THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES 

 
 SUBSTANCE 
 
 OF 
 
 A SPEECH, 
 
 PELIVEBED IN THE 
 
 HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 On Friday, April 5, 1805, 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN HUDLESTON, ESQ, 
 
 ON THE MOTION OF 
 
 PHILIP FRANCIS, ESQ. 
 
 " That this House adheres to the principles established by its 
 " unanimous Resolution on the 28th of May, 1784, and 
 " recognized by the Acts of the l^th and 33d years of hit 
 " present Majesty, that to pursue schemes of conquest and 
 " aggrandizement in India is repugnant to the wish, the 
 " honor, and the policy of this Country." 
 
 JLonton >. 
 
 PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR, 
 By C. Mercier and Co. Northumberland Court, Strand. 
 
 1805.
 
 THE erroneous statements, in several of the 
 public papers, of what was delivered by me in 
 the House of Commons, in the late debate on the 
 Affairs of India, had already determined me to 
 cause some copies to be printed of the substance 
 of what was really stated by me on that occasion, 
 as far as my notes and memory should enable me, 
 when I was favored (I doubt not by the courtesy 
 of the author) with a publication, entitled " Ob- 
 " servations on the Subject of the Debate in the 
 " House of Commons, on India Affairs, on the 
 " 5th April, 1805." 
 
 The author of these observations is a gentle- 
 
 o 
 
 man who has passed a great part of his life in 
 India, not in the service of the Company, but 
 with distinguished eminence, and respectability, 
 as a merchant, in which capacity he was enabled, 
 by his extensive capital and credit, to render 
 important aid to the Government of the Presi- 
 dency, where he resided during a long and 
 
 B 5000689
 
 arduous crisis of public affairs ; and, since his 
 return to this country, he has filled the offices 
 of Deputy Chairman, and Chairman, of the 
 Court of Directors. These circumstances, as 
 they naturally attach weight to his opinions 
 on subjects connected with India, make me 
 more desirous that the grounds of my own 
 opinions, which, on the most essential points, 
 are at variance with those expressed in his 
 Observations, should be fully known and un- 
 derstood by all who interest themselves in the 
 welfare of our dominion in India i or, perhaps I 
 should rather say, by all who feel the interest 
 which they really have in the stability of that 
 vast portion of the British empire : but more 
 especially am I solicitous, that both my opinions 
 and my conduct, in relation to India, should be 
 open to the examination of those who, by in- 
 trusting me with a share in the administration of 
 their affairs, and yet more by the manner in which 
 they bestowed it, have entitled themselves to my 
 Unalterable gratitude, and to every manifestation 
 of it that my unwearied efforts, in every situation, 
 and at every period of my life, may enable me to 
 give. I mean the Proprietors of East India 
 .Stock. It is, therefore, with the greater satisfac- 
 tion that I commit to the press the substance of 
 the arguments which I stated in the House of 
 Commons, on the 5th of April ; as my consti- 
 tuents will thereby be enabled to judge between
 
 them, and the arguments which were Intended to 
 have been urged in the same place by the honor- 
 able Author of the Publication alluded to: and, 
 although 1 indulge a hope that to most of 
 his positions virtual answers will be found in the 
 following sheets, I shall here submit a few obser- 
 vations on those passages of his work which are 
 the most prominent, and mark most strongly the 
 opposite views we take of the subject, without 
 going into any of the rest. The passages to 
 which I allude are in the commencement and 
 conclusion. 
 
 The author sets out with a quotation from a 
 pamphlet which he supposes to be from the pen 
 of the gentleman who opened the debate of the 
 5th April, namely, " Tippoo Sultaun is destroy- 
 fc ed; the Mahratta empire subdued, and dis- 
 " membered ; the French extirpated ; and the 
 " whole peninsula of India, in effect, laid under 
 " contribution to the power of Great Britain. 
 " The hackneyed plea of an expected war, and 
 " unforeseen expences, must fail at last in a 
 " country in which an enemy in arms is not to 
 tf be found, and where it is impossible for an 
 " European power to attack us," 
 
 On the above he observes, " These admitted 
 " facts, thus strongly and correctly stated, would 
 " seem to common understandings to call for some 
 "' applause to the counsels and conduct of those 
 <f to whom such events are to be attributed." 
 
 B 2
 
 I doubt much if the noble person himself, 
 whose administration in India it is the author's 
 object to defend, will thank him for admitting 
 all these facts j but, proceeding upon that ad- 
 mission, with the exception of the first, 1 cannot 
 concur in the author's view of them. The 
 destruction of Tippoo (or rather of his power, 
 for his death was a casualty of war) was rendered 
 just and necessary by his notorious violations of 
 the treaty of Seringapatam, and his proved de- 
 signs of joining the French against us; in a 
 word, by reiterated proofs of his persevering and 
 incorrigible perfidy: but as to the other facts, I 
 should rather think it would seem to every 
 understanding, that previously to pronouncing 
 them worthy of applause, or even regarding them 
 as benefits, we should determine their moral cha- 
 racter, and, for the purpose of enabling us to do 
 so, ascertain the causes which produced them, 
 and the views in which they originated. 
 
 <* The French extirpated," as far as the expres- 
 sion may allude to the taking possession of Pondi- 
 cherry, and the other French settlements, is a ser- 
 vice regularly and easily performed at the com- 
 mencement of every war with France. I conclude, 
 therefore, that the author's allusion was principally 
 to the reduction of the force which was lately un- 
 der the command of General Perron ; and as it is 
 certainly desirable for us that no Frenchman 
 should be in the service of any of the native
 
 powers in India, I shall readily admit the full 
 merit of this service the moment I shall be con- 
 vinced of the justice and necessity of the war 
 which led to it: but it is possible that some 
 readers may fall into the error of supposing 
 that the force commanded by M. Perron con- 
 sisted of French troops, unless informed that 
 there was no regiment or corps in it of that de- 
 scription, nor more, I believe, than twelve or 
 fifteen French officers, and of them not one of 
 particular eminence, or distinction. 
 
 Whether the fact of our having subdued, and 
 dismembered, the Mahratta empire has, with 
 reference to all its attendant circumstances, and 
 considerations, improved our situation, is a ques- 
 tion that no judicious mind will decide upon 
 merely from present appearances, however cap- 
 tivating; and even admitting that point to be 
 free from doubt, it would still remain to be 
 shewn that it is a fact which demands our ap- 
 plause ; for I hope we are not yet prepared to 
 assert the principle, that the end sanctifies the 
 means. 
 
 But " the whole peninsula of India is in effect 
 " laid under contribution to the power of Great 
 " Britain -" and this too the author not only ad- 
 mits, but considers as a fact that calls " for ap- 
 " plause to the councils and conduct of those to 
 " whom it is to be attributed." 
 
 In this instance, what the author panegyrizes 
 B 3
 
 would, in my view of it, convey a heavier cen- 
 sure upon our system, and administration, in 
 India, than they deserve ; for, certainly, a very 
 considerable part of the peninsula of India has 
 come under our government without any im- 
 peachment of its justice: but if, with the author, 
 I were to admit the fact, in the terms in which it 
 is stated in the work from which he quotes the 
 above passage, I should respectfully ask him by 
 which of the principles that we so uniformly 
 profess (justice, moderation, and forbearance) 
 we had been governed in thus treating " the 
 " whole peninsula of India ;" and if no satisfac- 
 tory answer were given, I should not be able to 
 consider that fact either as a fit subject of ap- 
 plause, or to see permanent good in any imme- 
 diate advantage resulting from it. 
 
 In his next observation, the author states, 
 " that some who are in the habit of disapproving 
 " whatever is done under the auspices of an ad- 
 " ministration to which they are hostile, have 
 " thought, or pretended to think, that the de- 
 " struction of the implacable enemy of the Bri- 
 " tish name, Tippoo Sultaun, and the repression 
 " of the plundering habits of the Mahrattas, and 
 " even the extirpation of French influence in 
 " India, are subjects of regret, if not of crimina- 
 " lity." 
 
 In this passage very strong facts are assumed, 
 and things quite different are classed together.
 
 I conceive it to be scarcely possible that any Bri- 
 ton should either feel or express regret at " the de- 
 " struction of the implacable enemy of the British 
 " name," or at the fact (considering it abstract- 
 edly) of " the extirpation of the French influence 
 " in India.'* These are harsh accusations, and I 
 should hope that the author himself will not al- 
 ways think them merited. As to " the repres- 
 " sion of the plundering habits of the Mahrattas," 
 it alludes to a fact of which the author had just 
 before adopted a description more appropriate, 
 namely, " the dismemberment of the Mahratta 
 (t empire." The plundering habits of the Mah- 
 rattas no one can be disposed to deny ; but it 
 will be as difficult to deny that they were not in- 
 Bulging those habits, or had been accustomed to 
 indulge them at our expence, when the late war 
 commenced : and here, 1 think, I might success- 
 fully submit to the author's candour, with what 
 grace those who challenge applause, " f or having 
 " laid the whole peninsula of India under con- 
 <f tribution to the British power," can complain 
 of the plundering habits of the Mahrattas. In- 
 deed this whole paragraph conveys an imputa- 
 tion of greater severity than would seem to be 
 due to the fault, or misfortune, of disapproving 
 the present system in India. 
 
 I certainly know and feel, in common with 
 many others, that the disapproving of that system 
 
 B 4
 
 does not necessarily involve the being hostile to 
 the administration urJr whose auspices it has 
 been adopted ; nor am I sure that the honorable 
 Author is not too sanguine, if he thinks that 
 the distinguished persons who compose the ad- 
 ministration feel the same unqualified approbation 
 of that system that he does; but be that as it may, 
 I know not how I can more strongly evidence my 
 solicitude for the welfare of the government, 
 and the success of those who administer it, than 
 by endeavouring to procure the abrogation of a 
 system which I sincerely believe to be fraught 
 with the most serious danger to our interests in 
 India. 
 
 The author next disclaims any intention of 
 entering into the justice of the late war with 
 the Mahrattas, and states his present business 
 to be with the policy of those measures, and 
 the principles which ought now to govern the 
 councils of India. But, in considering the po- 
 licy, or wisdom, of any measure, or system, and 
 in calculating on its effects, can we put its jus- 
 tice out of our contemplation ? 
 
 For my own part, in the arguments which I 
 submitted to the House of Commons on the late 
 occasion, I endeavoured to consider the justice of 
 the war as a question distinct from the policy; 
 but it is my firm belief, and unalterable convic- 
 tion, that they cannot in reality be separated, and
 
 that the issue of all these measures will add to 
 the innumerable proofs already upon record, that 
 justice is the very essence of policy. 
 
 The author then proceeds to impute it to 
 those who disapprove the late subsidiary ar- 
 rangements of the Governor-General, " that 
 " their favourite policy is divide et impera" to 
 " play one native potentate off against another 5" 
 and he then proceeds to argue as if the justice 
 of that imputation had been admitted : but I 
 can say for myself, and I believe I may safely 
 add for all with whom I have the honor to be 
 officially connected, that it is an assumption for 
 which we have not afforded the most distant co- 
 lour ; indeed, no opportunity has been afforded 
 us of offering an official opinion on the point ; 
 or I have little doubt that we should all have con- 
 curred in recommending (what individually I have 
 availed myself of every occasion to inculcate) 
 instead of ihe " divide et impera" the abstain- 
 ing sedulously from interference in the concerns, 
 and quarrels, of the native potentates, unless in- 
 vited to interfere for the purposes of reconcilia- 
 tion and peace ; to be content with maintaining 
 our own rights and independence, and equally 
 determined against encroaching on those of other 
 states. I am sure I need not enter into any 
 arguments to prove that the opposers of the pre- 
 sent system cannot be advocates for any prin- 
 ciple " that would tend to keep India in a state
 
 10 
 
 *' of almost constant war.*' I shall therefore 
 hasten to the concluding part of the author's 
 observations, and conclude my own by suggest- 
 ing what seems to me to be wanting in the 
 short statement which he has there exhibited, 
 for the purpose of showing that our finances in 
 India are in a better state now (or were in 1801) 
 than they were in 1793 : 
 
 " In 1793, Revenue 6,063,625 per Ann. Debt 9,084,550. 
 " In 1804, Revenue 13,794,140 per Ann. Debt 19,869,223." 
 
 The author then triumphantly asks *' whether 
 " the estate, burdened with twenty millions, and 
 " yielding fourteen millions per annum, is, or 
 " is not (of the two) the most valuable pro- 
 " perty." The Indian debt in 1792-3, accord- 
 ing to my account, was only 7,800,000. 
 
 Without going further into the subject at pre- 
 sent, I shall only observe, that it cannot be my 
 wish to depreciate the state of our finances in 
 India, and I feel the firmest confidence that 
 they may and will be retrieved by a return to 
 that system under which they so long flourish- 
 ed > but as the author's object, in the above 
 statement, must have been to give the publip 
 a correct view of their actual situation, tkat 
 purpose would, I conceive, have been more fully 
 answered if he had made the statement exhibit 
 also the amount of our annual expenditure at the re- 
 spective periods, and if he had contrasted the 
 amount of our surplus revenue in 1804, with its
 
 amount in 1792-3, when the revenue which pro- 
 duced it was not half so large : and the statement 
 would, perhaps, have been yet more complete 
 if, instead of merely giving the amount of the 
 Indian debt at the two periods, it had shown its 
 annual progressive increase under our former, 
 an4 under our new, or present system. 
 
 J. HUD.LESTON. 
 
 Lonjon, ^Tune ISO*.
 
 
 
 ii6f -T
 
 SPEECH, 
 
 Kc. Kc. 
 
 MR. SPEAKER, 
 
 ALTHOUGH much of what is deeply impressed 
 upon my mind has been stated by my Honor- 
 able Friend * near me, I cannot satisfy my- 
 self with giving a silent vote on a proposi- 
 tion so immediately connected with interests, 
 to the study of which the best part of my life 
 has been devoted, particularly as I think it pos- 
 sible my silence might be misconstrued by those 
 who know the apprehensions, and regret, with 
 which I have for some years past contemplated 
 our system in India. I am aware, at the same 
 time, that there are considerations which are 
 adverse to any detailed discussion of the subject 
 in Parliament, and I doubt not that the Honor- 
 able Mover has also been aware of them, but 
 
 * Mr. Grant, Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors.
 
 14 ^ 
 
 that they have been outweighed by other con* 
 siderations which he feels to be of greater im- 
 portance j and as he has now brought the sub- 
 ject fully before the House, J shall not shrink 
 from the discussion, but endeavour to state my 
 sincere opinions upon it, uninfluenced by any 
 other motive than an anxious solicitude for the 
 permanent welfare of our possessions in India. 
 
 I confess to have heard the arguments of the 
 Noble Lord* on the floor with considerable pain, 
 because I know the weight they must derive 
 from his authority ; and I therefore feel it to be 
 the more important, that what has been said by 
 my Honorable Friend, with respect to the state- 
 ment in one of the Governor General's dis- 
 patches, namely, that the justice and policy of 
 the treaty of Bassein had received the approba- 
 tion of the Court of Directors, and of his Ma- 
 jesty's Ministers, through the Secret Committee, 
 should be ckarly understood by the House, and 
 the Public ; as the fact is, that the merits of that 
 treaty never have been brought before the Court 
 of Directors, for decision, or discussion, nor did 
 they, nor could they know, that it had been ap- 
 proved by his Majesty's Ministers, until so in- 
 formed by the statement of the Noble Marquis f. 
 
 Castlereagh. 
 
 f The Secret Committee act in a capacity merely minis- 
 terial ; their province is to transmit to India under their 
 own signatures the orders of the Board of Commissioners.
 
 15 
 
 It should be distinctly known, that with re- 
 gard to the adoption of, or departure from, any 
 system of policy in India, or the decision on any 
 treaty, whatever be its nature, or object, whether 
 to annex kingdoms or provinces to the British 
 dominion in India, or to transfer any from it, the 
 Court of Directors, though ostensibly vested 
 with the administration of the affairs of India, 
 have no more authority than any Member of 
 this House : and here, Sir, I am sure the House 
 will permit me to state, by way of illustration, 
 a circumstance that I believe they will admit 
 to be a little hard on the Court of Directors. 
 
 It has been said, Sir, in another place, and 
 by persons to whom, from their great respecta- 
 bility, the public must naturally ascribe con- 
 siderable knowledge of the subject, descanting 
 on the merits of the Governor General, with re- 
 lation to the brilliant successes in India, that 
 " those merits were the greater in consequence 
 " of the obstacles well known to have been 
 fe thrown in his way from a certain quarter ;" 
 and, lest that statement should be misunder- 
 stood, it was expressly added, that no allusion 
 was meant to his Majesty's Ministers. On this 
 it was kindly observed, in behalf of the quar- 
 ter alluded to, that it was composed of " men 
 " of very good intentions, but not of minds suf- 
 " ficiently enlarged to be capable of embracing 
 " the vast extent, and great benefits, of the No-
 
 16 
 
 " ble Marquis's plans." Now, Sir, with respect 
 to the charge, I must observe, that great as 
 doubtless are the endowments, and .information, 
 of those respectable persons, there certainly is 
 one point of knowledge which even their minds 
 had not reached, or they would have known that 
 no order, or paragraph, relating to the East India 
 Company's affairs, civil, military, or political, or 
 to its revenue, can be sent to India until it has 
 received the sanction of the Board of Commis- 
 sioners, of which the President, and several other 
 members, are always members of the Cabinet ; 
 and, consequently, that no obstacle could have 
 been thrown in the way of the Governor Gene- 
 ral that had not the concurrence, and participa- 
 tion, of his Majesty's Ministers. It is less won- 
 tlerful that those respectable persons should not 
 have been acquainted with the fact, that the 
 treaty of Bassein, which gave birth to the war, 
 instead of having been approved by the Court 
 of Directors, has not, to this moment, been re- 
 ferred to their consideration. 
 
 Other decisions, Sir, if possible, of yet greater 
 importance, and which I incline to think will be 
 more noticed by the impartial historian hereafter, 
 than they have been, or are likely to be. during 
 the present generation, have been ascribed to the 
 Court of Directors, although they were not even 
 known to that body until communicated to the 
 public at large. No, Sir, the results and cor.se-
 
 17 
 
 quences only of great, and magnificent schemes, 
 come before the Court of Directors, and they 
 are apt to appear in very serious shapes. 
 
 With regard to the defence offered for the 
 Court of Directors, however humiliating it may 
 seem, I, as one of that body, am not ashamed to 
 claim the benefit of it in the fullest sense, and 
 to acknowledge that I have not a mind capable 
 of embracing the vast plans of the Noble Mar- 
 quis, or of perceiving their beneficial tendency. 
 To me, on the contrary, they appear fraught 
 
 with serious evils to teem with dreadful hazard 
 
 * 
 
 without any commensurate object to set our life 
 upon a cast to stake our existence in India on 
 the issue of projects and pursuits directly foreign 
 to our truest policy, and to the policy enjoin- 
 ed by the Legislature on splendid schemes, 
 and enterprises, of which the failure would be 
 destruction, and even the success is ruinous of 
 which, in a word, nothing is certain but the 
 enormous expencef of blood, and treasure, which 
 they create, and the hatred they must inspire. 
 
 These, Sir, were my impressions respecting 
 the vast plans of the Noble Marquis, and their 
 consequences, not less at the period last year, 
 when the intelligence arrived of our brilliant mi- 
 litary successes in India, than they are now that 
 the development of the system has begun, and 
 a serious disaster has opened the eyes of many 
 
 c
 
 18 
 
 to its real nature and tendency. But these im- 
 pressions, Sir, have never made me forget the 
 transcendent services, and able conduct, which 
 distinguished the commencement of the Mar- 
 quis's career in India 3 where his Lordship had 
 no sooner landed and taken possession of his go- 
 vernment, than he had occasion for all the ener- 
 gies which distinguish a great from a common 
 mind, and shewed that he possessed them. The 
 wisdom and firmness by which he overcame all 
 obstacles to the assembling of the army, and to 
 its march against the infatuated Tippoo, were 
 above all praise : the service the Noble Marquis 
 then performed was one of the greatest ever ren- . 
 dered to the East India Company; and, had his 
 Lordship returned to England immediately after 
 the conquest of Mysore, I should have ranked 
 him with the very highest of those illustrious per- 
 sons to whom the East India Company, and the 
 Nation, have been indebted for the acquisition, or 
 preservation, of our Eastern Empire-^not that, for 
 one, my satisfaction at the entire destruction of 
 the Mysorian power was unmixed, or that I 
 could have wished its destruction; but for the 
 incorrigible perfidy which had marked the con- 
 duct of Tippoo Sultaun ; for that power had 
 been always considered as the cheap, and only, 
 barrier to the Carnatic, against the turbulent and 
 encroaching disposition of the Mahrattas, and in
 
 19 
 
 that light its preservation had been deemed es- 
 sential : it was easy therefore, even in that great 
 conquest, to discern the seeds of future calamity, 
 unless the ardour of triumph should be tem- 
 pered with moderation, and the mind of the 
 victor be proof against the intoxicating qualities 
 of inordinate success. 
 
 And here I think the Noble Marquis has 
 failed : the complete, and, probably in some mea- 
 sure, unexpected success which followed the 
 exertion of his great talents on this signal occa- 
 sion, seems to have led him to imagine that 
 nothing was beyond their reach, and to despise 
 the sober wisdom of his predecessors, which, ex- 
 cept in one instance (and in that one the excep- 
 tion was attended with very disastrous conse- 
 quences) had uniformly deprecated all interfe- 
 rence in the concerns and quarrels of the native 
 powers, and more especially in the contentions 
 which were perpetually breaking out among the 
 Mahratta chieftains. The high and sanguine 
 mind of the Noble Marquis seems to have con- 
 sidered this as a narrow and degrading policy; 
 or, at best, a policy no longer adapted to bur 
 situation in India, changed, or extended, as it 
 had been, by our recent successes. Hence, as 
 it appears to me, the Governor General, relying 
 oh that change for his justification, in a departure 
 from the principle laid down by the Legislature, 
 
 c 2
 
 io 
 
 determined to aim at extension of territory on 
 every side, and connected with that aim the 
 grand and magnificent project of bringing all the 
 native princes and governments in India into 
 a state of dependence on, and in effect subjection 
 to, the British power, and establishing an inter- 
 ference and ascendancy in, and over, their con- 
 cerns, by obliging or inducing them to admit each 
 a force of British troops into his capital, to pay 
 a large subsidy for the maintenance of that force, 
 and then to change the subsidy into a cession of 
 territory *. 
 
 * This description does not include the whole of the Go- 
 vernor General's plan. In his letter to the Peishwa, dated 
 the 20th June, 1803, his Lordship avows his object to be, 
 " to establish a permanent foundation of general tranquillity 
 " in India, by securing to every sta'e the free enjoyment of its just 
 " rights and independence, and by frustrating every project cul- 
 " culated to disturb the possessions, or to violate the rights, of 
 " the established power of Hindostun, or of the Deccan." 
 Thus the Noble Marquis's object was to comprehend the 
 uniting of all the states of Hindostan and the Deccan (com- 
 prising regions nearly equal to the whole extent of Europe) 
 into one family, under the protection and superintendance of 
 the British power, making it the general guarantee of all their 
 respective rights and possessions, the general arbitrator of 
 all their disputes, and the general conservator of their peace 
 and tranquillity ! 
 
 Now to this scheme there are two objections, which force 
 themselves upon my mind. First, that it is impracticable, 
 and visionary in the extreme : and, secondly, that, during 
 the existence of such a system, and of any determination or
 
 I believe the candor of the Noble Lord 
 will not permit him to deny that, from the mo- 
 ment of the conquest of Mysore such appears to 
 have been the Governor General's system, and 
 that the determination to extend it to the Mah- 
 ratta states occasioned the late war with the 
 confederate chieftains. The splendid successes 
 of our arms, under the able conduct of Lord Lake 
 and General Wellesley, were well calculated to 
 dazzle men's eyes, to make them insensible to the 
 perils of this system, and to throw an air of ridi- 
 cule on the serious presages of its opposers ; 
 though, in fact, those unexampled achievements, 
 which covered all concerned in them with glory, 
 do most powerfully assist in proving the deep and 
 dreadful hazard incurred by the system which 
 led to them, since it is allowed on all hands that, 
 in order to succeed, or even to escape destruc- 
 
 attempts to enforce it, we must be constantly involved either 
 in actual war, or in great part of the expences incident to 
 it. If these positions are denied, it will at least be admitted, 
 that this magnificent system involved a serious change, and 
 a departure from all the principles and views that had been 
 uniformly inculcated by the East India Company ; on whom 
 would rest all the hazard, and all the expence; while the 
 credit of its success, should it succeed, would be exclusively 
 with his Lordship : could they then possibly expect that 
 such a change would be adopted without any previous re- 
 ference to them, or any power left with them to guard 
 against or prevent its adoption ? 
 
 C 3
 
 22 
 
 tion, it was necessary the troops should surpass 
 all that had before been recorded even of British 
 valour: nevertheless, in one, at least, of the 
 actions, victory for some time hung upon a 
 thread, How urgent then, how unavoidable the 
 necessity, which would alone justify the plunging 
 into a war in which every thing was thus ha- 
 zarded ! Surely, nothing less than some out- 
 rageous insult, or aggressive violence, on the 
 part of the Mahrattas some attempt to subvert 
 our independence, or at least to interfere in our 
 concerns ! Some conduct on their part which, in 
 the event of our defeat, and consequent ruin, 
 would have enabled the narrator of our misfor- 
 tunes to say, with truth, that we had deserved 
 to succeed that we had fallen in defence of our 
 rights, and independence, and not in any endea- 
 vour to invade the rights, or subvert the inde- 
 pendence, of other states : in a word, that our 
 cause had been such that success was not neces- 
 sary to determine its character. 
 
 And this, Sir, brings me to the important 
 point, to examine how far we should have been 
 entitled to any consolation of this kind, by look- 
 ing into the origin of the war : and in this exa- 
 mination I shall for a moment suppose that that 
 may be wise which is not just, and separate the 
 policy from the justice of the war. 
 
 Beginning then, Sir, with the policy, I shay
 
 .23 
 
 assume it as an admitted position, that the treaty 
 of Bassein gave birth to the war j and all who 
 are acquainted with the history of India, for the 
 last thirty years, and with the system, character, 
 and power of the Mahrattas, will, I am sure, per- 
 mit me to assume, as another fact, that that 
 treaty contained the vivid seeds of war ; that no 
 experienced eye could look 4ato it without 
 perceiving and predicting that war must be the 
 consequence of our carrying into effect, or at- 
 tempting to enforce, that treaty, for that it was 
 impossible to suppose that any thing short of 
 absolute conquest could induce the haughty and 
 warlike Mahratta chieftains to submit to a con- 
 dition so wounding to their pride, and so fatal to 
 their independence, as that by which Poona, the 
 capital of the Mahratta empire, was to be occu- 
 pied by British troops. 
 
 Doubtless the House know that the Mahratta 
 state is composed of a number of feudatory 
 chieftains, of more or less strength and terri- 
 tory, all claiming and exercising independence 
 of each other, but acknowledging an obedience, 
 which, however, is little more than nominal, to 
 the Peishwa (who is a Bramin) as hereditary mi- 
 nister or administrator of the general affairs of 
 the empire ; for the King, or, as he is called, the 
 Sahoo Rajah, is a mere pageant, and always re- 
 sides in a state confinement. When united, 
 
 c 4
 
 24- 
 
 their numbers, warlike habits, and the great 
 extent of country they possess, render them 
 truly formidable ; but, fortunately for their neigh- 
 bours, they are almost perpetually engaged in 
 contests with each other for 1 power, and terri- 
 tory j concurring, however, in one principle, 
 that of maintaining the independence of the em- 
 pire, and in extreme jealousy of foreign inter- 
 ference in their concerns. Such interference has 
 generally proved a signal either of reconciliation, 
 or of deferring the decision of their internal quar- 
 rels. We are their only rival, and the subversion 
 of the Mysore empire, and the influence we had 
 established in the dominions of the Suba of the 
 Deccan (whose capital we occupy) together 
 with our having obtained possession of the do- 
 minions of the Nabob of Oude, had brought us 
 so near to them, that it can only be ascribed to 
 the greatest, and, for us, most fortunate infatua- 
 tion, that they did not perceive that their only 
 chance of preserving the independence, and in- 
 tegrity, of the Mahratta empire, depended on their 
 union. 
 
 Now, Sir, what was the situation of the Mah- 
 rattas at the period when, in pursuance of the 
 system I have stated, we accomplished the treaty 
 of Bassein, and thereby acquired a right to inter- 
 fere in their concerns? Why, Sir, their situation 
 was precisely that which, politically speaking,
 
 25 
 
 we could have wished ; it was the very situation 
 that most tended to ensure our safety. They 
 were not merely occupied with the ordinary 
 struggles for power, and pre-eminence. The 
 two most powerful of the Mahratta. chieftains, 
 Scindia and Holkar, between whom had long 
 subsisted an inveterate enmity, were destroying 
 each other ; nay, Sir, as if to make the state of 
 things more critically favourable to us, the most 
 powerful of the two, Scindia, whom it was most 
 desirable for us to see weakened, had, in con- 
 junction with the Peishwa, been recently defeated 
 by Holkar with great slaughter : he was of course 
 preparing for revenge, collecting his scattered 
 troops, and drawing out his resources in order 
 to renew the combat, and retrieve his disgrace* 
 The next battle would have been still more san- 
 guinary, and more destructive of Mahratta power 
 they were effectually playing our game every 
 blow given on either side was in effect a blow 
 given for us while our strength remained entire, 
 and we tranquilly beheld the scene. At this 
 precise moment we interfered, not for the pur- 
 pose of reconciling the parties, and putting a 
 stop to the effusion of blood, but to accomplish 
 our favorite object of establishing the same in- 
 fluence and ascendancy in the Mahratta empire, 
 that we had already established in the dominions 
 of the Nizam j and, as the first, and most deci-
 
 sive, and unequivocal, step towards it, the tak- 
 ing possession of Poona, the Mahratta capital. 
 
 We interfered, Sir, and the scene was imme- 
 diately changed. The combatants forgot, or 
 suspended, their animosities. Scindia no longer 
 supported the Peishwa, and Holkar no longer 
 fought with Scindia. In short, Sir, our in- 
 terference produced, in a great degree, that 
 very consequence which the Governor General 
 himself seems to have augured, and antici- 
 pated, from it in his dispatch of June, 1802. 
 " The general jealousy (says his Lordship) 
 " of the Mahratta chieftains, of all the mem- 
 " bers of the confederacy against the British 
 " power, might induce them to compromise 
 " their differences, and unite in opposing British 
 " interference in their concerns." If this did not 
 happen in all its extent, it was because, con- 
 trary to all former experience of the Mahratta cha- 
 racter, Holkar's personal hatred of Scindia, and 
 jealousy of his power, and influence, were greater 
 even than his attachment to the principles of the 
 confederacy: he hoped that his own influence 
 would be strengthened by the ruin of his rival*. 
 
 * He supposed that a contest between the British power 
 and the other confederate chieftains would be long and ob- 
 stinate; that in the mean while his own resources would be 
 so improved as to put him in a situation to dictate to both 
 parties, or at least to commit depredations upon both with
 
 But what would have been the consequence if 
 Holkar, instead of determining to be neuter, 
 had joined his forces to those of Scindia, and the 
 Berar Rajah ? Or if, while our armies were fully 
 occupied in opposing them, he had led his army 
 into the Carnatic ? 
 
 Sir, I believe the true answers to these ques- 
 tions would go near to decide the question of the 
 policy of the war ; but, admitting that the po- 
 licy of interfering in the concerns of the Mah- 
 rattas, and embroiling ourselves in their quarrels, 
 can be maintained on a general principle (and I 
 believe there are but few who, possessing wy 
 means of forming a judgment on the subject, 
 are disposed to maintain it) ; still, Sir, and under 
 all the circumstances of brilliant success which 
 attended the war, I would confidently ask if 
 policy or wisdom dictated our interference at the 
 moment it took place ? 
 
 Sir, we have now completed our policy in 
 respect to these two rival chieftains, Scindia and 
 Holkar : we have decided the contest between 
 them, and effectually shown them what idiots 
 they were to quarrel. There were two lines of 
 
 impunity. To these causes it must be attributed that our 
 interference produced only a reconciliation between Holkar 
 and Scindia, or a discontinuance of their quarrel, instead 
 of an union between them in support of their common inde- 
 pendence.
 
 policy or procedure open to our choice. We 
 might have tried to reconcile them, or we might 
 have continued to look on, and have suffered 
 them to fight out the battle. In the first case, 
 we should have gained the respect and good will 
 of both. If we had adopted the second course, 
 they would have virtually strengthened us by ex- 
 hausting each other. But we chose a third line 
 of policy, quite distinct from either of these : 
 we first fought Scindia for Holkar, and we are 
 now fighting Holkar for Scindia j and without 
 supposing that the single disaster which has oc- 
 curred will influence the final issue of the war, 
 one thing seems indisputable, namely, that we 
 have secured to ourselves the lasting hatred 
 of both. 
 
 Now, Sir, presuming on the most prosperous 
 issue of the war, supposing all the Mahratta chief- 
 tains to be prostrate at our feet ; I will ask, was 
 it policy to place them there ? Will they re- 
 main there longer than we shall be able to stand 
 over them with our bayonets pointed at their 
 breasts ? 
 
 Is there not reason to apprehend that we 
 shall find that we have placed their wishes on 
 the side of our enemy, should any vicissitude 
 enable him to convey a body of troops to that 
 country ? 
 
 Was it wise, Sir, to furnish those whose mu-
 
 . tual hatred and animosities constituted our safety, 
 with so instructive a lesson on the value of 
 union? And, finally, Sir, if they should ever be 
 able to recover their independence, has any thing 
 yet appeared in the annals of human folly equal 
 to what theirs will be if they again suffer in- 
 ternal quarrels to divert them from the great ob- 
 ject of preserving it ? 
 
 So much for the policy of the war. I now- 
 come to the consideration of its justice ; and, 
 with a sincere wish to be able to determine this 
 momentous point in our favor, I have anxiously 
 sought for proofs of the statement of the Go- 
 vernor General, in his letter of the 3 1st of Oc- 
 tober, 1803, that "peace and tranquillity in 
 " Hindostan and the Deccan had been disturb- 
 te ed by the ambition and violence of the 
 * f enemy." It is with pain I feel myself com- 
 pelled to declare, that that search has been in 
 vain ; that I have seen nothing that enables me 
 to say that I think the Mahrattas were the 
 aggressors in the war*. 
 
 I again suppose it admitted that the treaty 
 of Bassein gave birth to the war; and the ques- 
 
 * Had the papers, indeed, tended to produce that convic- 
 tion, still the great principle of " audi alterant partem" 
 would have lain in my way ; and I should have lamented 
 that among those voluminous papers there was nothing in the 
 shape of a defence on the part of the Mahratta chieftains,
 
 30 
 
 tion of the justice of the war will, I doubt not, 
 be allowed on all hands to turn on this one 
 point, namely, whether Scindia, and the Berar 
 Rajah, as members of the Mahratta confederacy, 
 were, or were not, legally, or constitutionally, 
 bound to acquiesce in that treaty. That it could 
 not fail to excite alarm and jealousy in their 
 minds, I apprehend no one will deny, since its 
 object is avowed by the Governor General him- 
 self to be, the acquiring of the same influence, and 
 ascendancy, in the Mahratta states, that he had 
 already established in the territory and concerns 
 of the Nizam. t( This crisis," says the Go- 
 vernor General, (alluding to the desperate situa- 
 tion of the Peishwa's affairs, in consequence of 
 the recent victory obtained by Holkar over his 
 and Scindia's joint forces) " appeared to afford 
 " the most favorable opportunity for the com- 
 " plete establishment of the interests of the Bri- 
 " tish power, without the hazard of involving 
 " us in a contest with any party:" and the 
 Noble Marquis then states the object of the 
 negotiation to be (t the comprehending the 
 " Mahratta states in the general system of de- 
 no record of what they pleaded, or others in their behalf, 
 in their justification ; in a word, I should have thought it 
 right to bear in mind that we filled the characters both of 
 judge and party in the cause, that they were absent, and 
 that we were interested.
 
 31 
 
 " fensive alliance with the Company and its 
 " allies, on the basis of the treaty concluded with 
 " the Nizam." Now, Sir, the treaty with the 
 Nizam had placed him in a state of dependance 
 on the British power ; it had placed a subsidiary 
 force of British troops in his capital ! and the 
 same stipulation was the great leading feature, 
 and object, of the treaty of Bassein : but of the 
 Nizam, Sir, the object was obtained with his 
 free consent ; he was in a situation to give a 
 free consent, and he gave it in Hydrabad, his 
 own capital. The Nizam too, Sir, had no co- 
 estates whom it was incumbent on him to con- 
 sult : but how different was the situation of the 
 Peishwa, and the circumstances under which his 
 signature to the treaty of Bassein was obtained ! 
 He was a fugitive in our dominions ! Holkar 
 had recently defeated his and Scindia's united 
 forces, and the fear of falling into his hands de- 
 termined the Peishwa to seek refuge in our ter- 
 ritory. Even there he, for a considerable time, 
 resisted all the arguments and persuasions of the 
 Resident, as he had before uniformly done in 
 respect to the stipulation alluded to. " The 
 " Peishwa (says the Resident) is aware that a 
 " British force, stationed in Poona, would make 
 " him dependant on the British power. No- 
 <c thing but the prospect of certain destruction 
 " could induce- the Peishwa to consent to the 
 " terms proposed:" he "was willing to subsidize
 
 32 
 
 " the British troops, but not to admit them to 
 " be stationed in the Mahratta territory." At 
 length the desperate state of his affairs extorted 
 his consent even to that stipulation, and he 
 signed the treaty of Bassein. 
 
 Now, admitting, as a general principle, that 
 the Peishwa possessed authority to contract en- 
 gagements without consulting any of the Mah- 
 ratta Sirdars *, I ask of any one, conversant in 
 the Mahratta constitution, such as it is, and with 
 Mahratta history, whether he knows, or be- 
 lieves, that they would at any time, or at any 
 period of the confederacy, have acknowledged 
 his authority to conclude a treaty that should 
 place the capital of the empire in the posses- 
 sion of a foreign power, or have permitted him 
 to fulfil such a stipulation ? Secondly, in respect 
 to Scindia in particular, I ask of any one, who 
 has perused the treaty of Salbey f, whether the 
 
 * On this point, however, it seems to me that \ve should 
 not overlook what was stated to the Resident by Scindia's 
 ministers. "They entered (says the Resident) into a tedious 
 " explanation of the conduct which ought to have been 
 " adopted by the Peishwa previously to his forming a new 
 " treaty with the British government ;" and asserted, " that 
 " it had been the invariable usage on such occasions to 
 " consult with the Deccanny Sirdars." Vide printed pa. 
 pers, page 167. 
 
 f Mahadjee Scindia, the immediate predecessor of Dowlut 
 Row Scindia, was at once the friendly guarantee of that
 
 33 
 
 Peishwa could, consistently with either the letter 
 or spirit of that treaty, conclude such a treaty as 
 
 treaty, and the plenipotentiary, oa the part of the Peishwa, 
 for concluding it ; he was detached from the vMahratta 
 confederacy, and conciliated to our interests through the 
 address and taients of Mr. Hastings; and the value of his 
 mediation on this occasion will not easily be forgotten by 
 those who were eye-witnesses of the situation of our affairs 
 at that period. 
 
 The first article of the treaty states it to be stipulated 
 through the mediation of Mahadoo Row Scindit: the 4th 
 article, in favor of the Peishwa, states it to be consented to at 
 the request of Mahadoo Row Scindia: and the 16th Article 
 states that the East India Company and the Peishwa, having- 
 the fullest confidence in Mahadoo Row Scindia, " they 
 " have both requested of him to be the mutual guarantee 
 " for the perpetual and invariable adherence of both par- 
 " ties to the conditions of the treaty ; and the said Maha- 
 " doo Row Scindia, from a regard to the welfare of both 
 " states, hath accordingly taken upon himself the mutual 
 " guarantee." 
 
 This treaty is dated the 17th of May, 1782, and the ra- 
 tification bears date the 6th of June, 1782. 
 
 The Governor and Council of Bengal, in a Sunnud dated 
 the 3d of June, 1782, granted the City and Purgunnah of 
 Barouch to Mahadoo Scindia, "in testimony of their sense 
 " of his generous conduct to the government of Bombay at 
 " Wargaum, and of his humane treatment and release of the 
 " English gentlemen who had been detained as hostages oa 
 " that occasion." 
 
 Had the successor then of Mahadoo Scindia no preten- 
 sion or right to expect to be consulted by the Peishwa at 
 least, if not by the Company also, previous to the conclusion, 
 of such a treaty as that of Bassein ? 
 
 o
 
 54 
 
 that of Bassein, without his (Scindia's) previous 
 consent ? Thirdly, waving any discussion on 
 cither of those points, I will confine myself to 
 tbe circumstances under 'which the consent of the 
 Peishwa to the treaty of Bassein was obtained, 
 and merely ask whether that treaty, conclud- 
 ed under such circumstances, could justly be 
 considered as binding on the Peishwa's coes- 
 tates, or the great members of the Mahratta 
 confederacy ? 
 
 The determination to enforce the treaty of 
 Bassein, or rather the actual taking possession 
 of Poona by our army under General Wellesley, 
 in pursuance of the 3d article of that treaty, 
 I apprehend it cannot be denied was the imme- 
 diate cause of the war. Scindia and his minis- 
 ters endeavoured to persuade the Resident to 
 prevent that measure*, and it was not until seve- 
 ral weeks after it had taken place that Scindia 
 and the Berar Rajah determined on war. I am 
 not able therefore to ascribe the conflict which 
 ensued " to the ambition and violence of the 
 " enemy j 1 ' however justifiable may have been 
 the Governor General's views on the principle 
 of policy, I am at a loss to conceive how that 
 position can be maintained : to me it appears 
 that their ambition, and violence, had, with re- 
 
 1 -.&./> -< ..ii'v i f,..-*if<y > - - j-M< 
 
 * Vide Letter from the Resident, March 30, 1 803, in 
 printed papers, pages 06 and 97.
 
 ,35 
 
 spect to us, no other object than to prevent 
 that interference and ascendancy on our part 
 in the Mahralta territory which it was our ob- 
 vious purpose to establish, and to maintain their 
 accustomed independence. 
 
 But here are two points which it is essential 
 to notice, because the Governor General has laid 
 considerable stress upon them, in explanation of 
 his own procedure in resorting to the extremi- 
 ty of war. First, the Noble Marquis states, 
 that " Scindia had acquiesced in the treaty of 
 " Bassein, and acknowledged that it contained 
 " nothing hostile to his state, or that he could 
 " object to.*' That the Resident anxiously en- 
 deavoured to obtain such an acknowledgment, 
 and at length received verbally from Scindia 
 what he construed into such an acknowledg- 
 ment, there can be no doubt, as it is expressly 
 stated in the Resident's letter to the Governor 
 General of the 29th of May, 1803*; but the 
 
 It is plain, from a subsequent part of the same letter, 
 and from the whole tenor of his advices, v that Scindia and 
 his ministers were both dissatisfied and alarmed at the con- 
 duct of the Peishwa in concluding that treaty. The Resi- 
 dent, in his letter of the 2.5th of March, 1803, after stating 
 Scindia's declaration, that he had " no intention whatever 
 " to obstruct the completion of the arrangements lately 
 " concluded between the Peishwa and the British govern- 
 " raent," immediately proceeds to state, that Scindia asked 
 
 D 2
 
 36 
 
 best evidence of Scindia's feelings respecting 
 the treaty will be collected from his written an- 
 swer to the letter from the Governor General, in 
 which the conclusion of the treaty had been 
 announced ; and that answer I beg leave to read 
 to the House. 
 
 " From Dowlut Row Scindia. 
 
 " Received July 31, 1805. 
 
 "' J HAVE received your Lordship's friendly letter, notify- 
 ing the conclusiou of new engagements between his High- 
 ness the Peishwa and the English Company at J3assein, to- 
 gether with a copy of the treaty ; and I have been fully 
 apprised of every word of its contents, which have also been 
 communicated to me by Colonel Collins. 
 
 " Whereas the engagements subsisting between th* 
 Peishwa and me are such, that the adjustment of all aftairs, 
 and of the concerns of his state and government, should be 
 arranged and completed with my advice and participation, 
 by the favour of God ! through a regard to what is above 
 
 him whether he had received a copy of those arrangements, 
 and expressed a wish to be apprised of the particulars, 
 which he, the Resident, declined to communicate, unless 
 Scindia " would enter into the discussion of the diiFerent 
 " articles of the treaty, for the purpose of becoming a 
 " member of the general defensive alliance :" on which 
 one of the ministers interposed by observing, tliat Scindia 
 " had already declared that he would come to no deter- 
 " mination on that point until he had conversed with Balla. 
 ' Kooujjer."
 
 37 
 
 stated, the degrees of mutual concord have so increased, 
 that to this time no interruption, or derangement of them, 
 has occurred on either side. Notwithstanding this, the en- 
 gagements -which have lately been concluded between that 
 quarter (British government) and the Peishwa have (only) 
 now been communicated ; and on the part of the Peishwa 
 to this time of writiug, nothing. Therefore it has now been 
 determined with Rajah Ragogee Bhoosla, in presence of 
 Colonel Collins, that confidential persons on my part, and 
 the Rajah's, be dispatched to the Peishwa, for the purpose 
 of ascertaining the circumstances of the (said) engagements. 
 At the same time, no intention whatever is entertained, on 
 my part, to subvert the stipulations of the treaty, consisting 
 of 19 articles, which has been concluded at Bassein, be- 
 tween the British government and the Peishwa, on condition 
 that there be no design whatever* on the part of the English Com- 
 pany, and the Peishwa, to subvert the stipulations of the treaty, 
 which since a long period of time has been concluded between the 
 Peishwa's Sircar, me, and the said Rajah, and the Mahratta, 
 chiefs. 
 
 " Further particulars will be communicated by the let-, 
 ters of Colonel Collins. Let the receipt of friendly letters 
 Continue to be the means of gratification to me. 
 
 " A true translation. 
 
 (Signed) " J. M.ONCKTON, 
 
 " Ass. Per. Sec. to Gov." 
 
 The same, nearly word for word, was receiv- 
 ed from the Berar Rajah ; and these letters are 
 certainly expressive (especially to those acquaint- 
 ed with the Eastern manner of writing) of a feel- 
 
 D 3
 
 ii 
 
 ing very different from that of acquiescence in 
 
 the treaty of Eas$ein. 
 
 J . i*. ' i, 
 
 The Governor General lays stress on Scindia's 
 having told the Resident " that his conference 
 " with the Berar Rajah would determine the ques- 
 " tion of peace or war." This was certainly a 
 haughty and expressive intimation j but it should 
 be remembered, that it was not uttered until 
 our army had taken possession of the Mahratta 
 capita], and measures of precaution on all the 
 Mahratta frontiers had been menaced by the 
 Resident. 
 
 After that measure had been executed, I can- 
 not think that a determination on the part of 
 the Mahratta chieftains to resort to war would 
 have made them the aggressors*: it then became, 
 as to them, a question of prudence. In proof 
 of Scindia's hostile intentions, several letters are 
 alleged to have been written by him to officers 
 in the service of the Peishwa, requiring them to 
 be prepared to co-operate with the confederated 
 Mahratta armies against the English ; and in 
 particular a paper appears to have been deli- 
 vered to a collector in the province of Oude, 
 stated to be the copy of a letter written by 
 
 * The Governor General was not unaware that war 
 might be the result of the treaty of Bassein, and his lorcU 
 ship had accordingly taken every precaution, and issued all 
 the necessary orders, in contemplation of that result.
 
 39 
 
 Scindia to a fugitive Rohilla chief, one of those 
 who had fought against us in 1794, and on that 
 account been proscribed, or at least deprived 
 of his country : in this letter (which was for- 
 warded to the Governor General) Scindia ex- 
 horts the Rohilla chief to endeavour to regain 
 his rights, and to make war upon the English, 
 whom he describes as an unprincipled and 
 faithless people*. These letters and orders 
 were solemnly disavowed by Scindia. The 
 Secretary to the Bengal government informed 
 the Resident that measures were taken to ob- 
 tain the originals j but it does not appear that 
 they were ever obtained , and had there been 
 any proofs of their authenticity, it would not have 
 been difficult to procure them after the reverse of 
 Scindia's fortunes: but, admitting these letters 
 and orders to have been genuine, they do not 
 appear to have been written, or issued, until some 
 time after we had taken possession of Poona f. 
 
 The last point I have to touch upon with 
 reference to the question of the justice of the 
 war, relates to the French corps that was in 
 Scindia's service, under the command of Mon- 
 
 * Printed papers, vide page 14. 
 
 f The Governor General's letter of the 20th June, 1803, 
 discredits such rumours, and observes, that " many of the 
 "circumstances, related for the purpose of accrediting them, 
 "are manifest fabrications." Vide printed papers, page 139. 
 
 D 4
 
 40 
 
 sieur Perron. There is not, as far as I have been 
 able to discover, the least reason to conclude that 
 this corps was entertained by Scindia with inten- 
 tions of hostile aggression towards us, and yet 
 the Governor General appears to have adopted 
 a determination, the justice of which can only 
 rest on the contrary admission -, a determination 
 which, in the first instance, was limited to the 
 obtaining from Scindia an obligation " to enter- 
 " tain no more subjects or. France, or of her allies, 
 " in his service." 
 
 " Scindia's admission into his service" (says the 
 Governor General) " of the subjects of a state 
 " with which the British nation is at war, is evi- 
 <c dently inconsistent, under all the circumstances 
 " of the case, with the relations actually subsist- 
 " ing between him and the Company*." Now 
 as those relations, as far as I have ever understood 
 them, left the Company and Scindia perfectly 
 independent of each other, and gave neither 
 party a right to restrain the other from employ- 
 ing the subjects of any state in its service, I 
 know not how that position can be supported, 
 advanced, as it avowedly is, without reference to 
 any views on the part of Scindia hostile to the 
 British interests. The Governor General him- 
 
 * Printed papers, pag 9 -Letter from the Secretary to 
 Government, 15th Jan. 1802.
 
 41 
 
 self, however, at this time (January 1802) con- 
 tended only for the right of remonstrating with 
 Scindia against his admitting any more subjects 
 of France into his service ; and candidly ac- 
 knowledges that, although the arguments he had 
 used " applied with equal force to the expe- 
 " diency of removing the French officers actually 
 " in the service of Scindia, yet as they were 
 " entertained previously to the commencement 
 " of the war, and as the troops under their com- 
 " mand constitute so essential a part of Scindia's 
 " force, we cannot found upon those arguments 
 " a positive right to demand the dismission of 
 them." 
 
 But, in the Governor General's Instructions to 
 General Lake, which were framed with the view 
 of providing for the event of hostilities with 
 Scindia, and the Berar Rajah, his Lordship states, 
 that he not only concurs entirely with that 
 officer, in deeming the destruction of M. Perron's 
 force to be the primary object of the campaign ; 
 but that the most deliberate consideration of the 
 actual state of affairs between his Majesty and 
 France, would have induced him to undertake 
 that service, " even independently of any contest 
 " with Dowlut, now Scindia." 
 
 Surely here, Sir, at least, justice is put out of 
 view : even the policy of the undertaking must 
 rest on the certainty, or belief, that Scindia me-
 
 42 
 
 dilated the employing M. Perron, and the force 
 under his command, offensively, or aggressively, 
 against the Company ; and that he was hostile to 
 the British interests, and favourable to these of 
 France. But I have seen no proofs of those 
 facts, either in the conduct of D. R. Scindia, or 
 in that of his predecessor, Mahadoo Scindia*: 
 on the contrary, there are facts that to me seem 
 incompatible with them. I would ask, Sir, 
 would Scindia, if his mind had been secretly 
 hostile to us, have allowed us to destroy Tippoo 
 Sultaun, and subvert the Mysore government ? 
 Would he not rather have shown that hostility, at 
 a time when his weight, added to the scale against 
 us, might have operated our destruction ? Would 
 he have allowed us, without remonstrance or in- 
 terference, to possess ourselves of the dominions 
 of the Nabob of Oude ? Above all, Sir, if he had 
 intended a contest with the British power, would 
 he have entered into a bloody and vindictive con- 
 test with Holkar? Would he not rather have 
 husbanded his resources, and endeavoured to con- 
 ciliate the mind of that enterprising chieftain, 
 and induce him to concur in his designs against 
 us? 
 
 On the other hand, Sir, is it at all necessary to 
 
 * With respect to Mahadoo Scindin, it has beeo shown 
 that Mr. Hastings had made him a friend, and a very useful 
 one, to the Company. Vide Note, page 30.
 
 43 
 
 suppose Scindia hostile to us, in order to account 
 for his employing M. Perron, and strengthening 
 his army by every possible means, had he not an 
 immense territory to defend, which M. Perron 
 had assisted his predecessor in acquiring ? But, 
 without seeking for other motives, I would merely 
 ask, Sir, could he look around him and advert to 
 the situation to which we had reduced almost every 
 state in India, but the Mahratta states, without 
 trembling for his own independence? Nay,Sir,had 
 we not avowed to himself a wish to induce him to 
 become a party in the system of defensive and 
 mutual guarantee; and did he not well know- 
 that the essence of that system on our part, and 
 our great aim and object in the proposition, was 
 the placing a large subsidiary force of British 
 troops in his capital, to be maintained at his ex- 
 pence ? I own, Sir, I cannot, with the Governor 
 General, impute it to "low jealousy" that he was 
 insensible to the advantages of this sort of pro- 
 tection ? 
 
 Now, Sir, what I have to add is simply this : 
 We determined to effect the destruction of the 
 French force m Scindia's service, independently 
 of any contest with him, and without refer- 
 ence to any hostile intentions on his part towards 
 us we wished to prevent his having it in his 
 power to be hurtful and dangerous to us, by in- 
 ducing him to consent to receive a British army
 
 44 
 
 in his capital we wished to obtain, instead of a 
 pecuniary subsidy for our protection, such of his 
 possessions as intersected ours, and to extend our 
 territory to the Jumna ; in fine, we wished to es- 
 tablish our influence over the whole of the Mah- 
 ratta empire : admit that all these objects were 
 desirable, and convenient to us to obtain, I say, 
 Sir, it we must grasp at, and possess ourselves of, 
 these objects, at least let us not charge with injus- 
 tice and aggression those from whom we have 
 wrested them ! 
 
 '.O!^'^ ' <"* '"M ' 
 
 If the view which I have endeavoured to take 
 of this whole subject be an incorrect one, I shall 
 be happy to be set right, and to acknowledge my 
 error; for certainly I have meant it to be both 
 correct and impartial. I have not been able to 
 trace, any wish or intention, on the part of the 
 Mahratta chieftains, to trench upon our rights, to 
 wrest from us our independence, or to interfere in 
 our concerns*. The system of the Governor 
 
 * I feel it right to mention that, subsequent to my having 
 prepared these sheets for the press, I have read in the print- 
 ed intercepted correspondence from India, a letter appear- 
 ing to be from the Governor General in council, to the 
 Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 13th July, 
 1804-, in which the following are stated among the means of 
 which Scindia's power to affect our security consisted at the 
 commencement of the war : " The general grandeur, riches > 
 " and strength of the territories of Scindia and his army,
 
 General, to interfere in their concerns, and to 
 bring the Mahratta states into the same degree 
 of dependence on the British power, to which he 
 had already brought the Soubah of the Deccan 
 by the treaty of Hydrabad, his Lordship fully 
 avows: that he adopted that system, from the 
 fullest conviction that it was the wisest and best 
 for us to pursue, no one can doubt ; and as his 
 Lordship states his Majesty 's Ministers to have 
 
 and in the reputation of his military power, by which he had 
 " acquired a general influence and ascendancy at Poona and 
 " over all the Mahratta states, and even at Hydrabad, ivhich 
 " influence and ascendancy had been for some years uniformly 
 " directed against the British power in India." As this sup- 
 posed dispatch bears evident marks of authenticity, it is in- 
 cumbent on me, in point of candour, to acknowledge, that 
 any proofs to substantiate the fact stated in the concluding 
 words of the above quotation would very materially weaken 
 the impression I have uniformly felt respecting the justice of 
 the war ; and I should have to lament that the fact, and 
 those proofs of it, were not brought forward at an earlier 
 period, and in aid of arguments much less efficacious on that 
 important point : but how shall we estimate the grandeur, 
 riches, strength, and military power, here ascribed to Scin- 
 dia, when we look to a passage in another letter from the 
 Governor General, dated the 20th November, 1803, con- 
 tained in the same intercepted correspondence, and find that 
 his (Scindia's) servant, M. Perron, had "obtained the exercise 
 " of sovereign authority over a territory whose annual re- 
 " venue amounted to near two millions sterling, and had ne- 
 " gotiated treaties and alliances with several petty states m 
 " his own name ?"
 
 46 
 
 approved the principles of the policy on which 
 it is founded, 1 should have felt myself bound to 
 distrust my own judgment, as to the policy of the 
 system, if I had not witnessed the almost iatal 
 effects of our attempting the same system twenty- 
 five years ago ; and I certainly did not think it 
 possible that, while the memory of them remain- 
 ed, we should voluntarily revive that system, or 
 court the peril from which we then so narrowly 
 escaped. 
 
 And now, Sir, on the supposition of the most 
 complete success in the war in which we are en- 
 gaged, supposing Holkar to be completely sub- 
 dued, and his capital also occupied by our troops, 
 and our new system fully established, I would 
 beg to know of any one who has added up our 
 gains, what is their amount, and in what they 
 consist ? If it be answered, in a vast increase, to 
 the amount of many millions, of revenue, I will 
 tell him, that for these seven years past, or since 
 the adoption of our new system of politics, and 
 corresponding new system, and scale of finance 
 and expence, as we have advanced in revenue*, 
 
 * My definition of the word Revenue is somewhat different 
 from that of the advocates of the aggrandizing system : to 
 me it seems that the revenue of an estate is the clear product 
 of it, or the surplus after defraying the e::pences of collect- 
 ing, and protecting it. In this sense of the word, what
 
 we have receded in clear income, to say the very 
 least, and incurred an increase of debt, of the 
 precise amount of which I will not at present 
 venture to state even a conjecture. Is it addi- 
 tional security that we have gained? I an- 
 swer, that I fear this will prove a yet greater 
 delusion than the other. To military men I 
 leave the decision of the question, whether a 
 country is secure in proportion to its extent : but 
 I assert, without the hazard of contradiction, that 
 even before our late conquests our territory in In- 
 dia was too extensive to be maintained without a 
 greater drain of men than these Islands can bear*. 
 Sir, let any one look at Rennell's masterly delinea- 
 tion of that territory!, and, after including with 
 it the Mahratta countries we have since added to 
 our dominion, let him compare the aggregate 
 with the whole extent of Europe, and then say 
 
 have we gained ? Or, adopting their sense of the word, I 
 would ask, how do we feel our gains ? What are the actual 
 fruits ? 
 
 * If I am not mistaken, the War Office, or those who, 
 since the commencement of the Mahratta war, have succes- 
 sively had the care of providing for our defence and secu- 
 rity at home, could strengthen my argument on this point. 
 
 f Look at the portion of Asia which (to use the expres- 
 sion of a repectable person in a late letter from India) 
 "is dotted with our troops." The late conflicts in India 
 have abundantly proved that European troops must always 
 constitute our vital strength, and grand reliance, in that
 
 48 
 
 if we can hope, or if it would be wise to attempt, 
 to keep so vast a portion of the globe in perpe- 
 tual subjection. 
 
 Upon the whole, Sir, to conclude this long 
 trespass on the time of the House, I offer it as my 
 sincere opinion, that it India is to be preserved 
 to this country, the present system must be abro- 
 gated in all its branches, and that, admitting it 
 may not endanger the safety of our possessions 
 there, it must, as long as it remains in force, prove 
 an effectual bar to every hope of drawing from 
 that vast territory the aid which it is capable 
 of affording towards the relief of the public 
 burdens at home, and the East India Com- 
 pany will be obliged to apply for aid to the 
 public, before the public will receive that parti- 
 cipation from the territorial revenue which was 
 stipulated for it in the act for the renewal of the 
 charter. It is not merely in respect to the num- 
 ber, and pay, of the troops that the new political 
 
 country ; and if the population of these islands be insuffi- 
 cient to afibrd the necessary supply (and even Europe it- 
 self would scarcely be adequate to such a drain), what must 
 be the alternative if we adhere to our present system, and 
 determine to retain our conquests or late territorial acquisi- 
 tions? What but the permitting a system of colonization ? 
 And are there, among all who have ever turned their minds 
 to that subject, two opinions as to what that system must 
 produce ? This, though seen remotely, the reflecting mind 
 will not deem visionary.
 
 49 
 
 system has affected the finances in India: the 
 change has produced a corresponding change of 
 ideas, and opinions, in regard to expenditure in 
 general. This part of the subject belongs more 
 properly to the discussion of the India budget, 
 and I will therefore at present only observe 
 upon it, that there appears to have been en- 
 grafted on our military successes in India a scale 
 of expenditure to which no exhaustible revenue 
 is adequate. The system in all its parts calls for 
 serious revision. The advantages which India is 
 capable of producing to this country I believe to 
 be greater than the most sanguine imagination 
 has ever reached ; but much is to be done, and 
 many steps to be gradually retraced, before any 
 of them will be realized, or any effectual progress 
 made towards the reduction of our present enor- 
 mous Indian debt. For effecting these great 
 objects, his Majesty's Ministers have given the 
 most unequivocal proof of their concurring 
 anxiety in their approbation of the measure, of 
 all others that human wisdom could suggest, the 
 best calculated to effect them : I mean, Sir, the 
 reappointment to the office of Governor General 
 of a person whose bare acceptance of the trust 
 will be a pledge and assurance to the Eastern 
 world, that all that is good, and just, is intended 
 towards them; for with him they have been accus- 
 tomed to associate all the virtues that dignify the 
 

 
 50 
 
 human character. Revered alike by native and 
 European, by prince and peasant, that illustrious 
 person, in the happiness and content of every class, 
 and every description of men, found all his views 
 accomplished, and left the British character "m 
 India on the highest pinnacle of fame, because 
 identified with his own. 
 
 In the persuasion that a declaration from Par- 
 liament, Corresponding with the spirit of this 
 measure, would have a beneficial effect, I shall 
 support the Motion. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 
 Printed by C. Mercier and Co. Northumberland-court. 
 
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