The Value 
 
 OF A 
 
 Study of Ethics. 
 
 AN 
 
 Inaugural Lecture 
 
 BY- 
 
 JAMES GIBSON HUME, M.A., Ph.D., 
 
 Professor of Ethics and the History of Philosophy in the University of Toronto, 
 
 Toronto, Canada. 
 
 TORONTO : 
 
 THE J. E. BRYANT COMPANY (LIMITED) 
 1891. 
 
. 
 
 
 ' i* .'.": .*'*;, t ,*.\ 
 
THE VALUE OF A STUDY OF ETHICS. 
 
 On entering upon my duties as a Professor of Ethics and History 
 of Philosophy in this University, according to the time-honored custom 
 I am allowed the privilege of presenting to you some of the claims of 
 the department to which I belong. 
 
 We are living in a practical age. Very few, then, will be surprised 
 to hear the question asked, " What is the value of a study of Ethics ? 
 What is contributed by a rational and critical examination of man's 
 moral convictions, moral actions, and moral relations ?" 
 
 I should be presumptuous indeed if I fancied that I could answer 
 this question in a short inaugural lecture. All that I can hope to do is 
 to present briefly some of the chief contributions that a critical study 
 of Ethics is fitted to make. 
 
 There is a very general agreement that it is well for a man to have 
 moral convictions and moral principles. It is by pos- Moral principles 
 sessing a moral character that a man becomes worthy of approved. 
 the high praise of the poet : 
 
 "An honest man 's the noblest work of God." 
 
 There is, however, no such general consensus of opinion that it is well 
 to critically study these principles and philosophically 
 consider their meaning and validity. It is often sup- 
 posed that to consider their validity is to question their 
 validity ; to critically examine moral principles is to doubt those prin- 
 ciples ; to philosophically enquire what are those principles, and what 
 is their meaning, is to distrust their existence and importance. In 
 short, it may be held that we must regard moral principles, moral con- 
 duct, and moral character as having the highest significance, but that a 
 critical study will lead to a mistrust of those principles and an unsettle - 
 ment of character. 
 
4 The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 
 
 As so often happens, what we have to do here is to decide between 
 alternatives. Let us suppose, then, that a critical and 
 
 An alternative. '. -, i i i i i r 
 
 systematic study of Ethics is* avoided, with the belief 
 that to explain is, necessarily, to explain away ; that whatever we may do 
 
 in other departments of thought, in Ethics, at least, we 
 investigation shall rely entirely upon authority and depend upon the 
 
 dogmatic method. In discussing this supposition we 
 ?o?tLreby enc must consider the effects of other influences that bear 
 
 upon the education of our young men and young women. 
 Do we not all know that there is a period in the life of most 
 young people, when they become aware of possessing powers and 
 capabilities, and wish to exercise them ? "The glory of young men is 
 their strength"; and just as in youth the physical activity seeks exercise 
 and delights in athletic exploits, so with the consciousness of his 
 
 mental powers the young man desires to have the pleas- 
 S a que r stio e n ndency ure of solving problems for himself. It may be that 
 
 very correct answers are given at the end of the book, 
 but he wishes to work out the solution independently. Quoting 
 authority to him at this period of his life is like offering him crutches. 
 I am not concerned just now to maintain that this state of mind is 
 desirable or undesirable ; I simply call attention to the fact of its 
 existence and its effect. On e thing is certain, it will not tend to pro- 
 duce adherence to authority nor respect for the dogmatic method. 
 There is one word that always fires the enthusiasm of a young man : 
 " Liberty"; and at first it is the negative element in liberty, viz., freedom 
 from external constraint, that is most welcome. 
 
 We are living in a time of great literary activity. If we carefully 
 examine this literature we shall find that a very large proportion of it is 
 of a controversial character. To use the language -of Biology, that has 
 now become so familiar through the discussion of the theory of Evolu- 
 tion, there is now a great " struggle for existence" in the realm of opinions 
 
 and ideas. In our newspapers, monthlies, and theologi- 
 Htera r tu V re! slal cal journals, one view is strenuously opposed by another, 
 
 and young men and young women, if they read at all, are 
 almost compelled to think for themselves, and form opinions of their 
 own, for it is needless to point out that to decide in one's own mind 
 between conflicting views is practically to form an opinion or adopt an 
 independent position. 
 
The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 5 
 
 Then, as everyone knows, the spirit of our age is scientific. The 
 characteristic of Science is patient, thorough, systematic enquiry. 
 Science needs no apology for its existence. It has established itself by 
 doing its work, thus enforcing a lesson on the value of acting out our 
 convictions if we wish others to believe in them. The influence of 
 scientific thought and literature is felt by the student before he enters 
 the university, and no one can take a university training 
 without becoming more or less familiar with scientific 
 methods. Since Bacon wrote his " Instauration of the Sciences " and 
 exposed the various "idols" that hinder the attainment of truth, 
 authority has been discredited in science. One of the first things a 
 student of science learns to do is to mistrust his previous opinions. In 
 many enquiries they appear to him as mere prejudices, preventing him 
 from seeing the truth and giving an impartial decision. 
 
 \Ve started with the assumption that we were to exclude all critical 
 investigation of Ethics, and employ only the dogmatic method. But, 
 as we have seen, the other influences that we have enumerated all con- 
 cur in destroying the student's respect for the dogmatic method. 
 
 From the student's natural desire to exercise his own critical 
 faculties and judge for himself; from the influence of critical and con- 
 troversial literature; and from the more exact criticism 
 
 , , i , , . Summary. 
 
 employed by science, he is led to treat the dogmatic 
 
 method with less and less respect. Mere authority becomes less 
 
 and less trusted. Opinions that are supported only by 
 
 j . i r i i_ Results. 
 
 authority, and shrink from critical examination, become 
 suspected. The presumption is that they will not bear the light of 
 investigation ; that those who profess these principles, suspecting their 
 weakness, are afraid of having them examined, thus proving that they 
 themselves do not really believe in them. So reasons the young man. 
 I do not ask you to take my word for it that would be to employ the 
 dogmatic method but I think that if you carefully consider the matter 
 you will reach the conclusion that those who employ the dogmatic 
 method, with the very best intentions, nevertheless fail to reach the 
 results they aim at, and instead of establishing anything or conserving 
 it, lead to a distrust of the very principles that they consider too sacred 
 for investigation. 
 
 The dogmatic method of teaching is not, properly speaking, 
 teaching at all, nor is learning in the dogmatic way, " study." It is 
 
6 The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 
 
 simply a kind of absorption, as a sponge sucks up water. Such infor- 
 mation so obtained is not really acquired at all. It fails just when 
 needed. It cannot stand the test. It oozes away at the least pressure. 
 
 Granting that the critical method which says, "prove all things," 
 has its place in Science, is it necessary to extend it to Ethics, which 
 says, " hold fast that which is good " ? Will our results be satisfactory 
 if we completely divorce the study of what is from the consideration 
 of what ought to be ? 
 
 Let us examine Science a little more narrowly to see if there are 
 any inadequacies in its method which Ethics is fitted to 
 
 Is science suffi- . 11-11 
 
 dent without supply. Science deals with the existent and its laws. It 
 examines what is and what has been and thus discovers 
 what may be. Its aim, however, is not to modify or reconstruct, but 
 simply to understand the facts of the existent. Its goal is knowledge. 
 In its methods Science goes beyond our ordinary experience of matters 
 of /act. Its observations are not casual, but systematic 
 <ce. f and purposeful. The first advance that Science makes 
 
 upon ordinary unsystematic experience, is to make classi- 
 fications of objects. Its aim is to be exact ; hence, as far as possible, it 
 applies quantitative measurements and gives statistical tables. After 
 thus dealing with the constitution of what is, neglecting the time 
 element, it next proceeds to the investigation of what has been. That 
 is, it desires to trace the history^in time of objects and events and their 
 groups. Thus Science is at first descriptive and historical. Its next 
 problem is to determine the definite and permanent relations of objects 
 and groups of objects, and the uniform laws of occurrences. Here 
 Science becomes explicative, or explanatory. In discovering the laws 
 and rules of what is and has been it arrives at a knowledge of what 
 may be. 
 
 According to the character of the objects and our standpoint, 
 Science breaks up into a number of special sciences. Then again we 
 have sciences whose work is to find the laws of correlation between 
 one special science and another special science, e.g., psycho-physics; 
 and lastly, we have the more ambitious attempt to formulate a "Science 
 of the sciences," i.e., a more general consideration of the relations and 
 laws of the various special sciences, with the purpose of relating and 
 connecting these in one harmonious system. However difficult this 
 great enterprise may seem, it is still the goal of the sciences. Each 
 
The Study of Ethics : A n Inaugural Lecture. 7 
 
 scientist in his special department works with the purpose and hope of 
 contributing to this general result. 
 
 Science deals with facts. Has it nothing to do with theories? I 
 think we shall find that it has just as much to do with theories as with 
 facts. Fact, itself, is a term which is not entirely unambiguous. We 
 may mean by it that something is now occurring or something has 
 occurred, or, what is very different, that something is what we suppose 
 it to be. 
 
 Now it is the very work of science not to be satisfied with the 
 " fact " in the first sense. It wishes to classify and arrange these facts, 
 that is, these occurrences, appearances, or manifestations, according to 
 their mutual connections ; it wishes to go still further beyond the fact 
 the mere appearance to discover the rules of connection which 
 explain the fact. 
 
 And yet every explanation is a theory, so that it would seem to be 
 the very work of science to theorize. To ordinary observation the sun 
 appears without doubt to go around the stationary earth, 
 but scientific theory says that the earth turns on its axis. sdSw." 1 
 No one ever saw the earth turn on its axis. It is 
 simply a theory to explain the facts or appearances. We are now con- 
 vinced that it is a true theory. 
 
 But are not theories liable to be erroneous ? Certainly. Many 
 scientific theories held by one generation have been discovered to be 
 false by scientists of the succeeding generations, and a 
 
 ... , , . , Error possible. 
 
 historian would not consider it very extravagant to pre- 
 dict that many of our present scientific theories will be regarded as 
 false by scientists in the future. No one is better aware of this than 
 the scientists themselves. Part of the work of the scientist is to 
 re-organise the material of unrelated facts or appearances in accordance 
 with theories which he supposes to be established ; part of his work is 
 by careful experiment and laborious reasoning to determine whether 
 certain theories are to be admitted or rejected. 
 
 We should not regard the activity of the mind as the source merely 
 of falsehood. If the constructive activity of thought has produced 
 false theories, it has also given us true ones, and if it is 
 only through thinking that falsehood arises, it is just as Discoverable 
 true that only for an intelligent mind can there be truth, 
 and still further it is only by an exercise of the critical activities of 
 mind that we can decide what is true and what is false. 
 
8 The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 
 
 The suspicion that attaches to the activity of mind is chiefly due 
 to a dogmatic theory as to the nature of reality and mental action and 
 their relation to one another. 
 
 The fundamental reality, according to this theory, is altogether un- 
 knowable, and we can therefore make no valid statement in regard to 
 it. Then, with naive inconsequence, it is stated with great certainty 
 that the mind is one of the appearances of that of which we can say 
 nothing. The mind itself is an appearance, and all its activities are 
 appearances of this appearance. All that mind does in the way of 
 constructive activity is a fictitious and self-deceiving addition. 
 
 This theory is properly to be called pure dogmatism, because it 
 unsparingly condemns all theories without being aware 
 
 Dogmatic . . . 
 
 scepticism a that it is itself a theory. It does not see that its sweep- 
 suicidal theory. 
 
 mg denunciation of all theories is sawing off the limb on 
 
 which it sits. For if all that the mind does is erroneous and fictitious, 
 then this theory concerning the character of the mind and the unknow- 
 able and their relation, being itself a thought construction, is also 
 fictitious and erroneous. It is as though a lawyer, after presenting his 
 side of the case, should say to the jury : " Now, gentlemen, you must 
 not listen to one word that the opposing counsel may say, for I can 
 assure you that all lawyers are liars." 
 
 This pure dogmatism about the unknowable reality and the deceitful 
 mind (the knowable unreality) leads to a complete scepticism in know- 
 ledge, and indifference and fatalism in conduct. It says Plato was 
 simply deluded when he declared : " To think what is true, to feel 
 what is beautiful, to will what is good, in this the spirit acknowledges 
 the end of the life of reason." 
 
 Because in argument men make errors in logic this does not say that 
 all argument is useless, nor does it prevent us from detecting the incon- 
 sistencies when we give attention to the argument. The very fact that 
 we can say that many men reason illogically and act irrationally pre- 
 supposes that we can distinguish the rational from the irrational. We 
 are also convinced that the men who act irrationally are not those who 
 have most intelligence and think most, but those who think least. Truly 
 enough, " a little knowledge is a dangerous thing." We must then 
 conclude that we have not an alternative, but that we 
 
 Need of 
 
 theoretical must deal with the constructions of thought or do nothing. 
 
 philosophy. 
 
 These constructions may be true or false, therefore we 
 need a critical consideration of the activities of mind and its pro- 
 
The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. g 
 
 ductions ; we need, in Locke's words, " An Inquiry into the Human 
 Understanding." 
 
 The systematic and thorough criticism of consciousness and the 
 constructions of thought is the special work of philosophy. 
 
 Just as science is simply an advance upon ordinary observation, 
 making it systematic and exact and applying more thorough tests, so 
 philosophy is merely an attempt to systematize and more fully apply 
 the critical activity that we all possess and exercise to a greater or less 
 extent, for every man who reflects is to that extent a 
 philosopher. Kant well expressed the problem of philo- 
 sophy in the question, "What are the necessary conditions of the 
 possibility of experience ? " Such a question certainly assumes that 
 we have experience ; it asks what is implied in the experience we have. 
 In fact, it has been objected to Kant's starting-point that he begins with 
 an assumption, viz., that we have or may have knowledge. It is quite 
 true that Kant makes this assumption, and, it may be replied, that 
 anyone who questions his assumption must do so by building upon the 
 very same assumption. No one can give a reason why we should 
 prefer what is reasonable to what is unreasonable. To advance a 
 reason is to rest upon the assumption that the reasonable is better then 
 the irrational. We must assume that reason is reasonable or we cannot 
 reason, nor object to reasoning. 
 
 The philosophical enquiry then begins by admitting that we have 
 experience and knowledge, and the question is, What is implied in this 
 experience and knowledge ? Experience, taken in its widest sense, 
 means the sum of all the knowledge that we possess, gained from 
 whatever sources and by whatever method. It therefore includes the 
 results of the most rigid scientific investigations. With philosophy, our 
 activities of thought become critical and reflective. 
 Philosophy is the self-consciousness of science. 
 
 Philosophy naturally falls into two classes corresponding to the 
 experiences it is considering. These are designated 
 theoretical and practical philosophy respectively. The 
 first deals with knowledge, the second with conduct. 
 The first considers conscious activity as exercised in knowing; the 
 second intentional conscious activity, i.e., conscious activity as exer- 
 cised in choosing, in acting"with reference to ends. 
 
 We have seen that science needs to be supplemented by philosophy. 
 
10 The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 
 
 It is incomplete and inadequate without a critical examination of the 
 mental activities and thought constructions. Some who admit this 
 would limit philosophical reflection to the consideration 
 of knowledge. They would deny the need of a con- 
 sideration of intentional conduct or the selection of 
 philosophy? en( j s - n accor( iance w i tn ideals. Is not this an 
 
 arbitrary limitation ? Is theoretical philosophy sufficient ? 
 
 Let us examine the results reached by the reflection upon our 
 knowledge to see if any insufficiencies appear. 
 
 In answering the question, what are the necessary conditions of 
 
 knowledge, what is implied in our knowledge of the external world, 
 
 Kant demonstrates that we must declare certain princi- 
 
 What theoretical , . . . . . , 
 
 philosophy pies to be universal and necessary ; that these principles 
 
 are native to intelligence ; that they are necessary to 
 constitute experience and to apprehend the objects of experience ; and 
 that it is absurd to attempt to derive these from anything but intelli- 
 gence itself. Kant expresses this in very abstruse and difficult lang- 
 uage. He says that the various "categories" or conceptions involved 
 in knowledge must be referred to a " primitive unity of apperception," 
 and his proof that these " categories " are constitutive of the objects 
 of experience is termed the " deduction of the categories." We may 
 express the central idea more intelligibly by saying that the objects of 
 experience are relative to a subject, and that the laws of those objects 
 are laws of thought. That is, subject and object are correlative. The 
 objects that exist involve a reference to the subject to which they are 
 related. The laws that apply to objects constituting and explaining 
 them are also for intelligence. It is because the laws of the existent 
 are intelligible that the scientist is capable of discovering them by an 
 exercise of his intelligence. 
 
 Science deals with the knowable. Now, though theoretical philosophy 
 has demonstrated this, and maintained the validity of knowledge against 
 the attacks of scepticism, it is nevertheless liable to lose the results it 
 has so laboriously gained. 
 
 The previous scepticism was based on the dogmatic assumption of 
 the non-mental as the ultimately real and the source of the activities of 
 thought. 
 
 Theoretical philosophy, reflecting upon the facts of experience, con- 
 cludes that there are certain universal and necessary laws of thought 
 
The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. n 
 
 which cannot be based upon anything but intelligence. Now, because 
 these laws of thought are universal and necessary, and not the peculiar- 
 ity or private property of any individual thinker, it seems 
 
 Wherein it fails. 
 
 to be a very natural mistake to suppose that because they 
 are not dependent upon this or that finite thinker they therefore exist 
 independently of thinking altogether. Thus we have a new abstraction 
 set up, the hypostatizing of logic, as if laws of thought, by being called 
 "laws" and "universal and necessary," could be self-subsistent and exist 
 in independent reality apart from all thinking ; as if there might be 
 knowledge apart from a knower. 
 
 We are continually setting up abstractions as more worthy than 
 the concrete reality. Why are we so apt to worship ab- 
 
 Abstraction. 
 
 stractions? Surely something has been so far neglected. 
 Let us endeavor to discover what it is. What is it that makes us 
 dissatisfied with the previous results ? Is it not that in each case some- 
 thing of the greatest importance has altogether disappeared? In the first 
 place, the non-mental is set up as the ultimate reality. In the next case, 
 universal and necessary laws of logic take the place of the unknowable 
 somewhat. In both cases personality seems to drop 
 out of consideration, and finally out of existence. The 
 part is made greater than the whole. Just here a 
 philosophical study of Ethics is much needed. . Theoretical phil- 
 osophy did well to point out the dependence of 
 
 r F . Need of a 
 
 ideas upon a unity of consciousness. It did not do practical 
 
 - philosophy. 
 
 well to forget the primacy of consciousness. In the 
 sense of existing only for a consciousness, it did well to show the 
 relativity of ideas. Practical philosophy is needed to call attention to 
 the efficiency of ideas, and the reality of the active self-consciousness to 
 which ideas and ideals are relative, in which and for which ideas 
 and ideals exist. If theoretical philosophy has done well to establish 
 the universality, necessity, and validity of the laws of 
 thought, the practical philosophy is required to empha- 
 size the fact that thought and laws of thought are mere abstractions, if 
 supposed to exist apart from a conscious thinker. A man may see 
 quite well without knowing that he has eyes, just as with an excellent 
 digestion he is unaware that he has a stomach ; but if his ignorance 
 leads him to conduct that tends to destroy his eyes, it may be well for 
 him to know more about the connection of sight with the organs of 
 
12 The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 
 
 vision. We have considered the connections and relations of objects 
 and the constructions of thought. It is well to discover that the con- 
 struction of objects is capable of being known because the relations can 
 be reconstructed by thought ; we need to go further with our reflection, 
 and remember that constructions of thought involve the activity of a 
 constructive thinker. 
 
 In our previous preference of abstractions to the concrete reality, we 
 were making a judgment of estimation or preference. We were virtually 
 saying, this abstraction is of more worth. Now all judgments of worth 
 are moral judgments. Do we not, then, need to have a reflective con- 
 sideration of our moral judgments and standards of worth, that we may 
 decide if we have been correct in setting up abstractions as more 
 worthy than living personality ? 
 
 While science is investigating the existent and discovering the 
 relations and laws of the existent, and theoretical philosophy critically 
 and reflectively examines our knowledge of the existent and its implica- 
 tions, practical philosophy or Ethics, as we said at the outset, deals with 
 what ought to be. We may now add another word to our definition, 
 and say that Ethics deals with what ought to be done; that is, it is not 
 primarily and specially concerned with the knowledge of the static, the 
 constitution of the existent, but with action, conduct. Not with being, 
 but with doing. \\ estimates conduct. It wishes to decide what ought 
 to be done. In saying that something ought to be done, 
 we refer to the intentional conscious activity of a rational 
 agent, capable of making distinctions of better and worse 
 in accordance with ideals or standards of worth. As it is sometimes 
 expressed, Ethics deals with ideals or normative stand- 
 ards. Now it must be admitted that Ethics is not 
 entirely independent of the sciences. The general rules which have 
 been discovered by the sciences tell us what may be done, and so set 
 limits to the possibility of doing. But a mere knowledge of the various 
 possibilities, however indispensable for effective action, is very different 
 from the estimation of different possibilities, the selection among possi- 
 bilities, the determination of possibilities. Ethics deals with the 
 selection of ends. Science finds the means to gain ends. Now 
 because Ethics deals with all intentional conscious activity, and all our 
 science and all our theoretical philosophy are forms of intentional 
 activity, they, too, cannot escape ethical consideration. When we ask 
 
The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 13 
 
 what ought to be done, we have passed beyond the scientific point 
 of view. Science says, if you do this, then that will 
 happen ; if you employ these means, you will get such a 
 result it does not add, and this is a better result than 
 that. Pure science has no place for a judgment of better 
 and worse. Such a decision is an ethical judgment of approval or dis- 
 approval, which indicates how the result is estimated by a moral 
 subject. In passing a judgment of estimation or appreciation, of 
 approval or censure, the conscious subject is employing ideals or stand- 
 ards by which he measures the action. Thus it comes that Ethics 
 cannot avoid the consideration of ideals. An objection 
 
 An objection. 
 
 on this ground has often been made against Ethics. It 
 
 is said, what we want is the facts ; science has no use for ideals. 
 
 It is perfectly true that it is not the special work of the sciences to 
 make moral decisions in accordance with ideals. Scientists themselves, 
 however, are rarely found urging this objection against Ethics, because 
 the scientists have thoroughly learnt the principle of the division of 
 labor. Each special science is a more or less arbitrary limitation of the 
 whole field of enquiry. One scientist never dreams of saying that the 
 work of another scientist is useless because it does not deal with his 
 department. Hence most scientists would at once admit that science, 
 as a whole, is a limited field, unless, indeed, we begin by defining 
 science in such a way as to include everything; but then Ethics would 
 be included as the science of ideals. I think, however, that this 
 unlimited application of the term science is likely to lead to misconcep- 
 tion and to slur important distinctions. Hence I have used the 
 term in a more limited signification, which, I believe, corresponds more 
 nearly with popular usage. It is not quite true, however, that science, 
 even in this stricter sense, has nothing whatever to do 
 with ideals. It does not and cannot entirely dispense Jo ?c?ence? ssary 
 with all ideals. Its existence depends upon an ideal. It 
 cannot take a single step without this ideal, which is directive of all its 
 activities. This ideal is a complete knowledge of the relations and laws 
 of the existent. For Ethics this ideal is simply one among others, and 
 must be considered in its relation to others. 
 
 Because Ethics is concerned with the ideals that direct conduct, that 
 is, with intentional conscious activity, when it reflects 
 
 ... Personality. 
 
 upon what is implied, it is compelled to recognize and 
 
 maintain personality the choosing subject a person being "a con- 
 
14 The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 
 
 scious subject, who can distinguish himself from the objects he knows 
 and the ends he chooses." * An attempt to unfold all that is signified 
 by the term personality would lead us deep into the problems of Ethics. 
 We must content ourselves with a rude sketch. It is sometimes for- 
 gotten that the conception of something that ought to be done, the 
 recognition of duty and responsibility, even the conception of a better, 
 has neither existence nor meaning except in reference to a moral being, 
 a person who is capable of directing his conduct in accordance with 
 regulative ideals which he is capable of recognizing and adopting. 
 
 At one time it was usual to speak of a person as having various facul- 
 ties. These were sharply separated from one another, 
 pe^onaiity. We are now convinced that these are so implicated and 
 
 connected that no absolute separation is possible. We 
 may, however, call attention to the following aspects that have been 
 distinguished in the conscious life : feeling knowing willing. In 
 feeling we call attention to the particular elements that may be 
 distinguished in an experience. Now even in feeling 
 
 Feeling. . . & 
 
 we may distinguish a subjective and an objective 
 side. Sometimes the word sensation is employed to designate the 
 objective reference; but it must never be forgotten that there can be no 
 objective reference without an accompanying and inseparably connected 
 subjective reference. Sometimes the word feeling is employed to 
 designate the subjective side of this complex. Feeling, in this latter 
 sense, is that in the experience which is peculiarly private. The 
 possessor or subject of it has it and he alone, though he may speak 
 about it to another conscious subject, who may recognize from the 
 description that he also has had a similar experience. When we speak 
 Knowin about anything, when we try to convey information, we 
 
 are using and appealing to the faculty of knowing. 
 While the peculiarity of feeling is its incommunicably private character, 
 the characteristic of knowledge is its communicable and universal 
 character. Knowledge no one thinks of calling his own. Even when 
 a man discovers what appears to him, and what may appear to others, as 
 a new truth, yet he does not think of laying claim to the truth as 
 simply his private insight. If it were merely his, if no one else could 
 possibly know it, he would suspect that it was not a truth of much 
 
 * Professor George Paxton Young. 
 
The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 15 
 
 value ; it would simply rank with his feeling. Rather, if it be a truth 
 that he has discovered, and for the discovery of which he may claim 
 and may deserve recognition, he still regards it as a revelation of his 
 previous ignorance. In short, in knowledge the objective existence of 
 the fact is emphasized, its universal character, its existence for others 
 also and not for me alone. If we could use chemical terms without 
 leading to misapprehension, we might say that the simplest element 
 in the conscious life is always a molecule, never an atom. But 
 because feeling and knowing emphasize different aspects in the 
 consciousness, it becomes easy to think of these abstractly, that is, out 
 of connection with reality, apart from the process in which alone they 
 exist. On the one hand, in considering feeling we may forget that every 
 subjective feeling is part of a sensation which reveals objective existence, 
 saying not only " I am," but also " it is." Again, in knowledge, subject 
 knowing and object known are always correlative and inseparable, yet 
 the universal character of knowledge is apt to lead to the impression 
 that knowledge may exist apart from all knowing consciousness. There 
 is another aspect, however, of the conscious life that does not so easily 
 lend itself to abstraction, viz., willing, or volition. The 
 
 . , Willing. 
 
 reason of this is that it is in its essential nature an 
 organizing, uniting, synthesizing activity. It cannot be considered as 
 a product, but only as a process. Its work is to bring together the 
 particular in feeling and the universal in knowledge into a common 
 focus, into unity and co-ordination. In the acquisition of knowledge, 
 the Will is that activity which, on being convinced that there is a 
 communicable, sharable knowledge, a system of knowable relations 
 that are in a sense, and to a certain degree, as yet foreign to the 
 individual consciousness, at least not yet fully included in it, sets the whole 
 consciousness at work to secure and include this knowledge. The 
 Will may again be recognized as acting in a different direction. 
 Noticing that the consciousness has in its own private possession certain 
 wishes or ideals that are not yet realized, as we say, that is, are still merely 
 the private possession of the individual consciousness, the Will in this 
 case sets the whole consciousness at work to give these wishes and 
 ideals a more permanent and universal character. It wishes to actualize 
 them, that they may exist for others also. In both cases, in the 
 acquisition of knowledge and in the realization of ideals, Will is that in 
 the consciousness which, upon noticing a deficiency, strives to remedy 
 
1 6 The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 
 
 it. It desires to effect a union and reconciliation, so that what appears 
 to the individual consciousness as universal or existing for others may 
 become private also, that is, exist in the possession of the individual 
 consciousness ; and, on the other hand, that what appears as existing for 
 the individual consciousness alone may exist for others also as well as 
 for the individual, that is, become actualized, realized. We thus see 
 that the Will is the active, conciliating, unifying, living, organizing, 
 constitutive principle in the conscious process. It is, in fact, the 
 consciousness expressing itself. It is the vital element (though it is 
 incorrect to use the term element} in consciousness. It is the funda- 
 mental principle in personality. 
 
 In Will we recognize the self-activity and self-expression of conscious- 
 ness. In perception we distinguish this self-activity, as attention. As 
 gathering together the forces of consciousness, it is called concentration 
 of attention. As directing the forces of consciousness, that is, exclud- 
 ing what is irrelevant, including what is relevant, it is called selective 
 attention. The latter aspect is what is usually regarded as distinctive 
 of Will when it is termed volition. Volition is that self-expression of 
 consciousness which is intentionally selective, in accordance with ends 
 or ideals of action. Will is therefore essential and constitutive in per- 
 sonality. By its exercise the person distinguishes differences of worth, 
 makes judgments of preference or estimation, recognizes ideals and 
 strives to attain to them. 
 
 In every correct recognition of an ideal and admission of the validity 
 of its claims, the person declares that more conscious ex- 
 istence is better than less conscious existence, that more 
 personality is better than less personality. It discerns 
 that "life is true and truth is good." Thus, in every proper 
 choice in accordance with ideals, the conscious life is loyal to the 
 including ideal of a perfect personality. In the ideal of Perfect Per- 
 sonality all others must be harmonized. We have tried to indicate 
 that personality is not an abstraction, but a very complex, concrete, 
 living reality. 
 
 But there is one aspect of complete personality that we have not yet 
 noticed. The ideal of a perfect person includes in it, as 
 perTo P na!?ty an essential constituent, a reference and relation to other 
 
 P Tr P sons. ther persons. This is almost self-evident the moment we con- 
 sider what are universally regarded as virtues which a 
 person should include in his character : justice, truthfulness, benevo- 
 
The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 17 
 
 lence, love, which is called the fulfilling of the law. The moral person 
 cannot be a solipsist. Duties involve a reference to others. Even 
 when a person accuses himself, he does so by setting up in his own 
 consciousness a plaintiff, a defendant, and a judge. 
 
 The inter-relativity of persons is peculiarly emphasized in the moral 
 consideration. Yet even from the strictly scientific standpoint, the 
 social factor cannot be altogether excluded. If we distinguish the 
 reference to ideals and the implication of other persons as distinctively 
 moral elements, then science and theoretical philosophy cannot alto- 
 gether exclude a moral element. In science which seeks knowledge, 
 and theoretical philosophy which critically and reflectively enquires 
 into the implications of knowledge, an ideal is assumed, viz., true 
 knowledge and correct thinking. This is adopted as the goal of effort 
 and the measure of attainment. There is implied a judgment of worth, 
 i.e., a moral judgment, viz., that knowledge is better than ignorance, 
 that the truth is to be preferred to falsehood, that it is more excellent to 
 think correctly than incorrectly. In reality we set up an ideal of a nor- 
 mal or correct thinker, possessing complete knowledge. It is common 
 to smile at Aristotle's oft-repeated reference to the "wise man " as the 
 one who could settle moral perplexities satisfactorily; but this reference 
 is not entirely excluded from science. The snakes seen by the drunk- 
 ard in delirium tremens have an existence for him ; but because he does 
 not then think as a normal thinker, we say that he has hallucina- 
 tions. The distinction between the real and the apparent comes to 
 consciousness when a comparison is instituted between the results 
 gained by different thinkers. Both in its contents and its form we dis- 
 tinguish the merely individual from the universal, and ascribe to the 
 latter more importance. An experience which is peculiar to the indi- 
 vidual, which he cannot repeat at will or cannot share with others, such 
 as his dreams, is not considered to have the same worth as those 
 which can be communicated and corroborated by others. Also in its 
 form, we pass judgment on the results of the individual's thinking. We 
 measure it by a standard which we regard as normal. In 
 
 Science and 
 
 this sense the laws of logic become like ethical prescriptions Logic appeal to 
 
 .... normal thinking. 
 
 to thinking. They say to each individual, Thus oughtest 
 
 thou to think. If you disregard these rules, other individuals will 
 
 properly disregard your conclusions. 
 
 In moral considerations, we cannot avoid the reference to other 
 
1 8 The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 
 
 persons. An action which we regard as right must be such as we 
 would approve if done by another person in the like circumstances. In 
 moral relations, we must not be oblivious of the existence of other per- 
 sons. We must regard and treat other persons, not as things, but as 
 persons. As Kant expressed it, not as mere means to something else, 
 but as ends. We are not true to the ideal of personality, 
 
 Maintaining 
 
 personality not we are , false to our own personality, when we tail to 
 
 selfishness. 
 
 regard and respect the personality of others. Now we 
 have a very well understood word to describe such conduct. We say a 
 person should not act selfishly, but unselfishly. By this we do not 
 mean that he should abandon the claims of personality. We mean the 
 contrary. To act selfishly is to pervert the ideal of personality. It is to 
 give one element a predominance beyond its due ; on the other side, it 
 means that the other elements in personality are being neglected. The 
 part is declared to be more than the whole. It is unfortunate that 
 
 many writers are falling into the habit of describing 
 
 Unselfishness 
 
 not unselfish and generous conduct as ' impersonal. Even 
 
 such a careful writer as Professor Henry Drummond 
 does not always avoid this inaccuracy. If we were to speak 
 of a falling stone as acting, we might say that it acted impersonally. 
 When a man sneezes, he acts impersonally. What those writers mean 
 is, probably, that a man in his actions should recognize that he, as an 
 individual, does'not and cannot exist as a person in isolation from his 
 fellow-men. That he should remember that he is a member of the 
 social life. That he should treat other persons as also persons. That 
 the individual should endeavor to include all those relations to his 
 fellow-men which tend to the completeness of humanity in self and 
 others. But this is not the renouncing of personality. It is simply 
 recognizing the true character and significance of 
 
 Ethics unfolds , ~ , 
 
 the significance personality. The citadel which Ethics must defend 
 
 of Personality- i i 
 
 is personality. The only defence required, however, 
 is elucidation. It simply needs to be recognized and understood 
 to be appreciated; and a study of Ethics is of the highest value, 
 because it helps us to understand personality. In a critical and 
 philosophical study of Ethics, we must endeavor to understand, system, 
 atize, and harmonize the various ideals that are acknowledged 
 
 and sought by humanity. Perfect personality is the 
 
 Ideal of ideals. IT r 
 
 ideal of ideals. All our moral dissatisfaction arises 
 from the recognition that we are not what we ought to be, as measured 
 
The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 19 
 
 by this standard. Moral actions are guided by moral judgments. We 
 make such a moral judgment when some end or proposed action is 
 regarded by the mind as " fitted to yield satisfaction to the choosing 
 subject."* The only ends that can really satisfy the choosing subject 
 are those by the attainment of which the choosing subject becomes more 
 complete, and tends to make others more complete, approaches more 
 nearly to the ideal of perfect personality, and assists other persons to 
 approach to perfect personality or ideal humanity. Loyalty to this 
 ideal, efforts to attain it and conserve it, is the very essence of morality. 
 In this duty all the duties are included. 
 
 The study of Ethics brings us very close to life. All our university 
 training is a preparation for the duties of life. The day 
 that we go forth from the halls of our "alma mater" is 
 very appropriately called "Commencement Day." What- 
 ever may be the special work of each one in life, there 
 is one work which is no man's specialty, but the common work of 
 humanity, or, rather, we should say, it is every one's specialty to live 
 the moral life, to contribute to the development of an ideal personality 
 in self and in others. Immediately on leaving the college halls, if we 
 have not before settled the question, we are confronted with a deeply 
 serious moral problem, "What shall I do?" "What profession or life 
 work shall I adopt?" Would it not sometimes help in the solution of 
 this momentous question if we were more fully aware that it is a moral 
 question ? That we should propose to ourselves the question : In what 
 way can I best contribute to the more perfect development of person- 
 ality ? How can I best employ the special gifts I have in the service 
 of humanity ? Having chosen our profession, we are met in each one 
 with its peculiar cases of moral perplexity. What serious moral ques- 
 tions must be decided each week by the physician in the exercise of his 
 profession ! Shall he acquaint the patient with the critical state of his 
 illness or remain silent ? The responsibility of deciding delicate moral 
 questions confronts the lawyer very frequently. If any one above all 
 others would seem to need a special training in ethical principles, it is 
 the minister of the Gospel. I do not mean simply that we are accus- 
 tomed to look to him for a pattern of moral conduct. Is he not in a 
 peculiar sense a teacher of morals ; and is he not often consulted upon 
 
 * Professor G. P. Young. 
 
2O The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 
 
 moral questions ? Does not his decision determine in many cases the 
 course of conduct that will be pursued by others ? Then it is super- 
 fluous to add that there is the closest connection between morality and 
 religion. Is not a theory of religion or theology as much concerned in 
 the defence of a Perfect Personality as a theory of morals ? Though it 
 may be perfectly true that the being of our personality must depend on 
 the being of God, yet for our knowledge of the Divine personality we 
 must rest on our knowledge of our own personalities. We are aware 
 that the Founder of the Christian religion did not separate morality 
 from religion. Was He not the greatest moral teacher that the world 
 has seen? Did He not first elevate morality above mere legality? 
 Did He not say, "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father 
 which is in heaven is perfect," and, " If ye love me, keep my 
 commandments"? But as we have said, the consideration of 
 complex moral problems cannot be the specialty of 
 
 Living the moral 
 
 life the work of any profession. To decide moral questions, to apply 
 
 humanity. . , 
 
 moral principles, is the work of humanity. What 
 are the problems that press most heavily upon modern civiliza- 
 tion ? They are such as charity, temperance, divorce, socialism. The 
 latter is sometimes called the " social problem," as a wider term than 
 socialism. Each one of these is a moral problem of great significance. 
 A consideration of these shows the complex and difficult character of 
 many moral problems. Now we must deal with these questions. They 
 press upon our civilization. Surely our university graduates, who must 
 stand in the front rank and guide and form public opinion and direct 
 public action, need to make a special and careful study of them. But 
 it may be replied, "That altogether belongs to the field of political econ- 
 omy." It is quite true that they partly belong to the field of political 
 
 economy, but they also belong to the field of Ethics. A 
 
 Relation of 
 
 Ethics to moment s consideration will make this plain, and help to 
 
 indicate the relation of science in general to Ethics.* In an 
 excellent little treatise on " The Character and Logical Method of Politi- 
 cal Economy," Professor Cairnes says : " Neither mental nor physical 
 nature forms the subject-matter of political economy. The economist 
 considers, it is true, physical phenomena as he also considers mental 
 phenomena ; but in neither case as phenomena which it belongs to his 
 
 * See my Essay, " Political Economy and Ethics." The J. E. Bryant Co. (Limited), 1891. 
 
The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 21 
 
 science to explain. The subject-matter of that science is wealth ; and 
 though wealth consists in natural objects, it is not wealth in 
 virtue of those objects being material, but in virtue of their 
 possessing a quality attributed to them by the mind.'' Does not 
 this expressly state that wealth is wealth because it is desired by human 
 beings ? Must not this desire be considered in its relation to other 
 desires ? Let us notice the error that arises if the ethical consideration 
 is excluded. Cairnes says : " The subject-matter of political economy 
 is -thus neither purely physical nor purely mental, but possesses a com- 
 plex character, equally derived from both departments of nature, and 
 the laws of which are neither mental nor physical laws, though they are 
 dependent, and, as I maintain, equally dependent on the laws of matter 
 and those of mind." Thus the political economist " will consider, as 
 being included amongst the paramount mental principles to which I 
 have alluded, the general desire for physical well-being and for wealth 
 as the means of obtaining it, the intellectual power of judging of the 
 efficiency of means to an end, along with the inclination to reach our 
 ends by the easiest and shortest means, mental facts from which results 
 the desire to obtain wealth at the least possible sacrifice." Now by 
 those who have neglected or expressly excluded the ethical element, 
 this statement has been made the cloak for a tremendous fallacy a 
 fallacy widespread, injurious. It leads many to fancy that morality has 
 no place in business transactions. When we admit man's capability of 
 judging of means to accomplish his end, and the inclination to reach it 
 " at the least possible sacrifice/' we first think of him as dealing with the 
 powers of nature, and we approve of his action. Here we call the man 
 who can make use of these powers to the best advantage ingenious, clever, 
 inventive, etc. The Hollander, in constructing his windmill, tries to 
 catch the most breeze with the least machinery. We do not regard the 
 wishes of the wind, we do not consult its interests, we do not desire its 
 good, simply because it has no wishes, interests, or good to be con- 
 sulted. But the moment we come to exchange our manufactured 
 article with another person who has also produced an article by using 
 machinery as advantageously and economically as possible, we have a 
 quite different consideration. It is now one person dealing with 
 another person. It is only in this latter case that we can make sacri- 
 fices or be truly generous. If, in employing a laborer, the employer 
 regard him as he would the powers of external nature, try to get all he 
 
22 The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture 
 
 can from him, give as little as possible to him, do we commend his 
 cleverness, approve his ingenuity, admire his sharpness? We never 
 speak of a man cheating nature, taking a mean advantage of 
 nature ; but when a man seeks his advantage or happiness at 
 too great an expenditure on the part of the person who sup- 
 plies him with the means of gratification, we say, "You as a 
 person, as a man, were not justified in so using your fellow-man." 
 We cannot divorce political economy entirely from Ethics. Political 
 economy as a science, like every other scientific study, must limit its 
 field of inquiry. Like every other science, it strives to reach general 
 rules of what may be done. Political economy does not tell the poli- 
 tician or philanthropist what ought to be done, but simply how certain 
 ends may be gained. To determine which ends should be sought, the 
 politician and philanthropist must consider the compara- 
 
 Philanthropy, 
 
 Scientific and tive worth of various ends. This latter is the special 
 
 Ethical elements . 
 
 work of Ethics. We may say, then, that the following 
 inquiries must be made by the philanthropist : (i) He must study 
 general or theoretical or scientific political economy. (2) He must 
 make an ethical examination of the ends men ought to prefer when 
 alternatives have to be decided. His work is to make an application 
 of the results gained by the above considerations. That is, he must 
 endeavor to select the most suitable and effective means to attain ends 
 that are not merely desired, but that should be desired. 
 
 Now what we have outlined for the politician and practical philan- 
 thropist applies to every man according to his opportunities of action. 
 We are all, or at least ought to be, philanthropists to a greater or less 
 extent. No one lives for himself alone, no one acts for himself alone. 
 No greater moral delusion exists than to suppose that some of our 
 actions are our own private possession, and affect no one else. Directly 
 or indirectly, every moral act goes beyond the actor, and nearly or re- 
 motely affects other persons for good or ill. But if the full apprehension 
 of this thought brings with it at first a sense of awe, a second thought 
 brings gladness and joy to each soul that is in love with the good, who 
 desires the progress of the human race, the conquest and supremacy of 
 the higher life. It teaches that each one of us may use his or her 
 influence to the highest advantage, each one of us may 
 be a teacher of righteousness. Is not this the work in 
 which each moral being wishes to share, not only to 
 know and do the right, but also to be a teacher of the right and good p 
 
The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 23 
 
 The teacher's work, seen in this universal aspect, assumes its appropriate 
 importance and nobility. 
 
 I am sure that when I thus speak of the grandeur of the teacher's 
 mission, the nobility of the teacher's work, the thought 
 of every one here will at once turn to the noble Professor Young. 
 teacher whose memory will always be sacredly cherished 
 by those who had the privilege of knowing him Professor George 
 Paxton Young. 
 
 What was the secret of his wonderful power and influence as a 
 teacher ? Many would answer, " His remarkable personality " ; and this 
 would be a fitting reply, if we remember that the personality is not one 
 element in the character. The personality is the man himself, the whole 
 character. Professor Young had a mighty influence because he was a 
 great man. Throughout his whole life, he bent all his energies upon 
 one aim the development of the highest personality, the truest, purest 
 character in himself and in others. Few have had so clear a conception 
 of the ethical ideal, few have striven so earnestly to attain it, few have 
 been so successful in realizing the moral ideal, few, indeed, have 
 succeeded to such an extent in influencing the lives of others for good. 
 With a many-sided training that exemplified the Grecian idea of 
 education, the symmetrical development of all the powers, with a wide 
 experience of life with its very real joys and deepest sorrows, with a 
 profound theoretical philosophy, he concentrated all upon the state- 
 ment, solution, and application of ethical problems. 
 
 The results he reached were so nearly in accord with those gained 
 by the late Professor T. H. Green that, upon the appearance of the 
 latter's work, the " Prolegomena to Ethics," he seems to have abandoned 
 all intention of publication. This, to his students, has been a matter 
 of deep regret. This regret is not lessened when we recollect that 
 Professor Green's valuable book is written in a heavy and difficult style, 
 while Professor Young's exposition was marked with the lucidity that 
 comes from long experience in teaching and thorough mastery of the 
 subject. 
 
 The shorthand notes left by him are chiefly resumes of standard 
 works in Psychology, Logic, Philosophy, and Ethics, with criticisms 
 interspersed, various outlines of arguments, no doubt intended to 
 arrange the exposition that he intended to present to his class. He 
 never wrote out his lectures. Whether a work can be compiled con- 
 
24 The Study of Ethics : An Inaugural Lecture. 
 
 taining some of the results of his teaching and thinking is still an 
 unsettled question. 
 
 But though Professor Young left so little in the way of publication, 
 his work and influence can never be lost. Each pupil who sat under 
 him, and came in contact with him, will carry throughout his life deep 
 influence for good, won from the inspiration of his beloved teacher. 
 In my own case, it would be impossible for me to estimate how much 1 
 owe, not only in the way of direct guidance and teaching in the lecture- 
 room, but also in the way of counsel and encouragement beyond it. 
 
 "Love is cheap that can be told." In endeavoring to fulfil the 
 responsible duties that devolve upon me as a teacher in this University, 
 I shall aim to emulate the example of a noble predecessor. 
 
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