$B MM I .*** . -' JL UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. FROM THE LIBRARY OF DR. JOSEPH LECONTE. GIFT OF MRS. LECONTE. No. 7B ' faj-0u4GL &3.) Christian Ethics or Moral Thtology. Christ and the Apostles the Patris- tic notions and method Asceticism Mysticism Casuistry Characteristics of the Moral Theology of the Middle Ages. (c.) Scholastic Ethics, A. D. 874. Scotus ErigenaAnselm Hildebert Abe- 4: MOEAL PHILOSOPHY. lard Peter of Lombardy Alexander of Hales Albertus Magnus Thos. Aquinas- Duns Scotus William of Ockham Laurentius Valla Vives Erasmus Melanc- thon Corn. Agrippa. Sporadic Works and ^w^ors. Soto Suarez Sepulveda Montague Char- ron Piccolomini Campanella Giordano Bruno Petrarch Perkins Ames Hall Sanderson Taylor. (d.) Modern Systems of Morals. Netherland Moralists Grotius, Geulincx, Spinoza. British Moralists. Hobbes, More, Cumberland, Cudworth, Locke, Shaftesbury, Clarke, Wollaston, Mandeville. Hutcheson, Butler, Balguy, Warburton, Gay, Hart- ley, Tucker, Hume, Price, Smith, Paley, Gisborne, Stewart, Reid, Brown, Ferguson, Bentbam. French Moralists. De la Motte le Yayer, Bossuet, Fenelon, Bayle, Euet, Roche- foucauld, Malebranche, Diderot, de la Mettrie, Helvetius, Rousseau, Dalembert, Mablay. German Moralists. Leibnitz, Canz, Wolf, Baumgarten Crusius, Meier, Kant, Mendelsohn, Garve, Schmid, Schleirnaacher, Marheineke de Wette, Platner, Jacobi. (e.) JJursory glance at the Sympathetic developement of the science at the pre- sent time, in England, France and America. McCosh, Whewell, Cousin, Jonffroy, Tbornwell, Wayland. (III.) Criticism of Theories of Morals : History of the Systems of Moral Philosophy, presented according to the leading idea, developed and criticised. Classification of Systems. Theories of Dependent Morality Theories of Inde- pendent Morality Theories in reference to the Nature and Origin of our Moral Perceptions Theories in reference to the Criterion of Morals. (a) Theories which make morality dependent : (1) Upon consequences beneficial to self Selfish Theory. (2) " " to others Disinterested Theory. (3) " " to mankind generally Utilitarian Theory. (4) Upon the Will of God. (5) Upon Law, Education and Custom. (b) Theories which make Morals independent of any artificial or extraneous prin- ciple, but directly referable to Cl) Reason Rationalistic Theory. (2.) Sympathy or Sense Sentimental Theory. (3.) Conscience Conscience Theory. (IT.) Speculative Morality (W Virtue, Duty, Right, and the contrary.) Definitions of the Science. Basis of System. Is there a Conscience ? MOKAL PHILOSOPHY. O What is its Nature and Constitution ? The Laws and operations of Conscience. Of Bappiness of Obligation of Merit and of Demerit of Right and Wrong of Virtue and the Virtues of Temperance, Truth, Benevolence, Justice, Piety, Humanity, (Y.) Practical Morality (Qt Virtues, Duties, Rights, and their contraries.) ( as an animal ) . (A.) self J [ being, / as a moral \ I Family Fellowmen { Duties to * . Ecclesiastic (G.) Superior Being God. t T-> \ r J! n i.- \ B)'Ute8. (D.) Interior Creation ( r . . ^ ' J I Inanimate nature. (^4.) (1.) Duties to one's self, considered as possessed of an animal organization. (a.) Self preservation of Self Defence, of Suicide. (.) Self conservation of Frugality, of Drunkenness, of Gluttony. (c.) Self purification of Chastity, of Fornication, of Seduction, of Gentility. (2.) Duties to one's self considered as a Moral being. Of Truth of Lies. Of Honor of Duelling. Of Self command of Anger of Resentment of Revenge. (B.) Duties to Fellow men. (1.) Family Relations. (a) Of Husband and Wife, of Adultery, of Polygamy, of Divorce. (5) Of Parent and Child. (c) Of Brethren. (d) Of Master and Servant. (e) Of Friendship. (/.) Charity in deed of Philanthropy, of Alms, of Hospitality, of Gratitude. Charity in word of Liberality of Judgment, of Detraction, of Sneering. Charity in thought of Sympathy, of Envy, of Malice. (2.) Business Relations (a) Of Buyer and Seller. (b) Of Promiser and Promisee. (c) Of Borrower and Lender. (d) Of Employer and Employee. (e) Of Principal and Agent. (/) Of Partners. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. Morals of Trade. Of Gaming, of Speculation. Of Wills of Insurances. (3.) Political Relations. Of Property, of Gorernment, of Laws, of Crimes, of Patriotism, of Slavery, of Elections. (4.) Of Ecclesiastical relations generally. (C.) Duty to God. Of Love, of Worship, of Prayer, of Oaths, of Vows, of Sabbatical Institutions. (D.) Duties to JBrute and Inanimate Creation. To Brutes. Of Humanity of Cruelty. To Inanimate Creation. Use and not Waste of cultivation of the Arts and Sciences of ^Esthetic tastes and their connection with Morals. LIST OF EMINENT MEN WHO. HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO MORAL SCIENCE. ARRANGED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER. B. C. A. D. 584-504 Pythagoras, 1224-1274 Thomas Aquinas, 500 Heraclitus, flo. 1245 Alexander of Hales, 467-398 Socrates, 1274 Bonaventura, 426-347 Plato, 1309 Duns Scotus, 384-321 Aristotle & Pyrrho, 1457 Laurentius Valla, 342-270 Epicurus, 1499 Marcus Ficinus, 324 x Diogenes, 1518 Melancthon, 314-261 Zeno, 1525 Pomponatius, 213-130 Carneades, 1535 Hem. Corn. Agrippa, 122 ''Pancetius, flourished 1541 Vives, 108-44 Cicero, 1494-1560 Soto, i. 1580 Giordano Bruno. A. D. L. x Montague, 1-65 Seneca, 1582 Perkins, flourished , 82 Epictetus, lived. 1603 Charron, 99 Plutarch, 1604 Piccolomini, 162 Marc. Atonnius, 1538-1617 Suarez, 170 Sextus Empiricus, 250 Plotinus, 1639 1585-1645 Campanella, Grotius, 270 /Porphyrus, 1650 Ames, flourished, 331 Jamblichus, 1660 Bp. Sanderson, flo. 485 Proclus., tt Jeremy Taylor, flo. 496 ' Stobosus., 1667 Geulincx, 550 Simplicius, 1672 De la Motte le Vayer, 874 Scotus Eugena, 1677 Spinoza, 1034-1100 Anselm, 1079-1143 >Abelard, Hildebert, 1150 / Peter Lombard, 1588-1684 1685 x Hobbes, -' Henry More, 1173 Richard of St. Victor, 1617-1688 Cudworth, 1180 John of Salisbury, 1691 Horneius, 1193-1280 Albertus Magnus, 1704 ^ Locke, 8 CONTKIBUTOKS TO MOEAL PHILOSOPHY. A. D. 1627-1704 Bossuet, 1706 Bayle, 1671-1713 Shaftesbury, 1651-1715 Fenelon, 1638-1715 Malebranche, 1646-1716 /Leibnitz, 1632-1Z1&/ Cumberland, 1724 Huet and Gay, 1721 Wollaston, 1728 Thomasius, 1733 Mandeville, 1661-1737 Buffier, 1694-1747 Hutcheson, 1692-1752 Butler, 1753 Canz, 1754 Christ'n. Wolf, 1757 ^Hartley & la Mettrie, 1703-1758/ Jon. Edwards, 1762 / Baumgarten, 1771 Helvetius, A. D. 1772 Crusius, 1705-1774 Tucker, 1711-1776 Hume, 1778 /Meier, 1779 Rosseau. 1783 ' Dalembert, 1785 Mably, 1786 Mendelsohn, 1723-1790 Smith, 1723-1791 Price, 1796 Reid, 1798 /""Carve, 1804 .Kant, 1812 /Schmid, 1814 /yFichte, 1 743-18 fy'Paley and Gisborne, 1816 / Ferguson, 1818 Plainer, 1819 Jacobi, 1778-1820 Brown. PART I. HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, It is impossible for a science to rest in ignorance of its own history; it is impossible for the human mind to permit it. However clearly it may be demonstrated in its own eyes, a science cannot have perfect confidence in itself, unless it has obtained the secret of its errors; it cannot be sure that it has arrived at the True, except when it has ex- plained to itself how it has passed through, and how it must have needs passed through the False. Jouffroy. (1.) ETHICAL VIEWS OF PYTHAGORAS. The Pythagoreans were the first, we are told by Aristotle, who attempted to determine any points in moral philosophy. All, however, on this subject that they carried out scientifi- cally, and without dependence on their general view of things, was of little value apparently. Whether they established any doctrine of the supreme good, or the ultimate object of all rational action, is very doubtful ; so very discrepant are the statements of later writers on this point : that, however, they investigated the notion of virtue, would result from Philolaus having denoted virtue to be the property of the moral life. They are said to have called virtue a harmony ; which defini- tion, however, requires to be further limited, by shewing in what they supposed the harmony of virtue to consist. It is not improbable that they held it to be the coincidence of the rational and the irrational throughout the whole course of life. For, on the one hand, they employed music both to soothe the passions, and to excite the active energies. On the other, they strove to attain to a consistency and agreement in their whole life, as is expressed in their precept : Man ought 10 HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. to consider both the past and the future with a moral aim. "What, it is said, they taught of particular virtues, is for the most part questionable or worthless ; in the case of justice alone are we credibly informed that they said it was a " simi- larly similar number ;" by which they meant to convey the maxim, that it is just that every one should receive according to his deserts. No one will wonder to find so rude a notion in the infancy of ethics. Hitters History of Ancient Phi- losophy ', vol. 1., p. 414. (2.) CHARACTER AND METHOD OF SOCRATES' PHILOSOPHIZING. The philosophizing of Socrates was limited and restricted by his opposition, partly to the preceding, and partly to the Sophistic philosophy. Philosophy before th^ Socrates ,had been in its essential character, investigation of nature. But in Socrates, the hu- man mind, for the first time, turned itself in upon itself, upon its own being, and that too in the most immediate manner, by conceiving itself as active, moral spirit. The positive phi- losophizing of Socrates, is exclusively of an ethical character, exclusively an inquiry into the nature of virtue, so exclusively, and so one-sidedly, that, as is wont to be the case upon the ap- pearance of a new principle, it even expressed a contempt for the striving of the entire previous period, with its natural philosophy, and its mathematics. Setting everything under the stand point of immediate moral law, Socrates was so far from finding any object in "irrational" nature worthy of study, that he rather, in a kind of general teleological manner, conceived it simply in the light of external means for the at- tainment of external ends ; yea, he would not even go out to walk, as he says in the Phrsedrus of Plato, since one can learn nothing from trees and districts of country. Self-knowledge the Delphic (yvs&i tfeau. 236. (20.) SKETCH OF ADAM SMITH'S MOKAL SYSTEM. That mankind are so constituted as to sympathize with each other's feelings, and to feel pleasure in the accordance of these feelings, are the only facts required by Dr. Smith, and they HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 33 certainly must be granted to him. To adopt the feelings of another, is to approve them. When the sentiments of another are sHich as would be excited in us by the same objects, we approve them as morally proper. To obtain this accord, it becomes necessary for him who enjoys or suffers, to lower his expression of feeling to the point to which the bystanders can raise his fellow-feelings ; on which are founded all the high virtues of self-denial and self-command ; and it is equally necessary for the bystander to raise his sympathy as near as be can to the level of the original feeling. In all unsocial pas- sions, such as anger, we have a divided sympathy between him who feels them and those who are the objects of them. Hence the propriety of extremely moderating them. Pure malice is always to be concealed or disguised, because all sympathy 'is arrayed against it. In the private passions, where there is only a simple sympathy that with the original pas- sion the expression has more liberty. The benevolent af- fections, where there is a double sympathy with those who feel them, and those who are their objects are the most agreeable, and may be indulged with the least apprehensions of finding no echo in other breasts. Sympathy with the grat- itude of those who are benefited by good actions, prompts us to consider them as deserving of reward, and forms the sense of merit / as fellow-feeling with the resentment of those who are injured by crimes leads us to look on them as worthy of punishment, and constitutes the sense of demerit. These sen- timents require not only beneficial actions, but benevolent motives for them ; being compounded, in the case of merit, of a direct sympathy with the good disposition of the bene- factor, and an indirect sympathy with the persons benefited ; in the opposite case, with precisely opposite sympathies. He who does an act of wrong to another to gratify his own pas- sions, must not expect that the spectators, who have none of his undue partially to his own interest, will enter into his 34 mSTOEY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. feelings. In such a case, he knows that they will pity the person wronged, and be full of indignation against him. "When he is cooled, he adopts the sentiments of others on his own crime, feels shame at the impropriety of his former pas" sion, pity for those who have suffered by him, and a dread of punishment from general and just resentment. Such are the constituent parts of remorse. Our moral sentiments respecting ourselves arise from those which others feel concerning us. We feel a self-approbation whenever we believe that the general feeling of mankind co- incides with that state of mind in which we ourselves were at a given time. " We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and endeavor to imagine what effect it would in this light produce in us." We must view our own conduct with the eyes of others before we can judge it. The sense of duty arises from putting ourselves in the place of others, and adopting their sentiments respecting our own conduct. In utter solitude there could have been no self-approbation. The rules of morality are a summary of those sentiments ; and often beneficially stand in their stead when the self-delusions of passion would otherwise hide from us the non-conformity of our state of mind with that which, in the circumstances, can be entered into and approved by impartial bystanders. It is hence that we learn to raise our mind above local or tem- porary clamor, and to fix our eyes on the surest indications of the general and lasting sentiments of human nature. "When we approve of any character or action, our sentiments are deriv- ed from four sources ; first, we sympathize with the motives of the agent ; secondly, we enter into the gratitude of those who have been benefitted by his actions; thirdly, we observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the general rules by which those two sympathies generally act ; and, last of all, when we consider such actions as forming part of a system of behavior which tends to promote the happiness either of HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 35 the individual or of society, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility, not unlike that which we ascribe to any well-contrived machine." Mackintosh's Eth. Diss., p. 234:. (21.) GAY UPON THE CONNECTION OF HAPPINESS WITH THE LOVE OF GOD. He says : " Now it is evident from the Nature of God, viz. his being infinitely happy in himself from all eternity, and from his goodnes manifested in his works, that he could have no other design in creating mankind than their happiness ; and therefore, the means of their happiness : therefore, that my behavior, as far as it may be a means of the happiness of mankind, should be such. Here then we get one step further, or to a new criterion : not to a new criterion of Vir- tue immediately, but to a criterion of the Will of God. For it is an answer to the enquiry, How shall I know what the Will of God in this particular is? Thus the Will of God is the immediate criterion of Virtue, and the happiness of man- kind the criterion of the Will of God ; and therefore the hap- piness of mankind may be said to be the criterion of Virtue, but once removed." " As therefore happiness is the general end of all actions, so each particular action may be said to have its proper and pe- culiar end. Thus the end of a beau is to please by his dress ; the end of study, knowledge. But neither pleasing by dress, nor knowledge, are ultimate ends ; they still tend, or ought to tend, to something farther, as is evident from hence, viz. that a man may ask and expect a reason why either of them are pursued. Now to ask the reason of any action or pursuit, is only to enquire into the end of it : but expect a reason, i. e. an end, to be assigned for an ultimate end, is absurd. To ask why I pursue happiness, will admit of no other answer than an explanation of the terms." Gay's definition of Virtue is wider than Paley's : " Virtue 36 HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. is the conformity to a rule of life, directing the actions of all rational creatures with respect to each other's happiness ; to which conformity every one in all cases is obliged : and every one that does so conform, is, or ought to be approved of, es- teemed, -and loved for so doing. 5 ' /*/ (22.) (1.) PALEY'S OPINIONS OF HAPPINESS. In strictness, any condition may be denominated happy, in which the amount or aggregate of pleasure exceeds that of pain; and the degree of happiness depends upon the quan- tity of this excess. And the greatest quantity of it ordinarily attainable in hu- man life is what we mean by happiness, when we inquire or pronounce what human happiness consists in. In which inquiry I will omit much usual declamation on the dignity and capacity of our nature ; the superiority of the soul to the body, of the rational to the animal part of our constitution ; upon the worthiness, refinement, and delicacy of some satisfactions, or the meanness, grossness, and sensu- ality of others ; because I hold that pleasures differ in noth- ing but in continuance and intensity : from a just computation of which, confirmed by what we observe of the apparent cheer- fulness, tranquility, and contentment, of men of different tastes, tempers, stations, and pursuits, every question con- cerning human happiness must receive its decision. (2.) PALEY'S OPINION OF VIRTUE. Virtue is " the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness" According to which definition, " the good of mankind," is the subject ; the " will of God," the rule ; and " everlasting happiness," the motive, of human virtue. Virtue has been divided by some moralists into benevolence, prudence, fortitude, and temperance. Benevolence proposes HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 37 good ends ; prudence suggests the best means of attaining them ; fortitude enables us to encounter the difficulties, dan- gers, and discouragements, which stand in our way in pursuit of these ends ; temperance repels and overcomes the passions that obstruct it. Benevolence, for instance, prompts us to un- dertake the cause of an oppressed orphan ; prudence suggests the best means of going about it ; fortitude enables us to con- front the danger, and bear up against the loss, disgrace, or repulse, that may attend our undertaking ; and temperance keeps under the love of money, of ease, or amusement, which might divert us from it. Yirtue is distinguished by others into two branches only, prudence and 'benevolence / prudence, attentive to our own interest ; 'benevolence, to that of our fellow creatures ; both directed to the same end, the increase of happiness in nature ; and taking equal concern in the future as in the present. The four Cardinal virtues are prudence, fortitude, temper- ance, and justice. But the division of virtue, to which we are in modern times most accustomed, is into duties : Toward God ; as piety, reverence, resignation, gratitude, &c. Toward other men, (or relative duties ;) as justice, charity, fidelity, loyalty, &c. Toward ourselves ; as chastity, sobriety, temperance, pre- servation of life, care of health, &c. More of these distinctions have been proposed, which it is not worth while to set down. (3.) PALEY'S OPINION OF UTILITY. So then actions are to be estimated by their tendency. Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone, which constitutes the obligation of it. But to all this there seems a plain objection, viz. that many actions are useful, which no man in his senses will allow 38 HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. to be right. There are occasions in which the hand of the assassin would be very useful. The present possessor of some great estate employs his influence and fortune, to annoy, corrupt, or oppress all about him. His estate would devolve, by his death, to a successor of an opposite character. It is useful, therefore, to dispatch such a one as soon as possible out of the way; as the neighborhood will exchange thereby a pernicious tyrant for a wise and generous benefactor. It might be useful to rob a miser, and give the money to the poor, as the mone} 7 , no doubt, would produce more happiness by being laid out in food and clothing for half a dozen dis- tressed families, than by continuing locked up in a miser's chest. It may be useful to get possession of a place, a piece of preferment, or of a seat in Parliament, by bribery or false swearing : as by means of them we may serve the public more effectually than in our private station. What then shall we say ? Must we admit these actions to be right, which would be to justify assassination, plunder, and perjury; or must we give up our principle, that the criterion of right is utility? It is not necessary to do either. The true answer is this ; that these actions, after all, are not useful, and for that reason, and that alone, are not right. To see this point perfectly, it must be observed, that the bad consequences of actions are Ivf of old, particular and general. The particular bad consequence of an action is the mischief which that simple action directly and immediately occasions. The general bad consequence is the violation of some ne- cessary or useful general rule. Thus, the particular bad consequence of the assassination above described is the fright and pain which the deceased underwent ; the loss he suffered of life, which is as valuable to a bad man as to a good one, or more so ; the prejudice and affliction of which his death was the occasion, to his family, friends, and dependents. PART II. CRITICISM OF THEORIES OF MORALS. [This portion of the subject being fully discussed in the course of lectures, for the most part without the aid of authoritative quotations, the compiler refers the Student to the the following extracts only.] (23.) BISHOP BUTLER'S PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF A PRIN- CIPLE OF BENEVOLENCE, BESIDES THAT OF SELF-LOVE. First, There is a natural principle of 'benevolence in man which is in some degree to society, what self -love is to the indi- vidual. And if there be in mankind any disposition to friendship ; if there be any such thing as compassion, for compassion is momentary love; if there be any such thing as the paternal or filial affections ; if there be any affection in human nature, the object and end of which is the good of another ; this is itself benevolence, or the love of another. Be it ever so short, be it ever so low a degree, or ever so un- happily confined ; it proves the assertion, and points out what we were designed for, as really as though it were in a higher degree and more extensive. I must, however, remind you, that though benevolence and self-love are different ; though the former tends most directly to public good, and the latter to private ; yet they are so perfectly coincident, that the great- est satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our having benevo- lence in a due degree ; and that self-love is one chief security of our right behavior towards society. It may be added that their mutual coinciding, so that we can scarce promote one without the other, is equally a proof that we were made for both. 1st /Sermon upon Human Nature, p. 3. 40 CRITICISM OF THEOEIE8 OF MORALS. Second, Self-love and interestedness was stated to consist in or be an affection to ourselves, a regard to our own private good : it is, therefore, distinct from benevolence, which is an affection to the good of our fellow-creatures. But that benevo- lence is distinct from, that is, not the same thing with self-love, is no reason for its being looked upon with any peculiar suspi- cion, because every principle whatever, by means of which self-love is gratified, is distinct from it. And all things, which are distinct from each other, are equally so. A man has an affection or aversion to another : that one of these tends to, and is gratified by doing good, that the other tends to, and is gratified by doing harm, does not in the least alter the respect which either one or the other of these inward feelings has to self-love. We use the word property so as to exclude any other persons having an interest in that, of which we say a particular man has the property : and we often use the word selfish so as to exclude in the same manner all regards to the good of others. But the cases are not parallel : for though that exclusion is really part of the idea of property, yet such positive exclusion, or bringing this peculiar disregard to the good of others into the idea of self-love, is in reality adding to the idea, or changing it from what it was before stated, to consist in, namely, in an affection to ourselves. This being the whole idea of self-love, it can no otherwise exclude good- will or love of others, than merely by not including it, no otherwise than it excludes love of arts, or reputation, or of anything else. Neither, on the other hand, does benevolence, any more than love of arts or of reputation, exclude self-love. Love of our neighbor, then, has just the same respect to, is no more distant from self-love, than hatred of our neighbor, or than love and hatred of anything else. Thus the principles, from which men rush upon certain ruin for the destruction of an enemy, and for the preservation of a friend, have the same respect to the private affection, are equally interested, or CRITICISM OF THEORIES OF MORALS. 41 equally disinterested ; and it is of no avail, whether they are said to be one or the other. Therefore, to those who are shocked to bear virtue spoken of as disinterested, it may be allowed, tbat it is indeed absurd to speak thus of it ; unless hatred, several particular instances of vice, and all tbe com- mon affections and aversions in mankind, are acknowledged to be disinterested too. Is there any less inconsistence be- tween the love of inanimate things, or of creatures merely sensitive, and self-love, than between self-love, and t the love of our neighbor? Is desire of, and delight in the happiness of another any more a diminution of self-love, than desire of and delight in the esteem of another? They ^ are both equally desire of and delight in somew4^t ex- ' ternal to ourselves : either both or neither are so. The object of self-love is expressed in the term self: and every appetite of sense, and every particular affection of the heart, are equally interested or disinterested, because the objects of them all are equally self or somewliat which evidently constitutes what we call a virtuous disposition. But it appears to me that virtue, con- sidered as an attribute of character, is more properly defined by the habit which the fixed purpose gradually forms, than by the fixed purpose itself. It is from the eternal habit alone that other men can judge of the purpose ; and it is from the 80 SPECULATIVE MOBALS. uniformity and spontaneity of his habit that the individual himself must judge how far his purposes are sincere and steady. I have said that this account of virtue coincides with the definition of it given by the ancient Pythagoreans ; and it also coincides with the opinion of Aristotle, by whom the ethical doctrine of the Pythagoreans was rendered much more complete and satisfactory. According to this philosopher the different virtues are "practical habits, voluntary in their origin, and agreeable to right reason." This last philosopher seems indeed to have considered the subject of habits in general more attentively than any other writer of antiquity ; and he has suggested some important hints with respect to them, which well deserve the attention of those who may turn their thoughts to this very interesting class of facts in the human constitution. In referring to these doctrines of the ancient schools, I am far from proceeding on the supposition, that questions of science are to be decided by authority. But I own it always appears to me to afford a strong presumption in favor of any conclusion concerning the principles of human nature, when we find it sanctioned by the judgment of those who have been led to it by separate and independent processes of reasoning. For the same reason I think it of consequence to remark the coincidence between the account now given of Virtue and that of Mr. Hobbes, one of the most sceptical, but, at the same time, one of the most acute and original of our English metaphysicians. " Virtue" (says he) " is the habit of doing according to those laws of Nature that tend to our pres- ervation; and vice is the habit of doing the contrary." The definition indeed is faulty, in so far as it involves the author's selfish theory of morals; but in considering the word virtue as expressive of a habit of action, it approaches nearer to the O SPECULATIVE MORALS. 81 truth tban the greater part of the definitions of virtne to be found in the writings of the moderns. These observations lead to an explanation of what has at first sight the appearance of paradox in the ethical doctrines of Aristotle, that where there is self-denial there is no virtue. That the merit of particular actions is increased by the self- denial with which they are accompanied cannot be disputed ; but it is only when we are learning the practice of our duties that this self-denial is exercised, (for the practice of morality, as well as of everything else, is facilitated by repeated acts ;) and therefore, if the word virtue be.employed to express that habit of mind which it is the great object of a good man to confirm, it will follow, that, in proportion as he approaches to it, his efforts of self-denial must diminish, and that all occa- sion for them would cease if his end were completely attained. The definition of virtue given by Aristotle, as consisting in " right practical habits voluntary in " their origin" is well illustrated by what Plutarch has told us of the means by which he acquired the mastery over his irascible passions. "I have always approved" (says he) " of the engagements and vows imposed on themselves from motives of religion, by cer- tain philosophers, to abstain from wine, or from some other favorite indulgence, for the space of a year. I have also ap- proved of the determination taken by others not to deviate from the truth, even in the lightest conversation, during a par- ticular period. Comparing my own mind with theirs, and conscious that I yielded to none of them in reverence for God, I tasked myself, in the first instance, not to give way to anger upon any occasion for several days. I afterwards ex- tended this resolution to a month or longer ; and having thus made a trial of what i could do, I have learned at length never to speak but with gentleness, and so carefully to watch over my temper as never to purchase the short and unprofita- 11 82 SPECULATIVE MORALS. ble gratification of venting my resentment at the expense of a lasting and humiliating remorse." I must not dismiss this topic without recommending, not merely to the perusal, bat to the diligent study of all who have a taste for moral inquiries, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, in which he has examined, with far greater accuracy than any other author of antiquity, the nature of habits con- sidered in their relation to our moral constitution. The whole treatise is indeed of great value, and, with the exception of a few passages, almost justifies the very warm and unqualified eulogium pronounced upon it by a learned divine (Dr. Ken- nel) before the University of Cambridge, an eulogium in which he goes so very far as to assert of this work, " that it affords not only the most perfect specimen of scientific mor- ality, but exhibits also the powers of the most compact and best constructed system which the human intellect ever pro- duce^ upon any subject ; enlivening occasionally great se- verity of method, and strict precision of terms, by the sub- limest though soberest splendor of diction." For the use of English readers an excellent translation of Aristotle's Ethics and also of his Politics has been published by Dr. Gillies ; and indeed I do not know of any treatises, among the many remains of antiquity, which could have been selected as a more important accession to the stock of our na- tional literature. On an Ambiguity in the words Right and Wrong, Virtue and Vice. The epithets Eight and Wrong, Virtuous and Vicious, are applied sometimes to external actions, and som- times to the intentions of the agent. A similar ambiguity may be remarked in the corresponding words in other lan- guages. This ambiguity is owing to various causes, which it is not necessary at present to trace. Among other circumstances, SPECULATIVE MORALS. b& it is owing to the association of ideas, which, as it leads us to connect notions of elegance or of meanness with many ar- bitrary expressions in language, so it often leads ns to con- nect notions of right and wrong with external actions, consid- ered abstractly from the motives which produced them. It is owing (at least in part) to this, that a man who has been involuntarily the author of any calamity to another, can hardly by any reasoning banish his feelings of remorse ; and, on the other hand, however wicked our purposes may have been,. if by any accident we have been prevented from carry- ing them into execution, we are apt to consider ourselves as far less culpable than if we had perpetrated the crimes that we had intended. It is much in the same manner that we think it less criminal to mislead others by hints, or looks, or actions, than by a verbal lie ; and in general, that we think our guilt diminished if we can only contrive to accomplish our ends without employing those external signs, or those ex- ternal means, with which we have been accustomed to asso- ciate the notions of guilt and infamy. Shakespeare has pain- ted with philosophical accuracy this natural subterfuge of a vicious mind, in which the sense of duty still retains some authority, in one of the exquisite scenes between King John and Hubert : ' ' Hadat thou but shook thy head, and made a pause When I spake dark y what I purposed ; Or turned an eye of doubt upon my face ; Or bade me tell my tale in express words; Deep shame had struck me dumb, made me break off, And those thy fears might have wrought fears iu me. But thou didst understand me by my signs, And Didst in signs again parley with sin. n As the twofold application of the words Right and Wrong to the intentions of the mind, and to external actions, has a tendency, in the common business of life, to affect our opin- ions concerning the merits of individuals, so it has misled the 84 SPECULATIVE MOEALS. theoretical speculations of some very eminent philosophers in their inquiries concerning the principles of morals. It was to obviate the confusion of ideas arising from this ambiguity of language that the distinction between absolute and relative rectitude was introduced into ethics ; and as the distinction is equally just and important, it will be proper to explain it par- ticularly, and to point out its application to one or two of the questions which have been perplexed by that vagueness of expression which it is our object at present to correct. An action may be said to be absolutely right, when it is in every respect suitable to the circumstances in which the agent is placed ; or, in other words, when it is such as, with perfectly good intentions, under the guidance of an enlight- ened and well-formed understanding, he would have per- formed. An action may be said to be relatively right, when the intentions of the agent are sincerely good, whether his con- duct be suitable to his circumstances or not. According to these definitions, an action may be right in one sense and wrong in another ; an ambiguity in language, which, how obvious soever, has not always been attended to by the writers on morals. It is the relative rectitude of an action which determines the moral desert of the agent ; but it is its absolute rectitude which determines its utility to his wordly interests, and to the welfare of society. And it is only so far as absolute and rela- tive rectitude coincide, that utility can be affirmed to be a quality of virtue. A strong sense of duty will indeed induce us to avail our- selves of all the talents we possess, and of all the information within our reach, to act agreeably to the rules of absolute rectitude. And if we fail in doing so, our negligence is crimi- nal. " Crimes committed through ignorance," (as Aristotle has very judiciously observed,) " are only excusable when the SPECULATIVE MOKALS. 85 ignorance is involuntary ; for when the cause of it lies in our- selves, it is then justly punishable. The ignorance of those laws which all may know if they will, does not excuse the , breach of them ; and neglect is not pardonable where atten- tion ought to be bestowed. But perhaps we are incapable of attention. This, however, is our own fault : since the inca- pacity has been contracted by our continual carelessness ; as the evils of injustice and intemperance are contracted by the daily commission of iniquity, and the daily indulgence in vo- luptuousness. For such as our actions are, such must our habits become." Notwithstanding, however, the truth and the importance of this doctrine, the general principle already stated remains in- controvertible, that in every particular instance our duty con- sists in doing what appears to us to be right at the time ; and if, while we follow this rule, we should incur any blame, our demerit does not arise from acting according to an erroneous judgment, but from our previous misemployment of the means we possessed for correcting the errors to which our judgment is liable. From these principles it follows, that actions, although ma- terially right, are not meritorious with respect to the agent, unless performed from a sense of duty. This con- clusion, indeed, has been disputed by Mr. Hume, upon grounds which I cannot stop to examine; but its truth is ne- cessarily implied in the foregoing reasonings, and it is perfectly consonant to the sentiments of the soundest moralists, both ancient and modern. Aristotle inculcates this doctrine in many parts of his Ethics. In one passage he represents it as essential to virtuous actions, that the actions are done ivsxa O IE? si: VJS .