LIBRARY

"University of California^

IRVINE

EX [

LIBRIS |

'FRANK C.
BOWEN :

E MH

NAVAL POLICY

WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF

THE WARSHIPS OF THE PRINCIPAL

POWERS

PA'

G. W. ST E EVENS

FELLOW OF PEMBROKE COLLEGE, OXFORD

METHUEN & CO.

36, ESSEX STREET, W.C.

LONDON

1896

5 8/

PREFACE

The unkindest fate that this book or its author could
encounter, is that the one should be accounted an
attempt at original theory and research, or the other
dubbed a naval expert. I am not an expert, and the
following pages are not written for experts. They are
merely an endeavour to interpret in some measure
such sources of information upon naval matters as
are open to the general public. But even these,
unfortunately, make up a good body of print ; and
most men and women have neither the time nor the
inclination to study and collate them. I have
endeavoured to present their essence here in such a
way that those who disagree with my opinions may
be able to form conclusions of their own.

A book of this kind must needs scamp a full
recognition of its borrowings ; it is wholly made up
of borrowings. Many of these have been set down
in their proper place. But there are others too great
and too perpetually recurrent to be dealt with thus,
unless the whole book were to be made up of footnotes
and cross-references. For statistical matter I have
pillaged without scruple the successive volumes of
Brussels Naval Annual, and Mr. Laird Clovves's
Naval Pocket Book, as well as the principal newspapers.

PREFACE

In points of policy and strategical theory I am equally

indebted to the great works of Admiral P. H. Colomb,

the various strategical essays of Mr. J. R. Thursfield,

and the writings of Mr. W. H. Wilson. Above all,

it is impossible to give any detailed acknowledgment

of my debts to Mr. Spenser Wilkinson and Sir

Charles Dilke. Supposing this book were to prove

an introduction to the works here named, it will have

more than succeeded, and ought to prove of some

small but real service to the political direction of this

country.

G. W. STEEVENS.

CONTENTS

I. The Problem.

A Parliamentary Paper examined — The Debate on the 1896 Estimal
— Speeches by Mr. Goschen, Sir Charles Dilke, Mr. Balfour, and
others — The necessity for an analysis of official figures . Page 1

II. The Elements of Force in Warships.

Mechanical invention the controlling influence in the history of war —
Requisites of a fighting ship — Rifled guns, armour, steam— Con-
tinuity of progress — Introduction of rifled cannon — Of slow-burning
powder and breech-loaders — Wire guns — The secondary armament —
Introduction of quick-firers : their power, their construction — The
dynamite gun — The torpedo : its position in war still undefined —
Introduction of compound plating — Harveyed steel : its power of
resistance — Steam power: progress of engines — Forced draught
and its dangers — Water-tube boilers . . . 13

III. The British Navy.

The fighting force — Theory of offence and defence : the command of
the sea — The Majestic class described — The group system — Un-
armoured ends of British battleships — The Royal Sovereign,
Centurion, Renown, Canopus class, Nile , Sanspareil — Size of heavy
guns — The "Admiral" class— Second-class and third-class battle-
ships — Coast-defence ships — The functions of cruisers — The Arm-
strong type — The Terrible: compared with foreign types — First-
class cruisers described — Second-class cruisers : their inferiority in
gun-power to French types — Third-class cruisers — Torpedo-gun-
boats — Torpedo-boat destroyers : their fragility, their functions —
Torpedo-boats . . . . . . 51

IV. Foreign Navies.

France — Character of the French Navy — Description of Charlemagne,
Massena, Car not, Brennus, Marceau, etc. — The French battle
fleet compared with the British — Annoured cruisers — Can they
replace the battleship? — Other cruisers — Torpedo craft. Russia —
The Russian Navy exists for aggression — Russian battleships
described — Cruisers and torpedo craft. Germany — The best kept
Navy in Europe — German battleships, cruisers and torpedo boats.

vii

CONTENTS

Italy — Decline of Italian naval power — Deficiency of armour —
Description of battleships, cruisers, torpedo-craft. United States
— Aggressive naval policy — Description of battleships and cruisers

Page 107

V. Relative Strength.

The element of uncertainty — Tabular comparisons of the vessels of
the principal Powers . . . . .158

VI. Shipbuilding Policy.

Mr. Goschen's intentions — Policy and estimates — Our possible enemies
— Necessity for increase of armament — Necessity for meeting coast-
defence ships with British battleships — Defence of our commerce —
The theory and practice of blockade — We want five battleships to
an enemy's three — Deficiencies of our existing battle-fleet —
Deficiencies in our force of cruisers : of torpedo craft — The German
menace — Necessity for continuous progress . . . 179

VII. Officers and Men.

The personal equation — Necessity of training— Numbers kept at sea
by the principal Powers — Impossibility of manning our existing
fleet — The Royal Naval Reserve— Foreign reserves — Schemes for
making up our deficiencies : additions to permanent force, short
service, reform of present reserve, increase of marines, volunteers —
Mr. Goschen's intentions . . . . .212

VIII. Colonies and Coaling Stations.

The command of the sea the best Colonial defence — Our distant
squadrons — Obsolete ships on foreign stations — Local defence :
Australia, New Zealand, The Far East, India, South Africa,
Canada, The West Indies — Importance of coaling stations —
Weakness of present garrisons — Sierra Leone an example — Malta
and Gibraltar . . . . . 237

IX. Are we Ready for War ?

The Mediterranean Squadron — Strategical advantage of France —
Should we abandon the Mediterranean ? — Defective arrangements
for mobilization — Divided command of our naval ports — Divided
responsibility for the Navy generally — Necessity for a General Staff
with a responsible Chief — The function of public opinion in Naval
Policy — War must be left !" experts . . , 267

Appendix . . . . . . 291

Index . . . . . . . 321

viii

NAVAL POLICY

THE PROBLEM.

TOWARDS the end of January, 1896, there was issued
— a year late — a Parliamentary Return of the naval
strength of Great Britain and the other principal
maritime Powers. Compiled, as we must presume,
from the most authoritative sources by the most
competent experts, it was intended for the informa-
tion of the men who have to vote our money for
the one effective arm of defence we possess against
foreign aggression. It is natural, and surely most
essential to our health as a nation, that both Members
of Parliament and their constituents should wish to
be accurately and clearly informed upon the exact
strength of our Navy, and its relation to the strength
of others. The Return in question was presumably
issued to satisfy this most commendable curiosity. It
is not necessary to reproduce it here, for one very good
reason : that it can convey no information to anybody.
It could mean almost anything, according to the
taste and fancy of the interpreter; which means that
it means nothing. For example : that large body of
public opinion which regards a ship as a ship, and

NAVAL POLICY

one ship as good as another, could extract from the
Return very great consolation. It appears therein
that Great Britain owns 384 ships above the size of
a torpedo-boat; while France (160), Russia (90), and
Germany (81), have between them only 331. On this
calculation, we thus possess a comfortable superiority
over the three next naval Powers put together : a very
comfortable reflexion for the taxpayer to sleep on.
Other critics, more discriminating, would consider the
classification under which these numbers were submit-
ted to Parliament. There were four heads : battleships,
coast-defence ships, cruisers, and other ships. To the
believer in battleships it was doubtless interesting to
learn that Great Britain, with 46 of these craft com-
pleted and 10 building, holds at present a clear lead
of the next two Powers — France, with 25, and 9
building ; and Germany, with 20, and 3 — but will
have lost it by the time the ships building are ready
to go to sea. On the other hand, if you count coast-
defence ships in the fleet available for battle, we are at
present 9 ships behind, and will shortly be 11. It
would also be instructive to notice that Germany is
at present appreciably more powerful than Russia, both
in battleships alone and in battleships and coast
defenders together ; and also in cruisers. But in cruisers
the figures of the Return — and, of course, the Return
affords no criterion but figures — give Her Majesty's
Navy 126 ships, against 131 of the five other Euro-
pean Great Powers together. In " other ships " our
position is not quite so satisfactory, the figures stand-
ing at 131 to 167, both Russia and Italy being rela-
tively strong in "other ships." All these conclusions
might be drawn by the first two rules of simple

THE PROBLEM

arithmetic from the Parliamentary Return under con-
sideration. No doubt they are all interesting; but,
unfortunately, they are all demonstrably misleading.
And, indeed, it requires no very great acumen to discern
that one battleship may differ from another in capacity
for battle, one cruiser from another in fitness for
cruising ; while even one " other ship " may be other
than another. It is so obvious, that it may seem
rather poor spirit to make such cheap and obvious
mockery of the Return. Yet a Parliamentary Paper
purports to be a thing of some weight and dignity.
Why, then, on the most important question with
which Parliament has to deal is information conveyed
to it in a form so manifestly open to ridicule ?

For about six weeks Honourable Members had the
opportunity of digesting the intelligence thus conveyed
to them, and then came on the Navy Estimates. It is
not necessary to recapitulate the peculiar circumstances
of the international situation at the beginning of March,
1896. The country was beset by a crowd of difficulties
with Foreign Powers to which living memory can hardly
find a parallel later than the Napoleonic War. In
addition to France and Russia, who hold an honorary
position as our probable assailants, we were involved in
acute differences with Germany and with the United
States. On the face of things it was not wholly
inconceivable that we might have to make head at
sea against a combination of these four Powers. In
this crisis, if ever, it was plainly necessary that those
who provide our means of defence should be quite
clearly aware of our own naval strength, and of its
relation to that of our possible enemies. The pro-
vision of our means of defence depends, first, on the

NAVAL POLICY

naval advisers of the First Lord of the Admiralty;
second, on the First Lord ; third, on the Cabinet ;
fourth, on the House ; lastly, on the country as a
whole. In theory the technical knowledge of the
five factors may be considered to go, roughly, in a
descending scale. The Sea Lords may be presumed
to know what the Navy should be better than the
First Lord ; he, better than the Cabinet Minister ; he,
better than the plain M.P. ; and he, better than the
plain constituent. But in practice all knowledge
ought to be common to all. Certainly all are equally
interested in the adequacy of the Navy. And it is
surely not too much to ask that even the meanest
voter, though he must needs take much on trust,
should have some sort of idea what are the functions
our fleet is meant to discharge, and what is its capacity
for discharging them. There ought to be an accepted
standard of necessary strength, if such can be arrived
at. There should be in any case a common under-
standing as to our actual strength at sea relatively
to the navies against which we might possibly have
to defend ourselves.

A brief retrospect of the discursive debate on the
Naval Estimates of 1896 shows only too well that this
common understanding is completely absent. How
completely, a few extracts will prove. Mr. Goschen
began by frankly declining to flatter our intelligence
by entering into any details at all.

" I am not going," he said, " to place before the House
comparative lists of the navies of foreign countries and of
our own. It is, no doubt, a matter which has to be done,
and we at the Admiralty have given days and weeks and
months to the consideration of the relative strength of the

THE PROBLEM

different navies. I propose, not to place before the House
the processes or figures by which we have arrived at our
results ; I propose only to give those results, with some
indication of the system which we have followed. We
have proceeded by analyzing, as regards battleships, all such
forces as ought to be taken into consideration. We have
been aware of this fact : that there are first-class battleships
belonging to ourselves which are at present not much more
efficient than some second-class battleships; and, on the
other hand, that there are some second-class battleships
which may be ranked, in certain circumstances, as equal to
first-class battleships. We look at the matter as a whole.
We take a second-class battleship which is capable, as regards
armament, armour, and speed, of competing with the first-
class battleship. You must send the first-class battleship
against it. Nevertheless, that second-class ship is unequal to
the first class, because it has not got the coal-carrying capacity ;
and, therefore, it is only under certain given circumstances
that the second-class ship is equal to the first class. In the
construction of battleships there are four desiderata — speed,
armament, defensive armour, and coal-carrying capacity.
To secure these objects — if you want to secure them all
in their fullest efficiency — you require vessels of a certain
size; and when you want to decrease the size of that
vessel you must make up your minds which of those four
desiderata you are prepared to sacrifice, and that sacrifice
you will choose according to the special circumstances of
the nation. Those who are prepared with defensive naval
strategy may leave out coal-carrying capacity; those who
believe that theirs must be an offensive policy must on no
account surrender coal-carrying capacity ; and so it happens,
when you compare one of our ships, having large coal-
carrying capacity, and also considerable capacity for carrying
ammunition, with a foreign ship, you may find that the foreign
ship has thicker armour ; but what is her coal-carrying
capacity? You must make a sacrifice on one side or the
other ; and it is only when you bear in mind these first
principles, you will do justice to your own ships, or be able
to form a proper opinion."

NAVAL POLICY

At a later point in his speech he added : "A broad
view has been taken of the Navy, and we believe that
now" — that is to say, in 1899, by which time the 1896
programme is to be carried into effect — "we have
arrived at some point on which we may stand."

The considerations enounced by the First Lord are
very lucid and very true. But unluckily we find Sir
Charles Dilke, upon the continuation of the debate,
declaring with equal lucidity and truth that v/e are very
far indeed from any point on which we may stand.

"A very large proportion of our fleet," he pointed out,
"now extending to a half of the lowest class but one and
the whole of the lowest class is entirely armed with the
old guns ; and yet they are counted in all comparisons
between the force of this country and Foreign Powers as
battleships capable of taking their place in the line. The two
main points in all Naval Estimates must be battleships and
guns. No other test will stand the investigation of sound
sense. I cannot see in this programme of the Government
as regards battleships in 1899 that any standard of compari-
son has been taken by the Admiralty as between ourselves
and Foreign Powers which could be accepted by those who
hold views similar to my own as a sufficient standard for
defence. The programme this year seems to me to be a
hand-to-mouth programme, a mere continuation programme,
a France and Russia programme."

Mr. Balfour, in answer, was even more explicit as to
the absolute adequacy, so far as the present position
goes, of Mr. Goschen's estimates.

" I think, therefore, that we must content ourselves with the
general standard which has been quite sufficient in the past,
and, without taking a vast, though not absolutely impossible,
combination against us, simply contemplate bringing up our
fleet to a strength which would enable us to contend on satis-

THE PROBLEM

factory terms with the two largest fleets that could be brought
against us. I believe that that standard has been attained, and
will be attained, by the efforts of the late Government, and by
our efforts during the three coming years. The facts are ex-
tremely simple. You may take as first-class battleships, ships
which, from their armament, speed, and defensive armour, are
capable of fighting in the first line against any other ships
of a similar class, irrespective of coal supply, of height of
free-board, or other conditions which make a ship valuable for
distant service or service in a rough sea and on the ocean ; or
you may proceed on a different principle, and you may say
that no ship can be described as a first-class battleship which
is not capable of fighting anywhere in the first line of battle,
that has not a very large coal supply, as well as powerful
armament, and that is not therefore capable of joining in
a combination of fleets very far distant from its base of
operations. According as you take one or other of these
principles of calculation no doubt you will get different results
in making comparisons with foreign navies. But let it be
observed that there is so far this justification for the narrow
definition advanced by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer.
You are dealing by hypothesis with a single nation — with
Great Britain — fighting a combination of Powers, choose
what Powers you like. Those two Powers, if you mean to
include the second-class battleships — second-class in point
of size — with very heavy armament among their first-class
ships, undoubtedly cannot bring together in combination
a fleet equal to your own. Those ships are only first-class
ships in their own waters, and not first-class ships far from
their base, and therefore do not form part of a fleet which can
work with another nation very far from the base of operations.
Therefore it is manifest that, though it would be rash for this
House to say that, because some of these smaller and power-
fully-armoured ships cannot act far from their own port, they
ought under no circumstances to be regarded as first-class
battleships, for all purposes they are not first-class battleships,
and some of these purposes are the very purposes that
become important when you are considering the combined

NAVAL POLICY

action of two foreign fleets. If you take a rigid definition of
a first-class battleship, requiring not merely powerful arma-
ment, but powerful armour, speed, and coal endurance, we
shall have, as I make out, in 1898-99 a very considerable
superiority over the two largest fleets that may be brought
against us."

Sir William Harcourt followed on the same side.

"The First Lord of the Treasury has said truly that it
depends upon how you compare your ships. We see a small
ship of, say, 10,000 tons compared with a ship of 14,000 tons,
and we are told that the foreign ship is equal to the English
ship of 14,000 tons; it is said the only difference is in
the coal-carrying capacity of the vessel. The fact is the small
ship has got thicker armour and heavier guns, and therefore it
is of as much use in its own waters, as the First Lord has said,
as is the larger ship. I daresay that is quite true ; but
are you going to have no ships of your own in your own
waters ? If not, why are you not ? Are you not going to
have in your own waters constantly vessels which you will not
send to a great distance? In my belief, the nation will
always demand that you shall have a number, and a consider-
able number, of vessels in the Channel, which are not to go to
the other end of the world in case of war. I do not believe
that the nation ever will again run the risk which was nearly
fatal to it just before the battle of Trafalgar when the
Channel was left without a protective fleet, the great ships
having gone to a distance. If so, there is an easy method of
obtaining a larger number of ships which, for defensive
purposes, may be made as powerful as, or more powerful than,
much larger ships of other nations. There is a policy by
which you can get a far larger number of ships in your own
Channel, and that is a policy which is well deserving of
consideration."

And then he apologized to the House " for having
gone so far with the details of the matter " — a very-
significant hint as to the spirit in which it was

THE PROBLEM

considered decent that the House should treat such
affairs.

All this sounds very confident and very comforting.
But next follow Sir John Colomb, and later Mr. Arnold
Forster, both able and assiduous students of naval
affairs. On their showing the matter does not seem
quite so simple as Mr. Balfour would make out, and
they appear to differ from Sir William Harcourt in
holding the view that it is possible that the British
Navy might find it advisable to act in force in other
seas than its " own Channel." Sir John Colomb

" Regretted to hear the First Lord of the Treasury hark
back to the fallacious idea that if our fleet was equal to
the two fleets of the greatest Foreign Powers, therefore this
country was safe. The strategical equality of ships was a
question quite separate from individual fighting power, and he
submitted that if ten battleships were in a port they could
not be kept in by ten other battleships. In some ports he
could name it would take twenty and even thirty to give any
guarantee of producing that moral effect which would keep the
ten ships in. If that was so, he maintained it was false to
base our naval policy on the abstract comparison of battle-
ships."

And Mr. Arnold Forster followed (a day or two
afterwards) with a tribute to Sir Charles Dilke's
speech.

" It struck every one who heard it as a lucid, well-conceived
statement of a case which might be strong or weak, according
as the facts stood. Until the facts were overthrown it was a
strong case, and one to which a little more consideration ought
to be devoted. The leader of the Opposition said that we
were to accept the proposals of the Government, because they
were proposed by a responsible Government with their know-
ledge of the necessities of the case. Was it not an elementary
fact that during the last ten years everything that had been

NAVAL POLICY

conceded had been forced by agitation from the responsible
Government, and had been something they did not intend to
give? The increase of the Navy Estimates had proved that
the Estimates made by former responsible Governments did
not cover the necessities of the case. To tell them that they
must accept these Estimates, because they were proposed by a
responsible Government, was to fly in the face of all ex-
perience."

Now what is the plain Englishman — to whom, after
all, the naval power of England is a matter of vital
concern — to make of all this ? What can he make of
it ? Simply that the First Lord of the Admiralty and
the First Lord of the Treasury think that the Navy
Estimates of 1896 put the country in a satisfactory-
state of defence ; from which it should follow that there
will be next to no Navy Estimates in 1897. The leader
of the Opposition seems to tend towards the same view ;
while Sir Charles Dilke, Sir John Colomb, and Mr.
Arnold Forster hold a diametrically opposite opinion.
He will see that the men in high authority say one
thing, and the men who have made a study of the
subject say the other. But, beyond this, the four days
of debate tell him absolutely nothing. The men who
represent him and govern him are at loggerheads, and
of the opinions of the Sea Lords of the Admiralty —
the men of practical experience and knowledge — there
is no sign. The Parliamentary Returns fog him with
figures which carry no meaning with them ; the Parlia-
mentary speeches exhibit nothing but a conflict of the
opinions on which it is his custom to rely. We must
attempt to get beyond these levelling figures which make
one ship as good as another, and these speeches which
cannot determine what is a first-class battleship and
what is not. " It depends what you count," said Sir

THE PROBLEM

Charles Dilke, and the phrase was the keynote of the
whole debate. It seems worth while to ask what there
is to count, and what reason there is why you should
count it.

In other words, we ought to go behind arbitrary
classifications, and inquire what are the elements of
naval force which the classifications represent. We
must analyze. It may be granted at once that the
analysis can never be quite certain or quite final.
There has not been sufficient experience of naval
war to determine the relative value of one factor and
another with strict exactness. Still less can we put
down on paper such indeterminate equations as the
value — the skill and coolness — of one fighting man in
reference to another. War, like sport, must always have
this element of human uncertainty, which is the cause
of the charm of both. But without presuming to
absolute mathematical certainty, we can, and should,
get some way further towards it. We can ask what it
is that makes one fighting-ship superior to another ;
why one ship is superior for one particular purpose to
another ; how our own country stands in reference to
these qualifications. There is a reason for everything,
if we can only ferret it out ; and there must be a reason
why one ship, or one fleet, should conquer another. Also
there is a purpose for everything, and everything is what
it is in order that it may fulfil a certain purpose. If we
can find out what reasons there are why one ship or fleet
can be made superior to another, and in what particular
ways British ships and fleets ought to be superior to
any other ships and fleets that may be pitted against
them, then we shall have advanced some way to the
solution of the most important problem that confronts

NAVAL POLICY

us as a nation. We want to find out as well as we can,
first, what our Navy can do relatively to other navies,
and, second, what it ought to be able to do. And
having found this out as well as we can, at all costs, if we
are to remain the greatest nation of the world, we must
fit the Navy to do its work. We exist as a great nation
by reason of our colonies, our trade, and our daily bread,
and, once we lose the sea, we lose all three of them.

II.

THE ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN
WARSHIPS.

The history of warfare is the history of a struggle for
existence among weapons. If the world has chosen to
fix its attention upon those who have used weapons in
battle, those who devised them have been the real
makers of military history. The fighting man has
been as resolute and cunning in one age as in another ;
the manner of his fighting, and, within limits, the
chances of his success, have been governed by the
inventor. The battle of Crecy, to use a commonplace
of the school books, was less a victory of Englishmen
over Frenchmen than a victory of the light archer over
the armoured horseman. The battle of Falkirk before
it, where the English bowmen broke up the square of
Scottish spearmen, was a victory of organized long-
range weapons over an organization of weapons useful
only at close quarters. Bannockburn, where the English
bowmen were broken by cavalry, was a set-back in the
true line of progress, due, probably, rather to bad
generalship than to the defects of the bow as a
weapon ; the bow, at any rate, reaped a rich revenge
at Halidon Hill. The invention of gunpowder still
further increased the disadvantage of the close fighting
weapons, until, for highly-organized warfare, the bayonet

NAVAL POLICY

is like to become as obsolete as the battle-axe. This
and similar gigantic changes in the conditions of war
are the work of the inventor, and of the inventor alone.
The rulers of battle have been the inventors of steel-
forging, of body-armour, of gunpowder, and the like;
the great tacticians have been merely those captains
who had the insight and the coolness to turn the
inventor's ingenuity to best account in the field. It
would be futile to deny that courage or skill, or even
numbers, have often given the victory to the less
perfectly equipped force. But on the whole, and in
the long run, the military nations of the world seem
so nearly equal in bravery and generalship, that the
possessors of the best machines are certain to win in
the long run. Valour marches in the iron grip of
science, and must either obey or perish.

It is only in our own age, with its astonishing harvest
of inventions in every field, that physical science has
thus clearly disengaged itself as the tyrant of war. In
earlier days progress in the instruments of war was so
slow that a nation could easily be a century or two out
of date in its equipment without the certainty of defeat.
To-day progress is so bewilderingly rapid that the
failure to keep up with the scientific developments of
a single year might very conceivably ruin a great
empire. If this is true of war by land, it is a thousand-
fold truer of war by sea, and that for a very obvious
reason. It results from a fundamental law of hydro-
statics, that you cannot put more weight into a ship
than the weight of the water it displaces. In a ship of
any given size the amount of destructive and pro-
tective power that can be put on board is necessarily
and immutably limited by this law. Moreover, the size

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

of a ship itself, theoretically unlimited, is limited in
practice by such considerations as handiness in turning,
draught of water, capability of approaching land, facility
of docking, and the like. In the ship of war, therefore,
we find the very paradise of the inventor. It is the
essence of mechanical invention to concentrate the
greatest possible energy into the least possible weight
and space : an engine of fifty horse-power is preferable
to fifty horses, not because it is more powerful — for by
hypothesis it is not — but because it is more compact
and manageable. The ship of war cries out for such
compacted power, and the inventor has most abundantly
responded to the appeal. The modern warship is such
a maze of complicated machines, that the ordinary
Briton, who is not engineer, chemist, mathematician,
and electrician all in one, may well give up the attempt
to unravel the appalling tangle. Yet it is his business
to know, at least, the most important factors in the
efficiency of Her Majesty's ships of war, which are also
his own. On their efficiency depends his daily bread,
to say nothing of his national self-esteem and honour.
And this efficiency depends, nowadays, on a never-
ceasing development of new forces of attack and
defence, in which the smallest pause may at any
moment mean defeat and ruin.

The primary requisites for a fighting-ship are obviously
two — the ability to get to the point where she is to
fight, and the ability to fight when she gets there. The
first function is the subject-matter of strategy, the
second of tactics. Neither can be preferred before
the other, since no quality can be more than indis-
pensable. But it is obvious that, in any ship, they
can be combined in various degrees, and attained by

NAVAL POLICY

various means. The ability to get to the point of
action depends on sea-worthiness, speed, and staying-
power ; ability to defeat the enemy, mainly on power
to destroy his ships, protection for the ship's self, and
speed to enable it to bring its offensive qualities into
play to the best advantage, and to assist its means
of defence. In three words, offensive, defensive, and
locomotive power, are the principal necessities of a
warship ; and the best ship is that which affords the
most advantageous combination of the three.

It so happens that a point, which may be roughly
placed about forty years ago, marked a great step for-
ward in each of these respects. This was the almost
simultaneous introduction of steam propulsion, ar-
moured ships and rifled guns, and the epoch may be
taken as the birth of the modern warship.*' These
three elements combine into the battleship ; that is, the
ship capable, by reason of her offensive and defensive
power, to sustain the stress of a fleet action. With a
different distribution of the armour from that first
adopted — by the horizontal protection offered by a
steel deck, instead of vertical plating on the side — the
three elements are as indispensable to the modern
cruiser. The terrible example which the Merrimac,
possessed of armour, steam, and rifled guns, made of

* In strict accuracy the first steam vessel in the British Navy was the
Comet, in 1821, and the first screw steamer, the Rattler 1841. The first
armoured ships were five floating batteries built by France in 1854, and
their first appearance in action was at the capture of Kinburn, in the
Crimea, the following year. Rifled small arms were issued to British
troops in 1 851, but Lord Armstrong did not complete the first rifled
cannon till 1856. It is acutely observed by Mr. H. W. Wilson {Ironclads
in Action, ii. 210) that the steam-engine, making exact perfection of work
possible, and enabling large masses of metal to be treated, is really re-
sponsible both for armour-plates and rifled guns.

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

the Cumberland and Congress, which lacked them,
settled the question of this indispensability once and
for all. Without them, in short, no ship of any size
could possibly take the sea, in war-time, without the
certainty of destruction.

But since the well-marked epoch which saw this
great revolution in the construction of warships, pro-
gress has not been stayed. It is easy to fix this
point as the birth of the modern fighting-ship, but
since then its growth, if less readily marked down at
any particular period, has been continuous. During
the last forty years, indeed, the transformation has
been as complete, if more gradual, than was effected
by the three great inventions which rendered the old
man-of-war obsolete in every respect, almost at a blow.
The Warrior, of 1859, which (after the substitution of
rifles for smooth-bores) embodied all the progress of
her day, would be almost as helpless against the
Majestic as the Victory would be against the Warrior.
The Achilles (1869), which is the oldest armoured
ship supposed to be fit for service, carries armour
whose resisting power is less than one -third of that
of our newest, the Majestic ; her heaviest guns have
less than one - tenth of the power of the Majesties,
while her speed is to that of the Majestic, roughly,
as five to seven, and to that of our fastest vessels, as
five to twelve. Obviously the Achilles is hopelessly
obsolete as compared with the Majestic. Moreover
the thirty years between the two gave birth to a long
series of vessels, which mark the line of evolution from
the one to the other. Each of these vessels is obsolete,
in a greater or less degree, as compared with the type
that succeeded her. As compared with the very latest
c 17

NAVAL POLICY

type, they are all, in a sense, obsolete ; and it must ever
be remembered that to engage in naval war with an
obsolete fleet is to invite disaster. It will be replied,
and with perfect truth, that the absence of the one or
two latest modifications does not necessarily incapaci-
tate a ship for war. That being admitted, the method
by which we can arrive, as nearly as possible, at the
actual fighting value of a fleet is very plain. We
must analyze the various steps in naval progress
marked by each type, with a view to determining the
value of each. We must then examine the existing
fleet, and discuss to what extent it is equipped with
each progressive element of efficiency.

To take first attacking power. The superiority of
rifled small-arms was demonstrated in the Crimea ; the
superiority of rifled cannon as decisively in the
American Civil War. The smooth-bore gun had two
immense disadvantages — inaccuracy of aim, and short-
ness of range. For facility of loading, a certain amount
of what is known to artillerists as windage was neces-
sary ; that is to say, there was necessarily a space
between the projectile and the bore of the gun. When
the gun was fired the projectile bounded from side to
side of the barrel, and was naturally deflected to one
side or another, according to the spot where it last
struck before leaving the gun. Thus, if it struck at the
right, close to the muzzle, it bounded away to the left.
With such a machine precision in shooting was
obviously impossible. Furthermore, no projectile could
be used with the smooth-bore but a spherical one.
This had two disadvantages, as compared with the long
projectiles now in use. If its diameter was the same,
its weight was less ; if its weight was to be the same,

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

its diameter had to be greater. Now the resistance of
the air varies directly with the square of the diameter
of a body, and inversely with its weight. Consequently
the larger and lighter spherical shot was sooner stopped
by the air, which means that its range was less. If the
long projectile had been used in a smooth-bore, it would
have spun over and over on leaving the gun ; whereas
the rifled barrel spun it about its axis in the gun, so
that it preserved the original direction in its flight.
The first rifled cannon, built by Lord Armstrong, was
breech-loading, and made of steel. But both these im-
provements, which have since become essentials of
efficient ordnance, were somewhat in advance of their
time. Steel could not yet be cast with sufficient per-
fection, and though the difficulties and accidents that
resulted from the breech-loading method could have
been overcome, guns were then so short that it made
little difference whether they were loaded from one end
or the other. Hence the British Admiralty's preference
for muzzle-loaders, which to begin with was not un-
reasonable. What was unreasonable, and might easily
have been fatal, was the belated stubbornness with
which the muzzle-loader was clung to after the last
shred of justification for it disappeared.

This last shred went in 1878 — again, so far as con-
cerned this country, through the agency of Lord
Armstrong. In that year experiments were conducted
with slow-burning powder and long guns. The advan-
tage of this invention — which had been first proposed
in America, and first used in Russia — was great and
obvious. A small-grained quick-burning powder ignited
instantaneously, exerting a prodigious pressure on the
gun in the immediate vicinity of the explosion, but

NAVAL POLICY

a comparatively small and momentary impulse on the
projectile in its journey down the barrel. The large-
grained powder took longer to ignite ; the gas was
given off gradually, and thus drove the projectile down
the gun with steadily increasing force. In a short gun
slow-burning powder was useless ; the projectile was
gone while the powder was still igniting, so that much
energy was lost. In a long gun this powder got more
work on the projectile, with a vast resultant gain in
energy. For example, the long gun, even of twenty
years ago, drove the shot from the muzzle at the rate
of 2000 feet a second, whereas none of the short muzzle-
loaders had ever attained 1600; to-day France has
guns eighty times the length of their calibre, which
give a muzzle-velocity of over 3200 feet a second.
This enormous gain could not be sacrificed ; conse-
quently long guns became a necessity. As a further
consequence, these guns had to be breech-loaders, for
on board ship there was no room to run in the long
guns until the muzzle was in a possible position for
loading. As the breech-loader had not to be run right
in, there was also a gain in quickness of loading. A
third advantage lay in the protection given to the gun's
crews, since the loading could be done behind a better
protection of armour. With these three advantages —
superior velocity, giving increased range and power of
penetration, quickness of loading, and protection for the
crews, the breech-loader was plainly certain to drive its
competitor off the sea. To-day the muzzle-loader is
only less antiquated than the smooth-bore. How
heavily the British Admiralty has handicapped the
Navy by its long-continued refusal to recognize this
fact we shall see later.

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

As soon as steel became sufficiently well known to
be worked with precision and confidence, iron was
abandoned in the manufacture of heavy guns. The
superior strength of steel enabled it to resist a more
violent explosion, and thus the steel gun could fire a
higher charge. A further advance in this direction
was the introduction of wire guns. Until recently,
guns were made by shrinking hoops on to the barrel.
The barrel was first built of steel ; then a steel
cylinder was taken, whose inner diameter, when it
was cool, was less than the outer diameter of the
barrel. This cylinder, or hoop, or jacket, was then
heated until it expanded sufficiently to be placed
round the barrel. Then, as it cooled, it shrank on to
the barrel, which was compressed, while the hoop was
expanded. This gave enormous strength to both. In
wire construction, on the other hand, the steel is
applied in the form of a continuous wire, instead of
hoops, and is wound round the barrel at a very high
tension. This method has the disadvantage of being
slow, since the gun must all be made in one piece, so
to speak ; whereas previously the barrel and half-a-
dozen hoops could all be prepared simultaneously. On
the other hand, the wire gun is immensely stronger,
and the introduction of new smokeless powders, of
great explosive force, has made strength a matter of
prime importance. The 12 -inch wire gun of the
British Navy, for example, as compared with the older
hoop-shrunk weapon of the same calibre, will stand,
without damage, an explosion powerful enough to give
a muzzle-velocity of 2400 ft.-secs. to 1914, and a muzzle-
energy of 33,940 ft.-tons to 18,130. With this enor-
mous gain in power, wire guns will, doubtless, in time

NAVAL POLICY

replace all others ; they are already being built of
various calibres for the British Navy. As yet, however,
comparatively few are mounted aboard ship. Moreover,
although the wire gun is vastly more powerful than the
older guns of the same calibre, there are many guns
mounted in all the principal navies equal, or superior,
in power to the heaviest wire guns afloat. Thus the
energy with which the projectile leaves the muzzle of
our own I3|-inch 67-ton guns, as carried by the Royal
Sovereign and her sister ships, is slightly greater than
that attained by the 12-inch 46-ton wire guns of the
Majestic and similar ships. On these grounds it would
not be proper to consider an armament of hoop-shrunk
guns as necessarily inferior to one of wire guns in
the same way as an armament of muzzle-loaders is
necessarily inferior to one of breech - loaders. The
muzzle-loader is outclassed for purposes of modern
war, and any ship that carries it is unfit for the battle
of to-day or to-morrow ; whereas this is far from being
the case with the guns of the Royal Sovereign.

The next important development in gun-power, after
the introduction of breech-loaders, was not, properly
speaking, an improvement in artillery, though it led
indirectly, and in combination with other causes, to a
step forward in gunnery so great as to amount almost
to a revolution. This development, which at first ap-
peared only to concern the naval architect, was the
introduction of the secondary armament in battleships.
To explain the meaning of this, it is necessary to hark
back a little. The earliest ironclads resembled the old
three-deckers in carrying almost all their guns on the
broadside. But the ironclads of this type were very
large, and especially very long, otherwise they would

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

not have had broadside enough to carry a battery of
any power. As a consequence they were clumsy at
turning, and generally unhandy ; also they could
neither direct any fire to speak of ahead or astern, nor
were they protected from raking fire. To remedy these
defects Sir Edward Reed designed a series of central-
battery ships. In these the guns were concentrated
amidships, protected by armoured bulkheads from fire
ahead or astern, and capable of firing several heavy
guns in the same direction. With the same idea of
securing all-round protection and all-round fire, a series
of turret-ships was built concurrently with the central-
battery type. These carried four heavy guns, mounted
close together amidships, in revolving turrets adapted
to give them the widest possible arc of fire. It was on
these four heavy guns — the primary armament — that
the earlier turret-ships wholly depended for their offen-
sive power. But in the later vessels of this class the
secondary armament began to be introduced — that is to
say, a number of guns not powerful enough to pierce
thick armour, and yet more powerful than was neces-
sary to repel torpedo-boats. These guns, which would
evidently be very effective in attacking the unarmoured
parts of large ships, first appeared in the Inflexible,
which v/as completed in 1880. The turret-ship, how-
ever, with all her offensive and defensive power crowded
up into a comparatively small space amidships, was
ill-adapted for the development of the secondary
armament. At the worst, it masked the fire of the
heavy guns, and, at the best, it was not shielded by
armour, so that the secondary guns could easily be
put out of action in a few minutes. But in 1880 a
vessel of a very different type was laid down — the

NAVAL POLICY

Collingwood — designed by Mr. (now Sir William)
White. She carried her four heavy guns, not in
turrets, but in barbettes, which are armoured turrets
without any top to them :* the breech of the gun is
lowered to the loading position, which is under cover,
and the gun is then raised above the barbette to fire.
Instead of being set close together amidships, like the
earlier turrets, the Collingwood' s two barbettes are at
the forward and after end respectively of a long
armoured citadel, and the secondary armament of six
6-inch guns is mounted between them. All British
battleships since laid down have followed the main
lines of the Collingivood in respect of the disposition
of the armament, and the type is now being largely
copied abroad. Meanwhile, the number of secondary
pieces has been increased from six in the Collingwood
to twelve in the Majestic ; they are now mounted so as
to secure a better all-round fire, and in all the latest
vessels behind armour.

At first the function of the secondary battery was not
altogether plain. No doubt it could plug a certain
number of leisurely shells into the unarmoured parts
of an antagonist. But the ships of 1880 were built
with a view to let the whole of their unarmoured parts
be shattered, and yet to remain afloat and able to fight
their heavy guns as serenely as ever. In a few years,
however, came an invention that revolutionized, and
is still revolutionizing, the whole art of naval archi-
tecture and the whole science of naval tactics. This
was the quick-firing gun ; and it need hardly be said
that it owed its birth to the insatiable genius of Lord

* In some later ships there is a heavy steel shield over the top of the
barbette.

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

Armstrong. The quick-firing cannon may be called
the child of the machine-gun, of which the first to
see active service was the mitrailleuse in the Franco-
German war. But perhaps it may, with even greater
point, be called the child of the torpedo-boat. Every-
where it is the demand that begets the supply, the
attack that suggests the defence ; and we have already
seen that this is nowhere more true than in naval
war.

As soon as the torpedo-boat appeared on the scene
as a recognized factor in fighting by sea, it was plainly
necessary that the larger ship should be supplied with
a weapon to beat off the assailant. The earliest ex-
ploits of torpedo-boats were in the Russo-Turkish war
of 1877; the heavy guns of the Turks were too slow
and clumsy to hit the Russian boats, and rifle fire was
too light to stop them. Plainly some intermediate
weapon was wanted. Accordingly in 1877 Mr. Norden-
feldt invented a machine gun, with four barrels, one
inch in calibre: this fired in a minute 216 shots quite
large enough to sink any torpedo-boat of the day.
When the torpedo-boat became faster, and protected
her vitals with coal, the Hotchkiss three- and six-
pounder cannon were invented. These guns can fire
thirty and twenty-five rounds a minute respectively,
and are adapted to the use of shell, which would be
more effective against a torpedo-boat than shot. As
it is reckoned that an attacking torpedo-boat would
only be under fire of these guns for about a minute,
this rate of fire, wonderful and even appalling as it is,
is plainly none too high. Yet when the Hotchkiss six-
pounder is compared with older slow-firing guns, it will
be seen at once how tremendous was the revolution it

NAVAL POLICY

implied. Six of these tiny machines, whose calibre is
two inches and a-quarter, can fire in a minute exactly
the same weight of metal as the i6£-in. uo-ton gun,
which is the most powerful in the world. Of course,
one round from this monster will penetrate a thickness
of material which the six-pounder might bombard
resultlessly for ever ; on the other hand, the Hotchkisses
can perform many services of which the big gun is
incapable. The fact remains that these six guns,
weighing between them — and remember the vital im-
portance of economy of weight aboard ship — a little
over two tons, can spit out metal upon the enemy
at exactly the same rate as the gun which weighs
over no tons.

To get this amount of power at this economy of
weight and money was evidently enough for a torpedo-
boat. Even if only a couple of six-pounders bear on
an attacking torpedo-boat, they can fire fifty shots at
her during the minute she is under fire. But there are
torpedo craft in existence which the Hotchkiss gun is
not sufficient to stop. These are the craft called
indifferently torpedo-catchers and torpedo-gunboats —
very fast vessels of anything from 400 to 1200 tons.
They were originally designed to destroy torpedo-boats
with the light quick-fire guns which they carry; but
they are also fitted with torpedo gear for the attack of
larger vessels. Now the Hotchkiss is useless to stop a
vessel of this kind, as was very clearly demonstrated in
1 89 1, when the Balmacedist gunboats, Almirante Lynch
and Almirante Condell, torpedoed and sank the Blanco
Encalada in Caldera Bay. The ironclad carried three
six-pounders, and hit her assailants more than once,
but without doing them any damage. Three years

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

later the Aquidaban was similarly sunk by the torpedo-
gunboat Sempaio off Desterro, in Brazil ; the Sempaio
was hit thirty times by machine guns, but suffered no
disabling hurt of any kind. Here, then, was a new
demand for a larger quick-firing gun, and the demand
was duly supplied by Lord Armstrong. It was sup-
plied, indeed, before the practical demonstration of its
necessity afforded in Caldera Bay — almost as soon as
the new form of torpedo craft was designed. The new
weapon was the 4-7-in. quick-firer, an enormous ad-
vance on anything that had been seen before. In a
competitive trial, at Portsmouth, between one of the
new guns and the 5-in. service breech-loader, the quick-
fire piece fired ten rounds at sea in 47 sees., while the
slow-firer took 5 mins. 7 sees, for the same task. That
is to say, that a battleship, with the new gun, could
plant twelve shots into an approaching torpedo-catcher,
where the old gun could only discharge two. The
advantage is not represented by these figures alone :
there is also the serious addition to it, that whereas
the aim need only be altered slightly between each
of the quick-firer's shots, the attacking boat will have
advanced so far between the rounds of the slow-firer
that a considerable adjustment will be needed, and the
charge may far more easily be wasted. Twelve shots a
minute, again, seeing that these shots weighed 45 lbs.
apiece, with shell corresponding, was plainly good
enough for these torpedo-gunboats with anything like
shooting. If this was so with the 47-in. gun, how
much more so with the 6-in., introduced immediately
after, which throws shot of 100 lbs. as against 45, and
exerts an energy of 3356 ft -tons as against 995 ?
Indeed, it may be said that the invention of the quick-

NAVAL POLICY

fire gun — and that more especially since the advent of
smokeless powder — has robbed the torpedo of half its
terrors. It is still the same tremendous and irresistible
force when it can get home. But it has lost the attri-
bute of silent mysterious power which it won in the
days of its earliest successes ; there now exists a
weapon which can face it, given vigilance and skill,
with something more than an even chance of victory.
It is now no longer necessary to grope after such
helpless, clumsy devices as torpedo netting. The quick-
fire gun has, assuredly, not killed the torpedo. But it
has brought it down to the level of other weapons
whose possibilities can be estimated, and which can be
resisted, and even conquered, by recognized and definite
means.

By the time the quick-firer had advanced to such
relatively high calibres as 47 and 6 inches, new possi-
bilities and new functions began to open out before it.
If it was good enough to destroy the steel-built un-
armoured torpedo-catcher, it was also good enough to
destroy the unarmoured portions of steel-built battle-
ships. Before the introduction of the larger quick-
firers, the armour of battleships was concentrated on
certain definite positions. Over the whole water-line in
most foreign warships, over the side and the transverse
bulkheads of the central citadel in English vessels, and
over the heavy gun positions in all, was piled armour so
thick as to defeat, so far as possible, the attack of the
heaviest guns afloat. The rest of the ship was left un-
armoured. Considerations of weight forbade that any-
thing but the vitals should be efficiently protected
against the great guns, and if it could not be armoured
against these, it was as well left unarmoured altogether.

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

The large quick-firer changed these conditions com-
pletely. The 6-inch Armstrong quick-firer can pene-
trate 15 inches of wrought iron at the muzzle, and
9 inches at 2000 yards ; this means *]\ inches at the
muzzle, and about 4J at 2000 yards, of the hardest and
most impenetrable steel armour at present known.
Obviously a gun of this power, firing six rounds a
minute, can do enormous damage to the finest battle-
ship ever launched. It can riddle the unarmoured ends
of British battleships, thereby decreasing their speed,
and with it their tactical value, even if it does not
disable them altogether. It can destroy ammunition
hoists and hydraulic mountings, thereby as good as
destroying the guns. It can burst under barbettes or
turrets, which it could not attack directly, and possibly
disable half, or even in some cases all, the great guns of
a ship at a single blow. The naked or lightly-protected
secondary armament it can put out of action infallibly.
It must in any case deal awful destruction to life, and
sow wild confusion and disorganization in any ship
against which it is directed in any strength. And if
this is so with gunpowder, it would be tenfold more so
with the high explosives now tentatively adopted by the
leading naval powers. These compounds have a de-
tonating energy vastly greater than that of gunpowder :
wherever they penetrate they will tear a huge rent in
a ship's side, the concussion will be awful, smashing
everything within reach, and any man who is so un-
happy as to escape instant death will indubitably be
suffocated by their poisonous fumes. An engine which
can deal six such blows in a minute could not but
revolutionize naval warfare. It did not want the recent
lesson of the China-Japan war to demonstrate its

NAVAL POLICY

power, but that demonstration was complete and final.
The quick-fire guns of the Japanese riddled the Chinese
vessels and tore them open, mowing down every man
before them. Many were set afire, and two were actually
sunk by Japanese shell. It is true that these were
unarmoured cruisers, but what the cruiser suffered here
the unarmoured parts of the battleships may look to
suffer elsewhere.

It ma)' be said here that the quick-firing gun is not
differentiated from the ordinary slow-firer by any one
clearly-defined principle, as is the breech-loader from
the muzzle-loader. The superior rapidity of fire is
obtained by the combination of several expedients
affecting most of the component parts of a big gun.
The breech-piece is so arranged that it can be opened
more readily, in one motion instead of two ; a cartridge
case is used, which disposes of the necessity of spong-
ing out the gun after each round ; the recoil takes place
directly in the line of fire; springs are used to return
the gun at once from the recoil to the firing position,
and the sights are placed on the carriage instead of on
the body of the gun, thus enabling the gunner to take
his aim while the piece is being loaded. All these
inventions unite to make up the quick-firer. In
principle, therefore, there is no limit to the size of this
kind of ordnance, and the French Navy now claims to
possess quick-fire guns of 9/4 inches calibre, while Lord
Armstrong's firm goes no further than 8 inches, and the
British Navy only to 6. But in practice a limit is fixed
by the weight of the projectile. For a genuine quick-
firer this must be of a weight to be handled by one
man with the rapidity which the performances of these
guns exact. The British 6-in. gun is served by five

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

men, one of whom gives all his energies to handling
the ioo lb. shot; and to do this six times a minute is
probably as much as any man could comfortably stand
for many minutes together. The Armstrong 8-in. gun
has a projectile of over 200 lbs., and the Canet 9/4-in.
one of 330, which is too heavy for rapid handling.
Nevertheless, one pattern of the Elswick 8-in. gun fires
2501b. four times a minute, while the 9/2-in. British
service gun fires 380 lbs. five times in six minutes.
The energies of the discharges are 10,226 and 10,910
foot - tons respectively, so that in six minutes the
destruction done by the smaller quick-firer is to that
of the larger slow-firer as 245,424 to 54,550. With this
enormous balance to play with, the quick-fire gun can
easily afford to lose a little of its nominal rapidity
through the unhandy weight of the shot, and still
maintain a vast superiority in offensive power. From
all this it is quite plain that, bearing in mind the
original question as to the relative efficiency secured
by modern improvements, the ship that lacks heavy
quick-fire pieces must be considered obsolete relatively
to the ship that possesses them.

With regard to offensive power, so far as it resides in
guns, there is no need to pursue the analysis further.
There is, indeed, a weapon which, in the near future, may
conceivably create the completest transformation that
war has yet seen — the pneumatic dynamite gun, invented
by Lieutenant Zalinski, of the U.S. Navy. This weapon
discharges huge flying torpedoes, as they may most
appropriately be called, by means of compressed air.
The gun is fifty feet long, of 1 5 inches calibre ; the full
charge is 500 lbs. of dynamite. With this charge fair
practice can be made at about a mile and a-half, while

NAVAL POLICY

by using an 8-inch projectile, with ioo lbs. of dynamite,
the range can be increased to two miles. It is claimed
that the dynamite shell does not need actually to strike
a ship, but that if it struck the water and exploded, no
vessel could live within thirty yards of it. But even so
it has as yet been found difficult to make accurate
practice with this gun, and the flight of the projectile is
so slow that this difficulty, in aiming at a body in
motion, is much enhanced. For this reason, as well as
the very treacherous character of dynamite, most nations
are at present rather shy of the pneumatic gun. It is
mounted as a shore defence in various harbours of the
United States, which Government also, with commend-
able enterprise, fitted out the Vesuvius with the Zalinski
guns, and sent her to sea to destroy derelicts. The
Nictheroy was also armed with one of these weapons in
the recent Brazilian Civil War. But the experience of
the Vesuvius was not conclusive, and the Nictheroy
never fired her gun in action. At present, therefore, this
weapon need not be taken into account as a factor
in naval strength.

The locomotive torpedo — which is in its essence a
submarine gun — is still, although it has had many more
years of development, in something the same dubious
position as the Zalinski tube. That it can wreck the
stoutest ship, if it explodes against the bottom, is
obvious. But despite the fact that recent naval war has
given us more experience of torpedo actions than of
any others, the potentialities and limits of this weapon
remain largely obscure. That torpedo-boats can destroy
ships lying at anchor, keeping only a slack watch, or
unprovided with suitable quick-fire guns, was proved by
the fate of the Turkish Seife in the Danube nearly

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

twenty years ago, and by the cases of the Blanco
Encalada, the Aquidaban, and the Chinese vessels in
Wei-hai-Wei harbour since ; but the truth is so obvious
that it hardly needed demonstration. Mr. H. W. Wilson
has compiled an interesting tabular statement* of the
result of the twenty-seven actions in which the torpedo
has been used, from which it appears that out of
twenty-one ships attacked when at anchor, twelve were
sunk. Assailant boats were lost only in six instances,
of which three were in the American Civil War, before
the torpedo-boat had as yet developed itself into a
highly specialized craft. On the other hand, there is no
extant case in which a ship in motion has ever sustained
the slightest damage from a torpedo. The first time
such an attempt was made was by the British Shah
against the Huascar, while later, at the Yalu, more than
one of the Chinese vessels fired nearly every torpedo
(probably for fear they might be exploded by the
enemy's shell) without the slightest result. The deeds of
the Chinese boats were equally futile, though had they
been handled by skilful and resolute men, the dense smoke
of the battle would probably have given them admirable
openings. As it was, the sole result of the torpedo in
the only fleet action fought since its birth is the uncon-
firmed conjecture that a Chinese cruiser may have been
sunk by a stray floating Whitehead, or else by one of
her own torpedoes exploded in its tube. What results
could be attained by torpedo craft accompanying a fleet
to sea, or by the torpedo equipment of larger ships in
action, we have at present no data to determine. Six
torpedo-boats safely crossed the Atlantic in 1894 to the
seat of hostilities in Brazil ; but the numerous break-

* Ironclads in Action, vol. ii. table xxv.
D 33

NAVAL POLICY

downs of such craft in any sea raise the doubt whether
this performance, though most creditable in any case,
was not also somewhat lucky. Our own torpedo-boat-
destroyers could doubtless in some cases accompany a
squadron to sea, and act as enlarged torpedo-boats ;
but even the destroyers, as will be shewn in the next
chapter, have still to make their reputation for sound-
ness of machinery. Nor is there any experience to go
on as to the part 'these vessels would play in action
between squadrons of battleships. They would doubt-
less be used for this purpose in the event of war, and
should at least neutralize any sea-going torpedo-boats
that might be with the enemy ; to say more than this is
to prophesy without knowing. As for larger ships, it
can be said confidently that any torpedo above the
water would be a good deal more dangerous to its
possessor than to the enemy. Apart from this, the
principal point to notice is that as the torpedo has been
partly neutralized by the quick-fire, so it has itself almost
wholly superseded the ram. If a ship is immobile enough
and near enough to the enemy to be rammed, she is still
more certainly immobile enough and near enough to
be torpedoed ; moreover, she should be able herself to
torpedo the enemy before the moment of collision.
This fact does not, perhaps, amount to very much, for
the ram is hardly a more trustworthy weapon than the
torpedo.* Whatever, in fact, may be the ultimate fate
of the torpedo, it is too deadly a weapon to ignore in
any fleet. And for one boon we may all be grateful to
it. The torpedo-boat swooping through a hail of shot
and shell upon its huge prey, has restored all, and more
than all, the romance that went out of naval war with

* See Mr. Laird Clowes (Journal of the United Service Institution, 1894).

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

the cutting-out expeditions and boarding fights of the
old days.* What is almost as important is that, in the
day of great ships, torpedoes have restored to the junior
officer that opportunity of developing responsibility and
resource that comes of an independent command.

It is hardly necessary to insist further on the inti-
mate way in which progress in one department of
naval efficiency is associated with progress in another.
As soon as one weapon attains a commanding position,
there rises another to counteract it. Similar to this
struggle is the long duel between offence and defence,
between armour and the gun. The contest has had
various phases. At one moment armour has defied
penetration by the most powerful gun in existence ;
at another it has seemed on the brink of as complete
an obsolescence as has overtaken body-armour by land ;
at the present moment attack and defence are more or
less in equilibrium. Armour, in the first instance,
followed naturally upon the invention of shell. But,
although shrapnel came into use in 1808, it was only
at Sinope, in 1853, that its awful effects were clearly
demonstrated, and only in 1854 that mechanical pro-
gress enabled the long-existing idea of defence to be
put into execution. The earliest armour, though not
exceeding four or five inches of iron plating, proved
a world-awakening success. The ships that bore it
were nothing less than impregnable. At Kinburn
the French floating batteries bombarded and silenced
strong forts at half-a-mile range — a feat impossible
either before or since — with a loss of only two men
killed and twenty-five wounded — almost all hit by

* See Mr.'.T. Jane's Blake of the Rattlesnake, for a fine, lurid, blood-
and-dynamite romance on these lines.

NAVAL POLICY

projectiles entering the port-holes. The Merrimctc
and Monitor hammered each other steadily for three
hours, with no worse result than stunning one or two
men ; the only blood shed in the engagement was from
the nose, through concussion. But the general intro-
duction of rifled ordnance, along with its increasing
weight and power, soon changed the relation between
gun and armour. The corslet of iron grew heavier
and heavier, to resist the increasing violence of the
attack: the limit was reached about 1880 with the
enormous thickness of 24 inches in the Inflexible,
and 21 h in the French Formidable and Italian Dnilio.
Meanwhile the gun was still increasing its power, and,
unless the ship was to be all armour, the laying on of
ton after ton of iron could clearly not go on for ever.
A substance was required which should possess equal
or greater resistance, with less weight and thickness —
an economy of weight, in fact, for such is the essence
of all progress in naval architecture. The requirement
was fulfilled by the introduction of compound armour-
plates of soft iron faced with hard steel. This was
manufactured either by running steel, at a great heat,
over a wrought-iron plate, or by placing a thin steel
plate at a distance from the iron foundation, and filling
un the interval with molten steel, which bound the two
plates together. In both processes the iron was about
twice the thickness of the steel, and the compound
plate was compressed to about half its original thick-
ness, so. as to give it toughness. The effect of the
hard steel face was that the plate could not be pene-
trated by shot ; it had to be cracked and broken up
before the area behind it could be efficiently attacked.
With this great advantage to its account, compound

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

armour became the standard protection for British ships
for about ten years. There was, however, always a
doubt as to the relative merits of compound plates
and solid steel, and several competitive trials were carried
out all over Europe in the early Eighties, with a view
to the decision of this question. As all the armour
engaged is now more or less obsolete, it is not neces-
sary to enter into the details of these competitions.
Roughly, the conclusion was that compound plates
were the best up to 12 inches thickness. Beyond this,
solid steel showed a considerable superiority. The
whole problem was simple enough to state, but difficult
to solve. Projectiles were becoming harder and harder
every year ; chilled iron gave place to cast-steel, and
cast-steel, in turn, to the forged steel Holtzer shot. In
the meantime, as artillery increased in power, the force
with which shot could be propelled advanced, step for
step, with the improvement of the shot itself. The
problem for the armourer was to make a plate hard
enough in the face to break up steel shot, but, at the
same time, tough enough in the back to hold together,
if the shot got through. Compound plates were not
hard enough at the surface ; solid steel was too brittle
at the back.

The problem was solved by the Harvey proems,
which gives to a single steel plate a very hard face,
with a soft and tenacious back. This process consists
in planing one surface of steel plates, and sandwiching
between two of them a layer of animal charcoal equal
to their own thickness. They are then covered over
with sand, and heated for a fortnight at a temperature
of 1800 degrees. During this process the charcoal is
transferred to the surface of the steel plates, and gives

NAVAL POLICY

them great hardness. After cooling for a week, they
are re-heated, and chilled with water. The surface thus
obtained is so hard that it is difficult to drill holes in it ;
these have, therefore, to be made in the plate before the
Harvey treatment. Experience with this armour has
given results which may fairly be called extraordinary.
One of the plates for the American battleship Massa-
chusetts, 17 inches thick, was attacked by two 12-in.
880 lb. forged steel shot, with striking velocities of
1410 and 1853 ft.-secs., and energies of 11,715 and
20,240 ft.-tons respectively. The first round was calcu-
lated to pierce about 20 inches of iron, and 14-4 of
steel ; the second to pierce 24-2 inches of iron, and
19-4 of steel. Both projectiles broke up against the
hard face : the first penetrated 8, and the second 1 1
inches, slightly cracking the plate. Better still was the
success of a 14-in. double-forged Harvey plate last
year. Projectiles reckoned to pierce 20-4 inches of
iron, or 16-3 of steel, were defeated by it, without even
a crack; and even an 8301b. shot, with 1800 ft.-secs.
velocity — all but the standard test in the United States
for 17-in. armour — failed to get through it. This 14-in.
plate thus virtually passed the trial for 17 inches; and
its resistance to penetration was, roughly, two-fifths as
much again as that of untreated steel. The most
astonishing result of all was obtained by a Carnegie
plate, which, last year, resisted a projectile which would
have passed through two and a-half times its own
thickness of iron. It should be said that all these
plates were reinforced either by the use of nickel, or
by being reforged after the carburizing process, or by
both. Without this it has been found that the Harvey
treatment, while hardening the face, tends to soften the

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

back of armour considerably. Nickel enables the
carburization to penetrate deeper into the plate, and
also toughens the whole mass : reforging has the same
effect on the body of the steel. The net result of the
Harvey process is, as was said above, that armour has
regained its equality with the gun : although pro-
jectiles like the Carpenter and Wheeler-Sterling Ameri-
can shot grow more and more formidable, attack and
defence are roughly in equilibrium. This does not
mean to-day, of course, that there are not guns and shot
which, on the proving-ground, can break up any plate
on earth ; but in action many blows would be oblique,
and it is not likely that many fair hits would be con-
centrated upon a single plate. And even if Harveyed
steel armour were quite incapable of keeping out steel
shot, it would still be indispensable against the shells
of quick-firing guns — by far the deadliest agency of
modern battle.

The elements of force hitherto considered, armament
and armour, are purely tactical ; their function consists
in enabling a ship to fight. Steam power has a double
value. It both brings a ship into touch with the enemy,
and fits her to fight to the best advantage when she
gets there. In respect of steam power the advance of
the last forty years has been as striking as in offensive
force ; so that the steamers of the Crimean War would
be as obsolete by the side of the vessels of to-day as
were the old sailing ships beside them. The first great
development in steam propulsion was the substitution
of the screw for the paddle. This point was very
practically settled by making fast the screw steamer
Rattler by her stern to the stern of a paddle steamer of
equal horse power, and sending both ahead at full

NAVAL POLICY

steam ; the Rattler won this tug-of-war at the rate of
2'8 knots an hour. This point settled, there followed
great improvements in engines. The old engines were
of the simple or common kind ; that is to say, that
steam of a comparatively low pressure was passed from
the boilers direct into each cylinder. In 1886 appeared
the ironclad Pallas, which was fitted with compound
engines. Her engines had two cylinders, one of them
four times the size of the other ; steam passed at high
pressure into the smaller, and thence to the larger,
which it filled by its expansion. The pressure was
lower here, but it acted upon four times the area
of cylinder; so that if the pressure in the larger cylinder
of the Pallas were one-fourth that of the smaller, the
power developed in the two would be exactly equal.
In the same ship were introduced surface condensers,
by which the steam that had done its work was con-
densed and passed back to the boiler. This expedient
did away with the necessity for the old method of con-
densing steam by mixing it with sea-water, and the
consequent waste of energy involved in pumping out
part of this brackish water after it had been heated,
lest the salt incrustation should spoil the boilers. This
double advance secured a vast economy in coal ; the
expansion of steam was utilized, so as to serve two
cylinders instead of one, and the power applied to
treating the salt water was economized. Still more
substantial was the economy attained by triple-expan-
sion engines, with a cylinder intermediate between
those of the high and lower pressure. It was in the
Rattlesnake, launched in 1886, that this type of engine
was first used in the British Navy, and the saving of
coal thus effected is actually from one-third to one-half

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

of the whole consumption per horse-power per hour of
the older engines. In other words, a ship with triple-
expansion engines can steam double the distance
without coaling that she could make with simple
engines ; her radius of action is doubled, and her
strategical value therewith. This is a tremendous
advantage. For whereas the steamer has the advan-
tage of the sailing vessel in that she can go whither she
will, fair wind or foul, she has to pay for it in the fact
that without coal she cannot go anywhither at all.
The number of tons she can stow in her bunkers might
easily be a matter of life and death, and cannot be left
out in estimating the efficiency of any warship.

In the meantime there had been introduced a very
momentous innovation in the shape of forced draught.
When forced draught is used the stokehold is closed,
so that there is no escape for the air within it except
through the furnaces and funnels. Air is then pumped
into the stokehold by means of large fans ; the only
escape for the condensed air is through the furnaces,
which consequently burn the fiercer, and quicken the
generation of steam in the boilers. The action of
forced draught is thus analogous on a large scale to
that of the ordinary household bellows. In its early
days the expedient was very freely applied. The
increase in the horse-power developed was very great
— for instance, 8500 under forced draught in the
Aurora, as against 5500 under natural draught. In
the six battleships of the "Admiral" class the
natural draught ranged from 7733 to 8658, and
the forced from 9573 to 12,567 — the average being
about 3000 additional horse-power. The increase in
speed ran from - 8 to 2 knots an hour. Plainly

NAVAL POLICY

this was a great economy in the space and weight
of the engines and boilers, since by the aid of
forced draught lighter machinery could be made to
do the work of heavier. So far, therefore, forced
draught, developing superior energy with less weight,
ran on the general lines of naval progress, as ex-
emplified in such inventions as Harvey armour and
quick-fire guns.

Unluckily there is such a thing as false economy, and
that naval engineers very soon discovered in the case of
forced draught. The small boilers had to be driven
at high pressure to maintain a high horse-power,
and the intense heat caused the boiler-tubes to leak.
The tubes became so hot, and steam was generated
so rapidly, that it lifted the water away from the inner
surface of the tubes ; these thus came in contact only
with steam or steam and water, which did not protect
them from overheating. Consequently they expanded
unduly, and gave way. Very soon it became almost the
rule, rather than the exception, for boiler-tubes to break
down in trial-trips. Even as lately as the trials of the
Royal Sovereign in 1892 the tubes gave way because
the smallness of the boilers demanded a pressure of
1% inches in the stokehold. Ships were built, like
the Barham and Bel/ona, in which the effort to drag
high speed by means of very high pressure out
of ridiculously inadequate boilers resulted in almost
every tube leaking long before the estimated full
horse-power was attained.

Many people consoled themselves with the reflection
that a ship, having once got through her trials, would
never use forced draught again. And if she spent
her life in time of peace this is doubtless so. Even

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

in war a high pressure would never be used for
any length of continuous steaming. Nevertheless,
the ability to add on occasion, say for an hour, a
knot or two to the speed of a ship might be of vital
moment in action, whether to an individual ship
or to a unit in a squadron. It is rather surprising
to a layman to find Mr. R. S. Oldknow, R.N., who
speaks with authority about marine engines if anybody
does, depreciating the value of speed in battleships.
" Even in war," he says, " I do not believe that an extra
speed of one knot would be likely to be of any strong
advantage to a battleship. Battleships will generally be
called upon to fight in company, and the speed of
the squadron will necessarily be that of its slowest
ship."* But surely it might make all the difference in
the world whether that slowest ship could add a knot or
two to her speed. The fact that the speed so attained
is the speed of the whole squadron makes it not less
desirable, but more. The value of speed in a fleet
action appears to be one of the few questions of tactics
which admit of no dispute. An extra knot an hour
might make all the difference represented in old days
by the weather-gage. To take a simple case, most
British battleships are built to carry their four heavy
guns in pairs in two barbettes, forward and aft. Most
French battleships carry theirs in four barbettes, one
forward, one aft, and one on each beam. Consequently
the French ships can fire three heavy guns ahead, astern,
or on either broadside. The British ships can only fire
two ahead or astern, but four on the broadside. In an
engagement between the two fleets, therefore, it would

* The Mechanism of Men-of-War, p. 48.
43

NAVAL POLICY

be of the highest importance, perhaps of decisive im-
portance, whether the battle was fought end on or
broadside on. The side that had the superiority in
speed would be in a position to decide which way
the action was to be fought, so that the possession of
this advantage would mean (so far as heavy ordnance
went) odds of three to two on the French, or four to
three* on the British, as the case might be. To take
another case, it is very possible than an admiral, whose
fleet was more lightly armoured than his enemy's, but of
superior speed, might circle ahead of him in such a
course that all the enemy's hits on his armour would
strike at a small angle to the surface, and consequently
bound away without injury. For a third instance, it is
hardly disputable that Admiral Ito owed his victory
of the Yalu very largely to the superior speed of
his squadron. If he was able to defeat the Chinese
owing to the superior power of his quick-fire guns,
he was no less able to withdraw his unarmoured
cruisers intact because of his superiority in speed,
which enabled him to select his own range, and to
manoeuvre in such a manner that one Chinese ship
masked another. On these grounds it appears that,
except on condition of increasing the natural draught
speed to an extent which would have to be paid for by
a sacrifice of other elements of force, it would be unwise
to give up the reserve of speed ensured by the use
of moderate forced draught, or some similar expedient.
A substitute for forced draught has been found in
induced draught, which has been used in the Magnificent,

* Perhaps even two to one, since there are probably positions on the
bow and quarter, where French ships could only bring two great guns
to bear.

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

and is to be used in the Illustrious. The difference
between the two is that, whereas, with forced draught,
the air is pumped into the stokeholds, with induced
draught it is sucked out by powerful fans placed at the
bases of the funnels. It was objected when the system
was first suggested that, in principle, induced draught
was only forced draught under another name. " In both
cases," says Mr. Harry Williams, R.N.* "the object
aimed at is exactly the same, viz., to cause so much
difference in the air pressure in the stokeholds and
funnels as to make the air rush through the line of
fire in the boilers, and out through the funnels." It is
claimed, on the other hand, by the advocates of in-
duced draught that, as it acts on the top instead of the
bottom of the fuel, it has the gases given off under
control, so that they are developed and consumed
under a constant pressure; a lower temperature in the
uptakes and funnels is the result. The question, how-
ever, has yet to be solved by experience. It is to be
noticed that the Magnificent, with induced draught,
got slightly inferior results in her trials to the Majestic,
with forced — 17-6 knots to 17-9. As, however, with
natural draught, the Majestic steamed 16-9 knots to the
Magnificents 16-5, the difference is, perhaps, to be
attributed to other causes. In the meantime, the
difficulty has been turned, rather than overcome, by
the virtual abandonment of high pressure. A pressure
of half-an-inch is reckoned as natural draught, and
forced draught is seldom pushed much farther than
this. The Renown, which, in her recent trials, beat all
records for battleships except the Italian, steamed
19^ knots in an hour at a pressure of only 7 of an inch.

* The Siea?n Navy of England, p. 82.
45

NAVAL POLICY

Boilers are much larger, and breakdowns on trial trips
are now almost unknown.

The latest step in marine engineering is the introduc-
tion of water-tube boilers. These are now being fitted
in most of the cruisers and torpedo -boat -destroyers
building for the Royal Navy, and are to appear in our
next series of battleships. Their use in the great
cruisers Terrible and Powerful has been condemned as
a rash experiment, but it must be remembered that this
type of boiler has been used in the French Navy for
several years, and is fitted in all new vessels, battleships,
and cruisers alike. It has been taken up on a large
scale by the Messageries Maritimes, and our own
torpedo-boat-destroyers have given excellent testimony
to more than one or two varieties of tubular boilers.
The essential merit of these boilers is that they
expose a far greater surface to the action of the fires
than the old shell-boilers : the Powerful has no less
than 67,803 square feet of heating surface. Attempts
made to attain a high horse -power with the small
heating surface of cylindrical boilers failed almost
uniformly, and resulted only in burnt tubes ; with the
new models steam can be got up in an infinitely
shorter time, and maintained at a higher pressure.
Many further advantages are claimed for tubular
boilers. They are composed of small parts, and it is
easy to substitute a sound article for anything that
may give way, without tearing up the decks. They
are also lighter and compacter ; stoking is easier, and
their advocates claim for them a considerable economy
in coal. It is not necessary here to go into any
technical description of the various types of water-tube
boilers, especially as there are at least a dozen of

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

these which all claim serious attention. The boiler
invented by M. Belleville, of Dieppe, is the one that
is of the most practical importance to Englishmen at
the present moment, as it is to supply steam to at
least ten of our new cruisers. It consists of a number
of what are called elements, fitted side by side above
the furnace. The element is a series of straight tubes,
placed one above the other ; each tube is connected
with the one above it by a junction-box. The shape
of the element is, therefore, a flattened spiral, or, more
familiarly, a zig-zag standing on end. Each element
connects, at the bottom, with a feed-collector; and, at
the top, with a steam - collector. Each receives its
water from the feed-collector in its lowest tube; when
heat is applied, the steam generated passes by the
junction-box into the tube above, taking the un-
evaporated water with it. More water is evaporated
in the second tube, and the steam so generated,
together with that from the first tube, carries itself,
with the unevaporated water, by the junction-box, into
the third tube ; and so on to the last. Thence it
passes into the steam-collector, and what water remains
unevaporated passes, by tubes outside the boiler (and
therefore not heated by the fires), into the feed-collector,
and starts on its journey through the tubes again. As
the tubes always contain water circulating through
them along with the steam, they do not burn through
as they would if they contained steam alone. This
principle of circulation is found in all water -tube
boilers.

The Yarrow boiler, a most elegant invention, has
no outside tubes to carry back the unevaporated
water; but this function is performed in a row of

NAVAL POLICY

straight tubes, by those furthest from the fire, and
generating less steam.*

With the aid of these, and other engineering ad-
vances, the Esmeralda has been able to steam 23^ knots
an hour, as against, perhaps, half-a-dozen made by the
first steam paddle-boat built some seventy years ago
for His Majesty's fleet. Both for larger and smaller
ships there seems no limit to the advance. Twenty
knots is already becoming obsolete for a cruiser.
The United States have the Columbia and the Minne-
apolis, with top speeds of 22-8 knots ; Germany, the
Kaiscrin Augusta, with nearly 22 knots; Japan, the
Yoshiuo, with 23 ; while Chili and the Argentine have
been supplied by Armstrong & Co. with quite a little
fleet of cruisers, steaming from 22| to 23-2 knots an
hour. The Buenos-Aires, which made the latter record,
could, without doubt, steam 24 knots with forced
draught. As for smaller vessels, it is difficult to say
which holds the record at any moment.

With this broad sketch of recent naval progress
before us, we shall be able to estimate in some degree
the fitness of ships and fleets for the various operations
of war. The vessel which is deficient in one or more
elements of the force developed by the constant march
of invention will be at a disadvantage as compared
with the vessel which possesses it. The Harvey-
armoured vessel is better for war purposes than the
vessel which carries the same thickness of unhardened
armour ; the twenty-knot ship is better, so far, than the

* For a lucid explanation of the principle of circulation, together with
a description of the Yarrow and Thorneycroft boilers, see Mr. G. R.
Dunell in Brassey's Naval Annual for 1896. Other boilers are described
and illustrated in Mr. R. S. Oldknow's Mechanism of Men-of-War.

ELEMENTS OF FORCE IN WARSHIPS

nineteen-knot ship. But although it is comparatively
easy to compare the gun-power, or the protection, or
the speed, or the coal-endurance of any ships, it is im-
possible to compare, for instance, speed with gun-power.
England builds the Renown with a total energy of gun-
fire equal to 251,323 foot-tons per minute, and a speed
of iSf knots an hour. The United States build the
Kearsage with 32,550 foot-tons more gun-power, and
2f knots less speed. Who is to express speed in terms
of gun-power so as to demonstrate mathematically
which ship is the more efficient ? The two things are
incommensurable. " It is distinctly absurd," says
Admiral Colomb,* " to lay any stress on the bare fact
that one warship has a greater sea-speed than another.
. . . To make the statement mean anything, it must be
added that both ships had the same displacement, the
same armour, the same guns, the same ammunition,
the same supply of stores, provisions, coal and water,
the same torpedo armament, the same manoeuvring
power, the same crew, and the same cost." It would
be impertinent to do anything but accept Admiral
Colomb's authority. But perhaps the real significance
of the quotation is in its last three words. If we find
one of our ships inferior in any element of force to a
foreign ship of the same class, it would probably better
become the mistress of the seas, instead of falling back
on our ship's superior coal or ammunition supply, to
build a costlier vessel that would retain our own advan-
tage, and equal that of the foreigner. That is to say,
our ships of each class, being sea-keeping and world-
traversing, will be rather larger than those of any other

* North American Review, January, 1896.
E 49

NAVAL POLICY

people, and, so far, rather more expensive. " The
further we go," says Admiral Paris most truly, "the
more will naval war be waged with money rather than
with men." It may be deplorable, but it is inevitable.
We have now to consider what value in force we have
got for our money in the British fleet, and what further
force, if any, it behoves us to buy.

III.

THE BRITISH NAVY

The British Navy is pre-eminently a fighting force. It
may appear a platitude to say so, for with what object
except fighting, it might be asked, does any navy exist ?
Yet it is true that the British fleet would, in case of war,
be called upon to force an action far more urgently
than any other. This is plain, if only from the fact
that we spend more money upon our fleet than any
foreign Power, and that our fleet is consequently more
powerful, while our army, if also expensive, is com-
paratively weak. Obviously it is our policy to use the
strongest arm we possess, and our naval superiority
would be wasted if a war were fought out without
extensive operations at sea.

But there is also another reason why, in case of war,
it would be for the British fleet to seek out the enemy
at the first possible moment, and fight him wherever he
might be. In a naval war England, whether apparently
attacking or defending, is essentially on the defensive.
To an island power, with dependencies in every part of
the world, the sea is the one line of communication.
This line offers itself to the attack of an enemy at
every point, and must be defended on pain of the
break-up of our empire. The fear of an invasion in
such force as we might be unable to cope with, is

NAVAL POLICY

another imperative stimulus to this country to hold the
seas in the neighbourhood of our islands. And as we
must guard ourselves from invasion at home by com-
manding home waters, so we must guard all our
colonies by commanding the seas adjacent to them.
Our enormous commerce at sea presents another
commodious field of attack to an enemy ; on this we
may depend for the bread we eat, and this also must
be protected at all costs. Now a foreign power like
France or Germany is vulnerable to us in none of these
ways. Their transoceanic possessions are to us com-
paratively insignificant; their vastly superior land
forces could defy any invasion by our army ; their
land frontiers enable them to feed themselves in com-
fort, and their ocean trade is the merest trifle beside
ours. In a naval war, therefore, the British Empire
presents many weak spots to an enemy, and the only
way to keep him out is by commanding the sea.

Now how is this to be done ? It is curious that it is
only lately that Englishmen, even those who take a
keen interest in the Navy, have come to any clear
understanding of a question so vital to our national
interests — even to our national existence. It is to the
clear thinking and plain speaking of such recent writers
as Admiral Colomb and Mr. Spenser Wilkinson that we
owe the better comprehension of the subject which is
beginning to filter through the British mind. The sea,
to put it briefly, is to be regarded, not as a path from
one country to another, but as territory. The fleet
which controls the sea controls the commerce of the
sea, destroys that of its antagonist, and maintains and
increases that of its own country. How vital is such
control to our own country needs no demonstration.

THE BRITISH NAVY

According to a recent Parliamentary paper, the total
value of British sea-borne trade is to be put at
^945>485,95 1» as against £294,753,414 French,
£150,693,600 German, and £393,393,736 of the
United States. Such is the vast preponderance of
what we have to defend, and our possible enemies to
attack.

The command of the sea, though primarily directed
to the control of trade, has also a bearing on territorial
invasion. The power which commands the sea can
attack the enemy at what point it will, and can retreat
at what moment it will. It is true there are operations,
such as bombardments of sea-coast towns and descents
in small force upon an enemy's country, which can
possibly be undertaken without a general command of
the sea. For these it is sufficient that the assailant
should find no superior force in the immediate locality
of his attack. But such operations can bring no
substantial advantage to the attack, nor any serious
damage to the defence. The bombardment of coast
towns only embitters an enemy without, in most cases,
impairing his ability to continue the struggle ; an
invasion, being liable to find its transport destroyed
and its communications cut on the advent of a superior
fleet, would usually result in the isolation and subsequent
destruction or surrender of the invader. The Power
which commands the sea, on the other hand, makes
the enemy's coast-line its frontier, if so disposed, and its
base for territorial attack. It disposes of the trade of
the waters behind it, just as an army disposes of the
resources of a conquered province, and it can proceed,
if so it will, to further attacks, as an army makes one
conquered province its base against the next. This

NAVAL POLICY

command can be obtained again, as in the case of
warfare on land, either by destroying the enemy's fleet,
or by holding it with a superior force. In the first case,
it is obvious that the sea passes to the only force left on
it. In the second, should the weaker fleet venture out
of port for any aggressive movement, it either exposes
itself, within a given time, to be attacked and crushed
by the stronger enemy, or it must return again to port
before it can accomplish anything decisive.

From these considerations arises the British theory of
offensive defence. To secure ourselves from attack by
sea, either on our commerce or our territory, we must
command the sea, and this can only be done by beating
the enemy at once, or by shutting him up in his ports
and beating him if he ventures out. Even if we were
defeated at sea again and again, this would still be our
only possible method of war as long as we had a ship
that could float or a gun that could be brought to bear.
If we relinquish this struggle, we must lose our colonies
and commerce, even if we are not overwhelmed by
invasion. It is in this sense that our fleet, above all
others, is a fighting fleet. It must be ready to fight any
possible enemy who may show himself, at any place or
time, to dispute our mastery of the sea. Consequently
the first line of our Navy must be composed of ships
fitted to meet any hostile ship on equal or superior
terms. These must be heavily armed to crush the
enemy. They must be armoured, because theory and
experience alike prove that an unarmoured ship has
little hope of defeating an armoured one; while a fight
which leaves the enemy undefeated and at large on the
seas is a British defeat, even if our own vessels escape.
They must have good speed, to bring the enemy to

THE BRITISH NAVY

action wherever a chance offers ; and they must have
good coal-carrying capacity, so as to be able to operate
wherever a hostile fleet may have betaken itself. These
qualities are united in the battleship, so that a superiority
in this class of vessel is essential to us. We have also
cruisers, faster but less heavily armed and armoured, to
destroy an enemy's trade, and to defeat any of his
vessels that may have eluded the armoured fleet and
set out to prey on our merchantmen ; we need them
also to do the scouting for a fleet of battleships. After
these comes the torpedo-boat flotilla, together with
larger vessels to attack an enemy's torpedo-boats, and
to act as a support to our own ; these may be used
either as auxiliaries to the battle fleet, or in isolated
operations on their own account. But the battleship
remains the prime factor of naval war, without which
all others are as ineffective as cavalry without supporting
infantry on land.

It is with the list of our battleships, therefore, that
any account of the material of the British Navy must
open. It will probably be found most convenient to
take them in the reverse order of their chronology,
beginning with the newest and most powerful. First
comes a great group of nine ships, of which four —
the Majestic and Magnificent, Prince George and
Victorious — are completed, and the two first are at
sea as flagships. Of the remaining five, the Hannibal,
Jupiter, and Mars are to be finished next year, and
the Caesar and Illustrious in 1898. These ships are
probably the finest all-round fighting class in any
navy. Displacing 14,900 tons, they are certainly the
largest ; so that if they are not also the most power-
ful, the designer is at fault for not making the most

NAVAL POLICY

economical use of the space at his disposal. The
armament is powerful and well-protected. It consists
of four 12-in. 46-ton wire guns, such as have already
been described ; these throw a projectile of 850 lbs.
with a velocity, on leaving the muzzle, of 2700 feet,
and an energy at the muzzle of 33,940 ft.-tons. These
guns can be worked by hand, should the hydraulic
mounting break down. They fire three rounds in four
minutes. For their size they are certainly the most
powerful guns afloat. They are mounted in pairs in
two barbettes, fore and aft : the armour on the barbettes
is 14 inches of Harveyed steel,* and the breech of the
gun, when raised to the firing position, is protected by
a 10-in. hood of the same material. The secondary
armament consists of twelve 6-in. and sixteen 3-in.
(12-pounder) quick-fire guns ; all the former are pro-
tected by casemates of six inches of Harveyed steel.
Bulkheads of 14 inches of the same hardened steel run
across the ship fore and aft, meeting the barbettes
and thus forming an armoured citadel with an extreme
length of 300 feet out of the whole ship's 390 feet.
The area of side armour is 220 feet long by 26 feet
deep ; its thickness is 9 inches, and these plates also
are reinforced by the Harvey process. This is a far
greater surface of side than is protected by armour in
most battleships, whether English or foreign ; the object
of the modification is to keep out the shells of quick-
firing guns, for which the thickness of metal is ample.
Further protection is afforded by an arched steel deck,
varying from 2% to 4 inches in thickness; this covers

* The resisting power per inch of Harveyed steel may be put roughly
at the ratio of 3 to 2 as compared with compound armour, and 2 to I as
compared with wrought-iron.

THE BRITISH NAVY

the vitals of the ship — engines, magazines, torpedo-
rooms, and such like — and bends down from its highest
point in the centre of the ship to meet the lower edge
of the side armour. To deal the Majestic a mortal
wound, a projectile would thus have to pierce not only
the vertical nine inches, but also four inches inclined at
a considerable angle, and equivalent, for purposes of
penetration, to about ten inches of vertical armour.
The normal amount of coal carried is 900 tons ; but, if
necessary, 1850 tons could be taken on board, enabling
the ship to steam over 7000 miles at a speed of ten
knots. This coal-capacity and endurance is greater
than that of any foreign battleship afloat. The speed
of the group will range between \6h and 17 knots with
10,000 horse-power at natural draught, and from 17% to
18 knots with 12,000 horse-power at forced draught.

Individual vessels, both of our own and foreign powers,
may compare favourably with the Majesties in various
respects. Several are slightly faster. Battleships build-
ing for France and Germany have a greater energy of
gun-fire per minute. But, on the whole, it may be said
that no ship in the world is their equal in all-round
excellence. In particular, none is better protected for
a close action, whether we consider the extent of side
armour, the defence of the vitals of the ship, or the
shelter provided for the gunners. An exception must
be made as respects the 12-pounders, whose crews are
wholly unprotected, and could hardly live through a
single broadside of any power ; on the other hand, this
defect is far greater in almost every other ship in the
world. If these guns' crews were ever shot down, it is
fairly safe to predict that the attacking enemy would fare
as badly, and probably a great deal worse. Another

NAVAL POLICY

point in which these vessels fall short of ideal perfec-
tion is that they draw too much water to get through
the Suez Canal. The only other criticism that could
reasonably be passed upon the Majestic class is that
it is half-a-knot too slow. Eighteen knots is becoming
the standard speed of the new French and German
battleships ; and it is of great importance that our
vessels should be faster, both to ensure the ability to
bring an enemy to a decisive action, and to enable our
admirals to choose their own tactics. For the rest, the
Majesties are very large and very expensive, ranging in
cost from £865,000 to £912,000. But if they appear
to give less offensive and defensive power per ton of
displacement than some foreign ships, they possess the
countervailing superiority that they carry far more
ammunition and more coal than any foreigner. It
must also be remembered that though they are the
largest fighting-ships in the world, they are not — thanks
to the rapidity of their construction, and the industrial
resources of this country in general — by any means the
most expensive. Italy has had to pay a million apiece
for more than one of her ironclads, while France is
spending £1,100,770 on the Bouvet, and £1,100,400 on
the Massena — both undeniably inferior ships. On the
whole, we may rest well assured that there are no more
thoroughly efficient battleships afloat than these ; and
that, though they are expensive, we have got as good
money's worth in them as have any of our rivals.

Two features of the Majestic class deserve a brief
further discussion, since they will be found reappearing
throughout the British Navy. The first of these is
their homogeneity. It has been the recent policy of
our Admiralty to build almost all its ships in homo-

THE BRITISH NAVY

geneous groups, smaller or greater. There are nine
Majesties in the fleet, eight Royal Sovereigns, six
" Admirals " ; while there are to be five of the new
Canopus type which Mr. Goschen is laying down this
year. Very often this system of groups has gone no
further than a pair of sisters, such as the Nile and
Trafalgar, or the Centurion and Barfteur ; but the
Renown is the only isolated individual type laid down
since 1874. Among our cruisers we find still larger
families — eight Diadems, twelve Eclipses, and as many
as twenty-one Apollos. The advantages of homogeneity,
supposing the type to be a good one to begin with, are
great and easily apprehensible. A man who has served
on one ship knows her sister, and can fall into his work
from the first moment he is ordered aboard, instead of
wasting weeks in learning his way about the ship.
Similarly, all sorts of apparatus — guns, mountings,
spare parts of machinery, and a hundred others —
can be readily transferred, in case of need, from one
ship to another. Suppose the nine Majesties to have
been in action, and one of them to be disabled from
taking the sea again : she might yet conceivably be able
to fit out her eight damaged sisters with the undamaged
parts of her own equipment ; whereas, with vessels of
different types, damaged and undamaged parts would
alike be unavailable for service. A further, and per-
haps yet greater, advantage of this system of grouping
warships is that all problems of strategy and tactics are
enormously simplified thereby. Take the case of an
admiral with ten battleships opposed to a force of eight,
all the ships being roughly equal in fighting power.
Seven of his own ships, we will imagine, can steam
14 knots an hour, and the other three but 10; the

NAVAL POLICY

enemy's eight have a uniform speed of 12 knots. Is
an admiral to leave behind his three laggards, and face
eight ships with seven ; or is he to maintain his
superiority, and run the risk of missing the enemy
altogether? With a homogeneous group these per-
plexities cannot arise. In battle, again, an admiral
need not be always altering his plans to support any
weak point in his line which might be threatened, since
the line will be equally strong at all points. The
battle of the Yalu— in which Admiral Ito destroyed
the weak extremities of the Chinese line at his leisure,
while the powerful ships in the centre actually found
their fire masked by feebler comrades — proves that
this is far from an imaginary danger. A squadron of
ships which all turn in the same circle, again, is far
superior in manoeuvring power to one whose units
require different times and spaces for going about.
We may, then, fairly congratulate ourselves on the
wisdom of our Admiralty which has given this
uniformity to considerable sections of our fleet.
Carried to excess, the practice would, of course,
strangle all progress ; but, though we have carried
it further than any other Power, there is no reason
to suppose that our battleships, at any rate, have not
kept well abreast of the march of naval architecture.

The other feature worthy of a word of notice is
a smaller structural point. The battleships of the
Majestic class, in common with all our most recent
types, have a belt of plating of a greater or less
length amidships ; but both bow and stern are left
wholly unarmoured. The theory is that the steel deck,
which runs from end to end of the ship, would protect
everything beneath the water-line, while even if the

THE BRITISH NAVY

upper part were wholly shot away, the ship could
still float, and fight her guns. It has been thought
better, therefore, to devote the weight thus saved to
other uses. This resolution to chance the ends and
concentrate power amidships, is characteristic of the
British constructors, though the Russians have lately
favoured it, while the Italians have carried it further
than the boldest of our own experiments. France,
Russia (until lately), and Germany have all acted on
the opposite principle. They have run a narrow belt
of great thickness from stem to stern. Taking care
thus of the water-line, they expect the rest of the
ship to take care of itself. The rival merits of the
two systems were, until lately, the subject of a standing
controversy between Sir Edward Reed, who designed
several completely belted ships for our own and other
navies, and Sir William White, the author of the later
types. Sir William White, being the man in office, has
naturally backed his opinion by going on constructing
vessels with unprotected ends ; but the question will
probably not be settled beyond doubt without a great
naval war. It may be urged in favour of the complete
belt that it gives more strength for ramming ; but the
ram, as has been already said, will in most future cases
be forestalled by the torpedo. It may also be con-
tended, and that without possibility of answer, that
a ship which loses her bow, even if she does not
founder, will sink lower in the water, losing much of
her speed, and, therefore, of her manoeuvring power
and efficiency generally. On the other side, it is more
conformable to the spirit and conditions of the British
Navy to give our crews guns behind armour to sink the
enemy rather than a ship which will float on with

NAVAL POLICY

guns out of action — unharmed, but also harmless. The
invention of quick-firing guns cuts both ways. While
they make it easier to destroy the British unarmoured
ends, they will make fearful havoc of the great ex-
panses of unarmoured side exposed by the French
belted types. The only experience so far attainable
— that of the Yalu — tells in favour of the British
model. The two Chinese battleships, the Chen Ynen
and Ting Ynen, had bow and stern completely unpro-
tected, yet they came out of the battle perfectly sea-
worthy, and able to manoeuvre together. Even their
guns on the extreme forecastle and poop were still in
action. It may be that the Japanese shot badly, and
certainly the range was long. Yet the fact that they
carried out of the fight some two hundred shot-dints
apiece shows, at least, that such a partially belted ship
can sustain a very fair degree of punishment without
disablement.

Of the next class in order of modernity — the eight
Royal Sovereigns, built under the Naval Defence Act —
there is much the same to say as of the Majesties.
They displace 750 tons less, and are ten feet shorter;
the compound armour belt, however — 8 to 18 inches
thick, and 8ft. Sin. broad — covers 250ft. of their
length, instead of 220 in the later type. Above the
belt, to a height of 9 ft. 6 in. from the water-line, is a
sheath of 3- to 5-1'n. armour ; in the Ramillies, Repulse,
Revenge, and Royal Oak, this is of nickel steel, which
has given such admirable results in America ; in the
Royal Sovereign, Empress of India, Hood, and Resolution
of simple steel. The bulkheads range from 6 to 16
inches of compound armour, with 17 on the barbettes,
and a 3-in. armoured deck. The Hood carries her

THE BRITISH NAVY

heavy guns in two 18-in. turrets, instead of barbettes,
but is otherwise similar. The main armament consists
of four 13-J-in. 67-ton guns. These, as will shortly be
seen, are a trifle more powerful than the wire-wound
pieces of the Majestic, though considerably less so in
proportion to their weight. The secondary battery of
6-in. quick-firers is mounted between the barbettes as
in the Majestic ; it contains ten guns instead of twelve,
and only four of these, carried on the main deck, are
protected by 6-in. casemates. The others are on the
upper deck, and unprotected by armour — a great defect.
Equally naked are sixteen 6-pounder and twelve
3-pounder quick-firers intended to meet the attack of
torpedo-boats ; for their own peculiar purpose they do
not, of course, need any armoured protection, but they
could hardly survive a few minutes of a severe quick-
fire cannonade, after which the Royal Sovereigns would
be well-nigh helpless against torpedo-boats. With
1450 tons of coal this class is reckoned to steam 7900
knots at 10 per hour. The speed is officially quoted at
15 knots with 9000 horse-power at natural draught, and
17! with 13,000 at forced draught. As a matter of
fact several vessels of this class could probably exceed
both figures, so that with clean bottoms they should
be able to keep station at full-speed with the Majesties.
If we compare the two classes, the principal difference
is found in the complete recognition in the Majestic of
the revolution effected in naval war by large calibre
quick-firers. Thus, if the Majesties thick armour is
shorter than the Royal Sovereign's, it extends higher
and covers a greater portion of the ship's side ; and as
it starts with the advantage of the Harvey process, the
total of protection given is much greater. It is part of

NAVAL POLICY

the same revolution in artillery that the Majesties
quick-fire armament is both stronger — containing
twelve 6-in. guns instead of ten, and 12- instead of
6-pounders — and better protected. These ships cost
some thousands apiece less than the Majesties.

There were also built under the Naval Defence Act the
Barjleur and Centurion, projected as second-class battle-
ships, but now described as first-class. These may be
described as reductions in scale of the Royal Sovereign
— smaller and lighter and less powerful. Of 10,500
displacement, they have on the face of it as good a
right to the title of first-class as, for instance, the
American Indiana. In armour and armament, however,
these ships are much nearer the second-class, if classes
there are to be, than the first. The thickest belt
armour (which sheathes 200 feet out of 360) is 12
inches compound ; above it is 4 of nickel steel. The
bulkheads are 8 inches; the deck 2\ inches at its
thickest. The barbettes carry 9 inches compound with
6-in. shields of nickel steel protecting the breech of
the gun, which in the Royal Sovereign is exposed in
the firing position. There are 2-in. casements of the
same material, arranged as in the Royal Sovereign, for
four of the quick-firing guns. The protection is slight
as compared with the Royal Sovereign, but complete
enough as far as it goes. The main armament is four
10-in. 29-ton guns ; the secondary battery, ten 47-
in. quick-firers ; the anti-torpedo armament, eight 6-
and nine 3-pounders. This is certainly a very light
armament to carry on 10,500 tons ; the Indiana, which
displaces over 250 tons less, and is exceptionally weak
in quick-fire, works out at over 170,000 ft.-tons of gun-
power per minute to the Centurions 97,195 ; while the

THE BRITISH NAVY

new German Kaiser Friedricli III., of only 326 tons
more, exceeds her gun-power by more than four to one.
Here, then, is plainly a case where the mere setting
down the two ships as first-class conceals a tremendous
inequality. The compensation of the Centurion is
found in her sea-going qualities. With a top speed of
over \Z\ knots, she held the record among British — and,
if we except the great Italian ships sometimes ranked as
cruisers, among all — battleships for several years. The
Barfleur, curiously enough, could only get within a knot
of this on trial, though on paper similar in every
respect. With 1240 tons of coal, these ships are
reckoned capable of about 10,000 knots at an economical
speed without coaling. Both on this account and that
of their speed they are rather adapted to carry an
Admiral's flag on a foreign station than to take their
place in a fleet which would have to meet the heaviest
guns and attack the heaviest armour. Thus the
Centtirion is far more in place on the China Station
than is the Barfleur in the Mediterranean. The
Centurion, for instance, being better protected and of
equal speed, is probably the only vessel in Eastern
waters that could face the Russian Rurik.

The Renown is to the Majestic what the Centurion is
to the Royal Sovereign — much the same ship on a
smaller scale. Or to complete the proportion, the
Renown is to the Centurion as the Majestic is to the
Royal Sovereign — a development with special reference
to quick-fire. She carries the same main armament as
the Centurion, but ten 6-inch quick-firers, all behind
armour, and eight 12- and twelve 3-pounders. This
gives her roughly two and a-half times the Centurion's
volume of fire. Her armour — 6 to 8-inch belt, 6 to
f 65

NAVAL POLICY

io-inch bulkheads, 10 inches on barbettes and 2 to
6-inch casements — is all of Harveyed steel, thinner
than the Centurion's compound plating, but more widely-
extended over the side. In speed the Renown beat her
predecessor's record and greatly exceeded expectations;
she steamed very little short of 18 knots with natural
draught and i8f — at one time reaching 19J — with a
forced draught representing only -/-inch pressure. This
rate of steaming, however, is not very useful in a battle-
ship, unless she is combined in a fleet with others of the
same high speed, and these at present we do not
possess. It is probable, therefore, that the Renown —
which is also under-gunned, as compared with foreign
ships, for her 12,350 tons — will be used like the
Centurion as a flagship abroad. The time may come,
however, when she will fall into line with the five
new battleships which Mr. Goschen purposes to lay
down this year. With 12,900 tons displacement, exactly
the same gun-power as the Majestic, though lighter
armour, and the same speed as the Renozvu, these
should be among the most useful and powerful battle-
ships the world has yet seen.

Next in the same reverse order of seniority come the
twin turret-ships Nile and Trafalgar. At the date
of their completion — 1890 — they were the heaviest
vessels in the service, displacing 11,940 tons. They are
345 feet long — 45 less than the Royal Sovereign — and
73 feet in the beam. Excellent ships in most respects,
they are especially distinguished by the stoutness of
the resistance they would offer to even the most power-
ful attack. They carry no less than 4,230 tons of com-
pound armour, disposed in the following manner. A
vertical belt 230 feet long, 8 feet 6 inches wide, and

THE BRITISH NAVY

20 to 16 inches thick protects the sides of the lower
citadel ; transverse bulkheads 16 inches ahead and 14
inches astern close its ends, while a sloping steel deck of
3 inches prolongs the belt to strengthen the unarmoured
bow and stern. Above the lower citadel is placed
an upper storey as it were — the shorter upper citadel
with an extreme length of 193 feet, and protected by 18
to 16 inches of compound armour. The heavy arma-
ment is two pairs of I3i--inch guns carried by pairs in
18-inch revolving turrets at the forward and after ends
of the upper citadel. Between them is the auxiliary
battery of six 47-inch quick-fire guns ; this battery is
protected from splinters by 5-inch steel bulkheads which
cut off the secondary armament from the turrets, thus
dividing the citadel into three compartments. There
are also seventeen 6- and 3-pounder quick-firers, besides
machine guns. The Nile and Trafalgar each made
16-7 knots on their trials with forced draught, and are
good for 15-6 nominal at natural draught, which should
mean a sea-speed of thirteen to fourteen. The normal
coal capacity is 900 tons, and this can be increased
on occasion to 1200, giving a radius of action at 10
knots of 5000 and 6500 respectively. The weakness of
these vessels is the secondary armament, which is not
over-powerful, and defended by no more than an inch of
steel-plating. But as they date from the infancy of
quick-firing artillery this is but natural, and cannot
be imputed as a fault to the design. Despite this they
are a most formidable couple, and able to take their
own part against any warship afloat.

The Sans Pareil, of 10,470 tons, is sister of the
unfortunate Victoria. Like the Nile and Trafalgar,
she is a turret-ship, but, unlike them, concentrates all

NAVAL POLICY

the attacking power of her heavy guns in one turret,
placed forward. This contains two 16^-in. ui-ton
guns, the heaviest weapons ever mounted in any navy
— though Herr Krupp has turned out heavier ones,
such as are mounted, for instance, on shore at Spezia —
and the most powerful guns the world ever saw. The
projectile of these monsters weighs 1800 lbs., and is
discharged with a velocity of 2087 feet a second ; the
energy exerted would move 54,390 tons one foot, and
is sufficient to penetrate 3 ft. 2 in. of iron at the muzzle.
Since this gun puts forth so prodigious a force, it may
be asked why it has not been mounted on our later
ships. The answer is that, though the 111-ton gun is
superior in absolute power to any other, we have many
guns that in relative power — that is, in force exerted
per ton of gun — far surpass it. The I3|-in. 67-ton
gun has an energy of 35,230 ft.-tons, while that of the
newer i2.-in. 46-ton wire gun stands at 33,940. The
relative energy per ton of gun of the three is thus
represented by the figures 490 for the 111-ton, 526 for
the 67-ton, and 738 for the 46-ton. A further advan-
tage of the lighter guns consists in the greater rapidity
with which they can be worked. The ni-ton fires one
round in two minutes, the 67-ton seven rounds in twelve
minutes, and the 46-ton three rounds in 4 minutes.
Thus, in twelve minutes, the number of rounds fired
would be 6, 7, and 9 respectively, and the muzzle-
energy, which is the real measure of the work done by
the gun, would come out in the proportions of 326, 247,
and 325. It is true that the 111-ton still seems the
most powerful weapon, though the 46-ton runs it close.
But it must be remembered that a warship cannot go
on increasing the weight and number of her guns

THE BRITISH NAVY

indefinitely. Only a certain proportion of the dis-
placement can be given to heavy guns, and both the
newer models do more work in proportion to their
weight. The four 67-ton guns of the Nile weigh only
46 tons more than the Sans PareiVs two, and yet
the destructive energy they put out in twelve minutes
is as 988 to 752 — a gain out of all proportion to
the increased weight the designer has to find room for.
Still more advantageous is the change to the four 46-ton
guns of the Majestic. These weigh actually 38 tons
less than the Sans PareiVs two, and their energy, in
twelve minutes, is as 1500 to 752 — all but double. On
the other hand, the Renowns four 29-ton pieces would
only give an energy, in the same time, of 346 to the
Sans PareiVs 752 ; but then the Renown gives hardly
half as much weight to heavy guns, so that the com-
plaint that she is too lightly armed is certainly borne
out so far. Yet, though it is possible to go too far
down in the scale, the rule holds good that it is better
to supply four lighter guns than two heavier. The
downward limit of size is that the heaviest pieces
should be able to penetrate the thickest armour of
any opposing battleship, and this both the 67-ton and
the 46-ton would almost certainly do. Another argu-
ment in favour of carrying lighter guns, and more of
them, is that thereby a better all-round fire can be
obtained, and the disablement of one gun will not
go so far to disable a ship. With four heavy guns, the
silencing of one piece means one quarter of the power
gone ; with two, it means one half. It is true that both
these points depend for their application upon the
system on which the guns are mounted ; for instance,
a pair of lighter guns, mounted together in a barbette

NAVAL POLICY

or turret, give no wider area of fire than a heavier one,
mounted alone, and are almost as likely to be put out
of action by a lucky shot. In the case of the Sans
Pareil, however, this consideration does not apply.
Both the huge guns are mounted in a single turret
forward, and one of them could hardly receive damage
without simultaneously disabling the other. Moreover,
although they can be trained through a very wide angle
of fire — no less than 300° — so that they can bear not
only ahead, and on either broadside, but also (at least in
theory) on either quarter at an angle of only 30° to the
ship's axis, they cannot attack an enemy dead astern.
This leaves a very weak spot in the vessel, which is
hardly made good by a 10-in. gun mounted on the poop,
without any other armour protection than a mere shield.
The Sans Pareil must thus be pronounced out of place
in the British Fleet, since she is incapable of fighting
stern-on with any effect, while nearly all the other ships
with which she would be likely to be in line, are as well
fitted for that possibility as for engaging an enemy
ahead. Great indeed may be the importance of homo-
geneity to a squadron, and if it were necessary to fight
such an action, the Sans Pareil would be almost useless
and an encumbrance to the other vessels. For the rest,
the fact that the secondary armament of twelve 6-in.
guns (lately exchanged for quick-firers of the same
calibre) is aft of the turret, and also wholly undefended
by plating, only emphasizes the weak point in the ship,
since this open battery could be raked by an enemy.

The Sans Pareil is protected by sixteen to eighteen
inches of compound plating along only 162 of 340 feet
of length; she carries 18 inches on the turret, a 6-in.
bulkhead forward of the secondary battery, and sloping

THE BRITISH NAVY

backward from the turret, and — true to the neglect of
the stern — only a 3-in. bulkhead protecting half the
6-in. guns. The Sans Pareil steamed, on trial, 16 knots
under natural, and 1775 (with 14,483 horse-power)
under forced draught. This was a very remarkable
speed for 1888 — indeed, it is a fraction more than the
Magnificent made a few months ago. She can stow
1200 tons in her bunkers, which should take her 7000
miles at 10 knots. Her cost was ,£719,442 — nearly
£140,000 less than that of the Trafalgar, but it is
hardly doubtful that the more expensive ship is better
value for the money.

Next comes the " Admiral " class — so called because
its six ships are named after Anson, Benbow, Camper-
down, Collingwood, Howe, and Rodney. This type is
not only important by reason of the number of vessels
conforming to it, but also as marking an epoch in the
history of our armoured fleet. The Collingwood, the
earliest of the series (1886), was the first battleship in
which the barbette system of mounting the heavy guns
was adopted, and therewith a higher freeboard and
greater seaworthiness than was possible in turret-ships.
It is true that the "Admirals" themselves are low in
the bow compared with later barbette-ships ; but they
are an improvement on the earlier turret-ships, and
prepared the way for yet further advance in sea-going
qualities. The Collingwood was also the first vessel
that gave an adequate space and weight to the
secondary armament. Her four 12-in. 45 -ton guns
were mounted by pairs in barbettes, forward and aft,
140 feet apart, whilst the six 6-in. breech-loaders were
ranged in a box battery between. This disposition of
the lighter guns between two pairs of heavy ones

NAVAL POLICY

reappears in every one of our later ships, except the
Sans Pareil, so that the Collingwood may reasonably
be called their original progenitor. The distribution
of the armour also marked a sharp break with the
methods of the immediate past, and, in its turn,
helps to stamp the Collingwood as the ancestor of all
our later ships. We get in the Collingwood the long
plated citadel, with transverse bulkheads, instead of the
short oblong of the turret-ships which came before her.
In the Collingwood the belt covers only 140 feet out
of 325 ; but in the Colossus, the last of our old-pattern
turret-ships, it is no more than 123 on the same length.
This proportion of belt to total length increases from
43 per cent, in the Collingwood only to 44 per cent, in
the Sans Pareil ; but in the Nile, by a great advance,
the belt already protects two-thirds of the whole length.
This proportion is maintained in the Royal Sovereign
class ; but falls off again, in consequence of the greatly
increased area of side-plating, to 56 per cent, in the
Majestic. The thickness of the Collingwood 's compound-
plating is 18 to 8 inches on the belt, 16 to 6 on the
bulkhead, and 14 to 12 on the barbettes; the steel
deck is 2\ inches. Her faults are many, especially in
matter of armour. The unarmoured ends are very
long ; the secondary armament is also wholly un-
armoured. Worst of all, the bases of the barbettes
are similarly unprotected, so that the smallest shell
might enter, and explode under them. This would
certainly disable the main armament, even if it did
not cause the huge iron tray, with its two heavy guns,
to drop through the ship's bottom, and sink her.
Another defect, as has been pointed out, is her low
bow ; this may not be much felt in the Mediterranean,

THE BRITISH NAVY

where most of the "Admiral" class have served for
several years, but might easily handicap the ship in
manoeuvring and fighting her guns in any sea. But
these faults have been gradually corrected in later
vessels of similar type, while the distinctive arrange-
ments of armament in the Collingwood have been
adopted — sometimes sooner, sometimes later — in the
most recent battleships of every considerable naval
Power.

The other vessels of the " Admiral " type are enlarge-
ments and modifications of the Collingwood. The
Rodney and Howe displace 10,300 instead of 9500
tons, upon which, instead of the older 12-in. gun,
they mount four of the 13^-in. guns which form the
main armament of the Nile and Royal Sovereign
models. The Anson, Benbow, and Camperdoivti are of
10,600 tons, and five feet longer. The first and last
are armed like the Howe. The Benbow carries two
i6\-'m. 111-ton guns, similar to those of the Sans
Pareil, instead of four 13^-in., and ten 6-in. guns
instead of six. As the heavy guns are mounted one
in each barbette, they are not exposed to the simul-
taneous disablement which is a danger to the Sans
Pareil ; the Benbow is also able to engage an enemy
stern on, as well as to train both guns on either broad-
side. However, the two guns are inferior in power, as
has been seen, to the four i3§-in., which can plant
more, if less crushing, blows upon an enemy, while less
power is wasted in case of a miss by one of them.
On the whole, therefore, it appears wise that the
experiment was only tried in one ship out of six.
On the other hand, the Benbow has an advantage in
the greater number of her 6-in. guns — an advantage

NAVAL POLICY

multiplied by the substitution of quick-firers for the
slow-fire breech-loaders with which they were first
equipped. The Bcnbozv ought now to possess an energy
of fire per minute of 233,377 ft.-tons to 189,573 ft.-tons
of the Hozve or Anson.* It sounds almost incredible
that, although the 6-in. quick-firer has been used in
the service for over five years, this substitution of
quick-firing secondary armament has only been made,
and that just recently, on two ships of this class — the
Collingwood and Benbow. Any time these five years
they have been serving — all, or most of them — on the
Mediterranean Station, which is the first line of our
defence. Had we come to war with France in that
time — which we nearly did more than once — half of
the line which would have had to fight the first action
with the flower of the French fleet would have been
found depending on an obsolete weapon, and deprived
of half its due power. The neglect to re-arm these
ships is an example of official sluggishness, which
would appear impossible in a service so generally
efficient, were not the retention of effete muzzle-
loaders on our older battleships too deplorably exact
a parallel to it. However, the Collingwood has at last
been re-armed at Malta, and there is hope that before
long the whole of the class will receive the same
belated attention. This done, the "Admirals" will be
serviceable ships for many years, though their ineffective
protection against quick-fire shells must shortly relegate
them to the second line. The trial speeds of the six ships
under forced draught resulted, respectively, as follows :

* The shooting-power of these guns, which are the old 6-in. breech-
loaders converted into quick-firers, is here and elsewhere reckoned as that
of the 6-in. quick-firer proper; it is, however, in fact, slightly inferior.

THE BRITISH NAVY

Collingwood, i6'8 ; Howe, 169 ; Rodney, i6 - 9 ; Benbow,
l 7'S 'y Camperdown, \y\ ; Anson, 17*4. Of these results
that of the Benbow should be discounted, as she was not
tried at her normal weight. The top natural draught-
speed of the class is from 16 to \6l knots an hour.
All stow from 900 to 1200 tons of coal, which should
enable them to steam from 5000 to 7000 knots, at 10
knots an hour — the Collingwood rather more, since she
is smaller and lighter.

All the ships described above are officially ranked as
first-class. That distinction is a convenient one, inas-
much as the " Admirals " are the beginning and pattern
of our modern battle-fleet, but it is not wholly trust-
worthy. One class shades into another. When the
vessels of a fleet represent a continuous progress, as
ours do, the superiority of the best first-class ship over
the worst is almost certain to be greater than the
superiority of the latter over the best second-class ship.
The Majestic, for example, exerts an energy from all
her guns over 3-in. calibre, which may be roughly put
at 316,000 ft.-tons per minute; the Collingwood, before
the substitution of quick-firers for her original arma-
ment, had about 50,000 ft.-tons ; and the Colossus, the
leading vessel of the official second-class, over 45,000.
In point of offensive power, it would be absurd to put
the Collingwood in the same class as the Majestic and
omit the Colossus. The disparity in protective armour
is almost as great. Again, the old first-class ship
will often be less powerful than the new second-class.
The energy of the heavier guns on the French second-
class Bouvines is about 160,000 ft.-tons to the Colling-
wood 's 50,000 ; she is probably as well armoured, and a
fraction of a knot faster. It is true that the substitution

NAVAL POLICY

of quick-firers brings the Collingwood 's energy of fire
up to 130,000, while she has a great strategic supe-
riority in stowing 900 tons of coal to the Bouviness
300. Nevertheless, even if we grant that the Colling-
wood is the more desirable ship of the two in a
squadron, the balance of superiority is so slight that
the sharp distinction of first and second class loses
nearly all its significance. It is this impossibility of
drawing a hard and fast line between classes, and of
putting the same value on all ships within the same
class, that invalidates all estimates of relative strength
based on the official denominations. Hence arise
bluntly conflicting calculations of force, such as perplex
Parliament and the public. Plainly it makes a vast
difference, if we are basing a calculation upon first-class
ships, whether the six "Admirals" are included in the
British total or not. If you take them in, our position
is fairly satisfactory ; yet it is grossly misleading to
reckon a Collingwood as one, and a Majestic as no more
than one. If, on the other hand, you exclude the
" Admirals," you ignore a group of ships certainly
superior to most vessels usually ranked as second-class.
There can be no exact measurement of force : the only
possible method is to analyze the several capacities of
each vessel.

The second-class is mainly made up of a series of
turret-ships, built between 1870 and 1880; the type
has been already sketched in the previous chapter.
The turrets are not placed at either end of a long
central battery, as in the Nile, but together amidships.
In the Nile the guns of one turret bear ahead, and
those of the other astern ; in the later ships of the
second-class, the turrets are placed en echelon — that is,

THE BRITISH NAVY

obliquely : one on one beam, rather forward of the
ship's centre, and the other on the other beam, rather
abaft of it. With two guns in each turret, this arrange-
ment obviously gives a great concentration of all-round
fire; all four heavy guns can bear ahead, astern, on
either broadside — in any direction, indeed, except on
one bow and one quarter, where one turret would mask
the other. With this arrangement, the natural tendency
was to concentrate the armour also round the heavy
guns, thus making a small citadel in the centre of the
ship. The vessels built on this plan are (in order of
newness) the Colossus and Edinburgh, Agamemnon and
Ajax, and Inflexible. The two first are fairly successful
ships ; the three last are not. The Colossus and Edin-
burgh are of 9420 tons, and mailed with 14 to 16
inehes of compound armour ; they carry four 12-in.
45-ton guns, and five 6-in. slow-firers, as well as light
quick-firers for use against torpedo-boats. Their trial
speed, without forced draught, for which they are not
fitted, was 16 knots, and they carry coal enough to
maintain this rate for over 2000 miles, and 10 knots for
6000. It must be added that the Edinburgh lament-
ably failed in steaming powers at the 1896 manoeuvres,
and had great difficulty in making 11 knots. The
Agamemnon, Ajax, and Inflexible are far less valuable ;
indeed, it might be doubted whether the loss of their
crews, risked by sending them to sea in war-time, would
not be greater than any service they would be likely to
render. They are armed with obsolete muzzle-loaders,
they are very slow, and they will not steer. Besides
these special demerits of their own, they share with
the Colossus the disadvantage that the greater part of
the hull, and therewith the auxiliary armament, is

NAVAL POLICY

unprotected. These ships were the first to mount
medium-sized guns, but the want of protection for
their crews almost destroys the value of the innova-
tion. These were also the first British ships on which
compound armour was used, and the first also with
the armoured deck below the water-line that has since
partly superseded the belt in our battleships, and
wholly in our cruisers.

The earlier turret-ships of the second-class — the
Neptune, Dreadnought, Thunderer, and Devastation —
are like the Nile, in that the turrets are not en Echelon,
but fore and aft on the centre-line of the ship. They
are completely belted by thick iron plating ; and
having, except the Neptune, very low freeboards, are
armoured over almost their whole surface. The
Thunderer and Devastation, designed by Sir Edward
Reed nearly thirty years ago, are still most efficient
and valuable ships ; they have been re-armed with
io-in. breech-loaders, and light quick-firers, while new
machinery has given them a speed, in smooth water, of
over 14 knots.

Besides the turret-ships, there are also ranked in the
second - class, the Temeraire, Superb, and Alexandra.
These are central battery, or casemate ships, though
the Temeraire carries two of her heavy guns in
barbettes. The central battery was an effort to secure
the bow and stern fire, in which the earliest broadside
ironclads were necessarily deficient. These ships are
completely belted, and also armoured on the central
battery ; they command a good all-round fire ; their
speed is 13 to 14 knots.

The disabling weakness of these ships is their obsolete
armament. It is no use to waste words in condemnation

THE BRITISH NAVY

of the policy which retained the slow and feeble
muzzle-loader for years after every civilized nation had
abandoned it. But it is perhaps worth while to insist
that the mistake, once recognized, should be immediately
made good. " Our available supply of heavy breech-
loaders," wrote Lord Brassey in 1887, "is still lamentably
insufficient. . . . The delay in adopting the breech-
loading system for the British service is much to be
regretted. We have to face a large expenditure to
bring our store of guns to a level with our great
requirements." This was in 1887; the first heavy
breech-loaders had been mounted on the Conqueror in
1882. It is now 1896, and the work of re-armament is
hardly begun. Here again is one of the extraordinary
contradictions, which awake the doubt whether the
British Navy is, after all, the first in the world or the last.
In fourteen years we have succeeded in re-arming the
Thunderer and Devastation wholly, and the Alexandra
partially with heavy breech-loaders ; while we have
supplied the third-class Sultan and Hercules with ten
47-inch quick-firers between them. Feebler attempts
to keep our ships up to the requirements of war there
could not be. The result is that more than half the
second-class of our battleships, and all the third-class,
are unfit to send to sea except in peace time. The
Admiralty is supposed to be pursuing a steady course
of renovation and reconstruction with our older ships ;
they do indeed go into dockyard hands for months, and
heavy sums are spent upon them. But when they come
out again, as did the Superb, Hercules, Sultan, and
Monarch, with next to nothing but their old muzzle-
loaders to depend on, whose crews would likely enough
be shot down to a man by quick-fire shell before their

NAVAL POLICY

second round, then the only conclusion is that the
money spent had much better have been thrown into
the sea. The official defence against this charge of
modernization, which is no modernization, is that, the
ships being built for muzzle-loaders, it is not possible to
substitute the longer breech-loaders without virtually
taking the ship to pieces and putting her together again.
This, it is said, would not be worth the money, which
would be better spent on new ships. Very well; but if it
is not worth the money to re-arm them efficiently, how
much less worth it must be to spend large sums and
leave them inefficient. Let us have one thing or the
other. Either let us spend enough to arm our older
ironclads with breech-loaders and quick-firers, well
protected, and to re-furnish them with modern engines ;
or else let us recognize that the money will be better
spent on new ships, and spend it accordingly. Only
then let us quite frankly admit that more than half our
second, and nearly all our third line is virtually in-
effective. Or, better still, let us sell the ships to the
Emperor of China, or some other innocent potentate
who desires a ready-made toy fleet. But let us leave
the present farce of counting the ships as efficient on the
one side of the account, and crediting ourselves with the
money required to make them efficient on the other.

The third-class battleships on the effective list are
twenty-six in number. This includes fifteen vessels
classed as coast-defence ships. The classification is
misleading, in so far as it is not the custom of our
country to build ships intended for coast-defence alone.
Our frontier is the enemy's coast-line, and all our ships
should be able to take the offensive on that frontier,
leaving the sea secure in British possession behind them.

THE BRITISH NAVY

The coast defenders in our Navy are so called because
improvements in shipbuilding have left them unable
thus to operate against a distant enemy, either through
deficiency of coal-supply, or because their low free-
board renders them incapable of contending against
any sea. It is not worth while to give a detailed account
either of these or of the sea-going third-class ironclads.
The most efficiently armed are the Conqueror and Hero
— twin turret-ships built on the model of the Sans
Pareil, but much smaller. Each carries a pair of 1 2-inch
breech-loaders in a single forward turret, as well as four
6-inch slow-firers as auxiliary armament, with light
quick-firers. The compound armour-belt protects the
whole length except 20 feet astern. They are handy
ships, but so low in the bows that their speed falls to
ten knots in a seaway, and on this account they would
often be more of an encumbrance than a help to a sea-
going squadron. Somewhat similar are the older
Rupert and Hotspur. These are completely belted.
The Rupert has had two 9/2-inch breech-loading guns
substituted for the muzzle-loaders in her turret, and is
so far efficient that she is now serving as guardship at
Gibraltar ; it is, however, instructive, as demonstrating
the dependence of low-bowed ships on the weather, that
she had to turn back from her first attempt to get there.
The double-turreted Monarch has also been reconstructed,
and can steam 14! knots nominal, but the muzzle-
loaders remain. Of the other third-class ships, the
Sultan and Hercules are remarkable for the stoutness of
their build. They would last for years yet if they were
better armed ; as it is, a costly reconstruction stopped
short with the provision of four 47-inch quick-firers
for the one, and six for the other, leaving the heavy
g 81

NAVAL POLICY

muzzle-loaders still in place. The Bcllcrophon, a central-
battery ship over thirty years old, has been re-armed
with 8-inch breech-loaders, and could take her place in
the line of battle at a pinch. The Magdala and
Abyssinia, turret-ships used for Indian defence, have
been re-armed with the same guns. The rest of this
class would only be used in line as a last reserve, though
they might any of them be useful as depot-ships for
torpedo-boats acting as coast-defence, or to convoy
merchantmen. For the same duties the Admiralty
could draw on four antique broadside ironclads, officially
miscalled armoured cruisers. As none of them can
make more than 13! knots, they have little in common
with such ships as the Terrible. All retain their pristine
muzzle-loaders, but the Minotaur and Northumberland
mount a few 47 quick-firers which, backed by their
great surface of armour, would enable them to drive off
any but a powerful cruiser.

The real cruiser of to-day is very different from such
stout, unwieldy machines as these. With warships, as
with everything else, function governs structure. So
the cruiser, being, as it were, the cavalry of the sea,
must be swift to move even more than strong to strike.
It falls to the cruiser to discover the whereabouts, the
movements, and the strength of the enemy, and thus
enable the battle-fleet either to engage or avoid him.
This is the function of cruisers with a fleet. Their
other main duty is to act independently for the defence
or attack of commerce at sea. For both purposes they
clearly require a high degree of speed — speed, too, not
shown in a spurt over the measured mile, with boiler-
tubes just holding out unburned for the four hours, but
maintained for long periods in any sort of sea. To

THE BRITISH NAVY

ensure such a high sea-speed, an efficient cruiser,
whether in scouting for a fleet or a long chase on her
own account, must be of a certain size ; otherwise her
nominal speed will fall too much in contending with
the waves. But besides the capacity for continuous
hard steaming, she must possess also the capacities of
a fighting-ship. The fastest scout might often be
compelled to fight a running action with an enemy,
and the inability to defend herself might result in the
loss of momentous information. And though it needs
no overwhelming degree of military power to capture
a merchantman, isolated cruisers must always be ready
for actions with the cruisers of the enemy. Especially
is this so with British cruisers. On the high seas, as
before an enemy's battle-fleet, we shall be on the
defensive ; but our defence must, in both cases, be
offensive. We present to the enemy's attack a sea-
borne trade greater than that of any other three nations
together. We alone of all the nations of the earth
might be brought to our knees by the destruction of
our commerce at sea. Therefore the cruiser of an
enemy would ask nothing better than to be left un-
disturbed in the inglorious, but most effective, occupa-
tion of destroying our merchant marine. We, on the
other hand, must attack and destroy the hostile cruiser
at all times and at any cost. Every hostile cruiser at
large is a ihenace to our national existence ; and every
action, even though of itself indecisive, which leaves
a hostile cruiser at large is essentially a British defeat.
French writers have said that the commander of any
French cruiser in war-time ought to be court-martialled
if he engaged a British ship when he could avoid it.
If so, a British officer should be court-martialled if

NAVAL POLICY

he neglects to engage a hostile cruiser when there is
even the faintest hope of disabling her. Our cruisers,
then, must have speed to bring them into touch with
the enemy, and gun-power to enable them to defeat
him.

The modern cruiser, like many of the appliances of
modern naval war, is the invention of Lord Armstrong.
In 1879 there had been completed at Portsmouth the
Mercury \ which, on trial, got the splendid result of 187
knots an hour. But the Mercury does not stow coal
enough to be really efficient on a cruise, while the fact
that her engines and boilers are above the water-line,
and wholly unprotected by armour, seriously reduces
her value as a fighting-ship. The latter of these dis-
advantages were avoided in the Esmeralda, which Lord
Armstrong produced in 1889 for the Chilian Govern-
ment. The Esmeralda (now sold to Japan, and renamed
the Idzumi) is a knot slower than the Mercury, and is
also inferior in coal endurance ; but she carries two
10-in. and six 6-in. guns against thirteen 5-in. on the
Mercury, which would give her, roughly, one-third again
as much gun-power. What was far more important,
she had an arched protected deck below water, which
covered engines, boilers, steam-pipes, and magazines,
while all the more important guns were protected by
steel screens. With this Esmeralda began a series of
cruisers combining very high speed with an enormous
attacking power. The series has culminated in the
second Esmeralda — also built for Chili — which may
fairly be called the most remarkable warship in the
world. She is built to steam a trifle under 23J knots an
hour, which makes her the fastest war-vessel (other than
torpedo craft) in the world. Carrying two 8-in., sixteen

THE BRITISH NAVY

6-in., and ten 6-pounder guns — all quick-firing — her
energy of fire per minute comes to the enormous
total of 509,091 ft.-tons, which surpasses not only all
cruisers, but all battleships in the world, whether built,
building, or to be built. Moreover, she is protected
with a 6-in. belt over four-fifths of her length, carries
5-in. shields on her guns, and has a 2-in. steel deck.
On occasion she can carry 1000 tons of coal — and all
this on a displacement under 8000 tons.

In our own line of cruisers we have nothing to show
of such brilliance as the Esmeralda. Our latest, largest,
and most expensive are the Powerful and Terrible.
They are of 14,200 tons, and so large (500 feet long
between perpendiculars, and 538 over all), that a couple
of new docks have had to be built for them at Ports-
mouth, since no existing one would take them. But an
analysis of their offensive and defensive powers is at
the first blush very disappointing. They were built as
an answer to the Rurik and Rossia : compare them
with these Russian cruisers and with the Esmeralda.
They have greater tonnage — nearly double the Esme-
ralda's — and they have not only cost as much money
in themselves, but have caused us to spend .£375,000
more in making docks for them. What do we get
in return ? The Terrible s energy of fire per minute is
306,647 foot-tons ; the Esmeralda's is 509,091, while the
Rossids is estimated at 470,000. The Terrible has
no side armour ; the Esmeralda and Rossia are belted
over four-fiths of their length with six inches of steel.
The Terrible steams 22 h knots an hour, and the
Esmeralda over 23 ; the Rossia, it is true, but 20.
Briefly, it seems that at a vast expenditure of money
we have got a ship which cuuid neither catch the

NAVAL POLICY

cheaper Esmeralda, nor fight her if she did. She has
indeed a couple of knots in hand of the Rossia, but,
being weaker both in offence and defence, it looks
like the advantage in running away — a position which,
for a British cruiser, is neither dignified nor profitable.
But a closer examination of these ships puts a some-
what better face on the matter. The Terrible carries
fore and aft a couple of 9-2-inch guns of greater range
and penetration than anything mounted by her rivals,
and this goes to neutralize their side-armour. Further-
more, although wholly unarmoured on the side, she has
an arched steel deck of 4 inches over her vitals, as
against less than 3 inches in the Rossia, and but 2
in the Esmeralda. Her two 9-2-inch guns are in
6-inch barbettes, and her twelve 6-inch quick-firers are
protected by 6 inches of armour before and 2 inches
behind ; the Esmeralda 's have 5-inch shields in front,
but the crews are defenceless against shells bursting
behind them. The Rossia's guns, too (if she is like the
Rurik) are protected only by shields, and mostly carried
in an open battery, so that one shell might put half-a-
dozen of them out of action. Moreover, the very size
of the Terrible gives her a considerable advantage.
Her gun positions are more widely distributed, so that
guns will be less easily put out of action. It is true
that she carries four of her 6-inch pieces in casemates
exactly over four others, but even so her armament
would probably require more blows to silence it than
that of her rivals. The Terrible can steam 25,000
knots at 10 knots, the Rossia 20,000, and the Esme-
ralda a beggarly 2000. In speed, again, the Terrible 's
size favours her; the Esmeralda may have done more on
the trial trip, but the Terrible's high bow and great

THE BRITISH NAVY

length and weight would probably bring her well to the
front at sea. Her 22h knots, moreover, are attained
under natural draught. In ocean speed, indeed, the
Terrible and Powerful are likely to prove decidedly the
fastest cruisers in the world. Unlike the United States
cruiser Columbia of 7475 tons, which in crossing the
Atlantic fell four and a half knots below her trial speed,
they are likely to give their form in all weathers for
days together, and are probably the only cruisers afloat
which could chase a liner with the least chance of over-
taking her. Yet when all is said and done, it is doubt-
ful whether it would be wise to build many Terribles.
It is not so much that they are not good enough,
but that they are too good and too expensive for the
work they are likely to have to do. Assuming, as we
fairly may, that they could fight a Rossia or a Rurik on
equal terms, the two or four knots superiority in speed
might be just as well one for all useful purposes, so that
here is a certain waste of power. A coal endur-
ance of 25,000 knots, again, is probably more than
would ever be wanted in practice. As for the Esmeralda,
she can never operate a thousand knots away from her
coaling-base; so that if our probable enemies acquire any
such ship it would be more economical to build ships
with coal enough to bring them into her radius, and
sufficient gun-power and protection to overcome her.
After all there are but half-a-dozen cruisers in
the world that would be worthy antagonists for the
Terrible, and not a dozen foreign liners that would need
such high speed to run them down.

So that for nearly all probable eventualities of war
the new Diadem class will doubtless be found quite fast
and powerful enough. The Diadem and seven sisters —

NAVAL POLICY

Andromeda, Europe, Niobe, and four as yet unnamed —
will displace 11,000 tons. They are armoured on the
same plan as the Terrible, except that the casemates are
of 4^-inch steel instead of 6. Instead of the two
9-2-inch slow-firing guns in barbettes, the Diadem will
mount on forecastle and poop two pairs of 6-inch
quick-firers. This will add greatly to the energy of
fire, which in the Diadem reaches 355,235 ft.-tons a
minute as against 306,647 in the Terrible. It may be
objected as against this that the 6-inch gun is adequate
to pierce armour of any thickness, and the suggestion
has several times been made that a couple of 8-inch
quick-firers would have been better than either the two
9/2-inch or the four 6-inch ; the rate of fire would have
been far greater than that of the former, and nearly as
great as the latter, with far more efficiency for the
attack of armour. The Diadem, like the Terrible, is
fitted with Belleville water-tube boilers. At natural
draught these ships are estimated to steam 20| knots,
which estimate, following the very commendable custom
of our ships, will probably be exceeded on trial. With
forced draught, if it is used, they would doubtless do a
knot more, but even without it the Diadem class will
probably be able to hold their own in a sea with any
cruiser of any probable enemy.

The rest of our first-class cruisers are several years
older. The Blake and Blenheim, which rank next in
size, power, and speed, date from 1890. Of 9000 tons,
they are considerably smaller than the Terrible and the
Diadem, measuring 390 feet, as against 500 and 435,
and are consequently able to use many of our existing
docks — a consideration not without importance. They
carry forward and aft two 9 , 2-in. guns, of an older

THE BRITISH NAVY

pattern than the Terrible's, which latter are of wire, and
therefore strong enough to use a more powerful charge.
On each broadside they carry five 6-in. quick-firers ;
below this calibre they have no gun larger than their
sixteen 3-pounders for repelling torpedo-boats, whereas
the Terrible mounts sixteen, and the Diadem fourteen
12-pounders, besides a dozen 3-pounders apiece.
Nevertheless the Blake and the Blenheim are very
well armed for their date. They would be well able to
stand up to such first-class cruisers as the French
U Entrecasteaux, launched only the other day, and
should make short work of anything of a lower class.
They have no vertical armour, but carry 6-in. case-
mates for the four 6-in. guns mounted on the main
deck ; the others have only protective shields. This
is a weakness, but it belongs to their time : the im-
portance of shelter for guns has only been gradually
realized as the tremendous destructive force of quick-
fire shells has come home to naval constructors. The
protective deck is from 3 to 6 inches. The engines
present a novel feature, there being four distinct sets of
triple-expansion engines, two on each side. The forward
and after sets on each side can be coupled up together
to work at high speeds, or disconnected when moderate
speeds are desired by using the after engines alone.
The Blake performed disappointingly on her earliest
trials, steaming only 19 knots, against the Blenheim's
22, but after a commission on the North American
Station, she was fitted with new boiler-tubes, and being
tried again, reached 2ih knots. These ships, with 1800
tons of coal, were intended to steam 15,000 knots, at
10 knots an hour, or 2000 knots at full speed.

It may be here remarked that the coal*endurance of

NAVAL POLICY

ships is apt to be exaggerated, since often no account
is taken of the coal burned by the auxiliary machinery.
Also, if the endurance is calculated on the basis of the
fuel consumed on the trial-trip, no allowance is made
for steaming against wind or sea, which is naturally
more expensive of coal. All calculations of coal-
endurance are, therefore, to a certain extent untrust-
worthy, unless arrived at by actual experiment in
average conditions of weather. Nevertheless, as it is of
the first importance in estimating the strategic value of
a warship, and as the error is fairly uniform in all cases,
the calculated endurance of any two ships may be
taken as representing roughly the proportionate, if not
the actual, radius of their action. Modern ships are
estimated to burn approximately 2 lbs. per indicated
horse-power per hour, with a daily wastage of one to
six tons for auxiliary engines.

We possess nine first-class cruisers of the Edgar
class. This group really contains two slightly different
types. The Edgar, Endymion, Grafton, Hawke, and
Theseus are of 7350 tons; the Crescent, Gibraltar,
Royal Arthur, and St. George of 7700. With engines
of the same power, the lighter type, which also has
a slight advantage in the proportion of length to beam,
is about half-a-knot the faster; these ships steam 19
and 20 knots with natural and forced draught respec-
tively, the Crescent and her sisters 18 -J- and 19^. The
coal-endurance is reckoned at 10,000 knots at 10 per
hour, and 2800 at 18. The main armament (two 9 - 2-in.
and ten 6-in. quick-firers) is the same as that of the Blake,
with the advantage as against torpedo-boats of twelve
6-pounders and five 3-pounders, instead of sixteen
3-pounders. The Crescent and Royal Arthur, however,

THE BRITISH NAVY

carry only one o/2-in. gun and twelve 6-in. quick-firers
— an arrangement which gives a greater volume of fire,
though less power of penetrating armour. The steel
deck has a maximum thickness of 5 inches, and there
are, as in the Blake, four 6- to 2-in. armoured casemates.
Altogether these are, perhaps, the most satisfactory
cruisers we possess. They cost from .£350,000 to
£400,000 apiece, as against £440,000 and £425,000
for the Blake and Blenheim. They are perhaps a
couple of knots slower ; on the other hand, for less
money and on a smaller tonnage, they are more power-
fully armed, and almost as well protected, and are
worked by 544 men instead of 590. Even the
superiority of speed in the Blake is more apparent
than real. She dates from the era of excessive forced
draught, which could only be safely used for a short
spurt, and her natural draught speed can hardly be
more than 19 knots. On the other hand, to take
specimen cases, the Edgar has run twenty-four hours
on end at 19I knots, and the Royal Arthur twice as
long at I7f. In a word, there are very few cruisers
abroad that these fine sea-going ships could not catch
in a long chase, and fewer still that could withstand
their powerful quick-firing broadside. While we have
such ships there is little need to go in search of ex-
travagant displacements, or even excessive speed.

Of what are called armoured, as opposed to deck-
protected, cruisers, our constructors seem never to have
had a very high opinion. There are, indeed, seven
belted cruisers — Aurora, Australia, Galatea, Immor-
tality Narcissus, Orlando, Undaunted, laid down in
1885 and 1886; and the Imperieuse and Warspite, four
or five years older. These ships are protected on the

NAVAL POLICY

water-line by narrow belts of compound armour — 200
feet long in the 300-ft. Aurora, 5| feet broad and 10
inches thick ; and 140 feet long out of the Warspite's
315, 8 broad, and 10 inches thick. In each ship trans-
verse bulkheads close the ends of the belt. But a narrow
strip of armour like this is rather an alternative to the
protective deck than an advance upon it in resistance to
projectiles. As the curved deck would, in most cases,
be hit obliquely, it will be, roughly, twice as difficult
to penetrate, so that a 5-in. steel deck would answer
exactly the same purpose as the 10-in. side-plating.
The analogy is completed by the fact that at their load-
draught the Aurora class sink until the belt is almost
entirely submerged. This is, in itself, no disadvantage ;
for the belt emerges if the ship rolls, and thus protects
the vital parts just in the circumstances where they are
exposed to most damage. But so far as protection to
the hull is concerned, it is misleading to call the Aurora
an armoured cruiser any more than the Edgar. To find
the real armoured cruiser we must look abroad to the
French Jeanne d'Air, Dupuy-de-Lome, and Bruix class.
Here the hull is really armoured with a thin sheath of
steel over all but its whole surface. Whether our con-
structors have been wise in neglecting this type of
cruiser is doubtful. The Jeanne d' Arc's 6-in. mail will
defy under any conditions the shot of all our service
6-in. quick-firers, except the wire-wound model. The
4-in. plates of the others will do as much for the 47-in.
quick-firer, and stop even the 6-in. shot at long ranges.
Oblique hits, even from most powerful guns, will glance
aside off their armour; and, with a superior speed, a
captain can so manoeuvre that most hits will be oblique.
The attack of shell will be entirely defeated, since shell

THE BRITISH NAVY

will burst outside the ships. This means that until the
armour is broken up the principal offensive weapons
of naval war will be powerless against them. It is by
no means certain that even our most formidable cruisers
could meet such vessels with an even chance of success.
This being' so, is it wise to go on putting all our eggs in
the unarmoured basket ?

To come back to our belted cruisers. The Aurora
type is of 5600 tons. They mount two 9/2-in. and
ten 6-in. guns, which latter will, by the end of the year,
be converted to quick-firers in all but the Orlando and
Undatinted, which are serving on distant stations abroad.
The Warspite carries four 9/2-in. breech-loaders — one
ahead, one astern, and one on each beam, all in 8-in.
compound-armour barbettes; also ten 6-in., four 6-
pounder, and nine 3-pounder quick-firers. Both types
reinforce their belt with a 3-in. steel deck. In point of
protection and gun-power, therefore, both types rightly
rank as cruisers of the first class. The Aurora dis-
places, for example, 5600 tons to the Blake's 7000, and
cost £287,000 to £440,000. She is, on the whole, as
efficiently protected, and her guns give out about
201,000 ft.-tons of energy per minute to about 206,000.
The Warspite, on a displacement of 8400 tons — though
at a cost, it is true, of £529,000 — has better protection,
and a fire-energy of over 220,000 ft.-tons. The defi-
ciency both of the Aurora class and of the Warspite
is in speed. The former ships steam from 18 to \<$\
knots at top speed ; the latter 17 knots. This belongs
to their day, but they remain far better armed, in pro-
portion to their tonnage, than most of our cruisers.
Once they got up to an enemy they could give a very
good account of themselves.

NAVAL POLICY

The modern second-class cruisers of the British Navy-
are all developments of one type, so that no long time
need be devoted to their description. The archetype is
found in the Apollo and twenty sisters, built under the
Naval Defence Act in 1890 and 1891. To be strictly
accurate, there are two divisions in this class : ten* are
of 3600 tons, 300 ft. long, 43 ft. 8 in. in breadth, and

17 ft. 6 in. draught; and eleven of 3400 tons, being of
the same length, but 8 inches narrower, and drawing

18 inches less water. All alike have a protective deck
from 1 to 2 inches thick ; all carry two 6-in. quick-firers
at bow and stern, and three 47-in. quick-firers on either
broadside. They also have eight 6-pounders. In speed
the narrower and lighter class naturally have an advan-
tage : all reached 20 knots an hour with forced draught,
and the Sappho and Scylla 20J. The ten heavier boats
made about 19^.

These vessels have been severely criticized, and with
good reason. They are very decidedly under-armed,
and especially weak in end-on fire. If we compare
them with French second-class cruisers, such as the
C1iasseloiip-Lcmbat y it is plain that a combat could only
by a miracle result in anything but disaster for our ship.
Whether the Apollo chased or ran, she would find her
single 6-in. bow or stern-chaser faced by three 6 - 3-in.
and two 3"9-in. quick-firers. In three minutes the Apollo
would throw sixteen shots, represented by 43,696 ft.-
tons of energy, from her one gun ; the CJiasseloup-Lmibat
ninety-three shots, of 227,192 ft.-tons, from her five.f
As it will be the object of French cruisers to keep

* For names, see table in Appendix.

t See a forcible article by Mr. H. Arnold Forster, in the Pall Mall
Gazette of March 27th, 1895.

THE BRITISH NAVY

away from our ships and devote themselves to ruining
our trade, and as, therefore, actions between cruisers will
usually begin with a chase, this inferiority in end-on fire
can only be fatal. The Apollo will be more than half a
knot to the good each hour ; but of what use will that
be when she can hardly help being disabled before she
can come up with the enemy ? And even if we suppose
her to have come up, and to use superior speed to force
a broadside action, the case is hardly bettered. The
Apollo brings to bear on the broadside two 6-in. and
three 47-in. guns ; the Chasscloup-Lanbat four 6"3-in.
and two 3'9-in. : that is, 141,143 ft.-tons in three minutes
for the Apollo, to 227,192 for the Frenchman. The
conclusion is that only by an overwhelming superiority
in gunnery, such as we have no right to assume for our
seamen, could one of these ships escape defeat at the
hands of a typical second-class French cruiser. It may
be answered that the Apollo is superior to her rival in
coal supply, in ammunition, in the possession of a
double bottom for going aground on ; and that a
British cruiser, having to operate in any seas, must
needs possess these qualities. Possibly that is a very
good reason why our second-class cruisers should have
a larger displacement than any Power else's. But the
fact remains that British cruisers — British cruisers,
indeed, above all others — are built to fight their enemy,
and that this particular type is unable to tackle an
average opponent of its own class. As a fighting-ship,
it may have every other merit on the face of the waters,
only — it cannot fight.

The first modification of this type is seen in the
Astrtza class of eight vessels. These vessels are an
improvement in that they mount a couple more 47-in.

NAVAL POLICY

quick-firers, and that two of these can fire ahead or astern
as well as the 6-in. chaser. This is an undeniable gain.
But even this leaves a pursuing Astrcea at a great dis-
advantage against the Cliasscloup- Laubats stern fire,
while she still remains inferior in broadside fire. More-
over, against the Astrcsa's gain in gun-power, we have
to set the following points of inferiority. She is of 760
tons greater displacement than the Apollo, she costs
,£60,000 more, is half a knot slower, takes 318 men to
work her instead of 273, and, having the same bunker
capacity with a greater weight to propel, has but 5500
as against 7000 knots radius of action.

The next advance in the type of second-class cruiser
is the Eclipse class, of which, complete and completing,
we have nine, with three more to be laid down on the
1896 programme. These vessels are a trifle more
satisfactory. The Eclipse brings to bear forward three
6-in. quick-firers, and two astern, with three of these
guns and three 47-in. on each broadside ; she has also
3-in. 12-pounder quick-firers instead of 6-pounders.
Both ahead and broadside fire are only a trifle weaker
than that of the French cruiser. As, however, the
Eclipse is of 5600 tons — the same displacement as the
far more heavily-armed and armoured Aurora, and
more than that of many first-class cruisers of other
nations — it cannot be said that she is over-gunned for
her size. The work of her guns per minute comes to
162,209 ft.-tons ; that of the Chasseloup-Laubat — nearly
1900 tons lighter — to 177,284, and that of the Elswick-
built Argentine cruiser Buenos-Aires — 1100 tons lighter
— to no less than 292,340 tons. The speed of the
Eclipse class, moreover, was estimated for at i8| and
1 gh knots with natural and forced draught respectively,

THE BRITISH NAVY

which was progressing backwards. But as the Eclipse
and Talbot — the first two tried — made over 19 and
20, the official forecast has been falsified for the better *
The protective deck is 3 to ii inches — half as thick
again as that of the Astrcea, and the radius of action
substantially larger. The complement is 480, and the
average cost will be under a quarter of a million. Yet
when it is recalled that the Buenos- Aires aforesaid, besides
her superior gun-power, is three knots faster, carries
about as much coal, has a wider radius and a smaller
crew, the Eclipse, excellent sea-boat as she turns out,
seems hardly to come up to the full associations of her
name.

Nor are the Arrogant, Furious, Gladiator, and
Vindictive, now building, very much more likely to
make good their names. Displacing 5750 tons, they
mount one 6-in. gun less than the Eclipse. On the
other hand, their deck-protection is better ; in this
nickel steel is used. The Arrogant is expected to do
19J knots without forcing her furnaces, and on the
analogy of the Eclipse we may hope to see her make
20. This will give her a full-power sea-speed that
should make her a fairly useful scout for a squadron,
and keep her out of harm's way if she is worsted by
a better-armed enemy when cruising independently at
sea — a contingency by no means unlikely.

Of the cruisers now ranked as third-class, the most
efficient are the Pearl class, which in their day were
accounted second-class. They carry eight 47-in. quick-
firers — no extraordinary armament for their 2575 tons
— two apiece on forecastle, poop, and either broadside.

* It ought to be added, however, that the Eclipse was tried at less than
her normal draught. Since then the Venus has also exceeded 20 knots on trial.
H 97

NAVAL POLICY

The Medea class is larger, but carries only six slow-
firing 6-in. breech-loaders. Both types nominally
steam 19 knots with forced draught ; they were in-
tended to do more, and actually do less. Then there
are the BarJiam and Bellona and the Barracouta class,
each armed with six 47-in. quick-firers, which were
built to act either as scouts to a squadron, or for use on
distant stations. For both duties they are somewhat
handicapped by their small size — 1830 tons in the
Bar/iam, and 1580 in the Barracouta — which makes
against high speed in bad weather. They also belong
to the epoch when all things were expected of an im-
moderate forced draught ; the Barham and Belloua,
especially, never came near the expectations enter-
tained of their speed, and broke down again and again
through overheated tubes. Designed to steam 19 knots
with 6000 horse-power under forced draught, they
never got within a knot of it. Both ships, however,
have since been in commission, and when their
engineers came to know their ways were good for
18 knots at a spurt, and 15 to 16 for a long run. They
are now to be fitted with water-tube boilers. Although
our third-class cruisers are too small to do much in a sea —
as has been found notably in the Archer class of 1170
tons — they are so much cheaper than the larger second-
class vessels, that it has been thought well lately to lay
down the Pclorus and seven sister ships of 2135 tons.
These will doubtless be useful as scouts for a fleet in
reasonably smooth waters — the Mediterranean, for in-
stance — and should be a great deal more efficient for
all services than any existing British ships of their class.
The armament will be eight 4-in. quick-firers dis-
tributed as in the Pearl. This 4-in. gun is a new wire

THE BRITISH NAVY

piece with a 25 lb. shot, a muzzle-energy of 1046 ft.-tons,
and calculated to pierce 11 inches of wrought-iron at
the muzzle. The top speed of the Pelorus is to be 20
knots, and her radius of action 7000 miles. It must be
acknowledged that the Pelorus, like all our cruisers,
compares unfavourably for gun-power and speed with
the Elswick-built vessels of the same class — as for
instance the Italian Piemonte, which carries six 6A~in.
and six 47-in. quick-firers, and steams 21 knots. If
the Pelorus is to fight, she is ill-equipped ; if she is to
be merely a scout, she is hardly fast enough : 20 knots
an hour at this stage of engineering progress is be-
coming obsolete as the measure of high speed.

There is one very satisfactory feature, however, about
the steaming of our cruisers, and, indeed, of all our ships
of war, which must be borne in mind when their powers
are criticised. The trial speed is obtained, as a rule,
under favourable conditions of wind and sea, so that
there is a general disinclination to take these per-
formances as representative of the average working
capacity of the ship. But, besides these, there are
regular periodical trials during the period while a ship
is in commission, and on these, when the engineers
have come to know their machinery, and stokers are in
good training and well up to their work, even better
results are often obtained than when the ship is new.
The splendid performances of the Edgar and Royal
Arthur have been referred to already. The Vulcan,
torpedo-depot ship, with a trial speed for four hours' run
of iyh knots, last year steamed 850 miles in 48 hours —
an average of 17I knots. The Sirius did 18-2 knots on
her way home from a three years' commission in South
America, with her bottom foul, and in much need of

H 2 99

NAVAL POLICY

docking. The Camperdown is actually said to have
come into Malta, after her disastrous collision with
the Victoria, and with several feet of her bow torn
away, at i6| knots. As long as our engine-room
complements can put in splendid work like this,
we can afford to see our ships a little behind on
paper.

The torpedo flotilla of this country has now to be
considered in its three branches of torpedo-gunboats —
or catchers, as they used to be called — torpedo-boat
destroyers, and torpedo-boats. Of the first there are
four types — the Rattlesnake (four vessels), Sharpshooter
(nine), Alarm (eleven), and Dryad (five). The tonnage
rises from 525 tons in the Rattlesnake through 735
{Sharpshooter) and 810 {Alarm) to 1070 in the Dryad.
Of the uses of these boats something has been said in
the previous chapter. They are to sink or beat off
hostile torpedo-boats, act as a support for boats of their
own side, and, in case of need, torpedo any large vessel
that may offer itself. For the first and second purpose
they carry (all but three of them, whose armament is
obsolete) one or two 47-in. guns, and some 6- or 3-
pounders. For the latter purpose they are fitted with
torpedo tubes. But, on the whole, these boats have not
been successful. They are too slow to catch torpedo-
boats in any weather in which torpedo-boats are likely
to venture out of port. The Speedy (which has Thorney-
croft water-tube boilers) has made 20 knots with forced
draught, but none of the others go beyond 19I, and
the Dryad class can only make i8|. These results
compare very poorly with foreign vessels of the same
type, and, partly on this account, partly owing to the
superior capacity of the cheaper destroyer, no torpedo-

100

THE BRITISH NAVY

gunboat has been laid down in England for the last
three years.

The torpedo-boat destroyer, with its wonderful speed
and handiness, and its almost limitless possibilities in
war, is the latest, and perhaps the most striking,
development of naval science. The Havock and Hornet
were only launched by Messrs. Yarrow in 1893, but
their steaming powers were so astonishing that we have
already seventy of them, with a score more building.
They are from 180 to 210 feet long, of 18 to 20 feet
beam, and of 5 to 8 feet draught of water. They dis-
place between 200 and 300 tons. The armament is,
in most cases, one 12-pounder and five 6-pounders,
mounted so as to command an all-round fire. In the
earliest destroyers there was a bow torpedo-tube, but
the speed made by these vessels is so great, that it was
found that, at their fastest, they would stand to overrun
the torpedo. Since then they have been fitted with only
two broadside tubes. The slowest of these boats steams
over 26 knots an hour ; the fastest have made the
wonderful speed of 3 1 knots, or nearly 40 miles an hour
— a very respectable figure for a fast train. All but
one or two have water-tube boilers, which enable them
to get up full steam in a very few minutes. All can
turn within their own length. At the 1895 manoeuvres
it was found that they make steady gun-platforms in
ordinary weather, such as torpedo - boats would be
abroad in.

All this being so, it is tolerably plain that no
torpedo-boat could live long with the destroyer. Far
faster, almost as quick in the turn, provided with
powerful search-lights, and directing all round them a
shower of shells, any one of which would serve to sink

101

NAVAL POLICY

a torpedo - boat, these vessels should make torpedo
attack impossible in their presence. For this reason
they are pre-eminently the type of craft suited to the
necessities and traditions of the British Navy. The
torpedo-boat is, in the main, the weapon of the weaker
and defensive power ; the destroyer is the counter of
the stronger and of the attack. The boat's small coal-
capacity forbids it, as a rule, to operate before an
enemy's ports ; its most characteristic function is
defensive — to prevent a blockade. A blockading
squadron could not venture at night within a belt
of from 50 to 100 miles from shore, for fear of the
enemy's torpedo-boats. Thus distant, it would be
obliged to extend its ships to cover the blockaded
port, and it would be the easier for vessels to slip in
and out — especially if accompanied by boats to fend off
the enemy's attack. The blockade of a port provided
with an effective flotilla of boats was, indeed, almost an
impossibility until the advent of the destroyer. The
destroyers with a blockading squadron would be set to
dispose of any boats venturing out of port. While
they patrolled the inshore waters, the heavier ships
could venture nearer in than would otherwise be safe,
and so maintain a more stringent blockade. Vessels
running the blockade would have even more to fear
from the swift, hardly -discernible destroyer, dealing
blows with either gun or torpedo at will, than from
the most heavily -armed battleship or cruiser.

In order to fulfil this function of neutralizing hostile
boats, it is plain that the destroyers must be capable of
keeping the sea for considerable periods together, and
at considerable distances from any coaling and repairing
base. Can they do this ? As yet, perhaps, the question

102

THE BRITISH NAVY

cannot be answered of so young a class of vessel
without doing it some injustice. With a coal supply
of 80 tons the Desperate could perhaps keep the sea
with a blockading squadron for a week; also it would
no doubt be possible to coal these vessels at sea. That
they can ride out any but the severest storms is most
probable. At any rate the Ardent has now served on the
Mediterranean station for many months, and proved
herself seaworthy ; she has also run 680 miles at 19
knots without replenishing her bunkers. The worst
obstacle to sea-keeping in destroyers is the danger of
breakdowns in their machinery, which has to be as light
as possible, and at the same time to withstand the
severest strains.

It must be allowed that recent experience with
this class of vessel is not calculated to give the
highest estimate of their sea-keeping qualities. In
the beginning of January, 1896, the Government,
as everybody knows, decided to commission the
Particular Service Squadron, included in which were
six destroyers. At the same time six others were added
to the Channel Squadron ; while three apiece were
commissioned at Portsmouth, Chatham, and Devonport,
for the instruction of engine-room ratings. In three
months these twenty-one vessels met with the following
casualties. On January 16th, before the squadrons had
assembled, the Havock ran into the Royal Sovereign
and staved in her side, and the Rocket had to return to
Devonport with boilers leaking. Towards the end of
the month the Sturgeon was detained some days at
Devonport to make good defects. Early in February
the Havock and Surly were disabled through broken
cylinders, and had to be replaced by the Decoy and

103

NAVAL POLICY

Sunfish. At the same time the Daring developed
defects in a steam-pipe. On the ioth the Starfish
collided with the Skate and leaked badly, while a week
after, the unlucky Daring collided with a channel packet,
and one of her engines broke down on the subsequent
run to Portsmouth. On the 26th the Dragon cracked
her low-pressure cylinder, and on March 8th the Banshee
went into dock for strained ribs and plates, the result of
a buffeting in the Irish Channel. The next day the
Skate had to be relieved by the Opossum. In the
meantime the Rocket had broken down five times, and
her boilers took to priming at 14 knots speed, though
on her trials she had made 27. As a result of this last,
the Admiralty ordered that all destroyers should
undergo a two-hours' trial, and should not be allowed
to leave port unless they attained at least nine-tenths of
their contract engine-power. On the 30th the Surly
and Havock were tried after repairs, and could only
make 22*2 and 22*3 knots respectively. In the mean-
time the Handy had sustained defects through the
water running low in her boilers, and the Opossum
had to go into dock to repair her fan -engine. On
April 17th the Handy developed a defective steam-
pipe. Next day the Sturgeon, just out of dockyard
hands, began to leak through defective seams in her
sides.

No doubt this record is not quite so bad as it looks.
The men are unused to their ships, and with more
experience many of the breakdowns would doubtless be
avoided. At the same time the list of casualties
establishes a presumption that the destroyers are fragile
craft. If this fragility can be so far overcome that they

can keep the sea with a fleet, there is hardly any limit

104

THE BRITISH NAVY

to their usefulness. They could always be employed as
scouts or despatch-boats, and there is no function of the
torpedo-boat which they could not perform as well or
better. In night attacks on fleets or ports they would
present a larger mark, but, being faster, would be more
difficult to hit. In a fleet action they would play an
important, perhaps a decisive, part. If the enemy were
accompanied by torpedo-boats, it would be for the
destroyers to meet them, should they attempt a rush at
the battleships before the action, and to defeat them
before its close. During the fight they might shelter
behind battleships, and take advantage of the enemy's
pre-occupation with larger adversaries to shoot out and
send home a mortal blow. But their great opportunity
would come at the end of a battle, when the unprotected
quick-firing guns of the enemy would be disabled. In
this case the battleship would be almost helpless against
their torpedoes ; they could cover or retrieve a defeat,
and turn a victory into a massacre. No ship could
escape them, for they would have the pace even of the
fastest cruiser, and only have to hang on until nightfall
delivered the victim into their hands.

Of torpedo-boats we possess 43 more or less inde-
pendent and sea-going, 50 ranked as first- class, and
72 as second-class, which would generally operate with
a larger vessel in support. Besides their use as vedettes
the torpedo-boats, as well as the destroyers, have a most
important duty to perform in regard to coast-defence.
No hostile ship can remain for a night without grave
risk before a port garrisoned by boats or destroyers.
And in case an enemy attempted a disembarkation on
our coasts, the first night should expose his transports
to a furious attack from every quarter. The skill and

105

NAVAL POLICY

daring of our torpedo lieutenants and men form the
chief defence of our shores. Relying upon them we
shall do well to build no coast-defence armour-clads,
but to put every shilling we can afford into the assailant,
sea-going battle-fleet that is the first and best guarantee
of the inviolability of our islands.

1 06

IV.
FOREIGN NAVIES

FRANCE

Of foreign navies, that of France is at once the nearest
and the most important. To us, indeed, a just estimate
of its strength and efficiency may truly be said to be
hardly less important than of our own. It may not be
necessarily with hostile intention to ourselves that
France supports the double burden of an army on the
largest scale of continental militarism, and a navy
hardly less powerful and expensive than ours. A
very plausible explanation is found in the fact that the
French Navy, as it stands, is not more than equal to the
strategical necessities of a war with the Triple Alliance.
This theory can be supported by the circumstance
that since the connexion with Russia began in 1893,
and the allies found themselves in an overwhelming
position of naval supremacy to the Central Powers,
France (with the exception of one second-class armour-
clad, not yet laid down) has projected no further
addition to her battle-fleet. For a further explanation
of this energy of warlike preparation by land and sea,
with which no other nation, except perhaps Russia,
appears willing to load itself, we may recall the facts
that France has naval traditions almost as long as our

107

NAVAL POLICY

own, and that, at least on paper, she has a colonial
empire of considerable magnitude. But these facts are
in truth only another call upon Englishmen to pay
diligent heed to the naval armaments of their neigh-
bour. The very fact that France is by her traditions a
naval and a colonial Power is a potential menace to
ourselves. Her colonies increase the risk of a collision
between her and us ; her navy forms to us the principal
danger of such a collision. Neither danger is in any
way mitigated by the fact that she is now allied, in some
degree or other, with Russia — another Power which has
both possibilities of quarrel with us and the force to
make such quarrel a serious crisis for our empire. As
against France we are also beset with the peril of over-
confidence. In the Revolutionary and Napoleonic age
we normally beat the French at sea with a good deal to
spare. We have not forgotten that ; but we have, until
lately, forgotten how severely France was then handi-
capped in meeting us. Those battles were battles
of professional seamen against amateurs. At the
Revolution the whole French Navy went Royalist
along with Brittany, from which province officers and
seamen alike were mostly drawn ; we were thus able to
oppose experienced officers and trained gunners to the
raw, if brave, nominees of doctrinaire politicians. We
are not likely to start with this advantage again.
French officers and bluejackets know their business
to-day, none better. The fact that naval warfare has
become scientific is perhaps a point rather in favour of
the scientific acumen of Frenchmen. In any case we
may be sure their ships will be skilfully devised and
ably handled, and that science will be backed by the
brilliant gallantry in which Frenchmen can never fail.

1 08

FOREIGN NAVIES

It behoves us then, it may be repeated, to analyze
the resources of the French Navy no less carefully than
our own.

To adopt the same order as was used with our own
fleet, the latest French battleships, as has already been
said, show a tendency to approximate to British models.
These are the Charlemagne, Gaulois, and St. Louis, now
building. But nine feet shorter than our Majesties, they
are to displace only 11,275 tons, as against 14,900.
The armour consists of a belt of hardened steel along
the water-line, rising 4 feet 11 inches above, and
descending 1 foot 8 inches below it. On the line itself
it is i8f inches thick, but tapers down to 8 inches below
it. Above this belt to a height of 3 feet the hull
is sheathed with 3 inches of steel. There are two
armoured decks— one of 3^ inches at the upper, and
one of 1 \ inches at the lower edge of the belt. So far
as water-line protection goes the Charlemagne has thus
little to complain of, although possibly the English
curved deck offers a better, because an oblique, resist-
ance to projectiles than the horizontal ones. Above
the 3-in. deck, however, a larger area of side is left
naked of armour than in the Majestic. The heavy
armament is four 12-in. guns mounted in 1 5 J-in. steel
revolving turrets ; both turrets and guns can be worked
either mechanically or, if the mechanism breaks down,
by hand ; this advantage is also found in the Majestic.
These guns will probably be of a new pattern — now
in course of construction — giving a greater velocity
than our own 12-inch wire guns, but a somewhat
smaller energy. The secondary armament is very
numerous and powerful — ten 5^-in. quick-firers, of
which eight are protected by 2f-in. shields of hardened

109

NAVAL POLICY

steel, as well as eight 3'9-in., and twenty-six smaller
quick-firers. The whole volume of fire per minute
exceeds that of the Majestic by 25,000 ft.-tons. The
forced draught speed is expected to be 18 knots — half
a knot more than the Majestic. With this superiority
of gun-fire and speed on nearly four thousand tons less
displacement the French ship looks to be a much better
investment than the Majestic. But these, though the
most impressive, are not the only points of a warship.
The Majestic's secondary battery is vastly better pro-
tected, so that a few minutes close fighting would
probably put out of action more than enough of the
Charlemagne 's quick-firers to destroy her initial advan-
tage in gun-power. As for speed, it is very possible
that in any sea the Majestic's higher bow would change
her disadvantage into a half-knot or so of superiority.
Further, the Majestic carries more coal — 1850 tons to
about 1000 — and ammunition than her rival, and is
probably more stoutly built. The Charlemagne has the
advantage of being worked and fought by 632 men, in-
stead of 757 for the Majestic. But in cost — which after
all is the real test of the value a country gets in it war-
ships — the Charlemagne runs to nearly .£1,100,000, while
the average of the nine Majesties is over £200,000 less.
We may be confident that we have better value for our
£880,000 or so than France for her eleven hundred.

The Bouvet and Masscna are the next examples to
be considered. They are not, strictly speaking, sister
ships, since the Bouvet measures 331 feet in length and
70 in beam to the Masse'na's 365 and 66, and displaces
12,205 metric tons to 11,924. The Massenas belt of
hardened steel-plating is lj\ inches at its thickest, and
the Bouvet' s 2 inches less. The protective deck is

FOREIGN NAVIES

3^ inches. The heavy guns are mounted lozenge-wise,
according to the usual French custom: a 12-in. gun
ahead and astern, and a iO'6-in. on each beam, but
firing either ahead or astern — in each case protected by
14 to 16-in. steel plates. The advantage of this arrange-
ment in an end-on action, when these guns can be
brought to bear either ahead or astern, has already
been pointed out ; over and above this it has the further
advantage that no two heavy guns can be disabled by
a single shot. On the other hand, it is not certain
that in practice the beam guns could be fired dead
along the ship's axis without damaging her structure,
and, in a broadside action with the British type, ships
thus armed would have to meet four heavy guns with
three. Eight 5^-in. quick-firers are carried by the
Bouvet and the Massena ; and here again the mounting
exhibits a difference from the English system. They
are carried in pairs in four 4-in. turrets, one on each
bow, and one on each quarter ; the end-on fire is thus
once more stronger than in most battleships, none of
which, except the Majestic class, can bring as many as
four heavy quick-firers to bear directly ahead or astern.
Very similar in armour and armament to these ships
are the earlier Carnot (12,008 tons), Jaureguiberry
(11,824), and Charles Martel (11,882). The belt is
about the same thickness as in the Massena ; but above
it is another belt of 4-in. plating — a feature which is
not found in the later vessels. These three ships are
armed and armoured exactly as the Bouvet and Massena,
so far as their main and secondary batteries go, except
that in the Carnot each heavy quick-firer has a turret
to itself. The two later ships, however, have eight
3'9-in. shielded guns on the superstructure ; the three

NAVAL POLICY

earlier have only four 2^-in. guns in their place. All
five are well supplied with smaller guns for repelling
torpedo-boats. None of these ships are yet ready for
commission, though the Jaureguibcrry has been tried.
The speed, however, will probably turn out much the
same in each case — \6\ to 17 knots with natural, 17^
to 18 with forced draught. The coal capacity is but
800 tons — giving about 5,000 knots at 10 per hour —
in four of them, and in the Massena but 630 tons, with
4000 knots radius. In spite of this weakness, which
would hamper them but little as long as they operated
near their own coasts, these are plainly very formidable
ships. Their gravest defect is that their designers have
not allowed enough for the larger quick-firer as a factor
in future war, and have left great areas of side, above
the belt, wholly unarmoured. All this part of the hull
could be easily and speedily destroyed ; and the result,
even if the vitals were untouched, would be serious loss
in men and horrible disorganization of the whole ship.
The uptakes of the funnels would be riddled, and the
speed impaired, while the whole ship would choke with
poisonous fumes. Ammunition-hoists might be de-
stroyed, and heaps of ammunition exploded. Worse
still, the heavy 12-in. guns fore and aft might be
disabled by shells penetrating the armoured side, and
bursting underneath them. Possibly the whole turret
might fall through the ship's bottom, and sink her ;
possibly the huge armoured military masts — top-heavy
at the best of times — might go by the board, and
capsize her.

The military masts have played an important part
in the short life of the next ship, the Brennus. This
system of military masts is the lineal descendant of

112

FOREIGN NAVIES

the practice of stationing riflemen in vessels' tops,
which Nelson deprecated as causing useless waste of
life, and from which he met his own death. As sails
and rigging went out of use, the tops were enlarged,
and on them were mounted machine guns and the
smaller calibres of Hotchkiss guns. To protect these
and to enable the masts to stand up against shell fire
has been an aim in all modern battleships. The French
in particular strengthened and thickened the mast till
it became rather a turret of steel, with a spiral staircase
inside it. This was, no doubt, a very fine position for
quick-fire guns, which could thence make horrible havoc
of an enemy's deck ; but it involved the grave objection
that its huge weight impaired, and, in extreme cases,
destroyed the stability of the ship. It was so with
the Brennus. When the battleship came to her trials
it was found that the enormous weight was likely to be
too much for her stability, and one of the armoured
masts had to be removed. There were also other faults
in regard to her stability, and she had some difficulty
in making her estimated speed on trial. The result of
these and other repairs and reconstructions was that it
was no less than six years from her laying down before
the Bremzus was fit for sea. Compared with the two
years which Portsmouth and Chatham required to turn
out the Majestic and Magnificent, this gives some idea
of the advantage conferred on Great Britain by our
superior skill and resources in the matter of ship-
building. On the other hand, we must remember that
such comparisons, which are very often made, compare
the French worst with our best ; our Renown, to take
another example, took nearly three years and a-half to
prepare for sea, and the French Charlemagne will hardly
i 113

NAVAL POLICY

take much longer. The Brennus, to go back, is of
11,395 tons. Her steel belt, 6 feet broad, tapers from
17-4 inches amidships to 10 and 12 at the ends; above
this is a narrow belt of 4f inches ; above this again
a central redoubt extending over two-sevenths of the
length, and protected by 4-in. plating. In this redoubt
are six 6'3-in. quick-firers, while four more are mounted
on the upper deck, each in a 4f-in. turret. The heavy
guns are of 16-4 inches (34 centimetres) calibre; these
guns are longer, in proportion to their calibre,* than our
own 13-i-in. gun, and, therefore, considerably more power-
ful. The muzzle-energy is 42,139 to 35,230, though the
projectile is smaller. The Brennus mounts two of her
three big guns in a I7f-in. turret forward, and one aft
in a turret plated with 15! inches. Owing to the
central redoubt this ship exposes less surface than
some of her successors to quick-fire shell, but the
side below both turrets is unprotected. Top speed on
trial was 17-1 knots; and it is hardly doubtful that
she will never attain it again. Her normal coal
capacity is only 550 tons, which means a radius of
about 3000 knots. The complement is 696.

The Magenta, Marceau, and Neptune are the nearest
approach, among the French battleships, to a homo-
geneous class. Their displacement is about 10,900 tons,
their legend speed 16 to i6h knots with forced, and
under 15 with natural draught. They carry 12 to
174-in. of compound armour on the belt, and i^f-in.,
with 3-in. shields, on the barbettes. There are four

* The technical way of putting this is that the French gun is of
42 calibres, the English of 30 : that is, in the one the length of the bore
of the gun is 42 times its own diameter {i.e. 56 feet) ; in the other,
30 times {i.e. 41 feet 3 inches). This gives the powder more time to
work on the projectile before it leaves the gun.

114

FOREIGN NAVIES

i3§-in. (34 centimetre) guns, lozenge-wise, in separate
barbettes — forward, aft, and on either beam. On each
broadside are eight 5§-in. quick-firers — five ahead and
three abaft of the midship barbettes. In consequence
of the large number of quick-firers carried, the gun-
power of these ships is very great, amounting to over
380,000 ft.-tons a minute, or half as much again as the
Carnot, and very nearly as much as the Majestic. Very
similar to these three is the Hoclie (11,000 tons), but she
is less heavily armed. Fore and aft are two I3i-in.
guns, each in a I5f-in. turret, while on each beam she
carries a io - 6-in. gun in a barbette. There are only
eight 5|-in. quick-firers. All four ships are deficient in
armour protection for the hull, though an armoured
trunk sustains the base of each barbette or turret. A
very grave fault is the enormous superstructure, which
disposes the ship to roll — thus impairing the gunner's
aim — and is liable to be destroyed by quick-fire ; even
if the parts thus riddled be indifferent to the vitality of
the ship their destruction cannot but demoralize the
crew. To add to their top-heaviness these ships carry
two singularly heavy and hideous military masts. The
Hochc bears 630 men ; the other three 660.

The Amiral Baudin, Formidable, and Amiral Duperre
date from the early eighties, and are generally similar.
They have a narrow belt of compound armour, no less
than 2l| inches at its thickest, but the greater part of
the hull is left naked to the smallest projectile. The
first two carry three 14'5-in. 75-ton guns — short, as
compared with more modern guns, and not over-
powerful. The Duperre has four guns of the same
calibre. These ships date from the days before the
introduction of large quick-firers, and the Duperre has
1 2 115

NAVAL POLICY

not yet been re-armed. She still retains her fourteen
5|-in. breech-loaders, seven on each broadside, and has
no more than a couple of 3-pounder quick-firers to
defend her against torpedo-boats. The other two,
however, carry four 6 - 3-in., and eight 5i quick-firers,
as well as a fair provision of lighter guns. The Formid-
able is credited with i6h knots an hour, the Baudin
with 15*2, and the Duperre with 14/2. The first might
steam 4000 miles without coaling, the other two 3000.
They carry about 650 men.

Of battleships which may be ranked as first-class —
though the French Navy knows no such official
classification — there remain the Courbet, Devastation,
and Redoubtable, namesake of Nelson's prize at
Trafalgar. They are heavily armed, although their
guns are now a few years out of date, but indifferently
protected. By an exception to the general French rule,
the heavy iron belt is not quite complete, but stops
short a distance from the stern. Amidships is an
armoured casemate ; in this are mounted four guns —
12'6-in. pieces in the two first, and io^-in. in the last.
On the upper deck all four carry four io'6-in. guns in
unarmoured barbettes — one forward, one aft, and one
sponsoned on each beam. The Redoubtable has been
re-armed with six 5|-in. quick-firers ; the others retain
their breech-loaders of the same calibre. These vessels
steam about 14^ to 15 knots, and have a radius of 3000
knots at most. The Redoubtable takes 705 men, the
others 680.

To compare the French battle-fleet, as a whole, with
the British, is a difficult matter. Each excels the other
in various abilities, but as one cannot be expressed in
terms of the other, no balance can be struck between

116

FOREIGN NAVIES

them. Broadly, the British battleships excel as ships,
the French, in certain ways, as fighting-machines. In a
smooth sea their generally superior gun-fire would give
them an advantage, which would be doubled if they
had such a superiority in speed as would enable them
to take full advantage of the lozenge arrangement of
their heavy guns. As a matter of fact they do not
possess this superiority, but fall short, as a fleet, of the
British first-class ships by about a couple of knots.
Thus our system of mounting heavy guns fore and aft,
in pairs, would give us an advantage if we could compel
the enemy to fight broadside on. To France remains
the advantage that the heavy guns are more widely
distributed, and therefore less easily disabled ; the
British ships, on the other hand, have exactly the same
advantage in the mounting of their secondary guns.
Three of the French ships have not been re-armed with
quick-firers, which we may set against the neglect of
our own " Admirals." As for the alternative systems
of armouring, it is fairly plain that the French com-
plete belt is either a necessity or a huge waste of
weight ; but which, it wants the test of war to tell.
The belt was probably superior in the days of the ram ;
the greater extent of side-armour will probably be
superior as long as the reign of the quick-firer endures.
Only in considering this we must remember that some
of our own ships, as the " Admirals," are almost as bare
in the hull as the most exposed of the Frenchmen. In
both fleets the protection of the secondary guns leaves
much to desire, except in the very latest models.
Perhaps the question of armour will never be settled
between the belt and the citadel until the dynamite
gun arrives to do away with armour altogether. In a

117

NAVAL POLICY

high sea the superior steadiness of the British ships,
and the consequent better shooting from them, would
probably give them an easy victory over the French
sea-castles, whose rolling would destroy the gunners'
aim, but which would continue to present a fine mark
for British artillery. In coal endurance the British
fleet is largely superior. But we must discount this
superiority by the fact that the French do not need
great coal endurance. It was lately remarked, in the
House of Commons, that, for want of coal, many
French ships could not operate in the Eastern
Mediterranean ; but then they do not want to operate
in the Eastern Mediterranean. If there were a British
Fleet left no French squadron could go into the
Eastern Mediterranean without having to fight going or
returning, and it is as convenient to it to fight outside
Toulon. If there were no British Fleet left, the French
Fleet would be in the Channel assisting at the invasion
of England. If, then, a French battleship carries coal
enough to steam from Cherbourg to Toulon, and fight
an action on the way, that is as much as she is likely
to require.

Next come the coast-defence ships. There is nothing
about the so-called defence ships, which all Powers
except England build, that fits them peculiarly for
coast defence, except, in some cases, a light draught,
which enables them to operate in shallow waters. But
for that, and the small size which light draught implies,
one ship can defend a coast as well as another. All
British ships are, in a very obvious sense, coast-defence
ships. The only other characteristic of a coast defender
is its small coal supply, and sometimes a low freeboard,
which unfits her for rough water ; both of which are

118

FOREIGN NAVIES

rather defects than good qualities. Leaving out of
account light draught, it is plain that a ship carrying
IOOO tons of coal can, other things equal, defend a coast
as well as, and better than, one with 200 tons. This is a
sufficient answer to those who urge that England should
build such vessels. We may have to make our ships
larger, to meet any sea and carry their surplus of coal ;
but that is the price we pay for our insular security.
The French coast defenders may, for the most part,
be best described as rather small, old, and inefficient
battleships. An exception must be made for the Henri
Quatre (projected, but as yet not definitely designed)
and the Bouvines, Trehouart, Jemappes, and Valmy.
Of these, the two first have been modified into small
battleships by having their bows and forward turrets
raised, so as to give a higher freeboard and a better
field of fire. These ships are of 6610 tons; the
Jemappes and Valmy of 6590. Though small, they
are powerful, thoroughly modern ships. They are
protected by a belt of 18 inches at thickest, tapering
to 13, and by a steel deck of 4 inches extreme thick-
ness. The two first-named ships carry a couple of
12-in. guns, each in a I2|-in. turret, fore and aft, pro-
tected above by revolving cupolas of 14^ inches of
steel. The other two carry 13'3-in. guns, similarly
mounted and protected. All four carry four 3"9-in.
quick-firers on each broadside, behind ii-in. shields.
They have one military mast. The natural draught
speed is 14! knots, while, with forced draught, the
Trihotiart has steamed 17I, and the others 17 knots.
As these ships draw less than 22 feet, they might be
very useful, say, on the coast of Schleswig-Holstein, or
in the Baltic ; but their value is much impaired by the

119

NAVAL POLICY

fact that they only carry 300 tons of coal. You cannot
put a quart of power into a pint of displacement.
These four ships, together with the Hoche, form the
French Channel Squadron.

Particulars of the other ten coast-defence ships, so
as to avoid the weariness of unending figures, are
summed up on a later page. It may be said of them
generally that they are of moderate dimensions — none
reach 8000 tons — efficiently armoured up to the standard
of their day, and carry each a pair of heavy, though
somewhat obsolescent, guns, with only a few light quick-
firers. This last defect would be their heaviest handicap
in modern war ; but, even so, they would be more than
a match for such of our own second-class ships as have
not even breech-loaders. The four sisters Caiman, In-
dcnnptable, Reqnin, and Terrible, are to be refitted, and
smaller, but more powerful, pieces substituted for their
huge 75-ton guns. The Tcmpete and Vengeur, on the
other hand, will probably be struck off the effective list
in a year or two. None of these ships steams more
than 15 knots even in theory, or carries, normally,
more than 400 tons of coal. But the Caiman and her
sisters can fill up with Soo on emergency ; and even
400 tons, or 200, is enough to cross the Channel and
fight on.

The battleships also include the Fried/and, of 8990
tons, and the Richelieu, Colbert, Trident, and Suffren.
The first is lightly armoured, but heavily armed, and
is quite fit to take her place in the second line ; the
others have wooden hulls, and must shortly be con-
demned. The same may be said of six ships — one
of which is the Bayard, the French flagship in China —
classed as armoured cruisers, like our own Agincourt

120

FOREIGN NAVIES

and her fellows. The French appear much readier to
strike their old ships off the lists as obsolete than our
own Admiralty, which makes use of them as guard-
ships abroad, drill-ships, recruiting-ships, and the like.
Economy is a virtue, doubtless ; but it might turn out
even more provident, when a ship is past her work, to
say so at once, than to connive at any misconceptions
as to our real fighting strength.

Among French cruisers the most notable group con-
sists of the armoured vessels, and the most notable of
these is certainly the Dupuy-de-Lome. The whole hull
is sheathed with 4-inch mail up to the main deck, and
the two heaviest guns — 7'4-in. breech-loaders — are
carried in 4-in. sponsoned turrets amidships on each
beam. Besides these there are six 6'3-in. quick-firers,
one on the forecastle, one on the poop, and one on each
bow and quarter. Thus in theory the Dupuy-de-Lome
can fire five of her eight guns ahead, astern, or on either
beam ; whether the heavy guns amidships could actually
be fired dead ahead or astern without damage to the
ship is somewhat doubtful. The tonnage is 6300 ; the
speed \*]\ knots with natural, and (in theory) 20 with
forced, draught ; the coal-endurance 4000 miles at
I2| knots, and the crew 521. Even if all the advan-
tages claimed for this ship are not realizable in practice
she still remains a very formidable unit — especially for-
midable because her armour enables her to defy shell
and all but direct hits from shot. Indeed she is so
much admired by Rear-Admiral Fournier, a distin-
guished French sailor at present in command of a
group of cruisers intended as a tactical school for officers,
that he proposes to replace the whole existing French
fleet, battleships, coast-defenders, cruisers and all, by

121

NAVAL POLICY

117 vessels of this type* Thickening the armour to
6 inches, and increasing the displacement to 8300 tons,
Admiral Fournier expects to produce a ship which will
be self-sufficing for all the various duties of war at
present undertaken by ships so different as, for instance,
a first-class battleship and a third-class cruiser. He
demonstrates with great ingenuity that a homogeneous
squadron of this type could fight a squadron of present-
day battleships by using its superior speed so to
manoeuvre that it would receive all projectiles obliquely,
and therefore, without having its armour penetrated.
Without entering into details it may be said that,
granting all the advantages of a completely homoge-
neous fleet, f Admiral Fournier's scheme may be
objected to on a double ground. An 8 300 -ton
armoured ship is too expensive, on the one hand, to
be economically used for work which can be done as
well or better by, say, a 5000-ton unarmoured ship.
On the other hand, it is certain that a vessel so lightly
armed and armoured could not meet a modern battle-
ship in close action, and it is doubtful whether in
fighting battleships but little inferior in speed and
far superior in gun-power and armour Admiral Four-
nier's squadron could in all cases avoid coming to close
quarters ; it could in no case win a decisive victory in a
very long range action. The French Admiralty has,
however, given a kind of very tentative encouragement
to the theory by laying down the Jeanne dArc. This
ship is very fast, being designed to make 23 knots, and
is to be powerfully armed with two 7i-in., eight 5|-in.,

* "La Flotte Necessaire." Paris: Berger, Levrault et Cie. For a
detailed criticism of the scheme, see "A Naval Utopia," Blackwood' 's
Magazine, June, 1896.

+' See page 59.

122

FOREIGN NAVIES

and twelve 3'9-in. guns, all quick-firing. So far she
is well fitted to put Admiral Fournier's theories into
practice, since no battleship could get near her, and
would be bound to suffer heavily from the hail of
her fire. She carries 1500 tons of coal. But she is to
be of 11,270 tons, nearly twice the size of the Dupuy-
de-Lome, and is to cost more than double the earlier
ship, £416,000. And even with this great increase of
size and cost the Jeanne d' Arc's 6-in. belt will rise
no higher than 2 feet 3 inches from the water-line,
leaving nearly the whole hull vulnerable to the smallest
shell. So that plainly this vessel, though a most for-
midable ship, and perhaps a match for the Terrible, will
be no match for a well-protected battleship, whether at
long range or short. Of somewhat similar type to the
Dupuy-de-Lome, again, are the four smaller cruisers
of the Brnix class. Their armour, which is a shade
thinner, covers the whole hull, and they are armed
nearly in the same way, but they are at least half a
knot slower, and carry less than half the coal. The
Pothuau (5320 tons) is somewhat similar to the Brnix ;
her armour is thinner, and does not rise so high above
water ; her gun-power is rather greater. All these,
thanks to their armour, would be very formidable
customers for even our first-class cruisers to tackle, but
they hardly seem destined to supersede the battleship.
The Gnichen and Chdteaurenault, to be completed in
1898, are corsairs or commerce destroyers, built on the
model of the United States Columbia and Minneapolis.
Their business is not to fight, but to destroy merchant-
men. For the latter duty they are equipped with eight
large and seventeen small quick-firers ; to avoid the
former they are given an extreme speed of 23 knots.

123

NAVAL POLICY

On paper we have nothing, except perhaps the Terrible
and the Powerful, fast enough to overtake these ships ;
on the other hand, if caught going into port to coal,
even a second-class cruiser of the Eclipse class (with
a gun-power of about 160,000 ft.-tons per minute, as
against about 180,000) ought to fight either of them on
tolerable terms. Furthermore, if we go by the analogy
of the Columbia, which fell four knots short of her trial-
speed in crossing the Atlantic, these ships will be unable
to overtake an ocean liner, which must detract seriously
from their value. And if on the ocean they can make
no more relatively than the Columbia, they might very
conceivably be overhauled and demolished by such fine
steamers, however inferior in measured-mile speed, as
the Edgar,

The remaining unarmoured cruisers, as has been
already mentioned, are generally a trifle slower, of
smaller coal-capacity, and perhaps less seaworthy than
our own cruisers of similar size, but as a rule far more
heavily armed. The U Entrecasteaux, to be completed
next year, is the most powerful, being the French
analogue to our Edgar class. Of rather greater dis-
placement, she is a knot inferior, and carries less coal,
but has a rather heavier armament. The Tage, of
exactly the same size as the Edgar, is inferior only
because her eight 6 - 3-in. and ten 5|-in. pieces date from
before the large quick-firer. Were she re-armed she
would have a great advantage over the Englishman in
offensive power, but she carries less coal than the
Edgar's extreme capacity, and is a good knot slower.
The Cccille, of only 5766 tons, has the same armament
as the Tage, except that it is all ^quick-firing. She
possesses the same speed, and but 40 tons less coal. No

124

FOREIGN NAVIES

doubt the Edgar could get away from this ship, but it
would be her business to fight her, and in a fight she
would be at a very great disadvantage. Of second-
class cruisers the Catinat and Protet, of 41 13 tons, are
more strongly armed than our Eclipse, of 5600, and
Arrogant, of 5780; so are the Alger, Jean Bart, Isly,
and Sfax, and the slightly smaller ships which bear the
philosophic names of Descartes and Pascal. It is
almost comforting to come on the six vessels of the
Cassard and Bugeaud types, whose offensive power
is only slightly greater than that of our best second-
class cruisers. It must, of course, be borne in mind
that this deficiency of our ships only applies to one
function of a cruiser — that of independent patrol of
the high seas, attacking or defending commerce. For
the, if possible, more important duty of scouting for
a fleet, our own ships, being generally a knot the faster,
are superior. But it is certain that in war France
would, very properly, deliver a most furious attack on
our merchantmen at sea, and in this case the military
weakness of our second-class cruisers would compel us
to use large and expensive ships like the Edgar in their
defence.

There are nine modern third-class cruisers of 1848 to
2300 tons armed with quick-firing guns, and more than
twice that number of older, slower vessels with breech-
loading guns. These are intended to act with squad-
rons as scouts, but, although they would doubtless be
found generally efficient in the still waters of the
Mediterranean, they are probably too small to do their
work in all weathers.

The torpedo flotilla of France has always been
numerous, and very efficient. There are five torpedo-

125

NAVAL POLICY

cruisers over 1200 tons, and a dozen or so torpedo-gun-
boats, of which the Casablanca, Cassini, and d'Ibervillc
are faster than any of ours. Others, still faster, are
under construction. Forty-six boats are classed as
sea-going; all are 138 ft. long or over, and steam from
20 knots upwards ; one of them, the Forban, made
3T2 knots on her trial, and thus won the title of the
fastest vessel in the world. These boats accompany
squadrons to sea, but often have to run into port if bad
weather comes on, while the delicacy of their machinery
lends itself to frequent breakdowns. However, in many
circumstances they might play a very important part in
a fleet action, although, now that we have numerous
faster destroyers of our own, we can view the con-
tingency with an approach to equanimity. Sixty-
three first-class boats — somewhat inferior in size, coal-
capacity, and seaworthiness, but mostly available for
raids on hostile ships or ports in favourable conditions ;
eighty-four second-class and thirty-six third-class for
harbour defence, and fourteen vedette boats complete
this formidable flotilla. To these should be added
three submarine boats propelled by electricity. Their
value is yet untried, though they can certainly descend
considerable depths under water ; the difficulty is to
steer and to see the object of attack.

RUSSIA.

Whatever is to be said of the French fleet, that of
Russia can only be viewed in one light. The Russian
Navy is in no sense a defensive force. It is offensive,
and can only be intended as an instrument of aggression
upon its neighbours. The British Navy is plainly a

126

FOREIGN NAVIES

defensive force : it may be used for aggression, but it is
plain that it must, in any case, be maintained for the
defence of the country. The same may be said of the
Russian and other continental armies. But the Russian
Navy is essentially offensive. Russia has ample land
forces to protect herself against any possible enemy ;
the Baltic fleet she might use, it is true, to defend herself
against Germany, by making a diversion in Denmark or
Pomerania, but no such explanation is possible of the
powerful Black Sea squadron. It might have been
lately urged that Russia needs a fleet to maintain her
communications with Eastern Siberia. But if there
were any sincerity in this argument, the Siberian
Railway, now approaching completion, would have
been attended with a diminution of naval armaments,
whereas, in fact, it has been the signal for their rapid
augmentation. With a small coast-line to her vast
empire, and even that land-locked like the Black Sea,
both land-locked and shallow like the Baltic, or in-
vulnerable by reason of climate like the Siberian
•coasts, Russia is the one great European Power
which could have dispensed with the costly luxury
of a navy. When she builds a fleet, and strains every
nerve to increase it, the conclusion is that this fleet
is not intended for the superfluous defence of her
own sea-board, but for the appropriation of the sea-
board of her neighbours. Having no open port, she
has built a fleet, and now she wants a port for her ships;
if she gets it, she will next want more ships for her
port, and then more ports for her more ships, and so on
in an infinite series. Few people in this country appear
to have noticed the recent rapid growth of the Russian
Navy, or to have realized what it portends. Before this

127

NAVAL POLICY

year's programme was begun, Russia was building
exactly the same number of battleships as ourselves,
and at that rate of progress her armour-clad fleet would
double itself in four or five years. A further sign of
naval activity is the very remarkable progress made by
Russian shipbuilders, gunmakers, and engineers. When
the Russian ironclad fleet first began to come into being,
from twenty to thirty years ago, Russian workmanship
was helplessly incompetent to build a warship without
aid from abroad. Many strange stories filtered through
official discretion about warships which took the bit
between their teeth and ran away. Nowadays the
yards of Petersburg and Sevastopol turn out fine
battleships with the aid of native heads and hands
alone. In the designing and building of engines, it is
true, Russian workmanship is not quite out of leading-
strings ; it is customary to buy a set of engines in
England for one ship of a group, and copy them exactly
in the rest. Armour-plates, again, are largely bought in
America. In other branches of naval industry Russia
is well abreast of the foremost of her rivals. Some of
her experiments with capped shot and armour-plates
are for the moment classical. Her guns founded on
Krupp's models, as her engines are founded on Maud-
slay's, do not make so brave a show, in the accounts of
them allowed to be published, as our own or the French.
But the experiments referred to make it certain that she
has pieces as powerful as any in the world. It is
possible that on certain counts Russia has still some
ground to make up before she equals the skill of
Western Europe. But the progress already made, and
being made, may be taken as an assurance that she will
not long lag behind the most advanced.

128

FOREIGN NAVIES

Russia has at this moment four first-class battleships
completing for sea — the Tri Sviatitelia (Three Saints)
on the Black Sea, and the sisters Petropavlovsk, Poltava,
and Sevastopol 'at Petersburg. The first, which is perhaps
the most powerful of Russian battleships, does not differ
essentially from the latest British types. She is of
12,540 tons, and 370 feet between perpendiculars. Of
this only 350 feet is armoured on the water-line, leaving
the ends bare as in all our later battleships ; this is a note-
worthy departure, since Russia had till lately followed
the French system, and belted her armour-clads from
end to end. The water-line armour of the Tri Sviatitelia
is 16 to 18 inches of nickel-steel, so that it gains in
resisting power what it loses in extent. This side-
armour is just short of eight feet broad, more than half
of which is under water at normal draught, and below
it is a 3-in. nickel-steel deck. Above the water-line
armour is a large surface of unplated side ; above that
again is a central battery, or inner citadel, protected by
five" inches of armour. The main armament, carried in
two 16-in. nickel-steel turrets, is four 12-in. guns of
Russian make. The Russian Government prudently
conceals the power of these weapons. According to
published statistics, all the Russian guns are far inferior
in energy to those of other Powers, but the fact that in
experiments with armour-plates higher velocities have
been given from Russian guns than from any others on
record, makes it practically certain that they are fully
equal to the latest British models. The secondary
armament of the Tri Sviatitelia consists of eight 6-in.
Canet* quick-firers, mounted four on each broadside in

* French.
K 129

NAVAL POLICY

a battery between the turrets, as in the British Nile,
and of four 47-in. pieces by the same maker on the
superstructure ; these bear directly ahead and astern.
There is a full armament of 3- and i-pounders. The
Tri Sviatitelia is to attain 16 knots with forced draught,
and steam 4000 miles without coaling. She carries 582
men. Although the speed is rather short of the
standard to which our own and French battleships
now conform, she is an undeniably powerful ship.

The other three ships completing, which should all
be ready for trial this year or next, are somewhat
smaller, being 10,950 tons, and 367 feet long; of this
about 280 feet are protected by 1 5f-in. armour, and
there is a 3-in. steel deck. There are four 12-in. guns
mounted fore and aft in 10-in. turrets of Harvey steel.
The auxiliary armament, as originally designed, was
eight 8-in. guns in four 5-in. turrets, two on each beam ;
but this is to be replaced by twelve 6-in. quick-firers,
which will give the ships a vastly increased volume of
fire, nearly equal to that of the Majestic. The speed is
to be a knot and a-half greater than that of the Tri
Sviatitelia, the coal endurance slightly less at the
normal stowage. The engines of these three ships
have been copied in Russia from those built by Messrs.
Maudslay for the Georgi Pobiedonosek.

The last-named vessel (10,280 tons) is remarkable in
that she carries six heavy guns instead of the usual
four. There are two barbettes abreast forward, and
one aft ; each contains a brace of 12-in. guns. This
arrangement, of course, gives a tremendous bow-fire ;
indeed, the shock of the discharge is probably much
too great to allow all four forward guns to be fired
simultaneously. There is also the danger that one or

130

FOREIGN NAVIES

two lucky blows might disable the four together. The
Georgi Pobiedonosek has a complete steel belt of 8 to
i8f inches, and 12-in. bulkheads and barbettes, with
10-in. plating on the triangular redoubt containing the
barbettes. The secondary armament consists of seven
6-in. quick-firers — two on each bow and one on each
quarter in recessed ports, which give an axial fire, and
one astern. These guns have no armour protection.
This ship went through trials in the spring with the
greatest success, developing 2000 horse -power over
the contract 10,600. Three older ironclads share the
peculiarity of carrying six very heavy guns. These
are the Ekaterina II, the Sinope, and the Tchesme.
Like the Georgi Pobiedonosek, which is practically a
modernized copy of them, they belong to the Black
Sea fleet. They are heavily plated with compound
armour. The heavy guns are of 12-in. calibre, but
shorter and less powerful than the later weapons. The
secondary armament is as in the Georgi Pobiedonosek,
but the 6-in. guns are not quick-firing.

More recent and better equipped than these, but
ranked as second class by reason of their size, are the
Sissoi Veliky, with two sisters (one for the Black Sea
fleet), and the Dvenadzat Apostoloff (Twelve Apostles).
The Sissoi Veliky is of 8,880 tons, and 340 feet long ;
of this 241 feet are protected by 1 if to 15! inches of
compound armour. The four heavy guns (12-in.) are
carried in turrets — the forward one protected by
1 if inches of armour, the after by two inches less.
From the upper edge of the belt rises a 5 -in. plating
of steel, which sheathes the whole side for a length
of 195 feet; behind this protection is a broadside
battery of six 6-in. quick-firers. This ship is thus,

131

NAVAL POLICY

granting the unarmoured ends, among the best pro-
tected from quick-fire shell in Europe. The Rostislav,
the second of this triplet, has io-in. guns in her turrets,
and eight quick-firers. The speed is 16 knots, and the
utmost radius only 2000 knots, which greatly impairs
the efficiency of otherwise admirable ships ; here, once
more, we are met with the impossibility of combining
all elements of force on a small displacement. The
Rostislav, however, also burns petroleum, which might
take her further. The Dvenadzat Apostoloff is 800 tons
smaller than this group ; she also is partially belted,
and has 5 inches of steel on her central battery. Her
four 12-in. guns are carried in barbettes ; her secondary
battery is very weak, consisting only of four 6-in. slow-
firers. Her radius of action is much the same as that
of the Sissoi Veliky, but she is a knot and a-half faster.
The Navarin, of 9476 tons, is very similarly armoured
and armed, except that she has eight 6-in. breech-
loaders. The Gangoot (6627 tons) carries one 12-in.
gun in a turret forward, and four 9-in. in a central
redoubt. Russia has been very sluggish in adopting
the larger quick-firers, and would probably suffer
heavily for it in war.

The Oslabya and Peresviet were laid down at Peters-
burg in November, 1895. It is said that the Russian
Admiralty, greatly daring, intends to emulate Ports-
mouth and Chatham by getting them ready for sea in
two years ; but it will be very surprising if they are
tried before the ice melts in the spring of 1898. Displac-
ing 12,640 tons, they will be the largest battleships in the
fleet — if, indeed, they should be called battleships at all.
They are to have a belt on the water-line of not more
than 5 to 7 inches, and will carry four io-in. guns in

132

FOREIGN NAVIES

turrets, and eight 6-in. quick-firers in casemates. This
shows even less for the displacement than our own
Renown, and rather suggests a powerful cruiser, but
the speed — 17I knots an hour — is not the speed of a
cruiser. The coal supply is high — 1750 tons. If these
particulars are correct, which is not at all certain, one
rather wonders what has been done with the huge
tonnage at the designer's command.

Of the Russian coast-defence ironclads, only three
come up to modern requirements. The type of these
is the Admiral Onshakoff, which completed her trials in
1895. She is of 4126 tons, well protected, and armed
with four 9-in. guns in barbettes, with the same number
of 6-in. quick-firers, and numerous smaller pieces. She
steamed 15 knots with natural draught, and can run
2500 miles without coaling, so that she is at least
as well entitled to be called sea-going as the Sissoi
Veliky. f The rest of the coast -defenders, excluding
four new armoured gunboats of the Gremiastchy type,
are from twenty to thirty years old, and of little value.

Among cruisers, the first place is claimed by the
Rossia and Rurik. The latter was the beginning of
the huge cruisers now coming into vogue. The early
reports of her size and power made a great sensation,
and impelled our Admiralty to lay down the Powerful
and the Terrible. The Rurik is of 10,940 tons ; she
steams nearly 20,000 miles without coaling ; she carries
5 to 10-in. armour, 7 ft. wide, over about four-fifths of
her length, besides a 2f-in. steel deck; she is armed
with four 8-in. guns in sponsons, one on each bow and
quarter, with sixteen 6-in. Canet quick-firers on the
main deck, six 47-in. quick-firers on the upper deck,
and Hotchkisses to boot. With an energy of fire esti-

133

NAVAL POLICY

mated at some 470,000 ft.-tons per minute — over 50,000
tons more than that of the most powerful battleship
afloat — it is not surprising that the Rurik awakened
great apprehension in English minds ; that she was
conceived of as a roaring sea-lion, going up and down
the world devouring British traders, and slaughtering out
of hand any British cruiser that might have the temerity
to withstand her. But slowly the truth came out, that
the awful Rurik, though decidedly a most powerful
ship, is not at all the invincible monster she was pic-
tured. To begin with, she only made i8f knots on
trial, and that though she weighed a thousand tons
lighter than when she is equipped for sea. So that no
liner need fear her, and most modern cruisers can get
out of her way if they have had enough of her. Then
she appeared at Kiel, and was found to be heavily
barque-rigged — a great encumbrance in action. More-
over, none of her guns are protected, except by shields;
and twelve 6-in. guns are mounted in an open battery,
where two or three high explosive shells might put the
whole lot out of action. In short, as Mr. Brassey
shrewdly remarks, if we had seen the Rurik a little
sooner, we might not have built the Powerful and
Terrible. The Rossia, which is about 1300 tons
heavier, carries similar armour and the same armament,
though it is possible that she will substitute quick-firers
for the four 8-in. guns. She is expected to steam 20
knots an hour, and have the same endurance as her
prototype. It is possible that the guns may be better
protected. She requires a crew of 735 men ; the Rurik
727.

The other vessels of the Russian Navy demand little
notice. The Pamyat Azova, Admiral Nachimoff, Dmitri

134

FOREIGN NAVIES

Donskoi, and Vladimir Monomach, are almost entirely
belted cruisers, of between 5700 and 7800 tons ; their
principal guns are well protected with armour. Only
the Dmitri Donskoi has been re-armed with quick-firers
(four 6-in. and ten 47-in.) ; the others are heavily, but
in these days ineffectively, equipped with 8-in. and 6-in.
breech-loaders. The Pamyat Azova and Nachimoff
steam i8 - 8 and 17*5 knots an hour respectively, and
have a radius of 10,000 and 8000 miles. The other
two are slower and of less endurance. All but the
Vladimir Monomach are at present on the China
Station. Four elderly armour-clads are also classed as
cruisers. Among deck-protected cruisers the Svietlaua,
building at Havre, is the only one that carries quick-
firers. Of these she has eight 6-in. and ten 3-pounders
on a displacement of 3828 tons; she is to steam 20
knots, and carries 400 tons of coal, so that she should
be more than a match for our Apollos.

The torpedo squadrons of Russia are very strong,
and are said to be well exercised. There are eight
fast torpedo gunboats, with fifty-five sea-going and
one hundred and sixteen smaller boats. Russia has
also taken up the torpedo-boat-destroyer energetically.
Mr. Yarrow built her the Sokol, which steamed over
30 knots an hour, and made the record of the day ;
now thirty copies of her are to be made in Russia.
With this formidable muster of torpedo-craft, Russian
waters, especially the shallows round the islands and
inlets of the Baltic, would be almost unapproachable
to a hostile fleet.

i35

NAVAL POLICY

GERMANY.

The German Navy is the best-kept in Europe. In
the higher qualities of seamanship our own is doubtless
superior, for the German is not by nature a seaman.
He is not even, by nature, a fighting man, knowing
little of the ferocious joy which animates the inhabitants
of these islands, or of France, in the stress of battle.
But the German is a quite unequalled fighting machine,
and in the days of science this artificial substitute
becomes more and more equal, and sometimes superior,
to the original as turned out by Nature. Germany not
only expects every man to do his duty, but she drills
him until he forgets how to do anything else. Having
no navy to speak of, and no naval traditions at all,
the creators of the German Empire imported generals
into the marine service, and organized it with the same
minute thoroughness wherewith they organized the
German Army. We may smile at the fact that a
German naval officer can seldom find himself in port
without succumbing to the inbred instinct, and asking
leave to drill his men ashore. But it is just the fact
that the navy mirrors the army that is its title to
respect. Every detail of the service is planned out at
headquarters, and carefully executed ; everything is
remembered, everything is cut and dried, everything is
ready. Every man knows what to do in every
emergency, and nothing but sudden death will keep the
well-trained German from doing it. The German Navy
is the only one in Europe that at this moment, and at
every moment, is perfectly ready for war wherever and
whenever it may come. The situation, when the crisis

J 3 6

FOREIGN NAVIES

occurred in January last between Germany and our-
selves about South Africa, was thoroughly characteristic
on both sides. We had half-a-dozen good ships be-
tween Cape Town and Zanzibar. But at Delagoa Bay,
the pivot of affairs at the moment, Germany had the
See Adler, while we had the Thrush; and the See
Adler could have burned or sunk, or at least hopelessly
disabled, the TJirusli in a matter of minutes.

It may surprise the swaggerers who proclaimed, some
months ago, that the two battleships and four cruisers
of the Particular Service Squadron were superior to the
whole German Navy, to hear that the German battle-
fleet, exclusive of cruisers and torpedo-craft, consists of
twenty-two armour-clads. Of these, four are first-class —
the Brandenburg, Kurfiirst-Friedrich- Wilhelm, Weissen-
burg, and Worth. Of 10,100 tons, these ships are
considerably smaller than the largest vessels of other
navies. The water-line is completely plated with nf
to 15I inches of armour — compound in the first two,
hard steel in the others. They carry three barbettes
along the line of the keel, as in the French Formidable,
but each one, unlike hers, contains a couple of Krupp
guns of 1 1 inches ; those in the central barbettes are
for want of space shorter and less powerful than the
others. The barbettes and ammunition-hoists have
1 if -in. armour, and there is also a 2|-in. protective
deck over the engines. In a 3-in. casemate forward of
the central barbette are four 4*1 -in. quick-firers; there
are also eight 3'4-in. quick-firers. The additional gun-
power gained by the third barbette is thus to a certain
extent thrown away by the weakness of the quick-firing
armament. Another fault in these ships is that the
hull is wholly unarmoured from the belt upward, except

137

NAVAL POLICY

on the barbettes and casemates, so that they would
suffer very heavily from high explosive shells. All
these ships could make 16*5 knots ; the Weissenburg and
Worth over 17. They carry 750 tons of coal.

Completing for sea is the Kaiser Friedrich III., while
another new battleship is on the stocks. The Kaiser
Friedrich III. is of 11,000 tons; and all her armour is
Harveyed steel ; it is not so thick as in the Branden-
burg, the belt (which stops short some 75 feet from the
stern) being 6 to 12 inches. It is interesting to see
that Germany, as well as Russia, is tending to discard
the complete water-line belt which a year or two ago
was thought indispensable to a battleship in both
countries.

The weight thus saved in the Kaiser Friedrich III.
goes to protect the guns against quick-fire shell. The
principal armament — so says the Berliner Post — is to
be four cji-in. guns mounted in pairs in 10-in. barbettes,
but these seem very light pieces for a ship of 11,000
tons, and it will perhaps turn out that the armament is
heavier. In respect of quick-firing guns, this vessel
will be the best-equipped battleship in the world. She
is to carry no less than eighteen 6-in. and twelve 3 J-in.
pieces ; of the former six will be carried in 6-in. case-
mates, and twelve in 6-in. turrets. In energy of fire
per minute this ship exceeds the Charlemagne by
50,000, and our own Majestic by 70,000 ft.-tons : the
Kaiser, therefore, was not wrong when, in the character-
istic dithyramb he delivered at her launch, he pro-
nounced her superior to all rivals. She is, moreover, to
steam 18 knots an hour, so that it will need a very
powerful type indeed to cope with her. She is to
carry 750 tons of coal and 590 men, to cost a little

138

FOREIGN NAVIES

over .£700,000, and to be ready for sea about the end
of 1897.

The Baden, Bayern, Sadism, and Wiirttemberg are
second-class battleships of 7400 tons. They carry a
partial belt of armour, 16 inches at its thickest, which
forms a central redoubt, 12 feet high; in this are four
io*2-in. guns, while in a 16-in. barbette are two more of
the same calibre. There are eight 3|-in. quick-firers.
These ships only steam about 14 knots, which, as they
are all nearly twenty years old, is as much as could be
expected. They are all, however, either fitting, or to
be fitted, with new boilers and engines, as well as two
military masts and more quick-firing guns. It is,
indeed, very characteristic of the thoroughness with
which the German Navy is administered that the very
oldest ships are kept religiously up to all the latest
requirements, so far as their build allows it. For
instance, the Dentschland, which dates from 1874, has
received a full quick-firing armament and military
masts ; since the danger of fire was emphasized at Yalu
all the wood in her has been replaced with aluminium.
The Kbnig Wilhelm, which has had 6-in. quick-firers
substituted for the eighteen 9|-in. guns on her broad-
side, is nearly thirty years old. These two ships, with
the Kaiser, Friedrich der Grosse, and Preussen, all third-
class ships, and the Oldenburg, a smaller and less power-
ful copy of the Baden class, complete the list of the
larger German battleships.

There is, however, a very interesting group of eight
ships, which were originally intended to defend the
mouths of the Baltic Canal, but which, being found
excellently seaworthy, are now ranked as fourth-class
battleships. They might, indeed, be called third-class,

i39

NAVAL POLICY

since, although only of 3500 tons or so, they are
probably quite capable of meeting most of the older
ironclads. This class, of which the Siegfried is the
earliest, presents various modifications according as
naval ship-building advanced during its construction.
The earlier vessels are completely belted with 7 to
gl inches of compound armour : the Odin and Aegir,
the latest, have partial belts, but nickel-steel armour.
All carry two 9^-111. Krupp guns forward, and one aft,
behind 7f inches of armour. The Siegfried has six
3'4-in. quick-firers in sponsons, her successors eight,
and the Odin and Aegir ten. The speed varies from
15 knots in the Siegfried to 16 in the Odin and
Aegir, which have water-tube boilers. In the history of
this group we see again the anxiety of the German
Admiralty to secure, without delay, every advantage
which the advance of science can confer on the fighting
efficiency of the fleet.

The cruisers of Germany are few, but several of them
are very powerful. The vessel now building to replace
the obsolete Leipzig would, perhaps, be better classed
as a battleship, since she could certainly lie in line as
well as such a ship as the Centurion. Her belt is
complete, and of 8 inches of Harvey steel ; the
Centurions is partial, and at its thickest 12 inches
of compound. Her main armament looks somewhat
inferior, being four 9^-in. guns in 8-in. barbettes : the
Centurions is four 10-in. guns in 10-in. barbettes. But
probably, both in guns and armour, the newer ship is
the equal of the older. The new Leipzig's quick-firers
are twelve 6-in. behind steel shields, and ten 3|-in. to
the Centurions ten 47-in. guns, of which only four are
in 2-1'n. casemates. The German vessel will also be

140

FOREIGN NAVIES

half a knot the faster. She may, therefore, reasonably
be borne in mind in estimating the prospective strength
of the Kaiser's battle fleet ; and if the unenthusiastic
Reichstag will only grant the money to lay down three
more, the German fleet will be very considerably
strengthened. On the other hand, this class would,
to a certain extent, fall between the two stools of
battleship and cruiser. The new Leipzig will expose
a great part of her hull to high-explosive shells, while
even the eight inches of armour will be vulnerable to
the heavy guns which would be used in a fleet action ;
at the same time, her armament is not extraordinary
for her 10,300 tons. Moreover, her speed of 19 knots
is higher than is needful if she is to manoeuvre in a
squadron with the Baden, of 14; while it is not sufficient
to enable her, as a cruiser, to overtake many liners or
weaker cruisers of other nations.

The Kaiserin Augusta is a cruiser of over 6000 tons,
protected by a 3-in. steel deck, and armed with twelve
6-in. and eight 3'4-in. quick-firers. She has a good
all-round fire, but the guns are almost wholly un-
protected. It was hoped that she would steam 22i
knots, but repeated trials resulted only in 21 "8 ; and
even this figure has been called in question. In any
case her speed is high, but she is not over-well equipped
with coal. The smaller Gefion (4108 tons) has also a
3-in. protective deck, and carries eight 6-in. and ten
4 - i-in. quick-firers ; her highest speed is 20 knots, and
she carries 800 tons of coal, so that she ought, on paper,
to be a more useful ship than our own second-class
cruisers. Three other second-class cruisers on the stocks
are remarkable for their efficient protection. There
is a curved steel deck, whose maximum thickness is

141

NAVAL POLICY

4 inches. Two 8'2-in. breech-loaders and eight 6-in.
quick-firers are carried behind 4 inches of armour,
while the ammunition-hoists are also protected. There
are also six 4-in. quick-fire guns behind shields. The
normal displacement is 5650 tons, with 500 tons of coal,
or 6100 tons when the coal supply is 950 tons ; the
estimated forced draught speed is 21 knots. In dis-
placement, therefore, these ships are equal to our own
largest second-class cruisers, while in gun-power, speed,
and, above all, in protection, they are so far superior
that it would probably be misleading to describe them
as anything but first-class. The efficient protection of
their guns, at any rate, would give our Edgar, for
instance, a hard nut to crack, in a very literal sense,
before she could defeat one of them. For service on
distant stations Germany has half-a-dozen very fairly
efficient ships of the See Adler class. The displacement
is 1550 to 1650 tons; there are eight 4-in. quick-firers,
an armoured deck, a top speed of about 16 knots, and
coal capacity equal to 6000 miles. We have scores of
better cruisers ; but the See Adler, as has been said,
could make short work of many of the obsolete sloops
and gunboats we still keep on foreign stations.

Of torpedo craft Germany has eight gunboats armed
with 3- or 4-in. quick-firers, and ten division boats — very
much what we should call destroyers — steaming from
21 to 26 knots. Projected additions to this class will
probably have considerably higher speeds. There are
64 sea-going, 61 first-class, four second-class, and
sixteen vedette-boats. The whole flotilla is admirably
organized in every detail, and in constant training at
sea. The shallow coasts of Schleswig-Holstein and of
the Baltic afford an admirable field for its operations,

142

FOREIGN NAVIES

and these would accordingly be very dangerous to a
hostile fleet. The division boats would be equally
formidable in a fleet action at sea. Their nominal
strength is not overwhelming; but, as with all branches
of the German Navy, their force on paper is subject to
no deductions when it comes to work at sea. What-
ever naval strength Germany credits herself with, that
she has well ordered and in momentary readiness for
war use.

ITALY.

The present state of the Italian Kingdom is the
despair of its well-wishers, and the condition of the
Italian Navy is not the least depressing feature of the
situation. From the beginning of the last quarter of
this century Italy made strong efforts to acquire a
formidable fleet. Such a fleet was plainly necessary if
she was to be a factor of any importance in the military
system of Europe, and especially so in view of the
unfriendly relations which even then were becoming
traditional between herself and France. The Franco-
Italian frontier is a short and mountainous one, so that,
on the side of Piedmont, Italy is at the best of times
difficult to invade in force. She set herself vigorously
to work to make the task even more difficult than
Nature had left it ; and with the help of a line of strong
fortifications, with admirable regiments of Alpine troops
to man them, she has largely succeeded in this aim. But
fortifications on the frontier of Piedmont are of very
dubious value if France, being in a position to turn
them at any moment by sea, can land any force of her
superior army at any point she will on the long coast-

i43

NAVAL POLICY

line of Italy. Italy, accordingly, set herself to neutralize
the French naval superiority. By the year 1886 she
had, built or building, a fleet of ten huge vessels, which
for displacement, weight of ordnance carried, and speed,
had no equal in the world. But the effort was not
maintained. With the best of fortune it was probably
a mistake for a poor country to lay down huge iron-
clads costing from three-quarters of a million to near a
million and a quarter apiece. A single lucky torpedo
might destroy a tenth of the effective navy at a blow.
Even if this danger were escaped it was probable that
in the chances of war an Italia or a Re Umberto would
have to be used on service which a smaller and less
costly ship could have performed equally well ; so that
here was a waste of power which a poor nation should
have striven to economize. The Roman Admiralty
seems to have seen this, and no more enormous battle-
ships were laid down ; instead, a couple of 9,800-ton
battleships, and several armoured and unarmoured
cruisers, were put in hand. But meantime the finances
went from bad to worse. The shipbuilding yards were
starved, so that the latest of the monster battleships
were ten years old from the laying of the keel-plate
before they were ready for sea. The two smaller battle-
ships have been five years on the stocks, and are not
yet even launched. An armoured cruiser was recently
sold to the Argentine Government, and more lately it is
reported that a second has been disposed of — probably
to Spain. It is not possible to see without sympathy,
and even a touch of pity, a high-spirited nation
thus struggling under a burden too great for its
strength.

The most notable and, in many eyes, the most

144

FOREIGN NAVIES

dubious feature presented by the great Italian battle-
ships is the extreme lightness of their protective
armour. The Sardcgiia, of 13,860 tons, has only a
4-in. steel belt on the water-line, covering 250 out of
her 430 feet, and rising to the upper deck, whereon
her heavier quick-firing guns are mounted. There is
hardly a gun afloat that could not break up this mail,
while many could probably pierce it with shell. The
Re Umberto and Sicilia (13,300 tons), and the Italia
and Lcpanto (15,000 and 15,400 tons), have no armour
on the water-line ; the two first have 4 inches over
their central battery, the others no side-plating at all.
The three vessels of the Andrea Doria class (11,000
tons) have an 18-in. belt over about half the length,
with a smaller citadel of the same thickness above it ;
but all their quick-firing guns are exposed. The Duilio
and Dandolo (11,445 tons), the oldest pair of the ten,
are similarly protected by 2\\ inches of steel on the
water-line, and a shorter redoubt of 17 inches ; but
the quick-firers are again defenceless. It is true that
none of these ships is without an armoured deck, as
well as strong armour on the ammunition hoists and
round the bases of the funnels ; and it may be also
true that water-line hits in future warfare will be infre-
quent. Yet it is said that the Yoshino sank a Chinese
cruiser with her quick-firers at the Yalu ; and, even
apart from this, the real danger of quick-fire high-
explosive shells is not so much the sinking of the ship
as the destruction of the whole hull, with the auxiliary
armament and guns' crews, and the paralysis and
demoralization that cannot but follow. It is impos-
sible, therefore, not to fear that quick-fire has been
insufficiently guarded against in Italian ships. For
l 145

NAVAL POLICY

this reason, and their high speed, many people incline
to class them rather as cruisers than as battleships.
Perhaps it matters little what they are called ; but,
seeing that they are certainly intended to fight battle-
ships, rather than to act as scouts or ocean-patrols,
it is most convenient to rank them with the type of
vessel they are intended to meet.

The sacrifice of armour has, of course, been balanced
by great advantages in other respects. Most of these
ships have very high speeds ; the Sardegna over 20
knots, the Sicilia probably much the same if pushed
hard, the Re Umberto, Italia, and Lepanto, over 18. All
five can stow 3000 tons of coal if necessary, which
should take them at least 10,000 miles. The arma-
ments are also heavy. The three first-named carry
four 13-J-in. guns like the Royal Sovereign's, eight 6-in.,
and sixteen 47-in. quick-firers. The Italia and Lepanto
and the Andrea Doria class have each four 17-in. Arm-
strong guns of over 100 tons weight ; but they carry
no more than four 47-in. quick-firers, though they have
also some 6-in. guns, for which quick-firers are to be
substituted. The Duilio and Dandolo originally carried
four 100-ton muzzle-loaders in their echeloned turrets;
but in place of these 10-in. breech-loaders are being
mounted, along with seven 6-in. and five 47-in. quick-
firers. Yet the value of all these heavy armaments is
impaired by the want of adequate protection for the
guns ; and it is probable that they would be largely put
out of action before they had time to silence a better-
armoured enemy. An efficient battleship, it may be
repeated, should develop all the elements of force in
more or less equal proportion one to another. Other-
wise, the want of one — as of armour in these Italian

146

FOREIGN NAVIES

ships — may neutralize all the superiority obtained by
its sacrifice in respect of the others.

The two battleships on the stocks — Ammiraglio di
Saint Bon and Emanuele Filiberto — exhibit a striking
departure from previous Italian models. They have
a complete, though a thin, belt of hardened steel, and
almost the whole hull is sheathed in from 6 to 10 inches
of the same material, which will bid defiance to all
shell until the plates are broken up by heavy shot.
They are fairly heavily armed for their size, carrying
four io-in. guns mounted fore and aft in barbettes,
as well as eight 6-in. and eight 47-in. quick-firers — the
last somewhat exposed. The speed is to be 18 knots,
and the extreme radius over 7000 miles. When at last
these ships are ready for sea, they should be useful units
in any fleet.

Of armoured cruisers Italy has the Marco Polo ready
for sea. This vessel has a partial belt, with cross bulk-
heads at its ends, of 4 inches, carries six 6-in. and ten
47-in. quick-firers, and steams 19 knots. The Carlo
Alberto and Vettor Pisani (6500 tons) are enlarged and
improved copies of her, and these are protected by a
complete belt of nickel steel, while above it, along the
midship two-fifths of the hull, rises plating of the same
thickness, forming a central battery. Within this are
four 6-in. quick-firers on each broadside, while above, on
the upper deck, are four more, one at each corner of the
battery. The sisters also carry six 47-in. quick-firers —
one ahead, one astern, and two on each broadside on
the upper deck, and these, as well as the upper deck
6-in. pieces, are protected only by shields. Neverthe-
less, few cruisers would come unscathed out of an
action with these vessels : but for the absence of

147

NAVAL POLICY

armour-piercing guns, they might almost be called
light battleships. The Garibaldi (6840 tons) is of
much the same type, with armour-piercing guns added.
There are two 10-in. guns, carried in 6-in. barbettes,
ahead and astern. The central main deck battery —
6-in. plated, as in the Carlo Alberto, but occupying two-
thirds instead of two-fifths of the ship's length —
contains five 6-in. quick-firers on each broadside, while
six shielded 47-in. quick-firers are mounted on the
upper deck. The Garibaldi has a double bottom,
which is expected, though on rather dubious grounds,
to protect her to a certain extent against torpedoes ;
between the two skins liquid fuel is stored. With a
speed of 20 knots, this is a most useful ship, and
another of the same class is projected. Of deck-
protected cruisers, Italy has eight : of these the
Elswick- built Piemonte, of 2500 tons, is the most
remarkable. She is armed with six 6-in. and six
4'7-in. quick-firers, steams nearly 22i knots, and has
room for coal to take her 1 3,000 miles ; she is a very
admirable cruiser for work in any but rough water.
The Fieramosca has very good gun-power for a second-
class cruiser, but is slow ; the others should be very
efficient third-class cruisers for Mediterranean waters.
Most of them could steam 10,000 knots without
coaling; indeed, the coal endurance of the Italian
ships generally is very high.

There are fifteen torpedo-gunboats of good speed ;
in other ways also Italy has paid the attention to
torpedo warfare that would seem to be warranted by
her exposed coast-line, and the probability that, in
a naval war with France, she would have to act on

the defensive. She possesses at present a hundred and

148

FOREIGN NAVIES

eleven sea-going boats that could act with a fleet, and
seventy-one smaller and slower vessels. A 28-knot
destroyer has been ordered.

UNITED STATES.

It is only of late years that the United States have
aspired to become a first-class naval power. The
policy of building a fleet of fast cruisers was initiated
in 1883, but it was not until 1890 that the Federation
began to lay down first-class battleships. In these
thirteen years, however, so many ships have been built
or projected, the ships themselves are so powerful, and
the resolution to continue the programme is so mani-
fest, that, in future, the United States must be reckoned
with as perhaps the most dangerous of all our rivals.
It is impossible to believe that this new fleet has been
built for defence alone. No Power, whether naval or
otherwise, wishes to commit aggression upon the
United States ; how far removed is the idea from
the European Powers has plainly been shown by the
reception in Europe of the recent insults bestowed
both upon this country and upon Spain. Had any
such aggressive projects been entertained by any
European Power, these provocations would have been
hailed as heaven-sent opportunities for going to war
with a good cause ; instead of this, the transatlantic
menaces were received with half-amused, half-distressed
stupefaction. Even were aggression intended from
any quarter, the United States have no need to spend
millions of dollars on battleships to meet it. They
have no great carrying trade, and no dependencies

149

NAVAL POLICY

over sea which they stand to lose ; they do not depend
on the outside for food, as we do, but could maintain
themselves on their own products for ever. It is true
that many of their principal towns are on the sea-
board, and comparatively unprotected. But, in the
first place, the destruction of these towns would do
little service to an enemy, if only the United States
were resolute to continue the war ; in the second, it
was easy to defend them with shore-batteries and
torpedo-boats, as is actually being done concurrently
with the building of the sea-going fleet. If one axiom
of naval war is more certain than another, it is that the
most powerful fleet cannot stand up for any length of
time against well-constructed, well-armed, and well-
served works on shore. This being so, we can only
conclude that the new navy is part of the general spirit
of interference and menace which, starting with mere
bluff applied to electioneering purposes, is gradually
becoming more and more characteristic of the foreign
policy of the United States. At present the menace
can be lightly regarded, for the ocean fleet is still in its
infancy. But the resources, both natural and industrial,
of the United States are so vast, and potentially so
much vaster, that fifty years hence will tell a very
different tale. By that time they will have it in their
power to outbuild all the Old World, ourselves in-
cluded, and once in that position it is not likely they
will fail to take advantage of it. From the military
point of view, therefore, it seems a great pity that
Lord Salisbury did not meet Mr. Cleveland's im-
pertinence of December, 1895, in a far firmer spirit.
Had war come, we could probably have taken or

destroyed most of the United States warships, and

150

FOREIGN NAVIES

laid under contribution or destroyed New York,
Philadelphia, Boston, New Orleans, and San Francisco.
Conquer the United States we could not — that is an
impossibility. But with a few heavy blows at the
outset we might have sickened them of the war and
the new fleet at the same time. In a few years, when
they feel themselves militarily stronger, this also will
be an impossibility ; and, knowing the irresponsible
nature of the Western Federation, welded together out
of the malcontents of every European people, the Old
World will have to stand on guard.

The latest and most powerful of United States war-
ships are the Kearsage and Kentucky, which will
probably be ready for sea towards the end of 1898.
They are to be of 11,500 tons, 368 feet long and 72 feet
in the beam — the proportion of beam to length being
somewhat greater than in our later battleships, for
reasons which will appear in a moment. These ships
are very stoutly built, very strongly armoured, and very
powerfully armed. Their most striking feature, which
is exhibited by no other existing battleship, is the
system on which the heavy guns are mounted. Four
13-in. guns are carried in turrets fore and aft. But
these turrets are double, or two-storeyed, and in the
upper storey of each turret, above the 13-in. guns,
a couple of 8-in. breech-loaders are carried. Both
upper and lower stories turn together, so that all four
guns in each turret always bear in the same direction.
These turrets are very heavily armoured, as, indeed,
they should be, when their disablement would mean the
loss of so much power. To begin with, there is the
water-line belt, which extends from the stem to the
after turret. This sinks with the normal stowage of

151

NAVAL POLICY

coal to 4 feet below the water-line, and rises 3^ feet
above it ; except just at the bow it is i6|- inches thick.
The hull, from the upper edge of the belt up to the
main-deck, is sheathed with 5 -in. plating. The lower
storeys of the turrets are armoured with 1 5 inches, with
an additional 2 inches in front ; the upper similarly
with 9 and 1 1 inches. The gun positions are thus
completely protected from below the water-line to the
top of the upper turrets. The secondary battery
consists of fourteen 5-in. quick-firers — mounted seven
on each broadside between the turrets and behind
6 inches of armour — and twenty 6-pounders with
smaller quick-firers. All the armour is of nickel steel,
and its powers of resistance may be inferred from the
fact that the United States are the headquarters of the
most recent improvements both in steel plates and steel
shot. The speed is comparatively low, being only 16
knots. The normal coal capacity is 410 tons, but 800
tons more can be stowed, giving a total radius of 6000
miles.

It is plain that these will be very formidable ships ;
but their most characteristic feature — the double turret
— would seem to be a mistake. That it adds consider-
ably to the all-round fire is obvious; but there are many
countervailing disadvantages. If it is risky to expose
two guns in a turret or barbette to simultaneous dis-
ablement, it is much more so to expose four. The risk
that both big guns may miss, and two charges be
wasted, owing to an oscillation of the ship, is likewise
doubled. It is to minimize this chance that the
Kearsage and Kentucky are being built broad in the
beam. A third objection is that it is doubtful whether

the stoutest ship in the world could stand without

152

FOREIGN NAVIES

strain the tremendous shock resultant on the firing of
the four guns. And lastly, although the 8-in. guns are
mounted at a very commanding height, they restrict
the range of the heavier pieces below, which cannot be
elevated to any considerable degree without the risk of
damage to the storey above. For all these reasons it
may be doubted whether the four new battleships
which the Senate has authorized will carry double
turrets. For the rest, it is noticeable that in spite of
the great number of heavy and middle-sized guns
mounted by these ships, their energy of fire is but
283,873 ft.-tons per minute, as against the Majesties
393,920 ; this is attributable to the comparatively small
power of the United States ordnance.

The Iowa (11,296 tons), to be completed in
November, 1897, is the next battleship. She is
nothing like so well protected as her successors, since
she combines the British partial belt with the French
unarmoured hull. The belt, which covers about 240
out of 360 feet of length, is of 14-in. plates ; its ends
are joined by 12-in. transverse bulkheads; both above
and below it are 2f-in. steel decks. But for this belt
there is no external armour except on the guns. There
are four 12-in. breech-loaders mounted fore and aft in
15-in. barbettes, and eight 8-in. guns in pairs in 8-in.
barbettes, two sponsoned on each beam, so that four
fire nearly ahead, astern, or on the broadside. The
quick-firing armament is weak, consisting of two 4-in.
guns sponsoned right ahead behind 4-in. shields, two
similarly protected right abeam, and two on the un-
armoured superstructure bearing astern over the main
after barbette. There are twenty 6-pounders. She is
to make \6\ knots, and, with 2000 tons of coal, is ex-

i53

NAVAL POLICY

pected to steam 6000 miles. The Iowds fighting value
is much impaired by the fewness of her quick-firers, and
the ease with which shell could be lodged through the
unprotected side beneath all her six barbettes.

The Indiana, Massachusetts, and Oregon are all ready
for sea. Of 10,230 tons, they are, in the main, smaller
prototypes of the Iowa. The belt of 18-in. Harveyed
steel covers three-fifths of the length ; the cross bulk-
heads are 17 inches of the same. Above the belt to the
upper deck is 5-in. plating as in the Kearsage. Four
13-in. guns are carried in pairs in 17-in. barbettes ;
eight 8-in. in 8h to 10-inch barbettes, mounted as in the
Iowa, except that in these earlier types they are not
sponsoned on the same level as the heavier guns, but
mounted on the superstructure so as to fire over them.
The quick-fire armament is again very weak — six 4-in.
guns and twenty 6-pounders — and the 8-in. gun bar-
bettes are so high that they would be much exposed to
shells exploding beneath them. It seems doubtful
whether this whole system of providing an intermediate
armament of 8-in. guns does not expose the ship more
than the additional power is worth. The Indiana group
steam from 16 to 16 -i knots, and with 1800 tons of coal
— 1400 more than the normal stowage — their coal
endurance is put at the probably exaggerated figure of
16,000 miles.

Passing over the Texas — a small battleship of 6300
tons, neither better nor worse than other vessels of her
size — and some seventeen coast-defence monitors, of
which only the Mo?iterey is recent, we come to the
armoured cruisers. Of these the Brooklyn is the latest
and largest. She is of 9153 tons, 21 knots speed, and
15,000 miles radius of action. She is protected on the

154

FOREIGN NAVIES

water-line by a partial 3-in. belt of steel, and a steel
deck of 3 to 6 inches. She carries eight 8-in. guns
by pairs in 5| to 8-in. barbettes, mounted lozenge-wise
as in French battleships, and a dozen 5 -in. quick-
firers behind 4-in. plating. Thus in speed, coal-
endurance, gun-power, and protection for the water-line
and guns, the Brooklyn possesses a well-proportioned,
all-round power, and can challenge comparison with
any first-class cruiser of her size afloat, except perhaps
the Esmeralda. The New York, which is some 700
tons lighter, has the same speed, and 1500 miles less
radius. In her the 4-in. armour belt runs from stem to
stern with a similar steel deck. She carries only
six 8-in. guns, the mid-ship barbettes containing one
apiece, and her quick-firers are only of 4-in. calibre.
These are protected, as in the Brooklyn, by four inches
of steel plating ; the heavier guns by 10-in. barbettes
with 7-in. steel hoods. The Maine (6682 tons) is much
smaller, and a knot slower than these ; the fact that she
has a partial belt of 6 to 12-in. plating, a central
redoubt of ten inches and four 10-in. guns, in heavily-
armoured echeloned barbettes, leaves it doubtful
whether her designers intended her for cruiser or battle-
ship. The Maine has no quick-firers larger than the
6-pounder. The KataJidin is a somewhat anomalous
vessel, intended to be used as a ram. She is very low
in the water, and armoured over the whole hull with 2I
to 6 inches of steel. Of guns she carries only four
6-pounders. She failed by three-quarters of a knot to
reach her contract speed of 17 knots, but was never-
theless accepted by way of emphasizing Mr. Cleveland's
Venezuela message. Her price was only £1 86,000; but
it was probably all wasted, as almost any ship under

155

NAVAL POLICY

steam could easily get out of the way of a low vessel
ploughing through the water at only 16 knots.

The United States fleet of fast unarmoured cruisers
is a very fine one. Mention has already been made of
the triple-screw commerce -destroyers Columbia and
Minneapolis, which attained, on trial, the sensational
speed of 22'8 and 23 knots. This must, however, be
fined down to a natural-draught ocean speed of about
l8| knots — a performance that several of our own
cruisers could probably equal. Being intended to run
away rather than to fight, they carry one 8-in. gun and
four 4-in. quick-firers astern, with two 6-in. and four
4-in. quick-firers as bow-chasers. The guns have steel
shields, and there is a 2\ to 4-in. deck. Better armed,
though with a trial speed of only 2r6 knots, is the
Olympia, which carries four 8-in. guns in 4-in. hooded
barbettes, and ten 5-in. quick-firers behind 4-in. shields.
She would, of course, be a far more formidable fighting-
ship if she mounted larger quick-firers instead of the
8-in. guns ; but, as she is, she is superior to most of our
first-class cruisers in respect of speed and shelter for
the guns. Of the rest, the Philadelphia (4324 tons),
Newark, and San Francisco (4083), Baltimore (4600),
Charleston (4040), and Atlanta and Boston (3189), would
be classed as second-class cruisers in Europe. All steam
over 18 knots except the two last, which are being re-
engined, and most of them over 19. Their armament
would be powerful if quick-firing guns were substituted
for their old pattern breech-loaders. This has been
done on the Chicago (4500 tons), which owes her fame
to having been commanded by Captain Mahan, the
epoch-making naval historian. The Cincinnati and

Raleigh (3183 tons) are new second-class cruisers,

156

FOREIGN NAVIES

steaming 19 knots, with 4500 miles radius, and armed
with one 6-in. and ten 5-in. quick-firers, which means
considerably more gun-power than that of British
cruisers of approximate displacement. The Marble-
head and two sister ships, of 2000 tons, are third-class
cruisers; they are well armed with nine 5-in. quick-
firers apiece, but only steam 17 knots. The rest of
the United States Navy is, for the most part, composed
of slow gunboats of little military value, or of old
ships, classed as cruisers, which fought with Farragut
and Dahlgren, thirty years since, in the Civil War.
Among these is the Hartford, Farragut's flagship at
New Orleans — a wooden single-screw frigate, which
has been re-armed with 5-in. quick-firers. With what
object good guns and valuable men should be put
aboard this ship, which was already obsolete when
Farragut hoisted his flag, Heaven and the Washington
Navy Board alone can tell.

Torpedo-craft have received less attention in the
United States than their long, exposed coast-line, with
its numerous shallows and islets, would seem to demand.
There are two first-class torpedo-boats — the Cushing
and the Ericsson — and five second-class. Besides these,
eighteen others are building and projected ; but these
are all large sea-going boats of 24J to 2yh knots speed,
armed with small quick-firers. They are rather de-
stroyers than torpedo-boats, and are presumably in-
tended to act with a fleet : in other words, they are not
for defence, but for aggression. This, the first word to
be said about the United States Navy, is also the last.

*57

RELATIVE STRENGTH

We are now in a position to sum up the results of
the past chapters. Having some general idea, first, of
the purpose and efficiency of the various equipments
of modern warships, and, secondly, of the extent
to which each of the principal navies is equipped
with them, we may now attempt to discover, as ex-
actly as possible, how we stand in relation to our
rivals. Perfect mathematical exactness, it may be re-
peated, is not attainable in such a calculation. For
this we should require a table of naval weights and
measures, with such equations, for instance, as " 8 inches
of Harveyed steel = one 6-in. quick-firing gun." Un-
luckily such formulas would be almost impossible to
construct, and quite impossible to apply. Supposing
that the attacking power of a wire 6-in. quick-firer is
just equal to the defending power of an 8-in. Harvey
steel plate, we are still no nearer the practical appli-
cation of the proposition than we were before. For it
is quite plain that a 6-in. gun and ammunition is better
to carry than the same weight of armour, which would
go only the shortest way towards protecting a ship.
We might, with an approach to truth, say that a gun
and ammunition protected by its own weight of armour
is better than either two guns and no armour, or two

guns' weight of armour and no guns. But even this is

158

RELATIVE STRENGTH

true or not according to the particular ship to which
the formula is to be applied. For instance, if there were
any fresh weight to be utilized in the Royal Sovereign,
it would go most profitably to armouring the un-
protected 6-in. guns, while in the Majestic all such
guns are armoured already, and any additional force
might better be disposed otherwise. We cannot, there-
fore, hope to obtain any exact measurement between
our own naval force and that of others such as would
reduce the forecasting of naval war to a sum in
arithmetic. Even if this were possible, there would
still remain the chances of actual war as opposed to
the mathematical certainty of the results given on the
proving-ground. Then there is always the personal
equation of the men who are to work the machines ;
coolness and resolution may make up a disadvantage,
or flurry and indecision give away a superiority. The
personal element in naval war must always remain to
a great extent incalculable.

We can, however — and, indeed, considering the vital
national importance of the subject, we must — make as
exact estimates of the force possessed by us, and by
others, as the nature of the subject allows. To count
ships is plainly worse than inconclusive. To lump
together all ships, big and little, new and old, battle-
ships and gunboats, and call them all ships, and, as ships,
all equal units in a total, is as absurd as to count up
sovereigns, shillings, and pence, and say you possess so
many coins. To count up first-class, second-class, third-
class ships, and the like, on the basis of official classifi-
cations is similarly misleading ; as well might you take
a French five-franc piece and a Papal one, and reckon
each at four-and -twopence. It was such misunder-

159

NAVAL POLICY

standings, as revealed in recent debates in Parliament,
that we set out to clear up. By going rather more into
detail we can sum up roughly the relative strength of
our own and other navies, first in one element of force,
and then in another.

To take, first, battleships — that is, ships furnished
with armour and armour-piercing guns, such as fit them
to fight in line against other battleships. That ships
without this equipment cannot meet battleships with any
reasonable chance of success is antecedently as certain
as anything can be, and is borne out by all naval ex-
perience from the Merrimac s first action in Hampton
Roads to the battle of the Yalu. The battleship being
the one type of war vessel which cannot be driven
from the sea — leaving out of account such accidents
as a surprise by torpedo-boats and the like — except
by other battleships, it is plain that it is on battleships
that naval superiority must ultimately depend. The
number of such ships possessed, or shortly to be
possessed, by the principal navies may thus be
tabulated :

Battleships of the Principal Naval Powers.

Britain

France

Russia

Germany

Italy

United States

* The dates assigned for the completion of ships building are, of course,
more or less conjectural. The figures for 1899 take in only ships already
projected; by laying down ships at the beginning of 1897, and pushing
them on, it is obvious that any Power might add to its total at the
beginning of the next century.

160

1896

1897

1898

1899

(end).

(end). *

(end).

.. 64 ..

. 68

.. 71

.. 45 ••

. 46

.. 49

•• 36 ..

• 39

.. 40

•• 33 ••

• 34

•• 35

• 13

•• 13

RELATIVE STRENGTH

This table includes coast-defence ships, armoured
gunboats, and the like ; but omits all ships classed as
armoured cruisers. The mere fact of this official classi-
fication shows that such vessels as come under it are
not, in the first instance, intended to fight in line. Only
thirteen United States monitors, being armed only with
smooth-bore cannon, which became obsolete in the
early Sixties, are omitted.

This being so, it is plain that we cannot learn very
much from the bare statement without discriminating
somewhat. Taking guns first, we may draw a distinc-
tion between such ships as carry heavy breech-loaders
and such as have only muzzle-loaders. This makes
a great difference in the British figures, which come

out thus:

1896. 1897. 1898. 1899.

Britain . . 33 ... 36 ... 40 ... 43

while the Italian total has, for the moment, to be
reduced by one ship, the Duilio, which is, however,
shortly to be re-armed. The other totals remain the
same. On this showing, our strength is actually less
than that of France, and barely superior to Russia's
and Germany's. No doubt this does our ships some
injustice, since it must not be supposed that in no
circumstances could muzzle-load»ing guns oppose breech-
loaders. Yet it is as well to show, as crudely and
brutally as possible, how far behind we have allowed
ourselves to fall in heavy artillery.

We may now pass to the auxiliary armament, and
give the numbers of ships that carry heavy quick-firing
guns : that is — to take a necessarily rather arbitrary
standard — a gun of 3-in. calibre or over. A piece of

this calibre might attack with effect the unarmoured
m 161

NAVAL POLICY

parts of battleships ; and, if using shot, the thickness
of armour usually carried on secondary guns. As a
rule, the ships carrying these guns are also armed with
heavy breech-loaders ; the only exceptions are our own
Hercules and Sultan, but their quick-firers are few, and
not of the most powerful, so that they may be con-
veniently regarded as a supplementary class by them-
selves.

Battleships Armed with Breech-loaders and Heavy

Quick-firers.

1896.

1S97.

1898.

1899

Britain

23 •

. 27

.. 30

France

. 24 ...

26 .

• 27

.. 30

Russia

. 5 •••

•• 13

Germany

• 23

.. 24

Italy

• 13

•• 13

United States

. 6 ...

7 ••

.. 9

The elimination of the slow-firing secondary arma-
ment appears to have made a vast difference in the
relative strength of the various attacks. France appears
still better armed than ourselves, though her superiority
is far less, taking the double qualification, than it was in
breech-loaders alone, and is dwindling in any case.
The weakness of Russia in quick-firing guns is very
marked. Germany, ort the other hand, seems to have
kept her artillery more modern, in proportion to the
number of her ships, than any other Power. But this
table, again, is somewhat misleading. Supposing a 6-in.
quick-firer fires five shots a minute to a 6-in. breech-
loader's one, then a ship with five of the old pattern
guns is, so far, as powerful as a ship with a single quick-
firer. Substitute quick-firers for the breech-loaders, and

the superiority of the ship carrying the five guns be-

162

RELATIVE STRENGTH

comes immediately overwhelming. Now in the French
total, as stated above, many ships are included on the
strength of the most meagre armament of guns between
3 and 4 inches calibre. This is apparent from the fact
that at present our battleships mount 260 large quick-
firers to the French 165, while in three years we shall
actually have 540 to 261. The fact that the pieces
possessed by France are distributed over more ships is,
no doubt, an advantage ; but it hardly neutralizes the
inferiority of their number. It is absurd to compare
the Majestic, with her twelve 6-in. and sixteen 3-in.
quick-firers, with the Duguesclin, which mounts a solitary
3^-in. piece. Most of the German ships, again, have
very weak secondary batteries. We may, therefore,
profitably rule out all ships whose total energy of fire
per minute is less — to take a relatively low figure, which
will leave in all battleships seriously armed with large
quick-firers — than 150,000 ft.-tons.

Battleships with Fire-energy of over 150,000 ft.-tons

PER '.

Minute.

Britain

1896.
• r 5

1897.
... 18

1898.
22

1899.
... 25

France

... 14

•• 15

... 18

Russia

• 3

... 6

.. 9

Germany
Italy
United States

• 5
10

• 3

••• 5
10

This is probably a very fairly just estimate of relative
strength, so far as concerns the attack. Italy, perhaps,
is somewhat favoured by the comparison, since several
of her ships only just reach the standard of fire. The re-
armament with quick-firers of the Anson, Camperdown,

Howe, and Rodney, would add to our score; that of

163

NAVAL POLICY

the Amiral Duperri, Courbet, and Devastation, three to
France's. On the whole, we may consider that in gun-
power we are at present slightly superior to France, and
gaining on her by reason of the greater number of our
ships building or projected. On the other hand, Russia,
at present unready, is coming up very rapidly ; and in
three years France, with any one European Power, will
be at least equal to us, while a coalition of three ought
to possess a decisive superiority. Of ships below this
standard of offensive power, we have considerably more
than any rival, though fewer than France and Russia
together. We are most seriously weaker in heavy
breech-loaders, though this is somewhat balanced by
our great superiority in large calibre quick-firers.

To analyze and classify the various battleships from
the point of view of the completeness of their armour
protection, is not altogether simple. It is easy to say
that ship A carries more armour than ship B, but ship
B may carry it where the protection it gives is more
effective. Six inches of armour-plating, for example,
are probably better disposed to defend a quick-firing
gun than piled on to an already thick belt some feet
below the water-line. A rough and ready method of
differentiating between ships all claiming alike to be
armoured may, however, be found. We may begin by
excluding all armour-clads as insufficiently protected
whose armour on the whole side, or good part of it, and
on the principal gun positions, is not capable of keeping
out the shot of the heavy quick-firers usually mounted
by the newer battleships. It is true that these guns
would probably be fired with shell, at any rate early in
an engagement, with the view of destroying the un-

armoured parts of an enemy; but it would be always

164

RELATIVE STRENGTH

possible, and doubtless sometimes profitable, to use
shct, or shot and shell alternately, to break up such
armour as was incapable of resisting their blows. In
any case, ships that do not need heavy armour-
piercing guns to pierce their armour are at a dis-
advantage compared with those that do. The thickness
of armour which can be penetrated by the heaviest
quick-firers, at close range, may be put roughly at
12 inches of wrought iron, 8 of compound armour, and
6 of steel hardened by the best known processes. The
number of battleships for each Power that possess this
qualification is the following :

Battleships Invulnerable both on Side and Principal
Gun-position to Large Quick-firers.

1896.

1897.

1898.

1899

Britain

• 36 •

• 39 •

•• 43

... 46

France

29 .

• 3i •

.. 32

- 35

Russia

13 ••

. 17 .

. 19

Germany

16 .

. 17 .

. 18

Italy

5 ••

• 5 •

• 7

•• 7

United States

6 ..

• 7 •

• 9

.. 9

In ships thus stoutly armoured, therefore, we have a
small, but slightly increasing, superiority over France,
but a combination of France with either Russia or
Germany would leave us in a perilous position of
inferiority. Italy, it will be noticed, the only Power
which might, in conceivable circumstances, be found on
our side, comes very badly out of this comparison,
owing to the neglect of side armour in some of her
finest ships.

It must not, of course, be supposed that ships less

heavily armoured than those which appear in the table

above would necessarily find their heavy guns dis-

165

NAVAL POLICY

mounted, or themselves sunk by quick-fire shot. The

force with which a projectile would be likely to get

home in war is not that which it exerts on the

proving-ground. Some captains will, perhaps, be chary

of firing their guns with the full charge, even in action,

for fear of straining, or even bursting, the gun, or of

damaging parts of their own ship by the concussion.

It must also be remembered that only in case of direct

hits will the full force of the projectile be realized ;

with an oblique hit the force will be less, and, with very

oblique hits, at an angle of 45° or so, shot would

probably bound off without penetrating at all. On the

other hand, it is very possible that defective plates

exist unsuspected in many vessels ; a blow might find

out the weak spot in a plate which, if sound, ought to

defeat its attack.

The results given above seem to call for still further

differentiation, since nobody would call, for example,

the Nile and the Colossus equally well protected. An

enlightening comparison of strength might be formed

by counting only ships whose thickest armour is

capable of defeating the most powerful gun afloat.

But unfortunately no such ship exists. The Indiana

and her two sisters of the United States Navy

approach most nearly to it, having 17 inches of

Harveyed steel on their barbettes, and 18 inches at

thickest on the water-line. The most powerful guns

are estimated to pierce nearly 39 inches of iron, which

represents about half that thickness of Harveyed steel.

In practice, no doubt, the Indiana's thickest armour

is very unlikely to be penetrated, but hardly any other

ships approach her in defensive strength. A more

profitable basis of comparison, in view of the great

166

RELATIVE STRENGTH

part which quick-firers certainly, and high explosives
possibly, will play in the next naval war, might be the
armour carried on quick-firing guns, without which they
could hardly hope to escape speedy disablement from the
shell of the enemy. This form of protection is only of
recent introduction, and consequently is found in very
few ships actually ready for sea, though most Powers are
recognizing its importance in their newer models.

Battleships Carrying their Large Quick-firers
Behind Armour.

1896.
5
3

1S97.
8

5
5
4

1898.

1899

• 15

6 ..

• 9*

8 ..

5 ••

. 6

6 ..

. 6

Britain

France

Russia

Germany

Italy

United States

This table tells much the same tale as the others.
We are first in the list, but so poor a first that a
combination of second and third would leave us
behind. Italy, having laid down few ships since the
importance of the quick-firer was realized, is again
behind ; Germany and the United States, in proportion
to the number of their ships, are well forward. With
regard to our own force, it may be conceded that the
number of ships building of the Majestic and Canopies
types brings us a trifle better out of this comparison than
some of the others. We must also add to the British
total the eight ships of the Royal Sovereign class, and
the two Centurions, each of which carries four out of
her ten 6-in. quick-firers in armoured casemates.

* In default of information it is assumed that the Henri Quatre's quick-
firers will be protected by armour.

167

NAVAL POLICY

In respect of speed the construction of a compara-
tive table is an easy matter. The present standard
of speed for battleships, to judge by the ships now
building, is 18 knots an hour. For ships completed it
is 17, while any vessel with less than 15 knots would
probably prove a serious hindrance to a squadron of
modern ships. It must be remembered in this con-
nexion that most warships never steam at their extreme
forced-draught speed after the day of their trial. Some,
at any rate, of our own vessels are capable of attaining
or even exceeding their nominal speed for a spurt of
a few hours, such as might be sufficient for the tactical
necessities of a battle. But for continuous steaming
most ships would probably make from three to four-
fifths of their highest recorded performance.

Battleships Steaming 15, 17, and j8 Knots an Hour.

1896.

1897.

1898.

1899.

Knots.

15 17 18

Britain

. IO 14 2 .

. IO 17 2 .

. IO 19 4 .

. IO 19 7

France .

12 S — •

.12 7 — .

.12 7 I .

• 13 7 3

Russia

. 9 1 — ..

.IO 4 — ..

.11 6 — .

. 12 6 —

Germany .

9 2 — .

.10 2 — .

. 10 2 1 .

. 10 2 2

Italy

3 2 5..

•325..

•327.

•327

United States .

3 1 — ••

. 4 I — ..

. 6 1 — ..

.61 —

On this showing we are very fairly well off, though

still inferior in point of ships of good speed to the next

two Powers. But our great superiority in speed at

17 knots and over would probably be of service to us,

whether in a fleet action or in strategical combinations.

It must, however, never be forgotten that the speed of a

fleet is set by the slowest ship, not the fastest ; for this

reason the possession of two very fast battleships like

the Renown and Centurion is of no use to us until we

have others to act with them. In respect of speed Italy

168

RELATIVE STRENGTH

comes out far the best of the Powers, and the United
States worst ; the former has sacrificed protection to
speed, the latter speed to protection.

To make a table on the basis of coal-endurance is not
a very difficult task, but it is one of doubtful profit.
The particulars vouchsafed by most Powers with refer-
ence to their warships sometimes estimate the distance
they can steam at economical speed without coaling,
but these estimates, as has already been pointed out,
are often vitiated by the fact that they make no allow-
ance for the coal used by such auxiliary machines
as turning-engines, fresh-water engines, fire-engines, and
the like. The coal consumed by these varies accord-
ing to the number there may happen to be on board
a vessel, and the frequency with which they are used.
But leaving these out of consideration for purposes
of comparison — on the assumption that the error in all
calculations is much the same — we may put the radius
of action of the battleships of each Power as follows.
The standard — ability to steam 5000 geographical miles
without coaling — is again more or less arbitrary. It
has, however, for British purposes a certain appropriate-
ness in that it would allow a ship to steam at economical
speed from a Channel port to Malta and back, with a
good margin for fighting an action on the way.

Battleships with a Radius of 5000 Miles.

1896. 1897. 1898. 1899.

Britain

• 3 1 •

■ 34 ••

38 •

• 4i

France

• 3 •

• 3 ••

4 ••

. 6

Russia

4 •■

Germany

. —

— ..

Italy

• 5 •

• 5 ••

7 ••

• 7

United States

4 ..

6 ..

. 6

169

NAVAL POLICY

Here, at any rate, we come out of the test with flying
colours. At present we are more than double the total
of the five other Powers, and though they are now
building ships of better coal-endurance than hitherto,
we shall enter on next century with a great superiority
to them all together. Moreover the Power that comes
next to ourselves is Italy, the nation whose enmity we
have least reason to apprehend. French writers have
very severely criticized the policy which has built their
ships incapable of acting even in Egyptian waters with-
out being driven to look for some neutral port wherein
they may coal. Even if they find such a port, it is plain
that the necessity of frequent coaling must involve
delay, and, in future naval wars, even more than in
Nelson's day, time will be an essential condition of
success. Nevertheless, we must not set too much store
on the superior coal-carrying of our ships. An abun-
dant supply of coal has its off-set in the fact that it
entails great size and draught of water; this cuts ships
off from many of the harbours of the world, and many of
the docks. However, the advantage secured by a large
radius of action more than counterbalances the dis-
advantages for British ships. Our vessels have to go
anywhere the enemy is to be found, and to go quickly
before he escapes, without losing time to coal by the
way. But it is not at all so certain that foreign nations
need to give very much of their available displacement
to coal. A certain quantity they must have ; for
instance, a French ship loses more than half her
strategic value, if she cannot steam from Cherbourg
to Toulon, with a margin for any fighting that may be
necessary. But within some such limit as this the

foreigner, as against England, may rest content with an

170

RELATIVE STRENGTH

inferior coal-capacity. It is our business to go to him,
not his to come to us. If he beats us on his own shores
he can come to us, and invade us at his leisure ; if
he does not, it is at least better to be beaten near
his own port than to have to run home after the
damage of a battle.

It is hardly necessary to carry the analysis of battle-
ships further. The important point in making any such
comparisons is to keep the standards and classes as
elastic as possible. It may, perhaps, be claimed for the
tables drawn out above that they are based on real
elements of strength in a ship, and that the standards
themselves, though inevitably of an arbitrary nature,
are roughly representative of a real superiority of the
vessels which satisfy them over those which do not.
The general result of them all is that our naval position
relatively to other Powers is growing worse instead of
better. In attacking-power we are inferior to the two
second nations, while in breech-loading artillery we are
even inferior to France alone. In the protection of our
ships we are already falling behind any two of the
principal Powers, while even where we are strong, as in
speed and coal-endurance, our rivals are reducing our
lead. However, to sum up the exact amount of our
deficiencies, we shall do well to wait until the next
chapter, and to consider what Powers we are likely to
be called on to encounter, and what force we shall need
to defeat such possible attack.

To pursue the same analysis in respect of cruisers,
we seem, so far as mere numbers go, to possess a
considerable superiority ; though even here, considering
the vast volume and vital national importance of our

sea-borne commerce, we have not a single ship, even on

171

NAVAL POLICY

paper, which we can afford to spare. The total numbers
of cruisers for the principal Powers are the following :

1896.

1897.

1898

Britain

126

• 136 ••

• 150

France

• 56 ••

• 63 ..

. 64

Russia

• 31 ••

• 33

Germany .

18 ..

Italy

• 25

United States

• 36 ••

• 36 -

• 36

No profitable distinction can be drawn between the
ships represented by these figures on the basis of the
official distinction into armoured, first, second, and
third-class. An arrangement which puts the Rossia
and the venerable Black Prince (now used as a training-
ship) in the same category cannot but be worse than
misleading. Proceeding, as in the case of the battle-
ships, to analyze the figures on the basis of the various
elements of force, we may first eliminate all ships un-
furnished with the larger quick-firing guns, with which
exclusively British cruisers have been armed for nearly
ten years.

Cruisers Armed with Large Calibre Quick-fire Guns.

1896.

1897.

1898

Britain

. 74* ...

84 ••

. 98

France

. 27 ...

34 ••

• 35

Russia

Germany .

8 ...

8 ..

Italy

United States

14 ...

14 ..

Our own total is thus shorn away by nearly one -half,

* The Northuniberland, Nelson, and Minotaur are omitted, their few
47-in. quick-firers being balanced by the fact that their principal arma-
ment is muzzle-loading.

172

RELATIVE STRENGTH

but those of our rivals are still further reduced. That
of Russia is particularly insignificant, but it appears
likely that, with the hope of maritime dependencies in
Chinese waters, she will now devote herself to building
new cruisers. It will be seen that both now, and for the
next two years, we are superior in cruisers armed with
quick-firers to the five other Powers put together. But
this table somewhat overstates our strength, since
although our number of ships with a modern armament
is large, they are, on the whole, less heavily armed than
the corresponding ships of other Powers.

If we take a higher standard — for example, a fire-
energy of 150,000 ft.-tons a minute, as was done in the
case of battleships — the figures come out thus :

Cruisers with a Fire-energy of over 150,000

FT.-TONS

PER MINUTE.

1896.

1897.

1898.

Britain . . .20

France . . 19

Russia . . . 1 ...

...

Germany . . . 1 ...

...

Italy . . . 2 ...

...

United States . . 4

This puts a very different face on the matter. The
minor Powers are more minor than ever, but France is
at the moment virtually on an equality with us as
regards ships of this standard of gun-power. Suppose
that a ship satisfying this standard were regarded as
possessing the minimum of offensive power that would
justify her for independent cruising, while weaker ones
were used to scout with fleets. We should then be
vastly superior to France in the number of our scouts,

173

NAVAL POLICY

but should be very badly off on the high seas. Twenty
ships could hardly run down and capture nineteen, until
the nineteen had done considerable, perhaps mortal,
injuries to our food-supply. No doubt we should send
weaker vessels to cruise than are numbered in this class,
which includes the Eclipse type among our so-called
second-class cruisers, while excluding all the others.
But we should do this at the manifest risk of meeting
more powerful opponents. Less powerful vessels might
perhaps be set to cruise in pairs ; two Apollos could
doubtless defeat a Chasseloup Latitat very easily. But
that would mean employing £3 5 0,000- worth of ship to
get rid of ^250,000-worth, and — what with our present
dearth of officers and seamen is far more important —
550 men to neutralize 350. The conclusion wherefrom
is that, with all allowance for the fact that we are now
building a trifle faster than France, the list of our more
powerful cruisers ought to be a good deal longer than
it is.

In point of protection it has already been pointed out
that armoured cruisers, in any real sense, are very rare.
Our own Aurora, which is so classed, can hardly be
called better armoured by reason of her belt than she
would be by an arched deck of stout nickel-steel. The
same applies to all cruisers which are merely protected
by a thin armour-belt on the water-line, while among
cruisers which carry real side-armour to protect them
against quick-fire shell, the Dupuy-de-Lome stands
almost alone.

On this basis, therefore, we can hardly make any
satisfactory discrimination between cruisers. To classify
them according to the presence or absence of deck-
protection would be similarly inconclusive, since nearly

i74

RELATIVE STRENGTH

all vessels built since 1880 or so* have this to a greater
or less degree. The most profitable way of dis-
criminating between cruisers in matter of protection
would probably be according as their guns are, or are
not, protected from shell-fire. But this principle, as
was remarked in dealing with battleships, is of such
comparatively recent recognition that the materials for a
comparison hardly exist as yet. The ships of our own
Blake and Edgar classes carry each four 6-in. quick-
firers in 6-in. casemates, while the Terrible and Powerful
have all, and the Diadem class twelve, of their guns
similarly protected. Several French ships carry their
heaviest guns in lightly-armoured turrets. The German
Freya and her sisters will have all their guns of 6-in.
calibre and upwards, either in casemates or turrets of
4 inches greatest thickness.

In speed, which is of the utmost value to a cruiser,
whether she acts as intelligencer to a squadron or in-
dependently, a tabular comparison is simple enough.
The same caveat must, however, be given as in the case
of battleships with regard to nominal speed and sea
speed.

Cruisers Steaming 18, 19, 20, 21 Knots an Hour.
1896. 1897. 1898.

Knots.

19 20

Britain .

33 20

4 •

. 6

33 26

4 ••

33 4°

France .

•5

10 9

•• 3

17 10

iS 10

Russia

— .

. 2

— —

— ..

— 2

—

Germany

1 1

I ..

2 1

Italy

4 —

. 2

4 2

I ..

4 2

United States

4 2

5 ■

• 4

4 2

5 •■

4 2

In very high speeds the United States are well ahead

* The first cruisers were our own Comus class, launched in 1878 and
succeeding years.

175

NAVAL POLICY

of all competitors ; but in a few years, if all our ships

turn out well on trial, we shall be equal to them in the

proportion of our cruisers that make high speed, and,

of course, far superior in the total. With regard to

European Powers our position is satisfactory in point of

nominal speed, while in practice we should probably

find ourselves more nearly able to realize the results

gained on trial. It may be said, roughly, that our

cruisers are from half a knot to a knot faster than

the continental cruiser of the same class.

The coal endurance of their cruisers is of more

general concern to the nations of the earth than is that

of their battleships. If they are at war with us we

shall, if we are wise enough and strong enough, come

after their battleships ; but their cruisers must be ready

to go after our merchantmen. No Foreign Power is

over-well equipped with coaling stations in distant seas,

and such as they have it would be Britain's first business

to attack. Neutral ports, which foreign cruisers would

have to use largely for coaling purposes, would — again,

if we were strong enough — be watched by British

cruisers. The case might therefore easily arise that a

cruiser, whose bunkers had run low, would be obliged

to fight, because she had not coal enough to take her

into any other port. It would be our business to ensure

that this took place as often as possible ; it would be

the enemy's — whose real objective would be not our

cruisers, but our merchantmen — to reduce the possibility

of being brought to action for lack of coal to a bare

minimum. It follows from this that foreign cruisers

need a large radius of action just as much as ours do.

How large, is a question that admits of more dispute.

The Rurik is reckoned to steam 20,000 knots without

176

RELATIVE STRENGTH

coaling, and the Terrible 25,000 — more than the earth's
circumference. It is doubtful whether this would ever
be necessary, especially in the case of powerful ships
like these, which would have little reason to avoid a
coaling- station for fear of meeting an enemy in its
offing. It might well be argued that it is better for
a ship to have her bunkers so arranged that she can
coal quickly than to carry such enormous quantities as
this. By way of a standard to differentiate cruisers of
a high coal capacity from the ruck, we may, perhaps,
not unreasonably fix the ability to steam 10,000 miles
without coaling ; that is, a voyage rather longer than to
the West Indies and back, and rather short of India
round the Cape. The results for the various nations
are the following :

Cruisers of 10,000 Miles Radius, and Over.

1896.

1897.

1898

Britain

• 17

.. 17 .

France

• 4

4 .

• 5

Russia

Germany .

• 5

Italy

United States

• 5

•• 5 •

• 5

Once again, as whenever it is a question of sea-going
qualities, we are in a highly satisfactory position, and
likely to remain so. Unless the standard of 10,000
miles is far too high, it appears that foreign nations
have generally under-estimated the times and distances
over which their cruisers must keep the sea. An
extensive radius of action, however, is only needed for
independent cruising for the attack and defence of
commerce. Cruisers acting with a fleet can presum-
ably coal wherever the battleships coal, and, though
n 177

NAVAL POLICY

they would have much more steaming than the battle-
ships, might do with an endurance of considerably less
than 10,000 miles.

The following table is formed by combining the
previous one with the two previous to it, and repre-
sents the number of vessels possessed by each Power
which have a fire-energy of 150,000 ft.-tons per minute,
can steam 20 knots an hour, and go 10,000 miles with-
out coaling — perhaps as good a qualification for the
name of first-class ocean cruiser as any other.

Britain
France
Russia

1896.

• 9

• 3

1897.
•• 9
4

1898
• T 3
4
1

Germany .
Italy
United States

1
1

4
1

•• 3

Among the aristocracy of cruisers, therefore, we
return to our old equality, both now and in the future,
to all the other Powers together. But then our interests
on the high seas are greater than that of all the other
Powers together. For to them the possession of sea-
trade means luxuries ; to us it means our daily bread.

The torpedo flotillas may be briefly tabulated as they
will stand for 1897, and need no comment.

Britain.
Torpedo-gunboats 1
over 21 knots speed j

France.

5 •

Russia.
.. 6

Germany.

... 3 ■•

Italy.
3

U.S.A

Do. under 21 knots )
speed . . J "

. 16 .

.. 5 •••

... —

Destroyers . 90 .

— .

.. 11 ..

... —

Sea-going boats . 43 .

. 46 •

•• 55

.. 64 ...

III

... 20

Other boats . 123 .

• 197 •

.. 116

.. 81 ...

- 5

178

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

We now know roughly where we are in point of naval
armaments, and with what rival forces we are con-
fronted. Is our preparation sufficient ? Can we say,
with Mr. Goschen, that, with the completion of this
year's building programme in 1899, "We shall have
reached some point where we may stand " ? It appears
that the First Lord clings to this view, for, on the
Budget, he acquiesced in the following statement of
the Chancellor of the Exchequer : — " The increase over
last year's estimate is due mainly, of course, to the vast
increase of ^3,122,000 in the Navy Estimates. Every
Chancellor of the Exchequer for the last ten years has
been burdened with the ever-increasing burden of the
old man of the sea. I do not complain of it, because,
in the first place, I believe the expenditure to be
necessary. I know that it is far more economical that
we should incur it at a time when we have leisure to
think out a systematized plan on which it can be made,
than to defer works which we ought to do ourselves, to
be attempted some day, perhaps too late, by our
successors, and to allow to be passed votes of credit
amounting to enormous sums, most of which would
certainly be wasted, and all of which might be too

late for the object for which it would be required.

179

NAVAL POLICY

Therefore, sir, I do not grudge this increase in the

Navy Estimates of the current year. I am sanguine

that next year may show a decrease." It is impossible

that Sir Michael Hicks-Beach should have uttered the

last sentence without the consent of his colleagues, and,

among them, of Mr. Goschen — who, indeed, was sitting

at his side, and is stated by the newspapers to have

cheered the statement. When attention was called to

the matter later in the debate, Mr. Goschen said that

the charge of the first year of his scheme was the

heaviest — thus by implication allowing that there

would be no fresh scheme next year. It is true that

in the last days of the Session, replying to Sir Charles

Dilke, he limited his diminution of estimates to the

shipbuilding vote only, and appeared to contemplate

an increase in the Estimates as a whole. On the other

hand, the rest of his speech was deplorable. He

alleged that this country must be limited in an increase

of battleships, otherwise necessary, by the inability to

provide enough guns and armour-plates. It is quite

true that several of the battleships of the Majestic

class have been delayed by the tardy supply of guns

and plates. Yet that is not an excuse for a First Lord,

but rather an additional condemnation. If the makers

of guns and plates were guaranteed a demand for a

term of years, there would be no difficulty about the

supply. However, Mr. Goschen appears to have chosen

the easier part, and to be disposed to do little for the

battle-fleet in 1897.

Are we to agree with him that we may put our

money in our purse, or devote it to teaching our

agricultural population their catechism, secure in the

adequacy of our Navy to meet all calls likely in

180

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

reason to be made upon it ? Or are we to take the
view of Sir Charles Dilke, Sir John Colomb, and Mr.
Arnold Forster — who also have given attention to this
subject — and believe that still further efforts are
necessary before our safety from defeat is assured ?
To decide between them we must consider a wholly
new series of questions. We know what our Navy is,
and what proportion it bears to that of others. We
have now to enquire what it needs to be, and what
proportion to that of others it ought to bear. By
what standard are we to measure the adequacy or
inadequacy of the Navy ?

What, in the first place, is the Navy for ? Plainly to
protect us against attack, or against such encroachment
on our imperial standing, or commercial interests in
any part of the world, as amounts to an indirect attack.
If any such attack were made upon us by a single
Power, possibly Mr. Goschen is right, and we are
already — so far as ships go, and leaving the question
of men for separate consideration — able to defend
ourselves. We command, as has been seen, a very
substantial superiority over any single Power except
France, and have a tangible, though too small, margin
of superiority over her. But a small, or even a
handsome, superiority to any single Power is not
enough. Any child can forecast the possibility that
we may be assailed by two or more in concert. The
limit of such a combination is a concert which would
include every naval Power on earth. Such a coalition is
not inconceivable, and we cannot consider ourselves
absolutely and unconditionally impregnable to all
possible attack, unless we have a naval superiority
over the whole world put together. But that, un-

181

NAVAL POLICY

fortunately, is outside any immediate possibility. We
must compromise the matter, and look to the nearer
probabilities of the political situation. With how
many, and how powerful, nations is there a reasonable
possibility that we might be engaged ? That is what
Sir William Harcourt means when he says that policy
governs estimates. The phrase is one of those half-
truths, half-falsehoods, in which the party politician
takes unfailing comfort. It is undoubtedly true that
policy governs estimates in a sense ; forward policy
demands a military force to carry it through, which
halting or backward policy seems able to dispense
with. On the other hand, it is just as true that
estimates govern policy ; you cannot carry out a policy
unless your estimates are heavy enough to provide the
military force which is always at the back of diplomacy,
and which is its only sanction. If we are to play the
leading part in the world's affairs that most Britons
conceive to be our right in virtue of our national
character and achievements, we must have the force to
make our voice respected in the councils of the world.
We rule better than other nations, and therefore we
ought to rule more than other nations : such is the
central idea of what is called the Imperialist spirit,
and, given the premises, it is difficult to deny the
conclusion.

But to return to Sir William Harcourt. With Powers
like France and Russia (supposing them to be united,
as they presumably are, at least in a defensive alliance)
it is perfectly true that for the moment policy governs
estimates. There is no Power, or Powers, likely to
attack them, and unless they propose to attack others
they can ease off their preparations for war. But is

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

this true of Britain ? To answer the question, we need
only ask why it is true of France and Russia.

First, because they are allied, and, having common
interests against us, naturally allied. But we are not
allied with anybody, and not likely to be. France and
Russia do not need our alliance, and the only terms on
which they would accept it is the surrender on our part
of just those interests which our Navy exists to defend.
Nobody wants to conquer and enslave Great Britain
and Ireland, to govern them as satrapies from Paris or
Petersburg. But both France and Russia want empire
and trade where we also want it, and where at present
we have it. They covet our goods much more than we
covet theirs — Egypt, for example, or the trade of China.
Therefore they have no use for our alliance except on
terms of our giving up to them either something we
already possess, or something which we have as good a
claim to possess as they, and which may be used as
a base to proceed to take what is actually ours. If we
have to ally ourselves on these terms — and French
statesmen and privileged Russian journalists avow that
nothing less will content them — we may just as well
sell our fleet at once for what it will fetch.

Nor does the other great European combination offer
us any better prospect. Of the members of the Triple
Alliance, Italy is a Platonic but feeble friend, neither
able nor anxious to help us in any need ; while Austria,
more able but not a whit more willing, has no im-
mediate use for any return we could pay for her friend-
ship. Germany, the head and controlling will of the
Alliance, is bitterly hostile, and certain to remain so.
The personal relations of its autocrat with our mon-
archy, our national sports, and the like, had veneered

183

NAVAL POLICY

this hostility for years, but the outburst with which the
whole German press and the whole German nation
gave tongue, when once the Kaiser led off the chorus,
can leave no doubt as to the feelings with which we are
regarded in Germany. It is only fair to add that the
feeling of this country towards Germany, if less
ebullient, is as deeply unfriendly. Nor is it dispu-
table that the instinct of our democracy is a true one.
With France and Russia we may have more immediate
causes of friction, but among European Powers
Germany is our true enemy. We are commercial
rivals, engaged at this very moment in a life-and-death
struggle for the markets of the world. This kind of
enmity makes little show at ordinary times on the sur-
face, but it goes very deep. Moreover, it comes home
to everyone, be he politician or not. You cannot go
into the City without seeing before your own eyes, and
hearing in your own ears, evidences of the commercial
war — and what is worse, the successful war — which
Germany is waging against us. Alliance with Germany
is impossible ; it is forbidden by the national feeling,
and the competing commercial interests of either
country alike.*

* As an example of a German view of our international position, and
the readiness to take advantage of it, there is interest in this recent utter-
ance of Prince Bismarck's Hamburger Nachrichtcn: "A wise policy
must, therefore, take care that we hold aloof from England's conflict with
France and Russia, which will not seek war with us when fighting
England in three continents, and that we should reserve our strength in
order to be able to throw it into the scale when things come to be re-
arranged.

" But the British are tormented by another anxiety. They no longer
believe entirely in the unassailability of their European Island Empire,
for, whereas many things have changed elsewhere in the last decade,
England's system of defence is still the same as in Wellington's time. It
suffices for non-European countries. In view of the world-wide extent of

184

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

Outside Europe the field for British alliances is
hardly more promising. Recent events have shown
that we cannot count on the friendship of the United
States, although in a naval war between European
Powers her interest in neutrality would be so great that
we need not necessarily apprehend her hostility. In
Asia, having made it our policy for years to sustain
China against Russia, we have recently allowed her,
first, to be beaten to her knees by Japan, and then
saved from dismemberment by that very Russia, whose
encroachment it was the one aim of our policy to for-
bid. Japan, it is true, offers a possibility of alliance on
the basis of common rivalry to Russia. But industrially
and commercially, Japan is our rival even more than
she is Russia's. We have done nothing to earn her
friendship ; on the contrary, our recent impotent display
in the Far East must have gravely depreciated the
value of our alliance. It is even now possible that

her interests, she must have more ships on foreign coasts than Russia and
France. But the Power or Powers which preponderate where the conflict
must be decided, that is, in the Channel and the North Sea, will be
victorious. But the French Channel fleet alone is already a match for
the English, and its junction with the Russian Baltic fleet would put an
end to England's superiority in the waters in which the conflict must be
decided. Add to this that just her insular position involves the danger of
England being starved out by the enemy, so that she must unconditionally
surrender, if a victorious hostile fleet should succeed in cutting off her
supplies. England has not ignored this danger, and is, therefore, working
diligently at the task of increasing her navy to such an extent that it will
be superior under all circumstances. If she maintains her superiority at
sea, her antagonists must try to convert the sea war as quickly as possible
into a land war, and to seek a decision where all the nerves of the World-
Empire meet — that is, in London. The essay entitled ' Attempts to in-
vade England,' by Baron Luttwitz, a Prussian officer of the General Staff,
expresses the opinion that the question of the possibility of such an
invasion must be answered in the affirmative. The attempt to invade
England is still, indeed, a risky, but no longer an impossible enterpiise."

I8 5

NAVAL POLICY

Japan may discreetly have come in and made her peace
with Russia.

From the point of view of alliances, therefore, there
is no analogy between ourselves and the Franco-
Russian combination.

The second reason why they are in a position to

allow their policy to govern their estimates is equally

inapplicable to us. They are in a position of military

superiority to any probable enemy. As against the

Triple Alliance, it is almost as easy for Russia to make

war on her whole Austro-German frontier as on the

German frontier alone: she could bring the whole

strength of her army into play almost at once, whereas

this would be impossible, for reasons of transport, along

the three practicable lines of advance into Prussia.

France, meanwhile, could probably paralyze Italy by

her superior fleet and threats of invasion at all points,

while still keeping ample forces to operate on the

frontiers of Piedmont and Lorraine. As against

Britain the coalition is equally powerful. Locking

up the best part of our troops in Afghanistan on the

one hand, Russia could co-operate with France in

threatening us with invasion on the other. Even if this

threat were unexecuted, as it would most probably turn

out, the combined fleet could challenge our supremacy

at sea, and with it the supply of the food we eat. In

battleships, whether we consider the total number or

the powers of attack and defence, they are equal to us

to-day, and in a year or two equality will have grown

into preponderance. In point of cruisers they are

inferior, it is true, yet not so inferior but that they

might cause us the greatest embarrassment and loss,

while their shores and harbours are defended by

1 86

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

torpedo flotillas far more powerful than any which
could be brought against them. In this position of
equality tending to superiority France and Russia
might be justified by a pacific policy in reducing their
naval expenditure. But we, with the equality of to-day
declining inexorably to the inferiority of to-morrow,
cannot be justified by any such blameless intentions
in neglecting our defence. Only the stronger Power
can afford to be pacific. The weaker cannot choose
between war and peace — only between war and
surrender. And by the end of 1897, and during the
following years, we, as against France and Russia —
which in their relations with us may be counted as one
Power — shall be the weaker party, and exposed to all
the aggression which weakness inevitably invites.

There is yet another reason why a pacific policy
might permit France and Russia to reduce expenditure,
which does not apply to us. The naval strength of the
allies is not only sufficient to enforce their policy at the
present, but yet more amply sufficient for the immediate
future. The wisdom of their rulers, which led to the
laying down of many ships in the years immediately
precedent, permits them now to complete those ships at
leisure without laying down others. France is taking
this course, though Russia's procedure is exactly oppo-
site. But our improvident rulers, who attend to the
first interest of the country only by fits and starts,
neglected the Navy during the years succeeding the
completion of the Naval Defence Act programme. The
result is that, barely equal now, we shall be behind our
rivals next year, and must build for the future. The
immediate future is irredeemable, but by the beginning
of next century we may pull level again. If a battle-

187

NAVAL POLICY

ship could be built in a fortnight, the policy of the
future might be left to take care of its own estimates.
But a battleship takes, on the average, three years to
build ; and who can foresee to-day the policy of 1900 ?
We have let ourselves drop behind through exaggerated
confidence in the fact that we can build warships faster
than any other Power. We can ; but not so much faster
as a consideration of our best performances without
taking into account our worst — the remembering of the
Majestic and the forgetting of the Renown — would lead
us to believe. Laying down five battleships in 1896, we
shall perhaps have two of them ready in 1S98, but
hardly more. If we want ships by 1900, therefore, we
must lay them down without fail in 1897.

The dictum, then, that policy governs estimates, with
its implication that a policy of alliances or avoidance of
aggression can justify us in reducing the amount ex-
pended in armament, turns out false and misleading at
every turn. We cannot reduce our expenditure on the
strength of alliances, for there are no alliances open to
us, even if we desired them. Pacific intentions will not
avail us, for our rivals are in a position to impose upon
us either surrender or war at a disadvantage, On this
view policy does, indeed, govern estimates ; but exactly
the wrong way about. It is their policy that governs
our estimates — a position neither safe nor consistent
with the dignity of a great empire. And not only our
rivals' immediate policy, but their contingent future
policy also. We have to make ourselves ready to-day
to meet any onslaught they may choose to make in
1900.

It is the policy of our rivals, therefore, that must
furnish the measure of our naval expenditure during

188

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

the next years; and, so far as that policy can be fore-
cast, it affords no warrant for drawing tight the purse-
strings. That there exists, in spirit if not in letter,
a world-wide confederation against us has been plain
to us, and to the rest of the world, any time since
January, 1896. We consoled ourselves with the phrase
" splendid isolation." But in the mere fact of isolation
there is no more splendour than there is in that of
association. The consciousness of isolation may be
splendid if isolation is met with coolness and courage ;
but if this very courage leads to neglect of the excep-
tional precautions which isolation demands, then the
sense of isolation is rather dismal than splendid. It
is rather significant of this ostrich-headed attitude that
the same Mr. Goschen who adopted the phrase was
found, a few months later, acquiescing in the neglect of
the very naval precautions which isolation should have
enjoined. Neither he nor anyone else can be unaware
of the international situation. France and Russia we
had always reckoned with, though at the very time
of reckoning we had been allowing our forces to
decline below the level of theirs. We always knew
that their interests, as against us, were identical. Now
we know that they have themselves recognized this
identity of interest by alliance. Germany, too, as our
most dangerous commercial rival, and as intensely
hostile in feeling, must in future be reckoned with —
the more so as recent events in the Far East have
shown that the days when France and Germany could
not act in concert are either over, or very nearly so.
The United States stand on much the same footing as
Germany. With both there is the additional danger

that intestine political enmities may drive their rulers,

189

NAVAL POLICY

at almost any moment, to distract their populations by-
foreign war. That these four Powers should unite to
crush us in the near future is not, perhaps, very pro-
bable, but it is more than possible. To be safe, we
should be ready to meet them all together. But that
would mean doubling our fleet, so that it is hardly to
be looked for in the next year or two. That we might
be confronted with three of these Powers, of which
France and Russia would almost certainly be two, is
less unlikely than that we should have to face all four.
That before many years we may have to fight France
and Russia together — unless some piece of good luck
happens to disassociate them : a contingency on which
the present aspect of Europe gives us no right to
count — is not only not unlikely, but is affirmatively
more likely than not. The only alternative is that
we should resign all our interests in China — in the
north to Russia, in the south to her ally — as well as
a great deal of what we value in Africa ; and that
with supplementary concessions to Germany and the
United States, who would not lose the opportunity if
once they found us in a surrendering mood. Many
people, both at home and abroad, think that on the
consciousness of our naval weakness is already super-
vening the habit of surrender ; and there are not
wanting in the diplomatic history of the last year or
two facts to confirm that view. But what may have
been given up is nothing to what we shall be asked
to give up. Unless we increase our strength to a point
that warns off aggression, we shall have either to give
up all the sources of our greatness, or fight for them
on conditions that will put a premium on defeat.

What force do we need, then, to fight the possible

190

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

combinations against us ? To answer the question we
must consider the plan on which this country would
conduct a war. This plan is deduced* by the appli-
cation of the broad abstract principles of strategy to
our peculiar national circumstances. Although it took
Englishmen some centuries to get it formulated with
clearness, it is, when once formulated, very simple.
The sea, as has already been said, is our territory ;
and we must hold it just as if it were a province.
This is to be done either by crushing the enemy at
once, or by keeping a superior fleet of our own that
knows where to lay its hand on him, and crush him
if he shows himself out of port. Only by this method
of making war can we ensure the ocean communica-
tions upon which our Imperial existence depends, and
draw from the trade of the sea the supplies on which
our people are to be fed. Considering this necessity,
we can answer at once one of the questions with which
we started at the beginning. There was a doubt, in
calculations of relative force, what ships we were to
count. But if we are to carry the war up to the enemy's
coast-line, leaving the sea in British possession behind
us, this question becomes very simple. We must count
every ship of the possible enemy, whether sea-going
or coast-defending ; and we must only count such ships
of our own as can operate on an enemy's coast. This
appears to put a very heavy handicap upon us ; and so,
indeed, it does. But we must accept the handicap if
we are to command the sea, and we must command the
sea if we are to live. We cannot afford to wait in the
Channel until we are attacked and threatened with

* Very ably by Mr. Spenser Wilkinson (in The Command of the Sea
and elsewhere), following up Admiral P. H. Colomb.

191

NAVAL POLICY

invasion. Such strategy, leaving great tracts of sea
at the undisputed disposal of an enemy, would mean
crippling financial loss at the best, and, at the worst,
starvation.

There are, indeed, some who hold that we can avoid
the burden of commanding the sea by transferring our
trade to neutral bottoms. But there are two serious
and, it must appear, fatal objections to any such make-
shift. In the first place, it is in the last degree im-
probable that neutrality would be respected. The
Declaration of Paris provided, it is true, that a neutral
flag rendered all goods inviolate, except contraband of
war. But it is in the highest degree probable that the
first proceeding of any Power, which engaged in war
against us, would be to repudiate this Declaration. The
United States, indeed, were never party to it at all.
Even those Powers that were, considering it is now
forty years old, would hardly consider themselves still
bound by it. No treaty can in these days be counted
on to last much longer than the lifetime of the genera-
tion that made it. But even if the Declaration were
nominally honoured, there remains the provision except-
ing contraband of war. What is contraband of war?
The international lawyers define it as anything that
assists an enemy to carry on hostilities : arms and
ammunition, for instance, have always been held con-
traband, and coal would certainly in future be so
regarded. But would not food also be contraband
of war ? Indubitably it assists an enemy to carry on
hostilities. In our own case it is especially vital,
since we should collapse in three months without
supplies from abroad. There are not wanting signs

that this acceptation would be put on the words of

192

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

the Declaration. In 1893, when France was enforcing
a "pacific blockade" of Siam, rice was declared con-
traband : and rice, be it remembered, not imported
to feed Siam, but exported to feed Singapore. How
much more would not corn and cattle be immediately
declared contraband of war when shipped for a British
port ?

There is a second reason hardly less cogent against
entrusting our carrying trade to neutrals. The war
over, we should never get it back. The United
States, before their Civil War, had a flourishing
carrying trade. The depredations of the Confederate
privateers drove it into our hands, and we have kept
it ever since. Without doubt they would be glad,
and most reasonably glad, to receive it back again if
we were at any time desirous to relinquish the command
of the sea. So that even if the Declaration of Paris
were, by some impossibility, most fully observed, we
should still lose one of our most important industries.
It is in virtue of such industries that we are a great
nation ; but to us the carrying trade by sea is more
than a source of wealth. Supposing that in a war it
passed to a neutral — the United States, for instance,
or Germany or the Scandinavian Powers, who are
pressing us hard enough as it is — that neutral would
henceforth have our empire largely at its mercy. It
would possess the most powerful of all levers for
imposing upon us any conditions it pleased. If we
refused, it could cut off supplies, and leave us to
starve. No doubt we could go to war, and take the
trade away ; but then it would only pass from the new
enemy to a new neutral, and we should have the whole
humiliating and expensive process to begin again,
o 193

NAVAL POLICY

Britain, in short, is so completely dependent on sea-
borne trade that she cannot afford to see it even in
the hands of a neutral.

The conclusion stands, then, that we must be able to
meet every ship of an enemy that can show its nose out
of port with sea-going vessels of our own. But even
that does not exhaust our disabilities. It is possible,
and in many cases probable, that an enemy will not
choose to fight any British squadron to which he is
inferior, or even equal. Supposing he prefers to remain
in port, then we must have squadrons ready to engage
him as soon as he decides to come out. During the
Napoleonic war we thus blockaded all the important
French ports for long periods together. The effort
was, to a certain extent, successful, but it was a tre-
mendous strain on our naval resources. A blockaded
fleet possesses many obvious advantages over a
blockader. It lies comfortably in its own port, and
if it is decided to attempt to break the blockade it
knows the night and hour of the attempt, and can
make it with energies fresh and alert. To the
blockader one night is like another. Any moment
may be the all-important one when the enemy will
attempt to escape. Ceaseless wakefulness, ceaseless
anxiety and strain, perpetual false alarms, and per-
petual disappointments are the blockader's portion,
and even muscles of iron and nerves of steel must in
time break down under it.

Since our last blockades the conditions of the problem

have been vastly changed by two factors — coal and the

torpedo, and the change has loaded a still further

burden on the blockader. In the first years of this

century the necessity of fresh water and provisions,

194

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

as well as the even more imperative necessity of resting
and refreshing the crews, compelled blockading ships
to return to their own ports at frequent intervals ; and
unless a defeat were to be risked, the place of each
ship so returning had to be filled by another. But
far more urgent and more frequent than either of these
calls will be the necessity of coaling. A steamer, even
when cruising for the most part at her most economical
speed, can only keep the sea for weeks, where a sailing
ship could do so for months. Warships could possibly,
in favourable circumstances of weather, be coaled at sea
from specially-constructed vessels. But these would
need to be very fast to elude hostile cruisers, to whom
they would be the most valuable of all prizes ; and,
moreover, we do not possess such fast colliers. Perhaps
subsidized ocean -liners, like the Campania, could be
used for the purpose, but they would not be with
our fleets from the first moment of hostilities. It is,
moreover, on such fast vessels that we should have to
depend for great part of our supplies and communi-
cations with the outside world. At the best, coaling
at sea in this way could never be aught but uncertain
by reason of weather, and especially dangerous in the
vicinity of an enemy.

Of the bearing of torpedo-boats on blockade some-
thing has already been said* It is no exaggerated
estimate of their influence that henceforth they will
render impossible a close blockade of any port defended
by them. A torpedo-boat carries, on the average,
one-twentieth of the crew of a large battleship, while
her cost represents a still smaller proportion. The
blockaded Power would, therefore, be in a position to

* Page 1 02.
195

NAVAL POLICY

lose twenty torpedo-boats in sinking a single battleship.
There might be occasions — as, for instance, the reduction
of the invader's fighting strength to such an extent
that he could be brought to action and defeated by the
blockaded fleet or by a relieving squadron, or by the
two combined — which would justify even further risks.
It is certain, therefore, that no effort and no risk would
be spared to make torpedo attacks successful. With
darkness to help them every night, and often rain or
haze as well, it is hardly doubtful that a blockading
squadron standing near in to shore would suffer serious
losses. The only really safe position for it would be
so far out at sea that a torpedo-boat could not steam
to it and back between dusk and dawn. The distance
would vary with the length of the night at the time of
year, and with the speed of the boats ; but, roughly, it
may be put at anything from fifty to a hundred miles.
Now what would be the effect of a blockade in these
circumstances ? It would mean that if the blockading
battleships had to stand out fifty to a hundred miles
every night, the length of the semi-circle round the
blockaded port would have to be from a hundred and
fifty to three hundred miles. No squadron could hope
to be so powerful as to be able to establish an effective
circle at night-time, when seeing is difficult and scouts
must be close together, over so large an area. It would
be quite impossible to prevent isolated vessels from
running the blockade. It is probably a little more
than doubtful whether a whole fleet could be prevented
from going in and out. It would be easier for a
relieving squadron to get in than for a blockaded
squadron to get out. To guard against this the look-
out ships must be extended over an even wider semi-

196

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

circle than the natural line of the blockade, so as to
give early notice to the battleships of the enemy's
approach, from whatever quarter. The battleships
would, doubtless, be cruising together somewhere in
the centre of the line — otherwise they might easily be
attacked, and beaten in detail — and it is many chances
to one that they could not arrive to the attack of the
enemy before he had reached safety and reinforcements
in port. It was thus that in the 1896 manoeuvres
Admiral Seymour slipped past Lord Walter Kerr into
Lough Swilly. He had a far slower squadron than his
opponent, and was aided only by night, which occurs
every twenty-four hours, and haze, which accompanies
perhaps one dawn out of two. What happened once
in these very ordinary circumstances may be expected
to happen again and again, and again.

It is true that the advent of the torpedo-boat
destroyer has somewhat modified these conditions.
Supposing that the destroyers of a British squadron
had destroyed the torpedo - boats available to a
blockaded fleet, well and good. A rigorous blockade,
though still difficult, would perhaps be possible. But
as long as there were any hostile boats afloat an
Admiral would still probably hesitate, considering the
relative value of a boat and a battleship, to jeopardize
his battleships within the radius of boat attack, in
reliance merely on a patrol of destroyers nearer in-
shore. It is true that a destroyer might carry coal to
cruise, say, for a week, and could use the ships of the
squadron as a temporary base for coal, water, fresh
crews, and so on. But in time the strain would be
too great, and repairs would soon become needful.

Thus it would need a very large number of destroyers

197

NAVAL POLICY

to relieve each other, and maintain an effective patrol
against torpedo-boats. With any port not an alto-
gether impossible distance from a friendly base, a
blockade on the old system would probably not be
attempted. If an inferior squadron were lying, say,
in one of the French Channel or German North Sea
ports, we should doubtless keep fast destroyers and
cruisers outside that port, and a line of cruisers keeping
communication with an English port, in which a
superior fleet of battleships would lie. On receiving
information of the enemy's departure, our ships could
put out at once in pursuit, and even if the enemy were
not brought to action, he would probably be driven
back into port before he had time to do any harm.
Such temporary evasions could be viewed with equa-
nimity as long as the enemy was not so superior in
speed to our own fleet that it could join a friendly
squadron, and establish a superiority in force. But
there are plainly some foreign, and potentially hostile,
ports to which this method of quiescent blockade is
inapplicable — Toulon, for instance, which is some 800
miles from Gibraltar, our nearest base. In such cases
we must either have a superior squadron cruising within
moderate distance, or give up the idea of blockade, and
therewith the command of the sea, which is the breath
of our life.

We can now sum up the disadvantages of the
blockader, and see how urgently necessary it is that
he should have a superiority of force to balance them.
He ought to maintain a superior force before the
blockaded fleet ; otherwise he will be attacked at a
disadvantage, worn out with watching, and racked with

nervous tension, by the fresh crews of the enemy. He

198

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

must be able to maintain this superiority while still
sending away ships from time to time for necessary
refit and repairs, for coal and provisions, and, above all,
for rest. And he must be most abundantly supplied
with fast cruisers to maintain the circuit of the
blockade and furnish intelligence to the battleships,
as well as with specially constructed craft to ward
off torpedo attack ; all these vessels must be even
more frequently relieved than the battleships. The
exact degree of superiority required it is difficult to
determine — this question must be left to experts'
opinion. Such expert opinion, embodied in a com-
mittee of British Admirals, has decided that the
proportion of battleships blockading to battleships
blockaded should be at least five to three. That
means that, supposing — on a quite moderate computa-
tion — there were eighteen French battleships in Toulon
and nine in Cherbourg, while Russia had a dozen in
the Baltic and half-a-dozen in the Black Sea, we
should require thirty battleships in the Gulf of Lions;
fifteen at, say, Portland; twenty off the Sound, and ten
somewhere off the mouth of the Dardanelles. In all
we should thus need seventy-five battleships to meet
France and Russia alone, to say nothing of any other
Power. And our total strength, big and small, sea-
going and coast-defending, is no more than sixty-one.

Before passing to a more minute consideration of the
number of ships we require, there are one or two points
to be reckoned in our favour. The first is strategical :
that the forces of an opponent are not so powerful
divided as they are united. Russia's twelve ships, for
example, in the Baltic, and six in the Black Sea, are

in a position of strategic inferiority, because a fleet

199

NAVAL POLICY

of fifteen battleships might very conceivably attack

and defeat each squadron in succession. As we

occupy the interior line between Portland and Malta,

it is obvious that if the two Russian fleets were at

sea, we should be able to join our Channel and

Mediterranean squadrons, if necessary, in time to fall

on either Russian command in overwhelming force.

If France and Russia were allied against us, there

would be a line of stations — say Petersburg, Portland,

Cherbourg, Gibraltar, Toulon, Malta, and Sevastopol —

in which a British base would always lie between any

two of the enemy's, so that we might, in some cases,

prevent their junction, and thus be able to defeat

them with less force. But this advantage is rigorously

limited by one condition : that we should have at

each of our bases a fleet strong enough in cruisers to

find any hostile fleet that might seek to run past and

join its friends, and strong enough in battleships of

superior speed to catch it and beat it. If this were

not so — if, for instance, the fleet resting on Gibraltar

and Malta were only strong enough to hold the fleet

resting on Toulon, we could only prevent the Russian

Black Sea squadron from joining the Toulon squadron

at the risk of leaving the latter free either to join the

Black Sea squadron before we caught it, or had time to

crush it ; or else to go through the Straits of Gibraltar,

to join the Cherbourg squadron, to establish a naval

supremacy in the Channel, and possibly to unite with

the Petersburg squadron also. In that case it is

conceivable that our own Portland squadron might

suffer a heavy defeat before the Mediterranean squadron

could rejoin it, and that we should be reduced, on the

whole balance of force, to an inferiority. The con-

200

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

elusion seems to be that the advantage of the inner
line can be lost, if there is not a sufficiency of strength
to enforce it.

The other point is that if we now set to work and
build new ships to re-establish our supremacy, we need
not necessarily build one new battleship for every old
coast-defender that may be found on the other side.
A new battleship of the Canopus class is worth at
least a couple of Friedlands. But this, obviously, does
not apply to the new ships that other Powers are
rapidly building ; these may be inferior to our own, but
it would be rash to take it for granted. At present our
rivals are outbuilding us, and our first business is to
overtake their new vessels.

It has been said above that to blockade the French
and Russian squadrons we need, on the most moderate
computation, seventy-five battleships, whereas our
present total cannot be swollen beyond sixty-one.
The computation is called moderate, because it omits
all the French armoured gunboats and several old
vessels, and also fourteen elderly Russian armour-clads,
while including every obsolete vessel of our own. If
we include everything of our rivals, we should want, on
the scale of five ships to three, a hundred and twenty
armour-clads to keep them in port ; while out of our
present sixty-one we must deduct the Abyssinia and
Magdala at Bombay, and the Penelope at the Cape.
We should, therefore, have to build sixty-seven battle-
ships to be fit for a successful war this year, while by
1899 the additions to our opponents' strength would
make our deficiency no less than ninety.

No doubt these figures are too horribly bad to be

true. We should not be likely, for fear of torpedo-

201

NAVAL POLICY

boats, to send a fleet nearer Petersburg than the
Sound, nor nearer Sevastopol than the Dardanelles ;
we may therefore knock off ten Russian coast-defence
ships of low coal-capacity and of little military value in
any case. From the French total we may deduct the
Triomphantc, which is at Saigon, and eight weak gun-
boats. But even so, the combined fleets number fifty-
six ships, which we ought to oppose with eighty-four
instead of our present fifty-eight. By the end of 1899
we shall want one hundred and fourteen to meet
seventy, and shall have at our present rate of building
sixty-eight. Now consider these from the point of
view of their fighting efficiency ; in point of speed we
are satisfactorily superior. Of the hostile seventy,
eighteen will reach the combined offensive and de-
fensive standard of fire-energy of 1 50,000 ft.-tons per
minute, and of armour protection for their larger quick-
firers, without which they cannot be considered fully
equipped for modern war. Of our sixty-eight, fifteen
will satisfy this double standard, and, if we add the Royal
Sovereign class, which protect four out of ten large
quick-firers, twenty-three. We therefore need seven
new ships in this count alone. With regard to the
fifty-two French and Russian, and the forty-five British,
which do not come up to the double standard of offence
and defence, we do not need to make up our deficiency
in full with new and very powerful ships. That is to
say, it is unreasonable to ask our Admiralty to lay
down five ships like the Canopus, with a fire-energy of
394,000 ft.-tons per minute, with all their twelve large
quick-firers in 6-in. Harveyed casemates, and with a
speed of i8| knots — to neutralize the three French

battleships of the Magenta type, which have, indeed,

202

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

a fire-energy per minute of 380,000 ft.-tons, but expose
all their secondary guns to the smallest shell, and steam
under i6| knots. Still less is it necessary to lay down
five fine new ships for every three French and Russian
inferior to these, the most powerful of such as fall below
the double standard. Probably it will be sufficient, in
this lower class, to add enough modern ships to make
our total number equal to that of the allies — that is to
say, seven more. This is certainly the very lowest
estimate of our needs compatible with bare safety.
The conclusion is then, that to be equal, without any
margin to spare, to the necessities of a war with France
and Russia, we shall need at the beginning of the
century at least fourteen more battleships than we shall
possess.

It is in this state of things that Mr. Goschen pro-
poses to reduce the shipbuilding vote for 1897. Of
what precise type the warships ought to be may be left
to experts to decide, and we may have confidence that
Sir William White will give us a good article for our
money. But that an article for our money we must
have, and that we must be ready to pay the money is
most certain, and needs no expert opinion to confirm
it. Experts have told us that France and Russia are
allied, and that their policy is directed against us.
Experts have told us on what principle a war with them
should be fought, if this country is to come through it
without vital hurt. Experts have told us what pro-
portion our ships must bear to theirs, if that principle is
to be put in practice. It needs no expert to draw the
inevitable conclusion from the present state of the
facts : it is merely a question of common-sense and

simple arithmetic. To deny that on the data provided

203

NAVAL POLICY

for us \vc shall be unequal to the bare necessities of
war three years hence is to deny that two and two
make four. To deny that a battleship takes, on the
average, three years to build, is to contradict all ex-
perience. And yet it appears that Mr. Goschen is
disposed to refuse to take in 1897 the precautions
which he well knows must be taken then or never to
meet the deficiencies of 1900. Fortunately ministers
have always proved themselves obedient on this matter
of the Navy to public opinion, if only public opinion
speaks loud enough. Fourteen new and powerful
battleships would cost, roughly, ten million pounds,
to be spread over the four years from 1897 to 1901.
Ten millions in four years is not much to pay for the
security and immunity from war of a rich country — a
country enriched, moreover, by peace and by the traffic
of the sea.

A fortunate people should we be if only ten millions
were the total price of security. We have allowed our
older ships to count one for one with those of our
opponents, but, to be able to do this without imperilling
our safety, they must be brought and kept as far up to
date as their construction will allow. Breech-loaders
must take the place of muzzle-loaders, quick-firers of
slow-firers, new machinery of old. Ships which are
incapable of renovation ought to be replaced by new
ones. This is of the very first importance. If all this
were done by 1 901, we should be ready to take the sea
against France and Russia with eighty-two battleships
against seventy. That would probably serve, though
without very much to spare. After that we should
need only to lay down five new ships for every three of

theirs to maintain a satisfactory position.

204

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

We must now consider — still in relation to France
and Russia — our needs in respect of cruisers. It is not
quite so easy to reckon these up, since we have no
guiding proportion of five to three, as in battleships. It
is to be feared that five to three will not suffice us : the
truth is, indeed, that we cannot possibly have too many
cruisers. Their function as the eyes of our battleships
is clearly of more vital importance to us than to our
opponents. Since our part in war must be to fight the
enemy whenever he puts to sea, even at the risk of
heavy losses to ourselves, to miss the chance of en-
gaging him would be almost as bad as a defeat. We
can only hope to bring an enemy to battle by the help
of fast cruisers so numerous that, as they spread out
fanwise from their supporting battleships, it would be
impossible for him to elude their notice. There should
then be a chain of fast scouts from our own battle-
squadrons to the outposts of those of our enemy in
such a way that, once in touch with him, they would not
lose him again until he had been either brought to
action or driven into port. It must be remembered
that cruisers, being liable to become foul and lose speed,
need relieving as much as battleships. There is no
recognized standard for determining the number of
cruisers required for the efficient performance of the
scouting-work for a fleet. The lowest estimate places
it at one cruiser for each battleship, but many
authorities — including our own admirals — are inclined
to put it as high as two. Bearing in mind, however,
the fact that in light weather torpedo - gunboats and
destroyers could take their part of the work, we may
again take the lowest possible figure and say that a
modern fleet should have one cruiser to every battle-

205

NAVAL POLICY

ship. That is to say, that by 1900 we ought to possess
eighty-two cruisers capable of acting as scouts for a
squadron. These should be of a displacement sufficient
to make them independent of the state of the sea, and
capable of maintaining a high speed for long periods
continuously. They should also be sufficiently armed
with quick-firing guns to beat off hostile cruisers, or
destroy them in case they have important information
for their own admirals, and capable of a spurt at very
high speed to bring them out of imminent danger, or
assist them to defeat a scout of the enemy. Such a
type is furnished by our Eclipse class, supposing them
on service to come fairly well up to their trial speed of
19 knots with natural, and 20 with forced draught. As
the standard of high speed perpetually increases, it will
be well to add at least a knot an hour to the pace
of future vessels of this class.

But these eighty-two look-out ships by no means
exhaust our requirements. There are also the inde-
pendent cruisers, who are to patrol the sea, destroying
the enemy's commerce and defending our own by
destroying his cruisers. Vessels intended for this work
plainly need more fighting power than the scouts, who
would only come into action accidentally and occasion-
ally ; whereas these others are specifically meant to
fight. How much offensive and defensive force they
are to have depends on the military value of the cruiser
with which they are likely to be found in action. Their
proper number, on the other hand, cannot be fixed on
this scale. It is of no use to us to have a powerful
cruiser at Sierra Leone if the hostile cruiser she is
intended to counteract is making prize of British

steamers in the West Indies. It is useless — as was

206

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

abundantly shown by the long immunity of the
Alabama — for a cruiser to follow her enemy round and
round the world. There must be cruisers waiting for her
wherever there is trade to be plundered. All the
principal trade-routes of the world, in short, must be
held by our cruisers in force, and as it will be im-
possible to say at what exact point the attack of an
enemy's cruiser will be made, we should have several
ships for his one. How many to one, is most reason-
ably estimated on the basis of the sea-borne trade of
ourselves and other nations. We have nine hundred
and fifty millions of trade to defend, France and Russia
together but three hundred and sixty millions. On this
showing we ought to have eight equally powerful
cruisers for every three of theirs. France and Russia
possess twenty cruisers exerting over 150,000 ft.-tons
of energy from one minute's fire of their guns ; we
have exactly the same number. In 1899 we shall have
gone ahead, and shall dispose of thirty-three to their
twenty-nine. But if their twenty-nine had got out to
sea — and it has been seen that no blockade could hope
to prevent this — our thirty-nine could never run them
down until they had done enormous damage. On the
basis of eight to three, we want seventy-seven cruisers
of the same gun-power — some with a bare 150,000 ft.-
tons, others with far more, according to the respective
powers of our antagonists. Some of them ought to be
sheathed with side-armour to meet such antagonists
as the Dupuy-de-L6me on equal terms. They should
all be superior also in speed, but this superiority, on the
whole, we already possess.

We want, therefore, forty-four more powerful cruisers

by 1900, and to them must be added the eighty-two

207

NAVAL POLICY

scouts. Of these we shall have, in 1899, fifty-six of
over nineteen knots speed, exclusive of the better-
armed vessels that have been set aside for ocean
patrols. This leaves twenty-six more to be supplied,
or a grand total of seventy more fast cruisers of one
sort and another. A cruiser very often takes almost
as long to build as a battleship, and hardly ever less
than two years. Therefore, if we are to reach our
proper standard in 1901, we ought to begin laying
down at once. The whole seventy ought not to cost
much over twenty-three millions or so, and we have four
years in which to pay for them. If this is too short a
time, considering that battleships ought also to be
built concurrently, cheaper vessels, such as torpedo-
gunboats and destroyers, might be built instead. But
it ought to be recognized that such are but a temporary
makeshift, and that we ought not to relax our efforts
till we have enough cruisers to supply every battle-fleet
amply, and hold every ocean highway against all
marauders.

Of torpedo-boat destroyers, again, we can hardly
have too many. For work with our fleets, we ought
to have at least one to every sea-going torpedo-boat
of France and Russia, for Russia has already begun
to send her boats into the Mediterranean. This comes
to forty -three for France, and fifty -four for Russia.
That means, already, seven above our present ninety.
We might say, roughly, that our present force would
be enough to accompany our fleets to battle or to
blockade, since considerations of distance and coal
would prevent an enemy from attacking a blockading
squadron with all his torpedo flotilla at once. Then,

we want a large, but indeterminate, number either of

208

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

destroyers or first-class boats, to protect our shores
against raiding cruisers and our harbours against
raiding torpedo-boats, to destroy hostile transports in
case of an attempted landing, to protect our coaling-
stations and colonial harbours all over the world as
local defence, and to patrol such important strategic
points as the Straits of Gibraltar, the Sound, or the
Dardanelles. No doubt we could also do with a
largely increased force of small vedette boats, such as
are carried on the depot-ship Vulcan, and can use the
ship as their base. It is impossible to determine how
many of such craft we should need, and this task is the
less urgent in that more could easily be built within a
few weeks of the outbreak of war.

Even so, we are left face to face with the fact that, in
addition to our ships building, we must have fourteen
more battleships, seventy more cruising vessels of one
sort and another, and, say, a hundred destroyers and
torpedo-boats, before our Navy will be equal to the
necessities of a war with France and Russia, as their
fleets will stand in 1899. We know that these Powers
are closely associated, and we know that they have
temptations to quarrel with us. We shall not seek war,
and that for the best of reasons — weakness ; but, un-
fortunately, that is also the best of reasons for fearing
that we may have war thrust upon us. That, having
these facts in view, Mr. Goschen should propose to
diminish shipbuilding expenditure next year, would be
incredible, did not his own words testify against him.
A man who has come to such a decision, with the
responsibility for his country's safety resting on his
head, must be either much to be envied for his coolness,

or much to be reprobated for his indifference.
p 209

NAVAL POLICY

Of Germany and the United States — both more than
possible enemies — nothing has yet been said. Singly
we could certainly deal with either, but one of them
allied with France or Russia, or both, would be re-
doubtable enemies. Germany has the great strategic
advantage that the Baltic Canal would give us two
outlets to watch and blockade instead of one, which
would materially add to the strength of the force
required to cope with her. The same may be said
of the United States, since their chief positions are
far from Halifax and Bermuda, our nearest naval
bases. To meet either of these Powers we ought to
have at least five battleships to their every three,
probably two cruisers to their one, and destroyers and
torpedo-boats on rather a larger scale than as against
France and Russia. For use against either we might
do far worse than build a number of powerful, but
small, armour-clads of light draught. These could do
work, alike in the shoal waters of Schleswig-Holstein
or the estuaries of the American coast, which our latest
big ships could not get near enough to attempt. But
for the moment, perhaps, it would be as well to concen-
trate attention on the reinforcements required to bring
us up to the calls of a struggle with France and Russia.
If we get that deficiency remedied in five years, we
must then prepare ourselves for Germany also. The
year 1902 will probably see France drawn nearer to
Germany and Germany nearer to France, while the
hostility of Germany to ourselves can only be em-
bittered by five years of even tenser commercial
rivalry. It is not a task of to-day or to-morrow, but
a continuous, steady preparation. If, in two or three

years more, we can draw level with the three Powers

210

SHIPBUILDING POLICY

together, we shall have good cause to be thankful. To
be thankful — but not to rest. For it is resting after a
brisk effort that has brought us to our present pass, and
robbed us of that confidence in our security, without
which one necessity a nation cannot take breath to
enjoy a thousand blessings.

211

VII

OFFICERS AND MEN

So far we have only been concerned with the machinery
of naval war, without any consideration of the men who
put it in motion. That the machines are nothing with-
out the men is very obvious ; and it is further obvious,
from what has already been said, that there never was a
period in which naval war demanded higher qualities of
head and heart than it does to-day. The navigation of
the sea is a profession in itself, calling for a considerable
technical education, as well as the moral qualities of
patience, endurance, discipline, and imperturbable pre-
sence of mind. The naval officer, and even the higher
ratings among bluejackets, must add to all this a high
degree of attainment in more than one science, besides
an acquaintance with the general principles of war.

Further, the height of disciplined courage that will be
demanded by the next great naval war almost tran-
scends imagination. To suffer punishment without
either running away, and, worse still, without running
at the punisher, is justly regarded as the highest test
of human bravery. And in the naval battle of to-
morrow this is the only kind of courage that will
avail. There is no longer even the blood-heating
excitement of boarding. Admiral and stoker will
alike be called upon to conduct operations taxing

212

OFFICERS AND MEN

their whole energies, while, at the same time, the
target of all the deadliest weapons of destruction that
man has yet been able to devise. In a system of
delicate and elaborate machinery like the modern
battleship, a moment's flurry may mean the disloca-
tion of the whole. To work without a moment's flurry
when shot is screaming through the ship, when shell is
tearing the steel monster to pieces and flinging the
fragments abroad, when poisonous fumes are spreading
suffocation around them — such is the pitch of cool
heroism which will be demanded of those who make
war on the sea in future. To enable any man so
thoroughly to quell his natural fear of death as to
come unruffled through this ordeal, it is not possible
to exaggerate the degree of discipline, comradeship,
and devotion that will be required. Yet, lofty and
difficult of attainment as are these qualities, it is
plain that without them no sailors in our day can
ever hope to make a fight against those who possess
them. In a word, knowledge, training, discipline, and
devotion are even as indispensable to a navy as the
best equipment which science has devised.

If it were possible to tabulate, to add and subtract
the attributes of a good officer or a good bluejacket —
even imperfectly, as was done in the case of material
— the problem of naval war would be solved at once.
But unfortunately you cannot make a table of weights
and measures to deal with the moral qualities of various
sailors. There was an old nucleus of such a table
which declared one jolly Englishman equal to two
Frenchmen and a Portugee ; but this hardly seems
to afford any basis for an exact comparison. The

truth is that if much of the apparatus of naval war

213

NAVAL POLICY

is untried hitherto, and might give results quite oppo-
site to expectation, the men — the soul of the apparatus
— are still more completely untried. There exists no
method of determining how an average British lieu-
tenant, or an average French bluejacket, or an average
Russian stoker, would behave in the bewildering stress
of battle. Courage may be, indeed, confidently claimed
for the officers and men of most navies. But it is the
peculiar courage that consists of keeping a clear head
in the midst of awful peril that will be required for
a modern action at sea, and it is impossible to predict
that even a brave man may not be found wanting in
this when the moment of tension comes.

It is, however, possible to predict that training in
time of peace will go very far to produce the desired
state of mind in the crisis of war. If a man knows
his ship and his work, if he knows his superior officers,
his comrades and his subordinates, and knows that they
also know their work and him, then the almost super-
human degree of courage required will be appreciably
nearer of attainment. To this extent efficiency in
peace is the measure of probable efficiency in war.
Even so, it is not possible to make any exact com-
parison between one navy and another. Our own, it
is superfluous to say, has nothing to fear from any
such comparison. Professional and unprofessional testi-
mony is unanimous that there was never a time when
the Navy, in every branch, knew its business better
than to-day. Officers and men are assiduously exer-
cised, and show a keen devotion to the service without
expectation — and usually without realization — of re-
ward. Nobody can call the Navy a pampered force,

unless the applause and affection of a people is pamper-

214

OFFICERS AND MEN

ing. They take their ships without pilots into waters
where no others would venture themselves ; they
execute manoeuvres which no others dare to risk.
Their seamanship is the admiration and envy of the
world, and their discipline and devotion are proved
— now by such magnificent steadiness as the Victorias
crew displayed in going down, now by the self-sacrifice
of a lieutenant in the attempt to save a comrade — one
way or another almost every day.

Of other navies it is only possible to speak in
generalities. Probably all are our equals in bravery — it
would, at least, be discourteous and unwarrantable to
presume otherwise — almost certainly all are our in-
feriors in seamanship. Nowadays, however, the French
are probably beginning to approach us in the assiduous
training of at least a portion of their numbers. The
Active Mediterranean Squadron is kept in full com-
mission all the year round, providing constant exer-
cise for about 9000 officers and men. The Reserve
Squadron in the same waters takes its full complement
only during the summer manceuvres, but the ships are
in commission all the year, with some 2500 officers and
men. The Channel Squadron furnishes six months'
training for over 3600, while the foreign squadrons keep
some 3000 officers and men all their time aboard ship ;
these, however, are not so perpetually at sea as our own
crews on foreign stations. Altogether, the French may
be said to have some 12,000 men in constant, and nearly
7000 more in intermittent, training. This number, it is
true, compares disadvantageously with our own. Our
Mediterranean Squadron alone furnishes continuous
exercise for over 10,000 officers and men, or, with
recent additions from the Particular Service Squadron,

215

NAVAL POLICY

nearly 13,000. The Channel Squadron numbers some
8000 more. On the coastguard and portguard-ships
we have, at ordinary times, say, 5000 men ; but these
receive comparatively little sea-training. Our distant
squadrons exercise well over 12,000. We may be con-
fident, then, that so far as training goes — and it goes
very far — we are as ready to enter upon war as France.
The number of men whom Russia keeps in constant
training is necessarily limited by her climate. The
greater part of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets is
commissioned each summer; but the ships have to lie up
in the winter by reason of the ice, and this has a bad
effect on the efficiency of the crews. The Russian
seamen are well disciplined, and of good physique ;
and they ask no better than to die for the Little
Father. But intelligence is not their strong point, and
modern war needs a high degree of intelligence among
the superior ratings even of bluejackets. The officers
— at any rate of the Black Sea Fleet — are probably, on
the whole, less accomplished than those of Western
nations ; the engine-room complements also fall below
the highest standard. Probably the ice-bound condition
of the Russian ports in winter will always keep her
officers and men a little worse than the best. Even the
China Squadron, with a complement of over 4000, lies
up in the winter, while the new Mediterranean and
Atlantic Squadrons only exercise some 2000 men at
most.

Germany has nearly all her effective fleet in com-
mission in the summer months. In general the men are
assiduously and admirably drilled, though perhaps too
much on shore. Italy, on the other hand, though she

has a large seafaring population to draw on, keeps but

216

OFFICERS AND MEN

a small squadron in commission. Not more than 3000

or 4000 men are exercised for a year together. There

seems some reason to doubt whether the want of

training might not once again bring disaster to Italy,

as it did thirty years ago at Lissa. As for the United

States, the British bluejacket has a parable that they

have but one effective ship, and that there is a mutiny

aboard that. The statement is true only in so far that

a most rigorous discipline is maintained on a few ships,

and that there is reason to believe that the picked

crews which appear in European ports are more than

fairly representative of the men left behind. Probably

the personal branch is the weak point of the United

States' Navy, though there is no reason to suppose

that it could not, and will not, be worked up to the same

level of efficiency as the best of Western examples.

On this brief and inevitably vague survey we need

be under no apprehension of any want of quality in

our officers and men. But when we come to their

number, there is a very different tale to tell. Our

deficiency in this respect constitutes an even graver

and more immediate danger than our shortness of ships.

We have not enough ships for the necessities of possible

war ; but we have not even men enough to fight the

ships we have. On paper we have a total of 93,750 of

all ranks against France's 70,935, and Russia's 40,000.

But to wage a war in a manner which shall not be

ruinous to us, as an island people depending for our

food on the command of the sea, we need, as has

already been seen, considerably more ships than our

rivals, and, by consequence, many more men. Now

the total number required to take all our present

ships to sea is, according to Lord Charles Beresford,

217

NAVAL POLICY

backed by no less an authority than Mr. Goschen him-
self, 99,232. Of the 93,750 nominally available by
April 1st, 1897, some 7500 must be taken off for
clerks ashore, cadets, boys, and the like, and a further
3000 or so for wastage from sickness and other causes.
The total number ready to go to sea (again on the
high authority of Lord Charles Beresford) will be
82,870, whereas we shall want 99,232. This means
that before a shot had been fired, before a life had
been lost, we should only have, roughly, four men to
do the work of five. This being so, what is the use
of counting our ships, and comparing them with the
resources of others ? One-fifth of the fleet would be
without the men to take it to sea and fight.

It must be allowed that there is a consideration
to put on the other side. A certain number of our
ships are not in a condition to be risked with good men
at sea in war time, and we may subtract, perhaps, 5000
men from the number required on this account. We
have on foreign stations alone a number of slow, ill-
armed sloops and gunboats, locking up perhaps 3000
men, which could not venture out of port in war without
the most imminent risk of destruction by the first
modern enemy that came their way. But we must
remember that these men — some of our most efficient
and seasoned — will not be at home to put on board the
fresh ships we should have to commission for war.
They would be scattered all over the world, and though
many of them would, no doubt, be useful as reserves
abroad, it would be more or less a matter of chance
how soon and to what good purpose they could be
employed.

But if we may subtract a little from our deficiency

218

OFFICERS AND MEN

on this head, there is another fact which cancels all we
gain thus, and leaves us still further behind. There are
projected on the 1896 programme, and to be completed
by April 1st, 1899, forty-six new vessels, requiring
11,200 men. This, added to our existing deficiency,
makes us no less than 27,000 short, or — crediting our-
selves with the crews available from obsolete ships —
over 22,000. In 1899 we shall have 82,870 men to do
the work of 105,432. It may be said — and Mr. Goschen
has said — that large additions can be made before 1899.
That is true, but the additions will not be ready for
their work until 1902 at earliest. The least possible
time in which an able seaman can be turned out is five
years. Knowing this, and knowing that three years on
the average is the longest time that a ship takes to
build, whereas many classes take far less, it seems
incredible that at the same time new ships are laid
down provision should not be made for manning them.
Yet Mr. Goschen in 1896, though bringing forward pro-
posals for new ships, which in three years must have
11,200 men to take them to sea, made an addition
to the numbers of the fleet at sea of no more than 4310.
Which can only mean that — bringing in again the
deduction of 5000 on account of obsolete ships —
he deliberately set himself to make the fleet less
efficient by 1890 men in 1899 than it was in 1896.

In respect of officers, our position is so much worse
that it can only be called desperate. For 1896 our
number of lieutenants and sub-lieutenants is actually
less than that of France — 1221 to 1232. Counting the
new ships to be laid down, we need 1900 at the very
least. To train a lieutenant takes longer than to train

an able seaman, and he is less easily replaced. When

219

NAVAL POLICY

we consider the awful demands that war would make
on naval officers — the physical strain, the wearing sense
of responsibility the necessity in action of keeping
every faculty alert, while at the same time animating
their men to endure an ordeal of courage as fearful as
any man has yet been called on to face — we can hardly
find words strong enough to condemn the neglect that
has left us so terribly unprovided. One man can only
do one man's work, and physical breakdowns, as well as
losses in action, would presently throw us back on the
alternatives of sending ships to sea practically un-
officered or giving up the sea altogether. However,
the mischief has been done, and nobody has been
hanged ; and it is useless to say more about it. We
must do Mr. Goschen's administration the justice of
saying that the problem has been squarely, if tardily,
faced, and that the deficiency is now in a fair way
to be made up. Completely made up it cannot be for
many years. The replacement of the overcrowded
Britannia by a college on shore, and the raising of
the age for cadets so as to attract boys from public
schools, ought to have a further effect in making up
lost ground. But the college will not be completed
till 1900, and in the meantime it is idle to shut our eyes
to our weakness in point of officers.

Neither in officers nor in men are we adequately pre-
pared for war. But preparation for war, in the sense of
being able to send all our ships to sea with their full
complements, and preparation in the sense of having
men to fall back on to make up the wastage of war, are
two very different things. That this wastage would be
enormous may be taken as certain, whether we look to

the probabilities of the future or the experience of the

220

OFFICERS AND MEN

past. Before the Seven Years' War our seamen did
not exceed 12,000.* During the war they ran up, in-
cluding marines, to 70,000. During the Napoleonic
War we had, at one time, no less than 144,000 men
voted for the Navy, as against less than 19,000 in the
preceding peace. Even in the Crimean War, when we
had the help of France, and only Russia to meet at
sea, we were obliged to raise our numbers from 43,000
— the maximum during the previous years of peace —
to 76,000. These figures speak for themselves ; but
there is an important comment to be made upon them.
In the last century it was comparatively easy to make
a naval seaman. A merchant sailor, or even a pressed
landsman, became fully equal to his duties in a few
months. In a war under modern conditions we might
easily find ourselves in want of 150,000 men, many of
them needing years of training before they could be
efficient. Whence should we get them ?

We have, as all the world knows, a Naval Reserve.
It consists for 1897 of 1600 officers and 24,200 men —
a total of 25,800 to fill up deficiencies amounting to
some 16,000 before a man has been lost. This Reserve
— excluding 2000 stokers — is divided into two classes.
The first is drawn mainly from the Mercantile Marine,
the second from the fishermen of our coasts. They are
inured to the sea, hardy, and, as a body, intelligent ; but
for the work of naval battle the Reserve, as at present
organized, is very far indeed from ideal fitness. It
would be vain repetition to enlarge on the complication
of the machinery of modern warships, and the necessity
that men should have had time to acquaint themselves

* These figures are taken from the chapter on "Manning," by Mr.
T. A. Brassey, in the Naval Annual for 1896 (page 210).

221

NAVAL POLICY

with it. Hurriedly embarked in a strange ship on the
outbreak of war, the Reserve-man would take time even
to learn the passages and the internal economy of the
vessel ; he might actually be called upon to bear his part
in an important action without so much as knowing his
way about his ship. Even if he knew the ship he could
not possibly know his comrades, and this is almost as
important a matter as the other. A naval action under
modern conditions, it has already been suggested, will
be a terrific strain even on the coolest and bravest. To
come through it without panic, men will need a more
magnificently perfect discipline than is often found in
the merchant service, and an inbred confidence in both
officers and comrades. So complete a confidence is
impossible to the newly-joined Reserve-man ; and even
if we assume that this recruit will be a prodigy of cool
valour — and even a very brave man is not necessarily
that without the needful experience — he will in most
cases have been most inefficiently trained to the work
of war. Training in batteries ashore is not at all the
same thing as training afloat ; shooting from a rolling
ship, for example, is not an art possessed by the first
comer. A stationary drill-ship is little better. Further,
most of the batteries and hulks used for drilling the
reserves are utterly inadequate to give any training for
modern war. Seventeen batteries out of thirty-six have
not even a breech-loading gun to practise the men at ;
only two have quick-firers, and those not larger than the
6-pounder. The Admiralty have lately made a step in
the right direction by posting the cruisers Medea and
Medusa as drill-ships at Southampton and Shields.
But even these cruisers, though comparatively modern,
are not modern enough, since their 6-in. guns are old-

222

OFFICERS AND MEN

pattern breech-loaders, and not quick-firers. A few
of the men serve through the naval manoeuvres — in
1895 575 were embarked — but the time occupied in
this training is so short that the reserves are disbanded
as soon as they are beginning to learn.

The further disadvantage attaches to our present
Reserve that many of the first-class men would be
scattered all over the world in the merchantmen on
which they serve, and would not be able to join
their ships for weeks, or even months. It is said,
indeed, that three -fourths of them are employed at
home or in home waters. But even this computation
would draw at least 2000 men from a force already so
slender that it cannot afford to lose one. Moreover,
the Navy exists not to drain the merchant service of
its best men on the outbreak of war, but to enable
them, so far at least as steamers go, to pursue their
necessary vocation in war as in peace.

Two other points in connexion with the Reserve
make the case even worse. The nominal strength of
its executive officers is 1 300, and it has been seen that,
for many years to come, it is almost impossible that we
could fight a serious war without drawing upon it
to supplement the jejune list of our lieutenants. What
sort of material is it likely to supply ? Of the whole
1 300 — on the showing of the First Lord's own
memorandum for 1896 — only 158 have been, or are
being, trained for twelve months on warships. The
rest have received virtually no training at all. They
may be, and mostly are, excellent navigating officers,
and brave, intelligent men. But the complication of
modern warships demands more than skill in naviga-
tion, bravery, and intelligence ; and how is it possible

221

NAVAL POLICY

that these untrained officers should be equal to the
demands that war would make upon them ?

The other point concerns the engineers. The total
number of engineers in the Reserve is, on paper, 200.
They have not served in the Navy at all, so that in the
event of war they would be new, not only to their
engines, but to the whole organization of the Service.
But this is not all. The deficiency of engineers in the
fleet is 237. Supposing, therefore, that all the 200 of
the Reserve were available, we should still be 37 short
of the engineers required to drive our ships. This
deficiency, therefore, could not possibly be made up,
and Mr. Goschen's statement that we could man every
ship by taking 11,000 men from the Reserve, turns
out fallacious and misleading. We might take 11,000,
but what is the use of taking an able seaman when an
engineer is what is wanted ? The Reserve, then, is not
only no true Reserve, since it is wanted to complete
our crews in the first instance, but it is not even
sufficient for this.

Very different, both as to quality and quantity, are

the Reserves of other naval Powers. France has a

form of conscription called the Inscription Maritime, to

which the whole seafaring population is liable. The

inscripts are entered at the age of eighteen, and at

twenty are sent to a naval port. They are bound for

a service of seven years, of which five years are

supposed to be spent in the fleet, and two in reserve.

In practice, the term of service with the fleet has been

fixed at only forty months. While in reserve these

men may be called out for the manoeuvres, but large

numbers are not often summoned. The inscripts

remain liable to be called out by a Presidential decree

224

OFFICERS AND MEN

at any time between the end of their seven years and
the day they reach the age of fifty-five. In return for
this they have a monopoly of the seaman's and fisher-
man's trades, and receive a pension after a certain
length of sea-service, whether in the Navy or on board
a merchantman. Their orphans are provided for by
the State. It may be that the inscript, serving at sea
only from the age of twenty to twenty-three and a-half,
is less efficient than the British bluejacket, who is bred
to the Navy from boyhood, and serves aboard ship for
twelve years. On the other hand, there can be no doubt
that he is immensely superior to our own Reserve-man,
who may never have helped handle a modern gun in his
life. Moreover, the Inscription Maritime furnishes no
less than 135,000 men liable to service. Even if it be
conceded that only 40,000 men* would be effective and
available for war — surely a very modest estimate —
France still has a great advantage over us, both in
numbers and training. The proportional advantage is
even greater than the actual, for France needs fewer
men to fight all her ships than we do ; moreover war
would find all her ships fully manned to begin with.
The French Reserve is a real one, to replace the waste
of war ; ours is a sham. All other continental nations
obtain the material of their sailors by conscription, and
pass the men through the Navy before they are
relegated to the Reserve. The period of active service
is usually three years ; in Italy and Austria it is four.
Russia and Italy both have reserves of 100,000 men.
The value of the Italian Reserve, however, is dis-
counted by the fact that the whole numbers have not

* This is the minimum figure quoted by M. Weyl in Brassey's Naval
Annual, 1S96.

Q 225

NAVAL POLICY

received naval training. All men of twenty, who
have served at least eighteen months at sea, are avail-
able. The conscripts thus usually exceed the number
required for the small fleet kept in commission,
and the balance are passed into the Reserve without
training.

To come back to our own position, it is briefly this.
Our present force of both officers and men is inadequate
to supply even the ships we have at present ; when the
fleet is increased in accordance with the 1896 pro-
gramme it will be still more inadequate. It is im-
possible that the deficiency can be made up with
fully-trained officers and men until 1902 at the earliest.
In the meantime we can fill up the complements, so
far as seamen are concerned, by drafts from the Reserve.
But the officers we can draw from the Reserve are
almost completely untrained, while even by wholly
depleting the Reserve of engineers we shall still fall
short of our requirements. In fine, we cannot in any
case send the whole of our fleet to sea, and can only
send a large part of it on condition that we half
empty the Reserve before hostilities begin, leaving
ourselves next to nothing to fall back on. How is this
deplorable state of things to be remedied ? Five
possibilities suggest themselves, which may be briefly
considered in order : first, the maintenance of the fleet
continually on a war-footing, by keeping up enough
officers and men to take the whole fleet to sea ; second,
the establishment of a Reserve on the continental
system by passing men through a short service in the
Navy ; third, the increase and better organization of
the existing Reserve ; fourth, the adaptation of the

Marines to modern conditions ; fifth, the re-institution

226

OFFICERS AND MEN

of the disbanded Naval Volunteers, so as to form a
Volunteer Reserve.

Unquestionably the first plan supplies the most
direct and the simplest solution of the difficulty. We
want now, according to Lord Charles Beresford's cal-
culations, 99,232 men for the fighting-ships built or
projected before 1896, and shall want 110,432 in 1899.
If we deduct 5000, as has been suggested, for ships
which in three years' time will be too old to be safely
sent to sea, we shall want, in round numbers, 105,500
effectives. The present force available for sea is 81,500,
which, with 4310 men to be added by April 1st, 1897,
makes 85,810. Therefore we have to add 19,690 men
to complete the crews of the ships we shall have in
1899. Even this leaves no margin for men non-
effective through sickness or other causes. It is plain
that the 19,690 should be added at the earliest possible
moment, since in any case they cannot be fully trained
for war until at least two years after the ships are
ready. On this plan we ought to add at least 15,000
men by the end of next financial year on March 31st,
1898. More ships will be required, as has been shown,
and for them yet more men.

There are, no doubt, grave objections to this plan,
as to any other that may be suggested. In the first
place there is no end to its operation. Ships grow
obsolete very fast nowadays, but yet we build new
ones faster than the old ones become ineffective. Or
perhaps a more correct way of putting it is that it is
continually necessary to add ships with every latest
improvement to our first fighting line, while still re-
taining the older ones as effective — not to meet the

new ships of an enemy, but as a second or third line

227

NAVAL POLICY

against the time when the newer ships shall have
mutually disabled each other. We should thus con-
tinually be wanting more arid more officers and men
for the active service. This would be exceedingly
expensive in two ways. First, we should have to lay
out very large sums in pay, pensions, rations, and the
like; Mr. Brassey puts the expense at ^"ioo per head
per annum. Secondly, it is of no use adding men to
the fleet if they are to be left idle ashore ; we might
almost as well depend on raw levies at once. To keep
our full force in constant exercise at sea will mean,
virtually, keeping our whole fleet constantly in full
commission. Without doubt this would be an enor-
mous tax on the country. On the other hand, it would
give the country a service probably unmatched for
readiness and efficiency in the whole history of the
world.

The second expedient would be less expensive. Two
classes of bluejackets and stokers would be formed —
long-service men, who would serve twelve years, as at
present ; and short-service men, who would spend from
three to five years with the fleet, as might be deemed
desirable. They would then pass into the Reserve,
being liable to be called out for the annual manoeuvres
for, say, five years more. After this they would be
placed in a second-class Reserve for, say, fifteen years,
and only be called out in the event of war. This is,
of course, only one possible outline scheme out of
many. Lord Charles Beresford has proposed to supple-
ment some such plan as this by a temporary second-
class Reserve, who would be trained during two months
of the year. He would stop adding to the second-class

Reserve after seven years, by which time there would

228

OFFICERS AND MEN

be 35,000 second-class men, with 15,000 first-class men
who had passed through the fleet, and 20,000 more in
course of serving their five years. In eleven years
there would be 35,000 of each class available. The
total cost during these years he reckons at £3,740,000,
while the completed Reserve could be maintained for
£1,440,000 a year. As this is not so much as we
annually pay for the less necessary Army Reserve,
there should be no grumbling at this on the score
of expense.

A short-service scheme on these or similar lines
would have one great merit. It would form a valuable
recruiting ground for the merchant service, which is
gradually coming to employ fewer and fewer men of
British nationality. On the figures quoted by Sir
Charles Dilke in the debate on the 1896 estimates, the
British Mercantile Marine contains 63,000 able seamen.
Of these, 9000 are fishermen or yachtsmen, classed as
A.B. ; 7000 are Lascars, and 1 3,000 are foreigners.
This leaves only 34,000 men of British nationality in
our merchant service proper — not quite 54 per cent.
Without doubt this is a very grave state of things,
seeing that it is on these crews that we depend, not
only for a large part of our present revenue, but for our
food supplies in war time. Many of the foreigners
might be removed by conscription if they belonged to a
nationality engaged in any war we might undertake.
Even if they were not it would be a very easy matter,
with the British part of the crew withdrawn, to transfer
the vessel and its trade to a neutral flag. The pro-
portion of foreigners threatens our shipping interest
with an even completer collapse in war time than

it would otherwise suffer. The evil is growing worse ;

229

NAVAL POLICY

why, it is not here pertinent to inquire, but probably
neither the British shipowner nor the Plimsoll Acts
can be held altogether guiltless. In any case the
plan of forming a reserve by short-service would tend
to remedy just the evil which is now rapidly reducing
our present Reserve to inefficiency. It would, no doubt,
be necessary to hold out inducements to merchant ship-
owners to employ Reserve-men. But some sort of con-
nexion on the lines of the fatherly care shown by
France for the Inscripts Maritimes — not of necessity
quite so fatherly — would be far from an unmixed
evil.

The objection to this method of manning the fleet is
partly its expense, and partly its inconvenience. It
would be highly inconvenient, it is said, to have the
long-service men and the short-service men serving on
the same ship. Vessels of our navy are usually com-
missioned for four years. It would, therefore, be neces-
sary to send the five-year man, who would presumably
have served at least his first six months in a training-
ship, on a four-years' commission by the end of his first
year. Otherwise his time would expire in the middle
of a commission, which would involve trouble and
expense in relieving him, and would be perpetually
breaking up ships' crews. It is also thought by some
that this would lead to the shortening of the long-
service term, which would certainly be a great misfor-
tune. Mr. Brassey also urges that the men would take
very unkindly to the merchant service after the Navy.
But, perhaps, this objection cuts both ways, and might
work for the amelioration of the merchant service.
As regards the former objections they do not seem

insuperable. They would in any case be met by

230

OFFICERS AND MEN

shorter commissions — say, for two years, which would
give each short-service man two commissions in his
five years.

The re-constitution of the existing Reserve presents
in itself no insuperable difficulties. The first step would
doubtless be the abolition of the present distinction
between first and second-class Reserve. The latter
consists of fishermen, all of whom should be available
for immediate service. From the nature of their daily
avocations they should be especially fitted for torpedo-
boat operations, and boat work generally. It must be
owned, however, that the contemplation of the ordinary
fisherman does not instil the fullest confidence in his
quickness and activity. Boat work, too, for which his
calling seems especially to point him out, involves some
of the most highly-specialized operations of war — as the
laying and exploding of mines — to which he would go
quite untrained. On the other hand, his local know-
ledge would make him the very man for torpedo coast-
defence in his own part. He would at all events
be a very fairly useful recruit, if he had first served,
say, a year in the fleet, which should be the qualifica-
tion for the first-class Reserve. It is probable that by
throwing open the first-class Reserve, with an annual
pay of, say, £8 to £10 a year, to men who had served a
year, we could get a great many more fishermen than
we have at present — perhaps a total of 30,000 in all.
At the same time all batteries and drill-ships would
doubtless be modernized and used for the training
of the second-class reserve, who should also be
embarked for the manoeuvres.

This scheme would undoubtedly be the most

economical. But with a service on which the exist-

231

NAVAL POLICY

ence of a nation depends, economy, though never
to be forgotten, should be the last advantage to be
remembered. The objection to this scheme is the
objection that applies to the Reserve at present —
that it would not produce efficient men. It is not
easy to see how the Reserves could always be got
on board ship for their twelve months' training; yet
without it they would be all but useless. It would be
as difficult to get fishermen to join for the manoeuvres,
which usually come on simultaneously with the herring
fishery, on which they largely depend for their year's
living. And even when the first-class Reserve- man
had served his year, and the second-class man had
had his drill and his manoeuvres, they would even
so not be equal to the more specialized duties of the
seaman. It is answered, plausibly enough, that they
do not need to be. There are many functions in war
which need no great technical skill, and it is urged
that if three-quarters of a ship's crew were highly-
trained bluejackets, the other quarter might be half-
trained Reserves. That may be. But in practice it
would be quite impossible to distribute the Reserves
in this proportion on the outbreak of war. Would
its advocates propose to ship off quarter-crews of
Reserves to China on the outbreak of war, and bring
back the same number of bluejackets for the ships
to be newly commissioned? Even nearer home, the
Channel Squadron would probably have to go off in
hot haste to the Mediterranean. As a matter of
practice it would be found . that the new men must
be confined to the newly- commissioned ships. The
proportion of untrained or half-trained, instead of
being a quarter, would then probably be over half,

232

OFFICERS AND MEN

and the ships would be quite unfit for immediate
action of a serious kind. Even on ships where the
scheme could be realized, every fourth man would be
an unknown quantity. At the risk of tediousness,
it may be repeated that such a half-trained Reserve
as is contemplated by this plan ought to be a real
Reserve — to fill up gaps, and not to constitute the
first fighting line.

As for the Marines, they doubtless occupy an
anomalous position at present. Boarding is obsolete,
and rifle-fire will no more play any part in deciding
the issue of a naval action. The Marines have, indeed,
their own guns which they work on board ship, and
they work them very well. But it is plain that even
so splendid a force, as the Marines undoubtedly are,
is handicapped for sea service by the fact that it
alternates between sea and land. And after all it
is impossible to count on the Marines to fill up the
vacancies in the fleet, for the very sufficient reason
that they are counted already. The 15,861 are. all
included in our deficient total. To re-organize and
increase the force is doubtless a measure much to be
welcomed, but it is not in itself sufficient to complete
our crews for all the ships available.

The Naval Volunteers were instituted during Mr.
Goschen's former tenure of office at the Admiralty,
and disbanded some five years ago. If re-constituted,
they could be drawn from yachts' crews as well as
from landsmen. They would offer the great advan-
tage that their training, if less continuous than that
of Reserve - men who put in a year on board ship,
would be more constant. The Volunteers would not
give all their time for any long period, but they

233

NAVAL POLICY

would give part of their time every week, and thus
would not be likely to grow rusty. Admiral Sir
George Elliot has made the fruitful suggestion that
mechanics from shipbuilding and engineering firms
would constitute a very valuable section of such a
body. The whole force would probably be found
very useful for river and harbour defence. The per-
manent staff would consist of retired naval officers,
though probably the supply of efficient junior officers
would present the same difficulties as it does with
the Rifle Volunteers. Such a corps, again, having no
sea-service to speak of, could in no case be considered
as a substitute for professional seamen, though it might
prove in war time a valuable support for them.

It is plain there is no scheme which is not open to
objection. But then there is no scheme for anything
on earth that is not open to objection, and that should
be no bar to the adoption of one or another. Certainly
something must be done, if our expensive Navy is not
to prove a worthless and delusive sham. It is also
plain that all, or any, of the schemes stated above,
could be used in combination ; none is exclusive of
the other. From remarks of Mr. Goschen in the
House of Commons, it appears likely that he intends
to combine the first, third, and fifth expedients ; and
probably this will be as good a solution as any other.
The first is, of course, the best. However expensive,
it is essential to the efficiency of the Navy as a fighting
force that we should have trained seamen, knowing
their work and knowing their officers and each other,
to man all our ships in the first instance. It is, no
doubt, expensive to keep ships in commission to train
all the men we have ; but that again has its advantages.

234

OFFICERS AND MEN

Ships that have long lain up in reserve have a way
of developing unexpected defects, which would cause
great, and perhaps disastrous delay, if they were
hurriedly commissioned, in the event of war. If they
are kept in commission, their crews get to know not
only each other, but the ways of their ships ; and the
Admiralty knows exactly for what qualities it can
depend upon each vessel.

It would, however, be putting too great a strain on
the purse even of the richest nation in the world, to
keep more active-service men than will suffice for the
first fighting line. For the second, the Admiralty
appears to have rejected the short - service scheme,
which is probably the only one which can give a really
efficient Reserve. Supposing, however, that Mr. Goschen
adds to the long -service men enough to man all the
effective ships, there is no more to be said about short-
service ; if the bluejackets fill up all the available
ships, what room would be left to train the short-
service Reserve ? In that case, no doubt, the best
course will be to develop the Reserve of fishermen,
whose especial fitness for coast-defence by torpedo-
craft, in the waters they have known from infancy,
might be profitably made the most of.

Only a considerable addition to the mere numbers
of the Reserve does not necessarily mean any increase
of real power. In judging Mr. Goschen's proposals,
when he brings them forward, it must be remembered
that a man is next to useless, even to fill up blanks,
unless he has served a year — or, at the very inside, six
months — with the fleet, and is drilled every year and
embarked for the manoeuvres. For such men the
country ought to be ready to pay a tangible retainer ;

^35

NAVAL POLICY

but it is simply waste of money to pay the smallest
sum to an uneffective man.

It is not at all impossible that the Naval Volunteers
will be revived ; and they should, if too much is not
expected from them, prove a cheap force — useful in
time of peace as a link between the service and
civilians, and far from unhandy in time of war. But
it must always be remembered that the regular active-
service sailor is the backbone of our defence ; and no
fancy scheme of Reserve can fill the place of a very
substantial addition to the number of men voted for
the sea service. If Mr. Goschen will supply crews to
man the fighting -ships, then the country can afford
to regard any proposals he may make as to the Reserve
with prejudice in their favour. If he does not — unless
he adds, say, 15,000 men, or 10,000 at the very least —
then it will be the duty of the country to take the
business into its own hands, and put its Navy in order
for itself, as it has so often done before. After all,
it is the Queen's and the taxpayers' Navy, not the
Admiralty officials'.

236

VIII

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

It will be apparent from what has already been said
that the first and most potent defence of the distant
portions of our empire is the fighting-fleet in European
waters. So long as we pin down the battle-fleets of
our enemies to their own coast-line they are not likely
to find opportunity for any attack in force upon the
colonies. None of these, except India and Canada, is
exposed to land attack from a first-class Power. It
follows that if we are superior in the enemy's home
waters, we shall be able to prevent him from doing any
great harm over-sea. To despatch a powerful expedi-
tion against, let us say, Australia, would be quite
impossible. It would be, to begin with, almost im-
possible for any nation except ourselves to find
steamers enough to transport a large army, such as
would be needed, over several thousand miles of ocean.
A crowded troopship is almost in worse condition to
defend herself than a merchantman, and an attack by
even small cruisers or torpedo-craft would very easily
become a massacre. It may quite safely be said that
no Power would expose valuable troops to such over-
whelming chances against them, so long as we had a
superior fleet posted on their coasts and fast cruisers on
the high seas.

237

NAVAL POLICY

While we are able to do this — which, let it be always
remembered, at present we are not — our insular or
peninsular colonies need have no fear of subjugation.
If we were not strong enough to intercept and destroy
the transports of an invader, we should not be strong
enough to keep him out of our own islands, and he
would certainly rather strike at the heart than the
extremities. Yet while most of our colonies have no
need to anticipate the gravest danger, they could hardly
hope not to receive occasional reminders that they were
living in a state of war. We ought to be able to
destroy transports and defeat any convoying fleet that
might hamper itself with them, but it is tolerably
obvious that no superiority in the world could
guarantee our whole empire against raids by hostile
cruisers. A fast cruiser could break the closest
blockade possible in the days of torpedo-boats, and
though she would stand to meet and be engaged by
a cruiser or cruisers of our own, she would also stand
to elude them. She might then shell or lay under
contribution unprotected coast towns, destroy shipping
lying in them, or making for and from them, besides
landing small forces to do serious, if not vital, damage.

A further danger for the colonies in a naval war is
constituted by the presence of military establishments
of our possible enemies at a short distance from their
shores. Invasion in force from Europe we could
prevent, but there would still remain the troops main-
tained by hostile Powers abroad. Thus Australia,
British Columbia, Hong Kong, and the Straits are all
threatened in greater or less degree by the existence of
powerful bodies of Russian troops at Vladivostock.
When the Siberian Railway is completed the menace

238

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

will be emphasized tenfold, since then Vladivostock will
connect with its European base by land, and not, as at
present, by sea. Australia is similarly threatened by
France from New Caledonia and, just possibly, from
Madagascar ;* Mauritius and South Africa similarly,
but more nearly, from Madagascar ; the West Indies
from Martinique. Such attacks would be effective only
according to the strength of the permanent garrisons
maintained in the respective foreign stations, since a
superior fleet should prevent any considerable reinforce-
ment finding its way thither in war time. Nevertheless
they might be very awkward if the enemy seized im-
portant points on trade-lines, like Port Darwin at the
northern extremity of Australia, or Singapore, or
Esquimault, which commands the western terminus of
the Canadian Pacific Railway. A force strong enough
to hold Esquimault also commands the coal-fields of
Vancouver Island, while those of Westport, in New
Zealand, and of Tasmania would be similarly liable to
seizure. Even a small hostile force might seriously
annoy our colonies in ways like these.

How, then, are such perils to be forestalled ? Firstly,
and principally, by the command of the sea. As the
general command of the sea, if we are disposed to
make an effort to secure it, will protect both our own
islands and our colonies from invasion in force, so the
local command of the sea will prevent invasion by any
garrison which an enemy may maintain nearer at hand.
If our squadron in the neighbourhood of any colony is

* France has, at present, no force in Madagascar available for purposes
of offence — much less, indeed, than she needs to hold the natives. But
when the present troubles are past, it is hardly doubtful that she means to
establish herself there in such a way as to threaten at least our trade in the
event of war.

239

NAVAL POLICY

decisively stronger than that of the enemy, then that
colony has little to fear from the enemy's garrison.
The British Squadron must, of course, act towards the
ports of these garrisons as the main British Fleet
would act towards an enemy's naval ports at home.
British Columbia and Australia would be defended off
Vladivostock, Australia off New Caledonia, the Cape
Colony off Diego Suarez, and so on. The enemy must
be beaten at sea if he offers himself, and blockaded, or
kept under close observation, if he does not. With a
superior squadron in the same waters, he will not be
likely to risk his garrisons in attacks which may fail to
reach their objective, and must in any case be sooner
or later isolated. The Governor of New Caledonia, for
instance, would be mad to throw any troops at his
disposal into Australian territory, so long as the British
Squadron was supreme in Australian waters. The only
possible result would be that the invading French
would find their transports destroyed or driven into
port, and themselves, however valiant and well trained,
overwhelmed in time by the Australians. New Cale-
donia, meanwhile, denuded of its garrison, would fall an
easy prey to the British Squadron, and French military
power in Australian waters would be annihilated. Thus
a superior squadron would not merely furnish the means
to defeat any such assault as this, but would almost
inevitably forbid the very project of it.

Now to what extent are our foreign squadrons in a
position to play this part ? Equality, it must be
premised, is not sufficient : what is wanted for the
protection of colonies, as well as of trade, is such a
superiority as will drive the enemy off to sea. We

may take, first, the China Squadron — the most powerful

240

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

of those we maintain on distant stations ; to this force
it would fall to operate against Vladivostock. It
consists of the battleship Centurion, one cruiser of the
Edgar type, three so-called armoured cruisers of the
Aurora type (one without large quick-firers), four
second-class cruisers of the Apollo type, and two third-
class. There is also a despatch-vessel, of little value
for hard fighting, eleven obsolete sloops and gunboats,
and the Wivern, an obsolete ironclad, as guardship at
Hong Kong. To meet these, Russia has one elderly
battleship (the Nicolai I.), four armoured cruisers, in-
cluding the formidable Rurik, two armoured and seven
unarmoured gunboats, a second-class cruiser, and
twelve torpedo - boats. In numbers, omitting the
torpedo-boats, we have twenty-four to fifteen, which
is very nearly the orthodox five to three. But then
we ought not to omit the torpedo-boats — the less so as
four of them are very fine, new, sea-going boats, two of
22, and two of 26J knots speed. In an action these four
sea-going boats might be present, and decide the issue
against us ; in any case, the twelve would prevent us
from blockading Vladivostock. Moreover, if we sub-
tract obsolete vessels, the despatch-boat and the
Wivem, which could hardly leave Hong Kong, we
have only eleven sea-going battle-worthy vessels to
eight. We dispose, it is true, of a considerable
superiority in artillery, our squadron mounting thirty-
eight 6-in., and thirty-four 47-in. quick-firers, to the
Russians twenty 6-in., and sixteen 47-in. pieces. On
the other hand, five of the Russians are armoured, and
only four of ours. Nevertheless we may fairly say
that, considering the present force of the China
Squadron, the Governor of Vladivostock would not
r 241

NAVAL POLICY

care, even if he had the troopships, to send very many
of the vast force he is rumoured to command on a
long sea-voyage. Even if we add the French China
Squadron — an old ironclad, a powerful modern cruiser,
an older cruiser, and gunboats — we might just hold our
own in an action. Unless we were beaten it would be
madness on the part of the Allies to attempt any
operation in force against Australia, British Columbia,
or even Hong Kong. It is now announced that the
Admiralty mean to send a couple of destroyers to
strengthen the squadron.* This is a most admirable
decision, in view of the torpedo flotillas of Vladivostock
and Saigon ; when we are stronger in this type of vessel,
it is to be hoped that the two may become half-a-dozen.

Supposing, then, that we keep the vessels of the
China Squadron up to date, we are fairly well pre-
pared in far Eastern waters, though certainly not in
a position to blockade Vladivostock from the base of
Hong Kong, over 1600 miles away. On the other
hand, we have the Australian and Pacific Squadrons,
which could possibly, in case of real need, afford
the China station some reinforcement. The Australian
colonists have had the good sense and patriotism to
provide themselves with a small squadron of five
cruisers of the Pearl type, and two torpedo-gunboats.
It is quite conceivable that these — though, by the
original understanding with our Government, limited
to Australian waters — might best be in position to
protect Australian trade, and even Australian terri-
tory, off Vladivostock ; they almost certainly would
off New Caledonia. In addition to these, the
Australian Squadron comprises the Orlando (of the

* Also the first-class Aurora to relieve the third-class Porpoise.

242

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

Aurora class, but without large quick-firers), three
effete third-class cruisers, and three next to useless
gunboats. The Pacific Squadron, which might in
some eventualities act with either of these, has the
Imperieuse for its flagship, two obsolete cruisers, and
three obsolete gunboats. The French Pacific Squadron,
which has to serve for Australia as well, numbers only-
two elderly cruisers and a gunboat, so that their weak-
ness is greater than ours. As things stand at present,
France and Russia combined would make little head
against us east of the Indian Ocean.

It must be owned, however, that this is rather
because they are weak than because we are strong.
On the China station we have, indeed, a number of
modern ships. Yet even here nearly half the fleet
is obsolete, whilst the Australian and Pacific Squadrons
are admirable examples of the kind of vessel which
has up to now been thought good enough to carry
our flag on distant seas. Between them all they have
seventeen such craft as the DapJine, which carries eight
5 -in. breech-loaders, with machine guns, and 120 men,
and is supposed to steam 14I knots at top speed ; the
Goldfinch, which has six 4-in. breech-loaders, 100 men,
and 1 3 knots extreme speed ; the Partridge, with a
similar armament and speed, but only 73 men ; the
Linnet, with two 7-in. muzzle-loaders and four
6-pounder Hotchkisses, 82 men, and uf knots speed;
and the Esk, with three 6 - 3-in. muzzle-loaders, 46 men,
and a possible 9! knots an hour. Now these ships are
not only useless in themselves, but they are a grave
source of weakness to the fleet by reason of the men
they lock up. None of them have large quick-firers,
and some of them not even breech-loaders. It is fairly

243

NAVAL POLICY

plain that they could not fight even a small cruiser or
gunboat armed with modern artillery, and it is equally
plain that, with a speed of 14}- knots for the swiftest
and 9! for the slowest, they would be incapable of
running away. Even if they could run away it would
be little use enough. British cruisers, to be valuable,
must have power to fight, and speed to overhaul the
enemy; if there is only speed to get out of his way,
while the power to fight is wanting, the vessel is as
valueless as if she had neither the one nor the other.
The sloops and gunboats under consideration have
neither the one nor the other, and it would be the
height of temerity to let them go to sea in war time.
They could hardly catch the slowest tramp steamer,
while they would themselves be in imminent danger
of capture or destruction. The loss of the ships we
could bear with some equanimity ; but the seventeen
craft in question carry between them some 1600 men,
and it must be remembered that the sailors who are
sent on distant service are the most seasoned in the
fleet. What, therefore, would happen to these squadrons
on the outbreak of war ? The ships must scuttle back
to port in all haste, and lie up for the whole of the war.
Meanwhile the crews must rust ashore, and, while we
have the greatest difficulty to man even a part of our
ships at home, 1600 of our best men are useless in
Hong Kong, Esquimault and Sydney. Why should
we go out of our way to thus waste our strength?

This method of constituting squadrons has, no doubt,
something to say for itself; every abuse has something
to say for itself. The reasons for its persistence are
briefly these. We must have a certain force in peace-
time for the police of the seas, which duty we have

244

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

undertaken for the benefit of the whole world. If a
small, slow, ill-armed vessel is strong enough and fast
enough to destroy a pirate junk, or rescue a missionary
in the South Seas, it would be waste of power and
of men to use a large, fast, well-armed cruiser for the
same purpose. Another advantage of the system is that
the sloops and gunboats furnish independent commands
for officers under the rank of captain : the sooner
commanders and lieutenants are put on their own
responsibility, the better for the service. Thirdly, there
are duties, as in the rivers of China, for which large
cruisers, drawing sixteen feet of water or more, are
physically incapable.

Of these arguments none ought to be held valid but
the last. The others rest on the thoroughly vicious
theory that it is possible to have a peace fleet in time of
peace, and change it for a war fleet in time of war. It
is impossible to change a peace squadron ten thousand
miles from home into a war squadron in less than many
weeks, and in the meantime there might easily be no
peace squadron left to change. We must seek in other
ways the advantages gained by squadrons of these
unwarlike warships. For the police of the seas a
smaller number of new ships would probably be as
efficient as a greater number of old. To prevent waste
of force the number of ships could be reduced in pro-
portion as their size was increased ; there would thus
be much the same number of men employed on each
station. To display the flag abroad we might supple-
ment the reduced squadrons by sending a fleet of fine
cruisers from time to time on long voyages about the
world; this would also furnish an opportunity of training
Reserve- men on the high seas. As for the junior

245

NAVAL POLICY

officers, they will henceforth have excellent opportu-
nities of developing initiative and responsibility in
command of torpedo-craft. Certainly no commander
or lieutenant would pay very highly for the chance
of finding himself a prisoner, whether in an enemy's
port or his own, in the first week of war.

There still remains the fact that light-draught vessels
are needed for river work. But, in many cases, a
destroyer would be at least as serviceable as a gun-
boat with muzzle-loaders for her principal arm. Our
torpedo-gunboats again are fairly fast, carry quick-fire
guns, and in no case draw ten feet of water. Where
these are not powerful enough, we should have specially-
built ships, like the new Alert and her fellows, for service
in shallow water ; they are painfully slow, it is true, but
with six new 4-in. quick-firers and Hotchkisses, they
could at least make a fight for their lives.

If these suggestions should be found impracticable, it
would at least be possible to keep modern cruisers in
reserve at Hong Kong, Esquimault, and other head-
quarters of foreign stations. On the outbreak of war
the crews of obsolete vessels should be immediately
transferred to these. An Apollo would take the crews
of three sloops or gunboats ; an Eclipse of some five.
We have always plenty of new cruisers lying idle in our
dockyards, and they would be as well posted to open a
war at Hong Kong as at Chatham. In this connexion
it may be remarked that the Admiralty has of late
years introduced the admirable practice of conveying
new crews to distant stations in modern fast cruisers,
which then bring home the relieved ones. Thus the
men are habituated to the new ships and guns, while

any sudden war would find relieving and relieved crews

246

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

ready to defend themselves. Would it not be possible

to lay up these ships — each of which takes the crew of

several smaller vessels — at the headquarters of the

station to which they were sent, until the crews which

brought them out were ready to return home again ?

They could have small skeleton crews on board, while it

would be possible from time to time to freshen up the

men's knowledge of the ship and the machines they

would have to man in time of war. Whether this

be possible or not, it is sufficiently plain that the

organization of our foreign squadrons ought, in some

way, to be more adapted to the exigencies of war.

Turning westwards to the Indian Ocean, we find a

second-class cruiser of the Astrea class as flagship, with

three small fairly-modern and fairly-fast cruisers, which,

however, carry no large quick-firers. There are also

three gunboats — mainly for the police of the Persian

Gulf — and two torpedo - gunboats belonging to the

Indian Government. It is not an ideal squadron, but

it is far more powerful than the two old cruisers and

four sloops which represent the French naval force off

Madagascar. On the African station — whose sphere of

influence extends, roughly, from the Gambia River to

the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb — we have the St. George

{Edgar type) as flagship, the Fox, of the Astrea type,

four fast and handy third-class cruisers armed with the

47-in. quick-firer, and half-a-dozen gunboats for river

service. For North and South America (which are

separate commands) we have also fairly-efficient

squadrons, consisting of one first-class and three or

four second-class cruisers, with more or less obsolete

third-class cruisers and gunboats. These would, it is

true, be quite insufficient for war with the United

247

NAVAL POLICY

States. It is, indeed, a real danger to keep slow and
ill-armed vessels on this station, which at the first
alarm of war must either take refuge at Halifax or
Bermuda, or else be run down and overwhelmed by
the fast Yankee cruisers. As against any other Power,
however, the present force is amply sufficient. No
Power is very likely to attack Canada from the sea,
while in the West Indies the French naval force is
so small — only two cruisers and a sloop, without a
heavy quick-firer between them — that the garrison of
Martinique should prove very little of an annoyance
to its British neighbours.

We may, therefore, make fairly sure that, with the
present distribution of strength on foreign stations, the
colonies are safe. No serious violation of their terri-
tory would be attempted in face of the everywhere
superior forces of this empire. But we must remember
that these considerations apply only to the peace-
footing of foreign establishments. At the first moment
of war fast cruisers would begin to slip out of hostile
ports, to prey on our commerce and the outlying
portions of our empire. No blockade could be
stringent enough to keep them in. They might in
ti m e — again, if we had a sufficiency of powerful
cruisers, which at present we have not — be hunted
down one by one, and cleared off the sea ; but, at
the very best, this would be the work of months.
Meanwhile detached cruisers might concentrate at
such points abroad as to establish a local superiority
and threaten the colonies with attack. But to meet
this we also could, in almost any case, concentrate our
cruisers in time to checkmate any elaborate scheme of

invasion, and should be only too glad to find the

248

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

enemy's cruisers collected where they could be
attacked. On the other hand, it is not probable that
any vigilance could prevent raids by stray cruisers on
the coasts of the colonies, or on the coaling stations.
A small and weak station might even be overpowered
and destroyed, while considerable damage to property
might always be the result. How are we to guard
against this?

In the opinion of those best qualified to judge, the
defence should be two-fold. In the first place, shore
batteries of quick-firing guns should protect all im-
portant centres, and especially all ports in which any
quantity of merchant shipping might be found. Such
batteries, well protected and well served from a steady
gun-platform, should render impossible a bombard-
ment by any cruiser, which must, in the daytime, be
thoroughly exposed, and the accuracy of whose fire
must be affected by any sea that may be running. To
prevent a hostile cruiser from hanging about the port
out of range to make prize of merchantmen coming
in, or from attempting any kind of night attack,
defences on shore ought to be supplemented by
torpedo-craft. Even a couple of torpedo-boats would
probably be enough to drive off any isolated cruiser.

Now, how far are the principal mercantile centres of
our empire prepared to meet such an attack ? Begin-
ning again with Australia, we find that the same
intelligent patriotism which maintains a fleet of five
third - class cruisers, and two torpedo - gunboats, has
partially solved the further problem of local defence.
Besides these vessels (which were built, armed, and
equipped by the Imperial Government, and are kept up

by the Colonies) Victoria possesses, as a local marine,

249

NAVAL POLICY

the old turret -ship Cerberus, two gunboats, Victoria
and Albert, each carrying a 10-in. breech-loader, and
four torpedo-boats. These are probably sufficient for
the mobile defence of Melbourne ; though the Cerberus
might profitably be re -armed with breech-loaders, as
the Abyssinia and Magdala have been at Bombay.
As to shore defence, the harbour of Melbourne is at
the best very difficult of attack. It is defended by
heavy batteries and submarine mines. Any raiding
vessel would have to run the gauntlet of these before
penetrating to the capital, which lies at the extremity
of the landlocked harbour. The forts are manned by
a small permanent force of garrison artillery and
engineers. Besides these there are some 5000 men
of the colonial forces ready for service, and commanded
by officers of the British Army. These, with mounted
police, militia, and volunteers, could make any landing
from isolated cruisers impossible; while Australia, as has
been seen, has little cause to fear an invasion in force.

New South Wales is not so well equipped, having
only a couple of torpedo-boats to protect the port of
Sydney, and no depot-ship like the Cerberus to furnish
their base and their support. With regard to defences
ashore, the magnificent harbour of Sydney requires
very little to make it impracticable of entry to any
but the most heavily armoured ships. A battery of
large quick-firers, on either side of the harbour, would
probably serve the turn. Half-a-dozen modern torpedo-
boats might be stationed in the harbour, instead of the
two old 1 6- knot boats that are at present all the
Colony commands. Sydney is exposed to bombard-
ment not only from its own harbour of Port Jackson,

but from Botany Bay to the south ; but it is very

250

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

doubtful whether it would be wise to spend money on
batteries here. The best defence is a mobile defence,
and this is afforded by torpedo-boats afloat, and troops
ashore. The easy capture of Port Arthur and Wei-
hai-Wei, in the Chino - Japanese War, proves how
futile in themselves are forts on the sea- front, where
the defender has command neither of the sea nor of
the land. For Sydney, as for Melbourne, the local
levies are more than adequate to deal with any force
which a stray cruiser or two would be able to land.
The provision of more torpedo - boats would make
the neighbourhood impossible for such cruisers after
the fall of the first night. Ships and men have the
great advantage that they can go to the enemy, whereas
batteries can do nothing to defeat him unless he comes
to them.

For the other principal sea - coast towns, neither
Adelaide nor Brisbane is well protected. The first
has no torpedo-boats, and would be difficult to fortify ;
probably one old ironclad and a couple of torpedo-
boats would be the most practicable form of defence.
We possess a number of old ironclad ships at home,
which would be virtually useless to us in war, since
their want of sea-going power would put them out
of the question for offensive purposes. Of these, three,
as has been stated, have been made over to India and
Victoria ; a fourth, the Wivern, is guardship at Hong
Kong ; while a fifth, the Penelope, is at the Cape.
There are at least half-a-dozen more, which might
profitably be re-armed with breech-loaders, and sent
as guardships abroad. Queensland owns a couple of
torpedo-boats, which would doubtless be employed for

the defence of Brisbane.

251

NAVAL POLICY

Tasmania and New Zealand must depend primarily
for their safety upon the fleet. The former might con-
ceivably serve as a base for an enemy acting against
the mainland of Australia, but of course only in the
event that we lost the local command of the sea. This
is not, on the face of it, probable. Even if it were, it
is plainly wiser to put any money that may be spent
into ships to ensure the necessary command of the sea,
than into filling Tasmania with forts and garrisons which
might be locked up quite fruitlessly throughout a long
war. For troops, Tasmania must depend on its own
resources, with perhaps a light battery at Hobart ;
against such attack as these could not cope with, the
fleet is her true defence. The same is true of New
Zealand. Her very long coast-line, the fact that the
railways mostly run along the shore, and the fact that
in the mines of Westport she possesses the best coal
in the Antipodes — all point her out as a happy hunting-
ground for the raider. But it is plainly as impossible
to fortify the whole coast of New Zealand as it is to
do the like for the British Isles ; the New Zealanders,
like ourselves, must take the chance of such casual
assailants as the sea may bring them. To defend the
harbours of Auckland, Wellington, and Port Lyttleton,
the port of Christchurch, light batteries of quick-firing
guns should be sufficient. For coast-defence in general
New Zealand might profitably organize a torpedo
flotilla by districts ; the four existing boats would form
the nucleus of such a force. It may here be noticed
that, with the exception of Victoria, none of the
Australian colonies has added to its torpedo-boats
since 1884, and that their vessels are consequently of

comparatively low speed, as well as small. This is a

252

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

pity, as modern boats should be very fast to give them
the best possible chance of avoiding hits by quick-
firing guns ; small size again makes boats dependent
on the state of the sea to realize even the power they
are credited with. To meet any more serious attack
than could be dealt with by torpedo-boats and works
at the chief ports, New Zealand has to rely on the fleet
and her land forces. Two vessels of the Australian
Squadron are generally in New Zealand waters. There
is also the Imperial Australian Squadron. For mobile
defence on land there is, as in Australia, an athletic
population largely accustomed to the use of the rifle.
It would further, perhaps, be possible to employ the
fine fighting qualities of the Maoris.

Two spots in Australia demand a brief notice, not so
much for the importance of the local population, as for
their strategical position. In the south-west, at King
George Sound, the trade-routes to Melbourne and
Adelaide converge. It is therefore important that
cruisers should patrol the adjacent waters in war time,
to drive off any hostile cruisers who might there
be expecting a valuable booty. For the support of
these cruisers the town of Albany, which lies on the
Sound, should be well supplied with coal, stores,
apparatus for refitting, and the like. And as such a
depot would be a valuable prize to an enemy, as well as
a proportionately serious loss to ourselves and Australia,
King George Sound requires a battery commanding
its entrance as well as two or three torpedo-boats.
Forts have now been completed and manned by a small
permanent force of artillery, which could doubtless be
slightly reinforced on occasion from the population of
Albany. As Australian trade is mainly the gainer by

253

NAVAL POLICY

such a port of supply, and the patrol which in war time
would draw upon it, Australia, as a whole, has reason-
ably consented to share the expenses of fortification
and maintenance with the Imperial Government. The
cruisers of the Australasian squadron might fitly be
employed to patrol these waters in time of war,
especially that second-class vessels of the Apollo type
are now to relieve the third-class Katoombas. This will
go far to bring up the squadron to the requirements
of modern war.

The other strategical point is Port Darwin, in the
extreme north of Oueensland. Here the ocean cable
lands, and here converge the trade-routes from Hong
Kong, the Straits and Eastern Asia generally to
Sydney and the Oueensland ports. Port Darwin, like
King George Sound, has been fortified to form a base
for cruisers, and to prevent it being seized and put
to the same use by an enemy. The danger of this
is not so imaginary as in the case of large towns
like Melbourne or Sydney, since the local population is
relatively sparse. There ought besides the forts to be
at least a couple of torpedo-boats. This would, doubt-
less, be sufficient for local defence ; any attack by
an armed fleet ought to bring our own Australian
squadron hot upon its trail to defeat it. The defences
of Port Darwin are maintained by the Home and
Australian Governments in conjunction. Queensland
is the trustee in the one case, as is Western Australia
in the other.

Stepping over the East Indian islands, we find our

chief mercantile centres in Eastern Asia, Hong Kong,

and Singapore powerfully armed and fairly garrisoned.

But it must be remembered that the enormous distri-

254

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

buting trade of both places, which are the mercantile
clearing-houses of all the commerce of Eastern Asia,
would be the richest of prizes for an assailant, and that
both ought therefore to be ready for serious attack.
Hong Kong is defended by our powerful China
squadron, and by modern works, but it is doubtful if its
garrison is sufficient In a war with Russia we should
now have China passively, if not actively, against us,
and it must be remembered that part of Hong Kong
lies on the mainland. In these circumstances it would
perhaps be as well to recruit the garrison, like the local
military police, from India. Indeed there is much to say
for the proposal to make Hong Kong and Singapore
dependent on India for purposes of defence, as Aden is
at present. Both ports had to wait years and years for
modern guns, which they would not have had to do if
it had lain with the Indian Government to arm them.
Before this is done, however, India ought to be supplied
with factories and arsenals capable of turning out
all kinds of munitions of war, without waiting upon the
tardy convenience of Woolwich and Whitehall. Both
ports lack torpedo-boats, which would give the most
effective form of protection to the merchantmen in and
near them. Hong Kong already has the Wivern to act
as their parent ship, though she is not in commission ;
Singapore might receive a similar vessel.

The naval defence of India is no direct concern of
the taxpayer at home. The Imperial squadron on the
station is superior, as has been already shown, to any
foreign force in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Govern-
ment possesses two old ironclad turret-ships, two
torpedo-gunboats, and seven modern torpedo-boats.
These are not, of course, sufficient for coast-defence in

255

NAVAL POLICY

any ambitious sense of the phrase, but the finances
of India are not equal to such a defence, nor is there
any especial necessity for it. The chief ports are forti-
fied and garrisoned, and it is not needful to do more.
Invasion of India by sea in any force is impossible
while this country remains a sea-power.

In South Africa much remains to be done, but
the inquiries which Admiral Rawson and General
Goodenough have recently made have resulted in
strong recommendations, and an apparent determina-
tion to act. East London and Port Elizabeth are to
be fortified. E!ach of these ports has some value as the
terminus of a railway, but it is to be hoped that no
more than one small battery of quick-firing guns will be
mounted at each place. To do more would be to waste
money which might more profitably be spent, partly on
a couple of torpedo-boats, and as to the balance in sea-
going ships on the Australian plan. Cape Town itself
has fortifications, but wants search-lights and position-
finders. South Africa in general is in little need of
defences on shore. The garrison, though not perhaps
strong enough to hold the Boers and the vast native
population, is sufficient in the absence of other calls
upon it to prevent any likely invasion. Moreover, the
Burgher Law of universal military service still exists,
though it has not lately been used, and British South
Africa is full of excellent fighting stuff. There is, how-
ever, a very grave deficiency in garrison artillery.
This is to be strengthened by the enlistment of
" partially paid " troops on the model of the armies
of Victoria and New South Wales. They cannot be
raised too soon.

The position of Canada, from the point of view of

256

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

Imperial defence, is hardly satisfactory. In this respect,
indeed, the Dominion is only a weakness to the Empire,
and an embarrassment to this country in diplomatic
dealings with the United States. The case might easily
be reversed, since the militia of the United States,
though admirable raw material, is very far from well
trained. A thoroughly well-equipped, well-officered,
and well-drilled Canadian force might, by striking hard
at the outset of a war, reap very considerable successes
before the machinery of the United States Army had
got into motion. The truth is, however, that the
Canadian militia is not more completely trained and
equipped than the force over the border, while it is
heavily outnumbered. The land defences of Canada,
however, only concern the present discussion indirectly.
But for naval defence also Canada pays not a cent.
Our own North American squadron, though stronger
than it was a year ago, is not fit to meet that of the
United States, and in the event of war would have to
be largely reinforced from home. There are no torpedo-
boats on either the Atlantic or Pacific coasts. Halifax,
however, is rather overdone with fortifications than
otherwise. It is defended by Imperial troops, and would
not be easily captured, unless by a Power with an un-
contested supremacy, both on sea and land. The cities
on the St. Lawrence are all but wholly bare to attack.

On the Pacific coast the important point is the
south end of Vancouver Island, and Vancouver City on
the mainland. The first possesses the station of the
fleet at Esquimault, and the coal-fields of Nanaimo are
on the island; the latter is the terminus of the Canadian
Pacific Railway. After years of negotiation between
the Home and the Canadian Governments with reference
s 257

NAVAL POLICY

to the fortification of this position, a task which the
growing importance of the Pacific rendered daily more
imperative, the question has been settled. Vancouver
is a vital point in the new route to Japan, China,
and Australia, afforded by the Canadian Pacific Rail-
way — a route shorter than the old, and one which
crosses none but British territory. As such, it
would be almost certainly attacked by either the
United States or Russia. The delay in fortifying
this spot was due, not to any lack of urgency, but to
disputes between the Dominion and Home Govern-
ments as to the proper site for the works. The former
contends that a station on the island is of no value
to Canada, and that any fortifications should be on the
mainland. These, with an adequate force, would defend
the railway terminus from land attack. The Home
Government, on the other hand, was naturally unwilling
to abandon the dock which had been built at Esqui-
mault, and preferred to have its naval stations in a
spot that is not threatened by land attack. The Home
Government was probably in the right ; and accordingly
Esquimault has been fortified and garrisoned by a
force of marines. It seems very unlikely that British
Columbia could, in the long run, defend herself against
an organized invasion from the United States, and any
garrison which our army could spare for Vancouver
City — even if it were disposed to spare any at all —
would be too small to affect this result. The railway
terminus must then go in any case; and indeed the
connexion with the East is liable to be interrupted
from the neighbouring United States frontier over
almost its whole length. That being so, it is better to

retain at least the naval station, which can only be

258

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

captured from the sea. So far as naval attack goes
it matters little, provided we are superior in the
Northern Pacific, whether the fortifications are on the
island or the mainland. But fortifications on one spot
or the other, or both, there had to be beyond question,
and to these should now be added torpedo-boats with a
parent ironclad. At present, as has been said, Canada
has not seen fit to furnish herself with so much as a
single boat of any military value, although she has
borne her fair share in the defences of Esquimault.

Most of the prosperity of the West Indies has passed
from them since the days when Rodney and De Grasse
battled among them for the naval supremacy of the
world. But if their commercial riches are largely
of the past, there may come a day, and that not very
remote, when they will be once more the scene of
important and decisive naval action. The growing
weight of the Pacific in the world's balance has been
touched upon already, and when the Nicaraguan Canal
is cut, this will be the main highway of traffic between
the Pacific and the Atlantic basins. Opposite the
Atlantic end of the canal stands Jamaica, whose
strategic position may thus one day be as dominating
as that of Egypt. Against this day it is important that
we be prepared. At present Jamaica has at Port Royal
a fine harbour and dockyard, fairly defended. In view of
the canal, and the engagements which might be fought
off it, a dock ought certainly to be added for the recep-
tion of cripples ; France has already a fine dock at
Martinique. An ironclad guardship again ought to
replace the obsolete Urgent, with half-a-dozen torpedo-
boats for the defence of Port Royal Harbour. As for

garrison, one of the battalions of the West India

259

NAVAL POLICY

Regiment is usually maintained at Jamaica. The uplands
of the island are healthy, and this battalion, with the
present battery of garrison artillery, might suitably be
reinforced. St. Lucia is at present our most important
coaling station in the West Indies. Here also it is
doubtful whether, considering the troops maintained
by France at Martinique, the garrison is sufficient.
The capture by a sudden attack of this station would
be a disaster, though not an irreparable one. But,
considering the strategic importance of Jamaica, we
might probably do well to concentrate our West Indian
strength there.

The momentous bearing of coal-supplies on the next
world-wide naval war it is not possible to exaggerate.
Coal will be as necessary to warships as food to armies,
and the difference between good coal and bad coal is
even more important than that between good and bad
food. A coal which betrays the presence of a fleet an
hour before the fleet itself comes in sight is a most
valuable aid to the enemy's intelligence department.
Happily in the coal of South Wales we possess a
material which is almost smokeless, while that of West-
port, in New Zealand, is hardly inferior. Thus we start
well ; but how is our coal distributed ? To cruisers on
the ocean it is essential that they should be able to
replenish their bunkers frequently and in safety. It
must be remembered that the coal they would burn
in war time is by no means to be estimated on the
radius of action at 10 knots or so, with which they are
credited in the tables. These give only the distance
they can traverse at their most economical rate of
steaming ; at full speed, escaping or pursuing, they

burn coal far faster. A 27-knot destroyer, for example,

260

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

burns, per knot, ten times as much coal at full speed as
she does at 10 knots an hour.

Coaling stations should be well protected, as well as
numerous. Coal will be the most precious of all prizes.
Coaling stations will be the objects of resolute and
repeated attack ; their capture will mean that the
victor will take away all the coal he can carry, while
what he cannot carry he will sooner burn than allow
to be re -taken. Off coaling stations, again, will
presumably be fought many actions between cruisers,
as there vessels will endeavour to catch an enemy
as he goes in or out. A coaling station should,
therefore, if possible, be in a position to give help
to its friends, as well as to bid defiance to its foes
— should be equipped with torpedo-boats to help
in a fight, with docks and repairing apparatus to
salve its damages, as well as with forts and garrisons.
Docks, indeed, we must have in all parts of the
world, and docks must be protected against capture
and destruction.

It may appear that the question of garrisons, con-
cerning rather the Army than the Navy, is not germane
to the subject of this discussion. But it does affect the
Navy in a very real, if indirect, manner. Supposing
war breaks out, our coaling stations must be garrisoned.
If they were not garrisoned already in peace time,
garrisons must be sent out for them, and who is to take
them ? They cannot go in any ordinary mail-boat or
merchant steamer. Such a course, unless the transports
were exceedingly fast, would mean capture by the first
hostile cruiser that sighted them. It is manifest that
these garrisons must be either transported or convoyed
by the Navy. And that being so, it is further manifest

261

NAVAL POLICY

that the garrisons ought not to be transported at all,
but to be on the spot at the outbreak of war. The
Navy will be terribly overworked from the first moment
of war, and it would be as unjust as impolitic to throw
any further burdens upon it. Quite apart from this, to
leave coaling stations to be garrisoned only after de-
claration of war would in many cases be only meeting
the possibility half-way that the garrison might arrive
and find that its first duty was to recapture a coaling
station with all its coal destroyed.

Of our principal coaling stations, most have been
spoken of in the preceding consideration of colonial
defences. Of those which remain, none are important
except just as coaling stations, repairing bases, and
ports of supply ; the amount of protection they are to
receive must, therefore, be estimated according to their
importance in this respect alone. For instance, the
islands of St. Helena and Ascension are not important.
So long as we have coaling stations at the Cape, and at
Sierra Leone, neither of these is essential. Both being
islands, and largely depending on the sea for supplies
of various kinds, must fall to the power that commands
the sea. To place garrisons of any strength on these
rocks would be to waste force which is urgently needed
elsewhere. Sierra Leone is in a very different case.
It was reported by the Royal Commission of 1878 that
Sierra Leone, lying mid-way between Gibraltar and the
Cape, and also near the junction of several important
trade lines, ought to be retained as a coaling station.
Forts were accordingly constructed, but neither guns
were sent out to arm the forts nor men to fight the
guns. It possesses as garrison a battalion of the West

India Regiment, which might easily happen to be in

262

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

Ashanti when they were wanted, and a battery of Gar-
rison Artillery, who live at Devonport for their health.
Now Sierra Leone differs vitally from Ascension and
St. Helena in that it is not an island. Freetown is not
many days' march from Dakar, the headquarters of the
vast empire which for many years the French have been
assiduously pegging out for themselves in West Africa.
With white and native troops, and sailors from the fleet,
France could probably put 5000 men in the field against
the colony with great ease, and it is hardly possible that
they would be baulked of so easy a capture. Supremacy
at sea could be relied upon in no case to prevent this.
To supply bluejackets and marines enough to defend
Freetown against the Senegalese forces would deplete
the whole African squadron, which, for the rest, would
have plenty of work ready to hand elsewhere. It is
difficult to see what our Government means by building
fortifications, and then refusing to arm or man them.
The ways of governments are dark at the best of times,
but a blacker mystery than this it never propounded to
the ingenuity of the world. Either Sierra Leone ought
to be frankly abandoned in a military sense, or else
guns and gunners should be sent out. White troops
might live in as healthy an up-country station as can be
found, and connected by rail with the coast. Besides
these a strong native force should be organized. The
Haussas would probably be found excellent material
for this purpose.

Until lately Mauritius was more or less in the
position of Ascension and St. Helena, although there
was no Sierra Leone between the Cape and India.
But with the French occupation of Madagascar the

situation is changed. Diego Suarez, in war, would

263

NAVAL POLICY

become a nest of commerce-destroyers, and we ought
to have a station near at hand whence we can smoke
them out. For this purpose it is well to hear that a
survey is to be made for a dock, though it would be
better to know the date by which the dock is to
be completed. As for defence, it is physically as
easy to attack Port Louis from Diego Suarez, as to
attack Diego Suarez from Port Louis. Both fortifica-
tions and local militia have been allowed to fall into
decay. There is a volunteer torpedo corps, and it
would not be inappropriate to present the island with
torpedo-boats, to which an ironclad might profitably be
added. The garrison should be reinforced, or at least
an efficient local militia be organized. Mauritius, like
Singapore, might be made dependent on India for guns
and stores, were India first made sufficient for herself.

Jumping to the Western Hemisphere, Bermuda need
cause us no anxiety, being well defended, and possessing
a floating dock. The Falkland Islands possess an admir-
able situation on the line of the trade waters round
Cape Horn, but they are not likely to be seriously
attacked by any enemy whom a few quick-firing guns
could not scare away. Fiji, again, is in a good
position to break the journey between Vancouver and
Sydney, though Honolulu would have been better. A
little attention — not too much — to the defences of Fiji
would not be thrown away.

There remain Gibraltar and Malta — incomparably

the most important of all. They are invaluable, not

merely as coaling stations, but as the bases of our first

fighting-fleet. That being so, they should not only be

impregnable to an enemy, but amply supplied with

docks, a dockyard, and every kind of provisions and

264

COLONIES AND COALING STATIONS

stores. Malta is, on the whole, in good case, but the
garrison is a weakness. It is said that the Duke of
Saxe-Coburg, when in command of the Mediterranean
Fleet, amply demonstrated in a sham-fight that
Valetta is not impregnable. Apparently Malta could
not resist an attack in force by both land and sea ;
but, on the other hand, it would not be exposed to
such an attack until our fleet had been beaten out of
the Mediterranean. Then it would be useless in any
case and impossible in the long run to defend. What
is more serious is the fact that there are not troops
enough to man the existing works and guns against
even a light attack. A force of volunteer artillery
might serve as a useful reinforcement to the regulars
and local militia.

Gibraltar is even more important than Malta.
Defeated in the Mediterranean, we might be driven
to abandon the latter, but we shall only evacuate
Gibraltar when we evacuate the sea. Gibraltar is
marked out by its geographical position for a most
important torpedo station. It is little less than a public
scandal that measures to put Gibraltar in a proper
state of equipment as a naval base were only taken
by our Government after years of persistent pressure
from a private committee, with which the name of
Mr. Arnold Forster is prominently and honourably
associated. Thanks to him and others, the necessary
steps are at last being taken to render the anchorage
inaccessible to torpedo-boat attack. Until this is
done, no fleet could lie in safety for a night, as long as
an enemy had a torpedo-boat on the water. Lord
Spencer's Naval Works Bill provided for the extension
of the present mole, and for a detached mole parallel

265

NAVAL POLICY

with the shore, while the fourth side of the parallelo-
gram thus formed will probably be filled in with a
commercial mole. A single dock was also to be built,
which dock Mr. Goschen has wisely multiplied by
three. The value of these docks can scarcely be over-
estimated. If a battle were fought at Gibraltar, than
which nothing would be more probable in a war
between ourselves and France, to send damaged ships
home, or to Malta, might easily mean sending them
to founder on the way. These works will be finished
in 1900, after which Gibraltar will labour only under
the disadvantage that ships in its harbour can be
shelled from the heights known as the King of Spain's
Chair, and from the Spanish town of Algeciras. But,
as we cannot move Gibraltar to any other position —
as, indeed, its principal value consists in being where
it is — we must make the best of this. We are not
likely to be at war with Spain. And, if we ever are,
Algeciras, after all, is a good deal easier to take and
dismantle than Gibraltar.

266

ARE WE READY FOR WAR?

To ask at this stage of the inquiry whether we are
ready for war is truly somewhat superfluous. We are
most unready. We have not the ships ; we have not
the men ; we have not the guns. Our ships are in-
adequate to meet the two Powers with which we might
most easily become embroiled, to say nothing of a
possible three. Our men are insufficient to man even
the ships we have. The chief links that hold together
our empire over-sea are partly unarmed and partly un-
garrisoned. This being so, it is absurd to ask in a
broad sense if we are ready. The question may,
however, be put in a limited form. Are we in a
position to make at any moment the most of the
resources we possess ? It is generally held — though
why, it is not altogether easy to see — that this country
will never declare war, but will wait to be attacked. If
that is so, the attack may come at any moment without
warning. Nations sometimes fall into war, as it were,
by accident — by some chance spark kindling stored-up
ill-will : this was within measurable distance of happen-
ing when the Kaiser sent his telegram to President
Kruger, in January, 1896. At other times war comes
at the end of long years of premeditation and prepara-
tion, any trifle being seized upon to furnish the

267

NAVAL POLICY

occasion : this was the case with Japan and China.
But whether war come the one way or the other, it is
likely to find one party, at least, unexpecting and
possibly unready. There are, no doubt, some nations —
Germany is one — which may be taken unawares, but
yet never taken at a disadvantage. The plans and the
organization are there for any emergency. Whether
there is the momentary expectation of using them
matters nothing ; there is always the possibility of
using them. Are we in the same position ?

Supposing that war were to be declared to-morrow,
our most powerful squadron in commission would be
found in the Mediterranean — ten battleships, or twelve
with the Particular Service Squadron, and rather more
than the same number of cruisers and gunboats, with
one destroyer. It would be a chance if more than eight
or nine battleships were together between Gibraltar and
Malta, leaving three or four in the Levant. If our
enemy were Germany or the United States, this
squadron, containing some of our best ships and crews,
would be out of the game, and in no position to strike
an early and crushing blow such as would have great
effect on the progress of the war. If, on the other
hand, the enemy were France, or France and Russia,
the position would be yet more unfavourable. Assum-
ing France to be the aggressor, she would presumably
have concentrated her force at Toulon ready to hit
us hard and instantly. Sixteen battleships,* thirteen
cruisers, five torpedo-gunboats, and at least seven sea-

* This number is made up of the vessels at present in the Active and
Reserve Mediterranean Squadrons, together with the [auriguiberry^
Charles Alartel, and Carnot, which should be complete for sea by the end
of 1896.

268

ARE WE READY FOR WAR?

going torpedo-boats* would put out at once to take our
squadron unprepared and unconcentrated. Even if it
were concentrated, it would be a tremendous responsi-
bility for an admiral to risk the country's finest fleet
against odds of four to three. He might win : British
fleets have won against greater odds than four to three
times enough. But in the uncertainty attending on the
untried possibilities of modern naval war the risk would
be a very grave one. Even if he won his action there
would still be the problem how to get his crippled ships
back to port. In any case the admiral would see him-
self reduced in the first days of war to the uncomfor-
table alternative of either running from the enemy
or jeopardizing our strongest fleet, and therewith the
whole war, against heavy odds. It is, indeed, quite
truly pointed out by apologists of the present distribu-
tion of our fleets that the Mediterranean Squadron is
excellently equipped for running away, having about
two knots an hour in hand of the French. But the
comfort derived from this reflection is discounted by the
facts that we should thus begin the war with the
evacuation of the Mediterranean, which could hardly
have a salutary moral effect, and that we should have
been forced to forego an opportunity of fighting a
decisive action which might not readily occur again.

In the meantime, what would be happening in the
Channel? In the Channel Squadron, we have two
battleships of the Majestic and four of the Royal
Sovereign class, which, with cruisers, gunboats, and
half-a-dozen torpedo-boat destroyers, make up a
squadron, not perhaps very large, but more powerful

* It must not be forgotten that there is also a Russian Mediterranean
Squadron — Navarin, Alexander II., Posad7iik, and two torpedo-boats.

269

NAVAL POLICY

for its size than any in the world. France has the
Hoche, and four smaller battleships, with the armoured
cruiser Dupny-de-L6me, cruisers, gunboats, and sea-
going torpedo-boats. Our own squadron is the
stronger, and if it caught the French would make
short work of it. But would it catch the French?
Until last year it probably would have done so easily
enough, as their Channel Squadron was then composed
of slow and antiquated ships. But now the sea-speed
is little inferior to that of our own Channel Fleet.
If France were the aggressor, as we are assuming
would be the case, she would doubtless have her plan
of action ready, and could get some start towards its
execution before we could move to check it. In all
probability the French Channel Squadron would set
off at once towards Gibraltar, masking the operation
by a torpedo-boat attack on our Channel Fleet and
naval ports. Cherbourg is nearer to Gibraltar than
Portsmouth, and Brest than Plymouth ; with this ad-
vantage, and several hours' start, the French would
probably be in the neighbourhood of the Straits before
they were overtaken. In the meantime it would be
for the Toulon Squadron to run past the Rock — a task
presenting no difficulty in the absence of a hostile fleet
by day, or of torpedo-boats by night — and unite with
the Channel Squadron somewhere off Trafalgar or
thereabouts. The combined French would thus be
between the British fleets with a squadron superior in
number to both combined — much more so to either
singly — and could attack and annihilate them both in
succession.

Of course this plan might miscarry; though, if

the opening of hostilities found our Mediterranean

270

ARE WE READY FOR WAR?

Squadron so far east as Malta, it is difficult to see
what could prevent at least the junction of the two
French squadrons. Whether they would then bring
one or both of our squadrons to action is another
matter, which would depend partly upon the efficiency
of the scouts on either side, and partly upon such
accidents as weather and the like. Probable or not,
the suggested French strategy is plainly more than
possible, and it is questionable whether we ought to
run such a risk as the present disposition of our
forces involves. The situation is fairly simple, and
its analogue was rehearsed in our own 1894 manoeuvres.
The French Mediterranean Squadron is superior to
either of ours, the French Channel Squadron inferior
to either of ours. Our two combined are inferior in
number to their two combined, but perhaps equal in
power. It would, of course, be easy for us, on the
outbreak of war, to strengthen the Channel Fleet to
a numerical equality with both French squadrons com-
bined ; but that would take time, and meanwhile our
Mediterranean force would stand to be destroyed.
Even without any such delay, France, as the aggressor,
would have some hours in hand to begin with. It
would be almost impossible to prevent her combining
both squadrons between ours, and accident might
easily enable her to defeat them separately. In the
1894 manoeuvres the fleet which represented France
was held to have thus beaten the two squadrons
singly off Belfast, which stood, in the scheme, for
Gibraltar. It might chance, doubtless, that either
of our squadrons got warning of the enemy's neigh-
bourhood, and made off. But, even so, the pre-
ponderant French would still be between them, and

271

NAVAL POLICY

it might be found difficult exactly to time a joint
attack.

This strategical situation would not be necessarily
disastrous ; but, on the whole, it rather invites disaster
than not. It has completely changed since the
French Admiralty substituted a 16-knot for a i2f-knot
Channel Squadron. The question arises, therefore,
whether we should not also re-adjust our dispositions
to meet the new situation.

There is an influential school of writers and thinkers
who would re-adjust our dispositions very thoroughly
indeed by abandoning the Mediterranean altogether.
This radical scheme was elaborated a year or two ago,
with great ability and imagination, by an anonymous
correspondent in the Pall Mall Gazette, under the
name of "An Impossible Programme." It has been
reinforced since, with the authority of Sir George Clark
and Mr. Laird Clowes, and there is no inconsiderable
body of naval opinion in its favour. It would be idle
to deny that there is a good deal to be said for the idea,
both on political and strategical grounds. Its advocates
urge that the retention of a fleet in the Mediterranean
is a relic of the days when we were an European Power,
instead of a world-wide Empire standing outside the
alliances of the Continent, as at present. The abandon-
ment of the Mediterranean would mean the evacuation
of Egypt, which would conciliate France; of Cyprus,
which would conciliate Turkey; and of Malta, which
the author of the " Impossible Programme" ingeniously
proposed to sell to the Pope, and then to apply the
proceeds to a Catholic University for Ireland. A
further disembarrassment would be that we should in
future have no excuse for hampering our diplomacy

ARE WE READY FOR WAR?

with Armenians and other more or less Christian
subjects of the Porte. The surrender in war of the
control of the Suez Canal, which evacuation would
entail, is defended on the ground that the Canal
would be almost certainly blocked or destroyed in
any case.

Strategically, this policy has in its favour the un-
questionable fact that France must always have the
advantage of the interior line in the Mediterranean ;
it would be different if we had never lost Minorca.
It is proposed, in the event of evacuation, that we
should gain the consent of the delighted Continental
Powers to establishing ourselves on the south side of
the Straits, as well as at Gibraltar, so as to be able
more effectively to seal this outlet of the Mediterranean.
We should then repeat the process at Aden.

These are all advantages which it would be futile to
disregard, and which it is not altogether easy to
depreciate. On the other hand, there are grave
countervailing disadvantages in such a scheme, and,
on the whole — though the balance of reason is fairly
level on either side — the disadvantage perhaps out-
weighs the gain. So far as the political argument
goes, the first effect of it would be to throw Italy
into the arms of any combination against us. It is
doubtful whether, as against this, we should reap very
much good-will by abandoning Egypt, Cyprus, and
Malta. In morals it may be more blessed to give ;
but in international policy it is distinctly prefer-
able to receive. To give means not only to lose
what is given, but to lose caste and credit as well,
while there is no such thing as gratitude in dealings
between nations. France would thank us for leaving
t 273

NAVAL POLICY

Egypt °y taking it for herself ; such, at any rate,
is the opinion of a prominent French Parliamentarian.
Nor is it likely that the Sultan would forget his ill-will
towards us in the joy of receiving Cyprus. Moreover,
it may plausibly be suggested that, in giving up parts
of our Empire to facilitate the work of our fleet, we are
putting the cart before the horse. The fleet was made
for the Empire, not the Empire for the fleet.

It may further be doubted whether the strategical
advantages of abandoning the Mediterranean would be,
in fact, as great as they are made out to be. Is it
suggested that in war we should enter the Mediter-
ranean or not? If yes, why give up Malta, with its
docks and dockyard, when Malta might easily prove an
invaluable coaling and repairing base, to say nothing of
an admirable station whence to prevent a junction
between the French and the Russian Black Sea Fleet?
If no, where is the strategic gain? To prevent the
French Fleet from breaking out of the Mediterranean,
we must keep a superior fleet at both ends — in plain
language, we shall want two ships, where now we want
one. In reply, it is urged that we shall need no great
force at Aden — that it is as easy for us to block or
destroy the Suez Canal as for our enemies. So no
doubt it is. But, with a French military occupation of
Egypt, Canal and all, the blocking of it could never
be depended on with absolute surety, while it would
matter little to the French how often it was blocked
as long as it was clear the one day they wished to
pass it. There is more point in the argument that a
heavy squadron of battleships would have no very
obvious objective east of the Red Sea ; yet, even so,

they could doubtless make things very unpleasant for

274

ARE WE READY FOR WAR?

us in India and elsewhere. Giving away the question
of the eastern outlet, it may still be doubted if there is
true strategical wisdom in concentrating our fleet to pen
the enemy at Gibraltar. Why should we give up the
offensive, and allow France and Russia — supposing
them allied against us — to concentrate at their leisure?
After all, if we keep to the Mediterranean, it is always
possible that we might find the French fleet at sea and
beat it, while the relatively low coal-endurance and
speed of the Russian Black Sea Squadron would give
us a very fair chance of dealing with it in like manner.
Whereas if we sit down at the mouth of the Mediter-
ranean, why should the war ever cease ? Certainly it is
difficult to see how we should be helping to defeat
the enemy by abandoning to him the £54,000,000 of
our annual trade to Mediterranean ports. Considering
that the object of the enemy would be exactly to starve
us out by destroying our trade, this policy would be
more adapted to defeat ourselves.

On the other hand, if we want to command the
Mediterranean, and carry the war up to the enemy's
coast, we want a stronger squadron in that sea than
we have at present. It is too much to expect that
the Channel Fleet, with further to go, and probably
less time to go in, could reinforce it before it fell in
with a superior force. It might, with luck ; but a wise
policy will not leave the destinies of our Empire to
luck. We must recognize the fact that the Mediter-
ranean station, though not the nearest home, is the
most important. There is to be found the strongest
non-English fleet in the world — the combined French
Mediterranean squadrons ; and where the strongest

enemy is, there should our strongest fleet be also. In

275

NAVAL POLICY

estimating the degree of force required, we must not
regard the fact that the French Reserve Squadron has,
at most seasons of the year, only part of its comple-
ment on board. The crews can be brought up to war
strength at any moment from the depot at Toulon,
whereas our own crews cannot be so supplemented at
Malta or Gibraltar. We ought, therefore, to keep in
full commission a force equal in all respects to the
French Active and Reserve Squadrons together. At
the present moment we almost attain this standard,
having twelve battleships to thirteen ; but that in-
cludes the two battleships of the Particular Service
Squadron, while the French numbers will shortly be
increased as new ships are completed for the pennant.
With regard to cruisers, the Mediterranean station,
being the most important, should be supplied with
newer, faster, and more powerful vessels than the
Blanche — sent out this year — which even on trial
made less than 17 knots, or the Scout, which has not
even quick-firers. We have a dozen ships of the
Apollo class lying in the basins at home which might
be well employed in relieving these older craft. One
destroyer, again, is not enough. There should be at
least one for each French sea-going boat in commission.
The Admiralty has, indeed, done well to send out
more of this class lately ; but since the experience of
the Ardejit appears to show Mediterranean waters very
suitable for these delicate craft, at least half a dozen
more might without disadvantage be added to these.
We ought, also, to add vessels to neutralize the two
battleships and three torpedo-craft of the Russian
squadron in Mediterranean waters. These additions

would probably bring up the squadron to its full

276

ARE WE READY FOR WAR?

requirements on a sudden outbreak of war. We could
hardly expect the Admiralty to maintain, in the Medi-
terranean, a fleet equal to the full strength of France
and Russia, whether in commission or not. The
Channel Squadron should arrive in time to neutralize
these ; and, if more ships are wanted, there are the
coastguard and portguard-ships, which have only to
fill up with their complete crews. If we cannot
mobilize fast enough to bring these ships, and those
of the Fleet Reserves, into play in the first day or two
of war, then we should do well to give our attention
first to mobilization.

The word mobilization suggests another respect in
which we may or may not be ready for war. All
vessels placed in what is called the A Division of the
Fleet Reserve are supposed to be available for sea
within forty-eight hours. On the opening of war, this
supposition would be put to the severest proof; other-
wise we might be beaten by a ready enemy while still
engaged in preparing great part of our fleet for sea.
In future wars the power that is ready to strike the first
blow will not unlikely gain thereby material, and still
more moral, advantage which may easily turn out
decisive. It was so with Germany and with Japan.
France and China had doubtless tremendous reserves
of strength, but instead of developing them, they found
their initial unreadiness only the precursor of ever more
irremediable confusion. It is not to be supposed that
we are in so bad a state as China, or as France in 1870.
Yet it would be a relief to be persuaded that we are as
well prepared to put forth our whole strength without
delay, without hitch, as were Japan and Germany.

What grounds have we for such a confidence ? The

277

NAVAL POLICY

answer to this question, as to most others that bear on
our readiness for war, is that we do not know. We are
told that the ships are ready, but what little evidence is
to be had points in the opposite direction. There
is, indeed, an annual mobilization for the Naval
Manoeuvres, but the actual date of this is known for
weeks beforehand, and the approximate date is always
the same from year to year. Now France or Russia or
Germany would not give us a month's notice of their
intention to declare war, nor would they choose the
exact moment when they knew we were mobilizing in
any case for the Manoeuvres. So that any results
achieved at this season go for nothing as a real test of
our preparation. When anything in the nature of a
serious test is imposed, the dockyard authorities are
usually found wanting. The Swiftsure, which is in the
A Division of the Reserve, was recently called on for
service, but she was found wanting ; she could not
be ready for some weeks. Or take again the com-
missioning of the Particular Service Squadron in
January, 1896. Enthusiastic newspapers have spoken
of this achievement as the fitting out of a squadron
more powerful than any of Germany's within forty-eight
hours. But if we descend to dates and figures, it was
no more fitted out in forty-eight hours than it was a
match for the German Navy. The announcement of
the Admiralty's decision, and the lists of the principal
officers, were published on January 8th. All the ships
were officially supposed to be ready within forty-eight
hours ; it had even been announced by the Army and
Navy Gazette three weeks before that all but the de-
stroyers were to be commissioned in January. Yet in

spite of the supposed readiness of the ships, they were

278

ARE WE READY FOR WAR?

not actually commissioned till January 14th. The first
vessel left port rather over forty-eight hours after
hoisting the pennant, and it was not until January 20th,
twelve days after the order to mobilize, that the fleet
was actually able to put to sea.

Now this, instead of being extolled as an extra-
ordinary achievement, ought to have been the occasion
of a searching inquiry into our whole arrangements for
mobilization. If it is impossible that a number of
ships can be got ready for sea within forty-eight hours,
why does the Admiralty foster the delusion that they
can ? If it is possible, where was the fault, and whose
was the blame, that these ships were kept six times as
long fitting out as they should have been ? It is true
that there was a collision between a destroyer and a
battleship, while another destroyer broke down. But
that would be more, and not less, likely to happen in
actual war. Moreover, if these ships were in the
A Division of the Reserve, they should not have
broken down ; for presumably it is possible to keep
the machinery overhauled and in order. There was
also the fact that, Chatham being short of certain
ratings, they had to be sent from Devonport by train.
But what sort of organization is it that keeps ships at
Chatham, and the men to take them to sea at Devon-
port? That, in itself, is a sign that our arrangements
for mobilization are not what they should be. On this
head there is no more emphatic testimony than that of
the Army and Navy Gazette, which is, as a rule, no way
disposed to be needlessly alarmist. "The system of
skeleton crews and cadres for mobilization," says that
service organ, " is of the most haphazard character.
Much more remains to be done, if we are not to deceive

279

NAVAL POLICY

ourselves, before we can feel that our system is as good
as, for example, that of the German." Is it too much
to ask of this country that it should be as ready for
naval war as Germany?

It was suggested above that the first move of France
— or, for that matter, perhaps of Germany also — in a
war with this country would be to hurl a flotilla of
torpedo-boats upon one or each of our naval ports. If
the attack succeeded, it might heavily disable us at the
very outset ; if it failed, it would still cause considerable
confusion, and call off attention from any other move-
ment that might be contemplated. This danger would
probably come upon us without warning, and almost
certainly without declaration of war. There are always
a number of ships moored to the jetties in Portsmouth
Harbour inviting the torpedo. Are we prepared to
meet this contingency? Again the answer is, we do
not know. It is almost incredible that we should not
be prepared, since the probability of this kind of attack
has been the commonplace of alarmist prophets for
years. There are flotillas of destroyers in commission
attached to Portsmouth, Devonport, and Sheerness ;
but these would not necessarily be on the spot at
the moment of attack. Then there are forts enough,
as well as booms and similar defences ; but it is doubt-
ful whether the big guns of the former are adapted to
hit moving torpedo-boats, while the latter would only
be in position in war time. What precautions are to
be taken in peace time against any such surprise must,
of course, be left to the judgment of experts. But the
inexpert public may, at least, ask for an assurance that
precautions of some sort there are.

A further point arising out of this concerns the

280

ARE WE READY FOR WAR?

command of our naval ports. It is fairly obvious that
if the command of a great organization like the de-
fences of Portsmouth is to be effective, it must be
centred in a single officer. It is also not altogether
difficult to conclude that in the case of a naval port
that officer ought to be a sailor. The defence of such
places can only be efficiently carried out by the smooth
and harmonious combination of troops ashore, forts
ashore, mine-fields, torpedo-boats, and destroyers. Yet
in our system the troops and forts are under the
military authorities, the submarine mines — which are
surely naval work — are given over to the Royal
Engineers, with the assistance of militiamen recruited
from the seafaring class, while the torpedo-defence is
under the Admiral. How these different authorities
are expected to work together efficiently at a moment's
notice, only our wonderful Government offices can tell.
Certainly it will not be through practice during peace,
for such practice is conspicuously absent. Most in-
credible of all, the very ammunition of the fleet is
supplied by the War Office, and not by the Admiralty,
which is responsible for the fleets' movements. " The
coast-defence of Great Britain," says the official report
of an United States officer, " is notably the most in-
efficient of the European Powers. Owing to the
divided control, lack of co-operation, absence of
digested schemes for mutual support, and the mixing
of naval and military duties, the defence is unwieldy
in its administration, unprepared for sudden work, and
labours under the disadvantage of placing military men
in situations outside their legitimate sphere of action."
A further disability of the British system of giving over

shore-defence to military command is that a soldier will

281

NAVAL POLICY

in many cases not possess the necessary knowledge of
the weak points of attacking ships, nor be able so
readily to detect their intention from any manoeuvres
they may go through. But it is useless to multiply
disadvantages : briefly, our system of semi-military,
semi-naval defence is as clumsy and chaotic as can be.
Germany, France, Italy, have all placed their coast-
defence in charge of an admiral for each district. The
faults of our own organization, or disorganization, have
been freely pointed out and fully recognized for at least
ten years. To the official mind, it would appear, the
recognition of an abuse compromises the necessity for
its reform.

To come to an end of fault-finding, our whole
Admiralty system appears expressly designed to be
unready for war. Nobody is responsible for the suffi-
ciency of our naval preparations, and nobody is respon-
sible for the systematic employment of what prepara-
tion there is. In many lands, as is well known to all
interested in foreign affairs, there exists such a thing as a
General Staff, with a Chief of the Staff at its head. The
Prussian General Staff — the creation of Von Moltke,
from which all the others are derived — is simply
described by Sir Charles Dilke as " nothing more than
the application to military purposes of the principle on
which civil businesses are conducted. In each case
what is first needed is the best information upon the
facts. Then plans are formed, anticipating those of
others who are likely to become opponents." * A
General Staff collects information as to the preparations,
movements, and designs of other Powers, and arranges

* For a most detailed description of the functions of a General Staff, see
Mr. Spenser Wilkinson in The Brain of an Army.

282

ARE WE READY FOR WAR?

how it is to meet them. It has a definite scheme for
fighting any and every enemy. Thus, an English Chief
of the Staff would know what force he wanted to fight
France, what to fight Russia, what to fight France and
Russia, and so on. He would also know how the force
was to be disposed ; where he intended to make his
attack ; how he proposed to meet probable attacks by
the enemy. To the General Staff also is committed the
training of officers for war. The Chief will have had
a constant succession of officers through his hands ;
he will know their capabilities to a greater or less
extent, and be able to advise as to the position in
the general scheme which each is fitted to fill. In a
word, the Chief of the Staff is a man whose
business in life it is to organize war, and it is to be
presumed that, such being his business, he will organize
it well.

Now, if the Germany Army, with comparatively few
and simple tasks before it, requires a professional
organizer, with a staff of subordinate professional
organizers behind him, to put it in readiness for its
work, how much more does not the British Navy ? The
problems which it will have to face in war are of an
infinite and world-wide conplexity ; it is indispensable
that they should have been thought oat and provided
against beforehand. At present it is difficult to believe
and impossible to be sure that this has been done.
It is quite true that there is attached to the
Admiralty an Intelligence Department, presided over
by a captain, which has functions analogous to those of
one branch of the General Staff in continental countries.
But this department, though strong in ability, is numeri-
cally weak. What is worse, it is weak in official stand-

283

NAVAL POLICY

ing and authority ; the Director of Naval Intelligence
can make representations, but he cannot command their
adoption. He cannot even ensure a reasonable amount
of attention for them, unless his superiors choose to
bestow it. If the German Chief of the Staff represented
that a certain force was necessary for a certain not im-
probable war, he would either have his way or he would
decline to be responsible for the safety of the country in
such a war. If the Director of Naval Intelligence did
the same, his opinion would, like as not, be left to
the mercy of the First Lord, to be over-ruled for the
first party advantage, real or imaginary, that presented
itself.

The truth is that in this country it is nobody's
business to hold the Navy in readiness for war. No-
body is personally responsible, and therefore the thing
is not done. The First Lord's professional advisers, the
Naval Lords of the Admiralty, are doubtless respon-
sible to him ; so is the First Lord to the Cabinet, the
Cabinet to the House of Commons, and the House to
the country. But this 'House-that-Jack-built' of
responsibility comes, in the end, to no responsibility
at all. The naval advisers at one end are sincerely
anxious that the Navy should be sufficient for all not
impossible demands upon it, and know what these
demands would entail. The general sense of the
country at the other end is as anxious that the Navy
should be sufficient for all emergencies, though not
knowing how much sufficiency implies. Between the
two is the solid buffer presented by the First Lord,
the Cabinet, and the House of Commons. The First
Lord is too often an eminent party hack, who has to
be made room for in the Cabinet somehow, and is put

284

ARE WE READY FOR WAR?

into the Admiralty as being a position of dignity in
which he can do his party neither much good, nor
much harm. It must be remembered that the First
Lord has no direct responsibility to the country. He
is a member of the Cabinet, which stands or falls
together. Mr. Goschen, in the debate on the 1896
Estimates, professed himself ready to take the full
responsibility for measures affecting the Navy. It is
a cheap kind of responsibility, for it is not the First
Lord's responsibility at all, but the Cabinet's. The
defeat of the Rosebery Government illustrates this point
exactly. It was Sir Henry Campbell - Bannerman's
administration of the War Office that was censured ;
but it was the whole Cabinet — not Sir Henry personally
— that resigned. No doubt there might be a First
Lord who, by some mental twist, preferred his country
to his place and his party, and resigned if his colleagues
refused to allow him the money necessary for the
efficiency of the service. Lord Charles Beresford set
the example as Junior Lord ; but it is perhaps too
much to expect of a First Lord and Cabinet Minister.
He is content to pass the matter on to his colleagues
of the Cabinet. They would be very happy to oblige
him. But it is not so much their business to put the
country in a proper state of defence, as to knock a
penny off the income-tax, and put themselves, if
possible, into another tenure of office. As the result,
inadequate Estimates come year by year before the
House of Commons. The few members who have
studied naval questions explain that they are in-
adequate ; the First Lord replies that the Admiralty
has given, is giving, and will give the subject most
careful consideration. The First Lord's party follows

285

NAVAL POLICY

him into the Lobby — it has to, or face a General
Election — and the Estimates are passed.

It is not to be supposed that either the Sea Lords,
or the First Lord, or the Cabinet, or the House, or the
country, intends to leave the Navy insufficient to
perform its duties. But it is nobody's duty particularly
to see that it is sufficient. Each can shuffle off re-
sponsibility on to the next man, and each very
naturally does so. Those who know, have not the
power to bring the Navy up to its requirements ; those
who have the power — the private member of Parlia-
ment and his constituents — do not know. The result
is inevitable and deplorable. Our fleet ought to be
increased steadily, and on a reasoned plan, according
to the requirements of probable war as computed
by the best authority. In practice it declines for
three or four years, and then there is a scare. Popular
pressure is put upon the Government, and the First
Lord, who complacently declared our force amply
sufficient in one year, as complacently takes credit
for increasing it in the next. If the scare is inspired
by any definite danger, as was the case during the
Crimean or Russo- Turkish Wars, or the Penjdeh
incident on the Afghan frontier, it is usual to spend
millions of money in the most wasteful way. Ships are
bought up in a hurry, and naturally turn out extrava-
gant failures. When the pressure of public opinion is
exerted on the general ground of the inadequacy of
the fleet, the money is spent more reasonably. Yet
such a method of attending to the first interest of the
country by fits and starts, is at its best highly undigni-
fied, and is especially discreditable to our successive

Governments. It also has the bad result that when

286

ARE WE READY FOR WAR?

the moment's perturbation is passed, people and

politicians alike become lethargic again ; the Navy

is again neglected until, in a few years, there is another

scare. It is only by the greatest good luck that we

have been able to see-saw thus through forty years

without serious disaster.

Now if Parliament and the country were allowed to

know the opinion of responsible experts about our

naval strength, this most unbusinesslike conduct of

our national affairs would become impossible at once.

Let us imagine our Chief of the Staff — it does not

matter what he is called — installed at the Admiralty.

It is his duty, in case of war, to tell the First Lord

how that war is to be fought and won. He knows,

or thinks he knows, how many battleships, cruisers,

and torpedo-craft, will be required for this war ; what

coaling-stations, and with what garrisons ; what system

of coast defence, and so on. He knows how much

money this will cost. If the First Lord comes to him

and offers to spend less money than the necessary

minimum, he will object. If the First Lord thereon

refuses to increase the money up to the sum necessary,

the Chief of the Staff cannot force him to do so. But

he can, and ought to, declare that he considers the

provision granted him inadequate, and that he will

not make himself responsible for the success of a

campaign unless he gets more resources to do it with.

The truth is that his view of the provision made by

each year's Estimates ought to be accessible to

members of Parliament and to the public. Is the

Chief of the Staff ready to see us through a war on

these Estimates? should be the first question of the

debate. It may be a violation of the Constitution to

287

NAVAL POLICY

bring him into the case ; but, if so, then the Constitu-
tion ought to be altered. The country would then,
in case of conflict between the expert adviser and the
political First Lord, be left to decide between them.
Supposing that the Chief of the Staff approved certain
Estimates, which were afterwards found to be in-
adequate, then he ought to be broke. If the Cabinet
insisted on giving less for the Navy than he wanted,
and this were afterwards proved inadequate, then the
Cabinet ought to be impeached. In either case, the
full penalty ought to be exacted without mercy. We
are prepared to confer upon those who thus serve us
the highest honours we have to bestow ; we should be
prepared to punish them as remorselessly if they fail us
in our supremest need.

If this system, or some analogous system, were
adopted we might soon rest secure. To those re-
sponsible the adequacy or inadequacy of the Navy
would mean their whole careers — just as at bottom it
means the nation's whole career — and it would shortly
be superfluous to ask whether or not we were ready
for war.

There remains, however, one element of readiness
which cannot be affected by any administrative change.
That element is the force of popular opinion. In time
of peace, popular opinion is most properly concerned
with the strength of the Navy ; it is, indeed, directly
due to its expression that we are even as well
prepared for war as we are. But those who have
clamoured, and most rightly and necessarily clamoured,
for an increase of the Navy in time of peace, must
remember that their function ceases from the first

moment of war. Public pressure on the Government

288

ARE WE READY FOR WAR?

to alter its plans in war time might easily be almost
irresistible, and as easily quite fatal. It is conceivable,
for example, that popular feeling might insist on keeping
a powerful force in the Channel when strategy cried
aloud that it should be sent elsewhere. To the lay
mind it is a hard saying that we should be saved from
invasion in the Channel by sending the Channel
Squadron to the Mediterranean. It might happen
that it was too hard a saying — that the Channel
Squadron was kept useless at home, and that thereby
we suffered a crushing defeat. Still more urgent
might be the appeals of residents on the coast for
protection from raiding and bombarding cruisers,
but those appeals must perforce be disregarded and
ought not to be made. We must all remember that
we are not makers of war by profession, and if the
hour of trial comes we must put our whole-hearted
trust in those who are. All we can do is to insist
with all our might in peace that we should be well
prepared. War we must leave, and we may with all
confidence leave, to the men who understand it. It
is not an easy thing thus to sit still under anxiety and
suffering : perhaps it is less easy than to go out and
fight. But it is all that the plain citizen can do, and
he ought to do it. Only in return he ought to be
vouchsafed assurances that his countrymen who wage
war on his behalf will be equipped so that they may
do justice to themselves and to him. If he is but
permitted to know what they require, it is most certain
that he will be continually forward to give it.

u 289

APPENDIX

PARTICULARS OF

THE PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

The subjoined tables give particulars of all the most
important vessels in the principal navies. In addition to
those described in Chapter IV., statements have been added
of the force of Austria, Japan, and Spain. The first two,
although not themselves of the first rank, might conceivably
be engaged in a first-class war as the allies of other Powers.
The Spanish figures have been given in view of possible
complications with the United States.

Full information is not always given by foreign governments,
and hence some spaces have been left blank. Trial speeds are
given when obtainable and trustworthy, and rough estimates
of coal endurance : both are subject to the considerations
put forward respectively on pages 89 and 99. The coal
endurance is generally reckoned at 10 knots, or at the
vessel's most economical rate of steaming. Where a vessel
is fitted to carry more coal than her normal stowage, the
higher figure and coal endurance is given. This involves an
increase in displacement, and a slight decrease in speed, until
the extra quantity is burnt.

After the figures giving the thickness of armour, i means
iron; c, compound plating; //, Harveyed steel; n, nickel
steel; and s, steel hardened otherwise than by the Harvey
process ; solid steel armour is denoted by the figure alone,
without any further description, m.l. after a gun means muzzle-
loading; q.f., quick-firing. Guns below 3 inches calibre are
omitted, so as to avoid unending figures. Almost all vessels
but the very oldest carry Hotchkisses and machine guns.
Where ships are officially divided into classes, the classification
has been adhered to for facility of reference ; but it is some-
times misleading, as has been pointed out in previous pages.

291

NAVAL POLICY

<
h

t/1

t— I

»o

°a

*-».

t»

r>.

«i Q

o
o

O
O

«^o

i— <

»— (

•— *

*S «>•

*>.

r>»

t->.

c •

()

•

o :

■*

s °

»-*

I-I

i-t

►— »

l-l

i-i

■a

■£=**

•-4M

"W<

HC4

ml-*

H«

-w

MH<

«H<

r4en

e>*

goo

t>.

t*.

r>.

fe*

Ctl

i-i
■a

fe*

C«J

fe*

a
<x>

a
a

^'vS

VO
O

e), 126

Q.F.

6-in.

VO
N

..s

VO
O

CI
en

CU -

t— 1

.5 .• VO

H,"5

>-i S V,

as a -

. CM

"~^

n -

(-<

"* — '

rq . cm

"7*

C i-i

M C

"7"

« B

"7 1

-O

~ex

t— t

O O

" a

" s «

Tj-

■*

•*

■ti-

■*

rj"

"«*■

Ti-

PL,

->:i

~*»

H«

^ ro

■*

•*

1— i

_ o

(72

■^

■<s

■o

««

-*a

*«

A o

■*

<*■

■*

>*■

►SJ

•<*

■<5

»«3

►«i

■*

M.a

t— t

^-»

H- 1

■*

■*■

:»*S

-5J

►*!

►*S

•a

CT>

t-t

1— I

1-4

»-l

4-*

«4

>»

s? :

r-»

■*

;

•

ij-

**■

•

I-

r--.

°i9 Ci Q\ ^t CO W O\00 rovO roOOO r^roin
/na.SavoO C?sCO CTvoo Ovo^OO OnO\OnOvo\JS
■MO+? COOOOOOOCOoOOOoOOOOOCOOOOOoOo
rtOS M IH - W « I-I « M « M H H H „ „

Q ft "• ^ ^ ^

j> . OOOOQOOOOOOOQO'o

St3 " ; o O O O O O O O O voo O O "^^
S^covvo vovo ONVO Ovvoro>-i 0\ Q\ <J\ 11 q,

&g H c-r 0" o" o" "sf o" cvf o" Cv •* cm" cm" if t£ '£

— J3

(0 rt

< Jjj

a o 6 o «g

? •! S ^ S E g ^ 5 ^g l o

U.£nnJvurtrtrt<uoS^orto

292

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

t+~

tN.

IT)

r>.

i~»

t>^

t-»

t>.

UT)

t>.

t^.

o
o

t-^

t->.

t^.

o
o

O
in

o
m

O
in

CN1

«*■

■*

-*•

mto> Ha r*» ~ vT> r*g *t" KM> HN KM «H< W MW •** «W MHt «h)i nw

vo r^r^i^t^t^voco r^t^co i^t^t^vo t^t^t^

fa fa fe ^ fe fe" fe ^ .S

• <? .<? .<? .<? .q .fa o-.d'.ri cSf.fi fa fa . ri h" « .

■f -t •? ■? •? ^ -s .s 6- j cy 6> a 6> 6> M

VOvrjvovovo^vovO.---. - ~

•T _, Cn ^ ^ 2 »Jh L' fa „ fa J 2 fa 2 fa -T ^ r/ -T -T -7 C "? -V "•?

10 ^:rv^crv-irv*-crN»-5/-vj!i -rv^"; 10 _. >~! vo vo vo "T vo vo o •

^o ^<" < " w< "^^^^ u^o^o 2C J o o o "° o o

■v c-~ u-~ C-~ ii-H ^ .S^.S,; H - " - vo

r >, eu £ a,js_ cxj^ o-j^ a, r So-so--. r ji r r r r r r -

i c «- C « c - C - C W7 C >- G ~ "7 V 2"? 'V "7 - 7 "7 "7 "7 tv,

■^Si i >.n "7 ,o '7 , "7 in '7 ir , hct •■? -7 H« q " -«n -ct •-«?) Hoi H?) MM "-H .

^^ h-INN^-(»-,(_C , ~ , h-lw- 1 ^ ^ J »^ C4 NN 1-4 KH h-l II V^^

tncorocomrnrncnco

w * "t ^ ^- rf 00 O •^■r^O t^t^r^»« t^r^co

v»«<S»«S'«!'*i'*Sv l »<»««Sv,»«Si J v.v>v»ViV>Vj

VO '* 'i - ^- rj- tJ- CO vo -^-vo OvovovOVOvovovO

"*■

"<t

■*

>«

■«!

•*!

■*!

►«

=«

'sj

t— <

►-4

r-^

«*■

H-

t— 1

1-^

■*

tv.

"*•

-t

N-

t-H

k-H

■ta-«

<*■

1-^

ON
CO

CO
ON

On
CO

ON
CO

1-^

ON
CO

On
CC

ON
CO

On
CO

ON
CO

in 00

ON CO
CO CO

N ON
ON CO
00 00

oogogooooooooooooo

O O O O O O ^-O oinininininoininiv.
moNONOvovONONONOvi-" m>— 1-1 f m« >— tj-

c5~TfTfrfrf^fi-rpfTfTfiN'TfTfTFo''-^ : rFd'

.......... s

J A * 5 I I s I a - 8 5 «

o~aJ$i2.2£vj'Crt§«<35ooo§

K = ^,2SSsofaDiKci^a:QiaDi(/j

293

NAVAL POLICY

r-.

°a

■*

<r>

■*

*1-

•*

i o

o
o

O
in

o
o

- U")

l>«

Jv.

*vo

■*

■"*

i£

r~»

t>«

*§

O N

QOPm

— <

I " H

J5 r-.

l-H

i-i

t-»

r*H

«*

e»

S. ^

t-»

CM -

•4

t}-

■*

■<f

■*

rj-

tic

q 1 .

<-*

CN)

•

•■j*

CM cv'

1-3

ivH

•

►4

■

JL ^

»=5

5; .

» M

c'.S

•*

(—

<=< j

t"*.
^

C i-h

3 "T

^-i

r*M

H«

6 "*" r

r«l

1-471

•7 ■*""

co
i— »

"-• vo

^ vo

l-H

J3
O

«5

tj-

■*

•*

'd"

•*

r .

_i
O

o
o

t— i CO

■*

c<*>

H?»

*<5

e ^

...

*^j

*t«i

*tvi

*»vi

"^4

't>4

"rsl

*(»»

.5 00

■*

1 i

(L>

■M

ri *°

"•^

*t*4

*»»4

'fsl

**4

"fvi

**4

*r>4

*f*4

**s*

**M

•—

I 1

.Soo

•*

Mrt

»-*

►-i

—

H-t

*-i

a 1

^ ^*

-si

'^4

*<sk

*f<i

*tsi

*(*4

*tsi

**>»

*Psl

•**

•cJ

.2 o

•*

"4-

l-H

i— <

t)-

"3-

■*a

»->.

^ CM

•*

vo"

<~o

cm"

►-i

tj-

^1-

■*

O i

§ o

l-t

r>.

o 3

2 o>

r^.

t>.

t^.

■u o

£ so

rtO

. o

c o>

o
o

5«

«a

*-t

t>.

M-

rl-

■*

tml

•*

•—

k-H

l-H

•

6 CO

n
o

i/i

ITS

4->

a «

S5 - 1

r-
co

3
O

'C
o

h-»
o

z
o
o

rf
bo

•a
c

W
3

(/)
_o

hfl

3
O

a
•a

•a

3
O.

■2

<u
1*
<u

•3

C
3
43

li.

294

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

t~»

"3-

"1 CM CM CM CM

CO On On On On

CO i-l M H II

■*

U">

t1-

r-^

•*

Tl-

O
m

o
o

O
O

t^.

i-«

—

i— i

»-*

1-1

i-t

1— »

U-N

O
in

O
CM

O
in

O
CM

o
in

o
o

O
O
in

o
o
1>-

O
CO

CM
in

CO
CM

1-4

CM
CM*

co
in

i— i

-hM*

On
On

►•h

-*1
On

J 1

:C J

d ""?

C-

s r-

■*

"7 *"
On tJ-

U")

■•? CM

On m

C« VO

■*

CM **■

1-1

hij

h-1

h-)

^^^

«S5

<=5

*4-

■ —

ter<
<5

s?.

E C

f— —

£^

"7*

■f-i

"""

-.— >

• ■— 1

• ■— t

*" -

• ■^h *7*

. -H

O r^

CM «-»

"" ■*

^^ HH

•*

"3-

*d-

<3-

«*

■*

He*

-«n

■-*>

KH"

■

»-«

—

N-t

t-^

■

't>4

*f«4

"Cnn*

*p**

*^A

"fr4

*rs*

*1"A

■^4

*p*

"lN»

r4M

•—

*— t

t-H

vrj

N^J"

■«a

**>J

*PNi

He*

*(*»

***»

*t»J

*PN»

-o

*fS(

U")

H- 1
l-t

\r\

■*

*«S4

'cM

**4

*tM

*«s>.

*»vi

*xj

*f4

'»**

*n^n!

*»>*

*»^

'♦M

'•Si

'HlN

—

t-»

l-H

■*

•*

—

— ■

r>.

r^.

•*

t~»

r~~

Tj-

t-l

«*

*-*

*-«

—

*3-

**■

■<t

<N1

«3-

i-*

t-H

<-"

l-«

t^.

t>.

!>.

^s.

C>.

IV.

^-t

r>.

t-H

»-H

r>.

•*

"*■

■*

CO O

w z

< LU

■A lL

Oqhj

7 S

3
O

■ — <

"55

a,
o
u

u
O

t/1

3
O

4->

— -^

■ — -

.3
u

Ihj

ci
3
O

0)
Oh

— 1

X <

H O

_4J

"«3

-t->

*—*

rt
u

-a

t-H

3
O

8
o

o
_3

i-H

295

NAVAL POLICY

c :

O
s.

u
ll

h-
tn
<
o
O

z
<

co
<

I-

I
CO
ID

DC
CO

i +-

o ©

CM ■- •-
CO m VO
CM •- VO

VO VO

3 <D

w rt

o? O

« co

O
m

i- CM

o
in
vo

o
o

rt C » ■ o o o

rt J5 ,o rj- CO 00

O O
^J- in
in in

ft
W

■J.

»5

O
O

« s

>
<A

CJ m

•^

*"3

, • 00

^4-

•O

►4

i-3

—

.-^

t^ c

■*'T

"T 1

_u CN

t-r- '

"-h

1-4

>—

(

•a

3§

3
X!

fi«

tt,fl

r«q

•*

c"~

**4

•*»»

*f*4

"<^

i-*N

-4-»

bfl

<— 1 I

.-CT

■*

*T3

■*

•

t^»

-M

S7^

r^~

"— '

u-l

t-t

O I

©a.

-i "*

t-4

co.

3 r^

r~»

«o" 00

£°2 ~

!-•

n— i

►-H

»-l

,_|

o>
»2

«■: o

-C

§3

1— 1

c?>

.2d

C-H 1T>

CTi

1
in

z w

c
o

< O

C/) U

(—1

co \>- t

. — 1

< w

^-.

i n

1
u

c
_o

'a,
u
o
u
CO

n
CO

d
1

a,
E

P3
H
c72
i— i

rt-

C3\

■<*•

•

jt^.

•*

Nrf

Cv.

H-l

M^J

H«

t-^.

»*

i-<

•— •-

iJ pt, fo pu, pi, fn

^ c j c> c j c^ cy

i— i ■ . • . •

c c c c c

•*}• .3 .3 .3 .3 .3

!_. I I I | I

„ VO vo in vo VO

[^ O O O O CM

C^ r : r "r "r

d .5 -S .3 .S .3

^ CM CM CM CM CM

,_ On C7> O C?< OS

— CM CM CM N li

vO co CO VO VO vo

1-401
-3-

VO VO VO

<o Vj

VO VO

l-H

t-H

r-»

•*

•

■3-

, ,

CJ\

(— t

■*

()

Jt--.

t-«

t>.

H-l

•n

■—

6
o

"rt

•a

< < < OQ D3 O

296

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

I-W

o
CM

o
o

§o
o
CM

CM >H

O
CM
vo

rr co
vo •<*-

cm oo

vo rf

n- •* o

00 ON CM

ti- co vo

o
o
o

8 8

o o

o o o

8 8 8

o o

CM o

1-1 CM

o
o
on

vO
CM

S 8

to O

M ON

o
o
o
CM

o
CM

HOI

M7I
O ON

CM M

o
CM

o o o

O O vO

ON O CM

CO «

O
CM

CM x ►*

t>. CM ON On

m CM >h m

On
00

O
CM

- VO

df 2

VO
>-h CM

CM
ON
CM

—

VO
VO

vO
O

VO
O

c .fa

fa fa
cy 6>

VO
O

c c

fa fa

•*

fa
6>

Oh
CM

VO
O

CM
On
CM

.- m c

vO . vo

CM fa cm

c c c

•7 Ph'T
«««

CM M

vO
O

fa • fa

.S .5

vO _ .VO

cm' fa o

^v_a

a h c

•v _vr

%«

On >i on
CM CM

CO vO

CO vo

in vo

.-w

<*■

•

•*

*-*

l-l

i-i

■*

►H

"*■

r~-

i—i

t>«

^t-

«*

•

t->.

—

■*

—

■*

r-»

r>.

■*

">*■

^_^

^-.

>-»

l-l

»-

—

*-"

■*

t--.

t-^

l-l

1— 1

**.

*-».

l-l

•*

«f

»-l

•>«

E
•o

rt
tvO

•a

B
o

E
s>.

•o

CI)

■4J

E
E

<u
'C

a.
E

3
(/)
</)

'o
u

o
o

• — ■

a
jt

Ih
<U

H->

>>
o

Ih
O

'C
u

If)

fa'

297

NAVAL POLICY

2
cc

o
z
<

(0
CO

h-
00

UJ
CO

I
z

CC
00

VO
O

5 1 ~

o"n
cm

•*

•^4

^vo

3<g ,°vo

r*»

r>.

*— <

Tfr

•*

Endur-
ance.

Miles.
7000

•

■

r~»

jv.

>— 1

g.i?! §

<*■« c2 °^

p-i

^O H

*~*

S ^N

t*+

«*#

«*

-*«

CO -

i-«

►H

fa *.

fa*

QJ O

o»

r- - 3

"7 1

r^.

i^»

J^ ^

t-»

t-*

■*

TJ- . *

•<s-

■*

■* .

•

VO fa°°

vo fa

rC, "

•»

rO"

fa .fa

fa .

• CM

c « a

c S

VO
O

vO
O

vo °° vo

vo°0

—

"*■ CM

<D m CO

r4S

1-1

Gun

Posit'n.

In.

Bulk-
head.

In.

•

<*•

■*

1— 1

t-t

t-H

■*

° • g ON

a .2 00

t-t

Q a

v -^

o
o

VO
CO

000
000

CO *3- Tf
tJ- CO co

8 8

CO
VO

vo
CO
•<t

O
VO

O
O
VO

OOO
vo vo O
CO CO VO
tJ- rj- vo

<£

z •§

w I
So

i-2

co 2

cc cc

n <

•4-*

• —•

ctf

"0
0,

<u
u

298

fll

O
1

■4-J
(/l

G
O

4->

• •H

X»

CIS

3
rrt

ctl

*v4

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

i/->

t^.

*■%,

l>.

!>.

■<J-

■*

•*

CN1

ti-

O
in

o
o

•

■

•

t-«.

t*.

r~.

■*

U"l

»— <

»-)

•-H

H-

<**

-<*

-W

CCW

mhji

C-i

»-<

fc *-- L-

cy cy cy

cy cy

r~-

t-<.

rj- •

. rf

. •*

lO fe

fevo

U* oo

rr>

i ..

ry .-

rv r

^ .

In'

.fe

cy cy

cy cy cy cy

Pn En

cy d 1

o»

.S e -S
^ ^ ^

vofeio^ 00

.-cy :cv

"vi-
VO

fe (n fa

c c .5

t^ i^ ^r

■<j- r . -4- . '*

rev ro\ r

cv ^cy 9-cy o-c^ cy 2 cy cyo-cy^ cy cy c J . ccya-cyS-cy

_ G _ - _,

CM . CM

.S *" .S M .2 M .2 .S .5 .2 c m c h- _c

I^OOvo

VO 00 vo 00 vo 00 <£)

U-) U"> U"> N

VO'

_ N • CM _

c m T a w c « c

"7* 10 "? "V "7*

VO VO 00 vo ^ vo

N « iO in N

•O

■

M ITt

__ <u

i-i

S> 5

COCOCONNCONNCVlNNCNlN IcocONi-!™

4-*

. . U-i

• .en

. 1 .. 1 I . Z .......••• >~

. i . . i i ill - ;....... u

. . — - — Jt

::::::::::::::::::c

OOOnioOnvomoo r^^-r^ONVOt^r^oocov°

r>.NTj->-ii-iii->i-N. ^O^^li^^^oovoONVOlo^)

CNIOcooOOOOnO ■ .CMO—OO'-iO^OO^'*;^

N i- o! m" o* h ^f : •roi-r>-''-< , copr'4-'-^00

10 vn 1^ ^- ^- o * CNloooooo — liiiot^Tj-g

CMNCMCNCV1NN e»l-l»HW«««'-'IHp [|

^_^

, ,

•rf

•*

rf-

Tj-

t-N,

t>.

**■

>3-

■*

■<*•

">*

■4J

(/I

.2*
"0

(X.

•0
n)

VI-)

(fl

»— ■*

a
9
1— >

ctf

•a

299

NAVAL POLICY

OS N

1-^

t^.

t~»

1-^

t^»

l-~

Endur-
ance.

Miles.

8500

O
O

O
in

t-~.

r>.

■*

sb?ss

rt -s m

^0° H

t—t

«H<

ml*

Ml*

r-^

U N

""^

l-»

—

*-*

•—•

I-H

fa
ex

fa ^

fa ^L, fa fa fa

d' d' cy cy 6*

(n h h

6> 6> 6>

<"o

co
<

z
O

.—

.3. "7

4 . *

l^
4

•a
3

•

VO fa VO

JO' r

fa*

VO
O

o -

cys.cy

i/>

..i

—

c«c

■

VO ^ VO

in N

3
11

<n
. ^>

o ^ • Ha ^3

<Dk,N .rn :Ni-iNNNNNroNNN2

|£ « ::::::::::: : : : S

og~ .... jj

_^ . -

■ _• °

Wg ■ or,

00 H < • • • • • • • • • • • ' V

«* .a

CD-. ....... .......

2=:::::::::::::::S

o
o

in 00

"*■ ON

t 1

i-« in

1^ •*

VO
00

rrt

m
in

vo"
00

vo"

5fl CO
Q

O
vO

1-*

c»

t-t

•"'

»-l

l-»

»*

. a o

o>a.2 &

-1-

„

*; 0*? 00

O P.

■*

t*.

■*

s
s

CO
CO

<
J

o
o

a.
S

3
u

-*->

•a

fei

300

a.
rt

;_J

■e

•3

t/}

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

LT)

OrOvomrOOO „ nrtSooO <UQ - fa TJ <D

»Ot^Nr^t-.mvo O _ R j3^.h 2.-J! O -Be

rt-N fON N ■*■<*■ M O u -g"- £ 5 Q< O O C/Grt

c 2 c M ^ I; ^ § < d PS H

& K S, g, i : «r -o !a3 a d JF! * ** *

00 00 00 00 c c

« a O g § 1 ; 4? S S

u-)

mow -2. so «2"S a ° u
3 g * r a c £* o g « s
§ -* § e -a ~ w .2 < o 2 £

« M «w *. § B *ss-q„":§< 02

^ r^ On ON O On W d O oTc'SjO r rt O .-

.<2 ^r ri Q S - S/3 _ id rt ,_1

o on r^ on on o on « c« 2 <n~ o\ Si o _r rt o „rn

fa h ^ ^ fa fa

* .S -S .S d d 2 " "1 II .4= SI «S § iS" o K « 00

^ ^ fa fa <a ^r ,~'j o c •- S rt rt

O 1 Cr Cr cy ry a ? , i) ,S3 Sg £ <u

^ fa no c vo no ^ '* ^ fa 3 5 T B'S 1 SbAG«& 1 So

fa. fa Q fa fa fa fa . ^ § g, -^ c II «T S oT-^K K — c

did d d d d * d s - w > s 3. 3 s 2 a .« I 8 1

•"' 'T "T "7 "T - 7 - 7 2 rT rt- ■_ O w 0> C C W S

vo^vo 00 vo vo vo^vo^^ g - ^C OO'-CJCJ-J rt" 5

* « « *, N « ^ a -g, § .s|g^|iSo E^g

g 'S a c o II c £ «; £g

i-<

iri

1^1

•*

T)-

t-H

■

«T>

t>.

!>.

<3\

»-«

t-l

— ■

—•

IlO

■<1-

§7 « °*-i28-g.fa -o-Bg
■3. 2 .y g j-«-? lu5 9 5 N

& 3 ^ <u 2 — vo g £» tJ b „

6 I Sr^-| I-J-h Sit

S « ^-^C-'coi-najSCu^

G -in 01" D C _T3Q^

'— < ^ to ^O^j-iSirtnbcN

^- H VO *li *7* ft- "^

S .S> 5§ 2'-h§o^

i .^ —5 ^ on " t \ u .r* i_ y r T

rG fa /n'S^^O" — < - , o^" c ' i|

^ „ m , 3 o5coUo.S < M%

■Si g . S^g^-^SU g 1 Jo

o o

j3 a.

8 ^.mS 9-ocq o ^w

(0 0)

2 0) CS

jfahhhh>> 2^

NAVAL POLICY

1 .a

C D.

m en

" c"

.G l-O

- c

c <u
23

in C

:=! o £

4»S

<u -. c

W c3 _
■a o

jg co <-^

3 ►. 8

^^ ri
W "S c

"3 to S

.ir^j — '

J4 rt 4>

« <u rt

■21 S -o
at «$ a

2 K 5
"3 T3 "3

J3 C O

CO vfS <->

O O. w

.§.§ 8

rt , * ^c

<8°*

3 a S

& «

rt w c

W On ?

W-d"

•a

a
rt

iu a) w a) 2r
3 S 3 O..S O
■a u q

s, 5 -

£41 O

2 .C (N

q ^ J i
. _to£ 'g

<u 5 g <u 4) *«

N rt "3 •£ In o

rt Ll 5 «i S3 "2

u sis c

4> o

8 JH

u -I -

n •** 3 ■« rt ci

C W .b

« rt *" • "-" n

5 rt -g CO ^ o
±i G O J3 <ii

-2 Sco ^"*

4) J? O ' 4) _

4) P ►_, c/i "£

.g k ^r rt J!

CQ 2 I o ^
_r fit 5 w &

< Q cl °^

^ •!-> O > C

— r S*.c 4) to ^

1 8 i^K -

""• 4> 3 -^

n „,

1 JSK^o

3 O

*-• -* TO

« ba b 3 to _

ba.SEO' 8

I "O.S boo

CO .i< aii m

DC 4) rt a 3 N

>- rt *** i- tO o o

go >,0U j. S ro

c "O J5

Si 0, ti r it s

CO +,- C 43 b-

6. HO gco-ai

DCS . 3 4) rt

S § i a a N s

>Oa£ I

rt ?- "■! ^- ^i c> ,—

.2 *f "" & --
on „ o c

rt £ G d .N
43 4) t>» &•

o b J co

4) C

3 1)

I S

■3 CO

4)
>

4)
U

"O Im

C 3

rt XI

«T «
m ^^
rt rt

n °

H o

„ o
G °

d
o
o
•_>

Cfl

fo
d

. ^

I-
<
o

9 .5

6 v.

UJ cc
0. T3
CC 3

O <^i

h.s<

G 4J

'5 <°
" &

in O
4) 4»

d> a*

J3 O
^_i a)

<U m

3 •<

4) (/)

J3 4}

^ 4>
4>

G
rt

.2-

-op Q

t« G

rt O

G o
b>

S c£
> o
C -P

4)
O

G
4)

2 to

.2 4)

Q ^

u) 3

& s

.— &

u $

* 3

rs 4)

G ^

*j 4?

£ s

4> vO

S co
rt

.e •«

G
O

• — « Td

s ^§

^ 4>
M

•

.s
1

(^>

■*

.5
06

< n

M
H
H
<

^ >

c *r^

^|<M

h5 m

•-I

•>4

»• HO

c'O tn

, M

■

■*
■*

;

i-i

■*

CT.

r»

r>.

2 d

►1

h-<

—

^-'

y* 3
^2 «

»2

r>.

■<->

a,
a
•a

N
O
■*->

3
<
4)

•o

G
rt

G
O

302

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

OONO.OCO. ooo

3- & at m • 3- c*. : VC Y2 !£

to ^- ^*- to ' *}• vo ^r^ - ^ -

•

!->.

■*

-.!■»

c fc* *. fe fe .

3, • Qi • o» • <y <y

* c c c .S a ri .S

VO .~ «S *«H < •*-) «rH ■

r h'« t^ on °^ -*« 0. ^

_) CO ^ ^ vo CO ^ vo

«J ^ vo vO ^ ^ to *"

ri .S i a 4 4 4 4

on «. A n t N - ^ t

00 >-i 1-1 ON 00 On ON

00 ro n ■* 00 vo ■*•

«■♦

1-4

»-l

t-t

-*i

r^l

1-4

t-t

l-H

*•»

fn.

1— 1

O
O

«"^

1— :

1— 1

»^

«>.

t>.

*-»

— <

t>.

1—

•

■ — <

C
CIS

•

1-1
>

•

•a

•

02
P3
H
03

U-l

«*

•

O 1

**■

Hi-*

r+^t

r-J^

«t

1*4

•<t

•8

tj-

■*

(71

v>- Jj

O 4)

2 1 1 -5 W I ^ fc .2 .5

2 , 2"rtMatr- a»o)4J

■2 -2 o o § .S M .§

303

NAVAL POLICY

i *»

Op.

«*

«3-

s-. .

—

o
o

** o

•

o J

*5 ro

'i-

•*

S°

o
o

O
O

o
o

rS-p*
v°°

H 00

i— i

■d

H-f

H«

t-4

rt|M

M-

o "">

TJ"

r-»

".5

•

oo •

• d

• •

HO .

°° r 6

N oo

tn*

U-,

<x>

.S e r

a 1

r'o
vd
O

On
ro

VO C VO

2 .'^2 _

• VO

ro
•vo

..<
a

Hit'

■ a

c . r - 7

c.S.

v c

C-7

.SC*I

N .

C C On"7 _c

CM "> N

i VO

vo ►" 00

" vo vo VO «C/„

■*

r .
*

-W

-*«

«W

0*+

^4^

-4N

r#>

ui
< >

i— i

M *

■*

•*

.»**

-*>

.-K*

COW

cow

r*)

HOI

col*

c vO

•4-

■*

'^~

*->

.-*>

cow

COW

VJ r4X

nh(i

COW

cow

Hoi

ft!

r-t

c <->

t-i

rZt^c

*>.

»-*

>- CM

*■«

—

* «

t-i

i-^

►-*

ffl

tv.

^l-

o
O

t-H

*-.

^—

"">

»>.

t~»

o^i

oi.O O voO VOOOO VOCM O 10VOO

3*i «— vOO"iON-*Qt^OO>-iOvOON
ng cq, N CMVO rovo O CM0000 r^ii ON

aiEHH ii CM^ -"^CM ►-. « O O CM 00

s o <« * —

m nl 3 bus 5 o .2

•3 -g 3 3 § .5 E rt rt 3 > u .«

<l<nnnuuuui)Qii«ii.
304

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

m O

•*

ro O
VO

m tJ-

N rn

in rn rn

o
o

t-»

■*

«*

o
o

o
5

o
o

»-*

►— i

*-*

H|<N

-*<i

1*1

■*

ti-

xfr

lOl-H

,o>

.E ^

"00

R 8

•«

COW

i-«M

H«

fHftt

: rn

<fr

■o

«H>

r*<l

*40J

►S

t-<«

BH>

<->

Ml*

^C*l

-*N

: ^o

■*

c.l-*

Tj-

i— «

►-*

1— 1

t-H

H- 1

»-«

>— i

r*M

>•>

>-)

H«

«H>

e*#

: co

c**

tj-

CCHI

■ t—i

►H

H- (

l-t

»-t

i— i

—

i-t

■*

Iv.

• 1— <

►-H

(V)

C!\

is in

Ov rn

Ov vo

n" *s

m vo

rvi

00
ts

in Ov O
ts is >-i

N 00 vo

Ov
in

V
V)

3
CO

E
o

.s ^

r fa

CO " A

•

fa
C J

d .S

»*N

C ^" lr<,

•=:

"7 C

" C\

r-t?l

vnjt, ov

• (-«

N fa^

c^ r

rn
" 00

t-H

* .VO

O M

Ov
ro
CO

-*.S'T

rn-w^
>-i in „

fa ■*

—

.Sfa"^

N Xjrn

—

.S viv-S

'a ^

00 Z.

t— i

M IS

CV! ^>

Cv!

■* IN

9-1

bfl

c
<u

■o

c
o

o
o

u
u

J-»

4->

b/J

v(U

(Tl

•a

T «

CD
Oh
O,

vO)

(/>

.o
rt

I/)

■e

a
i

3
O

_CD

3
n

*->

•a

<i)

C/)

305

E
Id

2
*o

h)_I

.££
"53

•3 <

NAVAL POLICY

*>.

°s

•*

o
o

.—

U-l

•

<3-

■<!•

§.>>

l-H

•

re ••-<

Tj"

*d-

■*

M-

<3-

•a

l-H

—

fa*

•

4j>

t-H

•

"7*

"i*

■ 1

"J*

fa*

He»

f"^

ft!

r«q

^4N

ih|N

i-*M

H«

f— *

HOJ

-1M

ITN

u->

6 1

NO
NO

•»■*

• pH

• ■-H

(-"

• ft

co^

^t 1 -

^^L

" i

"*?

■*

. Tf

"St"

. •*

. n-

T}-

Tl-

1-^.

vdC c

*><y t

t^.

r-^.

■*?

( M
o

.-W

<ii

■*■

.55

•**

rt fl *
9*"

1— 1

■*

»— i

-<l?>

f-4?l

*H|-rf"

•

■*

•

>-o

^J-

Tj-

W i

t>-

•

o ^

l-H

■*

>— <

l-H

«*

■*

2-^

"h-

<*■

•*

«J fl

l-H

H-(

l-H

p.®

t^.

r-»

.a a

«t

"*■

t-4

< .

-ASS
URED

-*->

"3
q

-4->

1- tc
CO <

>>
N

9
u

•a

n
rt

<c8

c
rt

o
3
O

3
JS

4-»

<a>

306

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

oo ,„-

»o

tJ-

■*

Iv.

r>.

t>.

t--.

'i-

o *■"
■"oo

vO,5"

O
O
O

O
O
00

N oo

VN "

•d-

o o

C O

C
O

r-^

■3 -

(/)

t—t

■*

l-H

IT)

■3-

'j-

°co
r a

3
vS

-m

•hH*

mi-*

-4?1

-ft

^N»«

r4?l

C/S

t-H

l-H

l-l

»-«

»-(

1— •

tjj

fx|

1*1

pe|

P*l

f-1

'rU

pel

Ph"

Pt|

^h"

pel

Pel

•

pel

IS)

a 1

°?

co tuO

.2
6\

d
6v

•-*M

.2
4s

VN^

■O 4)
C o

rt .o

■*

rt-

•*

-^-

■k

■*

■'*

••

■

#*>

fce.

pel

r^H

pel

^-<

fe*

[-H

pel

r*" S

>>
.2

C J

o 1

q 1

C J

•?

VO _•

*—<

^ o

"f/5

r'o

G N

O „

t/T

vO"

vO*

vo'

VO"

vo*

vo'

■*

'd-

ti-

"3-

t-*r>

-*g

r4S

H«

■-*»

rn|M

H«

•H

>—

u-l CO

bfl

•

■

•

w 5
.!2 vn

rt
CJ

- 5 2

•

\<U o
ds N

3-4

4-J

t-<

73 r

v°

r-)

, '",

r^.

00^

r~»

oo"

■*

in"

vo"

-rv

4-1

i— i

t-H

'55 ,g

O -iri

u
U

•*

•>*

><*•

■*

> io

rt .

J *

•

to 5

r-^

CO r^

ifl

—

— ' —

r>.

e- 1

vj-i

•*

■

rl-

•M-

■vj-

rr
J2 o

<3J

—

CO u

Class C
D CLA

nde, T

o
o
o

M
ca

-— •

, -

rr tt

□

•

-O
3

•

d
o
o

l*rt

a
o

z
o
o

ta4

£ s

U TO

3
O

rt
in

"S 2^

lid

'« u"

_ i-

O CJ

UJ
CO

fafl

rt
<u

4-*

3
O

u
rt
u

rt
-a

c
rt

o
•— >

"rt
u

4-1

■4->

V
J3

o -

< o

'■4->

- — <

In
»— i

— 1«

■*

307

NAVAL POLICY

a a N N N N O

gg vn m m m on
, t ,2; vn in in vn u->

VO
ro

VO 00 00 VO VO VO

t^ vo vo vi r-» r^

ro vO vo ro ro ro

9 a> id

O
O

"2 a 5 :

■*■

&B g vn

o
vn

O
vn

i— i

5«H^

t*>.

t>.

Speed.
Knots.

H01

l-t

h h h h h
<y ^<y m <y .c> .cy

. c c ' c " c " .S

** *? ."? ■"? ."> • A,r *

a ^^^^^

^ .-t r-r r-r rr r^
c * c "* c ■*.c ^i-_c T

■■? rn'T ^"7 rn'7 rn'T ^
_, _, _, _ ^ N

H M "00 "00 H M q\ IH

VO VO vo vO ■*

"vO
O
VO

O
O
5^

ro
vn

•<*■

ov
vn

O
v>
N

On
vn

VO
O

6>
.s

vO vo

'5- fa

■VO -Qi

ONfa Ovfa 4j-
viQJvnQ 1 ro
M . ** . «
C 7 C

2 <>2 Ovcfv

oo oo oo

ro
VO

d»

ro
vO

-5 C V C i J C .>;

VO VO

( M
o

£ vN

-*■»

i-«

r^ra

eject-*

«H>

•«;

>»

—

<s»

■ m

r+j<

«H

mM"

■*!

ccH"

C**

■*)>

c vn

V M

" M

i-i

t-i

vO O vN i- M O0 N

O0 VO N Tf rf r>. M

oo vo O m ro m in

■<*■ vo" rf vn in t>T n"

tT O •- O ro N O

■* t1- tj- vn N t}- tJ-

«H

O 1

M
o

—

«*

■*

<d a

cr»

on :

t>.

!>.

t>.

■7 S

Q°

i~*

A .

c
o

o 5

•-*

•*

■<1-

'4-

"4-

■*

p.2

o «

tv.

t-»

>—i

^-« NN

_l
O

•a

ho vu be

3
.£>

n
a>
•a
c

3
<L>
U)
(0

^ ^

J5
O

"C
•a

- — «

<L>
V)

•a

o | g» I

•3 Pi 3 -^ ^3 O :J3

rt cd o» d 2 rt »>
CQ D3 Q UJ O (/) >

308

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

VO
to

VO
IN

vo
N
IN

VO vo

1-
o\
to

o
o

r>» vo
to vo
lO N

vo
vo
IN

VO
VO

ON VO
vo vo

vo
vN

O ui

vo N
VO N

VO
N

8vo
1^ N

vo vo VO vo

•*

.5 'cy

vo
vd

•■O'n

c5»

fa fa
c> cy

-a-

Ti-
to
CO

— ■

fa*

fa
6>

to
O

5-S.a

d t*

M fOov
<4- CO

Ov
CO

on
to

"7 • 3
Ovfa "T

N co

° 8

t^ O

I^ VO

vo CO

O
vo

O
O

o
o

I^ o

vo O

1^ vo

ON to

(0
(0

*> s
n

in
(/)
O

•a °

•a I*?

.*" "5

fa fa

•a
c

01
J3

^3 rt ^

•a

(LI

bus

■V-5

!>. VO

to VO
vo vN

o
o

O "1
vo M
VO N

VO -7

r * "*

-C^vO
o . -

'3.S.S

d ■* •*

M fOcf,

Tf fO

*«

-«

►*i

**i

■*t

m-*

KHI

ccHi

KH"

o»*

—

•si

»«i

-5i

►«i

►«

<-*x

-«q

r-H*

-H-

*-H<

-iw.

*>.

— i

»o

•

t--.

t-<

-H

t-t

■>*■

r»

o o

r^ O

t^ vo

VO to

[/)
tn

fa <S:

309

-•a

Si*

U CL,

<u •-

'to

"O .

rt >

p -->

a s

CO ~^

2 8

rt «

O
vU S

■s 1

fcvO

<L>

S
<U

O T3

-*fl 3

0) rt 3

1*3-5

S C rt

3 <* W

JC to .

3 C

«. 3 U.

3 U)J)

"O . >>

O 3 n*

O -7 CQ
O <n
w _

U M a

g-3 H

S « 03

8 -7
ft N

o -

C 3

.Si 5

m s

O
O

3 -a

'D5 00

rt -

CQ c

o a,

Z T3

o 1

Q on

LU O

£C «

D ""

O-o

i I

< &

3 41

>!^

rt
Ui -3
IU ."3

■3 6

< u

s (U

> 2

(0 13

'C «

•*£

■£ 3

rt
O , —

,£s J)

CL, 3
01

4) ui

C/l rt

</> C

O H

_l
o

I-

00
DC

Li.

—
to

•

— ■

•S fe

t 6>

CO • •

C 1

CO .3

r CN&<

l-l

fa "^ry

■*

C J « .

<-* j-

H-<

c r h-
•V .fit

On^-7 to

« -*

r4n

•5;

•

•«;

■

•

to O
to

to
vo

O
vN

00
00

a
■*■>
m

3
<

.— n

9 bfl

oi
rt

.2*
'iu

•3

LU
00

n
o

<3
01

NAVAL POLICY

CO
CO

Q
2
O
O

UJ
CO

Z
<

DC
UJ
O

ii -

8* ">

oo
IT)

ill

CT>

O
CO

2oo

c5»

ON
in

"4-

fa fa Feh

cy a d -

v • • •

.s ..s ..s

C^fa ^fa "^fa

in^y ^C^ "SO 1
oo -•

6 •* c r "*

T ro , r«V7 to

*! o N . o N . o

00 "" 00 M oo —

BJ3

t *-» ^

O I H rs.

00
00

£0

TO d " r>

"5." -H §•

Q s

o
o

\o ^o

■a

1
CO

•

•G

HI
CO

01
N

• »■«

•— 1

"a,

.G
H

c
d

C G

"? o

M <G
^ t/>
<» IB

G G<

^? «

00 ^

HI 0)

o -£

O cd

ri-9

4) O

< &
^ 1-.

<u o

4) fa
W ^

(IS

. o

'a, w

O
O
O

O
u

u
O

c
o

• t-l

<u
O

u
u

!m C/l

D
CC

co
<

cc O

o g

< h

a c"

3; o

c •-.

CU CJ

S ■£

s °

,0 «J

•*- c

O ?

< 5

. "S

« -a
a, «

05 to

ri
4>

o
o

u
o

1-1 Jj

o <2
Him i?

fi «
- c

3
t/J N

fa 2

O
O
10

O
O
in
>*

O
O
O

O
in

O
O
O

10
in

fa
6>

G . G . C .
"T fa ■V fa 'T fa

00 N r^

-? "■? :-t

C tU d t^.G tv

6 "*t^ ^ 6 "*

w 00 *" ■*• M in
>* rf -*

e>»

Ph
t— 1

•

cow

•— •

•— 1

»n

O
>*

eT
00

•

t-H

HI
HI

CO
CO

•

• «-*

•a

rrt

1-
co

DC
U.

•a

a
<

•a

d
Q

310

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

y-n

D 0)

•

Tj-

■*

fi^

1-^

■*

t>.

D
.0 xi

o
10

O
O

u-i

•

<U <u

r>.

•3-

s ^

u->

.2 O

t-l

1-1

i-»

l-l

1— 1

-a -x:

<_ - 5

Tj"

r>.

t-^

1 '- ,

►h

—1

i—i

A g

l-l

C-l

l-«

•S H

fa"

f^i

t->.

§^

•* ■

"*• <

■ <rt-

• Tj" •

• *

_ a

■*

a-«

■4— »

6 ^
2c

•VO^

' v6

*o fa .5

6>fa <^fa
00 .co .

W J2

§ .5

io-in., 8
4.7-in. Q
17-in., 2
Q.F.
17-in., 8
Q.F.
17-in., 8
O.F.

r.5* N & r .S r .S
•7 *"*" S a -S t^.S *■>•

Maria Pia,

s, and steam

■*

^}-

.- a>

O H

f-W

-+*

>S «5

J5 ^j

•c s.

erw

>-H<

r+f

w _

-"t

•*

-u> —

in -^

rt *c3

i-w

ccw

<o"-

n vo vn

nT y

CT>

S M s *

O, Oh

"*■

«t

, Ancon

[y re-anr

O
O

«o

"*■

<" T-

•

1^.

*>.

l/->

i-«

i-t

.1^

CO , rj

•a cc

H-t

l-l

.O vJT

-n

1— 1

Jc 5

f>.

•

*^ §

l-t

1— 1

I— 1

1— 1

1 £

"o c

1-^

u->

12 2

H-t

■<*■

g «

t-H

•<*•

^ y

.-<

£»

^3 vn

i- O

-5

D *-■

> -s

_•

O n-

'" <*-

'S °

-u

C C

•

■ — <

•

O O

• 1-1

•a

^ O

11
> 10

(1)

3
a
cd

c/l
4)
CJ

a
cd

"cd

•4-»

c
cd

.0.
6

'So
o/>

s
ha

-a

.»H

O ^3
tr. r-

—
•—

l-l

O 10 o o o

VO "- VO VO

It K) t * >t

1- 1 ^ —

o
o
o

ro
VO

o
o
o

O Cv

OOO

M "H

M CVl N

c a

r ■ r ■ C

*V "7

fa m -v

t^ t^

cy cy 12

tj- • tj- •

w • • ^- •

VO O

.5 .S

•*

^fa ^fa r "

fa , r

u-l— •, "1 -fa

2 2^'

_c ■

3 t~» C A.*7 .

Osfa'7^,'7 JL"? _L ^fa

jf*. as^.oa ^co '* li ^ rH .

O'uiO'c^vO cfsVO O

1-1 vO

N CM 11

i-*S rJtTl rHWl

*»*

"^4

♦»4

■*

•

■<*■

•

■<*■

•

'*■

u-i

"■)

u->

•

*-*

■<*■

Tj-

"->

h-»

Ui
0)
Si

*-*

•O

a
cd

-u>

"2J

NAVAL POLICY

1 +»

O Q3

;

nots ;

1 -in.

5 and

erful.

— Q«

^ -a a s=

m %

« e s

cm cs to &.

4) .

•

- t/> — m
—•, to •

i>>

C C F*I 5*

54?

■r ■•*•"?

v£5

• 1 U5

■^ m C

a
co

.2 00

in
1^.

t-4

10 ~ ° *r

~ C ri ™

^ 00 W r-—

O cn ~ rt

*° S N J*

^ | cs hO

rt nTQ

(—•

-o CQ -|3

■° « »° 2

2 S 3

.2 § «f

.-£ "^ •- s U

2 is

? c

"S»

«st

/ 4

u e -w

C^l

•*1

Hoi

C ^1 H-l •-!

jjj

»H 1-1

t-l

1— 1

r'C ._r

IS 68

ri in

I-*

•S c 1 8

cr
O

^H >

S ^ bo

O VO -*-■ .-T

-c W «

*»

00
O

00"

aT-S U .-

l-M

■g c> <2

O in ™

A § "">

il3&

161 2

Q P.

w . ...

t»

DC C *■*

A .

S •? i2 r^

(0 M O M

CO"

S-fi

r-^

=; — c "

2 «

»2

.ii in

3 ^ ^ , •

EC C pJH

z
3

CO C h .

CO ? _ fl

< to r -7

_i c fi, r^

O ^ ^J-

C/5

a a . *°

X "T C T3

i q

* Z

— — 1^> " 1 C
I -a- o\ rt

^" </T ^ C

CC
O

C C V0 -7
DO _ c>
<D •" . .

r c "i

'S in'7 ^>

. w

•— in 00 _

"S?

UJ
0)

-4-»

rt
u

S
O
U

- —

>
3
in

— rt m
bo^ -■

JP D -7

W fcc, W >

a)
tn

— >

1— 1

t— <

■— 1

■T3

•<*•

>>
■ *•*

•

d»

« u5
? C

£ &

s cy

^ •

,0 c

If-. .— "

-a

1— 1

1-)

fitter
125-

i-o

r*q

•0 c

Is rt

^ c

•<:

►*!

W "7

c72

17; HH

.&^

►5!

—

ittlesl

carry

«!

M 2

2 tf

3
•4-«

;

0-1 °

all an
;,I40

^ "^1

c -

•O

O °

6 .&

H3 ■*-•

rl-

*£

a cq

P °
bo -f.

•

i, Kon

ed are 1

Hi-ye

Project

•

:o"

Fu-S

ships.

The
raining-

to
CU

;i2

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

oqooqoooq£

m O in m O m m in O w

mmfimtocnmmrn,-.

— rt

• « • i_

_— '5

ooooooooU

NOOOOOOQ t

— —

m On m r» »■*

CNt4t s »r>.t^.t>.COCo' tn tn

— — — w

fa fa fa fa fa *"

o* 6> 6 1 £ 6 1 c5» S

.5" ' c c d" c ' " 4 <

£ ^ C N (• d ■ «^

ofa I „ »V ? on o °° o %

fa --vo : vo * h o S

C J .5 .S .£ r .£ .- r C N 5
jj *«. in irt .5 to .5 .5 e r g

"•? rj- N N 6 N 6 6 "T fa <"

.S o"

m CN] N CnI m CnI n « * 4 to
TQ NO "o

pH -'-1 -«' -'M H« ~ O

HTf • N CNI CNI CNI 1- m ^ G £

I M M N W c! z>

$ d o

£:^:::::::^3

HH-' , J' CN) ■--

n-* — J u

! .5* g
§ *

n on m •- 00 O m in N i; r-»
ONCOONONtv-CNCOCOON _,

cooocococooocococo Q o

N _

O t^t^vo r^o o o H^f 1 -;
m m i-» r^ •■» *-» m O in. a 1 —'
« tJ- CN! cni t^Nvo *^ « ~3 _
en cni •«*■ ^- « ^ m m ■* — a

|.«2

. • . • • • • • (Q D

e o

-~- . . . (0 o

•o -3 Pi

2 rt .

a S J

ctf rf W rt o — -

S <u S v 6 .t* < P.

• *-* ^J •-* — ' .«-■ JE2 v_^

1 £ 3 _ 'S § .5 S _ ■< «

313

m »n

1— i

W
H

H
<1
ffl

CO
CO

_j
o

H
co
cc

O
in

t>.

N-J

-*»

•«

r^.

—

»-!

§in
On
On

i-T N~

■-

•*

m : : '•

■<J-

►—

Nrt

*-l

»-•

—

— ■

1— 1

l-«

•*

-H

*-*

•0

■

1— 1

• — '

i—i

^3
O

rt
>

crt

NAVAL POLICY

a "a

•*

■*

Cn!

u->

-3-

r i
II

5«

«5

o 1

'•

•

t/i O

t: in

o
o

o
in

° ^

CN)

•

CNl

l°°

L-l M

i^.

c t ^-

;

-d-

X ~

t-i

l-H

t-»

ClH*

KH*

o •

O, .

o .

•

6> '

•

,-•

°°^-

On
in

NO
00

oo T
fa

<»fa

oo^

<3-

**N~

•>& ru- rC .

G n-T C C . j

•7 .'V c"a a .S

r cy

r- 1

.^H

3
1

N C

l-H • ■-«

"NO

CM -H

M NO

CNI

cnI "7

CN1

h-4

"— 1

t— i

CNl

t-H

CNl

t-H

■*

«*

^J"

^g-

<
_i

/ -3

. .

H«

r-101

Hei

r*M

HIM

H«

CN!

CNI

CnI

CN]

h
co

« ft"

►«i

►*i

NO
CCHI

3^2

l-H

t-l

—

t-H

CNl

t-H

t-«

KH<

«W

ccni

■O

BHI

I "S

« o>

■*

\ m

l-H

>— i

l-H

t-H

t-i

t—

t-<

-1

r-
<

V :

o
o

oo"

o
o

d
o

o
o

no"
On

■<t

t->

»-«

l-H

t-H

° dl

S ON

•rt-

Tt-

t-^

•*

o "

.2 on

tv.

"£ oo

C£

P. —

<o .

o **

CNl

■3 S

■*

*!■

l-H

■*

p.2

M g

£ CN)

l-H

C/)

4-»

>
o

*>
c3
O-

cu
DU

>
-*-t
"o
0,

o-»

en
rt
>
CU

o
c

in
U

314

rt
>
CO

CO
CO

<
J

O
O

UJ
CO

rt
cu

5c
o

en
o

o-t

>
Q

4->
O

I— 4

cu
>

bo
S3

O
u

- -0

in
O

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

co o

CO z

< Hi

co
<

00
vO

o o oo oo

00 CO " i-

N N CO ro

Tt M 00 N

vo *^ *-• m
IN >- ro **■

o
o
in

'■

rt-

-*»

1-4

»-(

t-H

t-t

l-<

c c

oo
o
oo

CO N
d VO

ro ro

rt-

•v G C C C "f

»- ■•? "? - 7 "7 oo

►* ON On 00 00

N ■<*■ CM N

oo «

t-t

hci

*
>*

rt"

i-W
Ti-

—

r4M

Ha
<3-

o o

o~ o

VO
00

00 r-»

o\ <o

00 00

1-
O

VO
00

CM VO vo

VO CM CM

Tt- w M

ro Tf Ti-

ro «

ON 00

Tt" 00

ro w

vo r-»

CM C

« O

Tt- in

O "*
oo c?\
I- Ti-
ro ro

its

0)
u

>
rt

• *-i

i/>

<i»

-1

»— «

• »-t

■o

•a

-a

12
'C

'a,
CO

-a

rt
u

°3
-a
o
u

•3
<

G
O

rt
>.

c
o

u
rt

"o 1

a u a)

c
o

w a 2

-a

-tJ

f/1

V-.

P— c

«J

-4->

P s

eh O

•4-> '—I

§ O

1 I

o wi • J
J2 • °

03 " —

XI
H

ON §

'T3

-0
4J

O _

'§"■3 I

0,0
in .S ta

1U Hi c

^•2 >

J rt ^
rt o

^3
rt ,o

O c J
•7 !e

o in o
XI Q,

^ ^r o

•*-■ S fa

o 2

c o "g
•p o .s
« ^ FJ

- ^ 2

rt N >

6 g-s

" fe b |

< *rt ojO

u, >
XI O

vo in —
in in ro

•

■*

o
o

rt-

•^

t— 1

-*i

*-<

»-*

•

fa • •

# C

•7 fa c

^C<A

Tl- _

r m

•»

• «pH "

.Ens

°0 Tl-oo

IN vo

•

»-•

1-4

—

i-^

rt-

o
|

•«-*

"rt

4>J

•o
<

L£

~rt

-*-»

a
<u

315

NAVAL POLICY

•£

cc
<

CO
CO

H
co
cc

UJ
CO

o
I
<

co
co

O o

O O m m 00 O
O m W CM VO m
m t)- m t>. r^ m

o
O

VO -SO

fe fe

c> 'c> "

S c

^^vo^-v

'SO'^^m

«f

—

• . »■*

„

- c - c „

.5 r^.S t^C

CO <j-CO tJ-qq

<d- >* **■

o
in
en

Q P.

00
CO
CO

CO
CO

O+J

c2 •*

o °

fi ^

O O m

^ m CM

8 « ON

< S

I 1

CO .■=>
CO V

< I

_l
O

in n

CM O
«* N

CM
<n

Endu
ance

Mile

•

i& 18

o
o

cJ.S ,o O
O ° r< «

»-i

i— i

*~t

a) s •

"<t

r^.

H«

1-1

>-i

H-t

*-*

•

»■*

• FH

vo
O

(* d :

H«

ml-*

-4n

-*«

: kh*

H«

<D HH •

■— ■

Gun

Posit'n.

In.

•

Belt.
In.

i— <

•

<\!

CO
CO

O 00
in M
O 00

O
in
o>

'-B
W

ba
o

t-i

j->

ctf

c
o

•a
rt

17)

Q
Z
O
O
u
W

'5
o

"crt
u

•a
<

crt

- — ■

crt
>•

E
crt

c
rt

CO
CO

crt

C
tn

O T3 U

< s -

• T °

o -a i>

J9 *S «
w^ «

rt > rt
*^ cf >»

- -3 s

g t3 i

« *o ^
o rt o

|0 HI d
'Ui O rn

» c -S

w> S S

« c rt
J2 co <u

n 4J «
v-> 3 CO

-G ™

H i : 1

w it ^
o rt

& n .

*-■ CO •-

o."H §

rt (j)

<u
rt Jd~

SCO

a ri c

£ *o -«

- CM

S j >?

o"3co
^CO M

— ' •*-*

rt «

1/5 C3 y)

rt O >-

u S vS

'g 6 -^ -

O o -? £

£ •£ I
cjj.n o

•as £ >

3»6

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

8 0'-' VOQO'I-UIOQQ

Ovo i-^OOOOfiOOO

2 W
Z m

< *

U">

— •

n .;

C -7 tJ-

O N

N ••?

& DQ

tj-

•**

ii->

vra

1— t

IT)

t>.

o
o

o
n

•

o
o

»++

tsl

M Ph" &H~ fe • & & U*

. • d 1 c> cy ^ ^ ^ c^

c" . O*

oo r oo .5 - 7 *7 "7 c "7 *7 '7

1^ .S m fl HS H« -*tj '7 rHR* Bin HM

• - to t-^

U") V/~l ul ""^ ly ^ "1 W>

h) N jj .Zogo„ooo

vOw'-ii-iOO'-ii-ii-i

S ^^ .Seeded c d

r<? n .a oo

i-i w on t~~-

PL d ■" &

CO gn "^ r^ iri HH

HCT

-a-

«i

-*N

-«N

i-*M

H«

-W

pHjoe

•

i-t

»—

t-«

— <

O Q O O Q O O

Q Q Q o 5 o o

\S . . : o_ o^ o q_ o

in- • o cT cT •<? cT cf cf

- OOOfOOOO

»— <

*-t

: On

: o>

: oo

t—l

»—i

o o o o o o

O O O On O S

O O O O O 5

!>. t^. t^ On t>. t-»

•o

i-<

_J
o

h
co
cr

1— 1

— H

cr
O

-4->

- — <
O

— •
u
ti

h
.2

-4-)

J3
"3

u
O

■*-»

- — ■

q
9

— <

'■5

a
id

■4->

•a

a
• — i

Ul
0)
U

a <u *i S3 S rt cit S 'a C .a

317

NAVAL POLICY

o <D

O O
10 10

"">

—

•-<

t-i

»-•

w »

Endur-
ance.

Miles.

6,000

O
O

O
O
O

-j

*-'

t-t

Capa-
city.

Tons.
400

1— 1

O
O

"3-

^t-

■<?

eed.

ots.
6

c»

tv.

VO
ro

t-H

—

(-1

*•*

00
00

.s .s

VO vo
1 «- * rt-

00 *0O

.00

,06

VO
VO

■*

6
»-»

t/)

W
H
<
H

W
h

1— 1

Eh
Eh
<1
pq

■* ^

?rv"

P
o

O
O

■*

o
o
00

o
o
o^

«?
o

o
o
o

vo"
ro
VO

O
O
O

o\
■<*■

.9
6

■*

o
o
o

.5 .5
6 ts

( *

»>4

« ro

H.-S

He*

!-(N

c^d

tv.

l-H

H-i

" 1-.

t>.

rv.

»-t

»-H

t-l

•— 1

—

<-i

«00

■^

►*8

•<i

<*■

t~.

o
o
o

VO N N
00 I-v, *>.
i-i N vN

' 9 ro
<D 3 .2 ON

Q p.

tv.

CJv

00
Ov
00

ro
Ov

S^ 000 o

c5a Hoo o

•5.8 .a n <r

» a id m w « o'

g « „ _, _, _ _,

o 00

VO M

00
00

o
o

ro
VO

ro
00
00

ro
On
00

VO
rv.

o o

ON IO

ON O

ro N

ro w

00 ON

00 00

O o 00

On ON (O

On On ►«

ro ro rf

>»

hfl

J«!

— _

Li.

^-»

•— •

CO
CO

O
O

III

I/)
</)

•

4-J

>«

• «-•

•a

G
•O
rt

£j

318

PRINCIPAL NAVIES OF THE WORLD

o o ■*
o o oo
in * ^

•*

»-t

I
00

• IN

ri-

o
o

O
O

•

-3-

•*

l-M

1-4

i— i

i-i

!■*

■*

l-l

i-»

►-«

l-l

*+«

ixm

<-f

-w

CClrJI

MH"

r-tM

-«frl

—<

>■*

*-i

•—

—

•

fe
6>

I- 1

•

•>

™

■,

• -*

.£

— "

l-l

>— 1

l-l

vo : : : : : :

•

H-l

02
i— i

— <

OOQ OOO OOOOOOOQ

8oo OOO OOOOOOOO

VOO VO O N .00OOOOVOOVO

t*« t>» mod • r^ O «"> m o i-~ m 00

>-iOn Ni-M t>.«N'^-Ninr^vOP«

inin •» tN m wNin'Tt-N'3-NN

rj-

t^.

r^»

»-H

l-l

1— t

1— 1

rj-

•*

■*

I— 1

•*

■*

*-»

■*

• • • Q

uj =

D • • O

O 5

w .«3

319

•a

h/l

>»

0\-

INDEX

Achilles, 17.

''Admiral" class, 71, 117.

Almiranle Condell, 26.

A t 'mirante Lynch, 26.

Andrea Doria, 145.

"Apollo" class, 94.

Aquidaban, 27.

Armaments, Comparative tables of,
162-3, 165, 167, 172-3.

Armour, 35-6, 61, 117, 129, 138,

152-
Armstrong, Lord, 19, 24.
Arrogant, 97.
" Astrcea" class, 95.
"Aurora" class, 41, 93.
Australia and France, 239.
"Australian Defence, 249.

Balfour, Rt. Hon. "A. J., 6.
Barfleur, 64.
Barham, 42.

Battleships, Classification of, 55, 64,
71, 76, 87, 90, 109, 129, 137.

- Belleville's boilers, 47.
Bellona, 42.
Beresford, Lord Charles, 218, 227,

285.
Blake, 8S.

Blanco Encalada, 26.
Blenheim, 88.
-Blockades, 194-9.
Bouvet, no.

Brassey, Mr. T. A., 134, 228, 230.
-Breech-loaders v. Muzzle-loaders,
79, 161.
Y

Brennus, 112, 1 14.
Brooklyn, 154.
Buenos-Aires, ofl.

- Canada, Defence of, 256.
Canet guns, 129.
Centurion, 64.
Channel Squadron —

French, 215, 270, 272.

British, 269, 270-1.
Charlemagne, 109.
China-Japanese War, Lessons of,

29, 33, 44, 62.
China Squadron, 241-2.
Coaling stations, 260-1.
Coast-defenders, French, 119- 120.
Collingwood, 24, 71.
Colomb, Sir John, 9, 52.
Colomb, Admiral P., vi., 49.
Colossus, 77.
Comet, 16.

Commerce, Destruction and main-
tenance of, 191-193.
Commerce-destroyers —

American, 156.

French, 123.
Comparative tables of —

Armaments, 162-3, 165, 167,
172-3-

Navies, 160, 172, 178.

Speed and endurance, 168-9, '75,
177.

Congress, 16.

Cruisers, 82, 85, 91, 93, 121, 133,
140, 148, 154, 156, 172.

321

NAVAL POLICY

Cumberland, 16.

Devastation, 78.

" Diadem " class, 87.

Dilke, Sir Charles, 6, 229, 282.

Dupuy-de-L6me, 121.

"Eclipse" class, 96, 206.
"Edgar" class, 90.
Edinburgh, 77.

Elements of force in warships, 13.
Elliot, Admiral Sir George, 234.
Esmeralda, 84.

- Forced draught, 41.
Foreign seamanship, 215.
Forster, Mr. Arnold, 9, 265. y/

Fournier, Admiral, 122.
France, Disposition of forces, 268.

— Relations of, 186.
French Navy, 107, 1 16.
Foreign Squadrons —

British-China, 241-2.
Mediterranean, 215, 268.
Pacific, 243.

General Staff required, 282.
German Navy, 136.

— hostility, 183, 189, 210.
Georgi Pobiedonosek, 1 30.
Gibraltar, Defence of, 264.
Goschen, Rt. Hon. J. G. , 4, 179,

203, 234.
Guns, Improvement in, 19.

— Pneumatic dynamite, 3 1.

— Quick-firing, 24, 27, 129, 162.

" Impossible Programme, An," 272.

Increase of strength imperative, 190.

India, Defence of, 255.

Induced draught, 44.

Inflexible, 23, 36.

Iowa, 153.

Isolation of England, 189.

Italian Navy, 143.

Jaureguiberry, ill.

Kaiser Friedrich III., 138.
Kaiserin Augusta, 141.
Kearsage, 49, 151.
Kentucky, 151.
- Krupp guns, 68.

Magnificent, 44, 57, 59-

Mahan, Captain, 156.

Maine, 155.

Majestic, 17.

Malta, Defence of, 264.

Marines, 233.

Massachusetts, 38.

"Medea" class, 98.

Mediterranean, Abandonment of,

Objections to, 272.
Mediterranean Squadron, 215, 268.
Mercantile Marine, British, 229.
Mercury, 84.
Merrimcu, 16, 22, 36.

Harcourt, Sir William, 8, 182.
Harveyed plates, 37, 166.
Havock, 10 1.
Holtzer shot, 37.
Hood, 62.
Hornet, 101.
Hotchkiss gun, 25, 113.
Huascar, 33.

Monitor, 36.

Muzzle-loaders in British Navy, 78-9.

Naval Estimates, 1896, Debate on, 4.
k — Reserve, Deficiencies of, 221,231.
Failure of, 278.

— Reserves, Superiority of Foreign
224.

— Volunteers, 233.
Navies, Comparative tables of, 160,

172, 178.

— Foreign, 107, 126, 136, 143, 149-
Nictheroy, 32.
Nile, 66.

322

INDEX

Nordenfeldt, 25.

Officers and men, 212.
— Deficient supply of, 219, 226 ;
Suggested remedies, 226, 228.

- Pacific Squadron, 243.

Pallas, 40.

"Particular Service Squadron, 268,
278.

"Pearl" class, 97.

Pelorus, 99.

Piemonte, 99.

Pneumatic dynamite gun, 31.

Powerful^ 46.

Precautions against surprise im-
perative, 280.

Public opinion, Pressure of, 286.

Rattler, 16, 39.

Rattlesnake, 40.

Rawson, Admiral, 256.

Re Umberto, 145.

Readiness for war nobody's business,

284.
Redoubtable, 1 1 6.
Reed, Sir Edward, 23, 61.
Relative strength of navies, 158, 205.
Renown, 32, 45.
-~- Reserve Squadron, 215.
Rifling, Superiority of, 18.
Rossia, 133.

Royal Sovereign, 22 42, 62, 64.
Rurik, 133.

Russia, Relations of, 186.
Russian Navy, 126.

Sans Pareil, 67.

See Adler, 137, 142.

Sempaio, 27.

Shipbuilding policy, 179.

Speed and endurance, Comparative

tables of, 168-9, 175, 177.
Steam-power, Advance in, 39.

Terrible, 48, 85.

Thunderer, 78.

Thursfield, Mr., vi.

Torpedo craft, 25, 100, 125, 135,
142, 148, 157, 178, 195.
destroyers, 34, 100, 104, 135, 197.

Torpedoes in warfare, 33.

Trafalgar, 66.
-Turret ships, 78, 81.

United States Navy, Growth of, 149.

Vesuvius, 32.
Vulcan, 99.

War, Britain's unreadiness for, 267.
Warrior, 17.
" Water-tube boilers, 46.
West Indies,\ Defence of, 259.
White, Sir William, 24, 61.
Wilkinson, Mr. Spenser, vi , 52,

191.
Williams, Mr. Harry, 45.
Wilson, Mr. H. W., 33.
Wire guns, 21.

Zalinski, Lieutenant, 31.

323

PLYMOUTH

WILLIAM HKENDON AND SON

PNINTERS

A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS

AND ANNOUNCEMENTS OF

METHUEN AND COMPANY

PUBLISHERS : LONDON

36 ESSEX STREET

W.C.

CONTENTS

PAGE

FORTHCOMING BOOKP, .

•

POETRY,

ENGLISH CLASSICS,

ILLUSTRATED BOOKS, .

HISTORY, .

BIOGRAPHY,

GENERAL LITERATURE,

SCIENCE,

PHILOSOPHY,

THEOLOGY,

LEADERS OF RELIGION,

FICTION,

BOOKS FOR BOYS AND GIRLS,

THE PEACOCK LIBRARY,

UNIVERSITY EXTENSION SERIES,

SOCIAL QUESTIONS OF TO-DAY,

CLASSICAL TRANSLATIONS,

EDUCATIONAL BOOKS,

OCTOBER 1896

October 1896.

Messrs. Methuen's

ANNOUNCEMENTS

oetry

RUDYARD KIPLING
BALLADS. By Rudyard Kipling. Crown Svo. 6s.
150 copies on hand-made paper. Demy Svo. 21s.
30 copies on Japanese paper. Demy Svo. 42s.

The enormous success of Barrack Room Ballads ' justifies the expectation that this
volume, so long postponed, will have an equal, if not a greater, success.

GEORGE WYNDHAM

SHAKESPEARE'S POEMS. Edited, with an Introduction and
Notes, by George Wyndham, M.P. Crown Svo. 3s. 6d.

[English Classics.
W. E. HENLEY

ENGLISH LYRICS. Selected and Edited by W. E. Henley.

Crown Svo. Buckram. 6s.

Also 15 copies on Japanese paper. Demy Svo. £2, 2s.

Few announcements will be more welcome to lovers of English verse than the one
that Mr. Henley is bringing together into one book the finest lyrics in our
language. The volume will be produced with the same care that made ' Lyra
Heroica' delightful to the hand and eye.

'Q'

POEMS AND BALLADS. By ' Q,' Author of 'Green Bays,

etc. Crown Svo. Buckram. 35. 6d.

25 copies on Japanese paper. Demy Svo. 21s.

History, Biography, and Travel

CAPTAIN HINDE

THE FALL OF THE CONGO ARABS. By Sidney L.
Hinde. With Portraits and Plans. Demy Svo. 12s. 6d.
This volume deals with the recent Belgian Expedition to the Upper Congo, which
developed into a war between the State forces and the Arab slave-raiders in
Central Africa. Two white men only returned alive from the three years' war —
Commandant Dhanis and the writer of this book, Captain Hinde. During the
greater part of the time spent by Captain Hinde in the Congo he was amongst
cannibal races in little-known regions, and, owing to the peculiar circumstances
of his position, was enabled to see a side of native history shown to few Europeans.
The war terminated in the complete defeat of the Arabs, seventy thousand of
whom perished during the struggle.

Messrs. Methuen's Announcements 3

S. BARING GOULD

THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE. By S. Baring

Gould. With over 450 Illustrations in the Text and 13 Photo-
gravure Plates. Large quarto. 365.

This study of the most extraordinary life in history is written rather for the general
reader than for the military student, and while following the main lines of
Napoleon's career, is concerned chiefly with the development of his character and
his personal qualities. Special stress is laid on his early life— the period in which
his mind and character took their definite shape and direction.

The great feature of the hook is its wealth of illustration. There are over 450
illustrations, large and small, in the text, and there are also more than a dozen
full page photogravures. Every important incident of Napoleon's career has
its illustration, while there are a large number of portraits of his contemporaries,
reproductions of famous pictures, of contemporary caricatures, of his handwriting,
etc. etc.

It is not too much to say that no such magnificent book on Napoleon has ever been
published.

VICTOR HUGO
THE LETTERS OF VICTOR HUGO. Translated from the
French by F. Clarke, M.A. In Two Volumes. Demy %vo.
\os. 6d. each. Vol. I.

This is the first volume of one of the most interesting and important collection of
letters ever published in France. The correspondence dates from Victor Hugo's
boyhood to his death, and none of the letters have been published before. The
arrangement is chiefly chronological, but where there is an interesting set of
letters to one person these are arranged together. The first volume contains,
among others, (1) Letters to his father ; (2) to his young wife ; (3) to his confessor,
Lamennais ; (4) a very important set of about fifty letters to Sainte-Beuve ; (5)
letters about his early books and plays.

J. M. RIGG

ST. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY: A Chapter in the

History of Religion. By J. M. Rigg, of Lincoln's Inn,

Barrister-at-Law. Demy Svo. "]s. Gd.

This work gives for the first time in moderate compass a complete portrait of St.
Anselm, exhibiting him in his intimate and interior as well as in his public life.
Thus, while the great ecclesiastico-political struggle in which he played so prominent
a part is fully dealt with, unusual prominence is given to the profound and subtle
speculations by which he permanently influenced theological and metaphysical
thought ; while it will be a surprise to most readers to find him also appearing as
the author of some of the most exquisite religious poetry in the Latin language.

EDWARD GIBBON
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.
By Edward Gibbon. A New Edition, edited with Notes,
Appendices, and Maps by J. B. Bury, M.A., Fellow of Trinity
College, Dublin. In Seven Volumes. Demy %vo, gilt top. 8s. 6d.
each. Crown Svo. 6s. each. Vol. II.

4 Messrs. Methuen's Announcements

W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE

A HISTORY OF EGYPT, from the Earliest Times to
the Present Day. Edited by W. M. Flinders Petrie, D.C.L.,
LL.D., Professor of Egyptology at University College. Fully
Jllustrated. In Six Volumes. Crown Svo. 6s. each.

Vol. II. XVII. -XVIII. Dynasties. W. M. F. Petrie.

'A history written in the spirit of scientific precision so worthily represented by Dr.
Petrie and his school cannot but promote sound and accurate study, and supply a
vacant place in the English literature of Egyptology.' — Times.

J. WELLS

A SHORT HISTORY OF ROME. By J. Wells, M.A., Fellow
and Tutor of Wadham Coll., Oxford. With 4 Maps. Crown 2>vo.
y. 6d. 3$opp.

This book is intended for the Middle and Upper Forms of Public Schools and for
Pass Students at the Universities. It contains copious Tables, etc.

H. DE B. GIBBINS

THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY. By H. DE B.

Gibbins, M.A. "With 5 Maps. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d. Pp. 450.

This book is written with the view of affording a clear view of the main facts of
English Social and Industrial History placed in due perspective. Beginning
with prehistoric times, it passes in review the growth and advance of industry
up to the nineteenth century, showing its gradual development and progress.
The author has endeavoured to place before his readers the history of industry
as a connected whole in which all these developments have their proper place.
The book is illustrated by Maps, Diagrams, and Tables, and aided by copious
Footnotes.

MRS. OLIPHANT

THOMAS CHALMERS. By Mrs. Oliphant. Second Edition.
Crown 8vo. 3^. 6d. [Leaders of Religion.

Naval and Military

DAVID HANNAY

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, FROM

Early Times to the Present Day. By David Hannay.

Illustrated. Demy 8vo. 1 5 j.

This book aims at giving an account not only of the fighting we have done at sea,
but of the growth of the service, of the part the Navy has played in the develop-
ment of the Empire, and of its inner life. The author has endeavoured to avoid
the mistake of sacrificing the earlier periods of naval history — the very interesting
wars with Holland in the seventeenth century, for instance, or the American
War of 1779-1783 — to the later struggle with Revolutionary and Imperial France.

Messrs. Methuen's Announcements 5

COL. COOPER KING

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY. By Lieut-
Colonel Cooper King, of the Staff College, Camberley. Illustrated.
Demy Svo. Js. 6d.
This volume aims at describing the nature of the different armies that have been
formed in Great Britain, and how from the early and feudal levies the present
standing army came to be. The changes in tactics, uniform, and armament are
briefly touched upon, and; the campaigns in which the army has shared have
been so far followed as to explain the part played by British regiments in them.

G. W. STEEVENS

NAVAL POLICY : With a Description of English and
Foreign Navies. By G. W. Steevens. Demy 8vo. 6s.

This book is a description of the British and other more important navies of the world,
with a sketch of the lines on which our naval policy might possibly be developed.
It describes our recent naval policy, and shows what our naval force really is. A
detailed but non-technical account is given of the instruments of modern warfare —
guns, armour, engines, and the like — with a view to determine how far we are
abreast of modern invention and modern requirements. An ideal policy is then
sketched for the building and manning of our fleet ; and the last chapter is
devoted to docks, coaling-stations, and especially colonial defence.

Theology

F. B, JEVONS

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF RELIGION.

By F. B. Jevons, M.A., Litt.D., Fellow of the University of
Durham. Demy Svo. 12s. 6d.

This is the third number of the series of ' Theological Handbooks ' edited by Dr.
Robertson of Durham, in which have already appeared Dr. Gibson's 'XXXIX.
Articles' and Mr. Ottley's 'Incarnation.'

Mr. F. B. Jevons' ' Introduction to the History of Religion' treats of early religion,
from the point of view of Anthropology and Folk-lore ; and is the first attempt
that has been made in any language to weave together the results of recent
investigations into such topics as Sympathetic Magic, Taboo, Totemism,
Fetishism, etc., so as to present a systematic account of the growth of primitive
religion and the development of early religious institutions.

W. YORKE FAUSSETT

THE DE CATECHIZANDIS RUDIBUS OF ST. AUGUS-
TINE. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, etc., by W. YORKE
Faussett, M.A., late Scholar of Balliol Coll. Crown Sz<o. 35. 6d.

An edition of a Treatise on the Essentials of Christian Doctrine, and the best
methods of impressing them on candidates for baptism. The editor bestows upon
this patristic work the same care which a treatise of Cicero might claim. There
is a general Introduction, a careful Analysis, a full Commentary, and other useful
matter. No better introduction to the study of the Latin Fathers, their style and
diction, could be found than this treatise, which also has no lack of modern interest.

6 Messrs. Methuen's Announcements
General Literature

C. F. ANDREWS
CHRISTIANITY AND THE LABOUR QUESTION. By
C. F. Andrews, B.A. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

R. E. STEEL
MAGNETISM AND ELECTRICITY. By R. Elliott
Steel, M.A., F.C.S. With Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 45. 6d.

G. LOWES DICKINSON

THE GREEK VIEW OF LIFE. By G. L. Dickinson,
Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

[ University Extension Series.

J. A. HOBSON
THE PROBLEM OF THE UNEMPLOYED. By J. A.
HOBSON, B.A., Author of 'The Problems of Poverty.' Crown 82/0.
is. 6d. [Social Questions Series.

S. E. BALLY
GERMAN COMMERCIAL CORRESPONDENCE. By S.
E. Bally, Assistant Master at the Manchester Grammar School.
Crown 8vo. is. [ Commercial Series.

L. F. PRICE

ECONOMIC ESSAYS. By L. F. Price, M.A., Fellow of Oriel
College, Oxford. Crown 8vo. 6s.

This book consists of a number of Studies in Economics and Industrial and Social
Problems.

Fiction

MARIE CORELLI'S ROMANCES

FIRST COMPLETE AND UNIFORM EDITION

Large crown Zvo. 6s.
Messrs. Methuen beg to announce that they have commenced the pub-
lication of a New and Uniform Edition of Marie Corelli's Romances.
This Edition is revised by the Author, and contains new Prefaces. The
volumes are being issued at short intervals in the following order :—

i. A ROMANCE OF TWO WORLDS. 2. VENDETTA.
3. THELMA. 4- ARDATH.

5. THE SOUL OF LILITH. 6. WORMWOOD.

7. BARABBAS. 8. THE SORROWS OF SATAN.

Messrs. Methuen's Announcements

BARING GOULD

DARTMOOR IDYLLS. By S. Baring Gould. Cr. Svo. 6s.

GUAVAS THE TINNER. By S. Baring Gould, Author of
' Mehalah,' 'The Broom Squire,' etc. Illustrated. Crown Svo. 6s.

THE PENNYCOMEOUICKS. By S. Baring Gould.
New Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s.
A new edition, uniform with the Author's other novels.

LUCAS MALET

THE CARISSIMA. By Lucas Malet, Author of ' The Wages of
Sin,' etc. Crown 8z>o. 6s.

This is the first novel which Lucas Malet has written since her very powerful ' The
Wages of Sin.'

ARTHUR MORRISON

A CHILD OF THE JAGO. By Arthur Morrison. Author

of ' Tales of Mean Streets.' Crown Svo. 6s.

This, the first long story which Mr. Morrison has written, is like his remarkable
' Tales of Mean Streets,' a realistic study of East End life.

W. E. NORRIS
CLARISSA FURIOSA. By W. E. Norris, 'Author of 'The
Rogue,' etc. Crown Svo. 6s.

L. COPE CORNFORD

CAPTAIN JACOBUS : A ROMANCE OF HIGHWAYMEN.
By L. Cope Cornford. Illustrated. Crown Svo. 6s.

J. BLOUNDELLE burton
DENOUNCED. By J. BLOUNDELLE Burton, Author of ' In
the Day of Adversity,' etc. Crown Svo. 6s.

J. MACLAREN COBBAN
WILT THOU HAVE THIS WOMAN? By J. M. Cobban,
Author of ' The King of Andaman.' Crown 8vo. 6s.

J. F. BREWER

THE SPECULATORS. By J. F. Brewer. Crown Svo. 6s.

A. BALFOUR

BY STROKE OF SWORD. By Andrew Balfour. Crown
8vo. 6s.

8 Messrs. Methuen's Announcements

M. A. OWEN

THE DAUGHTER OF ALOUETTE. By Mary A. Owen.

Crown Svo. 6s.
A story of life among the American Indians.

RONALD ROSS

THE SPIRIT OF STORM. By Ronald Ross, Author of
• The Child of Ocean. ' Crown Svo. 6s.
A romance of the Sea.

J. A. BARRY

IN THE GREAT DEEP : Tales of the Sea. By J. A.
Barry. Author of 'Steve Brown's Bunyip.' CrowjtSvo. 6s.

JAMES GORDON

THE VILLAGE AND THE DOCTOR. By James Gordon.
Crown Svo. 6s.

BERTRAM MITFORD

THE SIGN OF THE SPIDER. By Bertram Mitford.
Crown Svo. 3-f. 6d.
A story of South Africa.

A. SHIELD

THE SQUIRE OF WANDALES. By A. Shield. CrownSvo.
y. 6d.

G. W. STEEVENS

MONOLOGUES OF THE DEAD. By G. W. Steevens.
Foolscap Svo. 2 s - 6d.
A series of Soliloquies in which famous men of antiquity — Julius Cajsar, Nero,
Alcibiades, etc., attempt to express themselves in the modes of thought and
language of to-day.

S. GORDON
A HANDFUL OF EXOTICS. By S. GORDON. Crown Svo.
35. 6d.

A volume of stories of Jewish life in Russia.

P. NEUMANN

THE SUPPLANTER. By P. Neumann. Crown Svo. 3s. 6d.

EVELYN DICKINSON

THE SIN OF ANGELS. By Evelyn Dickinson. CrownSvo.
y. 6d.

H. A. KENNEDY

A MAN WITH BLACK EYELASHES. By H. A. Kennedy.

Crown Svo. 35. 6d.

A LIST OF

Messrs. Methuen's

PUBLICATIONS

Poetry

Rudyard Kipling. BARRACK-ROOM BALLADS; And

Other Verses. By Rudyard Kipling. Ninth Edition. Crown
8vo. 6s.

' Mr. Kipling's verse is strong, vivid, full of character. . . . Unmistakable genius
rings in every line.' — Times.

'"Barrack-Room Ballads" contains some of the best work that Mr. Kipling has
ever done, which is saying a good deal. " Fuzzy- Wuzzy," "Gunga Din," and
" Tommy," are, in our opinion, altogether superior to anything of the kind that
English literature has hitherto produced.' — Athenaum.
' The ballads teem with imagination, they palpitate with emotion. We read them
with laughter and tears ; the metres throb in our pulses, the cunningly ordered
words tingle with life ; and if this be not poetry, what is?' — Pall Mall Gazette.

"Q." THE GOLDEN POMP : A Procession of English Lyrics
from Surrey to Shirley, arranged by A. T. Quiller Couch. Crown
%vo. Buckram. 6s.
' A delightful volume : a really golden "Pomp." ' — Spectator.

" Q." GREEN BAYS : Verses and Parodies. By " O.," Author
of 'Dead Man's Rock,' etc. Second Edition. Crown 8z/o. 35. 6d.
1 The verses display a rare and versatile gift of parody, great command of metre, and
a very pretty turn of humour.' — Times.

H. C Beeching. LYRA SACRA : An Anthology of Sacred Veise.
Edited by H. C. Beeching, M.A. Crown 8vo. Buckram. 6s.

• An anthology of high excellence.' — Athenarum.

' A charming selection, which maintains a lofty standard of excellence.' — Times.

W. B. Yeats. AN ANTHOLOGY OF IRISH VERSE.
Edited by W. B. Yeats. Crown 8vo. $s. 6d.

■ An attractive and catholic selection.' — Times.

' It is edited by the most original and most accomplished of modern Irish poets, and
against his editing but a single objection can be brought, namely, that it excludes
from the collection his own delicate lyrics.' — Saturday Review.

E. Mackay. A SONG OF THE SEA : My Lady of Dreams,
and other Poems. By Eric Mackay, Author of ' The Love
Letters of a Violinist.' Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo, gilt top. $s.

• Everywhere Mr. Mackay displays himself the master of a style marked by all the

characteristics of the best rhetoric. He has a keen sense of rhythm and of general
balance ; his verse is excellently sonorous.' — Globe.
' Throughout the book the poetic workmanship is fine.' — Scotsman.

A 2

io Messrs. Methuen's List

Ibsen. BRAND. A Drama by Henrik Ibsen. Translated by
William Wilson. Second Edition. Crown %vo. 3s. 6d.

'The greatest world-poem of the nineteenth century next to "Faust." It is in
the sime set with "Agamemnon," with " Lear," with the literature that we now
instinctively regard as high and holy.' — Daily Chronicle.

"A. G. : ' VERSES TO ORDER. By "A. G." Cr. too. 2s.6d.

net.

A small volume of verse by a writer whose initials are well known to Oxford men.
' A capital specimen of light academic poetry. These verses are very bright and
engaging, easy and sufficiently witty.' — St. James's Gazette.

F. Langbridge. BALLADS OF THE BRAVE: Poems of

Chivalry, Enterprise, Courage, and Constancy, from the Earliest
Times to the Present Day. Edited, with Notes, by Rev. F. Lang-
bridge. Crown 8vo. Bitckram. y. 6d. School Edition, zs. 6d.
'A very happy conception happily carried out. These "Ballads of the Brave" are
intended to suit the real tastes of boys, and will suit the taste of the great majority.'
— Spectator. ' The book is full of splendid things.' — World-

Lang and Craigie. THE POEMS OF ROBERT BURNS.
Edited by Andrew Lang and W. A. Craigie. With Portrait.
Demy 8vo, gilt top. 6s.

This edition contains a carefully collated Text, numerous Notes, critical and textual,
a critical and biographical Introduction, and a Glossary.

1 Among the editions in one volume, Mr. Andrew Lang's will take the place of
authority.' — Times.

' To the general public the beauty of its type, and the fair proportions of its pages, as
well as the excellent chronological arrangement of the poems, should make it
acceptable enough. Mr. Lang and his publishers have certainly succeeded in
producing an attractive popular edition of the poet, in which the brightly written
biographical introduction is not the least notaile feature.' — Glasgow Herald.

English Classics

Edited by W. E. Henley.

' Very dainty volumes are these ; the paper, type, and light-green binding are all

very agreeable to the eye. Simplex munditiis is the phrase that might be applied

to them.' — Globe.
' The volumes are strongly bound in green buckram, are of a convenient size, and

pleasant to look upon, so that whether on the shelf, or on the table, or in the hand

the possessor is thoroughly content with them.' — Guardian.
' The paper, type, and binding of this edition are in excellent taste, and leave

nothing to be desired by lovers of literature.' — Standard.

THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF TRISTRAM SHANDY.
By Lawrence Sterne. With an Introduction by Charles
Whibley, and a Portrait. 2 vols. js.

THE COMEDIES OF WILLIAM CONGREVE. With
an Introduction by G. S. Street, and a Portrait. 2 vols. Js.

Messrs. Methuen's List i i

THE ADVENTURES OF HAJJI BABA OF ISPAHAN.
By James Morier. With an Introduction by E. G. Browne, M.A.,
and a Portrait. 2 vols. Js.

THE LIVES OF DONNE, WOTTON, HOOKER, HER-
BERT, and SANDERSON. By Izaak Walton. With an
Introduction by Vernon Blackburn, and a Portrait. 3^. 6d.

THE LIVES OF THE ENGLISH POETS. By Samuel
Johnson, LL.D. With an Introduction by J. H. Millar, and a
Portrait. 3 vols. ics. 6d.

Illustrated Books

Jane Barlow. THE BATTLE OF THE FROGS AND MICE,

translated by Jane Barlow, Author of ' Irish Idylls,' and pictured
by F. D. Bedford. Small .\to. 6s. net.

S. Baring Gould. A BOOK OF FAIRY TALES retold by S.

Baring Gould. With numerous illustrations and initial letters by

Arthur J. Gaskin. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Buckram. 6s.

'Mr. Baring Gould has done a good deed, and is deserving of gratitude, in re-writing
in honest, simple style the old stories that delighted the childhood of " our fathers
and grandfathers." We do not think he has omitted any of our favourite stories,
the stories that are commonly regarded as merely " old fashioned." As to the form
of the book, and the printing, which is by Messrs. Constable, it were difficult to
commend overmuch. — Saturday Rtview.

S. Baring Gould. OLD ENGLISH FAIRY TALES. Col-
lected and edited by S. Baring Gould. With Numerous Illustra-
tions by F. D. Bedford. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Buckram. 6s.
'A charming volume, which children will be sure to appreciate. The stories have
been selected with great ingenuity from various old ballads and folk-tales, and,
having been somewhat altered and readjusted, now stand forth, clothed in Mr.
Baring Gould's delightful English, to enchant youthful readers. All the tales
are good.' — Guardian.

S. Baring Gould. A BOOK OF NURSERY SONGS AND

RHYMES. Edited by S. Baring Gould, and Illustrated by the
Birmingham Art School. Buckram, gilt top. Crown Svo. 6s.

' The volume is very complete in its way, as it contains nursery songs to the number
of 77, game-rhymes, and jingles. To the student we commend the sensible intro-
duction, and the explanatory notes. The volume is superbly printed on soft,
thick paper, which it is a pleasure to touch ; and the borders and pictures are, as
we have said, among the very best specimens we have seen of the Gaskin school.'
— Birmingham Gazette.

i2 Messrs. Methuen's List

H. C. Beeching. A BOOK OF CHRISTMAS VERSE. Edited
by H. C. Beeching, M.A., and Illustrated by Walter Crane.
Crown Svo, gilt top. $s.

A collection of the best verse inspired by the birth of Christ from the Middle Ages
to the present day. A distinction of the book is the large number of poems it
contains by modern authors, a few of which are here printed for the first time.

'An anthology which, from its unity of aim and high poetic excellence, has a better
right to exist than most of its fellows.' — Guardian.

History

Gibbon. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN
EMPIRE. By Edward Gibbon. A New Edition, Edited with
Notes, Appendices, and Maps, by J. B. Bury, M.A., Fellow of
Trinity College, Dublin. In Seven Volumes. Demy Svo. Gilt top.
Ss. 6d. each. Also crown Svo. 6s. each. Vol. I.

' The time has certainly arrived for a new edition of Gibbon's great work. . . . Pro-
fessor Bury is the right man to undertake this task. His learning is amazing,
both in extent and accuracy. The book is issued in a handy form, and at a
moderate price, and it is admirably printed.' — Times.

' The edition is edited as a classic should be edited, removing nothing, yet indicating
the value of the text, and bringing it up to date. It promises to be of the utmost
value, and will be a welcome addition to many libraries.' — Scotsman.

'■ This edition, so far as one may judge from the first instalment, is a marvel of
erudition and critical skill, and it is the very minimum of praise to predict that the
seven volumes of it will supersede Dean Milman's as the standard edition of our
great historical classic' — Glasgow Herald.

' The beau-ideal Gibbon has arrived at last.' — Sketch.

' At last there is an adequate modern edition of Gibbon. . . . The best edition the
nineteenth century could produce.' — Manchester Guardian.

Flinders Petrie. A HISTORY OF EGYPT,fromthe Earliest
Times to the Present Day. Edited by W. M. Flinders
Petrie, D.C.L., LL.D., Professor of Egyptology at University
College. Fully Illustrated. In Six Volumes. Crown Svo. 6s. each.

Vol. I. Prehistoric Times to XVI. Dynasty. W. M. F.
Petrie. Second Edition.
' A history written in the spirit of scientific precision so worthily represented by Dr.
i'etrie and his school cannot but promote sound and accurate study, and
supply a vacant place in the English literature of Egyptology.' — Times.

Flinders Petrie. EGYPTIAN TALES. Edited by W. M.

Flinders Petrie. Illustrated by Tristram Ellis. In Two

Volumes. Crown Svo. 35. 6d. each.

'A valuable addition to the literature of comparative folk-lore. The drawings are

really illustrations in the literal sense of the word.' — Globe.
' It has a scientific value to the student of history and archaeology.' — Scotsman.
' Invaluable as a picture of life in Palestine and Egypt.'— Daily News.

Messrs. Methuen's List 13

Flinders Petrie. EGYPTIAN DECORATIVE ART. By
W. M. Flinders Petrie, D.C.L. With 120 Illustrations. Crown
Svo. 3s. 6d.

' Professor Flinders Petrie is not only a profound Egyptologist, but an accomplished
student of comparative archaeology. In these lectures, delivered at the Royal
Institution, he displays both qualifications with rare skill in elucidating the
development of decorative art in Egypt, and in tracing its influence on the
art of other countries. Few experts can speak with higher authority and wider
knowledge than the Professor himself, and in any case his treatment of his sub-
ject is full of learning and insight.' — Times.

S. Baring Gould. THE TRAGEDY OF THE C/ESARS.

The Emperors of the Julian and Claudian Lines. With numerous
Illustrations from Busts, Gems, Cameos, etc. By S. Baring Gould,
Author of ' Mehalah,' etc. Third Edition. Royal Svo. i$s.

' A most splendid and fascinating book on a subject of undying interest. The great
feature of the book is the use the author has made of the existing portraits of the
Caesars, and the admirable critical subtlety he has exhibited in dealing with this
line of research. It is brilliantly written, and the illustrations are supplied on a
scale of profuse magnificence.' — Daily Chronicle.

' The volumes will in no sense disappoint the general reader. Indeed, in their way,
there is nothing in any sense so good in English. . . . Mr. Baring Gould has
presented his narrative in such a way as not to make one dull page.' — Athenceum.

A. Clark. THE COLLEGES OF OXFORD : Their History,

their Traditions. By Members of the University. Edited by A.

Clark, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Lincoln College. Svo. 12s. 6d.

'A work which will certainly be appealed to for many years as the standard book on

the Colleges of Oxford.' — Athenceum.

Perrens. THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE FROM 1434
TO 1492. By F. T. Perrens. Translated by Hannah Lynch.
8vo. 12s. 6d.

A history of Florence under the domination of Cosimo, Piero, and Lorenzo de

Medicis.
' This is a standard book by an honest and intelligent historian, who has deserved

well of all who are interested in Italian history.' — Manchester Guardian.

E. L. S. Horsburgh. THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO.
By E. L. S. Horsburgh, B.A. With Plans. Crown Svo. $s.

'A brilliant essay — simple, sound, and thorough.' — Daily Chronicle.

' A study, the most concise, the most lucid, the most critical that has been produced.'
— Birmingham Mercury,

' A careful and precise study, a fair and impartial criticism, and an eminently read-
able book.' — Admiralty and Horse Guards Gazette.

H.B. George. BATTLES OF ENGLISH HISTORY. ByH. B.
George, M.A. , Fellow of New College, Oxford. With numerous
Plans. Third Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

' Mr. George has undertaken a very useful task — that of making military affairs in-
telligible and instructive to non-military readers — and has executed it with laud-
able intelligence and industry, and with a large measure of success. '• — Times.

'This book is almost a revelation ; and we heartily congratulate the author on his
work and on the prospect of the reward he has well deserved for so much con-
scientious and sustained labour.' — Daily Chronicle.

14 Messrs. Methuen's List

0. Browning. A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL ITALY,
A.D. 1 250- 1 530. By Oscar Browning, Fellow and Tutor of King's
College, Cambridge. Second Edition. In T-wo Volumes. Crown
8vo. 55. each.

Vol. I. 1250-1409. — Guelphs and Ghibellines.

Vol. 11. 1409-1530. — The Age of the Condottieri.

'A vivid picture of mediaeval Italy.' — Standard.

' Mr. Browning is to be congratulated on the production of a work of immense
labour and learning.' — Westminster Gazette.

O'Grady. THE STORY OF IRELAND. By Standish
O'Grady, Author of ' Finn and his Companions.' Cr. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
' Most delightful, most stimulating. Its racy humour, its original imaginings,

make it one of the freshest, breeziest volumes.' — Methodist Times.
' A survey at once graphic, acute, and quaintly written.' — Times.

Biography

R. L. Stevenson. VAILIMA LETTERS. By Robert Louis

Stevenson. With an Etched Portrait by William Strang, and

other Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. Buckram. Js.6d.
' The Vailima Letters are rich in all the varieties of that charm which have secured

for Stevenson the affection of many others besides "journalists, fellow-novelists,

and boys."' — The Times.
' Few publications have in our time been more eagerly awaited than these " Vailima

Letters," giving the first fruits of the correspondence of Robert Louis Stevenson.

But, high as the tide of expectation has run, no reader can possibly be disappointed

in the result.' — St. James's Gazette.
' For the student of English literature these letters indeed are a treasure. They

are more like " Scott's Journal" in kind than any other literary autobiography.'

— National Observer.

F. W. Joyce. THE LIFE OF SIR FREDERICK GORE
OUSELEY. By F. W. Joyce, M.A. With Portraits and Illustra-
tions. Crown 8vo. 75. 6d.

' All the materials have been well digested, and the book gives us a complete picture
of the life of one who will ever be held in loving remembrance by his personal
friends, and who in the history of music in this country will always occupy a
prominent position on account of the many services he rendered to the art.' —
Musical News.

' Thisbook has been undertaken in quite the right spirit, and written with sympathy,
insight, and considerable literary skill.' — Times.

W. G. Collingwood. THE LIFE OF JOHN RUSKIN. By

W. G. Collingwood, M.A., Editor of Mr. Ruskin's Poems. With

numerous Portraits, and 13 Drawings by Mr. Ruskin. Second

Edition. 2 vols. 8vo. 32^.

' No more magnificent volumes have been published for a long time.' — Times.

'It is long since we had a biography with such delights of substance and of form.

Such a book is a pleasure for the day, and a joy for ever.' — Daily Chronicle.
'A noble monument of a noble subject. One of the most beautiful books about one

of the noblest lives of our century.' — Glasgow Herald.

Messrs. Methuen's List 15

C. Waldstein. JOHN RUSK IN : a Study. By CHARLES
Waldstein, M.A., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. With a
Photogravure Portrait after Professor Herkomer. Post 8vo. 55.

'A thoughtful, impartial, well-written criticism of Ruskin's teaching, intended to
separate what the author regards as valuable and permanent from what is transient
and erroneous in the great master's writing.' — Daily Chronicle.

W. H. Hutton. THE LIFE OF SIR THOMAS MORE. By
W. H. Hutton, ALA., Author of ' William Laud.' With Portraits.
Crown Svo. $s.

' The book lays good claim to high rank among our biographies. It is excellently,

even lovingly, written.' — Scotsman.
' An excellent monograph.' — Times.
' A most complete presentation.' — Daily Chronicle.

M. Kaufmann. CHARLES KINGSLEY. By M. Kaufmann,
M.A. Crown Svo. Buckram. $s.

A biography of Kingsley, especially dealing with his achievements in social reform.
' The author has certainly gone about his work with conscientiousness and industry. —
Sheffield Daily Telegraph.

A. F. Bobbins. THE EARLY LIFE OF WILLIAM EWART
GLADSTONE. By A. F. Robbins. With Portraits. Crown
Svo. 6s.

'Considerable labour and much skill of presentation have not oeen unworthily
expended on this interesting work.' — Times.

Clark Russell. THE LIFE OF ADMIRAL LORD COL-
LINGWOOD. By W. Clark Russell, Author of ' The Wreck
of the Grosvenor.' With Illustrations by F. Brangwyn. Third
Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

' A most excellent and wholesome book, which we should like to see in the hands of
every boy in the country.' — St. James's Gazette.

'A really good book.' — Saturday Review.

Southey. ENGLISH SEAMEN (Howard, Clifford, Hawkins.
Drake, Cavendish). By Robert Southey. Edited, with an
Introduction, by David Hannay. Second Edition. CrownSvo. 6s.

'Admirable and well-told stories of our naval history.' — Army and Navy Gazette.

'A brave, inspiriting book.' — Black and White.

'The work of a master of style, and delightful all through.'— Daily Chronicle.

General Literature

S. Baring Gould. OLD COUNTRY LIFE. By S. Baring
Gould, Author of 'Mehalah,' etc. With Sixty-seven Illustrations
by W. Parkinson, F. D. Bedford, and F. Masey. Large
Crown Svo. \os. 6d. Fifth and Cheaper Edition. 6s.

"Old Country Life," as healthy wholesome reading, full of breezy life and move-
ment, full of quaint stories vigorously told, will not be excelled by any book to be
published throughout the year. Sound, hearty, and English to the core.' — World.

16 Messrs. Methuen's List

S. Baring Gould. HISTORIC ODDITIES AND STRANGE
EVENTS. By S. Baring Gould. Third Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

' A collection of exciting and entertaining chapters. The whole volume is delightful
reading. ' — Times.

S. Baring Gould. FREAKS OF FANATICISM. By S. Baring

Gould. Third Edition. Crozvn 8vo. 6s.
' Mr. Baring Gould has a keen eye for colour and effect, and the subjects he has
chosen give ample scope to his descriptive and analytic faculties. A perfectly
fascinating book.' — Scottish Leader.

S. Baring Gould. A GARLAND OF COUNTRY SONG:

English Folk Songs with their Traditional Melodies. Collected and
arranged by S. Baring Gould and H. Fleetwood Sheppard.
Demy a,to. 6s.

S. Baring Gould. SONGS OF THE WEST: Traditional
Ballads and Songs of the West of England, with their Traditional
Melodies. Collected by S. Baring Gould, M.A., and H. Fleet-
wood Sheppard, M. A. Arranged for Voice and Piano. In 4 Parts
(containing 25 Songs each), Parts I., //., III., 3s. each. Part
IV., 5j-. In one Vol., French morocco, \^s.
'A rich collection of humour, pathos, grace, and poetic fancy.''— Saturday Review.

S. Baring Gould. YORKSHIRE ODDITIES AND STRANGE
EVENTS. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s.

S. Baring Gould. STRANGE SURVIVALS AND SUPER-
STITIONS. With Illustrations. By S. Baring Gould. Crown
8vo. Second Edition. 6s.
' We have read Mr. Baring Gould's book from beginning to end. It is full of quaint
and various information, and there is not a dull page in it.' — Notes and Queries.

S. Baring Gould. THE DESERTS OF SOUTHERN
FRANCE. By S. Baring. Gould. With numerous Illustrations
by F. D. Bedford, S. Hutton, etc. 2 vols. Demy 8vo. 32^.

This book is the first serious attempt to describe the great barren tableland that
extends to the south of Limousin in the Department of Aveyron, Lot, etc., a
country of dolomite cliffs, and canons, and subterranean rivers. The region is
full of prehistoric and historic interest, relics of cave-dwellers, of mediaeval
robbers, and of the English domination and the Hundred Years' War.

' His two richly-illustrated volumes are full of matter of interest to the geologist,
the archaeologist, and the student of history and manners.' — Scotsman.

' It deals with its subject in a manner which rarely fails to arrest attention.' — Times.

R. S. Baden-Powell. THE DOWNFALL OF PREMPEH. A
Diary of Life with the Native Levy in Ashanti, 1895. By Lieut. -Col.
Baden-Powell. With 21 Illustrations, a Map, and a Special
Chapter on the Political and Commercial Position of Ashanti by Sir
George Baden-Powell, K.C.M.G., M.P. Demy 8vo. \o$. 6d.

' A compact, faithful, most readable record of the campaign.' — Daily News.
' A bluff and vigorous narrative.' — Glasgcnv Herald.
' A really interesting book.' — Yorkshire Post.

Messrs. Methuen's List 17

W. E. Gladstone. THE SPEECHES AND PUBLIC AD-
DRESSES OF THE RT. HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.
Edited by A. W. Hutton, M.A., and H. J. Cohen, M.A. With
Portraits. Svo. Vols. IX. and X. \2.s. 6d. each.

Henley and Whibley. A BOOK OF ENGLISH PROSE.
Collected by W. E. Henley and Charles Whibley. Cr. Svo. 6s.

'A unique volume of extracts — an art gallery of early prose.' — Birmingham Post.

' An admirable companion to Mr. Henley's " Lyra Heroica." ' — Saturday Review.

' Quite delightful. The choice made has been excellent, and the volume has been
most admirably printed by Messrs. Constable. A greater treat for those not well
acquainted with pre-Restoration prose could not be imagined.' — Athetueum.

J. Wells. OXFORD AND OXFORD LIFE. By Members of
the University. Edited by J. Wells, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of
Wadham College. Crown Svo. 3-r. 6d.
This work contains an account of life at Oxford — intellectual, social, and religious —
a careful estimate of necessary expenses, a review of recent changes, a statement
of the present position of the University, and chapters on Women's Education,
aids to study, and University Extension.
' We congratulate Mr. Wells on the production of a readable and intelligent account
of Oxford as it is at the present time, written by persons who are possessed of a
close acquaintance with the system and life of the University.' — Athenceum.

W. M. Dixon. A PRIMER OF TENNYSON. By W. M.
Dixon, M.A., Professor of English Literature at Mason College.
Crown Svo. 2s. 6d.

' Much sound and well-expressed criticism and acute literary judgments. The biblio-
graphy is a boon.' — Speaker.

' No better estimate of the late Laureate's work has yet been published. His sketch
of Tennyson's life contains everything essential ; his bibliography is full and con-
cise : his literary criticism is most interesting.' — Glasgow Herald.

W. A. Craigie. A PRIMER OF BURNS. By W. A. Craigie.

Crown Svo. is. 6d.

This book is planned on a method similar to the ' Primer of Tennyson.' It has also

a glossary.
' A valuable addition to the literature of the poet.' — Times.
' An excellent short account.' — Pall Mall Gazette.
'An admirable introduction.' — Globe.

L. Whibley. GREEK OLIGARCHIES : THEIR ORGANISA-
TION AND CHARACTER. By L. Whibley, M.A., Fellow
of Pembroke College, Cambridge. Crown Svo. 6s.

' An exceedingly useful handbook : a careful and well-arranged study of an obscure
subject. ' — Times.

' Mr. Whibley is never tedious or pedantic' — Pall Mall Gazette.

W. B. Worsfold. SOUTH AFRICA : Its History and its Future.
By W. Basil Worsfold, M.A. With a Map. Crown Svo. 6s.

'An intensely interesting book.' — Daily Chronicle.

' A monumental work compressed into a very moderate compass.' — World.

1 8 Messrs. Methuen's List

C. H. Pearson. ESSAYS AND CRITICAL REVIEWS. By
C. H. Pearson, M.A., Author of 'National Life and Character.'
Edited, with a Biographical Sketch, by H. A. Strong, M.A.,
LL.D. With a Portrait. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d.

' These fine essays illustrate the great breadth of his historical and literary sym-
pathies and the remarkable variety of his intellectual interests.' — Glasgow Herald.

' Remarkable for careful handling, breadth of view, and thorough knowledge.' — Scots-
man.

' Charming essays. ' — Spectator.

Ouida. VIEWS AND OPINIONS. By Ouida. Crown Svo.
Second Edition, ds.
' Ouida is outspoken, and the reader of this book will not have a dull moment. The
book is full of variety, and sparkles with entertaining matter.' — Speaker.

J. S. Shedlock. THE PIANOFORTE SONATA : Its Origin
and Development. By J. S. Shedlock. Crown 8vo. $s.

' This work should be in the possession of every musician and amateur, for it not
only embodies a concise and lucid history ot the origin of one of the most im-
portant forms of musical composition, but, by reason of the painstaking research
and accuracy of the author's statements, it is a very valuable work for reference.'
— A thenceum.

E. M. Bowden. THE EXAMPLE OF BUDDHA : Being Quota-
tions from Buddhist Literature for each Day in the Year. Compiled
by E. M. Bowden. With Preface by Sir Edwin Arnold. Third
Edition. i6mo. 2s. 6d.

J. Beever. PRACTICAL FLY-FISHING, Founded on
Nature, by John Beever, late of the Thvvaite House, Coniston. A
New Edition, with a Memoir of the Author by W. G. Collingwood,
M.A. Crown 8vo. 35. 6d.
A little book on Fly-Fishing by an old friend of Mr. Ruskin.

Science

Freudenreich. DAIRY BACTERIOLOGY. A Short Manual
for the Use of Students. By Dr. Ed. von Freudenreich.
Translated from the German by J. R. Ainsworth Davis, B.A.,
F. C. P. Crown 8vo. is. 6d.

Chalmers Mitchell. OUTLINES OF BIOLOGY. By P.

Chalmers Mitchell, M.A., F.Z.S. Fully Illustrated. Crown
8vo. 6s.
A text-book designed to cover the new Schedule issued by the Royal College of
Physicians and Surgeons.

G.Massee. A MONOGRAPH OF THE MYXOGASTRES. By

George Massee. With 12 Coloured Plates. Royal 8vo. 18s.net.
'A work much in advance of any book in the language treating of this group of
organisms. It is indispensable to every student of the Myxogastres. The
coloured plates deserve high praise for their accuracy and execution.'— Nature.

Messrs. Methuen's List 19

Philosophy

L. T. Hobhouse. THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. By
L. T. Hobhouse, Fellow and Tutor of Corpus College, Oxford.
Demy Svo. 2ls.
' The most important contribution to English philosophy since the publication of Mr.
Bradley's " Appearance and Reality." Full of brilliant criticism and of positive
theories which are models of lucid statement.' — Glasgow Herald.
An elaborate and often brilliantly written volume. The treatment is one of great
freshness, and the illustrations are particularly numerous and apt.' — Times.

W. H. Fairbrother. THE PHILOSOPHY OF T. H. GREEN.
By W. H. Fairbrother, M.A., Lecturer at Lincoln College,
Oxford. Crown Svo. $s. 6d.

This volume is expository, not critical, and is intended for senior students at the
Universities and others, as a statement of Green's teaching, and an introduction to
the study of Idealist Philosophy.

' In every way an admirable book. As an introduction to the writings of perhaps the
most remarkable speculative thinker whom England has produced in the present
century, nothing could be better than Mr. Fairbrother's exposition and criticism.' —
Glasgow Herald.

F. W. Bussell. THE SCHOOL OF PLATO : its Origin and
its Revival under the Roman Empire. By F. W. Bussell, M.A.,
Fellow and Tutor of Brasenose College, Oxford. Demy Svo. Two
volumes, "js. 6d. each. Vol. I.

' A highly valuable contribution to the history of ancient thought.' — Glasgow Herald.

' A clever and stimulating book, provocative of thought and deserving careful reading.'
— Manchester Guardian.

F. S. Granger. THE WORSHIP OF THE ROMANS. By

F. S. Granger, M.A., Litt.D., Professor of Philosophy at Univer-
sity College, Nottingham. Crown Svo. 6s.

The author has attempted to delineate that group of beliefs which stood in close con-
nection with the Roman religion, and among the subjects treated are Dreams,
Nature Worship, Roman Magic, Divination, Holy Places, Victims, etc. Thus
the book is, apart from its immediate subject, a contribution to folk-lore and com-
parative psychology.
'A scholarly analysis of the religious ceremonies.beliefs, and superstitions of ancient
Rome, conducted in the new instructive light of comparative anthropology.' —
Times.

2o Messrs. Methuen's List

Theology

E. C. S. Gibson. THE XXXIX. ARTICLES OF THE
CHURCH OF ENGLAND. Edited with an Introduction by E.
C. S. Gibson, D.D., Vicar of Leeds, late Principal of Wells
Theological College. In Two Volumes. Demy Svo. Js. 6d. each.
Vol.1. Articles /.- VIII.

' The tone maintained throughout is not that of the partial advocate, but the faithful

exponent. ' — Scotsman.
'There are ample proofs of clearness of expression, sobriety of judgment, and breadth

of view. . . . The book will be welcome to all students of the subject, and its sound,

definite, and loyal theology ought to be of great service.' — National Observer.
' So far from repelling the general reader, its orderly arrangement, lucid treatment,

and felicity of diction invite and encourage his attention.' — Yorkshire Post.

R. L. Ottley. THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION.

By R. L. Ottley, M.A., late fellow of Magdalen College, Oxon.,

Principal of Pusey House. In Two Volumes. Demy Svo. \^s.
'Learned and reverent : lucid and well arranged.' — Record.
'Accurate, well ordered, and judicious.' — National Observer.
' A clear and remarkably full account of the main currents of speculation. Scholarly

precision . ._ . genuine tolerance . . . intense interest in his subject — are Mr.

Ottley's merits.' — Guardian.

S. R. Driver. SERMONS ON SUBTECTS CONNECTED
WITH THE OLD TESTAMENT. By S. R. Driver, D.D.,
Canon of Christ Church, Regius Professor of Hebrew in the Uni-
versity of Oxford. Crown Svo. 6s.
' A welcome companion to the author's famous ' Introduction.' No man can read these
discourses without feeling that Dr. Driver is fully alive to the deeper teaching of
the Old Testament.' — Guardian.

T. K. Cheyne. FOUNDERS OF OLD TESTAMENT CRITI-
CISM : Biographical, Descriptive, and Critical Studies. By T. K.
Cheyne, D.D., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scrip-
ture at Oxford. Large crown Svo. "js. 6d.

This important book is a historical sketch of O. T. Criticism in the form of biographi-
cal studies from the days of Eichhorn to those of Driver and Robertson Smith.
It is the only book of its kind in English.

'A very learned and instructive work.' — Times.

O.H.Prior. CAMBRIDGE SERMONS. Edited by C.H. Prior,
M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Pembroke College. Crown Svo. 6s.

A volume of sermons preached before the University of Cambridge by various
preachers, including the Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop Westcott.

'A representative collection. Bishop Westcott's is a noble sermon.'— Guardian.

H. C. Beeching. SERMONS TO SCHOOLBOYS. By H. C.
Beeciiing, M.A., Rector of Yattendon, Berks. With a Preface by
Canon Scott Holland. Crown Svo. 2s. 6d.

Seven sermons preached before the boys of Bradfield College.

Messrs. Methuen's List 21

E. B. Layard. RELIGION IN BOYHOOD. Notes on the
Religious Training of Boys. With a Preface by J. R. Illing-
worth. By E. B. Layard, M.A. i8mo. is.

2Defcottonal Boofeg*

With Full-page Illustrations. Fcap. Svo. Buckram. 35. 6d.
Padded morocco, $s.
THE IMITATION OF CHRIST. By Thomas A Kempis.
With an Introduction by Dean Farrar. Illustrated by C. M.
Gere, and printed in black and red. Second Edition.

'Amongst all the innumerable English editions of the " Imitation," there can have
been few which were prettier than this one, printed in strong and handsome type
by Messrs. Constable, with all the glory of red initials, and the comfort of buckram
binding.' — Glasgcnu Herald.

THE CHRISTIAN YEAR. By JOHN KEBLE. With an Intro-
duction and Notes by W. Lock, M. A., Sub- Warden of Keble College,
Ireland Professor at Oxford, Author of the ' Life of John Keble.'
Illustrated by R. Anning Bell.

' The present edition is annotated with all the care and insight to be expected from
Mr. Lock. The progress and circumstances of its composition are detailed in the
Introduction. There is an interesting Appendix on the mss. of the "Christian
Year," and another giving the order in which the poems were written. A " Short
Analysis of the Thought" is prefixed to each, and any difficulty in the text is ex-
plained in a note. — Guardian.

' The most acceptable edition of this ever-popular work.' — Globe.

Leaders of Religion

Edited by H. C. BEECHING, M.A. With Portraits, crown 8vo.

A series of short biographies of the most prominent leaders
of religious life and thought of all ages and countries.

The following are ready —

CARDINAL NEWMAN. By R. H. Hutton.
JOHN WESLEY. By J. H. Overton, M.A.
BISHOP WILBERFORCE. By G. W. Daniel, M.A
CARDINAL MANNING. By A. W. Hutton, M.A.
CHARLES SIMEON. By H. C. G. Moule, M.A.
JOHN KEBLE. By Walter Lock, M.A.
THOMAS CHALMERS. By Mrs. Oliphant.
LANCELOT ANDREWES. By R. L. Ottley, M.A.

3/6

22 Messrs. Methuen's List

AUGUSTINE OF CANTERBURY. By E. L. Cutts, D.D.
WILLIAM LAUD. By W. H. Hutton, M.A.
JOHN KNOX. By F. M'Cunn.
JOHN HOWE. By R. F. Horton, D.D.
BISHOP KEN. By F. A. Clarke, M.A.
GEORGE FOX, THE QUAKER. By T. Hodgkin, D.C.L.
Other volumes will be announced in due course.

Fiction

SIX SHILLING NOVELS

Marie Corelli's Novels

Crown 8vo. 6s. each.

A ROMANCE OF TWO WORLDS. Fourteenth Edition.

VENDETTA. Eleventh Edition.

THELMA. Fourteenth Edition.

ARDATH. Tenth Edition.

THE SOUL OF LILITH. Ninth Edition.

WORMWOOD. Eighth Edition.

BARABBAS : A DREAM OF THE WORLD'S TRAGEDY.

Twenty-fifth Edition.

' The tender reverence of the treatment and the imaginative beauty of the writing
have reconciled us to the daring of the conception, and the conviction is forced on
us that even so exalted a subject cannot be made too familiar to us, provided it be
presented in the true spirit of Christian faith. The amplifications of the Scripture
narrative are often_ conceived with high poetic insight, and this "Dream of the
World's Tragedy " is, despite some trifling incongruities, a lofty and not inade-
quate paraphrase of the supreme climax of the inspired narrative.'— Dublin
Review.

THE SORROWS OF SATAN. Twenty-ninth Edition,

' A very powerful piece of work. . . . The conception is magnificent, and is likely
to win an abiding place within the memory of man. . . . The author has immense
command of language, and a limitless audacity. . . . This interesting and re-
markable romance will live long after much of the ephemeral literature of the day
is forgotten. ... A literary phenomenon . . . novel, and even sublime.'— W. T.
Stead in the Review of Reviews.

Messrs. Methuen's List 23

Anthony Hope's Novels

Crowii 8vo. 6s. each.
THE GOD IN THE CAR. Seventh Edition.

' A very remarkable book, deserving of critical analysis impossible within our limit ;
brilliant, but not superficial ; well considered, but not elaborated ; constructed
with the proverbial art that conceals, but yet allows itself to be enjoyed by readers
to whom fine literary method is a keen pleasure ; true without cynicism, subtle
without affectation, humorous without strain, witty without offence, inevitably
sad, with an unmorose simplicity.'— The World.

A CHANGE OF AIR. Fourth Edition.

'A graceful, vivacious comedy, true to human nature. The characters are traced
with a masterly hand.' — Times.

A MAN OF MARK. Third Edition.

' Of all Mr. Hope's books, " A Man of Mark " is the one which best compares with
" The Prisoner of Zenda." The two romances are unmistakably the work of the
same writer, and he possesses a style of narrative peculiarly seductive, piquant,
comprehensive, and — his own.' — National Observer.

THE CHRONICLES OF COUNT ANTONIO. Third

Edition.

'It is a perfectly enchanting story of love and chivalry, and pure romance. The
outlawed Count is the most constant, desperate, and withal modest and tender of
lovers, a peerless gentleman, an intrepid fighter, a very faithful friend, and a most
magnanimous foe. In short, he is an altogether admirable, lovable, and delight-
ful hero. There is not a word in the volume that can give offence to the most
fastidious taste of man or woman, and there is not, either, a dull paragraph in it.
The book is everywhere instinct with the most exhilarating spirit of adventure,
and delicately perfumed with the sentiment of all heroic and honourable deeds of
history and romance.' — Guardian.

S. Baring Gould's Novels

Crown Svo. 6s. each.

'To say that a book is by the author of " Mehalah" is to imply that it contains a
story cast on strong lines, containing dramatic possibilities, vivid and sympathetic
descriptions of Nature, and a wealth of ingenious imagery.' — Speaker.
' That whatever Mr. Baring Gould writes is well worth reading, is a conclusion that
may be very generally accepted. His views of life are fresh and vigorous, his
language pointed and characteristic, the incidents of which he makes use are
striking and original, his characters are life-like, and though somewhat excep-
tional people, are drawn and coloured with artistic force. Add to this that his
descriptions of scenes and scenery are painted with the loving eyes and skilled
hands of a master of his art, that he is always fresh and never dull, and under
such conditions it is no wonder that readers have gained confidence both in his
power of amusing and satisfying them, and that year by year his popularity
widens.' — Court Circular.

ARM I NELL : A Social Romance. Fourth Edition.
URITH : A Story of Dartmoor. Fourth Edition.

' The author is at his best.' — Times.

1 He has nearly reached the high water-mark of " Mehalah." ' — National Observer.

24 Messrs. Methuen's List

IN THE ROAR OF THE SEA. Fifth Edition.

'One of the best imagined and most enthralling stories the author has produced.'
— Saturday Review.

MRS. CURGENVEN OF CURGENVEN. Fourth Edition.

' A novel of vigorous humour and sustained power.' — Graphic.
' The swing of the narrative is splendid.' — Sussex Daily News

CHEAP JACK ZITA. Third Edition.

' A powerful drama of human passion.' — Westminster Gazette.
'A story worthy the author.' — National Observer.

THE QUEEN OF LOVE. Fourth Editio7i.

' The scenery is admirable, and the dramatic incidents are most striking.'— Glasgow

Herald.
'Strong, interesting, and clever.'— Westminster Gazette.
' You cannot put it down until you have finished it.' — Punch.
' Can be heartily recommended to all who care for cleanly, energetic, and interesting

fiction.' — Sussex Daily News.

KITTY ALONE. Fourth Edition.

'A strong and original _ story, teeming with graphic description, stirring incident,

and, above all, with vivid and enthralling human interest.' — Daily Telegraph.
' Brisk, clever, keen, healthy, humorous, and interesting.' — National Observer.
' Full of quaint and delightful studies of character.'— Bristol Me rcury.

NOEMI : A Romance of the Cave-Dwellers. Illustrated by
R. CATON Woodville. Third Edition.

' " Noemi " is as excellent a tale of fighting and adventure as one may wish to meet.

All the characters that interfere in this exciting tale are marked with properties

of their own. The narrative also runs clear and sharp as the Loire itself.' —

fait Mall Gazette.
'Mr. Baring Gould's powerful story is full of the strong lights and shadows and

vivid colouring to which he has accustomed us.' — Standard.

THE BROOM-SQUIRE. Illustrated by Frank Dadd.
Third Edition.

' A_ strain of tenderness is woven through the web of his tragic tale, and its atmosphere
is sweetened by the nobility and sweetness of the heroine's character.' — Daily News.

'A story of exceptional interest that seems to us to be better than anything he has
written of late.'— Speaker. ' A powerful and striking story. '—Guardian.

' A powerful piece of work.' — Black and White.

Gilbert Parker's Novels

Crown 8vo. 6s. each.
PIERRE AND HIS PEOPLE. Third Edition.

' Stories happily conceived and finely executed. There is strength and genius in Mr.
Parker's style.' — Daily Telegraph.

Messrs. Methuen's List 25

MRS. FALCHION. Third Edition.

' A splendid study of character.' — Athenwum.

' But little behind anything that has been done by any writer of our time.' — Pall

Mall Gazette.
'A very striking and admirable novel.' — .9/. James's Gazette.

THE TRANSLATION OF A SAVAGE.

' The plot is original and one difficult to work out ; but Mr. Parker has done it with
great skill and delicacy. The reader who is not interested in this original, fresh,
and well-told tale must be a dull person indeed.' — Daily Chronicle.

' A strong and successful piece of workmanship. The portrait of Lali, strong,
dignified, and pure, is exceptionally well drawn.' — Manchester Guardian.

THE TRAIL OF THE SWORD. Fourth Edition.

'Everybody with a soul for romance will thoroughly enjoy "The Trail of the
Sword." ' — St. fames' s Gazette.

' A rousing and dramatic tale. A book like this, in which swords flash, great sur-
prises are undertaken, and daring deeds done, in which men and women live and
love in the old straightforward passionate way, is a joy inexpressible to the re-
viewer, brain-weary of the domestic tragedies and psychological puzzles of every-
day fiction ; and we cannot but believe that to the reader it will bring refreshment
as welcome and as keen.' — Daily Chronicle.

WHEN VALMOND CAME TO PONTIAC : The Story of
a- Lost Napoleon. Third Edition.

' Here we find romance — real, breathing, living romance, but it runs flush with our
own times, level with our own feelings. Not here can we complain of lack of
inevitableness or homogeneity. The character of Valmond is drawn unerringly ;
his career, brief as it is, is placed before us as convincingly as history itself. The
book must be read, we may say re-read, for any one thoroughly to appreciate
Mr. Parker's delicate touch and innate sympathy with humanity.' — Pall Alall
Gazette.
'The one work of genius which 1895 has as yet produced.' — New Age.

AN ADVENTURER OF THE NORTH: The Last Adven-
tures of ' Pretty Pierre.'

'The present book is full of fine and moving stories of the great North, and it will
add to Mr. Parker's already high reputation.' — Glasgow Herald.

' The new book is very romantic and very entertaining — full of that peculiarly
elegant spirit of adventure which is so characteristic of Mr. Parker, and of that
poetic thrill which has given him warmer, if less numerous, admirers than even
his romantic story-telling gift has done.' — Sketch.

THE SEATS OF THE MIGHTY. Illustrated. Fourth
Edition.

' The best thing he has done ; one of the best things that any one has done lately.' —
St. James's Gazette.

' Mr. Parker seems to become stronger and easier with every serious novel that he
attempts. . . . In " The Seats of the Mighty " he shows the matured power which
his former novels have led us to expect, and has produced a really fine historical
novel. . . . The great creation of the book is Doltaire. . . . His character^ is
drawn with quite masterly strokes, for he is a villain who is not altogether a villain,
and who attracts the reader, as he did the other characters, by the extraordinary
brilliance of his gifts, and by the almost unconscious acts of nobility which he
performs. . . . Most sincerely is Mr. Parker to be congratulated on the finest
novel he has yet written.' — Athencrum.

26 Messrs. Methuen's List

'Mr. Parker's latest book places him in the front rank of living novelists. "The
Seats of the Mighty" is a great book.' — Black and White.

' One of the strongest stories of historical interest and adventure that we have read
for many a day. . . . Through all Mr. Parker moves with an assured step, whilst
in his treatment of his subject there is that happy blending of the poetical with the
prosaic which has characterised all his writings. A notable and successful book.'
— Speaker.

' The story is very finely and dramatically told. ... In none of his books has his
imaginative faculty appeared to such splendid purpose as here. Captain Moray,
Alixe, Gabord, Vauban — above all, Doltaire — and, indeed, every person who takes
part in the action of the story are clearly conceived and finely drawn and indivi-
dualised. — Scotsman.

'An admirable romance. The glory of a romance is its plot, and this plot is crowded
with fine sensations, which have no rest until the fall of the famous old city and
the final restitution of love.'— Pall Mall Gazette.

Conan Doyle. ROUND THE RED LAMP. By A. Conan
Doyle, Author of ' The White Company,' ' The Adventures of
Sherlock Holmes,' etc. Fourth Edition. Crown %vo. 6s.

' The book is, indeed, composed of leaves from life, and is far and away the best view
that has been vouchsafed us behind the scenes of the consulting-room. It is very
superior to " The Diary of a late Physician." ' — Illustrated London News.

Stanley Weyman. UNDER THE RED ROBE. By Stanley
Weyman, Author of ' A Gentleman of France.' With Twelve Illus-
trations by R. Caton Woodville. Eighth Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

'A book of which we have read every word for the sheer pleasure of reading, and
which we put down with a pang that we cannot forget it all and start again.' —
Westminster Gazette.

1 Every one who reads books at all must read this thrilling romance, from the first
page of which to the last the breathless reader is haled along. An inspiration of
"manliness and courage." — Daily Chronicle.

'A delightful tale of chivalry and adventure, vivid and dramatic, with a wholesome
modesty and reverence for the highest.' — Globe.

Mrs. Clifford. A FLASH OF SUMMER. By Mrs. W. K.

Clifford, Author of ' Aunt Anne,' etc. Second Edition. Crozvn

8vo. 6s.
' The story is a very sad and a very beautiful one, exquisitely told, and enriched with

many subtle touches of wise and tender insight. It will, undoubtedly, add to its

author's reputation — already high — in the ranks of novelists.' — Speaker.
' We must congratulate Mrs. Clifford upon a very successful and interesting story,

told throughout with finish and a delicate sense of proportion, qualities which,

indeed, have always distinguished the best work of this very able writer.' —

Manchester Guardian.

Emily Lawless. HURRISH. By the Honble. Emily Law-
less, Author of 'Maelcho,' etc. Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s.
A reissue of Miss Lawless' most popular novel, uniform with ' Maelcho.'

Emily Lawless. MAELCHO : a Sixteenth Century Romance.
By the Honble. Emily Lawless, Author of ' Grania,' ' Hurrish,'
etc. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s.

' A really great book.' — Spectator.

'There is no keener pleasure in life than the recognition of genius. Good work is
commoner than it used to be, but the best is as rare as ever. All the more
gladly, therefore, do we welcome in " Maelcho " a piece of work of the first_ order,
which we do not hesitate to describe as one of the most remarkable literary
achievements of this generation. Miss Lawless is possessed of the very essence
of historical genius.' — Manchester Guardian.

Messrs. Methuen's List 27

J. H. Findlater. THE GREEN GRAVES OF BALGOWRIE.

By Jane H. Findlater. Third Edition. GrownSvo. 6s.

'A powerful and vivid story.' — Standard.

' A beautiful story, sad and strange as truth itself.' — Vanity Fair.

' A work of remarkable interest and originality.' — National Observer.

' A really original novel.' — j 'oumal of 'Education.

' A very charming and pathetic tale.'— Pall Mall Gazette.

' A singularly original, clever, and beautiful story.' — Guardian.

' " The Green Graves of Balgowrie" reveals to us a new Scotch writer of undoubted

faculty and reserve force.' — Spectator.
' An exquisite idyll, delicate, affecting, and beautiful.' — Black and White.
' Permeated with high and noble purpose. It is one of the most wholesome stories

we have met with, and cannot fail to leave a deep and lasting impression.' —

Newsagent.

E. F. Benson. DODO : A DETAIL OF THE DAY. By E. F.

Benson. Sixteenth Edition. Crozun Svo. 6s.
' A delightfully witty sketch of society.' — Spectator.
' A perpetual feast of epigram and paradox.' — Speaker.
' By a writer of quite exceptional ability.' — AthcncEum.
' Brilliantly written.'— World.

E. F. Benson. THE RUBICON. By E. F. Benson, Author of

'Dodo.' Fifth Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

' Well written, stimulating, unconventional, and, in a word, characteristic' —

Birmingham Post.
' An exceptional achievement ; a notable advance on his previous work.' — National

Observer.

M. M. Dowie. GALLIA. By Menie Muriel Dowie, Author
of A Girl in the Carpathians.' Third Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

' The style is generally admirable, the dialogue not seldom brilliant, the situations
surprising in their freshness and originality, while the subsidiary as well as the
principal characters live and move, and the story itself is readable from title-page
to colophon.' — Saturday Review.

' A very notable book; a very sympathetically, at times delightfully written book.
— Daily Graphic.

Mrs. Oliphant. SIR ROBERT'S FORTUNE. By Mrs.
Oliphant. Crown Svo. 6s.

' Full of her own peculiar charm of style and simple, subtle character-painting come
her new gift, the delightful story before us. The scene mostly lies in the moors,
and at the touch of the authoress a Scotch moor becomes a living thing, strong
tender, beautiful, and changeful.' — Pall Mall Gazette.

Mrs. Oliphant. THE TWO MARYS. By Mrs. Oliphant.
Second Edition. Crozun Svo. 6s.

W.E.Norris. MATTHEW AUSTIN. By W. E. Norris, Author
of ' Mademoiselle de Mersac,' etc. Fourth Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.
' "Matthew Austin " may safely be pronounced one of the most intellectually satis-
factory and morally bracing novels of the current year.' — Daily Telegraph.

W. E. Norris. HIS GRACE. By W. E. Norris. Third

Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

' Mr. Norris has drawn a really fine character in the Duke of Hurstbourne, at once
unconventional and very true to the conventionalities of life, weak and strong in
a breath, capable of inane follies and heroic decisions, yet not so definitely por-
trayed as to relieve a reader of the necessity of study.' — Athcnczum.

28 Messrs. Methuen's List

W. E. Norris. THE DESPOTIC LADY AND OTHERS.

By W. E. Norris. Crown Svo. 6s.

' A budget of good fiction of which no one will tire.' — Scotsman.

' An extremely entertaining volume — the sprightliest of holiday companions.' —
Daily Telegraph

H. G. Wells. THE STOLEN BACILLUS, and other Stories.
By H. G. WELLS, Author of 'The Time Machine.' Crown
Svo. 6s.
' The ordinary reader of fiction may be glad to know that these stories are eminently
readable from one cover to the other, but they are more than that ; they are the
impressions of a very striking imagination, which, it would seem, has a great deal
within its reach.' — Saturday Review.

Arthur Morrison. TALES OF MEAN STREETS. By Arthur

Morrison. Fourth Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

' Told with consummate art and extraordinary detail. He tells a plain, unvarnished
tale, and the very truth of it makes for beauty. In the true humanity of the book
lies its justification, the permanence of its interest, and its indubitable triumph.' — ■
A thenaum.

' A great book. The author's method is amazingly effective, and produces a thrilling
sense of reality. The writer lays upon us a master hand. The book is simply
appalling and irresistible in its interest. It is humorous also ; without humour
it would not make the mark it is certain to make.' — World.

J. Maclaren Cohhan. THE KING OF ANDAMAN : A
Saviour of Society. By J. Maclaren Cobban, Author of 'The
Red Sultan,' etc. Crown Svo. 6s.

' An unquestionably interesting book. It would not surprise us if it turns out to be
the most interesting novel of the season, for it contains one character, at least,
who has in him the root of immortality, and the book itself is ever exhaling the
sweet savour of the unexpected. . . . Plot is forgotten and incident fades, and
only the really human endures, and throughout this book there stands out in bold
and beautiful relief its high-souled and chivalric protagonist, James the Master
of Hutcheon, the King of Andaman himself.' — Pall Mall Gazette.

' A most original and refreshing story. James Hutcheon is a personage whom it is
good to know and impossible to forget. He is beautiful within and without,
whichever way we take him.' — Spectator.

' "The King of Andaman," is a book which does credit not less to the heart than
the head of its author.' — Atlienceum.

' The fact that Her Majesty the Queen has been pleased to gracefully express to the-
author of " The King of Andaman" her interest in his work will doubtless find
for it many readers.' — Vanity Fair.

H. Morrah. A SERIOUS COMEDY. By Herbert Morrah.

Crotvn Svo. 6s.

'There are many delightful places in this volume, which is well worthy of its title.
The theme has seldom been presented with more freshness or more force.' —
Scotsman.

L. B. Watford. SUCCESSORS TO THE TITLE. By Mrs.
Walforo, Author of 'Mr. Smith,' etc. Second Edition. Crown
Svo. 6s.

' The story is fresh and healthy from beginning to finish ; and our liking for the two
simple people who are the successors to the title mounts steadily, and ends almost
in respect.' — Scotsman.

'The book is quite worthy to be ranked with many clever predecessors. It is ex-
cellent reading.' — Glasgow Herald.

Messrs. Methuen's List 29

T. L. Paton. A HOME IN INVERESK. By T. L. Paton.
Crown Svo. 6s.
'A distinctly fresh and fascinating novel.' — Montrose Standard.
'A book which bears marks of considerable promise.' — Scotsman.
'A pleasant and well-written story.' — Daily Chronicle.

Jolin Davidson. MISS ARMSTRONG'S AND OTHER CIR-
CUMSTANCES. By John Davidson. Crown Svo. 6s.

' Throughout the volume there is a strong vein of originality, a strength in the
handling, and a knowledge of human nature that are worthy of the highest praise.'
— Scotsman.

J. B. Burton. IN THE DAY OF ADVERSITY. By J.

Bloundelle Burton, Author of ' The Hispaniola Plate,' etc.

Crown Svo. 6s.
' Unusually interesting and full of highly dramatic situations.' — Guardian.
' A well-written story, drawn from that inexhaustible mine, the time of Louis XIV.

— Pall Mall Gazette.

H. Johnston. DR. CONGALTON'S LEGACY. By Henry
Johnston. Crown Svo. 6s.

' The story is redolent of humour, pathos, and tenderness, while it is not without a
touch of tragedy.' — Scotsman.
A worthy and permanent contribution to Scottish creative literature.' — Glasgow
Herald.

Julian Corbett. A BUSINESS IN GREAT WATERS. By
Julian Corbett, Author of ' For God and Gold,' ' Kophetua
Xlllth.,' etc. Crown Svo. 6s.
' In this stirring story Mr. Julian Corbett has done excellent work, welcome alike
for its distinctly literary flavour, and for the wholesome tone which pervades it.
Mr. Corbett writes with immense spirit, and the book is a thoroughly enjoyable
one in all respects. The salt of the ocean is in it, and the right heroic ring re-
sounds through its gallant adventures.' — Speaker.

0. Phillips Woolley. THE OUEENSBERRY CUP. A Tale
of Adventure. By Clive Phillips Woolley, Author of ' Snap,'
Editor of ' Big Game Shooting.' Illustrated. Crown Svo. 6s.

" A book which will delight boys: a book which upholds the healthy schoolboy code

of morality.' — Scotsman.
' A brilliant book. Dick St. Clair, of Caithness, is an almost ideal character — a com-
bination of the mediaeval knight and the modern pugilist.' — Admiralty and Horse-
guards Gazette.

Robert Barr. IN THE MIDST OF ALARMS. By Robert
Barr, Author of ' From Whose Bourne,' etc. Third Edition.
Crown Svo. 6s.

' A book which has abundantly satisfied us by its capital humour.'— Daily Chronicle.

'Mr. Barr has achieved a triumph whereof he has every reason to be proud.' — Pall
Mall Gazette.

L. Daintrey. THE KING OF ALBERIA. A Romance of
the Balkans. By Laura Daintrey. Crown Svo. 6s.

Miss Daintrey seems to have an intimate acquaintance with the people and politics
of the Balkan countries in which the scene of her lively and picturesque romance
is laid. On almost every page we find clever touches of local colour which dif-
ferentiate her book unmistakably from the ordinary novel of commerce. The
story is briskly told, and well conceived.' — Glasgoio Herald.

30 Messrs. Methuen's List

Mrs. Pinsent. CHILDREN OF THIS WORLD. By Ellen
F. Pinsent, Author of 'Jenny's Case.' Crown Svo. 6s.
' Mrs. Pinsent's new novel has plenty of vigour, variety, and good writing. There
are certainty of purpose, strength of touch, and clearness of vision.' — Athenceum.

Clark Russell. MY DANISH SWEETHEART. By W.
Clark Russell, Author of ' The Wreck of the Grosvenor,'' etc.
Illustrated. Fourth Edition. Crozvn Svo. 6s.

G. Manville Fenn. AN ELECTRIC SPARK. By G. Manville
Fenn, Author of ' The Vicar's Wife,' ' A Double Knot,' etc. Second
Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.
'A simple and wholesome story.' — Manchester Guardian.

R. Pryce. TIME AND THE WOMAN. By Richard Pryce,

Author of ' Miss Maxwell's Affections,' 'The Quiet Mrs. Fleming,'
etc. Second Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.
' Mr. Pryce's work recalls the style of Octave Feuillet, hy its clearness, conciseness,
its literary reserve.' — Athenaum.

Mrs. Watson. THIS MAN'S DOMINION. By the Author
of ' A High Little World.' Second Edition. Crown Svo. 6s.

Marriott Watson. DIOGENES OF LONDON and other
Sketches. By H. B. Marriott Watson, Author of 'The Web
of the Spider.' Crown Svo. Buckrai>i. 6s.
' By all those who delight in the uses of words, who rate the exercise of prose above
the exercise of verse, who rejoice in all proofs of its delicacy and its strength, who
believe that English prose is chief among the moulds of thought, by these
Mr. Marriott Watson's book will be welcomed.' — National Observer.

M. Gilchrist. THE STONE DRAGON. By Murray Gil-
christ. Crozvn Svo. Buckram. 6s.
' The author's faults are atoned for by certain positive and admirable merits. The
romances have not their counterpart in modern literature, and to read them is a
unique experience.' — Actional Observer.

E. Dickinson. A VICAR'S WIFE. By Evelyn Dickinson.
Crown Svo. 6s.

E. M. Gray. ELS A. By E. M 'Queen Gray. Crown Svo. 6s.

THREE-AND-SIXPENNY NOVELS

Crorvn Svo.

DERRICK VAUGHAN, NOVELIST. By Edna Lyall
MARGERY OF QUETHER. By S. Baring Gould.
JACQUETTA. By S. Baring Gould.
SUBJECT TO VANITY. By Margaret Benson.
THE MOVING FINGER. By Mary Gaunt.
JACO TRELOAR. By J. H. Pearce.

3/6

Messrs. Methuen's List 31

aut diabolus aut nihil. by x. l.

THE COMING OF CUCULAIN. A Romance of the Heroic
Age of Ireland. By Standish O'Grady. Illustrated.

THE GODS GIVE MY DONKEY WINGS. By Angus
Evan Abbott.

THE STAR GAZERS. By G. MANVILLE Fenn.

THE POISON OF ASPS. By R. Orton Prowse.

THE QUIET MRS. FLEMING. By R. Pryce.

THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. By F. Mabel Robinson.

DISENCHANTMENT. By F. Mabel Robinson.

MR. BUTLER'S WARD. By F. Mabel Robinson.

A LOST ILLUSION. By Leslie Keith.

A REVEREND GENTLEMAN. By J. M. Cobban.

A DEPLORABLE AFFAIR. By W. E. Norris.

A CAVALIER'S LADYE. By Mrs. Dicker.

2/6

HALF-CROWN NOVELS

A Series of Novels by popular Authors.
i. HOVENDEN, V.C. By F. Mabel Robinson.

2. ELI'S CHILDREN. By G. Manville Fenn.

3. A DOUBLE KNOT. By G. Manville Fenn.

4. DISARMED. By M. Betham Edwards.

5. A MARRIAGE AT SEA. By W. Clark Russell.

6. IN TENT AND BUNGALOW. By the Author of ' Indian

Idylls.'

7. MY STEWARDSHIP. By E. M'Queen Gray.

8. JACKS FATHER. By W. E. NORRIS.

9. JIM B.

Lynn Linton. THE TRUE HISTORY OF JOSHUA DAVID-
SON, Christian and Communist. By E. Lynx Linton. Eleventh
Edition. Post Svo. is.

Books for Boys and Girls ^>\f)

A Series of Boohs by well-known Authors, well illustrated. V_y /

THE ICELANDER'S SWORD. By S. Baring Gould.
TWO LITTLE CHILDREN AND CHING. By EDITH

E. CUTHELL.

32 Messrs. Methuen's List

3. TODDLEBEN'S HERO. By M. M. Blake.

4. ONLY A GUARD ROOM DOG. By Edith E. Ctjthell.

5. THE DOCTOR OF THE JULIET. By Harry Colling-

WOOD.

6. MASTER ROCKAFELLAR'S VOYAGE. By W. Clark

Russell.

7. SYD BELTON : Or, The Boy who would not go to Sea.

By G. Manville Fenn.

3 /6

The Peacock Library

A Series of Books for Girls by well-known Authors,
handsomely bound in blue and silver, and zvell illustrated.

1. A PINCH OF EXPERIENCE. By L. B. Walford.

2. THE RED GRANGE. By Mrs. Molesworth.

3. THE SECRET OF MADAME DE MONLUC. By the

Author of ' Mdle Mori.'

4. DUMPS. By Mrs. Parr, Author of Adam and Eve.'

5. OUT OF THE FASHION. By L. T. Meade.

6. A GIRL OF THE PEOPLE. By L. T. Meade.

7. HEPSY GIPSY. By L. T. Meade. 2s. bd.

8. THE HONOURABLE MISS. By L. T. Meade.

9. MY LAND OF BEULAH. By Mrs. Leith Adams.

University Extension Series

A series of books on historical, literary, and scientific subjects, suitable
for extension students and home-reading circles. Each volume is com-
plete in itself, and the subjects are treated by competent writers in a
broad and philosophic spirit.

Edited by J. E. SYMES, M.A.,

Principal of University College, Nottingham.

Crown Svo. Price {with some exceptions) 2s. 6d.

The following volumes are ready : —

THE INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND. By H. DE

B. Giubins, M.A. , late Scholar of Wadham College, Oxon. , Cobden
Prizeman. Fourth Edition. With Maps and Plans. 3-<r.
'A compact and clear story of our ndustrial development. A study of this concise
but luminous book cannot fail to give the reader a clear insight into the principal
phenomena of our industrial history. The editor and publishers are to be congrat-
ulated on this first volume of their venture, and we shall look with expectant
interest for the succeeding volumes of the series.' — University Extension J 'ournal.

Messrs. Methuen's List 33

A HISTORY OF ENGLISH POLITICAL ECONOMY. By

L. L. Price, M.A., Fellow of Oriel College, Oxon. Second Edition.

PROBLEMS OF POVERTY : An Inquiry into the Industrial
Conditions of the Poor. By J. A. Hobson, M.A. Third Edition.

VICTORIAN POETS. By A. Sharp.

TxHE FRENCH REVOLUTION. By J. E. Symes, M.A.

PSYCHOLOGY. By F. S. Granger, M.A., Lecturer in Philo-
sophy at University College, Nottingham.

THE EVOLUTION OF PLANT LIFE : Lower Forms. By
G. Massee, Kew Gardens. With Illustrations.

AIR AND WATER. Professor V. B. Lewes, M.A. Illustrated.

THE CHEMISTRY OF LIFE AND HEALTH. By C. W.
Kimmins, M.A. Camb. Illustrated.

THE MECHANICS OF DAILY LIFE. By V. P. Sells, M.A.
Illustrated.

ENGLISH SOCIAL REFORMERS. H. de B. Gibbins, M.A.

ENGLISH TRADE AND FINANCE IN THE SEVEN-
TEENTH CENTURY. By W. A. S. Hewins, B.A.

THE CHEMISTRY OF FIRE. The Elementary Principles of
Chemistry. By M. M. Pattison Muir, M.A. Illustrated.

A TEXT-BOOK OF AGRICULTURAL BOTANY. By M. C.
Potter, M.A., F.L.S. Illustrated. 3s. 6d.

THE VAULT OF HEAVEN. A Popular Introduction to
Astronomy. By R. A. Gregory. With numerous Illustrations.

METEOROLOGY. The Elements of Weather and Climate.
By H. N. Dickson, F.R.S.E., F.R. Met. Soc. Illustrated.

A MANUAL OF ELECTRICAL SCIENCE. By George
J. Burch, M.A. With numerous Illustrations, y.

THE EARTH. An Introduction [to Physiography. By Evan
Small, M.A. Illustrated.

INSECT LIFE. By F. W. Theobald, M.A. Illustrated.

ENGLISH POETRY FROM BLAKE TO BROWNING. By

W. M. Dixon, M.A.
ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT. By E. Jenks, M.A.,

Professor of Law at University College, Liverpool.

2/6

34 Messrs. Methuen's List

Social Questions of To-day-
Edited by H. de B. GIBBINS, M.A.

Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.
A series of volumes upon those topics of social, economic,
and industrial interest that are at the present moment fore-
most in the public mind. Each volume of the series is written by an
author who is an acknowledged authority upon the subject with which
he deals.

The following Volumes of the Series are ready : —

TRADE UNIONISM— NEW AND OLD. By G. Howell,
Author of ' The Conflicts of Capital and Labour.' Second Edition.

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT TO-DAY. By G. J.
Holyoake, Author of 'The History of Co-operation.' Second
Edition.

MUTUAL THRIFT. By Rev. J. Frome Wilkinson, M.A.,
Author of ' The Friendly Society Movement.'

PROBLEMS OF POVERTY : An Inquiry into the Industrial
Conditions of the Poor. By J. A. Hobson, M.A. Third Edition.

THE COMMERCE OF NATIONS. By C. F. Bastable,

M.A., Professor of Economics at Trinity College, Dublin.

THE ALIEN INVASION. By W. H. Wilkins, B.A., Secretary
to the Society for Preventing the Immigration of Destitute Aliens.

THE RURAL EXODUS. By P. Anderson Graham.

LAND NATIONALIZATION. By Harold Cox, B.A.

A SHORTER WORKING DAY. By H. de B. Gibbins
and R. A. Hadfield, of the Hecla Works, Sheffield.

BACK TO THE LAND : An Inquiry into the Cure for Rural
Depopulation. By H. E. Moore.

TRUSTS, POOLS AND CORNERS : As affecting Commerce
and Industry. By J. Stephen Jeans, M.R.I., F.S.S.

THE FACTORY SYSTEM. By R. Cooke Taylor.

THE STATE AND ITS CHILDREN. By Gertrude

TUCKWELL.

WOMEN'S WORK. By Lady Dilke, Miss Bulley, and
Miss Whitley.

Messrs. Methuen's List 35

MUNICIPALITIES AT WORK. The Municipal Policy of
Six Great Towns, and its Influence on their Social Welfare. By
Frederick Dolman.

SOCIALISM AND MODERN THOUGHT. By M. Kauf-
man N.

THE HOUSING OF THE WORKING CLASSES. By R.

F. BOWMAKER.

MODERN CIVILISATION IN SOME OF ITS ECONOMIC
ASPECTS. By W. Cunningham, D. D. , Fellow of Trinity College,
Cambridge.

Classical Translations

Edited by H. F. FOX, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Brasenose
College, Oxford.

Messrs. Methuen are issuing a New Series of Translations from the
Greek and Latin Classics. They have enlisted the services of some
of the best Oxford and Cambridge Scholars, and it is their intention that
the Series shall be distinguished by literary excellence as well as by
scholarly accuracy.

iESCHYLUS — Agamemnon, Choephoroe, Eumenides. Trans-
lated by Lewis Campbell, LL.D., late Professor of Greek at St.
Andrews. $s.

CICERO— De Oratore I. Translated by E. N. P. MOOR, M.A.,
Assistant Master at Clifton. 35. 6d.

CICERO— Select Orations (Pro Milone, Pro Murena, Philippic II.,
In Catilinam). Translated by H. E. D. Blakiston, M.A., Fellow
and Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford. $s.

CICERO— De Natura Deorum. Translated by F. BROOKS,
M. A., late Scholar of Balliol College, Oxford. 3-r. 6d.

LUCIAN— Six Dialogues (Nigrinus, Icaro-Menippus, The Cock,
The Ship, The Parasite, The Lover of Falsehood). Translated by
S. T. Irwin, M.A., Assistant Master at Clifton; late Scholar of
Exeter College, Oxford. 3^. 6d.

SOPHOCLES— Electra and Ajax. Translated by E. D. A.
Morshead, M.A., late Scholar of New College, Oxford ; Assistant
Master at Winchester. 2s. 6d.

TACITUS— Agricola and Germania. Translated by R. B.
Townshend, late Scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge. 2s. 6d.

36 Messrs. Methuen's List

Educational Books

CLASSICAL

TACITI AGRICOLA. With Introduction, Notes, Map, etc.
By R. F. Davis, M.A., Assistant Master at Weymouth College.
Crown Svo. 2s.

TACITI GERMANIA. By the same Editor. Crown Svo. 2s.

HERODOTUS: EASY SELECTIONS. With Vocabulary.
By A. C. Liddell, M.A., Assistant Master at Nottingham High
School. Fcap. Svo. is. 6d.

SELECTIONS FROM THE ODYSSEY. By E. D. Stone,
M.A., late Assistant Master at Eton. Fcap. Svo. is. 6d.

PLAUTUS : THE CAPTIVI. Adapted for Lower Forms by
J. H. Freese, M. A., late Fellow of St. John's, Cambridge, is. 6d.

DEMOSTHENES AGAINST CONON AND CALLICLES.
Edited with Notes, and Vocabulary, by F. Darwin Swift, M.A.,
formerly Scholar of Queen's College, Oxford ; Assistant Master at
Denstone College. Fcap. Svo. 2s.

GERMAN
A COMPANION GERMAN GRAMMAR. By H. de B.
Gibbins, M.A., Assistant Master at Nottingham High School.
Crown Svo. is. 6d.

GERMAN PASSAGES FOR UNSEEN TRANSLATION.

By E. M 'Queen Gray. Crown Svo. 2s. 6d.

SCIENCE
THE WORLD OF SCIENCE. Including Chemistry, Heat.
Light, Sound, Magnetism, Electricity, Botany, Zoology, Physiology,
Astronomy, and Geology. By R. Elliot Steel, M.A., F.CS.
147 Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown Svo. 2s. 6d.

' Mr. Steel's Manual is admirable in many ways. The book is well calculated to
attract and retain the attention of the young.' — Saturday Review.

' If Mr. Steel is to be placed second to_ any for this quality of lucidity, it is only to
Huxley himself ; and to be named in the same breath with this master of the
craft of teaching is to be accredited with the clearness of style and simplicity of
arrangement that belong to thorough mastery of a subject.' — Parents Review.

ELEMENTARY LIGHT. By R. E. Steel. With numerous
Illustrations. Crown Svo. 4s. 6d.

Messrs. Methuen's List 37

ENGLISH

ENGLISH RECORDS. A Companion to the History of

England. By H. E. Malden, M.A. Crown 2,vo. 35. 6d.

A book which aims at concentrating information upon dates, genealogy, officials,
constitutional documents, etc., which is usually found scattered in different
volumes.

THE ENGLISH CITIZEN: HIS RIGHTS AND DUTIES.
By H. E. Malden, M.A. is. 6d.

' The book goes over the same ground as is traversed in the school books on this
subject written to satisfy the requirements of the Education code. It would
serve admirably the purposes of a text-book, as it is well^ based in historical
facts, and keeps quite clear of party matters.' — Scotsman.

METHUEN'S COMMERCIAL SERIES.

Edited by H. DE B. GIBBINS, M.A.

BRITISH COMMERCE AND COLONIES FROM ELIZA-
BETH TO VICTORIA. By H. de B. Gibbins, M.A., Author of
'The Industrial History of England,' etc. etc. 2s.

COMMERCIAL EXAMINATION PAPERS. By H. de B.

Gibbins, M.A. is. 6d.

THE ECONOMICS OF COMMERCE. By H. de B. Gibbins,
M.A. is. 6 J.

A MANUAL OF FRENCH COMMERCIAL CORRE-
SPONDENCE. By S. E. Bally, Modern Language Master at
the Manchester Grammar School. 2s.

A FRENCH COMMERCIAL READER. By S. E. Bally.

25.

COMMERCIAL GEOGRAPHY, with special reference to Trade
Routes, New Markets, and Manufacturing Districts. By L. W. Lyde,
M.A., of the Academy, Glasgow. 2s.

A PRIMER OF BUSINESS. By S. Jackson, M.A. is. 6d.

COMMERCIAL ARITHMETIC. By F. G. Taylor,
M.A. 15. 6d.

38 Messrs. Methuen's List

works by a. m. m. stedman, m.a.

INITIA LATINA : Easy Lessons on Elementary Accidence.
Second Edition. Fcap. Svo. is.

FIRST LATIN LESSONS. Fourth Edition. Crown Svo. 2s.

FIRST LATIN READER. With Notes adapted to the

Shorter Latin Primer and Vocabulary. Second Edition. Crown Svo.
is. 6d.

EASY SELECTIONS FROM CAESAR. Part i. The Hel-
vetian War. 1 8 7>io. is.

EASY SELECTIONS FROM LIVY. Part I. The Kings of
Rome. iSmo. is. 6d.

EASY LATIN PASSAGES FOR UNSEEN TRANSLA-
TION. Third Edition. Fcap. Svo. is. 6d.

EXEMPLA LATINA. First Lessons in Latin Accidence.
With Vocabulary. Crown Svo. is.

EASY LATIN EXERCISES ON THE SYNTAX OF THE
SHORTER AND REVISED LATIN PRIMER. With Vocabu-
lary. Fourth Edition. Crown Svo. 2s. 6d. Issued with the con-
sent of Dr. Kennedy.

THE LATIN COMPOUND SENTENCE : Rules and
Exercises. Crown Svo. is. 6d. With Vocabulary. 2s.

NOTANDA QUAEDAM : Miscellaneous Latin Exercises on
Common Rules and Idioms. Second Edition. Fcap. Svo. is. 6d.
With Vocabulary, 2S.

LATIN VOCABULARIES FOR REPETITION : Arranged
according to Subjects. Fourth Edition. Fcap. Svo. is. 6d.

A VOCABULARY OF LATIN IDIOMS AND PHRASES.
iS/no. is.

STEPS TO GREEK. iSmo. is.

EASY GREEK PASSAGES FOR UNSEEN TRANSLA-
TION. Fcap. Svo. is. 6d.

GREEK VOCABULARIES FOR REPETITION. Arranged
according to Subjects. Second Edition. Fcap. Svo. is. 6d.

GREEK TESTAMENT SELECTIONS. For the use of
Schools. Third Edition, With Introduction, Notes, and Vocabu-
lary. Fcap. Svo. 2s. 6d.

Messrs. Methuen's List 39

STEPS TO FRENCH. i8mo. Sd.

FIRST FRENCH LESSONS. CrownZvo. is.

EASY FRENCH PASSAGES FOR UNSEEN TRANSLA-
TION. Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo. is. 6d.

EASY FRENCH EXERCISES ON ELEMENTARY
SYNTAX. With Vocabulary. Crown %vo. 2s. 6d.

FRENCH VOCABULARIES FOR REPETITION : Arranged

according to Subjects. Third Edition. Fcap. &vo. is.

SCHOOL EXAMINATION SERIES,

Edited by A. M. M. STEDMAN, M.A.
Crown Sz>o. 2s. 6d.
FRENCH EXAMINATION PAPERS IN MISCELLANE-
OUS GRAMMAR AND IDIOMS. By A. M. M. Stedman, M.A.
Sixth Edition.

A Key, issued to Tutors and Private Students only, to be had on
application to the Publishers. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s. net.

LATIN EXAMINATION PAPERS IN MISCELLANEOUS

GRAMMAR AND IDIOMS. By A. M. M. Stedman, M.A.

Fourth Edition. Key issued as above. 65. net.
GREEK EXAMINATION PAPERS IN MISCELLANEOUS

GRAMMAR AND IDIOMS. By A. M. M. Stedman, M.A.

Third Edition. Key issued as above. 6s. net.

GERMAN EXAMINATION PAPERS IN MISCELLANE-
OUS GRAMMAR AND IDIOMS. By R. J. Morich, Man-
chester. Third Edition. Key issued as above. 6s. net.

HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY EXAMINATION PAPERS.
By C. H. Spence, M.A., Clifton Coll.

SCIENCE EXAMINATION PAPERS. By R. E. Steel, M.A.,
F.C.S., Chief Natural Science Master, Bradford Grammar School.
In two vols. Part I. Chemistry ; Part II. Physics.

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE EXAMINATION PAPERS.
By A. M. M. Stedman, M.A. Second Edition. Key issued as
above. "js. net.

Printed by T. and A. Constable, Printers to Her Majesty
at the Edinburgh University Press

ii 14 i

iqQ qDATE due

GAYLORD

PRINTED IN USA.

V^<t-\A>