorial Force. There are, of course, many millions of persons in this country who are as convinced, as are the Voluntary Service Committee, of the fallacies which underlie the argu- ments of the compulsionist^ and of the disastrous effects that the introduction of compulsion in any form would have upon the strategic needs of our Empire. It is perhaps, however, no exaggeration to say that at least 50 per cent, of these persons who are VOLUNTARY SERVICE 77 so sound in theory do nothing whatever to put their theory into practice. It is indeed necessary that they should understand that criticism only is not states- manship, that an efficient voluntary Home Army is the pivot upon which rests the whole defensive system of the Empire, and that much more than the mere inconvenience and expense of compulsion is involved in the prosperity and the efficiency of the Territorial Force. The members of the Voluntary Service Committee would therefore ask all men of the required age and physical standard who desire to oppose compulsory service to give practical effect to their principles by serving at least four years in the Territorial Force, while as for that large body of voters who are no longer able to under- take active duties of this kind, there are many practical ways by which they can, whether they be employers or not, actively encourage and interest themselves in the welfare of the home defence army. WAR VALUE The military value of a force which has never yet been tested in war is a question upon which there is obviously room for large difference of opinion. It must be remembered, too, that while the opinions of professional soldiers vary very greatly on the point, the professional man who has devoted his whole life and energies to soldiering will naturally be prejudiced against the mere amateur. The almost invariable comment on the part of the professional soldier, when he first comes into contact with the Territorial Force, is surprise at the standard of efficiency reached. 78 THE CASE FOR Surprise is, after all, an admission of false premises, and, as the length of time since an army has had actual war experience lengthens, false premises are apt to increase. It is significant that the value set upon unprofessional troops, shortly after the South African war had brought experience of such troops, has steadily declined in professional estimation. If there- fore the opinions of Regular officers as a whole are even moderately favourable it will be quite fair to give their opinions something rather more than their face value when we come to estimate war ratios. So far as the performances of similar forces trained for similar or even shorter periods go, there are count- less examples in history in favour of troops who, with the very smallest amount of preparatory training and practically no war organisation at all, did wonders on behalf of a cause in which they had all their hearts, and a very large proportion of these examples have been given us by troops of Anglo-Saxon descent.* Lastly, the critics of the Territorial Force are apt to make one fundamental error in their reason- ing. They claim — and other things being equal — claim justly — that it is not fit to meet an equal number of Regular troops. If by Regular troops they mean our own Expeditionary Force, by the rules of war they are right. If they mean the conscripts of Europe immediately upon the outbreak of war, they will still by the rules of war be right, though with a much smaller margin of certainty. But this is only finding fault with second-line troops because they are not fit in the opening stages of a war to meet an equal number of first-line troops. What is too often * See pp. 48-9. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 79 forgotten is that they are not intended to do so, and that the whole of our strategical plans are based on the contrary assumption. Lord Haldane's statement that the Territorial Force will be embodied on the out- break of war, and that they will need six months' continuous training from that moment onwards, is twisted into a statement which he never made, that they would be altogether unfit to take the field until those six months had elapsed, and much ridicule is poured upon an army that would only be ready for war six months after it was required. The whole of this seemingly effective argument is a mare's nest, founded upon an entire misconception of the objects for which first and second line troops respectively exist. There are second line troops in Germany and France too; but no one has yet been heard to condemn the Landwehr or the Territoriaux, because they are not immediately fit for service on the frontier. They will be moved up to the frontier to replace casualties as they occur, and meanwhile they will be embodied and under training. Similarly as regards the Territorial Force, they will be needed only when the first line of defence — in our case the Navy — has been passed, and those that think that the British Navy can quickly be destroyed or decoyed away have indeed cause for their extreme despondency. If this occurs, our Expeditionary Force cannot leave England. If, on the other hand, it is our Navy which wins, and clears the narrow seas for the passage of our Army, this again will take time, and meanwhile the Territorial Force, fully organised, well led by trained oflficers, and already trained at least as well as were the Boers in 1899-1900, will, under the extreme stimulus of a great war, and 8o THE CASE FOR backed then at last by the whole-hearted enthusiasm of the nation, be daily narrowing down the difference in training between troops of the first and those of the second line by leaps and bounds. During the early stages of the war any Continental troops which may elude our fleet will be overpowered by the weight of sheer numbers; if they come in greater force in the later stages, they will no longer be the first line men who originally mobilised. Those, or a large proportion of them, will have fallen already, and their places will have been taken by Landwehr, or second-line men, too. What is more, will not a caltm consideration of the real possibilities of European war lead to the conclusion that it is, on the whole, more likely that the final and decisive engagements will be fought out, not by the picked soldiers of Europe on British territory, but amongst others by British troops of the second, as well as of the first line, upon Continental territory, against the exhausted and oft-replenished cadres of the Continental conscription ? After all, we have the precedent of our own history for such an eventuality, and it must be remembered that many of the men who formed the squares at Waterloo were second-line men, members of the Militia, fighting even in their Militia uniforms. CHAPTER V THE PARTICULAR PROBLEM OF HOME DEFENCE The brief consideration given to this problem in Chapter II. sufficed to establish the following con- clusions : — (i) If the Navy is so crippled as to be unable to protect our supplies from oversea, no land force can save us from the necessity for making peace. (2) If the Navy is not disposed of, any landing force must be limited in numbers, and cannot depend on any base in its own territory. (3) A certain period of warning must be given. These and other considerations now require a more detailed examination. Section i. — The Supposed Influence of the Fear of Invasion on Naval Action Realising that the presence of the Navy in or near home waters is an insurmountable difficulty to their argument, those who demand a compulsory army have endeavoured to show that the primary duty of the Navy will be elsewhere, and that in the absence of such an army the fleet will have to be " manacled " and " anchored around these shores." The two duties generally put forward as incon- sistent with that of preventing an invasion are trade 82 THE CASE FOR defence, and seeking out the enemy's fleet wherever it may be. The answer to both points is conclusively given in the Admiralty Memorandum of November, 1910. " The main object aimed at by our fleet, whether for the defence of commerce or for any other purpose, is to prevent any ship of the enemy from getting to sea far enough to do any mischief before she is brought to action. Any disposition which is even moderately successful in attaining this object will almost certainly be eff"ective in preventing a large fleet of transports, than which nothing is more vulnerable or more difficult to hide, from reaching our shores." The notion that our fleet is to be dissipated in protecting our ships at long distances from our shores while leaving the enemy able to capture them in home waters, has only to be stated to show its absurdity. So long as the enemy's fleet, or part of it, is available, either for commerce, destruction, or to convoy transports across the North Sea or the Channel, we must keep a superior fleet at hand. The last resort is the argument that public opinion will not permit the freedom which strategy dictates. But public opinion does not steer our ships, and it has in any case shown itself entirely indisposed to be alarmed by the most strenuous efforts of the National Service League to promote the very evil which its supporters foresee. Section 2. — Invasion Any question of invasion upon a scale only possible for a Power which has command in our own home VOLUNTARY SERVICE 83 waters may therefore be dismissed. If our Navy is not strong enough to prevent that command from being obtained, the only conclusion is that it is imperative that we should not divert from it the money which is needed, by adding to our expenditure the heavy cost of a compulsory land army which could not save us. If it is strong enough, it has no duty to perform inconsistent with that object. Section 3. — Raids Their General Characteristics The term "raid" is generally used in this con- nection to indicate a hostile landing which does not aim at a military occupation or at overcoming resist- ance throughout the country, but is intended to strike a blow which may vitally affect or even determine the struggle. That there are purposes which such raids may serve may be conceded, but it is to be observed that a raiding force is not for that reason free from the disadvantages which attend the fact that it is not an army of occupa- tion, and further, that the nature of its purpose limits its freedom of action. For instance, it may be sound to argue that a raid may achieve its purpose without the maintenance of communication with a base on its own territory, but it is none the less a fallacy to ignore the fact that the raiding force is subject to all the dis- advantages of being severed from such a base. It is equally fallacious to argue that a small highly dis- ciplined force may in time wear down a larger but less highly trained army, and then to apply the argument to a situation in which time may be essential to success, 6b 84 THE CASE FOR or to prove that an enemy may be able to land at a particular point, if that point will not suit the purposes of the raid. We must, therefore, ask what purpose the pro- jected raids are to serve. The National Service League, it is true, argues that the foreigner has only to set foot on these shores to create a panic which will be fatal ; but inasmuch as the League aims at creating an army for the express purpose of meeting him on land the arguipent is presumably not intended to be taken seriously. Again, the wanton destruction of lives and pro- perty is not a method of modern civilised warfare, and would in any case only affect the military situation by strengthening the determination of the nation attacked and arousing the hostility of neutral nations, who would certainly be injured or alienated by such action. It is, therefore, only by inflicting serious or vital injury on our power to carry on the war that a raid can serve its purpose. The possible objective of raids are, therefore, limited practically to our principal naval bases and London, and the nearer the points of landing selected are to one of our naval bases, the greater the difficulty of avoiding the attention of our torpedo and submarine flotillas. Further, the moment that any landing is attempted, the possible objectives to which it can be directed with any appreciable effect can be gauged with practical certainty, while the number and size of the transports will enable its strength to be estimated with all the accuracy required. Thus, at the outset, in contrasting the effective power of the raiding and defending forces, we find VOLUNTARY SERVICE 85 that, in addition to the handicap of having to operate in hostile territory to which an invader is always subject, the factors which are usually reckoned as assets of the attacking force operate in the case of a raid on this country to add to his difficulties. In his choice of objectives and starting points, instead of being free, he is narrowly restricted; he has little, if any, opportunity of concealing either his numbers or his plans; he must act without counting on receiving either supplies or reinforcements, and no substantial modification of his original plan can be made to meet a changing situation, without sacrificing the only object worth achieving. On the other hand, the home force has, beyond the usual advantages, exceptional means of knowing the enemy's strength and of antici- pating his movements, and the sense of assurance that if certain points are denied to the enemy, time must prove an effective ally. Strength and Composition of the Raiding Forces The next question to be considered is that of the strength and composition of the raiding force. This presents a serious dilemma for the Power contemplat- ing the raid. The greater the numbers and the more complete the force in cavalry, guns, and transport, the more serious the difficulties of finding suitable ships and evading our fleet and the longer the time required for embarkation and landing. To attempt to cut down the necessary adjuncts to a force of infantry means that the power of his force is seriously limited. In his evidence before the Norfolk Commission, Sir John French expressed his opinion that an enemy 86 THE CASE FOR would bring the recognised proportion of cavalry ; and, having regard to the need for avoiding any delay in bringing up supplies and ammunition, it is certain that the transport must be as complete as possible. Ingenious writers may be satisfied to leave their invader to wait to mount his cavalry until he has captured a sufficient number of horses from our Yeomanry, and to leave him undisturbed in collecting supplies from the surrounding country, wherever he may be ; but we fancy that an invader will take a different view. He will see that it is essential that he should be able to move rapidly, that his troops must be well provided for to enable them to out-march and out-fight superior numbers, and that his advance must not be hampered by the need of diverting it to the centres of population in which alone food for a large force can be obtained. A German army corps on a war footing may be taken as fairly indicative of the proportion of the different troops. The principal fighting troops in such a force represent 25,000 rifles, 1,200 sabres, 160 field guns, and the total personnel is, roughly, 41,000 men, with 2,400 vehicles, and 14,000 horses. With properly fitted transports, such a force might possibly be carried for a short voyage in shipping of about 100,000 tons, but if the raid is to be anything in the nature of a surprise, this figure would have to be largely increased, owing to the unsuitable character of the available transport. The more closely the problem of shipping, transporting, and landing even a single such army corps is looked at, the greater the difficulties appear. If the largest and swiftest vessels are chosen in order to facilitate the task of escaping the fleet, the VOLUNTARY SERVICE 87 greater the difficulties of finding suitable places for landing, and the longer the time which that operation must occupy. On the other hand, if these are dis- carded, not only will the difficulty of finding the necessary tonnage be increased, but the presence of a large number of ships, which must all move at the pace of the slowest, will make the chance of evading our fleet practically hopeless. In view of these considera- tions it is not surprising that the conclusion of the Admiralty, confirmed by the Defence Committee, is that a force of 70,000* men could never reach our shores unless we had lost command in home waters. The Provision to Meet Raids But the need for maintaining an ample margin of safety requires that provision should be made for con- tingencies. Consequently, although we rely mainly upon the impossibility of any force large enough to undertake an invasion escaping the fleet, it has been laid down as a standard that provision should be made for dealing with a force of 70,000 men. It, therefore, becomes necessary to examine what that provision is. In the first place, it must be observed that the force available at home is not a constant quantity. The essential of any military policy is to be able to cope with any situation which may arise when it arises, and not to waste men and money on maintaining a state of preparation which no circumstances can require. It * There has been a good deal of misconception about the origin of this figure. It is sometimes represented as being derived from a nice calculation of what force might possibly evade the fleet. This is not the case ; 70,000 was arrived at as being the minimum force which an enemy contemplating invasion would employ. 88 THE CASE FOR is, consequently, idle to discuss our power to repel a raid without reference to the circumstances under which the raid takes place. No army in the world is maintained constantly on a war footing, and the idea that a raid might be launched without previous mobilisation may be dismissed for two reasons. Not only is mobilisation necessary for the raiding force itself in order to complete the war establishment of men and horses, but no Continental nation, flanked by rival armies on either side, could afford to weaken its position by the dispatch of so large a force without having mobilised sufficiently to restore the balance. Now mobilisation cannot be kept secret — the mere attempt to do so would involve restrictions on the press sufficient to defeat the object — and there is no reason why we should not be able to mobilise as rapidly as any other nation. Probably we can do so more rapidly; the number of regular reservists to be called up is com- paratively small, and the fact that the units of the Territorial Force are localised, while the reservists of the Continental armies are scattered broadcast, makes the rapid concentration of the units comparatively simple. The result is, that in normal circumstances the invader with his 70,000, or, say, the equivalent of four divisions of the British type, would have to reckon on finding as soon as he landed, the Regular Field Army of about six divisions and a cavalry division of the finest troops in the world, as well as the Territorial Force and Special Reserve. It is clear that in such a case his task would be hopeless, and therefore those who seek to emphasise the dangers of raids always postulate the absence of the Regular Army. Inasmuch VOLUNTARY SERVICE 89 as the Regular Army is intended to be available for use abroad, if required, the possibility of its absence must be considered, but such consideration must include the whole of the circumstances involved by its absence. The Call on the Regular Army to Support our Oversea Dominions Now the possibilities for the use of the Expedi- tionary F'orce abroad fall into two categories which must not be confused. The first is the use for the protection of our Oversea Dominions or Depen- dencies; the second is the use in a Continental war. With regard to the first it is to be observed that there is no land frontier in the Empire against which a potential enemy can concentrate rapidly any large body of organised troops. No one in their senses will suggest that England is to adopt compulsory service in order to protect Canada from an invasion by the United States. A Russian advance against India has happily become extremely improbable, and could not in any case become effective until months after the intention became evident.* We have no neighbour on the African Continent capable of any sudden move requiring the dispatch of any large proportion of the Expeditionary Force. The extremities to which the advocates of compulsory service are driven in order to get rid of the Regular Army are well illustrated in the text book of the National Service League, where the question is rhetorically asked whether any Govern- * Cd. 3,062 of 1904. Lord WoheUy. The possibility of oi;r ever requiring three army corps on the frontiers of India could only be occasioned by Russia, and Russia at present is many hundreds of miles away from ns. Besides, she could not brinpf down troops to the frontiers of India without our knowledge, and it would take her months to do so. 90 THE CASE FOR merit, in the event of an Indian Mutiny, would hesitate about sending out every available man and boy of the Regular Army and Special Reserve. The answer, which the ingenious author wisely refrains from giving, is that no Government would hesitate, because no such absurd idea would be mooted. In 1857 there were 45,000 British to 230,000 native troops, and from first to last the number of British troops employed was less than 100,000. To-day, the British troops consist of 78,000 Regulars and 32,000 Volunteers, while the native troops number 160,000, and do not include any artillery except twelve mountain batteries. The ultimate suppression of a mutiny might be a long and serious matter, and involve sending troops, probably, from South Africa, and perhaps from England ; but it is safe to say that, even if the necessary transport, some 2,000,000 tons, were available — and it is not — the immediate dispatch of the whole expeditionary force is the last expedient which would occur to any responsible statesman. The foregoing considerations show that, apart from taking part in a Continental campaign, the immediate dispatch of the Expeditionary Force is not a con- tingency for which provision is required. Whether any situation can arise comparable to that of the South African War, in which ultimately a large force might be required, may be doubted, but in such a case the country will have had months in which to prepare for it, and the Territorial Force, mobilised as soon as the need for sending out a substantial part of the Expedi- tionary Force had become a practical question, would be very different from what it is to-day. It would have its complete regular staff accustomed to handle it; in VOLUNTARY SERVICE 91 physique, it would have become thoroughly fit; in morale, it would have had time to add to the advantage of being a voluntary force of men united by ties of previous association, the stifTening of a continuous period of military discipline; in numbers, it would probably have been brought up to strength by the re- enlistment of trained men or by recruits who would have had time to acquire a sufficient standard to take their place in the fighting ranks. During the same period the National Reserve would be organised and further trained, so that the bulk of the home garrisons could be met without trenching on the Territorial Field Force. The con- clusion must, therefore, be that any Continental Power, viewing the possibility of taking advantage of the situation to pick a quarrel, would have to reckon on the raiding force, if it could ever reach our shores, being met by a superiority of three or four to one of troops which, in Sir Ian Hamilton's opinion, would have a good chance of victory if in a superiority of three to two* — a prospect hardly likely to encourage the dispatch of an army at imminent risk of the entire force being sunk before ever a blow could be struck. The Call to Give Military Support to a Continental Ally So much for our power to meet the needs of our Oversea Dominion — and this, after all, is the vital question. The obligation to maintain the Empire our race has created is one for which we must, if necessary, tax our utmost resources. The question of giving military support to a Continental ally stands upon a * Compulsory Service, p. ii8. 92 THE CASE FOR very different footing. We are free to take whateve course our interests dictate, and as has been pointed out in the first chapter, it is highly doubtful whether we should be doing any service to France by a radical change in our military policy obviously aimed at Ger- many alone. Let it, therefore, be clearly understood at the outset that, whatever conclusion may be reached as to our ability to spare troops for the Continent, and whatever assumption be made as to the increase in that power effected by adopting any particular form of compulsory service, the question still is : Is that increase worth the price ? Now, it is curious that the forecast of the course of events which ends in the occupation of London is always veiled by the prophets in decent obscurity. Only one instant in the story is portrayed, the moment when the invader lands and finds himself faced by nothing but a caricature of our Territorial Force. Some few chapters in the story may, however, be deduced. War occurs between Great Britain and France, on the one hand, and Germany, and perhaps one or both of the other parties to the Triple Alliance on the other. The great Russian Army is left out of the story, but whether Russia is a belligerent or not — and she certainly would be, if Germany were joined by other Powers — her army must always remain a pressing menace on the Eastern frontier of Germany. Such being the "general idea," Great Britain, according to these strategists,* decides that it is * Whether the real crisis would not occur after the first struggle, and whether it is not more probable that the British Army would render more effective service if held as a reserve to be launched at a combatant already exhausted, are matters for debate into which we need not enter. It is sufficient to deal with the assumption which involves the dispatch of the troops at the earliest possible stage. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 93 Essential to give military support to France at the critical point, and determines to send out tlie whole Expeditionary Force. To do this we must mobilise in order to fill the cadres with men and horses, and, of course, the Territorial Force and Special Reserve will also be mobilised. Some days, at any rate, must there- fore elapse before any of the force can be ready to be sent abroad, and a considerable period before the whole force could be ready. In the meantime, something must have happened at sea. Though Germany may be credited with readiness to ship an army to take its chance amongst hostile destroyers and submarines, it is quite certain that we should do nothing of the sort, and naval success being vital to us, it is obvious that the Navy could not be charged with any convoying duty which might interfere with its operations against the enemy's fleet. It follows that, quite independently of the efficiency of our other land forces at home, no expedition can leave our shores until the enemy's fleet has been either met at sea and defeated, or so securely sealed in port as to make the possibility of an attack on our transports impossible. And this situation must be maintained until the whole expedition has been landed. The mobilisation and dispatch of the whole Expeditionary Force, two divisions of which are quartered in Ireland, would probably take at least a fortnight. So far, therefore, if the course of events is such as to permit of sending the Expeditionary Force, it must also have been such as to enable the Navy to achieve what the Admiralty Memorandum describes as its main object. In the meantime, what has the enemy been doing on land? Faced with the task of meeting, not only the whole 94 THE CASE FOR French Army, but the British Expeditionary Force as well, and threatened, if not attacked, by Russia, is it likely that he will be concentrating four divisions of his best troops at the North Sea ports on the chance of an opportunity for a raid? Scarcely; yet if he is not doing this, the raiding army will, at best, consist of Reserves, and a further interval must elapse before it is ready to start. But whatever be the composition of the force which is to undertake the projected raid, to see whether it can ever start we must return to the naval situation. The German Navy, or what remains of it, if there has been an action, is in its ports. The dispositions best suited for dealing with it are also those best suited for preventing a raid, so that the myth of a navy distracted by considerations of home defence disappears. The assumption of the absence of the Expeditionary Force, therefore, involves as a starting-point that at the end of the first two or three weeks we are in a position better able to prevent a raid from reaching our shores than we were at the outset, at which time, according to the evidence of Admiral Sir J. Ommaney Hopkins before the Norfolk Commission, we have nothing to fear.* But even if we suppose that all is not yet secure, a still further interval must elapse for the position to be sufficiently altered for a raid to be possible, for the final preparations for starting, for the embarkation, the voyage, and the landing. During all the time which will then have elapsed since mobilisation, the forces at home, the rest of the Regular Army and Reserve, the * Blue Book Cd. 2062 of 1904. Q.3116. — He might attempt little demonstrations? Yes. Q.3117. — Small raids? Yes. Q. 31 18. — But they would not do anybody any harm? No. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 95 Special Reserve, the Territorial Force, and the National Reserve will have been free to organise and train with the sole idea of meeting the possible raids. To meet the raid when it comes we shall, therefore, have in organised units a few thousand Regulars, the Special Reserve at, say, 50,000 effectives, the Terri- torial Force, which, allowing for deductions, for casualties, etc., and on the other hand for men rejoin- ing, may be put at, say, 250,000, and of trained men who could be used for certain purposes, though not organised as a field army, some 80,000 of the Regulars and Army Reser^^e not sent with the Expeditionary Force and the National Reserve. With the East Coast as the only practicable place for the landing of a force which must reduce its sea passage to a minimum, the number of troops required for garrison duty will be very limited. Further, we are always told — and it is the assumption on which the immediate despatch of the Regular Army to the Continent is demanded — that a decision will be reached in the Continental struggle in about six weeks after the outbreak of war, so that nothing could substantially affect the issue except a blow directed at London and immediately successful, and the task which faces the raider is, therefore, that of covering in a few days something like 100 miles in the face of a mobile force outnumbering them in a proportion of at least three to one, a task which never has been, and, we venture to suggest, never will be accomplished in civilised war. In the foregoing considerations all possible assumptions have been made in favour of the enemy, assumptions so remote from probability as to bring the 96 THE CASE FOR case outside the necessary margin of safety. But if, even so, the timidity of the militants of the National Service League is not re-assured, the retention of, say, a division of the Expeditionary Force would put the matter beyond a doubt. The League does not suggest that their scheme will increase the Regular Army, but only " free " it, so that the question resolves itself into this: Are we to adopt their system of compulsory service for the sake of sending, to take part in a Continental war, only 20,000 more than we can send under the Voluntary System? Training after War has Begun The idea of training the Territorial Force after war has begun has been a favourite theme for ridicule amongst those who have failed to realise that they only made themselves ridiculous by their omission to dis- cover that the operations in which the Expeditionary Force is engaged abroad are not operations in which the Territorial Force will be employed. So far from the proposal for such training being unsound, it illustrates precisely the merit of our present policy ; the position being such that circumstances may con- ceivably throw the main burden of military defence at home on the Territorial Force, but only after a period of warning, we provide the force and maintain a sufficient standard to enable it to adapt itself to the burden as the occasion requires. So far from training under these circumstances being less effective, it is obvious that, when patriotism has been stirred by a war in progress, and when the function the force has to fill is apparent, the training of a force of Volunteers VOLUNTARY SERVICE 97 will be a very different matter from the training in time of peace of a force raised by compulsion, and probably sceptical of the possibility of their ser- vices being ever required. If the truth of this state- ment needs practical illustration, it is furnished by the success of the Greek Army in the Balkans, when no less than about one-third of the total Greek Force under arms in the war had received no military training before the war began.* The conclusion of the whole matter may, therefore, be briefly stated. In normal circumstances our Ex- peditionary Force is at home, and will be mobilised and more than amply sufficient to dispose of any possible raid if a landing can ever be elTected. In abnormal circumstances the Force, or part of it, may be required abroad, but in such cases there must always be an interval of time sufficient to enable the troops at home to reach the standard necessary to keep the situation in hand. See " Army Review," January, 1914, p. 52. CHAPTER VI ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES EXAMINED The previous chapters have been directed to showing that our present system is adequate and well-suited to our needs. If that has been estabhshed it is a sufficient defence of the voluntary system. But those who propose any alternative must do more than merely criticise ; they must prove that their alternative is practicable and superior. Some of the alternatives suggested may therefore with advantage be examined. We say some because the number of proposals put forward is almost infinite, and the shadowy character of many of them is such as to baffle examination. I. Compulsory Service on Continental Lines This is the system most in favour in certain military circles. Two years or so of continuous training is the ideal of many supporters of the National Service League. The League, indeed, although it always assures its popular audiences that nothing is con- templated but a period of continuous training of four to six months, followed by three years' service under similar conditions to those for the Territorial Force, still finds it necessary to conciliate the " profound dis- content " aroused in the minds of a more select circle VOLUNTARY SERVICE 99 by so meagre a programme, with a hint of better things to come.* In 1 90 1 the Swedish Army was reorganised on a system almost identical with that proposed by the League, except that professional cadres are provided almost equal in numbers to the annual contingent — a practical necessity for which the League makes no provision. It is now proposed to increase the initial period of training to a year to meet exactly the criticism which is levelled against the Territorial Force, viz., that it is not immediately ready for field operations. In a recent article the military correspondent of the Times approves the proposed change, and, being embarrassed by the need of harmonising this view with the support given by the Times to Lord Roberts, explains that immediate readiness for war is not required for our second line army, but it is immediate readiness for war that the League demands, and there- fore they must ultimately ask for what is now required in Sweden. It is no business of ours to settle the differences amongst the League's supporters, but when we find * Fallacies and Facts, p. 13. Footnote. " This mention of four months has, I know, caused profound discontent amongst a considerable number of people who, while believing with the National Service League that the safety of the nation can only be secured by Universal Service, cavil at the idea that reasonable efficiency can be obtained in so short a period of training. In some cases this belief is so strongly held as to alienate its supporters from taking any active part in upholding and popularising the cause of National Service. I am glad to have this opportunity to explain that the N.S.L. has no special ■predilection for this particular period. The League's desire is to see the principle of Universal Service for Home Defence accepted, as it seems to its members that if this great principle once gains the consent of the majority of our countr>'men, there will then be no difficulty in adjusting the details of the scheme which will be necessary to reduce theory into practice." (Th« italics ar© ouri.) 7B loo THE CASE FOR in the same number of the Nation in Arms (Christmas, 1913) a definite announcement, on page 497, that the League does not advocate continuous training for two years — any other idea being "a misconception" which must be " cleared away " — while on page 466 the famous footnote is again quoted to suggest that the period is merely a detail to be adjusted later, we are entitled to devote some attention to pointing out the differences between the two policies. Such an explanation is equally necessary to expose the fallacious manner in which arguments applicable only to one system, are urged in support of another system to which they have no relevance. The Continental system produces — not a militia — but a standing army and reserve. In Germany, where the system is substantially a two-years' system, a population of 65,000,000 produces a standing army whose peace strength under the law of 1913 will reach about 854,000,* an active reserve of about 750,000, and a reserve of something over 3,000,000 trained men under forty-five. The population of the United Kingdom is about 45,000,000; in arriving at the corresponding figures for an army raised on the German basis some reduction would have to be made for men who would still be needed for a long service army for overseas' garrisons (assuming they could be obtained). We may say, then, that the system would produce a standing army of nearly 600,000, an active reserve of 500,000, and a reserve of over 2,000,000 trained men still of military age. As an army in the abstract this would, no doubt, be very fine ; we need have no fears as to home defence * Army Review, October, 1913, p. 391. This figure includes the '' volunteers," and the extra recruits taken to allow for wastage. VOLUNTARY SERVICE loi so far as land forces are concerned ; whatever advan- tages in the matter of physique and discipline can be claimed for the Continental system would be ours; we might even hope in course of time to produce some- thing of the Zabern atmosphere. But, with all these advantages on their side, the supporters of this system will hardly object to the mention of a few points on the other side. The least important of these points is that there appears to be no conceivable situation in which any- thing but a fraction of this Army can ever be employed. It is obviously unnecessarily large to deal with a raid of 70,000, or even 700,000. Even if enlisted for foreign service, only a fraction of it could ever be transported and maintained. As an army, it would be magnificent, as a weapon to a great extent useless. The next item which may be examined is the cost. The recent increase in the establishment of the German Army of about 136,000 officers and men involved a non- recurring expenditure of ;^44,ooo,ooo. The creation of such an army as that suggested, including the provision of barracks, but not the acquisition of train- ing grounds, would involve a capital expenditure of at least ;^ 100,000,000. The provision of training grounds has been omitted, because it would be practically impossible. The annual expenditure on the German Army now amounts to about ;^50,ooo,ooo. On the same scale the cost in the Budget of our com- pulsory army would be ;^38,ooo,ooo, to which must be added the cost of the removal of the men from productive occupations. (See page 5.) But the final objection is even more conclusive. 102 THE CASE FOR Not only would a short service army itself make no provision for our overseas' garrisons, but it would make that provision impossible. To maintain a foreign service army of about 3,000, Germany has to pay about twice as much per head as we pay for ours. France, by offering considerable inducements, main- tains 28,000 volunteers abroad. We have to maintain 120,000. Writing with the experience of an Adjutant- General, Sir Ian Hamilton does not hesitate to say that it is certain that the men could not be obtained.* The result of adopting the Continental system would therefore be : — (i) The production of an army, which would be to a great extent useless for any purpose. (2) Enormous cost. (3) The loss of the one thing absolutely essential to the maintenance of the Empire, our power to supply a long service army oversea. No more need be said. 2. The National Service League* s Programme So far as adult training is concerned this pro- grammef in its latest form consists of : — (i) A continuous training of from four to six months in such year as they may select between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one for all able-bodied youths, except those serving in the Navy, Mercan- tile Marine, or who may prefer to join the Regular Army. * Compulsory Service, pp. 63-89. t Nation in Arms, Christmas, 191 3, p. 497. The question of cadet training is am entirely different one to that of actual military service. In any case the League only proposes to spend ids. per head on cadets, so that the proposed training can hardly be intended to be taken seriously. VOLUNTARY SERVICE lO^ (2) During the next three years a fortnight's con- tinuous training in camp and such musketry and drills as may be prescribed. (3) Liability for home defence of the men so trained up to the age of thirty. The words italicised are new; they represent a con- cession to certain objections, and introduce an element of uncertainty into the annual recruiting contingent which would be quite impracticable. In a year of bad trade there would be a large influx, while in a good year there would be every inducement to the men, and pressure by the employers to postpone the period of service. The whole organisation of the force would, therefore, be subject to periodical disturbance. Nothing is said as to the case of a man who desires to serve in his nineteenth year, but is not then passed as fit. Presumably, he would, as on the Continent, have to come up again until he is passed or reaches twenty-two. The effect of this will be discussed later. The production of the League's programme has hitherto been given by the League as follows : — Total of lads reaching 18 in any year 416,000 Deduct — 48% for medical rejections and legal exemptions ... ... 200,000 Recruits for Navy and Marines 8,000 Recruits for Regular Army ... 35,000 Emigrants ... ... ... 10,000 Mercantile Marine ... ... 15,000 Total — 268,000 Leaving to be trained 148,000 104 THE CASE FOR It is to be noted that *' legal exemption " and exemp- tions for emigrants have now disappeared. As regards medical rejection out of the 1913 " classe " in France, i.e., men aged twenty, 71*83 per cent, were taken ; of those aged twenty-one, 83*87 per cent.* If, therefore, as appears to be the case, under the latest version, men may be taken up to twenty-one, the figure of 48 per cent, is quite unnecessarily high for medical rejections, and as there are now no " legal exemptions," and men are not to be allowed to evade service by emigration, the figures must be revised. A further point is that if, as we are told, many recruits for the Regular Army will be drawn from men who have done this term of compulsory service, the deduction of 35,000 is an error. Whether many men would so transfer or not, it may be taken as practically certain that most of those contemplating service in the Regulars would try the short service first. The net result should therefore be something as follows, accepting the other figures in the League's table : — Total available annually (average) 416,000 Deduct — 25% rejections ... ... ... 104,000 Navy and Marines ... ... 8,000 Men joining Regular Army direct, say, ... ... ... 10,000 Mercantile Marine ... ... 15,000 i37»ooo Leaving to be trained ... ... 279,000 * Army Review, January, 1914, p. 257. In the Norwegian Army (1905) the rejections were 24.2 per cent, in the Northern, and 16.4 percent, in the Southern districts. — Territorial Arn^y in Being, p. 124. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 105 The League's estimate, therefore, is about 90 per cent, too low; but, from their point of view, it is most important to keep the numbers down. There is, first, the question of cost, discussed in a subsequent chapter ; secondly, the diflRculty of finding officers, which is mentioned later; and, thirdly, the stupidity of having an army quite unnecessarily large. We will, there- fore, give the League the benefit of its lower figures, but at the same time it must be observed that numbers can only be so reduced either by resort to the ballot, or else by fixing a very high physical standard.* In either case the use of the term " universal " becomes an entire misnomer, the talk about all sharing the burden of service becomes nonsense, and it is evident that employers will have a large choice of men quite well fitted physically for civil employment who may be employed without the inconvenience of their being {periodically called out, so that patriotic employers and the men serving will be more, and not less, penalised than under the present system. Moreover, the physical training will be only given to those who are in no need of it. At once, therefore, the system is shorn of the advantages which constitute the greater part of the oratorical recommendation by which it is advertised. The cost of the force is shown in Chapter V^II, to *The latter alternative would create another difficulty. It would exclude all those who at present only pass into the Regular Army after the improvement in physique effected by a term in the Special Reserve and many of those who enlist direct into the Regulars. As the Special Reserve is to be abolished, this would mean that many men would be lost altogether. In any case, the recruiting of the Regular Army out of men rejected for the citizen army would seriously impair the prestige of th« former. io6 THE CASE FOR involve an increase on the present estimates of about ^7,000,000 for adult training alone, assuming the abolition of the Special Reserve, and we may therefore pass at once to the military aspect. The first point to observe is that the men doing continuous training are recruits, and not part of the organised force designed to take the field. The whole Army is, therefore, like the Territorial Force, a purely militia body, normally occupied in civil life. We do not hold that it is for this reason unsuited to our needs, but it will not answer the purposes which the National Service League requires. The foreword to Fallacies and Facts contains the following quota- tion: "Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as for offence, and where a substitute is attempted, it must prove illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a Regular force." Yet the League offers us nothing better than a militia ! We are bidden to be ready for an invasion landed by surprise in a time of profound peace before mobilisation can be completed.* Yet the League's army would be as peacefully in their beds as the Terri- torial Force ! The League appeals to Lord Roberts's authority ; Lord Roberts asks for a year's consecutive training to begin with,f and the League offers us four months ! The League tells us that we must be pre- pared to face a Continental invasion without assistance from the Regular Army, and appeals to Lord Wolse- ley's authority. Lord Wolseley says : " If you imagine you could trust them — i.e., troops with six months' * The Brtian's First Duty, p. 107. t Cd. 2062 of 1904, Q. 1 109. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 107 training — without Regular troops to fight the best troops of France, it would be madness!"* We are constantly told of the need for a power of expansion to support the Regular Army abroad. Yet the first item of the League's programme is to sweep away the Special Reserve, the only forc^' outside the Regular Army which is liable for foreign service — the very force, moreover, which their text-book tells us may be required at any moment to be sent abroad to its last man 1 f The fact of the matter is this : If the needs which the supporters of the National Service League urge really exist, then the League's proposals do not answer them. Hence the " profound discontent " of their supporters who genuinely believe in those needs, and therefore disbelieve in the League's programme. The Army, which consists of men whose occupation for the time being is soldiering and nothing else, who are physically trained for immediate readiness for war, and who nre living the life in which the habits of the soldier form part of the everyday routine, is one con- ception. The Militia Armv, in which the men are normally following civilian occupations, and steeped in civilian habits, is another conception. Between the two a great gulf is fixed, and those who believe that nothing but the former will suffice are doing a grave disservice to the nation by flirting with the League's proposals for a militia. So much for the primarv characteristics of the League's Army, a characteristic which, if it dis- qualifies the Territorial Force, equally disqualifies the * Ibid, Q 1473. \The Briton's First Duty, p. io8. io8 THE CASE FOR force which is offered in substitution. Let us turn to other features. The League's programme offers some increase in numbers; but, in reckoning the increase, allowance must be made for the loss of the Special Reserve. And, again, if the League's arguments are to be accepted — i.e., if we are to take 400,000* as the force to be met at a week's notice — the increase is quite inadequate. The force will have fewer youths in its ranks; but, on the other hand, it will not have a N.C.O.f or man of more than three years' service. The physical standard^ would, no doubt, be higher, but it is to be observed that the campaign for which our Home Defence Army is required would be a short one, fought in a country where the means of communi- cation are excellent and the ground comparatively easy, where the climate is seldom severe, and amongst a friendly population, so that the standard required for a long campaign in a hostile and difficult country is not demanded. Lastly, the men will start at a more advanced stage in their technical training; that is to say, they will be better shots, more adept at handling their arms, quicker at appreciating and executing orders, and *N.S.L. Leaflet, Statement of Our Case. t Unless it is proposed to introduce suddenly the Regul_ar N.C.O.s employed in training recruits ; such N.C.O.s would be strange to the men, and their introduction would be certain to cause friction. X The physique of the Territorial Force is a favourite theme of criticism amongst those who know least of it. The performance of units at the end of even a short time in camp are generally un- expectedly satisfactory. After paying a remarkable tribute to the equipment of the infantry soldier (which Lord Roberts has dubbed a failure!), General Langlois wrote in 1910, "a body of fully trained troops in good condition, wearing our equipment, would certainly have been more exhausted by such a day's work than these youths, many of whom were scarcely eighteen." — The British Army in a European War, p. 43. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 109 superior in some other similar respects. But, if the arguments in the preceding chapter have been sound, there will be time for a great deal of leeway to have been made up before the Territorial F^orce can be required to tight, and it is, after all, not the mere technique which takes the time in the making of a soldier. It is the acquisition of all that goes to make up morale and discipline. " The characteristics or emotions," writes General Haking, " which, from a military point of view, require the most serious con- sideration, are courage and fear, surprise, respect and disrespect, cheerfulness and dejection, comradeship, emulation and esprit de corps. Good discipline means that all the qualities quoted above which are favourable to success in war have been imparted during peace training, and those which are detrimental have been eliminated to the greatest possible extent."* To such discipline, a period of four months' com- pulsory service, anything from one to three years back will contribute little. The years spent under a volun- tary system by men who serve because they like it, and are throughout in constant association, off duty as well as on, will do far more. Again we may quote from General Langlois's opinions formed after a visit undertaken for the parti- cular purpose of studying the Territorial Force : " The standard of technical efficiency is evidently not all it might be, but its moral force is greater. This is a factor which is not sufticicntly taken into account in discussing the value of this Army, controversy turning almost entirely upon the question of numerical strength and on the number of days in the training * Company Training, p. a. no THE CASE FOR period, but it is a powerful element of strength which compulsory service would not give."* So much for numbers, physique, age, and technical training; put at its highest, the advantage which the League's Army can claim over the existing system amounts, when considered in relation to the demand to be made on a home defence force, to very little. What is there on the other side ? Firstly, the matter of officers. The League's pro- gramme requires (i) 2,250 Regular Officers for the training of the recruits, in addition to the further officers to command and staff the larger active Army ; (2) about 17,000 Territorial Officers. Their proposals for hnding these officers are examined in detail in the next chapter. They are shown to be absurd. The position therefore remains as at present, viz., that the supply of Regular Officers cannot properly meet the demand, while 10,000 Territorial Officers appears to be about the maximum attainable. Nor could a mere increase in the pay proposed by the League cure the difficulty in finding Territorial Officers. No one who means to get on in life could throw away the amount of time asked by the League, whatever the temptation offered by temporary emolument. The whole system is, in fact, a " make- believe," which crumbles as soon as it is looked at.f '''The British Army in a European War, p. 39. + It is sometimes argued that there can be no real difficulty in finding the officers, since it is don© under similar systems in Switzerland and Norway. The answer is that the Swiss and Norwegian systems are very different from the League's. For example, the League's period of training for the infantry recruit is 120 days; in Switzerland it is 65, and in Norway 48. In neither of the latter countries is there any Regular Army except the permanent staff of officers and N.C.O.'s for command and training, and in neither country does th« work required of the non-regular VOLUNTARY SERVICE ill If the scheme breaks down on the question of officers, it is, perhaps, unnecessary to go into further objections, but there is one which is so serious that it cannot be passed over, the same objection as that urged against the Continental system, viz., the effect on the recruiting for the Regular Army. In this case, no doubt, the vahdity of the objection is more open to question. On the one hand, it is said that the fact that men join the Regular Army now from the Special Reserve and Territorial Force shows that a little ex- perience proves an encouragement to enlist. On the other, it must be pointed out that the facts do not in the least prove the conclusion, because no one can say how many of the Special Reserve recruits joined with the idea of giving soldiering a trial, and then decided against it; until this is known, the effect of everyone giving service a trial cannot be deduced. It must further be observed that the Special Reserve and Terri- torial Force, being dependent on volunteers, must be made attractive, and it by no means follows that a turn of training in a compulsory school will leave a pleasant impression.* But the argument does not depend alone upon the debateable point of whether men will get " fed up " or not. There is a much more serious cause for anxiety. The Regular Army i -.:eis approximate to that required by the League's programme, v.~iile the positions open to officers in the Territorial Armies, though the nominal rank is no higher, are in fact far more attractive, owing to the absence of a Regular Army to monopolise the higher functions. *It is here, too, that the fallacy of drawing any deduction from such an experiment as the Spectator Company comes in. When an enterprising Officer is determined to produce a satisfactory result, a very different atmosphere is produced than is the case when a batch of compulsory recruits has to put through a training which is nobody'3 hobby. 112 THE CASE FOR depends for its recruiting largely on the surplus of men on the labour market. Under the League's scheme 130,000 (150,000, less 20,000 now taken for the Special Reserve) will be taken right off the market for a period of from four to six months. No doubt, there will still be fluctuations which will from time to time give rise to a surplus, but the fact remains that there will be regularly 130,000 less to meet the demand. Sir Ian Hamilton again gives it as the conclusion, based on his experience as Adjutant-General, that " it is my firm opinion that the acceptance of the proposals of the National Service League, as they stand at present, would, within two years, bring about some- thing very like disaster in the recruiting market for the Regular Army."* Put at its lowest, there is a very serious risk of depleting the Regular Army still further, and it is a risk which we cannot afford to run. To this risk must be added the certainty of the abolition of the whole of the Special Reserve, with the result that behind the Regular Army and Reserve, we shall not have a man enlisted for foreign service. The League, no doubt, will rely upon the trained men to volunteer; but, clearly, if the active army is required for home defence, no units can be spared, and con- sequently only drafts of individuals could be sent, and it would be impossible to do what can be done at present, release Regulars in oversea stations by re- placing them with Special Reserve units. The objections to the League's scheme may, there- fore, be summarised as follows : — I. It won't work, because the staff for training the recruits and officering the Army cannot be * Comfulsory Service, p. 113. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 113 ' f" v-.;^ obtained under the scheme, and no sufficiently trained cadres are provided. 2. If it could be worked, it would give us for home defence a militia army which would be stronger in numbers than the Territorial Force, and to that extent, if the Admiralty view is correct,* in excess of our requirements. 3. It would entail serious risk of depleting the Regular Army, which is essential to our needs. 4. It would destroy the present provision for expan- sion, and, at best, offer an inferior substitute. 5. It would not be universal training for able-bodied adults, but could only be reduced to manageable proportions by resort to the ballot or so high a physical standard as to be grossly unfair. 6. It would throw on the Budget a further charge of about ;^7,ooo,ooo and involve a further loss of at least ;^2,ooo,ooo per annum by the transference from productive to unproductive labour. f This is the scheme which commands the widest support. The League commends it as the solution propounded by a combination of Lord Roberts, Admiral Sir Gerard Noel, and two " pillars of the Empire," Lord Curzon and Lord Milner, and claims * See Admiralty Memorandum printed in the Appendix. Th« National Service I.eague has endeavoured to extract consolation from the remark of the First Sea Lord that " the presence of a sufficiently trained professional army in these Islands at all times is quite as necessary as the other arm of the service." The speech was made at a purely social function in support of an institution for the regular army, and the meaning read into it by the League has been publicly repudiated. (See Mr. Asquith's Speech on February 27th, 1914.) But, in any case, the request is for a frofessional army, which the League does not offer. If the statement is to be taken as a considered pronouncement that th« whole Exj^editionary Force will not, under any circumstances, be sent abroad, then the demand to be made of th© non-profa»sionaI army is smaller, and the need for the League's army so much the greater. t See p. 5. 8 114 THE CASE FOR that " they are entitled to ask for and receive careful consideration for the solution."* We venture to doubt whether any one of the above ever contributed anything to this " solution," except a blessing after it was produced, and we should not be surprised to find that the consideration given to it in the preceding pages is more careful than that which any one of them gave before the blessing was pronounced. 3. A Tivo-Ycar System Limited hy Ballot The objection to universal service on the German model on the ground of its producing an army far beyond any use to which it can be put, has been met by the suggestion that the numbers taken should be limited to requirements by ballot. Such a system has been carefully examined by Sir Ian Hamilton and con- demned.! Unless accompanied by the abolition of the linked battalion system, and therefore of the exist- ing Expeditionary Force — the men for oversea duty being merely trained in dep6tsj — the cost would be prohibitive. An Expeditionary Force of some sort is essential, and a short service force, raised by conscrip- tion, would be immensely inferior for long range pur- poses to our present long service voluntary army. But the military aspect is really hardly worth considering, because t\o Government would dare to propose a two- year compulsory system which did not even pretend to be universa,!. * Nation in Arms, Christmas, 1913, p. 487. ^ Com-pulsory Service, pp. 93— lor. t The main objections to this have b*eQ stated on p. 26. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 115 4. The Swiss or Norwegian Systems These systems are on the same sort of basis as the National Service League's programme, but the period of preliminary training is only about half as long, while the number of years spent in the active army is longer. Worked alone they are practicable, but any attempt to combine them with a long service voluntary army raises all the objections discussed in considering the League's scheme, though some of them are not quite so accentuated. The cost would be very little less than that of the League's scheme, as a mere reduction in the period of service would not effect any substantial economy. It would still be necessary to choose between having a really universal system which would give numbers far in excess of any possible requirements, and a merely nominally universal system in which two-thirds of the available men were allowed to escape on one pretext or another. F"inally, the result, for the purposes required, would be little, if at all, superior to the Territorial Force, and would certainly not compensate for the loss of the Special Reserve, and the probable depletion of the Regular Army. 5. Filling the Territorial Force by Ballot This is certainly the least objectionable proposal, and if it were really proved that the numbers were below the margin of safety, some practicable scheme might be evolved. But there are serious difficulties. If voluntary enlistment were entirely displaced, all the advantage of getting only the willing men and 8b ii6 THE CASE FOR those who can serve with the least possible dislocation of industry would be lost, and it is more than likely that the gain in numbers would be attained only by a loss in discipline and spirit. On the other hand, the alternative of requiring counties to raise a quota by compulsion if voluntary enlistment failed, would probably lead to a most undesirable form of indirect compulsion applied by the influential to those who were not in a position to resist, in order to avoid the need of resorting to the ballot. The scheme com- mands but little support. The idea of the ballot is thoroughly unpopular. The whole argument of the majority of the supporters of any compulsory system is that the training of the Territorial Force is entirely inadequate, and they are, therefore, equally opposed to any mere increase in numbers. The advocates of voluntary service derive their confidence in its suffi- ciency from considerations of the military needs of the country, which do not depend for their validity upon a matter of a few thousands less or more. They be- lieve that the present system meets those needs, and that as soon as the agitation for compulsion dies its natural death, the existing level will be easily main- tained and surpassed. Consequently the scheme, though it may not have many very bitter enemies, has many opponents and practically no friend. In other words, its prospects are hopeless. 6. The Australian or New Zealand Systems The National Service League is never tired of com- mending the example of these Dominions. The training undergone is, however, substantially the same VOLUNTARY SERVICE 117 as that which they condemn in this country as produc- tive of only a " make-believe army." The pay in Australia is lavish beyond anything dreamed of even in our voluntary system,* and as nobody suggests that we require an army of the numbers which would be produced, we should merely be throwing away mil- lions for something which, however valuable under the conditions prevailing in the Dominions, would be useless for our purposes. 7. A Little Drill and a Little Shooting There remains one other scheme — it has, we believe, only one real friend — Colonel Weston's system of " a little drill and a little shooting for the young fellows."! Very excellent things in themselves ; unfortunately, they do not produce an army, and until the proposal takes such shape as to give us an army to criticise, we will turn our guns on to those who sought to give to an electoral contest a significance which they knew perfectly well it did not warrant. Nothing could have been more candid and straightforward than Colonel Weston's advocacy of his own policy and his repudiation of the National Service League. Nothing could have been more uncandid than the attempts made in the press to represent the result of the election as setting the seal of approval on the League's policy. The foregoing pages have dealt, we believe, with all the proposals which have been seriously put before the public. They are all either useless or mischievous or both. That the able and distinguished men who * See Appendix III. t See p. 12. n8 THE CASE FOR advocate these various systems can produce nothing better is the most convincing proof of the conclusion that, whatever attractions compulsory service may seem to possess in the abstract, as soon as an attempt is made to propound a concrete system, the task of adapting compulsion to our Imperial needs is revealed as hopeless. The Voluntary System, whatever its imperfections, holds the field in this country un- challenged by any serious competitor. CHAPTER VII THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE'S ARMY ESTIMATES It is an interesting task to endeavour to estimate from the material at present provided, the available military strength of the country, exclusive of Regular Forces, in the event of the National Service League's pro- gramme being adopted, and the effect of the pro- gramme on the circumstances of the existing Terri- torial Force. The League's programme was officially explained in an article, communicated to the Army Review of April, 1912, by Colonel A. Keene, D.S.O. Section i . — Present Establishment The present establishments of the Special Reserve and Territorial Force, exclusive of the Officers' Training Corps, are as follows: — Special Reserve — Regular Establishment ... 977 Special Reservists 80,120 Total 81,097 120 THE CASE FOR Territorial Force — Divisional and Brigade Staffs and Adjutants Permanent Staff T.F. Officers T.F. Men Total 633 2,206 11,258 301,632 315J29 Total 396,826 The Special Reserve establishment provides for a force of 3 Cavalry Regiments, 957 Royal Garrison Artillery, 2,054 Royal Engineers, 101 battalions of Infantry, 4,000 Army Service Corps' drivers, and 3,995 Royal Army Medical Corps' personnel, all liable, when called out on permanent service, to serve either in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. The Territorial Force is liable for service in the United Kingdom only. The League's programme substitutes for this a re- cruit contingent of 150,000 undergoing training, and an active force with a total establishment of 414,000 officers and men, all of whom will have passed through the course of recruit training in the ranks for a period varying from four to six months, but none of whom will he liable as Territorials for service elsewhere than in the United Kingdom. It is pro- posed to invite Territorials so trained to engage to serve abroad with the Regular Army in time of war for an annual bounty of thirty shillings. But there is, apparently, no intention of forming any cadres* liable for service abroad. It is, perhaps, hardly realised that the League's *i.e., organised bodies of cavalry and infantry in skeleton form. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 121 programme abolishes the Special Reserve as such. Though its actual present strength is only about 63,000, the Cadres, which now exist and can be filled up in various ways, constitute a valuable addition to the striking force of the country. The threatened loss of these seems to cause but little perturbation, probably because the nature of the addition is so recent and so little realised. The power of supporting an Expeditionary Force abroad will thus be altered by substituting a list of 80,000 individuals for the organised troops of the Special Reserve as enumerated above. The proposed changes in the Territorial Force are more difficult to grasp, because the information is so meagre. The field force of 414,000 will be up to its establishment in time of peace, whereas the present strengths of the Special Reserve and Territorial Force are about 79 per cent, and 80 per cent, respectively of establishments which together are only 18,000 less than that of the League's active army.* We are given to understand that the only other material • The establishment of the Territorial Force was deliberately fixed at a much higher figure than the anticipated peace strength in order to provide for the intake of men who, having completed their service, would volunteer to join in time of war. The League, which depends for volunteers for foreign service, can hardly question the proprietry of anticipating that men not legally liable to serve will come forward for home dejence. The League constantly represents 315,000 as the number fixed by Lord Haldane as the minimum required for home defence. The fact is that Lord Haldane regarded 250,000 as the maximum needed in time of peace, and stated in introducing the scheme : " I believe that the auxiliary forces will give us a force which in time of peace need not exceed a quarter of a million, and in time of war will reach the strength of 300,000." [Hansard, February 25th, 1907.) The establishment of the field army available on mobilisation is therefore increased by 18,000 while the power of supporting the Expeditionary force abroad is to consist of a list of 80,000 individuals. 122 THE CASE FOR change is that the recruits will have been clothed and trained for a continuous period, that they will be better trained, but that in all other respects the Force will carry on as at present. It would seem to follow that the remaining expenses per head, apart from those of recruit training, will be the same to the country and to the individual. A difHculty seems to arise here, because at present no man need serve if his personal expenses at home do not permit the petty expenditure inevitable to volunteering. If, therefore, compulsion is applied, it is clear that he must be found in all necessaries. But so far from the expense to the country being the same, it is suggested by the League that the Force, apart from recruit training, is to cost considerably less. It becomes, therefore, an interesting point to endeavour to ascertain where the saving is to be. According to the League's estimates, the cost of the existing Special Reserve and Territorial Force if at full establishment would be ;^4, 816,665; the cost (exclusive of recruit training) of the new Territorial Force is to be ^2,182,000, or, adding the bounty for foreign service, ;^2,302,ooo. If we eliminate the Special Reserve from the calcula- tion on the ground that they at present go through a recruit training similar to that advocated by the League, it would seem that whereas an establishment of 315,000 Territorials would cost, according to the League, ^3,515,000, 414,000 are to cost, exclusive of recruit training, ;^2, 182,000. How is this saving to be accomplished ? It becomes necessary to examine the present expenditure debited against the Territorial Force. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 123 Section 2. — The Present Cost of the Territorial Force* In the Army Estimates for 19 13-14 the proportion of the cost of the annual training thrown on to the training grant was shown at ;i^659,ooo. A further sum of ^379,000 was allowed to Associations for expenses in connection with annual training in camp, including travelling and carriage and hire of horses and wagons, and a further ;^66,ooo for forage, straw, etc., was charged to Vote 7. The number of officers and men attending camp for eight days or more in 1913 was 219,535. The average cost of camp per head at present is, therefore, about ;^'5- It must be noted, however, that if the whole number had attended for fifteen days, the excess cost would be the total amount of a week's pay and allowances for about 55,000 officers and men, that being the number who attended in 19^13 for eight days or less. If a fortnight's camp were compulsory, as under the League's pro- gramme, it is clear that the cost per head for the camp training alone would be much more than ;^5, which is the total amount allowed by the League as the cost of training a Territorial soldier. It is true that the League allows a sum of ;^5oo,ooo to meet the expense of armaments, stores, horses, etc., but this expenditure would scarcely cover the requirements of the Terri- torial recruit depots as well as the fortnight's camp. The other principal items in the cost of the Terri- torial Force, as shown in the Estimates for 1913-14, were as shown in the following table : — * The cost for 1914-11; is about ;if 200.000 higher, but as the object of this section is to arrive at the cost of the League's army, in which the new Camp bounty would not be paid, the 1913-14 figures afford the best comparison. 124 THE CASE FOR Cost per head of Total. Establishment, (i) Permanent Staff (total effective services) ... ;^522,5oo ;^i 13 o (2) Training Outside Camp (charged to Training Grant) ;^90,ooo 5 6 (3) Buildings and Ranges ;£'290,ooo 18 o (4) Small Arms and Ammunition ... ... ;^i45,ooo 15 o* (5) Grants to County Asso- ciations for Adminis- tration, Clothing, Travelling to Drill and Musketry, &c. ... ;^90i,ooo £2 16 o* (6) Miscellaneous ... ^63,000 4 o £^ II 6 Of these items, when applied to the League's force, the cost of providing clothing must be deducted, as this is debited to the recruit training, and gd. per day in camp for extra messing allowance must also be deducted, as the League will not permit this luxury. Deducting £1 3s. od. (the basis of the grant) for the former, and iis. od. for the latter, the cost, exclusive of camp, works out at £4. 17s. 6d. The cost per head under the League's scheme, including camp, would therefore be about ;^io os. od., or ;^4,ooo,ooo for the entire force. * Item (4) depends on strength and therefore the cost per head must be reckoned on the strength and not the establishment. The same is true to some extent of item (5), but as the cost of clothing is eliminated later, this will not very largely affect the result. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 125 Section 3. — The League's Estimate The League arrives at £$ as the cost of train- ing subsequent to the recruit training by the extremely simple method of taking the present average cost of an infantry private of the Special Reserve after his first year — namely, ^9, and deducting the amount of his bounty, £4.. To take this as the basis of the cost of the further training of a force of 400,000 N.C.O.'s and men of all arms, is a rough and ready method of estimating cost which only needs to be glanced at to be cast aside as worthless. It is true that the League takes a further sum of ;^200,ooo for administration, but it is clear that this sum is arrived at by studying the Army Estimates Appendix (Esti- mates restated), where we find that the item " Staff and Administration " covers the cost of the War Office and Staffs of Commands and Districts, and the League's ;,^200,ooo is merely inserted as a provision for increased work in these departments. The League makes a contingent provision of ^^783, 91 2, but deficiencies and errors in other items of the nature indicated cannot be fairly met by such a sweeping and non-committal estimate. It would, therefore, seem necessary to assume either that the League has under-estimated the cost of the further training of the Territorial Force by about 90 per cent., or that the League intends to with- draw a large proportion of the facilities for training at present existing. The pamphlet published by the League in February, 1909, from which Colonel J Keene's figures are taken, definitely states that the 126 THE CASE FOR Territorial will receive Regular's pay during his "repetition courses." Therefore, the item for pay and allowances will hold good. It is clear that the cost of conveyance to camp and hire of horses and wagons cannot be omitted. The cost of upkeep of clothing will hardly be lessened by increased usage, while boots and shirts and other smaller items must be pro- vided for penniless men, and therefore for all. It is hoped that expenditure on musketry and ranges will not be further curtailed— indeed, unless it is largely increased, the musketry training of 550,000 men on Territorial lines will afford grave difficulties. Possible economies are, therefore, confined to the withdrawal of Regular divisional and brigade staffs, adjutants and permanent staffs, and the closing of units' headquarters. The League has on occasions protested that it has no intention of closing head- quarters, but the absence of any provision or reference in Colonel Keene's paper, or in the pamphlet, to the cost of headquarters or of the Regular establishments for the 414,000, make it clear that it is in these items at any rate that economy is to be practised. The regular establishments of the training depots will not be available because the periods of training recruits and repetition courses will coincide.* It is not easy to imagine what will be the increased military value of a Territorial unit with no permanent staff, or the con- dition of the orderly rooms during the year with no adjutants and no paid caretakers. Clerical work, orders, and the constant flow of instructional arrange- ments left to the tender mercies of unpaid officers and * If they do not, then a large capital cost for barracks must be faced. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 127 men who are hard at work as civilians, would be scarcely likely to produce higher efficiency. Indeed, the withdrawal of the permanent staffs is wholly im- practicable, and the like withdrawal of the regular divisional and brigade staffs would be a grave mis- fortune. But it is clear that the League makes no provision for their cost, unless they are merely " con- tingencies." Section 4. — The League's Scheme for Officers If, instead of taking a purely artificial basis, the fallacy of which has been repeatedly pointed out, the League would take the concrete figures for the Territorial Force, and point out exactly where the saving comes in, some reliance might be placed on their estimates. Some saving is no doubt made in the grants to officers, and in view of the constant assertion that commissions are to be open to the poorest, and given to merit alone, it is interesting to note the League's views on the way to attract officers to the Force. Fourteen thousand are wanted — 8,000 subalterns and 6,000 in the higher ranks — for the active force, and 3,000 for the recruit training. Subalterns are to be obtained at the rate of 5,000 a year, one in every thirty recruits, by restricting com- missions to boys who have first obtained Certificate A at school and reached a certain educational standard, and who have then passed through a four or six months recruits' training in the ranks, "without distinction of wealth or class," and been recommended for the rank of sergeant. Having 128 THE CASE FOR reached these dizzy heights, at the cost to the State of los. a year while a boy, and ;^22 while a recruit, the fortunate one will be invited to become a probationary officer, and if successful in obtaining a commis- sion in the active force, will exchange service in the ranks for the next three years for service as an officer. But his probation must be worked out by service in an Officers' Training Corps for a year, or for six months in a training brigade. During this probation he is to cost the State no less than ^20! Having passed through his proba- tion period, he will become a full-fledged officer, and is to cost the State on an average £13 a. year for the rest of his career as an officer, inclusive of all charges and expenses, including fifteen days' camp. The generosity of the proposal is somewhat overwhelming. No provision is made for replacing the present Special Reserve Officers who are available for service abroad. Indeed, on investigation, it appears that the League calmly proposes to take officers for the Territorial Force on mobilisation from the Regular units serving at home — i.e., the Expeditionary Force itself! No mention is made by the League as to the constitution of the new Officers' Training Corps, or training brigades, to which probationary officers are to be attached. How the training is to be carried out, when the existing Officers' Training Corps are abolished, is left to the imagination. Cadets in future are to be maintained on a grant of los. per annum, to cover all charges of uniform, equip- ment, camp, shooting, and instruction, and 50 per cent of the boys of the country are to be compelled to become cadets provided they are already VOLUNTARY SERVICE 129 physically fit. No adjutants or sergeant-instructors, no efficiency or other grants, no outfit allowance, no pay and allowances or money for training are in future to be provided for the Cadets or the new Officers' Training Corps except out of the los. per Cadet and ;^'20 per officer training; and officers of the Territorial Force, who are even now considerably out of pocket, will have the pay and allowances which they at present receive cut down to what £13 a. year can buy, and they will have the pleasure of buying their own outfits. As a working plan for getting and keeping officers the scheme is a marvel of commonsense ! To the present normal expenditure on Territorial training, the National Service League proposes to add the cost of training recruits from four to six months. This additional cost is estimated by them at ^4,837,125, and is arrived at by multiplying 150,000 by the estimated cost of training an infantry Special Reserve recruit for five months, and adding the cost of the training staff. But the figure taken as the cost of training a Special Reserve recruit is only that which covers such expenditure as can be regarded as personal to the man, and excludes the cost of horses, saddlery, harness, and warlike and other stores, for which i8s. per head of the whole establishment of 550,000 (recruits and trained men) is allotted by the League. If cavalry and artillery recruits are to be adequately trained in sufficient numbers, it seems somewhat rash to work upon the present cost of training infantry Special Reserve recruits, seeing that the whole cir- cumstances of the training would be vastly different from the training of a handful of the latter at an exist- ing depot. 9 I30 THE CASE FOR Section 5. — The League's Scheme for Recruit Training The recruit training is, of course, the rock upon which the whole efificiency of the League's scheme depends, and just as the efficiency of a school depends upon Its teachers, so the efficiency of the recruit train- ing will depend upon the stamp of officer and N.C.O. constituting the training staff. It almost takes one's breath away to find that the League recommends its own organising secretaries and other retired officers as the regular officers to train the recruits. Two thousand two hundred and fifty additional billets, '* all in the British Isles, and permanent and stationary," are to be opened as well-paid posts to those officers who have left the Army at a comparatively early age, presumably because they were tired of soldiering, or were not fit for promotion, and yet " who would no doubt come forward gladly for so congenial a task as soldier- ing at home in billets which would allow them to remain in one place." It is true that the League hints at an alternative method of making promotion to commissioned rank on a large scale from the ranks which would " give us very suitable men for the work " and popularise the introduction of universal service. But the organising secretary might reason- ably protest against such a scheme, and therefore it is not more than a hint. As for the N.C.O.'s, they are to be found by the National Association for the Employment of Ex-Soldiers, and in twenty-five years' time, we might have battalions of recruits with no officer or N.C.O. under sixty, all having left the VOLUNTARY SERVICE 131 Army a quarter of a century ago, and having remained " in one place " ever since. Tiie provision of the 3,000 Territorial subalterns is almost more humorous. They will apparently never rise above that rank, and never have any duty except training successive batches of recruits. They are to be employed for from four to six months of the year, and will cost the State exactly ;^'5o each per annum. Obviously if they are employed for about half the year they cannot follow any other serious business or profession. They must therefore be either men who can afford to earn little more than ;^5o per annum, or else men whose ambition does not rise above that amount; in other words, the " idle rich " and the agricultural labourer will be the only competitors for the positions of perpetual subalterns. What are we to think of a scheme which proposes to compel 50 per cent, of the youth of the country at a most impressionable age to spend four or live months in the care of such a training staff ? vSection 6. — The Probable Results To sum up the position it would seem that the adoption of the League's programme if carried out according to the League's estimate would involve the destruction of the Special Reserve Cadres, and the consequent reduction of the strength of our Foreign Service Army, the destruction of existing Officers' Training Corps, and the loss of their output of recruits for commissions, the destruction of all voluntary organisations, like the Boys' Brigade and the Boy Scouts, who object to the War Office control (inevit- able with the adoption of compulsory militar}'- training for boys), the deprivation of all existing Territorial 9B 132 THE CASE FOR units of their permanent and training staffs, and yet a great increase in the amount to be spent on equipping, maintaining, and training the Home Defence Force. It is impossible to frame an accurate estimate of the cost of the League's proposals under workable con- ditions without further material, but the following additions must certainly be made : — (i) It has been shown that, unless impossible economies are to be effected, the cost of annual training has been underestimated by about ^2,000,000. (2) The War Oflice estimate of the cost of the train- ing staff for the recruit training exceeds that of the League by ;^900,ooo. (3) Fifty per cent, of medical rejections for cadets is too high, and should be about t,s P^r cent. This brings the number to be trained annually to 1,000,000. The present cost in the Estimates for a member of the junior Officers' Training Corps is ;£i 12s., and parents spend a considerable further sum. The League says that this is only the extravagance of the voluntary system, an assertion which will be believed when the possible economies are pointed out. As an example of the economy of a compulsory system it may be noted that in Australia the estimate for uniform allowances, &c., to the cadets is ;^269,55o for the year 191 2-13. As the allowance to junior cadets (under fourteen) is only 4s. per head, the bulk of this must be spent on the 92,000 senior cadets, i.e., at least £2 los. per head. If £1 los. only is allowed for 1,000,000 cadets, this would mean an increase of over ;;^ 1,000,000. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 133 (4) Capital expenditure lias be373 ••• 25,000 54,062 100,000 The white population of New Zealand is about VOLUNTARY SERVICE 157 1,029,000. With certain permissible variations, the annual training is : — Territorial Force — 30 drills of i J hours, 12 half-day (3 hours), or 6 whole-day (6 hours) parades; 7 days (exclusive of days of arrival and departure) in camp, and a course of musketry. Cadets — 50 drills of i hour, 6 half-day parades, and a course of musketry. Rifle Clubs — 18 drills and a course of musketry. Of the men posted to the Territorial Force, 82*49 per cent, in 1912, and 83'78 per cent, in 1913 attended camp. It will be noted that the drills for the New Zealand Territorial Force considerably exceed the minimum laid down for our own Territorial Force, but do not largely, if at all, exceed what is actually done by many of the latter, that the period in camp is about the same as that attended by the home Territorials who get leave of absence for one week, and is only about half the full period of fifteen days attended by the majority of our men. In 1913 the percentages of the strength attending camp at home were, for eight days 22 per cent., for fifteen days 67 per cent., or 89 per cent, in all. The percentage attending ranij:) is, therefore, actually higher under our voluntary system. The estimates for 1913-14 put the recurring ex- penditure at /,'409,ooo. On the same basis, for the population of the United Kingdom, this would work out at about ;^ 17,000,000, as compared with about ;^5,ooo,ooo on the Estimates for our present Special Reserve, Territorial Force, Senior and Junior Officers' Training Corps, Cadets, and National Reserve. 158 THE CASE FOR AUSTRALIA In Australia, a Defence Act introducing compulsion was passed in 1909, and after being amended, came into force on January ist, 191 1 . The training provided for is as follows : — Age. Service. Annual Training. Junior Cadets 12-14 2 years 90 hours. Senior Cadets 14-18 4 ,> 4 whole-day, 12 half-day, and 24 night drills. Militia ... 18-26 8 ,, For the first 7 years, drills equivalent to 16 whole days, of which at least 8 must be spent in camp. Longer periods are prescribed for Artillery and Engineers. It is estimated that the system will produce 100,000 Senior Cadets, and 128,000 Militia actually training, i.e., excluding the eighth year contingent and certain specialist services. The number of Militia training in the year 1911-12 was 43,700, which again illustrates the time required to introduce a new system. The annual training is more than the minimum required at home, but less than that performed by the greater part of the Force. The annual cost in Australia is estimated at ;^2,5oo,ooo: as the population is one-tenth of that of the United Kingdom, if the cost were proportionate, VOLUNTARY SERVICE 159 a similar system would cost us ,/^25,ooo,ooo ! No doubt it would be done cheaper here, but it is significant that this modern democracy, when adopting compulsory service, required a scale of pay (4s. a parade for privates and los. a parade for sergeants) far beyond anything dreamed of by our volunteer Territorials. It will be seen that the training given both in Australia and New Zealand is practically no more than that which our critics here' deride. As regards numbers, the existence of the Regular Army and Navy makes comparison difficult, but the annual con- tingent in Australia in 1913 was 19,000, which would mean 190,000 on tiie basis of our population. The numbers joining the Regular Army, Special Reserve, Territorial Force, and Senior Officers' Training Corps in 1913 (excluding enlistment between branches) was about 1 10,000, so we do not compare so badly. What can be done under a voluntary system may be Illustrated from Natal, where, before the union, 2"8 per cent, of the population were serving in an active Voluntary Militia, as compared with 3 per cent, estimated as the product of the compulsory systems in Australia and New Zealand. Sir Ian Hamilton states as the reason that " public opinion compelled practicallv every healthy male to serve for a period * voluntarily.' If he failed to do so, the women and his old comrades of the school cadet corps marked him down as a shirker." There, indeed, is an example worthy of attention. Another useful example is the South African Defence Act, which requires those who do not volunteer for service to pay £1 per annum for twenty- four years. APPENDIX IV SOME OPINIONS ON VOLUNTARY SERVICE AND THE TERRITORIAL FORCE (a) Voluntary Service as a Policy The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, at Berwick, on September 9th, 1905, said: — " How are we to find an army numerically sufficient to defend the pos- sessions far oversea ? . . . You cannot solve that problem by conscription. No Western country, no country of Western Europe, has ever attempted, or will ever attempt, in my opinion, to employ an army raised by conscription principally for the pur- pose of defending its possessions thousands of miles distant across the ocean. The experiment has never been tried by a highly organised communit}^ I do not think it will ever be tried. I am certain the present Govern- ment (a Llnionist one) would never be responsible for so wild an experiment; and I do not believe its successors, whoever they may be, or how many of them there may be in the vista of the future, will ever show what SOme might describe as greater courage, but I should describe as greater rashness." In the House of Commons, on April 23rd, 1907, the Rt. Hon. gentleman said : — " I believe a voluntary system is a system that this country will never con- sent to abandon." VOLUNTARY SERVICE i6i Lord IIaldane, in the House of Commons, April 23rd, 1907 :— " I feel that, in enabling the people to defend themselves we are getting rid of that unrest and want of tranquillity which affords the greatest impulse to- wards compulsory service. I say that in our plan you have a bulwark against compulsory service. If you retain the present confused state of things it is impossible to predict what vicissitudes of political feeling that con- fusion in military affairs may bring about in the way of an impulse towards conscription. There- fore, we take our stand upon this Bill as a bulwark against compulsion, and we rejoice to find the right hon. gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition, is in accord with our view that the nation is not likely to turn to that remedy." The advocates of Compulsory Service never attacked the Volunteers as they have attacked the Territorial Force. Why? Just because of the truth of Lord Haldane's words. The efficiency of the Territorial Force is the obstacle to Compulsory Service which its supporters cannot overcome. Colonel Seely, in the House of Commons, on April nth, 1913 : — the principle of voluntary service " I suggest that we shall be wise on this occasion to adopt the principle of the hospitals and lifeboat service instead of adopting the principle of the Insurance Act with regard to National Defence. My reasons for this arc as follows : II i62 THE CASE FOR First of all, the advantages of a volun- tary army are so great that they cannot be exaggerated. ... If there be any doubt on the subject, I will quote a very great soldier who supported the voluntary principle more vehemently than any other soldier, I mean Lord Roberts. Now Lord Roberts, referring to the South African War, when he left the war — and I want this to go home — referred to all the different forces who served with him, and he said : ' England, relying as she does on the patriotic voluntary system for her defence, is resting on no broken reed.' Could any words be more emphatic ? They were not spoken words, but deliberately written words. Every soldier must admit that if you can get it, a voluntary army is far better." Mr. Percy Illingworth at Manchester (March 7th, 1913):— " As an old Territorial ofiftcer, I deeply resent this wanton attack on a Force which, if it is given fair play, is excel- lently fitted to cope with the task which is allotted to it, which was to resist a possible attempt at invasion in case of a temporary reverse at sea. You may deplore the growth of naval expenditure ; but, as an island Power, we have to face the fact that it is our first duty to provide a navy adequate for our defence. If our navy were destroyed, though you had every man in the country in arms, nothing would save you from being starved into submission. On the other hand, if you had an all-powerful navy and a con- script army, you would lay yourself open to the charge that you desired these arrangements, not for defence, but for aggression." VOLUNTARY SERVICE 163 Colonel Seely on the Government and Com- pulsory Service, Buckingham Gate (December 5th, 1912):— " This, then, is the decision to which the Government adhere. They know the institution of compulsory service to be quite impossible at the present time. Even if it were possible, it would take many years for an army based on a principle so novel to the British people to be an efficient engine of war. The times in which we live are not favourable to great changes which must weaken us during the transition period. His Majesty's Government have no intention whatever of adopting the system of compulsory service for fighting units. Far from abandoning the voluntary principle, they intend to foster, encourage, and extend it by every means in their power. This, then, is final, so far as we are concerned, and I go farther and say that no alternative Government that could be formed would come to a different conclusion at the present time." {b) Lord Roberts's Opinion of the Territorial Force — and Others Lord Roberts said, at Manchester, on October 22nd, 1912 : — " The Territorial Force is now an acknowledged failure— a failure in dis- cipline, a failure in numbers, a failure in equipment, a failure in energy. I have so often demonstrated this thesis. I have so often analysed the contradictions in the arguments of the II B i64 THE CASE FOR supporters of the Territorial movement; I have so often exposed their vamped up statistics, and the rewards and encouragements offered by politicians to every soldier or civilian willing to say a word in praise of that scheme — I have done all this so often that there seems nothing left for me to say. To you, as experienced business men, I will merely repeat this one statement — a statement the truth of which is known to every practical soldier — SO long as the Territorial Force is based on voluntary enlistment it is im- possible to give its members a suflBi- ciently lengthy and continuous period of training, to ensure a discipline which will stand the severe test of modern war." Major-General Sir Francis Lloyd, the General Officer Commanding the London District, late Com- manding the Welsh Territorial Division, when Lady Lloyd distributed the prizes to the 28th Battalion, County of London Regiment (the Artists' Rifles), at the headquarters, Duke's Road, Euston Road, said : — " I regard the Territorial movement as the expression of a free people, who mean to remain free. It is the greatest expression of the country, the expres- sion of free service, which has carried us through many a campaign in the past and will carry us through many a cam- paign in the future." On another occasion he stated of the Territorial Force : — " It had discipline, training, and equipment. If the untrained French who rose in 1870 had had as much training as the present Territorial Force, VOLUNTARY SERVICE 165 the result of the Franco-German war might have been very different." — Daily Telegraph, Decem- ber ist, 1913. Does Lord Roberts suggest that these are dishonest statements, prompted by the hope of " rewards and encouragements offered by pohticians " ? In the Revue Militaire Generale, 1909, the late General Langlois, one of the most distinguished French Generals, published his opinions, formed after a tour of inspection of the Territorial Force. These articles have been translated by Captain C. F. Atkin- son and published under the title, The British Army in a European ]Var (Hugh Recs Ltd.). He wrote as follows : — '* However, these points of practical detail will be acquired by degrees, and will become petrified into habits; for what is most striking of all is the enormous ascendancy the leaders have over the men, the keenness of the latter, their eagerness to learn, and the application and earnestness which they throw into all their drill and instruction work. No, this Territorial Army, at any rate its infantry, is not a worthless * national guard,' but a militia which even now is a factor to be reckoned with." (p. 36.) " The equipment of the British infantryman is perfect." (p. 43.) " The manoeuvres of this army which we had the good fortune to witness convinced us that the British Territorial Infantry is really adequate for the duties which it will have to undertake — repelling an invasion in a country favourable to i66 THE CASE FOR the defence — and for which it is preparing itself, patiently, resolutely, and diligently, (p. 67.) These passages deal with "discipline," "equip- ment," and " energy." Was General Langlois bribed, too? This was in 1909, since when the Force has greatly improved. Colonel Bromley-Davenport, Unionist Financial Secretary to the War Office, 1903-5, who himself served in South Africa, answered Lord Roberts at Chester, on October 29th, 191 2, as follows: — " He did not think that we ought to abuse our institutions. It was not for us to cry down what we had got ; there were plenty of people to do that. A blind optimist was a source of danger, no doubt, but, at any rate, his blindness was unconscious. A blind pessimist, however, who wilfully ban- daged his eyes and blinded himself to everything good in order to enlarge upon and exaggerate everything that was bad, was not only a source of danger, but of mischief. It was a poor com- pliment to all the Territorial Forces of England which had worked all through the last four years, and, as he thought, shown good results ; it was a poor compliment to those distinguished officers who had been appointed instructors and trainers of the Terri- torial Forces, to say that the end of it all was an acknowledged failure in discipline, numbers, training, and everything. That was the way to make failure. One had only to shout failure to make it, and if one wanted success one must shout it. " Lord Roberts had been carried away by his enthusiasm for compulsory mili- tary service. He (Colonel Bromley-Davenport) VOLUNTARY SERVICE 167 had always been of opinion that, for us, com- pulsory service was unnecessary. It was an unfortunate necessity for European nations whose boundaries were almost imaginary lines. For us, surrounded by the sea, and with the advantage of the protection of the sea, it was not, and never had been, a necessity. But when Lord Roberts asserted, as proof of the necessity for compulsory military service, that the Territorial Force was an acknowledged failure, he was riding his hobby a little too far. He was guilty of an injustice to tens of thousands of people, and guilty of an exaggeration not less grotesque than the exaggeration of other extremists who would ask us to believe that the Territorial Force was equally as efficient as the Regular Forces. He protested against exaggeration on the one side or the other. There was a great deal to be said for com- pulsory military training from the national point of view. Very likely it would improve the physique of the nation, and inculcate habits of discipline and subordination to properly constituted autho- rity. He pointed out, however, that if they were going to effect anv great social and political change, they had no chance of doing it unless they could persuade one of the great political parties in the State to take it up. and he asked which Of the two parties would take up com- pulsory military service and fight a General Election upon it? The answer was, Neither of them. . . . " He denied that the Territorial Force was a failure. It was a success— a re- markable success, which had been achieved in the face of many difi&culties and discouragements. It was hardly too much to say that in certain quarters there had been i68 THE CASE FOR a kind of conspiracy to belittle the Territorial Force in order to bring about the only alternative — compulsory service. In spite of this, he declared it had not been a failure, and it was their duty to make the best of it. The spirit of patriotism was not dead; only patriotism was a plant which could not thrive in an atmosphere of discouragement." In the summer of 1913 Lord Methuen visited a number of Territorial Camps in order to form an opinion as to the Force. He published the views thus formed in The Nineteenth Century and After for October, 19 13. Where he thinks it necessary, he is frankly critical, but his criticism is made with a view to bringing about improvement. The advocates of Voluntary Service and members of the Territorial Force will always be grateful for well-informed criticism offered in such a spirit. We have no desire to present Lord Methuen as a participant in a controversy into which he expressly disclaims any intention of entering, but we give the following quotations as indicative of an attitude which we earnestly commend to military critics of the Terri- torial Force, who are not prepared definitely to side with us in the controversy. " I do not enter the lists as a champion for compulsory or voluntary service ; both have their advantages and disadvantages. I do champion the Territorial Army, and I admire the fine spirit that has kept it alive under very depressing cir- cumstances." • • • « • " From all I could gather from those officers who from their positions are competent to give an VOLUNTARY SERVICE 169 opinion, the progress made in the Territorial Force is as good as one has any reason to expect." " If the Territorial Force is not in the high state of efficiency that one would wish to see, the fault does not lie with the members of the Force. The splendid spirit that pervades it is at once noticeable. The same individual intelligence was no doubt in existence in many of the old Volun- teer Corps, but there was lacking throughout the Force, taken as a whole, the determination to look at things seriously that is to be seen in the Terri- torial Force. This is, perhaps, the best answer that can be given to those who believe the volun- tary spirit is dead." " That there is a feeling of apathy amongst the class which ought to take the lead is true enough, and it is hard to keep one's patience when one has to listen to men abusing the Territorial Force who have it in their power to render it eflftcient, if, instead of grumbling, they would put their shoulders to the wheel and give a helping hand." • (c) Some Leaders of Industry THE WITNESS OF A LARGE EMPLOYER OF LABOUR " As a practical man, I refuse to pro- pose the imposition of unnecessary burdens on our people, and I regard the Territorial Army as supplying the means of forming a perfectly adequate second-line force. . . . The Territorial is receiving military instruction in drill hall, on rifle range, and on manoeuvre ground at intervals all I70 THE CASE FOR the year. ... In fact, the Territorial system devised by Lord Haldane, properly understood, supplies the means of evolving during the first stage of the war a second Regular Army. . . . Once abolish the voluntary system, and there will be an end of the enormous amount of unpaid ser- vice now so gladly given." — From an article by Sir John Barker, Bart., in the Manchester Courier, May 2nd, 1913. Mr. Max Muspratt, at the Imperial Industries Club Dinner, June 25th, 1913: — WHAT THE UNITED ALKALI CO. DOES " Our Company employs something like 10,000 men. We offer, at any rate, if it is not full wages, very nearly full wages, to any men who are absent on training. That means to say that any working man can get two weeks' holiday in every year without any cost to himself, and that is, need- less to say, with the routine and monotony of industrial pursuits, an enormous concession. Of the 10,000, about 250 take advantage of that, and, I believe, the reason is solely and entirely that it has not been properly brought to their minds. If the recruiting of the Territorials was systematic- ally conducted, showing the attraction it was to the ordinary working man to undertake this period of service, you would have the numbers of the Territorials going up by leaps and bounds." Sir Robert Hadfield on the Industrial Dangers of Conscription : — " You ask me to state what I think would be the effect of compulsory training upon our daily work. Personally, I think the result VOLUNTARY SERVICE 171 would be most disastrous. But, quite apart from this, wliy do we wish to copy Conti- nental nations when for hundreds of years we have held our own against the whole of the world without adopting their methods? I am quite at a loss to understand this ' panicky ' feel- ing. . . . Not very long ago I had some of the directors of the largest Continental works going round the works of my own company. These gentlemen were from the famous works of Krupp. After walking round our works they made this very remarkable statement to me. * We only wish we could get our men to work as your men do.' That comes from educated and trained men who repre- sented a country where compulsory military training prevails. Therefore, with all due respect to Lord Roberts, whom I venerate to the highest degree, I regret differing from him as to the necessity of compulsory training." — War and Peace, November 20th, (d) Some Press Views of the National Service Leaguers Campaign Tr:RRITORIAL ESTABLISHMENTS " Those who interest themselves, whether from duty or inclination, or both, in the progress of the Territorial Force, must have noticed with pleasure the evidences of activity and hopefulness of ulti- mate success which stand out so prominently in proceedings of the County Associations through- out the country. The perusal of their reports provides an excellent corrective to the gloomy and pessimistic futilities of certain speakers, who, not- 172 THE CASE FOR withstanding all their protests to the contrary, seem to lose no opportunity to decry and dis- parage the Force. . . . Competent authorities having declared that the Territorial Army, when completed to its proper Establishment and trained to the required standard, is sufficient for the purpose of home defence, one would think that all public-spirited men would co-operate to secure the fulfilment of these two conditions. . . . We deny that the voluntary system has failed; if it has received a temporary set-back, it is due to the efforts of those who in trying to advance their own unpopular programme, do not scruple to be- little the Territorial, and even the Regular Army. The Territorial conception holds the field. Here we have a scheme which has been evolved after much thought and labour, blessed and approved by men of much military experience, adapted to British temperaments and British military tradi- tion, and possessing all the elements needed for the gradual formation of a really national army. Why, then, not help towards carrying it forward to final success?" — United Service Gazette, November 7th, 19 13. NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE INCONSISTENCY " The charge against the National Service League of obstructing the Territorial movement is always met with indignant denials, but whether the members mean to disparage the Force or not, the fact remains that their whole scheme is incon- sistent with, and repugnant to, the Territorial idea. The League cannot advocate the one with- out condemning the other, and that being so all their protestations about being second to none in VOLUNTARY SERVICE 173 their admiration of the spirit which actuates the members of the Force, and of the success achieved in the face of difficulties and drawbacks, sound singularly hollow and insincere. Service in the Territorial Force is national ser- vice, and the fact that we have not at this moment a Citizen Army full up to establishment is largely due to the mis- directed efforts of the League. The ordinary man is perplexed and bewildered by the conllicting claims to his support of the voluntary service advocates on the one hand, and the Com- pulsory Service League on the other, and ends by giving his adherence to neither. The Claim that the National Service League has always done its best to support the Force is one which we find very hard to recon- cile with some of the statements of its emissaries, as reported in the public press." — United Service Gazette, November 28th, 1913. COST OF CONSCRIPTION IN GERMANY " However much the expenditure on fleet and army may be disguised, the burden is colossal. In the year 1878 the net expenditure, ordinary and extraordinary, for purposes of defence, for Army and Navy and all other military purposes whatso- ever, including pensions, amounted to 452,000,000 marks; in 1888, to 660,000,000 marks; in 1898, to 882,000,000 marks; and in 1908, to 1,481.000,000 marks. The total expenses net of the Empire in 1908 were 1,735,000,000 marks (;^86, 750,000), showing thatonly 254,000,000 marks (;^,'i 2,700,000) out of the grand total were spent on other than military purposes. As the Army and Navy now stand at a peace strength of some 174 THE CASE FOR 700,000 men, and as these men are all in the prime of their working power, the loss in wages and in productive work may be put very conservatively at 600,000,000 marks, which brings the cost of the support of the military establish- ments of Germany up to 2,000,000,000 marks and more per annum, or 500,000,000 dollars (^100,000,000). " Many Americans were dismayed when our total national expenditure reached the 1,000,000,000 dollars point, and the Congress voting the expenditure was nicknamed the ' Billion Dollar Congress.' What would we say of an expenditure of half a billion dollars for defence alone! " — Price Collier, Germany and the Germans, pp. 430-1. LORD ROBERTS AND MR. ARNOLD FORSTER Lord Roberts made a statement in the House of Lords, on July loth, 1905, as follows: — " I have no hesitation in stating that our armed forces as a body, are as abso- lutely unfitted and unprepared for war as they were in 1899-1900." On July 13th, 1905, Mr. Arnold Forster replied in the House of Commons : — " I was not responsible, Lord Roberts was responsible, for the Army in 1903. ... I do not pretend to know whether the Army improved or whether it deteriorated between the date to which he referred and 1903; but of this I am quite certain— that since 1903 there has been a rapid, a great improvement in the VOLUNTARY SERVICE 175 personnel and in the organisation of the Army. ... 1 know perfectly well that we are very far from the condition which we ultimately ought to reach, and which I hope we shall reach ; but I think I can say enough to prove that there has been a steady progression in the direction which we all wish to travel." THE QUESTION OF NUMBERS In the House of Commons, on July 14th, 1904, when he was talking of reducing the strength of the old Volunteer Force, Mr. Arnold Forster said : — " I propose to fix the establishment of the Volunteers at 200,000, and to reduce the strength by absorption in the first instance to 180,000." And on March 29th, 1905, he told his supporters why. He then said : — " The Volunteers have been made use of in foreign wars as individuals and not as a mili- tary force, and if they are to be employed as a military force it follows as a necessary consequence that they should be organised in such a way that they could go to the seat of war with their own organisations and their own officers." We are now told that a Force which is admittedly at least twice as well trained as the Volunteers, is organised as Mr. Arnold Forster wanted the Volun- teers to be organised, and exceeds the strength he proposed by about 70,000 men, is a " failure " I 176 VOLUNTARY SERVICE. VARYING OPINIONS No. I. — Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, at the Mansion House, August ist, 1905: — " The truth is, I rather understated than overstated the fact; for while, as re- gards organisation, efficiency, and power of ex- pansion, we are no better off than before the war; in one particular we are worse off — I mean in the falling-off in the number of officers." No. 2. — The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, in the House of Commons, on August 3rd, 1905, asked whether Lord Roberts's speech represented the views of the Defence Committee, of which he was a member, Mr. Balfour said : — " A member of the Defence Committee may make a speech without committing the Defence Committee. Lord Roberts spoke on his own personal responsi- bility." No. 3. — Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons, on August 8th, 1905, said: — " I do not agree that the Army is in the same condition that it was in 1899. It has improved, in my opinion, upon the Army of 1899, just as the Army of 1899 improved on that of 1895." APPENDIX V MUSKETRY It has been constantly stated that 100,000 of the Territorial Force failed to qualify in musketry in 1912. The statement indicates the length to which attempts to depreciate the Force can be carried, inasmuch as the figure is only arrived at by including the whole of the Artillery, Army Service Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps, etc., who are not tested in musketry. There is no doubt that the difficulty of access to ranges is a serious matter, and that there is much room for improvement. But there has been steady pro- gress. Of the arms who fire the test, the number who passed has risen from 75 per cent, in 191 1 to 85 per cent, in 1913, and the failures are mostly amongst the recruits. Of trained men in 1913, 93 per cent, passed the test. APPENDIX VI Statistics PRINCIPAL TERMS OF ENLISTMENT IN THE REGULAR ARMY (OCTOBER 1ST, 1912) Household Cavalry Cavalry of the Line Royal Horse and Field Artillery Royal Garrison Artillery Foot Guards Infantry of the Line Comparative Statistics with regard to the British Army — 1862-63 and 191 2-13 Total Establishment at Home and in Colonies. 1862-63. 1912-13. Officers 8,034 ... 9,800 N.-C.O.'s and men 137,416 ... 176,800 Colour Reserve Service. Service. 8 years 4 years 7 » 5 .. 6 „ .. 6 „ 8 „ 4 » 3 » 9 » 7 » 5 » Total H5'45o 83.523 186,600 Total numbers in India 75,886 Strength at Home and Colonies by Branches of the Service. 1862-63. 1912-13. Horse Artillery i>933 3,116 Cavalry 12,133 14,754 Field and Garrison Artillery ... 19,001 29,976 Engineers 4,565 9,818 Guards 6,306 7,416 Infantry of the Line 87,318 88,863 Total Estimates. 1862-63. 1912-13. Effective £\ 3,172,012 ;^23,955,ooo Non-effective 2,130,858 3,905,000 Total ;fi5,302,87o ;i{^27,86o,ooo VOLUNTARY SERVICE 179 TOTAL NUMBER OF MEN RAISED BY VOLUNTARY ENLIST- MENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM ANH • LIABLE TO SERVICE IN WAR Army, including Navy, including Territorials. Reserves. 1901 788,552 142,800 1902 789,927 141.625 1903 730,978 145.625 1904 738,014 150,000 1905 739,309 154,100 1906 751,829 152,000 1907 744.555 Not ascertained 1908 656,642 151,100 1909 735.213 173,743 1910 722,966 . . 184,471 1911 720,770 178,531 1912 713,466 181,531 »9'3 699,861 185,093 STATISTICS OF THE TERRITORIAL FORCE No. whose engagpments terminated during No. leaving on Year ending the previous termination Sept. 30th. Men joining. 12 months. of engagement. 190Q 120,749 Not publi.shed 31,859 1910 45,900 Not published 23,422 1911 41,569 45,957 15,962 1912 61,542 80,403 34,585 1913 72,293 114,621 62,978 Strength on No. cnllstlnR Sept. 30th of Tear ending In Army, Navy, No. leaving for Territorial N.C.O.'s Sept. 30th. or Special Reserve other causes. and mpn. 1909 7,357 9,974 260,389 1910 7,145 18,365 257,337 1911 6,299 22,157 254,688 1912 6,490 22,991 252,154 1913 7,427 18,653 249,393 12 B i8o THE CASE FOR These figures are extremely instructive. They show that recruiting, the real index of the popularity of the Force, has recovered from the reaction of 1910 and 191 1 . They also show the exact effect of the Daily Mail boom in 1909, viz., (i) reaction in subsequent years, due to units up to strength ceasing to recruit, and men being taken in 1909 who might normally have joined in the next two years; (2) increasing number of men leaving " for other causes " during 191 1 and 191 2; (3) abnormal number of men whose engagements expired in 1913 and consequent drop in strength. If, say, 40,000 of those who joined in 1909 had been spread over 1910 and 191 1, the Force would have shown a gradual increase up to about 270,000 N.C.O.'s and men. If recruiting can now be main- tained at its present level — and with encouragement if should be increased — the Force in two years should be about as near its establishment as is practicable having regard to the fact that, as soon as a unit gets up to strength, there is sure to be a drop in the energy devoted to recruiting, which means a subsequent fall below establishment. The figures should prove a great encouragement to those County Associations who have recently been passing resolutions indicative of a pessimism for which there is no justification. No one would wish to blame the Daily Mail for what was a well-meant, if short-sighted, effort; but that that paper should be the loudest in making the situation for which it is itself largely responsible a ground for denouncing the Territorial system, and so dis- couraging re-engagements, is a fair matter for complaint. VOLUNTARY SERVICE i8i NUMBERS OF MEMBERS OF TERRITORIAL FORCE ATTENDING CAMP FOR 15 AND 8 DAYS RESPECTIVELY, AND ANY NUMBER OF DAYS BETWEEN THESE PERIODS, SINCE THE FORMATION ANNUALLY 1908 1909 1910 1911 1913 i9'3 For 15 days For 8 days and less and over than 15 days 105,296 69,007 169,911 78,326 168,175 74,723 ••• 155.257 76,502 161,914 67,400 164,926 54,609 NUMBERS OF VOLUNTEER FORCE ATTENDING CAMP FOR SIMILAR TERMS FOR THE YEARS 1905-I907 For 15 days For 8 days and less than 15 days 1905 1906 1907 and over 24,882 24,202 4,459 • 148,925 144,520 151,228 NUMBER OF RECRUITS JOINING THE ARMY, NAVY, AND TERRITORIAL FORCl Year. Army 1900 227,339 1901 171,887 1902 152,284 1903 101,719 1904 139,690 1905 ii3>9'7 1906 122,348 1907 "4,777 1908 125,609 1909 170,451 1910 87.852 191 1 89,738 1912 110,152 i9'3 114,418 IN ANY GIVEN YEAR Not Navy, ascertained Not 10,358 13,589 15,187 15,176 20,095 ascertained i82 VOLUNTARY SERVICE. TOTAL NUMBERS OF MEN WHO HAVE RECEIVED AND ARE RECEIVING MILITARY TRAINING AND WHO MIGHT BE CALLED UPON FOR SERVICE In 1905 Colonel F. N. Maude, C.B., P.S.C., in one of the Special Prize Essays of the Royal United Service Institution, showed that we had about 2,750,000 men of military age, " more or less trained, upon whom we can draw in times of uttermost peril," and that by 1925, allowing for increase of population, and presuming the same average rates of enlistment to be main- tained, there will be about 4,500,000. ** Not a bad result," continues the author of the calcu- lation, " for a purely voluntary organisation to attain, seeing that it is slightly in excess of what the German law of Conscription would give us on an equal basis of population." APPENDIX VII THE FAILURE OF COMPULSORY SERVICE PROPOSALS TO SECURE SUPPORT IN THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT On three occasions attempts have been made to get Compulsory MiHtary Training Measures a first or second reading, but opinion has been overwhelmingly against them. In the first place, Captain Kincaid- Smith introduced a Bill in 1908 which was refused a first reading. Further, in July, 1909, a second reading of Lord Roberts's National Service Bill was negatived, and in 1913 the National Service and Territorial Force Bill stood adjourned on second reading. The Failure of the National Military Training Bill This Bill was introduced by Captain Kincaid- Smith on July 7th, 1908, its purpose being to establish compulsory military training in the Territorial Force. The first three clauses laid it down that any British subject should be liable at the age of eighteen to not more than forty-eight days' military training, at the age of nineteen to not more than thirty days, and between the age of twenty and thirty to not mofe than fourteen days every alternate year. A further clause provided that persons unfit at eighteen years of age, but subsequently found to be fit, should be liable to serve. When the question was put for leave to bring in the Bill the House divided as follows : — Ayes, 34. Noes, 250. Majority against, 216. i84 THE CASE FOR Lord Roberts's National Service Bill in the House of Lords {July 12th, 1909) When this Bill came up for second reading the following amendment, moved by the Duke of Northumberland, was carried : — " That this House fully recognises the need of a home army, amply sufficient to secure the country against all risks from invasion, and the advantage of giving to as large a part of the population as possible a sound groundwork of military training, but it is not prepared to proceed further with a measure which, while involving un- known demands upon the national resources, would supersede the system accepted as sufficient by the military advisers of His Majesty's Government." Some important pronouncements were then made, Lord Midleton said : — " Their lordships would be taking a great re- sponsibility if, against the military opinion of the trusted advisers of the Government, they passed this Bill — for they had not merely to deal with a resolution or an abstract proposition — and im- posed on the House of Commons the duty of find- ing an extra five millions of money. By such a course they would probably retard instead of advancing the establishment of an efficient mili- tary system." Lord Lansdowne said : — " It has been said that, after all, this Bill will not do much harm. I cannot accept that view. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 185 In my luimble opinion, if your lordships vote for the second reading of a Bill of this kind it means that you approve of it, and that you are ready, if the opportunity offers, to take it up yourselves; and I, for one, am not able to say that that is the manner in which I regard the matter. This Bill, remember, is not merely an attack upon the Territorial system instituted by Mr. Haldane; it is an affirmation that the voluntary system has been tried in this country and has failed. It is an affirmation that we desire to substitute for that voluntary system a system based upon compulsion, and com- pulsion in the particular form in which we find it in the clauses of this Bill." — House of Lords, July 13th, 1909. Lord Lansdowne: — " I can never bring myself to believe that we are so absolutely and completely at the mercy of the invader as the noble and gallant earl would have us believe. I observe that three conditions are always assumed: (i) that the w'hole of our Regular Army has gone abroad ; (2) that our Fleet has been decoyed away and dis- abled ; and (3) that the Territorial Force has not yet had time to undergo the training necessary to render it efficient. I find it difilcult to believe that the whole of these conditions are likely to present themselves simultaneously at the very outbreak of a war. If I may sum up my view I would say that while I am ready to go the full length in insuring against all reasonable risks, I do not want to lay upon the country the burden of insuring against risks which do not seem to me to be reasonable."— House of Lords, July 13th, 1909. i86 THE CASE FOR Lord Lansdowne: — " There is another by-product of this measure which I regard with the utmost apprehension. I mean its effect upon recruiting for the Regular Army. It seems to me impossible that a Bill of this kind should come into opera- tion and not very seriously affect recruit- ing for the Regular Army. In what way it would do so may not be very easy to foretell, but that it would have an effect of that kind I, for one, have no kind of doubt. But, then, what about its effect on the Territorials ? The supporters of the noble and gallant earl recommended this Bill to us on the ground that it fits in with the scheme of the Government and is calculated to promote the success of the Territorial system. I cannot believe that that is the case, and I must say that on a point of that kind I think we must, to some extent, at any rate, defer to the opinion of those who invented the Territorial system, and who are now carrying it into operation, and they tell us in the most unambiguous language that the adoption of this Bill, far from promoting the success of the Territorial system, far from being helpful to it, would, on the contrary, be destructive and injurious to it."— House of Lords, July 13th, 1909. Lord Lansdowne: — "I do not believe public opinion in this country is ripe for such a change as we are asked to make, and I do not believe that the proper way to ripen it is to pass this Bill through the House of Lords. The enthusiasm exhibited at public meetings requires to be a good deal discounted. You have to reckon with a great deal of inarticu- late opposition to compulsion. Compulsion to VOLUNTARY SERVICE 187 many people — people, perhaps, who do not express tiieir opinions very loudly— is hateful, and I believe that if this Bill were to become law, and if it were to be studied and the attention of our people called to the heavy pains and penalties v/hich are to be found in some of its provisions, there would be a very strong feeling of reaction against it, a feeling which, in my belief, might go very far to check the progress and impair the usefulness of the many measures which are now in force for the advancement of military efficiency in this country." — House of Lords, July, 13th, 1909. Lord Lucas said : — " It was claimed that the adoption of the scheme of the Bill would strengthen and increase our power of taking the offensive. The Govern- ment believed that the very opposite would be the outcome, and that the more the centre of gravity was drawn into a home defence the more would the nation's power of taking the offensive be im- paired, and the more would those forces which would have to take the offensive be starved in both men and monev. The scheme would cost at least £8,000,000. Was anyone prepared to say that there was the faintest indica- tion in the country of an intention to add to the already heavy expenditure on the Navy and the Regular Army another £8,000.000 to the cost of home defence? There lay one of (Iu> most crucial points of the whole question. If the country had the suggested system it would have sooner or later to take money for its maintenance i88 THE CASE FOR from the funds available for the Navy and the Regular Army."— House of Lords, July I2th, 1909. National Service (Territorial Force Bill) This Bill, read for a first time in the House of Commons on March 13th, 1913, proposed to impose on all male British subjects, resident in the United Kingdom, the obligation on attain- ing the age of eighteen years, of serving in the United Kingdom in the Territorial Force, if they were required to do so by the Army Council. Only those persons who were specifically described in the Bill would be exempt from the obligation. Provision was made for the Army Council to regulate the number of men required from time to time for the Territorial Force by altering the physical standard for enlistment or suspending the re-engagement of men. Service would be for a period not exceeding four years, as prescribed by the Territorial Force Act, 1907. No person could be required to serve abroad. The exemptions scheduled were men who have served in the naval or military forces, police, men em- ployed in the British Mercantile Marine, the sons of widows upon whom their mothers were dependent, and people certified by the Army Council as entitled to exemption in the interests of the public service. The debate on the second reading on April 11th stood adjourned. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 189 Lord Willoughby de Brake's Bill. The Second Reading Debate on this Bill was resumed in the House of Lords on March 19th, 1914, when by 53 votes to 34 the Peers declined to give it a Second Reading. During the course of the debate Lord Lansdowne said : — " I say quite frankly that I do not believe that at this moment the condi- tion of public opinion with regard to compulsory service is such as to justify either party in attempting to press it upon Parliament. I believe that feeling is common to the Front Benches on both sides, and not on account of what I may describe as mere party timidity." APPENDIX VIII '• A STALE LIBEL " Lord Roberts has recently described the complaint that the National Service League discourages service in the Territorial Force as " a stale libel." Perhaps Lord Roberts has in mind the saying " the greater the truth the greater the libel." At any rate, we beg to draw the League's attention to the views quoted on pp. 14 et scq. and to invite an explanation of the following passages : — " The National Service League derides the Territorials." — Fallacies and Facts, by Lord Roberts, p. 205. " The Territorial Force was essentially a fraudulent affair." . . . " The greatest calamity that could have befallen this country would have been for the Terri- torial Army to have been a so-called success." . . . " The only two directions in which the Territorial Force had shown an increase were expense and inefficiency." — Lord Wil- LOUGHBY DE Broke, at the annual dinner of the National Service League, 1913, as reported in The Nation in Arms, 1913, p. 369. " I tell you plainly that I know of no reason under our existing situation why any young man should join the Terri- torial Force." . . . " The effort which had been made in the voluntary Territorial system had been a lamentable and grotesque failure." — The Rt. Hon. F. E. Smith,'^K.C., M.P., at the Fair- field Club, Liverpool, Morning Post, January loth, 1914. VOLUNTARY SERVICE 191 S ^ t-- (M CO 00 00 c^ o -+ CO /*" '^ 0: 05 OS CO gi CO -«' CO ■* CO CO S u « S ~ u a U kLi OJ C-l «c> CO CO 00 t- -H t;: p^ S w s V) 6> e«5 ■^ §1 — , , ■^ CO .-1 ^J CO CD _l eofi CO o\ •* flO c^ g r- Tj 10 t^ CO l^ >o CO ■* ->*< »o u " u •> ■<1< r^\ »o -< CO ■* IM 00 ^ X s u ■^ ""* ^ •1 S2 5 ki .Sf 1^ «o •— 1 o 00 CD 10 >f5 C5 U5 CO 8 £ "^ o H M 2 s o o u o O b •J < •— I OS o H u u u H OJ : IN : 01 x: J -5 1 .1 :^ ■^ e ™ «i _. >, c -^ § oa ^ '^ t« "IS ^ iS "- i* ° rt o » -iS "^ + «^ m >, c 4) _U + N : be (4 > 4) > O a ^ )2 ^ iZ 'Z ) c c r" ■ >» . >^'^ "c > CO 00 00 192 THE CASE FOR ICfH (N -( r-H rM -H CO «D«<5U5 fOCDO •* ^ 05 ^ 10 CO W CO 10 ^S?5 1-^ ^ CO "* l-~ I-- 10 ■<* IM iC ^coaoi--.-^co--r^-H55 r^ t- ri< 00 -H ^ :o 'O cc to 0> 00 P5 IM Tt< Tji to o 5 l^iOiOOOCCtNtMiOiMO X 0-- O O l^ >0 Q Q H z : : ; : : I I ; : : a, 2 tB ^ • . :"g : D ; : 3 : hfl CO - . W lU (U J- ^ -o '^ ►£ >^ ij be U • ^ • "a a bf u c S 2 ^ iZ; fc E fc c^ >- D £ Q o -" .- C <" ^ ?! c tfl .; :z: o ^ = ■> ^ o o (u S n "^ r 1 cf IT ^°3'?^^ ■* ■* « -^ -H (N V « Tj< .yrt >. «, "' ^ "^ •- l- •- .= t > W jJ c .^ •5 <« S • - 4> S ^ Oi ^ — n »0 CO O C^ (N >- a> '^ VOLUNTARY SERVICE 193 u DO H 'J -z Q J5 en Ji ;^2 a "3 C C i c 1 73 ta C ^H (M w c: J?; c c 73 •a C c _] _) •2 J3 M vO "O 73 C C c< rt •a J3 a (N «o ^ X T. f^ ■f T3 O rt y C/2 ^ S 1 = •?-£:: 4) l-l .- ^1 E 3 (fl 5 - ^ J3 U k. u 00 = •a «Q "1 c = « o -JooZ 13 194 VOLUNTARY SERVICE, Scottish Southern c u m (n ' ■> ' ^ d Z No. 2 No. 7 No. 8 No. 3 d 2: 1 1 CO w 73 a Lowland 1st South Midland 2iid South Midland 1st South Western 2ad South Wes ern Welsh Border South Wales H Highland Lowland T3 C •5 3 O Wessex West Lancashire East Lancashire Welsh Seaforth and Cameron , "j Gerdon . . . . |- Argyle and Sutherland . j South Scottish . . . "j Scottish Rifle . . . [- Highland Light Infantry . J Warwickshire . . . "j Gloucester and Worcester V Soiuli Midland . . . j Devon and Cornwall . "j Southwestern. . . V Hampshire ... J North Lancashire . . "j Liverpool . . . . |- SouUi Lancashire . . j Lancashire Fusiliers . ^ East Lancashire . . J- Manche^ter . . , j Cheshire . . . . \ North Wales ... I South Wales ... J INDEX Abuse of the Territorial Force, Lord Methuen on ... Administration of the Territorial Force Admiralty Memorandum Quoted Advantages of the Voluntary System Aims of the Conscriptionists Alleged Dangers and How to Meet Them Alternative Schemes Examined Armaments and Compet:tion ... ... Armaments and Co-operation Armaments and the Future ... Army Ordnance Department, and Arms for the Troops Army, the Question of a larger Army and a smaller Navy Arnold Forster, Mr., on the Question of Numbers ... ,, ,, ,, ,, Improvements in the Army Attendance at Camp ; Australia, Compulsion in ... Balance of Power, The ... Balfour, Right Hon. A. J., on Voluntary Service as a policy Barker, Sir John, on the Adequacy of the T.F Barracks, No provision for, in N.S.L. Estimate of Cost ... Battle of Worth, What Meckel saw at the " Blood Tax," The T.F., according to N.S.L Boys' Brigades and Boy Scouts under Compulsion British Naval Power ... ... Bromley-Davenport, Colonel, on " Success of Territorial Forc^" ... Burden of Compulsion, Inequality of Cadet Battalions and Companies Camp, Attendance at ... Camp, Comfort of C.I.V. under Fire ... ... ... Coast Defence Troops in the T.F. Collier, Price, on " The Cost of Conscription in Germany '• Competition and Armaments Complaint of Insjjector-General about N.S.L Compulsion, Cost of ... ... Compulsion and Effect on Labour " Compulsory Militiamaa," Th© PAGE 1 68 70-80 148-50 146 140-2 138-40 98-118 •3. '38 3 4 67 136 17s 174 '3. 180 7, 158 73. 23-5 160 169 9 44-5 3-2 131 25 166 7-8 63 180 10 48 S3 »73 1-3 «3 4-6 5 33 196 THE CASE FOR PAGE Compulsory Militarism and Sea Power ... ... ... 135-8 Compulsory Service on Continental Lines 08-102 Compulsory Service, Brigadier-General Kemball on... ... 46 ,, ,, and the attitude of the Political Parties 183-9 Conscription and the possibility of Service abroad ... ... 2 jC.ooscription, the Meaning of the word 151-5 Conscriptionists, Ultimate Aim of ... ... ... ... 140-2 Considerations of International Politics ... ... ... 1-4 Continental Allies and Military Support 91-6 "Continuous Association" more easily attained under a Voluntary Sj^stem ... ... ... ... ... ... 40 Contrast of the Territorials with the old Volunteers 54-8 Convictions in Australia and New Zealand ... ... ... 7 Co-operation and Armaments ... ... ... ... ... 3 Cost of Compulsion ... 4-6 County Associations ... ... 66-9 Defence Committee on Raids 87 '■''Doctrine de Defense NalionaW'' on the Territorials ... 15 Dominions, Compulsory Service in ... ... ... ... 156-9 Economic Effects of Compulsion ... 134 Effect of the Agitation for Compulsory Service 10-17 Effects, Moral and Physical, of Compulsion ... ... ... 8-10 Empire Overseas, The ... 18-20 Employees, Restrictions on ... ... ... ... ... 6 Enlistment, Terms of , in some branches of the Regular Army 178 Entente, The, and our present Naval and Military Systems... 3 Ethical and Religious Objections ... 6 Expeditionary Force and Service Abroad ... ... ... 89-96 Expenditure on Armaments, Limitation of the 134 Features which characterise certain types of Armies ... 41-2 Field and Fighting Organisation of the T.F 51 Financial Unsoundness of the N.S.L. Proposals i3'2-3 France's Return to Three Years' Service ... 2 French, Sir John, on Raiding Forces 85 German Army Increase, and its Effect on France 1-2 German Law and Obligations of Soldiers ... ... ... 6 German Naval Power in Home Waters 25 Grants to County Associations ... ... ... ... ... 124 Hadfield, Sir Robert, on the Industrial Dangers of Con- scription ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 170 Haking, General, on Esprit de Corfs ... ... ... ... 109 Haldane, Lord, on Voluntary Service as a Policy ... ... 161 ,, ,, ,, the Effect of Compulsion on Recruiting 142 ,, „ ,, the numbers required for a Territorial Army ... ... ... 121 „ „ ,, "Seeing a bit of Soldiering" 37 VOLUNTARY SERVICE. 197 PAGE Hamilton, General Sir Ian, and the Invasion Question ... 91 ,, ,, ,, and the Overseas Army under Compulsion ... ... loa ,, ,, ,, on disaster in Recruiting market lu Henderson, Colonel, on the "War of Secession" ... ... 45 Home Defence, a Naval Problem ... 18 Home Defence, Particular Problem of 81-97 Home Fleet Figures ... 25 Hopkins, Admiral Sir J. Ommaney, on Raids ... ... 94 Horse Census in England... ... ... 52 Illingworth, Mr. Perc}', on " Fair Play for the Territorials " 162 Imperial Military Policy in Outline ... ... 18-30 Improbability of Compulsion ... ... ... ... ... 11-14 Incompatible S3'stems, Two ... ... ... ... ... 142 Industrial Dangers of Conscription ... ... ... ... 170 Inequality of the Burden of Compulsion ... ... ... 7-8 Inherent Characteristics of Armies ... ... 31-42 Inspector-General and Complaint of N.S.L. Agents ... 13 Interference with Personal Liberty 6 International Politics, Consideration of ... 1-4 "'International Revue" on the Territorials ... ... ... 16 Invasion, General Langlois on ... ... ... ... ... 14 Invasion, Improbability of 21-3 Invasion, Naval Action and Fear of ... ... 81-2 Keene, Colonel A., on N.S.L. Estimates 119 Kemball, Brigadier-General, on Compulsory Service ... 46 Kuropatkin on the Reservists from European Russia ... 42 Labour and Compulsion... ... ... ... 5 Langlois, General, on Comfort of Camp Life ... ... 10 Langlois, General, on Invasion ... ... ... ... ... 14 Langlois, General, in praise of Voluntary Service 165 Larger Aimy and a Smaller Navy, A ... ... ... ... 136 Leadership of the Territorial Force ... ... ... ... 70-2 Limitation of the Expenditure on Armaments ... ... 134 Lloyd, Major-General Sir Francis, on the T.F 164 Loire, Army of the ... 47 Maude, Colonel F. N., on Number of Men Trained to Arms 140 Max Muspratt, Mr., on Recruiting of Territorial Force ... 170 Meckel, at the Battle of Worth 44 Methuen, Lord, and Where the Fault Lies ... ... ... 169 Militia Converted into Special Reserve ... 56 "Militia," the term defined ... ... ... 33 " .l/27//ar-^K net. Can Oermany Invade England? By COL. H. B. HANNA. TN this little book the author brings a wide experience in transport operations by sea and by river, by railway and by road, both in peace and war, to bear upon the burning" question of the day, passing in review all the arguments for or against the possibility of an invasion of England with the same thoroughness with which, yeai s ago, he discussed the practicability of a Russian invasion of India. METHUEN & CO., LTD., 36, Essex Street, London, W.C. A GOOD RESOLVE. After reading this HandDook, and ii you approve of the principles expressed in it. please send your name and address to — The SECRETARY, VOLUNTARY SERVICE COMMITTEE, MiUbank House, WESTMINSTER, S.W. Subscribers of Ss. and upwards per year will receive all Leaflets, etc., as published from time to time. VOLUNTARY SERVICE COMMITTEE PUBLICATIONS. LEAFLETS. A. A few Questions by the National Service League —and some Answers. 3/- per thousand. B. Footballers, Please Note ! 3/- per thousand. C. What is the Object of the National Service League ? 6/- per thousand. D. Compulsory Soldiers. The Argument from the Balkans. 6/- per thousand. B. Why you should serve in the Territorials as a Volunteer rather than as a Conscript. 6/- per thousand. F. Our Defence Policy. 3/- per thousand. G. Competitive Armaments. 3/- per thousand. H. The Duty of Service. 3/- per thousand. I. What the National Service League is doing for us. 6/- per thousand. J. Facts and Fallacies. £1 Is. per thousand. K. A Mean Argument. 3/- per thousand. L. A Oonscriptionist "Inexactitude." 3/- per thou- sand. M, The Output of the Voluntary System. 3/- per thousand. N. The Training Fallacy. 3/- per thousand. 0. Universal Service and Apprenticeship. 3/- per thousand. P. Against Compulsion. A Cabinet Minister's View, 3/- per thousand. PAMPHLET. 1. Democracy and Voluntary Service. A Speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. Viscount Haldane of Cloan. 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