Ex Libris C. K. OGDEN < THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOHN PHILPOT CURRAN, MASTER OF THE ROLLS IN IRELAND, OS THE LATE TERY INTERESTING FOURTH EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS. LONDON: PRINTED FOR I.ONGMAX, Ht'HST, REES, ORME, AND BROMX, PAl'tRNOSTKR. IIOW. 1U15. E. Blackader, Printer, Took** Court, Chancery Lane, London. DA PREFACE C1AH 11 IS TO THE FIRST EDITION. JLT was formerly imagined that the study of the English law from its nature rendered its pro- fessors incapable of eloquence. Hume seems to have been a convert to the opinion; and though in one of his essays he al- most prophecies, that at a future day eloquent orators would arise in the British Senate; yet with respect to the bar he does not even insinuate a similar prediction. At that time the notion ap- peared sanctioned by experience, and eloquent barristers not having previously existed, the thing was deemed impossible. The period of an Erskine and a Curran* will be hereafter consi- dered a new sera in the eloquence of the bar of these kingdoms. Before their time the publica- tion of the state trials exhibits nothing of the orator in the pleadings of the lawyers; even the * Dunning and Burgh preceded them and were for a short time their contemporaries ; they were as inferior to these as Cotta and Hortensius to Cicero, a 2 cause l PREFACE. cause of the seven bishops, on the event of which depended the liberties of England, could not ex- cite energy in their advocates. Their speeches are excellent in legal reasoning: they have no pretension to eloquencet The alteration of the law, at the revolution, by permitting an address to a jury in cases of high treason, enlarged the field for the barrister. Notwithstanding which, in the numerous prosecutions of the adherents of the pretender, the counsel for the accused were insensible to the valuable privilege, and their languid defences would warrant the con- clusion, that the magnitude of the crime with \vhich the client was charged, extinguished the talents of his advocate,- and deprived him of the benefit afforded by the legislature. The genius of Erskine, after nearly the lapse of a century, called forth that inestimable statute into the full vigour of operation. On the trial of lord George Gordon, he seized the opportunity, and with honour to himself and advantage to his country laid the foundation of that professional rank and character, which he has always so ably a.nd inde- pendently maintained. It is much to be regretted that Mr. Erskine J s speeches as an advocate have not yet been pub- lished in a separate volume. They are only to. be found in the printed reports of the trials in which he was engaged. And from the difficulty which the editor of the present volume expe- rienced in collecting those of Mr. Curran, it is probable PREFACE. Ill probable in a few years to procure Mr. Erslvine's may be impossible.* From a similar neglect, few memorials are now to be had of the professional eloquence of Dunning* And of the forensic exer- tions of Burgh, nothing remains except an imper- fect note of the speech he delivered at the bar of the Irish house of lords in theValentia cause. To prevent the same fate attending those efforts of the talents of Mr. Curran, the memorials of which time has not yet destroyed, the editor gives this volume to the public. It appears under the dis- advantage of being neither revised nor corrected by Mr. Curran himself. His professional avo- cations would have prevented him from yielding to such an application, had it been made; and had he even enjoyed leisure for the task, it is more than probable, the modesty of genius, which always under-values its own productions, would have dictated a refusal. The editor determined not to request, what he apprehended would not have been granted. This collection is therefore offered to the public, extracted from the printed ephemeral reports of the trials in which the speeches were delivered. Mr. Curran is respon- sible neither for this publication nor for its de- merits. And the editor has studiously avoided the alteration of the most apparent inaccuracies, from the indelicacy that would attend encroach- ing on the privilege which should be left to every * Since the second edition of this work appeared, Mr Erskine's speeches have been published, public IV PREFACE. public man, of correcting his own production, if at any time he should be disposed to exert it. His defences of Finney and Bond were consi- dered by the bar as his ablest performances at the state trials of the year 1798. But unfortunate- ly, the imperfect reports, which from accident or design were given to the public, are rather memorandums of facts, than specimens of the talents of the advocate. If better could have been procured, the public should have had them. The- anonymous editor of the volume of Ed- mund Burke's parliamentary speeches, which appeared long before the edition of his works, sanctioned by himself, did not labour under the same disadvantage. Each of them had been pre- viously sent into the world, touched and re- touched by the orator himself into the highest state of polish and improvement. Perhaps, the anxiety of finish is too apparent, and notwith- standing many fine strokes of the sublime, they are rather elegant political essays, than eloquent harangues. The orations of Cicero are come down to us in a state much superior to what they were then delivered, and it is clearly ascer- tained that the one against Verres, that for Milo, and the second Phillippic, are not those which were spoken at the time, but the compo- sitions of subsequent retirement and study. And if our Irish advocate, in the period of his old age, in that interval' between finishing the business ; and the board i aldermen. spect 14 pect to be protected by panegyric or avenged by invective ; I shall therefore treat those sallies of the learned gentleman's imagination as I would the flights of their doves, they come abroad only animo revertendi, and ought to be suffered to return unmolested to their owners. The right of Mr. Howison is confessed by the counsel for his opponents to be warranted by the letter of the law. The mayor and aldermen sent down Mr. James; he was rejected by the commons, who sent to request that another might be sent down; the board did not send down another, but demanded a reason for the re- jection of Mr. James, which by the letter of the act they were certainly not warranted in doing* But it is said that by the sound construction of that law, the commons have a right to reject only for good cause, and that having refused to assign such cause, they have been guilty of de- fault which has transferred the sole right of election to the lord mayor and aldermen, who have accordingly elected Mr. James. Lord Chancellor. The question here is, " can " a mere right of rejection or approbation su- " persede a right of election.*' Mr. Curran. -If I can satisfy this board that that is not the question, I trust I shall be heard with patience as to what I conceive to be the question. I say 15, I say, my lords, that is not the question; because, 1st. The mode and the rights of election in this case turn not upon my general doctrine of the common law, but upon an express statute, which statute would never have been made, had it not been intended by the legislature to pre- scribe rules of direction, different from those of the common law. 2dly, The rule alluded to relates to offices in corporations, as in the case cited, who have a naked authority to admit, but can reject only for a plain defect of right in the candidate, and who, if a mandamus is directed to him requiring him to admit, must return a legal cause of his disapprobation, that the truth of the fact, or the validity of the cause may be duly tried. But there is clearly no analogy between such an officer and the great body of the commons of this city. 1st. That officer has no elective authority whatsoever; it is admitted that the act gives to the commons at least a concurrent elective con- trol, and, if the mayor and aldermen " make default," an exclusive right to elect, which shall be " valid to all intents and purposes!" 2dly. That officer has a sort of judicial power, which is well placed in a single permanent indi- vidual, who is capable of, and responsible for the is the exercise of a judicial power; but it would be monstrous to give a judicial power to a fluctu- ating multitude; for they cannot be presumed capable of exercising it, nor could they be re- sponsible for such exercise by any course of law; for, suppose a mandamus directed to them re- quiring them to approve, how is it possible to make any true return to such writ? How can any man assign a cause for that rejection which the law requires to be by ballot, and consequently secret? Or, suppose a party of the commons are practised upon to return a cause, and that de- signedly an invalid one, how shall the residue of the commons be able to justify themselves by alleging the true and valid cause of their disapprobation? To try it therefore by such a rule is to try it by a rule clearly having no general analogy to the subject, nor even a possible application, ex- cept so far only as it begs the question. My lords, it is absurd to ask how a simple power of approbation or rejection for cause, shall be controlled, unless it is first determined whether the commons have that simple power only, or whether they have, what I think ^they cleary have under the statute, a peremptory right of approving or rejecting without any control whatsoever. If they have but a simple right to reject for cause, and ought to have assigned such cause wider under the law, they have been guilty of a default, and the sole right to elect devolves to the board of aldermen, who, of course, have duly elected. If they are not bound to assign such a reason, manifestly the aldermen have acted against law, and by their default have lost this power, and the commons have duly elected Mr. Howison. Now, my lords, in examining this question, you must proceed by the ordinary rule of con- struction, applicable alike to every statute; that of expounding it by the usual acceptation and natural context of the words in which it is con- ceived. Do the words then, my lords, or the natural context of this act, describe a limited power of rejecting only for cause to be assigned, or a peremptory power of rejecting without any- such cause? says the act, " If it shall happen " that the commons shall reject or disapprove:" The law describes this accidental rejection in lan- guage most clearly applicable to the acts of men assembled, not as judges, but as electors, not to judge by laws which they have never learned, but to indulge their affections, or their caprice; and therefore justly speaks of a rejection, not the result of judgment but of chance. " If it shall happen that they shall reject or " disapprove :" my lords, you cannot say these words are synonymous; in acts every word must have its meaning if possible; " To reject" con- tra-distinguished to " disapprove" is to reject c by 18 by an act of the will; to disapprove, supposes some act of the judgment also, The act then clearly gives a right of rejecting, distinct from disapprobation, which by no possi- bility can be other than a peremptory right without limit or control. But here, if a reason must be had, the law Tvo-uld naturally prescribe some mode of having it demanded: this, however, unluckily cannot be done without a direct violation of the act, which enjoins, that the two bodies shall " sit 4< apart, and by themselves as heretofore;" but at least it might have left the board of aldermen the means of making a silent struggle for the approbation of their favourite candidate, by sending him down again for reconsideration. But, on the contrary, the law is express, that "if the commons shall happen to reject or dis- ** approve the first," they must then proceed to send down the name, not of him, but of another, rand so on. How long, my lords? Until a good reason shall be assigned for the rejection of the first? No, my lords, it is " until the commons " shall approve osome one person, so sent down;" and to this right of rejection, which the law has supposed might happen so often, the law has opposed the limit of a single proviso only, ap- plicable enough to a peremptory right of rejec- tion, but singular indeed, if applied to rejection for cause; " provided always, that such election " into 19 *' into the said office of lord mayor shall be of " some person from among the aldermen, and " that the commons shall approve of some one " person so elected and returned to them for their " approbation." A rejection without cause to be assigned, being a mere popular privilege, may be limited in its extent by reasons of expediency; but a judicial power of rejecting for legal cause cannot be so controlled without the grossest ab- surdity. It is like a peremptory challenge, which is given to a prisoner by the indulgence of the law, and may be therefore restricted within rea- sonable bounds. But a challenge for cause is given of common right, and must be allowed as often as it shall be found to exist, even though the criminal should remain for ever untried, and the crime for ever unpunished. Permit me now, my lords, to try this con- struction contended for by another test. Let us put it into the form of a proviso, and see how it accords with the proviso, which you find ac- tually expressed: " Provided always, that the " commons shall be obliged to approve of the " first person whose name shall be sent down to " them, unless they shall assign good legal cause " for their rejection." The proviso expressed is, * Provided that they shall approve," not of the first person, " but of some one person so elect- " ed." Can any thing be more obvious than the inconsistency of two such provisoes? c 2 Give 20 Give me leaVe, my lords, to compare this sup- posed proviso with the enacting part of the sta- tute. It says, that if the first person sent down be rejected, the lord mayor and aldermen shall " then proceed to elect another and send down ** his name;" but if this supposed proviso were to make a part of the act, they would not be ob- liged to send down " another name," but would be authorized to insist upon the claim of the first candidate, by demanding a reason for his rejection. This supposed proviso) therefore, and of course this superinduced construction, are directly incompatible both with the body and the proviso of the statute itself. But see further, my lords, what you do by such a construction ; you declare that the benefit of this statute, which is given expressly to the commons, is given upon a tacit condition, by the breach of which that benefit is utterly for- feited. Do you think, my lords, you shall a nerally to all statutes, that is, of seeking for the meaning of the legislature in the ordinary and natural context of the words they have * This would really be the case, supposing the act of par-. liament had confined the right of the privy council to disap- prove, and that of the common council to reject, to the legal cause of incapacity, and the privy council claimed for itself an unqualified power of disapproving, while it denied to the common council a similar power of rejecting. thought 25 thought proper to adopt;, and this, I thought, I might do with still more confidence in a law, professedly made for the direction of men unac- quainted with legal difficulty, unversed in the subtilty of legal distinction, and acting in a situ- ation which precludes them from the advantage of all legal assistance, but I am aware that what hath been satisfactory to my mind, hath not been so to some of your lordships. I feel myself, therefore, obliged to enter upon a more minute examination of this statute, upon principles and circumstances peculiar to itself. I am sorry, my lords, to trespass upon your patience ; but I am speaking upon a subject, in which if I do not succeed, the people of this country will have lost what is of infinitely more value than anytime, however precious, that may be wasted in their defence. This act, my lords, professes to be a remedial act, and as such must be construed according to the rules peculiar to remedial laws : that is, in three points of view; first, the former state of the law; secondly, the mischief of such former state ; and thirdly, the remedy proposed for the cure of that mischief. As to the first point: at the time of this statute the lord mayor and aldermen exercised the exclu- sive power of election to the chief magistracy, "without any interference of the commons. The immediate 26 immediate [mischief of such a constitution, with respect to the metropolis itself, I have touched upon before ; the people were borne down; the magistracy was depraved; the law was relaxed, and the public tranquillity at an end. These mischiefs were more than enough to induce the citizens of Dublin to call loudly, as they did, upon the justice of the legislature for parliamentary re- dress. But the w r isdom of that legislature formed an estimate of the mischief from considerations that probably did not enter into the minds of the contending parties ; namely, from the then state of Ireland as an individual, and as a connected country; as an individual depressed in every thing essential to the support of political or civil inde- pendency; depressed in commerce, in opulence, and in knowledge ; distracted by that civil and reli- gious discord, suggested by ignorance and bigotry, and inflamed by the artifice of a cruel policy, which divided in order to destroy, con scions that liberty could be banished only by disunion, and that a generous nation could not be completely stripped of her rights, until one part of the people was deluded into the foolish and wicked idea that its freedom and consequence could be preserved or supported only by the slavery or depression of the other. In such a country it was peculiarly necessary to establish at least some few incorpo- rated bodies, which might serve as great reposi- tories of popular strength : our ancestors learned from Great Britain to understand their use and their importance j in that country they hftd been hoarded 27 hoarded up with the wisest forecast, and pre- served with a religious reverence, as an unfailing resource against those times of storm, in which it is the will of Providence that all human affairs should sometimes fluctuate; and as such, they had been found at once a protection to the people and a security to the crown. My lords, it is by the salutary repulsion of popular privilege that the power of the monarchy is supported in its sphere; withdraw that support and it falls in ruin upon the people, but it falls in a ruin no less fatal to itself, by which it is shivered to pieces. Our ancestors must therefore have been sensible that the enslaved state of the corporation of the metropolis was a mischief that extended its effects to the remotest borders of the island. In the con- federated strength, and the united councils of great cities, the freedom of the country may find a safe- guard which extends itself even to the remote in- habitant who never put his foot within their gates. But, my lords, how must these considerations have been enforced by a view of Ireland, as a con- nected country, deprived as it was of almost all the advantages of an hereditary monarch : the father of his people residing at a distance, and the pater- nal beam reflected upon his children through such a variety of mediums, sometimes too languidly to warm them, sometimes so intense! vas to consume; a succession of governors differing from one ano- ther in their tempers, in their talents, and in their virtue?, and of course in their systems of adminis- tration; 41 tration ; unprepared in general for rule by any previous institution, and utterly unacquainted with the people they were to govern, and with the men through whose agency they were to act. Sometimes, my lords, 'tis true, a rare individual has appeared among us, as if sent by the bounty of Providence in compassion to human miseries, marked by that dignified simplicity of manly cha- racter, which is the mingled result of an enlight- ened understanding, and an elevated integrity; commanding a respect that he laboured not to in- spire; and attracting a confidence which it was impossible he could betray.* It is but eight years, my lords, since we have seen such a man amongst us, raising a degraded country from the condition of a province to the rank and consequence of a people, worthy to be the ally of a mighty empire, forming the league that bound her to Great Bri- tain, on the firm and honourable basis of equal li- berty and a common fate, " standing and falling *' with the British empire;*' and thus stipulting for that freedom which alone contains the principle of her political life, in the covenant of her foederal connection. But how short is the continuance of those auspicious gleams of public sunshine! how soon are they passed, and perhaps for ever! In what rapid and fatal revolution has Ireland seen the talents and the virtues of such men give place to a succession of sordid parade, and empty pre- tension, of bloated promise, and lank perform- * The duke of Portland, under whose adminstration Ire- land obtained a free constitution. ance, 2? ance, of austere hypocrisy and peculating eco- nomy!* Hence it is, my lords, that the admini- stration of Ireland so often presents to the reader of her history, the view not of a legitimate go- vernment, but rather of an encampment in the country of a barbarous enemy ; where the object of the invader is not dominion but conquest; where he is of course obliged to resort to the corrupting of clans, or of single individuals, pointed out to his notice by public abhorrence, and recommended to his confidence only by a treachery so rank and consummate, as precludes all possibility of their return to private virtue or to public reliance, and, therefore only, put into authority over a wretched country, condemned to the torture of all that petulant unfeeling as- perity, with which a narrow and malignant mind will bristle in unmerited elevation; condemned to be betrayed, and disgraced, and exhausted by the little traitors that have been suffered to. nestle and to grow within it, making it at once the source of their grandeur, and the victim ofiheir vices, reducing it to the melancholy necessity of * The. duke of Rutland and the marquis of Buckingham \jnickly followed His Grace. The first was marked by a love of dissipation, and undignified extravagance. The Marquis, upon his arrival in Ireland, led the country to expect a general retrenchment in the public expenses. This expectation was terminated by the creation of fourteen new places for the pur- pose of parliamentary influence, countervailed indeed by a cur- tailment of the fuel allowed to the old soldiers of the royal hos- pital by the public bounty, and by abortive speculations upon the practicability of making one pair of boots serve for two troopers. gup- .supporting their consequence, and of sinking under their crimes, like the lion perishing by the poison of a reptile that finds shelter in the mane of the noble animal, while it is stinging him to death. By such considerations as these, my lords might the makers of this statute have estimated the danger to which the liberty of Ireland was ex- posed; and of course the mischief of having that metropolis enslaved, by whose independency alone those dangers might be averted. But in this estimate they had much more than tlieory, or the observation of foreign events to shew them, that the rights of the soverign and of the subject were equally embarked in a common fate with that independency. When in the latter part ot the reign of queen Anne, an infernal conspiracy was formed, by the then chancellor (sir Constantine Phipps,) and the privy council, to defeat that happy succession which for three generations hath shed its auspicious influence upon these realms, they commenced their diabolical project with an attack upon the corporate rights of the citizens of Dublin, by an attempt to impose a disaffected lord mayor upon them contrary to the law. Fortunately, my lords, this wicked conspi- racy was defeated by the virtue of the people; I will read to your lordships the resolutions of acorn- mittee of the house of commons on the subject. " First, resolved, that it is the opinion of *' this committee, that soon after the arrival of " sit- 31 " sir Constant! ne Phipps, late lord chancellor, ** and one of the lords justices in this kingdom, ** in the year 1710, a design was formed and car- ** ried on to subvert the -constitution and free- ** dom of elections of magistrates of corpora- *' tions within the new rules, in order to procure " persons to be returned for members of p'arlia- '* ment, disaffected to the settlement of the '* crown, or his majesty and his royal issue." " 2d. Resolved, that it is the opinion of this " committee, that, in pursuance of that design, " indirect and illegal methods were taken to sub- " vert the ancient and legal course of electing " magistrates in the city of Dublin. " 3d. Resolved, that it is the opinion of this " committee, that the said sir Constantine Phipps, " and those engaged in that evil design, in less *' than five months, in the year 1711, procured " six aldermen duly elected lord mayors, and " fourteen substantial citizens duly elected she- " riffs, and well known to be zealously affect- " ed to the protestant succession, and members " of the established church, to be disapproved, 4 ' on the pretence that alderman Robert Constan- " tine, as senior alderman, who had not been *' mayor, had a right to be elected lord mayor. 4th. Resolved, that it is the opinion of this " committee, that the senior alderman, who had " not served as mayor, had not any right by " charter 52 *' charter, usuage, or by law, in force in the city of " Dublin, as such, to be elected lord mayor. " 5th. Resolved, that it is the opinion of this " committee, that the said sir Constantino " Phipps, and his accomplices, being unable to 4t support the pretended right of seniority, did, 4c in the year 1713, set up a pretended custom " or usage for the mayor in being, to nominate " three persons to be in election for lord mayor, " one of whom the aldermen were obliged to " choose lord mayor." Lord Chancellor. Can you think, Mr. Cur- ran, that these resolutions of a committee of the house of commons can have any relation whatsoever to the present subject? Mr. Curran. I hope, my lords, you will think they have much relation indeed to the subject before you. The weakness of the city was the mischief which occasioned the act of parlia- ment in question ; to give the city strength, was the remedy. You must construe the law so as to suppress the former, and advance the latter. What topics then, my lords, can bear so directly upon the point of your enquiry, as the perils to be ap- prehended from that weakness, and the advan- tages to be derived from that strength? What ar- gument then can be so apposite, as that which is founded on undeniable facts? Or what autho- rity so cogent as the opinipn of the representa- tive 33 live wisdom of the nation, pronounced upon those facts, and transmitted to posterity upon record? On grounds like those, for I can con- ceive no other, do I suppose, the rights of the city were defended in the time to which I have alluded ; for it appears by the records which I have read, that the city was then heard by her counsel; she was not denied the form of defence, though she was denied the benefit of the law. In this very chamber did the chancellor and judges sit, Avith all the gravity and affected attention to arguments in favour of that liberty and those rights which they had conspired to destroy. But to what end, my lords, offer argument to such men? A little and a peevish mind may be ex- asperated, but how shall it be corrected by refu- tation? How fruitless would it have been to re- present to that wretched chancellor, that he was betraying those rights which he was sworn to maintain, that he was involving a government in disgrace; and a kingdom in panic and conster- nation; that lie was violating every sacred duty, and every solemn engagement that bound him to himself, his country, his sovereign, and his God! Alas, my lords, by what argument could any man hope to reclaim or dissuade a mean, illiberal, and unprincipled minion of authority, induced by his profligacy to undertake, and bound by his avarice and vanity to persevere? He would pro- bably have replied to the most unanswerable ar- guments, by some curt, contumelious and tin- meaning apophthegm, delivered with the fretful smile of irritated self-sufficiency and disconcerted D arrogance; 34 arrogance; or, even if he could be dragged by Ins fears to a consideration of the question, by what miracle could the pigmy capacity of a stunted pedant be enlarged to a reception of the subject? The endeavour to approach it would have only removed him to a greater distance than he was before: as a little hand that strives to grasp a mighty globe is thrown back by the re-action of its own effort to comprehend. It may be given, to a Halej or a Hardwicke, to discover and re- tract a mistake; the errors of such men are only specks that arise for a moment upon the surface of a splendid luminary; consumed by its heat, or irradiated by its light, they soon purge and dis- appear; but the perverseness of a mean and nar- row intellect, are like the excrescences that grow upon a body naturally cold and dark: no fire to waste them, and no ray to enlighten, they assi- milate and coalesce with those qualities so con- genial to their nature, and acquire an incorrigible permanency in the union with kindred frost and kindred opacity. Nor indeed, my lords, except where the interest of millions can be affected by the folly or the vice of an individual, need it be much regretted, that, to things not worthy of being made better, it hath not pleased Provi- dence to afford the privilege of improvement. Lord Chancellor. Surely, Mr. Curran, a gentleman of your eminence in your profession must see that the conduct of former privy coun- cils has nothing to do with the question before us. The question lies in the narrowest compass; it 35 it is merely whether the commons have a right of arbitrary and capricious rejection, or are ob- liged to assign a reasonable cause for their dis- approbation. To that point you have a right to be heard; but I hope you do not mean to lecture the council.* Mr. Curran. I mean, my lords, to speak to the case of my clients, and to avail myself of every topic of defence which I conceive appli- cable to that case. I am not speaking to a dry point of law, to a single judge, and on a mere forensic subject; I am addressing a very large auditory, consisting of co-ordinate members, of whom the far greater number is not versed in law: were I to address such an audience on the interests and rights of a great city, and address them in the hackneyed style of a pleader, I should make a very idle display of profession, with very little information to those I address, or benefit to those on whose behalf I have the ho- nour to be heard. I am aware, my lords, that truth is to be sought only by slow and painful progress; I know also that error is in its nature flippant and compendious, it hops with airy and fastidious levity over proofs and arguments, and perches upon assertion, which it calls conclusion. * From the frequent interruptions experienced by Mr. Cur- ran in this part of his speech, it would appear that lord Clare perceived that the description of sir Constantino Phipps was intended lor himself. Those who best knew his lordship can judge of the justness of the representation. D 2 Here 36 Here the lord chancellor moved to have the chamber cleared; after some time the doory were opened.* My lords, I was regretting the necessity which I am under of trespassing so much on that in- dulgent patience with which I feel I am so honoured; let me not however, my lords, be thought so vainly presumptuous as to suppose that condescension bestowed merely upon me; I feel how much more you owe it to your own dignity and justice, and to a full conviction that you could not be sure of deciding with justice, if you did not hear with temper. As to my part, my lords, I am aware that no man can convince by arguments which he can- not clearly comprehend, and make clearly intel- ligible to others; I consider it therefore, not only an honour, but an advantage to be stopped when I am not understood. So much confidence have I in the justice of my cause, that I wish any noble lord in this assembly would go with me step by step through the argument; one good effect would inevitably result, I should either have the honour of convincing the noble lord, or the public would, by my refutation, be satisfied that they * During the exclusion of strangers, it was understood that lord Clare moved the council, that Mr. Curran should be re- strained by their lordships' authority from proceeding farther in that line of argument he \vas then pursuing; but his lord- *hip being over-ruled, Mr, Curran proceeded, are 87 are in the wrong: with this wish, and, if I may presume to say so, with this hope, I will proceed to a further examination of the subject. It is a rule of law, that all remedial acts shall be so construed as to suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy; now a good cause of rejec- tion can mean only a legal cause; that is, a cause working an incapacity in the person executing a corporate franchise ; that is, of course, such a cause as would justify a judgment of ouster against him by a court of law, if actually in pos- session of such franchise; or warrant his amoval, by an act of the corporation itself. There are three sorts of offences for which a corporator may be amoved; first, such as have no immediate re- lation to his office, but are in themselves of so infamous a nature as to render the offender unfit to exercise any public franchise ; secondly, such as are only against his oath, and the duty of his office as a corporator, and amount to a breach of the tacit condition annexed to his franchise or office; the third sort of offence for which an officer or corporator may be displaced is of a mixed nature, as being an offence, not only against the duty of his office, but also a matter indictable at common law. For the first species of offences, a corpora- tion can in no case amove without a previous indictment and conviction in a court of com- mon law. For the other offences, it has a power of trial, as well as a motion. To 38 To this let me add, that the office of alderman is as much a corporate office as that of lord mayor, and the legal cause that disqualifies the one must equally disqualify the other j but the person chosen to be mayor must be an alderman at the time of his election, and the law, of course, cannot suppose a man, actually in possession of a cor- porate franchise to labour under any corporate or legal incapacity : does it not then, my lords, follow irresistibly, that the law cannot intend to confine the power of rejection, which it expressly gives, to a legal incapacity, which without the grossest absurdity it cannot suppose to exist? But let us assume, for argument's sake, how- ever in defiance of common sense, that the legis- lature did suppose it possible, that such an inca- pacity might exist; what new privilege does a power of rejection for such cause give to the com- mons? And it is admitted by the learned counsel, *' that this statute made a great enlargement, in- " deed, in their powers.'* Before the act was made, any corporator, subject to a personal dis- qualification, was removeable by the ordinary course of law; to give the commons, therefore, only a power of preventing a man, legally dis- qualified, from serving a corporate office, was giving them nothing which they had not before. What sort of construction then, my lords, must that be which makes the legislature fall into the ridiculous absurdity of giving a most super- fluous S9 fluous remedy for a most improbable mischief? And yet it is not in a nursery of children, nor a bedlam of madmen; but it is in an assembly, the most august that this country knows of, that I am obliged to combat this perversion of sense and of law. In truth, my lords, I feel the de- gradation of gravely opposing a wild chimera, that could not find a moment's admission into any instructed or instituted mind; but I feel also, that they who stoop to entertain it only from the necessity of exposing and subduing it, cannot at least be the first objects of that degradation. Let me then, my lords, try this construction contended for, by another test. If the act must be construed so as to say that the commons can reject only for a legal cause to be assigned, it must be so construed, as to provide for all that is inseparably incident, and indispensably neces- sary to carrying that construction into effect : that is, it must provide a mode, in which four things may be done: First, a mode in which such cause shall be assigned. Secondly, a mode in which the truth of the fact of such cause shall be admitted or contro- verted. Thirdly, a mode by which the truth of such fact, if controverted, shall be tried; and, Fourthly 40 Fourthly, a mode by which the validity of such cause, when ascertained in fact, shall be judged of in law. i Judl ,'io av/oirf VTJUUQO tiiit indt i u^r:,; :K.c To suppose a construction requiring a reason to be assigned, without providing for these in- evitable events, would be not the error of a lawyer, but would sink beneath the imbecility of an infant. Then, my lords, as to tl*e first point : how is the cause to be assigned? The law expressly pre- cludes the parties from any means of conference by enacting, that they shall " sit apart and by " themselves." The same law says, that " the ff rejection or disapprobation shall be by ballot " cxnly and not otherwise." Now when the law gives the commons a power of rejecting by bal- lot, it gives each individual a protection against the enmity which he would incur from the re- jected candidate ; but if you say that the rejec- tion shall be null and void,, unless fortified by the assignment of legal cause, see, my lords, what you labour to effect : under this supposed construction, you call upon the voters who reject by a secret vote, to relinquish that pro- tection of secrecy, which the law expressly gives them; unless, my lords, the sagacity, that lias broached this construction can find out some way, by which the voter can justify why he voted against a particular candidate, without disclosing also, that he did in fact vote against that candidate. Let 41 Let me, however suppose that inconsistency reconciled, and follow the idea. The name of alderman James is sent down, and the commons certify his rejection ; an am- bassador is then sent to demand of the commons the cause of this rejection; they answer, ' Sir we have rejected by ballot, and they who have voted against him are protected by the law from discovering how they voted* to which the am- bassador replies, ' very true, gentlemen, but you mistake their worships' question, they do not desire you to say who rejected Mr. James, for in that they well know they could not be war- ranted by law ; they only desire to know why a majority has voted against Mr. alderman James.' This, my lords, I must suppose to be a mode of argument not unbecoming the sagacity of al- dermen, since I find it gives occasion to a seri- ous question before so exalted an assembly as I have now the honour to address; I will, therefore, suppose it conclusive with the commons; a legal reason must be assigned for their rejection. Pray, my lords, who is to assign that legal rea- son ? Is it the minority who voted for the rejected candidate? I should suppose not; it must be then the majority who voted for the rejection. Pray, my lords, who are they? By what means shall they be discovered? But I will suppose that every member of the commons is willing to adopt the rejection, and to 42 to assign a cause for it. One man, suppose a friend of the rejected candidate, alleges a cause of a rejection in which he did not in reality con- cur, and which cause he takes care shall be in- valid and absurd; as for instance, the plumpness of the person of Mr* James;* if he did not vote for the rejection, he can have no right to assign a cause for it ; the question then is, did he vote for the rejection? I beg leave, my lords to know how this is to be tried? But suppose, to get rid of a difficulty, other- wise insurmountable, it shall be agreed in direct contradiction to common sense and justice, that everymemberofthe commons shall be authorised to assign a legal cause of rejection; (and in truth if he may assign one he may assign more than one, if he is disposed to do so;) suppose then, my lords, that one hundred and forty-six causes are assigned, for such may be the number, though no one member assigns more than a single cause; if they maybe all assigned, they must be all dis- posed of according to law; but which shall be first put into a course of trial? How shall the right of precedence be decided? But I will sup- pose that also settled, and a single cause is as- signed ; that cause must be a legal disability of some of the kinds which I have already mention- ed; for there cannot be any other. The cause * The person of the alderman is of the full regulation di- mensions. He might well say of himself M'ilh relation to his brother justices, " Quorum pars magna fui." then 43 then assigned, in order to prevail, must be true in fact and valid in law, and amount to a legal incapacity. And here, let me observe, that a legal cause of incapacity, as it can be founded only on the commission of an infamous crime, or of some fact contrary to the duty and oath of a corporator, must, if allowed, imprint an indeli- ble stigma on the reputation of the man so re- jected. I ask, then, is the accusation of malig- nity, or credulity, or folly to be taken for true? Or shall the person have an opportunity of de- fending himself against the charge? The cause for which he can be rejected is the same with the cause for which he can be disfranchised; they arc equally causes working an incapacity to hold a corporate franchise, their consequences are the same to the person accused; loss of franchise, and loss of reputation. The person accused there- fore, if by the construction of a statute he is ex- posed to accusation, must by the same construc- tion be entitled to every advantage in point of de- fence, to which a person so accused is intitled by the general law of the land. What, then, are those advantages to which a corporator is enti- tled, w r hen charged with any fact as a foundation of incapacity or disfranclusemcnt? He must have due and timely notice of the charge, that he may prepare for his defence; every corporator must have timely and express notice of the specific charge against him, that nothing may be done by surprise on either side. Now, my lords, you condescend to observe, that the time sup- 44 posed by this statute for the whole business of election is a single day; is it then possible to give every member of the board of aldermen, for each of them may be a candidate, due notice of every charge of legal disability that may be possibly made against them? Or if it be not, as it mani- festly is not, will you, my lords, create a con- struction which exposes any subject of the land to trial without notice, and to conviction and forfeiture without that opportunity of defence to which he is entitled of natural justice and common right? But I will suppose that your lordships may adopt this construction, however it may super- sede the right of the subject and the law of the land; I will suppose that the candidate may be accused at a moment's warning Is bare accusa- tion to hold the place of conviction? Shall the alderman, whose name is sent down, and who is rejected for an alleged personal disability, have an opportunity of defending himself against the charge of the commons ? He cannot have the pri- vilege of the meanest felon, of standing before his accuser, for, as an alderman, he must remain with his brethren, " separate and apart by them- " selves." He cannot then plead for himself in person, nor by the law can he depute an attorney to defend in his name, for the commons are not authorised to admit any strangers amongst them. It is therefore utterly out of his power to deny the charge against him, however false in fact it may happen to be. But 45 But I will suppose, if you please, that the charge is denied, and issue joined upon the fact ; I beg leave to ask, if this supposed construction provides any mode of calling the jury, or sum- moning the witnesses, on whose testimony, and on whose verdict a citizen is to be tried upon a charge of corporate or legal culpability? But let me, my lords, with the profoundest respect, press this wicked and silly nonsense a little farther: suppose the charge admitted in fact, but the va- lidity of it denied; who, my lords, is to judge of it by virtue of this construction? A point of law is to be decided between the lord mayor and aldermen who have chosen, and the commons who have rejected. What is the consequence? If the lord mayor and aldermen decide, they judge in their own cause; if the commons de- cide, they judge in their own cause, contrary to the maxim " Nemo judex in proprid causa;" can you then, my lords, think yourselves war- ranted in adopting a construction, which sup- poses a legal charge to be made, in which the accused has not the advantage of notice, or the means of defence, or of legal trial, and on which if any judgment be pronounced, it must be pro- nounced by the parties in the cause, in direct opposition to the law of the land? But, my lords, it seems all these defects in point of accusation, of defence, of trial and of judgment, as the ingenious gentlemen have ar- gued, are cured by the magical virtue of those 46 beans, by whose agency the whole business must be conducted. If the law had permitted a single word to be exchanged between the parties, the learned coun- sel confess that much difficulty might arise in the events which I have stated ; but they have found out that all these difficulties are prevented or re- moved by the beans and the ballot. According to these gentlemen, we are to suppose one of those unshaven demagogues, whom the learned counsel have so humourously described, rising in the com- mons when the name of alderman James is sent down ; he begins by throwing out a torrent of se- ditious invective against the servile profligacy and liquorish venality of the board of aldermen this he does by beans: having thus previ- ously inflamed the passions of his fellows, and somewhat exhausted his own, his judgment col- lects the reins that floated on the neck of hi& imagination, and he becomes grave, compressed, .sententious, and didactic; he lays down the law of personal disability, and corporate criminality, and corporate forfeiture, with great precision, with sound emphasis and good discretion, to the great delight and edification of the assembly and this he does by beans. He then proceeds, iny lords, to state the specific charge against the unfortunate candidate for approbation, with all the artifice and malignity of accusation, scalding the culprit in tears of affected pity, bringing forward the blackness of imputed guilt through the 47 the varnish of stimulated commiseration; be- wailing the horror of his crime, that he may leave it without excuse ; and invoking the sym- pathy of his judges, that he may steel them against compassion and this, my lords, the un- shaved demagogue doth by beans. The accused doth not appear in person, for he cannot leave his companions, nor by attorney, for his attorney could not be admitted but he appears and de- fends by beans. At first, humble and deprecato- ry, he conciliates the attention of his judges to his defence, by giving them to hope that it may be without effect; he does not alarm them by any indiscreet assertion that the charge is false, but he slides upon them arguments to shew it impro- bable; by degrees, however, he gains upon the assembly, and denies and refutes, and recrimi- nates and retorts all by beans, until at last he challenges his accuser to a trial, which is accord- ingly had, in the course of which the depositions are taken, the facts tried, the legal doubts pro- posed and explained by beans; and in the same mariner the law is settled with an exactness and authority that remains a record of jurispru- dence, for the information of future ages; while at the same time the "harmony" of the metropolis is attuned by the marvellous temperament of jar- ring discord; and the " good will" of the citizens is secured by the indissoluble bond of mutual crimination, and reciprocal abhorrence. By this happy mode of decision, one hundred and 48 and forty-six causes of rejection (for of so many do the commons consist, each of whom must be entitled to allege a distinct cause) are tried in the course of a single day, with satisfaction to all parties. With what surprise and delight must the heart of the fortunate inventor have glowed, when he discovered those wonderful instruments of wisdom and of eloquence, which, without being obliged to commit the precious extracts of science, or persuasion, to the faithless and fragile vehicles of words or phrases, can serve every process of composition or abstraction of ideas, and every exigency of discourse or argumentation, by the resistless strength and infinite variety of beans, white or bl#ck, or boiled, or raw; displaying all the magic of their powers in the mysterious exertion; of dumb investigation, and mute dis- cussion; of speechless objection and tongue- tied refutation I Nor should it be forgotten, my lords, that this noble discovery does no little honour to the sagacity of the present age, by explaining a doubt that has for so many centuries perplexed the labour of philosophic enquiry ; and furnish- ing the true reason why the pupils of Pythago- ras were prohibited the use of beans : it cannot, I think, my lords, be doubted that the great au- thor of the metempsychosis found out that those mystic powers of persuasion, which vulgar na- turalists 40 turalists supposed to remain lodged in minerals^ or fossils, had really transmigrated into beans ; and he could not, therefore, but see that it would have been fruitless to preclude his disciples from mere oral babbling, unless he had also debarred them from the indulgence of vegetable loquacity. My lords, I have hitherto endeavoured to shew, and I hope not without success, that this act of parliament gives to the commons a pe- remptory right of rejection; that the other con- struction gives no remedy whatsoever for the mischief which occasioned its being passed; and cannot by any possible course of proceeding be carried into etfect. I \vill take the liberty now of giving an answer to some objections relied upon by the counsel for Mr. James, and I will do it with a conciseness, not I trust dispropor- tioned to their importance. They say, that a peremptory rejection in the commons takes away all power whatsoever from the board of aldermen : to that I answer, that the fact and the principle is equally against them: the fact, because that board is the only body from which a lord mayor can be chosen ; and has therefore, the very great power, that results from exclusive eligibility; the principle, because if the argument be, that the lord mayor and aldermen ought to have some power in such election, by a parity of reason, so ought the commons, who, if they can reject only for a F. .legal 50 legal incapacity, will be ousted of all authority whatsoever in such election, and be reduced to a state of* disfranchisement by such a construction. The gentlemen say, that your lordships cah only enquire into the prima fade title, and that the claim of Mr. James is, prima Jacie, the better claim. I admit, my lords, that you are not compe- tent to pronounce any judgment that can bind the right. But give me leave to observe, first, that the question, upon which you yourselves have put this enquiry, is a question applicable only to the very right, and by no possibility ap- plicable to a prima faclt title. One of your lordships has declared the ques- tion to be, " Whether by the common law, a " mere power of approbation or rejection can " supersede a power of election?" If that ques- tion is warranted in assuming the fact, give me leave to say, that the answer to it goes directly to the right, and to nothing else; for if the commons are bound by law to assign a cause of rejection, and have not done so, Mr. James had clearly the legal right of election, and Mr. Howison has no right or title whatsoever. But I say further: The mode of your enquiry makes it ridiculous to argue, that you haVe not entered into any disquisition of the right: Why, 51 Why, my lords, examine witnesses on both sides? Why examine the books of the corporation? Why examine into every fact relating to the election ? I cannot suppose, my lords, that you en- quired into facts, upon which you thought your- selves incompetent to form any decision : I cannot suppose you to admit an extra judicial enquiry, by which the members of a corporation may be drawn into admission, that may expose them to the future danger of prosecution or dis- franchisement. I hope, my lords, I shall not be deemed so presumptuous, as to take upon me to say, why you have gone into these examinations ; it is not my province to justify your lordships' pro- ceedings: it stands upon your own authority; I am only answering an argument, and I an- swer it by shewing it inconsistent with that pro- ceeding. Let me, my lords, pursue the idea a little further. Are you only enquiring into a primit Jade title? What is a primd facie title? I conceive it to be a title, not which may possibly be found a good one upon future examination ; but, which is good and valid, and must prevail, unless it be opposed and defeated by another, which may possibly be adduced, but which does not then appear. So in an ejectment at law, for instance, F. 2 a plaintiff 52 a plaintiff must make a title, or he is non-suited. If he makes out a legal title m omnibus, the court declares it a prima facie title, that is, a title con- clusive as to the right, unless a better shall be shewn; and accordingly calls on the defendant to shew such better title if he can : the moment the defendant produces his title, the question of prima facie title is completely at an end; and the court has no longer any question to decide upon, but the very merits; and this for a plain reason: The question, whether prima facie a good title or not, is decided upon the single ground that no other title then appears with which the title shewn can be compared; in short, my lords, whether primti facie good, is a question confined only to the case of a single title, and cannot be applied, without the grossest absurdity, to a case where you have both the titles actually before you. It may be the question in case of a single return ; in case of a double return, as here, it cannot by any possibility be the question. But, my lords, let me carry this a little far- ther yet. You have both the titles before you. You have yourselves declared, that the question turns upon the construction of this act of parlia- ment, which enacts also, " That it shall be " deemed a public act, in all courts, and in all " places." Now it is contended, the construction of the act is prima facie, in favour of Mr. James. Mav 53 May I presume to ask, what does the prima Jade construction of a statute import? It must import, if it import any tiling, that meaning which, for aught then appearing, is true, but may possibly, because of something not then appearing, turn out not to be so. Now, no- thing can possibly be opposed to that primd facie construction, save the act itself. A primd Jade construction of a statute, therefore, can be no- thing but the opinion that rises in the mind of a man, upon a single reading of it, who does not choose to be at the trouble of reading it again. In truth, my lords, I should not have thought it necessary to descend to this kind of argumenta- tion, if it had not become requisite for me to do so, by an observation coming from one of your lordships.* " That the letter of the act would ** bear out the commons in their claim, but that " the sound construction might be a very dif- " ferent thing." I will, therefore, add but ano- ther word upon this subject: If a prima facie construction be sufficient to decide, and if the commons have the letter of the law in their favour, I would ask with the profoundest humi- lity, whether your lordships will give the sanc- tion of your high authority to a notion, that, in statutes made to secure the liberties of the people, the express words in which they are written shall not be at least a priwa facie evi- dence of their signification ? * Lord Clare. My 54 My lords, the learned counsel have been pleased to make a charge against the citizens of Dublin, " for their tests and their cavalcadings" on a late occasion; and they have examined witnesses in support of their accusation. It is true, my lords, the citizens did engage to the public and to one another, that they would not vote for any candidate for corporate office or popular representation, who had any place in the police establishment. But I would be glad to know by what law it is criminal in freemen .to pledge themselves to that conduct which they think indispensably necessary to the freedom of their country. The city of Dublin is bound to submit to whatever mode of defence shall be devised for her by law, while such law shall con- tinue unrepealed; but I would be glad to learn, by what law they are bound not to abhor the po- lice institution, expensive, and ineffectual, in- adequate to their protection, and dangerous to their liberty; and that they do think it so can- not be doubted. Session after session has the floor of the senate been covered with their pe- titions, praying to be relieved against it, as an oppressive, a corrupt, and therefore an exe- crable establishment. True it is also, my lords, they have been guilty of those triumphant processions, which the learned counsel have so heavily condemned. The virtue of the people stood forward to op- pose an attempt to seize upon their representa- t^on, 55 tion, by the exercise of a dangerous and uncon- stitutional influence, and it succeeded in the conflict; it routed and put to flight that corrup- tion, which sat, like an incubus, on the heart of the metropolis, chaining the current of its blood, and locking up every healthful function and energy of life. The learned counsel might have seen the city pouring out her inhabitants, as if to share the general joy of escaping from some great calamity, in mutual gratulation and public triumph.* But why does the learned counsel insist upon this subject before your lordships? Does he think such meetings illegal? He knows his profession too well, not to know the reverse. But does he think it competent to the lord lieutenant and council of Ireland to take cogni- zance of such facts, or to pronounce any opinion whatever concerning the privileges of the people? He must know it is not. Does he then mean that such things may be subjects of your resent- ment, though not of your jurisdiction? It would have been worth while, before that point had been pressed, to consider between what parties it must suppose the present contest to subsist. To call upon the government of the country to let their vengeance fall upon the people for their resistance of unconstitutional influence is surely * The cavalcadings here spoken of took place on the elec- tion of Mr. (j rattan and lord H. Fitzgerald, who had been returned for the city of Dublin in opposition to the court candidates, one of whom was aldermau Warren, then at the head of the police establishment. an 56 an appeal not very consistent with the virtuolis, impartiality of this august assembly. It is only for those who feel defeat, to cherish resentment^ or to think of vengeance. But suppose for a moment, (and there never .ought to be reason to suppose it) that the oppo- sition of the city had been directly to the views or the wishes of the government; why are you, therefore, called upon to seize its corporate rights into your hands., or to force an illegal magistrate upon it? Is it insinuated that it can be just to punish a want of complaisance, by an jict of lawless outrage and arbitrary power? Does the Briti3h constitution, my lords, know of such offences, or does it warrant this species of. tyrannical reprisal? And, my lords, if the injustice of it is without defence, what argu- ment can be offered in support of its prudence or policy? It was once the calamity of England to Jiave such an experiment made by the last of the Stuart?, and the last of that unhappy race because of such experiments. The several cor- porations of that country were stript of their charters : and wjiat was, the consequence ? I need not state them; they are notorious; } r et, my lords, there was a time when that sovereign was willing to relinquish what he had so weakly and wickedly undertaken; but^there is a time when concession comes too late to restore either public quiet, or public confidence, and when it amounts to nothing more than an acknowledg- ment 57 mcnt of injustice ; when the people must see, that it is only the screen behind which oppres- sion changes her attack from force to fraud, from the battery to the mine. See then, my lords, how such a measure comes recommended ; its principle injustice, its motive vengeance, its adoption sanctioned by the authority of a tyrant, or the example of a revolution, My lords, the learned counsel has made ano- ther observation which I cannot pass without re- mark; it is the last with which I shall trouble you. He says, the commons may apply to the law, and bring an information in quo "ucarranto against Mr. James, though you should give him your approbation; that is, my lords, your judg- ment does not bind the right, it only decides the possession of the office. To this I answer, that in this case, to decide on the possession is in fact to decide the contest ; and I found that answer on the high authority of the noble lord, who was pleased to say, that " when the city had spent three years in the king's bench, she would probably grow sick of the contest."* I was not surprised, my lords, to hear an expres- sion of that regret which must arise in every worthy mind, and which I am sure the noble lord sincerely felt, at the distress of a people, reduced to defend those rights which ought never to have been attacked, and to defend them jn a way by which they could not possibly suc- * The lord chancellor. ceed. 58 ceed. The truth is, as the noble lord has stated, the time of Mr. James's mayoralty would expire in a year, and the question of law could not be terminated in three ; the present contest, there- fore, cannot be decided by law. How then, my lords, is it to be decided? Are the people to sub- mit tamely to oppression, or are they to struggle for their liberties? I trust, my lords, you will think they have not done any thing so culpable as can justify the driving them to so calamitous a necessity; for fatal must that struggle be, in whatsoever country it shall happen, in which the liberties of a people can find no safety but in the efforts of vindictive virtue; fatal to* all parties, whatsoever may be the event. But, my lords, I feel this to be a topic on which it is neither my province nor my wish to expiate, and I leave it the more willingly, because I know that I have already trespassed very long upon your patience, and also, because I cannot relinquish an hope, that the decision of your lordships this day will be such as shall restore the tranquillity of the public mind, the mutual confidence be- tween the government and the people, and make it unnecessary for any man to pursue so painful a subject. The lord lieutenant and privy council confirmed the election of the commons, in the person of alder* man Hotvisonfor lord mayor. SPEECH SPEECH OF JOHN PHILPOT CURRAN, ESQ. ON MOVING THAT IT IS THE EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGE OP THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TO ORIGINATE MONF.Y BILLS. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1783, 31 R. CURRAN. While I reflect that the mo- tion I am now going to make is of the utmost im- portance to the honour, and even existence of this house, and that I have given full notice of my intention, I am much surprized at the little regard that seems intended to be paid to it, as is manifest from the emptiness of those benches This, sir, is not a question of party; I never did, nor ever will attach myself to party; and though I mean to move the resolution from this side of the house, yet it concerns both sides equally; it goes to assert the privileges of the people of Ireland 60 Ireland represented in this house of commons, and I say every party, and every description of men in this house are equally concerned in sup- porting it. I say it is the sole and exclusive right of the commons of Ireland to originate and frame money bills in such manner as they shall think proper, and the resolution I intend to propose is only to vindicate this privilege from the en- croachments of a neighbouriug assembly, which has lately, by certain resolutions, invaded thi s right, this palladium of the constitution, which I trust every man in the house will think himself bound to defend. I am sorry to say that the constitution of Ire- land is so young, that I need not go back to a very remote period, to prove that the exclusive right of originating and framing money bills has always resided in this house ; but for thirty years back it certainly has, and in England, from whence we derive our constitution, it always has been the practice. The peers and the crown possess an undoubted right of rejecting such bills in toto, but, in the commons alone resides the power of originating or framing them ; the very mode of giving the royal assent to such bills demonstrates that the commons alone are the source from which they flow. His majesty thanks his faithful commons, accepts their benevolence, and wills it to be so; and this mode obtains both in Britain and here. To whom should the peo- ple of Ireland look for the redress of grievances, for 61 for the encouragement of arts, for the promotion of commerce, but to their representatives in this house? What powerful engine has this house, by which it can obtain the redress of grievances, the encouragement of arts, or the pro- motion of commerce, but by including those ob- jects in the bill of supply? And if the right be once given up, or wrested from the commons, they cease to be the patrons and representatives of the people ; another assembly will assume that power; the people will learn to look for that encouragement and support from the aristo- cratic, which they now receive from the demo- cratic branch of the state ; this house will be- come a very cypher, and its members, instead of possessing the power of encouraging arts, rewarding merit, or, in a word, of serving the country, will become the humble solicitors of another assembly. From the reign of Henry the Third the power of annexing the redress of grievances to money bills has been the constitutional privilege of the commons of England; the practice of inserting such clauses as the commons have deemed pro- per has obtained in Ireland for more than thirty years, and, to any person acquainted with our constitution, must, at the slightest view, appear to be their inherent right: I cannot therefore suppose this house will be silent when this pri- vilege is invaded by another assembly. No man entertains a higher opinion of that assembly than 62 than I do, and am persuaded, that so great is their lordships' wisdom, that when this matter is duly considered by them, they will see the im- propriety of two resolutions which appear upon their journals of the fourth and fifth of the pre- sent month, to this effect, " That all grants made " to private manufacturers ought to be made in *' separate acts, and that enacting clauses in bills " of supply, the matter of which is foreign to the " bill, is unparliamentary, and tends to destroy " the constitution of this kingdom." That the il- lustrious assembly to which I allude have passed such a resolution is notorious, and cannot be de- nied, it is inserted in their journals, and has been seen by many members of this house ; the formality therefore of appointing a committee to inspect their lordships' journals is unnecessary, and all that remains for the commons is to vin- dicate their own privileges by a mild and tem- perate resolution which I shall propose to the house; for even admitting that sometimes a house of commons has erred in making improper grants, we should rather reform ourselves, and determine not to err again, than submit to have a monitor over us. If I were addressing a house of commons the most virtuous, or the most corrupt, I should ex- pect to be supported in this measure ; for I would say to a virtuous house of commons, the privi- lege of originating and framing money bills is the palladium of your liberty, the great engine to 63 to restrain oppression, to redress grievances, or to encourage merit. I would say to a corrupt house of commons, it is the palladium of your corruption, the security of the wages of your ve- nality, the means by which you may obtain the reward of your prostitution ; or if I were address- ing a house containing both descriptions, both kinds of argument would be applicable. But to the house before which I stand, surely the argu- ments which I have first used, the arguments of virtue and honour will be sufficient; to them therefore I shall trust. I lament that a learned and right honourable member, with whom I oiace had the happiness of. living on terms of friendship, is now absent; because I think I might rely upon his support- ing the resolution I intend to propose; that support would perhaps renew the- intercourse of our friendship, which has lately been in- terrupted. And I must beg the indulgence of the house to say, that that friendship was on the footing of perfect equality, not imposed by obligation on the one side, or bound by gratitude on the other; for I thank God, when that friendship commenced, I was above receiving obligation from any man, and therefore our friendship, as it was more pure and disinterested, as it depended on a sympathy of minds and a congeniality of sentiments, I trusted would have endured the longer. I think myself bound to make this public declaration, as it has gone forth forth from this house, that I am a man of ingra- titude, and to declare, that for any difference of opinion with my learned and right honourable friend I cannot be taxed with ingratitude; for that I never received any obligation from him, but lived on a footing of perfect equality, save only so far as his great talents and erudition out- went mine. I confess my obligation to the house for this indulgence of speaking a few words foreign to the debate, but which every man must think I owed to my own character; and that I may de- tain gentlemen no longer, I shall briefly move : " That it is the sole and undoubted privilege " of the commons of Ireland to originate all *' bills of supply and grants of public money, in *' such manner and with such clauses as they shall think proper." SPEECH SPEECH OF JOHN PHILPOT CURRAN, ESQ. ON ATTACHMENTS. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1785. R. CURRAX said he hoped he might say a few words on this great subject, without dis- turbing the sleep of any right honourable mem- ber, (the attorney general having fallen a-sleep on his seat) and yet, perhaps, added he, I ought rather to envy, than blame the tranquillity of the right honourable gentleman. I do not feel myself so happily tempered, as to be lulled to repose by the storms that shake the land. If they invite rest to any, that rest ought not to be la- vished on the guilty spirit. He said, he never more strongly felt the necessity of a perfect, union with Britain, of standing or falling with her in fortune and constitution, than on this oc- casion. She was the parent, the archetype of Irish liberty, which she had preserved inviolate in its grand points, while among us it has been violated and debased. He then called upon the house to consider the trust reposed in them, as the great inquest of the people. He respected F judges 66 judges highly; they ought to be respected, and feel their dignity and freedom from reprehension, while they did what judges ought to do; but their station should not screen them, when they passed the limit of their duty. Whether they did, or not, was the question? The house was the judge of those judges; and it would betray the people to tyranny, and abdi- cate their representation, if they did not act with probity and firmness. ' In their proceedings against Reilly he thought they had transgressed the law, and made a pre- cedent which, while it remained, was subversive of the trial by jury, and of course, of liberty. He regarded the constitution, he regarded the judges, three of that court at least, and for their sakes he would endeavour to undo what they had done. The question was, whether that court had really punished their own officer for a real con- tempt; or whether it had abused that power for the illegal end of punishing a supposed of- fence against the state, by a summary proceed- ing, without a trial by jury? He said the question was plain, whether as a point of constitution, or as of law ; as the for- mer, it is plain and obvious; but he would first consider it in the former view. When he felt the er the constitution rocking over his head, his first anxiety was to 'explore the foundation, to see if the great arches that supported the fabrick had fallen in but he found them firm, on the solid and massy principle of common law. He then observed, that the principle of legal liberty was, that offence, and trial, and punishment should be fixed ; it was sense ; it was Magna Charta ; a trial by jury as to fact an appeal from judges as to law. He admitted attachment an exception to the general rule, as founded in necessity, for the sup* port of courts, in administering justice, by a summary control over their officers acting un- der them* But the necessity that gave rise to it was also the limit. If it was entered farther, it would ex- tend to all criminal cases not capital, and* in the room of a jury, crimes would be created by a judge, the party accused by him, found guilty by him, punished by the utter loss of his liberty and property for life, by indefinite fine and im- prisonment, without remedy or appeal. If he did not answer, he was guilty; even if he did, the court might think or say it thought the answer evasive, and so convict him for imputed prevarication. The power of attachment, he said, was wisely confined by the British laws, and practised with- F '2 in in that limit. The crown lawyers had not dnced a single case, where the King's-bench in England had gone beyond it. They had ranged through the annals of history; through every reign of folly, and of blood; through the proud domination of the Tudors, and the blockhead despotism of the Stuarts, without finding a sin- gle case to support their doctrine. He consider- ed the office of sheriff as judicial and ministerial. He said Ileilly's offence did not fall within any summary control, in either capacity. It was not' a judicial act; it was not colore qfficii. An act colore qfficii must either be an act done by the actual exercise of an abused or an usurped au- thority, neither of which could it be called; for where the sheriff summonses his county, he does it by command, by authority, under pain of fine and imprisonment to those who disobey. Was the appointment of a meeting any such active exertion of authority? Did any man sup- pose he was obliged to attend ? That he would be fined, if he refused to attend ? No. Did the sheriff hold out any such colourable authority? Clearly ' L not. The contrary: He explained the purpose of the intended meeting: he stated at whose instance he appointed such meeting, and thereby shewed to every man in his senses, that he was not affecting to convene them by colour of any compulsive authority. If then there was any guilt in the sheriff's conduct (39 conduct, it was not punishable by attachment. They who argued from its enormity, were guilty of a shabby attempt to mislead men from the question, which was not, whether he ought to be punished at all; but whether he had been punished according to law ? You have heard no man adduce a single case to support their assertion; but we have the uni- form practice of the KingVbench in England in our favour: the uniform practice, both there and here, during these last years. Had they not meet- ings there and here ? Was not the crown re- ceiving petitions and addresses from such assem- blies? Why, during that time, no motion for an attachment in either kingdom? If an English attorney-general had attempted such a daring outrage on public liberty and law lie must have found some friend to warn him not to debase the court, and make it appear to all mankind as the odious engine of arbitrary power; not to put it into so unnatural a situation, as that of standing between the people and the crown, or between the people and their representatives. He would warn him not to bring public hatred on the government, by the adoption of illegal pro- secution; that if he shewed himself afraid of pro- ceeding against offenders by the ordinary mode, then offenders would be exalted by arbitrary per- secution of them j they would become suffering patriots, patriots, from being mere petty offenders ; their cries would become popular. He would be wjirn- ed how he led the court into an illegality, whick the commons could never endure: that no honest representative could sacrifice his fame and his duty, by voting in support of a proceeding sub- versive of liberty; that he would shrink from the reproach of the most insignificant of his con- stituents, if that constituent could say to him, * when thou sawest the thief of the constitution, ' thou consentedst unto him,' tt * / |f t)y ', ,'l.''iV , "'.* ' ?II! '.' ,' Such would be the motion suggested to an English attorney-general, and accordingly we find no instance of his ever venturing on such a measure. Without case then or precedent, or principle, what is the support of such a conduct here? The distinction of a judge? And what is that dis- tinction? it is different in different men; it is different in the same man at different times it is the folly of a fool, and the fear of a coward it is the infamy of the young, and the dotage of age ; in the best man it is very weakness that human nature is subject to, and in the worst it is very vice. Will you then tell the people that you have chosen this glorious distinction in the place of fixed laws, offences and fixed punish- ment, and in the place of that great barrier be- tween the prerogative and the people a trial by jury. But 71 But it is objected that the resolution is a cen- sure on the judges, and a charge of corruption: I deny it, and I appeal to your own acts. He then called to the clerk, who read from the journals a vote of censure passed upon Mr. Justice Robinson, for imposing a fine illegally in a county when on circuit, without view or evi- dence. Was their resolution founded on any cor- ruption of that judge? No; you would, if so, have addressed to remove him. I called for the re- solution, therefore, not to charge him with guilt, I am persuaded he acted merely through error ; but to vindicate him, to vindicate you, and to exhort you to be consistent. You thought a much smaller violation of law was deserving your re- probation. Do not abandon yourselves and your country to slavery, by suffering so much a grosser and more dangerous transgression of the con- stitution to become a precedent for ever. In ten- derness even to the judges, interpose. Their re- gret, which I am sure they now feel on reflection, cannot undo what they have done ; their hands cannot wash away what is written in their re- cords j but you may repair whatever has been in- jured: if your friend had unwillingly plunged a dagger into the breast of a stranger, would you prove his innocence by letting the victim bleed to death? The constitution has been wounded deeply, but I am persuaded innocently; it is you only, who, by neglecting to interpose, can make the consequences fatal, and the wound ripen into murder. I would 72 I would wish, I own, that the liberty of Ire- land should be supported by her own children ; but if she is scorned and rejected by them, when her all is at stake, I will implore the assistance even of two strangers; I will call on the right honourable secretary to support the principles of the British constitution. Let him not render his administration odious to the people of Ireland, by applying his influence in this house to the ruin of their personal freedom. Let him not give a pre- tence to the enemies of his friend in a sister coun- try, to say that the son of the illustrious Chatham is disgracing the memory of his great father; that the trophies of his Irish administration are the introduction of an inquisition among us, and the extinction of a trial by jury; let them not say that the pulse of the constitution beats only in the heart of the empire, but that it is dead in the ex- tremities. He concluded with declaring his hearty concurrence in the resolution proposed. The attorney-general (Fitzgibbon), in a speech of much personality, opposed Mr. Curran's mo- tion. Mr. Curran, in reply, thanked the right ho- nourable gentleman for restoring him to his good humour, and for having with great liberality and parliamentary decency answered his arguments with personality ! Some expressions could not heat him, when coming from persons of a certain distinction. He would not interrupt the right honourable 73 honourable gentleman in the fifth repetition of his speech. He would prevent his arguments by telling him he had not in one instance alluded to Mr. Reilly. The right honourable gentleman said, he had declared the judges guilty; but he had said no such thing. He said, if any judge was to act in the manner he mentioned, it would be an ag- gravation of his guilt. The right honourable gentleman had said, that the house of commons had no right to investigate the conduct of judges; if so, he would ask the learned serjeant, why he sat in that chair? he would ask why the resolution had been just read from the journals? The gen- tleman had called him a babbler; he could not think that was meant as a disgrace, because in another parliament, before he had the honour of a seat in that house, but when he was in the gallery, he had heard a young lawyer named Babbler. He did not recollect that there were sponsors at the baptismal font, nor was there any occasion, as the infant had promised and vowed so many things in his own name. Indeed he found it dif- ficult to reply, for he was not accustomed to pro- nounce panegyric upon himself; he did not well know how to do it; but since he could not tell them what he was, he could tell them what he was not: He was not a man whose respect in person and character depended upon the impor- tance of his office; he was not a young man who thrust himself into the foreground of a picture which ought to be occupied by a better figure ; he was not a man who replied with invective when 74 sinking under the weight of argument ; he was not a man who denied the necessity of a parlia- mentary reform at the time he proved the expe- diency of it, by reviling his own constituents, the parish clerk, the sexton, and grave-digger ; and if there was any man who could apply what he was not to himself, he left him to think of it in the committee, and to contemplate upon it when he went home. SPEECH SPEECH OF JOHN PHILPOT CURRAN, ESQ. ON THE COMMERCIAL RESOLUTIONS. HOUSE OF COMMONS, SATURDAY, JULY 23, 1735. CURRAN. I can easily excuse some in- consistencies in the conduct of the right honour- able secretary, for some accidents have befallen him: when we met last, he desired us to ad- journ for three weeks ; we did so ; and now wants above a fortnight more. But will that help forward the business before the house? will it expedite the progress of a bill, to say, let us wait till the packet comes in from England, and perhaps we shall have some news about the pro- positions. Did the British minister act in this manner? no; when he postponed from time to time the consideration of the propositions, he did not postpone the other business of the house: he did not say, let it wait till the packet comes from Dublin. This the Irish minister is forced to do 76 do: I say forced, for I am sure it is not his in- clination; it must distress him greatly; and I sincerely feel for and pity his distress. When we had the eleven propositions before us, we were charmed with them. Why? because we did not understand them. Yes, the endear- ing word reciprocity rang at every corner of the streets. We then thought that the right honour- able gentleman laid the propositions before us by authority; but the English minister reprobates them as soon as they get to England, and the whole nation reprobates them : thus, on one hand we must conclude the English minister tells the Irish minister to propose an adjustment, and when it goes back alters every part ; or, that the Irish minister proposed it without any authority at all. I am inclined to believe the latter, for it would add to the gentleman's distress to suppose the former. Now let us mark another inconsistency into which the right honourable gentleman is driven, no doubt against his will. Time to deliberate was refused us, when we had something to deliberate upon; and now, when we are told we have no- thing before us to consider, we are to have a fort- night's recess to enable us to think about nothing. And time indeed it will take, before we can think to any purpose. It will take time for the propo- sitions to go through, and perhaps to be again altered in the house of lords. It will take time for 77 for them to be reconsidered in the British com- mons. It will take time for them to come over here. It will take time for us to consider them, though that time is likely to be very short. It will take time to send them back to England. It will take time for them to be returned to us again; and then time will be required to carry them into execution. But a rumour hath gone abroad of a studied design to delay the discussion of this business until there shall be no members in town. But away with such a suspicion ; I think too honour- ably of the right honourable gentleman; but yet I should be glad to hear him say, there is not even an idea of the base design of forcing them down our throats. Mr. secretary Orde moved, that the house do adjourn to Tuesday se'nnight. Mr. Curran. Sir, the adjournment proposed is disgraceful to parliament, and disgraceful to the nation. I must explain myself, by stating a few facts, though they relate to a subject that I own I cannot approach but with reluctance. The right honourable gentleman early in the session pro- duced a set of propositions, w r hich he was autho- rised to present to us as a system of final and permanent commercial adjustment between the two kingdoms. As a compensation for the ex- pected advantages of this system, we were called upon 78 upon to impose *l 40,000 a year on this exhaust-* ed country. Unequal to our strength, and enor- mous as the burden was, we submitted ; we were willing to strain every nerve in the common cause, and to stand or fall with the fate of the British empire. But what is the event? I feel how much beneath us it would be to attend to the un- authenticated rumours of what may be said or done in another kingdom ; but it would be a ri- diculous affectation in us not to know that the right honourable gentleman's- system has been re-* probated by those under whose authority he was supposed to act, and that he himself has been de- serted and disavowed. I cannot, for my own part, but pity the calamity of a man who is exposed to the contempt of the countries as an egregious dupe, or to their indignation as a gross impostor ; for even he himself now abandons every hope of those propositions returning to this house in the form they left it. On the contrary, lie now only hopes that he may be able to bring something for- ward that may deserve our approbation on some future day. He requests an adjournment for ten days, and he promises that he will give a week's notice, when the yet undiscovered something is to be proposed, which something he promises shall be agreeable to this nation, and authorised by the English minister. On what his confidence of this is founded I know not, unless he argues, that be- cause he has been disavowed and exposed in his past conduct by his employers, he may rely on tlieir supporting him in future. But however the right 79 right honourable gentleman may fail in drawing instruction from experience or calamity, we ought to be more wise; we should learn caution from disappointment. We relied on the right honour- able gentleman's assurances we found them fal- lacious: we have oppressed the people with a load of taxes, as a compensation for a commer- cial adjustment; we have not got that adjustment; we confided in our skill in negociating, and we are rendered ridiculous by that confidence. We looked abroad for the resources of Irish com- merce, and we find that they are to be sought for only at home, in the industry of the people, in the honesty of parliament, and in our learning that negociation must inevitably bring derision on ourselves, and ruin on our constituents. But you are called on to depend on the right honourable gentleman's regard for his own reputation : when the interest of the people is at stake, can we be honest in reposing on so despicable a se- curity ? Suppose this great pledge of the right honourable gentleman's character should chance to become forfeited, where w T ill you look for it? When he sails for England, is it too large to carry with him? Or, if you would discover in what parish of Great Britain it may be found, will the sacrifice be an atonement to the people who have already been betrayed by trusting to so contemptible a pledge? See then what we do by consenting to this short adjournment: we have been abased already, and we neglect every other duty, in order to solicit a repetition of that abuse. If so If this something should arrive at all, it will be proposed when the business of the country will engage every county member at the assizes : for as to his week's notice, it either cannot reach him in time, or, if it should, he cannot possibly obey it. Is it then our wish to have a new sub- ject of such moment, as a contract that is to bind us for ever, concluded in half a house, and with- out a single representative for a county in the number? Is it wise to trust to half the house in a negociation in which the wisdom of the whole has been already defeated? But what is the neces- sity that induces us to acquiesce in a measure of so much danger and disgrace? Is this nation brought to so abject a condition by her represen- tatives as to have no refuge from ruin, but in the immediate assistance of Great Britain? Sir, I do not so far despair of the public weal: oppressed as we were, we found a resource for our consti- tution in the spirit of the people; abused as we now find ourselves, our commerce cannot fail of a resource in our virtue and industry, if we do not suffer ourselves to be diverted from those great and infallible resources, by a silly hope from ne- gociation, for which we are not adapted, and in which we can never succeed. And if this great hope still is left, why fill the public mind with alarm and dismay? Shall we teach the people to think, that something instantly must be done, to save them from destruction? Suppose that some- thing should not, cannot be done, may not the attempt, instead of uniting the two countries, in- volve 81 volve them in the consequence of discord and dissention ? Bat, if your compliance with the right honourable gentleman's requisition does not sink the people into despair of their own situ- ation, does it not expose the honour and integri- ty of this house to suspicion and distrust? For what can they suppose we intend by this delay? The right honourable gentleman may find it worth his while to secure the continuance in his office by an expedient, however temporary and inef- fectual ; but, sir, if we are supposed to concur in such a design, our character is gone with the people ; for, if we are honest, it can be of no mo- ment to us whether this secretary or that minister shall continue in office or not. I know it has been rumoured that the right honourable gentle- man may take advantage of a thin house, to im- pose upon this country the new set of resolutions that have passed the commons of Great Britain. Sir, I do not suspect any such thing, nor would I encourage such a groundless apprehension. Sir, I do not think it would be easy to find a man who would stand within the low-water mark of our shore, and read some of those resolutions above his breath, without feeling some uneasiness for his personal safety ; neither can I think, if a foreign usurpation should come crested to our bar, and demand from the treachery of this house a surrender of that constitution which has been established by the virtue of the nation, that we would answer such a requisition by words. c But, But, sir, though the people should not appre- hend such extreme perfidy from us, they will be justly alarmed if they see us act with needless precipitation; after what is past, we cannot be surprised at not meeting with the most favour- able interpretations of our conduct. On great subjects, the magnitude of the ideas'* to be compared may cause some confusion in the minds of ordinary men; they will, therefore, ex- amine our conduct by analogy to the more fre- quent occurrences of common life: such cases happen every day. Will you permit me to sup- pose a very familiar one, by which our present situation may be illustrated to a common mind. I will suppose then, sir, that an old friend that you loved, just recovering from a disease in 'which he had been wasted almost to death, should prevail Upon you to take the trouble of buying him a horse for the establishment of his health ; and I the more freely presume to repre- sent you for a moment in an office so little cor- responding with the dignity of your station* from a consciousness that my fancy cannot put you in any place to which you will not be fol- lowed by my utmost respect. I will, therefore, suppose that you send for a horse-jockey, who does not come himself, but sends his foreman. .doii/;". -LuJji.' f ' i h i'i Says the foreman, " sir, I know what you want; my master has a horse that will exactly match 83 match your friend; he is descended from Ra- belais' famous Johannes Caballus, that got a doctor of physic's degree from the college of Kheims ; but your friend must pay his price. My master knows he has no money at present, and will therefore accept his note for the amount of what he shall be able to earn while he lives, allowing him, however, such moderate subsist- ence as may prevent him from perishing. If you are satisfied I will step for the horse and bring him instantly, with the bridle and saddle, which you shall have in the bargain." But, friend, say you, are you sure that you are au- thorised to make this bargain? What, sir, cries the foreman, w r ould you doubt my honour? Sir, I can rind three hundred gentlemen who never saw r me before, and yet have gone bail for me at the first view of my face. Besides, sir, you have a greater pledge ; my honour, sir, my renown is at stake. Well, sir, you agree, the note is passed ; the foreman leaves you, and returns without the horse. What, sir! where is the horse ? Why, in truth, sir, answers he, I am sorry for this little disappointment, but my mistress has taken a fancy to the horse, so your friend cannot have him. But we have a nice little mare that will match him better ; as to the saddle he must do without that, for little master insists on keeping it ; however, your friend has been so poor a fellow that he must have too thick a skin to be much fretted by riding bare-backed j besides the mare is so low that G 2 his his feet will reach the ground when he rides her; and still further to accommodate him, my master insists on having :a chain locked to her feet, of which lock my faster is to have a key to lock or unlock as he pleases, and your friend shall also have a key so formed that he cannot unlock the chain, but with which he may double-loci* it if he thinks fit. What, sirrah, do you think I'll betray my old friend to such a fraud ? Why really, sir, you are impertinent, and your friend is too peevish; it w r as only the other day that he charged my master with having stolen his cloak, and grew angry, and got a ferrule and spike to his staff. W r hy, sir, you see how good-humouredly my master gave back the cloak. Sir, my master scorns to break his word, and so do I ; sir, my character is your security. Now, as to the mare, you are too hasty in objecting to her, for I am not sure that you can get her ; all I ask of you now is to wait a few hours in the street, that I may try if something may not be done; but let me say one word to you in confidence: I am to get two guineas if I can bring your friend to be satisfied with what we can do for him ; now if you assist me in this, you shall have half the money; for to tell you the truth, if I fail in my undertaking, I shall either be dis- charged entirely or degraded to my former place of helper in the stable. Now 85 Now, Mr. Speaker, as I do not presume to judge of your feelings by my own, I cannot be sure that you would beat the foreman, or abuse him as an impudent lying imposter: I rather think you would for a moment be lost in reflect- ing, and not without a pang, how the rectitude of your heart and the tenderness of your head had exposed you to be the dupe of improbity and folly. But, sir, I know you would leave the wretch who had deceived you, or the fool who was deceived by his master, and you would re- turn to your friend. And methinks you would say to him, we have been deceived in the course \ye have adopted ; for, my good friend, you must look to the exertions of your own strength for the establishment of your health. You have great stamina still remaining, rely upon them, and they will support you. Let no man per- suade you to take the ferrule or spike from your staff. It will guard your cloak. Neither quar- rel with the jockey, for he cannot recover the contents of the note, as you have not the horse; and he may yet see the policy of using you ho- nestly, and deserving to be your friend. If so, embrace him, and let your staff be lifted iu de- fence of your common safety, and in the mean time, let it be always in readiness to defend yourself. Such, sir, is the advice you would offer to your friend, and which I would now offer to this house. There is no ground for despairing; let 1:5 86 us not therefore alarm the people. If a closer connexion with Great Britain is not now practi- cable, it may become practicable hereafter. But \ve shall ruin every hope of that kind by precipi- tation. I do therefore conjure gentlemen not to run the risk of forcing us at a week's notice to enter on a subject, on which every man in the nation ought to be allowed the most unlimited time for deliberation. I do conjure them not to assent to a measure that can serve nobody but the proposer of it ; that must expose the mem- bers of this house to the distrust of their con- stituents, and which may in its consequences en- danger the harmony of two kingdoms, whose interests and fortunes ought never to be se- parated. SPEECH or JOHN PHILPOT CURRAN, ESQ. ON THE BILL FOR REGULATING THE COMMERCIAL INTERCOURSE, BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND. HOUSE OF COMMONS, FRIDAY, AUGUST 12, 1785. lfj.R. ORDE moved for leave to bring in the bill. Mr. Curran said, he was too much exhausted to say much at that hour (six o'clock) on the sub- ject. His zeal had survived his strength. He wished his present state of mind and body might not be ominous of the condition to which Ireland would be reduced, if this bill should become a law. He could not therefore yield even to his weakness. It was a subject which might animate the dead. He then took a view of the progress of the arrangement, and arraigned the insidious conduct of administration. In Ireland it was proposed by the minister; in England it was re- probated by the same minister. Ho had known children learn to play at cards, by playing the right hand against the left : he had never before heard of a negociation being learned in that way. He 88 He said, a bill was not a mode of negotiating; our law spoke only to ourselves bound only ourselves ; it was absurd therefore to let a bill proceed. But the commercial part was out of the question ; for this bill portended a surrender of the constitution and liberty of Ireland. If, said he, we should attempt so base an act, it would be void, as to the people. We may ab- dicate our representation, but the right remains with the people, and can be surrendered only by them. We may ratify our own infamy; we cannot ratify their slavery. He feared the Bri- tish minister was mistaken in the temper of Ire- land, and judged of it by former times. Former- ly the business here was carried on by purchase of majorities; there was a time when the most in- famous measure was sure of being supported by as infamous a majority. But things were chang- ed; the people were enlightened and strong; they would not bear a surrender of their rights, which, he said, would be the consequence if they submitted to this bill. It contained a covenant to enact such laws as England should think pro- per, that would annihilate the parliament of Ire- land. The people here must go to the bare of the English house of commons for relief; and for a circuitous trade to England, we were ac- cepting, he said, a circuitous constitution. He said it was different totally from the cases to \\hich it had been compared, the settlement of 1779, or the Methuen treaty: there all was specific 89 specific and defined; here all was fustian and un- certain. A power to bind externally would in- volve a power also of binding internally; this law gave the power to Great Britain of judging what would be a breach of the compact, of con- struing it, in fact of taxing us as she pleased, while it gave her new strength to enforce our obedience. In such an event, he said, we must either sink into utter slavery, or the people must wade to a re-assumption of their rights through civil blood, or be obliged to take refuge in an union, which, he said, would be the annihilation of Ireland, and what he suspected the minister was driving at. Even the Irish minister, he said, no longer pretended to use his former language on this subject; formerly we were lost in a foolish admiration at the long impediraented march of oratoric pomp with which the secretary display- ed the magnanimity of Great Britain. That kind of eloquence, he supposed, was formed upon some model, but he suspected that the light of political wisdom was more easily reflected than the heat of eloquence; yet we were in raptures even with the oratory of the honour- able gentleman. However he now had descend- ed to an humble style. He talked no more of reciprocity, no more of emporium. He then went into general observations to shew that this treaty would give no solid advan- tages to Ireland, but was a revocation of the grant of 1770. He said, he loved the liberty of Ireland; he would therefore vote against the bill, 90 bill, as subversive of that liberty; he would also vote against it as leading to a schism between the two nations, that must terminate in a civil war, or in an union at best. He was sorry, he said, that he troubled them so long, but he fear- ed it might be the last time he should ever have an opportunity of addressing a free parliament ; and if, said he, the period is approaching when the boasted constitution of Ireland will be no more, I own I feel a melancholy ambition in de- serving that my name may be enrolled with those who endeavoured to save it in its last moment. Posterity will be grateful for the last effort, though it should have failed of success. House of Commons, Monday, August 15, 1785. THE Right Hon. Thos. Orde having intimated that he would not press the further considera- tion of the commercial regulation bill during the session, which was in fact giving up the bill, and Mr. Flood having moved the following re- solution : i " Resolved, That we hold ourselves bound " not to enter into any engagement to give up " the sole and exclusive right of the parliament " of Ireland to legislate for Ireland in all cases