^lOSANCEl^^ ^tUBRARYQ^ ^lUBRARYfl^, J(ya3AiNfl3ttV^ \^i\mi^ \^\\m'i^ JSWAINn-3ftV ^OFCAUF0% AOfCAllfO% ^ f ea *? ^^Jf J O I' fie ^J^UDNVSOl'^ MUBRARYi?/^ OFCAIIFO/?,IS^ &A«Vw«Jnii'^ ,5MEUNIVER% A^:lOSANCElfx> ^iUBRARY v/ _ IS > 4.0F( J^. slOSANCEl^^ ZSlQAIMn-3ftV ^iUBRARYOc. ^tUBRARY(?/. isjaAiNamv^ ^^ojnvDJo-^ ^.jojiivdjo'^ ^OFCAUFOft^ ^OFCAllFOfli^ ■ft <«»/| ^ V? ^ ' _ >&Advaanis^ ^(?Aavaanif^ . 5MEUNIVERy/A ^lOS ^^WE•UNIVER% . .^^tUBRARYO/, <^MII -^lUBRARYOc. 3 i ir-^ ^ ^iJOJITVDJO'^ %oi\vni^'^ AOFCAllFOMi;^ ^OFCAIIFO% A\\EtJNIVER% - CO so ^lOSANCElf/^ &Aavaaii# .\WEUNIVER% ^OFCAllFOi?^ ^.OFCAIIFO/?^ ^^WEUNIVERS/^ ,'>, Canning accepted the offer, nor was he to be tempted from it by an invitation which he received in the following year from Lord Ellenborough — on his appointment to succeed Lord Auckland as Governor- General of India — to accompany him as Private Secretary. The two men were destined, in after years, to come into violent collision on an Lidian topic. Canning worked hard at his duties, but the presence of his chief in the Upper House relieved him of the necessity — indeed deprived him of the opportunity — of Parliamentary explanation. But his character was felt. ' Lord Aberdeen,' says Earl Granville, ' had the most implicit confidence in him, and allowed him to do much of the Secretary of State's work. He was greatly looked up to in the office.' Early in 1 846 Sir Robert Peel, now in the troubled waters of the Corn Law Repeal, took the field again with a reconstituted Ministry, Mr. Gladstone at the Colonial Office, Lord Lincoln in Ireland, Lord Canning at the Woods and Forests. Sir Robert Peel's resig- nation in June of that year brought Lord John Russell to the Treasury and placed Lord Canning in opposition. He frequently, however, found himself in sympathy with the liberal measures of Lord John Russell's Cabinet, and in May, 1848, was the first to support Lord Lansdowne's motion in support of the removal of Jewish Disabilities, separating himself from almost the entire body of his former associates, and replying to Lord Ellenborough, who had moved an amendment on the second reading of the Bill. c 34 EARL CANNING On Lord John Russell's resignation in February, 1851, Lord Canning was invited by Lord Derby to fill a seat in his Cabinet as Foreign Secretary, an offer which, greatly as it was to his taste, he did not feel himself sufficiently in accordance with the Con- servative Leader to accept. In Lord Aberdeen's Coalition Ministry of 1852, Lord John Russell became Foreign Secretary, and Lord Canning, not without some natural feelings of disappointment, accepted the unambitious post of Postmaster-General. Here he did good work, instituting numerous reforms and fighting a courageous battle against vested interests which stood in the way of departmental efficiency. Sir Rowland Hill described the years during which he served under Lord Canning at the Post Office as ' the most satisfactory period of his whole official career, that in which the course of improvement was steadiest, most rapid, and least chequered.' In January, 1855, Lord Aberdeen was defeated on Mr. Roebuck's hostile motion for an inquiry into the conduct of the war, and resigned. Lord Canning was invited by Lord Palmerston to remain in office as Postmaster- General, with the addition of a seat in the Cabinet, an offer which he accepted. By this time Lord Dalhousie's long and brilliant term of office as Governor-General of India was drawing to a close, and the question of his successor was occupying the thoughts of Ministers. The choice fell on Lord Canning. The son was free to accept the splendid offer from which his father APPOINTED GOVERNOR-GENERAL -3,^ had, thirty-three years before, been compelled to turn away. 'I was the first person,' Lord Granville writes, 'who told him of the probability of the Governor- Generalship of India being offered to him. He at once discussed it, and seemed inclined to accept it. It was an interesting conversation. We had travelled by rail to Windsor, attended service at St. George's, and rode to Cleveden, where we had tea; and then dined at Salt Hill. His departure, and that of the beautiful and clever Lady Canning, created a great void in a very intimate society. Lord Palmerston gave me leave to write all Cabinet secrets to him while in India. . . . His departure for India deprived me of the most valuable assistance I ever had in speaking. He always gave me his opinion on my speeches. I knew his criticisms to be exactly what he thought, and I had absolute confidence in his judgment. There was no question, from the most important points of public and private life to the shape of a saddle, on which I did not desire his advice. He was one of my greatest friends. I am not sure that he was the most intimate. He had some natural re- serve, and, on the other hand, I should not willingly have told him of things that I had said or done of which I was ashamed.' On August 1st, 1855, Lord Canning was introduced at a Court of Directors and took the customary oath of office. In the evening he attended the banquet, with which, in that hospitable epoch, the Company c a ^fi EARL CANNING was wont to celebrate the outgoing of a new Governor- General. The speeches delivered on these occasions assumed the character of important political utterances, and were regarded with interest as indications of principle and policy. The Chairman, Mr, Elliot Macnaghten, proposed the new Governor-General's health. Lord Canning, in his reply, surprised and impressed his hearers by a grave and measured elo- quence in every way worthy of the occasion. The remembrance of George Canning — the marked resem- blance between father and son — the same handsome features, the noble brow and fine presence — no doubt predisposed the audience in the speaker's favour. But Lord Canning^s speech was intrinsically excellent — weighty, dignified, imbued with a statesmanlike sense of the greatness and the difficulty of his task. He responded with gratitude to the Chairman's assurance of the confidence and co-operation of the Directors and of the two great bodies with which he would have mainly to do — the Civil Service and the Army. * I know not,' the speaker continued in terms which, read in the light of after events, have a prophetic ring, ' I know not what course events may take. I hope and pray that we may not reach the extremity of war. I wish for a peaceful time of office, but I cannot forget that, in our Indian Empire, that greatest of all blessings depends upon a greater variety of chances and a more precarious tenure than in any other quarter of the globe. We must not forget that in the sky of India, serene as it SPEECH AT THE DIRECTORS' BANQUET 37 is, a small cloud may arise, at first no bigger than a man's hand, but which, growing bigger and bigger, may at last threaten to overwhelm us with ruin. What has happened once may happen again. The disturbing causes have diminished certainly, but are not dispelled. We have still discontented and hetero- geneous peoples united under our sway ; we have still neighbours before whom we cannot altogether lay aside our watchfulness ; and we have a frontier configuration which renders it possible that at any moment causes of collision may arise. Besides, so intricate are our relations with some subsidiary States that I doubt whether, in an Empire so vast and so situated, it is in the power of the wisest Government, the most peaceful and the most for- bearing, to command peace. But if we cannot command, we can at any rate deserve it by taking care that honour, good faith, and fair dealing are on our side : and then, if, in spite of us, it should become necessary to strike a blow, we can strike with a clear conscience. With blows so dealt, the struggle must be short and the issue not doubtful.' The grave and melodious voice rang through the great assembly and created a profound impression. Lord Cannings hearers, some of whom had never heard him speak and others who had only heard his ordinary Parliamentary replies, felt that they were listening to no common man. They were noble words, instinct with a high purpose, a pledge, pure and high- toned. Nobly was Canning destined to redeem it. 212330 38 EARL CANNING It was decided that Lord Canning should take over charge on March ist, and his journey to India was so timed as to allow of a short stay in Egypt, and of visits, en roide^ to Bombay, Cey- lon, and Madras, where his old school-fellow. Lord Harris, now reigned as Governor. On November 4th, 1855, Lord and Lady Canning sailed from Marseilles; they landed at Alexandria on the 12th, and had their first taste of Eastern hospitality in the somewhat over-splendid arrangements made by the Pacha's order at Cairo for their reception. Some weeks were devoted to the sights of Egypt and a journey up the Nile. On January 26th, 1856, Lord Canning landed at Bombay, and the full tide of official cere- mony began to flow. Lord Dalhousie had decreed that his successor should be royally welcomed ; but, amid the pomps and festivities of a State re- ception, the new Governor-General gave early proof of the indefatigable industry which never flagged throughout his whole career, ' I have been un- ceasingly busy,' he wrote to Mr. Elliot Macnaghten, ' for two-thirds out of every twenty-four hours since our arrival : and by the 5th or 6th I hope to have seen nearly all that calls for ocular inspection in this city and its neighbourhood.' Landing at Madras, the party spent a few days at Guindee Park, the Governor's country residence, and Lord Canning had an opportunity of renewing the memories of old school days in the society of Lord Harris. On the last day of February, he THE COUNCIL 39 disembarked at Calcutta, and proceeded at once to take the customary oaths of office and his seat in Council — ' within five minutes after touching land,' as he wi'ote home — and to be introduced to the members of the Council. Of these Mr. (Sir) Barnes Peacock, a distinguished English barrister, and John Peter Grant, a civilian of exceptional ability, were the most influential. Another member. General John Low, had fought in the last Maratha War, and since then had enjoyed a prolonged experience of native Courts and unusual facilities for reading native character. He was supposed to be of those who thought that Dalhousie had gone too far and too fast. The new Governor-General plunged eagerly into business, and commenced from the outset that neglect of all consideration for health which he continued to the end with such disastrous effect. At the end of the first week he writes that, so great had been the pressure of business that he had found time ' only for one look out of doors ' since arrival. The oppor- tunities for converse with Lord Dalhousie were, of course, invaluable. The tide of official work rolled in amain. 'Another fortnight is gone,' Lord Canning wrote towards the end of March, ' and I am beginning to gather up by slow degrees the threads of business, as it passes before me : but it is severe work to have to give up so much time to the bygones of almost every question that comes up ; and some weeks more must 40 EARL CANNING pass before I shall feel myself abreast of current events.' Not many weeks had passed before the new Governor-General perceived that his hopes of a peaceful reign were little hkely to be realised. The danger threatened from Persia. England was pledged to the independence of Herat ; but that independence had always been precarious, more than once actually endangered. In 1852 a Persian force had seized the place, and nothing but the peremptory interference of the English Government had induced her to abandon the project of annexation. The Crimean War seemed to the Teheran politicians to afford an opportunity for reviving a favourite design. Material for a quarrel was soon forthcoming. Mr. Murray, the British representative, found it impossible to remain any longer at his post. A Persian army was presently on the march against Herat. English diplomacy had said its last word. War had become imminent. Lord Canning watched with regret the lessening chances of a pacific settlement. ' Do not be afraid,' he wrote to the President of the Indian Board in April, ' of my being unduly hasty to punish Persia. Unless the Shah should steam up the Hiigli with Murray swinging at his yard-arm, I hope that we shall be able to keep the peace until your instructions arrive.' The prospects of peace, however, became daily fainter. ' My hope of an accommodation,' the Governor-General wrote to the President in August, ' has almost died out. I contemplate the prospect of PERSIAN IVAR 41 the inglorious and costly operations, which lie before us, with more disgust than I can express.' The quarrel went briskly forward. In the summer Lord Canning received instructions to prepare for the despatch of an army from Bombay, and in November war was officially declared. The choice of a com- mander for the expedition and the details of its equipment necessarily involved much thought^ talk, and correspondence, and made a formidable addition to the numerous and varied administrative topics which, in the ordinary course, called for the Governor- General's attention. A war with Persia involved a thorny question as to the aid that should be given to the Amir of Kabul — whether he should be helped at all, and if helped, to what extent and upon what conditions. The English authorities were of opinion that a blister to Persia might, with excellent effect, be applied from the side of Kandahar. Herbert Edwardes, stationed on the frontier, warmly advocated the project of an alliance with the Amir. At the beginning of 1857 a treaty, negotiated by Sir John Lawrence and Edwardes, bound the old Dost by a tie which, happily, he observed conscientiously through times when the hostility of Kabul, in the rear of the English, would have added disastrously to the difficulties of the situation. ' I have made an alliance with the British Government,' he exclaimed, when the treaty was signed, 'and, come what may, I will keep it till death.' 42 EARL CANNING Lord Canning, who at the other end of the telegraph wire at Calcutta had superintended the negotiation, complimented Edwardes on its satisfactory issue with a generous and hearty recognition of good service, which was habitual to him. ' I feel the more bound to do this,' he wrote, 'because the first suggestion of a meeting came from you. ... It would be a good thing if all diplomatic conferences were conducted as satisfactorily and set forth as lucidly as these have been.' Persia was not the only anxiety. Within the confines of India itself the course of events did not flow with unbroken smoothness during Lord Canning's first year of ofiice. Outram had welcomed his arrival with a telegram — 'All is well in Oudh;' but the announcement had been premature. Outram had now gone away to England, in ill health, and all had certainly not been going well with his successor — a hot-headed official, of the order of those whose destiny it is to be the marplots of diplomacy and thorns in the flesh of their employers. Lord Canning had to taste the bitterness which a refractory sub- ordinate infuses into the cup of high official life. His remonstrances fell on unheeding ears. The progress of dethroning an ancient royalty — necessarily an ungracious one — was made doubly distressful. Com- plaints became numerous and loud. The Governor- General wrote that his subordinates were placing him in the humiliating position of promising redress which they failed to give ; nor was the mischief ended till. TROUBLES IN OUDH 43 in the following spring, on its becoming clear that Outram would be employed in the Persian Expedition, an unexceptionable substitute was found in the person of Sir Henry Lawrence, who took charge of his duties at Lucknow a few weeks before the first outburst of the Mutiny. Periods such as that of the Mutiny afford but scanty space for the personal biography of those who play a prominent part in them. Such men lead only a public existence. Their thoughts, their h^pes^thdr_eflfort^j_aTe_CQncfiiitia^ Lord Canning's life during the fateful years 1857 and 1858 was one unflagging effort to keep pace with the torrential flow of events which followed each other with a rapidity too great even for diligence as phenomenal as his.\ ifJ o1^<^0'^'Oi^^^ iiiiu.m$ ,/UCcyifier^*^K It would be difficult to exaggerate the multifarious- ness or the importance of these demands on his judgment. The general course of the various cam- paigns which the suppression of the Mutiny involved, was, to a large extent, under his superintendence and control ; he was in immediate touch with the principal Commanders throughout, who looked to him for orders. Questions of the utmost difficulty — such, for instance, as the abandonment of Peshawar, in the critical weeks before the fall of Delhi — were constantly presenting themselves for immediate decision ; Parliamentary discussion of Indian topics added intensity to the controversial furnace in which Lord Canning lived. He had to watch the growth of public sentiment, 44 EARL CANNING to guide it in safe channels, and repress its undue violence ; and his task had to be performed under conditions well calculated to disturb the most steadfast equilibrium. There were great topics on which the fate of an Empire hung ; but little topics swarmed about him — like a cloud of midges — all the more irritating, possibly, for their minuteness. A convulsion which breaks down all ordinary barriers and overrides all ordinary rules of discipline, is certain to entail official blunders and collisions. Stupidity, decently latent in times of peaceful routine, leaps to light. There will be a misapprehension of duties, quarrels more acute than usual ; the excited man who does too much ; the nervous man who is afraid to do anything ; the wrong-headed man who does the wrong thing. Sometimes, moreover. Nature seems to have pro- vided that the men who have greatest capacity for blundering have the largest gifts of insistency in ♦ self-defence. Many such men now crossed Lord Canning's path. Many such questions — whose in- trinsic insignificance is no measure of the toil and vexation they occasion to those who have to decide them, beset him. His temperament was that wliich treats small things and large with the same precise and conscientious care, and so renders official life a burthen too heavy for the strongest shoulders. There is a habit of mind, well known to the student of official pathology, which shrinks in aversion from the rude expedients by which some men get through a vast amount of work. The EXACTNESS IN BUSINESS 45 just, the fastidious, the scrupulous, are its especial victims. Such a man has a honor of imperfection, of inexactness, of the hardship or mischief which inexactness may easily produce. He will not indite an incorrect sentence, slur over inconvenient difficulty, or pronounce an ill-considered decision. He knows how the thing ought to be done ; his conscience forbids him to do it, or to let it be done, in any other fashion. He will not slight it himself; he will not hand it over to another who might be more easily satisfied. One question after another is put aside for further thought, for further knowledge, for the last few touches which an artist loves to give to his work, but which, unhappily, so seldom are the last. Meanwhile, the world does not stand still: the tide of business rolls onward, rude and strong ; the impossibility of coping with it becomes obvious ; the arrears become so huge that a little more or less is not worth consideration ; the offender becomes desperate. The official machine is obstructed at a hundred points ; and sturdy workers of the rough and ready order are complaining that, in the research of a too exquisite perfection, the practical work of adminis- tration is being brought to a standstill. The offender entrenches himself behind a barricade of office boxes, each of which protests with dumb mouth against the dilatory mood which hinders its contents from dis- posal. Thence he defies those who preach to him that with statesmen, as with women, hesitation often means ruin. 46 EARL CANNING Such barricades, it is to be feared, rose high in Lord Canning's study. An embassy of his colleagues, on one occasion, brought some friendly pressure to bear upon their too assiduous chief, and urged him to part with some portion of his task, which it was certain that he could never accomplish. The re- luctant Governor-General hovered uneasily about the vast accumulation, finding in each instance some especial reason against abandonment, and was at last with difficulty persuaded to bow to the stern destiny which has decreed that human life shall be short, human energy exhaustible, and the art of adminis- tration difficult and long. Canning, however, could be prompt enough when promptitude was evidently essential, and a crisis had now arrived which called imperatively for in- stantaneous action. During the early months of the year 1857 various symptoms of a mutinous temper in the troops in the immediate neighbourhood of Calcutta, and at Ber- hampur, a military post a hundred miles to the north, sounded the first note of danger. Then, when the troubles in Bengal seemed to have subsided, out- breaks of similar character in Upper India, at Meerut and Lucknow, showed that the malady was no merely local one ; and, while these were being dealt with, there came the astounding news that the Sepoys at Meerut, the strongest post, as to European troops, in India, had thrown off" allegiance, murdered their officers, sacked the Station, and effected their escape, OUTBREAK OF MUTINY 47 and that the rebel soldiery were in possession of the capital of the Mughals. Lord Canning knew that he was confronted by the gravest emergency that had ever beset the English in India. Before dealing with the Mutiny, it will be well to take a survey of the general situation and of the conditions under which the Government entered upon this tremendous trial of its strength. CHAPTER III The IndixV which Loed Canning found LoKD Canning's predecessor had on his homeward journey recorded, with almost dying hand^ the achieve- ments of his long and prosperous reign. To few, indeed, of the rulers of mankind has such a retrospect been accorded. Success in the ventures of War and the labours of Peace — improvement in every depart- ment of administration — progress in every phase of civil life — the triumph of enlightened beneficence — such is the note which rings through the whole exultant strain. Nor was the boast an empty one. But if Dalhousie left India prosperous, orderly, pro- gressive and replete with the outward and visible signs of efficient government, there were quarters in which the cold breezes of adversity might easily arise ; and he himself had preluded his narrative with the warning that no prudent man^ with any knowledge of the case, would ever venture to predict unbroken tranquillity within our Eastern possessions. Every- thing, however, in the external relations of India seemed to promise it. Burma had been cowed into the terror which was the best assurance of friendship with a Court too barbarous to know its FOREIGN RELATIONS 49 own weakness. Nepal, under a sagacious Minister, and with a Thibetan War on hand, was little likely to break the peace she had observed for forty years. The Chieftain whom, in an unlucky moment for humanity, the British Government had placed on the throne of Kashmir had laid hold of the great Pro-consul's dress in Darbar and cried: 'Thus I grasp the skirts of the British Government, and 1 will never let go my hold.' A treaty concluded in 1 855 with the Amir of Kabul bound him to common friends and foes, and Lord Dalhousie could report that every portion of our Western frontier was covered against hostile attack by the barrier of a treaty with a friendly power. But an Empire within whose confines, either by conquest, failure of heirs, or the stern decree of paramount authority, four kingdoms and various minor principalities had in less than a decade been merged, could scarcely fail to contain much smouldering disaffection or to provide the occasion which would fan it to a blaze. Oudh, the latest acquisition, lying in the very heart of the North- Western Provinces, was full of explosive material. The King had yielded without a blow ; but the results of a century of anarchy were not to be effaced by the heroic remedy of annexation. The administration had been supremely corrupt ; the patrons of corruption were numerous and influential. The disbandment of the royal army sent 60,000 peasants back to their homes, stripped of their livelihood and ripe for disturbance. The local magnates, following the D 50 EARL CANNING familiar Indian precedent, had taken advantage of a Court paralysed by profligacy to do what they pleased ; and their pleasure was that of sturdy warriors, entrenched in forest fastnesses and followed by small armies of retainers as little compunctious as themselves. For such men might is right, and the doctrine had been, no doubt, rudely applied against rivals and dependants. A British official, who conducted an inquiry, a few years previous to annexation, into the condition of the Province, had travelled through a tract of eighty miles which Nature had designed to be a garden but which one of the Oudh magnates had reduced to a desert. When the British administrator appeared upon the scene, bent on beneficent projects for an oppressed peasantry, backed up by Courts which could not be bribed and forces which it was impossible to resist, the Oudh Talukdar found himself in a new and uncongenial world. The European officials regarded him with no friendly eye, as an oppressor of the poor and a useless incumbrancer of the soil. His title-deeds were strictly scanned; his vague prerogatives were disallowed. Tenant- rights, of which the tenant himself had scarcely dreamed, were boldly affirmed. Great dissatisfaction, accordingly, existed in the landed classes of Oudh. When the Mutiny came, the tenantry sided with their traditional lords against an alien protector, and the rebel soldiers, themselves for the most part drawn from the peasantry of Oudh, found in the strongholds and jungles of the landholders their THE KING OF OUDH 5 1 best refuge and in many of the landholders their warmest allies. Sir James Outram, the Head Official of the newly- annexed Province, had welcomed Lord Canning's arrival with a telegraphic announcement that all was well in Oudh ; but failing health had driven Outram to Europe, and his successor had by violent temper and want of judgment materially enhanced the dangers of an already perilous situation. In the meantime, the dethroned Sovereign was established in a suburb of Calcutta, and was consoling himself by the mission of various members of his family to plead his cause before the authorities in London. Those who profess to find elsewhere than in military disaffection the causes of the great outbreak of 1857, are accustomed to point to the presence of the ex-King of Oudh at Calcutta as one of the motive causes of the convulsion. No evidence, however, has ever been produced that the ex -King, either directly or in- directly, took part in the movement ; while amongst the circumstances connected with the Mutiny, which favoured the fortunes of the English, may reasonablj^ l)e counted the fact that, when Oudh threw off its allegiance^ the natural centre of local loyalty was not on the spot to afford a nucleus for disaffection. North-westward across the Doab, well placed in a commanding position on the Jumna, such a nucleus existed. The historical capital of the Mughals — so the will of Heaven or the fatuity of man had decreed — was now at once a strong fortress, a first- D 2 52 EARL CANNING class arsenal, and the home of the dethroned dynasty. Here Bahadur Shah — faded image of the great Mughal — still lived, a splendid pensioner, impotent for every- thing but sensuality, intrigue and crime. Half a century before, when Lord Wellesley and Lake were shattering the confederacy of Maratha States, the English had rescued his ancestor — a blind, helpless old man — from the oppression of the Marathas and control of the French, Lord Wellesley, with much respectful language, had reduced him to a puppet, consoled him with a good pension and splendid ceremonial for the loss of all real power, and, repenting of his original intention, allowed him to continue to reside at Delhi. Here, though with ever diminishing prestige, the heir of the House of Timiir lived on in quasi-royal state. The un- wisdom of the arrangement had been recognised and denounced by Lord Dalhousie. ' Here,' he said, ' we have a strong fortress in the heart of one of the principal cities of our Empire, and in entire command of the chief magazine of the Upper Provinces. It lies so exposed both to assault and to the dangers arising from the carelessness of the people living around it, that it is a matter for surprise that no accident has occurred to it.' The only effectual remedy was, the Governor-General observed, to transfer the stores into the Palace, ' which would then be kept by us as a British post, capable of maintaining itself against any hostile manoeuvre, instead of being, as it is now, the source of positive danger, and, perhaps, DISAFFECTION AT DELHI ^^ not unfrequently, the focus of intrigues against our power.' In 1856 the question was again brought under notice by the death of the King's heir, and Lord Canning strongly enforced his predecessor's view. The phantom dignities of the King were, he pointed out, unmeaning, useless and dangerous. The ultimate decision was that the legal heir to the discrowned monarch should be recognised, but only on condition of surrendering the title of King and of residing elsewhere than at Delhi. The child of the King's favourite wife, whom his mother's ambition destined as liis heir, was wholly put aside. The Queen was loud in lamentation and busy with intrigue. The young Prince, her son, was growing up a bitter hater of the English. In 1856^ there is reason to believe, these feelings rose higher than usual in the royal circle. A famous priest was poisoning the King's ear, and performing propitiatory sacrifices to hasten the moment of restoration. Exciting rumours filled the air. Russia was to avenge the Crimea by the invasion of India and the re-establishment of the Mughals. Persia was to help. The hundred years' rule by the aliens of the West was about to close. Vague talk took at last a more solid form, and in March, 1857, a proclamation, posted on the gates of the Great Mosque, announced that the King of Persia was marching to the destruction of the British Raj, and that it behoved the faithful to be ready to fight the unbeliever. Thus was Delhi prepared to welcome 54 EARL CANNING the mutineers who were soon to seek shelter behind her walls. Further again to the North-West lay a Province which any one, forecasting the chances of tranquillity, might well have regarded as a likely centre of dis- turbance. The Punjab, when Lord Canning arrived in India, had been for seven years a portion of the British Empire. Not an hour of those seven years had been wasted by the administrators of the newly-conquered Province, in their task of extend- ing to it the advantages of enlightened government. Under the two Lawrences and the able officials, whom Dalhousie crowded into his favourite acquisition, its prosperity had advanced by leaps and bounds. Yet the history of our connection with the Punjab was full of warning. At the beginning of the century the rising ambition of Ranjit Singh became a menace to Upper India. When in 1806 he crossed the Sutlej, and advanced pretensions to the territory between that river and the Jumna, Lord Minto, abandoning his policy of non-interference, had de- spatched a mission under Metcalfe and a British force to check the unwelcome intrusion. This combined argument induced the Sikh leader to sign a treaty of perpetual peace with the English, which he faithfully observed. The disorders, which followed on his death, had ended in a Praetorian tyranny. The army governed itself, ruled the State, and assumed a threatening atti- tude toward the English across the Sutlej. Hardinge massed his forces on the frontier. British victories at THE PUNJAB 55 Firozshah in 1845, and, in the following year, at Aliwal and Sobraon, tamed the ambition of the Sikh leaders and advanced the British frontier to the west of the Sutlej. The infant Sovereign was restored, a Council of Regency appointed ; benevolent despotism had full sway. The current of reform ran swift and strong. There was superficial tranquillity. Hardinge left India with the belief that not another shot need be fired for five years. In a few months the bloody fields of Chilian wala and Gujarat attested the vanity of such hopes. The army of the Punjab was con- quered and disarmed ; but the fact remained that the Sikhs who, under Ranjit Singh, had stood as one good line of defence against an assailant from the North- West — India's most vulnerable point — had shown themselves our sternest foes, and had cost us some of our bloodiest encounters. The Protectorate established by Lord Hardinge had completely broken down ; and Lord Dalhousie having to determine between ' thorough conquest and incessant warfare,' had solved the alternative by annexation. But though Gujarat had crushed the Sikh Confederacy, the cam- paign had demonstrated how formidable a foe the Sikh nation could be, how easily the national feeling might be roused against the English. Seven years of alien administration could hardly have efliaced national resentment or the desire of a warlike nation to assert its prowess in the field. ' The spirit of the whole Sikh people,' Lord Dalhousie had said, ' was inflamed by the bitterest animosity against us. . . . It was necessary to 56 KARL CANNING take measures for obliterating a State which could never become a peaceful neighbour.' The experiment proved a splendid success. During the Mutiny the Sikh soldiery rendered invaluable service ; but, in calculating the chances of that dire encounter, it is well to remember how easily matters might have gone otherwise — how, by the merest change of cir- cumstances, we might have had the most soldierly population in India arrayed amongst our foes, and how supremely fortunate for the English it was that the annexation of the Punjab — the expediency of which was greatly called in question by the opponents of Dalhousie's policy — had been effectively earned out — the Sikh army broken up — the population dis- armed, and that an exceptionally vigorous British administration had got the Province well in hand. Had an army — such as that with which Ranjit Singh threatened Upper India, or as that which Gough confronted at Chilianwala — been hovering in our rear during the siege of Delhi, the whole character of the struggle would have been altered, and the odds against the British immeasurably en- hanced. Another fortunate circumstance was that the portion of the Province, through which the route to Delhi lay, was held by Chieftains who owed their escape from absorption by Ranjit Singh to a British Protectorate, and who showed their gratitude by loyal co-operation at a moment when the fortunes of the British seemed at the lowest. The Chief of Patiala lent an army to preserve our communications ; and AFGHANISTAN 57 the troops of the Jind Raja fought by the side of British soldiers in the breach at Delhi. Fortunate, too, was it that the head official of the Province was a man whose character, temperament and antecedents seemed as though expressly designed to meet a great emergency. Sir John Lawrence had been familiar with Delhi since his first appointment, as a young civilian, twenty-five years before. In 1845 he was its Chief Magistrate, and earned Lord Hardinge's approval by the excellence of his transport arrangements to the battlefield of Sobraon. He had been placed in command of the territory then acquired. On various occasions he had been officially connected with districts on either side of Delhi, and knew them and the people thoroughly. Such knowledge is strength. When the moment arrived he was able to turn it to invaluable account. His colleagues and subordinates formed the strongest body of officials ever concentrated on an Indian Province. Among them were several whose military capacity amounted to absolute genius. Westward, across the Indus, the wild tribes of the Sulaiman hovered on the frontier, ever ready for a fray ; and, beyond them, again, was old Dost Muhammad in his Kabul fortress, eagerly watching the course of events and the chances of safety for his little State; dangerously environed by mightier Powers, whose collision might crush it out of ex- istence. Experience had taught him some rude lessons. The British had giievously wronged him — had driven him from a throne into exile and 58 EARL CANNING captivity. He had revenged himself, after his restora- tion, by sending his best troops to aid the Sikhs in theu' struggle for independence. He had now made up his mind that the British were better as friends than foes. The wrongs, which he had received — the assistance which he had given our enemies had been mutually condoned, and a formal agreement of amity had been signed in 1855. In Lord Canning's first year the course of events had tended to strengthen the ties of friendship between the Enghsh Government and the Amir. Persia was once again threatening Herat ; war with Persia was imminent. There was, fortunately, at this time, an official at Peshawar who appreciated the importance of the Amir's alliance, and believed that he might be conciliated and trusted. Herbert Edwardes succeeded in convincing Lord Canning that we might with advantage settle the terms on which England would help him in his struggle with the common enemy. The old Chieftain came down to the Khaiber, discussed his resources and necessities with the British envoys, renewed the alliance and received a satisfactory assurance of material aid. ' Now,' he said, ' I have made a treaty with the British, and I will keep it till death' — a promise which, happily for England, he observed with exemplary fidelity at a crisis when its breach would have been disastrous. But there were dangers nearer home. The great south-easterly bend of the Jumna marked a frontier which seemed boldly to challenge the sturdy tribes of ^. RAJPUTANA ( 59 Rajputana. Delhi, Agra and Allahabad looked out upon a region where, on an arid soil and beneath a blazing sky, some of the fiercest blood in India throbbed in the veins of a warrior race. Southward from Aijra towered the rock-built strono-hold of Gwalior, where Sindhia recalled the faded glories of Manitha rule. To the south, again, was Jhansi, home of a brave and fierce woman, widow of the last of the Jhansi Rajas, bitterly brooding over Lord Dalhousie's refusal to allow her to adopt an heir to the title and dignities of her departed lord. Still further to the south — where the Vindhyan Hills look down upon the Valley of the Narbada — Holkar, another Maratha potentate, preserved a loyalty which, perhaps, at times derived opportune reinforcement from the neighbourhood of a British cantonment at Mhow. Throuo;h this region ran the great high-road from Bombay to Agra and Delhi ; and, in case of a disturbance in Upper India, its military significance would be enormous. The Maratha Princes had no great reason to love the British. Nowhere had national instincts been more rudely thwarted, or the struggle between anarchy, rapine and oppression, as represented by native rulers, and order and subordination, as enforced by English administrators, been more acute. The antagonism had been long, fierce, inveterate. In the latter half of the seventeenth century Sivaji, founder of the Marathas, had carved a kingdom for himself out of a dismembered fragment of the Mughal Empire. His successors had 6o EARL CANNING pillaged with indiscriminate ruthlessness north and south of the Narbada — in the Gangetic valley and in the uplands of the Deccan. His descendants reigned at Satara, far to the south ; but a race of hereditary ministers had eclipsed the lineal heads of the con- federacy, and the Peshwas at Poona had won their way to an acknowledged headship. Another powerful subordinate had started an independent princedom in Berar, with Nagpur for his capital; another became a Sovereign at Baroda ; Sindhia gathered his retainers at Gwalior ; Holkar at Indore. Far and wide, across India, from Gujarat to Cuttack — from the Jumna to the Karnatic — these fierce communities had made the thunder of the Maratha horsemen a sound of terror. At the beginning of the century their mutual ani- mosities brought a nobler combatant upon the scene, and Arthur Wellesley had crushed a Maratha army at Assaye. Later victories made the English masters of Delhi, Agra, and a wide tract of country north of the Jumna. The Province of Orissa was taken from the Maratha Chieftain of Nagpur. Holkar still held his ground, and Lord Wellesley's closing years were chequered by inglorious reverses and baffled schemes. Lord Cornwallis arrived in 1805 with a mission of peace ; but the day of peace was not yet dawning. Twelve years later Lord Hastings found himself committed to another Maratha War. The Peshwa struck a bold blow for his ascendancy — bold, but ineffectual. He was vanquished^ lost his kingdom and his Maratha headship, and retired, a pensioner THE MARAT HAS 6l of his conquerors, to Bithur, an estate in the neigh- bourhood of Cawnpur, where his adopted son, forty years later, was destined to take a terrible revenge for his father's reverses. The Berar Sovereign tempted his fate with a like result. His kinafdom was shattered and dismembered. Holkar received a crushing blow at Mehidpur. The Maratha States bent their stubborn neck beneath the yoke, and owned themselves feuda- tories of the conquering Power. Such a history leaves no kindly recollections ; nor had subsequent intercourse tended to induce a more friendly mood. Southward of Bombay, behind the Western Ghats, lay a tract, known as the South Maratha Country, reaching from Satara to Dharwar. Here there was at work a special cause of animosity, the proceedings of a Commission, whose function it was to inquire, with the exactness of an English Court, into the validity of various titles and privileges purporting to emanate from former dynasties. The holder of a title, which has served well enough for his fathers before him, naturally resents official intrusion into his muniment room. The ' Inam Commission ' and its agents were odious, especially to those whom their proceedings ruined. There was, moreover, one Maratha, whose hatred toward the English was tinged with a deep personal animosity. The last of the Peshwas had lived on at Eithiir till 1851. His adopted son, known to infamy as Nana Sahib, petitioned to have the ex-Peshwa's life-pension continued to himself. The claim had no legal basis, and Lord Dalhousie con- 6a EARL CANNING sidered that the claimant, who inherited a large sum from his adoptive father's savings, was generously treated in being constituted owner of the Bithur Estate. The Nana sent an envoy to move the English authorities in his behalf; but the Directors were as immoveable as Dalhousie. He nursed his grievance. Shortly before the outbreak of the Mutiny, he made a tour in Upper India, and paid a visit to Lucknow, which so unfavourably impressed Sir H. Lawrence that he wrote to communicate his suspicions to the General commanding at Cawnpur — a warning, which, unhappily, was not believed till tragic experience confirmed its truth. There were other considerations, of wider range and stronger import even than nationality, which V at this -time influenced the public mind in India. ^^\Oiie_ was religious disquietude. The pious con- servative has generally ample grounds for deplor- ing his lot as born in evil days and a revolu- tionary epoch. But the classes who, in the India of Lord Dalhousie, wished to stand in the old ways of custom and creed, may well have felt something like consternation at changes which threatened the whole structure of society and struck at the very heart of religion. Creed and custom and institution seemed to be tottering to their fall. Popular education, a prominent feature of Dalhousie's programme, had been inaugurated by a brilliant essay, in which Macaulay assumed as his standpoint the thesis that Hindu mythology was a mere tissue of absurdities. RELIGIOUS DISQUIETUDE 6^ With cheerful but ruthless lucidity he pointed out that the first lesson in physics must satisfy the Bengali student that his sacred cosmogony was a childish myth. The hopes of missionaries rose high. Their language was confident and courageous. Some of their manifestoes sounded like invitations to general apostacy. Their influence on legislation was unmistakeable. The Hindu system visits apostacy with tremendous penalties, and declares the renegade to have forfeited, not merely the social communion of his fellow-men, but his share of the inheritance. An Act of the Governor-General's Council had swept away these penalties, and allowed the deserter from his creed to share with believers in the property and privileges of the family estate. A strong senti- ment, embodied in a sacred text and a widely-spread custom, prohibited the Hindu widow from a second marriage. A British enactment — declaring that this was not the Hindu law, and that the widow was free to marry again — had been prepared in Lord Dalhousie's time, and was passed by his successor. Another measure of the legislature, promoted in the early days of Lord Canning's reign, under the patronage of influential members of the Govern- ment, for the purpose of restraining certain odious forms of polygamy, was resented by Brahmans, whose privileges it curtailed, and dreaded by Hindu conservatives, who saw in it only another blow at existing institutions. When the legislature was thus courageous, it was not likely that the zeal of indi- 64 EARL CANNING viduals would be checked by authority or tempered by discretion. There were many in India at this time, not mere fanatics or enthusiasts, who regarded the conversion of the people of India as a not im- prabable event, and the endeavour to promote it as a duty, which no human mandate could overrule. One officer had openly preached to the soldiers of his regiment at Barrackpur: another had inscribed the Lord's Prayer on pillars on the main road entering the capital of his district. It is significant that, on so important an occasion as the banquet given by the Directors of the East India Company to Lord Canning on his appointment as Governor- General, Lord Palmerston had used language, which alarmists in India might not unreasonably inter- Cpret as suggestive that the conversion of the people was among the hopes, if not the immediate projects, of the Government. ' Perhaps,' he said, ' it might be our lot to confer on the countless millions of India a higher and nobler gift than any mere human knowledge; but that must be left to the hands of Time and the gradual improvement of the people.' The hands of Time seemed moving very quick ; the pace was becoming dangerous. ' The faster the current glides,^ wrote Sir H. Lawrence in 1856, ' the more need of caution, of watching the weather, the rocks and shoals.' Even while he wrote, the breakers were close a-head. What — millions of anxious hearts were ask- ing — did all these changes portend to the social and religious ascendancy of the Brahman, to his prestige, musalmAn grievances 6^ his sanctity, his caste? There was fear in the high quarters of Brahmanism, and Brahmans were a ruling \ power in the Sepoy army. Tlie Musalman had a personal grievance. He was feeling the dull pain of humiliated authority and tar- nished prestige. In the days of the great Mughal Emperors the Muhammadan rule had stretched far and wide. Eastward and southward — across the rich delta of Bengal, the rice fields of Dacca, the fat homesteads of Arcot, Muhammadan rulers had exercised sway, and Muhammadan soldiers and officials had enjoyed the pleasant privileges of victorious rule. Those halcyon days had passed. The Muhammadan had now toi compete on equal terms with the race which he had conquered and despised. His temperament, his creed, his education, disabled him from contending successfully with the subtle and quick-witted Hindu. The present was distressful. He brooded gloomily over the past. His lawful Sovereign sat with his sham Court at Delhi, more prisoner than prince — a pale shade of his former greatness. He was humbled. His conquerors were now devising fresh humiliations for his son. Haidar- abad and Lucknow alone remained of the mighty kingdoms which derived their sovereignty from Delhi ; and now the suppression of the Lucknow Court once again sounded in the Musalman's ears the knell of departing glory. In his dreams of the future, the fall of the British rule presented itself to the eye of faith as opening a possibility of restoration. The Musalman's E 66 EARL CANNING acquiescence in an infidel ruler is always contingent on the impossibility of rebellion. If a favourable opportunity offered, it would not be for pious believers to let it pass unused. A stimulus was afforded to disloyalty by a colony of fanatics from India, who had established themselves at Sitana, in the mountain ranges beyond the Indus, with the alliance of a local ruler, the Akhond of Swat. They issued incendiary proclamations, while the Miilvies of Patna secretly co-operated, and kept up a train of political converts from that city to the British frontier. Apart from race or religion there were large classes in India on whom the British rule weighed heavily, or who had old scores to settle with the new regime, or who were sufficiently uneasy to wish for change. There were other great landholders besides those of Oudh, who had experienced a rude transition, and come out of it with lessened dignities and a lighter purse. Lord Dalhousie's Government had rigorously enforced the principle that the right of an Indian Prince to transmit sovereignty to his adopted heir was contingent on the permission of the paramount Power. That permission had been on several notable occasions refused. The princely families of India could not fail to recognise that, as failure of natural heirs is a continual incident in an Eastern magnate's family, their absorption in the Empire was, sooner or later, inevitable. Such feelings in high quarters may have tended to unsettlement, and in any case have weakened the AGGRIEVED INTERESTS 6^ dislike of change natural to a privileged class. So, too, there were men to whom the introduction of a regular judicial system and strict procedure had proved a capital misfortune. Immemorial estates pass away to successful decree-holders, and a time- honoured family is sunk in ruin. To such men the hour of revolution sounds a hopeful note. There were, no doubt, men in such a mood in 1857, who reflected that the Centenary of Plassey was at hand, and recalled with secret satisfaction the prophecy that the hundi'edth year of British rule was to see its close. E a CHAPTER IV The Native Akmy The native army, with which Lord Canning had to deal, had been winning its laurels for a century. The French and English, ranging themselves on opposite sides in the War of the Austrian Succession, had carried their quarrel to the Coromandel Coast, and had soon learnt the valuable secret that native troops, disciplined and led by European officers, might be effectively employed against a native or a European foe. The English had turned the discovery to good account, and, when Clive started to rescue Calcutta from Siraj-ud-daula and to win his great victory at Plassey, he led with him, besides his 900 English soldiers, a well-drilled force of 1200 Sepoys. Since then the Sepoy army had shown its mettle on a hundred well-fought fields, it had carried the stan- dards of England to victory against the greatest armies and most famous commanders of the East — before the ramparts of Seringapatam, in the forest swamps of Burma, on the banks of the Sutlej, in the burning plains of Sind. It had enabled Wellesley to crush the Marathas at Assaye, and Gough to shatter the Sikh battalions at Gujarat. It had LOYALTY OF NATIVE SOLDIERS 69 shared our reverses as well as our triumphs. Native soldiers had suffered and died by the side of their English comrades on the banks of the Chambal, in the defiles of Kabul, and behind the crumbling earth- works of Jalalabad. The English leaders of this force, in its earlier days, appear to have wielded a strange spell over their followers. Eomantic stories are told of the devotion with which the native soldier regarded his European officer, and the chivalrous loyalty with which he obeyed him. On one occasion the Sepoys had stood by Clive against a mutiny of English officers and troops. On another they had, when food was running short, given up their own rations in order that the Europeans of the garrison, less inured than themselves to privation, might not feel the pinch of hunger. An honourable record of meritorious service had embodied itself in the tradition that the Sepoy, if properly led, would go anywhere and do anything that his officer enjoined. The officers, on the other hand, were proud of their men, careful of their well-being, confident in their loyalty — a confidence, which, in many instances, was not to be shaken by the clearest evidence, and which cost many lives by the delay of precautions till it was too late to strike a blow. Some signal instances, however, had proved that the Sepoy was capable of a mutinous mood. At Vellore, in 1806, discontent — aroused by certain inno- vations in drill and dress, which were regarded as 70 EARL CANNING a menace to caste and religion, and aided, probably, by Tipti Sahib's family, who were detained there — had shown itself in overt insubordination. In a few hours Gillespie's Horse Artillery, galloping from Arcot, had brought the offenders to account, and military order had been vindicated by a sudden and terrible retribution. Eighteen years later, on the occasion of the first Burmese War, a native regiment, the 47th, alarmed lest the vicissitudes of the journey to Burma might imperil the integrity of the terms of their engage- ment, refused to march. Discipline was again sternly asserted. A sudden discharge of artillery swept the ranks of the offenders ; the surviving leaders were hanged, and the name of the guilty regiment disappeared from the Army List. Subsequent events had not tended to improve the temper of the Sepoy, or diminish the grounds of disaffection. The conquests of Wellesley, Hastings, and Dalhousie had enlarged the area in which the Sepoy was bound to serve without the extra allowance granted for foreign service. The victories, which the Sepoy helped to win, were thus turned to his dis- advantage. The ill-feeling had on more occasions than one assumed a dangerous form. The 34th Regiment, ordered to Sind, had refused to march beyond Firozpur without the usual addition to its pay. Several other regiments had followed the example. The Government was afraid or unable to strike the necessary blow ; and though the 34th SEPOY DISCONTENT 7 1 Regiment was ultimately struck out of the Army List, the Sepoy had learned the mischievous lesson that insubordination might enjoy impunity and even effect its object. The conquest of the Punjab once more raised the question of the extra allowance for foreign service. In 1849 two regiments of the Army of Occupation showed overt signs of discontent. A soldier of nerve and resolution was, happily, on the spot to meet the emergency. Sir Colin Campbell's mood was not encouraging to incipient mutineers, and the difficulty, for the moment, passed away. In December of the same year General Hearsey, an officer destined a few years later to play a prominent part in the opening scene of the Mutiny, found himself confronted by a similar manifestation. In January of 1850 the 66th N.I. broke out at Govindgarh, the fort which dominated Amritsar, the sacred city of the Sikhs. The outbreak was promptly crushed by some native Cavalry which, luckily, stood firm. The guilty regiment was disbanded: its name was erased from the Army List, and its place taken by a regiment of Gurkha Hill-men, whose military value was now beginning to be realised. At this stage of the story a conflict of opinion between the Governor-General and the Commander-in- Chief tended to obscure the merits of the controversy, and to impede the application of remedial measures. Neither Lord Dalhousie nor Sir Charles Napier were men to sleep upon their rights. Napier, in a more 72 EARL CANNING than usually independent mood, thought proper to rescind a departmental order, which had been passed in 1845 as to some details of the Sepoys' pay, and to denounce it as 'impolitic and unjust.' Dalhousie at once responded to the challenge, and in incisive language reproved the attempted encroachment on his authority. Napier, angry and rhetorical, declared that he had acted in ' a moment of great public danger,' and that he was dealing with 'an army of 40,000 men, infected with a mutinous spirit.' Dalhousie denied the mutinous spirit and derided the alleged danger. The result was to commit Dal- housie to the theory that the condition of the native army was satisfactory. He received, however, some serious warnings as to the soundness of such a view. Once again Burma supplied the occasion. In the second Burma War the 38th N. I., a distinguished regiment, was invited to embark for Arakan. Such a journey was beyond the terms of its engagement. It would imperil caste. The men declined to go. Dalhousie was unable to compel them. They were in their right. The Great Lord Sahib was known, in soldiers' circles, to have suffered a repulse. Such triumphs are dangerous to those who win them. The Sepoy was tasting the pleasure of having his own way, and was learning how to get it. The difficulty was one of the troublesome legacies which Dalhousie bequeathed to his successor. When Lord Canning arrived in India, it had become acute. The conquest of Pegu necessitated a permanent Burma THE BURMA DIFFICULTY 73 garrison ; but only a twelfth part of the Bengal Army- was available for foreign service. The rest could refuse to cross the sea. The land journey to Burma was practically impossible. The problem pressed for solution. Of the six regiments available for general service, three were in Pegu, and would have shortly to be relieved : the other three had but recently returned, and could not be again called upon for such unwelcome employment. Lord Canning appealed for help to the Madras Government, whose army did not, by the terms of enlistment, enjoy the exemption from service across the sea. But the Madras Government objected that the general employment of its troops as a garrison for Burma would render the army unpopular, check enlistment, and impair the morale and discipline of the force. Thus foiled. Lord Canning resolved that the only course was to act in the direction which had, several years before, been in- dicated by the Directors — to assimilate the terms of enlistment for the whole Bengal Army to those in force in the Bombay and Madras Armies and in the six ' General Service ' regiments of Bengal. It was decreed, accordingly, that, for the future, the terms of recruitment for the whole of the Bengal army would involve the obligation of service beyond the sea. The announcement produced no manifestation of disapproval, and Lord Canning wrote home in the autumn of 1856 that there was no symptom that the change was unpopular, or that the Sepoys, enlisted on the old termSj regarded it as a first step towards 74 EARL CANNING breaking faith with themselves. There is reason, however, to believe that the measure was unfavourably regarded by the Bengal Army and the classes from which it was recruited. That army was, to a large extent, a hereditary body. The existing Sepoys regarded the future position of their sons with as much anxiety as their own. Sir Henry Lawi'ence, writing early in May, 1857, reported that the en- listment oath ' for general service ' was frightening the Sepoys and deterring the Rajput recruits. It is possible that this, among other topics, was urged on the Sepoys by the propagandists of disaffection as a ground for the belief that their privileges, caste and religion were not as secure as heretofore. The un- easiness of the native army may have been increased by the rumour that the Government contemplated a large addition to the Sikh troops in their employ, and would thus become, to some degree, independent of the army, by which hitherto its Empire had been extended and sustained. A source of chronic danger existed in the personnel of the Bengal Ai'my. It was mainly recruited from districts in Oudh, in which Brahmans and Bajputs form the bulk of the fighting population. The men were of fine, stalwart physique, such as a commanding officer naturally selects as promising material. The orders of Government, accordingly, which had from time to time enjoined the necessity of composing regiments of diverse castes and classes, had been too generally overlooked. The son stepped proudly and THE BENGAL ARMY 75 gladly into the father's place, and found himself surrounded by kinsmen. The result was that two- thirds of the Bengal Army, and of the ' Contingent Forces ' maintained by Holkar, Sindhia and other semi-independent States, consisted of men drawn from the same locality, inspired with the same ideas, and bound together by strong ties of creed, custom, and feeling. In one of the regiments near Calcutta, in which in 1857 disaffection first disclosed itself, it was ascertained that, out of a total of 1083 men, more than 800 were Hindus, and of these no less than 2,2)^^ including 41 officers, were Brahmans. An army so composed could scarcely fail to engender forces subversive of its discipline as a military machine, and calculated to give to the sentiments of any influential section the dangerous universality of an epidemic. The seriousness of such a state of things was enhanced by the fact that the Bengal Army garrisoned a territory which stretched from the Trans- Indus frontier on the west to Pegu and the Malay Peninsula on the east, and that it outnumbered the com- bined numbers of the other two Presidential armies. In 1856 it consisted of seventy-four regiments of Infantry, ten regiments of regular, and eighteen of irregular Cavalry. Part of the Bombay Army, also, was re- cruited from the same districts in Oudh, and shared the susceptibilities of their fellow-tribesmen in Bengal. It is possible, also, that the annexation of Oudh may have fostered disaffection in the native soldiery, largely recruited from that country. Some, no doubt, 76 EARL CANNING felt aggrieved at the extinction of a dynasty, which, whatever its offences, had the merit of making Oudh a kingdom. When the order of effacement came, the shortcomings of the deposed Sovereign — his debased surroundings — the outrages of his officials — the reign of cruelty, impotence, and wrong — passed, no doubt, into a generous oblivion. A soldier, whom oppression scarcely touched and certainly did not shock, would feel but languid enthusiasm for the new and impersonal regime, which replaced the picturesque splendours of an Oriental Court by the dull preciseness of English administration ; and which lowered his personal status by bringing within the reach of the community at large legal rights which had previously been the privilege of the soldiery. In the army itself there was a serious deficiency of European officers. Lord Dalhousie's administrative system necessitated the free employment of European officers for civil work. A semi-military, semi-civil regime answered the wants of a newly-conquered Province. It was cheap ; it was effective ; it rendered the head of the organisation more completely master of the situation — to do what he pleased, unchecked by technicalities. But it involved a large reduction in the staff of European officers doing duty with their regiments. In April, 1857, Lord Canning had written to England an urgent request for an addition to the officers in each Infantry regiment — four for each European, two for each native regiment. He ex- plained that the application was submitted in a DETERIORATION OF THE NATIVE FORCE 77 bald shape because 'the necessity of immediate increase is urgent, and I have no time to go into the complicated question of our military wants gene- rally.' An influential party in England, however, deprecated any such addition in native regiments as tending to lead the officers to form a class apart, and to live a too completely European life, and so to lose touch of their troops. Administrative changes, moreover, introduced with the object of improved discipline and efficiency, had lowered the status of the officers in native regiments, and had substituted for a small body of European officers, specially adapted to their work and closely associated with their men, the conventional staff of an English regiment. A system of appeal to Head- quarters had grown up, which taught the Sepoy the dangerous lesson that his officer's decision was liable to be revised and set aside. Altogether it may be said that many causes had tended to undermine the Sepoy's respect for authority, his loyalty to his officers, his sense of discipline, and to accustom him to the idea of carrying his own way against his superior. All these bad influences are more or less conjectural; but there was one evil, affecting the native soldiers before the Mutiny, which admitted of arithmetical demonstration. There were too many of them. In 1838, when the Afghan War broke out, the native army was under 154,000 men. Lord Hardinge's preparations to meet the Sikhs had raised the numbers 78 EARL CANNING to 245,000. At the close of Dalhousie's reign, the numbers were still 333,000. On the other hand, the European force had been gradually lowered from 48,709 men in 1852 to 45,322 at the moment of Lord Canning^s arrival. He found, accordingly, an approximate ratio of one European to five native soldiers. In the Artillery there were more than 12,000 native Gunners, as compared with 6500 Europeans. The European force was very unequally distributed, a preponderating number being employed in garrisoning newly-acquired territories, the Punjab, Sind and Oudh. Twenty years before there had been no less than six European regiments between Calcutta and Allahabad. In Dalhousie's time there were only two, and when the Mutiny broke out, Lord Canning found that, for the 750 miles between Barrackpur and Agra, there was only a single European regiment, stationed about half-way, at Dinapur. This numerical disproportion had occasioned anxiety to Lord Dalhousie, and he had brought the subject strongly before the Home Government. In 1853, Parliament had sanctioned an increase of the European local force from 1 2,000 to 20,000 men. Unfortunately, advantage had been taken of this permission only to the extent of an addition of three regiments. Under the pressure of the Crimean War, two European regiments from the Indian garrison had been de- manded, a request which provoked a vehement protest from the Governor-General. Such a transfer would, DIMINUTION OF EN GUSH FORCE 79 he objected, give rise to an impression that in our conflict with Russia we had grappled with too powerful an antagonist : it would reduce the European force below the standard recognised as safe in ordinary times. 'If, further,' he added, 'we should be called to despatch an army to the Persian Gulf . . . then indeed I shall DO longer feel, and can no longer express, the same confidence as before that the security and stability of our position in the East will remain unassailed.' Despite this protest, two European regiments were transferred in 1 854. They were never replaced ; and when the Mutiny broke out, another important fraction of the European force was engaged in the Persian expedition. One of Dalhousie's last acts in India had been to lay on his Council table a series of Minutes, the general purport of which was a reduction of Sepoy regiments, an increase of European regiments, an addition to the Irregular and Gurkha forces, and of the European officers with native regiments. The warning fell on unheeding; ears : the Minutes were pigeon-holed, and never reached Parliament or the English public. Some of them were irretrievably mislaid. The subject dropped out of notice; and the outbreak of 1857 found the Government with an European force wholly inadequate to meet the barest requirements of the situation. Dalhousie's protest did not stand alone. Sir Henry Lawrence in 1855 had written in no faltering terms of 8o EARL CANNING the defects which at that time impaired the efficiency of the native army. He called attention to the dangerous numerical disproportion of the native to the European force. He insisted on, the danger of high military commands being entrusted to men whose only claim rested on seniority, and whose incompetence was, in many instances, notorious — on the ' sullen discontent ' which the existing rules excited in aspiring native soldiers — the inadequate pay — the scanty and long-deferred pension, the narrow possibilities which bounded the ambition of ' the man who lives and rots without hope.' He pointed out how 50,000 soldiers of the King of Oudh, turned adrift for no fault of their own, and an equal number of his dependents, were all looking to the British Government for compensation — and how Oudh, with its 246 forts and innumerable smaller strongholds, hidden in impenetrable jungles, afforded a congenial refuge for despair and disloyalty. ' We shall be unwise,' he said, 'to wait for the occasion. Come it will, unless anticipated.' The Sibylline leaves were scattered to the winds, and even while he wrote, the hours, during which anticipation would be possible, were passing rapidly away. CHAPTER V Mutiny Theke are periods in history, it has been said, which resemble the moments before the rising of the curtain on a stage where some thrilling drama is about to be enacted. We seem to hear the muttered voices, the hurried steps, the bustle of preparation on the still hidden scene. There is a nervous excitement — a sense of impending catastrophe : the common acts of life gain a strange, terrifying significance : common words mean more than meets the ear. The heroes, the victims, the villains of the piece, have not begun their parts : but the thrill of expectation is strong ; tragedy already fills the air. It is with some such feeling as this that we watch the close of Lord Canning's first year in India, and the fateful 1857, with its store of troubles, opening upon a world where all things still promised to run their common course. And now the first whiff- of the coming tempest broke upon an untroubled atmosphere. It had been decided that the old-fashioned musket should be superseded by the Enfield rifle. Depots for in- struction in the use of the new weapon had been F 82 EARL CANNING formed at three stations : Dumdum, a cantonment in the neighbourhood of Calcutta ; Ambala and Sialkot, at the foot of the Himalaya in Upper India. Large numbers of cartridges for the new rifle had been manufactured at Fort William in Calcutta, and sent up country for use at the two northern depots. Another supply had been manufactured at Meerut, the headquarters of the Bengal Artillery. None had, however, as yet been issued to the troops. A chance altercation between a high-caste Sepoy and and a low-caste employ^ at Dumdum brought to light the astounding fact that the material used in lubri- cating the new cartridge consisted partially of the fat of cows and pigs, a substance which neither Hindu nor Muhammadan could touch without pollution. The story spread like wild-fire. It became at once the topic of the Sepoy's talk at the neighbouring can- tonment of Barrackpur, where four native regiments were quartered. The Sepoys were seriously alarmed ; and the Sepoys were a body so constituted that a sentiment, felt acutely by any of its members, flashed through the entire body with the swiftness and force of an electric shock. There is reason to believe that, before Lord Canning's day, the native soldiers of Upper India were haunted by the idea that the Government contemplated their conversion to Christianity by the summary process of rendering them outcasts from their own religion. In the first days of trouble at Lucknow a Brahman ofiicer of high standing assured Sir H. Lawrence that for ten years PANIC IN NATIVE ARMY 83 the Government had entertained such a design, and, when Sir Henry reasoned with him, stuck to his opinion, saying, ' I tell you what everybody says.' Such an idea would not seem grotesque to men whose notions of religion rested more on customary ceremonial than on sentiment or dogma, and with whom acceptance by the vanquished of the creed of the conqueror was a not unfamiliar incident of conquest. It now received a tremendous impetus from the discovery that the Government was about to furnish the soldier, as part of his equipment, with something which Hindu and Muhammadan alike re- garded it as sacrilege to touch. Their rulers were contriving, had actually contrived, their religious and social ruin. Whenever, from Calcutta to Peshawar, a group of Sepo^^s gathered round a camp fire to eat their meal, or chatted on the march, the tidings found ready belief ; and, owing to the close ties between the Bengal army and the Oudh population, every pang which the Sepoy felt vibrated through a hundred villages, where the fate of father or husband or brother was keenly felt and eagerly discussed. Such anxieties soon mount into panic, and early in 1857 the Sepoy army of Bengal was panic-stricken. At Barrackpur there was an outburst of incendiarism in the native quarters — -midnight meetings — excited talk — despatching of letters to other regiments — every symptom of alarm and agitation. A hundred miles to the north the cantonment of Berhampur kept guard over Murshidabad, a former capital of Bengal, F % «4 EARL CANNING and now the home of one of India's discrowned magnates. There were no European troops. An Infantry regiment — the 19th,— a corps of irregular Cavalry and a battery of Artillery, composed the native force. Here, before the close of February, the excitement became acute. The 19th broke into open mutiny. The men i*efused. the copper caps tendered to them for a parade, and presently rushed to their arms. The Colonel, after vainly endeavouring to persuade or intimidate them into submission, and not too confident of the support of the rest of the force, was compelled to purchase their return to discipline by a concession which was equivalent to surrender to a mutinous demonstration. At Calcutta, meanwhile, prompt measures had. been taken to allay the excitement. An order was pro- mulgated, informing the troops at Barrackpur that they would be allowed to purchase for themselves the ingredients for greasing their cartridges. General Hearsey, the General of the Division, an officer thoroughly familiar with native feeling, addressed the brigade and explained to the troops the futility of their alarms. His explanations fell on unbelieving ears. The fact that the Government had sent to Burma for an English regiment, and that the regiment which had misbehaved at Murshidabad was under orders to come down to headquarters to receive sentence for its offence, increased the general alarm. The suspicion, originally felt about the grease used OUTBREAK AT BARRACKPUR 85 for lubricating the new cartridge, was now transferred to the glazed paper of which it was made. It was in vain that its innocence was demonstrated. Terror will not be convinced. At the close of March, a more pronounced outburst of insubordination occurred at Barrackpur. In front of the Quarter Guard of the 34th N. I., one of the native regiments there stationed, a young Sepoy, in a frenzy of excitement, strode boldly up and down, inviting his companions to rebellion. He fired upon an European officer, as he was galloping to the scene of disorder, brought down his horse, and grappled with him on the ground. In the scuffle which ensued, no native, except a single Muhammadan, came to the assistance of their officer. The native officer of the Quarter Guard and his men looked on unmoved. Some of them even joined in the assault. The arrival on the scene of the General of the Division and his daring and impressive behaviour restored discipline for the moment. But it was evident that the regi- ment was completely demoralised, and that further troubles might be expected. The disbanding of the 19th N.I. was, however, effected without disturbance. The dismissed soldiers went away, cheering their General, protesting contrition, and vowing vengeance against the 34th Regiment as the instigators of their misbehaviour. Meanwhile, at Ambala, 1000 miles away, an inci- dent had occurred in the Commander-in-Chief's camp which showed how widely the alarm about the new 86 EARL CANNING cartridges had spread. The 36th Regiment, which formed General Anson's escort on his march, had a detachment in the rifle depot. Two Sepoys from this detachment visited the General's camp, and learned with horror that their comrades regarded them as Christians and outcasts, and refused to eat with them. The men reported the incident to Lieutenant Martineau, the Musketry Instructor at the deput, with tears in their eyes. If this, they argued, could occur in the Commander-in-Chief's camp, what would be their fate when they returned to their homes 1 They were ruined. Then the Commander-in-Chief attempted to allay their anxiety. Summoning the native officers before him, he assured them that the Government harboured no design against then- caste, and that their fears were baseless. The native officers, respectful, but unconvinced, pointed out in reply that, however groundless it might be, the story was universally believed in the country, and that, though they were ready to obey any order to use the new cartridge, its use would render them outcasts. General Anson then raised the question, whether it might not be well to meet an irrational panic by the simple expedient of breaking up the deput and dispersing the detach- ments to their regiments. Upon consideration, how- ever, Lord Canning decided that it would be a mistake to postpone the target drill. On no possible ground could objection to the cartridge paper be justified. ' If we give way upon this,' he wrote, ' I do not see INCENDIARISM 87 where we can take our stand.' The difficulty in the future would be only increased by delay. The new drill, accordingly, was ordered to proceed. The Sepoys submitted ; but nightly fires in the cantonments indi- cated the prevalence of disturbing influences and an agitated mood in the soldiery. Night after night some military building was found to have been mysteriously fired. All attempts to discover the origin of the conflagration were unsuccessful. The tide of trouble continued to rise. One alarming rumour followed another. At Cawnpur, where grain prices happened to be ruling high, some consignments of flour, forwarded in Government boats, were offered to the troops. The proffered boon was refused, and the sale was at once arrested by the report that the grain had been ground in European mills, and that the dust of cow bones had been mixed with it for the purpose of polluting it. Not a Sepoy would touch the suspected supply. In the surrounding country the general un- easiness was enhanced by the mysterious transmission, from village to village, of chupattis — flat cakes of flour — the meaning of which has never been elucidated, but which were admitted on all hands to herald the advent of stirring times. At Meerut, a religious mendicant, mounted on an elephant and followed by a long retinue, riding through the streets of the city, stimulated the public excitement. Nana Sahib, the adopted son of the ex-Peshwa, whose estate of Bithur was but a few miles from Lucknow, was travelling from city to city, and earl}^ in itS57 paid 88 EARL CANNING visits to Delhi, Lucknow, Kalpi across the Jumna, and other important centres of native society. In the last week of April the latent fire blazed out. Out of ninety troopers of the 3rd Native Cavalry at Meerut, who were called upon to receive their cartridges for a parade, all but five refused to touch them. In vain their Colonel expostulated, upbraided, explained. The men were firm. The parade was broken up, a court-martial ordered, the due complement of officers — all natives — was assembled to investigate this flagrant breach of discipline. At Calcutta it appeared as if the excitement was subsiding. There had been no more outbreaks at Barrackpur. The mutinous Sepoy of the 34th N.I. and the native officer of the Quarter Guard had been hanged in presence of all the troops of the can- tonment, the latter with his last breath confessing his guilt and warning his comrades against disloyal behaviour. So satisfied was General Hearsey with the state of the cantonment that, on May 7th, he reported that he no longer required the European troops, which had been sent there to guard against disturbance ; and the Government were preparing to send back the 84th Regiment, which, on the first occurrence of disturbance, had been brought over from Burma. At Dumdum the detachment in the rifle depot had proceeded to ball practice without any symptoms of disaffection. At Sialkot the new rifle drill was proceeding quietly. Sir J. Lawrence, who visited TROUBLES AT LUC KNOW 89 that station in May for the purpose of seeing the new weapon, as well as of judging of the temper of the Sepoys, reported to Lord Canning that ' all were highly pleased with the new musket and quite ready to adopt it ; ' ' The officers assured him that no bad feeling had been shown, and he could perceive no hesitation or reluctance on the part of the Sepoys.' From Ambala General Barnard wrote in favourable terms of the behaviour of the troops. It thus seemed that at the central points, the rifle depots, the difficulty had been tided over. At Meerut, the insubordination of the 3rd Cavalry provoked no imitators. The threatening storm seemed to have passed, and Lord Canning began to turn his thoughts to current topics of administration. Presently came bad news from Lucknow. Early in May a regiment of Oudh Irregular Cavalry had shown symptoms of dis- affection. The men refused to use the cartridges, and had broken into open mutiny. Sir H. Lawrence had at once adopted vigorous measures of repression, and, hurrying to the spot, had succeeded in disarming the regiment. Symptoms of disturbance, however, continued. Incendiarism was rife in the native quarters, and Sir H. Lawrence satisfied himself, by personal intercourse with the men, that the moving cause of the disturbance was the conviction of the native soldiery that the English Government con- templated their compulsory conversion. At Calcutta the punishment of the 34th Regiment had been considered with that leisurely exactness 90 EARL CANNING which Lord Canning's temperament demanded, and which the importance of the matter justified. It was not till the end of April that the sentence of disbandment was announced. It was, confessedly, a mild sentence. Lord Cannii.g's assailants are never weary of denouncing its inadequacj^ as one of the causes of subsequent military insubordination. But there is no ground for supposing that the careful mode- ration exhibited by the Government at the outburst of the Mutiny encouraged its spread. On the contrary, the first great act of rebellion was the immediate result of a severe sentence carried out, with every degrading accessory, at Meerut. Lord Canning himself, reviewing the case in the light of a subsequent outbreak at Lucknow, thus summed up the argument for a policy of leniency: — ' I wish to say that it is my conviction that the measures which have been taken in dealing with mutineers have not been too mild. I have no doubt that many rank offenders have not had their deserts, but I know of no instance in which the punishment of any individual could, with unquestioned justice, have been made more severe : and I am not disposed to doubt the efficacy of the measures because the present ferment, in running its course over the land, after being checked in Bengal, has shown itself in Oudh and the North- West. I would meet it everywhere with the same deliberately measured punishments ; picking out the leaders, wherever this is possible, for the severest penalties of military law ; visiting the common herd with disbandment, but carefully exempt- MUTINY AT MEERUT 9 1 ing those whose fidelity, innocence, or. perhaps, timely repentance, is fully proved.' The subject was still under discussion when, on May 1 2th, there came news from Upper India whose transcendent importance at once revolutionised the situation. The station of Meerut, some forty miles north-east of Delhi^ was one of the very few in India where adequate means existed for quelling an outbreak of native troops. There was a regiment of English Dragoons, a battalion of the 60th Rifles, and a strong force of Horse and Foot Artillery, far more than sufficient to deal with the three native regiments who were also quartered in the cantonment. The court-martial on the eighty-five men of the 3rd N. C. who had refused to take their cartridges, had by this time completed its inquiry. The men were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The sentence was carried out with impressive solemnity. On a morning, presently to become historical — the heavens sombre with rolling clouds — the brigade assembled to hear their comrades' doom — to see them stripped of their uniform and secured with felons' manacles. The scene produced intense emotion. Resistance was impossible. There were entreaties, tears, imprecations, as the prisoners were marched away to jail. Discipline had been vindicated by a terrible example. The next day was Sunday. In the evening, as the European Riflemen were gathering for Church, a sudden movement took place in the native quarters. The Cavalry dashed oft" to the jail 92 EARL CANNING to rescue their imprisoned companions. The two Infantry regiments, after a moment's wavering, threw in their lot with the mutineers. Then ensued a scene such as, unhappily, became too familiar in Upper India within the next few weeks. Officers were shot, houses fired, Europeans — men, women, and children, wherever found, were put to the sword. A crowd of miscreants from the jail, suddenly set free, made a long night of pillage. Meanwhile, paralysed by the sudden catastrophe, the English General of the Division and the Brigadier of the Station forebore to act, re- fused to let their subordinates act, and the Sepoys who had fled, a disorganised mob, in different direc- tions, soon found themselves gathering on the march for Delhi. In the early morning at Delhi, where courts and offices had already begun the day's work, a line of horsemen were descried galloping on the Meerut road. They found their way into the city, into the presence of the King ; cut down the European officials, and, as they were gradually reinforced by the arrival of fresh companions, commenced a general massacre of the Christian population. A brave telegraph clerk, as the mutineers burst in upon him, had just time to flash the dreadful tidings to Lahore. Before evening, the native regiments fired upon their officers and joined the mutineers. After weary hours of hope for the help from Meerut which never came, the British officers in command were compelled to recognise that the only chance of safety FIRST DAY OF MUTINY AT DELHI 93 lay in flight. Ere the day closed, every European who had risen that morning in Delhi, was dead, or awaiting death, or wandering about the country in the desperate endeavour to reach a place of safety. A day dark with disaster was, however, illumined by the first of those heroic acts which will make the siege of Delhi immortal. The insurgents had their first taste of the quality of the race whose ascendancy they had elected to assail. Lieutenant Willoughby, the officer in charge of the Magazine, and eight gallant companions, resolved, early in the day, that, if they could not defend their invaluable supply of ammu- nition, they would destroy it, though its destruction would almost certainly involve their own. For hours they defended their stronghold against an overpowering crowd of assailants. The train was laid : the sergeant who was to fire it stood ready: Willoughby took a last look out upon the Meerut road: the assailants were swarming on the walls. The word was spoken : a vast column of flame and smoke shot upward. Two thousand of the assailants were blown into the air. The thunder of that explosion announced to the mutineers that one great object in the seizure of Delhi had escaped their grasp. Was it an opening note of victory, or the knell of an abortive insurrection ? The mutiny began badly for the English. Its first great episode was one which, least of any in its history, can be remembered with satisfaction. Eng- lishmen for the most part, during that dread ordeal, rose nobly to the occasion ; but those, whom circum- 94 EARL CANNING stances called to play a leading part in this first scene, sank below the average level of promptitude, energy, and daring. Fifty years before, an outbreak at Vellore, in the Madras Presidency — curiously similar in the character of its origin — had, fortunately, found a man equal to the occasion. In a few hours Gillespie, who com- manded a regiment of British Cavalry at a neigh- bouring station, had come galloping to the rescue. The retribution, which his troopers dealt to the mutineers, had crushed the outbreak and taught the native army a long-remembered lesson. There was no such spirit now in the Meerut head-quarters. Those, on whose firmness and promptitude salvation depended, were neither firm nor prompt. Had their example been followed — had other Englishmen, at critical moments, shown the same passivity, want of resource, the same anxiety to secure their own position to the neglect of others still more endangered, the Mutiny must have assumed a difierent. a far more serious aspect — our hold on Upper India must have been lost, and recovered — if indeed it proved recoverable — by a struggle the dimensions of which it is impossible to conjecture. On the other hand, a Nicholson or Havelock would have been presently thundering on the track of the mutineers, and have brought them, before they were many miles on their road, to a swift and terrible account. Order, unbroken, would have reigned in Delhi : the English would have held a fort and arsenal from which they could have defied CONDITION OF BENGAL 95 any combination of assailants, and the propagandists of disloyalt}^, from one end of India to the other, would have been cowering, in terrified silence, before the signal punishment which had overtaken the first attempt at rebellion. Not so had the book of fate been written. The history of many months of struggle, suffering and sacrifice, may be summarised as a prolonged effort to repair the disastrous con- sequences of this ineffable shortcoming. Nobly was it to be retrieved. The seizure of Delhi severed the great British line of communication which runs straight across Upper India for 1500 miles from Calcutta to Peshawar. As his eye followed it on the map, Lord Canning realised profoundly the huge distances with which he had to deal, the defencelessness of the European position, in case the movement initiated at Delhi and JMeerut should spread, and the many grave possibilities which the position presented of further trouble. Delhi, the immediate scene of action, was 900 miles away. The great Province of Bengal was destitute of European troops. There were in the Province 2400 European soldiers, as against a native force of more than 29,000. A single English regi- ment was distributed between the fort in Calcutta and the neighbouring cantonments. A traveller, who at that time had journeyed up the line, would have found no other European troops till he reached Dinapur, 380 miles away; and the English regiment there stationed had enough to do in watching four g6 EARL CANNING native regiments and the neighbouring city of Patna, itself a hotbed of Muhammadan fanaticism and a dangerous nucleus of Muhammadan intrigue. It was a portion of the line of communication at which difficulties were likely to occur, and where, in fact, the gravest perils did subsequently present themselves. A little further to the westward our imagined traveller would have come to the holy city of Benares, the stronghold of Brahmanism. Here were three native regiments, without a single European soldier to control them, the excitable inhabitants of the city, or the turbulent population of the sur- rounding country. Next on the line of communication was Allahabad, at the junction of the Ganges and Jumna, commanding the eastern entrance of the tract of country which lies between the two rivers — known locally as the Doab — thus dominating the North- Western Provinces, the neighbourino; districts of Oudh to the north and the Rajputana frontier on the southern bend of the Jumna. Its position gave it enormous military sig- nificance ; but Allahabad was without a European soldier. At Cawnpur, on the right bank of the Ganges, 140 miles from Allahabad, the traveller would have found four native regiments, and a European force represented by fifty-nine Artillerymen, and a small party of invalids. Its defenceless condition was the more unfortunate, as there was an unusually THE LINE OF THE JUMNA 97 large non-combatant population, including several hundreds of women and children. At Lucknow, forty-two miles away from Cawnpur, to the north-east, on the other side of the Ganges, in the centre of the newly-annexed Province, were stationed three regiments of native Infantry, one of native Cavalry, and a battery of native Artillery. The European force consisted of a single regiment, H. M.'s 32nd Foot, about 570 strong, and 50 or 60 artillerymen. Following the course of the Jumna from Allahabad upwards, the traveller would next come to Agra, the capital of the North-Western Provinces ; here were quartered two regiments of native Infantry, one European regiment, and a battery of Artillery. One hundred and fifteen miles higher up the stream he would have found Delhi, the head-quarters of the rebellion, with every trace of British domination swept away. Thence, forty-three miles across the Doab, he would have found at Meerut a powerful British force — of all arms — paralysed for the moment, unhappily, by its nerveless commander. Still journeying westward, and crossing the highlands which separate the Indus and Ganges systems, the traveller would at last reach a Province where the disproportion of the European force to the native was less serious. In the Punjab there were some twelve English regiments, numbering about 11,000 men. The native regular force numbered 36,000, composed of much the same elements as the Sepoy army in other Provinces of Upper India, and 98 EARL CANNING suspected of being largely infected with the same disloyal mood. There was, besides, a local force of Punjab Irregulars, numbering some 1 3,000 men — distributed for 600 miles along the Indus frontier. To which side would these men incline, supposing that the Sepoys — already more than three to one — turned against the English ? Besides the army there was in the Punjab a body of 13,000 military police, drawn from the same classes as the Irregulars, and likely to follow them in the matter of loyalty. The English regiments were massed principally about Ambala on the eastern confines of the Province, and in the Peshawar Valley, on its north-western frontier — four regiments at the one and three at the other. Even here the British were outnumbered. At Peshawar the 3000 Euro- peans were confronted with 6000 native troops. The position was in other respects full of anxiety. Within an easy ride was the famous Khaibar Pass and the belt of mountain tribes, untameable, warlike, and nothing loath to seize a favourable opportunity for a raid. Beyond them again was the old Afghan Amir, who, though recently bound by an alliance of friendship with the British Government, had some old scores to settle, some deep grievances to resent, and the dear hope of regaining the Peshawar Valley, of which Ranjit Singh had robbed him. Nor was it of Upper India alone that Lord Canning had to think. How would the country southward of the Jumna, the races of Rajputana and Central India, SPREAD OF THE MUTINY 99 be affected by the crisis? the Maratha Chieftains, through whose dominions ran the other great line of British communication — that which linked Agra and Bombay ? Would the Gwalior army be friend or foe, and, if foe, could either line of advance be adequately protected from so well-placed an assailant, aided by such important allies as the Kani of Jhansi, burning to avenge her husband's wrongs % How would Holkar's retainers at Indore view the opportunity of striking a blow at their old opponent ? What of Bombay, and the South Maratha Country beyond, where elements of mischief were known to be at work % The answer was not long in coming. Within a few weeks of the seizure of Delhi, Oudh and the North- Western Provinces were practically lost. In one great station after another the Sepoys rose, drove out or massacred the Europeans, pillaged the treasury, turned loose the population of the jails, and marched away in triumph to join the rebel army. The Lieutenant- Governor of the Province was locked up in Agra, and expecting every day to be besieged. Allahabad had been saved by a lucky chance and a bold act, and was held by a hastily extemporised garrison. At Lucknow a British garrison was standing grimly at bay, surrounded by an overwhelming force of besiegers. At Cawnpur a handful of English soldiers, and a multitude of non-combatants, lay at the mercy of Nana Sahib and the huge army that had gathered to his banner. A British force had, indeed, appeared before the walls of Delhi, but only to demonstrate G 2 lOO EARL CANNING how inadequate were its resources for the siege, and to be obliged to fight hard, day by day, to maintain its position. As week after week went by, and the Mughal capital still offered defiance to the British flag, the crisis intensified and the area of insurrection spread. The Lucknow garrison was in desperate peril: that of Cawnpur was doomed. Oudh had become an enemy's country. Rohilkhand, on the left bank of the Upper Ganges, was a-blaze. At all the great stations of the North-West Provinces — Aligarh, Eta- wah, Mainpuri, Bulandshahr — there had been mutiny. In the Punjab, where a prompt blow, struck by Montgomery at Lahore, the vigour and determination of Lawrence, and the military prowess of Nicholson, had hitherto kept the disafiection in check, the temper of the Sepoy army was dangerous. On the 3rd of June Sir J. Lawrence wrote to Lord Canning that the whole native army was ready to break out, and that unless a blow were soon struck, the irregulars as a body would follow their example. Nicholson and Edwardes at Peshawar had found it necessary to disarm four native regiments there, and another at the neighbouring station of Murdan ; and Nicholson sweeping about the country like the incarnation of vengeance, had struck terror into wavering: hearts. Li the east of the Province the fort of Phillor, an important arsenal, containing much of the siege material destined for use at Delhi, had, happily, been saved. Firozpur, too, another im- portant arsenal, with its priceless magazine, was safe ; THE RANI of JHANsI lOl but the disbanded Sepoys had escaped to swell the rebel ranks at Delhi. In June the Sepoys at Jalandhar rose, effected their escape^ plundering the city of Ludhiana en route. Multan, an important position commanding the south-west portion of the Province and the Indus line of communication with the coast, was saved by a timely disarming of the mutinous regiments there stationed. The Sikh Chiefs, whom Nicholson invited to give assistance, declined, till it should be more apparent which would be the winning side. Soon, however, it became apparent that the general population had no sympathy with the Hindu- stani mutineers^ and in a few weeks some 34,000 recruits were raised, delighted at the prospect of sacking Delhi, In the first week of June, on the Jumna frontier, the Rani of Jhansi had shown her savage mood, massacred an European force, and proclaimed herself Sovereign of her State. The Gwalior force, sent by Sindhia to aid the British, had turned against them, and was threatening Agra. The Sepoys at Nimach and Nasirabad, gar- risons in the heart of Rajputana, had broken out, pillaged the surrounding villages, and marched away to Delhi. Ajmere, the arsenal and treasury of the Province, had been saved by the timely disarming of a Brahman regiment. Bundelkhand, flanking the Jumna line to the south, might at any moment burst into a blaze. Still further southward the tide of disaffection rolled. At I02 EARL CANNING Sagar the troops rose, and the Europeans had to defend themselves for months in a fort to which they had fled for safety. The Jabalpur district, across the Narbada, was soon teeming with rebel Chiefs in arms. Nagpur was saved by a determined official and the staunch loyalty of the Madras troops. At Indore the British Eesidency had been attacked, and, despite the proximity of the cantonment at Mhow, the British Resident had been forced to beat a hasty retreat. At Haidarabadj the Nizam's stormy capital, the shock of the Delhi news was felt ; and, before June was over, there were outbreaks of Musalman fanaticism, and cries to the Moolvie in the Great Mosque to proclaim a holy war. An attack on the Residency was repelled by the Madras Horse Artillery. Still, as the weeks went by, and Delhi remained a rebel capital, and Rohillas, Afghans and Punjabis flocked into Haidarabad, bringing ever fresh news of English disaster, and urging participation in the struggle, the position became critical. Had the Nizam's great Minister, Sir Salar Jang, been weak, or had the loyalty of the Madras forces wavered, Southern India might presently have been in a blaze. Westward, across the Deccan, the towns of the South Maratha Country were dangerously sympathetic with the movement in the north. In more than one regiment^ correspondence with the mutinous Sepoys was seized, and the germs of conspiracy were discovered and suppressed. At Kolhapur, before July had passed, THE POSITION BECOMES SERIOUS 103 the Sepoys actually broke out, plundered the town and treasury, and made off for the jungles. Such was the general position, with which, within the first few months of the Mutiny, Lord Canning was confronted. It was impossible to define the area of probable disturbance or to gauge its intensity. It was impossible to conjecture where next the flames would break out, how far the conflagration might ex- tend. In Upper India it already glowed fiercely. All Bengal might, at any moment, be in a blaze. The great necessity of the moment was, fii'st, to keep open the main lines of communication which led from Calcutta and Bombay to the scene of action ; secondly, to prevent, — and, if prevention were impossible, to delay — explosions in Bengal which there were for the present no means of suppressing ; thirdly, to prevent the struggle from becoming what the temper of the English was threatening to make it, a war of races. For several months the position became increasingly critical. The British army before Delhi, despite all that Lawrence could do to reinforce it with Punjab levies, was enormously outnumbered, and daily fights were thinning its ranks. The idea of seizing Delhi by a cowp de main had been abandoned. Many doubted whether, even by regular siege opera- tions, its reduction was possible ; for the besieging force could attack it only on one side, and behind its walls were all the resources of the insurrection and a constant inflow of recruits. In July the rescue of the Cawnpur garrison had 104 EARL CANNING become an affair of hours. Havelock had been selected for the task. Not less a military than a religious enthusiast^ he had been for forty years preparing himself, by study and much varied service, for the realisation of his long cherished dream — the command of a British army in the field. Some derided his pietism, some his theoretic researches, some his care-worn features and emaciated frame; but Sir H. Hardinge had said of him : ' If ever India should be in danger, the Government have only to place Havelock at the head of an army, and it will be saved.' The moment had now arrived to test the truth of the prediction. On the 7 th July Havelock started from Allahabad, fought his way, through a series of fierce encounters, to the battlefield before Cawnpur, where the Nana — his hands red with European blood — was awaiting the advent of the avenging force. The resistance was long and fierce, but Havelock and Havelock' s army were in no mood to be resisted. In a few hours the rebels were rushing in confusion from the field ; the Nana, who had been descried during the day riding from post to post, rallying his wavering ranks, was himself spurring hard to his refuge at Bithiir, and the inhabitants of Cawnpur, cowering at the retributive fury of the English, were streaming in panic out of the city into the surrounding country. They well might fear, for Havelock's troops heard news next morning, and witnessed sights that even now cannot be recalled without a thrill of horror. HAVELOCK AT CAWNPUR 1 05 Their forced marches under the fierce July sun, their long days of hard fighting, had been in vain. They had come too late — too late, that is, for anything but vengeance. The vestiges of recent tragedy were around them — the clotted floor, the shreds of hair and clothing, the ghastly well, where lay the last victims of the fierce Maratha's lust for English blood. The dreadful story was soon told. About 400 English combatants and an equal number of women and children had been collected at a spot where defence, for more than a few days, was impossible. They were surrounded by a fully- equipped army of 3000 men. On June 5th the Sepoy regiments had risen and marched away to Delhi. The Nana, who had till then professed to be assisting the EngHsh, took the command. Conscious of the cool welcome which a Maratha leader was likely to receive from the Musalmans at Delhi, he induced the rebel force to return with him to Cawnpur. From that moment the doom of the garrison was sealed. The so-called siege was one long massacre throughout. All the artillerymen were killed or wounded in the first week. On June 1 1 th the thatch of the barrack, which had afibrded a scanty refuge to the women, children and wounded men, was fired by red-hot balls, and the whole building was presently a mass of flames. On the loth a message from Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow had told the doomed garrison that he was powerless to help them. Two fierce assaults were repelled. Misery, exposure, exhaustion, the ceaseless io6 EARL CANNING rush of shot and shell, and the merciless summer sun, were rapidly thinning the remnant of English fighters. Water was to be had only at the cost of precious lives. Provisions began to fail. The end had come. The Nana's ofier of a safe conduct gave the only chance of escape. On June a7th the fatal move began, and, a few hours later, the blackest perfidy of modern times was enacted. The survivors of that afternoon's fusillade were dragged back for the further torture of imprisonment. Eighteen days later, on July 15th, as Hav clock's avenging force drew near, the despot of the hour decreed a last revel of ferocity, and when the English columns entered Cawnpur, they found — so far as their own countrymen were concerned — a city of the dead. No one of English birth — man, woman, or child — remained to tell the dreadful tale. Was the same tragedy, the bafiled rescuers asked themselves, to be re-enacted at Lucknow? A deep gloom fell on leader and men. Havelock's spirits sank. ' If the worst came to the worst,' he said to his son that evening, ' we can but die with our swords in our hands.' Lucknow was to be relieved, but was relief achievable % The task was a serious one. His march lay for fifty miles through a country swarm- ing with enemies. Several large armies threatened his line of advance. He was leaving an ill-defended base, a great river in his rear, the bridge over which might easily be destroyed, and his retreat thus be cut ofi". At the end there was the Lucknow garrison, penned HAVE LOCK FALLS BACK 107 up in a corner of a huge city, thick-set with defensible buildings, crowded with combatants, through which the rescuing force would have to fight its way. On July 25th Havelock's march began. After a fortnight's hard fighting he was forced to recognise that his strength was inadequate, and to fall back on Cawnpur, now seriously threatened by a rebel force advancing from Bithur. Even at Cawnpur, Havelock's position became precarious, and he was obliged to warn the Government that, unless speedily reinforced, he might have to fall back on Allahabad. Not till the third week in September did Outram's welcome reinforce- ments enable the two leaders to start for the rescue of the Lucknow garrison. The weeks during which Havelock was fast-held at Cawnpur were eventful at two other centres of interest. At Lucknow it had been felt from the moment of the outbreak at Meerut that a siege was inevitable. Sir H. Lawrence had been reluctant to endanger the tranquillity of the rest of the Province by disbanding the Sepoy regiments at Lucknow ; but he had pre- pared to stand on the defensive. As the country round rose into rebellion, Lucknow became the one isolated position in Oudh where British authority was upheld. Its isolation was perilous. On June 30th a British force, which had started from Lucknow to meet an approaching army of the mutineers, was de- serted, as the action began, by the native Artillery, and encountered a severe repulse ; it retired with difficulty, and soon found itself actually besieged. Lawrence lived lo8 EARL CANNING but to see the commencement of the siege ; but the spirit of that brave, generous and romantic nature continued to inspire the leaders of that heroic defence. Its incidents are familiar history. The garrison was greatly outnumbered and ill-supplied ; the defences were weak, hurriedly constructed, and, in parts, un- finished : the position was, according to every rule of war, indefensible. Defended it was, however, at a terrible cost of human life and suffering, for eighty- seven days. The garrison held its own, unaided, till September 25th. On that day Outram and Havelock, with their long-expected succour, fought their way into the Residency — a reinforcement, not a relief; for the heavy losses entailed by the operation made it clear that it would be impossible, with the existing forces, to attempt the removal of the non-combatants. Outram's little army had greatly increased the powers of the defence ; but it also greatly increased the rate at which provisions were consumed. As evacuation was impossible, the position of the garrison was, in one sense, more critical than ever. Not till November 17th did the hour of deliverance come. Meanwhile, the fate of the Empire seemed to depend on the little force which, barely able to protect its own position, was clinging fiercely to a single side of the Delhi ramparts. On June 8th, two English forces, combining from Ambala and Meerut, had di'iven the mutineers in confusion from the field, and taken up their position on a ridge of stony ground which faces the city's northern side. Some bold spirits urged SIEGE OF DELHI 1 09 an immediate assault. An accident alone, on one occasion in the early days of the siege, prevented the trial of that audacious experiment. But the persistent attacks on the British position, the heavy losses, the serious wear and tear, the certainty that the resources of the Punjab were approaching exhaustion, inspired the responsible leaders of the force with the gravest anxiety as to the impending assault. It was a cast of the die, and the fortunes of English rule in India depended on it. Who can wonder that human nerve should shrink from so fateful a crisis ■? June and July were spent in a series of encounters which, if they disheartened the rebels, grievously taxed the slender resources of the besiegers. In August, Nicholson's ap- pearance on the scene with a force which he had taught to think nothing impossible inspired fresh spirits and brighter hopes. Early in September the arrival of the siege-train, and of the last reinforcements which could be expected from the Punjab, decided the moment of attack. The English General now had 8748 men at his disposal, 3317 only of them his own countrymen. Batteries were hastily run up, a cannonade opened upon September nth, and, by the evening of the 13th, a practicable breach had been effected. Early on the morning of the 14th, Nicholson led the assaulting force to its great emprise. His fall dimmed the successes of a day bright with British heroism ; but he lingered long enough to know that the object of the long and costly struggle had been attained. Delhi was again in the hands of the British ; the old no EARL CANNING Mughal monarch was a prisoner, and the principal nucleus of insurrection was destroyed. The re-conquest of Upper India, however, was still far from completion. The fall of Delhi, important as was its moral effect, made substantially little difference to the rebel numbers. The garrison had escaped, and the hostile forces, previously occupying various portions of the country, were strengthened by the accession of a garrison till now concentrated for the defence of the besieged city. Outram and Havelock had heard of the fall of Delhi as they were entering Lucknow, but they were practically prisoners in that city. The task of rescuing them devolved on the newly- arrived Commander-in-Chief. It was no hght one. Sir Colin Campbell, on his arrival in Calcutta, found a general sense of disaster and discouragement. There was much to be done before an advance upon Lucknow could be attempted. The war departments at Calcutta had to be strengthened into increased efficiency: transport for reinforcements to be pro- vided ; the line of advance from Calcutta to Cawnpur — dangerously exposed throughout its entire length — to be secured. It was not till the close of October that the Commander-in-Chief was able to quit Calcutta for the theatre of war. After a narrow escape of being taken prisoner, en route, Sir Colin reached Allahabad on November ist. His position was critical. To his north lay Oudh, and the districts, eastward and westward, which had been caught in the Oudh Sm COLIN CAMPBELL 1 1 1 conflagration — Oudh, with its dense population, now pledged to the rebel cause — its feudal Chiefs, its impenetrable jungles, its hundreds of strongholds, — and Lucknow in its midst, where Outram and Havelock were held fast-bound by 60,000 rebels. To the north-west, the post of Fatehgarh, one of the most important strategical positions in Upper India, had been seized by a rebel Chief, who was thus master of the Central Doab. To the north of this again, all Rohilkhand, a rich and warlike Province, was in arms. Its capital, Bareilly, and other large towns, were in rebel hands. The revolted Gwalior Contingent was hovering on Sir Colin's flank, and, within a few miles of Cawnpur, a formidable army was assembled under the banner of Nana Sahib. Outram had sent a message to Sir Colin at Cawn- pur that the Lucknow garrison could hold out till November i8th, and the problem was how to rescue them before that date and get back before the Allahabad line of communication could be broken by the Gwalior Contingent, or the English reserve, left to hold Cawnpur, be crushed by the Nana's army advancing from Bithur. The rebel positions in Lucknow had, it was known, been greatly strengthened since the relieving English force had fought its way across them in the preceding September ; but Havelock had lost nearly 1000 men — a third of his entire force — on that occasion, and Sir Colin had now not only to surmount the new obstacles but to bring away a large crowd of non-combatants. 112 EARL CANNING There was, moreover, the likelihood that on his return he might find the bridge over the Ganges destroyed, its banks strongly defended, and the force which he had left to guard Cawnpur assailed by an over- whelming foe. On November 12th, Sir Colin reviewed the httle army with which this brilliant feat of strategy was to be achieved. An onlooker has described the scene — the force, dwarfed by its surroundings to a mere handful of men, drawn up in the middle of a vast plain — the forests which bounded the horizon— the blackened and battle-worn guns and batteries from Delhi — English lancers with their blue uniforms and turbans twisted round their caps — wild frontier troopers on prancing horses, with loose fawn-coloured robes, long boots, and towering head-gear — the worn and wasted remnants of English regiments in slate-coloured uniform, stand- ing, with wearied air, around their standards — tall Punjab Infantry with huge twisted turbans and sand-coloured tunics, and, conspicuous among the rest, the 93rd Highlanders — ' a waving sea of plumes and tartans ' — as with rapturous cheers they greeted their veteran chief. The long stubborn fight across the defences and through the streets of Lucknow, and the successful rescue of the British garrison, skilfully and gallantly efiected in the course of the next few days, marked the second great step towards the rehabihtation of the British rule ; but Sir Colin had to hurry back to rescue the force at his base from annihilation. Wynd- DEFEAT OF T A NT I A TOPI II3 ham, whom he left to hold Cawnpur, had encountered Tantia Topi, at the head of a powerful and well- equipped army, and had been driven back on his en- trenchments. Cawnpur was in the hands of the enemy. The Gwalior army of 25,000 men, flushed with success, and arrayed in a strong position, awaited the English General's attack. Sir Colin's victory of the 8th of December avenged the fortunes of his lieutenant, and shattered the rebel forces beyond recovery. Thus, in the closing weeks of 1857, a third great step towards re-establishment of British ascendancy had been achieved. CHAPTER VI Conquest The months during which these events were occurring in Upper India threw a heavy weight of anxiety upon the Governor-General and his co- adjutors at Calcutta. The first shock of surprise had speedily been followed by tidings which left no doubt as to the nature of the impending conflict. Each day brought a heavier tale of outbreaks, massacres, desperate conflicts, or scarcely less desperate escapes. It became apparent that at numerous points the English were in supreme peril. It was apparent, too, that the means at the disposal of the Government were utterly inadequate for their protection. Reinforce- ments had been sought in various quarters — Madras, Bombay, Ceylon, Lord Elgin's China force. Before May was over they were beginning to arrive, but they came in driblets, as compared with the multi- tudinous array of insurgents ; and still smaller were the di'iblets in which it was possible, with existing facilities, or such as could be extemporised, to send them to the front. Meanwhile the whole country was like a volcanic soil seamed with igneous material, which, at any moment, at any spot, may burst into fiames. CANNING'S VIEW OF THE SITUATION 115 ' Our hold on Bengal and the Upper Provmces,' the Governor- General wrote to Lord Elgin on May 19th, ' depends upon the turn of a word — a look. An in- discreet act, or irritating phrase from a foolish commanding officer at the head of a mutinous or disaffected company may, whilst the present condition of things at Delhi lasts, lead to a general rising of the native troops in the Lower Provinces, where we have no European strength, and where an army in rebellion would have everything its own way for weeks and months to come. We have seen within the last few days what that way would be.' ' Here,' Lord Canning wrote, a few days later, to Sir J. Lawrence, with reference to the successful disarming of the Punjab regiments, 'from Calcutta up to Agra, we are in a very different position, and must play a very different game. With the exception of Dinapur, where there is one weak Queen's Regiment, not a single European soldier exists over a stretch of 750 miles. It would be impossible to take the Sepoys' arms from them ; and, if it were done, we should not be much the better for it. There are no sufficient numbers of any other class in whose hands the arms could be placed with safety. All that can be done at present is to put on a bold front, and to collect strength as rapidl}' as possible. If the rebels at Delhi are crushed before the flame spreads, all will go well. Time is everything, and delay will severely try Cawnpur, Benares, and Oudh.' The Delhi rebels, however, were not crushed and H 3 ii6 EARL CANNING the flames were mounting high. At Calcutta the English community, profoundly shocked and agitated, beg-an to criticise and condemn the action of the Government. Lord Canning was mortified to find that some of the officials about him were not giving him the moral support for which, at such a crisis, he had a right to look. There was much despondent talk, many prophets of evil. Circumstances made it necessary for the Governor-General to assume a confidence which he was far from feeling, and to avoid everything that might suggest to the population of Bengal the idea that the emergency was acute enough to drive the Government to extraordinary expedients. Such a policy does not admit of being publicly explained. Too little trouble was, perhaps, taken to explain it. Lord Canning found himself working in an atmo- sphere highly charged with the electricity which soul-stirring events, unexampled disasters, sudden dangers, engender in the public mind. There was thunder in the air — fierce outbursts from agitated and angry men — a hostile press — violent pamphlets, violent speeches, violent acts — everything that could agitate, unnerve, provoke. Yet Lord Canning la- boui'ed on in unruffled equanimity. His letters at this time breathe a really noble tone. ' The sky is black,' he wrote to Bishop Wilson, 'and, as yet, the signs of a clearing are faint. But reason and common sense are on our side from the very beginning. The course of the Government has been guided by justice HIS UNPOPULARITY 1 17 and temper. I do not know that any one measure of precaution and strength which human foresight can indicate has been neglected. There are stout hearts and clear heads at the chief posts of danger — Agra, Lucknow, Benares. For the rest, the issue is in higher hands than ours. I am very confident of complete success.' It was hard that a mood so high-toned and cou- rageous should not have found support in the sym- pathy and confidence of the English community. But the English in Calcutta were now in no sympathising temper. Again and again it was Lord Canning's lot to provoke their distrust, dislike, resentment. They were angered by his fancied reluctance to accept their services as Volunteers for the defence of Calcutta. They were angered at the neglect of precautions which to them seemed obvious and necessary, but which reasons of policy led Lord Canning to veto or postpone. They were angered at restrictions of the press, European as well as native, which the position rendered imperative. They were angered at the rule which obliged European and native alike to obtain a license for carrying fire-arms. The grievance was purely sentimental: but the English were not in a mood to tolerate anything which implied equality between themselves and the natives of the country. The tragedies of the Mutiny were bearing fruit in a fierce, sometimes a ferocious, spirit of revenge. The sufferings of our countrymen had engendered an appetite for blood — an appetite which grows by Il8 EARL CANNING what it feeds on. Revenge is an intoxicating cup. The less sober of the English ministers of vengeance were becoming intoxicated. There was excess, there was violence, there was indiscriminating retaliation. To men in this temper Lord Canning's calm and judicial mood was profoundly distasteful. He felt, and showed that he felt, some contempt for personal terrors, to which he was constitutionally a stranger — something more than contempt for the ruthless mood which such terrors engender. But those who inferred from Lord Canning's cold exterior that thinner blood throbbed in his veins than in their own, judged him wrongly. He was stirred by passions as human as theirs. The first news of the insurrection convinced him that signal punishment ought to be inflicted on the Meerut mutineers and their fellow-rebels, now masters of Delhi. ' No amount of severity,' he wrote to the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra in May, 1857, 'can be too great.' 'I should rejoice,' he writes in the same month to the Commander-in-Chief, ' to hear that there had been no holding our men, and that the vengeance had been terrible.' But a calmer, more equitable mood had replaced in Lord Canning's mind the first hot rush of indignation. He was determined to discriminate, and to compel the tribunals to which, in the first moments of emergency, dangerously large powers of life and death had been entrusted, to do the same. His Proclamation to this eflfect, issued in July, roused a storm of indignation. A great journal in England, after much contemptuous derision of the EXCITEMENT IN CALCUTTA 1 19 cheap virtue of humanity at other people's expense, denounced the ' clemency of Canning ' as ill-timed weakness, and boldly advanced the proposition that the suppression of the Mutiny must be left to the unfettered hands of the military authorities. ' They,' it was said, ' must know, not only what is best to be done, but what is the only thing possible under the circumstances.' Lord Canning, however, was more and more con- vinced of the necessity of putting a check on the violent temper of his countrymen. ' There is a rabid and indiscriminate vindictiveness abroad/ he wrote to the Queen in September, ' even among those who ought to set a better example. . . . Not one man in ten seems to think that the hanging and shooting of 40,000 or 50,000 men can be otherwise than practicable and right.' Excitement was excusable, for ever since May the horror of the situation had been becoming more intense. When Sir Colin Campbell arrived in August, things were almost at their worst. The little be- sieging force was clinging grimly to the Delhi ridge ^ but the standard of rebellion still flaunted us from its walls. Cawnpur had witnessed a disaster of which Englishmen could scarcely bear to speak. The Lucknow garrison was sorel}^ pressed. Havelock was fast-bound at Cawnpur. The line of communi- cation with Upper India was menaced throughout its entire length. At one time it was actually severed, and it seemed as if Behar were lost and the tide of trouble I20 EARL CANNING were about to roll down upon Bengal. The gallant stand of an amateur garrison at Arrah, their rescue by Vincent Eyre and his vigorous pursuit of the Dinapur mutineers, re-established British ascendancy at this endangered spot, checked the downward progress of insurrection, and set free once again the flow of reinforcements towards the scenes where their arrival was of such vital importance. A question which, in the course of July, Lord Canning was called to decide, marks the darkest hour of the storm. Early in June Sir John Lawrence had faced the possibilities suggested by the precarious position of the besieging force at Delhi. To reinforce it he had drained the Punjab of its last man. No help could be looked for elsewhere : but the leaders before Delhi were doubtful of success, doubtful indeed whether the attempt should be made. If it failed, the consequences would be to place the surrounding country and the Punjab in extremest peril. Across the Indus were three European regiments, a powerful force of artillery, and some of the best native troops, whose presence would assure order in the Punjab and settle the fate of Delhi in a week. If Delhi could not be taken otherwise, it might be necessary, Lawrence suggested, to concentrate this force, leaving Peshawar and the Trans-Indus Valley in the custody of Dost Muhammad, with a promise of ultimate cession to him of that much-coveted region. This is no place to enter upon the controversy which this proposal evoked, or to discuss the arguments with which Edwardes and 'HOLD ON TO PESHAWAR TO THE LAST' 121 Nicholson met it. The alternative on either side was deplorable. Edwardes's view was that the General before Delhi should be told ' that he could have no more men from the Punjab, that he must either get into Delhi with such men as he had, or get rein- forcements from below, or abandon the siege and fall back on the Sutlej , leaving Delhi and its dependencies to be re-organised in the cold weather.' . . . ' If General Reid,' he wrote to Lawrence, ' with all the men you have sent him, cannot get into Delhi, let Delhi go. . . . You have made vast efforts for him, and no one can blame you for now recovering your own Province.' The security of his own Province, however, had from the outset filled but a part, and not the largest part, of Lawrence's thoughts. He was convinced that the abandonment of the siege of Delhi, or its failure, would be an imperial disaster. He was prepared, if needs be, to make any sacrifice with a view to its prevention. He now pointed out that, even from the Punjab point of view, it would be fatal to leave Delhi untaken and the besieging army to its fate. 'The Punjab,' he said, ' will prove short work to the muti- neers when the Delhi army is destroyed.' Nicholson, in a conversation with Lawrence, pleaded that other places rather than Peshawar might be abandoned. ' Give up everything,' he said, ' but Peshawar, Lahore, and Multan:' but Lawrence objected that such a measure would isolate those three places, lock up a fine force in Peshawar, and expose us to destruction in detail.' Dark indeed must have been the prospect 122 EARL CANNING when men such as Lawrence, Edwardes and Nicholson could feel such desperate alternatives to be within sight. Happily, the moment for adopting one or other of them never came. We can read Lord Canning's letter, giving the grounds of his own decision on the point, merely as a vivid picture of the situation and of the terrible perils which at the moment beset the British rule. ' My answer to your question about Peshawar,' he wrote to Lawrence on July 15th, 'will be, Hold on to Peshawar to the last. I should look with great alarm to the effect in Southern India of an abandonment of Peshawar at the present time — or at any time until our condition in the south becomes either more desperate or more secure. Kemember how fearfully weak we are in Central Lidia, and everywhere to the south of it. It is true that in Central India itself things are already at their worst. Holkar himself, as well as his troops, has turned against us, and, although I do not know the same for certain of Sindbia, I have little doubt of it. But as yet the wave of rebellion has not reached the Narbada. The Nizam and the Gaekwar are still staunch, and believe in our su- premacy. Nagpur too is kept down. If we were now to abandon territory, no matter how distant, it would be impossible that faith in the permanency of our rule should not be shaken. The encouragement to join the league against us would be irresistible and immediate ; its effect would be felt long before we should receive any material benefit from the force HIS VIEW OF AFFAIRS 123 which would be set free by the abandonment : and in the event of a rising in the Deccan, or on the side of Baroda, our position would be hopeless unless we could keep the Native Governments on our side. I look upon Central India as gone, and to be re- conquered ; and I believe that Southern India, that is, from Gujarat on the west to Nagpur on the east, and downwards to Cape Comorin, is at present in a more critical position than any part of the Punjab, not excepting Peshawar itself. Sir Patrick Grant is pretty sure of the Madras Army, and some three or four regiments will be brought to Bengal to ease our exhausted Europeans. The family system of the Madras regiments gives the Government a great hold on them, especially in the present case, when the families will be left in Madras. Still, if the Deccan were to rise, the Madras Army would not be equal to cope with the difficulty ; and the Cavalry, almost entirely Muhammadan, could not be trusted, in spite of all checks upon it. On the Bombay side, I fear there is already some taint in the army. How can it be otherwise"? One half is Hindustani, and pretty much of the same materials as the Bengal regiments. I should not like to see them tempted by any open resistance to us in Gujarat or elsewhere near at hand to them. ... Of Delhi I know nothing later than the 19th, and I begin to despair of hearing any good from there. The arrival of Chamberlain and Nicholson is the best remaining ground of hope.' In a postscript he adds : — 124 EARL CANNING ' I have objected to the abandonment of Peshawar upon one ground alone — the bad effects which would result from it at the present crisis ; and this for the moment is the paramount objection. But I also incline to the mountain boundary in preference to the river. The expense is inordinately large, and will continue so as long as a large European force is retained on the other side of the Indus. Yet, as a military frontier, I have never seen the case satisfactorily made out in favour of the river.' Amid such anxieties throughout this eventful year, Lord Canning continued to perform his arduous task with unruffled calmness and unshaken nerve. One of his letters to Lord Granville towards the end of 1857 breathes a serene and magnanimous spirit, and shows how thoroughly he had thought out the grounds which rendered a policy of conciliation essential. ' Look at a map. With all the reinforcements you have sent (all the Bengal ones are arrived, except 800 men) Bengal is without a single European soldier more than we had at the beginning of the Mutiny, Calcutta alone excepted, which is stronger. Twenty-three thousand men have moved through Bengal, and in Bengal we are still dependent (mainly) upon the good- will — I can't say affection, and interest — well understood by themselves — of the natives. ' Suppose (not an impossibility, although I hope not a likelihood) — suppose that hostilities train on, and that we don't make our way with Oudh and other disturbed places, that our strength becomes again A CONCILIATORY POLICY 1 25 a subject of doubt — will it be the part of a wise Government to keep such a population as that of the three great Provinces in a loyal frame of temper? Can you do so, if you proscribe and scout as unworthy whole classes % ' For God's sake, raise your voice and stop this. As long as I have breath in my body, I will pursue no other policy than that I have been following: not only for the reason of expediency and policy above stated, but because it is immutably just. I will not govern in anger. Justice, and that as stern, as inflexible as law and might can make it, I will deal out. But I will never allow an angry and undiscriminating act or word to proceed from the Government of India as long as I am responsible for it. ' I don't care two straws for the abuse of the papers, British or Indian. I am for ever wondering at myself for not doing so, but it really is the fact. Partly from want of time to care, partly because an enormous task is before me, and all other cares look small. 'I don't want you to do more than defend me against unfair or mistaken attacks. But do take up and assert boldly that, whilst we are prepared, as the first duty of all, to strike down resistance without mercy, wherever it shows itself, we acknowledge that, resistance over, deliberate justice and calm patient reason are to resume their sway; that we are not going, either in anger or from indolence, to punish wholesale ; whether by wholesale hangings and burn- 126 EARL CANNING ings, or by the less violent, but not one bit less offensive, course of refusing trust and countenance and favour and honour to any man because he is of a class or a creed. Do this, and get others to do it, and you will serve India more than you would believe.' Those who raved against Lord Canning little knew of the nobility of the man whom they were en- deavouring to ruin. The friends who were admitted to his confidence found that, under a cold and un- impassioned exterior, there glowed the warm instincts of chivalry. Sir Frederick Halliday, who was Lieu- tenant-Governor of Bengal in 1857 and in constant and confidential communication with the Governor- General, narrates how, on one occasion, when the outcry against him was loudest, Lord Canning showed him papers illustrating the scandalous brutality of certain of the special tribunals. The Lieutenant- Governor urged their publication, by way of reply to his calumniators. ' No,' said Lord Canning, taking the papers and locking them up in his drawer, ' I had rather submit to any obloquy than publish to the world what would so terribly disgrace my countrymen. It is sufficient that I have prevented them for the future.' At the opening of the new year Lord Canning decided to move to Allahabad, both for freer oppor- tunities of communication with the Commander-in- Chief during the impending operations in Oudh and Rohilkhand, and with a view to a more complete AT ALLAHABAD 1 27 mastery of the Oudh question and to the re-organisation of the government of the North-Western Provinces, many parts of which had lapsed into something like anarchy. Colonel Stuart, who was Military Secretary to the Governor- General during these eventful months, gives in his diary a vivid idea of the anxious and dispiriting circumstances under which Lord Canning assumed the functions of the Lieutenant-Governor, and addressed himself to this serious enhancement of his already heavy task. In February Mr. (Sir W.) Muir, the Secretary to the Government of the North-Western Provinces, arrived from Agra with a staff of fifty clerks, awaiting in- spiration from his new Chief and adding hourly to his toils. The tremendous strain of the past year was beginning to tell upon the Governor-General's health. In January, Lady Canning, herself bearing sad evidence of the anxieties which her Indian life had involved, learnt with apprehension that a respite at Simla was out of the question for her husband. She began to feel doubtful of his physical ability to bear the burthen, and to wish for his resignation. Lord Canning, how- ever, was in no mood to shirk his task, or spare nerve or muscle in its accomplishment. Again and again Colonel Stuart's diary records feats of long continued effort, such as no man can accomplish with impunity — entire nights passed at the desk — long days without an instant's intermission devoted to despatches for which an English mail was waitinof. On the loth January, Colonel Stuart records that, after labouring 128 EARL CANNING incessantly from 2 a.m. till luncheon time, without even an interval for breakfast, Lord Canning ' fell back, quite exhausted, and could do no more. The action of the brain had ceased. This has happened before. . . .' Lord Granville mentions that somewhat similar seizures had, at an earlier period of his life, befallen Lord Canning ; once in the House of Lords, and once again when, shooting with the Prince Consort, he was apprehensive, for an instant, of having fired in the direction of the Prince of Wales. Whatever might be the cause, Lord Canning showed himself no mercy. A half-hour's stroll before dinner, a visit to some military hospital, an occasional ride, sometimes, by his doctor's injunction, a short drive at sunrise — such was the nearest approach to relaxation which zeal and conscience allowed him. Nor did he labour alone. Lady Canning shared his toil. General Stuart's diary makes more than one allusion to occa- sions on which that faithful companion laboured far into the night, copying letters or despatches which, for one reason or another, were not allowed to pass through the ordinary official channels. In the meantime Lidian affairs were attracting attention in England. In January, 1858, Lord Palmerston had introduced a Bill transferring the government of India from the East India Company to the Crown. The measure was one which, though not so intrinsically important as its form suggested, was grave enough to give the Governor-General some anxiety. He was apprehensive that, on the CHANGE OF MINISTRY 129 removal of the time-honoured barriers which safe- guarded Indian topics from interference, Parliament might be betrayed into rash and ill-considered action. In February a new cause of disquietude was added. Lord Palmerston's defeat on his Conspiracy to Murder Bill brought into office a Ministry, many of whose members had shown themselves ready to criticise in no friendly spirit Lord Canning's Indian administra- tion — Lord Derby, Mr. D'Israeli, the impetuous and rhetorical Ellenborough. How was Lord Canning to work with a new and, probably, unfriendly Cabinet 1 The embarrassment was not lessened by the circum- stance that by the mail, which brought the tidings of the change, Lord Canning received no communica- tion from any member of the new Government, but merely private letters from Lord Granville and Lord Aberdeen, dissuadino- him from resignation. The Governor-General was thus obliged to address the new President of the Board of Control without having learnt his views with regard to his continuance in office. He wrote, accordingly, that he had no intention of resigning unless called upon to do so ; but, at the same time, letting Lord Ellenborough understand that he would submit to no improper inter- ference. The next mail cleared away all uncertainty by bringing three letters from Lord Ellenborough, friendly in tone and based on the assumption that Lord Canning did not contemplate resignation. Letters from Mr. Gladstone, Lord Stratford de KedclifFe, Lord Granville^ and from the Chairman of the East India 130 EARL CANNING Company, all pointed in the same direction. Mr. Vernon Smith, though not counselling resignation, showed him- self a better prophet than the rest by drawing a dis- couraging picture of the inconveniences likely to arise from Lord Ellenborough's hasty and dictatorial mood — a prophecy of the soundness of which Lord Canning was soon to experience disagreeable proof. The course of events in India, however, left the Governor-General but scanty leisure to weigh the chances of attacks from home. The Mutiny was far from being dead. Lucknow, since the relief of its garrison in the November of the preceding year, had remained in the hands of the insurgents. The Commander-in-Chief was in favour of the next movement being directed against the rebels to the north-westward, in Rohilkhand, leaving the reduction of Lucknow — a very serious enterprise — to be accom- plished later in the year. Lord Canning, however, decided that the capture of the Oudh capital ought to be forthwith undertaken. There were good reasons for the decision. The fall of Lucknow would have a great moral effect. It had filled the public eye. For many months all India had beheld the un- precedented spectacle of an English garrison barely able to hold its own behind the Residency entrench- ments. Ever since the relief in November it had defied us. Friend and foe were now watching its fate. Outram, who had remained on guard at the Alambagh, an outpost a few miles south, had been frequently and fiercely assailed. It was now for the CAPTURE OF LUC KNOW 131 English to attack. The defences of the city had been greatly strengthened since the English garrison quitted the Residency in November of the preceding year. Its present garrison was estimated at 130,000 men, of whom 27,000 were trained Sepoys and 7000 Cavalry. Three formidable lines of resistance had been constructed against an advancing enemy. The palaces, gardens, mosques and public buildings, with which a series of luxurious Sovereigns had embellished the city, had been converted into formidable strong- holds. Sir Colin now, by a skilful disposition, dimin- ished the cost and peril of the assault. The city of Lucknow lies along the south bank of the river Gumti, one of the great affluents of the Ganges, which traverses the Province of Oudh. In this direction the defences had been comparatively neg- lected. Taking advantage of this omission, Sir Colin, on March 5th, sent Outram across the river to operate on its northern side, whence he would be able to enfilade the enemy's powerful positions from an un- expected quarter and divert much of their attention, while Sir Colin, with the main force, fought his way, day by day, through the loopholed streets and strongly barricaded buildings of the city. The programme was brilliantly realised ; but the re- sistance was obstinate, and it was not till March 17th that the Residency was occupied and the last of the rebels driven out. One of those mishaps, which so often in military history mar the splendour of a success, favoured the escape of most of the garrison, I 2 132 EARL CANNING some into Rohilkhand, where Nana Sahib and other leaders were established in force, some into the jungles of Oudh, where, buried in their forest strong- holds, hundreds of warlike Chieftains welcomed all comers to the standard of rebellion. The capture of Lucknow may be regarded as the fourth great episode in the re-establishment of British rule. The fifth was now to commence. Rohilkhand, the country which lay along the left bank of the Upper Ganges, had for many months been a dangerous centre of disturbance. Lord Canning resolved that measures for its subjugation must be at once undertaken. Sir Colin Campbell, whom a well-deserved peerage had by this time converted into Lord Clyde, proceeded to effect this object by a concentration of forces, advancing from different points of the compass upon Bareilly, the capital of the Province. A few weeks sufficed for the accomplishment of this programme. Before the close of May, 1858, a decisive engagement had shattered the fortunes of the rebel cause. Bareilly had been recovered ; the leaders of the rebellion had fled into Oudh, and British rule was re-established throughout Rohilkhand. Meanwhile, a great campaign was being fought in Central India. The English leaders had throughout been harassed, on the Jumna line of communication, by the pressure exercised by the Gwalior Contingent and other rebel forces from the Raj pu tana side. It was determined to relieve this pressure by a great strategic operation from the rear of the a&sailants. S/J? HUGH ROSE'S MARCH 133 The programme was that two British columns should simultaneously advance, one, the more eastern, from Jabalpur, due northward across Bundelkhand to Banda — the other moving north-eastward from Mhow upon Jhansi and Kalpi. Sir Hugh Rose's series of suc- cesses, while in command of the latter column, forms one of the most interesting and splendid chapters of English military history. Leaving Indore at the be- ginning of 1858, he fought his way northward, early in February relieved the beleaguered garrison of Sagar, and on the 21st March appeared before Jhansi, above the granite walls of which floated the banner of the insurgent Rani. The fort was of great strength, standing on a lofty rock, its walls of solid masonry and bristling with guns. Its garrison of 11,000 men was fired with the fierce enthusiasm of their leader. The besiegers opened a cannonade. For seventeen days the English batteries poured in a ceaseless fire of shot and shell. A breach had been effected, when news arrived that Tantia Topi was advancing from the direction of Kalpi, with 23,000 men and twenty- eight guns, to the relief of the beleaguered Princess, Sir Hugh, without allowing an instant's pause in the operations of the siege, led a portion of the besieging force against his new foe, drove Tantia Topis army headlong into the jungle, and returned m two days to deliver a successful assault upon the fortress. Jhansi captured, the victorious General was soon on the road to Kalpi, and, on the 22nd May, encountered the rebel force and inflicted a repulse which seemed 134 EARL CANNING to have definitely settled the fortunes of the campaign. But the heart of the fierce Maratha woman was still unquelled. On June 4th arrived the startling news that the Rani and Tantia Topi had combined their shattered armies, had threatened Gwalior's capital — that Sindhia, marching to oppose them, had been deserted by his army and had fled to Agra, and that the Fort of Gwalior was in the rebels' hands. It was a dying rally ; for, before the third week in June had closed, Gwalior had been recovered, and Sir Robert (Lord) Napier, catching the rebel army between Agra and Gwalior, had practically annihilated it. Tantia Topi, eff'ecting his escape, continued till the spring of the following year to elude his pursuers, a cordon of whom surrounded him on every side ; but, so far as concerned co-operation with the northern mutineers, the rebellion in Rajputana and Central India had been effectually crushed. The wavering Chiefs had no longer reason for indecision. The British ascendancy was secured. This, the sixth great episode of the Mutiny, may be regarded as practically concluding it. In the autumn Lord Clyde surrounded the Oudh rebels with a cordon of concentrating armies, and gradually swept them across the frontier into Nepal. The spirit of resistance was by this time broken. The Begam of Oudh, who had been one of the chief leaders in resistance, made overtures of submission ; the leading landholders followed her example ; and by the close of the year nothing remained to be done CLOSE OF THE MUTINY 135 but to hunt down the refugees, who were still lurking in the surrounding regions of Nepal and the jungles that fringe the base of the Himalayas. In May, 1859, ^^^ Hope Grant, who had been entrusted with the task of stamping out the last embers of rebellion, was able to report that Oudh was completely tranquil and the Mutiny at an end. Such, in the barest possible outline, is the story of the great military revolt with which it was Lord Canning's task to deal. From first to last it occupied two years. For the first six months the tide of rebellion rose fast and flowed strongly against the rulers of the country. The fall of Delhi came at a moment when the fortunes of England in India seemed to be trembling in the balance, and, but for some such signal demonstration of prowess, the wavering powers of India would presently have thrown in their lot with that which seemed the winning cause. Lord Clyde's rescue of the Lucknow garrison and great victory, at the close of the year, over Tantia Topi struck one staggering blow at the rebel cause ; his capture of Lucknow a second ; Lord Strathnairn's campaign in Central India a third. The honour of these splendid successes is justly due to the Generals, by whose genius, and the troops by whose gallantry and endurance they were achieved. The general superintendence and direction of the entire series of campaigns, by which the Mutiny was stamped out and the pacification of India secured, rested with 136 EARL CANNING the Governor-General. The responsibility was Lord Canning's ; and to him, too, his countrymen's gratitude is due for a result which restored the endangered prestige of British arms, and settled conclusively the question of British supremacy in the East. Mutinous symptoms came to light wherever native troops were quartered, over a vast local area in Upper and Central India, from the garrisons on the Indus frontier to cantonments on the confines of Assam and across the Bay of Bengal— from the foot of the Himalayas to the capital of the Deccan and the towns which skirt the Western Ghats. The enormous extent of the struggle, its terrible vicissitudes, its dark spots of agony, reverse or mistake, the awful possibilities which beset it, its splendid successes, its long array of noble acts of heroic self-sacrifice, will leave it, so long as Enghshmen prize their country- men's best achievements, among the most fascinating chapters of our military annals. Its causes are still to a large extent shrouded in the same mystery as hid it from contemporary onlookers. At the best the diagnosis must be imperfect ; for many things about the patient's condition and temperament are hidden from us. In such cases it is only pre- sumptuous sciolism which would profess to explain the sequence of events, to indicate the course by which this or that disaster might have been avoided, or to criticise those, to whose hands the conduct of the crisis fell, from the standpoint of superior sagacity. The Mutiny transcended experience. It bafiled skill ; it LESSONS OF THE MUTINY 137 bewildered statesmanship ; it was full of surprises to those who were least likely to be surprised ; it misled the wisest and the best informed. It bequeathed to us the unpretentious lesson that the government of two hundred millions of human beings, about whom the governing race know little except that they differ, toto caelo, from themselves in temperament, belief, taste, and the way of looking at life — is likely to produce unexpected results and to be diversified by unexpected incidents. The occurrence of panics is one of them, though it may be hoped that the fraction of the population, which is yearly raised out of absolute ignorance, will tend, as years go on, to render the occurrence of panics less probable. But, to this day, no great bridge is begun in India without a local panic, baseless and childish as that to which the greased cartridges gave rise. A second modest lesson follows on the first, namely, that India is not a country with which it is well to play pranks — political, administrative, or philan- thropic. The English rule in India, as Sir James Stephen has well observed, represents a belligerent civilisation ; England must be prepared to fight as well as to civilise. When, as in 1857, she allows other considerations to outweigh the observance of this precaution, she runs a frightful risk. As a civilised and civilising administration she does, every day, things which millions of her subjects misunderstand, dislike, or disapprove. It is beyond the scope of mortal faculty to conjecture at what point mis- l$H EARL CANNING understanding, dislike or disapproval, may break out in an infectious form, and suddenly convert a tranquil community into a realised chaos. Ignorance, superstition, the wild promptings of heredity, remain — despite a fair exterior of civilisation — tremendous forces. Their combinations can be as little antici- pated, as little controlled, as the atmospheric con- ditions which produce a cyclone. Amid such surroundings it behoves the ruler to watch carefully, to move slowly; to innovate with cautious reluctance, to turn a deaf ear to the mutterings of ignorance and impatience or the syren song of inexperienced benevolence, and — not least — while busy with his peaceful task, to have, like the Jews of Nehemiah, his weapon near at hand and fit for use. That there were plenty of malcontents in India delighted to do the British Government an ill turn by encouraging disloyalty, spreading mischievous rumours and raising false hopes, may be taken for granted. But of a conspiracy in the sense of common action, systematically directed towards a common end, there is nothing that deserves the name of evidence. The most searching inquiries failed to produce any direct proof of such a conspiracy. ' It is Sii- John Lawrence's very decided impression,' so wrote one who was certainly well qualified to judge, ' that the Mutiny had its origin in the army itself; that it is not attributable to any external or antecedent conspiracy whatever, although it was CAUSES OF THE MUTINY 139 afterwards taken advantage of by designing persons to compass their own ends ; and that its proximate cause was the cartridge affair and nothing else. Sir John Lawrence has examined hundreds of letters on this subject from natives, both soldiers and civilians. He has, moreover, constantly conversed on the matter with natives of all classes ; and he is satisfied that the general — indeed the universal — opinion in this part of India is to the above effect.' The behaviour of the Sepoy regiments throughout was hardly reconcilable with the idea of a con- spiracy. The 1 9th Native Infantry, who may be said to have led off the Mutiny at Berhampur, were obviously more frightened than rebellious ; and, when their fright was over, would gladly, had they been allowed, have returned to their allegiance. Incen- diarism — which was the almost invariable prelude of a military outbreak — is the act rather of men wishing to attract attention to their grievances than of member^ of a plot, whose object would be to escape notice. Again and again it was obvious that, up to the very moment of mutiny, it was uncertain, even with the men themselves, what line they would take, and that some accident — a word, a cry, a sudden alarm — turned the agitated and wavering multitude to the side of rebellion. Again and again mutinies took place under conditions which precluded the possibility of eventual success. Among the leaders of the move- ment there was no real aofreement. The Kinsr had 140 EARL CANNING great difficulty in maintaining his ascendancy in Delhi. Nana Sahib's first act was to persuade the Cawnpur mutineers to return with him to that city instead of joining the common cause ; and in Oudh, each of several rebel parties played its own game, regardless of, and often in opposition to, the interests of the rest. In connexion with this branch of the subject, it is satisfactory to remember that no Native State took part against us, though the loyalty of two of them led to the desertion of their armies — that several of them gave us active and valuable help — that, outside the central region of disaffection, the upper classes showed no indication of sympathy with the movement, and in Lower Bengal plainly discountenanced it, and that, though several of the leaders of the movement were, as might have been ex- pected, persons who considered themselves aggrieved by the British administration, their conduct was obviously rather the outcome of individual idio- syncrasy than the natural result of English policy. Nothing that it was in the power of the Government to do, or to refrain from doing, would have made Nana Sahib anything but a treacherous savage, or have tamed the fierce Maratha blood that throbbed in the heart of the Rani of Jhansi. The circumstance that the North- Western Provinces were overrun by the mutineers, that the Oudh Taluk- dars, en masse, joined the rebel cause, and that Lord Canning thought right, in re-organising the land- revenue system of the Province to do so on a basis THE LAND QUESTION 141 more favourable to their position than that which had been accorded to them in the Provisional Settlement operations at the time in progress, has been the excuse for much misplaced denunciation of the policy of land-administration, of which Mr. Thomason was the most distinguished advocate in the North-West Pro- vinces, and which Lord Lawrence had rigorously enforced in the Punjab. It may be sufficiently described as a system which looked with disfavour on the various landlord interests, which in India have a tendency to grow up between the State on the one hand and the original owner and actual cultivator of the soil on the other. It has sometimes been even asserted that the area of the insurrection was co-^: extensive with that in which this policy had been allowed free play, and that, in fact, it was one of the motive causes of which the Mutiny was an effect. It would be difficult, without plunging into a still existent controversy, to set forth the grounds on which such a view is regarded by an important school of Indian administrators as unsound and fallacious. It is true, no doubt, that the curtailment of their privileges did incline the Oudh Talukdars to take part against the rulers who had ordered that curtailment. It is true too, that the Oudh peasantry were unable to resist the combined influences of the Talukdars and the mutinous soldiery, and joined with them in assailing the power, whose main object had been the im- provement of their condition. It may be conceded, moreover, that the liberal concessions made to the 142 EARL CANNING Talukdars on the close of the Mutiny secured their ready adhesion to the cause of order, and so facilitated the tranquillisation of the country. But all this does not prove that the advocates of the territorial magnates were right, or that the supporters of the peasant interest were wrong, or that the Government had erred in its endeavour to protect the feeblest class of the population from oppression. The condition of the occupiers of the soil must, so long as Indian society remains in its present phase, be one of the principal objects of solicitude to any Government which re- cognises the welfare of the mass of the inhabitants, rather than the conciliation of a small and privileged class of proprietors, as the object of its existence. The system of land settlement, which is known by the name of its most distinguished advocate, Mr. Thomason, has, it is certain, contributed enormously to the well- being of the agricultural classes wherever it has been introduced. It has rescued large sections of the popu- lation from suffering and degradation ; it has arrested the triumph of the high-handed oppressor ; it has vindicated popular rights, which had been trampled under foot by violence, or juggled away by fraud and chicanery. Its introduction may, in some instances, render the task of government more difficult ; but that which is difficult is often right ; and it may none the less be the dut}^ of an enlightened and benevolent administration to adhere to its policy of protecting the weak, and to refuse to purchase the adhesion of the strong by condoning oppression. That such a THE INDIAN PEASANT 143 policy is not inherently adverse to loyalty was sufficiently proved by the fact that, of the many thousands of native soldiers who fought on the English ^ side in the Mutiny, by far the larger proportion had been enlisted in a Province where the system had been long and actively at work. CHAPTER VII Lord Canning's Assailants Throughout the eventful two years which followed the outbreak of the Mutiny, it was Lord Canning's fa,te to be almost incessantly the object of hostile criticism, on the part sometimes of the European community at Calcutta, sometimes of Parliamentary leaders or jour- nalists at home. It was inevitable that it should be so. At periods, which arrest public attention and profoundly stir public feeling, views are quickly formed, strongly expressed, and pass from man to man with a rapid contagion. Under such a Government, too, as that of India, there is none of the relief which the outspokenness of Parliamentary interpellation in England affords to popular mistrust, misapprehension or disapproval. Many things which Lord Canning and his colleagues did at the outset of the Mutiny were mistrusted, misapprehended and disapproved by those among whom he lived, and to whom the events of the day were matters of grave personal significance. As wave after wave of disastrous news came rolling in. the tension of feeling grew intense, and Lord Canninsf's calm mood and untroubled demeanour were unendurably irritating to a society which was ~^Xi, PETITION FOR CANNING'S RECALL 145 becoming anything but calm. The Calcutta public was impatient. Lord Canning had no leisure, perhaps no inclination to allay its impatience. The English press was embittered. Public opinion be- came increasingly estranged. Towards the close of 1857 the European public of Calcutta and Bengal addressed a petition to the Queen, setting forth in vivid colours the various calamities of which India hfd of late been the theatre, alleging that these calamities were 'directly attributable to the blindness, weakness and incapacity of the Government,' and praying Her Majesty to mark her disapproval of the policy pursued by the Governor-General by directing his recall. The Indian Government forwarded this document to the Court of Directors, offering no general reply, but pointing out, in marginal notes, various errors of fact in the allegations of the petition. The petition, thus annotated, forms, accordingly, an authentic sum- mary of the grounds of Lord Canning's unpopularity with the European community. Bootless as it gene- rally is to resuscitate an extinct controversy, it is interesting to consider some of the grounds of complaint, and to realise the sort of difficulties with which — in addition to anxieties necessarily inherent in such a struggle, carried on a thousand miles away, — Lord Canning had to contend in the society around him. The grievance as to the tardiness of the Government in utilising the proffered services of the Volunteers proved not to be of a very substantial K 146 EARL CANNING order. Lord Canning's general arrangements, on the first outbreak of the Mutiny at Meerut, were admitted to have been made with praiseworthy expedition. Without an hour's delay he had summoned aid from every available quarter — Madras, Bombay, Ceylon, Lord Elgin and General Ashburnham on their way, with several English reoiments, to China. But the Calcutta Volunteers' offer of their services had not been received with corresponding alacrity. Lord Canning now explained how matters really stood. The original offer. May 20th, to serve 'as special constables or otherwise ' had been forthwith ac- cepted. On June 12th, when it was ascertained that service as special constables was distasteful, and that there was a general wish that a Volunteer Corps should be enrolled, this measure also was adopted. The Volunteers had been informed, and truly in- formed, that ' there was no apprehension of disturbance in Calcutta, and that if, unfortunately, any disturbance should occur, the means of crushing it utterly were at hand.' Valuable, accordingly, as had been the assistance of the Volunteers, especially in inspiring confidence in the European and Eurasian population, it could not be conceded that Calcutta had ever been threatened, or that the safety of the city had been owing to the 800 Volunteers, ultimately enrolled, or that their numbers would, as the petition alleged, have been four or five times as great but for the supposed discouragement, offered by the Government in the first instance. GROUNDS OF COMPLAINT 147 Another complaint was, that during the whole siege of Cawnpur, i.e. from June 4th to July 15th, no attempt was made to relieve it ; that the Government might, by enrolling Volunteers, have set free the Calcutta garrison for this purpose, as well as^ if necessary, the 2000 or 3000 British sailors in the port. To this the Government replied that every possible exertion had been made to relieve Cawnpur — that troops had been pushed 500 miles up the country at the hottest season of the year by means before unused — that 100 soldiers had been thus conveyed to Cawnpur before the outbreak, and that, even supposing the whole Calcutta garrison to have been at the Government's disposal, the absence of transport rendered it physically impossible to send forward a single soldier in addition to the numbers actually sent. The delay in disarming the three native regiments at Dinapur was another grievance on which the petitioners relied. The answer was : — First, that, as there was at this station but a single weak European regiment, confronted by three native regiments, and as the mutinous temper of the Sepoys was by no means certain, the Government had not thought it expedient to prematurely risk so hazardous an ex- periment: second, that the delay of an English regiment on its way to reinforce Havelock, who was waiting fast-bound at Cawnpur, unable for want of strength to advance to the relief of Lucknow, was a certain evil ; the necessity of disarming the Dinapur K 3 14S EARL CANNING regiments by no means certain ; and that, with a view to this consideration, the General in command at Dinapur, though empowered to stop some of the troops on the march up country, if he decided it to be necessary to disarm the Sepoys, had hesitated to do so : and, thirdly, that, after all, the Dinapur regiments did not mutiny till they had been almost driven to do so by the weak and clumsy measures which the local authorities unfortunately adopted for disarming them. As to the next ground of complaint, the restriction of the liberty of the press, the petitioners complained especially of the ' aggravation of an inherently odious measure by the weak and wanton confounding of loyal subjects with the seditious and rebellious,' in other words, by the extension of the rules to European as well as to native newspapers. The answer was that the measure was not aimed solely at sedition, but at the prevention of intelligence which, for the special reasons of the moment, it was not expedient to divulge, and of attacks calculated to inflame disaffection at a crisis when it was all-important to guide public feeling in the right direction. In these aspects the English press was as much in need of supervision as the native. The only instance in which, under the Act, a licence had been withdrawn from any English newspaper, and that only for a few days, was ' one on which an important measure of the Government was stigmatised in language directly and obviously calculated to weaken GROUNDS OF COMPLAINT 149 its authority and to bring it into hatred and contempt among all classes of Her Majesty's subjects ' — a degree of licence which it was impossible, in the existing condition of India, to concede. The next complaint referred to a measure passed in September, 1857, necessitating a licence to carrj^ arms and ammunition. ' Notwithstanding the broad line of distinction,' the petitioners urged, ' which was afforded to the Legislature by the fact of the present movement being avowedly one of race and religion, the Governor-General and his Council refused to make any such distinction, and the Act was made applicable to the Christian as well as the native races.' This the petitioners stigmatised as 'highly offensive and dangerous.' The Government replied that the muti- neers formed but a small class of the native popu- lation, the great bulk of which continued loyal : that any general distinction, grounded on race, would be unjust and invidious ; and that all necessary relaxation could be effected by the power of exempting individuals or classes, for which the Act provided. The next topic of complaint was a measure which, now that we can look at the subject in cold blood, stands among^ Lord Canning's strongest claims to respect. During the early months of the Mutiny it had been necessary to invest various civil officers and ' commissions ' — often, in fact, consisting of a single individual, selected by the local authority and offering no adequate guarantee of experience or self-restraint — with summary powers of trying and sentencing l5o EARL CANNING all persons suspected of desertion or mutiny. These powers, as was inevitable, had been freely and some- times indiscriminately used. In July, accordingly, the Governor- General issued a Resolution for the instruction of these tribunals, indicating the lines of distinction which, with a view to justice and the ultimate pacification of the country, ofiicials should observe in dealing with various classes of suspects brought before them. Many soldiers in regiments which had mutinied had shown no sympathy with the movement, but had gone quietly to their homes. To hang such men as mutineers after a summary trial was needless and cruel severity. Instructions were, accordingly, given that the civil tribunals were, for the future, to deal only with such deserters as were found with arms in their possession, or were charged with specific acts of rebellion, or belonged to regiments which had murdered their officers or committed other murderous outrage. All other deserters were to be made over to the military authorities for regular trial. The petition treated these directions as tantamount to an amnesty to all mutineers except those who had taken an active part in the murder of their officers or others ; ' and denounced such leniency as ' misplaced, impolitic, and iniquitous,' as calculated to ' excite con- tempt and invite attack by exhibiting the Government as so powerless to punish mutiny, or so indifferent to the sufferings of its victims, as to dispense with adequate retribution,' and as thus tending to a pro- longation of the struggle. It is a curious instance THE RESOLUTION OF JULY 151 of the misleading effects of popular passion that such obvious and moderate precautions against in- discriminate vengeance should have been regarded with disapproval, and that even in England the ' clemency ' of their author — for it was on this occasion that the historical nickname of their author first saw the light — should have been made a topic for satirical and depreciatory comment. Another count of this long indictment showed still more distinctly the real temper of Lord Canning's accusers. It alleged that, notwithstanding numerous instances of treachery on the part of Muhammadan officials, the Governor-General had continued to show his confidence in that class of men by sanctioning the appointment of a Muhammadan to be ' Deputy Com- missioner ' of Patna, a place of great importance and trust, and of other Muhammadans to other places of trust, ' to the great offence and discouragement of the Christian population of this Presidency.' The letter in which the Commissioner at Patna justified the appointment specially instanced in the petition, puts in a striking light the dangers against which Lord Canning had at this period of his career to contend. The gentleman whose appointment was thus denounced was a Calcutta advocate in large and lucrative practice. He had, throughout, taken an active part in supporting the cause of order, urging his countrymen and co- religionists to loyalty, and supplying useful informa- tion, for obtaining which he had special facilities, to the Government. He had abandoned his professional 152 EARL CANNING avocations in order to assist the Behar authorities at a moment when things were at the worst in that Province. His assistance had been invaluable in maintaining tranquillity and in checking outbursts of Muhammadan excitement. The return made by English newspapers for these valuable services had been unfortunate. ' He has,' wrote the Commissioner, ' been the object of ceaseless vituperation. The most treacherous motives have been attributed to him, and he has become, in fact, the hete noire of the English press. The main ground of attack against him has been that he was a Muhammadan. The whole of the Calcutta press, apparently without exception, have taken up the idea that this is a Muhammadan rebellion, not merely in the sense that the Sepoys were worked upon by individual Muhammadans — which may or may not be true — but that the entire Muhammadan community is disaffected, and merely waits its oppor- tunity to rise and throw off the British yoke. I need not point out how destitute of foundation this notion is, how entirely unrestrained many millions of Muhammadans in Bengal have been during the last five months, except by their own feelings of loj'alty, and how quiet the Muhammadan villages of Southern Behar have been, while Brahmin and Rajput villages were rising round them. Articles like this have a O direct tendency to excite disaffection among large masses of the population, and to convert what is now a military revolt into a national rebellion.' ' Your Majesty's petitioners submit,' so ran the A POLICY OF REPRESSION 153 concluding passages of the petition, ' that the only policy by which British rule and the lives, honour, and properties of your Majesty's Christian subjects in this country can in future be secured, is a policy of such vigorous repression and punishment as shall convince the native races of India— who can be influenced effectually by power and fear alone — of the hopelessness of insurrection against British rule, even when aided by every circumstance of treachery, sur- prise and cruelty.' The adoption of any milder policy would, the petitioners urged, be regarded as springing wholly from conscious weakness^ would lead, at no distant date, to a recurrence of the same scenes, and so endanger the future tranquillity of British India. Language such as this tells its own tale. It is the language of rage. There was much to excuse it. It would be well to bury it in oblivion, but that it is impossible, without recalling it, to understand the perils of the time and the inestimable service which Lord Canning rendered to his countrymen in the determined and courao-eous resistance which he offered to a mood which, if it had prevailed, would have gone far to make the ultimate pacification of the country impossible. Less excuse can be offered for the political par- tisanship which made the allegations of the Calcutta petition the pretext for an attempt to exclude the Governor-General's name from the vote which, early in 1858, was carried through both Houses of Parliament, 154 EARL CANNING thanking the Indian services, civil and military, for then- zeal in the suppression of the Mutiny. These ungenerous attacks on the representative of the Sovereign, engaged in a life and death struggle for the maintenance of the English supremacy in the East, can be now remembered only with sorrow that English statesmen should have been guilty of so ignoble a lapse. They stand a warning to politicians not to tempt the ill-informed and hasty suffrage of a popular assembly to expressions of opinion which, however they may gratify the temper of the moment, are soon recognised as unjust, and have to be repu- diated by leaders and followers alike with confusion and remorse. The moment of this attempted slight was that at which, more than at any other period of his career. Canning's nobility of character was safeguarding the Empire from a great danger and Englishmen from an indelible disgrace. In the spring of 1858 Lord Canning encountered another and still more serious controversial tempest. On the fall of Lucknow a Proclamation was addressed to the landholders. Chiefs and inhabitants of Oudh, which became — thanks to Lord Ellenborough's im- pulsiveness — the topic of a fierce Parliamentary fight. It is worth while to consider it with more attention than such quarrels, for the most part, deserve, because it throws light on Lord Canning's general policy in the pacification of Oudh, and on the diflicult problems which, in the task of pacification and reconstruction, he was continually called upon to solve. THE OUDH PROCLAMATION 155 From the outset of the Mutiny, Lucknow had been a main centre of rebellion ; for many months a British force had been besieged there ; for many months it had defied the English rulers of the country. The entire Province had joined in the rebellion. The landowners, with hardly an exception, had turned against the Government, and sent their retainers to aid the besiegers at Lucknow. The peasantry, too ignorant or too feeble to appreciate the efforts of the British officials in their behalf, had followed their Chiefs. Lucknow now lay at the conqueror's mercy; the subjugation of the Province was a mere question of time. It was necessary to announce to the in- habitants the terms on which the Government was ready to accept their return to allegiance. Lord Canning had learnt by experience that Proclamations are not the surest or safest mode of influencing the natives of India. He would have preferred, had it been possible, to communicate the intentions of the Government by instructions issued to officers attached to the columns marching through the country. This being impracticable, a Proclamation was necessary, and the question was as to the terms which would best meet the ends of justice and conduce to the pacification of the Province. The conclusions arrived at by Lord Canning were : — First, that all questions of punishment with death, transportation or imprison- ment of rebels, however inveterate and unnecessary their hostility might have been, ought, in the special circum- stances of the Oudh population, to be set aside : next. 156 EARL CANNING that the one declared punishment for rebellion should be confiscation of proprietary rights in the soil ; such penalty, however, to be enforced with an indulgent hand, and to be remitted on timely submission or other valid ground. The Proclamation, accordingly, announced that, with a few specified exceptions in which loyalty had been maintained, ' the proprietary rio-ht in the soil was confiscated to the British Government ; who would dispose of such right as might seem fitting.' To landowners, who should make immediate surrender, their lives and honours were secured, provided that 'their hands were unstained with English blood, murderously shed.' For further indulgence 'they must throw themselves upon the justice and mercy of the British Government.' 'To those who come promptly forward,' it was added, ' and supported the Government in the restoration of order, the indulgence will be large, and the Governor- General will be ready to view liberally the claims which they may thus acquire to a restitution of their former rights.' The last provision had been added in deference to the objection urged by Sir James Outram, the Chief Commissioner of Oudh, that the announcement of the Government's intention to confiscate the landowners' rights would drive them to desperate and prolonged resistance, and render it in vain to hope for their services on the side of order. The Proclamation was unfavourably viewed in Outram's camp, and there were those present who LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S DESPATCH 157 had the means of making their objections known in high quarters in England. The moment was unfortunate. Lord Palmerston's defeat on the Con- spiracy to Murder Bill had just caused a change of Ministry, and a private letter addressed by Lord Canning to Mr. Vernon Smith, President of the Board of Control, explaining the Proclamation and attenuating its apparent severity, had not been transferred by the outgoing official to his successor. Lord EUenborough, reading the Proclamation as it stood, considered the confiscating clause as excessive and impolitic in its severity. His colleagues fully shared his views. The opportunity for vii'tuous indignation and denunciatory rhetoric proved too strono; for a Minister whose foible was indiscretion. The machinery of the Board enabled its President, by addressing the Indian Government in the ' Secret Committee,' to emancipate himself from the ordinary trammels of extraneous interference. To Lord Ellen- borough's stormy genius such a chance was irresistible. Preparing the way by a summary, not too accurate, of the relations of the English Government to Oudh, and of the course of events which had led up to annexation, he thus delivered his assault : — ' We must admit that, under the circumstances, the hostilities, which have been carried on in Oudh, have rather the character of legitimate war than that of rebellion, and that the people of Oudh should rather be regarded with indulgent consideration than made the objects of a penalty exceeding in extent and in 158 EARL CANNING severity almost any which has been recorded in history as inflicted upon a subdued nation. ' Other conquerors, when they have succeeded in overcoming resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of punishment, but have, with a generous policy, extended their clemency to the great body of the people. ' You have acted upon a different principle ; you have reserved a few as deserving of special favour, and you have struck, with what they will feel as the severest of punishment, the mass of the inhabitants of the country. ' We cannot but think that the precedents from which you have departed will appear to have been conceived in a spirit of wisdom superior to that which appears in the precedent you have made. ' We desire that you will mitigate in practice the stringent severity of the decree of confiscation you have issued against the landholders of Oudh. ' We desire to see British authority in India rest upon the willing obedience of a contented people. There cannot be contentment when there is general confiscation. ' Government cannot long be maintained by any force in a country where the whole people is rendered hostile by a sense of wrong ; and if it were possible so to maintain it, it would not be a consummation to be desired.' Lord Canning bore the attack with characteristic coolness. He had already, in his correspondence with Outram, indicated the grounds on which the CANNING'S JUSTIFICATION 159 policy of the Proclamation was to be justified. Making all allowance for the special circumstances of the Oudh landowners, the fact remained that they had shown themselves strenuous and determined rebels. Confiscation of their lands was declared as the general penalty ; the means of escaping were shown to be within reach of all without loss of honour. ' Nothing more is required of them than that they should promptly tender their adhesion and help to maintain peace and order.' To concede more than this would have been to treat rebels ' not only as honourable rebels, but as enemies who had won the day ; ' would have led the people of Oudh to the conclusion that rebellion against the British Government could not be a losing game, and, ' though perhaps productive of an immediate return to order, would not have placed the future peace of the Province on a secure foundation.' The argument that the rebellion of the Talukdars had been provoked by the unjust manner in which the Government had dealt with their estates, was met by the fact that among the most inveterate of our opponents were several Talukdars, who had, confessedly, benefitted by the administrative changes introduced in the land system since the annexation of the Province. Nor, on the whole case, was any valid reason shown for departing from the rule that the penalty of confiscation had been incurred, and that relaxation of that sentence could be obtained only by submission. i6o EARL CANNING Lord Canning's reply to Lord Ellenborough's on- slaught dealt at the outset with the exceptional circumstances which attended it, and the position in which it placed the Governor- General. Though written in Secret Committee, it had been made public in England three weeks before it reached the Governor-General, and, within a few days of his receipt of it, would be read in every station in Hindustan. The disapproval which it conveyed, publicly endorsed by the Ministry, had been tele- graphed to India, and must necessarily increase the difficulties of the Government by weakening the authority of its head, raising delusive hopes, and encouraging resistance. ' No taunts or sarcasms,' Lord Canning continued, ' come from what quarter they may, will turn me from the path which I believe to be that of my public duty. I believe that a change in the head of the Government of India at this time, if it took place under circum- stances which indicated a repudiation, on the part of the Government in England, of the policy which has hitherto been pursued towards the rebels of Oudh, would seriously retard the pacification of the country. I believe that that policy has been, from the beginning, merciful without weakness, and indulgent without compromise of the dignity of the Govern- ment. I believe that, wherever the authority of the Government has been re-established, it has become manifest to the people in Oudh, as elsewhere, that the indulgence to those who make submission, and who LORD CANNING'S REPLY l6l are free from atrocious crime, will be large. I believe that the issue of the Proclamation, which has been so severely condemned, was thoroughly consistent with that policy, and that it is so viewed by those to whom it is addressed. I believe that policy, if steadily pursued, offers the best and earliest prospect of restoring peace to Oudh upon a stable footing. ' Firm in these convictions, I will not in a time of unexampled difficulty, danger and toil, lay down, of my own act, the high trust which I have the honour to hold ; but I will, with the permission of your Honour- able Committee, state the grounds upon which these convictions rest, and describe the course of policy which I have pursued in dealing with the rebellion in Oudh. If, when I have done so, it shall be deemed that that policy has been erroneous ; or that, not being erroneous, it has been feebly and ineffectually carried out ; or that, for any reason, the confidence of those, who are responsible for the administration of Indian affairs in England, should be withheld from me, I make it my respectful but earnest request, through your Honom-able Committee, that I may be relieved of the office of Governor-General of India with the least possible delay.' Lord Canning next proceeded to point out that his assailants' argument threw a grave shade of doubt on the lawfulness of the British annexation of Oudh, and regarded the rebel population rather as engaged in legitimate warfare than as rebels against duly con- stituted authority. Such a point was, of course, L l62 EARL CANNING beyond the competence of a servant of the Govern- ment, which had ordered the annexation, either to raise or to discuss. But the fact that a Minister of the Crown could speak hesitatingly of the right of the Government to rule the country was calculated to give a stimulus to the spirit of turbulence, and to unite the various factions of disorder — hitherto without concert or cohesion — in the common cause of national resistance to a foreign oppressor. Coming to the actual merits of the dispute, Lord Canning next traced the course of British administra- tion in the newly-annexed Province, the oppression, fraud, or chicanery, which infected the majority of the Talukdar titles, the collapse of the endeavour to reinstate the proprietary occupants of the soil in their supposed rights, the consequent impracticability, on the one hand, of recurring to the status quo imme- diately previous to the Mutiny, and thus renewing an admittedly unsuccessful experiment, or, on the other, of putting a premium on rebellion by re-establishing the Talukdars in privileges which, previous to the Mutiny, we had declared to be unjust and inadmissible. The attempt, at such a moment, to adjudicate their rio-hts would have been attended with insurmountable difficulties : nor would ' confiscation ' be understood by the landowners as necessarily operating a permanent alienation of their rights, but merely as placing in the hands of Government the means of punishing persistence in rebellion, and, in case of submission, of substituting an undeniable for a doubtful title, and of SURRENDER OF THE TALUKDARS 163 attachinj; to the fiat of restoration such conditions as the new conditions of the Province might appear to necessitate. Lord Canning was able to clench his argument by reports, showing that large numbers of Talukdars were responding to the Proclamation by tendering their allegiance ; that many more, who wished to do so, were deterred by the armed bands still at large in the Province ; and that, as soon as this terrorism had been arrested, the acceptance of the terms of the Proclamation throughout the Province might be con- fidently expected. The hopes thus expressed were fully realised. No sooner had the bands of mutineers, to which the jungles of Oudh afforded so convenient a refuge, been broken up or driven across the Nepal frontier, than the Talukdars came freely forward to tender their submission. Within eighteen months Lord Canning, in p-ivinfj an account of a Darbar which he had held at Lucknow in October for the Oudh Talukdars, was able to declare that the tranquillity of the Province was completely established, and that it was his con- viction that in no part of Lidia was opposition to the Government less likely to be encountered. These happy results he attributed chiefly to the introduction of a simple system of administration, suited to the usages of the people, to a light assessment of land revenue, and to the measures whereby the Government had been enabled to confer on the Talukdars a permanent and hereditary proprietary title in the L 2 164 EARL CANNING estates which had been restored to them. With few exceptions, the Talukdars had, he said, re- sponded to the summons to Lucknow. Many had come, however, in the fear that occasion would be taken to punish their delinquencies. ' They are now,' he said, 'preparing to return to their homes, to all appearance reassured and gratified.' In the spring of 1861 still more striking evidence was afforded of the promptness and thoroughness of the pacification of the Province. On the 6th April, 1 861, a deputation of nineteen of the principal Oudh Talukdars were received in Darbar by the Viceroy at Calcutta. Their address attested in no faltering terms the degree in which the administration of Oudh had conciliated the confidence and goodwill of its landed classes. Making all due allowance for the Oriental hyperbole in which parts of it are conceived, their address conveys a strong sense of the gratitude with which the superior landowners recognised the generous leniency with which they had been treated at the close of the Mutiny and the restoration of privileges so seriously curtailed at annexation. They referred especially to Lord Canning's Darbar of October, 1859. The Viceroy was able to say in reply that there was ' no part of Hindustan more flourishing or more full of promise for the future. The ancient system of land tenure has been restored, but has been placed on a new and clear foundation. The preservation of the great families of the soil has been encouraged and facilitated. The rights of the humbler PACIFICATION OF OUDH 165 occupants have been protected. Garrisons have been reduced, police diminished. The country is so tranquil that an English child might travel from one end of it to the other in safety ; so thriving that its people have been the most prompt and liberal of all the natives of India in responding to the cry of their famishing: brethren of the North- West.' Such was the end of the rash and ill-considered attack, which nearly shipwrecked an English Ministry, cost its author his seat in the Cabinet, and might, but for Lord Canning's calmness, have produced a calamitous disturbance in Indian administration at a moment still sorely beset with difficulty and peril. I have dwelt upon it at length because no other incident in Lord Canning's career displays, so far as I am aware, in more striking colours his characteristic qualities of thoroughness in preparation, wisdom in action, and magnanimity under undeserved attack. CHAPTER VIII Pacification The events of 1857 had the effect of turning a sti'ong current of English thought and feeling in the direction of India. What did such a convulsion mean ? Of Avhat disease in the body politic was it the out- come ? What defects in the administrative machinery had occasioned so sudden, so serious a collapse ? In July, 1857, Mr. D'Israeli, in the last debate of the session, had taken the view that the revolt was not military but national, and had proposed, by way of remedy, a Royal Commission to enquire into grievances, and a large increase of the European force. The people of India should, he urged, be made to feel ' that there was a hope for them in the future, and be taught at once that the relations between them and the Sovereign would be drawn nearer.' The House re- fused to interfere with the action of the Government, but accepted Lord John Russell's proposal to vote an address, expressive of their readiness to support the Crown in any effort necessary to restore tranquillity. There could be little doubt that among such restorative measures would be a modification of the English branch of the Indian Government. In July, 1857, Lord IRANSFER OF GOVERNMENT TO CROWN 167 Palmerston had represented to the Queen the in- conveniences occasioned by the so-called ' double Government ' of India, that of the Board of Control and that of the Court of Directors. In December he laid before Her Majesty the heads of a plan, recommended by a Committee of the Cabinet, for superseding this cumbrous and obsolete machine. In February of the following year Lord Palmerston introduced a Bill for giving effect to these recommendations. Lord Ellenborough in the House of Lords objected that the supremacy of British rule should be completely es- tablished before structural questions of administration could be properly discussed. It was, however, apparent that the main weight of Parliamentary opinion inclined to a transfer of the government of India from the East India Company to the Crown. The Company was too powerful a corporation to resign its powers and dignities without a struggle. Earl Grey in the Lords and Mr. Earing in the Commons presented the Directors' protest against the threatened extinction. Lord Palmerston, in introducing his Bill, pointed out the inconvenience of the double government, the delay and confusion involved in a procedure which kept momentous despatches oscillating between Cannon Row and Leadenhall Street — the obscurity thrown on the real seat of power and the real responsibility. He proposed to substitute an Indian Council, presided over by a Secretary of State, with a seat in Parliament, in lieu of the Court of Directors, the Secret Committee, and the President of the Board of Control. ' I am not 1 68 EARL CANNING afraid,' he said, in defending the general policy of his Bill, ' to trust Parliament with an insight into Indian affairs. Parliament will do fully as well as the Directors.' An amendment, hostile to the proposed measure, moved by Mr. T. Baring, evoked from Sir G. Cornewall Lewis a statesmanlike disquisition on the subject, which put the case for the transfer in its most convincing aspect. The petition against the Bill, he said, was based on two fallacies ; one, that it was by the Company that the East Indian Empire had been acquired ; another, that the administration of the Company had been extraordinarily good. A very slight historical retrospect sufficed to expose the futility of these assumptions. As for the pretension to administrative excellence, there had never been a worse government than that of the East India Company from 175"CES opened Maldii ■ Paddiphol o. TTlc nurturals dUiLote tiije height aheve stxL iwrf in- ir J7u> ^ap isf irvt^ndect only to ej^ubit thepriruTipaL , ^^def' -rivers &c. iji India-. 'I (Jaraularh Fr-ess. Oirfyrd- ©pinions of tftc Press! COLONEL MALLESON'S 'AKBAR.' ' Colonel Malleson's interesting monograph on Akbar in the "Rulers of India " (Clarendon Press) should more than satisfy the general reader. Colonel Malleson traces the origin and foundation of the Mughal Empire ; and, as an introduction to the history of Muhanima- dan India, the book leaves nothing to be desired.' — St. James's Gazette. * Akbar was certainly a great man. Colonel Malleson has done well to tell his story thus succinctly and sympathetically : hitherto it has been mostly buried from the mass of readers. The book is in our idea a piece of thoroughly well-executed work, which cannot fail to recommend still further a series which has begun right well.' — Nonconformist. ' The cliief interest of the book lies in the later chapters, in which Colonel Malleson presents an interesting and singularly pleasing picture of the great Emperor himself and the principles which governed his enlightened and humane administration.' — Literary World. ' It is almost superfluous to say that the book is characterised by the narrative vigour and the extensive familiarity with Indian history to which the readers of Colonel Malleson's other works are accus- tomed.' — Glasgoio Herald. ' This volume will, no doubt, be welcomed, even by experts in Indian history, in the light of a new, clear, and terse rendering of an old, but not worn-out theme. It is a worthy and valuable addition to Sir W. Hunter's promising series.' — AthencBzim. ' Colonel Malleson has broken ground new to the general reader. The story of Akbar is briefly but clearly told, with an account of what he was and what he did, and how he found and how he left India. . . . The native chronicles of the reign are many, and from them it is still possible, as Colonel Malleson has shown, to construct a living portrait of this great and mighty potentate.' — Scots Observer. ' Akbar is, after Mohammed himself, the most striking and interest- ing figure in Mussulman history. Few men of any age or country have united in equally successful measure the gifts of the conqueror, the organiser, and the philosophic statesman . . . His personal charac- ter is even more exceptional among Oriental rulers than his intel- lectual brilliance . . . He is the only great Mussulman ruler who showed himself capable of rising out of the narrow bigotry of Islam to a lofty and comprehensive view of religious truth. The life and rule of such a man is a noble theme for a great historian.' — Speaker. ' The brilliant historian of the Indian Mutiny has been assigned in this volume of the series an important epoch and a strong personality for critical study, and he has admirably fulfilled his task. A luminous exposition of the invasions of India by Babar, Akbar's grandfather, makes a good introduction to Asiatic history of the sixteenth century. Akbar's own career is full of interest, and to the principles of his in- ternal administration Colonel Malleson devotes in the final chapter more than a quarter of the pages of his book. Alike in dress and style, this volume is a fit companion for its predecessor.' — Manchester Guardian. P 2 SDpinions of tbc IPress CAPTAH TROTTEE'S 'WAEEEI HASTIiaS.' ' The publication, recently noticed in this place, of the " Letters, Despatches, and other State Papers preserved in the Foreign Depart- ment of the Government of India, 1772-17S5," has thrown entirely new light from the most authentic sources on the whole history of Warren Hastings and his government of India. Captain L. J. Trotter's War HEN Hastings, a volume of the " Rulers of India " series, edited by Sir W. Hunter (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press), is accordingly neither inojiportune nor devoid of an adequate raison (Veire. '' The present volume," says a brief preface, " endeavours to exhibit for the first time the actual work of that great Governor-General, as reviewed from the firm stand-point of the original records now made available to the students of Indian history." Captain Trotter is well known as a competent and attractive writer on Indian history, and this is not the first time that Warren Hastings has supplied him with a theme.' — The Times. ' He has put his best work into this memoir . . . Captain Trotter's memoir is more valuable [than Sir A. Lyall's] from a strictly historical point of view. It contains more of the history of the period, and it embraces the very latest information that casts light on Hastings' re- markable career . . . His work too is of distinct literary merit, and is worthy of a theme than which British history presents none nobler. It is a distinct gain to the British race to be enabled, as it now may, to count the great Governor-General among those heroes for whom it need not blush.' — Scotsman. ' Captain Trotter has done his work well, and his volume deserves to stand with that on Dalhousie by Sir William Hunter. Higher praise it would be liard to give it.' — Neto York Herald. ' This is an able book, written with candour and discrimination.' — Leeds Mercury. ' Captain Trotter has done full justice to the fascinating story of the splendid achievements of a great Englishman.' — Manchester Guardian. ' This neat little volume contains a brief but admirable biography of the first Governor-General of India. The author has been fortunate in having had access to State papers which cover the period of the entire rule of Warren Hastings.' — The Neivcastle Chronicle. ' In preparing this sketch for " The Rulers of India," Captain Trotter has had the advantage of consulting the "Letters, despatches, and other State papers preserved in the Foreign Department of the Government of India, 1772-85," a period which covers the entire administration of Warren Hastings. The present volume, therefore, may truly claim tliat it " exhibits for the first time the actual work of the great Governor-General, as reviewed from tlie firm stand-point of original records." It is a book which all must peruse who desire to be " up to date " on the subject.' — The Globe. Opinions of t&c IPrcss YISCOOTT HAEDII&E'S 'LORD HAEDIN&E.' ' An exception to the rule that biographies ought not to be entrusted to near relatives. Lord Hardinge, a scholar and an artist, has given us an accurate record of his father's long and distinguished services. There is no filial exaggeration. The author has dealt with some con- troversial matters with skill, and has managed to combine truth with tact and regard for the feelings of others.'- — The Saturday Revieio. 'This interesting life reveals the first Lord Hardinge as a brave, just, able man, the very soul of honour, admired and trusted equally by friends and political opponents. The biographer . . . has produced a most engaging volume, which is enriched by many private and official documents that have not before seen the light.' — The Anti-Jacobin. ' Lord Hardinge has accomplished a grateful, no doubt, but, from the abundance of material and delicacy of certain matters, a very difficult task in a workmanlike manner, marked by restraint and lucidity.'— TAe Fall Mall Gazette. ' His son and biographer has done his work with a true appreciation of proportion, and has added substantially to our knowledge of the Sutlej Campaign.' — Vanity Fair. ' The present Lord Hardinge is in some respects exceptionally well qualified to tell the tale of the eventful four years of his father's Governor-Generalship.' — The Times. 'It contains a full account of everything of importance in Lord Hardinge's military and political career ; it is aiTanged ... so as to bring into special prominence his government of India ; and it gives a lifelike and striking picture of the man.' — Academy. ' The style is clear, the treatment dispassionate, and the total result a manual which does credit to the interesting series in which it figures.' —The Globe. ' The concise and vivid account which the son has given of his father's career will interest many readers.' — The Morning Fost. 'Eminently readable for everybody. The history is given succinctly, and the unpublished letters quoted are of real value.' — The Colonies and India. ' Compiled from public documents, family papers, and letters, this brief biography gives the reader a clear idea of what Hardinge was both as a soldier and as an administrator.' — I'he Manchester Examiner. ' An admirable sketch.' — The New York Herald. 'The Memoir is well and concisely written, and is accompanied by an excellent likeness after the portrait by Sir Francis Grant.' — The Queen. HDpinions of t^e Pre^s ON MAJOR-GENERAL SIR OWEN BURNE'S * CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN.' *In " Cl3^(le and Strathnairn," a contribution to Sir William Hunter's excellent "Rulers of India" series (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press), Sir Owen Burne gives a lucid sketch of the military history of the Indian Mutiny and its suppression by the two great soldiers who give their names to his book. The space is limited for so large a theme, but Sir Owen Burne skilfully adjusts his treatment to his limits, and rarely violates the conditions of proportion imposed upon him.' . . . ' Sir Owen Burne does not confine himself exclusively to the military narrative. He gives a brief sketch of the rise and progress of the Mutiny, and devotes a chapter to the Reconstruction which followed its suppression.' . . . ' — well written, well proportioned, and eminently worthy of the series to which it belongs.' — The Times. ' Sir Owen Burne who, by association, experience, and relations with one of these generals, is well qualified for the task, writes with know- ledge, perspicuity, and fairness.' — Saturday Review. ' As a brief record of a momentous epoch in India this little book is a remarkable piece of clear, concise, and interesting writing.' — The Colonies and India. 'In this new volume of the excellent "Rulers of India" series, Major-Gen eral Burne gives in a succinct and readable form an account of the Mutiny, its causes, its nature, and the changes in army organisa- tion and civil administration which followed upon it.' — Glasgow Herald. ' Like the rest of the book, this part is not only excellently written, but is excellently reasoned also.' — The National Observer. ' Sir Owen Burne, who has written the latest volume for Sir William Hunter's " Rulers of India " series, is better qualified than any living person to narrate, from a military standpoint, the story of the suppres- sion of the Indian Mutiny.' — Daily Telegraph. * Sir Owen Burne's booli on " CXyAe and Strathnairn " is worthy to rank with the best in the admirable series to which it belongs.' — Manchester Examiner. ' The book is admirably written ; and there is probably no better sketch, equally brief, of the stirring events with which it deals.' Scotsman. ' Sir Owen Burne, from the part he played in the Indian Mutiny, and from his long connexion with the Government of India, and from the fact that he was military secretary of Lord Strathnairn both in India and in Ireland, is well qualified for the task which he has undertaken.' — The Athenaeum. ' Sir W. W. Hunter acted wisely in commissioning Sir Owen Tudor Burne to write the lives of " Clyde and Strathnairn " for this series (Clarendon Press). Neither of these generals was, strictly speaking, a Ruler of India : still the important period of the Mutiny is so contained in the story of their exploits, that perhaps it was as well to choose them as the personages round whom might be grouped the history of that stirring period. . . . Sir O. T. Burne's book is well worthy of a place in the most valuable of the many series now issuing from the Press.' — The Header. WORKS BY SIR HENRY CUNNINGHAM, K.C.I.E. THE HERIOTS. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. ' 'Phis novel will confirm the good opinions which " The Chronicles of Dustypore " and "The Creruleans" had won for their author. . . . Sir Henry h:us a neat turn for epigram, which makes his symposia of smart people sparkling and sometimes racy ; he is brimful of the wit of the French cynics, and can caj) it on occasion with his own. . . . Lady Heriot is a charming old lady whom it is a privilege to have met even in a novel." — 'I'imex. 'This is a work of genius. . . . "The Heriots" leave us with a large circle of new friends, whose acquaintance it has been a privilege to make, and many of whose sayings it is ple;i.sant to remember. Several of the characters may fairly claim to be original creations in English fiction.' — Academy. ' It is an eminently readable novel, as well as a singularly clever one.' — Guardian. ' We are glad to welcome home the delightful author of "The Chronicles of Dustypore " and "The Coeruleans." ..." The Heriots " is not a novel with a purpose . . . but for all that it produces an effect on the reader's mind, and favours the belief that purity and goodness are better possessions than allotments in "going" companies and villas on the Thames. And it teaches this gratifying lesson amid a whirl of talk and society. . . . People will do well to read " The Heriots." ' — Speaker. ' A story of much literary excellence. In style and matter it has a fine aroma of intellect and culture, and it is jiervaded by a taste for what is good and true and beautiful in life and human nature. We do not propose to give an outUne of Sir Henry C\mningham's story; but the reader may be assured that it is as highly interesting as a narrative destitute of lurid sensationalism can well be. It is brightened by chapters of unusually good conversation of the brisk and consciously brilliant sort. Altogether this is perhajis the best story that Sir Henry Cunningham has produced since he delighted Indian readers with his "Chronicles of Dustypore.'" — Scotsman. 'Is not only a powerful novel, but conspicuous amongst publications of the same character for the healtliiness of its tone, the brUliancy of its dialogue, and the simplicity of its plot. His book is a chapter of the history of the world in which we live. It is more even than that. It is a chapter wliich embodies the experiences of a lifetime — a chapter which those would do well to study who are fond of calling evil good, and good evil ; a chapter which the pure-minded BngUshman and Englishwoman will cherish as giving, in a refined and taking style, illustrated by brilliant dialogues and scenes of ever- increasing interest, a lesson from which there is no one so wise that he cannot derive alike profit and pleasure.' — Evening News. 'The author of those capital books, "The Coeruleans" and "The Clironicles of Dustypore," stands quite apart from the oi'dinary run of novelists, for he has learning enough and to spare, and, although he never displays it unduly, yet he makes his readers pleasantly conscious of an atmosphere of good reading and good sense. . . . Sir Henry Cunningham's new novel does not fall below the high standard of its predecessors. — Manchester Examiner, ' It is seldom that in an age of three-volume novels we come across one so thoroughly satisfactory as "The Heriots." It is brilliant as a picture of social life, it sparkles witli epigram, its presentation of character is varied and graphic. . . . For all its excellence it is nevertheless thoroughly unbookish; its fluent elegance, its lively jests, its happy allusiveness, possess the crowning grace of apparent spontaneity.' — Daily News. MACMILLAN AND CO., LONDON. THE CCEBULEAirS. A Vacation Idyll. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. ' This is a novel of uncommon merit. In an elegant style, and with considerable power of satire and epigram, Mr. Cunningham gives us sketch after sketch of the various Anglo-Indian types of character. . . . On the whole we should say that Ccerulean officialdom is unusually favoured in its personnel. There does not appear to be a dull day in the whole of Coerulea. Everybody is witty, and the repartees which fly about are almost too good to be natural. . . . "The Coeruleans" appeals to a high standard of taste and intelligence, and we shall be surprised if it does not achieve success.' — Times. 'Middle-aged people remember as one of the cleverest short novels they ever read a book called "Wheat and Tares." . . . Once only, so far as we know, until now has the writer reminded readers of fiction of his existence. But the talent, though apparently PRESS OPINIONS ON THE CCERULEANS {contimml). hidden, has after all been at usury. Good as was " Wheat and Tares" twenty years ago, " The Coeruleans " must be accounted even better. There was wit in that; in this there is a riper wit, and abundance of wisdom as weU.' — Alheiueum. ' It is a joyful relief to come upon a pleasant and natural story, admirably written by a gentleman and scholar, who is at the same time blessed with a constant flow of quiet but most effective humour. Such a story is "The Cceruleans." . . . Mr. Cunningham's fityle is not only correct, but elegant — with an elegance now unhappily rare ; and all that he writes is forcible and self-contained. There is not a dull page in the book.' — Haturday Review. 'Several theories of Indian government are discussed in this brilliant book ("The Coeruleans"), and the writer has much to say on this question that is well worth consideration if it may not always command assent.' — Academy. "'The Coeruleans" is an unusuaUy pleasant and entertaining novel. It is clever, original, and refined, full of bright scenes and amiable conversations, as weU as excellent studies of character. Above all, it contrasts favourably with the majority of clever novels of the day by the preponderance of agi'eeable people among its characters.'— Guardian. WHEAT AND TARES. Crown 8vo. 3.5.