DT .18 A = o OUTHER 9 ^ REGION n 2 3D 4 1 5 -; — 5 9 iNA. LIBRARY (f: l. Gymnastics. 35 Applied r.vinn.istics— Italians Dislodging Bedouins at Bengasi. BENGASI. — Center of Resistance. Vallej' of Dema. 3& THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 37 Reconnaissance. The cavalry reconnoitered towards Bir Tobras and Bir Edin; and on December 17th a battalion of grenadiers pushed as far south as 12 kilometers (8 miles) below Ain Zara; on the 19th a mixed detachment went to Bir Tobras to liberate Arab families who were loyal to us, but held captive by the enemy. In this last reconnaissance officers and men had been subjected to long and continued hard- ships and all the privations and dangers of an uncertain situation, but they attacked with ardor, valor, and firm- ness in a manner to impress the adversary, who were emboldened by their superiority in number. This de- tachment hoped to obtain an easy success against a small number of troops detached from their base, and who were for the first time fighting on a desert terrain devoid of sustenance. The detachment succeeded in making an undisturbed retreat, carrying their wounded and all their equipment ; overcoming the difficulties of orientation on a dark night, they returned on the morning of the 20th to Ain Zara. Battle and Occupation of Gargaresc. (January 18-20, 19 12.) Our occupation had now to be extended principally towards the east, in order to protect the marble works in the garrisons around Gargaresc, and to prevent the raids of the Arab-Turks upon the population loyal to us. On January 18, 191 2, the enemy was attacked and defeated 38 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. by our troops; on the 20th the town was garrisoned and work immediately begun to fortify it. Second Combat of Ain Zara. (January 28, 19 12.) On January 28, 191 2, after a respite, a violent attack was made on Ain Zara; and around Tripoli a series of forays were made by the cavalry and small mixed detach- ments. Numerous trips were made by our intrepid avia- tors, dropping bombs on the enemy, whose attacks on our redoubts and detachments were in every case vigorously repulsed. ZONE OF HOMS. In the meantime combats were being carried on with intensity and without truce along other points of the coast, and each one was a new success to our arms. Reconnaissance of Lebda. (December i, 191 1.) At Homs, to break the Turkish telegraph lines and to impress the Bedouins encountered in the vicinity of Lebda and near the slopes of Mesellata, we attacked the enemy on the ist of December and defeated them about 4 kilometers {2}^ miles) southeast of our trenches. Thereafter the attacks on our line were insignificant, and the time at our disposal was utilized in fortifying the po- sition we occupied. This work was not simple, owing to THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 39 the natural configuration of the ground around Horns, hidden from view along the Uttoral by the oases of L,ebda and the numerous Roman ruins, which occupied a great deal of the territory in those parts, dominated towards the west and southwest especially by the hills of Mergheb — a point excellently defended, and facing Horns with a clear range of vision. Combat and Occupation of Mergheb. (February 27, 19 12.) This strong position at Mergheb had been noted ; and occasionally from its heights cannon had been fired upon the city. It was therefore found necessary to occupy these heights. This was carried out decisively on the 27th of February. To diminish the forces of the de- fenders, a well-simulated move was made towards Sliten to entice the enemy in that direction ; meanwhile three of our columns approached Mergheb silently, and the Arab- Turks were accordingly surprised. The enemy than made a violent counter-attack; but after a mixed and close combat and an impetuous flank attack by our columns, the enemy was routed by a bayonet charge. Night Combat of Mergheb. (March 5-6, 1912.) In spite of their losses, the enemy did not give up ; and on the night of March 5-6th they attempted to regain their former position by a furious attack, hoping to find 40 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. our vigilance relaxed. Officers and men had, however, intelligently fortified their position and were eagerly on the watch, so that the Arab-Turks found the defenders calm and assured of their position, and suffered consequent losses. Meanwhile, to the east of Homs, our troops frus- trated a tentative attack made with the object in view of diverting the attention of the defenders of Mergheb. ZONE OF BENGASI. In the days subsequent to our occupation, the nucleus of the Arab-Turks had by preference rallied in the oasis near the city of Bengasi, aiming to have better facilities to secure their provisions and to keep in touch with the inhabitants. Combat of Koefia. (November 28, 191 1.) After having advised the outposts (established at Daut-Luba and Ras el Ferg), a column consisting of the three arms pushed towards Sidi Calif a the 28th of No- vember, and at Koefia our troops, after ably overcoming the difficulty of the terrain, and giving proof of their vigor and ardor, surprised and dispersed a large force of Bedouins, who left on the field 21 dead, among them chiefs of the Avaghir tribe, who had entered the combat on horseback. Towards the end of November and the beginning of December the work of systematizing the defenses of the city proceeded uninterruptedly, and meanwhile the Arab- Instructions on Board Ship. 41 Castle of Orfella. I à 'i > > \ ' THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 43 Turkish force was rapidly growing, augmented by the arrival of the regular troops from the Egyptian frontier, as well as by the assistance in this respect of the popula- tion of the hinterland. The tactics preferred by the enemy were to simulate night attacks, with the object in view of disturbing the repose of our troops and provoking useless expenditure of ammunition, and hoping to sur- prise the advance works of the defense and the line of security of Bengasi. These sporadic attacks were always promptly and en- ergetically repulsed with the assistance of our Navy, who cooperated in the fire-action and with their search- lights illuminated the terrain near our lines and con- tiguous to the sea. The Navy, besides bombarding Koefia, bombarded the oases of Suani Osman, Tolmetta, Bersis, and Tocra, to punish the inhabitants, who were giving aid to the enemy around Bengasi by furnishing men from their tribes. Defense of Bengasi. (December 25, 1911.) After a brief respite, from the i6th to the 21st of De- cember, the activity of the enemy manifested itself on the 2 2d by an attack upon a camp redoubt and a defended post. This was a prelude to the general attack upon the city on December 25th. This action involved only the artillery, as the Arab-Turks advanced cautiously and 44 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. kept a great distance from the lines. The other arms, ready and on the watch, consequently participated neither in the action nor in the defense of the trenches nor in the counter-attacks. The artillery opened up an efficacious and continuous fire at 3,800 to 4,000 meters (4,000 to 4,300 yards), using 29 pieces, each one firing on an average of 39 shots. There were no appreciable losses; and when it is taken into consideration that the firing kept up all day, the ex- penditure of that amount of ammunition was justified. The batteries gave proof of their perfect fire-discipline, excellent technical and professional preparation, efficacy, and coordination of action. The enemy took advantage of nightfall and retreated, leaving on the field 200 dead, several hundred wounded, two dismantled guns, and many horses. Battle of Suani el Rani or "Due Palme" {"Two Palms"), (March 12, 1912.) Serious losses occurred two and one-half months after- wards in the battle of Suani el Rani, better known as "Two Palms." From December to March the work of the enemy was limited to small skirmishes around our redoubts and out- posts or with our reconnoitering parties; on the 12th of March they showed considerable force and started a gen- eral attack upon the city, but hesitated, owing to our im- -^ * lw t ^■W' "^..IM.^ - Landing at Kalitheas. 45 A Halt during the Advance on Rhodes. Panorama of Psitos. Turkish Prisoners. 46 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 47 mediate and energetic counter-attack. They attempted to withstand the attack, but in vain ; our valorous troops surrounded them with a ring of fire and steel and anni- hilated them. Nearly one thousand were left dead on the field, while many more died in consequence of their wounds. The result obtained was the reward of constant co- operation of the various arms and of the intelligence, discipline, and incomparable dash of our troops. The behavior of our infantry was splendid; their advance under the heavy fire of the adversary is deserving of every praise. Calm and in good order, with excellent examples set by their officers, they launched themselves upon the enemy, engaging them in a hand-to-hand conflict, from which they emerged victorious. This day set the seal of approval on the excellence of the organization of the artillery, who did their work patiently, and gained their fire of position with a clearness of scope. The functions and range of the field and mountain batteries were excellent; the pieces were light and ably handled, and the ability to make hits and the discipline were perfect. The cavalry assaulted in an orderly and prompt manner. They carried out the orders to protect the right wing from attack, and later assisted in developing this wing in a most commendable manner. Even the intrenchments and field works of Bengasi revealed their efficacy by the fact that a decisive and ofifensive action took place under their immediate pro- 48 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. tection, and (the artillery of a whole sector was brought into action) demonstrated the excellent position of these works and that they dominated the surrounding terrain. The battle of "Two Palms" greatly dampened the ardor of the enemy, and they no longer attempted to at- tack in force. Our aviators dropped bombs on them, and our Navy bombarded various points along the coast. So they contented themselves with small attacks against our redoubts and workmen, but were always easily re- pulsed. At times they fired upon our troops while at drill. The three arms were drilled daily to keep them in trim and to intimidate the enemy. ZONE OF DERNA. The garrison of Derna had to show its mettle, owing to the topography of the terrain in that vicinity. The city was situated on the face of a rocky cliff; there was no accessible way to reach the higher plain, nor could one be built, as the rock was composed of limestone and crumbled. The higher plane had also a wide gap, caused by rain and sun, which did not present any foothold, being cut up by sharp cliffs and thick, impassable vegeta- tion. This precipice was honeycombed with caverns and cells, greatly assisting the inhabitants in their innate spirit of brigandage and rapine. Therefore a great deal of difficulty was experienced with this terrain in securing a line of defense, either to- wards the east or towards the west, to protect the potable water. TurkLsli Prisoners. ininDES. -Towor of tho Aunr-h 49 1{I1( )\)KS -I)q);irture of Iroo]) : .^v'^ ^•^#'« Ruins at Lebda. MISURATA.— Cape Zarrug. THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 51 The encounters fought here until September, 191 1, were not of a decisive character, because it would have been perilous and imprudent to venture into this unknown and impervious zone to follow the enemy into possible ambush. But they offered themselves continually to our fire — both the fire of the troops who protected the workmen and in general attacks made with the hope of recapturing the city. Defense of the Redoubts of Lombardia and Calabria. (February 11-12, 19 12.) Defeat after defeat occurred to the Arab-Turks, a memorable one being the night attack February ii-i2th, commanded by En ver Bey. The battle of Sidi Abdallah (March 3, 191 1) also proved disastrous for the enemy. They displayed their forces in the manner most favorable to them, taking ad- vantage of the cover afforded by the difficult and treach- erous ground. The day was one of laborious combat; but the great forces of the adversary, with their knowl- edge of the terrain and their fanatical enthusiasm, were met by the sturdy opposition of our troops, who, at the proper time, encountered the foe with firmness and charged them with impetuosity. 52 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. Intensification of the War in Libya and the ^gean. (From April 12th to the Declaration of Peace.) zone of zuara. To put a stop to the contraband of war in Tunis, it was decided, in the latter part of December, 1911, to make a landing at Zuara; but heavy seas, due to high winds, which continued for three weeks, caused the aban- donment of the enterprise. The Navy, however, had a chance to prove its great value, and the troops to dem- onstrate their patience during their long confinement aboard ship, from the 2 2d of December to the 14th of January, on which latter date the enterprise was definitely given up. Landing at Macahez. (April 10-14, 1912.) Persisting, however, in the necessity of preventing this smuggling, another attempt was made to land at Zuara in April, 19 11; but, owing to various nautical and military features, it was decided to land at Macabez in- stead. This landing was accomplished by all the arms in four days, after experiencing great hydrographic dif- ficulties. Again the Navy showed their abihty to co- operate with the troops. Landing at Misurata. 53 Skinni,sli Advance on Misuiata. Artillery Advance on Misurata. Trenches — Oasis of Misurata. 54 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 55 The beach, Fort Bu Chemesc, and the caravans were taken possession of, all of which were to serve to carry the expeditions into the interior towards the new lines of communication, which the Arab-Turks would not have failed to single out. Our troops were well tried in the long and obscure work, landing upon a beach open and deserted (probably the only case of its kind where such maritime conditions were overcome), desiring to face an enemy who could display a force and ardor worthy of the effort made to reach them. The enemy appeared on the 23d of April at Bu Chemesc, and our gallant soldiers had their desires ful- filled. With great violence and vigor, the enemy at- tacked successively from the east, southeast, and west. Mowed down by the artillery from our works and from our counter-attacks, after a spirited combat they were compelled to retreat, leaving a great number of dead and wounded. Operations for the Occupation of Sidi Said. (January 26, 27, 28, 1912.) The frequent offensive reconnaissances sent out by our troops had permission to capture the caravans and to disperse the Arab-Turk convoys, but it was not altogeth- er easy nor convenient to halt and sustain themselves, owing to the absolute hostility of the inhabitants and the difficulty of maintaining communications across the 56 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. uninterrupted series of streams (called sebche) that run through the middle of the zone of Bu Chemesc. The enemy (consisting of several thousand men, many- horses, and some cannon) attempted to oppose every tentative move we made towards the caravans. But, uncertain of the direction of our movements and be- cause of our persistent activity around Bu Chemesc, they formed a cordon with a front of about 30 kilometers (19 miles), out of range of our artillery, with their right on the stronghold Sidi Said and their left eastward of the Tunisian border. With this ample front, and not having been sufficiently harassed by our troops, who had only gone 15 kilometers (9 miles) inland, they had little by little strongly fortified themselves. After the decision to attack, to avoid proceeding through the inhospitable region next to the Tunisian border, it was decided to march in two columns from Macabez and Bu Chemesc, respectively, to mass against the position of Sidi Said, the conquest of which would in all probability determine the fall of the Arab-Turk defense. And so it happened; the methodical plan of attack was crowned with success on the victorious days of June 26th, 27th and 28th, which gave us possession of Sidi Said, a very important position on the road of Zelten and Zuara, and gave us uncontested domain of 40 kilo- meters (26 miles) of coast, from the Tunis border to Sidi Said and to the line of streams. The losses of the Arab-Turks were more than 700 dead, left on the field, and a large number of wounded; THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 57 arms, ammunition, animals, and various materiel fell into our hands. Our troops behaved admirably, as did the commanders who led them on to victory ; and with the faith that was placed in them, everything seemed possible in the face of the difficult terrain, the enemy, the climate, and re- sources. The spontaneous and intelligent accord be- tween the various commanders, arms, and the Army and Navy corresponded excellently to the particular require- ments during the three days of operation, constituting in their completeness a prepared ofiFensive combat. Battle of Sidi Ali. (July 14, 1912.) A few days later the opportunity presented itself to extend our territorial occupation as far as Sidi AH, a high position 6 kilometers (4 miles) to the eastward of Sidi Said, which would assure our halt during our stay in this latter locality, an advanced post, and an excellent point of vedette on the Zuara road ; and it would impede in the meantime the Arab-Turks from assembling at and using this point from which to molest our occupation of Sidi Said. This point was carried on July 14th, after a bril- liant reconnaissance by one of our flying columns, which disposed of the fear of any serious threat on the part of a nucleus of the enemy assembled to the southward of Bu Chemesc. The combat was violent and at close quarters, and the enemy numerous, reinforced from the Sahara the 58 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. day after Sidi Said. Terrific heat tended to diminish our forces; but the troops maintained, as always, an elevated spirit, and their conduct was admirable. The enemy was beaten and demoralized. "It is des- tiny," so terminated a canard in a Tunisian newspaper. "Ah! destiny, the prophet of reason, is with the Italians, and our troops fall like flies before the enemy's fire." There was no further need to defend Zuara, a city exposed to the fire of our Navy, as was also the surrounding ter- rain. Its peculiar conformation and works erected by the enemy were adapted to a tenacious resistance. Occupation of Zuara. (August 6, 191 2.) Our troops entered with hardly any casualty, after having dispersed small squads of the enemy's rear guard. Zuara was the objective towards which operations were to point after the abandonment, because of logical difficulties, of any further penetration of the Tunisian border. This was, besides representing the center of habitation, the most important of all the vast region to the eastward of the border. Regdaline was the principal gathering-place of the caravans which proceeded from the border to the eastward. To the south of Regdaline the country was a desert waste, not containing sufficient water to allow the passage of numerous caravans. There- fore, with the zone of Zuara-Regdaline occupied, the train of caravans that had used the trail close to the sea were DERXA.^Bu Msafer. 59 DERNA.— Halg Gianiba. THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 6i effectively intercepted and eliminated, and the great contraband trade was limited to the mountain roads, which were so distant and difficult that it was not found worth while to consider them. It was impossible to at- tend simultaneously to the two objectives, Zuara and Regdaline, owing to the insufficiency of forces. Zuara, if found undefended, could be reached on the same day, and an offensive operation made against Regdaline and Menscia on the following day, to cut off a caravan com- ing from the west. It was found convenient to abstain, owing to the extreme high temperature and the hardships the troops were subjected to, deprived of the bare neces- sities, which were still on board, and because of the youth of the men of this class. On the other hand, the day after the occupation it was discovered, without doubt, that a general uprising amongst the inhabitants was contemplated, and they would be joined by the armed "Mehalle" in case our vigilance between Zuara and Regdaline was at all relaxed. Combat and Occupation of Regdaline. (August 15, 1912.) With the troops reorganized and fully equipped, the advance towards RegdaHne was made August 15th. The enemy, remembering our impetuosity and firm intent to win, experienced at Sidi Said and Sidi Ali, com- ported themselves accordingly when we confronted them en masse; the more audacious ones, however, rallied on 62 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. our extreme left and opposed us in close quarters; but our troops, with their usual valor, did not delay in flanking and dispersing them. Thereafter and until the declaration of peace our only engagements were small skirmishes or artillery fire upon caravans in the distance. OPERATIONS IN THE ^GEAN. The better to prevent the smuggling of arms from Turkey to Libya, to aggravate the moral situation of the enemy at home and abroad, and to have pledges in our favor in case of a peace treaty, it was decided to occupy some of the islands in the lower ^gean. The island of Stampalia, on account of its topo- graphical conformation and its central position regarding the islands in the lower ^gean, was selected as a base for the naval forces detailed to operate in those waters, and was occupied April 28th. An expeditionary force that was being organized at Tobruk sailed on the night of May 3d-4th, escorted by the ships of the second squadron, and proceeded to the isle of Rhodes. Expedition to Rhodes. This island, bound to Italy from time immemorial, is certainly the most important of the Sporades group, and also economical as a station for transit from the eastern to the western cities of the Mediterranean, in spite of its squalid decadence since the sixteenth century. Italian Colonial Troops. i: '■■-■ Squad of Meharisti. 64 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 65 Landing at Kalitheas and the Battle oj Asguru. (May 4, 191 2.) The expeditionary force rapidly landed at Kalitheas before daylight on the 4th, met the enemy at Asguru, and dispersed them; the following day Rhodes was entered. We decided not to give the Turkish garrison a chance to organize armed bands or receive reinforcements; but before a decisive engagement was fought it was necessary to construct a solid base which would guarantee the safety of the operating troops. Political and military preparations were also necessary for various reasons, and could not be hurried, requiring great foresight in order to arrive at the desired end. This work was completed on the 14th, nine days after the entrance of our troops into Rhodes; thereafter they were able to march into the interior. Battle oj Psitos. (May 16-17, 1912.) The enemy, after being disbanded during the retreat on the 4th, gradually ralhed at Psitos; which was an ad- vantage for us, for we could encounter the whole force, and not have prolonged warfare with fractions of their troops. The intent was perfectly carried out, after dif- ficult and fatiguing maneuvers; the opportune disposi- tions of the command, the admirable accord between the 66 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. Army and Navy, and the magnificent conduct of our troops won for us this reward. For the first time in history, rapidly and without the sUghtest inconvenience, two landings of troops and ma- teriel were contemporaneously made at night, without the assistance of moon or lights, on a shore open and hostile. The merit of the excellent results obtained belongs to the Navy, for the skill and ardor demonstrated, and to the troops, who behaved with dash and perfect discipUne. Our troops marched fourteen hours at night, across country unknown, mountainous, broken by deep ravines, rough and steep paths, yet they were able to arrive on the field of action and enter into combat against fresh troops. The Turks at Psitos found themselves surrounded by a ring of steel, and endeavored in vain to escape; at nightfall they took refuge in the valley of Maritza, fol- lowed and held there by our troops, and on the following day they were made prisoners. Immediately afterwards our troops, in spite of the day's battle following the fatiguing march and notwithstanding the unsatisfying repose of the previous night, spent on the rocks, took up the return march to Rhodes, covering in forty-eight hours (twenty hours' marching time) a distance of 75 kilometers (50 miles) or more, under conditions anything but normal and on haversack rations. We have there- fore a proof that our troops are inexhaustible, precious and enviable treasures of miUtary virtue. On the 12th of May the fleet landed sailors on the THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 67 islands of Scarpanto, Casos, Episcopi, Nisyros, Calymnus, Leros, and Patmos, and captured the small Turkish gar- risons and raised the national flag. Successively they occupied the islands of Cos, Symi, and Calchi, so that during the month of May the southern Sporades fell into our hands. ZONE OF HOMS. Battle and Occupation of Lebda. (May 2, 1912.) The garrison at Mergheb was reinforced, and then it was found necessary to push towards Lebda, in order that our troops might have freedom of movement to the eastward. Exact account had been kept of the enemy and their disposition, so that the attack was planned for the 2d of May. While the garrison at Mergheb engaged the enemy in their vicinity, two of our columns advanced silently and in accord upon Lebda, to surprise the adver- sary. They, however, managed to extricate themselves from our grasp in a precipitate flight, but they suffered heavy losses, and on that victorious day left in our hands the ruins of an antique city of the Roman Empire. Battle of the Monticelli di Lebda. (June 12, 1912.) The activity of the enemy was subdued after the 68 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. sanguinary engagement at the Monticelli, June 12, 191 2. The garrison at Horns having been diminished by the departure of several detachments, needed at other posts, the hope arose among the Arab-Turks that they could attack our line of Lebda (the Monticelli) and Homs to advantage. Their illusion, however, was replaced by a tragic realization when, having failed to surprise us, the Arab-Turks beat a hasty retreat: some towards the south, raked by a rapid and accurate fire from our bat- teries; some towards the deep ravines of Lebda, where our men, indefatigable and exalted by victory, followed them tenaciously, so that not one of the enemy thus cut off managed to escape. A detachment of Arab-Turks on Mount Rosse did not have time to extricate itself and was "nailed to the spot." This made the fourth victorious combat for the troops of Homs, undoubtedly unprecedented for positive and moral results, and which greatly contributed to the pride of the Italian soldier; as our forces in these cases were much smaller than those of our adversary, whereas in other cases our forces were numerically stronger. The greater losses were inflicted upon the enemy by rifle and artillery fire, but the bayonet also had its place of honor; glistening along the line, furiously seeking the enemy, closely pursuing, and finally engaging him in mortal combat. After this complete and bloody defeat, the activity of the enemy ceased around Homs. Entanglements of wire and other material were made to keep off the ma- 69 BKXCASI.— Sentries of a Battery Hospital Ship. Customs ^^"harf at Tripoli. 70 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 71 rauding Bedouins. A few shots, however, always put them to rout. ZONE OF MISURATA. In order to extend our occupations towards the west on the TripoUtan coast, on the i6th of June, nearly two months after the capture of Macabez, a surprise landing was made on the coast of Misurata. The operations were carried on with such excellent order and celerity that we only met with a futile resistance. A battalion of sailors and a company of infantry landed and dis- persed the small number of the enemy assembled on the beach, and with admirable impetuosity immediately oc- cupied the hill and pushed on to Ras Zorug. The balance of the expedition was landed and undisturbed, and on the following day the oasis of Kasr-Hamed was occupied. It might have been possible to send a detachment to Misurata immediately, taking advantage of the disor- ganized enemy and the panic of the population ; but such a resolution might have been repented, owing to the limited forces at hand ; it being necessary to leave on the coast a considerable number of troops to protect the landing of materiel and to establish and garrison a base. Battle and Occupation of Misurata. (July 8, 19 1 2.) But on the 7th of July, after twenty days' liv^ely work, the defense of the base was systematized, and on the 8th 72 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. we occupied successively the oasis of Misurata and Zarrug, and then the city of Misurata. The enemy, after the capture of Zarrug, made weak resistance here and there, having been at Zarrug subjected to artillery fire and the violent assaults of our troops, and put to rout. Our men, now veterans of nearly all the other combats, behaved with admirable ardor and dash, physical re- sistance, and excellent discipline. They took advantage of all the cover of the terrain, and therefore their losses were relatively slight. As soon as Misurata was occupied, a military and po- litical regime was immediately begun against the enemy, who had fled to the south and west of the oasis of Mis- urata. At times they showed force and committed acts of violence against the inhabitants of the surrounding country, who asked for our protection. Battle of Gheran. (July 20, 191 2.) The enemy was then dispersed by one of our brigades, composed of mixed troops, sent to Gheran; their activi- ties were thereby reduced to small attacks against our outposts and redoubts. ZONE OF DERNA. Advance on Sidi Abdallah II. (September 14, 19 12.) In July the possession of Derna was assured by the \ ì:i r Arming a Battery at Aiu Zara. 73 Advance on Regdaline. Cuiiiel Battery, Transporting Cannon. TransDortine Cannon. 7d. THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 75 defensive belt of works, erected between 2 to 3 kilometers (i to 2 miles) from the inhabited center, and other works for immediate security. The enemy's force, not exactly computed, but judged to be between eight and twelve thousand men, were encamped on the left of the ridge, out of range of the heaviest artillery. The adversary were not anxious to attack the encampment, but from long range dropped a few shells, which did no damage, but gave ground for the articles which appeared in the foreign gazettes, that we were being besieged by the troops of Enver Bey. Having received reinforcements, and being sure of the safety of our base at Derna, on the 14th of September we advanced, with the intent of oc- cupying Rudero at the head of the Laggati, to construct an occasional work; and to take up the position of Kasr Ras el Leben and of Casa Aronne to protect the workmen at Rudero. The enemy refused to contest our advance, and withdrew into the interior, but the material and moral results consequent to this move were great, because it demonstrated that we could work and impose upon the enemy at a distance from our encampment and our guns at Derna. Battle of Kasr Ras el Lehen. (September 17, 19 12.) On the 15th and i6th of September the enemy made tentative and weak attacks here and there on our front. The 17th was the day of battle. This engagement was 76 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. not preordained on our part, bur it was a direct conse- quence of our advance and the location assumed and maintained from the night of the 14th. The battle was composed of three distinct actions: a weak one early in the morning on our extreme left, in which the enemy was easily repulsed; the other two re- spectively heavy, at the head of the Bent in the morning, and again on our extreme left in the afternoon ; but in the evening the enemy was defeated and left the field covered with dead and wounded. On that memorable day the Arab-Turk forces, several thousand strong, with plenty of well-commanded artillery, conducted by Bnver Bey, arrayed themselves against the solidity, calmness, and vigor of the counter-attacks of our troops, white and native, conducted by the conspicuous ability of our officers and guided by a clear conception of tactics, with harmonious and effectual opportune dispo- sitions of troops. Our losses of 10 officers and 174 men, dead and wounded, were small compared with those of the enemy, of whom 1,135 were found dead near our lines. Battles of Sidi Abdallah III. and Braksada. (October 8-10, 191 2.) To enlarge the line of works in the western zone, Sidi Abdallah and Halg Giaraba were occupied on October 8th, after having attacked and defeated the enemy, who THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 77 later, on the loth, were again defeated at Bu Msafer, suffering heavy losses. ZONE OF TRIPOLI. Battle of Sidi Ahdul-Gelil or Zanzur. (June 8, 191 2.) From Sidi Abdul-Gelil towards the south and west of Gargaresc, the Arab-Turks managed Httle by little to construct and fit out a long line of intrenchments (Boer fashion), reinforced, traversed, blind covers and covered passages, from which they could advance towards our front at Gargaresc, while at other points they kept from 15 to 20 kilometers (10 to 13 miles) away from our out- posts. Therefore, it was necessary to remove this menace so close to our line, and with the fond hope that a victory on our part would win over to us the Urscefifana Tribe, who were showing some signs of discontent; also to de- stroy these trenches at Zanzur that were closing our works at Gargaresc, and which were considered im- pregnable. For military reasons and for reasons of policy and morale, the attack on Zanzur was made on June 8th. The Arab-Turks tenaciously defended the trenches of Sidi Abdul-Gelil, but our troops surmounted every ob- stacle with irresistible impetuosity and charged in a long Hne with the bayonet. The enemy made a desperate resistance, but were finally put to rout. They fled to- 78 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. wards the oasis of Zanzur, followed by rifle and artillery fire. So that, after less than four hours of fighting, the treble and strong line of intrenchments of the Arab-Turks, proclaimed impregnable, fell into the hands of the Italian soldiers. In the meantime a hostile column, 10,000 strong, at- tempted to turn our left flank, which was operating against Sidi Abdul-Gelil; but two of our reserves were being held at Gargaresc and Bu Meliana, respectively, so that while one reserve faced the enemy, the other at- tacked their right flank. It was impossible to close the two reserves on the enemy before they retreated. Great loss was suffered by the Arab-Turks. On this day we had 43 killed, i officer, and 278 wounded, of which 13 were officers. The enemy lost about 2,000 dead and a relative number of wounded. Our officers and men did their duty in an admirable manner, audaciously and with dash on the offensive, calm and tenacious on the defensive. In the fourteen hours of close combat and maneuvering the temperature fortunately was not as high as it had been on the pre- ceding days. The Ascari (native troops) demonstrated their excellence as soldiers and the devotion they had for our flag. Battle of Sidi Bilal. (September 20, 191 2.) The occupation of the heights of Sidi Abdul-Gehl gave us the control of the oasis of Zanzur. With a view, how- Wharf at Gargaresc. 79 TRIPOLI.— Trenches at Bu Meli ma. TRIPOLI.— Oasis. TRIPOLI. Oasis of Feschlum. Oasis South of Sciara Sciat. S( THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 8i ever, to further operations, it was necessary to materially secure the possession of the oasis and to push on towards the hills that skirted it on the south, to the valley of Hira; and exactly on the height of Sidi Bilal. On September 20, 191 2, three days after the bloody defeat of Enver Bey's troops at Dema, the enemy left 2,000 more dead on the field of battle, and their re- sistance around Tripoli was definitely weakened. Our losses were heavy, but, compared with those of the enemy, small : 10 officers dead and 22 wounded; 105 men dead and 411 wounded. The troops had to fight and maneuver on ground difficult to march and deploy upon. The temperature at certain hours was 90 degrees in the shade. Led by officers who set a splendid example, our soldiers of all the arms, of all the corps, and those of the Colonial troops, gave ad- mirable proof of endurance and elevated spirit during the twelve hours of combat. ZONE OF TOBRUK. The base at Tobruk was being gradually transformed into a maritime stronghold, fortifying first on the land side and afterwards towards the sea. The adversary was growing in numbers, and made a great many attacks against our works and skirmished with our troops on reconnaissance, but all the engage- ments were limited in importance; and finally, finding our defensive organization consistent in action, they ceased all hostiUties at the end of July. Table op Losses in the Principal Actions. Locality. ZUARA. Tripoli. HoMS. JVIlSURATA. Bengasi. Derna. TOBRUK. The ^gean. Action. Combat of Bu Chemesc, April 23, 19 12 Combat of Sidi Said, June 26, 27, 28, 1912 . . Combat of Sidi AH, July 14, 1912 Occupation of Zuara, August 6, 19 12 Combat and Occupation of Regdaline, Au- gust 15, 1912 Combat of Henni-Sciara-Sciat, Oct. 23, 1911 . Combat of Henni-Bu Meliana, Oct. 26, 1911 . Combat of Hamidiè Battery, Nov. 6, 1911 . . Combat of Henni-Messri, Nov. 26, 1911 . . . . Combat and occupation of Ain Zara, De- cember 4, 1911 Reconnaissance of Bir Tobras, Dec. 19, 19 11 Combat and occupation of Gargaresc, Janu- ary 18-20, 1912 Second combat of Ain Zara, Jan. 28, 19 12 . Battle of Sidi Abdul-Gelil or Zanzur, June 8, 1912 Battle of Sidi Bilal, September 20, 1912 . . . Reconnaissance of Lebda, Dec. 1,1911... Combat and occupation of Mergheb, Feb- ruary 27, 19 12 Night combat of Mergheb, March 5-6, 19 12 Combat and occupation of Lebda, May 2, 1912 Combat of the Monticelli of Lebda, June 12, 1912 Combat and occupation of Misurata, July 8, 1912 Combat of Gheran, July 20, 19 12 Landing from the Giuliana and conquest of Berca, October 19, 1911 Combat of Koefia, November 28, 1911 Defense of Bengasi, December 25, 1911 Combat of "Two Palms," March 12, 1912 . . Combat of November 24, 191 1 Combat of December 16, 1911 Combat of December 27, 1911 Combat of January 17, 1912 Combat of February 1 1-12, 1912 Combat of Sidi Abdallah I., March 3, 1912 . Combat of Sidi Abdallah IL, Sept. 14, 1912. Combat of Kasr Ras el Leben, September 17, 1912 Combat of Sidi Abdallah III. and of Brak- sada, October 8-10, 1912 Combat of Hagiass Nadra, Dec. 22, 1912 . . . Combat of Psitos, May 16-17, 1912 Total Dead and Wounded. Officers. Men 5 21 18 14 32 13 I 4 4 7 6 ID 3 17 2 I 22 2 236 63 236 82 122 482 172 19 119 123 89 67 14 320 516 14 80 5 59 86 135 "3 95 67 160 74 24 108 14 60 227 II 174 93 20 2,0 4.076 Besides the above, the following were lost in minor engagements at the various garrisons during the year of war, up to and including Januarj' 16, 1912: Officers and men, 5,652; of whom 1,432 died. Illness and disease, 1,948 died. Radio-Telegraph at Bengasi. *1»^2 feet, allowing the passage of small craft. Naturally, the major portion of this work was done in the two principal ports, Tripoli and Bengasi. The wharves here were more substantial, larger and longer, and the cranes heavier. Tracks were laid on the wharves, and the merchandise transferred to the store-houses or to the main railroad line by train. Survey. It was essential, for military purposes, to know the TRIPOLI. — A Breakwater'under Construction. TORRUK.— Aiuia VuUev. TRIPOLI.— Railway Station. RHODES.— Mount Smith. 116 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 117 topography of Libya. We had approximate and incom- plete knowledge of the surrounding country, especially of Cyrenaica, which was not widely traveled. A com- mission from the Military Geographic Institute, from the first days of the occupation, began at Tripoli a study of the geodetic and topographical conditions, and promptly turned out maps of Libya on various scales and of suf- ficient accuracy, in spite of the insufficient methods of reproduction. Roads, Streets, and Railways. The roads, even in the proximity of the inhabited centers, were deficient and in some places obsolete or reduced to broken paths. This was the case at Derna. When the communica- tions between the littoral and the higher plane were difficult, at first paths were made, then transformed into trails, and finally into roads for wagon-travel. In some places the road-building was difficult, and in one place we cut through rock for 2,500 meters (2,735 yards). Ar- riving on the higher plane, the work became easier, and roads were built connecting Marabutto, Sidi Abdallah, and Segnale on one side, and Kasr Ras el Leben and Casa Aronne on the other. The first road, when completed, would reach Ain Mara, and the second would become the principal communication towards Mantuba and Bomba. Along the shore and the wider roads of the plain narrow-gauge railroads were laid and animal power used, principally to carry water. An aerial cable 300 meters ii8 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. (310 yards) long was stretched across the valley of Giaraba, to which a car capable of carrying 200 kilograms (450 pounds) was attached, so that a haul up and down the mountain-side was saved. At Bengasi the work of road-building was not as dif- ficult as at Derna. A road was built from Bengasi to Giuliana (a drawbridge was built across the Sibback) ; to the oasis of Foeyat (where the water was potable) ; to Sabri and the various field-works. On this road narrow- gauge tracks were laid, facilitating the hauling of water, and so forth. At Tobruk, where the ground was rough and broken, a number of difficulties had to be overcome. However, 21 kilometers (14 miles) of roads were built, which could be used by auto-trucks, with a view to the future use by the towns, connecting them with the caravan trails of Solum and Derna. In the other garrisons of Libya secondary roads were built to meet the immediate requirements of the troops. At Tripoli, however, from the first days of our occu- pation, a narrow-gauge track was laid connecting the wharves with magazines and warehouses, and, with a view towards operations into the interior and the future railroad of Libya, 60 kilometers (40 miles) of tracks were requisitioned from Italy and laid. In March, 191 2, railroads connected Tripoli with Ain Zara ; in April, with Gargaresc ; and from this line ran a spur connecting with the quarries, for the transport of stone used in construction. In July the railroad from Fountain at Zanzur, Constructed by Soldiers. 119 Re8er\'oir at Bii M eliana. Panorama of Misurata. A Water Maia at Berna. 120 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 121 Tripoli to Tagiura was completed, and in the beginning of September the tracks were extended from Gargaresc to Zanzur. In the meantime a central depot and also one of de- parture were erected in Tripoli, with all the necessary apphances and offices. At the declaration of peace 60 kilometers (40 miles) of tracks were laid, and in operation there were 4 loco- motives, I train of first- and i of third-class coaches, 12 tank cars, 62 box and flat cars, and 12 armored cars. Even in the ^gean, roads were constructed. On the island of Rhodes, from Rhodes to Kum-Barnu Trianta to Fanes (a road for auto-trucks), from Rhodes to the fountains of Rodino to Kalitheas, 12 kilometers (18 miles). Another road 3 meters (3^ yards) wide was paved from the Bay of Trianta to Mount Smith, and then down into Rhodes. It was the ancient road of Cavaliere, which had been reduced to a path in spite of its being the most direct communication between Trianta and Rhodes. This work, finished in October, was long and tedious, the bridges and retaining-walls having to be repaired or rebuilt. At Leros the detachment stationed there repaired the road from Partheni to S. Marina for a length of 5 kilo- meters (3>2 miles). Telegraph and Telephone. As has been stated in the report of the Engineer Corps, the telegraphic, telephonic, and radio-telegraphic commu- 122 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. nication installed by them, for immediate military pur- poses, was only the forerunner of an extensive net to be established and that would prove its value in the colony. Water Mains. The water problem was one of the gravest faced during the war. It has been seen how in the beginning water had to be sent from Italy, and later how wells were dug and water sterilized for drinking purposes. Gradually this problem was solved, and water was furnished for the inhabitants as well as the troops. Little could be done around Bu Chemesc, because the water was brackish; and after digging loo meters (io8) yards) and not finding fresh water, this project was abandoned. In the peninsula of Macabez the water was fresh, but did not reach to a great depth. At Tripoli the sources of Bu Meliana were cleaned out and the existing mains were renovated; but the flow of water was insufiicient when the inhabitants abandoned the use of the wells. Work is in progress laying mains from Hamidiè to provide water for Hara, Sciara Sciat, and other quarters in that zone. At Misurata water mains and a power-plant were es- tablished, getting water from the wells of Mangush, i8 meters (20 yards) deep, i kilometer (1,094 yards) distant. At Bengasi plans are laid to get water from the wells of Foeyat and to construct a reservoir of 200,000 liters (40,000 gallons) . THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 123 At Dema the best water exists. Before our occupa- tion the city was furnished by wells and two uncovered aqueducts, which ran along the valley of Dema; the one on the right called the Seghia, 5 kilometers (3^2 miles) from the city and 53 meters (57 yards) above the sea level; the other, on the left, called Bu Mansur; both from distant sources not yet located. From the first days of our occupation this latter aqueduct was de- stroyed by the Arab-Turks, but the remaining one fur- nished enough water for our use. To prevent the de- struction of this one, the valley was dammed and the water was obtained through an iron pipe leading from this wall. The few wells and sources at Tobruk furnished brackish water, but the bad results were negative. It is expected that good water will soon be located further inland. Sanitary and Hygienic Measures. The sanitary conditions of the natives were bad, owing to the lack of hygienic and curative measures. They were provided, gratuitously in all the garrisons, with dispensaries, either detached or in the military hospitals, and even in the regimental infirmaries. The natives, at first diffident, finally began to report for treatment in great numbers and with faith. At Homs from 15 to 20 per day at first reported, and finally from 60 to 80; at Misurata, from June to October, 5,000 sick were cared for; and at Bengasi, during the year of the war, 32,507. 124 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. At Rhodes the civil and marine hospital services were in a position to attend to all the wants. In Tripoli this free treatment had to be reinforced, the cholera having broken out among the natives just before we landed. The first steps taken were to isolate and stamp out this epidemic. The military sanitary corps worked with great intelligence and abnegation, first alone and then in conjunction with the civil sanitary corps. Notwithstand- ing the gravest difficulties experienced — the scarcity of potable water, the filth in the houses and streets, and insufficient and unsuitable means to cope with this dis- ease, they managed to eliminate the cholera in a brief space of time. The peril from cholera having diminished, the sanitary personnel immediately began to organize. They in- stalled two laboratories, one chemical and one bacterio- logical, with all the means and instruments necessary to carry on their respective work. They could therefore perform and render the same service as any laboratory in the mother country. To prevent contagious diseases and to rapidly stamp them out in case they manifested them- selves, a quarantine station was established in all the ports; the one in Tripoli being the most important, as this port was used by the pilgrims to and from Mecca. In case of an epidemic, those afflicted were isolated out- side of the city in a hospital of 150 beds. Illness of a minor character was taken care of in the regular hos- pitals. The laboratory Baccelli, created by the Minister y'ii'iiUJL ...,,, r \ 1.-,. yjL i ii_.i.ain..w 1..1 - -a. J lieview ol" Troups. 125 BENCÌA61. — iort at riemonU), A Company of Colonials. m Orphans at Exercise. 126 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 127 of Foreign Affairs for research before our occupation, with its four specialists, did excellent and conspicuous work in ophthalmia and diseases of the ear, nose, and throat. To organize and better the sanitary and hygienic con- ditions of the natives, doctors were detailed to live in the various quarters, to see that decrees relative to sanitation were being carried out, and to give medical aid. Various Services. The synthetic character of this writing does not allow the space these services merit, but will be explained in brief. Customs and tariff were imposed or reduced, care being taken not to alarm the commerce of the neutral nations; keeping account of the local exigencies, and not preventing the liberal development of industr>^ com- bating, moreover, the excessive use of alcoholic drinks. The port officials regulated the harbor police, fishing- boats, maritime rights and sanitation, pilots, landings, and departures. Steps were taken to protect and till the tobacco plan- tations and promote the growth of Fezzan and Tripolitan tobacco. The municipal and federal establishments were reha- bilitated, having been left by the Turks in complete abandon. Civil jails and prisons were constructed, elec- tric lights and cars installed, streets paved, and local and suburban police organized. 128 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. At Tripoli an orphan asylum was established, where the children were maintained and educated. Steps were taken to assist the poor, who had become more numerous, due to the misery of the war. The Exchange was organized; illicit speculations, ex- cessive loans from banks, illegal acquirement of land, and the cutting down of palms prevented. Steps were taken to repopulate and cultivate the oases, with pecuniary encouragement and protection against marauders, who were a menace to all isolated grounds, and to institute agricultural credit. Excellent silk is raised on the experimental farms established. Italian schools were opened as soon as possible. In the interests of archaeology, the old Roman ruins around Libya are being excavated under the supervision of experts. The service of the poHce was at first rendered by the Carabiniere (Italian Royal PoHce), then by natives under their supervision. The courts of justice were in the beginning all military. Later, a civil tribunal and an appellate court were insti- tuted in Tripoli. Our good intentions were demonstrated to the Arabs, relative to the new colony, and the comparison made be- tween the old and new regime, the removal of the squalor, and our respect for their traditions, customs, and rehgious beliefs by distributing lambs for their rites, and repairing the mosques that had been damaged by shells. Flour was furnished gratuitously and periodically, money was *^V O^i-v Orphans at School. 129 Orphans at Drill. Olive Trees at Misurata — Shoemakers in the Shade. TRIPOLI.— DrilUng Recruits. 130 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. 131 given for repair of houses and wells, and work-animals loaned. Treaties were made with the chiefs, and they were given administrative rights and power over their tribes. As it was difficult to get into direct communica- tion with the Arabs, owing to the vigilance exercised by the Turks over our emissaries, proclamations in Arabic were dropped from dirigibles and aeroplanes into Arab camps. The Arabs had been and were kept in the dark by the Turks as to the developments of the campaign, our vic- tories, our intentions, and our form of government, in the whole theater of war. Conclusion. Our recent war, due to the condition of the terrain, resources, and climate of the hostile country, was complex and difficult. The work completed by Italy, by means of its Army and Navy and supported by public enthusiasm, can be said to be truly unique. The accurate and sagacious work of military prepara- tion, the valor displayed in combat, and for the fruitful civil rights established in our antique Roman colony, is destined, under the activity of our people, to be given a new and religious life. His Majesty the King issued the following order: "Order of the Day to the Army and Navy. "S. Rossore, 2Qth October, igi2. "In the solemn proof, to which Italy was called by her 132 THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR. new destinies, the Army and Navy have worthily ac- complished their proper duty. "They were put to the test on land and sea, and were found prepared, ably directed by chiefs, and valorous in combat. The happy result was merited and was a con- sequence of the activity and intelligent cooperation of all, the abnegation, the calm patience with which the perils and discomforts were serenely confronted, the sacrifice of noble lives with enthusiastic loyalty devoted to their country. "Glory to those who fell for the grandeur of Italy. "To the Army and Navy, who fraternally united in this arduous enterprise and worthily impersonated the national conscience, falls the warmest expression of my most heartfelt gratitude and the loyal applause of a grateful country." On the 19th of January, 19 13, the troops passed in review before His Majesty; the flags of all the corps were then escorted to the monument of Vittorio Emanuele II., "The Altar of the Country," and decorated by the King. Arab l-*risoners. 133 King of Italy Decorating the Colors. LITANIA : 1.500.000 regione Jegii O'ieila MISURATA Scala appr 1 : 250.000 Zarrytg TRIPOLITANIA i'»>^I.''r. r ,(\ JM /'-' I \ - A ^ \ TRIPOLI E DINTORNI UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 'I lll||lll|ll| III III ll|l|lll Il|li|i1i|rii| i|iii|> i|l| AA 000 902 415 9