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THE TRANSITION FROM "BEWUSSTSEIN" 
 
 TO "SELBSTBEWUSSTSEIN'' 
 
 IN 
 
 Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind 
 
 AN EXEGETICAL ESSAY 
 
 With an Introduction and With Notes 
 
 By 
 
 Henry Bradford Smith 
 
 A Thesis Presented to the Fac«Ity of the Graduate School 
 
 of the University of Pennsylvania, in Partial Fwl- 
 
 fillment of the Requirements for the 
 
 Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 PrcM of B. D. Smhh & Brothers 
 Pulaski, Virginia 
 
PREFACE, 
 
 np HE aim of this essay is to present an exegesis of the early 
 
 chapters of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind in a phraseol- ^ 
 ogy, which, while not untechnical, will be as free as possible of 
 the strange and often mystifying verbiage of Hegel. 
 
 Hegel is perhaps more than aoy other philosopher the pro- 
 duct of the speculation that preceded him, and it would thus 
 seem possible to reproduce his argument in terms which are the 
 common property of philosophy in general. The advantage of 
 clearness which is thus attained is offset by the impossibility of 
 an exact rendition. It is impossible to render the author in 
 familiar terms without more or less perverting his meaning. 
 Thus the commentators have in general been content to restate 
 the argument in the original verbiage, with no great resulting 
 advantage to clearness; nor is the reader helped if the author's 
 style be imitated in a language other than the German. 
 
 Hegel largely invented his own technical vocabulary. He 
 was doubtless suspicious of the ambiguity of the terms in famil- 
 iar use and aware of their inadequacy to express his meaning. 
 When a new word is introduced it is usually delined, but the 
 definition will in itself scarcely render the meaning intelligible 
 to the reader. It is only after the term has appeared many times 
 in a context that its real meaning begins to appear. Thus the 
 first parts of the system may only become clear in the light of 
 the last. 
 
 The Phenomenology is admittedly one of the most difficult 
 of all philosophical works and the present essay makes no pre- 
 tense of an understanding of all these difficulties. Moreover the 
 notions that are philosophically significant will be subject to a 
 multitude of interpretations and will be often presentable from 
 many points of view. 
 
 It is with the belief that some intelligible system of interpre- 
 tation, even if inexact in some of the details, is better than no 
 system, or a system exact but unintelligible, that the present 
 essaj;^ has been prepared. 
 
 228333 
 
INTRODUCTION, 
 
 npHB interest which the early chapters of the Phenomenol- 
 ogy — viz., those embracing the general headings, "con- 
 sciousness" and the "self-consciousness" — possess, lies partly 
 in the dialectic transition as such, and partly in the fact that 
 the treatment parallels the history of an important philosoph- 
 ical concept, the ' ' Ding an sich ' ' from Kant to Fichte. 
 
 The chapter on the "Certainty of Sense" presents what is 
 roughly an analysis of this concept as it presents itself in the 
 transcendentale Aesthetik^. This of course is the part of the 
 Critique that elaborates the theory of the a priori forms of sensi- 
 bility, space and time, which are supposed to account for 
 individuality. This chapter, in which the individual takes its 
 place as a " thing in itself" and in which the truth of the cer- 
 tainty of sense turns out to be the universal, is a fine example of 
 Hegelian skill. In the next chapter " the thing of perception " 
 plaj^s the role of the ^'Ding an sich'^ in its new guise in the 
 Analytik,"^ or more exactly as it appears in the corresponding 
 part of the Prolegomena,^ and finally the chapter on " Force and 
 the Understanding" presents a critique of the concept as it^ 
 exhibits itself generally in the Dialectik^. The division whichl 
 deals with the self- consciousness owes its position to the histor^ 
 leal fate of the " thing in itself" in the ethical idealism of Fichte.\ 
 The author himself, however, seems consciously to avoid giving 
 the impression that this order is in mind; and indeed the obser- 
 vation applies only to the whole and not to the details, many of 
 which are historical standpoints selected freely without regard 
 to their chronological origin. 
 
 The ideal of rationalism is the formulation of a definition of 
 a fact from which the fact's existence is the necessary implica- 
 
 1 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Originalausgabe), S. 3S-73. 
 
 2 Ibid, S. 89-349. 
 
 3 Ibid, S. 349-732. 
 
 * Prolegomena zu einer jeden kunftigen Metaphysik.etc. (ed. Reclam) , S. 73-1Q9. 
 
tion. The difficulty of the rationalist's position seems patent to 
 the empiricist, who regards his fact as directly given in experi- 
 ence. It is the custom of some to say that the kind of philosophy 
 one chooses depends upon what kind of a human being one 
 happens to be. If temperamentally one prefers reality to general 
 information, he will be an empiricist, while if his philosophic 
 needs compel him to rank the whole as of greater interest than 
 the part, then he will be a rationalist; that in the one case one 
 prefers to submerge himself in the world and lose himself, with 
 a consequent gain in reality, while in the other case one elects 
 to elevate himself above the world and as a consequence be at a 
 loss to account for the facts of experience. One must make up 
 his mind, they will tell you, to have some difficulties at hand for 
 which his system cannot hope to account. The situation is not 
 without humor when it is a professed empiricist who talks in 
 this fashion, for reflection seems to show that the empiricist is 
 in a worse way for his fact than is the rationalist. 
 
 Absolute knowledge viewed as the limit of a series of 
 approximations may be regarded as attainable if the series have 
 an end; unattainable if the series be infinite. In the latter case 
 the philosopher may perhaps regard his absolute as the percept 
 of a divine intellect or resort toa " pre-established harmony " of 
 his primal substance, or by some postulate or other satisfy this 
 philosophic need. The rationalist either regards this knowledge 
 as attained when his definition is at hand (as Descartes) or if it 
 be the last of a series of definitional implications, its attainment 
 will be determined by whether or not this series has an end. 
 The absolute knowledge of Hegel is a result of the latter sort. 
 Of course the author is not necessarily in any paragraph giving 
 an expression of his own philosophical opinion. Usually some 
 historical standpoint is being considered or one side of an antith- 
 esis is being developed. The true Hegelian view is to be 
 regarded as the outcome which dialectic deduces from the clash 
 of conflicting standpoints. The law of contradiction is for the 
 rationalist the supreme canon of method. The object (as con- 
 cept) whose definition implies its own antithesis is nothing. 
 The dialectic proceeds until through definitional implication, 
 the object of knowledge is defined whose truth is implied. This 
 
object is the absolute and is thus distinguished from all other 
 objects of consciousness that appeared in the process, for the 
 definition of each one of these is conceived as involving inherent 
 contradiction. 
 
 It is suggestive to recall certain passages from Schelling in 
 this connection as making clear the source of the Hegelian view 
 as thus interpreted. The phenomena of the path of the dialectic 
 are the conflicts of contradictory opinions. When the contra- 
 diction is removed, the phenomenon (now appearance) ceases to 
 possess reality; it vanishes and leaves a nothing. Through the 
 dialectic the successive scenes of conflict are left behind until 
 through flight the promised land of the absolute is reached. For 
 Schelling, however, to attain the absolute is to attain pure self- 
 consciousness. " All processes of the mind proceed with this 
 in view, to portray the infinite in the finite. The end of all 
 these processes is the self- consciousness, and the history of these 
 processes is nothing but the history of the self-consciousness. 
 Every process of the soul is also a determinate state of the soul. 
 The history of the human mind will thus be nothing but the 
 history of the different states through which the mind gradually 
 attains unto intuition of itself, unto pure self-consciousness."^ 
 And, again: ''Had we only to do with the absolute there would 
 never have arisen a conflict of different systems. Only when 
 we have left the domain of the absolute does there arise a conflict 
 regarding the same, and only because of this original conflict in 
 the human mind, arise the conflicts of philosophers. Should it 
 ever happen — not to philosophers but — to mankind, to be able to 
 leave this domain in which they have lapsed through desertion 
 of the absolute, then will all philosophy and that domain itself, 
 cease to exist. For the latter originates only through that con- 
 flict and has reality only so long as the conflict continues."^ 
 Again to quote from Fichte: " Epistemology ( Wissenschaftslehre) 
 is necessary not alone as a clearly conceived, systematically 
 exhibited science, but as a natural predisposition — while logic is 
 
 1 Werke, Abth. I. Bd. I, S. 382, Erlauterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaf- 
 
 tslehre. 
 
 2 Werke, Abth. I, Bd. I. S. 293, Philosophische Briefe iiber Dogmatismus \\n^ 
 
 Kriticismus. 
 
 W 
 
an art- prod act of the human mind in its freedom."^ These 
 passages indicate the source of an opinion which has come to be 
 regarded as typically Hegelian. 
 
 The Phenomenology begins with a consideration of the truth 
 furnished the subject by the fact of immediate observation. 
 When a series of observations is made on some definite quantity 
 by the use (say) of an instrument, as is well known, the individ- 
 ual observations exhibit discrepancies among themselves and 
 this is the case even when all known and avoidable sources of 
 error have been removed. It is the custom of physical science 
 to select a value of the unknown observed quantity, which gives 
 what is regarded as the most probable value — the nearest approx- 
 imation to the true value attainable with the data at hand. 
 This, the physicist will say, is in answer to a logical demand — 
 each one of a series of discordant results cannot be simultaneously 
 true. In introducing the notion of error in this way, empirical 
 science, either tacitly or openly, postulates a real fact forever 
 beyond the reach of knowledge by experiment. 
 
 That this knowledge is unattainable seems to be a matter of 
 experience^ for while small errors seem to occur more frequently 
 than large errors and while more refined methods of observation 
 seem to give more exact results, even if the object observed were 
 the same from moment to moment, the observer is not the same 
 observer that he was a moment before. However this may be, 
 it follows deHnitionally from the manner in which this real fact 
 is postulated that it will ever remain unknown, for if an in- 
 creasingly large number of observations give an increasingly 
 accurate approximation to the true value and if the probable 
 value of any finite number of observations will always have a 
 probable error attached, then it is an immediate and necessary 
 inference that the true value will be the most probable value of 
 an infinite number of observations and that this true value has 
 no probable error attached. But an infinite number of observa- 
 tions means, if it means anything, a greater number than can 
 ever be taken — an infinite number of observations is by definition 
 impossible. Therefore to postulate the fact thus is to postulate 
 it unknowable — or the fact is unknowable by definition. It can- 
 not be said that the limit of the series is the true value, for the 
 
 1 Werke Abth. L Bd. I, S. 69, Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre. 
 
 [5] 
 
series has never a limit but always only a probable limit. The 
 notion is that positive errors will cancel negative errors, but the 
 law that states the equal frequency or facility of occurrence of 
 positive and negative errors only holds when an infinite number 
 of observations is obtained and this is equivalent to saying that 
 it never holds. Again the chances are co :1 according to the post- 
 ulate that any given observation has an error, and hence, defini- 
 tional ly, every observation has an error, which the true value 
 has not. Since every observation has an error attached, whether 
 the number taken be large or small, the compounded result is 
 not an observation but an universal result, i. e., a similar set of 
 observations would give rise to the same value of the unknown 
 quantity. The true value would not cease to be a computation 
 and become an observation in virtue of the number of observa- 
 tions passing from the finite to the infinite. 
 
 If it is the view of the empiricist that the real fact is 
 postulated because of the discrepancies among certain observa- 
 tions, this is because he would avoid the sceptical conclusion that 
 the truth is the last perception or that there is a different truth 
 for each observer. In so far as this is his motive, however, he is 
 not empiricist but rationalist; his postulate answers a logical de- 
 mand. He is properly empiricist if he asserts that his real fact is 
 postulated on empirical grounds, i. e., because it is a matter of 
 experience that errors occur. But the notion of error is only 
 introduced when a true value without error is postulated. If 
 the observations had no probable error there would be no need 
 of the postulate. If they have a probable error then a true 
 value without error is already postulated. Therefore, a real 
 fact is postulated because a real fact is postulated. If the real 
 fact be postulated in answer to the logical demand which asserts 
 that a series of discordant results cannot be simultaneously true, 
 then the real fact is postulated because of the laio of contradiction. 
 The existence of the fact Jollows from the law of contradiction. 
 This would be the view of the rationalist. 
 
 The postulate takes another form when it is said that the 
 real fact is postulated because of its definition. But its defini- 
 tion is equivalent to the assertion that it can never be known. 
 The empiricist says: "/t is because it is.^^ The theologian as- 
 
 [6] 
 
sei'ts: '■'■It is because it can never he known.^^ He names his fact 
 God and describes his postulate as his supreme act of faith. 
 
 Such an absolute is the natural meeting place for realism and 
 idealism but it is not one in which either realist or idealist is 
 called upon to rejoice. The ground is cleared for an absolute 
 scepticism. Having to deal with an unknowable which is abso- 
 lutely real the sceptic can argue with his opponent as he likes. 
 '■'■ The more information we have of our fact," we may suppose 
 him to say, ''the more real does it become. Of the absolute 
 fact we have no information. Therefore, the absolute fact 
 is absolutely unreal. But the absolute fact was postulated 
 as the most real thing. Therefore, to define the absolute 
 fact as the most real thing is to imply its absolute unreality." 
 Or otherwise: "Nothing is both a and non-a; the absolute fact 
 is both real and unreal and is consequently nothing." Again: 
 " A. thing that is not a possible object of consciousness is no 
 thing. The absolute fact can never be known and is therefore 
 nothing." These contradictions which seem to follow definition- 
 ally are not the only weapons of the sceptic. As an induction 
 from experience, the realist or the idealist asserts that the real 
 fact is never the same from moment to moment. The real fact 
 is postulated with the admission that it is in constant flux. 
 Again the observer is not the same observer from moment to 
 moment. There are as many real facts as observers. The post- 
 ulator may rightly be called upon to explain this. 
 
 Fichte's fundamental postulate, "I am because lam," is 
 akin to both the empiricist's and the rationalist's mode of asser- 
 tion. In form it is the empiricist's, viz., "The real fact is 
 postulated because it is postulated." In content it is in the 
 rationalist's manner, for the ego as pure activity is no thing (a 
 passive something) and hence can never be object of knowledge. 
 Hence, " it is because it can never be known." The expression 
 " It is because it is," is familiar in the writings of those philos- 
 ophers immediately following Kant. Thus in HegeP " the 
 thing is and it is only because it is." In Fichte the "I" is 
 predicated as existent because it is existent in the same sense. 
 The purely logical law " A is A," does not hold without quali- 
 
 1 Fbanomeuologie des Geistes, Qoebhardt, Bamberg und Wurtzburg,1807, S.23 
 
 [7] 
 
fications, such as, in the same place, at the same time, under the 
 same circumstances, etc., etc. **I am I " holds without qualifi- 
 cation since the subject in question is the absolute subject. Of 
 the first we say: " if A is, A is;" of the second: " because A is, 
 A is." The use of "because ' in the sense of the present 
 context might be expected since the real fact in this connection 
 and the '' I " in Fichte play the same part as '' thing iu itself." 
 Each is predicated absolutely since neither has any ^^Erkennt- 
 nissgrund.'^ The " A is ^ " in Fichte finds its sufiBcient reason 
 in the "I am I." In the Fichtean postulate, form and content 
 being identical, the rationalistic and the empirical dilemma is 
 supposedly transcended. This conclusion is the corollary which 
 Schelling draws and clears the ground for his "identity system." 
 This manner of satisfying the demand of the rationalist and 
 empiricist at once, necessitates the assumption of an ego as 
 pure activity which at the same time is no thing (nothing) and 
 this zero answers the same demand as that of the real fact of 
 science forever beyond the reach of experiment. 
 
 " In this choice, (we might imagine Schelling to say), in 
 this choice as to how the " thing in itself " shall be postulated, 
 the theologian has the courage to stand on the platform of his 
 dilemma, but he fears to call his God what the concept implies. 
 He clothes his concept with this or that unessential or accidental 
 feature in his vain attempt to supply it with reality. He lacks 
 the courage to submerge himself in the real world. The materi- 
 alist has the courage to submerge himself in his world but he is 
 coward when asked to strip his world of its reality — to admit its 
 absolute unreality." 
 
 The real fact is qualitatively the same as any individual 
 observation of it: That is to say, if a mass be observed the real 
 mass lies beyond observation but is nevertheless a mass of some 
 definite amount. It is an instance of mass. The necessity of 
 postulating it in this manner is the result of what we may call 
 the necessity of perception. It is the necessity which assures us 
 that we are not observing any one of a number of masses but a 
 determinate mass; that we do not observe a length in general but 
 a particular instance of length. 
 
 The most probable value of an unknown observed quantity 
 
 [8] 
 
is uot itself observed; it is deduced as the result of a set of observa- 
 tions. The actual value of the unknown (i. e., the limit of the 
 probable value when the number of observations is increased 
 without limit) cannot then be an observation unless, as was sug- 
 gested before, it be argued that it ceases to be a deduction and 
 becomes an observation in virtue of the number of observations 
 taken passiug from the finite to the infinite. The actual value 
 (the real fact) is a general or universal result, i. e., a similar set 
 of observations would lead to the same result. Of course if an in- 
 finite number of observations were taken a second time on the 
 unknown quantity, each observation of the first set would suj)- 
 posedly occur in the second set but in a different position in the 
 series, in such a way, however, that the implied result of each 
 set should be the same unknown quantity. The real fact is uot 
 immediate as was supposed at first and before reflection; its truth 
 appears as universal. As universal its necessity is the kind of 
 necessity that folloios on definition. 
 
 The contradiction at hand is the contradiction of definitional 
 and perceptive necessity and the presence of this contradiction 
 directs our attention to the fact that the original postulate has 
 failed to meet the initial need. Our difliculty in the beginning 
 was due to the experience that the individual members of a series 
 of observations are not the same. This difficulty was supposedly 
 removed when the individual discrepancies were attributed to 
 the variable state of the observer and when the real result was 
 postulated as independent of the observer, qualitatively the same 
 as the perception of it, but always quantitatively different. De- 
 fined in this way, however, it ceased to be an instance of the 
 observed quantity, since it is never perceived, and became mii- 
 versal. As universal, it fails, however, to meet the initial need, 
 which was for a stable element in the flux of perception. The 
 real fact must then remain an instance of the quality in question 
 but an instance which is independent of the perception of it, a 
 " thing in itself." As such, however, its definition leads to the 
 standing contradiction. 
 
 Besides its characteristic of being unknowable the definition 
 of the real fact implies as well that it is a limit which may be 
 approached as near as one may wish but never attained. Viewed 
 
in this manner it is in the nature of an ideal. Its reality is the 
 kind of reality that attaches to any other concept and is not a 
 reality that subsists somehow independently of the subject. 
 Like the " I am I" of Fichte, the subject postulates it and this 
 is its sole ground of existence. 
 
 In its lirst form as a reality lying beyond its manifestations 
 in experience and as the objective cause of perception it is the 
 cause of appearances and hence comes to be identified with force 
 (Kraft). As the "inner truth" it is implied by its appear- 
 ances, for it is only postulated because of these. (In the language 
 of Hegel) "The expression of the force implies the force proper." 
 But also in the opposite sense, as the cause of its manifestations, 
 it implies these. Now the force proper has appeared as an ideal, 
 or it is conceptual in its nature, and the only way in which a 
 concept can be the cause of anything in this connection is in the 
 sense that its effects follow as the necessary implications of its 
 definition. (In the language of Hegel) "The force proper im- 
 plies its expression and follows upon the realization of its 
 expression." 
 
 The use of the term "force" (Kraft) in this connection is 
 intelligible when the habit of thought familiar in Fichte and 
 Schelling is recalled. "She (the soul) does not intuite herself 
 without exhibiting herself in an object. She will thus intuite 
 herself as an object in which there is productive force. "^ Of 
 course the standpoint is the idealism that represents the world 
 as the product of the self. " Since there is in the mind an un- 
 ending striving to organize itself, so too in the outer world, an 
 universal tendency to organization must reveal itself."'^ And 
 again: " No organization is thinkable without productive force. 
 I should like to know how such a force would come into matter, 
 if we regard matter as a thing in itself. * * * Theris is a 
 productive force in things outside us. Such a force is only the 
 force of a mind; thus those things cannot be things in them- 
 selves— i. e., cannot possess reality through themselves. They 
 can only be the creations, the products of a mind."^ 
 
 1 Schelling, Werke, Abth. I, Bd. I, S. 385-386, Erlauterung des Idealismus 
 der Wissenschaftslehre. 
 
 2 ibid, B. 386. 
 
 3 Ibid, S. 387. 
 
 [10] 
 
" Force " appears then as an active principle in the sensible 
 world and its activity is the necessity of definitional implication. 
 In this sense it is the free self-active legislator for appearances 
 and as the ''inner" or "beyond" the perceived world it 
 appears as a kingdom of laws, the true image of reality. This 
 kingdom of laws as the laws of definition and hence as creations 
 of the self, is seen to be nothing but the realm of the self's 
 activity. When these laws have been formulated the self's 
 activity is realized, the curtain is raised on the " beyond '' and 
 the self -consciousness appears. 
 
 Nevertheless, it is patent that any instance of change in the 
 world of perception is not implied by the law of change itself, 
 for even if all the laws of the universe were formulated, an initial 
 situation would have to be known before all past and future 
 situations could be predicted definitionally. A physicist (as 
 Laplace) might say: ''Give me the mass, velocity and position 
 of all the matter in the universe and I will predict any future 
 situation." But without such data his completed description of 
 the world is an empty form and m itself helpless without this 
 alien assistance. The real fact, defintd as beyond the reach of 
 observation, was introduced at first as a "force" which would 
 account for an initial situation. Since it lies beyond experience 
 it is an ideal and is then recognized as the contribution of the 
 describer. Through the experience of this transformation the 
 self-consciousness makes its appearance, but the gap between the 
 law as universal and its individual illustration is not bridged. 
 
 By the real fact as initially postulated one was far from 
 meaning the self's activity or even a product due entirely to 
 self's activity. The need to be met was that of an objective 
 stimulus which should somehow remain stable in the flux 
 of sense perception. If the truth be merely the last percep- 
 tion, a thoroughgoing scepticism results. Eegarded as inde- 
 pendent of the self, the real fact appears as a "thing in itself," 
 (i. e., as no thing), and it comes then to be regarded as the 
 constant or invariable character that attaches to change among 
 things or as the law of change.^ In this guise, however, it fails 
 
 1 Cf. Hegel's words: Die Kraft ist gerade so beschajfen, wie das Oesetz 
 (opp. cit. S. S5). 
 
 [11] 
 
to meet tbc original need. The need was not for an invariable 
 formula of change, but for a term that should remain invariable 
 in such a formula. The initial motive is still unsatisfied if the 
 real fact in its role of law fails to meet the initial need. That it 
 does fail in this is patent if the law carries no criterion of the 
 terms that enter into it, if it furnishes no test of its own appli- 
 cation; for then we have two independent constants — the law 
 itself and the terms that enter into it. 
 
 The alternative is to regard the law as the definition of the 
 term. The real fact is that which behaves in the way prescribed. 
 Thus mass is that fact which exactly satifies the formula of the 
 law of gravitation. Of course this fact cannot be independent 
 of the self, and Schelling has been quoted above as saying that 
 " the force in nature is nothing but the force of the mind." It 
 is of course evident that the contrast of the law as essence and 
 its individual realization or instance is not thus transcended. 
 The requirements of an initial situation or instance is furnished 
 for Fichte by the so-called intellectual intuition, the intuition 
 of the self as pure activity, in which the self is seen to exist 
 through the mere act of predication. The problem which the 
 idealism of Fichte does not seem to explain naturally is this: 
 If the real fact is the ego, or the ego's activity, how is the multi- 
 plicity of egos to be explained and how is the conclusion to be 
 escaped that there are as many systems of truth as there are 
 egos? The answer to the first question might be that the num- 
 ber of real facts is no difficulty so soon as one is at hand, or as 
 soon as a starting point is attained. 
 
 For Hegel the absolute is not reached on the attainment of 
 the pure self consciousness, this representing but a station in the 
 ^progress to the final goal. 
 
 [12] 
 
Before taking up an investigation of nature, the critical 
 philosopher is inclined to make a preliminary survey of himself 
 and his faculties, as the subjective medium through which truth 
 is given; to see how far his knowledge is dependent on this 
 medium— in short, to inquire of the true essence of the subjec- 
 tive and the objective. The mechanism of mind, whose func- 
 tion it is to deliver finished truths to the subject, must be 
 approached for its own sake, and a natuial dialectic is hence 
 confronted with the problem of how this approach is to be 
 instigated. 
 
 The field of choice indeed appears to be open enough, but 
 through previous acquaintance with the problems of mind, it is 
 ventured that on first reflection "the objective" appears as that 
 part which is independent of this medium, and hence the "real" 
 element as over against the "accidental." The "real" received 
 through the medium undergoes a change, a formation; it receives 
 the imprint of the medium. When external reality (the "real" 
 hypothesized) is fed into the mechanism of mind, the re^sultant 
 product ceases to be real. It becomes the "accidental," for it is 
 known, not as it is, but as it appears in the medium.^ 
 
 It would seem that should we discover the behavior of the 
 mechanism — the laws of its action — the "real" would be dis- 
 tinguished from the "accidental" as well as the true from the 
 false. Should we attempt to remove the "accidental" and so 
 obtain the "real" in its pure state, we require a test that will 
 distinguish the subjective from the objective; but this touchstone 
 would in no way help us, for all appears only through the 
 medium. A formula describing how our knowledge is affected 
 in the medium is not then what we require. We require to know 
 "not the law of refraction of the lays in the medium, but the 
 rays themselves." 
 
 As a result of this first engagement with its natural exper- 
 ience, dialectic retreats, proceeds to examine her presuppositions, 
 and discovers that various distinctions have been assumed. A 
 medium and something separately existing for itself (the hy- 
 
 [13] 
 
pothesized "real"), and the distinction between a self audits 
 information, are the antitheses which separate out. If the absolute 
 be viewed as "beyond" the province of experience and as a 
 something to which knowledge cannot attain, it is customary to 
 say that the subject is foredoomed to know only an aspect of 
 truth, the phenomenal reflection of the "real." But now the 
 absolute "real" and the knowledge the subject possesses come 
 into stronger antithesis. The chasm is not bridged but only 
 deepened. This characteristic assumption that the absolute is 
 the only " real," effectually blocks a solution. To suppose that 
 we already possess a meaning for such categories as these, is to 
 suppose our first task already accomplished; indeed to attach a 
 complete meaning to them is the task itself. 
 
 The exposition as just given is not itself the knowledge 
 which dialectic seeks. It is rather to be viewed as a sample of 
 the history of natural dialectic — as the viewing of inner exper- 
 ience in its successive manifestations. It does not represent 
 truth itself but a process of which truth is the final term. The 
 ways of philosophizing are many. The systems, in which great 
 thought has been given classical form, are not to be regarded as 
 ways of exhibiting the same truths with greater or less success, 
 but rather as a continuous dialectic development, which consti- 
 tutes the growth of metaphysical experience.'- The process must 
 be followed to the final term. Forewarned that the successive 
 shapes, into which this experience is cast, are not the goal, con- 
 sciousness views the process as the road of appearances; the 
 shapes at hand present but phenomenal knowledge. The task 
 which the science of mind prescribes for itself is to transcend 
 these its accidents. Each succeeding point of view, as the child 
 of the preceding, is committed to the death of its parent. Viewed 
 in this light the task of metaphysic postulates a faith in its 
 outcome. 
 
 Viewed for itself and not for its result, the natural dialectic 
 may be regarded as the road of scepticism.^ Not indeed a Carte- 
 sian scepticism, in which, when the doubt has been removed, 
 the original opinion remains as it was before, but a scepticism 
 whose outcome is quite the antithesis of the opinion which gave 
 birth to it. It is the postulate of the untruth of the phenomenal 
 
 [14] 
 
knowledge with which it is committed to deal. It is the postu- 
 late that the self must follow its own conviction, or rather 
 construct its own opinion — that in fact the truth can only be the 
 final product of the self.* 
 
 The life of natural dialectic is in conformity to law and its 
 progress unavoidable.* The context and interconnection of its 
 phenomena — points of view — on this road of appearances, are 
 the guarantee of its completeness. Since each point of view is 
 the parent of the succeeding one, the omission of any term is the 
 death of the sequence. Indeed the opposite view is one of the 
 natural phenomena of the road. Appearances are the demons 
 the natural dialectic must overcome, before mind is landed in 
 the heaven of truth. 
 
 On this view the thinking self, as distinguished from the 
 phenomenal self, is perceived as former, classifier and legislator 
 in the world of appearances. The self's thought is reality, and 
 this is the standpoint of idealism. The idealism which assumes 
 this position for its starting point, but which has not trodden 
 the path that leads to it, has not grasped the significance of its 
 stand, for the demons of the road are yet to be slain. Its cer- 
 tainty is immediate, but it stands by the side of other certain- 
 ties which are equally immediate, which in truth may be pred- 
 icated with equal assurance. These alien certainties are for 
 me, but in their presence I admit that something other than I is 
 for me object and certainty. The truth of idealism possesses 
 neither validity nor meaning when presented bald of the context 
 of its deduction. 
 
 A difficulty, which appears to confront the method of dia- 
 lectic, is the initial lack of a criterion of its procedure, whether 
 this criterion be the touchstone of the content of metaphysic 
 or the test of its starting point. If such a touchstone were at 
 hand it would represent the essence of the process itself, and 
 hence would be expected rather in the outcome. How now can the 
 outcome furnish any assurance of the necessity of the process? 
 Metaphysic viewed as the task of searching for and testing the 
 reality of knowledge, would be expected to find its criterion of 
 truth within itself. This test as the essence "in itself" is our 
 pbject, or it is "for us" and its truth is rather the knowledge 
 
 [15] 
 
that we have of it. These two poles, concept and object, as ''in 
 itself" and "for another," fall within the knowledge which is 
 the domain of our investigation. 
 
 It is not, however, enough that the touchstone be at hand in 
 consciousness; dialectic must be a contributor as well as an 
 observer. Consciousness is not only consciousness of an object, 
 but consciousness of itself. The object is only for consciousness 
 in the manner in which it is known. If, however, the object 
 does not correspond to the concept, it would seem that con- 
 sciousness must alter the concept. Now, by this act the object 
 is altered, for the knowledge in question was essentially knowl- 
 edge of the object. The object is only "in itself" in the manner 
 that it is "for us." The truth or essence of the process of 
 natural dialectic appears then, first as that which it is "in 
 itself." But in so far as it is the end of our search it is our 
 object, or it is "for us," i. e., the antithesis, which is essential 
 to our understanding of the "in itself" destroys the character- 
 istic feature of the latter term. 
 
 The modification of the point of view, through the process 
 of dialectic is experience. The truth ot experience is the out- 
 come or the final view- point. The history of the process is 
 itself the science of mind. 
 
 II. 
 
 We recognize two classes of information — the knowledge 
 of universals, and that furnished by the senses; the essence of 
 athing as over against its "being" or individuality. Of the 
 latter we appear to be merely receptive; we say the information 
 is given. 
 
 These "data" unreflectively considered appear as our rich- 
 est knowledge, for their domain, space and time, is boundless, 
 whether by addition or by subdivision of parts. It gives illus- 
 tration to the most rigorous science, mathematics. Thus it 
 appears to give rise as well to our truest knowledge. 
 
 On reflection, however, the information that these "data" 
 furnish turns out to be the poorest and most abstract. It says 
 nothing of the object, except "it is."^ It predicates only exist- 
 ence. The function of the object, its relation to other objects, 
 
the way we come to know it, in short its behavior in the context 
 of experience, is not given in sense ''data." This is to say that 
 we are given no account of the meaning or significance of the 
 experience. It is what remains when all differences are 
 abstracted. 
 
 Dialectic, at this its starting point, has spun as yet no web 
 of meaning for the term consciousness. Consciousness is certain 
 of its ''datum," but not because it is a manifold and complex 
 something, which furnishes its own contribution to the "datum;" 
 nor because the "datum" is a manifold rich in relationships, 
 within itself, to consciousness, and to experience. "It is." 
 This is the bald information ol the certainty of sense. Con- 
 sciousness is simple "I," the subject of the proposition: I am 
 certain. I am thiSy which is certain, and the "datum" is that of 
 which I am certain. Thus does the first difference or distinction 
 appear. 
 
 The "datum," besides being the most abstract of abstrac- 
 tions, is also an individual; it is immediate. It is this last how- 
 ever only with reference to a knoioer, and the knower is such 
 only with reference to a thing Jcnoivn.^ I am certain on account 
 of the "datum;" the "datum" furnishes the certainty tome. 
 Thus knower and thing known 0)ily have significance with 
 reference to one another. Neither has a meaning without this 
 reciprocal reference, and hence each ceases to be immediate and 
 becomes mediate. The object is the essential; it may exist 
 whether it be known or not. Or the knower is the essential; 
 the information may remain after the object ceases to exist. 
 That is to say, the essential pole of this reciprocal relation is 
 determined by the view-point. 
 
 Now the "datum" is only characterized as immediate in 
 the sense that it is an instance of immediateness. In other 
 places and at other times are other ''data," which are with 
 equal justice characterized by this very predicate of immediate- 
 ness. Immediateness is not a feature of that object yonder that 
 applies uniquely. The extension of the class of things immediate 
 is unlimited, for every individual possesses this feature. The 
 essence of the individual is hence an universal.' These distinc- 
 
 [17] 
 
tions— the first of the / and the '^ datum,^^ and the second of the 
 essence and theinstance — are not furnished by me, but are rather 
 the discoveries of the dialectic. 
 
 We are not helped if we attempt to come upon the singu- 
 larity of the individual by means of a system of codrdinates in 
 space and time.^ If we refer our object to any system of coordi- 
 nates in space, the space origin is a new individual which is 
 either assumed arbitrarily or is referred to a new origin which 
 in turn is arbitrarily assumed. If a date be attached to the 
 occurrence of the object, the time origin is the new individual 
 which is in question. 
 
 On this view the object is characterized as the " here" and 
 the ^' now." " To the question: what is the ' now '? we answer 
 for example: the 'now' is the night." The answer however 
 cannot be a truth unless it remain invariable, and this it does 
 not. The "■ now " is twelve o'clock; while I speak the truth of 
 the statement vanishes. Of the ''here" I say: the "here" is 
 a tree. I turn, and the " here " is no longer a tree but a house. 
 Thus the "here" and the "now" are strictly universals, for 
 they are predicated of any one of a number of objects. 
 
 If then the certainty of sense be the universal, the object is 
 no longer the essential, but rather the knowledge which the 
 subject has of the object. The truth is to be sought in the im- 
 mediateness of my sense perceptions. I assert that the " here " 
 is a tree because I see the tree. Another subject however asserts 
 that the "here" is a house. Both assertions have the same 
 justification, viz., the immediateness of sense perception. What 
 subsists is the / — the / as universal — a perceiving, which is a 
 perceiving, whether it be that of a tree or that of a house. 
 
 " I mean, to be sure, an individual subject, but I can say as 
 little of this individual subject as I can say of the ' here ' and 
 the ' now.' In so far as I say this ' Aere,' ' noio ' or an individual, 
 I say every this, every ^ here,^ '■ now,^ individual. Just so when 
 I say: /, this individual 7, I say: every I. Each one is what I 
 say; 7, this, individual 7."^ 
 
 What then are we to answer to the question: what is the 
 " that yonder % " The answer if it be a truth must be lasting. 
 It must represent a feature of that individual thing which is 
 
 [18] 
 
invarient. It must be a feature of which that individual thing 
 yonder is an illustration. We require to put the object in a 
 class by itself; to name a property which applies to it and can 
 apply to no other thing. No such class is thinkable except a 
 null class; the only solution to the condition hypothesized is zero. 
 This solution, while unique, applies however to every illustra- 
 tion of the " that yonder." But that which can be predicated of 
 every individual we call an universal. The universal then 
 turns out to be the stable element of the certainty of sense. 
 
 Should it be said that the uniqueness of the "that yonder " 
 consists in its relation to the rest of experience —that its particu- 
 lar context can never be repeated in exact detail — one can reply 
 that no account of this context can be given without reference 
 to general terms; in vain is it to be distinguished from an infinite 
 number of possible experiences. Is the individual immediate 
 from one point of view, it is mediate from another. Predicate 
 its essence to be pure being and it disappears. Give it any 
 positive quality and it will from another point of view exhibit 
 the opposite quality. In truth it behaves strictly as a zero 
 ought to behave. Defined in antithesis to the universal it 
 becomes itself an universal; in fact, " the individual is the most 
 universal thing there is, for everything is an individual. "^° 
 
 III." 
 
 The truth of the certainty of sense has proven to be the uni- 
 versal. In the origination of this principle two factors separated 
 out— the mental act of reception (perception) and the object. 
 The two are in essence the same— their principle is the universal; 
 the one is a separation of the elements (perception) and the 
 other their combination (the object). Since it is the function of 
 perception to be aware of the separate qualities as determinate 
 and mutually exclusive, its essence consists in negation, determ- 
 inateness or manifoldness. The perception differs from the 
 immediateness of the supposed individual, for it exhibits itself 
 as property or as universal. The properties in so far as they are 
 determinate have a negative character attached to them, i. e., 
 they are exclusive. 
 
 [19] 
 
i 
 
 The universal as the truth is the essential; the perception 
 and the object the unessential. However in so far as the latter 
 are the things described through the universal, both are essential. 
 Viewed in their reciprocal relationship the one must be essential 
 and the other unessential. 
 
 The object as that which exists for itself, whether perceived 
 or not, must be further examined. On the view that the object 
 possesses a self-subsistence apart from the perception of it, and 
 granted that its truth is in the nature of an universal, this same 
 object exhibits itself as the thing of complex attributes.^ 
 
 The existence of a property is mediate in that it expresses 
 its immediateness as its characteristic. It is mediate again in 
 that it predicates itself as the negation of other simultaneously 
 existing attributes. The several properties are differentiated, 
 the one from the other, and are thus not only universaLs but 
 instances of universality as well. The simple universal is rather 
 the medium, in which the several properties subsist and of which 
 they are the expressions — each and every property partakes of 
 universality. 
 
 The properties of a thing exist together without disturbing 
 one another. This characteristic constitutes the oneness of the 
 thing. It abstracts from the differences and is a simple universal 
 or the medium in which the properties subsist. This unity is 
 nothing more than the "here " and the " now." The properties 
 subsist together and simultaneously. This salt is white, it is also 
 sharp, also heavy, also cubical in form. This indifferent " also " 
 is the simple universal, the medium, the unity of the thing, 
 which binds the properties together. This togetherness of a 
 complex of properties, this indifference which they entertain 
 toward one another, is characteristic of the object and constitutes 
 its essence. 
 
 The members of a complex of properties have not however 
 alone the purely negative feature of indifference to one another— 
 they have as w611 a positive feature. If they are to differentiate 
 themselves they must be determinate. They must deny their 
 opposites as well as their indifferents. Thus in this sense they 
 cannot subsist in the same medium. In this suit then to estab- 
 lish the object as the truth of perception, reflection has won tliQ, 
 
 [20] 
 
case for his client perception. The object is defeated on his 
 own premises. It is asserted that the essence of the object is 
 the indifference of the several qualities or their self-subsistence, 
 and the pragmatic result which reflection briugs out is the dis- 
 appearance of the qualities, for these cannot be described save 
 as mutually exclusive. 
 
 The negative character of the several properties — their in- 
 difference to one another, and the positive side — their opposition, 
 exhibit two aspects of the medium:, it is unitary; it is as well an 
 ''also." The discussion of the object as the truth of perception 
 is then for the present complete. It is: (1) passive universality, 
 indifference, the "also;" (2) the universal of opposition, the 
 determinate, the one; and (3) the properties themselves, the' 
 relation of the first two aspects to one another. 
 
 The truth of the object in whatever aspect it may present 
 itself, is the universal. All the properties as universals and the 
 simple universal as the medium in which they subsist, are as 
 such the possession of the subject. The subject, however, has 
 as yet no assurance that this medium is invariant and hence 
 no assurance that the manner in which its truth is given 
 is always the same. If the subject furnishes any contribution 
 to the datum, then the truth of the datum is changed. On the 
 supposition that the object is the true, the universal, the essen- 
 tial, the self subsistent, while consciousness is the unessential 
 and the changeable, it can happen that the object is not rightly 
 perceived. It is through the experience of this argument that 
 the perceiver first becomes conscious of the possibility oi deception. 
 
 The object as the truth of perception is the essential, the 
 perceiver the unessential. If the perception is incorrect it is 
 the fault of the perceiver. The object, viewed in the medium, 
 which is the universal, receives the stamp of the medium. 
 Since the object is the self-subsistent and the true, the untruth 
 arises in the perceiver. Assume that the truth of the object, 
 which I perceive, is its unity, its individuality. I perceive the 
 several properties as indifferent to, and as not affecting one 
 another. Eeflection distinguishes the properties as universals 
 and as exclusive, i. e., it is not perceived in the medium in its 
 true aspect. Keflection tells us that a determinate property 
 excludes its opposites and its indifferentsj the self-subsistence, 
 
 [21] 
 
the indifference of the several properties of the object constitute 
 its individuality. As universals the proj)erties are determinate, 
 opposed to one another, excluding one another, i. e., I do not 
 perceive the object correctly; reflection destroys the continuity 
 of the object. 
 
 As a result of this dialectic circle, consciousness is landed 
 on a higher level. As a result of these distinctions the ex- 
 perience is gained that the truth of the perception and thing per- 
 ceived is to be sought in reflectLQii. ^^ Consciousness corrects the 
 former impression; it distinguishes truth conceptually attained 
 from the untruth of perception. It is aware of refiectiou within 
 itself as distinguished from simple perception. We are aware 
 that the truth as well as the untruth of the object lies in con- 
 sciousness. To be warned of the untruth of perception is to be 
 armed against the possibility of being deceived. Thus when the 
 contradiction of unity and multiplicity arises we recognize it as 
 a distinction of thought. 
 
 If then the object is one, if its contradictory aspect — the 
 mutually exclusive character of its attributes — arises in me, it 
 is the subject which is responsible for the destruction of the 
 self-subsistence of the object. Properties are assigned to the 
 object depending on the sense organ affected. The salt is white 
 because brought before the eye; it is sharj) when pressed on the 
 tongue; cubical to the sense of sight and of touch, and so on. 
 Tlie subject contributes the latter result and distinguishes the 
 properties from one another. The subject is the medium in 
 which the properties subsist, and the truth of perception is to 
 be sought in the subject. The latter has however but brief 
 space in which to congratulate itself. The dialectic proceeds as 
 before. It is characteristic of the several properties on account 
 of their determinateness and mutual exclusiveness to destroy the 
 unity and continuity of the object. The essence or truth of the 
 object is then its unity, its continuity, i. e., a universal medium 
 in which the properties subsist together. 
 
 Thus the circle is complete and we are returned to the 
 starting point. The object is one onjj as opposed to other 
 objects. But its unity does not distinguish it from other objects, 
 but the determinateness of its properties — it is the same as any 
 
 [22] 
 
other object witli respect to its oneness. It has properties which 
 distinguish it from other objects. In truth it is the object which 
 is white and cubical, heavy and sharp; or the object is the 
 '' also," the universal medium, and so conceived it is conceived 
 in its reality. 
 
 The object is one; it is "for itself," but it is no less for the 
 perceiver, just as otherwise the perceiver is "for it." Thus 
 the essential of the object is doubled; it is the object which this 
 time oifers us the contradiction. The determinateuess of the 
 object which is the essential on the one side, is that which dis- 
 tinguishes it from other objects. But that which distinguishes 
 it from other objects puts it into relation to these, and that is 
 to destroy its self-subsistvence, which is its essential feature. 
 The object predicated as "for itself" or as absolute negation 
 of otherness, falls because of its essential characteristic. Nega- 
 tion of otherness is at the same time negation of self. 
 
 The fate of the object as the truth of perception is then 
 identical with that of the supposed certainty of sense. The latter 
 proved itself an universal. Viewed in the light of its origin, 
 however, it is essentially conditioned by the sensuous. The 
 universal, as the outcome, is essentially dependent ou the start- 
 ing point; the final term as the child of the initial term, bears 
 the birth-mark of its origin. On the view that this antithesis 
 be somehow necessarily dissoluble into a unity, consciousness 
 stands in the presence of the absolute universal, and has for the 
 first time truly entered the kingdom of the understanding. 
 
 The conviction that the individual of sense is the immediate 
 certainty has been displaced for the conviction that this certainty 
 is the universal, but this universal because of the way in which 
 it has arisen remains the itm'yersaZ of sense. The "thing" of 
 perception is in like manner no less "for itself" than "for 
 another." 
 
 These sophistries, the "also," the "in so far as," the "es- 
 sential" and the "unessential" as well as the different "points of 
 view, ' ' are the subterfuges of this lower consciousness in the 
 role of the immediate certainty and of perception. They are 
 the weapons of the so-called "sound common sense" ou account 
 
 [23] 
 
of which philosophy is so often accused of having to do only with 
 ' 'things of thought. " In this fashon is this mode of consciousness 
 accustomed to metaphysicize against metaphysics. 
 
 IV. 
 
 The truth of the object of consciousness has proven to consist 
 neither in its relation to other objects nor to the subject, for 
 predicate either of these to be essential and it turns out prag- 
 matically to be unessential, i. e., to postulate the relationship 
 involves inherent contradiction. The object has now presented 
 itself in three roles. The dialectic of the certainty of sense ex- 
 hibited this same object as the immediate individual — the im- 
 mediateness of seeing, hearing, etc. It appeared next in the 
 guise of perception as the thing, and lastly in the outcome as 
 undetermined universal, (i. e., undetermined as to content), or 
 as thought. 
 
 The undetermined universal is now (1) the existent for itself, 
 (2) absolute self-subsistence, — as related to an unessential it is 
 itself unessential — and (3) absolute activity — its range of appli- 
 cation is unlimited — which is equivalent to absolute rest since it 
 is contentless. Consciousness has not yet transcended the deceit 
 of perception, for the attempt to supply a content or an object 
 for its activity must be discarded as unsuccessful. Conscious- 
 ness returns to itself; itself as undetermined universal, for it has 
 not yet seen itself in this contentless form. Again, since its 
 content is lacking, its concept (as form) is still in question, for a 
 concept without application is empty. None the less its essence 
 for consciousness is an objective essence. The object as such 
 subsists so long as consciousness as object and consciousness as 
 subject have not exhibited themselves as coextensive. Thus it 
 is customary to say that for the absolute form and content are 
 identical. 
 
 The positive result of the outcome is that the untruth of 
 perception, and simultaneously that of the understanding, is 
 removed and consequently the concept of truth is attained. 
 Until the experience of untruth the conception of truth is not 
 realized. This concept appears as the existent '' true in itself," 
 
 [24] 
 
as lacking a ''consciousness in itself," as a something for which 
 the understanding stands sponsor, and as an existent of which 
 consciousness is aware but in which it does not partake. Con- 
 sciousness that is not consciousness of an object is not conscious- 
 ness. It is form without content, or otherwise activity divorced 
 of passivity. Consciousness must become this concept in all its 
 phases and is then become thinking consciousness. 
 
 The outcome is universal in the purely negative sense that the 
 one- sided concept formerly adhered to is discarded, but also in 
 the positive sense, in the conviction that the two poles of the 
 antithesis — the "in itself" and the "for another'' — are essentially 
 identical. The universal in question would seem to exhibit 
 merely the form, or the relation of the one pole to the other, but 
 it represents as well the content, since the antithesis can have no 
 other illustration than is given in the outcome. Again, the con- 
 tent is universal since it applies to any "existent" that is in a 
 determinate way both "in itself" and "for another." The 
 experience is gained that form and content as univ^ersals, (and 
 hence in the true sense), are identical. The essential nature of 
 the outcome is that it presents the object of consciousness as 
 universally "in itself" and "for another," so that the result is 
 universal in the absolute sense. 
 
 "^ The undetermined universal, since it is the o^'ect of con- 
 sciousness, may be considered both as to form and as to content 
 and to examine this opposition of form and content is to perceive 
 that we are again on familiar ground. The content is on the one 
 hand an universal medium, in which subsists a pluralism of prop- 
 erties, and on the other a self-contained unity. As self-contained 
 unity it is viewed as the "existent in itself;" as universal medium 
 it implies the dissolution of the thing's self- subsistence. The 
 medium reveals itself as passivity, as the "existent for another." 
 The experience is now at hand that these ways of viewing the 
 universal are not unconnected but are essentially related through 
 the form: they are the modes in which the universal reveals 
 itself, for both moments are in essence undetermined universals 
 and are predicated as essentially contradictory aspects of the 
 same. The medium is to be viewed as identical with the self- 
 subsistence of a group of properties or the medium as universal 
 
 [25] 
 
IS nothing more than this self-subsistence. This self- subsistence 
 implies a group of properties that are essentially exclusive; the 
 properties are different but exist side by side. The self-subsist- 
 ence however implies the dissolution of the differences and this 
 the pure "existent for itself." The last is the medium and this 
 again is uothiug unless something in which differences subsist. 
 On the one hand we are aware of the uuiversal as the medium, 
 the self- subsistence of the properties, or the essence of the object, 
 i. e., the universal is essentially the pluralism of the several 
 properties. The movement of the dialectic presents two mo- 
 ments. On the one view the object is a collection of self-subsistent 
 material, on the other it is a self-subsistent unity. The second 
 aspect does not properly appear until the first has presented 
 itself to view. Either aspect immediately implies the other or 
 contains this implication in itself, while each one requires the 
 other to render it meaningful. 
 
 This implied transition, this implication of the other, which 
 each moment possesses in itself, is termed force^* (Kraft). It 
 is in nature essentially periodic, for the points of view are seen 
 to repeat themselves, although the outcome is not coincident 
 with the starting point. The one moment, the truth of the ob- 
 iect regarded as a collection of propeities self-subsistent in the 
 medium, its development, is the expressio'n}^ of the force. The 
 other moment the vanishing of this self-subsistence is the force 
 proper- The latter result cannot however be obtained until the 
 expression is realized, for it follows upon this. 
 
 On the view that these distinctions are essentially the im- 
 plications of the dialectic they are seen to be the property of the 
 understanding. The differences in question are not in them- 
 selves distinguished; they are distinctions of thought or they are 
 conceptual in nature. The aspects of the object are only mean- 
 ingful in so far as they exhibit themselves in this antithetical 
 guise. The concept of the process represents then the carrier of 
 the two moments, or the substance of the process. Each moment 
 is substantial in so far as each one contains the process by im- 
 plication in itself. We have as features of this concept, on the 
 one hand the two vanishing moments, each one holding the 
 warrant for the dissolution of the other, and on the other hand 
 
 [20] 
 
the force proper as exclusive unity. The force as such only 
 exists (by definition) in the form of this antithesis. The object 
 of consciousness has now for its content these two contradictory 
 self-destructive moments. Being for consciousness this content 
 is objective-, but, since it is contradictory and so, self- destructive 
 the truth becomes the non-objective, (something not for con- 
 sciousness), or tbe " inner side of things-'' ^^^ 
 
 The "force"' of the understanding has ceased to be the 
 simple unitary concept that it was in its origin. Without its 
 development, its expression, the "force'' of perceptiom it is 
 unrealized and hence presents itself as postulating and as depend- 
 ent upon this expression. It contains within itself the impli- 
 cation of the expression but it contains as well the implication 
 that the expression be dissolved, or it presents itself as unity, 
 for the " force" of perception and the "force" of the under- 
 standing are self- destructive (contradictory) and cannot exist 
 side by side. As unity its essence is alien to it, for this consists 
 in the standing contradiction. Nevertheless the "other," (the 
 alien essence), that implies expression and dissolution is itself 
 "force." If then "force" as unity and "force" as "other" 
 are self-subsistent "forces " the domination of unity is dissolved. 
 On the other hand as the " inner side " of things or the non-ob- 
 jective — perception is nothing if not objective — the development 
 of the self-subsistent properties is excluded and hence " force" 
 is another again distinct from ' ' force ' ' proper. 
 
 These distinctions are: 
 
 As content— As form— 
 
 The unity of The medium of Postulating Postulated 
 
 the two "forces" self-subsistent (active). (passive), 
 
 (expression and materials, 
 force proper), 
 
 "for us," objective "In itself" self-subsistent, mutually 
 
 or for a conscious- exclusive and opposed, 
 
 ness. 
 
 Ij as form : active, postula- IJ as content : passive, postulated, 
 
 ting, "for itself" "for another." 
 
 Then as content : Then as form : universal medium 
 
 "force" proper. of different properties. 
 
 [27] 
 
 
The non-objective or "inner side of things" is, as its con- 
 cept implies, far from being the immediate object of conscious- 
 ness. The nuderstanding is supposed to gain this vision of the 
 true background of things through the medium of the self- 
 destructive " forces." An A, which contains within itself the 
 immediate implication of a nou-A, is self- contradictory. For 
 this reason we call it appearance; not as instance or as illustra- 
 tion but as a totality of appearance or as universal Every 
 genuine appearance as such implies its own unreality. Through 
 the mean of appearance the true or "inner" side becomes the 
 object of consciousness, but only as concept without content, as 
 the negation of appearance. 
 
 Because then of the contradiction of perceptive and defini- 
 tional necessity, the understanding distinguishes the sensible 
 world or the world of appearances from the supersensible or the 
 true world- The mean that unites the understanding with the 
 inner truth is appearance, and it is this because it does not 
 represent truth itself but rather the pathway to truth. It is the 
 medium through which truth is seen. To render the notion of 
 truth intelligible we require the notion of apparent truth or 
 falsity. The absolute universal which unites conceptually the 
 antithesis of individual and universal is a thought distinction 
 and hence furnished by the understanding. If the " inner 
 truth " is to be perceived at all it is by this side of consciousness. 
 On this view the sensible world takes its place as the world of 
 appearance in contradistinction to a supersensible or the true 
 world — the transient "present" as over against the permanent 
 " beyond." 
 
 Our object is then this antithesis, the two extremes which 
 consciousness on the side of the understanding has before it. 
 The mean that unites conceptually the two extremes is appear- 
 ance. The "beyond" has as yet no content. It is only defined 
 as the negation of appearance and as simple universal. This 
 mode of the "beyond" is the Kantian sort. As such then it is 
 unknowable, V)eing defined as that which lies beyond conscious- 
 ness. Because the reason is too shortsighted or limited, it is 
 only known through its manifestations in appearances. But now 
 if this "beyond"' be forever unknowable; if the curtain can never 
 
 [28] 
 
€3^ 
 
 be raised and its content revealed, then there is no choice but 
 to cling to appearances, i. e., to hold that true which is not true \ 
 by definition. 
 
 Nevertheless the supersensible has arisen and is at hand. It 
 comes from appearance and appearance is its mean, its e^^sence, 
 indeed its consummation. It is the truth of appearance. But 
 the truth and essence of the perceived world is that it be appear- 
 ance, and thus the supersensible is apijearauce as appeanmce 
 and hence the world of immediate sensuous certainty and per- 
 ception. But appearance is the sensible world of perception 
 stripped of its reality and predicated as having its truth in the 
 "beyond." The sensible world as in itself reality is not 
 appearance. 
 
 Appearance and the "inner side'' immediately imply one 
 another and the necessity of this implication is essentially defi- 
 nitional. Appearances are the implications of the "inner" — 
 the "inner" is the legislator — appearances are legislated for- 
 Appearances are the eajpression of the "inner." The "inner" 
 postulates its expression and is in so far active, while appearance 
 is the postulated and is thus passive- This distinction as the 
 universal aspect of the play of "force" is its truth or the law of 
 "force." The "inner" appears then as a kingdom of laws,^^ 
 beyond the pe"rceived world and legislating for appearance. 
 When the curtain is raised on this "beyond," this self-active 
 legislator, the self-consciousness is revealed- 
 
 This kingdom of laws is however only the ^'first trutK'' and 
 does not wholly account for appearance. The law is in some sense 
 present in the process of change but does not supply the entire 
 reality of the process. It can never supply the existential ele- 
 ment. Under different circumstances the law is differently 
 realized. Thus there remains for appearances an aspect unac- 
 counted for by the "inner truth'' of the supersensible world." 
 
 This weakness of law to account for appearance appears to 
 lie in its universal character; in its jack of determinateness. 
 Indeed the kingdom is essentially a plurality and this contradicts 
 the supposition that the truth of the understanding is in nature 
 an unitary something. In so far now as this kingdom is one 
 law— not law in general— it is determinate, and what we would 
 
 [29] 
 
wish to do would be to reduce all law to one law, e. g., the law 
 of gravitatioD. But by this very process the law loses its 
 determinateuess. Its rauge of application becomes more and 
 more general. The concept arrived at is only the very general 
 one of the universal conformity to law of all reality, a concept 
 however with a content, a feature lacking in the "inner truth" 
 as first conceived, but one that in no way accounts for the sensi- 
 ble world itself. 
 
 Eeflection upon the problem of change and its explanation 
 continually points to the standing contrast of these two worlds — 
 the one thedomain of rationality, of definition, of description, the 
 intellectual, the fixed, the birthplace of inferences; the other the 
 realm of perception, the changeable, the world of appearances, 
 where accidents, the unclassified and undescribed residue of ex- 
 isting things are born. It is in the latter sphere that natural 
 law seems to find its realization. The concept of law, we are 
 tempted to say, cannot be the essential aspect of change, for the 
 concept is only created in answer to a practical demand. It is 
 in essence an after-thought, a postulate superadded. If the 
 determinate character of law is that which adheres to appearance 
 or has its sufficient reason in appearances than this feature of 
 law is accidental. We are accustomed to contrast the concept 
 with what is accidental to our formula of change, but in devel- 
 oping this contrast we are continually reminded that what is 
 accidental is incidental as well. The accidental as the unexplained 
 residue is father to the concept, for its existence provokes a 
 logical demand. It arouses an activity whose response is the 
 concept. As such it is a "force" responsible for the creation of 
 its own antithesis, and on this view it is prior to its antithesis. 
 The concept that does not arise in answer to a practical demand 
 is a phantasy of the imagination and itself an accident, and thus 
 the meaningful or intelligible concept is essentially dependent 
 upon the phenomenal. Nevertheless since the accidental is not 
 meaningful until its contrast with what is essential comes to 
 light, the concept is prior to the appearance. If the latter be 
 contrasted with the concept, then it is the concept of law that 
 exhibits the law's inner necessity. 
 
 A law establishes or states a relationship that obtains among 
 
 [30] 
 
appearances and at the same time presnpposes a difference or a 
 distinction. This difference is however a general one; the law 
 furnishes no test of its own application. The distinction 
 supplied is not one which cleaves to the sensible world itself but 
 is furnished by the understanding. When for example we speak 
 of a positive electricity, we at once suppose another kind, a 
 negative electricity. This distinction is not one that attaches to 
 the thing in itself but is rather supplied by the subject. The 
 necessity of the law which describes the behavior of positive and 
 negative electricity with reference to one another, is the necessity 
 which follows on the definition of the describer. This is to say 
 that it is its own necessity which the understanding predicates, 
 and not a necessity that inheres in the natural event itself. 
 
 In so far however as the law is recognized at all it is in the 
 sensible world. It is always this last which gives illustration to 
 the law. If then the supersensible world be only mediate, if it be 
 only known through appearances, its characterization as the king- 
 dom of laws, as the unchangeable image of the perceived world, is 
 lost. Conceived only through appearances the sensible world be- 
 comes its only reality. It is through the experience of this result 
 that consciousness is aware that it is indeed its own contradiction, 
 which is at hand. This contradiction is the " inverted world.^^ 
 The ' 'inverted world' ' is the construct of the self', the contradiction 
 is produced by me- I distinguish myself from the conclusion 
 that my judgment draws; it is the behavior of my own conscious- 
 ness that must be further examined. The procedure of meta- 
 physic has then no alternative but to view these results in the 
 light of their newly found origin, as the constructs of the self's 
 consciousness. The second supersensible world, the " inverted 
 world," is the antithesis of the first and of itself, for it contains 
 this implication within itself. An appearance is genuine if it 
 contains within itself the implication of its own unreality and it 
 is after this fashion that the supersensible world presents itself. 
 It is appearance as appearance. An appearance is an A which 
 implies the truth of a non-A. Thus what is in the first super- 
 sensible world sweet, is in the second or " inverted world " sour; 
 the moral principles which the one world exalts are the prin- 
 piples of evil in the second. The supersensible world as the 
 
 [31] 
 
realm of the self's activity is appearance, and since this appear- 
 ance has become object of consciousness, now for the first time 
 consciousness is become the self-consciousness.^^ 
 
 The Truth of the Certainty of Self. 
 
 The truth of the certainty of the modes of consciousness 
 considered up to now has been distinct from the certainty itself. 
 Up to now truth has been for consciousness, but always in some 
 sense distinct from consciousness. In the mill of dialectic this 
 truth — the "existent" of sensuous certainty, the "thing" of 
 perception, the "force" (Kraft) of the understanding — was 
 seen to disappear. Every one of these three modes of supposed 
 certainty, each after its own manner, played th© part of a 
 " thing in itself," and when each "in itself" remained unintel- 
 ligible without reference "to another," the truth and the 
 certainty vanished together. 
 
 Dialectic has then to treat of a mode of certainty that has 
 not previously appeared. The alternative immediately at hand 
 is the identification of certainty with the "existent" conscious 
 of itself (Selbstbewusstein), and it is in the role of this alterna- 
 tive that the self- consciousness appears. To test the validity of 
 the identity of certainty and consciousness in its new guise is 
 the next task of the natural dialectic. The immediate, the "in 
 itself," shall not be obtained conceptually but shall be intuited. 
 The certain fact is the fact of consciousness. The " for another' ' 
 shall be robbed to pay the "in itself." 
 
 The certainty in question lies "in itself" but it is no less 
 "for another;"for in so farasit is "for itself" it is for conscious- 
 ness. In the sense that the ego is the certainty it is "/or itself," 
 but in the sense that it is its own object or the object of conscious- 
 ness — in the sense that is object — it is "for another." 
 
 The philosophical satisfaction which is our gain in viewing 
 the ego as the certain fact of consciousness is that we have our 
 hands on the elusive individual; if an illustration of singularity, 
 of uniqueness, is to be found, it is here. 
 
 On this view the world of j)erception presents itself as pure 
 negation — negation of the self — while the self is the negation of 
 the perceived world. In this relationship the self is " in itself," 
 
 [32] 
 
but it is also ''for another," viz: the perceived world. Viewed 
 in itself it is viewed as the certain or the true; in relation to the 
 other as the false or as appearance. N^evertheless this antithesis 
 of certainty and appearance is essential, for without it there 
 remains but the empty tautology, the "I am I." To seek the 
 true is to suppose the possibility of the false. Our relationship 
 presents a complete reciprocity. Does the certainty of self 
 require the concept of apparent certainty or falsity to give it 
 meaning, then for like reason does appearance find its justifica- 
 tion in antithesis to a supposed certainty. Is the ego in any 
 sense self-subsistent, then so in the same sense must be the 
 non-ego. The need, which the ego has for the non-ego, without 
 which the ego is devoid of meaning, is desire.^^ Those aspects 
 of the non-ego which have a meaning and value and hence an 
 interest for the ego are in so far living^^ (organic). Those 
 features of the non-ego which lack significance for the ego are 
 in so far inorganic- It is the task of philosophy to render the 
 inorganic meaningful; to indicate the values that attach to the 
 varied phases of the cosmos, designated in its elementary state, 
 the perceived world. Thus through the medium of dialectic the 
 inorganic constantly tends to become organic. The real cosmos 
 in its full signification is the final term of a developmental process. 
 
 "What of the non-ego is of meaning for the ego thereby ceases 
 to be non-ego. Thus is its reference, its value, destroyed and 
 created by the same act. Its truth is, as it was before, both "in 
 itself and ''for another" and in this consists its individuality 
 or the substance of its life. In so far as the process of rendering 
 meaningful the non-ego is viewed as living process or as experi- 
 ence is the concept of pure ego attained. In so far as the non-ego 
 (as object) is absorbed in the ego (subject) does there not result 
 philosophical satisfaction, and must result, for the outcome is 
 truth. The inorganic, as the negation and object of desire of 
 consciousness, is a consciousness. "The sell's consciousness 
 attains its satisfaction only in another self's consciousness." 
 Here first in the "I which is we and the we which is I" does the 
 concept of mind make its appearance. 
 
 In the reciprocal relationship of ego and non-ego the be- 
 Jiavior of the one is always in some sense behavior of the 
 
 [33] 
 
other. lu different senses each is at the same time knower 
 and thing known. The life of the selfs consciousness as "in 
 itself" consists in the overthrow of its neg:atives and indifferents — 
 a one -directional process. The life of the other is equally a one- 
 directional process but in the opposite sense. The life of the 
 one is not compatible then with that of the other; each is com- 
 mitted to the death of the other, and must enter the contest, ^^ 
 for the task prescribed it is to raise the certainty of self to the 
 rank of the truth for it, and the truth for the other. The 
 individual which has not risked^^ this experience has not attained 
 the truth which the starting point assumed, (viz, the certainty 
 of self), for it has not yet seen itself in the other. 
 
 Through this very process however is the initial postulate 
 of the certainty of self destroyed. Does the non-ego turn out to 
 be the essential then the ego is the unessential. Does the ego 
 survive either actually through the act or as the final term of a 
 process conceived as an ideal, then there is lost the antitheses 
 which rendered it meaningful, for if all is ego, what is the utility 
 of the certainty of self postulated as an initial truth ? 
 
 In the experience of this process the self at first appears 
 alone as the self-subsistent certainty; but it required to make it 
 intelligible an antithetical term. This term in so far as it turned 
 out to have a positive content or to be intelligible was in so far 
 the possession of the self; in so far as it was mere negation, or 
 unrealized possibility, it dissolved. The final result is the loss 
 of the initial truth on the death of the antithetical term. 
 
 The self, because of its behavior in the context of this dia- 
 lectic and after the experience of it, is become master- The 
 abstract existence, the non-self, for the like reason and since it 
 too was essential, is become servanf^'^ These correlatives are 
 not intelligible apart from one another. The truth then of the 
 certainty of self lies in this serving consciousness, for predicate 
 it unessential and our initial truth vanishes. It follows that our 
 essential pole is reversed, and the truth of the certainty of self 
 is destroyed. 
 
 The consciousness of the self, which first appeared as abstract 
 or simple ego in the certainty of self, has come then to present 
 many differences in its make up. At first characterized as sim- 
 ple, self-subsistent, inert, it is become producing or formative 
 
 [34J 
 
iu nature. Its life is conserved through its relation to an antithet- 
 ical term (thingness). Because of its formative nature it is free, 
 in the sense that it is controlled only by the necessity of its own 
 nature, but its freedom only is intelligible as in contrast to a 
 serving consciousness — the visualized, the imaged, the external 
 existent. It is former or producer because of a thing formed or 
 produced and in this sense it is free. Again the substance of its 
 life is that it thinks, and thought deals in concepts, not images 
 or objects. The last are the wares of the serving consciousness, 
 which he lays at the feet of his monarch which is thought. But 
 a monarch without a vassel is a meaningless term; the freedom 
 of a thinking consciousness is clear because of a consciousness 
 whose perceptions are given. Not the consciousness of a world 
 order subject to teleological or mechanical description, whether 
 this consciousness be my own or an alien one, is the essential 
 consciousness, but the thinking consciousness, which cannot be 
 represented as other than mine and inseparable from me. The 
 exaltation of this free or thinking consciousness as an ethical 
 end, is the principle of the Stoic. ^^ 
 
 The freedom of the thinking consciousness is exercised how- 
 ever no less in the realm of the serving consciousness than in its 
 own domain. The macrocosm, the world of individual things and 
 natural events, calls for description and explanation, and hence 
 presents a choice to«microcosm as to how this task is to be 
 accomplished. The microcosm is free within certain limits.^* 
 Not as the ruling consciousness does it find its truth in the serv- 
 ing consciousness but ''on its throne even as in its chains" in 
 the concept of its freedom. Its essence is thought (an abstract 
 essence) and consists not in the actual exercise of its freedom, 
 but in a self- subsistence that stands apart from the serving con- 
 sciousness. Standing apart from the world of individual things 
 as a forming principle, it has in itself no content but its content 
 is given. The content is alien to it, and in so far as it thinks, 
 it thinks an alien existence. 
 
 In this manner is the dilemma of Stoicism presented. The 
 good, the true, is the attainment of pure reason, contentless 
 thought. But would the free consciousness think, it must think 
 
 [35] 
 
a content. ^-^ The end is forbidden through its own legislation. 
 The ideal hypothesized prevents its own attainment and our 
 interest in it is lost because of its consequent. 
 
 For the Stoic the world of perception is the unessential. 
 His task is the attainment of a world of pure thought the chief 
 feature of which is that it shall be free. But free of what ? 
 Why, the world of perception. The latter is essential then on 
 the Stoic's own premises, for it is presupposed by him if his 
 freedom is to have a meaning. 
 
 The realization of this dilemma, to be aware that this 
 mode of the "in itself is but an incomplete negation of the 
 "other," is the standpoint of scepticism. For the Stoic the 
 dilemma did not appear as such, by the Sceptic it is realized 
 and accej^ted. 
 
 Dialectic has now arrived at a new station in her progress. 
 Convinced of the freedom of the thinking self as the negation of 
 the world of perception (the unessential), the Sceptic is aware 
 that his truth has vanished without knowing how. The world 
 of perception is repudiated for the thinking self, but by this very 
 act is the truth of the thinking self destroyed. The nothingness 
 of the materials furnished by perception is asserted by the subject 
 and yet the subject sees, feels, hears. Moral principles are exalted 
 as the ruling principles of action and their nothingness asserted 
 in the same breath. The pleasure of th^ceptic is to remain in 
 contradiction with himself. Let one assert that ''a" is ''b," he 
 will prove the opposite on the same premises. 
 
 For the sophistic temperament, the presence of inner contra- 
 diction is a satisfaction. Its delight is to hold the antithetical 
 poles apart; to see the truth vanish the instant one attempts to 
 lay hands on it. The rationalistic temperament in the presence 
 of this dilemma is the "unfortunate consciousness." The latter 
 feels the need and indeed the necessity of overcoming the dilemma 
 but is at the same time convinced of its binding force. 
 
 This dual consciousness, which presents the inner contradic- 
 tion, must be unified. The most prominent feature of this unity 
 is as yet the radical difference of the thinking (invariant) self 
 and the serving (variant) self. We perceive the law as in some 
 pense present in the process of change. By the act of putting 
 
 [36] 
 
that red thing yoDder in the class of red things; in so far as that 
 quality (red) is a familiar quality, is the universal perceived as 
 present income sense in that thing yonder. The serving or alien 
 consciousness perceives the thinking consciousness in itself. 
 But the thinking consciousness, in so far as it thinks, thinks an 
 alien content, or it perceives the other in itself. Each conscious- 
 ness perceives the other in itself, and the motive for the belief 
 of the "unfortunate consciousness" that in truth it must be one 
 consciousness, free of contradiction, finds its justification in this 
 reciprocal relationship. 
 
 [37] 
 
NOTES. 
 
 Page 13, Note 1. 
 
 " The existence of finite things, (and so of finite ideas), cannot be explained 
 according to notions of cause and effect. With the appreciation of this law all 
 philosophy begins; for without it we have never the need to philosophize— with- 
 out it all our knowledge is merely empirical, a progression from cause to effect." 
 {Schelling's s'ammtliche Werke, Abth. I. Bd. /., 8. 368.) 
 
 Page 14, Note 2. 
 
 Fichte {Soimmtliche Werke, Abth. I.Bd. I., S. 422-423) divides the objects of 
 consciousness (Vorstellungen) into two classes, (1) those accompanied by the 
 feeling of freedom and (2) those accompanied by the feeling of necessity. Of 
 the first class it is meaningless to ask why they are so and not otherwise (in the 
 absolute sense), since the law of suflScient reason does not govern the domain 
 of freedom. They are so because we say they shall be so; had we said they 
 should be otherwise then they would be otherwise. The system of ideas accom- 
 panied by the feeling of necessity is called experience, and it is the problem of 
 philosophy to furnish the sufficient reason for this second class. 
 
 (Thus the mathematician may select his parameters in accordance with any 
 conditions that he may see fit to impose, the number of conditions being only 
 limited by the number of parameters. He has certain degrees of freedom. The 
 astronomer is free to regard the sun as revolving around the earth or vice I'ersa, 
 his choice being governed in this case by the simplicity of description that 
 results from the latter selection. Again the physicist, the biologist, or the psy- 
 chologist arbitrarily dictates the conditions of any given experiment.) 
 
 The science of the first class of ideas would be, for Fichte, scientific method, 
 that of the second class, philosophy. The phenomena of mind brought out by 
 the dialectic as a necessary tendency are called then experiences by Hegel in 
 the same sense as the term is employed by Fichte. 
 
 Page 14, Note 3. 
 
 Compare in this connection two passages, the first from Fichte and the 
 second from Schelling. 
 
 "If it be undeniable that the speculative reason is indebted for every human 
 advance that she has accomplished to the comments of scepticism on the uncer- 
 tainty of her previous resting point, * * * then nothing is more desirable than 
 that the sceptic should crown his work and that the investigating reason should 
 attain her exalted end." (I. 1, 3.) 
 
 "How infinitely more has the sceptic served the cause of true philosophy by 
 declaring war on every system claiming universal validity ! how infinitely 
 more than the dogmatist, who would have all minds swear by the symbol of a 
 theoretical science!" (1. 1, 307.) 
 
 Page 15, Note 4. 
 
 This is the view of Schelling. 
 
 "Philosophy must not be a creation that only causes one to admire the inge- 
 
 [38] 
 
nuity of the author. She must portray the march of the human mind itself 
 not that of this or that individual's." (I. 1, 293.) 
 
 Page 16, Note 5. 
 
 * * * "the thing is, and it is only because it is." {Phiinomenologie 
 des Oeistes, Ooebhardt, Bamberg und Wicrzburg, 1807, S. 23) Also Schelling 
 Werke, Abth. I. Bd. /., Moglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie, and Fichte 
 Werke, Abth. I. Bd. /., Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. 
 
 Page 17, Note 6. 
 
 "Now the more immediate the experience so much the nearer its disappear- 
 ance. Indeed the intuition of sense, so long as it is merely this, borders on 
 nothing. * * * But so long as the intuition turns to objects, i. e. so 
 long as it is sensuous, it runs no risk of losing itself. The ego in so far as it 
 discovers opposition, is necessitated to contrast itself with this, i. e., to return 
 unto itself . * * * Were I to pursue the intellectual intuition I would cease 
 to live. I go then 'out of time into eternity.' " {Hchelling, Werke, I. 1, 325,) 
 
 Page 17, Note 7. 
 
 A procedure, by which that individual thing yonder might be characterized 
 uniquely or put in a class by itself, is suggested by the law of traditional logic 
 viz., "as the intension of our descriptive terms is increased, the extension is 
 decreased." Thus by characterizing that individual yonder with a succession 
 of predicates and so excluding other objects which lack these predicates, we 
 might hope to arrive at last at a class whose only illustration is the individual 
 thing in question. Of course the law does not hold if • the extension of our 
 delimiting predicates gives a resultant class whose extension is not limited and 
 the only way to determine whether this extension be finite or not is by the path 
 of experiment. There appear however to be practical difficulties— not to speak 
 of the logical contradiction at hand when such a problem is stated— involved in 
 a complete canvass of possible experience. Moreover no account of this experi- 
 ence can be given save in terms of universals. If contradictory predicates be 
 attached to the individual in question, it is at once put in the zero class and is 
 admittedly nothing, but excluding this case let predicate be heaped on predicate 
 as long as we please, the extension of the final class having all these predicates 
 is as much open to question as before. Nor is this all. Not even one predicate 
 can be attached with assurance. Any experiment is subject to error. Any 
 measurement has a probable error attached. A knowledge of facts can be only 
 approximated, never exactly attained through experiment. The real fact is the 
 limit of a series of approximations, forever beyond the reach of knowledge by 
 experiment, a " thing in itself." 
 
 On this latter point cf. Prof. E. A. Singer, Jr., " KanVs First Antinomy, ^^ 
 Philosophical Review, July, 19U9. 
 
 Page 18, Note 8. 
 
 Space and time in the " transcendentale Aesthetik" (Kant's Kritik der 
 reinen Vernunft) are supposed to account for individuality. 
 
 [39] 
 
Page IS, Note 9. 
 
 It is clear that the individual here plays the part of the Kantian " Ding an 
 sich " — the " Ding an sicli " of the transcendental esthetic. The real individ- 
 ual in this connection is unknowable, and answers appropriately to the concept 
 of nothing. Viewed as an ideal— as the limit of a series of approximations— it 
 is the absolute. The identification of the concept of nothing with that of the 
 absolute may be not without motive. Thus if the absolute be that which has all 
 predicates, (the God of rationalism), then it is nothing, for that which is every- 
 thing is nothing. It may be noted in addition that the existence of the real 
 fact, forever beyond the reach of experiment, is one of the fundamental 
 postulates of physical science. It is on this common ground according to 
 Schelling that realism and idealism merge and become identical. 
 
 Page 19, Note 10. 
 
 The "Ding ansich^'' of Kant appears in some connections as '■'■ Empfindung'''' 
 a content somehow alien to the subject, the individual of the present context. 
 Schelling in a foot note expressly designates this a zero. (I. 1, 95. > Cf. Note 6, 
 first sentence. Cf . note 12, the last quotation. 
 
 Again: "to be afifected is nothing but negative activity. An absolutely 
 passive being is absolutely nothing (a nihil privativum) .'''' (I. 1, 369.) 
 
 Page 19, Note 11. 
 
 This discussion should be read in the light of Fichte's Bestimmung des 
 Menschen.'' (I. 2, 199-247.) 
 
 Page 20, Note 12. 
 
 "In our experience <7te thing, that which is determined independently of our 
 freedom and that according to which our knowledge should fashion itself, and 
 intelligence, that which knows, are indissolubly connected. The philosopher is 
 able to abstract the one from the other and has then abstracted from experience 
 and raised himself above these. Let him abstract from the latter and he gets 
 an intelligence i7i it self, {that is, one abstracted from its relation to experience) ; 
 let him abstract from the first and he gets a thing in itself, (that is, one 
 abstracted from the fact of its occurrence in experience), as the explanation of 
 experience. The first procedure is idealism, the second dogmatism.'''' {Fichte, 
 Werke, I. 1, 425-6.) 
 
 The following from Schelling can hardly be translated: "Bedingen heisst 
 die Handlung, wodurch etwas zum Ding wird, bedingt, das was zum Ding 
 gemacht ist, woraus zugleich erhellt, dass nichts durch sich selbst als Ding 
 gesetzt sein kann, d. h. dass ein unbedingtes Ding ein Widerspruch ist. " (1. 1, 166.) 
 
 Page 22, Note 13. 
 
 For Fichte the term "■Reflexion"' is opposed to "Abstraction.''^ "Abstrac- 
 tion'''' is the mental act, through freedom, of separating the form from the 
 content, while "Eefle.Hon'^ is the act of supplying form with a given content. 
 (1.1,67.) 
 
 Page 26, Note 14. 
 The monads, the Leibnitzian substance, are immaterial and besouled, 
 
 [40] 
 
They are perceiving forces. The activity of the monads is an activity of per- 
 ceptions. The tendency of one perception to pass into another is called ''desireJ^ 
 Cf. Note 19. 
 
 In Fichte (I. 2, 101) the position is assumed for the moment that I 
 am myself the expression of a force alien to me (natural necessity)—! am 
 ■what natural necessity makes of me; to be discarded for the resolution that I 
 will be this force myself, (through freedom)— I will be what I chose to make 
 myself— I will be my own ultimate ground of action. 
 
 The object here, as the expression of a force alien to it, (the dialectic pro- 
 cess), is what the dialectic has made it. Its features have been supplied by the 
 process. As thought-construct it is the expression of the thinking force. Cf. 
 Note 20. 
 
 The terms motion {Beiuegung) and expression {Aeusserung) may be 
 explained by comparing their use with Schelling's habit of thought. In so far 
 as the mind views her phenomena as changing creations of her own is she aware 
 of a principal of activity within herself. " Such a being is living." " Live in 
 the visible analogue of spiritual being," (I. 1, 38S.) 
 
 " The mere succession of ideas, intuited as external, gives the conception of 
 mechanical motion. But the soul should not only intuite this succession, but 
 herself in this succession, and (since she only intuites her own activity) should 
 intuite herself as active in this succession." {Ibid., S. 385.) 
 
 Page 27, Note 15. 
 
 " To penetrate the ' inner side ' of objects, i. e., to assume that appearances 
 are determinable, with respect to their reality, independently of the ego." 
 {Schelling, Werke, I. 1, 212, note.) 
 
 Page 29, Note 16. 
 
 The early writings of Schelling furnish not only the most important source 
 for the ideas embodied in the early part of the " Phanomenologie " but also the 
 most enlightening commentary on the same. If Hegel could have been clear he 
 might have written the following passage and foreshadowed at once the transi- 
 tion which the present essay has been endeavoring to present. 
 
 " Doubtless Kant said that the laws of nature are the human mind's modes 
 of action, the conditions under which our intuition itself is first possible; but 
 he added: nature is nothing distinct from these laws, it is only a progressive 
 process of the infinite mind, in which the latter first comes to self-consciousness 
 and through which it gives to this self-consciousness extension, permanence, 
 continuity and necessity." {Schelling, Werke, I. 1, 361.) 
 
 Page 29, Note 17. 
 
 This indifference which the law and the law's illustration entertain toward 
 one another is explained for Leibnitz by his theory of the "pre-established 
 harmony'" of the monads; for Berkeley by regarding facts as tho thoughts of a 
 divine intellect. Cf. the quotation above, which is in general a fair enough 
 representation of the standpoint of German idealism. 
 
 Page 32, Note 18. 
 
 The law which exhibits the absolute identity of subject and object is arrived 
 
 [41] 
 
at by Pichte after somewhat the same fashion as the dialectic might be expected 
 to deduce it. The starting point is indifferent. Any empirical fact is selected 
 and we are asked to think away the empirical conditions. (In Hegel the 
 accidental is removed in the dialectic process.) That which remains and which 
 cannot be thought away is then recognized as something presupposed by every 
 empirical fact. This is the mental act of predicating the fact's existence and 
 the ego is this act or activity. The ego predicates itself through its mere exist- 
 ence and exists because of the act of predication. The discovery of the fact 
 whose existence is involved in its own defluition is the aim of all rationalism. 
 For Fichte this fact is the ego, the ego as act or activity. (1. 1, 91-98.) 
 
 rage 33, Note 19. 
 
 '^Begierde,^^ i. e., the need of the thinking force- for what is essential to it, 
 but which is not yet reality in the sense that it is not yet realized. Cf. the use 
 of the terms "A>a/r' and ''Begierde" in Fichte's Bestimvnoig des Menschen. 
 (I. 2, 176-198, in particular in the context of page 187.) Cf. again note 14, the 
 first paragraph. 
 
 Page 33, Note 20. 
 
 For Fichte the object of philosophy is not properly a construct of the philos- 
 opher himself. The object expresses itself as so and so ; the philosopher is 
 merely observer and describer. The artificial object of the first sort is dead 
 concept to which the investigation is related passively. In the case of the 
 improper object of philosophy attention is directed to the matter (as the acci- 
 dental) and not to the form, the self active power (Kraft). Tne matter 
 being passive, the object is then appearance, whereas the proper object is 
 concept. The proper object is active and living concept and through its necessity 
 philosophical knowledge is created. The philosopher observes the behavior of 
 the ego. "He proposes an experiment." (I. 1, 454.) 
 
 Cf. Note 24, last two quotations. 
 
 Again, according to the Wissenschaftslehre, every purposive activity, 
 mental or physical, is accompanied by the " intellectual intuition " of the con- 
 sciousness of self. Intellectual intuition and sensuous intuition never occur 
 separately but always in conjunction. Thus the intellectual intuition is viewed 
 as the source of life (activity), in the world of sense and without it the sensuous 
 world is conceived as dead. {Ibid, S. 463.) 
 
 Cf. the following quotation from Schelling: " We awake from the intel- 
 lectual intuition as from the state of death. We awake through reflection, i. e., 
 through necessitated return to ourselves. But without opposition is no return; 
 without an object no reflection is thinkable. An activity is living if it be di- 
 rected to objects alone, dead if it lose itself in itself. But man should be neither 
 lifeless nor merely living being. His activity turns of necessity to objects but 
 as necessarily does it turn back to himself. Through the former does he distin- 
 guish himself from the lifeless, through the latter from merely living (animal) 
 being." (I. 1, 325.) 
 
 Cf . Note 6. 
 
 Again: -'That which is object is something dead, passive, self -capable of 
 no action, and only object, of action." (I. 1, 367.) 
 
 [42] 
 
Page 34, Note 2i. 
 
 In the following passage from Schelling the non-ego is for the dogmatist the 
 absolute. For the idealist such an absolute disappears in the light of criticism. 
 
 "I understand you, dear friend! You conceive it more sublime to contest 
 an absolute power and, fighting, to succumb, than to insure yourself in the first 
 place against all risk through the assumption of a moral God. Certainly this 
 struggle against the infinite is not alone the most sublime that a man can con- 
 ceive, but is on my view, itself the principle of all sublimity. But I should like 
 to know how you will find in dogmatism an explanation of the power by which 
 man opposes himself to the absolute, as well as of the feeling which accompanies 
 the struggle. The consistent dogmatism does not succumb through strife but 
 through acquiescence, not through a violent but through a voluntary destruc- 
 tion, through quiet surrender of myself to the absolute object." (I. 1, 284.) 
 
 Page 34, Note 22. 
 
 The terms are Fichte's. 
 
 Cf. " I will that I be lord of nature and that nature be my servant; I will 
 that I have over her an influence appropriate to my own power {Kraft), but 
 that she have none over me." (I. 2, 192-93.) 
 
 "So long as man remains in the domain of nature, is he in the most appro- 
 priate sense of the word, as he can be loi'd of himself, lord of nature. He 
 knows the objective world in her determinate limits, over which she dare not 
 impose. In that he represents the object to himself, in that he prescribes for 
 the object form and consistency, does he dominate the same. He has nothing 
 to fear from it, for he has himself prescribed its limitations." {Schelling, 
 Werke, I. 1, 337.) 
 
 Page 35, Note 23. 
 
 Hegel is frequently nothing but Schelling rendered obscurely. The method 
 of thesis, antithesis and synthesis is illustrated in the following passage: 
 
 "Whosoever has reflected concerning Stoicism and Epicureanism, the two 
 most contradictory of moral systems, has easily seen that both agree in the 
 same ultimate end. The Stoic, who seeks to free himself of the influence of 
 external objects, struggles after happiness no less than the Epicurean, who sub- 
 merges himself in the arms of the world. The former makes himself independent 
 of sensuous needs, in that he satisfies none, the latter, in that he satisfies all. 
 
 "The one seeks to attain the final end, absolute happiness, metaphysically , 
 through abstraction from all sensibility ; the other physically, t\iToufc,h cova.- 
 plete indulgence of sensibility. But the Epicurean was metaphysicist, in that 
 his problem, to attain happiness through the successive indulgence of individual 
 needs, was unending. The Stoic was physicist, since his abstraction from all 
 sensibility could only succeed gradually in a temporal series. The one would 
 attain his final end through progression, the other through regression. Never- 
 theless both sought the same ultimate end, the end of absolute happiness and 
 satisfaction " (Opp. cit. S. 829.) 
 
 It is customary to say that in the absolute freedom and necessity coincide. 
 The absolute both prescribes and obeys its own law. When the absolute is 
 attained all is object of knowledge and freedom is no more. If the absolute 
 become object of knowledge, my own freedom is annihilated by the absolute 
 causality. 
 
 [43] 
 
Page 35, N^ote 24. A 
 
 Thu8 in Fichte that which introduces limitations is the objective, which is 
 opposed to freedom as indeterminateness. Whenever I think, I think something 
 determinate. "I hold myself with freedom in this sphere when I view myself 
 and / a77i held through this sphere and limited by it." (I. 1, 492.) 
 
 The view of Schelling is the same : 
 
 "Thus I will be conscious of my freedom only in so far as I feel myself con- 
 trolled in reference to the object. — JVo consciousness of the object without 
 consciousness of freedom, no consciousness ofjreedom without consciousness 
 of the object." (I. 1, 371.) 
 
 rage 36, Note 25. 
 
 "Now along with absolute freedom no self -consciousness is thinkable. An 
 activity, for which there exists no object, no opposition, never returns to itself. 
 Only through return to itself does consciousness arise. Only limited reality is 
 actuality for us. {Schelling, Werke, I. 1, 324.) Again: "When an activity 
 which is no longer limited by objects and which is wholly absolute, is no longer 
 accompanied by any consciousness; when unlimited activity is identical with ab- 
 solute rest; when the supreme moment of being borders on non-being; then does 
 criticism as well as dogmatism involve self -destruction. Does the latter demand 
 that I be submerged in the absolute object, so must conversely the former demand 
 that all which is object shall disappear in the intellectual intuition of myself. In 
 both cases all is for me object, and at the same time all consciousness of myself 
 as subject is lost. My reality disappears in the infinite." {Ibid, 6'. 527.) 
 
 [44] 
 
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