'^KNOW THYSELF" IN GREEK AND LATIN LITE ^4TURE A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE i: IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF GREEK ( BY ELIZA GREGORY WILKINS Private Edition, Distributed By THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 1917 y^ EXCHANGE 01|? Unttt^rsttg of (Jll]tra0n "KNOW THYSELF" IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF GREEK BY ELIZA GREGORY \WILKINS Private Edition, Distributed By THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 1917 GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY MENASHA, WISCONSIN CONTENTS CHAPTER I Page Introduction The inscriptions at Delphi their number, authorship, date, etc. Dis- cussions of Ti'co^i aavTov in antiquity. Importance attached to 7;/co0t aavrdv by the Ancients 1 CHAPTER II rNfiei 2ATT0N As Know Your Measure Earliest apparent reference to the maxim, in Heracleitus. Aeschylus' use of the apophthegm. Interpretation of Pindar, Pythian II, 34. TvQdi aavrdv as 'Know your Measure' in Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle. Historical charac- ters who did not know themselves Alcibiades and Alexander. The above meaning for the maxim in Cicero and Juvenal. Significance of title of chapters 21 and 22 of Stobaeus' Florilegium 12 CHAPTER III rNfiei SATTON As Know What You Can And Cannot Do As an injunction not to over-estimate one's ability. As an injunction not to under-estimate one's ability. As an injunction to know one's special bent. As an injunction to know what one can do in the realm of Will 23 CHAPTER IV rNflei SATTON As Know Your Place. Its Relation To S12*P0STNH TpS)6i aavTov apparently a current definition of awippoavvr]. Connection of the two in Aristotle's Ethics. Common use of the maxim in this sense. Con- nection between yvcbdi, aavrdv and the etymological meaning of adjtppovL in Plato's Timaeus. The phrase to ayvoetv kavrbv used of mental derangement as well as by way of suggestion of tvco^i aavrdv. The blending of the two meanings of rb diyvoeiv kavrbv in Xenophon's Memorabilia. The later tendency to make yvS^L aavrbv include other virtues as well as autppoavvrj 33 CHAPTER V rNfiei 2ATT0N As Know The Limits Of Your Wisdom Socrates' life-long search after self-knowledge. The false conceit of knowl-^ edge a universal fault. The use of tj^w^i aavrbv in the above sense by Xenophon^ Aristophanes, and Isocrates. Later uses of the maxim with this connotation. A 41 CHAPTER VI rNaei SATTON As Know Your Own Faults This use of the maxim as applied to the individual, irrespective of others. Man's proneness to see others' faults rather than his own. The fable of the two sacks brought into connection with yvcodi aavrbv 46 o*yfyf\A^ CHAPTER VII rNfiei SATTON As Know You Are Human And Mortal Page The injunction to think mortal thoughts a common-place of Greek litera- ture. Instances of the use of ')vG>dL aavrov in this sense 52 CHAPTER VIII rNfiei SATTON As Know Your Own Soul The soul the real self, as discussed in Alcibiades I, The antithesis between soul and body led to an emphasis upon the knowledge of each separately, and upon a knowledge of the relation between them. Since the soul is the man, ypu>6i, aavTov means to know man, and hence to be a philosopher. Resultant tendency of the Stoics to centre all their philosophy around yvuidL aavrov. The Neo-Platonists' application of the maxim to a knowledge of the psychological divisions of the soul. Its connection with the idea of self-consciousness. Its relation to certain of the soul's activities 60 CHAPTER IX rN120I SATTON Is Difficult. How Attained? "Tpudi aavTov is difficult" an old saying. Difficulty of knowing self versus knowing others. Self-knowledge limited to the philosophers. Perfect self- knowledge unattainable. Means to self-knowledge suggested by various writers through dialectic, through a friend, through theatrical performances, through literature, through a knowledge of the Universe, through a knowledge of God. 78 CHAPTER X rNfiOI SATTON In Early Ecclesiastical Literature The maxim asserted to have been borrowed by the Greeks from Hebrew writers. Ecclesiastical discussions of self-knowledge reflect various Stoic appli- cations of yvwdi. aavTov, and the influence of Plato and the Neo-Platonists. Self- knowledge of the Angels, the Trinity, etc. Self-knowledge a necessary help toward a knowledge of God. Doctrines related to yviadi aavrov by the Church Fathers distinctively self-knowledge as a realization that God created man in His own image; self-knowledge as a recognition of man's sinfulness and need of repentance; self-knowledge as including a belief in man's immortality 89 List Of Passages In Which The Maxim Is Expressed Or Implied.... ; 100 PREFACE The Delphic maxim ''Know Thyself" has occurred so frequently in the literature of every age from the fifth century B. C, down to our own day that it mav seem at first thought too well-worn a theme for fresh discussion. But modern use of it, whether in the title of a book or a play, or in the incidental pointing of a moral in some literary work, takes little account, as a rule, of its ancient con- notation; and no systematic attempt has been made hitherto to discover its meanings for the Greeks themselves. It has been the aim of this study to determine the sense in which the Ancients in- terpreted the maxim, by collecting the instances of its actual or implied presence in the extant writings of the Greeks and Romans down to about 500 A. D. It is possible that in covering so exten- sive a field some more or less important passages may have been over- looked, but they would probably not affect the categories indicated. It is with sincere gratitude that I here acknowledge my indebted- ness to Professor Paul Shorey of the University of Chicago for the subject of this investigation, and for many an illuminating sug- gestion during the progress of the work. Eliza Gregory Wilkins. CHAPTER I Introduction When Socrates in Plato's Protagoras^ is discussing certain verses of Simonides which refer to an apophthegm of Pittacus XaKeirbv ecrdXov ^lJLvaL, he explains that this is one of the numerous examples of the Old-time Wisdom, an instance of Laconian ^paxvKoyla, and he turns by way of illustration to the inscriptions at Delphi. "Thales the Milesian," he says, "and Pittacus the Mitylenian, and Bias the Prienian, and our Solon, and Cleobulus the Lindian, and Myson the Chenian, and the seventh Lacedaemonian Chilon . . . met together and dedicated the first-fruits of wisdom to Apollo at the temple at Delphi, writing these sayings which are on everybody's tongue, Tva)dL aavrov and MrySev ayav^ While this passage raises no questions regarding the interpretation of yvCiOi uavrbv, it may serve as a fitting introduction to a consideration of the Delphic inscriptions in generaltheir number, their authorship, and their exact location on the temple. Besides the two given above we know positively of three others the ^'E.yyvT), irapa 5' arrj, mentioned by Plato in the Charmides,^ by Diogenes Laertius^ and others; Qec^ rjpa, cited by Varro,'^ and perhaps reflected in the "sequi deum" of Cic- ero's De Finihus 111:22; and a large E, known to us chiefly through Plutarch's treatise entitled De E apud Delphos. The scholiasts on Lucian^ and on Dio Chrysostom give seven inscriptions, attributing one to each of the Seven Sages, and there is a manuscript^ in the Laurentian Library at Florence containing ninety-two sayings, which bears the title Maxims of the Seven Sages Which Were Found Carved on the Pillar at Delphi.^ The late scholiasts on Lucian and Dio Chrysostom, however, are hardly to be relied upon,^ and the 1 343 A-B. 2 165 A. 'I, 3,6 & IX, 11, 8. Sat. Menip. XXIX, 16. Ed. Reise p. 130. 5 On Phalar. I, 7. Quoted by Schultz in Philologus XXIV, p. 203, n. 62. 7 Philologus XXIV, p. 215. ' TOiv eiTTa (TOfpcov TapayyeX/xara arcua evpedrjaav KeKoXafi/xeva kTrl rod kv AeKipois kIovos. See Philologus XXIV, p. 193 and pp. 215 ff. Mullach. Frag. Phil. Graec. Vol. I, p. 212 ff. brings together the apophthegms which ancient writers attributed to the Seven Wise Men severally and collectively. Philologus XXIV, p. 203. IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE compiler of the UapayyeXfiaTa of the Wise Men was undoubtedly confused^^ in assigning to Delphi so many sayings which are no- where else mentioned as belonging there. So, too, according to Photius and Suidas, some people classed another proverb the r-qv Kara aavrov eXa as a UvdiKov aTr6(pdeyiJLa, and with like error. Modern discussion of the inscriptions at Delphi is concerned chiefly with the meaning of the E and with the arrangement of the sayings, certain scholars holding conservatively to the five known surely to have been there, and others seeking to find trace of enough more to make possible an arrangement in hexameters. The meaning of the letter E was evidently not clear to the men of later antiquity, as Plutarch's treatise shows. He gives in the main five possible explanations, two based on the supposition that the E is a real E, the fifth letter of the alphabet, and three on the supposition that it represents the diphthong EI. If the E is a simple E, he suggests that there were originally five Sages instead of seven and that this fifth letter registered a protest against the claims of the other two;^^ or again, that the E may have the mystical meanings connected with the number five.^^ If the letter represents the diphthong, he fancies that it may be the conjunction eP used in asking questions of the God if one should marry, if one should go on a voyage, and the like; or the argumentative ify^^ honored by a God who fav- ored logic; or, further, that it may be the second person singular of the verb et/zt^" and mean ''Thou art" the worshipper's recognition of the fact that God alone possesses true Being. This treatise of Plutarch's is the only ancient discussion of the E in our extant literature, and almost the only allusion to it,^^ but the letter occurs on the recently discovered omphalos,^^ and also on some coins of the time of Hadrian which represent the temple front.^*^ "7HJ. p. 217. " c. 3. "c. 7 &8. Cf. Athenaeus 453D , ^rjra, yafifia, SeXra, Qeov yap el, ^tjt', fjra. . . . C. 5. " c. 6. ^ c. 17. *' Plut. De def. orac. 31, and a frag, of a Lexicon (See Bursian Geog. I, 175, note 5) refer to the E. " See Year's Work in Classical Studies for 1915, pp. 73-74. 18 Frazer on Pausanias X, 19, 4, Vol. V, p. 340. Also Hermes XXXVI, p. 476. Among the first of modern scholars to concern himself with the inscriptions was Goettling. He accepts Plutarch's last suggestion that the E represents the verb form el, but he thinks it was addressed not to the God but to the worshipper, and renders it: *'Du hast als geschaffenes, vernlinftiges Wesen ein Selbst bewusstsein, bist Mensch. "^^ Schultz interprets it similarly, but Roscher, in an article published in 1900, suggests a different explanation. He thinks that the E is the diphthong et, but he regards it as an imperative form, like the other Delphic inscriptions, and belonging rather to the verb etfjiL a form found in compounds,^" and, according to his view, oc- curring as a simple verb in Homer.^^ This he translates not '^go" but "come," and says that it is a word of welcome and assurance to the trembling worshipper. Still another view has been promul- gated by Lagercrantz, who thinks that the E represents an ^ and means "He said." He thus regards it not as one of the Sprliche, but as the verb which introduces them, with Apollo understood as subject. Goettling and Roscher have both been interested in arranging these inscriptions in verse form, and they have had no difficulty in making an hexameter of TvcjOl cravTOV, Mridev ayav, 'E77i;a irapa 5' arr], by treating the u and a in 'E77ua as a case of synezesis.^^ Then Goettling, on the supposition that there were seven^^ Sprliche, at- tempted to fill out the first line by using the word Koyn^e and a phrase which Suidas and the Paroemiograph connect with TvCidi aavTov as napa77eX/xara Ilu^t/cd, and he produced the following i^^ et. Gev rjpa. irapal to vojiktixo. xo-pci-^ov. The KOfxL^e Goettling renders "sei hilfreich" and thinks we would naturally consider our relation to men after honoring God.^^ The irapal to vojiLcrfxa xo-pa^ov he takes with the Qec^ rjpa to mean "der *^ Ahhandlungen I, p. 236. 20 PhUologus LIX, pp. 25-26. JIfet {Clouds 633) 7rp6(r (Epictet. Enchir. 32, 2). 21 In the phrase d 8' aye, which he would write el, 5' aye. " Ahhandlungen I, p. 228. -^ Goettling thinks Plato's and Pausanias' statement that the Seven Wise Men met at Delphi and inscribed the sayings indicates that the sayings were seven in number, and that perhaps the number of sayings started the tradition of the Seven Wise Men. 2* Ahhandlungen I, p. 248. 25 Ihid. 244. 4 "know thyself" in greek and latin literature Gottheit sollst du dienen, nicht menschlichen Satzungen. "^ This TO vofjuorfMa Tapaxapa^ov, however, was not a Delphic inscription, as Suidas says, but it apparently originated in a statement of Dio- genes the Cynic in the Uodakos, a lost play attributed to him in ancient times,^^ to the effect that God had bidden him yvcbdu aavroi^^ and Trapaxapa^oi/ ro vonLfffxa}^ Diogenes Laertius says that according to a certain story this command was an answer to the Cynic's ques- tion as to how he could win distinction among men,^^ and Julian likewise treats Tapaxapa^ov to vbp.i(Tp.a not as a maxim but as an oracle given to Diogenes specifically.^^ Roscher in his turn, acting on the supposition that there were seven Spriiche because of the prevalence of that number in connec- tion with the Apollo cult,^^ filled out the first Une with two other sayings taken from the JlapayyeKyiaTa HvBiKa. He makes the verse read:^ el. deco ^pa. voimls ireWev. (peldev re xpovoLO. He selects the vofWLs weldov on account of a passage in Marcus Anto- ninus^ cLKoXovdrjaov deep. eKetvos fxev (pyjcnv otl iravTa vopuffTi . . . and another in Xenophon's Memorabilia,^^ where Apollo when asked how any one could please the Gods, replies Vojucp TroXecos.' The ipdbev xpovoio he thinks is reflected in the statement in Cicero's De P. 239. " Diogenes Laertius VI, 2, 1 (20). Julian says it is a matter of dispute whether Diogenes wrote these plays or his disciple Philiscus. Or, VII, 210 C-D. 28 We are not told distinctly that tvco^i aavrdv was in the UodaXos, but it seems the natural way to account for its use in this connection later. " For the ambiguous meaning of this phrase see Diog. Laert. VI, II, 1 (20). He tells us in effect that out of the one meaning a story arose charging Diogenes, who was the son of a banker, with adulterating the coinage. Its metaphorical meaning of disdaining custom or convention occurs more frequently, however. Cf. sec. 71: TotauTa SteXeyero /cat iroL^u k'poiiveTo oyruis vdiXKXfxa irapaxa-pa.TToii'f fxr}dv 0VT03 Tols Kara vonov cbj rots Kara, (pvaiv 5i5ovs. See also Julian Or. VII, 211 B-C: tI 8e eiTiv 6 debs, ap' Icr/jLev ; otl ttj^ rSiv iroWQiv avri^ So^jjj, kirkra^ev virepopav Kal Tcapaxo-poLTTeiv oh Trjv aX-ffdeiav, dXXa to pofnafxa. Suidas' rendering is almost identical with this. See Gomperz, Greichische Denker, vol. II, p. 127. ^ VI, II, 1. Kal irvudavonevov . . . tI Troiritras hSo^oTaTos eaTai, ovtco Xa^eiv TOP XP^'^y^V TOVTOV. '^ VI, 188 A. 32PhilologusLX, p. 91, n. 17. 33 Philologus LX, p. 90. 3* VI, 31. 35 IV, 3, 16. Roscher thinks further that the phrase tC^ 5e vbix(^ ireiarkov in Plato's Apol. 19 A has reference to this saying. Finihus^ "Quaeque sunt Vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent tempori parere, et sequi deum, et se noscere et nihil nimis," . . . though he needs to emend parere to parcere to make good his point.^^ In their insistence upon the verse form of the inscriptions Goettling and Roscher are influenced, of course, by the fact that the Delphic oracles were given in hexameters, and by the presence of such dedica- tions elsewhere. There was an epigram on the Apollo temple at Delos, according to Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics^^; and at Ephesus, apparently on the old temple of Artemis, were six words, known as 'E^ Plutarch says the Amphictyons wrote them on the temple.^ Some ancient writers held the theory, too, that they were not the words of the Sages, but the utterance of the priestess^^ the view advocated by Roscher. The uncer- tainty attached to their authorship is well expressed by Porphyry, who sums up the situation with the words: ^'Whether Phemonoe, through whom the Pythian God is said to have first distributed favors to men, uttered this {yvcbOu cavTov) ... or Phanothea, the priestess of Delphi, or whether it was a dedication of Bias or Thales or Chilon, started by some divine inspiration . . or whether it was before Chilon . . , as Aristotle says in his work on Philosophy, who- soever it was . . let the question of its origin He in dispute. "^^ We are not only in doubt concerning the original authorship of the sayings, but we do not know how early they appeared at Delphi. They must have been on the temple built toward the end of the 6th, or early in the 5th, century to replace the old stone structure de- stroyed by fire in 548 B. C.,^^ and it is possible, if not probable, that they were on the earlier temple of stone.^ Plutarch speaks of the existence in his day of an old '^ wooden ," the ''bronze E of the Athenians," and the ''golden E of the F.mpress Livia."^^ If the bronze E was dedicated by the Athenians to adorn the new temple which the Alcmaeonidae made splendid with its front of Parian marble,^^ it may be that the wooden E was rescued from the fire of 548 B. C. This new temple built by the Alcmaeonidae was de- ** Strom. I, 14, 59. See also Diog. Laert. Proem. IX (13). ** Hitzig's Pausanias, vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. 749. I, 9, 35. "1,2, 16. Cf. I, 1, 14. " I, 3, 6. " IX, 10. ^''DeGarrul. 17. " CI. Alex. Strom. 1, 14, 60 & Diog. Laert. I, 1, 13 (40). " Stob. Flor. XXI, 26. " Herodotus II, 180 & Paus. X, 5, 13. " Schvdtz thinks from the statement by Porphyry that t^'w^i aavrbv at least was on the stone temple. ^De E apud Delphos, c. 3. " Her. V, 62. Cf . Pindar, Pyth. VII. "know thyself" in greek and latin literature 7 stroyed and rebuilt in the 4th century, and the 4th century temple seems to have suffered partial destruction in 84/83 B. C, and again in Nero's time.^*^ Presumably the sayings were inscribed anew with each rebuilding, or if they were on tablets, as Goettling and Roscher think,^^ the old ones may have been rescued on some of these occa- sions. Pliny tells us that the sayings were inscril ed in letters of gold^ an addition belonging to the Roman Period, doubtless, as Plutarch says of the golden E. The exact position of the inscriptions on the temple is variously given. The scholiast on Plato's Phaedrus^^ says they were on the Propylaea. Macrobius in one passage*^^ places them on the temple front, and in another^^ on the door-post. Pausanias, however, says they were on the pronaos,^^ and Diodorus in speaking of the three best known to us says they were on a certain column.^^ The coin referred to above represents the temple as hexastyle, with the E in the central space, which may or may not be indicative of its position. Roscher thinks it may have been suspended between the two columns of the pronaos,^ while the other inscriptions were written three each on two tablets in boustrophedon fashion and at- tached to either column. He also conceives the idea of the sayings being written on six tablets attached to the six columns of the temple front, with the E on the left central and 71/co^t aavrbv on the right central column; but the theory that they were on one or both of the pillars of the pronaos seems to us more plausible, especially in view of its support by the earlier of the ancient authorities. As regards the original meaning of these sayings, we have spoken of Roscher' s suggestion that they may have corresponded in a sense to the Mosaic Decalogue. In a later article^^ he developes the idea that, originating at Delphi, they all had to do with the temple service. The E would be the welcome and assurance of the God to the wor- shipper, and the Geo) ^pa would enjoin upon him to give the God " Frazer on Pans. X, 19, 4. vol. V, p. 328 if. ^^ Abhandlungen, p. 225. " N. H. VII, 32. 229E. " Somn. Scip. I, 9, 2. 2 Sat. I, 6, 6. "X, 24, 1. " IX, 10. Cf. Varro, Sat. Menip. p. 169, ed. Reise. Phil. LX, 96. Phil. LX, 98-100. 8 "know thyself" in greek and latin literature sacrifice and honor. Tvcbdu aavrbv, he says, was an exhortation to the worshipper to be clear about himself and what he wanted; the yiribh a7ai' an exhortation to limit the excessive number of requests with which many seekers assailed the God; and 7760, irapa 5' arr], which taken independently later came to mean "Give a pledge (whether of bonds or in betrothal) without great caution, and trouble awaits you,*'^ meant originally "Bringe nur dem Gott dein Gelubde dar, aber bedenke dabei auch, dass du es erfiillen musst, wenn du nicht der Gottlichen Strafe oder Rache verf alien willst." This theory of Roscher's that the sayings originated at Delphi and had at first only a local application implies that the attributing of them to the Wise Men was a later tradition arising through their similarity in form to the general "Wisdom Literature" or Proverbs of the Greeks. But the ancient theory that they appeared at Delphi only after they had become current proverbs is at least equally plausible. We have observed that Plato is the first to refer them to the Seven Sages,^^ but in his time likewise do we find first mention of their presence on the Delphic temple. Yet they were current long before Plato, for Mfibh a7ai/ is quoted by Theognis*^ and Pin- dar,^^ and TvSjBl aavTov by the tragic poet lon,^^ and (with a dif- ferent form of the verb) by Heracleitus^^ and Aeschylus. '^^ '^ See Plutarch, Sept. Sap. Convivium c. 21 (164B) Kal tovto Si) to TroXXoi)s fikp Ayafxavs, iroXKovs 5' ctTrio-Tous, kviovs 8e Kal a found not infrequently in Homer and elsewhere (cf. Plato Rep. 362A, 466C, 569 A) in expressing a sort of challenge or threat, * Then you'd find out. ' The scholiast misses this, and reads into Homer an idea which did not become current until a later day. This tendency on the part of late writers to refer the Delphic maxims to Homer appears also in Plutarch's 56//. Sap. Convivium, c. 21 (164 B-C). "KNOW THYSELF" IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 9 Whatever their origin, these two sayings came to have an im- mense importance in Greek thought. ''Behold how many questions these inscriptions TvciodL aavrbv and yi7]bev ayav have set afoot amongst the philosophers, " says Plutarch, "and what a multitude of discussions has sprung from each of them as from a seed. "^^ And in another passage he compares them to streams confined in a narrow channel.^^ "One cannot see through their meaning," he adds, ''but if you consider what has been written or said about them by those who wish to understand what each means, not easily will you find longer discussions than these." Of such long and multitudinous discus- sions comparatively few have been left to us, although fxrjdh a7aj' and particularly yvo^di aavrov are scattered all through our extant literature, and their mention is often accompanied by some reflec- tions upon their meaning. The longest surviving work which bears directly upon the yvoidi aavrov is the Alcibiades I, ascribed to Plato, though conceded by many scholars to be of doubtful authenticity.'^^ The Neo-Platonist commentators upon the dialogue have much to say about the maxim itself, and there are discussions of shorter length to be found elsewhere in Plato, in Xenophon, Dio Chrysostom, Epictetus, Cicero, Plutarch, Julian, and a great many other writers. But Aristotle's fullest treatment of the apophthegm was apparently Kai 6 "Aktcottos orav ye Trai^ii irpos e/ue Xepcrtas, elrre, airovba^oiv 8k rovroiv "Oixtjpov evperriu ATroSet/cffcrt Kai (prjcn tov p,kv "lEKTopa yiypoiaKeiv kavrov (See p. 26) . . . t6v 8' 'OSvaaka tov p.T]8ev ayav kiraivkTr}v. . . . " E apud Delphos c. 2. ''* De Pythiae Oraculis 29. to Tvojdc aavrov Kai t6 MrjSh ayav aToSexecree . . . Kai TO. ToiavTa nev &TrodL aavTov, Kai t6 Mr]8kv ayav, Kai to 'E77ia, irapa 8' aTa. The Rhetorical writers used them as an illustration of a KbfiyLa. See Demetrius (?) On Style 9: bpl^ovTai 8' avro u}8e, Konixa 6s airrd poovvtos ', Plautus' Pseudolus, 972-3: "Pauci istuc faciunt homines quod tu praedicas; Nam in foro vix decumus quisque est qui ipsus sese noverit." Ausonius De Herediolo 19-20: "Quamquam difficile est se noscere; yvOiOi creavrdp quam prope legimus, tam cito neclegimus. " *^ Or. LXXII, 386R cbj r^ oj^ti Si) Oeta raura Kal cx^^ov tl toov xP'H^tJ''^^ deiorepa, ovs if Uvdia expo.. . . . 8* De Legihus I, 22. See p. 69. w XI, 27. 11 with a meaning capable of varied applications, and it is the various shades of meaning which 7j/co^t aavrov conveyed with which this study is chiefly concerned. Apparently its earlier and ordinary forces were comparatively simple, but as time went on and literary discussions multiplied, the maxim came to take on many ideas which were not connected with it when it first gained potency. These later uses did not drive out the earlier, but simply served as accre- tions, arising from the growth of ethical, philosophical, and meta- physical thought. They began to gather as early as Plato's time, and it is probable that to him and his Master, Socrates, we owe much of the emphasis upon certain phases of the interpretation of the apophthegm. Yet just how much originated with them we can only infer, as the saying occurs but rarely in the earlier literature. In point of language, the presence of the maxim is regularly indi- cated by some form of the verb yiyvoiCKO) with a reflexive, but it sometimes happens, particularly among later writers, that ot5a is used with the same purport. In fact, olha and yiyviCGKOi both occur with this connotation within the same sentence in at least two instances. ^^ The negative is regularly ayvoeco. Occasionally yvoipl^co with a reflexive is suggestive of the maxim. ^^ Philo Judaeus some- times uses verbs of remembering and forgetting to introduce ideas familiarly expressed with yiyvcoaKO) and ayvoecx), but this is not usual among Greek writers. ^^ The corresponding Latin phrase for yvcbdt aavTov is Nosce te, but cognosce is used very frequently instead of the simple verb, and agnosco now and then suggests the apophthegm. Scio^^ and intellego^^ are rarely found in this connection, but they do occur. Aristotle, Magna Moralia II, 1213a, 15; Philostratus, Apoll. of Ty. Ill, 18. " Eud. Ethics VIII 1245a 36-37; Magna Mor. II, 1213a; Porphyry De Ahsti- nentia: "Man, in need of all things," he says, e'Ue. re t^ dv-qrc^ rffs (puo-ecoj avrov lojs TOP oj'Tcos havTov cvK eyv(bpLcrey. The words from ecos on will scan as an iambic trimeter, which accounts for the line being listed as a Comic Frag, of unknown origin (vol. Ill, no. 246, ed. Koch). *^ The phrase ^ti? Xavdavecv airdv avrov in Plato's Philebus 19C may also suggest the maxim. See Shorey's rendering in A. J. P. XIII, 372. Cf. Plutarch, Quo Modo Adolescens Poet. aud. deb. c. 11; also Proclus on Ale. I, p, 229 ed. Creuzer: Tcav de KaT eKaaTov ^71ij.(ltu)v to jxtv kavrov XkXrjdas oiKelov carl tcJ) eavrou dyvoovvTi. Origen, In Cant. Cant. II, 56. See p. 44, n. 30. CHAPTER II TNfiei SATTON As Know Your Measure The earliest apparent reference to jvccOl aavTov is found in a fragment attributed to Heracleitus:^ avBpoiTTOiGL iracri jikreaTL ytvoxTKeLV ecavTovs /cat aoitppovelv. But this is only a fragment, and without the context the meaning which the words are intended to convey cannot be determined direct- ly. The fragment of Ion, to which we have also alluded, tells us merely that yvchdL aavTov is difficult. Aeschylus, however, who is the only other author to use the phrase directly before Plato's time, brings it into his Prometheus, where its meaning is unmistakable. The self-will of Prometheus his defiant pride has brought him to his doom and nailed him to a beetling crag on the desolate edge of the world. Justified in his own eyes for his service to man, he can see in Zeus' treatment of him only ingratitude for his help in gaining the throne and an arbitrary use of power, and his Titan heart knows no flinching. But Oceanus at length comes to beseech him to conciliate Zeus, and says in the course of his pleadings:'^ ylyvaxTKe aavTov koL nedapfioaat Tpoirovs veovs' veds yap /cat rvpavvos kv deols. Obviously Oceanus' plea is that Prometheus may humble his pride and adopt manners becoming a subject god. To know himself' is to know his place as subject of the new king, to recognize his limi- tations in his inability to defy Zeus save to his own hurt.^ And these meanings of 71/co^t colvtov, together with the more general idea ^ Stob. Flor. V, 119. Bywater (Heracleiti Ephesii Reliquiae, CVI,) questions the authenticity of this, but Diels (frag. 116) treats it as genuine. Diels substi- tutes (ppovetv for the MSS. reading (xoxppovetv, though he gives no reason for doing so. 2 Prow. 309-310. 'Harry (Prometheus p. 184) renders the verb "learn to know thyself (en- deavor)" as distinguished from the aorist Ti'w^t "come to a knowledge of thy- self (attainment), "and says that the pres. imp. is not as abrupt and urgent as the aorist. This may be true, but very likely the requirements of the meter would more naturally account for the shift in tense. * Similar to this in spirit are the words of Odysseus in Euripides' Hecuba (vv. 226-228) when he announces Polyxena's doom: nrjT' eis xepG)v ifiCKXap e^cX^ps ifiol ylyi/(a(TKe d' ahcriv Kal irapovalav kokojv Tuv aS)v, ir6 'KL'Ktavos kv Ae\vv abrdv neyaXuv, irrespective of the justice of the claim. He also speaks of the Old as HLKpoyf/vxot because they have been humbled {reTaireLvSiadai.) by life. (II, 13, 5). 3 123 D. ^ 124 A-B. "know thyself" in greek and latin literature 19 Alexander the Great, who like Alcibiades had vast ambitions, was reminded of his failure to obey the Delphic precept by Dio- genes the Cynic, according to a story told by Dio Chrysostom.^^ While at Corinth, Alexander went to visit the Philosopher, and after he had recovered from his surprise at being asked to stand a little to one side that he might not shade Diogenes from the sun,^^ he at length asked Diogenes how one could be the best kind of a king^' and from whom he could learn the art. Diogenes replied that he should learn the art from Zeus and the Zeus-nourished kings of Homer (dioTpecpels jSao-tXeas).^^ A King like Xerxes, when he drove his hordes into Greece, he said, acted as a cook, driving them to be butchered.^^ "Does not even the Great King seem to you to be a king?" asked Alexander. "No more than my little finger," replied Diogenes. "Then will I not be a great king if I overthrow him?" Alexander asked further. Diogenes answered that he would no more be a real king than if he were made so by children in a game,''^ and Alexander was vexed, because he did not care to live if he could not be king of Europe and Asia and Lybia and the islands of the sea . . . .^^ "You seem to be jesting," he said, "if I take Darius and the king of India besides, nothing will hinder my being the greatest king who ever existed. For what is there left for me to conquer, after subduing Babylon and Susa and Ecbatana and gaining con- trol of affairs in India?" And Diogenes, seeing him aflame with ambition, said "You will not be a king the more as a result of this purpose, not even if you leap over the wall of Babylon and so take the city . . . nor if you take a continent greater than Asia by swimming through the ocean." "And what further enerny is left me?" said Alexander, "after I take these whom I have mentioned?" "The hardest to fight of all," replied Diogenes, "not a Persian, nor a Lydian in speech, as I suppose Darius is, but a Macedonian and a Greek." And Alexander was confused and contended that he did not know any one in Macedonia or in Greece prepared to make war, and he asked who this enemy in Greece or Macedonia 36 Or. IV. 147 R. " 150 R. " 155 R. " 156 R. " 156 R-157 R. 158 R. 20 "know thyself" in greek and latin literature might be. "You are your own worst enemy," . . . Diogenes answered,'*^ "and this is the man of whom you are ignorant as of none other. For no uncontrolled and wicked man understands himself, else Apollo would not have enjoined this first of all as the hardest thing for each of us, yvCovaL eavrbv. Or do you not consider aappoavvitf^ the greatest and most deadly of all diseases . . .?" "You will have the truth from me alone," Diogenes says a little farther on, "and from no one else could you learn it." Alexander was evidently making the mistake of estimating himself by his posi- tion and military achievements rather than by his real qualities of character, and the Cynic would have him know the measure of his real self. Diogenes gives the maxim much the same force in Dio Chrysostom's short dialogue on Reputation.^^ The question is raised as to how the philosopher seems to differ from the rest of mankind, and the gist of Diogenes' argument is that the philosopher brings every- thing to the test of truth, while others are guided by what men say of them. "Would a man be of any account," Diogenes asks, "if he measures himself by this rule and standard?", and his interlocutor replies that he certainly would not. Then the dialogue continues: AtjXov yap 6tl ovdeirore yvoir\ av eavTov ourco aKOiroiv Ou yap av yvolr) "ficrre ovk av en TreldoLTO tQ AekipiKco TrpoaprjfxarL KeXevaavrt iravrds fxaWov yiyvoiGKeiv avrov. The effect of flattery in making a man "think more highly of himself than he ought to think" is a common theme in ancient literature and is associated with 7j/co^t cavrdv on more sides than one. It was implied in the words of Diogenes to Alexander to the effect that Alexander would learn the truth from him alone, and we remember that Croesus frankly admitted that he grew to over- estimate his powers partly because he was spoiled by flatterers.^^ So Seneca, in speaking of the subject, says that men in position who listen to flattery do not know their own strength, but while they believe that they are as great as they hear themselves called, they draw on unnecessary and hazardous wars.^^ Plato saw in this in- 160 R. " For the significance of the word iLcppocrvvrj here, compare Chap. IV, page 38. It is evidently the opposite of (Toappoavvrj in its general sense. "Or. LXVII, 361 R. ^ Cf. Zeno (Stob. Flor. 14, 4) "^XeTxe (ravrbv oaris el, fxri irpds x^-Pi-v aKov\ a- Srjaei o{)8' a^eXetJ ttjv irpoaipeffiv. Sta tovto iraprjyyeWov oi TraXaiot rd ypcoOi aavTov. Sec. 18-23. "/ John, LXVI. 1. Cf. XXXII, 5 "Nam infirmitatem suam Petrus nesciebat, quando a Domino quod ter esset negaturus audiebat. " ^'^ De Anima et Eius Origine IV, 11. He also argues that we are ignorant of ourselves as touching the extent of our memory. Sec. 9-10. 32 "know thyself" in greek and latin literature specific connotations of the general idea of 'knowing one's meas- ure' ; and this is true also of the use of the maxim in its further meaning of 'knowing one's place. '^^ ^^A part of Ausonius' little poem on Chilon is somewhat pertinent in connection with the theme of the present chapter: "Commendo nostrum ypcodi aeavrov, nosce te, Quod in columna iam tenetur Delphica. Labor molestus iste, fructi est optimi, Quid ferre possis, quidve non, dinoscere; Noctu diuque, quae geras, quae gesseris, Ad usque puncti tenuis instar quaerere, OiB&cia cuncta, pudor, honor, constantia In hoc et ulla spreta nobis gloria." {Ludus Septem Sapientum, 138-145) CHAPTER IV TNfiei SAT TON As Know Your Place. Its Relation To 2:i]$P02TNH. When in Aeschylus' play Oceanus advised Prometheus to know himself, he was, as we have said,^ warning him to know his place as a subject of the new king of the Gods. Now 'knowing one's place' was one of the meanings of that complex Greek virtue aouppoavvr],^ and because of this phase of similarity it is probable that 71/co^t aavTov was often given as a definition of the virtue in the ethical discussions of Fifth-century Athens. Hence it is that in Plato's Charmides,^ when another current definition of aouppoavvt] namely, ro to, avTov irpcLTTeLv was seen to fail, because the man who lacks a knowledge of what he can and cannot do beneficially is not always able to do his own business, Critias seized upon yvaidi aavTov. To be sure, Socrates had virtually put the words into his mouth by using the phrases ov yiyvcoa-KeL eavrov cos eirpa^ev and ayvoet 6' kavrbv in his pre- ceding refutation, but it is also probably safe to assume that Critias was repeating something which he had heard before. Socrates' interlocutors usually voiced opinions rife in popular thought and discussion,^ and besides the statement in the Charmides that the definition ret auroO tp6lttlv was borrowed,^ we have as evidence for the general currency of the two definitions a passage in the Timaeus:^ v /cat TTctXat Xe7rat to TrpoLTTtiv Kcd yvcbvac t6l re avTOv /cat eavrdv dL aavrbv by people in general in this sense of 'knowing one's place' is recorded by Philo Judaeus. In his Embassy to Gains Philo gives an account of the murders perpetrated by Gains Caesar against those who were near to him by reason of kinship or influence. Among his first victims was Macro, a man who had befriended Gains continually in the face of the dis- trust of Tiberius, and so had helped him to secure the throne. ^^ After Gains became Emperor, Macro pursued him with occasional advice and admonition a course which at length became irksome to Gains and led him to put Macro to death. The people, despite the number of eminent men whom Gains was removing, tried to make excuses for him at first, and yielding to the prejudice against Macro which Gains had deliberately sought to create,^^ they said that Macro was ''puffed up beyond measure," and that ''he did not thoroughly grasp the Delphic inscription yvOidi (javrbv . . . For what could have made him change the relative positions of Gains and himself so as to virtually make himself ruler and Gains his subject? "^^ Whether yvwdi aavrbv was actually on the lips of the people on the occasion of this incident, or whether it merely came spontaneously to the pen of Philo in writing the account in his own way, makes little difference. The setting naturally recalled the maxim in either case. The Emperor Julian introduces the apophthegm playfully in the sense of 'knowing one's place in the presence of superior wisdom' in one of his letters to lamblichus.^^ He begins the letter by saying: *'We ought in obedience to the Delphic inscription to know our- selves and not have the face to behave boldly toward a man of such great fame a man whose mere glance it is hard to return, to say nothing of meeting him on equal terms when he rouses the harmo- nious strains of all wisdom {riiv iravaoipov apuovlav) ; for if Pan were to echo his shrill song, every one would stand dumb, even Aristaeus, and if Apollo should play on his lyre, every man would keep silence, though he knew the music of Orpheus." Tv(hdi, aavrov seems to have been a favorite maxim with Julian, for he discusses it at length in 13 Sec. 32 ff. " Sec. 57. 1^ Sec. 69. trKkov k^ kiprinepoi, xa^eiroi' vfnv kariv yiy visaKew rd. {>Herep' airrCav xp^y^o.Ta Kai irpos yi y/xas airovs, &. ' Tim. 86B. 15 Laws 886B-E. " Laws 863 C-D. " Apol. 23B. 18 Soph. 230B-D. 19 Thaeet. 150D. 20 Laches 187E-188A. " Sym. 216A-C. IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 43 himself, who in his ironical affectation of ignorance claimed to know nothing, and who was too busy to rationalize mythology until he should know what manner of man he was, really obeyed the God's behest better than did the generality of mankind. This extended use of jvcjOl aavTov in the sense of 'knowing the limits of one's wisdom' occurs in the works of three of Plato's con- temporaries. Xenophon's use of it we have already discussed.^^ Aristophanes, as we might expect, refers to it in the CloudsP Strep- siades has proved a sorry pupil in the school of Socrates and is trying to persuade his son Pheidippides to attend in his place. ''What good could any one learn from them?" Pheidippides asks; and Strepsiades replies: oKrjde!; ; oaawep ear' kv avSpo^iroLS (joipk' yvcoaif) 8e aavrov cios ajjLadijs el Kal iraxvs. Hermann says of this passage "Haud ego credam, quod Suverino p. 7 visum est, facile hie tangi illud ab Socrate discipulis commenda- tum yvcjdL aavTov.''^'^^ But it is hard to see how Hermann or anyone else who is familiar with Plato should hesitate to agree with Suvern.^^ The phrase yviiaxi . . aavrbv could scarcely mean anything else to a Greek ear, and no better catch- words could be found to describe the Socratic teaching than are contained in the second of the above verses. Isocrates also gives this meaning to the Delphic inscription in his Panathenaicus. The oration really contains an essay within an essay a long historical account of Athens' greatness which Isocrates represents himself as having written. When he had finished all but the conclusion,^ he says, he read it with three or four of his pupils, and then called in a former disciple who had been used to an oli- garchical form of government and had been given to praising the Lacedaemonians, thinking that he would be especially quick to notice any errors. The man approved the speech in general, but did not like what had been said about Sparta, and he thereupon made bold to say that Greece ought to be grateful to Sparta because she had dis- 22 See pp. 37 f. 23 vv. 841-2. 2 Note on Nuhes, p. 109. 2* Starkie, The Clouds of Aristophanes p. 190, weakly says: "possibly, as Silvern (iiber Ar. Wolken, p. 7) suggests, an allusion to the Delphic yvGidi, aavrdp.'' Humphreys, however, declares it "the expansion of the Delphic yvusdt aavrSp." {Clouds p. 160), Forman also sees the allusion to the maxim (p. 167). 28 Panathenaicus 200. / '' 44 covered the noblest of pursuits and had taught them to others.^^ Isocrates in turn proceeds to confute this idea by objecting to the ends of Spartan education and her attitude toward her neighbors; and at length his critic, who has dared to interpose but once, goes away "a wiser man with the sails of his opinion furled, having ex- perienced" Isocrates says, "that which is written at Delphi, and knowing himself and the character of the Lacedaemonians better than before. "2^ It is evident that the man had been afflicted with that conceit of wisdom which the Platonic Socrates so deplores, and "knowing himself" means that he had come to see the worthlessness of his opinions. The Socratic theme of man's proneness to think he knows what he does not became something of a tag among later writers,^^ though it is not often again associated so closely with the maxim.^'^ There is at least a hint of this conceit of wisdom, however, in the story told of Hipparchus in the spurious Platonic dialogue which bears his name, and it is essentially the purport of a passage in Dio Chrysostom. Fj'co^t aavTov is introduced in the Hipparchus, as in Plato's Protagoras, not so much for the sake of its own meaning as by way of humorous illustration in connection with another apoph- thegm. Socrates and his interlocutor are discussing the love of Gain, and Socrates is accused of deceiving his companion by turning things topsy-turvy in his arguments.^^ He replies that in that case he would not be heeding Hipparchus, who set up Herms in every deme, bearing epigrams of his own composing, that the people might not marvel at the wise inscriptions at Delphi the TvoidL aavrbv and the M'nbh ayav and the rest but think the sayings of Hipparchus wiser and flock to him to learn more.^^ One of these epigrams of Hippar- chus contained the injunction /xi? (p'Ckov k^airara,^^ which is the point "Sec. 202. 2* Sec. 230. 6 fj-kv yap airfiei (ppovifxdiTepos yeyeurj/xepos Kat (rweaTaXfikvrjv excov TTjv SLavoiap . . . Kai Treirovdus to yey pafx/jievov kv AeXipoTs, avrSv t' kypcoKus Kal rifv XaKeSainopLoov )Tlvr}v ^lottiv a kvbiTTpc^ XPVM*^' o.v Kal rdv &vdpci}irivci3V els t'^v 4^vxvs aperrip, Kal ovtcos av p.6iKi(7Ta dpQfxeu Kal yLyvcoaKOfieu 17/xas avrovs. '^Sp. Leg. I, 263-4; De Somn. I, 211-2. Cf. Tertullian, De Anima XVII "ipsius dei providentiam . qui cunctis operibus suis intellegendis, incolendis, dispensandis, fruendisque fallaces et mendaces dominos praefecerit sensus . . Sed enim Plato, ne quod testimonium sensibus signet, propterea et in Phaedro ex Socratis persona negat se cognoscere posse semetipsum. ..." 62 "know thyself" in greek and latin literature true Being. He introduces yvCiSi aavrbv with this purport in his symbolic interpretation of Charran and the life of Jacob in particular. Charran the land into which Terah came when he left Chaldea/^ and into which Jacob went to live with his Uncle Laban, is the land of the external senses. The word means '' holes, "^^ he says, and he bids the man who would examine himself go into the holes and caverns of the body, and investigate his eyes, ears, nostrils, and other organs of sense. ^* ''He who is still active in mortal life has need of these organs, "^^ and so Rebekkah says to Jacob :^^ yvihdi aavrbv Kal TCL aavTov fikprj t'l t eKaarov /cat irpos tl yeyove Kal ttcos kvepyeTv irkipvKe Kai TLS 6 TOL davjiara klvcov Kal vevpocnradrSiv aoparos dopdrcos etre 6 kv aol vovs etre tcov avfjLiravTOJv. But Rebekkah would not have Jacob stay long in the country of the external senses. He was not to remain there all his life but "certain days," while a long lifetime is stored up for him in the city of the Mind.^^ The command to Abraham likewise was to depart from his country and his kindred, the outward senses, which means to be alienated from them in one's thought to treat them as subjects, to learn to rule and not be ruled by them.^^ Uclvtcl TOP alcova ylvo)aKe aeavrov, Philo says, . . . ourcos yap &v re viraKoveiv Kal oh k-KiTarreiv irpoarJKev aladrjaif}^ This control of the outward senses is followed by the mind's beginning to know itself^^ and associating with the reflections of the intellect, and when the mind has come to understand itself accurately, it will probably somehow know God.^^ ^^ Mixed in with this exposition of the meaning of self-knowledge are exhor- tations to abandon the study of the physical sciences and to know oneself, even as Terah in going from Chaldea abandoned the investigation of the universe for which the Chaldeans were famous to study himself at Charran. The dis- position which the Hebrews called Terah, he says, found concrete embodiment in Socrates, who grew old in the most careful consideration of yuCodi aavrbv. De Somn. I, 58. cf. Mig. Abraham 185. " De Fuga et Inventione 45. " De Somn. I, 55. 15 De Fug. et In. 45. 16 Sec. 46. 17 De Somn. I, 46. 18 Cf. Tertullian, De Anima XVII: "Plato, ne quod testimonium sensibus signet, propterea et in Phaedro ex Socratis persona negat se cognoscere posse semetipsum. ..." 19 De Mig. Abraham 7-8. 20 Ibid. 13. ^1 Ibid. 195. fioBoiv ctKpt/Scos eavrdv eiaerai xAxa ""oi; Kal deov. . . . 63 Porphyry in an extract from his work on TvCjOl Zavrov refers to Plato's Philebus and says, among other things, that to know oneself altogether probably includes i7^tas /cat ra rjnerepa Kal to, tcov ri/jLeTepcov. *'Plato," he says, '' was zealous to know himself in every way, that the immortal man within might be known and the outer portrait might not be unknown, and that the difference between them might be distinguishable. For the perfect vovs of which each of us is a likeness distinguishes the inner self, where the real man dwells, and the outer image is distinguishable by the things of the body and one's possessions. The powers of these also we ought to know and con- sider how far they extend. . . ."^^ The Emperor Julian likewise says23 that yj/w^i aavrdv means a knowledge of the body, for ''Socrates and many others," he says, "thought to eavrdv yvcovai to be this TO fxadelv oLKpL^ccs tI jiev OLTodoTeov \l/vxV) '''^ 5e adcjJLdTL.^^ and earlier in the same chapter he says:^'* "He who knows himself will know about the soul and he will know about the body also. . . . And coming back to the first beginning of the body, he will consider whether it is simple or composite; and then as he goes forward he will reflect about its harmony, and how it is affected, and about its powers and, in a word, about everything which it needs for its continuance." The above passages from Porphyry and Julian are patently mere enlargements of the rd lavTov theme of Plato's tripartite division, and Philo very likely had it in mind also. There is a further instance of self-knowledge as applied to the body in Nemesius' work on The Nature of Man,^^ where he says that the Tree of Knowledge in the Garden of Eden gave a knowledge of one's nature, and makes it clear that the self-knowledge which it gave was a consciousness of one's bodily needs.^ He refers to the Hebrews the statement that man in the beginning was neither mortal nor immortal; for if he had been mortal, God would not have pronounced death as the pen- alty of his disobedience, while if he had been immortal, he would not have needed food; and he gives as his own view that man in that state was equipped as a mortal, but was able to attain immortality 22Stob. Flor. 21:28. 23 VI, 190B. 2* 183B-C. 25 1, 16. 2 cf^ John of Damascus, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith II, 11. t6 nkv ^vXov rfjs yv6}, ov yvaxry aeavT-qv ohdk. y6.p aXXos 6(TTLs fxi} oyrco So^ctfei iyvo) eavrdv. 32 Stob. Flor. I, 88. See page 74. 33 130C. 3* Proclus In Ale. I, vol. II, p. 3 ed. Creuzer. 35 Ad. Colotem 20: t6 yvCcdi (tovtov 6 5i) /cat ScoAcpdTet dTroptas Kai ^r]Tr]cr&i)s raiiTrii iipxhv ivkbiOKtv, cos ApLO-TOTkXrjs kv rots nXaTcovt/cois elprjKe ... el yap t6 k^ &fxp,a T]vaL to rw kTnaTpafpfjvai,. 70 "know thyself" in greek and latin literature certain skill in knowing what follows each thing and what is opposite to each. And when he perceives that he has been born for civil society, he will not only think that he ought to use that careful rea- soning for himself, but also that he ought to diffuse more widely the power of speech by which he rules peoples, establishes laws, chastises the wicked, gives recognition to the Good, praises illustrious men, gives forth precepts of safety and praise suited for the persuading of his fellow-citizens, exhorts to glory, recalls from disgrace, consoles the afflicted, and records the deeds and counsels of the brave and wise, along with the ignominy of the wicked, in eternal monuments. These are the powers, many and great as they are, which those who wish to know themselves see to be in man; and the parent and nurse of these is Philosophy. "^^ We have seen, then, how from the idea that yvcadi (tovtov bids us know our soul, the command came to be applied not only to the relation of the soul to the body in the case of the individual, but to the knowledge of man in general and the pursuit of philosophy, including the main tenets of the Stoics. The Neo-Platonists con- strued the God's command to mean a knowledge of the psychological analysis of the soul into its various faculties and functions, while they brought its phraseology into connection with the idea of self- consciousness, and applied it to certain of the soul's activities. Plotinus says in his first chapter on the Difficulties about the Soul that in investigating these difficulties we would obey the command of the God which bids us know ourselves ;^^ and again in speaking of the One or the Good and of how it transcends all predications of know- ledge, he says:^* kirel koL to yvC^Qi uavrov Xeyerau tovtols ot dta to TrXrjdos eavTihv epyov exovac diapLOfxelv eavrovs Kal (jiadelv, oaa Kal Troia 6vts ov iravra laaaiv rj ov8ev, ovd' otl apxet ov8e Kara tI avrol. Porphyry says in his work on Tvco6l Xavrov that knowing oneself is likely to have reference to the necessity of knowing the soul and the vovs.^^ And when " De Legibus I, 58-62. Ed. Orellius. *^ En. IV, III, 1 : iretBofx^a Se av Kal tQ tov deov irapaKeKebatxari avroi/s yivoiCKeLP TrapaKeKevonevcfi irepl rohrov rrfv k^kTcuriv iroiovntpoi. lamblichus says in his Letter to Sopater on Dialectic (Stob. Flor. 81, 18) : /coi ttjv avufxefxiynkPTiv 8t6.aKef/Lv tov \6yov Trpos TO. o\a Trpaynara ayairco/iev aiir-qu 8k t-^p kavrov ypQxnp tov \6yov, Kad' rjp aiJir}v eldevai' (Txo\f} yap av aWo TL^8rj,tyeiJL7]d' k/jLavToveylyvccaKov} So Croesus, we remember, said that when Apollo told him that if he knew himself he would be happy, he thought that the easiest thing in the world.^ And Galen even says of himself that when he was a lad he thought people praised the Pythian command to know oneself overmuch, for it did not seem to him a great injunction.^ It is evident that to unthinking youth and the Lydian Croesus the words yvQdt aavrbv might, for literary purposes at least, mean merely 'know who you are,'^ but greater maturity of thought and experience brought men to a better realization of their profundity. That yvCiBi aavrbv was difficult, however, was a new idea to the individual only as it became his own through experience or reflection, for it was an old saying, attributed, like the maxim itself, to Thales,^ or Chilon,^ or the Wise ^ 129 A. See p. 60. 2 IV, II, 24. See p. 23. 3 Xen. Cyr. VII, 2, 21. See pp. 15-16. * Vol. V, p. 4. Kuhn. See p. 47. ^ Observe that Socrates asks Euthydemus if a man seems to know himself who knows his name only (sec. 25). Macrobius {Sat. I, 6, 6) tells the story of how Vettius Praetextatus was asked by one of a group of scholars assembled at his house why among the various terms applied to a man's dress Praetextatus only was used as a proper name. Vettius prefaced his explanation by saying in part: "... cum posti inscriptum sit Delphici templi et unius e numero septem sapientum eadem sit ista sententia yvGidL (ravrbv, quid in me nescire aestimandus. sum, si nomen ignoro?" Stob. Flor. Vol. IV, p. 297; Meineke; Diog. Laert, I, 9, 35. ^ Stob. Flor. 21, 13. "know thyself" in greek and latin literature 79 Men generally.^ The Pythagorean ** hearers," lamblichus tells us,^ included it in the second class of questions in their catechism:^" ov8e tI to xaXeiroi', dXXa tI to xaXeTrajraroj'' otl to avTOV yvojval kaTLvM How early this became a part of the Pythagorean aKohatiaTa we do not know, but we meet the thought in a fragment of Ion's :^^ TO yvCiSi aavTov tovt' eiros fiev ov tikya epyov 8' baov Zeus jjubvos eTrto-rarat dedv. Leopold Schmidt in his Ethik der Alien Griechen says this is the only place in Greek literature, as far as he knows, where self-knowledge is called impossible;^* but it is probable, especially in view of the period in which Ion wrote, that he was exclaiming over the difficulty of the task rather than its impossibility. ''This yvoodi aavTov," he says, " is a little word, but the deed how great it is Zeus only knows!" This sentiment that 7j'a;^t aavTov is difficult occurs frequently in discussions of the maxim, and the question of wherein the difficulty lies is answerable only in terms of its application in each given instance. When Diogenes cited it to Alexander,^'* he meant that it was hard for men to estimate aright their own ability and impor- tance; but when Socrates asked Alcibiades whether or not it seemed hard to him, he was thinking of knowing one's soul.^^ Sometimes we read that it is harder for us to know ourselves than to know others, and then again that knowing others is more difficult, but the statements involve no contradiction, for it all depends upon the meaning of the maxim in a given context. So Crassus in Cicero's De Oratore,^^ after enumerating Antonius' characteristics * Aristotle, Magn. Mor. II, 1213a, 14; lamblichus, Life of Pythagoras 83. ^ Life of Pythagoras 83. ^^ The first class asked what a thing is, the second what it is especially, and the third what one must or must not do. ^^ The next question was oibh tI to ^g.8u>v, dXXa tI t6 pq.(TTov 6ti rd Wet, xPWdo-'" ^2 Frag. 55, Nauck. From Plut. Cons, ad A poll. 28. A similar distich is to be found among the Comic fragments (no. 389, Koch vol. Ill, p. 481). TO jpuOl aavTov kv \6yois ohbkv /i^^a ep7({) bk TovTo ixbvos kiriaTaTai Beds. This is taken from the scholiast on Ale. I, 390 (Bekker.) with no word as to its authorship. It is more likely to be a corruption of the Ion fragment than a quotation from a different author. ^^ II, 396. Schmidt's quotation from Goethe's Gesprache mit Eckermann is excellent, but hardly apropos of Ion's meaning. " See pp. 19-20. ^5 Ale. I, 129A-130E. i III, 33. 80 as an orator, says of his own: "Quale sit non est meum dicere, propterea quod minime sibi quisque notus est et difficillime de se quisque sentit," meaning, of course, that it is difficult to form a right estimate of one's own powers. But when Apollonius of Tyana tells Tigellinus that he uses his wisdom to know the Gods and under- stand men, tov yap eavTov yvoovaL xaXcTrcorepoj^ elvau to aWov yvoivai,^"^ he probably has reference to the idea that knowing oneself is the beginning of philosophy. Augustine says that a man in charge of a monastery may resolve to admit no one who is wicked, and asks how he will avoid doing so.^ "Those who are about to enter do not know themselves"; he says "how much less dost thou know them^ For many have promised themselves to fulfill that holy life: . . . they were sent into the furnace and they cracked ";^^ and Augustine's thought apparently is that while we may be deceived about our own strength of will, we can judge of it better than we can that of another. Again it is sometimes assumed that a knowledge of self includes the ability to know others likewise; as, for instance, when Socrates tells Euthydemus that they who know themselves can the better judge of other people, ^^ and when he tells Alcibiades^^ that only as a man knows himself in the three-fold way will he know others aright and be a fit leader among them. A story told by Philostratus is also in point in this connection. In his Life of Diony- sius of Miletus^^ he says that Dionysius once came to Sardis, where he learned from his host Dorion, that a certain Polemon, of whose eloquence he had heard fabulous tales, was to serve as advocate in a law-suit the next day. In the course of his conversation with Dorion about the coming event and about Polemon's oratory, he suggested that Dorion tell him in what respects Polemon and him- self excelled each other, but Dorion replied very discreetly: "You will be the better judge of yourself and him. av yap vwd coipias olos cavTov re y ly vicaKHV, 'irepov re jiij ay vorjaaLV This story of Philostratus' shows not only that the knowledge of others was regarded as in a sense consequent upon the knowledge " Philostratus, Apoll. Ty. IV, 44. Cf. VI, 35 where in speaking of Apol- lonius' later journeys to places which he had visited previously, he says: irhXiv ovdafiov kWtlirovTL to htj ovx ofwiu) (palvtadai. xaXeTToO yap tov yvCivai kavrov 8okovvto5 XaXcTTOJTepoj' e7co7e riyovixai. to fxtlvat. tov aapov kavTi^ ofWLov. . . . ^^ Enar ratio in Psalmum XCIX, 11. 9 Xen. Mem. IV, II, 26. 20 Ale. /, 133D ff. 21 Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists I, XXII, 4 p. 38, ed. Kayser. "know thyself" in greek and latin literature 81 of self, but it hints at another idea common in later philosophical literature namely, that the knowledge of self, and so the knowledge of man, was limited to the philosophers. Tvcodt aavrbv in any sense was hard, but in its simpler ethical forces it was not conceived as being beyond the attainment of each and all. Taken as an injunc- tion to know one's soul, however, it became possible for the Wise Man only, and even for him perfect self-knowledge was unattainable, for it is God alone who fully knows Himself. This is expressed in part by Philo Judaeus, when he speaks of yvCiSi aavrbv in connection with the life of Jacob. Jacob was to tarry in Charran, the country of the external senses, only a few days, we remember,^^ but a longer period was allotted him in the city of the mind. He would never be really able to comprehend his soul and his mind,^^ Philo says, yet those who practice the exercise of wisdom most perfectly proceed to leave Charran after they have learned fully the whole field of the senses, as did Abraham, who attained to great progress in the com- prehension of complete knowledge ;^^ "for when he knew most then he especially renounced himself in order to come to an accurate knowledge of true Being. For he who apprehends himself well, by clearly grasping the universal nothingness of the creature, heartily renounces himself, and he who renounces himself learns to know Being. "2^ Sextus Empiricus, the Skeptic, says^^ in his discussion of the definition of man that man is not altogether to be comprehended, for Socrates was at a loss, although he continued in his investigation, and said that he did not know what he was and how he was related to the universe.^^ "Democritus, " Sextus says further, "in saying man is what we all know, merely begged the question; for no one will grant that man can be known off-hand d ye 6 TIWlos ojs tikyicrov ^7]TT}iJLa irpovdriKev avrQ to yvddi aavTov. But granted that man can be known at all, he will not turn the investigation over to all men 22 See p. 62. 23 De Somn. I, 56. ^ Sec. 59-60. A free rendering. 2* Sec. 60. In his Leg. Allegor. I, 91-92 he says the mind cannot understand itself and asks: dr* oIk evijOeis ol Tepl dwv crKiirTOfxeuoi. ovcrLas] ol yap rfjs idias ^vxfji rv,v ovaiav ovk laacn. ttcos olv irepl rrjs tccv oXojv 4^vxvs i-KpL^uxraiev ] There is no real contradiction here. He means simply that the mind can know itself and God but imperfectly at best, and it can know God only as it knows itself. 26 Upds AoycKovs A. 264-6. 2" Sextus goes on to quote the Fhaedrus passage here. 82 ''know thyself" in greek and latin literature but only28 to the most careful philosophers." Hierocles shows that this is the thought of certain of the Golden Verses of the Pytha- goreans '?^ ZeO Trarep, rj ttoWCov Ke KaKchv \v(Taas oiTravTas t iracnv deltas otco tQ daifiovi, xp^vto.l. dXXd (Ti) Okpatiy kird Belov yhos kaTi ^poToXaiv oh tepa irpoipepovaa i/'uxf?- And he further says in effect that while all have implanted within them the first impulse to a knowledge of their own essence, it is impossible for every one to attain it, for all cannot be philosophers, and they alone have turned to the con- templation of the real Good.^^ This idea that self-knowledge was possible only for the philoso- pher is, of course, merely a re-statement from a different angle of the Stoic doctrine, logically derived from Plato, that self-knowledge is the beginning of philosophy. That self-knowledge could be but imperfectly attained even by the philosopher is expressed in the words of Heracleitus :^2 "^vxn^ irelpaTa Idjv ovk av k^evpoio, iraaav kirL-wop^ evojjLevos odov ovto) ^advv \byov exet although we assume that Heraclei- tus did not especially relate the thought to yvOidi aavTov. The connection of the maxim with the power of abstract contemplation necessary to an apprehension of true Being or the Good, which we met in the Alcibiades /, means perforce that man can know himself but intermittently, for only so can the soul be free from the limitations of the flesh and in unison with the Divine which knows itself per- fectly, call it Nous, true Being, the Good, or God. "According to one and the same knowledge, God knows both Himself and all things," said Dionysius the Areopagite.^^ It is but the personal 28 Reading n6voi% with Bekker. 29 vv. 61-66. 30 Page 156, line 12, ed. Mullach. " Page 157. 32 Frag. 45, Diels. 33 De Div. Nom. VII, 469C /card fiiav Kal ahriiv yvCiv oTTCoaovv ovTOiv ras alrlas. . . . But if this self-knowledge, while so fundamental, is withal so difficult, then how can a man know himself? This was essentially the question which both Euthydemus^^ and Alcibiades^^ put to Socrates when he tried to impress upon them the importance of giv- ing heed to the maxim. In neither case does Socrates answer the question directly, but he implies by his method that dialectic is the surest way, and in the Alcibiades I that method leads at length to a vision of self through the vision of (ppovrjaLs and God. A lack of self- knowledge, moreover, was for Socrates virtually synonymous with that reprehensible false conceit of wisdom which he attacked so incessantly, and for that he says plainly that dialectic is the remedy .'* But there were other answers suggested for this well-nigh insoluble problem, and one of these grew out of the old saying "A friend is a second self. "^^ That a friend helps us to know ourselves is stated in Aristotle's chapter on Friendship in the Nicomachean EthicSy and while the words of the maxim are not used there, they are implied in the corresponding passage of the Eudemian Ethics, and occur unmistakably in the Magna Moralia. ^n the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle raises the question as to whether the happy man has need of friends, and among the arguments brought forward to prove that he has is the fact that in living the fullest life (h rc3 ^rjv Kal kvepyelv) it contributes to his happiness to contemplate noble actions and ^* See Philo Judaeus Leg. Allegor. 7, 91. 17 yap tup oXcav ^vxh o 6e6s kan Kard. Ivvoiav. 35 Plotinus' God was beyond Nous and self-knowledge was not predicated of Him, although a grasp of the idea of Him leads to self-knowledge in the soul. Enn. V, III, 7. ^ Or. VI, 184B-C. ' 185B. 38 Xen. Mem. IV, II, 30. ^^Alc.I, 124B. * See p. 42. Proclus (on Ale. I, pp. 8-9) says in effect that the dialectic method leads to self-knowledge. " aXXos 'HpaxXiJs, aXXos airds. Eud. Eth. 1245a. 30. 84 *'know thyself" in greek and latin literature recognize them as his own; and a man can contemplate his friend better than himself, and he can see his friend's deeds better also.^^ Moreover, a good man sees himself and his actions in his friend because his friend is likewise good and a friend is a second self.'^ Tn the corresponding passage of the Eudemian Ethics,'^ Eudemus tells us that this full life (/car' hepyelav) is the being alive to our perceptions and the acquisition of knowledge, and to have perception of oneself and acquire knowledge of oneself is most to be desired. If one could isolate the knowledge of self from living, he says, it would make no difference whether you knew yourself or another instead of yourself ;^^ and he adds farther on: to ovv tov (pikov aladaveadaL TO avTOV TTCos avdyKTi aiaS aveadai elvai, Koi to o-kwi' oti wduTes aixaprdveLV eluidaatv ; (llept Ilap- pafTias 46. p. 22 (Teubner). And Libanius uses it in the sense of knowing the frailty of man's nature in view of the power of evil, when he makes Timon the Misanthrope say: AXX' eTretSi) decov ris iKptiKtro nov r-qv kxKvv koL rrfv \//vxvv kKadr]pe TTjf kfjiriv Kai Kara to ypafxfxa to AeXfpiKou tyvoiv hfiavTov Kal tL ttot' karlv avdpwTros Kai oaou KaKov kd(, aavTov. Sokratische Philosophic und Christenthum verhalten sich dennoch, in diesen ihren Aus- gangspunkt betrachtet zu einander wie Selbstserkenntniss und Sunder-erkenntniss. " A recognition of our sinful nature, together with a sense of the greatness of God, naturally leads to the Christian " LVI, 3. Cf. Ambrose In Ps. CXVIII, 16, 11: "hominem se esse cognovit impar sibi bellum adversum spiritalia nequitiae in coelestibus. . ." Cf. also Basil, Ep. CCIV, 4. ^s III, 23. *9 In Ps. LXV, 14. so Strom. IV, 6, 27. *i In Ps. CXVIII, II, 14. The wicked do not know themselves according to Ambrose, De Excidio Hierosol. Ill, XVII, 28: "Sed hunc exitum sacrilegi ferunt, aut proditores vel percussores parentum, qui verum patrem non agnove- runt, nee sese cognoscunt." Cf. Augustine, ^er wo XLVI, 18: "Haeretici . . . ipsi non se norunt." See 37 also. - Page 24. 98 "know thyself" in -greek and latin literature grace of humility. Chrysostom says that the more we advance in virtue, the more we make ourselves contrite, and that he who best knows himself esteems himself to be nothing.^^ So Augustine says: "Tu, homo, cognosce quia es homo: tota humilitas tua ut cognoscas te";^ and Theodoret says: "We know and measure ourselves in truth, for we have learned from the beginning the humility of the Apostles. "^ As the idea that man is human was extended by the ecclesiastical writers to mean 'know that you are sinful, and be humble,' so the kindred thought of knowing that man is mortal came to mean * know that while you have a mortal body, your soul is immortal. ' Irenaeus says that God may permit us to be mortal and die that we may never become puffed up as if we had life from ourselves, . . but may learn from experience that we have eternal life from Him. "And was it not on this account," he asks, "that God permitted our resolution into the dust of the earth that we might be clearly instructed in every way and diligent in all things for the future, ignorant neither of God nor of ourselves? "^^ And Basil says in his Homily on Ilpoo-exe 2eaura): "Know thine own nature; that thy body is mortal, thy soul immortal, and that thy life is somehow two-fold thine own life after the flesh which swiftly passeth, and the inborn life of the soul which knoweth no bounds. "^^ Eusebius would find a basis for this im lortality in the conception that man is made in the image of the immortal God, for he says^^ that Plato and Moses agree about the soul, in that Moses defined the substance of the soul as immortal when he taught that man was made after God's image; "and Plato," he explains, "as if he had been a disciple of Moses, says in the Alcibiades I: 'Looking to God .... and into the virtue of the human soul, we would see and know " In Matt. XXV, 4. Pat. Graec. vol. LVII, p. 332. "/ John XXV, 16. Cf. Sermo LXVII, 9: humiles erant, non superbi . . . se agnoscebant. . . . Also Sermo CCXC, 1, where he says of John the Baptist: "quod bonum erat ei, se agnovit, ut ad pedes Domini . . . humilia- retur." ^Ep. LXXXVI. Cf. De Prov. V. " Irenaeus Adv. Her. V, 23. " Sec. 3. '8 Praep. Evangelica XI, 34 where he says that man shall know the exper- iences that belong to God, by having become immortal. Augustine, however, says we do not know the origin of the soul that it is a gift from God, but not of the same nature as God Himself. De Anima et Origine IV, 3. IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 99 ourselves best.' "^^ Something of this sense of man's birthright seems to have been felt previously by Tertullian in a passage in his Apolegeticum, although Tertullian taught the resurrection of the body as well as the immortality of the soul. The renewal of day and night, and of the seasons, and of the fruits of the earth, are all emblems of the resurrection, he says, and then he addresses the reader :^ **Tu homo, tantum nomen, si intelligas te vel de titulo Pythiae discens, dominus omnium morientium et resurgentium, ad hoc morieris ut pereas?" The mission of Christ, according to Tertullian, was not to make the soul know itself, for it did not lack knowledge of its author and judge, and of its own condition, but to make the soul safe by a knowledge of the resurrection with the flesh, which it could not know until it was manifested in Christ's resurrection.^^ In these few ideas, then, knowing that we are created by God in His image, knowing that we are sinners in need of repentance, and knowing that we are immortal lie the chief connotations^ of self-knowledge which are to be found in the works of the Church Fathers for the most part, rather than among non-Christian writers. Yet the difference was, after all, largely a matter of emphasis and direction. The essential divinity of the soul and a kind of immor- tality were a part of the faith of Plato and of some of the later philo- sophical schools, and the sinfulness of the flesh found recognition in the asceticism of the Pythagoreans and Neo-Platonists, as well as in the indifference accorded to carnal desires by the Stoics. We would not in any way belittle the claims of the Hebrew Scriptures or the teachings of Christ and his Apostles; but as touching this parti- cular theme of self-knowledge, it seems evident that, however much priority over the Delphic maxim the Church Fathers may have felt disposed to attribute to Moses' Upoaexe 'ZeavrQ and the verse in the Song of Songs, they owed the greater part of their thought, even if somewhat indirectly, to the 7J/co^t cavrbv on Apollo's temple. 59 See. p. 61 and n. 10. 80 Chap. 48. ^^ De Came Christi 12: "Sed adeo non ignorat ut auctorem et arbitrum et statum suum norit. . . . Nunc autem non efl&giem suam didicit a Christo, sed salutem. . . . Ignoravimus plane resurrecturam cum came. Hoc erit quod Christus manifestavit. " 82 Augustine discusses the soul's knowledge of itself more or less in his De Trinitate IX & X. In X, 12 he says in effect that the precept "Know Thyself" means ' Know ' and * self, ' and so by the very act by which the mind understands the words, it knows itself. Passages in which the Presence of the Maxim is Made Explicit, whether BY the Exact Words Tpoodt Tlavrdv, or by an Allusion to Delphi, Apollo, OR the Wise Men In Greek Authors Aeschylus : Prometheus 309 (yiyvciaKe aavrbv) Ion: Frag. 55 ed. Nauck Plato: Charmides 164E Phaedrus 229E Philebus 48C Protagoras 343A-B Laws 923A Alcibiades I 124A, 129A, 130E, 132D Erastae 138A Hipparchus 228E Isocrates: Panathenaicus 230 Xenophon: Cyropaedia VII, 2, 20 Memorabilia IV, 2, 24 Aristotle: Rhetoric II, 21, 13 Magna Moralia II, 15, 1213a, 14 Philemon: Frag. 152 ed. Koch (Stob. Flor. 22, 4) Menander: Frag. 240, 249, 307, 538 ed. Koch Demetrius (?) : On Style 9 Diodorus Siculus: Hist. IX, 10 Philo Judaeus: De ug. et In. 46 De Spec. Leg. I (De Monarchia) 44 De Somn. I, 57 ff. Legatio ad Gaium 69 De Mig. Ab. 8 {ylviixxKe aeavrdv) Dio Chyrsostom: IV, 160 R; X, 303 R; LXVII, 361 R Epictetus: I, 18, 17; III, 1, 18; III, 22, 53 Frag. I. Ed. Schenkl. (From Stob. Flor. 80:14) Plutarch: Ad. Colotem c. 20 Cons, ad ApoU. c. 28 De Dis. Adul. ab Am. c. 1 & 25 De Garrulitate, c. 17 Demosthenes, c. 3 De Inim. Utilitate c. 5 De Pyth. Or. c. 29 De Tranq. An, c. 13 E apud Delphos c. 2 & 17 Lucian: On Pantomime 81 Aristeides: Art of Rhetoric A' 483 Pausanias: Des. Graec. X, 24, 1 Galen: De Prop. An. Cuius. Aff. Dign. et Cur. c. II (vol. V, p. 4 ed. Kuhn) Clement of Alexandria: Strom. I, 14, 60; II, 15, 70-71; V, 4, 23; VII, 3, 20 101 Hippolytus: Adv. Her. I, 18; X, 34 Origen: In Cant. Cant. 56B Sextus Empiricus: Upds AoyiKovs A, 266 Diogenes Laertius: De Vit. Phil. I, 1, 13 Philostratus: Life of Apollonius of Tyana VII, 14, 137 Plotinus: Ennead IV, III, 1 & Ennead VI, VIII, 41 Porphyry: Frag, on TvS>ei "Zavrdv (Stob. Flor. 21, 26-28) Athanasius: Frag. In Cant. Cant. (Pat. Graec. vol. 27, p. 1348) Libanius: Or. XII, 11 Julian: Epistle 41, 420B Epistle to Themistius 260C Oration VI, 185A & 188A-C Oration VII, 211B-C Proclus: In Alcibiades I vol. I, p. 5 ed. Creuzer Cyril of Alexandria: Contra Julianum VI, 20 IB Hierocles: On the Golden Sayings of the Pythagoreans, p. 64 & 65 ed. Mullach. Damascius Successor: Dubitationes et Solutiones F 96 V, p. 156 ed. Ruelle Choricius of Gaza: Epitaphius for Procopius, p. 16 ed. Boiss. Stobaeus: Flor. Ill, 79; XXI Gregory of Pisida: Hexaemeron 633 Palatine Anthology IX, 366; IX, 349; Appendix IV, 48 Scholiasts on Iliad III, 53 vol. Ill, ed. Dindorf & vol. V, ed. Maass; Pindar, Pythian II, 34 & III, 60; Plato's Phaedrus 229E; Republic 600A; Dio Chrysostom LXXII 386 R; Lucian's Phalaris I, 7 Hesychius no. 38 Suidas 839 C, 831 A, & on Thales In Latin Authors Varro: Sat. Menipp. rN120I SATTON Cicero: De Finibus III, 22; V, 44 De Legibus I, 22 (58-60) Ep. ad Fratrem Quintum III, 6, 7 Tusc. Dis. I, 52; V, 70 Ovid: Ars Amatoria II, 500-502 Seneca: De Consolatione XI, 2-5 Ep. Mor. 94:28 Pliny: Nat. Hist. VII, 32 Juvenal: XI, 27 Tertullian: Apolegeticum 48 De Anima XVII Ausonius: De Herediolo 19 Ludus Septem Sap. Solon 1-3 & Chilon 138 Hieronymus: Epistle LVII, 12 Ambrose: In Ps. CXVIII, II, 13 Hexaemeron VI, VI, 39 Augustine: De Trinitate X, 9 (12) 102 "know thyself" in greek and latin literature Macrobius: Comm. in Somn. Scip. I, 9, 2 Sat. I, 6, 6 Sidonius: Carmina II, 163; XV, 50 Passages in which the Presence of the Maxim is Apparent, Though More OR Less Indirectly Expressed In Greek Authors Heracleitus: Frag 116, Diels Pindar: Pythian II, 34 Plato: Timaeus 72 A Philebus 19C Xenophon: Hellenica II, IV, 40-41 Memorabilia III, VII, 9; III, IX, 6 Aristophanes: Clouds 842 Aristotle: Nic. Ethics IV, 9, 1125a. 22 Eud. Ethics IV, 9, 1169b. 33 Philemon: Frag. 213 ed. Koch Philo Judaeus: De Mig. Ab. 185 & 195 De Spec. Leg. I (De Circumcision) 10; De Sac. 262-265 De Somn. I, 212 Leg. AUegor. I, 91-92 Epictetus II, 8, 10-13; 14, 18-20 Plutarch: Septem Sap. Con. c. 21 Quo modo ad. poet. aud. deb. c. 11 Lucian: Dialogues of the Dead XIV, 6 Diogenes Laertius: De Vit. Phil. I, 9, ."5 Philostratus: Life of Apollonius of Tyana III, 18; IV, 44; VI, 35 Lives of the Sophists IV, 525 Plotinus: Ennead V, III, 3 fif.; VI, IX, 6 Prophyry: Letter to Marcella 32 Frag, in Stob. Flor. I, 88 De Abstinentia 3, 27 lamblichus: Life of Pythagoras XVIII, 83 Frag, in Stob. Flor. 81, 18 Julian: Or. VII, 225D Nemesius: Nature of Man I, 16 Proclus: In Ale. I passim, esp. pp. 85 & 277, vol. I ed. Creuzer Institituo Theologica, esp. LXXXIII, CLXVII, & CLXXXVI Olympiodorus: In Ale. I passim, esp. pp. 4, 7-8 & 10, vol. II, ed. Creuzer Golden Sayings of the Pythagoreans, 14-15 Hierocles: On the Golden Sayings of the Pythagoreans, p. 157 ed. Mullach. Stobaeus: Flor. Chapter XXI; and CVIII, 81 In Latin Authors Plautus: Pseudolus 972-973 Stichus 124-125 Cicero: De Officiis I, 31 (114) 103 De Oratore III, 33 Phmipics II, 68 Horace: Satires I, 3, 22 Seneca: De Beneficiis VI, 30, 5 De Ira II, 36, 1 De Tranq. An. VI, 2-3 De Vita Beata 27, 4-6 Ep. Mor. Ill, 7, 10 Persius: Satire IV, esp. vv. 23-24 Martial: X, IV, 10-12 Apuleiiis: De Dog. Plat. II, 16 Further Passages Touching Self-Knowledge in the Church Fathers In Greek Ecclesiastical Writers Irenaeus: Adv. Haer. II, 7, 2; 17, 5 & 8; V, 2, 3 Clement of Alexandria: Strom. IV, 6, 27 Origen: Comm. In Joan. XXXII, 18 Gregory Thaumaturgus: In Origenem Or. Panegyr. XI Eusebius: Praep. Evangel. XI, 27, 5 Basil: Homily on Ilpocrexe "ZeavTi^ Hexaemeron IX, 6 De Hominis Structura I, 1 Sermo XX, 2 (Appendix) Ep. CCIV, 4 Epiphanius: XXXVI, 264C; LXXIV, 4, 10; LXXVI, 11 Gregory of Nyssa: In Cant. Cant. II, p. 806; III, p. 810 (vol. 44) Chrysostom: Homily on Matthew XXV, 4 Cyril of Alexandria: In Cant. Cant. 1, 7 Theodoret: De Nat. Horn. 39 Ep. LXXXVI Dionysius Areopagiticus: De Div. Nom. VII, 469C & 470A De Eccles. Hierarch. II, III, 4 In Latin Ecclesiastical Writers Minucius Felix: Octavius 17 Tertullian: De Carne Christi, 12 Arnobius: Adv. Nationes II, 16 & 74 Lactantius: Epit Div. Inst. LX Hilary of Potiers: De Trinitate XII, 53 Ambrose: De Is. et An. I, IV, 15-16; I, VIII, 64 De Excessu Frat. Satyri I, 45 De Excid. Hierosol. Ill, 17, 28 De Fide. V, 19, 237 De Jos. Pat. I, IV, 20 Hexaemeron VI, 2, 3; VI, VI, 42; VI, VIII, 50 In Ps. CXVIII, III, 30; X, 10; XIII, 20; XVI, 11 Ep. I, II, 8; XVII, 7 104 "know thyself" in greek and latin literature Augustine: Confession X, V, 7 Soliloquies II, 1 De Civ. Dei, VIII, 10-12 De An. et Origine IV, Chap. 2-21 De Trinitate I, 12; IX, 3-X, 9; XIV, 5-14; XV, 3, 6, 7, 13 In John XXV, 16; XXXII, 5; LXVI, 1; XC, 1 In Ps. LXV, 14; XCIC, 11; C, 8 Sermo XXV, 4; LXVI, 18, 27, 36-37; XL VII, 23; LVI, 3; LVIII, 13; LXVIII, 9; CXXXVIII, 8; CCXC, 1; CCXCII, 5 BIBLIOGRAPHY E. Barker: The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle. New York, 1906. Baur: Das Christliche des Platonismus. Tubingen, 1837. A. W. Benn: The Greek Philosophers. London, 1914. C. Bigg: The Christian Platonists of Alexandria. Oxford, 1886. The Origins of Christianity. Oxford, 1909. F. A. Bohren: De Septera Sapientibus. Bonn, 1867. G. S. Brett: A History of Psychology. London, 1912. J. Burnet: The Ethics of Aristotle. London, 1904. Greek Philosophy. 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Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. IX, p. 282 ff. R. L. Nettleship: Lectures on the Republic of Plato. London, 1906. W. H. Roscher: Die Bedeutung des E zu Delphi und die ubrigen ypannara A\UiJ^S^TAMPED BELOW JUN 1 1198 r RFP riR llli^ 2 0*83 - 'mwmc. MAR J 1 b W MAY 06 1983 AUTO. DIS ^. \ [APR 1 9 19 J9 % UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY FORM NO. DD6, 60m, 12/80 BERKELEY, CA 94720 U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES III CD041t7MSb r^I ..'* I