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 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 FRASER
 
 HENRY FROWDE, M.A. 
 
 PUBLISHEU TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 
 
 LONDON, EDINBURGH, AND NEW YORK
 
 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 ANNOTATED 
 
 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF 
 
 MODERN PHILOSOPHY FOR THE USE 
 
 OF STUDENTS IN COLLEGES 
 
 AND UNIVERSITIES 
 
 ALEXANDER CAMPBELL ERASER, D.C.L. Oxon. 
 
 EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS 
 IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 
 
 FIFTH EDITION, AMENDED 
 
 AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
 1899
 
 PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PREbS 
 
 BY HORACE HART, M.A. 
 
 rRlNTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
 
 PREFACE TO FIFTH EDITION 
 
 In this Edition the verbal expression of the thought 
 contained in the Editor's Introduction to the Selections, 
 as well as in his Prefatory Notes and Annotations, has been 
 further amended. Some additional annotations have been 
 introduced, intended to suggest questions hardly contem- 
 plated by Berkeley, but, now raised through his direct 
 and indirect influence or otherwise ; and other notes con- 
 tained in former editions, which seem less suitable, have 
 been withdrawn. The design and mutual relations of each 
 of the Three Parts into which the Selections are divided, 
 are made more distinct. Portions of Berkeley's ' Principles,' 
 as well as of his ' Theory of Vision,' less adapted to the 
 present state of science, are omitted in this edition. I 
 have substituted parts of his charming Dialogues on 
 Materialism, in which his conception of Matter, as con- 
 stantly dependent on living Mind or Spirit, is unfolded 
 after the manner of Plato. 
 
 It is hoped that the book is thus better fitted for its 
 intended use, as a text-book and aid to reflection on the
 
 vi PREFACE TO FIFTH EDITION 
 
 spiritual constitution of the universe — including the chief 
 questions of contemporary Materialism, and also involving 
 the three central problems of philosophy, concerned 
 severally with the World, the Ego or Self, and God, in 
 themselves and in their mutual relations. 
 
 This selection from the classical works of a philosopher 
 who appeared at a critical time in the development of 
 modern speculation, and whose account of Matter has 
 exercised a great if unsuspected influence at once on 
 physical science and on religious thought, has been found 
 apt to stimulate original thinking in students of philo- 
 sophy in the academical institutions of this country and 
 America. It has perhaps helped to make Berkeley a 
 factor in that restoration of faith which appears in the 
 closing years of the nineteenth century. 
 
 May, 1899.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introduction to the Selections . . ix 
 
 FIRST PART. 
 
 Philosophical Principles concerning; Matter 
 AND Spirit. 
 
 Prefatory Note 
 
 I. Introduction to the Principles 
 II. Rationale of the Principles 
 
 III. Objections to the Principles . 
 
 IV. Consequences of the Principles 
 
 A Dialogue concerning the Principles . 
 
 7 
 32 
 
 57 
 90 
 
 117 
 
 SECOND PART. 
 
 The Visible World a Divine Language 
 interpretable in Science. 
 
 Prefatory Note 169 
 
 I. A New Theory of Vision 175 
 
 II. Divine Visual Language: A Dialogue . . 220 
 
 III. The Visual Language Vindicated . . . 268
 
 viii CONTENTS 
 
 THIRD PART. 
 
 SiRis, OR THE Universe United in God. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Prefatory Note 283 
 
 A Chain of Philosophical Reflections . . . 287 
 
 Index 331
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 The design of the Selections is to afford appropriate 
 exercise to students of Psychology, Inductive Logic, and 
 Metaphysics, who desire to discuss and determine questions 
 at the foundation of human life and knowledge, raised in 
 modern thought, through which a liberal education should 
 conduct them. 
 
 Berkeley may be used as an Introduction to the problems 
 of Modern Philosophy for the following among other 
 reasons : — 
 
 1. His philosophical writings, although only philosophical 
 fragments, are English classics of true metaphysical genius, 
 which present subtle thought in graceful and transparent 
 language. 
 
 2. Their principal doctrine, about the ultimate nature 
 and supposed powers of Matter, suggests some of the chief 
 questions at the root of our spiritual life : Theism versus 
 Materialism is their pervading note. 
 
 3. Berkeley is an important factor in the history of 
 modern philosophy, especially in the period inaugurated by 
 Locke's 'Essay,' which includes the last two hundred years.
 
 X INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 The sceptical crisis of this Era, represented by Hume, was 
 precipitated by the new questions about Matter and the 
 Visible World that Berkeley had raised. An intellectual 
 revolution followed, in which, largely through the influence 
 of Berkeley's Philosophical Principles, Locke was gradually 
 exchanged either (a) for the Idealism of Kant and Hegel, 
 (b) for Association psychology in its development from 
 Hume and Hartley to the present day, or {c) for Reid's 
 emphatic appeal to what he called the Common Sense. 
 
 The intrinsic freshness of Berkeley's thought, the literary 
 charm of its expression, the romantic interest of his Im- 
 materialism, its intellectual reach when it is pushed into 
 its issues, with his historical importance, and the present 
 urgency of the ultimate questions concerning Matter and its 
 functions in the universe, all unite in recommending him as 
 a stimulating companion for a student of philosophy. His 
 new conception of Matter raises the fundamental questions 
 of philosophy and theology. 
 
 This estimate of the educational value of Berkeley does 
 not of course oblige the student to accept his celebrated 
 (often misunderstood; explanation of what the reality of the 
 sensible world consists in. 
 
 Berkeley's personal history is full of human interest. 
 The early years are shrouded in a mystery that is in 
 keeping with the halo of romance in which his whole 
 life is enveloped. It is certain that he was born in the 
 county of Kilkenny, in March, 1685, and that in March, 
 1 700, he entered Trinity College, Dublin, where his next 
 thirteen years were spent. Peter Browne, afterwards the 
 philosophical bishop of Cork, was then provost of Trinity, 
 and the seeds of modern thought were finding their way 
 into the Irish College. Through the influence of Moly- 
 neux, Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding had 
 been introduced, and Malebranche too, the French philo-
 
 BERKELEY'S PERSONAL HISTORY xi 
 
 sophical contemporary of Locke, was not unknown in 
 Dublin. The spirit of Descartes and of Bacon, the early 
 operations of the Royal Society, and the discoveries of 
 Newton and Leibniz, were also influences then and there 
 at work. Berkeley's writings show early familiarity with 
 Locke and Newton, Descartes and Malebranche. 
 
 When Berkeley was in Dublin, and before he had reached 
 his thirtieth year, he had given to the world the three small 
 philosophical classics, which state and defend his new con- 
 ception of Matter, and consequent refutation of Materialism. 
 In 1709 the Essay towards a Ahw Theory of Vision appeared, 
 to open the way for the other two. It was followed in 17 10 
 by the Principles of Hutnan Knotvledge — a systematically 
 reasoned exposition of Principles which determine the 
 spiritual nature and office of the material world. In 17 13 
 they were further explained and illustrated, in a more popu- 
 lar form, in Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. 
 Thus, like Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume, and in contrast 
 to Locke, Kant, and Reid, Berkeley presented his leading 
 thought to the world in early life — a fact in keeping with 
 the fervid impetuosity of his temperament. 
 
 His intellectual growth at Trinity College, during the 
 years which preceded the publication of these three books, 
 may be traced in his Commonplace Book. This is one of 
 the most interesting records in existence of the awakening 
 struggles of philosophical genius. It was first published 
 in 187 1, in the Oxford edition of his Works and Life. 
 Therein he appears under the fervid inspiration of a new 
 thought ; — labouring to find fit expression for Principles 
 which he was resolved to present to the world, but in as 
 conciliatory a way as he could devise ; determined to 
 employ them in sustaining spiritual faith, and in purging 
 physical science. 
 
 In 1 7 13 Berkeley visited London. His next twenty years 
 were spent chiefly in France and Italy, and in America.
 
 xii INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 His personal charm, as well as the novelty and boldness of 
 his conception of Matter, made him an object of attention 
 to eminent contemporaries. In 1724, after his return from 
 Italy to Ireland, he was made Dean of Derry. Ardent 
 philanthropy led him to resign this preferment, and carried 
 him to North America, at the age of forty-five, where he 
 meant to devote the remainder of his life to spreading 
 Christian civilisation in the Western World, by founding 
 a College at the Bermudas. But after three years of in- 
 evitable delay in Rhode Island, on his way to Bermuda, 
 withdrawal of the public support on which the enterprise 
 depended obliged him to return to Ireland. 
 
 The last twenty years of his life were spent in comparative 
 retirement as Bishop of Cloyne in the south of Ireland. 
 
 Neither in the twenty years of movement, nor in the closing 
 twenty years of retirement, was philosophy forgotten by 
 Berkeley. A Latin tract on the ultimate cause of Motion in 
 Matter, the fruit of studies in Italy, appeared in 1721, on 
 his return from the Continent. Alciphron or the Minute 
 Philosopher^ a book of dialogues, directed against sceptical 
 free-thinkers, and unfolding the rationale of faith in God 
 as God speaks to us in the Visible World, was a result of 
 recluse life in Rhode Island. It was published in 1732, on 
 his return from America, and was followed, a year later, by 
 a Further Vindication of the spiritual meaning of the World 
 we see. The latest issue of this ever-deepening course of 
 philosophical thought appeared in 1744, under the quaint 
 title of Sir is, or a Chain of Philosophical Reflectiojis — more 
 from the point of view of Plato than of Locke, and more 
 immediately in relation to God than to Matter. 
 
 Berkeley spent the evening of his days in philanthropy 
 and in meditative quiet. For Cloyne he had a particular 
 fondness. Its obscurity and remoteness had a contem- 
 plative charm. But at last, when declining health needed 
 change, his love for academical retirement carried him to
 
 MODERN THOUGHT BEFORE BERKELEY xiii 
 
 Oxford, which for years had been before him in imagination 
 as the ideal home of his old age. He enjoyed Oxford only 
 for a few months. In January 1753, death suddenly closed 
 this ingenious and beautiful life, devoted to exposition of 
 the necessary dependence of material nature upon Omni- 
 present Intelligence. 
 
 That the things we see and touch, and their supposed 
 inherent powers, are neither more nor less than appearances 
 in the five senses, presented in a continuous natural order 
 by the power of God ; and further, that the material world 
 thus presented by Supreme Active Reason is dependent 
 for its reality on living mind being percipient of the 
 orderly sensuous phenomena ;— this was the new concep- 
 tion of Matter presented by Berkeley. It arose in his 
 youth under the influence of Locke ; it was enlarged in 
 his later life by sympathy with Plato. Its consequences 
 justify us in regarding it as one of the conceptions that mark 
 epochs, and become springs of spiritual progress. 
 
 The state of Modern Philosophy before and after Berkeley 
 illustrates this. An outline of the history, with Berkeley in 
 the centre, may prepare the reader for the Selections. 
 
 Descartes (i 596-1650) was the father of modern meta- 
 physics. It originated in his endeavour to explode Pre- 
 judice by means of tentative Doubt. As the first step in 
 philosophy Descartes refused to accept without support 
 in reason any belief which, on trial, he might find it possible 
 to suspend. He announced this as the means he had 
 found effectual for delivering his own mind from irrational 
 prejudices ; for finding the genuine necessities of reason ; 
 and for correction of a priori fallacies, which is a chief 
 end of metaphysical inquiry. He recommended it as the 
 way to transform a life of blind trust in inherited dogmas 
 into the philosophic life of reasonable faith.
 
 xiv INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 In trying the mental experiment of temporarily suspending 
 all his beliefs, Descartes found doubt arrested by one irre- 
 sistible conviction, namely, that of his own existence. This 
 conviction he could not even for a moment hold in suspense. 
 He expressed this intellectual necessity in the celebrated 
 formula — cogito ergo sum, or ego sufn cogitans — ' I am con- 
 scious of existing.' This means that the changing conscious 
 life so necessarily presupposes an unchanging ego or self, 
 that the consciousness cannot arise without finding this 
 conviction involved in it. From this starting-point — not 
 adequately recognised in the ancient world — the philo- 
 sophy of modern Europe has pursued its free course. 
 
 One who imbibed Cartesianism was accordingly ready 
 to begin the life of reflection by being surer of his own 
 existence as a conscious person than of anything else. 
 We know the Self in our own conscious life with the 
 most perfect assurance that is conceivable : we know our 
 own bodies even, and all things external to them, only 
 through this Self being conscious. For if I were to cease 
 to be conscious, the things of sense would cease to be real, 
 as far at least as I was concerned. And if all conscious 
 life in the universe were to die, the dead Matter which 
 remained would be as good as non-existent. Extended 
 things are unconscious of any real existence : only con- 
 scious beings realise themselves and things around them : 
 they contribute even to unconscious things their only in- 
 telligible reality, in feeling and knowing them. The con- 
 scious person, revealed to himself in the acts and states of 
 which he is conscious, is therefore the primary reality. The 
 existence of visible and tangible things, external to his felt 
 sensations or ideas, was with Descartes only an inference, 
 not a primary datum — an inference which he vindicated on 
 the ground of the trust we all necessarily place in our own 
 conscious experience as rooted in God. For this divine 
 trust seemed to justify the assumption that we cannot be
 
 CARTESIANISM xv 
 
 deceived regarding whatever we have a clear and distinct 
 conviction of, as we find we have of the existence of a 
 world outside our individual consciousness. 
 
 Descartes thus found two finite beings — one conscious 
 and unextended, and the other extended and unconscious — 
 and Perfect Being or God, on whom the two depend. This 
 ultimate duality of opposed dependent beings in the uni- 
 verse—the one invisible and the other visible — the one con- 
 scious and the other unconscious — was a difificulty in early 
 modern philosophy. How were conscious substance and 
 extended substance — living thought and dead ?natter — to be 
 reconciled in a coherent philosophy ? This, in its different 
 phases, became the question of questions. The extended 
 world was so opposed by the Cartesian to the unextended 
 ego or self of which he was conscious, that explanation of 
 perception and science of the former by the latter, or 
 of intercourse between the two, seemed impossible. Ex- 
 tended things and conscious life seemed to be mutually 
 exclusive. How can they be mixed^ either in our percep- 
 tions or in our voluntary movements? How can extended 
 things become perceptions, and how can our invisible 
 volitions produce changes in extended things ? 
 
 Yet it was not denied that we do in fact perceive extended 
 things ; or that changes in things are referred to our volitions. 
 The explanation offered by Cartesianism was, that the two 
 dependent but mutually exclusive substances are perpetu- 
 ally dependent on and harmonised by God. All changes in 
 extended things, and our perceptions of them, were viewed 
 as effects of which the will of God must be the originating 
 cause. Matter existed that it might be occasion for, and 
 a sign of Divine action. On occasion of an impression 
 produced by God in a human organism, God caused a cor- 
 responding perception in the human mind that animated 
 the organism : when one exerted one's will to move, God 
 caused the bodily motion that followed the volition. This
 
 xvi INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 conception of physical causation, as divinely ordered suc- 
 cession only, not real efficiency, was further developed by 
 two Cartesians, Geulinx and Malebranche. According to 
 Malebranche (1638-1715) matter, because extended, could 
 not become an immediate object of perception ; and being 
 in itself powerless and unintelligent, it could not be the 
 efficient cause of the perception of its own existence. So 
 he was led to think that, while passive setisatiotis of taste, 
 smell, sound, and so on, are produced by Divine power, 
 our ideas of things as extended, or under mathematical 
 relations, are our participations in Divine intelligence, so 
 that we know the external world ' in God.' This monist 
 tendency of later Cartesianism reached its extreme in 
 SpiivfOZA (1632-77), who discarded the supposed duality, 
 and treated self and matter as correlative modes of the One 
 Substance — still called by him God. 
 
 It was in this way that the material world was conceived 
 by those leading thinkers in the seventeenth century, 
 through whom Cartesianism was transformed into Spino- 
 zism. 
 
 But other intellectual influences were simultaneously con- 
 tributing to form modern thought. Bacon (1561-16 26) 
 in his Novum Organum, before Descartes, had urged the 
 need for purifying the human mind from the prejudices 
 generated by dependence on tradition. He too recom- 
 mended the free inquiry which presupposes doubt, as essen- 
 tial to the philosophic spirit, and as an indispensable first 
 step in the critical examination of our experience. Bacon 
 was the English prophet of modern physical science ; which 
 men were then trying to construct, by better calculated 
 observation of the qualities of things, and of the sequence 
 of events. His favourite lesson of man's dependence upon 
 actual experience for real knowledge, and his warnings 
 against empty verbal reasonings and dogmas unverified by
 
 BACON AND LOCKE xvii 
 
 facts, represented the spirit and method which Locke was 
 soon after to apply, in order to find the origin and Hmits 
 of human knowledge — the problem to which modern 
 philosophy next addressed itself. 
 
 Locke (1632 -1704) inaugurated the philosophical dis- 
 cussions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by 
 investigating experience experimentally. He applied him- 
 self, in Bacon's spirit, to study human understanding, in 
 and through which we attain our ideas, with our knowledge 
 and beliefs regarding the ego, the world, and God. What 
 he called ' ideas ' were for him facts important beyond all 
 others, for by their means matter was converted into know- 
 ledge. He studied them in his own consciousness ; — not 
 in order to construct an imposing theory of the universe, 
 but modestly to mark the growth, and take the measure of 
 that understanding of ourselves and our surroundings which 
 human beings have within their reach. By investigating 
 this, in a plain matter-of-fact way, he hoped to discover the 
 foundation and inevitable limits of human certainty ; as 
 well as the rationale of assent to what is only probable \ 
 
 The result of Locke's researches, pursued for nearly 
 twenty years, with this design in view, appeared in 1690, 
 in his Essay concerning Human Understa7iding. The Essay 
 contains, first an account of the ideas that are found within 
 the range of human experience ; then of the certain know- 
 ledge, and the judgments of probability to which the ideas 
 give rise. Locke argues, after a patient study of the facts, 
 that all that man can know is made up of simple or unana- 
 lysable ideas, some of them presented to our five senses, and 
 others which arise when we reflect upon our mental opera- 
 tions. He concludes that nothing can be conceived that has 
 not been given in one or other of these two ways. 
 
 In the last of the four books into which the Essay is 
 divided, Locke discusses human certainties, and also judg- 
 
 ' See Introduction to Locke's Essay. 
 b
 
 xviii INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 ments of probability. Our gradual acquisitions through 
 the five senses, and through reflection or self-consciousness 
 are, according to him, the materials out of which we form 
 certain knowledge and estimate probability. With a sem- 
 blance of inconsistency, he tacitly assumes, as data prior to 
 experience, fundamental principles, the intellectual necessity 
 of which his theory of the origin of all ideas in experi- 
 ence, strictly interpreted, inadequately explains. Here 
 is his account of the three primary certainties — Ego, God, 
 and Matter. 
 
 {a) Man's knowledge of his own invisible existence as 
 a self-conscious being, he resolved, like Descartes, into 
 irresistible conviction. ' If I doubt of all other things, that 
 very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will 
 not suffer me to doubt of that.' — {U) The existence of God, 
 or Eternal Mind, he treats as a consequence of the demand 
 of reason for an eternal Cause of his own existence, and 
 * as certainly evident to a man who thinks as any conclusion 
 n mathematics.' In this argument he presupposes the 
 necessity and universality of the principle of causation, but 
 without explaining how ' experience ' can make it universal 
 and necessary. — {c) Our knowledge of Matter, or things 
 that move in space, we have, he says, ' only by sensation.' 
 Here too he proceeds upon the principle of causation ; 
 for no man, he says, can know the existence of any being, 
 except himself and God, but only when, 'by its actual 
 operating upon him,' that being 'makes itself felt by him.' 
 The ideas or appearances which are presented to us in our 
 five senses, make us believe that ^ something^ exists without 
 us, at the time we have them, which makes us have them ; 
 and we believe in the existence of this external cause of 
 their appearance with ' a certainty as great as human nature 
 is capable of conceiving the existence of anything but a 
 man's self alone and God '.' 
 
 ^ See Essay, b. IV. ch 9, 10, 11, for Locke's explanation of our
 
 LOCKE AND MATTER xix 
 
 Locke found two sorts of qualities or powers in that 
 something called Matter, which he supposed to be the 
 cause of the ideas we perceive in sense. One sort was 
 assumed by him to be like what we perceive ; these were 
 called \is primary, real, or mathematical qualities : the other, 
 unlike what we perceive, were called its secondary or imputed 
 qualities. Of the former sort are the sizes, figures, motions, 
 impenetrability, and divisibility attributed to things ; — quali- 
 ties (or rather relations of quantity) which we cannot imagine 
 any particle of matter to be destitute of. They belong to 
 matter : they would be what we perceive them to be, even 
 if there were no living being in the universe to perceive 
 them. The secondary qualities, on the other hand, — the 
 colours, sounds, tastes, and odours of things — are, so far 
 as we directly perceive them, only sensations of which we 
 are conscious. The heat we feel cannot be felt by the 
 matter which forms the fire, nor can our feeling of taste 
 exist in the orange. What these sensations correspond to in 
 the ' something ' without us, Locke cannot even imagine, 
 if not to modifications of its primary qualities — atoms and 
 their motions that are unperceived by us. For, like the 
 atomists of old, he conjectured that the secondary qualities 
 might exist in the outward thing in the form of unperceived 
 motions of its constituent atoms, connected by natural law 
 with our sensations of colours, sounds, tastes, odours, heat 
 and cold, to which they give rise. Colour or sound as 
 perceived would thus be a kind oi feeling, while i7i itself 
 it is a mode of motion. But even if we could perceive 
 these unperceivable atoms, and their supposed motions, 
 Locke insisted that we could never predict a priori, i.e. 
 without experience, the sensations to which they would give 
 rise in us, or their natural order. It is therefore a funda- 
 mental doctrine in the Essay, that absolutely demonstrable 
 
 knowledge of ourselves, God, and external things — the three final 
 certainties. 
 
 b 2
 
 XX INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 physical science is impossible, consistently with the limits of 
 human knowledge : the laws of nature, as discoverable 
 by us, are in this respect arbitrary : as far as we know, they 
 might have been different from what they are : for our 
 intelligence, they are contingent on divine will, not eternal 
 truths. 
 
 Locke's doctrine of a 'something' or 'substance,' called 
 Matter, external to, and the cause of, what is present in our 
 senses, was connected with what he taught about ' abstract ' 
 ideas. ' Idea ' was the name applied by him to whatever 
 we are conscious or percipient of, when viewed without 
 respect to truth or falsehood, or to the relations in which 
 certainty and probability consist. It corresponds so far to 
 the ' simple apprehension ' of logicians. The word in this 
 wide meaning was naturally of frequent occurrence in an 
 Essay concerning human understanding^ . The second and 
 third books of the Essay contain an analysis of our ideas, 
 and conclude that they all depend upon experience. One 
 class of ideas Locke signalises. He found, he says, in his 
 scrutiny of human understanding, that men, especially 
 philosophers, have not only ideas of individual things, as 
 when they use their five senses, and when they exercise 
 memory or imagination, but that they have also ideas that 
 are not ideas of individual things, which in consequence 
 are not pictureable, and are therefore difficult to apprehend. 
 
 ^ Students of the present clay are apt to misconceive the psychology 
 of the seventeenth century from want of due regard to the special 
 meaning of the word idea, as then much in use. By Plato it was 
 used to express the archetypal essence of things. Through the 
 Aristotelian distinction of form and matter, it came gradually to lose 
 its high Platonic meaning, until with Descartes and Locke it was 
 applied indiscriminately to all phenomena which we apprehend — in 
 sense or otherwise. Berkeley, in his earlier writings, uses ' idea ' for 
 objects presented to our senses, and for representations of the same, 
 which arise in memory, or are formed in imagination. In Siris he 
 restores the term to its Platonic meaning, and prefers phenomeno?t as 
 the name for what we perceive when we exercise our senses.
 
 LOCKE AND ABSTRACT IDEAS xxi 
 
 He calls ideas of this sort abstract. The idea of a triangle 
 is one of his examples. He says it is an idea of a figure 
 'neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equi- 
 crural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once ; 
 something imperfect that cannot exist; an idea wherein 
 some parts of different and inconsistent ideas are put 
 together.' Another example was the abstract idea of sub- 
 stance. He describes it as made by abstraction — as the 
 idea of a something which we accustom ourselves to suppose 
 in which the qualities of things subsist, and from which they 
 result — something related as a support or centre to the 
 individual and concrete ideas or appearances that are pre- 
 sented to our senses and are regarded as qualities of things 
 present. 
 
 Locke describes his abstract idea of substance in terms 
 which prepare the way for Berkeley's rejection of substance 
 in Matter. ' The mind,' Locke says, ' being furnished 
 with a great number of the simple ideas conveyed in by 
 the senses as they are found in exterior things, or by reflec- 
 tion on its own operations, takes notice also that a certain 
 number of these ideas go cofistantly together ; which, being 
 presumed to belong to one thing, are called, so united in 
 one subject, by one name ; which, by inadvertency, we are 
 apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea, 
 which indeed is a complication of many ideas together ; 
 because, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist 
 by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some 
 substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they 
 do result ; which therefore we call Substance. So that if 
 any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure 
 substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it 
 at all, but only a supposition of he knoivs not tvhat support 
 of qualities which affect our senses ^ 
 
 Locke refers to other parts of his Essay for an answer to 
 
 ' Locke's Essay, b. II. ch. J 3. §§ i, z.
 
 xxii INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 the question, whether the mere fact ' that we are accustomed 
 to suppose ' material substance is all that can be said on 
 behalf of the reality of Matter. We want to know whether 
 this ' custom ' is grounded upon reason. So when 
 treating of abstraction, he tries to show that the 'general 
 idea of substance ' is formed ' by abstracting ' ; that our 
 idea of body or matter is of ' an extended solid substance ' ; 
 and our idea of mind or soul that of 'a substance that 
 thinks or is conscious.' But in none of these mental 
 experiences does he profess to find a ' clear and distinct ' 
 idea of abstract substance ; he only finds that we are 
 somehoiv obliged to suppose ' we know not what.' ' We have 
 no other idea or notion of Matter than as something wherein 
 sensible qualities which affect our senses do subsist.' 
 In like manner, ' by supposing a substance wherein thinking, 
 knowing, doubting, and a power of moving do subsist,' we 
 have as clear a notion of Spirit as we can have of Body, 
 — the one being supposed to be what he calls the sub- 
 stratum of those simple ideas that are presented to our 
 senses ; and the other supposed (in like ignorance of 
 what substratufn means) to be the substratum of the 
 ' operations we experiment in ourselves within.' ' It is plain 
 that the idea of corporeal substance is as remote from our 
 conceptions and apprehensions as that of spiritual substance 
 or spirit ; and therefore from our not having any notion of 
 the substance of spirit, we can no more conclude its non- 
 existence than we can for the same reason deny the existence 
 of body.' It is 'as rational to afiirm there is no body, 
 because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance 
 of matter, as to say there is no spirit, because we have no 
 clear and distinct idea of the substance of a spirit.' But 
 ' whatever be the secret abstract nature of substance in 
 general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct 
 substances are nothing but several combinations of 
 simple ideas or qualities, coexisting in such, though un-
 
 MA TERIA LISM xxi ii 
 
 known, cause of their union, so as to make the whole 
 subsist of itself. What we call their powers make a great 
 part of our complex ideas of substances.' — In the end Locke 
 finds that we are as ignorant of spiritual substance as of 
 material substance. Berkeley, as we shall see, retains sub- 
 stance of which we are conscious while he rejects unperceived 
 substance. 
 
 The Essay of Locke \ with its constant refrain, that real 
 knowledge is never attained by the human mind ' without 
 experience,' was coming into vogue when Berkeley was 
 beginning to think. It seems to have awakened his eager 
 and acute intelligence more than any other philosophical 
 book. But Locke failed to satisfy him about an unper- 
 ceived reality of Matter ; and also about abst7-act ideas, 
 especially the 'obscure' idea of Matter as an abstract 
 substance and power. 
 
 Certain contemporary tendencies increased Berkeley's dis- 
 satisfaction with the opinions of Locke about Matter. His 
 age, like our own, encouraged Materialism. The rise of 
 the mixed mathematical sciences, and the habits formed 
 by exclusive attention to external nature, were leading 
 scientific men to attribute conscious life itself — that conscious 
 life in which Descartes found the basis of knowledge, and 
 among the facts of which Locke searched for certainties 
 — to supposed power in Matter, that substance or 'some- 
 thing ' without us, which Locke said was the cause or 
 occasion of our ideas of sense. Power in Matter, it was 
 suggested, might be the cause of conscious life, as well as 
 of all that happens in the material world itself. Even to 
 
 ' For interpretation and criticism of Locke's Essay as a whole, and 
 not merely in its relation to Berkeley, I may refer to my annotated 
 edition of the Essay, with the Prolegomena, published by the Oxford 
 Clarendon Press in 1894; also to Locke in 'Philosophical Classics' 
 (Blackwood, 1899).
 
 xxiv INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 Locke it had appeared possible that God might lend to 
 organised matter the power of being conscious. ' It is 
 not,' he says, ' much more remote from our comprehension 
 to conceive this than to conceive that God should superadd 
 to matter another substance with a faculty of thinking ; 
 since we know not in what thinking consists ; nor to what 
 sort of substances the first eternal thinking Being has been 
 pleased to give that power ^' Locke here suggests only 
 a subordinate, not an atheistic or universal materialism, for 
 he presupposes ultimate dependence of matter, with its 
 supposed power of thinking, on God. 
 
 Such were some of the early issues of the endeavour of 
 modern thought to explain conscious life and our perception 
 of Matter. In Descartes and still more in Spinoza it was 
 unwilling to accept perception and moral agency as in- 
 explicable facts ; and it was coming more and more to 
 see that extended things could not exist as we find them in 
 our experience, unless there were percipient beings alive, 
 to realise their qualities. The tendency of Descartes and 
 Malebranche was to explain perception by the agency of 
 God — to find power only in Spirit — to proceed upon the 
 absolute powerlessness of Matter. Hobbes, Gassendi, and 
 the materialists, at the opposite philosophical extreme, 
 acknowledged power only in Matter ; and seemed to say 
 that what is blind and unconscious is deeper and more 
 explanatory than conscious reason. Spinoza, in his specu- 
 lative flight, emptied visible things and finite spirits of real 
 substance and power, and accordingly emptied God, or 
 the Unica Substantia, of moral agency. Locke, satisfied 
 to report facts, offers no explanation of perception, or of 
 what is ultimately meant by Matter, nor does he try to 
 analyse reality. 
 
 * See Essay, b. IV. ch. 7. § 9 ; also b. I. ch. 4. § t8 ; b. II. ch. 23 ; 
 b. III. ch. 10. § 15.
 
 BERKELEY'S NEW QUESTION xxv 
 
 It was at this juncture that it occurred to Berkeley to 
 discuss a question which had not been put, from the point 
 of view at which he put it, by any ancient or modern. He 
 found unrealised dogmas about Matter making men mate- 
 rialists. He pressed upon the world, with all the fervour 
 of his Irish temperament, this New Question, to be an- 
 swered before men could rest in materialism : — What in 
 reason should we mean when with Locke we assume the 
 reality of ' matter ' ; and to what power should we refer the 
 appearances that are presented to our senses? Let us, in 
 the spirit of Locke, be faithful to facts, and to the ascertained 
 limits of man's knowledge. A fuller and more faithful 
 analysis of experience than that of Locke might perhaps 
 show that the philosophers had been making an irra- 
 tional assumption, in supposing that what we see and touch 
 involves the existence of unconscious substance, endowed with 
 unknowti powers ; or that we are obliged to accept this 
 dogma, when, with the mass of mankind, we affirm the real 
 existence of a material world. 
 
 To transform our conception of the Matter whose exist- 
 ence mankind takes for granted into an intelligible con- 
 ception, and to show the instrumental and subordinate 
 function of the material world in the spiritual economy 
 of the universe, was what Berkeley attempted. His con- 
 temporaries and predecessors had been taking for granted 
 that the things presented to sense exist as abstract sub- 
 stances ; some had even thought that Matter explained self- 
 conscious life and intelligence. He entreated them to re- 
 consider their dogma, and to cease to suppose that unreason 
 could be the foundation of our universe. Let them first 
 make sure that Matter could really explain anything, or, 
 indeed, that its independent reality was an intelligible 
 dogma. Instead of blindly accepting propositions about 
 the real existence and efficiency of Matter, he would first 
 ask what 'existing,' and being 'real,' 'external,' 'substantial,'
 
 xxvi INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 and 'powerful,' tnean, when asserted of the things we are 
 daily seeing and touching. 
 
 What Berkeley tried to do was to get this — as a previous 
 question — put in place of the traditional dogmas about 
 Matter, and Space, and Power. He wanted to find the 
 tme philosophical fjieatiitig of Matter ; he did not doubt 
 the reality of the material world, or the value of physical 
 science, which no sane person could doubt. He wanted 
 above all to settle the true philosophical ?)ieaning of causa- 
 tion ; he did not doubt that there was a subordinate sense 
 in which outward things might be called causes. 
 
 Berkeley's place in history cannot be understood by those 
 who do not see that what he wanted was to change the 
 questions about the material world, with which his philo- 
 sophical predecessors had been busy, into what he believed 
 to be a deeper and more productive question. With the 
 new question settled, in a fresh interpretation of the dogma 
 that Matter exists, he hoped that thinking men might be 
 relieved from perplexities about the things we see and 
 touch, which retarded the physical sciences ; and that they 
 might also discover the irrationality of referring life, whether 
 manifested in sense-perception or in any other intelligent 
 way, to an unintelligible something called 'matter' as its 
 cause. Find out what Matter must mean, when we are 
 faithful to facts and are not misled by empty abstract 
 words, and by traditional dogmas about its nature and 
 powers. This was his fervid entreaty. His promise was 
 that when we have found this we shall see that we do not 
 need to search for proofs of its ' reality ' ; and that there 
 is no reason for the materialistic assumption that Matter 
 is endowed with powers which explain the universe — 
 because in truth the things we see and touch, being all 
 as we find them only caused causes, not originating causes, 
 can in reason have only a subordinate sort of reality and 
 power, and can afford no sufficient explanation of anything.
 
 MATTER DEPENDENT ON MIND xxvii 
 
 But what are the facts to which we must be faithful when 
 we are trying to find what we should mean by 'matter' 
 and its ' powers ' ? In his Principles of Human Knoivledge, 
 Berkeley started with Locke's ambiguous thesis, that human 
 knowledge is the gradual issue of ideas given in experi- 
 ence '. 
 
 When he reflected upon his experience in the five senses, 
 he said that he could not find in experienced Matter either 
 independent substance or originating power. Moreover, 
 material substance, unrevealed in a living perception of 
 concrete phenomena, seemed to him meaningless and 
 unreal. But he found in abundance concrete sights and 
 touches and sounds and tastes and smells. He found also 
 himself, actually conscious of sights and touches, and sounds, 
 and tastes, and smells — conscious too of his own identity 
 through all changes, and of his power to produce (to some 
 extent) changes in what he saw and touched. But when 
 he reflected upon his experience of what is called matter, 
 he found only sights, touches, and other ideas or pheno- 
 mena, presented according to natural laws, and all dependent 
 for their reality on a person being percipient of them. 
 
 So Berkeley melted the material world into what is 
 actually presented to our senses. The existence of this 
 world was incapable even of Cartesian doubt. When we 
 say that we see or touch a material object, all that we can 
 truly mean is, that we perceive ideas or phenomena which 
 have for us a very practical meaning, inasmuch as our 
 pleasures and pains depend upon them. When we are 
 actually percipient, we have as much evidence of their 
 reality as we have of our own. In being percipient we are 
 conscious of our selves, and, simultaneously with this, of the 
 passive and dependent appearances which our senses reveal. 
 
 ' See Berkeley's metaphysical Commonplace Book, passim, in the 
 Oxford edition of his Works. Compare Principles of Human Kno'v- 
 ledge, §§ I, 2.
 
 xxviii INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 Strictly speaking we are conscious of the former : we are 
 percipient of the latter. There is as little room for doubt 
 and problematical inference in the one case as in the 
 other. Human knowledge begins with these two irreducible 
 facts — (a) self-conscious action, and {b) perceived appear- 
 ances that seem to be unsubstantial and powerless. 
 
 But Berkeley found more than this when he further 
 considered the solid and extended bodies placed in space, 
 composed of the sense-presented appearances. For all sane 
 persons believe that things continue to exist independently 
 of their own perceptions. Now the sights, sounds, and 
 other appearances realised in my perception are only tran- 
 sitory. They cannot be the solid and extended things that 
 do not pass away. We find moreover in Matter more than 
 a mere succession of presented appearances called ideas. 
 We find clusters of these, which we distinguish as things ; 
 and we speak of the presented ideas as Equalities of the 
 things.^ Into what facts of experience is this knowledge 
 of qualified things to be resolved ? If the things exist only 
 while the actual perceptions last, what is meant by the 
 permanence which seems to be implied in the reality of 
 outward things ? 
 
 If the material world were reduced to my passing per- 
 ceptions, the existence of Matter would be only intermittent 
 and fragmentary. The tree that I am looking at exists, 
 as an object actually perceived by me, only while I am 
 looking at it. And then it so exists only in its visible qual- 
 ities; for, being at a distance, the invisible qualities, which 
 at the same time I attribute to it, are not, under these 
 conditions, my actual perceptions. Do they all the while 
 exist ? If not, the greater part of what is meant by the tree 
 is not real, even at the very time that I say ' I see the tree.' 
 If external matter means only actual perception, all visible 
 qualities of things must relapse into non-entity when things 
 are left in the dark ; and their tangible ones too, in the
 
 SENSE SYMBOLISM xxix 
 
 light as well, unless a percipient is ahvays touching every 
 part of them. The material world could not have existed 
 millions of ages before men or other sentient beings began 
 to be percipient, if only this is what is meant by its real 
 existence '. 
 
 Here Berkeley brings in what he calls our 'judgments 
 of suggestion,' but without analysis of their validity. Sug- 
 gestion is the term he uses to express our tendency to 
 expect the reappearance of the ideas or phenomena of 
 sense in the order in which they have always been found 
 connected. Perception through suggestion is indirect or 
 acquired perception. It presupposes memory and imagina- 
 tion, and above all permanent rational order in the world 
 of sense, ideas or appearances, which we call the material 
 world. Suggestion rises at last into science of nature and 
 scientific prevision, and affords room for scientific experi- 
 ment and verification. The mere sight of the tree ' suggests ' 
 the sensation of resistance. This is so connected with what 
 is seen, in the material order of sense-presented appear- 
 ances, that we expect to feel resistance, after going through 
 the locomotive experience required to bring us into collision 
 with the tree. The one sense-appearance is the suggesting 
 sign of the other. The connexion, somehow established 
 between them, gives rise to what Berkeley calls 'language.' 
 But this significance and interpretability in sensuous ideas 
 is not confined to visible ones. All presented appearances 
 in all the senses are significant and interpretable. Physical 
 science is the interpretation. Each sense can do duty for 
 the others. What is called the material world is thus found 
 to consist not of mere phenomena, but of significant or 
 interpretable phenomena. It is a cosmos and not a chaos. 
 
 ' This question is raised by Locke {Essay, b. IV. ch. ii), when he 
 says that the things of sense are certainly known to exist only while 
 they are actually present to our senses — their existence when by me un- 
 perceived being only ' presumed ' by me.
 
 XXX INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 While the most striking examples of the supreme fact 
 that sense-presented ideas or phenomena constitute an 
 interpretable language are those presented by Sight, one 
 must never forget that this Symbolism of Nature is illus- 
 trated in our whole experience : we are continually trans- 
 lating the language of each sense into data of some other 
 sense, above all into those of Touch. The inductive 
 inferences of previsive science are only elaborate translations 
 of this sort, founded ultimately, like those of sense-percep- 
 tion, on rational suggestion. The whole material world is 
 a system of sensible signs — a sense-symbolism. Every 
 appearance of which we are conscious in our senses is 
 significant of other appearances, of which at the time we 
 are not actually percipient. The scientific significations of 
 phenomena are not immediately perceived in the transitory 
 phenomena, nor can they be discovered by a priori reason- 
 ing. Our interpretations of nature are the gradual result 
 of custom and intelligent comparison of instances ; but it 
 is a custom on the part of external nature which is found 
 to involve reason : what in its scientific form is inductive 
 reasoning, commences in the habit produced by the 
 customary order among natural phenomena. 
 
 The connexion between a felt or a visible perception in 
 sense and the expected phenomenon which it signifies, is 
 said by Berkeley to be ' arbitrary.' He enlarges on its 
 arbitrariness, and founds on this his favourite analogy of 
 a language of natural signs — connexion between names 
 and their meanings being in like manner arbitrary. This 
 may seem to imply that the natural laws which govern the 
 material world are capricious, and not to be depended 
 on. But what he intends appears to be, that there is no 
 a priori or eternal reason in things why, for example, a tree 
 seen from a distance must * suggest ' the particular tactual 
 phenomena which it does suggest ; nor why any one of the 
 constant connexions among phenomena which form the web
 
 NATURAL AND SPIRITUAL CAUSATION xxxi 
 
 of physical science might not have been other than it is in 
 fact. Natural causation is a natural symbolism, dependent 
 on, and expressive of, the perfect reason and will of God. 
 At our point of view it is not necessary^ more than is the 
 connexion between a word and the meaning which men 
 have agreed to connect with the word. In both cases the 
 connexion seems to be contingent. God, as perfect Reason 
 and Will, is accustomed to maintain sensible things and 
 their natural laws as we find them in experience. 
 
 Faith in divinely established connexion — that is to say 
 in scientific connexion— among the ideas presented to our 
 senses is Berkeley's account of belief in natural law. The 
 consequent permanence in the relation between the present 
 and the expected, in and among the different clusters of 
 sense-phenomena — assumed as a judgment of common 
 sense — is (so far) his explanation of belief in the ' perman- 
 ence ' of sensible things, during the intervals in ivhich they 
 are not actually perceived. To illustrate the fact that our 
 expectations are at first suggested by habit, and that the 
 rationale of this habit is unfolded in the coherent thought 
 of physical science, is a result of his investigation of Vision, 
 making it an important contribution to psychology. There 
 is neither contradiction nor meaninglessness, he would say, 
 in a material world that is composed of significant sense- 
 phenomena, which we can all to some extent interpret and 
 make use of: there must be either meaninglessness or 
 contradiction in the material world of the philosophers, 
 which consists of unifitelligible material substattces and 
 pcnvers. 
 
 But Berkeley finds in our experience of the material 
 world more than momentary sense-phenomena, and the 
 prevision which results from the fixed order and consequent 
 significance of those phenomena. Causation, in its highest 
 meaning, is more than sense-symbolism. Indeed it is quite 
 other than this. It is not constant connexion of pheno-
 
 xxxii INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 mena with other phenomena. It is something that is in- 
 volved in the meaning of the personal pronoun ' I,' and 
 in the assertion ' I can.' At least the germ of this deeper 
 philosophy is latent in Berkeley. 
 
 Besides the present perceptions of sense and the suggested 
 or expected perceptions of sense, he finds that human ex- 
 perience necessarily involves the notion (not idea) of the 
 percipient active being, or self-conscious person, that each 
 individual calls himself, or which is expressed by Ego — the 
 personal pronoun ' L' I cannot indeed be percipient of my 
 invisible conscious self in the way I am percipient of the 
 sights or sounds or other phenomena of sense to which 
 the term idea is confined by Berkeley. Still, I can use 
 the personal pronoun with meaning; I can %-\^q.'^ intelligibly 
 about my continued identity. So it may be said that we 
 have a 'notion' of Ego, although Ego is not an idea or 
 phenomenon. I must also believe in my own voluntary 
 activity, or that I am the originating cause of all acts for 
 which I am justly responsible ; and I practically under- 
 stand, through this moral experience, what originative poiver 
 means. It is from this moral experience that the word 
 power gathers its deepest meaning ; for the ' power ' 
 affirmed of material phenomena, present or expected, is 
 dependent, not originative. My conviction of my own 
 power is as certain as my conviction of my own existence, 
 to the extent to which I acknowledge my moral respon- 
 sibility. 
 
 But there must be Power in the universe other than 
 man's personal power : we find that we are unable to create 
 the phenomena of which we are percipient in our senses, 
 or to change the natural laws of their occurrence. We 
 overcome the material world only by submission to the 
 established order in which its ideas or phenomena appear, 
 which therefore we regard as established by the Universal 
 Power, not by us. Sometimes we find ourselves able, and
 
 DIVINE RATIONAL PROVIDENCE xxxiii 
 
 therefore responsible — yet oftener unable, and therefore 
 irresponsible ; sometimes tve can and sometimes we cannot ; 
 and our ability is small indeed in its range compared to 
 our inability. It is in this experience of his own limited 
 and resisted power that each one finds himself; we have 
 in the same experience our one intelligible example of 
 what the word potver ultimately means. That which is 
 done, but not by man, must have been done (so Berkeley 
 might argue) by the only kind of originative power which 
 experience gives me any example of : it must be due to 
 the moral agency of Spirit, not to anything in Matter. 
 
 It is thus necessary in reason that the universe pre- 
 sented in sense — unsubstantial and impotent in the highest 
 meaning of substance and power — should be sustained 
 and regulated by moral agency in the Universal Power. 
 This power is what we mean by God. We cannot go 
 deeper. The Divine Active Reason is continuously pre- 
 senting to us the phenomena of which we are percipient 
 in the senses. God regulates, and suggests in and through 
 custom based on reason, the events which we have reason 
 to expect. All the natural laws of the universe are simply 
 manifestations of the Active Reason in which the universe 
 centres. This is the efficient cause at work in those meta- 
 morphoses of things with which the physical sciences are 
 concerned ; the formal cause of the natural relations which 
 make science ; and their final cause too is this same 
 omnipresent rational Will. In and through God, or Perfect 
 Reason vitalised, the material world becomes intelligible. 
 Its permanence, amidst constant change amongst its consti- 
 tuent phenomena, is accounted for. Its qualities, as well 
 as the propositions of science concerning qualified things, 
 which, under the new conception of Matter, at first seemed 
 dissolved in perishable sensations, are in the end restored 
 to permanence in the eternally operative Divine Rational 
 Providence.
 
 xxxiv INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 This, I think, is implied, though not fully realised, by 
 Berkeley, in his explanation of what the reality of the 
 material world means. The explanation virtually connects 
 the three primary data of metaphysics — conscious Ego, 
 the material World, and God. It comprehends the two 
 contrasted and dependent substances, and the one supreme 
 Substance and Power, according to Descartes, — the three 
 existing certainties of Locke. But this is not worked out by 
 Berkeley. What he tried to do was done, he modestly says, 
 ' with a view to giving hints to thinking men who have 
 leisure and curiosity to go to the bottom of things, and 
 pursue them in their own minds.' One result of his new 
 conception of Matter was the substitution of God for un- 
 intelligible substance and power in Matter. The report he 
 made, after he had reflected upon the relevant facts — freed 
 from the bondage of abstract words — might be in effect 
 this : — We in this mortal life reach practical knowledge of 
 ourselves and of God, in and through our interpretation 
 of the significant phenomena of sense, commonly called 
 material; one end of whose significant and interpretable 
 presence in the universe seems to be, — to enable us who 
 perceive and interpret them to become conscious of our- 
 selves, capable of intercourse with one another, and assured 
 that we all live and move and have our being in God or 
 Omnipotent Goodness. 
 
 Berkeley, as we have seen, starts from Locke's ambi- 
 guous formula, which reduces complex human knowledge, 
 in its last analysis, to human experience. But Locke and 
 Berkeley, without critical analysis of what experience in- 
 evitably presupposes, proceed upon the assumption that 
 there is in it more than isolated sensation. Locke's employ- 
 ment of the principle of causality in his explanation of our 
 knowledge of God, for instance, is a virtual acknowledg- 
 ment of more than sense-presented appearances in the 
 constitution of knowledge. Clarke (1675-1729), the philo-
 
 BERKELEY IN SIRJS XXXV 
 
 sophical theologian of Locke's school, worked out, more 
 elaborately than Locke, a 'demonstration ' of rational neces- 
 sity for God. And the phenomena presented to the senses, 
 with their interpretation by suggestion, do not exhaust 
 the philosophy of Berkeley. Custom-induced suggestion 
 was in the end contrasted with inference of reason. ' To 
 perceive,' he tells us in one of his later works, 'to perceive ^ 
 is one thing : to judge is another. So likewise to be sug- 
 gested is one thing, and to be inferred another. Things 
 are suggested and perceived hy sefise. We make judgements 
 and inferences by the intellect"^ ^ 
 
 In Siris he puts the ideas or appearances presented in 
 Sense and Suggestion more in the background. God and 
 Divine Ideas are in the foreground. When he attributes 
 to Aristotle the doctrine ' that the mind of man is without 
 innate ideas,' in contrast to Plato, who found in the mind 
 ' notions which never were nor can be in the sense,' he 
 hints his Platonic sympathies. ' Some,' he says, ' may 
 think the truth to be this : — that there are properly 
 no ideas, or passive objects in the mind but what were 
 derived from sense ; but that there are also besides these 
 her own acts or operations : such aTe notions^ Again : 
 ' The perceptions of sense are gross : but even in the 
 
 senses there is a difference By experiments of some 
 
 we become acquainted with the lower faculties of the soul ; 
 and from them, whether by a gradual evolution or ascent, we 
 arrive at the highest. Sense supplies images to memory. 
 These become subjects for fancy to work upon. Reason 
 considers and judges of the imaginations. And these acts 
 of reason become new objects to the understanding. In this 
 scale each low^er faculty is a step that leads to one above it. 
 And the uppermost naturally leads to the Deity ; which is 
 
 ^ ' to perceive,' i. e. to have ideas or phenomena presented in our 
 senses. 
 
 * Vindication of A^ew Theory of Vision, sect. 42. 
 C 2
 
 xxxvi INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 rather the object of intellectual knowledge than even of the 
 discursive faculty, not to mention the sensitive \' 
 
 If Berkeley in his youth seems to resolve Experience into 
 Sensation, the pervading tendency of Siris is to find the 
 essence of the universe and the foundation of experience 
 in Omnipresent Reason, and to see in the things of sense 
 opportunity provided, through physical research and science, 
 for useful education of reason in the individual mind of 
 
 Such in outline was Berkeley's philosophical conception 
 of the material world, as that conception appears, first in the 
 fervid reasonings of his youth, awakened by Locke, and 
 then in Siris, modified by the Platonic studies of lata- life. 
 Let us now look at some of its issues in the period 
 which followed. 
 
 Six years before Siris appeared, Locke's vague formula 
 regarding the dependence of human knowledge on human 
 'experience,' had been understood by David Hume 
 (17 1 1-76) to signify that experience includes only ideas 
 felt in sense — called by Hume ' impressions.' Impressions 
 of sense, blindly connected by custom — this was in the 
 end his ' solution of sceptical doubt '^.' His universe of 
 blindly associated phenomena was therefore at last 'a riddle, 
 an genigma, an inexplicable mystery.' 
 
 By his total agnostic doubt, Hume obliged the sincere 
 thinker to search further for the roots of knowledge, if it was 
 to remain rooted at all. 
 
 Hume's paralysis of human intelligence was the chief 
 crisis in the epoch of philosophy that was inaugurated by 
 Locke, and in which we are living. An exposure of the 
 impossibility of interpreting human life, if knowledge at last 
 
 ^ See Siris, sect. 308, 303. 
 
 * See Hume's Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, ch. 2-8.
 
 DAVID HUME xxxvii 
 
 means only experience, and if experience can mean only 
 blindly suggested phenomena, without root in reason — was 
 the next act in the philosophical drama, after Berkeley's 
 exhibition of the ultimate dependence of the material world 
 for its qualities and utilities on percipient and active Mind. 
 Materialism seemed, in Berkeley's theory, to be impossible, 
 and to be replaced by a spiritually-constituted Universe, in 
 which all extended things, including our own bodies, exist 
 only as groups of dependent and powerless sense-appear- 
 ances ; perceived and changed so far by finite persons ; and 
 supremely by omnipresent and ever active Divine Reason. 
 But Berkeley's spiritually-constituted Universe, it was argued 
 by Hume, involved assumptions which— on the hypothesis 
 with which Hume started, namely, that experience is merely 
 sensations connected by non-rational custom — miglftt be 
 proved (if proof were possible in a total paralysis of reason) 
 to be as absurd as Berkeley found independent material 
 substance to be. 
 
 Hume's attempt to show that, on those Principles, mind 
 or ego is as sensuous as matter — as unsubstantial and 
 impotent — is what gives him his conspicuous place in the 
 history of modern theology and philosophy. His sceptical 
 analysis of experience into customary connexion of phe- 
 nomena was first proposed, without qualification, in his 
 Treatise on Human Nature, in 1739;. then, less intrepidly, 
 in 1 748, in his Inquiry concerning Human Understanding. In 
 both he referred to Berkeley's rejection of abstractions, and 
 analysis of matter into sensations, as memorable discoveries 
 in philosophy. Looking otily at the negative part of what 
 Berkeley taught, he claimed for him a place among sceptics ; 
 adding, as evidence of this, that his ' arguments admit of no 
 answer, and yet produce no conviction, their only effect 
 being to produce that momentary amazement, irresolution, 
 and confusion, which is the result of scepticism \' 
 
 ' Inquiry concerning Iliivian Understanding, sect. xii. pt. i., note.
 
 xxxviii INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 The way in which Hume would bar as incompetent 
 Berkeley's ascent, from the ' gross perceptions of sense ' 
 with which he starts, to ' the intellectual knowledge of 
 Deity' in Siris, is argued and illustrated throughout Hume's 
 Treatise of Hiunan Nature. The salient points of the 
 argument should be studied. 
 
 id) A significant one is that in which Hume deals with 
 Berkeley's ' notion ' of Ego or Self. Berkeley takes for 
 granted that I cannot help being conscious that I exist. 
 Apart from the ' notion ' of Self, found on reflection, his 
 spiritually-constituted universe dissolves into transitory 
 unconnected appearances. ' There are some philosophers,' 
 Hume remarks, 'who imagine we are every moment 
 conscious of what we call our self ; that we feel its 
 existence and its continuance in existence ; and so are 
 certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of 
 its perfect identity and simplicity. . . . Unluckily all these 
 positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, 
 which is pleaded for them. . . . For my part, when I enter 
 most intimately into what I call myself I always stumble on 
 some particular perception or other — of heat or cold, light 
 or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can 
 catch myself at any time without a perception, and never 
 can observe anything but the perception. When my per- 
 ceptions are removed for any time— as by sound sleep — so 
 long am I insensible of myself and may truly be said not 
 to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, 
 and I could neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor 
 hate, after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely 
 annihilated ; nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to 
 make me a perfect nonentity '.' 
 
 We have Berkeley's answer to this (by anticipation) in 
 
 ^ See Hume's Treatise on Human Nature, being an attempt to intro- 
 duce the Experimental Method of reasoning into Moral Subjects, b. i. 
 pt. iv. sect. 6.
 
 TOTAL SCEPTICISM xxxix 
 
 the third of his Three Dialogues behveen Hylas and Phi- 
 lonous. ' It seems to me,' Hylas objects, ' that, according 
 to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your 
 own principles, it should follow that you are only a system 
 of floating ideas, without any substance to support them. 
 Words, you say, are not to be used without a meaning ; 
 and as there is no more meaning in spiritual substance than 
 in material substance^ the one ought to be exploded as well 
 as the other.' ' How often,' replies Philonous (representing 
 Berkeley), ' must I repeat that / know or am conscious of 
 my oivn being, and that / ?fiyself am not my ideas, but 
 somewhat else — a thinking active principle that perceives, 
 knows, wills, and operates about ideas. I know that I — 
 the same self — perceive both colours and sounds : that a 
 colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour : that 
 I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from colour 
 and sound : and, for the same reason, from all other sensible 
 things and inert ideas. But I am not in like manner 
 conscious either of the existence or essence of Matter.' 
 
 {b) Take, next, Hume's demand for evidence of that con- 
 tinual dependence on God, or omnipresent Reason, on the 
 part of the constant sequences in material nature, which 
 Berkeley had maintained. — ' It seems to me,' Hume says, 
 ' that this theory of the universal energy and operation of 
 the Supreme Being is too bold ever to carry conviction with 
 it, to a man sufficiently apprised of the weakness of human 
 reason, and the narrow limits to which it is confined in its 
 operations. . . . Our line is too short to fathom such im- 
 mense abysses. And however we may flatter ourselves that 
 we are guided in every step we take by a kind of verisimili- 
 tude and experience ; we may be assured that this fancied 
 experience has no authority, when we thus apply it to sub- 
 jects that lie entirely out of the reach of experience. . . . We 
 are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which bodies operate 
 on each other : their " force " or " energy " is entirely
 
 xl INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 incomprehensible. But are we not equally ignorant of the 
 manner or force in which the Supreme Mind operates 
 either on itself or on body? Whence, I beseech you, do 
 we acquire any idea of this ? We have no sentiment or 
 consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea 
 of the Supreme Being but what we learn by reflection upon 
 our own faculties. Were our ignorance therefore a good 
 reason for rejecting anything, we should be led into 
 denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as in 
 the grossest matter. We surely comprehend as little the 
 operations of the one as of the other. Is it more difficult 
 to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that 
 it may arise from volition ? All we know is our profound 
 ignorance in both cases '.' 
 
 {c) Berkeley's favourite doctrine of perfectly reasonable 
 arbitrariness in the natural laws is by Hume translated 
 into irrational arbitrariness — in which anything may 
 a priori be the ' cause ' of anything that happens. For total 
 itiexplicableness is substituted by Hume for the Rational 
 Will supposed by Berkeley to connect phenomena and 
 their changes in the order we find in nature. Reason at 
 the root of the Universe is not recognised by the sceptic : 
 only blind uncertain change. All so-called knowledge is 
 only belief, caused physically by custom. Take the 
 following : — ' Whatever is may not continue to be. No 
 negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The non- 
 existence of any being is as clear and distinct an idea as its 
 existence. The proposition which affirms it not to be, how- 
 ever false, is no less conceivable and intelligible than that 
 which affirms it to be. The case is different with the 
 sciences, properly so called". Every proposition which is 
 not true is there unintelligible. That the cube of sixty-four 
 is equal to the half of ten is a false proposition, and can 
 
 ^ See Hume's Inquiry concerning Human Understanding , sect. vii. 
 * The demonstrable sciences, e. g. mathematics.
 
 TOTAL SCEPTICISM xli 
 
 never be distinctly conceived. But that Caesar, or the angel 
 Gabriel, or any beings, never existed, may be a false propo- 
 sition, but still is perfectly conceivable, and implies no 
 contradiction. The existence, therefore, of any concrete 
 being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its 
 effect ; and these arguments are founded entirely on ex- 
 perience. If we reason a priori, anything may appear able 
 to produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for 
 aught we know, extinguish the sun ; or the wish of a man 
 controul the planets in their orbits. It is only experience 
 which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and 
 eifect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object, 
 in the world either of matter or of spirits, from that of 
 another. Not only the Will of the Supreme Being may 
 create matter, but, for aught we know a priori, the will of 
 any other being might create it ; or any other cause that 
 the most whimsical imagination can assign \ 
 
 Thus in the sceptical nescience of Hume, what we call 
 reason resolves into an inexplicable seeming constancy, 
 according to which events follow one another. Reason 
 takes the form of habit. ' P'or, wherever the repetition of 
 any particular act or operation produces in us a propensity 
 
 ^ See Inquiry, § xii. pt. iii. — There are three divergent views 
 about Causation. They correspond severally to two extreme positions 
 — Empirical Scepticism, Absolute Idealism, and the intermediate 
 ' broken system,' which, acknowledging final incomprehensibility, is 
 satisfied with Faith in irreducible credcnda, latent in our higher nature, 
 ready to respond, and which may by reflection be more or less trans- 
 formed into intelligcnda in philosophy. It is implied in the first that 
 anything may a priori be the cause of anything ; so that it is presump- 
 tuous to speak of an alleged cause as ' sufficient' or • insufficient' : this 
 is Hume's account of the matter. According to the opposite view, each 
 thing must be determined by everj'thing that exists, in the infinite 
 concatenation of existence, according to universal rational necessity : 
 this is the outcome of the mathematical philosophy of Spinoza. — The 
 third finds the only true and ' sufficient' cause at last in active Reason 
 or moral Agency — exemplified in our experience of our own moral 
 agency, which presents man as an ' image of God.'
 
 xlii INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 to renew the act or operation, without being impelled by 
 any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always 
 say that th\s propensity is the effect of Custom. By employ- 
 ing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate 
 reason of such propensity. We only point out a principle 
 of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and 
 which is well known by its effects. Perhaps we can push 
 our enquiries no farther^. ^ 
 
 Berkeley's method of disposing of Materialism, in his 
 spiritual explanation of the words Matter and Reality, 
 was thus followed, in the next movement in European 
 thought, not by a fuller development of his Spiritual Philo- 
 sophy, but by the Scepticism or Agnosticism which professes 
 inability to find more in ' experience ' than inexplicably 
 evolved sensations, which inexplicably issue in beliefs that 
 are ultimately non-rational. To this Locke was conducted, 
 when Locke and especially Berkeley were interpreted in 
 a one-sided way by Hume. His disintegration of rational 
 faith surrendered all that depends on other elements in 
 knowledge than sensations, apparently connected by custom, 
 — dissolving Berkeley's conception of a divinely-constituted 
 universe. 
 
 Under this interpretation, in the middle of last century, 
 Locke's proposed analysis of experience by experience 
 seemed exhausted. The empirical psychology to which 
 it had given rise, represented in' Britain by Hume, had no 
 further word to say — unless, contemporaneously, through 
 Hartley and his school, to repeat the word 'association' 
 as a universal solvent \ and, in the nineteenth century, to 
 expand the associative tendency in the individual, by the 
 principle of heredity, under the law of organic evolution, 
 so as to connect it with the history of the race and with the 
 whole physical system. In France, Locke's philosophy, in- 
 
 ' See Hume's Inquiry^ § v. p. i.
 
 REID AND KANT xliii 
 
 adequately interpreted, was transformed into materialism in 
 the latter part of the eighteenth century. On the other 
 hand, metaphysics, long represented in Germany by Leibniz 
 (1646-1716), seemed to expire in the arid reasonings of 
 the German school of Wolff, as the eighteenth century 
 advanced. 
 
 Thus modern philosophy, due to the original Cartesian 
 impulse, and the more particular direction given to it by 
 Locke, issued, in the eighteenth century, in the constructive 
 tendency of Berkeley, and the destructive doubts of 
 Hume. 
 
 But man's disposition to rise out of ignorance, and if 
 possible to attain certain knowledge, is permanent. De- 
 spair of philosophy was not the final result of the sceptical 
 speculation of Hume, which the spiritually constituted 
 universe conceived by Berkeley, looked at only on its 
 negative side, suggested, but did not justify. For Hume's 
 scepticism led to a deeper consideration of the foundations 
 of knowledge in the light {a) of the actual constitution of 
 the human mind, by Reid, and (b) of the principles pre- 
 supposed in the very possibility of experience, by Kant. 
 
 The earliest immediate and direct effect of Hume was 
 the attempt of Reid (1710-96), by patient reflection, to 
 awaken in human consciousness fundamental convictions 
 that are incapable of logical proof, but are tacitly accepted 
 by all sane persons. These he called Principles of the 
 Common Sense, or the Common Reason, with which all 
 men are divinely inspired. That we are inspired with 
 faith in the external existence of a material world, is the 
 thesis illustrated and vindicated in Reid's Inquiry into t/ie 
 Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764). 
 This and other Principles — in particular our inspired con- 
 viction of our own personality and free personal causality —
 
 xliv INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 are explained and justified in Essays on the Intellectual 
 Pozvers (1785), and Essays on the Active Powers (1788) \ 
 
 The other was the attempt of Kant (i 724-1804), by 
 critical analysis, to show that constructive activity of reason 
 is necessarily involved in the constitution of experience. 
 Kant was the contemporary of Reid. Without mutual concert, 
 they unconsciously co-operated as early leaders in the reac- 
 tion towards constructive philosophy, which followed the 
 total disintegration of human knowledge and human nature 
 by the Scottish sceptic. Kant's critical analysis of Pure 
 Reason appeared in 1781, followed by an examination of 
 Practical or Moral Reason, in 1788. 
 
 Perhaps the secret intention of Hume was to illustrate 
 defects in the philosophy proposed by Locke, with a view 
 to its amendment, rather than finally to dissolve all human 
 knowledge and thus extinguish human life. If so, the 
 design succeeded ; for a step in advance was taken by 
 Reid and Kant, and more by their successors, in disclosing 
 the ultimate formations of Science and Religion. Reid 
 candidly represents the sceptics as 'men whose business 
 it is to pick holes in the fabric of knowledge, where it is 
 weak and faulty ; and when these places are properly 
 repaired, the whole building becomes more firm and solid.' 
 He says that he at first accepted Berkeley's account of 
 Matter, till, imagining sceptical consequences to follow from 
 it which gave him 'more uneasiness than the want of a 
 material world,' it occurred to him to reconsider what he 
 believed to be its source, in the pervading assumption of 
 philosophers— that we are percipient, not of what is real, 
 but only of our own impressions and ideas, which without 
 ground we suppose to be representations of the reality. 
 Kant, on the other hand, found the source of scepticism in 
 Hume's misinterpretation of causation. 
 
 ' I have discussed this philosophy in Thomas Reid, ' Famous Scots ' 
 Series (1898). In Jacobi (1743-1819), the philosopher of faith, even 
 more than in Kant, we find analogies with the spirit of Reid.
 
 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY xlv 
 
 It is beyond the design of this Introduction to trace 
 modern philosophy in its revival after Hume. In this 
 revival Reid and Kant hold a place analogous to that of 
 Descartes in its first period. The reflex of experience 
 offered in Locke's Essay was insufficient : its recognition 
 of the implicates necessarily presupposed in experience 
 seemed inadequate. Hence a scepticism, which confesses 
 that, if experience is only transitory and isolated sensations, 
 accidentally associated, there can be no knowledge. Reid 
 and Kant gave expression to the need for recognising 
 principles which are tacitly presupposed in the physical and 
 moral experience of mankind, inasmuch as without them it 
 would all dissolve. Some of those underlying credenda, 
 as Reid conceived them, or rational categories, in Kant's 
 nomenclature, had been proceeded upon, as guarantees of 
 their generalisations and beliefs, by philosophers who, like 
 Locke and Berkeley, vaguely referred all knowledge to ' ex- 
 perience.' For aprofounder investigation of the constitution 
 of experience we are indebted to the reaction from Hume. 
 
 The issue in the nineteenth century of the return to 
 the spiritual constitution of experience, by Reid and by 
 Kant, presents analogies to the issue, in the seventeenth 
 century, of the more tentative philosophy of Descartes ; 
 before the investigation of the nature and limits of human 
 knowledge had been proposed by Locke, and then pursued 
 in two opposite directions — constructively — by Berkeley, 
 sceptically by Hume. The more recent issue has the advant- 
 age of its later development. In no philosophy do we find 
 the realisation of the philosophical ideal — only an approach 
 to this ; but we look for a nearer approach in later than in 
 earlier speculations, because assisted by the extremes and 
 collisions of previous thought. In the second or post- 
 Kantian period, Kantism led to Hegelianism, as Carte- 
 sianism in the seventeenth century led to Spinozism. But 
 the influence of Kant, through the negative side of his philo-
 
 xlvi INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 sophy, appears also in Comte and Positivism, and in scien- 
 tific Agnosticism, as that of Descartes appears in Hume. 
 
 In an examination of philosophical opinions and systems 
 we assume that true philosophy must at least not be inco- 
 herent. It must also be in harmony with those universal 
 judgments of the common sense, or common reason, which 
 science and morality can be shown to presuppose. It may 
 further be granted that it ought not to reject practical 
 beliefs, beneficially operative in human life (though often 
 dormant in individual minds), which, to say the least, 
 cannot be proved to be inconsistent with the abstract 
 necessities of reason. These three conditions ought to 
 regulate critical judgments of philosophical doctrine. 
 
 To awaken a sympathetic response in individual minds 
 to the spiritual convictions on which human life ought to 
 rest, and with which man is, as it were, silently or sub-con- 
 sciously inspired, is the chief aim of philosophical education. 
 From Socrates onwards this has been recognised by every 
 true teacher. The regulative principles in the constitution 
 of man, especially those which are characteristic of his 
 higher life, are often not recognised consciously. Some of 
 them are always dormant in some ; or they are acted on 
 without distinct consciousness. They are ' universal and 
 necessary ' potentially rather than intelligently. Thus the 
 conviction that we are free rational beings, and therefore 
 morally responsible, is often weak ; or it is acted on without 
 due recognition of what it implies. The same is true as to 
 those convictions of God and the higher life that belong 
 to our moral experience. ' The natural man receiveth not 
 the things of the spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto 
 him.' It is the office of religion and of philosophical 
 education to assist in making patent in the individual mind 
 what is latent in our spiritual constitution, and implied in 
 the Divine Reason in which we all share.
 
 FAITH AND REASON xlvii 
 
 History is full of the records of reactions on behalf of 
 principles, dormant in the consciousness of individuals and 
 communities, which have, in consequence, lost influence for 
 a time. Reason is eternal ; our individual consciousness 
 of the moral reason that is latent in the universe fluctuates 
 and may be paralyzed. The unpractical recluse, by habitual 
 introspection, weakens his latent conviction of external 
 reality. One who is exclusively devoted to observation of 
 the visible world loses power of apprehending the invisible 
 facts of spiritual experience — so that what cannot be seen 
 or touched seems illusion. 
 
 At the close of the nineteenth century, the things of 
 sense, and the means of making ourselves comfortable, 
 through skilful applications of the laws of the material 
 world, occupy people's imagination as perhaps they never 
 did before — not even at the time when Berkeley was led 
 to inquire what Matter means, and what its true place and 
 office is, in relation to living and percipient beings. In 
 this way, faith in the invisible realities which give reality 
 to what is seen and touched — faith in moral agents and in 
 God— dissolves in doubt, because it does not admit of 
 verification by the senses, but only by inward moral or 
 spiritual experience. That scientific certainty which is 
 reached through verification by the senses —although if in- 
 volves faith — is held paramount ; the certainty that is reached 
 without an appeal to the material world of the senses, 
 because it involves faith, is rejected as illusory. That is to 
 say, faith in physical law or government — the basis of 
 our inferences in the sciences of nature— is strong. Faith 
 in inferences which presume ethical and spiritual universality 
 and supremacy — not less lawfully rested on the implicates 
 of moral experience — is weak. 
 
 Materialism, as it has done before, must disappear, when 
 it contradicts what are found to be constituents of reason in 
 human nature — though often dormant, or existing semi-
 
 xlviii INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTIONS 
 
 consciously, in individual minds. Pliilosophy may even 
 swing to the opposite extreme. For its history has been 
 a succession of oscillations between one-sided physics 
 and one-sided metaphysics — between extreme Materialism, 
 which explains consciousness by motions of molecules, and 
 extreme Idealism, which explains the things of sense and 
 their motions by Pure Reason. These two opposite systems, 
 in their successive reappearances, have repeatedly been 
 refuted by the reductio ad absurdum of total Scepticism 
 to which each has given rise. But the Sceptical Nescience 
 of a philosophy emptied of God, thus induced, passes 
 away in its turn, when the root-principles of divinely in- 
 spired human nature have been revived in conscious life, — 
 insight of them even deepened by the preceding collision 
 of the two extremes and its sceptical issue. Mankind 
 is in this way better prepared than before to pass through 
 the ordeal of another but more enlightened development 
 of extreme Materialism and extreme Idealism. It is thus 
 that man advances through successive sceptical crises, 
 consequent upon the collision of his own one-sided sys- 
 tems. What is permanent in our higher nature should be 
 strengthened in the end, as the issue of a succession of 
 philosophical catastrophes. 
 
 These Selections from Berkeley are meant to incite and 
 prepare for further reflection, in the light of later philosophy. 
 They are so arranged as to carry the reader upwards through 
 Berkeley's reasoned account of Matter, which makes it 
 mean significant phenomena, necessarily dependent on per- 
 cipient and active Mind ; followed by his analysis of our 
 interpretation of what the phenomena signify, reached at 
 first by means of habit and suggestion, and then in physical 
 sciences ; all ending in mediative hints as to the ultimate 
 unity of the universe in God.
 
 FIRST PART 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 MATTER AND SPIRIT 
 
 SELECTIONS FROM 
 
 BERKELEY'S ' TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE,' AND HIS 'DIALOGUES 
 
 BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS' 
 
 The same Principles which, at first view, lead to Scepticism, pnrsued 
 to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense. — Berkeley.
 
 PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 Berkeley's Treatise on the Principles of Human Knozv- 
 
 ^e, as the one systematic exposition and defence of his 
 subtle argument against Materialism, deserves to be explained 
 in its systematic connexion. 
 
 The Introduction points to the abuse of Language, even 
 by philosophers, as the chief cause of the slow progress of 
 human knowledge. Language had long been a cover for 
 empty abstractions. The key to Berkeley's philosophical 
 point of view is found in his attack on 'abstract ideas' 
 in the Introduction— resumed in other places. The prin- 
 ciple here unfolded is — that real knowledge deals with 
 what is concrete ; that there can be no concrete reality in 
 the things of sense, commonly called the material world, 
 apart from the perceptions of a living mind, in which alone 
 Matter is realised ; and that to test the meaning of terms, 
 especially such terms as Matter and Mind, we must exem- 
 plify what we mean in individual examples. 
 
 Not to pretend to look for real substances or causes in 
 abstractions which cannot be individualised and always 
 to verify words concerning Matter by what is actually 
 presented in living perceptions of sense, is the lesson of 
 the Introduction.
 
 4 PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 In the Treatise which follows, the lesson of the Introduc- 
 tion is applied, in order to show the meaninglessness of 
 Matter, when it is supposed to be something that exists in 
 abstraction independently of living percipient mind. We 
 cannot have an abstract idea of Matter, or an idea of it 
 other than what is derived from the concrete manifesta- 
 tions given in our perceptions. The material world must 
 consist of the perceptions of persons ; and in all our reason- 
 ings, physical or theological, we must assume that, in order 
 to be real, Matter must be actually perceived. 
 
 This central Principle about Matter is expounded, 
 defended, and applied as follows : — 
 
 I. (Sect. 1-33.) These sections contain a reasoned exposi- 
 tion of what is meant by the real existence of Matter, which 
 is resolved into concrete ideas of sense, or natural phenomena, 
 instead of the meaningless abstract substance or cause which 
 philosophers had assumed it to be. Analysis of the reasons 
 for adopting this conception affords abundant intellectual 
 exercise for the student. 
 
 II. (Sect. 34-84.) We have in these sections a statement 
 and refutation of Objections to the Principles. 
 
 Other and graver objections, not suggested by Berkeley, 
 and partly arising out of later philosophical thought, might 
 be sought for, and critically examined by the student. 
 Some of them are proposed in the Annotations. 
 
 III. (Sect. 85-156.) In the remainder of the Treatise 
 the new conception of Matter, as consisting of phenomena 
 of sense that are necessarily dependent on a living 
 mind for their intelligible existence, is applied to refute 
 Scepticism and restore Belief; as well as to clear the way 
 to progress in science by the removal of fallacies re- 
 garding the material world. It is applied : — 
 
 (a) To restore, in an improved form. Beliefs which were 
 dissolving in Scepticism (Sect. 85-96) ;
 
 REGARDING ' PRINCIPLES ' 5 
 
 (b) To get rid of unmeaning abstractions (Sect. 97—100) ; 
 
 (c) To advance Sciences which had been impeded by 
 confused conceptions of Matter, Causation, Space, Time, 
 and Motion (Sect. 101-116); 
 
 id) To reheve perplexities in mathematical reasonings 
 (Sect. 1 1 7-1 34); 
 
 {e) To explain and sustain faith in human Immortality 
 (Sect. 137-144); 
 
 (/) To explain the belief which each man has in the 
 existence of other men (Sect. 145) ; 
 
 {g) To explain and sustain faith in the existence of God 
 (Sect. 146-156). 
 
 1 have appended to the First Part of the Selections 
 portions of the Dialogues between Hylas and Pkiionous, 
 in which the Principles are discussed in an easy familiar 
 manner, Hylas arguing for the old abstract conception 
 of Matter, and Philonous vindicating Berkeley's new con- 
 ception. The lucidity of thought, the play of fancy, 
 and the ardent enthusiasm with which difficulties involved 
 in the New Principles are disentangled in the Dialogues, 
 may serve as a relief to the more systematic and didactic 
 style of the preceding Selections. 
 
 In dealing with this short and easy method with Mate- 
 rialists, the student may find some of his best philosophical 
 education in critically testing the Principles and the con- 
 clusions drawn from them.
 
 I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 
 CONCERNING MATTER AND SPIRIT 
 
 I, Philosophy being nothing else but the study ofivisdom 
 and truth \ it may with reason be expected that those who 
 have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater 
 calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence 
 of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and diffi- 
 culties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate 
 
 ' The best definitions of Philosophy imply that it is the deepest or 
 most real insight attainable by man into the meaning of his experience. 
 Its aim, as distinguished from ordinary knowledge and the special 
 sciences, is to exhibit knowledge in the unity of an all comprehensive 
 science. 
 
 Is this aim attainable? Can human experience be reduced to a unity 
 in which fundamental faith is entirely converted into knowledge? 
 Philosophy, as ' the study of wisdom and truth,' seems to find when it 
 tries that this reduction is inconsistent with due recognition of all 
 that is found in our experience. Bacon thus puts it as regards the data 
 of religion : — ' As for perfection or completeness in divinity it is 
 not to be sought. For he that will reduce a knowledge into an art 
 will make it round and uniform ; but in divinity many things must be 
 left abrupt ' {Advancement of Leaj-tiing). It seems that in the end 
 many things must (by us) be left 'abrupt' — not necessarily incoherent — 
 in a finally incomplete philosophical science. The imaginative ardour 
 of Berkeley was at first apt to encourage the expectation that philosophy 
 could solve all difficulties, transforming a final faith into perfect science. 
 We find him less sanguine in his later years.
 
 8 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 bulk of mankind, that walk the high-road of plain common 
 sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the 
 most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is 
 familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend^. 
 They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, 
 and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no 
 sooner do we depart from Sense and Instinct to follow the 
 light of a superior Principle — to reason, meditate, and re- 
 flect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring 
 up in our minds concerning those things which before we 
 seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense 
 do from all parts discover themselves to our view ; and, 
 endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly 
 drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsisten- 
 cies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in 
 speculation, till at length, having wandered through many 
 intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, 
 which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism '". 
 
 2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of 
 things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of our 
 understandings. It is said, ' the faculties we have are few, 
 and those designed by nature for the support and pleasure 
 of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and 
 constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being 
 finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it 
 is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and 
 contradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever 
 extricate itself; it being of the nature of infinite not to be 
 comprehended by that which is finite ^' 
 
 ' Custoui dulls apprehension, till it is awakened by philosophical 
 reflection. ' Truths of all others the most awful and interesting are 
 often considered as so true that they lose all the power of truth.' 
 
 ' The aim of Berkeley was, by reflection, to make us conscious of the 
 final meaning that is dormant in the data of the senses. 
 
 ' Cf. Descartes' Third Meditation ; also Locke's Essay, Introduc- 
 tion, §§ 4-7. Locke attributes the perplexities of Philosophy to rash
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES g 
 
 3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in 
 placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather 
 in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard thing to^ 
 suppose that right deductions from true principles should | 
 ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained or' 
 made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt 
 more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a 
 strong desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite 
 out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted 
 indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites 
 it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish 
 them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not 
 fail to satisfy them '. Upon the whole, I am inclined to 
 think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties 
 which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up 
 the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves — 
 that we have first raised a dust and then complain we 
 cannot see. 
 
 4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what 
 those Principles are which have introduced all that doubt- 
 fulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradic- 
 tions, into the several Sects of Philosophy; insomuch that 
 the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, con- 
 ceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation 
 of our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving 
 
 application of our narrow understanding; which is meant to regulate 
 our lives — not to make the universe in which we live perfectly intelligible 
 to us. 
 
 ' Have we reason a priori to assume that the data of our moral 
 and physical experience must be (by us) resolvable into perfect science ? 
 Does philosophy not at last issue in the faith that the realities of 
 existence are capable of solution, though not fully by us, whose know- 
 ledge of things is under relations of time and change? To take the 
 universe as we find it, after we have exhausted reflection upon it, is 
 'wisdom,' even if we find that it consists at last of irreducible facts. 
 We are not to assume that the attainable end of human philosophy 
 is the Omniscience which makes no demand upon faith.
 
 lO SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the First 
 Principles of Human Knowledge, to sift and examine them 
 on all sides ; especially since there may be some grounds 
 to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and 
 embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring 
 from any darkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural 
 defect in the understanding, so much as from False Prin- 
 ciples which have been insisted on, and might have been 
 avoided '. 
 
 5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt 
 may seem, when I consider what a number of very great 
 and extraordinary men have gone before me in the like 
 designs, yet I am not without some hopes — upon the con- 
 sideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, 
 and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the 
 object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow 
 survey, discern that which had escaped far better eyes. 
 
 6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the 
 easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise some- 
 what, by way of Introduction, concerning the Nature and 
 Abuse of Language ^. But the unravelling this matter leads 
 me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking 
 notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering 
 speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have occasioned 
 
 ' Berkeley explains the anarchy of Philosophy by the meaningless 
 ' principles,' to which, — under cover of empty abstract terms, — it had 
 helped to give currency. Men thus put words in place of realisable 
 ideas, and then called the empty words ' abstract ideas.' 
 
 ^ ' The inadequacy of the words of ordinary language for the pur- 
 poses of Philosophy,' as Sir J. Mackintosh remarks, ' is an ancient and 
 frequent complaint. The philosopher alone is doomed to use the rudest 
 tools for the most refined purposes. He must reason in words of whicli 
 the looseness and vagueness are suitable in the ordinary intercourse of 
 life, but which are almost as remote from the extreme exactness and 
 precision required in pliilosophy as the hammer and axe would be unfit 
 for the finest exertions of skilful handiwork.'
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES II 
 
 innumerable errors and difificulties in almost all parts of 
 knowledge. And that is the opinion that the fnind hath a 
 power of framing abstract ideas or 710 1 ions ^ of things. He 
 who is not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes 
 of philosophers must needs acknowledge that no small part 
 of them are spent about abstract ideas'^. These are in a 
 more especial manner thought to be the object of those 
 sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics, 
 and of all that which passes under the notion of the most 
 abstracted and sublime learning, in all which one shall 
 scarce find any question handled in such a manner as does 
 not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is well 
 acquainted with them^ 
 
 7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes 
 of things do never real/y exist each of them apart by itself, 
 
 ^ 'Idea' and 'notion' seem here to be taken as synonymes ; yet 
 afterwards Berkeley makes them represent a significant distinction. 
 
 ^ With Berkeley 'idea' means — object presented to the senses, or 
 represented in imagination. For him 'abstract ideas' would be abstract 
 sensations, which is absurd. 
 
 ^ Compare with what follows against abstract ideas (as Berkeley 
 understands idea), §§ 97-joo, 118-132, 143; A'ew Theory of Vision, 
 §§ 122-125. See also AlcipJiron, Dial. vii. 5-7, and Defence of Free 
 Thinking in Mathematics, §§ 45-48, in Works, vols. ii. iii. But in 
 the end compare all this with Siris, § 335, and those which follow 
 on the ' Ideas ' of Plato, to which Berkeley's intellectual ' notions ' are 
 nearer than his ideas, which mean sensuous phenomena in his early 
 writings. 
 
 In the following sections, on the misuse and right use of words, 
 Berkeley has Locke much in view. What is said of 'abstract ideas' 
 in Locke's Essay may be studied, with the commentary in my edition 
 of the Essay ;Clarendon Press, 1894). See §§ 11-13 which follow. 
 Hume refers to Berkeley {Treatise of Human Nature, b. I. part i. 
 chap. 7) as having produced ' one of the greatest and most valuable 
 discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters,' 
 in bringing to light the absurdity of abstract ideas. So also J. S. Mill, 
 in Fortnightly Review for Nov. 1S71, extols Berkeley's 'discovery ' of 
 the legitimate office of abstraction in the formation of human knowledge, 
 as distinguished from the illusion that it can be a factor of sensations 
 and mental images that are abstract.
 
 12 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, 
 and blended together, several in the same object. But, 
 we are told, the mind being able to consider each quality 
 singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which 
 it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstract 
 ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object 
 extended, coloured, and moved : this mixed or compound 
 idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent parts, 
 and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame 
 the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not 
 that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without 
 extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by 
 abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of 
 motion exclusive of both colour and extension. 
 
 8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular 
 extensions perceived by sense there is something common 
 and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or 
 that figure or magnitude, which distinguish them one from 
 another ; it considers apart or singles out by itself that 
 which is common, making thereof a most abstract idea of 
 extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has 
 any figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded 
 from all these '. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of 
 the particular colours perceived by sense that which dis- 
 tinguishes them one from another, and retaining that only 
 which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract 
 which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other 
 determinate colour. And, in like manner, by considering 
 motion abstractedly not only from the body moved, but 
 likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular 
 directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is 
 framed ; which equally corresponds to all particular motions 
 whatsoever that may be perceived by sense. 
 
 ' 'Prescinded,' i.e. exclusively attended to. 'To prescind an object 
 is to attend to it — to the exclusion of other objects.
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 13 
 
 9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of 
 qualities or modes, so does it, by the s^mc precision or mental 
 separation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded 
 beings which include several co-existent qualities. For ex- 
 ample, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and 
 John resemble each other in certain common agreements of 
 shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or com- 
 pounded idea it has of Peter, James and any other particular 
 man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is 
 common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein all 
 the particulars equally partake — abstracting entirely from 
 and cutting off all those circumstances and differences 
 which might determine it to any particular existence. And 
 after this manner it is said we come by the abstract idea 
 of man, or, if you please, humanity, or human nature ; 
 wherein it is true there is included colour, because there 
 is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither 
 white, nor black, nor any particular colour, because there 
 is no one particular colour wherein all men partake. So 
 likewise there is included stature, but then it is neither tall 
 stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but some- 
 thing abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. More- 
 over, there being a great variety of other creatures that 
 partake in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of 
 man, the mind, leaving out those parts which are peculiar 
 to men, and retaining those only which are common to all the 
 living creatures, frames the idea of attinia/, which abstracts 
 not only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, 
 fishes, and insects. The constituent parts of the abstract 
 idea of animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. 
 By body is meant body without any particular shape or figure, 
 there being no one shape or figure common to all animals, 
 without covering, either of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., 
 nor yet naked : hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness 
 being the distinguishing properties of particular animals,
 
 14 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 and for that reason left out of the abstract idea. Upon 
 the same account the spontaneous motion must be neither 
 walking, nor flying, nor creeping ; it is nevertheless a motion, 
 but what that motion is it is not easy to conceive. 
 
 10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of ab- 
 stracting their ideas, they best can tell. For myself, I find 
 I have indeed a faculty of imagining, or representing 
 to myself, the idea of those particular things I have per- 
 ceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. 
 I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts 
 of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider 
 the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or 
 separated from the rest of the body. — But then whatever 
 hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape 
 and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to 
 myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, 
 a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized 
 man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive^ the 
 abstract idea above described. — And it is equally impossible 
 for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the 
 body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvi- 
 linear nor rectilinear ; and the like may be said of all other 
 abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own 
 myself able to abstract /// one sense, as when I consider 
 some particular parts or qualities separated from others, 
 with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is 
 possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that 
 I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, 
 those qualities which it is impossible should exist so sepa- 
 rated ; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting 
 from particulars in the manner aforesaid — which last are 
 the two proper acceptations of abstraction. And there is 
 
 ' ' Conceive ' here means realise in imagination. Only concrete 
 objects can be so realised.
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 15 
 
 ground to think most men will acknowledge themselves to 
 be in my case. The generality of men which are simple 
 and illiterate never pretend to abstract Jiotions^. It is said 
 they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and 
 study ; we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such 
 there be, they are confined only to the learned. 
 
 II. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence 
 of the doctrine of abstraction, and try if I can discover what 
 it is that inclines the men of speculation to embrace an 
 opinion so remote from Common Sense as that seems to be. 
 There has been a late deservedly esteemed philosopher - 
 who, no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by 
 seeming to think the having abstract general ideas is what 
 puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt 
 man and beast. 'The having of general ideas,' saith he, 
 'is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and 
 brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do 
 by no means attain unto. For, it is evident we observe no 
 footsteps in them of making use of general signs for uni- 
 versal ideas ; from which we have reason to imagine that 
 they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general 
 ideas, since they have no use of words or any other general 
 signs.' And a little after : ' Therefore, I think, we may 
 suppose that it is in this that the species of brutes are dis- 
 criminated from men, and it is that proper difference wherein 
 they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so 
 wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas at all, and are 
 not bare machines (as some ^ would have them), we cannot 
 
 ^ Here ' abstract notion ' = abstract idea, phenomenon, or sensation. 
 
 - Locke. Consider whether Locke really means by ' abstract ideas ' 
 what Berkeley supposes he does. Study the relative passages in Locke's 
 Essay. The objections in the text are due partly to Locke's confused ex- 
 pression, and partly to Berkeley's limitation of idea' to natural phenomenon. 
 
 ^ The Cartesians, rejecting one of the alternatives open in their 
 philosophy — that brutes are self-conscious, preferred the other— that 
 they are organisms without consciousness.
 
 l6 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to 
 me that they do, some of them, in certain instances reason 
 as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, 
 just as they receive them from their senses. They are the 
 best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have 
 not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of 
 abstraction.' — Essay 07i Human Understandings b. II. ch. ii. 
 §§ lo and II. I readily agree with this learned author, that 
 the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to abstrac- 
 tion. But then if this be made the distinguishing property 
 of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that 
 pass for men must be reckoned into their number. The 
 reason that is here assigned why we have no grounds to 
 think brutes have abstract general ideas is, that we observe 
 in them no use of words or any other general signs ; which 
 is built on this supposition — that the making use of words 
 implies the having general ideas. From which it follows 
 that men who use language are able to abstract or generalise 
 their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of the 
 author will further appear by his answering the question 
 he in another place puts : ' Since all things that exist are 
 only particulars, how come we by general terms ? ' His 
 answer is: 'Words become general by being made the 
 signs of general ideas.' — Essay on Human Understanding, 
 b. III. ch. 3. § 6. — But it seems that a word becomes 
 general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general 
 idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it 
 indifferently suggests to the mind. For example, when it is 
 said ' the change of motion is proportional to the impressed 
 force,' or that ' whatever has extension is divisible,' these 
 propositions are to be understood of motion and extension 
 in general ; and nevertheless it will not follow that they 
 suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a body 
 moved, or any determinate direction and velocity, or that I 
 must conceive an abstract general idea of extension, which
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 1 7 
 
 is neither line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, 
 black, white, nor red, nor of any other determinate colour. 
 It is only implied that whatever particular motion I con- 
 sider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, 
 or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it 
 holds equally true. As does the other of every particular 
 extension, it matters not whether line, surface, or solid, 
 whether of this or that magnitude or figure \ 
 
 12. By observing how ideas become general, we may the 
 better judge how words are made so. And here it is to be 
 noted that I do not deny absolutely there are general ideas, 
 but only that there are any abstract general ideas ; for, in 
 the passages we have quoted wherein there is mention of 
 general ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by 
 abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9. 
 Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak 
 only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge 
 that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes ' 
 general by being made to represent or stand for all other 
 particular ideas of the same sort. — To make this plain by 
 an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the 
 method of cutting a hne in two equal parts. He draws, for 
 instance, a black Hne of an inch in length : this, which in 
 
 ' What are now called concepts were probably intended in an obscure 
 way by advocates of the so-called abstract ideas. Berkeley seems to 
 recognise them sometimes, under the name of 'notions.' 'A concept 
 cannot as such be presented as an individual thing ; but it must contain 
 no attribute incompatible with the individual presentation of the objects 
 that are united under it. It is not itself individual, but it can compre- 
 hend only such attributes as are capable of individualisation. . . . Yet 
 the rule inaividiialise your concepts does not mean sensationalise them, 
 unless the senses are the only sources of presentation.' (Mansel ; see 
 Proleg. Logica, pp. 23, 33.) When a mathematician exemplifies in 
 perception or imagination what a triangle is, he will have an individual 
 triangle before him ; but he can form propositions about triangles which 
 do not depend upon this or that individual, or upon their being right- 
 angled or acute-angled or obtuse-angled. 
 
 C
 
 l8 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its 
 signification general, since, as it is there used, it represents 
 all particular lines whatsoever ; so that what is demonstrated 
 of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line 
 in general. And, as that particular line becomes general 
 by being made a sign, so the name ' line,' which taken 
 absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made general. 
 And as the former owes its generality not to its being the 
 sign of an abstract or general line, but of all particular 
 right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be 
 thought to derive its generality from the same cause, 
 namely, the various particular lines which it indifferently 
 denotes '. 
 
 13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of 
 abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary to, 
 I shall add one more passage out of the Essay on Human 
 Understanding, which is as follows : — ' Abstract ideas are 
 not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised 
 mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men it 
 is only because by constant and familiar use they are made 
 so. For, when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find 
 that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the 
 mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily 
 offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, 
 
 ' Berkeley does not go so far as to say, with extreme Nominalists, 
 that an individual object becomes general by the accident of it and other 
 objects being denoted by the same name, or that ' generality ' consists 
 in this name, apart from its concept, being applied to an indefinite 
 number of individuals. He here explains how a particular object may 
 represent an indefinite number of particular objects, individualising the 
 concept which connects them. It may l)e added that their common 
 name, itself a particular thivg, is connected with their concept in the 
 mind by an arbit7-ary tie ; for the name — spoken or written — is not 
 itself an example of the concept which it is employed to signify, and 
 may vary, as it does, in different languages. It is an arbitrary sign 
 of qualities common to many individual objects, each of which exemplifies 
 the concept.
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 19 
 
 does it not require some pains and skill to form the general 
 idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, 
 comprehensive, and difficult) ; for it must be neither oblique 
 nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, 
 but all and none of these at once ? In effect, it is some- 
 thing imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some 
 parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put 
 together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has 
 need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, 
 for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of 
 knowledge, to both which it is naturally very much inclined. 
 But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of 
 our imperfection. At least this is enough to shew that the 
 most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind 
 is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its 
 earliest knowledge is conversant about.' — B. IV. ch. 7. § 9. 
 If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an 
 idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pre- 
 tend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All 
 I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform 
 himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, 
 methinks, can be no hard task for any one to perform. 
 What more easy than for any one to look a little into his 
 own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain 
 to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description 
 that is here given of the general idea of a triangle — which 
 is neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor 
 scalenon, but all and none of these at once ' ? 
 
 ' The language of Locke is awkward. Does it mean more than tliat 
 the concept of a triangle may be individualised in any one of its many 
 possible applications — oblique, equilateral, &c. — in all of which it is as 
 it were latent ? No concept can, as such, be pictured. It belongs to 
 the intellectual constitution, not to the variable matter, of human 
 thought, and so neither in perception nor in imagination can we realise 
 universal relations. Only in the concrete example are they thus 
 reali'iable. 
 
 C 2
 
 20 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas 
 carry with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the 
 forming them. And it is on all hands agreed that there is 
 need of great toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate 
 our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to 
 those sublime speculations that are conversant about ab- 
 stract ideas. From all which the natural consequence 
 should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the forming 
 abstract ideas was not necessary for comtnimicatmi, which 
 is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are 
 told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is only 
 because by constant and familiar use they are made so. 
 Now, I would fain know at what time it is men are em- 
 ployed in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing them- 
 selves with those necessary helps for discourse. It cannot 
 be when they are grown up, for then it seems they are not 
 conscious of any such painstaking ; it remains therefore to 
 be the business of their childhood. And surely the great 
 and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions will be 
 found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard 
 thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot prate to- 
 gether of their sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their 
 little trinkets, till they have first tacked together number- 
 less inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds abstract 
 general ideas, and annexed them to every common name 
 they make use of? 
 
 15. Nor do I think them a wit more needful for the 
 enlargement of knozvledge than for communication. It is, 
 I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and 
 demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully 
 agree : but then it does not appear to me that those notions 
 are formed by abstraction in the manner premised — univer- 
 sality^ so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the ab- 
 solute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the 
 relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 21 
 
 by it ; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions ', 
 being in their own nature f articular^ are rendered universal. 
 Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning tri- 
 angles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal 
 idea of a triangle ; which ought not to be understood as if 
 I could frame an idea of a triangle which was neither equi- 
 lateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural; but only that the par- 
 ticular triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it 
 matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all recti- . 
 linear triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense universal. 
 All which seems very plain and not to include any difficulty 
 in it ". 
 
 1 6. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any j 
 proposition to be true of all particular triangles, except we 
 have first seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea of a tri- 
 angle which equally agrees to all ? For, because a property 
 may be demonstrated to agree to some one particular tri- 
 angle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to 
 any other triangle, which in all respects is not the same 
 with it. For example, having demonstrated that the three 
 angles of an isosceles rectangular triangle are equal to two 
 right ones, I cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees 
 to all other triangles which have neither a right angle nor 
 two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain this 
 proposition is universally true, we must either make a par- 
 ticular demonstration for every particular triangle, which is ' 
 impossible, or once for all demonstrate it of the abstract 
 
 ' ' Notion ' is liere again synonymous vvitli individual perceptions 
 and imaginations, or ideas — not contined, as afterwards by Berkeley, to 
 vorjfiara and SiavoTjfxaTa. 
 
 ' This and the next are important sections. They touch the pene- 
 trating question — 7a/ia/ that is in the constitiitio.n of things which enables 
 us to extend our knowledge beyond the data of sense and memory, by 
 inductive inferences. Is it not the omnipresence of reason, order, or law 
 in the universe ? Unless the universe were rationally, i. e. divinely, 
 constituted it could not be reasoned about.
 
 S2 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 idea of a triangle, in which all the particulars do indifferently 
 partake and by which they are all equally represented. — To 
 which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view whilst 
 I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an iso- 
 sceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate 
 length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other 
 rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And 
 that because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor 
 determinate length of the sides, are at all concerned in the 
 demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in view in- 
 cludes all these particulars, but then there is not the least 
 mention made of them in the proof of the proposition. It 
 is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones, 
 because one of them is a right angle, or because the sides 
 comprehending it are of the same length. Which suffi- 
 ciently shews that the right angle might have been oblique, 
 and the sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration 
 have held good. And for this reason it is that I conclude 
 that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I 
 had demonstrated of a particular right-angled equicrural 
 triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition 
 of the abstract idea of a triangle. [' And here it must be 
 acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as 
 triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of 
 the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he may ab- 
 stract '^ ] but this will never prove that he can frame an 
 abstract, general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like 
 manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man, or so 
 far forth as animal, without framing the forementioned 
 
 ' What follows to the end of this section was added in Berkeley's 
 third edition. 
 
 - Here Berkeley grants that without abstraction in one sense of the 
 term, there can be no scientific or philosophic knowledge of things. But 
 this abstraction means exclusive attention to the common attributes, or 
 connecting relations, of itidividual things, which, as such, cannot be 
 reduced to idea-images.
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 23 
 
 abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all 
 that is perceived is not considered.] 
 
 17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace 
 the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, through 
 all the manifold inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute 
 which their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems 
 to have led them into. What bickerings and controversies, 
 and what a learned dust have been raised about those 
 matters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence 
 derived to mankind, are things at this day too clearly known 
 to need being insisted on. And it had been well if the ill 
 effects of that doctrine were confined to those only who make 
 the most avowed profession of it. When men consider the 
 great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many ages 
 been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the 
 sciences, and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part 
 of them remain full of darkness and uncertainty and disputes 
 that are like never to have an end, and even those that are 
 thought to be supported by the most clear and cogent demon- 
 strations contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly irre- 
 concilable to the understandings of men, and that, taking all 
 together, a very small proportion of them does supply any real 
 benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent 
 diversion and amusement — I say, the consideration of all this 
 is apt to throw them into a despondency and perfect contempt 
 of all study. But this may perhaps cease upon a view of 
 the False Principles that have obtained in the world, amongst 
 all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide and 
 extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than 
 this of abstract general ideas '. 
 
 ' To say that the sort of abstraction against which Berkeley argues is 
 impossible is simply to say that abstractions or substances abstracted 
 from all qualities, are unimaginable. But this does not prove that unre- 
 lated phenomena, /crj^, can constitute science ; or thai ihey can become 
 knowledge without their relations being involved in the product ;
 
 24 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 1 8. I come now to continue the source of this prevaihng 
 notion, and that seems to me to be Language. And surely 
 nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been 
 the source of an opinion so universally received. The truth 
 of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plain 
 confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who 
 acknowledge that they are made in order to naming ; from 
 which it is a clear consequence that if there had been no 
 such thing as speech or universal signs there never had 
 been any thought of abstraction. See b. III. ch. 6. § 39, 
 and elsewhere of the Essay on Human Understanding. 
 Let us examine the manner wherein Words have contri- 
 buted to the origin of that mistake. — First then, it is 
 thought that every name has, or ought to have, one only 
 precise and settled signification ; which inclines men to 
 think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas that con- 
 stitute the true and only immediate signification of each 
 general name, and that it is by the mediation of these ab- 
 stract ideas that a general name comes to signify any par- 
 ticular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as 
 one precise and definite signification annexed to any general 
 name, they all signifying indifferently a great number of 
 particular ideas \ All which does evidently follow from 
 what has been already said, and will clearly appear to any 
 one by a little reflection. To this it will be objected that 
 every name that has a definition is thereby restrained to 
 one certain signification. For example, a triangle is de- 
 fined to be 'a plain surface comprehended by three right 
 lines,' by which that name is limited to denote one certain 
 idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the defini- 
 
 or that progress in real knowledge is other than an ever widening 
 and deepening intellectual apprehension of the relations of individual 
 things. 
 
 ' The same concept or notion is found exemplified in any one of 
 innurr.erable particular objects.
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 25 
 
 tion it is not said whether the surface be great or small, 
 black or white, nor whether the sides are long or short, 
 equal or unequal, nor with what angles they are inclined 
 to each other ; in all which there may be great variety, 
 and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits 
 the signification of the word triangle. It is one thing for to 
 keep a name constantly to the same definition, and another 
 to make it stand everywhere for the same idea ; the one is 
 necessary, the other useless and impracticable ^ 
 
 19. But, to give a farther account how words came to 
 produce the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed 
 that it is a received opinion that language has no other end 
 but the communicating our ideas, and that every significant 
 name stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withal 
 certain that names which yet are not thought altogether 
 insignificant do not always mark out particular conceivable 
 ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for ab- 
 stract notions. That there are many names in use amongst 
 speculative men which do not always suggest to others 
 determinate particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is 
 what nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover 
 that it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) 
 significant names which stand for ideas should, every time 
 they are used, excite in the understanding the ideas 
 they are made to stand for — in reading and discoursing, 
 names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, 
 in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each 
 letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every 
 step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular 
 quantity it was appointed to stand for". 
 
 ' Yet a definition can determine the individual objects to which a 
 common name is applicable, although the relations which constitute 
 the concept expressed by the name defined cannot, as such, be pictured 
 in imagination. They are imaginable only in concrete examples. 
 
 - Compare with this the so-called 'symbolical knowledge' of Leibnitz
 
 26 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words 
 is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly 
 supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some 
 passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the 
 putting the mind in some particular disposition — to which 
 the former is in many cases barely subservient, and some- 
 times entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without 
 it, and I think does not unfrequently happen in the familiar 
 use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect with him- 
 self, and see if it does not often happen, either in hearing 
 or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, 
 hatred, admiration, and disdain, and the like, arise imme- 
 diately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, 
 without any ideas coming between \ At first, indeed, the 
 words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to pro- 
 duce those emotions ; but, if I mistake not, it will be found 
 that, when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of 
 the sounds, or sight of the characters, is oft immediately 
 attended with those passions which at first were wont to be 
 produced by the intervention of ideas that are now quite 
 omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the 
 promise of a good thing, though we have not an idea of 
 what it is ? Or is not the being threatened with danger 
 sufficient to excite a dread, though we think not of any 
 
 {Opera Philosophica, pp. 79 So, Erdmann). See also Stewart on ' Ab- 
 straction ' {Elements, vol. I. ch. 4. §§ i and 2) — where he treats of 
 individual examples, or resembling signs, and of words, or non-resembling 
 sign^. 
 
 ' That is to say, without any 'ideas' (particular examples) of the 
 concepts signified by the words rising up in his imagination in the act 
 of hearing or of reading — the word doing service instead. Language in 
 this way more easily discharges iis practical function, which is to evoke 
 emotion and incite to action more than to convey either intellectual 
 notions or mental images; but we are apt, in consequence, unconsciously 
 to accept words that are meaningless. To escape this disaster we should 
 test our concepts by exemplifying them, dismissing the names till their 
 meanings are thus realised.
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 27 
 
 particular evil likely to befall us, nor yet frame to ourselves 
 an idea of danger in abstract ? If any one shall join ever 
 so little reflection of his own to what has been said, I 
 believe that it will evidently appear to him that general 
 names are often used in the propriety of language without 
 the speaker's designing them for marks of ideas in his own, 
 which he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer. 
 Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken 
 with a design to bring into our view the ideas of those indi- 
 viduals that are supposed to be marked by them. For 
 example, when a schoolman tells me ' Aristotle hath said 
 it,' all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to em- 
 brace his opinion with the deference and submission which 
 custom has annexed to that name. And this effect is often 
 so instantly produced in the minds of those who are accus- 
 tomed to resign their judgment to authority of that philo- 
 sopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his person, 
 writings, or reputation should go before. So close and 
 immediate a connexion may custom establish betwixt the 
 very ivord Aristotle and the motions of assent and reverence 
 in the minds of some men. Innumerable examples of this 
 kind may be given, but why should I insist on those things 
 which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully 
 suggest unto him ' ? 
 
 21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract 
 Ideas. We have considered what has been said for them 
 by their ablest patrons ; and endeavoured to shew they are 
 of no use for those ends to which they are thought neces- 
 
 ' Compare Alciphron, Dial. VII. §§ 8-10. Berkeley here shows how- 
 words — especially in politics, theology, and metaphysics- impose upon 
 the uneducated and half-educated — determining their feelings and con- 
 duct independently of their intelligence ; and why uneducated persons 
 are annoyed by exactness e. g. in philosophical discussion. History 
 records theological controversies, and social revolutions which were 
 largely due 10 the influence on the unreflecting of verbal shibboleths 
 without mtaning, at least without meaning for such minds.
 
 28 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 sary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source from 
 whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language. 
 — It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, in 
 that by their means all that stock of knowledge which has 
 been purchased by the joint labours of inquisitive men in 
 all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and made 
 the possession of one single person. But most parts of 
 knowledge have been strangely perplexed and darkened by 
 the abuse of words and general ways of speech wherein they 
 are delivered. Since therefore words are so apt to impose 
 on the understanding, whatever ideas I consider, I shall 
 endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view, 
 keeping out of my thoughts, so far as I am able, those 
 flames which long and constant use hath so strictly united 
 with them ; from which I may expect to derive the following 
 advantages : — 
 
 2 2. First, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies 
 purely verbal — the springing up of which weeds in almost 
 all the sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth 
 of true and sound knowledge. Secondly, this seems to be 
 a sure way to extricate myself out of that fine and subtle 
 net of abstract ideas which has so miserably perplexed and 
 entangled the minds of men ; and that with this peculiar 
 circumstance, that by how much the finer and more curious 
 was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he 
 likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. Thirdly, 
 so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested 
 of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The 
 objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I can- 
 not be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have 
 not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of 
 my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. 
 To discern the agreements or disagreements there are be- 
 tween my ideas, to see what ideas are included in any 
 compound idea and what not, there is nothing more requi-
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 29 
 
 site than an attentive perception of what passes in my own 
 understanding '. 
 
 23. But the attainment of all these advantages does pre- 
 suppose an entire deliverance from the deception of words 
 which I dare hardly promise myself; so ditlficult a thing it 
 is to dissolve an union so early begun, and confirmed by 
 so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which 
 difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the 
 doctrine oi abstraction. For, so long as men thought abstract 
 ideas were annexed to their words, it does not seem strange 
 that they should use words for ideas — it being found an im- 
 practicable thing to lay aside the word, and retain the abstract 
 idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceivable. 
 
 This seems to me the principal cause why those who have 
 so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all 
 use of words in their meditations, and contemplating their 
 bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it themselves. Of 
 late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions 
 and insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of 
 words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise 
 well, that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our 
 attention from the words which signify them ^. But, how 
 good soever this advice may be they have given others, it 
 is plain they could not have a due regard to it themselves, 
 so long as they thought the only immediate use of words 
 was to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of 
 every general name was a determinate abstract idea. 
 
 ' Berkeley appeals throughout to this test. He everywhere entreats 
 the student to try whether he can conceive clearly and distinctly the 
 meanings of his words, and can realise the terms he employs in individual 
 examples. 
 
 '^ See Locke, Essay, b. II. ch. 13. §§ iS, 28; also b. III. ch. 10. The 
 drift of Berkeley's exhortation is good so far as it is fitted to guard us 
 against the dangerous tendency to accept empty words instead of legiti- 
 mate concepts, a lesson which it was the chief purpose of Locke's Essay 
 to insist upon.
 
 30 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 24. But, these being known to be mistakes, a man may 
 with greater ease prevent his being imposed on by words. 
 He that knows he has no other than particular ideas^ will 
 not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive ' the 
 abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows 
 names do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the 
 labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had. 
 It were, therefore, to be wished that every one would use 
 his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas 
 he would consider, separating from them all that dress and 
 incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind 
 the judgment and divide the attention '^. In vain do we 
 extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails 
 of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned 
 men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity — we need 
 only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of 
 knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach 
 of our hand. 
 
 25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of 
 Knowledge from the embarras and delusion of words, we 
 may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose ; 
 we may draw consequences from consequences, and be 
 never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose 
 ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper en- 
 tangled in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore 
 designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him that he 
 
 ' To 'conceive' here means lo form a mental itnage, e. g of a triangle 
 that is neither right-angled, acute-angled, nor obtuse-angled ; which, on 
 trial, is found impossible. 
 
 ^ Here the student may perhaps ask what he is expected to do when 
 his words signify SiayorjfxaTa and vo-qnarn — what Berkeley sometimes 
 called notions., in contrast to ideas {alad-qixaTa and ipivTaaixara), — if it 
 be true that all words must at bottom signify only what is presentable in 
 sense, or representable in imagination. Did he, even in the imperfect 
 philosophy of his youth, intend to limit human understanding to sense 
 and sensuous imagination, overlooking intellectual implicates indispens- 
 able to intelligent experience ?
 
 INTRODUCTIOy TO THE PRINCIPLES 31 
 
 would make my words the occasion of his own thinking, 
 and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in read- 
 ing that I had in writing them. By this means it will be 
 easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say. 
 He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words, 
 and I do not see how he can be led into an error by con- 
 sidering his own naked, undisguised ideas.
 
 II. RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 I. It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the 
 objects of human knowledge, that they are either (a) ideas 
 actually imprinted on the senses ; or else {b') ideas per- 
 ceived by attending to the passions and operations of the 
 mind ; or lastly {c) ideas formed by help of memory and 
 imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely repre- 
 senting those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways '. — By 
 sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several 
 degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, 
 heat and cold, motion and resistance ; and of all these more 
 and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes 
 me with odours ; the palate with tastes ; and hearing conveys 
 sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and com- 
 position. 
 
 And as several of these are observed to accompany 
 each other, they come to be marked by one name, and 
 so to be reputed as one thing ^. Thus, for example, a cer- 
 
 ' All natural phenomena, including those of human nature, whether 
 actually perceived, remembered, or imagined, are called ideas by Berkeley 
 in his early philosophical works. In Si7-is the perceptions of sense are 
 caWed pkcnomena, according to ourprcsent usage. The thesis is ambiguous 
 as expressed both by Locke and by Berkeley ; and Berkeley even more 
 than Locke fails, in his earlier writings, to recognise theoretically ele- 
 ments necessarily presupposed in the experience upon which he proceeds 
 in his subsequent reasonings. 
 
 ^ Is 'observation' alone enough to account for this synthesis, in which
 
 RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES 33 
 
 tain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been 
 observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, 
 signified by the name apple; other collections of ideas 
 constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible 
 things — which as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite 
 the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. 
 
 2. But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects 
 of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or 
 perceives them, and exercises divers operations, — as willing, 
 imagining, remembering,— about them. This perceiving, 
 active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself'. 
 By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but 
 a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, 
 which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived — for 
 the existence of an idea consists in being perceived. 
 
 3. That neither our thoughts nor passions, nor ideas 
 formed by the imagination, exist without the mind^, is what 
 everybody will allow. 
 
 And to me it is no less evident that the various sensa- 
 tions, or ideas imprinted o?i the sense, however blended or 
 combined together ( that is, whatever objects ^ they compose), 
 
 ideas or natural phenovujia are conceived as qualities of thingsl ' I 
 own the word idea, not being commonly used for thing, sounds some- 
 thing out of the way,' he says elsewhere. ' My reason for so using it 
 is because a necessary relation to mind is implied by the term idea^ 
 
 ' This unique element necessarily involved in experience is usually 
 signified by the personal pronoun 'I' — Ego, — in contrast to the changing 
 ideas or natural phenomena of which we are percipient. 
 
 '■' 'Without the mind,' i.e. unperceived — after total withdrawal of 
 conscious or percipient life. Ideas in memory and imagination, by 
 consent of all, could not exist /^rj^, or in a totally dead universe. This 
 raises his chief question : — Can a totally dead universe exist ? Are 
 natural phenomena, as presented to our senses, independent of a knowing, 
 feeling, and active Ego, in which they can be realised? Must not all 
 phenomena depend for their reality upon Egosi Must not all things 
 depend upon persons ? Is not personal consciousness the root of reality ? 
 He begins to answer this question in the next sentence. 
 
 ^ ' Objects ' = ' things,' i.e. aggregates of ideas or natural phenomena, 
 
 D
 
 34 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. I 
 think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by 
 any one that shall attend to 7(.ihat is meaiit by the term 
 EXIST when applied to sensible things. The table I write 
 on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it ; and if I were out 
 of my study I should say it existed — meaning thereby that 
 if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other 
 spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that 
 is, it was smelt ; there was a sound, that is, it was heard ; a 
 colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. 
 This is all that I can understand by these and the like 
 expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence 
 of unthinkitig things ivithont any relation to their being 
 perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their esse 
 is percipi ; nor is it possible they should have any exist- 
 ence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive 
 them \ 
 
 recognised as 'qualities,' and of which the 'material world' con- 
 sists. 
 
 ^ The characteristic question of Berkeley's philosophy might be thus 
 expressed : — Do the phenomena presented to the five senses — the 
 individual things of sense — which seem to be ojily aggregates of 
 ideas — really exist as substances, i. e. things totally independent of 
 percipient mind ? Are solid things that move in space — the things 
 we actually touch and see — independent of the sentient and intelligent 
 life that exists in the universe, in a way that feelings and fancies are 
 not ? His answer is, that the things we touch and see cannot be real 
 otherwise than as appearances of which a (not necessarily my) mind 
 is percipient : their esse is percipi. The reason for this is, that the 
 supposition of phenomena really existing when no one is percipient of 
 them, is an unintelligible, if not a self-contradictory, supposition. To 
 say ' this table exists^ or is ' something real,' means, if it has any 
 meaning, that it is seen or felt by some one. Out of all perception, 
 or imagination, of the phenomena (called its qualities), the word 
 'table' is an empty abstraction. Let all life in the universe be 
 annihilated, and what becomes of the then unrealisable data now realised 
 in the senses ? (He has still to explain the transformation of ' sensations ' 
 into ' qualities ' of things moving in space — the transformation of 
 momentary sensation into what is believed to be permanent quality.) 
 
 Ueberweg charges Berkeley with begging his principal question,
 
 RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES 35 
 
 4. ' It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst 
 men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all 
 sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct 
 from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with 
 how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this prin- 
 ciple may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find 
 in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, 
 perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what 
 are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by 
 sense ? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or 
 sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one 
 of these, or any combination of them, should exist un- 
 perceived - ? 
 
 5. If we throughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps, be 
 found at bottom to depend on the doctrine oi abstract ideas. 
 For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to dis- 
 tinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being 
 perceived, so as to conceive' them existing unperceived? 
 Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures — in 
 a word the things we see and feel — what are they but so 
 
 because he sets out by naming the things of sense sensations or ideas — 
 thus implying in the connotation of their name, that they have only a 
 transitory, mind-dependent existence. But Berkeley need not, at setting 
 out, be required to mean more than that all that we are percipient of in 
 sense is perceived, and must therefore be, so far, dependent on mind — 
 leaving it still open to inquire, whether absolute independence of all 
 perception is intelligible. 
 
 ' §§ 4-24 contain the rationale of his answer to the question 
 about the relation of Matter to Mind that was raised in § 3. That 
 unperceived Matter must be meaningless seems to him hardly to require 
 proof, being self-evident to any one who attends to what must be 
 meant by ' exist ' and ' real.' That the unthinking are notwithstanding 
 disposed to give a different answer, he attributes (§ 5) to that tendency 
 to substantiate empty abstractions on which he had enlarged in the 
 Introduction. 
 
 ■^ How does Berkeley, in thus limiting our ' perceptions ' to the 
 phenomena of which we are individually conscious in sense — ' our own 
 ideas ' — not subside into Panegoism ? 
 
 ^ Does ' conceive ' here mean imagine — have a mental picture of? 
 
 D 2
 
 36 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense ' ? 
 and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these 
 from perception ? For my part, I might as easily divide a 
 thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my thoughts, or 
 conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhaps, 
 I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the 
 trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the 
 smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far, 
 I will not deny, I can abstract — if that may properly be 
 called abstraction which extends only to the conceiving sepa- 
 rately such objects as it is possible may really exist or be 
 actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining 
 power does not extend beyond the possibility of real exist- 
 ence or perception -. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see 
 or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, 
 so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sen- 
 sible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception 
 of it. In truth, the object and the sensation are the same 
 thing and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other. 
 
 6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind 
 that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I 
 take this important one to be, viz. that all the choir of 
 heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies 
 which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any 
 subsistence without a mind — that their being {5 to be perceived 
 or known ; that consequently so long as they are not 
 actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that 
 of any other created spirit, they must either have no exist- 
 ence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal 
 
 * Here the ' things of sense ' are vaguely called •' notions ' — a term in 
 this passage synonymous with sensation, idea, natural phenomenon. 
 Berkeley has not defined what he means, here and elsewhere, by the 
 metaphor ' impressions on sense,' which, taken literally, makes 'percep- 
 tion ' motio7i in the organism, instead of state of conscious life. 
 
 * ' Real existence or perception,' i. e. existence as realised in and by 
 actual perception.
 
 RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES 37 
 
 Spirit — it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the 
 absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of 
 them an existence independent of a spirit. To be convinced 
 of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in 
 his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being 
 perceived^. 
 
 7. From what has been said it is evident there is not any 
 other substance- than spirit, or that which perceives^. But, 
 for the fuller demonstration of this point, let it be considered 
 the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, 
 &c., i.e. the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to 
 exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction : 
 for to have an idea is all one as to perceive ; that therefore 
 wherein colour, figure, &c. exist must perceive them ; hence 
 
 ' Ueberweg accepts Berkeley's arguments as regards the necessary 
 dependence of phenomena of sense, as phenomena, severally or in aggre- 
 gates, on percipient mind : he denies that he has proved that they may 
 not also be external things, existing in space independently of being 
 perceived, and which may so operate on our senses that the spirit which 
 animates every part of our organism is able to perceive them. 
 
 Berkeley has not here given reason for adopting the alternative — that 
 sensible things do subsist continuously in the perception of the Eternal 
 Spirit, during intervals in which they are not perceived by any finite 
 spirit — instead of the counter alternative of their ceasing to exist during 
 such intervals. He does not even ask ivhy we are obliged to believe in 
 their continuity. Still less does he explain how things exist in the 
 Eternal Mind during intervals of finite perception. Is this more intelli- 
 gible than abstract or unperceived existence ? Do they exist as per- 
 ceptions of sense, or as intuitions of reason, in the mind of God ? 
 
 ^ He does not say distinctly what he means by 'substance.' He seems 
 (like Descartes) to distinguish finite and relative from absolute substance 
 — the absolute substance being God, or substance in the highest meaning 
 of the term. 
 
 ' Does this imply that each spirit or ego must be always percipient 
 of phenomena — that mmd must always be conscious? Otherwise should 
 we not in an unconscious spirit (on Berkeley's premises) still have an 
 empty abstraction, open to his objection against unperceived things ? 
 Indeed he asserts elsewhere that the essence of mind is conscious 
 activity; — an 'unthinking substance or substratum of ideas' being 
 a ' manifest contradiction.' See Commonplace Book.
 
 38 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or sub- 
 stratum of those ideas. 
 
 8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist 
 without the mind, yet there may be things like them, 
 whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist 
 without the mind in an unthinking substance ^ I answer, 
 an idea can be like nothing but an idea ; a colour or figure 
 can be like nothing but another colour or figure^. If we 
 look but never so little into our own thoughts, we shall find 
 it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only 
 between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed 
 originals or external things, of which our ideas are the 
 pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or 
 no ? If they are, then they are ideas and we have gained 
 our point ; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one 
 whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something 
 which is invisible ; hard or soft, like something which is 
 intangible ; and so of the rest. 
 
 9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt 
 printary and secondary qualities ^. By the former they mean 
 
 ' As those seem to say who, in contrast with Berkeley, hold that our 
 perception of the material world is not immediate, but realised through 
 representative ideas. With Berkeley ideas which appear in sense are 
 not representative : they are "Cae. presented w^iwizS. phenomena of which 
 his world is composed. 
 
 ^ The reader should ponder this assumption, illustrating it to himself 
 and examining its reason, as an exercise in psychology. Compare it 
 with Locke's assumption, Essay, II. 8, that our ideas of sofiie of the 
 qualities of matter are resemblances of what really exists in things. 
 
 ^ Locke is here in his view. See Essay, b. II. ch. 8. In this and the 
 seven following sections we have Berkeley's criticism of Locke's account 
 of the Qualities of Matter. That account implies that some of them 
 are independent of sensations. P'or Locke took for granted that 
 those qualities commonly called /r/wa;'_j' (of which a list is given) do not 
 need to be perceived in order to be real. Those called seco7idary, on 
 the other hand, are manifested only in the sensations on which they 
 depend. So we knozv the primary, and we only feel the secondary. 
 But Berkeley tries, in what follows, to melt down the primary into
 
 RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES 39 
 
 extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity, impenetrability, and 
 number ; by the latter they denote all other sensible quali- 
 ties, — as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas 
 we have of these last they acknowledge not to be the 
 resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or 
 unperceived ; but they will have our ideas of the primary 
 qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist with- 
 out the mind — in an unthinking substance which they call 
 Matter. — By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an 
 inert^, se?iseless substatice, in which extetision, figiire and 
 motion do actually subsist. But it is evident, from what we 
 have already shewn, that extension, figure, and motion are 
 only ideas existing in the mind; and that an idea can be 
 like nothing but another idea ; and that consequently neither 
 they nor their archetypes '^ can exist in an unperceiving sub- 
 stance. Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is 
 called Matter or corporeal substance involves a contradiction 
 in it^. 
 
 10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of 
 the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind, 
 in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge 
 that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike secondary 
 
 dependent phenomena like the secondary, affirming at the same time 
 the practical reality of both, so far as realised in perception. 
 
 ' The necessary poiverlessness of Matter, with the consequent absurdity 
 of all materialistic explanations of the universe, is the essence of Berkeley's 
 philosophy. 
 
 ^ ' Their archetypes,' i.e. the independent things, movable in space, 
 which the ideas or phenomena presented in sense were supposed to 
 symbolise. 
 
 ^ In this section Berkeley has defined the ' Matter ' against which his 
 reasoning is directed. It is inert, unperceiving, and unperceived : yet 
 extension, figure, and motion are attributed to it : it is per se extended, 
 figured, and movable. He tries to show that this is unintelligible, and 
 that even the mathematical qualities of things must be melted down 
 into sensations, which of course can only exist when perceived. 
 Movement in space cannot survive the withdrawal of the percipient 
 activity which is needed for realising it.
 
 40 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 qualities, do not — which they tell us are sensations existing 
 in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by 
 the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles 
 of matter '. This they take for an undoubted truth, which 
 they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be 
 certain that those original qualities are inseparably united 
 with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, 
 capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows 
 that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to 
 reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, 
 conceive the extension and motion of a body without all 
 other sensible qualities ^ For my own part, I see evidently 
 that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body ex- 
 tended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour 
 or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist 
 only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, 
 abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where 
 therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these 
 be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else. 
 
 1 1. Again, great and small, swift and slow, are allowed to 
 exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and 
 changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense 
 varies. The extension therefore which exists without the 
 
 ' See hocV.t'% Essay, h. II. ch. 8. §§ 16-18 ; ch. 23. § 11; b. IV. 
 ch. 3. §§ 24-26, for his theory of the relation of the secondary to the 
 primary qualities of matter — the former being the supposed natural 
 issue of (by us) unperceivable modifications of the primary atoms. 
 Locke consequently denies the possibility of any strictly demonstrative 
 science of nature, holding that physical science must ultimately consist 
 of probable presumptions. Berkeley puts all qualities — secondary and 
 primary — on the same sensuous footing. Their essence is alike percipi. 
 There is only one way in which they can be real, i.e. in the conscious 
 life of a spirit. If this ceases they cease, because they cease to be 
 realised. 
 
 * That we cannot perceive or imagine extensions and motions unless 
 as blended with sensations may be granted. Does it follow that exten- 
 sion and motion are only transitory sens.-xtions ?
 
 RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES 41 
 
 mind ' is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor 
 slow, that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are 
 extension in general, and motion in general : thus we see 
 how much the tenet of extended moveable substances exist- 
 ing without the mind depends on that strange doctrine of 
 abstract ideas"'. And here I cannot but remark how nearly 
 the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or cor- 
 poreal substance, which the modern philosophers are run 
 into by their own principles, resembles that antiquated and 
 so much ridiculed notion of materia prima., to be met with 
 in Aristotle and his followers "'. Without extension solidity 
 cannot be conceived ; since therefore it has been shewn 
 that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the 
 same must also be true of solidity. 
 
 12. That number is entirely the creature of the mind*, 
 even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, 
 will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing 
 bears a different denomination of number as the mind views 
 it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is one, 
 or three, or thirtj'-six, according as the mind considers it 
 with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so 
 visibly relative, and dependent on men's understanding, that 
 it is strange to think how any one should give it an absolute 
 existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, 
 one line, &c. ; all these are equally units, though some con- 
 tain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, 
 the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas 
 arbitrarily put together by the mind. 
 
 * ' Without the mind,' i.e. unperceived. 
 
 ^ Does it follow that if Kxtension, viewed apart from the perceptions 
 of individuals, is 'neither great nor small'; or that Motion, so ab- 
 stracted, is 'neither swift nor slow,' they must, after conscious mind is 
 withdrawn, be ' nothing at all'? 
 
 ° For Aristotle's trpwri) v\r), see his Phj's. I. 9 ; also Melaph. VII. 3. 
 
 * If Number is entirely a ' creature of the mind,' how does Berkeley 
 reconcile this with what he says elsewhere ahoxx^ plurality ai finite spirits'}
 
 42 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 13. Unity I know some^ will have to be a simple or un- 
 compounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into the 
 mind. That I have any such idea answering the word unity 
 I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not miss 
 finding it : on the contrary, it should be the most familiar 
 to my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other 
 ideas, and to be perceived by all the' ways of sensation and 
 reflexion. To say no more, it is an abstract idea ^. 
 
 14. I shall further add, that, after the same manner as 
 modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have 
 no existence in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing 
 may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities what- 
 soever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are 
 affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real 
 beings existing in the corporeal substances which excite 
 them, for that the same body which appears cold to one 
 hand seems warm to another ^ Now, why may we not as 
 well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or 
 resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because to the 
 same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture 
 at the same station, they appear various, and cannot there- 
 fore be the images of anything settled and determinate 
 without the mind ? Again, it is proved that sweetness is not 
 really in the sapid thing, because the thing remaining un- 
 altered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a 
 fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable 
 to say that motion is not without the mind, since if the 
 
 ' Locke for instance. See Essay, b. II. ch. 7. § 7. 
 
 ^ Cf. Locke's Essay, b. IL ch. 7. § 7 ; ch. 13. § 26 ; ch. 16. § i, 
 where ' number ' is said to be ' the most imiversal idea we have,' applic- 
 able to everything real or imaginar}'. 
 
 ^ Yet we find a standard in the thermometer, in which mol20?t 
 (a primary quality) is substituted for sensatio7is of heat and cold 
 (secondary qualities), which are thus interpreted in terms of motion. 
 Berkeley argues that the motion equally with the feeling of heat is 
 dependent on being realised in living perception.
 
 RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES 43 
 
 succession of ideas in the mind become swifter the motion, 
 it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any altera- 
 tion in any external object ? 
 
 15. In short, let any one consider those arguments which 
 are thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist 
 ofi/y in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal 
 force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, 
 figure, and motion. — Though it must be confessed this 
 method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no 
 extension or colour in an outward object, as that we do not 
 know by sefise which is the tnie extension or colour of the 
 object. But the arguments foregoing ^ plainly shew it to be 
 impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other 
 sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking 
 subject without the mind ; or in truth, that there should be 
 any such thing as an outward object '^. 
 
 16. But let us examine a little the received opinion. — It 
 is said extension is a mode or accident of Matter, and that 
 Matter is the substratum that supports it. Now I desire 
 that you would explain to me what is meant by Matter's 
 supporting extension. Say you, I have no idea of Matter 
 and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have 
 no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must 
 at least have a relative idea of Matter ; though you know 
 
 * See §§ 5-9, which argue that if all conscious mind were withdrawn 
 from the universe, the words which now signify sensible things must 
 become meaningless. 
 
 ^ His conclusion, in this part of the argument against Matter as an 
 independent factor in the universe of existence, which turns on the mind- 
 dependent character of the qualities of Matter, is that all of them — the 
 primary as much as the secondary — resolve into phenomena which pre- 
 suppose a living percipient, and therefore cannot be realised in the 
 absence of all sentient intelligence. In its absence they cease to be 
 actual ; and the supposed ' Matter ' becomes an unintelligible abstrac- 
 tion. All its qualities, including its motions, are dependent for their 
 reality on percipient activity lifting them into it : and this holds good 
 of our organism itself as well as of extra-organic bodies.
 
 44 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what 
 relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by its 
 supporting them. It is evident ' support ' cannot here be 
 taken in its usual or literal sense— as when we say that 
 pillars support a building ; in what sense therefore must it 
 be taken ? 
 
 17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philoso- 
 phers declare themselves to mean by material substance'^ ^ we 
 shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning 
 annexed to those sounds but the idea of being in general, 
 together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents. 
 The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract 
 and incomprehensible of all other ; and as for its supporting 
 accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be 
 understood in the common sense of those words ; it must 
 therefore be taken in some other sense, but what that is they 
 do not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or 
 branches which make the signification of the words material 
 substance, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning 
 annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves any 
 farther, in discussing this material substratum or ' support ' 
 of figure, and motion, and other sensible qualities ? Does 
 it not suppose they have an existence without the mind ? 
 And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether incon- 
 ceivable'-? 
 
 * He argues elsewhere that the meaning] essness applies exclusively to 
 material substance., and not to spiritual substance. He accepts the 
 ego, or spiritual substance, as an intelligible datum of consciousness. 
 Personal pronouns, he argues, have meaning : unperceived phenomena 
 have none. 
 
 ^ He seems to have Locke in view. Cf. Locke's Essay, b. L ch. 4. 
 § 18 ; b. IL ch. 12. §§ 3-6; ch. 13. § 19; ch. 23, where our idea of sub- 
 stance, as distinct from all perceived qualities, is said to be dark, 
 confused, and of little use. Yet Locke hesitates to dismiss this abstract 
 idea — as Hume afterwards did ; or even to exclude it from the material 
 world — as Berkeley is here doing. For Locke recognises it as some- 
 thing of which we are conscious, obscure though it be — the idea of 'one
 
 RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES 45 
 
 18. But, though it were possil)le that solid, figured, move- 
 able substances may exist witliout the mind, correspondifig 
 to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us 
 to know this? Either we must know it by Sense or by 
 Reason. — As for our senses, by them we have the know- 
 ledge onfy of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are 
 immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will : 
 but they do not inform us that things exist without the 
 mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. 
 This the Materialists themselves acknowledge ^ — It remains 
 therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external 
 things, it must be by Reason inferring their existence from 
 what is immediately perceived by sense. But what reason 
 can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the 
 mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of 
 Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary 
 connexion betwixt them and our ideas ? I say it is granted 
 on all hands — and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and 
 the like, puts it beyond dispute— that it is possible we 
 might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though 
 there were no bodies existing without resembling them. 
 Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is 
 not necessary for the producing our ideas ; since it is granted 
 they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be pro- 
 duced always in the same order we see them in at present, 
 without their concurrence. 
 
 knows not what support^ of the perceived qualities, 'which we are 
 somehoi^ obliged to presuppose.' Propositions which seem to contradict 
 one another. 
 
 * 'Materialist' here includes all who maintain the existence of what 
 is neither percipient nor perceived ; not limited, as it commonly is, to 
 those who take Matter, or movable atoms, to be the only real existence. 
 The hypothesis that God, by divinely-established law in nature, has 
 made matter capable of being conscious, must be distinguished from 
 the Universal Materialism which substitutes blind atomism even for 
 God. Locke while rejecting the latter suggests the possibility of the 
 former.
 
 46 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations 
 without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to 
 conceive and explain the manner of their production, by 
 supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than 
 otherwise ; and so it might be at least probable there are 
 such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. 
 But neither can this be said ; for, though we give the 
 materialists their external bodies, they by their own con- 
 fession are never the nearer knowing hotv our ideas are 
 produced ; since they own themselves unable to compre- 
 hend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is 
 possible it should imprint any idea in the mind'. Hence 
 it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our 
 minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter or 
 corporeal substances, since ihat is acknowledged to remain 
 equally inexplicable with or without this supposition. If 
 therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the 
 mind', yet to hold they do so must needs be a very pre- 
 carious opinion ; since it is to suppose, without any reason 
 at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are 
 entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose ^. 
 
 20. In short, if there were external bodies, it is impos- 
 sible we should ever come to know it ; and if there were 
 not, we might have the very same reasons to think there 
 were that we have now. Suppose — what no one can deny 
 possible — an intelligence without the help of external bodies, 
 
 ' So Locke, who professes inability to explain how the percipient 
 act originates, although we may find by observation the organic 
 conditions under which it manifests itself. Locke repudiates any final 
 explanation of perception. lie takes it as au inexplicable fact. 
 
 ^ 'Without the mind,' i.e. in the absence of all percipient life in 
 the universe. 
 
 ^ Not 'useless' if it can be shown that the independent existence 
 of sensible things is needed in order to {a) my knowledge of the 
 existence of other men ; {b) the existence of continuous order in nature; 
 and (c) the realisation of my own existence as a person. Of all which 
 afterwards.
 
 RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES 47 
 
 to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas 
 that you are, imprinted in the same order, and with Hke 
 vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelHgence hath 
 not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal sub- 
 stances, represented by his ideas, and exciting them in his 
 mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same 
 thing ? Of this there can be no question ; which one 
 consideration were enough to make any reasonable person 
 suspect the strength of whatever arguments he may think 
 himself to have, for the existence of bodies w'ithout the 
 mind'. 
 
 21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against 
 the Existence of Matter ", after what has been said, I could 
 instance several of those errors and difficulties (not to 
 mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It 
 has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in 
 philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. 
 But I shall not enter into the detail of them in this place, 
 as well because I think arguments a posteriori are un- 
 necessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, 
 sufficiently demonstrated a priori'', as because I shall here- 
 after find occasion to speak somewhat of them. 
 
 22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am need- 
 
 ' Whether Berkeley's conception of the material world can be recon- 
 ciled with lato in nature, without presupposing covertly what it 
 professedly rejects, is a question which here begins to suggest itself. If 
 the reality of natural uniformities among phenomena requires the 
 nnpcrceived or independent existence of what is manifested to us in 
 sense, then Berkeley must not say that the independent matter is 
 ' entirely useless,' and ' serves no manner of purpose.' 
 
 ^ i. e. its existence independently of a realising Mind. 
 
 ^ In its old meaning ' reasoning a priori ' is from the presupposed 
 essential nature (real definition) of a cause — prior to any experience of 
 its effects; 'reasoning a posteriori' is based upon observation of its 
 effects. The premises of the former are abstract principles ; those of the 
 latter facts of experience. The method of the former is deductive ; 
 that of the latter inductive.
 
 48 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 lessly prolix in handling this subject. For, to what purpose 
 is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the 
 utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one that is capable 
 of the least reflection? It is but looking into your own 
 thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible 
 for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without 
 the mind or unperceived. This easy trial may perhaps 
 make you see that what you contend for is a downright 
 contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the 
 whole upon this issue : — If you can but conceive it possible 
 for one extended moveable substance, or, in general, for 
 any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise 
 than in a mind perceiving it \ I shall readily give up the 
 cause. And, as for ail that compages of external bodies 
 you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you 
 cannot either [a) give me any reason why you believe it 
 exists, or {U) assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. 
 I say, the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall 
 pass for an argument that it is so. 
 
 23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for 
 me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books ex- 
 isting in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I 
 answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what 
 is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind 
 certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the 
 same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may 
 perceive them? But do not you yourse/f perceive or think 
 of them all the while ? This therefore is nothing to the 
 purpose : it only shews you have the power of imagining or 
 forming ideas in your mind ; but it does not shew that you 
 can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may 
 exist without the mind. To make out this, // is necessary 
 that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought 
 
 ' Is a universe empty of all life, finite or Divine, conceivable?
 
 RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES 49 
 
 of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our 
 utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are 
 all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the 
 mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can 
 and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without 
 the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended 
 by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any 
 one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make 
 it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the 
 existence of material substance ^. 
 
 24. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own 
 thoughts, to know whether it be possible for us to under- 
 stand what is meant by the absolute existence of sensible 
 objects in themselves, or without the mind. To me it is evi- 
 dent those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or 
 else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know 
 no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would calmly 
 attend to their own thoughts ; and if by this attention the 
 emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, 
 surely nothing more is requisite for their conviction. It is 
 on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the absolute exist- 
 ence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, 
 or which include a contradiction '\ This is what I repeat 
 
 ' It may be asked \\hether this argument does not equally apply to 
 the existence oi other persons, whose existence, as signified by material 
 phenomena, it is a chief aim of Berkeley's philosophy to vindicate. 
 Conscious life exteittal to his oivn, is not, he would argue, meaningless 
 in the way unperceived matter is. This is an intelligible sort of exter- 
 nality, derived from our notion of our own self-conscious life. But what 
 of persons in intervals of apparent unconsciousness? Is the existence of 
 an unconscious spirit more intelligible than the existence of unperceived 
 matter ? 
 
 "^ AVhat we only imagine is so far real, but it is real individually or 
 privately — not as part of the universal system of ordered or objective 
 things. Now, it is the interrttpled existence of material things in 
 living experience that Berkeley has to reconcile with our faith in their 
 permanence. 
 
 ' (a) A ' contradiction,' if they mean that sensible objects are at 
 
 £
 
 50 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 and inculcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive 
 thoughts of the reader. 
 
 25. All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which 
 we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distin- 
 guished, are visibly inactive — there is nothing of Power or 
 Agency included in them. So that one idea or object of 
 thought cannot produce or make any alteration in another. 
 — To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else 
 requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since 
 they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it fol- 
 lows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived : 
 but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or 
 reflection, will not perceive in them any power or activity ; 
 there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A 
 little attention will discover to us that the very being of an 
 idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that 
 it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly 
 speaking, to be the cause of anything : neither can it be the 
 resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident 
 from sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, 
 figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. 
 To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers result- 
 once perceived and not perceived — phenomenal and yet not phe- 
 nomenal. (/') 'Words without a meaning' if what is intended is, 
 that Matter is 'something' other than natural phenomena. The argu- 
 ment rests on the assumption that what is not sense-presented is 
 not merely unimaginable, but must be empty abstraction. But for 
 Berkeley's recognition elsewhere that personal pronouns are not 
 meaningless, this principle would involve the agnostic phenomenalism 
 of Hume. 
 
 Berkeley rejects, as meaningless, a material world unrealised by any 
 living percipient. He takes no account of the distinction between 
 existence that is on\y polen/ial and existence that is actual, i. e. realised 
 in living experience. The function of x in human knowledge is a subject 
 to be pondered, with the question vi^helher philosophy can ever entirely 
 eliminate x.
 
 RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES 51 
 
 ing from the configuration, number, motion, and size of 
 corpuscles, must certainly be false '. 
 
 26. We perceive a continual successioji of ideas ; some 
 are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. 
 There is therefore some Cause of these ideas, whereon they 
 depend, and which produces and changes them. That this 
 cause cannot be any quality, or idea, or combination of 
 ideas is clear from the preceding section. It must there- 
 fore be a substance ; but it has been shewn that there is 
 no corporeal or material substance : it remains therefore 
 that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance 
 or Spirit^. 
 
 ' In this and the next section we have the rudiments of that concep- 
 tion of Causality and Power which it is the chief purpose of Berkeley's 
 philosophy to unfold, and which implies the total potverlcss7iess of 
 Matter. In § 25 he turns from Spirit giving reality to the material 
 world, to Spirit as the only originating cause or active agent in existence. 
 Here his first position is, that there can be no power or active causality 
 in things of sense ; ' bare observation ' gives proof of their inactivity. 
 Customary sequences among things, maintained by God, is the only sort 
 of 'causality ' which Berkeley recognises in the material world; which 
 is with him a divinely established system of signiticant phenomena, 
 in which a priori a.nyth.mg might by God have been made the sign or 
 natural cause of anything. This is like the physical conception of 
 causality, afterwards professed by Hume, Brown, Comte, the Mills, and 
 others, in harmony with Bacon's favourite conception of external nature 
 as a system of interpretable signs, of which the natural sciences are the 
 interpretation. With them, however, it was not, as with Berkeley, 
 limited to the material world, and so with them originating causality 
 or agency proper is left out of account. 
 
 ^ Here Berkeley, like Locke, without an express analysis of the 
 ambiguous term 'cause,' proceeds tacitly upon the assumption, that 
 every change necessarily presupposes the existence of something out of 
 which it issues. Causality proper is with him more than antecedent 
 phenomenon. He sees in phenomena only ordered signs, Spirit alotie 
 beingthecause oftheirorderandconsequentsignificance or interpretability. 
 The material world is thus emptied of power, and its supposed 'powers' 
 are refunded into Spirit. All appearances in sense and the constant 
 order in which they appear are passive or caused : only Spirit actively 
 causes. Except metaphorically, he does not attribute any efficacy 
 to any sensible thing : the material world consists of substances and
 
 52 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 27. A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active being — as it 
 perceives ideas it is called the Understanding, and as it xi, pro- 
 duces or otherwise operates about them it is called the Will. 
 Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit ; for, 
 all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, (vid. sect. 25,) 
 cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that 
 which acts. A little attention will make it plain to any one 
 that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle 
 of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. 
 Such is the nature of Spirit, or that which acts, that it 
 cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which 
 it produceth.— If any man shall doubt of the truth of what 
 is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if we can frame 
 che idea of any Power or Active Being ; and whether he 
 has ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names 
 Will and Understandifig, distinct from each other, as well as 
 
 causes only metaphorically. In recognising only a divinely arbitrary 
 invariableness in the natural order of phenomena, he takes no explicit 
 account of the Divine Will as Perfect Reason, or of our justification in 
 refunding effects only into causes that are adequate to stick effects. 
 
 In these sections Berkeley seems to found our notion of Power on our 
 intuitive conviction of our own activity — akin to the solution adopted 
 afterwards by Reid, Stewart, and Maine de Biran. Elsewhere (e.g. Siris, 
 257) he seems to trace it specially to agency in actions for which one is 
 responsible, and in which, therefore, he must be free to act or not 
 to act. His views (more developed in the Vindication and in Siris) 
 may be compared with those of Locke, Essay, b. II. ch. 21 and ch. 26; 
 also with the reduction of the causal relation afterwards proposed by 
 Hume ; with the analysis of causation by Kant, as a ' category ' con- 
 stitutive of experience ; or (turning to ancient speculation) with the 
 Aristotelian Four Causes. Hume tries to show that necessity of con- 
 nexion among phenomena is an illusion. Kant finds the notion of 
 cause presupposed in the very possibility of any intelligible experience. 
 According to Aristotle, everything presuppuses {a) matter of which 
 it is made ; {b) fortn or essence by which it may be defined ; {c) force or 
 efficiency by which the matter and form have been united in its consti- 
 tution; and {d) end or purpose which it is its function to fulfil; — so 
 that a philosophical knowledge of an individual thing, or of the 
 universe itself, would be a knowledge of it in all these four relations 
 of its causality.
 
 RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES 53 
 
 from a third idea of Substance or Being in general, with a 
 relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the 
 aforesaid powers — which is signified by the name Soul or 
 Spirit '. This is what some hold ; but, so far as I can see, 
 the words zvill, sou/, spirit, do not stand for different ideas, 
 or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is 
 very different from ideas, and which, being an Agent, can- 
 not be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. 
 Though it must be owned at the same time that we have 
 some notion ^ of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind ; 
 such as willing, loving, hating — inasmuch as we know or 
 understand the meaning of these words. 
 
 28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and 
 vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit^. It is no more 
 than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my 
 fancy ; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes 
 way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth 
 very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is 
 certain and grounded on exj^erience : but when we talk of 
 unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas exclusive of Volition, 
 we only amuse ourselves with words'*. 
 
 ' According to Locke we have no positive idea either of corporeal 
 or of spiritual substance ; yet he recognises an obscure negative idea of 
 both. Berkeley accepts, as given in consciousness of self , the 'notion' 
 (not idea or phenomenon) of spiritual substance. Hume afterwards 
 rejected both, as neither can be traced to a sense-given phenomenon. 
 Kant recalled the intellectual notion of substance, as necessarily 
 involved in the intelligibility of experience. 
 
 2 In short, according to Berkeley, the notions and judgments of 
 substance and cause are given to us in our consciousness of continued 
 personality, and of moral agency, rather than as necessarily involved 
 in experience. He says too that we have ' notions,' not ' ideas,' of them ; 
 for .Spirit cannot be phenomenalised. 
 
 ^ In this and the five following sections we have Berkeley's account 
 of the difference between the original data or ideas of cause, and our 
 sensuous imagination of those data. 
 
 ' The impotence of Matter rather than its unreality, when it is not 
 perceived, is the lesson of spiritual philosophy.
 
 54 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 29. But, whatever power I may have over my own 
 thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have 
 not a like dependence on my will. When in broad day- 
 light I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose 
 whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular 
 objects shall present themselves to my view ; and so like- 
 wise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted 
 on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore 
 some other Will or Spirit that produces them. 
 
 30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct 
 than those of the Imagination ; they have likewise a steadi- 
 ness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, 
 as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but 
 in a regular train or series — the admirable connexion whereof 
 sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its 
 Author. Now the set rules or established methods wherein 
 the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, 
 are called the /aivs of nature ; and these we learn by 
 experience ', which teaches us that such and such ideas 
 are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary 
 course of things. 
 
 31. This gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to 
 regulate our actions for the benefit of life. And without 
 this we should be eternally at a loss ; we could not know 
 how to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure, 
 or remove the least pain of sense. That food nourishes, 
 sleep refreshes, and fire warms us ; that to sow in the seed- 
 time is the way to reap in the harvest ; and in general that 
 to obtain such or such ends, such or such means are con- 
 ducive — all this we know, not by discovering any necessary 
 (ontiexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of 
 
 ' Something more lliaii present phenomena is here tacitly presupposed 
 in ' experience ' : otherwise, experience is only of what now is, not of 
 what will always be. For, how does experience give conviction of the 
 universality of order, if it only presents ideas or phenomena of sense?
 
 RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLES 55 
 
 the settled laws of nature, without which we should be all 
 in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more 
 know how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an 
 infant just born \ 
 
 32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so 
 evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of that Govern- 
 ing Spirit whose Will constitutes the laws of nature, is so 
 far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it rather sends 
 them wandering after second causes. For, when we perceive 
 certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas, 
 and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith 
 attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves, and 
 make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be 
 more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having 
 observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round 
 luminous figure we at the same time perceive by touch the 
 idea of sensation called heat, we do from thence conclude 
 the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner per- 
 ceiving the notion and collision of bodies to be attended 
 with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of 
 the former. 
 
 33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of 
 nature are called real things: and those excited in the Ima- 
 gination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more 
 properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy 
 and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so 
 vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas ; that is, they exist 
 in the mind^ or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of 
 its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have 
 
 ' Strict reduction of induction into 'observation' is open to the 
 difficulty suggested in the preceding note. 
 
 * 'in the mind' is here and elsewheie used figuratively for being 
 perceived, not for being locally within mind, — to which terms of locality 
 are foreign. We do not speak of the size or shape of a thought, or 
 a feeling, or a volition, apart from their correlative organic conditions, 
 with which physiology is concerned.
 
 56 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and 
 coherent than the creatures of the mind ; but this is no 
 argument that they exist without the mind. They are also 
 less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which 
 perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of an- 
 other and more powerful Spirit ; yet still they are ideas, and 
 certainly no idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise 
 than in a mind perceiving it \ 
 
 ' Such is Berkeley's account of the difference between perceived 
 things and imagined things — between perception in sense and mere 
 fancy. Things of which we are percipient, he says, {a) appear in- 
 voluntarily, ns far as the percipient is concerned, while fancies are our 
 creatures ; {b) the former are more strong, lively, and distinct than the 
 latter, thus differing from them in degree ; {c) they are units in the fixed 
 system of nature. The second of these three distinguishing marks was 
 afterwards emphasised by Hume, in his contrast between iinpressiotis 
 and their (representative) ideas {Treatise of Hufiiati Nature, b. I. pt. i. 
 §§ I J 3j pt- 4- § 7; Inquiry concerning Human Understanding § 2). 
 Hume explains all belief as the issue of the natural tendency of blind 
 custom to enliven those ideas or phenomena that are found in constant 
 connexion ; thus transforming them from capricious fancies into beliefs. 
 'The memory, senses, and understanding are,' he says, 'all of them 
 founded on the intensity or vivacity of our ideas.' — See also Leibnitz, 
 De modo distinguendi Phenomena Realia ab Tmaginariis , and Locke, 
 Essay, b. IV. ch. 2. § 14; ch. 4; ch. 11, for opinions antecedent to 
 Berkeley. 
 
 The Principles the rationale of which is given in the foregoing sections 
 should here be articulately unfolded, and arranged in distinct propositions 
 by the student, to test his intelligence.
 
 III. OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we 
 spend some time in answering Objections which may prob- 
 ably be made against the Principles we have hitherto laid 
 down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of 
 quick apprehensions, I desire I may be excused, since all 
 ■ men do not equally apprehend things of this nature, and 
 I am willing to be understood by every one. 
 
 First, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing prin- • 
 ciples all that is real and substantial in nature is banished 
 out of the world ; and instead thereof a chimerical scheme 
 of ideas takes place. All things that exist exist only in the 
 mind, that is, they are purely notional \ What therefore 
 becomes of the sun, moon, and stars ? What must we think 
 of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones \ nay, even of our 
 own bodies ? Are all these but so many chimeras and illu- 
 sions on the fancy ? 
 
 To all which, and whatever else of the same sort may be 
 objected, I a?is7ver, that by the principles premised we are 
 not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, 
 feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, remains as 
 secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a rerum 
 natura, and the distinction between realities and chimeras 
 
 ' ' notional.' Here notion is undislinguished from idea qx phenomenon. 
 Cf. §27.
 
 58 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 retains its full force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 
 ;^2„ where we have shewn what is meant by real things, in 
 opposition to chimeras, or ideas of our own framing ' ; but 
 then they both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense 
 are alike ideas. 
 
 35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing 
 that we can apprehend either by sense or reflection. That 
 the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do 
 exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only 
 thing whose existence we deny is that vihlch J) hi losop hers call 
 matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is 
 no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will 
 never miss it. The atheist indeed will want the colour of an 
 empty name to support his impiety ; and the philosophers 
 may possibly find they have lost a great handle for trifling 
 and disputation. 
 
 36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or 
 reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath 
 been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take 
 here an abstract of what has been said : — There are spiritual 
 substances, minds, or human souls, which excite ideas'^ in 
 themselves at pleasure ^ : but these are faint, weak, and 
 unsteady in respect of others they perceive by Sense, which, 
 being impressed upon them according to certain Rules or 
 Laws of Nature, speak themselves the effects of a Mind more 
 powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter are said 
 to have i7iore reality * in them than the former ; — by which is 
 
 * ' of our own framing,' whereas ' real things ' are continuously called 
 forth by a power other than ours — the Power universally operative in 
 nature. 
 
 ^ ' ideas,' i. e. fancies, in contrast to the more real ideas of which we 
 are percipient in sense, and which enable us to interj-.ret nature. 
 
 ^ Ideas thus raised we call fancies or dreams of imagination, in con- 
 trast with the real ideas or natural phenomena which are presented to 
 our external senses. 
 
 * ' more reality.' This implies that reality admits of degrees. Ac- 
 cordingly that is for me most real whicti enters most into relation
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 59 
 
 meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and 
 that they are not fictions' of the mind perceiving them. And 
 in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and 
 that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former ^ 
 In the sense here given of reality, it is evident that every 
 vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the 
 mundane system, is as much a real being by our principles 
 as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the 
 term reality different from what I do, I entreat them to look 
 into their own thoughts and see. 
 
 37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, 
 that we take away all corporeal substa7ices. To this my 
 answer is, that if the word ' substance ' be taken in the vulgar 
 sense — for a combination of sensible qualities, such as exten- 
 sion, solidity, weight, and the like — this we cannot be accused 
 of taking away ; but if it be taken in a philosophic sense — 
 for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind, 
 then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may 
 be said to take away that which never had any existence, not 
 even in the imagination. 
 
 38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we 
 eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknow- 
 ledge it does so — the word idea not being used in common 
 
 with my individual personality; for man, that which most fully satis- 
 fies the ideal man. Thus the appearances presented to the senses are 
 more realised when interpreted scientifically than when looked at or 
 felt unintclligently ; and when also apprehended philosophically, or 
 in their relation to God, they are realised in the highest degree. But 
 do mere fancies differ from actual jierceptions only in degree? 
 
 ^ Appearances, or qualities of things, when actually presented to our 
 senses, are ' not fictions ' : they are primary data immediately present 
 in sense. They cannot misrepresent, because they are not representative 
 of reality, but are themselves the real thing : themselves constitute 
 matter. 
 
 * Here again we have the signal difference between imagined matter 
 and real matter insisted on, and sought to be reconciled with the already 
 argued unsubslanliality and impotence of the material world, apart from 
 a percipient mind.
 
 6o SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible 
 qualities which are called things ; — and it is certain that any 
 expression which varies from the familiar use of language 
 will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern 
 the truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more 
 than to say, we are fed and clothed with those things which 
 we perceive immediately by our senses. The hardness or 
 softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, or suchlike quali- 
 ties, which, combined together, constitute the several sorts 
 of victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in 
 the mind that perceives them ; and this is all that is meant 
 by calling them ideas ; which word, if it was as ordinarily used 
 as fking, would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than 
 it. I am not for disputing about the propriety, but the truth 
 of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we 
 eat and drink and are clad with t/ie immediate objects of sense, 
 which cannot exist unperceived or tvithout the mind, I shall 
 readily grant it is more proper or conformable to custom 
 that they should be called things rather than ideas. 
 
 39. If it be demanded why I make use of the word idea, 
 and do not rather in compliance with custom call them 
 things, I answer, I do it for two reasons : — first, because 
 the term thing, in contradistinction to idea, is generally 
 supposed to denote somewhat existing without the mind ' ; 
 secondly, because thing hath a more comprehensive signifi- 
 cation than idea, including spirit or thinking things as well 
 as ideas ^. Since therefore the objects of sense exist only in 
 the mind, and are withal thoughtless and inactive '^, I choose 
 to mark them by the word idea'^, which implies those 
 properties. 
 
 ' i. e. unperceived — unrealised by any conscious being. 
 '^ Conscious agents are properly called persons, in contrast to things. 
 ' He takes for granted that he has already demonstrated the wholly 
 dependent substantiality and power attributable to matter. 
 
 * 'Sensation,' 'impression,' 'percept,' 'phenomenon,' might be sub-
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 6r 
 
 40. But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt 
 to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any 
 arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty 
 of them. Be it so; assert the evidence of sense as high as 
 you please ; we are willing to do the same. That what I see, 
 hear, and feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, 
 I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not 
 see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for 
 the existence of anything which is not perceived by sense. 
 We are not for having any man turn sceptic and disbelieve 
 his senses ; on the contrary, we give them all the stress and 
 assurance imaginable ; nor are there any principles more 
 opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down, as 
 shall be hereafter clearly shewn '. 
 
 41. Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great dif- 
 ference betwixt real fire, for instance, and the idea of fire, 
 betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and actually 
 being so : if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which 
 you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be con- 
 vinced with a witness '^. This and the like may be urged in 
 opposition to our tenets. — To all which the answer is evident 
 from what hath been already said ; and I shall only add in 
 this place, that if real fire be very different from the idea of 
 fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions very different 
 from the idea of the same pain ; and yet nobody will pre- 
 tend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an 
 
 stituted. though objections are open to them all. In Siris he prefers 
 phenomenon to idca,2i'i the name for perceived appearances in the senses. 
 
 ^ Berkeley argues that to suppose sensible things which are not 
 really perceived by any mind is as absurd as to suppose perception 
 without perception. But to resolve things wholly into isolated ideas or 
 phenomena leaves the material world without any principle connecting 
 its present with its absent phenomena, and therefore unintelligible. 
 This is the essence of Scepticism. 
 
 ^ So Locke, Essay, b. IV. ch. 11. §§ 7, 8.
 
 62 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than 
 its idea '. 
 
 42. Thirdly, it will be objected that we see things actually 
 without, or at a distance from us ; and which consequently 
 do not exist in the mind ; it being absurd that those things 
 which are seen at the distance of several miles should be 
 as near to us as our own thoughts. — In answer to this, 
 I desire it may be considered that in a dream we do oft 
 perceive things as existing at a great distance off, and yet 
 for all that, those things are acknowledged to have their 
 existence only in the mind. 
 
 43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be 
 worth while to consider hoiv it is that zve perceive distance 
 and things placed at a distance by sight. For, that we should 
 in truth see external space, and bodies actually existing in 
 it— some nearer, and others farther off — seems to carry with 
 it some opposition to what hath been said of bodies existing 
 nowhere without the mind. The consideration of this diffi- 
 culty it was that gave birth to my Essay toivards a Neiv 
 Theory of Vision, which was published not long since — 
 wherein it is shewn that distance or outness is neither im- 
 mediately of itself perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended 
 or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath 
 a necessary connexion with it ; but that it is only suggested "- 
 to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations 
 attending vision, which in their own nature have no manner 
 of similitude or relation either with distance or things placed 
 
 ' But is there no more outness and independence of percipient mind 
 in the solid things of sense than there is in transitory pains and pleasures 
 — though both, it is granted, are different from the bare imagination of 
 either ? 
 
 '^ The term suggestion, so significant in Berkeley, here makes its 
 first appearance in the Priuciples. See Theory of Vision, % 16, note. — 
 ' Suggestion ' — simple suggestion and relative — was employed long after- 
 wards, as a synonym for mental association, in the psychology of 
 Dr. Thomas Brown.
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 63 
 
 at a distance ; but, by a connexion taught us by experience ', 
 they come to signify and suggest them to us — after the same 
 manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they 
 are made to stand for ; insomuch that a man born bh'nd and 
 afterwards made to see, would not, at first sight, think the 
 things he saw to be without his mind, or at any distance 
 from him. See sect. 41 of the forementioned treatise. 
 
 44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely 
 distinct and heterogeneous. The former are marks and 
 prognostics of the latter. That the proper objects of sight 
 neither exist without the mind, nor are the images of ex- 
 ternal things, was shewn even in that treatise. Though 
 throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of 
 tangible objects — not that to suppose that vulgar error was 
 necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down, but 
 because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute it 
 in a discourse concerning Vision. So that in strict truth 
 the ideas of sight, when we apprehend by them distance 
 and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out 
 to us things actually existing at a distance, but only admonish 
 us what ideas of touch ^ will be imprinted in our minds at 
 such and such distances of time, and in consequence of such 
 and such actions. It is, I say, evident from what has been 
 said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and in sect. 147 
 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible 
 ideas are the Language whereby the Governing Spirit on 
 whom we depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about 
 to imprint upon us, in case we excite this or that motion in 
 our own bodies. But for a fuller information in this point 
 I refer to the Essay itself. 
 
 ' ' Suggestion ' is here rested upon ' experience,' or customary con- 
 nexion, and is then made the constructive innnence in the formation 
 of visual perception, if not ultimately of physical science. 
 
 ^ Under ' touch ' and ' tangible ideas ' he includes what is now called 
 muscular sense, and also our sense of locomotive activity. 
 
 ' Visual expectation may be developed into universal sense symbolism.
 
 64 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 45. Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing 
 principles it follows things are every moment annihilated 
 and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they 
 are perceived ; the trees therefore are in the garden, or the 
 chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is somebody 
 by to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furni- 
 ture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon 
 opening them it is again created. — In answer to all which, 
 I refer the reader to what has been said in sect. 3, 4, &c., 
 and desire he will consider whether he means anything by 
 the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being per- 
 ceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, 
 I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by 
 those words ; and I once more entreat the reader to sound 
 his own thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on 
 by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his ideas 
 or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I 
 give up the cause ; but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it 
 is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows 
 not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the 
 not assenting to those propositions which at bottom have 
 no meaning in them '. 
 
 46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received 
 principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those 
 pretended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that 
 upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me 
 should be reduced to nothing ; and yet is not this what 
 philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on 
 all hands that light and colours, which alone are the proper 
 and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations ^ that 
 
 ' This repeats the warning against empty abstractions with which 
 he introduced us to philosophy; for such, according to his argument, 
 are material substances and powers unperceived by any mind. 
 
 ^ It is the want of perrtiancnce in things, which seems to follow 
 Berkeley's conception of matter, that is objected to ; but this objection 
 equally applies also to that providence, or ' constant creation,' held by
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 65 
 
 exist no longer than they are perceived ? Again, it may to 
 some perhaps seem very incredible that things should be 
 every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly 
 taught in the schools. For the Schoolmen, though they 
 acknowledge the existence of matter, and that the whole 
 mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of 
 opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conser- 
 vation, which by them is expounded to be a continual 
 creation. 
 
 47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that though 
 we allow the existence of Matter, or corporeal substance, yet 
 it will unavoidably follow, from the principles which are now 
 generally admitted, that the particular bodies, of what kind 
 soever, do none of them exist whilst they are not perceived. 
 For, it is evident, from sect. 1 1 and the following sections, 
 that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehen- 
 sible sotnewhat, which hath none of those particular qualities 
 whereby the bodies falling under our senses are distinguished 
 one from another. But, to make this more plain, it must 
 be remarked that the infinite divisibility of Matter is now 
 universally allowed, at least by the most approved and 
 considerable philosophers, who, on the received principles, 
 demonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows 
 there is an infinite number of parts in each particle of 
 Matter, which are not perceived by sense \ The reason 
 therefore that any particular body seems to be of a finite 
 magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense, 
 is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains 
 an infinite number of parts, but because the sense is not 
 
 many long before Berkeley discovered that percipi was the essence of the 
 ' constantly created ' material object. 
 
 Berkeley's recognition of power as existing only in Spirit substitutes 
 for substance and power in the ' extended thing,' the constant creative 
 activity of God (§§ 6, 48, &c.). 
 
 ' It is of the essence of infinite division that it can never be completed, 
 because every actual division must be carried further. 
 
 F
 
 66 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 acute enough to discern them. In proportion therefore as 
 the sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater 
 number of parts in the object ; that is, the object appears 
 greater, and its figure varies, those parts in its extremities 
 which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound 
 it in very different lines and angles from those perceived by 
 an obtuser sense. And at length, after various changes of 
 size and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely acute the 
 body shall seem infinite. During all which there is no 
 alteration in the body, but only in the sense. Each body 
 therefore, considered in itself, is infinitely extended, and 
 consequently void of all shape and figure \ From which it 
 follows that, though we should grant the existence of Matter 
 to be never so certain, yet it is withal as certain, the Mate- 
 rialists themselves are by their own principles forced to 
 acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived 
 by sense, nor anything like them, exists without the mind. 
 Matter, I say, and each particle thereof, is according to them 
 infinite and shapeless ; and it is the mind that frames all that 
 variety of bodies which compose the visible world, any one 
 whereof does not exist longer than it is perceived. 
 
 48. But, after all, if we consider it, the objection proposed 
 in sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the 
 principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any 
 objection at all against our notions. For, though we hold 
 indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas 
 which cannot exist unperceived, yet we may not hence con- 
 clude they have no existence except only while they are 
 perceived by us ; since there may be some other Spirit that 
 perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies are 
 said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be 
 understood to mean this or that particular mind, but ail minds 
 wiiatsoever. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing 
 
 1 The infinite in quantity being a negative, or wholly unimaginable 
 as an idea or sensuous phenomenon.
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 67 
 
 principles that bodies are annihilated and created every 
 moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our 
 perception of them ^ 
 
 49. Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected that if extension 
 and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind 
 is extended and figured ; since extension is a mode or attri- 
 bute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the 
 subject in which it exists. — I answer, those qualities are in 
 the mind only as they are perceived by it — that is, not by 
 way of mode or attribute, but only by way of idea ; and it no 
 more follows the soul or mind is extended, because extension 
 exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because 
 those colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, 
 and nowhere else. As to what philosophers say of ' subject ' 
 and ' mode,' that seems very groundless and unintelligible. 
 
 * To explain our confidence in the continued identity of the things we 
 see and touch, notwithstanding their constant flux in our perceptions; 
 and to show how they exist during intervals in which there might be no 
 sense-perception of thena by any mind, is Berkeley's difficulty. 
 
 With reference to Berkeley's reply to the fourth objection, it has 
 been urged that if sensible things exist only supernaturally in God's will 
 and thought, when unperceived by us ; and if, as realised, they are 
 dependent on our (often interrupted) sense-perceptions, — then, what we 
 call the satne thing is 7nany things, each of them annihilated and 
 created anew with every opening and closing of our senses. — Did the 
 Herculanean manuscripts, some one asks, not really exist during the 
 centuries in which they were buried ; and shall we say that when they 
 were discovered God created them anew ? Is this restoration explained by 
 the assumption that all things are divinely governed according to natural 
 laws ? Is law in nature possible except on the supposition that things 
 exist in space, independently of realization in percipient life? That 
 there may be inhabitants in Mars, though no man on earth has ever 
 seen them, must be admitted ; but this means only that in the progress 
 of our knowledge we may realise them for ourselves. That which 
 is related to present perception according to the natural laws which 
 regulate experience is physically real. 
 
 Perfect similarity in the sense-phenomena manifested, not objective 
 numerical identity, constitutes ' sameness ' in sensible things, according 
 to Berkeley. As io personal identity he is obscure. 
 
 F 2
 
 68 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 For instance, in this proposition — ' a die is hard, extended, 
 and square,' they will have it that the word die denotes a 
 subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, 
 and figure which are predicated of it, and in which they 
 exist. This I cannot comprehend : to me a die seems to 
 be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its 
 modes or accidents. And, to say ' a die is hard, extended, 
 and square ' is not to attribute those qualities to a subject 
 distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication 
 of the meaning of the word die'^. 
 
 50. Sixthly, you will object there have been a great many 
 things explained by matter and motion : take away these 
 and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy, and 
 undermine those mechanical principles which have been 
 applied with so much success to account for the pheno- 
 mena. In short, whatever advances have been made, either 
 by ancient or modern philosophers, in the study of Nature 
 do all proceed on the supposition that corporeal substance 
 or Matter doth really exist. — To this I answer that there 
 is not any one phenomenon explained on that supposition 
 which may not as well be explained without it, as might 
 easily be made appear by an induction of particulars "'. To 
 
 ^ If Space and extended things exist only in and through percipient 
 mind, it may seem that mind must be extended ; so that after all 
 we are landed in Materialism.— Berkeley's reply throws light on his 
 conception of the relation between sense and the phenomenon of 
 extension — between the percipient and the interpretable appearances. 
 Percipient mind is related to extension, figure, and what else is given 
 in sense in the uniqtie relation of percipient to what is perceived, 
 with whatever ' otherness ' that altogether unique relation may involve. 
 Therefore it is not so related as that the extended phenomenon or idea 
 is an attribute of the ego. 
 
 ^ It has been further objected — that all pliysico-mathemalical explana- 
 tions of events in nature presuppose that the things of sense and their 
 changes are absolutely independent of percipient mind, and also that 
 Berkeley's conception of what ' reality ' of tiie material world means is 
 inconsistent with the ' conservation of force.'
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 69 
 
 explain the phenomena, is all one as to shew why, upon 
 such and such occasions, we are affected with such and 
 such ideas. But how Matter should operate on a Spirit, 
 or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher will 
 pretend to explain ; it is therefore evident there can be no 
 use of Matter in Natural Philosophy'. Besides, they who 
 attempt to account for things do it, not by corporeal sub- 
 stance, but by figure, motion, and other qualities ; which 
 are in truth no more than mere ideas'", and therefore can- 
 not be the cause of anything, as hath been already shewn. 
 See sect. 25. 
 
 51. Severithly, it will upon this be demanded whether it 
 does not seem absurd to take away natural causes ^, and 
 ascribe everything to the immediate operation of Spirits? 
 We must no longer say upon these principles that fire 
 heats, or water cools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. 
 Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should 
 talk after this manner? — I atiswer, he would so; in such 
 things we ought to think with the learned, and speak with 
 the vulgar. They who to demonstration are convinced 
 of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say 
 
 ' The question for Materialism is — whether conscious life in man, 
 in its rational and voluntary manifestations, must originate in {a) a 
 power like itself, intellect being the only possible cause of what is intel- 
 lectual, — or may it be somehow (/') a physical sequence to changes in 
 matter. With Berkeley the human body, in itself unsubstantial and 
 impotent, is ultimately dependent on active Spirit ; and the human ego 
 is also conditioned by its own mind-dependent organism, as healthy 
 or diseased. They are known in combination and as mutually depen- 
 dent, but the dependence of the conscious ego differs in kind from the 
 dependence of matter and the organism. Universal Materialism, moreover, 
 differs from modified Materialism, as remarked in a former note. 
 
 ^ ' ideas,' i. e. phenomena which succeed one another naturally in our 
 sense-experience. 
 
 ' ' take away natural causes,' i. e. empty natural causes of all 
 inherent power, and refer their supposed powers to the constant agency 
 of God.
 
 70 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 * the sun rises,' ' the sun sets,' or ' comes to the meridian ; ' 
 and if they affected a contrary style in common talk it 
 would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little 
 reflection on what is here said will make it manifest that 
 the common use of language would receive no manner 
 of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our 
 tenets, 
 
 52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be 
 retained, so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, 
 or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for 
 our well-being, how false soever they may be if taken in 
 a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is unavoidable, 
 since, propriety being regulated by custom, language is 
 suited to the received opinions, which are not always the 
 truest. Hence it is impossible— even in the most rigid, 
 philosophic reasonings — so far to alter the bent and genius 
 of the tongue we speak as never to give a handle for 
 cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But 
 a fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the 
 scope and tenor and connexion of a discourse, making 
 allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which 
 use has made inevitable. 
 
 53. As to the opinion that there are no Corporeal Causes ', 
 this has been heretofore maintained by some of the School- 
 men, as it is of late by others among the modern philoso- 
 phers ; who, though they allow Matter to exist, yet will have 
 God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all things. 
 These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there 
 was none which had any power or activity included in it ; 
 and that by consequence this was likewise true of whatever 
 
 ' The essential principle is tliat Matter cannot be the tiUimate cause 
 of anything ; so that physical change must itself in all cases presuppose 
 spiritual agency. It thus reconciles the common-sense recognition of 
 natural order, on which science of nature proceeds, with the constant 
 regulation of the natural order by God.
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 71 
 
 bodies they supposed to exist without the mind, Hke unto 
 the immediate objects of sense '. But then, that they should 
 suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings, which 
 they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one 
 effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner 
 of purpose, since God might have done everything as well 
 without them — this I say, though we should allow it pos- 
 sible, must yet be a very unaccountable and extravagant 
 supposition '. 
 
 54. In the eighth place, the universal concurrent Assent 
 of Mankind ^ may be thought by some an invincible argu- 
 ment in behalf of Matter, or the existence of external things. 
 Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken ? And 
 if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and pre- 
 dominant an error ? — I a?iswer, first, that, upon a narrow 
 inquiry, it will not perhaps be found so many as is imagined 
 do really believe the existence of Matter, or things without 
 the mind. Strictly speaking, to believe that which involves 
 a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is impossible ; and 
 whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, 
 
 * ' bodies ' — of which the ideas, or immediate objects of sense, were 
 supposed by them (not by Berkeley nor by Reid) to be only represen- 
 tatives. 
 
 '■' The reference in this section is to Malebranche, Geulinx, and other 
 so-called Occasionalists in the seventeenth century, who, while they main- 
 tained an independent existence of Matter, denied, lilce Berkeley, but on 
 other grounds, its efficiency. They held that, on occasion of the affection 
 of the organism, perception is evoked by God. 
 
 ^ This is like the argument from ' common sense ' for the reality of 
 the material world, as put by Reid. The point in question is not, 
 however, whether the world, in some sense of the term ' real^ really 
 exists ; it is what we should mean, if we are not to indulge in empty 
 verbal abstraction, when we assert its reality. That the unreflecting 
 part of mankind should have a confused view of what the external 
 reality of matter means is not to be wondered at. It is the office of 
 philosophical meditation to improve their conception, making it deeper 
 or more real.
 
 72 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one 
 sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter 
 exists ; that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their 
 sensations, which affects them every moment, and is so 
 nearly present to them, were some senseless, unthinking 
 being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any mean- 
 ing marked by those words, and form thereof a settled 
 speculative opinion, is what I am not able to conceive. 
 This is not the only instance wherein men impose upon 
 themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions 
 which they have often heard, though at bottom they have 
 no meaning in them '. 
 
 55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion 
 to be never so universally and stedfastly adhered to, yet 
 this is but a weak argument of its truth to whoever 
 considers what a vast number of prejudices and false 
 opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tena- 
 ciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far greater) 
 part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes 
 and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous 
 absurdities even by men of learning : and if it be consi- 
 dered what a small proportion they bear to the rest of 
 mankind, we shall find that at this day those notions 
 have gained but a very inconsiderable footing in the 
 world. 
 
 56. But fiinthfy, it is demanded that we assign a Cause 
 of this Prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the world. 
 — To this I answer, that men knowing they perceived several 
 ideas, whereof they themselves were not the authors — as not 
 being excited from within, nor depending on the operation 
 of their wills — this made them maintain those ideas or 
 objects of perception had an existence independent of and 
 
 ^ That our perceptions of the material world are only perceptions 
 of mind-dependent phenomena is what Reid is supposed to refute.
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 73 
 
 without the mind, without ever dreaming that a contra- 
 diction was involved in those words. But, philosophers 
 having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception 
 do not exist without the mind, they in some degree cor- 
 rected the mistake of the vulgar ; but at the same time run 
 into another, which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there 
 are certain objects really existing without the mind, or 
 having a subsistence distinct from being perceived, of which 
 our ideas are only images or resemblances, imprinted by 
 those objects on the mind '. And this notion of the philo- 
 sophers owes its origin to the same cause with the former, 
 namely, their being conscious that they were not the authors 
 of their own sensations, which they evidently knew were 
 imprinted from without, and which therefore must have 
 some cause distinct from the minds on which they are 
 imprinted". 
 
 57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to 
 be excited in us by things in their likeness, and not rather 
 have recourse to Spirit, which alone can act, may be ac- 
 counted for, first, because they were not aware of the repug- 
 nancy there is, as well in supposing things like unto our 
 ideas existing without, as in attributing to them power or 
 activity. Secondly, because the Supreme Spirit which excites 
 those ideas in our minds, is not marked out and limited 
 to our view by any particular finite collection of sensible 
 ideas, as human agents are by their size, complexion, limbs, 
 and motions. And thirdly, because His operations are 
 regular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is 
 interrupted by a miracle, men are ready to own the pre- 
 sence of a Superior Agent. But, when we see things go 
 on in the ordinary course, they do not excite in us any 
 
 * This is the hypothesis of a wholly representative perception in 
 sense, against which Reid's philosophy was a protest. 
 
 ' A ' representative ' perception presupposes real but unperceived 
 things — existing de/iiitd v/hat is perceived.
 
 74 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 reflection ; their order and concatenation, though it be an 
 argument of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in 
 their creator, is yet so constant and famihar to us that we 
 do not think them the immediate effects of a free spirit ; 
 especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting, 
 though it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of 
 freedom \ 
 
 58. Tenthly, it will be objected that the notions we 
 advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in Philo- 
 sophy and Mathematics. For example, the motion of the 
 earth is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth 
 grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, 
 on the foregoing principles, there can be no such thing. For, 
 motion being only an idea, it follows that if it be not per- 
 ceived it exists not : but the motion of the earth is not per- 
 ceived by sense. — I anstver, that tenet, if rightly understood, 
 will be found to agree with the principles we have premised ; 
 for, the question whether the earth moves or no amounts in 
 reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason 
 to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, 
 that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and 
 such or such a position and distance both from the earth 
 and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the 
 choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one 
 of them ; and this, by the established rules of nature which 
 
 ^ But divine ' arbitrariness ' is not caprice. Confusion about this 
 occasions the difficulty of allowing that God originates and constantly 
 maintains law in nature. Philosophy struggles to resolve seeming 
 contingencies into the rational unity that is only dimly revealed to us in 
 sense. Sense is confused thought, which the rational constitution latent 
 in nature enables human intellect to convert into physical science. But 
 the narrow intellectual power and experience of man can never entirely 
 eliminate probability in the conversion. Locke, who may have suggested 
 to Berkeley his favourite conception of arbitrariness in the constitution 
 of the laws of nature, maintained that therefore man could form no 
 demonstrable science of nature.
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 75 
 
 we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from 
 the phenomena. 
 
 59. We may, from the experience we have had of the 
 train and succession of ideas ' in our minds, often make, I 
 will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure and well-grounded 
 predictions concerning the ideas we shall be affected with 
 pursuant to a great train of actions, and be enabled to pass 
 a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case 
 we were placed in circumstances very different from those 
 we are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge of 
 nature, which may preserve its use and certainty very 
 consistently with what hath been said. It will be easy 
 to apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may 
 be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any other 
 discoveries in astronomy or nature. 
 
 60. In the eleventh place, it will be demanded to what 
 purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the 
 animal mechanism in the parts of animals ; might not 
 vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves and blossoms, and 
 animals perform all their motions, as well without as with all 
 that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put 
 together ; which, being ideas, have nothing powerful or 
 operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion with 
 the effects ascribed to them ? If it be a Spirit that imme- 
 diately produces every effect by Zifiat or act of His will, we 
 must think all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether 
 of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, 
 though an artist has made the spring and wheels, and every 
 movement of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner 
 as he knew would produce the motions he designed, yet he 
 must think all this is done to no purpose, and that it is an 
 
 * Our sense-experience is here supposed to be constituted by divinely 
 established associations of natural phenomena or ideas — not by what 
 is commonly meant by ' association of ideas.'
 
 76 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour 
 of the day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, with- 
 out his being at the pains of making the movements and 
 putting them together? Why does not an empty case serve 
 as well as another ? And how comes it to pass that when- 
 ever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some 
 corresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which 
 being mended by a skilful hand all is right again ? The like 
 may be said of all the Clockwork of Nature, great part 
 whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be 
 discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be asked, 
 how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be 
 given, or any final cause assigned, of an innumerable multi- 
 tude of bodies and machines, framed with the most exquisite 
 art, which in the common philosophy have very apposite 
 uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of 
 phenomena ? 
 
 6 1. To all which I answer, first, that though there were 
 some difificulties relating to the administration of Providence, 
 and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature, 
 which I could not solve by the foregoing principles, yet this 
 objection could be of small weight against the truth and 
 certainty of those things which may be proved a priori, with 
 the utmost evidence and rigour of demonstration. Secondly, 
 but neither are the received principles free from the like 
 difficulties ; for, it may still be demanded to what end God 
 should take those roundabout methods of effecting things, 
 by instruments and machines, which no one can deny might 
 have been effected by the mere command of His will, without 
 all that apparatus : nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall 
 find the objection may be retorted with greater force on 
 those who hold the existence of those machines without the 
 mind ; for it has been made evident that solidity, bulk, figure, 
 motion, and the like have no activity or efficacy in them, so 
 as to be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 77 
 
 sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist (allow- 
 ing the supposition possible) when they are not perceived 
 does it manifestly to no purpose ; since the only use that is 
 assigned to them, as they exist unperceived, is that they 
 produce those perceivable effects, which in truth cannot 
 be ascribed to anything but Spirit. 
 
 62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed 
 that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be 
 not absolutely necessary to the producing afiy effect, yet it is 
 necessary to the producing of things in a constant regular 
 7vay according to the laws of nature. There are certain 
 general laws that run through the whole chain of natural 
 effects : these are learned by the observation and study of 
 nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing 
 artificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the 
 explaining the various phenomena ; — which explanation con- 
 sists only in shewing the conformity any particular pheno- 
 menon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the 
 same thing, in discovering the imifortnity there is in the 
 production of natural effects ; as will be evident to whoever 
 shall attend to the several instances wherein philosophers 
 pretend to account for appearances. That there is a great 
 and conspicuous tise in these regular constant methods of 
 working observed by the Supreme Agent hath been shewn 
 in sect. 31, And it is no less visible that a particular size, 
 figure, motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, though 
 not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the pro- 
 ducing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. 
 Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelli- 
 gence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, 
 might, if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all 
 the motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody 
 had ever made the movements and put them in it : but yet, 
 if He will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism— by Him 
 for wise ends established and maintained in the creation —
 
 78 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby 
 he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede 
 the production of the aforesaid motions ; as also that any 
 disorder in them be attended with the perception of some 
 corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once 
 corrected all is right again ^ 
 
 63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that 
 the Author of nature display His overruling power in pro- 
 ducing appearances out of the ordinary series of things. 
 Such exceptions from the general rules of nature are proper 
 to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgment of the 
 Divine Being ; but then they are to be used but seldom, 
 otherwise there is a plain reason why they fail of that effect. 
 Besides, God seems to choose the convincing our reason of 
 His attributes by the works of nature, which discover so 
 much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such 
 plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, 
 rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by 
 anomalous and surprising events ^ 
 
 ^ When Berkeley recognises rational order omnipresent in nature, his 
 position, it has been urged, is untenable, because he can only assume, 
 not prove, the conformity of the phenomena presented in sense to that 
 order ; — and because this very assumption implies that things exist 
 independently of being perceived, scientific interpretation of things pre- 
 supposing their independent existence. Between our perceptions in 
 eating and our perceptions of the consequent growth of our bodies, for 
 instance, many sequences are interposed, which exist unperceived by 
 sentient mind ; but these, as each term in the sequence is only a datum 
 of sense, cannot, it is argued, 7vhen thus unperceived, be identified 
 with the supersensible Ideas of God. So too with the existence of the 
 planets anterior \.o finite or jf«/?V«/ intelligence. — On the other hand, 
 Berkeley might ask in reply, whether the qualities of the material 
 world could maintain a conceivable existence after the extinction of all 
 perception ; also whether there is more difficulty in explaining (con- 
 sistently with his conception of the material world) the unperceived 
 growth of our bodies, or the early geological periods, than there is in 
 explaining the existence of the tangible qualities of a house or a mountain 
 when one is only seeing it. 
 
 ^ The nature and office of miracles is here touched. If the whole
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 79 
 
 64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe 
 that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to 
 no more than this : — ideas are not anyhow and at random 
 produced, there being a certain order and connexion between 
 them, like to that of cause and effect : there are also several 
 combinations of them made in a very regular and artificial 
 manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand 
 of nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have 
 a secret operation in producing those appearances which are 
 seen on the theatre of the world, being themselves discernible 
 only to the curious eye of the philosopher. But, since one 
 idea cannot be the cause of another, to what purpose is that 
 connexion ? And, since those instruments — being barely 
 inefficacious perceptions in the mind — are not subservient 
 to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why 
 they are made ; or, in other words, what reason can be 
 assigned why God should make us, upon a close inspec- 
 tion into His works, behold so great variety of ideas so 
 artfully laid together, and so much according to rule ; 
 it not being credible that He would be at the expense 
 (if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity to no 
 purpose ? 
 
 65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of 
 ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only 
 of a mark or sign with the thing signified \ The fire which 
 I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approach- 
 ing it, but the mark that forewarns me of it. In like 
 
 evolution of nature is always and immediately caused by God, where, 
 it may be asked, is the room for miraculous interference? Berkeley's 
 answer to this may be gathered from § 62. Spiritual intuition, although 
 itself different in kind from sensuous perception of phenomena, ordinary 
 or miraculous, may be awakened by physical miracles. 
 
 ^ \Vhen it is objected that what exists unperccived by me must have 
 existed independently of my perception, it should be remembered that 
 the sense-symbolism here supposed to constitute externality in nature is 
 postulated by all human minds in virtue of their human nature.
 
 8o SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that 
 motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign 
 thereof. Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into 
 machines, that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the 
 same with that for combining letters into words. That a 
 few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of 
 effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined 
 together. And, to the end their use be permanent and uni- 
 versal, these combinations must be made by rule, and with 
 7vise contriva?ice. By this means abundance of information 
 is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from 
 such and such actions, and what methods are proper to be 
 taken for the exciting such and such ideas — which in effect 
 is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said ' 
 that, by discerning the figure, texture, and mechanism of the 
 inward parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may 
 attain to know the several uses and properties depending 
 thereon, or the nature of the thing ^ 
 
 66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under 
 the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the 
 production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run 
 us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, 
 and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, when 
 they are considered only as marks or signs for our informa- 
 tion. And it is the searching after and endeavouring to 
 understand this Language (if I may so call it) of the Author 
 of Nature, that ought to be the employment of the natural 
 philosopher ^ ; and not the pretending to explain things by 
 
 ' By Locke, for instance, in his hypothesis of the natural dependence 
 of the secondary on the primary qualities of matter. 
 
 - This section expresses well the office of the orderly material world 
 in occasioning mental activity, and so educating us scientiiically, which 
 perhaps is partly the final cause of its existence and elaborate organ- 
 ization. 
 
 ^ Compare this with the ' homo naturae minister et interpres ' of 
 Eacon.
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 8l 
 
 corporeal causes ', which doctrine seems to have too much 
 estranged the minds of men from that Active Principle, 
 that supreme and wise Spirit ' in whom we live, move, and 
 have our being ^' 
 
 67. In the twelfth i)Iace, it may perhaps be objected 
 that — though it be clear from what has been said that there 
 can ])e no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, 
 figured, moveable substance existing without the mind, such 
 as jihilosophers describe Matter, — yet, if any man shall 
 leave out of his idea of matter the positive ideas of exten- 
 sion, figure, solidity and motion, and say that he means 
 only by that word an inert, senseless substance, that exists 
 without the mind or unperceived, which is the occasion of 
 our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased to 
 excite ideas in us— it doth not appear but that Matter taken 
 in this sense may possibly exist. — In answer to which I say, 
 first, that it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance 
 without accidents, than it is to suppose accidents without 
 a substance. But secondly, though we should grant this 
 unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be 
 supposed to be ? That it exists not in the mitid is agreed ; 
 and that it exists not in place is no less certain — since all 
 place or extension exists only in the mind, as hath been 
 already proved. It remains therefore that it exists nowhere 
 at all. 
 
 68. Let us examine a little the description that is here 
 given us of Matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is 
 perceived \ for this is all that is meant by saying it is an 
 
 ' ' Corporeal causes' — M'hich Berkeley thinks lie has already disposed 
 of. in his 'proof iha.i produciivc Jioiuer cannot be found in the material 
 world, and that spiritual agency is the only efficient in nature. 
 
 - The search for physical ' causes ' and natural laws thus becomes 
 search for the meaning of ' language' addressed to men in nature by the 
 Universal Power. Does the causality that belongs to the things of 
 sense mean no more than is signified l;y tliis metaphor ? 
 
 G
 
 82 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 inert, senseless, unknown substance ; — which is a definition 
 entirely made up of negatives ', excepting only the relative 
 notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it 
 must be observed that it supports nothing at all, and how 
 nearly this comes to the description of a )ioueniity I desire 
 may be considered. But, say you, it is the laiknown occa- 
 sion, at the presence of which ideas are excited in us by the 
 will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can 
 be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor 
 reflection, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, 
 nor IS at all extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in 
 any place. The words ' to be present,' when thus applied, 
 must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, 
 and which I am not able to comprehend. 
 
 69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So 
 far as I can gather from the common use of language, that 
 word signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or 
 else something that is observed to accompany or go before 
 it in the ordinary course of things. But when it is applied 
 to Matter as above described, it can be taken in neither 
 of those senses ; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, 
 and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It is also 
 unperceivable, as being devoid of all sensible qualities, and 
 so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter 
 sense — as when the burning my finger is said to be the 
 occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be 
 meant by calling Matter an occasion ? This term is either 
 used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from 
 its received signification. 
 
 70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not 
 perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by (}od, to whom 
 it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds. For, say 
 you, since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an 
 
 ' This approaches Kant's ' thing in itself {iluig an si'c/r, made up of 
 negatives, yet supposed able to produce seasations.
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 83 
 
 orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to sup- 
 pose that there are certain constant and regular occasions of 
 their being produced. That is to say, that there are certain 
 permanent and distinct parcels of Matter, corresponding to 
 our ideas, which, though they do not excite them in our 
 minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as beifig a/together 
 passive aftd unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to 
 God, by 7vhom they are perceived, as it were so many occa- 
 sions to remind Him when and what ideas to imprint on 
 our minds — that so things may go on in a constant uniform 
 manner. 
 
 71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of 
 Matter is here stated, the question is no longer concerning 
 the existence of a thing distinct from Spirit and idea, from 
 perceiving and being perceived ; but whether there are not 
 certain Ideas, of I know not what sort, in the mind of God, 
 which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to 
 produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular 
 method — much after the same manner as a musician is 
 directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious 
 strain and composition of sound which is called a tune, 
 though they who hear the music do not perceive the 
 notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But, this 
 notion of Matter (which after all is the only intelligible 
 one that I can pick from what is said of ' unknown occa- 
 sions ') seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. 
 Besides, it is in effect no objection against what we have 
 advanced, viz. that there is no senseless nnperceived sub- 
 stance. 
 
 72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the 
 constant uniform method of our sensations, collect the 
 goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who excites them in our 
 minds ; but this is all that I can see reasonably concluded 
 from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of 
 a Spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly 
 
 G 2
 
 84 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 sufficient to explain all the appearances of nature. But, as 
 for inert, sefise/ess Alatter, nothing that I perceive has any 
 the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. 
 And I would fain see any one explain any the meanest 
 phenomenon in nature by //, or shew any manner of reason, 
 though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have 
 for its existence, or even make any tolerable sense or mean- 
 ing of that supposition. Yox, as to its being an occasion, 
 we have, I think, evidently shewn that with regard to Jis it 
 is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at 
 all, the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us ; and what 
 this amounts to we have just now seen. 
 
 73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives 
 which induced men to suppose the existence of material 
 substance ; that so having observed the gradual ceasing and 
 expiration of those motives or reasons, we may proportion- 
 ably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. First, 
 therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the 
 rest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist 
 without the mind ' ; and for this reason it seemed needful to 
 suppose some unthinking substratum or substance wherein 
 they did exist — since they could not be conceived to exist 
 by themselves ^. Afterwards, in process of time, men being 
 convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible 
 secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they 
 stripped this substratum or material substance of those 
 qualities — leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, 
 and suchlike, which they still conceived to exist without 
 the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material 
 
 ' This is the uneducated supposition, which assumes that the material 
 world could be exactly what we now experience, if no one was experienc- 
 ing — disregarding what is added by our sensations even in the case of the 
 secondary qualities. 
 
 * He hardly explains ivhy the appearances presented in sense may not, 
 per se, be regarded as impotent Substances.
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 85 
 
 support. But, it having been shewn that none even of 
 these can possibly exist otherwise than in a spirit or mind 
 which perceives them, it follows that we have no longer any 
 reason to suppose the being of Matter ; nay, that it is utterly 
 impossible that there should be any such thing — so long 
 as that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratutn 
 of qualities or accidents, wherein they exist without the 
 mind '. 
 
 74. But — though it be allowed by the Materialists them- 
 selves that Matter was thought of only for the sake of 
 supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely ceasing, one 
 might expect the mind should naturally, and without any 
 reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded 
 thereon — yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our 
 thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to part with it, and 
 are therefore inclined, since the thifig itself is indefensible, 
 at least to retain the najne, which we apply to I know not 
 what abstracted and indefinite notions of bei7ig, or occasion, 
 though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can 
 see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we per- 
 ceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions" which are 
 imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflection ^, from 
 whence may be inferred the existence of an inert, thought- 
 less, unperceived occasion ? and, on the other hand, on the 
 part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should 
 make us believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert 
 occasion to excite ideas in our minds ? 
 
 75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of 
 prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man 
 
 ' It has been argued, in opposition to this, that although the sensible 
 ([ualities themselves cannot exist per se as they are found in our ex- 
 perience, yet that the steady order of the phenomena we perceive implies 
 the existence of something independent of the perception. Berkeley finds 
 in God this independent ' something.' 
 
 -■ Here he uses ' idea, sensation, and notion ' as synonymous, and 
 speaks of ' ideas of rejlectioti ' even, as ' imprinted.'
 
 86 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, 
 for a stupid thoughtless Someivhat; by the interposition 
 whereof it would as it were screen itself from the Providence 
 of God, and remove Him farther off from the affairs of the 
 world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure 
 the belief of Matter \ though, when reason forsakes us, we 
 endeavour to support our opinion on the bare possibihty of 
 the thing ; and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope 
 of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that 
 poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is — that there are 
 certain utiknouni Ideas in the mind of God ; for this, if any- 
 thing, is all that I conceive to be meant by occasion with 
 regard to God. And this at the bottom is no longer con- 
 tending for the thing, but for the name. 
 
 76. Whether there are such Ideas in the mind of God, 
 and whether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall 
 not dispute. But, if you stick to the notion of an unthink- 
 ing substance or support of extension, motion, and other 
 sensible qualities, then to me it is most evidently impossible 
 there should be any such thing ; since it is a plain repug- 
 nancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported 
 by an unperceiving substance '. 
 
 77. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no 
 thoughtless support of extension and the other qualities or 
 accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some 
 
 ' Berkeley says years ni'terwaids that he has ' no objection to calling 
 the Ideas in the mind of God archetypes of ours,' and that he objects 
 only to those [unthinking] archetyjies supposed by philosophers to exist 
 without any consciousness of them. (See my Life of Berkeley, ch. v.) 
 And in truth his account of what the reality of the material world 
 means presupposes divine Ideas, realised in the cosmical order, and 
 towards an intelligence of which human science is approximating. The 
 assertion that matter is real would, when so understood, be an asser- 
 tion that what we perceive in sense is part of an interpretable universe. 
 It is actually interpreted to the extent that our scientific conceptions are 
 in harmony with the divine Ideas exemplified in the natural sequences. 
 Cf. Siris, § 335.
 
 OBJECTIO.XS TO THE PRINCIPLES 87 
 
 inert, unperceiving substance or substratum of some other 
 qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man 
 born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. 
 But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more 
 doubt of their existence than a blind man made to see does 
 of the existence of light and colours. — I answer, first, if what 
 you mean by the word Matter be only the nnknoivn support 
 of unknmvn qualities, it is no matter whether there is such 
 a thing or no, since it no way concerns us ; and I do not 
 see the advantage there is in dis])uting about we know not 
 7i.<hat^ and we know not 7vhy. 
 
 78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only 
 furnish us with new ideas or sensations ; and then we should 
 have the same reason against their existing in an unper- 
 ceiving substance that has been already offered with relation 
 to figure, motion, colour, and the like. Qualities, as hath 
 been shewn, are nothing else but sensations or ideas, which 
 exist only in a mind perceiving them ; and this is true not 
 only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present, but 
 likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever. 
 
 79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to be- 
 lieve the existence of Matter ? what if I cannot assign any 
 use to it, or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is 
 meant by that word ? yet still it is no contradiction to say 
 that Matter exists, and that this Matter is in general a sui>- 
 s/ance, or occasion of ideas ; though indeed to go about to 
 unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication 
 of those words may be attended with great difficulties. — I 
 answer, when words are used without a meaning, you may 
 put them together as you please without danger of running 
 into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice 
 two is equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take 
 the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation, but 
 for marks of you know not what. And, by the same reason,
 
 88 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 you may say there is a;/ itiert thoughtless substance without 
 accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall 
 understand just as much by one proposition as the other. 
 
 80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the 
 cause of material Substajice, and stand to it that Matter is 
 an unknown Souiewhat — neither substance nor accident, 
 spirit nor idea, inert, thoughtless, indivisible, immoveable, 
 unextended, existing in no place ? For, say you, whatever 
 may be urged against substance or occasion, or any other 
 positive or relative notion of IVTatter, hath no place at all, 
 so long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to. 
 — I answer, you may, if so it shall seem good, use the word 
 matter in the same sense as other men use nothing, and 
 so make those terms convertible in your style. For, after 
 all, this is what appears to me to be the result of that defini- 
 tion — the parts whereof when I consider with attention, 
 either collectively or separate from each other, I do not find 
 that there is any kind of effect or impression made on my 
 mind different from what is excited by the term fiothing. 
 
 81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the aforesaid definition 
 is included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing 
 — the positive abstract idea of quiddity, entity, or existetice. 
 I own, indeed, that those who pretend to the faculty of 
 framing abstract general ideas do talk as if they had such an 
 idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general notion 
 of all ; that is, to me, the most incomprehensible of all 
 others. That there are a great variety of spirits of different 
 orders and capacities, whose faculties both in number and 
 extent are far exceeding those the Author of my being has 
 bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me to 
 pretend to determine, by my own few, stinted, narrow inlets 
 of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the 
 Supreme Spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the 
 utmost folly and presumption— since there may be, for aught
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLES 89 
 
 that I know, innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as 
 different from one another, and from all that I have per- 
 ceived, as colours are from sounds. But, how ready soever 
 I may be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehen- 
 sion with regard to the endless variety of spirits and ideas 
 that may possibly exist, yet for any one to pretend to a 
 notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spirit and 
 idea, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a 
 downright repugnancy and trifling with words.
 
 IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 85. Having done with the Objections ', which I endea- 
 voured to propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the 
 force and weight I could, we proceed in the next place to 
 take a view of our tenets in their Consequences ^. 
 
 ' In the foregoing sections. v\e have arguments for and against 
 Berkeley's new conception of Matter and the material cosmos. Instead 
 of the unreflecting assumption, that things around us would be as we 
 now perceive, although no one was perceiving them — he argues that 
 they can be realised only in and through phenomena that are dependent 
 for their realization on being perceived — without any independent 
 substance or power in the phenomena themselves. The meaninglessness 
 of Matter, on any other view than this, might be called his logical 3jg\\- 
 ment for the necessary dependence of a real material world upon 
 percipient and conscious Spirit. The need for resolving all the qualities 
 of matter, into passive, although significant and therefore scientifically 
 interpretable, phenomena, is his psychological argument. There is, in 
 the third place, the practical argument, that any existence unrealised 
 in a living experience, would after all make no difference to us in the 
 conduct of our lives. 
 
 The chief objections to these Principles are the difficulty of recon- 
 ciling this dependence of external things upon perception (a) with their 
 continuous identity ; M) with the mathematical necessities and phy- 
 sical laws to which they must conform ; ',cj with our belief that other 
 persons exist; ^d') the implied unsubstantiality and impotence of 
 persons or percipients as well as of material things, if this new con- 
 cejition of matter is consistently carried out. Berkeley's Commonplace 
 Jyook shows that this last difficulty at first influenced him enough to 
 make his ])osition then like Hume's. 
 
 ^ The remainder of this book of l'hiloso])liieal I'rinciples contains
 
 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRI.XCIPLES 9 1 
 
 86. From the Principles we have laid down it follows 
 Human Knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads 
 — that of IDEAS and that of spirits '. Of each of these I 
 shall treat in order. 
 
 And JJrst as to ideas or iiiit/nnki/ig tlii/igs. Our know- 
 ledge of these has been very much obscured and confounded, 
 and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by sup- 
 posing a two-fold existence of the objects of sense — the one 
 intelligible or in the mind ; the other real and without the 
 mind, whereby unthinking things are thought to have a 
 natural subsistence of their own, distinct from being per- 
 ceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, hath been 
 shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the 
 very root of Scepticism ; for, so long as men thought that 
 real things subsisted without the mind, and that their know- 
 ledge was only so far forth real as it was cotiforjuable to real 
 things, it follows they could not be certain that they had any 
 real knowledge at all. For, how can it be known that the 
 things which are perceived are conformable to those which 
 are not perceived, or exist without the mind'-? 
 
 Berkeley's appluations of his new conception of the reality and function 
 of the material world. — And first he shows its efficacy as against 
 scepticism ^§§ 86-96), and in freeing the mind from empty abstractions 
 (§§ 97-100). 
 
 ^ * Ideas and spirits.' In other words human knowledge is concerned 
 with natural phenovicna and with self-conscious persons. Berkeley's 
 use of the word idea to signify the phenomena presented in nature to 
 our senses ; and his conclusion that the material world consists only 
 of phenomena or sense appearances which co-exist and succeed one 
 another in uniform order, has led to his being called an idealist, which in 
 this use of words means a phenouicnalist. In his later writings, especially 
 in Siris, his early ' idealism ' assumes a more Platonic form and tone. 
 
 - This question expresses what has been regarded as the insuperable 
 objection to a wholly representative perception of the material world. — 
 How can wc be assured of the harmony of the supposed representation 
 with the real thing — if the real thin}; is always unperceived ? We have 
 no opportunity in that case to com])are the two.
 
 92 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, con- 
 sidered only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly 
 known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. 
 But, if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to 
 things or archetypes existing ivithoiit the mind, then are we 
 involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, 
 and not the real qualities of things \ ^Vhat may be the ex- 
 tension, figure, or motion of anything really and absolutely, 
 or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only the 
 proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things 
 remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or 
 even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality 
 really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. 
 So that, for aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may 
 be only phantom and vain chimera, and not at all agree 
 with the real things existing in renini natura. All this 
 sceptical cant follows from our supposing a difference 
 between things and ideas, and that the former had a sub- 
 sistence without the mind or unperceived. It were easy to 
 dilate on this subject, and shew how the arguments urged 
 by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external 
 objects 'K 
 
 88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking 
 things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not only 
 impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any 
 real unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is 
 that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of 
 the existence of heaven and earth, of everything they see or 
 feel, even of their own bodies. And, after all their labour- 
 ing and struggle of thought, they are forced to own we cannot 
 
 ' According to I'lerkelcy the ])crceivcd .appearances or natural phe- 
 nomena, are the realised things — named by him ' ideas ' for the reason 
 alreatly given. 
 
 ■-' The supposition, that is to say, that the real things are unperceived 
 — because external to or behind the ideas which represent them.
 
 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLES 93 
 
 attain to any self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of the 
 existence of sensible things '. lUit all this doubtfulness, 
 which so bewilders and confounds the mind, and makes 
 philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if 
 we annex a meaning to our words, and not amuse ourselves 
 with the terms ' absolute,' ' external/ ' exist,' &c. — signifying 
 we know not what. For my part, I can as well doubt of 
 my own being as of the being of those thifigs which I actually 
 perceive by sense ^ ; it being a manifest contradiction that 
 any sensible object should be immediately perceived by 
 sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in 
 nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being 
 consists in being perceived^. 
 
 ' Atteni])lb have been made to prove that matter exists, all whieli, 
 according to Berkeley's conception of what matter means, are of course 
 unnecessary. Its living jjerception is its reality — that in which it is 
 realised. 
 
 - As long, at least, as 1, or some one else, is in the act of perceiving 
 them. See Locke's Essay, b. IV. ch. 11. § 9. 
 
 ^ The difficulty is to suppose that we can have a knowledge of things 
 that are permanent, if our knowledge of them is melted down into 
 phenomena thnt are transitory. The difficulty raises a chief question 
 in intellectual pliilosojihy — to vindicate reality in experience. Berkeley 
 argiies that the favourite hypothesis of philosophers — that the real things 
 are not themselves perceived, but have to be inferred — needlessly 
 increases the difficulty. Let us, he says, recognise the real thing as 
 already presented \\\ perception ; not as something dependent on a ' con- 
 formity '—impossible to ascertain — between the real thing and the 
 representation in the mind of which alone, on this hypothesis, we are 
 supposed to be percipient — and the difficulty is relieved. But is 
 Berkeley's conception of things, as necessarily sense-dependent, consis- 
 tent with their objective reality as media of communication between 
 persons ? 
 
 On the connexion between scepticism and representative percc])tion, 
 see Hume's Inquiry concerning Htwian Understanding, sect. xii. pt. 1, 
 which might be a text for discussing the ' immediate perception ' of 
 Rcid and Hamilton, and for comparing it with the ' perception ' and 
 ' suggestion' of Berkeley. See also Hamilton's Disciissiotts, ' Piiilosophy 
 of Terception.' — For an account of various modifications of an exclusively 
 representative perception which have been held by philosophers, 
 see Reid's Second Essay on the Intellectual Towers, and Hamilton's
 
 94 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting 
 a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be 
 proof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the 
 beginning in a distinct explication of w/iaf is /iiea/U by 
 THING, REALITY, EXISTENCE ; for in vain shall we dispute 
 concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any 
 knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the mean- 
 ing of those words '. Thing or being is the most general 
 name of all : it comprehends under it two kinds entirely 
 distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common 
 but the name, viz. spirits- and ideas. The former are 
 active, indivisible substances : the latter are inert, fleeting, 
 or dependent beings ; which subsist not by themselves, but 
 are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances. 
 
 ' We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or 
 reflection, and that of other spirits by reason \ — We may be 
 said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, 
 of spirits and active beings — whereof in a strict sense we 
 have not ideas. In like manner, we know and have a notion 
 
 appended Dissertations B and C in his edition of Reid. These Scotch 
 psychologists taught that an immediate revelation of Matter in certain 
 of its qualities, is an ultimate fact, — the rejection of which logically 
 involves total scepticism, because it involves distrust in the very founda- 
 tion of all belief; but they did not, like Berkeley, try to explain what 
 is meant by the reality of Matter. 
 
 ' This throws light on Berkeley's purpose, which was not to prove 
 the reality of the material world, but — by showing what we are entitled 
 to mean when we say tliat an external thing 'exists' — to make proof 
 superfluous. 1 le takes for granted that this reality may be analysed, and 
 that analysis resolves it into signijiiaiit because ^/-i/tvrf/ sense-phenomena. 
 
 - Spirits are not properly things. 
 
 ^ The remainder of this section was added in the Second Edition of 
 the Piinciples, when he recognised the importance of the distinction 
 which he then began to exjiress by the contrasted terms idea and notion 
 — a distinction which, in one form of expression or another, goes deep 
 into his and every philosophy. His reason for recognising independent 
 substance in Spirit, while he rejects it in Matter, is tiiat ' we are conscious 
 of permanence or substance in the Kgo, but not in the things around us.' 
 
 ' i. c. by inference.
 
 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLES 95 
 
 of relations between things or ideas — which relations are 
 distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the 
 latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the 
 former'. To me it seems that ideas, spirits, dind relations 
 are all, in their respective kinds, the object of human know- 
 ledge and subject of discourse, and that the term idea would 
 be improperly extended to signify eve?'vf/u'>i!r we know or 
 have any notion of'-. 
 
 90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do 
 really exist : this we do not deny ; but we deny they can 
 subsist without the minds which perceive them ; or that they 
 are resemblances of any archetypes^ existing without the 
 mind ; — since the very being of a sensation or idea consists 
 in being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an 
 idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed 
 external, with regard to their origin, in that they are not 
 generated from within by the mind itself*, but imprinted by 
 a Spirit ■' distinct from that which perceives them. — Sensible 
 objects may likewise be said to be ' without the mind ' in 
 another sense, namely when they exist in " some other mind ; 
 thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, 
 but it must be in another mind. 
 
 91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said 
 derogates in the least from the reality of things. It is 
 acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension, 
 motion, and in a word all sensible qualities, have need of a 
 support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But 
 
 ^ This seems to say that we iiia\ know an absolute!}' isolated phe- 
 nomenon. 
 
 -' Note again how Berkeley calls the term iiotio:! into use in this 
 special meaning. 
 
 ' lie means unperceived and unperceiving archetypes — not Platonic 
 Ideas. 
 
 ' Here Berkeley's view differs from Fichte's, so far as the latter 
 seems to find in the individual Ego the origin of the material world, and 
 thus lands in Panegoism. ' God. 
 
 " ' e.xist in,' i. e. are perceived by — some other mind.
 
 96 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing 
 but combinations of those qualities^ and consequently cannot 
 subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreed on all hands. 
 So that in denying the things perceived by sense an exist- 
 ence independent of a substance or support wherein they 
 may exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of 
 their reality, and are guilty of no innovation in that respect. 
 All the difference is that, according to us, the unthinking 
 beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from 
 being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other 
 substance than those unextended indivisible substances or 
 Spirits which act and think and perceive them ; whereas 
 philosophers vulgarly hold the sensible qualities do exist in 
 an inert, extended, unperceiving substance which they call 
 Matter — to which they attribute a natural subsistence, ex- 
 terior to all thinking beings, or distinct from being perceived 
 by any mind whatsoever, even the Eternal Mind of the 
 Creator, wherein they suppose only Ideas of the corporeal 
 substances created by Him : if indeed they allow them to 
 be at all created. 
 
 97. Beside the external existence of the objects of per- 
 ception, another great source of errors and difficulties with 
 regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of ' abstract ideas,' 
 such as it hath been set forth in the Introduction. The 
 plainest things in the world, those we are most intimately 
 acquainted with and perfectly know, ivhen they are con- 
 sidered in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and 
 incomprehensible. Time, Place, and Motion, taken in 
 particular or concrete, are what everybody knows ; but, 
 having passed through the hands of a metaphysician, they 
 become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of 
 ordinary sense. Bid your servant meet you at such a time 
 in such a place, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the 
 meaning of those words ; in conceiving that particular time
 
 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLES 97 
 
 and place, or the motion by which he is to get thither, he 
 finds not the least difficulty. But if Time be taken exclu- 
 sive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify 
 the day, merely for the continuation of existence, or Duration 
 in abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to 
 comprehend it ^ 
 
 98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a 
 simple idea of Time, abstracted from the succession of 
 ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly and is participated 
 by all beings, I am lost and embrangled' in inextricable 
 difificulties^ I have no notion of it at all : only I hear 
 others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a 
 manner as leads me to harbour odd thoughts of my exist- 
 ence ; — since that doctrine lays one under an absolute 
 necessity of thinking, either that he passes away innumer- 
 able ages without a thought, or else that he is annihilated 
 every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd. 
 Time therefore being nothing, abstracted frotn the succes- 
 sion of ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration 
 of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of 
 ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit 
 or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul 
 always thinks ; and in truth whoever shall go about to 
 
 * ' Si non rogas intelligo.' 
 
 - ' Embrangled,' to ' brangle,' i. e. to twist or involve in perplexity. 
 
 ^ Locke's account of time {Essay, b. II. ch. 14. §§ 3, 5, 17) may be 
 compared with this. Though change in the phenomena of which we 
 are percipient, as a matter of fact, develops in its the idea of time, the 
 ultimate mystery of that idea remains. In Berkeley's Coimnonplace 
 Book we find such expressions as these, regarding Time, Duration, and 
 Eternity: — 'Time — train of ideas succeeding one another. Succession 
 explained by before, between, after, and numbering. Duration infinitely 
 divisible ; time not so. The same to vvv now common to all intelli- 
 gences. Time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure. 
 Time a sensation ; therefore only in the mind. Eternity is only a train 
 of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of the soul easily con- 
 ceived, or rather the immortality of the person, that of the soul not 
 being necessary for aught we can see.' 
 
 H
 
 98 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 divide in his thoughts, or abstract, the existence of a spirit 
 from its cogitation, will, I believe, find it no easy task '. 
 
 loi. The two great provinces of speculative science 
 conversant about ideas received from Sense, are Natural 
 Philosophy and Mathematics ; with regard to each of these 
 I shall make some observations -. 
 
 And first I shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy. 
 On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All that 
 stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties 
 and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn 
 principally from this head, namely, that we are under an 
 invincible blindness as to the true and real nature of things. 
 This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are 
 miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, and amused 
 only with the outside and show of things. The real essence 
 — the internal qualities and constitution — of every the 
 meanest object, is hid from our view ; something there is in 
 every drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is beyond 
 the power of human understanding to fathom or compre- 
 hend. But, it is evident from what has been shewn that all 
 this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by 
 false principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and 
 think we know nothing of those things which we perfectly 
 comprehend \ 
 
 ^ Berkeley says in one of his letters : ' A succession of ideas I take 
 to constitute time, and not to.be only the sensible measitre thereof, as 
 Mr. I.ocke and others think. One of my earliest inquiries was about 
 time, which led me into several paradoxes that I did not think fit or 
 necessary to publish.' 1 See my Life of Berkeley, ch. v.) 
 
 With Berkeley ' the soul always thinks,' else it would lose its identity, 
 for unconscious ligo is as impossible as unperceived matter. Hence since 
 the esse of things hfenipi, the esse of the Ego would ht percipere. 
 
 ''■ In Kant's ' Kritik ' (' Aesthetic ' and 'Analytic ') we have his explan- 
 ation and defence of mathematical and physical science, as against the 
 sceptical dissolution of it into phenomena accidentally associated. 
 
 ' For, under Berkeley's conception of the material world, there is
 
 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLES 99 
 
 102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves 
 ignorant of the nature of things is the current opinion that 
 everything includes within itself Xho. cause of its properties ; 
 or that there is in each object an inward essence which is the 
 source whence its discernible qualities flow, and whereon 
 they depend '. Some have pretended to account for ap- 
 pearances by occult qualities : but of late they are mostly 
 resolved into mechanical causes, to wit, the figure, motion, 
 weight, and suchlike qualities", of insensible particles; — 
 whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or efficient cause 
 than spirit, it being evident that motion, as well as all other 
 /i/mi-, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25 ^ Hence, to endeavour 
 to explain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, mo- 
 tion, magnitude and the like, must needs be labour in vain. 
 And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at 
 all satisfactory. Which may be said in general of those in- 
 stances wherein one idea or quality * is assigned for the cause 
 of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and 
 speculations are left out, and how much the study of nature 
 is abridged by this doctrine '\ 
 
 nothing to be comprehended in the material world with which our senses 
 are concerned excej^t the phenomena or appearances of which it consists, 
 and their relations of coexistence and succession, in virtue of which they 
 constitute a system of sensible signs — a natural and divine language. 
 
 ' This is the Aristotelian and Scholastic teaching, according to which 
 the essential nature or formal cause of anything {ovaia, ro ri r]v 
 uvai) explains its secondary qualities {T!oia), and is unfolded in its 
 definition. The form or essence of a thing thus consists of what is 
 essential to its existence as that identical thing, and is present in all 
 its developments. 
 
 ^ The primary qualities, in respect of their differences of shape, size, 
 motion, &c., were regarded by Locke and Descartes as the explanation 
 of the differences in the secondary qualities of things. 
 
 ' On the impotence or passivity of matter. 
 
 ' Phenomenon. 
 
 ^ ]5erkeley's conception of the material world is ultimately Spiritual : 
 it eliminates power from the things we see and touch, but retains it 
 in Mind or Spirit. He sees in the order and interpretability of all 
 
 H 2
 
 lOO SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 133. By what we have hitherto said, it is plain that very 
 numerous and important errors have taken their rise from 
 those false Principles which were impugned in the foregoing 
 parts of this treatise ; and the opposites of those erroneous 
 tenets at the same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, 
 from whence do flow innumerable consequences highly 
 advantageous to true philosophy, as well as to religion. 
 Particularly matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal 
 objects', hath been shewn to be that wherein the most avowed 
 and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, whether human or 
 divine, have ever placed their chief strength and confidence. 
 And surely if by distinguishing the real existence of un- 
 thinking things from their bet?ig perceived, and allowing them 
 a subsistence of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one 
 thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great 
 many inexplicable difficulties arise ; if the supposition of 
 Matter is barely precarious, as not being grounded on so 
 much as one single reason ; if its consequences cannot endure 
 the light of examination and free inquiry, but screen them- 
 selves under the dark and general pretence of Infinites being 
 incomprehensible ; if withal the removal of this Matter be 
 not attended with the least evil consequence ; if it be not 
 even missed in the world, but everything as well, nay much 
 easier, conceived without it; if, lastly, both Sceptics and 
 Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits 
 and IDEAS ^, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable 
 
 phenomena presented to the senses, the constant operation of the Universal 
 or Divine Power. 
 
 * The denial of the existence of matter, as a substance and power 
 independent of all conscious or percipient spirit, is not denial of the 
 popular dogma that what is perceived in the senses is real. It only 
 professes to be a deeper analysis of what the popular dogma menns, 
 making it more reasonable. 
 
 ^ They are ' for ever silenced ' if it may be concluded that Moral 
 Reason is supreme in the universe, and Natural Order subordinate. But 
 is that necessarily involved in the supposition that only spirits, and 
 ideas or phenomena dependent on a percipient exist ? Consider whether
 
 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLES lOl 
 
 both to Reason and Religion — methinks we may expect it 
 should be admitted and firmly embraced, though it were 
 proposed only as an hypothesis, and the existence of Matter 
 had been allowed possible, which yet T think we have 
 evidently demonstrated that it is not. 
 
 135. Having despatched what we intended to say con- 
 cerning the knowledge of Ideas \ the method we proposed 
 leads us in the next place to treat of Spirits — with regard 
 to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so deficient as 
 is vulgarly imagined ". The great reason that is assigned 
 for our being thought ignorant of the nature of Spirits is — 
 our not having an idea of it. But, surely it ought not to 
 be looked on as a defect in a human understanding that it 
 does not perceive the idea of spirit ^ if it is manifestly im- 
 possible there should be any such idea. And this if I 
 mistake not has been demonstrated in section 27 ; to which 
 I shall here add — that a spirit has been shewn to be the 
 only substance or support wherein unthinking beings or 
 ideas can exist; but that this substance which supports or 
 perceives ideas should itself be an idea, or like an idea, is 
 evidently absurd. 
 
 136. It will perhaps be said that we want a sense (as some 
 have imagined) proper to know siibstaiices withal ; which, if 
 we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. 
 To this I answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed 
 
 this Principle is justified by reason, and whether it is the only one that 
 effectually silences rejection of ethical sn]iremacy in the Universe. 
 
 ^ ' Ideas '= natural phenomena presented to the senses. 
 
 ■ In the preceding sections Berkeley has mentioned improvements in 
 the physical sciences which should follow acceptance of his conception 
 of Matter. He proceeds, in §§ 135-56, to trace its consequences, 
 in its application to studies which are concerned wilh the origin and 
 destiny of men, and the being and attributes of God. 
 
 ^ 'Idea of spirit,' i.e. a picture of spirit in the sensuous imagination, 
 or its appearance in sense as a natural phenomenon, or idea.
 
 I02 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 upon us, we could only receive thereby some new sensations 
 or ideas of sense. But I believe nobody will say that what 
 he means by the terms soul and substatice is only some par- 
 ticular sort of idea or sensation \ We may therefore infer 
 that, all things duly considered, it is not more reasonable to 
 think our faculties defective, in that they do not furnish us 
 with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than it 
 would be if we should blame them for not being able to 
 comprehend a round square. 
 
 137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known afier 
 the manner of an idea or sensation ^ have risen many absurd 
 and heterodox tenets, and much scepticism about the nature 
 of the soul. It is even probable that this opinion may 
 have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul 
 at all distinct from their body ; since upon inquiry they 
 could not find they had an idea of it. That an idea, which 
 is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in being per- 
 ceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsist- 
 ing by itself, seems to need no other refutation than barely 
 attending to what is meant by those words. But perhaps 
 you will say that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in 
 its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in 
 some other respects ; and it is not necessary that an idea or 
 image be in all respects like the original. 
 
 138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is 
 impossible it should represent it in any other thing. Do 
 but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving 
 ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein the idea can 
 be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit we mean only that 
 which thinks, wills, and perceives ; this, and this alone, 
 constitutes the signification of that term. If therefore it 
 
 ' Ideas, sensations, and natural phenomena are synonyms with 
 Berkeley, as the student cannot be too often reminded. 
 
 ' That is to say, ' the opinion ' that we can have a sensuous perception 
 of a spirit, as we do have of a sensible object.
 
 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLES 1 03 
 
 is impossible that any degree of those powers should be 
 represented in an idea, it is evident there can be no idea of 
 a spirit. 
 
 139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea 
 signified by the terms ' soul,' ' spirit,' and ' substance,' they 
 are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them '. 
 I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing — 
 which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which 
 perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What 
 I am myself — that which I denote by the term / — is the 
 same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance. 
 But if I should say that / was nothing, or that / was an 
 idea, nothing could be more evidently absurd than either of 
 these propositions. If it be said that this is only quarrel- 
 ling at a word, and that, since the immediate significations 
 of other names are by common consent called ideas, no 
 reason can be assigned why that which is signified by the 
 name spirit or soul may not partake in the same appella- 
 tion, I answer — All the unthinking objects of the mind 
 agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence 
 consists only in being perceived ; whereas a soul or spirit 
 is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being 
 perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking ^. It is 
 therefore necessary — in order to prevent equivocation and 
 confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that 
 we distinguish between spirit and idea. See sect. 27. 
 
 ' ' Rational ])sycholoi,'y,' says Kant, ' has its origin in a mere mis- 
 understanding. The unity of self-consciousness is confused with an 
 intuition of the subject as an object ; and the object thus supposed to be 
 thus intuited is, moreover, substantiated. But this " subject " is really 
 nothing more than a unity in thought, in 'which no object is given, and 
 to which therefore the category of substance, whicli presupposes an 
 object, cannot be applied. Therefore the subject cannot be known as 
 a substance.' This of Kant seems to overlook the fact that the indi- 
 vidual is present to himself in his own activities. 
 
 ^ If the existence of the Ego depends on actual perception, a person 
 cannot become unconscious without ceasing to exist.
 
 104 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 140. In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an 
 idea [or rather a notion^] of spirit; that is, we understand 
 the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or 
 deny anything of it ^. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas 
 that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, 
 which we suppose to be resemblances of them ; so we know 
 other spirits by means of our oivn soul — which in that sense 
 is the image or idea of them ; it having a like respect to 
 other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived has to 
 those ideas perceived by another ^. 
 
 ^ Added in Second Edition of the Pnnciples. The term ' notion ' 
 introduced to signify what is unimaginable. 
 
 ^ By ' spiritual substance ' Berkeley intends whatever is meant by 
 the personal pronoun. This cannot, he urges, be an idea, or datum 
 of sense. The knowcr cannot be tints known ; yet, as I am presupposed 
 in all my knowledge, I cannot be ignorant of myself. Hume afterwards 
 applied Berkeley's own reasoning against abstract matter to this 'notion ' 
 of Ego, and argued that the knowing spirit, as well as the things of 
 sense, is resolvable into passing conscious states, whose union in 
 imagination gives rise to the illusion of personal identity. ; Treatise of 
 Till mail Nature, b. I. part iv. sect. 6.) — Berkeley's answer to this is given 
 by anticipation in the Dialogue betweeii Hylas and Philonons, where 
 Philonotis meets the objection, that ' there is no more meaning in 
 spiritual substance than in material substance, so the one is to be 
 e.Kploded as well as the other.' 
 
 ^ That is to say, we become aware of the existence of other conscious 
 beings, not by entering into their consciousness, but by inference, 
 based partly on our own consciousness, and partly on the sigits of similar 
 conscious life in them, implied in our perceptions of their corporeal 
 actions. We can conceive conscious life numerically different from our 
 oivn, while unperceived matter is unimaginable negation. 
 
 Berkeley's account of the relation cf human spirits to the Supreme 
 Spirit, and to the System of Nature, is obscure. The question how far 
 the human spirit is part of the Cosmos, its physical birth being an 
 event or evolution, he does not touch ; — nor yet our relation to the 
 Universal Consciousness, of which, Pantheists say, we are individual 
 phases — God being the universal form of whicli each of us is a finite 
 and illusory manifestation. — Is not the root of individual personality 
 found in the self-originated power by which a man is able to be immoral, 
 and to lose his power to act reasonably, through self-caused paralysis 
 of will ?
 
 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLES 105 
 
 141. The Natural Immortality of the Soul is a necessary 
 consequence of the foregoing doctrine. But before we 
 attempt to prove this, it is fit that we explain the meaning 
 of that tenet. It must not be supposed that they who 
 assert the natural immortality of the soul are of opinion 
 that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the 
 infinite power of the Creator who first gave it being, but 
 only that it is not liable to be broken or dissolved by the 
 ordinary laws of nature or motion. They indeed who hold 
 the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, or system of 
 animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the body ; 
 since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a 
 being, which it is naturally impossible should survive the 
 ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is enclosed. And this 
 notion has been greedily embraced and cherished by the 
 worst part of mankind, as the most effectual antidote 
 against all impressions of virtue and religion. But it has 
 been made evident that bodies, of what frame and texture 
 soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind — which is more 
 distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from 
 darkness. We have shewn that the soul is indivisible, 
 incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorrup- 
 tible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, 
 changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see 
 befall natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the 
 course of nature) cannot possibly affect an active, simple, 
 uncompounded substance : such a being therefore is indis- 
 soluble by the force of nature ; that is to say — the soul of 
 man is natu7-ally immortal '. 
 
 ' This is Berkeley's application of his conception of Matter to the 
 final human question of the continued existence of self-conscious life in 
 persons after the dissolution of the bodily organism in Death. From 
 the necessary dependence of body on spirit, and the conceivable inde- 
 pendence of the conscious spirit in man of its corporeal organism 
 (which lie assumes that he has already proved), he argues for the natural 
 immortality of the human spirit. If this be so, there is no absurdity
 
 Io6 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain 
 that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as 
 
 in supposing our continued personal consciousness after death — 
 as imbodied spirits, — the dissolution of the body having no natural 
 connexion with extinction of personal consciousness ; though, by a 
 miracle, God might at death cause our self-conscious lives to cease. 
 ' I see no difficulty,' he says in one of his letters, ' in conceiving a change 
 of state, such as is vulgarly called Death, as well without as with 
 material substance. It is sufficient for that purpose that we allow 
 sensible bodies, i. e. such as are perceived by sight and touch ; the exist- 
 ence of which I am so far from questioning (as philosophers are used to 
 do) that I establish it, I think, upon evident principles. Now, it seems 
 very easy to conceive the soul to exist in a separate state (i. e. divested 
 from those limits and laws of motion and perception with which she is 
 embarrassed here), and to exercise herself on new ideas— without the 
 intervention of those tangible things we call our bodies. It is even very 
 possible to conceive how the soul may have ideas of colour without 
 an eye, or of sounds without an ear.' {Life of Berkeley, ch. v.) 
 Note how in this he distinguishes ' sensible bodies,' dependent for their 
 existence on being perceived, from ' material substance,' supposed to 
 exist altogether independently of any percipient and sensation. 
 
 It was common among philosophers and theologians of the seven- 
 teenth century and afterwards to defend faith in a life after death by the 
 metaphysical assumption of the indivisibility of mind, its independence 
 of matter, and its merely contingent connexion with the body. Thus 
 Bishop Butler takes for granted that ' all presumption of death's being 
 the destruction of living beings must go upon the supposition that they 
 are compounded and so discerptible ' ; adding that, since consciousness 
 ' is a single and indivisible power, it should seem that the subject in 
 which it resides must be so too.' And even if it should not be ' abso- 
 lutely indiscerptible,' we have no way, he argues, of determining by 
 experience ' what its bulk in space is ; and till it can be shown that 
 what I call myself is larger in bulk than the solid elementary particles 
 of matter (atoms), which as there is no ground to think any natiwal 
 power can dissolve, so there is no natural rea.s,on to think death to be our 
 dissolution.' Referring to our connexion with our bodies, he says that 
 ' upon the supposition that the living being each man calls himself is 
 a single being . . . otir organised bodies are no more ourselves, or part of 
 ourselves, than any other matter around us.' ' It is as easy to conceive,' 
 he continues, ' that we may exist out of bodies as in them ; that we 
 might have animated bodies of any other organs, and senses wholly 
 different from those now given us ; and that we may hereafter animate 
 these same, or new bodies, variously modified and organised, as to 
 conceive how we can animate such bodies as our present ; and the 
 dissolution of all these several organised bodies, supposing ourselves
 
 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLES 107 
 
 senseless, inactive objects, or by way of idea. Spirits and 
 ideas are things so wholly different, that when we say ' they 
 exist,' ' they are known,' or the like, these words must not 
 be thought to signify anything common to both natures. 
 There is nothing alike or common in them ; and to expect 
 that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties 
 we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle, 
 seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. 
 This is inculcated because I imagine it may be of moment 
 towards clearing several important questions, and preventing 
 some very dangerous errors concerning the Nature of the 
 Soul. [^ We may not, I think, strictly be said to have 
 
 to have successively animated them, would have no more conceivable 
 tendency to destroy the living beings, ourselves, or deprive us of living 
 faculties, than the dissolution of any foreign matter' {Analogy, pt. I. 
 ch. i). 
 
 This train of thought is more foreign to the present generation, when 
 science insists that self-conscious life in constant correlation with a 
 corporeal frame is a fact proved by sufficient induction ; whatever may 
 be the abstract metaphysical possibility of conceiving the conscious 
 being to exist independently of body. The only personal life we have 
 any experience of, it is argued, is one that is found in organic union 
 with the corporeal structure, in correlation with which it develops 
 Speculations like those of Berkeley and Butler would be condemned as 
 mere dreams. 
 
 Faith in continued self-conscious life after death seems to have its 
 rationale in ethical considerations rather than in physical or in meta- 
 physical arguments. Does not a theistically constituted universe with 
 its moral implications suggest that physical death is not the extinction 
 of the moral agent after a short life in this mixed world, with its 
 irregular distribution of happiness and opportunity? Moral experience 
 of the organised unity I call w^'j't'^ may justify the previsive inference 
 that the physical change called death is not the end of me. In one 
 view the rising of the sun to-morrow, and the conscious life after death 
 of any person who has not yet died, are both ' beyond experience.' In 
 another definition of experience, neither is ' beyond ' it : the one may 
 be involved in the rational constitution of natural, and the other in 
 the rational constitution of moral experience. 
 
 ' What follows to the end of this section was introduced in the second 
 edition of the Pruiciples, as well as other passages in which nolion is 
 distinguished from idea or sense-presented phenomenon.
 
 Io8 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 an idea of an active being, or of an action, although we 
 may be said to have a 7iotioii of them. I have some know- 
 ledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas — 
 inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these 
 words. What I know, that I have some notion of. — I will 
 not say that the terms idea and notion may not be used 
 convertibly, if the world will have it so ; but yet it con- 
 duceth to clearness and propriety that we distinguish things 
 very different by different names. It is also to be re- 
 marked that, all relations including an act of the mind, we 
 cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a 
 notion of the relations and habitudes between things '. But 
 if, in the modern way, the word idea is extended to spirits, 
 and relations and acts, this is, after all, an affair of verbal 
 concern ^.] 
 
 145. From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot 
 know the existence of other spirits ^ otherwise than by their 
 operations, or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive 
 several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that 
 inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, 
 which accompany them and concur in their production. 
 Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is not imme- 
 
 ' There is perhaps a faint anticipation of Kantism in this employment 
 of the term notion to signify conscious mind, and the relations which its 
 intellectual acts constitute. But a critical analysis, like Kant's, of the 
 relations presupposed in real experience is foreign to Berkeley. 
 
 - Berkeley hardly proves that we cai not have an intellectual ' notion ' 
 of substance as manifested in its sensible phenomena. What he says 
 goes to show that we find in self that to which there is nothing 
 analogous in the phenomena of which we are percipient in our five 
 senses — that our continuous individual personality is an irreducible fact, 
 stii generis, and untranslatable into a natural phenomenon that can be 
 presented to our senses. 
 
 ^ ''Other spirits^ e.g. other men. We only see their bodies and 
 bodily motions: their conscious life or proper personality is necessarily 
 invisible.
 
 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLES 1 09 
 
 diate, as is the knowledge of my ideas ; but depending on 
 the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits 
 distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs ^ 
 
 146. But, though there be some things which convince 
 us human agents are concerned in producing them, yet it is 
 evident to every one that those things which are called the 
 Works of Nature — that is, the far greater part of the ideas 
 or sensations perceived by us — are not produced by, or de- 
 pendent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some 
 other Spirit that causes them ; since it is repugnant ^ that 
 they should subsist by themselves. See sect. 29. But, if 
 we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and 
 concatenation of natural things ; the surprising magnificence, 
 beauty and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite con- 
 trivance of the smaller parts of the creation, together with 
 the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole ; but 
 above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and plea- 
 
 ' This is one of the most fruitful sections in the Principles. How 
 can one indi\'idual mind communicate with another individual mind 
 through a viind-dctieudent body, such as Berkeley supposes all bodies, 
 and the whole material world, to be ? It has been alleged that, under 
 Berkeley's conception of the material world, I have no reason to believe 
 in the existence of other men ; — that, at most, I can discern only my 
 own existence and that of God. I find that /can will, and I suppose 
 that what my will fails to determine is God's doing ; so my volitions 
 and His determine all changes. — Berkeley, however, might argue that, 
 under his view of nature, the supremacy of Divine Will is a security 
 that we are not deceived when changes in phenomena presented to our 
 senses suggest the intentions and meanings of persons like ourselves as 
 their cause. (Is this, we may ask, mere ' suggestion ' or is it ' inference 
 of reason'? See Vindication of Theory of Vision, §§ 11, 12,42.) The 
 difficulty still is to understand hoiv the appearances which I perceive 
 when I use my senses — if they are wholly subjective or self-contained, 
 and numerically different from those of which any other mind is con- 
 scious — can be media of communication with another mind. In § 147 
 he says vaguely that God ' maintains that intercourse between spirits 
 whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each cither.' 
 
 - ' Repugnant,' for it would involve thought in incoherence, by para- 
 lysis of its indispensable presupposition of efficient and final causation.
 
 no SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 sure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and 
 passions of animals — I say if we consider all these things, 
 and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of 
 the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and 
 Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the 
 aforesaid Spirit, ' who works all in all,' and ' by whom all 
 things consist.' 
 
 147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly 
 and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever 
 distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the 
 existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the 
 existence of men ; because the effects of Nature are infin- 
 itely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed 
 to human agents. There is not any one mark that denotes 
 a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more 
 strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author 
 of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other per- 
 sons the will of man has no other object than barely the 
 motion of the limbs of his body ; but that such a motion 
 should be attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of 
 another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He 
 alone it is who, ' upholding all things by the word of His 
 power,' maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby 
 they are able to perceive the existence of each other. And 
 yet this pure and clear light which enlightens every one is 
 itself invisible \ 
 
 148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking 
 herd that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, 
 say they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is, 
 and believing obey His commands. But alas, we need 
 only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, 
 with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our 
 fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine we see God (as some 
 
 ' The reasoning in this and the two next sections is expanded in the 
 Dialogue on Divine Visual Language.
 
 COiXSEOUEiXCES OF THE PRINCIPLES HI 
 
 will have it) by a direct and immediate view ; or see cor- 
 poreal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which 
 represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, 
 I must confess, to me incomprehensible '. But I shall 
 explain my meaning : — A human spirit or peison is not 
 perceived by sense, as not being an idea ; when therefore 
 we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we 
 perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own 
 minds ; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry 
 distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence 
 of finite and created spirits like ourselves. Hence it is 
 plain we do not see a man — if by man is meant that which 
 lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do — but only such 
 a certain collection of ideas - as directs us to think there is a 
 distinct principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, 
 accompanying and represented by it. And after the same 
 manner we see God; all the difference is that, whereas some 
 one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a parti- 
 cular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we 
 do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens 
 of the Divinity — everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise 
 perceive by Sense, being a sign or effect of the power of 
 God ; as is our perception of those very motions which 
 are produced by men •■. 
 
 ' He refers to Malebranche, whose doctrine — that we perceive the 
 material world ' in God ' — was an attempt to reconcile the Cartesian 
 duality of self-conscious and unextended substance, on the one hand, 
 extended and unconscious substance, on the other, witli the colierence of 
 an experience that is interpretable. I'erkcley does not, like Malebranche, 
 say that we perceive things by perceiving God, and that we perceive 
 them in Ilini (whatever that may mean) ; but only that phenomena are 
 presented in our jierccptions according to what we call 'natural order,' 
 which is really the immediate issue and sensible expression of the 
 Will and Ideas of God. The phenomena present in our senses, whi:h 
 are wholly passive, cannot, he argues, be like the Divine Spirit, who is 
 wholly active. See Berkeley's Works, vol. I. p. 308. 
 
 '-' ' Ideas,' i. e. natural appearances presented to our senses. 
 
 ' The present existence of God and the present existence of other
 
 112 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evi- 
 dent to any one that is capable of the least reflection than 
 the existence of God, or a Spirit who is intimately present 
 to our minds — producing in them all that variety of ideas 
 or sensations which continually affect us ; on whom we have 
 an absolute and entire dependence, in short 'in whom we 
 live, and move, and have our being.' That the discovery 
 of this great truth, which lies so near and obvious to the 
 mind, should be attained to by the reason of so very few, is 
 a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men, who, 
 though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations 
 of the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they 
 seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light. 
 
 150. But you will say, Hath Nature no share in the pro- 
 duction of natural things, and must they be all ascribed to 
 the immediate and sole operation of God ? I answer, if by 
 Nature is meant only the visible series of effects or sensations 
 imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and 
 general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, 
 cannot produce anything at all '. But, if by Nature is meant 
 some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of 
 nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that 
 word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible 
 meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a 
 vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not 
 just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of 
 God -. But, it is more unaccountable that it should be 
 
 human spirits are both reached, it seems, through sense signs, accord- 
 ing to Berkeley, and at first only in the way of ' suggestion.' The 
 Dialogue on 'Visual Language is an expansion of this section. Neither 
 here nor there does he refer to the moral presupposition of God given 
 in conscience, and its ' supremacy,' which is practically perfect ethical 
 supremacy in the universe. 
 
 * In a word ' natural causes ' are not, properly speaking, causes at all ; 
 they only inatrumentally transmit the originating efficacy and signify its 
 meaning. 
 
 ^ Thus in the Greek conception of Nature {(pxiais) as something inter- 
 
 J
 
 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLES I13 
 
 received among Christians, professing belief in the Holy 
 Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the 
 immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont 
 to impute to Nature. ' The Lord He causeth the vapours 
 to ascend ; He maketh lightnings with rain ; He bringeth 
 forth the wind out of His treasures.' Jerem. x. 13. 'He 
 turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh 
 the day dark with night.' Amos v. 8. ' He visiteth the 
 earth, and maketh it soft with showers : He blesseth the 
 springing thereof, and crowneth the year with His good- 
 ness ; so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the 
 valleys are covered over with corn.' See Psal. Ixv. But, 
 notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scrip- 
 ture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing 
 that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain 
 would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substi- 
 tute some l'l!7id iintliinking deputy in His stead, though (if 
 we may believe Saint Paul) ' He be not far from every one 
 of us.' 
 
 151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow, 
 gradual, and roundabout methods observed in the pro- 
 duction of natural things do not seem to have for their 
 cause the ittimediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, 
 monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, 
 rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human 
 life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole 
 frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superin- 
 tended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness \ But 
 
 mediate between Necessity and Chance — the efficient cause of the 
 Cosmos, of which God is the final cause. So too in the impersonal 
 ' force * of modern scientific a?sumption. Are conservation and trans- 
 formation of force more than names for that la7(j of change in the 
 universe under which every perishing phenomenon has its equivalent in 
 a new one, in the metamorphosis which passing the phenomena of 
 sense are continually undergoing ? 
 
 ^ So J. S. Mill, in his Autobiography and posthumous Essays, in 
 
 I
 
 114 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain 
 from sect. 62 ; it being visible that the aforesaid Methods 
 of Nature are absolutely necessary, in order to working by 
 the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and 
 consistent manner ; which argues both the wisdom and 
 goodness of God. Such is the artificial contrivance of this 
 mighty Machine of Nature that, whilst its motions and 
 various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which 
 actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh 
 and blood. ' Verily ' (saith the prophet) ' thou art a God 
 that hidest thyself'.' Isaiah xlv. 15. But, though the 
 Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and 
 lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet 
 to an unbiassed and attentive mind nothing can be more 
 plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise 
 Spirit, who fashions, regulates, and sustains the whole 
 system of beings. It is clear, from what we have elsewhere 
 observed, that the operating according to general and stated 
 laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of Life, 
 and letting us into the secret of Nature, that without it all 
 reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and de- 
 sign, could serve to no manner of purpose ; it were even 
 impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in 
 the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abun- 
 dantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may 
 thence arise ^. 
 
 152. But we should further consider that the very blem- 
 
 which he conjectures a Manicheeist solution of the difficulties of our 
 moral experience, instead of referring them to the immoral agency of 
 men or other finite persons. 
 
 ^ So Pascal in the Pensces, on God as a God ' that hideth himself.' 
 ^ We should be virtually irrational if we lived in a physical Chaos 
 instead of the Cosmos ; for sense-phenomena would then have no mean- 
 ing on which our cognitive power might be exercised. The rationally 
 constituted Cosmos is the correlate of our faculty of intelligence, and 
 material phenomena give concrete meaning to abstract unrealising 
 thoucht.
 
 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLES. 115 
 
 ishes and defects of Nature are not without their use, in 
 that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and augment 
 the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture 
 serve to set off the brighter and more enhghtened parts. 
 We would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing 
 the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction 
 of plants and animals, before they come to full maturity, as 
 an imprudence in the Author of Nature, be not the effect 
 of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and 
 saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of 
 those things which he cannot procure without much pains 
 and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not 
 imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or 
 vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble 
 in its production than a pebble does ; nothing being more 
 evident than that an Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently 
 produce everything by a mere Jiat or act of his will'. 
 Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural 
 things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in 
 the agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as 
 an argument of the riches of his power. 
 
 153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in 
 the world, pursuant to the general Laws of Nature, and the 
 actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in 
 at present, is indispensably necessary to our well-being. £ut 
 our prospects are too tiarrow. We take, for instance, the 
 idea of some one particular pain into our thoughts, and 
 account // evil ; whereas, if we enlarge our view, so as to 
 comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependen- 
 cies of things, on what occasions and in what proportions 
 we are affected with pain and pleasure, the nature of human 
 freedom, and the design with which we are put into the 
 
 ' By a power that is independent of nature. We suppose nature and 
 natural laws to be constantly sustained by Supreme Active Reason, not 
 evolved in blind necessity, nor yet accidentally. 
 
 I 2
 
 ri6 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 world ; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those par- 
 ticular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be 
 evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with 
 the whole system of beings '. 
 
 ' So afterwards Butler. ' Our tvhole nature leads us to ascribe moral 
 perfection to God, and to deny all imperfection of Him. And this must 
 for ever be a practical proof of His moral character. From thence we 
 conclude that virtue must be the happiness and vice the misery of 
 every creature; and that regularity, order, and right cannot but prevail 
 finally, in a universe under His government. But we are in no sort 
 judges what are the necessary means of accomplishi?ig this end.' 
 {Analogy, Introduction.) See also his Sermon on the ' Ignorance of 
 Man.' — In the Theodicee of Leibniz, published in the same year as the 
 Principles of Berkeley, these difficulties are discussed. 
 
 They gave rise to Manich?eism, or the doctrine of Manes, a Persian 
 philosopher of the third century, who appears to have held Eternal 
 Duality in the Universal Power to' be an explanation of the mingled 
 good and evil that is in the universe. The existence of free agents, — 
 who, as free, must be free to act immorally, — might seem to be a 
 modified Manichaeism ; especially if accompanied by the supposition 
 that the universe into which finite agents can introduce sin is absolutely 
 incapable of ultimate freedom from evil, and that it is thus a failure, 
 which it is doubtful whether the Manichaeans themselves meant to say. 
 Is the creation of finite creators of acts which may be evil as well as 
 good, Divine creation of evil? A sense of the importance of respon- 
 sible (because free) agents in the universe has, through Christianity, 
 grown in the mediaeval and modern world, as compared with an indiffer- 
 ence towards individual personality in the ceconomy of things on the 
 part of Greek and other ancient philosophers. 
 
 Our ignorance of the origin and destiny of the universe is tlie as- 
 sumption at the root of objections at the present day to the recognition 
 of Perfect Mind as its ultimate explanation. Hume proceeds partly 
 on this, when he treats the universe as a 'singular effect,' the phenomena 
 of which can be interpreted only so far as this life of sense is concerned 
 (and even that in merely probable interpretations), but which at last 
 dissolves in ' a riddle, an aenigma, an inexplicable mystery.' Does not 
 true philosophical analysis show that our knowledge of the universe 
 cannot be even so much as this without being more than this ? Is not 
 final assurance of Omnipotent Goodness the fundamental postulate of 
 human experience, virtually presupposed in the scientific postulate 
 of uniformity a constant order in nature?
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 Philonous. Good morrow, Hylas : I did not expect to find 
 you abroad so early. 
 
 Hylas. It is indeed something unusual ; but my thoughts 
 were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last 
 night, that finding I could not sleep, I resolved to rise and 
 take a turn in the garden. 
 
 Phil. It happened well, to let you see what innocent and 
 agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be 
 a pleasanter time of the day, or a more delightful season of 
 the year? That purple sky, those wild but sweet notes 
 of birds, the fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers, the 
 gentle influence of the rising sun, these and a thousand 
 nameless beauties of nature inspire the soul with secret 
 transports ; its faculties too being at this time fresh and 
 lively, are fit for these meditations, which the solitude of 
 a garden and tranquillity of the morning naturally dispose us 
 to. But I am afraid I interrupt your thoughts : for you 
 seemed very intent on something. 
 
 Hyl. It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you 
 will permit me to go on in the same vein ; not that I would 
 by any means deprive myself of your company, for my 
 thoughts always flow more easily in conversation with a 
 friend, than when I am alone : but my request is, that you 
 would suffer me to impart my reflections to you.
 
 Il8 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Phil. With all my heart, it is what I should have requested 
 myself if you had not prevented me. 
 
 Ifyl. I was considering the odd fate of those men who 
 have in all ages, through an affectation of being distinguished 
 from the vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought, 
 pretended either to believe nothing at all, or to believe the 
 most extravagant things in the world. This however might 
 be borne, if their paradoxes and scepticism did not draw 
 after them some consequences of general disadvantage to 
 mankind. But the mischief lieth here ; that when men of 
 less leisure see them who are supposed to have spent their 
 whole time in the pursuits of knowledge professing an entire 
 ignorance of all things, or advancing such notions as are 
 repugnant to plain and commonly received principles, they 
 will be tempted to entertain suspicions concerning the most 
 important truths, which they had hitherto held sacred and 
 unquestionable. 
 
 Fhil. I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency of 
 the affected doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical 
 conceits of others. I am even so far gone of late in this 
 way of thinking, that I have quitted several of the sublime 
 notions I had got in their schools for vulgar opinions. And 
 I give it you on my word, since this revolt from metaphysical 
 notions, to the plain dictates of nature and common sense, 
 I find my understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can 
 now easily comprehend a great many things which before 
 were all mystery and riddle. 
 
 Hyl. 1 am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts 
 I heard of you. 
 
 Phil. Pray, what were those ? 
 
 Hyl. You were represented in last night's conversation, as 
 one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever 
 entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such 
 thing as material substance in the world. 
 
 Phil. That there is no such thing as what Philosophers
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES I19 
 
 call material substance, I am seriously persuaded : but, if 
 I were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, 
 I should then have the same reason to renounce this that I 
 imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion. 
 
 Ifyl. What ! can anything be more fantastical, more 
 repugnant to common sense, or a more manifest piece of 
 Scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as 
 matter ? 
 
 Phil. Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove, that 
 you, who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, 
 a greater sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and 
 repugnances to common sense, than I who believe no 
 such thing? 
 
 Hyl. You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater 
 than the whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and 
 Scepticism, I should ever be obliged to give up my opinion 
 in this point. 
 
 Phil. Well then, are you content to admit that opinion 
 for true, which, upon examination, shall appear most 
 agreeable to common sense, and remote from Scepticism ? 
 
 Hyl. With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes 
 about the plainest things in nature, I am content for once to 
 hear what you have to say. 
 
 Phil. Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a sceptic ? 
 
 Hyl. I mean what all men mean — one that doubts of 
 everything. 
 
 Phil. He then who entertains no doubt concerning some 
 particular point, with regard to that point cannot be thought 
 a sceptic. 
 
 Hyl. I agree with you. 
 
 Phil. Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the 
 affirmative or negative side of a question ? 
 
 Hyl. In neither ; for whoever understands English, cannot 
 but know that doudti/ig signiHes a suspense between both.
 
 I20 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Phil. He then that denieth any point, can no more be 
 said to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same 
 degree of assurance. 
 
 Hyl. True. 
 
 FhiL And, consequently, for such his denial is no more 
 to be esteemed a sceptic than the other. 
 
 Hyl. I acknowledge it. 
 
 Phil. How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you pro- 
 nounce me a sceptic, because I deny what you affirm, to wit, 
 the existence of Matter? Since, for aught you can tell, 
 I am as peremptory in my denial, as you in your affirmation. 
 
 Hyl. Hold, Philonoies, I have been a little out in my 
 definition ; but every false step a man makes in discourse 
 is not to be insisted on. I said indeed that a sceptic was 
 one who doubted of everything ; but I should have added, 
 or who denies the reality and truth of things. 
 
 Phil. What things ? Do you mean the principles and 
 theorems of sciences ? But these you know are universal 
 intellectual notions, and consequently independent of 
 Matter ; the denial therefore of this doth not imply the 
 denying them. 
 
 Hyl. I grant it. But are there no other things ? What 
 think you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real 
 existence of sensible things, or pretending to know nothing 
 of them. Is not this sufficient to denominate a man a 
 sceptic ? 
 
 Phil. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that 
 denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest 
 ignorance of them ; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be 
 esteemed the greatest sceptic ? 
 
 Hyl. That is what I desire. 
 
 Phil. What mean you by Sensible Things ? 
 Hyl. Those things which are perceived by the senses. 
 Can you imagine that I mean anything else ?
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 121 
 
 Phi/. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to appre- 
 hend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. 
 Suffer me then to ask you this farther question. Are those 
 things only perceived by the senses which are perceived 
 immediately ? Or, may those things properly be said to be 
 sensible which are perceived mediately, or not without the 
 intervention of others ? 
 
 Hyl. I do not sufficiently understand you. 
 
 Phil. In reading a book, what I immediately perceive 
 are the letters, but mediately, or by means of these, are 
 suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, &c. 
 Now, that the letters are truly sensible things, or perceived 
 by sense, there is no doubt : but I would know whether 
 you take the things suggested by them to be so too. 
 
 Hyl. No, certainly ; it were absurd to think God ox virtue 
 sensible things, though they may be signified and suggested 
 to the mind by sensible marks, with which they have an 
 arbitrary connexion. 
 
 Phil. It seems then, that by scftsible things you mean 
 those only which can be perceived immediately by sense ? 
 
 Hyl. Right. 
 
 Phil. Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one 
 part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason 
 doth thence evidently conclude there must be some cause 
 of that diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to 
 be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing? 
 
 Hyl. It doth. 
 
 Phil. In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, 
 yet I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds ? 
 
 Hyl. You cannot. 
 
 Phil. And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot 
 and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that 
 I feel the cause of its heat or weight ? 
 
 Hyl. To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell 
 you once for all, that by sensible things I mean those only
 
 122 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 which are perceived by sense, and that in truth the senses 
 perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately : 
 for they make no inferences. The deducing therefore 
 of causes or occasions from effects and appearances, 
 which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to 
 reason. 
 
 Fhil. This point then is agreed between us — that sensible 
 things are those only tvhich are immediately perceived by sense. 
 You will farther inform me, whether we immediately per- 
 ceive by sight anything beside light, and colours, and 
 figures ; or by hearing, anything but sounds ; by the 
 palate, anything beside tastes ; by the smell, beside odours ; 
 or by the touch, more than tangible qualities. 
 
 Hyl. We do not. 
 
 Phil. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all 
 sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible ? 
 
 Hyl. I grant it. 
 
 Phil. Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so 
 many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible 
 qualities ? 
 
 Hyl. Nothing else. 
 
 Phil. Heat then is a sensible thing ? 
 
 Hyl. Certainly. 
 
 Phil. Doth the reality of sensible things consist in being 
 perceived ? or, is it something distinct from their being per- 
 ceived, and that bears no relation to the mind ? 
 
 Hyl. To exist is one thing, and to be perceived is another, 
 
 Phil. I speak with regard to sensible things only : and 
 of these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean 
 a subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their 
 being perceived ? 
 
 Hyl. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and 
 without any relation to their being perceived. 
 
 Phil. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must 
 exist without the mind ?
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 1 23 
 
 Hyi. It must. 
 
 Phi/. Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally com- 
 patible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive ; or is there 
 any reason why we should attribute it to some, and deny 
 it to others, and if there be, pray let me know that reason. 
 
 Hyl. Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we 
 may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it. 
 
 Phil. What ! the greatest as well as the least ? 
 
 Hyl. I tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect 
 of both : they are both perceived by sense ; nay, the 
 greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived ; and 
 consequently, if there is any difference, we are more certain 
 of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a lesser 
 degree. 
 
 Phil. But is not the most vehement and intense degree 
 of heat a very great pain ? 
 
 Hyl. No one can deny it. 
 
 Phil. And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain 
 or pleasure ? 
 
 Hyl. No certainly. 
 
 Phil. Is your material substance a senseless being, or 
 a being endowed with sense and perception ? 
 
 Hyl. It is senseless without doubt. 
 
 Phil. It cannot therefore be the subject of pain ? 
 
 Hyl. By no means. 
 
 Phil. Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by 
 sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain ? 
 
 Hyl. I grant it. 
 
 Phil. What shall we say then of your external object ; is 
 it a material substance, or no ? 
 
 Hyl. It is a material substance with the sensible qualities 
 inhering in it. 
 
 Phil. How then can a great heat exist in it, since you 
 own it cannot in a material substance ? I desire you would 
 clear this point.
 
 124 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Hyl. Hold, Fhi/ofious, I fear I was out in yielding intense 
 heat to be a pain. It should seem rather, that pain is 
 something distinct from heat, and the consequence or 
 effect of it. 
 
 Fhil. Upon putting 3'our hand near the fire, do you. 
 perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct 
 sensations ? 
 
 Hy/. But one simple sensation. 
 
 Phil. Is not the heat immediately perceived ? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Fhil. And the pain ? 
 
 Hyl. True. 
 
 Fhil. Seeing therefore they are both immediately per- 
 ceived at the same time, and the fire affects you only 
 with one simple, or uncompounded idea, it follows that 
 this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately 
 perceived, and the pain ; and, consequently, that the intense 
 heat immediately perceived, is nothing distinct from a par- 
 ticular sort of pain. 
 
 Hyl. It seems so. 
 
 Fhil. Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can con- 
 ceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure. 
 
 Hyl. I cannot. 
 
 Fhil. Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible 
 pain or pleasure, in general, abstracted from every particular 
 idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells ? &c. 
 
 Hyl. I do not find that I can. 
 
 Fhil. Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is 
 nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas — in an intense 
 degree ? 
 
 Hyl. It is undeniable ; and, to speak the truth, I begin 
 to suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind 
 perceiving it. 
 
 Fhil. What ! are you then in that sceptical state of 
 suspense, between affirming and denying?
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 1 25 
 
 H}'/. I think I may be positive in the point. A very 
 violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind. 
 
 Fhil. It hath not therefore, according to you, any real 
 being ? 
 
 Hyl. I own it. 
 
 Phil. Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in 
 nature really hot ? 
 
 Nyl. I have not denied there is any real heat in 
 bodies. I only say, there is no such thing as an intense 
 real heat. 
 
 FhiL But did you not say before that all degrees of heat 
 were equally real ; or, if there was any difference, that the 
 greater were more undoubtedly real than the lesser ? 
 
 Hy/. True : but it was because I did not then consider 
 the ground there is for distinguishing between them, which 
 I now plainly see. And it is this : — because intense heat is 
 nothing else but a particular kind of painful sensation ; and 
 pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being ; it follows that 
 no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal 
 substance. But this is no reason why we should deny heat 
 in an inferior degree to exist in such a substance. 
 
 Phi/. But how shall we be able to discern those degrees 
 of heat which exist only in the mind from those which exist 
 without it? 
 
 Hy/. That is no difficult matter. You know the least 
 pain cannot exist unperceived; whatever, therefore, degree 
 of heat is a pain exists only in the mind. But, as for all 
 other degrees of heat, nothing obliges us to think the same 
 of them. 
 
 Phil. I think you granted before that no unperceiving 
 being was capable of pleasure, any more than of pain. 
 
 Hyl. I did. 
 
 Phil. And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat 
 than what causes uneasiness, a pleasure? 
 
 Hyl What then?
 
 126 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Phil. Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in 
 an unperceiving substance, or body. 
 
 Hyl. So it seems. 
 
 Phil. Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that 
 are not painful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking 
 substance ; may we not conclude that external bodies are 
 absolutely incapable of any degree of heat whatsoever ? 
 
 Hyl. On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident 
 that warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat 
 is a pain. 
 
 Phil. I do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure 
 as heat is a pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small 
 pleasure, it serves to make good my conclusion. 
 
 Hyl. I could rather call it an indolence. It seems to be 
 nothing more than a privation of both pain and pleasure. 
 And that such a quality or state as this may agree to an 
 unthinking substance, I hope you will not deny. 
 
 Phil. If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or 
 a gentle degree of heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to 
 convince you otherwise, than by appealing to your own 
 sense. But what think you of cold ? 
 
 Hyl. The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of 
 cold is a pain ; for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive 
 a great uneasiness : it cannot therefore exist without the 
 mind ; but a lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser 
 degree of heat. 
 
 Phil. Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application to 
 our own, we perceive a moderate degree of heat, must be 
 concluded to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in 
 them ; and those, upon whose application we feel a like 
 degree of cold, must be thought to have cold in them. 
 
 Hyl. They must. 
 
 Phil. Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads 
 a man into an absurdity ? 
 
 Hyl. Without doubt it cannot.
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 127 
 
 Phii. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing 
 should be at the same time both cold and warm ? 
 
 By/. It is. 
 
 Phil. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other 
 cold, and that they are both at once put into the same 
 vessel of water, in an intermediate state ; will not the water 
 seem cold to one hand, and warm to the other? 
 
 HyL It will. 
 
 Phil. Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to 
 conclude it is really both cold and warm at the same time, 
 that is, according to your own concession, to believe an 
 absurdity ? 
 
 Nyl. I confess it seems so. 
 
 Phil. Consequently, the principles themselves are false, 
 since you have granted that no true principle leads to an 
 absurdity. 
 
 Hyl. But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to 
 say, there is no heat in the fire ? 
 
 Phil. To make the point still clearer ; tell me whether, 
 in two cases exactly alike, we ought not to make the same 
 judgment ? 
 
 Hyl. We ought. 
 
 Phil. When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and 
 divide the fibres of your flesh ? 
 
 Hyl. It doth. 
 
 Phti. And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any 
 more ? 
 
 Hyl. It doth not. 
 
 Phil. Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation 
 itself occasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in 
 the pin ; you .should not, conformably to what you have 
 now granted, judge the sensation occasioned by the fire, or 
 anything like it, to be in the fire. 
 
 Hyl. Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this 
 point, and acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensa-
 
 128 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 tions existing in our minds. But there still remain qualities 
 enough to secure the reality of external things. 
 
 Fhil. But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear that 
 the case is the same with regard to all other sensible 
 qualities, and that they can no more be supposed to exist 
 without the mind, than heat and cold ? 
 
 Hyl. Then indeed you will have done something to the 
 purpose ; but that is what I despair of seeing proved. 
 
 Phil. Let us examine them in order. What think you of 
 tastes — do they exist without the mind, or no ? 
 
 Hyl. Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is 
 sweet, or wormwood bitter ? 
 
 Phil. Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular 
 kind of pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it not ? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or 
 pain ? 
 
 Hyl. I grant it. 
 
 Phil. If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking 
 corporeal substances existing without the mind, how can 
 sweetness and bitterness, that is, pleasure and pain, agree 
 to them ? 
 
 Hyl. Hold, Philo?ious, I now see what it was deluded 
 me all this time. You asked whether heat and cold, 
 sweetness and bitterness, were not particular sorts of plea- 
 sure and pain ; to which I answered simply, that they were. 
 Whereas I should have thus distinguished : — those quali- 
 ties, as perceived by us, are pleasures or pains ; but not as 
 existing in the external objects. We must not therefore 
 conclude absolutely, that there is no heat in the fire, or 
 sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness, 
 as perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar. What 
 say you to this ? 
 
 Phil. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse 
 proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 129 
 
 defined to be, the things we inunediately perceive by our senses. 
 Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of, as distinct 
 from these, I know nothing of them, neither do they at all 
 belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend 
 to have discovered certain qualities which you do not 
 perceive, and assert those insensible qualities exist in fire 
 and sugar. But what use can be made of this to your 
 present purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. Tell me then 
 once more, do you acknowledge that heat and cold, sweet- 
 ness and bitterness (meaning those qualities which are 
 perceived by the senses), do not exist without the mind ? 
 
 Hyl. I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give 
 up the cause as to those mentioned qualities. Though 
 I profess it sounds oddly, to say that sugar is not sweet. 
 
 Phil. But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along 
 with you : that which at other times seems sweet, shall, to 
 a distempered palate, appear bitter. And, nothing can be 
 plainer than that divers persons perceive different tastes in 
 the same food ; since that which one man delights in, 
 another abhors. And how could this be, if the taste was 
 something really inherent in the food ? 
 
 Hyl. I acknowledge I know not how. 
 
 Phil. In the next place, odours are to be considered. 
 And, with regard to these, I would fain know whether what 
 hath been said of tastes doth not exactly agree to them ? 
 Are they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations ? 
 
 Hyl. They are. 
 
 Phil. Can you then conceive it possible that they should 
 exist in an unperceiving thing ? 
 
 Hyl. I cannot. 
 
 Phil. Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect 
 those brute animals that feed on them out of choice, with 
 the same smells which we perceive in them ? 
 
 Hyl. By no means. 
 
 Phil. May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the 
 
 K
 
 I30 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Other forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any 
 but a perceiving substance or mind ? 
 
 Hy/. I think so. 
 
 Phil. Then as to sounds, what must we think of them : 
 are they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not ? 
 
 Hyl. That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain 
 from hence ; because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver 
 of an air-pump sends forth no sound. The air, therefore, 
 must be thought the subject of sound. 
 
 Phil. What reason is there for that, Hylas} 
 
 Hyl. Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we 
 perceive a sound greater or lesser, according to the air's 
 motion ; but without some motion in the air, we never hear 
 any sound at all. 
 
 Phil. And granting that we never hear a sound but when 
 some motion is produced in the air, yet I do not see 
 how you can infer from thence, that the sound itself is in 
 the air. 
 
 Hyl. It is this very motion in the external air that 
 produces in the mind the sensation of sound. For, 
 striking on the drum of the ear, it causeth a vibration, 
 which by the auditory nerves being communicated to the 
 brain, the soul is thereupon affected with the sensation 
 called sound. 
 
 Phil. What ! is sound then a sensation ? 
 
 Hyl. I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular 
 sensation in the mind. 
 
 Phil. And can any sensation exist without the mind ? 
 
 Hyl. No, certainly. 
 
 Phil. How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in 
 the air, if by the air you mean a senseless substance existing 
 without the mind ? 
 
 Hyl. You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as 
 it is perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the 
 same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive,
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 131 
 
 and that which exists without us. The former, indeed, is 
 a particular kind of sensation, but the latter is merely 
 a vibrative or undulatory motion in the air. 
 
 PhiL I thought I had already obviated that distinction, 
 by the answer I gave when you were applying it in a like 
 case before. But, to say no more of that, are you sure then 
 that sound is really nothing but motion ? 
 
 Hy/. I am. 
 
 Fhil. Whatever therefore agrees to real sounds may with 
 truth be attributed to motion ? 
 
 Hyl. It may. 
 
 Phil. It is then good sense to speak of motion as of 
 a thing that is loud, siveet, acute, or grave. 
 
 Hyl. I see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it 
 not evident those accidents or modes belong only to sen- 
 sible sound, or sound in the common acceptation of the 
 word, but not to soufid in the real and philosophic sense ; 
 which, as I just now told you, is nothing but a certain 
 motion of the air ? 
 
 Phi/. It seems then there are two sorts of sound — the 
 one vulgar, or that which is heard, the other philosophical 
 and real ? 
 
 Hyl. Even so. 
 
 Phil. And the latter consists in motion ? 
 
 Hyl. I told you so before. 
 
 Phil. Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you, 
 the idea of motion belongs ? to the hearing ? 
 
 Hyl. No, certainly ; but to the sight and touch. 
 
 Phil. It should follow then, that, according to you, real 
 sounds may possibly be seen ox felt, but never heard. 
 
 Hyl. Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make 
 a jest of my opinion, but that will not alter the truth of 
 things. I own, indeed, the inferences you draw me into, 
 sound something oddly ; but common language, you know, 
 is framed by, and for the use of the vulgar : we must not 
 
 K 2
 
 132 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 therefore wonder, if expressions adapted to exact philosophic 
 notions seem uncouth and out of the way. 
 
 Phil. Is it come to that ? I assure you, I imagine myself 
 to have gained no small point, since you make so light 
 of departing from common phrases and opinions ; it being 
 a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are 
 widest of the common road, and most repugnant to the 
 general sense of the world. But, can you think it no more 
 than a philosophical paradox, to say that real sounds are 
 never heard, and that the idea of them is obtained by some 
 other sense? And is there nothing in this contrary to 
 nature and the truth of things? 
 
 Hyl. To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after 
 the concessions already made, I had as well grant that 
 sounds too have no real being without the mind. 
 
 Phil. And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknow- 
 ledge the same of colours. 
 
 Hyl. Pardon me : the case of colours is very different. 
 Can anything be plainer than that we see them on the 
 objects ? 
 
 Phil. The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal 
 Substances existing without the mind ? 
 
 Hyl. They are. 
 
 Phil. And have true and real colours inhering in them ? 
 
 Hyl. Each visible object hath that colour which we 
 see in it. 
 
 Phil. How ! is there anything visible but what we per- 
 ceive by sight ? 
 
 Hyl. There is not. 
 
 Phil. And, do we perceive anything by sense which we 
 do not perceive immediately ? 
 
 Hyl. How often must I be obliged to repeat the same 
 thing ? I tell you, we do not. 
 
 Phil. Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once 
 more, whether there is anything immediately perceived by
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 133 
 
 the senses, except sensible qualities. I know you asserted 
 there was not ; but I would now be informed, whether you 
 still persist in the same opinion. 
 
 HyL I do. 
 
 Phi/. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible 
 quality, or made up of sensible qualities ? 
 
 Hyl. What a question that is ! who ever thought it was ? 
 
 FhiL My reason for asking was, because in saying, each 
 visible object hath that colour which ive see in it, you make 
 visible objects to be corporeal substances; which imphes 
 either that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or 
 else that there is something beside sensible qualities per- 
 ceived by sight : but, as this point was formerly agreed 
 between us, and is still maintained by you, it is a clear 
 consequence, that your corporeal substance is nothing 
 distinct from sensible qualities. 
 
 Hyl. You may draw as many absurd consequences as you 
 please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things ; but 
 you shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly 
 understand my own meaning. 
 
 Phil. I wish you would make me understand it too. 
 But, since you are unwilling to have your notion of corpo- 
 real substance examined, I shall urge that point no farther. 
 Only be pleased to let me know, whether the same colours 
 which we see exist in external bodies, or some other. 
 
 Hyl. The very same. 
 
 Phil. What ! are then the beautiful red and purple we 
 see on yonder clouds really in them ? Or do you imagine 
 they have in themselves any other form than that of a dark 
 mist or vapour? 
 
 Hyl I must own, Fhilonous, those colours are not really 
 in the clouds as they seem to be at this distance. They are 
 only apparent colours. 
 
 Phil. Apparent call you them ? how shall we distinguish 
 these apparent colours from real ?
 
 134 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Hyl. Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent 
 which, appearing only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer 
 approach. 
 
 Phil. And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which 
 are discovered by the most near and exact survey. 
 
 Hyl. Right. 
 
 Phil. Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help 
 of a microscope, or by the naked eye ? 
 
 Hyl. By a microscope, doubtless. 
 
 Phil. But a microscope often discovers colours in an 
 object different from those perceived by the unassisted 
 sight. And, in case we had microscopes magnifying to any 
 assigned degree, it is certain that no object whatsoever, 
 viewed through them, would appear in the same colour 
 which it exhibits to the naked eye. 
 
 Hyl. And what will you conclude from all this? You 
 cannot argue that there are really and naturally no colours 
 on objects : because by artificial managements they may be 
 altered, or made to vanish. 
 
 Phil. I think it may evidently be concluded from your 
 own concessions, that all the colours we see with our naked 
 eyes are only apparent as those on the clouds, since they 
 vanish upon a more close and accurate inspection which is 
 afforded us by a microscope. Then, as to what you say by 
 way of prevention : I ask you whether the real and natural 
 state of an object is better discovered by a very sharp and 
 piercing sight, or by one which is less sharp ? 
 
 Hyl. By the former without doubt. 
 
 Phil. Is it not plain from Dioptrics that microscopes 
 make the sight more penetrating, and represent objects 
 as they would appear to the eye in case it were naturally 
 endowed with a most exquisite sharpness ? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. Consequently the microscopical representation is 
 to be thought that which best sets forth the real nature
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES T35 
 
 of the thing, or what it is in itself. The colours, therefore, 
 by it perceived are more genuine and real than those 
 perceived otherwise. 
 
 Hyl. I confess there is something in what you say. 
 
 Phil. Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that 
 there actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed 
 to perceive those things which by reason of their minuteness 
 escape our sight. What think you of those inconceivably 
 small animals perceived by glasses ? must we suppose they 
 are all stark blind ? Or, in case they see, can it be imagined 
 their sight hath not the same use in preserving their bodies 
 from injuries, which appears in that of all other animals ? 
 And if it hath, is it not evident they must see particles 
 less than their own bodies, which will present them with 
 a far different view in each object from that which strikes 
 our senses ? Even our own eyes do not always represent 
 objects to us after the same manner. In ^he Jaundice every 
 one knows that all things seem yellow. Is it not therefore 
 highly probable those animals in whose eyes we discern 
 a very different texture from that of ours, and whose bodies 
 abound with different humours, do not see the same colours 
 in every object that we do ? From all which, should it not 
 seem to follow that all colours are equally apparent, and 
 that none of those which we perceive are really inherent 
 in any outward object ? 
 
 Hyl. It should. 
 
 Phil. The point will be past all doubt, if you consider 
 that, in case colours were real properties or affections 
 inherent in external bodies, they could admit of no altera- 
 tion without some change wrought in the very bodies 
 themselves : but, is it not evident from what hath been said 
 that, upon the use of microscopes, upon a change happening 
 in the humours of the eye, or a variation of distance, with- 
 out any manner of real alteration in the thing itself, the 
 colours of any object are either changed, or totally dis-
 
 136 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 appear ? Nay, all other circumstances remaining the same, 
 change but the situation of some objects, and they shall 
 present different colours to the eye. The same thing 
 happens upon viewing an object in various degrees of 
 light. And what is more known than that the same bodies 
 appear differently coloured by candle-light from what they 
 do in the open day? Add to these the experiment of 
 a prism which, separating the heterogeneous rays of light, 
 alters the colour of any object, and will cause the whitest 
 to appear of a deep blue or red to the naked eye. And 
 now tell me whether you are still of opinion that every body 
 hath its true real colour inhering in it ; and, if you think 
 it hath, I would fain know farther from you, what certain 
 distance and position of the object, what peculiar texture 
 and formation of the eye, what degree or kind of light 
 is necessary for ascertaining that true colour, and distin- 
 guishing it from apparent ones. 
 
 HyL I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all 
 equally apparent, and that there is no such thing as colour 
 really inhering in external bodies, but that it is altogether 
 in the light. And what confirms me in this opinion is that 
 in proportion to the light colours are still more or less vivid ; 
 and if there be no light, then are there no colours perceived. 
 Besides, allowing there are colours on external objects, yet, 
 how is it possible for us to perceive them ? For no 
 external body affects the mind, unless it acts first on our 
 organs of sense. But the only action of bodies is motion ; 
 and motion cannot be communicated otherwise than by 
 impulse. A distant object therefore cannot act on the eye, 
 nor consequently make itself or its properties perceivable 
 to the soul. Whence it plainly follows that it is immediately 
 some contiguous substance, which, operating on the eye, 
 occasions a perception of colours : and such is light. 
 
 Fhil. How ! is light then a substance ? 
 
 Uyl. I tell you, F/iilonous, external light is nothing but
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 1 37 
 
 a thin fluid substance, whose minute particles being agitated 
 with a brisk motion, and in various manners reflected from 
 the different surfaces of outward objects to the eyes, com- 
 municate different motions to the optic nerves ; which, 
 being propagated to the brain, cause therein various im- 
 pressions ; and these are attended with the sensations of 
 red, blue, yellow, &c. 
 
 I'Ai/. It seems then the light doth no more than shake 
 the optic nerves. 
 
 Ify/. Nothing else. 
 
 P^t7. And, consequent to each particular motion of the 
 nerves, the mind is affected with a sensation, which is some 
 particular colour. 
 
 Ify/. Right. 
 
 /%//. And these sensations have no existence without the 
 mind. 
 
 Ifyl. They have not. 
 
 P/it7. How then do you affirm that colours are in the 
 light ; since by /I'g/if you understand a corporeal substance 
 external to the mind ? 
 
 Ify/. Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us, 
 I grant cannot exist without the mind. But, in themselves 
 they are only the motions and configurations of certain 
 insensible particles of matter. 
 
 /%//. Colours then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the 
 immediate objects of sight, cannot agree to any but a 
 perceiving substance. 
 
 Ify/ That is what I say. 
 
 J^M/. Well then, since you give up the point as to those 
 sensible qualities which are alone thought colours by all 
 mankind beside, you may hold what you please with 
 regard to those invisible ones of the philosophers. It is 
 not my business to dispute about them ; only I would 
 advise you to bethink yourself, whether, considering the 
 inquiry we are upon, it be prudent for you to affirm — //le
 
 138 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 red and blue which we see are not real colours, but certain 
 unknown motions and figures, which no matt ever did or can 
 see, are truly so. Are not these shocking notions, and 
 are not they subject to as many ridiculous inferences, as 
 those you were obhged to renounce before in the case of 
 sounds ? 
 
 ITyl. I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to stand 
 out any longer. Colours, sounds, tastes, in a word all those 
 termed secondary qualities, have certainly no existence with- 
 out the mind. But, by this acknowledgment I must not 
 be supposed to derogate anything from the reality of 
 Matter or external objects ; seeing it is no more than 
 several philosophers maintain, who nevertheless are the 
 farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For the clearer 
 understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities are 
 by philosophers divided into primary and secondary. The 
 former are Extension, Figure, Sohdity, Gravity, Motion, 
 and Rest. And these they hold exist really in bodies. 
 The latter are those above enumerated ; or, briefly, all sen- 
 sible qualities beside the Primary, which they assert are only 
 so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the 
 mind. But all this, I doubt not, you are apprised of. For 
 my part, I have been a long time sensible there was such 
 an opinion current among philosophers, but was never 
 thoroughly convinced of its truth until now. 
 
 Phil. You are still then of opinion that extension and 
 figures are inherent in external unthinking substances ? 
 
 Hyl. I am. 
 
 Phil. But what if the same arguments which are brought 
 against Secondary Qualities will hold good against these 
 also ? 
 
 Hyl. Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too exist 
 only in the mind. 
 
 Phil. Is it your opinion the very figure and extension
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 139 
 
 which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or 
 material substance ? 
 
 Hyi. It is. 
 
 Phil. Have all other animals as good grounds to think 
 the same of the figure and extension which they see and 
 feel? 
 
 Hyl. Without doubt, if they have any thought at all. 
 
 Phil. Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were 
 bestowed upon all animals for their preservation and well- 
 being in life ? or were they given to men alone for this end ? 
 
 Hyl. I make no question but they have the same use in 
 all other animals. 
 
 Phil. If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled 
 by them to perceive their own limbs, and those bodies which 
 are capable of harming them ? 
 
 Hyl. Certainly. 
 
 Phil. A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own 
 foot, and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of 
 some considerable dimension; though at the same time 
 they appear to you scarce discernible, or at best as so many 
 visible points ? 
 
 Hyl. I cannot deny it. 
 
 Phil. And to creatures less than the mite they will seem 
 yet larger ? 
 
 Hyl. They will. 
 
 Phil. Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will 
 to another extremely minute animal appear as some huge 
 mountain ? 
 
 Hyl. All this I grant. 
 
 Phil. Can one and the same thing be at the same time 
 in itself of different dimensions ? 
 
 Hyl. That were absurd to imagine. 
 
 Phil. But, from what you have laid down it follows that 
 both the extension by you perceived, and that perceived by 
 the mite itself, as likewise all those perceived by lesser
 
 I40 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 animals, are each of them the true extension of the mite's 
 foot ; that is to say, by your own principles, you are led into 
 an absurdity. 
 
 Hyl. There seems to be some difficulty in the point. 
 
 Fhi/. Again, have you not acknowledged that no real 
 inherent property of any object can be changed without 
 some change in the thing itself? 
 
 Hyl. I have. 
 
 Fhil. But, as we approach to or recede from an object, 
 the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or 
 a hundred times greater than at another. Doth it not 
 therefore follow from hence likewise that it is not really 
 inherent in the object ? 
 
 Hyl. I own I am at a loss what to think. 
 
 Fhil. Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will 
 venture to think as freely concerning this quality as you 
 have done concerning the rest. Was it not admitted as 
 a good argument, that neither heat nor cold was in the 
 water, because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to 
 the other ? 
 
 Hyl. It was. 
 
 Fhil. Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there 
 is no extension or figure in an object, because to one eye 
 it shall seem little, smooth, and round, when at the same 
 time it appears to the other, great, uneven, and angular ? 
 
 Hyl. The very same. But does this latter fact ever 
 happen ? 
 
 Fhil. You may at any time make the experiment, by 
 looking with one eye bare, and with the other through 
 a microscope. 
 
 Hyl. I know not how to maintain it, and yet I am loath 
 to give up extension, I see so many odd consequences 
 following upon such a concession. 
 
 Fhil. Odd, say you ? After the concessions already 
 made, I hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness.
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 141 
 
 But, on the other hand, should it not seem very odd, if the 
 general reasoning which includes all other sensible qualities 
 did not also include extension ? If it be allowed that no 
 idea nor anything like an idea can exist in an unperceiving 
 substance, then surely it follows that no figure or mode 
 of extension, which we can either perceive or imagine, or 
 have any idea of, can be really inherent in Matter ; not 
 to mention the peculiar difficulty there must be in conceiving 
 a material substance, prior to and distinct from extension, 
 to be the siibstratum of extension. Be the sensible quality 
 what it will — figure, or sound, or colour ; it seems alike 
 impossible it should subsist in that which doth not 
 perceive it. 
 
 Hyl. I give up the point for the present, reserving still 
 a right to retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter 
 discover any false step in my progress to it. 
 
 Phil. That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures and 
 extension being despatched, we proceed next to j/iotion. 
 Can a real motion in any external body be at the same time 
 both very swift and very slow ? 
 
 ByL It cannot. 
 
 Fhil. Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal 
 proportion to the time it takes up in describing any given 
 space ? Thus a body that describes a mile in an hour moves 
 three times faster than it would in case it described only 
 a mile in three hours. 
 
 Hyl. I agree with you. 
 
 Fhil. And is not time measured by the succession of ideas 
 in our minds ? 
 
 Byl. It is. 
 
 Fhil. And is it not possible ideas should succeed one 
 another twice as fast in your mind as they do in mine, or 
 in that of some spirit of another kind ? 
 
 Hyl. I own it. 
 
 Fhil. Consequently, the same body may to another seem
 
 T42 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 to perform its motion over any space in half the time that 
 it doth to you. And the same reasoning will hold as to any 
 other proportion : that is to say, according to your principles 
 (since the motions perceived are both really in the object) 
 it is possible one and the same body shall be really moved 
 the same way at once, both very swift and very slow. How 
 is this consistent either with common sense, or with what 
 you just now granted? 
 
 Hyl. I have nothing to say to it. 
 
 Phil. Then as for solidity ; either you do not mean any 
 sensible quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry : 
 or if you do, it must be either hardness or resistance. But 
 both the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses : 
 it being evident that what seems hard to one animal may 
 appear soft to another, who hath greater force and firmness 
 of limbs. Nor is it less plain that the resistance I feel 
 is not in the body. 
 
 Byl. I own the very sensation of resistance, which is all 
 you immediately perceive, is not in the body ; but the cause 
 of that sensation is. 
 
 Phil. But the causes of our sensations are not things 
 immediately perceived, and therefore not sensible. This 
 point I thought had been already determined. 
 
 Ilyl. I own it was ; but you will pardon me if I seem a 
 little embarrassed : I know not how to quit my old notions. 
 
 Phil. To help you out, do but consider that if extensiofi 
 be once acknowledged to have no existence without the 
 mind, the same must necessarily be granted of motion, 
 solidity, and gravity — since they all evidently suppose ex- 
 tension. It is therefore superfluous to inquire particularly 
 concerning each of them. In denying extension, you have 
 denied them all to have any real existence. 
 
 JJyl. I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why 
 those philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any 
 real existence, should yet attribute it to the Primary. If
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 143 
 
 there is no difference between them, how can this be 
 accounted for? 
 
 Phil. It is not my business to account for every opinion 
 of the philosophers. But, among other reasons which may 
 be assigned for this, it seems probable that pleasure and 
 pain being rather annexed to the former than the latter 
 may be one. Heat and cold, tastes and smells, have some- 
 thing more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the ideas 
 of extension, figure, and motion affect us with. And, it 
 being too visibly absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can 
 be in an unperceiving Substance, men are more easily 
 weaned from believing the external existence of the Secon- 
 dary than the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied 
 there is something in this, if you recollect the difference 
 you made between an intense and more moderate degree 
 of heat ; allowing the one a real existence, while you denied 
 it to the other. But, after all, there is no rational ground 
 for that distinction ; for, surely an indifferent sensation is as 
 truly a sensation as one more pleasing or painful ; and con- 
 sequently should not any more than they be supposed to 
 exist in an unthinking subject. 
 
 Hyl. It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have 
 somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and 
 sensible extension. Now, though it be acknowledged that 
 great and s/nali, consisting merely in the relation which 
 other extended beings have to the parts of our own bodies, 
 do not really inhere in the Substances themselves ; yet 
 nothing obliges us to hold the same with regard to absolute 
 extension, which is something abstracted from great and 
 stnall, from this or that particular magnitude or figure. So 
 likewise as to motion ; swift and slow are altogether relative 
 to the succession of ideas in our own minds. But, it doth 
 not follow, because those modifications of motion exist not 
 without the mind, that therefore absolute motion abstracted 
 from them doth not.
 
 144 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Phil. Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one 
 part of extension, from another? Is it not something sen- 
 sible, as some degree of swiftness or slowness, some certain 
 magnitude or figure peculiar to each ? 
 
 Hyl. I think so. 
 
 Phil. These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible 
 properties, are without all specific and numerical differences, 
 as the schools call them. 
 
 Hyl. They are. 
 
 Phil. That is to say, they are extension in general, and 
 motion in general. 
 
 Hyl. Let it be so. 
 
 Phil. But it is a universally received maxim that Every- 
 thing which exists is particular. How then can motion 
 in general, or extension in general, exist in any corporeal 
 Substance ? 
 
 Hyl. I will take time to solve your difficulty. 
 
 Phil. But I think the point may be speedily decided. 
 Without doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame 
 this or that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on 
 this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct 
 abstract idea of motion or extension ; divested of all 
 those sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, 
 round and square, and the like, which are acknowledged 
 to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you 
 contend for. But, if you cannot, it will be unreasonable 
 on your side to insist any longer upon what you have 
 no notion of. 
 
 Hyl. To confess ingenuously, I cannot. 
 
 Phil. Can you even separate the ideas of extension and 
 motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they who 
 make the distinction term secojidary ? 
 
 Hyl. What ! is it not an easy matter to consider extension 
 and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible 
 qualities ? Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them ?
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 1 45 
 
 FhiL I acknowledge, Bylas, it is not difficult to form 
 general propositions and reasonings about those qualities, 
 without mentioning any other ; and, in this sense, to con- 
 sider or treat of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow 
 that, because I can pronounce the word motiofi by itself, 
 I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body ? 
 Or, because theorems may be made of extension and figures, 
 without any mention of great or small, or any other sensible 
 mode or quality, that therefore it is possible such an abstract 
 idea of extension, without any particular size or figure, or 
 sensible quality, should be distinctly formed, and appre- 
 hended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, 
 without regarding what other sensible qualities it is attended 
 with, as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. 
 But, when laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare 
 ideas, I believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted 
 ideas of extension. 
 
 Ilyl. But what say you to pure intellect'^ May not 
 abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty ? 
 
 Phil. Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain 
 I cannot frame them by the help of pure intellect ; whatso- 
 ever faculty you understand by those words. Besides, not 
 to inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual 
 objects, as virtue, reason, God, or the like, thus much seems 
 manifest— that sensible things are only to be perceived by 
 sense, or represented by the imagination. Figures, there- 
 fore, and extension, being originally perceived by sense, 
 do not belong to pure intellect : but, for your farther 
 satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea of any figure, 
 abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other 
 sensible qualities. 
 
 Hyl. Let me think a little I do not find that I can. 
 
 Phil. And can you think it possible that should really 
 exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its con- 
 ception ? 
 
 L
 
 146 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Hyl. By no means. 
 
 Phil. Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind 
 to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other 
 sensible qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one exist 
 there necessarily the other exist likewise ? 
 
 Hyl. It should seem so. 
 
 Phil. Consequently, the very same arguments which you 
 admitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are, 
 without any farther application of force, against the Primary 
 too. Besides, if you will trust your senses, is it not plain 
 all sensible qualities coexist, or to them appear as being 
 in the same place ? Do they ever represent a motion, or 
 figure, as being divested of all other visible and tangible 
 qualities ? 
 
 Hyl. You need say no more on this head. I am free 
 to own, if there be no secret error or oversight in our 
 proceedings hitherto, that all sensible qualities are alike 
 to be denied existence without the mind. But, my fear is 
 that I have been too liberal in my former concessions, or 
 overlooked some fallacy or other. In short, I did not take 
 time to think. 
 
 Phil. For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time 
 you please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You 
 are at liberty to recover any slips you might have made, 
 or offer whatever you have omitted which makes for your 
 first opinion. 
 
 Hyl. One great oversight I take to be this — that I did 
 not sufficiently distinguish the object from the sensation. 
 Now, though this latter may not exist without the mind, 
 yet it will not thence follow that the former cannot. 
 
 Phil. What object do you mean ? The object of the 
 senses? 
 
 Hyl. The same. 
 
 Phil. It is then immediately perceived ? 
 
 Hyl. Right.
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES I47 
 
 Phil. Make me to understand the difference between 
 what is immediately perceived, and a sensation. 
 
 Hy/. The sensation I take to be an act of the mind per- 
 ceiving : besides which, there is something perceived ; and 
 this I call the object. For example, there is red and yellow 
 on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours 
 is in me only, and not in the tulip. 
 
 Phil. What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which 
 you see ? 
 
 Hyl. The same. 
 
 Phil. And what do you see beside colour, figure, and 
 extension ? 
 
 Hyl. Nothing. 
 
 Phil. What you would say then is that the red and yellow 
 are coexistent with the extension ; is it not ? 
 
 Hyl. That is not all ; I would say they have a real exist- 
 ence without the mind, in some unthinking substance. 
 
 Phil. That the colours are really in the tulip which I see 
 is manifest. Neither can it be denied that this tulip may 
 exist independent of your mind or mine ; but, that any 
 immediate object of the senses — that is, any idea, or com- 
 bination of ideas — should exist in an unthinking substance, 
 or exterior to all minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. 
 Nor can I imagine how this follows from what you said 
 just now, to wit, that the red and yellow were on the 
 tulip you saw, since you do not pretend to see that un- 
 thinking substance. 
 
 Hyl. You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our 
 inquiry from the subject. 
 
 Phil. I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. 
 To return then to your distinction between sensation and 
 object; if I take you right, you distinguish in every per- 
 ception two things, the one an action of the mind, the 
 other not. 
 
 Hyl True. 
 
 L 2
 
 148 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 F/iil. And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any 
 unthinking thing ; but, whatever beside is impHed in a 
 perception may ? 
 
 UyL That is my meaning. 
 
 Phil. So that if there was a perception without any act 
 of the mind, it were possible such a perception should exist 
 in an unthinking substance ? 
 
 Hyl. I grant it. But it is impossible there should be 
 such a perception. 
 
 Fkil. When is the mind said to be active ? 
 
 -Hyl. When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, 
 anything. 
 
 Phil. Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change 
 anything, but by an act of the will ? 
 
 Hyl. It cannot. 
 
 Phil. The mind therefore is to be accounted active in 
 its perceptions so far forth as volition is included in 
 them ? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. In plucking this flower I am active ; because I do 
 it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon 
 my volition ; so likewise in applying it to my nose. But is 
 either of these smelling ? 
 
 Hyl. No. 
 
 Phil. I act too in drawing the air through my nose ; 
 because my breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect 
 of my volition. But neither can this be called smelling : 
 for, if it were, I should smell every time I breathed in that 
 manner ? 
 
 Hyl. True. 
 
 Phil. Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this ? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil But I do not find my will concerned any farther. 
 Whatever more there is — as that I perceive such a particular 
 smell, or any smell at all — this is independent of my will.
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES T49 
 
 and therein I am altogether passive. Do you find it other- 
 wise with you, Hylas ? 
 
 Hyl. No, the very same. 
 
 Phil. Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open 
 your eyes, or keep them shut ; to turn them this or that 
 way ? 
 
 Hyl. Without doubt, 
 
 Phil. But, doth it in hke manner depend on your will 
 that in looking on this flower you perceive white rather than 
 any other colour? Or, directing your open eyes towards 
 yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun ? 
 Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition ? 
 
 Hyl. No certainly. 
 
 Phil. You are then in these respects altogether passive ? 
 
 Hyl. I am. 
 
 Phil. Tell me now, whether seeing consists in perceiving 
 light and colours, or in opening and turning the eyes ? 
 
 Hyl. Without doubt, in the former. 
 
 Phil. Since therefore you are in the very perception of 
 light and colours altogether passive, what is become of that 
 action you were speaking of as an ingredient in every sensa- 
 tion ? And, doth it not follow from your own concessions, 
 that the perception of light and colours, including no action 
 in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? And is not 
 this a plain contradiction ? 
 
 Hyl. I know not what to think of it. 
 
 Phil. Besides, since you distinguish the active 2CCi& passive 
 in every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But 
 liow is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you 
 please, should exist in an unperceiving substance ? In 
 short, do but consider the point, and then confess in- 
 genuously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c., 
 are not all equally passions or sensations in the soul. You 
 may indeed call them external objects, and give them in 
 words what subsistence you please. But, examine your
 
 150 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as 
 I say ? 
 
 Hyl. I acknowledge, Philonons, that, upon a fair observa- 
 tion of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else 
 but that I am a thinking being, affected with variety of sen- 
 sations ; neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation 
 should exist in an unperceiving substance. — But then, on 
 the other hand, when I look on sensible things in a different 
 view, considering them as so many modes and qualities, 
 I find it necessary to suppose a material substratum, without 
 which they cannot be conceived to exist. 
 
 Fhii. Material substratum call you it ? Pray, by which 
 of your senses came you acquainted with that being ? 
 
 Hyl. It is not itself sensible ; its modes and qualities 
 only being perceived by the senses. 
 
 Phil. I presume then it was by reflection and reason you 
 obtained the idea of it ? 
 
 HyL I do not pretend to any proper positive idea of it. 
 However, I conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be 
 conceived to exist without a support. 
 
 F/iil. It seems then you have only a relative notion of 
 it, or that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving 
 the relation it bears to sensible qualities ? 
 
 Hyl. Right. 
 
 Fhil. Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that 
 relation consists. 
 
 Hyl. Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term substratum, 
 or substance ? 
 
 Fhil. If so, the word substratum should import that it 
 is spread under the sensible qualities or accidents ? 
 
 Hyl True. 
 
 Fhil. And consequently under extension ? 
 
 Hyl. I own it. 
 
 Fhil. It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely 
 distinct from extension ?
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 151 
 
 Ifyi. I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter 
 is something that supports modes. And is it not evident 
 the thing supported is different from the thing supporting ? 
 
 Phi/. So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, 
 extension is supposed to be the substratum of extension ? 
 
 IfyL Just so. 
 
 Phil. Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without 
 extension ? or is not the idea of extension necessarily 
 included in spreading! 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under 
 anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the 
 extension of that thing under which it is spread ? 
 
 Hyl. It must. 
 
 Phil. Consequently, every corporeal substance being the 
 substratum of extension must have in itself another exten- 
 sion, by which it is qualified to be a substratum : and so on 
 to infinity ? And I ask whether this be not absurd in itself, 
 and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that 
 the substratufH was something distinct from and exclusive 
 of extension ? 
 
 Hyl. Aye but, Philonotcs, you take me wrong. I do not 
 mean that Matter is spread in a gross literal sense under 
 extension. The word substratum is used only to express 
 in general the same thing with substance. 
 
 Phil. Well then, let us examine the relation implied in 
 the term substance. Is it not that it stands under accidents ? 
 
 Hyl. The very same. 
 
 Phil. But, that one thing may stand under or support 
 another, must it not be extended ? 
 
 Hyl. It must. 
 
 Phil. Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same 
 absurdity with the former ? 
 
 Hyl. You still take things in a strict literal sense ; that 
 is not fair, Philonous.
 
 152 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Phil. I am not for imposing any sense on your words : 
 you are at liberty to explain them as you please. Only, 
 I beseech you, make me understand something by them. 
 You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents. 
 How ! is it as your legs support your body ? 
 
 Hyl. No ; that is the literal sense. 
 
 Phil. Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, 
 that you understand it in. . . . How long must I wait for 
 an answer, Hylas ? 
 
 Hyl. I declare I know not what to say. I once thought 
 I understood well enough what was meant by Matter's sup- 
 porting accidents. But now, the more I think on it the less 
 can I comprehend it ; in short I find that I know nothing 
 of it. 
 
 Phil. It seems then you have no idea at all, neither 
 relative nor positive, of Matter ; you know neither what 
 it is in itself, nor what relation it bears to accidents ? 
 
 Hyl. I acknowledge it. 
 
 Phil. And yet you asserted that you could not conceive 
 how qualities or accidents should really exist, without con- 
 ceiving at the same time a material support of them ? 
 
 Hyl. I did. 
 
 Phil. That is to say, when you conceive the real existence 
 of qualities, you do withal conceive something which you 
 cannot conceive ? 
 
 Hyl. I was wrong I own. But still I fear there is some 
 fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this ? It is just 
 come into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies 
 in your treating of each quality by itself. Now, I grant that 
 each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind. Colour 
 cannot without extension, neither can figure without some 
 other sensible quality. But, as the several qualities united 
 or blended together form entire sensible things, nothing 
 hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist 
 without the mind.
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 153 
 
 PAt'l Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad 
 memory. Though indeed we went through all the qualities 
 by name one after another ; yet my arguments, or rather 
 your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the 
 Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; 
 but, that they were not at all without the mind. Indeed, 
 in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could 
 not exist without the mind, because it was impossible even 
 in thought to separate the:B from all secondary qualities, so 
 as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this 
 was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion. 
 But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon 
 it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put 
 the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible 
 for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible 
 object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant 
 it actually to be so. 
 
 Hyl. If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. 
 What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing 
 by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind 
 whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them exist- 
 ing after that manner. 
 
 rhil. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which 
 is at the same time unseen ? 
 
 Hyl. No, that were a contradiction. 
 
 Phil. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving 
 a thing which is nnconceived} 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. The tree or house therefore which you think of is 
 conceived by you ? 
 
 Hyl. How should it be otherwise ? 
 
 Phil. And what is conceived is surely in the mind ? 
 
 Hyl. Without question, that which is conceived is in the 
 mind. 
 
 Phil. How then came you to say, you conceived a
 
 154 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 house or tree existing independent and out of all minds 
 whatsoever ? 
 
 Ifyl. That was I own an oversight ; but stay, let me 
 consider what led me into it. — It is a pleasant mistake 
 enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place 
 where no one was present to see it, methought that was 
 to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought 
 of— not considering that I myself conceived it all the 
 while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to 
 frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive 
 in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or 
 a mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving 
 that I can conceive them existing out of the minds of all 
 Spirits 
 
 Phil. You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly 
 conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist 
 otherwise than in a mind ? 
 
 Hyl. I do. 
 
 Phil. And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth 
 of that which you cannot so much as conceive ? 
 
 Hyl. I profess I know not what to think ; but still there 
 are some scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I see 
 things at a distance ? Do we not perceive the stars and 
 moon, for example, to be a great way off? Is not this, I say, 
 manifest to the senses ? 
 
 Phil. Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the 
 like objects ? 
 
 Hyl. I do. 
 
 Phil. And have they not then the same appearance of 
 being distant ? 
 
 Hyl. They have. 
 
 Phil. But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in 
 a dream to be without the mind ? 
 
 Hyl. By no means. 
 
 Phil. You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 1 55 
 
 objects are without the mind, from their appearance or 
 manner wherein they are perceived. 
 
 Hyl. I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive 
 me in those cases ? 
 
 FkiL By no means. The idea or thing which you imme- 
 diately perceive, neither sense nor reason informs you that 
 it actually exists without the mind. By sense you only know 
 that you are affected with such certain sensations of light 
 and colours, &:c. And these you will not say are without 
 the mind. 
 
 Hy/. True : but, beside all that, do you not think the 
 sight suggests something of outness or distance ? 
 
 Phil. Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible 
 size and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the 
 same at all distances ? 
 
 JJyl. They are in a continual change. 
 
 Fhii. Sight therefore doth not suggest or any way inform 
 you that the visible object you immediately perceive exists 
 at a distance, or will be perceived when you advance 
 farther onward ; there being a continued series of visible 
 objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your 
 approach. 
 
 Hyi. It doth not ; but still I know, upon seeing an object, 
 what object I shall perceive after having passed over a 
 certain distance : no matter whether it be exactly the same 
 or no : there is still something of distance suggested in 
 the case. 
 
 Phil. Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, 
 and then tell me whether there be any more in it than this : 
 — From the ideas you actually perceive by sight, you have 
 by experience learned to collect what other ideas you will 
 (according to the standing order of nature) be affected with, 
 after such a certain succession of time and motion. 
 
 Nyl. Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else. 
 
 Phil. Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born
 
 156 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 blind was on a sudden made to see, he could at first have 
 no experience of what may be suggested by sight ? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. He would not then, according to you, have any 
 notion of distance annexed to the things he saw ; but would 
 take them for a new set of sensations existing only in his 
 mind ? 
 
 Hyl. It is undeniable. 
 
 Fhil. But, to make it still more plain : is not distance 
 a line turned endwise to the eye? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. And can a line so situated be perceived by sight ? 
 
 Hyl. It cannot. 
 
 Phil. Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not 
 properly and immediately perceived by sight ? 
 
 Hyl. It should seem so. 
 
 Phil. Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a 
 distance ? 
 
 Hyl. It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind. 
 
 Phil. But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting 
 in the same place with extension and figures ? 
 
 Hyl. They do. 
 
 Phil. How can you then conclude from sight that figures 
 exist without, when you acknowledge colours do not ; the 
 sensible appearance being the very same with regard to both ? 
 
 Hyl. I know not what to answer. 
 
 Phil. But, allowing that distance was truly and imme- 
 diately perceived by the mind, yet it would not thence 
 follow it existed out of the mind. For, whatever is 
 immediately perceived is an idea : and can any idea exist 
 out of the mind ? 
 
 Hyl. To suppose that were absurd : but, inform me, 
 Phi/o?ioiis, can we perceive or know nothing beside our 
 ideas ? 
 
 Phi/. As for the rational deducing of causes from effects.
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 1 57 
 
 that is beside our inquiry. And, by the senses you can best 
 tell whether you perceive anything which is not immediately 
 perceived. And I ask you, whether the things immediately 
 perceived are other than your own sensations or ideas? 
 You have indeed more than once, in the course of this 
 conversation, declared yourself on those points ; but you 
 seem, by this last question, to have departed from what 
 you then thought. 
 
 Hy/. To speak the truth, Fhilofious, I think there are two 
 kinds of objects :^the one perceived immediately, which 
 are likewise called ideas ; the other are real things or external 
 objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are their 
 images and representations. Now, I own ideas do not exist 
 without the mind ; but the latter sort of objects do. I am 
 sorry I did not think of this distinction sooner ; it would 
 probably have cut short your discourse. 
 
 Phi/. Are those external objects perceived by sense, or 
 by some other faculty ? 
 
 J/yl. They are perceived by sense. 
 
 Phil. How ! is there anything perceived by sense which 
 is not immediately perceived ? 
 
 Hyl. Yes, P/ii/o//ous, in some sort there is. For example, 
 when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may 
 be said after a manner to perceive him (though not imme- 
 diately) by my senses. 
 
 PAH. It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone 
 are immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things : 
 and that these also are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they 
 have a conformity or resemblance to our ideas ? 
 
 I/y/. That is my meaning. 
 
 P/ii/. And, in the same way that Julius Ccesar, in himself 
 invisible, is nevertheless perceived by sight ; real things, 
 in themselves imperceptible, are perceived by sense. 
 
 Ify/. In the very same. 
 
 Pki/. Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of
 
 158 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Julius Caesar, do you see with your eyes any more than some 
 colours and figures, with a certain symmetry and composi- 
 tion of the whole ? 
 
 Uyl. Nothing else. 
 
 Fhii. And would not a man who had never known 
 anything of Julius Caesar see as much ? 
 
 Jlyl. He would. 
 
 Fhil. Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, 
 in as perfect a degree as you ? 
 
 Hy/. I agree with you. 
 
 Fhil. Whence comes it then that your thoughts are 
 directed to the Roman emperor, and his are not ? This 
 cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of sense by 
 you then perceived ; since you acknowledge you have no 
 advantage over him in that respect. It should seem 
 therefore to proceed from reason and memory : should 
 it not ? 
 
 Byl. It should. 
 
 Fhil. Consequently, it will not follow from that instance 
 that anything is perceived by sense which is not immediately 
 perceived. Though I grant we may, in one acceptation, be 
 said to perceive sensible things mediately by sense — that is, 
 when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the immediate 
 perception of ideas by one sense suggests to the mind others, 
 perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be 
 connected with them. For instance, when I hear a coach 
 drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only the 
 sound ; but, from the experience I have had that such 
 a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the 
 coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strict- 
 ness, nothing can be heard but sound ; and the coach is not 
 then properly perceived by sense, but suggested from 
 experience. So likewise when we are said to see a red- 
 hot bar of iron ; the solidity and heat of the iron are not 
 the objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 159 
 
 colour and figure which are properly perceived by that sense. 
 In short, those things alone are actually and strictly per- 
 ceived by any sense, which would have been perceived in 
 case that same sense had then been first conferred on us. 
 As for other things, it is plain they are only suggested to the 
 mind by experience, grounded on former perceptions. But, 
 to return to your comparison of Caesar's picture, it is plain, 
 if you keep to that, you must hold the real things or arche- 
 types of our ideas are not perceived by sense, but by some 
 internal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory. I would 
 therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from 
 reason for the existence of what you call real things or 
 material objects. Or, whether you remember to have seen 
 them formerly as they are in themselves ; or, if you have 
 heard or read of any one that did. 
 
 Hyl. I see, Philonotis, you are disposed to raillery ; but 
 that will never convince me. 
 
 Phil. My aim is only to learn from you the way to come 
 at the knowledge of f/iaterial beings. Whatever we perceive 
 is perceived immediately or mediately : by sense ; or by 
 reason and reflection. But, as you have excluded sense, 
 pray shew me what reason you have to believe their exist- 
 ence ; or what medium you can possibly make use of to 
 prove it, either to mine or your own understanding. 
 
 Hyl. To deal ingenuously, Fhilonous, now I consider the 
 point, I do not find I can give you any good reason for it. 
 But, thus much seems pretty plain, that it is at least possible 
 such things may really exist. And, as long as there is no 
 absurdity in supposing them, I am resolved to believe as 
 I did, till you bring good reasons to the contrary. 
 
 Phil. What ! is it come to this, that you only believe the 
 existence of material objects, and that your belief is founded 
 barely on the possibility of its being true ? Then you will 
 have me bring reasons against it : though another would 
 think it reasonable the proof should lie on him who holds
 
 l6o SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 the affirmative. And, after all, this very point which you 
 are now resolved to maintain, without any reason, is in effect 
 what you have more than once during this discourse seen 
 good reason to give up. But, to pass over all this ; if 
 I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not exist 
 without the mind ; but that they are copies, images, or 
 representations, of certain originals that do ? 
 
 Ify/. You take me right. 
 
 Phi/. They are then like external things ? 
 
 Hyl. They are. 
 
 Phi/. Have those things a stable and permanent nature, 
 independent of our senses ; or are they in a perpetual 
 change, upon our producing any motions in our bodies — 
 suspending, exerting, or altering, our faculties or organs 
 of sense ? 
 
 Jifyl. Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, 
 which remains the same notwithstanding any change in our 
 senses, or in the posture and motion of our bodies ; which 
 indeed may affect the ideas in our minds, but it were absurd 
 to think they had the same effect on things existing without 
 the mind. 
 
 Phil. How then is it possible that things perpetually 
 fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies or images 
 of anything fixed and constant? Or, in other words, since 
 all sensible qualities, as size, figure, colour, &c., that is, our 
 ideas, are continually changing upon every alteration in the 
 distance, medium, or instruments of sensation ; how can 
 any determinate material objects be properly represented 
 or painted forth by several distinct things, each of which 
 is so different from and unlike the rest? Or, if you 
 say it resembles some one only of our ideas, how shall 
 we be able to distinguish the true copy from all the false 
 ones ? 
 
 Hyl. I profess, Phi/onous, I am at a loss. I know not 
 what to say to this.
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES l6l 
 
 Fhil. But neither is this all. Which are material objects 
 in themselves — perceptible or imperceptible ? 
 
 Hyl. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived 
 but ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves 
 insensible, and to be perceived only by our ideas. 
 
 Phi/. Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or 
 originals insensible ? 
 
 Hy/. Right. 
 
 Phi/. But how can that which is sensible be like that 
 which is insensible ? Can a real thing, in itself invisible, 
 be like a colour ; or a real thing, which is not audible, be 
 like a sound} In a word, can anything be like a sensation 
 or idea, but another sensation or idea ? 
 
 Hyl. I must own, I think not. 
 
 Phil. Is it possible there should be any doubt on the 
 point ? Do you not perfectly know your own ideas ? 
 
 Byl. I know them perfectly ; since what I do not perceive 
 or know can be no part of my idea. 
 
 Phil. Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then 
 tell me if there be anything in them which can exist without 
 the mind ? or if you can conceive anything like them existing 
 without the mind ? 
 
 Hyl. Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to 
 conceive or understand how anything but an idea can be 
 like an idea. And it is most evident that no idea can exist 
 ivithout the mind. 
 
 Phil. You are therefore, by your principles, forced to 
 deny the reality of sensible things : since you made it to 
 consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind. 
 That is to say, you are a downright sceptic. So I have 
 gained my point, which was to shew your principles led 
 to Scepticism. 
 
 Hyl. You say your own soul supplies you with some sort 
 of an idea or image of God. But, at the same time, you 
 
 M
 
 1 62 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 acknowledge you have, properly speaking, no idea of your 
 own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a sort of beings 
 altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea 
 can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any 
 spirit. You admit nevertheless that there is spiritual 
 Substance, although you have no idea of it ; while you 
 deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, 
 because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair 
 dealing? To act consistently, you must either admit 
 Matter or reject Spirit. What say you to this ? 
 
 Phil. I say, in the first place, that I do not deny the 
 existence of material substance, merely because I have no 
 notion of it, but because the notion of it is inconsistent ; 
 or, in other words, because it is repugnant that there should 
 be a notion of it. Many things, for ought I know, may 
 exist, whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can have 
 any idea or notion whatsoever. But then those things must 
 be possible ; that is, nothing inconsistent must be included 
 in their definition. I say, secondly, that, although we 
 believe things to exist which we do not perceive, yet we 
 may not believe that any particular thing exists, without 
 some reason for such belief: but I have no reason for 
 beheving the existence of Matter. I have no immediate 
 intuition thereof : neither can I immediately from my 
 sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or passions, infer an 
 unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance — either by 
 probable deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas 
 the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or 
 thinking principle, I evidently know by reflection. You 
 will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer to the 
 same objections. In the very notion or definition of 
 material Substance, there is included a manifest repugnance 
 and inconsistency. But this cannot be said of the notion 
 of Spirit. That ideas should exist in what doth not per- 
 ceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is repugnant.
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 163 
 
 But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should 
 be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them. 
 It is granted we have neither an immediate evidence nor 
 a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of other finite 
 spirits ; but it will not thence follow that such spirits are 
 on a foot with material substances : if to suppose the one 
 be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to suppose the 
 other ; if the one can be inferred by no argument, and 
 there is a probability for the other ; if we see signs and 
 effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves, and 
 see no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational 
 belief of material Substance. I say, lastly, that I have a 
 notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an 
 idea of it. I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means of 
 an idea, but know it by reflection. 
 
 Hyl. Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems 
 that, according to your own way of thinking, and in conse- 
 quence of your own principles, it should follow iha.tyou are 
 only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to 
 support them. Words are not to be used without a meaning. 
 And as there is no more meaning in spiritual Substance 
 than in material Substance^ the one is to be exploded as well 
 as the other. 
 
 Phil. How often must I repeat, that I know or am 
 conscious of my own being; and that I myself diXn not my 
 ideas, but somewhat else — a thinking, active principle that 
 perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas. I know 
 that I, one and the same self, perceive both colours and 
 sounds : that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound 
 a colour : that I am therefore one individual principle, 
 distinct from colour and sound ; and, for the same reason, 
 from all other sensible things and inert ideas. But, I am 
 not in like manner conscious either of the existence or 
 essence of Matter. On the contrary, I know that nothing 
 inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter 
 
 M 2
 
 164 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 implies an inconsistency. Farther, I know what I mean 
 when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support 
 of ideas ; that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. 
 But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an 
 unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports 
 either ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is there- 
 fore upon the whole no parity of case between Spirit and 
 Matter. 
 
 Hyl. I must needs own, Fkilonons, nothing seems to 
 have kept me from agreeing with you more than somehow 
 mistakitig the question. In denying Matter, at first glimpse 
 I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and 
 feel : but, upon reflection, find there is no ground for it. 
 What think you, therefore, of retaining the name Matter, 
 and applying it to sensible things} This may be done 
 without any change in your sentiments : and, believe me, 
 it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons 
 who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than 
 in opinion. 
 
 Phil. With all my heart : retain the word Matter, and 
 apply it to the objects of sense, if you please ; provided 
 you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from 
 their being perceived. I shall never quarrel with you for 
 an expression. Matter, or material substance, are terms 
 introduced by philosophers ; and, as used by them, imply 
 a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being 
 perceived by a mind : but are never used by common 
 people ; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of 
 sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the names 
 of all particular things, with the terms sensible, siibstance, 
 body, stuff, and the like, are retained, the word Matter 
 should be never missed in common talk. And in philo- 
 sophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite 
 out : since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that hath
 
 A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 165 
 
 more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the 
 mind towards Atheism than the use of that general confused 
 term. 
 
 Hy/. "Well but, Fhilonous, since I am content to give up 
 the notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind, 
 I think you ought not to deny me the privilege of using the 
 word Matter as I please, and annexing it to a collection of 
 sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind. I freely own 
 there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than Spirit. 
 But I have been so long accustomed to the term Matter 
 that I know not how to part with it. To say, there is no 
 Matter in the world, is still shocking to me. Whereas one 
 may say, There is no Matter, if by that term be meant an 
 unthinking substance existing without the mind : but if by 
 Matter is meant some sensible thing, whose existence 
 consists in being perceived, then there is Matter. This 
 distinction gives it quite another turn ; and men will come 
 into your notions with small difficulty, when they are pro- 
 posed in that manner. For, after all, the controversy about 
 Matter, in the strict acceptation of it, lies altogether between 
 you and the philosophers : whose Principles, I acknowledge, 
 are not near so natural, or so agreeable to the common 
 sense of mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. There 
 is nothing we either desire or shun but as it makes, or 
 is apprehended to make, some part of our happiness or 
 misery. But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief, 
 pleasure or pain, to do with Absolute Existence ; or with 
 unknown Entities, abstracted from all relation to us ? It is 
 evident, things regard us only as they are pleasing or dis- 
 pleasing : and they can please or displease only so far forth 
 as they are perceived. Farther, therefore, we are not con- 
 cerned ; and thus far you leave things as you found them. 
 Yet still there is something new in this doctrine. It is plain, 
 I do not now think with the philosophers, nor yet altogether 
 with the vulgar. I would know how the case stands in that
 
 l66 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 respect ; precisely, what you have added to, or altered in 
 my former notions. 
 
 Fhii. I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. 
 My endeavours tend only to unite and place in a clearer 
 light that truth which was before shared between the vulgar 
 and the philosophers :— the former being of opinion, that 
 those things they itnmediately perceive are the real things ; 
 and the latter, that the things immediately perceived are ideas 
 which exist only in the mind. Which two notions, put 
 together, do, in effect, constitute the substance of what 
 I advance. 
 
 Hyl. I have been a long time distrusting my senses : 
 methought I saw things by a dim light, and through false 
 glasses. Now the glasses are removed, and a new light 
 breaks in upon my understanding. I am clearly convinced 
 that I see things in their native forms, and am no longer 
 in pain about their unknotvn tiatures or absolute existeiice. 
 This is the state I find myself in at present : though, indeed, 
 the course that brought me to it I do not yet thoroughly 
 comprehend. You set out upon the same principles that 
 Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually do ; and 
 for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their 
 Philosophical Scepticism ; but, in the end, your conclusions 
 are directly opposite to theirs. 
 
 Phil. You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how 
 it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height ; 
 at which it breaks, and falls back into the basin from whence 
 it rose ; its ascent as well as descent proceeding from 
 the same uniform law or principle of gravitation. Just 
 so, the same Principles which, at first view, lead to 
 Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back 
 to Common Sense.
 
 SECOND PART 
 
 THE VISIBLE WORLD 
 
 A DIVINE LANGUAGE INTERPRETED 
 IN SCIENCE 
 
 SELECTIONS FROM 
 
 BERKELEY'S ' NEW THEORY OF VISION,' ' ALCIPHRON, 
 
 OR THE MINUTE PHILOSOPHER,' AND THE 
 
 ' THEORY OF VISION VINDICATED ' 
 
 Mens agitat molem. — Virgil.
 
 PREFATORY NOTE ^ 
 
 The Essay toivards a New Theory of Vision was pub- 
 lished in 1709, a year before the Principles. It is the first 
 in chronological order of those writings of Berkeley, illus- 
 trated in the Second Part of the Selections, which,— osten- 
 sibly concerned with the Visible World, the psychology of 
 the Senses and sense-suggestion, — treat by implication of 
 the philosophy of Science, and ultimately of our knowledge 
 of God. Twenty-three years after the publication of the 
 juvenile Theory of Vision, theological inferences involved 
 in that theory were deduced in Alciphron, or the Alinute 
 Philosopher, in a Dialogue on the Visible World interpreted 
 as the language of God. And in the following year this 
 thought was pursued in the Theory of Visual Language 
 Further Vindicated and Explained. The selections which 
 follow are taken from those three works, which are 
 harmonised by the foregoing Philosophical Principles, 
 
 According to Berkeley's Principles, the supposition that 
 matter really exists independently of a percipient mind is 
 unintelligible : it involves the absurdity of experience exist- 
 ing without any one living to realise the experience. 
 
 Yet all bodies exist ' without mind,' if what is meant
 
 170 PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 by ' without ' is, that they exist ' in space.' And that they 
 exist in space, or consist of partes extra partes, cannot be 
 doubted. Do we not see them so existing in seeing that 
 they are extended ; and also in seeing that each extra- 
 organic body is placed relatively to other extra-organic 
 bodies, and to the living body of the percipient? Now 
 what, Berkeley asks, is the deepest or most real meaning of 
 'outness' or 'externality'; and is the outivardness of bodies 
 originally seen ? This question leads us into the heart of 
 the psychology of perception. 
 
 The Netv Theory of Vision is so far Berkeley's answer. 
 But in it he holds in reserve the bolder doctrine of his 
 book of Principles — that the material world cannot in any 
 of its qualities exist really out of living perception : he is 
 satisfied with the more limited thesis, that coloured extension 
 is dependent on a percipient who can see. The claim to 
 independent externality on behalf of what is perceived by 
 touch is meanwhile postponed. He argues that, because 
 outwardness is unintelligible apart from the experience we 
 have when we touch things and move our bodies, therefore 
 it cannot be perceived originally by sight. This Theory 
 may be examined critically by the student, as a central part 
 of the psychology that relates to the Senses and the rise of 
 sense-perception into physical science. 
 
 Berkeley's account of the Visible World advances from 
 the things of sense in their relation to our organism, 
 through their natural laws as interpreted in the physical 
 sciences, to our faith in Universal Mind, as the philo- 
 sophical explanation of all changes of the sensible world, 
 and therefore the ultimate rationale of sense-perception. So 
 our power of seeing things in ' ambient space ' is virtually 
 a power of seeing signs of the constant agency of God. He 
 thus rises reflectively from Sense to Intellect. 
 
 The Essay on Vision was the first elaborate attempt to 
 \ show that our ordinary visual perceptions of extended things
 
 PREFATORY NOTE 171 
 
 are not our original perceptions of Sight ; that they are 
 expectations which, by ' suggestion,' are connected with what 
 we see, so that sight becomes foresight. According to 
 Adam Smith this theory is ' one of the finest examples of 
 philosophical analysis that is to be found either in our 
 own or in any other language.' ' Whatever I say upon the 
 subject,' he adds, ' if not directly borrowed from Berkeley, 
 has been suggested by what he has said.' Berkeley traces 
 the early growth of our real knowledge of space, in its 
 three dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness, to ideas 
 or sensations of contact, muscular resistance, and locomotive 
 effort that are suggested by visual ideas or sensations, 
 with which they have been connected in our experience. 
 The former in process of time by habit come to do duty 
 for the latter, so that we can be ' admonished by what we 
 see of what sensations of touch will affect us, at such and 
 such distances of time, in consequence of such and such 
 actions.' 
 
 Berkeley starred with the permitted assumption that 
 Colour is the proper and immediate object of sight. With- 
 out denying that the colour we see is superficially extended, 
 he analysed coloured extension, in order to show that it is 
 different in kind from the extension presented to us in 
 touch, in which he supposes that real ' outness ' consists. 
 He argues that when one sees a thing ' at a distance,' he is 
 really foreseeing coming sensations of which what he sees 
 is the sign. Seeing becomes predicting. If people never 
 experienced locomotive sensations, they could not under- 
 stand what the word Space means ; for it means room to 
 move in, — an idea we could not have had without experi- 
 ence of movement. The so-called ' sight ' of outwardness 
 is therefore a power of interpreting visual phenomena. This 
 power, he further argues, is {a) not instinctive ; {p) nor so 
 connected with what we originally see that it can be 
 realised a priori: it is {c) gradually suggested, in the same
 
 172 PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 way as words spontaneously suggest meanings in human 
 languages. 
 
 This is the answer given by Berkeley to the question, 
 How it comes to pass that we /earn to perceive, by what we 
 see, what is not seen ; and what neither resembles, nor 
 causes, nor is caused by, nor has any necessary connexion 
 with what is seen ? This answer implies that what we see 
 is connected with its tactual meaning by natural law ; not 
 merely by the tendency to associate ideas that have by 
 accident often been together in our experience. The ulti- 
 mate reason of Law in Nature, or the philosophy of natural 
 Science (almost unconsciously on the part of Berkeley) is 
 thus proposed for reflection. Natural law is resolved into 
 divinely established connexion among the phenomena or 
 ideas of which nature is composed : this connexion is said 
 to be 'arbitrary,' because God might have made the law 
 different. This arbitrariness is what Berkeley intends in 
 his metaphor of external nature as ' Visual Language.' 
 But the ' arbitrariness ' must not be confounded with 
 caprice ; for it means the perfectly rational will of the 
 Divine Agent. An important difference between the words 
 of men, and the words daily addressed to us by God in the 
 providential language of the senses is, that the connexion 
 between human words and their meanings is due to human 
 convention, whereas the connexion between what we see 
 and the experience ivhich in consequence we expect is grounded 
 on faith in the reason of God. As he puts it, 'visible 
 ideas are the language whereby the Governing Spirit, on 
 whom we depend, informs us what tangible ideas He is 
 about to imprint upon us, in case we excite this or that 
 motion in our own bodies.' When applied to the phe- 
 nomena presented in the five senses, and not merely in 
 sight, this implies that Order in Nature is the expression 
 of Divine Rational Will — that the Natural Government of 
 things is subordinate in the Divine System of the Universe
 
 PREFATORY NOTE 1 73 
 
 to the Moral Government of persons — and that knowledge 
 of the natural laws of the material world cannot be a priori 
 in a human mind, but must be formed by experiment. 
 
 Berkeley's psychological analysis of seeing implies that if 
 a person born blind were suddenly endowed with sight, he 
 could at first have no knowledge of visual outness ; that 
 the visible world must all seem to be ' in his mind,' prior 
 to further experience. This is a 'conclusion which might 
 be tested by experiments on individuals as well as by mental 
 analysis. Appropriate tests would be — {a) cases of born- 
 blind persons who have been made to see ; {p) the imagina- 
 tion of space found in the born-blind ; {c) experiments on 
 persons able to see, but who had no sense of movement 
 (if such persons could be found) ; [d) facts of sight in human 
 infants ; {e) in the lower animals. Berkeley contributes no 
 original observations gathered on any of these fields. 
 
 His discussions on Visual Signs and their interpretation 
 may be used by the student as aids to the study of the 
 human mind in its ascent from the Five Senses and their 
 original perceptions, by development of the perceptions in 
 sensuous Imagination through Suggestion ; discovery of 
 laws in Nature, with the ground of scientific inferences ; all 
 culminating in recognition of the relation between natural 
 order and the Supreme Active Reason that operates beyond 
 and within Nature. 
 
 In the ' Dialogue on Visual Language ' which follows the 
 selections from the ' New Theory,' the subject is unfolded 
 in its theological relations. The significant phenomena pre- 
 sented in sight are taken as striking illustrations of the 
 omnipresent agency of God, and as affording the same 
 sort of assurance of this as we have of the presence of our 
 fellow men when they stand before us and speak to us. 
 Accordingly all causation in the universe centres in Spirit.
 
 174 PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 I have appended to the Second Part some extracts from 
 Berkeley's ' Vindication ' of the conception of Vision as 
 Divine Language — the last philosophical publication of his 
 middle life, which appeared in 1733, in which, with added 
 explanations, the subject is presented in some fresh lights. 
 
 The rationale of Theism that is offered in Berkeley's 
 visual psychology lies in his treatment of Natural Order 
 as virtually omnipresent active Intelligence. Perhaps he 
 leaves too much in the background the still deeper con- 
 ception of Omnipotent Goodness in the omnipresent In- 
 telligence, or the ethical presupposition that is implied in 
 confidence in natural law and in the original constitution 
 of man. His appeal is to our physical rather than to our 
 moral experience.
 
 I. A NEW THEORY OF VISION 
 
 1. My design is {a) to shew the manner wherein we 
 perceive by Sight the Distance, Magnitude, and Situation of 
 objects ; also ib) to consider the difference there is betwixt 
 the ideas of Sight and Touch, and whether there be any 
 idea common to both senses '. 
 
 2. It is, I think, agreed by all that Distance, of itself and 
 immediately, cannot be seen. For, distance being a line 
 directed endwise to the eye, it projects only one point in the 
 fund of the eye, which point remains invariably the same, 
 whether the distance be longer or shorter ^. 
 
 * The design is, to compare the phenomena immediately presented in 
 Sight with those immediately presented in Touch, and to show how 
 we learn gradually in seeing to apprehend invisible phenomena of the 
 natural world. It is an analysis of the genesis of an adult perception 
 of visible things. It is founded upon deductions from the laws and 
 tendencies of the human mind, as these operate in the adult, but are 
 assumed to be latent in infancy. From this we are naturally led 
 to consider the office of all the Senses, and the development of sense- 
 perception in the formation of Icnowledge, in connexion %vith our 
 analysis of Sight, ' the most perfect and delightful ' of them. 
 
 * Sect. 2-51 explain how we seem to * see' Distance, or an interval 
 between two points, one of which is invisible. Sect. 2 takes for 
 granted, but without distinct proof or definition of terms, that distance 
 is necessarily invisible directly, and that it can be seen only through the 
 medium of visual signs by which it is suggested. Now the ' distance '
 
 176 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 3. I find it also acknowledged that the estimate we make 
 of the distance of objects considerably remote is rather an act 
 of judgment ^ grounded on experience than of sense. For 
 example, when I perceive a great number of intermediate 
 objects, such as houses, fields, rivers, and the like, which 
 I have experienced to take up a considerable space, I thence 
 form a judgment or conclusion, that the object I see beyond 
 them is at a great distance. Again, when an object appears 
 faint and small which at a near distance I have experienced 
 to make a vigorous and large appearance, I instantly con- 
 clude it to be far off. — And this, it is evident, is the result 
 of experience ; without which, from the faintness and little- 
 ness, I should not have inferred anything concerning the 
 distance of objects ^. 
 
 intended seems to be space in its third dimension, i. e. depth, or 
 outness from the eye in the line of sight ; not superficial extension. 
 In relation to the distance which cannot be seen — viz. depth, or distance 
 which is in the line of sight — the percipient is supposed to be at the 
 end of a straight line, the interval between the two extremes of which 
 must be invisible, because only one of them can be present. When 
 we see superficial distance, on the other hand, we are at the side, and not 
 at the end of the line — at a point where the distance forms a larger or 
 smaller angle with the eye ; so that this sort of distance is called 
 lateral, transverse, or atigiilar. Any distance that is strictly in the line 
 of sight, in order to become visible, must, by a change in the point of 
 view of the percipient, be as it were transformed into lateral distance, 
 i.e. from a relation in the third dimension of space into plane superficial 
 extension. But it has then ceased to be the sort of distance that is 
 invisible. 
 
 Some of Berkeley's critics have referred to sect. 2 as if it fully stated 
 his famous ' theory of vision,' and also his 'argument in support of it.' 
 It is merely a statement of one of the alleged facts on which the theory 
 rests. 
 
 ^ See the account of what Locke calls judgnient (i. e. faith in 
 probability), in his Essay, b. IV. eh. 14, 15, 16. Like Berkeley here, 
 Locke opposes it, as ' grounded on experience ' with its contingencies, 
 to knowledge proper, which is formed by intuition or by demonstration. 
 
 ^ What does Berkeley here and in what follows intend by ' tiecessary 
 connexion '? Is it only a factitious, a posteriori ntctssiiy ; generated, as 
 Hume would say, by custom in nature, and coirelative habits of the 
 individual, and of the race ? Or is it a necessity due to the eternal con-
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 177 
 
 4. But, when an object is placed at so near a distance 
 as that the interval between the eyes bears any sensible 
 proportion to it, the opinion of speculative men is, that 
 the two optic axes (the fancy that we see only with one 
 eye at once being exploded), concurring at the object, do 
 there make an angle, by means of which, according as it 
 is greater or lesser, the object is perceived to be nearer or 
 farther off. 
 
 5. Betwixt which and the foregoing manner of estimating 
 distance there is this remarkable difference ;^that, whereas 
 there was no apparent necessary^ connexion between small 
 distance and a large and strong appearance, or between 
 great distance and a little and faint appearance, there 
 appears a very necessary connexion between an obtuse 
 angle and near distance, and an acute angle and farther 
 distance. It does not in the least depend upon experience, 
 but may be evidently known by any one before he had 
 experienced it, that the nearer the concurrence of the 
 optic axes the greater the angle, and the remoter their 
 concurrence is the lesser will be the angle comprehended 
 by them ^. 
 
 stitution of things ? That it is meant to be more than the former seems 
 implied in the subsequent analysis of our faith in the actual laws of 
 nature into ' suggestion ' determined by custom. Necessity he illustrates 
 by pure mathematics ; although the outcome of the Essay tends to refer 
 mathematical necessity itself to the will of God. 
 
 ' What artists call aerial and linear perspectives are here taken as 
 acknowledged signs of ' considerably remote ' distances. But the main 
 question is, the manner in which we learn to see near distances in the 
 line of sight outwards. In Berkeley's day even, it was 'agreed by all ' 
 that ' the remoter distances ' outwards are ' suggested ' by ' arbitrary 
 signs' ; near distances were supposed to be demonstrated from (not 
 merely suggested by) eternally necessary relations of lines and angles. 
 This last supposition Berkeley proceeds to refute in the following 
 sections. 
 
 ^ Here again, what sort of necessity 'does he intend in the connexion 
 (§§ 6) 7) between angles and distances, and between divergency of 
 rays and degrees of distance ? The varieties in the possible meaning 
 
 N
 
 178 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 6. There is another way, mentioned by optic writers, 
 whereby they will have us judge of those distances in 
 respect of which the breadth of the pupil hath any sensible 
 bigness. And that is the greater or lesser divergency of 
 the rays, which, issuing from the visible point, do fall on 
 the pupil — that point being judged nearest which is seen 
 by most diverging rays, and that remoter which is seen by 
 less diverging rays ; and so on, the apparent distance still 
 increasing, as the divergency of the rays decreases, till at 
 length it becomes infinite when the rays that fall on the 
 pupil are to sense parallel. And after this manner it is said 
 we perceive distance when we look only with one eye. 
 
 7. In this case also it is plain we are not beholden to 
 experience : it being a certain, necessary truth that, the 
 nearer the direct rays falling on the eye approach to a 
 parallelism, the farther off is the point of their intersection, 
 or the visible point from whence they flow. 
 
 8. Now though the accounts here given of perceiving 
 near distance by sight are received for true, and accord- 
 ingly made use of in determining the apparent places of 
 objects, they do nevertheless seem to me very unsatisfactory, 
 and that for these following reasons : — 
 
 9. First, It is evident that, when the mind perceives any 
 idea, not immediately and of itself, it must be by the means 
 of some other idea. Thus, for instance, the passions which 
 are in the mind of another are of themselves to me invisible. 
 I may nevertheless perceive them by sight, though not 
 immediately, yet by means of the colours they produce in 
 
 of the ambiguous term 'necessity' (which may be either logical, 
 mathematical, metaphysical, physical, or moral necessity) should be 
 here distinguished by the student. Is there ground for tiUimaiely dis- 
 tinguishing the necessity in virtue of which this is the cause of that 
 from the necessity for a cause of every change ; also for distinguishing 
 inatliematical from metaphysical necessity ; and both from the logical 
 obligation to avoid a contradiction in terms ? 
 
 i
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 179 
 
 the countenance. We often see shame or fear in the looks 
 of a man, by perceiving the changes of his countenance to 
 red or pale. 
 
 10. Moreover, it is evident that no idea ^ which is not itself 
 perceived can be to me the means of perceiving any other 
 idea *. If I do not perceive the redness or paleness of a 
 man's face themselves, it is impossible I should perceive 
 by them the passions which are in his mind. 
 
 11. Now, from sect. 2, it is plain that distance is in its 
 own nature imperceptible^; and yet it is perceived by sight. 
 It remains, therefore, that it be brought into view by means ; 
 of some other idea, that is itself immediately perceived in 
 the act of vision. 
 
 12. But those lines and angles by means whereof some 
 men pretend to explain the perception of distance, are 
 themselves not at all perceived, nor are they in truth ever 
 thought of by those unskilful in optics. I appeal to any 
 one's experience, whether, upon sight of an object, he com- 
 putes its distance by the bigness of the angle made by the 
 meeting of the two optic axes ? or whether he ever thinks 
 of the greater or lesser divergency of the rays which arrive 
 from any point to his pupil ? nay, whether it be not perfectly 
 impossible for him to perceive by sense the various angles 
 wherewith the rays, according to their greater or lesser 
 divergence, do fall on the eye? Every one is himself the 
 best judge of what he perceives, and what not. In vain 
 
 * 'idea,' here and elsewhere = phenomenon presented in sense, or 
 natural phenomenon. 
 
 * Here ' perceived ' means apprehending imniediate data of sense : 
 'perceiving' sometimes means being aware (through what he calls 
 'suggestion') of what is signified by the sense-given data. So in the 
 following sections what is ' imperceptible,' because not actually felt in 
 sense, is yet ' perceived,' or 'judged ' through suggestion. The former 
 is immediate, and the latter acquired perception, 
 
 ' That is to say distance outwards, or in the line of sight, is not 
 immediately presentable in sense — cannot be an idea or phenomenon so 
 presented. Accordingly it must be perceived through some medium. 
 
 N 2
 
 l8o SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 shall any man tell me, that I perceive certain lines and 
 angles which introduce into my mind the various ideas 
 of distance, so long as I myself am conscious of no such 
 thing. 
 
 13. Since therefore those angles and lines are not them- 
 selves perceived by sight, it follows, from sect. 10, that the 
 mind does not by them judge of the distance of objects. 
 
 14. Secondly, The truth of this assertion will be yet 
 farther evident to any one that considers those lines and 
 angles have no real existence in nature, being only an 
 hypothesis framed by the mathematicians, and by them 
 introduced into optics that they might treat of that science 
 in a geometrical way. 
 
 15. The third and last reason I shall give for rejecting 
 that doctrine is, that though we should grant the real exist- 
 ence of those optic angles, &c., and that it was possible for 
 the mind to perceive them, yet these principles would not 
 be found sufificient to explain the phenomena of distance, 
 as shall be shewn hereafter. 
 
 16. Now, it being already shewn that distance is suggested^ 
 
 * Note in § 16 the first use in the Essay of the term suggestion — 
 already referred to as expressive of the way in which our acquired power 
 of interpreting what we see, and thus going beyond bare visual sense of 
 colour, is explained by Berkeley. He explains acquired visual perception 
 by resolving it into what he calls suggestion. — An important question 
 is, What does he mean by Suggestion ? Is it more than blind unconscious 
 Habit ? Does it involve exercise of reason? (See Vindicatioti, sect. 42.) 
 The answer to this question goes (so far) to settle Berkeley's starting- 
 point, as either empirical like Hume's, or as anticipating Reid, if not 
 even Kant, in this constructive principle of his early philosophy. — Reid, 
 in his Inquiry, often uses the word ' suggestion ' when treating of the 
 five senses, and the relations of their data to one another, making it 
 mean common rational conviction of which no further explanation can 
 be given — what he calls the Common Sense. ' I know no word,' he 
 says, ' more proper than suggestion to express a power of the mind 
 which seems entirely to have escaped the notice of philosophers, and to 
 which we owe many of our simple notions which are neither im- 
 pressions nor ideas, as well as many original principles of belief. . . . 
 There is a sort of suggestion which is not natural or original : it is the
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION l8l 
 
 to the mind, by the mediation of some other idea which is 
 itself perceived in the act of seeing, it remains that we 
 inquire 7vhat ideas or sensations there be that attend 
 vision unto which we may suppose the ideas of distance 
 are connected, and by which they are introduced into the 
 mind *. 
 
 result of experience and habit. . . . But I think it appears that there are 
 also natural suggestions, e. g. that sensation suggests the notion of 
 present existence, and the belief that what we perceive or feel does now 
 exist ; that memory suggests the notion of past existence, and the belief 
 that what we remember did exist in time past ; and that our sensations 
 and thoughts suggest the notion of a mind, and the belief of its existence, 
 and of its relation to our thoughts. By a like natural principle it is 
 that a beginning of existence, or any change in nature, suggests to us 
 the notion of a cause, and compels our belief of its existence. And in 
 like manner, certain sensations of touch, by the constitution of our 
 nature, suggest to us extension, solidity, and motion, which are nowise 
 like sensations, although they have been hitherto confounded with them ' 
 {Inqtiiry, ch. II. sect. 7). ' This class of intimationSj' says Stewart, 
 with reference to this passage, 'result from the original frame of the 
 human mind, and were quite overlooked by Berkeley.' — The question 
 which Berkeley would solve by ' suggestion ' is really the great one 
 afterwards proposed by Hume, in his Inquiry concerning Human 
 Understanding, section IV, and which the remainder of that work is an 
 attempt to answer : — ' What is the nature of that evidence which assures 
 us of any matter of fact that lies beyond the present testimony of our 
 senses or the records of our memory ? ' This is just to ask what the 
 ultimate constructive principle of our sciences of nature is, in virtue of 
 which present phenomena of sense issue first in acquired perceptions, and 
 then m physical science. That Hume says is Custom or Habit. With 
 Berkeley sense-perception is evolved by ' suggestion,' to which the origin 
 of our judgments of Extension is referred. Berkeley's explanation may 
 be compared with Kant's, by whom phenomena of sense were supposed 
 to be translated into perceptions, under ' forms ' that belong to intellect 
 and not to sense, but which are true, because they are forms under 
 which phenomena must be experienced by us if they are experienced at 
 all. Compare ' suggestion ' also with the transformed sensations ol 
 Condillac ; and with the ' principle of common sense ' of Reid. 
 
 The truth seems to be that Berkeley's ' suggestion ' means habit, but 
 habit that may be unconsciously rational. One result of what he says 
 is to show the efficacy of early habits. 
 
 ^ §§ 16-27 gi've three sorts of 'arbitrary signs' of 'near distances' 
 — recognition of their arbitrariness being what Berkeley considers the
 
 l82 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 And, Jirst, it is certain by experience, that when we look 
 at a near object with both eyes, according as it approaches 
 or recedes from us, we alter the disposition of our eyes, by 
 lessening or widening the interval between the pupils. This 
 disposition or turn of the eyes is attended with a sensation ^, 
 which seems to me to be that which in this case brings the 
 idea of greater or lesser distance into the mind. 
 
 17. Not that there is any natural or necessary connexion 
 between the sensation we perceive by the turn of the eyes 
 and greater or lesser distance. But — because the mind has, 
 by constant experience, found the different sensations corre- 
 sponding to the different dispositions of the eyes to be 
 attended each with a different degree of distance in the 
 object — there has grown an habitual or customary con- 
 nexion " between those two sorts of ideas ; so that the mind 
 no sooner perceives the sensation arising from the different 
 turn it gives the eyes, in' order to bring the pupils nearer or 
 farther asunder, but it withal perceives the different idea of 
 distance which was wont to be connected with that sensa- 
 tion. Just as, upon hearing a certain sound, the idea is 
 immediately suggested to the understanding which custom 
 had united with it. 
 
 18. Nor do I see how I can easily be mistaken in this 
 matter. I know evidently that distance is not perceived of 
 
 important outcome of his whole investigation into vision, as it empties 
 natural law and physical science of a priori necessity, reducing them to 
 effects of Divine rational will. 
 
 ' This muscular ' sensation ' connected with this adjustment of the 
 eye is of course not itself seen ; it is felt. It may be called visual, but 
 it is not visible. Thus the visual signs through which we learn to see 
 things in their places are some of them (like this one) invisible while 
 others are seen. 
 
 " The ' customary connexion,' elsewhere called arbitrary, need not 
 therefore be capricious. The ' suggestions ' to which it gives rise may 
 involve unconscious reason; and 'arbitrary' may be understood to 
 mean thinking will, as opposed to blitid necessity — so that this divine 
 arbitrariness would be the motive power of tiie visible universe.
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 183 
 
 itself— that, by consequence, it must be perceived by means 
 of some other idea, which is immediately perceived, and 
 varies with the different degrees of distance. I know also 
 that the sensation arising from the turn of the eyes is of 
 itself immediately perceived, and various degrees thereof 
 are connected with different distances, which never fail to 
 accompany them into my mind, when I view an object 
 distinctly with both eyes whose distance is so small that in 
 respect of it the interval between the eyes has any consider- 
 able magnitude. 
 
 19. I know it is a received opinion that, by altering the 
 disposition of the eyes, the mind perceives whether the 
 angle of the optic axes, or the lateral angles comprehended 
 between the interval of the eyes or the optic axes, are made 
 greater or lesser ; and that, accordingly, by a kind of natural 
 geometry, it judges the point of their intersection to be 
 nearer or farther off. But that this is not true I am con- 
 vinced by my own experience, since I am not conscious 
 that I make any such use of the perception I have by the 
 turn of my eyes. And for me to make those judgments, 
 and draw those conclusions from it, without knowing that 
 I do so, seems altogether incomprehensible. 
 
 20. From all which it follows, that the judgment we make 
 of the distance of an object viewed with both eyes is entirely 
 the result of experience '. If we had not constantly found 
 certain sensations, arising from the various dispositions of 
 the eyes, attended with certain degrees of distance, we should 
 never make those sudden judgments from them concerning 
 the distance of objects ; no more than we would pretend to 
 judge of a man's thought by his pronouncing words we had 
 never heard before. 
 
 ' * Experience,' i e. phenomena presented to the senses, at first 
 autonnatically organized into intelligible experience by 'suggestion' — 
 which he held sufficient to explain the 'judgment,' or presumption 
 of probability, that is latent in acquired perception.
 
 184 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 21. Secondly, an object placed at a certain distance from 
 the eye, to which the breadth of the pupil bears a consider- 
 able proportion, being made to approach, is seen more con- 
 fusedly. And the nearer it is brought the more confused 
 appearance it makes. And, this being found constantly to 
 be so, there arises in the mind an habitual connexion 
 between the several degrees of confusion and distance ; the 
 greater confusion still implying the lesser distance, and the 
 lesser confusion the greater distance of the object '. 
 I 22. This confused appearance of the object doth therefore 
 |seem to be the medium whereby the mind judges of distance, 
 in those cases wherein the mo^ approved writers of optics 
 will have it judge by the different divergency with which the 
 rays flowing from the radiating point fall on the pupil. No 
 man, I believe, will pretend to see or feel those imaginary 
 angles that the rays are supposed to form according to their 
 various inclinations on his eye. But he cannot choose 
 seeing whether the object appear more or less confused. 
 It is therefore a manifest consequence from what has been 
 demonstrated that, instead of the greater or lesser diver- 
 gency of the rays, the mind makes use of the greater or 
 lesser confusedness of the appearance, thereby to determine 
 the apparent place of an object. 
 
 23. Nor doth it avail to say there is not any necessary 
 connexion between confused vision and distance great or 
 small. For I ask any man what necessary connexion he 
 sees between the redness of a blush and shame ? And yet 
 no sooner shall he behold that colour to arise in the face of 
 another but it brings into his mind the idea of that passion 
 which hath been observed to accompany it. 
 
 ^ This explanation of our acquired power of seeing near distances, 
 tends towards an acknowledgment of what is now called Inseparable 
 Association. See Mill's Examination of Hamilton, ch. XIV. But can 
 scientific experience be resolved into blind association ? It may explain, 
 in a physical way, connexions in an individual mind ; surely not the 
 perception of objective reality.
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 185 
 
 24. What seems to have misled the writers of optics in 
 this matter is, that they imagine men judge of distance as 
 they do of a conclusion in mathematics ; betwixt which and 
 the premises it is indeed absolutely requisite there be an 
 apparent necessary connexion '. But it is far otherwise in 
 the sudden judgments men make of distance. We are not 
 to think that brutes and children, or even grown reasonable 
 men, whenever they perceive an object to approach or 
 depart from them, do it by virtue of geometry and demon- 
 stration. 
 
 25. That one idea may suggest another to the mind, it will 
 suffice that they have been observed to go together, without 
 any demonstration of the necessity of their coexistence, or 
 without so much as knowing what it is that makes them so 
 to coexist. Of this there are innumerable instances, of 
 which no one can be ignorant'^. 
 
 26. Thus, greater confusion having been constantly 
 attended with nearer distance, no sooner is the former idea 
 perceived but it suggests the latter to our thoughts. And, 
 if it had been the ordinary course of nature that the farther 
 off an object were placed the more confused it should 
 appear, it is certain the very same perception that now 
 makes us think an object approaches would then have 
 
 ' In this Berkele}' thus early seems to recognise intellectual necessity 
 in mathematical demonstration. 
 
 ' Here and throughout Berkeley presupposes a natural tendency in 
 each person to connect in his thoughts ever after those phenomena of 
 sense which have been connected in his previous experience — a tendency 
 the strength of which may be so confirmed through repetition, that his 
 mind at last becomes unable to separate them. This is the associative 
 tendency, since made so much of by some psychologists, which thus, 
 with Berkeley as with Aristotle, is mixed up with the psychology of the 
 senses. Because it is dependent on the variable experience of each 
 person, it has been called a subjective law or tendency, in contrast to 
 relations which issue from irreversible necessities that are of the essence 
 of reason, and therefore common to all intelligence. The difference 
 between the physical tendency to associate and relations of reason is 
 obscured in association psychology.
 
 l86 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 made us to imagine it went farther off — that perception, 
 abstracting from custom and experience, being equally 
 fitted to produce the idea of great distance, or small 
 distance, or no distance at all. 
 
 27. Thirdly, an object being placed at the distance above 
 specified, and brought nearer to the eye, we may never- 
 theless prevent, at least for some time, the appearance's 
 growing more confused, by straining the eye. In which 
 case that sensation supplies the place of confused vision, in 
 aiding the mind to judge of the distance of the object ; it 
 being esteemed so much the nearer by how much the effort 
 or straining of the eye in order to distinct vision is greater. 
 
 28. I have here set down those se7isations or ideas that 
 seem to be the constant and general occasions of introducing 
 into the mind the different ideas of near distance. It is 
 true, in most cases, that divers other circumstances con- 
 tribute to frame our idea of distance, viz. the particular 
 number, size, kind, &c. of the things seen ^ Concerning 
 which, as well as all other the forementioned occasions 
 which suggest distance, I shall only observe, they have none 
 of them, in their own nature, any relation or connexion 
 with it : nor is it possible they should ever signify the 
 various degrees thereof, otherwise than as by experience 
 they have been found to be connected with them". 
 
 ' Visible signs mix with those that are merely visual. The latter 
 appear to he felt in the eye, but are not themselves see?;. 
 
 2 The visual ' signs ' given in the preceding sections are all either 
 (a) visible or {b) invisible. Under neither head is Berkeley's list ex- 
 haustive, nor even accurate as far as it goes. Recent German and 
 British physiologists have discovered others: Miiller, Helmholtz, and 
 Lotze have mentioned visual signs not recognised by Berkeley. The 
 student should here generalise the chief visual signs of the distances 
 of objects, including the muscular sensations which accompany focal 
 adjustment of the crystalline lens ; the muscular sensations due to 
 convergence of the axes of both eyes ; the smallness and indistinctness
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 187 
 
 41. From what hath been premised, it is a manifest con- 
 sequence, that a man born Wind, being made to see, would 
 at first have no idea of Distance by sight : the sun and 
 stars, the remotest objects as well as the nearer, would all 
 seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind \ The objects 
 intromitted by sight would seem to him (as in truth they 
 are) no other than a new set of thoughts or sensations, each 
 whereof is as near to him as the perceptions of pain or 
 pleasure, or the most inward passions of his soul. For, our 
 judging objects perceived by sight to be at any distance, or 
 without the mind, is (vid. sect. 28) entirely the effect of 
 experience, which one in those circumstances could not yet 
 have attained to. 
 
 42. It is indeed otherwise upon the common supposition 
 — that men judge of distance by the angle of the optic axes, 
 just as one in the dark, or a blind man by the angle com- 
 prehended by two sticks, one whereof he held in each hand. 
 For, if this were true, it would follow that one blind from 
 his birth, being made to see, should stand in need of no 
 new experience, in order to perceive distance by sight. 
 But that this is false has, I think, been sufficiently demon- 
 strated -. 
 
 of the visible image ; the number of intervening objects ; as well as 
 the phenomena of binocular vision. But these and other matters of 
 biological psychology were for Berkeley questions of detail, irrelevant 
 to the general principle of arbitrary sense-symholism which was mainly 
 in his view. The distinction between the sensory and jnotor nerves, 
 important in connexion with the correlative difference between passive 
 and active sense-consciousness, was unknown to him ; also much else 
 now known as to the nervous system and its relations by physiological 
 psychologists. 
 
 In §§ 29-41, here omitted, Berkeley proceeds to verify his invisible 
 and visible signs, by showing that one class of them can explain a 
 curious optical phenomenon that had baffled Barrow and others. 
 
 ' 'In his eye' and 'in his mind' — i.e. existing depefidently on the 
 organ, or on the sentient mind. 
 
 ^ He does not, as one might expect, ask for experimental verification 
 of his conclusions in the form of cases of born-blind persons made to see.
 
 l88 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 43. 'And perhaps, upon a strict inquiry, we shall not find 
 that even those who from their birth have grown up in a 
 continued habit of seeing are irrecoverably prejudiced on 
 the other side, to wit, in thinking what they see to be at 
 a distance from them. For, at this time it seems agreed 
 on all hands, by those who have had any thoughts of that 
 matter, that colours, which are the pivper and immediate 
 object of sight "^j are not without the mind^. But then, it 
 will be said, by sight we have aiso the ideas of extension, 
 2in6.Jigure, diTid motion; all which may well be thought with- 
 out and at some distance from the mind, though colour 
 should not. In answer to this, I appeal to any man's ex- 
 perience, whether the visible extension of any object do 
 not appear as near to him as the colour of that object ; 
 nay, whether they do not both seem to be in the very same 
 place. Is not the extension we see coloured, and is it 
 
 ' Berkeley now advances from {a) the argument that our power to 
 see distance outwai'ds is due to suggestio7t, and proceeds (/') to draw 
 similar conclusions from the fact that phenomena of colour are the only 
 phenomena which we immediately see. Having shown, by the pre- 
 ceding reasons, that distances outwards, whether near or remote, are 
 not actually seen, but are suggested by arbitrary signs, he now proceeds 
 to deny the externality of colour — 'externality' meaning its being 
 extended in space, in independence of a percipient. 
 
 One may here ask, why totich is popularly regarded as the test of 
 externality, and why visibility without tangibility is supposed to imply 
 that what is seen is illusory? lierkeley, though he argued for the 
 ideal or mind-dependent nature of. what is seen, sooner than for 
 the ideal or mind-dependent nature of what can be touched, does not 
 make the distinction between the illusory and the real turn ultimately 
 upon the tangibility of the real. (See Principles, sect. 28-33.) But 
 see Mansel's Metaphysics, p. 346 ; also Brown's Lecttires, xxiv. 
 
 ■■^ With psychologists generally, since Aristotle 'yDe Anima, b. II. 
 ch. 7), he assumes that colour, and whatever colour implies, is the only 
 original datum of sight, all else popularly included in ' seeing ' being 
 gradually learned through suggestion. 
 
 ^ 'Not without the mind,' i. e. not independent of sentient intelligence 
 — not able to exist really without being felt or perceived ; therefore 
 incapable of being ' at a distance ' from embodied mind.
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 189 
 
 possible for us, so much as in thought, to separate and 
 abstract colour from extension ? Now, where the extension 
 is, there surely is the figure, and there the motion too. 
 I speak of those which are perceived by sight '. 
 
 44. But, for a fuller explication of this point, and to shew 
 that the immediate objects of sight are not so much as the 
 ideas or resemblances of things placed at a distance, it is 
 requisite that we look nearer into the matter, and carefully 
 observe what is meant in common discourse when one says, 
 that which he sees is at a distance from him. Suppose, for 
 example, that looking at the moon I should say it were 
 fifty or sixty semidiameters of the earth distant from me. 
 Let us see what moon this is spoken of. It is plain it 
 cannot be the visible moon, or anything like the visible 
 moon, or that which I see — which is only a round luminous 
 plain, of about thirty visible points in diameter. For, in 
 case I am carried from the place where I stand directly 
 towards the moon, it is manifest the object varies still as I 
 
 * Berkeley started, in § 2, with the asstunption that distance in 
 the line of sight is in its nature invisible ; on this foundation he pro- 
 ceeded in the proof, given in §§ 3-28, that all distances outward 
 are perceptions of sight only so far as they are ' suggestions ' gradually 
 acquired through experience of the meaning of visual and visible signs. — 
 He enters in this section on a second line of proof. He argues that 
 what ive see cannot be independent of perception. This is founded 
 on a second assumption, also sustained by concurrent authority — that 
 colour is the only immediate or original object of sight. Locke had 
 said that we can see distances between bodies, and between parts 
 of the same body. But does colour involve distance ? What Berkeley 
 wants to show is, that ' distance ' and ' extension ' are ambiguous words 
 — the distances and extensions we see being different in kind from those 
 we touch. The common philosophical opinion had been, that light or 
 colour is what we see — including whatever extension is necessarily 
 involved in seeing colour ; for it was supposed that colour, as originally 
 seen, was in some sort extended, invoh-ing an immediate perception of 
 extension. The question still unconsidered was the nature of visible 
 extension. Is it of two dimensions or of three ? Is the coloured 
 extension we see identical with, or even similar to, the extension we 
 touch? Berkeley argues that it is not. See §§ 121-46.
 
 IQO SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 go on ; and, by the time that I am advanced fifty or sixty 
 semidiameters of the earth, I shall be so far from being 
 near a small, round, luminous flat that I shall perceive 
 nothing like it — this object having long since disappeared, 
 and, if I would recover it, it must be by going back to the 
 earth from whence I set out. Again, suppose I perceive 
 by sight the faint and obscure idea of something, which 
 I doubt whether it be a man, or a tree, or a tower, but 
 judge it to be at the distance of about a mile. It is plain 
 I cannot mean that what I see is a mile off, or that it is the 
 image or likeness of anything which is a mile off; since 
 that every step I take towards it the appearance alters, 
 and from being obscure, small, and faint, grows clear, large, 
 and vigorous. And when I come to the mile's end, that 
 which I saw first is quite lost, neither do I find anything 
 in the likeness of it \ 
 
 45. In these and the like instances, the truth of the matter, 
 I find, stands thus : — Having of a long time experienced 
 
 ^ The sceptical objections of the Eleatics and others to the trust- 
 worthiness of our senses, referred to by Des Cartes in his Meditations, 
 and by Malebranche in the first boolc of his Recherche, may have 
 suggested the ilhistrations in this section. The sceptical difficulty rises 
 out of the assumption that the extended colour we see, when the 
 tangible object is near, is the same extended colour that we see, when 
 the tangible object is more remote. Berkeley insists that what is 
 strictly seen in these cases is different, but that what is signified or 
 suggested by -what is seen may still be the same. He does not here 
 pursue the deeper question of what is ultimately meant by sameness in 
 sensible things — foreign to an Essay on Sight. This he had to meet 
 in defending his conception of Matter, as necessarily dependent on 
 percipient mind. 
 
 Compare, and analyse critically, Hume's illustration of his position 
 — that 'nothing can be present to the mind but an image or perception,' 
 and that the senses are only ' inlets through which these images are con- 
 veyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between 
 the mind and the [outward] object. The table which we see seems to 
 diminish as we remove further from it : but the real table which exists 
 independent of us suffers no alteration ' {Essay on ^Sceptical Philosophy^ 
 Part I).
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 191 
 
 certain ideas perceivable by touch ' — as distance, tangible 
 figure, and solidity — to have been connected with certain 
 ideas of sight, I do, upon perceiving these ideas of sight, 
 forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are, by the wonted 
 ordinary course of nature, like to follow. Looking at an 
 object, I perceive a certain visible figure and colour, with 
 some degree of faintness and other circumstances, which, 
 from what I have formally observed, determine me to think 
 that if I advance forward so many paces, miles, &c., I shall 
 be affected with such and such ideas of touch. So that, in 
 truth and strictness of speech, I neither see distance itself, 
 nor anything that I take to be at a distance. I say, neither 
 distance nor things placed at a distance are themselves, or 
 their ideas, truly perceived by sight. This I am persuaded 
 of, as to what concerns myself. And I believe whoever will 
 look narrowly into his own thoughts, and examine what he 
 means by saying he sees this or that thing at a distance, will 
 agree with me, that what he sees only suggests to his under- 
 standing that, after having passed a certain distance, to be 
 measured by the motion of his body, ivhich is perceivable by 
 touch, he shall come to perceive such and such tangible 
 ideas, which have been usually connected with such and 
 such visible ideas ^. But, that one might be deceived by 
 
 * This is the first introduction of the phenomena of 'touch' — a term 
 which with Berkeley includes not merely {a) the sense of simple contact, 
 but also {b) the soise of vmsciilar resistance, and (c) the sentient 
 activity connected witii the movements of our bodies, or any of their organs. 
 From this point he begins to unfold his antithesis of the visible and the 
 tangible worlds — coloured and resistant extension. To explain by 
 ' suggestion ' the union of tliese opposite elements in our acquired 
 perceptions of sight is the aim of this theory of Visual Symbolism, or 
 tactual meaning in visual signs. 
 
 ^ The important office of our sensuous consciousness of bodily move- 
 ment and muscular resistance, in the development of self-consciousness 
 and knowledge of extra-organic things, might be illustrated in connexion 
 with this fact. It is in active collision with the material world that 
 we begin to distinguish between ' I can ' and ' I cannot ' ; and the 
 conviction of personality, personal identity, and personal responsibility 
 is thus gradually drawn out.
 
 192 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 these suggestions of sense, and that there is no necessary 
 connexion between visible and tangible ideas suggested by 
 them, we need go no farther than the next looking-glass or 
 picture to be convinced \ — Note that, when I speak of 
 tangible ideas, I take the word idea for any the immediate 
 object of sense or understanding — in which large signification 
 it is commonly used by the moderns ^. 
 \ 46, From what we have shewn, it is a manifest consequence 
 that the ideas of Space, Outness, and things placed at a dis- 
 tance are not, strictly speaking, the object of sight : they are 
 not otherwise perceived by the eye than by the ear. Sitting 
 in my study I hear a coach drive along the street ; I look 
 through the casement and see it ; I walk out and enter into 
 it. Thus, common speech would incline one to think 1 heard, 
 saw, and touched the same thing, to wit, the coach. It is 
 nevertheless certain the ideas intromitted by each sense are 
 widely different, and distinct from each other ; but, having 
 been observed constantly to go together, they are spoken of 
 as one and the same thing. By the variation of the noise, 
 I perceive the different distances of the coach, and know 
 that it approaches before I look out. Thus, by the ear 
 I perceive distance just after the same manner as I do 
 by the eye^ 
 
 ' Consider and examine critically the meaning and relevancy of this 
 illustration. 
 
 ^ ' moderns ' — Locke and Des Cartes for instance. With Locke 
 (^Essay, Introduction, § 8), 'ideas' mean whatever we are conscious of 
 — ' whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks ; ' 
 and what we are conscious, i. e. immediately percipient of, in sense- 
 perception, includes primary qualities of things, and also sensations which 
 the primary qualities are supposed to occasion, or secondary qualities. 
 By Des Cartes, 'idea' was sometimes applied to the mental perception 
 and sometimes to the organic motion or physical impression with which 
 the perception of the mind was believed to be connected by Divine 
 appointment. 
 
 '• In short the ' perception' in both cases is a 'suggested' expectation. 
 Acquired sight is really foresight. 
 
 A
 
 A NEIV THEORY OF VISION 193 
 
 47. I do not nevertheless say I hear distance, in like 
 manner as I say that I see it — the ideas perceived by hearing 
 not being so apt to be confounded with the ideas of touch as 
 those of sight are. So likewise a man is easily convinced 
 that bodies and external things are not properly the object 
 of hearing, but only sounds — by the mediation whereof 
 the idea of this ox that body, or distance, is suggested to 
 his thoughts \ But then one is with more difficulty brought 
 to discern the difference there is betwixt the ideas of 
 sight and touch : though it be certain, a man no more 
 sees and feels the same thing, than he hears and feels the 
 same thing. 
 
 48. One reason of which seems to be this. It is thought 
 a great absurdity to imagine that one and the same thing 
 should have any more than one extension and one figure. 
 But, the extension and figure of a body being let into the 
 mind two ways, and that indifferently, either by sight or 
 touch, it seems to follow that we see the same extension 
 and the same figure which we feel. 
 
 49. But, if we take a close and accurate view of the matter, 
 it must be acknowledged that we never see and feel one and 
 the same object. That which is seen is one thing, and that 
 which is felt is another. If the visible figure and extension 
 be not the same with the tangible figure and extension, we 
 are not to infer that one and the same thing has divers 
 extensions. The true consequence is that the objects of 
 sight and touch are two distinct things. It may perhaps 
 require some thought rightly to conceive this distinction. 
 
 ' The original data peculiar to the sense of Hearing should be here 
 analysed by the student, and compared with those of .Sight and of 
 Touch, as systems of audible and visual signs. The chief natural 
 languages of sense, as well as all artificial or articulate languages, consist 
 either of audible signs or of visual signs. Visible signs it should be 
 remembered are seen, whereas visual signs may be felt in the organ 
 of sight without being seen — e. g. motions in the eye, &c. 
 
 O
 
 194 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 And the difficulty seems not a little increased, because the 
 combination of visible ideas hath constantly the same name 
 as the combination of tangible ideas wherewith it is con- 
 nected — which doth of necessity arise from the use and end 
 of language. 
 
 50. In order, therefore, to treat accurately and uncon- 
 fusedly of vision, we must bear in mind that there are two 
 sorts of objects apprehended by the eye — the one primarily 
 and immediately, the other secondarily and by intervention 
 of the former. Those of the first sort neither are nor appear 
 to be without the mind, or at any distance off. They may, 
 indeed, grow greater or smaller, more confused, or more 
 clear, or more faint. But they do not, cannot approach or 
 recede from us. Whenever we say an object is at a distance, 
 whenever we say it draws near, or goes farther off, we must 
 always mean it of the latter sort, which properly belong to 
 the touch, and are not so truly perceived as suggested by the 
 eye, in like manner as thoughts by the ear '. 
 
 5 1 . No sooner do we hear the words of a familiar language 
 pronounced in our ears but the ideas corresponding thereto 
 present themselves to our minds : in the very same instant 
 the sound and its meaning enter the understanding ; so 
 closely are they united that it is not in our power to keep 
 out the one except we exclude the other also. We even act 
 in all respects as if we heard the very thoughts themselves. 
 So likewise the secondary objects, or those which are only 
 suggested by sight, do often more strongly affect us, and are 
 more regarded, than the proper objects of that sense ; along 
 with which they enter into the mind, and with which they 
 have a far more strict connexion than ideas have with words. 
 Hence it is we find it so difficult to discriminate between 
 
 ' Whether what is perceived in touching is as dependent on a per- 
 cipient mind as what is perceived in seeing, Berkeley does not discuss in 
 this juvenile Essay. That is the wider question considered in his 
 J'riiuipks of Human Knowledge.
 
 A NEIV THEORY OF VISION 1 95 
 
 the immediate and mediate ' objects of sight, and are so 
 prone to attribute to the former what belongs only to the 
 latter. They are, as it were, most closely twisted, blended, 
 and incorporated together. And the prejudice is confirmed 
 and riveted in our thoughts by a long tract of time, by the 
 use of language, and want of reflection. However, I doubt 
 not but any one that shall attentively consider what we have 
 already said, and shall say upon this subject before we have 
 done (especially if he pursue it in his own thoughts), may 
 be able to deliver himself from that prejudice. Sure I am, 
 it is worth some attention to whoever would understand 
 the true nature of vision'". 
 
 52. I have now done with distance, and proceed to shew- 
 how it is that we perceive by sight the Magnitude of objects •'. 
 — It is the opinion of some that we do it by angles, or by 
 angles in conjunction with distance. But, neither angles nor 
 distance being perceivable by sight, and the things we see * 
 being in truth at no distance from us, it follows that, as we 
 have shewn lines and angles not to be the medium the mind 
 makes use of in apprehending the apparent place, so neither 
 are they the medium whereby it apprehends the apparent 
 magnitude of objects. 
 
 53. It is well known that the same extension at a near 
 
 ' ' mediate' or suggested. 
 
 ■•* The attempt to define the original data of any of the senses taken 
 singly illustrates this difficulty; but it is more obtrusive in sight and in 
 touch, because perception of extension, and discernment of its relations 
 (the chief difficulty in the analysis), seem to occur in visual and tactual 
 experience exclusively. In his Cofumottplace Book (p. 494) Berkeley 
 well remarks that ' extension is blended with tangible or visible ideas, 
 and afterwards by the mind prescinded [abstracted] therefrom.' 
 
 ' Sect. 52-.'^7 treat of the necessary invisibility of the real Magnitudes 
 of things — the actual distances between their parts. Cf. Vindication, 
 sect. 54-61. 
 
 * ' see,' i.e. see immediately, as distinguished from visual suggestion or 
 acquired seeing. 
 
 O 2
 
 196 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 distance shall subtend a greater angle, and at a farther dis- 
 tance a lesser angle. And by this principle (we are told) 
 the mind estimates the magnitude of an object, comparing 
 the angle under which it is seen with its distance, and 
 thence inferring the magnitude thereof. What inclines men 
 to this mistake 'beside the humour of making one see by 
 geometry) is, that the same perceptions or ideas which 
 suggest distance do also suggest magnitude. But, if we 
 examine it, we shall find they suggest the latter as imme- 
 diately as the former. I say, they do not first suggest dis- 
 tance and then leave it to the judgment to use that as a 
 medium whereby to collect the magnitude ; but they have 
 as close and immediate a connexion with the magnitude as 
 with the distance ; and suggest magnitude as independently 
 of distance, as they do distance independently of magnitude. 
 All which will be evident to whoever considers what has 
 been already said and what follows. 
 
 54. It has been shewn there are two sorts of objects appre- 
 hended by sight, each whereof has its distinct magnitude or 
 extension — the one, properly tangible, i.e. to be perceived 
 and measured by touch, and not immediately falling under 
 the sense of seeing ; the other, properly and immediately 
 visible, by mediation of which the former is brought in view. 
 Each of these magnitudes are greater or lesser, according as 
 they contain in them more or fewer points, they being made 
 up of points or minimums. For, whatever may be said of 
 extension in abstract, it is certain sensible extension is not 
 infinitely divisible. There is a minimum tangibik, and 
 a minimum visibile, beyond which sense cannot perceive *. 
 This every one's experience will inform him. 
 
 ' There is a minimtim visibile at which we cease to be percipient of 
 colour, and also a mininmin tangibile at which all «ense of resistance 
 and contact disappears from sense consciousness. This point is, for us, 
 the necessary limit (in imagination) of (^visible or tangible) reality. 
 
 Though Berkeley regards extension as, in itself, necessarily dependent
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION I97 
 
 55. The magnitude of the object which exists without the 
 mind, and is at a distance, continues always invariably the 
 same : but, the visible object still changing as you approach 
 to or recede from the tangible object, it hath no fixed and 
 determinate greatness. Whenever therefore we speak of the 
 magnitude of any thing, for instance a tree or a house, we 
 must mean the tangible magnitude ; otherwise there can be 
 nothing steady and free from ambiguity spoken of it '. Now, 
 though the tangible and visible magnitude do in truth belong 
 to two distinct objects, I shall nevertheless (especially since 
 those objects are called by the same name, and are observed 
 to coexist), to avoid tediousness and singularity of speech, 
 sometimes speak of them as belonging to one and the same 
 thing ^ 
 
 56. Now, in order to discover by what means the magni- 
 tude of tangible objects is perceived by sight, I need only 
 reflect on what passes in my own mind, and observe what 
 those things be which (as signs) introduce the ideas of 
 greater or lesser into my thoughts when I look on any 
 object ^. And these I find to be, first, the magnitude or 
 
 on a percipient mind, he does not mean that mind, in perceiving ex- 
 tension, itself becomes extended. ^Vith him, extension — existing only 
 as a greater or smaller number of coloured or resistant minima, all 
 'in mind,' or dependent on sentient mind, nevertheless does not exist 
 in mind as an attribute of mind. (Cf. Principles, sect. 49.) Mind, he 
 might say, can be conscious without being conscious of what is extended ; 
 on the other hand, what is extended cannot exist (^really at least) with- 
 out a living mind to realise it. 
 
 ^ But is not this 'unsteadiness' or ' flux' found in what we touch as 
 well as in what we see — though less obtrusively ? A felt thing is felt to 
 be laiger or smaller according to the state of the organism of the 
 percipient at the time of the perception. Every perception is relative 
 to the state of the bodily organ. 
 
 - Ordinary language identifies what psychological analysis of the 
 original data of the senses seems to Berkeley to distinguish. Does 
 language involve a truer analysis of extension than Berkeley entertains, 
 and if not, why not ? 
 
 ^ The 'signs' which 'suggest,' and so enable us to 'judge' of, the 
 real magnitudes of things are inquired about in the following sections.
 
 198 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 extension of the visible object, which, being immediately 
 perceived by sight, is connected with that other which is 
 tangible and placed at a distance : secondly, the confusion 
 or distinctness : and thirdly, the vigorousness or faintness 
 of the aforesaid visible appearance. Cceteris paribus, by 
 how much the greater or lesser the visible object is, by so 
 much the greater or lesser do I conclude the tangible 
 object to be. But, be the idea immediately perceived by 
 sight never so large, yet, if it be withal confused, I judge 
 the magnitude of the thing to be but small. If it be 
 distinct and clear, I judge it greater. And, if it be faint, 
 I apprehend it to be yet greater. What is here meant by 
 confusion and faintness has been explained in sect. 35. 
 
 57, Moreover, the judgments we make of greatness do, 
 in like manner as those of distance, depend on the dis- 
 position of the eye ; also on the figure, number, and situation 
 of intermediate objects, and other circumstances that have 
 been observed to attend great or small tangible magnitudes. 
 Thus, for instance, the very same quantity of visible ex- 
 tension which in the figure of a tower doth suggest the idea 
 of great magnitude shall in the figure of a man suggest the 
 idea of much smaller magnitude. That this is owing to the 
 experience we have had of the usual bigness of a tower and 
 a man, no one, I suppose, need be told. 
 
 58. It is also evident that confusion or faintness have no 
 more a necessary connexion with little or great magnitude 
 than they have with little or great distance. As they suggest 
 the latter, so they suggest the former to our minds. And, 
 by consequence, if it were not for experience, we should no 
 more judge ' a faint or confused appearance to be connected 
 
 They are concluded to be {a) ihe proportion of the field of sight which 
 the object occupies, {b) the clearness or indistinctness of its outlines, {c) 
 the lightness or faintness of its colours, {d) the number of intervening 
 visible objects, and {e) the amount of muscular strain or sensation in 
 directing both eyes to the object. 
 
 * ' Judge,' i. e. presume as proved by sujficieiil experience — again in
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 199 
 
 with great or little magnitude than we should that it was 
 connected with great or little distance. 
 
 59. Nor will it be found that great or small visible magni- 
 tude hath any necessary relation to great or small tangible 
 magnitude — so that the one may certainly and infallibly be 
 inferred from the other. — But, before we come to the proof 
 of this, it is fit we consider the difference there is betwixt 
 the extension and figure which is the proper object of 
 touch, and that other which is termed visible ; and how the 
 former is principally, though not immediately, taken notice 
 of when we look at any object. This has been before men- 
 tioned, but we shall here inquire into the cause thereof. 
 We regard the objects that environ us in proportion as they 
 are adapted to benefit or injure our own bodies, and thereby 
 produce in our minds the sensations of pleasure or pain. 
 Now, bodies operating on our organs by an immediate 
 application, and the hurt and advantage arising therefrom 
 depending altogether on the tangible, and not at all on the 
 visible, qualities of any object — this is a plain reason why 
 those should be regarded by us much more than these. 
 And for this end the visive sense seems to have been 
 bestowed on animals, to wit, that, by the perception of 
 visible ideas ' (which in themselves are not capable of affect- 
 ing or anywise altering the frame of their bodies), they may 
 be able to foresee (from the experience they have had what 
 tangible ideas are connected with such and such visible 
 ideas) the damage or benefit which is like to ensue upon 
 the application of their own bodies to this or that body 
 
 Locke's meaninfj of 'judj,'ment' — in contrast with what is either in- 
 tuitively or demonstratively ' known.' Even with Berkeley rational 
 judgments turn out to be unconsciouslj' presupposed in the sub-conscious 
 and mechanical ' suggestions ' of experience ; but he does not explicate 
 them critically as Kant would do. 
 
 ' ' perception of visible ideas,' i.e. of the visible symbols. He 
 proceeds to explain why we associate reality with touch rather than 
 with sight.
 
 200 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 which is at a distance. Which foresight, how necessary it 
 is for the preservation of an animal, every one's experience 
 can inform him \ Hence it is that, when we look at an 
 object, the tangible figure and extension thereof are prin- 
 cipally attended to ; whilst there is small heed taken of the 
 visible figure and magnitude, which, though more imme- 
 diately perceived, do less sensibly affect us, and are not 
 fitted to produce any alteration in our bodies. 
 
 60. That the matter of fact is true will be evident to any 
 one who considers that a man placed at ten foot distance is 
 thought as great as if he were placed at a distance only of 
 five foot ; which is true, not with relation to the visible, but 
 tangible greatness of the object : the visible magnitude being 
 far greater at one station than it is at the other. 
 
 61. Inches, feet, &c. are settled, stated lengths, whereby 
 we measure objects and estimate their magnitude. We say, 
 for example, an object appears to be six inches, or six foot 
 long. Now, that this cannot be meant of visible inches, &c. 
 is evident, because a visible inch is itself no constant deter- 
 minate magnitude, and cannot therefore serve to mark out 
 and determine the magnitude of any other thing. Take an 
 inch marked upon a ruler; view it successively, at the dis- 
 tance of half a foot, a foot, a foot and a half, &c. from the 
 eye : at each of which, and at all the intermediate distances, 
 the inch shall have a different visible extension, i.e. there 
 shall be more or fewer points discerned in it. Now, I ask 
 which of all these various extensions is that stated deter- 
 minate one that is agreed on for a common measure of other 
 magnitudes ? No reason can be assigned why we should 
 
 ^ Most of what is commonly called 'vision' is r^aWy prevision, and 
 proceeds on sub-conscious assumption of the omnipresence of law or 
 reason in nature. In all developed visual perception we go beyond 
 mere sense ; still more in all the inferences of physical science, and 
 virtually on the same rational basis. But the judgment in science is 
 more conscious of its rational ground, and is not the issue of habit only, 
 as at the lower stage of mere stnsc-suggestion.
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 201 
 
 pitch on one more than another. And, except there be 
 some invariable determinate extension fixed on to be marked 
 by the word inch, it is plain it can be used to little purpose ; 
 and to say a thing contains this or that number of inches 
 shall imply no more than that it is extended, without bring- 
 ing any particular idea of that extension into the mind. 
 Farther, an inch and a foot, from different distances, shall 
 both exhibit the same visible magnitude, and yet at the 
 same time you shall say that one seems several times greater 
 than the other. From all which it is manifest, that the 
 judgments we make of the magnitude of objects by sight are 
 altogether in reference to their tangible extension. When- 
 ever we say an object is great or small, of this or that deter- 
 minate measure, I say, it must be meant of the tangible 
 and not the visible extension, which, though immediately 
 perceived, is nevertheless little taken notice of. 
 
 62. Now, that there is no necessary connexion between 
 these two distinct extensions is evident from hence — because 
 our eyes might have been framed in such a manner as to be 
 able to see nothing but what were less than the niini7?ium 
 tangibile. In which case it is not impossible we might have 
 perceived all the immediate objects of sight the very same 
 that we do now ; but unto those visible appearances there 
 would not be connected those different tangible magnitudes 
 that are now. Which shews the judgments we make of the 
 magnitude of things placed at a distance, from the various 
 greatness of the immediate objects of sight, do not arise 
 from any essential or necessary, but only a customary- tie 
 which has been observed betwixt them. 
 
 ' lint if extension is only an empirical datum of sense, and if tangible 
 or resistant as well as coloured extension fluctuates relatively to the state 
 of the sense-organism, we need an objective criterion of the former as 
 well as of the latter. What is it ? 
 
 ''' So Hume afterwards, who tried to reduce all so-called ' necessary ' 
 connexion in the universe to the physical issue of habit, induced by 
 custom or previous experience. ' All inferences from experience,' he
 
 202 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 63. Moreover, it is not only certain that any idea of sight 
 might not have been connected with this or that idea of 
 touch we now observe to accompany it, but also that the 
 greater visible magnitudes might have been connected with 
 and introduced into our minds lesser tangible magnitudes, 
 and the lesser visible magnitudes greater tangible magni- 
 tudes. Nay, that it actually is so, we have daily experience 
 — that object which makes a strong and large appearance 
 not seeming near so great as another the visible magnitude 
 whereof is much less, but more faint, and the appearance 
 upper, or which is the same thing, painted lower on the 
 retina, which faintness and situation suggest both greater 
 magnitude and greater distance. 
 
 64. From which, and from sect. 57 and 58, it is manifest 
 that, as we do not perceive the magnitude of objects 
 immediately by sight, so neither do we perceive them by 
 the mediation of anything which has a necessary connexion 
 with them. Those ideas that now suggest unto us the 
 various magnitudes of external objects before we touch 
 them might possibly have suggested no such thing; or they 
 might have signified them in a direct contrary manner, so 
 that the very same ideas on the perception whereof we judge 
 an object to be small might as well have served to make us 
 conclude it great ; those ideas being in their own nature 
 equally fitted to bring into our minds the idea of small or 
 great, or no size at all, of outward objects, just as the words 
 of any language are in their own nature indifferent to signify 
 this or that thing, or nothing at all. 
 
 65. As we see distance so we see magnitude. And we 
 see both in the same way that we see shame or anger in 
 the looks of a man. Those passions are themselves in- 
 
 maintaiiis, 'are effects of custom, not conchisions of reasoning. Custom 
 is the guide of human life.' {Inquiry, V. p. i.) With Bishop Butler, 
 in like manner, ' probability is the guide of life.' {^Analogy, Introd.) 
 .So too Pascal and Locke.
 
 A NEIV THEORY OF VISION 203 
 
 visible ; they are nevertheless let in by the eye along with 
 colours and alterations of countenance which are the 
 immediate object of vision, and which signify them for no 
 other reason than barely because they have been observed 
 to accompany them. Without wliich experience we should 
 no more have taken blushing for a sign of shame than of 
 gladness. 
 
 66. We are nevertheless exceedingly prone to imagine 
 those things which are perceived only by the mediation of 
 others to be themselves the immediate objects of sight, or 
 at least to have in their own nature a fitness to be suggested 
 by them before ever they had been experienced to coexist 
 with them. From which prejudice every one perhaps will 
 not find it easy to emancipate himself, by any the clearest 
 convictions of reason. And there are some grounds to 
 think that, if there was one only invariable and universal 
 language in the world, and that men were born with the 
 faculty of speaking it, it would be the opinion of some, that 
 the ideas in other men's minds were properly perceived by 
 the ear, or had at least a necessary and inseparable tie with 
 the sounds that were affixed to them. All which seems to 
 arise from want of a due application of our discerning 
 faculty, thereby to discriminate between the ideas that are 
 in our understandings, and consider them apart from each 
 other ; which would preserve us from confounding those 
 that are different, and make us see what ideas do, and what 
 do not, include or imply this or that other idea . 
 
 ' Mark the stress put in these sections on the arl>itrari>iess of the 
 connexion between those visual signs which suggest tangible magnitudes, 
 and that which they signify — a fundamental (jrinci]>le throughout the 
 Essay ; for, as according to the analogy of articulate language, any 
 term might a priori have been made the sign of any meaning, so any 
 sort of sense-])henomcnon might have been connected by divine Will 
 with any other sort, under ' natural ' law. This so far accords with 
 Hume, when he says that ' if we reason a priori anything may appear
 
 204 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 77. For the further clearing up of this point, it is to 
 be observed, that what we immediately and properly see are 
 only lights and colours in sundry situations and shades, and 
 degrees of faintness and clearness, confusion and distinct- 
 ness. All which visible objects are only in the mind^ ; nor 
 do they suggest aught external^, whether distance or magni- 
 tude, otherwise than by habitual connexion, as words do 
 things. We are also to remark^ that beside the straining 
 of the eyes, and beside the vivid and faint, the distinct and 
 confused appearances (which, bearing some proportion to 
 lines and angles, have been substituted instead of them in 
 the foregoing part of this Treatise), there are other means 
 which suggest both distance and magnitude — particularly 
 the situation of visible points or objects, as upper or lower ; 
 the former suggesting a farther distance and greater magni- 
 tude, the latter a nearer distance and lesser magnitude — all 
 which is an effect only of custom and experience, there 
 being really nothing intermediate in the line of distance 
 between the uppermost and the lowermost, which are both 
 equidistant, or rather at no distance from the eye ; as there 
 is also nothing in upper or lower which by necessary con- 
 nexion should suggest greater or lesser magnitude. Now, 
 as these customary experimental means of suggesting dis- 
 tance do likewise suggest magnitude, so they suggest the 
 
 able to produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for all we 
 know, extinguish the sun ; or the wish of a man control the planets in 
 their orbits. It is only experience that teaches us the actual nature and 
 bounds of cause and effect' {Imjiiiry, ch. XII. pt. 3). Here 'cause' 
 means sign, and physical causation means natural signification. 
 
 In §§ 67-77, which are here omitted, Berkeley tries to verify the 
 preceding doctrines, as to the visual signs of actual or tangible Magni- 
 tude, by applying them to solve a scientific puzzle of long standing — the 
 fact of the greater visible magnitude of the moon and other heavenly 
 bodies when in the horizon. See Berkeley's Works, vol. I. 
 
 ' ' in the mind,' i. e. dependent on being perceived. 
 
 ^ ' external,' i. e. given in touch, the data of which are (meantime) 
 granted to be possibly independent of perception.
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 205 
 
 one as immediately as the other. I say, they do not (vide 
 sect. 53) first suggest distance, and then leave the mind 
 from thence to infer or compute magnitude, but suggest 
 magnitude as immediately and directly as they suggest 
 distance ^ 
 
 78. This phenomenon of the horizontal moon is a clear 
 instance of the insufficiency of lines and angles for explain- 
 ing the way wherein the mind perceives and estimates the 
 magnitude of outward objects. There is, nevertheless, 
 a use of computation by them — in order to determine the 
 apparent magnitude of things, so far as they have a con- 
 nexion with and are proportional to those other ideas or 
 perceptions which are the true and immediate occasions 
 that suggest to the mind the apparent magnitude of things. 
 But this in general may, I think, be observed concerning 
 mathematical computation in optics — that it can never be 
 very precise and exact, since the judgments we make of the 
 magnitude of external things do often depend on several 
 circumstances which are not proportional to or capable of 
 being defined by lines and angles. 
 
 79. From what has been said, we may safely deduce this 
 consequence, to wit, that a man born blind, and made to [ 
 see, would, at first opening of his eyes, make a very different 
 judgment of the magnitude of objects intromitted by them 
 from what others do. He would not consider the ideas of 
 sight with reference to, or as having any connexion with the 
 ideas of touch. His view of them being entirely terminated 
 within themselves, he can no otherwise judge them great or 
 small than as they contain a greater or lesser number of 
 visible points. Now, it being certain that any visible point 
 can cover or exclude from view only one other visible 
 point, it follows that whatever object intercepts the view 
 
 ' Note the contrast here between ' inference " and ' suggestion ' : the 
 former involves conscious exercise of Intellect while in the latter 
 Intellect is depressed by Sense. See Vindication, sect. 42.
 
 2o6 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 of another hath an equal number of visible points with it; 
 and, consequently, they shall both be thought by him to have 
 the same magnitude. Hence, it is evident one in those 
 circumstances would judge his thumb, with which he might 
 hide a tower, or hinder its being seen, equal to that tower ; 
 or his hand, the interposition whereof might conceal the 
 firmament from his view, equal to the firmament : how great 
 an inequality soever there may, in our apprehensions, seem 
 to be betwixt those two things, because of the customary 
 and close connexion that has grown up in our minds between 
 the objects of sight and touch, whereby the very different 
 and distinct ideas of those two senses are so blended and 
 confounded together as to be mistaken for one and the 
 same thing— out of which prejudice we cannot easily 
 extricate ourselves. 
 
 121. We have shewn the way wherein the mind, by 
 mediation of visible ideas \ doth perceive or apprehend 
 the distance, magnitude, and situation of tangible objects. 
 
 I come now to inquire more particularly concerning the 
 difference between the ideas of Sight and Touch which are 
 called by the same names, and see whether there be any idea 
 common to both senses. From what we have at large set 
 forth and demonstrated in the foregoing parts of this treatise, 
 it is plain there is no one self-same numerical Extension, 
 perceived both by sight and touch ; but that the particular 
 figures and extensions perceived by sight, however they may 
 be called by the same names, and reputed the same things 
 with those perceived by touch, are nevertheless different, 
 and have an existence very distinct and separate from them. 
 So that the question is not now concerning the same 
 
 ' ' visible ideas ' — say rather visible and visual ideas ; for he here 
 includes not only colours which we see, but also the invisible ' sensa- 
 tions ' in the visual organ — muscular and locomotive — which zs^ felt and 
 not seen.
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 207 
 
 numerical ideas, but whether there be any one and the same 
 sort or species of ideas equally perceivable to both senses ; 
 or, in other words, whether extension, figure, and motion 
 perceived by sight, are not specifically distinct from 
 extension, figure, and motion perceived by touch ? 
 
 127. It having been shewn that there are no abstract ideas 
 of figure, and that it is impossible for us, by any precision ' 
 of thought, to frame an abstract idea of extension, separate 
 from all other visible and tangible qualities, which shall be 
 common both to sight and touch, the question now remaining 
 is. Whether the particular extensions, figures, and motions 
 perceived by sight, be of the same kind with the particular 
 extensions, figures, and motions perceived by touch ? In 
 answer to which I shall venture to lay down the following 
 proposition: — The extensions, figures, and tnotions perceived 
 by sight are specifically distinct from the ideas of touch, called 
 by the same names ; nor is there any such thing as one idea, 
 or kind of idea, coinmon to both senses ^. This proposition 
 may, without much difficulty, be collected from what hath 
 been said in several places of this Essay. But, because it 
 
 ' ' precision,' i.e. separation produced by thinking. 
 
 * This stems to imply that there are no ' common sensibles,' as 
 Aristotle called them, and as the primary qualities are by many held to 
 be. That space may be a common and presupposed perception, 
 necessarily involved in all (or in some) perceptions of sense, while per 
 se inconceivable apart from a particular perception, does not occur to 
 Berkeley. He rightly insists on the impossibility of perceiving, and of 
 having a sensuous image of space in abstraction from sense ; but he does 
 not discuss the counter impossibility of sensuous data being perceived 
 or conceived as matter without space ; nor that perceptions which 
 involve extension may be evoked by sensations in touch or in sight, 
 \Yithout space being therefore identiped either with sensations of contact 
 and resistance or with sensations of colour. Is it the perception of 
 extension thus evoked that ^ivcs outness to what we are conscious of 
 in sense, and enables us to realise objects definitely as 'in space' — not 
 vaguely as unknown powers that are supposed 'external' to, because 
 uncontrollable by, our peisonal agency?
 
 2o8 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 seems so remote from, and contrary to the received notions 
 and settled opinion of mankind, I shall attempt to demon- 
 strate it more particularly and at large by the following 
 arguments : — 
 
 128. First, When, upon perception of an idea, I range it 
 under this or that sort, it is because it is perceived after the 
 same manner, or because it has a likeness or conformity with 
 or affects me in the same way as the ideas of the sort I rank 
 it under. In short, it must not be entirely new, but have 
 something in it old and already perceived by me. It must, 
 I say, have so much, at least, in common with the ideas 
 I have before known and named, as to make me give it the 
 same name with them. But, it has been, if I mistake not, 
 clearly made out that a man l?oni blind would not, at first 
 reception of his sight, think the things he saw were of the 
 same nature with the objects of touch, or had anything in 
 common with them ; but that they were a new set of ideas, 
 perceived in a new manner, and entirely different from all 
 he had ever perceived before. So that he would not call 
 them by the same name, nor repute them to be of the same 
 sort, with anything he had hitherto known. 
 
 129. Secondly, Light and colours are allowed by all to 
 constitute a sort of species entirely different from the ideas 
 of touch ; nor will any man, I presume, say they can make 
 themselves perceived by that sense. But there is no other 
 immediate object of sight besides light and colours. It is 
 therefore a direct consequence, that there is no idea 
 common to both senses. 
 
 130. It is a prevailing opinion, even amongst those who 
 have thought and writ most accurately concerning our ideas, 
 and the ways wliereby they enter into the understanding, that 
 something mo?-e is perceived by sight than barely light and 
 colours with their variations. Mr. Locke termeth sight ' the 
 most comprehensive of all our senses, conveying to our 
 minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only 
 
 A
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 209 
 
 to that sense ; and also the far different ideas of space, figure, 
 and motion.' {Essay on Human Understaiiding, b. II. ch. 9. 
 s. 9.) Space or distance, we have shewn, is no otherwise 
 the object of sight than of hearing. (Vid. sect. 46.) And, 
 as for figure and extension, I leave it to any one that shall 
 calmly attend to his own clear and distinct ideas to decide 
 whether he has any idea intromitted immediately and 
 properly by sight save only light and colours : or, whether 
 it be possible for him to frame in his mind a distinct 
 abstract idea of visible extension, or figure, exclusive of all 
 colour ; and, on the other hand, whether he can conceive 
 colour without visible extension ? For my own part, I must 
 confess, I am not able to attain so great a nicety of abstrac- 
 tion. I know very well that, in a strict sense, I see nothing 
 but light and colours, with their several shades and variations. 
 He who beside these doth also perceive by sight ideas far 
 different and distinct from them, hath that faculty in a 
 degree more perfect and comprehensive than I can pretend 
 to. It must be owned, indeed, that, by the mediation of 
 light and colours, other far different ideas are suggested to 
 my mind. But then, upon this score, I see no reason why 
 the sight ^ should be thought more ' comprehensive ' than 
 the hearing, which, beside sounds which are peculiar to that 
 sense, doth, by their mediation, suggest not only space, 
 figure, and motion, but also all other ideas whatsoever that 
 can be signified by words. 
 
 131. Thirdly, It is, I think, an axiom universally received, 
 that 'quantities of the same kind may be added together 
 and make one entire sum.' Mathematicians add lines 
 together; but they do not add a line to a solid, or conceive 
 it as making one sum with a surface. These three kinds 
 of quantity being thought incapable of any such mutual 
 
 ' 'the sight,' i.e. what we originally and immediately see, as dis- 
 tinguished from the ' suggestions ' called forth by visible or visual 
 signs. 
 
 P
 
 2IO SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 addition, and consequently of being compared together in 
 the several ways of proportion, are by them for that reason 
 esteemed entirely disparate and heterogeneous. Now let 
 any one try in his thoughts to add a visible line or surface 
 to a tangible line or surface, so as to conceive them making 
 one continued sum or whole. He that can do this may 
 think them homogeneous ; but he that cannot must, by the 
 foregoing axiom, think them heterogeneous. A blue and 
 a red line I can conceive added together into one sum and 
 inaking one continued line ; but to make, in my thoughts, 
 one continued line of a visible and tangible line added 
 together, is, I find, a task far more difficult, and even 
 insurmountable; and I leave it to the reflection and 
 experience of every particular person to determine for 
 himself. 
 
 132. Fourthly, A farther confirmation of our tenet may be 
 drawn from the solution of Mr. Molyneux's problem, pub- 
 lished by Mr. Locke in his Essay : which I shall set down 
 as it there lies, together with Mr. Locke's opinion of it : — 
 ' Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by 
 his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of 
 the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to 
 tell when he felt one and the other, which is the cube and 
 which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere 
 placed on a table, and the blind man made to see : Qusere, 
 Whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could 
 now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which the 
 cube. To which the acute and judicious proposer answers : 
 Not. For, though he has obtained the experience of how 
 a globe, how a cube affects his touch ; yet he has not yet 
 attained the experience, that what affects his touch so or so 
 must affect his sight so or so : or that a protuberant angle 
 in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear 
 to his eye as it doth in the cube. I agree with this think- 
 ing gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 211 
 
 his answer to this his problem ; and am of opinion that 
 the bhnd man, at first sight, would not be able with cer- 
 tainty to say, which was the globe, which the cube, whilst 
 he only saw them.' (Locke's Essay on Human Understand- 
 ing, b. II. ch. 2. s. 8 ^) 
 
 133. Now, if a square surface perceived by touch be of 
 the same sort with a square surface perceived by sight, it is 
 certain the blind man here mentioned might know a square 
 surface as soon as he saw it. It is no more but introducing 
 into his mind, by a new inlet, an idea he has been already 
 well acquainted with. Since therefore he is supposed to 
 have known by his touch that a cube is a body terminated 
 by square surfaces ; and that a sphere is not terminated by 
 square surfaces — upon the supposition that a visible and 
 tangible square differ only /;/ nuniero, it follows that he might 
 know, by the unerring mark of the square surfaces, which 
 was the cube, and which not, while he only saw them. We 
 must therefore allow, either that visible extension and figures 
 are specifically distinct from tangible extension and figures, 
 or else, that the solution of this problem, given by those 
 two thoughtful and ingenious men, is wrong. 
 
 134. Much more might be laid together in proof of the 
 proposition I have advanced. But, what has been said is, 
 if I mistake not, sufficient to convince any one that shall 
 yield a reasonable attention. And, as for those that will 
 not be at the pains of a little thought, no multiplication of 
 words w'ill ever suffice to make them understand the truth, 
 or rightly conceive my meaning. 
 
 135. I cannot let go the above-mentioned problem with- 
 out some reflection on it. It hath been made evident that 
 a man blind from his birth would not, at first sight, denomi- 
 nate anything he saw, by the names he had been used to 
 
 * This ' problem * first appeared in the second edition of Locke's 
 Essay. See also Leibnitz (Nouveatix Essais, liv. IL ch. 9), who dis- 
 putes the alleged heterogeneity. 
 
 P 2
 
 212 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 appropriate to ideas of touch. Cube, sphere, table are 
 words he has known applied to things perceivable by touch, 
 but to things perfectly intangible he never knew them 
 applied. Those words, in their wonted apphcation, always 
 marked out to his mind bodies or solid things which were 
 perceived by the resistance they gave. But there is no 
 solidity, no resistance or protrusion, perceived by sight. 
 In short, the ideas of sight are all new perceptions, to 
 which there be no names annexed in his mind : he cannot 
 therefore understand what is said to him concerning them. 
 And to ask of the two bodies he saw placed on the table, 
 which was the sphere, which the cube, were to him a ques- 
 tion downright bantering and unintelligible ; nothing he 
 sees being able to suggest to his thoughts the idea of 
 body, distance, or, in general, of anything he had already 
 known. 
 
 136. It is a mistake to think the same thing affects both 
 sight and touch. If the same angle or square which is the 
 object of touch be also the object of vision, what should 
 hinder the blind man, at first sight, from knowing it ? For, 
 though the manner wherein it affects the sight be different 
 from that wherein it affected his touch, yet, there being, 
 beside this manner or circumstance, which is new and 
 unknown, the angle or figure, which is old and known, he 
 cannot choose but discern it. 
 
 138. I shall not enlarge any farther on this subject, but pro- 
 ceed to inquire what may be alleged, with greatest appear- 
 ance of reason, against the proposition we have demonstrated 
 to be true ; for, where there is so much prejudice to be 
 encountered, a bare and naked demonstration of the truth 
 will scarce suffice. We must also satisfy the scruples that 
 men may start in favour of their preconceived notions, 
 shew whence the mistake arises, how it came to spread, 
 and carefully disclose and root out those false persuasions
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 213 
 
 that an early prejudice might have implanted in the 
 mind. 
 
 139. It will be demanded how visible extension and 
 figures come to be called by the same nai/ie with tangible 
 extension and figures, if they are not of the same kind with 
 them ? It must be something more than humour or acci- 
 dent that could occasion a custom so constant and universal 
 as this, which has obtained in all ages and nations of the 
 world, and amongst all ranks of men, the learned as well 
 as the illiterate. 
 
 140. To which I answer, we can no more argue a visible 
 and tangible square to be of the same species, from their 
 being called by the same name, than we can that a tangible 
 square, and the monosyllable consisting of six letters whereby 
 it is marked, are of the same species, because they are both 
 called by the same name. It is customary to call written 
 words, and the things they signify, by the same name : for, 
 words not being regarded in their own nature, or otherwise 
 than as they are marks of things, it had been superfluous, 
 and beside the design of language, to have given them 
 names distinct from those of the things marked by them. 
 The same reason holds here also. Visible figures are the 
 marks of tangible figures ; and, from sect. 59, it is plain 
 that in themselves they are little regarded, or upon any 
 other score than for their connexion with tangible figures, 
 which by nature they are ordained to signify. And, because 
 this Language of Nature does not vary in different ages or 
 nations, hence it is that in all times and places visible figures 
 are called by the same names as the respective tangible 
 figures suggested by them ; and not because they are alike, 
 or of the same sort with them. 
 
 141. But, say you, surely a tangible square is liker to a 
 visible square than to a visible circle : it has four angles, 
 and as many sides ; so also has the visible square ; but the 
 visible circle has no such thing, being bounded by one
 
 214 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 uniform curve, without right lines or angles, which makes it 
 unfit to represent the tangible square, but very fit to repre- 
 sent the tangible circle. Whence it clearly follows, that 
 visible figures are patterns of, or of the same species with, 
 the respective tangible figures represented by them ; that 
 they are like unto them, and of their own nature fitted to 
 represent them, as being of the same sort ; and that they 
 are in no respect arbitrary signs, as words. 
 
 142. I answer, it must be acknowledged the visible square 
 is fitter than the visible circle to represent the tangible 
 square ; but then it is not because it is liker, or more of a 
 species with it, but, because the visible square contains in it 
 several distinct parts, whereby to mark the several distinct 
 corresponding parts of a tangible square, whereas the visible 
 circle doth not. The square perceived by touch hath four 
 distinct equal sides, so also hath it four distinct equal angles. 
 It is therefore necessary that the visible figure which shall be 
 most proper to mark it contain four distinct equal parts, 
 corresponding to the four sides of the tangible square ; as 
 likewise four other distinct and equal parts, whereby to 
 denote the four equal angles of the tangible square. And 
 accordingly we see the visible figures contain in them dis- 
 tinct visible parts, answering to the distinct tangible parts of 
 the figures signified or suggested by them. 
 
 143. But it will not hence follow that any visible figure is 
 like unto or of the same species with its corresponding 
 tangible figure — unless it be also shewn that not only the 
 tiiimder, but also the kind of the parts be the same in both. 
 To illustrate this, I observe that , visible figures represent 
 tangible figures much after the same manner that written 
 words do sounds. Now, in this respect, words are not 
 arbitrary ; it not being indifferent what written word stands 
 for any sound. But, it is requisite that each word contain 
 in it as many distinct characters as there are variations in 
 the sound it stands for. Thus, the single letter a is proper
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 215 
 
 to mark one simple uniform sound ; and the word adultery 
 is accommodated to represent the sound annexed to it — in 
 the formation whereof there being eight different colHsions 
 or modifications of the air by the organs of speech, each of 
 which produces a difference of sound, it was fit the word 
 representing it should consist of as many distinct characters, 
 thereby to mark each particular difference or part of the 
 whole sound. And yet nobody, I presume, will say the 
 single letter a, or the word adultery, are alike unto or of the 
 same species with the respective sounds by them represented. 
 It is indeed arbitrary that, in general, letters of any language 
 represent sounds at all ; but, when that is once agreed, it is 
 not arbitrary what combination of letters shall represent this 
 or that particular sound. I leave this with the reader to 
 pursue, and apply it in his own thoughts. 
 
 144. It must be confessed that we are not so apt to con- 
 found other signs with the things signified, or to think them 
 of the same species, as we are visible and tangible ideas. 
 But, a little consideration will shew us how this may well 
 be, without our supposing them of a like nature. Visible 
 signs are constant and universal; their connexion with tan- 
 gible ideas has been learnt at our first entrance into the 
 world ; and ever since, almost every moment of our lives, 
 it has been occurring to our thoughts, and fastening and 
 striking deeper on our minds. When we observe that signs 
 are variable, and of human institution ; when we remember 
 there was a time they were not connected in our minds with 
 those things they now so readily suggest, but that their 
 signification was learned by the slow steps of experience : 
 this preserves us from confounding them. But, when we 
 find the same signs suggest the same things all over the 
 world ; when we know they are not of human institution, 
 and cannot remember that we ever learned their signification, 
 but think that at first sight they would have suggested to us 
 the same things they do now : all this persuades us they are
 
 2l6 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 of the same species as the things respectively represented 
 by them, and that it is by a natural resemblance they suggest 
 them to our minds. 
 
 145. Add to this that whenever we make a nice survey of 
 any object, successively directing the optic axis to each point 
 thereof, there are certain lines and figures, described by the 
 motion of the head or eye, which, being in truth perceived 
 hy feeiing\ do nevertheless so mix themselves, as it were, with 
 the ideas of sight that we can scarce think but they apper- 
 tain to that sense. Again, the ideas of sight enter into the 
 mind several at once, more distinct and unmingled than is 
 usual in the other senses beside the touch. Sounds, for 
 example, perceived at the same instant, are apt to coalesce, 
 if I may so say, into one sound : but we can perceive, at the 
 same time, great variety of visible objects, very separate. and 
 distinct from each other. Now, tangible extension being 
 made up of several distinct coexistent parts, we may hence 
 gather another reason that may dispose us to imagine a like- 
 ness or analogy between the immediate objects of sight and 
 touch. But nothing, certainly, does more contribute to 
 blend and confound them together, than the strict and close 
 connexion they have with each other. We cannot open 
 our eyes but the ideas of distance ^, bodies, and tangible 
 figures are suggested by them. So swift, and sudden, and 
 unperceived is the transit from visible to tangible ideas that 
 we can scarce forbear thinking them ec^ually the immediate 
 object of vision. 
 
 146. The prejudice which is grounded on these, and what- 
 ever other causes may be assigned thereof, sticks so fast on 
 our understandings, that it is impossible, without obstinate 
 striving and labour of the mind, to get entirely clear of it. 
 
 * These are vistial, as distinguished from visible, signs of tactual 
 phenomena. 
 
 ^ 'distance,' i.e. distance outward in the line of sight. Outwardness 
 is invisible, and only ' suggested ' by what we see.
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 217 
 
 But then the reluctancy we find in rejecting any opinion can 
 be no argument of its truth, to whoever considers what has 
 been already shewn with regard to the prejudices we enter- 
 tain concerning the distance, magnitude, and situation of 
 objects ; prejudices so famihar to our minds, so confirmed 
 and inveterate, as they will hardly give way to the clearest 
 demonstration. 
 
 147. Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude 
 that the proper objects of vision ' constitute the Universal 
 Language of Nature '" ; whereby we are instructed how to 
 regulate our actions, in order to attain those things that are 
 necessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies, 
 as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive 
 of them. It is by their information that we are principally 
 guided in all the transactions and concerns of life. And 
 the manner wherein they signify and mark out unto us the 
 objects which are at a distance is the same with that of 
 languages and signs of human appointment ; which do not 
 suggest the things signified by any likeness or identity of 
 nature, but only by an habitual connexion that experience 
 has made us to observe between them. 
 
 148. Suppose one who had always continued blind be 
 told by his guide that after he has advanced so many steps 
 he shall come to the brink of the precipice, or be stopped 
 
 ' Is the ' proper object of vision ' extended or unextended colour ? 
 
 ^ In this and the next section Berkeley sums up the ' theory ' to 
 which the preceding analyses conduct ; — after having, as he believed, 
 shown the complete heterogeneity of the original data presented in the 
 sense of Sight, and the original data presented in the sense of Touch. 
 He had been gradually approaching this in the preceding sections, under 
 his favourite metaphor of ' language ' latent in nature, with the therein 
 implied arbitrariness and generality in the sensible signs. When this 
 tiieory is pushed into its issues, the mathematical as well as the physical 
 sciences appear as if based on arbitrary relations among the data of 
 the two senses, all their inferences being sustained by ' suggestions,' 
 themselves not fully explnined, and which yield only ,^'6.'«tV'a/or customary 
 not necessary or absolutely universal conclusions.
 
 2l8 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 by a wall ; must not this to him seem very admirable and 
 surprising? He cannot conceive how it is possible for 
 mortals to frame such predictions as these, which to him 
 would seem as strange and unaccountable as prophecy does 
 to others. Even they who are blessed with the visive faculty 
 may (though familiarity make it less observed) find therein 
 sufficient cause of admiration. The wonderful art and 
 contrivance wherewith it is adjusted to those ends and 
 purposes for which it was apparently designed ; the vast 
 extent, number, and variety of objects that are at once, with 
 so much ease, and quickness, and pleasure, suggested by it — 
 all these afford subject for much and pleasing speculation, 
 and may, if anything, give us some glimmering analogous 
 prsenotion of things that are placed beyond the certain 
 discovery and comprehension of our present state'. 
 
 "■ The Book of Vision is throughout a Book of God, which we are 
 really interpreting when we seem to be seeing, and which we find to be 
 literally a Book of Prophecy. 
 
 Does Berkeley mean to maintain that the only proper object of sight 
 IS unex/ended colowr — that even superficial extension is invisible — and 
 that, apart from an experience of certain sensations and exertions in 
 the motor organs, all visibilia are perceived as unextended points ? 
 Can coloured extension ever be seen without previous experience of 
 organic movement and muscular resistance ? Among British writers, 
 Brown {Lectures. XXIX), J. S. Mill {Exam, of HaiJiilton,^^^. 285-287), 
 and Dr. Bain {Senses and Intellect, pp. 366-378) answer this question 
 in the negative. They virtually analyse our perception of extension, in 
 length and breadth as well as in depth, into successive sensations of 
 impeded and unimpeded organic movement, including muscular expan- 
 sion and contiaction. They deny thaty^rw can be seen in colour alone, 
 or that what we mean by visible form can be conceived by one who has 
 never been conscious of sensations of locomotion — at least in the eye. 
 They interpret a ' round ' form to signify something that presupposes 
 a felt sweep of the eye to enable us to apprehend it. We must, it 
 is argued, experience organic movement before we can find extension in 
 our visual perceptions of colour. ' I cannot,' says Mill, ' admit that 
 we could have what is meant by a perception of stiperfcial space, unless 
 we conceived it as something which the hand could be moved across.' 
 Yet both Mill and Dr. Bain seem to allow that when the extended area 
 is very small (less than jV of an inch in diameter), it can be seen 
 
 i
 
 A NEW THEORY OF VISION 219 
 
 without any motion even in the visual organ. On this subject seo 
 Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. II. p. 165, where a reason is 
 offered for concluding the necessary implication of superficial extension 
 (as distinguished from outness or depth) in all perception of colours. 
 
 As to all this the question arises, whether perception of phenomena in 
 motion does not presuppose perception of space or room, as a con- 
 dition of our perceiving motion. If so, the proposed explanation of the 
 latter by the former would involve petitio principii. Can the idea of 
 motion from plnce to place be wholly resolved into experience of 
 successive phenomena? As a relative question, one might also ask what 
 conception of motion is possible to a person born blind ? 
 
 Some hold that all sensuous impressions, in all the senses, are 
 originally given as external to one another in place — in short, that we 
 cannot have any organic sensation without an implied perception of 
 extension — that sensation proper in our organism, and perception proper 
 of the extended object exist only as they co-exist, though always in an 
 inverse ratio of intensity — and that we are originally sentient and per- 
 cipient of our own extended organism, and of that only. ' All the 
 senses,' says Hamilton, 'simply or in combination, afford conditions 
 for the perception of the primary qualities ' (Reid, Works, p. 864). 
 
 ' Mind alone,^ says Mansel, ' is not capable of sensation ; for it is sen- 
 tient only so far as it animates a bodily organism. That a disembodied 
 spirit has consciousness we must believe; — at least it is impossible to 
 conceive how spiritual existence can be otherwise manifested ; — but it 
 is impossible to conceive such consciousness as at all resembling our 
 own, at any rate in the particular phenomena which are conveyed by 
 means of the senses' {^Metaphysics, p. 91'. Berkeley elsewhere assumes 
 that it is possible for us to continue to be percipient of colours after 
 death has dissolved the bodily organ of sight, of sounds after the bodily 
 organ of hearing has been dissolved, and of the material world in all its 
 familiar qualities after the total dissolution of the bodily organism.
 
 II. DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 
 A DIALOGUE 1 
 
 I. EARLY the next morning, as I looked out of my 
 window, I saw Alciphron walking in the garden with all 
 
 ' This is the Foiarth of Seven Dialogues, published by Berkeley in 
 1732, under the title of Alciplu'on, or the Alinute Philosopher. ' Minute 
 philosophers' were sceptics, or, as we might now call them, agnostics, 
 whose narrow philosophy was limited by the empirical data of the 
 senses. Alciphron and Lysicles represent this minute philosophy — the 
 former in intelligent form, and the latter merely as an apology for 
 a life of sensuous pleasure : Euphranor and Crito endeavour to show 
 the reasonableness of religion. The following Dialogue discusses the 
 foundation of faith in the perpetual and omnipresent activity of God in 
 external nature, taking its departure from the theory of seeing, and 
 looking at the visible world as a Book of God, because a system of 
 sensible signs, more or less interpretable by man. As the Power that 
 regulates the phenomena presented in sense is continually presenting to 
 us in Sight sig>iijica)it phenomena, which are to all intents and purposes 
 a Divine Language, it is argued that I have the same kind of evidence 
 for the Universal Power being intelligent and intending Spirit as I have 
 for the existence of a man when he is speaking to me. (The explanation 
 raises the inquiry, — Can one mind communicate with another mind 
 through the medium of a material world that consists, according to 
 Berkeley, only of sense-dependent phenomena?) 
 
 The subject is introduced in §§ 1-7. The theory that much of 
 what is called seeing is really interpreting xvhat is i»imediateiy seen 
 is explained in §§ 8-15 ; where it is argued that, as the visible world 
 has in itself no active power, the phenomena presented to Sight must 
 derive their orderly and therefore significant relations to those of Touch 
 from ordering Intelligence always actively omnipresent in external nature. 
 The remainder of the Dialogue (§§ iG-24) is devoted to a discussion 
 of the nature and limits of a human knowledge of this Universal Power
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 22T 
 
 the signs of a man in deep thought. Upon which I went 
 down to him. 
 
 Akiphron, said I, this early and profound meditation 
 puts me in no small fright. 
 
 How so ? 
 
 Because I should be sorry to be convinced there was no 
 (iod. The thought of anarchy in Nature is to me more 
 shocking than in civil life : inasmuch as natural concerns 
 are more important than civil, and the basis of all others. 
 
 I grant, replied Alciphron, that some inconvenience may 
 possibly follow from disproving a God : but as to what you 
 say of fright and shocking, all that is nothing but mere 
 prejudice. Men frame an idea or chimera in their own 
 minds, and then fall down and worship it. Notions govern 
 mankind : but of all notions that of God's governing the 
 w^orld hath taken the deepest root and spread the farthest : 
 it is therefore in philosophy an heroical achievement to | 
 dispossess this imaginary monarch of his government, and \ 
 banish all those fears and spectres which the light of reason 
 can alone dispel : 
 
 Non radii solis, non lucida tela diei 
 Discutiunt, sed naturae species ratioque*. 
 
 My part, said I, shall be to stand by, as I have hitherto 
 done, and take notes of all that passeth during this 
 memorable event ; while a minute philosopher, not six 
 
 that is continually speaking to us by visual signs, and indeed by all 
 the phenomena of the senses, which thus constitute a vast sense-sym- 
 bolism, or natural language. Crito argues that our conception of this 
 Power cannot be wholly negative ; for total nescience makes faith im- 
 possible. We have reasonable assurance that the Power operative in 
 the visible world is Spirit. God is inferred from the intelligibility of 
 the visible world, in the sort of way one's human neighbour is inferred 
 from his words and actions that are manifested to our senses. 
 
 This Dialogue may be taken as a rationale of theism, founded on the 
 orderliness, and therefore interpretability, of the data of the senses — 
 most obviously those of sight. 
 
 ' Lucretius.
 
 222 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 feet high, attempts to dethrone the monarch of the 
 universe. 
 
 Alas ! repHed A/cip/ifon, arguments are not to be measured 
 by feet and inches. One man may see more than a milHon ; 
 and a short argument, managed by a free-thinker, may be 
 sufficient to overthrow the most gigantic chimera. 
 
 As we were engaged in this discourse, Crito and Euphranor 
 joined us. 
 
 I find you have been beforehand with us to-day, said 
 Crito to Alciphron, and taken the advantage of soHtude 
 and early hours, while Euphranor and I were asleep in our 
 beds. We may, therefore, expect to see Atheism placed 
 in the best light, and supported by the strongest argu- 
 ments. 
 
 2. Ale. The being of a God is a subject upon which 
 there has been a world of commonplace, which it is need- 
 less to repeat. Give me leave therefore to lay down certain 
 rules and limitations, in order to shorten our present con- 
 ference. For, as the end of debating is to persuade, all 
 those things which are foreign to this end should be left 
 out of our debate. 
 
 First then, let me tell you I am not to be persuaded by 
 1 metaphysical arguments ; such, for instance, as are drawn 
 from the idea of an all-perfect being ', or from the absurdity 
 of an infinite progression of causes ^. This sort of argu- 
 ments I have always found dry and jejune : and, as they 
 are not suited to my way of thinking they may perhaps 
 puzzle, but never will convince me. Secondly, I am not 
 to be persuaded by the authority either of past or present 
 lages, of mankind in general, or of particular wise men, all 
 which passeth for little or nothing with a man of sound 
 argument and free thought. Thirdly, all proofs drawn from 
 
 ' As proposed by Des Cartes for instance. 
 ' A favourite argument of some theologians.
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 223 
 
 utility or convenience are foreign to the purpose. Tliey 
 may prove indeed the usefulness of the notion, but not the 
 existence of the thing. Whatever legislators or statesmen 
 may think, truth and convenience are very different things 
 to the rigorous eye of a philosopher. 
 
 And now, that I may not seem partial, I will limit myself 
 also not to object, in the first place, from anything that may 
 seem irregular or unaccountable in the works of nature, 
 against a cause of infinite power and wisdom ; because I 
 already know the answer you will make, to wit, that no one 
 can judge of the symmetry and use of the parts of an in- 
 finite machine, which are all relative to each other, and to 
 the whole, without being able to comprehend the entire 
 machine, or the whole universe. And, in the second place, 
 I shall engage myself not to object against the justice and 
 ])rovidence of a Supreme Being from the evil that befalls 
 good men, and the prosperity which is often the portion of 
 wicked men in this life ; because, I know that, instead of 
 admitting this to be an objection against a Deity, you 
 would make it an argument for a future state, in which 
 there shall be such a retribution of rewards and punish- 
 ments as may vindicate the Divine attributes, and set all 
 things right in the end. Now, these answers, though they 
 should be admitted for good ones, are in truth no proofs of 
 the being of God, but only solutions of certain difficulties 
 which might be objected, supposing it already proved by 
 proper arguments. Thus much I thought fit to premise, in 
 order to save time and trouble both to you and myself. 
 
 Cri. I think that as the proper end of our conference 
 ought to be supposed the discovery and defence of truth, 
 so truth may be justified, not only by persuading its adver- 
 saries, but, where that cannot be done, by shewing them to 
 be unreasonable. Arguments, therefore, which carry light 
 have their effect, even against an opponent who shuts his 
 eyes, because they shew him to be obstinate and prejudiced.
 
 224 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Besides, this distinction between arguments that puzzle and 
 that convince, is least of all observed by minute philo- 
 sophers, and need not therefore be observed by others in 
 their favour. — But perhaps, Euphranor may be willing to 
 encounter you on your own terms, in which case I have 
 nothing further to say. 
 
 3. Eiiph. Alciphron acts like a skilful general, who is 
 bent upon gaining the advantage of the ground, and 
 alluring the enemy out of their trenches. We who believe 
 a God, are entrenched within tradition, custom, authority, 
 and law. And, nevertheless, instead of attempting to force 
 us, he proposes that we should voluntarily abandon these 
 intrenchments and make the attack ; when we may act on 
 the defensive with much security and ease, leaving him 
 the trouble to dispossess us of what we need not resign. 
 Those reasons (continued he, addressing himself to Alci- 
 phron) which you have mustered up in this morning's 
 meditation, if they do not weaken, must establish our belief 
 of a God ; for the utmost is to be expected from so great 
 a master in his profession, when he set his strength to a 
 point. 
 
 Ale. I hold the confused notion of a Deity, or some in- 
 visible power, to be of all prejudices the most unconquer- 
 able. When half-a-dozen ingenious men are got together 
 over a glass of wine, by a cheerful fire, in a room well- 
 lighted, we banish with ease all the spectres of fancy and 
 education, and are very clear in our decisions. But, as I 
 was taking a solitary walk before it was broad daylight in 
 yonder grove, methought the point was not quite so clear ; 
 nor could I readily recollect the force of those arguments 
 which used to appear so conclusive at other times. I had 
 I know not what awe upon my mind, and seemed haunted 
 by a sort of panic, which I cannot otherwise account for 
 than by supposing it the effect of prejudice : for, you must 
 know, that I, like the rest of the world, was once upon
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 225 
 
 a time catechised and tutored into the belief of a God or 
 Spirit. There is no surer mark of prejudice than the be- 
 lieving a thing without reason. What necessity then can 
 there be that I should set myself the difficult task of proving 
 a negative, when it is sufficient to observe that there is no 
 proof of the affirmative, and that the admitting it without 
 I)roof is unreasonable ? Prove therefore your opinion ; or, . 
 if you cannot, you may indeed remain in possession of it, 
 but you will only be possessed of a prejudice. 
 
 Euph. O Alciphron, to content you we must prove, it 
 seems, and we must prove upon your own terms. But, in 
 the first place, let us see what sort of proof you expect. 
 
 Ale. Perhaps I may not expect it, but I will tell you what 
 sort of proof I would have : and that is, in short — such 
 proof as every man of sense requires of a matter of fact, or 
 the existence of any other particular thing. For instance, 
 should a man ask why I believe there is a king of Great 
 Britain ? I might answer — Because I had seen him. Or 
 a king of Spain ? Because I had seen those who saw him. 
 But as for this King of kings, I neither saw him myself, or 
 any one else that ever did see Him. Surely, if there be 
 such a thing as God, it is very strange that He should leave 
 Himself without a witness ; that men should still dispute 
 His being ; and that there should be no one evident, sen- 
 sible, plain proof of it, without recourse to philosophy or 
 metaphysics. A matter of fact is not to be proved by 
 notions, but by facts '. This is clear and full to the point. 
 
 * So Hume in Inquiry concerning Understanding, sect. 4, pt. i. 
 Those matters of fact for which we have not the direct evidence of 
 sense cannot be ascertained in the same way as abstract conchisions, 
 which are demonstratively certain. ' The contrary of every matter of 
 fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction . . . 
 That tlie sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, 
 and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will 
 rise ... If you ask a man why he believes any matter of fact which is 
 absent, he would give you a reason ; and this reason would be some 
 other fact. — But although a present fact may thus signify an absent 
 
 Q
 
 226 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 You see what I would be at. Upon these principles I defy 
 superstition. 
 
 Euph. You believe then as far as you can see ? 
 
 Ale. That is my rule of faith. 
 
 Euph. How ! will you not believe the existence of things 
 which you hear, unless you also see them ? 
 
 Ale. I will not say so neither. When I insisted on 
 seeing, I would be understood to mean perceiving in 
 general. Outward objects make very different impressions 
 upon the animal spirits, all of which are comprised under 
 the common name of sense. And whatever we can perceive 
 by any sense we may be sure of. 
 
 4. Euph. What ! do you believe then that there are such 
 things as animal spirits ? 
 
 Ale. Doubtless. 
 
 Euph. By what sense do you perceive them ? 
 
 Ale. I do not perceive them immediately by any of my 
 senses. I am nevertheless persuaded of their existence, 
 because I can collect it from their effects and operations. 
 They are the messengers which, running to and fro in the 
 nerves, preserve a communication between the soul and 
 outward objects. 
 
 Euph. You admit then the being of a soul ? 
 
 Ale. Provided I do not admit an immaterial substance, 
 I see no inconvenience in admitting there may be such a 
 thing as a soul. And this may be no more than a thin fine 
 texture of subtle parts or spirits residing in the brain. 
 
 Euph. I do not ask about its nature. I only ask whether 
 
 fact, can an empirical fact, or any combination of them, prove Infinite 
 and Eternal Power ? Can an infinite conclusion be drawn from finite 
 premises? ' Tiie existence and nature of the Supreme Being,' says 
 Reid (so far recognising the peculiarity), 'is the only real fact that is 
 necessary. Other real existences are the effects of will and power. 
 They had a beginning and are mutable.' (Hamilton's Reid, p. 442.) 
 In this respect God is unique, and so far out of analogy with finite 
 embodied persons such as men.
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 227 
 
 you admit that there is a principle of thought and action, 
 and whether // be perceivable by sense. 
 
 Ale. I grant that there is such a principle, and that it is 
 not the object of sense itself, but inferred from appearances 
 which are perceived by sense. 
 
 Euph. If I understand you rightly, from animal functions 
 and motions you infer the existence of animal spirits, and 
 from reasonable acts you infer the existence of a reasonable 
 soul. Is it not so ? 
 
 Ale. It is. 
 
 Euph. It should seem, therefore, that the being of things 
 imperceptible to sense may be collected from effects and 
 signs, or sensible tokens. 
 
 Ale. It may. 
 
 Euph. Tell me, Alciphron, is not the soul that which 
 makes the principal distinction between a real person and 
 a shadow, a living man and a carcass ? 
 
 Ale. I grant it is. 
 
 Euph. I cannot, therefore, know that you, for instance, 
 are a distinct thinking individual, or a real living man, by 
 surer or other signs than those from which it can be inferred 
 that you have a soul ^ 
 
 Ale. You cannot. 
 
 Euph. Pray tell me, are not all acts immediately and 
 properly perceived by sense reducible to motion ? 
 
 Ale. They are. 
 
 Euph. From motions, therefore, you infer a mover or 
 cause ; and from reasonable motions (or such as appear 
 calculated for a reasonable end) a rational cause, soul or 
 spirit? 
 
 Ale. Even so. 
 
 5. Euph. The soul of man actuates but a small body, 
 an insignificant particle, in respect of the great masses of 
 
 ' Accordingly, I cannot see you. I can only see visible signs oi you, 
 the spiritual agent or person. 
 
 Q 2
 
 228 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Nature, the elements, and heavenly bodies, and System of 
 the World. And the wisdom that appears in those motions 
 which are the effect of human reason is incomparably less 
 than that which discovers itself in the structure and use of 
 organised natural bodies, animal or vegetable. A man with 
 his hand can make no machine so admirable as the hand 
 itself; nor can any of those motions by which we trace out 
 human reason approach the skill and contrivance of those 
 wonderful motions of the heart, and brain, and other vital 
 parts, which do not depend on the will of man. 
 
 Ale. All this is true. 
 
 Euph. Doth it not follow, then, that from natural 
 motions, independent of man's will, may be inferred both 
 power and wisdom incomparably greater than that of the 
 human soul ? 
 
 Ale. It should seem so. 
 
 Euph. Further, is there not in natural productions and 
 effects a visible unity of counsel and design ? Are not the 
 rules fixed and immoveable ? Do not the same laws of 
 motion obtain throughout ? The same in China and here 
 the same two thousand years ago and at this day ? 
 
 Ale. All this I do not deny. 
 
 Euph. Is there not also a connexion or relation between 
 animals and vegetables, between both and the elements, 
 between the elements and heavenly bodies ; so that, from 
 their mutual respects, influences, subordinations, and uses, 
 they may be collected to be parts of one whole, conspiring 
 to one and the same end, and fulfilling the same design ? 
 
 Ale. Supposing all this to be true. 
 
 Euph. Will it not then follow that this vastly great, or 
 infinite, power and wisdom must be supposed in one and 
 the same Agent, Spirit, or Mind ; and that we have at least 
 as clear, full, and immediate certainty of the being of this 
 infinitely wise and powerful Spirit, as of any one human soul 
 whatsoever besides our own ?
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 229 
 
 Aic. Let me consider : I suspect we proceed too hastily. 
 What ! Do you pretend you can have the same assurance of 
 the being of a God that you can have of mine, whom you 
 actually see stand before you and talk to you ? 
 
 Euph. The very same, if not greater. 
 
 Ale. How do you make this appear ? 
 
 Euph. By the person Alciphron is meant an individual 
 thinking thing, and not the hair, skin, or visible surface, 
 or any part of the outward form, colour, or shape of 
 Alciphron. 
 
 Ale. This I grant ^ 
 
 Euph. And, in granting this, you grant that, in a strict 
 sense, I do not see Alciphron, i. e. that individual thinking 1 
 thing, but only such visible signs and tokens as suggest and 
 infer "^ the being of that invisible thinking principle or soul. 
 Even so, in the self-same manner, it seems to me that, though 
 I cannot with eyes of flesh behold the invisible God, yet I do 
 in the strictest sense behold and perceive by all my senses 
 such signs and tokens, such effects and operations, as suggest, 
 indicate, and demonstrate an invisible God — as certainly, 
 and with the same evidence, at least, as any other signs, 
 perceived by sense, do suggest to me the existence of your 
 soul, spirit, or thinking principle ; which I am convinced of 
 only by a few signs or effects, and the motions of one small 
 organised body : whereas I do at all times and in all places 
 perceive sensible signs which evince the being of God. 
 The point, therefore, doubted or denied by you at the 
 beginning, now seems manifestly to follow from the premises. 
 Throughout this whole enquiry, have we not considered 
 
 ' The sceptic is apt to object to this spiritual individuality, as an 
 abstraction foreign to our experience of conscious personality and agency, 
 which we always find embodied; — concluding from this, unwarrantably, 
 that persons and all their conscious acts u'.tiinate'y depend on matter, 
 and taking the bodily organism for the person. 
 
 "^ Here ' suggestion ' and ' inference ' are both included in the ground 
 of our belief in the existence of other conscious beings.
 
 230 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 every step with care, and niade not the least advance 
 without clear evidence ? You and I examined and assented 
 singly to each foregoing proposition : what shall we do then 
 with the conclusion ? For my part, if you do not help me 
 out, I find myself under an absolute necessity of admitting 
 it for true. You must therefore be content henceforward to 
 bear the blame, if I live and die in the belief of a God ^ 
 
 6. A/c. It must be confessed, I do not readily find an 
 answer. There seems to be some foundation for what you 
 say. But, on the other hand, if the point was so clear as 
 you pretend, I cannot conceive how so many sagacious men 
 of our sect should be so much in the dark as not to know 
 or believe one syllable of it. 
 
 Euph. O Alciphron, it is not our present business to 
 account for the oversights, or vindicate the honour, of those 
 great men the free-thinkers, when their very existence is in 
 danger of being called in question. 
 
 Ale. How so ? 
 
 Euph. Be pleased to recollect the concessions you have 
 made, and then shew me, if the arguments for a Deity 
 be not conclusive, by what better arguments you can prove 
 the existence of that thinking thing which in strictness 
 constitutes the free-thinker. 
 
 As soon as Euphranor had uttered these words, Alciphron 
 stopped short, and stood in a posture of meditation, while 
 the rest of us continued our walk and took two or three 
 turns, after which he joined us again with a smiling 
 countenance, like one who had made some discovery. 
 
 I have found, said he, what may clear up the point in 
 
 ' The argument here ascends from finite facts given in sense to the 
 transcendent Infinite Fact. It is based on the analogy of the proof 
 from sensible facts of the existence of our fellow men. But if their 
 existence is only the existence of spirits that are embodied, are we to 
 transfer this analogy to God ? Is the material universe the embodiment 
 of Deity ?
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 23 1 
 
 dispute, and give Euphranor entire satisfaction ; I would say 
 an argument which will prove the existence of a free-thinker, 
 the like whereof cannot be applied to prove the existence 
 of God. You must know then that your notion of our per- 
 ceiving the existence of God, as certainly and immediately as 
 we do that of a human person, I could by no means digest ; 
 though I must own it puzzled me, till I had considered the 
 matter. At the first methought a particular structure, shape, 
 or motion was a most certain proof of a thinking reasonable 
 soul. But a little attention satisfied me that these things 
 have no necessary connexion with reason, knowledge, and 
 wisdom ; and that, allowing them to be certain proofs of 
 a living soul, they cannot be so of a thinking and reasonable 
 one. Upon second thoughts, therefore, and a minute 
 examination of this point, I have found that nothing so 
 much convinces me of the existence of another person as 
 his speaking to me. It is my hearing you talk that, in strict 
 and philosophical truth, is to me the best argument for your 
 being. And this is a peculiar argument, inapplicable to 
 your purpose; for, you will not, I suppose, pretend that 
 God speaks to man in the same clear and sensible manner 
 as one man doth to another ? 
 
 7. Euph. How ! is then the impression of sound so much 
 more evident than that of other senses ? Or, if it be, is the 
 voice of man louder than that of thunder? 
 
 Ale. Alas ! you mistake the point. What I mean is not 
 the sound of speech merely as such, but the arbitrary use 
 of sensible signs, which have no similitude or necessary 
 connexion with the things signified ; — so as by the apposite 
 management of them to suggest and exhibit to my mind an 
 endless variety of things, differing in nature, time, and place ; 
 thereby informing me, entertaining me, and directing me 
 how to act, not only with regard to things near and present, 
 but also with regard to things distant and future. No matter 
 whether these signs are pronounced or written ; whether
 
 232 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 they enter by the eye or ear : they have the same use, and 
 are equally proofs of an intelligent, thinking, designing 
 cause. 
 
 Etiph. But what if it should appear that God really speaks 
 to man ; would this content you ? 
 
 Ale. I am for admitting no inward speech, no holy 
 instincts, or suggestions of light or spirit. All that, you 
 must know, passeth with men of sense for nothing \ If 
 you do not make it plain to me that God speaks to men by 
 outward sensible signs, of such sort and in such manner 
 as I have defined, you do nothing. 
 
 Euph. But if it shall appear plainly that God speaks to 
 men by the intervention and use of arbitrary, outward, sen- 
 sible signs, having no resemblance or necessary connexion 
 with the things they stand for and suggest : if it shall appear 
 that, by innumerable combinations of these signs, an endless 
 variety of things is discovered and made known to us ; and 
 that we are thereby instructed or informed in their different 
 natures ; that we are taught and admonished what to shun, 
 and what to pursue ; and are directed how to regulate our 
 motions, and how to act with respect to things distant from 
 us, as well in time as place, will this content you ? 
 
 Ale. It is the very thing I would have you make out ; for 
 therein consists the force, and use, and nature of language. 
 
 8. Euph. Look, Alciphron, do you not see the castle 
 upon yonder hill? 
 
 Ale. I do. 
 
 * If 'men of sense' could say that a man is only his body, this might 
 pass. But what if evidence of the presence and supremacy of Spirit 
 in the universe is found in our moral experience — evidence of a sort 
 which if rejected would oblige us in consistency to disallow in external 
 perception all that justifies us in treating the presented phenomena as 
 interpretable ? What if the rise of sensation into perception is itself 
 inexplicable, except on grounds which require us to interpret experience 
 under the presupposition that the universe is morally governed, and that 
 what ought to be is the deepest and truest reality ?
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 233 
 
 Euph. Is it not at a great distance from you ? 
 
 Ale. It is. 
 
 Euph. Tell me, Alciphron, is not distance ^ a line turned 
 endwise to the eye ? 
 
 Ale. Doubtless. 
 
 Euph. And can a line, in that situation, project more 
 than one single point on the bottom of the eye? 
 
 Ale. It cannot. 
 
 Euph. Therefore the appearance ^ of a long and of a short 
 distance is of the same magnitude, or rather of no magnitude 
 at all — being in all cases one single point. 
 
 Ale. It seems so. 
 
 Euph. Should it not follow from hence that distance is 
 not immediately perceived by the eye ? 
 
 Ale. It should ^ 
 
 Euph. Must it not then be perceived by the mediation 
 of some other thing ? 
 
 Ale. It must. 
 
 Euph. To discover what this is, let us examine what 
 alteration there may be in the appearance of the same object 
 placed at different distances from the eye. Now, I find by 
 experience that when an object is removed still farther and 
 
 ' i. e. distance outwards, or in the line of sight. 
 
 ^ ' appearance.' Does he mean here the visible appearance, and 
 that we actually see the single point in the retina — which, as always of 
 the same size, or rather of no size, cannot be a visible sign of distances 
 that are of various degrees ; or does he mean that, being of ' no magni- 
 tude,' the supposed appearance cannot be either a visible or invisible 
 sign ? In what follows he says nothing of instinct — a name for the 
 unexplained — in his account of the way we learn to see things existing 
 under space relations. To confess ' instinct ' would be to allege that in 
 the perception of placed things there lies an inexplicable fact. Berkeley 
 tries so far to explain by means of ' suggestion ' our perception of the 
 significant phenomena we call Matter. 
 
 ^ Could it be inutiediately perceived in seeing, even if the ' ap- 
 pearance ' — the point in the bottom of the eye — did vary according to 
 the distance of the object seen ?
 
 234 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 farther off in a direct line from the eye, its visible appearance 
 still grows lesser and fainter ; and this change of appearance, 
 being proportional and universal, seems to me to be that by 
 which we apprehend the various degrees of distance. 
 
 Ale. I have nothing to object to this. 
 
 Euph. But littleness or faintness, in their own nature, 
 seem to have no necessary connexion with greater length of 
 distance ? 
 
 Ale. I admit this to be true. 
 
 Euph. Will it not follow then that they could never 
 suggest it but from experience ? 
 
 Ale. It will. 
 
 Euph. That is to say — we perceive distance, not imme- 
 diately, but by mediation of a sign, which hath no likeness 
 to it, or necessary connexion with it, but only suggests 
 it from repeated experience — as words do things ^ 
 
 Ale. Hold, Euphranor : now I think of it, the writers in 
 optics tell us of an angle made by the two optic axes, where 
 they meet in the visible point or object ; which angle, the 
 obtuser it is the nearer it shews the object to be, and by how 
 much the acuter, by so much the farther off; and this from 
 a necessary demonstrable connexion. 
 
 Euph. The mind then finds out the distance of things 
 by geometry ? 
 
 Ale. It doth. 
 
 Euph. Should it not follow, therefore, that nobody could 
 see but those who had learned geometry, and knew some- 
 thing of lines and angles ? 
 
 Ale. There is a sort of natural geometry which is got 
 without learning. 
 
 Euph. Pray inform me, Alciphron, in order to frame 
 a proof of any kind, or deduce one point from another, is 
 it not necessary that I perceive the connexion of the terms 
 in the premises, and the connexion of the premises with'the 
 
 ^ Outness is only signified by its sensible signs — not originally secti. 
 
 1
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 235 
 
 conclusion ; and, in general, to know one thing by means 
 of another, must I not first know that other thing ? When 
 I perceive your meaning by your words, must I not first 
 perceive the words themselves ? and must I not know the 
 premises before I infer the conclusion ? 
 
 A/c. All this is true. 
 
 Euph. Whoever, therefore, collects a nearer distance from 
 a wider angle, or a farther distance from an acuter angle, 
 must first perceive the angles themselves. And he who 
 doth not perceive those angles can infer nothing from them. 
 Is it so or not ? 
 
 Ale. It is as you say. 
 
 Euph. Ask now the first man you meet whether he per- 
 ceives or knows anything of those optic angles ? or whether 
 he ever thinks about them, or makes any inferences from 
 them, either by natural or artificial geometry ? What 
 answer do you think he would make ? 
 
 Ale. To speak the truth, I believe his answer would be, 
 that he knew nothing of these matters. 
 
 Euph. It cannot therefore be that men judge^ of distance 
 by angles : nor, consequently, can there be any force in the 
 argument you drew from thence, to prove that distance is 
 perceived by means of something which hath a necessary 
 connexion with it. 
 
 Ale. I agree with you. 
 
 9. Euph. To me it seems that a man may know whether 
 he perceives a thing or no ; and, if he perceives it, whether 
 it be immediately or mediately : and, if mediately, whether 
 by means of something like or unlike, necessarily or 
 arbitrarily connected with it. 
 
 Ale. It seems so. 
 
 Euph. And is it not certain that distance is perceived 
 
 ' ' judge ' here seems to include demonstration through relations 
 necessary in reason, and so is different from Locke's 'judgment,' which 
 is probable presumption based on analogy.
 
 236 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 only by experience \ if it be neither perceived immediately 
 by itself, nor by means of any image, nor of any lines and 
 angles which are like it, or have a necessary connexion 
 with it ? 
 
 Ak. It is. 
 
 Eiiph. Doth it not seem to follow, from what hath been 
 said and allowed by you, that before all experience a man 
 would not imagine the things he saw were at any distance 
 from him ? 
 
 Ale. How ! let me see. 
 
 Euph. The littleness or faintness of appearance, or any 
 other idea or sensation not necessarily connected with or 
 resembling distance, can no more suggest different degrees 
 of distance, or any distance at all, to the mind which hath 
 not experienced a connexion of the things signifying and 
 signified, than words can suggest notions before a man hath 
 learned the language. 
 
 Ale. I allow this to be true. 
 
 Euph. Will it not thence follow that a man born blind, 
 and made to see, would, upon first receiving his sight, take 
 the things he saw not to be at any distance from him, but 
 in his eye, or rather in his mind ? 
 
 Ale. I must own it seems so. And yet, on the other 
 hand, I can hardly persuade myself that, if I were in such 
 a state, I should think those objects which I now see at so 
 great distance to be at no distance at all. 
 
 Euph. It seems, then, that you now think ^ the objects 
 of sight are at a distance from you ? 
 
 ' ' experience,' namely, of the connexion, established independently 
 of human will, between what we see and movement among extra- organic 
 bodies. But more than automatic sense-suggestion is surely latent in an 
 acquired perception. Is not reason unconsciously involved in such 
 ' suggestions ' ? 
 
 ^ 'i'hink, i.e. judge — the judgment somehow emerging in the sugges- 
 tion with which it is blended. Berkeley does not fully explain its 
 appearance, or explicate it after it has appeared.
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 237 
 
 Ale. Doubtless I do. Can any one question but yonder 
 castle is at a great distance ? 
 
 Eiiph. Tell me, Alciphron, can you discern the doors, 
 windows, and battlements of that same castle ? 
 
 Ale. I cannot. At this distance it seems only a small 
 round tower. 
 
 Euph. But I, who have been at it, know that it is no 
 small round tower, but a large square building with 
 battlements and turrets, which it seems you do not see. 
 
 Ale. What will you infer from thence ? 
 
 Euph. I would infer that the very object which you 
 strictly and properly perceive by sight is not that thing 
 which is several miles distant. 
 
 Ale. Why so ? 
 
 Euph. Because a little round object is one thing, and 
 a great square object is another. Is it not ? 
 
 Ale. I cannot deny it. 
 
 Euph. Tell me, is not the visible appearance alone the 
 proper object of sight ? 
 
 Ale. It is. 
 
 What think you now (said Euphranor, pointing towards 
 the heavens) of the visible appearance of yonder planet ? 
 Is it not a round luminous flat, no bigger than a sixpence ? 
 
 Ale. What then ? 
 
 Euph. Tell me then, what you think of the planet itself. 
 Do you not conceive it to be a vast opaque globe, with 
 several unequal risings and valleys ? 
 
 Ale. I do. 
 
 Euph. How can you therefore conclude that the proper 
 object of your sight ' exists at a distance ? 
 
 ' ' the proper object of sight,' i. e. the data that are due exclusively 
 to sight, — before we have learned, in the way already explained, to read 
 into them data of touch. This primary consciousness cannot be revived 
 by the adult. And could the adult, one may ask, have read extension 
 and space, with their mathematical relations, into the sensible data
 
 238 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Ak. I confess I know not. 
 
 Euph. For your further conviction, do but consider that 
 crimson cloud. Think you that, if you were in the very 
 place where it is, you would perceive anything like what 
 you now see? 
 
 Ale. By no means. I should perceive only a dark mist. 
 
 Euph. Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the castle, 
 the planet, nor the cloud, which you see here, are those 
 real ones which you suppose exist at a distance ? 
 
 10. Ale. What am I to think then? Do we see anything 
 at all, or is it altogether fancy and illusion ? 
 
 Euph. Upon the whole, it seems the proper objects of 
 sight are light and colours, with their several shades and 
 degrees ; all which, being infinitely diversified and combined, 
 do form a language wonderfully adapted to suggest and 
 exhibit to us the distances, figures, situations, dimensions, 
 and various qualities of tangible objects — not by similitude, 
 nor yet by inference of necessary connexion, but by the 
 arbitrary imposition of Providence \ just as words suggest 
 the things signified by them. 
 
 Ale. How ! Do we not, strictly speaking, perceive by 
 sight such things, as trees, houses, men, rivers, and the 
 like? 
 
 Euph. We do, indeed, perceive or apprehend^ those things 
 by the faculty of sight. But will it follow from thence that 
 
 either of touch or of sight, unless extension and space had been pre- 
 supposed in them ? 
 
 ' Modern doubt would not be satisfied by this unreasoned reference of 
 materinl nature to Active Reason. Berkeley here takes no account 
 of the supremacy of conscience, and the fundamental ethical postulates. 
 It is in conscience, not in sensuous understanding, that our faith in God 
 is rooted. 
 
 ^ 'perceive, or apprehend,' i.e. mediately — through 'suggestion,* or 
 'judgment according to sense,' as distinguished by Berkeley from direct 
 apprehension, v/hich also he calls 'perception' — both falling short of 
 the scientific, and still more of the philosophic or theistic interpretation 
 of the sensible world.
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 239 
 
 they are the proper and immediate objects of sight, any more 
 than that all those things are the proper and immediate 
 objects of hearing which are signified by the help of words 
 or sounds ? 
 
 Ale. You would have us think, then, that light, shades, 
 and colours, variously combined, answer to the several 
 articulations of sound in language ; and that, by means 
 thereof, all sorts of objects are suggested to the mind 
 through the eye, in the same manner as they are suggested 
 by words or sounds through the ear : that is, neither from 
 necessary deduction to the judgment, nor from similitude 
 to the fancy, but purely and solely from experience, custom, 
 and habit. 
 
 Euph. I would not have you think anything more than 
 the nature of things obligeth you to think, nor submit in the 
 least to my judgment, but only to the force of truth : which 
 is an imposition that I suppose the freest thinkers will not 
 pretend to be exempt from. 
 
 Ak. You have led me, it seems, step by step, till I am 
 got I know not where. But I shall try to get out again, 
 if not by the way I came, yet by some other of my own 
 finding. 
 
 Here Alciphroji, having made a short pause, proceeded as 
 follows 
 
 II. Answer me, Euphranor, should it not follow from 
 these principles that a man born blind, and made to see, 
 would, at first sight, not only not perceive their distance, 
 but also not so much as know the very things themselves 
 which he saw, for instance, men or trees ? which surely to 
 suppose must be absurd. 
 
 Euph. I grant, in consequence of those principles, which 
 both you and I have admitted, that such a one would never 
 think of men, trees, or any other objects that he had been 
 accustomed to perceive by touch, upon having his mind
 
 240 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 filled with new sensations of light and colours', whose 
 various combinations he doth not yet understand, or know 
 the meaning of; no more than a Chinese, upon first hearing 
 the words man and tree would think of the things signified 
 by them. In both cases, there must be time and experience, 
 by repeated acts, to acquire a habit of knowing ^ the 
 connexion between the signs and things signified ; that 
 is to say, of understanding the language, whether of the 
 eyes or of the ears. And I conceive no absurdity in all 
 this. 
 
 Ale, I see, therefore, in strict philosophical truth, that 
 rock only in the same sense that I may be said to hear 
 it, when the word roek is pronounced. 
 
 Euph. In the very same. 
 
 Ale. How comes it to pass then that every one shall say 
 he sees, for instance, a rock or a house, when those things 
 are before his eyes ; but nobody will say he hears a rock or 
 a house, but only the words or sounds themselves, by which 
 those things are said to be signified or suggested but not 
 heard ? Besides, if vision be only a language speaking to 
 the eyes, it may be asked, when did men learn this language ? 
 To acquire the knowledge of so many signs as go to the 
 making up a language is a work of some difficulty. But, 
 
 ' Here throughout he speaks of ' sensations of light and colours ' as 
 the visible language of vision, making no account of the visual but in- 
 visible signs /^// in the organ of seeing. 
 
 ^ A ' habit of knowing.' Consider whether human knowledge can 
 be constituted only by habit or automatic suggestion. If not, what 
 higher elements must it involve ? — The function of custom must of 
 course be recognised. It is at any rate a stage in the evolution of 
 knowledge and development of man. ' Custom,' says Pascal, ' may be 
 conceived as a secondary nature, and nature as a primary custom.' 
 ' What,' he even asks, ' are all our natural principles but principles of 
 custom, derived by hereditary descent from parents to children, as fear 
 and flight in beasts of sport ? ' So too Wordsworth — 
 'And custom lie upon thee with a weight 
 .... deep almost as life.'
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 24I 
 
 will any man say he hath spent time, or been at pains, 
 to learn this Language of Vision ? 
 
 Euph. No wonder ; we cannot assign a time beyond our 
 remotest memory. If we have been all practising this 
 language, ever since our first entrance into the world : if the 
 Author of Nature constantly speaks to the eyes of all man- 
 kind, even in their earliest infancy, whenever the eyes are 
 open in the light, whether alone or in company : it doth not 
 seem to me at all strange that men should not be aware they 
 had ever learned a language begun so early, and practised 
 so constantly, as this of Vision. And, if we also consider 
 that it is the same throughout the whole world, and not, 
 like other languages, differing in different places, it will not 
 seem unaccountable that men should mistake the connexion 
 between the proper ol;jects of sight and the things signified 
 by them to be founded in necessary relation or likeness ; 
 or, that they should even take them for the same things. 
 Hence it seems easy to conceive why men who do not think 
 should confound in this language of vision the signs with 
 the things signified, otherwise than they are wont to do in 
 the various particular languages formed by the several nations 
 of men. 
 
 12. It may be also worth while to observe that signs, 
 being little considered in themselves, or for their own sake, 
 but only in their relative capacity, and for the sake of those 
 things whereof they are signs, it comes to pass that the mind 
 overlooks them, so as to carry its attention immediately on 
 to the things signified. Thus, for example, in reading we 
 run over the characters with the slightest regard, and pass 
 on to the meaning. Hence it is frequent for men to say, 
 they see words, and notions, and things in reading of 
 a book ; whereas in strictness they see only the characters 
 which suggest words, notions, and things. And, by parity 
 of reason, may we not suppose that men, not resting in, but 
 overlooking the immediate and proper objects of sight, as 
 
 R
 
 242 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 in their own nature of small moment, carry their attention 
 onward to the very things signified, and talk as if they saw 
 the secondary objects ? which, in truth and strictness, are 
 not seen, but only suggested and apprehended by means of 
 the proper objects of sight, which alone are seen. 
 
 Ale. To speak my mind freely, this dissertation grows 
 tedious, and runs into points too dry and minute for 
 a gentleman's attention. 
 
 I thought, said Crito, we had been told that minute 
 philosophers loved to consider things closely and minutely. 
 
 Ale. That is true, but in so polite an age who would be 
 a mere philosopher? There is a certain scholastic accuracy 
 which ill suits the freedom and ease of a well-bred man. 
 But, to cut short this chicane, I propound it fairly to your 
 own conscience, whether you really think that God Himself 
 speaks every day and in every place to the eyes of all 
 men. 
 
 Euph. That is really and in truth my opinion ; and it 
 should be yours too, if you are consistent with yourself, and 
 abide by your own definition of language. Since you cannot 
 deny that the great Mover and Author of nature constantly 
 explaineth Himself to the eyes of men by the sensible 
 intervention of arbitrary signs, which have no similitude or 
 connexion with the things signified ; so as, by compounding 
 and disposing them, to suggest and exhibit an endless 
 variety of objects, differing in nature, time, and place ; thereby 
 informing and directing men how to act with respect to things 
 distant and future, as well as near and present. In conse- 
 quence, I say, of your own sentiments and concessions, you 
 have as much reason to think the Universal Agent or God 
 speaks to your eyes, as you can have for thinking any 
 particular person speaks to your ears \ 
 
 ' This argument by implication universalises the fact of continuous 
 personal existence, assumed to be given in our primary consciousness 
 (^Principles, % 2), and of which, in Berkeley's language, we have a
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 243 
 
 Ak. I cannot help thinking that some fallacy runs 
 throughout this whole ratiocination, though perhaps I may 
 not readily point it out. Hold ! let me see. In language 
 the signs are arbitrary, are they not ? 
 
 Eiiph. They are. 
 
 Ale. And, consequently, they do not always suggest real 
 matters of fact. Whereas this Natural Language, as you 
 call it, or these visible signs, do always suggest things in 
 the same uniform way, and have the same constant regular 
 connexion with matters of fact : whence it should seem the 
 connexion was necessary ; and, therefore, according to the 
 definition premised, it can be no language. How do you 
 solve this objection ? 
 
 Euph. You may solve it yourself by the help of a picture 
 or looking-glass. 
 
 Ak. You are in the right. I see there is nothing in it. 
 I know not what else to say to this opinion, more than that 
 it is so odd and contrary to my way of thinking that I shall 
 never assent to it. 
 
 13. Euph. Be pleased to recollect your own lectures upon 
 prejudice, and apply them in the present case. Perhaps they 
 may help you to follow where reason leads, and to suspect 
 notions which are strongly rivetted, without having been 
 ever examined. 
 
 Ak. I disdain the suspicion of prejudice. And I do not 
 speak only for myself. I know a club of most ingenious 
 
 ' notion.' He thus infers, by analogy, the constant presence of living 
 God in nature. The argument is an application of an assumed analogy 
 between the visible signs of the existence of a man, on the one hand, 
 and the symbolism of the sensible world, on the other hand, — as 
 premises of the conclusion that both are revelations of spiritual agency. 
 It implies too ihat the causal tendency can find rest only in an tmcaused 
 cause — not in the caused causation, or sensible signs and sequences, of 
 natural science. Is the sensible world to be viewed as the divine 
 organism or natural incarnation of God ? Or is the analogy between 
 the human organism and the material universe, as the supposed or- 
 ganism of God, incomplete, and if so, in what respects is it wanting ? 
 
 R 2
 
 244 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 men, the freest from prejudice of any men alive, who abhor 
 the notion of a God, and I doubt not would be very able to 
 untie this knot. 
 
 Upon which words of Alciphron, I, who had acted the 
 part of an indifferent stander-by, observed to him — That it 
 misbecame his character and repeated professions, to own 
 an attachment to the judgment, or build upon the presumed 
 abilities of other men, how ingenious soever ; and that this 
 proceeding might encourage his adversaries to have recourse 
 to authority ^, in which perhaps they would find their account 
 more than he. 
 
 Oh ! said Crito, I have often observed the conduct of 
 minute philosophers. When one of them has got a ring 
 of disciples round him, his method is to exclaim against 
 prejudice, and recommend thinking and reasoning, giving 
 to understand that himself is a man of deep researches and 
 close argument, one who examines impartially, and con- 
 cludes warily. The same man, in other company, if he 
 chance to be pressed with reason, shall laugh at logic, and 
 assume the lazy supine airs of a fine gentleman, a wit, 
 a railkur, to avoid the dryness of a regular and exact 
 inquiry. This double face of the minute philosopher is 
 of no small use to propagate and maintain his notions. 
 Though to me it seems a plain case that if a fine gentleman 
 will shake off authority, and appeal from religion to reason, 
 unto reason he must go : and, if he cannot go without 
 leading-strings, surely he had better be led by the authority 
 of the public than by that of any knot of minute philo- 
 sophers. 
 
 ^ ' authority,' i. e. fallible authority of trusted men — faith in the 
 insi<;ht of experts, as distinguished from our own. But with Berkeley's 
 view of language or meaning immanent in Nature, all reasonings 
 about natural laws are based on faith in the Divine Person, and are in 
 that respect reasonings about facts that are grounded on personal 
 authority— the absolute or infallible authority of the personal God.
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 245 
 
 Ale. Gentlemen, this discourse is very irksome, and need- 
 less. For my part, I am a friend to inquiry. I am willing 
 reason should have its full and free scope. I build on no 
 man's authority. For my part, I have no interest in denying 
 a God. Any man may believe or not believe a God, as he 
 pleases, for me. But, after all, Euphranor must allow me to 
 stare a little at his conclusions. 
 
 Etiph. The conclusions are yours as much as mine, for 
 you were led to them by your own concessions. 
 
 14. You, it seems, stare to find that God is not far from 
 every one of us ; and that in Him we live, and move, and 
 have our being \ You, who, in the beginning of this 
 morning's conference, thought it strange that God should 
 leave Himself without a witness, do now think it strange the 
 witness should be so full and clear. 
 
 Ale. I must own I do. I was aware, indeed, of a certain 
 metaphysical hypothesis of our seeing all things in God by 
 the union of the human soul with the intelligible substance 
 of the Deity, which neither I nor any one else could make 
 sense of-'. But I never imagined it could be pretended that 
 we saw God with our fleshly eyes as plain as we see any 
 human person whatsoever, and that He daily speaks to our 
 senses in a manifest and clear dialect. 
 
 Cri. As for that metaphysical hypothesis, I can make no 
 more of it than you. But I think it plain this Optic Language 
 hath a necessary connexion ^ with knowledge, wisdom and 
 
 * Because, on this view of things, God animates the whole sensible 
 universe, like as a man animates the movements of his own body: God 
 uses the physical system too as the symbol and sacrament of the 
 spiritual agency that is externalised in it : all natural changes and their 
 laws are resolved into the Universal \\{\\. The course of nature would 
 thus be throughout supernatural. 
 
 ^ This refers to Malebranche's hypothesis, which Berkeley here and 
 elsewheie disclaims, for reasons which shouhl be studied. It is perhaps 
 less remote from his own philosophy, as developed in Siris, than at this 
 earlier stage in his mental history he supposes it to be. 
 
 ' He thus presumes a necessary connexion between the physical and
 
 246 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 goodness. It is equivalent to a constant creation, betoken- 
 ing an immediate act of power and providence. It cannot 
 be accounted for by mechanical principles, by atoms, 
 attractions, or effluvia. The instantaneous production and 
 reproduction of so many signs, combined, dissolved, trans- 
 posed, diversified, and adapted to such an endless variety of 
 purposes, ever shifting with the occasions and suited to them, 
 being utterly inexplicable and unaccountable by the laws of 
 motion, by chance, by fate, or the like blind principles, 
 doth set forth and testify the immediate operation of a spirit 
 or thinking being ; and not merely of a spirit, which every 
 motion or gravitation may possibly infer, but of one wise, 
 good, and provident Spirit, which directs and rules and 
 governs the world. Some philosophers, being convinced 
 of the wisdom and power of the Creator, from the make 
 and contrivance of organised bodies and orderly system 
 of the world, did nevertheless imagine that he left this 
 system with all its parts and contents well adjusted and 
 put in motion, as an artist leaves a clock, to go thence- 
 forward of itself for a certain period \ But this Visual 
 Language proves, not a Creator merely, but a provident 
 Governor, actually and intimately present, and attentive 
 to all our interests and motions, who watches over our 
 conduct, and takes care of our minutest actions and designs 
 
 the spiritual or moral government of the universe — without explaining 
 the ' necessity.' He implies that the former must be subordinate to the 
 latter, which is supreme. So with Plato and the idea of the Good, or 
 Butler and Kant on the Supremacy of conscience. 
 
 ' This is the philosophical theory of an established Causal Harmony, 
 by which Leibniz sought to explain the consistent, yet mutually in- 
 dejDendent, agency of conscious persons and unconscious things. Leibniz 
 uses the analogy of the watch in his correspondence with Clarke. See 
 Collection of Papers between Leibnitz and Clarke, relating to the 
 Principles of Natural Philosophy and Religion (171 7), pp. 2-6, 12-16, 
 28-34, "^c. On the other hand, on Berkeley's conception of what the 
 real existence of the material world means, the Cosmos would relapse 
 into a meaningless abstraction if the Divine providential action in it 
 were for a moment withdrawn.
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 247 
 
 throughout the whole course of our Hves, informing, ad- 
 monishing, and directing incessantly, in a most evident and 
 sensible manner. This is truly wonderful. 
 
 Eiiph. And is it not so, that men should be encompassed 
 by such a wonder, without reflecting on it ? 
 
 15. Something there is of Divine and admirable in this 
 Language, addressed to our eyes, that may well awaken the 
 mind, and deserve its utmost attention : — it is learned with 
 so little pains : it expresseth the differences of things so 
 clearly and aptly : it instructs with such facility and despatch, 
 by one glance of the eye conveying a greater variety of 
 advices, and a more distinct knowledge of things, than 
 could be got by a discourse of several hours. And, while 
 it informs, it amuses and entertains the mind with such 
 singular pleasure and delight. It is of such excellent use 
 in giving a stability and permanency to human discourse, 
 in recording sounds and bestowing life on dead languages, 
 enabling us to converse with men of remote ages and 
 countries. And it answers so apposite to the uses and 
 necessities of mankind, informing us more distinctly of those 
 objects whose nearness and magni,tude qualify them to be 
 of greatest detriment or benefit to our bodies, and less 
 exactly in proportion as their littleness or distance makes 
 them of less concern to us \ 
 
 Ale. And yet these strange things affect men but little. 
 
 Euph. But they are not strange, they are familiar ; and 
 that makes them be overlooked. Things which rarely happen 
 strike ; whereas frequency lessens the admiration of things, 
 though in themselves ever so admirable. Hence, a common 
 man, who is not used to think and make reflections, would 
 probably be more convinced of the being of a God by one 
 
 ' Berkeley makes much of the sensible evidence of the constant active 
 presence of God being such that we may be said to see Him as we see 
 a fellow-man ; not much of our finding God, even more nearly, in 
 conscience and spiritual life.
 
 248 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 single sentence heard once in his Hfe from the sky than by 
 all the experience he has had of this Visual Language, con- 
 trived with such exquisite skill, so constantly addressed to 
 his eyes, and so plainly declaring the nearness, wisdom, and 
 providence of Him with whom we have to do'. 
 
 A/c. After all, I cannot satisfy myself how men should be 
 so little surprised or amazed about this visive faculty, if it 
 was really of a nature so surprising and amazing. 
 
 Euph. But let us suppose a nation of men blind from 
 their infancy, among whom a stranger arrives, the only man 
 who can see in all the country ; let us suppose this stranger 
 travelling with some of the natives, and that one while he 
 foretells to them that, in case they walk straight forward, in 
 half an hour they shall meet men or cattle, or come to 
 a house ; that, if they turn to the right and proceed, they 
 shall in a few minutes be in danger of falling down a 
 precipice ; that, shaping their course to the left, they will 
 in such a time arrive at a river, a wood, or a mountain. 
 What think you ? Must they not be infinitely surprised that 
 one who had never been in their country before should 
 know it so much better than themselves ? And would not 
 those predictions seem to them as unaccountable and 
 incredible as Prophecy to a minute philosopher? 
 
 Ale. I cannot deny it. 
 
 Euph. But it seems to require intense thought to be able 
 to unravel a prejudice that has been so long forming ; to get 
 over the vulgar errors or ideas common to both senses ; and 
 so to distinguish between the objects of Sight and Touch, 
 which have grown (if I may so say), blended together^ in 
 
 ' ' In philosophy equally as in poetry,' says Coleridge, ' it is the 
 Iiighest and most useful prerogative of genius to produce the strongest 
 impressions of novelty, while it rescues admitted truths from the neglect 
 caused by the very circumstance of their universal admission.' 
 
 - ' blended together.' So in his Commonplace Book he says that 
 ' extension is blended %vith tangible or visible ideas,' which might mean 
 that it is a latent pre-condition of sense experience.
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 249 
 
 our fancy, as to be able to suppose ourselves exactly in the 
 state that one of those men would be in, if he were made 
 to see. And yet this I believe is possible, and might seem 
 worth the pains of a little thinking, especially to those men 
 whose proper employment and profession it is to think, and 
 unravel prejudices, and confute mistakes. 
 
 Ale. I frankly own I cannot find my way out of this maze, 
 and should gladly be set right by those who see better than 
 myself. 
 
 Cri. The pursuing this subject in their own thoughts 
 would possibly open a new scene to those speculative 
 gentlemen of the minute philosophy. It puts me in mind 
 of a passage in the Psalmist, where he represents God to 
 be covered with light as with a garment, and would methinks 
 be no ill comment on that ancient notion of some eastern 
 sages — that God had light for His body, and truth for His 
 soul ^ 
 
 This conversation lasted till a servant came to tell us 
 the tea was ready : upon which we walked in, and found 
 Lysicles at the tea-table. 
 
 16. As soon as we sat down, I am glad, said Akiphron, 
 that I have here found my second, a fresh man to maintain 
 our common cause, which, I doubt, Lysicles will think hath 
 suffered by his absence. 
 
 Lys. Why so ? 
 
 ' According to this philosophy, the significant phenomena presented 
 in the senses — conspicuously those given in sight — are types or symbols 
 of spiritual and unseen realities : physical order is the instrument of moral 
 government. The supporting argument for this might be, that the 
 theistic explanation of what we ' experience,' and that alone, expresses 
 absolute trust in the intellectual, emotional, and moral constitution of 
 man, and fully satisfies the demands of that constitution. But Berkeley 
 relies too exclusively on sense, and conclusions conceivable by under- 
 standing judging according to suggestions of sense, and takes too little 
 account of conscience and moral experience.
 
 250 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Ale. I have been drawn into some concessions you will 
 not like. 
 
 Lys. Let me know what they are. 
 
 Ak. Why, that there is such a thing as a God, and that 
 His existence is very certain. 
 
 Lys. Bless me ! How came you to entertain so wild a 
 notion ? 
 
 Ale. You know we profess to follow reason wherever it 
 leads. And in short I have been reasoned into it. 
 
 Lys. Reasoned ! You should say, amused with words, 
 bewildered with sophistry. 
 
 Eiiph. Have you a mind to hear the same reasoning that 
 led Alciphron and me step by step, that we may examine 
 whether it be sophistry or no ? 
 
 Lys. As to that I am very easy. I guess all that can be 
 said on that head. It shall be my business to help my 
 friend out, whatever arguments drew him in. 
 
 Euph. Will you admit the premises and deny the con- 
 clusions ? 
 
 Lys. What if I admit the conclusion ? 
 
 Euph. How ! will you grant there is a God ? 
 
 Lys. Perhaps I may, 
 
 Euph. Then we are agreed. 
 
 Lys. Perhaps not. 
 
 Euph. O Ly sides, you are a subtle adversary. I know 
 not what you would be at. 
 
 Lys. You must know then that at bottom the being of 
 a God is a point in itself of small consequence, and a man 
 may make this concession without yielding much. The 
 great point is what sense the word God is to be taken in \ 
 
 ' This is still the ' great point ' in the philosophy of religion. Is 
 ' God ' a conscious Person, incognisable by us otherwise than as conscious 
 intending activity ;^or merely a name for the universal relations of 
 thought presupposed in experience ; or even for absolutely unknowable 
 Power ?
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 25 1 
 
 The very Epicureans allowed the being of gods ; but then 
 they were indolent gods, unconcerned with human affairs 
 Hobbes allowed a corporeal god : and Spinosa held the 
 universe to be God. And yet nobody doubts they were 
 staunch free-thinkers. I could wish indeed the word God 
 were quite omitted ; because in most minds it is coupled 
 with a sort of superstitious awe, the very root of all religion. 
 I shall not, nevertheless, be much disturbed, though the 
 name be retained, and the being of a God allowed in any 
 sense but in that of a Mind, which knows all things, and 
 beholds human actions, like some judge or magistrate, with 
 infinite observation and intelligence. The belief of a God 
 in this sense fills a man's mind with scruples, lays him 
 under constraints, and embitters his very being : but in 
 another sense it may be attended with no great ill con- 
 sequence. This I know was the opinion of our great Diagoras, 
 who told me he would never have been at the pains to find 
 out a demonstration that there was no God \ if the received 
 notion of God had been the same with that of some Fathers 
 and Schoolmen. 
 
 Euph. Pray what was that ? 
 
 17. Lys. You must know, Diagoras, a man of much 
 reading and inquiry, had discovered that once upon a time 
 the most profound and speculative divines, finding it 
 impossible to reconcile the attributes of God — taken in the 
 common sense, or in any known sense — with human reason, 
 and the appearance of things, taught that the words knotv- 
 ledge, 7visdom, goodness, and such like, when spoken of the 
 Deity, must be "understood in quite a different sense from 
 what they signify in the vulgar acceptation, or from anything 
 that we can form a notion of or conceive. Hence, whatever 
 
 ' The most plausible objections to Theism are founrled on the sup- 
 position of the final insolubility of the universe of nature and man. 
 Agnosticism is offered as the alternative to either Theism or Atheism, 
 — 'suspense of judgment' as the only possible issue at last.
 
 252 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 objections might be made against the attributes of God 
 they easily solved — by denying those attributes belonged to 
 God, in this, or that, or any known particular sense or 
 notion ; which was the same thing as to deny they belonged 
 to Him at all. And, thus denying the attributes of God, 
 they in effect denied His being, though perhaps they were 
 not aware of it. 
 
 Suppose, for instance, a man should object that future 
 contingencies were inconsistent with the Foreknowledge of 
 God, because it is repugnant that certain knowledge should 
 be of an uncertain thing : it was a ready and an easy 
 answer to say that this may be true with respect to know- 
 ledge taken in the common sense, or in any sense that we 
 can possibly form any notion of; but that there would not 
 appear the same inconsistency between the contingent 
 nature of things and Divine Foreknowledge, taken to signify 
 somewhat that we know nothing of, which in God supplies 
 the place of what we understand by knowledge ; from which 
 it differs not in quantity or degree of perfection, but 
 altogether, and in kind, as light doth from sound; — and 
 even more, since these agree in that they are both sensa- 
 tions ; whereas knowledge in God hath no sort of resem- 
 blance or agreement wath any notion that man can frame of 
 knowledge. The like may be said of all the other attributes, 
 which indeed may by this means be equally reconciled with 
 everything or with nothing. But all men who think must 
 needs see this in cutting knots and not untying them. For, 
 how are things reconciled with the Divine attributes when 
 these attributes themselves are in every intelligible sense 
 denied ; and, consequently, the very notion of God taken 
 away, and nothing left but the name, without any meaning 
 annexed to it? In short, the belief that there is an un- 
 known subject of attributes absolutely unknown is a very 
 innocent doctrine ; which the acute Diagoras well saw, and 
 was therefore wonderfully delighted with this system.
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 253 
 
 1 8. For, said he, if this could once make its way and 
 obtain in the world, there would be an end to all natural or 
 rational religion, which is the basis both of the Jewish and 
 the Christian : for he who comes to God, or enters himself 
 in the church of God, must first believe that there is a God 
 in some intelligible sense ; and not only that there is Some- 
 thing in general, ivithout any proper notion, though never so 
 itiadequate, of any of its qualities or attributes : for this may 
 be fate, or chaos, or plastic nature, or anything else as well 
 as God. — Nor will it avail to say: — There is something in 
 this unknown being analogous to knowledge and goodness ; 
 that is to say, which produceth those effects which we could 
 not conceive to be produced by men, in any degree, with- 
 out knowledge and goodness. For, this is in fact to give 
 up the point in dispute between theists and atheists — the 
 question having always been, not whether there was a 
 Principle (which point was allowed by all philosophers, as 
 well before as since Anaxagoras), but whether this principle 
 was a j'oi)?, a thinking intelligent being : that is to say, 
 whether that order, and beauty, and use, visible in natural 
 effects, could be produced by anything but a Mind of Intel- 
 ligence, in the proper sense of the word? And whether 
 there must not be true, real, and proper knowledge, in the 
 First Cause? We will, therefore, acknowledge that all 
 those natural effects which are vulgarly ascribed to know- 
 ledge and wisdom proceed from a being in which there is, 
 properly speaking, no knowledge or wisdom at all, but only 
 something else, which in reality is the cause of those things 
 which men, for want of knowing better, ascribe to what 
 they call knowledge and wisdom and understanding. You 
 wonder perhaps to hear a man of pleasure, who diverts 
 himself as I do, philosophize at this rate. But you should 
 consider that much is to be got by conversing with ingenious 
 men, which is a short way to knowledge, that saves a man 
 the drudgery of reading and thinking.
 
 254 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 And, now we have granted to you that there is a God in 
 this indefinite sense, I would fain see what use you can 
 make of this concession. You cannot argue from unknown 
 attributes, or, which is the same thing, from attributes in an 
 unknown sense. You cannot prove that God is to be loved 
 for His goodness, or feared for His justice, or respected for 
 His knowledge : all which consequences, we own, would 
 follow from those attributes admitted in an intelligible 
 sense. But we deny that those or any other consequences 
 can be drawn from attributes admitted in no particular 
 sense, or in a sense which none of us understand. Since, 
 therefore, nothing can be inferred from such an account 
 of God, about conscience, or worship, or religion, you may 
 even make the best of it. And, not to be singular, we 
 will use the name too, and so at once there is an end of 
 atheism. 
 
 Eiiph. This account of a Deity is new to me. I do not 
 like it, and therefore shall leave it to be maintained by 
 those who do. 
 
 19. Ci-i. It is not new to me. I remember not long 
 since to have heard a minute philosopher triumph upon 
 this very point ; which put me on inquiring what founda- 
 tion there was for it in the Fathers or Schoolmen. And, 
 for aught that I can find, it owes its original to those 
 writings which have been published under the name of 
 Dionysius the Areopagite '. The author of which, it must 
 
 ' May we not say that reason in man at last necessarily merges in 
 faith or moral trust in the omnipotent goodness of the Power at work 
 in the physical and spiritual system in which, in our bodily and moral 
 experience, we find ourselves included? Does not this, with its back- 
 ground of mystery, meet our intellectual inadequacy — God practically 
 comprehended, while still scientifically incomprehensible? Does not 
 Berkeley incline too much to the anthropomorphic Theism that is 
 content to think that God is only what man is able to conceive ? 
 ' Knowledge,' ' wisdom,' and ' goodness,' so far as our experience can 
 put meaning into them, may be inadequate terms when applied to 
 Deity ; not because the Universal Power includes less, but because the
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 255 
 
 be owned, hath written upon the Divine attributes in a 
 very singular style. In his treatise De Hierardiia Coelesti, 
 he saith that God is something above all essence and life, 
 iiTTcp TTurrnv ovaiav kqI ^wryi' ; and again, in his treatise Z)e 
 Divinis JVomhti/'us, that He is above all wisdom and under- 
 standing, virlp Tvaa-av crocf>iai' kol avveaLv, ineffable and inno- 
 minable, appTjro? kol ai/oji'u/xos ; the wisdom of God he terms 
 an unreasonable, unintelligent, and foolish wisdom, r^r 
 dXoyov, Kal avow, kol fiwpav cro</)iW. But then the reason he 
 gives for expressing himself in this strange manner is, that 
 the Divine wisdom is the cause of all reason, wisdom, and 
 understanding, and therein are contained the treasures of 
 all wisdom and knowledge. He calls God vTrepao4>o<; and 
 virep^ws ; as if wisdom and life were words not worthy to 
 express the Divine perfections : and he adds that the attri- 
 butes unintelligent and unperceiving must be ascribed to 
 the Divinity, not Kar eWenf/cv, by way of defect, but KaO' 
 vTrepoxip', by way of eminency ; which he explains by our 
 giving the name of darkness to light inaccessible. And, 
 notwithstanding the harshness of his expressions in some 
 places, he affirms over and over in others— that God knows 
 all things ; not that He is beholden to the creatures for His 
 knowledge, but by knowing Himself, from whom they all 
 derive their being, and in whom they are contained as in 
 their cause. It was late before these writings appear to 
 have been known in the world ; and, although they obtained 
 credit during the age of the Schoolmen, yet, since critical 
 learning hath been cultivated, they have lost that credit, 
 and are at this day given up for spurious, as containing 
 several evident marks of a much later date than the age 
 of Dionysius. — Upon the whole, although this method of 
 growing in expression and dwindling in notion, of clearing 
 up doubts by nonsense, and avoiding difficulties by running 
 
 Universal Power includes more than even our highest spiritual experience 
 enables us to realise.
 
 256 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 into affected contradictions, may perhaps proceed from 
 a well-meant zeal, yet it appears not to be according to 
 knowledge ; and, instead of reconciling atheists to the truth, 
 hath, I doubt, a tendency to confirm them in their own 
 persuasion. It should seem, therefore, very weak and rash 
 in a Christian to adopt this harsh language of an apocryphal 
 writer preferably to that of the Holy Scriptures. I remember, 
 indeed, to have read of a certain philosopher, who lived 
 some centuries ago, that used to say — if these supposed 
 works of Dionysius had been known to the primitive 
 Fathers, they would have furnished them admirable weapons 
 against the heretics, and would have saved a world of pains. 
 But the event since their discovery hath by no means 
 confirmed his opinion \ 
 
 It must be owned, the celebrated Picus of Mirandula', 
 among his nine hundred conclusions (which that prince, 
 being very young, proposed to maintain by public disputa- 
 tion at Rome), hath this for one — to wit, that it is more 
 improper to say of God, He is an intellect or intelligent 
 Being, than to say of a reasonable soul that it is an angel : 
 
 ' The books attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, who was said 
 to be a contemporary of the Apostles (Acts xvii. 34) and first Bishop of 
 Athens. They belong probably to the fourth century after Christ, if 
 not to a later period, and to the New Platonic school. They are 
 entitled De Hierarchia Coelesti, De Noiinntbiis Divinis, De Hierarchia 
 Ecclesiastica, and De Theologia Mystua. Various editions appeared in 
 the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In common with some Fathers 
 of the Church, the pseudo-Dionysius expresses, in paradoxical language, 
 the ultimate incomprehensibility of God, unbalanced by the counter 
 truth that God may be practically known, — absolutely as at man's finite 
 point of view, and relatively to the ends of human life. He ascends (or 
 descends) to a point at which, by total abstraction of attributes, the 
 Universal Power becomes wholly incognisable. The subject invites 
 to the study of Kant's ' Dialectic,' li. II. ch. 3, in the Kritik of Pure 
 Reason. 
 
 ^ John Picus, Count of Mirandula, lived in the fifteenth century. The 
 disputation in which he proposed to defend his nine hundred theses 
 never took place.
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 257 
 
 which doctrine it seems was not relished. And Picus, 
 when he comes to defend it, supports himself altogether by 
 the example and authority of Dionysius, and in effect ex- 
 plains it away into a mere verbal difference — affirming that 
 neither Dionysius nor himself ever meant to deprive God 
 of knowledge, or to deny that He knows all things ; but 
 that, as reason is of kind peculiar to man, so by intellection 
 he understands a kind or manner of knowing peculiar to 
 angels ; and that the knowledge which is in God is more 
 above the intellection of angels than angel is above man. 
 He adds that, as his tenet consists with admitting the most 
 perfect knowledge in God, so he would by no means be 
 understood to exclude from the Deity intellection itself, 
 taken in the common or general sense, but only that peculiar 
 sort of intellection proper to angels, which he thinks ought 
 not to be attributed to God any more than human reason, 
 Picus, therefore, though he speaks as the apocryphal 
 Dionysius, yet, when he explains himself, it is evident he 
 speaks like other men. And, although the forementioned 
 books of the Celestial Hierarchy and of the Divine Names, 
 being attributed to a saint and martyr of the apostolical age, 
 were respected by the Schoolmen, yet it is certain they 
 rejected or softened his harsh expressions, and explained 
 away or reduced his doctrine to the received notions taken 
 from Holy Scripture and the light of nature. 
 
 20. Thomas Aquinas ^ expresseth his sense of this point 
 in the following manner. All perfections, saith he, derived 
 from God to the creatures are in a certain higher sense, or 
 (as the Schoolmen term it) eminently in God. Whenever, 
 therefore, a name borrowed from any perfection in the 
 
 ' Thomas of Aquino (Aquinas), in the territory of Naples (1225-74), in 
 whose works the philosophy called Scholastic reached its highest point, 
 accommodating Aristotle lo the doctrine of the Catholic Church. His 
 philosophical theology, or theological philosophy, is contained in his 
 Sununa Theologiae. 
 
 S
 
 258 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 creature is attributed to God, we must exclude from its 
 signification everything that belongs to the imperfect manner 
 wherein that attribute is found in the creature. AVhence 
 he concludes that knowledge in God is not a habit but 
 a pure act. And again, the same Doctor observes that 
 jour intellect gets its notions of all sorts of perfections from 
 the creatures, and that as it apprehends those perfections 
 so it signifies them by names. Therefore, saith he, in 
 attributing these names to God we are to consider two 
 things : first, the perfections themselves, as goodness, life, 
 and the like, which are properly in God ; and secondly, 
 the manner which is peculiar to the creature, and cannot, 
 strictly and properly speaking, be said to agree to the 
 Creator. 
 
 And although Suarez \ with other Schoolmen, teacheth 
 that the mind of man conceiveth knowledge and will to be 
 in God as faculties or operations, by analogy only to created 
 beings, yet he gives it plainly as his opinion that when 
 knowledge is said not to be properly in God it must be 
 understood in a sense including imperfection, such as 
 discursive knowledge '^ or the like imperfect kind found 
 in the creatures : and that none of those imperfections in 
 the knowledge of men or angels belonging to the formal 
 notion of knowledge, or to knowledge as such, it will not 
 thence follow that knowledge, in its proper formal sense, 
 may not be attributed to God. And of knowledge taken 
 
 ' Suarez, the Spanish Thomist, who died in 16 17. What follows is 
 related in his Dispntationes Meiaphysicae, XXX. ' Quid Deus sit.' 
 
 ^ Knowledge reached only through the intervention of what is sup- 
 posed to be alread}' knowoi, i. e. by means of premises, is called ' dis- 
 cursive,' and is the object of discursive as distinguished from intuitive 
 reason. Discursive or ratiocinative activity may be a mark of the 
 finitude of the mind that is obliged to have recourse to it. Were we 
 able to know all things and all their relations in a single view, discursive 
 thought or reasoning would seem to be superfluous. It is in all com- 
 prehensive intuition, we are apt to suppose, that Omniscient Intelligence 
 knows.
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 259 
 
 in general for the clear evident understanding of all truth, 
 he expressly affirms that it is in God, and that this was 
 never denied by any philosopher who believed a God '. 
 It was, indeed, a current opinion in the schools that even 
 l>eing itself should be attributed analogically to God and 
 the creatures. That is, they held that God, the supreme, 
 independent, self-originate cause and source of all beings, 
 must not be supposed to exist in the same sense with 
 created beings ; not that he exists less truly, properly, or 
 formally than they, but only because he exists in a more 
 eminent and perfect manner'-. 
 
 21. But, to prevent any man's being led, by mistaking 
 the scholastic use of the terms analogy and analogical, into 
 an opinion that we cannot frame in any degree a true and 
 proper notion of attributes applied by analogy, or, in the 
 school phrase, predicated analogically, it may not be amiss 
 to inquire into the true sense and meaning of those words. 
 Every one knows that analogy is a Greek word used by 
 mathematicians to signify a similitude of proportions. For 
 instance, when we observe that two is to six as three is to 
 nine, this similitude or equality of proportion is termed 
 analogy. And, although proportion strictly signifies the 
 habitude or relation of one quantity to another, yet, in 
 a looser and translated sense, it hath been applied to 
 signify every other habitude ; and, consequently, the term 
 analogy comes to signify all similitude of relations or 
 
 ' But if Omniscience does not, like our limited or broken knowledge, 
 presuppose a succession of conscious acts going on in God, contem- 
 poraneously with our own conscious acts and states — as we represent to 
 ourselves the intellectual life of a man — we cannot realise the ' clear 
 evident understanding of all truth ' by God : an act that is represent- 
 able by us must be part of a succession. 
 
 - All this is very different from the materialistic dogma, that the 
 Universal Power is be/ow, instead of mysteriously above, the personal 
 conscious life we experience, and in which our spirits are manifested 
 to ourselves. 
 
 S 2
 
 26o SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 habitudes whatsoever. Hence the Schoolmen tell us there 
 is analogy between intellect and sight ; forasmuch as 
 intellect is to the mind what sight is to the body, and that 
 he who governs the state is analogous to him who steers 
 a ship. Hence a prince is analogically styled a pilot, being 
 to the state as a pilot is to his vessel. 
 
 For the further clearing of this point, it is to be observed 
 that a twofold analogy is distinguished by the Schoolmen — 
 metaphorical and proper. — Of the first kind there are fre- 
 quent instances in Holy Scripture, attributing human parts 
 and passions to God. When He is represented as having 
 a finger, an eye, or an ear ; when He is said to repent, to 
 be angry, or grieved ; every one sees that analogy is meta- 
 phorical. Because those parts and passions, taken in the 
 proper signification, must, in every degree, necessarily and 
 from the formal nature of the thing, include imperfection. 
 When, therefore, it is said — the finger of God appears in 
 this or that event, men of common sense mean no more 
 but that it is as truly ascribed to God as the works wrought 
 by human fingers are to man : and so of the rest. But 
 the case is different when wisdom and knowledge are attri- 
 buted to God. Passions and senses, as such, imply defect ; 
 but in knowledge simply, or as such, there is no defect \ 
 Knowledge, therefore, in the proper formal meaning of the 
 word, may be attributed to God proportionably, that is 
 preserving a proportion to the infinite nature of God^ We 
 may say, therefore, that as God is infinitely above man, so 
 
 * But what if there is something necessarily involved in all human 
 experience which forbids the resolution of experienced reality into 
 a perfectly comprehended unity, by human intellectual power, and which 
 obliges us, if we have regard to reason, to ' leave many things abrupt,' 
 as Bacon says the philosophical theologian must at last do ? The scep- 
 tical issue of this sort of Monism, as contrasted with the philosophy 
 that begins and ends in moral faith, seems to prove that the Infinite 
 Reality refuses to ht. fully explained in our ' little systems.' 
 
 ^ What does this apparently important qualification imply ?
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 261 
 
 is the knowledge of God infinitely above the knowledge of 
 man, and this is what Cajetan calls analogia proprie facta. 
 And after this same analogy we must understand all those 
 attributes to belong to the Deity which in themselves 
 simply, and as such, denote perfection. We may, therefore, 
 consistently with what hath been premised, affirm that all 
 sorts of perfection which we can conceive in a finite spirit 
 are in God, but without any of that allay ^ which is found 
 in the creatures. This doctrine, therefore, of analogical 
 perfections in God, or our knowing God by analogy, seems 
 very much misunderstood and misapplied by those who 
 would infer from thence that we cannot frame any direct 
 or proper notion, though never so inadequate, of know- 
 ledge or wisdom, as they are in the Deity ; or understand 
 any more of them than one born blind can of light and 
 colours ". 
 
 22. And now, gentlemen, it may be expected I should 
 ask your pardon for having dwelt so long on a point of 
 
 * * allay,' i. e. alloy. ' Allay ' in Bacon and other early writers. 
 
 ' In what he says about an analogical knowledge of God, Berkeley 
 had probably in view two contemporary theologians — both Irish 
 bishops. Among other replies to Toland's Christianity not Alysterious 
 (1696) was a Letter by Peter Browne, afterwards Bishop of Cork and 
 Ross, which appeared in 1699. Browne maintains (so far in verbal 
 agreement with Berkeley) that we have no idea of spirit ; and further, 
 that our knowledge of God and the spiritual world is gained by analogy 
 from our knowledge of the operations of our own embodied spirit. 
 Also in 1709, Archbishop King published a Sermon on the Consistency 
 of Predestination and Foreknoivledge ivith the Freedom of Alan^s Will, 
 which he defended on the same foundation of analogy, in a way that 
 seems to imply that our highest conception of God must be in meta- 
 phors, not in science. Browne's view of human theological knowledge 
 is stated in his Procedure, Extent, and Limits of LIuinan Under- 
 standing (1728), and more fully in Things Divine and Supernatural 
 conceived by Analogy with Things Natural and Human (1733). — 
 Butler's ' analogy ' between the constitution of things in nature and that 
 larger constitution that is implied in Christianity, is not to be con- 
 founded with Browne's analogical interpretation of the attributes 
 of God.
 
 262 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 metaphysics, and introduced such unpohshed and un- 
 fashionable writers as the Schoohiien into good company ; 
 but, as Lysicles gave the occasion, I leave him to answer 
 for it. 
 
 Lys. I never dreamt of this dry dissertation. But, if 
 I have been the occasion of discussing these scholastic 
 points, by my unluckily mentioning the Schoolmen, it was 
 my first fault of the kind, and I promise it shall be the last. 
 The meddling with crabbed authors of any sort is none of 
 my taste. I grant one meets now and then with a good 
 notion in what we call dry writers, such a one for example 
 as this I was speaking of, which I must own struck my 
 fancy. But then, for these we have such as Prodicus or 
 Uiagoras, who look into obsolete books, and save the rest 
 of us that trouble. 
 
 Cri. So you pin your faith upon them ? 
 
 Lys. It is only for some odd opinions, and matters of 
 fact, and critical points. Besides, we know the men to 
 whom we give credit ; they are judicious and honest, and 
 have no end to serve but truth. And I am confident some 
 author or other has maintained the forementioned notion in 
 the same sense as Diagoras related it. 
 
 Cri. That may be. But it never was a received notion, 
 and never will, so long as men believe a God : the same 
 arguments that prove a First Cause proving an Intelligent 
 Cause ;— intelligent, I say, in the proper sense ; wise and 
 good in the true and formal acceptation of the words. 
 Otherwise, it is evident that every syllogism brought to 
 prove those attributes, or, which is the same thing, to prove 
 the being of a God, will be found to consist of four terms, 
 and consequently can conclude nothing \ But for your 
 
 ' ' Four terms ' in a syllogism — one of the commonest fallacies, due 
 to the ambiguity of human language. The reference is to the position 
 in Bishop Browne in his rroccdure uf the Understamling and Divine 
 Analogy, where he argues that God's so-called ' knowledge ' and
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 263 
 
 part, Alciphro?!, you have been fully convinced that God is 
 a thinking intelligent being, in the same sense with other 
 spirits ; though not in the same imperfect manner or degree. 
 
 23. Ale. And yet I am not without my scruples : for, with 
 knowledge you infer wisdom, and with wisdom goodness. 
 But how is it possible to conceive God so good and man 
 so wicked ? It may, perhaps, with some colour be alleged 
 that a little soft shadowing of evil sets off the bright and 
 luminous parts of the creation, and so contributes to the 
 beauty of the whole piece ; but for blots so large and so 
 black it is impossible to account by that principle. That 
 there should be so much vice, and so little virtue upon 
 earth, and that the laws of God's kingdom should be so 
 ill observed by His subjects, is what can never be recon- 
 ciled with that surpassing wisdom and goodness of the 
 supreme Monarch'. 
 
 Eiiph. Tell me, Alciphron, would you argue that a state 
 was ill administered, or judge of the manners of its citizens, 
 by the disorders committed in the jail or dungeon ? 
 
 Ale. I would not. 
 
 Euph. And, for aught we know, this spot, with the few 
 sinners on it, bears no greater proportion to the universe of 
 intelligences than a dungeon doth to a kingdom. It seems 
 we are led, not only by revelation, but by common sense, 
 observing and inferring from the analogy of visible things, 
 to conclude there are innumerable orders of intelligent 
 beings more happy and more perfect than man ; whose 
 
 ' goodness ' are not knowledge or goodness as we understand those 
 terms, but are only words that represent mysteries which transcend 
 intelligence. Can this be reconciled with the human reality of theism 
 and theology, and if so, how ? 
 
 ^ This familiar difficulty does not rise, like that which occasioned 
 the analogical hypothesis, from speculative perplexities implied in 
 finite Intelligence. It is occasioned by the Evil which in fact men 
 find in their own lives, and around them on the planet which they 
 inhabit.
 
 264 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 life is but a span, and whose place, this earthly globe, 
 is but a point, in respect of the whole system of God's 
 creation. We are dazzled, indeed, with the glory and 
 grandeur of things here below, because we know no better. 
 But, I am apt to think, if we knew what it was to be an 
 angel for one hour, we should return to this world, though 
 it were to sit on the brightest throne in it, with vastly more 
 loathing and reluctance than we would now descend into 
 a loathsome dungeon or sepulchre \ 
 
 24. Cri. To me it seems natural that such a weak, 
 passionate, and short-sighted creature as man should be 
 ever liable to scruples of one kind or other ^. But, as this 
 same creature is apt to be over-positive in judging, and 
 over-hasty in concluding, it falls out that these difficulties 
 and scruples about God's conduct are made objections to His 
 being ^. And so men come to argue from their own defects 
 against the Divine perfections. And, as the views and 
 humours of men are different and often opposite, you may 
 sometimes see them deduce the same atheistical conclusions 
 from contrary premises. I knew an instance of this in 
 two minute philosophers of my acquaintance, who used to 
 argue each from his own temper against a Providence. 
 One of them, a man of a choleric and vindictive spirit, 
 
 ' Astronomers tell us of thirty millions of stars or suns, with their 
 respective planetary systems — in many cases it may be supposed the 
 homes of self-conscious persons or moral agents, as well as of sentient 
 beings. With the conception thus formed of the population of the 
 material universe, not to speak of unembodied spirits, what room is 
 there for a priori dogmas regarding man ? 
 
 ^ This suggested mitigation of the mystery of the sorrow and sin found 
 on this planet is in the spirit of Butler's ' Analogy ' rather than of 
 Browne's, especially Butler's Sermon on the ' Ignorance ot Man.' 
 
 ^ Thus much at least, as Butler might say, will be found not taken 
 for granted but proved — that a reasonable man, who will consider 
 the matter, may be as much assured as he is of his own being, that 
 it is not so clear a case that there is a nothing in our faith in final 
 ethical supremacy in the universe, and in our own self-conscious life 
 and continued moral agency after physical death.
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 265 
 
 said he could not believe a Providence, because London 
 was not swallowed up or consumed by fire from heaven ; 
 the streets being, as he said, full of people who shew no 
 other belief or worship of God but perpetually praying 
 that He would damn, rot, sink, and confound them. The 
 other, being of an indolent easy temper, concluded there 
 could be no such thing as Providence ; for that a being 
 of consummate wisdom must needs employ himself better 
 than in minding the prayers and actions and little interests 
 of mankind ^ 
 
 Ale. After all, if God have no passions, how can it be 
 true that vengeance is His ? Or how can He be said to 
 be jealous of His glory ? 
 
 Cri. We believe that God executes vengeance without 
 revenge, and is jealous without weakness, just as the 
 mind of man sees without eyes, and apprehends without 
 hands. 
 
 25. Ak. To put a period to this discourse, we will grant 
 there is a God in this dispassionate sense ; but what then ? 
 What hath this to do with Religion or Divine worship ? 
 To what purpose are all these prayers, and praises, and 
 thanksgivings, and singing of praises, which the foolish 
 vulgar call serving God ? What sense, or use, or end is 
 there in all these things ? 
 
 Cri. We worship God, we praise and pray to Him : not 
 because we think that He is proud of our worship or fond 
 of our praise or prayers, and affected with them as man- 
 kind are : or that all our service can contribute in the 
 least degree to His happiness or good : but because it is 
 
 ' A supreme law of Omnipresent Providential Adaptation is no 
 more inapplicable to the * little interests of mankind,' or even of the 
 lowest orders of sentient beings, than the law of gravitation is in- 
 applicable to the fall of an insignificant grain of sand. Is not the 
 Universe of God adapted as much to the least as to the greatest 
 individual contained in it ?
 
 266 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 good for us to be so disposed towards God : because it is 
 just and right, and suitable to the nature of things, and 
 becoming the relation we stand in to our supreme Lord 
 and Governor. 
 
 Ale. If it be good for us to worship God, it should seem 
 that the Christian Religion, which pretends to teach men 
 the knowledge and worship of God, was of some use and 
 benefit to mankind. 
 
 Cri. Doubtless. 
 
 Ale. If this can be made appear, I shall own myself very 
 much mistaken. 
 
 Cri. It is now near dinner-time. Wherefore, if you 
 please, we will put an end to this conversation for the 
 present \ 
 
 ' Berkeley, in the preceding Dialogue, argues that faith in the 
 existence and character of God may be vindicated in the same way as 
 faith in the existence and character of our fellow-men. He realises the 
 universe as consisting in a hierarchy of intercommunicating spirits — 
 intercommunicating by means of the phenomena presented to each in 
 sense ; and all by like means in communion with the Divine Spirit 
 Supreme. God is with him the conscious Spirit, Supreme in the 
 hierarchy, on whom all other conscious spirits depend. 
 
 But one may ask whether this conception enough recognises that 
 ineffable mysteriousness of the Infinite Being, which nourishes the 
 sentiment of reverence, so efficacious in our spiritual life, and which is 
 involved in the faith, in its different degrees of consciousness in individual 
 men, on which human life rests ? 
 
 At the opposite extreme God disappears in Unknowable Power, 
 divorced from a universe of material nature dependent on spirit, 
 by which the Power is so far revealed — as e.g. with Mr. Herbert 
 Spencer. 
 
 The difficulty of an intcrniediate between the extremes of strict 
 antlu-opomorphism and total theological nescience perplexes modern 
 thought. A fully comprehensible God is no God : a totally unknowable 
 God cannot engage faith. Berkeley seems unconscious of the difficulty. 
 Out of it has arisen the theological agnosticism of modern physical 
 science, and its counterpart gnosticism, in an Abstract God — personified 
 only in finite spirits. Siris carries us further into this subject. 
 
 The preceding Dialogue hardly recognises difficulties which are now 
 apt to beset the inquirer in theology ; for it encourages the assumption
 
 DIVINE VISUAL LANGUAGE 26j 
 
 that there is no alternative between a fully comprehended God and 
 dogmatic Atheism. Moreover, little is said that applies to later scientific 
 agnosticism, initiated by Hume, which pronounces the final problem 
 insoluble — in Hume's words, ' a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable 
 mystery'; with 'doubt, imcertainty, and suspense of judgment,' as 'the 
 only result of our most accurate scrutiny into it ' — and which thus 
 holds us debarred from any ultimate explanation. We are now 
 beginning to see that if the ultimate problem is wholly insoluble for 
 practical human purposes, then even the working principles of secular 
 life, and the generalizations of science, must, on the same ground, be 
 unworthy of trust. The issue is then total as well as theological 
 agnosticism. 
 
 Many of the subjects that are touched in the preceding annotations 
 and in those which follow are discussed in my Gifford Lectures on the 
 rhilosophy of Theism (2nd ed. 1899).
 
 III. VISUAL LANGUAGE 
 FURTHER VINDICATED AND EXPLAINED. 
 
 9. By a sensible object I understand that which is properly 
 perceived by sense. Things properly perceived by sense are 
 immediately perceived ^. — Besides things properly and imme- 
 diately perceived by any sense, there may be also other 
 things suggested to the mind by means of those proper and 
 immediate objects : — which things so suggested are not 
 objects of that sense, being in truth only objects of the 
 imagination ", and originally belonging to some other sense 
 or faculty. Thus, sounds, are the proper object of hearing, 
 being properly and immediately perceived by that, and by 
 no other sense. But, by the mediation of sounds or words, 
 all other things may be suggested to the mind ; and yet 
 things so suggested are not thought the object of hearing. 
 
 10. The peculiar objects of each sense, although they are 
 
 ^ Do we become immediately percipient — meaning by that cognisant 
 of something that is more than a transient phenomenon contempo- 
 raneous only with the percipient act — in any one of our five senses, 
 taken singly? Does externality so belong to all of them that in each 
 we have not only individual sensations, but also realise external 
 objects as distinguished from the individual percipient ? If so, what 
 means this distinction, and how and why is it made ? 
 
 ^ ' imagination,' i. e. expectant imagination. But is not reason latent 
 in the automatic expectation which Berkeley calls ' suggestion ' ?
 
 VISUAL LANGUAGE VINDICATED 269 
 
 truly or strictly perceived by that sense alone, may yet be 
 suggested to the imagination by some other sense. The 
 objects therefore of all the senses may become objects of 
 imagination — which faculty represents all sensible things. 
 A colour, therefore, which is truly perceived by sight alone, 
 may nevertheless, upon hearing the words blue or red, be 
 apprehended by the imagination. It is in a primary and 
 peculiar manner the object of sight ; in a secondary manner 
 it is the object of imagination : but cannot properly be 
 supposed the object of hearing \ 
 
 II. The objects of sense, being things immediately per- 
 ceived, are otherwise called ideas ^. 
 
 The cause'^ of these ideas, or the power of producing 
 them, is not the object of sense — not being itself perceived, 
 but only inferred by reason from its effects, to wit, those 
 objects or ideas which are perceived by sense. From our 
 ideas of sense the inference of reason is good to Power, 
 Cause, Agent, But we may not therefore infer that our 
 ideas are like unto this Power, Cause, or Active Being. 
 On the contrary, it seems evident that an idea can be only 
 like another idea, and that in our ideas or immediate 
 
 ' In this and the preceding section he distinguishes sense-phe7t07nena 
 that are imviediaiely perceived in the several senses, and peculiar to 
 each sense, from suggestions, in which more than one sense is involved, 
 their respective data being interpreted as signs, by which our percep- 
 tion of extra-organic things is enlarged. Berkeley's ' immediate per- 
 ception ' is dii'ect consciousness of phenomena in sense ; his 'suggestion ' 
 is the automatic i7iterpretation of the phenomena given in sense that is 
 evoked after custom or experience. 
 
 ^ Elsewhere called ' sensations ' and ' real ideas ' (in contrast with 
 'chimeras* of fancy), and afterwards in Siris called 'phenomena.' 
 I'hcnomenon is perhaps the most convenient term. 
 
 ■' ' Cause ' here is not sign, i. e. constant antecedent or natural cause, 
 but efficient or productive cause ; and that with Berkeley must be spirit. 
 It cannot be phenomenon of sense.
 
 270 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 objects of sense, there is nothing of Power, Causahty, or 
 Agency included. 
 
 12. Hence it follows that the power or cause of ideas is 
 not an object of sense, but of reason. Our knowledge of the 
 cause is measured by the effect ; of the power, by our idea. 
 To the absolute nature, therefore, of outward causes or 
 powers, we have nothing to say : they are no objects of our 
 sense or perception. Whenever, therefore, the appellation 
 of sensible object is used in a determined intelligible sense, 
 it is not applied to signify the absolutely existing outward 
 cause or power, but the ideas themselves produced thereby'. 
 
 13. Ideas which are observed to be connected together 
 are vulgarly considered under the relation of cause and 
 effect, whereas, in strict and philosophic truth, they are 
 only related as the sign to the thing signified^. For, we 
 know our ideas, and therefore know that one idea cannot 
 be the cause of another. We know that our ideas of sense 
 are not the cause of themselves. We know also that we do 
 not cause them. Hence we know they nmst have some 
 other efficient cause, distinct from them and us. 
 
 14. In treating of Vision, it was my purpose to consider 
 the effects and appearances — the objects perceived by my 
 senses — the ideas of sight as connected with those of touch ; 
 to inquire how one idea comes to suggest another belonging 
 
 ^ This seems to say that ' objects ' of sense involve only phenomena 
 immediately perceived in sense ; or suggested when the data of one 
 sense are interpreted as evidence of sense-phenomena to be expected in 
 another. But the rational relations which the objects necessarily 
 involve are not empirical phenomena, and they are presupposed in 
 intelligent perceptions of sense. 
 
 - He does not articulately show what is involved in our being obliged 
 to refer sensuous phenomena to unperceived power ; nor why we must 
 connect them as sign and thing signified, i. e. under laws of nature. 
 Mere sense cannot give more than a transient phenomenon. Of sug- 
 gestion he only says that it is based on ' arbitrary institution,' while 
 he implies that reason involves ' necessary connexion.'
 
 VISUAL LANGUAGE VINDICATED z-jl 
 
 to a different sense ; how things visible suggest things 
 tangible ; how present things suggest things more remote 
 and future — whether by likeness, by necessary connexion, 
 by geometrical inference, or by arbitrary institution. 
 
 15. It hath indeed been a prevailing opinion and un- 
 doubted principle among mathematicians and philosophers 
 that there were certain ideas common to both senses : 
 whence arose the distinction of primary and secondary 
 qualities. But, I think it hath been demonstrated that 
 there is no such thing as a common object — as an idea, or 
 kind of idea, perceived both by sight and touch. 
 
 16. In order to treat with due exactness on the nature of 
 ^'ision, it is necessary in the first place accurately to consider 
 our own ideas ; to distinguish where there is a difference ; 
 to call things by their right names ; to define terms, and 
 not confound ourselves and others by their ambiguous use ; 
 the want or neglect whereof hath so often produced mistakes. 
 Hence it is that men talk as if one idea was the efficient 
 cause of another ; hence they mistake inferences of reason for 
 perceptions of sense ; hence they confound the poiver residing 
 in somewhat external'^ with \\\e proper object of sense — which 
 is in truth no more than our own idea. 
 
 17. When we have well understood and considered the 
 nature of Vision, we may, by reasoning from thence, be better 
 able to collect some knowledge of the external unseen cause 
 of our ideas ; — whether it be one or many, intelligent or 
 unintelligent, active or inert, body or spirit. But, in order 
 to understand and comprehend this theory-, and discover 
 the true principles thereof, we should consider the likeliest 
 way is not to attend to unknown substances, external causes, 
 
 ' This 'power' is, with Berkeley, Divine Mind or Spirit — not imme- 
 diately perceived by our senses, but found by ' inference,' if not by 
 automatic suggestion. 
 
 " i.e. the theory of our acquired power of interpreting visual phe- 
 nomena.
 
 272 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 agents, or powers ; nor to reason or infer anything about 
 or from things obscure, unperceived, and altogether un- 
 known \ 
 
 1 8. As in this inquiry we are concerned with what objects 
 we perceive, or our own ideas, so, upon them our reasonings 
 must proceed. To treat of things utterly unknown as if we 
 knew them, and so lay our beginning in obscurity, would 
 not surely seem the properest means for the discovering of 
 truth. Hence it follows, that it would be wrong if one 
 about to treat of the nature of Vision should, instead of 
 attending to visible ideas, define the object of sight to be 
 that obscure cause, that invisible power or agent, which pro- 
 diiced visible ideas in our minds. Certainly such cause or 
 power does not seem to be the object either of the sense 
 or the science of Vision, inasmuch as what we know thereby 
 we know only of the effects ". 
 
 ' ' unknown ' — so far as mere sense is concerned. 
 
 ■■^ The foregoing sections confine the question to the objects we are 
 inwiediately percipient of — namely, 'ideas of sense,' or 'phenomena' 
 actually present in sense — and to their suggested connexion with one 
 another, in which connexion the reality of the material world con- 
 sists. The pozuer that presents phenomena to our senses, in an inter- 
 pretable order, cannot itself be an ' object ' of sense : its character is 
 inferred from the phenomena in which its presence is implied. This 
 inference he might justify on the ground that we distinguish what we 
 tan produce, from visible and tangible phenomena which we cannot 
 produce, and which therefore we find ourselves in reason obliged to 
 refer to a Spirit 'distinct from them and us' (§ 13). Causality — 
 physical, formal, efficient, and final — as a fundamental principle in 
 Universal Reason, is thus, as it were, proposed here for further philo- 
 sophical analysis, by any student who is so inclined. 
 
 The causal principle has been often used by philosophers as a premiss 
 in reasonings on behalf of the existence of impcrcipient and impejreived 
 Matter. The phenomena of sense, they argue, must be caused : / am 
 not their cause (although they are perceived by me) : they must there- 
 fore be effects of an unknowable Something, called Matter. Unable 
 to accept this conclusion, Berkeley had asked, Must not the Power 
 of which the phenomena presented to our senses are effects — at least 
 if the word ' jiovver' is to have a verifiable meaning — be Mind or Spirit
 
 VISUAL LANGUAGE VINDICATED 273 
 
 33. We not only impose on others but often on ourselves, 
 by the unsteady or ambiguous use of terms. One would 
 imagine that an ol>ject should be perceived'^. I must own, 
 when that word is employed in a different sense, that I am 
 at a loss for its meaning, and consequently cannot compre- 
 hend any arguments or conclusions about it. And I am not 
 sure that, on my own part, some inaccuracy of expression, 
 as well as the peculiar nature of the subject, not always 
 easy either to explain or conceive, may not have rendered 
 my Treatise concerning Vision difficult to a cursory reader. 
 But, to one of due attention, and who makes my words an 
 occasion of his own thinking, I conceive the whole to be very 
 intelligible : and, when it is rightly understood, I scarce doubt 
 
 — like our own mind in kind, but higher in degree — and 7iot a mere 
 abstraction, as unphenomenal Matter divorced from living Mind is? — 
 Others, Reid and Hamilton for instance, deny that Matter is inferred. 
 Body and mind, in their view, exist as it were face to face in perception 
 — in the siii generis relation of percipient act and perceived object — 
 each equally known to the perceiving mind — the extended and the 
 self-conscious — in an irreducible act ; neither knowable independently 
 of their phenomena. — Berkeley argues that we may infer that Active 
 Spirit is the cause of sense-presented phenomena and of their signifi- 
 cance, although we cannot infer that abstract Matter is so. And his 
 implied reason for this seems to be, that we have experience of what 
 'power' means — in the free personal acts of which we recognise 
 ourselves the responsible, and therefore creative, causes, while we 
 cannot connect any meaning with the term power when it is applied 
 to ' matter ' : there is meaning in spiritual power ; power ift matter is 
 a meaningless abstraction, knowable neither as ' idea' or ' phenomenon ' 
 nor as a ' notion.' 
 
 A representative perception (after a sort) of sensible things is implied 
 in Berkeley's ' suggestion,' or developed perception : ' real things ' 
 consist of phenomena that are significant of (and that thus represent) 
 other phenomena — under natural law, i. e. according to the rational order 
 of ever acting Divine Providence. 
 
 ' Berkeley's suggested ' objects of sense ' imply both actual and ex- 
 pected phenomena of sense ; the former signs of the latter, and the latter 
 not actually given in sense. (Cf. § 39.) He regards what is suggested 
 as mediately perceived, and so resolves perception of things and inductive 
 expectations into automatic suggestion, in the first stage of their develop- 
 ment at least.
 
 274 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 but it will be assented to. One thing at least I can afifirm, 
 that, if I am mistaken, I can plead neither haste nor inatten- 
 tion, having taken true pains and much thought about it. 
 
 38. It is to be noted that, in formerly considering the 
 Theory of Vision, I observed a certain known method, 
 wherein, from false and popular suppositions, men do often 
 arrive at truth \ Whereas in the synthetical method of 
 delivering science or truth already found, we proceed in an 
 inverted order, the conclusions in the analysis being assumed 
 as principles in the synthesis. I shall therefore now begin 
 with that conclusion — That Vision is the Language of the 
 Author of Nature ; from thence deducing theorems and 
 solutions of phenomena, and explaining the nature of visible 
 things and the visive faculty. 
 
 39. Ideas which are observed to be connected with other 
 ideas come to be considered as signs ', by means whereof 
 things not actually perceived by sense are signified or sug- 
 gested to the imagination ; whose objects they are, and 
 which alone perceives them. And, as sounds suggest other 
 things, so characters suggest other sounds ; and, in general, 
 all signs suggest the things signified, there being no idea 
 which may not offer to the mind another idea which hath 
 been frequently joined with it. In certain cases a sign 
 may suggest its correlate as an image, in others as an effect, 
 in others as a cause ^. But, where there is no such relation 
 
 ' The juvenile Essay on Vision proceeds upwards from facts to the 
 general principle which they exemplify. 
 
 ^ How do they ' come to be so considered' ? Berkeley says through 
 ' experience ' or ' custom.' The ' custom of nature ' which the things 
 of sense follow, commonly called 'law' of nature, presupposes an 
 ' arbitrary (not capricious) institution ' of the laws, by t\\e perfect reason 
 of God. 
 
 ^ Does this imply that efficient and final causes— free spiritual causes 
 — may be ' suggested ' automatically in sense, without being ' inferred 
 by reason ' ?
 
 VISUAL LANGUAGE VINDICATED 275 
 
 of similitude or causality, nor any necessary connexion 
 whatsoever, two things, by their mere co-existence, or two 
 ideas, merely by being perceived together, may suggest or 
 signify one the other — their connexion being all the while 
 arbitrary ; for it is the connexion only, as such, that causeth 
 this effect \ 
 
 40. A great number of arbitrary signs, various and oppo- 
 site, do constitute a Language. If such arbitrary connexion 
 be instituted by men, it is an artificial Language; if by the 
 Author of Nature, it is a Natural Language. Infinitely 
 various are the modifications of light and sound, whence 
 they are each capable of supplying an endless variety of 
 signs, and, accordingly, have been each employed to form 
 languages ; the one by the arbitrary appointment of man- 
 kind, the other by that of God Himself. A connexion 
 established by the Author of Nature, in the ordinary course 
 of things, may surely be called natural, as that made by 
 men will be named artificial. And yet this doth not hinder 
 but the one may be as arbitrary as the other. And, in fact, 
 there is no more likeness to exhibit, or necessity to infer, 
 things tangible from the modifications of light, than there 
 is in language to collect the meaning from the sound 
 {Essay on Vision, sect, 144, 147). But, such as the con- 
 nexion is of the various tones and articulations of voice 
 
 ' Uleiita' association seems to be here taken as an explanation of our 
 belief in objective order in nature ; and thus of our translation of the 
 transitory phenomena of sense into fixed perceptions of solid and 
 extended objects. This might be compared with Kant's theory of 
 perception, according to which sensations, received under rationally 
 necessary forms of space, are made intelligible by categories of ujider- 
 standitig. The modem philosopher has to determine between the two 
 explanations. Berkeley assumes that each human being begins his 
 conscious life with perception of \ henomena presented to his senses 
 spontaneously, and recognised by him as his personal experience ; he 
 then finds by ' suggestion ' — which here seems to mean little more than 
 invariable association — the externality of this inward experience, and 
 at last rises to inductive judgments of science. 
 
 T 2
 
 276 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 with their several meanings, the same is it between the 
 various modes of h'ght and their respective correlates, or, 
 in other words, between the ideas of sight and touch. 
 
 41. As to light, and its several modes or colours, all 
 thinking men are agreed that they are ideas peculiar only 
 to sight ; neither common to the touch, nor of the same 
 kind with any that are perceived by that sense. But herein 
 lies the mistake, that, beside these, there are supposed other 
 ideas common to both senses, being equally perceived by 
 sight and touch — such as Extension, Size, Figure, and 
 Motion. But that there are in reality no such common 
 ideas, and that the objects of sight, marked by these words, 
 are entirely different and heterogeneous from whatever is 
 the object of feeling, marked by the same names, hath been 
 proved in the Theory {A New Theory of Vision, sect. 127). 
 
 42. To perceive is one thing ; io judge is another. So 
 likewise, to be suggested is one thing, and to be inferred 
 another. Things are suggested and perceived by Sense. 
 We make judgments and inferences by the Understanding. 
 («) What we immediately and properly perceive by sight is 
 its primary object — light and colours, (b) What is suggested, 
 or perceived by mediation thereof, are tangible ideas — 
 which may be considered as secondary and improper objects 
 of sight, (c) We infer causes from effects, effects from 
 causes, and properties one from another, where the connexion 
 is necessary '. 
 
 ' Note in this a fuller recognition of universal and necessary human 
 judgments, having their evidence in themselves, the source and sub- 
 stance of truths above sense, — designated by some tlie Common Reason. 
 According to Berkeley, in his earlier writings, our ability to read into 
 what we see more than is originally seen is due to 'suggestion,' 
 under associative laws, of phenomena previously perceived, especially in 
 touch. In all this Intellect is merged in Sense. Judgment and in- 
 ference, on the other hand, manifest Intellect proper. The higher 
 development of mind, in which Sense is subordinate to Intellect, is now 
 more prominent in his view. 
 
 What ('oes Berkeley here and elsewhere mean by ^necessity' of con-
 
 VISUAL LANGUAGE VINDICATED 277 
 
 How comes it to pass that we apprehend by the ideas of sight 
 certain other ideas, luhich neither resemble them, fior cause 
 them, nor are caused by them, nor have any necessary con- 
 nexion with them ? The solution of this Problem, in its full 
 extent, doth comprehend the whole Theory of Vision. This 
 stating of the matter placeth it on a new foot, and in 
 a different light from all preceding theories. 
 
 43. To which the proper answer is — That this is do?ie in 
 virtue of an arbitrary connexion, instituted by the Author of 
 Nature ' . 
 
 44. The proper, immediate object of vision is light, in 
 all its modes and variations, various colours in kind, in 
 degree, in quantity ; some lively, others faint ; more of some 
 and less of others ; various in their bounds or limits ; various 
 in their order and situation. A blind man, when first made 
 to see, might perceive these objects, in which there is an 
 endless variety ; but he would neither perceive nor imagine 
 any resemblance or connexion between these visible objects 
 and those perceived by feeling ^. Lights, shades, and 
 colours would suggest nothing to him about bodies, hard or 
 soft, rough or smooth : nor would their quantities, limits 
 or order suggest to him geometrical figures, or extension, or 
 situation — which they must do upon the received supposition, 
 that these objects are common to sight and touch. 
 
 nexion ; and how, on his theory of knowledge, does he account for 
 the ' necessity ' ? He finds ' judgments ' of reason rising out of the 
 ' suggestions,' but he does not ask why they do so, or define precisely 
 what they are, or unfold them articulately. In short, he does not 
 anticipate Kant or even Reid. 
 
 * The philosophical inquirer still asks On what tdtitnate ground of 
 reason we in any case proceed from the known to the unknown — from 
 ihe perceived sign to the suggested thing signified. More than a mere 
 datum of sense is needed to explain this mental transition ; and to 
 justify the assumption of steady order in nature which is involved in 
 suggested expectation and inductive inference. 
 
 ■■' ' feeling,' i. e. touch, which here, as elsewhere with Berkeley, includes 
 the muscular sense, and the sense of locomotive activity.
 
 278 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 45. All the various sorts, combinations, quantities, 
 degrees, and dispositions of light and colours, would, upon 
 the first perception thereof, be considered in themselves 
 only as a new set of sensations and ideas. As they are 
 wholly new and unknown, a man born blind would not, at 
 first sight, give them the names of things formerly known 
 and perceived by his touch. But, after some experience, 
 he would perceive their connexion with tangible things, 
 and would, therefore, consider them as signs, and give 
 them (as is usual in other cases) the same names with the 
 things signified. 
 
 71. Before I conclude, it may not be amiss to add the 
 following extract from the Philosophical Transactions (No. 
 400), relating to a person blind from his infancy, and long 
 after made to see : ' When he first saw, he was so far from 
 making any judgment about distances that he thought all 
 objects whatever touched his eyes (as he expressed it) as 
 what he felt did his skin, and thought no objects so agree- 
 able as those which were smooth and regular, though he 
 could form no judgment of their shape, or guess what it 
 was in any object that was pleasing to him. He knew not 
 the shape of anything, nor any one thing from another, 
 however different in shape or magnitude : but upon being 
 told what things were, whose form he before knew from 
 Feeling, he would carefully observe them that he might 
 know them again ; but having too many objects to learn at 
 once, he forgot many of them ; and (as he said) at first he 
 learned to know, and again forgot, a thousand things in a 
 day. Several weeks after he was couched being deceived 
 by pictures, he asked which was the lying sense — Feeling 
 or Seeing ? He was never able to imagine any lines beyond 
 the bounds he saw. The room he was in, he said, he knew 
 to be part of the house, yet he could not conceive that the 
 whole house could look bigger. He said every new object
 
 VISUAL LANGUAGE VINDICATED 279 
 
 was a new delight, and the pleasure was so great that he 
 wanted ways to express it '.' — Thus, by fact and experiment, 
 those points of the theory which seem the most remote 
 from common apprehension were not a little confirmed, 
 many years after I had been led into the discovery of them 
 by reasoning. 
 
 ' Berkeley here quotes the noted experiment of Cheselden, recorded 
 in the Philosophical Transactions for 1728. It is offered as evidence 
 that our poiver of interpreting sensible signs is neither {a) an instinct 
 nor {b) a necessary inference, but {c) an expectation suggested by our 
 customary experience. — Cheseiden's is among the first of several recorded 
 examples of persons born blind and made to see, whose mental ex- 
 perience, immediately consequent upon their acquirement of sight, 
 has been (more or less accurately) described. Berkeley's comparative 
 indifference to experiments of the sort, and to the relative physiology of 
 the senses, is not difficult to understand. His appeal to our inward 
 consciousness, to show that we cannot originally see outward distances, 
 magnitudes, or situations, nor touch what is visible, nor see what is 
 tangible ; along with the evidence he offers that our inclination to unite 
 visible and tangible phenomena, as ' qualities ' of the same ' substance,' 
 may all be explained by the constant mental association of the latter 
 with the former — perhaps seemed to make external testimony of the born- 
 blind unnecessary. The records hitherto of experiments like Cheseiden's 
 illustrate the remark of Diderot, that an adequate cross-examination of 
 persons born blind would be employment enough for the combined 
 powers of Newton, Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz. 
 
 Besides the first experience of the born-blind when made to see, 
 the experiences of children, and of the lower animals, during formation 
 of distinct visual perception, have also been recorded, with a view to 
 show the nature and genesis of adult visual perception,— instead of 
 Berkeley's introspective inferences from the tendencies of consciousness. 
 The former is an example of the method of external observation in 
 psychology — more obvious, but apt to overlook the spiritual phe- 
 nomena. The latter is the method of introspective analysis — more 
 subtle and difficult, but more fundamental than the other. Experimental 
 physiological psychology, as it is sometimes called, is of later growth 
 than Berkelev.
 
 THIRD PART 
 
 A CHAIN OF PHILOSOPHICAL 
 REFLECTIONS 
 
 OR 
 
 THE UNIVERSE SPIRITUALLY 
 UNITED IN GOD 
 
 SELECTIONS FROM 
 BERKELEY'S 'SIRIS: A CHAIN' 
 
 In God we live and muve and have our being.
 
 PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 Stris {aeipa, a chain) appeared when Berkeley was about 
 sixty. It contains the philosophy of his later life, in which 
 he rises from Locke to Plato. He ingeniously starts from 
 the supposed medicinal virtues of tar-water, also invites us 
 to follow the ascending links which connect sensible things 
 with one another, through supreme and pervading Intelligent 
 Will, and revels in his favourite thought of the natural 
 world realised in constant, because necessary, dependence 
 on Eternal Active Mind. 
 
 In the English metaphysical literature of the eighteenth 
 century no work more abounds in seeds of thought than 
 Sirt's. Its immediate purpose was to confirm the conjecture 
 that Tar yields a ' water of health ' for the relief of diseases, 
 from which the whole animal creation might draw fresh 
 supplies of vital essence. In a series of aphorisms, con- 
 nected by subtle association, the thoughts of ancient and 
 medieval philosophers are interwoven, the whole forming 
 a study at once in medicine and in metaphysics. The 
 work breathes the spirit of Plato, in the least Platonic 
 generation in England since the rise of modern philo- 
 sophy, all with the unexpectedness of genius, inspired by 
 a thing so commonplace as tar. 
 
 More than half of Sin's is occupied with physical con-
 
 284 PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 jectures applied to the art of healing. The Selections 
 which follow are almost all taken from the metaphysical 
 aphorisms. They may be studied apart from tar-water, 
 simply as meditations upon the world viewed in its spiritual 
 unity. 
 
 In this curious work medicine thus passes into meta- 
 physics. Doubt regarding the medicinal virtues of tar-water 
 need not disturb enjoyment of the philosophical speculations 
 about the rational concatenation of the Universe of which 
 tar is merely the occasion. The medical aphorisms may 
 misinterpret the meaning that is latent in the phenomena 
 of tar ; this must not hinder us from learning through Siris 
 to see, in an unsubstantial and impotent material world, the 
 constant manifestation of God. 
 
 When we compare Siris with the Frijtciples, published 
 nearly forty years earlier, we find important developments 
 of Berkeley's philosophy. The Universals of Reason here 
 overshadow the changing phenomena presented in Sense 
 and the Suggestions of sensuous Imagination. Sensible 
 things are looked at as adumbrations of a reality beyond 
 Nature, which philosophy helps us to recognise. The 
 objects of sense are called phenomena, instead of ideas or 
 sensations ; while Ideas (not in Berkeley's early meaning of 
 the term but in Plato's) are recognised as the supreme 
 objects of meditative thought. 
 
 An increase of intellectual tolerance and of eclecticism 
 appears in Siris, and less disposition to insist with merely 
 controversial acuteness upon the dependence of the sensible 
 world on sentient mind, as a final solution of all difficulties. 
 That esse is percipi, in the sensuous reference of the latter 
 term, is felt more to be the beginning than the end of 
 philosophy. Recluse meditation — long continued, with 
 more study of human speculations in the past — has given 
 Berkeley a larger conception of the final problem of the 
 Universe, and a feeling that it is neither so easily nor so
 
 PREFATORY NOTE 285 
 
 perfectly intelligible under his old formula as it seemed in his 
 ardent and less considerate youth. Awe of its mysterious- 
 ness is shown, and also readiness to allow different ages and 
 countries, each in its own way, to recognise Active Reason 
 as the fixed element in existence, — with irreducible data 
 too in the explanation finally offered. He now welcomes 
 an acknowledgment of God in any intellectual form of faith 
 that consists with supremacy of Reason in the universe. 
 His last work in philosophy more than any breathes and 
 helps to educate the philosophic spirit ; which begins in 
 infantile wonder, but is found at the end to issue in wonder 
 that has been deepened by reflection. Siris illustrates 
 his spiritual growth in later life. We find him intellec- 
 tually broader, more modest, and more liberal ; more 
 ready to accept with reverence the ' broken ' philosophy, 
 with its sense of mystery, to which deep and patient insight 
 at last conducts us ; more aware that in this mortal state, 
 under its present limitations, we must be satisfied to make 
 the best of any openings which occur ; — yet not without 
 hope, there being ' no subject so obscure but we may 
 discern some glimpse of truth by long poring on it,' if we 
 cultivate love for truth— ' the cry of all,' while it is really 
 ' the game of a few.' 
 
 Thus the course of thought in the life of Berkeley, 
 taken in chronological order, begins with Matter and ends 
 with God. Intellect is latent in the senses : the phenomena 
 of the external world find their ultimate explanation in the 
 omnipresent meaning which makes natural sciences possible : 
 Sense-perception introduces the contrast between conscious 
 Spirit and unconscious phenomena, with their unfathomable 
 mysteries of Space and Time : Reason essays the ultimate 
 meaning of what in Sense is revealed under conditions of 
 co-existence and succession. Here are the three great objects 
 of all meditative thought — the conscious Ego and the 
 Material World — mutually related in and through God. The
 
 286 PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 correlation of Self and Sense — Spirit and Matter — is pro- 
 minent in the Principles ; the ultimate unity of the Universe 
 in Divine Spirit is prominent in Siris, which enforces the 
 harmony of physical science with the constant agency of 
 Omnipresent Reason and Will. Natural causation is the 
 physical revelation of the Divine Agent who is immanent 
 and manifested in the natural world.
 
 A CHAIN OF PHILOSOPHICAL 
 REFLECTIONS 
 
 154. The order and course of things, and the experiments 
 we daily make, shew there is a Mind that governs and 
 actuates this mundane system, as the proper real agent 
 and cause. . . . We have no proof, either from experiment 
 or reason, of any other agent or efficient cause than Mind 
 or Spirit. When, therefore, we speak of corporeal agents 
 or corporeal causes, this is to be understood in a different, 
 subordinate, and improper sense \ 
 
 155. The principles whereof a thing is compounded, the 
 instrufnent used in its production, and the end for which it 
 was intended, are all in vulgar use termed 'causes,' — though 
 none of them be, strictly speaking, agent or efficient. There 
 is not any proof that an extended corporeal or mechanical 
 cause doth really and properly act — even motion itself being 
 in truth a passion. . . . They are, nevertheless, sometimes 
 termed 'agents' and 'causes,' although they are by no means 
 
 ' This and the following sections express Berkeley's later thoughts 
 about Divine Reason as the Universal Power, and so the insufficiency of 
 the atomic hypothesis, as the ultimate or philosophical explanation of the 
 universe, even if it may satisfy physical science. His implied premiss 
 is, that every change must at last have sufficient cause, and that the 
 only sufficient ultimate cause must be Active Reason ; but that in merely 
 physical nature, anything might a priori have been made by God the 
 sign, i. e. natural cause, of any change. Is this contingency consistent 
 with perfection in the ever acting Reason, and if so, how ?
 
 288 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 active in a strict and proper signification. When therefore 
 force, power, virtue, or action is mentioned as subsisting in 
 an extended and corporeal or mechanical being, this is not 
 to be taken in a true, genuine, and real, but only in a gross 
 and popular sense, which sticks in appearances, and doth 
 not analyse things to their first principles \ In compliance 
 with established language and the use of the world, we 
 must employ the popular current phrase. But then in 
 regard to truth we ought to distinguish its meaning. 
 
 i6o. The mind of man acts by an instrument necessarily^. 
 The TO iiye/xovLKov, or Mind presiding in the world, acts by an 
 instrument freely^ Without instrumental and second causes, 
 there could be no regular course of nature. And without a 
 regular course, nature could never be understood ; mankind 
 must always be at a loss, not knowing what to expect, or 
 how to govern themselves, or direct their actions for the 
 obtaining of any end. Therefore in the government of the 
 world physical agents — improperly so called — or mechanical 
 or second causes, or natural causes or instruments, are ne- 
 cessary to assist, not the governor, but the governed \ 
 
 ' This is urged and illustrated in Dr. Thomas Brown's Inquiry into 
 ike Relation of Catise and Effect. 
 
 ^ This is in the spirit of the opening aphorisms oi \h.e A'^ovnnt Organuni, 
 which teach that, in order to be able to produce beneficial changes in 
 nature, man must observe and understand the established connexions, or 
 laws of change, in nature. The divinely established sense -symbolism 
 is the basis of science of nature. 
 
 ^ The ' laws of nature,' to which man must conform his overt actions, 
 are here assumed to be themselves the immediate issue of the will of 
 God — so that nature is essentially supernatural, although physical 
 science, as such, is bound to disregard its supernatural side, while 
 philosophy is bound to recognise both sides. 
 
 * Cf. Principles, §§ 60-66, in which Berkeley urges the utility to man 
 of this elaborate order in nature, which needs to be interpreted in science, 
 and its consistency with constant dependence of matter and its changes 
 upon percipient mind.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 289 
 
 231. The laws of attraction and repulsion are to be re- 
 garded as laws of motion ; and these only as rules or methods 
 observed in the productions of natural effects, — the efficient 
 and final causes whereof are not of mechanical consideration. 
 Certainly, if the explaining a phaenomenon be to assign its 
 proper efficient and final cause, it should seem that Me- 
 chanical Philosophers never explained any thing ; their 
 province being only to discover the laws of nature, that is, 
 the general rules and methods of motion, and to account 
 for particular phaenomena by reducing them under, or 
 shewing their conformity to, such general rules. 
 
 232. Some corpuscularian philosophers of the last age 
 have indeed attempted to explain the formation of this world 
 and its phcenomena by a few simple laws of mechanism. 
 But, if we consider the various productions of nature, in the 
 mineral, vegetable, and animal parts of the creation, I believe 
 we shall see cause to affirm, that not any one of them has 
 hitherto been, or can be, accounted for on principles merely 
 mechanical ; and that nothing could be more vain and 
 imaginary than to suppose with Descartes, that merely from 
 a circular motion's being impressed by the supreme Agent 
 on the particles of extended substance, the whole world, 
 with all its several parts, appurtenances, and phaenomena, 
 might be produced, by a necessary consequence, from the 
 laws of motion '. 
 
 233. Others suppose that God did more at the beginning, 
 having then made the seeds of all vegetables and animals, 
 containing their solid organical parts in miniature, the 
 
 * This is part of the scientific cosmogony of Descartes. He explained 
 the stellar system, and the motions of stars and planets, as the is5-ue of 
 vortices, or vortical motions, in an oiiginal chaos coextensive with 
 space. But this must be taken in connexion with what he taught 
 about the apparent interaction of mind and body being really due to 
 the constant efficient agency of (jod. The notion of constant Divine 
 agency was brought out further by Geulinx, Malebranche, and other 
 Cartesians, in their theory of ' occasional ' causes. 
 
 U
 
 ago SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 gradual filling and evolution of which, by the influx of 
 proper juices, doth constitute the generation and growth 
 of a living body. So that the artificial structure of plants 
 and animals daily generated requires no present exercise of 
 art to produce it, having been already framed at the origin 
 of the world, which with all its parts hath ever since sub- 
 sisted; — going like a clock or machine by itself, according 
 to the laws of nature, without the immediate hand of the 
 artist \ But how can this hypothesis explain the blended 
 features of different species in mules and other mongrels? 
 or the parts added or changed, and sometimes whole limbs 
 lost, by marking in the womb ? or how can it account for 
 the resurrection of a tree from its stump, or the vegetative 
 power in its cuttings ? in which cases we must necessarily 
 conceive something more than the mere evolution of a 
 seed ^. 
 
 234. Mechanical laws of nature or motion direct us how 
 to act, and teach us what to expect. Where Intellect pre- 
 sides there will be method and order, and therefore rules, 
 which if not stated and constant, would cease to be rules. 
 There is therefore a constancy in things, which is styled the 
 Course of Nature ^. All the phsenomena in nature are pro- 
 
 ' This is the theory of Leibniz, according to which the force or 
 energy originally infused into the universe remains the same, only 
 subject to transformations, agreeably to laws of nature, in a harmony 
 pre-established by God between thoughts and motions. Mind and body 
 in man thus agree like two clocks moving in concert. And thus the 
 material world is always in harmony with intelligence. \\'ith Cartesians 
 and with Leibniz, matter is neither that of which we are actually 
 percipient, nor is it the efficient cause of our being percipient : we are 
 percipient hy present (Cartesians\ ox previous (Leibnizians) agency and 
 arrangement of God. 
 
 ^ We cannot, he virtually argues, find sufficient cause of the effects in 
 mere data of sense, so that there must be more than an evolution of 
 phenomena to explain the issue. The issue presupposes the constant 
 orderly agency of evolving Mind, evolution being the manifestation or 
 revelation of power in the evolving Mind. 
 
 ^ Faith, i. e. moral trust in the supremacy of Perfect Reason in the
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 291 
 
 duced by motion. There appears an uniform working in 
 things great and small, by attracting and repelling forces. 
 But the particular laws of attraction and repulsion are 
 various. Nor are we concerned at all about the forces, 
 neither can we know or measure them otherwise than by 
 their effects, that is to say, the motions ; which motions 
 only, and not the forces, are indeed in the bodies. Bodies 
 are moved to or from each other, and this is performed 
 according to different laws. The natural or mechanic 
 philosopher endeavours to discover those laws by experi- 
 ment and reasoning. But what is said oi fofces residing in 
 bodies, whether attracting or repelling, is to be regarded only 
 as a mathematical hypothesis, and not as any thing really 
 existing in nature '. 
 
 235. We are not therefore seriously to suppose, with 
 certain mechanic philosophers, that the minute particles of 
 bodies have r^a/ forces or powers, by which they act on each 
 other, to produce the various phenomena in nature. The 
 minute corpuscles are impelled and directed, that is to say, 
 moved to and from each other, according to various rules 
 or laws of motion. The laws of gravity, magnetism, and 
 electricity are divers. And it is not known what other 
 different rules or laws of motion might be established by 
 the Author of Nature -. 
 
 237. These and numberless other effects seem inexplic- 
 
 universe, is in short the explanntion of our inductive assumption of 
 physical law, and of ideals latent in nature. 
 
 * That is to sny, even if all changes in natural phenomena could be 
 resolved according to laws of motion, the motions and their laws would 
 be themselves only effects, not efficient or real causes. The Intellect 
 that is omnipresent in motions and their laws cannot be an effect of the 
 motion which reveals it. 
 
 * The 'arbitrariness' of the existing constitution of nature must 
 mean dependence, not on caprice, but on reasonable will. The ultimate 
 dependmce of the physical world on the moral world is thus suggested. 
 
 U 2
 
 292 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 able on mechanical principles ; or otherwise than by recourse 
 to a mind or Spiritual Agent. Nor will it suffice from 
 present phasnomena and effects, through a chain of natural 
 causes and subordinate blind agents, to trace a Divine 
 Intellect as the remote original cause, that first created the 
 world, and then set it a going. We cannot make even one 
 single step in accounting for the phccnomena, without 
 admitting the immediate presence and immediate action of 
 an incorporeal Agent, who connects, moves, and disposes 
 all things, according to such rules, and for such purposes, 
 as seem 2:ood to Him \ 
 
 247. Though it be supposed the chief business of a 
 natural philosopher to trace out causes from the effects, yet 
 this is to be understood not of agents, but of component 
 parts, in one sense, or of laws or rules, in another. In strict 
 truth, all agejits are incorporeal, and as such are not properly 
 of physical consideration. The astronomer, therefore, the 
 mechanic, or the chemist, not as such, but by accident only, 
 treat of real causes, agents, or efficients. Neither doth it 
 seem, as is supposed by the greatest of mechanical philo- 
 sophers, that the true way of proceeding in their science is, 
 from known notions in nature to investigate the moving 
 forces. Forasmuch a.s force is neither corporeal, nor belongs 
 to any corporeal thing ; nor yet to be discovered by experi- 
 ments or mathematical reasonings, which reach no farther 
 
 ' In short, there are no active or responsible causes in the material 
 world. There is simply the agency of the Universal Mind, and the 
 occasional agency of morally responsible finite spirits. The Divine 
 agency Berkeley, like Descartes, seems to say must be constant, not, 
 as with Leibniz, remote in past time. But perhajis the alternative, 
 as between Descartes and Leibniz, here is one which man cannot settle ; 
 nor the involved question of time and the timeless, in relation to Divine 
 Mind. He cannot exclude human volitions as free powers, though he 
 leaves in obscurity their ultimate relation to God.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 293 
 
 than discernible effects, and motions in things passive and 
 moved. 
 
 248. Vis or force is to the soul what extension is to the 
 body, saith St. Augustin, in his tract concerning the Quantity 
 of the Soul ; and without force there is nothing done or 
 made, and consequently there can be no agent. Authority 
 is not to decide in this case. Let any one consult his own 
 notions and reason, as well as experience, concerning the 
 origin of motion, and the respective natures, properties, and 
 differences of soul and body, and he will, if I mistake not, 
 evidently perceive, that there is nothing active in the latter. 
 Nor are they natural agents or corporeal forces which make 
 the particles of bodies to cohere. Nor is it the business 
 of experimental philosophers to find them out. 
 
 249. The mechanical philosopher, as hath been already 
 observed, inquires properly concerning the rules and modes 
 of operation alone, and not concerning the cause ; foras- 
 much as nothing mechanical is or really can be a cause. 
 And although a mechanical or mathematical philosopher 
 may speak of absolute space, absolute motion, and of force, 
 as existing in bodies, causing such motion and proportional 
 thereto ; yet what these ' forces ' are, which are supposed 
 to be lodged in bodies, to be impressed on bodies, to be 
 multiplied, divided, and communicated from one body to 
 another, and which seem to animate bodies like abstract 
 spirits, or souls, hath been found very difficult, not to say 
 impossible, for thinking men to conceive and explain. 
 
 250. Nor, if we consider the proclivity of mankind to 
 realise their notions ', will it seem strange that mechanic 
 philosophers and geometricians should, like other men, be 
 misled by prejudice, and take mathematical hypotheses for 
 
 * ' realise their notions,' — by assuming for instance that the abstrac- 
 tions of natural philosophy, such as ' force ' or ' power,' stand for 
 something that may be imagined, instead of something that is un- 
 imaginable, but nevertheless morally or practically knovvable.
 
 294 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 real beings existing in bodies, so far as even to make it 
 the very aim and end of their science to compute or measure 
 those phantoms ; whereas it is very certain that nothing in 
 truth can be measured or computed, besides the very effects 
 or motions themselves. Sir Isaac Newton asks. Have not 
 the minute particles of bodies certain forces or powers by 
 which they act on one another, as well as on the particles 
 of light, for producing most of the phsenomena in nature ? 
 But, in reality, those minute particles are only agitated, 
 according to certain laws of nature, by some other agent, 
 wherein the force exists, and not in them, which have only 
 the motion ; which motion in the body moved, the 
 Peripatetics rightly judge to be a mere passion, but in 
 the mover to be eVepycm or act \ 
 
 251. It passeth with many, I know not how, that mecha- 
 nical principles give a clear solution of the phtenomena. 
 The Democritic hypothesis, saith Dr. Cudworth, doth much 
 more handsomely and intelligibly solve the phaenomena, 
 than that of Aristotle and Plato'. But, things rightly con- 
 sidered, perhaps it will be found not to solve any phccnome- 
 non at all: for aWphcenomena^ are, to speak truly, appear- 
 
 ^ The relation oi motion (as a sense-presented idea or phenomenon) to 
 poiver ox force (an intellectual notion to which no mere sense-phenomenon 
 corresponds) is the subject of Berkeley's tract De Motu [Works, vol. III. 
 pp. 75-100). 
 
 ^ The passage in Cudworth (1619-1688) is as follows : — ' The whole 
 Aristotelical system of philosophy is infinitely to be preferred before 
 the whole Democritical ; though the former hath been so much dis- 
 paraged, and the other cried up of late amongst us. Because, though it 
 cannot be denied but that the Democritic hypothesis doth much more 
 handsomely and intelligibly solve the corporeal phcenomena, yet in all 
 other things which are of far the greater moment, it is rather a madness 
 than a Pliilosophy.' — Intellectual System, b. I. ch. i. § 45. The atomic 
 hyjjothesis may satisfy physical science, but not philosophy. Plato 
 (b. C. 427-347) and Aristotle (B.C. 384-322), in contrast to the atomism 
 of Democritus (B.C. 460-370), occupy many of the sections which 
 follow. Bacon and others had extolled Democritus and the pre- 
 Socratics, in comparison with Socrates and his scliool. 
 
 ^ ' phenomena,' I may say again, correspond to the ' sensations,' or
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 295 
 
 ances in the soul or ftiind ; and it hath never been explained, 
 nor can it be explained, how external bodies, iigures, and 
 motions, should produce an appearance in the mind. These 
 principles, therefore, do not solve — if by solving is meant 
 assigning the real, either efficient or tinal, cause of 
 appearances — but only reduce them to general rules. 
 
 252. ' There is a certain analogy, constancy, and uniformity 
 in the ph^enomena or appearances of nature, which are 
 a foundation for general rules : and these are a Ckammar 
 for the understanding of Nature, or that series of effects in 
 the Visible World whereby we are enabled to foresee what 
 will come to pass in the natural course of things. Plotinus ^ 
 observes, in his third Ennead, that the art of presaging is in 
 some sort the reading of natural letters denoting order, and 
 that so far forth as analogy obtains in the universe, there 
 may be vaticination. And in reality, he that foretels the 
 motions of the planets, or the effects of medicines, or the 
 results of chemical or mechanical experiments, may be said 
 to do it by natural vaticination \ 
 
 253. We know a thing when we understand it ; and we 
 understand it when we can interpret or tell what it signifies. 
 Strictly, the Sense knows nothing \ We perceive indeed 
 
 ' ideas of sense,' of Berkeley's earlier works, as to which he had argued 
 that their real existence depends upon their being perceived. In order 
 to become real a mind must be percipient of them; but they do not 
 depend on my individual mind. 
 
 ' The following sections place Nature in some new liijhts, when 
 regarded as an interpretable and prophetic Language. 
 
 - The celebrated Neoplatonist. 
 
 ^ This remarkable passage in its own way anticipates the modern 
 scientific conception of prevision. It treats perception in sense as 
 obscure science, disclosed when we emerge from mere sense, and enter, 
 through divine reason in which we share, into the true meaning of things. 
 
 * So Cudworth, who carefully distinguishes inUlUclual notions from 
 sensuous iiiiaginalions : ' Sense,' he argues, * cannot be the knowledge 
 which comprehends a thing as it is. If the Sense had no other power
 
 296 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 sounds by hearing, and characters by sight. But we are not 
 therefore said to understand them. After the same manner, 
 the phsenomena of nature are alike visible to all : but all 
 have not alike learned the connexion of natural things, or 
 understand what they signify, or know how to vaticinate 
 by them. 
 
 254. As the natural connexion of signs with the things 
 signified is regular and constant, it forms a sort of Rational 
 Discourse, and is therefore the immediate effect of an intel- 
 ligent Cause. This is agreeable to the philosophy of Plato, 
 and other ancients. Plotinus indeed saith, that which acts 
 naturally is not intellection, but a certain power of moving 
 matter, which doth not know but only do. — And it must 
 be owned that, as faculties are multiplied by philosophers 
 according to their operations, the will may be distinguished 
 from the intellect. But it will not therefore follow that the 
 Will which operates in the course of nature is not conducted 
 and applied by intellect \ although it be granted that neither 
 will understands, nor intellect wills. Therefore, the phaeno- 
 mena of nature, which strike on the senses and are under- 
 stood by the mind, do form not only a magnificent spectacle, 
 but also a most coherent, entertaining, and instructive Dis- 
 course ; and to effect this, they are conducted, adjusted, 
 and ranged by the greatest wisdom. This language or Dis- 
 course is studied with different attention, and interpreted 
 with different degrees of skill. But so far as men have 
 studied and remarked its rules, and can interpret right, so 
 far they may be said to be knowing in nature. A beast is 
 
 but this of passion or sensation (as Protagoras supposed), then there 
 could be no such thing as absolute truth or knowledge. But that hypo- 
 thesis contradicts itself. For that which pronounces that sensible ideas 
 of things are phantasticaland relative, must itself be something superior 
 to Sense, and able to judge what really and absolutely is and is not.' 
 See Cudwortb's Immutable Morality. 
 
 ' It is not imperfectly reasonable Will, but Will in Perfect Reason.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 297 
 
 like a man who hears a strange tongue but understands 
 nothing \ 
 
 255. Nature, saith the learned Doctor Cudworth, is not 
 master of art or wisdom : nature is ratio inersa ct confusa — 
 reason immersed and plunged into matter, and as it were 
 fuddled in it and confounded with it. But the formation 
 of plants and animals, the motions of natural bodies, their 
 various properties, appearances, and vicissitudes, in a word, 
 the whole series of things in this visible world, which we 
 call the Course of Nature, is so wisely managed and carried 
 on that the most improved human reason cannot thoroughly 
 comprehend even the least particle thereof; — so far is it 
 from seeming to be produced by fuddled or confounded 
 reason ". 
 
 256. Natural productions, it is true, are not all equally 
 perfect. But neither doth it suit with the order of things, 
 the structure of the universe, or the ends of Providence, that 
 they should be so. General rules are necessary to make the 
 world intelligible : and from the constant observations of 
 such rules, natural evils will sometimes unavoidably ensue : 
 things will be produced in a slow length of time, and arrive 
 at different degrees of perfection. 
 
 257. It must be owned, we are not conscious of the 
 systole and diastole of the heart, or the motion of the 
 diaphragm. It may not nevertheless be thence inferred, 
 that unknowing nature can act regularly, as well as our- 
 selves. The true inference is — that the self-thinking in- 
 dividual, or human person, is not the real author of those 
 
 ^ This section applies to external nature the theory, implied in Bacon 
 and ex]iressed in Berkeley, that what we see, or perceive in any of our 
 senses, is to all intents a Divine Language. I-Sacon's favourite conception 
 of the interpretability of Nature is in harmony with this. Physical 
 science is a conscious attainment by human mind of divine thoughts that 
 are expressed by the sensible world. 
 
 ■ Since we cannot know any one thing without knowing all its relations 
 to all other \X\\w<g%, knowledge in its highest real it j' musi be Omniscience.
 
 298 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 natural motions. And, in fact, no man blames himself if 
 they are wrong, or values himself if they are right '. The 
 same may be said of the fingers of a musician, which some 
 object to be moved by habit which understands not; it 
 being evident that what is done by rule must proceed from 
 something that understands the rule ; therefore, if not from 
 the musician himself, from some other active Intelligence, 
 the same perhaps which governs bees and spiders, and 
 moves the limbs of those who walk in their sleep ^. 
 
 258. I?istniinents, occasions, and signs (sect. 160) occur 
 in, or rather make up, the whole visible Course of Nature. 
 These, being no agents themselves, are under the direction 
 of One Agent, concerting all for one end, the supreme good. 
 All these motions, whether in animal bodies, or in other 
 parts of the system of nature, which are not effects oi par- 
 ticular tvills, seem to spring frOm the same general cause 
 
 ^ The w^;-^/ judgment seems to be here taken (by implication) as the 
 test for distinguishing agents proper from the wholly physical laws or 
 methods of action that are maintained by God in nature. Conscience 
 makes it impossible to explain moral or immoral acts by means of 
 physical law ; and presupposes moral ideals, not derived from, but 
 which may be illustrated in experience. Conscience points to our only 
 known example of an efficient and final cause, in pointing to the free or 
 creative agency of persons — moral or immoral agents. Phenomena 
 presented in sense can only be divinely appointed signs of unpresented 
 phenomena — not agents; and, as far as one can see, any phenomenon 
 might be the sign {physical cause or effect) of any other, due to the 
 Universal Agent. 
 
 ^ So Cudworth {^Intellectual System, b. I. chap. 3. §§ 12-14). ^ 
 vein of speculation somewhat similar appears in Aristotle's Physics. 
 The facts here referred to, with others analogous, have given rise to 
 hypotheses of ' unconscious mental agency,' ' unconscious cerebral 
 agency,' and ' automatic activity.' That our habits and instincts involve 
 thoughts of ivhich the person who is the subject of them is itnconscious, 
 is not, however, to be taken as evidence that thought may issue from 
 what is unintelligent. It rather shows that our unconscious instincts 
 and habits express the Divine Reason acting in us according to natural 
 laws. An artist need not possess consciously the ideal that determines 
 the work by which he is inspired.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 299 
 
 with the vegetation of plants — an aethereal spirit actuated 
 by a Mind '. 
 
 259. The first poets and theologers of Greece and the 
 East considered the generation of things as ascribed rather 
 to a Divine Cause, but the physici to natural causes, sub- 
 ordinate to and directed still by a Divine ; except some 
 corporeali.sts and mechanics, who vainly pretended to make 
 a world without a God. The hidden force that unites, 
 adjusts, and causeth all things to hang together, and move 
 in harmony — which Orpheus and Empedocles styled Love 
 — this principle of union is no blind principle, but acts with 
 intellect. This Divine Love and Intellect are not them- 
 selves obvious to our view, or otherwise discerned than in 
 their effects. Intellect enlightens. Love connects, and the 
 Sovereign Good attracts all things. 
 
 260. All things are made for the Supreme Good, all 
 things tend to that end : and we may be said to account for 
 a thing, when we shew that it is so best. In the Phaedon, 
 Socrates declares it to be his opinion that he who supposed 
 all things to have been disposed and ordered by a Mind 
 should not pretend to assign any other cause of them. He 
 blames physiologers for attempting to account for phgeno- 
 mena, particularly for gravity and cohesion, by vortexes and 
 aether ; overlooking the to dya^ov and to Seoj/, the strongest 
 bond and cement which holds together in all parts of the 
 universe, and not discerning the Cause itself from those 
 things which only attend it -. 
 
 ' In short, wicked acts, for which persons are responsible, are the only 
 effects in the universe that ?a<tnot to be referred to the Universal Tower: 
 persons are the only real, because responsible, causes. 
 
 ^ In Berkeley's philosophy, as one cannot be too often reminiled, the 
 physical inquirer lias to do only \^\^ powerless phenomena, and witli the 
 laws or rules which they are made by God to follow in their natural 
 metamorphoses. Phenomena (i.e. the data of the senses — 'ideas' of 
 sense), as well as their laws, are effects, not active causes — in which 
 Divine Reason and Will are revealed to human minds : physical
 
 300 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 262. As for the blots and defects which appear in the 
 course of this world— which some have thought to proceed 
 from a fatality or necessity in nature, and others from an evil 
 principle — that same philosopher observes, that it may be 
 the Governing Reason produceth and ordaineth all those 
 things ; and, not intending that all parts should be equally 
 good, maketh some worse than others by design ; as all 
 parts in an animal are not eyes ; and in a city, comedy, or 
 picture, all ranks, characters, and colours are not equal or 
 alike ; even so excesses, defects, and contrary qualities 
 conspire to the beauty and harmony of the world. 
 
 263. It cannot be denied that, with respect to the uni- 
 verse of things, we in this mortal state are like men educated 
 in Plato's cave, looking on shadows with our backs turned 
 to the light. But though our light be dim, and our situation 
 bad, yet if the best use be made of both, perhaps something 
 may be seen\ — Proclus, in his Commentary on the Theology 
 of Plato, observes there are two sorts of philosophers. The 
 one placed Body first in the order of beings, and made 
 the faculty of thinking depend thereupon, supposing that the 
 principles of all things are corporeal : that Body most really 
 or principally exists, and all other things in a secondary 
 sense, and by virtue of that. Others, making all corporeal 
 things to be dependent upon Soul or Mind, think this to 
 exist in the first place and primary sense, and the being of 
 
 ' causation ' is the divinely caused— constant and arbitrary, but not 
 capricious — connexion of sensible signs with other phenomena of sense, 
 which they signify according to what is commonly called ' law ' in 
 nature. 
 
 ^ The tone in this and other parts of Siris may be compared with 
 that in the first five sections of the Introduction to the Principles of 
 Human Knoivledge, in which Berkeley attributes the difficulties of 
 philosophy, not to the facts of the case, but to ' our having first raised 
 a dust, and then complaining that we cannot see ' — led to do so by 
 empty verbal abstractions. He is now more ready to recognise the 
 reality of what cannot appear in sensuous perception and imagination.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 30 1 
 
 Bodies to be altogether derived from and to presuppose that 
 of the Mind '. 
 
 264. Sense and Experience '^ acquaint us with the course 
 and analogy of appearance or natural effects. Thought, 
 Reason, Intellect introduce us into the knowledge of their 
 causes. Sensible appearances, though of a flowing, unstable, 
 and uncertain nature, yet having first occupied the mind, 
 they do by an early prevention render the aftertask of 
 thought more difficult ; and, as they amuse the eyes and 
 ears, and are more suited to vulgar uses and the mechanic 
 arts of life, they easily obtain a preference, in the opinion 
 of most men, to those superior principles, which are the 
 later growth of the human mind, arrived to maturity and 
 perfection, but, not affecting the corporeal sense, are thought 
 to be so far deficient in point of solidity and reality — sensible 
 and real, to common apprehensions, being the same thing. 
 Although it be certain that the/r/«r^/(f5 of science are neither 
 objects of Sense nor Imagination ; and that Intellect and 
 Reason are alone the sure guides to truth ^ 
 
 ' This expresses the contrast between Materialism and Immaterialism. 
 Proclus, the Neoplatonist, lived in the fifth century after Christ. 
 
 ^ 'Experience' seems to be here limited to the fluctuating phenomena 
 presented to the senses, connected by automatic mental association, as 
 distinguished from the intellectual notions by virtue of which we rise 
 into reasoned knowledge. 
 
 ^ This section is one of the best expressions of Berkeley's later philo- 
 sophy, influenced by Plato and Plotinus, with its recognition of Intellect 
 or Reason {yov'i) as supreme, and distinguished from mere Sense, as 
 well as from the Suggestions to which sense, experience, or custom gives 
 rise, while it is unconsciously involved in them. It may be contrasted 
 with the attack on abstractions, in the Introduction to the Principles, 
 and with the account of the factors of human knowledge with which he 
 starts in the Principles, §§ 1,2. Siris, animated by its higher Idealism, 
 finds reality in 'principles' — 'universal lelations '—which are appre- 
 hended in sense-perception and in sense- suggestion only in a dim sub- 
 conscious way. In the exposition of Principles in his early works, 
 Berkeley speaks as if scepticism consisted in doubting the reality of 
 sensible things. Here he speaks lightly of the phenomena of sense. 
 Can these views be reconciled, and if so, how?
 
 302 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 265. The successful curiosity of the present age, in arts, 
 and experiments, and new systems, is apt to elate men, and 
 make them overlook the Ancients. But, notwithstanding 
 that the encouragement and purse of princes, and the united 
 endeavours of great societies in these later ages, have ex- 
 tended experimental and mechanical knowledge very far, 
 yet it must be owned that the Ancients too were not 
 ignorant of many things, as well in Physics or Metaphysics, 
 which perhaps are more generally, though not first, known 
 in these modern times. 
 
 266. The Pythagoreans and F/atonis/s had a notion of 
 the true System of the World. They allowed of mechanical 
 principles, but actuated by soul or mind : they distinguished 
 the primary qualities in bodies from the secondary, making 
 the former to be physical causes, and they understood 
 physical causes in a right sense : they saw that a mind 
 infinite in power, unextended, invisible, immortal, governed, 
 connected, and contained all things : they saw there was no 
 such thing as real absolute space : that mind, soul, or spirit 
 truly and really exists : that bodies exist only in a secondary 
 and dependent sense : that the soul is the place of forms : 
 that the sensible qualities are to be regarded as acts only in 
 the cause, and as passions to us : they accurately considered 
 the differences of intellect, rational soul, and sensitive soul, 
 with their distinct acts of intellection, reasoning, and sensa- 
 tion ; points wherein the Cartesians and their followers, who 
 consider sensation as a mode of thinking, seem to have 
 failed. They knew the whole mass of corporeal beings 
 was itself actually moved and directed by a mind ; and 
 that physical causes were only instruments, or rather marks 
 and signs ^ 
 
 ' This section helps to show what Berkeley had come to consider 
 'the true system of the world.' It may also be used as a text for
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 303 
 
 270. Plotinus acknowledgeth no place but soul or mind, 
 expressly affirming that the soul is not in the world, but 
 the world in the soul. And farther, the place of the 
 soul, saith he, is not body, but soul is in mind, and body 
 in the soul. 
 
 273. It was an opinion of remote antiquity that the World 
 was an animal. If we may trust the Hermaic writings, the 
 Egyptians thought all things did partake of life. This 
 opinion was also so general and current among the Greeks 
 that Plutarch asserts all others held the world to be an 
 animal, and governed by Providence, except Leucippus, 
 Democritus, and Epicurus. And although an animal con- 
 taining all bodies within itself could not be touched or sen- 
 sibly affected from without, yet it is plain they attributed to 
 it an inward sense and feeling, as well as appetites and 
 aversions ; and that from all the various tones, actions, and 
 passions of the universe, they suppose one symphony, one 
 animal act and life to result. 
 
 274. Jamblichus declares the world to be one animal, in 
 which the parts, however distant each from other, are never- 
 theless related and connected by one common nature. And 
 he teacheth, what is also a received notion of the Pytha- 
 goreans and Platonics, that there is no chasm in nature, but 
 a Chain or Scale of beings rising by gentle uninterrupted 
 gradations from the lowest to the highest, each nature 
 being informed and perfected by the participation of a 
 higher '. As air becomes igneous, so the purest fire becomes 
 
 comparing speculatic ns about the universe among the Platonists and 
 Neoplatonists with those of the moderns, in the Cartesian and Lockian 
 era in which Berkeley was educated. 
 
 ' The thought of a Chain (afipa') in nature, connecting the phenomena 
 of the universe with one another and with God, the omnipresent provi- 
 dential Mind, in a Cosmos in which phenomena are regulaily linked 
 with phenomena, is the governing thought in Sh-is. This and the next 
 section may be compared with Milton, Par. Lost, V. 469-490.
 
 304 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 animal, and the animal soul becomes intellectual : which 
 is to be understood not of the change of one nature 
 into another, but of the connexion of different natures ; 
 each lower nature being, according to those philosophers, 
 as it were a receptacle or subject for the next above it to 
 reside and act in. 
 
 275. It is also the doctrine of Platonic philosophers, that 
 intellect is the very life of living things, the first principle 
 and exemplar of all, from whence by different degrees are 
 derived the inferior classes of life : first the rational, then 
 the sensitive, after that the vegetal ; but so as in the rational 
 animal there is still somewhat intellectual^ again, in the sen- 
 sitive there is somewhat rational, and in the vegetal some- 
 what sensitive, and lastly, in mixed bodies, as metals and 
 minerals, somewhat of vegetation. By which means the 
 whole is thought to be more perfectly connected. Which 
 doctrine implies that all the faculties, instincts, and 
 motions of inferior beings, in their several respective sub- 
 ordinations, are derived from^ and depend upon Mind and 
 Intellect. 
 
 276. Both Stoics and Platonics held the world to be alive ; 
 though sometimes it be mentioned as a sentient animal, 
 sometimes as a plant or vegetable. But in this, notwith- 
 standing what hath been surmised by some learned men, 
 there seems to be no Atheism '. For, so long as the world 
 is supposed to be quickened by elementary fire or spirit, 
 which is itself animated by soul, and directed by under- 
 
 ' Faith in the absolute supremacy of Active Reason in the universe 
 is here recognised under its various forms of verbal expression ; in par- 
 ticular in the graduated evolution of vegetable into animal life, of animal 
 into rational life, and generally in the order of nature. ' Evolution ' 
 itself is a scientific, not a philosophical or ultimate conception. It is 
 a (supposed ultimatej physical law ; and although moral ideas and 
 universal truths have gradually developed in human consciousness under 
 this law, the resulting national consciousness is unaccountable by this 
 or any other merely physical law.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 305 
 
 Standing, it follows that all parts thereof originally depend 
 upon, and may be reduced unto the same indivisible stem 
 or principle, to wit, a Supreme Mind — which is the concur- 
 rent doctrine of Pythagoreans, Platonics, and Stoics. 
 
 277. There is, according to those philosophers, a life in- 
 fused throughout all things : the irvp voepov, Trvp re-xvixov, an 
 intellectual and artificial fire— an inward principle, animal 
 spirit, or natural life, producing and forming within as art 
 doth without; regulating, moderating, and reconciling the 
 various motions, qualities, and parts of this Mundane System. 
 By virtue of this life the great masses are held together in 
 their orderly courses, as well as the minutest particles 
 governed in their natural motions, according to the several 
 laws of attraction, gravity, electricity, magnetism, and the 
 rest. It is this gives instincts \ teaches the spider her web, 
 and the bee her honey. This it is that directs the roots of 
 plants to draw forth juices from the earth, and the leaves 
 and corticle vessels to separate and attract such particles of 
 air, and elementary fire, as suit their respective natures. 
 
 278. Nature seems to be not otherwise distinguished from 
 the anitna inundi than as life is from soul, and, upon the 
 principles of the oldest philosophers, may not improperly or 
 incongruously be styled the life of the world. Some Pla- 
 tonics, indeed, regard life as the act of nature, in like manner 
 as intellection is of the mind or intellect. As the First 
 Intellect acts by understanding, so nature according to them 
 acts or generates by living. But life is the act of the soul, 
 and seems to be very nature itself, which is not the principle, 
 but the result of another and higher principle, being a life 
 resulting from soul, as cogitation from intellect -. 
 
 ' Compare § 257, and note. 
 
 ' ' soul,' i. c. animating power, as distinguislied from its physical 
 manifestations. The phenomena constitute the material woild— the 
 world being, by the supposition, an animated organism. Soul (}pvxTj) 
 was distinguished from body (aap^), on the one hand, and from reason 
 (j'oOj), on the other— mediating between them. The ancient notion of 
 
 X
 
 3o6 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 279. If nature be the life of the world, animated by one 
 soul, compacted into one frame, and directed or governed 
 in all parts by one mind : this system cannot be accused of 
 Atheism ; though perhaps it may of mistake or impropriety. 
 And yet, as one presiding mind gives unity to the infinite 
 aggregate of things, by a mutual communion of actions and 
 passions, and an adjustment of parts, causing all to concur 
 in one view to one and the same end — the ultimate and 
 supreme good of the whole, it should seem reasonable to 
 say, with Ocellus Lucanus the Pythagorean, that as life 
 holds together the bodies of animals, the cause whereof is 
 the soul ; and as a city is held together by concord, the 
 cause whereof is law, even so the world is held together by 
 harmony, the cause whereof is God. And in this sense the 
 world or universe may be considered either as one animal 
 or one city \ 
 
 284. * * Thus much the schools of Plato and Pythagoras 
 seem agreed in, to wit, that the Soul of the World, whether 
 having a distinct mind of its own, or directed by a superior 
 mind, doth embrace all its parts, connect them by an in- 
 visible and indissoluble Chain, and preserve them ever well 
 adjusted and in good order. 
 
 285. Naturalists, whose proper province it is to consider 
 phaenomena, experiments, mechanical organs and motions, 
 principally regard the visible frame of things or corporeal 
 world — supposing soul to be contained in body. And this 
 hypothesis may be tolerated in physics, as it is not necessary 
 in the arts of dialling or navigation to mention the true 
 
 the animation of the universe may be found, in one form or another, 
 among physical philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
 It is olten difficult to distinguish from Hylozoism, or the hypothesis 
 that the universe is Eternal Matter of which conscious life is a mani- 
 festation, under certain conditions of its physical organization. 
 
 ' The De Legibus of Ocellus Lucanus is here referred to — now, along 
 with other fragments, rejected as spurious.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 307 
 
 system or earth's motion. But those who, not content with 
 sensible appearances, would penetrate into the real and 
 true causes (the object of Theology, Metaphysics, or the 
 Philosophia Prima '), will rectify this error, and speak of 
 the world as contained by the soul, and not the soul by the 
 world. 
 
 287. If we suppose that one and the same Mind is the 
 Universal Principle of order and harmony throughout the 
 world, containing and connecting all its parts, and giving 
 unity to the system, there seems to be nothing atheistical 
 or impious in this supposition. 
 
 288. Number is no object of sense : it is an act of the 
 mind. The Same thing in a different conception is one 
 or many. Comprehending God and the creatures in one 
 general notion, we may say that all things together make 
 one Universe, or to ttSv. But if we should say that all 
 things make one God, this would, indeed, be an erroneous 
 notion of God, but would not amount to Atheism, so long 
 as mind or intellect was admitted to be the to rjyejjLoviKov, the 
 governing part'^. It is, nevertheless, more respectful, and 
 consequently the truer notion of God, to suppose Him 
 neither made up of parts, nor to be himself a part of any 
 whole whatsoever. 
 
 289. All those who conceived the universe to be an 
 
 ' With Aristotle these are one. See Metaph. lib. W. c. i, and lib. 
 XI. c. 7. This section again contrasts ' sensible appearances,' i.e. the data 
 of sense and suggestion , in their sequences and coexistences, — with true 
 causes, apprehended only by intellect. (Cf. Vindication, §§ 9-13, 
 and 42.) 
 
 ^ This is a Theism difficult to reconcile with moral agency in men, 
 and therefore with a finally spiritual or ethical conception of the universe 
 — unless we distinguish moral agents from ' things.' But his disposition, 
 especially in Siris, is to acknowledge that, in defect of perfect knowledge 
 of God, men may nevertheless struggle to become like the God revealed 
 in the sense-symbolism of nature, in conscience, and in history, and be 
 victorious in the struggle. 
 
 X 2
 
 3o8 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 animal must, in consequence of that notion, suppose all 
 things to be one. But to conceive God to be the sentient 
 soul of an animal is altogether unworthy and absurd. There 
 is no sense nor sensory, nor any thing like a sense or 
 sensory, in God. Sense implies an impression from some 
 other being, and denotes a dependence in the soul which 
 hath it. Sense is a passion : and passions imply imper- 
 fection. God knoweth all things, as pure mind or intellect ; 
 but nothing by sense, nor in nor through a sensory. There- 
 fore to suppose a sensory of any kind — whether space or 
 any other — in God, would be very wrong, and lead us into 
 false conceptions of His nature '. 
 
 290. Body is opposite to spirit or mind. We have a 
 notion of spirit from thought and action. We have a notion 
 of body from resistance. So far forth as there is real 
 power, there is spirit. So far forth as there is resistance, 
 there is inability or want of power : that is, there is a nega- 
 tion of spirit. We are embodied, that is, we are clogged 
 by weight, and hindered by resistance. But in respect of 
 a perfect spirit, there is nothing hard or impenetrable : 
 there is no resistance to the Deity : nor hath he any body : 
 nor is the supreme Being united to the world as the soul 
 of an animal is to its body ; which necessarily implieth 
 defect, both as an instrument, and as a constant weight 
 and impediment ^. 
 
 ' Berkeley here rejects the supposition that things exist as phenomena 
 of sense in the Divine Mind. He says that they exist in God intel- 
 lectually, whatever that implies. And the sublime mystery of infinite 
 uncreated space again repels him. — Note what is said in this section 
 of dependence on Power external to ourselves being implied in the 
 passivity of sense. Thus sense, by contrast with our own self-activity, 
 awakens in us the conviction of personal individuality, rounded off 
 by a Power other than our own. 
 
 ^ He assigns solidity (not extension) as the essential mark of body. 
 So too in his early i)hilosophicaI works. How are tactual jihenomena 
 tests of sensible reality more than visible phenomena? Are they in an\ 
 respect our fundamental experience in sense, into which that of the other 
 senses has to be translated ?
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 309 
 
 291. Nor is this doctrine less philosophical than pious. 
 We see all nature alive or in motion. We see water turned 
 into air, and air rarefied and made elastic by the attraction 
 of another medium, more pure indeed, more subtle, and 
 more volatile, than air. But still, as this is a moveable, 
 extended, and consequently a corporeal being, it cannot be 
 itself the principle of motion, but leads us naturally and 
 necessarily to an incorporeal Spirit or Agent. We are con- 
 scious that a Spirit can begin, alter, or determine motion ; 
 but nothing of this appears in body. Nay, the contrary is 
 evident, both to experiment and reflexion '. 
 
 292. Natural phtenomena are only natural appearances. 
 They arc, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. 
 Their real and objective^ natures are, therefore, the same; 
 passive without anything active, fluent and changing without 
 anything permanent in them. However, as these make the 
 first impressions, and the mind takes her first flight and 
 spring, as it were, by resting her foot on these objects, 
 they are not only first considered by all men, but most con- 
 sidered by most men. They and the phantoms that result 
 from those appearances, the children of imagination grafted 
 upon sense — such for example as pure space — are thought 
 by many the very first in existence and stability, and to 
 embrace and comprehend all other beings. 
 
 293. Now, although such phantoms as corporeal forces, 
 absolute motions, and real spaces do pass in physics for 
 
 ' Here he finds what the word power means in his consciousness 
 of self-activity, but without sufficient reference to this activity as 
 morally responsible, and there/ore self-originated. And he grounds his 
 allegation of the total powcrlessness of matter on our not having evidence 
 of originating causality in sensible things, which we have in the case of 
 morally responsible /^rjowj. 
 
 * ' objective ' — here equivalent to presented in sense. Contrast its 
 other applications, {a) to what is extended, and so supposed to be a 
 manifestation of something other than mind, and {l>) to relations that 
 are universal and necessary, because involved in the essential con- 
 stitution of reason.
 
 3IO SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 causes and principles, yet are they in truth but hypotheses ; 
 nor can they be the objects of real science. They pass 
 nevertheless in physics, conversant about things of sense, 
 and confined to experiments and mechanics. But when 
 we enter the province of \he philosophia prima, we discover 
 another order of beings — mind and its acts — permanent 
 being — not dependent on corporeal things, nor resulting, 
 nor connected, nor contained ; but containing, connecting, 
 enlivening the whole frame ; and imparting those motions, 
 forms, qualities, and that order and symmetry, to all those 
 transient phasnomena which we term the Course of Nature. 
 
 294. It is with our faculties as with our affections : what 
 first seizes holds fast. It is a vulgar theme, that man is 
 a compound of contrarieties, which breed a restless struggle 
 in his nature, between flesh and spirit, the beast and the 
 angel, earth and heaven, ever weighed down and ever 
 bearing up. During which conflict the character fluctuates : 
 when either side prevails, it is then fixed for vice or virtue. 
 And life from different principles takes a different issue. — 
 It is the same in regard to our faculties. Sense at first 
 besets and overbears the mind. The sensible appearances 
 are all in all : our reasonings are employed about them : our 
 desires terminate in them : we look no farther for realities 
 or causes ; till intellect begins to dawn, and cast a ray on 
 this shadowy scene. We then perceive the true principle 
 of unity, identity, and existence. Those things that before 
 seemed to constitute the whole of Being, upon taking an 
 intellectual view of things, prove to be but fleeting 
 phantoms '. 
 
 295. From the outward form of gross masses which 
 occupy the vulgar, a curious inquirer proceeds to examine 
 the inward structure and minute parts, and, from observing 
 
 * This section suggests that gradual development of intellect and 
 spirit in man which it is the office of psychology to describe, along 
 with the conditions on which it depends. Cf. §§ 255 and 264.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 311 
 
 the motions in nature, to discover the laws of those motions. 
 By the way, he frames his hypothesis and suits his language 
 to this natural philosophy. And these fit the occasion and 
 answer the end of a maker of experiments or mechanic, 
 who means only to apply the powers of nature, and reduce 
 the pha^nomena to rules. But if, proceeding still in his 
 analysis and inquiry, he ascends from the sensible into the 
 intellectual world, and beholds things in a new light and 
 a new order, he will then change his system, and perceive 
 that what he took for substances and causes are but fleeting 
 shadows : that the mind contains all, and acts all, and is to 
 all created beings the source of unity and identity, harmony 
 and order, existence and stability \ 
 
 296. It is neither acid, nor salt, nor sulphur, nor air, nor 
 aether, nor visible corporeal fire — much less the phantom 
 fate or necessity — that is the real agent, but, by a certain 
 analysis, a regular connexion and climax, we ascend through 
 all those mediums to a glimpse of the First Mover, invisible, 
 incorporeal, unextended, intellectual source of life and being. 
 There is, it must be owned, a mixture of obscurity and 
 prejudice in human speech and reasonings. This is un- 
 avoidable, since the veils of prejudice and error are slowly 
 and singly taken off one by one. But, if there are many 
 links in the Chain which connects the two extremes of what 
 
 ^ In this and the foregoing section conscious intellect, as an element 
 in the formation of ten owl edge, is recognised, in contrast to the physical 
 phenomena of sense and their automatic suggestions. We do not find 
 this in Berkeley's earlier writings. In his Commonplace Book especially, 
 juvenile ' mind ' is little more than sense ; and necessities of reason are 
 not distinctly acknowledged in the construction of our knowledge. ' Pure 
 intellect I understand not.' ' We must with the mob place certainty in 
 the senses.' ' If it were not for the senses mind could have no knowledge, 
 no thought, at all.' ' Mind is a congeries of perceptions. Take away 
 perceptions and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you 
 put the mind.' ' Sensual pleasure is the sumnnim bonur?i. This the 
 great principle of morality.' This sensuous utilitarianism rises in Siris 
 into a more spiritual ethic.
 
 312 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 is grossly sensible and picrely intelligible, and it seems a 
 tedious work, by the slow helps of memory, imagination, 
 and reason ' — oppressed and overwhelmed, as we are, by 
 the senses, through erroneous principles, and long ambages 
 of words and notions — to struggle upwards into the light of 
 truth, yet, as this gradually dawns, farther discoveries still 
 correct the style and clear up the notions. 
 
 297. The Mind, her acts and faculties, furnish a new and 
 distinct class of objects, from the contemplation whereof 
 arise certain other notions, principles, and verities, so remote 
 from, and even so repugnant to, the first prejudices which 
 surprise the sense of mankind that they may well be 
 excluded from vulgar speech and books, as abstract from 
 sensible matters ", and more fit for the speculation of truth, 
 the labour and aim of a few, than for the practice of 
 the world, or the subjects of experimental or mechanical 
 inquiry. 
 
 300. Plato and Aristotle considered God as abstracted 
 or distinct from the natural world ''. But the Egyptians 
 considered God and Nature as making one whole, or all 
 things together as making one Universe. In doing which 
 they did not exclude the Intelligent Mind, but considered it 
 as containing all things. Therefore, whatever was wrong 
 in their way of thinking, it doth not, nevertheless, imply or 
 lead to Atheism *. 
 
 ' ' reason ' — here used for reasoning, as by Locke and others. 
 
 ''■ The ' abstract ' is here contrasted with the ' sensible ' — in a tone 
 foreign to his earlier thought. 
 
 ° This is confirmed by passages in Plato. As regards Aristotle the 
 case is not so clear. He distinguishes Deity from Nature, and recognises 
 final causes — but not God in analogy to a person : the world with him 
 is eternal — an endless succession of changes, developed according to the 
 essences of their species, and in relation to their ends. 
 
 * As in his early works, Berkeley expressly raised the question about 
 what should be meant when we use the word Al alter, so in Siris (as 
 previously in the Dialogue on Vistial Language), he raises the deeper
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 313 
 
 301. The human mind is so much clogged and home 
 downward by the strong and early impressions of sense, 
 that it is wonderful how the ancients should have made 
 even such a progress, and seen so far into intellectual 
 matters, without some glimmering of a divine tradition. 
 Whoever considers a parcel of rude savages left to them- 
 selves, how they are sunk and swallowed up in sense and 
 prejudice, and how unqualified by their natural force to 
 emerge from this state, will be apt to think that the first 
 spark of philosophy was derived from heaven. 
 
 302. Theology and philosophy gently unbind the liga- 
 ments that chain the soul down to the earth, and assist 
 her flight towards the sovereign Good. There is an instinct 
 or tendency of the mind upwards, which sheweth a natural 
 endeavour to recover and raise ourselves from our present 
 sensual and low condition, into a state of light, order, and 
 purity ^ 
 
 303. The Perceptions of Sense are gross : but even in 
 the senses there is a difference. Though harmony and 
 proportion are not objects of sense, yet the eye and the ear 
 are organs which offer to the mind such materials by means 
 whereof she may apprehend both the one and the other. 
 By experiments of sense we become acquainted with the 
 lower faculties of the soul ; and from them, whether by 
 a gradual evolution or ascent, we arrive at the highest.— 
 Sense supplies images to memory. These become subjects 
 
 question of what should be meant when we use the word God, and 
 what Atheism essentially consists in. He says less here than in the 
 Dialogue about verifying faith in God by sense and its suggestions, 
 and more about finding God in the constitution of reason, if not in the 
 supremacy of conscience or moral reason. 
 
 ' Evil, as Plato represents, is due to apostasy from the original Good. 
 To the Good philosophy and religion struggle to return ; the former 
 through intellect, and the latter in the spiritual experience through 
 which we become like, and thus learn to know, ' the Good ' which is 
 God.
 
 314 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 for Fancy to work upon. — Reason considers and judges of 
 the imaginations. And these acts of reason become new 
 objects to the Understanding. — In this scale, each lower 
 faculty is a step that leads to one above it. And the upper- 
 most naturally leads to the Deity ; which is rather the object 
 of intellectual knowledge than even of the discursive faculty, 
 not to mention the sensitive \ — There runs a Chain through- 
 out the whole system of beings. In this Chain one link 
 drags another. The meanest things are connected with 
 the highest. The calamity therefore is neither strange nor 
 much to be complained of, if a low sensual reader shall, 
 from mere love of the animal life, find himself drawn on, 
 surprised and betrayed, into some curiosity concerning the 
 intellectual. 
 
 304. There is, according to Plato, properly no knowledge, 
 but only opinion concerning things sensible and perishing ; 
 not because they are naturally abstruse and involved in dark- 
 ness, but because their nature and existence are uncertain, 
 ever fleeting and changing. Or rather, because they do not 
 in strict truth exist at all, being always generating or in fieri, 
 that is, in a perpetual flux, without any thing stable or 
 permanent in them to constitute an object of real science. 
 The Pythagoreans and Platonics distinguish between to 
 yiyvo/A€i/oj/ and to oj/, that which ever generated and that 
 which exists. Sensible things and corporeal forms are per- 
 petually producing and perishing, appearing and disappearing, 
 
 ' This important passage contains hints of the interdependent grada- 
 tion of faculties that is involved in the development of Intellect in man. 
 In proportion as Intellect becomes more conscious in the individual, the 
 universe becomes more intelligible and real. The ascent is from (a) 
 sense-perception to {b) sensuous imagination, determined by automatic 
 laws of suggestion. These are the lower ' faculties,' which provide 
 material for (c) scientific inferences, all culminating in {d) ' intellectual 
 knowledge ' of God sustained in faith. Philosophy gradually ascends 
 towards God, and culminates in theology.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 315 
 
 never resting in one state, but always in motion and change ; 
 and therefore, in effect, not one being but a succession of 
 beings : while to ov is understood to be somewhat of an 
 abstract or spiritual nature, and the proper object of 
 intellectual knowledge. Therefore, as there can be no 
 knowledge of things flowing and unstable, the opinion 
 of Protagoras and Theaetetus, that sense was science, is 
 absurd'. 
 
 305. As understanding perceiveth not, that is, doth not 
 hear, or see, or feel, so sense knoweth not : and although 
 the mind may use both sense and fancy, as means whereby 
 to arrive at knowledge, yet sense or soul, so far forth as 
 sensitive, knoweth nothing. For, as it is rightly observed in 
 the Thecztetus of Plato, science consists not in the passive 
 perceptions, but in the reasoning upon them — rw Trept eKeiVwi' 
 
 * The reference is to the honio tnensura of Protagoras — argued against 
 in the lliecctetus by Plato — with whom God, not each individual man, 
 least of all man as a merely sensuous animal, is the criterion of truth. 
 But man in his spiritual integrity — the ideal man — is surely, for man, 
 the only possible final criterion. Tiiis is the hotno mensura in its 
 highest significance, or the Diviiia ?netisura humanised. 
 
 If there can be no ' knowledge ' of what is ' flowing and unstable,' 
 how do transitory sensations ever become knowledge in perception ? 
 Also, how can merely customary sequences of phenomena be known to 
 be absolutely invariable ? These questions hardly rise in Berkeley. 
 
 Here, as in his earlier writings, what he teaches is in harmony with 
 the arbiti-ariness, in constant creation, of natural law. Throughout he 
 resists the hypothesis that laws of nature can be so necessary that they 
 are independent of the Reason and Will that is Supreme, or that there 
 is this necessity even in the geometrical relations of things. To those 
 who argue that, in interpreting nature, we titust suppose that the natural 
 laws are absolutely necessary, and that the opposite conception is irre- 
 concilable with our having experience — he would answer that, in this 
 meaning of ' knowledge,' we have 710 knowledge of things sensible. 
 
 ^ Does this imply that isolated phenomena of sense are unintelligible, 
 so that we cannot be even conscious of them — unless by ' consciousness ' 
 is meant only blind sensuous feeling ?
 
 3l6 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 307. Aristotle maketh a threefold distinction of objects, 
 according to the three speculative sciences. Physics he 
 supposeth to be conversant about such things as have a 
 principle of motion in themselves ; Mathematics about 
 things permanent but not abstracted ; and Theology about 
 Being abstracted and immoveable. Which distinction may 
 be seen in the ninth book of his Metaphysics, where by ab- 
 stracted, xMpKJTov, he understands separable from corporeal 
 beings and sensible qualities. 
 
 308. That philosopher held that the mind of man was a 
 tabula rasa, and that there were no innate ideas. Plato, on 
 the contrary, held original ideas in the mind ; that is, notions 
 which never were or can be in the sense, such as being, 
 beauty, goodness, likeness, parity. Some, perhaps, may 
 think the truth to be this : — -that there are properly no ideas, 
 or passive objects, in the mind but what were derived from 
 sense : but that there are also besides these her own acts 
 or operations ; such as notions '. 
 
 309. It is a maxim of the Platonic philosophy, that the 
 soul of man was originally furnished with native inbred 
 notions, and stands in need of sensible occasions, not abso- 
 lutely for producing them, but only for awakening, rousing, 
 or exciting into act what was already pre-existent, dormant, 
 and latent in the soul ; as things are said to be laid up in 
 the memory, though not actually perceived until they happen 
 to be called forth and brought into view by other objects. 
 
 ^ In this important sentence we again touch the contrast yet correla- 
 tion of Sense and Intellect. I'erkeley's ' ideas (phenomena) or passive 
 objects ' represent the former ; his ' notions ' the latter. What he says 
 here is in curious contrast to what he says in the Commonplace Book of 
 his early youth, where he expressly accepts the sensationalist answer — 
 ' Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in se7isti '; adding that if the 
 Schoolmen had stuck to this, ' it had never taught them the doctrine of 
 abstract ideas.' Here, in Siris, the work of his old age, he virtually 
 accepts the famous addition of Leibniz — ' Nihil est in intellectu quod 
 non prius fuit in sensu, nisi intcUcctus ipse ' ; in which the activity of 
 intellect is recognised as necessary to the constitution of real knowledge.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 317 
 
 This notion seemeth somewhat different from that of innate 
 ideas, as understood by those moderns who have attempted 
 to explode them '. To understa?id and to be are, according 
 to Parmenides, the same thing. And Plato in his seventh 
 Letter makes no difference between vovs and iTriarTr'nxri, mind 
 and knowledge. Whence it follows that mind, knowledge, 
 and notions, either in habit or in act, always go together. 
 
 310. And albeit Aristotle considered the soul in its 
 original state as a blank paper, yet he held it to be the 
 proper place of forms- — -r^v \^vyriv cTvat rdirov etStov ; which 
 doctrine, first maintained by others, he admits, under this 
 restriction, that it is not to be understood of the whole soul, 
 but only of the rorjTiKr] ; as is to be seen in his third book 
 De Am ma ". 
 
 311. As to an absolute actual existetice'^ of Sensible or 
 Corporeal Things (sect. 264, 292, 294), it doth not seem to 
 have been admitted either by Plato or Aristotle. In the 
 ThecBtetus we are told that if any one saith a thing is, or is 
 
 ' He probably refers to Locke, who fails in his Essay to recognise the 
 distinction between conscious and latent or sub-conscious intellectual 
 activity, in liis argument against innate ideas and knowledge. 
 
 ^ In the passage referred to, Aristotle identifies the alaO-qriKov with 
 the aiaOrjTuv, and the tniaTrn^oviKuv with the eiriaTTjTdv, through their 
 forms {ii5r]) — the potential intellect being with him, as with Plato, the 
 place of forms — tottos itSajv. The illustration of blank paper is also used 
 by Locke. ' Let us suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void 
 of all character, without any ideas— how comes it to be furnished?' 
 {Essay, b. IL ch. i. ^ 2.) Locke, in answering this question, does not 
 recognise the distinction of latent and actual knowledge. 
 
 ' In §§ 311-319, Berkeley, in contemplating the transitoriness of all 
 that appears in the senses, and the implied ' notion ' of the ego on 
 which they depend, returns (but in a more meditative and less argu- 
 mentative sj^irit) to the favourite speculation of his youtli — the mean- 
 ing of real, when the term is applied to sensible thint^'s, and the 
 distinction between visible and tangible space. He summons Plato 
 and Aristotle as witnesses, that the real existence of matter and space 
 is dependent upon a living percipient; so that what is supposed to be 
 unperceived must be mere negation. (' Sensible things ' are not to 
 be confounded with the dnfipov of Plato, or the vKrj of Aristotle.)
 
 3l8 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 made, he must withal say, for what, or of what, or in respect 
 of what, it is, or is made ; for, that any thing should exist in 
 itself or absolutely is absurd. Agreeably to which doctrine 
 it is also farther affirmed by Plato, that it is impossible 
 a thing should be sweet and sweet to nobody \ It must, 
 nevertheless, be owned with regard to Aristotle, that even 
 in his Metaphysics there are some expressions which seem 
 to favour the absolute existence of corporeal things. For 
 instance, in the eleventh book, speaking of corporeal sen- 
 sible things, what wonder, saith he, if they never appear to 
 us the same, no more than to sick men, since we are always 
 changing and never remain the same ourselves ? And 
 again, he saith, sensible things, although they receive no 
 change in themselves, do nevertheless in sick persons pro- 
 duce different sensations and not the same. These passages 
 would seem to imply a distinct and absolute existence of 
 the objects of sense I 
 
 312. But it must be observed, that Aristotle distinguisheth 
 a twofold existence — potential and actual. It will not there- 
 fore follow that, according to Aristotle, because a thing is, it 
 must actually exist ^ This is evident from the eighth book 
 of his Metaphysics, where he animadverts on the Megaric 
 philosophers, as not admitting a possible existence distinct 
 from the actual : from whence, saith he, it must follow, that 
 there is nothing cold, or hot, or sweet, or any sensible thing 
 
 ' So Berkeley on all the qualities of matter. 
 
 * See b. X. (XI.) ch. 6, where Aristotle argues against Protagoras and 
 the sceptics, in behalf of permanence in sensible things. He does not 
 thereby contradict the doctrine of the De Anima, as to the creative 
 activity of mind, and the share contributed by perception to real 
 things. Only he seems to imply that things are, potentially at least, 
 more than intellectual cognitions — more, a fortiori, than sensations of 
 a sentient being. 
 
 ^ Although the real being of the things of sense, even in their lowest 
 degree of reality, depends on a living perception of their qualities, may 
 they not have a potential existence that is independent of all per- 
 cipients ? 
 
 1
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 319 
 
 at all, where there is no perception. He adds that, in 
 consequence of that Megaric doctrine, we can have no 
 sense but while we actually exert it : we are blind when 
 we do not see, and therefore both blind and deaf several 
 times a day '. 
 
 313. The ivTeXix^LUL TTpMTai of the Peripatetics, that is, the 
 sciences, arts, and habits, were by them distinguished from 
 the acts or evTcAe'xetat Sevrepat, and supposed to exist in the 
 mind, though not exerted or put into act ^. This seems to 
 illustrate the manner in which Socrates, Plato, and their 
 followers, conceive innate notions to be in the soul of man 
 (sect. 309). It was the Platonic doctrine^ that human souls 
 or minds descended from above, and were sowed in genera- 
 tion ; that they were stunned, stupefied, and intoxicated by 
 this descent and immersion into animal nature ; and that 
 the soul, in this ompwfi? or slumber, forgets her original 
 notions, which are smothered and oppressed by many false 
 tenets and prejudices of sense. Insomuch that Proclus 
 compares the soul in her descent, invested with growing 
 prejudices, to Glaucus diving to the bottom of the sea, and 
 
 ' The distinction of potential and actual is amongst the most fruitful 
 in Aristotle, and one might reconsider Berkeley's theory of the reality 
 of the material world in the light of it. In this passage, potential 
 {iv hwaniC) is contrasted with actualised existence {Iv (vepyeia, or tv 
 (VT(\fx(ia) ; and the Megaric theory, limiting * being ' to the latter, is 
 identified with the sceptical individualism of Protagoras. Berkeley, on 
 the other hand, might mean that, as far as individual percipients and 
 agents are concerned, the things of sense might always exist in iv Swa/iei • 
 inasmuch as, when unperceived by them, they exist potentially in the 
 Divine Reason and Will. — What is to be understood by a 'potential' 
 existence in God ? Is a thing in the Divine Idea at all analogous to the 
 thing as known by us in sense ? Is the material world unbeginning and 
 endless, or is it something created in time by God ? Berkeley hardly 
 recognises these questions, but he rejects the supposition that the material 
 world has a sentient existence in God, i. e. that it exists in the form of 
 divine sensations. 
 
 ^ The acquisition of a habit implies previous potentiality in those 
 who acquire the habit, as indeed exercise of the habit afterwards does. 
 Hence the first and second energies of the Peripatetics.
 
 320 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 there contracting divers coats of seaweed, coral, and shells, 
 which stick close to him, and conceal his true shape ^ 
 
 314. Hence, according to this philosophy, the mind of 
 man is so restless to shake off that slumber, to disengage 
 and emancipate herself from those prejudices and false 
 opinions that so straitly beset and cling to her, to rub off 
 those covers that disguise her original form, and to regain 
 her primeval state and first notions : hence that perpetual 
 struggle to recover the lost region of light, that ardent thirst 
 and endeavour after truth and intellectual ideas, which she 
 would neither seek to attain, nor rejoice in, nor know when 
 attained, except she had some prenotion or anticipation of 
 them, and they had lain innate and dormant, like habits 
 and sciences in the mind, or things laid up, which are called 
 out and roused by recollection or reminiscence. So that 
 learning seemeth in effect reminiscence ^. 
 
 315. The Peripatetics themselves distinguish between 
 reminiscence and mere memory. Themistius observes that 
 the best memories commonly go with the worst parts ; but 
 that reminiscence is most perfect in the most ingenious 
 minds. And, notwithstanding the tabula rasa of Aristotle, 
 yet some of his followers have undertaken to make him 
 speak Plato's sense ^ 
 
 ' Commentaria of the Neoplatonist Proclus (a. D. 412-485). 
 
 ^ There is blind or automatic suggestion, founded on coexistence in a 
 person's past experience. It is distinguished from active' reminiscence' 
 i. e. development in consciousness of what was previously unconsciously 
 latent in the person — born with him, and as some would say transferred 
 at birth from a preceding life. 
 
 ' Themistius, the first-named of those Peripatetics, lived in the fourth 
 century. To Simplicius, a Neoplatonist of the sixth century, we owe 
 valuable expositions of Aristotle, especially of the De Anima. He 
 attempted to reconcile Aristotle with Plato. ' Plutarch the Peripatetic' 
 seems to be Plutarch son of Nestorius, the Neoplatonist, who is said 
 to have written a commentary, now lost, on the De Anitiia. With 
 Aristotle, reminiscence (dfa^cT^ffiy) implies perhaps intending will, but
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 321 
 
 317. Neither Plato nor Aristotle by Matter, vXi^, under- 
 stood corporeal substance, whatever the moderns may under- 
 stand by that word. To them certainly it signified no 
 positive actual being. Aristotle describes it as made up of 
 negatives, having neither quantity, nor quality, nor essence \ 
 And not only the Platonists and Pythagoreans, but also the 
 Peripatetics themselves declare it to be known, neither by 
 sense, nor by any direct and just reasoning, but only by 
 some spurious or adulterine method, as hath been observed 
 before. That Matter is actually nothing, but potentially all 
 things, is the doctrine of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and all the 
 ancient Peripatetics. 
 
 318. According to those philosophers, Matter is only 
 a pura potentia, a mere possibility. Plato observes that we 
 dream, as it were, when we think of place, and believe it 
 necessary that whatever exists should exist in some place. 
 Which place or space, he also observes, is /xer' avaia-Orjcria'; 
 d-nTov, that is, to be felt as darkness is seen, or silence 
 heard, being a mere privation ^. 
 
 hardly all that Plato meant by pre-existing or latent ideals, evolved with 
 growing clearness through reflective activity. 
 
 ' The aveipov, or irepov of Plato — according to Hegel, a necessitated 
 ' otherness.' The material word, as realised in lixang perception, mnst 
 not be confounded with the formless Matter of Aristotle. This is that 
 dark, undefinable, pre-condition of the actuality of things, for which 
 Berkeley substitutes God and constant creation, or divinely sustained 
 regularity of nature. 
 
 - Space, in total abstraction from sense, is neither ' notion,' nor 
 'idea,' nor 'phenomenon ' (according to Berkeley's use of these terms). 
 We cannot when we try imagine space emptied of all sensuous data. 
 But on the other hand, data of sense cannot be conceived as onttvard 
 apart from space, which is necessarily blended with the phenomena 
 that we perceive, giving them outwardness, and suggesting that bound- 
 lessness or spacial infinity which is one of the ultimate mysteries of 
 reality. 
 
 Berkeley sees in the successive phenomena of sense and in intellectual 
 notions the two elements of concrete reality. In his early philosophy 
 he concerned himself chiefly with the former ; in Siris rather with the
 
 322 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 319. If any one should think to infer the reaUty or actual 
 being of Matter from the modern tenet— that gravity is 
 always proportionable to the quantity of matter, let him but 
 narrowly scan the modern demonstration of that tenet, and 
 he will find it to be a vain circle, concluding in truth no 
 more than this — that gravity is proportionable to weight, 
 that is, to itself. Since Matter is conceived only as defect 
 and mere possibility ; and since God is absolute perfection 
 and act ; it follows there is the greatest distance and oppo- 
 sition imaginable between God and Matter. Insomuch that 
 a material God would be altogether inconsistent. 
 
 320. The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the 
 goodness that perfects all things in the Supreme Being. Evil, 
 defect, negation, is not the object of God's creative power. 
 
 326. Now, whether the vovs be abstracted from the sen- 
 sible world, and considered by itself, as distinct from, and 
 presiding over, the created system ; or whether the whole 
 Universe, including mind together with the mundane body, 
 is conceived to be God, and the creatures to be partial 
 manifestations of the Divine essence — there is no Atheism in 
 either case, whatever misconceptions there may be ; so long 
 as Mind or Intellect is understood to preside over, govern, 
 and conduct, the whole frame of things \ 
 
 latter. Absolute space, abstracted from sense, being neither a pheno- 
 menon nor a notion, must, he concluded, be an illusion. He did not 
 contemplate space as relations necessary a priori to the constitution of 
 our experience of the world of sense. 
 
 Sect. 320-329, in accumulating authorities favourable to the depend- 
 ence of all phenomena ultimately on Mind, approach the question of 
 what the term God, or Divine Mind, means. 
 
 ' He seems satisfied to think of God either as transcending the 
 dependent universe of things and persons, or as omnipresent in nature and 
 spirit — provided only that there is a practical acknowledgment of physical 
 and moral order at the heart of the universe, the physical subordinate to 
 the moral, and each man's personal relation to all this. The 'must' of 
 speculative reason, and the ' ought ' of moral reason, cannot be reduced 
 to the ' is ' or ' is not' of sense.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 323 
 
 328. Might we not conceive that God may be said to be 
 All in divers senses ; — as he is the cause and origin of all 
 beings ; as the vovs is the voiyra, a doctrine both of Platonics 
 and Peripatetics ; as the voi? is the place of all forms ; and 
 as it is the same which comprehends and orders and sustains 
 the whole mundane system ? Aristotle declares that the 
 Divine force or influence permeates the entire universe, and 
 that what the pilot is in a ship, the driver in a chariot, 
 the precentor in a choir, the law in a city, the general in 
 an army, the same God is in the world. This he amply 
 sets forth in his book De Mundo ; a treatise which, having 
 been anciently ascribed to him, ought not to be set aside 
 from the difference of style; which (as Patricius rightly 
 observes), being in a letter to a king, might well be sup- 
 posed to differ from the other dry and crabbed parts of 
 his writings ^ 
 
 329. And although there are some expressions to be met 
 with in the philosophers, even of the Platonic and Aristotelic 
 sects, which speak of God as mixing with, or pervading all 
 nature and all the elements ; yet this must be explained by 
 force and not by extettsion, which was never attributed to 
 the mind, either by Aristotle or Plato. 
 
 330. These disquisitions will probably seem dry and 
 useless to such readers as are accustomed to consider only 
 sensible objects. The employment of the mind on things 
 purely intellectual is to most men irksome; whereas the 
 sensitive powers, by constant use, acquire strength. Hence, 
 the objects of sense more forcibly affect us, and are too 
 often counted the chief good. For these things men fight, 
 
 ' The De A/undo is not now accepted as Aristotle's. That God is 
 Order vivified or personified — not capricious interference with order — 
 is the profound lesson at once of modern science and of true religion. 
 As so conceived, theistic faith is the indispensable postulate in all real 
 experience. 
 
 Y 2
 
 324 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 cheat, and scramble. Therefore, in order to tame mankind, 
 and introduce a sense of virtue, the best human means is 
 to exercise their understanding, to give them a glimpse of 
 another world, superior to the sensible, and, while they take 
 pains to cherish and maintain the animal life, to teach them 
 not to neglect the intellectual \ 
 
 331. Prevailing studies are of no small consequence to 
 a state, the religion, manners, and civil government of 
 a country ever taking some bias from its philosophy, which 
 affects not only the minds of its professors and students, 
 but also the opinions of all the better sort, and the practice 
 of the whole people, remotely and consequentially indeed, 
 though not inconsiderably. Have not the polemic and 
 scholastic philosophy been observed to produce controversies 
 in law and religion ? And have not Fatalism and Sadducism 
 gained ground, during the general passion for the corpuscu- 
 larian and mechanical philosophy, which hath prevailed for 
 about a century? This, indeed, might usefully enough have 
 employed some share of the leisure and curiosity of inquisi- 
 tive persons. But when it entered the seminaries of learning 
 as a necessary accomplishment, and most important part of 
 education, by engrossing men's thoughts, and fixing their 
 minds so much on corporeal objects, and the laws of motion, 
 it hath, however undesignedly, indirectly, and by accident, 
 yet not a little indisposed them for spiritual, moral, and in- 
 tellectual matters. Certainly had the philosophy of Socrates 
 and Pythagoras prevailed in this age, among those who think 
 themselves too wise to receive the dictates of the Gospel, we 
 should not have seen interest take so general and fast hold 
 on the minds of men, nor public spirit reputed to be ycwaiav 
 cvyOecav, a generous folly, among those who are reckoned to 
 
 * The eloquent protest on behalf of Plato and against Materialism, in 
 this and the following sections, is the prelude in Sin's to some abstruse 
 speculation as to the Personality and Trinity of God, and the dependence 
 of the Personality on the Trinity which is omitted here.
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 325 
 
 be the most knowing as well as the most getting part of 
 mankind '. 
 
 332. It might very well be thought serious trifling to tell 
 my readers that the greatest men had ever a high esteem for 
 Plato ; whose writings are the touchstone of a hasty and 
 shallow mind ; whose philosophy has been the admiration of 
 ages ; which supplied patriots, magistrates, and lawgivers to 
 the most flourishing states, as well as fathers to the Church, 
 and doctors to the schools. Albeit in these days the depths 
 of that old learning are rarely fathomed ; and yet it were 
 happy for these lands if our young nobility and gentry, in- 
 stead of modern maxims, would imbibe the notions of the 
 great men of antiquity. But, in these freethinking times, 
 many an empty head is shook at Aristotle and Plato, as well 
 as at the Holy Scriptures. And the writings of those cele- 
 brated ancients are by most men treated on a foot with the 
 dry and barbarous lucubrations of the schoolmen. It may 
 be modestly presumed there are not many among us, even 
 of those who are called the better sort, who have more 
 sense, virtue, and love of their country than Cicero, who in 
 a Letter to Atticus could not forbear exclaiming, O Socrates et 
 Socratici viri ! niinquam vobis gratiam referam. Would to 
 God many of our countrymen had the same obligations to 
 those Socratic writers ! Certainly, where the people are well 
 educated, the art of piloting a state is best learned from the 
 writings of Plato. But among bad men, void of discipline 
 and education, Plato, Pythagoras, and Aristotle themselves, 
 were they living, could do but little good. 
 
 334. Socrates in the First Alcibiades teacheth that the 
 contemplation of God is the proper means to know or under- 
 
 ' In short, the superiority of the often latent principles of reason to 
 the accidents of human experience, and to the transitory opinions and 
 dispositions of individuals and societies, would be recognised as they 
 cannot be in a materialistic aj^e, when moral and spiritual experience is 
 dogmatically reduced to terms of physical science.
 
 326 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 Stand our own soul. As the eye, saith he, looking steadfastly 
 at the visive part or pupil of another eye, beholds itself, 
 even so the soul beholds and understands herself, while 
 she contemplates the Deity, which is wisdom and virtue, or 
 like thereunto. In the Phsedon, Socrates speaks of God 
 as bein to ayaOw and to 8eov ; Plotinus represents God as 
 Order ; Aristotle as Law ^ 
 
 335. It may seem, perhaps, to those who have been taught 
 to discourse about substratums, more reasonable and pious 
 to attribute to the Deity a more substantial being than the 
 notional entities of wisdom, order, law, virtue, or goodness, 
 which being only complex ideas, framed and put together by 
 the understanding, are its own creatures, and have nothing 
 substantial, real, or independent in them. But it must be 
 considered that, in the Platonic system, order, virtue, law, 
 goodness, and wisdom are not creatures of the soul of man, 
 but innate and originally existent therein, not as an accident 
 in a substance, but as light to enlighten, and as a guide to 
 govern. In Plato's style, the term Idea doth not merely 
 signify an inert inactive object of the understanding, but is 
 used as synonymous with atrLov and apxrj, cause and principle. 
 According to that philosopher, goodness, beauty, virtue, and 
 such like are not figments of the mind, nor mere mixed 
 modes, nor yet abstract ideas in the modern sense, but the 
 most real beings, intellectual and unchangeable : and there- 
 fore more real than the fleeting, transient objects of sense, 
 which, wanting stability, cannot be subjects of science, 
 much less of intellectual knowledge ^. 
 
 ^ These doctrines present God as abstract reason and goodness, towards 
 which we are ethically bound to struggle, rather than as law, order, 
 reason, goodness, vivified or personified. 
 
 2 Mark the contrast between ' abstract ideas' as criticised in Berkeley's 
 early writings, and what he now appreciates in the Ideas of Plato. 
 Without Ideas, according to Plato, the material universe could not exist 
 really ; by participation in them the relations of sensible things are
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 327 
 
 337. The most refined human intellect, exerted to its 
 utmost reach, can only seize some imperfect glimpses of the 
 Divine Ideas— abstracted from all things corporeal, sensible, 
 and imaginable. Therefore Pythagoras and Plato treated 
 them in a mysterious manner, concealing rather than ex- 
 posing them to vulgar eyes ; so far were they from thinking 
 that those abstract things, although the most real, were the 
 fittest to influence common minds, or become principles of 
 knowledge, not to say duty and virtue, to the generality of 
 mankind. 
 
 340. Human souls in this low situation, bordering on mere 
 animal life, bear the weight and see through the dusk of a 
 gross atmosphere, gathered from wrong judgments daily 
 passed, false opinions daily learned, and early habits of an 
 older date than either judgment or opinion. Through such 
 a medium the sharpest eye cannot see clearly. And if by 
 some extraordinary effort the mind should surmount this 
 dusky region, and snatch a glimpse of pure light, she is soon 
 drawn backwards, and depressed by the heaviness of the 
 animal nature to which she is chained. And if again she 
 chanceth, amidst the agitation of wild fancies and strong 
 affections, to spring upwards, a second relapse speedily 
 succeeds into this region of darkness and dreams. 
 
 350. The displeasure of some readers may perhaps be 
 incurred, by surprising them into certain reflexions and 
 
 constituted ; in discovery of them, as principles, by reminiscence or 
 otherwise, philosophy finds satisfaction. Inductive research is only our 
 tentative endeavour to resolve things under laws according to their 
 implied divine reason. Its provisional but useful generalisations, limited 
 by the data of our experience, are far short of the Divine Thought 
 which Idealist systems have hitherto vainly tried fully to grasp and 
 comprehend. Yet our scientific inferences involve trustful ' leaps ' not 
 wholly 'in the dark,' for even science of nature is rooted in theistic 
 faith.
 
 328 SELECTIONS FROM BERKELEY 
 
 inquiries for which they have no curiosity. But perhaps 
 some others may be pleased to find a dry subject varied by 
 digressions, traced through remote inferences, and carried 
 into ancient times, whose hoary maxims, scattered in this 
 Essay, are not proposed as principles, but barely as hints 
 to awaken and exercise the inquisitive reader, on points not 
 beneath the attention of the ablest men. Those great men, 
 Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, the most consummate in 
 politics, who founded states, or instructed princes, or wrote 
 most accurately on public government, were at the same time 
 most acute at all abstracted and sublime speculations ; the 
 clearest light being ever necessary to guide the most im- 
 portant actions. And, whatever the world thinks, he who 
 hath not much meditated upon God, the human mind, and 
 the summum bonum, may possibly make a thriving earth- 
 worm, but will most indubitably make a sorry patriot and 
 a sorry statesman. 
 
 367. As for the perfect intuition of divine things, that 
 Plato supposeth to be the lot of pure souls, beholding by 
 a pure light, initiated, happy, free and unstained from those 
 bodies, wherein we are now imprisoned like oysters. But, 
 in this mortal state, we must be satisfied to make the best 
 of those glimpses within our reach. It is Plato's remark, in 
 his Thecetetus, that while we sit still we are never the wiser, 
 but going into the river, and moving up and down, is the 
 way to discover its depths and shallows. If we exercise and 
 bestir ourselves, we may even here discover something. 
 
 368. The eye by long use comes to see even in the darkest 
 cavern : and there is no subject so obscure but we may 
 discern some glimpse of truth by long poring on it. Truth 
 is the cry of all, but the game of a few. Certainly, where it 
 is the chief passion, it doth not give way to vulgar cares and 
 views ; nor is it contented with a little ardour in the early 
 time of life ; active, perhaps, to pursue, but not so fit to
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS 329 
 
 weigh and revise. He that would make a real progress in 
 knowledge must dedicate his age as well as youth, the later 
 growth as well as first fruits, at the altar of Truth '. 
 
 ' Siris concludes with sentences which seem to confess that human 
 knowledge of the infinite universe of reality must in the end be in- 
 complete, or with a residuum of mystery that presupposes faith or 
 moral trust in the Power that is at work universally. We know 
 enough to know that our experience, as interpreted in the highest 
 human science, cannot be Omniscience ; that our philosophy cannot 
 solve all the questions to which our physical and our moral experience 
 gives birth ; that in its progressive advance, there must be an ever 
 extending horizon of faith. But — although by ' exercise,' if we ' bestir 
 ourselves,' we may ' discover something,' — Omniscience is not indis- 
 pensable to our living wisely and religiously. Universally victorious 
 science is not the human way of finally separating gold from dross in 
 this transitory life, which may be a life of finally reasonable faith, even 
 if it must be one of incomplete conceptions and constant controversy — 
 of slowly enlarging experience — of ever unfinished, and therefore faith- 
 constituted, knowledge.
 
 tf 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Abstraction Jind Abstract Ideas, xxi, 
 
 3-4. "-23, 35-36,96- 
 
 Activity, unconscious mental, 298 Ji. 
 
 Agent. See Causality. 
 
 Analogy, 259 ; laws of nature 
 founded on, 295 ; God conceived 
 by, 259, 261 w.; Butler's use of, 
 261 n., 264 n. 
 
 Angles, cannot judge near distance 
 by, 179, 204^205, 235. 
 
 Anirna mttndi, 305. 
 
 Aquinas, Thomas, 257. 
 
 Arbitrariness, of physical law or 
 natural causation, xxx, xl, 74 «., 
 178-186. 
 
 Archetypes of ideas, 39, 64, 92. 
 
 Aristotle, his viateria pri7na, 41 ; 
 his four causes, 52 n. ; on essence, 
 99 n. ; on the association of ideas, 
 185 w. ; Cudworth on, 294; on 
 unconscious human activity, 298 
 M. ; Theology and Metaphysics 
 identical according to, 307 «. ; 
 makes threefold distinction in 
 objects, 316 ; mind at first like 
 blank paper, 317 ; on matter, 31S, 
 321; God immanent in the uni- 
 verse, 323. 
 
 Association, subjective, 185 n. 
 
 Atheism, 58, ico, 322. 
 
 Attraction, 289. 
 
 Augustine, St., 293. 
 
 Bacon, xvi, 7 «., 51 w., 8o«., 294 «. 
 
 Bain, Dr., 218 «. 
 
 Being, comprehends ideas or phe- 
 nomena and self-conscious spirits, 
 94- 
 
 Berkeley, w-hy a good introduction 
 to the problems of modern 
 thought, ix ; outline of his life, x- 
 xiii; his precursors, xiii ; his new 
 question, xxv ; his starting-point, 
 xxvii ; outline of his system, 
 xxvii-xxxvi ; modern thought 
 since, xxxvi-xlvi ; reply to Hume 
 by anticipation, xxxviii; his new 
 principles unfolded, 3 ; the lesson 
 of the introduction, 3 ; aim of his 
 inquiries, 8 n. ; question of his 
 philosophy, 34 M. ; charged with 
 begging the question, 34 n. ; does 
 not show in what form sense ideas 
 exist in the Divine mind, 37 n. ; 
 Can spirit be unconscious? 37 n., 
 49 n.; on causality, 51 n.; dis- 
 tinction between perception and 
 imagination, 56 n., 59 n. ; the 
 permanence and identity of sen- 
 sible things the difficulty of his 
 system, 67 w., 68 n., 69 n., 90 «., 
 93 n. ; consistency of order in 
 nature with his system, 46 «., 
 78 n. ; divine naturalism, 99 «. ; 
 on the relation of free finite 
 spirits to God, 104 n. \ on death, 
 105 '^- > germs of Kantism in, 
 108 n. ; on our communication 
 with other persons through phe- 
 nomena presented in sense, 109 
 w. ; his theory of vision, 170— 
 173; on necessary connexion in 
 mathematics, 176 n, 177 m.; on 
 suggestion, 180 «. ; assumes the 
 existence of an associative ten- 
 dency, 185; onunextended colour.
 
 332 
 
 INDEX 
 
 218 n. ; hiblphildlphy deepened 
 in Siris, 28Jh2S6. 
 
 Biran, Maine <\, 52. 
 
 Blind (men borniJmid), have at first 
 no idea of distance, or outness by 
 sight, 187, 239, 27S — do not at 
 first connect phenomena of sight 
 and touch, 205 ; cases of sight 
 when first awakened in the born 
 blind, 278. 
 
 Body, perceived in our sense of 
 resistance, 308 ; connexion of 
 soul and, 105. 
 
 Brown, Dr. T., 51 n., 218 n. 
 
 Browne, Bp. Peter, x. 261 n., 262 w. 
 
 Butler, Bp., 106 «., 116 n., 202 «., 
 261 n , 264 n. 
 
 Causation, xxxi-xxxiv, xxxix-xlii, 
 xli n. ; dogma of materialists re- 
 garding, 69 n. ; moral agents the 
 only true causes, 51 w. ; ideas or 
 phenomena are not real causes, 
 51, 72 ; no idea, but a notion of, 
 52 ; not an object of sense, 269 ; 
 an object of reason, 301 ; physical 
 causes, merely symbols, xxxi, 51, 
 72, 79, 288 ; occasional causes, 82. 
 
 Cheselden's case, 278. 
 
 Clarke, Dr. S., xxxiv, 246 n. 
 
 Colour, idea of, abstracted from ex- 
 tension, 12 ; abstract general idea 
 of, 13; the proper object of sight, 
 188, 208, 238; admitted not to 
 exist without percipient mind, 38. 
 
 Common Sense, 8 ; Reid's synony- 
 mous with Common Reason, 71 n. 
 
 Conception, as a criterion of objec- 
 tive possibility, 48. 
 
 Concepts, 17 «., 19 n. 
 
 Condillac, 181 n. 
 
 Consciousness, xxvii. 
 
 Cosmos, 104 71., 113 n., 114 n. 
 
 Creation, constant, 64, 65, 78 «., 
 246. 
 
 Cudworth, Dr., 294, 295 «., 297, 
 
 298 71. 
 
 Custom, xlii, 51 «., 201, 201 /i., 
 240 7t. 
 
 Death and unembodied spirits, 
 Berkeley and Butler on, 105 w. 
 
 Definition, 24-25, 99. 
 
 Democritus, 294, 303. 
 
 Descartes, his tentative doubt, xiii ; 
 his Dualism, xv ; Substance and 
 Causality according to, ib. ; scien- 
 tific cosmogony of, 2S9; holds 
 Divine agency to be constant, 
 292 7t. ; Cartesians and Platonists 
 compared, 302. 
 
 Diderot, 279 71. 
 
 Dionysius the Areopagite, 256. 
 
 Distance, outness in the line of sight, 
 175 11. — Outness, admitted not to 
 be a direct object of vision, 1 75 ; 
 also admitted that remote out- 
 ness is suggested by visible 
 signs, 176; signs of near distance 
 said to be necessary, 177; this 
 rejected, for reasons given, 178- 
 1 80 ; signs by which near dis- 
 tance is suggested, 1S0-186, 234; 
 one born blind has no idea of 
 outness, 187, 239. Is lateral, or 
 superficial, an original object of 
 sight with Berkeley? 278 w. 
 
 Divisibility, of matter, 65, 218. 
 
 Dreams, 45, 61. 
 
 Ego. Sec Spirit. 
 
 Empedocles, 299. 
 
 Epicurus, 303. 
 
 Error, causes of, 8. 
 
 £sse, of sensible things is percipi, 
 34 ; of spirits is percipere, 98 «. 
 
 Evil, physical, 113, 300; moral, 
 222, 263. 
 
 Existence, consists of spirits and 
 their ideas or phenomena, 94 ; 
 abstract idea of, incomprehen- 
 sible, 80; of sensible things, 39, 
 66, 87, ei passion; of our own 
 spirit, 33, 94, 97; or other finite 
 spirits, 94, 108 ; of God, 109, 228, 
 
 245- 
 
 Expectation. See Suggestion. 
 
 Experience, teaches us the scientific 
 significance of sense ideas or phe- 
 nomena, xxviii-xxxi, 54 ; infer- 
 ences of geometry and their 
 relation to knowledge of causes, 
 301. 
 
 Extension, is realized only in a
 
 INDEX 
 
 333 
 
 mind perceiving;, 40 ; so exists by 
 waj' of idea or phenomena, not as 
 a mode of mind, 67, 196 n. ; ex- 
 tension not the same in sight and 
 in touch, 207 ; no absolutely ne- 
 cessary connexion between visible 
 and tangible, 2or. 
 Externality, real meaning of, 92. 
 
 Faculties, human, their finitude and 
 its relation to scepticism, 8 ; are 
 not mere ideas or phenomena, 
 loS; cannot be abstracted from 
 mind, ib.\ gradation of, 314. 
 
 Faith, moral, xlvii, 8, 329 n. 
 
 Fichte, 95 n. 
 
 Force. See Power. 
 
 Gassendi, xxiv. 
 
 Geometry, 206, 234. 
 
 Geulinx, xvi, 71 «., 2S9 n. 
 
 God, existence of, contained by impli- 
 cation in phenomena of sense, 1 10, 
 245 ; laws of nature express the 
 Reason and Will of, xxxii-xxxiv, 
 54, ITT, — and are His natural 
 langtiage, xxix-xxxii, 63, 80, 239- 
 249, 295-297; His Ideas the arche- 
 types of ours, 86 n. ; the relation 
 of free finite spirits to, T04 tt. ; 
 objection from physical pain to the 
 goodness of, 113; from moral evil, 
 322, 262-263; What is to be un- 
 derstood by the word ' God,' and 
 in what respect God is knowable ? 
 250. 
 
 Hamilton, Sir W., 93, 219, 273 w. 
 
 Hegel, X, 321 n. 
 
 Helmholtz, 1S6 n. 
 
 Hermaic writings, 303. 
 
 Hobbes, xxiv, 251. 
 
 Hume, xxxvi ; on self as an idea or 
 phenomenon, xxxviii ; on human 
 agency and will, xxxix ; on order 
 in nature, xl ; resolves intellect 
 into sense, xli ; on abstract ideas, 
 II «.; impressions or sensations, 
 56 ;/. ; on substance, 44 n. ; on 
 causality, 52 n. ; on Berkeley's 
 argument against matter, xxxvii, 
 
 104 «. ; on Representative percep- 
 tion, 93 «. ;( his sceptical nesci- 
 ence, 267 n. ; the universe a 
 'singular effect,' 116 n.; custom 
 the physical cause of science ac- 
 cording to, 181 tt., 201 n. 
 
 Idea or phenomenon, xvii, xx n., 
 10 «., Ti, 32 n., 91 ;/., 269 «^; 
 restricted to the immediately per- 
 ceived, and the imaginable, in 
 Berkeley's early works, 55 ; can 
 be like nothing but another idea, 
 38,95; not equivalent to 'notion,' 
 15, 20; distinguished from 
 ' mode,' 67 ; ideas of sense and 
 their potential existence in God, 
 36, 67, 82, 96; do not imply 
 abstract substance, xxvii, 44 ; are 
 not true causes, 51, 98, 269 ; but 
 only signs, 54, 79 ; those presented 
 to us in sense are real things, in 
 contradistinction to mere fancies 
 or dreams, 55, 61, 92; in Siris 
 those of sense and imagination 
 called phenomena, and ' idea ' is 
 used in its Platonic meaning, 
 XX w., 294 n., &c. Ideas, abstract. 
 See Abstraction. Ideas, how 
 general, 17. Ideas, and language, 
 24-31. 
 
 Identity, of sensible things, 64-66, 
 82, 90 n. 
 
 Imagination, 32, 54, 268 ; affords no 
 proof that sensible things can 
 exist really when unperceived, 48 ; 
 Locke, Leibnitz, and Hume on, 
 56 «. 
 
 Immaterial ism, xxviii, xlvii. 
 
 Immortality of man, 105, T06 n. 
 
 Induction, xviii n., xx 11., xxx w., 
 180, 295. 
 
 Inference, rational, contrasted with 
 automatic suggestion , and adapted 
 to finite intelligence, 205, 2747?., 
 276 ;/. 
 
 Infinity, 8 n. 
 
 Jamblichus, 303. 
 Judgment, 176 «., 199 n. 
 
 Kant, xliv ; on causation, 52 tt. ; on
 
 334 
 
 INDEX 
 
 identity of things, 82 «. ; on phy- 
 sical and mathematical science, 
 98 n. ; on knowledge of ego or 
 self, 103 n. ; on the origin of 
 knowledge, 108 «.; on the con- 
 stitutive principles of knowledge, 
 180 «. 
 
 King, Abp., 261 n. 
 
 Knowledge, objects of, 32, 91 ; does 
 not include abstract ideas, 20 ; 
 ideal, 96 ; real, 23 n. ; imperfec- 
 tion of, 328 ; and automatic sug- 
 gestion, 240 n. ; intuitive and 
 discursive, 258 n. ; symbolical, 
 Leibnitz, 25 «.; and opinion, 
 Plato, 314. 
 
 Language, 275 ; nature and abuse of, 
 10, 28; does not require general 
 ideas to be abstract, 17; univer- 
 sality in, 20 ; ends of, 26 ; Lan- 
 guage of Nature, particularly of 
 Vision, xxxi, 62, 63; its arbitrari- 
 ness, or dependence on perfect 
 Reason and Will, 217, 239; its 
 reasonableness, 182 «., 225; dif- 
 fers from artificial languages of 
 man, 241. 
 
 Law, in nature, 54, 55. 
 
 Leibnitz, xi, xliii, 25 «., 56 «., 1 16 «., 
 211 n., 246 11., 290 «., 292 n., 
 316 n. 
 
 Leucippus, 303. 
 
 Locke, influence of, on Berkeley, 
 xi, xiii, xvii-xxiv; begins with 
 introspective study of mind, xvii ; 
 finds our experience made up 
 of ideas of the senses and of re- 
 flexion, ib. ; tacitly assumes a 
 priori principles, xviii, 38 ; dis- 
 tinguishes primary from secondary 
 qualities of matter, xix ; ' idea ' 
 and its meaning according to, xx, 
 192 «.; on 'abstract ideas,' xxi, 
 15, 18; idea of 'substance,' xxii, 
 45 «, ; ' perception,' according to, 
 XX «. ; on causation, 51 «. ; on 
 the perplexities of philosophy, 
 8 n. ; holds that abstraction dis- 
 tinguishes man from brute, 15 ; 
 on physical science and its in- 
 demonstrability, 40 «. ; on judg- 
 
 ment in his special meaning of the 
 term, 176 n. ; on sight and touch, 
 208, 210 ; on innate ideas, 31 7 «. ; 
 does not distinguish potential 
 from actual knowledge, 317 n. 
 Lotze, 186 n. 
 
 Mackintosh, Sir J., 10 n. 
 
 Malebranche, xi, xvi, xxiv, 71 n.. 
 Ill «., 245 ft., 289 n. 
 
 Manichseism, 116 «. 
 
 Mansel, Dean, 17 w. 
 
 Materia prima, Aristotle's, 41. 
 
 Materialism, xxv, 45 11., 68 n., 69 n. 
 
 Mathematics, 9S, 316 11. 
 
 Matter, abstract, xxiv-xxxvi, 39 ; 
 supposed support of accidents, 43 ; 
 as such, cannot be known, 45 ; 
 as such, useless, 46, 70, 81 ; as 
 such, either contradictory or un- 
 intelligible, 44 n., 49 ji. ; impo- 
 tence of, 50 ;;., 53 7t. ; as such, not 
 needed in natural philosophy, 69 ; 
 origin of belief in, 72-73; not 
 the unknowable cause of ideas, 
 81 ; nor the unknowable support 
 of unknowable qualities, 87 ; nor 
 an unknown somewhat, neither 
 substance nor accident, 88; erron- 
 eous conception of matter the 
 root of materialism and scepti- 
 cism, 94. 
 
 Megaric philosophy, 31 8. 
 
 Metaphysics, xiii, 11. 
 
 Mill, J. S., II «., 5i«., 113;/. , 2i8«. 
 
 Mind. See Spirit. 
 
 Miracles, physical, 78 n. 
 
 Mirandula, Picus of, 256. 
 
 Molyneux, x, 210. 
 
 Motion, 12, 39, 50, 218 «. 
 
 Miiller, 186 11. 
 
 Nature, laws of, xxx, xl, 54, 55, 
 1 1 2-1 15 ; language of. ^e^ Lan- 
 guage. Berkeley's conception of 
 natural law, 47 n., 65 «., 70 «., 
 74 n., 78 «., 90 n. 
 
 Necessity, physical, xxxi ; mathe- 
 matical, 177; ancients on, 303- 
 304, 
 
 Newton, Sir Isaac, xi, 294. 
 
 Nominalism, Berkeley's, 11-31.
 
 INDEX 
 
 335 
 
 Notion, as distinguished by Berkeley 
 from sensuous idea or pheno- 
 menon, xxxii, XXXV, xxxviii, ii n., 
 15. 53. 94, 108, 316 «., 317 Ji., 
 321 n. 
 
 Number, 41, 307. 
 
 Occasional causes. See Cause. 
 Ocellus Lucanus, 306. 
 Outness. See Distance. 
 
 Parmenides, 317. 
 
 Pascal, 114 «., 240 n. 
 
 Perception, xx n. ; mediate, ac- 
 quired, or suggested, as distin- 
 guished from immediate, 17S, 
 192, 272 ; distinguished from 
 imagination, 53; in the ascending 
 'chain of faculties,' 313; repre- 
 sentative, 38, 91 «., 93 «., 273 n. 
 
 Peripatetics, 319, 320, 321, 323. 
 
 Phenomenon, instead of idea, in 
 Siris, XX n., 294 11. 
 
 Philosophy, What ? 7-10. 
 
 Philosophy of Theism, 267 n. 
 
 Plato, Ideas of, xx n., 11 «., 326- 
 329; Theaetettis, quoted, 315, 
 317, 3 28; Phaedo, 326; Timaetis, 
 321 ; on the personality of God, 
 3 1 2 : on evil, 3 1 3 w. ; on knowledge 
 and opinion, 314 ; on matter, 318, 
 321 ; on the soul, 319 ; on innate 
 notions, 316; on sensible quali- 
 ties, 321, 322; on God, 323; 
 protest on behalf of, 324. 
 
 Platonists, 302-306, 314, 321, 323. 
 
 Plotinus, 295, 296, 303, 326. 
 
 Plutarch, 303. 
 
 Porlius, Simon, 320 it. 
 
 Power, xxxii, 50, 51 «. See Causa- 
 tion. 
 
 Powers of mind. See Faculties. 
 
 Proclus, 300, 301 n., 319. 
 
 Psychology, the facts with which it 
 is concerned, 32 ; Berkeley's early, 
 32 ;;. ; rational, 103 n. 
 
 Pythagoreans, 302, 305, 306, 314, 
 321,327- 
 
 Qualities of Matter, primary and 
 secondary, xix, 38, 84. See Ideas 
 and Phenomena. 
 
 Reality, admits of degrees, 58. 
 Reason, 269, 272 ;/., 301. 
 Reasoning, a priori and posteriori, 
 
 47 «• 
 
 Reid, xliii, 52 n., 71 n., 72 ;/., 93 n., 
 180 n., 219 «., 226 n., 273 n. 
 
 Relations, 'notions' of, 94, 108; 
 presupposed in knowledge, 47 w., 
 108, 268. 
 
 Responsibility, moral, and origina- 
 tive causation, xxxii, 298. 
 
 Scepticism, xxxvi-xlii, 8, 61 w., 94, 
 100, 238 «. 
 
 Schoolmen, 23, 65, 67 n. 
 
 Science, xxix, 73, 101 n. 
 
 Self. See Spirit. 
 
 Sensations, can exist only in a 
 sentient mind, 33 ; cannot be 
 true originating causes, 50 ; are 
 significant through the constant 
 Divine Activity, 90 n. ; contain 
 nothing but what is perceived, 92. 
 
 Sense, why the presentations of are 
 called ideas, 59 ; abstract matter 
 not an object of, 43 ; nor tlie 
 spiritual ego, 101 ; per se, knows 
 nothing, 295 ; antithesis of sense 
 and reason, 271, 301. 
 
 Sight, immediate and mediate ob- 
 jects of, 188, 204, 208; and of 
 touch, 202, 206, 207. 
 
 Signs, material world a system of 
 sense-given, and so can be inter- 
 preted, xxix, 51 n., 90 «. ; material 
 causes really signs, 79, 275; of 
 the agency of other spirits, 109, 
 
 Simplicius, 320 n. 
 
 Socrates, 319, 324-326. 
 
 Solidity, 39, 191. 
 
 Soul. See Spirit. 
 
 Space, no such thing as real abso- 
 lute, inconceivable, 302 ; in its 
 three dimensions not an imme- 
 diate object of sight, 192, 218 n. 
 
 Spinoza, xvi, 251. 
 
 Spirit, xxxii, xxxviii, 33, 34, loi ; 
 the only substance, 37, 51 n., 95, 
 1 01 ; the only efficient cause, 
 51 ft. ; thinks always, 37 «., 97 ; 
 a notion, not an idea or image of, 
 53, 104, 107 ; the Supreme, how
 
 336 
 
 INDEX 
 
 known by an individual mind, 
 • 53, 73, 224; other finite spirits, 
 
 how known one by another, 33, 
 
 53 «•, 107, 227. 
 Stewart, Dugald, 26 «., 52 «., 181 n. 
 Stoics, 304. 
 Suarez, 258. 
 Substance, xx, xxi, xxiii, 37, 53, 
 
 103. See Spirit and Matter. 
 Suggestion, automatic, xxix, 62, 63, 
 
 iSo, 202, 268; contrasted with 
 
 rational inference, 276. 
 
 Tangibile, minimum, 201. 
 
 Themistius, 320. 
 
 Theophrastus, 321. 
 
 Thing, xxviii, 55, 60, 94. See 
 
 Existence, Being, Matter, Spirit, 
 
 Reality. 
 
 Time, 96, 97. 
 
 Toland, 261 n. 
 
 Touch, 63 «., 188 «., 191 ; sight 
 
 and. 63, 202, 207. 
 Truth, 28 ; the cry of all but the 
 
 game of few, 328. 
 
 Ueberweg, 34 «., 37. 
 
 Unity, tlie aim of philosophy, and 
 how far attainable in a human 
 knowledge of existence, 7 «., 8 n. ; 
 of consciousness, 103 n. 
 
 Visihile, minimum, 201. 
 Vision. See Sight. 
 
 Will, or moral agency, xl, xli, 52 ; 
 Divine, 75. 
 
 THE END
 
 pbilosopbical mov]\e 
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 HON. D.C.L. OXOX. 
 
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