THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SUBSTANCE OF A SPEECH, PELIVEBED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, On Friday, April 5, 1805, BY JOHN HUDLESTON, ESQ, ON THE MOTION OF PHILIP FRANCIS, ESQ. " That this House adheres to the principles established by its " unanimous Resolution on the 28th of May, 1784, and " recognized by the Acts of the l^th and 33d years of hit " present Majesty, that to pursue schemes of conquest and " aggrandizement in India is repugnant to the wish, the " honor, and the policy of this Country." JLonton >. PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR, By C. Mercier and Co. Northumberland Court, Strand. 1805. THE erroneous statements, in several of the public papers, of what was delivered by me in the House of Commons, in the late debate on the Affairs of India, had already determined me to cause some copies to be printed of the substance of what was really stated by me on that occasion, as far as my notes and memory should enable me, when I was favored (I doubt not by the courtesy of the author) with a publication, entitled " Ob- " servations on the Subject of the Debate in the " House of Commons, on India Affairs, on the " 5th April, 1805." The author of these observations is a gentle- o man who has passed a great part of his life in India, not in the service of the Company, but with distinguished eminence, and respectability, as a merchant, in which capacity he was enabled, by his extensive capital and credit, to render important aid to the Government of the Presi- dency, where he resided during a long and B 5000689 arduous crisis of public affairs ; and, since his return to this country, he has filled the offices of Deputy Chairman, and Chairman, of the Court of Directors. These circumstances, as they naturally attach weight to his opinions on subjects connected with India, make me more desirous that the grounds of my own opinions, which, on the most essential points, are at variance with those expressed in his Observations, should be fully known and un- derstood by all who interest themselves in the welfare of our dominion in India i or, perhaps I should rather say, by all who feel the interest which they really have in the stability of that vast portion of the British empire : but more especially am I solicitous, that both my opinions and my conduct, in relation to India, should be open to the examination of those who, by in- trusting me with a share in the administration of their affairs, and yet more by the manner in which they bestowed it, have entitled themselves to my Unalterable gratitude, and to every manifestation of it that my unwearied efforts, in every situation, and at every period of my life, may enable me to give. I mean the Proprietors of East India .Stock. It is, therefore, with the greater satisfac- tion that I commit to the press the substance of the arguments which I stated in the House of Commons, on the 5th of April ; as my consti- tuents will thereby be enabled to judge between them, and the arguments which were Intended to have been urged in the same place by the honor- able Author of the Publication alluded to: and, although 1 indulge a hope that to most of his positions virtual answers will be found in the following sheets, I shall here submit a few obser- vations on those passages of his work which are the most prominent, and mark most strongly the opposite views we take of the subject, without going into any of the rest. The passages to which I allude are in the commencement and conclusion. The author sets out with a quotation from a pamphlet which he supposes to be from the pen of the gentleman who opened the debate of the 5th April, namely, " Tippoo Sultaun is destroy- fc ed; the Mahratta empire subdued, and dis- " membered ; the French extirpated ; and the " whole peninsula of India, in effect, laid under " contribution to the power of Great Britain. " The hackneyed plea of an expected war, and " unforeseen expences, must fail at last in a " country in which an enemy in arms is not to tf be found, and where it is impossible for an " European power to attack us," On the above he observes, " These admitted " facts, thus strongly and correctly stated, would " seem to common understandings to call for some "' applause to the counsels and conduct of those but as the author's object, in the above statement, must have been to give the publip a correct view of their actual situation, tkat purpose would, I conceive, have been more fully answered if he had made the statement exhibit also the amount of our annual expenditure at the re- spective periods, and if he had contrasted the amount of our surplus revenue in 1804, with its amount in 1792-3, when the revenue which pro- duced it was not half so large : and the statement would, perhaps, have been yet more complete if, instead of merely giving the amount of the Indian debt at the two periods, it had shown its annual progressive increase under our former, an4 under our new, or present system. J. HUD.LESTON. Lonjon, ^Tune ISO*. ii6f -T SPEECH, Kc. Kc. MR. SPEAKER, ALTHOUGH much of what is deeply impressed upon my mind has been stated by my Honor- able Friend * near me, I cannot satisfy my- self with giving a silent vote on a proposi- tion so immediately connected with interests, to the study of which the best part of my life has been devoted, particularly as I think it pos- sible my silence might be misconstrued by those who know the apprehensions, and regret, with which I have for some years past contemplated our system in India. I am aware, at the same time, that there are considerations which are adverse to any detailed discussion of the subject in Parliament, and I doubt not that the Honor- able Mover has also been aware of them, but * Mr. Grant, Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors. 14 ^ that they have been outweighed by other con* siderations which he feels to be of greater im- portance j and as he has now brought the sub- ject fully before the House, J shall not shrink from the discussion, but endeavour to state my sincere opinions upon it, uninfluenced by any other motive than an anxious solicitude for the permanent welfare of our possessions in India. I confess to have heard the arguments of the Noble Lord* on the floor with considerable pain, because I know the weight they must derive from his authority ; and I therefore feel it to be the more important, that what has been said by my Honorable Friend, with respect to the state- ment in one of the Governor General's dis- patches, namely, that the justice and policy of the treaty of Bassein had received the approba- tion of the Court of Directors, and of his Ma- jesty's Ministers, through the Secret Committee, should be ckarly understood by the House, and the Public ; as the fact is, that the merits of that treaty never have been brought before the Court of Directors, for decision, or discussion, nor did they, nor could they know, that it had been ap- proved by his Majesty's Ministers, until so in- formed by the statement of the Noble Marquis f. Castlereagh. f The Secret Committee act in a capacity merely minis- terial ; their province is to transmit to India under their own signatures the orders of the Board of Commissioners. 15 It should be distinctly known, that with re- gard to the adoption of, or departure from, any system of policy in India, or the decision on any treaty, whatever be its nature, or object, whether to annex kingdoms or provinces to the British dominion in India, or to transfer any from it, the Court of Directors, though ostensibly vested with the administration of the affairs of India, have no more authority than any Member of this House : and here, Sir, I am sure the House will permit me to state, by way of illustration, a circumstance that I believe they will admit to be a little hard on the Court of Directors. It has been said, Sir, in another place, and by persons to whom, from their great respecta- bility, the public must naturally ascribe con- siderable knowledge of the subject, descanting on the merits of the Governor General, with re- lation to the brilliant successes in India, that " those merits were the greater in consequence " of the obstacles well known to have been fe thrown in his way from a certain quarter ;" and, lest that statement should be misunder- stood, it was expressly added, that no allusion was meant to his Majesty's Ministers. On this it was kindly observed, in behalf of the quar- ter alluded to, that it was composed of " men " of very good intentions, but not of minds suf- " ficiently enlarged to be capable of embracing " the vast extent, and great benefits, of the No- 16 " ble Marquis's plans." Now, Sir, with respect to the charge, I must observe, that great as doubtless are the endowments, and .information, of those respectable persons, there certainly is one point of knowledge which even their minds had not reached, or they would have known that no order, or paragraph, relating to the East India Company's affairs, civil, military, or political, or to its revenue, can be sent to India until it has received the sanction of the Board of Commis- sioners, of which the President, and several other members, are always members of the Cabinet ; and, consequently, that no obstacle could have been thrown in the way of the Governor Gene- ral that had not the concurrence, and participa- tion, of his Majesty's Ministers. It is less won- tlerful that those respectable persons should not have been acquainted with the fact, that the treaty of Bassein, which gave birth to the war, instead of having been approved by the Court of Directors, has not, to this moment, been re- ferred to their consideration. Other decisions, Sir, if possible, of yet greater importance, and which I incline to think will be more noticed by the impartial historian hereafter, than they have been, or are likely to be. during the present generation, have been ascribed to the Court of Directors, although they were not even known to that body until communicated to the public at large. No, Sir, the results and cor.se- 17 quences only of great, and magnificent schemes, come before the Court of Directors, and they are apt to appear in very serious shapes. With regard to the defence offered for the Court of Directors, however humiliating it may seem, I, as one of that body, am not ashamed to claim the benefit of it in the fullest sense, and to acknowledge that I have not a mind capable of embracing the vast plans of the Noble Mar- quis, or of perceiving their beneficial tendency. To me, on the contrary, they appear fraught with serious evils to teem with dreadful hazard * without any commensurate object to set our life upon a cast to stake our existence in India on the issue of projects and pursuits directly foreign to our truest policy, and to the policy enjoin- ed by the Legislature on splendid schemes, and enterprises, of which the failure would be destruction, and even the success is ruinous of which, in a word, nothing is certain but the enormous expencef of blood, and treasure, which they create, and the hatred they must inspire. These, Sir, were my impressions respecting the vast plans of the Noble Marquis, and their consequences, not less at the period last year, when the intelligence arrived of our brilliant mi- litary successes in India, than they are now that the development of the system has begun, and a serious disaster has opened the eyes of many c 18 to its real nature and tendency. But these im- pressions, Sir, have never made me forget the transcendent services, and able conduct, which distinguished the commencement of the Mar- quis's career in India 3 where his Lordship had no sooner landed and taken possession of his go- vernment, than he had occasion for all the ener- gies which distinguish a great from a common mind, and shewed that he possessed them. The wisdom and firmness by which he overcame all obstacles to the assembling of the army, and to its march against the infatuated Tippoo, were above all praise : the service the Noble Marquis then performed was one of the greatest ever ren- . dered to the East India Company; and, had his Lordship returned to England immediately after the conquest of Mysore, I should have ranked him with the very highest of those illustrious per- sons to whom the East India Company, and the Nation, have been indebted for the acquisition, or preservation, of our Eastern Empire-^not that, for one, my satisfaction at the entire destruction of the Mysorian power was unmixed, or that I could have wished its destruction; but for the incorrigible perfidy which had marked the con- duct of Tippoo Sultaun ; for that power had been always considered as the cheap, and only, barrier to the Carnatic, against the turbulent and encroaching disposition of the Mahrattas, and in 19 that light its preservation had been deemed es- sential : it was easy therefore, even in that great conquest, to discern the seeds of future calamity, unless the ardour of triumph should be tem- pered with moderation, and the mind of the victor be proof against the intoxicating qualities of inordinate success. And here I think the Noble Marquis has failed : the complete, and, probably in some mea- sure, unexpected success which followed the exertion of his great talents on this signal occa- sion, seems to have led him to imagine that nothing was beyond their reach, and to despise the sober wisdom of his predecessors, which, ex- cept in one instance (and in that one the excep- tion was attended with very disastrous conse- quences) had uniformly deprecated all interfe- rence in the concerns and quarrels of the native powers, and more especially in the contentions which were perpetually breaking out among the Mahratta chieftains. The high and sanguine mind of the Noble Marquis seems to have con- sidered this as a narrow and degrading policy; or, at best, a policy no longer adapted to bur situation in India, changed, or extended, as it had been, by our recent successes. Hence, as it appears to me, the Governor General, relying oh that change for his justification, in a departure from the principle laid down by the Legislature, c 2 io determined to aim at extension of territory on every side, and connected with that aim the grand and magnificent project of bringing all the native princes and governments in India into a state of dependence on, and in effect subjection to, the British power, and establishing an inter- ference and ascendancy in, and over, their con- cerns, by obliging or inducing them to admit each a force of British troops into his capital, to pay a large subsidy for the maintenance of that force, and then to change the subsidy into a cession of territory *. * This description does not include the whole of the Go- vernor General's plan. In his letter to the Peishwa, dated the 20th June, 1803, his Lordship avows his object to be, " to establish a permanent foundation of general tranquillity " in India, by securing to every sta'e the free enjoyment of its just " rights and independence, and by frustrating every project cul- " culated to disturb the possessions, or to violate the rights, of " the established power of Hindostun, or of the Deccan." Thus the Noble Marquis's object was to comprehend the uniting of all the states of Hindostan and the Deccan (com- prising regions nearly equal to the whole extent of Europe) into one family, under the protection and superintendance of the British power, making it the general guarantee of all their respective rights and possessions, the general arbitrator of all their disputes, and the general conservator of their peace and tranquillity ! Now to this scheme there are two objections, which force themselves upon my mind. First, that it is impracticable, and visionary in the extreme : and, secondly, that, during the existence of such a system, and of any determination or I believe the candor of the Noble Lord will not permit him to deny that, from the mo- ment of the conquest of Mysore such appears to have been the Governor General's system, and that the determination to extend it to the Mah- ratta states occasioned the late war with the confederate chieftains. The splendid successes of our arms, under the able conduct of Lord Lake and General Wellesley, were well calculated to dazzle men's eyes, to make them insensible to the perils of this system, and to throw an air of ridi- cule on the serious presages of its opposers ; though, in fact, those unexampled achievements, which covered all concerned in them with glory, do most powerfully assist in proving the deep and dreadful hazard incurred by the system which led to them, since it is allowed on all hands that, in order to succeed, or even to escape destruc- attempts to enforce it, we must be constantly involved either in actual war, or in great part of the expences incident to it. If these positions are denied, it will at least be admitted, that this magnificent system involved a serious change, and a departure from all the principles and views that had been uniformly inculcated by the East India Company ; on whom would rest all the hazard, and all the expence; while the credit of its success, should it succeed, would be exclusively with his Lordship : could they then possibly expect that such a change would be adopted without any previous re- ference to them, or any power left with them to guard against or prevent its adoption ? C 3 22 tion, it was necessary the troops should surpass all that had before been recorded even of British valour: nevertheless, in one, at least, of the actions, victory for some time hung upon a thread, How urgent then, how unavoidable the necessity, which would alone justify the plunging into a war in which every thing was thus ha- zarded ! Surely, nothing less than some out- rageous insult, or aggressive violence, on the part of the Mahrattas some attempt to subvert our independence, or at least to interfere in our concerns ! Some conduct on their part which, in the event of our defeat, and consequent ruin, would have enabled the narrator of our misfor- tunes to say, with truth, that we had deserved to succeed that we had fallen in defence of our rights, and independence, and not in any endea- vour to invade the rights, or subvert the inde- pendence, of other states : in a word, that our cause had been such that success was not neces- sary to determine its character. And this, Sir, brings me to the important point, to examine how far we should have been entitled to any consolation of this kind, by look- ing into the origin of the war : and in this exa- mination I shall for a moment suppose that that may be wise which is not just, and separate the policy from the justice of the war. Beginning then, Sir, with the policy, I shay .23 assume it as an admitted position, that the treaty of Bassein gave birth to the war j and all who are acquainted with the history of India, for the last thirty years, and with the system, character, and power of the Mahrattas, will, I am sure, per- mit me to assume, as another fact, that that treaty contained the vivid seeds of war ; that no experienced eye could look 4ato it without perceiving and predicting that war must be the consequence of our carrying into effect, or at- tempting to enforce, that treaty, for that it was impossible to suppose that any thing short of absolute conquest could induce the haughty and warlike Mahratta chieftains to submit to a con- dition so wounding to their pride, and so fatal to their independence, as that by which Poona, the capital of the Mahratta empire, was to be occu- pied by British troops. Doubtless the House know that the Mahratta state is composed of a number of feudatory chieftains, of more or less strength and terri- tory, all claiming and exercising independence of each other, but acknowledging an obedience, which, however, is little more than nominal, to the Peishwa (who is a Bramin) as hereditary mi- nister or administrator of the general affairs of the empire ; for the King, or, as he is called, the Sahoo Rajah, is a mere pageant, and always re- sides in a state confinement. When united, c 4 24- their numbers, warlike habits, and the great extent of country they possess, render them truly formidable ; but, fortunately for their neigh- bours, they are almost perpetually engaged in contests with each other for 1 power, and terri- tory j concurring, however, in one principle, that of maintaining the independence of the em- pire, and in extreme jealousy of foreign inter- ference in their concerns. Such interference has generally proved a signal either of reconciliation, or of deferring the decision of their internal quar- rels. We are their only rival, and the subversion of the Mysore empire, and the influence we had established in the dominions of the Suba of the Deccan (whose capital we occupy) together with our having obtained possession of the do- minions of the Nabob of Oude, had brought us so near to them, that it can only be ascribed to the greatest, and, for us, most fortunate infatua- tion, that they did not perceive that their only chance of preserving the independence, and in- tegrity, of the Mahratta empire, depended on their union. Now, Sir, what was the situation of the Mah- rattas at the period when, in pursuance of the system I have stated, we accomplished the treaty of Bassein, and thereby acquired a right to inter- fere in their concerns? Why, Sir, their situation was precisely that which, politically speaking, 25 we could have wished ; it was the very situation that most tended to ensure our safety. They were not merely occupied with the ordinary struggles for power, and pre-eminence. The two most powerful of the Mahratta. chieftains, Scindia and Holkar, between whom had long subsisted an inveterate enmity, were destroying each other ; nay, Sir, as if to make the state of things more critically favourable to us, the most powerful of the two, Scindia, whom it was most desirable for us to see weakened, had, in con- junction with the Peishwa, been recently defeated by Holkar with great slaughter : he was of course preparing for revenge, collecting his scattered troops, and drawing out his resources in order to renew the combat, and retrieve his disgrace* The next battle would have been still more san- guinary, and more destructive of Mahratta power they were effectually playing our game every blow given on either side was in effect a blow given for us while our strength remained entire, and we tranquilly beheld the scene. At this precise moment we interfered, not for the pur- pose of reconciling the parties, and putting a stop to the effusion of blood, but to accomplish our favorite object of establishing the same in- fluence and ascendancy in the Mahratta empire, that we had already established in the dominions of the Nizam j and, as the first, and most deci- sive, and unequivocal, step towards it, the tak- ing possession of Poona, the Mahratta capital. We interfered, Sir, and the scene was imme- diately changed. The combatants forgot, or suspended, their animosities. Scindia no longer supported the Peishwa, and Holkar no longer fought with Scindia. In short, Sir, our in- terference produced, in a great degree, that very consequence which the Governor General himself seems to have augured, and antici- pated, from it in his dispatch of June, 1802. " The general jealousy (says his Lordship) " of the Mahratta chieftains, of all the mem- " bers of the confederacy against the British " power, might induce them to compromise " their differences, and unite in opposing British " interference in their concerns." If this did not happen in all its extent, it was because, con- trary to all former experience of the Mahratta cha- racter, Holkar's personal hatred of Scindia, and jealousy of his power, and influence, were greater even than his attachment to the principles of the confederacy: he hoped that his own influence would be strengthened by the ruin of his rival*. * He supposed that a contest between the British power and the other confederate chieftains would be long and ob- stinate; that in the mean while his own resources would be so improved as to put him in a situation to dictate to both parties, or at least to commit depredations upon both with But what would have been the consequence if Holkar, instead of determining to be neuter, had joined his forces to those of Scindia, and the Berar Rajah ? Or if, while our armies were fully occupied in opposing them, he had led his army into the Carnatic ? Sir, I believe the true answers to these ques- tions would go near to decide the question of the policy of the war ; but, admitting that the po- licy of interfering in the concerns of the Mah- rattas, and embroiling ourselves in their quarrels, can be maintained on a general principle (and I believe there are but few who, possessing wy means of forming a judgment on the subject, are disposed to maintain it) ; still, Sir, and under all the circumstances of brilliant success which attended the war, I would confidently ask if policy or wisdom dictated our interference at the moment it took place ? Sir, we have now completed our policy in respect to these two rival chieftains, Scindia and Holkar : we have decided the contest between them, and effectually shown them what idiots they were to quarrel. There were two lines of impunity. To these causes it must be attributed that our interference produced only a reconciliation between Holkar and Scindia, or a discontinuance of their quarrel, instead of an union between them in support of their common inde- pendence. policy or procedure open to our choice. We might have tried to reconcile them, or we might have continued to look on, and have suffered them to fight out the battle. In the first case, we should have gained the respect and good will of both. If we had adopted the second course, they would have virtually strengthened us by ex- hausting each other. But we chose a third line of policy, quite distinct from either of these : we first fought Scindia for Holkar, and we are now fighting Holkar for Scindia j and without supposing that the single disaster which has oc- curred will influence the final issue of the war, one thing seems indisputable, namely, that we have secured to ourselves the lasting hatred of both. Now, Sir, presuming on the most prosperous issue of the war, supposing all the Mahratta chief- tains to be prostrate at our feet ; I will ask, was it policy to place them there ? Will they re- main there longer than we shall be able to stand over them with our bayonets pointed at their breasts ? Is there not reason to apprehend that we shall find that we have placed their wishes on the side of our enemy, should any vicissitude enable him to convey a body of troops to that country ? Was it wise, Sir, to furnish those whose mu- . tual hatred and animosities constituted our safety, with so instructive a lesson on the value of union? And, finally, Sir, if they should ever be able to recover their independence, has any thing yet appeared in the annals of human folly equal to what theirs will be if they again suffer in- ternal quarrels to divert them from the great ob- ject of preserving it ? So much for the policy of the war. I now- come to the consideration of its justice ; and, with a sincere wish to be able to determine this momentous point in our favor, I have anxiously sought for proofs of the statement of the Go- vernor General, in his letter of the 3 1st of Oc- tober, 1803, that "peace and tranquillity in " Hindostan and the Deccan had been disturb- te ed by the ambition and violence of the * f enemy." It is with pain I feel myself com- pelled to declare, that that search has been in vain ; that I have seen nothing that enables me to say that I think the Mahrattas were the aggressors in the war*. I again suppose it admitted that the treaty of Bassein gave birth to the war; and the ques- * Had the papers, indeed, tended to produce that convic- tion, still the great principle of " audi alterant partem" would have lain in my way ; and I should have lamented that among those voluminous papers there was nothing in the shape of a defence on the part of the Mahratta chieftains, 30 tion of the justice of the war will, I doubt not, be allowed on all hands to turn on this one point, namely, whether Scindia, and the Berar Rajah, as members of the Mahratta confederacy, were, or were not, legally, or constitutionally, bound to acquiesce in that treaty. That it could not fail to excite alarm and jealousy in their minds, I apprehend no one will deny, since its object is avowed by the Governor General him- self to be, the acquiring of the same influence, and ascendancy, in the Mahratta states, that he had already established in the territory and concerns of the Nizam. t( This crisis," says the Go- vernor General, (alluding to the desperate situa- tion of the Peishwa's affairs, in consequence of the recent victory obtained by Holkar over his and Scindia's joint forces) " appeared to afford " the most favorable opportunity for the com- " plete establishment of the interests of the Bri- " tish power, without the hazard of involving " us in a contest with any party:" and the Noble Marquis then states the object of the negotiation to be (t the comprehending the " Mahratta states in the general system of de- no record of what they pleaded, or others in their behalf, in their justification ; in a word, I should have thought it right to bear in mind that we filled the characters both of judge and party in the cause, that they were absent, and that we were interested. 31 " fensive alliance with the Company and its " allies, on the basis of the treaty concluded with " the Nizam." Now, Sir, the treaty with the Nizam had placed him in a state of dependance on the British power ; it had placed a subsidiary force of British troops in his capital ! and the same stipulation was the great leading feature, and object, of the treaty of Bassein : but of the Nizam, Sir, the object was obtained with his free consent ; he was in a situation to give a free consent, and he gave it in Hydrabad, his own capital. The Nizam too, Sir, had no co- estates whom it was incumbent on him to con- sult : but how different was the situation of the Peishwa, and the circumstances under which his signature to the treaty of Bassein was obtained ! He was a fugitive in our dominions ! Holkar had recently defeated his and Scindia's united forces, and the fear of falling into his hands de- termined the Peishwa to seek refuge in our ter- ritory. Even there he, for a considerable time, resisted all the arguments and persuasions of the Resident, as he had before uniformly done in respect to the stipulation alluded to. " The " Peishwa (says the Resident) is aware that a " British force, stationed in Poona, would make " him dependant on the British power. No- -< ..ii'v i f,..-*if - - j-M< * Vide Letter from the Resident, March 30, 1 803, in printed papers, pages 06 and 97. ,35 spect to us, no other object than to prevent that interference and ascendancy on our part in the Mahralta territory which it was our ob- vious purpose to establish, and to maintain their accustomed independence. But here are two points which it is essential to notice, because the Governor General has laid considerable stress upon them, in explanation of his own procedure in resorting to the extremi- ty of war. First, the Noble Marquis states, that " Scindia had acquiesced in the treaty of " Bassein, and acknowledged that it contained " nothing hostile to his state, or that he could " object to.*' That the Resident anxiously en- deavoured to obtain such an acknowledgment, and at length received verbally from Scindia what he construed into such an acknowledg- ment, there can be no doubt, as it is expressly stated in the Resident's letter to the Governor General of the 29th of May, 1803*; but the It is plain, from a subsequent part of the same letter, and from the whole tenor of his advices, v that Scindia and his ministers were both dissatisfied and alarmed at the con- duct of the Peishwa in concluding that treaty. The Resi- dent, in his letter of the 2.5th of March, 1803, after stating Scindia's declaration, that he had " no intention whatever " to obstruct the completion of the arrangements lately " concluded between the Peishwa and the British govern- " raent," immediately proceeds to state, that Scindia asked D 2 36 best evidence of Scindia's feelings respecting the treaty will be collected from his written an- swer to the letter from the Governor General, in which the conclusion of the treaty had been announced ; and that answer I beg leave to read to the House. " From Dowlut Row Scindia. " Received July 31, 1805. "' J HAVE received your Lordship's friendly letter, notify- ing the conclusiou of new engagements between his High- ness the Peishwa and the English Company at J3assein, to- gether with a copy of the treaty ; and I have been fully apprised of every word of its contents, which have also been communicated to me by Colonel Collins. " Whereas the engagements subsisting between th* Peishwa and me are such, that the adjustment of all aftairs, and of the concerns of his state and government, should be arranged and completed with my advice and participation, by the favour of God ! through a regard to what is above him whether he had received a copy of those arrangements, and expressed a wish to be apprised of the particulars, which he, the Resident, declined to communicate, unless Scindia " would enter into the discussion of the diiFerent " articles of the treaty, for the purpose of becoming a " member of the general defensive alliance :" on which one of the ministers interposed by observing, tliat Scindia " had already declared that he would come to no deter- " mination on that point until he had conversed with Balla. ' Kooujjer." 37 stated, the degrees of mutual concord have so increased, that to this time no interruption, or derangement of them, has occurred on either side. Notwithstanding this, the en- gagements -which have lately been concluded between that quarter (British government) and the Peishwa have (only) now been communicated ; and on the part of the Peishwa to this time of writiug, nothing. Therefore it has now been determined with Rajah Ragogee Bhoosla, in presence of Colonel Collins, that confidential persons on my part, and the Rajah's, be dispatched to the Peishwa, for the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances of the (said) engagements. At the same time, no intention whatever is entertained, on my part, to subvert the stipulations of the treaty, consisting of 19 articles, which has been concluded at Bassein, be- tween the British government and the Peishwa, on condition that there be no design whatever* on the part of the English Com- pany, and the Peishwa, to subvert the stipulations of the treaty, which since a long period of time has been concluded between the Peishwa's Sircar, me, and the said Rajah, and the Mahratta, chiefs. " Further particulars will be communicated by the let-, ters of Colonel Collins. Let the receipt of friendly letters Continue to be the means of gratification to me. " A true translation. (Signed) " J. M.ONCKTON, " Ass. Per. Sec. to Gov." The same, nearly word for word, was receiv- ed from the Berar Rajah ; and these letters are certainly expressive (especially to those acquaint- ed with the Eastern manner of writing) of a feel- D 3 ii ing very different from that of acquiescence in the treaty of Eas$ein. J . i*. ' i, The Governor General lays stress on Scindia's having told the Resident " that his conference " with the Berar Rajah would determine the ques- " tion of peace or war." This was certainly a haughty and expressive intimation j but it should be remembered, that it was not uttered until our army had taken possession of the Mahratta capita], and measures of precaution on all the Mahratta frontiers had been menaced by the Resident. After that measure had been executed, I can- not think that a determination on the part of the Mahratta chieftains to resort to war would have made them the aggressors*: it then became, as to them, a question of prudence. In proof of Scindia's hostile intentions, several letters are alleged to have been written by him to officers in the service of the Peishwa, requiring them to be prepared to co-operate with the confederated Mahratta armies against the English ; and in particular a paper appears to have been deli- vered to a collector in the province of Oude, stated to be the copy of a letter written by * The Governor General was not unaware that war might be the result of the treaty of Bassein, and his lorcU ship had accordingly taken every precaution, and issued all the necessary orders, in contemplation of that result. 39 Scindia to a fugitive Rohilla chief, one of those who had fought against us in 1794, and on that account been proscribed, or at least deprived of his country : in this letter (which was for- warded to the Governor General) Scindia ex- horts the Rohilla chief to endeavour to regain his rights, and to make war upon the English, whom he describes as an unprincipled and faithless people*. These letters and orders were solemnly disavowed by Scindia. The Secretary to the Bengal government informed the Resident that measures were taken to ob- tain the originals j but it does not appear that they were ever obtained , and had there been any proofs of their authenticity, it would not have been difficult to procure them after the reverse of Scindia's fortunes: but, admitting these letters and orders to have been genuine, they do not appear to have been written, or issued, until some time after we had taken possession of Poona f. The last point I have to touch upon with reference to the question of the justice of the war, relates to the French corps that was in Scindia's service, under the command of Mon- * Printed papers, vide page 14. f The Governor General's letter of the 20th June, 1803, discredits such rumours, and observes, that " many of the "circumstances, related for the purpose of accrediting them, "are manifest fabrications." Vide printed papers, page 139. D 4 40 sieur Perron. There is not, as far as I have been able to discover, the least reason to conclude that this corps was entertained by Scindia with inten- tions of hostile aggression towards us, and yet the Governor General appears to have adopted a determination, the justice of which can only rest on the contrary admission -, a determination which, in the first instance, was limited to the obtaining from Scindia an obligation " to enter- " tain no more subjects or. France, or of her allies, " in his service." " Scindia's admission into his service" (says the Governor General) " of the subjects of a state " with which the British nation is at war, is evi- " and strength of the territories of Scindia and his army, General, to interfere in their concerns, and to bring the Mahratta states into the same degree of dependence on the British power, to which he had already brought the Soubah of the Deccan by the treaty of Hydrabad, his Lordship fully avows: that he adopted that system, from the fullest conviction that it was the wisest and best for us to pursue, no one can doubt ; and as his Lordship states his Majesty 's Ministers to have and in the reputation of his military power, by which he had " acquired a general influence and ascendancy at Poona and " over all the Mahratta states, and even at Hydrabad, ivhich " influence and ascendancy had been for some years uniformly " directed against the British power in India." As this sup- posed dispatch bears evident marks of authenticity, it is in- cumbent on me, in point of candour, to acknowledge, that any proofs to substantiate the fact stated in the concluding words of the above quotation would very materially weaken the impression I have uniformly felt respecting the justice of the war ; and I should have to lament that the fact, and those proofs of it, were not brought forward at an earlier period, and in aid of arguments much less efficacious on that important point : but how shall we estimate the grandeur, riches, strength, and military power, here ascribed to Scin- dia, when we look to a passage in another letter from the Governor General, dated the 20th November, 1803, con- tained in the same intercepted correspondence, and find that his (Scindia's) servant, M. Perron, had "obtained the exercise " of sovereign authority over a territory whose annual re- " venue amounted to near two millions sterling, and had ne- " gotiated treaties and alliances with several petty states m " his own name ?" 46 approved the principles of the policy on which it is founded, 1 should have felt myself bound to distrust my own judgment, as to the policy of the system, if I had not witnessed the almost iatal effects of our attempting the same system twenty- five years ago ; and I certainly did not think it possible that, while the memory of them remain- ed, we should voluntarily revive that system, or court the peril from which we then so narrowly escaped. And now, Sir, on the supposition of the most complete success in the war in which we are en- gaged, supposing Holkar to be completely sub- dued, and his capital also occupied by our troops, and our new system fully established, I would beg to know of any one who has added up our gains, what is their amount, and in what they consist ? If it be answered, in a vast increase, to the amount of many millions, of revenue, I will tell him, that for these seven years past, or since the adoption of our new system of politics, and corresponding new system, and scale of finance and expence, as we have advanced in revenue*, * My definition of the word Revenue is somewhat different from that of the advocates of the aggrandizing system : to me it seems that the revenue of an estate is the clear product of it, or the surplus after defraying the e::pences of collect- ing, and protecting it. In this sense of the word, what we have receded in clear income, to say the very least, and incurred an increase of debt, of the precise amount of which I will not at present venture to state even a conjecture. Is it addi- tional security that we have gained? I an- swer, that I fear this will prove a yet greater delusion than the other. To military men I leave the decision of the question, whether a country is secure in proportion to its extent : but I assert, without the hazard of contradiction, that even before our late conquests our territory in In- dia was too extensive to be maintained without a greater drain of men than these Islands can bear*. Sir, let any one look at Rennell's masterly delinea- tion of that territory!, and, after including with it the Mahratta countries we have since added to our dominion, let him compare the aggregate with the whole extent of Europe, and then say have we gained ? Or, adopting their sense of the word, I would ask, how do we feel our gains ? What are the actual fruits ? * If I am not mistaken, the War Office, or those who, since the commencement of the Mahratta war, have succes- sively had the care of providing for our defence and secu- rity at home, could strengthen my argument on this point. f Look at the portion of Asia which (to use the expres- sion of a repectable person in a late letter from India) "is dotted with our troops." The late conflicts in India have abundantly proved that European troops must always constitute our vital strength, and grand reliance, in that 48 if we can hope, or if it would be wise to attempt, to keep so vast a portion of the globe in perpe- tual subjection. Upon the whole, Sir, to conclude this long trespass on the time of the House, I offer it as my sincere opinion, that it India is to be preserved to this country, the present system must be abro- gated in all its branches, and that, admitting it may not endanger the safety of our possessions there, it must, as long as it remains in force, prove an effectual bar to every hope of drawing from that vast territory the aid which it is capable of affording towards the relief of the public burdens at home, and the East India Com- pany will be obliged to apply for aid to the public, before the public will receive that parti- cipation from the territorial revenue which was stipulated for it in the act for the renewal of the charter. It is not merely in respect to the num- ber, and pay, of the troops that the new political country ; and if the population of these islands be insuffi- cient to afibrd the necessary supply (and even Europe it- self would scarcely be adequate to such a drain), what must be the alternative if we adhere to our present system, and determine to retain our conquests or late territorial acquisi- tions? What but the permitting a system of colonization ? And are there, among all who have ever turned their minds to that subject, two opinions as to what that system must produce ? This, though seen remotely, the reflecting mind will not deem visionary. 49 system has affected the finances in India: the change has produced a corresponding change of ideas, and opinions, in regard to expenditure in general. This part of the subject belongs more properly to the discussion of the India budget, and I will therefore at present only observe upon it, that there appears to have been en- grafted on our military successes in India a scale of expenditure to which no exhaustible revenue is adequate. The system in all its parts calls for serious revision. The advantages which India is capable of producing to this country I believe to be greater than the most sanguine imagination has ever reached ; but much is to be done, and many steps to be gradually retraced, before any of them will be realized, or any effectual progress made towards the reduction of our present enor- mous Indian debt. For effecting these great objects, his Majesty's Ministers have given the most unequivocal proof of their concurring anxiety in their approbation of the measure, of all others that human wisdom could suggest, the best calculated to effect them : I mean, Sir, the reappointment to the office of Governor General of a person whose bare acceptance of the trust will be a pledge and assurance to the Eastern world, that all that is good, and just, is intended towards them; for with him they have been accus- tomed to associate all the virtues that dignify the 50 human character. Revered alike by native and European, by prince and peasant, that illustrious person, in the happiness and content of every class, and every description of men, found all his views accomplished, and left the British character "m India on the highest pinnacle of fame, because identified with his own. In the persuasion that a declaration from Par- liament, Corresponding with the spirit of this measure, would have a beneficial effect, I shall support the Motion. THE END. Printed by C. Mercier and Co. Northumberland-court. vy A 000 069 954 6