IRLF 
 
 MM D2M 
 
THE JAMES K. MOFFITT FUND. 
 
 LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 GIFT OF 
 
 JAMES KENNEDY MOFFITT 
 
 OF THE CLASS OF '86. 
 

 
r\ V 
 
 
 A THEORY OF LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 FROM THE 
 
 EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 BY 
 
 SYLVAN DREY. 
 
 WILLIAMS AND NORGATE, 
 
 14, HENRIETTA STEEET, CO VEST GAEDEX, LONDON; 
 
 20, SOUTH FEEDERICK STEEET, EDINBUEGH; AND 
 
 7, BEOAD STEEET, OXFOED. 
 
 1897. 
 
 PRICE ONE SHILLING. 
 
A THEORY OF LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 FROM THE 
 
 EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 BY 
 
 SYLYAX DREY. 
 
 WILLIAMS AND NORGATE, 
 
 14, HENRIETTA STREET, COYENT GARDEN, LONDON; 
 
 20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH; AND 
 
 7, BROAD STREET, OXFORD. 
 
 1897. 
 

 to mg farg foeat jjoung ftien&s 
 
 SADIE ADLER AND ROSA STEIX 
 
 OF BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, 
 
 IN THE 
 
 HOPE THAT THEIR KEEN INTEREST 
 
 IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS BROCHURE 
 
 MAY ENABLE THEM TO WHILE AWAY A PLEASANT HALF HOUR 
 
 IN THE PERUSAL OF 
 
 ITS PAGES. 
 
 BALTIMORE, MD., December 1st, 1897. 
 
PREFATORY NOTE. 
 
 Ix presenting this brochure to the public the author desires 
 to state that it was all but completed seven years ago 
 substantially in the form in which it now appears. Various 
 circumstances, chief among them the writer's ill-health, 
 prevented the manuscript from being put into shape for 
 publication at an earlier date. 
 
 113186 
 
THEORY OF LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 FROM 
 
 THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 BENEATH the abstractions and generalizations of every 
 system of philosophy, worthy of the name, there lies con- 
 cealed what may be termed a theory or interpretation of life, 
 using the word "life" in its deepest and widest possible 
 signification. True of philosophical systems in general, 
 this is preeminently so of the Evolution Philosophy. Nay, 
 more : assuming the real worth of any system of philosophy 
 to be properly determinable by the rationality, the logical 
 consistency, and the practical value of its theory of life, 
 we can hardly question the superiority of the Evolution 
 Philosophy over the metaphysical systems which it is 
 destined to supplant. It is no part of our present purpose 
 to advance arguments in support of these propositions 
 except in so far as the exposition presently to be laid 
 before the reader may be considered in this light. 
 
 No one at all familiar with the subject will need to be 
 told that the central doctrines of the Evolution Philosophy, 
 as herein set forth, are, to all intents and purposes, identical 
 with the cardinal teachings of Herbert Spencer's Synthetic 
 Philosophy. This close correspondence is easily accounted 
 
6 A TEEOKY OF LIFE DEDCCED 
 
 for by the fact that there is no completely elaborated 
 unification of knowledge, based on the doctrine of evolution 
 and measuring up to the requirements of a system of 
 philosophy, other than Herbert Spencer's. In other words 
 the terms " Evolution Philosophy " and " Synthetic Philo- 
 sophy "are practically convertible; and hence an expounder 
 of the one is, of necessity, to a very great extent, the 
 interpreter of the other, whether he is willing to acknow- 
 ledge the fact or not. It is perhaps proper to add that 
 though the conclusions set forth in the following pages 
 cannot, in the nature of the case, be considered original, 
 still the presentation of the subject and the method of 
 treatment alike are, for the most part, so entirely our own 
 as to make us alone responsible for any errors in the 
 premises. 
 
 In attempting the task which we have undertaken, let us 
 ask the reader to pause for a moment and picture to himself 
 the globe on which he " moves, lives and has his being/' 
 Here, in the boundless regions of space a tiny ball 
 among the countless spheres that make up the universe 
 is an immense globe, adorned by the blended beauty of sea, 
 mountain, valley, tree, field and flower, enlivened by the 
 varied activity of a vast concourse of sentient beings, rolling 
 ever on and on with ceaseless energy amid glittering myriads 
 of other worlds that on a calm moonlight night look down 
 upon man with a million of eyes. Standing in the presence 
 of so profound a mystery, there is impressively forced upon 
 us, as the starting point of any rational theory of life, the 
 obvious elementary truth that man's very existence makes 
 him a part of the great scheme of things ; places him in 
 some sort of relation to his own little planet and all that is 
 on and around it ; creates for him a terrestrial and an extra- 
 terrestrial environment in which there is everywhere some- 
 
FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 7 
 
 thing of some kind that continuously obtrudes itself upon 
 his consciousness. From which it follows that, if we are to 
 construct a theory of life at all, our only available means 
 and material for the purpose arc, on the one hand, the 
 human mind, and, on the other, our terrestrial and extra- 
 terrestrial environment. The mind, however, being the 
 court of last resort to which all questions that may arise in 
 the course of our undertaking must be referred for final 
 adjudication, it behoves us, at the very outset, to ascertain 
 how far it is equipped for the task which it will have to 
 perform. In other words, we must seek to acquaint our- 
 selves both with the powers and the limitations of the 
 human mind ; for that it has its limitations no philosopher 
 will at this late day dare to deny. 
 
 The mind, we say, is the faculty by which we know. But 
 what is knowledge ? What do we mean when we say we 
 know some particular fact ? Invariably it will be found to 
 express an understanding of the quality of things, or of 
 the attributes of persons, or of some relationship existing 
 between persons or things, or both. It is impossible for 
 us to know the first origin or real substance of anything, 
 even of a common clod of earth. Every answer professing 
 to explain either the first origin or the real substance of 
 things is, in fact, only another question in a declarative 
 form. A simple illustration will confirm the truth of this 
 proposition. In answer to the question, What is the origin 
 of the earth ? the geologist tells us, " It was gradually 
 formed from nebulous matter.'' But obviously this answer 
 contains within itself the further query, Where did this 
 nebulous matter come from ? Sooner or later we stumble 
 across these unanswerable queries in every branch of 
 science. We perceive, then, at a glance, how narrow is 
 the field of knowledge, how limited the powers of the 
 
8 A. THEORY OF LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 mind ! We human beings can know nothing of the 
 primary hoiv, u'liat or why ; nothing of the first origin and 
 real substance of things ; nothing of mind or matter in 
 themselves; we know only the proximate how, what and 
 why ; we know and can know only phenomena and their 
 relations, and even such facts as are within the domain of 
 knowledge are known to us as relative and not as absolute 
 truth ; they are true only for beings such as we. Why do 
 we say so ? For the simple reason that the limited capacities 
 of a human being are always reflected in his perception of 
 things must of necessity determine the character of his 
 knowledge. What we know presents itself to us as we 
 know it because we are what we are. To beings otherwise 
 constituted the known object would be otherwise known. 
 Our analysis, then, brings us to this conclusion : whatever 
 affects consciousness ranges itself either under the head of 
 the unknowable or the knowable. And even such affections 
 of consciousness as are knowable are known to us only as 
 relative and not as absolute truth. Note carefully that the 
 genesis and substance of things, according to our state- 
 ment, are not only unknown but absolutely unknowable. 
 As we are simply trying to set forth a theory of life, we do not 
 regard it incumbent on us to fortify our propositions step 
 by step with the necessary arguments ; but there has been 
 such a fatal misconception of the significance of the word 
 unknowable, as used in this connection, that an extended 
 elucidation seems absolutely essential. 
 
 "What right have you to say of anything that it is 
 unknowable ? " I imagine I hear some one object. " Un- 
 knowable, indeed ! Who that recollects the glorious 
 achievements of the human intellect will dare to pronounce 
 as forever unknowable what is at present simply unknown? 
 Might not the barbarians of thousands of years ago have 
 
FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 9 
 
 argued with equal force that no one could possibly master 
 that of which they were then ignorant ?" To the superficial 
 reasoner this will seem to be a very formidable objection ; 
 but a little reflection will show the argument to be utterly 
 fallacious. Note now the sophistry. Our imaginary 
 opponent having appealed to history in support of his 
 argument must of necessity grant us the same right in 
 fact, in a matter of this kind, where a priori reasoning fails 
 to carry conviction, no other appeal is possible. Well, 
 what are the facts ? Judged from one point of view, 
 science has made remarkable conquests in domains over 
 which ignorance once reigned in undisputed supremacy; 
 but, looked at from another aspect, with all our boasted 
 attainments, it is a solemn truth that we stand to-day 
 where the human race stood in its veriest infancy. Is 
 there any philosopher living, or has he ever lived, who 
 knows anything about the first cause or real substance of 
 things in any proper sense of knowing ? Can anybody 
 to-day solve the mysteries of life and the universe ? Has 
 any genius of any age at any time done more than 
 emphasize the fact that they are mysteries passing human 
 comprehension? Unquestionably not; and if the human 
 mind of the future is to have any fundamental points of 
 resemblance to that of the present and the past, there can 
 be no possibility of bringing within the domains of know- 
 ledge what is here designated as belonging to the sphere of 
 the unknowable. Of course, as in the past so in the future, 
 our fund of knowledge must grow with ever increasing 
 rapidity. Progress great progress there has been and 
 ever will be ; but it is, and of necessity must be, progress 
 only along the line of the knowable. It cannot possibly 
 be otherwise. To say that the mind which, by its very 
 constitution, by the very nature of its knowing powers, can 
 
10 A THEOEY OP LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 understand things only phenomenally,, to say of the mind 
 that it will ever be able to grasp things noumenally is 
 somewhat akin to saying that the day will come when we 
 can sing the visual impression, of a painting or chisel the 
 emotional stirrings of a song.* Those who have fallen into 
 this error may find an easy way out of it, i they will but 
 try to remember that what is to-day unknown may be either 
 knowable or unknowable. The knowable includes so much 
 of that which is at present unknown as it is possible for us 
 to know in the future. How much that is, nobody will 
 dare to predict ; but it is at least certain that this part of 
 the unknown (i.e., so much as may be known in the future) 
 embraces all potential knowledge concerning phenomena. 
 The residue of the unknown is comprehended under the 
 head of the unknowable; this part of the unknown includes 
 things in their noumenal aspect. Hence what is at present 
 unknown is divisible into the knowable unknown and the 
 unknowable unknown. By the knowable unknown we mean 
 potential knowledge of phenomena ; by the unknowable 
 unknown is meant what the mind by its very constitution is 
 incapable of knowing ; namely, things in their noumenal 
 aspect. Or to express the idea in still another way, what is 
 at present known may be either phenomenally or noumenally 
 unknown ; what is phenomenally unknown is always know- 
 able, what is noumenally unknown is absolutely unknowable. 
 To this argument there are but two conceivable objections. 
 It might be said thatJJi-&B-premc Bcino'-mayL^omejiav so 
 -ansfigure and illumine the human mind as to enable it to 
 omprehend at a future day what is now totally beyond its 
 owers of comprehension, and that by reason of this 
 ossible divine interposition we are logically estopped from 
 
 * I say advisedly somewhat akin, for the comparison is open to possible 
 jections. 
 
FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 11 
 
 asserting that any part v of the unknown is unknowable. 
 To which, besides other answers, it is sufficient to say that 
 even if the possibility of such an illumination be conceded, 
 the concession does not disprove the proposition sought to 
 be maintained ; for in the case supposed we could not be 
 said to know what is unknowable in any proper sense of 
 knowing. The feat of having finally comprehended the 
 incomprehensible would have been accomplished not by any 
 resident forces of the human mind, not by any power of the 
 intellect, but by some extra-mental agency. Or again, 
 some ultra skeptic might say that we do not know anything \ 
 at all, and hence cannot know that anything is unknowable./ 
 But the argument in support of absolute and universal 
 ignorance defeats the very purpose for which it is here 
 specifically made. For he who is endowed with such superla- 
 tive stupidity is, on the one hand, estopped from denying 
 that there may be an unknowable aspect of things, and, on 
 the other hand, he cannot prove his own supreme ignorance 
 so long as he is committed to the doctrine that nothing at 
 all can be known. Moreover, the theory, if at all tenable, 
 can be maintained only by arguments that are suicidal; for 
 any evidence offered in its support would of itself disprove 
 the proposition to be demonstrated. Its strongest proof, in 
 a word, constitutes its strongest refutation. 
 
 Turning now from this long but necessary digression, 
 let us see how far we have advanced in our undertaking. 
 Almost at the very outset it became apparent that in 
 attempting to construct a theory of life we can have no 
 choice but to accept our mind, on the one hand, and our 
 terrestrial and extra-terrestrial environment, on the other, 
 as the only available implements and materials, so to speak, 
 for the purpose. From the nature of the case, however, 
 the mind must play the chief role; for it is the medium 
 
12 A THEORY OP LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 through which we become cognizant of the external world. 
 Bat the mind, as we saw, has its limitations as well as 
 its powers. Whether considering problems of mind or 
 of matter, we are forced to the conclusion that the genesis 
 and substance of things are forever unknowable, that only 
 phenomena and their relations are knowable, and that even 
 such knowledge as it is possible for us to acquire is relative 
 and not absolute truth ; that is, we know what we know 
 as we know it because we are what we are. To others 
 differently constituted things are doubtless differently 
 known. Now mark the important consequences that follow. 
 What in the early part of this essay we distinguished 
 as the terrestrial environment and the extra-terrestrial 
 environment now appears to us each in two distinct forms, 
 represented respectively by their unknowable and their 
 knowable aspects. In other words, both the terrestrial 
 environment and the extra-terrestrial environment have 
 each an unknowable and a knowable side. The unknow- 
 able aspects of this dual environment reduced to their 
 lowest terms stand for the impenetrable mystery in which 
 the genesis and substance of things are shrouded ; and 
 although this mystery is beyond the possibility of a solution, 
 it nevertheless persists in obtruding itself on conscious- 
 ness is just as much a part of the external influences 
 that affect consciousness as is the kuowable aspect of 
 our environment. Hence when contemplating the grand 
 scheme of the universe there are excited within us two 
 sets of activities ; one responding to the unknowable and 
 mysterious aspect of our environment; the other to its 
 knowable manifestations. Or to express ourselves from a 
 point of view which it was the main object of the fore- 
 going remarks to emphasize, we have now discovered a 
 permanent basis for religion and for science. And here 
 
FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 13 
 
 it is worth while for the reader to note a fact already 
 indicated by necessary implication ; namely, that every 
 rational theory of life considers man from an extra-terres- 
 trial and a terrestrial point of view. For religion concerns 
 itself with these two-fold relations in their unknowable 
 aspect, while science deals with them in their knowable 
 aspect. Having thus found a basis for religion and a basis 
 for science, let us take up each separately, and see what is 
 the significance of the division in its ultimate bearings. 
 
 Religion, as we have seen, has for its subject matter 
 the mystery in which the universe is enshrouded. How, 
 then, ought the word to be defined ? Rightly understood, 
 " Religion," to borrow words elsewhere used,* " may be 
 defined as the consciousness that an inconceivable, an 
 inexplicable energy is everywhere revealing itself in and 
 through the workings of the entire universe." It consists 
 in the recognition of this energy as an undefined, indefin- 
 able reality, from which in some way all things proceed,, 
 and to which all things are united. That it is a reality we 
 are forced to conclude by all that we do know a priori 
 and a posteriori ; but the nature of the reality is utterly 
 inscrutable. Man, however, is so constituted that he 
 cannot avoid picturing it to himself in some way or other ; 
 and there can be no logical objection to any representation 
 that ascribes to the ultimate cause no other attributes than 
 the widest mental grasp makes absolutely essential. Any 
 attempted definition of the Infinite, therefore, in full re- 
 cognition of our total inability to do more than very dimly, 
 very remotely apprehend its true nature any conception 
 that fully realizes how utterly unlike the reality is the- 
 symbol that would shadow forth its non-mechanical, non- 
 
 * Herbert Spencer's Theory of Eeligion and Morality. By Sylvan Drey- 
 London : "Williams and Xorgate. 
 
14 A THEORY OF LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 anthropomorphic character is wholly unobjectionable, by 
 very reason of the necessity under which we labour to 
 express finitely what only the Infinite itself can adequately 
 express. And now observe that it can constitute 110 valid 
 objection to this idea of God that it fails to satisfy the 
 needs of those who have been brought up to fashion the 
 Infinite after man. Whoever cannot accept it is at perfect 
 liberty to reject it ; but let no one suppose that its value 
 is to be tested by its capacity for satisfying the needs of 
 those who have been taught to degrade God to the level 
 of man. The point is not whether it can satisfy people 
 who have been brought up with orthodox notions, but 
 whether it cannot be made to satisfy the needs of a progres- 
 sive humanity whether, as society advances, the changes 
 in our way of looking at things which always accompany 
 social evolution will not make this view of God entirely 
 acceptable; and to these questions no one who has his eyes 
 open can fail to read the answers in the signs of the times. 
 God, thus conceived, though revealed to man through 
 phenomena, is nevertheless unlike anything in the universe 
 though revealed to man through nature is unlike any- 
 thing in nature. It is always this " Infinite and Eternal 
 Energy " that manifests itself to us, whether the revelation 
 comes through the calm stillness of a moonlight night, or 
 through the tempestuous fury of a gale ; whether it comes 
 through sunny fields and meadows, or through the angry 
 flames of a volcano. The relation in which we stand to 
 this " Infinite and Eternal Energy" may, nay, must be 
 relied on to call forth such emotions as are appropriate to 
 the religious consciousness. If, as some critics assure us, 
 the sentiments growing out of the Christian's present 
 attitude toward the Deity will not be found among the 
 religious emotions thus evoked, this is the best possible 
 
OF TH 
 
 FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 reason for believing that those sentiments 
 appropriate to the higher forms of religion. Most 
 people fall into the very pardonable error of living too 
 intensely in the present. They seem to think that because 
 a large majority of persons at the present day find it 
 necessary to worship an anthropomorphic God, this will 
 ever remain a necessity of human nature. No wide- 
 spread belief has so completely obscured man's vision as 
 the fallacy that human nature never changes. History 
 proves most emphatically, not only that human nature does 
 change, but that without such change social progress is 
 impossible. Hence any objection to an idea of a first 
 cause, based on a contrary supposition, need give us little 
 concern. To know how to estimate such strictures at their 
 true value, we have but to remember that, in the eyes of 
 an idolater, the substitution of a mental picture of God for 
 a wooden image might have been made an equally valid 
 ground of complaint. Moreover, it must not be forgotten 
 that this view of a first cause cannot gain a very wide 
 acceptance until men are prepared for it. When that time 
 arrives, a de-anthropomorphic conception of God will 
 certainly find a fit response in the human soul. To attempt 
 to forecast the emotional changes involved in such a 
 remodelling of human nature would be a hazardous under- 
 taking. But of one thing we may be certain. When the 
 first cause ceases to be an object of love and worship as at 
 present understood, those instincts which prompted men 
 to love and worship God will find a much more appropriate 
 sphere of activity. As for 
 peraecutrng_nnr fellow-mem nnf. of Tjpal far 
 
 E 
 
 " 
 
 begin tp^prjicticfi-JJie moral preceptswhich we have 
 tofore been content with simply preaching; and as for 
 worship, perhapa such of our prevailing religious, forms 
 
16 A THEORY OP LTFE DEDUCED 
 
 and ceremonies as no longer harmonize with the new 
 conception of God will make room for a genuine spirit oi: 
 reverence for noble ideals of manhood and womanhood 
 ideals which we shall strive earnestly to realize in our own 
 lives. 
 
 To recapitulate, the point to be emphasized is, that in 
 place of the anthropomorphic notions of God now dominant, 
 there is here offered a theistic attitude that acknowledges 
 with unswerving consistency the complete inability of the 
 human mind to grasp the Infinite. From this point of 
 view, any representation of God that measures up to the 
 highest theistic conception possible to human beings is 
 wholly free from objection, when coupled with the frank 
 admission that all such representations are at best but 
 symbols totally unlike the incomprehensible reality for 
 which they stand. This conception of God can, of course, 
 gain general acceptance only so fast as the mass of men 
 are alike intellectually, morally, and emotionally prepared 
 for it; and with it will come all such changes in the 
 externals of religion as its acceptance demands. " ' Instead 
 of the present religious ceremonies and forms of worship/ 
 to borrow language elsewhere used, ' there will arise 
 observances tending to keep alive a consciousness of the 
 true relation in which we stand to the unknown cause, and 
 tending to give expression to the sentiment accompanying 
 that consciousness ' ; and as for the minister of the future, 
 he will be chiefly a moral educator, but while discussing 
 ethical questions, which must of themselves exert a highly 
 elevating influence upon his hearers, he will, at the same 
 time, have ample opportunity of ministering to their 
 spiritual needs by appropriate references to the mysteries of 
 cosmology, either for the purpose of quickening the religious 
 emotions and reinforcing the religious consciousness, or 
 
FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 17 
 
 with a view of emphasizing some moral lesson which 
 he may wish to bring home to the hearts of his auditors. 
 Thus will_man's conduct be influenced in the right 
 direction. On the one hand, the necessity of leading 
 a moral life will be impressed upon him; on the other 
 hand, he will be led to reflect upon that inscrutable power 
 whose marvellous energy reveals itself in a universe of 
 
 wonders -a^power which, though indefinable, nay, incom- 
 prehensible, is yet as_real in its existence as it is unknowable 
 in its attributes^"* 
 
 Nor ~3oesthi s view of religion shut out all hopes of 
 posthumous possibilites. Whether or not death means total 
 annihilation is a question which no system of philosophy 
 can even pretend to begin to answer; it is a part of the 
 awful mystery that enshrouds the universe. There is no 
 argument to deprive men of the right to hope for a life 
 beyond the grave, provided always that the true nature of 
 such a hope be constantly kept in mind, and provided they 
 do not allow their feelings in the matter in any way 
 to becloud their intellect. And there will be room for_ 
 faith, too. Not_the__chikUsh faith that trembles bcfore- 
 the faith that can well afford to defy reason 
 
 faith that there is an everlasting- meaning-, a never-ending 
 purpose in life anj^l the nniYornn, whiVh onr inability to 
 .g&tap the entire scheme of things hides from us. Such a 
 faith is, indeed, eminently rational. It does not shun 
 investigation, nor seek to dull the edge of reason. On the 
 contrary it rests on tue logical deductions Of a vTsion wide 
 enough to recognize the deep significance of the limit 
 powers ol 
 
 We come now to consider the subject-matter of science. 
 
 * Herbert Spencer's Theory of Religion and Morality. By Sylvan Drey. 
 London : Williams and Norgate. 
 
18 A THEORY OF LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 Religion, as we have seen, concerns itself solely with that 
 which lies outside the domain of knowledge. It is only for 
 the purpose of drawing the line of demarcation between 
 the knowable and the unknowable, and pointing out the 
 necessary inferences to be deduced from the distinction, 
 that science can be said to touch on the subject-matter of 
 religion. In other words, after proving that there is an 
 unknowable as well as a knowable aspect of things, science 
 surrenders to religion a vast territory over which it can 
 claim no lawful dominion. In expressing ourselves thus, 
 we give those gifted with more wit than insight an 
 excellent opportunity of exercising their powers for 
 the amusement of the unreasoning multitude. Despite 
 all that has been said above on the subject, the field 
 assigned to religion will doubtless be pictured as a barren, 
 desolate waste, which science in a fit of altruism has 
 graciously deeded over to its mighty opponent, for the sake 
 of keeping peace in the evolutionist's kingdom. But when 
 it is remembered that this ' ' barren, desolate waste " stands 
 in truth for the inexplicable origin and the unknowable 
 substance of all things knowable and stands also for a 
 boundless expanse of unexplorable space whose illimitable 
 immensity eludes and baffles the human mind and makes 
 our very imagination tremble ; and when it is further 
 remembered that this congeries of incomprehensible 
 realities, through the all-powerful mystic influence which it 
 must inevitably exert ever the souls of enlightened men, 
 shows itself in every way adequate to the spiritual 
 demands of highly civilized communities, criticism of the 
 kind above indicated to the thoughtful reader, at least, 
 will seem not more shallowly amusing than profoundly silly. 
 Carefully bearing in mind, then, what it is the object 
 of these preliminary remarks to bring into prominence, 
 
FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 19 
 
 fbat science makes no assumption of knowledge con- 
 cerning^ those affections of consciousness which are 
 
 frnnprpT^prirlp-fl nnr)ay $& nnVnnwa.Klftj that it has no 
 
 verdict to render regarding that which lies without the 
 domain of knowledge, except to recognize the existence of 
 sucna, sphere as belonging to religion and as capable of 
 satisfying man's religious needs, it is strictly correct to say 
 that science deals only with the knowable. Having told 
 us, thefi7all that we can know about the subject-matter of 
 religion, let us see what else science has to say about man 
 in his . terrestrial and extra-terrestrial relations. For this 
 purpose it is not necessary to take up the various special 
 branches of science. We need but glance cursorily over 
 the whole field. We are concerned only with practical 
 results. Let us see, then, what is the story that lies 
 hidden in the deductions of science. 
 
 The earth on which we dwell is but an infinitesimal part 
 of a vast universe that contains many other worlds besides 
 our own. Of these other worlds nothing is known 
 except such facts concerning their position, movements, and 
 physical constitution as we have been able to gather by the 
 aid of the telescope and the spectroscope. The entire 
 universe, as at present existing, is supposed to have been 
 gradually evolved from nebulous matter the earth after 
 being detached from the general mass still continuing to 
 develop as a separate body, while remaining at the same 
 time a part of the continuously evolving whole. So much 
 for man in his extra-terrestrial relations, what remains 
 unconsidered belongs, as we have seen, to the domain of 
 religion. But what of our past, present, and future, so far 
 as life on this planet is concerned? For information of 
 the past we are dependent on the records that have come 
 down to us in the shape of history, monuments, and fossil 
 
20 A THEOKY OF LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 remains. From these sources we learn that the earth 
 is many millions of years old, that two or three thousand 
 centuries separate the man of to-day from his primitive 
 ancestors,, and that all life, vegetable, animal, and 
 human, has been brought to its present state through a long- 
 continued process of evolution. Furthermore, there is every 
 reason to believe, from the evidence past and present, in 
 the further working of these evolutionary forces to the end 
 of bringing all things into higher and wider harmony. 
 Ignoring now such aspects of the past, present, and future 
 as do not directly concern the welfare of the human race, 
 for it would occupy too much space to attempt to exhaust 
 the subject even in outline let us inquire what is the 
 meaning of social evolution. Pause for a moment and look 
 back into the far past. Now glance around you to-day, and 
 you will see that social evolution aims at establishing 
 perfect peace between man and man, aims at uniting man- 
 kind in complete harmony. From a past state of chronic 
 hostility on to the present predominantly peaceful state, to 
 the ideal society of perfect peace such is the unmistakable 
 trend of social evolution. Nolens xolens we are being- 
 impelled onward to this goal. There is a power over 
 which each individual has but a limited control slowly 
 making for the realization of all those possibilities that are 
 bound up with a complete eradication of men's aggressive 
 instincts. 
 
 What, now, is the practical import of this fact ? What 
 reasons are there for rejoicing over it ? Why help along 
 these social forces why not use what power we have to 
 resist them ? Let us see. Given a globe, and given a 
 number of people to populate that globe, there can be, 
 broadly speaking, but three possible modes of associated 
 life. Either the inhabitants must assume an attitude of 
 
FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 21 
 
 unqualified hostility towards one another, or of qualified 
 hostility, or they must dwell together on terms of undis- 
 turbed peace. The earliest states of aggregate life may be 
 characterized as preponderantly militant. To-day we have 
 arrived at the predominantly peaceful stage and are 
 moving 011 to the age of complete peace. Nor will social 
 evolution have reached its final limit with the total disap- 
 pearance of open aggression. Evidently the completely 
 peaceful stage of corporate existence cannot claim to 
 represent a perfectly evolved state until, in addition to the 
 cessation of open hostility, there also prevails among men 
 perfect justice and perfect beneficence. Or, to express the 
 idea more properly, as taking into account the highest 
 possible point of individual as well as corporate develop- 
 ment, the perfectly evolved social state must be one in 
 which human conduct has simultaneously reached its 
 physical, biological, psychological, and sociological evolu- 
 tionary limit. Let us say, then, for the sake of clearness, 
 without meaning in any way to insist too strictly on our 
 classification, that there are four states of associated life : 
 the warlike, the predominantly peaceful, the completely 
 peaceful, and the perfectly evolved, or what we shall here- 
 after call the ideal. Now arises the question, Which of 
 these four states of corporate life is the best ? But 
 manifestly this problem admits of no solution until we 
 agree on the meaning of the word " best." For if it be 
 said that every one's ambition ought to be to perfect him- 
 self in the art of murder, then there is no good reason 
 save perhaps the difficulty of finding sufficient material on 
 which to practise the art, in the presence of so many 
 equally skilful brother-assassins there is no good reason, 
 we say, why the warlike state should not be pronounced the 
 best. But clearly no such meaning is implied by the term. 
 
22 A THEORY OF LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 as used by civilized men. When we ask the question : 
 "Which is the best?" we make the tacit assumption, 
 universally concurred in among ourselves, that we all want 
 to extract as much happiness out of life as is possible. 
 All men agree, then, that the greatest attainable happiness 
 is the ultimate aim of life. I say designedly " ultimate " 
 aim ; because there are those who deny that they make 
 happiness the final object of pursuit, and think that they 
 are acting in perfect consonance with the denial in choosing 
 such ends as perfection, virtue, and so forth. Invariably, 
 however, analysis shows that they choose some other 
 proximate aim, simply because happiness is unconsciously 
 made the ultimate end. Restated, then, the problem 
 assumes this form : Which of the four kinds of aggregate 
 life is productive of the greatest possible happiness ? I say 
 designedly " the greatest possible happiness." Not perfect 
 happiness ; for observe that happiness is not solely depen- 
 dent upon human conduct. Even in a state composed of 
 ideal men there may be causes of unhappiness, due to the 
 destructive forces in nature. Over these mankind may 
 never gain complete control. The elements can do a great 
 deal towards destroying happiness, and, so long as we do 
 not see our way clear to say of the- destructive forces in 
 nature that they will ultimately behave towards mankind 
 like perfectly ethical men, we cannot consistently argue 011 
 a contrary hypothesis. Bearing, then, this qualification in 
 mind, let us try briefly to determine which of the four 
 enumerated states of corporate life must be productive of 
 the greatest happiness. But now a new difficulty confronts 
 us. How is it possible amid so much diversity of opinion 
 to agree upon any common standard of happiness ? A, let 
 us say, takes delight in music; B's hobby is hunting; while 
 C is passionately fond of the drama, and so on ; who shall 
 
FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 23 
 
 judge, then, of what "happiness consists ? The difficulty 
 here presented is more apparent than real. There is no 
 necessity of trying to arrive at any consensus as to what 
 constitutes happiness. We must determine not the contents 
 of happiness, but the conditions to its attainment. What, 
 then, are these conditions ? Clearly, that each one of us 
 shall be perfectly free to do what he wills, and yet at the 
 same time be so constituted as not to want to do anything 
 that interferes with the full development of himself and of 
 others. It must be our voluntary desire to further the life 
 of ourselves and our fellow-man in every imaginable way, 
 and we must have reciprocally limited spheres of activity 
 to enable us to gratify this desire. 
 
 We are now at last in a position to answer the queries 
 first above propounded. It needs no argument to prove 
 that the only form of associated life that conforms to the 
 conditions necessary to the attainment of the greatest 
 human happiness is that which we designated above as the 
 ideal state. Hence we can clearly perceive why we ou<;ht 
 to help along the forces of social evolution, why we ought 
 to believe in true civilization ; for what does it all mean but 
 a closer approximation to that state of existence in which 
 the conditions to the attainment of the greatest possible 
 happiness are supposed to have been fulfilled ? 
 /The idea] sncjpfy is but the logical outcome of all this 
 striving after the greatest attainable happiness ; for being 
 composed of men who are perfectly peaceful, perfectly just, 
 and perfectly beneficent ; of men whose conduct has simul- 
 taneously reached its physical, biological, psychological, 
 and sociological evolutionary limit, it must ex, necessitate 
 present a state of affairs where human beings, by conforming 
 to all the requirements of their surroundings, shall find 
 the greatest possible happiness in so doing, and thus realize 
 
24 A THEORY OF LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 as well as may be what is universally conceded to be the 
 ultimate object of life. And even though we may not 
 positively assert that the ideal state will ever be attained, 
 it is nevertheless possible of attainment ; and " unless the 
 whole evolutionary theory be a farce," to borrow words 
 elsewhere used, " antagonism between men must eventually 
 disappear, and in obedience to the law of increasing adap- 
 tability of means to ends, social harmony, to a very high 
 degree, must reign in its steadT 
 
 And now we are in sight of a very important truth, 
 which it was the ulterior purpose of the foregoing remarks 
 to bring out into greater clearness. Judged from another 
 point of view, the source whence the ideal society derives 
 its sanction furnishes us with a scientific basis for ethics 
 and politics ; for, if there be a social arrangement possible 
 by which the greatest sum of happiness can be attained, 
 small as may be the chance of its actual realization, it 
 follows as the day the night that in the conditions for the 
 maintenance of such a state is to be found our material for 
 constructing a moral and political science. Our next step, 
 then, must be briefly to formulate the teachings of these 
 sciences as thus derived. And first, as to ethics what 
 are its fundamental principles ? Translated into simple 
 language they may be thus stated : You say that the aim of 
 life is the greatest possible happiness. Granted. Recol- 
 lect, however, that you are but one of many millions of 
 people, and what has been admitted in your case applies 
 with equal truth to every other human being. You say 
 that if the greatest happiness is the object of existence, 
 you have a right to strive to attain that end. So you have. 
 Bear in mind, however, that this is a right which every 
 other human being enjoys in common with yourself. Hence 
 arises the necessity of limiting your freedom of action to 
 
FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 25 
 
 the extent of recognizing the right of your fellow-men to 
 strive after happiness as well as yourself; otherwise every- 
 body will rush pell-mell, and, amid the hopeless conflict of 
 the general scramble after happiness, there will result no 
 little misery. You cannot possibly offer any logical 
 objection to such a limitation being placed on your conduct ; 
 for remember it is but "another way of saying that nobody 
 ought to interfere unduly with your right to strive after 
 happiness. Furthermore, do not forget that happiness 
 varies in degrees of intensity. Do not suppose that the 
 character of your tastes has no effect on your happiness. 
 Eecollect that the more you cultivate all your faculties, 
 the greater is the sum and the higher is the degree of the 
 happiness which results from their exercise. You see, 
 then, that if you want to secure the greatest possible 
 happiness, there are certain conditions to which you must 
 conform, in order that you may accomplish your end. Not 
 only must you do all in your power to perfect your own 
 i development, not only must you be absolutely just in all 
 \ your dealings with your fellow-men, not only must you do 
 \ nothing to give them pain, but you must actively do every-. 
 1 thing in your power to assist them in gratifying all those 
 I desires which would help to perfect their own development. 
 C| In other words 1 as the perfect fulfilment of the moral law 
 '.constitutes the only means by which the greatest attainable 
 ViqppiTiPsg ran bft achieved, strict obedience jto__the_moral 
 law, and not the pursuit of happiness, must be made the 
 f, of lifft. Jjnjifnris conducive to 
 
 happiness, how jioes it come about that the good jHreso 
 often unhappy, and the wicked happyj^ The explanation 
 is v^ry^i21l^---- r r'^ p rmlifi.ppinpss of the_gpod man springs 
 
 not from his OWp Tnnra1if,y > frrit from fog- wi'p.TrPflnpqq of 
 
 somebody_elsfiJLAa-411ustration will help to correct this 
 
26 A THEOEY OF LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 fatal misconception. A baker, a butcher, a grocer, a 
 clothier, a milkman, a hatter, and a physician make up the 
 entire population of a certain town. They are all good, 
 honest citizens, let us assume, except the baker and the 
 milkman, who are fairly dealt by in their transactions with 
 the rest of the community in spite of their own unscrupu- 
 lous practices and their successful attempts to evade their 
 debts. Now, of course, under such circumstances an 
 honest man, the butcher for example, in the case supposed, 
 may easily be made very unhappy ; but to assign his 
 honesty as the efficient cause of his unhappiness would be 
 about as logical as to say that the injury which a careful 
 person might sustain by falling on the sleety pavement of 
 a negligent neighbour was caused by the injured man's 
 prudence in removing the ice from, his own premises.* 
 No, morality is never the direct cause of unhappiiiess. 
 The objection here raised only proves what has already by 
 necessary implication been strongly emphasized, namely, 
 that uniyrsal happiness is dependent on universal morality^ 
 If in an ideal society, which, as we have seen, means a 
 condition of things where the greatest attainable happiness 
 prevails, any one of the units should suddenly lapse from 
 a state of moral perfection, the total sum of happiness would 
 instantly be diminished, and the society would of necessity 
 cease pro tanto to represent the ideal state. Judge, then, 
 what must be the effect in a society such as ours, where 
 momentarily thousands upon thousands are committing 
 trespasses against their fellow-men ! Amid such a hope- 
 lessly confused entanglement of the natural results of 
 
 * Such subjective states of happiness [as result from the fulfilment of 
 one's duty and which ought to be taken into account as an offset against 
 unhappiness objectively caused, I purposely ignore here, in order to present 
 my opponent's side of the case in its strongest light. 
 
FKOM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 27 
 
 moral and immoral conduct as the associated life of millions 
 of good, bad, and indifferent human beings presents, is it a 
 wonder that the true causal connection between morality 
 and happiness should be somewhat obscured ? Not in the 
 least. Let us be careful then not to confound superficial 
 observation with profound criticism. We must not mistake 
 outer signs for inner realities hold fast the shadow of 
 things and let go the substance. Despite all that can be 
 said to the contrary, the man who makes the greatest 
 attainable happiness the object of his existence is con- 
 sistently bound to lead as moral a life as his surroundings 
 permit; for even if his lot happens to be cast among men 
 who fail in their duty to him, by imitating their example 
 he does but increase the sum of misery, which must in 
 some way, however subtle, recoil upon himself. 
 
 And just here a word of caution seems necessary to 
 correct a grave misapprehension. In setting forth the 
 above facts I do not mean to imply that the evolution 
 philosophy relies upon argument as the efficient means of 
 moralizing the world. That considerations of this kind 
 will have great weight with a certain order of minds can 
 hardly be gainsaid ; but the philosophical evolutionist, 
 better than anyone else, knows the futility of attempting 
 to reform the masses by the power of logic. Neither does 
 he lay claim to any device by means of which mankind can 
 be coaxed, cajoled, or coerced into morality. What, then, 
 is his theory of morals ? He holds that ethics, like 
 religion, like government, like civilization itself, is a 
 growth and development; that just as civilized men of 
 to-day, with such moral improvement as they have attained, 
 were slowly evolved from the rough, rude barbarians of 
 by-gone ages, so the moral evolution of the human 
 race will continue. Other than this natural process of 
 
28 A THEORY OF LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 development whereby, through the influence which, the ever 
 changing conditions of social life are continuously exerting 
 upon the human nervous system, men, so to speak, grow 
 into morality, somewhat as the sapling develops into a 
 tree, other than this natural process of the moralization of 
 the nervous system, the philosophical evolutionist has no 
 special theory of ethics, no particular scheme of moral 
 reformation to advocate or defend. Convinced as he is 
 that the present moral advancement of the human race has 
 been achieved through the working of natural forces, still 
 in operation, he insists that by this same process mankind 
 will be brought to higher and higher planes of ethical 
 development. 
 
 The limits of this article forbid a more detailed exposi- 
 tion of what I take to be the true evolutionary theory of 
 ethics. The subject, however, is one of such overshadowing 
 importance that I must add an illustration which I trust 
 may make any further elucidation unnecessary. At that 
 period in the world's history when wars were habitual, 
 murder was quite a common occurrence ; but as fast as 
 indiscriminate warfare ceased, the altered social conditions 
 consequent upon decreased aggression gradually gave birth 
 to a sense of human fellowship, until, through the influence 
 of such further changes as were involved in the progress of 
 civilization, the average man of to-day has acquired an 
 internal aversion to committing murder, is so constituted 
 nervously as to shrink from the very thought of it. Now 
 what has already taken place with respect to murder will as 
 certainly happen in other cases of wrong-doing. Surely 
 there is nothing in the nature of things to confine this 
 inward shrinking from evil deeds to any particular form of 
 crime. To the question, then, How is the ethical regenera- 
 tion of man to be accomplished ? the philosophical evolu- 
 
FEOM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 29 
 
 tionist replies, Though the moralization of the nervous 
 system the natural process of ethical reformation that 
 has been operating all along and that will continue to 
 operate in the future as it has in the past. What we call 
 1 ' conscience " is, so to speak, but the moral thermometer 
 that marks the progress of this process a process that 
 must go on until the development of mankind is complete. 
 
 And now note that this theory places ethics on a much 
 more secure basis than does the Christian doctrine of post- 
 humous rewards and punishments. While recognizing, for 
 instance, that the blessings of heaven and the dread of 
 hell have exerted great influence over men as ethical agents, 
 the philosophical evolutionist can see no cause for alarm 
 should they ever cease entirely to exercise that authority. 
 Elsewhere I have hinted at the notion that, in some form or 
 other, the hopes and fears bound up with the great mystery 
 of death may ever remain with the human race as a power 
 for good; but even if this suggestion turns out to be 
 utterly valueless, we need give ourselves no serious concern 
 about results ; for, as extra-mundane hopes and fears consti- 
 tute but one of the many forces of ethical evolution, the lapse 
 of a single agency cannot stop the whole moral machinery. 
 Quite on the contrary, as fast as one force fails a new one 
 is slowly evolved to take its place ; meanwhile the process 
 of moralization goes on with more or less activity, and 
 surely it must be conceded that the emotions thus 
 engendered, manifesting themselves as they do in spon- 
 taneous aversions to wrong- doing, furnish us with the 
 safest moral sanctions possible. 
 
 " But," it will be said, " what does the philosophical 
 evolutionist propose to do with men who persist in their 
 evil ways in spite of his theory of ethics." He can do 
 nothing but exert all possible influence to reform them ; 
 
30 A THEORY OF LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 and when lie fails to produce any good results, he has no 
 alternative but patiently to let matters take their own 
 course; unless, indeed, the safety of his person or property 
 is endangered, in which event he calls in the police, or appeals 
 to the proper tribunal for protection. And, strange as it 
 may appear, it is nevertheless a fact that this is precisely 
 the course that the Christian himself must pursue; for in 
 spite of the rewards and punishments which Christianity 
 holds out as moral incentives, are there not hosts of wicked 
 men among Christians ? Are there not plenty whom 
 you can neither entice nor frighten into goodness by the 
 fair promises of heavenly bliss or by the eternal fires of 
 hell ? It is no answer to this argument to say that they 
 are not true Christians. I am not attacking Christianity. 
 The point that I make is, what is the Christian going to do 
 with those who will not abandon their evil ways in the face 
 of all imaginable threats and promises to coerce or entice 
 them into morality ; and I make the point to prove that, in 
 taunting the philosophical evolutionist with having no 
 means of awakening moral enthusiasm in the breast of a 
 wicked profligate, the Christian forgets that he may very 
 often be placed in the same predicament himself, in spite of 
 holding an altogether different moral theory. 
 
 So much for ethics.^ We come next to consider the 
 deductions of political science, and incidentally to supple- 
 ment what has already been said on the wider subject of 
 social science. From the philosophical evolutionist's point 
 of view the true purpose of government is to prevent 
 citizens from encroaching on each other's rights. Within these 
 limits the state ought rigidly to enforce obedience ; but 
 interference with personal liberty for any other purpose does 
 not come within the proper sphere of government. Such 
 measures of reform, however, as are commendable in 
 
FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 31 
 
 themselves need not on that account be abandoned. The 
 voluntary cooperation of those who favour them is 
 generally a sufficient guarantee of their being carried into 
 successful execution ; and it is in this direction that we 
 must look for their successful inauguration. 
 
 The object of state control, as we have seen, is to prevent 
 citizens from encroaching on one another's rights. Accord- 
 ing to the evolution philosophy, however, the spirit of 
 aggression and hostility must decline as civilization 
 advances ; hence when men attain to the high state of 
 moral development pre-supposed by the ideal society, the 
 need of such external restraints on freedom as it is the 
 duty of government to impose will, in a great measure, if 
 not entirely, cease. Internal restraints will supply the 
 place of legislative coercion. We may say then that if 
 there are any functions at all for a government to perform 
 in an ideal society they must be such as consist with the 
 most complete human development such as insist upon 
 the least possible state control and the greatest possible 
 personal freedom. The practical import of which is that 
 we ought always to keep this standard of government in 
 view as the goal to be attained ; and whatever compromises 
 between individualism and state control we may be induced 
 to advocate as a present need ought not to blind us to the 
 fact we shall never attain the perfect form of government 
 until the control needful to make good citizens comes from 
 within and not from without. And thus, incidentally, we 
 are brought to see the true purpose of social evolution. It 
 does lut aim to lead men out of the condition of freedom and 
 desire to injure their fellow-men back again into the original 
 state of freedom with none of the original desire. J- 
 ''^But how is this goal to be attained ? Not indeed by any 
 magic means. Simply and solely through natural agencies, 
 
32 A TIIEOEY OP LIFE DEDUCED 
 
 through the instrumentality of justice and sympathy in 
 their most highly developed and most completely diversified 
 form in a word, through the moral perfection of the 
 human race. ^ 
 
 The political creed of the philosophical evolutionist, then, 
 is the doctrine of individualism. Not crude, anarchistic, or 
 anti-social individualism, however; for society, as we have 
 seen, cannot attain perfection until its units are bound 
 together by the closest ties of sympathy. The individualism 
 which the philosophical evolutionist advocates fully recog- 
 nizes the brotherhood of man ; and, in order that due 
 prominence may be assigned to its cooperating character, 
 it might be designated as social individualism, to indicate 
 more clearly the distinctive features of the ideal state from 
 the standpoint of political evolution. This term has, too, 
 the advantage of indicating on its face that the philosophi- 
 cal evolutionist recognizes that modicum of truth contained 
 in the perverted notions of the anarchists, on the one hand, 
 and the exaggerations of the socialists, on the other. That 
 men ought to be perfectly free, as Anarchy asserts, and 
 that the freedom of each ought to be regulated for the 
 benefit of all, as Socialism maintains, are propositions which 
 the philosophical evolutionist admits when conjoined with 
 the all-essential further truth that human beings never can 
 be perfectly free, nor can the freedom of each ever be 
 completely under the regulative control of all, until men 
 are perfectly moral. When we will not do what we ought 
 not to do, while yet having complete freedom to do it; 
 when liberty, externally uncontrolled, is internally controlled; 
 when we have only such desires, hopes, or ambitions as 
 belong to the ideal man, then ought we to be, and shall we 
 be, perfectly free ; then ought we to feel, and shall we feel, 
 constrained to work for the welfare of humanity .> 
 
FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 33 
 
 And now at last our task is completed. " But/' it will 
 be said, "even if the teachings of the Evolution Philosophy 
 be correct, they cannot be accepted as absolute truth. You 
 have yourself forgotten one of your fundamental principles. 
 Did you not restrict the field of philosophy to the knowable, 
 and did you not caution the reader against supposing that 
 finite beings can know anything within that field except as 
 finite beings : whence it follows that your conclusions are 
 after all of little value. " It is undeniable that absolute 
 truth is beyond the grasp of human beings ; but for all 
 practical purposes the teachings of the evolution philosophy, 
 relative truths though they be, may be regarded as final and 
 conclusive. Even though they be utterly false from the 
 standpoint of absolute knowledge, they are all-sufficient for 
 our guidance in the daily affairs of life, and are to be 
 valued accordingly. Two analogies will help to make our 
 meaning clear. The earth, in reality, is but a mere speck 
 in the universe compared with other worlds, but to us it is 
 a huge globe nevertheless. We carry on the concerns of 
 life just as if it were relatively as large as it appears 
 absolutely. What though it be but a tiny ball in space ; if 
 we undertake to travel around its circumference its relative 
 diminutiveness does not decrease the length of the journey. 
 Again, when we stand in the presence of a gigantic moun- 
 tain it loses none of its sublime grandeur because, relative 
 to the earth's entire surface, its height does not in reality 
 exceed the ridges of an orange peel. Js the ascent any the 
 less fatiguing on that account ? Is the time assumed in 
 mounting to the top any shorter ? Assuredly not. We 
 perceive, then, that this objection is of no weight, except in 
 so far as it very properly warns us against setting up human 
 knowledge as a true measure of the universe. Nor must we 
 conclude that, because absolute knowledge is unattainable, 
 
34 A THEORY OP LIFE DEDUCED FROM THE EVOLUTION PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 one man's theory of life embodies as much truth as another's. 
 It was Goethe, we believe, who very wisely observed : " If 
 I acquiesce at last in. some fact of nature, it is no doubt 
 only resignation ; but it makes a great difference whether 
 the resignation takes place at the limits of human faculty, 
 or within the hypothetical boundaries of my own narrow 
 individuality/' This is one of the cardinal doctrines of the 
 philosophical evolutionist. Fearlessly pushing his inquiries 
 to the uttermost limits of knowledge, when once the impass- 
 able gulf is reached he quickly calls a halt, and, echoing 
 the words of Dubois-Keymoiid, which Herbert Spencer had 
 in substance uttered long before him, he openly proclaims : 
 "Ignoramus ! Ignoramibus I " We know not ! We never 
 shall know ! On the brink of this impassable gulf the 
 philosophical evolutionist must ever stand in mute 
 bewilderment, pointing to Religion, as he pictures her to 
 himself, as the only trustworthy guide under whose 
 leadership mankind can continue its pilgrimage. 
 
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