.-NGE AND
THE WORLD WAR
.JAJOR GENERAL
WILLIAM CROZIER
ORDNANCE AND THE
WORLD WAR
ORDNANCE AND
THE WORLD WAR
A Contribution to the History
of American Preparedness
BY
MAJOR-GENERAL
WILLIAM CROZIER
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
7920
COPYRIGHT, 1920, BY
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
Published May, 1920
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO
THE ORDNANCE OFFICERS
WHOSE DEVOTED SERVICES MADE THE RECORD
WHICH IS HEREIN ONLY PARTIALLY
SET FORTH
INTRODUCTORY
THIS BOOK is written in the belief that there is a
public in the United States which would wish to
know something of the method by which its great
army was prepared to play its part in the World
War. Everybody now knows that we entered the
war with a very small army and a wholly inade-
quate supply of arms, ammunition and other equip-
ment ; but there are some who do not know why it
took so long a time to raise the war army and trans-
port it to Europe, or why its supply with certain
American-made munitions was so much delayed;
and there are even some who, puzzled by sugges-
tions from sources claiming to be well informed,
do not know why we were not better prepared
originally, at least in the matter of war equipment.
Official reports have made known that we did not
send to Europe artillery of the two most important
calibers in time to have any of it get into use at
the front before hostilities ceased. And the same
fact has developed concerning gas shell. The funds
which were made available for supplying equip-
ment were prodigious in amount, and the citizen
who is in the habit of thinking that America is a
master of manufacture is naturally receptive of the
criticism that such delay must necessarily imply
incompetence of personnel or clumsiness of method,
or both.
I shall try herein to show where the principal
trouble lay with regard to the fighting equipment
Tii
Vlll
INTRODUCTORY
which Is furnished by the Ordnance Department,
and in doing so I shall tell something of the organi-
zation of that department, in order that an idea
may be formed as to its fitness for its task, and as
to the necessity for a substitute organization, which
was suggested, with strong backing, for taking over
that portion of the Ordnance Department's work
which had to do with the procurement of munitions
by contract with private manufacturers. I shall
then illustrate the course of the Department's per-
formance by giving some prominent instances in
which intense dissatisfaction was expressed popu-
larly, and also in certain high official quarters, with
the progress which was made in the supply of im-
portant equipment during the early months of the
war, and shall try to make it appear whether the
Ordnance Department met its responsibilities well,
or better action could have been taken under the
circumstances. I shall do this in the hope that the
interested reader may thereby be enabled to form
a judgment as to where his efforts should be di-
rected in order that we may not again enter a
war under conditions requiring so much time for
their correction, and so much protection by other
forces while we are making our own ready to en-
force the nation's will.
I should add that, having retired from active serv-
ice, I am no longer a part of the "War Department or
of the Army with the Colors. I therefore speak
without official authority, and with something of the
freedom of any other citizen.
APRIL 13, 1920.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTORY vii
I
ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT
General duties Provision for their performance in foreign coun-
tries Early methods in the United States Appointment of
ordnance officers Qualifications Necessity for incentive
Change in method of recruitment after Spanish War Disad-
vantages of the change Modifications of method Shortage
of personnel Great expansion in the World War Organiza-
tion of the Ordnance Office Cost-plus contracts. Pages 1-19
II
EMBARRASSMENTS
Inadequacy of appropriations for preparation Other handicaps
Discouragement of training of private manufacturers Dif-
ficulty of expanding clerical force Difficulty of increasing
office space Legal obstacles to expansion of plant Delay in
war appropriations Restrictions in expenditure of appropria-
tions Unnecessary limitations of discretion. Pages 20-37
III
OVERHEAD ORGANIZATION
Task of huge expenditure Adequacy of existing organizations
Aid required Changes suggested Creation of General Muni-
tions Board Substitution of War Industries Board Proposed
Department of Munitions Division of Purchase, Storage and
Traffic. Pages 38-50
ix
CONTENTS
IV
CEITICISMS
Adjournment of Extra Session of Congress in 1917 Investigation
of War Department at first regular Session Spirit of investi-
gators Special subjects of criticism Scheme of reply.
Pages 51-55
RIFLES
Importance of weapon Supply of Springfields Manufacture of
Enfields Questions of caliber and interchangeability of parts
Decision of the questions Criticism of the decision Ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the course pursued Testimony
of manufacturers Margin of time Satisfactory outcome.
Pages 56-73
VI
MACHINE GUNS
Great development of use Light and heavy types Insufficiency
of supply Tests before the war Appearance of the Lewis
gun Difference of opinion between testing boards and inven-
tor Lewis guns on the Mexican border First large appro-
priation Program for its expenditure Tests of April and
May, 1917 Views of testing board Appearance of Browning
gun American machine gun output Charge of prejudice
against Lewis gun Testimony of Col. Lewis Plattsburg test
of June, 1916 Col. Lewis' claim of free offer to Government
Confirmation by Gen. Wood Col. Lewis' claim of free offer
of range finders His further charge of prejudice Correspond-
ence on this subject Col. Lewis' return of royalties News-
paper charges Investigation by Inspector-General Public
endorsement by Secretary of War of Inspector General 's con-
clusions Failure of efforts for court of inquiry Criticisms by
Senators Chamberlain and Wadsworth Assistance from the
French. Pages 74-203
CONTENTS
VII
FIELD ARTILLERY
Criticism of shortage Previous efforts of Chief of Ordnance to
avoid it Responsibility of the people Allied assistance
Subject of dies, jigs and gauges French and American 75 mm.
guns Difficulty of manufacturing French model Senator
Wadsworth's criticisms Reply thereto. Pages 204-243
VIII
SMOKELESS POWDER
Initial manufacturing capacity Estimated needs Allied situation
Plans for enlarging the output Disapproval by War De-
partment Attitude of War Industries Board Construction
of plants at Nitro, W. Va., and at Nashville, Tenn. Experi-
ence with the two plants Comparison of cost of powder.
Pages 244-268
IX
RESPONSIBILITY
Military efficiency of form of government Senator Chamberlain's
New York criticism Reply of Representative Glass Appre-
ciation by public men of cause of unpreparedness.
Pages 269-283
CONCLUSION
Purpose of this volume Congressional investigation Immediate
effect Duty of the citizen. Pages 284-292
Ordnance and the World War
THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT
THE Ordnance Department has the duty of design-
ing, procuring by manufacture or purchase, sup-
plying to the service and maintaining in repair the
artillery, small arms, ammunition, pyrotechnics,
grenades and trench warfare weapons for the fixed
defenses and mobile armies of the United States and
its insular possessions, and supplies also the small
arms for the Navy and the Marine Corps. Until
the latter part of the World War it supplied the
personal equipment of the men, that is, their pack
carriers, cartridge belts, mess kits, etc., the horse
equipments for the cavalry, and the harness for the
artillery ; but these last were taken over by the newly
created division of Purchase, Storage and Traffic,
leaving to the Ordnance Department the technical
supplies generally comprised in the terms arms and
ammunition.
Military nations have adopted different methods
for providing an organization to attend to the above
mentioned duties. The common practice has been
to confide the task to a bodv of officers selected from
2 .-\ :(JI|1S T :A5:C!E l\ND v rHE WORLD WAR
the artillery service, and in European industrial
countries great reliance has been placed upon pri-
vate manufacturing establishments for the designs
and the experimental work preliminary to the in-
troduction of new types of weapons. The Krupp
establishment in Germany, the Skoda in Austria, the
Ansaldo in Italy, the Creusot in France and the
Vickers in England are well known examples of
private manufactories which have contributed nota-
bly to the munition making of the world. Such
establishments, with their expensive staffs and spe-
cial facilities, must, of course, be sustained on a
money-making basis. This has been possible both
by reason of the encouragement of the respective
governments, and also because of the markets af-
forded for the military output of the factories by
the backward industrial countries of the Orient and
of the new world, in the supply of which markets
the home governments have often given very ma-
terial assistance to the home factories. At each of
these establishments a corps of engineering design-
ers has been maintained, largely recruited from the
military services.
The United States has never had such establish-
ments to rely upon, and therefore, from the begin-
ning of its existence, has followed the method of
providing a special governmental organization for
attending to the design and the supply of arms and
ammunition, the fighting munitions of war. In the
Continental Congress a special committee known as
the " Board of War and Ordnance" was charged
with the duty of supplying the revolutionary forces
THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT 8
with war material, in so far as this was done by the
central government. The committee was composed
of five members of the Congress, but was soon en-
larged by the addition of persons not members of
Congress, and was shortly again changed so as to
exclude the members of Congress and reduce the
board to three members. This was in primitive
form the beginning of the War Department, which
was thereafter evolved as the special branch of the
government for the control of the military forces.
The name was changed to the " Board of War," but
its functions continued to include the supply of the
forces with ordnance material. The board had
under it a body of officers known as Commissaries
General of Military Stores, for the care of the mu-
nitions procured by the Board of War and their
issue to the service.
In 1781 the office of Secretary of War was cre-
ated, and in 1794 there was created the office of
Superintendent of Military Stores, who was given
charge of the custody of these stores, but not of
their procurement. As yet there was no Ordnance
Department, and the duties which were afterwards
assigned to the Chief of Ordnance were distributed
between the President, the Secretary of War and
the Commissary of Military Stores and his assis-
tants. In 1812 the Ordnance Department was cre-
ated and placed under an officer with the rank of
colonel, and the title of Commissary-General of Ord-
nance. This officer was given assistants with titles
like his own and appropriate military rank, and the
whole department was placed under the Secretary
ORDNANi
WORLD WAR
of War. In 1815 the title of Commissary was dis-
carded and the officers were designated as colonels,
lieut.-eolonels, etc. In these early years the actual
work of manufacturing arms and ammunition was
performed by artisans who were first employed and
later enlisted in the Ordnance Department. Again,
in still later years and up to the present time, these
enlisted men formed the guards and caretakers of
the ordnance establishments and the field force for
issue and repair of ordnance stores, and the work of
manufacture at these establishments was performed
by employees.
During the early years of its existence the officers
of the Ordnance Department were appointed from
the rest of the Army or from civil life. For eleven
years, from 1821 to 1832, they were obtained by de-
tail from the Artillery, with which the department
was merged. But this arrangement not provin'g sat-
isfactory, the department was re-established by the
Act of April 5, 1832. After its creation the Military
Academy at West Point became a source of supply
of ordnance officers, as of other officers of the Army ;
and for a number of years the practice was to ap-
point to the Engineer Corps the highest graduates of
each class, and to the Ordnance Department the next
following. From the early days of the existence of
the department solicitude was displayed by Congress
as to the qualifications of ordnance officers. When
it was to be enlarged examinations were prescribed
as a condition precedent to the transfer of officers
from other branches of the Army, and in 1863 an
examination was instituted by law as a condition of
THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT 5
promotion, some twenty-seven years before this re-
quirement was prescribed for officers of the Army
at large. In 1869, following a reduction in the
strength of the Army, appointments and promo-
tions in the Ordnance Department were suspended
for several years; and during this period of sus-
pension much consideration was given to the best
method of securing officers for taking charge of the
design and procurement of the nation's munitions,
for which there was no other body of citizens who
could be called upon.
The designing and constructing ordnance officer
must be a mechanical engineer, since no character-
istic of this mechanical age is more pronounced
than the complete entry of its spirit into the pro-
duction of implements and engines of war. The
ordnance officer's knowledge of engineering subjects
must not be merely that of the liberally educated
man, understanding the general principles of all
professions, but that of the expert with details at
his finger ends, and he must have a specially sound
mastery of principles, since he must oftentimes de-
duce the methods of their application to his art
without the aid of the many handbooks and practi-
cal treatises which are available in the civil practice
of the engineering profession. Progressive develop-
ment of arms and armament requires strenuous pry-
ing, with stimulated imagination, in advance of the
own; for war is competition, and there is no
standard of excellence for anything. It does not
suffice to have good soldiers, good officers, and good
rmament, if the enemy has better soldiers, better
6 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
officers, and better armament. The intense appli-
cation and close work required of an ordnance offi-
cer are not attractive to one without special apti-
tude, and do not of themselves tempt line officers
to laborious preparation for entry into the Ord-
nance Department from a life which certainly offers
a more agreeable combination of indoor and out-
door occupation than does that of the technical staff
officer. The necessity for some incentive for serv-
ice in the Ordnance Department was therefore
recognized.
In 1873 the Corps was reopened with a new scheme
for the recruitment of officer personnel. The low-
est grade in the corps was made that of 1st lieu-
tenant, and transfer to the corps was to be pre-
ceded by an examination satisfactory to a board of
ordnance officers. The examination was not re-
quired by law to be competitive, but the practice of
the department soon made it so that the stimulus of
an advance in grade for the successful 2nd lieutenant
of the line, and of permanent transfer to a corps
of which he liked the duties and in which subsequent
promotion was faster than in the line, being suffi-
cient to secure a number of competitors for each
vacancy. This system was quite successful, and
furnished excellent officers for the Ordnance De-
partment. It lacked the advantage of an easy way
to disembarrass the department of officers who did
not fulfill their early promise and it thus failed to
keep up the stimulus of competition after entry into
the department, but it was probably better than was
enjoyed by any other branch of the service, and it
THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT 7
lasted until the reorganization of the Army after
the Spanish War.
In the temporary interest in the Service which
always follows war there was the usual scrutiny of
the military machine after the Spanish War, and
among the criticisms of organization and methods
probably the most severe were directed against the
staff departments as being too completely divorced
from the line, and consequently lacking both in
knowledge of line requirements and in sympathetic
concern in meeting them. There was no doubt of
the harsh things said of the staff by line officers,
and whether these charges were justified or not, it
was part of good organization to try to remove their
cause, and produce harmony between the mutually
essential components of the military force. The
cause was diagnosed as the completeness of the sep-
aration of the staff officer when he was permanently
transferred from the line; and the cure, as applied
in the Act of February 2, 1901, was to place all
the staff departments, except the Judge Advocate
General's, the Medical Department and the Engi-
neers, under a detail system, in which their officers
were detached from the line for tours of four years,
with compulsory interval of two years between suc-
cessive details in grades below that of lieut.-colonel.
The new system was not made to apply to officers
already in the staff departments, who continued on
therein, but with no more permanent transfers, and
it prevailed up to the time of our entry into the
European War, without important modification ex-
cept as to the Ordnance Department.
8 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
The detail to the staff was accompanied by no in-
crease of rank, being made from the same grade in
the line as that in the staff department which was
filled by the detail; and as promotion took place in
the line only, there was no special incentive to seek
service in a staff department, except a liking for
the work of the department. This incentive was
not sufficient to secure officers for the Ordnance De-
partment, which had kept up its standard of quali-
fications by continuing the examination as a condi-
tion precedent to detail, as it had before been a
condition precedent to permanent transfer. The
diminution of incentive was such that not only was
it impossible to secure competition for detail to the
department, but there were not enough applicants
for detail to fill the vacancies, and oftentimes there
were no applicants at all. Officers would not under-
take the labor of preparation for examination, and
incur the risk of failure, for the sake of entering
upon the laborious duties which would follow suc-
cess. In 1906, therefore, after five years of strong
effort on the part of the Chief of Ordnance, an act
was passed authorizing the ^detail to the Ordnance
Department of officers from the same grade in other
branches of the service, or from the grade below;
decreasing the compulsory interval between succes-
sive details from two years to one, and lowering the
grade at which the compulsory interval should cease
from lieut.-colonel to major. These slight changes
in the law, involving no increase of expense, were
of great significance, since they placed the officers
of the Ordnance Department upon a competitive
THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT 9
basis of merit both for entry into the department
and for service afterward therein, with the strong
incentive of advancement in rank either upon origi-
nal detail or upon some subsequent one. In case
an officer failed to make good all that was necessary
was to refrain from redetailing him, after any four-
year tour. The method remained in successful prac-
tice until our entry into the European War.
With the keen and interested personnel produced
by this method of recruitment the best results
attended the theoretical course established for
young ordnance officers, at the Sandy Hook Proving
Ground, for one year's study, under guidance, of
the application of their student courses to the de-
sign of the artillery and other armament furnished
by the Ordnance Department ; and equal success was
experienced at the Watertown Arsenal, where these
officers were given a year's practical work in the
foundry, the machine shop, the forge shop and the
chemical laboratory, making the same hours as the
other workmen. At the end of the year they were
not only fair artisans but they had an increased
capacity for understanding the workman's point of
view.
Incidentally, it may be here stated that in the
bills for the organization of the Army now in the
spring of 1920 before the two Houses of Congress
the incentive for service in the Ordnance Depart-
ment is removed; and if either the Senate bill or
the House bill shall become a law, without modifica-
ion in this respect, there will thereafter be lacking
stimulus for tho special kind of service herein-
10 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
before described which the Department has enjoyed
practically since its first creation.
In common with the rest of the military establish-
ment, the Ordnance Department was hampered
greatly in its preparations for war by shortage of
personnel. The Act of February 2, 1901, after
the Spanish War, fixed the number of officers of the
department at seventy-one; the Act of 1906, which
changed the conditions of detail, increased the num-
ber to eighty-five, and the National Defense Act of
1916 further increased it to one hundred and forty-
two; but the last Act prescribed that the increase
should take place over an interval of five years, so
that upon our entry into the war only ninety-seven
officers were in the department. Not only was this
number entirely inadequate for the performance of
the multitudinous duties of the Department, but a
considerable proportion of the ninety-seven officers
were young men with little experience in their
duties, and some of them were under instruction as
student officers, giving no aid in carrying on the
work of the department, and requiring the atten-
tion of more experienced officers for their instruc-
tion. This condition, of course, always obtains to
an extent in a going organization of professional
people, but it was accentuated in the Ordnance De-
partment by the lateness of congressional apprecia-
tion of the necessity for increasing its personnel,
and by circumstances which attended the outbreak
of the war in Europe.
When the nations which afterwards became our
associates in the war turned to the United States
THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT 11
for the manufacture of munitions, the absence of
civilian engineers skilled in the design and produc-
tion of weapons of war became at once acutely felt,
and the organizations which had secured foreign
contracts turned to the only reservoir in the country
of the kind of skill which was necessary for them
and drew from the Ordnance Department a number
of its most expert officers, who resigned from the
Army to accept positions of responsibility in their
plants.
Such was the state of affairs with regard to the
personnel of the Ordnance Department when the
war drew us into its whirlpool in April, 1917. A
system of providing a reserve of ordnance officers
for an emergency had been authorized by the Na-
tional Defense Act of June 3, 1916, and a few offi-
cers had been listed in consequence; but, as with
many other features of that Act, there had been no
time for effective realization of its purpose. Upon
the breaking of relations with Germany, when it be-
came apparent that we would soon be in the war,
a special division was created in the office of the
Chief of Ordnance and placed in charge of the then
Lieut.-Col. C. C. Williams, who afterwards became
Chief of Ordnance, for taking charge of the essen-
tially important subject of the recruitment of offi-
cers from the numerous volunteers whom the acute
conditions then stimulated to offer their services.
The division soon grew to five officers and some
twenty clerks, of whom all but one officer were them-
selves new recruits in the department, enrolled since
our entry into the war. The one experienced officer
12
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
was Major James L. Walsh, who succeeded Lieut.-
Col. Williams when the latter went to France with
General Pershing, as Chief Ordnance Officer of the
American Expeditionary Force. The department
had at its ten Arsenals in the United States boards
of officers examining local candidates for commis-
sions, of which the proceedings were all reviewed
and the qualifications of the candidates summarized
for presentation to the Chief of Ordnance by the
Personnel Division of the Ordnance office. The
division worked days and nights and Sundays at
its tremendous task, upon whose performance de-
pended all the other work of the department; for
without officers the department, of course, could not
function.
A few words as to the numbers involved in this
expansion of the personnel. After the war had
proceeded a few months, during which a large num-
ber of new officers had been inducted into the de-
partment, a survey was made of the requirements
in commissioned personnel for the fiscal year to
end June 30, 1918, as indicated by the experience
and outlook at the time of the survey. The number
arrived at was 5,373. Of course, not many of these
were required to be designing engineers of ord-
nance, but their duties included administration and
executive work, inspection of manufacture and of
finished material, supervision of mechanical instal-
lations, including metallurgical and chemical plants,
the negotiative and legal work of contract making,
the custody and issue of munitions,, the repair of
arms and material in the field, and watchfulness
THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT 13
over the supply of troops as ordnance officers of
tactical organizations. For all these kinds of work
the department needed and obtained from civil life
mechanical, electrical and chemical engineers, metal-
lurgists, professors of various sciences, business
managers, financiers, lawyers, and men of some
training or aptitude in the handling of bodies of
other men. In recruiting for these requirements,
the Ordnance Department received substantial help
from the American Society of Mechanical Engi-
neers, the American Society of Civil Engineers, the
Western Society of Engineers, the Engineers Club
of Philadelphia, the American Chemical Society,
and various other engineering and technical asso-
ciations ; and also from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, the Stevens Institute, Columbia Uni-
versity, Lehigh University, the University of Michi-
gan and other technical institutions of learning.
Assistance was also received from efficiency en-
gineers with wide professional acquaintance, and
from the heads of large industrial and manufactur-
ing establishments employing engineering talent.
The examining boards of the arsenals were supple-
mented by others convened in several of the large
manufacturing centers.
By the end of the year 1917, the number of ord-
nance officers had increased to about 3,000. A large
number of applications for commissions had been
received, and the carefulness of the scrutiny of the
examining boards may be estimated from the num-
ber passing satisfactorily, which did not exceed 15
per cent of the applicants. The directive and ad-
14 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
ministrative work of the department centered in
the office of the Chief of Ordnance at Washington,
and the expansion there was in even greater per-
centage than in the department at large. Upon
our entry into the war 10 officers were on duty in
the Ordnance Office, the Chief of Ordnance and his
assistants. By the middle of December following
there were 950, representing an increase of 9,500
per cent. Those of the community who have had
any experience in the expansion of industrial or-
ganizations can appreciate the task of the Ord-
nance Department in adjusting itself to an amount
of business represented by this augmentation of
superior personnel of the officer class. The work
of indicating to those best equipped where their
field of endeavor lay, of assigning the assistants,
and of fitting the multitudes of juniors into the
places where the need for them developed with
startling rapidity, had to be carried on by the small
permanent personnel concurrently with the direc-
tion of the country's vast manufacturing resources
into the line of military manufacture, and the prepa-
ration of estimates of further needs of the depart-
ment for presentation to Congress. These last
duties would have constituted a great task even
for an originally adequate personnel.
At the outbreak of the war the Ordnance Bureau
in Washington was arranged in divisions, each
charged with the provision of a particular class of
materiel. There was a Gun Division for cannon
and their ammunition; a Carriage Division, for
artillery carriages; a Small Arms Division, for
THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT 15
riflos, pistols, and their ammunition ; an Equipment
Division, for cartridge belts, pack carriers, saddles,
bridles, and other articles of personal and horse
equipment; and some others. There were also a
few divisions not relating directly to materiel, such
as the Personnel Division, the Finance Division, etc.
Each division having charge of materiel occupied
itself with all the principal functions attending the
provision of its particular class. That is, it was
responsible for the design, including the drawings
and specifications; for the procurement through or-
ders to manufacturers and contracts; for the pro-
duction, which meant watchfulness over the course
of manufacture and the facilitation of its progress ;
and for inspection of the product, to determine its
acceptability for use in the service. Information
concerning any stage in the provision of a particular
article was to be sought in a single division; and
the divisions were prevented from attempting to
use the same manufacturing facilities, and other-
wise kept out of one another's way, by the Chief
of Ordnance and his assistants who were close
enough to him to be, in a way, a part of himself.
When the war was about nine months old a change
was made in the above arrangement, and the divi-
sions were separated along the lines of function,
instead of along the lines of classes of munitions
to be provided. That is, one division, called the
Engineering Division, took over the function of
design of all the fighting materiel provided by the
department; guns, carriages, small arms, and all
the rest. Another, the Procurement Division, placed
16
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
the orders and made contracts for everything. The
Production Division supervised the processes of
manufacture in all factories; and the Inspection
Division passed upon the quality of all materiel
and workmanship. Each division had a chief and
staff, and the new arrangement, in giving each only
one kind of function, was supposed to make for sim-
plicity of organization.
The arguments for this kind of segregation of
duties are quite obvious, but a little consideration
will show that it is possible to carry it too far. No
one would advocate the consolidation in a single
division of all designing for the Army, the Navy
and the Shipping Board; and no one would seek to
promote comprehensiveness of grasp of government
work by requiring all the orders and contracts for
the War Department and the Treasury Department
to be placed by one office. Which is to say, that
when any business becomes very large it is best to
keep the various functions required to prosecute it
in relations with each other, and not to detach them
from such relations, and unite them with similar
functions of other business. Just where the line
should be drawn would depend upon the circum-
stances of a particular case. In the Ordnance
Bureau there had been no difficulty in attending to
all the functions of providing gun carriages of dif-
ferent types in the single Carriage Division; but it
would have been undesirable to spread the functions
of design, procurement, production and inspection
for the Ordnance Department over the Aviatiori
Service, for example, although both were in the
THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT 17
War Department. The old divisions of the Ord-
nance Department had each been considered to
embody a business of sufficient magnitude to include
in itself all the principal functions, and the war
brought a tremendous expansion in them. It would,
therefore, have been more in accord with previous
experience to subdivide the divisions, and retain for
each the various functions, but over a restricted
class of material, than to expand each function to
cover all classes of material, as was done.
Difficulties were encountered with the new ar-
rangement. Kesponsibility for backwardness of
output became obscure, and was almost impossible
to locate. And after several months of trial the
arrangement was abandoned, and the old one, in
principle, restored, with some changes of assign-
ment of work between divisions, and some creation
of new divisions to meet enlarged duties ; also with
soine arrangements for coordination between divi-
sions, which, in peace time, the Chief of Ordnance
had been able to attend to himself.
The distribution of duties in the Ordnance Office
has been dwelt upon somewhat because the change
was commented upon as one of excellence which had
been forced upon the Department by pressure from
the outside. It had, however, often been considered
and discussed within the organization and with
various efficiency engineers, but through the years
had failed to carry conviction of its desirability.
Its final abandonment after trial will probably be
conclusive as between the two methods.
A now section became necessary because of the
18
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
uncertain conditions in regard to the cost of labor
and material. Nobody could tell from week to week
what the prices of commodities were going to be,
and nobody could say what changes were going to
take place in the labor market. All kinds of prices
were rising rapidly. It was extremely difficult for
private manufacturers to take contracts at fixed
prices for such articles as guns, carriages or am-
munition, and it would generally have been useless
to ask them to do so, and take the risk of an under-
estimate through changing conditions, because the
transactions were so large they would have been im-
able to carry the resulting loss and could not have
completed their contracts. The only practicable
method, in many cases, was to have the manufac-
turer do the work and charge to the Government the
actual cost plus a sum as compensation for the ser-
vices of himself and his establishment; which sum
was sometimes agreed upon as a percentage of the
cost, and sometimes was made a fixed amount per
article manufactured.
This method of contracting, commonly called the
"cost plus method/' required the Ordnance Depart-
ment to go into the works of manufacturers and
supervise effectively the process of keeping account
of the cost of work done for the Government, which
had never before been done, and necessitated the
establishment in the office of the Chief of Ordnance
of a cost accounting section as a part of the Finance
Division. Mr. Lester W. Blyth, a member of the
accounting firm of Messrs. Ernst & Ernst, of Cleve-
land, Ohio, Avas invited to accept a commission in the
THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT 19
Ordnance Department and was placed at the head of
the new section, which he organized and carried
through the war. The section employed and trained
some 1,200 accountants during the war, and its per-
sonnel reached the number of 13 officers, 58 enlisted
men, and 1,990 civilians.
The writer of these pages had the advantage of
long enough service at the head of the Ordnance
Department to realize the results of a consistent
policy. Appointed Chief of Ordnance in 1901, and
successively reappointed in 1905, 1909, 1913 and
1917, he was able to hold to his plans long enough
to test them, notwithstanding that it took the first
five years of his incumbency of office to secure the
improved method of recruitment of officer personnel.
He continued in charge of the department until we
were about half way through the World War, when
the officers who had come into the department under
the merit system of 1873, and those who had come
in under the merit system of 1906, were carrying
great burdens of technical and administrative re-
sponsibility; some in the department, and a few in
private munitions factories in which they had taken
positions after having resigned from the Ordnance
Department before we came into the war. They
formed a small but invaluable nucleus for the able
assistance which came to them from civil life.
n
EMBARRASSMENTS
THE failure of the country during the long peri<
of peace to give attention to military preparation
in matters of personnel, which was naturally re-
flected in a similar failure by Congress, was accom-
panied by equal neglect in the matter of material.
The military material most characteristic of war
is that supplied by the Ordnance Department; and
for the reason that it is characteristic only of war,
it is not naturally produced in time of peace, and
the agencies for its production do not arise unless
artificially stimulated. The rate of preparation in
Ordnance material after the Spanish War was
measured by annual appropriations of about $10,-
000,000 until the year 1916, when, in accordance with
the program of the National Defense Act, the ap-
propriation rose to about $100,000,000. As late as
1913, however, it was only $8,138,000. The adequacy
of these sums may be judged by the fact that during
our nineteen months of war the Ordnance Depart-
ment expended over $4,000,000,000. The refusal to
make larger appropriations was in the face of fre-
quent representations by the Chief of Ordnance, and
indeed by all other military officers in position to
make recommendations, both as to the necessity for
20
EMBARRASSMENTS 21
making more substantial provision and as to the
time which would be required to produce the weap-
ons of modern warfare in adequate amount, for a
considerable conflict, even after the funds should be
furnished.
In a subsequent chapter, on Artillery, I cite cer-
tain particular statements to Committees of Con-
gress, in connection with which it should be borne
in mind that all other preparations, both in organ-
ization, personnel and materiel, can take place
faster than the manufacture of arms and ammuni-
tion, which therefore sets the pace at which the
country can make ready to wage war.
But meagerness of appropriations was not the
only handicap under which such departments as the
Ordnance had to struggle in the effort to be fore-
handed on the material side of readiness for war.
Here are a few of the others:
Manufacturing Arsenals could, of course, turn out
only a small proportion of the munitions needed in
a war of any magnitude. There were six of these
Arsenals : Watertown, Mass., where the product was
sea coast gun carriages and armor piercing projec-
tiles ; Springfield, Mass., manufacturing, before the
war, rifles, pistols and machine guns; Watervliet,
N. Y., making cannon, large and small; Frankford,
Penn., making small arms ammunition, artillery
ammunition and fire control instruments ; Picatinny,
N. J., making smokeless powder and high explo-
sives, and Kock Island, HI., making field gun car-
riages and other vehicles, artillery harness, personal
and horse equipments, targets and rifles. The main-
22
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
tenance of these establishments served several pur-
poses. They afforded opportunity for the determi-
nation of standards of workmanship, so that these
might be embodied in specifications for the govern-
ment of private manufacturers without giving just
grounds for complaint of undue severity ; they pro-
duced the intimate acquaintance of ordnance officers
with the materiel designed and furnished by the de-
partment, which can only come from actually making
at least a part of it, and they gave rise to knowledge
of the cost of manufacture which permitted the de-
partment to exercise a reasonable control over the
prices charged by private parties for manufactur-
ing in accordance with its designs and specifications.
Properly used, they formed an agency of the Ord-
nance Department of the first importance, but they
were not always used with the best of judgment. They
should have been employed at such capacity as to re-
quire their operation for a single eight-hour shift
only in the twenty-four hours, and such materiel as
they could not produce when operated to this extent
should have been procured by contract with private
manufacturers, to the amount permitted by available
appropriations. There would thus have been avail-
able for the increased requirements of the war, not
only the expansibility of the Arsenals to double-shift
capacity, or greater, but also the facilities of private
factories, with their own possibility of expansion,
which would have been familiarized with the manu-
facture of war materiel for the Government in time
of peace. But the efforts of the Department to pro-
mote economy of manufacture in its Arsenals had
EMBARRASSMENTS 23
been so successful as to interfere with its purpose
of training private establishments for supplying its
emergency needs.
The Government has certain advantages in cost
of manufacture over the commercial plant. It can
in ordinary times write an interest charge of only
3 per cent, against about twice that amount for the
private party. It has to support only actual fire
losses, which are not much more than half the cost
of insurance. Its superintendence by officers costs
much less than the civilian superintendence of pri-
vate establishments. For example, the Command-
ing Officer of none of the Arsenals costs the Govern-
ment more than $7,000 per annum. His actual pay
is not over $5,000, and his quarters and other allow-
ances do not exceed the difference between these
two sums. A civilian superintendent for an estab-
lishment of corresponding magnitude could not be
obtained for twice the amount. In addition, the
Government has no selling costs, no costs of financ-
ing, and makes no profit. On the other hand, the
Government has a handicap in its labor cost. It has
for a number of years practised the eight-hour day,
as against nine hours or ten hours in the private
factory. This may or may not be a handicap, since
there is evidence to the effect that workmen will
do as much in an eight-hour day as in one of longer
duration ; but however this may be, the Government
pays for a considerable amount of time during
which it receives no return at all in work. It pays
its employees for seven national holidays, for thirty
working days of leave, and for thirteen Saturday
24 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
afternoons in summer time, which amount to a total
of forty-three and a half days; about 16 per cent
of the two hundred and seventy remaining working
days of the year, not counting Sundays. The Gov-
ernment's advantages probably overbalance this
disadvantage, and, coupled with special attention to
efficiency of methods, produced, in the years before
the war, such economy of manufacture at the Ar-
senals, in comparison with the prices for which
private establishments would do the same work for
the Government as to influence Congress to require
that appropriations made for the Ordnance De-
partment should be expended in manufacture at
the Arsenals, up to the full capacity of these institu-
tions. This policy prevented the use of public funds
for the peace time training and encouragement of
private manufactures as a reliance for emergency.
The disadvantage of the policy was earnestly and
repeatedly pointed out by the Chief of Ordnance in
hearings before the committees of Congress, when
it was stated that the difference in cost was no
more than necessary insurance for maintaining the
availability of private plants to come to the help of
the Government in time of need; but the fear of
profiteering overrode the consideration of prepared-
ness, and the restrictions could not be removed.
Another hindrance related to clerical service.
Upon the advent of a great emergency calling for
the immediate expansion of the operations of such
an organization as the Ordnance Department, the
very first requisite is the multiplication of the means
of communication. Multitudes of letters and tele-
EMBARRASSMENTS 25
grams must be written and received, and must be
properly entered upon the records in order that
they may not speedily resolve themselves into a
confused mass of papers. Such funds as may be
available must be quickly allotted to manufacturing
orders, and estimates for new funds must be made
up, arranged, tabulated and recorded, for submis-
sion to Congress. All of which, and much that is
similar, requires the immediate services of many
clerks. The headquarters is a nerve center whose
impulses must go out to the rest of the organization,
and to the agencies which are to be brought into
operation, over the desks of clerks. Now, there is a
law (22 Statutes, 255) which forbids the hiring in
AVashington of employees other than those spe-
cifically authorized, in number and salary, by law.
The appropriations for expenditure outside Wash-
ington, as for manufacture at the Arsenals, for in-
stance, do not limit the proportion of the funds
appropriated which can be expended for labor,
either clerical or any other kind; but in order to
employ additional people in any capacity in the
departments in Washington it is necessary to sub-
mit, for the funds required, estimates which must
be in the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury by
the 15th of October, with explanation of the neces-
sity for the employees required, who, if the explana-
tions are satisfactory to Congress and the funds are
appropriated, may be employed on the first of the
following July. The jealousy with which this re-
striction is guarded by Congress may be appre-
ciated from the fact that in one of the years shortly
ORDNANCE AJ
WORLD WAR
preceding our entry into the war, I submitted an
estimate for an increase of nine in the force of
about one hundred clerks of the Ordnance office,
and appeared before the appropriate committees in
argument for the authorization. I secured author-
ity to employ six of the nine whom I had asked for.
When we came into the war the number of pieces of
mail, incoming and outgoing, handled by the clerical
force of the Ordnance Office was in the neighbor-
hood of five hundred per week; by December of the
same year pieces of outgoing mail alone had risen
to more than one thousand per day. The office was
greatly embarrassed in the early part of the war
by lack of authority to increase its clerical force,
which was sought earnestly from Congress but was
granted only grudgingly and after much delay and
inconvenience. The extent to which additional force
was required is shown by the increase from about
two hundred at the declaration of war to about
forty-five hundred in the following December.
Office space was another trouble. For the accom-
modation of the additional officers and clerks there
was, of course, needed at once additional office room.
The space in the War Department building was
filled to overflowing, and room for expansion could
only be secured by renting buildings about the city.
But there is a law (19 Statutes, 370) which pro-
hibits the renting of office room in Washington,
unless authorized by an appropriation for the spe-
cific purpose. The same process of estimating and
explaining as in the case of employees is therefore
necessary. We were, in consequence, up against
EMBARRASSMENTS 27
the same kind of embarrassment, notwithstanding
strong representation to Congress, as in the other
matter, the extent of the embarrassment being
apparent from the comparison of the floor space
occupied by the Ordnance Department when we en-
tered the war, some fifteen thousand square feet,
with that occupied at the end of the year, which
was about six hundred and ten thousand square feet.
Congress had not failed to pay some attention to
the statement of needs, and made appropriations
for large temporary buildings; but this was not
until June, and the buildings were not ready until
the end of the year; and, in the meantime, the
authority of the Department to help itself as best
it might was quite inadequate. In December of
1917 the Ordnance Office was scattered about Wash-
ington in fifteen different buildings; during the
painful acquisition of which there were frequent
intervals when clerks had to use their typewriting
machines on window-sills or take them to their
lodgings to perform their work, and at one time of
special congestion a number of officers clubbed to-
gether and with their own funds hired a loft over
a garage, and fitted it up with temporary divisions
as office room for themselves and their clerks.
These officers had recently joined the department
from civil life, and their action was illustrative of
the fine spirit w r hich prevailed in the department's
personnel.
In putting into hasty operation an immense pro-
gram of manufacture of articles not theretofore pro-
duced in large numbers, as in the case of artillery,
28 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
it was often necessary to provide for the radical
extension of existing plants or for the construction
of new plants. Here a whole series of legal ob-
stacles was encountered. Plant almost invariably
involves buildings and machinery, and it had been
the practice of Congress to provide for machinery
by special appropriation, or by special wording in
an appropriation for the procurement of manufac-
tured articles. For example, there would be an
appropriation of a specific sum for artillery ammu-
nition, with the words added "and for the machinery
necessary for its manufacture at the Arsenals."
With this wording the Department was free to use
such proportion of the appropriation as it thought
proper in purchasing and installing machinery, pro-
vided the machinery was to be used at an Arsenal.
But some of the appropriations did not have this
wording, and Congress would not add it in all cases ;
and besides, the usual case which arose in our war
proceedings was one in which machinery was to be
purchased for use elsewhere than in an Arsenal, as
in a private plant whose construction or enlarge-
ment was financed by the Government. As no pro-
hibiting statute could be found covering this point,
however, we secured a legal opinion that the pre-
ceding practice did not have the effect of law, and
that appropriations for procurement could be lawful-
ly expended for machinery required in manufacture.
But with buildings it was different. There is a
law (Revised Statutes 1136) which states that
"buildings and structures of a permanent nature
shall not be constructed unless detailed estimates
EMBARRASSMENTS 29
shall have been previously submitted to Congress,
and approved by a special appropriation for the
same, except when constructed by the troops; and
no such structures, the cost of which shall exceed
$20,000, shall be erected unless by special authority
of Congress/' And there is another law (Revised
Statutes 355) which prohibits the expenditure even
of funds which may be specially appropriated for
the purpose, upon any land purchased for the erec-
tion thereon of public buildings, of any kind what-
ever, until the written opinion of the Attorney-Gen-
eral shall be had in favor of the validity of the title,
and until the consent of the legislature of the State
in which the land is situated has been given. And
there is still another law which prohibits the pur-
chase of land except in pursuance of an appropria-
tion specially made for the purpose. By these laws,
although we had hundreds of millions of dollars
for the procurement of war material, we were em-
barrassed in the expenditure of the funds for the
plants essential to its production. We met the
obstacle as to the use of the appropriations for the
erection of buildings by deciding not to put up any
of a " permanent nature, " and thereafter large sums
were expended for temporary structures. Although
these were to house power plants and other great
groups of machinery, they had to possess the
strength required to support enormous traveling
cranes, and necessarily involved the use of a great
deal of concrete and other masonry in their con-
struction, there was so much use of steel shapes that
it was possible to take them apart and remove them,
30
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
which was construed as bringing them within the
definition of the term "temporary," and thus as
permitting their erection without specific appro-
priation, and upon leased land not belonging to the
United States.
But these constructions of the laws, perhaps some-
what strained, did not relieve us from the prohibi-
tion to expend funds upon any kind of public build-
ings whatever, which were to go upon purchased
land, until after the inadmissible delay required to
secure the opinion of the Attorney-General upon the
title, and the action of the state legislature. An Act
had been approved on July 2, 1917, relieving the
department from the operation of this prohibition
with reference to land purchased for works of forti-
fications, coast defenses and military camps; and
the War Department sent communications to Con-
gress requesting that the relief be extended so
as to cover the class of cases mentioned above ; but
no action could be secured upon the request until,
on the last day of the special session of Congress
of 1917, the Hon. Swagar Sherley, of the Committee
of Appropriations of the House of Representatives,
personally took up the matter, and through his inti-
mate knowledge of congressional methods and his
high personal standing with the leaders of both
Houses secured the passage of a joint resolution
relieving the Ordnance Department from the re-
striction of this law.
Of course, these hampering laws were not enacted
in mere wantonness. They were designed usually
to correct some abuse, and for reasons which, in
EMBARRASSMENTS 31
most cases, would probably have been considered
good ; but they took no account of the interference
which they occasioned with effective preparation
for war, which always had to give place to con-
siderations of economy or political expediency. On
many occasions I represented to Committees of Con-
gress not only the current embarrassment which
these restrictions were causing in the operations of
the Ordnance Department, but the tremendous
handicap which they would cause if the Department
should suddenly be called upon to act with maximum
energy in order to meet a great emergency; and in
this I was not alone, but I imagine that I was sup-
ported by every other bureau chief of the War
Department. My representations did not prevail,
and no one of the restrictions mentioned was lifted
until after we got into the war. Thereafter relief
was so slow and partial that it was not until the end
of the year that, by legal construction and by con-
gressional action, we got the obstacles so smoothed
out or circumvented that necessary measures could
be taken without much loss of time in devising ways
of doing business without violating the law.
These legislative hindrances, and others which
I do not mention, make part of the long list of every-
thing else than making ready for war which had
been piled upon the departments in peace time.
They consumed an inordinate amount of the time
of administrative officers at a period when they had
far too little time to attend to other phases of their
multiplied duties. Their removal was one of the
slowost mobilizations of the war.
32 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
Another cause of delay was the slowness with
which appropriations were made for prosecuting
the war, after we entered it, although estimates were
promptly submitted. It will be remembered that a
military program was adopted by the Act of June
3, 1916, in accordance with which an armed and
equipped force of about a million men, regulars and
auxiliaries, was to be brought into existence in five
annual installments. The equipment of the first
installment had been provided for by appropriations
made in the summer of 1916 ; that of the second was
embodied in estimates which were before Congress
for action in the winter of 1916 and 1917, but the
larger part failed of consideration because of a fili-
buster in the Senate over the Shipping Bill which
lasted until the end of the session on March 4, 1917.
They were taken up at the extra session called April
1st, upon severance of the relations with Germany,
and were passed on May 12th. These estimates
were in the form in which they were usually re-
quired to be submitted ; that is, they specified in con-
siderable detail the different classes of objects for
which funds were needed, such as small arms, field
artillery, machine guns, etc., and the amounts re-
quired for each; and, of course, their preparation
required considerable time. Therefore, when the
war came upon us, and it was necessary to send in
quickly estimates for arming and equipping a large
force, the best course was to compress into one the
estimates which had already been made for the re-
maining increments under the five-year plan, and
isend them to Congress immediately. This was
EMBARRASSMENTS 33
done, and the estimates reached that body on April
5th, the day before the declaration of war.
But when appropriations are made after the
itemized manner mentioned above, the sums appro-
priated for one class of object are not available for
any other class, notwithstanding any shortage or
surplus which may arise as between classes; so in
sending in this large estimate for the first great
sums for prosecuting the war, the War Department
did not itemize them, but asked for a lump sum of
about $3,000,000,000 for all purposes involved in
carrying on the war; this for the reason of avoid-
ing a failure of funds for any necessary purpose
which might have been overlooked, or have been
inadequately provided for. But this was too great
a departure from the usual methods for acceptance
by Congress, and the Committee in charge of the
measure required from the chiefs of bureaus which
had made up the estimates, information upon the
various items making up the total, so that they
might be separated in the appropriation act into the
usual classes, with the judgment of Congress sepa-
rately exercised as to the amount required for each,
and the discretion of the War Department as to
expenditures between classes, or for objects not
mentioned, denied. With respect to the Ordnance
Department, I endeavored to secure a limited dis-
cretion by requesting the committee to authorize
the expenditure of as much as 10 per cent of the
amount appropriated under any heading, for any
purpose necessary in the judgment of the Secretary
for the prosecution of the war; but although the
34 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
committee was liberal in recommending the appro-
priation of the full amount asked for in each case
and Congress afterward granted the sum the lati-
tude required in expenditure was not allowed.
The time required for the explanation of the
items of the great bill was such that it did not
become law, and make the funds available for use,
until the 15th of June. It could scarcely have been
expected sooner in view of the number of items
which, in accordance with the method pursued by
the committee, required separate examination.
Samples of these items were : Clerical Force, $900,-
000; Military Observers, $85,000; Signal Service of
the Army, $47,267,766; Court Martial Expenses,
$190,000; Mileage of Commissioned Officers and
Field Clerks, $510,000; Subsistence, $133,000,000;
Small Arms Ammunition, $131,048,000; Machine
Guns, $65,900,000; Field Artillery, $195,000,000;
Field Artillery Ammunition, $367,000,000; Proving
Ground Expenses, $600,000. These were some of
the items, for which, as stated above, the appropria-
tions were not available for any other purpose than
the one specified, either as between the items them-
selves or for others whose need was .not foreseen.
The absence of appropriations during the time the
bill was in Congress was met to a certain extent
by the assumption of responsibility by administra-
tive officers, who placed orders without authority
and in direct violation of law. These orders were
accepted by manufacturers and others in faith that
the officers would be sustained by the action of Con-
gress and that the orders would be made good. But
EMBARRASSMENTS 35
no money could be paid out of the Treasury pursu-
ant to these orders in advance of an appropriation,
and no contract based upon them could be entered
into ; the parties who undertook them therefore had
to furnish their own finances for an indeterminate
period, which was the more difficult for them to do
in that they had no contracts with the Government
upon the strength of which they could borrow money
from the banks. Of course, all these matters were
ultimately straightened out, but they made for delay
and embarrassment in the first months of the war,
when the officers of the War Department were en-
gaged in their hardest struggle to get the wheels in
motion.
Before the first large Appropriation Bill became
a law, the need for additional expenditures had
become apparent. It was evident to the Ordnance
Department, for example, that the amount of Field
Artillery which its first estimates contemplated
appropriate for an army of about 1,000,000 men
would not be sufficient for the much larger army
which it was already seen it would be necessary to
put in the field. Estimates were therefore prepared
in the Ordnance Department for the artillery for a
second million men ; and as it was necessary to com-
mence as soon as possible the arrangement for its
manufacture, and even so it could not be ready as
soon as the men would be, it was desirable to have
the estimate acted upon at the earliest practicable
date. As soon therefore as the estimates were ready,
which was in the early part of June, I requested an
interview with the Secretary of War and the Chief
36 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
of Staff together and submitted them, explaining
their necessity. This was at once understood by
these officers, and the estimates were sent to the Gen-
eral Staff with instructions for the proper officers
of that body to consult with me, and prepare to in-
clude the estimates with others for transmission to
Congress by the Secretary of War. The officers
came promptly to my office and we had a harmonious
consultation; after which they returned to their
associates of the General Staff and put the estimates
into the shape which they considered appropriate
for the action of the Secretary of War, courteously
sending me a copy. But it appeared that there had
not been entire mutual comprehension between their
office and mine, and it was necessary for me to send
an officer to the office of the General Staff in order
to clear up the misapprehensions. This was done
without friction, and the estimates were finally per-
fected in form and amount. This process, however,
took such a long time, together with that required
by other somewhat similar processes for the Ord-
nance Department and the other bureaus of the War
Department, that the estimates did not reach Con-
gress before August 2nd.
I mention these details as another illustration of
defects in our governmental methods, under which
there is so much checking of one agency by another,
and so much review of discretion which ought to be
final, under responsibility, that prompt action in
emergency is impossible. In this example a press-
ing estimate which was ready in the department in
direct charge of the subject in the early part of
EMBARRASSMENTS 37
June, did not reach Congress until nearly two
months later, notwithstanding the best of good will
and the absence of strong difference of judgment
on the part of all concerned. The system called for
the review of the judgment of the Chief of Ord-
nance, w r ho knew perfectly well what was required,
by the General Staff, who undoubtedly worked as
diligently at its task as any set of men could ; and in
the end it formed no better agency to be held re-
sponsible for results than did the Ordnance Depart-
ment. The estimates were subjected in Congress to
the same detailed scrutiny which had been bestowed
upon those submitted at the declaration of war, and
the Appropriation Bill was not passed until October
6th. It carried about five and a half billion dollars,
of which about three and three-quarter billion were
for the Ordnance Department.
m
OVERHEAD ORGANIZATION
WE have become somewhat accustomed to the men-
tion of the great sums of money which have been
used in the prosecution of the war; but their like
have never before figured in the transactions of
mankind. The first large Appropriation Bills car-
ried, as has been stated, something over eight and a
half billion dollars, and of this sum over four and a
half billion dollars were for the use of the Ordnance
Department alone. The mention of the amount con-
veys little significance as to the effort involved in
its utilization, and the labor and thought required
for its useful expenditure. For a series of years
before our entry into the World War, the annual
expenditure of the whole United States Government
had been about one billion dollars. To properly
direct the activities set in motion in expending this
sum required the services of the numerous well
trained and competently headed departments of
the Government, including the State Department,
the Treasury Department, the War Department, the
Department of Justice, the Post Office Department,
the Navy Department, the Department of the In-
terior, the Department of Agriculture, the Depart-
38
OVERHEAD ORGANIZATION 39
ment of Commerce, the Department of Labor, each
with its cabinet officers and assistant secretaries;
and various other money-spending agencies, such as
the Smithsonian Institute, the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Houses of Congress themselves.
The mere enumeration of these organizations brings
to mind an array of distinguished names of men
engaged, with staffs of sub-directors of all kinds,
in the proper expenditure in the course of a year
of a billion dollars. We realized that the busi-
ness was immense, and were proud of the Govern-
ment whose greatness was illustrated by it. Now in
six months there was thrown upon the Ordnance
Department a task of directing and controlling
human energies which was pecuniarily measured by
four times the entire Government's measure of its
yearly accomplishment ; and it had to be carried out
as a breathless race against time, while concurrently
expanding the organization for performing the task
from a size appropriate to one of about a five hun-
dredth of the magnitude. And the Ordnance Office
was a single bureau of a single department.
At the outbreak of the war, therefore, the Govern-
ment was confronted with an immense question of
overhead organization for carrying it on, and it was
a very reasonable inquiry whether our governmental
organization, which had been developed to meet the
country's peace time needs, would answer for the
very different war time needs. We had before us
the example of the British Empire, whose two and
a half years' experience had led it to at least two
very great changes in its governmental machinery.
40 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
One of these changes was the creation of a War
Cabinet, consisting of the Prime Minister and six
additional members, only one of whom, the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, had the portfolio of an
executive minister. The others had no departmental
work to perform, and were free to give all of their
time to what might be called matters of policy.
When the affairs of any one of the administrative
departments were under consideration by the War
Cabinet, the minister at the head of that department
sat with it ; otherwise the ministers attended only to
the affairs of their own departments. Thus the
War Cabinet relieved the ministers heading execu-
tive departments of the collective responsibility
which they had theretofore exercised in carrying on
the government.
Another great change was the creation of several
new executive departments. Of these there were
nine, namely, the Ministry of Munitions of War,
the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Pensions, the
Ministry of National Service, the Ministry of Eecon-
struction, the Ministry of Blockade, the Shipping
Comptroller, the Secretary of State for Air, and the
Food Comptroller. The greatest of these new de-
partments was the Ministry of Munitions.
The great change of conditions upon our passage
into a state of war, which rendered the contempla-
tion of some such agency as a Ministry of Munitions
necessary, was the transition from a state in which
the various supply departments of the Army and
the Navy had been going into an abundant market
and drawing from it their necessaries, limited by
OVERHEAD ORGANIZATION 41
small appropriations, to a state in which these
departments had to be kept out of one another's way
when pressing for the supply of enormously in-
creased necessaries in a market which had become
entirely inadequate. The Ordnance Departments of
the Army and Xavy were the only agencies avail-
able, or which could be expected, to say what the
Government wanted in the way of munitions, to
describe them in specifications and to state the
amounts. These departments in peace time had at
their disposal in the Government factories and in
private plants abundant capacity for supplying their
needs, and for insuring fair prices by competition.
The departments, however, had had no experience
in searching out manufacturing facilities, in bar-
gaining for just prices, or in allocating to one an-
other, in accordance with the pressure of their
respective needs, a limited capacity for production.
For these purposes, therefore, they had need of a
general coordinating and supporting agency outside
themselves. The support was especially needed for
assuring the public that prices paid would be rea-
sonable, in the necessary abandonment of the com-
petitive basis, resulting from there being more than
enough work for everybody with a plant.
There had been created by law before the war a
Council of National Defense, for the consideration
of Governmental policies relating to military prep-
aration; and an Advisory Committee and other
subordinate bodies had been provided for as aides
to the Council. Subsequently, after we had been
something over a year at war, there was enacted
42 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
what had been known as the Overman Bill, giving
to the President the authority to create new execu-
tive agencies for carrying on the war, and to re-
distribute the duties of those which were existing.
Under the earlier statutory authority there was
created a General Munitions Board of the Coun-
cil, which was superseded on July 12, 1917, by the
War Industries Board, created by the Council with
the authority of the President for performing, in
connection with the supply departments of the
Army and Navy, such duties as are indicated
above, in which the departments required outside
assistance.
It does not require much demonstration to show
that the situation with reference to the method of
procurement of the armament and other supply of
the forces was a dangerous one. Owing to long
national neglect of military preparation the problem
was immense, and the necessity for some changes
and additions in the means of meeting it was appar-
ent. The great governing powers of the country
had given little thought to such a subject; and the
point at which paralyzing conservatism adhering
closely to antiquated methods and inadequate mech-
anism, and dangerous radicalism urging the sub-
stitution of new and untried agencies for the estab-
lished governmental departments which had well in
hand an unknown capacity for dealing with the sit-
uation, would meet in compromise, was entirely
problematical. Shifting of the point too far either
way might easily result in disaster. In the excite-
ment of a tremendously stirring situation, radical-
OVERHEAD ORGANIZATION 43
ism had a great call, and there was strong pressure
for the substitution of new bodies, of civilian mem-
bership, for taking over the procurement of muni-
tions and other military supplies.
Into this turbulent situation, to the great good
fortune of the Government, there came a man of
sanity, to a highly important position, Mr. Frank A.
Scott, a manufacturer, of Cleveland, Ohio, who was
appointed Chairman of the General Munitions
Board. After consultation with the heads of the
departments to which his body would have to give
assistance, he clearly perceived the lines along which
this assistance would be appropriate and helpful,
and stuck to these lines during the formative months
of the munitions policy. His experience enabled
him to realize that the departments of the Gov-
ernment whose organizations had been developed
through long practice in the design, purchase, manu-
facture, custody, issue, use in the service, and main-
tenance in repair of munitions of war, must of neces-
sity be better qualified to carry on these functions
in an enormously enlarged degree than any new
organizations which could be created by a lot of
people with power, who knew very little about the
subject, and he addressed himself to the difficult
task of holding to these organizations the functions
to which they were accustomed. He did not fail to
appreciate, however, that the Government bureaus
needed a great deal of assistance for which the
acquired knowledge and the unremitting industry of
a large number of civilian business men would be
necessary.
44 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
The assistance needed was divided into three
general classes :
(1) Finding and presenting to the supply bureaus
capacity, in plant and organization, for meeting their
needs.
(2) Allocating among the different bureaus the
productive capacity found, in order that their needs
might be supplied in the proper order of priority;
as compared with one another, with the Allied Gov-
ernments, and with the needs of the civil population.
(3) Insuring the interests of the Government and
safeguarding the reputation of purchasing officers
by giving advice upon the subject of prices, which
could no longer be controlled by competition.
The wide acquaintance of business men with pri-
vate establishments, which the Army and Navy
officers did not have, was useful, in furnishing
knowledge of available resources which the experi-
ence of the officers had necessarily left them with-
out; but such an establishment having been placed
at the disposal of a supply department, the officers
of that department were qualified, as no other per-
sons could be within a reasonable time, to conduct
negotiations to utilize the establishment for making
something for the Government, in which negotia-
tions, design, specifications, quantity, urgency, and
the nature of the inspection were essential consider-
ations. The business with the given establishment,
with the exception of advice in regard to compensa-
tion, was, therefore, left to these officers.
The matter of allocation and priority involved an
OVERHEAD 'ORGANIZATION 45
understanding of the relative urgency of different
military supplies, of the capacity of manufacturing
establishments and their degree of occupation, of
the possibility of finding untapped resources, and of
the status and prospect of the supply of raw ma-
terials. It required, therefore, both civilian and
military knowledge for its handling, and the Priority
Committee of the War Industries Board had in
consequence to include both military and civilian
membership.
The prompt comprehension of the situation by Mr.
Scott, and his guidance of the General Munitions
Board and of the War Industries Board along the
above described lines during the early months of the
war, insured the full utilization of the Government's
existing agencies and the supply to them of neces-
sary outside help, without the disruption, and the
long process of finding itself by a new organization,
which would necessarily have accompanied the sub-
stitution of new machinery for that which had been
already tried and was in large part adequate for the
emergency. The Government owes a wonderful debt
of gratitude to Mr. Scott and to the level-headed and
experienced civilians who supported him as members
of the auxiliary bodies aiding in the conduct of the
war.
The War Industries Board carried on its work
under the presidency of Mr. Scott through the diffi-
cult formative period of the summer and autumn of
1917, when his health failed temporarily under the
great strain, and he was succeeded by Mr. Daniel
Willard, who resigned and resumed his duties as
46 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
president of the Baltimore and Ohio Eailroad in
January of 1918.
At the meeting of the United States Congress in
the winter following our entry into the War, bills
were introduced for the creation of a War Cabinet
and a Department of Munitions. Neither of these
bills became a law ; but there is probably difference
of opinion to-day as to whether they should not have
been enacted, especially the one for a Department of
Munitions. The last named department would neces-
sarily have had very close relations with the Ord-
nance Department, both of the Army and the Navy,
and would in all probability have absorbed the
greater portion of these departments, if it had been
created. The British Ministry of Munitions took
over at first only the placing of orders and contracts
and the following up of the production of munitions ;
but it was soon found that these activities were so
closely connected with design that it was necessary
to take over also the design of the articles which
were procured, leaving the Ordnance Department
only the custody, issue and maintenance in the serv-
ice of the material. That is, the Ministry of Muni-
tions transferred to its own organization the per-
sonnel of the Ordnance Department, which had been
engaged upon design.
On March 4th, the President made something of a
change in the character of the War Industries Board,
by assigning Mr. Bernard M. Baruch to the chair-
manship, and directing that the ultimate decision of
all questions, except the determination of prices,
should rest with him, the other members acting in
OVERHEAD ORGANIZATION 47
a co-operative and advisory capacity. The President
at the same time outlined the formation of a price-
fixing committee to consist of the chairman of the
board, the members of the board immediately
charged with the study of raw materials and of
manufactured products, the labor members of the
board, the chairman of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the chairman of the Tariff Commission, the
Fuel Administrator, a representative of the Army,
a representative of the Navy, with Mr. Robert S.
Brookings as chairman. This committee received
its instructions directly from the President and made
its reports directly to him. The President at the
same time took occasion to re-define the functions of
the War Industries Board, and stated among the
duties of the chairman to be :
1. To act for the joint and several benefit of all
the supply departments of the Government.
2. To let alone what is being successfully done
and interfere as little as possible with the present
normal processes of purchase and delivery in the
several departments.
3
4. To determine what is to be done when there is
any competitive or other conflict of interest between
departments in the matter of supplies ; for example :
when there is not a sufficient immediate supply for
all and there must be a decision as to priority of
need or delivery, or when there is competition for
the same source of manufacture or supply, or when
contracts have not been placed in such a way as to
48 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
get advantage of the full productive capacity of the
country.
These instructions were in general accordance
with the ideas which had governed since the estab-
lishment of the General Munitions Board. They
indicated a policy different from that which had
been followed by the British Government in the
formation of a Ministry of Munitions, in that they
crystallized the method of making the greatest use
possible of the existing designing, purchasing and
manufacturing departments of the Government. The
time which would have been necessary for a great
new department, spreading over all the activities
of procurement of munitions of war, to find itself,
gathering together its personnel and installing its
methods of doing business, was therefore saved ; and
it appears that the outcome justified the system fol-
lowed, since the wheels of industry were set turning
for the Government's purposes with a minimum of
delay, and with a promptness of delivery of output
comparable favorably with that in any other coun-
try. The only change of agency, of any moment,
was the creation of the Division of Purchase, Storage
and Traffic, of the General Staff, which was to take
over the purchase, for the Army, of the class of
stores which could be called commodities and were
made commercially instead of being manufactured
from designs. This division, however, did not get
into operation until about the end of the War, and
did not have opportunity to justify its existence. Its
creation had been inspired by the belief that any
OVERHEAD ORGANIZATION 49
commodity, such as blankets, for example, which
had been purchased for horses by the Ordnance De-
partment and for men by the Quartermaster Depart-
ment, would best be handled, from procurement,
through transportation and storage, to final issue to
the ocean transport service, by a single agency ; for
which there was much to be said. But the field
which it was attempted to cover w r as very great, and
much knowledge had to be acquired by the new divi-
sion, which was already in the possession of the
regular departments; so that difference of opinion
as to the success of the undertaking was never
smoothed out.
Altogether, although the question may always be
arguable, I think it can be said that the achievement
of putting in the theater of war a million and a quar-
ter of fighting troops in eighteen months, with never
any embarrassing shortage of arms or ammunition,
is a justification of the policy of using existing gov-
ernmental departments, and expanding, aiding and
co-ordinating them, by outside assistance, instead of
replacing them by an all-absorbing department after
the emergency was upon us. The subject has spe-
cial interest because of the intense effort which was
made to impose a course more nearly resembling
that of the British Government, and because of the
natural sympathy which was expressed for this
effort in lively public discussion.
In speaking thus I have in mind the regularly con-
stituted and already functioning military depart-
ments, and refer to their operation within their
rtive spheres. I have no failure of apprecia-
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
tion of the work of the War Industries Board in
helping the military departments in matters beyond
the scheme of their creation or practice, nor of the
several other boards which were set up under the
Overman Act or under special legislation, to perform
tasks which either were not tasks of normal times,
or were then performed by private agencies. The
War Finance Corporation, the War Trade Board,
the War Labor Board, the Food Administration, the
Fuel Administration, the Alien Property Custodian,
and the Bureau of War Eisk Insurance show how
large a field there was which could best be occupied
by civilian personnel, and indicate the abundant
necessity for constructive organization of new ad-
ministrative bodies, without infringing upon or
duplicating the duties of the old ones.
IV
CRITICISMS
THE special session of Congress which had been
called by the President to meet the emergency oc-
casioned by Germany's resumption of ruthless sub-
marine warfare, in February, 1917, came to an end
on October 6th, when the Houses adjourned after
the passage of the appropriations asked for, and the
enactment of much other legislation for the prosecu-
tion of the war. The membership were in rather
cheerful mood, with an apparent consciousness of
having worked hard and done their duty. It is true
that the appropriations had been slowly made, but
they were altogether liberal in amount; and, al-
though all the special legislation asked for by the
executive departments had not been granted, the
response had been so much more complete than in
normal times as to produce a feeling almost of
generosity in the minds of legislators.
But when the statesmen had scattered to their
homes, and had had opportunity, many of them, to
observe the great gap between the making of appro-
priations and the fulfillment of the objects for which
the appropriations were made, as exemplified by the
shortage in arms, equipment and shelter of the
troops who had been gathered at the mobilization
51
52
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
centres, the feeling of satisfaction suffered a rude
shock; and there was realized the danger of dis-
satisfaction throughout constituencies, which is apt
to appear as unmixed evil to the sensitive perception
of the dependent upon popular suffrage. So, when
the 65th Congress came together again for its first
regular session, in the first week in December, a dis-
position was evident to make searching inquiry as to
why troops were still without guns and clothing,
after eight months of war and billions of appropria-
tions. The military committees of the two Houses
were appropriate bodies to examine, on behalf of
Congress, into the conduct of the war; but a simul-
taneous examination by both committees would have
involved duplication of effort, and double expendi-
ture of time by testifying officers; so the Senate
Committee only took up the task, and commenced its
" Investigation of the War Department" by calling
the Chief of Ordnance before it on December 12,
1917.
I think that more members of the Senate Commit-
tee were surprised, and perhaps dismayed, by the
shortage of equipment than could have been found
in the House Committee. The needs of the War
Department were usually presented, during what
ought to have been the years of preparation, in con-
nection with appropriation bills, and these were
much more thoroughly considered by the House
Committees than by the Senate Committees; more
extended hearings were held, and explanations as to
deficiencies of supply and the impossibility of mak-
ing them up quickly, upon emergency, were more
CRITICISMS 53
extensively gone into. All of which may have given
the House membership a better understanding of
conditions than was to be found in the Senate Com-
mittee, and more of a realization of the time that
would be required to make up for the years which
had been lost. However this may be, a number of
the Senate Military Committee members conducted
their part of the examination of officer witnesses in
a manner to indicate their indignant astonishment
at what they considered inexcusable failure to show
more prompt results from the resources which had
been placed at the disposal of the War Department.
The sessions of the Committee were usually public,
so that the dissatisfaction of these Senators was
exhibited before press representatives, and found a
loud echo throughout the country. The Committee
did not report any result of investigation or conclu-
sions arrived at, at least in respect to the Ordnance
Department; but individual senators criticized and
condemned freely, both in speeches on the floor of
the Senate and in other public utterances. They did
this in such apparent disregard of the evidence
which had been given before the Committee by all
responsible witnesses as to indicate, on the part of
these critics, a refusal to attach weight to the infor-
mation given them by those who were in special
position to impart it, and a disposition to give full
credence to the small number of faultfinding wit-
nesses, even when the latter had an evident motive
for misrepresentation. Such widespread charges of
inefficiency and incapacity resulted from this action
on the part of a few Senators that I think it is worth
54 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
the time required to look into the most important
subjects which were dealt with, relating to the Ord-
nance Department, and to show if possible whether
the organization which the taxpayers had been
maintaining was hopelessly defective, both in char-
acter and in personnel, or whether it functioned, in
the emergency, as well as there was any right to
expect, under the handicap of long-continued in-
adequacy of support for which some of the most
severe legislative critics had not been without
responsibility.
I do not intend to make a general review of the
accomplishment of the Ordnance Department in the
production of war material. That has been done by
the Assistant Secretary of War and Director of
Munitions, Mr. Benedict Crowell, in an interesting
report published by the War Department under the
title "America's Munitions 1917-1918, " and by the
Chief of Ordnance in his annual reports. But there
were four subjects, viz.: rifles, machine guns, field
artillery and smokeless powder, upon which criti-
cism centered so fiercely and in regard to which mis-
information was so rife that the truth really ought
to be known about them; especially as they con-
stitute the most important items in the armament of
a fighting force. I shall therefore, in the following
pages, tell the story of the controversial points as
to these items, and leave readers to judge whether
or not they have heretofore been given a just appre-
hension of them. It would be much pleasanter
simply to state the record of good achievement,
without attempt at defense, which is never agree-
CRITICISMS
55
able, and let it go at that ; but if the history is to be
of any use as a guide for the future it is difficult to
see how there can be avoided an examination of at
least the more serious charges prominently made.
The examination calls for more extended quota-
tion from public speeches and from recorded testi-
mony than would be appropriate in a story written
to make interesting reading; but these constitute
respectively the indictment and its support, and are
nofM'ssary to a real understanding of the phase which
I am endeavoring to make plain.
RIFLES
THE most important weapon with which nations go
to war is the infantryman's rifle. This remains a
fact notwithstanding the greatly increased impor-
tance of artillery, the extensive use of the machine
gun, the revival of such early weapons as the hand-
grenade and the trench mortar, and the introduction
of new ones such as the aeroplane and asphyxiating
gas. The rifle was, therefore, a matter of very early
concern with the Ordnance Department upon enter-
ing into the war, as, indeed, it had been for a con-
siderable time before.
The standard rifle of the American service, popu-
larly known as the Springfield, is believed to have no
superior ; but our supply was entirely insufficient for
the forces which we were going to have to raise. Our
manufacturing capacity for the Springfield rifle was
also insufficient, and could not be expanded rapidly
enough for the emergency. This capacity was avail-
able at two arsenals: one at Springfield, Massachu-
setts, capable of turning out about a thousand rifles
per day, and one at Rock Island, Illinois, which could
make about five hundred per day. Until September
of 1916 the Springfield Armory had been, however,
56
RIFLES 57
running far below its capacity, and the Rock Island
Arsenal, or at least the rifle-making plant, was
entirely shut down, due to lack of appropriation.
At the end of August, 1916, there had been appropri-
ated $5,000,000 for the manufacture of small arms,
including rifles. A considerable sum of this ap-
propriation had to be put into pistols, of which we
were even shorter than we were of rifles, but the
remainder was used to reopen the rifle plant at Bock
Island, and to increase the output at Springfield, as
rapidly as these effects could be accomplished in the
stringent condition of the supply of skilled labor
occasioned by the demands of the private factories
making rifles for European governments. The dis-
sipated force could not be quickly regathered. For-
tunately, it had been the policy of the Ordnance
Department to keep on hand a considerable reserve
of raw material, so that little delay was caused by
lack of this important element. We had in April,
1917, about 600,000 Springfield rifles, including those
in the hands of troops and in storage ; and the ques-
tion was as to the best method of rapidly increasing
our supply of rifles, of sufficiently good model to
justify their procurement.
Six manufacturing establishments were making
riflos in the United States for foreign governments,
and of these, three, the Winchester Repeating Arms
pany, of New Haven, Connecticut, the Reming-
ton Arms Company of Ilion, New York, and the
Remington Arms Company, of Eddystone, Pennsyl-
vania, were making what was known as the Enfield
rifle, for the British service. The capacity of these
58
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
three plants was sufficient for our purpose, and as
their contracts with the British Government were
running out, and the general type of the rifle which
they were making was a good one, it was not difficult
to decide that these plants should be used to supple-
ment those at Springfield and Eock Island, which
should, of course, be stimulated to their utmost
production. Certain other questions, however, at
once arose. The British type of ammunition, for
which the Enfield rifles were being made, was not a
very good one, in that the bullet was of low velocity
and the cartridges, having a projecting rim at the
base, were likely to catch upon one another in feed-
ing from the magazine, and to produce a jam. In
addition, this ammunition was not interchangeable
with our own, and could not be used in the Spring-
field rifle. The manufacture, for ourselves, of the
Enfield rifle as it was being made would, therefore,
have entailed the use of two kinds of ammunition
in our service, and one of these not a very good
kind, or else the abandonment of our Springfield
rifle and the complete substitution of the Enfield,
with the corresponding throwing out of commission
of the Springfield and Eock Island plants and the
Government ammunition factory at the Frankford
Arsenal.
There was another difficulty about the Enfield
rifle. It was being independently manufactured at
the three factories, and there was not only very poor
interchangeability of parts in the product of a single
factory, but as between the three factories the parts
were not interchangeable at all. Under these cir-
RIFLES 59
cumstances, and in view of the moderate supply of
Springfields on hand and the manufacturing ca-
pacity of the arsenals, it was decided that the new
Enfield rifles should be manufactured for use with
the United States' ammunition, and that the manu-
facture should be standardized so as to effect prac-
tical interchangeability of parts throughout.
It was considered that the Springfield rifle situa-
tion justified taking the time required for these
changes, of which the first would necessarily appeal
strongly to any military man, and the one involving
interchangeability could, fortunately, be considered
with the aid of an officer who was very familiar with
the Enfield rifle as it was being manufactured at the
three private factories. This officer was Colonel
John T. Thompson, formerly of the Ordnance
Department, who had been retired from active
service and was in the employ of the Remington
Arms Company in connection with their rifle manu-
facture for the British. I called Colonel Thompson
back into active service and placed him in charge of
small arms and small arms ammunition, and had the
benefit of his expert and especially well-informed
advice in deciding that the interchangeability wanted
would be worth its cost in time.
Action in accordance with this decision raised
serious criticism from various sources with a
capacity for making themselves heard. That most
formally expressed was by Senator Chamberlain,
in a speech on the question of personal privilege in
60 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
the Senate, on January 24, 1918, in which the Senator
spoke as follows :
"Let us now consider the question of rifles.
"We were furnishing Lee-Enfield rifles to the
British Government in large numbers. The fac-
tories were prepared for them. It is true that Great
Britain was trying to make an improvement upon
the rifles used by her when she became involved in
the war, but when the war came on Great Britain
said we will not waste any time improving our rifles,
but will get them out just as fast as we can, and they
have been manufacturing them ever since. What
did America do? With 700,000 rifles in America and
in our colonial possessions, a motley group of differ-
ent kinds of guns, America was seeking, through the
Ordnance Department, to improve the rifle that
Great Britain was manufacturing here and which
we could have put out without any trouble in the
factories. We went to work, through the Ordnance
Department, to improve the Enfield rifle. I am
frank to say it is a great improvement. I believe
it is a better gun than the English gun, but here
while the house was burning America was determin-
ing through its Ordnance Department what instru-
mentalities ought to be adopted to put out the fire.
It took weeks and months before they finally got the
Lee-Enfield rifle into condition where the Ordnance
Department thought it was all right. And after this
was agreed upon there were further delays caused
by indecision. Here were the engineers of these
great arms companies, who got together and finally
agreed upon a program for the manufacture of
RIFLES 61
these guns, and concluded that they would manu-
facture them with seven interchangeable parts, and
they started to manufacture the gauges, the jigs,
and dies, and everything necessary for the manu-
facture of guns with seven interchangeable parts.
After the Ordnance Department had practically
accepted the suggestion, it went to work through a
distinguished ordnance officer and changed the plan
from 7 to 40 interchangeable parts, and finally raised
it to over 50 interchangeable parts, with the result
that everything had to be stopped for awhile that
additional gauges might be made. This may have
resulted in improvement, but why the delay in the
midst of the smoke of battle?"
Senator Chamberlain's position as Chairman of
the Military Committee, and the fact that his speech
followed an extensive investigation of the War De-
partment by the Committee, gave to his utterances
a particularly important character, and caused them
to be very widely published throughout the country,
undoubtedly to the considerable impairment of the
public confidence in the manner in which this im-
portant matter of rifles had been handled by the
department. Senator Weeks, also of the Commit-
tee, joined in a criticism of the department, saying
in regard to myself, "He had constantly sought
justifiably so in ordinary times for the best the
market could produce, and in this case he was un-
willing to modify that standard of perfection even
though a modification would have greatly hastened
tin 1 production of a satisfactory arm, and one which
would have answcrod all purposes." After review-
62 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
ing some of the reasons which had been advanced in
defense of the change, the Senator continued: "But
all of these arguments in favor of the change did
not commence to overcome the advantage of im-
mediately providing the largest supply of rifles pos-
sible a rifle which has served England satisfac-
torily during three years of actual warfare."
There was very little military support of the posi-
tion of these two Senators that was ever brought to
my notice. I knew of but one officer, General Leon-
ard Wood, then commanding the Department of the
East, who held the view that we should have con-
tinued the manufacture of the Enfield rifle as it was
being made at the time of our entry into the war,
should have armed our troops abroad entirely with
it, and should have used the British ammunition.
He gave these views in an official recommendation
to the War Department, and perhaps based them on
an exaggerated estimate of the number of rifles re-
quired to make wastage good, which had appeared
in the newspapers. His recommendation was for
supply at the rate of five rifles per man, while the
fact was, and subsequent history proved, that one-
half a rifle per man was a sufficient allowance for
a year 's wastage.
It was claimed by the advocates of the exclusive
use of the British caliber and the British ammuni-
tion that it would diminish by one the number of
different kinds of small arms ammunition in use
by the Allies, by avoiding our introduction of a new
type, and would place us in a position to draw upon
the British supply in case our own should be inter-
RIFLES 63
rupted. But before the conclusion was reached that
we should modify the Enfield rifle, it had already
been decided that our troops were to operate with
the French, and not with the British ; and, therefore,
the ability to draw upon the British ammunition
supply became of less importance. Besides, the
small arms ammunition constituted such a minor
proportion of the supplies which had to be trans-
ported across the ocean that interruption of trans-
portation would have made itself felt in other mat-
ters long before it would reach the small arms
ammunition. For example, the rifle ammunition
supply would not amount to a quarter of a pound
per day for each man, while his food supply, alone,
would, at the very least, be four pounds per day,
that is, sixteen times as great. The French, with
whom we were to and did operate, made no point
of our lack of interchangeable rifle ammunition with
their troops. No tonnage would have been saved
by our use of British ammunition, since the mate-
rials for manufacturing the ammunition would, in
any case, have had to come from this side. As a
matter of fact, the few divisions of our troops which
did for a time operate with the British were sup-
plied during the interval with British rifles and
ammunition.
But great stress has been laid upon the earlier
equipment of our troops with rifles which would
have resulted from adoption, without change, of
the Enfield. This is based upon the assumption
that the factories would then have been able to go
right ahead turning out several thousand per day,
64 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
from the time when they should have finished their
British orders. The testimony of the manufacturers
themselves was not quite to this effect, however.
Mr. Charles H. Schlacks, the General Manager of
the largest of the three factories, that at Eddystone,
Pennsylvania, testified before the Committee, in
December, 1917, as follows :
"The Chairman In your opinion, was the prog-
ress of manufacture delayed any by the adoption
of the new model gun!"
"Mr. Schlacks Very slightly, Mr. Chairman, if
any, and that is certainly wiped out by the fact
that the material manufacturers have not kept pace
with us."
But there is probably no doubt that we could have
secured from the British Government a large num-
ber of the Enfield rifles which had already been
manufactured for their service, and therefore we
can admit that we should have had a somewhat
earlier supply for all our troops if we had accepted
the rifle as it was. This promptness, however, would
have been accompanied by very grave disadvan-
tages. We would have had three makes of rifle in
use, of unstandardized manufacture, and with non-
interchangeable parts. A soldier in the field, there-
fore, losing or breaking a part of his rifle, could not
make use of a similar part from another gun, and
his rifle would thus have been made completely un-
serviceable. One of the manufacturers was per-
mitted to go ahead with his manufacture before
he had attained the finally settled degree of inter-
changeability, under instructions to attain that de-
RIFLES 65
gree gradually. This brought from the Expedi-
tionary Force in France the following: "The mat-
ter of spare parts and maintenance in our present
situation is serious and must not be complicated by
the addition of any distinctions in manufacture."
The manufacturers, themselves, were all favorable
to the change. Mr. S. M. Vauclain, a member of
the Advisory Committee of the Council of National
Defence, who built the Eddystone rifle factory, and
was one of the most experienced business men con-
nected with the manufacture of rifles for the Allied
governments, testified as follows before the Senate
Military Committee :
"Mr. Vauclain I consider that the Ordnance
Department was very wise in taking the time to
perfect this rifle. I think it is the finest rifle made
today. I think it is even a better rifle than the
Springfield rifle, as it is now made. I might not
get everybody to agree with me on that, but there
is a longer distance between the sights, and it is a
very accurately constructed rifle and should give
no trouble in the field.
"There is a great objection to using the rim car-
tridge in the field, on account of jamming when you
are working the shot in the rifle. These rifles now
have rimless cartridges, the same as used by the
Springfield rifle, interchangeable ammunition, abso-
lutely no possibility of jamming in service. Their
interchangeability is such that when we were put-
ting English rifles together, if a man put twenty
rifles a day together, we thought he had done a good
days' work. About ten days ago one of our fitters
66 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
put 128 of these rifles together, and 97 per cent of
them targeted first shot. If this rifle was not of
perfect design and perfectly made as to tolerance,
it would be impossible for anybody to put 128 rifles
together in ten hours out of the miscellaneous heap
of parts; so that I am satisfied that the rifles are
an absolutely interchangeable piece of work. The
other rifle makers are coming along in good shape.
The Government plants are also turning out an in-
creased number of rifles. I do not see anything to
worry about rifles." (Hearings, page 360.)
Later experience and wider examination showed
the comparative figures of assembly of rifles to be
even more striking than as stated by Mr. Vauclain.
The best record in the three factories before our
entry into the war was the assembly of fifty Enfield
rifles in a day by one man, but of the altered and
standardized rifle, as it was made for us, the .best
record became 280 rifles a day, while the average
record after the work got well going was 250 rifles a
day. The influence of this acceleration of manu-
facture, both upon the supply and upon the cost,
was necessarily very great. The Enfield rifles had
cost the British Government over $40 apiece, while
the altered rifles cost the United States Government
less than $30 apiece. Mr. Vauclain ? s testimony con-
tinued:
66 The Chairman There has been some feeling
that that change in the Lee-Enfield rifle, to mod-
ernize it, created great delay in the delivery of the
guns, and there is criticism of the Department in
the tardiness with which they have produced the
UIFLKS 67
larger ordnance. Do you feel that there is ground
for the criticism . )M
"Mr. Vauclain I do not feel there is. If any-
thing, there is ground for commendation for the
manner in which the officers in the Ordnance De-
partment of the Army and Navy have arisen to this
situation. It is a tremendous task. It is only those
who have lived with it as I have lived with it, day
and night, Sundays included I have given my en-
tiiv time to it who realize what a tremendous
proposition it is." (Page 367.)
.Mr. Henry S. Kimball, President of the company
which was manufacturing the Enfield rifles at Bion,
testified as follows :
"Mr. Kimball There is one point that I think,
perhaps, might be brought out for your benefit. The
manufacture of English ammunition at the time
war was declared in the United States was reduced
to a comparatively small figure. The English con-
tract had run out and had been replaced by other
contracts. It would have taken nearly as long I
think Mr. Tyler will correct me if it is not correct
to produce English ammunition in quantities as it
has taken us to produce American ammunition in
quantities, in the combined resources of the car-
tridge manufacturers of this country. Therefore, it
would have been a serious mistake to build for a
la rue production of an inferior ammunition when
in comparatively the same time it was possible to
build up for a large production of superior ammuni-
t it in. Therefore, the ammunition feature was a very
large part of the consideration of what arms and
68 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
what ammunition should be furnished to our
troops."
"The Chairman And justified the modification
of the rifle?"
66 Mr. Kimball Absolutely, in our opinion.''
(Page 391.)
Mr. J. E. Otterson, Vice-President and General
Manager of the Winchester Repeating Arms Com-
pany, gave opinions as follows :
"Mr. Otter son From the manufacturers' point
of view, and to anyone familiar with the British
rifle, it was desirable to change." (Page 406.)
"On the cartridge manufacturing side, the manu-
facturers could more readily and easily and ex-
peditiously manufacture the United States cartridge
than the British cartridge." (Page 407.)
"So, coupling the two things together by making
the change, you are getting a superior cartridge and
getting a rifle that will function better, and your
delay was but about thirty days, and there seemed
every reason to change the caliber of the rifles."
(Page 408.)
Mr. Otterson, while having no doubt as to the
desirability of changing the rifle so as to fire- the
American ammunition, did not feel so well qualified
to estimate the relative weight of the high degree of
interchangeability required by the Department and
the time which was required to secure it. Upon this
point he said :
"Mr. Otterson My position as a representative
RIFLES 69
of the manufacturer at the time was, that while
I was not qualified to pass on the necessity for
this higher degree of interchangeability, I could say
that it would result in delay, and the question was
one purely as to whether the exigencies of the situ-
ation warranted or permitted delay. (Page 410.)
"In the manufacturing and technical sense I was
opposed to it and did not consider it worth while.
I believe, however, that the necessity for it should
rest on the judgment of a military man, and not on
the judgment of a manufacturer." (Page 422.)
Mr. Otterson had received a military education,
being a graduate of the Naval Academy, but he did
not care to trust his judgment as to the military
value of a high degree of interchangeability in the
rifles ; differing in this from certain gentlemen who,
with very indifferent attention to military subjects
in the past, were quite ready with a condemnatory
judgment.
It must be remembered that these manufacturers,
in testifying in favor of the changes made in the
rifle, were testifying to their own financial disad-
vantage; for it is apparent that the earlier the
manufacture and delivery of rifles for the United
States should commence, the sooner would their
profits begin to come in. Because of rather unfor-
tunate experience with the manufacture of rifles for
the British Government, they were greatly in need
of profits.
A very distinct disadvantage of the adoption for
service of the British rifle, as it stood, and the
70
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
British ammunition, would have been that it would
have left us after the war with several million rifles
and several hundred million rounds of ammunition
on our hands of types which we did not like, and
all the plants fitted for the manufacture of this rifle
and ammunition.
But even the critics admit that the rifle, as
changed, was a much better gun, and the substance
of their criticism is that the change was not worth
the delay. They do not seem to have appreciated
the extent to which the disadvantages would have
involved the ammunition and the ammunition sup-
ply; but the effect of the delay in rifle supply needs
a little examination. As stated above, we had on
hand at our entry into the war about 600,000 Spring-
field rifles. Not all of these were in the United
States. Some were in the Philippine Islands and
some in Panama ; but, since in armies constituted as
were those in the European "War only about half of
the men carry rifles, the number on hand was insuffi-
cient for an army of over a million men. We called
our men to the colors so fast, however, that in the
autumn of 1917 there were infantrymen in the camps
and cantonments without rifles; but, in addition to
the Springfields, we had on hand some 160,000 Krag-
Jorgensen rifles which were perfectly good guns for
training, and these, together with the Springfields,
gave a supply for training the soldiers, although not
enough to supply a rifle for each man. The short-
age, however, was rapidly diminished by the coming
on of the modified Enfield rifles, whose delivery
commenced in August of 1917 and progressed so
RIFLES 71
fast that tho shortage was wiped out in January of
1918.
A great deal was made by the critics of the
shortage of rifles in the camps during the early
months of mobilization, but it is doubtful whether
the matter was as seriously felt in the camps as it
was by the critics. The following letter received
from the Division Ordnance Officer at one of the
National Army cantonments throws some light upon
this point :
"0. 0. file 354.1/477
DIVISION HEADQUARTERS,
December 15, 1917.
GENERAL WILLIAM CROZIER,
Washington, D. C.
Sir:
In connection with the Congressional inquiry now
in progress, I believe some wrong impressions have
been created.
I submit some facts which may be of use to you
so far as this camp is concerned. I presume the
conditions are the same, or nearly the same, at all
the other National Army camps.
1. There was no delay in target practice due to
lack of Enfield rifles.
2. Target practice has been in progress for over
a month with plenty of Enfield rifles and ammuni-
tion available.
3. Machine guns (Colt) were received before
troops were ready to use them.
4. Automatic rifles (Lewis and Chauchat) were
received before troops were ready to use them.
& Machine gun target practice is being held every
day the weather permits.
72 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
6. The supply, at this camp, of all kinds of target
practice ammunition for both infantry and light ar-
tillery is more than ample.
7. In my opinion it is almost certain that the
troops will be equipped and trained long before
ships are available to transport them overseas.
8. After articles of equipment leave the factory
there is delay in transportation. The average daily
run per car of freight is around 40 miles about
twice the rate of good infantry marching. This rate,
I believe, is high for peace time, but seems low under
present conditions when transportation is supposed
to be mobilized for war.
Very respectfully,
With regard to the armament of our troops senl
abroad, it can be stated that no soldier was delayed
in the slightest degree in sailing for Europe by lack
of a modern rifle, and that if any were sent over
without sufficient training, it was for other reasons
than the lack of rifles to train them with. "We
neither needed nor received any assistance from
our Allies in rifle supply, and never at any time suf-
fered from shortage of rifles in the theatre of war,
nor from any threat of such shortage. It is a fact
that we had on hand upon our entry into the war
more than twice as many rifles, of the standard
Springfield model, than were needed for all the
troops which we had in the theatre of war a full
year later. We had manufactured, up to the time
of the armistice, 2,500,000 rifles of the two service
models which, with the 600,000 which we had on
hand at the beginning, were enough for an army of
RIFLES 73
6,000,000 men, a million more than we were con-
templating for the campaign of 1919.
No decision concerning the equipment of our
armies for the great struggle was more important
than tliis one in regard to the rifles. It was arrived
at in a conference presided over by the Secretary of
War, at which there were present the Chief of Staff,
the President of the War College, the Commandant
of Marines, General Pershing, who had already been
designated to command the expeditionary force, and
myself, upon whom fell the task of presenting and
urging the program. The event showed that there
was no matter connected with the prosecution of
the Avar in which our forces were more adequately
served than in this most important one of all, and
this without any offsetting price, except the evidence
exhibited to the people of the previous neglect of
proper provision, and the subsequent savage criti-
cism by some of those who might have feared that
they would be held responsible.
VI
MACHINE GUNS
THE late war, so to speak, brought the machine
gun into its own. This class of weapon had been
developed to a serviceable stage at the time of the
Spanish- American War, but neither in that war, nor
in the Boer War, nor in the Philippine insurrection,
nor in the Pekin Eelief Expedition, nor in the Russo-
Japanese War, nor in the Balkan Wars had it
attracted anything like the attention which has
resulted from its use in the World War.
In the matter of the delivery of musketry fire
proving ground performance shows the machine gun
to be equivalent to twenty or thirty infantrymen,
and if its necessary crew be taken as, say, five men,
it can be regarded as saving, in uses for which it Ls
appropriate, from three-quarters to four-fifths oJ:
the men who would otherwise be necessary to do the
same work. It has been employed universally in the
defense of positions ; either those recently taken in
an advance, and in process of "consolidation," or
those prepared and held against an expected as-
sault. A prominent use, of the latter class, was
by the Germans in rear guard actions, where
machine guns scattered along the front, in "nests"
or "pill-boxes," that is, in specially concealed or
74
2
MACIIINK c;r\s 75
iall\ strengthened emplacements, constituted
mutually supporting strong points, very difficult
to advance against or to get between. In many
a the crews were evidently instructed to fight
the last, with the expectation that they would
then fall into the hands of the pursuers, while the
main body would get away. The necessity for
discouraging this practice undoubtedly led in some
cases to refusal to accept the surrender of the crews.
As was to be expected, the extensive employment of
the weapons brought about a differentiation of func-
tion, and the introduction of special designs for
special uses. The normal design was used for posi-
tion holding, where weight was not of importance
in comparison with prolonged and continuous fire,
while a lighter design was developed for carrying
forward with an advancing line, and holding a posi-
tion gained until it could be more strongly "consoli-
dated." This later type was called, for want of a
better name, automatic rifle, leaving the name ma-
chine gun for the heavier type, although both types
machine guns and both are automatic rifles. In
the automatic rifle a certain degree of endurance is
sacrificed to lightness. The Vickers, the heavy
otchkiss and the heavy Browning, weighing in the
ighborhood of 36 pounds each, are examples of
machine guns; the Chauchat and the light Browning,
liing 16 to 19 pounds, are automatic rifles; while
tin- Lewis and the Benet-Mercie, or light Hotchkiss,
of about 20 pounds weight, arc intermediate and not
favored for ground use by the French, although so
employed by the British. The Germans had appar-
76
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
ently realized better than anyone else the value of
machine guns in the kind of fighting which they ex-
pected to be engaged in, and therefore supplied them
to their troops in greater numbers than did the
other Powers. We, in common with many other
civilized nations, had before the World War such an
appreciation of the need for machine guns as was
expressed by our establishing an allowance of about
four per regiment, with no machine gun organiza-
tions outside the regiments, and a supply was then
accumulating at the very low rate corresponding to
an annual appropriation of about $150,000. The
present allowance is at the rate of about 250 per
regiment.
An appropriation of the above amount was made
in the Army Act of 1912, but before the considera-
tion commenced of a bill for the next year, expres-
sions of dissatisfaction with the rifle with which the
service was then principally armed the Benet-
Mercie, otherwise known as the light Hotchkiss
had reached the ears of Congress. This dissatisfac-
tion was, I believe, largely due to lack of proper
instruction in the use of this class of weapon, and
the belief upon the part of numbers of officers in
the service that there was some other machine gun
of such simple construction that no great amount of
special instruction would be necessary for its use
which was a radical error.
No entirely satisfactory machine gun has yet been
developed; that is, we have never had a machine
gun that is not subject to stoppage by reason of
some kind of malfunction. The Browning gun, as
MACHINE GUNS 77
was anticipated by the Ordnance Department, is a
great advance in this respect ; but it must be remem-
bered that these weapons are machines, operating
with tremendous pressures and tremendous veloc-
ity of moving parts, the Benet-Mercie giving out
about one horsepower for each pound of its weight
approximately double the output per pound of the
Liberty engine they are, therefore, subject to the
weaknesses and infirmities of all machines. They
have never reached the simplicity and perfection of
construction which would insure their operation in
the hands of the soldier with the same certainty that
attends that of the ordinary rifle or pistol. Their
infirmities have been accepted because of the large
effective output which can be had from them when
they do work well. Our line officers now understand
the intensive and laborious instruction which is
necessary to train a soldier in the mechanical ma-
nipulation and the tactical use of a machine gun.
The Benet-Mercie automatic machine rifle was
adopted for use in the United States Service in 1909,
after exhaustive trials by two boards, both of which
reported that it was the best and most reliable ma-
chine gun which had ever been before the Govern-
ment. It is still the machine gun of the British
Government for the armament of tanks.
The Army Appropriation Act of June, 1913,
i use of the dissatisfaction above mentioned, in-
(1 of making an appropriation for machine guns,
authorized the Secretary of War to contract for
their manufacture to the extent of $150,000, "if in
liis opinion it be for the interest of the service."
78
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
This legislation reflected doubt in the mind of Con-
gress as to a suitable service machine rifle, and
threw upon the Secretary of War a more impressive
burden than usual of responsibility for the type of
machine rifle for which contracts might be made.
Before urging upon the Secretary of War, there-
fore, the exercise of the authority which had, with
some warning, been conferred upon him, the Ord-
nance Department joined in arrangements for a
competitive test of automatic machine rifles, which
was begun in the autumn of 1913 and continued in
the spring of 1914; the guns now most prominent
among those which were tested being the Benet-
Mercie, the Vickers, and the Lewis, which last gun
figured extensively in the expressions of dissatisfac-
tion which became common at the lack of sufficient
equipment of machine guns upon our entry into war,
the point being urged in behalf of this gun that there
was prejudice against it in the Ordnance Depart-
ment, and that the Government was, therefore,
unwisely, if not wrongfully, deprived of a supply
which everybody afterward would have been very
glad to have. It is appropriate, therefore, to set
forth especially the experience of the United States
Government with the Lewis gun.
The first offer of the Lewis gun to the Govern-
ment of which there is any record, or of which I
have any personal knowledge, was made to the
Board of Ordnance and Fortification in a letter
dated May 2, 1912, from the Automatic Arms Com-
pany, which controls the patent, by the attorney for
the company, Mr. R. M. Calfee (proceedings of the
MAC 'HINK GUNS 79
"Board of Ordnance and Fortifications, dated May 2,
1912, signed by General Wood).
The Board considered this letter on June 6th, and
replied that it did not care to accept certain limita-
tion.- upon the test which had been imposed in the
letter offering the gun (proceedings of the Board
of Ordnance and Fortification, dated June 6, 1912;
signed by General Crozier).
On July 2, 1912, the Board considered a letter,
dated July 1st, from the Automatic Arms Company,
requesting reconsideration of the Board's action in
ird to the test of the gun, and stated in its reply
"the Automatic Arms Company is informed that,
a ltd- careful consideration of their letter, the board
is of the opinion that the usual procedure should be
followed, namely, the gun must be submitted to the
prescribed by the Ordnance Department. Dur-
ing this test the representatives of the company will
be permitted to be present, and, preliminary to the
. to give such exhibition of the performance of
the gun as they may see fit, in the presence of the
representative of the Ordnance Department charged
witli technical examination of the gun. After this
demonstration is completed the gun will then be sub-
mitted to such tests as the Ordnance Department-
inn y deem necessary. Ammunition for such tests
% \ill be furnished by the Government.
4 The parties representing the gun may have the
privilege of declining to subject it to any portion of
flie test which may be proposed to which they mny
lot wish to have it subjected at the time, but in re-
80 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
specting their wishes in this regard the report will,
of course, state the facts.
"In the course of the complete test the gun will
have the kind of field test which they desire, and
copies of all reports in regard to the test will be
furnished the company." (Proceedings of the Board
of Ordnance and Fortification, dated July 2, 1912;
signed by General Wood.)
The matter rested at this stage until March 5, 1913,
when the Automatic Arms Company again offered
a Lewis machine gun for test, pursuant to which a
test was ordered on the recommendation of the
Board of Ordnance and Fortification. (Proceedings
of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification, dated
March 6, 1913; signed by General Wood.) A board
of officers was, pursuant to the recommendation of
the Board of Ordnance and Fortification, appointed
by the War Department, to make a competitive test
of all the automatic machine guns which should be
submitted to it, the membership of the board con-
sisting of Colonel Ernest Hinds, U. S. A.; Major
W. G. Penfield, Ordnance Department; Captain
W. E. Smedberg, Jr., Cavalry; Captain Frank 8.
Bowen, Infantry, and Lieutenant Austin N. Hardee,
Infantry.
The board met at the Springfield Armory in Sep-
tember, and tested seven different models of auto-
matic machine guns. The Lewis gun submitted used
American ammunition, but had been manufactured
in England. At this test all of the competing guns
were eliminated except the Benet-Mercie and the
Vickers, and of these two a field test was made in
MACHINE GUNS 81
the spring of 1914, which resulted in the selection of
the Vickers gun. Of the three guns that were the
most prominent, the report of the board states that
in the endurance test there were with the Lewis gun
206 jams and malfunctions; with the Vickers gun,
and with the Bonet-Mercie, 59; the Lewis gun
had 35 broken parts, while there were none for the
Vickers and 7 for the Benet-Mercie; and the Lewis
gun had 15 parts not broken but requiring replace-
ment, as against none for the Vickers gun and none
for the Benet-Mercie. The board reported that,
"The Lewis automatic machine rifle, as at present
designed, is not superior to the service automatic
machine rifle (Benet-Mercie) on account of the fail-
ure to maintain continuous fire, the large number of
parts which were broken, and the large number of
jams, many of the latter being reduced only after
much difficulty and considerable time." The report
also stated that "The board is of the opinion that,
with the exception of the Vickers gun, none of
the other guns submitted showed sufficiently marked
superiority for the military service, in comparison
with the service automatic machine rifle (Benet-
Mercie) to warrant further consideration of them
in a field test." The instructions of the board had
i. -(11 to ascertain whether any gun had sufficient
superiority over the Benet-Mercie to warrant its
adoption or further test.
During the course of the test the Army bill of
1914 was passed, and as no conclusion had been
hed, tin' bill made no appropriation for machine
guns. At thr time of the passage of the hill of the
82 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
following year, 1915, the Vickers gun had been
adopted as the approved type, and that bill there-
fore made an appropriation of $150,000 for machine
rifles, and in addition reappropriated the unex-
pended balance of $44,421.00, which had been left
over from preceding appropriations at the time
when the question of substituting a new machine
rifle for the Benet-Mercie was taken up. Funds thus
made available w r ere used in making a contract for
Vickers guns, which had been unanimously recom-
mended by the testing board for adoption in replace-
ment of the Benet-Mercie.
It is apparent that at this stage, the middle of the
year 1915, there would have been no justification for
expending the slender means at the disposal of the
Department for procuring Lewis guns, in the face
of the declaration of the board that they were
inferior both to the Benet-Mercie gun already in
service, and to the Vickers gun which had been
recommended for adoption.
No Lewis gun was presented for a second test,
after the first one in 1913, until April of 1916. This
was understandable in view of the outbreak of the
w r ar in Europe, where the guns were being made,
but in the latter part of 1915 their manufacture in
this country for the forces of the British Empire
w r as commenced by the Savage Arms Company of
Utica, N. Y., and the Ordnance Department then
took the initiative in an effort to secure a second
gun for test. In reply to request on the Savage
Arms Company for such a gun, its Vice-President,
;
MAC'HINi: GUNS 83
Mr. W. G. Greene, wrote on September 30, 1915, as
follows :
"At the present time we are not able to furnish
your Department with a gun, having only two our-
selves, both of which are in constant use at the fac-
tory, one as a manufacturing model, and the other as
nn experimental model. These two guns were botli
manufactured by the Birmingham Small Arms
Plant. We will gladly demonstrate one of these
"uns if you care to send an officer." (0.0. file
472.5 :>5.)
Under date of December 28, 1915, after another
inquiry, Mr. Greene wrote:
"We acknowledge your letter of the 23d, in which
you ask if we can furnish you with one Savage-
Lewis machine gun. We are, of course, most anx-
ious to furnish the Department not only with one
Savage-Lewis gun, but with a considerable quantity,
but at the present moment our output is all engaged,
deliveries just now being due the Department of
Militia and Defense at Ottawa, and we do not feel
at liberty to divert even one gun from the contract
deliveries." (0.0. file 472.5/55.)
In response to another effort of the Department,
Mr. A. A. Boric, president of the Savage Arms
Company, wrote under date of January 27, 1916:
"I regret to inform you that such a sale at the
lit time is impossible on account of other com-
mitments made by this company. We trust, how-
. in the near future to be able to deliver a Lewis
machine gun to the Department for the purpos
test by the Department, and will notify you in re-
84 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
gard to this as soon as possible." (0.0. file
472.5/74.)
A test of the Lewis gun was finally held at the
Springfield Armory in April of 1916. Two guns
were tested, one using American and the other Eng-
lish ammunition. In regard to the gun using Amer-
ican, or service ammunition, the report of the board
states :
4 'The service gun was withdrawn at this time by
the Savage Arms Company (Mr. Borie and Mr.
Wright, Colonel Dooley, Mr. Nelson and Mr. Eenew
being present), who stated that, as the gun was in
an experimental stage, and as it was giving trouble
both in feeding and in rupturing cartridges, which
trouble it was thought would be overcome in a sub-
sequent gun, they considered it useless to continue
the test." (0. 0. file 472.5/110.)
This statement of the company in April, 1916, that
the gun for American ammunition was in an experi-
mental stage at that time ought to dispose of the
claim that it was then, or had been at any time
previously, ready for purchase for the use of the
American Army. The claim as to its ability to fire
American ammunition was made by Col. Lewis in
his testimony before the Senate Military Commit-
tee, on December 22, 1917, in the following lan-
guage: "Not only does the Lewis gun fire ammuni-
tion, American ammunition, successfully, but the
Chief of Ordnance fired it many times himself in
the tests in the presence of the members of the
Board of Ordnance and Fortifications. That was in
1912. There has been no question about firing
MAC 'HIM-: T.UNS 85
American ammunition. It was made to fire it. It
tires it better than any other kind of ammunition.
I have now perfected it so that it will lire eight
different kinds of ammunition of as many different
countries.
"I want, therefore, first of all to settle the ques-
tion of whether it will use or shoot American ammu-
nition. Witness after witness has come before your
committee and deliberately misrepresented the facts
in the case. It is done intentionally. I cannot
escape the conclusion that the misrepresentation is
intentional, because it is so oft repeated." (Hear-
ings: Part 2; page 701.)
The board was composed of Captain W. K. Smed-
berg, Jr., of the Cavalry; Captain G. H. Stewart, of
th i Ordnance Department, and First Lieutenant
Thomas W. Brown, of the Infantry. The board was
created by a War Department Order, and submitted
its report to the Adjutant-General. It was not a
board of the Ordnance Department, nor were any
of the boards which dealt with the Lewis gun. They
were all War Department boards, which contained
only one Ordnance officer, and were not subject to
the jurisdiction of the Chief of Ordnance.
In regard to the gun using British ammunition,
the Board reported as follows:
"Considering the performance of the Lewis gun
in the test reported herein, and comparing that per-
formance with the performance of the Yickers gun
(Automatic Machine (Jun. Model of 1915) and of the
Springfield gun (Automatic Machine Rifle, caliber
86 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
.30, model of 1919)* in the test conducted by the
board convened by Special Orders No. 191, War
Department, August 16, 1913, the board finds that
the Lewis gun in its present state of development is
not equal or superior to either of the above-men-
tioned guns. The Lewis gun is not as reliable or as
dependable as are the other guns mentioned. The
following table shows in summary the data upon
which this opinion is based :
ENDURANCE TEST 15,000 BOUNDS
Lewis Springfield Vickers
Time of firing, exclud-
ing cooling and repair-
ing 2 hrs. 3 min. 2 hrs. 27 min. 1 hr. 24 min.
Number of jams and
malfunctions 314 59
Number of broken parts. 8 7
Number of parts not
broken but replaced.. 5
i
"The Lewis gun, on the other hand, is lighter, si
pier and has fewer number of parts than the other
guns mentioned; and, in the opinion of the board,
the question as to whether or not it can be developed
to a satisfactory degree of reliability and depend-
ability is an open one.
"The board finds, therefore, that the results of the
present test were not such as to justify the purchase
of four Lewis guns chambered for the service am-
munition for further test at this time, but in view of
the desirable features of the gun, the board recom-
mends that if the Savage Arms Company under-
* Otherwise known as the Benet-Mercie.
MAC I II\K GUNS 87
to develop a gun for the service ammunition a
further test be made, upon their request, after the
(lexvlopment shall have 1 been carried to a satisfac-
tory stage/' (0. 0. file 472.5/110.)
It is thus seen that at this second test the board
d that the Lewis gun, even using British am-
munition, was not as good as had been shown at the
if 1913 to be both the Benet-Mercie, which had
1, and the Vickers, which had been
adopted: and that the gun using American ammuni-
tion had not been able to get through the test at all,
Tin-re \vould, therefore, have been no justification
at this time for the investment of funds in Lewis
guns, with two better types within the knowledge of
the Department, even if there had been funds avail-
able for the purpose, which there were not. In re-
gard to this test of the month of April, the President
ol' the Savage Arms Company, which presented the
is guns, wrote the following letter, before the
lusion of the board was announced:
EXECUTIVE OFFICE, SAVAGE AKMS Co.,
50 Church Street, New York, U. S. A.
April 26, 1916.
A. E. BORIE, Pres.
BRAL "\VILLI.\M H. CROZIER, tine Chief of Ord-
\Var Departm>
Wa*lt D. C.
VTl
pany wishes to express its appreciation
e Ordnance Department for the courtesies
'i-ntly by the hoard appointed to inspect
ration <>!' the Li-wis machine gun. The com-
Sir:
3s
88 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
pany feels that the investigation has been entirely
impartial and regards the board as one very capable
of judging the value of the investigation to the Ord-
nance Department.
We also appreciate the courtesy shown us by
Colonel Peirce and his assistants.
Respectfully,
SAVAGE ARMS COMPANY,
(0.0. 472.5/124) A. E. Borie, President.
The next experience of the Ordnance Department
with Lewis guns was in the summer of the same year,
1916, when, pursuant to my recommendation, 353
of these guns were purchased, for use on the Mexican
border, from the Savage Arms Company, where they
happened to be available from a number which had
been made for the Canadian Government. The guns
used British ammunition, a supply of which had to
be purchased for them, and were the only machine
guns which could be had. As funds were not avail-
able for the purchase of these guns, a deficit had to
be created for the purpose ; that is, they were pur-
chased without authority of law. Unusual care was
taken in establishing schools and furnishing experts
to give instruction in the use of the guns before the
soldiers were allowed to have them. Various reports
were received as to their performance. The follow-
ing is from an officer who was an instructor in one
of the schools. It inclosed a letter which had beeil
written to the editor of the Army and Navy Journal
of New York, but which I did not forward to thai
paper. This inclosure I also present :
MACHINE GI\S 89
CAMP COTTON,
El Paso, Texas, December 11, 1916.
GENERAL WILLIAM CROZIER, Chief nf Ordnance,
U. 8. A. :
Washington, D. C.
Mi/ Dear General:
From the privilege extended me while you were
observing the machine gun instruction at Fort Bliss,
IVxas, some time since, I am addressing you in
ird to the selection of the types of machine guns
to be adopted and secured for our service.
The enclosed letter is written not in the nature of
an expression of which type of -automatic rifle is the
better, only as the result of the comparison of the
two as we have found them in our daily work.
This letter was addressed to the Army and Navy
Journal requesting that it be published with no
re to get ourselves before the public, but solely
through interest in this very important subject and
with the hope that it may enlighten some who have
not had the opportunity to witness such a com-
parison and test in field work.
It is requested that you have this article published
or used in any way that you may deem advisable and
Ix-st, or advise us, as we will not forward a copy to
tin.' Army an<l Navy Journal until advised by you.
\Ve are intensely interested in the subject of
machine guns and only wish that we had a chance to
I'-arn more of and work more with the various types
<f automatic rifles and machine guns, than can be
had in our very interesting work here.
With kindest personal regards,
Very truly yours,
T. N. GlMPERLTNG,
Cai>t(tht .14th Infantry.
90 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
EL PASO, TEXAS, December 9, 1916.
Note: Not sent (Dec. 18, 1916).
To the Editor of the Army and Navy Journal, New
York, N. Y.
Sir:
In view of the present controversy over- the selec-
tion of automatic machine rifle to be adopted and
bought for the army; as the machine gun board is
now in session and as various articles are appearing
in your columns on this subject, we request that you
publish the following data, based on facts obtained
from over three months of daily instruction in the
handling and firing of these guns and in problems
simulating active service conditions and require-
ments as nearly as can be obtained anywhere.
The two types of automatic machine rifles used
were the Benet-Mercie and the Lewis gun. Factory
experts of each type were present to keep their guns
in the best possible condition.
The machine gun company of the 33rd Michigan
Infantry, 95 per cent of whose personnel are general
mechanical engineers and expert mechanics, is
equipped with both the Benet-Mercie and the Lewis
automatic rifles; this company had two Benet and
four Lewis guns. The organization has received
thorough instruction in the operation -of both types
of guns from experts direct from the Savage Arms
Company (Lewis gun) and from the Springfield
Armory (Benet-Mercie gun) and there is no reason
to believe other than that these men are fully com-
petent to assist in giving both types of gun a fair and
impartial test.
We therefore believe we are safe in asserting, as
both guns were in use side by side, that the compara-
MACHINE GUNS 91
ti've merits of these two types of guns, as efficient
pons, could be fairly judged.
This company has fired approximately forty thou-
>and rounds of service ammunition with the Benet
a and approximately twenty-five thousand rounds
<i' British .:>03 with the Lewis guns. These two
Benet- Merrie guns have been in use for a period of
about six years and have been in use at the School
of Instruction at Sparta, Wisconsin. During this
time they were in use by the machine gun companies
of the Michigan National Guard for a period of three
while the Lewis guns were issued to them in
August of this year and were, therefore, new, as they
part of the Canadian shipment taken over by
the U. S. Government from the Savage Arms Com-
pany.
In every case in which these guns have been fired
side by side, the Benet-Mercie gun has proven its
superiority. Many examples could be cited in sup-
port of this, one of which is as follows :
" Firing was maintained for one and one -half
minutes for all six guns, with these results: one
Benet gun fired 348 rounds with one jam; another
fired 364 rounds with two jams. One Lewis .mm
fired 117 rounds with four jams; a second fired 87
shots with two jams; a third fired 44 rounds with
.jams; and a fourth fired 9 rounds with one jam,
which put this gun out of action."
This is l)ii t a fair example of the general results
obtained by this company in the operation of the two
types of irun.
The company has obtained as many as f>4f> rounds
*om one Benet gun in continuous iirin,^ without a
With the Lewis gun the hot that they have
92
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
obtained is the 117 rounds with two jams in one and
one-half minutes, cited above.
It is our opinion that the parts of the Lewis
gun are not properly finished and that they are
made of a rather poor grade of material. The gun
has a number of steel stamped parts, improperly
heat-treated, which cause jams and a consequent
inefficiency in the gun. As an example, the magazine
is made of a very thin, flimsy steel stamping, toggled
up with a combination of soft aluminum core and
metal strips which are riveted on. This causes the
magazine to be very vibrant and susceptible to the
strain of feed pawl functioning. The ejector is made
of a thin steel stamping, improperly heat-treated,
and very often it bends, nearly always batters on
the end, through bolt action, in the course of eighty
to one hundred and fifty rounds. The feed pawls,
stop pawls and rebound pawls seem to be made of a
poor grade of steel. The gas cylinder is made of a
twenty gauge mill run steel, which has been found
to be full of scale pits and imperfections. We believo
that the gun, as at present constructed, could bo
made in lots of a thousand or more, at approximately
fifty or fifty-five dollars per gun, for material and
labor. It is now sold to the Government for a
thousand dollars.
From the standpoint of mechanics, the Benet-
Mercie gun is a masterpiece, inasmuch as the parts
are finely finished and are made of excellent material
and are properly treated where this is essential.
The price at which the Government issues this gun
is approximately $412.00, which, it is believed, would
net, to a private manufacturing concern, but a fair
profit over the cost of production.
.MACHINE GUNS 93
We are wedded to no type of gun, but are pre-
senting these facts in the interest of the service.
T. N. GIMPERLING,
Captain, 34th U. S. Infantry,
Machine Gun Director, llfh Prov. Div.
DAVID 0. BYARS,
1st Lieut. 34th U. S. Infantry,
On duty with Machine Gun Company.
ARTHUR C. GROSSMAN,
Captain, 33d Michigan Infantry, Comdg. Machine
Gun Company,
Efficiency Engineer, Studebaker Corp.
MAXWELL H. SPREEN,
1st Sergt. Mach. Gun Co., 33d Mich. Inf.,
Asst. Chief Engr. Chevrolet Motor Car Co.
The School of Musketry submitted a report, Jan-
uary 7, 1917 (0.0. 472.5112/129), on efficiency of
machine guns, showing extensive firings and careful
consideration. The report stated as follows :
"Thirteen Lewis guns were used in the firing.
The guns were new. Except for some possible test
firing not a shot had been fired from any of them
prior to their use by this class. When they were
received at the school it was found that several of
tin- parts did not fit properly. This was true in
particular of the joints between the barrel groups
and the receiver groups. The other cases of misfit
wore due largely to poor workmanship and lack of
finish.
"When the firing of the guns began there was very
little trouble with them that could not be accounted
b ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
for by the fact that the personnel of the class was
inexperienced and that about 3 per cent of the am-
munition used was found to be faulty. After about
2,000 rounds had been fired from each gun, jams
began to occur which were due to causes other than
untrained personnel and defective ammunition.
"By far the greater portion of jams due to defec-
tive mechanism were caused by the wear of the feed
operating arms and stud, the bending of the cartridge
guide, and the faulty construction and bending of
the magazines ; and of these about one-half were due
to faulty magazines.
"The total number of rounds fired from these 13
guns was 166,180. The maximum number fired from
any one gun during any particular day was 2,992.
"The following list shows the parts of these guns
that were broken, damaged or lost during the course
of the firing above noted:
Broken 57, including 13 bore cleaning rods
Worn 74, 57 magazines.
Lost 162
Total 293
"In their present condition these guns cannot be
depended upon to fire a single magazine without
malfunctions. Whether or not they would operate
with good magazines and with serviceable feed
operating arms and studs remains to be seen when
they are tested in this manner. At the present writ-
ing the spare parts with which to make such tests
are not on hand.
MACHINE GUNS 95
"The Lewis gun in its present state of develop-
ment is not believed to be a satisfactory weapon
for issue to our service as an automatic rifle or
4 first line gun.' "
"The Lewis gun, while it is not a dependable
weapon at present, is believed to possess great pos-
sibilities. Its lightness, the simplicity of its mechan-
ism, the efficiency of its cooling system, and the ease
with which men learn to use it (when it is new and
working well), all tend to indicate that if it can be
made dependable, it will be an excellent first line
gun."
This report was signed by Colonel E. M. Blatch-
ford, Infantry, afterward a major-general in the
National Army.
A number of reports were submitted by organiza-
tion commanders in the Southern Department in
ird to these guns, of which the general purport
is exhibited in the following letter from the Depart-
ment Commander:
SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Sam Houston, Texas,
March 1, 1917.
From: Commanding General, Southern Depart-
ment.
To : The Adjutant General of the Army.
Subject : Keports covering tests made of the Lewis
machine gun and Benet-Mercie machine
gun.
1. Herewitli are tin- reports of the commanding:
officers of tlie machine -un companies of the 19th
Infantry and tin 1 .'J7th Infantry covering com]>;
96 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
tive tests made of the Lewis machine gun and the
Benet-Mercie machine gun.
2. These reports are forwarded in connection with
the 9th indorsement on A.G.O. file 2436783.
3. These reports are further evidence that in the
extensive tests made in the Southern Department,
the Lewis machine gun has failed to demonstrate its
superiority over the Benet-Mercie gun in so far as
its suitability for use with the machine gun organiza-
tion of infantry and cavalry regiments is concerned.
(signed) JOHN J. PEKSHING,
Major General, Commanding.
In the meantime, in July, 1916, the same War
Department board which had tested the Lewis gun
in April tested a Colt gun submitted by the Colt
Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company, and
reported as follows :
' ' Considering the performance of the Colt gun in
this test as compared with the performance of the
Lewis gun chambered for British Mark VII ammuni-
tion, reported on by this board under date of April
25, 1916, the board finds that the Colt gun as sub-
mitted is superior to the Lewis gun for general
service use. The Colt gun showed considerably
greater reliability than the Lewis gun. The board
finds, however, that for the particular case of use in
aeroplanes, the Lighter Lewis gun, with its self-con-
tained magazine, is superior to the Colt gun, in spite
of the former's greater liability to malfunction."
During all this time appropriations for the pur-
chase of machine guns had been most meager, but
the Army Appropriation Act approved August 29,
1916, carried a large appropriation of $12,000,000,
MACHINE GUNS 97
for these guns, and its judicious expenditure became
a matter of great moment.
This was the first appropriation of size sufficient
to be of any significance in procuring a supply of
machine guns which was ever made. About ten days
before the date of the Appropriation Act, and when
it was evident that the inclusion, upon its passage,
of the sum for machine guns was assured, I sub-
mitted to the Secretary of War a recommendation
as to the disposition which should be made of the
funds. The recommendation was made in the light
of a possible emergency calling for a hasty supply
of more machine guns for use on the Mexican border,
and also in reply to a recommendation which had
come from General Wood that the Benet-Mercie
guns in the service be discarded and replaced by
Lewis guns. My recommendation is contained in the
following memorandum :
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Ordnance,
Washington, August 18, 1916.
Memorandum for the Secretary of War.
Subject : Purchase of machine guns.
1. I recommend that the following action be taken
upon the passage of the pending Army appropriation
bill:
(a) That for emergency requirements in the
immediate future either Colt guns or Lewis guns,
using American ammunition, be purchased. With
this authorization I shall probably purchase Colt
guns, in accordance with the recommendations of
the testing board as to their superiority over the
Lewis guns for general service, unless a particularly
favorable reply shall be received to an inquiry now
98 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
pending as to possible terms of purchase of Lewis
guns.
(b) That orders be immediately placed for Vick-
ers guns, to the extent of one-half of the funds
available.
(c) That orders for machine guns, of a type to be
determined at the time of ordering, to the extent of
the remaining funds available be placed not later
than November 1st next.
(d) That a test for the determination of its suit-
ability for purchase and use in the service be made
of any gun presented in sufficient time for the
conclusion and consideration of the test before
November 1st next.
(e) That thereafter the usual practice be followed
of testing any machine gun which may be presented
for test, with reference to its suitability for purchase
for use in the service from any sums made available
by future appropriations.
(f ) That decision be definitely made not to replace
the Benet-Mercie guns now in the service with Lewis
guns, or with those of any other type, unless further
developments shall indicate the desirability of a
review of this decision.
(g) That announcement of the above be made in
such manner as to reach all interested parties.
2. These recommendations are made in the light
of the following information : The total number of
automatic machine guns required, in accordance with
the approved program, is 12,000, of which the fol-
lowing are on hand or under manufacture:
Maxim 287
Benet-Mercie 665
Lewis 353
Vickers 125
Total 1,430
M A("TII\K GUNS 99
Of these the Maxims and the Vickers are of a
heavy type, and the Benet-Mercie and the Lewis are
<>f a light type. Some guns on hand, of older models,
are not counted. The funds expected to be available
an* about $12,000,000, which are sufficient to pur-
chase about 4,000 guns, with necessary accessories,
of the most expensive type. Additional funds ought
to 1)0 available not later than March 4th next, to be
appropriated at the next session of Congress.
.'5. Before the next session of Congress the Ord-
o Department will bring to the attention of the
War Department the necessity for arriving at a
conclusion as to whether a heavy and a light type
of automatic machine gun are needed in the service,
and if so, their relative numbers. Such a conclusion
is not necessary with reference to the program above
recommended, for the reason that the program will
leave the supply such as to render compliance pos-
sil>le with any probable conclusion which may be
readied.
WILLIAM CROZIER,
r General, Chief of Ordnance, United
States Army.
The tests referred to under (d) and (e) of the
memorandum were designed to afford opportunity
for a perfected Lewis gun, a Browning gun, or any
other, to establish its suitability for procurement.
The Secretary of War did not follow my recom-
inc]i(latioi)>, but, on September 28, 1916, appointed
a board with the following instructions:
"Th<> board will consider and make recommenda-
tions as to whether a single type or more than one
of machine rifle, using small arms ammunition,
is needed for the service, and the type or types which
100 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
should be procured ; and if more than one type, the
proportion of the different types.
"In making its recommendations the board will
take into consideration the present supply of machine
rifles of the various types; all reports of tests of
machine rifles which may be believed to be service-
able in reaching a conclusion; the amount of funds
now available for the procurement of machine rifles ;
the appropriations necessary to be made in order to
complete the supply at an appropriate rate ; and any
records of the War Department, or of any branch
of it, which it may desire to consult. If the board
shall find that tests previously made are insufficient
to enable it to reach a conclusion it will make recom-
mendation as to further tests which ought to be
made, their character, time and place.
"The board will recommend the type of gun which
should be procured in case of an emergency requiring
an earlier supply in possibly limited quantity than
can be had of the gun which it may consider as
eventually the most suitable, if there be any of
which earlier delivery may be possible ; and whether
contract should be entered into for a considerable
supply of a gun of known type in advance of any
test which it may conclude to be called for, and if so,
to what extent.
"The board will submit its report to the Adjutant
General of the Army."
The membership of the board was selected with
great care, in order to insure its expert and judicial
character, and was as follows: Brigadier General
Francis H. French, Colonel Joseph T. Dickman, 2d
MACHIN! GUNS 101
Cavalry; Colonel Tracy C. Dickson, U. S. Army,
retired; Lieutenant Colonel Henry D. Todd, Jr.,
\ rtillery Corps ; Captain Robert II. Willis, Jr.,
Signal Corps; Lieutenant Steven C. Rowan, U. S.
Xavy; Captain Edward B. Cole, U. S. Marine Corps;
Mr. Bascom Little, Cleveland, Ohio, and Mr. B. M.
Hanson, Hartford, Conn. Their instructions re-
quired them in effect to cover the whole subject of
thr supply of mac-nine guns, including types. Mr.
Hanson, an expert mechanical engineer, had at that
time no connection with any machine gun interest,
although he subsequently became a member of the
stall of the Colt Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing
Company.
On October 24, 1916, the board submitted a pre-
liminary report in which it recommended among
other things
"That tests heretofore made show that the Vick-
ers machine rifle fulfills to a high degree the require-
ments of the military service for a machine rifle of
the heavier type.
"That previous tests and other information ob-
tained by the board do not warrant its recommend-
ing at this time a rifle of the light type.
"That available funds be used for immediate pro-
inent of 4,(>00 Vickers machine rifles and 960
pack outfits for the same.
'That further and competitive tests of machine
rifles be conducted by the board at the Springfield
Armory, Springfield, Mass., tests to begin May 1,
1917."
Tl. >rt was approved by the Secretary of
102 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD
War on October 27, 1916, but immediate action of the
Ordnance Department in regard to procuring 4,600
Vickers machine guns was suspended by the War
Department upon a protest by Mr. K. M. Calfee, of
the Automatic Arms Company, representing the
Lewis gun; and the machine gun board was recon-
vened. It submitted an additional report dated
December 4, 1916, which confirmed its previous
recommendations, with a statement that if it was
desired to retain a certain amount of the funds then
on hand for the purpose of insuring procurement of
light machine guns after a test in May, such action
could be had by reducing the number of guns which
had been allowed for wastage.
The final conclusion reached by the War Depart-
ment (contained in 0. 0. file 472.5-112/117) was that
4,000 Vickers machine guns with 960 pack outfits
therefor, should be immediately procured; that
$1,560,000 should be held in reserve for the purchase
of guns of such other types than the Vickers as the
Secretary of War might decide upon after test, or
for such other use as might be decided by the
Secretary.
The Adjutant General's Office on December 15,
1916, transmitted to the Ordnance Office final au-
thority to proceed with the procurement of Vickers
guns. On the following day, December 16th, the or-
der was placed and the contract executed and signed
(A. G. 0. file 2482640-E). The resort to a board
delayed action until about the middle of December,
or nearly four months, but the method used was
through extreme solicitude to give every considera-
GUNS 103
tion to the Lewis gun, and prevent any reasonable
ground for dissatisfaction at its treatment.
Such was the situation at the time when the
imminence of war with Germany became apparent.
All of the funds at the disposal of the Ordnance
I >.'partment, except about $1,500,000, had, by author-
f the War Department, been utilized in placing
a contract for machine guns of the type which had
atedly been declared, by the most expert agen-
which the War Department could create, to be
the best in existence, and which had received em-
phatic and continuing indorsement in the European
War. The remaining funds had been held for util-
ization in accordance with knowledge which might
subsequently be acquired. If, up to this time, any
iclerable order had been placed for Lewis guns
using American ammunition, the action would have
been taken in the face of the failure of these guns
ever to perform satisfactorily at a test with Amer-
i'-an ammunition; and against the recommendation
of every body of advisers upon which the War De-
partment had called for counsel.
In vie\\ of the fact that Lewis guns were at this
time rendering such service to the British forces
as to justify their continuance as the standard
nine gun of the li.^lit type for their army, the
question arises as to why good Lewis guns were
in England, and at the same time poor
is --iins were being made in this country and
urged upon the Government with great insistence.
I do not undertake to answer this question, but it
must be remembered that no Lewis gnu as made in
104 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD W.
England for the British service had ever been avail-
able for the United States, even for test.
On April 9, 1917, immediately after the outbreak
of the war, I recommended that, as soon as funds
should become available, which was expected to be
almost immediately, orders should be given for
4,000 more Vickers guns, and for 2,500 Colt guns.
The latter were recommended because it was prac-
ticable to secure them promptly, and, although not
of an adopted type, their immediate availability
called for their purchase as an additional number
to those covered by the machine gun program. The
Lewis gun had, through the winter and early spring,
in the meantime been brought to a state of prac-
ticability for use with American ammunition, as
shown by a test held under the auspices of the Navy
Department, and witnessed by one of my officers,
over fifteen important changes having been made in
it ; and, therefore, at the same time, and in anticipa-
tion of the test to be held in the month of May, I
recommended that the $1,500,000 at the disposal of
the Department be invested in an order for Lewis
guns, and that further authority to procure up to
5,000 of these guns be given, for utilization as soon
as additional funds should become available. The
funds thus already available were utilized in placing
an order for 1,300 Lewis guns, which was done on
April 12th. The 2,500 Colt guns were ordered on
June 2d, using funds which were made available
by the Army Appropriation Act of May 12, 1917.
From the funds appropriated in the same Act, the
Ordnance Department also ordered, on June 12th,
M.\( HINK GUNS 105
4,400 Lewis guns, at the same time informing the
Savage Arms Company that additional orders might
be expected. Two thousand additional were ordered
on June 18th, three days after the passage of the
first war appropriation measure, the appropriation
Act of May 12th having been small, this act being
the deferred Army appropriation bill which failed
at the session before.
At the tests which were held in the month of May
by the War Department machine gun board, in ac-
cordance with its program, the Lewis gun's per-
formance was highly satisfactory. In regard to it
the board stated :
"The mechanism of this gun has been under con-
tinual development since it was last tested by the
War Department. . . . The Lewis machine rifle,
caliber .30, fully established its character as a first-
class machine gun. Many improvements have been
made in this gun since it was last tested, which
justify the delay of the War Department in accord-
ing complete recognition to this weapon."
Following this report orders for Lewis guns were
^iven from time to time as funds became available,
up to tin* nunil>< i r of about 42,000, ordered by the
autumn of 1917, and subsequently increased to
86,700, to produce which the company was first re-
sted to incivase its plant capacity to 2,000 per
month, and afterwards to 3,750 per month, the
arrangement providing for an expenditure of $1,-
000,000 in the expansion of facilities, to be taken
can- ot % properly in the price of the i^uns.
This history shows that as BOOH Rfl the Lewis 1:1111
106 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
was developed to the point of ability to properly
perform with American ammunition, large orders
were given for it, and the manufacturers were en-
couraged to expand their plants, the commencement
of this action anticipating the report of the War
Department board.
In the meantime, while the consideration of the
relative merits of the Benet-Mercie, Vickers and
Lewis guns was going on, Mr. John Browning, of
Utah, working in connection with the Colt Patent
Fire Arms Co., of Hartford, Conn., had undertaken
the design of a machine gun, and had informed the
Ordnance Department of his efforts. One or two
exhibitions of the gun had been made, which showed
promising performance of both a light and heavy
type, and justified a hope of successful development;
but the exhibitions were in no sense conclusive or
properly to be regarded as tests, and had not been
made as such. A heavy gun, water-cooled, and a
light gun, air-cooled, were finally completed and
presented to the board for the tests held in the
month of May, 1917. In regard to them the report
of the board stated as follows:
". . . The board invites special attention to the
tactical possibilities of the Colt automatic machine
rifle, air-cooled, highly portable, designated above
as the Browning air-cooled gun. According to re-
ports received from observers, especially by Major
L. T. Hillman, Ordnance Department, the drift of
the French Army is decidedly towards greater use
of automatic rifles of highly portable type, such as
the Chauchat. In the British Army the Lewis gun
MACHINE GUNS 107
is used in much the same way, but, on account of its
_rht and size, not with equal facility."
The report of the machine gun board further
stated in reference to the other Browning, the water-
cooled Lcun: "This gun developed such remarkable
reliability of function during the firing of over
20,000 shots, that a further test of 20,000 shots was
fired by the same gun for endurance. . . . The only
break was one scar after 39,500 shots; this caused
the only stoppage directly chargeable to the gun."
The report of the board of May, 1917, upon its
ipt by the War Department, was sent to the
War College Division, General Staff, and eventually
reached the Ordnance Department on June 24, 1917,
with instructions, among others, that as soon as
possible Browning light air-cooled automatic rifles
be furnished to infantry at the rate of at least eight
per company.
The program of procurement of machine guns
and automatic rifles was based upon these instruc-
tions, upon considerations concerning the training
of troops in the United States, and upon informa-
tion from abroad as to the possibility of obtaining
a the French Government an emergency supply
of t! Capons for the troops of the American
Expeditionary Fon-r first sent over, as well as on
the plans for tin- armament of the various braiu-ln-s
of the force. An item of such information was
1 in a cal >!<"_: ram received from General
: iinu: on July 17, lf)17, an extract from which
)llov
. . . Suggest United States make every attempt
108 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
to secure greatest possible production Vickers type
per month. At least two Vickers guns on every
aeroplane synchronized with engines and equal
number Lewis guns unsynchronized with engine.
We should anticipate use three Vickers synchronized
guns and three Lewis unsynchronized on every
aeroplane. Pershing. ' '
The use to which it was intended to put the Lewis
guns in the American force in Europe was impor-
tant in that it would govern the details of construc-
tion of the guns. For aeroplane service the cooling
apparatus would be left off as unnecessary. There-
fore, in order to avoid cross purposes between the
Ordnance Department and the Expeditionary Force
as to the use of these guns, and to ascertain the
possibility of supply of others by the French, the
Chief of Ordnance, on July 28th, caused the follow-
ing cablegram to be sent to General Pershing :
Amexforce, Paris.
Number 67.
Paragraph 4. About 20,000 Lewis machine guns
chambered for United States ammunition as recom-
mended by recent gun board are being secured for
delivery before June 30, 1918. Deliveries begin in
August. Will these guns be wanted? Deliveries of
either type of Browning gun cannot be expected in
less than six to nine months. 4,000 Vickers guns
should be delivered by December 31st. 2,500 Colt
will be completed about September 15th.
(Signed)
MAMIINK GUNS 109
In answer, General Pershing cabled as follows
KG 472.555/910):
Date, August 5, 1917.
Xuinber 9 N. Y. 0.0.370.22/548.
From Paris.
"To the Adjutant General, Washington.
X umber 85.
With reference to paragraph 4 your 67, and in
connection with paragraph 1 my 61, arrangements
completed to equip first two divisions with Hotch-
maehine mms and Chauchat automatic rifles.
Subsequent divisions should be equipped in same
manner until Vickers machine guns and a suc-
cessful automatic rifle is furnished by Ordnance
Department. Information desired as to when in-
coming divisions may be expected to arrive with
machine guns and automatic rifles so furnished, this
information needed to determine what material
should be obtained from French Government. Lewis
machine gun more suitable as automatic rifle, but
recommended as armament for aeroplanes in para-
graph 9 my 44, July 16th. Recommended Lewis
machine guns be used for aeroplanes accordingly.
(Signed) PERSHING."
The large number of Lewis guns which were
li-red had been intended for use either in aero-
planes, or, in advance of securing a supply of light
Browning guns, on the ground; but the ability to
ire fn>m France machine guns of both light and
heavy type sufficient for the armament of our forces
until such time as li^ht and heavy Browning or
Yickers iruns could be manufactured in this coun-
try, togrtln-r with the appearance of the insistent
emand for L-\\is -uiis for the aviation service,
110 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
dictated instructions to the Savage Arms Com-
pany to manufacture all guns still under order from
them of the aviation type, except 2,500 for use in the
instruction of troops in this country. The event
showed these instructions to embody a wise policy,
which was adhered to till the end, notwithstanding
severe criticism of the department by certain sen-
ators for not using the Lewis guns on the ground.
The development of the use for Lewis guns in
the aviation service, in addition to the Vickers guns,
called for the continuous manufacture of the Lewis
guns, instead of for the ultimate cessation of this
manufacture, which had been contemplated for the
time when a sufficient supply of light guns and heavy
guns for the land service should make the use of an
intermediate gun no longer necessary.
About 180,000 machine guns and automatic rifles
of the Vickers, Lewis, Colt-Marlin and Browning
types were manufactured between the time of our
entry into the war and the date of the armistice.
This number was greater than the total number
manufactured by the British during the same period,
and somewhat less than the number manufactured
by the French. With the providential assistance of
the French in preventnig an early shortage due to
our poor initial supply, our rate of manufacture
soon reached a point such as to remove all fear that
our troops might lack a sufficient number of weapons
of this class. Our rate prior to the armistice reached
more than 25,000 guns per month, which was twice
that of the French or the English, and the quality
of the Browning guns proved in service to be such
<;r\S 111
that both the British and the French Governments
applied for the purchase of a supply for the arma-
ment of their own forces.
The only possible way in which the resources of
the department could have been utilized to secure
a greater supply of these guns at an earlier date
would have been to use a larger proportion of the
$12,000,000 appropriated in the Act of August 29,
1916, for the purchase of Colt guns, instead of
putting the money mostly into Vickers guns, uni-
versally acknowledged to be a better type, but
ol' which the delivery was slower than was prom-
and anticipated ; which was the experience both
of the United States and England. To meet the
demands,, of the aviation service 23,000 Colt-Marlin
aircraft guns, in addition to Lewis and Vickers guns
1 manufactured. The Colt-Marlin, a modification
of the Colt, had developed a fortunate adaptability
for airplane use.
I believe that this history shows that the wisest
possible use was made of the funds available and
the manufacturing facilities of this country and
the allies, in providing the best available types of
shine irims. As in the case of field-artillery,
then* was no way in which the long national neglect
to provide a proper supply of these weapons could
l>e immediately made good from our own resources,
upon the outbreak of the war; but the full supply
of our lighting troops with their needs, without
failure in any instance, justifies the claim that the
opportunity afforded by good luck was seized upon
by good management.
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAI
The charge that government departments are
inhospitable to inventors; that a cold reception is
often followed by rejection of the device offered;
and that it is only after the discouraged inventor
has taken his device abroad and developed its
merits with foreign help that the United States
has recognized it, and has taken advantage of what
it might have originally had with much less delay
and expense, is heard with what ought to be dis-
turbing frequency. The accusation has been made
not only by disappointed inventors but by members
of both houses of Congress, from the floor, and has
been given wide publicity in the press, so that the
public has been educated to believe it. The War
Department, and within it the Ordnance Department
as being the one most closely concerned with the
field of mechanical invention, has been particularly
subject to this charge, of which the general accep
tance affords evidence of the popular tendency to
regard the government official as a person of
wooden-headed prejudice, prone to disregard sug
gestion from outside his own class. The ten-
dency is so common that it must have some
operating, though obscure, cause. The reasoning
that there are nineteen useless inventions for one
good one; that the disappointed are vocal while
the successful are quiet ; that an accusation is news
while a defense is not, and the failure of response
to the challenge to cite an instance within the last
half century in which a device rejected by the War
Department has afterward been shown to be useful
though many have been subsequently tested by
MACHINE GUNS 113
special direction of Congress have apparently left
the belief unaffected, as has the long list of in-
vent ions by others than officers which have been
adopted and put in use by the War Department.
Possibly the experience of some inventors like
llotrhkiss and Maxim, who have not themselves
complained but have taken their plans abroad for
development in the more lucrative markets of Eu-
rope instead of trying to bring them out under the
meager appropriations for military purposes in the
I'n it ed States, has not been understood here in
their own country, and has been taken as evidence
that they went abroad because they were not appre-
ciated by their government. In such cases the
development was usually made by foreign private
capital, stimulated by the prospect of good sales
which was absent in the United States.
In the case of the Lewis gun the charge of preju-
dice and unfair treatment was made by Col. Isaac
N. Lewis, an officer of the army, on the active
list at the time when his gun was first presented
to the War Department, and subsequently retired.
His status as an army officer justifies an exami-
nation of his charge and of his particular relations
with the Ordnance Department. The country is en-
titled to know whether an important department of
the Government is so conducted that persons with
valuable suggestions to offer, along the lines which
the department is specially created to consider, can-
not expect even fair treatment at its hands.
Col. Lewis' charges have been made in corre-
spondence and in the press, but they were made
114 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
with the most formality in his testimony before the
Military Committee of the Senate on December 22,
1917. This testimony is found on pages 699 to 742
of the "Hearings before the Committee on Military
Affairs, United States Senate, 65th Congress, 2nd
Session; Part 2" in the "Investigation of the War
Department. ' ? The parts relating to the alleged
inability of Col. Lewis to secure consideration of
his gun with reference to its test and adoption are
as follows:
"The Chairman. I think, Col. Lewis, you prob-
ably have in your mind some chronological order in
which you wish to make your statement to the com-
mittee, and probably that is the best way for you
to do it.
Senator Wadsworth. There is no necessity for
going back prior to the completion of the first model
of the Lewis machine gun and its offer to the
Government, as I understand an offer was made.
Col. Lewis. I would prefer, Senator, not to go
into ancient history. The story, as I have intimated,
is not a pleasant one, because I do not think
it is a credit to the present organization of the
Ordnance Bureau.
Before, however, I begin that story, I would like
for once and all to settle the question as to whether
Lewis has given his machine gun to the Govern-
ment or tried to give it to the Government or not.
It has been denied officially and unofficially so many
times.
As early as 1911, when the first model of the
Lewis gun was built, I took it myself to Washington.
M.iCHINK GUNS 115
I presented it in person to the Chief of Staff.
I requested him to examine it. It had been devel-
oped without one cent of expense to the Govern-
ment, during my odd time. I was then on important
duty. I was senior director of the Artillery School
at Fort Monroe. I wanted to submit the gun unre-
. 'dly for the use of my Government, giving up
all rights of whatever nature in the invention. In
doing so I asked that it be presented to the Bureau
of Ordnance and to the members of the Bureau
of Ordnance and Fortifications as early as 1912.
.re 700.)
The Chairman. On what terms did yon offer to
let the Government have the gun?
Col. Lewis. On one condition, and I think in view
of what I had gone through, I was justified in that.
It was only on the condition that the official test
would not be made at the Springfield Armory.
Senator Hitchcock. You mean that there was no
royalty to be allowed?
Col. Lewis. So far as my interest was concerned.
This gun, Senator, you will understand, has been de-
veloped under very discouraging circumstances. I
not a wealthy man. I was a poor man with a
family.
TJtr CJiainnati. What other interests were in-
volved besides yourself?
Col. L The present stockholders, the owners
of the Automatic Arms Company. They gave tho
al to develop my gun when I was not able to
do it.
116 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD
WAR
The Chairman. Had they made offers as to what
they would charge?
Col. Lewis. They did not get that far. The offer
was not considered. The gun was not accepted for
further test. It was not considered. It was turned
down flat. (Page 702.)
Col. Lewis. I retired from active service five
years ago, discouraged and disappointed. I went
to Europe and expected to live in Europe. I played
a lone hand in Europe. I did not have any friends.
I had very little money back of me. A little group
of Belgian bankers had bought the rights of the
Lewis gun for Europe. The man at the head
of that group closed a deal by which he purchased
the European rights after seeing a single gun fired
at a target from an aeroplane.
Senator Hitchcock. What year was that?
Col. Lewis. That was the fall of 1912. I think it
was in November, 1912.
I would like to state at this time what occurred
in Washington in August of 1912, a month or two
before that. I left here in January, 1913. I did
not go to Europe until I had given up all hope
of having any chance to develop the Lewis gun in
America. I had four guns made without expense
to the Government of the United States. They
were good guns. They fired American ammuni-
tion. They were ready for any test. As the events
afterwards developed, they were successful enough
to be adopted in the countries of Europe. Two of
those guns were offered to the United States Signal
as
MACH1M-: <;r\S 117
Corps free and without any question of price. They
were offered for test during the time of the maneu-
vers in Connecticut in that year. General Allen was
then the Chief Signal Officer. I was called up by
a long-distance telephone in New York and was
asked if I would permit the Signal Corps to have
two guns for use during the maneuvers. I told
them that I would be glad to do it. I would be glad
urnish even the pilot, as my son had offered
>T vices, if he could be of any service, in shooting
mm from an aeroplane. The Lewis gun was the
first one so used. It was fired out here at Col-
lege Park, near Washington. That was the first
shot ever fired from an aeroplane.
I came on to Washington. I supposed they would
expect me over here.
In that connection, I would like to read a letter
from the Acting Chief Signal Officer to me a few
days later. It was one of the factors that decided
me in going to Europe. This letter is dated * i Office
of the Chief Signal Officer, August 12, 1912." It
is addressed to "My dear Col. Lewis, " and reads
follows (reading) :
August 2, 1912.
MY DEAR COL. LEWIS:
I spent a good part of the morning a day or
UK<> endeavoring to straighten out the matter
ot the use of your gun during the maneuvers and
have seen Gen. Wood and Gen. Crozier on the sub-
The latter has entered what amounts to a
protest against the use of the gun during the ma-
neuvers by the Signal Corps of the Army.
Of course, these maneuvers are official, and it is
118 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
presumed that this protest must be considered as
final. The ordnance gun will be tried. I regret
that your gun cannot be officially tested and used.
General Wood, in an official paper written by me
after I had my personal conversation with him, of
which I wrote you, has put the following indorse-
ment, as I air. told, though the paper has not yet
come into this office:
"The whole matter of the test of this gun is now
under consideration.
" Until the matter is settled, it is not believed any
official action should be taken."
This bars the use of the gun at the maneuvers,
but I am informed by the Chief of Staff that any
unofficial use of the gun with the militia or not
during actual maneuvers or at College Park will
probably not be objectionable.
Very truly yours,
GEOKGE P. SCRIVEN.
The protest that is referred to in that letter took
the shape of a declination on the part of Gen. Crozier
to furnish American ammunition to fire in the ?un.
When it was put in that shape, I refused to purchase
the ammunition. I thought that if I furnished the
gun and the aviator they might furnish the ammuni-
tion. I ask you, gentlemen, if after receiving a
letter like that in response to your offer you would
have urged it any further.
Senator New. What was the indorsement upon
that?
Col. Lewis. That is a letter written by Gen.
Scriven, who is still living. He succeeded Gen.
Allen as Chief Signal Officer. This was in 1912.
(Page 706.)
MACHINE GUNS ii<)
Senator Wadsicortli. In the tests which resulted
in the Birmingham contract, was American ammuni-
tion used?
Col. Lewis. Yes, sir; I had the British ammuni-
tion later because the gun was going to the British
We used Kussian ammunition in the
Russian service and Belgian ammunition in the Bel-
gian service. We have been doing that for years.
We an- now delivering 300 Lewis guns every
week to aeroplanes crossing the English Channel.
That brings me to the point as to this question of
making all the output of the factory of the aeroplane
type. I will tell you what we are doing in Birming-
ham. They are making 300 a week for the aero-
planes and 1,300 a week for trench purposes. Both
arried on together. The reason it is not done
here is that they want to kill the Lewis gun.
Tie Chairman. Why do they want to do that?
Col. Leu-is. They want to take the label off of
it. The Lewis label will stick to the Lewis gun
as long as Lewis is alive.
Senator Hitchcock. It has been emphasized here
that parts of the Lewis gun broke in its test in May,
1913.
Col Lcu-i*. I am glad that you touched upon that
point. I will tell you why the gun did not do well.
That gun was made in England. It was made to
an ammunition by our British company.
Remember, T had taken two guns over there. They
had to be dismantled. The test at Springfield, in
1913, was with the last gun entered. In that test
th- guns were entered over my protest and against
120 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
,,
sin
judgment and in spite of my personal protests.
I did not want to send the guns up for the tests.
It was put up to me by my associates that I should
do it.
Senator Hitchcock. I thought you were anxious
to have the Government use the gun and to have
it tested.
Col. Lewis. Not at that time, I was not.
Senator Hitchcock. Then, there was some
rant for Gen. Crozier's statement that at the tests
1913 that individual gun did not behave very well?
Col. Lewis. Do you mean that the parts broke?
Senator Hitchcock. Yes.
Col. Lewis. So did every other gun tested at
the same time. Every gun tested at the same time
broke.
Senator Hitchcock. Was there not some admis-
sion of that character made some official admis-
sion?
Col. Lewis. I beg your pardon?
The Chairman. You had to confess that it did
not meet the requirements.
Col. Lewis. There was no confessing it. There
is no use confessing such a thing when the broken
parts are before you.
The Chairman. That is not the question.
Senator Hitchcock. I am asking you whether you {]
know that any one had made that admission or not?
The Chairman. Yes. The admission, in sub-
stance, was that there had been a fair test and that
the Lewis gun did not come up to the test shown by
the other guns.
MACIIINK GUNS 1*21
Senator Hitchcock. That was the 1917 test?
s. No, sir; that was 1916.
nator Hitchcock. Let us see the letter, if you
have it there.
Col. Lewis. I misunderstood you, Senator.
Senator Hitchcock. It has been stated to this
committee that you were given a test, or several
tests.
Col. Leivis. At Springfield, yes.
Senator Hitchcock. And that the tests were not
-atiM'actory and that your company, or somebody
connected with the company, admitted that the guns
v not satisfactory.
Col. Lewis. As I told you, the guns that we sent
for that test in 1913 were the first two guns
made by the Birmingham Small Arms Company.
as a time limit ; the guns had to be here at
md if we did not send them here they
could not be entered in official tests. We had never
made an American gun over there. We were then
making the British inms.
Tin' Chairman. And for British ammunition!
Col. Lririfi. For British ammunition, yes. At that
time we hurried with the two guns and converted
liicin so they would l>e able to fire American ammu-
n, and tin- ,iz:uiis were sent over here without
Ticicntly exhaustive firing test in England. We
admit that.
S( i .'filchcock. Who notified you to come for
it test?
Col. Lewis. My a- Mr. Calfee, arrai
.22 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
that with Gen. Crozier, if I am not mistaken, very
much against my judgment.
Senator Hitchcock. So Gen. Crozier did give you
an opportunity to present your gun for test in 1913
and again in 1916!
Col. Lewis. Oh, no. I have been abroad since
then.
Senator Hitchcock. But Gen. Crozier gave you
opportunity to have the Lewis gun tested on those
two occasions?
Col. Lewis. The first test. I am not sure about
the other test, because I have not been here. My
son represented me at the test in 1913, because he
wanted to see the guns. I was fearful that they
would not behave well, as they had not been tested
at home. My son went before the board, and he
had a very hard time because of the fact that many
parts of the gun broke in that test, but still the
gun fired 20,000 rounds of American ammunition in
a very short length of time, notwithstanding Ihe
breaking.
Senator Hitchcock. At that time was your fac-
tory in Great Britain turning out any considerable
number of guns?
Col. Lewis. No ; we had not then turned out our
first British gun at that time. These were the first
two guns made the first two guns that the Birming-
ham Small Arms Company had made and they
were not properly made. The material was not
properly tempered.
Senator Hitchcock. When was it that the factory
in Birmingham began the output of the guns?
MACIIIM: GUNS
Col. Leici*. On a large scale our first inter-
changeable .miiis were delivered to the British Gov-
ernment under contract in 1914. I think it was
in November, if I am not mistaken. I think war
was declared on the 3d of August, and we did not
get real deliveries of these interchangeable guns
under our contract with the British Government,
although we had been working eighteen months at it,
until November of 1914. I am quite sure, Senator.
nator Hitchcock. Prior to 1913 you were not
in shape to offer guns to Gen. Crozier, were you?
Col. L< wis. What do you mean?
Senator Hitchcock. You had no factories estab-
lished?
Col. Lewis. No; certainly not. I had not the
money to establish a factory.
Senator Hitchcock. And when the test was made
\ our first output of the British factory it was
premature ?
Col. Lewis. Very much so, and against my judg-
ment.
Senator Hitchcock. And it failed on that occa-
sion?
Col L Simply on account of certain break-
age of smaller parts, utterly minor parts, which did
not affect the design of the gun. The design to-day
is just as ii was then, no better and no worse.
Senator Hitchcock. Would you consider the test
lilure?
Col. I. Certainly not. I have been wit-
nessing government tests for nearly forty years,
Senator.
124 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
What other guns were tested
Senator Hitchcock.
in 1913!
Col. Lewis. The Coventry gun, the Vickers gun,
the Madsden gun, and the Benet-Mercie, I think,
were tested at that time. (Page 710.) . . .
Senator Hitchcock. At the time Gen. Wood was
Chief of Staff did you make an effort to go over
the head of Gen. Crozier to the Chief of Staff?
Col. Lewis. I did. I went personally to him and
offered him my gun.
Senator Hitchcock. What was the attitude there?
Col. Lewis. They had a meeting of the board.
They were both members of the Board of Ordnance
and Fortifications. Gen. Wood, who was the senior
member of the board, was absent, and that made
Gen. Crozier ex officio president of the board in his
absence. When the matter came up Gen. Wood
was detained on other business, and Gen. Cro2,ier,
being ex officio president of the board, turned it
down.
Senator Hitchcock. And you were unable to get
any one to overrule Gen. Crozier?
Col. Lewis. Oh, no. He is absolutely autocratic,
Gen. Crozier. You gentlemen year after year have
been hearing Gen. Crozier 's testimony in regard to
the ordnance conditions in the country, and you can
judge better the representations he has made than
I can.
The Chairman. May I ask you in a general way
what is the trouble with the Ordnance Department?
You are an old Ordnance officer?
i]
MACHINE GUNS 125
Col. Lewis. No ; I am an Artillery man. I belong
to the fighting branch.
Senator Hitchcock. \Ye have inferred that,
Colonel.
Col. Lewis. I am still fighting. I am sixty years
old, but I am still in the ring.
Senator McKellar. That is plainly evident.
The Chairman. What is the trouble there! If
there has been a fall down in this emergency, where
is the trouble and what is the trouble?
CoL Lewis. It is primarily at the present time
with the man who is Chief of Ordnance. There has
not been a new idea or a new development in ord-
nance in America in fifteen years. We haven't a
new gun to-day in our coast fortifications ; that is,
new within fifteen years.
The Chairman. Are the methods at fault?
Col. L It is not so much Crozier as it is
Crozierism that is at fault. That is what this coun-
t ry is suffering from.
The Chairman. Has he developed the Ord-
nance Department under this present system and
method
CoL Lewis (interrupting). Certainly. It is a
<me-man machine, Senator.
n* Chairman. How long has he been connected
with it?
Col. Li lei*. Fiftrcn yrars I think, sixteen years.
I think lie lias been ('lin-l' <>f Ordnance sixteen years.
Tl /man. As a matter of fact, is not the
in about as it was before he went in?
<)h, yes. It was the same thing
126 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
under his predecessor. I had the same trouble
under his predecessor, also.
The Chairman. That is what I am getting at.
Col. Lewis. It is the system, Senator.
The Chairman. It is not the man; it is the
system?
Col. Lewis. In my particular case it is the
man. The head of a great bureau has simply used
his office as a vehicle for personal malice and envy
toward a man who is not in the ring. I have been
invited to join the ring, Senator, so I know there
is one.
Senator Weeks. What do you mean by the
"ring," Colonel? Just a moment before you an-
swer that question. I think you are talking in a
very desultory way and not accurately. You are
pretty loquacious. Get right down to facts, and
answer the question directly, and tell us what you
mean by the ring.
Col. Lewis. If I could tell you the system that
has controlled the production of ordnance, the de-
sign of ordnance, and the purchase of ordnance,
and supply of arms and ammunition ever since I
have been in the service and I have had active con-
tact with it for nearly thirty-eight years
Senator Weeks. Do you mean to say there is any-
thing dishonest about it?
Col. Lewis. No. I am not saying there is any
pecuniary graft. There are many kinds of graft in
this world besides money graft, Senator.
Senator Weeks. What kind of graft do you
mean?
MACHIM: GUNS
Is. Tt is tlio same thing as in politics,
A man who is loyal to his party at the ex-
: l he State is, to my niindj exactly analogous
he man who is loyal to a bureau chief at the
of his country. That is what I mean by
a ring.
Senator Weeks. Let us commence with the bu-
; (hid'. In ^hat respect is he at the head of
a ring!
( '"/. Lfiri.s. He is it.
>tator TIVvA-x. Assuming that he is it. Is not
he following his judgment!
Cot. L' wis. Why, presumably so; yes.
Sena f <>i W< < -Its. Then your charge reduces it-
self to the fact that he is inefficient?
Col. Lewis. Oh, it is hopelessly inefficient under
our present bureau system.
'or Weeks. Anything else!
Prejudice, do you mean? Profes-
sional prejudice; yes.
/ Weeks. That would be included in in-
efnVi. ncv.
s. Inefficiency, yes. I certainly do not
iih-aii corruption.
Sena for Week.-. You mean to say that everybody
in thr Ordnance service is ineiTicient?
Col. /.< wis. No; I do not say that.
Senator TI You said a moment ago
Col. /. wis. There are still good men
iid there had not been an
! developed in this country for fifteen
lit ago.
128 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
Col. Lewis. I mean in the broad view of ordnance
that is true.
Senator Weeks. You mean to say there is not
an efficient man in the Ordnance Bureau?
Col. Lewis. A man may be efficient in his limita-
tions and not be an expert, Senator. There are lots
of good, conscientious and efficient men that are not
experts. (Page 711.) . . .
Senator Frelinghuysen. Col. Lewis^ in August of
1912, who was the Chief of Staff!
Col. Lewis. I think Gen. Wood was Chief of
Staff.
Senator FrelingJtuysen. Did he not practically
govern the policy of the Ordnance Department at
that time?
Col. Lewis. No. The Chief of Staff does not
govern its policy now, Senator.
Senator Frelinghuysen. Who governs it?
Col. Lewis. The Secretary of War, if it has any
government.
Senator Frelinghuysen. Who was the Secretary
of War in August, 1912?
Col. Lewis. I have been away so many years that
I do not remember ; but I think it was Mr. Stimson.
I can say that Gen. Wood has been very favorably
disposed toward the Lewis gun and has been very
much in favor of its adoption, Senator.
Senator FrelingTiuysen. Was he at that time?
Col. Lewis. Yes; very much so.
Senator Hitchcock. Do you attribute the failure
on the part of the Army to adopt and use your gun
to the constant opposition of Gen. Crozier?
III\i;
Col. Lewis. To him and his immediate coterie in
the Ordnance Department.
Senator Hitchcock. Can you name other officers?
Col. Lewis. Senator, I do not want to do any
injustice to any younger officers. That is a one-man
bureau, and 1 think one man ought to bear the brunt
It (Tage 733.) . . .
Senator Neiv. Col. Lewis, you feel, then, sum-
ming it up here, that if the United States Govern-
ment, through its Ordnance Department, had viewed
the Lewis gun from the same friendly standpoint
that it did the Browning gun, when it was originally
introduced for its inspection, that the Lewis gun
would have been accepted on its merits!
Col. Lewis. There would have been no Browning
gun.
Senator Neiv. There would not have been any
Browning gun!
Col. Lewis. No, sir.
Senator McKdlar. And you also think the
l'n i ted States Government would be better supplied
with machine guns if it had adopted your gun, of
course?
Col. Lewis. I certainly do, and a very much
larger number of them. I might say among the let-
ached to my letter inclosed to the Secretary
on will find a letter of October 16th, addressed to
ident of the Machine Gun Board, in which
I oft produce a light gun, such as the Brown-
ig is; I offered to come back to give up my Euro-
an work to eome back to the United States to de-
elop that gun at my own expense and I would
130 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
present it to the Government without any compensa-
tion, direct or indirect, in any shape.
Senator New. You made such an offer as that
in October, 1916?
Col. Lewis. Yes, sir; I can read the letter.
Senator New. Is that letter in the record? I
think it ought to go in the record.
Col. Lewis. Col. Lewis had made machine guns,
and Mr. Browning has not. Now, Mr. Browning is
a great inventor, a great pistol and rifle inventor,
but he never has made a machine gun. I offered to
do it for nothing ; I would have been glad to ; I think
it would have been as good a gun as the Browning,
perhaps naturally, I think so it certainly would
not have cost the Government $1,250,000.
Senator FrelingJiuysen. Did the Ordnance De-
partment inform you that they would accept for test
the Lewis gun rechambered to Springfield ammuni-
tion?
Col. Lewis. They never informed me, Senator,
I was on the other side. I had nothing whatever to
do with those tests ; I did not even know of them.
Senator FrelingJiuysen. How was that test
brought about the reopening of the negotiations?
Col. Lewis. I think the Savage Arms Company
Mr. Borie, did you not take that up with the Sav-
age Arms Company?
Mr. Borie. Yes, all those questions came up with
us.
Senator Frelinghwysen. What I am trying to de-
velop, Mr. Borie, is this : That either through preju-
MACIIIM: Gl NS
lice or tor scientific reasons the Ordnance Depart-
objected to tin* use of the Lewis gun, and there
itfl made from August, 1912, until we en-
1 this war, and the Lewis gun was not in us*'.
Mr. I-inric. There was a test made in 1913, before
I had anything to do witli the gun.
'////// ui/*' i'. Nevertheless it was not
i it rd at that time?
Mr. Hurie. Xo, sir; and in 1916 there was a
made, in which T was interested, but then
the L;im was not adopted. Then, as I recited this
morning, tho Ordnance Department bought 350 of
English guns, and then the Secretary of Wai-
took th- matter of the machine-gun controversy out
the hands of the Ordnance Department and ap-
pointed this machine-gun board, consisting of nine
from all branches of the service. That was
lather an acrimonious correspondence be-
n ( .'en. Cro/ier and myself, on which we insisted
that the M-nn 1 i a fair test, not an armory
or laboratory test, and suggested that a board com-
d of all branches of the service, including the
Xavy, should be appointed to pass on the gun. The
machine-trim board met in the fall of 1916 and re-
r hearing from Mr. Han-
for instance, whose letter I quoted as to
10 enormous capacity of the Colt works, they or-
lered ' - guns, and they set May 1, 1917,
11 liirht machine guns. Then we
;ir. and T told you the rest of the
'he Lewis machine
132 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
gun tested for the Springfield ammunition our am-
munition by the Ordnance Department?
Mr. Borie. In 1916 we gave this partial test at
Springfield ; it was not satisfactory.
Mr. FrelingJiuysen. Was it accepted?
Mr. Borie. No, sir; the recommendation of the
board was that the machine gun I think we have
got the record somewhere here in the opinion of
the board, it was not satisfactory for our service
arm, but that in the opinion of the board the Savage
Arms Company should continue to develop the gun,
in the expectation that it would prove satisfactory.
Was that not about the gist of it, Mr. Calf ee ; was
not that the gist of the report of the 1916 test? You
have got it in your records there. But the Lewis
gun was not accepted by the United States Govern-
ment as a standard arm until after the Winthrop
test for the Navy, and then the other test at the
Springfield Armory.
Senator Hitchcock. Then you received an order
for 1,300?
Mr. Borie. From the Army, and 3,500 from the
Navy.
Senator Hitchcock. And subsequent to that you
have received an order for
Mr. Borie. Well, those orders I gave you 2,000,
4,400 and 12,000; then 22,000.
Senator FrelingJiuysen. Has the Lewis gun ever
been officially adopted by the Ordnance Depart-
ment?
Mr. Borie. It has been adopted as the service
arm.
MACIIIM: (,r\s
Col. Lewis. Yes, sir ; it has been since last May.
(Page 740.) . . .
It appears from this testimony and the preceding
narrative (page 79) that when the Lewis gun was
first officially offered to the Government for test
it was offered with a string to it; that the test
should not be of the kind to which military inven-
tions arc usually subjected by the agencies main-
tained by the Government for the purpose, but
should be of a particular kind, by another agency,
proposal by the commercial company presenting
tin- gun. The Board of Ordnance and Fortification,
tatutory board for considering and testing in-
ventions, composed of the Chief of Staff, an officer
of K n Lrii iccrs, an officer of Ordnance, three officers
of Artillery and a civilian, did not turn the gun
down in the absence of Gen. "Wood as testified by
Col. Lewis, but offered a test in which the usual
procedure would be followed, and which would
include the kind of test which those presenting the
gun desired. The proceedings of the board setting
h this action were signed by Gen. Wood, as
presiding officer when they were taken.
In the same month in which the test was offered
by the board, July, 1!)li_\ occurred the incident re-
CoL L-wis of a proposed test of the
run in firin- from an aeroplane, by the
Signal Corps. nal Corps was not the agency
for making tests of machine iruns, had no experts or
litiea For doinir so, and undoubtedly wished only
to test th" firing of a machine ^un from an aero-
134 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
plane. The matter is explained by the following
correspondence between the Acting Chief Signal
Officer and myself:
37819/392.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,
Washington, July 17, 1912.
CHIEF OF ORDNANCE, UNITED STATES ARMY.
Sir:
I have the honor to state that it is contem-
plated trying the Lewis gun with the aeroplanes
during the coming maneuvers to be held in the vicin-
ity of New York, N. Y., in August next, and it is
requested that 5,000 rounds of ammunition for the
service rifle be issued to the Signal Corps for the
purpose.
If it is considered necessary, reimbursement can
be made by transfer of funds from appropriation
Signal Service of the Army, 1913.
Very respectfully,
GEORGE P. SCRIVEN,
Colonel, Signal Corps, U. S. Army,
in charge of Office.
37819/396
WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE,
Washington, July 27, 1912.
THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER, U. S. ARMY.
Sir:
1. Replying to letter from your office, dated
17th instant (0. 0. 37819/392), in regard to the sup-
ply of five thousand rounds of ammunition for the
purpose of trying a Lewis gun with aeroplanes
during the maneuvers to be held next month in the
MACHINE GT\- 135
vicinity of New York City, I have the honor to in-
form you that this Department would not be author-
ized to supply ammunition for the trial of a gun
not under test with reference to its adoption in
the service, and that the representatives of the
Lewis gun have not accepted the offer of the Board
of Ordnance and Fortification to test their gun with
reference to that cbject.
2. I will be glad, however, to furnish the Signal
Department with an automatic rifle of the present
service type, which weighs about 22 pounds; to fit
it to an aeroplane, or to furnish the appliances for
doing so, and to supply a suitable number of rounds
of ammunition, without expense to the appropria-
tions of the Signal Corps, for such test as you may
desire to make with them.
3. Of course, this Department will be glad to fur-
nish any number of rounds to the Signal Depart-
ment, at the expense of the appropriations of your
Department, without question as to the purpose for
which you may desire them.
Respectfully,
WILLIAM CROZIER,
Brig. -Gen., Chief of Ordnance, U. 8. A.
It is seen from these letters that I was willing to
furnish ammunition at the expense of the Signal
Corps' appropriations for a test of the Lewis or
any other gun, but the Acting Chief Signal Officer
was governed by the view of the Chief of Staff
quoted in the former's letter to Col. Lewis, that
"The whole matter of the tost of this gun is now
under consideration. Until the matter is settled, it
is not believed any official action should be taken."
It was after his failure to secure this (fna*i tost,
as a side issue to a trial of machine gun fire from
136 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
an aeroplane, while there was still pending a definite
offer to give his gun the usual test including one of
his own kind, that Col. Lewis testifies that he retired
from active service, discouraged and disappointed,
and went to Europe to look after the manufacture
of his gun after the European rights therein had
been bought by a group of Belgian bankers. It is
evident that he did not retire and go abroad because
of refusal to consider and test his gun, but in order
that he might command all of his time to exploit
it for profit, while under pension by his Govern-
ment.
In the following spring, 1913, the Automatic Arms
Company, not having taken up the offer of the pre-
ceding July to test a Lewis gun, came forward again
with a proposal that a gun be tested. The proposal
was accepted; the usual procedure of convening a
board to conduct the test was followed, and the gun
was tested, together with several other types, in
the following September. This was the first test
made by the United States Government of a Lewis
gun, and it failed by malfunction and the breakage
of parts. (See page 81, and the testimony of
Col. Lewis quoted above.) The claim in behalf of
the gun that the failure was due to poor manu-
facture and defective material may very well have
been true. Neither the Ordnance Department nor
the Board of Ordnance and Fortification ever found
any fault with the principles of construction of the
Lewis gun; but from the beginning, and after each
failure, offered to make further tests of the gun if
and when it should be desired.
MAC HIM; GUNS 137
From the preceding narrative (page 82) it ap-
pears that no i'urther proposition to test the gun
was made until the Ordnance Department itself
brought up the subject, in September, 1915, by ask-
ing the Savage Arms Company to present a gun for
: that company having taken up the manufacture
for the Canadian army. Then it was not until April,
1916, seven months afterward, that a gun was pre-
sented and a test held, with the poor result stated.
This was the last official test under the War De-
partment before the one of April, 1917, under the
Navy Department, which was the first at which
the gun performed well, after many changes in it,
and after which it was accepted and large orders
were given by the Ordnance Department for its
manufacture. But in the early part of June, 1916,
a comparative test of the Lewis and the Benet-
]\I< r i mins was held at Plattsburg by a board con-
vened by verbal order of Gen. Leonard Wood from
among his own officers. The Lewis gun used in the
test was one made by the Savage Arms Company to
use British ammunition, and was reported by the
board to have performed excellently in the test,
while the Benet-Mercie performed very badly.
Import of the test was not made to the War Depart-
ment by Gen. Wood until over a month afterward,
in a letter of July 29th ; but a copy of the report
of the board was furnished the Savage Arms Com-
pany, and the company sent a copy to the Secretary
of' \Var on June 21Mh. T iv^-ived my first informa-
tion ol' the test Hi rough the com; nd in reply
said, among other thino-s: "I hope that this last
138 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
performance indicates that progress has been made
in overcoming such defects as previous tests have
shown, and that the gun in which this Government
is now investing a considerable sum has reached a
stage in which it can be relied upon to render first
class service. " The immediately subsequent per-
formance of the gun on the Mexican border, how-
ever, which has been previously described (page
88), showed that as made in this country it had
not yet reached a reliable stage; while the Platts-
burg test itself was inconclusive in that less than
2,000 rounds were fired from the gun as against
20,000 or more required for a proper test, which
should include at least 15,000 rounds for endurance.
Notwithstanding the failures to get a performance
from the Lewis gun, with either English or Ameri-
can ammunition, which would justify its adoption
for the service I realized that the continued use of
the gun by the English in the war, and the absence
of effort on their part to replace it with another
model, raised a presumption that it ought to te
possible to manufacture it to give good service in
this country. It was apparent, of course, that the
American model was not the same as the English
one; and also the English use of the gun afforded
no comparison between it and the Benet-Mercie, the
former service gun, which had been declared to be
its superior by every board, except the Plattsburg
one, which had considered both, and which is still
the British model for the cavalry and for tanks.
The Benet-Mercie, however, had been superseded in
the United States by the Vickers; the manufacture
MAC HIM: GUNS 139
of it here had ceased and the manufacturing equip-
ment had been dissipated; and, besides, the need for
an additional type lighter than the Vickers had ap-
peared. I, therefore, as related on page 97, made
the recommendation designed to afford two and a
half months from the middle of August, 1916, for
the perfection and presentation for further test of
a Lewis gun or any other, and reserving $6,000,000
for investment in the light of the test. The board
appointed by the Secretary of War, however, re-
served only $1,500,000, and this sum was invested
in it after the test of April, 1917, had shown it to
be fit for purchase.
Col. Lewis' charge of prejudice and unfair treat-
ment for himself and his gun is accentuated by
statements from him to the effect that the refusal to
consider his gun for test was in the face of an
offer on his part, alleged to have been repeatedly
made, to give the free use of the gun to the Gov-
ernment, without any payment of royalty to himself
as the inventor. These statements were spread
widely through the press, and are repeated in his
testimony before the Senate Military Committee, as
folio
Col. Lcu-is. I wanted to submit the gun un-
reservedly for the use of my Government, giving
up all rights of whatever nature in the invention.
... I repeat, that I offered to give my gun to the
Government. T made the offer to the Chief of Staff
in 1 Dli2. Krri I made tin- offer in 1D11 and then
again in 191:2. T also told the pro- -retary
of War, in his own office, in June, 1916, when I
140 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
was over here from Europe for a few weeks, that
I had offered it, and then desired to make him a
present of my interest in the gun, the Lewis gun,
without any emolument whatever. None of my
offers has been accepted, and the peculiar thing is
that even the fact of the offers having been made
has been denied. That is the puzzling thing to me.
Senator Weeks. Were they ever made in the
presence of witnesses?
Col. Lewis. I think there are two or three officers
still in the War Department who know about it.
There is an official statement of the Chief of Staff
and the president of the Board of Ordnance and
Fortifications that I did make the offer.
Senator Hitchcock. Who was Chief of Staff when
you originally made the offer?
Col. Lewis. Gen. Wood.
Senator Hitchcock. WTio was Chief of Ord-
nance?
Col. Lewis. Gen. Crozier.
Senator Weeks. Those offers were not made in
writing?
Col. Lewis. The original offer was not made in
writing.
Senator Weeks. Who were present when you
made these different offers?
Col. Lewis. Gen. Wood, Gen. Weaver, and Col.
Kilbourn. There were one or two other officers on
duty. I could probably verify my recollection. It
was a matter of common knowledge. (Page 701.)
Col. Lewis. I would like to have permission to
read to the committee a letter which I have here,
MACIIIM-; GUNS
in order that this question may never be the subject
of controversy again. It is a letter to the Secretary
of War under date of December 11, 1917. I have
made one final effort to divorce my personal pe-
cuniary interest from the Lewis gun.
December 11, 1917.
THE SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
In accordance with the understanding reached
during our very frank talks at your office in Wash-
ington on Friday and Saturday last, I beg to submit
the following:
1. I now r believe, and have believed since our first
conference in June, 1916, that you have intended
to act fairly and with exact justice toward me in
all matters relating to the Lewis machine-gun con-
troversy. It is a fact, however, that acting upon
incomplete information and very complete misin-
formation furnished you by others, you did me seri-
ous injustice in the authorized issue of the official
~ress Bulletin Xo. Ill, of October 28, 1916; in the
interviews relative to the subject-matter of that
bulletin given by you at the time to representatives
of the public press of the country; and in your tes-
< ; mony before the Military Committees of the Sen-
te and House of Kepresentatives during the official
Hearings in January, 1917.
I accept without question your statement and as-
rance that the injustice was not intentional, and
understand it to be your intention at an early
te to right the wrong in some suitable public
manner.
J. therefore rni<-\v in the most definite and posi-
tive terms possiMe under the changed conditions,
the offers I made to the AYar Department in 1911
142 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD
and again in 1912, through the Chief of Staff and
the president of the Board of Ordnance and Forti-
fication.
3. At the present time approximately 40,000
Lewis machine guns, together with a large number
of spare parts and necessaries, remain undelivered
on the orders already placed by the War Depart-
ment. My share of the total royalty to be paid to
the manufacturers under the present license agree-
ments on these 40,000 guns and spare parts would
amount to approximately $2,500,000, and the very
large additional orders for Lewis guns and spare
parts which will undoubtedly be placed by the War
Department would still further add to the royalty
payments legally and equitably due me in the future.
I now offer to turn over to the Treasury of the
United States, as and when due me under existing
contract agreements, all of my part of such royalty
payments, and upon the acknowledgment and ac-
ceptance of this offer by you I will duly execute all
necessary and proper instruments to carry out this
offer, in order that there may be paid into the Treas-
ury of the United States instead of to me all of my
share of the above-mentioned royalty payments. It
is definitely understood and intended by me that
from and after January 1, 1918, provided this offer
is accepted by that date, I shall receive no compensa-
tion whatever, direct or indirect, as royalty or other-
wise, for any Lewis machine gun or component part
or accessory thereof, that may thereafter be manu-
factured by, for, or sold to the Government of the
United States for its own use and benefit.
4. The Lewis machine gun is no longer a new and
untried weapon. It has successfully met every mili-
tary requirement under a grilling test of more than
three years of daily service on the battlefields of
Europe during this the greatest war in history.
M.\< HIM; GUNS
nty thousand Lewis guns have already <
siij)])lied to the fighting forces of the Allies in P^ng-
land, I'Yanee. Belgium, Italy, and Kussia, and our
Dries in Knidand, France and America are at
the j>re>ent time adding to the number already in
at the rate of approximately 2,000 guns
!>:. In the British tanks no\v doing such effec-
k on ti in front there are more than
li'.nnn Lewis iruns, no other type of machine gun
by the .British for tank service.
I may also properly add at this late date that of
i \\elve Zeppelins so far brought down by the
British ten were brought down by Lewis iuins alone.
."). In connection with my definite offer in para-
graph L' above, I beg to invite special attention to
the following letters now of record in the official
files of the War Department, namely:
(a) Lett ei- to me from the Adjutant General,
led July ](), 15)00.
(b) Letter to the Adjutant General, dated Octo-
ber -jo, 1900.
(c) Letter to Chief of Artillery, dated November
. ' 06.
(d) ! Military Secretary, dated Febru-
ry 19,1!
() Letter t<> President, Machine-^im Board,
dated October 111, IJMii.
r to Adjutant (Jem-nil, dated February
:.. 1917.
to Secretary of War, dated February
1C. 1!'
(h) Letter ! v of War, dated May 1'J,
\\hieh ! ;ire attached hereto.)
'vanf,
I. V. I
Colour!. f'Hlfffl Sfntfs Ann >i. /'
144 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
I would like to state to the committee that my
share in this company is forty-three per cent. There-
fore, any arrangement now made with the Govern-
ment by the Automatic Arms Company will reduce
the amount paid by the Government automatically
by forty-three per cent.
The Chairman. Those letters will go into the
record with the one that you have read.
Col. Lewis. All right.
Senator Hitchcock. Was this $2,500,000 which
you offered to the Government on existing contracts
practically carrying out your original offer?
Col. Lewis. Exactly. I do not want to receive,
directly or indirectly, one penny from any Lewis
gun that may be produced.
Senator Hitchcock. When did you make the
original off erf
Col. Lewis. First in 1911, and again in 1912.
Senator Hitchcock. And you have kept it eJive
ever since?
Col. Lewis. I beg your pardon?
Senator Hitchcock. You have kept at it ever
since ?
Col. Lewis. If you are interested in that I would
like to read you a letter forwarding a check for my
royalties on the three hundred and fifty-three guns
of the British, to which I was entitled. They were
made for Great Britain, and as soon as I received
the royalties I immediately forwarded a check for
the amount to the Secretary of War.
Senator Hitchcock. When was that done?
Col. Lewis. That letter was sent on the 16th day
i
-?
MAC 'HIM: (iUNS 145
of last February, after I returned from Europe.
Tho letter was never acknowledged, except that it
had been referred to the Adjutant General to decide
if lie would advise its acceptance, General Crozier
advised, in strong terms, that it be not accepted.
Chairman. It was sent back!
Col. Lncis. I wrote another letter insisting upon
the acceptance. Tin- letter is here with the corre-
spondei pt the reply of the Secretary of "War.
Senator Hitchcock-. Was the check finally ac-
Col. Lewis. It was accepted, but it was never
acknowledged. No government official ever acknowl-
edged receipt of it.
ator McKellar. "What is the amount?
Col. Lewis. It was made in two parts. One was
for approximately $11,000 directly due to the Gov-
ernment. The other was approximately $6,700 due
lie Automatic Arms Company, because I wanted
fund the entire amount. In all, it amounts to
aln. ut $17,000.
nator Hitchcock. Does the Automatic Arms
Company have a forty-eight per cent interest?
Col. J. I own forty-three per cent.
7. The Automatic Arms Com-
y owns fifty-seven per cent?
00 per cent : yes, sir.
Senator Hitchcock. Have you any interest in the
Automatic Arms Company?
. I have not. I still own my stork, but
I shall ii'-ver have any interest, so far as it relates
146 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
to the gun. I have fixed it up so that it may be paid
directly into the United States Treasury.
Senator Hitchcock. But you are a stockholder in
the Automatic Arms Company?
Col. Lewis. I am. I shall not profit to the extent
of one cent, however not one penny.
Senator Hitchcock. From this large order that
has been placed for the Lewis gun, the Automatic
Arms Company will pay a part of its dividend into
the Treasury, in addition to what you personally
pay?
Col. Lewis. All of my share I pay into the Treas-
ury. A proportionate part of my stock holding will
be paid directly into the Treasury of the United
States.
Senator McKellar. Why do you do that, Colonel
Lewis?
Col. Lewis. Well, that is rather a difficult ques-
tion to answer. I suppose it is a psychological affair.
Senator Hitchcock. Perhaps because you do not
need the money?
Col. Lewis. Senator, I do not need the money.
I have made every penny I possess. I have never
had a dollar given to me by anybody in this world.
Senator Weeks. The probabilities are that your
offer will be accepted after you have paid the excess-
profits tax.
Col. Lewis. And I shall still have to pay the in-
come tax.
Senator McKellar. I would like to know your
feelings as to why you turned this over to the
Government.
MACHINE GUNS 147
Col. Lewis. Well, Senator, I asked one of my
closest personal friends what he thought of it. He
told me this : He said it was a very handsome thing
to do ; that it was a very patriotic thing to do. But
I said, "That is not what you think. You think I
am a fool, don't you?" That is what he does
think to-day.
Senator McKellar. Your idea is that you ought
to help the Government along, having been an officer
of the Government.
Col. Lewis. Absolutely. I got my education at
the Government's expense. I have been persecuted
by the Government and therefore I want to pay it
back in good money give good money in return
for it. (Page 702.) . . .
Senator Hitclicock. "Was that check, for some-
thing over $300,000 that you sent to the War De-
partment
Col. Lewis. Pardon me, Senator, I did not have
$300,000 at that time ; it was only $11,000 the first
check and there was $6,700, approximately $17,000
in all, that I returned for the three hundred and fifty
English caliber guns that were furnished our troops
last summer that is, the summer of 1916.
Senator Hitchcock. Those were the only remit-
tances you have made to return your royalty to the
Treasury?
Col. Lewis. Yes, sir; I have waited for a year
to find out whether the checks were accepted.
Senator Hitclicock. They were finally accepted?
Col. Lewis. They were. If they had been accept-
ed it was fully my intention to have continued, and
148 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
every penny of royalty I received would have been
returned to the United States Government.
Senator Hitchcock. I understood you made a
written offer also to the War Department to return
a very large sum of money?
Col. Lewis. Absolutely, in writing. It is before
the Secretary now.
Senator Hitchcock. To cover your share of the
royalty on all the Lewis guns that had been ordered
already or might be ordered?
Col. Lewis. No, sir ; to take effect on the 1st day
of January, because I have felt I have gone to the
extent of my obligation as an officer and a gentle-
man, to return money to the United States Govern-
ment, inasmuch as I have never had a word of
acknowledgment; I have never had a word of ap-
preciation from my Government in the thirty-eight
years of my service, in any shape.
Senator McKellar. Do I understand you to say
they finally accepted your checks, but never wrote
you a letter saying
Col. Lewis. It was just a clerical oversight, only
I did not know the check had been accepted until
within ten days.
Senator McKellar. They never did write you,
saying they had accepted the money?
Col. Lewis. No, sir; not until the Secretary of
War told me so, himself. I was very much sur-
prised to know that it had been accepted. (Page
736.) . . .
Senator Hitchcock. You gave an estimate here,
MACHINE GUNS 149
as I recall it, as to the amount you would return
to the Treasury if it would be acceptable on the
present contract.
Col. Lewis. Contracts, as they actually exist,
about $2,500,000.
Senator Hitclicock. But that requires the affirma-
tive action of the Government to accept it?
Col. Lewis. As a matter of fact, Senator, I am
going to give it to them whether they accept it or
not. That is the point. I want to have it off my
conscience and my heart.
Senator Hitchcock. But you would like to have
some governmental acknowledgment?
Col. Lewis. Do you not think a postage stamp,
or, as the Government can frank its mail, they might
write me a letter acknowledging the receipt of it?
Senator Hitchcock. Has that letter been acknowl-
edged?
Col. Lewis. I must say, on behalf of the Secre-
tary of War, he has only had it a very short time,
because the only reason I delayed sending it after
writing it on the llth was because I was not sure
whether the War Industries Board of the Council
of National Defense would acknowledge I had any
rights of royalties at all, and I thought if I had
nothing to give I would not give it.
Senator Hitchcock. They have now acknowledged
it?
Col. Leivis. Yes, sir. All I wanted was an ac-
knowledgment I had some rights. I have forty-three
per cent of the royalties of the gun, and I give it
unconditionally and perpetually to tho "Tinted States
150 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
Government without any acknowledgment of any
kind.
Senator Hitchcock. Have yon any evidence that
General Crozier objected to you having the Gov-
ernment accept these other checks you sent?
Col. Lewis. I have a very remarkable indorse-
ment from General Crozier, sent to the Secretary of
War, that I do not think was intended to be sent to
me.
Senator Hitchcock. I should like to see that.
Col. Lewis. Senator, I would rather take out the
controversial matter.
Mr. Calfee. I will send that to you, Senator
Chamberlain, because I do not think that was ever
intended for Colonel Lewis to see.
Senator Hitchcock. What was the substance of
it?
Col. Lewis. I am perfectly willing to send it to
you and let you judge for yourself. There are state-
ments in that which are not true, if you want to
know the fact, over the official signature.
The Chairman. Indorsing the Government gun!
Col. Lewis. No, sir ; I never got such an indorse-
ment as that.
Senator Frelinghuysen. How long was that check
in the hands of the War Department!
Col. Lewis. I sent it the 16th day of February,
and I only heard last week it was accepted.
Senator Frelinghuysen. Have you the check?
Col. Lewis. I think I have the canceled check in
my pocketbook (producing check).
MACHIXI: (irxs 151
Senator Frelinghuysen. What is the date of the
indorsement or the depositing?
Col. Lewis. It is in July some time, but I have
never been notified. I will give you the canceled
check, the certified check, on the Corn Exchange
Bank, New York.
Senator Hitchcock. What I wanted to get at was
what evidence you had that General Crozier ever
really opposed accepting the check. You said quite
possibly ho did uphold it.
Col. Leivis. I will send you the indorsement.
Senator Hitchcock. I want it to go in the record
here.
Col. Leivis. There are other statements in that
indorsement I do not think were intended to come
to me, but I am perfectly willing you shall see it and
read it. I prefer that it not be made a part of a
public record.
Senator Hitchcock. The purport of the indorse-
ment was Crozier 's opposition to accepting the
check ?
Col. Lewis. Undoubtedly; that was the only in-
ference I could draw from it.
Senator Hitchcock. And it was from that in-
dorsement you infer he opposed accepting it.
Col. Leivis. Yes.
Senator McK filar. You will furnish it to the
stenographer, so that he can put it in the record,
will you!
Col. Lewis. I would prefer not to put that in the
record.
152 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
The Chairman. It came to you through regular
channels, did it not f
Col. Lewis. Yes ; sent by the Secretary of War.
Senator McKellar. Why not put it in?
Senator FrelingJiuysen. Will you trace, for the
benefit of the committee, the routine that that check
has gone through ! I mean when it was paid ?
Col. Lewis. The last indorsement, I think, was
June, 1914. (Page 738.)
General Wood had confirmed Colonel Lewis' state-
ments as to the free offer of his gun, in a letter of
September 19, 1916, to the Adjutant General, in the
following words :
" Colonel Lewis did offer the gun to the United
States Government free of all charge, not only
offered it but said he hoped the Government would
take it as he believed it was a good gun. He also
said that he did not want to profit in any way from
it as far as the use of it by the United States was
concerned. This offer was made to me in my official
capacity as Chief of Staff and led to an informal
test of the gun at Fort Myer. General Crozier was
present at this test, as was the then Secretary of
War. Colonel Lewis was most anxious that the
United States should have free use of his gun."
The offer referred to could not have been any-
thing more than a statement of intention, which
was not carried out, for it was not made in writing,
was not followed by any piece of writing nor by any
other act which would make the offer binding, and
when the subject was presented to the Board of
Ordnance and Fortification it was by a commercial
company, as a commercial matter, with no mention
MACHINE GUNS 153
of any concession to the Government by reason of
the gun having been invented by an officer of the
Army. Neither Colonel Lewis nor General Wood
ever said anything to the Chief of Ordnance or the
Board of Ordnance and Fortification about a free
offer of the gun, although General Wood afterward
took part in the proceedings of the board, as presi-
dent, in considering the gun. General Weaver, men-
tioned by Colonel Lewis as a witness of his offer to
General Wood, was also a member of the Board of
Ordnance and Fortification, and never mentioned
to the board the free offer when the subject of the
gun and the terms for which it was actually offered
to the board were under discussion. If, therefore,
the offer was " turned down flat," as stated by
Colonel Lewis, it must have been turned down by
General Wood, the friend of Col. Lewis and of the
gun, for he was the only one in authority who knew
anything about it and he kept the knowledge to
himself.
In an effort to substantiate the charge of preju-
dice upon my part against himself and his inven-
tions, Colonel Lewis gave the following testimony
before the Senate Military Committee:
Senator Frelinghuysen. Do you feel that General
Crozier's position is due to prejudice?
Col. Lewis. Oh, certainly.
Senator Frelinghuysen. Is it personal or pro-
fessional ?
Col. Lewis. I think it is both personal and pro-
fessional.
ator Frelinghuysen. Why is it personal?
154 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
Col. Lewis. It is personal simply because I, as
an officer when I entered the Department and since,
have made many inventions. Many of my inven-
tions are now in the service of the United States,
and in each case, so far as I recall, the introduction
of these things into actual service has been over the
opposition of the Ordnance Bureau.
Senator Frelingliuysen. What inventions are
they?
Col. Lewis. The one that the Government is using
to the greatest extent is the range and position
finder. They have adopted the Lewis range and
position finder throughout the coast fortifications,
and in the number of letters I submitted to you is
my letter giving the development of the instrument,
its offer to the Government without any royalty or
pay. It is my presentation to the Government.
Senator Frelinghuysen. "We; will go into that
later. Has General Crozier invented anything?
Col. Lewis. Mechanical devices for use in the
Ordnance Department; yes, the Crozier-Buffington
disappearing gun-carriage.
Senator Frelingliuysen. Anything else?
Col. Lewis. I think he has been very largely in-
terested in the development of a wire-wound gun
system that is now used. Outside of that, I do not
know of anything.
Senator FrelingJiuysen. He has not invented any
class of ordnance similar to yours, has he?
Col. Lewis. Machine guns?
Senator FrelingTiuysen. Yes.
Col. Lewis. Not that I know of.
MACHINE GUNS 155
Senator FrcUnghuysen. You have only invented
the machine gun and the range finder?
Col. Lewis. No. I have a list there, Senator.
The letter I gave you will show the list of my in-
ventions since I have been in the military service.
Senator Frelinghuysen. The question I am ask-
ing you now is, whether Gen. Crozier came in com-
petition in any invention in the Ordnance Depart-
ment with you?
Col. Lewis. A similar invention to mine!
Senator Frelinghuysen. Yes.
Col. Lewis. Not at all, Senator ; not the slightest.
The Chairman. Who accepted the range finder?
Col. Lewis. It was first recommended by the
Board of Ordnance and Fortification, the old model,
in 1896. The new model was subjected to very
rigorous tests in New York Harbor, covering a
period of six weeks, by the special board of range
finding, a board appointed by the War Department
to test competitively range-finding instruments. I
think that was in 1907, or possibly 1908. I think the
letter will give you the date.
Senator Frelinfjlunjsen. Then there was no
prejudice against you in the acceptance of your
range finder?
Col. Lewis. I do not know whether the committee
wants to go into that.
Senator Hitchcock. Was Gen. Crozier involved
in it?
Col. Lewis. He opposed the introduction of my
finder to the hitter end.
156 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
Senator Hitchcock. He did not control the War
Department or the Ordnance Department?
Col. Lewis. Not in that case. That was a special
board appointed by the War Department over him,
and it was adopted in spite of his opposition.
(Page 715.)
Col. Lewis invented two range and position finders
which were purchased and used by the Govern-
ment. The statement that I opposed the adoption
of either one of them is not true. The first was de-
veloped in 1896 and the years preceding, and there
is no record that he ever offered it to the Govern-
ment free of charge for royalty ; but there is record
that he offered it for a price. With reference to a
free offer of his inventions in general, there is on
file in the Ordnance Office a letter relating to a
certain dial telegraph, and incidentally to other de-
vices. The letter is Ordnance Office file 4613-Enc.
48, and is as follows:
BOAKD ON REGULATION OF SEACOAST
ARTILLERY FIRE, Fort Wadsworth, N. Y.
May 4, 1896.
To THE BOARD OF ORDNANCE AND FORTIFICATION,
Fort Monroe, Va.
Gentlemen:
I would like to state further, that my only desire
in bringing this telegraph before you is to aid in
securing for our service the very best of each kind
of instrument and device that we must necessarily
use. In case you accept it, it becomes the property
of the War Department absolutely and without con-
dition so far as every military use is concerned,
MACIIIN'K GUNS 157
and the same is true not only of this, but of every
instrument or device that I may at any time submit
to you.
I am, gentlemen,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
I. N. LEWIS,
First Lieut., 2d Art.
The paragraph quoted is the only one which is
here pertinent. The instrument to which the letter
relates never came into extensive use, and was never
purchased in quantity by the Ordnance Department ;
but the letter is quoted because of the general state-
ment of intention at the end of it, which Col. Lewis
would evidently like to have understood as indicat-
ing his attitude toward the Government with refer-
ence to his inventions. The intention, however, like
that with reference to the gun, was never carried
out, as is evidenced by the following. With regard
to the first range finder, Col. Lewis wrote this letter
to the War Department:
4613 Enc. 83
Fort Wadsworth, N. Y. H.,
Nov. 23, 1896.
To THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.
Sir:
I have the honor to respectfully submit for the
consideration of the Secretary of War, and for such
action as he may droin proper, the following with
respect to my rani^ and position finder:
The fact is well known to the Department that
during the past eight years I have developed
158 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAE
practically and invented a range and position finder
for seacoast artillery use which, has been subjected
to the most thorough service tests for a period of
more than three years, and which, as the result of
those tests has been officially adopted by the Board
of Ordnance and Fortification as the service range
finder for TJ. S. Artillery with the recommendation
that the necessary steps be taken to acquire the right
to use this instrument upon such terms or at such
a rate of compensation as may to the Secretary of
War seem just and equitable.
The result of the tests made shows that not only
does the instrument meet every requirement of a
modern artillery service in the most satisfactory
manner, but that it is also the most reliable and
accurate of its kind in the world to-day. There is,
in fact, no other instrument of American origin that
even approximately fulfills service requirements.
Believing, as I do, that it forms a most important
element in the artillery defence of our coast, I want
my own Government to have the first opportunity to
purchase my rights in the invention, and I wish to
dispose of those rights on terms that are fair and
equitable.
I own absolutely in my own name all the rights,
and have never at any time parted either directly
or indirectly with the whole or any part of the in-
vention; I am therefore in a position to assign
all patent and other rights, to turn over all the
confidential data of construction, and to furnish
complete working drawings to the Government in
case of purchase.
I would respectfully submit the following distinct
propositions which I believe to be fair and reason-
able, viz.:
First. I will sell all rights in the invention for
the United States alone, leaving me free to negotiate
MACHINE GUNS 159
for the sale of the rights for foreign countries,
for the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
Second. I will sell all rights in the invention
absolutely and exclusively for the sum of seventy-
five thousand dollars ($75,000).
Inasmuch as I have already waited long and pa-
tiently for the Department to take some definite
action in regard to the purchase of my inven-
tion, and in view of the fact that I have already
had overtures from two foreign governments, and
a direct offer of purchase for the rights from a well
established and thoroughly reputable American com-
pany, I would respectfully ask to be informed as
soon as possible of the decision of the Secretary
of War.
I am, General,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
I. N. LEWIS,
1st Lieut. 2d U. S. Art.
This offer, which it is seen was made about six
months after the general statement of intention in
the letter quoted just above, was not accepted; but
another effort was made to secure payment from the
(iovrniinent for the invention, through the action of
Congress. The following letter was addressed to
the Secretary of War by the Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Military Affairs of the Senate:
4613 Enc.88
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, February 1, 1897.
Dear Sir:
nator Chandler offers an amoiulment to be
})!(]), .;M| i,, Hi,- Fortifications Appropriation Bill,
appropriating $100,000 for tln> purchase of all
160 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
rights in the Lewis range finder. The proposed
amendment was referred to the Committee on Coast
Defenses, of which I am Acting Chairman, in the
absence of Senator Squire.
So far as I have canvassed the committee all are
in favor of it except one, and he makes a suggestion
which I submit to the Department. This gentleman
has visited Sandy Hook and seen the range finder
tested and admired it; but he says that great in-
genuity is being exercised in that direction and in
view of the possibility that some better range finder
may be found we ought to authorize the War De-
partment to buy ten, twenty, thirty or forty range
finders, as they may be needed, and wait awhile, and
ultimately, if it be necessary and nothing better is
discovered, buy the patent.
I shall be glad of some expression from the War
Department or the Ordnance Bureau on this criti-
cism. I think the Committee is disposed to report
the amendment favorably.
Yours truly,
J. E. HAWLEY.
HON. D. S. LAMONT, Secretary of War.
P. S. If a note can be mailed to me this afternoon
I should be glad to get it in the morning.
The letter was answered by the Chief of Ordnance
on the following day. The answer is below:
4613. Enc. 88.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE,
Washington, D. C., Feb. 2, 1897.
HON. Jos. E. HAWLEY, U. S. Senate,
Washington, D. C.
Sir:
Your letter of the 1st instant, addressed to the
Secretary of War, in regard to the Lewis range
finder, has been referred to me for reply.
MACHINE GUNS 161
This department has purchased a limited number
of the Lewis range finders, and in accordance with
the recommendations of boards that investigated the
matter, has issued these range finders to posts for
actual trial in service. Unless an extraordinary
emergency should arise it is not the intention to
purchase more range finders until those in use have
been tried. In the meantime other range finders are
under consideration, it is not impossible that a
better range finder may be obtained, and under all
the circumstances it would not, in my judgment, be
wise for the United States to incur the expense of
purchasing all rights in the Lewis range finder.
Kespectfully,
(Signed) D. W. FLAGLEB,
Brig.-Gen., Chief of Ordnance.
Since these letters were written Col. Lewis has
jnanifested continued hostility to the Ordnance De-
partment, and has freely made against it his charges
of unfair treatment. I had at the time nothing to
do with the subject in which he was interested, being
a subordinate officer of the Ordnance Department
engaged on other duties.
On March 15th, following the correspondence with
Senator Hawley, an order was given for one hun-
dred Lewis range finders at a price of $1,500 each.
The purchase was made from a commercial com-
pany, and in it there was no proposition or mention
of reduction of price because of relief from royalty
charge. The royalty, if any, was taken care of in
the purchase price. (0. 0. file 4613-Enc. 140.)
The invention in which the rights were thus
offered for sale to the Government by Col. Lewis
had been developed with the aid of public funds
162 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
allotted for the purpose by the Board of Ordnance
and Fortification. The various allotments were as
follows :
August, 1890, $2,885 (0. 0. file 4973/1890).
September 22, 1890, $200 (0. 0. file 6619/01).
May 3, 1892, $3,000 (0. 0. file 2345/92).
January 24, 1893, $95 (0. 0. file 606/93).
September 6, 1893, $250 (0. 0. file 706-B/93).
On letter of September 29, 1894, $44.75 (0. 0.
file 4613-Enc. 83).
November 20, 1894, $2,000 (0. 0. file 4613-Enc.
88), increased later by $500 (0. 0. file 4613-Enc. 2).
October, 1895, $550 (0. 0. file 4613-Encs. 7 and 8).
The Lewis range and position finder was later
superseded by another invention which remained
the adopted type until about 1908, when Col. Lewis
submitted his second instrument. The second range
finder was considered by the Board of Ordnance
and Fortification, of which I was then a member,
and it was pursuant to action of that board that it
was subjected to a test by a special board, and was
adopted as a result of the test. I took part and
concurred in the proceedings leading to the test
and to the adoption. The history can be found in
the record of proceedings of the Board.
Following its adoption something like two hun-
dred thousand dollars' worth of the second range
finders were bought by the Ordnance Department.
Like the first range finders they were bought from
private parties, with no known reduction of price
because of relief of the Government from the pay-
ment of royalty. What the relations are between
Col. Lewis and the parties selling these inventions
MACHINE GUNS 163
to the Government, and what consideration, if any,
was paid to him for the control of his patents for
range finders, has never been stated by Col. Lewis
or otherwise disclosed, to my knowledge. He has
never entered into a written engagement in regard
to them, such as his letter of December 11, 1917, to
the Secretary of War, quoted in his testimony above
in regard to his gun, nor has he ever paid to the
Government any sums of money representing re-
ceipts by him for these inventions ; of which the last
is still the standard model of range finder, and there-
fore subject to further purchase.
After the adoption of his gun by the British Gov-
ernment, and after a large number had been
manufactured, Col. Lewis took the first effective
step towards making good his stated intention of
foregoing profit from his inventions used by the
United States by enclosing his check for something
over $10,000 in his letter of February 16, 1917, to
the Secretary of War, as described in his testimony.
As he stated that the check was never acknowledged,
and that I advised strongly against its acceptance,
the story of the transaction as revealed by the
correspondence may be of some interest. Colonel
Lewis' letter is as follows:
072.62-Inc. 3.
1 Russell Terrace, Montclair, N. J.
February 16, 1917.
Tin: HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington, D. C.
Sir:
Since my return from abroad on the 1st instant,
164 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
I have received a complete statement of moneys due
and paid to me during the year ended December 31,
1916, by the Savage Arms Company of Utica, New
York, as royalties on the American manufacture of
Lewis guns, spare parts and accessories.
Included in the statement referred to is the sum
of ten thousand eight hundred and eighty-nine dol-
lars and seventeen cents paid to me as royalties on
three hundred and fifty-three Lewis guns (with
spare parts), manufactured originally under con-
tract with the Canadian Government but actually
delivered to and paid for by the United States War
Department.
During our personal interview in your office in
June, 1916, about the time of the delivery of these
three hundred and fifty-three guns, I informed you
that I had repeatedly offered my interest in my
machine-gun invention to my own Government,
without thought of pecuniary recompense, long be-
fore undertaking the development and introduction
of the gun abroad; notwithstanding the fact that I
had never received the slightest assistance or en-
couragement in the practical development of my
inventions from anyone connected with the United
States Ordnance Department.
I feel a moral obligation to refuse to profit to the
extent of one penny from the sale -of the above-
mentioned guns to the War Department, and I
therefore enclose herewith my certified check on the
Corn Exchange Bank of New York, payable to your
order, for ten thousand eight hundred and eighty-
nine dollars and seventeen cents, with the request
that you deposit the same to the credit of the United
States Government.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
ISAAC N. LEWIS,
U. S. Army (retired).
MACIIIM; c;r\s 165
The check was apparently sent to the Secretary
of the Treasury on March 2nd, and raised a doubt
in the mind of that officer whether it should be ac-
cepted. He therefore returned it to the Secretary
of War with the following letter:
072.4/62 Inc. 2
TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, April 14, 1917.
MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:
Referring to your letter of March 2nd, with which
you transmit a check of Isaac N. Lewis, in the sum
of $10,889.17, drawn to the order of the Secretary
of War and by you endorsed to the Secretary of
the Treasury, it is noted that Isaac N. Lewis, the
drawer of the check, is a retired officer of the United
States Army and the inventor of a machine gun;
tli at the gun is manufactured by the Savage Arms
Company and that Lewis receives a royalty there-
from; that the sum of $10,889.17 represents the
royalty received by Lewis from the said company
for the sale of the guns in question to the War De-
partment; and that Lewis feels a moral obliga-
tion to refuse to profit to the extent of one penny
from the sale of the guns to the Government,
and for that reason transmits the check repre-
senting the amount of the profit with the request
that it be deposited to the credit of the United States
Government
The amount tendered and offered by Lewis ap-
pears to be offered as a gift or donation on his
part to the United States and as it is apparently
rod without any condition or qualification wliat-
r, the same may be loyally accepted.
li\\ \ r, as it appears from your letter of March
2nd that the Savage Arms Company, the corpora-
tion which paid tlio royalties to Col. Lewis, is
166 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
constantly competing for orders before your De-
partment, in the last analysis the question of ac-
cepting this donation would seem to be a proper
one for the War Department to determine.
The correspondence and certified check are re-
turned herewith.
Very truly yours,
W. G. McAooo,
Secretary.
To Honorable the Secretary of War.
Upon receiving the check back the Secretary of
War sent the correspondence to me with the memo-
randum below, and I returned it to him with the
one which follows :
072.4/68
WAR DEPARTMENT,
April 18, 1917.
Memorandum for the Chief of Ordnance:
Subject: Letter from Secretary of the Treasury,
April 14, returning check for $10,889.17 from Col.
Isaac N. Lewis.
Will Gen. Crozier kindly give me his opinion in
the matter of the acceptance of the enclosed gift?
I am inclined to request the Secretary of the
Treasury to deposit this fund to the credit of the
United States as a gift, and yet I do not want to
embarrass the Ordnance Department in its dealings
with the Savage Arms Company.
BAKER,
Secretary of War.
MACHINE GUNS 167
072.4/68
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE,
Washington, April 24, 1917.
Memorandum for the Secretary of War:
Subject: Acceptance of check from Col. Lewis
covering royalties on machine guns.
I do not think that the acceptance of this check
would embarrass the Ordnance Department in its
dealings with the Savage Arms Company with ref-
erence to the Lewis gun. If Col. Lewis wishes to
treat further purchases made and to be made of
L< -\\is guns from the Savage Arms Company in a
similar manner and shall notify the War Depart-
ment of his intention, the resulting advantage in
cost to the Government of the Lewis gun must be
considered when negotiations for machine guns of
like character are under way. If he shall not give
any such notice of intention, nor transfer to the
United States his right to royalties on guns manu-
factured for the United States, the price at which
guns may be offered by the Savage Arms Company
will, of course, be considered at the figure which the
company gives.
There are, however, some other features accom-
panying the offer of this check by Col. Lewis which
I think should be taken into consideration in reach-
ing a conclusion as to its acceptance. In his accom-
panying letter dated February 16, 1917, he states
to the Secretary of War :
"I informed you that I had repeatedly offered my
interest in my machine gun inventions to my o\vn
government, without thought of pecuniary recom-
pense, loii before undertaking the development and
introduction of the gun abroad."
Col. Lewis never offered either to this Depart-
ment or to the Board of Ordnance and Fortifica-
168 ORDNANCE
TIE WORLD WAI
tion, which are the agencies established for the con-
sideration of the machine gun supply of the United
States, his interest in his machine gun inventions.
There is no record of any such offer as he claims
to have made, and the first gun which he presented
to either the Ordnance Department or the Board of
Ordnance and Fortification was offered for consid-
eration as a commercial matter, and had itself been
manufactured abroad.
He further states in his letter enclosing his check :
"I have never received the slightest assistance or
encouragement in the practical development of my
inventions from any one connected with the United
States Ordnance Department."
Col. Lewis never asked the assistance of the Ord-
nance Department in the development of his inven-
tions. If the inventions had been developed with the
aid of the United States Government Col. Lewis
would have lost the right to royalties for their use
by the Government. The Government has tested
several of his inventions quite extensively, at con-
siderable expense, and the tests were probably use-
ful in the development of the inventions ; but it has
done as much for many other inventors. The Act
of June 25, 1910, giving additional protection to
owners of patents of the United States, grants the
right of suit against the United States for compen-
sation for the use of inventions, and provides fur-
ther
"That the benefits of this Act shall not inure to
anybody who, when he makes such claim, is in the
employment or service of the Government of the
United States, or the assignee of any such patent;
nor shall this Act apply to any device discovered or
invented by such employee during the time of his
employment or service."
MACHIM; GUNS 169
Col. Lewis further state
"I feel a moral obligation to refuse to profit to
the extent of one penny from the sale of the above-
mentioned guns to the War Department. "
The Ordnance Department has made considerable
purchases of two other articles invented by Col.
Lewis, namely, range finders, aggregating in cost
something like $350,000. These articles, like the
machine gun, were invented by Col. Lewis while in
active service in the Coast Artillery. His range
finders have been purchased from private parties,
and the Government has been given no advantage,
in purchase price or otherwise, by reason of the
range finders having been invented and patented by
Col. Lewis. In connection with the development of
the first there were allotted by the Board of Ord-
nance and Fortification sums aggregating approxi-
mately $10,000.
I think that the effect of the acceptance of Col.
is' check in operating as an endorsement of his
statements and position in regard to the use of his
inventions by the Government should be taken into
consideration in determining whether or not it
should be accepted, if any discretion exists in the
matter.
(Signed) WILLIAM CROZIER,
Brig. -Gen., Chief of Ordnance, U. S. A.
The last paragraph of my memorandum was in-
tended to induce reflection before accepting the
chock, for the reason stated. It was this memoran-
dum which Col. Lewis, as stated in his testimony,
BO averse from having appeal- in the record. I
can understand why he \v.iilI not like to have it
appeal-, but I put it in ord myself a few days
afterward.
170 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
Shortly after the receipt of my memorandum
the Secretary of War sent it to Col. Lewis with
the following letter:
072.4/70
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., April 29, 1917.
MY DEAR COLONEL LEWIS :
On February 16th you wrote me a letter and sent
me a certified check on the Corn Exchange Bank of
New York for $10,889.17, with request that I deposit
same to the credit of the Government of the United
States.
In your letter you state that this sum was thje
amount received by you from royalties on three
hundred and fifty-three Lewis machine guns with
spare parts manufactured largely under contract
with the Canadian Government but actually deliv-
ered to, and paid for by, the United States Govern-
ment through the War Department. In my office in
June, 1916, you informed me that you had repeat-
edly offered your interest in your machine gun
inventions to the Government of the United States
without thought of pecuniary recompense, and that
you felt a moral obligation to refuse to profit to the
extent of one penny on the sale of such guns to
the War Department.
In view of the fact that your letter contains sev-
eral statements which have from time to time been
the basis of controversy I deem it wise to hand you
herewith copy of memorandum from the Chief of
Ordnance, to whom I referred the question of ac-
cepting this check, and also as to whether its
acceptance would embarrass the Ordnance Depart-
ment in subsequent dealings with the Savage Arms
Company in purchasing further supplies of the
Lewis gun.
MACHIM; GUNS 171
I do not send you the attached memorandum to
invite further comment on the controversial por-
tions either of your letter or that of the Chief of
Ordnance, but merely to have it understood that the
acceptance of this check by the Government is not
to be considered as a determination by me of any
of these ancient matters of controversy.
If you do not care to have this money deposited
in the Treasury of the United States simply on the
ground stated in your original letter and without
understanding that I am now examining or under-
taking to determine any controversial question as
to the breach of relations between you and the War
Department, or any branch or division of it, I shall
of course be glad to accept the check on behalf of
the Government.
I shall hold the check until I have your reply.
I ask your particular attention to the suggestion
made by Gen. Crozier with regard to the purchase
of certain Lewis guns from the Savage Arms Com-
pany, in order that this department may be advised
in undertaking future purchases.
Very sincerely yours,
NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War.
COL. ISAAC N. LEWIS,
1 Bus.-"!! Terrace,
Montclair, N. J.
In view of the frequent reference in this letter to
my memorandum to the Secretary of "War. enclosed
with it, it is not easy to und< rsfand the statement
of Col. Lewis and Mr. Calfee that they did not think
it was intended to bo seen by Col. Lewis. (Page
1 .")(.) Pol. Lewis' reply to the Secretary came
U> *\ ; T returned it with a memorandum that
172 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAI
I saw no objection to the acceptance of the check;
which was then sent to the Treasury Department
and deposited as a donation to the Government.
Col. Lewis' reply, my memorandum and the letter of
the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury telling of
the final disposition of the check are below:
072.4/73
No. 1 Eussell Terrace,
Montclair, N. J.,
May 12, 1917.
THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington, D. C.
MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:
Your letter of April 29th, with its enclosed
memorandum from the Chief of Ordnance, has been
received and very carefully considered.
I do care to have the money represented by the
check sent you in my letter of February 16, 1917,
deposited in the Treasury of the United States
simply on the ground stated in my original letter,
without any understanding that you are now exam-
ining or undertaking to determine any controversial
question as to the breach of relations between me
and the War Department, or any branch or division
of it, and I now have the honor to request again
that you so accept and deposit it.
My letter of February 16, 1917, was sent you
solely for the reason stated therein, and for no
other.
I can see no possible embarrassment to the War
Department nor to the Ordnance Department, in the
acceptance of my check. It is possible, however, that
your acceptance and deposit of the check may em-
barrass the present Chief of Ordnance personally.
The memorandum from the Chief of Ordnance to
MACHINE GINS 173
which you invited my attention is so widely at vari-
ance w"ith what I know from personal knowledge to
be the facts in the case, that I cannot fairly consider
any of the questions raised by Gen. Crozier therein
without controversy, and I understand it to be your
wish and direction that there be no further con-
troversy.
In the present very grave national emergency, I
am directly instrumental in supplying, delivering
and putting on the actual firing lines against the
fighting enemies of my country more machine guns
each week than the present Chief of Ordnance has
supplied for the use of our own army of defence
during the whole of the fourteen years that he has
been in office. I have done, and am doing, this with-
out one penny of assistance and without one word
of encouragement or acknowledgment from any one
connected with the Ordnance Department, and in
spite of the long continued and active opposition of
that Department.
I am therefore content to now rest the matter with
you simply as a personal appeal for justice.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) I. N. LEWIS,
Colonel, U. S. Army, Retired.
072.4/86
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE,
War Department, June 4, 1917.
Memorandum for the Secretary of War:
Subject : Acceptance and deposit of check from
Col. Lewis returning myaltie<.
I do not sec any objection to the acceptance and
deposit of Col. Lewis' check I'm* $10,889.17 in ac-
cordance with the letter of May 12, 1917 (0. 0. file
i>7_.4/73), in reply to one from the Secretary of War
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
of April 29th (0. 0. file 072.4/70), in view of the
reservations made in the last-mentioned letter con-
cerning the determination of the matters in con-
troversy.
(Signed) WILLIAM CROZIER,
Brig.-Gen., Chief of Ordnance, U. S. A.
072.4/92
TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 18, 1917.
MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of
your letter dated 7th instant, with its enclosures,
including check No. Special 692, drawn February 16,
1917, by Isaac N. Lewis, on the Corn Exchange
Bank, New York, in your favor for $10,889.17, en-
dorsed by you to the order of the Secretary of the
Treasury.
The check has been collected and, as requested, its
amount has been deposited in the United States
Treasury in the name of Isaac N. Lewis, Colonel
U. S. Army, retired, on account of "Donation to
the Government," as shown by enclosed duplicate
certificate of deposit No. 6802 issued, therefor on
June 15th by the Treasurer of the United States.
The correspondence which accompanied yonr
letter is herewith returned for the files of your
Department.
Respectfully,
(Signed) OSCAR T. CROSBY,
Assistant Secretary.
The Honorable the Secretary of War.
A reason seems needed for Col. Lewis' change of
procedure, and his final determination to carry out
his intention of release of the Government from pay-
ment for his inventions, which he had been express-
MACHINK GUNS 175
ing for so many years without carrying them out.
Perhaps the reason may be found in his changed
circumstances. He testified before the Senate Mili-
tary Committee that at that time, in December, 1917,
over 70,000 of his machine guns had been manu-
factured for the European armies. I do not know
what royalty he received on these guns, but if the
rate was the same as stated for -the 40,000 machine
guns, ordered by the United States, in his letter
of December 11, 1917, quoted on page 141, and
if the proportion of spare parts to guns was the
same, the total of the royalty must have been a
large sum. He further testified that, at the same
time, the manufacture of his gun was going on at
the rate of over 2,000 per week, of which less than
500 could have been for the United States. He was,
therefore, receiving royalty, apparently, for 1,500
or more per week. At the rate indicated in his above
1 letter, his continuing income from the manu-
facture of guns must also have been very large. I
do not see any objection to the receipt by Col.
Lewis of these large sums; but I do see objection
to his effort to accentuate his unfounded charge of
unfair treatment by the Ordnance Department and
its head with the allegation that the treatment was
in face of his desire to spare the Government
pense, which lie never took any steps to carry out
until he could well afford to do so.
Tn the early autumn of 1916 a particularly ener-
newspaper assault was made upon the Ord-
Department and myself for the unfairness
which v .. to have exhibited toward Col.
176 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WA]
Lewis and the Lewis gun. A great metropolitan
daily considered the matter of enough importance
to devote a column of the first page and all the
reading matter of the fourth page of one issue,
and an editorial, to its presentation ; and the charges
made were widely printed in other journals through-
out the country. I made a short reply in the first
mentioned paper, which manifested a fair disposi-
tion to print both sides, and in addition I took up
the subject with the Secretary of War, urging that
the matter was not simply one of a controversy be-
tween two officers, but was another instance of a
long series of charges against an executive depart-
ment of the Government and its subordinate bureau,
made now, however, by an officer whose status on
the retired list of the army rendered him subject
to call to account through the processes of military
discipline. I represented that we who were tem-
porarily at the head of these departments had not
only our own reputations to look after, but had the
good name of the departments in our custody, and
that it was our duty to vindicate the latter when it
was assailed by persons who could be made respon-
sible, particularly when, as in the present instance,
the assault was against both ourselves and our pred-
ecessors in office.
Gen. Leonard Wood, on the other side, also
brought the matter to the attention of the Secretary
of War in a letter objecting to the manner in which
my reply in the metropolitan daily had spoken of
his machine gun test at Plattsburg, which was not
MACHINE GUNS 177
complimentary, and requested action in accordance
with his views.
The Secretary referred the matter to the In-
tor General for examination and report, and
that officer handed his report to the Chief of Staff
on October 12, 1916. After reviewing the case his
conclusions were as follows :
"56. The essential questions of fact raised by
this correspondence are:
(a) Whether the test at Plattsburg was an in-
formal OIK'.
By the Inspector General: In my opinion the test
was informal.
(b) Whether the Benet-Mercie guns submitted
to the test were in fit condition.
By the Inspector General: The proceedings of
the Board do not show that it, as a Board, made
any examination of the Benet-Mercie gun, but do
show that Lieut. Gordon, commanding the Machine
(inn Troop from which the guns were received to
ted that they were in the best possible con-
dition.
Gen, \Voo<l states in his letter: . . . "Lieut.
Gordon is thoroughly familiar with the Benet-
]\Iei-cir min, skilled in its use, and reported his
^iiiis in perfect condition." . . .
In n-ply to this, (ien. Crozier states: . . . "The
parties interested in one of the competing guns,
only, received notification and were represented at
the test. They presented their guns with all the
irance of proper condition to enter the test and
of ! handling dnrin- the test which would
naturally result from the presentation of a gun
l>\ its manufacturers. The Benet-Mercie gun was
pivx-nted and looked after by the class of personnel
which has, in the service. 80 often failed to get
178 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
good results from the gun by reason of unskillful
care and handling, whose statement therefore that
the guns were in the best possible condition natu-
rally would not be accepted by any one interested in
the guns." . . .
By the Inspector General: In my opinion this is
a fair statement of the case.
Note: On July 5, 1916, the United States Ord-
nance Company, as attorney and agent for Messrs.
Benet and Mercie, requested information from the
Secretary of War as to the comparative tests as re-
ported in the public press to have been conducted
at the Plattsburg camp with the Benet-Mercie au-
tomatic rifle, stating that they had no knowledge
that such tests were contemplated and requesting
information as to whether they were conducted
under official authority of the War Department.
57. On September 18, 1916, Gen. Crozier wrote
a letter to the New York Times, in reply to a long
article and editorial published in that paper on that
date, on the subject of the Lewis gun and its rela-
tion with the Ordnance Department, in which ha
used the following language : . . . " In the so-called
Plattsburg test none of the safeguards of thorough-
ness or fairness was present. A -small number of
rounds, only, was fired, which did not include the
essential endurance test. No responsible officer
would have been justified in basing conclusions upon
its results." . . .
58. On September 19, 1916, Major-Gen. Leonard
Wood inclosed this extract to the Adjutant-General
of the Army and raised questions of fact as to the
statement that none of the safeguards of thorough-
ness or fairness was present in the test referred to,
alleging the statement to be contrary to fact, wholly
unwarranted and tending to misrepresent the test.
59. By the Inspector General: The Inspector
MACHINE GUNS 179
thinks that the difference of opinion between Gen.
<1 and Gen. Crozier with respect to the character
of the test of the Lewis gun at Plattsburg Barracks
is from a difference of point of view rather than
involving questions of fact.
As above stated, the Board of Ordnance and Forti-
ion had determined a program of tests to which
this Lewis gun should be subjected, which program,
by the way, had been approved by Gen. Wood as
^ident of the Board of Ordnance and Fortifica-
tion, and also by the Secretary of War.
Undoubtedly, Gen. Crozier had such a test in
mind when interpreting the test at Plattsburg, while
Gen. Wood, now commanding the Eastern Depart-
ment, had abandoned the program prescribed by the
Board of Ordnance and Fortification and substi-
tuted one of his own.
While I think Gen. Crozier made a mistake in
entering the controversy over the Lewis gun in the
s, I must admit that there was strong provoca-
tion in the article and editorial thereon published
in the New York Times of September 18, 1916, prin-
cipally in that it placed the responsibility for the
;i of the Lewis gun upon Gen. Crozier and
the Ordnance Department, whereas, every action
with respect to this gun and its rejection had been
conducted under the direction of the Board of Ord-
nance and Fortification, with the approval of the
Secretary of War; and all tests of the gun had been
made by a board convened by direction of the Sec-
ry of War, on which there was only one ord-
nance officer.
oNS.
60. My u-eneral conclusions, as developed from an
examination of the Is, are:
) There is no official record that Col. Lewis
ever offered a gun of his invention, through any
180 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAI
individual or through the Board of Ordnance and
Fortification, to the United States Government, free
or at a price.
(b) The first and only offer of the gun to the
Government, of record, was made by a representa-
tive of the Automatic Arms Company, on September
2, 1913, to the Chief of Ordnance One hundred
guns, complete, at not to exceed $1,000 each, and to
license the Ordnance Department to manufacture,
use and sell such guns in the United States for a
royalty of not to exceed $150 per gun.
(c) Such tests as the Lewis gun has been sub-
jected to, have been under a program authorized
by the Board of Ordnance and Fortification and ap-
proved by the Secretary of War, and were made by
boards of officers named in orders from the Adju-
tant-General's Office one officer of the Ordnance
Department on each board.
(d) The Savage Arms Company, through its
President, in a letter to the Chief of Ordnance with
reference to the test conducted in April, 1916,
stated: "The Company feels that the investigation
has been entirely impartial and regards the Board
as one very capable of judging the value of the
investigation to the Ordnance Department. We also
appreciate the courtesy shown us by Col. Peirce
and his assistants. "
(e) The proceedings of the boards which tested
the rifle have been, in each case, duly approved by
the Secretary of War.
(f) Whatever responsibility attaches to the con-
demnation of this gun as a service gun belongs to
the War Department and not to the Chief of Ord-
nance nor to the Ordnance Department.
(g) The test ordered by the Commanding Gen-
eral, Eastern Department, at Plattsburg, N. Y., in
June, 1916, was unauthorized and improper.
MACHINE GUNS 181
(h) The controversy over the Plattsburg test
arose through the tact that the owners of the Lewis
gun had previously submitted it for two tests to
boards convened by tin 4 War Department, under a
program approved by the Board of Ordnance and
Fortification and it had failed to pass what is known
lie Arsenal or endurance test, thereby losing
ight to the field test proposed by the program of
the Board of Ordnance and Fortification, or to any
not authorized by the War Department.
(i) The records do not show any hostility on the
part of Gen. Crozier or the Ordnance Depart-
ment to the Lewis gun, but do show that the Depart-
ment, by direction of its Chief, afforded the owners
of this gun every reasonable facility in placing it
before the testing board at the Springfield Armory.
(j) The Secretary of War should direct each of
the officers concerned in this controversy to drop
it, as no good purpose can be subserved by con-
tinuing such a controversy, which really does not
involve questions of fact, but the value of opinion
as to the character of test to which this gun was sub-
jected at Plattsburg.
E. A. GARLINGTOIT,
Inspector General.
In the body of the report there had occurred the
following :
. .
'Note: It will be observed that the Ordnance De-
partment furnished the Automatic Arms Company
every facility with respect to the manufacture of
this gun for t
After the submission of the Inspector General's
rt, the Secretary of War issued a press bulletin
in which, after summarizing the subject, lie stated:
182 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
"The Inspector General of the Army was ordered
to investigate the other aspects of the case. He has
now done so, and his general conclusions are as
follows: The "General Conclusions" were then
given, except that conclusion (g) was omitted, and
for conclusion (j) was substituted the following:
' ' The controversy which has arisen does not involve
questions of fact, merely the value of opinion as
to the character of test to which this gun was sub-
jected at Plattsburg. The Secretary of War has
approved these conclusions of the Inspector General
and, in accordance with the latter ? s recommendation,
has directed the controversy to cease."
It can be noted that in thus disposing of the case
the Secretary of War found that the Ordnance De-
partment had acted without hostility and in accord-
ance with its duty toward the Lewis gun, but he
failed to take any disciplinary or otherwise remedial
action against the officer who had published the con-
trary, and he placed all concerned on an equality
in directing that the controversy should cease. I
felt that this action did not conclusively dispose of
the matter, principally in that it did not follow
formal proceedings in which both sides would ap-
pear together, such as are held by a court, preceding
announced conclusions, and I urged upon the Secre-
tary that the matter had reached such a stage that
nothing less than such proceedings would serve to
set it at rest, and meet the sentiment of angry criti-
cism of the Ordnance Department which had been
aroused in the public mind. He replied that Col.
Lewis was not satisfied either, and had made the
MACHINE GUNS 183
complaint appearing in his letter of December 11,
1917, quoted in his testimony on page 141, and
added that he intended to offer him a court of in-
quiry in order to afford full opportunity for the
presentation and examination of his grievance. The
offer of a court of inquiry was made to Col. Lewis,
and was declined by him; whereupon I myself ap-
plied for such a court in the following letter:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE WAR COUNCIL,
Washington, D. C., January 6, 1918.
From: Major-Gen. William Crozier, Chief of
Ordnance.
To: The Adjutant-General of the Army.
Subject: Eequest for appointment of a court of
inquiry.
1. Charge having been publicly made by Col. I. N.
Lewis, U. S. A. (retired), to the effect that the Ord-
nance Department, and I as Chief of Ordnance, have
failed to accord proper consideration to his inven-
tion of a machine gun, and that the service has
thereby been deprived of a much-needed supply of
'nine .mins, and this charge having been repeated
in the testimony of Col. L<-\\is before the Senate
Committee on Military Affairs on December 22,
11)17. together with the further charge that I op-
doption for use in the service of certain
range Cinders invented by Col. Lewis, and these
charges having been made to appear more serious
throu.ii'li the allegation that the use of the inven-
nti <>ne(l had been offered to the United
Stat- of charge for compensation to the in-
ventor, and the eh. >^in received wide circu-
lation, with danger of impairment of the confidence
ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
of the Country in the manner in which the opera-
tions confided to the Ordnance Department have
been carried on, I request that a Court of Inquiry
be appointed to examine into the nature of all of
the transactions referred to in the above-mentioned
charges, and into all the relations between the said
Col. Lewis and the Ordnance Department or the
Chief of Ordnance in so far as they concern these
charges and the interests of the service, and that
the Court be directed to state, in addition to its
conclusions of fact, its opinion concerning the trans-
actions inquired into and the conduct of the officers
involved in them, and to recommend what further
steps should be taken in the premises.
WILLIAM CROZIER.
The Secretary of War had a conversation with
Senator Chamberlain, Chairman of the Committee
on Military Affairs, on the subject of this applica-
tion for a court, as a result of which he sent tie
Senator the following letter:
January 7, 1918.
MY DEAR SENATOR CHAMBERLAIN :
I enclose you a copy of a letter from Gen. Crozier,
which I found on my desk to-day after my return
from the Capitol. The General had suggested to me
his purpose, but I did not know that he intended to
follow it up with a formal request.
This request is made under the provision of
Article 97 of the Articles of War, which reads as
follows :
A Court of Inquiry to examine into the na-
ture of any transaction of or accusation or im-
putation against any officer or soldier may be
ordered by the President or by any command-
ing officer; but a Court of Inquiry shall not
MACHINE GUNS 185
be ordered by any commanding officer except
upon the request of the officer or soldier whose
conduct is to be inquired into.
As I stated to you to-day in our conversation, Gen.
Crozier feels that by reason of the Lewis machine
#un controversy his life-long service to the country
and his reputation as an officer and as a man have
i brought into discredit. As he stated to you and
to me, he feels that one side of this controversy has
had access to widespread newspaper publicity while
the other was restrained by those considerations of
discipline and propriety which prevent Army offi-
from indulging in newspaper controversies
with regard to the business of the service. As a
consequence, he feels that the country has reached
an opinion on this subject to the effect that he has
been unjust to Col. Lewis and to his invention, slow
in recognizing the merits of a good weapon, and
prejudiced in his treatment of the weapon and its
inventor, all of which he earnestly denies and yet
feels himself unable to effectively follow the ac-
tion with his denial or by any act which is
within his power to change an erroneous public
opinion against him. T am deeply impressed with
(I'-n. Crozi . His confirmation is now
pending before the- Senate. He is nearly sixty-three
B "I<1 and has been in the Army since his grad-
uation from \Ves1 Point in 187(5, in all forty-one
s. Whatever ivputation lie lias lie has made as
iticer in the Army, and T can testify that at least
for the two years during which lie has been under
my observation his industry lias been indefatigable
; nd his xeal tVnvnf and sinirh'-niinded for the irood
of the service. Ind. d, T think T know of no public
ant who spends nmre hours in or has fewer
interests apart from the service than fion. Crozier.
186 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
I have myself endeavored twice to examine this ma-
chine gun controversy, feeling that I was without
any other interest than that which a judge ought
properly to have in determining a controversy, and
each time I have come away with the feeling that
Gen. Crozier had acted not only upon the best mo-
tives, but upon a sound discretion and reasoned
judgment. I am not saying this to affect in the least
the ultimate determination of the question now pre-
sented, but only because it seems to me that in
justice an officer of such service and such present
loyalty and zeal is entitled to any protection for his
reputation which the rules of his profession accord
him.
I have tA\ r o embarrassments about the request
which Gen. Crozier has presented. One arises from
the fact that the Government needs at this time its
capable officers in other service, and I should hesi-
tate to detail three or five officers of sufficient expe-
rience and judgment to constitute this Court. This
difficulty, however, I can meet by asking the Presi-
dent of the American Bar Association to name a
competent number of the most distinguished law-
yers in the country who would be willing to accept
National Army Commissions and thus become of-
ficers long enough to be constituted into this Court,
make the necessary inquiry and report their findings,
and this I should undoubtedly do were it not for
the fact that this controversy is at least a part ot ?
the subject-matter which the Committee on Military
Affairs of the Senate is now considering, and I
realize that there might be some embarrassment
to the Committee if such a Court were appointed to
prosecute this inquiry while the Committee itself
is considering the matter.
If I could make a suggestion in the matter, it
would be that the Committee hold Gen. Crozier 's
MArilINK (HTNS 187
nomination in abeyance until after the report of
the Court of Inquiry, which T would in every pos-
sible way urge to speedy deliverance. I do not
think this action would necessarily affect any rec-
ommendations which the Committee may desire to
make growing out of its present inquiry, and so
there would be avoided the appearance of an
attempt either to influence or anticipate the action
of the Committee by the appointment of the Court.
You were good enough to say to-day that you would
lav this matter before your associates on the Com-
mittee in executive session and give me the benefit
of their views. I will be very grateful if you would
do so at your early convenience.
Cordially yours,
NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War.
HON. GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
United States Senate.
On the next day he sent me a copy of this letter
with a note as follows:
THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington, D. C.
January 8, 1918.
MY DEAR GEN. CROZIER:
I had a talk yesterday with Senator Chamberlain
and, as a result, sent him a letter of which the
enclosed is a copy.
Tli it^gestion with regard to the pos-
sibility of onr olTriidiii.ir the Committee by appear-
ing to 'disr. nurd their conclusions was a new thought
to me. I do not want to make matters worse, to
the least. Cordially yours,
NEWTON D. BAKER.
I do not know what response the Secretary's letter
to Senator Chamberlain met with, but a few days
18 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
after the receipt of Ms note I said to the Secretary
that I still thought that the court should be held
and earnestly requested him to appoint it. I found
him then very averse from taking such action, on
the ground that it would be unwise because of its
possible effect upon the Committee; and was ad-
vised by him to leave the matter in his hands, when
he would see that justice should be done both to
the Ordnance Department and to myself, and that
the subject should be made to appear in the proper
light. I had in the meantime been relieved from my
duties as Chief of Ordnance and assigned as a mem-
ber of the newly formed War Council, and was
under orders to make a visit to Europe to secure
information in regard to the conduct of the war.
I had not wanted to be relieved as Chief of Ord-
nance; first because I wished to carry through the
great war the department which a devoted personnel
had brought to its existing stage of efficiency during
my sixteen years' service as its head, and second
because I felt that my relief would imply the ad-
mission by the War Department of justification for
the criticism which had been directed against the
Ordnance Department, when the unpreparedness
which the department had for years been warning
against began to be appreciated by Congress and
the country. But I was assured by the Secretary
that the sole reason for my relief was that my
services might be availed of on the highly impor-
tant Council which had been formed, and I accepted
the assurance, though with reluctance at leaving my
department; and was then very anxious to get into
MACHINE GUNS 189
the theater of war. I therefore acted upon the Sec-
retary's advice that I should not press the matter
of the court of inquiry, with its resultant delay, and
sailed for Europe,
When the war was over, and most of the troops
had returned from Europe, so that there were
plenty of officers of suitable rank available for duty
upon a court of inquiry, I renewed my effort to
obtain such a court, and upon August 16, 1919, ad-
dressed a letter to the Adjutant-General. In this
letter I gave quotations from the testimony of Col.
Lewis before the Senate Military Committee, which
contained erroneous presentation of facts, and were
also aspersions upon the Chief of Ordnance. I
added that I wished to avail myself of the method
provided by the military code for securing a judicial
examination of the charges made and expression
of opinion upon the conduct of all officers concerned.
I received from the Adjutant-General the reply
of the Secretary of War, dated September 10, 1919,
as follows :
WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
Washington, Sept. 10, 1919.
om: The Adjutant General of the Army.
To: Major (H-nrral William Cro/ier, U. S. Army,
Retired, J735 Massachusetts Ave., Washington,
B.C.
Subj' i : lu quest for appointment of a Court of
[iiiry.
Your eonmmnioation of August 16, 1919, reqnest-
tlie appoint incut of a Court of Inquiry was offi-
190 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
cially considered by the Secretary of War on the
6th of September, 1919, and was refused by him
for the following reasons :
"1. During the progress of the war, on January
6, 1918, a prior request of like nature was made by
General Crozier, but at that time not pressed by
him for the reason that the good of the service did
not permit the withdrawal from active operations of
the requisite number of officers of rank and experi-
ence to constitute such a Court. The same situation
now exists; the Army is being demobilized, tem-
porary officers are being discharged, and the heavy
burden of closing up the business of the great war
and reorganizing the military establishment rests
upon the limited number of regular officers availa-
ble to the department. Such an inquiry as General
Crozier desires would necessarily have to be con-
ducted by officers of rank and authority.
2. In October of 1916, the entire subject covered
by the allegations attributed to Colonel I. W. Lewis
was brought to the attention of the department, and
the Secretary of War directed an investigation to be
made by General E. A. Garlington, Inspector Gen-
eral. The result of that investigation was a complete
exoneration of General Crozier as Chief of Ordnance
and of the Ordnance Department in all matters relat-
ing to the so-called * Lewis Machine Gun Contro-
versy.' The Secretary of War approved the find-
ings and conclusions of the Inspector General, so
that both by the Inspector General's report and by
the action of the Secretary of War the War Depart-
ment has become responsible for all action taken
with regard to the Lewis Machine Gun, and General
Crozier 's actions and those of the Ordnance Depart-
ment are vindicated and approved.
3. The Secretary of War has repeatedly, in tes-
timony before Congress and in public statements,
MACHINE GUNS 191
stated as the result of careful investigation and in-
quiry on his part, aided and informed by official in-
vestigations and by examinations of department rec-
ords, that General Crozier 's action with regard to the
Machine Gun Controversy was in every respect jus-
tified and had the full approval of the Secretary of
War. The subject has therefore been investigated
and final definite action taken by the Secretary of
War, which General Crozier, of course, does not seek
to have reversed, but rather reaffirmed.
4. Whatever may have been the teachings of me-
chanical science, the results of shop and field tests,
and the logic of the Machine Gun Controversy be-
the war, the war itself has completely demon-
strated the correctness of the position taken by
General Crozier. There is, therefore, nothing left
uninvestigated, and in denying the request for the
Court of Inquiry the Secretary of War is happy to
rt, as a part of the record of General Crozier,
his confident approval of his entire course in the
matter.
JOHN B. SHURMAN,
Adjutant General."
I replied on September 26th that while I appre-
ions of exoneration and approval
of the Secretary of War, they left me in the same
position as had his former approval, which not only
failed to arrest the attention of Congress and the
public, luit did not stop the attacks of Col. Lewis
which had made the vindication necessary. T stated
that a material element which had been lacking from
my vindication by the \Var Department, and whose
nee could account I'm- the failure of effect, was
sonic expression of condemnation of Col. Lewis for
192 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAI
his false charges, or some disciplinary action toward
that officer, and I renewed my request for a court
of inquiry or, in default of that, for an expression
of opinion by the Secretary of War of the conduct
of all officers concerned in the machine gun con-
troversy and range-finder matter, which I had re-
quested that a court should be instructed to give.
My request was again denied, in the following
letter :
October 2, 1919.
From: The Adjutant General of the Army.
To: Major General William Crozier, U. S. Army,
Eetired, 1735 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington,
D. C.
Subject: Eequest for appointment of a Court of
Inquiry.
You are informed that your application of Sep-
tember 26, 1919, for a reconsideration of the action
heretofore taken upon your request for a Court of
Inquiry has been considered by the Secretary of
War, who directs that you be informed as follows :
General Crozier himself appeared before the same
Committee of the Senate which heard Colonel Lewis.
The whole question of the adequacy of our armament
and the history of the action taken by the Ordnance
Department and the Chief of Ordnance from time
to time was thoroughly surveyed, and to the extent
that there is any allegation of fact in the statements
made by Colonel Lewis, General Crozier ? s state-
ments were placed in juxtaposition to them and the
records of the War Department cited fully. So far
as the statements attributed to Colonel Lewis ex-
press the opinion entertained by him as to the ade-
quacy of General Crozier ? s action as Chief of Ord-
nance, the Secretary of War disagrees entirely with
MACHINE GUNS 19.'*
Colonel Lewis, hut does not feel that he has any
er to discipline him for such an opinion. No
action which the War Department could take would
iter publicity than the action which it has
idy taken. The Secretary of War does not be-
lieve that well-informed persons entertain any other
idea upon this subject than that expressed as the
< f oi'the Secretary of War in the previous memo-
randum. The hope of reaching and correcting the
opinions of uninformed persons on this subject seems
too remote to be entertained. In any case, the con-
troversy is ancient and, in the opinion of the Secre-
tary of War, has been adequately disposed of.
JOHN B. SHURMAN,
Adjutant General.
I had not asked for the discipline of Col. Lewis
for his opinion, but for his unfounded statements of
- and for his improper imputations of motive in
speaking, as an officer, of a bureau of the War De-
partment ; but having failed to secure from the War
Department the action provided for in the articles
of war for an officer who considers himself im-
properly assailed by another, and in tfce absence of
any < xpression from the War Department even
admonitory of Col. Lewis, I have no other re-
course than to make the matter public.
I have dealt with the subject of machine guns and
witli the testimony of Col. Lewis at considerable
"h, because they afford a good illustration of
the kind of criticism which was leveled against
Ordnance Department in the early months of
6 war, and of tin- character of information upon
ich the criticism was based.
194 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
Col. Lewis' status as an officer of the army, and
as a well known inventor of an important weapon
which had met with a pronounced success in the
British service, gave to his testimony a standing
which could very well be relied upon by any one dis-
posed to criticise. Its effect upon the minds of some
of the members of the Senate Military Committee
may be seen from the following quotation from a
speech of Senator Chamberlain, Chairman of the
Committee, made in the Senate on January 24, 1918 :
Take the question of machine guns. I am not
going into the merits of any particular gun. This
has been an old controversy here for years. There
are things that can be said on both sides of it. Here
was the Lewis gun, that was being manufactured in
America for Great Britain. She had 70,000 of them
on the battle front, and the testimony of every Brit-
ish soldier that I have seen is as to the excellent
character of the gun. There are several kinds of
machine guns. America was manufacturing in large
numbers and on large contract the Lewis gun for
export to the allies and was prepared to turn them
out in large quantities. And yet, while we stood
along the edge of a seething volcano, we were tri-
fling along with the Ordnance Department, trying to
find a machine gun. With this war on, and America
in it, we did not even adopt a machine gun until
along in May sometime, and it was not finally
adopted, I believe, until sometime in June. Then
they adopted another gun not the Lewis gun, that
was being used on the battle front in Europe, but a
gun that was still a gun on paper, and it is a gun
on paper to-day I do not care what anybody says
about it because it has never been given a field
test. It has been developed, Mr. President, that all
MAC HIM: GUNS 195
of those guns liave to 1> rimeutcd with and de-
veloped and changed and modified in one form or
another before they can finally become an imple-
ment of warfaiv in the proper sense of the word.
It may be that -the Browning gun, the one adopted,
is the best gun. It is an automatic rifle. There are
two classes of the Lewis gun, one light and one
y. \\V are manufacturing the Lewis gun, and
manufacturing it for aircraft. If they are good for
that, why could we not have adopted the plans then
in vogue, and have manufactured the Lewis gun,
even if it was not the best gun, until final tests had
discovered the best? They are the modern imple-
ments of war with heavy artillery, Mr. President,
and without them America could not get anywhere.
We are going to use them on the aircraft. The reply
to the criticism of the tardiness in adopting a ma-
chine gun is: "Well, we have thirty or forty thou-
sand of them for aircraft, the lighter kind." But,
Mr. President, what I complain of is that they were
not manufactured in large quantities in factories
that were then manufacturing them for the British
Government and for other countries.
I think the Secretary testified in regard to the
coni >r the Browning gun. Contracts are out,
and the trims are to be delivered sometime at vary-
ing dales in -the future. T ask you to read Gen.
-limony. T do not want to go into that,
do not think it would be proper to go into it;
t \\e are advised that we have got some manu-
ctured. ' t i fied sometime during
e middle <.f January that we had nine guns at
t time nine Browning guns nine guns to go
'ist tlie thonsa the machine guns of
lany. It may !) that havinir nine shows that
then- is now an opportunity for quantity production,
the gaii ire < may be ready: but we have !
,USe 1
196 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
in the war ten months, and nothing has been accom-
plished in the way of securing these guns.
From this extract it might be inferred that it was
the American-made Lewis gun which had been sup-
plied in such large numbers to the British service
and had done so well in the war, whereas the great
bulk of the guns for the British had been made in
England, by the Birmingham Small Arms Company.
The Lewis gun of the kind manufactured in America
up to the time of our entry into the war had made
the record on the Mexican border which has been
already described. Notwithstanding that the guns
which we purchased had been manufactured under
contract for the troops of the British Empire, the
right to them was willingly waived, and we were
allowed to have them for our much less important
use than that which was pressing hard upon the
allied forces.
The wording of the speech enables the part quoted
to be connected very directly with Col. Lewis' tes-
timony, especially with the following :
Senator Hitchcock. Have you seen the Browning
gun at all?
Col. Lewis. No, sir; but my associate here has
seen it. The story of the Browning gun is not a
pleasant one, either. When I look upon our National
Army at the sixteen different camps over this coun-
try, it makes me sick at heart. We have no machine
guns except a few Lewis guns that are sent them.
Their machine-gun commanders have been officially
informed by the War Department that no Lewis gun
will go to France.
MACHIM: c;i ID:
Now, I have had experience in making the Lewis
gnus, and I know how long it takes and what expense
ttached to making an interchangeable machine
gun.
Senator Weeks. Even if that statement had been
made, it is not true, because the previous witness
has testified that he is making 40,000 guns that are
going to France.
. I beg your pardon.
Senator Weeks. The previous witness testified
that he was making 40,000 guns to go to France.
Col. Lewis. Oh, you mean aeroplane guns. Those
a iv being manufactured. I am speaking of machine
guns for troops in the National Army encampments.
Tli-y have been officially informed that only Brown-
ing guns will be used by the National Army in
France for ground work.
Senator Hitchcock. Yon say the story of the
Browning gun is a bad one. What do you mean by
thatf
Col. Lewis. You cannot get a definite idea by just
taking a picture or a working drawing. I say that
no such tliinir as a Browning gun, and it will
not be developed in ten months.* They will not turn
out an interchangeable Browning gun from any
factory in America in ten months from to-day.
iHtchrncl-. How long did it take yon to
do that with your own gun?
1 landed in "Birmingham in March,
'. This was fifteen months before the war
thin ten months there were enough Drowning guns in Fr .!
to arm the entire American force.
198 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
started. I had six hundred men employed eighteen
months, working extra hours, before we turned out
the first interchangeable gun in England at a cost
of nearly $2,000,000. It was done in approximately
peace times, because it preceded the war. It would
be much harder to do it now. There were no inter-
changeable guns made in America up to the time
of this war.
Senator Hitchcock. Is the Browning gun a sim-
pler gun than yours?
Col. Lewis. Not as a manufacturing proposition.
I think, in fact, that the machine-gun operations are
practically the same. I have not studied it. The
Browning gun will not do what the Lewis gun will.
It has twenty cartridges in the clip. It will get red
hot after you have fired a hundred or so rounds.
I can fire 2,000 rounds from the Lewis gun in f ve
minutes and pick the gun up from this table and
carry it out. , Of course, that would be a physi-
cal impossibility for any gun like the Browning
gun. You cannot fire 500 rounds in ten minutes
(Page 707.)
Senator Frelinghuysen. You have stated that the
Browning gun is a gun on paper.
Col. Lewis. That is my opinion; yes, at this mo-
ment.
Senator Frelinghuysen. You say no gun not tested
can be effective?
Col. Lewis. Certainly not for the armament of
troops in war.
Senator Frelinghuysen. Has not a model of the
MAUIIM-: (;iTNS 199
Browning gun been built, and is it not under test
now?
Col. Lewis. A model was built, and that model
was subjected to a very severe firing test; yes. I
do not know whether they are under test now or not.
Senator FreliHgliuysen. Why did you say the
Browning- u- im i s only a gun on paper!
Col. Lewis. Because an arsenal test is not a test
for any gun or any weapon of war. There is only
one test.
Senator Frettnglmysen. It is not entirely a gun
on paper, because a model of the gun has been built
and tested.
Col Lewis. Yes, but that model has already been
altered. The gun that they are going to make to
issue to the troops is a modified Browning, different
from the one accepted by the board and recom-
mended by the board.
Senator Frelinghuysen. But more has been ac-
complished than simply paper specifications. A
model has been built and is now under test.
Col. Lrwi*. Yes: but the final specifications, as I
understand it, are not yet completed.
t/ator Frilhtf/huysen. Then it is not really a
paper #1111, because a gun has been built.
Col. Lewi.-. There has been a gun built. I did
not mean to say that
Senator FrrJhinlntji Then your statement
that the gun is on paper is incorrect, because a
model has been built.
Col. Leivis. I do not see the incorrectness of my
200 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
statement, because the final Browning gun that the
Army has contracted for has not yet been built.
Senator "Frelinghuysen. Would you have consid-
ered that the Lewis gun, of which specifications had
been drawn and two models had been made and
tested, a gun on paper?
Col. Lewis. It was a gun under development. It
was not a service model absolutely. In the condition
it was submitted, it was not a gun suitable for mili-
tary purposes, a gun for the armament of troops.
No gun in the development stage is suitable for the
armament of troops in quantities.
Senator Frelinghuysen. The Lewis gun was not
satisfactory.
Col. Lewis. Not in 1913 ; no. I cannot claim that
it was, Senator.
Senator Frelinghuysen. Then your criticism that
the Browning gun is a gun on paper is equally ap-
plicable to the Lewis gun?
Col. Lewis. It is a gun under development.
(Page 714.)
Not all of the members of the Committee were
similarly affected as Senator Chamberlain by Col.
Lewis' testimony, but that some of them were is in-
dicated by the following quotation from an inter-
view with Senator Wadsworth, published in the
New York Times of September 22d :
"The committee has never questioned the excel-
lence of the Browning gun, but it did urge that our
army should be furnished with Lewis guns, easily
obtainable in this country, until the Browning gun
had been thoroughly tested and put into quantity
MACHI.M: (;UNS 201
production. The Ordnanc-- Department failed to
take the Lewis gun for ground use, although it had
given eminent B -lion to the British. While we
.tiling for nearly a year for the Browning
gun to come through, the devoted French had to
supply our troops in ! \vith machine guns of
their own manufacture, as they have also done with
guns of larger caliber."
The pi g narrative shows that the Ordnance
trtment did not wait for the Browning gun to
come through, but did exactly as the Senator says
iould have done; that is, it gave orders for the
Lewis gun as soon as it readied a state of develop-
ment in which its own producers claimed a suc-
: ul test of it with our ammunition, and it then
upied the factory to capacity while making other
ctories ready to turn out the Browning gun. Criti-
cism of this course can only be understood as a
claim that the Department should have given orders
for Lewis guns before the test of April, 1917; that
imediaiely upon the appropriation of funds for
guns in 191 fi, notwithstanding that such action
would have used up our money for a gun which the
that we could get had declared to be
unsatisfactory, instead of for the well known and
thoroughly indorsed Yickers gun, and would have
meant turning down the carefully formed con-
clusions of tin- n advisory agei
which the War Department had known how to
The French Govcrmn -tly eapabl.-
supplying the American I ;!h machine guns.
202 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
and was very anxious to do so. The French capacity
was more than sufficient to supply the needs of the
French troops, and it was to the distinct advantage
of that Government to employ this capacity for the
benefit of the United States, with the resultant off-
set to a portion of the indebtedness of France. The
attitude of the French Government is indicated by
the following quotation from a letter from the
French High Commissioner in Washington to the
Chief of Ordnance, dated September 7, 1917 (CMG-
472. 583/3).
My Government has also proposed to Gen.
Pershing for the next ten divisions sent to France,
2,600 machine guns, thus making a total of 3,340
Hotchkiss machine guns firing the French ammuni-
tion.
Of these 3,340 machine guns, 2,600, about, are to
be delivered before the 1st of January, 1918.
As you can see, the French Government is in a
position to fulfil all requirements of the United
States Expeditionary Forces abroad, so far as heavy
machine guns are concerned.
And from another letter dated December 5, 1917
(CMG-472. 574/8), in regard to the manufacture of
the light type of machine gun and automatic rifle:
I beg to state that I am informed by my Govern-
ment that the factory manufacturing the 25,000
Chauchat rifles for the American Army expects to
have the whole lot completed about March, 1918.
Under these conditions, I am directed to ask you
whether you will be prepared to place a further
MAC HIM; GUNS 203
i-nler ami what will be the importance of this order.
This information is necessary to plan out the out-
put of the factories concerned for 1918.
The French had no difficulty in supplying our
ns in Franc - with lloiclikiss machine guns and
I'hauchat automatic rifles as long as they were
led, which was until the end of April, 1918.
divisions which went over in May and June of
i hat year were all armed with Chauchat automatic
riiles, but they had American-made Vickers machine
.u:uns. The divisions which went over after June
all armed with Browning machine guns and
Urowning automatic rifles, made of course in the
Tinted States. By the time the Armistice was
signed, enough Browning guns of both classes had
arrived in France to equip all the American forces,
but the change was not completely made from the
guns which they were using, because of the ex-
ly active operations which were going on.
vn
FIELD ARTILLERY
THERE is probably no one in the United States who
is not aware of the fact that we entered the Great
War with a very inadequate supply of field artil-
lery. When the Senate Military Committee com-
menced its investigation of the War Department,
in December, 1917, this shortage was naturally
a very prominent subject of inquiry and criticism.
The criticism was divided under four principal
heads: the inadequacy of original supply; the strain
put upon our Allies in the effort to meet the short-
age ; the slowness of production of American artil-
lery after our entrance into the war; and certain
special allegations concerning the reasons for this
slowness. An important arraignment of the Ord-
nance Department was contained in the New York
speech of Senator Chamberlain, which has been pre-
viously referred to, and is expressed in the follow-
ing quotation from his speech of January 24, 1918,
in the Senate;
"Mr. President, the Secretary of War, in his gen-
eral statement to the country which was carefully
written and prepared tells us that $3,200,000,000
have been appropriated for the Ordnance Depart-
204
TIKLl) AHTILLKKV 205
ment, and contracts have been let for $1,677,000,000;
all of which is true. But the Secretary i'ails to tell
Mr. President, in his statement to the country,
and it only comes out in the course of a cross-exam-
ination, that America stands to-day unprepared so
as ordnance is concerned. I challenge anybody
to read the testimony and come to any other con-
clusion. Poor, bleeding France, my friends bled
white, not only for her own life and for the liberty
of her own citizens but for America as well is to-
day furnishing our troops as they arrive in France
the necessary heavy ordnance and machine guns for
aircraft and for ground service. Why, Mr. Presi-
dent, it' we relied upon the Ordnance Department
in this emergency to furnish our troops with the
heavy ordnance and this is largely a war of artil-
lery to-day the war would be over before we ever
got to the front.
Why, tin ! timouy, if I correctly remember
it, before the Military Affairs Committee that along
some of these fronts the cannon and heavy can-
non, if you pl.-ase are located five yards apart for
a distance <>f six miles: and yet America, this great
and magnil untry, is dependent upon poor
France to deliver our ordnance! Did France agree
in order to win ovor reluctant America?
Did she agree to furnish it in order to oncour
and hearten America? What would happen to
France with the d.-lwle in Italy, Senators, wl
s are and where the troops of her
Allies ir to furnish ordnance to America?
What is France to do for them in case of an
206 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
emergency and a desperate battle for the life of one
of her Allies?
I will not go into details, I do not think it would
be proper to go into details, but I call to the atten-
tion of the Senate the confidential evidence of Gen.
Crozier himself as to the amount of contracts which
the Secretary speaks of as having been let, and as
to the progress of the work. If the Administration
wanted to be fair with the American people and
they are entitled to fair treatment, and to know
these things why did not the distinguished Sec-
retary, whom I hold in the very highest regard as
an able and intellectual gentleman, tell the Ameri-
can people how long it would take to make deliveries
under these contracts and let them assist in getting
ready for this terrible cataclysm that not only con-
fronts America but confronts the world!"
The Senator's charges were undoubtedly based
partly upon his general information in regard to the
situation acquired from the discussions which had
taken place, and partly upon the testimony which
had been given before his committee. The testi-
mony which appeared most directly to support his
charges was that of Col. Lewis, which, upon this
particular point, was partially as follows, on Decem-
ber 22, 1917:
"The equipment of our troops in France, the piti-
ful handful of men, hardly equal to the casualty
lists of the British that we get week by week the
equipment of those men is an outrage and a disgrace
to this country.
FIELD AKTII.I.KKY 207
They have neither machine guns nor a suitable
supply of rifles; they have- no field artillery except
what we are begging and borrowing from France,
which is stripped to the skin. AVe are not going
to get armament to them in ten months from to-day
nor one year from to-day. We will not have 1,000,000
armed men in the field, because America will be abso-
!y unable to supply the arms and ammunition
required. Somebody is responsible for that; some-
thing is responsible; some system is responsible for
it. Can you fix the responsibility?
I can tell you a part of it. As to this particular
question of guns and ammunition, the responsibility
primarily rests upon the Bureau of Ordnance of
the \Var Department. There is no escape from that
conclusion. Gen. Crozier to-day is more responsible
for the obsolete and inadequate equipment that the
United States forces have than any other living
man." ( 05.)
1 am not excusing or trying in any manner to
explain away the unfortunate shortage in artillery or
in any other class of war material, which the coun-
appaivntly awoke to only after we got well into
the war, but which T had been well aware of for a
long time. The condition ought not to have exi
but T claim freedom of responsibility for it upon
the part of the Ordnance Department. In common
with all other officers who were in a position to make
recommend- ! had in my annual reportfl and in
my hearings before committees of Congress persis-
ly urged that bigger appropriations be made,
208 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
especially for field artillery and field artillery am-
munition. I could fill a volume with, quotations, but
the following will serve sufficiently for illustration.
In my hearing on the Fortification Bill before the
proper sub-committee of the Committee on Appro-
priations of the House of Bepresentatives, on Janu-
ary 25, 1906, I stated as follows:
"Let me explain to you what this appropriation
will do, if you decide to make it. I am hoping to
supply for use in war 250 batteries of guns of this
class. . . . That will be at the rate of two guns per
1,000 men for an army of 500,000, which is a very
moderate estimate. . . . Thus far there has been
provided by appropriations . . . sixty-nine of these
batteries. . . . That will leave such a number to
be provided that at the rate at which they are esti-
mated for in this item, a supply will be completed
in the year 1919. . . .
I would like to say, in connection with this item,
that it is a very important one, because this material
is of a class that cannot be procured on short notice.
It takes a great while to build these guns and to
build the carriages and to get the ammunition for
them."
And in my hearing before the Senate Committee
upon the same bill, on February 27, 1906, there oc-
curred the following:
The Chairman: . . . The subcommittee had
thought it unnecessary to have any hearings on the
pending bill until they received your communication
dealing mostly with the necessity for a reserve sup-
FIELD ARTILLERY
209
ply of ammunition. .
ferred to is as follows:
The communication re-
WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE,
Washington, February 23, 1906.
THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
Sir:
I have the honor to request that the attention of
the Senate be invited to the following matters with
reference to the bill (H. R. 14171) making appro-
priations for fortifications, etc., now pending before
that body.
FIELD ARTILLERY.
This department is endeavoring to bring into
existence a supply of 250 batteries, which is in the
very moderate proportion of two guns per 1,000 men
for an army of 500,000. The appropriation carried
by lines 1 to 5 of the bill, added to an appropriation
carried in the pending Army bill for batteries for
the militia, will permit the construction of eleven
batteries. At this rate the procurement of the sup-
ply needed will be delayed until the year 1923, sev-
enty batteries having been previously provided for.
Ammunition and mobile artillery are the items of
material in which military preparation of the United
States is now most behind.
Very respectfully,
WILLIAM CROZIER,
Brig.-Gen., Chief of Ordnance, U. 8. A.
stiov: Kindly explain to us, General, the field
artillery; whore it is manufactured, and your recom-
mendation therefor; why tho appropriation was so
210 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
largely reduced in the House ; what motive influen
them there, and also your views relative not only to
the necessity, but the policy of the Government con-
tinuing this work in the expectation of completing
these guns and carriages.
Gen. Crozier . . . The estimate which I submitted
to the Secretary of War for this purpose called for
about $1,200,000. With that amount and with money
amounting to about $550,000, which is carried by
the Army appropriation bill for the purpose of pro-
curing batteries for issue to the militia, I expected
to procure this field artillery at such a rate that the
250 batteries, which I think are necessary, would
have been .supplied by the year 1916. By direction
of the Secretary of War I reduced the estimate
from $1,200,000 to $600,000. That so increased the
time necessary that the earliest date at which we
would under it have been able to get our entire
reserve would have been 1919. Now this estimate of
$600,000 has been further reduced by the bill, as
it has passed the House of Eepresentatives, to
$310,000. With this amount I shall be able to get
only three batteries of field artillery, it not all being
available for the purchase of field artillery, but the
remainder going for other items which are men-
tioned in the bill. These three batteries, added to
the eight which are provided for in the Army Appro-
priation Bill, will make eleven batteries, which are
all I can manufacture during the coming year unless
the appropriation is increased. Now, seventy bat-
teries have already been provided for. Two hundred
and fifty being required, one hundred and eighty are
F1KLD ARTILLERY 211
left. One hundred and eighty batteries at eleven
batteries a year would require a time until about the
year 1923 for their procurement. This is a plain
statement of the case, gentlemen, and when I have
made it you know as much about the subject as I do."
In my annual report to the Secretary of War for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1910, I stated the
following in regard to the supply of field or mobile
artillery:
' ' The supply of this material provided for to date
is less adequate than that of any other class of
fighting equipment. The types needed have been
developed and some of each are under manufacture,
but the appropriations do not permit of production
in any considerable quantity. It is considered that
in case of an emergency of any importance the field
artillery equipment would be found to be insufficient,
and it is consequently thought that the financial con-
ditions which have rendered impossible the acquisi-
tion of a much larger reserve are unfortunate. "
The following extracts are from my hearings on
the Fortification Bill and the Army Bill at various
subsequent times:
From my hearing on the Fortification Bill, Jan-
uary 12, 1911:
"Nothing is, perhaps, more striking than that as
i lake some progress it is impressed upon us how
very slowly we are going, and how far we have yet
to go. I think I have called it to the attention of
the committee for several years past that as regards
our preparation for war, we are worse off in this
matter of field artillery than we are in anything else
212 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
that we have, connected with the materiel. We are
better off with reference to the seacoast armament;
we are better off with reference to small arms; we
are better off with reference to small arms ammuni-
tion; we are better off with reference to personal
equipment of the soldier and with reference to horse
equipment for the cavalry, than we are with refer-
ence to this item of field artillery."
From my hearing on the Army bill, March 11,
1912:
"Question. It takes a long time to manufacture
these field guns?
Gen. Crosier. Yes.
Question. How long does it take ?
Gen. Crozier. I do not think that we could count
on getting a battery delivered in less than a year
from the time the order was given. I do not mean
to say that it would take a year for each battery,
but deliveries would not begin until a year after
the order was given.
Question. Is it very important to have them on
hand?
Gen. Crozier. Yes ; it is the slowest manufacture
of any of the fighting materiel which we need."
From my hearing on the Fortification Bill, Janu-
ary 15, 1912:
"Question. What I am trying to get at is this : At
what period of time would it be desirable, assuming
that the army had to be recruited up to its strength
for purposes of war, to have the guns to deliver?
Gen. Crozier. I should think that we ought to
have them within a couple of months, under the
FIELD ARTILLERY 213
present circumstances, of the time at which it is
decided to put the army on its war footing. How-
ever, I think the circumstances ought to be such,
and it is the duty of the Government to have them
such, that materiel would be needed in a fortnight.
Question. I appreciate that ; but in the absence of
that condition existing, is there any particular need
of our advancing so rapidly in the supply of this ma-
teriel? You now have all the batteries that are
needed by the Regular Army, with some reserve;
you now have all the batteries and more than can
be distributed among the militia, and the question
necessarily arises, in connection with as large an
item as this, as to the present need of supplying
batteries in the amount requested.
Gen. Crozier. The Regular Army, of course, is
such a small force that the fact of its being com-
pletely equipped with everything that it requires is
one of no great moment, when you consider the force
that ought to be equipped. The whole idea of prep-
aration for war in this country is and ought to be
the maintenance of a small force continually in
the service and the rapid expansion of that force
in time of war, which rapid expansion ought to be
possible to be made with men who will already have
had some training. Now, if we should ever arrive
at that state, as I say, we would need this materiel.
If there should be a state of confusion, lack of prep-
aration, or absence of method by which the Army
could be increased in size rapidly and effectively,
I should not like to say how much we might be slack
in one element to meet the slackness in others.
214 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
Question. The present army is more than sufficient
in size for any offensive movement that we would
ever contemplate!
Gen. Crosier. I do not think so, Mr. Chairman,
by any means.
Question. Your idea of an army of 450,000 men
is a defensive army of that size, is it not?
Gen. Crozier. Yes. But the number of troops that
we could use offensively is very different from the
army that we have now. Of course, I might go on
and amplify that, but I could not tell you anything
that you are probably not as well aware of as I am
with regard to the possibility and necessity of using
a larger force in any of the problems that may con-
front the country.
I might refer to the fact that I have been asking
for a good deal more than I have gotten, because I
have been trying to impress upon the committee
that this class of material is that in regard to which
our straits are greatest. We are better prepared
to enter upon a war with respect to everything
else that is to be supplied in the way of materiel than
field artillery and field artillery ammunition. It is
sometimes stated irresponsibly, of course that
we never get through asking and that we always
represent ourselves as in a deplorable condition."
Again in my annual report for the year ending
June 30, 1913, which was made in October of that
year, less than a year before the outbreak of the
European War, I said in regard to the supply of
mobile artillery:
FIELD ARTILLERY 215
"As stated in my last annual report, the supply
of this class of equipment is less satisfactory than
that of any other furnished by the Ordnance De-
partment, except the ammunition for field artillery.
The appropriations for the last two years for this
purpose have been somewhat larger than for several
years prior to that time, but it is hoped that still
larger annual appropriations may be made, as even
the present rate is not such as to provide a sufficient
amount within a reasonable time."
Notwithstanding these appeals, no appropriation
as large as $3,000,000 was made for field artillery
within the years since the Spanish- American War,
and, as appears from the extracts, the annual appro-
priation was often very much less than that sum,
until after the passage of the National Defense Act,
on June 3, 1916, when the sums appropriated in
the Fortification Bill and in the Army Bill, passed
respectively in July and August of that year, for
field artillery aggregated $16,321,000. While this
indicated a significant advance in congressional
ideas with reference to military preparation, and
provided a sum which, it it had been annually sup-
plied from the period when I had commenced
pleading, would have brought us to the war in much
better condition of accumulated supply and usefully
equipped plants, the adequacy of the sum for the
'((uipment in field artillery of an army of 1,000,000
men may be judged from the amount which was
asked for and appropriated for this purpose during
the first three months following our declaration of
war with Germany on April 6, 1917, which was
216 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD
$171,900,000; and the still further inadequacy of
the sum for providing artillery for the larger army
which we soon saw we w^ould have to raise, can be
understood from the appropriation made in the Act
of October 6, 1917, for the purpose, which was
$225,000,000.
The information contained in the above extracts
had been brought by me to Senator Chamberlain's
attention before he made his New York speech, in
my hearings before his committee, but perhaps the
attitude of his mind toward the source of this infor-
mation can be grasped from the following quotation
from his speech in the Senate :
"Whenever you get a soldier who has not any
other ambition than an ambition to serve his coun-
try, you will invariably get the truth. It is not
always so with one of these swivel-chair artists who
wants to go higher and from whom you cannot ascer-
tain what the truth is."
The passage referred to testimony of Gen. E. St.
J. Greble, before the Senate Military Committee,
in regard to the equipment and the sanitary and
other conditions in the division which he was com-
manding. Gen. Greble is a capable officer whose
testimony is worthy of all credence, but in regard
to ordnance equipment he simply stated his short-
ages, indicating his belief that they occurred through
necessity for utilizing the limited military sup-
plies in equipping the first divisions to sail for
France, and did not indicate any blame for the limi-
tations of the supply. The passage apparently indi-
cates the initial handicap of a staff officer in laying
FIELD ARTILLERY; 217
the condition of his department before Senator
Chamberlain, as compared with those whose infor-
mation was necessarily less complete.
When the subject of responsibility for shortages
was brought up in the Senate Military Committee
hearings, I did not charge the responsibility against
Congress ; but I stated that it should be placed upon
the whole people of the United States. The people
had taken no interest in the matter of military prep-
aration, during the series of years following, as well
as preceding, the Spanish- American War. They had
concerned themselves, after the manner which they
well know how to make effective, with the senti-
ments of their representatives upon the tariff, the
currency, the control of the trusts, and the regula-
tion of the railroads, but they had displayed no curi-
osity nor imposed any instructions in regard to mili-
tary matters, and there was no constituency in the
country in which the return of the member depended
in the slightest degree upon his attitude on any
military question. At as late a period as that of
thr political campaign of 1916 a leading member of
Congress told me that he found that an attempt
to talk upon the subject of military preparation in
the great Middle West speedily emptied the hall,
and that he had to make hasty study to prepare him-
self upon other subjects, when he had considered
himself well prepared for the campaign by reason
of the knowledge which his special committee service
in Congress had given him on the subject of arma-
ment and organization. His audiences had an in-
terest in the European War, and would listen to
218 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WA]
information about it; but they apparently had no
interest in getting ready for a possible part in it.
The scheme of the National Defence Act did not
contemplate preparation for entering the European
War, for it provided a plan of military organiza-
tion, and supply of the resulting forces, to extend
over a period of five years. While many thought
that the war would not be of short duration, it is
evident that a five year plan, entered upon in the
summer of 1916, was not made with relation to it.
While the responsibility for military shortages
must, therefore, be borne by the whole people, ulti-
mately, the theory of representative government
places the immediate charge upon the Administra-
tion and upon Congress; at least to the extent to
which these agencies of the people are expected ts
be leaders in policy, instead of followers of the mul-
titude. All through the period of preparation the
estimates for funds of such military agencies as the
Ordnance Department were repeatedly reduced in
the War Department, by direction of the Adminis-
tration; and after the European War was in full
progress the Administration discouraged warnings
of military unpreparedness as being hysterical, and,
through the mouth of the Secretary of State, op-
posed even reasonable defensive measures, on the
ground that they might be taken as an indication of
our intention to take part in the war. Under these
long-continued conditions, it would appear that, if
any element of the Republic ought to escape criti-
cism for failure to exercise proper foresight, it
should be the military element ; perhaps because its
FIELD ARTILLERY 219
personnel were paid to concern themselves with the
subject.
In this state of affairs it is hard to understand
the object or the bearing of the criticisms of the
War Department for accepting assistance from the
French and English governments in the supply of
artillery and machine guns. While we all deplore
the necessity for this assistance the necessity was
upon us, and criticism for yielding to it and making
the best of the situation is inexplicable. The will-
ingness, and more, of the French and English allies
to render this aid is exhibited by certain expressions
from them which accompanied the negotiations for
the supply of artillery for the American forces.
Upon the conclusion of the first arrangement for
the purchase of 75 mm. field guns and 155 mm.
howitzers the two most important pieces of artil-
lery from the French Government, the High Com-
missioner of that Kepublic, Mr. Andre Tardieu, pre-
pared a notice for publication in the French press
in order to furnish the French citizens with infor-
mation in regard to our transaction, of which his
own estimate was shown by his expressions. The
notice was as follows:
Washington, 14 Juillet, 1917.
PRESIDEXCE CONSEII,,
Copie a Guerre-Annninont,
(Note for ihe French Press)
Translation.
An important agreement has boon concluded be-
tween the United States Government and the French
High Commissioner, ^Innsicur Andre Tardieu.
220 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR,
According to said agreement the American Gov-
ernment adopts the two principal pieces of materiel
of French artillery, the 75 millimeter field gun and
the 155 millimeter rapid-fire howitzer.
The Expeditionary Corps of Gen. Pershing has
received from the French authorities, on arrival, its
field artillery, its rapid-fire heavy artillery and its
trench artillery, which, of course, will accelerate
its taking place in the line.
At the same time the artillery production in
France and in America has been organized so that
the American Army of 1,000,000 men which is about
to be recruited, will receive without delay, as the
units are formed, the necessary heavy and light guns.
The negotiations taken up for the first time at
the end of May between Monsieur Andre Tardieu,
French High Commissioner, Monsieur Ganne, Chief
of War Munitions of the High Commission, and
Brig.-Gen. Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, were char-
acterized by two ideas.
On one hand the American Government wished to
adopt the quickest solution, in order to realize in
the shortest time the complete armament of its
forces.
On the other hand, with great foresight they
attached particular importance to realizing, for the
American and French armies, called to fight on the
same battlefields, uniformity of munitions, of such
capital importance from a tactical point of view.
In view of these two desired aims, the French
High Commissioner was able, thanks to the develop-
ment since 1916 of the machine equipment of our
war munitions factories, to furnish Gen. Crozier
with a detailed plan of industrial collaboration
which by the united efforts of the French and Ameri-
can industries, will assure the complete realization
of the American program.
FIELD ARTILLERY 221
The double certainty of rapid production and
uniformity of munitions, decided the United States
Government, despite the incontestable value of its
own materiel, especially that of the three-inch field
gun, of which the superior qualities are universally
recognized, to adopt our 75 and our short 155.
The negotiations on these lines were rapidly com-
pleted at the end of somewhat over one month ; they
were concluded this week by a complete under-
standing fixing the quantity and the price of the
materiel to be furnished.
This understanding susceptible of important fur-
ther developments, is a precious proof of the esteem
in which the most powerful industrial country of
the world holds our engineers and our mechanical
constructors. It has also a practical bearing of great
value.
From the military point of view it is evident that
uniformity of type of guns and munitions for armies
fighting on the same battle-fields, is an appreciable
guarantee of safety and efficiency. The supply and
volume of fire are thereby equally facilitated. Unity
results spontaneously from identity of weapons.
Finally, all tactical results, obtained by the experi-
ence of three years of war, are without previous
adaptation, assimilated by the American Army.
From the industrial viewpoint, the unity of effort
created between the manufacturing plants of the
two countries, will produce happy results without
precedent, not only during the war, but also subse-
quently. Common action provides the best means
of mutual acquaintance and for preparation of the
close co-operation which it is desired to organize for
thr t'u1un>.
From the financial standpoint it is possible to
hope that the purchase by the United States of
French artillery materiel will create an improve-
222 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
inent in exchange, which under the existing relations
of America and her European allies, is as much to
be desired by the United States as by France.
It is also likely that the adoption of the metric
system, which has been officially requested by the
American Bureau of Standards and which is much
to be desired from the point of view of future
Franco-American interests, may be thereby facili-
tated.
These are, briefly stated, some of the results, cer-
tain or probable, of the agreement between the
French High Commissioner and the American Gov-
ernment.
The dominant note of the agreement lies in the
proof it gives of the unshakable resolution of the
American Government to achieve in the shortest
time the maximum of military strength, and on the
other hand it proves the intimate and active co-oper-
ation existing between the United States and
France.
Mr. Baker, Secretary of War, and Gen. Crozier,
Chief of Ordnance of the American Government,
have given proof in this case of the broadest spirit
of comprehension and decision and have succeeded
in a few weeks in securing for the American troops
artillery of the first order.
Our High Commissioner at Washington speaks in
unbounded praise of their cooperation with him.
We may add that the first French guns arrived
last week in the United States and that the Artillery
School of Saumur has been placed at the disposal of
the American Army for training purposes.
Later, the French Government proposed to fur-
nish a supply of more powerful pieces of artillery,,
namely, 155 mm. guns, following negotiations which
had already been opened in France with Gen. Persh-
FIELD ARTILLERY 223
ing. The letter from the French High Commissioner
in Washington conveying this proposal was as fol-
lows:
Washington, D. C.,
August 22, 1917.
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE FRENCH
REPUBLIC IN THE UNITED STATES.
To Brigadier-General William Crozier, Chief of
Ordnance, War Department, New York City.
My dear General:
Confirming the conversation you had yesterday
with Col. Remond and Capt. de Jarny, I beg to
inform you that I have received a cable from my
Government stating that, at the request of Gen.
Pershing, the French Government have proposed
the sale of forty-eight 155 mm. guns of Filloux type.
These guns will be delivered at the rate of one
battalion (twelve guns) per month for each month
from September to December.
It will be possible -to continue deliveries at the
same rate after January 1, 1918, and probably to
increase this proportion.
It should be noted that it will be difficult for the
French Government to supply the' necessary tractors
and other motor vehicles entering into the composi-
tion of one battery of 155 mm. guns.
I note from verbal information received that your
( lovermnent will be in a position to supply the neces-
Bary tractors in December. I am therefore cabling
my Government, asking whether they ran make the
necessary arrangements to provide caterpillar trac-
tors and trucks corresponding to the batteries due
in September, October and November.
T would greatly appreciate, my dear General, if
you could let me know whether the United States
224 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
Government is prepared to give me an order for the
guns in question and under which conditions.
I beg to remain, my dear General,
Yours faithfully,
ANDRE TARDIEU.
An order for the 155 mm. guns was given, and
certain of these pieces were immediately turned over
to our forces in France while a larger supply was
put in manufacture. The supply of 155 mm. howit-
zers by the French proceeded more rapidly than
had been anticipated when negotiations were first
entered into ; that is, the French Government found
itself better able than it had promised to make
prompt deliveries ; of which I was informed by the
following letter from the High Commissioner:
Washington, D. C.,
September 26, 1917.
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
IN THE UNITED STATES,
To the Carriage Division, Office of the Chief of
Ordnance, U. 8. A., 1703 New YorJc Ave., N. W.,
Washington.
Sir:
2. I wish also to confirm that, as per your request,
48 Schneider Howitzers will be ready for the 15th
of October instead of 30, as originally provided.
Yours faithfully,
ANDRE TARDIEU.
When the Commission headed by Col. House was
sent to Europe to confer with the highest British
and French authorities in regard to the scheme of
FIELD ARTILLERY 225
cooperation of the allies, in the autumn of 1917,
the supply of the American forces with artillery
was carefully considered, and the decision as to
the part to be played by European factories in a
coordinated effort to utilize the productive capacity
of the allies was expressed in a cablegram from Gen.
Tasker H. Bliss, Chief of Staff of the United States
Army, who accompanied the Commission. Extracts
from this cablegram are as follows :
Received at the War Department December 5,
1917, 7 :17 A. M. 1, CO. London.
THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Washington.
..*
... in order to insure the equipment with artillery
and ammunition of the American troops as fast as
they arrive in France, the Ministers of Munitions of
France and England, and Perkins, representing the
United States, have exhaustively examined the situ-
ation and adopted the following resolutions for
their respective governments :
"The representatives of Great Britain and
France state that their production of artillery (field,
medium and heavy), is now established on so large
a scale that they (are) able to equip completely all
American divisions as they arrive in France during
the year 1918 with the best makes of British and
French guns and howitzers. . . . With a view
therefore first to expedite and facilitate the equip-
ment of the American armies in France and second
to securing the maximum ultimate development of
the ammunition supply with the minimum strain
upon available tonnage, the representatives of
Great Britain and France propose that the Amer-
,
226 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
lean field, medium and heavy artillery be supplied
during 1918 and as long after as may be found con-
venient from British and French gun factories. "...
(Signed) BLISS.
These exhibits are conclusive as to the attitude
of the French and English governments toward
the task of supplying our troops with artillery.
There was, of course, perfectly good reason why,
notwithstanding their three years' expenditure of
effort, they were in position to give us such effec-
tive and much-needed assistance. Their own manu-
facturing capacity had been much enlarged in order
to provide the initial equipment in artillery of their
own greatly increased forces, and to supply the fur-
ther demand occasioned by the augmentation of the
proportion of artillery to other branches of the
service which experience in the war had shown to be
necessary. By the time of our entrance into the war
their factories had filled this program, and their
capacity was much greater than was necessary to
make good the current wastage and was, therefore,
available for arming our troops.
As to our own program, both for artillery and
machine guns, and the question whether it ought not
to have been smaller in order to insure earlier fruit
from it, it must be remembered that the experience
of our Allies, and especially of the British, in failing
to see large enough at the beginning of the war, and
to inaugurate means for an ample supply, had been
somewhat bitter; and with this experience before
us the American military authorities could not have
escaped just criticism if we had made the same
FIELD ARTILLERY
227
mistake. The event bore out the judgment exercised ;
for while the great flow of American-made artillery
to Europe did not commence before the conclusion
of the fighting, a certain flow had commenced, the
evidence of which is the 2,000 complete artillery
units gun, carriage, limber, etc., which were pro-
duced here for ourselves and our Allies between our
declaration of war and the signing of the Armis-
tice. This output of finished artillery^ coupled with
the supply of over 14,000 gun forgings and a large
number of other partially finished artillery com-
ponents to our allies, and the delivery of finished
artillery furnished by them to the American forces,
prevented any shortage for the troops on the firing
line during the continuance of hostilities. The abun-
dant provision for further hostilities was thus not
secured at the price of any skimping of the fighters
during the active operations; while the 2,000 com-
pleted American guns were over 85 per cent of
the total number of guns in action in the American
Expeditionary Force during the war, although only
800 of the 2,000 were shipped abroad.
Senator Chamberlain also charged the Ordnance
Di-purtnu'iit with great inertia after the outbreak of
ihr European War. The following quotation is a
further illustration of his state of mind:
"What has th<> Ordnance Department been doing
ice 1914! Was there even a half-witted American
itizen who at the very outset did not know and
ali/e that tin a chance that America might
become involved? There were omens in the sky,
colleagues, that indicated that America would
228 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
become involved, notwithstanding her desire to keep
out. She could not keep out. What was the Ord-
nance Department doing! Nothing. Here we were
from August, 1914, until the declaration of war in
April, 1917, with the Ordnance Department lying
supinely upon its back, making no plans, construct-
ing no gauges, manufacturing no dies, doing abso-
lutely nothing to ascertain what were the possi-
bilities in raw material and the possibilities of
manufacture. It would not have taken any time, it
would not have cost much, if anything, to have done
that. Congress appropriated quite a large sum in
two or three appropriation bills for the purpose of
manufacturing dies, jigs, and gauges to be used
in the construction of all of these implements of
artillery warfare. That money has not been ex-
pended; and yet every business man and every
sensible man in this country knows that for quantify
production it is absolutely necessary to have the
gauges and the jigs and the dies, so that when you
are ready to manufacture all you have to do is
to send them out, so that guns may be manuf actured
along those lines. What was the Ordnance Depart-
ment doing? Nothing."
Testimony in regard to the plan for the manu-
facture and supply of gauges, templates and other
like auxiliaries is found on pages 243-245 of the
hearings before the Senate Military Committee.
The testimony shows that of the sum of $2,050,000
which had been appropriated for gauges, jigs, fix-
tures, etc., $1,728,000 had been allotted in manufac-
turing orders at the time of the hearing. When the
FIELD ARTILLERY 229
first appropriations became available, negotiations
were opened with the tool and gauge manufacturers
of the United States for carrying out their object,
and earnest attention was given to this highly spe-
cialized subject. The first appropriation, however,
had been made as late as the summer of 1916, and
the whole plan was necessarily of a character to re-
quire looking to the future for results of any very
groat importance. Every person with any knowl-
edge of manufacturing methods understands that
tin* tool, gauge and fixture equipment for an exten-
sive output by the methods of quantity production
is a proposition of a long time of execution, and it
should require nothing more than a statement of
dates to see at once that the contingency for which
the appropriations were intended to provide some
preparation was upon us before there was any pos-
sibility of effective results from the plan. The
gauge project of the Ordnance Department included
the early loan of Dr. Fisher by the United States
Bureau of Standards, and his commission as a ma-
jor in the department for taking charge of this very
extensive matter. The close attention given to it
and the value of the cooperation of the great gauge
makers of the country are evidenced by the fine de-
LTI > of Intel-changeability which was secured in all
tin- manufacture of standardized materiel during
tin 1 war.
The criticism of the Ordnance Department for
delay in the manufacture of artillery was joined in
Senator Wadsworth in an interview which was
printed in the New York Times on September 22,
230 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
1918. In this interview the Senator was reported as
saying :
6 'Knowing that our troops in the field have been
obliged to call upon the French for practically all
their artillery; knowing, for instance, that at the
first independent operation of the American Army,
that of the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, a very
few American-made guns were in operation, we
have felt it our imperative duty to inquire into
the conditions that produced this situation. Why
should it exist when the United States had been
at war for seventeen months and after we have
appropriated over a billion dollars for the construc-
tion of ordnance?"
This statement might produce the impression that
as late as September, 1918, our army had had no
field artillery, and that the portion of the arny in I
France had been obliged to turn to the French Gov-
ernment or do without altogether ; while as a matter
of fact, as heretofore stated in this account, the'
supply by the French Government had been carefully j
arranged by the Ordnance Department from the be- j
ginning, with the cordial approval of that Govern- i
ment which was anxious to furnish the artillery^
while the American initial supply and that which had ;
been manufactured since the beginning of the war,,
which would have been much more than enough for
our troops engaged at St. Mihiel, had been kept in
the United States for the training of new regiments.
The Senator, in the continuation of his interview
stated the reason for the delay in the manufacture
of American artillery as follows :
FIELD ARTILLERY 231
"Upon investigation we encountered these facts:
It seems that in July, 1917, the French Government
offered us the use of its priceless secret of the
famous French 75s. You will realize its peculiar
and inestimable value if you recall the well-known
fact that it is often said that these 75s saved Paris
in 1914, while they have at all times been the back-
bone of the French artillery service. The secret
of their mechanism lies in their recuperator, which
is assembled in the French factories with every
safeguard for secrecy. Although the Germans have
captured hundreds of these guns and have many
times pulled them apart in efforts to discover the
secret of their construction, they have never yet
been able to make a gun the equal of or in any way
similar to those French 75s. The exquisitely deli-
it e mechanism of the recuperator has always defied
teir analysis. However, this offer apparently did
lot appeal to the War Department, which failed to
ike advantage of it. Instead, the American Ord-
ince Department decided to develop and perfect
design of gun carriage and recuperator which,
it was confidently believed, would be superior to
French and all other models. Orders were given
'or several thousands of these American 75s."
This statement would be calculated to lead any
to suppose that there was some definite secret
>f manufacture of the French 75 mm. gun which
)iild be imparted directly as a piece of informa-
tion to the Ordnance Department, and would enable
it, and manufacturers informed by it, to proceed
it once with the production of this weapon in quan-
232 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
titles. This is so far from being the case that, at
the time of the commencement of the arrangements
with reference to the supply of French artillery to us,
the representative of the French Government as-
sured the Ordnance Department that the department
would not be able to make the recuperator of the
French 75 mm. gun carriage until after a long
course of practice under instruction, and cited in
support of this advice the inability of the Germans,
which the Senator mentions, to manufacture these
recuperators, even with the assistance of captured
French guns, which, of course, they were able to
minutely examine. With this warning the Ordnance
Department, while giving orders for the manufac-
ture in France of a large number of French guns,
and arranging for the continuance of the manufac-
ture in the United States of guns of its own models
and of British models which was already under way,
proceeded to take all possible steps for learning how
to manufacture the French recuperator, so that it
might have this knowledge upon need for its use.
To this end, it sent experts to French factories,
secured the visit to this country of French experts
and procured samples of the French 75 mm. guns
for examination and tryout, as well as making close
study of the French drawings of the recuperator of
the 75 mm. gun carriage, which were not received
in detail until as late as December, 1917, and were
then found to be incomplete. All this constituted
the most earnest effort which it was known how to
make to master this particular piece of manufacture
which the Department had been assured was so dif-
FIELD ARTILLERY 233
ficult to learn, even with the best instruction. We
speedily learned that the so-called secret was a very
small part of the matter, but that the real difficulty
lay in the time required to train a great body of
workmen in the special and peculiar skill necessary
for manufacturing, fitting together and adjusting to
its work this nice mechanism. We learned to under-
stand why it had taken the French, as they had told
us, years to accomplish this.
In the meantime, among other means for securing
a supply of American-made artillery of this caliber,
the Ordnance Department gave orders for the con-
tinued manufacture of American 75s, known as the
model of 1916, which had already been experimented
with and were in course of further production at
the time. The American orders were not for a car-
riage of a design to be developed and perfected, but
for one which had already been under development
during the course of three years of experimentation,
and was under orders for manufacture in the limited
quantities which the appropriations before the war
1>ermitted. Further improvement in it was con-
cmplated, but this was to come on at a later period,
o be applied if it should prove successful.
In support of the reasons which he had advanced
or the delay in the manufacture in America of 75
mm. gun carriages, the Senator proceeded in his
interview as follows:
" After months of effort and the failure to pro-
duce the carriages and recuperators, manufacturers
who had undertaken these contracts protested to the
Ordnance Department that the carriages and recu-
234 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
perators could not be turned out in quantity produc-
tion. They were too complicated.
Toward the end of February, 1918, the Ordnance
Department was forced to the same conclusion, can-
celled contracts for four-fifths of the American de-
signed carriages and recuperators and decided to
adopt and put into production the French models.
Thus there occurred a delay of many months."
Perhaps a short statement of the pronounced
characteristics of the French model of 75 mm. gun
carriage and of the American model known as that
of 1916 may be of interest, in view of the fact that
the major part of the criticism of the War Depart-
ment, for its alleged failure to supply our troops
with field artillery as promptly as the critics as-
serted that it might have been done, centers upon
the treatment of this question between the two
types of 75 mm. carriage.
Both models are of what is known as the long
recoil type. That is, the gun, upon firing, recoils
between three and four feet upon the carriage, and
is automatically returned to the firing position.
This long recoil so softens the action of the gun upon
the carriage that the latter is not displaced by the
recoil, and the gunner sits upon a seat attached
to the trail v.ithout moving his eye from the sight,
which, of course, is attached to a non-recoiling part
of the carriage, and continues to fire the piece as
rapidly as it can be reloaded. No time is required
for re-aim at the target, since the carriage remains
fixed in its position. This long recoil feature is a
device of the French, of about the end of the last
FIELD ARTILLERY 235
century, and is now employed in all modern field
artillery. Its use increased the rate of firing for
the 75 mm. gun from about one ronnd per minute
to more than twenty rounds. The peculiar feature
of the French carriage is the recuperator, which
returns the gun to the firing position after recoil.
The returning force is a spring of compressed air,
which is further compressed on recoil, and by its
expansion forces the gun back to position. The
advantage of compressed air springs as compared
with steel springs is that they do not wear out nor
break in use. The difficulty about them is the leak-
age of the air. The recoil of the gun is checked, in
both models, by the forcing of liquid, usually oil,
through a small orifice. In the French model, a
piston drawn through a steel cylinder under the gun
by the recoil forces the oil with which the cylinder
is filled through a small opening into another cylin-
der alongside, in w T hich is the compressed air, fur-
ther compressing the air ; and the difficulty in regard
to leakage is not only the prevention of the escape
of compressed air from the cylinder, but preventing
the mixture of the air with the oil in a kind of
froth, which would alter the weight of the oil and
diminish the pressure required to force it through
1h> orifice, and hence would promote an over-recoil,
with resultant damage to the mechanism. The
mixture of the compressed air with the oil is pre-
vented by a movable diaphragm called the floating
piston, separating them in the air cylinder, and slid-
ing back and forth on recoil and counter recoil.
The preservation of the tightness and at the same
236 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
time of the freedom of motion in this piston, so that
the air will not leak past it, is the peculiar feature
of the French model. It is accomplished by extreme
nicety of workmanship.
In all other services than the French, including
the American service, a steel recoil spring has been
used instead of a compressed air spring. It is
subject to the disadvantage that, unless made with
great metallurgical skill, the springs lose their elas-
ticity or even break. Early in the war we received
reports as to the great mortality of these steel
springs in the British service, which induced anxiety
and disposition to substitute an air spring. Later
information indicated, however, that the mortality
was due to the lack of experience of the large num-
ber of new artillery officers necessarily brought into
the service, who had not understood the necessity
for keeping the recoil cylinders filled with oil, and
had therefore produced breakages by permitting
them to become partially empty. Disaster would
equally have occurred under similar conditions
with the French model. When its cause was prop-
erly understood, therefore, the British experience
showed no indication that our steel springs would
not do as well under the test of war as they had
done under conditions of peace.
But the difficulty of manufacturing the French
air recoil spring was not the only reason for dis-
satisfaction with the French model of carriage.
Everybody is familiar with the general appearance
of a field gun carriage, in which the member called
the trail is attached to the axle under the gun and
FIELD ARTILLERY 237
rests upon the ground by its rear end. In elevating
the gun to obtain greater range, a limit is soon
reached by the contact of the descending breech
with this trail, so that the angle of elevation cannot
pass about twenty degrees, which corresponds to
little more than half of the range which the gun is
capable of at full elevation.
The only way to realize upon the value of the
gun is to dig a hole for the end of the trail, or to
raise the wheels of the carriage upon a kind of
platform. In the American model of 1916 carriage
this shortcoming is met by splitting the trail into
two parts, lengthwise, hinged at the axle, and sepa-
rating the rear ends into a V when the gun is pre-
pared for firing. In this device the breech of the
gun is allowed to descend between the two parts
of the trail, and the elevation can be increased to
some forty degrees, corresponding to about the
maximum range which the gun is capable of giving.
As an additional advantage, though not so im-
portant, in the American model the gun can be
fired much more obliquely laterally than with the
French model without causing the line of recoil of
the gun to pass so much outside the point of sup-
port of the trail as to cause the carriage to slue
about sideways when the gun is fired. Although
we have been speaking of it as the American model,
the split trail is also a French invention, of Gen.
Deport, and is used in the Italian service, although
it came out too recently to be adopted in the French
service, where its installation would have involved
the replacement of a very large number of carriages
238 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
already constructed, and the setting up a new manu-
facturing equipment. The American model em-
bodies certain other improvements, particularly
in the method of controlling recoil. It is a significant
fact that in July of 1918 the French Government
recommended the substitution in manufacture in the
United States of the American model, with a recu-
perator which the Ordnance Department had had
designed for it in France the year before, for the
French 75.
No other idea could be conveyed by the words of
Senator Wadsworth than that the factories of the
country were kept employed for months by the Ord-
nance Department in an effort to produce something
which could not be manufactured rapidly in large
numbers; while the fact is that these manufac-
turers were not so occupied, for the reason that the
factories were not ready to manufacture carriages
in accordance with the designs of the Ordnance De-
partment, or with any other designs. The time was
occupied in the erection and equipment of plants,
which had not theretofore existed, for the manufac-
ture of carriages of some model, and in the examina-
tion of details and the preparation of shop pro-
grams, which are always the slow preliminaries in
preparation for the output of large numbers of a
new thing. During the course of this preparation
objection was made to a certain part of the Ordnance
Department gun carriage not the recuperator
that it would be difficult to turn out by the rapid
methods quantity production; whereupon orders
were changed so as to call for a considerable ma-
FIELD ARTILLERY 239
jority of the carriages to be of the French design
instead of the American design, and work proceeded
along the corresponding lines; the manufacture of
a large number of American carriages going along
as it had been ordered.
The Senator found encouragement in the course
of the Ordnance Department under my more fortu-
nate successor, which he expressed as follows:
"The error of judgment committed in the early
summer of 1917 caused many months' delay, but
tin* Ordnance Department, now reorganized from
top to bottom, is bending every effort to catch up
in the production of 75 's with carriages and recu-
perators made after the French model. "
The reorganization referred to seems to be that
described on page 15, which was the only one
of any moment made in the department, and was
changed back to the old form shortly after the
Senator's interview.
This statement of facts, even if it were all there
is to be said, makes a very different story from
that conveyed by the Senator's interview, in which
it is made to appear that the Ordnance Depart-
ment either allowed manufacturing plants which
might have been employed to stand idle while it
was perfecting a new design, or occupied such plants
in work whose product had afterwards to be dis-
carded, wl). might from the beginning have
been making things of proved value. The Ordnance
Department took steps to follow out the course
which would give the earliest assurance of suitable
240 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
artillery, and the definite ultimate assurance of the
best artillery; which is further illustrated by the
continuance of the manufacture of the eighteen-
pounder field gun which the Bethlehem Steel Com-
pany was carrying on for the British Government,
notwithstanding the fact that the model was not one
which either the British or ourselves thought right
up to date. The Ordnance Department continued its
manufacture in order to take advantage of a going
production, while preparing to make something
better. The only change was in the caliber of the
gun, which was made 75 mm. in order to agree with
the others.
But in view of subsequent experience there is
more to be said in regard to this change of manu-
facturing orders from the American model to the
French model. The change had been pressed hard
upon the Ordnance Department, which appreciated
the difficulty of manufacturing the French recu-
perator, and the difficulty proved so real that by the
end of the year 1918 only a single French recupera-
tor had been completed and accepted in the United
States ; while at the same date two hundred and fifty-
one American 75 mm. carriages, recuperators and
all, had been completed and accepted, 206 of which
had been completed at the signing of the Armistice,
and thirty-four shipped across the sea ; although the
latter did not get onto the firing line. The difficul-
ties of manufacture of the French recuperator were
not surmounted till April of 1919, by the end of
which month it was considered that quantity pro-
duction had been established and that the flow of the
FIELD ARTILLERY
output would continue ; but this conclusion was based
upon the production of only some sixty satisfactory
recuperators. Of the sixty, however, twenty-three
had been produced in April and twenty in March,
so that there was reasonable justification for the
conclusion.
Such a small number of French 75 mm. units hav-
ing been completed in the United States by the end
of the second month of spring, it is evident that the
supply of this unit would not have been available
for the campaign of 1919, if it had taken- place ; but
since the monthly output of American 75 's reached
sixty in August of 1918 and continued at forty in
September and fifty in October, it is a reasonable
inference that there would have been a good supply
for the 1919 campaign if we had continued to press
the manufacture, w r hile treating the French model
somewhat experimentally until after its difficulties
had been conquered. A strong probability appears,
therefore, that the change of the Ordnance Depart-
ment's original program of pressing the manufac-
ture of the American model was a mistake.
A deliberate survey of the whole subject indi-
cates that there might have been another mistake.
The American three-inch gun carriage of the model
of 1902, with which our artillery was armed and
of which we had some five hundred when we entered
the war, was an excellent carriage. Professional
opinion has come from the Field Artillery School of
fire to the effect that it had some important points
of superiority over the French 75, which had been
242 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
established by the daily use of the two side by
side; and it has been recommended by the school
that the American model and not the French should
be made the standard. The American 1902 had
been in production for some years, and the manu-
facturing details had all been worked out; the
expansion of output would therefore have been a
straightforward task. Under these conditions the
earliest supply from the United States would un-
doubtedly have been had by pushing the 1902
instead of the French 75; while preparations for
realizing the advantages of the 1916 could have been
made by going ahead, in the meantime, with its
manufacturing development. If this course had
been followed it is reasonable to suppose that prog-
ress with the model of 1916 would have been about
as it actually was, while we would have had a much
larger number of 1902 's than we got of the French
75 's. But we were too modest about the Ordnance
Department's model of 1902.
American manufacturers are to be congratulated
upon having been able to apply the methods of
standardization and quantity production to the
French recuperator, which had not been so produced
in France, and also upon having promptly overcome
the anticipated difficulty which had led some of them
to object to a part of the American carriage as
being difficult to turn out in mass. Their success
gave assurance of an abundant ultimate supply of
the French model and of an earlier supply of the
superior American model. It is indicative of the
FIELD ARTILLERY
rapid advance in war material which was stimulated
by the war, that both models are now obsolete, being
destined to disappear, together with their motive
power, the horse; to be replaced by a mechanically
driven carriage and a heavier gun.
VIII
SMOKELESS POWDER
THE smokeless powder in use by the Army and
Navy of the United States at the outbreak of the
European War, and for some years before, was of
such excellent quality that no experiments of any
moment for its improvement were undertaken be-
fore the close of hostilities. The powder is known
as the Nitro-Cellulose type, and is made by treating
ordinary cotton with nitric acid and dissolving the
resulting guncotton, or Pyro-Cellulose, in a mixture
of alcohol and ether, in which it is soluble. The
gelatinous mass thus produced is then formed into
grains of suitable size and shape, and the ether
and alcohol afterwards expelled by drying, leaving
almost pure guncotton, in hard, horny pieces or
grains.
When the war broke out in Europe the total pow-
der making capacity in the United States was about
50,000 pounds per day, of which about 1,100 pounds
was at the Army plant at Picatinny Arsenal, N. J.,
and something like three times this capacity at the
Naval factory at Indian Head, Md. The European
Governments, however, had placed such large or-
ders for powder in the United States that by the
time we came into the war the manufacturing ca-
244
SMOKKI.1'.S> POWDER 245
pacity of the country had been increased to about
1,250,000 pounds per day, of which the prepon-
derating majority was with the plants of E. I. du
Pont de Nemours Co., Inc. Notwithstanding this
large capacity it was evident to the Ordnance De-
partment that more manufacturing plants would be
ncrded. An expenditure of $500,000 had been au-
thorized by Congress for increasing the capacity of
the Army plant, either by additions at the Picatinny
rial or by the construction of a new plant; but
the amount was too small to be of any significance
in the emergency, and it was never used. The De-
partment therefore in the first month of the war,
April, 1917, requested the du Pont de Nemours
Company to consider the subject of expanding the
powder manufacturing capacity of the country, and
to commence at once the search for a suitable site
for a new plant. Certain expansions of existing
plants, which were practicable, were made to meet
orders for powder by the department, and by Octo-
ber, 1917, the consideration of the subject had
reached the point of embodiment in a proposition
by the company, pursuant to which, on the eleventh
of that month, I submitted a statement of the situa-
tion in a memorandum to the Secretary of War.
At the time of submission of this statement a few
orders for Army powder had already been placed,
and accepted by the manufacturers, and there was
nail supply on hand.
In accordance with the military program there
was called for in addition, as a manufacturing pro-
gram, the production of 500,000,000 pounds of
'AR
246 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
smokeless powder in the calendar year 1918 for
the forces of the United States Army ; but although
a certain increase had been provided for since we
entered the war, the full capacity of the country,
if operated every day in the year, would turn out
only 480,000,000 pounds; not enough for the Army
alone, without considering either the Navy or the
Allies. The allocation of capacity between the
Army, the Navy and the Allies was made by the
War Industries Board, and this had been done in
such a manner as to leave available for the Army
only 168,000,000 pounds of the 'unobligated capacity,
to meet the requirement of 500,000,000 pounds, a
shortage for 1918 of 332,000,000 pounds.
For the year 1919 it was estimated that the Army
requirements would be 600,000,000 pounds of pow-
der, which was 120,000,000 pounds in excess of the
country's capacity, even if this were all to be avail-
able for the Army's use, which it was not, by a
great deal. So that by the end of 1919 there would
have been a shortage of 332,000,000 pounds plus
120,000,000 pounds, or 452,000,000 pounds, without
considering the Navy and the Allies for 1919. (For
a larger force than was then contemplated the esti-
mate for 1919 afterwards went up to 1,000,000,000
pounds.) All this related for the United States to
cannon powder alone, without reference to the pow-
der needed for small arms.
At this time the appeals and statements of posi-
tion of the Allies with reference to the supply by
the United States of powder and other explosives
for their uses had become most impressive. Their
SMOKKLKSS POWDER 24-7
situation arose from their necessity for importing
the bulk of the raw materials for the manufacture
of powder and explosives, and from the great weight
of these materials as compared with that of the
finished product. For the manufacture of one ton
of hi^h explosive from eight to twelve tons of raw
material are required, depending upon whether coal
i< included; and for one ton of smokeless powder
there are used from fifteen to twenty tons of raw
materials. France, for one,. although having plenty
of manufacturing capacity, was not able to produce
-elf more than one-third of her requirements in
raw materials, and the rest had to come from
abroad. The highly important nitrate of soda came
i'mm Chile by a long and dangerous voyage on
which the submarine was a dreadful menace, which
not only took its toll of the nitrate ships but by its
alarming destruction of other shipping reduced the
tonnage available for nitrate importation. The
measure of the rate of prosecution of the war was
pretty nearly the amount of ocean transport which
available for all imperative purposes, and at
that time the question as to whether this amount
could be kept at a figure sufficient to sustain the
armies in the theater of war and the civil popula-
ii spite of the submarine campaign, had not
yet been answered.
A body entitled the Technical Franco- American
Commission on Explosives had been organized in
France and had held several meetings in the month
ist, 1H17. Tt had made an extended report
its proceedings and conclusions in which it set
248 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
forth the condition of France, stating that "the Gov-
ernment of the United States should be invited to
take into its own hands the supplying of the entire
amount of powder and explosives necessary not only
for the American contingents in France, but as well
(and in the proportion of about two-thirds), the
powder and explosives necessary for the consump-
tion of the French Armies." It urged that the "de-
cision must not be delayed, in consequence of the
critical situation of the stocks and reserves of
nitrate of soda ' ' ; and added that ' ' This indispensa-
ble component in the manufacture of powder and in
the greater number of explosives will soon be want-
ing, and it must be foreseen that by the beginning
of the month of December next the production of
powder and explosives in France will be reduced to
one-tenth of the present amount "; also that it vill
"follow that by December 31st the stock will be
completely exhausted, and consequently the solution
heretofore set forth (of American manufacture),
becomes imperative, and it must not be delayed
under any pretext under pain of incurring disaster. "
Gen. Pershing transmitted these conclusions to the
War Department in a cablegram dated August 23,
1917, and added: To avoid calamity the United
States must not only furnish powder and explosives
for all of its own forces but must supply about half
of the French requirements. It is therefore recom-
mended: (a) That the United States Government
furnish all powders and explosives needed for
present contracts with the French Government, (b)
That the United States Government prepare to fur-
SMOKKLKSS POWDER 249
nish by December :>()() ions per day of explosives
and 200 tuns per day of powder for French con-
sumption.
Such was the situation which, in the autumn of
1;'17, presented itself to rae as Chief of Ordnance,
responsible for the supply to our own forces and
to a large extent to the forces of our Allies, of
powder, perhaps the best single measure of strength
which is afforded by all the materials of war. It is
profitless to discuss the relative importance of indis-
pensables; but the amount of our contribution to
victory would be more nearly proportional to the
quantity of powder which we furnished and caused
to be fired at the enemy than to any other one item
of military power. We were not sending troops
to Europe to beat the Germans with their fists, nor,
in any great degree, to stick them with bayonets or
slash them with sabers, but to pound them with
missiles sent from rifles, machine guns and artillery
by powder, powder, powder. Even the toxic gases,
which in the latter part of the war caused thirty
per cent of the casualties, were usually delivered
among the onemy in shells propelled by powder,
which was everywhere demanded and in widespread
necessity was next to food itself. The requirements
and the threat of shortage had been made strikingly
apparent, and the subject was not to be trifled with.
Tlu- du Pont Company had such incomparably
greater experience than any other agency in Amer-
.!i the coiistruciion aini operation of plants for
manufacture of smokeless powder, and was so
well provided with plans of construction and ad-
250 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
ministrative and technical staff, in a going organiza-
tion, that I had no hesitation in recommending that
the company be empowered to erect and operate a
plant for the Government, in accordance with the
proposition which it submitted. The output for
which the plant was to be constructed was 1,000,000
pounds per day, which would have failed by a con-
siderable amount to meet the requirements up to the
end of the year 1919; but the enterprise was con-
sidered as great as it was prudent to undertake at
that time. Subsequent enlargement should have
come after it was well in hand. The total estimated
cost of the plant was $90,000,000, which was to be
borne entirely by the Government, the Company
acting as agent both for construction and operation,
with a percentage compensation for construction,
and a fixed sum per pound plus a premium for
economy as compensation for manufacture. The
plant was to be in ten units, or lines, with a capacity
of 100,000 pounds each, per day, and the first unit
was expected to be in operation after about eight
months, the whole plant after about eighteen
months.
The War Department did not approve my recom-
mendation, and held up the proposition on the
ground of excessive compensation to the Company.
It is of interest, therefore, to examine in some detail
the nature of the compensation contemplated and
the estimated cost to the Government of the project,
including that of the powder which it was expected
to procure.
As stated above, the estimated cost of construe-
SMOKELESS POWDER 251
tion of the plant which was expected to be on two
sites was $90,000,000, which included fifteen per
cent of the actual expenditures to be paid to the
Company to cover its services in connection with
the following:
Preparation of plans.
Selection of sites.
Optioning land.
Survey of land.
Making of contour maps.
Supervision of construction.
Supervision of manufacture of machinery and
apparatus.
Premiums to employees for extra efforts.
Expense of making purchases.
Expense of following up and expediting deliv-
eries.
Expense of Washington office.
Administrative expense away from the plants.
Depreciation of a machine shop to be purchased
at the expense of the Company.
Profits on construction.
The headquarters of the Company were at Wil-
mington, Del., where the administrative offices and
the engineering force were located, and it was in-
tended that the work should be directed from this
office, as listed above, leaving to be charged to the
work only local supervision and administration at
the plants.
For the operation of the plant the Company was
to receive five cents per pound of manufactured
powder; and if the cost of manufacturing should
have been less than forty-four and a half cents per
pound of manufactured powder, excluding the five
252 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
cents, the Company was to receive in addition one-
half the amount by which the cost fell short of forty-
four and a half cents. The five cents per pound
was intended to cover engineering direction and
supervision of operations, other than local super-
vision at the plant; purchasing and expediting the
delivery of materials for operation; premiums to
employees ; administration of operations other than
local administration at the plant, and profit.
Under this proposition the Company would have
received a large sum, about $11,758,000, as a per-
centage of the construction cost, and would also
have received a liberal percentage, about eleven per
cent, of the estimated base cost of manufacture of
powder, for operation; but these figures were to
cover, in addition to compensation, very consider-
able services of the Company to be rendered by the
organization, from the headquarter offices at Wil-
mington. Any saving below the estimated cost of
forty-four and a half cents a pound was to have
been shared by the Government and the Company.
It was estimated that the cost of the plant itself,
when spread over a year's output for each of the
units, would amount to about thirty cents per
pound of powder manufactured, and assuming the
cost of manufacturing to be what the Government
was at the time paying the Company on orders
for powder already given it, forty-nine and a half
cents per pound, the output of the plant would
have cost seventy-nine and a half cents per pound
of powder, including the amortization of the plant
in one year. The European Allies had paid $1.00
SMOKELESS POWDER 253
per pound for the output required to amortize
the plant required to meet their needs, and the
Company had thereafter charged both them and us
forty-nine and a half cents per pound, without any
further charge for interest or amortization.
A good deal of interest had been taken in the cost
of smokeless powder since its introduction into use
in our Artillery Service at the time of the Spanish
AVar. Private manufacturers were at that time and
for some years thereafter the only reliance of the
Government for the supply of powder, and they were
soon consolidated under the du Pont Company. The
price almost immediately after that war was $1.00
per pound, and then commenced to somewhat slowly
decline. The Government, however, stepped in and
accelerated this process by imposing statutory limi-
tations upon the price to be paid, which, before the
outbreak of the European War, had come down to
fifty-three cents per pound. The Navy Department
had during the interval established a small factory
at Newport, B. I., which was afterward moved to
Iii'lian Ih'iid, Md., and somewhat enlarged. In the
year 1908 the army factory at the Picatinny Arsenal
was built, and the knowledge afforded by its opera-
tion permitted the exercise of intelligence in the
control of the price paid to private manufacturers.
The cost of manufacture at the Arsenal had at one
time gotten down as low as thirty-eight cents per
pound, including all the overheads which a private
manufacturer has to charge, except selling costs,
costs of financing and profits, which an arsenal is not
subject to. Before our entry into lh<> v ar, however,
2.54 ORD.VANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
material and labor had so advanced that the cost of
the powder at the Arsenal had reached about fifty
cents per pound
Under the circumstances I considered the proposi-
tion of the du Pont Company to be suitable for ac-
ceptance. The estimated cost, including amortiza-
tion, was to be about twenty per cent less than had
already been paid by the Allies, and the reasonable
disposition of the Company was evidenced by the
price at which they were currently selling us pow-
der, which was less than our own cost of manufac-
ture and less than had ever before been charged
being three and a half cents per pound less than the
statutory price which had been paid before the war;
a rise of ten cents per pound of powder in the cost
of raw materials notwithstanding. Although the
snms to go to the Company in percentages and com-
pensation were large, I had no means of knowing
what proportion of these snms would be profit, and
in the compelling emergency in which the country
stood I felt both justified and bound to meet it by the
only agency which could enable us to do so, at a cost
which not only did not itself appear to be unreason-
able, but compared favorably with every other cost
of which I had knowledge.
When my recommendation was not approved by
the War Department I invited a conference with the
officers of the du Pont Company in an effort to
secure a modification of the terms of their proposi-
tion, and several weeks were spent in negotiations,
and in consultations with the Secretary of War and
the War Industries Board, trying to reach a con-
SMOKELESS POWDER 255
elusion under which the much-needed work could
proceed. The Company consented to certain modi-
fications ; but, as no ground of agreement as to con-
ditions which the War Department would accept
had been arrived at after a month of discussion, I,
on November 23, 1917, submitted a new memoran-
dum to the Secretary of "War, in which I recom-
mended that the modified terms which I had arrived
at with the Company be accepted for the erection of
a factory of 400,000 pounds per day capacity, and
for its operation for some eighteen months unless
the need for the powder should in the meantime have
ceased to exist. I renewed my expression of view
that plants with 1,000,000 pounds per day capacity
should be commenced at once ; but urged the smaller
plant, as one which would cover such construction
as could be had upon a single site, and of which the
commencement would afford a short time for a
further survey of the situation, and a search for
some other agency to construct an additional plant.
The principal changes in the terms were the divi-
sion of the fifteen per cent which was to have been
paid for overhead services and compensation for
construction into two parts, of eight per cent
for overhead services and six and a half per cent
for compensation for construction ; but the compen-
sation for construction was to be paid back to the
Government in accordance with a sliding scale, as
compensation was paid for operation, at such a rate
that the whole six and a half per cent should have
been paid back and tlio compensation reduced In
that for operation only, upon the completion of
256 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
about 180,000,000 pounds of powder ; which was ex-
pected to be after about eighteen months of opera-
tion. The sum to be paid as compensation for oper-
ation was changed from five cents a pound for
overhead services and profit to three and a half cents
a pound ; and to offset this reduction in compensation
the base cost below which a premium of the half
saving was allowed for economy was changed from
forty-four and a half cents a pound to forty-six cents
a pound, and the Company safeguarded itself in the
matter of the minimum by stipulating that the base
cost should go up or down with the price of sodium
nitrate. In my memorandum I said: "It must be
remembered that all other powder-making agencies
than the du Pont Company, including the Ordnance
Department, are already strained to the limit, either
in powder manufacture or in other duties connected
with the preparation of our forces, and that the
personnel of the Ordnance Department, in particu-
lar, is no more than sufficient to set in motion and
overlook, in the interest of the Government, the
performance of agencies outside itself; also that
there is no such margin of resource for the prosecu-
tion of the war as would justify failure to use one
of the first importance, in the hope, and taking the
risk, of finding a possible substitute."
This recommendation also was not approved by
the Secretary of War.
As the lapse of time was making the subject more
and more pressing, I made a visit in the early part
of December to Wilmington for a conference with
the officers of the du Pont Company, with the hope of
SMOKELESS POWDER
further modification of their terms. At this inter-
view I assured them that I considered their assist-
ance imperative for meeting the necessities of the
Government, and informed them of my understand-
ing and belief that the question of compensation \vas
the only one standing in the way of their employ-
ment. The Company then agreed that they would
construct and operate the plants of 1,000,000 pounds
per day capacity, as previously proposed, and that
questions of compensation for the services of the
Company, both in construction and operation, should
be referred to a Board of Arbitration of three
members to be selected ; and it afterward presented
this agreement in a memorandum to the Secretary
of War, dated December 10, 1917, at an interview
for which I made appointment for them with the
Secretary. In the meantime a proposition had been
made to the Company, drawn up by the War In-
dustries Board under whose advice the Secretary of
War had been acting when he rejected my own, and
the Company had declined to accept this proposi-
tion. Referring to this incident, the Secretary of
War declined the proposition including arbitration
as to compensation of the du Pont Company, and
embodied his declination in a memorandum dated
December 12, 1917, stating that the department had
proceeded to work out a plan for the direct creation
of this capacity by the Government itself.
The War Industries Board, however, took a dif-
ferent view of this last offer of the Company, and,
by resolution dated December 13, 1917, stated that
the offer fully covered all objections that they had
258 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
raised; that the emergency had become accentu-
ated during the delay to an extent that made it
vitally important not to lose a single day in push-
ing the powder project, and urged upon the Secre-
tary of War the vital importance of avoiding any
further delay, or of assuming the risk incident to
the Government undertaking, either the construc-
tion or operation of the plant. The Board thus
joined in the effort to make use of the du Pont
Company.
But, pursuing the idea of the construction and
operation of a plant by the Government itself, the
Secretary of War, on December 15, 1917, ap-
pointed Mr. D. C. Jackling, without compensation,
to build and operate the new Government plants,
giving him an entirely free hand and full authority.
Mr. Jackling had had no experience in the manu-
facture of powder, but had been prominently con-
nected with large and successful mining enterprises
in a controlling capacity. He decided to commence
construction at Nitro, the site which had been se-
lected near Charleston, W. Va., and ground was
broken on February 1, 1918. The plant was in-
tended to have a capacity of 625,000 pounds per
day, and was about eighty-three per cent complete
at the time of the Armistice, when 4,533,000 pounds
of powder had been manufactured by the parts
which had been gotten into operation.
In the meantime Mr. Jackling had himself con-
cluded that the services of the du Pont Company as
an organization, in addition to the help which he had
received from it in the matter of plans and prelim-
SMOKKLKSS I'OWDER 259
inary work (the blue prints of the plans covered
some thirty-five acres of surface), were necessary for
the Government, and on January 29, 1918, a contract
\s as concluded with the Company for the construc-
tion and erection of a plant of five units, each of
100,000 pounds per day estimated capacity, at the
site which had been selected near Nashville, Tenn.,
and called Old Hickory. A railroad spur about nine
miles in length had to be built to the site of the
plant before construction could commence, but
ground was broken on March 8th, and the first unit
was in operation the 1st of July, some months ahead
of the date called for in the contract. In the mean-
time the project was enlarged, and it was decided
to make the Old Hickory plant one of nine units
instead of five units. The plant was about ninety-
three per cent complete when the Armistice was
signed and at that time had manufactured 25,620,000
pounds of powder. It covered about eight square
miles of ground, and included a town of some twenty
thousand people. It thus appears that although
ground was broken for the Nashville plant over one
month later than for the Nitro plant, and the plant
was to be of fifty per cent greater capacity, it was
ton per cent nearer completion at the time of the
Armistice, and had then turned out more than five
times as much powder as the other plant. So much
for the experienced organization, which some of us
'onsible had not been willing to contemplate the
failure to make use of, in the compelling emergency.
As the refusal of the Secretary of War to permit
the employment of the du Pont Company had per-
260 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
sisted, after the offer of the Company to go ahead
with the work and leave the matter of compensation
to subsequent adjustment by arbitration was made, a
question is raised as to whether compensation was
the controlling consideration in his decision. How-
ever it was the only one which was objected to
during the negotiations; and therefore, although I
have not the figures with which to make an analysis
of the expense of the rejected projects as compared
with that which was incurred under the method which
was actually carried out, it is worth while to consider
certain broad statements that can be made from
which may be deduced the relative financial advan-
tage of the course covered by my recommendations,
and that which was finally pursued.
Experience with the construction and operation
of the plants which were built, and especially the
one which was built by the du Pont Company at Old
Hickory, indicates that the plant originally proposed
could have been constructed for about the sum esti-
mated, viz. : $90,000,000, and would have produced by
the date of the Armistice about 110,000,000 pounds
of powder. The cost of manufacture was found to
be about forty cents a pound, to which, under the
original proposition, would have been added five
cents a pound as compensation to the manufactur-
ers and two and a quarter cents a pound as premium
for reducing the cost of manufacturing below forty-
four and a half cents. The total cost of manufac-
ture, therefore, to the Government, would have been
forty-seven and a quarter cents a pound, two and a
quarter cents less than it had been paying to the
SMOKELESS POWDER 261
manufacturers for powder made in their own plants.
i !' to the cost of manufacturing is added the amount
necessary to amortize the $90,000,000 plant by the
1 10,000,000 pounds of powder which could have been
manufactured by the date of the Armistice, the cost
of the powder becomes $1.29 a pound. That is, if
the first course recommended had been followed the
United States would, at the time of the Armistice,
have had from its plant 110,000,000 pounds of pow-
der which would have cost it, in total, $1.29 a pound.
At the Nitro and Old Hickory plants there had
been expended for construction and for powder man-
ufactured, at the time of the Armistice, $153,770,400,
and there had been manufactured 30,153,000 pounds
of powder. The total expenditure, per pound of
powder, at these two plants had therefore been $5.10,
as against $1.29, above, and we had some 30,000,000
pounds of powder instead of 110,000,000 pounds.
Put differently, the course first recommended would
have furnished us with 110,000,000 pounds of pow-
der, at the cessation of hostilities, for an expendi-
ture of about $142,000,000, while the course actually
followed gave us about 30,000,000 pounds for an ex-
penditure of $153,770,000. Of course this compari-
son is not absolutely fair to the method which was
followed for providing powder, since hostilities
ceased sooner than was anticipated, and the Govern-
ment was left with large plants on its hands from
which there had been time to get but a small pro-
duction over which to spread the cost of construc-
tion. But there is substantial justice in the com-
parison, nevertheless, for the reason for the small
262 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
output by the Armistice date was the long delay in
making the effort to avoid utilizing the du Pont
Company, and the attempt first made to get on with-
out its help. The late start had rendered necessary
the building of larger plants in order to accelerate
the supply, and the investment charge was thus
increased. It is true that no shortage of powder
arose from the delay in getting a flow of increased
production, but this was due to the later date
than was anticipated at which any large body of
American troops got into action; and also it can-
not be stated that there would not have been a
shortage for such a campaign as was expected for
1919, if it had taken place. There were some
200,000,000 pounds of powder on hand in the United
States, from all sources of supply, at the Armistice ;
but the conclusion in the spring of 1918 to build for
a daily capacity of 1,500,000 pounds, and the serious
consideration given in the early summer to an ad-
ditional project for 600,000 pounds capacity, show
that my anxiety to get immediately at work upon a
capacity of 1,000,000 pounds in the autumn of 1917
was not unwarranted. In the light of half a year's
later knowledge than I had the matter of a larger
project than mine had been was considered most
urgent.
Mr. Jackling and the agencies employed by him in
constructing the plant at Nitro were commendably
efficient in getting into partial operation a well built
plant in time to turn out 4,533,000 pounds of powder
by the date of the Armistice ; but the handicap which
they suffered as compared with the Company having
SMOKELESS POWDER 263
experience and previous organization for the work,
both of which they lacked, is shown by the results
at the two plants. The earlier readiness for opera-
tion of the Old Hickory plant and the greater out-
put from it have been already mentioned. The total
cost for construction and operation at Old Hickory
was $95,221,150, which, distributed over the $25,-
620,000 pounds of powder produced, gave $3.71 a
pound. The expenditure for construction and op-
oration at Nitro was $58,549,250, and the quantity
of powder produced was 4,533,000 pounds, making
the total cost per pound $12.95.
The Old Hickory plant was built by the du Pont
Company for a compensation for construction of one
dollar. The contract of January 29, 1918, with this
Company had called for the payment of $500,000 for
construction plans, and for a sum equal to three per
cent of expenditures made, for services, with a limit
for services of $1,500,000. But this was for a plant
of only 500,000 pounds a day ; and when, in March,
it was decided to build the plant to have 900,000
pounds capacity it is reasonable to suppose that an
extension of the limit of compensation for construc-
tion would have been allowed. However, the Com-
pany desired a somewhat freer hand in making ex-
penditures, especially for stimulating the personnel,
than was comfortably practicable with an arrange-
ment under which its compensation increased with
xpenditures of Government money, and so, when
a supplementary agreement was made to cover the
enlargement of plant, it considered it advantageous
to forego compensation for constrnr-tion altogether,
264 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
hoping to make it up by an earlier commencement of
compensation for operation.
It will be remembered that the original project,
of October, 1917, called for the payment to the Com-
pany of fifteen per cent of expenditures for con-
struction, to cover certain overhead expenses of the
Company and profit. Both the contract of January,
1918, and the supplementary agreement of the March
following, abandoned this method of lumping the
overheads and the profit, and required these over-
head expenses to be kept account of, and paid. I
have not just now access to the accounts, and so
do not know how much the particular overheads
amounted to, and therefore, I am unable to say how
much of the $11,758,000, which constituted fifteen per
cent of the estimated expenditures, would have been
profit, which was saved to the United States by :he
final arrangement. In the original project the direct
compensation for operation was to be five cents per
pound of manufactured powder; but the Company
would have taken all the risk of an increase in the
price of materials and labor, which would have af-
fected its expected premium of one-half the savings
in cost of manufacture below forty-four and a half
cents a pound. In the second proposition, of No-
vember, 1917, the five cents was changed to three
and a half cents, but the base cost of manufacture,
below which premium should commence, was fixed
at forty-six cents a pound instead of forty-four and
a half cents ; and also the Company safeguarded the
premium, in so far as it would have been affected
by the important ingredient of sodium nitrate, by
SMOKELESS POWDER 265
stipulating that the base cost should change in ac-
cordance with any change in price of this substance.
In the contracts of January and March the compen-
sation was left at three and a half cents per pound
while the base price was brought back to forty-four
and a half cents, but the contracts further safe-
guarded the premium by providing that the base
cost should vary in accordance with the price of
any of the principal materials, viz. : sodium nitrate,
cotton, shavings, alcohol or sulphur. In the period
of rapidly rising prices these were important stipu-
lations, greatly increasing the Company's chances
of securing a premium. On the whole it is difficult
to say, without close analysis of the accounts, what
advantage, if any, could be claimed for the Govern-
ment through the change from the terms of the first
proposition which was rejected, in October, to those
o!' the first contract which was made, in January,
when it was decided to use the du Pont Company
after all; but it must have been insignificant in
comparison with the financial disadvantage, not to
speak of the risk, which resulted from the delay.
The figures upon which the above statement as to
accomplishment are based are not exact, but they
arc as accurate as could be arrived at as late as two
months after hostilities had ceased. That is, two
months after the transactions to which they relate
had ended. Any inaccuracies must therefore be of
little moment in comparison with the general facts
bed,
I have never been able to understand the reluc-
tance of the AVar Department to make use of the
.
266 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
du Pont Company. It is true that the payments
which were to be made to it, over and above the
direct costs, under my first recommendation, were
large, and there would be a natural indisposition to
pay large profits to a notoriously rich corporation
for a war service ; but the payments would not have
been all profit; they covered various overhead ex-
penses and certain very real risks, and they were
for an immense service, of which the desperate need
had been urged upon us, and which no one else could
render. That the profit was not considered of the
first importance by the Company is indicated by
its offer of December to do the work and leave the
subject of compensation to arbitration, and by its
final voluntary agreement to forego compensation
for construction altogether, after having already
made a contract which included it. The way in
which the Company risked its profit is further
shown by the actual outcome of the transaction.
Owing to the early termination of the war only
31,000,000 pounds of powder were manufactured at
the Old Hickory plant at the cessation of operations,
some time after the Armistice. The cost of manu-
facture added to the cost of construction of the plant
amounted to something over one hundred million
dollars; and the compensation for manufacture,
which was all the profit the Company got out of the
whole matter, was only about one and three-quarters
per cent of the sum which it handled for the Gov-
ernment. Presumably its war taxes had to be paid
on this profit.
When I first presented the October proposition to
SMOKELESS POWDER 267
the Secretary of War, on the llth of that month,
he approved it verbally, but afterwards withdrew
his approval by a telegram directly to the Company,
in which he gave instructions to stay all action until
he could acquaint himself thoroughly with all the
features of the matter. Then followed two months
of discussion, in which I tried to secure from the
du Pont Company concessions which would be satis-
factory to the Secretary and the War Industries
Board, and tried to convince both that neither the
Ordnance Department nor any other agency of the
Government could be relied upon to build a powder
plant of the magnitude required in any such time as
this Company could do it. I knew that the Ordnance
Department could build a small plant and could
make good powder in it, cheaply, for w r e had done
this ; and I believed we could build a large plant if
given time to study it out and to proceed deliber-
ately; but for building an immense plant, under
pressure of the greatest haste, our much-strained
organization could not compare in efficiency with the
highly specialized company which had just done that
very thing. After one month of discussion I con-
sidered it necessary, in justice to myself, to again
call attention formally to the urgency of the sub-
ject and the danger of further delay, which I did
in the memorandum of November 23rd, mentioned
on page 255. I had no success with the Secretary of
War, but I had some measure thereof with the War
Industries Board, which joined me, after the Com-
pany's offer of December 10th to arbitrate its com-
pensation, in urging upon the Secretary of War the
..
268 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
employment of the du Pont Company. A week after
my final unsuccessful effort to get a powder plant
started through this Company I was relieved from
the charge of the Ordnance Department.
Notwithstanding the importance of smokeless
powder the War Department was subjected to less
savage public and congressional criticism with ref-
erence to the slowness of its supply than in regard
to any other prime matter of armament. Artillery,
machine guns and rifles were abundantly noticed,
and many harsh things were said of those who were
closest to the responsibility for their production;
but powder did not receive much attention. It did
not escape altogether, however, for Senator Hitch-
cock, of the Committee on Military Affairs, said on
February 4, 1918, in the course of a speech in the
Senate in which he was advocating the creation oi
a director of munitions and a war cabinet, and with
reference to the committee's investigation of the
War Department : "We found that we are only now,
nine months after entering the war, just beginning
to work on two great powder plants, costing $90,-
000,000, the powder from which will not be available
until next August. We found that we need a million
pounds of powder a day more than America is pro-
ducing. We found that the need of this powder
was known last spring, and that now for the first
time we are beginning to build the factories in which
the powder is to be made."
"All's well that ends well"; and neither we nor
the Allies suffered for lack of powder before the
end of hostilities.
IX
RESPONSIBILITY
BESIDES the specific criticisms which have been dealt
with at some length in the preceding chapters there
e others made in the first winter of the war
which were of more general character, and were
so all-inclusive in their condemnation of the govern-
mental organizations with which the United States
was endeavoring to prosecute the war as to justify
a doubt, if they were accepted, as to whether a
republic like ours is fitted to carry on hostilities
requiring preparation on the scale to which we were
committed in the World War. It is probably true
that an autocracy is the best form of government
with which to wage war. The full power of such
an organization as a community of people can best
be used against an enemy, or indeed for any pur-
pose for which it must bring to bear its entire
ngth, acting as a whole, when it is subject to
the control of a single will, which can direct all the
energies toward a specific object, in accordance witli
a consistent policy of preparation and execution.
Essayists have told us that in the earlier days of
man the despotic rule of a chief was the usual form
of tribal government, for tin- very good reason that
it was. the only form whicli could survive, in a social
269
270 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
state in which every tribe was at war with all its
neighbors, and must have its collective power
wielded most efficiently, or must have gone out of
existence before a community handled under a bet-
ter system. This might augur badly for the ulti-
mate survival of democracy in a world of struggle,
but as time goes on democracy seems to attract more
people of the intelligent races to its methods than
does autocracy, and can thus offset military effi-
ciency with superior numbers. This is what ap-
peared in the World War, in which the combined
population of the Entente Allies greatly exceeded
that of the Central European powers ; and even with-
out autocratic Russia had the preponderance of
numbers. After America had come in and Russia
had gone out, the numerical advantage still contin-
ued very great. When the United States was drawr.
into the struggle autocratic war powers were con-
ferred upon the President, for the duration of the
emergency, and our Government was thus brought
more nearly to a state of equality in efficiency with
that of Germany; but the handicap of neglect in
preparation, so characteristic of governments of the
people, was still upon us.
I have endeavored to show some of the ways in
which our source of power, the people, acting
through their very obedient servants both in the
Executive Government and in Congress, failed to
pursue any adequate policy of military preparation,
and even blocked and hampered the military depart-
ment by statutory hindrances of whose effect they
were careless in their concern over the suppression
RESPONSIBILITY 271
of various abuses elsewhere. But this location of
responsibility was not accepted by all who might
be considered to be involved in accountability, and
a vigorous effort was made to shift it to other shoul-
ders. The most notable charge, in this effort,
against the executive departments concerned with
the prosecution of the war, was made by Senator
Chamberlain, Chairman of the Military Committee,
whose office ought to have insured his being well
informed and who spoke from a position of great
authority, in a speech before the National Security
League, at New York, on January 19, 1918, in which
he said:
"The military establishments of America have
fallen down. There is no use to be optimistic about
a thing that does not exist. It has almost stopped
functioning, my friends. Why? Because of ineffi-
ciency in every bureau and in every department of
the Government of the United States. "
This speech was made after a large part of the
testimony had been taken by Senator Chamberlain's
committee in its investigation of the War Depart-
ment, and must therefore represent the Senator's
conclusion from the testimony. Whether the con-
clusion was justified by the evidence could be defi-
nitely <1< t-rmiiu'(l only after a complete study of
tlic l } , .*)()() pages which have been printed, but some-
thing of an opinion might be gained from the quota-
tions which are given in this text in regard to the
most important items of armament. The conclusion
was characterized by the President as an astonish-
ing and absolutely unjustifiable distortion of the
272 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
truth. The New York speech was followed by one
delivered by Mr. Chamberlain in the Senate on
January 24, 1918, in which he defended himself
against the reproof of the President, and made
his most serious and extended charges against the
War Department. I have made several quotations
from the references in this speech to the Ordnance
Department, in the chapters which deal with cer-
tain special subjects of criticism, and these I think,
are sufficient to show its purport. It was carefully
analyzed in the light of the published evidence,
and answered, by the Hon. Carter Glass of the
House of Representatives, on February 7, 1918.
Mr. Glass had no previous relations with the
Ordnance Department, was not a member of any
committee having to do with legislation for that
department, and was personally unacquainted with
the Chief of Ordnance. His appreciation of the
evidence, therefore, was such as might have been
had by anybody who would take the trouble to in-
form himself in regard to it. For these reasons I
give several quotations from his speech:
"If, with good reason, it may be charged that
the people of the United States with their constitu-
tional freedom of speech and of the press, have been
so indifferent to their liberties and so insensible
of their own security as to commit * every bureau
and department of Government' to incompetent
hands, would we not better welcome, rather than
resist, the invasion of Teutonic Kultur?"
"Mr. Chairman, when an earnest quest for the
truth carried me painstakingly to the end of nearly
RESPONSIBILITY
2,000 pages of responsible testimony only to find
revealed the utter insufficiency of proof to sustain
the astounding censure, distress gave place to
amazement. ' '
4 'Wo have been asked to search the record, Mr.
Chairman, and it is to the record that I appeal. I
have seen it with mine own eyes and with mine own
ears have heard it expounded. From the testimony
I have turned away, not with tears nor with trem-
bling apprehension for the well-being of my own
sons or the sons of other fathers, but with a firmer
faith in my country, praising God for the quiet
courage of the men and the ineffable fortitude of
the women of America who are to win this war.
And for those who impeach their fidelity and deride
their capabilities and seek to decry or obscure their
achievements we should invoke the imprecations of
every loyal citizen."
"What member of Congress does not very defi-
nitely know that France is furnishing the American
Army with guns, not because we sought to deplete
her * meager stores' but because her chosen ambas-
sadors and picked experts asked the privilege of
arming our expeditionary force from her over-
supplied arsenals. It was the wise thing for France
to have proposed and the only effective thing for
America to have done."
"It is because of gross ignorance of the truth that
critics bemoan a condition which, in the circum-
stances, any discerning man must see is of tremen-
dous advantage to France as \\vll as to America?"
"From it all we may deduce the comforting assur-
.
274 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
ance that the War Department is more concerned
to furnish the American Army in France with
modern guns with which to train and fight than it
is to haggle with ambitious statesmen over the
source of supply."
Under the heading "Machine-gun Squabble" Mr.
Glass made the following statements :
"Mr. Chairman, in support of the intemperate
charge that the * Military Establishment of the
United States Government is a myth that it has
no existence a charge contemptuously echoed only
the other day by a German military expert in a
German newspaper, the controversy over the Lewis
machine gun and the Browning gun is revived^ and
in the very obvious attempt to discredit the Govern-
ment and to 'get Baker' the critics try desperately
to convict the Ordnance Department of incapacity
and the Chief of Ordnance of personal venom. I
addressed myself to an examination of the evidence
deeply prejudiced against Gen. Crozier; but there
is not one particle of disinterested testimony in
the hearings which does not abundantly acquit the
Chief of Ordnance of blame."
"The whole point of what I am saying goes to
establishing the fact that the Ordnance Bureau of
the Government cannot be discredited, even in this
single detail, when we balance the testimony of
experts against the self-interest of disappointed
persons and the miserable bias of fretful politicians
with a case to make out."
"It is absolutely convincing that delay, if any,
occasioned by the retrial of machine guns and the
RESPONSIBILITY 275
selection of the Browning is much more than made
up by the vastly superior qualities of the gun ac-
cepted. Talk to the contrary is mere inference,
amateur inference. "
It is not astonishing that before his examina-
tion of the evidence Mr. Glass should have been
prejudiced against me. Considering the interested
charges which had been made, and the public en-
dorsement of them by certain prominent Senators,
it would have been astonishing if he had not been
prejudiced. Addressing himself to the outcry over
the changes made in the Enfield rifle before manu-
facturing it for the forces of the United States, he
made the following comments:
"And they bring up the old rifle dispute, Mr.
Chairman, and hang a complaint on that peg by
seeking to have it appear that the Army experts
did not know their business. Men like Scott, Chief
of Staff at the time; Bliss, next in rank; Crozier,
Chief of Ordnance; Kuhn, of the War College;
Pershing on his way to France, were unsafe advisers
to the Secretary of War!"
"It seems to be the idea of some distinguished
gentlemen that we should have grabbed up any old
instruments of warfare and sent a ragamuffin army
across the Atlantic instantly to break the Hinden-
burg lino. They <li<l not want us to have modern
rifles, nor did they want us to have the best machine
gun in the world. Their impatience ran away with
their discretion."
"Frustrated in the obvious desire to prove the
inadvisability of the change from the technical
276 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
viewpoint, and 'hell bent' on making out a case
of disastrous delay, one of the hostile critics of the
War Department asked Mr. Vauclain how many
rifles would have been produced had there been no
change of model, to which the witness made the
heartbreaking response, 'Not one more than we have
to-day.' And again and again this great captain
of industry, this 'driving power' of the Govern-
ment's artillery and munitions force, vindicated the
efficiency of the Ordnance Bureau and confounded
his inquisitors."
"What the American people will desire to know,
and what these hostile critics of the Government
have been unwilling to tell them, but what the testi-
mony itself abundantly reveals, is that no appreci-
able time, after our declaration of war, was lost in
turning out rifles for the American Army."
Addressing himself to the question of responsi-
bility for the lack of munitions of war with which
this great, rich country entered the most formidable
conflict of all time, Mr. Glass gave his conclusions
from the evidence recently adduced, and from his
knowledge as a public man of the national course
throughout the preceding decades :
"But Mr. Chairman, I earnestly invite the atten-
tion of the House to this point: Backed by an in-
controvertible record of events, I assert that if there
was a shortage of modern rifles, or even of danger-
ously defective weapons, the responsibility is not
with the Bureau of Ordnance."
"Why did not the Ordnance Bureau function?
Let the Chief of Ordnance tell the story of how the
RESPONSIBILITY 277
Ordnance Department of the Government did func-
tion to the fullest extent of lawful permissibility.
I shall put into the record for it can do no harm
extracts from Gen. Crozier's testimony bearing on
the subject. But in contemplating the sweeping
indictment of his Government by Mr. Chamberlain
the astounding thing to which I invite your atten-
tion right now is the fact that, with all his pre-
cognition, Mr. Chamberlain did not function. He
was and is chairman of the Committee on Military
Affairs of the United States Senate, with access to
every particle of available information. In a large
sense he held the purse-strings upon military ex-
penditures, because the Senate always increases and
rarely decreases appropriations. For a long time
this Government has owned two arsenals, one at
Rock Island and the other at Springfield. Ten years
before the war the appropriation for small arms
in these establishments aggregated $1,700,000; a
year later, $1,778,000; a year later, $1,700,000 at a
time when nobody in America could have dreamed
of war. And yet in 1915, practically two years after
Mr. Chamberlain had assumed the chairmanship of
the Senate Military Committee, when for seven
months war had raged in Europe, the appropriation
for small arms had gone down to the pitiful mark
of $250,000, and that, Mr. Chairman, so far as the
record discloses, without one word of protest or
even admonition from these adversary critics and
calamity shriekers. Furthermore, the fires at the
Rock Island Arsenal had long been out; how long
I do not know. The arsenal at Springfield, where
the best rifle in the world is made, was running
at one-eighth of its capacity. The war had reached
its trench-fighting stage, furnishing a fair infer-
ence <>f a protracted struggle. Kitchener had pre-
dicted that it would last three years. Notwith-
.
278 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
standing these things, Mr. Chairman, the men who
now affect preknowledge of future events did not
increase by one dollar the trifling appropriations
for small arms, but reduced it from the preceding
year by nearly fifty per cent. The expert foremen
and skilled artisans at the Government armories had
been scattered and the forces disorganized and
demoralized, so that later, when operations were
resumed, the Ordnance Bureau had to get these
people back by bidding high against private estab-
lishments engaged on munitions for foreign govern-
ments. Was Crozier to blame for that? Is this
soldier to be assailed and his reputation destroyed
by the cruel imputation of inefficiency levelled by
the Oregon Senator at this New York meeting
against every bureau and department of his Govern-
ment? I protest, Mr. Chairman, it is not just; for
Gen. Crozier, we are told, did not know the truth.
The President did not know the truth. Secretary
of War Garrison did not know the truth. Tardicu
and Lloyd-George, great ministers of munitions of
foreign governments, Scott and Bliss, Pershing and
Kuhn none of these knew the truth. Only this
world- wise Oregon critic knew the truth, and at the
critical moment he failed to function ! With a mov-
ing picture of America at war before his eyes, with
strong conviction in his mind, distressed by his very
contemplation of our utter inefficiency, he permitted
the small-arms appropriation of the American Con-
gress in the very year that the Lusitania was sunk
to go down to the contemptible figure of $250,000 !"
"Oh, Mr. Chairman, the utter proneness of poor
human nature to evade just responsibility and to
reprehend in others the ugly things that most afflict
our own records and dispositions! Why not be
strictly honest with ourselves and brutally frank
RESPONSIBILITY 279
with the country! Let us tell the unhappy truth,
which is that for a century and a half, we have em-
phasized the single warning of Washington against
* entangling alliances abroad' and sadly neglected
his admonition about a sane preparation against
war. We have hated militarism with such a holy
hate that now we constrain Heaven and earth to
avoid becoming its victim. Our aversion to a large
standing army is traditional and constitutional-
bred in the blood and bone of successive generations.
The whole policy of the Nation for all these years
has been antagonistic to preparation. No one group
of men is to blame. No one political party above
another is to be censured. If anything, some of the
most frantic protestants against our plight share
tremendously the responsibility for our condition,
and conspicuous among these culpable critics are the
distinguished gentleman who made that New York
speech and the distinguished gentleman who led the
applause of the unbridled indictment. But because
we were unprepared is no reason to infer that we
are not being prepared; and being prepared, Mr.
Chairman, at a pace that has amazed the European
nations in arms. Gen. Crozier's testimony, and that
of other witnesses, shows conclusively that there is
no particle of excuse for the charge that the Ord-
nance Bureau was indifferent to passing events,
that it was supine, that it did nothing to anticipate
trouble, that it fell down and has ceased to function.
The testimony is to the contrary, the facts are the
very reverse ; and the evidence and ascertained facts
together would warrant a characterization of the
as wanton."
. Orozier, as far back as 1906, warned the
Congn-s and th<> country of our utter lack of prep-
aration, and for years successively repeated the
280 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
warning. In January, 1911, he pointed out that we
were ' worse off in this matter of field artillery than
in anything else/ and warned that 'in case of an
emergency of any importance, the field artillery of
the United States would be found positively insuffi-
cient.' The emergency has come, and not even an
appropriation of $16,000,000 immediately before
going to war nor of $396,000,000 immediately after
going to war can provide all the guns we need
as we need them. The Congress cannot evade its
responsibility, and to attempt to shift it to the War
Department and thus to discredit by a charge of in-
efficiency every branch and bureau of the Military
Establishment is an unspeakable injustice."
These speeches of Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Glass
constitute respectively the most sweeping indictment
and the most general defense of the Ordnance De-
partment which appeared in the contemporary utter-
ances of responsible public men. Both speakers
were of the same political party as the Administra-
tion. Both men were informed as to the evidence ;
one through his official connection with its elucida-
tion, the other through special study of it for
information. I have therefore felt justified in quot-
ing rather fully from their speeches in order to
give the most representative views of a subject in
which the public was at one time keenly and patri-
otically interested, but which few have time to
examine for themselves.
There were other public men of long experience
and intimate knowledge of governmental methods
who, without making any special review of the in-
cidents attending our early struggles in the war,
RESPONSIBILITY 281
knew from personal observation where the respon-
sibility for our unprepared state definitely rested.
Mr. Tilson, of the Military Committee of the House
of Representatives, in an address before the Hard-
ware Manufactuiers' Organization for War Service
at Atlantic City, on May 27, 1918, which was printed
in the Congressional Eecord of January 8, 1918,
said upon this point :
"One of the reasons we were caught unprepared
was that as a people we were not genuinely inter-
ested in things military. You gentlemen under-
stand this. Apply it to yourselves five years ago.
How many thought seriously about the military
situation or of national defense! We might just
as well own up and be honest with one another and
with ourselves, especially. Very few men in the
country were interested in the military situation at
all. If you and all the other men over the country
had been alive and awake on this subject, which we
were not, you would have seen to it that somebody
else was interested. Your interest would have been
communicated from one to another until after a
while we should have had general interest and all
of these tilings would have been done. We were
.-igod in something else, however, and were too
busy to bother with little things like national de-
< ; hence we tailed to be prepared to defend our
own national existence. "
Mr. Sherley, of the Appropriations Committee
of the House of Eepresentatives, as chairman of
the sub-committee which deals with appropriations
for artillery, had had close experience with the way
in which the subject had been handled legislatively
through a number of preceding years, and said in a
282 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
speech in the House on February 15, 1918, which
was printed in the Congressional Eecord of Feb-
ruary 19th:
"What has been the result? When the great war
broke there happened just what I prophesied three
years ago would happen, namely, a breakdown at
the desk of these administrative officers, not because
they were inefficient, not because the Government
was not efficient in the sense that term is used ordi-
narily, but because Congress had refused for years
to give a sufficient corps capable of expanding
quickly and dealing with a great matter such as
was thrust upon it. A.nd every man who wants to
be honest must admit it. And yet there is always
a tendency here to blame the other man for failures
and never to look into our own hearts to see how
far we are to blame for these things."
In the Senate also, where most of the criticism
was made, there was appreciation by well-informed
members of the reason for the shortages which
brought forth the criticisms. On February 8, 1918,
Mr. Thomas, of the Military Committee, said in an
extended address printed in the Congressional
Eecord of February llth :
"I am not surprised, Mr. President, that we are
not yet able to produce heavy artillery. I am not
surprised that we are not yet ready to produce
powder to the capacity which may be demanded in
the war. These are patent facts, but who is pri-
marily to blame for it 1 As far back as 1913, when,
as a member of the Committee on Military Affairs,
I first attended its sessions, as I have for every year
since, we have been warned by the experts of the
"War Department not only of its inability to produce
RESPONSIBILITY 283
these very needed articles of equipment immediately
but that it would take a very long time to do so after
its orders were placed.
"Gen. Crozier has told us time and again that
from the time of the placing of an order for heavy
artillery to the time of its completion and delivery
would require from twelve to eighteen months. Now
we and I accept my share of the blame, if blame
there be should have heeded that and similar warn-
ings, and should long ago have provided the means
and enacted the legislation empowering the War
Department to obtain this artillery and to place the
orders for it. If we had done so, we should have
had it in due season.
"Bed tape is due in large part to our methods
of legislation and in large part, perhaps, to the
genius of our Government. Our methods of appro-
priations, Mr. President, are specific; they are not
general. A general appropriation bill, an appro-
priation bill relating to the departments, contains
from 175 to 200 pages, and specific appropriations
are made for everything, even for the clerks and the
employees. In the administration of that sort of a
law, with responsibility necessarily fixed for expen-
ditures in the way which it provides, red tape will
ensue as naturally as maggots from a decaying
carcass."
CONCLUSION
IT would be an ambitious hope that this writing
could have much direct effect in stimulating the
American people to the kind of active concern in
matters of military preparation which they exhibit
in regard to other issues, upon which they rest their
choice of representatives in the national Legisla-
ture. Today's questions press hard; and the neces-
sity for the use of military force is always thought
to be remote. Economy is a good cry, and military
preparation is expensive. There is temptation
therefore to put the legislator to the strain of de-
fending his action in favor of appropriations for
this kind of purpose. Above all, an understanding
of military matters is difficult, and popular exposi-
tions are very little set forth by military men, the
natural experts in the subject. Eailroad people
write and speak abundantly about their business
when legislation in regard to it is pending; and
participants in industrial activity, both on the side
of employer and employee, spread abroad a great
deal of information about labor questions. But
army officers do not take free part in the kind of
public discussion which brings forward and clarifies
the issues upon which a free people expresses its
284
CONCLUSION 285
demands. There is a class of people, however, who
make it their business to study and present to the
attention of the voting public the important ques-
tions of policy; the magazine and editorial writers,
the college presidents, the men who have rendered
prominent service; all these are public instructors
who have a necessary function in the formation of
opinion, and who are therefore indispensable agents
of popular government. These writers and speak-
ers would be particularly handicapped in an at-
tempt to place before the public the labors and
difficulties of a technical military supply depart
ment, both by unfamiliarity with the professional
considerations, different from those of civil life
and by the obscurity of the laws and rules under
which these departments operate; and I therefore
venture to hope that, in gathering together from
the body of the laws and from the experience of
the Ordnance Department certain illustrative ex-
amples both of real difficulties and of unfounded
accusations, I may be making it easier for these
public teachers to secure the data for lessons which
their responsibility of occupation should remind
them are due from them. In presenting these
examples I realize that I have quoted from original
sources of information at length too tedious for
popular reading, but I have done this with the view
of enabling any one wishing to use this book as a
reference to be sure of his ground without having
to resort to a deterrent search for evidence. I read,
in the early winter of 1917, an editorial in a great
daily newspaper which commented on a visit of two
286 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
distinguished Senators to some of the Army Can-
tonments. The Senators had found the inevitable,
in that there was a shortage of military supplies of
more than one kind, and the editorial expressed the
hope that the individuals responsible might be com-
pelled to retire and make way for others more effi-
cient. This typical editorial failed to realize that
the people responsible were the citizens of the
United States, and that their responsibility related
back to the years when they were permitting the
accumulation of an impossible task for performance
by an always insufficient personnel. The intelligent
but uninformed writer represented a large class,
upon which the reading public was dependent for
its information as to the progress of the country
in making ready for war. It is my hope that the
facts in this book may render it easier for such
writers to make a sound analysis of our national
situation in the early wartime.
There is another purpose which I think not inap-
propriate for attempt by one who can write of events
with the intimate knowledge which comes only from
participation in them. The purpose concerns the
investigation of the War Department by the Senate
Committee on Military Affairs, which was com-
menced upon the opening of the session of Congress
in December, 1917. An investigation by this body
was entirely appropriate. Although our form of
government does not involve direct responsibility
of the heads of the executive departments to the
legislative branch, there is nevertheless an acknowl-
edged duty of the representatives of the people who
CONCLUSION 287
compose this branch to scrutinize the performance
of the executive government, in the interest of effi-
cient administration. Whenever any matter of
extraordinary interest has transpired in an exec-
utive department, and particularly when there has
been a charge or a suspicion of mismanagement or
wrongdoing, investigation by one of the regularly
constituted committees of the Senate or the House
of Eepresentatives, or by a specially appointed
committee, has followed .as a matter of course.
There can be no sound objection to the practice.
But investigation should be made with considera-
tion for the task which is laid upon the executive
officials, and should not be conducted in such spirit
of hostility to the department under investigation,
or to any of its important officials, as to require the
latter to neglect supremely important duties in
order to defend themselves against attack, unless
there is strong presumption that they have failed
in the performance of their office. Although the
Senate Military Committee displayed no indisposi-
tion to accept what the evidence soon brought out,
namely, that the backward conditions were the result
of long acting causes, a few members so persistently
refused to accept the statements of responsible offi-
cials, and by their utterances gave such force and
notoriety to the biassed complaints of interested
parties, as to require busy officers to suspend their
work of making ready the Army, and devote time
which they did not have to spare to the preparation
of replies to attacks. In the month of December,
1917, the two officers of the Ordnance Department
288 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
who had most to do with the procurement of machine
guns were obliged to shut themselves up and deny
interviews to designers and manufacturers, as well
as to their own subordinates, for five days, in order
that they might gather from the records the data
for refuting the misinformation which had found
lodgment in certain minds; and my own testimony
before the investigating committee, in the same
month, occupied over two hundred printed pages,
and naturally took much more time for its prepara-
tion than for its delivery. This and other like inci-
dents interfered with war preparation, but the offi-
cers ' time was necessaryun order to forestall radical
action based upon misapprehension. No critic ever
came to my office during the investigation for the
purpose of seeing what was wrong at the nerve cen-
ter of ordnance supply, and whether he could help
by the exercise of his own powers ; but they formed
judgment without the assistance of such easily made
examination, and proposed readjustments based
upon assumed defects in the Department's organi-
zation. The organization was good ; and the critics
never learned that the inadequacy was due to in-
sufficiency of resource which might have been
remedied in the years preceding, but in the emer-
gency was being met by extraordinary expansion,
requiring time. Although the committee took no
action in disapproval of the Ordnance Department,
and made no report of the part of its investigation
which related to that Department, the individual
members above spoken of claimed to voice the senti-
ments of the committee in expressing their own
CONCLUSION 289
harsh criticisms; and in the absence of a report
their claim could not be fully controverted. I have
quoted dissenting views expressed by some members
of the committee, but I think the Department was
entitled to a report.
The great achievements of the Ordnance Depart-
ment have been described in other publications, both
of permanent character and appearing in periodical
literature, but these have not undertaken to state
whether the Department had to be recreated for its
purpose, or whether it performed its task with no
essential change other than tremendous enlarge-
ment; nor have they attempted to reply to the
charges of basic errors of the Department when it
was going its own way, and that they were only cor-
rected after they were revealed by the efforts of the
hostile members of the investigating committee. I
have therefore endeavored to recite herein the facts
and the evidence which show that the Ordnance
Department was adequate for its proper functions,
in so far as it could be with insufficient numbers
and resources; that its officers labored devotedly
and successfully, and with proper methods, in mak-
ing use of the facilities of our own and our allied
countries and the auxiliary agencies created to
supplement the regular departments, to supply our
armies with fighting material ; and that it increased
its numbers by personnel of a high type which it
secured, assigned to duties appropriate to its apti-
tudes, and assimilated. I think the record also
shows that the investigation of the Senate Military
Committee, in so far as it was conducted by its se-
290 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
vere critics of the Ordnance Department, consumed
uselessly the time of busy officers; slowed up prep-
aration at a time when the work of the Department
was most pressing; brought us nothing that was in-
forming or helpful, and stirred up the country on
wrong lines. The only effect which it could have on
a real effort at reform would be to direct it astray.
The professional department had realized the right
thing when it saw it to be done; but the newly in-
spired critics, uninformed through inattention, did
not recognize the right even when they saw it
already accomplished.
Undoubtedly the Ordnance Department can be
improved in its organization in the light of the ex-
perience of the World War. It can be given some
method of utilizing the services of civilians of
scientific attainments, for at least a part of their
time, in dealing with the problems which it is always
having to handle ; and the method can be made such
as to cause these gentlemen to take a pride in ren-
dering the service. The relations between the de-
partment and the industries of the country which
would be utilized by it in time of war can be made
closer in time of peace. Machinery can be devised
for the coordination of the ordnance and other de-
partments in time of war which is not needed in time
of peace, and can be given such artificial practice in
peace time as to make it readily available and
expansible in war, instead of having to be newly
created, as in the late war. But it would be a mis-
take to conclude from our experience that the
functions of the Ordnance Department should be
CONCLUSION 291
assigned to a different kind of personnel, in a
different kind of organization, such as was pro-
posed, for example, in the early part of the war
when it was urged that the procurement of muni-
tions of war should be taken over by an organization
of civilians, on the ground that as business men
they could handle it better than ordnance officers
with training supposed to have been military only.
As a matter of fact the department was enlarged
by the recruitment, among others, of business
men, who did their work within the organization,
instead of setting up a new one, and did it with
great satisfaction and success. The procurement
itself, meaning the placing of contracts and orders
for manufacture, was put under the coordinating
direction of a very eminent business man, whose
selection of the Ordnance Department as the organi-
zation in which he volunteered his services to help
see the war through was a testimonial to the stand-
ing of the department in the business community.
The proper committees of Congress will work
assiduously at the preparation of an Army reorgani-
zation measure for presentation to their respective
houses, and they will have the carefully studied as-
sistance of all the branches of the War Department,
as well as the results of observation of officers who
served in the theater of war. No doubt the measure
will embody the best wisdom which is available.
But whatever it may be it will fall short of success
unless the idea which is behind it, the military prep-
aration of the country, shall inspire the people to
better support than they have ever given in the
292 ORDNANCE AND THE WORLD WAR
past. It is an ungracious part to tell the people
that they are wrong. They are not accustomed to
hear it. Public men, from whom they hear most
about themselves, are given to assuring them that
they, ultimately, are always right, and that their
collective judgment should invariably be accepted.
Their collective judgment must be accepted because
they have the power to enforce it ; but that it is not
always right is evidenced by all the expense and
bloodshed which took place in the World War, after
the date at which a prepared America might have
brought it to an end. It is the duty of the citizen
to have an opinion about matters of national de-
fense, and although this does not mean that he
should make himself an expert in the subject, it
does mean that he should require attention to it
upon the part of the men whom he supports with
his franchise, and that he should encourage and sus-
tain them in forwarding it, in accordance with views
which the citizen should take the trouble to ascertain
while the public servant is in the candidate stage.
If this book shall make any contribution to public
interest in the labors and trials of those who toil to
prepare the nation to meet its enemies it will
accomplish its purpose.
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