LIBRARY uKrveflsinr 9f WWJTORW* SAN DIEGO ' STUDIES IN THEOLOGY All rights reter-vcd STUDIES IN THEOLOGY BY J. ESTLIN CARPENTER AND P. H. WICKSTEED irav Stiiprj/jM rAetop &vt>)0tv effnv Ka.ra.fia.lvov diro roO irarpos rHv ii}T(t}i> Trap' (j5 OVK Zvi irapa\\ayij r) TOV yap Kal yivos lai>.tv. 1903 LONDON J. M. DENT & CO. 29 AND 30 BEDFORD STREET, W.C. Go OTTO PFLEIDERER AND HENRICUS OORT CONTENTS PAGE i. THE RELIGION OF TIME AND THE RELIGION OF ETERNITY. . . . . P. H. W. i ii. THE EDUCATION OF THE RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION. J. E.G. 51 in. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNITARIANISM AS A THEOLOGY. . . . . . P. H. W. 91 iv. THE PLACE OF IMMORTALITY IN RELIGIOUS BELIEF. . . ,*va aj . J. E. C. 105 v. THE FEAR OF GOD AND THE SENSE OF SIN. . P. H. W. 149 vi. THE PLACE OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGION IN THEOLOGICAL STUDY. . . . J. E. C. 169 vn. THREE WAYS OF SALVATION. . . J. E. C. 201 viu. THE LIBERAL FAITH. . . . J. E. C. 225 ix. THE RELATION OF JESUS TO His AGE AND OUR OWN. . . . . J. E. C. 239 x. THE PLACE OF JESUS IN HISTORY. . . P. H. W. 273 xi. SOCIOLOGY AND THEOLOGY. . . . P. H. W. 283 xii. THE STUDY OF THEOLOGY AND THE SERVICE OF MAN. . . . . J. E. C. 301 XHI. RELIGION AND SOCIETY. . . . P. H. W. 325 THE essays gathered in this volume have all appeared before, either as separate publica- tions or in periodicals or collections. A few verbal alterations and corrections have been made in this re-issue. The authors have to thank the Committee of the British and Foreign Unitarian Association for allowing them to include a number of essays originally published under their direction. I THE RELIGION OF TIME AND THE RELIGION OF ETERNITY Being a Study of Certain Relations between Mediaeval and Modern Thought Essex Hall Lecture for 1899 P. H. W. 1899 Yet it is not easy to combat these conceptions because of the love I bear to the men who put them forward." PREFACE THOUGH the purpose of this essay is entirely constructive, the writer is aware that he has occasionally fallen into a controversial tone ; and though his aim has been to deal with spiritual realities, he is conscious of having put forward many historical judgments which may be open to legitimate challenge. There may be readers who will detect his ignorance of periods of human thought, a knowledge of which might have corrected one-sided views and shown him that the thing he goes over the sea of centuries to fetch lies near at hand in the very regions where he says that it is not. Others may smile at his insistence on what has always been very nigh unto them in their mouth and in their heart, and seems to need no enforcing. And yet others may see neither vital power in the ideals he sets forth nor defect in those he attacks. Indeed, it may well be that he has really given nothing but a chapter of his own spiritual autobiography, while believing himself to be tracing movements in the world's thought. Yet even so, if any one has been able in maturity to reach what he believes to be clearer thought and higher vitality than his youthful period of storm and stress brought to him, the record of the path he has trodden may be of help or of interest to others. Defects of knowledge and distortions of view will be corrected by the better informed or the more thoughtful ; but a certain human interest will still attach to a human experience. The gates of life are many, but life is one. P. H. W. ^yd May 1899. THE RELIGION OF TIME THE RELIGION OF ETERNITY RECENT developments of the High Church movement in England have filled many minds with wonder, some with exultation, some almost with despair. It seems as though nothing were ever settled, as though history were going back upon herself, as though national characteristics and tendencies which we thought had once for all declared themselves, may still veer round ; as though, in the current phrase of contempt and reprobation, we were liable at any moment to find ourselves " back again in the Middle Ages." Yet it is difficult for the reflective mind to acquiesce in a theory of mere reaction or retrogression with respect even to a side current of the life of nations ; and the question naturally occurs whether this anomalous appearance of retrogression is in any way connected with other movements or tendencies with which we can more easily reconcile ourselves. And in truth, as soon as we examine our surroundings a little more closely, we find that this modern ecclesiasticism, with its elaborate pomp of ceremonial, with its lofty claims for the supremacy of the Church, with its jealous attempt to control education, and to lay its guiding hand upon the inmost thoughts and volitions of the individual soul, is but one out of many evidences that the ideals of the Middle Ages, and more specifically of the twelfth, the thirteenth, and the fourteenth centuries, are reasserting their attractive force. And when we consider what these cen- turies produced (the great cathedrals of France, for example), a re- newed interest in them can by no means be put down off-hand as purely reactionary and regrettable, except by the narrowest and least spiritually-minded of the sons of the nineteenth century. THE RELIGION OF TIME 5 Let us examine, then, a little more in detail some of these other witnesses to a changed attitude of the modern mind with respect to the period of the great days of the Papacy. Perhaps the recovered sense for the greatness of mediaeval architecture, which was condemned not so long ago as bar- barous, was the first indication of the coming change ; and more recently a similar change has come over our estimate of early painting, so that now once again " the cry is Giotto's." l Again, the revived interest in Dante, to which the printing presses of Italy, France, Germany, England, and America bear unceasing testimony, is universally and properly greeted as a sign of enlarging and deepening spiritual perception as well as literary appreciation. Renan once said, " To me alone in my century has it been granted to appreciate Jesus and Francis of Assisi." 2 Before he died a great host of lovers of the Seraphic Father surrounded and outvied him. "A little spark kindles a mighty flame." 3 We do not grudge Renan the credit of having been a few years in advance of his fellows, but he found the world already ripe to understand alike the intimate beauty of the life of the saint of Assisi, and the amazing light which the development of the Franciscan literature will ultimately throw upon the composition of the Gospels. Once again, when the present Pope, early in his reign, prescribed the study of Thomas Aquinas as the antidote to the intellectual aberrations of our day, 4 I can well remember the amused contempt with which the receipt was greeted in Protestant England. For, with the notable exception of Auguste Comte, thinkers of the nineteenth century had been, for the most part, in the habit of regarding mediaeval philosophy as a negligible quantity. But this too has changed. No doubt it may still be maintained that between Greek and modern thought, between Aristotle and Hobbes, perhaps even between Aristotle and Kant, there has been no essential advance of the first importance in speculative philosophy; but the developed scholasticism for which Aquinas stands is now felt to represent an august system of thought which the historian of civilisation and 1 Cf. Dante, Purg. xi. 95. Giotto's date is 1276-1336. 2 " J'ai pu seul en mon siecle comprendre Jesus et Francois d'Assise." Souvenirt tfcnfance et de jeunesse, 8me ed. 1883, p. 148. 3 Cf. Dante, Parad. i. 34. 4 In his Encyclical " Etarni Patris" 1879. 6 THE RELIGION OF TIME the student of human nature cannot neglect or treat as effete and inoperative any more than he can ignore the analogous attempt to combine the highest thought with the poetry and passion of life, which is embodied in the works of Plato. 1 These are but a few of the many evidences of a reawaken- ing to the significance of mediaeval character and ideals. But it is needless to multiply examples. If we think of the cathedrals, of the fourteenth-century frescoes, and of these three men Francis, Aquinas, and Dante, it will be enough to make us realise the renewed hold which the later Middle Ages have gained upon modern Europe. The mediaeval ideals in poetry, thought, and life are no longer relegated to the rubbish-bins of history, or even to the museums of curiosities. They are recognised not only as august, but as inspiring. And surely few men will be prepared to say that all this is sheer reaction and loss. What is the meaning, then, of this renewed vitality in mediaeval ideals, good and bad, reactionary and progressive ? To answer the question we must go back to the times of the Renaissance (especially Humanism), and the Reformation. The two great movements so designated run parallel ; allegi- ance to them is often combined, as in the case of Melanchthon, in a single individual ; and a more or less developed sense of a practical community of interest between the two covers a far wider area than that of their actual spiritual coincidence. Hence it is customary in modern histories, at any rate in Germany and England, to treat them as the two related sides of a single movement. Yet on a closer inspection they appear to be not only distinct, but to a great extent mutually hostile and destructive. What could be less like than the stern Puritan and scriptural ideals of the Reformers, with their intense moral earnestness and passionate religious conviction, and the genial culture, toleration, and sense of humour, or the pedantic devotion to "letters," or the frank paganism, that characterise the various manifestations of Humanism ? 2 Why then are they regarded as allies ? Because both alike, though for very different reasons, and in very different directions, represent a reaction, contemptuous or impassioned as the case may be, against the ideals of the Middle Ages. Both alike regarded the whole period from the fall of the Western Empire, 1 See Appendix A, p. 28. 2 See Appendix B, p. 29. AND OF ETERNITY 7 up to their own time, as a regrettable parenthesis in the history .of humanity. The formula of life they found in overleaping this middle period and going back, in the one case to the Greco -Roman civilisation, in the other case to primitive Christianity. It is true that primitive Christianity and the Greco -Roman civilisation stood in sharp contrast to each other ; and hence the Humanist and the Reforming ideals of life were really opposed to each other in principle. But their common antipathy to the Middle Ages inspired them mutually to ignore their own fundamental hostility and to combine in their attack upon that long stretch of ages during which the elements of earlier civilisations had reacted upon each other, and had been welded into an august ideal system of govern- ment, of religion, and of life. 1 It is strange how successful the combined movement has been in imposing its theory of history upon posterity. The man in the street still devoutly believes that the Middle Ages are a waste period of human history. He not only knows nothing about them, but does not so much as desire to increase his stock of knowledge. For him the scholastic philosophy means attempts to decide how many angels can dance on the point of a needle. Mediaeval history is merely a storehouse of " properties " for picturesque masking and charading, and if he chance to know or to have been told that Dante was a great poet, or Francis a great saint, he thinks it was amazingly to their credit, "considering the times in which they lived." We consider that we ought to know something of general European history from about as far back as the middle of the fifteenth century, and then we make a great bound and concern ourselves with nothing more till we get back to classical or Christian antiquity, to which we imagine our religion and our culture directly attach themselves. 2 But the current version of history is quite a different thing from history itself; and a very little examination will convince us of a fact which general principles would lead us to antici- pate, viz., that no generation of men can by any possibility sever themselves from the beliefs and ideals of the generations that immediately precede them. " Nature makes no leaps " ; 3 and whether you glance at so early a work as Petrarch's 1 See Appendix C, p. 29. a See Appendix D, p. 30. 3 See Appendix E, p. 30. 8 THE RELIGION OF TIME ^ or so late a one as Bacon's Organon^ you are quite as likely to be impressed by its mediaeval tone as by its affinity to modern conceptions. An attempt to make a violent breach with the past may appear successful to itself far beyond the warrant of facts, partly because of our profound unconscious- ness of the most fundamental obligations we are under to our education and to the atmosphere of thought in which our minds have been formed, and partly because when we have crushed down the expression of any special mode of thought we usually think that we have dried up its sources. We can only trace the origin of that portion of our beliefs which we have consciously adopted. We do not recognise the origin of those far deeper beliefs which we have unconsciously absorbed. Thus Luther and his followers might know that the monastic and papal systems had been forced upon Europe by visible and palpable agencies against which they could rebel ; but (to say nothing of the development of the Pauline teaching, and the perversion of the teaching of the Gospels into the elaborated "scheme of salvation," or of the beliefs as to heaven and hell) such articles of faith as the doctrine of the Trinity, and the fearful systems of demonology, 1 had sunk into the tissues of their minds. They knew not that they owed them to the Church and to other mediaeval agencies. They were content to attach them here and there by a slender thread to some hook or nail of Scripture, and they mistook these ornamental connections for the supports and binding girders of their edifice. And in like manner the fundamental doctrine of a church divinely appointed to supplement and interpret Scrip- ture was far more suppressed in expression than superseded in fact. 2 Again, in those periods of human history in which actual changes in the currents of thought and newly acquired aspects of truth assume exceptional magnitude and prominence, the limitation of the human mind seems to involve the realisation of the new truth being gained at the sacrifice of some aspects or portions of the truth realised and recognised of old. To say, therefore, that the classical and scriptural reaction of the fifteenth and following centuries, so far as it was valuable and successful, was bought for a price, and involved a certain blind- ness to the beauty of mediaeval literary and spiritual ideals, is 1 See Appendix F, p. 31. 2 See Appendix G, p. 32. AND OF ETERNITY 9 not to depreciate the gain it brought, but merely to say that that gain was acquired under conditions which human nature cannot escape. These considerations, which are of an entirely general character, are sufficient to suggest a point of view from which the reassertion in our day of the potency of mediaeval ideals may be regarded as in no way anomalous. Where the Renais- sance and the Reformation were right as against the Middle Ages, they gained an appearance of victory largely in excess of the reality, and it is only natural that we should have to fight the battle again, and yet again for in such matters there is hardly such a thing as conclusive victory. And where the Renaissance and the Reformation were relatively wrong, that is to say, where the combative stress they laid upon one side of truth amounted to neglect and depreciation of another, the neglected aspects of the truth are sure to avenge themselves. So that even the true children of the Reformation find in the study of the Middle Ages much to explain what was obscure, and much to supplement what was defective, in their spiritual life and ideals, and are amazed to discover exaltation, beauty, and earnestness where they had been led to expect nothing but sordidness, grotesqueness, chicanery, and frivolity. It is no wonder, then, that we are called upon once more to take arms against dangers which we supposed ourselves conclusively to have overcome, and are at the same time invited to garner life-giving thought, aspiration, and example from literatures and from ages which we supposed had nothing to teach us. And happily these two claims may draw us in the same direction, for we can most wisely combat the errors of any system when we most profoundly and sympathetically appreciate its truth. A true understanding of the permanent place in the human mind of the mediaeval ideals, and the spon- taneous or deliberate combining of them with the best elements of modern life, a combining which will itself constitute a transformation, perhaps a transfiguration of both the factors is the surest way of disarming all reactionary attempts and of carrying forward the true spirit of those reforming movements which once again demand our active championship. It is to this task of making some contribution towards a better appreciation of the permanent religious significance of certain great mediaeval conceptions that I would address myself. io THE RELIGION OF TIME When we think of mediaeval religion, probably most of us think of it under its gross and material aspects. We think of a religion of outward observances and of formal regulations of conduct ; of remission of sins on a fixed scale of penance, if not a fixed scale of payment ; of relations between God and man conceived on the principles of a court of justice, and a theology constructed out of legal quibbles. It is easy to gather historic and philosophical justification and illustration of these conceptions in any quantity that may be desired ; but it is to a far different aspect of mediaeval religion that I wish to call your attention. For there is a sense in which mediaeval theo- logy is contrasted with current conceptions of the Deity precisely because it is so profoundly philosophical, so exalted in its dignity and worthiness, and so far removed from those anthropomorphic conceptions which are for ever seeking for easier terms of sympathy between God and man, not by striving to raise man to "think the thoughts of God," but by degrading the conception of God to conformity with the limitations of human experience. The group of mediaeval religious ideas which I have in mind gathers round the conception of Eternity, as elaborated in the Greek schools of philosophy, as adopted into the Christian thought by such as Augustine, as formulated by Boethius, and as inspiring the deepest thought and the most glowing piety of the Christian centuries down to Aquinas and Dante. To the mediaeval thinker Eternity is not endless time, but a state in which perfection is found in the co-existence^ not in the succession^ of the parts that make the whole. Time, in its thin succession, drops one thing to grasp another, and ever conscious of the incompleteness of the present experience, reaches ever on and on, and so " imitates by going that fulness of life which it cannot grasp by abiding." When Augustine speaks of God's eternal " now," to which all our past and future are present, when Dante speaks of God as him in whom " every where and every when are focussed in a point," x that is to whom every season is now and every place is here^ they are not using mere vague phrases, but struggling to express their sense of the inevitable limitations which the conceptions of time and space set upon human thought, and 1 Parad. xxix. 12. AND OF ETERNITY n the belief that the absolute life of God transcends such limita- tions, and " by abiding grasps " that which we " strive after by going." l And connected with this conception of Eternity is the kindred conception of Fruition ; that is to say the belief that truth is not only worth the winning but worth the having, the belief that the bliss of communion with God is not something in the encouragement and refreshment of which we can go along with our active life, but is the absolute goal in which that active life itself finds its meaning and in which at last it shall be swallowed up. For the mediaeval saint believed that to see God is to see as God sees, and that just in so far as we rise into true communion with him and do in truth see God, so far shall we see things not in their fragmentary imperfection, but in their combined perfectness. Bonaventura 2 says that no one can share the life of God supremely in the absolute sense, but each one may share that life supremely relatively to himself; that is to say, granted that each human soul is something less than God himself, and therefore has certain limitations which it can never transcend, within those limitations it may rise to perfect and unclouded communion with God, and seeing as he sees, may rejoice with him in the universe wherein he rejoices and in his own eternal being. 3 Thus when the supreme vision is granted to Dante, and he lifts his mortal eyes to look into the light of God, he sees all things, and sees them in all their rela- tions, not as fragmentary imperfections, but as a single perfect whole ; yet what he sees is but one simple flame, the flame of love ; for therein " all the scattered leaves of the universe are bound by love into a single volume." 4 Thus to see the universe is to see it in God, and to see it as God sees it ; for the soul that has reached this highest life of knowing and of loving is altogether emptied of itself and poured out into God. This is fruition ; this is the life eternal, the self-realising in self-losing of true love. This is the life worthy to be lived, not for what it leads on to, but for what it is. It is the life eternal. This loss of self and finding of self in God differs from what we are told of some of the Oriental attempts to cure the disease of existence by emptying the soul of all thought and all passion, 1 See Appendix H, p. 39. 2 Commentary on the Sentences, Bk. iv. Dist. 49, Part 2, Question 6. 1 See Appendix I, p. 45. 4 Parad. xxxiii. 82-90. 12 THE RELIGION OF TIME in that the latter aims at the loss of self-consciousness in un- consciousness, the former at the transfiguration of self-conscious- ness into God-consciousness ; the self is not lost, neither does it rejoice in the fulfilment of its own will, but rejoices that the will of God has now so transmuted it into itself, that it flows without hindrance or friction through it. "His will is our peace " ; we live the life, we think the thoughts, we love the love of God. 1 Such is the religion of Eternity as we find it in Augustine, in Scotus Erigena, in Bernard, in Aquinas, and in Dante, but which seems to vanish from the main stream of religious thought and of sacred poetry with the Renaissance and the Reformation ; 2 to reappear, in its germinal conception at least, in Wordsworth when he feels Incumbencies more awful, visitings Of the upholder of the tranquil soul, That tolerates the indignities of Time, And, from the centre of Eternity All finite motions overruling, lives In glory immutable. Or where he recognises in mathematical truth A type, for finite natures, of the one Supreme Existence, the surpassing life, Which to the boundaries of space and time, Of melancholy space and doleful time, Superior and incapable of change, Nor touched by welterings of passion is, And hath the name of God. 8 But for reasons not hard to understand it is the religion of Time rather than the religion of Eternity which has charac- terised our modern civilisation. To the mediaeval thinker the outlook upon time was short. Dante tells us that the 1 Bernard, De diligendo Deo, cap. x. Dante, Parad. iii. 85. 2 See Appendix J, p. 45. 8 Prelude, Bk. iii. 119-124; Bk. vi. 133-139. N.B. In the last line I have omitted a comma before " God," which is in all the editions I have seen, but which appears to ruin the sense. A similar misleading or distracting insertion of a comma appears in the Excursion, Bk. v. line 330, and doubtless elsewhere in Wordsworth : Better far Than this, to graze the turf in thoughtless peace, By foresight or remembrance, undisturbed I AND OF ETERNITY 13 proper motion of the starry sphere carries it through one degree only in a hundred years, and adds that it will never complete its first revolution, since the end of the world will anticipate by many ages the fulfilment of its first period. 1 Moreover, Time itself was regarded as a creation, and its suc- cession as recording nothing that was essential to the glory or the bliss of the Creator. To the mediaeval thinker there was really no progressive development of the world as we conceive it. History was rather a history of corruption and of falling away than a history of progress. At the creation when man came straight from the hand of God, human life on earth already realised its utmost perfection. After that came the fall of man ; and sacred history itself was but a long drawn promise of restoration, together with a foreshadowing of the higher glories to which man would have been almost instan- taneously uplifted had he persevered in innocence. And after the Redemption, the one central event of history, came a long period of degeneracy in which the race of men crowded the portals of hell, while (at any rate after the " first love " of the early centuries) only here and there a soul was rescued to fill one of the empty seats in heaven yet left ere the tale of saints should be complete and Time should be done away. Hence the mediaeval saint sought refuge from the world and from all temporal things. He looked through the flux and reflux to something abiding, changeless, eternal, to the God to whom the past and the future alike are "now." But all this is changed. The world has not come to an end. It is not Time, but hell, with its vaunted eternity, that has been done away. Not that we must exaggerate the sig- nificance of this change of thought ; it were the shallowest of shallow mistakes to think that with the vanishing of the belief in an eternal hell we have got rid of the terrible problem of evil, and may now, with an easy theistic optimism, excuse ourselves from all attempt to reconcile the existence of evil with the goodness of God. But, nevertheless, the conditions of the problem are essentially altered to us. To the mediaeval thinker, what he called (and what we still call) evil was a permanent thing. The deep notes of anguish from the abyss were as abiding as the triumph of heaven. Their discord had a place in the ultimate harmony. It was the business of the 1 Convivio, ii. 15: 102-118. i 4 THE RELIGION OF TIME saint to struggle against evil ; but the struggle was his per- sonal probation, his choosing of the better part. He did not fight with a hope of conclusive victory in any such sense as would involve the extermination of the foe against which he fought. The only way in which he could ultimately deal with evil within the circle of his beliefs was to regard it as in some way so transfigured in the sight of God that the cries of the damned form a part of the divine harmony, and darkness is solved in light. 1 To the mediaeval thinker, then, there was no great outlook upon time ; no essential message of love was borne upon its stream, save that very message which it had itself retarded and was still obscuring. The evil in the world must be fought against, but would never be exterminated ; it would, in some inconceivable manner, be transfigured to God and to his saints, but would never be annihilated to itself. Meanwhile, Eternity was very nigh at hand, very real and instant in its presence. Already men could believe in it ; very shortly they might experience it. When man should see as God sees, then Time, with its flux and reflux, fleeting and changing, would be no more, and the divine All-at-once would make harmony out of seeming discord. How widely has all this changed in modern times ! It is true that till quite within our own day professed theologians have held and have insisted upon the doctrine of an eternal hell, keeping the worst, while losing the best, of mediaeval theology. But the vital currents of the world's life, the formative pro- cesses which have moulded it, have long ceased to flow through the channels of official theology. With the revival of learning came an outburst of intellectual activity. The new-found treasures of Greek literature opened up fresh sources of delight, and seemed to multiply the possi- bilities of the human mind. The earth herself expanded by the discovery of the New World to match man's growing powers and possibilities. The conquests of science threw back the walls of the universe and carried the triumph of human thought and the discovery of natural law into the boundless regions of space. All tended to throw men's thoughts forward to unmeasured possibilities ; and the development of the wealth 1 See Appendix K, p. 46, AND OF ETERNITY 15 of earthly life, material, intellectual, and aesthetic, seemed the worthiest object of human effort. This earth Where, in the end, We find our happiness, or not at all, 1 became the centre of human interest at the very time when it ceased to be physically the centre of the universe. New prospects were opened up to enterprise, and life was full of eager hopes. Men's eyes looked forward into the future, where they could see vast and unmeasured changes looming, and undefined possibilities beckoning them on. Meanwhile, social discontent was spreading through the disinherited ranks of society. Poverty was no more a thing in which mankind was to acquiesce, or a condition favourable to every spiritual grace, but an exclusion from that ample heritage of earthly blessing to which all men had a right. Fiercely as uprisings prompted by this spirit were repressed by the temporal, and bitterly as they were resented by the spiritual leaders of the nations, they were, nevertheless, the half-articulate contribution of the masses to the formulating of the new spirit which the Renaissance and the Reformation had themselves unchained. 2 And at last the French Revolution stirred throughout Europe the thought that the peoples may be freed ; that a finer national character may be developed ; that man's lot on earth may be brightened and dignified. So men's eyes looked forward to a future of material and moral amelioration. The greatest testimony that history can bear to the splendour of this gift from France is that the gratitude of humanity survived the bloody horrors with which she accompanied her gift, and will survive the prolonged agony and shame over which at this moment Europe weeps. 8 And this sense of growth in knowledge and in power has reacted upon our anticipations and hopes for the moral nature as well as the social state of man. The lost prophetic ideal of the kingdom of heaven upon earth, of the golden age in the future, not the past, has been recovered ; and the thought has grown that evil can be not only struggled with but overcome. 1 Prelude, Bk. xi. 143, 144. 2 See Appendix L, p. 47. 3 Written in the midst of L'affaire Dreyfus. Europe is still weeping or indignant, but not over France. Pianger ne con-vlen per altra sfada, 1903. 16 THE RELIGION OF TIME And thus, in the material and the spiritual worlds alike, the expression of our deepest life has been gathered into the word Progress. Progress ! Men's eyes turn to the future, but no goal is in sight, for the pathway stretches too far for any eye to pierce the distance. On and on, with ever brightening hope ! The prospect of the world's life, which seemed so short to the medi- aeval saint, is indefinitely lengthened. The conception of the life of man on earth has taken an altogether new colouring ; and modern religion, too, has become the religion of progress and of the future. The attitude of men's minds towards the problem of evil has changed altogether. Evil can no longer be regarded as a permanent thing ; or if our optimism cannot rise to so bold an assertion, at any rate we will prescribe no limit to the possible amelioration of the lot of man by material advance, by intel- lectual achievement, and by the resultant improvement in methods of education and of social organisation. If we are forced to admit that in some mysterious sense it is the will of God that evil should be, we proclaim with deepest conviction that it is also his will that evil should cease to be, and cease to be through our own effort. It is this general change of attitude toward the future that has destroyed the belief in an eternal hell. The modern mind rejects the acquiescent faith that in the ultimate harmony the keynotes will be struck in tones of joy at one end and of despair at the other. It rests in the belief that those deep, discordant notes shall not be eternal, shall not be prolonged as elements of a future harmony, but shall be annihilated. We cry with Bryant to the " unrelenting past " : All that of good and fair Has gone into thy womb from earliest time Shall then come forth to wear The glory and the beauty of its prime. All shall come back ; each tie Of pure affection shall be knit again : Alone shall evil die, And sorrow dwell a prisoner in thy reign. Evil shall die. Not only shall it die to us by ceasing to be AND OF ETERNITY 17 evil to us, but it shall die to itself likewise. There is for us no eternal hell. And against the hell of cruelty and wickedness that now is, we fight to win. Who will not rejoice in the vital gain which this changed attitude of mind represents ? A gain of which it would be difficult to overestimate the scope and the significance ! But it has not been made without some loss, temporary, let us hope, but grave enough. And this loss, strange as it may seem, is to the religious life. The inspiring conception of progress, the sense of unknown and unimagined things which the future holds in store for us, the feeling that all we know and love awaits its fulfilment and even its interpretation from things as yet not seen even by the eye of faith, has not only given a certain vagueness to our higher life, but has even reduced it to a kind of inherent self-contradiction. Like the apostle, we do not " count that we have attained," and we cannot accept as adequate anything that lies within even the furthest stretch of definite anticipation ; and so the very idea of attainment has become cramping and repellent to us. And thus we are in danger of losing the very sense of a truth which is worth enjoying as well as worth seeking, of a life that is worth living as well as worth gaining. In our intellectual and, in a certain sense, in our moral life, we are in danger of degenerating into sportsmen who hunt for the sake of hunting, not for the sake of the quarry. Lessing's motto has become ours. If God offered us truth in the one hand, and in the other hand the eternal search for truth coupled with eternal error, we should choose to woo in vain rather than to win and to enjoy our love. Yet surely this blights with a certain insincerity our deepest life. We seek, not with the hope of finding, but on the understood condition that we shall not find. 1 The contradiction becomes more glaring when we turn to the moral life, and the efforts for social amelioration which happily form so large a part of our conception of the moral life to-day. We are told, on the one hand, that moral effort is the noblest element in our personal life, and that self- sacrifice is the most beautiful of all things ; and on the other hand, that we must never be content so long as there are evil or selfish impulses in 1 See Appendix M, p. 47. S 1 8 THE RELIGION OF TIME our hearts. We must not only act as though we loved our neighbour as ourselves, but must actually so love him ; we must not only restrain our evil passions, but must so overcome them that we love only what is sound and true, and are no longer tempted by evil. And in like manner we must never rest content with palliating social evils, or endeavouring to make compensation for social wrongs, but must strive for the establishment of an order of things in which there shall be no social wrongs to right. But if so, then from both sides, by the quenching of the cravings of selfishness, and by removing the occasions for self-sacrifice, we are striving to do away with every need for the moral effort and self-sacrifice which we say are our highest life ; so that if the kingdom of heaven should really come the life most worth living could be lived no more. Thus the moral life is involved in an inherent contradiction. The very characteristic of modern, as distinguished from mediaeval thought, on which I have laid stress as such an unmeasured gain the fact, namely, that we fight against evil with the determination to exterminate it involves us in a self- contradiction ; for we fight and pray for a state of things which, if it came, would put an end to all that we profess most to value. Having lost our conception of a goal, of a life supremely worth living for itself, we lose also the meaning of progress ; and when we face the fundamental question, "What shall be done with the victory ? " we can only answer, " The battle will last my time ; there is enough evil to give reality, at any rate, to my struggles." But surely no thinking man can acquiesce in this. We may believe that complete success in the moral welfare cannot be thought of as even an abstract possibility for indefinite genera- tions or centuries to come ; but, none the less, the man who fights to win, however far off the victory may be, must have in his mind a conception of something to be won that is worth having, or he fights for he knows not what, and obeys, after all, a mere blind impulse. 1 It is just such a conception of the absolute life, the life in itself worthy, which seems to me to be so largely wanting in our day. Seeley 2 says that most English parents, if asked what their ideals for their children were, would find it extremely hard to say, except that they are to take a proper position in society, 1 See Appendix N, p. 48. 2 Natural Religion, p. 135. AND OF ETERNITY 19 that they are to make or to have a suitable income, and that it is hard if they cannot have plenty of amusement meanwhile. And comparatively few of us can give any more intelligent answer to the question, " What is the ultimate purpose of life ? " unless, indeed, there lurk in some corner of our memory the answer supplied by the dying echo of mediaeval theology caught by the opening declaration of the Shorter Catechism^ " Man's chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him for ever." Do we realise the meaning of that word enjoy? "To enjoy God for ever." The mediaeval thinkers say that we " use " that which we desire for the sake of what it leads to, and " enjoy " that which we desire for its own sake. To " use," therefore, is lower than to " enjoy," and since all good things lead up to the supreme source of good, however much and how- ever rightly we may " enjoy " them we yet in some sort " use " them. God only may we altogether " enjoy," and " enjoy him for ever." Augustine l declares that " all human perversity, or vice, consists in wishing to enjoy what we ought to use, and to use what we ought to enjoy." It is a deep saying, for when we reverse the true order of things, making the higher life subservient to the lower, finding our end in what ought to be our means, and our means in what ought to be our end, we are enjoying what we ought to use, and using what we ought to enjoy. But, in our day, we have strangely reversed our estimate of the useful and the enjoyable. When we speak of " enjoy- ment " we usually mean pardonable relaxation and amusement, justified only in so far as it enables us to be more " useful " afterwards. We have lost the higher meaning of the word "enjoy" largely because we have persistently turned our minds away from the conception to which it corresponds. But unless we recover this sense of the higher " enjoy- ment " enjoyment of God and of human love and of truth and of beauty unless we recover this sense of a life in- trinsically worthy, then the very kingdom of God on earth will itself become to us a thing merely " useful " in anticipa- tion, because it stirs us to effort, but which would bring no "enjoyment" with it did it really come. For if God's will 1 In the thirtieth of the eighty-three " Questions," vol. vi. in the Benedictine edition. See also Aquinas, Prim. Sec. Question 71, Art. vi. 3. 20 THE RELIGION OF TIME were actually done on earth as it is in heaven, what more, we ask, would there be to live for ? Clouds of stagnation and ennui settle down upon our imagination, or we escape by saying that there will be " room for progress yet " ; that is to say, that the deadly effects of getting what we profess to want will be counteracted by our still wanting something that we have not got ! Surely we should value progress, not as mere change and movement, but for the abiding treasures which it brings treasures of knowledge and of love, the possession of which is at once the most exalted activity and the deepest peace. If by saying that in the most ideal state of life which we can imagine there will be room for progress, we mean that no con- ception we can now form of life can exhaust the possibilities of blessedness which will unfold themselves as we become wiser and more worthy ; and further, that progressive advance is the law of our attainment of the highest life open to us ; then we speak truly and well. But if we mean that life has brought and brings to us nothing of intrinsic and abiding worth, nothing that is good to keep and to live with, only things good enough to go on to something else from ; if we mean that attainment is disillusion, and that we ought to desire never really to reach the absolutely highest point accessible to us, beause life consists in moving towards what we have not, rather than in "enjoying" what we have, then surely our aspirations are self-contradictory, and we have lost the true note of life. " Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven," we pray. But if we shrink from the heavenly conception of the attained " enjoyment " of God we practically invade heaven with our earthy ideal, and, reversing our prayer, think of God's will being done in heaven as it is done on earth. The conception of the divine vision, of true oneness with God, having all but faded away from our modern theology, and the heaven of the landscape gardener, the upholsterer and the lapidary being naturally found inadequate (whether presented in Milton's elabo- rate unreality or in the more naive splendours of Bunyan), we have begun to conceive of the life of heaven as "endless progress." Endless progress to what ? To something which only remains interesting so long as we get perpetually nearer to it, but never reach it. Were we there, the illusion would be over. AND OF' ETERNITY 21 Stagnation and ennui are once more upon us. The endless progress to perfection turns out to be only another expression for the endless deferring of perfection, which indeed is only perfect so long as we do not enjoy it. 1 But this is not all. Triumphant progress has not only absorbed into itself the earthly and the heavenly life of man, but has invaded the conception of Deity itself. Men want a progressive Deity, capable of having his life enriched by suc- cessive experiences, and without that terrible finality and attainment which strike a chill to their hearts. A Christ of limited (though it be self-limited) knowledge, a Christ who is an actual participator in the struggles of life and has not won, but is yet winning, his victories, is the God demanded by our age. We Unitarians might be expected to escape from this anthropolatry, this worship of a man. But it is not so. The idea of the eternal life seems in danger of being banished from our conception of God himself. God has become to us a being who lives the life of Time, who watches to see what Time shall bring forth, and how his creatures shall exercise the gifts he has given them. We hear of a God who cries pathetically to us for our help in his struggle against evil, much as we cry to him for his help. If we so conceive of God, he indeed is not eternal ; but Eternity itself is not so easily exorcised. If we banish it from our conception of God, it takes its awful stand behind him. God himself we have entangled in the flux and succession of Time, but above him now stands an iron fate which holds both him and us in its grip, dictating the con- ditions under which he shall strive to gain his ends, holding him to laws and to necessities, which are not modes of his being nor forms of his self- utterance, but necessities to which he must submit. And this awful background of fate, not God, is then the Eternal. Thank God, such a creed, though it seems to me hard to define it as anything but philosophical atheism, is not in fact incompatible with deep devoutness and an awed sense of fellow- ship with the Eternal. This whole matter of formulating largely concerns the intellect, and most happily those whose philosophical creeds are to each other anathema may kneel side by side in prayer, and fight shoulder to shoulder in the battle 1 Cf. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 508. 22 of life, conscious only of brotherhood and of unity. But, nevertheless, it is no wonder that, when such formulae of religion are current, the minds even of those who accept them, and far more the minds of those who utterly reject them, should turn with a sense of relief and of escape to the thought of the timeless unconditioned being of God and the absolute fruition of life in him. God is eternal. To him every where, is here, and every when is now. He Triumphs in conclusive bliss, And that supreme result of all. He grasps all the plenitude of unmeasured life at once. He "seeth the end from the beginning." To him, in his time- less Eternity, the future hath nought to give ; from him the past hath taken nought away. To his "now," all times are present ; and as we lift our souls to him we taste something of the life wherein not the progress of Time but the fruition of Eternity makes us the sharers of his being. But do these phrases really represent any positive concep- tions ? Or are they mere grandiose verbiage ? Formulae are dangerous things. It is easy to talk about Eternity as the abiding reality which lies behind fluctuating time, and is itself timeless. It is not very difficult to acquire a kind of knack of using such phrases and working them into a juggling solution of problems which are in truth insoluble. 1 There may be a cant in speaking of timeless and spaceless existence, as there may be in all other things. Let us ask ourselves then, in all seriousness, whether we mean anything, and if so what, by timeless existence. Do what we will, we cannot think time or space out of an objective existence. Earnest attempts by thinkers, ancient and modern, have been made to accomplish this impossibility ; but they have failed, and they must fail ; and if we talk of Time itself being swallowed up in Eternity, we are speaking of some- thing which we cannot by any possibility conceive. We may indeed think of ourselves or of God as in a state of existence which has no relations with time, to which time, therefore, has no significance and on which it has no hold. But in the back of our minds we always find a reservation that time is going on all the same, even though there be nothing material nor any 1 See Appendix O, p. 48. AND OF ETERNITY 23 changing succession of mental experiences to mark its progress. This reservation may be, and I believe is, unphilosophical ; but it is human, and it is ineradicable. We cannot then think Time away ; but many of our experiences seem to indicate that in proportion as we touch our highest realisation, we tend to escape from the dominion of time ; so that we must needs con- ceive of the existence of the Supreme Being as timeless, and our own life, so far as it is divine, as sharing in such existence. We know that when one emotion of perfect uniformity and simplicity dominates our whole being, the sense of succession is lost and we know not whether it is after minutes or after hours that we re-enter into relations with time. We cannot think away time ; but we can think of ourselves as passing out of relation to it. And many of our more ordinary experiences seem to tell us that the essential difference in the significance to us between things past, present, and future, is dependent upon the bodily organisation through which our mental experience comes to us. A greater vividness generally belongs to the experiences attached to a present nerve impression than to the memory of a former one. But this is not always so. Often our past is more vivid to us than our present life, and more vivid than it was itself when present. It is a commonplace, too, that ex- periences when anticipated are sometimes more keen and vivid than when they come, even though they bring no disillusion or disappointment. In such cases past and present, or past and future, seem to reverse their usual significance to us. But we may go much further than this. Mozart tells us 1 how one of his own musical compositions would sometimes assert itself to him, not as a succession of notes and chords, but as a co-existent whole. " All the inventing and making goes on in me as in a beautiful strong dream. But the best of all is the hearing of it all at once." And is there not a sense in which the like is true of all of us up to the limit of our musical capacity ? When we hear the second bar of a piece of music, has the first bar gone ? If it were so, there would be no such thing as continuous music at all. It is because all of the piece that we have already heard is still, in some limited 1 Quoted by Prof. William James, Principles of Psychology, i. 255. See also the citation on p. 128 of this volume, to which I owe my first knowledge of the passage. 24 THE RELIGION OF TIME sense, present with us, that we can follow it with intelligent emotion. And when we know it well, it is not only what we have heard and what we are hearing, but what we are yet to hear, that combines to produce the present effect. And so with literature. Contrast the feverish excitement with which we follow a play or a story because we do not know what is coming, and our feeling as we read The Agamemnon, The Divine Comedy, or King Lear, when we do know what is coming. How crude, how shallow and immature, seems the successional excitement in the one case compared with the awful or beautiful sense of co-existing completeness in the other. And so too with life. Though we know not what is com- ing, we know what has come, and our deepest and richest experiences gather into themselves the past, and at the same time transform it. So that even that seeming irrevoc- ability which we think of as the great characteristic of the past turns out to be an illusion. The past is not, in any effective sense, irrevocable. We may yet make it, in large measure, what we will. For detached experiences are in them- selves mere unintelligible fragments. It is when they are taken as parts of a whole that they have their meaning. And what is the whole of which our past is a part ? Is that irrevocably fixed beyond our control ? Nay, our past as well as our future shall be what we shall make it. It is a fragment that awaits its interpretation, nay, awaits its full being, its true creation, from the whole. 1 Thus past, present, and future proclaim themselves even to our own experience as varying modes that draw their signifi- cance from conditions relative to our organisation, not essential to themselves. The sharp distinctions between them seem to yield to the fusing power of our higher and intenser experiences ; and already we may know something of the life eternal. Can we seriously believe, then, that time has the same signi- ficance to God which it has to us in our ordinary moments ? Can we suppose that it really matters to him whether this thing took place yesterday, takes place to-day, or shall take place to-morrow ? Are not the things that shall be as real a part of his infinite life as the things that have been ? 2 Does 1 Compare a well-known passage in the Autocrat of the Breakfast Table, ii. 2 See Appendix P, p. 49. AND OF ETERNITY 25 consciousness of one thing need to go in order that the con- sciousness of another may come ? Or is there anything corresponding to the pressure of instant nerve and sense experi- ence which alone distinguishes present from future and past for us, in his august and all-embracing being ? Does time in its progress really add to his experiences and progressively fill in his being ? Fill it whence ? And with what ? Are there then sources outside the Infinite, whence he can draw, and so add to his growing treasures ? And does he need the solace of the thought that these sources at least are inexhaustible, so that he too may for ever " imitate by going, the life which he may not grasp by abiding " ? Nay, God is eternal, and in some measure man may share his eternal life. Creatures of time as we are, we may rise more and more as our life strengthens and deepens into a life to which succession does not indeed cease to matter, but to which it matters less and less, while coexistence matters ever more and more. We too, in our measure, seeing God, may see as God sees. The wild exhilaration of searching and struggling may give place to the deep joy of having found and vanquished. The life of knowing and of loving may be found supremely worthy. We may taste a life not worth the wooing only, but worth the winning and enjoying. It were indeed a vain and presumptuous thing to say that any one of us can establish himself in a life which shall be independent of all that Time can give or take away ; but, none the less, just those things that Time cannot touch constitute our dearest wealth. Just in so far as we have love which shall survive, though that to which it clings be taken away from us, in so far as we have wisdom which shall abide, though the knowledge from which it was gathered fade away, in so far as our fruition has brought us to a sense of the worth of life which will triumph over any downfall or wretchedness that may be in store for us, in so far as our sorrow has brought us into the wide fellowship of human suffering and anguish, and given us a tenderness that shall endure though years of placid comfort should flow over us, in so far as we have reached a life not subject to change or the workings of Time, so far we have some sense of eternal realities, so far we may feel that we see God, and may, though with awe -struck humility, ask whether haply in some measure we are seeing as God sees. 26 THE RELIGION OF TIME Infinitesimal as our attainment may be vast as the inex- haustible, even unrealisable possibilities relentless as the call to service, and the demand that we should make our efforts " useful " to ourselves and others, and cheerful as our response to it may be deep as the passion, and penetrating as the need for progress, we shall nevertheless know what it is to " enjoy " ; and shall not only strive after, but shall in some measure have^ the life eternal. Thus to conceive of a life in and with God, worth living, not for what it leads to, but for what it is ; thus to think of life as a whole, thus to conceive of love and knowledge as eternal fruition, will surely throw us back into our life of progress and of action with a quickened realisation of its significance, with the sense of its inherent contradiction banished, with its daily fragments of intercourse with God, with nature, and with man, deepened into communion. Progress has a meaning if there is a goal. Fighting against the foes of life, gathering and spreading the means of life has a meaning, if we know how to live. The thin-drawn succes- sions of Time have received the transfiguring touch of Eternity, and we can live in the present and wear the yoke of time with deepened faith, with brightened hope, with more glowing love, because we fight not as those that beat the air, but as those who know what it is to live, and who would fain throw open the gates of life that they and their brethren may go in thereat and live the life of God. SUMMARY MANIFOLD signs of renewed interest in the later Middle Ages (4-6). We are awakening from the misconceptions inherited from the polemics of the Renaissance and the Reformation, realising that the breach between mediaeval and modern times was not so absolute as we supposed, and recognising in the weakness of the Middle Ages dangers not yet vanquished, in their strength sources of life not yet exhausted, and in both an unsuspected kinship with the forces that move our own lives (6-9). Hence the interest and the import- ance of a sympathetic study of the Middle Ages (9). The group of religious ideas selected for study gathers round the conceptions of Eternity, Fruition, the vision of God (10-12). Reasons for prominence of the thought of Eternity in the Middle Ages (12-14). The m dern conception of Progress (14-17) has so averted our minds from the ideas of Eternity and Fruition as to involve our spiritual life in a self-contradiction (17, 1 8). Necessity of recovering the sense of the higher " enjoyment " if we are to rescue our thought from this tangle (18, 19). The true significance of Progress as the means of realisation, and the false habit of mind engendered by the misconception that dwells on Progress to the exclusion of Fruition in man's life here and hereafter, and in the being of God (19-21). The inevitableness of the conception of Eternity, which this misconception banishes from the being of God, but cannot remove from the constitution of things ; and the relief of turning to a religious ideal which finds Eternity in the being of God, not behind and above it (21, 22). How our own experience leads us to the conception of the Eternal life (22-24), anc * teaches us to believe that God is eternal and that we may share in his eternal fruition (24-26). Quickening and clarifying effect of this belief and this experience upon our active life, and upon our devotion to the cause of progress (26). APPENDIX A (TO p. 6). HEGEL (1770-1831), in his Geschichte der Philosophic, iii. 99, declared his intention of traversing the Middle Ages with seven-league boots, and carried out his design by dealing, for instance, with Albertus Magnus in two pages and with Roger Bacon in exactly two lines. Prantl (1820-88), as quoted by Professor Seth in his article on " Scholasticism " in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, declared that there was no such thing as philosophy in the Middle Ages, there were only logic and theology. G. H. Lewes, in his Biographical History of Philosophy (1845-46), gave us "Series I., Ancient Philosophy," and " Series II., Bacon to the Present Day." But between Proclus (412-485) and Bacon (1561-1629) he gave us nothing at all. When he elaborated this work into a more systematic History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte, he remedied this defect ; but even in the fifth and latest edition, of 1880, he quotes with approval the remark of Hegel given above (see vol. ii. p. 2), and devotes about loo pages to the Middle Ages, having given about 400 to ancient philosophy. On the other hand, Erdmann, who, I suppose, is the most recent and the most authoritative historian of philosophy, gives about 200 pages to ancient and more than 400 to mediaeval (pre-Baconian) philosophy. (Grundriss der Gesch. der Philosophic, J. E. Erdmann, 4th ed. 1896. English translation, History of Philosophy, 1893.) It is equally instructive to compare the article in Rees's Encyclopaedia (vol. xxxi. 1819) on "Scholastic Philo- sophy " with Professor Seth's article, above alluded to, in the Encyclopedia Britannica (vol. xxi. 1886). Every intelligent student must feel the deepest admiration for the sympathetic sagacity which enabled Auguste Comte to under- stand, or at least divine, the significance of mediaeval thought at a time and amid surroundings which were as unfavourable as could possibly be imagined to any such appreciation. Amongst the many claims of this great man to respect and gratitude we ought to give a 28 2 9 high place to his persistent protest against shallow and chaotic mis- conception with respect to the Middle Ages. B (TO P. 6). The essential difference between the spirit of Humanism and the spirit of the Reformation is too obvious to be overlooked in Italyy'the birthplace of Humanism. It is impossible for any one to confound the movement that centred round Lorenzo di Medici and Leo X. with the spirit which uttered itself in Savonarola. In Germany, Holland, and England the alliance between the two movements was close and widespread, yet after all the attempts of the historians to treat them as belonging to each other the ineradic- able impression remains that Luther and Erasmus stood for two completely different things. The strength and the weakness of Luther and Calvin, the good and the evil that came of their work, are alike alien in nature and in principle from the purposes and ideals of Erasmus. C (TO P. 7). I lay stress on the word ideal. There could hardly be a more serious mistake than to suppose that the study of the history of the Popes and the Papal Court gives an adequate idea of the historical significance of the Papacy. For example, we constantly come upon the influence of the ideal Papacy in Bede's ecclesiastical history, in the organisation of Alfred's kingdom, or in such a poem as the wonderful elegy by Bishop Hildebert of Le Mans (born 1075), given at the close of Bryce's Holy Roman Empire. The idea of the Papacy was a living and forming influence upon Europe of the first importance, and it seems as though the great Popes had power to confirm and deepen it, but the unworthy and insignificant ones had no power to degrade or destroy it. In like manner Dante hurls his terrible invective against one after another of the contemporary Popes, but retains his passionate devotion to the Papacy. He denounces Boniface VIII. as the "prince of the new Pharisees," but declares that when Philip the Fair persecuted him "Christ was crucified again" in his person. (Inferno, xxvii. 85; Purgatorio, xx. 85-90.) The power exercised over the faithful by Rome and by the ideal Papacy was as independent of the actual Popes as the power exercised by Jerusalem was of its Saracen conquerors. Boccaccio (Giorn. i. nov. 2), by a random shot, indicated one of the most fascinating and difficult of the problems of history when he sarcastically told the story of a Jew who was converted to Christianity by visiting Rome, for there he saw the abominable 30 THE RELIGION OF TIME lives the clergy were leading, saw the whole place made into a "devil's smithy," saw the Pope and all his court toiling to destroy Christianity and toiling in vain. Truly the religion that could live under such tutelage must be divine ! D (TO P. 7). The history of our own island is a little perplexing to us. It is so continuous, so interesting, and so unmistakably significant, that it does not the least fit in with our general conception of the Middle Ages ; and except that we vaguely date our historical romances by reference to some one of our kings by preference, Richard I. I fancy that most of us do not locate the " Middle Ages " in England at all, but in some other place, with respect to which our notions are vaguer probably Germany or France. E (TO P. 7). Natura non facit saltuf. It is worth while pausing for a moment to examine this saying, as the process will throw a good deal of indirect light on the subject of the first portion of the essay. We are accustomed to regard this maxim, usually ascribed to Linnaeus, as embodying one of the great principles that differentiate modern from mediaeval and ancient science. Harbottle's Dictionary of Quotations will enable the reader to look up the reference in the Philosophia Botanica, Upsala, 1750, where he will find the phrase both at the beginning and at the end of 77, used with admirable point (see below). But Harbottle will also enable him to trace the maxim in a slightly different form back to a work by Jacques Tissot, published at Lyons in 1613, and reprinted by Edward Fournier in vol. ix. of his Variet'es Historiques et Litt'eraires^ 1859, p. 248. The treatise in question is an essay on some bones which were supposed to be those of a giant Theutobocus, but which modern science pronounces to belong to a mastodon. The treatise is written in French, but the maxim, " Natura enim in suis opera- tionibus non facit saltum" is quoted in Latin. Evidently, therefore, it was current in the early seventeenth century. I have not been able to trace it further back in the form of an aphorism, but the principle is taken for granted by Dante as holding good in the physical universe, and is applied by him to the intellectual order. "And since in the intellectual order of the universe we rise and descend by almost continuous steps from the lowest form to the highest, and from the highest to the lowest (just as we observe to be the case in the material order), and between the angelic nature, AND OF ETERNITY 31 which is an intellectual form of existence, and the human soul, there is no intermediate step, but the one is, so to speak, continuous with the other in the order of gradations ; and between the human life and the most developed life of the brute animals, again, there is no intermediate step ; and we see many men so vile, and of so low condition, that they seem scarce to. be other than beasts ; so also we are to suppose and firmly believe that there be some so noble and of such high condition that they are, as it were, nought other than angels. Otherwise, the human species would not be continued in both directions, which may not be." (Convivio, iii. 7 : 69-88.) It is particularly interesting to compare this passage in Dante with the passage in Linnaeus. He declares that "All plants have affinity on every side, like the territories marked on a geographical map." And again, " The absence of specimens not yet discovered is the cause of the Natural Method being defective, and the discovery of more specimens will complete it. Natura enim non facit sa/tus." The treatise being written in Latin there is nothing in the language to indicate that this phrase is quoted as a current aphorism, but its repetition and the way in which it is used give the impression that it is so. Setting these two passages together will certainly not make us think little of the progress of science between Dante and Linnaeus ; but it will help us to regard that progress as a development rather than a revolution, and to find the stress of the change rather in the altered directions than in the altered methods and principles of human thought. The same lesson may be taught by Dante's insistence on the principle (popularly regarded as Bacon's specific contribution to thought), that " Experiment is the fountain whence science flows." See Paradise, ii. 95, 96. F (TO P. 8). The most terrible development of the demonology of the Middle Ages is not itself mediaeval. The trials for witchcraft, says Leclcy (History of Rationalism, 4th edition, 1870, vol. i. p. 55), reached their climax in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The Malleus Maleficarum was written in 1487. The persecutions raged through- out the sixteenth century, there was scarcely any sensible abatement in the seventeenth century (Matthias Hopkins was appointed witch- finder in 1642), and all through the eighteenth century official executions occasionally took place. See Roskoff, Geschichte des Teufels, vol. ii. 293-314. It was therefore not the " Dark Ages," but the ages of supposed enlightenment and re-birth that brought this darkest and most terrible blood-guiltiness upon us. 32 THE RELIGION OF TIME G (TO P. 8). Naturally the Humanists and the Reformers, as well as the philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were by no means so free from the influences of the Middle Ages as they supposed themselves to be, and arc usually represented as being. Dr. Stallo well observes : l " But, although the founders of modern physical science at the outset of their labours were animated by a spirit of declared hostility to the teachings of medieval scholasticism a fact which is nowhere more conspicuous than in the writings of Descartes [1596-1650] nevertheless, when they entered upon the theoretical discussion of the results of their experiments and observations, they unconsciously proceeded upon the old assumptions of the very ontology which they openly repudiated." My own (very imperfect) acquaintance with Bacon (1561-1629) began with his Wisdom of the Ancients, which (though he wrote it in Latin) was one of the English subjects which I had to prepare for my degree. I shall never forget the bewilderment and scorn with which I read what seemed its utterly fantastic and futile allegories. Bacon's way of looking at things was equally remote from anything classical or modern which I had ever encountered. I have since found the key to it in the elaborate allegorisings of the Middle Ages, and their dim sense that the mythology and devotion of pagan times must have some intelligible place and meaning in the scheme of things. It is interesting to note that Erdmann includes Bacon in the transitional period of Mediaeval Philosophy. As for the Reformers, Selden (1584-1654) boldy declares: " Popish books teach and inform ; what we know, we know much out of them. The Fathers, Church Story, School-men, all may pass for Popish books ; and if you take away them, what learning will you leave ? . . . These Puritan Preachers, if they have any- thing good, they have it out of Popish books, though they will not acknowledge it, for fear of displeasing the people." (Table Talk, ix. 4.) We Unitarians are certainly not likely to fall into the error of supposing that the Reformers had completely emancipated themselves from mediaeval and scholastic traditions. The combination of conscious revolt against scholasticism with unconscious bondage to it gives curious results, even in so late a writer as Milton (1608-1674). Many readers must have been per- plexed by his insistence upon the bona fides of the angelic appetite and digestion. Raphael eats not in appearance only : 1 Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (vol. xlii. of Regan Paul's International Scientific Series), jrd edition, 1890, p. iv., introduction to the 2nd edition. AND OF ETERNITY 33 But with keen dispatch Of real hunger, and concoctive heat, To transubstantiate. (Paradise Lost, v. 436 sqq.). It is true he entertained "No fear lest dinner cool " (line 396), but that was only because the dinner was never hot, not because the angel was indifferent to Eve's housewifely care as to the proper preparation of his food. What in the world, we ask, is the meaning of it all ? The answer is to be found in the fact that Milton, in spite of his esteeming Spenser above the Schoolmen, 1 has inherited from Aquinas and his pre- decessors a developed system of angelology which he vainly attempts to reduce within scriptural limits. The Schoolmen had declared that angels, being pure "form," had no material bodies whatever. But this is unscriptural. Did not angels eat meat with Abraham ? These ascetic and unauthorised refinements of the Schoolmen, then, must be denounced, and wholesome scriptural doctrine sub- stituted for them. So Milton misses both the naivete of the early Hebrew narratives and the elaborate spirituality of the Schoolmen, and the result is strangely gross and incongruous. It may further be noted that whereas Milton apparently intends to throw a slight upon scholastic philosophy by making the devils occupy themselves in philosophical discussions (Paradise Lost, ii. 555-569) ; yet when he comes actually to "justify the ways of God to men" himself, and to place his apology on the lips of the Deity (Paradise Lost, iii. 80-1 34), he has nothing to give us but a jejune summary of scholastic argumentation stripped of the religious awe and reverential sense of mystery, and stripped of the sublime metaphysics which give it dignity when dealt with by the mediaeval teachers, from Boethius down to Dante. Lastly, as to the Humanists. The service they rendered to culture and general enlightenment, by vindicating and recovering the classical heritage which had been so largely abandoned and neglected in the Middle Ages, is of course inestimable ; but looked at from another point of view, their efforts during three centuries constitute one huge pathetic blunder. For at the very time when they were scoffing at the Middle Ages they were prolonging a mediaeval tradition that had lost its justification. For three centuries they strove to make literature in a dead language, and to throw discredit upon the real literature which the modern languages were producing ! In the fourteenth century there existed, in the first place, the almost effete tradition of a Latin literature proper ; in the second place, the Latinity of the theologians, historians, and 1 " Our sage and serious poet, Spenser (whom I dare be known to think a better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas) ' ' (Artopagltica). C 34 THE RELIGION OF TIME so forth, which, within its own limits, was by no means a dead language. It had the power of adapting and developing itself to changing needs, and it had grown up in direct contact with the ideas and purposes it was required to meet. In the third place, there were the vernacular languages which had already been developed into splendid literary instruments. The idea that Latin was the only language in which a scholar and a gentleman could express himself had received a rude shock at the hands of Dante (1265-1321), Petrarch (1304-1374), and Boccaccio (1313-1375), to mention no others. But Petrarch himself, the first of the Humanists, reinforced this obsolescent tradition by the direction which he gave to the classical revival of which he was the apostle. His own Italian poems, alone of all his voluminous productions, now rank as literature ; but he himself treated them as wholly insignificant, and threw the full weight of his unique influence, with extraordinary success, into the attempt to make a more classical Latinity the vehicle of literary activity. It is impossible to conceive a more radical misconception of the actual facts and forces of the time. Instead of seeing that the vernacular languages were now ripe for the highest literature, he considered that the requirement of the age was to reassert the universal claim of Latin ; and at the same time he lowered its vitality by reducing it to an artificial imitation of the classics, and robbing it of its power of free development to meet contemporary requirements. Thus the revival of Letters threatened for more than a century to be the death of Literature ; and when, at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries, the vernacular poets again rose into significance, they had to contend against the pedantic prejudices of their contemporaries, from which their own minds were not yet liberated. Politian (1454-1494) succumbed ; Ariosto (1474-1533) long wavered; and while a Nicodemus Frischlinus (sixteenth century) pathetically bewails his hard fate in having to assure himself that historical precedent exists before he can use a word in his poetry, whereas Virgil could use or make whatever words he chose; a Lilius Gyraldus (1478-1552) enumerates, literally by the hundred, the forgotten Latin "poets" of his times, and then expresses his pained surprise that there are men (and learned men too) who prefer the Italian to the Latin literature of the day ! And this when Ariosto (not to mention any others) had lived and written. During this same period, Melanchthon (1497- 1560) in his declamation " De Corrigendis Studiis" identifies, almost in terms, the history of Latinity with the history of theology and of civilisation. He has some words of respect for Gregory the Great, Bede and Alquin, who struggled against the barbarism that AND OF ETERNITY 35 surrounded them. The Victorines (Hugh, Richard, and others) were " not utterly bad writers " (non pessimi scriptores) ; but after that, "whether prompted by intellectual wantonness or by sheer contentiousness of spirit, men hit upon Aristotle," and then the game was up. " Hence issued the Thomases, the Scotuses, the Duranduses, the Seraphics, Cherubics, and the rest of them." 1 It is amusing to note how the same writer, in his declamation Eloquently Encomium, two hundred years after Dante had written the Divine Comedy, and at the very time when Luther was flooding Germany with his tracts, urges his students in all sincerity not to grudge the time that must be devoted to the cultivation of a polished Latin style, because if they do not acquire it, they will not be able to make themselves understood. Scotus and the rest he declares are unintelligible because of their bad Latinity. But time brings its revenges. Probably most modern students will find the Humanists, as a rule, beset with difficulties, in spite of their flowing and choice Latinity, partly because they constantly assume that the reader will recognise the context and understand the meaning of every classical phrase and reference, and partly owing to the forced and artificial union between the classical vehicle and the modern thought it is to convey ; whereas the language of Aquinas and Scotus, whatever else it may be, is at least of admir- able lucidity. 2 The ecclesiasticism which is the most prominent, though perhaps not the most significant, of the present manifestations of medias- valism, serves admirably to illustrate the twofold point that the Reformers did not really do all that they thought they were doing, and could not give permanency to all that they actually did. They thought they were abolishing the Church as an officially organised and authoritative body of persons who should interpret and develop revealed truth, and were only preserving the Church in the sense 1 Melanchthon declares (truly enough) that Aristotle, difficult at best, is practi- cally unintelligible in the Latin translations used by the Schoolmen ; but he entirely fails to recognise the stupendous sagacity, learning and patience which enabled such writers as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, by the aid of old commentators and such other helps as they could command, to decipher and expound their unin- telligible text. They did so with such good effect, that the student of the less known works of Aristotle will, at this day, have great difficulty in finding anything more helpful and satisfactory than the commentaries of Thomas Aquinas j and the latest editors of the Metaphysics still quote Albertus Magnus. 2 The passages in Frischlinus, Lilius Gyraldus and Melanchthon (together with an indefinite number of further illustrative passages) may be found respectively in No. 7, 10, and 4 of the extremely useful series of Latelnischc Litteratwdenkmaler del x-v. u. x-vi. Jahrhunderts brought out under the general editorship of Max Hermann, Berlin, 1891, etc. See specificallv Deutsche Lyriker des Sechszehnten Jahrhunderti, p. 5Z sq. Lilius G. Gyraldus De foetis nostrorum temforum, p. 85. Philippug Melanchthon Declamations, pp. 15 sqq. and p. 29. 36 THE RELIGION OF TIME of the fellowship of faithful souls. But in point of fact, not only did they carry over with them bodily from the Church inheritances such as the substitution of the Sunday for the Sabbath, or the canon of the New Testament ; but each sect, within the limits of its own power, established by symbols and assemblies a church in miniature which was ready to back its decisions by such penalties and persecu- tions as it could command. Milton found that New Presbyter is but Old Priest writ large ; l and the creeds which were to bind men's consciences were still drawn up in accordance with the vote of the " odd man " and promulgated on the authority of the " Holy Ghost." 2 Gradually the untenable nature of the Protestant position has become clear. On the one hand the authority claimed for the Scriptures themselves is seen to rest on a basis no sounder in principle than that claimed by the Church, so that if the authority of the Church is indeed to be annulled, the authority of the Scrip- tures must be annulled with it ; and on the other hand the hopeless impossibility of regulating faith and morals by a miscellaneous collection of writings, the composition of which stretches over some thousand years, has become patent, so that only an authoritative interpreter can possibly make such a code effective. Thus the Reformers went either too far or not far enough in assailing the authority of the Church and maintaining that of the Scriptures. Moreover, the antisocial implications of the exaggerated religious individualism of the Reformers, always obvious to the Catholics, are beginning to make themselves dimly felt by Protestants also. The alliance between social enthusiasm and the High Church movement which characterises our great cities is not fortuitous, and the felt need of spiritual fellowship is a part of the felt need of fellowship in general. Wiser and less sterile ways of meeting the need will be found ; but it is well, not ill, that the need should be felt. A curious minor current of this movement may be perceived amongst ourselves. As long as the orthodox Dissenters preached doctrines revolting to our reason and our conscience they exercised little influence upon us save by repulsion. It seemed as though the action were all the other way ; and we perpetually and reasonably congratulated ourselves on the growth amongst other Churches of the views we advocated. Now the reaction has set in. The repel- ling features of their theology having to a great extent disappeared, 1 See his poem On the New Fore en of Conscience under the Long Parliament. 2 "They talk (but blasphemously enough) that the Holy Ghost is President of their General Councils, when the truth is, the odd man is still the Holy Ghost." Selden's Table Talk, xxx. AND OF ETERNITY 37 their mere bulk and mass begins to exercise a natural attractive influence upon us, and we are in great danger of being drawn out of our own orbit into a hazy and nondescript theological and christo- logical position which finds its relative justification in their traditions and antecedents, not in ours. Here again the sensitiveness to the wider streams of spiritual life around us is good, but its manifesta- tions may none the less be wanting in depth and consistency. If it develops our own traditions and makes us dig deeper, it is well. If it substitutes other traditions and makes us abandon our own place in the truth-mine, then the world will be the poorer. We may note, in this connection, that the doctrine of the authority of the Church is being revived amongst us in a vague but very real manner. We no longer discuss how far down in ecclesiastical history the Councils of the Church are to be regarded as authorita- tive, yet many of us practically accept the utterances of the early Church if only it is early enough as authoritative sources of information as to the significance of the personality of Jesus. There is a type of Christology amongst us that seems to amount to this : " It is true that, critically speaking, the synoptic Gospels are our only source of information as to what Jesus said and did, but they are not our only source of information as to what he was and is ; for in truth Jesus himself appears never really to have preached his own Gospel, except in the most inadequate and shrivelled form. Paul (who does not seem to have heard or known him, and who was warmly opposed by those who had), and the writer of the fourth Gospel (who is not a historian), really knew what Christ was ; and the Christian consciousness recognises the truth of what they said. The real Gospel, then, is not to be fonnd, in any effective sense, on the lips of Jesus, but must be looked for in the teachings of the early Church, tested and confirmed by the Christian consciousness." It is a curious indication of how little logic goes for in the formation, or even the formulating, of opinions, that Mr. Carpenter's challenge of the validity of this " Christian consciousness " as a witness to the identity of a historical personage with the source of a spiritual experience has (so far as I know) remained without answer and without effect (see pp. 241 sqq. of this volume). There is another aspect of the revolt against ecclesiastical authority, with respect to which we seem in danger of misconceiving the nature, if not of exaggerating the magnitude, of the great change that has taken place since the close of the Middle Ages. I refer to the whole theory of compulsion and persecution. Happily there can be no doubt of the enormous advance in humanity which has characterised the Western nations in recent centuries. The frightful recrudescence of cruelty and barbarism into which we relapse when 38 THE RELIGION OF TIME races on different levels of power or civilisation come into close contact, as in the Southern States of America, and, in a lesser degree, in some of our own colonies, should indeed warn us that the hideous passions habitually supressed in civilised communities, lie nearer the surface than we should like to think (just as scientific and industrial callousness to the suffering of animals may be only too easily developed in the midst of a tender-hearted community) ; but when all abatements have been made, the gain remains real and stupendous. Subject, however, to the limitations imposed by this growing sense of humanity, our ideas of compulsion, not to say persecution, have rather changed their direction than their funda- mental theory. We do not (and it is difficult to see why we should) hesitate to apply compulsion wherever we are quite satisfied that a body of persons exists that can pronounce authorita- tively as to what is good for humanity at large ; but we have changed our minds very considerably with respect to the class of persons and the class of opinions to which we think authority can rightly attach. We compel parents to have their children taught reading, writing, and arithmetic, because, in spite of Ruskin, we are most of us convinced of the extreme importance of these accomplish- ments. We persecute the " Peculiar People," because they do not call in, on critical occasions, members of an official class, who we believe are in a position to pronounce with authority on matters of grave consequence to them. And it is only within the last few months that we have allowed parents to choose for their children between what they hold to be the risks of vaccination and what others hold to be the risks of smallpox. But in none of these matters are we prepared to carry compulsion or persecution to any- thing approaching the lengths which seemed justifiable to our ancestors. The anti-vaccinationists have already won their victory. If the " Peculiar People " persevere, they will surely soon win theirs. And if Ruskin's views on the relative importance of reading and writing amongst the arts of life were to gain anything like the volume of conscientious support to which their intrinsic merits seem to entitle them, we should have no more cases of little girls relegated from home tuition to the charge of the School Board for not being able to spell conceive in the conventional fashion. There is, however, another and more dangerous aspect of this question. Without going into any abstract speculations on the philosophy of ethics, we may say that morality as conceived by the community consists in those principles of conduct and habits of mind which the general sense pronounces to be of supreme significance. Now every body of experts is apt to believe, and to persuade those who accept its authority to believe, that the general AND OF ETERNITY 39 opinion of what is most significant in life must yield to its own knowledge of the real significance of things. And so the expert Church declares itself superior to the communal morality. This is the heaviest charge that has ever been brought against the Church of the Middle Ages ; and this charge is still brought against our governors and diplomatists, against our police and against our doctors. But the most terrible forms of this evil occur when it is not the statesmen, the police, or the doctors, but the soldiers that thus override the communal morality in the name of the supreme interests of the national life. Our national action, especially our foreign policy and intercourse with the weaker races, is almost avowedly carried on upon principles which the responsible ministers and administrators know are necessary and therefore right ; but which would outrage the public conscience if nakedly avowed. The relations in which the police stand, for instance, to receivers of stolen goods or keepers of disorderly houses or of opium dens are deemed necessary and therefore right, but would be extremely startling to the general moral sense of the community if they were realised. For half a generation the moral sense of the community had to fight against the deeply immoral and futile system of the Contagious Diseases Acts ; which were championed by the military, backed by the police and the doctors ; and the practices of vivisec- tion and artificial virus culture would not be able to stand for a day against the indignant revolt of the public conscience, were not that conscience still dominated by the idea that a body of experts who really know what is important for the welfare of humanity may override and abrogate the laws of morality. But, in England at least, there is room to hope that we are more and more coming to understand that the function of experts is to give evidence, not to pronounce judgment, and that experts do not know what is supremely important, just because they are specialists. Specialist morality always gets warped unless it has to justify itself to communal morality ; and as there are exceptionally devout men but no experts in religion, so there are exceptionally good men but no experts in morality. Where this is clearly realised, the work of the Reformation with respect to an authoritative Church will have been carried a mighty step further and the Kingdom of God on earth will be visibly nearer. H (TO P. 1 1 ). The conception of Eternity is due to Plato, and its genesis may be traced with great distinctness. 1 1 The account of Greek speculations before Plato is partly based upon Mr. Archer Hind's introduction to the Timtftts, 1888. 40 THE RELIGION OF TIME No sooner had the Greek thinkers issued from the aphoristic stage of wisdom than they attacked the central problem of all philosophy, viz., the relation of unity to multiplicity of the one to the many. It is obvious that science and philosophy alike are concerned with the problem of finding that which abides under that which changes, that which is one behind or in that which is manifold. The law of gravitation, for instance, enables us to think of all the bodies that constitute the solar system as a single whole with an unchanging centre of gravity, and so forth. The Greeks, then, boldly attacked this problem of unity in multiplicity ; but the Ionian philosophy, culminating in the teaching of Heraclitus, insisted on the perpetual change and flux of all things in such a way as to reduce our knowledge of the one element which underlay all material transformations to absolute nescience. Since we can only know that which abides and since nothing except the inaccessible first element abides, we can know nothing. Parmenides, on the other hand, with the characteristic audacity of Greek speculation, appears to have deduced from the axiom "nothing can come out of nothing," the conclusion that there is not really any change at all. If nothing can come out of nothing, then nothing can come out of anything in which it does not already exist, for that would be equivalent to coming out of nothing ; but if it already exists it does not come into existence at all, but // in existence ; therefore there can be no change of any sort, and all that we think of as change is non-existent and illusory. And here again, though by another road, we are brought to nescience. Plato and Aristotle in their different ways combined these two conceptions into systems which attempted to establish the law of relation between the permanent and the changing the one and the many. Plato, with whom alone we are here concerned, conceived all objects of sense as, to some extent, illusory and unreal, but as deriving a certain measure of reality from their affinity to abiding realities accessible to the intellect though not to the senses. These realities that lie behind the things of sense are the only objects of true knowledge, and they are unchanging. This is the significance of Plato's celebrated doctrine of Ideas, , which, however, he worked out with such wide divergences in his different Dialogues, that no interpreter has been able to give a consistent account of his system embracing all his writings, or to escape the charge, at the hands of other experts, of misunderstand- ing and misrepresenting him in some respect. But in spite of these differences of interpretation it seems very safe to connect Plato's doctrine of Eternity with this conception of an abiding reality lying behind every changing appearance. AND OF ETERNITY 41 For if everything that changes corresponds to something that abides, then time itself, which is but a name for successional and changing existence, must have behind it some abiding form of co- existence, in which there is no change or succession. And this is exactly the account of Eternity which we find in the Timtetu. After describing the creation of the sensible universe after the pattern of eternal things, Plato goes on to say that the Creator attempted to make the creation as nearly like its living pattern as possible. " Since, then, that pattern is an eternal living existence, he went about to bring out this Universe as far as might be like unto it. Now the being of this living existence was eternal ; and it was not possible to accommodate this altogether to that which had been brought into being ; he therefore designed a certain moving image of Eternity, and as he ordained the Universe he made an eternal image of the Eternity which abides in unity, which image itself advances by measure ; and to this existence we have given the name of Time. As for days and nights and months and years, which were not before the Universe was, he fashioned their genesis at the same time that the Universe was brought into existence ; and all these are parts of Time, and was and shall be are forms of Time which have come into being ; and when we apply them to the external existence we fall unawares into error, for we say that it was, is, and shall be, whereas in real truth is alone applies to it, for was and shall be are only properly applied to that coming into being which pro- ceeds in time, for they are movements. But that which abides without change or movement behoves not to become older or younger by the passage of time ; nor ever did it come into being, nor has it now come into being, nor again will it hereafter come into being ; and, in general, we cannot apply to it any of those con- ceptions which the coming into being attaches to the things that appeal to the senses, all which conceptions are forms of Time, which imitates Eternity and circles by measure. And, moreover, such expressions as that that which has come into being /'/ that which has come into being, and that that which shall come into being is that which shall come into being, and the non-existent is the non-existent are none of them accurate expressions. 1 . . . Time then came into being along with the Universe (so that having been generated together, they may be dissolved together, if there ever be such a dissolution of them), and after the pattern of the Eternal existence, in order that it may be as like it as is possible to its capacity ; for the pattern M, as existence, for all Eternity ; but Time has been, and is, and shall be continuously for all time " (Tim