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THE PKOBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
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THE PROBLEM OF 
 PERSONALITY 
 
 A CRITICAL y CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY 
 IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT THOUGHT 
 
 BY 
 
 ERNEST NORTHCROFT MERRINGTON 
 
 M. A. (Sydney), Ph.D. (Harvard) 
 
 RESEARCH STUDENT, UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, 1903-4 
 
 LECTURER IN PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, I907-9 
 
 AUTHOR OF 'THE POSSIBILITY OF A SCIENCE OF CASUISTRY' 
 
 MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED 
 ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON 
 1916 
 
BD33/ 
 
 M i 
 
 COPYRIGHT 
 
 GLASGOW : PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 BY ROBERT MACLEHOSE AND CO. LTD. 
 
FOREWORD. 
 
 The present work represents an effort to state 
 the problem of Personality in relation to some 
 of the fundamental truths of philosophy and 
 theology. The kingdom of truth is to be found, 
 if anywhere, ' within you ' ; and it is worth 
 while to seek to clarify our ideas regarding the 
 somewhat vague concept of Personality in order 
 that the constructive spirit which is manifest 
 everywhere to-day may have some materials with 
 which to work. This is but a partial attempt to 
 express certain opinions, which, whatever their 
 defects may be, have at least passed through 
 the fires of criticism in three universities, and 
 have proved to the author and others with 
 whom he has discussed them that, in an age of 
 much questioning, they have a helpful influence 
 upon the truths by which we live, and upon the 
 life itself which is ' more than they.' 
 
 349347 
 
vi FOREWORD 
 
 The substance of this work is a Thesis which 
 is hereby published with the authority of the 
 Division of Philosophy of Harvard University, 
 by whom it was accepted as part of the work 
 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, on the 
 recommendation of the Examining Committee, 
 Professors J. Royce, G. H. Palmer and R. B. 
 Perry. To these and other Harvard teachers 
 and friends, especially the late William James 
 and Professor H. Miinsterberg, I have to make 
 acknowledgments. Also I am grateful to Pro- 
 fessors Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison and James 
 Seth (of Edinburgh), and to Professor Francis 
 Anderson and Principal Andrew Harper (both of 
 Sydney) for their earlier help. 
 
 As the first part of the book is occupied with 
 an examination of certain views of the Self held 
 by recent philosophers in Britain and America, 
 and is somewhat technical to a certain class of 
 readers, some may prefer to begin with the 
 Second Part in which the subject is more con- 
 structively treated. 
 
 The following characteristic note from the late 
 Professor William James upon the views set 
 forth in this work should be of interest to those 
 who knew him, and who admire his brilliant 
 
FOREWORD vii 
 
 work as philosopher and teacher. It expresses 
 a certain facet of his theory of the Self, which 
 supplements what is given in Chapter I by way 
 of estimating the place of Personality in his 
 thought : — 
 
 ' The part of your thesis that hits me hardest 
 is the remarks on " Experience " — with the rest 
 I am in sympathy of tolerance if not of active 
 echo. I have worked for so many years with 
 the " passing thought " formula which prag- 
 matically does all the work of a Self, that the 
 inability to define the Self except by its work 
 makes me perhaps unduly hostile, not to the 
 word, of course, but to the use of it as a funda- 
 mental term in philosophy. The " train of 
 experience " kind of self gets its unity after the 
 facts only; but the " unanalyzable principle" 
 kind is anterior to the facts and seems to 
 warrant their having unity. But if one makes 
 of each stage of unity already achieved in fact, 
 an active worker for more unity, with efficacy 
 too, doesn't the warrant also seem to exist ? ' 
 
 In reply, I must say here simply, it all depends 
 upon the point of view, and leave the reader 
 to form his own opinion in the sequel. But 
 may I acknowledge my debt in heart and mind 
 
viii FOREWORD 
 
 to this knight-errant of Truth, the greatest of the 
 century, and most beloved by all who were 
 honoured with his friendship ? To the memory 
 of William James I dedicate anything of worth 
 in this book. 
 
 While the manuscript was in the publisher's 
 hands, Professor Henri Bergson announced as 
 the subject of his Gifford Lectures the title which 
 had been given to this work. This is a coinci- 
 dence ; but here is another evidence of the recog- 
 nition in our time of the great importance of this 
 subject. All students of philosophy and theology 
 will eagerly await the fuller pronouncement by 
 Bergson of his views upon Personality, which 
 will doubtless be made available in book form 
 at no distant date. Meanwhile there is room 
 for study and treatment of the problem of the 
 inner life by those who- are occupied with the 
 theme in their own way, and are keenly alive 
 to the privilege of being admirers, and perhaps 
 disciples, of the great thinkers of our time. 
 
 E. N. M. 
 
 Emmanuel College, 
 
 University of Queensland, 
 
 March 1914. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGK 
 
 Introduction 1 
 
 PART I. 
 EXPOSITORY AND CRITICAL. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 William James 9 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 Mr. F. H. Bradley 26 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Professor Josiah Royce 55 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Professor G. H. Howison 77 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Mr. F. C. S. Schiller 88 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Dr. Hastings Rashdall - 122 
 
x CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Professor Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison - - 130 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 Later Tendencies 140 
 
 PART II. 
 CONSTRUCTIVE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Experience as a Metaphysical Concept - - - 151 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Meaning of Personality and Related Concepts 160 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 The Reality of Self 170 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Metaphysic of Existence 181 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Metaphysic of Values 200 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Metaphysic of Reality 210 
 
 Index 221 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The concept of Personality is so vague and 
 undefined, and the possible problems connected 
 with it are so numerous and far-reaching, that 
 it is advisable to state as briefly as possible 
 my main thesis. I am not concerned primarily 
 to discuss the relations of Personality to Logic, 
 Psychology, Ethics, Sociology, Cosmogony, Theo- 
 logy, and the like, except in so far as the line of 
 thought passes through these regions. And even 
 in Metaphysics I have allowed myself but little 
 space for the problems of Epistemology, In- 
 dividuality and Immortality. The reason is two- 
 fold. In the first place, the treatment of this 
 subject is essentially an exercise in the much- 
 needed discipline of self-limitation ; for one could 
 easily lose oneself in seeking metaphysically to 
 find ' the Self ' ! Further, it is plain that these 
 problems are insoluble apart from a general theory 
 of Reality. Instead of seeking to defend any 
 
2 TEE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 special theory represented by these terms directly, 
 we do better, perhaps, to get an adequate meta- 
 physical view of the Self ; and then these pro- 
 blems will precipitate a solution in the theoretical 
 medium that has been provided. This is especi- 
 ally true of Immortality ; on which, accordingly, 
 there is not much said directly ; but the answer 
 to this great question emerges positively with a 
 Personalistic Theory of the Universe. 
 
 Our thesis then is to examine the main pro- 
 blems of Personality, with especial reference 
 to recent works in metaphysics. Accordingly, 
 the First Part of the work is devoted to the 
 exposition and criticism of the leading doctrines 
 of Personality as maintained by some of the prin- 
 cipal present-day philosophers, who have dealt 
 fully with the subject. We are concerned with 
 them only to the extent required for an under- 
 standing of their views upon our Problem ; and 
 so we are not called upon to investigate their 
 systems in other respects, however important 
 they may be from a different standpoint. And 
 as the * reaction ' is constructively given in the 
 Second Part, the criticisms in the First Part are 
 very brief and pointed. The Second Part will 
 carry on the alignment negatively shown in the 
 
INTRODUCTION 3 
 
 earlier criticisms, to a positive view of the 
 answers to our main problems. 
 
 What then is the Problem of Personality ? It 
 is primarily the Problem of the Reality of the 
 Self, and the meaning, and the place of this and 
 kindred Concepts in a metaphysical theory. 
 Following upon that are the questions concerning 
 the Personality of God, and of the Absolute ; 
 the demands of our moral and religious nature ; 
 and the relation between Spirits ; the questions 
 of Monism and Pluralism ; the metaphysical 
 importance of our Ideals and Values ; the im- 
 plications of Freedom and Duty, and belief in 
 Immortality. 
 
 The First Part of the book does not aim at 
 giving an epitome of all recent thought upon the 
 subject before us. That would require more 
 years of research and preparation than I have 
 been able to give, and a large volume as the result. 
 The aim is to treat the views of those whose 
 work upon the Concept has been central to their 
 thinking. I confine myself for the most part to 
 the thinkers of Britain and America who have 
 been fairly influential. Accordingly I shall treat 
 of constructive philosophers chiefly, such as 
 James, Bradley, Royce, Howison, RashdaJl, and 
 
4 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 Schiller. For his valuable works of criticism 
 Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison is included. 
 
 The subject is one that spreads so naturally 
 that a rigid conciseness of matter and treatment 
 is essential. The study of the Self easily leads 
 one into relations with almost any and every 
 conceivable concept ; and this is for the very 
 good reason that it fulfils the claims of centrality 
 and supremacy made here on its behalf. 
 
 It may be remarked that there is need of a 
 Synthetic Psychology or empirical side of meta- 
 physics which shall study the Self, and such 
 concepts as Organism and Life in their wholeness. 
 And this must be done not in an unsympathetic 
 spirit, but as seeking for light upon the totality of 
 conduct and behaviour, and the deeper facts and 
 principles which are most important and signifi- 
 cant in psychology, ethics, and philosophy, as well 
 as in life, and which the analytic methods of the 
 present day, and merely methodological ideals of 
 truth, are absolutely incompetent to furnish. 1 
 
 1 Miss Calkins has recognized this by her provision for Psy- 
 chology as Science of Related Selves in A First Book in Psychology 
 (Macmillan, 1910), p. 273 ff. Professor W. R. Boyce Gibson has 
 made a plea for the recognition of the limitations of Pheno- 
 menalistic Psychology in his Philosophical Introduction to Ethics, 
 p. 193 ff. 
 
INTRODUCTION 5 
 
 It is part of the Thesis that not only is the Self 
 the true starting-point for a Metaphysic of 
 Existence, but, as Personality, it forms the 
 groundwork of a Metaphysic of Values also, 
 while it proves to be the supreme category of 
 explanation, the goal and the consummation of 
 a Metaphysic of Reality. 
 
PART I. 
 EXPOSITORY AND CRITICAL. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 WILLIAM JAMES. 
 
 The metaphysical study of the Self is distinct 
 from, but not wholly independent of the psycho- 
 logical treatment of the various problems con- 
 nected therewith. The late William James has 
 given a valuable psychological analysis of these 
 problems, 1 and he has also passed beyond this 
 stage into the region of metaphysics, in which 
 his view of the Self is naturally important. His 
 system of Radical Empiricism is partially worked 
 out in his later books and in various articles 
 which we shall refer to as occasion requires. 2 
 
 1 The Principles of Psychology, by Prof. William James. Two 
 volumes. New York, 1890. Especially chapters ix, x. 
 
 2 The more recent books of James expound the main ideas 
 indicated in this chapter, so far as our topic is concerned. His 
 chief works are Pragmatism, The Meaning of Truth, and A 
 Pluralistic Universe. In the last-named book — perhaps his 
 greatest — James works over the Problem of the Self once more, 
 arrives at the same conclusions as previously adopted ; but, 
 at least as it seems to the author, with certain qualms of his 
 philosophic conscience. 
 
10 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 Accordingly we shall pass rapidly along the track 
 of his thought until the bridge between psycho- 
 logy and metaphysics is crossed, and we are intro- 
 duced to the region where lie our mam problems. 
 
 i. 
 
 The distinct starting-point is his conception of 
 consciousness as ' the Stream of Thought' l Our 
 psychical life is essentially characterized by 
 change. Mental life is ever flowing. Never does 
 the same sensation recur. As Shadworth Hodg- 
 son has said, ' the chain of consciousness is a 
 sequence of differents.' 2 Here is the point of 
 divergence from Locke, Hume and Herbart, 
 although in their insistence upon succession they 
 approximate to this view. But they wrongly 
 held to atomistic units of consciousness, sensa- 
 tions and ideas, supposed to remain unchanged 
 except for the different combinations by which 
 the mental processes were built up. It is im- 
 possible to think of the brain as unmodified by 
 the constant change. The same ' object ' may 
 recur, but that is quite distinct from the same 
 bodily sensation, which cannot repeat itself. 
 
 1 The Principles of Psychology, vol. i. ch. ix. 
 
 2 The Philosophy of Reflection, i. p. 290. 
 
WILLIAM JAMES 11 
 
 But, further, this sequence of changes is 
 characterized by felt continuity. Even after 
 breaks, as on awakening from sleep, the personal 
 consciousness manifests gregarious tendencies in 
 regard to preceding thoughts, and accepts what 
 it regards as its own past experiences. What is 
 its criterion in this unifying process ? James 
 replies that certain qualities of ' warmth, inti- 
 macy, and immediacy ' x are possessed by those 
 past feelings which are welcomed as personal 
 property. Later 2 he inclines to the opinion that 
 these characteristics which constitute our sense 
 of Selfhood are chiefly, if not wholly, physical. 
 But, leaving that for the present, we have seen 
 reason to prefer the conception of consciousness 
 as essentially changing and continuous to the 
 notion of it as something static. This smooth- 
 ness and now are represented by the ' Stream of 
 Thought.' 
 
 Now we are ready to ask — How is the personal 
 character of mental life provided for in this 
 procession ? How can the train of thought 
 explain the Self which seems to own all its 
 
 1 Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 239. 
 
 a Ibid. vol. i. pp. 241, 242, 299, 300. See also his article ' Does 
 Consciousness Exist,' Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and 
 Scientific Methods, vol. i. No. 18. 
 
12 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 thoughts, and to be the centre of its feelings and 
 desires, and the agent in its volitions ? James 
 admits the existence of the personal element. 
 No psychology can question it. But when it 
 comes to definition of it, divergence seems 
 inevitable. Common-sense and spiritualistic 
 philosophy stand for a Soul, an identical 
 being throughout the psychical change, while 
 the scientific interests require a more workable 
 hypothesis. 
 
 James tries to meet these claims by his view 
 of the Self as the ' Passing Thought.' If the 
 feelings of Selfhood be regarded as themselves 
 parts of the s stream,' the difficulty of reconciling 
 common-sense and science seems to be met. For 
 whatever those thoughts and feelings of Self may 
 be, they are formed in the present, and projected 
 from this ' section ' of the stream. This is a 
 pragmatic account of the Self, and it seeks to 
 express its ' face- value.' It regards the field of 
 consciousness as given all at once in every 
 instant, with feelings of relation and tendency, 
 thus doing away with the need for an Ego to 
 unify a manifold of ideas. 1 Consciousness, in 
 
 1 Cf. Critique written by the late Professor James upon the 
 views given in this work, printed in the Foreword. 
 
WILLIAM JAMES 13 
 
 fact, is fundamentally a selection within this 
 field, some ideas being emphasized and others 
 being ignored. Elsewhere he has described it 
 as a ' fighter for ends.' 1 The greatest division 
 due to this emphasis is that which we find 
 between the ' Me ' and the ' Not-Me,' which are 
 thus viewed as expressions of relation. By the 
 ' Me ' we understand the Empirical Self, the so- 
 called ' contents of consciousness,' and the 
 various relationships in which the ' I ' stands, 
 and which constitute Personality. So James 
 speaks of the Material, the Social, and the 
 Spiritual Self, reserving the Pure Ego for later 
 consideration. The Material and Social Selves 
 may be readily conceived, but what is the 
 Spiritual Self ? It represents the psychical 
 faculties and processes ; and it may turn out to 
 be either the ' Stream ' as a whole, or the present 
 ' section/ Examining these in turn, as the 
 abstract and concrete views of the Spiritual 
 Self, James admits that the former gives an 
 account of the intimate and incessant nature of 
 the Self, which accords best with ordinary 
 feeling and opinion. 2 But, again, definitions will 
 cause divergence between the advocates of the 
 
 1 Principles of Psychology, i. p. 141. 2 Ibid. i. p. 297. 
 
14 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 Soul and those who attribute the self-feeling to 
 a fiction denoted by the personal pronoun, ' I.' 
 An examination of the actual feelings is what 
 concerns James, and for his part, introspection 
 seems to reveal nothing but intra-cephalic move- 
 ments and sensations between the head and 
 throat. Our feeling of activity in the ' nuclear ' 
 Self is viewed as due to these bodily sensations 
 of movement. 1 
 
 Accordingly the concrete method is adopted, 
 and the Thinker is regarded as a postulate of the 
 present Thought. The Self is identical, in fact, 
 with the Thought, which judges the past, knows 
 the preceding thought, and ' finding it warm,' 
 that is, possessing the qualities previously de- 
 scribed, adopts it. 2 As every thought passes 
 away it is taken up by a present one, which 
 knows it, and transmits itself in turn to a suc- 
 cessor. This ' trick ' of the present Thought in 
 appropriating the past constitutes the Self. This 
 
 1 Cf. Stout, Analytic Psychology, vol. i. chapter on ' Mental 
 Activity ' for a criticism of this view. See also James' article on 
 1 The Experience of Activity, in the Psychological Review, vol. 
 xii. No. 1 footnote, pp. 7-9. In A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 378- 
 380, James replies to Stout's criticisms, and again endorses his 
 view of the ' I ' as essentially a bodily term, expressive mainly 
 of the relation of position. 
 
 2 Principles of Psychology, i. p. 339. 
 
WILLIAM JAMES 15 
 
 also explains the sense of Personal Identity with- 
 out invoking any metaphysical principle. The 
 judgment of my Identity is like any other judg- 
 ment of sameness, a matter of thought ; no 
 direct spiritual feelings are required, the mere 
 ' warmth ' of bodily quality which gives all such 
 thoughts a generic unity is sufficient. 
 
 A criticism of the three leading metaphysical 
 theories of the Inner Principle of Personal 
 Unity, or Pure Ego, is given, 1 viz. the Spiritual- 
 istic, Associationist, and the Transcendentalist. 
 As to the first, James regards the Soul as a 
 superfluity. The Associationists missed the mark 
 by failure to describe Self-consciousness. The 
 Kantian Transcendental Unity of Apperception 
 and the Self-distinguishing consciousness of the 
 Neo-Kantians — Edward Caird and T. H. Green — 
 are dismissed as cumbrous and erroneous, through 
 the effort to explain relations by the knower 
 rather than by the known. James provides for 
 relations in the world of objects rather than on 
 the subjective side. The Subject submits to 
 ' feelings of relation ' as naturally as any other 
 experience. While James has been largely in- 
 fluenced by Locke, Hume, and Mill, he disagrees 
 
 1 Ibid. i. p. 342. 
 
16 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 here with his authorities. So he stands out of 
 all three schools. He leaves the reader free to 
 supplement his view of ' the Passing Thought ' 
 by the theory of the Soul as an actual being or 
 substantial Ego, if he chooses ; but for himself 
 he finds no need for such hypothesis. He accord- 
 ingly speaks of the empirical person as ' Me,' and 
 the judging Thought as ' I.' ' There need never 
 have been a quarrel between associationism and 
 its rivals, if the former had admitted the inde- 
 composable unity of every pulse of thought, and 
 the latter been willing to allow that " perishing" 
 pulses of thought might recollect and know.' x 
 
 In addition, it should be remarked that 
 James discussed some of the psychological diffi- 
 culties attendant upon the belief in the Self as 
 commonly held, especially the phenomena of 
 changes of personality, of hypnotism, and of the 
 possession of many selves. Such abnormalities 
 seem to indicate the transitive and unsubstantial 
 nature of what we esteem as Selfhood, and suffi- 
 cient evidence is forthcoming to establish the 
 genuineness of these facts. 
 
 Turning now to the later developments of his 
 doctrine in his metaphysical system, we find that 
 
 1 Principles of Psychology, p. 371. 
 
WILLIAM JAMES 17 
 
 the Self approaches the vanishing point in 
 Radical Empiricism. The negative side of his 
 earlier doctrine of the Self becomes more and 
 more prominent, till the Person is scarcely dis- 
 tinguishable among the multitude of * experi- 
 ences ' which compose our psychic life. Con- 
 sciousness itself is mistrusted and even discarded ! J 
 The function of consciousness is performed by 
 thoughts ; and ' that function is knowing.' 2 
 There is a common medium of knower and 
 known which James calls ' pure experience.' He 
 boldly denies the inner duplicity of consciousness 
 and content. Both are alike, and may be desig- 
 nated ' experiences.' In perception or thought 
 what happens is this — certain experiences get 
 themselves presented twice at least, once in a 
 context of relations which concern a field of 
 objects or ideas, and again in a context which is 
 made up of relations of ' personal history.' 
 These relations are themselves felt experiences, 
 according to the view which we have found in 
 his Psychology. He illustrates the process of 
 the dual context by the point at the intersection 
 of two lines, in both of which it may be counted. 
 
 1 Journal of Philosophy, etc., i. No. 18, p. 478. 
 
 2 Ibid. p. 478. 
 
 B 
 
18 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 I think this may be made clearer by considering 
 the instance of the bright circle thrown by a 
 search-light upon the sea. The bright circle is 
 counted in the stream of light and also in the 
 surface-plane of the sea, — two different contexts ; 
 the former may be compared to the person, the 
 latter to the ' thing.' But the analogy fails in 
 so far as it does not indicate the oneness of nature 
 which is claimed in James' Theory for both con- 
 texts, as parts of ' pure experience,' instead of 
 regarding them dualistically as matter and mind, 
 subject and object, and so forth. 
 
 Self and its activities are regarded as belonging 
 to the content of experience. In a later article * 
 James speaks of Personality as the experienced 
 relation between terms that are conscious of con- 
 tinuing each other. This ' relation ' by which the 
 Self is organized as a system of memories, pur- 
 poses, strivings, and so on, is admittedly the 
 most difficult to explain. But this is just the 
 strategic point of Radical Empiricism, directed 
 against all the fictions of rationalistic metaphysics. 
 As to what this ' withness ' which constitutes our 
 
 1 ' The World of Pure Experience,' Journal of Philosophy, etc., 
 vol. i. No. 20, p. 3. Also vol. ii. No. 2, ' The Thing and its 
 Relations.* 
 
WILLIAM JAMES 19 
 
 personal life is, we can only describe it as experi- 
 ence of conjunctive relations, continuity or 
 absence of break. The schools in the past have 
 recognized disjunctive relations, the disconnected- 
 ness of experience, but they have not accepted 
 conjunctive relations, as equally ' given ' ; had 
 they done so, they would not have needed to 
 employ transcendental principles to explain dif- 
 ferences, and to unify the discrepant subject and 
 object which their one-sided abstract method 
 provided. Even our minds are not so absolutely 
 separate as is supposed ; they may and do 
 become conterminous in our common world, 1 and 
 perhaps even confluence will be possible at some 
 future time. James admits his affinity here with 
 Natural Realism rather than with views similar 
 to those of Berkeley and Mill. He maintains a 
 pluralistic, as opposed to monistic, view of the 
 world, and rejects infinity. 
 
 Self-activity and efficient causation are de- 
 fended by James, 2 although he regards the body 
 as the centre of such feelings, as opposed to 
 theories like Wundt's Innervationsgefilhle which 
 
 1 Journal of Philosophy, etc., vol. i. No. 21, p. 15 ff. 
 2 ' The Experience of Activity,' Psychological Review, vol. xii. 
 No. 1. 
 
20 THE PKOBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 James had attacked in his Psychology, and 
 had reduced to associated and present muscular 
 feelings. 1 He champions the cause of free- 
 will 2 as against determinism of every sort, 
 not, however, as an ethical principle, but as a 
 natural manifestation of novelty and chance 
 in our ' activity-situations.' His pluralism is 
 radical, and is hostile to absolutism in every 
 form. 
 
 In his treatment of the religious consciousness, 
 he follows his characteristic ' Method ' of Prag- 
 matism. Instead of the scholastic arguments, he 
 asks for the practical effects, the individual re- 
 actions upon our attitudes towards the unseen. 
 From a long and valuable survey 3 of such 
 religious experiences, he concludes that there is 
 a wider spiritual universe, personal communion 
 with which has recreative value and moral 
 worth. There may be many Gods rather than 
 one ; but Personality, presumably as conceived 
 by James himself, both of man and of Gods, 
 
 1 Principles of Psychology, vol. ii. pp. 493-518. Cf. Miinster- 
 bcrg's Die Willenshandlung, pp. 73, 82. 
 
 2 The Will to Believe, and other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 
 Longmans, 1897. 
 
 3 The Varieties of Religious Experience, Gifford Lectures, Edin. 
 1901-1902, Longmans, pp. 444-485 ff. 
 
WILLIAM JAMES 21 
 
 ^/ must be regarded as Reality in the completest 
 sense of the term. 1 
 
 II. 
 
 As stated in the Introduction, my critical 
 reaction upon the expositions of the different 
 systems will be brief, as the latter part of this 
 work will permit a fuller commentary and a 
 constructive statement. In regard to James' 
 views, I will merely make a few critical remarks. 
 
 1. There seems to be a lack of homogeneity in 
 the various presentations of Personality at differ- 
 ent stages in his thought. Two warring tenden- 
 cies are seen at work, and the terms of peace have 
 never been made public, so far as I am aware. 
 One line fights for a sort of simplicity, and what 
 looks like a monistic empiricism, while the other 
 contends for fulness of life, individualism and 
 pluralism. The key to the struggle is given, I 
 believe, in the Psychology, where the person is 
 admitted as uniquely real, and yet is pushed into 
 the whirling ' stream of thought.' I believe 
 Interactionism to be a thoroughly defensible 
 doctrine of mind and body, but it is not clear in 
 James' system what distinguishes the psychical 
 
 1 For his treatment of the Soul, Ibid. pp. 195-6, 498-9. 
 
22 THE PKOBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 from the physical. Especially is this true in 
 Radical Empiricism, where the Self is dismissed, 
 and Experience is called upon to play the leading 
 role. James' early dualistic tendencies * are con- 
 tradicted by his later philosophy of Pure 
 Experience. 
 
 2. There is a similar inconsistency involved in 
 the attack on Consciousness, which was a ' fighter 
 for ends' at first, but which is subsequently 
 reduced to pathological feelings, especially in its 
 higher forms ! The bodily feelings brought to 
 light by James' introspection do not seem to me 
 in any way to disprove consciousness or the 
 reality of the Self, but rather to confirm it. What 
 we want is the Introspector, not the results of his 
 analysis. Those results seem to me to concern 
 a psychology of vital feeling. What is described 
 is the bodily background or object to the Subject 
 in its quiescent contemplation. 
 
 3. The Self is the spiritual factor manifested 
 in our highest psychical experiences, where bodily 
 terms are absolutely unmeaning. As a matter of 
 fact, which should surely concern psychology, and 
 quite apart from logical and metaphysical theo- 
 ries, consciousness is given as the presupposition 
 
 1 Psych, i. p. 218 ff. 
 
WILLIAM JAMES 23 
 
 and active participant in all experience. In 
 comparison, judgment, selection, love, aspiration, 
 and volition, the Subject preponderates over the 
 field of objects, which do not seem to be given in 
 that ' hyphenated ' condition which James repre- 
 sents 1 as being the characteristic of the field of 
 consciousness. If the active and synthetic char- 
 acter of subjectivity be admitted, no account of 
 ' experiences reporting themselves to one another,' 
 in the epistemology of Eadical Empiricism, will 
 suffice to account for the apparent dualism. 
 
 4. Side by side with the impersonal character 
 of James' descriptions, his remarks upon the 
 ' judgment ' of Personal Identity also call for 
 criticism. The judgment itself implies a syn- 
 thetic activity of Self. Further, it is as difficult 
 to explain metaphysically the identity of two 
 instants as of a life-time. This difficulty is hardly 
 overcome by endowing experience with the innate 
 relational quality usually attributed to the mind. 
 As to abnormalities, they should be the most 
 common of psychical phenomena, if the personal 
 life merely consisted in ' next-to-nextness,' where- 
 as, in point of fact, they are so rare as to be 
 regarded as curiosities. 
 
 1 Ibid. i. p. 278 ff. 
 
24 THE PROBLEM OP PERSONALITY 
 
 5. The ' Passing Thought ' is inadequate to do 
 justice to the Self. Have not the conjunctive 
 relations been ignored here in favour of the dis- 
 junctive ? If so, James has committed the error 
 which he charges against the schools. Metaphysi- 
 cally, some sameness is required to constitute even 
 a ' sequence of difTerents.' No explanation of the 
 ' trick ' of thought in appropriating the preceding 
 thought need be looked for. If it be demurred 
 that these are merely psychological accounts, it 
 must be remembered that most of them are 
 reproduced in the metaphysical system of Radical 
 Empiricism. 
 
 6. Opposed to the disintegration represented 
 by the ' Passing Thought ' is his preference for 
 an anima mundi thinking in all of us, to a number 
 of individual Souls ! x Instead of seeing in this 
 startling confession an inclination to Absolutism, 
 we should rather look upon it as a premonition 
 of his later attraction to the tendency of the 
 ' Pure Experience ' philosophy of Avenarius, 
 Mach, Petzoldt and others, whose general position 
 will concern us later. 2 
 
 1 Psych, i. p. 346. 
 
 * Chapter I. of the Second Part will deal with the important 
 relation of Experience to the Self. 
 
WILLIAM JAMES 25 
 
 7. The strong argument of Individuality in 
 favour of the Soul is not justly met by James' 
 reference to present-day tendencies towards spirit- 
 transference and the like, 1 as indicating the 
 removal of the middle wall of partition between 
 Self and Self. So in his Eadical Empiricism we 
 find no explication of this fundamental difficulty, 
 except the conterminousness of minds in objects, 
 and the hope of confluence. Karl Pearson's 2 
 singular expectation of the time when we shall 
 know the thoughts of other persons by observa- 
 tion of their brains seems to be along the same 
 line. Altogether, I feel that the examination of 
 the efforts of Professor James to provide for a 
 theory of experience without a Self confirms the 
 opinion that such a theory, no matter how 
 ingeniously worked out, is wholly unsatisfactory 
 and in its very nature liable to all the objections 
 brought against Hume's view by psychology and 
 metaphysics. 
 
 1 Psych, i. p. 350. 2 Grammar of Science. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 ME. F. R BRADLEY. 
 
 Widely different thinkers these, James and 
 Bradley ! And yet their systems resemble one 
 another in two respects at least, both of which 
 concern us here : first, the emphasis upon Experi- 
 ence, and second, the disparagement of the Self. 
 I am hopeful that by expanding these two text 
 I may be able to set forth Bradley's views at 
 sufficient length for our purpose. Brevity, how- 
 ever, is here indispensable. 1 
 
 We need not delay long over Experience, 
 although it is a concept of prime importance in 
 Bradley's theory of Reality. It will suffice to 
 
 1 Appearance and Reality, a Metaphysical Essay, by F. H. 
 Bradley; Swan, Soonenschein & Co., Second Edition, 1899. 
 
 The new book by Mr. Bradley, Essays on Truth arid Reality 
 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1914) appears to exhibit the same 
 standpoint as that given in the former work. 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 27 
 
 get two purposes falnlled in this part of our 
 treatment, viz. to obtain a general conception of 
 Bradley's system, and the part played by Experi- 
 ence therein ; and in the second place, to notice 
 the relation — or lack of relation — between this 
 concept and that of the Self. We are enabled to 
 state Bradley's general position under this head 
 of Experience, because that concept provides him 
 with a starting-point and also a goal, in his search 
 for reality. It does not become prominent, 
 however, till the beginning of the Second Book, 
 entitled Reality. The First Book, as is well 
 known, is designated Appearance, and is utterly 
 negative in character. Xothing can withstand 
 the onslaught of Bradley's logic. Primary and 
 Secondary Qualities, Substantive and Adjective. 
 Relation and Quality. Space and Time. Motion 
 and Change, the Perception of Change, Causation, 
 Activity, Things, the Self, and Things-in-them- 
 selves. disappear in rout and utter confusion 
 Reality is not to be found in any of these. 
 
 Bradley's three chief arguments are : (a) 
 incompleteness ; (b) relativity (which follows from 
 the former) ; and (c) the discrepancy of identity 
 and diversity, of the One and the Many, which is 
 manifested in them all. Such contradictoriness 
 
28 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 disposes of any claim to be considered as real. 
 And non-contradiction is Bradley's criterion of 
 Reality. ' Ultimate Reality is such that it does 
 not contradict itself; here is an absolute cri- 
 terion.' * Tested by this touchstone of logic, our 
 seeming real world is proved to be alloy, ' mere 
 appearance ' and ' illusion.' But this criterion 
 is also positive ; it directs us to an Absolute 
 Reality, One and Individual, in which the world 
 of appearance is somehow transmuted, and har- 
 monized within the Whole, which is also a 
 System. But Bradley says that the concrete 
 nature, the matter of this Absolute must be 
 Experience, which ' means something much the 
 same as given and present fact . . . Sentient 
 experience is reality, and what is not this is not 
 real.' 2 
 
 This point of view is maintained to the close, 
 although it appears that the Absolute Reality is 
 beyond Truth, and therefore, in a sense, tran- 
 scends experience as actual. But this agnostic 
 and even sceptical attitude is not final in the 
 explicit presentation of Bradley's doctrine, al- 
 though comparisons with Spinoza's Substance 
 and even Spencer's Unknowable suggest them- 
 
 1 Appearance and Reality, p. 136. a Ibid. p. 144. 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 29 
 
 selves to the reader. Yet, against such an 
 1 empty transcendence ' and ' shallow Pantheism,' 
 Bradley intends his work to be one sustained 
 polemic. 1 He follows Hegel's lead of seeking the 
 Absolute in experience, and in his doctrine of 
 Degrees of Truth and Reality he acknowledges 
 his debt to the German philosopher. According 
 to this doctrine, the ' appearances ' find their 
 places in hierarchical rank in the Absolute System. 
 The standard is in one sense Reality itself, and 
 it may be applied as a test under the forms of all- 
 inclusiveness and harmony within the System as 
 a Whole. So judged, ' pure spirit would mark 
 the extreme most removed from lifeless Nature.' 2 
 So, in spite of seeming contradiction, Reality is 
 revealed only in the world of ' appearance,' and 
 in the higher more than in the lower. 3 
 
 Reality is Experience. The Absolute must be 
 sentience. No Reality can be supposed that is not 
 felt or experienced. Reality satisfies our whole 
 being, and the Absolute is more than thought and 
 / volition, it possesses the direct nature of feeling. 
 And yet it would be incorrect to say that the 
 Absolute is personal. It is supra -personal. 4 
 
 1 Ibid. p. 551. 2 Ibid. p. 498. 
 
 3 Ibid. p. 550. * Ibid. p. 533. 
 
30 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 Further details will come to light as we pro- 
 ceed. Let us now face the difficult task of 
 stating what is the relation of the Self to 
 Experience. That will prepare the way for the 
 minute examination of his sceptical treatment of 
 the Self. 
 
 When Bradley contends that Experience is 
 Reality, he denies what he regards as a funda- 
 mental error, the position, namely, that the Self 
 can make any valid claim to be real. It is true, 
 he holds, that all being and fact fall within 
 sentience. No other content than is supplied by 
 feeling, thought, and volition is even possible. 
 
 Bradley purposely chooses these impersonal 
 terms as free from the erroneous reflection of 
 subjectivity. He does not ' divide the percipient 
 subject from the universe : and then, resting on 
 that subject, as on a thing actually by itself — 
 urge that it cannot transcend its own states.' * 
 Such a vicious abstraction leads to impossible 
 results. What we find is a unity in which dis- 
 tinction, but not divisions, may be made. This 
 is the unity of the sentient experience. 
 
 The private and immediate character of the 
 ■ whole ' of sentience in which subject and object 
 
 1 Appearance and Reality, p. 145. 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 31 
 
 appear together is an obvious difficulty in the 
 system. This Bradley discusses in the chapter 
 on ' The This and the Mine.' 1 He admits that 
 particularity and even uniqueness characterize 
 ' an experience.' 2 He assumes that there are an 
 infinite number of ' this-mines.' 3 By this unusual 
 term he means the immediate character of feeling, 
 which appears in ' a finite centre.' The question 
 is — are these ' finite centres of experience ' in- 
 compatible with his Absolute ? He has to confess 
 that this plurality and particularity are in the 
 end inexplicable. 4 Yet Reality may be enriched 
 thereby, and feelings may surely be fused together 
 in the Absolute. The ' this ' seems exclusive, but 
 when examined, it is found to have no content 
 which does not go beyond itself. And it is so, 
 too, in the case of the ' mine.' It has no content 
 but what is left over by our impotence. 5 Even 
 the positive special feeling of Self is referable to 
 an ideal Whole, in which somehow the rough 
 places must be made plain. There is nothing 
 which, to speak properly, is individual, except 
 only the Absolute. 6 
 
 1 Ibid. p. 223. 2 Ibid. p. 223. Italics mine. 
 
 3 Ibid. p. 223. 4 Ibid. p. 226. 
 
 5 Ibid. p. 239. 8 Ibid. p. 246. 
 
32 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 In the course of the examination of the im- 
 possible theory of Solipsism, he divides experience 
 into direct and indirect. Direct experience means 
 what is ' confined to the given simply, to the 
 merely felt or presented.' Indirect experience 
 includes all fact that is constructed from the 
 basis of the ' this ■ and the ' mine.' x 
 
 Direct experience gives us the ' this-mine,' not 
 the reality of my self and its states. We must 
 go on to the indirect experience, postulating 
 existence beyond our momentary feelings. The 
 ' this ' and the ' mine ' must be transcended. 
 And yet this result must itself be ' felt ! ' Bradley 
 admits this, but denies that the ' felt reality is 
 shut up and confined within my feeling.' 2 What 
 then is this ' more ? ' Bradley falls back upon 
 his statement of the Reality as a direct, all- 
 embracing experience, and claims that it is 
 present in ' my ' feeling. ' My " mine " becomes 
 a feature in the great " mine," which includes 
 all " mines ! " ' 3 I consider this a crucial point 
 in the development of the relations of the 
 concepts we are considering. We reach our 
 own past and future by a process of inference 
 
 1 Appearance and Reality, p. 248. 2 Ibid. pp. 252-253. 
 
 8 Ibid. p. 253. 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 33 
 
 similar to that by which we reach the belief in 
 other selves. 
 
 And yet it is true that ' all I experience is my 
 state — so far as I experience it. Even the Abso- 
 lute, as my reality is my state of mind.' x But 
 we cannot limit it to that one aspect. ' The 
 import and content of these processes does not 
 consist in their appearance in the psychical 
 series.' 2 In short, because experience is my 
 experience, it does not follow that what I experi- 
 ence is no more than my state. 
 
 In concluding this chapter, however, Bradley 
 is ready to admit that ' in the end to know the 
 Universe, we must fall back upon our personal 
 experience and sensations.' 3 
 
 To sum up, then ; Bradley puts the Self in 
 the realm of indirect experience, with other 
 ' intellectual constructions,' and with the ' import 
 and content of my states.' 
 
 All reality burns in the focus of my state of 
 mind. 4 So Bradley speaks constantly of ' finite 
 centres of experience.' But we should err if we 
 supposed that he means that Experience requires 
 an equally real Experiencer or Self. And he says 
 
 1 Ibid. p. 258. 2 Ibid. p. 259. 
 
 3 Ibid. p. 260. • Ibid. p. 260. 
 
34 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 in his chapter on Ultimate Doubts that ' a self 
 is not the same as such a centre of experience. 
 . . . From immediate experience the self emerges, 
 and is set apart by a distinction.' * Experience 
 transcends the Self, and is itself Reality. He 
 traces the development of Self, other selves, the 
 world and God, from undifferentiated experience. 
 ' For certain purposes what I experience can be 
 considered as the state of my self, or again, of my 
 soul . . . because in one aspect it actually is so. 
 But this aspect may be an infinitesimal fragment 
 of its being.' 2 
 
 Having settled this question for the present, 
 we must now take up Bradley's negative treat- 
 ment of the Self, which begins early in the book, 
 although, like the best wine, we have kept it till 
 the last. In two Chapters on the Meanings of 
 Self, and the Reality of Self, the most glaring 
 inconsistencies in this concept are brought to light. 
 It is certain that if pure logic had guided us, we 
 could never have believed in it. But as men have 
 forsaken this ' dry light,' Bradley has to convince 
 them by means of argument. In the first of 
 these Chapters, 3 it is shown that we do not know 
 
 1 Appearance and Reality, p. 524. 2 Ibid. p. 526. 
 
 8 Ibid. p. 75 ff. 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 35 
 
 what we mean by the Self. And that is itself 
 sufficient condemnation for metaphysic, since 
 only by definitions can truth be attained. But 
 Bradley goes into psychology to bring to light 
 the diverse meanings of Self. A mere statement 
 of these results must suffice. 
 
 Leaving aside the body, by the Self may be 
 meant : — 
 
 (1) The present contents of experience — a 
 * cross-section ' at any moment. 
 
 (2) The constant average mass, habits, char- 
 acter, behaviour, dispositions. 
 
 (3) The essential Self, the inner core of feeling 
 called Coenesthesia. This leads to the problem 
 of Personal Identity, which Bradley regards as 
 insoluble, owing chiefly to the difficulty of fixing 
 the meanings of ' person,' and of ' continuity.' 
 Memory is equally powerless to explain the 
 supposed sameness. 
 
 (4) The Self as a kind of Monad or simple 
 being. 
 
 (5) That in which I take an interest. 
 
 (6) The distinction of Subject and Object, 
 which has two main forms — as theoretical, involv- 
 ing perception and intelligence, and as practical, 
 involving desire and will. In each case, the Self 
 
36 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 as related to a Not-Self is found on introspection 
 to be some concrete form of unity of psychical 
 existence. And probably every detail of the Self 
 can be presented in turn as Not-Self in the theo- 
 retical relation. And in the practical relation, any 
 feature in the Self may be felt as a limit against 
 which it could react. And taking the Not-Self, 
 most of its elements can be regarded as passing 
 into the background of feeling, and so becoming 
 Self. Bradley admits that there is a margin, as 
 it were, which cannot be crossed, but he affirms 
 that it is unreasonable to make this margin ulti- 
 mate. So Self may mean either the feeling of 
 the psychical contents, or a distinction within 
 the whole mass of certain contents as a back- 
 ground, against which as a Not-Self, the Self is 
 realized as existing ; or finally in the practical 
 relation as an end to be achieved, with which, 
 as is said, one actively identifies himself. This 
 leads to a psychological discussion of the per- 
 ception of activity in relation to the Self, and 
 it is shown to involve an idea of the change 
 desired. 
 
 (7) The ' mere self ' or the ' simply subjective,' 
 which is not relevant to a definite psychical 
 function : it is the unessential in any mental 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 37 
 
 process. This is a merely 'chance self,' the 
 residue, not used, but only felt ; and the meaning 
 is both too wide and too narrow for our purpose. 
 Bradley now passes on to discuss definitely the 
 Reality of the Self. 1 He repeats once more his 
 admission that one's own existence in some sense 
 is an indubitable fact, 2 but the question is whether 
 the claim of the Self to possess reality and even to 
 guarantee the reality of appearances, can be 
 maintained. We are not long left in doubt as to 
 the weapons or the result of the encounter. ' It 
 is the old puzzle,' Bradley says, ' as to the con- 
 nection of diversity with unity.' 3 The assurance 
 of personal identity is irrelevant to the issue. It 
 is a question of intelligibility. Does the Self 
 give an experience which will enable us to under- 
 stand the way in which diversity is harmonized ? 
 Bradley answers, 'No.' His reason is that, 
 whether taken as mere feeling, or some form of 
 self-consciousness or self-identity, the analysis is 
 made either in the plane of relations with their 
 inconsistencies, or else in the deeper region of 
 immediate experience, without distinction be- 
 
 1 Appearance and Reality, Chapter IX. 
 
 2 Ibid. p. 103 ; cf. pp. 76, 119, 357. 
 
 3 Ibid. p. 103. 
 
38 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 tween subject and object. ' Feeling is an appre- 
 hension too defective to lay hold on reality.' * 
 Feeling cannot deal with terms and relations 
 which, ' as it commonly appears/ constitute 
 Reality. 2 Neither can self-consciousness satisfy 
 the claims of intellect. ' It is a mere experience.' 3 
 It cannot give a consistent account of itself or of 
 Reality. Self-consciousness has too much the 
 form of feeling. The subject can never wholly 
 become object to itself, and so cannot become 
 matter of ' perception.' 4 As to personal identity, 
 Bradley confesses that the self is ' the same 
 within limits and to a certain extent,' but denies 
 that any metaphysical conclusions follow, until 
 the understanding of how the Self is the same, 
 is forthcoming, and is presented for criticism. 
 Neither will he accept any view of the Self as 
 timeless, supposed to be furnished from the 
 function of comparison in mental life. 
 
 Bradley then treats of the Self as Will or 
 activity, and denies that intellectually it is better 
 off than those meanings previously discussed. 
 The ghosts of change, of unity and diversity, of 
 relation, will not be laid to rest. Psychologically, 
 
 1 Appearance and Reality, p. 106. 2 Ibid. p. 107. 
 
 3 Ibid. p. 109. l Ibid, p. 111. 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 39 
 
 the experience of activity is illusion. The same 
 result follows the discussion of Monads. The 
 same arguments recur with fatal regularity. 
 
 The conclusion of the whole matter is that the 
 Self, whatever meaning be attached to it, is 
 ' appearance ' merely. It bears the burden of 
 external relations, the stigma of unintelligibility, 
 the brand of inexplicable diversity and unity. 
 No doubt it is ' the highest form of experience 
 which we have, but, for all that, it is not a true 
 form. It does not give us the facts as they are 
 in reality ; and as it gives them, they are appear- 
 ance, appearance and error.' * The principle 
 which metaphysics requires in order to resolve 
 the contradiction of diversity and unity, the Self 
 cannot supply. On the contrary, ' when not 
 hiding itself in obscurity,' the Self ' seems a mere 
 bundle of discrepancies.' 
 
 In the Chapter on ' Body and Soul ' 2 similar 
 results are obtained. The Self is distinguishable 
 from the Soul. The latter is defined as ' a finite 
 centre of immediate experience,' ' possessed of a 
 certain temporal continuity of existence and again 
 of a certain identity of character.' 3 
 
 The Soul is a personal centre, not taken at an 
 
 1 Ibid. p. 119. * Ibid. p. 295. 3 Ibid. p. 298. 
 
40 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 instant, but considered as a ' thing.' * Accord- 
 ingly, it is an ideal construction and not a 
 presented fact. It is a result of a process of 
 idealization of ' experience,' bringing out the 
 oneness of past with present. So it is endowed 
 with an ideal and eternal character, which raises 
 it out of the time-series, although it is realized 
 in that series. So it is inconsistent, and ' rooted 
 in an artifice ! ' It has the unfailing mark of 
 ' appearance ' given, in the separation of the 
 ' that ' and the ' what.' The same conclusion is 
 reached also from the Absolute side — no plurality 
 of such existences can be Reality. 
 
 Bradley discusses objections to this view, based 
 on the independence of Souls, especially in relation 
 to bodies ; the claim for a transcendent Soul or 
 Ego ; and, lastly, the psychical warrant alleged 
 to be given for a Soul as being beyond mere 
 phenomena. Bradley declines to be a party to 
 the identification of soul with body. 2 Even if 
 psychologically tenable, it would yet involve a 
 vicious circle. The Ego only serves to increase 
 our difficulties and is dismissed. As for the 
 psychical evidence for a Soul, it is either mani- 
 fested in events in the time-series, or not at all. 
 
 1 Appearance and Reality, p. 302. % Ibid. p. 308. 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 41 
 
 If in events, we cannot claim as evidence the 
 intellectual constructions which are built upon 
 them, since the self-transcendence, the import, of 
 experience cannot be classed in this way. If in 
 more than mere events, they must take their 
 chance in intellectual criticism, and, as we have 
 seen, their ' chance ' is not worth much in a 
 System of Reality. 
 
 Both Soul and Body consist of phenomenal 
 series, and come together in Absolute Reality, 
 and their special characters must there be ' lost ' 
 and ' dissolved in what transcends them.' x 
 
 As to the relation between Souls P experiences 
 are certainly separate from each other, and are 
 capable of influencing each other, so far as we 
 know, only through the body. We have a 
 ' common understanding ' in regard to the world 
 of discourse, and further we behave as if our 
 internal worlds were the same. There is an 
 ideal identity between Souls. In the individual's 
 life, both bodily and psychical, an active function 
 of identity is required. And the Soul is ' less 
 unreal ' than the physical world ; for it shows 
 more clearly the self-dependence and harmony 
 which are the marks of Absolute Reality, to 
 
 1 Ibid. p. 342. 
 
42 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 which we are driven, as the explanation of all 
 ' appearance,' and the resolution of all discords. 
 
 ii. 
 
 With the main outlines of Bradley's formidable 
 system before us, I may now briefly express some 
 of the respects in which it seems to me to come 
 short of, or to transgress, the requirements of a 
 metaphysic, from the standpoint of our special 
 problem. It is abundantly evident how promi- 
 nent the Self is in his polemic. Indeed it is no 
 exaggeration to say that it affords him his chief 
 difficulty, increased doubtless by his apparent 
 hostility to the concept throughout. It is hard to 
 resist the feeling that he means to keep the Self 
 in the background, and so to preserve an im- 
 personal character for his Absolute Idealism. 
 
 (1) The first criticism is directed against Brad- 
 ley's use of the Concept of Experience as over 
 against that of the Self. Sentience, Experience, 
 and the like are abstractions when taken out of 
 relation to a conscious Subject. The use of these 
 impersonal concepts is at the basis of his grand 
 mistake in setting up Experience as Reality, 
 while the Subject involved in all experience is 
 shut into the outer darkness of * appearance.' 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 43 
 
 As this objection will appear again in different 
 aspects of the subsequent criticism, and will be 
 more fully discussed in the opening chapter of 
 the Second Part of this book, I leave it for the 
 present. 
 
 (2) The foregoing difficulty is obscured by the 
 use of such phrases as ' this-mines,' ' finite 
 centres of experience,' ' experiences/ ' souls/ ' im- 
 mediate feeling,' * felt wholes,' and so on. Bradley 
 is forced to admit again and again that the Self is 
 real in some sense. But while he complains that 
 nobody tells him how it is able to transcend these 
 logical difficulties, he never submits ' Experience ' 
 to the same test. Experience is a vague and 
 ambiguous term which is supposed to include the 
 Self, and yet escapes all its difficulties by ignoring 
 them. It must surely consist of ' appearances ' 
 in the wildest confusion, from a logical point of 
 view, since it includes all the contradictions and 
 inconsistencies of the Subject, plus those of the 
 Object. And in itself it has no remedy for these 
 difficulties. It is only when adjectived by Abso- 
 lute, and spelt with a capital, that it can solve 
 them. If time permitted, a minute examination 
 of the relations of the concepts of Experience and 
 Appearance would reveal the double part which 
 
44 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 the former plays in Bradley's system. I am 
 satisfied that just here the opening wedge must 
 be applied, and when it is driven home, Bradley's 
 ' block universe,' which seems so compact, will 
 appear streaked with gaping inconsistencies. 
 
 (3) What are we to say of the argument, upon 
 which so much depends, that the power to 
 transcend direct experience introduces us to a 
 world of Reality from which the psychical fact of 
 Self has disappeared ? Our answer is simply 
 to point to Bradley's own confessions that the 
 dual relationship of Subject and Object is never 
 really sundered. ' Even the Absolute is my 
 state,' l he says. Therefore the import of experi- 
 ence does not do away with its relationship to 
 a Self, as essentially part of the experience. And 
 in his endeavour to transcend the ' this-mine,' 
 Bradley faces this question. At the critical point 
 he fails. He admits that the ' more ' must be 
 felt. 2 ' It is somebody's experience then,' we 
 say, — ' W hose is it ? ' Bradley falters, and then 
 falls back on his a priori position ! It is mine, 
 but ' what I feel is the all-inclusive universe,' 
 that is, it belongs to the Absolute Experience ! 
 I contend that at any rate it implies the Self, by 
 
 1 Appearance and Reality, p. 260. 2 Ibid. pp. 252-253. 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 45 
 
 his own admission. It would alter the whole 
 character of his impersonal System, if Bradley- 
 were to take fully into account this implication 
 of the subject in ' indirect experience.' 
 
 (4) Bradley fails to make the all-important 
 distinction between the Self as an intellectual 
 construction and as an essential element in all 
 experience. 1 This is the only serious ground he 
 suggests for the superior reality of experience 
 over the Self. This is an instance of the ' psycho- 
 logist's fallacy.' The ' limited aperture ' where 
 reality burns as in a focus may be called ' an 
 experience,' but by his own confession it is ' our 
 sole means of getting at Reality,' and, as such, 
 it involves subjective awareness, that is, essential 
 selfhood, apart from all construction. Merely 
 psychological and genetic problems must not be 
 confused with the metaphysical issue. 
 
 (5) No grade, no totality of experience can 
 possibly be more real than that which is its con- 
 dition, viz. the experience of it by a Subject or 
 Self. If the Subject can be excluded from the 
 Reality which is granted to experience, then 
 knowledge is for ever beyond us. If we cannot 
 
 1 Cf. Prof. James Ward's Article ' Psychology,' Ency. Britt. 
 Ninth Edition, vol. xx. p. 83. 
 
46 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 rely upon our own reality, if our existence is not 
 as real as any matter of human experience, then 
 is our philosophic and scientific faith vain. This 
 is our ultimate nerve of truth. This is the 
 rationale for our existence as seekers after reality. 
 If there be no point of absolutely real contact 
 with fulness of Reality, then scepticism is the 
 logical result. And impersonal Absolutism is not 
 far from its kingdom either. 
 
 (6) Bradley practically admits this frequently, 
 but by his complexity of phrases, the admissions 
 which he makes regarding the Self's place in 
 Reality are quite overshadowed by the assertions 
 of its place in the world of ' mere appearance.' 
 I refer not only to his confessions of the Self's 
 supreme place in existence, but to his express 
 conviction that ' even the Absolute is my state,' 
 and all Reality exists only in centres of sentient 
 experience. 1 What then can withhold him from 
 recognizing the reality of Personality as above 
 every other form of finite experience ? He grants 
 this too, — but ' experience ' has been replaced by 
 the sinister word ' appearance.' 
 
 (7) The method of Bradley is surely somewhat 
 slighting to the universe. He applies our ' logi- 
 
 1 Appearance and Reality, p. 260. 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 47 
 
 cal ' paradoxes and abstract puzzles, — which 
 might stand with Buridan's Ass in the road until 
 they should perish — to the full, rich, growing 
 universe. 1 The negative results are a reflection 
 upon his methods, and upon logic itself ; but not 
 upon the revelation of Reality which experience, 
 in the true sense, is every day presenting to us. 
 If we want an explanation of unity and diversity, 
 instead of throwing away everything that mani- 
 fests it, we ought rather to free our minds from 
 the burden of scholasticism which is so powerless 
 to cope with actually existing facts and principles. 
 Life is more than concepts. Reality sets us the 
 task of following her lead. The ' Owl of Minerva ' 
 which, as Hegel tells us, ' does not start on her 
 flight until the shades of evening have begun to 
 fall,' cannot imitate the lark which heralds the 
 day with prophetic song. Life makes the way 
 for Thought. 
 
 (8) But, more in detail, the solution of incom- 
 pleteness, relations, unity and diversity is to be 
 found ' within us.' Professor Royce has shown 
 
 1 Such works as Bergson's U Evolution Creatrice and James' A 
 Pluralistic Universe, represent a very proper as well as popular 
 revolt from the dry scholasticism which lurks in many systems 
 of Absolute Idealism. The present tendency is wholly towards 
 a ' concrete ' and living Idealism 
 
48 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 that Thought gives a concrete solution of the 
 puzzle of the One and the Many. 1 The answer 
 to the difficulty is solvitur ambulando. The Self 
 is the key to these mysteries of logic, and it 
 affords an actual hint and illustration of the way 
 in which fragmentariness is overcome, relations 
 subsist in a whole which embraces them, unity 
 and diversity are positively experienced. This 
 key Bradley deliberately throws away. The 
 somehow must be cleared up. 
 
 (9) But even in the case of the Absolute, the 
 somehow is never changed into an account of 
 how. If we are excused for crying ' mystery ' 
 now, why were we birched for doing so in the 
 case of our immediate experience ? This act of 
 faith on Bradley's part results from his method, 
 because only in our experience can the conceptual 
 difficulty be overcome. The paradox therefore 
 recurs, and creates discord even in the Absolute. 
 The logical discord grates upon the ear until the 
 noise is drowned by the mystical chorus hymning 
 the supra-relational, all-absorbing and reconciling 
 Absolute Experience which enjoys a balance of 
 pleasure over pain ! Here sameness and diversity 
 
 1 The World and the Individual, vol. i. Supplementary 
 Essay, p. 490 ff. 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 49 
 
 simply must be real. There — in the case of the 
 Self — they were real but were disowned ! 
 
 (10) In regard to the ambiguities in the term 
 Self, Bradley's contention must be admitted. He 
 has performed indirectly a great service by calling 
 attention so acutely to these various meanings. 
 In a humble way, I shall endeavour to fix some 
 meanings elsewhere in this work. 1 
 
 But from this bundle of meanings some stand 
 out as proof against Bradley's attacks, although 
 he is reluctant to admit his failure to demolish 
 them. For example, in his third case of Essential 
 Self, Coenesthesia, the Self is twitted about the 
 problem of change, about its own undefined limits, 
 and its character as ' a wretched fraction and 
 poor atom/ if it be merely the identical element 
 through change. Then he proceeds to the prob- 
 lems of personal identity, continuity, and memory. 
 This view of the Self is really scouted because of 
 our inability to define what we feel. But I am 
 not aware that the slightest feeling has ever 
 been any better off in this respect. We are not 
 clever enough to turn ourselves inside out, and 
 then take a snapshot photograph. But are we 
 therefore unreal ? 
 
 1 Part II. , Chapter II. 
 D 
 
50 THE PEOBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 No, the feeling and consciousness of Self cannot 
 possibly be treated as objects on our horizon, and 
 no one but an intellectualist would desire it. But 
 Bradley himself does not challenge feeling so long 
 as it is not feeling of Self, the most intimate 
 experience, and the most difficult to describe, — 
 and then he objects ! In his system, feeling is 
 given a clear course to the highest peak of 
 Reality, and luxuriates in state as Absolute 
 Experience, while the Self is refused admittance 
 except in the guise of a beggar, and on condition 
 of forfeiture of character. 
 
 Bradley's criticism of Subject and Object is 
 also most inconclusive, and quite unconvincing. 
 The fluctuating margin of Self and Not-Self is 
 a psychological characteristic devoid of meta- 
 physical interest, since both subject and object 
 are still essentially present in all experience. 
 These two important meanings of Self therefore 
 remain intact. 
 
 (11) As to the criticism of the Self's Reality, 
 we have already examined Bradley's method and 
 aim, and little further need be said. It is evident 
 that any existing object of attack might be proved 
 unreal in Bradley's way, for it consists in showing 
 its entanglement with the aforesaid contradic- 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 51 
 
 tions. Even the Absolute would succumb but 
 for the special consideration shown. But in the 
 main, the reality of the Self is attacked because 
 of our failure to intellectualize it, which has 
 just been adverted to. It may be added that, 
 whether we will or not, we must accept experience 
 as our portion. And by this term I mean the 
 concrete personal kind of experience which we 
 actually have, and not something which can set 
 itself over against the life of the Self, and call our 
 contents of consciousness hard names, from its 
 vaunted eminence as being ' somehow ' Absolute. 
 After all we must own the ' I ' that makes a 
 judgment, that feels a pain, that resolves, strives, 
 and wills, as having a reality which will not be 
 decried, and which we assert even in denying and 
 in doubting. When the Self is intellectualized, 
 as far as that is possible, Bradley calls it a ' con- 
 struction/ and mocks at its lateness in appearing 
 on the scene of experience ! When it is imme- 
 diate, it is blind feeling. What is the poor thing 
 to do ? The confusion in the issue is brought 
 out by his dissatisfaction with the Self when 
 analysed below relations without distinction 
 between Subject and Object, because it cannot 
 deal with terms and relations of which, ' as it 
 
52 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 commonly appears,' Reality consists ! x And 
 yet when it is taken ' higher up/ it is infected 
 with relations, and with diversity and unity, 
 and is an intellectual construction ! Significant 
 is his remark on self-consciousness : ' It is 
 a mere experience ! ' How it bears out the 
 contention in regard to the mistaken use of 
 Experience in this wide, vague sense so prevalent 
 to-day ! 
 
 Surely the truth is that the Self and Experience 
 stand or fall together in this matter. Neither 
 are accurately definable. Both must be accepted. 
 The Absolute Reality must be revealed in Experi- 
 ence as embodying Subjects of experience. Brad- 
 ley's frequent admissions that the Self is ' less 
 unreal ' than any other finite thing are forced 
 out in spite of his dialectic. If the Self were not 
 associated with a world long before designated 
 as ' mere appearance,' it would be able to come 
 unto its own. It would manifestly range on the 
 supreme levels of experience as essentially real, 
 in subordination to a transcendental Absolute, 
 which really gives an entirely new point of view. 
 But even so, Self and Experience should appear 
 as in essential relation. 
 
 1 Appearance and Reality, pp. 106-7. 
 
MR. F. H. BRADLEY 53 
 
 (12) The denial of Selfhood to the Absolute 
 in any real sense is the outcome of the position 
 so frequently admitted before. As has been well 
 pointed out by Professor A. Seth Pringle-Patti- 
 son 1 and Professor Royce, 2 — from different points 
 of view — Bradley's Absolute Experience really 
 involves the attribution of what is indistinguish- 
 able from Perfect Personality. The unwillingness 
 to characterize his Absolute as Self is not con- 
 sistent with the Idealistic position. 3 His accom- 
 modation of ' personality ' within the Absolute 
 beside moral and aesthetic and other ' appear- 
 ances ' is open to the objection that it limits 
 Reality while seeking to guard it from determina- 
 tion. Further, the Self, for which moral purposes 
 are, is on a higher plane than moral relationships. 
 Instead of being supra-personal this type of 
 Absolute tends to fall to the level of infra -human 
 or impersonal, or else becomes a mere Unknow- 
 able, hardly distinguishable from a monstrous 
 Thing-in-itself except for the unmeaning desig- 
 nation of Experience. The inconsistency in the 
 
 1 Man's Place in the Cosmos, Essay on 'A New Theory of the 
 Absolute,' p. 218 ff. 
 
 2 The World and the Individual, vol. i. Supplementary Essay, 
 pp. 550-554. 
 
 3 Appearance and Reality, pp. 558-9 (Appendix). 
 
54 THE PROBLEM 'OF PERSONALITY 
 
 use of that concept which we have traced through- 
 out is so obviously magnified in the final result, 
 that further criticism here is unnecessary. The 
 prominence of feeling in the final Reality, and 
 the discussion of the Absolute's enjoyment, com- 
 ing after the denial of personality * strike one as 
 incongruous, and form their own commentary on 
 the position. 
 
 1 Appearance and Reality, pp. 532-5. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE. 
 
 To the student of Professor Royce's more recent 
 works, 1 it is evident that the concept of the Self 
 occupies a central position in his System. In his 
 earlier philosophical writings 2 the palpably ethical 
 interpretation of the Self and the Universe was 
 conspicuous — an influence which continues to be 
 prominent, but now more in relation to the 
 interpretation he gives of the Self. In the two 
 later works we find sufficient material for the 
 problem of our Thesis. 3 Royce approaches the 
 
 1 The Conception of God, by Profs. Royce, Howison, Mezes, 
 and Le Conte ; New York, Macmillan Co., 1897. The World and 
 the Individual, Gifford Lectures, University of Aberdeen, by Prof. 
 Royce ; N.Y., Macmillan Co., 1st and 2nd Series, 1901. 
 
 2 The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, 1885 ; The Spirit of 
 Modern Philosophy, 1892 ; both of the Riverside Press, Cam- 
 bridge. 
 
 8 Since these words were written, Professor Royce has given 
 us The Philosophy of Loyalty, William James, and Other Essays 
 on the Philosophy of Life, and The Problem of Christianity, 
 2 vols, (all Macmillan). These works express in fresh relations 
 
56 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 Self through his Idealistic Theory of Being. But 
 he does not regard his system as a priori. Accord- 
 ingly we are at perfect liberty to expound first 
 his view of the Self, and then the place of the 
 Self in his Theory of Reality. 
 
 i. 
 
 What, then, is the Self ? Royce's answer is 
 partly negative, but finally positive. He criti- 
 cizes certain current conceptions of the Self, and 
 then gives what he believes to be the idealistic 
 and the true view. Let us state in turn these two 
 aspects of his answer. 
 
 He begins his discussion of the Self with a 
 psychological account. Viewing the merely brute 
 facts of self-consciousness, one must see that 
 there is no stability, no verifiable identity to be 
 found. The Empirical Ego is the product of 
 growth, and the outcome of experience, having 
 a genesis in time, and a connection with the body. 
 In the aspect of mere fact, a passing mood can 
 
 the view of the Self given in The World and the Individual, 
 which is discussed in the Chapter, but do not greatly modify 
 the definition of the Self given by Royce, in terms of its relation 
 to the community and the past and present values of the indi- 
 vidual experience. In other words, the Self remains for Royce 
 an interpretation, a logical, ethical and social conception, rather 
 than a basic fact correlative with experience. 
 
PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE 57 
 
 alter spiritual stability, while the idea of the Self 
 is largely made up of bodily sensations, especially 
 muscular and visceral. These form a nucleus to 
 which are added habits and social experiences. 
 These latter elements are most important in pro- 
 ducing that contrast-effect, in which the idea of 
 Self mainly consists. The child's natural depen- 
 dence on others becomes consciously weakened, 
 and gradually the discovery is made of the dis- 
 tinction between himself and all other selves. 
 Stages in this process are indicated by quarrels, 
 loves, the sense of rivalry, the conflict of desires, 
 and especially by conscious imitation and docility 
 to another's will. Then comes the sensitiveness 
 to the approval and disapproval of others. But 
 it is not till the formation and growth of an Ideal 
 that true selfhood begins, bringing order, con- 
 nectedness, and permanence into the inner world. 
 This important factor is essentially social in 
 character, and of the nature of a contrast. When 
 an inward comparison of ideals takes place, how- 
 ever, then the progress to selfhood only lacks the 
 fulfilled purpose in order to reach completion. 
 The meaning or value of a life as expressed in an 
 Ideal, gives Self its unity and reality. By atten- 
 tion — the essence of Will — to the life-plan which 
 
58 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 is selected as the Ideal, the seeking Self partly 
 realizes his selfhood, which is only to be perfectly 
 fulfilled, however, in the Absolute. 
 
 Thus we have passed from the negative to the 
 positive point of view, or — as it comes to mean 
 —from the psychological to the metaphysical. 
 In other words, we have found that the reality of 
 the Self can only be reached by regarding the 
 significance or value of certain elements of inner 
 experience, which, as merely empirical facts, are 
 incompetent to furnish a doctrine of the Self. 
 6 The real Self is the totality of our empirical 
 consciousness when viewed as having unity of 
 meaning, and as exemplifying, or in its totality 
 fulfilling an idea.' x So instead of vainly seeking 
 for an Ego among the empirical facts of con- 
 sciousness where all is variable and fragmentary, 
 we realize that the only real and permanent Ego 
 is to be found in the consciously selected and 
 adopted plan of life, which pervades such ele- 
 ments and gives them unity and meaning. By 
 such an Ideal a Self is constituted, and without 
 some such purpose no Self can exist. Nay, does 
 not psychology show that, apart from this stan- 
 dard, we may be said to possess many selves 
 
 1 The Conception of God, p. 288. 
 
PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE 59 
 
 rather than one ? So our Self must be viewed 
 metaphysically and even morally, if it is to be 
 seriously reckoned with at all. 
 
 Before we finally pass over into this meta- 
 physical region, however, let us supplement what 
 has been said by a further survey. In the Second 
 Series of The World and the Individual the sub- 
 ject is more fully treated. After speaking of the 
 ambiguities in the meaning of Self — shown, for 
 example, in our contrary ethical maxims — ' forget 
 yourself ' — ' find yourself ' — Royce maintains that 
 the usage of Self in the higher ethical sense is the 
 only defensible mode of employing the concept. 
 Then he proceeds to discuss three different con- 
 ceptions of the individual Self. 
 
 The first conception is an empirical view of the 
 Self, as a certain unity of facts, contrasted with 
 all else, partly physical and partly psychical as 
 including the conscious states. That there is a 
 variable character about the common-sense dis- 
 tinction of Self from Not-Self must be admitted. 
 Royce claims that the psychological unity 
 observable in this series is due to the principle 
 that the distinction between the Self and Not- 
 Self is essentially social, and depends upon a 
 succession of contrast-effects, together with 
 
60 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 the psychical processes of habit, memory, and 
 imagination. 
 
 The second conception consists in the view of 
 the Self as a real and independent being, in some 
 metaphysical sense. The Self is one, and is called 
 the Soul, and is regarded as a Substance. It is 
 not to be confounded with the mere states of 
 consciousness. It gives unity and order to mental 
 life. But Royce contends that this doctrine is 
 condemned already as Realistic ; and the refuta- 
 tion of Realism has been given previously in his 
 pages. In short, both this and the first con- 
 ception of the Self are inadequate since they are 
 incompatible with the only tenable Theory of 
 Being, namely the Idealistic. To this view Royce 
 addresses himself as the third conception of the 
 Self, which shall provide all that is worth con- 
 tending for in the others. The following out of 
 this conception will lead us into the realm of 
 metaphysics and into as much of Royce's System 
 as it will concern us here to explore. 
 
 This third type escapes the two great diffi- 
 culties of the former conceptions. It is not 
 burdened by the ethical contradictions which a 
 criticism of the common-sense Self brings to 
 light ; nor yet is it disturbed by the psychological 
 
PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE 61 
 
 theories of the ' Passing Thought/ and the like, 
 or the complexities of empirical processes. What 
 this third type is we have previously indicated. 
 It consists in the view of the Self as a ' Meaning 
 embodied in a conscious life.' * The Self is not 
 an entity, not a Substance, not a Soul, nor yet 
 a series of inner states. What the Self is can 
 only be fully revealed by the fulfilment of the 
 Ideal which constitutes its Selfhood. That Mean- 
 ing is relative to other Selves or Meanings and to 
 the Absolute Self, or Infinite Meaning. And yet 
 it is distinguished from them, for the Whole is an 
 infinitely rich and complex unity. 
 
 We can no longer keep closed the floodgates of 
 Royce's Idealism, if we would float down the 
 river of his thought. In the First Series he has 
 discussed the Four Conceptions of Being, — the 
 theories of Realism ; Empiricism and its logical 
 outcome, Mysticism ; Critical Rationalism ; and 
 finally his own Idealism, that is, the ultimate 
 unity in the Absolute of the Internal and External 
 Meaning. Now, the Self, as a merely fitful flush 
 of conscious purpose, seems to be just as strongly 
 contrasted from the wider Not-Self, as the In- 
 ternal from the External Meaning. But reflection 
 
 1 The World and the Individual, vol. ii. p. 269. 
 
62 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 shows the same ultimate transcendence in the 
 Absolute. The outer world, the Not-Self, the 
 External Meaning, are seen to be reducible to . 
 the true Internal Meaning, although without loss 
 of individuality. So an ' infinite number ' of 
 such contrasts of Self and Not-Self can be 
 made, 1 which in reality only express the wealth 
 of meaning in the Absolute. 
 
 And when in any one instant I seem to have 
 such a contrast between Self and Not-Self, the 
 fact is that I identify the past and the future 
 experiences of what I consider Myself with the 
 present, not by any psychical entity, but by a 
 unity of purpose which at least I ' ought to 
 possess ' 2 in contrast with all else. Personal 
 identity is not the discredited psychological type, 
 but that of ethical meaning and purpose, which, 
 as we have seen, constitutes the Self. This Ideal 
 implies the will to preserve one's own significance 
 in subordination to the essential Unity. In the 
 true Theory of Being, therefore, this ethical con- 
 ception of Self will predominate ; and it will be 
 valid not for the human individual alone, but, as 
 we shall see, for the Absolute also, and even for 
 Reality in its essential structure. 
 
 1 The World and the Individual, p. 273. » Ibid. p. 274. 
 
PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE 63 
 
 For since you cannot find out what the Self 
 really is by mere experience however prolonged, 
 but must regard its Meaning in the light of the 
 Absolute who is precisely this system of values 
 consciously fulfilled unto perfection in his own 
 infinite Unity, you must look to this stand- 
 point for a true doctrine of the Self. And it is 
 for this reason that Royce approaches the Self 
 through his Theory of Being. But this con- 
 ception of Reality is essentially based on the 
 ethical nature of Selfhood — for that is what the 
 Unity of the Internal and External Meaning 
 comes to mean. Hence the realm of the Absolute 
 is throughout conscious and the perfection of 
 Meaning. That is, the Absolute is a Self, a 
 Person. And Reality is of this structure also. 
 For it is the completely organized life of the 
 Absolute, inclusive of the infinite variety of 
 meanings, in fulfilled Unity, in which our various 
 finite Selves have a place, with all that constitutes 
 God's universe. 
 
 Royce's favourite argument, however, for this 
 constructive view is drawn from his doctrine of 
 the Self-representative Series, based upon the 
 formal structure of the Self and extended in 
 relation to the number series of mathematics. 
 
64 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 The Self is found to be inclusive and included. 
 It is essentially dual and self-representative in 
 its structure. And Reality is found to have the 
 same form, which is shared by the Infinite of 
 the ' New ' mathematics. 1 Accordingly, against 
 Bradley, Royce maintains the fundamental reality 
 of the Self as he conceives it, and he defends as 
 an integral part of his system the Personality of 
 the Absolute. This conception of the Self-repre- 
 sentative System also supplies him with the 
 solution of Bradley's great riddle of the One and 
 the Many. For in such a System, as in the Self 
 also, variety is constituted by unity, and unity 
 by variety. The life's Meaning makes a Self out 
 of fragmentary and multitudinous elements, which 
 only get their being through relation to the Self, 
 although not fully discovered as yet. And, on 
 the other hand, the Series of self-inclusive repre- 
 sentations, for example, maps of maps, is such 
 that every point is in an infinite unity, while yet 
 different from every other. In short, this formal 
 conception gives Royce the clue to the structure 
 of the Whole of Reality as an Infinite Collection 
 of the essential type of a Self-representative 
 
 1 The World and the Individual, vol. i. Supplementary Essay, 
 p. 512 ff. 
 
J 
 
 // / 
 
 f PEOFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE 65 
 
 OiSystem. Hence his definition of consciousness, 
 and of the Self, conceived as we have presented 
 it, as that which can be content to itself; for, so 
 viewed, the Self is the system of unfulfilled mean- 
 ings, unsatisfied longings, by which it seeks to 
 express itself, and yet it is included in these as 
 the conscious Self with a certain conception of its 
 meaning at any given stage in the temporal 
 process. But this is supremely true of the Abso- 
 lute Self who includes within his life the infinite 
 collection of Selves. And in this way the appear- 
 ance of new Selves is to be interpreted. A New 
 Self arises within a more inclusive Self. 
 
 The concept of Infinity is freely used by Royce, 
 and it is interpreted after the pattern of the 
 ' new ' infinite of Mathematics as required by the 
 Self-representative Series. An infinite totality 
 is provided for by the inclusion in the Absolute 
 of all actually fulfilled, as opposed to all barely 
 possible, ideas and meanings. This Self-deter- 
 mination on the part of the Divine Will removes 
 the objection to Personality as imposing an 
 arbitrary limit upon the Absolute. 
 
 This leads to the problem of the relation of 
 the Selves, as essentially moral beings, to the 
 Absolute. Royce faces the difficulty which is 
 
66 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 so strongly emphasized by Howison. 1 How 
 are genuine moral autonomy, ethical freedom, 
 and personal immortality compatible with such 
 Monism ? Well, since Royce is so insistent upon 
 the ethical character of Selfhood, it is a most 
 relevant point to raise. And, further, he seeks 
 to provide a distinct theory of Individuality. 
 
 Eoyce considers his system compatible with 
 the highest claims for moral freedom and ethical 
 autonomy. For it is the essence of my indi- 
 viduality to define myself as distinct from all 
 else by the unique life-plan chosen and adopted. 
 And my doing so is God's will also. While 
 Royce conceives the universe as interpretable 
 teleologically, and as a Divine Unity, he yet 
 regards every fragment of the world as being in 
 its individuality an essential aspect of the life 
 of the Whole, as the positive embodiment of 
 conscious will and purpose. The antinomy be- 
 tween human freedom and Divine Purpose is 
 solved by the category of Time. The fact of 
 the dependence of the Self upon another Will in 
 Time does not conflict with the assertion that 
 in the aspect of Eternity, the Self exists as Self- 
 defining, and yet as the expression of the Divine 
 
 x The Conception of Ood. See also the next Chapter. 
 
PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE 67 
 
 Will. The Divine Will expresses itself in the 
 Self's own purposes, and includes them in its own. 
 So freedom, individuality and immortality are 
 provided for in the System. The Self is real as 
 an expression of its own meaning, freely chosen 
 and adopted. But that is so because it is the 
 Divine purpose. The Absolute supremely solves 
 the problem of the One and the Many. The 
 various Selves are many because in God they are 
 One ; and God is Unity because of this Plurality, 
 and infinite variety. 
 
 The Selves are not independent beings, and 
 Royce considers any such Realistic Theodicy 
 beset with the greatest difficulties. Evil he 
 regards as due to inattention to the highest. It 
 is atoned for in the Absolute, and so is reconcilable 
 with the Perfection of Reality. The uniqueness 
 of our individuality is preserved in God, the 
 Supreme Person and Individual, in whom our 
 Eternal Selves find fulfilment and immortality. 
 God's life includes the temporal process and He 
 views it eternally, as in one indivisible instant. 
 In His totality as Absolute He is ' conscious not 
 in time, but of time, and of all that infinite time 
 contains.' * As sharers in that Divine Life, the 
 
 1 Ibid. vol. ii. p. 419. 
 
68 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 Selves, from the eternal standpoint, consciously 
 attain their perfection by the knowledge of their 
 temporal strivings in their wholeness, and by 
 beholding their fragmentary meanings as fulfilled 
 in the Absolute and revealed in the light of 
 Eternity. 
 
 ii. 
 
 Royce's System of Absolute Idealism is logical 
 and impressive. It represents the results of the 
 best thinking of one of the foremost living meta- 
 physicians, after many years of profound reflec- 
 tion upon philosophical problems. It was not 
 cast into the literary mould before it was melted. 
 It has glowed in the crucible of personal life and 
 conviction ; it has been fused beneath the white 
 heat of honest criticism. 
 
 This conviction, however, must not be empha- 
 sized here ; but rather we must go on audaciously 
 to our work of appreciation and criticism. A 
 word or two more of appreciation will suffice. 
 I believe that in the latter part of this Thesis, 
 it will be found that the conclusions indicated 
 will not very widely diverge from the main out- 
 lines of Royce's System, with which I am largely 
 in sympathy, as the best expression yet given of 
 
PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE 69 
 
 Idealism. And now, in regard to criticism : My 
 first and fundamental divergence is concerning 
 Royce's view of the Self. I cannot accept the 
 doctrine, — however widespread it may be, and 
 however capable of conserving spiritual interests, 
 that the only real Self is the idea of a life-purpose, 
 the Meaning intended, the Ideal sought. For 
 the resort to the Passive Voice here will serve as 
 a hint of my objection, which I may at once 
 state bluntly. What intends, means, seeks ideals ? 
 To my mind the only answer is the Subject or 
 Ego to whom these thoughts, purposes, and 
 strivings, are Object, albeit expressive of the 
 ethical nature of the Person. Now this Subject- 
 Object aspect, so fundamental to an existential 
 account of experience, is not explicitly prominent 
 in Royce's treatment. Yet it seems to me to lie 
 right across the track of his thought. The 
 duality in Selfhood is present, and figures occa- 
 sionally in the 'Self -representative' and the ' Well- 
 ordered Series,' under the old terms, Subject and 
 Object, but on examination it will be found to be 
 distinct, and consisting of twofold Meanings, or 
 objective content of some hind. Yet this undeniable 
 fact of ' my ' experience, which we have had 
 occasion to miss in James and Bradley, does not 
 
70 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 fully come to its proper rights even in Royce. 
 To be sure, the Self is placed with Experience, 
 even in the Absolute. So far that is well. But 
 the 'Self' is not the Subject of Experience, 
 which I contend is essential to a true metaphysic. 
 In other words, the Self is pushed into the 
 conceptual realm, where it is very much at home 
 with mathematical and other impersonal con- 
 cepts. But thereby it loses its immediacy, its 
 character as directly felt and experienced. And 
 this is precisely the essential thing about the 
 Self which must be taken into account in Meta- 
 physics. Royce charges such views with being 
 Realistic, and accordingly dismisses them. But 
 surely this is a hard saying to those who believe 
 all reality to be given in terms of experience and 
 thought. It is certainly remote from the Realism 
 of independent things in themselves or relations 
 apart from knowledge. Of course, the brunt of 
 the charge is against the Soul-Substance Theory, 
 which regards the Soul as an independent thing 
 or entity. But there are many and diverse forms 
 of this theory ; and, in any case, the reality of 
 the * Spiritual Self,' even of James' Psychology, 
 the Subject of our thinking, feeling, willing, striv- 
 ing, yes, even of our meaning, imagining, and 
 
PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE 71 
 
 planning, must be given a prime place in a system 
 of Reality. 
 
 As to the disintegrating facts of empirical 
 Psychology, what do they really teach % A 
 genesis of the Self ; a process of growth in the 
 idea of the Self ; the possibility of manifestation 
 in one individual of different groups of habits, or 
 as we call them in this ethical sense, — selves or 
 personalities, the social character of Selfhood ; 
 the flowing moments of consciousness. I main- 
 tain that there is nothing really new, and nothing 
 of metaphysical significance to the problem of the 
 Subject of experience in any of these facts. And 
 as to the Personal Identity in regard to the Self 
 for whom this stream of experiences is, I contend 
 that it is no whit less authenticated, rational, and 
 defensible than the belief in the identity of the 
 world. In one case we build up an identity amid 
 the objects presented in the stream of thought 
 and in the other we believe in an identical Sub- 
 ject, which has the great advantage over the 
 former of being the most intimate experience, and 
 most verifiable identity, for it is the pivotal 
 spectator around which the objective kaleido- 
 scope revolves ! If we are to disintegrate experi- 
 ence, let us treat both sides alike, and then we 
 
72 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 can turn our open books face downwards, and 
 confess ourselves utter sceptics ! As this will 
 come up again in the sequel, I pass on to other 
 aspects of the same tendency. 
 
 In close connection with the foregoing is the 
 criticism that the Self of Royce's doctrine is 
 essentially ethical, and therefore stands on a 
 different plane from that which is claimed for the 
 Self as an entity. Even if Being is only consti- 
 tuted by Meaning or Value, as Royce maintains, 
 from our human point of view, then that Mean- 
 ing is relative to some kind of identical Self other 
 than the Meaning. The Meaning requires a con- 
 scious Self for which different experiences are. 
 The same truth applies to all forms of Prag- 
 matism. Schiller and the Oxford School realize 
 this important basis for reality in terms of value. 
 Royce's Absolute may serve as the ultimate 
 standard, but it is hardly fair to fall back upon 
 it as the ground of the reality of the Self as 
 Meaning, after discussing psychological and gene- 
 tic problems ! We must, and we do recognize 
 the different standpoints of reality for man, and 
 final Reality for God. 
 
 Accordingly, I maintain that the Ethical Self 
 implies a real being, a Subject, an ' 1/ in relation 
 
PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE 73 
 
 to which all my experiences are, and which my 
 meanings, purposes, ideals imply, as surely as 
 currency implies some actual medium of ex- 
 change. And, on the other hand, if you allow 
 me a Real Ego, I will have no difficulty in 
 seeing my way to an Ideal Ego. But without 
 such an admission, so imperatively demanded by 
 inner experience, we cannot set one against 
 the other, or even conceive how an Ideal Ego 
 can possibly be real in the prime or exclusive 
 sense. 
 
 Accordingly, when Eoyce says that there is no 
 real Ego or permanent being apart from the life- 
 plan which pervades our mental experiences, and 
 which alone makes what I call ' myself,' * I 
 have to protest that he is employing one con- 
 ception of the Self — namely the ethical — to the 
 exclusion of the existential Self or Subject, with- 
 out drawing the distinction between them. Per- 
 haps the criticism of Royce might be put thus : 
 he identifies the ' I ' with an ethical and intel- 
 lectual ' Me,' to the exclusion of the real Ego 
 as Subject. He repeats Bradley's mistake of 
 treating the Self as an intellectual and ethical 
 construction, as if there were no other meaning 
 
 1 Conception of God, pp. 289-290. 
 
74 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 of Self. Our distinction between terms in the 
 Second Part will make this clear. 
 
 The emphasis upon the formal and conceptual 
 side of all Reality follows as a corollary from the 
 subjection of the Self to these relations. Ethical 
 and Mathematical concepts and judgments go 
 together here, — an instance of history repeating 
 itself — and they accord well with the principles of 
 Symbolic Logic. To some, no doubt, these purely 
 formal discussions will appear valuable ; for my 
 own part, conviction as to Reality does not follow 
 from such formal considerations. 1 But, leaving 
 this aside, the duality in the Self-representative 
 Series, which gives the clue to the structure of 
 Reality is after all confessedly the structure of 
 Subject-Object. Now, if this were fully recog- 
 nized and worked out in the case of the Self, 
 
 1 The reader of Royce's latest books, especially his recent fine 
 work on The Problem of Christianity, will have an opportunity 
 of observing how far he has gone in following the lead of Sym- 
 bolic Logic and the New Mathematics in the elaboration of his 
 system. Concepts are the pieces on the metaphysical chess- 
 board, and the game of thought is played with them rather than 
 with the facts of life and experience. Christianity is the evolu- 
 tion of concepts, loyalty is the abstract principle which unites 
 the individual with the Divine Community. Great as may be 
 the truth underlying such a conclusion, one feels as if the 
 philosopher reaches it a priori. He seems to be thinking in 
 one language, as it were, and speaking in another. 
 
PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE 75 
 
 we should have a system free from the objection 
 which has been previously urged. In such a 
 system our hold would be retained upon the 
 essence of empirical reality, — namely, our own 
 existence as the Subjects of Experience, — while 
 ' at the same time we should be able to seek for 
 the ultimate Reality without forfeiting our im- 
 mediate feeling, our self-activity, and our sense 
 of life. 
 
 The claim of Royce that his system is not a 
 priori is scarcely manifested by his method of 
 reading his facts in the light of his conclusions 
 from the start of his constructive work. It is 
 true, his writings are on Religious Philosophy; 
 but, to my thinking, a clear progress from start- 
 ing-point to conclusion, from finite to Absolute 
 Reality, would avoid the abstractness and deduc- 
 tive character of his reasoning, shown for example 
 in his dismissal of his Second Conception of the 
 Self, — as a real entity — on the grounds of Realism- 
 Akin to this method is his over-emphasis, — as it 
 appears — upon the Social side as constituting 
 selfhood. Again, we seem to have relations 
 without any real and experienced terms, short 
 of the Absolute itself. 
 
 With his conception of the Absolute as a Self, 
 
76 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 I am in accord, with reservations, which will 
 readily be perceived from what I have said in 
 criticism of the ethical and conceptual character 
 of the Self. The relation of God to man as a 
 moral being will come up in the next Chapter. 
 I may state here that I cannot regard either 
 Royce's provision for the moral, or Howison's 
 provision for the metaphysical, necessities of Per- 
 sonality as fully satisfactory. Boyce's view is 
 still too monistic to meet the requirements of 
 true freedom and responsibility, while Howison's 
 conception is too pluralistic. 
 
CHAPTEK IV. 
 PROFESSOR G. H. HOWISON. 
 
 One of the most interesting expressions of the 
 present reaction of many minds against the 
 recently prevailing Monism is the system of 
 ' Personal Idealism ' as expounded by Professor 
 G-. H. Howison. 1 It is quite distinct from the 
 views set forth by Eight Oxford Graduates in a 
 recent volume bearing the title of Personal 
 Idealism, to which reference is made elsewhere. 
 
 The kernel of Howison's thought is to be found 
 in his protest that Idealistic Monism is irrecon- 
 cilable with Personality, human or divine. As 
 
 1 The Conception of God, by Professors J. Royce, J. Le Conte, 
 G. H. Howison, and S. E. Mezes ; N.Y., The Macmillan Co., 
 1897. The Limits of Evolution and other Essays, illustrating the 
 Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism, by Professor G. H. 
 Howison, Second Edition, revised and enlarged; N.Y., The 
 Macmillan Co., 1905. 
 
78 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 we have seen, this opinion was freely expressed 
 at the Discussion with Professor Royce, reported 
 in the Conception of God. Equally incompatible 
 with personality are the claims of Naturalism ; 
 and that the polemic against this latter view is 
 no less strenuous is indicated by the Essay on 
 1 The Limits of Evolution' which gives to his book 
 its title. 
 
 Howison contends for a Rational Pluralism of 
 free spirits forming an eternal Society, including 
 God, not as the Efficient Cause, but as the Final 
 Cause, or determining Ideal of all. Not only the 
 moral claims of personality, — infinitely momen- 
 tous as they are, — but also the intellectual self- 
 activity of minds, leads him to the formulation 
 of Pluralism as a system. In fact, the theoretical 
 activity is not to be set over against the ' Practical 
 Reason ' as separate or fundamentally distinct ; 
 he maintains that the intellectual is ultimately 
 reducible to the moral relation, that consciousness 
 is best interpreted as conscience. In each case 
 the act of Self-definition is at the root of experi- 
 ence ; and this personal determination is neces- 
 sary owing to the presence of a system of 
 conscious Subjects, other Selves and God, or 
 the Supreme Self, which together constitute the 
 
PROFESSOR G. H. HOWISON 79 
 
 world of Persons, the ' City of God/ 1 This 
 Self-defining and moral activity is so essential 
 that the ultimate reality must be stated in terms 
 which do justice to Personality above all. Monism, 
 whether Idealistic or Naturalistic, fails in this 
 supreme task, and therefore is false to the highest 
 truth of experience. Howison attributes this 
 fundamental error to the prominence of Efficient 
 over Final Causation in such systems. The old 
 form of Monotheism, with its doctrine of Creation 
 and Regeneration, falls under the like condem- 
 nation, in his opinion. 
 
 If we go to the heart of the matter and ask — 
 * What is a Person ? ' we shall bring out Howi- 
 son's thought more fully. Howison answers that 
 a person is a self-active member of a manifold 
 system of real beings. 2 The true person is 
 possessed of independent origination ; and yet 
 he is essentially related to an inclusive society 
 of beings equally characterized by initiative ; 
 and all are attracted to the Ideal and Perfect 
 Person, God, the Final Cause and bond of union 
 of spirits. ' It is the essence of a person to stand 
 in relation with beings having an autonomy, in 
 
 1 The Limits of Evolution, pp. 174-5. 
 
 2 The Conception of God, p. 91. 
 
80 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 whom he recognizes rights, and toward whom 
 he acknowledges duties.' * 
 
 The person is the real creator of Nature, and 
 cannot be explained as derived from Nature. 
 He has no origin, 2 for he is above time. Hence 
 a philosophy of Evolution is incompetent. The 
 elements of self-active consciousness are a priori, 
 as Kant has established, and when this truth is 
 fully recognized, and consistently worked out, 
 Howison claims that rational Pluralism will result 
 as the true Idealism, and the only adequate 
 philosophy. Each person is a ' focal point ' of the 
 universe, receiving rays from other conscious 
 centres and reflecting them back with added 
 brightness. The universe is the product of the 
 consciousness of this Society of Persons, who 
 constitute Nature by their self-activity according 
 to the laws of cognition summed up in the 
 Categories, as a priori modes or conditions of 
 experience. Accordingly, the Person in its whole 
 reality is the one intelligible creative unity, the 
 single synthetic energy, ' blending in one ener- 
 getic whole above the categories the two activities 
 of absolute subject and absolute cause.' 3 Howi- 
 son illustrates his extension of the Kantian argu- 
 
 1 Limits, etc. p. 52. 2 Ibid. p. xiv. 3 Ibid. p. 174. 
 
PROFESSOR G. H. HOWISON 81 
 
 ment by treating Time * as a form of consciousness 
 in each of us, expressive of our self-activity. 
 Time is ' a changeless principle of relation, by 
 which the active-conscious self connects the 
 items of experience into the serial order which 
 we call sequence or succession, and blends the 
 two concomitant series, physical and psychic, 
 into the single whole that expresses the self's 
 own unity.' 2 
 
 While it is indubitably certain, as Descartes 
 said, that the Self is real, still that conviction 
 rests, as a matter of fact, upon the essentially 
 social relation with other selves, that is, upon the 
 consciousness of Self as personal. But this funda- 
 mental recognition of the Society of Minds leads 
 to emphasis upon the moral relation as the deepest 
 reality, and the spring of the intellectual and 
 aesthetic. Yes, from the connection of the idea 
 of self and the idea of God, the best proof of the 
 actual existence of God is to be found. God is 
 the Supreme Person in this Society, defining 
 himself from every other as the perfect Self- 
 fulfilment in eternity, the reality of all ideal 
 
 1 Ibid. pp. 299-302. 
 
 2 Ibid. p. 301. There appears to be evidence of affinity of 
 thought with Bergson in this view of time. 
 
82 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 possibilities. Human souls define themselves 
 from God, as from other persons ; so the reality 
 of each member depends upon the reality of the 
 Ideal, and the reality of God is involved in the 
 reality of each member. This mutual self-defini- 
 tion ensures the ' singular and unrepeatable per- 
 sonality ' of each soul. This moral relationship 
 and mutual dependence of souls and God is the 
 only creation which Howison recognizes. 
 
 Howison seeks for a reconciliation between 
 Freedom and Determinism by means of Self- 
 determination or purposive action as ' free causa- 
 tion,' together with the attraction of those Ideals 
 which constitute the rational bond of Souls, and 
 which centre in the perfection of God. The 
 1 Dilemma of Determinism ' can only be avoided 
 by regarding freedom as rational choice, and by 
 adopting Final instead of Efficient Causation. 
 
 Each Self-defining individual is eternal, and 
 yet gives rise to ' the phenomenal world of defect ' 
 in defining himself from God, and has, on the one 
 hand, the trait of empirical alternative ; and, on 
 the other, the power to respond to the vision of 
 Good, an influence eternally real throughout the 
 City of God, emanating from the Spirit who is 
 the perfection of all Ideals. Evil enters through 
 
PROFESSOR G. H. HOWISON 83 
 
 failure of will on the part of human selves. 
 Immortality is provided for on the basis of the 
 reality and eternity of all members of this 
 Society of Persons. 
 
 Let it be noted that Howison guards his system 
 against the charge of being merely Subjective 
 Idealism by his provision for objectivity. It is 
 true that he views Nature as the product of the 
 individual's formative consciousness. But as this 
 is a part of the soul's act of self-definition, it can 
 only be done with reference to other minds and 
 God, the Type of all intelligence. So the same 
 social and ethical principles which constitute the 
 Person provide the unity of Nature as a ' com- 
 munal system of experience.' Time and Space 
 exist because of this correlation of minds, involv- 
 ing a logical and moral order in the self-defining 
 consciousness of each. 
 
 The motif of Howison's System is, as we have 
 seen, the conviction of the inalienable worth and 
 absolute reality of personality. Accordingly he 
 falls back upon a Pluralism in opposition to 
 Monistic and Naturalistic systems which seem to 
 sacrifice the highest values of morality and indi- 
 viduality. Royce's provision in his System for 
 both these values, Howison rejects, on the grounds 
 
84 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 that the distinctness of our minds cannot be pre- 
 served in the Absolute, nor can the significance 
 of moral personality be maintained. 1 In such 
 Absolutism he contends also that the Personality 
 of God is unrecognizable. Upon this attempt to 
 vindicate personality Howison's system is built. 
 What shall we say about it ? 
 
 ii. 
 
 With Howison's motive I have considerable 
 sympathy. I cannot but feel that Absolutism has 
 been half blind to the intellectual, moral and 
 emotional implications of Personality, the most 
 significant fact of which philosophy must take 
 account. But in addition to what has already 
 been said in the criticism of Royce, we shall have 
 occasion to refer to this subject again, and so 
 need not pursue it here. 
 
 In regard to Howison's Pluralism, so funda- 
 mental in his system, we cannot rest in that as a 
 final account of Reality. The problem of Rela- 
 tions is certainly too strong to allow us to accept 
 a divided universe. If it be said the price is less 
 than that paid in the sacrifice of personality, I 
 
 1 The Conception of Qod, p. 129. 
 
PROFESSOR G. H. HOWISON 85 
 
 agree ; but I am hopeful that such an alternative 
 is not ultimate. 
 
 Howison does not contribute to a theory of the 
 Self in his pages, but expounds the concept of the 
 Person in an essentially social and ethical way. 
 No doubt he is thus emphasizing a valuable truth, 
 but, it seems to me, a very partial one. Con- 
 sidering how important the concept is in his 
 system, he might have given less reiteration of a 
 few truths about personality, and assisted in the 
 pressing work of clearing the intellectual atmo- 
 sphere that surrounds the concept of the Self. 
 He shows similar tendency to repetition in the 
 case of Final Causation, as if it were the ' skeleton 
 key ' for all locks. Change the term to Teleology 
 and it ceases to be so flexible — its dangers and 
 ambiguities come to light, — while the magic word 
 6 cause ' drops out of sight. As far as I can dis- 
 cover he has not given us a definite account of 
 what he means by Final Cause, nor of how it is 
 sufficient for all these things. I think that his 
 assertion of Efficient Causation as the unpardon- 
 able sin of all Absolutists and theologians is an 
 instance of false emphasis. 1 Cause is not a cate- 
 gory to conjure with in metaphysics, and the less 
 
 1 Limits, etc. pp. 343, 384, 396. 
 
86 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 said about it the better, except as a working 
 hypothesis. The inspiration of ' the great Stagi- 
 rite ' was hardly ' verbal ' after all. 
 
 The social analogy is pressed too closely and 
 made too prominent. In fact, such phrases as the 
 ' City of God,' ' Eternal Republic,' and so forth, 
 do not help us to the solution of the problem of 
 existence, but rather serve as illustrations in the 
 ethical sphere. The account of Nature is meagre. 
 The merely formal aspect of social relationship is 
 unable to bear the weight of a Universe. 
 
 The place of God in this system seems to 
 me to be unworthy of the name. That is a 
 serious defect in a system which professes to 
 rescue divine Personality from the blankness of 
 Monism. As Dr. J. M. E. M'Taggart pointed out 
 in his review, 1 the role of the Deity in Howison's 
 system is inadequate to meet the requirements 
 of traditional and Christian thought. Howison 
 replies 2 that the moral qualities are more impor- 
 tant than Self-existence. But, after all, does 
 Howison give us concrete holiness, love, and truth 
 in God ? I think not. God becomes the meeting- 
 place of mere abstractions. He is somehow 
 perfect, but without living Personality. 
 
 1 Mind, July, 1902. a Limits, etc. p. 429 (Appendix). 
 
PROFESSOR G. H. HOWISON 87 
 
 If this be true, as I believe, then Howison has 
 failed in his object, and chiefly through loss of 
 contact with the matter of experience. He seems 
 to save the soul ; but he has merely preserved 
 the formal fact of relationship between souls, and 
 does not touch concrete experience anywhere. In 
 consequence, even human personality becomes a 
 mere intersection of abstractions ; and no one is 
 likely to glow with enthusiasm over his Personal 
 Idealism. It is too academic, too a priori, too 
 eclectic, for a system professing to deal justly 
 with living personality. At the same time, it 
 must be admitted that the unsystematic form of 
 presentation as popular Essays on diverse topics 
 may account for some of these defects. 1 
 
 1 Professor James Ward has given a critique on Howison's 
 views, with special reference to Creation, in the Supplementary 
 Notes to his recent book, The Realm of Ends, p. 455 ff. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER. 
 
 The works of Mr. Schiller which we shall here 
 study are his Riddles of the Sphinx, 1 his essay on 
 Axioms as Postulates, in Personal Idealism, 2 and 
 his later contribution of Philosophical Essays 
 published under the title of Humanism. 3 
 
 As these writings extend over an interval of a 
 dozen years, it is not surprising to find a natural 
 development of his thought, and in some instances 
 a change of ideas. Mr. Schiller's first work was 
 the most ambitious in its range of treatment, 
 although possibly it was not so expressive of his 
 characteristic courage as the later essay on 
 Axioms as Postulates, which, if accepted as valid, 
 
 1 Riddles of the Sphinx, A Study in the Philosophy of Evolution, 
 by a Troglodyte; London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1891. 
 
 2 Personal Idealism, by Eight Members of the University of 
 Oxford. Edited by H. Sturt. London, Macmillan & Co., 1902. 
 
 8 Humanism, Philosophical Essays by F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., 
 Macmillan, 1903. 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 89 
 
 would revolutionize our notions of Truth. But 
 this view is still adopted generally in his collection 
 of essays entitled Humanism, and, although he has 
 not yet sought to systematically establish and 
 defend this view, he holds out the hope of so 
 doing in the future. Meanwhile he shows the 
 full scope of his doctrine to be wider than an 
 epistemological theory ; involving as it does 
 certain views of experience, the world and God, 
 which he seeks to embody under the inspiring 
 designation ' Humanism.' This he prefers to 
 such titles as ' Pragmatism,' which is good, but 
 not the final term of philosophic innovation, and 
 ' Radical Empiricism,' which it interprets syn- 
 thetically, and ' Personal Idealism,' which is 
 perhaps liable to ambiguity, and has already been 
 adopted for the System of G. H. Howison in his 
 Limits of Evolution. Humanism is the watch- 
 word of the movement which sets up the whole 
 personality in philosophy to the place which it 
 actually occupies in life, namely the supreme 
 place ; and from this vantage-ground alone can 
 the problems of thought be properly surveyed 
 and correlated with the essential conditions of 
 will and emotion. 
 
90 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 I. 
 
 Upon plunging into the Riddles of the Sphinx, 
 which, notwithstanding Mr. Schiller's develop- 
 ment of thought, still contains sufficient per- 
 manence of material, especially in its relation to 
 personality, to preserve its value for the student 
 of Humanism, we soon find something bearing 
 on our topic to catch hold of, and upon which 
 we can drift to ' high and dry ' philosophic 
 certainty, secure from the waves of Agnosticism, 
 Scepticism, and Pessimism. As it was with the 
 yvwQi creavrov of Socrates and the Cogito ergo 
 sum of Descartes, so it is with ' the one indis- 
 putable fact and basis of philosophy ' of Schiller ; 
 the reality of the Self it is impossible to doubt. 
 For to deny it is to resolve everything, including 
 our ' only chance ' of knowledge, into a destruc- 
 tive whirl of ' appearance ' and illusion, from 
 which there is no escape. It is no idle coincidence 
 then that the historical representatives of Scepti- 
 cism and Agnosticism, Hume and Kant, have 
 been just those who tried to disprove the reality 
 of the Self. Their arguments Schiller refutes, 
 and then fearlessly proceeds to examine the cheap 
 phrases and empty charges of anthropomorphism 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 91 
 
 flung at religion and any philosophy that recog- 
 nizes the uniqueness of personality in our own 
 interpretation of experience. Science is itself 
 infected with the dreaded taint of anthropo- 
 morphism. So is philosophy. It behoves thought, 
 therefore, to be conscious of itself and to construct 
 a system true to the noblest part of reality, the 
 conditio sine qud non of experience, namely, the 
 Self, which furnishes the key to all else, and 
 therefore makes necessary a teleological explana- 
 tion of the universe. 
 
 Before examining more closely Schiller's doc- 
 trine of the Self, let us briefly state the leading 
 principles of the system laid down in the Riddles 
 of the Sphinx. The ' Riddles ' themselves are 
 the relation of Man to the World, to his Cause, 
 and to his Future. The first is to be solved by 
 the doctrine of the Plurality of ultimate reals ; 
 the second requires God, non-phenomenal and 
 personal, but also finite ; and the third is met 
 by a theory of Immortality, qualified by the 
 degree of consciousness reached by the soul in 
 its past. Prominent in Schiller's system is the 
 process of Becoming, a real process with a begin- 
 ning and an end in time. Time comes into being 
 with the World-Process, through a determination 
 
92 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 of the Divine Spirit to form the ultimate spiritual 
 entities into a harmonious cosmos. Between the 
 individual selves and God there is interaction. 
 Evil enters through non-adaptation of the Ego 
 to the interaction with God. Hence Evil tends 
 to become less as Evolution goes on. Error is in 
 the same case as Evil. The material world is 
 due to the Divine side of the ' stress/ while on 
 its own side the Ego produces the phenomenal 
 Self. The process of Evolution means the per- 
 fecting of the interaction, so that the development 
 of the world will reveal more and more the nature 
 of God, until at the completion, the perfected 
 spirits would behold the countenance of God. 
 The perfection of the individuals and their group- 
 ing into societies must go together, and this is 
 the true End of the Process. The Ideal is to be 
 conceived as the perfection of activity (as in 
 Aristotle). 
 
 Beginning, then, with the reality of the Self, 
 Schiller examines the question whether our con- 
 sciousness of our own existence can be made the 
 basis of theoretical inferences. 1 Kant denied this 
 principle put forward by Descartes in his famous 
 formula. But Schiller shows that this is based 
 
 1 Riddles, p. 51. 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 93 
 
 on a misunderstanding of the Cartesian formula, 
 due to its necessary presentation in an intellectual 
 form in a philosophical argument. But its force 
 does not lie in ' I think/ but in the ' I ' whose 
 reality is intuitively assured in all experience. 
 So viewed, the supposed objections are seen to be 
 in the form of an ignoratio elenchi. Schiller goes 
 on, however, to refute Kant from his own words. 
 Because thought cannot adequately think the 
 Self, the latter is a conception only, and — that 
 is to say — no reality. But the true reason for 
 thought's inability to think the subject, Kant has 
 previously implied, namely, because it is the 
 subject for every conception, and for every 
 experience besides ! 
 
 Having passed through the extremes of Agnos- 
 ticism, Scepticism, Pessimism, and being on the 
 brink of despair, Schiller revives this conviction 
 of the Self's reality as the one truth which is left 
 and which may be plucked like a brand from the 
 burning — though it merely serve to light the 
 funereal pyre of Knowledge ! But no, it serves 
 a purpose far more useful than that, even to 
 kindle one by one the torches of reality in this 
 otherwise dark and unintelligible world. Its 
 light is intelligence ! Schiller exposes the futility 
 
94 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 of Hume's objection to personal identity. Hume 
 declared that he could not find the Soul without 
 stumbling upon some impression or idea. If 
 absolute blankness of all content was the con- 
 dition of the ' self ' for which he was seeking, 
 and to which he was willing to grant reality, then 
 indeed he was on a vain quest, for it would be a 
 most uncanny ghost of a soul that would satisfy 
 him. 
 
 And so Schiller finds a basis for his Reconstruc- 
 tion of Reality. 1 The Self is the most certain of 
 all things ; it is the Alpha, and it would not be 
 surprising if it turned out also to be the Omega, 
 the goal of philosophy. 
 
 As the unity of thought and feeling, the con- 
 scious Self is a better guide now than either 
 (abstract) thought or (phenomenal) perceptions. 
 Schiller has not yet grasped fully the Pragmatic 
 theory of knowledge, for he speaks of ' the use 
 of the categories and first principles of our 
 thought.' 2 And yet he had previously given 
 evidence of having the germ of the later develop- 
 ment, when, as a test concerning certain prin- 
 ciples of knowledge, he had asked of one ' does 
 it work ? ' 3 But there he concluded that this 
 
 1 Riddles, p. 141 ff. ■ Ibid. p. 142. 8 Ibid. pp. 91-92. 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 95 
 
 is not enough ; for the principle is not completely 
 disproved because it does not work ; logical con- 
 siderations must be taken into account. And 
 further, the pessimist admits that knowledge 
 appears to work. Schiller's development of the 
 teleological principle of explanation approxi- 
 mates to the later ' Humanistic ' view, 1 in some 
 of its statements. These signs are not only 
 interesting ; they are relevant to our inquiry ; 
 for between the acceptance of the reliability of 
 the Self and such theories of knowledge as are 
 represented by the designation of ' Humanism/ 
 there is close connection. 
 
 Schiller finds use for the distinction, familiar 
 in philosophy, between the phenomenal Self and 
 the Transcendental Ego, that is, between the Self 
 as it appears to itself in its interaction with the 
 Deity, and the Self as the ultimate reality. He 
 seeks to avoid the dualism, however, which proves 
 so dangerous in Kant's theory. There is needed 
 something in consciousness to connect the mo- 
 ments of experience. The Transcendental Ego 
 serves to do this, as a permanent being, and as 
 the form, which contains the whole of our psychic 
 life as its content. The error of Kant in separating 
 
 1 See also Ibid. pp. 167-168, 260 (footnote). 
 
96 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 the form from the matter is avoided by maintain- 
 ing that the two selves are in some way one, an 
 empirical truth corresponding to our conviction 
 that the Self changes and yet is the same. The 
 Transcendental Ego is defined as the ' I ' with 
 all its powers and latent capacities of develop- 
 ment, the ultimate reality which we have not yet 
 reached. 1 In the progress of development the 
 approximation of the two goes on, until at last 
 coincidence and perfection shall be reached. This 
 is supported by the testimony of Psychology to 
 the phenomena of multiplex personality and 
 * secondary ' selves. Our whole Selves are deeper 
 and more real than our ordinary selves. 
 
 The existence of other selves and of their 
 worlds of objectivity is explained after the analogy 
 of hypnotism. As ' several subjects may be made 
 to share in the same hallucinations,' so may ' an 
 operator of vastly greater knowledge and power ' 
 create subjective worlds valid for several persons. 2 
 Between the Ego and the Deity interaction is 
 going on, and the material world is the resultant, 
 from the Divine force, and our phenomenal con- 
 sciousness is due to our imperfect adaptation to 
 the ' stress.' 
 
 1 Riddles, p. 281. a Ibid. p. 286. 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 97 
 
 Schiller makes the sensible distinction 1 of a good 
 and bad (including false and confused) anthro- 
 pomorphism. The false kind consists in the 
 ascription to beings other than ourselves of 
 qualities which we know that they cannot possess. 
 The confused sort is due to a contradiction enter- 
 ing in between the points of analogy with which 
 we start, and the principles with which we con- 
 clude. Good anthropomorphism (seeing that non- 
 anthropomorphic truth is a fiction) will seek to 
 parallel all things to the principles of explanation 
 furnished by the human mind, and ultimately the 
 universe must be stated in these terms (the highest) 
 if it is to be explained. And so Teleology comes 
 in. Action for the sake of rational ends is implied 
 in our natures, and we cannot avoid this, the best 
 explanation of change, in regard to natural pro- 
 cesses. A historical method will not suffice, for 
 no description, no mere regress of causes, can 
 satisfy our rational nature. To discover the 
 significance of things is the task of metaphysics, 
 and therefore it is necessary that we explain the 
 lower by the higher, and not the reverse, as the 
 extreme physicists and biologists urge. The final 
 cause will be found to be the true ground of 
 
 1 Ibid. p. 145 ff. 
 G 
 
98 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 existence, and this is possible only through the 
 Deity transcendent above the evolutionary pro- 
 cess. Evolution, ' which was to have abolished 
 teleology, turns out itself to require the most 
 boldly teleological treatment.' But to be free 
 from objection, the teleological explanation must 
 not be narrowly anthropocentric. The universal 
 end of the world-process is being subserved by 
 the lesser ends. If teleology be kept from con- 
 flict with scientific mechanism, both philosophy 
 and science will gain. It is only by a knowledge 
 of what has been, that we can venture a prediction 
 of what is to be, and that an adequate explana- 
 tion can be given of the natural Process as a 
 whole ; while, on the other hand, the teleological 
 formula of metaphysics should eventually be of 
 benefit to the sciences of ethics, sociology, bio- 
 logy, and, lastly, — the order being one of time as 
 well as of logic — physics and mechanics. Such 
 is Schiller's contribution to the Problem of 
 Teleology. 
 
 Bearing in mind his general Theory of Inter- 
 action, previously indicated, the following 
 supplementary ideas x on the nature of God 
 are given. God is the Creator, ' the non- 
 
 1 Riddles, p. 310. 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 99 
 
 phenomenal and unbecome Cause ' ; the Sus- 
 tained as interacting with the Ego ; it follows 
 also that he is personal and intelligent Spirit. 
 The reasons given for Personality are to the 
 point : — 
 
 (a) Cause is a category which is valid only if 
 used by persons and of persons. 
 
 (b) Personality is the conception expressive of 
 the highest we know. 
 
 (c) Not only as Cause, but also as Perfector of 
 the world-process, God must be regarded as 
 possessing Personality. 
 
 (d) Since purpose belongs only to intelligent 
 beings, and Evolution is meaningless if not teleo- 
 logical, therefore we acknowledge the divine Per- 
 sonality, rather than contradict our principle of 
 not multiplying entities needlessly to invent 
 gratuitous fictions like an unconscious or an 
 impersonal intelligence. In a footnote 1 he ex- 
 presses his willingness to accept the terms ' supra- 
 personal ' or ' ultra-personal ' as applicable to 
 God ; for doubtless the Personality of God 
 transcends that of man as far as man transcends 
 the atom. But he adds a proviso which is needed 
 in the light of F. H. Bradley's doctrine of the 
 
 1 Ibid. p. 310. 
 
100 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 Absolute as ' supra-personal but not personal.' * 
 Schiller is wise therefore in clearing himself from 
 such a meaningless position (which really asserts 
 the Unknowable in a new dress !) by the stipula- 
 tion that by supra-personal we mean something 
 including and transcending, rather than excluding 
 personality. 
 
 But there is a fourth attribute of God, insisted 
 on throughout Schiller's writings, viz. that God 
 is finite, or rather, that to God as to all realities, 
 ' infinite ' has no meaning. For firstly, Kant's 
 rebuttal of the so-called Teleological (or ' physico- 
 theological ') * Proof ' of God's existence turned 
 upon the conclusion to an infinite God from 
 inadequate finite premises. All that could be 
 inferred was a cause adequate to the pro- 
 duction of the world. To go beyond this is to 
 argue for the unknowable from the known, to 
 seek the infinite from finite data. Again God is 
 finite as Force, for resistance is implied in Force ; 
 and God cannot he all if He is to enforce His will 
 upon the world — * unless He is by some inexplicable 
 chance divided against Himself? 2 
 
 1 Appearance and Reality, pp. 173, 531-33. See supra, Chapter 
 I. ; also see Part II., Chapter VI. 
 
 8 Riddles, p. 311. Italics mine. 
 
MR. F. C. S\ SCHILLER* 101 
 
 From his previous account 1 of the universe 
 the same result follows. Kegarding infinity as 
 negative and conceptual, he had denied that 
 Space and Time possess it ; and he had refused 
 to acknowledge an infinite process of Becoming, 
 or the conception of ' the world as a whole ' as 
 infinite. ' An infinite whole is a contradiction in 
 terms.' 2 The belief in infinity contradicts the 
 important conception of causation, to which 
 Schiller holds under the form of a First Cause, as 
 against the unprofitable notion of an endless 
 regress. While he is influenced by the Cosmo- 
 logical and Teleological Proofs, it is evident that 
 he has departed from them considerably, inas- 
 much as he argues to a finite Being. 
 
 But the grand indictment is not yet complete. 
 The philosopher must be told that he has false 
 grounds for the assumption of infinite existence, 
 and the theologian that the doctrine is not 
 only illogical but irreligious, and detrimental to 
 piety, to faith, and to good works. Infinity 
 in God would make Him the Author of Evil 
 would neutralize His Personality, and would 
 deprive the worshipper of his true heritage of 
 religious emotion. Personality and Infinity are 
 
 1 Riddles, Chapter IX. 2 Ibid. p. 253. 
 
102 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 incompatible, for Personality rests on the dis- 
 tinction of Self from Not-Self. With this highest 
 attribute sacrificed at the altar of an abstraction, 
 there would disappear also power, intelligence, 
 wisdom and goodness, from an Infinite Being. 
 
 The religious and philosophical doctrines of 
 infinity meet in Pantheism, which leads into the 
 general discussion of Monism and Pluralism. The 
 pantheistic tendency is in every way a mistake, 
 emotionally, scientifically, logically. The result 
 is practically indistinguishable from Atheism. 
 Change and Becoming are impossible on strict 
 absolutistic grounds, as the Eleatics consistently 
 maintained. From the standpoint of the finite, 
 God comes to mean nothing, and from the stand- 
 point of the Infinite, the world is nothing — a prac- 
 tical and theoretical failure is really the result. 
 
 Examining Monism, Dualism, and Pluralism, 
 Schiller at once discards Dualism. Between the 
 other two systems he proceeds to a defence of 
 Pluralism. The unity claimed by Monism might 
 indeed have the advantage if it were not neces- 
 sarily abstract, and devoid of all practical value. 
 It does not simplify the understanding of the 
 world. This merely abstract unity cannot explain 
 the phenomenal manifold. Pluralism escapes the 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 103 
 
 difficult problem of origins. But it is prone to 
 fall into another danger quite as great as that 
 which seems fatal to Monism. A relation between 
 the Reals seems required, and this relation seems 
 to imply a Unity. In such a manner, then, does 
 Pluralism imply the Unity of the world. This 
 difficulty is to be avoided by a rational assump- 
 tion that " the possibility of the interaction of 
 the many is implied in their very existence, and 
 does not require any special proof.' x In a sense, 
 therefore, Pluralism seems to be based on Monism, 
 but the One is without reality, being merely an 
 ideal factor in a real plurality. Pluralism seeks a 
 better unity, the actual result to be arrived at by 
 the process of interaction, the perfection and 
 harmony of a real universe, evolved in the course 
 of Time. In this conception Pantheism and Indi- 
 vidualism are transcended. The Many and the 
 One are recognized, but the primacy and reality 
 of the Many are more valid than the abstractions 
 of the One. The influence of the Divine factor 
 in the interaction provides the element of good 
 in the moral world of our experience. In this 
 sense God is immanent in all things. But He is 
 also transcendent in Himself, though finite. 
 
 1 Riddles, p. 355. 
 
104 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 Leaving the Riddles of the Sphinx, the exposi- 
 tion of which has run into some length — but into 
 no greater than it deserves — I turn to the essay 
 on ' Axioms as Postulates ' in Personal Idealism. 
 Here there is the same emphasis, even in the 
 opening words, upon the Self as real and valid, 
 upon the part played by the ' whole 'personality ' 
 in the formation of a metaphysic as in every other 
 human enterprise. Schiller sets forward a two- 
 fold ground of agreement among philosophers. 
 The first is that the world is experience, and the 
 second is that for the organization of this experi- 
 ence into a reality for philosophy certain con- 
 necting principles are needed. Then he asks that 
 pointed question, which causes such heart-burn- 
 ings among the ' Experience '-Philosophers — 
 'Whose experience ? ' and secondly, ' Of what is it 
 the experience ? ' In reply to the first question, 
 it is vain to say that it is the experience of the 
 Absolute. Schiller's answer is, ' our experience,' 
 or if that is assuming too much, ' my experience.' 
 8 Here again,' he says, ' I must be prepared to 
 be assailed by a furious band of objectors intent 
 on asking me — Who are you ? How dare you 
 take yourself for granted ? Have you not heard 
 how the self is a complex psychological product, 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 105 
 
 which may be divided and analysed away in a 
 dozen different ways ? And do you actually 
 propose to build your philosophy upon so dis- 
 credited a foundation ? ' 1 In reply, certain obser- 
 vations are made : — 
 
 (a) There is a divergence among the analyses 
 of the Self. 
 
 (b) A Self conducts the analysis in every case. 
 
 (c) These analyses must serve some purpose, 
 which is relative to selfhood. 
 
 (d) For the acceptance of an analysis choice is 
 involved, and ' if I choose to analyse differently or 
 not at all, if I find it convenient to operate with 
 the whole organism as the standard unit in my 
 explications, what right have Scribes and Phari- 
 sees to complain ? ' 2 Now comes the Prag- 
 matism, which is to be so prominent in Schiller's 
 subsequent work. Since consequences must jus- 
 tify the choice made, it is damaging to the afore- 
 said analyses that nothing valuable or workable 
 has resulted. He is therefore hopeful that the 
 assumption of his own existence may perhaps 
 prove more valuable than any of the denials of 
 the Self that are propounded by ' psychologies 
 
 1 Humanism, p. 52. 
 
 2 Ibid. p. 53. Italics after ' whole ' are mine. 
 
106 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 which neglect their proper problem in their 
 anxiety to be ranked among the natural sciences.' 1 
 Schiller interprets the Self as not yet com- 
 pletely known, but as revealed in its true reality 
 with the process of experience. The World, too, 
 is only imperfectly known as yet. This leads 
 him into an exposition of his Pragmatic Theory 
 of Knowledge. Briefly put, it is that our know- 
 ledge is gradually evolved by a series of experi- 
 mental guesses or ' postulates.' There is a large 
 element of indeterminateness manifested in the 
 World. The same characteristics of plasticity and 
 growth are present in the intellectual cosmos. 
 Logic is essentially dependent upon psychological 
 needs. This, too, must be the method of super- 
 human intelligence, if there be one at work in 
 the forming of the cosmos. ' Its nature must be 
 the same as ours ; it also proceeds by experiment, 
 and adapts means to ends, and learns from 
 experience.' 2 Matter is the raw material and is 
 conceived after the Aristotelian view of poten- 
 tiality. Bearing this in mind, Schiller criticizes 
 ordinary Empiricism, in which the activity of the 
 Self is ignored in the presence of * impressions 
 and ideas ' ; and Apriorism, which in its intellec- 
 
 1 Humanism, p. 53. 2 Ibid. p. 58. 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 107 
 
 tualistic bias has maintained certain ' necessities 
 of thought.' This ' necessity,' this ' universality ' 
 claimed for a priori truths, the Postulates of 
 Pragmatism are quite capable of yielding. So 
 Schiller boldly sets out to compel the Axioms, and 
 even the Laws of Thought to own their true 
 nature as Postulates, justified in experience by 
 their working, and by the satisfaction they bring 
 to the whole nature of man. These Postulates 
 depend upon psychical temperament, and ' radiate 
 from human personality as their centre.' 1 This 
 is a confession of the indissoluble relation which 
 exists between a Pragmatic doctrine of knowledge 
 and a conviction that the Self is real. This is the 
 pragmatic motif for Schiller's insistence upon the 
 fact of the Self, at a period when it is very un- 
 fashionable to do so. 
 
 He assumes also the characteristic features of 
 consciousness, e.g. its continuity, coherence, cona- 
 tiveness, and purposiveness. Consciousness can- 
 not be denned, and is the ttov <ttw of this, and 
 every such inquiry. But more than all the 
 features above named is the consciousness of an 
 identical Self. The psychological theories do not 
 
 1 Ibid. p. 94. For other assertions of this aspect of Pragmatism, 
 see pp. 95-6. 
 
108 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 affect more than the scientific aspect of the 
 matter. Upon this Self-identity of consciousness, 
 which is a psychical fact, he raises his theory of 
 the postulation of logical Identity, the greatest 
 principle of thought. This has come to be through 
 our demand for identity, based upon our con- 
 sciousness of identity, and ratified by its working 
 in the world of objects. So, too, the conscious- 
 ness of Self and of Not-Self (as equivalent to the 
 external world) has grown up through successful 
 postulation to account for the felt unsatisfactori- 
 ness of experience. This gives the clue to his 
 explanation of the rise of other Postulates — Con- 
 tradiction, and Excluded Middle, Hypothesis, 
 Causation, Sufficient Reason, Uniformity of 
 Nature, Space, and Time. One postulate is not 
 yet fully axiomatic, that is, Teleology. Schiller 
 again argues in favour of Teleology, and the 
 necessity for anthropomorphism. 1 The bias of 
 Natural Science against these postulates, and 
 the crude treatment of them in the past by their 
 advocates account for the fact that Teleology is 
 still a postulate and not an axiom. 
 
 The Personality of God is again briefly vindi- 
 cated, 2 as also is His Goodness, as a methodologi- 
 
 1 Humanism, p. 118 ff. 2 Ibid. p. 122. 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 109 
 
 cal postulate. Infinity is again denied. 1 And 
 Schiller concludes his powerful Essay with a 
 polemic against intellectualism, and a plea for 
 the Pragmatic Theory of Knowledge. The Will- 
 to-believe must be regarded, and philosophy must 
 be reconstructed on a voluntaristic basis. 
 
 Passing now to the consideration of Humanism 
 we may reserve the examination of the Preface 
 to the last. For it is Schiller's latest contribution 
 in the book, and also his most pronounced expres- 
 sion of opinion on our general problem. 
 
 In the first Essay on the Ethical Basis of Meta- 
 physics, the development of his theory of know- 
 ledge is made clear. Schiller distinguishes be- 
 tween Irrationalism as a doctrine and the view 
 that our cognitive activities are pervaded by the 
 purposive character of mental life generally. The 
 question of value must be raised ; purpose and 
 end are, in fact, fundamental to the right under- 
 standing of experience. This is further expounded 
 in the ' Discourse Concerning Pragmatism,' en- 
 titled Useless Knowledge, in which the position is 
 maintained that action is primary, and knowledge 
 only secondary — that the Good is the Source of 
 the True. This is completed by the third Essay 
 
 1 Ibid. p. 130. 
 
110 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 on Truth, in which the various definitions of 
 truth are examined and shown to be open to 
 serious objection. Truth is not individual either ; 
 it must win recognition from society. Prag- 
 matism can show how this is possible, viz. by 
 efficiency and usefulness being taken as the 
 criteria of truth in our intellectual activity. The 
 usefulness is relative to any human end, but 
 ultimately to the perfection of our whole life. 
 
 In the Essay on Lotze's Monism, that philo- 
 sopher's ' proof ' of the underlying unity is 
 subjected to attack. Schiller enlarges upon his 
 previous view that Pluralism may ' beg ' inter- 
 action. 1 
 
 In regard to the argument from Change, appeal 
 must be made to our inner experience, and there 
 we find the consciousness of change based on a 
 feeling of our identity. But this does not apply 
 to the Absolute, for we can have no such feeling 
 of its identity. Lotze's re-creation of spiritual 
 beings by their stepping out of the Absolute, at 
 the close of his argument is an effort to save his 
 theory from abstractness. 
 
 Schiller agrees with Lotze's arguments to prove 
 that God must be conceived as personal and 
 
 1 Humanism, p. 66. 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 111 
 
 spiritual. But he differs from him in the attempt 
 to connect this view with the doctrine of God as 
 the Unity of things. Even religion does not 
 require this identification. The Unity of the 
 Absolute could have no religious value. Lotze's 
 admission of free-will affords a ground for the 
 conception of a Divine guidance and Providence, 
 but it creates an inherent instability in the 
 Absolute. The mysterious problem of Evil 
 thwarts the Unity of things, and destroys the 
 argument. Lotze's identification of God with 
 the Absolute leads him, according to Schiller, 
 into a kind of Pantheism. The a priori proofs 
 share, in common with Lotze's proof from inter- 
 action, the weakness of being too abstract. This 
 kind of reasoning would hold in any kind of 
 world. 
 
 In the Essay on Reality and Idealism, Schiller 
 clearly indicates the connection between Prag- 
 matism and the conviction of the Self's reality. 
 'The only certain and ultimate test of reality 
 is the absence of internal friction, is its undis- 
 puted occupation of the field of consciousness, 
 in a word, its self-sufficiency.' * Upon this 
 criterion the distinction between real and unreal, 
 
 1 Ibid. pp. 118, 119. 
 
112 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 and even that between the Self and the World, 
 is based. The emotional consequences of presen- 
 tations in experience are various ; so the subject 
 must, of necessity, distinguish himself from the 
 object, the world, which does not ' feel ' ; and 
 he must seek to control this realm. Hence the 
 attention to phenomena which are followed by 
 pains or other consequences which are practically 
 important. 
 
 The chief remaining essay for our purposes — 
 since I am compelled to exclude the arguments 
 concerning Immortality — is that which contro- 
 verts the main tenets set forth in Bradley's 
 Appearance and Reality, in the interests of 
 Schiller's pragmatistic theory. The title, ' On 
 Preserving Appearances,' indicates its polemical 
 aim. Schiller is opposed to the whole method 
 of the dialectic of Bradley, by which everything 
 is first convicted of unreality and then ' some- 
 how ' reconstituted by the Absolute. Such a 
 negative procedure is itself a verdict of con- 
 demnation upon the arguments employed, and, 
 perhaps, upon Logic itself, for ' nothing which 
 exists in however despicable a sense can really 
 be contradictory.' x The contradictions can only 
 
 1 Humanism, p. 187. 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 113 
 
 be in our thought, for the reality is there in spite 
 of them ! Therefore, Bradley's criterion that the 
 real is that which is not self-contradictory is only 
 partial, the complete criterion being, according 
 to Schiller, the principle of Harmony. The 
 Absolute, furthermore, is ' quite as unknowable 
 as Spencer's monstrosity.' x And then once again 
 Schiller lays it down 2 that the only reality we 
 can start with is our own immediate, personal 
 experience, and that apart from this basis no 
 ultimate reality can be reached. The distinction 
 of ' appearance and reality ' remains always rela- 
 tive to our knowledge of our world, or, if preferred, 
 Schiller is willing to say ' that for me it remains 
 relative to my world.' 3 
 
 In the Preface, the chief topic is the advent of 
 ' Humanism,' in place of the terms ' Pragmatism ' 
 and ' Personal Idealism.' It represents an atti- 
 tude of thought which is sympathetic towards 
 the full life of Personality. It signifies an attempt 
 to put forward a philosophic theory of a ' re- 
 anthropomorphized ' or, as Schiller prefers, a 
 ' re-humanized ' universe. He is ready to stand 
 by Protagoras, and maintain that Man is the 
 measure of all things. Instead of illusory hopes 
 
 1 Ibid. p. 191. 2 Ibid. p. 192. 3 Ibid. p. 192, footnote. 
 H 
 
114 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 of a philosophy without assumptions, Humanism 
 candidly confesses that its starting-point is our 
 immediate experience and experienced self, from 
 which it can proceed in any direction. Even the 
 a priori philosophers really take this for granted, 
 and cannot give us any superhuman system. 
 
 ii. 
 
 With much of Schiller's philosophy of per- 
 sonality I find myself in hearty agreement. With- 
 out committing myself to his theory of knowledge, 
 it seems plain to me that such a Pragmatism or 
 Humanism depends for its very life upon the 
 conviction of the reality of the Self. This is the 
 starting-point, actual no less than theoretical, for 
 a philosophy of postulation. If the fashionable 
 ' Experience ' philosophy will hide a multitude of 
 distinctions in other realms, both of Absolutism 
 and of Empiricism, here in Humanism it has to 
 own its twofold aspect of subject and object. 
 Schiller is ready to ask the simple question 
 1 Whose experience ? ' which causes such a com- 
 motion among the ' Pure Experience ' philo- 
 sophers. And with the problem of the Self thus 
 raised philosophy must deal. The task of Meta- 
 physics is to explain the distinctions which 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 115 
 
 palpably lie within experience, involving the 
 problems of the relation of the Self to Nature, 
 of Self to Self, and of Self to God. 
 
 Let us briefly consider now the more detailed 
 view of the Self given by Schiller. It seems to me 
 that he does not improve his system by his dis- 
 tinction between the Empirical Self and the 
 Transcendental Ego. For the latter is confessedly 
 an ideal. The difficulties of the Kantian dualism 
 concerning the Ego can hardly be avoided by 
 clipping off the epistemological function of the 
 Transcendental Ego, or by saying — with surely 
 a Bradleian reminiscence — that the two are some- 
 how one. Nor can the difficulty of knitting up the 
 moments of our experience with an identical Ego, 
 which we know as ourself, be overcome by making 
 an Ideal Ego do it. Of course, there is this Inter- 
 action Theory to support, and both the Ego and 
 the Self are needed for the ' stress ' of the Divine 
 and the human sides. But neither this nor the 
 hypnotistic analogy will carry our sympathies 
 any further in this direction. 
 
 Briefly then, Schiller's view of the Self as real 
 and the centre of experience and philosophy 
 accords entirely with that adopted in the present 
 work. Humanism insists^on Personality through- 
 
116 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 out. With the intention of Schiller in giving a 
 place to the Transcendental Ego as opposed to 
 the Self as existing at any one moment, I am in 
 sympathy, but I cannot endorse his use of the 
 term so redolent with historical associations, nor 
 can I approve of his method of seeking the Ego as 
 distinct from the Self, in the future, as an Ideal. 
 I agree with his maintenance of self-identity 
 (worked out in ' Axioms as Postulates ') as the 
 basis of all postulation of identity and of the 
 Law of Identity. His emphasis upon the whole 
 . Personality throughout his works, as opposed 
 to a shallow empiricism, or an abstract intel- 
 lectualism is also valuable. His recognition of 
 purpose and practical needs, of individual and 
 social satisfaction when experimentation is found 
 to work is also true to a certain extent, and 
 may be true in the sense that Pragmatism or 
 Humanism claims. 
 
 With Schiller's views on Anthropomorphism 
 and Teleology I am in accord, and so I may pass 
 them over. It is the outcome of the Humanistic 
 view of things to see that the significant thing 
 in thought, as in all else, is to be aware of the 
 active personality which reclaims an unknown 
 void, and is rewarded by reality and enrichment 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 117 
 
 of experience. And so the highest explanation of 
 the Universe must be in the highest terms, along 
 the lines of purpose, meaning, and development 
 towards an Ideal, as we know it in ourselves. 
 
 A discussion of Schiller's views of the Deity 
 would strictly involve an estimate of his Inter- 
 action Theory. But this is not possible here. And 
 we are concerned more with those doctrines which 
 have been emphasized in his recent writings. As 
 to the Personality of God, I consider Schiller's 
 \ views well-founded. At the same time some of 
 his conclusions appear to be uncritically anthro- 
 pomorphic, not only in his early work, but also in 
 his later Essays, as when he says that the nature 
 of a superhuman intelligence must be the same as 
 ours, proceeding by experiment, adapting means 
 to ends and learning from experience ! x This 
 surely deserves the charge which Professor Howi- 
 son brings against Schiller's ' God,' of being 
 ' finite and pathological.' 2 
 
 But there is another serious question to which 
 my answers would scarcely coincide with his. 
 I refer to the view of the finite nature of God. 
 This is, of course, a part of the general discussion 
 
 1 Personal Idealism, p. 58. 
 
 2 Limits of Evolution, p. xii. 
 
118 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 of Infinity, against which Schiller is strenuous 
 in season and out .[of season. But strictly the 
 question arises in this paper merely as bearing 
 on our prime subject. 
 
 Now I am unwilling to dogmatize in regard to 
 the Infinite, and for this reason especially, viz. 
 that mathematical usage has so put its stamp 
 upon the term, as to invalidate any outside claim 
 for it. Accordingly I consider that a different con- 
 cept should be employed in philosophy. Again, 
 I would not maintain that this metaphysical con- 
 cept will meet the requirements of the definition 
 of ' Infinity.' Hence it is of no avail to try and 
 refute such a metaphysical Absolute or Perfect, 
 with the objection that it does not answer to 
 Kant's definition of Infinity, viz. 'that which 
 cannot be completed by successive syntheses.' 
 If the conception ' Absolute ' be granted in a 
 relative sense, relative like all else to our capabili- 
 ties (surely a Humanistic position), there is no 
 contradiction in regarding such a conception as 
 preserving all that was valuable in the conception 
 of the Infinite, without incurring the charges of 
 falsity and abstractness which are hurled at us 
 for using it in a ' philosophical ' sense. The 
 proper distance between the science of mathe- 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 119 
 
 matics and constructive metaphysics is thereby 
 preserved. If this, then, be what Schiller means 
 when he says, ' to God, as to all realities, infinite 
 has no meaning,' I should agree with him. But 
 it is not. He will not allow one uninterrupted 
 gaze towards reality as a whole. He denies that 
 the universe may be conceived under such ideas. 
 His pluralism is vital and fundamental. Not 
 only is there no Absolute, no Unity of all ; there 
 is division and discord at the heart of things. 
 We may hope for a unity as the world learns 
 to swing together better, as Evolution does its 
 work in nature, society, and the individual ; 
 but there is no underlying unity or world- 
 ground. The whole process is one of approxi- 
 mation toward unity, never before realized in 
 thought or existence ; the Becoming is essential 
 to the true conception of things, and it is in 
 Time. 
 
 The idea of God as being but a part of the 
 universe does not satisfy ' the craving for unity ' 
 which, abuse it as one will, has at least a prag- 
 matic bearing. It seems to me that we require 
 a Personal Ground of all things, the Supreme 
 Unity. But I leave this for the present. 
 
 God is not limited by some accident or ' chance' 
 
120 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 as Schiller implies as a possible view, 1 — ' dividing 
 Him against Himself.' It is not reasonable to 
 introduce chance in such a connection, but it is 
 rational to endow the Perfect Personality with 
 the power of Self-determination. I have previously 
 indicated my objections to Pluralism. It lacks 
 the denniteness at least which belongs to the One. 
 The possibility of ultimate interaction between 
 pluralistic entities is opposed surely to our 
 notions of rationality. And why the unity, which 
 even Schiller has to admit to account for this 
 ultimate possibility of interaction, should be 
 merely abstract, I am at a loss to conceive. 
 
 Schiller is willing to hold to Teleology as a 
 postulate on its way to becoming an axiom. 
 And yet against an ' infinite ' unity he is em- 
 phatic. May not a similar venture of faith 
 rationalize the universe, and so justify itself ? 
 May not Perfect Personality be the ground of 
 all, even of the independence of the world of 
 Egos ? May not God be more than a strenuous 
 Pilot wrestling with a refractory fleet in an 
 unfortunate storm, and seeking to make a 
 possible port ? May He not be what unbounded 
 worship wills, what faith believes, goodness 
 
 1 Riddles, p. 311. 
 
MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER 121 
 
 implies, reason justifies, and love demands, when 
 it uses the controversial terms ' Infinite ' and 
 1 Unity ' ? In the light of the views which 
 are set forth later, I think that the ' venture 
 of faith ' is reasonable and even necessary. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 DR. HASTINGS RASHDALL. 
 
 Among the contributors to the discussion of 
 our Problem Dr. Rashdall has a claim and rank 
 for the views which he has set forth concisely 
 and yet systematically in his Essay on ' Per- 
 sonality, Human and Divine/ in the volume 
 entitled Personal Idealism. This closing essay 
 perhaps fairly reflects the outlook upon ultimate 
 problems, of the majority of the contributors 
 to the volume. A very brief account must 
 suffice here. 
 
 I. 
 
 Rashdall endeavours to describe the nature 
 of Personality, and to discuss its metaphysical 
 bearings. He assumes the position of an Idealist, 
 and he does not aim at a full exposition of his 
 arguments in so short a paper. 
 
 In answer to the question, — What is a person ? 
 — he arrives at the following conclusions. In 
 
DR. HASTINGS RASHDALL 123 
 
 addition to the obvious possession of conscious- 
 ness, a person thinks, and not merely feels. 
 Involved in this power to think is the per- 
 manence of the personal consciousness, for it 
 must be able to transcend the succession of 
 mere feelings. And for the same reason the 
 person must be a self-distinguishing conscious- 
 ness, defining himself both from objects regarded 
 as things, and from other selves. Individuality 
 is recognized as essential in the idea of Per- 
 sonality. Further, the person can originate acts, 
 or, in other words, is will as well as thought 
 and feeling. Personality is not confined to man, 
 but in some degree characterizes all forms of 
 conscious life. Even on grounds of morality, 
 we are not compelled to exclude the lowest 
 animal from possessing a rudimentary sort of 
 personality, for some kind of conflict of impulses 
 is conceivably present in even the lowest 
 organisms. 
 
 Yet even man is not fully possessed of the 
 essentials of Personality. For the best of men 
 fail to realize fully the permanent elements of 
 personal experience. And in moral achievement 
 they fail more or less, to realize what Personality 
 fully means. Accordingly, Rashdall follows Lotze 
 
124 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 in regarding Personality as an Ideal pertaining 
 to God. He gives a proof of God along Idealistic 
 lines, rising above a Universal Thought or Self- 
 Consciousness to the Thinker and Will demanded 
 by rational consistency. He then discusses 
 objections to the Divine Personality. It is 
 said that an object is required for the Divine 
 Subject. Rashdall replies that the objects 
 thought by the Divine Thinker are not to be 
 regarded as existing independently of the Knower, 
 but we must hold that the Subject may dis- 
 tinguish itself from its own changing states, 
 which are willed as well as thought. In this 
 way the Dualism is avoided which would make 
 the world an alien Other to God — ' a sort of 
 Siamese twin to which He is eternally and 
 inseparably annexed but which is something 
 other than the content of his Will." * No im- 
 mediate whole of experience, no ' higher unity ' 
 than that given by Subject and Object can be 
 accepted — despite Bradley's claim — and so no 
 alternative to the Personality of God is possible. 
 The objections to Will are based on mistaken 
 conceptions of causality, and are met by the 
 extension of the latter to include Final Cause. 
 
 1 Personal Idealism, p. 378. 
 
DR. HASTINGS RASHDALL 125 
 
 If also we view thought as itself a manifestation 
 of Self-activity we need not hesitate to ascribe 
 Will to God. 
 
 What then is the relation between the Divine 
 Will and the human wills ? Is the moral 
 universe in reality a Pluralistic Society of 
 independent Souls ? Rashdall does not regard 
 this consequence as necessary. For not only is 
 the original unity of the world sacrificed, but 
 the dependence upon God involved in theoretical 
 considerations, e.g. in the relation of soul to 
 body, is not to be ignored. But when Rashdall 
 passes from the question of origins, he inclines 
 to a Pluralistic view of the relation between the 
 Souls as existing beings, and God, rather than 
 to the Monistic conception of God as including 
 finite Spirits. He criticizes Royce and the Neo- 
 Hegelian School. These thinkers commit the 
 * supreme fallacy ' of identifying existence for 
 others with existence for self, the knowledge of 
 persons with a person's private experience of 
 himself. This is the outcome of intellectualism. 
 The social relations which help to constitute the 
 individual furnish only one aspect of the truth, 
 and miss the essential side of the Self's reality. 
 From this source also spring Bradley's objections 
 
126 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 to the Self as real. A distinction must be made 
 between the reality of persons as they exist for 
 the Absolute, and the reality peculiar to Selves 
 alone — of which they are immediately aware as 
 conscious persons. God must know the Self as 
 a being which is not identical with His know- 
 ledge of it. The Universal Consciousness, sup- 
 posed to include all Selves, does not as a matter 
 of fact explain the possibility of the knowledge 
 of one finite Self by another finite Self. The 
 conception of the Self as included within a larger 
 Self, is met by the objection that the appearance 
 of externality and independence must impera- 
 tively be made clear. Then again even the 
 content of our individual experience is not 
 shared by another. As to our knowledge of 
 other Selves, Rashdall thinks that the difficulty 
 has been over-estimated, and he regards it as 
 the duty of philosophy to treat such elementary 
 cases of inference as fact, and part of our manner 
 of thought. The distinction between the uni- 
 versal content of thought, and the private 
 thinking, feeling, and willing consciousness, is 
 one of most fundamental importance in philo- 
 sophy. 
 Rashdall holds therefore to a view intermediate 
 
DR. HASTINGS RASHDALL 127 
 
 between Monism and Pluralism. According to 
 this conception, the One Mind gives rise to 
 Many. We may call this whole collection One 
 Reality, but after all it consists of a community 
 of Persons. Rashdall cares little if this view 
 is regarded as incompatible with the infinity 
 of God. In regard to Time, his opinions are 
 not fully exhibited, but he aims at preserving 
 the time-consciousness of the human individual 
 with the supra-temporal reality of God. Be- 
 tween God and the Absolute he draws a dis- 
 tinction necessary for common-sense, philosophy 
 and religion. God is personal. The Absolute 
 as the Infinite Being cannot possess personality. 
 The Absolute then means the collection of 
 Persons including God, not as an aggregate, 
 but as an organic Society. 
 
 ii. 
 
 RashdalFs Essay gives a good presentation of 
 the side of our subject which lies closer to the 
 standpoint of Theism than the views previously 
 discussed. He has improved upon the work of 
 another author, J. R. Illingworth, whose Per- 
 sonality, Human and Divine, 1 is gracefully written, 
 
 1 Bampton Lectures, 1894. 
 
128 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 but might well be stronger on the metaphysical 
 side. 
 
 To criticize Rashdall is unnecessary here, 
 since positive views will be set forth in the 
 Second Part, and respective differences in 
 method and conclusions will then become 
 apparent. I may say, however, that the need 
 of a discrimination between the terms used 
 almost at random as synonyms for Personality 
 is plainly shown by Rashdall's treatment. The 
 employment of Personality as a metaphysical, 
 practical and social concept is fraught with 
 ambiguity and error, and makes more imperative 
 the task of distinguishing the various terms used 
 to designate the Self. This looseness may partly 
 account for the omission on Rashdall's part of 
 a clear statement of the Moral side of Per- 
 sonality, and of the relation between the ethical 
 and the existential theories of the Self. 
 
 Rashdall comes between Royce and Howison 
 in his ultimate statements. He holds to a 
 partial dependence of Souls upon God, including 
 their origination from Him. Yet he declines to 
 be a party to the identification of the purposes 
 of finite Selves with those of God. He holds to 
 an ultimate Society of Souls, but, unlike Howison, 
 
DR. HASTINGS RASHDALL 129 
 
 views all as Reality, as the Absolute, as originated 
 by God's Will, and as Objects for the Divine 
 Knower, but still preserving their initiative and 
 private consciousness. The Souls are not viewed 
 as co-eternal with God. Nor does Rashdall 
 follow M'Taggart * who holds to Reality as a 
 ' System ' of eternal souls without God. Rash- 
 dall maintains that the ' System ' requires a 
 Mind to know it. For him the Absolute consists 
 in God and the Selves who are present to the 
 divine Mind, but who have a beginning in time. 
 His system is incomplete ; but even as it stands 
 it is valuable as a vindication of the claims of 
 Personality. 
 
 1 Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, p. 60 ff. 
 
CHAPTEE VII. 
 
 PROFESSOK ANDREW SETH PRINGLE- 
 PATTISON. 
 
 Hitherto we have been dealing with authors 
 whose treatment of the Self has formed part of 
 a constructive system of metaphysics. Now we 
 turn to one whose works are well worthy of 
 study in connection with our Problem, not on 
 account of any system which he has propounded, 
 but because of his insistence upon certain truths 
 pertaining to this subject, in his expositions and 
 criticisms of various philosophical systems. In 
 this duty he has wielded a very important 
 influence upon recent thought, and has com- 
 mended his views to many minds by his vindi- 
 cation of certain basic principles of common- 
 sense and sound reason. Accordingly we have 
 here a different task. While running with the 
 hare we must hunt with the hounds. While 
 Professor Pringle-Pattison is criticizing others we 
 must seek to take stock of the critic himself. 
 
PROFESSOR A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON 131 
 
 Most of Pringle-Pattison's work has been 
 devoted to the Idealistic Philosophy of Germany 
 and England, since Kant. In this field he ranks 
 among the best living commentators, and for 
 this reason his criticisms of Modern Idealism 
 have had great weight. His epoch-making book, 
 Hegelianism and Personality, has probably tended 
 more than any other recent work, to shake the 
 foundations of the ' block universe ' of a rigid 
 Absolutism, and to quicken the recent growth 
 of philosophies of Personality. 1 In his other 
 writings 2 also we find able criticisms of con- 
 temporary tendencies. I shall endeavour in a 
 brief space to set forth his views upon our topic, 
 so far as they have been published. 
 
 In his criticisms of the doctrines of Kant and 
 the Neo-Kantians, especially Green, and of Hegel 
 and the Neo-Hegelians, notably Bradley, the 
 main outlines of Pringle-Pattison's standpoint 
 may be briefly represented as follows : — 
 
 1. He is hostile to every attempt to substitute 
 
 1 Hegelianism and Personality, Balfour Philosophical Lectures, 
 Second Edition ; Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1893. 
 
 2 The following will be sufficient for our purposes: Man's 
 Place in the Cosmos, and other Essays ; Blackwood, Edinburgh, 
 1897. Two Lectures on Theism delivered at Princeton, N.Y.; 
 Scribner, 1897. 
 
132 THE PKOBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 abstractions for real existence as given in our 
 immediate experience. The chief examples of 
 this error he finds in Hegel's transition from 
 Logic to Nature, 1 and in Bradley's sacrifice of 
 phenomena for the logic of abstract identity. 2 
 This attitude characterizes Pringle-Pattison's 
 whole position, and the next point is one among 
 many instances of his unwillingness to accept a 
 logic for a metaphysic. 
 
 2. The Self is real, our bed-rock of fact, our 
 foundation of Truth, and our highest category 
 of explanation. Unless we have this basic 
 affirmation of the real existence of the Self, we 
 cannot, in strictness, go on to positive state- 
 ments about the universe of Being at all. ' We 
 must touch reality somewhere ; otherwise our 
 whole construction is in the air.' 3 This given 
 element which is necessary must primarily be 
 correlated with the reality of our personal ex- 
 perience. For him, experience involves the 
 essential subject-object relation, and all exist- 
 ence ultimately depends upon the immediate 
 experience and the undeniable conviction of our 
 
 1 Hegelianism and Personality, pp. 110-13, 124-7. 
 * Man's Place in the Cosmos, pp. 155-160. 
 8 Hegelianism, etc. p. 124 ff. 
 
PROFESSOR A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON 133 
 
 own existence. Accordingly, Pringle-Pattison 
 vigorously criticizes Bradley's negative treat- 
 ment of the Self 1 which we have previously 
 dealt with, and maintains that the clue to his 
 mysterious transformation of existence into 
 ' appearance ' is to be found in his polemic 
 against the Self, which is our saving instance, 
 and living experience, of unity in diversity. We 
 need not follow this argument any further after 
 what has been said in our Chapter on Mr. Bradley. 
 3. Pringle-Pattison regards the Self as mani- 
 festing its reality in its activity, with the feeling 
 that accompanies it, as well as in thought. 
 Accordingly his version of Descartes' formula 
 would be not cogito, but ago ergo sum. The 
 phenomenalistic theories of Will, such as Pro- 
 fessor Miinsterberg's, 2 seem to Pringle-Pattison 
 to leave out the essential element of ' feeling- 
 directed activity ' as distinct from the content 
 with which it deals. 3 The act of attention is 
 itself an act of Will. He joins with Professor 
 James Ward in maintaining that no pheno- 
 menalistic account can give a true theory of 
 
 1 Man's Place, etc. p. 160 ff. 
 
 2 Die Willenshandlung, Hugo Miinsterberg, 1888. 
 
 3 Man's Place, etc. p. 99 ff. 
 
134 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 Will, for Will essentially implies the self-activity 
 of a unitary conscious being. 1 However, it is 
 sufficient to say that for Pringle-Pattison a 
 better assurance of the Self's reality than that 
 given by knowledge is imparted by the Will, 
 which in its purposive activity refuses to be 
 dissolved away into a passing succession of 
 phenomena. So while thought, feeling, and will 
 are not separable from the Self, yet it is the self- 
 existence implied most clearly in the felt activity 
 of the Subject that we must give as a reason 
 of the conviction that is in us. 2 This is borne 
 out by considering the voluntaristic basis of all 
 mental life, including thought, to which theory 
 Pringle-Pattison inclines. 3 
 
 4. Perhaps the most prominent feature in our 
 author's critical work is his polemic against the 
 doctrine of a Universal Self or Self-consciousness 
 which thinks in all of us. This is his central 
 objection to Hegelianism and Neo-Kantianism. 
 He claims that such a view is destructive to the 
 Personality of man and of God. Green's Spiritual 
 
 1 Professor Munsterberg replies that he does not profess to 
 give an account of the true Will, which belongs to Life, to the 
 world of appreciation, not to descriptive psychology, Psych. 
 Review, 1898, p. 640. 
 
 2 Cf. Two Lectures on Theism, p. 46. 3 Man's Place, etc. pp. 123- 5. 
 
PROFESSOR A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON 135 
 
 Principle 1 he regards as a mere extension of Kant's 
 Transcendental Unity of Self-consciousness to 
 the place of Absolute or Universal Self-con- 
 sciousness, constituting the universe of relations, 
 our knowledge of it, and the source of morality. 2 
 We are reproductions of this eternal Spirit, 
 which uses as its vehicle in time our bodily 
 organisms. Pringle-Pattison regards this as an 
 extension which Kant would have repudiated ; 
 and — what is far more important — a doctrine 
 which denies true Personality, to both God and 
 man. The merely formal principle of conscious- 
 ness-in-general is very different from the Uni- 
 versal Consciousness. The former is based upon 
 an abstraction from the actual human Selves — 
 the latter is supposed to be endowed with Per- 
 sonality unto perfection. He regards this as 
 akin to the hypostasization of universals — which 
 thus include individuals as accidents — by the 
 Scholastic Realists. It is the method, however, 
 of epistemology, which is particularly obnoxious 
 to Pringle-Pattison ; for questions of ontology 
 must be settled by a metaphysic of real exist- 
 
 1 Prolegomena to Ethics, T. H. Green, Oxford, Chap. I. p. 15 ff. 
 Fourth Edition, 1899. 
 
 2 Sidgwick denies this — mistakenly, in my opinion. 
 
136 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 ence. In short, his attitude of hostility towards 
 the ' Ontological Proof ' of Theism is manifest 
 throughout his works, and may be the briefest 
 way of expressing his aversion to all forms of 
 conceptualism which hypostasize abstractions 
 and then convert an identity of type into a 
 numerical existence. 1 He finds in Hegel, and 
 Fichte — in his later works — the tendency which 
 has been criticized in the case of Green. De- 
 spite the most valuable emphasis placed by 
 Hegel upon self-consciousness as the highest 
 manifestation of reality, he finds that in regard 
 to both the Absolute Idea and the human Self, 
 the Hegelians of the Left were nearer the logical 
 truth in their interpretation, than were those 
 who advocated Personality and defended the 
 harmony of their master's thought with Chris- 
 tianity. The same is true of Neo-Hegelianism, 
 with its universal Self that thinks in all of us. 
 Such a ' Self ' is devoid of all true Personality, 
 and it deprives us also of our inheritance. It 
 is opposed to our own assurance of ' impervious- 
 ness ' as individual Selves. ' I have a centre 
 of my own — a will of my own — which no one 
 shares with me or can share — a centre which 
 
 1 Hegelianism, etc. pp. 69, 124. 
 
 i 
 
PROFESSOR A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON 137 
 
 I maintain even in my dealings with God Him- 
 self.' x Religion requires this, and so its testi- 
 mony is against such identification of the human 
 and divine Self. Morality protests also. Ex- 
 perience, and even a true metaphysic of know- 
 ledge will have none of it. At the same time, 
 the Personality of God must be advocated, if 
 we are to be faithful to our highest category. 
 With this position stand human worth and 
 immortality, as against a universal consciousness 
 which denies both. And without Personality 
 Idealism strictly speaking ceases, for all ideals 
 are bound up with the person, including intel- 
 ligibility, the inspiration of philosophy. 
 
 n. 
 The value of this work of Pringle-Pattison is 
 seen in the light of our previous survey. Be- 
 tween Radical Empiricists like James, and 
 Humanists like Schiller, on the one hand, and 
 Absolute Idealists like Green, Bradley and 
 Royce on the other, he stands midway. Rash- 
 dall is close beside him, and Howison has many 
 points of affinity, except for his Pluralism, 
 which Pringle-Pattison will not accept. But 
 
 1 Ibid. p. 228. 
 
138 THE PROBLEM OE PERSONALITY 
 
 what is his solution of these difficulties ? It is 
 not given. He falls back upon a reverent 
 agnosticism — reasonable enough, no doubt — in 
 regard to the Absolute. Religion, morality, and 
 poetry can teach us more on these ultimate 
 matters than philosophy ; and a revelation of 
 the Absolute is ever given us in our experience. 1 
 At the same time he repudiates the historical 
 Agnosticism of an earlier decade. But philo- 
 sophy cannot rest in either of these attitudes. 
 While we can never know Reality as it is for 
 the Absolute, as Pringle-Pattison truly says, yet 
 we can try to reach a better conception than 
 that which merely affirms Monism and yet insists 
 upon the sacred privacy of our Personality. 
 The problem is hard, but our calling is high 
 as lovers of truth, and we must, as William 
 James said, refrain from adopting as our motto, 
 ' hypotheses non jingo' until the end is in sight. 
 So Pringle-Pattison apparently gives no posi- 
 tive system. He does not furnish a clear doc- 
 trine of the Self, in whose reality and importance 
 he so strongly believes. 2 Nor does he clear up 
 
 1 Theism, p. 57. 
 
 2 Professor Dewey criticizes his use of the term Self in Hegelian- 
 ism and Personality as ambiguous. Mind, xv. p. 58. 
 
 y 
 
PROFESSOR A. S. PRINGLE-PATTLSON 139 
 
 the ambiguity and confusion of terms connected 
 with Personality. He does not definitely state 
 his theory of God and the Absolute, nor the 
 extent of his objection to an Absolute Self, 
 when reached by a line of argument different 
 from those which he condemns as epistemo- 
 logical, merely logical or abstract. His view of 
 time as ultimate is near to common-sense, but 
 by no means free from difficulties. 
 
 At the same time it must be acknowledged 
 that Pringle-Pattison has given the greatest pos- 
 sible stimulus towards the formulation of a 
 revised philosophy of common-sense. The pre- 
 sent tendencies are largely the outcome of his 
 strong and sound work in metaphysics, and the 
 Scottish philosophy is in safe keeping while 
 following the lines of scholarly exposition and 
 criticism. His insistence upon the rights of 
 Reality in life and experience, as against abstract 
 generalities, is vitally related to the growth of 
 such systems as those of William James, Bergson, 
 and James Ward. The place of Personality in 
 present-day philosophy has been made secure 
 by just such critical work as this. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 LATER TENDENCIES. 
 
 The valuable movement of reaction which has 
 set in recently against a hard and fast Abso- 
 lutism, in favour of life and experience, chiefly 
 through the medium of James and Schiller in 
 their own respective ways, probably dates from 
 Pringle-Pattison's attack on Hegelianism and 
 his plea for Personality. This is a fitting place 
 therefore to add a very brief survey of present 
 tendencies in regard to the Self. 
 
 We see that those who deny the Self a reality 
 of its own are drawn from different schools of 
 thought. The ' Pure Experience ' Philosophy, 
 or the ' Immanence Movement,' closely allied to 
 a form of Realism, has grown from such views 
 as those of Avenarius, 1 Mach, Petzoldt, 2 on the 
 Continent, S. H. Hodgson, G. E. Moore, and 
 
 1 Der Menschliche Weltbegriff. 
 
 2 Die Philosophie der Reinen Erfahrung. 
 
LATER TENDENCIES HI 
 
 the Cambridge School in England, William 
 James in his ' Eadical Empiricism,' Dr. R. B. 
 Perry, Dr. E. B. Holt, and others in America. 
 These seek to approach the Self and Personality, 
 and even Consciousness, from a universal point 
 of view, called ' pure experience ' ; and end by 
 practically denying to them any veritable reality. 
 Consciousness is but a selection of objects from 
 the world of ' experience.' On the other hand, 
 we have Mr. F. H. Bradley and his disciple, 
 Professor A. E. Taylor, on the side of Absolute 
 Idealism, viewing the Self negatively, as com- 
 pared with ' experience ' also. Hence my thesis 
 against this vague use of experience so preva- 
 lent to-day. Royce is capable of being classified 
 with these, when we treat the existential aspect 
 of reality as important, as I do here. A. E. 
 Taylor's doctrine of the Self is set down in his 
 recent book. 1 It presents a union of the negative 
 views of Bradley, Royce and James compressed 
 into one clearly written chapter. The social 
 side is very prominent in his interpretation of 
 experience to the detriment of all real selfhood. 
 The attacks of Mr. Taylor upon the idea, concept, 
 or even consciousness of Self do not disprove the 
 
 1 Elements of Metaphysics, 1904, Book iv. Chap. III. p. 335. 
 
142 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 Reality of the Self as the essential factor in all 
 experience, except upon the basis that Reality 
 is reducible to ideas, — a position which is dis- 
 missed by the whole anti-intellectual school of 
 to-day. 
 
 Professor Hugo Miinsterberg views the psychi- 
 cal and physical as constructions by the Will, that 
 takes attitudes, and is itself in the realm of life, 
 of values, of Reality ; this Personality, however, 
 is but a part in the supra-temporal Reality 
 which is constituted by Values. 1 
 
 On the other hand, we have many advocates 
 of the Self, such as the Oxford Personal Idealists, 
 including Professor G. F. Stout, Dr. Rashdall, 
 W. R. Boyce Gibson (now of Melbourne, Aus- 
 tralia), G. E. Underhill and H. Sturt ; in addition 
 to F. C. S. Schiller, who has now come out as 
 a Humanist. Then Professors Pringle-Pattison, 
 James Ward, Sully, Bakewell, Ladd, G.. H. 
 Palmer, C. M. Tyler, J. Le Conte, Howison, and 
 the late Thomas Davidson and Borden P. Bowne, 
 defend Personality, and make it prominent in 
 
 1 Professor Munsterberg's main works in English are Psychology 
 and Life and The Eternal Values (1909). His principal work in 
 German is his Grundziige der Psychologie. His emphasis upon 
 Will places him in considerable affinity with philosophies of 
 Personality. 
 
LATER TENDENCIES 143 
 
 their views, the three last-named building their 
 metaphysical systems upon Personality as an 
 ethical concept. Thomas Davidson held to a 
 Personalistic Pluralism of a very individualistic 
 type, — he called it Apeirothism — in which the 
 human Egos are themselves sufficient to con- 
 stitute the world of reality. Professors Dewey 
 and Baldwin would perhaps belong to the main 
 group of believers in the Self, although they are 
 more difficult to classify. Charles Renouvier 
 recently published his system under the title of 
 Le Personnalisme, in which the doctrines of 
 Absolutism and Infinity are opposed, and an 
 empirical theory is held. 
 
 A mighty contribution to the psychological 
 and metaphysical treatment of the subject is 
 furnished by Dr. Wm. M'Dougall of Oxford in 
 his book on Body and Mind. 1 His patient exami- 
 nation of the animistic hypothesis in the light 
 of physiology and the mechanistic tendencies of 
 present-day science is worthy of all praise. 
 After giving full value to the hostile views, Dr. 
 M'Dougall gives conclusive reasons for preferring 
 the old belief in the soul as an entity to the 
 
 1 Body and Mind, A History and Defence of Animism (Methuen, 
 1911). 
 
144 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 pseudo-scientific hypotheses of a materialistic 
 or empirical kind. 
 
 The works of Bergson and of Eucken on the 
 Continent have provided recent philosophy with 
 much material for fresh advances, but in neither 
 instance has an explicit doctrine of the Self been 
 as yet fully formulated. Bergson certainly holds 
 to the reality of conscious life with the efficacy 
 which we associate with will. 
 
 Bergson's Philosophy of Change expresses a 
 revolt against concepts and the construction of 
 Reality by means of the intellect. Deeper lies 
 the stream of Reality, which is consciousness in 
 ceaseless, creative activity. Reality is to be 
 apprehended by Intuition rather than by Intel- 
 lect. This stream of consciousness, with which 
 Duration is identified, is more than the indi- 
 vidual experiences. Hence for Bergson, per- 
 sonalities are but means to the end of supra- 
 ' personal spirit. We await further light from 
 this inspiring thinker regarding the Problem of 
 Personality. Meanwhile, it appears that he has 
 not provided in his Monistic Activism, as we 
 may call his system, for the rights and reality of 
 the Personal Will. 
 
 Eucken provides a spiritual interpretation of 
 
LATER TENDENCIES 145 
 
 life, society and history, based upon a union 
 of idealism and activism ; but does not the 
 student of Eucken look in vain for a satisfying 
 dialectic, a critical philosophy of conscious- 
 ness ? One is constantly in the world of 
 values while in the company of this stimu- 
 lating German thinker, but there is no cogent 
 answer given to the questions that rise regarding 
 the reality of the distinctions which mark off 
 God, man and the world. 
 
 It is not too much to say, however, that Berg- 
 son and Eucken have rendered invaluable service 
 to the cause of religion, ethics and philosophy 
 by their strong vindication of life as against 
 mere conceptualism. Whether the Intuitive 
 method of Bergson or the Interpretative method 
 of Eucken afford us an alternative pathway to 
 Reality, better than that of rational investi- 
 gation and induction, is a question too large 
 for discussion here, but the insistence of both 
 these thinkers upon the final reality of conscious 
 life and Personality, in some sense or other, 
 expresses the genuine conviction of all who 
 base reflection upon life, and concepts upon 
 experience. 
 
 As to the Divine Personality, except for the 
 
 K 
 
146 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 ' Supra-Personal ' Absolute of Bradley and Taylor 
 most of the leading thinkers of to-day hold that 
 the reasonable attitude to take towards the 
 nature of the highest Being, whether regarded 
 as the Absolute, or pluralistically, is to postulate 
 Personality in some form or other. The problem 
 of the relation of the Absolute to human Per- 
 sonality divides Bradley, Royce, Taylor, and, — 
 according to Pringle-Pattison — all Neo-Hegelians, 
 such as Green, the Cairds and Watson — from 
 the champions of human Personality, such as 
 Howison, Davidson, Rashdall, Schiller, Bergson, 
 Eucken, and others, including Pringle-Pattison 
 himself. Royce, at any rate, comes nearer to 
 providing for a solution of the problem from the 
 Absolutist's side than do the others. If we can 
 accept his view of the Self as satisfactory, Royce 
 is certainly a defender of the use of the concept. 
 James seemed to be anxious to regard Personality 
 most favourably, but the psychological * passing 
 Thought ' is accepted by him ; and the Pure 
 Experience theory of his Radical Empiricism has 
 to be accommodated. Other tendencies are 
 summed up in the Panpsychism of Fechner, 
 Paulsen, and C. A. Strong. 
 That there is much confusion current upon 
 
LATER TENDENCIES 147 
 
 the question of the Self is plain. It is partly 
 due, I believe, to the exclusion of the Self from 
 much of the ' new ' physiological psychology ; 
 partly to the hesitation of metaphysicians as to 
 the treatment of the empirical side of the Self ; 
 partly to the intellectualistic bias of science and 
 philosophy which waits for definitions before 
 acknowledging reality in life or spirit ; — and 
 chiefly to the vagueness of the concept of Ex- 
 perience, which has to play the most important 
 role in the majority of prevalent systems of 
 philosophy. But over and above all, it is evident 
 that the tendency is very strong to restore Per- 
 sonality and Life to their place as fundamental 
 to a theory of Reality. 
 
PART II. 
 CONSTRUCTIVE. 
 
CHAPTEE I. 
 
 EXPERIENCE AS A METAPHYSICAL 
 CONCEPT. 
 
 If there is one concept about which it would 
 seem that philosophers are agreed, it is surely 
 that of Experience. For it is in all the systems 
 of metaphysicians, the great and the small. 
 One has only to gasp out ' Experience ' to pass 
 the sentinels of philosophical orthodoxy ; and 
 the constant repetition of the password seems 
 to have a value which has long ago been recog- 
 nized outside of the ranks of the mystics. ' Ex- 
 perience ' is thrust forward by every one as a 
 guarantee of intelligence and good faith. It is 
 pronounced with great unction as the starting- 
 point of all extant systems, — not excluding the 
 Transcendentalists. The announcement is re- 
 ceived with nodding heads and smiles of approval 
 by the circle of philosophers and critics. So 
 long as the tyro in philosophy adheres to 
 
152 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 experience and ' rings the changes ' on ideas, and 
 things, and what not, as ' experience,' there is 
 no obvious reason why he should not draw an 
 admiring crowd. The only apparent check to 
 his career would arise if some one inquired as 
 to the significance of the term. The rude 
 question, What do you mean by it ? might 
 suggest a dim world of realities lying beneath 
 the fog that has settled so heavily upon philo- 
 sophy. It might then and there appear that 
 the very widespread use of this concept should 
 itself cause uneasiness. Popularity does not 
 conduce to definition. It might also occur that 
 in spite of this agreement as to premises by very 
 diverse schools of thought, the conclusions are 
 as wide asunder as the poles. Surely what has 
 happened is this : the several schools have 
 taken everything for granted, have, in fact, 
 ' begged ' the universe, with the most compre- 
 hensive term in existence ; and have then pro- 
 ceeded to develop some one or more of the 
 multitude of distinctions which palpably lie 
 within experience. 
 
 Like a great snowstorm, this vague concept 
 has buried beneath a colourless and uniform 
 surface the various grades of reality, and the 
 
EXPERIENCE AS A CONCEPT 153 
 
 chief problems of philosophy. But the much- 
 needed thaw that can restore the vanished 
 world to light has already begun. Schiller has 
 insisted upon the questions which cause such 
 concern to the Absolutists like Bradley, and to 
 the ' Pure Experience,' and Kealistic School, — 
 ' Whose experience is it ; and of what is it the 
 experience ? ' Ward has ably maintained 2 that 
 this concept conceals the duality of subject and 
 object implied in experience. And the fore- 
 going criticisms of Part I., on James and Bradley 
 in particular, have already made manifest the 
 error and ambiguity latent in this term, the 
 contradictions of which are really worked out 
 into such divergent results. The unanimity of 
 a Kant, a Mill, a Bradley, a James ; of Idealist, 
 Mystic, and Eealist ; of Absolutist, Pluralist, 
 and Radical Empiricist in adopting Experience 
 as the starting-point is not really an evidence 
 of the value of the concept as used ; but it is 
 rather an incentive to the critic to point out the 
 
 1 Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. ii. p. 131 et passim. Dr. 
 Ward's new book, The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism 
 (1912) gives an impressive presentation of Idealism with special 
 reference to the category of Personality. I take this opportunity 
 of expressing many obligations to this thinker for the clarifying 
 influence of his works upon the problems connected with this 
 subject. 
 
154 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 vagueness and ambiguity of the term, and to see 
 in it one cause of the present-day confusion in 
 metaphysics. 
 
 This is most marked in the case of the Self, 
 which is the chief victim in this usage. It has 
 ever been the most difficult concept for meta- 
 physics, and the most recalcitrant fact for 
 science. The concept of experience is a ' neutral 
 and non-committal term,' as William James 
 said ; and so it seems to offer an opportunity 
 of constructing a system free from the embar- 
 rassment of a Self. 
 
 (1) But one of my main theses has been to 
 contend that Experience essentially implies the 
 Subject of experience, and that apart from such 
 a reference, it has no meaning. It is erroneous 
 to identify the objects in the ' stream of con- 
 sciousness ' with * experiences ' which become 
 thereby capable of personal activity. Yet the 
 term does not give us the shock that ' entities,' 
 or ' things,' or even ' ideas ' would. We noted 
 this incongruity in James' Radical Empiricism, 
 where ' experiences report themselves to one 
 another ' ! I maintain that there is a change 
 of meaning here from that which Experience 
 bears as the states of a conscious Subject, to 
 
EXPERIENCE AS A CONCEPT 155 
 
 that of a mere portion of the stream of objects 
 when treated as unref erred to a Subject. 1 
 
 (2) In addition to this error, the hidden 
 duality of the concept really carries with it a 
 reference to the Self which is supposed to be 
 explained, or even explained away, by it. The 
 substitution of universal experience for that of 
 finite Selves is really meaningless, unless the 
 self-reference which experience implies, can be 
 fastened upon some Self. To fix it upon the 
 Absolute Self is not the first, but the last step 
 in metaphysics. Or again, to make all things 
 conscious is either a gratuitous assumption, or 
 else should come at the close of a Panpsychistic 
 course of reasoning. Hence the unfitness of 
 Experience without qualification to be a starting- 
 point in a metaphysic is plain. It is either used 
 uncritically ; or else it presupposes the whole 
 theory constructed upon it. And in either case 
 we have error and fallacy. 
 
 (3) The genuine problems of experience — in 
 the true sense as implying Subjects of experience 
 — are not solved by adopting a merely universal 
 point of view, apart altogether from the erroneous 
 use of the term. The problems of the relation 
 
 1 Cf. Ward, Art. ' Psychology,' Ency. Britt. (9), vol. xx. p. 39. 
 
156 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 of Subject and Object, of Self and the World, 
 of Self and Self, of Self and God, persist, and 
 demand solution as the outstanding questions 
 for any theory that claims to be ultimate. But 
 these are the very problems supposed to be solved 
 by adopting the starting-point of Experience! 
 How gratuitous that assurance is becomes evident 
 upon examination. 
 
 (4) A breach with genuine reality is made by 
 ignoring the condition of knowledge, and the 
 pre-supposition of experience. The most im- 
 portant factor is left out of account, that which 
 makes the series of presentations into a unity, 
 and which renders knowledge and rational 
 activity possible. In the emotional and voli- 
 tional processes this element is even more 
 obvious. The centre of susceptibility and the 
 agent of purposes which are conceived intel- 
 lectually also by the same Subject, are not to 
 be labelled with the same term as the objects 
 which exist for the Subject. This ignoring of 
 the prime factors in experience is equivalent to 
 turning our backs upon our citadel of reality. 1 
 
 1 The Will is the great divider and judge of systems of Monism. 
 Perhaps the chief value and final impressiveness of systems of 
 Voluntarism and Activism, for instance, as given in such diverse 
 forms as by Fichte, Schopenhauer, Miinsterberg, Bergson, and 
 
EXPERIENCE AS A CONCEPT 157 
 
 (5) The patent distinction between my ex- 
 perience and the experience of others is not 
 provided for in this method. A fact, e.g. a 
 pain, has to be reported to be known. But it 
 is not the genuine fact which is reported, and 
 multitudes of other facts never get reported ! 
 And yet, who can deny that they are genuine 
 experiences for me ? In a word, this notion 
 of experience as an absolute, universal and 
 impersonal medium is altogether false to ex- 
 perience in the true sense of the word. And 
 observe the ambiguity in the term. It is high 
 time to stand by immediate experience against 
 the assumptions of a 'priori systems of philo- 
 sophy. And that ' stand ' must begin, as Ward, 
 Pringle-Pattison, and Schiller have maintained, 
 with the bed-rock of reality, our own existence 
 as conscious Selves. 
 
 (6) The making of a class of ' special diffi- 
 culties ' in works of Psychology and Metaphysics, 
 of our most intimate, real and significant 
 experiences, is itself an indication of the fallacy 
 of the method of ' experience ' as ' pure ' or 
 
 Eucken, are to be found in the fact of the indubitable reality of 
 Will as an experience, and as efficacious in disturbing the flow 
 of intellectual presentations of objects. 
 
158 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 ' transcendental.' I refer to feeling, volition and 
 the higher processes of mind. That any doubt 
 should arise as to the central place of these funda- 
 mental facts in a theory of reality is an instance 
 of the inadequacy and futility of the whole 
 method. It is false to epistemology, to meta- 
 physics, and to life. 
 
 (7) The ambiguities of the term ' experience ' 
 may be further brought out by considering some 
 of its meanings. 
 
 (a) Originally, a trial or experiment by someone. 
 
 (b) A striking event or series of events in the 
 life of a person. 
 
 (c) The content of consciousness, the stream of 
 objects as present to the Subject, or Subjects, 
 whose experience it is. This is the correct 
 meaning in my opinion. 
 
 (d) The series of all possible conscious facts, 
 including among them the Self or Subject, and 
 even the hypothetical ' Pure Ego.' This use is 
 misleading. 
 
 (e) The ' things,' colours, motions, causes, and 
 so forth, belonging to the world at large ; and 
 all thoughts, feelings, volitions, and the con- 
 sciousness of Selfhood so far as known. In fact, 
 anything and everything that can find a place 
 
EXPERIENCE AS A CONCEPT 159 
 
 in the ' universe of discourse ' is called by this 
 term, as equivalent to * actual and possible 
 experience,' with a singular and a plural. This 
 usage is vague and dangerous. 
 
 (/) Experience as something universal or 
 ' Pure,' cutting beneath the distinctions of Self 
 and the world ; only nominally distinguishable 
 from independent Being, in the Realistic sense. 
 This is perfectly fallacious. 
 
 (g) Absolute Experience, as Reality more tran- 
 scendental and idealistic than the previous usage. 
 Here the meaning of Experience may vary, as on 
 the lower plane ; but when used out of relation 
 to an Absolute Self or a plurality of Selves, it is 
 really quite meaningless. 
 
 (h) Experience in the phylogenetic sense, as 
 used by Evolutionists in opposition to a priori or 
 transcendental theories of origin or development. 
 
 In the face of these numerous varieties of 
 meaning, the term is hopelessly ambiguous, unless 
 qualified by the implication of Selfhood, as 
 stated in (c) above. As a starting-point in 
 Metaphysic the Concept is fraught with error 
 and confusion, and is liable to objection, 
 except as expressing what is implied in the 
 relationship of subject and object. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE MEANING OF PERSONALITY AND 
 RELATED CONCEPTS. 
 
 In the First Part we have had abundant evidence 
 of the criticisms directed against Personality for 
 the various meanings which may be attached to 
 it, and to the other terms expressive of diverse 
 phases of Selfhood. We have also seen for our- 
 selves the need of clearly distinguishing these 
 meanings. Accordingly we shall devote ourselves 
 to the following purposes in this Chapter : first, 
 to the examination of the concepts pertaining to 
 Personality, including the Not-Self as well as the 
 Self ; and then we shall proceed to the considera- 
 tion of some difficulties, or paradoxes, connected 
 with the Self. 
 
 A complete list of these related concepts would 
 include person, personality, individual, indi- 
 viduality, self, selfhood, consciousness, self-con- 
 sciousness, subject, soul, ego, spirit, mind, * I,' 
 
PERSONALITY— RELATED CONCEPTS 161 
 
 and the 'me'; also the correlatives, not-self, 
 object, non-ego, and not-me. Then there are 
 concepts in the form of phrases which have 
 become current, such as Kant's ' synthetic unity 
 of apperception,' or c transcendental unity of 
 self-consciousness,' the ' noumenal ' as distinct 
 from the - phenomenal ' ego, and the ' empirical 
 self ' ; the ' material,' the ' social ' and the 
 ' spiritual ' self, the ' stream of consciousness,' 
 and the ' Passing Thought,' employed by 
 William James ; the Personality of God ; the 
 ' Perfect Personality ' advocated by Lotze ; the 
 ' Absolute Self ' in Royce's system, and the 
 ' Absolute Experience ' in Bradley's, — and so on. 
 
 The mere mention of these current phrases is 
 all that is possible here. Most of them are 
 treated and made clear in the course of the 
 Thesis. From the first list we shall select the 
 principal terms for specification. 
 
 Let us start with the true basis of mental life, 
 as we have seen it in our discussion of the con- 
 cept of Experience. That resolves itself, as we 
 saw, into the relationship of Subject and Object. 
 Let us take this ground, and begin with the 
 Subject. We do not stop to ask now whether 
 we can distinguish the Subject by itself. Bradley 
 
162 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 we know suffers pangs at the bare suggestion of 
 such an abstraction, although he is more hardened 
 when dealing with experience. But that question 
 will recur in the next Chapter. Meanwhile, if 
 anyone has qualms similar to Bradley's, he can 
 display his mental agility by correlating the idea 
 of Object with that of Subject, while the latter 
 is under discussion. 
 
 The Subject signifies the one for whom any set 
 of experiences is, the centre to which various 
 objects are consciously present, and from which 
 they derive a special relationship to one another, 
 as facts of one felt whole. It is usually employed 
 to denote the knower as related to the known ; 
 but it may also imply the one who feels, who is 
 susceptible to pleasure and pain. It does not 
 generally signify, however, the one who is active, 
 who wills, who strives, who conceives, plans and 
 executes them. We may for the present speak, 
 in reference to this self-activity, of ' the Agent,' 
 or more simply, of Will. The Subject then has 
 primarily this epistemological and affective refer- 
 ence, and may be regarded as signifying the 
 knower, the experiencer, as distinct from the 
 objects known, and from the content of 
 experience. 
 
PERSONALITY— RELATED CONCEPTS 163 
 
 Now let us pass to the terms closely connected 
 with the Subject, yet possessed of important 
 shades of meaning. Such are ' I,' Ego, and 
 the Soul. Now we have the identity of the 
 Subject in time brought out, its character of 
 permanence through change, of unity in diver- 
 sity. This is not necessarily implied in the 
 Subject itself. It appears as the correlative of 
 the series of Objects which are essentially in 
 time, and as such does not express the character 
 of identity, which, whether philosophically accept- 
 able or not, is at least the postulate of reflective 
 common-sense, and as such is sufficient for our 
 present purpose, viz. the determination of mean- 
 ings. The philosophical question of identity will 
 come up later. But there is another change . 
 made by the terms ' I ' and ' Ego.' Now the 
 recognition of the agent in volition is brought 
 in ; the pale fact of mere subjectivity is trans- 
 formed by the organic presence of Will. The 
 terms ' I ' and Ego express a unitary conscious v 
 Subject which is also active, as the Agent. The 
 Soul signifies the Ego as a permanent entity cv 
 or Substance which endures through all the 
 temporal manifestations, and is related to 
 the affective, emotional and moral aspects of 
 
164 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 experience rather than to the side of volition. 
 Spirit is closely allied to the Soul, in antithesis 
 to the bodily and material, and as inclusive of 
 self-activity. Mind is used to denote the Subject 
 as Thinker, plus the objects of thought. Simi- 
 larly the concept of the Self in metaphysics 
 involves the relation of Subject and Object, not 
 in intellectual terms merely, as is the case with 
 the Mind, but in the organic totality of feeling 
 and will. While this relation is present in the 
 constitution of the Self, however, a distinction 
 is made upon the objective side between what 
 is Self and what is Not-Self. I will return to 
 this presently. 
 
 The medium of awareness, in which experience, 
 so to speak, comes to light, is Consciousness, 
 and in Self-consciousness there is a recognition 
 of the rational, constitutive and moral part per- 
 formed by the Self in our highest experiences. 1 
 The positively social and ethical character of 
 Selfhood is expressed by the concept of the 
 
 1 Abnormal forms of self- consciousness which are related to 
 moral or pathological conditions, usually in a more or less morbid 
 way, are not included in this treatment of Self- consciousness. 
 Recent advocates of Realism are apt to lay undue stress upon 
 this aspect, as vitiating the Idealistic claims of Self- consciousness. 
 It is perhaps advisable to point out that all morbid forms of 
 Self-feeling are distinct from the rational Self- consciousness. 
 
PERSONALITY— RELATED CONCEPTS 165 
 
 Person. 1 Although in popular usage the Self is 
 employed in this sense, it is much better in 
 Metaphysics to confine that concept to the 
 meaning given above. Individuality expresses 
 the aspect of uniqueness in the various Selves, 
 as Persons. And Personality includes all the 
 foregoing meanings of Ego, Self, Individual and 
 Person, with the full circle of relationships to 
 other Selves, the world and God. Moral char- 
 acter, rights and duties are provided for by 
 this concept. ^Esthetic, social, intellectual and 
 religious ideals are the portion of man as the 
 possessor of Personality. But God is regarded 
 as the Source and Inspiration of all such aspira- 
 tions, and is the Ideal and Perfect Personality. 
 In regard to the Object which is in relation 
 to the Subject, we may distinguish between the 
 Non-Ego and the Not-Self. The Non-Ego is 
 equivalent to the ' Me,' that is, the empirical 
 content of the consciousness of Self ; but it may 
 
 1 The Theological usage of ' Person ' in the doctrine of the 
 Trinity is quite distinctive, and is associated with historical 
 and metaphysical considerations which, if fully treated, would 
 lead us into another region than that contemplated in the present 
 work. The Legal connotation of Person, to which some writers 
 have given special prominence (as William Temple, in his Nature 
 of Personality, 1911), is but one among many of the aspects of 
 social value, which belong to Personality. 
 
166 THE PKOBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 be distinguished from the Not-Self, or the Not-Me, 
 by which we signify that which is distinct and 
 separable from the Self. The Not-Self is a part 
 of the objective series, which is marked off on 
 the basis of the Will. Certain presentations are 
 capable of being dissociated as unnecessary to our 
 immediate consciousness. They are branded as 
 the Not-Self. The limit of the body is a fair 
 indication of the demarcation ; but it is a mis- 
 take to take it as an absolute test, or as the 
 explanation, of the Not-Self, for certain psychical 
 processes may also be regarded as the Not-Self. 
 The Non-Ego, on the other hand, consists in the 
 states of consciousness, the processes in building 
 up our experience, which may be introspectively 
 presented and branded as not the Ego. The Self 
 V-as Subject-Object includes the Ego and the 
 Non-Ego, but not the content of experience 
 which has rightly been termed the Not-Self. 
 Yet it is quite misleading to separate the Not- 
 Self, as a part of experience, from the Subject 
 of experience. 
 
 We will now discuss very briefly some diffi- 
 culties and seeming paradoxes in connection with 
 the general question of Personality. The first — 
 Hegel's problem of ' negativity ' — arises from 
 
PERSONALITY— RELATED CONCEPTS 167 
 
 the effort to define the Self. Every such effort 
 involves the presentation of the Self as object, 
 and therefore it cannot be the true Self. So 
 Hegel, to characterize subjectivity, defined it as 
 the refusal to recognize the Self in any one 
 object. But that refusal itself is related to the 
 Self. Hence the Self must express itself in that 
 which is objective, and therefore not the Self. 
 The paradox is obvious. But our doctrine of 
 the Self does not seek for such a definition. 
 Verily the paradox is the outcome of seeking to 
 present existence in the forms of logic, which 
 we have had occasion to criticize in the First 
 Part. And in our view of the Self the place 
 of the Subject is assured ; while in all attempts 
 to substitute definitions for genuine experience, 
 a breach with existence and reality is — as 
 Pringle-Pattison maintains * — inevitable. 
 
 A second difficulty is allied to the former one. 
 The essence of Selfhood is subjectivity and 
 particularity, and yet the striving and develop- 
 ment of the Self is toward objectivity and 
 universality. To be conscious of a limit implies 
 the transcendence of it. Our life, as Fichte felt 
 and taught, is one continual striving, longing 
 
 1 Supra, Chapter VII. 
 
168 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 and seeking. What constitutes selfhood thus 
 seems to be denied by rational selfhood. We 
 pursue the universal and objective. This diffi- 
 culty is really due to our taking the Self in one 
 aspect as existential — a limited subjective world 
 — and in the other as ethical — as a seeker after 
 ideals. The Subject-Object relation persists just 
 as much in the latter, as in the former case, if 
 we view them both as existences. And full of 
 meaning is the ethical aspect presented in this 
 seeming paradox. The transcendence of limits 
 may be said, with equal truth, to imply the 
 previous consciousness of those limits. 1 This 
 rendering of Personality is but an extension of 
 the truth that we must lose our life to find it. 
 
 Finally there is the paradox stated by Pro- 
 fessor Palmer in his Nature of Goodness. 2 In 
 the progress towards true Personality, how can 
 I really develop myself ? That would require 
 that ' I make myself ' ! Truly significant is the 
 distinction involved in this difficulty. From the 
 standpoint of the Self, as the Subject of certain 
 experiences, I am now as real a being as ever I 
 can be. But from the standpoint of values, I 
 
 1 Cf. Art. ' Cartesianism,' Edward Caird, Ency. Britt. 9th Edit. 
 
 2 Chapter V. on Self- Development. 
 
PEESONALITY— RELATED CONCEPTS 169 
 
 am not yet my true Personality. These are 
 insuperable paradoxes only to those who deny 
 the right of the Self to exist apart from the 
 Ideal Ego ; or, on the other hand, to those who 
 fail to recognize the valid place of ideals and 
 their significance in Reality. For the difficulty 
 expresses twin truths, which must not be con- 
 fused, but which, in a complete view, are ' never 
 to be sundered without tears.' 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 THE REALITY OF SELF. 
 
 In the present chapter I shall defend the thesis 
 that the Self is real, and the true basis for any 
 theory of Reality. In this part of the discussion 
 I am not using Reality in any absolute or final 
 sense, but as implying genuine being, or real 
 existence. What Reality may be in the last 
 analysis is a problem which will come up later. 
 Our previous discussions have cleared the 
 ground, and now we may get our material 
 together and begin to build. We have seen 
 that Experience is unfitted to serve as a starting- 
 point in metaphysics. It is a vague and am- 
 biguous concept. It is too wide. It cannot 
 serve as a criterion for reality, because every- 
 thing shares in the universal promotion. But 
 when Experience is taken in connection with 
 the Subject of experience, we are nearer the 
 truth. It is natural to go a step further and 
 
THE REALITY OF SELF 171 
 
 ask — what if this Self as Subject in relation to 
 Object be our criterion of reality ? Is not the 
 reverse contention an impossible position ? The 
 very denial of the Self implies the affirmation. 
 There can be no surer test of reality than that. 
 And all experience, thought, and reasoning 
 imply the reality of the Subject or Knower. 
 There is not a theory of knowledge which does 
 not implicitly depend upon the reality of the 
 Self. We have noted how Pragmatism and 
 i Humanism are forced to throw the whole burden 
 of proof upon the Self's reality, whose satisfaction 
 is the key to what is accepted as truth. All 
 theories of knowledge as ' practical value ' have 
 the same axiomatic — and therefore often ne- 
 glected — basis. Even the Rationalistic theories 
 imply the cogito in which Descartes, himself a 
 Rationalist, detected the prime certainty of the 
 Self's reality. But we do not need to stay upon 
 the narrow track that has been worn by the 
 feet of the Rationalists. The universe is ours ; 
 abundance of life is ours ; the experiences of 
 emotion, activity, imagination, memory, aspira- 
 tion and purpose, as well as thought, are all 
 ours ! Why should we narrow our world to a 
 mere cogito ? Such a limitation was the source 
 
172 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 of Kant's refinements of the Self. Feeling and 
 will give evidence of stronger convictions than 
 thought, and furnish many infallible proofs. 
 
 In short, the reality of Self cannot be denied 
 without at the same time being affirmed. It 
 is implied in every theory of reality, and forms 
 the secret source of whatever plausibility such 
 a theory may have. It is not proved merely 
 from the side of thought ; it is also felt and 
 realized in our pursuit of ends, and in the execu- 
 tion of our purposes. In addition to these very 
 cogent considerations, we have the metaphysical 
 necessity that if we cannot trust the reality of 
 ourselves, then we are in the darkness of agnos- 
 ticism, and the deep darkness of scepticism. And 
 further, it is evident that if there be no such 
 reality as ourself, then there is no link between 
 the mere constructions of a world in thought on 
 the one side, — perhaps as arbitrary as the 'moves' 
 allotted to the various pieces in chess — and, on 
 the other, the world of genuine existence and 
 experience with which we have actually to deal. 
 
 Bradley admits off-hand that the Self is of 
 course a fact in some sense and to some extent, 
 but the question is, how ? * He never seems 
 
 1 Appearance, etc. p. 103. 
 
THE REALITY OF SELF 173 
 
 very concerned about the positive problem. 
 He shares with Cleon the glory of an accomplish- 
 ment in which philosophers have been somewhat 
 proficient, — 
 
 1 And I have written three books on the soul, 
 Proving absurd all written hitherto, 
 And putting us to ignorance again.' x 
 
 We saw, however, that he could not really dis- 
 pose of two meanings of Self, viz. the Essential 
 Self as feeling, and the Self as the Subject in 
 relation to the Object. 2 Now these are precisely 
 the two meanings most accordant with our view 
 of the Self. Accordingly we may proceed with 
 fuller confidence to our constructive exposition. 
 
 What is here meant by the Self will become 
 clearer upon closer examination. When it is 
 said that the essential relation of Subject and 
 Object precludes us from treating of the Subject 
 in itself, I demur. Such a complete prohibition 
 of all distinctions would destroy all knowledge. 
 We would be unable to speak of anything at all 
 as distinct from the whole system of relations ; 
 that is, we would need to keep absolute silence. 
 We may certainly distinguish, but not separate, 
 
 1 The Poetical Works of Robert Browning, vol. i. p. 542. 
 
 2 Supra, Part I., Chapter II. 
 
174 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 the Subject from the Object. This is all I 
 desire to do in bringing out what is implied in 
 the Self, as Subject. 
 
 (1) Consider then, in the first place, the 
 different plane occupied by the Subject to that 
 which is occupied by the Object. Further light 
 will come by reflecting that the ' Object ' of 
 which we speak, in relation to the Subject, 
 denotes nothing in particular, while the Subject 
 does. The objective side of inner life may 
 contain any kind of presentation, from the 
 perception of a varied landscape to the thought 
 of oneself! In this way then the Subject is 
 the one centre of a shifting circumference, in 
 addition to its being the condition of the ex- 
 perience of such a world of objects, as I have 
 previously shown. 
 
 1 1 am a part of all that I have met ; 
 Yet all experience is an arch wherethro , 
 Gleams that untravell'd world, whose margin fades 
 For ever and for ever when I move.' 1 
 
 (2) But secondly, this one Subject is also 
 realized to be the same ' I ' as that which feels, 
 and that which wills. Hence the Subject is 
 already consolidated by fusing with the centre 
 
 1 Tennyson's * Ulysses,' Works, etc. p. 95. 
 
THE REALITY OF SELF 175 
 
 of all our experiences. The old ' faculty ' psycho- 
 logy has been abolished ; all subjective pheno- 
 mena are now seen to be related to the Self as 
 a unitary being. But, behold, no sooner is this 
 position accepted than we have threats of 
 execution of the Self, as a caput mortuum of 
 metaphysics ! And we hear of ' psychology 
 without a Self ' ! Well, our concern is not with 
 psychology here ; but it seems the height of 
 perversity to repudiate faculties, and then deal 
 treacherously with the conscious unity which 
 must take their place. 
 
 (3) Now thirdly, this Self must be identical ; 
 must include the Ego. For the mere series of 
 states could not know itself as a unity unless 
 the Subject were the common centre of refer- 
 ence to the different presentations. To deny 
 this identity of the knower would mean that 
 we are shut up to merely instantaneous experi- 
 ences. The rejection of this latter absurdity is 
 also involved by our Self-activity, which con- 
 sciously passes over the elements of the time- 
 series in the steadiness of purpose and in the 
 fulfilment of the plan of a life. And feeling 
 speaks out for the Ego, not only by its immediate 
 testimony, but from the place which it pleases 
 
176 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 the Ego to assign it in his life. The emotion 
 may be controlled ; the appetites may be related 
 to a Self, which is conceived as permanent ; 
 and which defers its gratification till the time 
 required in its own plans as a rational harmony. 
 Let us not be ashamed of this belief in personal 
 identity ; but rather let us regard its ancient 
 vogue as confirmatory of the conclusions of 
 philosophy, experience and common-sense. I 
 shall touch on some objections presently. 
 
 (4) Fourthly, the objective series is subordi- 
 nate to the Will of the Ego. The object is a 
 changing manifold. The objects get related by 
 being apperceived by a Subject, which gives to 
 them a certain permanence reflected from its 
 own. They are unified and related to past 
 objects. They are constructed into an identical 
 world, that lasts from moment to moment, and 
 is subject to the laws postulated by the reason. 
 This is posited as the Not-Self. But there is 
 a much more manifest evidence of the Will than 
 this, which is somewhat subtle, and is obscured 
 by epistemological questions. This is the direct 
 evidence, and absolute conviction that by the 
 exercise of my will I can make changes in the 
 world of objects. It is manifest therefore that 
 
THE REALITY OF SELF 177 
 
 we have here, in the Self, an emphasis upon 
 the subjective and self-active element which 
 predominates over the objective, as the potter 
 over the clay in his hand. And to refuse to 
 form an estimate of the Subject, because it is 
 related to the Object, is like refusing to credit 
 the potter with anything more than the abstract 
 relation to clay. 
 
 (5) Fifthly, what are we to say of the alter- 
 native, adopted by some psychologists and the 
 Radical Empiricists, of seeking in the stream 
 of consciousness for the Self, as the ' passing 
 thought,' or as ' the mere idea of the Ego ' 
 which is constructed in the course of experience, 
 and plays its part with other conscious elements ? 
 Well, in addition to our previous criticism of 
 James, 1 I may add that this device really in- 
 volves the Self which is supposed to be dis- 
 integrated. For the accusations that the Self 
 is an intellectual construction involve also in 
 the same charge the theories of the ' stream of 
 consciousness ' and the ' passing thought ' and 
 ' the Self as a mere idea.' For they, too, are 
 constructions. Experience gives none of these 
 hypothetical moments of consciousness in which 
 
 1 Supra, Part I., Chapter I. 
 M 
 
178 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 the flow consists ! On the contrary, it gives us 
 longer or shorter glimpses, or synthetic apper- 
 ceptions, of things, which are as cogent evidences 
 of identity as the ' allotted span ' of human life ! 
 And further, such constructions as Empiricists 
 put forward are incapable of being made, except 
 by the active mind of a Self, enduring through 
 time, and able to transcend the terms of the 
 series, and connect them into a system. Nor 
 does the endowment of the ( passing thought ' 
 with spiritual privileges help us. It is false to 
 experience ; it is a mere device ; and it is a less 
 simple theory than that which it seeks to sup- 
 plant. Such atomistic theories of mental life 
 and of Selfhood either involve the error and 
 scepticism of Hume ; or else they ' beg ' per- 
 sonal identity, and reproduce it in the mysterious 
 capacities of the ' passing thought,' while pro- 
 fessing to have explained it away. 
 
 (6) Sixthly, the psychological difficulties of 
 multi-personality and secondary selves do not 
 affect the Self as we have viewed it, from the 
 metaphysical standpoint. The old sets of habits, 
 or the strange modes of behaviour, which appear 
 in such abnormal cases, affect only the ethical 
 personality, and not the existential Self. It is 
 
THE REALITY OF SELF 179 
 
 the same Subject still, in an epistemological 
 sense ; but the habits and meanings are different. 
 Much of the emphasis placed upon the pheno- 
 mena of so-called ' multi-personality ' causes a 
 departure from scientific views of mental pro- 
 cesses to such an extent as to imply the miracu- 
 lous, without any intention of such a concession. 
 If it be true, as every psychologist holds, that 
 perception, habit, memory, and the other mental 
 conditions are built upon the data of previous 
 experience, then there cannot be an absolute 
 break in the continuity of the mental life, or 
 there would be no materials for the new experi- 
 ences. If the old material is drawn upon, it 
 must be by the same epistemological Subject 
 as existed before. I believe that these pheno- 
 mena are abnormalities of habit, and certainly 
 belong to the realm of values, and not of exist- 
 ence, in so far as the Self is concerned. Pro- 
 fessor Royce says that there are many so-called 
 Selves which are not true Selves, on his theory ; 
 and under this head he would no doubt dismiss 
 such abnormalities. Were it not for this proviso, 
 he would find this side of empirical psychology 
 most damaging for his view of the Self as ideal ; 
 and he would then be unable to claim that his 
 
180 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 theory avoids the empirical difficulties. The 
 theory here set forth misses these, in maintain- 
 ing that the Self as really existing is not con- 
 cerned with the attainment or non-attainment 
 of certain purposes, meanings, or ideals. And 
 it is evident that the purely social character 
 of selfhood on Royce's theory and its nature 
 as a mere contrast-effect is quite remote from 
 my view, which insists that the Self must be 
 a real being. We do not need to employ the 
 misleading term Substance, of which no one 
 knows anything, except that in the material 
 world qualities were supposed to inhere in it. 
 It is an entirely different point to maintain 
 that this ' I,' this Self, which thinks, feels, 
 and wills, which is the centre of experience for 
 me ; which is capable of making judgments and 
 of conceiving purposes, is a real being. Viewing 
 the Self as the identical, constitutive and active 
 centre of reference in consciousness, as the Sub- 
 ject in relation to the spiritually conditioned 
 Object, can it be denied that the Self exists, is 
 real, and is our first criterion of Reality at the 
 human point of view ? 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 METAPHYSIC OF EXISTENCE. 
 
 The reality of the Self constitutes the reality 
 and trustworthiness of our experience. This 
 furnishes the motif of the profound efforts of 
 Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and more recently, of 
 Green, Miinsterberg, Schiller and others, to 
 evolve the world of experience from the Ego, 
 whether it be conceived as in some way a tran- 
 scendental, noumenal, absolute, or universal 
 principle ; or as the will that takes attitudes ; 
 or as the active Self which seeks satisfaction. 
 In diverse ways these theories express the 
 central importance of the spirit in a theory of 
 reality. 
 
 Now we are in a position to accept experience 
 as it burns in the focus of subjectivity. Whence 
 these rays of light come, we do not yet know ; 
 but meanwhile we have guarded against the 
 
182 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 acceptance of the rays apart from the focus ; 
 and have provided against the substitution of 
 merely conceptual for actually existing rays, 
 burning in a real focus. And we have seen 
 that whatever reality the rays may have, they 
 derive it from their appearance in the focus. 
 In other words, we find two truths about the 
 Object ; first, that it is conditioned by spirit, 
 that is, by being known, and otherwise related 
 to the Ego ; and second, that the Self which 
 provides the unity of Objects in relation to a 
 Subject, imparts to them also of its own 
 reality. 
 
 A word or two more on these points will lead 
 us beyond them. I say firstly that what the 
 Object is apart from a Subject we can never know. 
 It cannot be said to exist independently of Spirit. 
 Nor could it be constituted in its nature as it is 
 but for the synthetic activity of Spirit. I do 
 not surely need, at this time of day, to inveigh 
 any further against the Ding-an-sich or any such 
 ' rudimentary organ ' of Realism. As to this 
 point, namely, the constructive part played by 
 the mind in experience, we do not require merely 
 logical and abstract categories, which are drawn 
 up post rem, and are reminiscent of Scholas- 
 
METAPHYSIC OF EXISTENCE 183 
 
 ticism, 1 but we may emphasize the case of ideali- 
 zation. There the contribution of the Mind 
 appears as an agreeable exaggeration of the part 
 played by it in perception. In Art, ' a portion 
 of life/ as Zola said, is ' seen through the medium 
 of a temperament.' In common life, do we not 
 often consciously read into things our memories 
 and imaginings, and so transform them to our 
 wish by our Self-activity ? For my own part, 
 I do not believe that we really know any subjecb 
 till we have thus fused it with our memories, 
 interests and associations in the heat of feeling 
 and will, — a process closely akin to idealization. 
 And I am perfectly convinced that experience 
 and knowledge are so constructed by Self- 
 activity. Voluntarism best expresses this truth, 
 and hints at the essential attempts of the Subject 
 to reduce the Object to identity with itself. But 
 I must pass on to the second point. 
 
 The reality which we have seen to belong to 
 the Self cannot be withheld from the Object 
 which is essentially related to the Subject, and 
 
 1 Kant's Deduction of the Categories from the Transcendental 
 Unity of Apperception is, however, the classical instance of the 
 way in which the spiritual or noumenal Reality constitutes the 
 intelligible world of experience, and even the world of phenomena 
 as manifesting the order of Nature. 
 
184 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 thus expresses the nature of the Self. So we 
 have now a valid claim to regard the experience 
 of the world as real. 
 
 Now this raises the question which has not 
 prominently appeared as yet. What is the 
 relation between different Selves ? How do we 
 pass from one to another ? I answer : (a) in 
 the first place, that the question is really less 
 difficult for us than for the man who takes * Ex- 
 perience ' as his starting-point. He thinks that 
 he escapes the problem by assuming the stand- 
 point of a communal experience ! But the pro- 
 blem is there all the time, with others which are 
 apt to be ignored ! (b) In the second place, the 
 bodily presence of others is guaranteed as real 
 by our foregoing argument proceeding from the 
 reality of Self to that of experience, in which 
 other Selves play a part, (c) But thirdly, the 
 recognition of other personalities as located in 
 human bodies springs up with the earliest con- 
 victions, in point of temporal development ; 
 prior in fact to the consciousness of Self. The 
 child depends upon his mother and nurse, and 
 in his dawning consciousness fives through them. 
 The point of metaphysical interest in this, how- 
 ever, is not the temporal and genetic priority 
 
METAPHYSIC OF EXISTENCE 185 
 
 of the consciousness of other Selves ; what con- 
 cerns us is the logical truth that emerges, viz. 
 that experience is essentially of such a nature 
 that other personalities exist and share in it. 
 In other words, it does not lead us to regard 
 Selfhood as a mere" contrast-effect and a purely- 
 social relationship, as Professor Koyce holds, but 
 it leads us to view experience as partaking of this 
 "social character just as surely as it involves the 
 representation of things as separate in Space and 
 Time. This conviction is also dependent upon 
 the reality of the body, in which our own Selfhood 
 as voluntarily active meets with other Selves 
 under objective conditions ; and so the body 
 plays a unique part in our experience not only 
 of other Selves, but of the World, and of the 
 essential relation existing between Selves and 
 the World, (d) But finally, this community of 
 experience is not sufficiently explained without 
 seeking to account for the agreement and har- 
 mony of Self with Self, and of the World with 
 Selves in certain respects. What imparts to us 
 this similarity in knowledge and experience ? 
 How can the common intelligence in Selves, and 
 in the World, — which Selves explore and reduce 
 to rationality, — be explained ? Not by the mere 
 
186 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 effulgence of light from the particular Subject for 
 which it exists epistemologically ; for as we have 
 seen the Object is broken up and part is postu- 
 lated as Not-Self ! And this is the part which 
 unexpectedly manifests that striking identity, 
 rationality, and intelligibility which is so awe- 
 inspiring, and which must spring from a spiritual 
 source. The conviction of the absoluteness and 
 objectivity of the World, this Not-Self, cannot 
 be given up. Nor can the wondrous harmony 
 of Spirit and the Universe be ignored. This 
 antinomy Idealism recognizes and solves. The 
 universality and pervasiveness of Intelligence, 
 Order, and Law point to a Spiritual Principle 
 which constitutes existence as rational and har- 
 monious. The conditions of experience point to 
 the same conclusion. The world of relations 
 can be synthesized and known only by a Mind, 
 and so it is required that the Universe be con- 
 ceived as constituted, as surely as it exists, by 
 the Supreme Mind for whom all things are. So 
 conceived, the Spiritual Principle must be of the 
 form of Subject and Object ; for that is precisely 
 the relationship which must obtain between the 
 Universe as existing for such a Spiritual Prin- 
 ciple and the Spiritual Principle as knowing and 
 
METAPHYSIC OF EXISTENCE 187 
 
 so constituting the Universe. But this answers 
 to our description of a Self. Therefore, the 
 Spiritual Principle, whatever else it may be, 
 must be a Self. 
 
 Let us now look once more at the relation 
 between Selves. "We saw that their mutual 
 relationship, and their relation to the World 
 demanded a Spiritual Principle to explain their 
 community of agreement and intelligibility. 
 This appears as an immanent principle in regard 
 to the content of their experience, but it leaves 
 their particularity and private Selfhood intact. 
 The failure to provide for this on the part of 
 * Pure Experience ' philosophy breaks down its 
 argument. The respects in which this imman- 
 ence may be found to consist, may be here 
 specified as follows : 
 
 (1) First, it gives us subjectivity of such a 
 kind that its objective content harmonizes with 
 the worlds of all rational Selves. This is the 
 so-called a priori Self-activity of minds. 
 
 (2) Second, it provides the data of our experi- 
 ence with their capacity for being known, because 
 they are themselves the Objects of a Supreme 
 Mind. This saves us from all the perils of a 
 merely Subjective Idealism. 
 
188 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 (3) Third, our ' universe of discourse ' and 
 common rationality may be said to manifest the 
 same immanent Principle. Hence Science and 
 Education owe their existence to the presence 
 of the same principle of intelligence and ration- 
 ality in the Selves. 
 
 (4) And fourth, the objectivity of view which 
 Selves seek, the desire to see the universe sub 
 specie aeternitatis, and all ideals of truth, as well 
 as those of beauty and goodness, with which we 
 shall be concerned in the next Chapter, are 
 manifestations of this immanent and universal 
 Principle. 
 
 A deep conviction which gives rise to many 
 of the subjoined criticisms and theses may be 
 here stated. There is a profounder meaning in 
 existence than metaphysicians have usually been 
 ready to discover. Their training in the world 
 of conceptions and methods of logic has tended 
 to make them restricted in their vision. Is not 
 this the living message of James and Bergson 
 for our day ? Everything that actually is, is 
 bearing witness, clear and infallible, so far as it 
 goes, to the nature of Reality. The mere theory 
 that you or I may mean by our manipulation of 
 conceptions may or may not be true : and con- 
 
METAPHYSIC OF EXISTENCE 189 
 
 sidering the wide diversity of opinions, we have 
 to say, cannot be quite true. But everything 
 that actually has come to be in the universe, that 
 really exists is a messenger and a revelation from 
 the Unseen ! It does not mean that we should 
 study the mere form. That would lead us into 
 the conceptual realm again. But it means that 
 we should regard the interpretation of these things 
 as organized capacities showing that the Unseen 
 must be such that it is so manifested. And as 
 interpretation, this is not so mysterious and 
 productive of difference of opinion as the objector 
 might think. For it is patent to all reflective 
 minds that in life, growth, animal organism, con- 
 sciousness, and Selfhood we have stages of 
 development, in which, even without going into 
 teleology and the world of values, we have 
 different kinds of being, representing various 
 modes or functions of Existence. Sufficient is 
 it to say that in Selfhood we have evidence 
 of a completer being than any so-called lower 
 kind can give. Hence we view the Universe 
 and the Reality which it represents as being 
 such that Selfhood, ultimately stated in terms 
 of value as Personality, expresses its highest form 
 of Existence. 
 
190 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 So, when we are honestly and critically anthro- 
 pomorphic in our construction of Reality, we 
 may feel a conviction which no shallow arguments 
 can disturb. And when we see in Personality our 
 highest category of explanation, and apply it 
 in order to understand the Universe and the 
 ultimate Reality, we have two infallible proofs. 
 First, we have the testimony, and now so rapidly 
 growing conviction that this is almost the last 
 word of present-day philosophy, that Reality 
 must be conceived in terms of Thought, Spirit, 
 and Personality. And secondly, we have a 
 reflection, which we do not need to suppress 
 when we leave our study and class-room, and 
 have the budding trees of spring, the singing 
 birds and the gay butterflies as our companions ! 
 We may feel with the poet — 
 
 ' To me the meanest flower that blows can give 
 Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.' 
 
 For the conviction may well sweep over us that 
 there is nothing incongruous in Personality's 
 claim of a relationship with this world of Nature, 
 nothing unsound in our application of Per- 
 sonality as our category of explanation, not 
 merely because all things are ours as knowing 
 Subjects, — that thought we have banished mean- 
 
METAPHYSIC OF EXISTENCE 191 
 
 while in place of another. The fresh thought 
 is this — the Universe is so related to Personality 
 that Personality has really appeared as the child 
 of All ! It exists ; it is real ; it has being, how- 
 ever it may be interpreted ; and it cannot be 
 gainsaid. And not only so ; but all things else 
 appear as stages in its growth to produce for 
 Nature, ' Man, her last work,' who seems so fair ! 
 And he, as Personality, can know nature and 
 rethink her laws, which so far from being dead 
 and impersonal have actually produced Life and 
 Personality ! 
 
 Now it seems to me that this is so much 
 better than the halting forms of logic, that it 
 is in reality the source of what is valuable in 
 formal logic itself. Bradley comes too late to 
 tell us what the world should be like to har- 
 monize with his riddles ; for, in however abstract 
 a fashion, logic has had only this basis of ex- 
 perience to go upon in spite of itself. And from 
 the life of the Ego have come its forms of Identity, 
 and the like, and the categories of Causality, 
 Substance, and so on. That is part of the heri- 
 tage left us by Kant. Fichte expounded the 
 great thought in his own wonderful way. And 
 when Hegel turned to the world of experience 
 
192 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 with his abstract forms, and sought to recon- 
 struct it in Schelling's phrase as ' a petrified 
 logic/ he was really building better than he knew. 
 For the deepest motives for such attempts, and 
 their secret source of profound rationality are 
 not to be found in their conceptualizing a living 
 universe, but in their re-vivifying of logic by 
 laying the quick, breathing body of Experience 
 upon its corpse. And as a matter of fact, we 
 see how Hegel was driven to urge the revision of 
 logic ; and he built his great dialectical process 
 upon forms which ran counter to the rules of the 
 scholastic logic. And so rationality is more than 
 a mere name, not because it is understood to be 
 postulated in the text-books of logic, but because 
 it is immanent in us, and in the Rock of Reality 
 from whence we are hewn. Or, to drop the 
 figure, the stages of real existence which cul- 
 minate in Personality give us our best and 
 surest hints, inklings, and even revelations of 
 the nature of the Unseen, and teach us that 
 Reality indubitably manifests Rationality and 
 Personality, that the Living God is at the heart 
 of things. 
 
 Accordingly we must characterize Reality as 
 essentially of the nature of an Absolute Self. 
 
METAPHYSIC OF EXISTENCE 193 
 
 This result may be reached by another line of 
 argument, in addition to those which I have 
 employed on the grounds of Existence. Such, 
 for example, is that which seeks to provide for 
 the ultimate principle of Unity. No final 
 plurality of reals can stand the onslaught of 
 the argument from relations. In the last resort 
 existence must be a Unity. But in characteriz- 
 ing this Unity, philosophers have had recourse 
 to various abstractions, such as Being, Sub- 
 stance, the Absolute Idea, Energy, and so forth. 
 But no conception of the Unity will suffice 
 which does not provide for the disconnectedness 
 of things and the plurality of Selves. And the 
 only type of Unity which can meet these demands 
 is that which also provides us with our solution 
 of the puzzle of the One and the Many, and is 
 by its very nature a Unity in diversity. The 
 manifold of experience is given to us in the 
 unity of one conscious Subject. That is the 
 prototype of the relation between monism and 
 pluralism. And so Personality not only proves 
 to be the prime unit of reality, the criterion of 
 existence, the synthetic principle, the condition of 
 experience, the best mode of existence, and the 
 highest category of explanation, but it is also the 
 
194 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 supreme type of Unity, and the only solution of 
 the Sceptic's problem of the One and the Many. 
 And now I will briefly state, from the stand- 
 point of a Metaphysic of Existence, a theory of 
 the Absolute, reserving a more detailed ex- 
 position of it till the concluding Chapter, after 
 an examination of the influences derivable from 
 a Metaphysic of Values. I hold that we are led 
 to view Reality as the Absolute Self who is also 
 the Unity of all. So far we have seen that the 
 Self is at least Subject in relation to Object. 
 Such too, we find, not from analogy alone, but 
 from the nature of the conditions of Being, must 
 the Absolute Self be. As Subject and Object 
 He embraces all existence, and in fact consti- 
 tutes it so. We can further say that as we — 
 although in an imperfect manner — constitute our 
 Object, so does He, as Subject, but unto per- 
 fection . As the distinction of Sub j ect and Ob j ect, 
 however, implies an inevitable difference between 
 them, as well as an essential relation, so the 
 Absolute as Subject is necessarily different from 
 the Absolute as Object. This is essential to the 
 Divine Self-consciousness. It implies also the 
 existence of a world of conscious beings, who 
 constitute the ' Other ' to God. But while with 
 
METAPHYSIC OF EXISTENCE 195 
 
 us the difference between Subject and Object 
 is beyond our complete control, with Him the 
 Object is Self-determined to be distinct from 
 Himself as Subject. This delivers the universe 
 from the mere identity, the blank undifferentiated 
 Unity of Pantheism, and most forms of Abso- 
 lutism. Self -limitation is a most important cate- 
 gory — as Hegel showed — and is the essential 
 attribute of the Absolute as Subject ; and this 
 Self-determination posits relative independence 
 to the Object. Three logical stages in the 
 Divine Life may be stated, and subsequently 
 explained on the basis of our own Selfhood. 
 (1) The first is His Subjectivity, Omniscient, 
 Eternal and Self-determining. (2) The Second 
 is His Objectivity, posited in relation to Himself 
 as Subject, and consisting of the real universe 
 in time, including our experience, and being thus 
 itself of the same type of Subject-Object. (3) 
 And the third stage is included m the second, 
 as Object, but is given the special character of 
 Not-Self, by the Divine Self-limitation. It is 
 posited as autonomous, apart from essential and 
 constitutive conditions. 1 His highest glory, His 
 
 1 Cf. the political relationship of the British Empire and the 
 self-governing Colonies. 
 
196 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 essence of rationality, and His sign of Personality 
 is revealed in this Self-determination. This 
 Divine positing of an Other in Himself as Not- 
 Himself is equivalent to the so-called ' creation ' 
 of an infinity of Selves with their own point of 
 view, as finite Subjects, with their own moral 
 autonomy and individual freedom, with their 
 own privilege of the voluntary choice of good- 
 ness, and participation in the life of God. Now 
 the essence of this Not-Self as posited, is the 
 likeness of the human Selves to God Himself. 
 These Selves are microcosms of the Macrocosm, 
 the Divine Self. In spite of finitude and imper- 
 fection, they may realize their spiritual privi- 
 leges of progress towards likeness to God. And 
 as they seek the Ideals which are the earnest 
 of their inheritance they become imbued with 
 the Immanent Principle, or the Logos which, 
 as we saw, gives to the Selves community of 
 experience, rationality, order, and objectivity of 
 vision, besides the moral, aesthetic and religious 
 evidences of Divinity in humanity. This Pro- 
 gress or Development, whether in the individual 
 or the race, is the striving of the Objective side 
 of the Absolute back to Subjectivity. And all 
 the concrete forms which the Object has mani- 
 
METAPHYSIC OF EXISTENCE 197 
 
 ; fested in the course of historical Evolution are 
 but growing revelations of the Absolute Spirit 
 as living, organized, conscious, and finally self- 
 conscious and self-determining, as it is the 
 essence of Divinity to be, unto perfection. 
 When we say that these forms, produced in the 
 course of development, are stages in the pro- 
 gress to Divine Subjectivity, and are also stages 
 towards the Not-Self, or in the direction of 
 alienation from Divine Subjectivity, we are 
 stating a paradox which contains a great truth, 
 as an illustration will make clear. In Nature 
 every such manifestation is a step towards 
 independence and self-activity. The simple unity 
 of a passive material universe is broken up by 
 each sprout of life, organism, or personality, that 
 sets itself up to be something on its own account. 
 The essence of human subjectivity, for example, 
 is exclusiveness and isolation, — ' I am I ' ; but, 
 as Hegel showed in his dialectical treatment of 
 the Person, 1 this is but the first step to larger 
 organization and ultimate unity of the Indi- 
 vidual with Society, with the Universe, and with 
 the Absolute Spirit. 2 So the progress of Divine 
 
 1 Philosophy of Right, Introduction. 
 
 2 Professor Muirhead expounds this principle in relation to 
 
198 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 Objectivity to Divine Subjectivity is through 
 negation and alienation, by becoming part of 
 the Divine Not-Self, and finding in this life of 
 otherness the immanence of the Logos which 
 shall make possible a life of Godlikeness, akin 
 to the full organization and Self-determination 
 of the Divine Subjectivity. 
 
 Before closing this Chapter, some illustrations 
 may be given of the relation of the Divine Self 
 and Not-Self. If it be said that it is unreason- 
 able to speak of the Divine Object, and of the 
 Divine Not-Self, as in any real sense God, I 
 reply by referring to instances in human life. 
 (a) In ourselves we find the world of experience 
 within a unity of Self, part of which is yet posited 
 as Not-Self. God needs no such external World 
 to constitute His Personality — as Lotze convinc- 
 ingly showed in answer to objections * — as if the 
 Absolute were dependent upon the conditions of 
 
 Idealism (Art., Ency. Brit. (u) , vol. xiv. p. 285). The momenta 
 of Idealism are found in the successive and correlative prin- 
 ciples, ' Without mind no orderly world ' : ' Without the world 
 no mind.' He concludes by saying, ' Subject and object 
 grow together. The power and vitality of the one is the 
 power and vitality of the other, and this is so because they 
 are not two things with separate roots, but are both rooted 
 in a common reality which, while it includes, is more than 
 either.' 
 
 1 Microcosmus, Bk. II. Chap. IV. 
 
METAPHYSIC OF EXISTENCE 199 
 
 development peculiar to finite beings ! But the 
 Universe of the Self-existent Absolute Experi- 
 ence is posited as ' the Other ' by His Self- 
 determination, while He is also in a certain sense 
 the Unity of all. (b) Again, we are able to 
 present to ourselves the objects of desire and 
 aspiration, although, in spite of the aesthetic 
 pleasures of idealization and anticipation, we 
 have to confess them unrealized and unattained, 
 and to admit their character as Not-Self, (c) 
 And, as another illustration of the same prin- 
 ciple, we have habits and modes of activity 
 which manifest the Self and which yet have sunk 
 from the level of consciousness and will. These 
 are a Not-Self to us, although produced by our 
 volitions in the past, and they are still part of 
 our wider Self. A certain autonomy is shown 
 in habit, (d) And finally, in self-sacrifice and 
 self-determination, that which is ours is at once 
 owned and disowned, and we have the glory 
 of the Cross, a reflection of the Divine Nature, 
 and a cumulative proof of the reasonableness 
 of the view sketched so imperfectly in this 
 chapter. 
 
CHAPTEE V. 
 
 METAPHYSIC OF VALUES. 
 
 Different from the point of view of Existence 
 is that of Meanings, of Ideals, of Values. For a 
 full exposition of this difference between that 
 which merely is and that which is appreciated, 
 apprized and approved, we would need to refer 
 to Kant, Koyce, Ward, Miinsterberg, and Eucken. 
 It is only possible here to insist upon the im- 
 portance of this distinction between the realm 
 of mere Fact, and the realm of Value. To the 
 latter sphere we now pass. Here we may sub- 
 stitute the Concept of Personality for that of 
 the Self. Personality, as we have seen, refers 
 to all the relations which pertain to Selfhood, 
 the social, ethical, aesthetic, intellectual, and 
 religious ideals which give life its worth and 
 meaning. In the past Chapters this aspect has 
 not been always completely excluded, owing to 
 the limitations of the method of abstraction. 
 
METAPHYSIC OF VALUES 201 
 
 If we have not suffered the brightness of the 
 Ideal to shine forth like the full-orbed moon in 
 the heavens, we have not always been able to 
 hide the irridescence of its silver glory through 
 the cloud of Existence. 
 
 Beginning again at our finite point of view, we 
 must consider what constitutes us as real Persons. 
 And I may be very brief, as I am in substantial 
 agreement here with the conclusions of Professor 
 Eoyce, in regard to the Ideal Ego. 1 But I con- 
 sider that in the world of Existence the Self is a 
 real being. In the world of Values, however, I 
 agree that the Personality is constituted as real 
 by the meaning, purpose, or ideal, which pro- 
 duces order and unity out of the chaotic confusion 
 of mere impulse and caprice. And it is just in 
 proportion as this plan is organic to all the true 
 interests of the life of the individual and of the 
 * over-individual,' that Personality is attained. 
 
 The question arises then, to what do these 
 values, meanings, and ideals refer as their stan- 
 dard and end ? We find certain moral, intel- 
 lectual, aesthetic and religious appreciations, 
 which are considered as constitutive of Personal- 
 ity, on account of their place in a normative 
 
 1 See Supra, Part I., Chapter III. 
 
202 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 system. For these we all live, for these some 
 would even dare to die. Is the norm a matter of 
 individual and subjective taste, or has it a certain 
 universal validity and objective character ? In 
 ordinary life we find that what we do has a 
 reference to some end, which gives to the action 
 a purposive character. But further, out of these 
 voluntary acts certain are approved and certain 
 are condemned. Now I maintain that this critical 
 reference of purposes to a standard is but a 
 higher form of the relation of all action to an 
 end. In other words, all judgments are cases of 
 teleological or purposive reference. 
 
 We shall select the moral aspect as that which 
 may best present the argument. The elementary 
 fact here is that of voluntary or purposive activ- 
 ity, upon which, as I hold, the explanation of 
 the highest development of validity depends. It 
 is brought out by the simple question, — Why 
 did I act so ? The answer is — I had some end 
 in view. Now what is this end ? The Hedonist 
 rashly answers in terms of personal sensibility. 
 But if I always act so from my own pleasure, no 
 solution of the problem of the subsequent approval 
 and disapproval is forthcoming, and we are left 
 with merely a universal principle, by which to 
 
METAPHYSIC OF VALUES 203 
 
 interpret all human actions ! Accordingly the 
 Hedonist has to set out on his long voyage for 
 the End in terms of pleasure, and yet as pro- 
 viding for the problem of approval and dis- 
 approval. We do not need to follow him into the 
 deeps of metaphysics where his Universalistic 
 needs compel him to steer his course. It is suffi- 
 cient to know that he is afloat on this ocean of 
 speculation, which allows a course for all kinds 
 of craft. So, setting out again for ourselves, we 
 observe in the first place that the end to which 
 all purposive conduct must be relative is centred 
 in the Personality which conceives, appreciates 
 and executes it. Apart from this no ground for 
 values can be found, any more than a theory of 
 reality can be held by an unreal Self. 1 The result 
 is that Personality is in some way an end in itself. 
 But evidently this end is not mere sensibility. 
 
 For if so, we must either deny the distinctions 
 of worth in conduct ; or else we must regard 
 these moral distinctions as unproductive of any 
 genuine act, and merely an empty phrasing of 
 
 1 This is manifestly one of the main contentions of Pragmatist 
 and Humanist. These theories of truth depend upon the 
 existence of a Self, whose satisfactions or dissatisfactions are 
 implied in the estimate of the results of conduct, by which Truth 
 is, in their view, to be explained in the long run. 
 
204 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 thought, after the fact. Both alternatives are 
 absurd. Therefore, whatever part pleasure may 
 play in the End, it is not the sole constituent of 
 it. The conclusion is, then, that every purposive 
 act is expressive of some phase or other of Per- 
 sonality, which is alone capable of being con- 
 ceived as an end in itself. This contention is 
 vastly strengthened by the consideration of 
 Obligation. But in the second place, the merely 
 individual Person cannot be viewed as the End. 
 His life, his meanings, his ideals are unrealizable 
 in isolation. He is a member of society, and 
 is dependents upon others foY the expression of 
 himself, and for the realization or values which 
 make his life. He has relations, also, to the 
 World, and to God, which form an integral part 
 of his true Personality. Hence the End is Per- 
 sonality, not in isolation, but in its complete 
 circle of relations. As Professor Palmer says, 
 the ' conjunct ' character of Personality must 
 essentially be present in the End. 1 In Self- 
 realization, then, as the development of the 
 whole Personality in all its relations, is to be 
 found the End. 
 
 ' The Field of Ethics. Kant's Categorical Imperative involves 
 the worth of the good will in relation to the Kingdom of Ends. 
 
METAPHYSIC OF VALUES 205 
 
 The central fact of ethics is Conscience. Upon 
 the interpretation of that psychological datum 
 the general ethical doctrine largely depends. The 
 theory of Conscience which I here present has 
 close affinities with the view of the End as Self- 
 realization, and with a theory of the ground of 
 Moral Obligation. In my view Conscience is the 
 consciousness of the Ideal Self, not as a conception 
 of it in perfection — which is unthinkable, — but 
 as the implication of the bettered Self of the 
 succeeding stage of life. This Ideal, which con- 
 stitutes the moral Person as the Unity of impulses 
 that are in themselves discordant and fragmen- 
 tary, is presented to consciousness, and the 
 reactions of the actual to the Ideal Self in terms 
 of feeling, thought, and will, produce the pheno- 
 mena of Conscience. As feeling, it expresses the 
 congruity or incongruity of the actual Self with 
 the ideal Personality. As will, it represents the 
 response of activity called forth in us. As 
 thought, it has the prerogative of taking into 
 account the full set of circumstances, and also 
 the rational law which is behind the contrast. 
 So Conscience is always adapted to the con- 
 ditions of the individual and the race. And what 
 is the Law itself ? It is the fundamental principle 
 
206 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 of Progress upon which the universe and Per- 
 sonality rest, as the Objective of the Divine Sub- 
 ject. The differentiations of the real world, its 
 stages of development, the values of life, the 
 reality of Selfhood, and Personality as an End, 
 all depend upon this fundamental law of Progress 
 on the part of the Divine Object towards the 
 Divine Subject. Or to state the matter in less 
 controversial terms, the law which makes the 
 ' Categorical Imperative,' the ' Ought,' is the 
 fundamental one of all experience, namely, that 
 in the process of change, which is ever going on in 
 the universe, the moments should add the present 
 conditions to the past. It is unthinkable that 
 decay and subtraction could have constituted 
 the temporal universe. On the other hand, it 
 is the essence of rationality to synthesize ; it is 
 the essence of life to grow, of organism to become 
 more completely organized, of Personality to 
 realize more and more fully the capacity and 
 harmony of its nature. But even this cannot 
 give the weight of moral responsibility to the 
 Law which experience and reason attest. Neither 
 the Obligation, nor the law of Progress on which 
 it rests, nor Conscience as we have explained it, 
 nor the meaning of Personality itself, can be 
 
METAPHYSIC OF VALUES 207 
 
 adequately explained without reference to the 
 Objective and Perfect Personality, through whom 
 alone the Law and the process are explicable, and 
 without whom the community of interests in the 
 Good would be beyond our understanding. Once 
 more we are led to Personality as the Supreme 
 Principle, in this case from the side of moral 
 values. 1 
 
 And the argument from intellectual and aes- 
 thetic values is somewhat similar. I believe that 
 the theories of knowledge as practical value, 
 which, as we have seen, demand the reality of 
 Personality, to confirm or reject — according to 
 the reaction upon experience, — will find their 
 true warrant in terms of the satisfaction of the 
 whole man in reference to his Ideal. So truth 
 will be regarded not merely as that which ' works,' 
 but as that which accords with the implicated 
 Ideal of a progressing Self and a wider experience, 
 in a parallel manner to the case of Conscience ; 
 and the Laws of Keason will be found rooted and 
 grounded in the same principle of Progress. And 
 only by the postulation of a Perfect Personality 
 
 1 Lotze reserved the term Personality for God. This usage, 
 however, is apt to deny to man genuine, albeit imperfect, Per- 
 sonality (i.e. the Self, as it is termed in this work), as Royce 
 appears to do, so far as the world of Existence is concerned. 
 
208 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 can the ideals of truth, beauty and goodness be 
 explained. For aesthetically also, our sense of 
 the beautiful is similar to the fact of Conscience, 
 in which the coming event casts its shadow- 
 before, — a reversal of the psychological fact of 
 after-images, being rather the content of a kind 
 of sense of expectancy. And the compatibility of 
 the Ideal, so far as it is conceived, with the Actual 
 presentation to consciousness, gives pleasure, 
 intellectual stimulation and artistic activity ; 
 while incompatibility offends our taste. But 
 such things are only for a being who ' looks before 
 and after,' who can appreciate, and harmonize 
 the various claims of the Ideals which are sought. 
 Therefore, whether the artist knows it or not, the 
 passion for a perfect form which fills his soul, and 
 the longing for a deeper harmony than any 
 known before, are akin to the hunger and thirst 
 after righteousness, and point to an Ideal Unity 
 in which our aspirations shall be satisfied. All 
 ideals are glimpses of the Perfect Spirit, who, as 
 religion also testifies, has formed us for Himself. 
 And our heart is restless until it finds rest in Him. 
 The positive definition given to Personality in 
 Chapter II. of the Second Part, as the Self in 
 the full circle of its relationships, not only helps 
 
METAPHYSIC OF VALUES 209 
 
 us to understand the various qualities that mark 
 off one human personality from another, in regard 
 to individuality ; but also gives us a clue to the 
 interpretation of Divine Personality in other than 
 negative terms, and thus removes the favourite 
 objection to the Personality of God as implying 
 limitation. God, we may say, is fully Personal 
 in the infinity of His relations (compare Spinoza's 
 ' Substance '), and is only limited in the world 
 of Values as of Existence by His Self-Determina- 
 tion. 
 
 The remaining questions may be left over to 
 the closing Chapter. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 METAPHYSIC OF REALITY. 
 
 We have now seen that the trend of the argument 
 from the side of Values is as strongly in favour 
 of Perfect Personality as the argument from the 
 side of Existence was in favour of the Absolute 
 Self. The result is the fusion of the two ideas. 
 As in ourselves we find one Personality, although 
 conceivable either as an existing Self or as appre- 
 ciative Personality, so we reach the conclusion 
 that there is an Absolute Personality, who exists, 
 and whose nature is the perfect fulfilment of all 
 meanings, values, and ideals. 
 
 And further, as we saw that the stages of suc- 
 cessive existence in the World- Order represent 
 under the form of Time the living and Personal 
 Reason immanent in Reality ; now we supple- 
 ment that view by the recognition of the meaning 
 and significance of these stages in the develop- 
 ment. These stages are seen to be explicable only 
 
METAPHYSIC OP REALITY 211 
 
 teleologically, as involving a reference to a stan- 
 dard, an End, which is hid in the Absolute, — 
 
 ' That one far-off Divine event, 
 To which the whole creation moves.' 
 
 And in our view of Reality as Personality, these 
 stages are gradations in which the Divine Subject 
 is immanent in proportion to their manifestation 
 of His own transcendent life. And so there are 
 degrees of Reality — in the full sense of the term, 
 — according to the ' all-inclusiveness and har- 
 mony ' — to borrow Bradley's phrase — of these 
 several orders of Existence, in relation to the 
 Absolute Life. But this progress to Divine Sub- 
 jectivity involves on the part of the Divine Objec- 
 tive, a kind of alienation as the condition of the 
 realization of ultimate harmony with His tran- 
 scendent nature. And the forfeiture of that 
 independence on the part of the human person 
 under any condition implies the loss of the 
 promised inheritance, and the retrogression to 
 the merely Objective plane. Whereas, the im- 
 mortal distinctness of our life as a fully organized, 
 complex and progressive Personality is essential 
 to the realization of a reflection of the Divine 
 Nature, of which we are ' broken lights.' And 
 the autonomy of moral persons as free and 
 
212 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 responsible is so necessary to a theory of ultimate 
 Reality that we are prepared to side with those 
 who maintain the rights of Personality, even to 
 the detriment of the final Unity or Absoluteness, 
 if such an alternative is the only one possible. 
 But this view seeks to provide a place in the 
 Absolute for independent persons, by the dis- 
 tinctions which we have seen to be necessitated 
 not only by the analogy of human Personality, 
 but also by the rational conditions of existence 
 and by the truest harmony of meanings. In our 
 view, the Absolute is not the All, in any sense of 
 an immediate and resistless Unity ; but He is so 
 only through profound distinctions, not imposed 
 upon Him from without, nor the product of chance ; 
 but as Self-determined by His own Personal Nature. 
 Instead of a blank Monism, we have a Unity 
 capable not merely of relative independence of 
 the various parts, implied in the category of 
 organism, but capable of the positive otherness 
 clearly required by the only available and com- 
 petent category to apply to the conception of the 
 Absolute, namely, that of Personality. And as 
 we have seen, the universe of separate things, of 
 living beings, of organisms, of consciousness, of 
 Personality, with its Self-distinguishing, Self- 
 
METAPHYSIC OF REALITY 213 
 
 determining, Self-sacrificing nature, can be truly 
 unified only in an Absolute which produces 
 these distinctions, and provides for this inde- 
 pendence, — that is, Perfect Personality. And 
 the reduction of form to matter, the annulling 
 of distinctions, the negation of autonomy which 
 are characteristic of every form of Pantheism and 
 of Absolutism, except of some such Personalistic 
 type as I have endeavoured to present, must be 
 regarded as radically defective, however successful 
 such systems may be in displaying a smooth 
 logical surface to the conceptualist. 1 The in- 
 spiration of the poet and the mystic in their 
 pantheistic moods we shall regard as empha- 
 sizing one side of a never-failing truth, namely 
 the fundamental Unity of all, but as neglecting 
 what is perhaps an even greater aspect, that 
 of Difference, of Meaning, of Value, and of Per- 
 sonality. We shall therefore supplement their 
 Absolutism with the recognition of the validity 
 drawn from Personality and Life, and confirmed 
 by our highest reasoning, even when it finds 
 captivating expression as in William Watson's 
 
 1 Cf. Art. ' Cartesianism,' by Edward Caird, Ency. Brit.( 9 ), 
 vol. v., on the defects of the Infinite of Spinoza, and of all 
 Pantheists. 
 
214 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 Ode in May, in which he says, addressing the 
 sun : — 
 
 4 Thou art but as a word of his speech, 
 
 Thou art but as a wave of his hand ; 
 
 Thou art brief as a glitter of sand 
 'Twixt tide and tide on his beach ; 
 
 Thou art less than a spark of his fire, 
 Or a moment's mood of his soul ; 
 
 Thou art lost in the notes on the lips of his choir 
 That chant the chant of the Whole.' 
 
 The immanence of God in the world is a hope- 
 less doctrine unless counterbalanced by and har- 
 monized with that of His transcendence. Our 
 view seeks to reconcile immanence and tran- 
 scendence, and to include a theory of gradations 
 in the manifestation of the Reality appropriately 
 regarded as Divine. In the universe, God is im- 
 manent as Object merely, in regard to the matter, 
 which serves as the passive condition for develop- 
 ment towards Subjectivity. In the stages of 
 Development, there is a movement towards Other- 
 ness, and through that independence a fuller 
 manifestation of Subjectivity, which becomes 
 more immanent as the organism becomes more 
 like the Self-existent, Self-determining, Divine 
 Subject. In man's higher spiritual life and pro- 
 gress in the search for truth, goodness and beauty, 
 
METAPHYSIC OF REALITY 215 
 
 the microcosm expresses itself in the highest 
 form, and these ideals, — now become so precious 
 and significant, — are evidences of the immanence 
 of the Divine as Subject — not, however, to the 
 negation of individuality, of the real being of man 
 as a part of the Divine Not-Self. 
 
 As Professor Howison would say, God is attract- 
 ing the Society of Spirits unto likeness to Himself 
 by Final Causation and through the immanence 
 of Ideals. In my view, however, Pluralism is 
 only a phase of the Divine Unity which is ration- 
 ally necessary. The problem of the One and 
 Many is capable of solution only under the form 
 of Personality. But this question of Monism and 
 Pluralism and the questions of Infinity, and 
 Supra-Personality, I have dealt with in my criti- 
 cisms in the First Part, and may refer the reader 
 to those pages for my views. 1 
 
 As to Time, I hold that it has its place in the 
 Divine Objective as the mode of the manifestation 
 of the Divine Subject. The existent is temporal 
 because Time is one of the meanings of the Abso- 
 lute, who is not in Time, any more than judgments 
 of value are in time, but who knows all as in ' an 
 indivisible instant,' and who manifests Himself 
 
 1 Supra, Chaps. III. -VI. 
 
216 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 under the form of Time, which therefore may 
 never be done away, unless a state of blank 
 identity is to supervene upon the order of ration- 
 ality. Such a condition, even in Eternity, is 
 unthinkable. 1 
 
 In regard to Supra-Personality, we may admit 
 that the Absolute is above our highest conception 
 of Personality, without detriment to those essen- 
 tials of Personality in which we have seen reason 
 to believe. And it is therefore more than a risk of 
 depersonalization to speak of Supra-Personality 
 of the Absolute as prohibitory of the ascription 
 of Personality to Him. The result of such a 
 position is the postulation of a Supreme Thing- 
 in-Itself or Unknowable. This was far from 
 Pfleiderer's thought when he used the term 
 ' super-personal,' and urged Theists to follow 
 suit. 2 The danger of such a course ensues upon 
 placing the emphasis on the prefix, thus changing 
 Theism into Agnosticism, as Bradley practically 
 does. But Perfect and Absolute Personality are 
 
 1 Bergson's idea of the identity of Duration and Consciousness 
 appears to me to be an instance of hypostatization, which is 
 foreign to much in his system that makes for a concrete view of 
 Man and Nature. 
 
 8 Philosophy and Development of Religion, by Otto Pfleiderer, 
 Gifford Lectures, vol. i. p. 168. 
 
METAPHYSIC OF REALITY 217 
 
 terms which will meet the requirements of meta- 
 physics, which, as we have seen, both on the side 
 of Existence and of Values, demands that the 
 Supreme Unity be viewed as Personal. 1 
 
 In conclusion, what then is the relation of 
 Existence and Value ? From the synthetic and 
 Absolute standpoint, so far as we can conceive 
 it, of what does Reality consist — of Existence, or 
 of Value, or of a union of both ? What are the 
 mutual relations of these fundamental principles ? 
 Such questions would demand in reply a Meta- 
 physic of Reality in the final sense. 
 
 From the human point of view, the matrix of 
 the outer reality of existing things cannot be 
 explained in terms of value. The given element 
 exists, not because of my attitude towards it, 
 but as a datum of experience which I must accept 
 as material of experience, and make the best of. 
 And if we view ' things ' in this light as con- 
 ditions of spiritual progress, we are not really 
 
 1 The objections to Divine or Absolute Personality on the 
 score of its limiting the Divine Infinity have been stated over and 
 over again from the time of Spinoza to the present day, but do 
 not find so much currency now that Intellectualism and Absolu- 
 tism are being challenged in so many directions. They have 
 been well answered by Lotze, Microcosmus, Bk. II., Chap. IV. ; 
 Martineau, A Study of Religion, vol. ii. p. 181 ; Royce, The 
 World and the Individual, vol. ii. pp. 418-425. 
 
218 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 at the human standpoint any longer. And I 
 repeat that Existence is inexplicable in terms of 
 my meaning, for it goes beyond my meaning, 
 and presupposes my values, inasmuch as my own 
 existence as a Self is something which, of course, 
 I could not accomplish or effect. But when we 
 take the hint as to the teleological explanation 
 of Existence, that is, when we pass to the Abso- 
 lute standpoint, so far as we can, we are impelled 
 to believe that Existence is expressive of the 
 Meaning of the Perfect Personality. As the 
 existing details of a picture may be pointed out 
 by a critic, with only a partial conception of the 
 meaning of these details, so we as human beings 
 are able to say what is, from the standpoint of 
 Existence, without resolving its existence into 
 what we mean, or to terms of practical value. 
 But every stroke of the brush had a meaning for 
 the Artist, and the existence of every detail is 
 but an incident in the complete meaning which is 
 expressed in the existence of the picture. So the 
 universe as Existence is explicable in terms of the 
 Absolute Meaning, and at that ultimate point of 
 view, the worlds of Existence and of Value upon 
 which, in distinction from each other, I have laid 
 so much stress, coalesce as the complete Expres- 
 
METAPHYSIC OF REALITY 219 
 
 sion of Divine Purpose and of Absolute Value. 
 Or, as Professor Royce would say, the External 
 is ultimately reducible to the Internal Meaning. 
 In this final synthesis of the logical stages of 
 the Divine Life and Purpose, we pass from the 
 finite and human standpoint in which the real 
 and the rational, the ' is ' and the ' ought,' the 
 Existent and the Ideal, the Self and the immortal 
 Personality, are in irreconcilable dualism, — to 
 the view ' under a form of eternity ' in which all 
 is known as the manifestation of Meaning and 
 Purpose. And the Plan of the Divine Subject 
 ' which brought us hither, 5 and has revealed Him- 
 self to mankind by the Logos, ever present with 
 the race in Spirit, and historically manifested in 
 Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word, and the ' ex- 
 press image ' of the Person of God, will not be 
 defeated by the dissolution of our personalities ; 
 but will be more completely fulfilled in our 
 immortality as individuals. For, as we have 
 seen, this distinctness from the Divine Subject 
 is the condition of the Universe as significant 
 and ordered, the path to its truest unity and 
 fullest organization, and the expression of His 
 Eternal Will and Purpose in bringing many sons 
 unto glory. And while now we know only in 
 
220 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 
 
 part, when that which is perfect is come, we 
 shall know even as also we are known. In 
 that fuller light all Being will be seen as Value — 
 our own Personalities will be known as expres- 
 sions of the Complete Ideal. We shall behold 
 God's face in righteousness, and we shall be 
 satisfied, when we awake, with His likeness. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Abnormalities, 16, 23, 71, 164 n., 
 
 178, 179. 
 Absolute, 3, 28, 29, 31, 33„ 44, 46, 
 
 48, 51-54, 58, 62 ff., 70 ff., 
 
 75, 84, 100, 104, 110 ff., 118, 
 
 119, 126 ff., 138, 139, 146, 
 
 194-199, 210-220. 
 Absolutism, 84, 85, 114, 131, 195, 
 
 213, 217 n. 
 Activism, Monistic, 144, 156 n. 
 Activity, 14 n., 20, 27, 36 ff , 
 
 78 ff., 116, 125, 133, 134, 
 
 144, 171, 175, 180 ff., 197, 
 
 202, 205, 208. 
 ^Esthetic aspect, 165, 196, 199 ff., 
 
 207 ff. 
 After-images, 208. 
 Agent, 162 ff. 
 Agnosticism, 28, 90, 93, 138, 172, 
 
 216. 
 America, 3, 141. 
 Anthropomorphism, 90, 91, 97, 
 
 108, 116, 117. 
 Apeirothism, 143. 
 Appearance, 27 ff., 37 ff., 40 ff., 
 
 46, 52, 90, 113, 133. 
 Apriorism, 106. 
 Aristotelianism, 86, 92, 106. 
 Art, 183. 
 
 Aspiration, 23, 171, 199. 
 Association, 73. 
 Associationism, 15, 16. 
 Atheism, 102. 
 Atomistic units of consciousness, 
 
 10. 
 Atonement, 67. 
 
 Autonomy, Moral, 66, 78 ff., 
 
 195 ff., 211, 213. 
 Avenarius, 24, 140. 
 Axioms as Postulates, 104, 107, 
 
 108, 116, 120. 
 
 BakeweU. 142. 
 Baldwin, J. T., 143. 
 Beauty, 188, 208, 214. 
 Becoming, 91, 101, 102, 119. 
 Being, 62, 72, 73, 132, 146, 159, 
 
 189, 193, 194, 220 ; Theory 
 
 of, 56, 60 ff. 
 Bergson, 47 n., 81 n., 139, 144, 
 
 146, 156 n., 188, 216. 
 Berkeley, 19. 
 Biology, 98. 
 Body, 11, 14 n., 19, 21, 22, 35, 39, 
 
 40, 57, 125, 166, 184 ff. 
 Bowne, B. P., 142. 
 Bradley, F. H., 4, Part I. Chap. 
 
 II., 64, 69, 73, 99, 112, 113, 
 
 115, 124, 125, 131, 132, 133, 
 
 137, 141, 146, 153, 161, 162, 
 
 172, 191, 211, 216. 
 Brain, 10, 25. 
 British Empire, 195 n. 
 Browning quoted, 173. 
 
 Caird, Edward, 15, 146, 168 n., 
 
 213 n. 
 Caird, John, 146. 
 Calkins, Miss, 5 n. 
 Cambridge School, 141. 
 Categories, 80, 85, 94, 99, 132, 
 
 182, 183 n., 190, 191, 193, 
 
 195, 212. 
 
222 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Causality, 124. 191. 
 
 Causation, 27, 82, 101, 108 
 Efficient, 19, 78, 79, 82, 85. 
 Final, 78, 79, 82, 85, 97, 124, 
 215. 
 
 Cause, 80, 85, 91, 99, 100. 
 First, 101. 
 
 Chance, 20, 41, 120, 212. 
 
 Change, 10. 11, 27, 38, 49, 102, 
 110, 144, 163, 206. 
 
 Choice, 82, 105. 
 
 Christianity, 55 n., 74 n., 86, 136. 
 
 City of God, 79, 82, 86. 
 
 Cleon, 173. 
 
 Coenesthesia, 35, 49, 173 
 
 Communion, 20. 
 
 Community, 74 n., 79 ff., 127, 
 207. 
 
 Comparison, 23, 38, 57. 
 
 Conscience, 78, 205 ff. 
 
 Consciousness, 10 ff., 15, 17, 22, 
 51, 58, 60, 65, 71, 78, 
 80 ff., 91. 92, 95, 96. 107 ff., 
 123, 126, 129, 141, 144, 145, 
 154, 158, 160, 164, 166, 177, 
 180, 184, 185, 189, 199, 208, 
 212, 216 n. 
 Atomistic units of, 10. 
 Field of, 23, 111. 
 Stream of, 158, 161, 177. 
 
 Continuity, 19, 35, 39, 49, 107. 
 Felt, 11. 
 
 Contradiction, 108. 
 
 Contrast-effect, 57, 59, 180, 185. 
 
 Cosmogony, 1. 
 
 Cosmological Proof, 101. 
 
 Creation, 79-82, 87 n., 98, 196, 
 211. 
 
 Criterion, 28, 111, 180. 
 
 Cross, The, 199. 
 
 Davidson, Thomas, 142, 143, 146. 
 Definition, 35, 49, 65, 167. 
 Degrees of Truth and Reality, 
 29, 211. 
 
 Descartes, 81, 90, 92, 133, 171. 
 Desire, 35, 199. 
 Determinism, 20, 82. 
 Development, 196, 197, 199, 206, 
 
 211, 214. 
 Dewey, John, 138 n., 143. 
 Difference, 24, 193, 194, 213. 
 Dilemma of Determinism, 82. 
 Ding-an-sich, 182. (See Thing- 
 
 in -itself.) 
 Distinctions, 57, 145, 152, 157, 
 
 173, 203, 212, 213, 218. 
 Diversity, 37 ff., 47, 48, 52, 133, 
 
 163, 193. (See Unity and 
 
 Diversity.) 
 Dualism, 22, 23, 95, 102, 115, 124, 
 
 219. 
 Duality, 69, 73, 153, 155. 
 Duration, 144, 216 n. 
 Duty, 3. 
 
 Ego, 12, 15, 40, 56, 58, 69, 73, 
 
 99, 120, 143, 158, 160 ff., 
 
 165 ff., 175, 176, 181, 182, 
 
 191, 201. 
 Transcendental, 95, 96, 115, 
 
 116, 181. 
 Eleatics, 102. 
 Emotion, 89. 171, 176. 
 Empiricism, 21, 61, 106, 114, 116, 
 
 178. 
 Radical, 9, 17. 18, 22-25, 89, 
 
 137, 141, 146, 153, 154, 177. 
 End, 201-204, 206, 211. 
 Energy, 80, 193. 
 England, 131, 141. 
 Epistemology, 1. 23, 89, 115, 135, 
 
 158, 179. 
 Error, 39, 92. 
 
 Eternity, 66,68, 82, 216, 219. 
 Ethical aspect, 62, 63, 71 ff., 86, 
 
 163, 168, 200 ff. 
 Ethics, 1, 4, 98, 145, 205 ff. 
 Eucken, 144 ff ., 156 n., 200. 
 Evil, 67, 82, 92, 101, 111. 
 
INDEX 
 
 223 
 
 Evolution, 80, 92, 98, 99, 119, 
 197. 
 
 Existence, 5, 32, 37, 86, 92, 
 98, 101, 125, 132 ff., 167, 
 179 ff., Part II. Chap. IV., 
 200, 201, 207 n., 209 ff., 
 217-220. 
 
 Expectancy, 208. 
 
 Experience, vii., 18, 23, 25-34, 
 35 ff., 42-48, 51, 52, 56, 58, 
 69 fit., 75, 78 ff., 83, 87, 89, 
 91, 95, 104, 106, 108, 109, 
 112 ff., 123 ff., 132, 137 ff., 
 141, 145, 147, Part II. Chap. 
 I., 161, 164, 166, 170, 174, 
 176 ff., 180 ff., 187, 191, 193, 
 
 195, 198, 199, 206, 207, 217. 
 Absolute, 28 ff., 43 ff., 48, 
 
 50 ff., 159, 161. 
 Ambiguity of term, 43, 152- 
 
 159. 
 Phylogenetic, 159. 
 Pure, 17, 18, 22, 24, 104, 114, 
 
 140, 141, 146, 153, 157, 159, 
 
 184, 187. 
 Experiences, 11, 17, 23, 31, 43, 57, 
 
 62, 71, 73, 144, 154, 162, 175. 
 
 Fechner, 146. 
 
 Feeling, 22, 29 ff., 36 ff., 49, 50, 
 
 51,54,94,110,112,123,133, 
 
 134, 158, 162, 164, 172, 173, 
 
 175, 183, 205. 
 Feeling of Self, 12, 14, 19, 31, 32, 
 
 36, 38, 49, 50 ff., 173. 
 Fichte, 136, 156 n., 167, 181, 191. 
 " Fighter for Ends," 13, 22. 
 Finitude, 91, 100, 102, 117, 118, 
 
 196, 201. 
 Force, 96, 100. ' 
 
 Freedom, 3, 66, 67, -79, 82, 196 ff. 
 Free-will, 20, 111. 
 
 Germany, 131. 
 
 Gibson, W. R. Boyce, 5 n., 142. 
 
 God, 3, 20, 34, 66, 67, 72, 76, 78- 
 84, 86, 89, 91, 92, 96, 98-103, 
 110, 111, 115, 117-121, 124- 
 129, 134, 135, 137, 139, 145, 
 156, 165, 192, 194, 196, 198, 
 204, 207 n, 209, 214, 215, 
 219, 220. 
 
 Goodness, 102, 108, 188, 196, 208, 
 214. 
 
 Gradations, 211, 214. 
 
 Green, T. H., 15, 131, 134, 136, 
 137, 146, 181. 
 
 Growth, 56, 106, 189, 206. 
 
 Habit, 57, 60, 71, 178, 179, 199. 
 Harmony, 29, 103, 113, 176, 186, 
 
 206, 208, 211. 
 Hedonism, 202, 203. 
 Hegel, 29, 47. 131, 132, 134, 136, 
 
 166, 167, 181, 191, 192, 195, 
 
 197. 
 Herbart, 10. 
 
 Hodgson, Shadworth, 10, 140. 
 Holt, E. B., 141. 
 Howison, G. H., 4, 66, 76, Part 
 
 I. Chap. IV., 89, 117, 128, 
 
 137, 142 146, 215. 
 Humanism, 89, 95, 109, 113 ff., 
 
 137, 171, 203 n. 
 Hume, 10, 15, 25, 90, 94, 178. 
 Hypnotism, 16, 96, 115. 
 Hypostasization, 135, 136, 216 n. 
 Hypothesis, 108, 138, 144. 
 
 " I," 13, 14, 14 n., 16, 51, 72, 73, 
 93, 96, 160, 163, 174, 180, 
 197. 
 
 Idea, 36, 58, 81, 152, 154, 177. 
 Absolute, 136, 193.~ 
 
 Ideal, 3, 57, 58, 61, 62, 69, 73, 78, 
 82, 92, 115 ff., 124, 137, 165, 
 168, 169, 180, 188, 196, 200, 
 201, 204, 205, 207, 208, 210, 
 215, 220. 
 
 Ideal construction, 40. 
 
224 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Idealism, 47 n., 53, 56, 60, 61, 80, 
 
 122, 124, 131, 137, 145, 
 
 153 n., 164 n., 186, 197 n. 
 Absolute, 42, 47 n., 61, 68 ff ., 
 
 136, 137, 141. 
 Personal (Howison's), Part I. 
 
 Chap. IV., 89, 113. 
 (Oxford), 72, 77, 89, 122, 142. 
 Subjective, 83, 187. 
 Idealization, 40, 73, 183, 199. 
 Identity, 56, 71, 108, 110, 116, 
 
 132, 136, 163, 175, 178, 183, 
 
 186, 191, 195, 216. 
 Personal, 11 ff., 15, 23, 35, 37, 
 
 38, 49, 62, 71, 94, 108, 163, 
 
 176 ff. 
 Illingworth, J. R., 127. 
 Imagination, 60, 73, 171. 
 Immanence, 103, 140, 187, 196, 
 
 198, 214, 215. 
 Immortality, 1, 2, 3, 66, 67, 83, 
 
 91, 112, 137, 219. 
 Imperative, Categorical, 204 n., 
 
 206. 
 Individualism, 21, 103, 204. 
 Individuality, 1, 25, 31, 59 ff., 
 
 66 ; 67, 83, 123, 160, 165, 196, 
 
 197, 202, 204, 209, 215, 219. 
 Infinite, 64, 65, 100, 102, 118, 120, 
 
 121, 213 n. 
 Infinity, 19, 65, 101, 102, 109, 
 
 118, 127, 143, 215, 217 n. 
 Intellectual aspect, 164, 200, 201, 
 
 207 ff. 
 Intellectual construction, 41, 
 
 45 ff., 51, 52. 
 Intellectualism, 41, 50 ff., 93, 
 
 106, 109, 116, 125, 147, 
 
 217 n. 
 Intelligence, 35, 83, 93, 102, 106, 
 
 117, 185, 186, 188. 
 Interaction, Theory of, 92, 95 ff., 
 
 103, 110, 111, 115, 117, 
 
 120. 
 Interactionism, 21. 
 
 Introspection, 14, 22 
 Intuition, 144, 145. 
 Irrationalism, 109. 
 
 James, William, vi. ff., 3, Part I. 
 Chap. I., 26, 47 n., 69, 70, 
 137 ff., 140, 141, 153, 154, 
 161, 177, 188. 
 
 Jesus Christ, 219. 
 
 Judgment, 23, 202. 
 
 Kant, 80, 90, 92, 93, 95, 100, 115, 
 118, 131, 135, 153, 161, 172, 
 181, 183 n., 191, 200, 204 n. 
 
 Kingdom of Ends, 204 n. 
 
 Knowledge, 17, 70, 94, 95, 106, 
 107, 109, 114, 125, 126, 134, 
 135, 137, 156, 171, 183, 185, 
 207. 
 
 Ladd, G. T., 142. 
 
 Law, 186, 205, 206, 207. 
 
 Moral, 206. 
 Laws of thought, 107. 
 Le Conte, J., 142. 
 Legal aspect, 165 n. 
 Life, 4, 47, 75, 89, 134 n., 142, 
 
 144, 145, 147, 158, 171, 183, 
 
 189. 191, 197, 206, 213. 
 Life-plan, 57, 58, 66, 69, 73, 175, 
 
 201. 
 Limit, 167. 
 Locke, 10, 15. 
 Logic, 1, 28, 34, 47, 48, 106, 112, 
 
 132, 167, 188, 191, 192, 213. 
 Symbolic, 74, 74 n. 
 Logos, 196, 198, 219. 
 Lotze, 110, 111, 123, 161, 198, 
 
 207 n., 217 n. 
 Love, 23, 86. 
 
 M'Dougall, W., 143. 
 Mach, 24, 140. 
 Macrocosm, 196. 
 M'Taggart, 86, 129. 
 
INDEX 
 
 225 
 
 Man, 91, 99, 113, 123, 134, 135, 
 
 145, 191, 207 n., 214, 215, 
 
 216 n. 
 Martineau, J., 217 n. 
 Mathematical concepts, 74, 118, 
 
 119. 
 Mathematics, " New," 64, 65, 
 
 74 n., 118. 
 "Me" and " Not-Me," 13, 73, 
 
 161, 165, 166. 
 Meaning, 61 ff., 67 ff., 72, 163, 
 
 173, 179, 180, Part II. 
 
 Chap. V., 210, 212, 218, 219. 
 Internal and External, 61 ff., 
 
 219. 
 Mechanics, 98. 
 Mechanism, 98, 143. 
 Memory, 35, 49, 60, 171, 179. 
 Metaphysics. 1-5, 9, 10, 15, 18, 
 
 25, 39, 58, 70, 85, 97, 98, 104, 
 
 114, 118, 119, 128, 130, 137, 
 
 139, 147, 154, 155, 157, 158, 
 
 164, 165, 170, 172, 175, 178, 
 
 184, 188, 194, 203, 217. 
 Microcosm, 196, 215. 
 Mill, John Stuart, 15, 19, 153. 
 Mind, 129, 160, 164, 182, 183, 
 
 186, 187, 197 n. 
 Minds, Society of, 81, 83, 84. 
 Mind and Body, 21. 
 Monads, 35, 39. 
 Monism, 3, 19, 66, 77, 79, 83, 86, 
 
 102, 103, 110, 125, 127, 138, 
 
 156 n., 193, 212, 215. 
 Moore, G. E., 140. 
 Moral aspect, 76, 78, 79, 81, 86, 
 
 128, 163, 164, 196, 201, 202, 
 
 203. 
 Morality, 83, 123, 135, 137, 
 
 138. 
 Motion, 27. 
 
 Muirhead, Professor, 197 n. 
 Miinsterberg, H., 20 n., 133, 142. 
 
 156 n., 181, 200. 
 Mysticism, 61, 153. 
 
 Naturalism, 78, 83. 
 Natural Science, 106, 108. 
 Nature, 29, 80, 83, 86, 115, 132, 
 
 183 n., 190, 197, 216 n. 
 Nature, Uniformity of, 108. 
 Negativity, 166, 167. 
 Neo-Hegelians, 125, 131, 136, 
 
 146. 
 Neo-Kantians, 15, 131, 134. 
 Non-contradiction, 28. 
 Non-Ego, 161, 165, 166. 
 Not-Self, 36, 50, 59, 61, 62, 102, 
 
 108. 160, 161, 164 ff., 176, 
 
 186, 190, 195 ff., 215. 
 Novelty, 20. 
 
 Object, 10, 22, 23, 43, 69, 112, 
 123, 124, 161, 163, 167, 174, 
 177, 182, 183, 186, 187, 
 194 ff., 206, 214. (See Sub- 
 ject and Object.) 
 
 Objective, 206, 211, 215. 
 
 Objectivity, 83, 96, 167, 186, 188, 
 195, 196, 198. 
 
 Obligation, 204 ff. 
 
 One "and the Many, 27, 37, 48, 
 64, 67, 103, 127, 193, 194, 
 215. 
 
 Ontological Proof, 136. 
 
 Ontology, 135. 
 
 Order, 83, 186, 196, 201, 219. 
 
 Organism, 4, 189, 197, 206, 212. 
 
 "Other," 124, 194, 196, 199, 
 212. 
 
 Pain, 48, 51, 162. 
 Palmer, G. H., 142, 168, 204. 
 Panpsychism, 146, 155. 
 Pantheism, 29, 102, 103, 111, 195, 
 
 213. 
 Paulsen, 146. 
 Pearson, Karl, 25. 
 Perception, 17, 35, 38. 
 Perfection, 67, 68, 82, 92, 96, 103, 
 
 110, 135, 194, 205, 220. 
 
226 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Perry, R. B., 141. 
 
 Person, 16, 17, 35, 63, 67, 69 5 
 79 ff., 99, 122 ff., 127, 137, 
 158, 160, 165, 165 n., 197, 
 201 ff., 205, 219. 
 Society of Persons, 80, 83, 
 127. 
 
 Personality, 1, 2, 3, 5, 13, 18, 20, 
 21, 46, 53, 54, 65, 71, 76 ff., 
 81-91, 96, 99 ff., 104, 107, 
 113, 115, 116, 122 ff., 127- 
 129, 131, 134-137, 139-147, 
 153 n., Part II. Chap. I., 
 165 n., 185, 189-193, 200, 
 201, 203-213, 216-219. 
 Multiplex, 16, 96, 178. 
 Paradoxes of, 160, 166-169. 
 
 Personality of God, 3, 20, 64, 67, 
 84,86,99,101,108,110,117, 
 120, 124, 127, 134, 135, 137, 
 146, 161, 192, 196, 198, 207, 
 209-219. 
 
 Personal Idealism. (See Ideal- 
 ism.) 
 
 Personal Identity. (See Iden- 
 tity.) 
 
 Pessimism, 90, 93. 
 
 Petzoldt, 24, 140. 
 
 Pfleiderer, Otto, 216, 216 n. 
 
 Philosophy, 4, 84, 89, 93, 94, 104, 
 109, 114, 115, 118, 126, 127, 
 137 ff., 144, 145, 147, 153, 
 176, 190. 
 Religious, 75. 
 
 Physico-theological Proof, 100. 
 
 Physics, 98. 
 
 Pleasure, 48, 162, 202, 203, 204, 
 208. 
 
 Pluralism. 3, 19 ff., 31, 67, 76, 78, 
 80, 83, 84, 91, 102, 103, 110, 
 119, 120. 125, 127, 137, 143, 
 153, 193, 215. 
 
 Pragmatism, 72, 89, 94, 105 ff., 
 109 ff., 113, 116, 171, 203 n. 
 Method of, 20. 
 
 Pringle-Pattison, Andrew Seth, 
 4, 53, Part I. Chap. VII., 
 140, 142, 146, 157, 167. 
 
 Progress, 196, 197 : 206, 207, 217. 
 
 Protagoras, 113. 
 
 Psychologist's fallacy, 45. 
 
 Psychology, 1, 4, 5 n., 10, 22, 25, 
 35, 45, 56 ff., 71, 157, 175, 
 179. 
 The " New," 147, 175. 
 
 Purpose, 57, 62, 66, 67, 69, 73, 99, 
 109, 116, 117, 171, 175, 179, 
 201, 219. 
 
 Qualities, Primary and Secon- 
 dary, 27. 
 
 Rashdall, H., 4, Part I. Chap. 
 VI., 137, 142, 146. 
 
 Rationalism, Critical, 61, 171. 
 
 Rationality, 185, 186, 188, 192, 
 196, 206, 216. 
 
 Realism, 19, 60, 61, 67, 70, 
 75, 140, 153, 159, 164 n., 
 182. 
 
 Reality, 1, 5, 21, 26 ff., 30 ff., 
 37 ff., 42, 44 ff., 50 ff., 57, 
 62 ff., 67, 70 ff., 74, 75, 79 ff., 
 84,91-96,103,104,111,113, 
 116, 119, 126, 127, 129, 
 132 ff., 136, 138, 139, 142, 
 144, 145, 147, 152, 156 ff.. 
 167, 169, Part II. Chap. 
 III., 181, 183, 183 n., 188- 
 194, Part II. Chap. VI. 
 
 Reason, 207, 210. 
 Sufficient, 108. 
 
 Relation, 15, 18, 27, 38. 
 
 Relations, 15, 17, 37 ff., 47, 48, 
 51, 52, 75, 84, 135, 173, 186, 
 193, 200, 204, 209. 
 Conjunctive and Disjunctive, 
 19, 24. 
 
 Religion, 20, 91, 111, 127, 137, 
 138, 145, 196. 200, 201, 208. 
 
INDEX 
 
 227 
 
 Religious Philosophy, 75. 
 
 Renouvier, C, 143. 
 
 Royce, Josiah, 4, 47, 53, Part I. 
 Chap. III., 78, 83, 84, 125, 
 128, 137, 141, 146, 161, 179, 
 180, 185, 200, 207 n., 217 n., 
 219. 
 
 Scepticism, 46, 72, 90, 93, 172, 178. 
 
 Schelling, 192. 
 
 Schiller, F. C. S., 4, 72, Part I. 
 Chap. V., 137, 140, 142, 146, 
 153, 157, 181. 
 
 Scholasticism, 183. 
 
 Schopenhauer, 156 n. 
 
 Science, 12, 91, 98, 108, 147, 188. 
 
 Scottish Philosophy, 139. 
 
 Selection, 13, 23. 
 
 Self, vii, 1-5, 9, 11 ff., 16 ff., 22- 
 27, 30-39, 42 ff., 48-53, 55- 
 67, 69-76, 78, 81, 85, 90-96, 
 102, 104 ff., Ill, 112, 114 ff., 
 125, 126, 128, 130, 132 ff., 
 136 ff., 140 ff., 146, 147, 
 154 ff., 158 ff., 164 ff., Part 
 II. Chap. III.. 181 ff., 187, 
 194, 198 ff., 203, 203 n., 205, 
 207, 208, 210, 218. 
 Absolute, 53, 61 ff ., 76, 139, 155, 
 159, 161, 187, 192 ff., 210 ff. 
 Empirical, 13, 16, 56, 58, 59, 
 
 115, 161. 
 Meanings of, 34, 35, 36, 49, 50, 
 
 Part II. Chap. II., 179. 
 Universal, 24, 134, 135, 180. 
 
 Self-consciousness, 37, 38, 52, 56, 
 124, 134, 135, 136, 160. 164, 
 194, 197. 
 
 Self-definition, 66, 78, 82, 83. 
 
 Self -de termination, 82, 120, 
 195 ff., 199, 209, 212, 214. 
 
 Selfhood, 11, 16, 53, 57, 58, 61, 
 63, 66, 75, 105, 141, 158, 160, 
 164, 167, 168, 178, 185, 187, 
 189, 195, 200, 206. 
 
 Self -identity, 37, 108, 116. 
 Self-limitation, 1, 195. 
 Self-realization, 204, 205. 
 Self-representative system, 63, 
 
 64, 65, 69, 74. 
 Self-sacrifice, 199. 
 Selves, 65 ff.. 78, 92, 96, 126, 129, 
 
 165, 179, 185, 187, 188, 193, 
 
 196. 
 Secondary selves, 16, 58, 96, 
 
 178. 
 Sentience, 29, 30, 42. 
 Sidgwick, Professor, 135 n. 
 Social aspect, 57, 59, 71, 75, 81, 
 
 86, 125, 128, 164, 165, 180, 
 
 197, 200, 204. 
 Sociology, 1, 98. 
 Socrates, 90. 
 Solipsism, 32. 
 Soul, 12, 14, 16, 24, 25, 34, 39, 
 
 43,60, 61, 70, 82, 83, 87,91, 
 
 94, 125, 128, 143, 160, 163, 
 
 164. 
 Society of Souls, 125, 128. 
 Space, 27, 83, 101, 108, 185. 
 Spencer, H., 28, 113. 
 Spinoza, 28, 209, 213 n., 217 n. 
 Spirit, 29, 82, 92, 99, 135, 147, 
 
 160, 164, 181, 182, 186, 190, 
 
 208, 219. 
 Spirits, 3, 20, 25, 79, 125, 215. 
 Spiritual Principle, 135, 186, 187, 
 
 188, 196, 205. 
 Stages, 57, 189, 191, 195, 197, 
 
 210, 211, 219. 
 Standard, 202 ff . 
 Stout, G. F., 14 n., 142. 
 Strong, C. A., 146. 
 Sturt, H., 142. 
 
 Subject, 22, 23, 30, 42, 43, 45, 52, 
 69, 70 ff., 75, 78, 80, 93, 124, 
 154 ff., 158, 160 ff., 166 ff., 
 170, 171, 173 ff., 179 ff., 182, 
 183, 186, 190, 193 ff., 206, 
 
 211, 214, 215, 219. 
 
228 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Subject and Object, 18, 19, 23, 
 30, 31, 35, 38, 43, 44, 50, 51, 
 69, 71, 74, 112, 114, 124, 132, 
 153, 156, 159, 161, 162, 
 164 ff., 171, 173, 174 ff., 
 
 180, 182, 183, 186, 194, 195, 
 197 n., 206, 214, 215. 
 
 Subjectivity, 23, 30, 163, 167, 
 
 181, 187, 195 ff., 202, 211, 
 214. 
 
 Substance, 60, 61, 70, 163, 180, 
 
 191, 193, 209. 
 Substantive and Adjective, 27. 
 Sully, Professor, 142. 
 Supra-personality, 29, 53, 99, 
 
 100, 146, 215, 216. 
 
 Taylor, A. E., 141, 146. 
 Teleological Proof, 100, 101. 
 Teleology, 66, 85, 91, 95, 97, 98, 
 
 108, 116, 120, 189, 196 ff., 
 
 202, 211, 218 ff. 
 Temple, W., 165 n. 
 Tennyson quoted, 174, 211. 
 Theism, 136, 216. 
 Theologv, 1, 67, 85, 101, 165 n. 
 Things, 27, 40, 123, 152, 154, 158, 
 
 185, 192, 217. 
 Thing-in-itself, 27, 53, 216. (See 
 
 Ding-an-sich.) 
 Thought, 10, 12, 14 ff., 24, 30, 47, 
 
 48, 89, 91, 93, 94, 107, 108, 
 
 113, 116, 123 ff., 133, 134, 
 
 164, 171, 172, 190, 204, 205. 
 " Passing," vi ff., 12, 16, 24, 
 
 61, 146, 161, 177, 178. 
 Stream of, 10 ff., 21, 177. 
 Time, 27, 40, 66. 67, 80, 81, 83, 
 
 91, 98, 101, 103, 108, 119, 
 
 127, 129, 163, 178, 185, 195, 
 
 210, 215, 216. 
 Time-series, 40, 175 ff. 
 Transcendence, 29, 62, 103, 167, 
 
 168, 214. 
 Trinity, 165 n. 
 
 Truth, 28, 29, 46, 86, 89, 110, 
 132, 171, 188, 207, 208, 
 214. 
 
 Tyler, C. M., 142. 
 
 Underhill, G. E., 142. 
 
 Unity, 30 ; 36, 57-64, 67, 80, 83, 
 94,102, 103, 110, 111, 119 ff., 
 125, 156, 175, 182, 193 ff., 
 197 ff., 201, 205, 208, 212, 
 
 213, 215, 217, 219. 
 
 Unity and Diversity, 27, 37 ff ., 
 47, 48, 52, 133, 163, 193, 212, 
 213. 
 
 Personal, 15. 
 
 Transcendental, 15, 135, 161, 
 183 n. 
 Universality, 107, 167, 186, 
 
 202. 
 Universe, 33, 44, 46, 47, 55, 66, 
 80, 84, 86, 97, 101, 103, 117, 
 119, 125, 135, 152, 171, 186- 
 192, 195, 197, 198, 206, 212, 
 
 214, 219. 
 Unknowable, 28, 53, 100, 216. 
 Unseen, 189, 192. 
 
 Value, 57, 72, 109, 111, 215, 217- 
 
 220. 
 Values, 3, 5, 63, 142, 145, 168, 
 
 179, 189, 194, Part II. 
 
 Chap. V., 210, 217, 218. 
 Volition, 23, 29, 30, 158, 103, 164, 
 
 199. 
 Voluntarism, 134, 156 n., 183. 
 
 Ward, James, 87 n., 133, 139, 
 142, 153, 153 n., 155 n., 157, 
 200. 
 
 Watson, John, 146. 
 
 Watson, William, quoted, 214. 
 
 Whole, 28, 29, 31, 61, 64, 66, 101, 
 214. 
 
INDEX 
 
 229 
 
 Will, 35, 38, 57, 65 ff., 83, 89, 100, 
 123 ff., 129, 133, 134, 142, 
 144, 156 n., 162 ff., 166, 172, 
 174, 176, 180, 181, 183, 199, 
 205, 219. 
 
 " Will-to-believe," 109. 
 
 Wordsworth quoted, 190. 
 
 World, 34, 52, 66, 89, 91, 92, 96, 
 100, 102, 106, 108, 111, 113, 
 
 119, 124, 125, 145, 156, 165, 
 172, 176, 183 n., 184 ff., 190, 
 191, 194, 198, 204, 206. 
 
 World- Order, 210. 
 
 World-Process, 91, 92, 98, 99. 
 
 Worth, 200, 203. {See Value.) 
 
 Wundt, 19. 
 
 Zola, Emile, 183. 
 
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