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LIBRARY
Umvcmity of Caiifamb^
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THE INTERCHURCH WORLD MOVEMENT REPORT ON
The Steel Strike
OF 1919
The Commission of Inquiry consisted of
Bishop F. J. McConnell D. A. Poling
G. W. Coleman Nicholas Van Der Pyl
Alva W. Taylor John McDowell
Mrs. Fred Bennett Secretary, Heber Blankenhorn 'J
( Bishop W. M. Bell
Advisory | Bishop C. D. Williams
With the technical assistance of The Bureau of Industrial Eesearch.
m
' ' On the commission arc a Methodist and an Episcopal Bishop,
a secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Home Missions, and
other persons of character and intelligence. Their conclusions
are entitled to respectful consideration."
Philadelphia Record.
"A challenging document. The whole question of industrial
relationships is raised, and needs to be."
Springfield Republican.
"The report of men whose good faith is not questioned. "
N. Y. Tribune.
"Carries the impress both of factual truth and correct judg-
ment. " N.Y. Evening Post.
REPORT ON THE STEEL
STRIKE OF 1919
BY
THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY,
THE INTERCHURCH WORLD MOVEMENT
BISHOP FRANCIS J. McCONNELL
Chairman
DANIEL A. POLING
Vice-Chairman
GEORGE W. COLEMAN NICHOLAS VAN DER PYL
ALVA W. TAYLOR JOHN McDOWELL
MRS. FRED BENNETT
j BISHOP WILLIAM MELVIN BELL
vtsory -j gjgjjQp CHARLES D. WILLIAMS
HEBER BLANKENHORN
Secretary to the Commission
With the technical assistance of
THE BUREAU OF INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH, NEW YORK
n
NEW YORK
HARCOURT, BRACE AND HOWE
1920
COPYBIGHT, 1920, BY
HABCOUBT, BBACE AND HOWE, INC.
THE QUINN ft BODEN COMPANY
RAHWAY. N. J,
TO THE PRESIDENT
[Following is the essential part of the letter addressed by the
oflBcers of the Commission of Inquiry to President Wilson in
presenting a copy of the Report.]
Authorized by the Interchurch World Movement to investi-
gate industrial unrest in general and the steel strike in par-
ticular, the Commission, of which the undersigned are Chairman
and Vice-Chairman, respectively, has gone forward with its work
for a little more than seven months. The publication of its
completed report has been authorized. It is the very earnest
desire of the Commission that since this report ventures to suggest
certain actions by the Federal Government, it should come first
to the President of the American people.
The Commission finds in the iron and steel industry condi-
tions which it is forced to describe as not good for the nation.
It fails to fin(J any federal agency which, with promise of early
result, is directly grappling with these conditions.
Unless vital changes are brought to pass, a renewal of the
conflict in this industry seems inevitable. The report suggests
the appointment of a special commission to bring about imme-
diately free and open conference between employee and employer.
This commission to go forward on the precedents of the presi-
dential commission for the bituminous coal industry, named by
you after a strike, and of the anthracite commission, appointed
to avert a strike. . . .
The conviction has grown upon this Commission that it should
not fail to recommend a practical suggestion of peace for an
industry drifting toward unrestricted warfare. As Christians
we can do no other.
Frajtcis J. McCoNNELL, Bishop Metho-
dist Episcopal Church,
Chairman, Commission of Inquiry.
Daniel A. Poling, Associate General
Secretary, Interchurch World Move-
ment,
Vice-Chairman, Commission of Inquiry.
[The White House received the copy of the Report on July 27,
1920.]
CHEONOLOGY OF THE INVESTIGATION
Establishment of an independent, representative Commission of
Inquiry by the Industrial Relations Department of the
Interehurch World Movement . . . Oct., 1919.
Personnel: Bishop Francis J. McConnell (Methodist)
Dr. Daniel A. Poling (United Evangelical)
Mr. George W. Coleman (Baptist)
Dr. Alva W. Taylor (Disciples)
Dr. John McDowell (Presbyterian)
Dr. Nicholas Van der Pyl ( Congregationalist)
Mrs. Fred Bennett (Presbyterian)
Advisory ^
Bishop William Melvin Bell (United Brethren)
Bishop Charles D. Williams (Protestant Episcopal)
Field investigation .... Oct., 1919— Feb., 1920.
(Mediation effort, Nov. 28,— Dec. 5, 1919.)
Report adopted unanimously by the Commission of Inquiry
March 29-30, 1920.
Report received by the Executive Committee of the Interehurch
Movement May 10
Recommended for publication by Sub-committee of Executive
Committee June 25
Personnel: Dr. Hubert C. Herring, (Congregationalist);
Bishop James Cannon, Jr., (Methodist South) ; Mr. Warren S.
Stone (Congregationalist).
Adopted unanimously by the Executive Committee of the Inter-
ehurch Movement June 28, 1920
' The advisory members did not take part in the active field investiga-
tion but signed the report after full examination of it and the evidence
on which it was based.
CONTENTS
PAGE
Letter to President Wilson iii
Chronology of the Investigation v
List of Sub-Reports 1
1. Introduction 3
Inauguration of Inquiry 6-7
Scope and Method 8-10
Siimmarized Conclusions 11-16
Recommendations 16-19
II. Ignorance 20
Gary Testimony 23-26
Espionage 27-30
Bolshevism 31
W. Z. Foster's Red Book . 34-35
National and Local Strike-Leaders .... 37-38
British Experience 41-42
III. The Twelve-Hour Day in a No-Conference Industry 44
Nimiher on Eight-Hour Day 48-49
Tables of Hours 52-53
Diary of Carnegie Workman 60-64
Senate Committee Testimony 67-68
Testimony of Clergymen re Seven-Day Week . . 70-71
Engineer's Findings 77-78
Americanization 82-84
IV. Wages in a No-Conference Industry .... 85
U. S. Steel's Wage and Salary Budget .... 87-91
Comparison v?ith Minimum Standards .... 92-95
True Average Annual Earnings 97
Open Hearth Schedule 98
Family Budget— A. R. C 100-101
Comparisons with Other Trades 102-103
U. S. S. C. Housing 104
Investigator's Findings 105-107
Tables of Hours, Wages and Budgets .... 108-109
Typical Cases 110-118
V. Grievances AND Control IN A No-Conference Industry 119
Carleton Parker's Conclusions 125
U. S. S. C. Finance Committee Resolution . . . 126
Diary of Gary, Ind., Worker 129-131
Homestead Nationality Report 133
"• Typical Grievances 138-141
Senate Testimony 141-143
vii
viii CONTENTS
PAGE
VI. Organizing fob Confeeence 144
List of 24 Unions in National Committee . . 145-146
John Fitzpatrick 147
Foster's "Boring from Within" 156-159
Testimony on Attitude of Slavs 161-164
Fitzpatrick's Position 165-167
Organizing of National Committee 169-170
Attitude of New Recruits 171
Attitude of International Unions 172
Attitude of National Committee 176
Causes of Failure 177-183
Size of U. S. Steel Corporation 184-185
Appendix to Section VI 189
Report of National Committee 189-196
VII. Social Consequences of Arbitrary Control . . 197
Consequences for Employers 197
Consequences for Communities 197
Contents of Sub-Reports 198-199
Conclusions (a and b) 199
Causes of Steel Corporation's Policy .... 200
Excerpts from IMinutes of Steel Corporation . . 200-205
Analysis of Minutes 206-207
Mr. Gary's Testimony 210
Discharge for Unionism 211-213
Affidavits of Discharge 213-218
Blacklists 219-220
Espionage 221-224
Testimony of Federal Official 225-226
Agents — provocateurs 230
Spying on Commission of Inquiry 233-234
Abrogation of Civil Liberties 235-237
Uses of Armed Forces 240-242
Pulpit and Press 242-243
Concluding 245
Christian Findings 246-250
Appendix A —
Standards of Living 255
Ogburn Budget 256-257
Chapin Budget 257-258
N. Y. Factory Commission's Budget .... 258
N. Y. Board of Estimate's Budget 259
U. S. Bur. of Labor Statistics Budget .... 262-263
Appendix B —
Wages in Iron, Steel and Other Industries . . . 264
Average Hourly Earnings 265-266
Wages in Pittsburg District 267-268
Sources of Data 269
Appendix C —
Classification According to Skill 270-271
Index 273
KEPOKT ON THE STEEL STRIKE, 1919
MAIJST SUMMARY
Note. — This volume presents the Summary of industrial facts
as drawn from all data before the Commission and adopted as the
Report of the Commission. On it a sub-committee of the Com-
mission based the Findings, from the Christian viewpoint, which
are printed at the conclusion of the book.
Another volume will be required for the supporting reports and
exhibits by the staff of field investigators : George Soule, David
J. Saposs, Miss Marian D. Savage, M. Karl Wisehart, and Robert
Littell. Heber Blankenhorn had charge of the field work and
later acted as Secretary to the Commission.
The principal sub-reports, frequently quoted in this Summary
and awaiting full publication, deal with the following topics :
Civil Liberties.
Welfare Work, Pensions, Etc.
Discharges for Unionism.
The Press and the Strike.
The Pulpit and the Strike.
The Strike in Johnstown.
The Strike in Bethlehem.
Pamily Budgets and Living Conditions.
Intellectual Environment of Immigrants.
Rank and File View.
Under-cover Men.
History of the National Committee.
The Steel Corporation's Labor Policy.
The Negro in the Steel Industry.
MAIN SUMMARY
I
INTEODUCTION
STJMMAEIZED CONCLUSIONS. RECOMMENDATIONS
The steel strike of SeptemlDer 22, 1919, to January 7,
1920, in one sense, is not over. The main issues were not
settled. The causes still remain. Moreover, both, causes and
issues remain uncomprehended by the nation. The strike,
although the largest in point of numbers in the history of the
country up to the first date, exhibited this extraordinary
phase; the basic facts concerning the work and lives of the
300,000 strikers were never comprehensively discovered to
the public.
The strike's real issues were swallowed up in other issues,
some just as real as the actual causes of the strike, some
unreal but in general quite characteristic of American indus-
trial development.
Moreover the little-known working conditions, which
caused the strike, persist in the steel industry. Also the
engulfing circumstances, nationally characteristic, persist.
The following report, therefore, in attempting to analyze
and publish the facts, though belated, finds peculiar justifi-
cation in a central phase of the strike and of conditions left
after the strike. If the steel industry is to find a peaceable
way out of its present state, it must do so on the basis of
a general understanding of such facts as are here set forth.
If the country is to find peaceable ways out of the present
industrial tension it must find them through an enlightened
9
4 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
public opinion based upon a more general understanding of
those national conditions and trends here analyzed.
In the months after the close of the strike no effort was
being made to settle the issues raised by the strike in the
steel industry through reasoned public discussion of the basic
facts. Employers and employees began to wait for " the next
strike " ; they and the public wondered, careless rather than
fearful, whether " the next strike " would come in months
or years, and whether it would be " without violence " as in
1919 or with guns and flame as at Homestead in 1892. The
steel industry continued in the same state as in the past, a
state of latent war. It was expected that the next outbreak
would be precipitated as was the last, by efforts for work-
men's organization and collective bargaining. Meanwhile the
civil liberties of entire communities were subordinated to the
" necessities " of this state of war and the situation in the
steel industry continued, in a peculiar way, to threaten
the industrial peace of the nation.
Eank and file strikes of such spontaneity, intensity and
duration as to slow up the industry of the whole nation char-
acterized the period succeeding the steel strike. Labor unions
which had been striving toward internal reform by democra-
tizing their organizations and by defining their responsibili-
ties to the public ; employers who were working toward plans
for industrial cooperation; those few government agencies
and social institutions which had been at work on the nation's
after-war industrial problem — all felt a set-back. Conditions
of industrial disorganization set in, directly related to events
in the steel industry.
Put tersely, the public mind completely lost sight of the
real causes of the strike, which lay in hours, wages and con-
ditions of labor, fixed " arbitrarily," according to the head
of the United States Steel Corporation, in his testimony at
a Senatorial investigation. It lost sight of them because it
INTEODUCTION 5
was more immediately conceiiied with the actual outcome of
the great struggle between aggregations of employers and
aggregations of workers than it was with the fundamental
circumstances that made such a struggle inevitable. This
investigation and report deal primarily with the causative
facts, — with abiding conditions in the steel industry — and
only secondarily with conflicts of policies and their influence
on national institutions and modes of thought.
Out of the first set of undisputed facts, these may be cited
in the beginning:
(a) The number of those working the twelve-hour day is
69,000. (Testimony of E. H. Gary, Senate Investiga-
tion, Vol. I, p. 157.)
(b) The number of those receiving the common labor or
lowest rate of pay is 70,000. (Letters of E. H. Gary
to this Commission.)
This means that approximately 350,000 ^ men, women and
children are directly affected by the longest hours or the
smallest pay in that part of the industry owned by the United
States Steel Corporation, which fixes pay and hours without
conference with the labor force.
Since this corporation controls about half the industry, it
is therefore a reasonably conservative estimate that the work-
ing conditions of three quarters of a million of the nation's
population have their lives determined arbitrarily by the
twelve-hour day or by the lowest pay in the steel industry.
This nub of the situation, the Commission found, was
subordinated, and after the strike remained subordinate, to
the industry's warfare over collective bargaining. Both sides
were enmeshed. The huge steel companies, committed to a
non-union system (and offering no alternative) and the masses
1 The average American family, the so-called statistical family, con-
sists of five persons.
6 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
of workers, moving as workers do traditionally, seemed both
to be Helpless. Espionage replaced collective bargaining or
cooperative service.
Inauguration of Inquiry:
The data for this report were obtained by and for an
independent Commission of Inquiry appointed at the request
of the Industrial Relations Department of the Interchurch
World Movement of North America after a National Indus-
trial Conference in New York on October 3, 1919. The Con-
ference rejected a resolution condemning one party to the
strike for refusing to adopt the principle of collective bar-
gaining but unanimously supported a resolution directing
a thorough investigation of the strike and publication of the
reports of the investigators.
Those parts of the evidence obtained directly by the Com-
mission were secured through personal observation and
through open hearings held in Pittsburgh in November, sup-
plemented by inspection trips in Western Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. More technical and detailed data
were obtained by a staff of investigators working under a
field director from the Bureau of Industrial Research,
New York. Other evidence was obtained directly by
the Bureau of Industrial Research, by the Bureau of Ap-
plied Economics in Washington, by a firm of consulting
engineers, and by various other organizations and tech-'
nical experts working under the direction of the Com-
mission.
The results are presented in a Main Report with sub-
sidiary supporting reports. Pertinent phases of other in-
vestigations and surveys, including governmental studies, the
recent findings of the Senate Committee on Labor, evidence
on the limitation or abrogation of civil rights, before and
during the strike, have been collected and analyzed. The
INTRODUCTION 7
relation of " welfare work " to the workers was determined,
chiefly hy the analysis of available statistics.
A detailed analysis was made of the relation of the press
and of the pulpit to the strike, fields hitherto neglected ; and
a similar analytical study was made of companies' " under-
cover men " and " labor detective agencies." A body of over
five hundred afiSdavits and statements from striking and non-
striking steel workers was collected and analyzed.
The chief effort at intensive study was limited to the Pitts-
burgh district, including Johnstown and Youngstown. The
evidence may be said to center in the plants of the United
States Steel Corporation and particularly its plants in the
Pittsburgh district.
Difficulties in obtaining evidence were expected; — ^they
exceeded expectations. In certain quarters the Commission
of clergymen were charged with being " Bolshevists " and
" anarchists " ; their investigators were rebuffed as " Reds " ;
one was " an ^sted." Formal action was finally necessary
to combat the circulation in written form of charges whose
only basis, apparently, was that any persons had ventured to
make any investigation. In other quarters great courtesy was
accorded, coupled with inability to furnish the desired
statistics. Moreover the lack of up-to-date and available
statistics which should have been possessed by union officials,
the over-supply of unverified complaints from strikers and
the reluctance to impart any information on the part of the
companies combined to lengthen unduly the period of field
investigation. The Commission's effort was in itself a reve-
lation of the lack of authoritative means for acquainting the
public with industrial information at a time of industrial
crisis.
At one period, investigation was delayed by an effort of
the Commission to settle the strike. The Commission, hav-
ing been urged to do so in a manner impossible to refuse,
8 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
actually formulated a plan of mediation which was formally
accepted by the leaders of the strike but was definitely re-
jected by the Steel Corporation.
Scope and Method'.
The scope of the inquiry was delimited by applying two
simple questions:
(a) What workers constituted the bulk of the strikers ?
The answer is not disputed : the backbone of the strike
consisted of the mass of common labor and the semi-skilled,
constituting roughly three-quarters of all employees, and
mostly " foreigners."
By " foreigners " the steel industry means not all im-
migrants or sons of immigrants, but only the " new immigra-
tion," consisting of the score of races from southeastern or
eastern Europe. About half of these " foreigners " had
citizenship papers.
In many places all the skilled struck ; in a few places the
skilled went out and many unskilled stayed in the mills.
The foreigners had never been organized before; hitherto
they had been looked upon by the unions as potential strike
breakers, " stealing Americans' jobs and lowering the Ameri-
can standard of living."
(b) What was the chief factor on the employers' side?
The answer is not in dispute : the U. S. Steel Corporation
was the admittedly decisive influence.
Whatever the Steel Corporation does, the rest of the in-
dustry will ultimately do; whatever modifications of policy
fail to take place in the industry fail because of the opposition
of the Steel Corporation.
Throughout the report great emphasis is laid on Mr. Gary's
testimony, partly because he was almost the sole spokesman
for the industry during the strike and partly because officials,
corporation and " independent/' referred investigators to Mr.
INTRODUCTION 9
Gary and often limited their own testimony to reading ex-
tracts from Mr. Gary's statements or approving his policies.
The scope of the inquiry, therefore, included chiefly repre-
sentative cross-sections of the mass of low-skilled " foreign-
ers " in the Pittsburgh and Chicago district plants of the
Steel Corporation.
Of the Corporation's 268,000 employees, 80,000 are miners,
railworkers and dockmen, ship crews and shipyard workers,
who were untouched by the strike and are therefore excluded.
The method was to carry the inquiry to the steel workers
themselves, strikers and non-strikers. Effort was made to get
beyond the debates of Mr. Gary and Mr. Gompers. The
statements and affidavits of 500 steel workers carefully
compared and tested, constitute the rock bottom of the
findings, the testimony of the leaders on both sides being
used chiefly to interpret these findings.
Effort was made to keep in mind, that a strike is not
merely a call to strike, it is a walk-out, frequently without a
call. Everything, — Mr. Gary, Mr. Gompers, the Corpora-
tion's labor policies, Mr. Foster's record, — was viewed in
the light of whether or not it had or had not a relation to
the separation of 300,000 men from their jobs.
The Commission and its investigators went to the steel
workers with two main questions:
A. Why did you strike ? (Or why refuse to strike ?)
B. What do you want ?
Answers to A. were found to deal with things that existed,
— schedules of hours, wages, conditions, grievances, physical
states and states of mind.
Answers to B. were found to deal with a method (hitherto
non-existent in the steel industry), for changing A.; the
strike leaders called it collective bargaining and the right to
organization; the steel employers called it the closed shop
and labor autocracy.
10 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
Therefore, the first half of the inquiry concerned, prima-
rily, conditions of labor.
The second half concerned, primarily, methods for chang-
ing the conditions revealed by the first half.
The second line of inquiry was found to stretch back with
decisive effect over the first half; in short, the key to the
steel industry, both before and during the strike and now
was found in following to its furthest implications this
question : What means of conference exist in the steel mills ?
Both sides agreed that the occasion of the strike, leaving
aside for the moment its relation to any fundamental cause,
was the denial of a conference, requested by organized labor
and refused by Mr. Gary.
The inquiry into the means of conference was pursued
through the three possible forms of conference: (a) through
individuals ; (b) through shop committee or company unions ;
(c) through labor unions.
The complete scope of this phase of the inquiry might
be restated as follows:
(A) Investigation of a system of denial of organization and
collective bargaining (the policy of the Steel Corpora-
tion).
(B) Investigation of a system or systems of non-union collec-
tive bargaining (existent in certain "independent'' plants
where strikes had once existed or were feared).
(C) Investigation of a movement for collective bargaining and
organization of the traditional trade union kind (ini-
tiated by the American Federation of Labor and fought
by the Steel Corporation).
Inquiry B. was not sufficiently completed to be presented
in this report, except as a sidelight on the main conditions.
The plans in operation or attempted in the Pueblo plant of
the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, the Midvale-Cambria
mTRODUCTION 11
Company, the Bethlehem, Inland and International Harvester
plants, etc., did not suggest to the dominant factor, the Steel
Corporation, any modification of its policy.
Summarized Conclusions:
SuflBcient data were analyzed to warrant the following main
conclusions concisely stated here and discussed at length in
this report and the sub-reports.
1. The conduct of the iron and steel industry was deter-
mined by the conditions of labor accepted by the 191,000
employees in the U. S. Steel Corporation's manufacturing
plants.
2. These conditions of labor were fixed by the Corporation,
without collective bargaining or any functioning means of
conference; also without above-board means of learning
how the decreed conditions affected the workers.
3. Ultimate control of the plants was vested in a small group
of financiers whose relation to the producing force was
remote. The financial group's machinery of control gave
it full knowledge of output and dividends, but negligible
information of working and living conditions.
4. The jobs in the five chief departments of the plants were
organized in a pyramid divided roughly into thirds; the
top third of skilled men, chiefly Americans, resting on a
larger third of semi-skilled, all based on a fluctuating mass
of common labor. Promotion was at pleasure of company
representatives.
5. Eates of pay and other principal conditions were based on
what was accepted by common labor; the unskilled and
semi-unskilled force was largely immigrant labor.
6. The causes of the strike lay in the hours, wages and con-
trol of jobs and in the manner in which all these were
fixed.
7. Hours: Approximately one-half the employees were sub-
jected to the twelve-hour day. Approximately one-half
of these in turn were subjected to the seven-day week.
12 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
Much less than one-quarter had a working day of less
than ten hours (sixty-hour week).
The average week for all employees was 68.7 hours; these
employees generally helieved that a week of over sixty
hours ceased to be a standard in other industries fifteen
to twenty years ago.
Schedules of hours for the chief classes of steel workers
were from twelve to forty hours longer per week than in
other basic industries near steel communities; the Ameri-
can steel average was over twenty hours longer than the
British, which ran between forty-seven to forty-eight hours
in 1919.
Steel jobs were largely classed as heavy labor and hazard-
ous.
The steel companies professed to have restored practically
pre-war conditions; the hours nevertheless were longer than
in 1914 or 1910. Since 1910 the Steel Corporation has
increased the percentage of its twelve-hour workers.
The only reasons for the twelve-hour day, furnished by the
companies, were found to be without adequate basis in fact.
The increased hours were found to be a natural develop-
ment of large scale production, which was not restricted
by public sentiment or by organization among employees.
The twelve-hour day made any attempt at " Americani-
zation " or other civic or individual development for one-
half of all immigrant steel workers arithmetically impos-
sible.
8. Wages: The annual earnings of over one-third of all pro-
ductive iron and steel workers were, and had been for years,
below the level set by government experts as the minimum
of subsistence standard for families of five.
The annual earnings of 72 per cent, of all workers were,
and had been for years, below the level set by government
experts as the minimum of comfort level for families of
five.
This second standard being the lowest which scientists are
willing to term an " American standard of living," it fol-
INTRODUCTION 13
lows that nearly three-quarters of the steel workers could
not earn enough for an American standard of living.
The bulk of unskilled steel labor earned less than enough
for the average family's minimum subsistence; the bulk
of semi-skilled labor earned less than enough for the aver-
age family's minimum comfort.
Skilled steel labor was paid wages disproportionate to the
earnings of the other two-thirds, thus binding the skilled
class to the companies and creating divisions between the
upper third and the rest of the force.
Wage rates in the iron and steel industry as a whole are
determined by the rates of the U. S. Steel Corporation.
The Steel Corporation sets its wage rates, the same as its
hour schedules, without conference (or collective bargain-
ing), with its employees.
Concerning the financial ability of the Corporation to pay
higher wages the following must be noted (with the under-
standing that the Commission's investigation did not in-
clude analysis of the Corporation's financial organization) :
the Corporation vastly increased its undistributed financial
reserves during the Great War. In 1914 the Corporation's
total undivided surplus was $135,204,471.90. In 1919 this
total undivided surplus had been increased to $493,048,-
201.93. Compared with the wage budgets, in 1918, the
Corporation's final surplus after paying dividends of
$96,382,027 and setting aside $274,277,835 for Federal
taxes payable in 1919, was $466,888,421, — a sum large
enough to have paid a second time the total wage and
salary budget for 1918 ($452,663,524), and to have left
a surplus of over $14,000,000, In 1919 the undivided sur-
plus was $493,048,201.93, or $13,000,000 more than the
total wage and salary expenditures.^
1 Detailed figures on the Corporation's surpluses, accumulation of
which was begun in 1901, are:
1913— Total undivided surplus $151,798,428.89
1914— Total undivided surplus 135.204,471.90
1915— Total undivided surplus 180,025,328.74
1916— Total undivided surplus 381,360,913.37
1917— Total undivided surplus 431,660,803.63
1918— Total undivided surplus 466,888,421.38
1919— Total undivided surplus 493,048,201.93
14 ITEPOnT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
Increases in wages during the war in no case were at a
sacrifice of stockholders' dividends.
Extreme congestion and unsanitary living conditions, prev-
alent in most Pennsylvania steel communities, were largely
due to underpayment of semi-skilled and common labor.
9. Grievances: The Steel Corporation's arbitrary control of
hours and wages extended to everything in individual steel
jobs, resulting in daily grievances.
The Corporation, committed to a non-union system, was
as helpless as the workers to anticipate these grievances.
The grievances, since there existed no working machinery
of redress, weighed heavily in the industry, because they
incessantly reminded the worker that he had no " say "
whatever in steel.
Discrimination against immigrant workers, based on ri-
valry of economic interests, was furthered by the present
system of control and resulted in race divisions within the
community.
10. Control: The arbitrary control of the Steel Corporation
extended outside the plants, affectiug the workers as citi-
zens and the social institutions in the communities.
The steel industry was under the domination of a policy
whose aim was to keep out labor unions. In pursuit of
this policy, blacklists were used, workmen were discharged
for union affiliation, " under-cover men " and " labor de-
This report does not go into the long dispute over the Corporation's
financing, a controversy which blazed up during the strike but not as a
part of the issue. A typical criticism printed about this time was the
following from the Searchlight, commenting on Basil Manly's analysis
of Senate Document 259, (a report from the Secretary of the Treasury) :
" On the basis of the Steel Corporation's public reports, its net profits
for the two years 1916 and 1917, ' after the payment of interest on bonds,
and other allowances for all charges growing out of the installation of
special war facilities,' amounted, according to Mr. Manly, to $888,931,511.
The bonds of the corporation represent all the money actually invested
in the concern, for the common stock is ' nothing but water.'
" Of course out of the net income the Steel Corporation had to pay its
taxes to the federal government, but the hundreds of millions that re-
mained represented earnings on ' shadow dollars.' "
INTKODUCTION 15
tectives " were employed and efforts were made to influ-
ence the local press, pulpit and police authorities.
In Western Pennsylvania the civil rights of free speech
and assembly were abrogated without just cause, both for
individuals and labor organizations. Personal rights of
strikers were violated by the State Constabulary and sher-
iff's deputies.
Federal authorities, in some cases, acted against groups
of workmen on the instigation of employees of steel
companies. In many places in Western Pennsylvania,
community authorities and institutions were subservient
to the maintenance of one corporation's anti-union
policies.
11. The organizing campaign of the workers and the strike
were for the purpose of forcing a conference in an in-
dustry where no means of conference existed; this specific
conference to set up trade union collective bargaining, par-
ticularly to abolish the twelve-hour day and arbitrary meth-
ods of handling employees.
12. No interpretation of the movement as a plot or conspiracy
fits the facts; that is, it was a mass movement, in which
leadership became of secondary importance.
13. Charges of Bolshevism or of industrial radicalism in the
conduct of the strike were without foundation.
14. The chief cause of the defeat of the strike was the size of
the Steel Corporation, together with the strength of its
active opposition and the support accorded it by employers
generally, by governmental agencies and by organs of pub-
lic opinion.
15. Causes of defeat, second in importance only to the fight
waged by the Steel Corporation, lay in the organization
and leadership, not so much of the strike itself, as of the
American labor movement.
16. The immigrant steel worker was led to expect more from
the twenty-four International Unions of the A. F. of L.
conducting the strike than they, through indifference, self-
ishness or narrow habit, were willing to give.
16 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
17. Racial differences among steel workers and an immigrant
tendency toward industrial unionism, which was combated
by the strike leadership, contributed to the disunity of the
strikers.
18. The end of the strike was marked by slowly increasing
disruption of the new unions; by bitterness between
the "American" and "foreign" worker and by bit-
terness against the employer, such as to diminish pro-
duction.
The following question was definitely placed before the
Commission of Inquiry: Were the strikers justified? The
investigation's data seem to make impossible any other than
this conclusion:
The causes of the strike lay in grievances which gave the
workers just cause for complaint and for action. These un-
redressed grievances still exist in the steel industry.
Recommendations:
I. Inasmuch as —
(a) conditions in the iron and steel industry depend on the
conditions holding good among the workers of the U. S.
Steel Corporation, and —
(b) past experience has proved that the industrial policies
of large-scale producing concerns are basically influenced
by (1) public opinion expressed in governmental action,
(2) labor unions, which in this case have failed, or (3)
by both, and —
(c) permanent solutions for the industry can only be reached
by the Steel Corporation in free cooperation with its
employees, therefore —
INTKODUCTION 17
It is recommended —
(a) that the Federal Govermnent be requested to initiate
the immediate undertaking of such settlement by bring-
ing together both sides ;
(b) that the Federal Government, by presidential order or
by congressional resolution, set up a commission repre-
senting both sides and the public, similar to the Com-
mission resulting from the coal strike; such Commis-
sion to —
1. inaugurate immediate conferences between the Steel
Corporation and its employees for the elimination of
the 12-hour day and the Y-day week, and for the
readjustment of wage rates ;
2. devise with both sides and establish an adequate plan
of permanent free conference to regulate the conduct
of the industry in the future;
3. continue and make nation-wide and exhaustive this
inquiry into basic conditions in the industry.
II. Inasmuch as —
(a) the administration of civil law and police power in
Western Pennsylvania has created many injustices
which persist, and —
(b) no local influence has succeeded in redressing this con-
dition, therefore —
It is recommended —
(a) that the Federal Government inaugurate full inquiry
into the past and present state of civil liberties in West-
em Pennsylvania and publish the same.
18 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
III. Inasmuch as —
(a) the conduct and activities of " lahor-detective " agencies
do not seem to serve the best interests of the country,
and —
(b) the Federal Department of Justice seems to have
placed undue reliance on cooperation with corporations'
secret services, therefore —
It is recommended —
(a) that the Federal Government institute investigation for
the purpose of regulating labor detective agencies; and
for the purpose of publishing what government depart-
ments or public moneys are utilized to cooperate with
company " under-cover men."
IV. It is recommended that the proper Federal authorities
be requested to make public two reports of recent in-
vestigations of conditions in the steel industry, in mak-
ing which public money was spent, and to explain why
these and similar reports have not hitherto been made
public, and why reports which were printed have been
limited to extremely small editions.
(Reference is made specifically to Mr. Ethelbert Stewart's
report on civil liberties in Western Pennsylvania, made to the
Secretary of Labor ; to Mr. George P. West's report made to the
War Labor Board; to the Testimony of the Senate Commit-
tee's strike investigation, 2 vols., printed in an edition of 1,000
only; and to Senate Document 259.)
V. It is recommended that the Industrial Relations De-
partment of the Interchurch World Movement continue
and supplement the present inquiry into the iron and
steel industry with particular reference to —
INTRODUCTION 19
1. Company unions and shop committees;
2. Social, political and industrial beliefs of the immi-
grant worker;
3. Present aims of production in the industry.
4. Conduct of trade unions with reference to democracy
and to responsibility.
VI. It is recommended that immediate publication, in the
most effective forms possible, be obtained for this report
with its sub-reports.
11.
IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM
As a preliminary to the whole report, analysis of the data
gathered in the inquiry warrants the following conclusions
on two salient and inter-related phases of the strike:
The steel companies had no adequate means of information
on the usual conditions of employment, previous to the
strike, nor on the motives of employees in joining the
unions during the organizing campaign; they therefore
placed undue reliance on information obtained from
secret and mercenary sources.
The public purveyors of information on normal steel condi-
tions and on the causes of the strike failed to ascertain
and publish the facts. Ignorance of the facts was so
general that it was possible for one interpretation of the
strike to obtain wide acceptance, viz. the companies'
explanation that the strike was a plot of Bolshevists, sup-
ported mainly by " radicals " who were largely aliens.
Evidence on this interpretation of the strike as a Bolshevist
plot failed entirely to substantiate it. On the contrary,
it tended to show that this conception was without foun-
dation in fact.
Concerning the basic facts of normal steel employment
conditions, not only were the public and the companies un-
informed but the strikers' leaders were also uninformed. It
is not unusual for strikes, like presidential elections and wars,
to be fought out on extraneous issues, with little elucidation
of fundamental facts. In most such cases, however, some of
the basic facts finally do come to the surface. In this strike,
20
IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM 21
so far as the public was concerned, lack of information re-
mained so general that it was possible to set up straw-man
explanations and keep public attention diverted to knocking
them down.
It was necessary for this Commission to consider such
questions as the following: Was there any substantial
general knowledge of the customary organization of the steel
industry, its hours, its wages, its workers and their modes
of living ? Did the government have the basic facts regard-
ing employment in the industry, and did it make use of the
facts it had ? Did the United States Steel Corporation, in
normal times, possess adequate means of ascertaining the
truth about living conditions and the desires of its workers ?
Was the Corporation subject to misinformation? Were the
press and the pulpit in possession of the facts ? Within steel
communities, are the facts about steel workers' lives obvious
and immediately accessible to the rest of the community?
As to the allegation that the strike was plotted and led by
" Reds " or syndicalists or Bolshevists, that it was supported
mainly or entirely by alien " radicals," and that its real
objects were the overthrow of established leaders and es-
tablished institutions of organized labor and perhaps the
overthrow of the established government of the country, it
was necessary to consider such questions as: What sort
of facts were essential to determine the problem ? Who
offered this allegation and with what proof? Why was this
allegation made? Did the allegation seriously affect the
strike? What were its effects on the public?
Analysis of the data collected proved that neither the
United States Steel Cor^Doration, nor organized labor, nor
governmental agencies have considered it their normal busi-
ness to ascertain the current facts regarding conditions of
employment, etc., in the steel industry and to take the public
constantly ipto their confidence on such facts. The Corpora-
22 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
tion's annual report is made public, but the facts therein
which deal with labor are confined to a few lines and are not
illuminating. Organized labor has never understood the
business of gathering facts about any industry nor the advisa-
bility of presenting such facts to the public. The govern-
ment's bureaus for collecting such statistics as hours, wages,
working conditions, costs and profits, are ridiculously in-
adequate, are almost invariably undercut by Congress in
appropriations, and are not primarily concerned with pop-
ularizing such facts as they possess. What might be con-
sidered as a prime business of any government, i.e. the
discovery and current publication of fundamental facts of
the country's basic industries was not considered the national
government's business in relation to the steel industry.
In normal times, the Steel Corporation had no adequate
means of learning the conditions of life and work and the
desires of its employees. Company officers admitted that
they had no real way of reaching, or of keeping in touch
with, the mass of workers who became involved in the strike,
that is the foreign-speaking unskilled workers and the lower
half of the semi-skilled, constituting up to 80 per cent, of
the force in representative plants. Even such machinery of
contact as is provided in " modern employment management "
systems had not been installed very long in the steel plants
and was not developed beyond the point of keeping in con-
tact at the moment of hiring and firing. With the employ-
ment managers were usually joined one to four welfare
workers of limited training who were little concerned with
interpreting the difficulties and desires of the " foreign "
steel worker because they were powerless to efi'ect changes.
The President of the Carnegie Steel Company declared to
the Commission that there was " no real way of getting
hold of the foreigner." The head of the Corporation's Sani-
tation, Safety and Welfare Department, Mr. C. L. Close
IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM 23
agreed with this statement. Neither seemed to think that this
inability was due to a lack of machinery and it was apparent
that steel officials generally relied on some other method for
information than an openly organized system of studying
the minds and needs of the workers. A suggestion that
companies might foster and enlist the aid of organizations
of the workers themselves for the purpose of insuring such
information was commented on by company officers with
surprise not to say suspicion. Mr. Gary gave the clearest
testimony in confirmation of his subordinates, though that
was not his immediate purpose. He told the Senate Com-
mittee that his men were " contented." He said he knew
this to be the case and that he had adequate means for know-
ing it ; that there was " no cause " for the strike and that
" the men were not complaining ; the workmen had found
no fault; we are on the best of terms with our men and
have always been, with some very slight exceptions, very in-
consequential exceptions." Then he volunteered the follow-
ing, (quoted in full from the Senate Testimony, Volume I,
pages 161 and 162) :
Senator Walsh. " How did you personally know that hun-
dreds and thousands of your men were content and satisfied ? "
Mr. Gary. " Senator, I know it because I make it my par-
ticular business all the time to know the frame of mind of our
people. Not that I visit every man ; I do not do that ; of course,
I could not do that; not that there could be something done or
something said in the mills that I would not know; but, in
the first place, my instructions regarding the treatment of the
men are absolutely positive, given to the presidents at the presi-
dents' meetings regularly — plenty of my remarks to the presi-
dents have been printed and can be exhibited if necessary —
and because I am inquiring into that; and we have a man at
the head of our welfare department, Mr. Close, who is here,
who is around among the works frequently, and all the time,
24 KEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
more or less, trying to ascertain conditions; because public
writers, unbeknown to us, have been among our works mak-
ing inquiry and reporting and writing articles on the subject;
and because we come in contact with the foremen and often
with the men, going through the mills, Mr. Farrell and myself,
and others from time to time; because we have a standing rule,
and have had, that if any of our men in any department are
dissatisfied in any respect they may come singly or they may
come in groups, as they may choose, to the foremen and ask
for adjustments, make complaints, and if necessary they may
come before the president of the company, or they may come
to the chairman of the Corporation. Now then, sometimes there
have been complaints made. For instance, to mention a some-
what trivial circumstance, some three or four years ago — not
to be exactly specific as to date — one of our presidents tele-
phoned to the president of our Corporation, who is in general
charge of operations, that a certain number of men — it may
have been a thousand or it may have been two thousand men —
in a certain mill had all gone out, and his report was that
there was no reason for their going out "
Senator Sterling. " When you speak of * one of our presi-
dents,' you mean the president of a subsidiary company ? "
Mr. Gary. " Yes ; the president of a subsidiary company.
And he said, ' It is very easy for me to fill this mill, and I
will proceed to do it.' The president of the Corporation came
to me immediately and reported this. I said, ' Tell him to wait
and to come to New York.' He came the next morning and he
made substantially that same statement to me. I said, ' Have
you taken pains to find out; has anybody spoken to you? ' * No,'
he said, 'I have not received any complaint whatever.' I said,
* Are you sure no complaint has been made to anj^one ? ' He
said, ' I will find out.' I said, * You had better do so before
you decide what you are going to do or what you propose to
do.' He went back; got hold of the foreman. A committee
of men had come to the foreman and said that they thought
three things, if I remember, were wrong — not very important,
but they claimed they were wrong. And the president came
IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM 25
back the second time and reported that; and I said, 'Well,
now, if they state the facts there, isn't the company wrong ? '
' Well,' he said, ' I don't consider it very important.' I said,
* That is not the question. Are you wrong in any respect ? It
seems to me you are wrong with respect to two of those things,
and the other not. Now, you go right back to your factory
and just put up a sign that, with reference to those two par-
ticular things, the practice will be changed.' "
The foregoing revelation of Corporation practice must be
analyzed from the standpoint of Mr. Gary's machinery for
getting information about his workmen. Mr. Gary's sys-
tem is; 1) To give instructions to the subsidiary com-
pany presidents ; as to whether the presidents carry out those
instructions, he " is inquiring into that." 2.) He has one
man, head of a busy and complex department, who is " more
or less trying to ascertain conditions." 3.) Public writers
write articles on his steel works. 4.) Mr. Gary and Mr.
Farrell sometimes go through the mills and " come in con-
tact with the foremen and often with the men." 5.) Mr.
Gary knows his system is adequate because of " a standing
rule " that anybody in the plant is privileged to come to him
with complaints. He did not cite, nor, so far as the Com-
mission has been able to ascertain has anybody in his office
cited, any example of any workman or committees of work-'
men coming to him. In short, it would appear that he gets no
information under "the standing rule." Finally, he gives
in full the circumstances of how he learned of the desires
of one thousand, " it may have been two thousand," whose
grievance was so vital to themselves that they went on
strike.
That is, these one thousand, or two thousand, workmen
whose complaint was just, or two-thirds just, according to
Mr. Gary himself, after weeks or months of effort to obtain
redress, took the desperate venture of quitting their jobs.
26 EEPORT OX THE STEEL STRIKE
That they might never get the jobs back again was likely, as
the president of the subsidiary company told Mr. Gary that
he could easily fill their places. The livelihood of more
than five thousand men, women and children (if the strikers
numbered one thousand) of over ten thousand men, women
and children (if the strikers numbered two thousand) was
vitally involved. Without redress, and without jobs, this
population would have had to move from their community,
perhaps, and would certainly have had to seek new ways
of earning a living except for Mr. Gary's casual intervention
in deciding to ask them what they wanted.
"Why it is normally impossible for steel workers to get
their lesser grievances considered by officers in power is con-
sidered in another section of this report. The greater griev-
ances, concerning hours and wages, are admittedly outside
the province of the Corporation's theoretical committee sys-
tem. In practice, grievances which drive workers out of the
steel industry are effectually stopped from getting higher
than the first representative of the company reachable by
the workers, — the foreman. Is it not clear, therefore, that
the Steel Corporation disposes of the work and livelihood of
its 260,000 employees without learning how such disposal
really affects them ?
The Corporation relies upon other means of information
than a system of open and cooperative machinery operating
within the mills. Mr. Gary's testimony on this subject is
brief: (Senate Testimony, Volume I, Page 177:)
Senator Walsh. "Have you a secret service organization
among your employees at any of the subsidiary plants of the
Steel Corporation ? "
Mr. Gary. " Well, Senator, I cannot be very specific about
that, but I am quite sure that at times some of our people have
used secret service men to ascertain facts and conditions."
IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM 27
It was not the original intention of the Interchurch Com-
mission to gather evidence on the widespread charges of
" company spy systems," " industrial espionage," etc. Steel
workers and their spokesmen asserted that such spy systems
were the ever-present instruments resulting in an ever-present
fear, — some workers called it " terrorization," — evident
among the rank and file of steel workers. For one thing, it
would have seemed impossible to get such secret evidence.
For another thing, the Commission doubted its importance.
But it became apparent that some officials of some steel com-
panies were so accustomed to look upon their secret service
reports as the basis on which their, or any company's, labor
policy would have to be formed that they showed no hesitancy
in producing information about them from their secret files.
The Commission's investigators, asking the officers of a
company in the Pittsburgh district for information concern-
ing their machinery for ascertaining their workers' needs,
encountered this: "Bring in the labor file." The labor
file, this company's basis for a labor policy, consisted of the
secret service reports of various detectives and of "labor
agencies." Here were hundreds of misspelled reports of
" under-cover men," " operatives * X,' ' Y,' and ' Z," con-
tracts for their services, official letters exchanged between
companies giving lists of strikers, commonly known as
" black lists." In some instances original pencilled scraps
of paper contained secret denunciations of workers, which
denunciations, raised to the dignity of typed documents,
were then circulated to other companies and even to the
Federal Department of Justice. The names of independent
concerns and of subsidiary companies of the Steel Corpora-
tion appear on letterheads showing how this information or
misinformation was passed along.
A detailed study of this file and of the spy system is
given in another section of this report. It is sufficient to
28 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
note here that no small part of the labor policy of this com-
pany was founded on the inaccurate, prejudiced and usually
misspelled reports of professional spies.
In Chicago one labor detective agency had operatives at
work during the strike in the South Chicago district, where
a subsidiary of the Steel Corporation and independents have
plants. This concern was investigated by agents of the War
Department, its offices were raided by the State's Attorney
and one of its responsible heads was indicted for intent to
" kill and murder divers large numbers of persons " and to
create riots. A published statement that these operatives had
been employed in behalf of the Steel Corporation among
others was put before the President of the Illinois Steel Com-
pany, the Corporation's big Chicago-Gary subsidiary, who
declared it untrue. The statement was put before the head
of the raided concern who declared that his operatives were
working for the Illinois Steel Co.
The Commission of Inquiry had not expected to ask
Mr. Gary whether the head of the United States Steel Cor-
poration made use of such detectives' reports. However,
one such report, received by Mr. Gary, was produced by him.
This document dealt with the present investigation of the
steel strike, the activities of the Interchurch World Move-
ment and its Commission of Inquiry. The same curious il-
literacy, characteristic of the labors of these " under-cover
men," characterized the " report " on the Commission of
Inquiry. Mr. Gary made this document the primary sub-
ject of discussion when conferring with a committee of Com-
missioners whose business with him was nothing less than a
plan of mediation designed to end the whole strike.^
* That is, the committee men representing the Interchurch Commis-
sion visiting Mr. Gary by appointment were first asked by Mr. Gary's
secretary if they had seen the secret document which he handed them.
They replied that they had.
Mr. Gary's secretary expressed surprise and he wondered " where it
had come from."
A Conunissioner noted that " The report is anonymous." The sec-
IGNOKANCE: BOLSHEVISM 29
It is undeniable that labor policies in the steel industry
rest in considerable part on the reports of " under-cover
men " paid directly by the steel companies or hired from
concerns popularly known as " strike busters." The " opera-
tives " make money by detecting " unionism " one day and
" Bolshevism " the next. The importance of the espionage
system as revealed by this evidence lies in the light it sheds
on the atmosphere of war normal to the steel industry, and
this atmosphere is due to the dominant policy of preventing
organization among the workers, even organization for above-
board study of the men's conditions of labor and thought.
This state of latent warfare is now so customary that the
highest company officers can consider it a matter of routine,
consonant with their practice and dignity, to examine with
judicial solemnity the reports of anonymous spies.
For the country at large, the source of information about
conditions in the steel industry and the progress of the strike,
was, of course, principally the press. The wide discrepan-
cies between the facts now disclosed and most of the press
reports at the time are the subject of exhaustive analysis
elsewhere. The findings are that most newspapers, tradition-
ally hesitant in reporting industrial matters, failed notably
to acquaint the public with the facts, failed to take steps
necessary to ascertain the facts, failed finally to publish
adequately what was brought out by the brief investigation of
the U. S. Senate committee.^
Within the steel communities themselves the facts about
the organization of the steel industry are not known. Even
in the case of the American workers, the conditions of their
retary agreed that "the copy which they had was also anonymous and
they had no idea where it came from."
Then the whole matter of the weighty business in hand had to wait
while Mr. Gary read excerpts of the " anonymous " report and cross-
examined the Commissioners as to whether the persons named in the
report were Bolshevists or I.W.W.'s or some other kind of radical.
(The secret report is analyzed elsewhere.)
1 A notable exception to the general rule was shown by a series of
articles during the strike carried by the New York World.
30 EEPOHT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
jobs, their hours, rates of pay, methods of promotion and
attitude to the companies are not common knowledge. Even
in normal times it is difficult to get American skilled steel
workers to discuss their jobs. These men say when pinned
down, "How do I know who you are? Even in the mill
I can't talk about conditions. If I talk, I may find myself
transferred to a worse job or laid off. I can't afford to talk."
In the case of the " foreigner," the facts lie behind the
further screen of physical and mental segregation. The
unskilled foreign-language steel workers congregate in com-
munities of their own. In the narrow valleys of the great
Pittsburgh and Mahoning Valley districts, they are for the
most part crammed into old houses and tenements fringing
the great plants. The worker's life is to hurry from his
segregated home to the plant and then hurry back and
sleep. Not even on street cars is there much communication
between the " foreigner " and the ordinary American citizen.
Within these bounds of physical segregation there are
twenty or thirty distinct mental worlds, belonging to as many
different races. What influences move those worlds is an un-
answered question to most good Americans and for the
most part an unasked question. To this lack of understand-
ing and sympathy much of our popular distrust of the
" foreigners " can be traced. Physically powerful men,
with dark or dirty faces, with heavy brows or long mus-
taches, in whose former home lands strange political events
are going on, these men are feared because nothing is known
about them. A few years ago East Youngstown, the dis-
trict's " hunkie " town, was a scene of riot and wholesale
burning during a strike. But what caused that strike and
what moved those " foreigners " to violent outbreak are still
unknown to the good Americans who live on the hill tops.
The employment managers, welfare workers and other
mill officials who try to make it their business to know at
IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM 31
least a little something of what is going on in the " foreign-
er's " head, say frankly that they cannot follow hira, they
cannot speak his twenty or thirty languages nor break down
his suspicion of " bosses."
The situation, then, during the strike, and existent now,
is that the fundamental facts about the steel industry and
especially about the masses of unskilled foreign workmen
are not known and that this ignorance breeds a public fear
akin to panic.
" Bolshevism " :
The second preliminary phase of the report concerns the
charge, widely current, that the strike was a product of
Bolshevism. The evidence, from steel company officials,
strike committee records, local and national governmental
cfBcers and from observations by the Commission and its in-
vestigators is completely adequate for forming a judgment.
A stranger in America reading the newspapers during the
strike and talking with steel masters both in and out of
steel communities must have concluded that the strike repre-
sented a serious outbreak of Bolshevism red hot from Rus-
sia. The chief memory that American citizens themselves
may have a few years from now may well be that the strike
was largely the work of Reds. " ' Reds ' hack of the Steel
Strike " was a frequent headline in September. As late as
January 4, 1920, an article in The New York Times con-
tained the following:
" Radical leaders planned to develop the recent steel and coal
strike into a general strike and ultimately into a revolution to
overthrow the government, according to information gathered
by federal agents in Friday night's wholesale round-up of mem-
bers of the Communist parties. These data, officials said, tended
to prove that the nation-wide raids had blasted the most men-
acing revolutionary plot yet unearthed."
32 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
Data on the strike as a Bolshevist manifestation were
analyzed with the following questions in mind:
1. Who started this explanation?
2. Why was it offered ?
3. Was there Bolshevism in the strike? Was there radi-
calism ?
The allegation was not offered by the strikers nor by the
government. It was traced chiefly to two sources: first, the
newspapers ; and these led to the second and main source, the
steel companies.
The following efforts, among others, were made to obtain
from oflScials of the steel companies their evidence.
First, the commission addressed to Mr. Gary, after long
discussions with him personally and after considering particu-
larly his statements that men still out were " Bolsheviki," a
letter which formally asked him to furnish the evidence on
which he based that judgment. The Commission at the time
felt confident that Mr. Gary could furnish considerable evi-
dence and that any discussion would turn on whether or not
the evidence he produced proved the case. But Mr. Gary
produced nothing.
Second, Mr. H. D. Williams, President of the Carnegie
Steel Company, the largest subsidiary corporation, when asked
for the evidence referred the Commission to " Margolis' testi-
mony before the Senate Committee." When told that the
Margolis testimony established no connection between Bol-
shevism and the leaders of the strike, Mr. Williams expressed
surprise. He admitted that he had not read the transcript
of the testimony but was sure, however, that the newspapers
had said so. Anyway, he said, there were many other things
that could be produced to prove the point. Eleven subse-
quent calls for this evidence were made on Mr. Williams'
office but without result.
IGNOEANCE: BOLSHEVISM 33
Third, the Commission's desire for evidence on this point
was explained to Mr. E. J. Buffington, President of the Illi-
nois Steel Company, and he was asked for the facts on which
he endorsed Mr. Gary's Bolshevist theory of the strike. He
expressed wonder at the Commission's inability to find such
proofs. He did produce a photograph of a poster, saying,
" Look at that." The poster consisted of photographs of
strike scenes, showing among other things the dead body of a
union organizer, Mrs. Fanny Sellins. This poster was signed
by A. F. of L. officials and was headed " Abolish Garyism."
When doubt was expressed as to the conclusiveness of this
exhibit as proving the Bolshevist origin of the strike, Mr.
Buffington was certain that he had seen other " evidence,"
but he produced none.
Of the many interviewed, no steel company official pre-
sented to the Commission any evidence of Bolshevism. In
declaring on December 5 that the workmen who " followed
the leadership of Fitzpatrick and Foster were Bolsheviki,"
Mr. Gary insisted to the Commission that the strike aims were
" the closed shop, Soviets and the forcible distribution of
property." Mr. Gary warned the Commissioners to remem-
ber that any statement that they might make about the U. S.
Steel Corporation and the strike should be " gravely con-
sidered " inasmuch as " the foundations of the United States
Government were involved."
Mr. Buffington, in supporting Mr. Gary's position, said :
" The organizers were all subversive. They said things to
make the labor forces want more than fair wages ; made 'em
want to share the profits."
Mr. Gary was finally asked in the course of one of these
discussions if he did not ireally mean that " labor was
getting too strong." To this he gave general assent.
In addition to the efforts above cited, the Commission care-
fully examined the organization of the strike, and the union
34 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
literature, listened to speakers, consulted Federal and State
officials, and in every way sought to get at the bottom of the
Bolshevist theory. The line of inquiry included such ques-
tions as: What induced the nevt^spapers in many states in
the first week after September 22 to print on their front
pages extensive extracts of a pamphlet called " Syndicalism "
by Wm. Z. Foster ? Why was " radicalism " charged ? Were
ideas of political radicalism as inextricably mixed with ideas
of industrial radicalism in the actual situation as they were
in the published charges? Was there industrial radicalism,
that is, ulterior strike aims for something beyond orthodox
trade union demands on hours, wages, conditions and organi-
zation ?
The first facts persistently brought up were : Mr. William
Z. Foster, Secretary-Treasurer of the National Committee for
Organizing Iron and Steel Workers, and his " Eed Book,"
the above mentioned tract on " Syndicalism." The two must
be separated. The " Red Book's " actual relation to the
strike is undisputed. No copy of the original book, out of
print for several years, was found in possession of any striker
or strike leader. A reprint, which was a fac-simile in every-
thing except the price mark and the union label, was widely
circulated from the middle of September on by officials of the
steel companies. The absence of the union label indicated
that the reprint was not in behalf of any labor organization.
What organization bore this expense of reproducing the book
was not investigated. There was no need to investigate who
distributed it. Steel company officials openly supplied it to
newspapers, to preachers and investigators. In McKeesport,
for example, it was mailed to all the pastors in the city who
were then summoned to a meeting with the Mayor, attended
also by representatives of the Sheriff, the State Constabulary
and the Steel Corporation. The representative of the Steel
Corporation, who was the Superintendent of the local Cor-
IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM 35
poration plant, came well supplied with '^ Red Books " and
read extracts. In cities like New York and Boston, far
from the strike areas, newspapers carried extracts from the
book as the principal news of the beginning of the strike.
The book's relation to the strike, therefore, was in no sense
causative ; it was injected as a means of breaking the strike.
Mr. Foster, however, was a causative factor in the strike.
Attempts to raise the question, " Was Mr. Foster really
sincere in recanting Syndicalism," inevitably raised the other
question, " Was Mr. Gary really sincere in charging Bolshe-
vism." It seemed best to leave such analysis to speculative
psychologists. Instead the test of Mr. Foster's acts was
applied to Mr. Foster's mind. In two other sections of the
report this analysis is made, based on full examination of
the private official records involved and on reports of first
hand observers both of the strike and of the organizing cam-
paign. Only the conclusions need be set down here and
these are —
That the control of the movement to organize the steel in-
dustry, vested in twenty-four A. F. of L. trade unions,
was such that Mr. Foster's acts were perforce in har-
mony with old line unionism.
That Mr. Foster " haraioniously " combated the natural
tendency of sections of the rank and file toward in-
dustrial unionism.
That a mass movement involving 300,000 workers and twenty-
four national unions cannot be controlled to secret,
opposite ends.
The organizing plan was the same and was directed by
the same two men as that of the stock yards employees in
1918. That campaign was carried through to recognition
of the unions without anyone calling it Bolshevism. The
36 KEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
plan rejected the opportunity to organize along the line com-
monly called the One Big Union. From the standpoint of
the Industrial Workers of the World and the other One
Big Unionists, no group ever had such an opportunity to
establish the new kind of organization as did the National
Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers. I. W.
W.s throughout the campaign spoke with contempt of the
Committee's plan of splitting up each batch of union re-
cruits into twenty-four separate craft unions. Despite the
fact that most professed industrial revolutionaries " favor "
all strikes there is evidence as to their indifference or active
opposition to this one. When Mr. Foster's organization was
having hard sledding in organizing Youngstown, Ohio,
Eugene V. Debs visited the district and began severely criticis-
ing the whole plan in public speeches. It was necessary to
send a committee to Debs before he could be indued to drop
the subject. In the Pittsburgh District, I. W. W.s tried to
break the strike a few days after it had been started by
circularizing the mills with leaflets declaring that the old
A. F. of L. plan would fail and that the A. F. of L. would
not support the strike.
As to literature: the official strike pronouncements and
leaflets were confined to orthodox texts. Investigators saw
one bunch of Communist leaflets but these had been con-
fiscated by strike leaders who had thrown the distributor out
of a hall into which he had wormed his way. Mr. Foster
refused to allow in an official strike bulletin even the mild
advice that laboring men should join a labor party, until the
chairman of the National Committee, John Fitzpatrick him-
self, ordered it put in. One of the leaflets ended with the
supposedly poetical quotation : " Forward to bleed and die ! "
The Committee's translator rendered this into Polish to
read, " Forward to wade through blood ! " The Polish
leaflets were returned by local Polish organizers with this
IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM 87
objection, — " My people are all good Catholics. They won't
stand for advice like that."
As to national organizers: there were socialists among
them but the most were old organization standard bearers of
the A. F. of L. Moreover in the Pennsylvania district the
meetings were few, police were on the platform and the
power of the organizers was greatly lessened. Most organizers
were overworked and preoccupied with details. These A. F.
of L. veterans could not get over their surprise at being de-
nounced as Bolshevists.
As to local leaders : these generally followed the ideas and
methods of the National Committee but were less considerate
of A. F. of L. doctrine and more influenced by the feeling of
the rank and file. Finding that organization by shops, de-
partments and plants was often the most natural to their
inexperienced fellow- workers, they followed that plan even
though the result was industrial unionism in miniature.
They had no labor reputations to preserve against charges of
Bolshevism. They used as assistants the boldest and most
energetic spirits and these were frequently readers of the
only sort of labor papers customarily circulating among un-
organized workers, that is, socialist and I. W. W. papers.
The local leaders' talk ran more freely to downright terms and
to soaring speculation about " sharing in industrial control."
Their sole object was to win the strike. They expected to
have " public opinion " against them anyway and so they
cared less about exhibiting to the public a conventionally
conservative front. They looked to their followers, men
speaking thirty different dialects, and did not mind if some of
the followers imbibed ambitious ideas about " ending the
rule of the bosses." But it took very few repetitions of these
ambitions, in broken English, to the mill bosses to spread the
fear that the " foreigners " had revolutionary intentions.
The investigators searching for political revolutionaries
38 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
among the leaders or even the great rank and file became
convinced, from the attitude taken by local, state, federal
and array officials, that if such revolutionaries existed the
authorities would surely find them.
No leaders of the strike were convicted of " radicalism "
in court. Hundreds of strikers were rounded up in " radical
raids," but none tried and convicted. In McKeesport in one
raid 79 workmen were taken, three were detained and one on
final examination was held by the Federal authorities.
Federal officers testified that the denunciations which had
led to these arrests were made by plant detectives or " under-
cover men " of the steel companies, many of them sworn in
as sheriff's deputies during the strike. In the Pittsburgh
District raids and arrests for Bolshevism were made on the
sole complaint of company " under-cover men." Meetings
were broken up but most of those arrested were released.
The testimony of Federal authorities in two districts in
December was that after the raiding and arresting at the
instigation of company " under-cover men," no striker had
been held by the Federal authorities on any charge of radical
agitation in the strike.
In the Gary district in October out of 16,000 strikers,
seven immigrants were turned over for deportation by the
military officers whose agents had been working in Gary
since May, 1919. In February, 1920, these seven had still
not been ordered deported. None of these was arrested on
charges of radical agitation during the strike but for being
members of organizations, such as the I. W. W. and various
Russian societies or for professing Communist beliefs. That
is, the arrests might have been made, so far as the charges
were concerned, at any time irrespective of the strike. In
view of the undoubted efforts by various organizations to
spread political or industrial revolutionary teachings in
America, it seemed probable that some of the workers, if not
IGNORAN^CE: BOLSHEVISM 39
the leaders, among 300,000 strikers would utilize the strike
as a platform for organizing agitation of their views. De-
spite this, no records of conviction through legal process on
charges of such agitation were discovered by investigators.
(The charges on which many hundreds of arrests were made
are considered elsewhere.)
Were there any radicals in the sense of rebels against their
present way of life? The steel industry was full of them.
They wanted big changes. But the changes were all related
definitely to the right to organize, the twelve-hour day, the
seven day week, the foremen's ways, the company's methods,
or some other definite thing which they were sick of. It is
possible that the workers throughout the whole steel industry
might much more easily have been organized on a radical
appeal. But the Strike Committee were opposed in prin-
ciple to any such appeal. After the first three months of the
strike when the nerves of strikers and leaders were worn by
the struggle, Mr. Foster was constantly complaining of fight-
ing the " radicals," meaning those who wanted to have a
general strike called or the whole strike called off in order to
be called on again and again and again. But that kind of
" radical " still was concerned only with steel matters, not
with social or political programs.
The upshot of the matter is this: the methods of organi-
zation used in the steel strike were old fashioned and became
ostentatiously so as the organizers recognized the radical
possibilities of the strike and conscientiously believed that
anything other than tried trade unionism would be bad for
the steel workers in their newly organized state. The cry
of Bolshevism was not only a fraud on the public ; it was a
dangerous thing because it advertised to the mass of immi-
grant steel workers, who went down to defeat under old flags
and old slogans, an idea and untried methods under which
they might be tempted to make another battle. It roused in
40 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
tlie minds of hundreds of thousands who know best that they
are not Bolsheviki a distrust, which abides, and a suspicion of
government agencies and of American public opinion which
seemed to lend themselves to a campaign of misrepresentation.
The evidence justifies the following observation of general
significance: I^ot one new development of major importance
was discovered in this strike. That is, in the light of indus-
trial history there was nothing in the strike which deserves
to be called industrially new, or revolutionary.
It was an old-fashioned strike, preceded by a slightly new
mechanical quirk in organizing. It ran on rather unusually
old-fashioned lines, especially in comparison with such up-
heavals as the coal strike, the printers' strike, the clothing
strikes of recent years and the recent aims of railroad labor
organizations. The steel strike had old style methods and
aims, it was attended by the usual futile governmental at-
tempt to avert and futile Senatorial effort to investigate. By
the end of the year it was evident that the strikers were
getting an old-fashioned licking. There was the usual crip-
pling of industry, threatening to hang over into the months
after the strike was called off.
As the strike ended there was in steel master circles the
usual after-strike feeling " that something would have to be
done." The word was " the Corporation is going to do some-
thing." The Corporation in January raised wages 10 per
cent. " Independent " small concerns began trying to put in
the eight-hour day. The feeling was general that the eight-
hour day and collective bargaining could not be staved off
forever. Corporation subsidiaries announced more extensive
welfare work, company stores, etc. The latter weeks of the
strike saw Mr. Gary expressing to public-spirited inquirers his
open-minded desire " to consider any well thought out plan
which anyone can suggest " for bettering conditions in the
steel mills. (Another section of this report considers what
IGNOEANCE : BOLSHEVISM 41
soundness there may be in any attitude of looking outside the
industry for " any well thought out plan.")
That the whole strike seemed extraordinarily old-fashioned
to observers in England is evident from even a hasty examina-
tion of such conservative papers as the London Times
(October 28, 1919) :
" The steel workers' strike, which is the rock upon which
the Industrial Conference split, turns on the question of recog-
nizing unions, an issue which has gone into the Umbo of almost
forgotten things here, as between employers and employed. . . .
The employers in America have evidently something to learn
in these matters. They have been apt to compare with some
complacency their own relations with labor to those existing
in this country and to attribute their comparative immunity
from labor troubles to the superior atmosphere of the United
States or to their own superior management. It is really due
to the simple fact that the Labor Movement in the United
States is historically a good many years behind our own. But
it will infallibly tread the same broad course with certain dif-
ferences determined by local conditions, and to resist the in-
evitable is a great mistake. There are many different elements
present in the States, and a far greater tendency to violence
is one of them.'*
Not only the issues but the attendant circumstances of the
steel strike seem antique. A hundred cases could be cited.
The famous " Dorchester Laborers' case " which happened in
1833, was also a first attempt at organizing common labor,
that time on the farm. Farm hands at Tolpuddle, a tiny
English village, faced with a cut in wages from 8 shillings
to 6 shillings a week went to the magistrate who interpreted
to them the noted " law of supply and demand." " We were
told," writes their leader, the Methodist lay preacher, Love-
less, " that we must work for what our employers saw fit to
give as there was no law to compel masters to give a fixed
42 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
sum." Then the farm hands heard of trade societies in the
nearby towns and they were visited by two delegates or " out-
side agitators," who formed a Friendly Society among them
and " instructed them how to proceed." Among the instruc-
tions were the directions for a secret oath. The union's con-
stitution read : " That the object of this society can never be
promoted by any act of violence, but on the contrary, all such
proceedings must tend to injure and destroy the society it-
self." Within four months, six of the leading members were
arrested as " evil disposed persons " and thrown into jail.
Since the law against unionization had been repealed in
1824 it was necessary to discover some other under which
these men could be tried. An old statute intended for the
suppression of seditious societies was specially invoked and
the six persons, after a brief trial, were sentenced to seven
years' transportation to Botany Bay, for the crime of having
administered an oath.
This law, Daniel O'Connell said, " has only been raked up
to inflict an enormous punishment on unfortunate men who
were wholly ignorant of its existence and innocent of any
moral offence." But the London Times of that age declared
that " The real gravamen of their guilt was their forming a
dangerous union to force up, by various modes of intimida-
tion and restraint, the rate of laborers' wages." Other
spokesmen of public opinion agreed on the need for rigorous
action against " that criminal and fearful spirit of combina-
tion." A wave of panic swept the country; Lord Howick
tried to prove in Parliament that these laborers, who worked
all day, knew they were doing wrong for " did they not hold
their meetings at night? '^ The first great procession of in-
dustrial protest ever formed in England marched through
London to present a petition which the government refused
to receive.
In western Pennsylvania in 1919 steel workers were tried
IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM 43
and fined in cases "where the major allegation was " smiling
at the State police."
In his testimony before the Senate Mr. Gary, discussing
the cause of the strike, specifies " intimidation " on pp. 151,
153, 164, 174, 201, et al.
In the course of the strike deputations of workers sought
the government with petitions. Attorney General Palmer,
they considered, gave them the government's only answer in
his letter, published on November 26, commending a patriotic
society's efforts to run labor " agitators " out of Pennsyl-
vania. " It is a pity," the Attorney General wrote, " that
more patriotic organizations do not take action similar to
that of your order."
Altogether, analysis of all data seems to make it more
profitable to consider the steel strike of 1919 in the light of
one hundred years' industrial history than in the glare of
baseless excitement over Bolshevism.
Ill
THE TWELVE-HOUE DAY IN A NO-CONFERE:N'aE
INDUSTRY
Analysis of the data gathered in this inquiry proves that
a prime fact in the organization of the steel industry and
a prime fact in explaining the strike may he formulated as
follows :
Approximately half of the employees in iron and steel manu-
facturing plants are subjected to the schedule known as
the twelve-hour day (that is a working day from 11 to
14 hours long).
Less than one-quarter of the industry's employees can work
under 60 hours a week " although in most industries
60 hours was regarded as the maximum working
week " ^ ten years ago.
In the past decade the U. S. Steel Corporation has increased
the percentage of its employees subject to the twelve-
hour day.
The mass of unskilled and semi-skilled workmen, mostly
" foreigners," in the twelve-hour day class were the backbone
of the strike.
The relation of a prevailing schedule of excessive hours
to the facts that no means of conference affecting hours and
wages, or collective bargaining exist in the plants of the Steel
Corporation, and that the Corporation's workmen hitherto
* " Conditions of Employment in Iron and Steel Industry," Senate
Document 110, Vol, I, p. xlii { 1910) . At that time 14.39 per cent, of all
steel employees worked less than 60 hours.
44
THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 45
were unorganized, is analyzed in Section V of this Report,
on " Control in a No-Conference Industry."
What is true of the Corporation's hours and wages is
mainly true of the industry of which it constitutes the domi-
nating half.
Consideration of hours is inseparable from wages ; the next
section determines what proportion of the twelve-hour day
men fall in the following class:
The high percentage of steel workers whose earnings, despite
their long hours, fall from 5 to 25 per cent, below the
lowest level which Government experts have been will-
ing to call an " American standard of living " for an
average family.
It must be clearly noted that the twelve-hour day schedules
are compulsory. The Steel Corporation's " basic eight-hour
day " is a method of paying wages and in no way concerns
hours. The twelve-hour day workman cannot knock off at the
end of eight hours, if he wants to retain his employment.
Neither can he escape the eighteen-hour or twenty-four hour
" turn," usually every fortnight, which goes with most of
the twelve-hour day schedules. He can " take it or leave it "
but he cannot bargain over his job's hours.
The present analysis deals with the length of hours in
the industry and the nature of the long-day jobs ; whether the
hours are necessary; what excuses for such schedules are
made by the Corporation; what validity attaches to these
excuses; what amount of seven-day work persists; and what
the twelve-hour day means to the worker and to the com-
munity.
Data considered were drawn from the U. S. Steel Cor-
poration, " independent " concerns. Federal bureau reports,
diaries by steel workers before the strike, records of indepen-
dent investigators, the testimony before the Senate strike in-
46 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
vestigating committee, hearings before this Commission and
interviews with hundreds of strikers and non-strikers.
Literature on the subject of the steel industry's hours,
especially on the twelve-hour day enforced by the U. S. Steel
Corporation, has accumulated since 1907; each year of these
records is punctuated with plans, promises or expectations
that the Corporation was about to abolish such hours. Ten
years ago the practice was referred to as " notorious " ; the
literature includes sardonic references even by steel masters.
For example, W. B. Dickson, Chairman and Vice President
of the Cambria-Midvale Co., and former director of the U. S.
Steel Corporation, in an address in 1919 to a scientific body,
spoke of the spectacle of Mr. Gary as chairman of a com-
mittee to relieve unemployment (in 1916 in New York),
when the " large proportion of his men were working twelve
hours a day and are still doing so."
General conclusions to be drawn from this literature are, —
that the development of large-scale production enter-
prises under absentee financial control tends inevitably
to sacrifice the labor force in favor of utilizing, to the
maximum, the costly machines; that is, trust manage-
ment lengthens hours, unless combated by —
(a) public opinion (generally, in legislation), or
(b) organization of the workmen (generally, in
unions) : —
that in the steel industry the Corporation, by resisting
public opinion and by preventing organization among
its workmen, tends persistently to lengthen the hours
of labor.
Examination of government statistics assembled in this
Inquiry proves that hours in the steel industry have actually
lengthened since 1910 and that now over 400,000 steel
THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 47
workers, or a population of about two million men, women
and children are more or less directly affected by this un-
restricted tendency toward lengthened hours.
In the following discussion, therefore, the frequent quo-
tation of Mr. Gary — necessary because he was almost the sole
spokesman of the industry during the strike and is the only
authorized source of statistics for the Steel Corporation —
must not be misinterpreted to imply that Mr. Gary could be
personally and solely responsible for the labor hours of which
he testifies. Industrial history would seem to indicate that
despite the " good deal of authority and power " which Mr.
Gary ^ says he possesses, the effectiveness of personal wills,
once they have committed an industry to a labor 'policy such
a^ the Corporations, greatly diminishes, as regards hours
and several other matters.
However, the Corporation ended the strike without mak-
ing any promises on the twelve-hour day and the Corpora-
tion's statements on " eliminating " the seven-day week were
found to be inaccurate.
The term " twelve-hour day " is precise only where the
day's work at the blast furnace, open hearth and other more
or less continuous processes, is actually divided into two shifts
of twelve hours each. But in many plants it is divided into
an 11-hour day shift and a 13-hour night shift, or a 10-hour
day and 14-hour night. Usually the shifts alternate weekly
and men must work the " long turn " of 18 hours or 24 hours,
— a solid day at " heavy " labor. In some plants the 36-hour
turn is still not unknown. (The 7-day week of 12-hour
turns will be considered later.)
Consideration of the number on the 12-hour day may begin
with Mr. Gary's figure of 69,000 ; and might stop there since
this means that the daily hours and lives of over 350,000
men, women and children are directly dominated and " arbi-
* Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 216.
48 KBPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
trarily " * ordered by the Corporation's 12-hour day. The
total, however, assignable to this class seems to be larger.
Mr. Gary testified (Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 157) :
"Twenty-six and a half per cent, of all employees work the
twelve-hoTir turn and the number is 69,284."
" All employees," however, include nearly 80,000 of the
Corporation's metal miners, coal miners, railroaders, ship
crews, dockers, etc., not concerned in the strike or in the
12-honr day. Mr. Gary furnished data to the Commission,
howerer, enabling correction of the misleading " twenty-six
and a half per c-ent" ; the total of all Corporation employees
in " the manufacturing plants," that is, in the strike areas,
is 191,000. Mr. Gary's "69,284 " is 36 per cent, of 191,000.
The 36 per cent, of men working 12 hours or over fails to
account for a large number working 11 hours or even 10
hours, and, on alternate weeks, 13- and 14-hour turns;
that is, a large number properly to be classed as 12-hour men.
The only attempt at exact analysis of hours furnished by a
Corporation plant to the Senate Investigating Committee was
the following given by Superintendent Oursler of the typical
Homestead works (Senate Testimony, Vol. II, p. 482) :
"21.2 per cent, working eight hours; 25.9 per cent, work-
ing ten hours; 16.4 per cent, working eleven hours; 36 per
cent, working twelve hours."
The " 16.4 per cent, working 11 hours " is made up of day
shift " 12-hour men " whose hours on night turn will be
13; ^ that is, a proper classification is 36 per cent, plus 16.4
per cent, or 52.4 per cent, on the 12-hour turn at Homestead.
* " Arbitrarily " controlled is Mr. Gary's term in relation to fixing
wages. Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 226; it also applies to hours.
2 Mr. Gary's explanation, letter of Feb. 13: " 16 per cent, of the total
employees at Homestead work 11-hour and 13-hour turns alternately
weekly." See next footnote, quoting letters.
THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 49
This does not equal the verbal estimate of the President of
the Carnegie Co. (of which the Homestead works is a part),
made to the Commission of Inquiry in November, 1919,
whose estimate was 60 per cent, of his 55,000 employees on
the 12-hour turn.
Moreover the Homestead figures seem to be compiled on the
same method of classification as Mr. Gary's for the total of
the Corporation's manufacturing plants: the Homestead 36
per cent, agrees exactly with Mr. Gary's 36 per cent. ; the
Homestead 21.2 per cent, on " the 8-hour day " agrees with
Mr. Gary's 22 per cent, on " the 8-hour day," as furnished to
the Commission. The proper classification, indicated for the
Corporation's manufacturing plants, is thus 52.4 per cent,
on " the 12-hour " turns.
Hours in the " independent " plants comprising the other
half of the industry are approximately the same as the Cor-
poration's (with a few notable exceptions such as the Pueblo
works of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Co., which, are on a
three-shift 8-hour basis, and Pacific Coast plants which are
on an 8-hour basis). The only exact figures obtained for
an " independent " plant were for a department in the
Youngstown Sheet and Tube as follows :
On 8 hours , 10 per cent.
On 10 hours.. 35 per cent.
On 12 hours.... ....... 55 per cent.
The Corporation's figures which were submitted by Mr.
Gary as estimates, not as exact tabulations^ (admittedly diffi-
*The Steel Corporation's lack of knowledge of how its decrees affect
its workmen extends to its statistics of hours. Mr. Gary's letters to this
Commission, again and again replying that "we have no compiled
statistics" showing the exact data requested, indicate thatthe task of
determining precisely the trend of steel hours is left to outside agencies,
such as the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Even the apparently abso-
lutely precise figures supplied by the Homestead Superintendent, cited
above, fail to total up precisely 100 per cent. Mr. Gary's explanation of
Mr. Oursler's testimony, in a letter to this Commission dated Feb. 13,
50 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
cult to compile owing to the widely differing methods of
time-keeping in the Corporation's 300 plants) are borne out
by more comprehensive statistics from more impartial sources.
The chief of these sources is the U. S. Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics whose figures are taken from the company pay rolls
of representative plants all over the country.
Government statistics are reckoned on the basis of hours
per week ; roughly interpreted these mean that hours avera-
ging TO to 72 weekly mean 6 days of 12 hours each; hours
averaging 80 to 84 weekly mean 7 days of 12 hours each;
this is irrespective of how the shifts are actually divided in
various plants, of 12, 11, 10% or 10 hours, alternating
weekly with 12, 13, 13-14 or 14 hours. Taking the statistics
for the center of the industry, the Pittsburgh District, by
departments of plants, for the last quarter of 1918 and the
first quarter of 1919, as compiled by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (October, 1919, Monthly Keview), we have for the
largest department in the industry :
1920, contains the following interesting comment: "The percentage Mr.
Oursler quoted of 16 per cent, for employees working 11 hours is cor-
rect although his statement, to be exactly right, should have read ' 16
per cent, of the total employees at Homestead work 11-hour and 13-hour
turns alternating weekly.' " So far so good, but Mr. Gary went on :
" The percentage given of 36 per cent, is not correct if the percentage
was intended to indicate those who work straight 12-hour turns. The
number of these straight 12-hour turn men is 26 per cent, of the total.
Thus at Homestead 26 per cent, of the total men work straight 12-hour
turns, 16 per cent. 11 and 13-hour turns, alternating as explained and
the balance of the men work 10 hours or less."
Now, statistically analyzed, Mr. Gary's letter comes to this: Supply-
ing his "26 per cent." of "straight 12-hour men" (Avhatever that may
mean) for Mr. Oursler's 36 per cent, and totaling all up gives only
89.5 per cent, and fails to account for the remaining 10.5 per cent, at
Homestead. His letter indicates plainly that the two classifications
should be lumped, that is, 16 per cent, plus " 26 per cent.," or 42 per
cent.; the remaining 10 per cent., of course, is in Mr. Oursler's figures,
making 52.4 per cent, as the true total of 12-hour men.
Mr. Gary's letter of Jan. 30 to the Commission contains estimates
even harder to reconcile with his other estimates. This letter gives the
"standard daily service or turn" as "for about 70,000 — 10 hours; for
about 68,000 — 11, 12, 13 hours." This attempts to limip the 13-hour
men imder the 68,000 but Mr. Gary gave the Senate Committee (Vol.
II, p. 157 ) " 69,284 " on " the 12-hour turn," with no mention of the
I
THE TWELVE-HOUK DAY 51
Stockers, 83.6; larrymen, 82.6; larrymen's helpers, 82.3; skip
operators, 81.6; blowers, 81.7; blowing engineers, 81.7; keep-
ers, 81.9; keepers' helpers, 81.8; pig machine men, 83; cinder-
men, 81.8; laborers, 82. Average, 82.1.
That is, the whole department, the largest in the industry is
on the 12-hour basis, 7 days a week, a mathematical average
for all workers in the department being 11.7 hours daily.
Open hearth furnaces, the next largest producing depart-
ment, hours per week by occupations are :
Stockers, 78.8; stock cranemen, 76.6; charging machine men,
76.8 ; melters' helpers, first, 78.9 ; melters' helpers, second, 76.1 ;
melters' helpers, third, 76; stopper setters, 75.8; steel pourers,
75.7; mold cappers, 77; ladle cranemen, 76.1; ingot strippers,
70.5; laborers, 78.5. Average, 76.4.
That is, with one exception, all occupations are above 72
hours, or the 12-hour day, on a 6-day week basis, and the
thousands of 12-hour men whose hours on alternate weeks are Hi; that
is, 10 hours by day for one week, and 14 hours by night for the next
week. It would be a highly misleading classification to lump under
the 10-hour class, for example, 15,000 men actually working 10 hours
one week but subject to 14 hours the next.
At the same time that Mr. Gary was writing to the Commission, he
made the following admission, as quoted in the statement made by Dr.
Devine of the Federal Council of Churches to the presidents of the
Corporation's plants: "the proportion (of 12-hour men) would be 50
or 60 per cent. Judge Gary said that this might be correct."
The Corporation's entire statistical reckonings, as furnished to the
public, are on the wrong basis. The hundreds of different kinds of steel
jobs vary so in hours-requirements that, for its own benefit, the Cor-
poration can get accurate estimates only by dropping the vague " alter-
nating turns" classification and by adopting the long-established gov-
ernment bureau classification of " hours per week." The government's
" 72 hours per week," for example, plainly indicates 6 daily 12-hour
"turns" whether the turns are actually divided into 12 and 12, 11 and
13, 10 and 14, or any other shifts; likewise "82 or 84 hours weekly"
indicates the 7-day week of 12-hour turns, no matter how divided. Aa
against this system the total " 69,284 " on " the 12-hour turn " sounds
very exact but means little without additional information as to (a)
the length of the period for which the figure is given; (b) the number
outside this 69,284 working 10 or 11 hours but subject bi-weekly to
13 and 14.
52
EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
78.5 weekly hour average of laborers (who constitute 46
per cent, of the whole) is nearer the 12-hour day, 1-day week
average.
Take the same departments, from the latest figures for
1919 in the Bureau of Labor Statistics, giving the numbers
employed instead of percentages and affording comparison
of other districts with the Pittsburgh District.
HOURS
Blast Furnaces
No. estab-
lishments
°^
^ a
CD
Average
full time
hours
Schedule of 12-hour day
56
60
60-66
66-72
72
72-78
78
78-84
84
24
6315
78.8
456
178
29
364
483
38
702
16
4049
All under 72 hours per week are from Great Lakes and Mid-
dle West and Southern Districts (except one laborer at 60
hours, and 41 laborers at 66-72 hours, in Pittsburgh District).
With this exception, Pittsburgh blast furnace workers are all
twelve-hour day and three-quarters are seven-day week.
Open Hearth Furnaces
m a)
a; g
at
0)
it
01
Average
full time
hours
Schedule of 12-hour day
56
60
60-66
66
66-72
72
73-78
78
84
19
4702
73.8
751
80
10
38
39
1010
24
1913
337
In this table the only men 60 hours or under, in the Pitts-
burgh District, are five ingot strippers at 56 and one laborer at
60. Practically everything 60 and under is Great Lakes and
Middle West and Pacific Coast Districts (which include a num-
ber of three-shift, eight-hour day plants).
THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY
53
The only available late figures for a rolling mill depart-
ment exhibit 78 per cent, of the employees on the 12-hour
day, almost altogether with the 6-day week.
Rail Mills
No. estab-
No. of
employees
Hours
lishments
48
50-60
60
72
84
5
1170
237
3
18
900
12
None under 60 in the Pittsburgh District. All 60-hour and
84-hour men were laborers in this district. The 48-hour men
were from one mill in the Great Lakes and Middle West Dis-
trict.
What do these figures for principal departments mean in
relation to the Corporation's statistics (keeping in mind that
half the industry is in the Pittsburgh District and that the
influence of Corporation practice is less hampered in this
District) ? They mean altogether —
that the large continuous-process producing depart-
ments, — the pace setters of the industry — ^were being
run largely on a 12-hour day basis and largely 7 days
a week;
that the resultant hours approximated 12 hours daily
for about half the employees;
that to these must be added about a quarter more, mak-
ing three-quarters of all employees whose hours per week
were 60 or over, that is, beyond the generally accepted
maximum for most other industries.
54 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKB
These long hours appeared, in the course of the Commis-
sion's inquiry, to have a more causative bearing on the strike
than " Bolshevism." Of the hundreds of strikers and nom
strikers interviewed in this inquiry, few could put together
two sentences on " Soviets " but almost all discoursed or,
more accurately, cursed " long hours."
Comparisons of wider-sweeping government statistics, also
based on company pay-rolls, only confirm conclusions. The
average of hours for the entire industry, including great
numbers of foundries and fabricating plants whose hours
average less than those of the plants against which the strike
was aimed, was 68.7 hours per week or over 11% hours per
day on a 6-day mathematical average. (U. S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Monthly Review, Sept., 1919.)
Ten years ago the Labor Commissioner, at the order of
Congress, made the exhaustive survey of the industry (Senate
Document 110, four vols.) which formed the standard on
which to make comparisons. In May, 1910, the percentage
of employees working 72 hours and over per week, i.e. at
least 12 hours a day, was 42.58 per cent, (ibid.. Vol. I, p.
xlii). How much the 1919 percentages of 12-hour men may
have increased over that 42 per cent, cannot be exactly de-
termined. The average of weekly hours for the industry in
1910 was 67.6; for 1919 it was 1.1 hours higher. The
average weekly hours for the Pittsburgh District in 1910
and 1919 for three departments for which 1919 statistics
were available were:
Year Blast Furnaces Open Hearth Plate Mills
1910 78.7 75.3 67.3
1919 82.1 76.4 7L1
These increases were from 1 to nearly 4 hours weekly.
They are insufficient to prove, but they do suggest, that if
the government had ordered another exhaustive survey of the
THE TWELYE-HOUR DAY 55
iron and steel industry in the months immediately preceding
the strike, it would have found conditions materially worse
than they were in 1910 when strikes due to lengthening hours
started the government survey.
The requirements of the war, which permitted the steel
companies free rein as regards hours, ceased with the armi-
stice and according to steel company officials war conditions
were largely eliminated ^ in the spring of 1919. By the sum-
mer of 1919 then there could be no legitimate excuse for war
conditions ; yet it was in the months of July, August and
early September, 1919, that the steel industry was speeded
up in every direction ; and for these critical months the gov-
ernment statistical bureaus have published no figures.
These, then, were the steel hours constituting one of the
" relics of barbarism " referred to by an official of a steel
company, who told an independent investigator ^ that his
sympathies in the strike were " entirely with Judge Gary "
but whose stand on hours was set forth in a letter as follows :
" At the greatest personal sacrifice, both in friendship and in
money, for the past twenty-five years I have waged unceasing
warfare against the Steel Corporation on the question of the
seven-day week, the twelve-hour day and the autocratic methods
of dealing with workmen."
These were the hours which must be compared with hours
in other industries of the coimtry. The steel workers' 68.7
hours a week must be compared with the street railwaymen's
56.4 in another " continuous industry " and the nearest com-
petitor to steel hours in the list of principal industries com-
piled by the Bureau of Applied Economics, Washington,
D. C. ; ^ with the anthracite coal miners' 52-hour weekly
' " With the close of the war . . . the 7-day service has been largely
eliminated. At the present time there is comparatively little of it."
Letter of Mr. Gary to Commission, Jan. 30, 1920.
" R. S. Baker in N. Y. Evening Post, Dec. 31, 1919.
* See Sub-Report for charts and details.
56 REPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE
schedule and the bituminous coal miners' 52.9-hour weekly
schedule; with the standard 48 hours weekly of the United
States Arsenals, the United States Navy Yards, the railroad
shop men, railroad freight firemen, the ship yards ; compari-
son is impossible with the 44 hours weekly of the building
trades, the 30 hours average for passenger firemen on the
railroads.
These were the hours which must be compared with steel
hours in England ^ where the twelve-hour day had largely dis-
appeared before 1914 and where the elimination of the
twelve-hour day was directly retarded by the competition of
the American plants' longer schedules.
These were the hours which must be compared with what
government sanction and public opinion had for manys years
considered a standard work week, — 48 hours ; the steel week
averaged more than 20 hours longer. For thousands of steel
workers the " normal " work week was nearly twice as long
as the 44-hour standard customary in many industries.
These were the hours for 1919 which must be compared
with the industry's own hours for 1914 and 1910. Five
years ago the steel week was 2.4 hours shorter ; 10 years ago
1.1 hours shorter. Steel hours have lengthened in a decade
when other industries were shortening hours. This in spite
of Mr. Gary's statement before the Senate Committee : " The
Chairman of the Committee will bear in mind that we have
been reducing these hours from year to year, going back many
years, as rapidly as we could " (Senate Testimony, Vol. I,
p. 202). The emphasis of the analyst must be laid on the
" as we could." Industrial history, as noted before, indicates
that hours inevitably tend to lengthen under absentee cor-
poration control, unless restricted by public opinion or by
labor organization. Competition, foreign markets, " the
1 General average of steel hours in England, July, 1919, 47-48 hours
weekly.
THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 57
war," each in turn, is an actual cause for lengthening hours,
or an excuse for it long after the cause is gone. Personal,
will alone, — or " as we could," — simply has not worked re-
form. Whoever ought to do the reforming, it is a matter of
record that in England the abolition of the twelve-hour sched-
ule was initiated and pressed by trade unions. So far as
the twelve-hour day can be laid to choice, the responsibility
is flatly put by " independent " steel companies on the Steel
Corporation.
The twelve-hour day is not a metallurgical necessity ; steel
masters are not caught in the grip of their gigantic machin-
ery. Thirty years ago train wrecks burned up a lot of pas-
sengers because of the " deadly car stove " ; and the solidest,
most responsible railroad presidents assured the legislatures
that coal stoves were an unescapable necessity, that cars could
not be heated by steam from the engine. Do steel masters
fail to end tlie twelve-hour day because they cannot? The
fact that the eight-hour day has replaced the twelve-hour day
in England, on the Pacific Coast, in the Pueblo plant of the
Colorado Euel and Iron Co., and in some " independent "
plants near Chicago and Pittsburgh, proves that it is not a
matter of necessity. Metallurgists agree that production is
better, — by a small percentage, but better, — on the three-shift
eight-hour day. Steel engineers do not dispute that three
shifts mean more steel and better steel. Only one process is
absolutely " continuous," requiring, on the eight-hour basis,
three shifts. The final findings of the 1910 survey of the
industry, which are true today, read (Senate Document 110,
Vol. I, p. Ixii) :
" The blast-furnace department is the only one of the four-
teen departments where there is any metallurgical necessity for
continuous operation day and night throughout seven days per
"week. . . . Throughout the iron and steel industry . . . the
employees were expected to work seven days wherever the de-
58 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
partment in which they were working was running seven days
and the occupation in which they were engaged required con-
tinuous work, . . .
" The large proportion of Bessemer converters, open hearth
furnaces and rolling mills working seven days or turns was due
to the fact that these departments were in continuous operation
in some plants, although no real necessity for this condition ex-
isted, only a desire to increase the output of the plant."
Only two excuses were oifered to the Commission for the
twelve-hour day: labor shortage and workmen's preference.
On analysis we shall see that both are baseless and that the
true causes concern much more the helplessness of disorgan-
ized immigrant labor. First, it is advisable to analyze steel
production sufficiently to understand the kinds of jobs these
are which must be followed twelve hours a day.
It is an epigram of the industry that " steel is a man
killer." Steel workers are chiefly attendants of gigantic
machines. The steel business tends to become, in the owners'
eyes, mainly the machines. Steel jobs are not easily char-
acterized by chilly scientific terms. Blast furnaces over a
hundred feet high, blast " stoves " a hundred feet high, coke
ovens miles long, volcanic bessemer converters, furnaces with
hundreds of tons of molten steel in their bellies, trains of hot
blooms, miles of rolls end to end hurtling white hot rails
along, — these masters are attended by sweating servants
whose job is to get close enough to work but to keep clear
enough to save limb and life. It is concededly not an ideal
industry for men fatigued by long hours.
To comprehend precisely what the twelve-hour day meant,
the Inquiry gathered data from steel mill officials and from
the workers themselves. Mr. Gary's testimony was :
"It is not an admitted fact that more than eight hours is
too much for a man to labor per day. ... I had my own ex-
THE TWELVE-HOUE DAY 59
perience in that regard (on a farm) ; and all onr officers worked
up from the ranks. They came up from day laborers. They
were all perfectly satisfied with their time of service; they all
desired to work longer hours . . . the employees generally do
not want eight hours. ... I do not want you to think that
for a moment." (Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 180.)
Mr. H. D. Williams, president of the Carnegie Steel Com-
pany, said that he had worked fourteen hours a day and did
not feel he was any the worse for it.
Mr. W. B. Schiller, president of the !N'ational Tube Com-
pany, said that he had worked the twelve-hour day when
young and that it never did him any harm.
Mr. E. J. Buffington, president of the Illinois Steel Com-
pany, said that he had worked the twelve-hour day when a
young man and he rather thought it did him good.
This official attitude is important despite the fact that it is
the testimony of experience undergone twenty-five to forty
years before, the severity of early work being tempered
and mellowed in recollection by decades in comfortable office
chairs. Corporation officials do regard the twelve-hour day as
a young man's " experience," to be left early. Eor the
workers who do not rise to be a steel corporation's subsidiary
president but who are held for years to the twelve-hour day
a phrase has been coined which is well understood by them :
" Old age at forty." Especially they understood it when a
\ corporation plant made the rule of hiring no man over forty
years of age.
First, what exactly is the schedule of the twelve-hour
worker ? Here is the transcript of the diary of an American
worker, the observations of a keen man on how his fellows
regard the job, the exact record of his own job and hours
made in the spring of 1919, before the strike or this Inquiry,
and selected here because no charge of exaggeration could bo
made concerning it. It begins :
60 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
" Calendar of one day from the life of a Carnegie steel work-
man at Homestead on tlie open hearth, common labor:
"5:30 to 12 (midnight) — Six and one-half hours of shovel-
ing, throwing and carrying bricks and cinder out of bottom of
old furnace. Very hot.
" 12 :30 — Back to the shovel and cinder, within few feet of
pneumatic shovel drilling slag, for three and one-half hours.
"4 o'clock — Sleeping is pretty general, including boss.
" 5 o'clock — Everybody quits, sleeps, sings, swears, sighs for
6 o'clock.
" 6 o'clock — Start home.
" 6 :45 o'clock — Bathed, breakfast.
" 7 :45 o'clock — Asleep.
"4 P. M. — Wake up, put on dirty clothes, go to boarding
house, eat supper, get pack of lunch.
" 5 :30 P. M.— Report for work."
This is the record of the night shift ; a record of inevitable
waste, inefficiency and protest against " arbitrary " hours.
Next week this laborer will work the day shift. What is his
schedule per week ? Quoting again from the diary :
" Hours on night shift begin at 5 :30 ; work for twelve hours
through the night except Saturday, when it is seventeen hours,
until 12 Sunday noon, with one hour out for breakfast; the fol-
lowing Monday ten hours ; total from 5 :30 Monday to 5 :30
Monday 87 hours, the normal week.
" The Carnegie Steel worker works 87 hours out of the 168
hours in the week. Of the remaining 81 he sleeps seven hours
per day ; total of 49 hours. He eats in another fourteen ; walks
or travels in the street car four hours; dresses, shaves, tends
furnace, undresses, etc., seven hours. His one reaction is ' What
the Hell ! ' — the universal text accompanying the twelve-hour
day."
What kinds of job are these twelve-hour turns ? Here are
the observations of his own successive jobs by a second
worker, also an AmericaUj also written before the strike
THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 61
began, in the summer of 1919 in an " independent " plant in
the Pittsburgh district. (Both these workers were distinctly-
critical of labor organizers.)
"Job of labor in the clean-up gang in pit of open hearth
furnaces:
" The pit is the half-open space where furnaces are tapped
into ladles (pocket shaped, ten feet high, swung by overhead
cranes) and ' poured ' into ingot molds. As the hot metal comes
from the tap-hole much spills and when partially cool must
be broken with picks and cleaned out, and *slag' and * scrap'
separated into different cars.
" The job is : clean up cinder when ladle is dumped ; break
clay covers from valve pipes, pile pipes at side of pit, repile
pipes on flat car. After pipes have been moved to blacksmith,
affix chains for swinging them to blacksmith's door, repile in
shop. Get straightened pipes back to pit by same series of
steps ; same going and returning for broken chains. Affix hooks
to ladles when crane shoves ladle in your face. Clean out all
hot cinder and scrap under all furnaces, take cinder by hand
or barrel to cinder boxes. Clean hot overflow metal or slag
from tracks. Very hot work. Tools used, pick, shovel, fork,
crowbar, sledge-hammer, chains, barrel. Heavy work, but con-
sidered here as one of the ^easier jobs.' Hours: 14 hours on
night turn, 10 hours on day turn; long turn of 24 hours every
two weeks.
"Job of third-helper, open hearth furnace:
"With other helpers he makes ^back wall,' which means
throwing heavy dolomite with a shovel across blazing furnaces
to the back wall, to protect it for the next bath of hot steel.
Every third-helper makes the back wall on his own furnace
and on his neighbor's, sometimes making three or four a shift.
You march past the door of the furnace, which is opened in your
face for a moment. Heat about 180° at the distance from which
the shovelful is thrown in; each shoveler wears smoked gog-
gles and protects his face with his arm as he throws. After a
back wall it is necessary to rest at least 15 minutes.
63 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
" Second and first helpers work ' hook and spoon * to spread
dolomite for the front wall. Very easy for a new man to get
badly burned in approaching furnace to fill his spoon.
"When front wall and back wall are both made there is
usually a long ' spell ' unless the adjoining furnace needs atten-
tion. A man may have four or five hours to himself out of
the fourteen-hour shift or he may work hard the whole turn.
He may have two or three such easy days or he may have a
week of the most continuoiLS and exhausting Icind.
" After making the front and back walls the third-helper
wheels mud to the tap-hole for lining on the spout; it takes
40 minutes to one hour; temperature around spout about
110°.
" Scrap, in chunks from small bits to thousand-pound blocks,
fall from charging boxes when furnace is being charged and
must be cleaned up by second and third-helpers.
"The third-helper fills large bags with coal to throw into
the ladle at tap time ; easy to burn your face ofE.
"Helps drill a * bad ' hole at tap time, work of the most
exhausting kind ; also must shovel dolomite into ladle of molten
steel. This is the hottest job and certainly the most exposed
to minor burns. Temperatures around 180°, but it takes only
four or five minutes. Nearly every tap time leaves three or
four small burns on neck, face, hands or legs. It is usually
necessary to extinguish little fires in your clothing. Altogether
not so bad as heavier lifting parts of the furnace job which are
most hateful, together with the monotonous exposures.
"On the blast furnaces. Job of the stove gang:
" Six to ten men in a gang keep the blast furnace stoves
cleaned (a stove is an oven for heating the blast and is as big
as the blast furnace itself, full of a gigantic brick checker work) ;
as stove cools, gang cleans out hardened cinder in combustion
chamber with pick and shovel. Men go inside the stove. Ten
minutes to one hour is the length of time inside, according to
degree to which the stove has been allowed to cool. Before
going in the man puts on wooden sandals, a jacket which fits
the neck closely and heavy cap with ear flaps; also goggles.
THE TWELVE-HOUE DAY 63
Cleaning out the flue dust not so hot^ but men breathe dust-
saturated air.
" Hardest job is ' poking her out/ ramming out the flue dust
in checker work at top of stove. Large pieces of canvas tied
over feet and legs to keep heat from coming up the legs; two
pairs of gloves needed; handkerchiefs cover all head except the
eyes. Three minutes to ten minutes at a turn are the limit for
work in the chamber at top of stove ; very hard to breathe. Aver-
age man can do four holes each trip.
"Easy days with couple of hours' sleep are sandwiched in
betiveen hard ones, after which the men leave the mill exhausted.
Hours: 12 hours a day.
" Joh of stove-tender helper:
"Learners' job following stove tender; manipulates large,
clumsy valves; operations, if performed in wrong order, stove
tender will break his stove and kill himself. Unless tremen-
dous pressure is first * blown off ' the opening of another valve
will blow the opener into bits. Hours: day shift, 10 hours;
night, 13 hours."
These workers' records were made before the strike began
and are open to no possible charge of bias. They record in
exact form what many " hunkies " tried to tell investigators.
As actual experience — as opposed to theory — they may be
contrasted with this excerpt from Mr. Gnary's testimony be-
fore the Senators (Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 160) :
Mr. Gary. " Nowadays none of these men, with very few
exceptions, perform manual labor as I used to perform it, on
the farm, neither in hours, nor in actual physical exertion. It
is practically all done everywhere by machinery and the boy
who opens the door I think touches a button and opens the door.
And this work of adjusting the heavy iron ingots is done by
the pulling of a lever. It is largely machinery, almost alto-
gether machinery. That is not saying there is no work in that,
because of course there is, and I would not belittle it^ of course.
64 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE
It is hard work to work hard whatever one does, and to the
extent one does work hard he, of course, is doing hard work."
Mr. Gary submitted to the Senate Committee " photo-
graphs of open hearth laborers at leisure " and asserted that
they worked but half the time. This hardly accords with
the open hearth laborer himself who worked that twelve-hour
day every day in the week and whose daily job includes such
as the following, and this is described as " not the worst of
his daily grind " (from Carnegie Steel worker's diary) :
" You lift a large sack of coal to your shoulders, run towards
the white hot steel in a 100-ton ladle, must get close enough
without burning your face off to hurl the sack, using every
ounce of strength, into the ladle and run, as flames leap to
roof and the heat blasts everything to the roof. Then you
rush out to the ladle and madly shovel manganese into it, as
hot a job as can be imagined."
!N'or are the above at all the extreme hours of the plant.
In the millwright department of the Carnegie Steel Company
everyone in the department works fourteen working days out
of every fourteen calendar days, on the thirteen-hour night
turn, including the twenty-four-hour turn within the four-
teen days. Here is the actual schedule of the above quoted
worker when employed in the millwright department of the
Carnegie Steel Company last spring :
"Five nights at 13 hours, regularly ..,. . 65 hours
Saturday night, regular 15 hours
Sunday double turn, regular every other week 24 hours
Total 104 hours
" Add to this half an hour each night for dinner means three
hours more, or 107 hours under the plant roof in the 168 hours
in the week."
THE TWELVE^HOUR DAY 65
That conditions in Corporation plants are not worse than
in " independents " is shown by this from the records of an
investigator for the Commission (Youngstown, Oct. 2Y,
1919) :
" Timekeeper in the sheet mill department of a large ' inde-
pendent ' stated : that among the men whose time he kept there
were about 45 rollers who worked eight hours^ 110 laborers who
worked ten hours and 190 who were on the twelve-hour basis,
seven days a week. They changed every week from day to night
turn, making a 24-hour shift. These latter included electricians,
mill hands, engineers, pipefitters, cranemen, loaders, loader-
helpers, and gasmen. In the sheet galvanizing department the
men worked a twelve-hour day with no rest spells and no lunch
hour. Their rates were 42, 42%, and 44 cents. So many
men gave out under the strain and had to be fired for not being
able to do the work that checks for these men gave out in the
time department, and the timekeeper begged the foreman not
to discharge so many. There were about 100 men in the de-
partment, and from 35 to 50 were hired and fired each month."
!N'one can dispute the demoralizing eifects on family life
and community life of the inhuman twelve-hour day. As a
matter of arithmetic twelve-hour day workers, even if the
jobs were as leisurely as Mr. Gary says they are, have abso-
lutely no time for family, for town, for church or for self-
schooling, for any of the activities that begin to make full
citizenship ; they have not the time, let alone the energy, even
for recreation.
At Johnstown a member of the Commission was ap-
proached by a man of middle age who said that he was
determined never to go back to work until the question of
hours was settled. He gave as his reason the fact that his
little daughter had died within the last few months ; he said
he had never known the child because he was at work when-
66 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
ever she was awake, or else he was asleep, during the day
time. He was determined that he would know the other
children and for that reason felt that it was imperative that
he should have the eight-hour day.
This man was an American, getting good wages and embit-
tered, not by " outside agitators " but by the facts of his life
as he found them.
When the Commissioners spoke to President Williams of
the Carnegie Company about this, he smiled and said that it
was very evident that the man's case was an exceptional one
and not to be taken as typical. He did not go on to explain
how such a man who worked from eleven to thirteen or four-
teen hours a day or a night could secure time in which to be
a normal father to a family of children.
Insufficient evidence was gathered by the Commission to
pass any judgment on one phase of the twelve-hour day — the
resultant rate of accidents. The accident rate in the steel
industry is, of course, still high. After the various criticisms
of its policies thirteen years ago, and after engineers had
proved to the companies the loss entailed by accidents and
especially after compensation laws threatened to make acci-
dents pretty costly to the companies, the steel companies
began installing safety devices; the Steel Corporation set up
a Safety Department which has been the recipient of many
medals. Only statistics can determine to what extent the
safety campaign is adequate. Statistically steel still ranks
with mining for fatal accidents. The 1918 report of compen-
sable accidents for the state of Pennsylvania gives the four
largest hazardous industries as follows:
Number Percent of Total
Mines and quarries 23,161 33.13
Metals and metal products. .. 22,223 31.78
Public service 4,985 7.13
Building and contracting. . . . 4,184 5.98
THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 67
It was surprising, in view of the reputation which the Steel
Corporation had been accorded for safety, to find so large
a number of strikers complaining about hazards. They de-
scribed with specificness menaces to limb or life, concerning
which they had complained to foremen and superintendents
month in and month out without avail. Without adequate
statistics it was impossible to weigh the value of these com-
plaints just as it was inadvisable to pay great heed to the
number of crooked-legged men always seen in the streets of
a steel mill town.
Here is a specimen of such complaints, this from a
worker's testimony before the Senate Committee (Vol. II,
pp. 728-9) :
Mr. Colson — I worked in the mill in 1913, in the nail mill.
I drew 17% cents an hour. I enlisted in the army during
the trouble in Mexico and from there I was sent to West Point
Military Academy with a detachment of Engineers, and from
there to Washington, D. C, with the First Battalion of Engi-
neers. From there I went to France and I was one of the
first fifty men that got off the boat — one of the first men in
France.
The Chairman — What mill are you in?
Mr. Colson — The bloom mill at the steel works at Donora,
Pa.; and, so far as safety conditions up there are concerned,
a man has no chance, because if he ever slips, his hands are
greasy and the steps are greasy, and there is no rail, and there
is no chance for your life, unless you jump out of the window
and kill yourself.
Senator Sterling — Did you ever know of anybody slipping
there ?
Mr. Colson — ^Yes, sir; there was one man who slipped and
fell off and I got his job. I took his place as millwriglit
helper.
Chairman — Why did you go on strike?
Mr. Colson — I went out with them, because I did not get
68 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
satisfaction from the company in no way. I had to get down
on my hands and knees and ask for a job.
Senator McKellar — 'What job did you have before you en-
listed in tlie Regular Army?
Mr. Colson — I was in the tool room ; and they said, ' When
you come back we will give you a good job.'
Senator McKellar — And when you came back you got 44
cents an hour?
Mr. Colson — And longer hours, sir.
The Chairman — How long did you work?
Mr. Colson — Thirteen hours during the night and 11 hours
during the day.
Ten years ago the Steel Corporation and all steel com-
panies were under fire because of Sunday work, the seven-
day week, the possible 365-day year, chiefly the work on the
largest single department of a steel plant, the blast furnace.
During the strike the Steel Corporation flatly asserted that
that condition had been reformed before the war and that
although the seven-day week was resumed during the war, it
was quite done away with by 1919. The president of the
Carnegie Steel Company and of the Illinois Steel Company,
Corporation subsidiaries,^ assured this Commission that
" seven-day work is all done away with," or where it persists,
as it must in the blast furnace department, that " the seven-
day week work is a thing of the past " ; that is, that blast
furnace employees got one day off in seven.
Mr. Gary testified before the Senate Committee (Vol. T,
p. 179) : " We decided to eliminate the seven-day week if we
possibly could and we practically eliminated it. At times
and places there were strikes, because the compensation was
decreased."
* President Schiller of the National Tube Co. said that the 7-day week
was " indefensible," that his company had none of it but that " most
other companies' blast furnaces were still on a 7-day basis."
THE TWELVE-HOUK DAY 69
On January 30, 1920, in a letter to the Commission, Mr.
Gary said :
"We have no compiled statistics in respect of employment
at blast furnaces which you ask for.
" As to the seven-day week, however, beg to state that prior
to the war it had been eliminated entirely except as to main-
tenance and repair crews on infrequent occasions. During
the war, at the urgent request by government officials for larger
production, there was considerable continuous seven-day serv-
ice in some of the departments. With the close of the war
this attitude was changed and the seven-day service has been
very largely eliminated. At the present time there is com-
paratively little of it. We expect to entirely avoid it very
shortly."
Concerning the eighteen-, twenty-four- or thirty-six-hour
shifts customary with the twelve-hour day, especially at blast
furnaces, Mr. Gary could find for the Senate Committee only
" 82 employees working a continuous twenty-four hours once
each month," and " 344 working continuous eighteen hours
twice each month." (Vol. I, p. 202.)
Analysis of all data before the Commission proved that
conditions regarding the seven-day week work are radically
different from the impression conveyed by Mr. Gary.
Moreover the evidence showed this fact : that the conditions
concerning seven-day week work complained of and proved in
1910 still exist in the steel industry. The thing in the situa-
tion which needs explaining is not so much whether these evil
and unnecessary conditions exist today as why they exist,
especially in the face of the Steel Corporation's asserted de-
sire to better them.
The Commission of Inquiry composed as it was of church-
men, liable to a biased interest in the observance of Sunday,
for that very reason attempted to confine its studies to in-
70 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE
dustrially important facts. Sunday violation by sevenrday
work is a minor consideration compared to the violation of
American life worked by the twelve-hour day even for only
six days a week throughout an industry. The seven-day week
on blast furnaces and the avoidable Sunday work will go
when the twelve-hour day is eliminated as the industry's
basis. The Commission tried not to be unduly swayed by
the testimony of local preachers and priests over the havoc
wrought in their congregations by' the seven-day week worked
by members of their congregations. For example, part of the
interrogation of the Rev. Charles V. Molnar, pastor, Slovak
Lutheran Church at Braddock, Pa., by the Commission
reads :
"My people are on strike. They work mostly in the Edgar
Thompson Works. Some are working in Eankin, and have
some members in Homestead and Duquesne, but most of the
congregation are in Braddock."
Question — " Are practically all of your members on the
twelve-hour day?"
Answer — " Yes, some of our men have been working longer
than twelve hours."
Question — "Is there much Sunday work?"
Answer — "Very much; that is what we suffer from. The
men would be very glad to be excused from Sunday work, but
it seems impossible to accomplish anything."
The testimony of a Eoman Catholic priest before the
Senate Committee was even more emphatic. When asked
about " the number of times that persons have omitted to go
to church " (Senate Testimony, Vol. II, p. 544) :
Father Kazinei — Well, these are from the furnaces in the
Braddock mills. There are nine furnaces there, and furnaces
H and A allow the men to go to church every second Sunday.
The balance of the nine furnaces do not allow their men at
THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 71
all to go to church. Some get a Sunday off, joerhaps, once in
six months ; but it is not taking care of their souls.
The Chairman — Do many members of your church congre-
gation work on Sunday?
Father Kazinci — Most of them work on Sunday; and they
do not see the inside of a church more than once in six months,
because they are forced to work on Sunday.
What are the simple statistical facts concerning the
" elimination " of seven-day work and the " reduction " of
hours which according to Mr. Gary have been the object of
such earnest effort by the Corporation ?
Beginning by re-stating the comparison of hours in 1910
when private institutions and governmental agencies began
the "great drive" against such hours, with hours in 1919,
we have (Figures from Senate Document 110 and October
Monthly Keview, IT. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics) :
Average steel week, 1910 67.6 hours
Average steel week, 1919 68.7 hours
That is, ten years of " reduction " has increased the num-
ber of hours. In this time several " independent " concerns,
such as the Pueblo plant and all the Pacific Coast plants have
adopted the eight-hour day; the Corporation's hours have
helped overbalance this " deficit " for the total increase.
Take the figures for 1914 and 1919 :
1914 1919
Common labor — hours per week.... 70.3 74.
Skilled and semi-skilled — hours per
week 57. 66.
All employees — hours per week 66.3 68.7
In each classification the length of the week has increased.
Take the seventy-nine separate occupations in the steel in-
dustry for which statistics are given by the U. S. Bureau
72 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
of Labor Statistics and compare 1914 and 1919. In eighteen
classes hours have decreased; in four remained stationary;
in fifty-seven of the seventy-nine classes hours 'per week have
increased, from a few minutes up to fourteen hours per week.
Blast furnace and open hearth laborers constitute the
great bulk of the eeven-daj week workers. For all districts
the figures are :
1914 1919
Blast furnace, common labor 70.8 78.9
Open hearth, common labor 69.5 72.7
In one case an increase of eight hours per week or more
than an hour per day since 1914; in the other an increase
of three hours.
In the Pittsburgh District, thus eliminating the principal
eight-hour independents and confining the comparison more
to Steel Corporation conditions, the figures are:
1914 1919
Blast furnace, common labor 73.1 82.
Open hearth, common labor 71.3 78.5
Increases of nearly nine hours in one class and over seven
in the other. Statistics from Bureau of Labor Statistics
Bulletin 218 (Oct., 1917) reveal what actual successes were
accomplished by the Corporation in "eliminating" seven-
day work. Seven-day workers in blast furnaces were: (p.
17) 1911, 89 per cent.; 1912, 82 per cent.; 1913, 80 per
cent.; 1914, 58 per cent. ; 1915, 59 per cent. Open hearths,
during the same period, " about equally divided among the
seven-day, the seven-day and six-day alternately and the six-
day groups." Even before the war seven-day " eliminating "
waited on what " steel demand " decided. The best year's
figures show that the Corporation never achieved even a half-
reform.
THE TWELVE-HOUE DAY 73
For 1919, after the war, the latest figures for blast fur-
naces, referred to earlier in this report, mean not even a real
attempt to reform. The figures were drawn from the twenty-
four representative establishments' pay-rolls and of the
employees in the blast furnace department, totalling 6,315,
exactly 4,049 were on the flat eighty-four-hour week, i.e.
seven-day week. An additional 756 were on twelve hours, six
days a week, plus Sunday work rcmging up to eleven hours.
The Pittsburgh section of the twenty-four plants had on
schedules below seventy-two hours only the following: 1
laborer at 60 hours and 41 laborers at 66 to 72 hours. All
the rest of these Pittsburgh blast furnace workers in twenty-
four representative plants were on the twelve-hour day and
all but 485 of the 5,290 were on this twelve-hour-day seven
days a week.
In the open hearth, where there was no metallurgical
excuse for seven-day work, conditions were similar. In nine-
teen representative establishments whose open hearth em-
ployes total 4,702, 2,750 were on the six and one-half or the
flat seven-day week, all on the twelve-hour schedule.
It is in the face of such facts, buried in statistics usually
unread by the public, that Steel Corporation officials from
Mr. Gary down assured the Commission that " seven-day
work was a thing of the past"
Such statements were maddening to the strikers. A Home-
stead worker whose evidence happened to be in the shape of
the notebook in which he had recorded all his hours and
" turns " for eight months and twenty days previous to the
strike, went to the Senate Committee hearing in Pittsburgh
to read what the notebook showed. It showed :
Hours worked 2,930
Number of 24-hour turns — ..... 18
Number of days off ,. . . . 17
74 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
That is, he worked the twelve-hour day in ten and one-half -
hour shifts by day and thirteen hours by night for thirty-
seven weeks, with the twenty-four-hour shift every fortnight
and one day off every fortnight. These were the hours of his
department in a Corporation mill ; the schedule of that de-
partment allowed its employees seventeen days off out of 244.
He did not testify. He explained to an investigator that he
saw what he feared were Corporation " spotters " in the room.
He ovmed his home in Homestead and he said he could not
afford to testify and run the risk of being blacklisted.
Mr. Gary began his account of " elimination " to the
Senate Committee with the telegram sent by him to the presi-
dents of all constituent companies on March 18, 1910, read-
ing as follows :
"Mr. Corey, Mr. Dickson and I have lately given much
serious thought to the subject matter of resolution passed by
the Finance Committee April 23, 1907, concerning Sunday or
seventh-day labor. . . . The object of this telegram is to say
that all of us expect and insist that hereafter the spirit of the
resolution will be observed and carried into effect. There
should and must be no unnecessary deviation v^ithout first tak-
ing up the question with our Finance Committee. ... I em-
phasize the fact that there should be at least twenty-four con-
tinuous hours interval during each week in the production of
ingots. E. H. Gary."
This " peremptory order," putting into effect a resolution
passed three years before, was sent the day after the Federal
Labor Commission began an investigation of seven-day work
in the Bethlehem plant on an order from Congress; which
investigation was later extended to Corporation plants and
the whole industry.
Following this telegram, Mr. Gary told the Senate Com-
mittee, " We practically eliminated it/' and he asserted that
THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 75
the Corporation had now sufficiently recovered from the emer-
gencies of war practically to re-eliminate seven-day work. To
what extent the Steel Corporation lived up to this peremptory
order even in peace time can be estimated. In 1916 the Lacka-
wanna Steel Company in its petition for exemption from the
one day rest law of New York State showed plainly what
Professor Commons (who qnotes it in the American Labor
Legislation Review, March, 1917) calls "the futility of de-
pending on even the most prosperous of the tariff's bener-
ficiaries " :
" We are advised that the chairman of the United States
Steel Corporation several years ago, while labor conditions were
entirely different from those obtaining at the present time,
gave instructions quite peremptory in character to all the sub-
sidiaries of that company requiring them to follow out the
one day of rest principle and warning them that any devia-
tion from the published instructions would result in dismissal
from office. We have, therefore, directed our investigations to
these subsidiaries and state, without fear of successful con-
tradiction, that ihe corporation is now disregarding the one
day of rest in seven principle which it so strongly advocated
several years ago and which it in the past, in good faith, earn-
estly strove to put into practice. It, too, has felt the shortage
of men, and owing to the great and pressing demand for its
product no longer observes the practice which its chairman
promulgated. Having taken so firm a position, it is not strange
that it is difficult to get heads of subsidiaries to admit that the
published rule has become a dead letter. Wlien labor condi-
tions become normal the corporation will doubtless return to
an observance of the rule. So far as we can ascertain, the rule
was only observed by the corporation during the years when
the employees of this company had far more time off than the
one day of rest statute requires."
There is then some basis for estimating the probable effi-
cacy of what Mr. Gary told the Senate Committee (Vol. I,
76 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE
p. 180) when he assured the Senators that he believed in the
eight-hour day and that he believed, " there are a good many
employees, I do not say the majority or anything like the
majority, but there are a good many employees v^ho believe
the same thing." Mr. Gary asserted that the Corporation
was " very carefully considering that question." He added :
" If we can make it practicable to develop the eight-hour shift
throughout our works universally and the men are willing to
accept that basis we would be very glad to adopt it for the
reason, if for no other, that we think there is a strong public
sentiment in favor of it and I would not want to be put on
record here or any other place as against the eight-hour day
if the men themselves want it."
The Steel Corporation oflFered but two excuses for the
twelve-hour day to the Commission.
The first was the shortage of labor. President Williams of
the Carnegie Steel Company said it would take 50 per cent, or
26,000 more workers to put in three shifts on the eight-hour
day in the Carnegie Steel Company (which employs 55,000
men). He asked: "And if we could get the labor, where
could we house it? It would take 20,000 more houses."
Steel masters in general agreed with this viewpoint except
that Mr. Gary wrote the Commission that only 16% per cent,
more men would be required.
On the other hand it was admitted, even by the steel
masters themselves, that one of the reasons why the industry
faced a shortage of labor was " because you can't get Ameri-
cans to work the twelve-hour day." The labor shortage in the
industry is a problem, according to the opinion of the steel
masters or of their employment managers, of getting Slavic,
Greek, Italian and Turk labor which will work the twelve-
hour day, or even of admitting Chinese coolie labor into the
country. It was admitted that Americans dislike the slavish
character of common labor steel jobs as being " hunkie jobs."
THE TWELVE-HOUE DAY 77
Despite this, inasmuch as the steel mills were once entirely
manned by Americans, it was admitted that a great many
men would come back to the industry if the twelve-hour day
were eliminated.
But the decisive factor, setting aside all consideration of
the moral questions involved in the twelve-hour day and in
suggestions of flooding the steel industry with Balkan immi-
grants or coolie labor, lies in this consideration which, ac-
cording to engineers, disposes of the labor shortage argu-
ment against the eight-hour day ; the steel requirements of the
country could be met by utilizing all the first-class machinery,
scrapping the rest and distributing the work throughout the
available labor supply and throughout the year on a three-
shift eight-hour day basis.
Engineers' findings are: that the steel industry being run
for the making of profit and not primarily for the making of
steel as the country needs it, favors (a) spells of idleness
during which the country and the steel workers pay for the
maintenance of idle machinery, and later (b) spurts of long
hour, high speed labor.
Here is an analysis of steel production, made in 1919 by
W. ]Sr. Polakov, who compiled coal production studies for
the Council of National Defense during the war :
"It is a well-known fact that during 1914 the mills were
running considerably below their capacity because of an in-
dustrial crisis manifested in a general business depression. Pro-
duction of pig-iron during the two preceding years averaged
thirty million tons, even at that time, however, utilizing less
than 75 per cent, of the productive capacity of equipment;
full productive capacity of blast furnaces in 1914 was 44,405,000
tons per year. The fact that only 23,300,000 tons were 'pro-
duced in 1914 left nearly half of the equipment idle. A con-
sumer of iron should not be asked to pay for the use of fur-
naces in which his iron was not made any more than the tenant
78 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
to pay rent of the vacant apartments of his landlord. Yet
exactly the same thing was being done when the overhead
charges, rent, etc., amounting to $104,052,085, were distributed
on only 23,000,000 tons, while they should have been spread
over 44,000,000 tons. The consumer was asked to pay rent
at a rate of $4.47 per ton instead of only $2.17. The country,
therefore, had to pay $2.30 more for each ton of pig-iron than
it was worth and than it would have cost if production had not
been curtailed by the companies. Total over-charges, therefore,
appear to be about $53,552,084.
" Similarly, the capacity of steel mills was sufficient to pro-
duce 45,000,000 tons while only about 23,500,000 tons were
made. Were the overhead expenses, rent, etc., of only that
portion of plant and equipment that was actually used in the
production of steel charged to consumer, the overhead per ton
would have been not $9.95, but only $5.17, and the country
would not have had to pay $112,350,000 to the steel makers
for the equipment the country and the people received no
benefit from. In other words, the expense of idle plant equip-
ment was charged to consumers of both iron and steel, and
this item alone cost the country $175,009,084."
The second excuse offered for the twelve-hour day was
this : that the workers prefer the twelve-hour day.
This was urged by the Corporation's subsidiary presidents
before this Commission just as solemnly as Mr. Gary urged
it before the United States Senate.
Mr. Gary said " Let me tell you, the question of hours
has been largely a question of wishes, of desire on the part
of the employees themselves."
Steel presidents assured this Commission that in a few
plants where the three-shift day was inaugurated the plants
lost their men " because the foreigner wants to work the
twelve-hour day, he wants to make as much money as he
possibly can." They united in telling the Commission that
" if the Corporation put in the eight-hour day, the ' inde-
THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 79
pendents ' would steal all our men, because they want to work
the twelve-hour day."
They stated, what there is little reason to doubt, that some-
times when they tried to put in a rule of one day's rest in
seven, blast furnace laborers would desert to a seven-day job
or go to a neighboring plant and work for that extra day when
they were supposed to be " off."
This whole argument is based on what Mr. Gary called
" compensation." Mr. Gary himself said, " Of course if we
should immediately limit hours to eight and pay for the
eight hours the same the men are now getting for ten or
twelve hours every employee would favor it." (Senate Testi-
mony, Vol. I, p. 180.)
There seems to be not the slightest disposition on the part
of the Corporation in tackling the twelve-hour day evil to go
at their problem from this standpoint: "What is a wage
necessary for an American standard of living? Let us pay
at least that minimum for an eight-hour day." Many pages
of the Steel Corporation's testimony and hours of discussion
by presidents and plant superintendents would vanish if the
Steel Corporation would consent to such a basis of considera-
tion of its problems. Of course there are " hunkies " who
will work just as long as possible for all the money they can
get ; these are chiefly the immigrants who want to hurry back
to Europe to live in comparative leisure for the rest of their
days. Are these men to be favored at the expense of the
immigrant who has become an American, who wants to stay
here with his family, who is growing up to American speech
and ways and who wants to keep himself and his money here
forever? This latter is the immigrant who struck by the
tens of thousands against the twelve-hour day; but he looks,
to Mr. Gary, the same as the un-American worker. Mr.
Gary told the Senate Committee (Senate Testimony, Vol. I,
p. 183) : " Some of the men prefer to secure their own places
80 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STEIKE
of residence and save their money and take it home — take it
abroad. Of course this is not objectionable from our stand-
point at all." But is it not emphatically objectionable from
the standpoint of American citizenship?
Mr. Gary propounded his question of pay, what he called
twelve hours wages for eight hours work, as if it could not
be taken seriously by practical men. It is taken seriously
by his entire common labor force. Witnesses before the
Senate Committee and scores interviewed in this Inquiry
took the stands set forth in the following paragraph from
the diary of the Carnegie Steel worker at Homestead in the
spring of 1919 :
"A rumor of the coming eight-hour day is commented on
as follows: Negro laborer says he doesn't see how he can
get along with only eight hours as long as family groceries stay
up so high. One of the best first-helpers, pay check $175 to
$200 every fifteen days, mainly tonnage, says it would be fine;
it would cost money, but it would give him a chance to get
the good of being alive."
There in a nutshell are the answers given by the two main
parts of the labor force. The upper third, consisting of the
skilled workers and upper half of the semi-skilled, would
willingly accept a compromise cut in wages for the sake of
the eight-hour day. The other and greater half, especially
the common labor section, feel they must have their present
pay when they get the eight-hour day. That the Corporation
recognized some reasonableness in this stand was evidenced
when Mr. Gary announced a 10 per cent, raise for all com-
mon labor three weeks after the strike was called off.
This Inquiry hesitated to raise the issue as to whether
or not the rates of pay for the Steel Corporation's common
labor are purposely kept low in order to force men to submit
to the inhuman twelve-hour day.
THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 81
Progressive steel masters have fought the Corporation's
twelve-hour day for years. They instance what is well
known, that the actual work delivered toward the end of the
twelve-hour shift, much less the eighteen, twenty-four, or
thirty-six hour shift, is nothing compared to the wear and
tear on the workman delivering the lahor. The following
quotation from the diary of the Carnegie steel worker is
pertinent :
" The twelve-hour day for common labor is impossible. To
deliver heavy muscular effort for twelve hours cannot be done.
The last six hours is done with a 35 per cent. load. After
midnight it is a contest to see who keeps out of the boss's way
and does the least work."
In sum, the twelve-hour day is the most iniquitous of the
by-products of the Corporation's labor policy; which is to
get cheap labor and keep it cheap. The Corporation baits
floating labor with the wage possibilities of excessive hours,
does nothing to combat the drainage of money out of the
country by the smaller fraction of the incorrigibly un-Ameri-
can immigrant; and for the greater bulk of immigrants who
want to be Americans it imposes un-American hours. In the
light of thirteen years' history of " eliminating " the seven-
day week, the conclusion seems unescapable: that the Steel
Corporation moves to reform only when it has to. It must
be added that if the twelve-hour day is bad for the country,
the government is to blame and as long as it fails to tackle
the twelve-hour day it imposes upon the trade unions alone
the humane task of moving the Steel Corporation in the
direction of reform.
Moreover, the conclusion is unescapable that a real cause
of the persistence of the twelve-hour day and the seven-hour
week is the defenselessness of the unorganized immigrant
worker. Again the government, as much as the Steel Cor-
poration, is to blame and again the Corporation and the
83 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
government have seen fit to leave the field of reform to the
trade unions.
In the twenty-eight pages of the Senate Committee's Re-
port on the steel strike much space is devoted to the need
for Americanization. Only a few lines were devoted to the
twelve-hour day. But Americanization is a farce, night
schools are worthless, Carnegie libraries on the hilltops are
a jest, churches and welfare institutions are ironic while the
steel worker is held to the twelve-hour day or the fourteen-
hour night. Not only has he no energy left, he has literally
no time left after working such schedules. He has not even
time for his own family.
The facts have long been known. The National Associa-
tion of Corporation Schools, the chief employers' organization
for furthering workers' education, at its 1919 session heard
A. H. Wyman of the Carnegie Steel Company of Pittsburgh
cite the reasons given by immigrant workers for dropping
out of the nightly English classes for foreigners in the South
Chicago public schools :
Fatigue from long hours , 2T
Change of jobs, unable to get to school by 7 P. M. .... . 36
Change from day to night work 37
Overtime work ,. 69
Total 169
That is, nearly fifty per cent, of the startlingly small group
of 341 enrolled out of the tens of thousands in the district
dropped out for reasons connected with hours. Mr. Wyman
did not mention the relation of steel workers' hours to the
defeat of the South Chicago Americanization educational
campaign ; neither did anybody else in the audience mention
it.^
The Committee of Senators investigating the strike heard
* Report National Association of Corporation Schools, 1919, p. 493.
THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 83
testimony directly related to this matter of Americanization
of which the following is typical (Vol. II, p. 602) :
A. Pido — Twenty-three years old, an immigrant striker, on
the stand.
The Chairman — "WHiat is the reason you struck this time?
Mr. Pido — I strike on eight hours a day and better condi-
tions.
Senator McKellar — Wliat sort of conditions do you want
better ?
Mr. Pido — This better; I think that a man ought to work
eight hours today and have eight hours sleep and eight hours
that he can go to school and learn something; and I think that
an education is much better than any money. I have been
going to night school in Clairton for a while.
The Chairman — Did a good many of the men go to night
school ?
Mr. Pido — They don't have any chance. They work 12 hours
a day, and they do not have any chance.
The Chairman — How long did you go to night school?
Mr. Pido — I went about twenty nights altogether.
The Chairman — Is that all of the schooling that you hare
ever had?
Mr, Pido — I did not have any chance.
The Chairman — How many men went to the night school?
Mr. Pido — Not very much. There were about twenty-three
altogether.
The Chairman — Do you think they would go to night school
if they had an opportunity?
Mr. Pido — I think they would if they had a chance to go,
but the way they are now they have no chance to go to school.
Another witness, a Slovak priest in Braddock, testified aa
follows :
Father Kazinci : " We have an Americanization course in
project taking place, and they have been instructed to go and
attend those night schools. They are not a very great success,
84 HEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
for the simple reason that the men are overworked, working
from 10 to 13 hours a day; and they do not feel like going
to the schools and depriving their families of their own com-
pany and society even after those hours, those long hours.
Sundays, they have none, for most of them go off to work.
" The men are worked from 10 to 13 hours a day. The
conditions under which they are living are bad for America.
The housing conditions are terrible. The work conditions, the
hours of work, are absolutely impossible, and I think that it
tends to make the men become disgusted with the country,
and they will say, ' Well, let us go back to the old country ;
perhaps it is going to be better than it is for us here.* There
is no hope for them bettering their condition, for they work
from the time the whistle begins to blow in the morning until
they are whistled out at 6 o'clock in the evening." (Vol. II,
p. 544-6.)
Americanization of the steel workers cannot take place
while the 12-hour day persists. Human beings un- Ameri-
canized by the 12-hour day in such scores of thousands are
a stiff price paid by America for the profits of steel com-
panies.
Recommendations along the following lines seem unescap-
able :
That the 12-hour day is a barbarism without valid ex-
cuse, penalizing the workers and the country.
That the church and every other American institution has
a duty to perform to the immigrant worker and that
this duty cannot be fulfilled until the 12-hour day is
abolished.
That effective elimination of the 12-hour day must and
can be initiated and worked out only by (a) the IT. S.
Steel Corporation in free cooperation with its workers,
and (b) by the Federal Government.
IV
WAGES m A N"0-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY
Analysis of the wages paid in the iron and steel industry,
together with comparisons with wages in other industries and
with two recognized standards of living, results in the fol-
lowing conclusions directly bearing on the causes of the
strike :
The annual earnings of over one-third of all productive
iron and steel workers were, and had been for years, below
the level set by government experts as the minimum of subsis-
tence standard for families of five.
The annual earnings of 72% of all workers were, and
had been for years below the level set by government ex-
perts as the minimum of comfort level for families of five.
This second standard being the lowest which scientists
are willing to term an " American standard of living," it
follows that nearly thre-e-quarters of the steel workers could
not earn enough for an American stomdard of living.
The bulk of unskilled steel labor, with exceptions here-
after noted, earned less than enough for the average family's
mirdmum subsistence.
The bulk of semi-sMlled steel workers earned less than
enough for the average family's minimum comfort.
Skilled steel labor is paid wages disproportionate to the
earnings of the other two-thirds, thus binding the skilled
class to the companies and creating divisions between it and
the rest of the force.
41.6 per cent, of the payroll goes to the skilled, who number
but 30.4 per cent, of the whole.
85
86 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
30.6 per cent, of the payroll goes to the semi-skilled, who
number 31.5 per cent, of the whole.
37.8 per cent, of the payroll goes to the unskilled, who, how-
ever, are 38.1 per cent, of the whole.^
One-half of the three-quarters earning less than an Ameri-
can living wage reached even their wage levels only because
of the twelve-hour day with its " 14-hour earnings."
Wage rates in the iron and steel industry are determined
by the rates of the U. S. Steel Corporation. The Steel Cor-
poration sets its wage rates, the same as its hour schedules,
without conference (or collective bargaining) with its em-
ployees; it decrees them arbitrarily.
Mr. Gary testified before the Senate Committee :
" I have forgotten how many times we increased wages dur-
ing the war, but repeatedly, voluntarily — arhiirarily, but arbi-
trarily in favor of the workmen." (Senate Testimony, Vol I,
p. 226.)
The Commission's data on wages were furnished primarily
by the U. S. Steel Corporation. The Corporation's Annual
Reports, together with more recent statistics supplied by Mr.
Gary are here analyzed through the media of the standard
government survey of the industry, (Senate Document 110,
4 vols.), the analyses of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics; and are checked by data accumulated by the Commis-
sion's investigators. Comparison is made with budgets of
expenditures supplied by workers' families in the Pitts-
burgh District and with wage rates paid in similar industries.
In relation to the strike these wage analyses warrant the
following conclusion:
1 Figures derived from analysis of the wage tables In Senate Docu-
ment 110. The proportion between the different classes of workers
and other general conditions have not changed vitally since then (1910).
The percentages have been carried out to the decimal point, although,
of course, they represent no such precise division in fact.
WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 87
Besides the skilled workers who struck principally against
arbitrary (or autocratic) control and besides the mass
which struck mainly against the 12-hour day, a large
proportion of the unskilled and semi-skilled struck also
against wages which, statistics indicate, were actually
inadequate to maintain an American standard of liv-
ing.
In regard to the Steel Corporation's financial ahility to pay
higher wages than it does the following facts were noted :
The Corporation increased its total undivided surplus from
$135,204,471.90 in 1914 to $493,048,201.93 in 1919,
that is, to a figure larger than its total wages and salary
budget for 1919.
Increases in wages during the war in no case were at a sacri-
fice of stockholders' dividends.
Net earnings per ton of steel in 1918 were $14.39, that is,
higher than the average since 1910, ($13.03). Net
earnings per ton of steel in 1917 were $19.76.
These conclusions being true, some explanation should be
made of what would then seem to be a popular illusion, —
that steel is a highly paid industry. The most recent cause
of this illusion is, perhaps, Mr. Gary's testimony on wages
before the Senate Committee. Mr. Gary began his wage
list with " rollers, $32.56 per day " (Senate Testimony, Vol.
I p. 156). Although it became quickly apparent (ibid. p.
159) ^ that there was only one roller in the steel business
making that $32.56 per day, nevertheless, the public at large
seems to have accepted Mr. Gary's flat statement that " the
Corporation has been in the van all the time " ^ and his
applications of this to wages, such as the following :
' Mr. Gary : " Senator, I believe there is only one who gets as high
as $32.56."
= P. 178.
88 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
Mr. Gary : " I wish to state that there is no basic industry
in this country, nor in the world, in my opinion, which has
paid larger wages to its employees than the United States Steel
Corporation, and perhaps not as large. . . .
" For the year 1914 in manufacturing the wages were $2.93 ;
July, 1919, $6.27, an increase of 114 per cent, ... all com-
panies, 1914, $2.88; July, 1919, $5.99, an increase of 108
per cent; unskilled labor, 10 hours, 1914, $2 per day; July,
1919, $4.62, an increase of 131 per cent. Twelve hours, in
1914, $2.40; in July, 1919, $5.88, an increase of 145 per cent,
(p. 158).
" We hare stood for the highest wages, anvariably. We
have been the first to increase wages and the last to decrease
them.'' (Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 175.)
Altogether, Mr. Gary's figure of $6.27 per day as the
average for the "whole industry, his figures on wage increases
in hundred percentages and exhibits of photographs of beauti-
ful homes owned by steel "workers, combined to leave with
the public the impression that " steel may be mighty hard
labor but its wages are mighty big," and that " whatever else
the steel trust may be, it pays well." It might not be unfair
to say that the impression is general that the Steel Corpora-
tion's reason for hiring 24 different races of foreigners was
that they could stand the hours, not that the kind of wages
these foreigners would take had anything to do with it
Another means of misleading public opinion undoubtedly
was the appearance in the press and in magazines during the
strike of many articles such as the one entitled " Think of
the ' Poor Steel Workers ' Who Get From Four Dollars to
Seventy Dollars a Day " in the Current Opinion of Janu-
ary, 1920. The article is taken from the N. Y. Sun and goes
on to say:
" According to a writer who has been investigating condi-
tions in the Pittsburgh steel mill district for the New York
WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 89
Sun, the worker on an ice wagon or on a moving van in any
large city does more real hard work in a day than the aver-
age mill laborer does in two or three days. . . . Wages of from
$8.26 to $9 a day have been made right along by semi-skilled
workers, a large nimiber of whom are foreign born. For
what are known as skilled workers in the steel mills, to which
positions all workers may aspire and many of which are held
by aliens, the average daily wages are, at this writing;
Steel rollers $28.16
Sheet heaters 21.12
Roughers 11.92
Steel pourers 12.84
Vessel men , 14.65
Engineers, manipulators, etc 12.63
Blooming mill heaters ,. 17.92
Skelp mill heaters 18.18
Skelp mill rollers 21.73
Lap welders 16.08
Blowers 13.76
Bottom makers 12.91
Regulators 13.52
"It is stated authoritatively that emploj^ees of the United
States Steel Corporation now are the highest paid body of men
in the steel industry in the world."
The list of employees given above, " rollers," etc., consti-
tutes a fraction of 1 per cent, of all employees. Of these in
turn, the " aliens," or immigrants who " may aspire " to
such jobs, constitute a fraction of 1 per cent. It was " stated
authoritatively " — on behalf of steel companies, — many times
during the strike that steel workers were highly paid, on the
basis of such citations as the above.
The result was that most persons had the imprecision that
" wages were not an issue in the strike." Even public
spirited citizens who conferred with Mr. Gary on the strike
90 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
remained under this misapprehension. Persons "who took
the trouble to mingle with strikers, however, found every
other man complaining of wages. Half the strikers inter-
viewed by the Senate investigating committee talked of " low
wages."
It is entirely possible that the Steel Corporation heads
sincerely believe their workers are well off^ financially. 'No
such analyses as the following were obtainable from the Cor-
poration's statisticians.
Analysis shows that the misconception of steel as a high
wage industry arises from:
(a) The existence of a very small highly skilled and highly
paid body of American workers prominently visible at
the top of the industry.
(b) Failure to realize that the amounts earned by the low-
skilled, (the bulk of the labor) are determined chiefly
by the extraordinary long hours rather than by a high
rate per hour.
That is : steel rates are the same or lower than in similar
industries if earnings are compared on a basis of equal hours.
As regards common labor steel is a low wage industry. Com-
parison of common labor earnings in steel with common
labor earnings in five other major industries in the Pitts-
burgh district for the latter part of 1919 on the basis of a
common standard week shows steel labor the lowest paid of
the six.
" This class (common labor) is of the greatest importance
in the industry, not only because of the very large propor-
tion employed, but even more because their wage forms the
base rate of the entire industry, above which the wages of
the other employees are graded." (Senate Document, 110,
Vol. I p. xxxix.) This finding of the Labor Department's
famous study of the steel industry in 1910 is admittedly true
today. The steel wage, as well as the organization of the
WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTEY 91
steel business, (see next section of this report) is pyramided
on a broad and tremendous base of common labor, restlessly
drifting and with a high turnover while the industry is held
together by the tight and almost unbreakable skilled organi-
zation at the apex. Yet the high pay rates at the top depend
largely on the rates which the mass at the bottom are will-
ing to take.
True understanding of the wage complaints of thousands of
steel workers depends on analyzing the huge wages budget
of the Corporation to show how the earnings are divided. It
is no comfort to the underpaid worker to learn that the
Corporation paid in wages and salaries for 1918, $452,663,-
524. ; and for the first eight months of 1919, to manufacturing
employees, $255,861,264. The following figures make the
matter plainer than gigantic totals, though the figures are
based on the totals, which include many salaries in the
administrative force, admittedly larger than the run of pro-
ducing employees' wages. (Reference is made to tables in
sub-reports.) These figures are maxima, too high to be rep-
resentative. The figures cover approximately the union or-
ganizing period of a year before the beginning of the strike,
September 22, 1919.
In 1918 the the Corporation's wage and salary budget " for
the manufacturing properties," $344,907,626 went to the
198,968 employees as follows:
60,486 skilled (30.4 per cent, of all) got 41.6 per
cent., or $143,581,571
62,675 semi-skilled (31.5 per cent, of all) got 30.6
per cent., or 105,531,733
75,807 unskilled (38.1 per cent, of all) got 27.8
per cent, or 95,884,320
In 1919 the Corporation's wage and salary budget ($255,-
861,264 for eight months) went to 191,000 employees as fol-
92 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
lows : (eight months budget multiplied by 50 per cent, for an
annual basis) :
58,064 skilled (30.4 per cent, of all) got 41.6
per cent., or $159,657,328
60,165 semi-skilled (31.5 per cent, of all) got 30.6
per cent., or 117,440,320
72,771 unskilled (38.1 per cent, of all) got 27.8
per cent., or 106,694,145
That is, individual average earnings were not higher than
as follows, since the above totals contain administrative
salaries :
In 1918:
Skilled annual earnings averaged under $2,373
Semi-skilled annual earnings averaged under. . 1,683
Unskilled annual earnings averaged under 1,265
In 1919:
Skilled annual earnings averaged under $2,749
Semi-skilled annual earnings averaged under. . 1,952
Unskilled annual earnings averaged under. . . . 1,468
With this must be compared what the workingman is
always comparing with his wage — his cost of living. Before
taking up detailed discussion of standards of living, it will
be convenient to set down here brief definitions of two stand-
ards, (disregarding a third commonly called the pauper line,
because the latter has not been defined with scientific exacti-
tude comparable to) — (1) the minimum subsistence level, and
(2) the minimum comfort level) both for families of five.
These standards, derived from the most exhaustive extant
analysis of cost of living statistics, incorporated in govern-
ment reports and used in government wage awards, are defined
as follows:
WAGES m NO-CONFEKENCE INDUSTEY 93
1. The minimum of subsistence level. This is based essen-
tially on animal well-being, with little or no attention to the
comforts or social demands of human beings.
2. The minimum comfort level. This is somewhat above
that of mere animal subsistence, providing in some measure
for comfortable clothing, insurance, a modest amount of rec-
reation, etc. This level provides for health and decency, but
very few comforts, and is probably much below the idea had
in mind in the frequent but indefinite expression, " the Ameri-
can standard of living."
In other words, these standards applied to families, mean
first, the level at which a wage-earner can keep himself and
his dependents healthfully alive; second, the lowest level at
which scientists would be willing to put " the American
standard of living." (The detailed calculations of these stand-
ards, chiefly on the basis of the work done for the govern-
ment by Prof. W. F. Ogburn, the best known American
authority on costs of living statistics, will be set forth later
in an appendix.)
It must be noted that as standards for wages, these levels
are bitterly protested by organized labor. The whole princi-
ple of limiting wage rates to their relation to bare standards
of subsistence or of minimum comfort has been denounced
again and again by Mr. Gompers. The following figures
therefore may be considered simply at the rock bottom of
calculation for those who wish to grasp the meaning of exist-
ing wage rates, not as representing rates which organized
labor considers just.
For 1918, Family of Five (June)
Minimum of subsistence level , $1,386
Minimum of comfort level 1,760
For 1919, Family of Five (August)
Minimum of subsistence level $1,575
Minimum of comfort level 2,024
94 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
These figures, — which are hammered down to the most
conservative possible levels — may be compared with the
(highest possible) individual averages based on the Corpora-
tion's payrolls above, as follows: —
1918 1919
Minimum of comfort level $1,760 $2,024
Minimum of subsistence level , 1,386 1,575
Unskilled labor's annual average 1,265 1,466
That is, in 1918, the unskilled worker's annual earnings
were more than $121 below the minimum of subsistence
level and more than $495 below the " American standard of
living " for families.
In 1919 the unskilled worker's annual earnings were mpre
than $109 below the minimum of subsistence level and more
than $558 below the " American standard of living."
Comparing the semi-skilled earnings and the minimum of
comfort level:
1918 1919
Minimum of comfort level $1,760 $2,024
Semi-skilled labor's annual average 1,683 1,952
That is, in both years the semi-skilled's annual earnings
Were below the lowest " American standard of living " for
families.
These two groups, unskilled and semi-skilled, comprise 72
per cent, of all manufacturing iron and steel workers.
If, leaving average annual earnings for a moment, com-
parison is made between (a) the two standards of living cited
and (b) the wages of those groups of workers whose highest
earnings just fail to reach these standards, the following
curious and significant revelation results. That is, the labor
force of 191,000 men for 1919 can be classified by grada-
tions upward, beginning with the group earning $3.36 a day
or approximately $1,000 a year, then the group earning
WAGES IN NO-CONFEEENCE INDUSTRY 95
$1,200, then $1,300, etc. The level at which $1,575 (the
minimum of subsistence standard) appears in this classifi-
cation leaves just 38 per cent, of the workers below it. If
the classification is continued on upward, through $1,600
annually, $1,700, $1,800, etc., the level at which $2,024
(the minimum of comfort standard) appears leaves just 72
per cent, of the workers below it. But 38 per cent, marks
the limit of unskilled labor and 72 per cent, the limit of
semi-skilled.
That is, as if by the workings of a law, all in the unskilled
class fall just short of the level of living to which common
labor ordinarily feels it is entitled and should attain, — the
level of a healthful animal existence. And all in the semi-
skilled class (workers in steel jobs usually from 1 year to 5
years or more) fall just short of the level of living to which
more steady workers feel they ought to attain — the level of
decency and at least a few comforts.
Such a " law " might be put thus : that the " labor market,"
if left only to " supply and demand," uninfluenced by trade
union or other forces, tends to leave the top level of possible
earnings for each class of worker just out of reach. Each
class of worker must always be striving for the level of
livelihood which seems " due " him and always be just short
of it. He must, therefore, always be working his hardest.
The worker is, therefore, by the workings of such unre-
stricted industrialism, " speeded " to the limit by the hope
of attaining the standard which seems surely attainable.
Employers capitalize the situation, partly consciously, — " if
you pay 'em too much, they won't work " — and partly un-
consciously, by making each wage raise just enough to meet
" increased costs of living." Consciously, employers have
utilized this " law " to speed workmen by skilfully adjust-
ing reductions in piece-rates of payment to increases in out-
put. This is the practice of " increasing output by ' shaving '
9e EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
rates, a method raised to perfection by the steel trust," ^ as
observed by Prof. Carleton Parker in 1914.
The wage averages given above, it should be noted again,
■were based on the money actually palid out. The true aver-
ages for each class of work, therefore, could not be over
the figures given. How much lower than the given averages
the true averages should be is hard to determine. It depends
mainly on the extent to which the Steel Corporation has
lumped into its totals for wages for the labor force, the sums
spent for salaries for the great office and administrative or-
ganizations. That these have been lumped in is obvious ; *
but to what extent can only be estimated. Besides the adminis-
trative salaries which must be paid out of the industry's
productiveness, there are such items as the thousands of
" plant police " and other adjuncts of anti-union policies,
whose pay must also be earned by the productive steel workers.
This percentage of deduction for administrative overhead,
etc., should be, judging by the only statistics available, about
9 per cent. In 1910 the indicated average for all Steel
Corporation employees, obtained by di^dding the given total
payroll of $174,995,130 by the 218,435 employees, was $801
per man annually. But the actual average annual earnings,
as determined by the government's exhaustive survey of that
year, were about $726 per man, or 9 per cent, below the
Steel Corporation's indicated average. In 1919 the Cor-
poration's indicated average, obtained by dividing the given
manufacturing plant payroll by the number of manufacturing
employees, was $2,009 per man. If this " manufacturing
* " The Technique of American Industry," Atlantic Monthly, Jan., 1920.
• The fact is plainly indicated by analysis of the figures cited by Mr.
Gary to the Commission in the letter of Jan. 30. This gives $344,907,-
626, as the " total payroll " for " the employees of the manufacturing
plants." If this excluded administrative salaries, etc., these salaries
should raise unduly the average annual wage for the rest of the Cor-
poration's 70,000 employees. Instead the average for the remaining
70,000 is $200 lower than the average given as for " the employees of
the manufacturing plants " alone.
WAGES IN NO-CONFEEENCE INDUSTEY 97
payroll " contains the same proportion of overhead as the
Corporation's customary " total payroll," as seems to be true,
this average of $2,009 should be 9 per cent, too high as a
true average. But the $Y26 true average of 1910, increased
by 150 per cent., (the actual increase in iron and steel wages
according to government reports ^) would be $1,815 and this
is also just 9 per cent, below the Corporation's indicated
average. This would mean that the true average annual earn-
ings of iron and steel workers for 1918 and 1919 would be as
follows :
1918 1919
Unskilled $1,153 $1,335
Semi-skilled 1,534 1,777
Skilled 2,178 2,502
That is, if a survey were made of company payrolls, it
would probably indicate the above as the actual average
earnings of steel workers.^
These facts, then, should be borne in mind in consider-
ing the following recapitulating table. The above averages
are probably much truer estimates of actual annual earn-
ings than the averages given below which, on the com-
panies' own statistics, are maxima. The true averages for
semi-skilled and unskilled are farther below the standards
of living than this table indicates:
1918 1919
Skilled $2,373 $2,749
Minimum of comfort ,. 1,760 2,024
Semi-skilled 1,683 1,952
Minimum of subsistence 1,386 1,575
Unskilled 1,265 1,466
^ Increase in average hourly earnings 1910 to 1919 is 150 per cent.
Bulletins U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics No. 218 and Monthly Labor
Review, November, 1919, p. 192.
* An increase of 10 per cent, for common labor with proportionate
adjustments for skilled was granted by the U. S. Steel Corporation
at the close of the strike. This was immediately met by tncreasea
from the independent companies.
98 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STEIKE
In each of two classes, in each year, the average earnings
were below the standard of living which each class normally
feels to be the least " due " him. How far one class, common
labor, was below the minimum comfort or lowest " American
standard of living " was striking.
For many years this was so in the industry; decency, or
comfort, just out of reach, for two-thirds of the workers.
Therefore many strikers, who looked blank at mention of
" Bolshevism " and who knew little even of the A. F. of L.,
insisted on talking a great deal about wages to this Com-
mission's investigators and to the Senate Committee.
Such were the hard facts of which all but skilled steel
workers were more or less conscious year in, year out. They
realized that by the long day, and its overtime they could
earn considerable sums, but, what with exhaustion due to
overwork and what with lay-offs due to shut-downs, the an-
nual income was disappointing. Though they were laid off,
they must eat and their families be kept alive. Iron men,
with plants running full time, could earn much more than
the $24.32 (1918) or the $28.19 (1919) maximum weekly
averages actually paid to common labor in those years. For
example, the following is an Open Hearth gang actual sched-
ule for a Pittsburgh District plant, July, 1919 :
Hours: ten-hour day, fourteen-hour night
(Alternate 6-day and 7-day week)
Weekly Rate
Common lahor . , . imskilled $35.28 $ .42
Pit unskilled 36.12 43
Third-Helper ....semi-skilled ... 45.00 (6 wks. to learn) .45
Second-Helper ...skilled 45.00 (8 mo.-2y2 yrs.) . 7.00 a day
First-Helper skilled 69.00 10.07 plus
tonnage
($lor$2)
17 (hours) X 45 (cents) X 6 (days) = night week
11 " X 45 " X 6 " 4- (32 X 45) = day week
The mathematics of overtime for the semi-skilled man at the end
illustrates the story. This Third-Helper makes his total on his " night
week," 14 hours for 6 nights, by multiplying his hourly 4.1 cents by
17 hours by 6. He makes his "day week" total by multiplying 45
cents by 11 hours by 6 plus one 24 hour turn, or (overtime pay, 32 hours
in all), $14.40.
WAGES IN NO-CONFEEENCE INDUSTRY 99
If this semi-skilled man kept this up for 52 weeks ho
would, being allowed only 26 days rest in all that year of
12-hour days, earn $2,340 or $216 over the minimum of
comfort level for 1919. And if the common laborers who
Tnahe up 49 per cent, of Open Hearth employees, worked
this 12-hour schedule for all but 26 of the 365 days in the
year, they would still be nearly $200 below the lowest
" American standard." But few men can stand it and few
plants run without a lay-off, — many are " down " from 8
to 20 weeks a year, and the years' earnings are never " full
time." Thus common labor's income is annually below
healthful existence for families.
It is these possibilities of overtime on 12 to 24-hour shifts
which give to steel jobs the reputation of " high pay " which
they actually enjoy among a considerable class of husky
unmarried immigrant workers. This touches one of the
real reasons why the 12 -hour day has persisted in the steel
industry: 30 per cent of steel workers are umnarried, with
no responsibilities and with the strength and desire to pile
up as much as they can for a few weeks or months, then
'' lay off " to enjoy life or take an " easy job " until " broke."
From this 30 per cent, the steel companies recruit their 12-
hour gang in considerable part, irrespective of whether the
development of such intermittent working is good for the
industry or the community. The long overtime constitutes
the bait to this class and to many a simple foreign laborer
who sees what one day can bring in but not what the years
do bring in, to him and his class. Moreover 68 per cent, of
the " foreigners " are married, with an average of 6.63 mem-
bers to each household, and 81 per cent, of the " foreigners "
in the industry are paid the unskilled or semi-skilled wage
rates. These married and familied " foreigners " are the
ones who desire to keep their money and themselves here, to
be " Americans ;" and these are the immigrants most worth
100 REPOKT ON THE STEEL. STKIKE
while and yet most penalized by steel's long hours and un-
American wage rates.
It must be noted too that 15 per cent, of immigrant steel
workers have families of ten members or over; of the Croa-
tians 37 per cent, have families of 10 or over; of the Mag-
yars, 21 per cent. With large families, with the unskilled
jobs where the " lay offs " strike first in slack times, with
the communities such that none other than steel jobs are
near, with the work such that " old age at forty " is its watch-
word, the average immigrant steel worker, after a dozen
years at it, often finds himself contemplating not the " long
overtime " which first tempted him but actual conditioni
nearer the following:
This is the official family budget and verbal report made
by the Home Service Division of the Pittsburgh Red Cross
for the only case of relief growing out of the strike that had
come to it by November 26, 1919. (The question of helping
a stAher was the subject of very serious debate by the Pitts-
burgh Red Cross.)
Polish worker living in Braddock, employed by American
Steel and Wire Company. Father, mother, and nine children.
Oldest boy, 21, was making about $60 a month, went into army
eervice.
Father, 42, common laborer, was making $80 to $90 a month
on the average. His employment was irregular, although his
foreman reported that he was a good, steady workman and
worked every day there was a job. Last summer his monthly
earnings went up, being $129 in July, and $118 in August.
There is no record of the family ever having been a charity
case.
Another boy makes about $15 per month, and some of the
girls occasionally pick up some money.
The father went on strike; since the strike he has applied
WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 101
for other jobs and was refused them because he belongs to the
union. At length he got a Job on a government dam.
Minimum Budget for the above family of father, mother
and eight children, worked out specially with reference to the
special needs of the family for milk, medicine, etc.:
Rent $ 20.00
Food 101.65
Clothing 43.00
Fuel 3.00
Spending money 5.00
Medicine 4.00
Education .60
Polish tuition 1.50
Insurance 2.00
Recreation 1.00
$180.75
Family income in normal times. . . . 143.00
Actual relief needed before the
strike $ 37.75
Comment : Almost any ordinary workman's family has a hard
time to get along at present prices. The worst problem is hous-
ing. Not only are rents high, but there is an absolute shortage
of fit housing.
In this case the " decency budget " set hy local authorities
was $2,168 a year, or over $700 more than the average
actual earnings of common labor for that period; and over
$1,000 more than the average earnings of the father himself.
Before making detailed comparisons with costs of living,
reference should be made to the other of the two comparisons
which the steel worker is always making in regard to his
wages — the comparison with the wages of his neighbor miner,
builder, railroader, etc. Detailed comparisons of hours and
102 KEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
wages in nine industries are given in Appendix B, based on
the " earnings per full week," not on the actual annual earn-
ings. With this is a comparison of weekly earnings in six
principal industries, besides steel, in the Pittsburgh District,
on the basis of a common standard-length week. The earn-
ings of (1) steel workers, (2) bituminous coal miners, (3)
metal trades, (4) railroad employees, (5) building trades,
(6) street railwaymen, (Y) printers, are compared on the basis
of the same week for all, in this case a 44-hour week.^ In the
comparison steel earnings due to overtime for the customary
excessive hours are averaged in, but even so the following
facts are brought out:
Comparative earnings for 4:4:-hour week at prevailing hourly
rates (Pittsburgh District, 1919) :
Common labor —
Iron and steel $21.12
Bituminous coal 25.30
Building trades
Building laborers $22.00
Hod carriers 30.80
Plasterers' laborers 30.80
Average for laborers 27.85
The comparison makes it plain that steel common lahor has
the lowest rate of pay of the trades for which there are
separate statistics for laborers. The two principal factors to
be considered in the comparison are, of course, (a) seasonal
influences; (b) unionism.
Excluding laborers the main comparisons run as follows:
(still on 44-hour week basis) :
Iron and steel —
Skilled and semi-skilled $38.32
* It could be any week for the purposes of comparison, 44-hour week,
90-hour week, 120-hour week; the comparison would result the same.
WAGES IN NO-CONFEEENCE INDUSTRY 103
Bituminous coal miners —
Hand miners • . 34.50
Machine miners 41.67
Metal trades —
Blacksmiths 30.80
Iron molders 33.00
Eailroad employees —
Machinists 31.68
Boilermakers 31.68
Building trades —
Bricklayers 49.50
Carpenters . 39.60
Painters 38.50
Structural iron workers 44.00
Street railwaymen 23.76
Printers —
Newspaper linotypers 38.50
Newspaper compositors 33.88
Book and job 26.58
With this should be noted the average for all steel workers
— $32.02 ; the whole comparison makes plain why steel work-
ers found that steel rates of pay were not " high " when com-
pared with similar industries ; that " high " earnings in
steel plants were due principally to long hours. Steel work-
ers often carried the comparisons on to the causes of differ-
ences : e.g. to comparisons of the amounts of time lost by un-
employment in steel, building, mining, etc.; and to the fact
that the building trades, street railways, railroads and mines
were more or less completely unionized and steel not at all.
A first and foremost item in living costs, conditioned by
wages, is housing. This Inquiry for adequate reasons did
not go extensively into two phases of housing: (a) the Steel
Corporation's housing provisions; (b) comparison of present
conditions with findings of investigations of a dozen years
o.
(a) The Steel Corporation testimony on the houses, includ-
104 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STEIKE
ing whole towns, built for workmen and leased at low rentals,
takes up over ten pages in the Senate Investigating Com-
mittee's record. It includes the millions expended for this
purpose and this item as a total (Vol. I, p. 192) :
Dwellings and boarding houses constructed and leased
to eniployees at low rental rates , 25,965
But most of these houses, it was well known, were for the
Corporation's miners, erected in hitherto uninhabited regions
where towns had to be built before mining could go on.
Inquiry of the Corporation determined the fact that less than
10,000 of these houses were available for steel workers. The
facts were simple :
Total employees at manufacturing plants 191,000
Total Corporation houses near plants ,. ., 10,000
Employees not company-housed , 181,000
That is, 181,000 steel workers had just as much chance to
get a Corporation-built, low-rental house as they had to get
Mr. Gary's Niew York mansion. Moreover most of the
10,000 houses were occupied by " American " workers.
(b) A dozen years ago the Pittsburgh Survey revealed
conditions of housing of steel workers which shocked public
opinion and which, Pittsburgh authorities state, have been
improved practically not at all since then. It was impossible
to conduct another such exhaustive housing survey in this
investigation but sufficient observation was made to bear out
the local statement, that housing was as bad as ever. The
U. S. census, taken in January, 1920, should reveal com-
plete statistics of conditions. The census takers found in
Braddock, for example, that in this steel suburb of Pitts-
burgh 200 families were living in 61 houses; 35 boarders
were in one house where three different persons occupied each
bed in the 24 hours of each day, sleeping in eight-hour shifts.
WAGES IN NO-CONFEEENCE INDUSTRY 105
It was of Braddock that Senator Kenyon, chairman of the
Senate Investigating Committee, was quoted as saying:
" This is the worst place I have ever seen and I have
watched the living conditions of many immigrants."
A sub-report ^ contains the detailed findings of an investi-
gator for this Inquiry who spent three weeks in November,
1919, in the Pittsburgh District collecting data on the actual
living conditions of steel workers' families. The investi-
gator obtained, as far as the workers could supply them, data
on the family budgets of expenditures for rent, food, clothes,
children's education, benefit societies, etc. and observed the
housing conditions. Questions were also asked, principally
of the wives, dealing with the strike, what were their ideas
of its causes, whether they approved the strike. Strikers
and non-strikers, " foreigners " and " Americans," were in-
terviewed. The visits were haphazard, including neighbor-
hoods in Pittsburgh, Braddock, Homestead and Monessen,
sometimes with an interpreter, sometimes with a member of
the strike relief committee or with a settlement worker, fre-
quently alone. The neighborhoods were principally those of
the immigrant semi-skilled and unskilled workers who con-
stitute the bulk of steel communities. At the end of the
investigation, tabulation of the results proved that this hap-
hazard inquiry had achieved a representative survey inas-
much as the average of income for the families visited ap-
proximated the average income for the semi-skilled and un-
skilled workers for the whole industry. The semi-skilled and
unskilled actual average for the eight months of 1919 before
the strike was not over $128 monthly. The average income
of the forty-one immigrant strikers' families visited was
$132 a month. The excerpts from the investigators' family
reports, given herewith, are representative of the forty-one
immigrant households.
1 Family Budgets and Living Conditions," by Marian D. Savage.
These families ran from four to eight members. The
tabulation of the forty-one immigrant families brought out
the first characteristic of steel communities, — overcrowding;
Living in 1 room ........ . . . . . 2 families
Living in 2 rooms 22 families
Living in 3 rooms , 14 families
Living in 4 rooms 2 families
Living in 5 rooms. ...,.., 1 family (with two
boarders)
Over half of these four to eight-member families lived in
" apartments " of two rooms; over one-third in three rooms.
The resultant physical and moral conditions are not suffi-
ciently portrayed by the bare figures. An excerpt from the
report reads :
The first thing which strikes the attention of one who visits
the homes of the strikers is the shocking overcrowding. The
majority of families which I have seen live in only two rooms,
and only four of them have more than three rooms. As the
families are composed of from four to eight people, this means
that the air space necessary for hygienic living is wholly lacking,
and the right kind of home life is made impossible. It means
that frequently a bed must stand in the kitchen all the time,
taking up space greatly needed for other things. In a few
cases the crowding is due to the presence of lodgers, but usually
it is not. In one case I was told that the family had tried to
find an apartment with three rooms instead of two, but had been
unable to, as many landlords objected to having such a large
family of children in their houses. Such a policy, of course,
means that the largest families may be forced into the smallest
accommodations. In general, however, the burden of paying
rent for an additional room seemed too great for the family
to undertake. In many cases the apartments have no water in
them and several families are forced to use a single pump in the
court yard. In still a larger number of eases there are no toilet
arrangements except dilapidated water closet sheds in the yard.
WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 107
In a few places there are open unsanitary drains in the court
yard, around which the wooden houses are built. Many of the
strikers live in alleys which are very dirty and cluttered with
rubbish collected by the authorities at infrequent intervals. In
one place in Homestead I found what appeared to be drainage
water flowing down the middle of the alley. In a good many
cases families live in rear houses which can only be reached by
narrow dark passageways or ramshackle wooden staircases lead-
ing in from the street.
Although the wages in many departments of the industry have
more than doubled in the last five or six years, the women are
quite convinced that the cost of living has risen very much
higher in proportion, so that they are worse off than they used
to be. According to the Associated Charities of Pittsburgh, a
food order which in 1914 cost $5.88 in New York City (where
prices are not very different from those here), in 1919 cost
$11.10 in Pittsburgh. This food order, though intended as a
minimum standard for a family of five for one week, is not con-
sidered adequate by the Pittsburgh A. C, which substitutes a
food budget of $17.04 that makes it possible to have meat twice
a week instead of once. Compared with this minimum standard,
the amount spent for food by the women visited seems to be
enough to sustain life, but in most cases, especially in the larger
families, to do little more than that. Considering how hard and
long-continued the work of a man in the steel industry is, a
food budget which does not allow him meat more than twice a
week is hardly sufficient, so even in the cases where somewhat
more than $17.04 is spent for food for a family of five every
week the amount seems far from exorbitant.
Out of forty-eight families from which data could be
obtained for estimating each family's budget of expenditures,
twenty-eight of the budgets fell below the minimum of sub-
sistence level for 1919 and ten below the minimum of com-
fort level.
Following are the tables of hours, wages and budgets for
the immigrant strikers and for native-born strikers :
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Following are typical excerpts from the investigator's note-
books, giving a little better idea, than do the tables, as to
what such budgets means to strikers:
Place — Braddock
ISTationality — Slavish
G is a laborer in a blast furnace. Earned $34.00 a week.
Worked 11 hours on day shift, 13 hours on night shift. Has
6 children. Before prices were so high he could save, but can-
not now. Groceries cost from $48.00 to $60.00 a month, and
meat Just about as much. The rent for the two rooms in which
the family lives is $10.00 a month, and the landlord is soon to
raise it to $11.00. A " tax " of $5.09 also has to be paid. The
wife, when asked in the presence of her husband if she wanted
him out till the strike was won, replied that she did.
Place — Braddock
Nationality — Slavish
earned $4.62 a day and worked 13 days in two weeks.
Has two children. The mother-in-law lives with them and pays
half the rent, which is $10.00 a month for the two rooms. Food
costs from $76.00 to $88.00 a month. They were unable to
save anything. The man, who seemed more intelligent than
most, declared vehemently that the union was the principal thing
he cared about — more even than wages and hours. His wife said
little, but agreed that she wanted him to stay out on strike.
Place — Braddock
Nationality — Slavish
E. is a laborer in rail mill. Earned 43 cents an hour ($80
in two weeks when working 14 turns) . Worked 12 hours, some-
times on day shift, sometimes on night. Worked 7 days a week
about twice in- two months. Has four children. Eent for their
two rooms costs $10 a month. Food costs about $80 a month;
$5 a month was paid to the lodge to insure man and his wife.
He had bought a $100 Liberty Bond, but has only paid $50 on
it; $10 a month was deducted from his pay for it. He cared
more for shorter hours than anything else, though he needed
higher wages, too.
Place — Braddock
Nationality — Slavish
S. worked in engine house of Carnegie Steel Co. Earned
48 cents an hour; $77 for 15 turns was the most he ever earned.
Worked 10 hours a day, 7 days a week. Has one child. Eent
for one room in which family lives is $6 a month. Food costs
from $60 to $65 a month; $1.85 a month is paid to the lodge.
Shoes cost on an average $5 a month. The wife wants the man
to stay out on strike till it is won. She cares most about reduc-
tion of hours, provided the weekly pay is not reduced.
Place — Homestead, Pa.
Nationality — Russian
K. worked as an open hearth laborer in one of the Carnegie
Steel Mills, 11 hours during the day, 13 hours at night. Every
second Sunday he worked also. His wife said that when he
came home at night he was so tired that he just lay down and
slept. As one of the neighbors explained, when a man works
as long as that "he can't see his babies, he can't see the day-
light — all he can do is just to come home and lie and sleep."
Shorter hours seemed more important to him than anything
else, provided the weekly wages were not reduced. He could
get along after a fashion with his present wages, but could not
stand the long day. His wage was 45 cents an hour, and $60
or $70 in two weeks, according to whether there were 12 or 14
turns. This amount did not permit any permanent saving, how-
ever. He had one Victory Bond of $100 which he was forced
to sell after the strike began in order to live. A Liberty Bond
which he had bought last year he had been obliged to sell again
last fall in order to live. He had nothing in the bank and he
had not been able to afford membership in any lodge. Rent
for the three rooms in which he and his wife and three children
lived was $15 a month. The rooms were well lighted and the
kitchen had running water. He was obliged to pay for paper-
ing and painting them, however.
Place — Homestead, Pa.
Nationality — Austrian.
C. worked as a laborer in one of the Carnegie MiUs, 10 honrs
on the day shift, 12 hours at night, 6 turns a week, and earned
from $53 to $58 in two weeks. He has two children. The fam-
ily lives in three rooms, which are light, pleasant and well cared
for. Rent is $15 a month. The wife said she wanted to more
somewhere where rent was cheaper, but could find no other
rooms. I was unable to discover how much food and clothes
cost, as she kept no record of them. From $3.25 to $4 a month
was paid to the lodge, according to the number of members who
were ill. If a member is obliged to omit three monthly pay-
ments he is dropped from the lodge. The man was ill with in-
fluenza for 12 weeks last year and was obliged to sell the $200
Liberty Bond which he had in order to pay expenses. The bond
was sold to the storekeeper, who only gave $180 for it, much
to the indignation of Mrs. C. Since the strike began C. has had
to sell the only other bond which he had — a $50 one, on which
he had only paid $30. The family have no other savings, and the
money from the bond is almost gone.
Last spring the family bought a load of coal for $13, but
that is all gone and they have nothing but wood to burn. They
cannot afford any more coal.
I asked Mrs. C. if she wanted her husband to go on strike,
and if she now wanted him to stay out. She said she did not
know anything about the strike before the men went out and
knows little about it now. She does not want her husband to
return to work while the strike is going on for fear he might
be hurt. She does want better conditions, however. Shorter
hours seem to her more important than anjrthing else, provided
there is no reduction in pay, as her husband is very tired when
he comes home — too tired to do anything but eat and sleep. She
also feels that more money is needed.
I asked if she liked living in Homestead. She replied that
she had lived there ever since she came to America thirteen years
ago and could not compare it with other places. She was too
young when she left Austria to know much about conditions
there.
Place — Pittsburgh
Nationality — Polish
S. is 45 years old. Six children in the family, the oldest 15
years old. The father was the only supporter. He was a laborer
in the J. & L. mill, but did not have steady work. Worked 12
hours a day about four days a week frequently. Earned on the
average about $25 a week. Was able to save nothing. Paid
$1 a month to the lodge. He owns the house — a ramshackle
wooden building — lives in three rooms. According to the wife,
all that is earned goes into food. Though wages were quite in-
adequate, the long hours seemed most serious to the woman.
When asked if she wanted him to stay out till the strike is won
replied, " Yes — what a question ! "
Place — Pittsburgh
Nationality — Polish
P. is 56 years old. Has three children, one of them is a boy
who is now earning $10 a week. Has worked as a laborer, putting
screws on bolts at the Oliver Iron & Steel Co, for 10% hours a
day, 5% days a week. He earned 30 cents an hour. Before
the strike, he was sick for ten weeks and hence had no savings.
He paid $1,05 a month to the lodge, however. Pent for the two
rooms in which the family lives is $8.50 a month. The man
wants a permanent union most of all, but better wages and hours
are both very important.
Place — Pittsburgh
Nationality — Lithuanian
J. has six children, one of whom, a girl, is earning $7.50 a
week. The man worked as a laborer at the J. & L. mill, 12 hours
a day, 7 days a week. (Since the strike was declared the week
has been shortened to 6 days for that job.) He earned $5.80 a
day. Pent for three rooms in rear building costs $9 a month;
85 cents a month is spent for schooling. He pays 50 cents a
114 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
month to the lodge, and $1 more when a member dies. He was
unable to save anything else, because he was forced to buy at the
company store, where prices were higher than elsewhere. Some-
times nothing remained of his wages when things purchased
there — clothes, groceries, etc. — were deducted. Those who re-
fused to trade with the company had things made unpleasant for
them.
Place — Homestead, Pa.
Nationality — Irish
S, has two children. He was a pipe worker in the Carnegie
Steel Mill, with 10 hours on the day shift, 13 hours on the night
shift, 7 days a week. Every second week he was obliged to work
from 7 A. M. on Saturday to 7 A. M. on Sunday, with only
one hour off for rest and food. Then he had to begin work again
at 3 P. M., and continue until 7 the next morning — thus work-
ing 39 hours out of 48. (Both he and Mr. C, another striker,
complained that no time was given for eating meals when a man
was on a 12-hour shift. He was expected to snatch a bite of
food as he worked. Mr. C. said he was obliged to work 15 hours
every Sunday, and often did not get time to eat a mouthful dur-
ing that period. This, he considered, one of the most serious
grievances.) There is no chance for advancement in tbe plant.
The boss brings in his friends, relatives, or people who have pull
with him, and gives them the better positions instead of advanc-
ing others.
Mr. S. earned 47 cents an hour, and from $74 to $75 in two
weeks. He was discharged from the Canadian Army about a
year before the strike, and during that period he had been able
to save nothing. He bought one $150 Liberty Bond, but had
only paid $100 on it, and was obliged to dispose of it for $90
when the strike began. The company had forced him to buy
it and deducted $15 a month from his pay for it. During tbe
strike he had a few odd Jobs, but for the most part they had
been living on credit.
They pay $15 rent for 4 rooms. This rent is lower because of
the fact that the house is close beside the railroad and is noisy
WAGES m NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTEY 115
and dirty. The landlord threatened to raise it soon. Groceries
for the family cost from $25 to $30 in two weeks. This pur-
chases a very small and inadequate supply. They do not know
how much meat costs. Horlich's milk for the small baby costs
about 25 cents a day. The mother thinks it necessary to pay
this, as she lost another baby because of improper feeding. She
says that she can spend very little on clothes. She has had only
one suit in six years. Friends have given her clothes for the
children to help out. She says she wishes the strike had never
happened, and is rather discouraged about it. Nevertheless, she
thinks the men ought to have better conditions and wants the
men to win out. She is indignant that so many of the higher
paid men are still at work, and thinks they ought to come out
to help the others.
Place — Homestead, Pa.
Nationality — Slav from Austria-Hungary
D. did repair work on machines and furnaces, working 13
and 13 hours a day, and sometimes 36 hours at a stretch. Once
he objected to doing overtime work when he was very tired and
•was laid off for a week as a penalty. His work was dangerous,
yet he earned only 45 cents an hour. He has three children.
Eent for three rooms, a parlor, kitchen and bedroom, is $16.
There is water in the kitchen, but the room is so dark that the
gas must be kept burning all the time. The woman cooks with
it, and also heats other rooms with it in winter. Groceries cost
$40 a month, meat from $25 to $30, milk $4.50. Shoes for the
children last only one or two months and cost from $5 to $6 a
pair. The man and his wife both belong to two lodges, and
pay from $14 to $15 a month to them. The children are also
insured, and 20 cents a month is paid for them. The lodge pays
$5 a week in case of sickness, $1,000 in case of death of the
man, $250 in case of death of a child.
They had bought bonds worth $450, $350 of this they had
spent before the strike for necessary food and the expenses of
the baby's christening. The remaining $100 they had spent dur-
ing the strike. They have no savings.
I asked the woman if she thought she was better off in Amer-
116 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
ica than if she had stayed in Austria-Hungary and she said she
didn't know. She had lived in Homestead for fifteen years and
could not afford to move anywhere else in order to get better
conditions. She knew nothing about other parts of America.
Her husband said he has his first citizenship papers, but had
not yet gotten his second. He told me indignantly that some
strikers had applied for their second papers in Pittsburgh, but
had been refused because they were on strike.
The wife told me she wanted her husband to stay on strike
till he got shorter hours and better conditions. She did not
"want a bad name on her children.'*
Place — Homestead, Pa.
Nationality — Slavish
V. was a millwright in the open hearth department, working
12 hours a day, and sometimes 7 days a week. He earned 45
cents an hour, or from $100 to $105 in two weeks. There are
seven children in the family.
They pay $10 a month rent for two rooms in a rear house.
There is running water in the kitchen, but the only toilet is
in the yard, which also has open drains. They have tried to get
a better apartment with three rooms, but cannot find one, for
landlords object to such a large family of children and will not
rent to them. Groceries cost them about $60 a month, meat
about $29 or $30, milk $5. One of the daughters works in the
grocery store, earning $10 a week, and the family are obliged
to trade there, so she will not lose her position. Coal costs
them $20 a year — perhaps more. Monthly dues to the "so-
ciety" which pays sick benefits and death benefits are $5 for
the man and his wife, $1.20 for the children. The children
go to Slavish school, and something must be paid for their
tuition also.
They have been unable to save anything with the exception of
$800 in Liberty Bonds, which they had at the beginning of
the strike. These have all been sold since then, with a loss of
$4 or $5 on each one. The company deducted $50 a month
from the man's pay while he was buying his bonds. The wife
WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 117
has been sick a good deal for the last ten years and her illness
has cost money.
She says she wants her husband to stay out on strike. Shorter
hours seem to be most important, but better general conditions
are also necessary.
Place — Homestead, Pa.
Nationality — Slavish
E. was a laborer, working 12 hours a day with a 24-hour shift
every other Sunday (one hour being allowed off for break-
fast). He earned 42 cents an hour, or $60 in two weeks. He
has four children.
Rent for the one room in which they live is $4.50 a month.
Food cost $60 a month even when they had little but bread
and potatoes. They sometimes had meat, but never any cakes
or pies. Three years ago, when wages were only $1.60 a day,
they could buy more than they can now because of the high
prices. The shopkeepers find out beforehand when a rise in
wages is to come and put up the prices at once, the man says.
They cannot buy any clothes without going hungry, and cannot
afford insurance or lodge membership. He says he has never
been able to save anything. He was forced to buy a $50 or $100
bond of each loan, but had to sell them again at once. He told
of one case where a man who said he could only afford a $50
bond instead of the $100 one, which the boss ordered him to
take, was tarred and feathered by men whom he was sure the
company had stirred up to do it. This story was also told me
by two American strikers — Mr. S. and Mr. C.
The family had been living on his last pay ever since the
strike began. Higher wages seem as important to them as
shorter hours. The wife said she wanted him to stay out on
strike.
One great grievance was that there was no chance to get
ahead or change to better work. He had tried hard to get a
chance to do more skilled work, which he was sure he could
do just as well as anyone, but though he had worked there for
thirteen years, he was never given a chance. The foreman kept
118 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
people back because they were hunkies and brought in his rela-
tives and those who treated him to booze to take the better posi-
tions. If anyone complained he was fired.
The man lost his thumb at the mill and was out for three
months a while ago. The company paid him $75.
He has his first citizenship papers and sends his children to
the public school.
Place — Monessen, Pa.
Nationality — Russian
T. worked as a pipe fitter in the machine shop of the Pitts-
burgh Steel Co., 10% hours a day, 7 days a week. Sometimes
as often as twice a week he was obliged to work 29% hours at
a stretch. For this period he was given overtime pay for only
5% hours. He earned 46c. an hour or about $100 in two
weeks. He has two children.
Rent for three good rooms is $18. Food, which is quite
ample, costs $100 a month. Insurance costs $62 a year. He
had saved about $100 before the strike. He evidently considered
himself much more prosperous than many of the strikers. His
principal objection was too long hours.
During the organizing campaign a company official had asked
him to go around and find out what " Bolsheviks " there were
among the men, and what men had joined the union, so they
could be discharged. He refused but someone he knew undertook
the job.
GRIEVANCES AND CONTROL IN A NO-CON-
FERENCE INDUSTRY
Analysis of the data gathered in this Inquiry on the
grievances of workers and the companies' methods of control
of employees in the iron and steel industry warrants the
following conclusions :
The Steel Corporation's " arbitrary " control of hours and
wages extends to everything in individual steel jobs, re-
sulting in daily grievances.
The Corporation, committed to a non-union policy, is as
helpless as the workers to prevent these grievances.
The grievances, since there exists no working machinery of
redress, weigh heavily in the industry because they in-
cessantly remind the worker that he has no " say " what-
ever in steel.
The strike was the workers' revolt against the entire system
of arbitrary control and for trade unionism.
The Steel Corporation, here as in hours and wages, is the
determining factor for the whole industry. " Independent "
companies, however, have shown far more tendency to break
away from the Corporation's methods in the case of control
than in the case of wages and hours.
This section deals with the industrial effects of a policy of
" no conference," and arbitrary control ; its effects on the
worker in relation to his job, especially inside the mill ; its
inevitable consequences of rebellion and the means taken to
soften rebellion.
Section VII will deal with the social results of such a labor
119
120 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
policy; the means taken to combat rebellion when softening
fails ; the effects on the worker in relation to the community ;
the effects on the community and state ; and will try to deter-
mine to what extent social institutions in towns, counties or
states, i.e. the executive government, the judiciary, the
church, the press, etc., were bent to the business of maintain-
ing one corporation's policy of " not dealing with labor
unions."
The evidence for both sections is drawn principally from
public records, private labor files of companies, interviews
with Corporation oflBcials, also with officers of " labor detec-
tive " concerns and from affidavits or statements from over
five hundred strikers and non-strikers.
This section deals mainly with conditions before the strike,
with the normal conduct of the industry, with the problem
raised by a friendly critic of Mr. Gary who said :
" The trouble is that the Corporation's labor policy is etill in
the stage of detectives and toilets."
That is : a stage of arbitrary control naturally causing unrest
which is met with espionage on the one hand and sanitation
and welfare on the other.
It is important to grasp clearly the distinction between
the two aspects of control in this or any other industry. The
distinction is that between " personnel management " and
" industrial relations " ; the one confined within the plant,
conditioned primarily by each job's requirements; the other,
labor policy or the system of relations between the labor
force and the owners. The first aspect concerns the job, —
who gets it, how he shall do it, how it shall be safeguarded if
hazardous, who shall meet the emergency requirements always
fringing the job, the running of the job for production. The
second aspect concerns the relations of the workers as a whole
to the sum of jobs: it concerns the profits of work (wages),
GEIEVANCES AND CONTEOL 131
the length of work (hours) and the vesting of authority over
the separate jobs (control proper, — whether autocratic con-
trol, trade union control, shop committee control, etc.). The
first aspect is the primary concern of employment managers,
or scientific managers or production engineers; the second
aspect is concerned primarily with who shall control the em-
ployment manager or production engineer and for what pur-
poses. Each function tends to encroach on the other and is
generally nullified when it does. In the steel industry the
typical employment manager is helpless when he tries to deal
with industrial relations; he can get the workers a day off
or a change of job, but he cannot influence hours, wages or
the foreman's authority. Likewise the Finance Committee
of the Steel Corporation can decree hours and wages but is
helpless to direct workers on the jobs. But always the second
aspect stretches hack with decisive ejfect over the first. In
the steel industry this is peculiarly so.
Section VII therefore deals with the more important
phase: with the non-union policy of the Corporation, the
resultant attitude of the workers, the means, — such as espion-
age, discharge for unionism, blacklists, police, " labor detec-
tives" etc. — used to combat the workers, the use made of civil
authorities, courts, press and pulpit, particularly during the
strike. It analyzes the actually existing alternative to " the
hind of conference the labor unions wanted.'^ But before the
present section's analysis, — which must begin at the opposite
pole, the organization of the jobs for production, — can be
grasped, some of the facts concerning the other greater aspect
of control must be set down.
The character of the control in the Steel Corporation is
plain : it is arbitrary control. The workers called it " auto-
cratic." Mr. Gary's word,^ spoken to the Senate investigat-
ing Committee, was " arbitrarily," used by him in reference
* Senate Teatimony, Vol. I, p. 226.
132 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
to fixing wages, but applying equally to the whole system.
With this Mr. Gary coupled his recognition that there was
possible at least one other system of control — by conference
— in the statements that " his workmen knew that they were
always free to come to him or any plant officer or to send
committees." Coupled with this, investigation proved, were
the facts that no workers, individuals or committees, do con-
fer with Mr. Gary, and that actual conferences with plant
officers, higher than foremen, fell into either of two cate-
gories: (a) individual or committee conferences which did
not deal with hours or wages or authority of control, but with
comparatively minor matters; or (b) conferences by tempo-
rary committees concerning hours or wages, of such a rare
character as to prove themselves the exception, the exhibition
of temerity, almost like strikes. The few instances of such,
discovered in this Inquiry, are detailed in a sub-report.
The practice of Corporation plants was by no means uni-
form, but all practice conformed to the Corporation's policy,
as perfectly understood and as set forth by Mr. Gary, for
example, publicly to his own officials as follows : ^
"... treating the whole thing as a business proposition,
drawing the line so that you are just and generous and yet
at the same time keeping your position and permitting others
to keep theirs, retaining the control and management of your
affairs, Jceeping the whole thing in your own hands, but never-
theless with due consideration to the rights and interests of all
others who may be affected by your management."
In practice, it was found, Corporation steel workers wher-
ever questioned, recognized that the control of " the whole
thing " was absolutely in the Corporation's " own hands."
Surprise, that the inquirer should be so naive, or contemptu-
* Proceedings of meeting of presidents of subsidiary companies of
Steel Corporation. Empire Building, New York, Jan. 21, 1919. (Senate
Testimony, Vol. I, p. 242.)
GEIEVANCES AND CONTROL 123
ous jeers greeted any serious question concerning the " right
to see Mr. Gary or the Superintendent."
A number of " independents " have parted company, to
slight or great degree, with the Corporation in the matter
of installing some conferring. This is considered later, but
there is no question that the iron and steel industry, as a
whole, will change its manner of control only as the Cor-
poration does.
The Corporation, of course, has been assailed for many
years for its " autocratic methods of handling workmen,"
and in one instance, after due self-investigation, has gone on
record approving the policy; Mr. Gary put this record into
the Senate investigation.^ This was the " Report of Com-
mittee of Stockholders," dated April 15, 1912, which under
the heading, " Repression of the Men," said that if the term
" repression of workmen " involved " the question as to what
measures the Corporation should adopt for the suppression of
organizations that in the past have, at times, proved irrespon-
sible and incapable of self-control," then, the Committee finds
that " while we do not believe the final solution . . . has
been reached," still, " we do believe . . . that the Steel
Corporation, in view of the practices often pursued by labor
organizations in steel mills in past years, is justified in the
position it has taken."
Repression justified and the whole control in their own
hands is a policy so long practised by Corporation officers
that they rarely really question it except when disrupting
strike times compel them to discuss it. So customary is it
that Mr. Gary cited with satisfaction one example of its
workings, quoted elsewhere from the Senate testimony, and
reset down here in part : ^
For instance, to mention a somewhat trivial circumstance, some
three or four years ago — not to be exactly specific as to date —
' Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 232-233.
" Senate Testimony, Vol. I, pp. 161-2.
124 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE
one of our presidents telephoned to the president of our Cor-
poration, who is in general charge of operations, that a certain
number of men — it may have been a thousand or it may have
been two thousand men — in a certain mill had all gone out, and
his report was that there was no reason for their going out . . .
And he said, "It is very easy for me to fill this mill, and I
will proceed to do it." The president of the corporation came
to me immediately and reported this. I said, " Tell him to wait
and to come to New York." He came the next morning and he
made substantially that same statement to me. I said, " Have
you taken pains to find out ; has anybody spoken to you ? " " No,"
he said, " I have not received any complaint whatever." I said,
" Are you sure no complaint has been made to anyone ? " He
said, " I will find out." I said, " You had better do so before
you decide what you are going to do or what you propose to do."
He went back; got hold of the foreman. A committee of men
had come to the foreman and said that they thought three
things, if I remember, were wrong — not very important, but they
claimed they were wrong. And the president came back the
second time and reported that ; and I said, " Well, now, if they
state the facts there, isn't the company wrong?" "Well,"
he said, " I don't consider it very important." I said, " That is
not the question. Are you wrong in any respect? It seems to
me you are wrong with respect to two of those things, and the
other, not. Now, you go right back to your factory and just
put up a sign that with reference to those two particular things,
the practice will be changed."
The incident represents completely the Corporation's
working system of control; — the un-asked-for grievances of
thousands, the perilous strike, the arbitrary intervention, and
the episode ended with " just put up a sign." This section's
analysis centers on the post where signs are put up and the
foreman who had ignored a committee. But the causes for
such a system of industrial control must be sought behind
the post and the foreman.
GEIEVANCES AND CONTROL 125
Those reasons involve a phase of which Mr. Gary seemed
unconscious and which indicates that personal vsdll or per-
sonal powers of arbitrary intervention may after all be less
controlling than other forces. These forces molded modem
industrial development and in two senses they left the Cor-
poration comparatively helpless. In the first place the trend
of development forced, or at least made easier, the Corpora-
tion's first choice of fundamental non-union policy. The
mere concentration of private financial power tended to oust
collective bargaining. Professor Carleton Parker put the
matter as follows : ^
In the words of Mr. A. D. Noyes ..." We are in
the presence of a novel and striking condition of things in
American finance, whereby active or potential control of a very
great part both of our financial institutions and our industrial
institutions is concentrated in the hands of a comparatively small
group of financiers."
How does this affect the labor problem in America?
First, it brings the most complete temperamental and geograph-
ical divorce of management and worker in industrial history.
Second, it leaves the final control of industrial enterprises in
non-industrial, and in the end, abstract financial, hands.
Third, it means that the only information from the industrial
plants which these boards of directors care for or understand
is that of statistics of output and costs.
Fourth, it turns over the formation of wage — and labor —
policies to men supersensitive to the stock market, a market no-
toriously panicky over labor disturbances.
In a word, it turns industrial affairs, one of whose major char-
acteristics is the human quality brought by the worker, over to
a group of financial minds whose education, environment, and
ambitions make it impossible for them to obtain an accurate per-
spective of the human side of industrial production. The con-
dition is potential for clanger.
* " The Technique of American Industry." Atlantic Monthly, Jan.
1920. (Written in 1914.)
126 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
In a second sense the helplessness of the steel masters is
daily emphasized by their inability to keep from creating
grievances. It was not an original object of the Corporation
when organized in 1901 to go into either the detective busi-
ness or the welfare business. It was going to make money
out of plants which were to make steel as much as possible
and as cheap as possible and it deemed the best way of keep-
ing down labor costs was to control arbitrarily hours and
wages. Since unions try to cut hours and increase wages the
Corporation adopted the anti-union policy which was not so
widespread in the steel industry in 1901 as the Corporation
has made it now. After twenty years of this kind of control
the Corporation finds that in making steel, it must spend
five to seven millions a year for sanitation, stock participa-
tion, pensions and welfare, and sums for watching its workers
which are not revealed to investigators.
It is not merely that the Corporation Executive Committee
on June 17, 1901, passed the resolution:^
" That we are unalterably opposed to any extension of union
labor, and advise subsidiary companies to take a firm position
when these questions come up and say they are not going to
recognize it, that is any extension of unions in mills where they
do not now exist that great care should be used to prevent trouble
and that they promptly report and confer with this Corporation."
But on the basis of this fundamental labor policy, laid
down at the start and pursued so that all unions were elimi-
nated from the Corporation's mills, the Corporation devel-
oped its whole productive organization, trained its great
staffs of executives, superintendents and foremen, organized
the jobs and picked the labor force until now it makes steel
through a machinery which makes trouble too. A policy or
system of industrial relations, on the employing side, becomes
'Minutes Executive Committee, see Senate Document 110, Vol. Ill,
p. 118 and pp. 497-499.
GEIEVANCES AND CONTROL 137
visibly a body of executives and their methods of action.
The Corporation's executives are trained anti-union men who
convert the Corporation's labor policy into action by organ-
izing labor forces which shall be primarily " tractable." *
They translate the 1901 resolution into orders such as the
following, for handling labor : ^ " Catch 'em young, treat 'em
rough, tell 'em nothing." The Corporation's executives, in
order to meet the Corporation policy, are forced to grind the
faces of the " hunkies " and to trust to " welfare " to salve
the exacerbations.
The system, of course, is not new. It was typically Ameri-
can in the heyday of the Captains of Industry; but no big
corporation has developed it so drastically or clung to it to
so late a date as has the Steel Corporation.
The system, in which both sides, employers and employees
are enmeshed, is subject to two viewpoints appallingly dif-
ferent: and the vie'O'point of the employees is what caused
the strike. The viewpoint of the directors of the Steel Cor-
poration is based on examining the reports of millions spent
for " welfare," the picture books of company houses, clubs,
hospitals and towns, photographs of groups of smiling old
pensioners, and finally the Corporation's annual payroll, as
big as a small nation's national debt: viewing the total the
directors naturally feel, " the Corporation does a tremendous
lot for its workmen." The viewpoint of the workman is
based not on totals but first on the percentage of all these
things touching him personally. The bulk of employees —
the unskilled and semi-skilled — ^have had simply no experi-
ence of the company houses, " welfare " and pensions, and
their percentage of stock profits do not impress them. But
* Letter of manager of Edgar Thomson works, quoted in " Inside His-
tory of Carnegie Steel Co.," by J. H. Bridge, p. 81. "My experience
(in 1875) has been that Germans and Irish, Swedes and what I denomi-
nate 'buckwheats' (young American country boys), judiciously mixed,
make the most effective and tractable force you can find."
* Quoted by R. S. Baker, N. Y. Evening Post, Dec. 31, 1910.
128 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
in the second place, they, as well as the skilled, experience
the Corporation's hours and wages, about which they have as
little " say " as about the weather, and were hitherto hope-
less about getting a " say " ; and they experience daily griev-
ances about which they cannot help trying to " have a say."
ISTow if the system is such that the grievances are excessive,
and if the grievances seem to them to be met mostly by
detectives and " welfare " in place of machinery for redress,
and if the grievances perpetually remind them of the great
grievance of no control over hours and wages, it is obvious
that the workers may come to look blackly on what the di-
rectors regard blandly.
The data will be analyzed first as to the causal relation be-
tween the customary organization of the steel industry and
grievances.
A Pittsburgh professor of economics, an admiring student
of the steel industry, described its organization to the Com-
mission as " highly militarized." Several steel masters
agreed that his description was fitting.
" The general staff of the Carnegie Company," he said,
" is one of the most efficient in the whole world of business.
The superintendents, department managers and foremen are
splendidly loyal efficient officers with high morale.
" Bound to them are the non-commissioned officers, such
gang leaders as rollers, blowers, melters and the other top-
skilled Americans, who are part bosses, part workmen. Alto-
gether this administrative group, almost a third of the force,
has a real military efficiency, bound to the company by
stock participation, bonuses, loans, house-rentals and pen-
sions."
The " army " under this group is, of course, almost alto-
gether made up of low-skilled " foreigners." They are the
smallest participants in the Corporation's stock offers, ton-
nage bonuses, company houses and pensions. Before con-
GRIEVANCES AND CONTEOL 129
sidering how this system impinges on them, let us view it in
relation to the skilled Americans.
The first characteristic of the militaristic system is pro-
motion : promotion by seniority. From the upper half of the
semi-skilled class on up every steel worker has his eye on the
next higher job. He is in line for it, but he has no guarantee
that he will get it. Seniority is a custom only. The man
who incurs the displeasure of the Company is not promoted.
Let him be suspected of " agitating in the mill " or of being a
" trouble maker " and he has no way of enforcing his com-
plaint when others are promoted over him. Merely making
the complaint may be deemed proof of being " undesirable "
and cause for demotion. In the absence of any enforceable
rule favoritism results and where it may not exist, it is
suspected by the workers. The following from the diary of
a steel worker at Gary in the summer of 1919 is paralleled by
many other statements to the Commission's investigators :
" Old hand here tells me : ' Superintendent of this department?
He's the cousin of the general superintendent. His assistant?
Married to his sister. Boss's assistant on this floor is his son-
in-law.' And so on down a long list of the better jobs. It is the
universal impression of the lower ranks that favoritism rules."
There is then an inherent grievance touching the skilled
worker's most precious possession under this system — his
right to promotion.
The second characteristic is " speeding up." An object of
this militarized organization is the attainment of the high-
est production. Tonnage bonuses are the commonest method
of accomplishing it. Supplementary is the incited rivalry
between teams or crews, between furnaces, between depart-
ments, between plants. The " record " made by a rival outfit
is the unceasingly applied spur. Against " speeding up " the
skilled worker feels he has no defense. AU the while he
130 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
feels that his success in attaining unexampled tonnage — and
unexampled bonus — may be the excuse for a cut in bonus
rates. He feels that rates are " shaved," as it is called, just
to " speed " him harder by egging him on to the attempt
to regain his former earnings' total. " Speeding " is most
marked as a grievance in the Pittsburgh District.
Third, because of their obvious relation to control, the
Corporation's stock sales, loans, bonuses and pensions are
viewed as a grievance by many highly skilled. They grad-
ually see what these mean. If they complain on any score
whatever they may be told directly : " You own stock in the
Corporation? Well, then you don't want to damage that
stock's price by making trouble for the Company. This com-
plaint of yours makes trouble." Many workers, taking Com-
pany jobs, living in Company houses, buying at Company
stores, obtaining Company loans, holding Company stock,
working toward a Company pension, feel " all sewed up."
Every " lay-off " they ask, to recuperate from speeding or
long hours, depends on the favor of a Company boss and
reminds them of all their company entanglements.
Freedom from arbitrary control, then, which was generally
given by the skilled Americans who did strike as their object
in going out, seems by the organization of the steel job to
be denied them. In Youngstown, Johnstovra, Wheeling,
Cleveland, as well as in many Calumet District mills where
great numbers of Americans struck, the basis of their peculiar
grievance, aside from long hours, was the system of absolute
control. These men earned from $8 to $30 a day. Their
willingness to imperil this and all their prospects indicated
how strongly some of them rebelled against having no
" say."
Add to this the eternal and increasing grievance of exces-
sive hours and the state of mind of even the skilled Ameri-
can tended to become more violent than clear. Here is a
GRIEVANCES AND CONTEOL 131
page from the diary of the Gary worker, made in August,
1919, recording the talk of a group of skilled workers :
" A heater who works eleven hours by day and thirteen by
night, making $400 a month, says, * Why shouldn't we get the
eight-hour day without striking for it? I'd be glad to give
up three or four dollars a day to get eight hours.'
" An engineer many years on the job says, ' Count me in
for a six-day week too, like a civilized man. This fourteen hours
a night, seven days a week, is hell.'
" The gang boss says, * Who the devil is this man Gary to tell
our representatives to go to hell. Somebody's going to get him
for that.'
" Another says, ' Gary thinks we've worked his old twelve and
fourteen hours so long we'll stand for anything.' "
This was before the strike. The following, one of many
statements made by skilled men during the strike, was ob-
tained in Youngstown, October 25, from a gray-haired
stationary engineer :
"The other day the boss called on me and told me I was
too valuable a man not to be working for the company, that aU
the places were filled except mine, and that he wanted me to
come back. I told him I would think it over. The next day
he came back again and asked me how much was owing on my
house. I told him it was none of his God damn business. I told
him there was not a cent owing on my house, but if there was
my wife and family would follow me into the street before I
would touch any of his dirty money. There is money owing on
my house, but I would not give him the satisfaction of knowing
it. I would rather lose it than go back to work before this
strike is won. I had relatives in the Revolutionary War, I fought
for freedom in the Philippines myself, and I had three boys in
the army fighting for democracy in France. One of them is lying
in the Argonne Forest now. If my boy could give his life
fighting for free democracy in Europe, I guess I can stand it to
132 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
fight this battle through to the end. I am going to help my
fellow workmen show Judge Gary that he can't act as if he was
a king or kaiser and tell them how long they have got to
work ! "
All the foregoing analysis, finally, applies to only about
one-third of the employees, and that third the better paid,
shorter-houred, better treated, the skilled, the " Americans."
If the Corporation's " welfare," which applies principally to
this third, leaves so many with such a viewpoint, it becomes
practically negligible, as an emollient in consideration of the
two-thirds, the " hunkies," particularly if the Corporations
system of production and control creates even more grievances
among the immigrants than among the Americans.
How does the basic organization of the steel industry affect
the " hunky job " ? Below the skilled, who form the apex of
the pyramid, comes the indefinable mass of the semi-skilled;
beneath these, the mass of the unskilled, mainly classed as
common labor. The loyalizing forces of the militarized
organization are loose among the semi-skilled and scarcely
exist at all among the unskilled. The bulk of both sections,
of course, is recruited from the fifty nationalities, more or
less, making up the foreigners, mostly Slavs.^ At the top
of the semi-skilled there is no sharp dividing line from the
skilled. Heaters' helpers, melters' helpers, the helpers closest
to rollers, blowers, etc., hold jobs requiring a training which
takes years ; in these jobs the influence of possible promotion,
the pull of seniority, is almost as strong as among the highly
skilled jobs. In the jobs below these, where pay and skill
are less, the influence of possible promotion is also less, and
so on, down through the "whole range of jobs beneath the
• Some idea of the number of races in the steel industry is given by
the following table, submitted to the Senate investigating committee
by the superintendent of the Homestead plant. It is not typical of the
industry in two respects: (a) the small proportion of Slavs, Greeks
and Italians; (b) the large proportion of Americans, due to the un-
GRIEVANCES AND CONTROL
133
hierarchy of the skilled and the upper half of the semi-skilled,
the prospect of promotion becomes more and more remote,
the militarizing influence rapidly lessens, until at the bottom
the whole mass of common labor, the broad base of the pyra-
mid of steel, is fluid. The jobs are not clearly defined, the
capabilities for the jobs are largely brawn, and the holders of
the jobs can be and are switched about. 'Not but that even
the heavy common labor jobs in steel require a certain degree
of training, rather knack, but the " know-how " can be
learned in a few days or weeks at most, and if not learned
the job can still somehow be done, though badly and with
usual number of negroes. Fifty-four races are given, or 52 non-
American. (Senate testimony, Vol. II, p. 480.)
Nationality report. Homestead Steel Works, Howard Axle Works, Carrie
Furnaces, Oct. 8, 1919.
Nationality 1^
American
Armenian
fimiber
6,799
15
42
5
25
1
3
2
1
67
20
299
2
9
6
424
1
7
7
219
267
11
1
6
574
3
443
264
1
Per
cent.
39.45
.10
.29
.30
.17
.01
.02
.01
.01
.46
.14
2.04
.01
.06
.04
2.89
.01
.05
.05
1.49
1.82
.07
.01
.04
3.91
.02
3.02
1.80
.01
Nationality
Kreiner (Slovanian)
Lithuanian
Numbt
6
. 238
4
. 130
. 1,734
1
1
1
4
. 432
1
18
49
. 628
1
4
. 226
. 2,373
26
48
74
11
9
53
91
Per
!r cent.
0.04
1 62
Austrian .
Macedonian
Mexican
Negro :
American
British
East India
West India
Norwegian
Polish
.03
Arabian . .
.89
Albanian
Austro-Servian
Belgian
Bohemian
Brazilian . -
11.80
.01
.01
01
Bulgarian ,
Canadian .
.03
Horvat) . .
2 94
Croatian (
Portuguese
.01
Cuban ....
Dalmatian
Danish . . .
Porto Rican
Roumanian
Russian
Ruthenian
Saxon
Scotch
Slovak
Servian
Spanish
Swede
.12
.33
4 28
English . . .
Filipino . .
.01
.03
Finnish . . .
French . . .
German . .
Greek ....
Hebrew . . .
(Magyar)
1.54
16.15
.18
.33
.50
Hindu ....
Swiss
07
Hollander .
Syrian
06
Hungarian
Indian . . . ,
Turk
Welsh
Total
.36
.62
Italian . . .
Japanese . ,
. 14,687
100.6
134 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
bad effects on the clumsy worker. Every sort of long, hard,
hot, heavy work, from shoveling weighty substances into the
maws of white-hot furnaces or sledging to pieces still-hot
masses of metal or slag, to picking up or putting down or
heaving or carrying pipes, hot bricks, planks, great iron
hooks, sheets of metal, largely with an accompaniment of
grease, noise, sweat or danger — these make up the steel jobs
and the dirt, grease, heat and long hours generally increase
the lower the job is in the pyramid. Finally, the pay-rate
of the common labor at the bottom, the lowest of all, of
course, is the base from which all other wage rates are ranked.
The semi-skilled is the growing group in the whole in-
dustry. The mechanizing of processes in the past two de-
cades has revolutionized the industry, each new machine dis-
placing skilled men at the top and unskilled at the bottom.
More and more the steel job tends to become the job of a
machine, each new machine tending to abolish either the
occupations of a dozen common laborers in favor of one semi-
skilled man or of a few skilled men in favor of one not so
skilled. More and more the making of steel requires a type
different from either the brawny Fafnir who used to wield
the " peel " or the versatile brainy man who could do many
things with many complicated machines. The new type is
the slighter, weaker man with intelligence a little above the
common laborer, who can handle with accuracy a few levers
on some crane, charging machine, or " skip." He must not
have too much brain or he will revolt at the deadly monotony
of moving his few levers on his one machine ten to fourteen
hours a day and from three hundred to three hundred and
forty days in the year.
In these jobs, of the lower half of the semi-skilled and all
of the unskilled, two things are all-important: the disagree-
ableness of the job and the length of time the worker is kept
at it. The lure of immediate promotion is small, one or two
GRIEVANCES AND CONTEOL 135
cents more an hour, no change in the length of the day and
mainly the added satisfaction of slightly greater security,
inasmuch as it is always forty-two-cent common labor that
gets laid off or fired first when work is slack. Hours and
wages, then, are the great grievance of common labor, with
denial of promotion entering in according to the job's height
in the scale of the semi-skilled. In the upper half of the
semi-skilled the lure of promotion takes hold of the worker
out of all proportion almost even in comparison with the
skilled American worker higher up ; for it is this almost-
skilled worker, of five to fifteen years' experience in the busi-
ness, who remembers most keenly the dirt, heat and drudgery
from which he ascended and who feels most poignantly the
failure to win promotion still higher if the discrimination
against him is based solely on the one thing he cannot get
away from, — his race.
For common labor, then, grievances primarily concern too
low wages, too long hours and the arbitrariness of the fore-
man; he feels little their connection with the company's
labor policy; for the semi-skilled, grievances are less con-
cerned with wages, more with hours and most sharply with
discrimination based on race and preventing promotion, and
through this, a great deal with the company's labor policy.
Here is the sum of grievances and the life and progress
of the immigrant steel worker as determined from hun-
dreds of interviews: The Slav, Pole, Serb, Croat, Russian,
Greek, Magyar, Jew, Roumanian or Turk is nine times out
of ten, a peasant, taking an industrial job for the first time.
At the start, only as the wages fail to keep him and his
family as he wants them to be kept, or the hours break down
his health, does he care much about " controlling " cither
wages or hours. What matters most to him is that if the
mill is shut down he is the first to be laid off; if the job
is unusually hot, greasy or heavy, he is the first to be set to
136 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
it. He is the most arbitrarily, often brutally, shifted and
ordered about ; if he takes a lay-off, he is the most likely to
pay for it with his job; if he is late a few minutes he is
the most likely to be heavily docked and he is the most likely
to be kept beyond his hour with no additional pay. If there
is sickness in his home or he is otherwise kept away, his
excuses get the shortest shrift. If he is the butt of unusual
prejudice in either his foreman or some fellow- worker,
evinced in profanity or the penalties of always the nastier
task, he knows least where to go for redress or how to speak it.
As the years go on and he works on up, the right to his
job, the fear of losing it or of being shifted become more im-
portant and he is the one to value most his security in pro-
motion. He finds he is the one whose personal preference
counts least and the bar that stands out strongest in his mind
is not being an " American." " That job is not a hunky's
job ; you can't have it," is the answer that destroys his confi-
dence in himself. He can't change his race ; he can't change
his foreman and he cannot get above the foreman. By this
stage in the progress he has become sufficiently Americanized
to want higher wages and shorter hours, he wants better
living and more recognition as a human being and less as a
hunky, but he finds himself in the grip of a system which
regulates his hours by whistle, his wages by bulletin-board,
his grievances by rebuff. In this stage the union organizer
found tens of thousands in the steel industry to whom the
strike was very considerably a revolt against arbitrary con-
trol, as it was principally for the Americans and hardly at all
for the common laborer. Of the " foreigners," this class is the
one left by the strike in the most rebellious frame of mind
and most likely to answer another strike call.
It is entirely possible that this state of things is almost
unknown to the corporation officials who assured the public
and the Senate investigating committee that the steel workers
GRIEVANCES AND CONTEOL 137
were " satisfied " and " contented," and that " there was no
cause for the strike." It has been pointed out elsewhere that
Mr. Gary has admittedly no functioning open and above-
board system of learning what his workmen think. If the
Corporation even had an efficient system of redressing daily
grievances, leaving totally out of consideration hours and
wages, Mr. Gary would inevitably learn these things. Most
of the companies now have employment systems which are
efficient in turning out statistics concerning the labor force
gleaned from two points of contact; hiring and firing. In
between, the most important time of all, these systems ad-
mittedly have no contact. The employment managers rely
on the foremen, " cooperate " with the welfare workers and
fundamentally are powerless to do anything. Consideration
of wages and hours is clean out of their province, and as more
than half the remaining grievances deal with the foreman,
who is their co-worker, they are a futility as far as any
redress is concerned and not only do they know it, but the
mass of steel workers know it too. The general test of an
employment manager's success, in the estimation of his super-
intendent, is whether or not he is successful in keeping com-
plaints from bothering the superintendent. What with his
powerlessness and with the prevalence of the system, the em-
ployment manager, whatever his human desires, quickly falls
into the way of steel — to refuse, rebuff, browbeat, or, finally,
to " get-to-hell-out," that is, fire.
Here are typical statements of grievances of the lesser
skilled taken from Inquiry investigators' notebooks or from
Senate Committee testimony, just as the workers disjointedly
spill them out. They could be duplicated to the point of
boredom.
J W , a Czech, (Homestead) was a miner during
his first two years in this country. Learned to speak
English in the mines. Is married, with two children, owns his
138 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STEIKE
own home and has his first citizenship papers. In the steel mills
he is a pipe fitter, $8.50 a day, of 10y2 hours day shift and
14 hours night shift. Thinks the hours are altogether too long
but the pay is fair. During the war the workers were paid, he
said, for every hour they put in; now they are paid for 10 hours
during the day but must work 10% hours. At night they are
paid for 12 hours but work 14. Those who complained were
told to get-to-hell-out if they did not like it.
W declares that the workers have never been ahle to
learn the rate of pay which they get. The foreman does not tell
the worker, who must wait until pay day to see how much he
will receive. Once W found out from the timekeeper
what his hourly rate was but soon after it was announced that
the rate of pay was increased although no definite rates were
posted. When he applied again to the timekeeper for informa-
tion he was refused.
He had never heard about the I.W.W., until the present strike
when the newspapers told about it in their attack on the union.
He believed in the A. F. of L., as he thinks they have shown
results at the mines.
M U , a Czech, (Homestead), in this country
eight years and is married but he " never could find time to take
out citizenship papers since he would have to go on a week day
to Pittsburgh, which would mean that he would have to pay
the wages of his two witnesses and lose his own." While he was
out on strike he would have taken out papers but he understood
from the newspapers that the strikers were not granted citizen-
ship. He owns his own home and a little Company stock. He
can read, write and speak English fluently. Chief grievance the
unbearably long hours. He wants an 8-hour day with present
pay, $8.50 a day.
This man feels that he is discriminated against because he
is a hunky. Several times when he has asked for promotion he
has been told that the good jobs are not for hunhies. He feels
that the clean, decent jobs are for Americans only.
GRIEVANCES AND CONTROL 139
A — ; — T , a Czeclij millwright's helper, 47 cents an
hour. During the war he worked as a millwright but has been
demoted since and feels that he is discriminated against because
he is a hunlcy.
Would be willing to forego a raise in wages if the hours were
shorter. He thinks the long hours the worst part of the steel
work.
M (of Donora) feels that he is being cheated by the
Company officials in regard to the pay for tonnage. He says
he has never heen able to find out how much tonnage he is
entitled to and that the rest of the workers feel that the count
is not accurate but they have no means of checking it.
M is a Lithunian who speaks English fluently and reads
and writes it; electrical craneman, 12 hours a day, 13 hours at
night, at 50 cents an hour and tonnage. " The hours are alto-
gether too long; eight hours a day is long enough for any man
to work."
That the long hours are unendurable and destroy family life
is the grievance of J McG , born in Scotland, (now of
Natrona). He works 10"!/^ hours a day and 14 hours night,
alternating each week, at $5.50 a day, which he says is inadequate
to support his family.
P Y , a Lithuanian (Vandergrift), 6 years a citi-
zen, family, rougher at $6 a day of 8 hours, declares that
while the wages are insufficient his chief grievance is discrimina-
tion and contempt. The foreigners are given the dirtiest and
hardest jobs and are lorded over by the skilled American workers.
He is always told to tvait by the foreman when he asks for a
better job, although his hands are maimed because of the hard
work which he must do. In the meantime young Americans
who have worked in the mills only a short time are promoted
over him to the better jobs.
W S , Russian-Pole (Natrona), in America six years,
first papers and served in the A. E. F. Works as a laborer, $5.50
140 KEPOHT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
for a day of 10 hours and 14 hours at night, alternating each
week.
Although he was in the Army he feels that he is now being
discriminated against and is very bitter about it. He says
that the Americans call him a "foreigner.'' He was unable to
get his old work back when he came out of the Army but jfinally
after getting to the superintendent with his complaint he did
receive back his old place.
S G , a Neapolitan, water-tender at $7.50 for a
12-hour day (New Kensington), joined the union because the
foremen are arbitrary and won't listen to anyone's grievances and
because the hours are altogether too long for any man to work.
He has never heard about the I. W. W., or Socialism, cannot
tell what they mean and knows almost nothing about the A. F. of
L. Never heard the term " closed shop " and does not know what
it means. Never has read any literature on trade unionism either
in Italian or English.
K , a Pole, works in galvanizing shop, 12-hour day for
$5.00 (East Vandergrift), says that the foreigners get the hardest
and most unpleasant jobs and are always discriminated against.
Says it makes no difference about the foreigner's ability or
whether he speaks English, he is looked down upon and con-
sidered fit only for jobs Americans won't take.
Says he has a younger brother, born in this country, who
had a knack for learning and was sent to the high school up
on the hill in the American section. But the other children
would not play with him because he was a hunky. Now he
is at work in the mills.
K complained that the shop is very unhealthy, full of
acid fumes and the vapor was so thick a person could not be
seen a few feet away. Everybody in it has complained again
and again to the foreman who promises relief but nothing ever
happens. Nobody dares go to the superintendent for fear of
angering the foreman.
GEIEVANCES AND CONTROL 141
L , a Russian, (Natrona) naturalized, laborer, $5.50 a
day, 10 hours days and 14 hours nights, declared he cannot
support himself and family on $5.50 a day. Complained at great
length about the hours being much too long. Finds it does not
help to complain to foremen or superintendent because " all the
higher-ups have offices somewhere else." Unions seemed to him
the only way of getting anything done.
Two Poles, (Yandergrift) both roughers, 8 hours at $5.50 a
day, complained bitterly that the foreigner has no chance at the
better jobs, that they are looked upon with contempt and con-
sidered fit only for the dirty and heavy work that Americans
would not do. They feel they are exploited by the heater and
roller who can rest at intervals while the remainder of the gang,
the foreigners, must work steadily and even snatch bites of their
lunch while working. "Always when they ash for better jols
they are told to wait."
Again and again investigators found this attitude of the
immigrant worker repeated with an added intensity of bit-
terness by the son of the immigrant, the native born " for-
eigner," speaking English, dressing and largely living like an
" American." In the steel mills he is a " hunky." One of
these, a striker, released a few months before from the army,
summed up the attitude of many when, asked what his job
was in the mills, he answered, " Oh, the same as the other
hunkies."
It is the same story on examining the volumes containing
the testimony offered by the Senate Committee's investiga-
tion:
George Mikulvich, a Dalmatian, in the coke works at Clairton,
complained to the Senate Committee which interviewed a group
of strikers on a street corner that the " reason why these people
went out on strike and he went with them was because they
want to work shorter hours and get more money and better
142 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE
conditions; better treatment from the bosses and the foremen."
He worked on shifts of 12 Jiours and 14 hours for 42 cents an
hour straight, no time and a half for overtime, and none in his
gang got overtime pay.
(Senate Testimony, Vol. II, p. 524.)
George Miller, a Serb, thirteen years in the mill at Clair-
ton, a naturalized citizen, was inten-iewed by the Senators as
follows :
Mr. Miller: If my family gets sick and I ask my foreman
that I want off that day, because my woman is sick at home,
he say " All right," and he will go around and get another man
if he can, and if he cannot he will let me off. The next day
I will come back and there will be a man in my place and I say
to him " My woman is better." He will say " You can go
home and stay home ..."
There is not enough money for the workmen. We work 13
hours at night and 11 hours at day, and we get 42 cents an
hour.
Senator McKellar: And how much is that a day?
Mr. Miller: For a 12-hour day it makes $4.20 and for the
longer day it makes $5.04 .
WTiy did we strike? We did not have enough money so
that we could have a standard American living . . .
I have a wife and two children
And take all I make and I can not put one penny aside, and
if my family gets sick and I call a doctor, he won't come down
for nothing, and I do not make enough money to pay a doctor
and he won't come for nothing .
There is another thing. If I get in the mill but three-quarters
of a minute late in the morning, they take off an hour, off of me.
Then if I stay five minutes over the hour I should quit in the
mill, they won't give me an hour for the five minutes at all.
(Senate Testimony, Vol. II, pp. 524, 525.)
GEIEVANCES AND CONTROL 143
Frank Smith, a Hungarian, testified as follows (Clairton) :
The Cliairman: How long have you been in this country?
Mr. Smith: Thirteen years. The reason that I am not
naturalized is that I have never stayed long enough in one
place; stayed long enough to get my papers.
Senator McKellar: Do you expect to be naturalized ?
Mr. Smith: Yes; I expect to be naturalized, of course, be-
cause I have got my family here, my woman, and I have five
children; and I have that family, and I would like to know
how a man is going to make a living for himself and his wife
and five children on $4.75 a day.
The Chairman: How many hours do you work?
Mr. Smith: I work 10 hours a day and I get paid for straight
10 hours time.
The Chairman: And how many days in the week do you
work?
Mr. Smith: Seven days — sometimes six days and sometimes
seven days.
He was asked about treatment by the corporation on joining
a union.
Mr. Smith: Oh, they won't allow us in there if they know
that we are union men.
The Chairman: And you want the right to belong to the
union, too?
Mr. Smith : Yes, sir ; we do. This is the United States and
we ought to have the right to belong to the union
We were all for the United States. We worked day and night
for that.
The Chairman: And bow many of you contributed to the
Red Cross and the Y.M.C.A.?
Mr. Smith: Every one of us contributed $3 to them.
(Senate Testimony, Vol. II, pp. 526, 527.)
VI
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE
In this section are analyzed tlie Commission's data on
how steel workers were organized as trade unionists, the plan,
methods, aims and personnel of the organizing campaign,
the object and conduct of the strike, its successes, if any, and
the causes of failure inherent in the organization, if any. The
evidence was drawn from union records, interviews with labor
leaders and talks with the rank and file and with company
officials and government agents. Findings may be sum-
marized thus:
The organizing campaign and the strike were for the purpose
of forcing a conference in an industry where no means
of conference existed ; this specific conference to set up
trade union collective bargaining, particularly to abolish
the 12-hour day and arbitrary methods of handling em-
ployees.
(No interpretation of the movement as a plot or conspiracy
fits the facts ; that is, it was a mass movement, in which
leadership became of secondary importance.
The strike failed in its object; part of the failure was due
to defects in the labor movement.
In analyzing the organization resulting in the strike it is
necessary to draw a distinction which however cannot be
clearly kept throughout the discussion ; that is, the distinction
between the leadership and the body of strikers. The leader-
ship came from the organized labor movement, the American
Federation of Labor, having comparatively few footholds in
the steel industry. The labor movement initiated the organiz-
ing campaign, invited by the steel workers, according to the
144
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 145
labor leaders, invading where it was not wanted, according
to the employers. Both statements are correct and neither
lays emphasis on the principal fact — the isolation of the mass
of immigrant steel workers, unable to unite their thirty
nationalities, ignorant of, or fearful of, the ways by which
workmen act to change their conditions of labor. These
steel workers are more important than their leaders, in analyz-
ing causes of the strike, and in this section of the report
the emphasis laid on the leadership must be clearly grasped
as over-emphasis, due to the fact that it is organization which
is being analyzed. Such analysis must begin with the list
of the twenty-four ^ participating A. F. of L. unions, whose
officers composed the National Committee for Organizing
Iron and Steel Workers, of which John Fitzpatrick, President
of the Chicago Federation of Labor, became chairman, with
William Z. Foster as Secretary-Treasurer. The list whose
relative unimportance compared with the hundreds of thous-
ands of nameless steel workers miust not be forgotten is as
follows :
Blacksmiths, International Brotherhood of; J. L. Kline, presi-
dent, Chicago, 111.
Boiler Makers and Iron Ship Builders of America, Brotherhood
of; L, Weyand, acting president, Kansas City, Kans.
Brick and Clay Workers of America, The United ; Frank Kasten,
president, Chicago, 111.
Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers International Union of
America; William Bowan, president, Indianapolis, Ind.
Bridge and Structural Iron Workers, International Association;
P. J. Morrin, president, Indianapolis, Ind.
Coopers International Union of North America; A. C. Hughes,
president, Newton Highlands, Mass.
Electrical Workers of America, International Brotherhood of;
J. P. Noonan, acting president, Springfield, 111.
1 The list, as officially furnished to the Senate Committee, includes
a 25th union, added in the latter months of the organizing campaign.
146 EEPORT OJT THE STEEL STRIKE
Foundry Emplo3^ees, International Brotherhood of; A. E. Linn,
president, St. Louis, Mo.
Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers' Union of North
America, International; D. D'Allessandro, president,
Quincy, Mass.
Iron, Steel and Tin Workers Amalgamated Association of;
M. F. Tighe, president, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Machinists, International Association of; L. H. Johnston, pres-
ident, Washington, D. C.
Metal Polishers International LTnion; W. W. Britton, president,
Cincinnati, Ohio.
Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, International Union of; C. H.
Moyer, president, Denver, Colo.
Mine Workers of America, United; Frank J. Hayes, president,
Indianapolis, Ind.
Moulders' Union of North America, International ; J. F. Valen-
tine, president, Cincinnati, Ohio,
Pattern Makers' League of North America ; James Wilson, pres-
ident, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Plumbers and Steam Fitters of the United States and Canada,
ITnited Association of; John R. Alpine, president, Chicago,
111.
Quarryworkers, International Union of North America ; Fred W.
Suitor, Barre, Vt.
Carmen of America, Brotherhood Railway; M. F. Ryan, pres-
ident, Kansas City, Mo.
Seamen's Union of America, International; Andrew Fureseth,
president, San Francisco, Calif.
Metal Workers' International Alliance, Amalgamated Sheet;
J. J. H}Ties, president, Chicago, 111.
Firemen, International Brotherhood of Stationary; Timothy
Healy, president. New York, N. Y.
Engineers, International Union of Steam and Operating; Milton
Snellings, president, Chicago, 111.
Switchmen's Union of North America; S. E. Heberling, pres-
ident, Buffalo, N. Y.
Steam Shovelmen and Dredgemen, International Brotherhood
of; W. M. Welsh, president. New York City, N. Y,
ORGANIZING FOE CONFERENCE 147
One man, it was generally admitted inside and outside of
this heterogeneous group, stood out among his fellows and was
so far as personal characteristics went the central dominating
influence. This was John Fitzpatrick, the chairman. His
broad human qualities, it seemed to observers, justified his
national reputation. An uncalculating idealism, quite sim-
ple, but quite determined, was in him.
It is much easier to give an accurate surface record of the
strike than to detail the underlying essential facts which are
largely facts of psychology. A list of all committees, a chrono-
logical history of all the organizing mass meetings, trans-
cripts of executive meetings held, copies of correspondence
between Mr. Gompers and Mr. Gary, might conceivably shed
no light on the fundamental question: —
What made 300,000 steel workers leave the mills on
September 22nd and stay away in greater or fewer numbers
for a period up to three and a half months ?
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that a strike does not
consist of a plan and a call for a walkout. There has been
many a call with no resultant walkout ; there has been many
a strike with no preceding plan or call at- all. Strike con-
ditions are conditions of mind.
The frame of mind of steel workers in late 1918 and early
1919, first and foremost, as detailed in other sections of this
report, grew out of their conditions of labor, things with
which Mr. Gompers, Mr. Fitzpatrick and the strike organizers
had little to do. That three quarters of steel employees, who
were forced to work from 10 to 14 hours a day, developed a
frame of mind of more or less chronic rebellion, largely the
physical reaction from exhaustion and deprivation. Re-
bellious reactions from having no " say " in the conduct of
the job was also chronic, though less so. These were funda-
mental facts in steel workers' minds, of which they were
constantly reminded by endless " grievances " ; these facts Mr.
148 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
Foster was thinking of when he said that if the steel com-
panies had shortened hours and granted some sort of repre-
sentation, " this movement would never have had a show."
In this respect the Finance Committee of the U. S. Steel
Corporation was the principal organizer of the strike.
This rebellious state of mind had existed a long time
without a mass strike. The high labor turnover in steel
plants ^ means that thousands of steel workers have been
going on " individual strikes " for several years. The
" labor shortage " which steel companies experience is a per-
sistent evidence of this " strike " frame of mind. The high
rate of absenteeism is another evidence. Whetting this
state of discontent were two other psychological factors, both
growing out of the war and previously referred to in this
report. Together they were far more important than Mr.
Gompers or Mr. Foster or anybody possibly except Mr. Gary.
The first factor was the increased consideration accorded
steel workers, by foremen daily and by high company officials
frequently, in the course of the national war effort. The
steel worker was made to feel that he was mightily helping to
win the war, with his steel shells, steel guns, gun carriages,
ship plates, etc., etc., etc., in short, with his maximum pro
duction. The " foreigner " foimd himself sworn at less by
the foreman, actually conversed with, finally promoted to
semi-skilled or even skilled jobs, periodically solicited by the
plant superintendent himself to buy Liberty Bonds, subscribe
to the Red Cross, the Y. M. C. A., etc. More especially the
American worker read in his newspaper that he was an im-
portant person, that President Wilson, General Pershing and
other great men were relying on him and were telling him so
in " greetings," " appeals " and " proclamations " in which
" labor " and especially " organized labor " was " recognized "
^ Labor turnover in Homestead Steel Works for 1919 was 575 a month
or 6,800 a year to maintain the force of 11,500. Testimony of Home-
stead Superintendent, Senate Testimony, Vol. II, p. 481.
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 149
in a fashion hardly recognizable to the old steel worker.
Most important of all, the Government was putting its seal of
recognition on Mr. Gompers personally, and the War Labor
Board was making " collective bargaining " and the " right
to organize in trade and labor unions " the text of business
awards. The mistake was quite natural for the worker to
suppose that this recognition was based on his worth as a
steel maker, not on the coincidence of war time needs.
Naturally, on November 11, 1918, he made a mistake about
the armistice which seemed to him to have no connection
with this recognition.
The data before the Commission show that at the beginning
of the strike steel workers in great numbers had the liveliest
expectation of governmental assistance in getting their or-
ganization " recognized " by the Steel Corporation. Particu-
larly the " foreigners," with their tradition of awed respect
for constituted authority, talked about the government com-
ing to the rescue ; some believed " Mr. Wilson will run the
mills." Months before, others of the " foreigners " had been
disillusioned ; they lost the skilled jobs, the foremen resumed
swearing and reminded them in so many words that they
were " hunkies." The solicitous superintendent and the
published proclamations vanished. Instead there was rumor
of cuts in wages. Once again the vital link between the
steel worker and the steel employer was the wooden board
where notices were posted. During the strike instead of Mr.
Wilson, Mr. Palmer came and the Senate Committee's re-
port. Thus, in two aspects, the Federal Administration was
an organizer of the strike.
The second psychological factor growing out of the war,
with which American labor leaders had even less to do,
sprang from events in Europe. The news of two years
happenings there deeply influenced all labor, of course, but
the evidence indicates peculiar influence on steel workers.
150 EEPOKT ON THE STEEL STEIKE
English speaking workers were impressed by what happened
in England; the mass of Slavic workers, constituting from
30 per cent, to 70 per cent, in many mills, were stirred by
Eiissia.
The evidence supports no sweeping conclusions about exact
effects of British and E/iissian influence. Weeks of care-
ful interviewing in the Pittsburgh and Chicago districts in-
dicated that it was results rather than methods which " got
over" to the American worker from London and Moscow.
The inference is not warranted that all " American " steel
workers become converts to political action by labor and all
Slav workers to a dictatorship of the proletariat. " Ameri-
cans " talked about British labor a great deal but they were
vague on the details of organizing labor parties. The one big
thing they grasped was the news of the probability or pos-
sibility of a labor government of the British Empire, how to
be obtained they did not exactly understand.
Slav workers were even more vague about Kussia. A
sub-report^ demonstrates that the immigrant leadership in
Eussian, Slovak, Serb, Hungarian, Polish and Roumanian
communities in steel areas has been largely conservative, mid-
dle-class, " characteristically bourgeois." It is the leadership
of priests, editors, small business men, and officers of benefit
societies; only lately has there been much labor leadership,
and the little radical labor leadership has not been widely
effective.
One or two nationalities, Magyars and Finns, for example,
are politically Socialist by tradition and the Finns are
economically of radical trend. The mass are principally con-
cerned with " bettering themselves " in the fashion usual to
pioneers, — better houses, better food, better hours and wages,
better social recognition, especially from " Americans." But
* " Intellectual Environment of the Immigrant Steel Worker," by
David J. Saposs.
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 151
they came from Eastern Europe and now Eastern Europe
means to them mainly the overthrow of autocracy. They
have a vague idea that big rich people who run things
" arbitrarily," even in mills, are coming down in the world.
Russia, moreover, means to them the rise of workingmen to
power. They have a vague idea that poor people who have
been run for a long time, on farms and in mills, are coming
up in the world and are beginning to run themselves.
Communists, looking for evidence of Lenin as an organizer
of the steel strike, found little to please them. Two students
of Lenin's method, one a Communist enthusiast, returned
from rather hasty investigations of the Pittsburgh strikers in
a state of dejection. They reported that the Slavic workers
" were mad enough but didn't know anything." They laid
the blame to the strike leadership and to the lack of propa-
ganda. They recommended breaking down the influence of
A. E. of L. organizers, Foster especially, and " a campaign
of education by leaflets." They said the steel workers were
not ripe for "action" (Communist) but would be particu-
larly ripe for " education " after the strike was lost. One of
these investigators termed Fitzpatrick "' a menace because he
wanted to lead the workers away from economic direct action
and into a labor party, to follow the losing by-path of
bourgeois political action; " he considered Foster " worse than
useless because his reputation as an old radical spoiled the
true picture of the strike — the worst kind of an A. F. of L.
strike."
The Commission's own investigators noted the following
fact which relates to the above gentlemen's discouragement
about " spreading knowledge of proletarian tactics :"
Slavs in this country have a high percentage of illiteracy;
and most of the papers of large circulation which they can
read don't even print " labor news," let alone revolutionary
methods. Radical foreign language papers to " counter-act "
153 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE
these newspapers, seem to be few in number and without
established means of circulation. There is plenty of evidence
of a militant minority, informed on Russia, among the im-
migrant races, just as there is in any " American " com-
munity. But these militant immigrants, it is undisputed,
had no connection and no power with the national leaders of
the strike. The " Russian idea " imbedded in the minds of
the great majority of immigrant workers, as revealed in many
interviews, was this : That Russia now is a worker's repub-
lic. This, of course, is pretty much the " American " work-
er's conception, according to observers who have talked much
with the rank and file of American workers : — ^that the Rus-
sian revolution was likely a bloody business and Bolsheviks
are doubtless dangerous and wild but the Russian Govern-
ment is a laboring man's government and it has not fallen
down yet. Two years of newspaper reports that the Russian
republic was about to fall seem to have given workingmen,
even here, a sort of class pride that it hasn't fallen.
The above represents about the best that can be made
in the direction of analyzing out the ingredients comprising
" foreign influence " on immigrant workers. What is a
common sense way of regarding it all? When Gen. Smuts
said that now " humanity is on the march " and that men
everywhere, workingmen too, feel that sweeping social read-
justments are necessary, he spoke the every-day belief of sen-
sible men in America. Steel workers felt that in this period
workers everywhere were moving to get rid of things which
chained them, — czaristic dynasties in some lands, in others
slavish hours of labor and subjection to industrial machines.
This is a rather more sensible view than to suppose that
several hundred thousand immigrants, many of them illiter-
ate, struck in 1919 because they had carefully read and
mastered rules for forming Soviets. Their intention, analy-
sis seems to indicate, was to reach an agreement with the
ORGANIZING FOE CONFERENCE 153
Steel Corporation about hours, wages and bosses, rather than
to send armed workers to seize the Allegheny County court
house or the Pennsylvania railroad station. What immi-
grant and native-born learned from Europe in 1919 was that
it seemed a good time to end the autocracy which they knew—
the Corporation's way of running its workers.
Therefore, from all these causes, the length of hours and
arbitrary control inside the mills and the deep influences
growing out of war events, steel workers were indlvidvxdly
in a strike frame of mind; it was the job of the National
Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers to make
a machine for moving these individual frames of mind into
mass action. Mr. Foster, its Secretary-Treasurer, could never
have supplied the first part of the necessary conditions but
he did furnish the second.
The overshadowing importance of basic states of mind is
only emphasized by seeing how a strike machine works. The
vital thing about the Fitzpatrick-Foster campaign organiza-
tion was that it dealt in psychological factors. It wasn't so
much the system of organization as the handling of states of
mass-mind that counted. To the very end the Foster machine
was a poor thing as a system of control; the strike moved
on its own legs, it was a " walkout " of rank and file.
Inspection of the records makes this plain ; that while Mr.
Foster's disposition of organizers and his series of mass
meetings brought members into the unions, the thing that
fetched steel workers to sign up in big numbers was the in-
fluence of an idea which Mr. Foster's men skilfully wielded.
The idea was not culled from the " Red Book " nor from Mr.
Gompers' speeches; it was the same idea which is the back-
bone of most American political campaigns, the idea that
" this thing is going to succeed — this movement is getting
somewhere — ^we're winning." The fact is proved in such
detail that it makes impossible the explanations of steel com-
154 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE
pan J officials that " the men joined because milk drivers and
barkeepers tricked their wives into signing " or " the men
were intimidated into joining." Steel officials who said " the
organizers promised them everything " came a little nearer
the explanation.
The union tabulations show how this psychology of success
worked, how " red " ideas had as much to do with it as blue
or green. The two great jumps in tabulated memberships
came first when the strike ballot was ordered among those
already signed up and word went round among the others,
" they are doing something — they're off." During the strike-
balloting the enrollment jumped 50 per cent. Setting a
strike date brought in the next large increment. Likewise
the two great drops in active membership had occurred, first,
after the " flu ban " in the Chicago district had caused the
National Organizers to be withdrawn, giving the rank and file
the idea that " there was nothing doing after all ; " and
second, after the congress of 500 rank and file workers in
Pittsburgh on May 25. The inexperienced delegates, eager
for a strike, found that they were not empowered to call one,
and immediately the whole movement sagged, again in the
belief that the leadership was getting nowhere.
Herd psychology was far more powerful than any set of
trade imion doctrines preached in meeting. It proves, too,
how essential to such a movement were the states of mind
induced by long hours, arbitrary control and aspirations de-
rived from the war. This business — of gauging the feelings
of the masses in the mills — was the all-engrossing duty of
Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Foster, a task of which the public
knew nothing and which Mr. Fitzpatrick did not promulgate.
Conversely, the leaders' greatest difficulty, beginning in
the spring and almost unmanageable by August, was in with-
standing the mass-feeling they had fostered. The " situation
nearly got away " from them several times in Johnstown, and
ORGANIZING FOE CONFEHENCE 155
in places in Ohio and Indiana ; that is, the men in these dis-
tricts nearly went on strike before other districts were organ-
ized. As it waS; " the dam broke before this district was
more than half worked," according to one organizer in Pitts-
burgh. The movement, before getting to the 100,000 mark,
reached a point where, by the working of the very idea that
built it, it threatened to break out in sporadic strike-lets or
break down altogther. That point was when Mr. Gary re-
fused to confer: right then the " this-thing-is-succeeding "
idea began to change to " this-thing-is-not-succeeding " along
the negotiating line, and the leaders had to let it go on to a
strike as the next means of success or let it go all to pieces.
The inside story of the strike puts out of consideration
descriptions of it as a " plot " or " dark Bolshevik conspir-
acy." A strike movment of 300,000 men in a dozen states is
about as secret as a presidential campaign.
Conversely again, the great blow to the strike in October
and [November was the growth of the feeling that " this
thing is not succeeding." The steel companies' most powerful
single weapon was creating and fostering the feeling that
" it's a fizzle, we're making steel, strike's all over." That
feeling, more than arrests or suppression of meetings or
" Cossacks," wore down the strike. Mr. Foster built up the
movement from the idea that " the steel trust can be beaten."
The companies won out by restoring the idea that the Steel
Corporation can't be beaten. During the campaign the I. W.
W. used the same argument as the companies, with this dif-
ference : " Don't join the A. F. of L. ; the A. F. of L. loses
its strikes."
To these psychological facts, which are the nub of the
history of the strike movement, many details can be added
from the Commission's evidence by examining the plan of
the organization movement, the industrial situation of the
period, the men who formed the National Committee and
15G REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
their ideas of what they were after. Such examination must
begin with Mr. Foster and his resolution to organize the
workers in the steel industry passed by the A. F. of L. con-
vention at St. Paul, June 17, 1918. This raises at once
the matter of "radicals boring from within," over which
public opinion was greatly exercised as the strike began.
Organized labor, however, seemed to regard " boring " as an
old story. Its explanation may shed light on why the trade
unions have not " ditched Foster," as many " friends of
labor" expected them to do and why the trade unions have
no intention of ditching him.
Mr. Foster's business might be described as making the
labor movement move. His main personal characteristic is
intensity. When he followed the sea he is reported to have
been intensely a sailor for he qualified an A. B. and learned
all the knots on a 4-sticker. When he was a homesteader, in
the Coast mountains, he was intense enough to stick at it
alone for five years, prove his claim and clear twenty-two acres
of land. When he took up making the labor movement move,
he tried it first as a very intense syndicalist, an I. W. W.
outside the trade unions. Little motion resulting, he "re-
pudiated " syndicalist methods and joined the Etailway Car-
men's Union in order to " bore from within " the A. F. of
L. In the steel campaign he was most intensely boring from
within and the labor movement knew it and let him bore.
It was considered that his boring might be through the unions*
but was certainly against the anti-union employers.
That is, he decided that the labor movement turn the
A. F. of L. and not the I. W. W. and that his job was
making the A. F. of L. move. The A. F. of L.'s first job, he
conceived, was organizing men. He saw that even the
strongest A. F. of L. unions, the United Mine Workers, had
only about half the coal miners organized ; perhaps he
noticed that Mr. Gompers' own union, the Cigar Makers, had
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 157
its industry only 25 per cent, organized. He saw the stock-
yards unorganized, the steel industry unorganized. Instead
of merely trying to sting the A. F. of L. into moving on
the stockyards, he thought out a plan of action which was
to get all the unions having " claims " on stockyard trades to
unite in one onslaught instead of attempting separate attacks
and being beaten separately. He took the plan to Mr. Fitz-
patrick, who saw its possibilities, the A. F. of L. endorsed it
and they led the united unions triumphantly through the
stockyards. Then they turned to steel.
In each case besides offering the plan, Mr. Foster offered
himself, a liability from one viewpoint, an asset according to
the trade unionists backing the plan. For this reason : a new
kind of man was necessary: a large-scale promoter instead
of smaU salesmen. Mr. Foster's advent in the steel industry
was like Mr. Gary's. Mr. Gary came in from outside to help
consolidate the efforts of separate concerns. Twenty years
later Mr. Foster was the newcomer, to help consolidate the
efforts of a score of unions, not in the industry but trying to
get in ; his, too, was a large scale business proposition. The
oflScers of A. F. of L. trade unions, it is alleged, tend to be
job holders rather than apostles; they are more expert, it is
asserted, in figuring out the scale of dues for their own
organizations than in figuring out what is due to laborers
outside their locals. Some of the unions in the steel drive
were stumped to the end by the following problem: how to
admit recruits at the $3 initiation fee, set for the drive,
when their union constitutions set initiation fees at from 5
to 3000 per cent higher. Mr. Foster flattered himself on be-
ing a broad gauge executive, able to look past such details and
to offer a prospectus of " trust " magnitude. The officials
of the unions flattered him by regularly nominating and
electing him Secretary-Treasurer of the National Committee,
under two bonds, inspected by three auditors, responsible
158 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
for the minutes and more noting than noted during com-
mittee meetings.
Thus the supposition that "boring" is a Machiavellian
business does not seem to fit the facts. It does not mean join-
ing the Republican party and boring from within throughout
a campaign in the confident expectation of having all the
Republicans on election day vote the Democratic ticket. It
did not mean a campaign among the steel v^orkers at the end
of which they voted the I. W. W. ticket, or Mr. Gary's
ticket, or for anything but " strike " for their unions. It
does mean putting inside the trade unions radically minded
men who will make more trade unionists. It does in-
volve the possibility that after all the unorganized are
gathered into the old-line trade unions, these radically minded
organizers may convert the trade unions, if they can; that
is the trade unions' lookout. Inside the unions the critics of
the " borer " are old officials who feel he is a reflection on
them; which he is. To Mr. Foster personally the steel
organization campaign was largely a matter of conciliating
old unionists who were not used to having the movement
move. Beyond that, his task was persuading the twenty-four
rival unions involved to obey Marshal Foch, alias Fitzpatrick.
Let this analysis of Mr. Foster and of " boring " be dis-
tinctly understood in its relation to the labor movement as a
whole ; it is much the smaller side of the real problem which
confronts A. F. of L. trade unions. That problem is indus-
trial unionism and the larger side of it is not " borers "
but economic conditions. Ten years ago " boring " was a
fairly live topic in the conventions of both camps — craft
union and industrial union — and both camps are now little
interested in it. The I.W.W. official decision was against it
on the ground that it would depopulate the I.W.W. and that
industrial unionists inside the craft union would become
denaturized. I.W.W.'s in 1919 pointed scornfully to Foster
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 159
as a " horrible example " of the emasculation of an industrial
unionist. The A. F. of L. decision was to welcome the
" borer " as a " convert from heresy," welcome to enter and
act like other craft unionists. And there the American con-
troversy has rested, revived occasionally, as during the steel
strike or when some British exponent of " boring," like
Tom Mann, is elected head of an old craft union, or when
William D. Haywood proclaims that any real " borer " must
ultimately bore to the outside, that is, must get out of the
A. F. of L.
The far more important side of the labor movement's in-
dustrial union problem lies in those economic conditions
which latterly have exposed weaknesses in craft unions and
have driven them to essay " amalgamations " and other ap-
proximations of industrial organization. When a craft union
on strike sees brother unions in the same industry sticking to
work or even filling the strikers' jobs, that craft union begins
to do a lot more thinking about industrial unionism than a
hundred " borers " could inspire. When craft unions pro-
mulgate ambitions, as did the A. F. of L. in 1919, about
" sharing control and democracy in industry," they are forced
automatically to considering industrial union problems.
Neither in plan nor practice was the work of the National
Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers industrial
unionism.
During a year of Committee meetings on the campaign
there was never discussion of " general policy as regards ideas
to be used " by the speakers, except once. There was no dis-
cussion because the international craft unions and the experi-
enced organizers they supplied all knew what the ideas would
be: the orthodox pure and simple trade union text of
" organize." Heresies such as industrial control or industrial
unionism or political organization or, least of all, " Soviets,"
never were an issue in the Committee ; the undisputed gospel
160 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
was " organize and all these things shall be added unto you/*
with no speculation as to what " all these things " might turn
out to be in actual terms of hours, wages and conditions for
steel workers. The one exception was a reference at the start
in 1918 when President Gompers warned " lest the move-
ment be turned to other than trade union ends." Scenting
the bare possibility of industrial organization, he wanted
early to make it plain to the Committee, meeting for the
first time, that his endorsement in no way meant any personal
leaning toward One Big Unionism. But the twenty-four
unions had no doubt about what they wanted, — more numbers
for each of their separate craft organizations; and that is
what they got. Mr. Foster, as the string around the pack-
age, might have been a very red string, and still he couldn't
have incarnadined the multitudinous locals from Maine to
Mississippi which put up the money to pay the organizers to
get new craft unionists in steel towns.
Data were gathered by the investigators on whether the
viewpoint expressed by Mr. Gompers and carried out by Mr.
Foster resulted in the same harmony among the newly
organized rank and file as among the ISTational Committee-
men. The evidence is clear that it did not. In many plants
the instinct of the immigrant recruit was to associate with
his shopmates of different " crafts " rather than with his
" craft " mates from other shops. He fell more easily into
a shop or plant union, which, however, would have been
an industrial union. Some local leaders so organized him.
Thus an internal conflict arose which had serious conse-
quences (set forth elsewhere) for the strike. In local unions,
the artificial harmony of the twenty-four International
Unions conflicted with the " inexperienced " immigrant drift
toward real industrial unionism. The twenty-four crafts
smothered this drift. The end of the strike saw different
unions pulling out of the National Committee, each with its
OEGANIZING FOR CONFEEENCE 161
separate booty of recruits and even the specious " industrial "
effort represented by the Committee openly disrupted. If
Mr. Foster, as a former industrial unionist, had still in the
back of his head a hope of an industrial union in steel, the
outcome was a joke on him as it was on those of the rank
and file who moved with the drift.
Ideas of industrial control and the ideal of One Big Union
were urged at different times from the outside by I.W.W.'s,
by Socialists, by " friends of labor " in publications and per-
sonally. One of the Committeemen was told : " Don't
answer the Bolshevik stuff by making yourself out so con-
servative. It's just a ruse of the Steel Corporation to make
you admit you're conservative, so that those foreigner steel
workers will distrust you. Those Slavic steel workers are
radical and won't respond to conservative pleas."
The Commission's investigation of Slavic communities, as
referred to before, indicates that the ideas influencing immi-
grant steel workers hitherto have not been radical. When the
above theory was repeated to a national strike leader he dis-
played no interest beyond saying, " I don't think Mr. Gary
is that smart." Mr. Foster's comment was : " That advice
sounds like one of those intellectuals who are always telling
Sam Gompers how to run trade unions. The trouble with all
radicals is that they don't know the labor movement or the
laboring man or what we're up against."
At the Commission's Pittsburgh hearings in November,
Mr. Foster was asked directly whether he did not think the
Slavic worker brought to this country radical leanings in
industrial ideas. He replied that so far as knowledge of
trade unions or any industrial organization was concerned,
" they brought a blank in their skulls." The record of his
conception reads as follows :
" They are really a new factor in American trade unionism.
They are just learning unionism since the war started. They
162 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
are just breaking into it. So far as I can see the foreigner wants
more money. He is confronted with the immediate problem of
life. His idealism stretches about as far as his shortest working
day. The percentage of them that have any vision for future
conditions is very small. It is not a determining factor at all.
It is more wages, shorter hours — the regular trade union de-
mands are the things that count.
" Take an organization like the brotherhoods — they have a
vision among them far in excess of anything among these people.
The American makes the best type of union man. He is hard
to organize, and he hasn't got that collective sense so highly
developed as the foreigner has. He is individualistic and critical,
and he has some ten or twelve excuses why he shouldn't belong
to an organization ; but once you can win them, once you can get
them on your side, you have a splendid type.
" The foreigner is a different type. He has that group idea
very strongly developed. In his own country individualism plays
a small part. He is labeled and tagged and oppressed, and he
is classed, and his psychology is pretty simple over there. He
knows what he is, and if there is any possible chance for him to
do anything he feels that it is as a group, not as an individual.
" He comes over here and he seems to respond to an appeal
better than Americans do. But he is very materialistic in his
demands. You know you can convince the Americans and you
can hold an organization for years in a plant without getting a
cent benefit out of it directly. But the foreigner you can't hold
that way. He comes in for increase of wages and shortening
of hours. He comes in quite readily, but if you don't get him the
results he drops away quite readily also.
" Then, a peculiar thing happens. When the fight occurs, he
is a splendid fighter. He has the American beaten when it comes
to a fight. I don't say that in criticism of the American, but
I think it is due to the position he occupies in industry. The
American usually holds the good job, and he has a home half
paid for, and he is full of responsibility; whereas the foreigner
is more foot-loose; has a poor job anyway, and he doesn't feel
that so much is at stake.
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 163
" He will stick, while the American will go back to work.
That is what happened in the mills just now. When the fight
occurs the foreigner displays a wonderful amount of idealism,
a wonderful amount of stick-to-it-iveness, that is altogether dis-
similar to the intensely materialistic spirit he shows in his union
transactions."
Question : " There has been a difference in response to your
appeals in the district here between the unskilled foreign workers
and the skilled American workers. Could you give any further
explanation, — other than what you have given, — of why the
skilled American in this district was slow to join the organ-
ization ? "
Mr. Foster : " The reason is simply this : The most irre-
sponsible elements rally first. Mr. Gary rules by fear — pure un-
adulterated fear; fear of losing their job; the fear of having
their life's occupation taken away from them. That is what
keeps them from joining the unions.
" If Mr. Gary would post a notice in his mills tomorrow that
every man could join a union if he saw fit, they'd break down
the doors all over the country trying to join, A first-class proof
of this was shown by what occurred to the railroads. Our
unions fought along for years and years and years in the face
of no response at all from the workers. There was violent
opposition on the part of the company to trying to organize
the men, but as soon as the railroad administration took the
position that the men could join the union, a million and a
half joined in practically two or three months. The great
Pennsylvania Railroad was organized in about two or three
months, which for forty years they had worked on before and
couldn't touch. As soon as the fear was removed they flocked in.
" When we came into the Pittsburgh district we were con-
fronted with the proposition of breaking down this fear. Those
men who had less to fear were first to respond. They are the
unskilled, and naturally, the foreigner. They don't care whether
they are discharged or not.
" Here is what usually happens to a plant. At first the
American doesn't like to say he is afraid. No, he won't admit
164 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
that, but he says the union can't do anything; it is no good.
Naturally, every man likes to develop some philosophy to pro-
tect his own particular brand of weakness.
" But we go ahead and organize those who will come in, and
we get more and more into the union, and the first thing you
know the American begins to prick up his ears a little bit, and
begins to be not quite so sure about the union being a failure.
And so, as we go into the mill we get into the better class of men,
and eventually get them all. We get the very best of them.
But it is a question of time.
*' The reason we didn't get them here was because our or-
ganization was immature. In this Pittsburgh district it was
due to the fact that we couldn't hold meetings and couldn't
reach the men. In Johnstown, where we had a free hand, we
organized them right off the bat, and right up to the ofiBce.
We had the office help in our organization up there.
" The creation of an organization among or in a group of
workingmen is wonderful. After the bonds of organization
are created it is just as hard to break them as to create.''
Mr. Foster's testimony is cited because it typifies the
statements of the National strike leaders investigated by the
Commission. It is borne out by all the National Committee
records accumulated by investigators. Whether its reasoning
is based on fact or not, it seems to be a fair statement of the
ideas actually carried out in the campaign, and so far as the
strike's failure rested with ideas, these were the ideas
responsible.
What ideas were responsible for the actions of the leaders
in the next phase of such a movement — the attempt to ac-
complish something for the men when organized, by forcing
a conference with the employers? This phase, from mid-
summer, 1919, on, is the story of continued attempts to
arrange a conference or to mediate, attempts made by the
Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers, then
by the National Committee, then by Mr. Gompers, then by
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 165
President Wilson, then during the President's National In-
dustrial Conference and last by the Commission of Inquiry
of the Interchurch World Movement. All these attempts
were successfully defeated. It seemed as if the public
approved the denial of anything which might eventuate in
" the kind of conference the labor unions wanted." What
kind of conference was this? What exactly was in Mr.
Fitzpatrick's mind in writing to Mr. Gary ?
Mr. Fitzpatrick himself gave the Commission the clearest
possible picture. The personal element was the first element
in it. Mr. Fitzpatrick showed the most downright, unquali-
fied, belief in the idea that " if only both sides could get
together around a table, it could all be straightened out."
Personalities as a stumbling-block did exist strongly in the
minds of both sides. Mr. Gary objected to conference partly
because of " the character of the leadership." He reminded
the Commission that " Mr. Foster is a slick one." Mr. Buf-
fington told the Commission that " Mr. Fitzpatrick is a bad
lot." Mr. Fitzpatrick, in a discussion of general conditions,
said, " When I think of those trust magnates and the condi-
tions their workers live in and work in and die in — ^why
their hearts must be as black as the ace of spades." But
he seemed to think more deeply that " it could aiU be
straightened out " if he could convince the other side that
labor leaders were not bad men and that their plans were not
bad.
What Mr. Fitzpatrick wanted was what he got at the end
of the 1918 campaign to organize the stockyards of Chicago.
Then he began attempting to arrange a conference with Mr.
Armour, the leader of the packers. Mr. Armour's offices were
on the seventh floor of a Chicago building, Mr. Fitzpatrick's
on the sixth. The efforts reached the point where Mr.
Armour's secretary acted as messenger, reporting to Mr. Fitz-
patrick, " John, he won't meet you " : and on being persuaded
166 KEPORT ON THE STEEL STEIKE
to go back again, reporting as a finality, " John, he says
you're a very fine man and he has nothing against you, but
he won't deal with union labor and he's very busy."
Just as happened later in the Steel Industry, Mr. Fitz-
patrick set a stockyard strike date and President Wilson
intervened to effect a conference. The President promised
to do everything in his power to obtain that conference, just
as he tried later to approach Mr. Gary. Meanwhile Mr.
Fitzpatrick gave the President " two hours, two weeks, or
two months " to get the conference, extending the strike limit
indefinitely. The President ordered the five big packers and
the union leaders to meet in the office of Secretary of Labor
Wilson.
" There," Mr. Fitzpatrick said, " we all sat in a circle,
about twenty of us, Armour and the packers on one side
and our fellows on the other side, and the Secretary in the
middle on a kind of pedestal. It was war-time and the
Secretary made a most eloquent, patriotic speech. At the
end, Armour's lawyer got up and began to argue against
conferring with union men. I saw he was simply cutting
the ground out from under the speech and out from under
everything, so I just stood up and said, ' Gentlemen, it all
seems to turn on whether or not Mr. Armour is going to
meet anybody, and I want to say right here that I am now
going to shake hands with Mr. Armour.' So I just walked
across that circle, had to walk about twenty feet, over to
where Armour was sitting, and I stuck out my hand. He got
red and looked up at me very funny and then he stood up
very courteously and shook hands and said, ' Of course I'll
shake hands with Mr. Fitzpatrick.' And then I went right
on down that line of packers and shook hands with every one
of them, and the lawyer's argimient and the whole confer-
ence went bust for twenty minutes.
" If the argument had gone on, we would have just got
ORGANIZING FOE CONFERENCE 167
nowhere. But, after that twenty minutes of mix-up, we sat
down and quickly arranged a conference between the packers
and union labor."
There was the picture in the mind of the leader of the
steel strikers. His ideal was to overcome the personal re-
fusal of Mr. Gary to deal with labor leaders personally and
to bring about a peace meeting which should be first a simple
meeting of men ; and then what ? Mr. Fitzpatrick explained
to the Commission his next idea.
" Suppose Mr. Gary had met us and had said, ^ Let us
negotiate.' I wouldn't have been able to do it, I don't know
steel. Then we should have said, ' All we want to do, Mr.
Gary, is to tell you with whom to confer to carry out the
details.' And these men would have been Mr. Gary's own
employees, with the union leaders somewhere nearby to
advise."
There, frankly set forth, is the union leaders' position,
under Mr, Gompers' tenets. To Mr. Fitzj^atrick it was a
very simple proposition. He was undeniably surprised that
the Government did not support it and that public opinion
did not enforce it.
He might be surprised if reminded that in this frankness
he had put his finger on two points which often, rightly or
wrongly, leave pure and simple trade unionism, with so little
support in " public opinion " and with such opposition from
the employer. " To tell him with whom to confer " typifies
in many minds all that goes with the phrase " labor autoc-
racy." The second point, " I don't know steel," typifies all
the repugnance in the mind of the employer conveyed by the
phrase, " dealing with outsiders." So far, A. F. of L. unions
have answered the two objections in but one way, by saying
that if you won't confer, we'll make you confer, we'll strike.
That is, union labor's tactic simply accepts the gauge of
" autocracy of labor " and sets to to fight it out against an
168 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE
" autocracy of capital." Certain unions outside the A. F.
of L., and atroad, have begun to formulate another, — not a
substitute but an additional, — answer: — the acceptance of
responsibility for production, the learning of the problem of
production for public service and the clarified demand for a
decisive share in control and in earnings.
What part had this limited " force against force " doctrine
of the A. F. of L. in the responsibility for the failure of the
strike? What were the causes of failure? It would be a
serious mistake to consider causes within the labor organiza-
tion without reference to other causes which were more im-
portant, for example, the active opposition waged by the
U. S. Steel Corporation. And before analysis of either set
of causes can be made, the character of the new steel workers'
organizations and of the twenty-four-headed leadership must
be clearly grasped.
The respective positions of the organized steel workers, the
^National Committee and the twenty-four International
Unions, may be summarized as follows :
The raw recruits, particularly the immigrant workers, wanted
to strike soon after they had joined up, since they could
conceive of both protection and " results " only in a
universal walkout.
The twenty-four old unions willingly put money into a cam-
paign for new members but hesitated greatly over back-
ing a strike in behalf of the new steel locals, which might
possibly jeopardize their old membership outside the
steel industry.
The ISTational Committee tried to unify the twenty-four Inter-
nationals for (a) the organizing drive (in which it had
difficulties) ; (b) the strike (in which it was partly
successful) ; (c) the concerted conduct of business in
the industry, through the establishment of a Steel De-
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 169
partment in the A. F. of L. (in whicli it was easily
beaten) .
The facts are detailed with greater exactness than has
usually been attained in histories of strikes, in the sub-report
on " The National Committee," based on the Committee's
minutes. It is the story of a conciliating body, made up
principally of representatives of the Internationals rather
than of the International presidents themselves, which per-
suaded and cajoled the twenty-four unions, all rivals for the
booty of new recruits, into subordinating their differences and
contributing a modicum of cooperative effort. The Com-
mittee struggled with ancient jurisdictional disputes between
the Steam Shovelmen and the Stationary Engineers over
the disposition of cranemen ; between the Amalgamated Asso-
ciation of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers and the Hod Carriers'
Union over the disposition of common laborers; it argued
unceasingly with constituent unions whose constitutions and
by-laws threatened to bar out steel recruits. It tried to im-
press the wishes of the newly organized rank and file, clamor-
ing for action, upon the absentee officialdom of the Inter-
national Unions and the conservative A. F. of L. overlords.
As an administrative machine the Committee never attained
a remarkable degree of perfection. " This organization," one
of the strike officers said, " has as much cohesiveness as a
load of furniture."
The first meetings of the embryo N'ational Committee were
held June 17-20, in St. Paul, Minn., coincident with the
1918 convention of the A. F. of L. Organization meetings
were convened in Chicago August 1 and August 16, at which
W. Z. Foster was elected temporary, then permanent Secre-
tary-Treasurer, in active charge of the organizing drive, and
John Fitzpatrick succeeded Mr. Gompers as Chairman. It
was decided to make the campaign simultaneously nation-
170 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
wide; to use a uniform application blank and a universal
low initiation fee of $3, of whicli $1 should go to the ^National
Committee's fund, the other $2 to the International Unions ;
to obtain from each union a $100 initial contribution as an
organizing fund ($2,400 to organize an entire industry!) and
as many experienced organizers as could be donated. Organi-
zation was to be through mass meetings, at which applicants
would be signed up, the applications then " segregated "
according to crafts, and the segregated applicants then organ-
ized into separate locals or inducted into locals already
existent in separate localities, thenceforward to be dues-pay-
ing members subject to the laws of the International to
which they were assigned. The industry was divided into
the following " Districts " : Chicago, Bethlehem, Johnstown,
Pittsburgh, Youngstown, Cleveland, Wheeling, Steubenville,
Buffalo, Pueblo (Colo.) and Birmingham (Ala.) ; in each
was formed a " Steel Workers' Council," a Poster idea, re-
sulting in the most effective organizing means outside the
National Committee.
Inspection of the records demonstrates how the three main
parties to the movement reached their differing positions.
(a) Rarik arid file of new recruits.
With the first mass meetings in September, 1918, the rank
and file began to indicate their general attitude and their
need, — protection. At the I^ational Committee meeting of
September 28, delegates reported " splendid mass meetings at
South Chicago, Gary, Hammond, Joliet and Bethlehem." A
delegate reported 1,500 signed up at one Chicago meeting.
A delegate from Gary reported " fifteen boilermakers dis-
charged for union affiliation."
From September, 1918, to September, 1919, the new
unionists with increasing power urged action, — and the only
action they understood was serving " demands " and striking.
At the January 4 meeting reports were heard on "good
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 171
movements on foot at the steel plants at Bethlehem, Coates-
ville, Sparrows Point, Steelton, Johnstown, Butler, Mones-
sen, Wheeling, Youngstown, Buffalo, Cleveland, Lorain, Mil-
waukee, Gary, Indiana Harbor, Joliet, South Chicago,
Minnesota, Pullman, Pueblo." The Secretary " announced
that beyond all question the steel industry is being organ-
ized." The South Chicago workers asked " whether or not it
was advisable for them to begin wearing the union button."
Apparently even that much show of " action " was urged by
the rank and file but the Committee advised holding buttons
" in abeyance for the time being," Discharges of workmen
for union activity began to be reported from the Pennsylvania
districts.
At the March 8 meeting " hundreds " of Johnstown
workers were reported as " discharged point blank " ; affi-
davits were read of union men discharged "after ten to thirty-
five years service." Similar " obstructionist " tactics had
been reported from Youngstown. On May 25 a congress of
583 rank and file delegates from eighty steel centers, un-
trained in trade union practice, clamored their abuses and
urged a strike which they thought themselves empowered to
call. The Internationals' representatives counselled modera-
tion. At the July 11 meeting the reports read that " in
Johnstown, Youngstown, Chicago, Vandergrift, Wheeling
and elsewhere great strikes are threatening. The men are
letting it be known that if we do not do something for them
they will take the matter into their own hands. W^here they
are not threatening to strike they are taking the position
that they will pay no more dues until they can see some
results from their efforts." From then on until September
the records show a long tussle between the erupting rank and
file and the International officers — with the National Com-
mittee as buffer — ^Avhile demands were served, a strike ballot
taken and a strike date set. In the last tense debates over
172 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
postponing the date it was the impact of many telegrams like
the following which forced the issue (meeting of September
17):
W. Z. Foster, 303 Magee Bldg., Pittsburgh, Pa.
We cannot be expected to meet the enraged workers, who will
consider us traitors if strike is postponed.
Organizers Youngstown District.
The rank and file through the local leaders thus over-rode
the Internationals, the A. F. of L. and President Wilson's
request to wait for the October Industrial Conference.
(b) The IntermdioTwls.
The position of the twenty-four International Unions is
indicated with similar clearness from the earliest Committee
meetings. Few of the International Presidents, nominally
members of the Committee, ever attended the meetings per-
sonally and at one meeting there were demands that the
unions' representatives be at least a vice-president, rather
than a powerless organizer. They agreed to the financing
plan — pro-rata distribution of expenses in ratios of each
union's total votes in A. F. of L. conventions — but, from
September, 1918, on, many of the Internationals had to be
"jacked up" persistently for moneys pledged. In organ-
izers they contributed in all about 100 ; at the May 25 con-
gress of rank and file, resolutions were passed that " there is
sadly lacking a sufficient number of labor representatives "
for the campaign and, "Whereas, without straining their
resources all the various cooperating unions could easily in-
crease " their organizers and " financial assistance," the
Internationals were urged to " double the number of organ-
izers now in the field in this work." Other resolutions called
on Mr. Gompers and the A. F. of L. " to lend their assist-
ance."
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 173
Particularly this conference, and the local leaders per-
sistently, called on the Internationals to back up the National
Committee's " free speech fight " in western Pennsylvania.
Committee meetings from November, 1918, on, were much
concerned with Pennsylvania's " time honored tactics of sup-
pressing the right of assembly." In Pittsburgh, McKees-
port, Braddock and Homestead, the Secretary reported, mass
meetings were forbidden flatly or the money for rented halls
was returned " under pressure of the steel interest " and the
meetings " cancelled." The minutes of November 25 wax
indignant :
In Rankin, the hall-owner having more than the usual share
of independence, the city officials were unable to make him
abandon the meeting. A lick-spittle Board of Health was called
into service and gotten to arbitrarily close the hall.
The November 25 meeting of the Committee adjourned to
go before the City Council of McKeesport to demand " the
right of organized labor to have a hearing in McKeesport."
They were rebuffed : the minutes add that " after this dis-
gusting evidence of subserviency to the Steel Corporation "
the Committee called on the A. F. of L. and all the Interna-
tionals to hold " a meeting as soon as possible in Pittsburgh "
to test the right of assembly and settle the " free speech
fight."
No such meeting resulted: the A. F. of L. took verbal
action at its June convention and some International presi-
dents promised to " fight it out in McKeesport " personally.
The records, however, indicate no change in western Penn-
sylvania's administration of its laws of assembly, etc., as a
result of " concerted action " by the Internationals and the A.
F. of L.
The last and by far the most important positions taken by
the Internationals, at variance with the new steel rank and
174 ITEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE
file, concerned the strike — both as to calling the strike and as
to supporting it. It was natural that Internationals, such as
the Machinists, with old established locals in a dozen other
industries, should hesitate to burden these with a strike in
behalf of their new machinist locals in steel. They were
divided between the desire to keep the steel locals, with their
revenues, and the fear of possible consequences in carrying
through to the limit what they had inaugurated. At the
May 25 congress it was the Internationals' representatives
who quickly asserted their authority over the impatient rank
and file. At the critical July 20 meeting where the advisa-
bility of a strike ballot was debated, some of the Inter-
nationals, especially the Amalgamated Association of Iron,
Steel and Tin Workers and the United Mine Workers, op-
posed the ballot and all impressed on the Committee that
only the Internationals were authorized to take strike votes.
After the locals' balloting, — resulting in a 98 per cent, vote
for a strike — tense meeting followed meeting of the National
Committee. On September 4 President Gompers warned the
Committee " of the great power of the ste^l trust, its ruth-
lessness and the glee with which it would deal Labor a heavy
blo\/." He advised " caution " and called a meeting of
the twenty-four presidents. Another message was sent to
President Wilson, in the west, who telegraphed back his fail-
ure to influence Mr. Gary. At the September 9 meeting for
the twenty-four presidents, those present were divided, some
urging " caution," some seeing " no way out," and all worried
about financing so huge a strike. By a vote of 14 to 4 it
was decided to send a last telegram to President Wilson.
The President's answer " contained no assurance of a con-
ference " and the Committee set the strike date. But when
the President appealed to Mr. Gompers for a postponement,
Mr. Gompers (minutes of September 17) wrote to " the
International presidents requesting them to postpone action
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 175
until after the Industrial Conference of October 6, if possible
to safeguard the unions' interests while doing so." Mr.
Gompers did not notify Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Foster of
his action in writing to the presidents on the Committee.
" In consequence (of Mr. Gompers's letter) a number of
delegates came to the conference (of September 17) with
definite instructions as to how to vote on the postponement."
Eight Internationals, it was re^^aled, either had instructed
to vote for postponement or had telegraphed against the
strike.
In opposition came a flood of telegrams and protests from
local leaders urging that " it would be absolutely dangerous
for our organizers to meet the men if the strike is called off."
The Committee sent telegrams to the absent International
presidents " requesting them either to come to Pittsburgh
or to give their delegates the powers to act as the needs of
the situation would seem to indicate." The debate lasted over
a day and the consensus of those present was that if post-
poned the steel workers would " make short work of the
organizations " and strike sporadically. Some of the Inter-
national representatives wavered ; the vote was for the strike,
12 to 3.
The record concerning the actual support of the strike by
the Internationals is not clear. The Stationary Engineers
and the Switchmen, two of the twenty-four Internationals,
did not call their members out of the steel plants and yards,
but a number of Switchmen's locals did. The Amalgamated
Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, after a month,
began ordering its men back into " independent " plants, and,
after the strike, withdrew from the Committee, taking away
70,000 to 90,000 members^ all of whom were recruits from
the drive. The United Mine Workers had their own strike of
^November on hand. Locals of the Internationals all over the
country contributed to the strike relief fund but the bulk of
176 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
this fund camje from the Jewish clothing unions, one of
which, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, an industrial
union fought hy the A. F. of L., sent a check for $100,000
to the A. F. of L. for the steel strikers.
Thus the brunt of the strike lay on the steel workers who
had forced it, not on " the organized labor movement of
America " which had initiated the drive.
(c) The National Committee.
The position of the National Committee, in relation to
the rank and file, has been indicated except in one matter.
The Committee attempted to carry the temporary and arti-
ficial unity of the twenty-four Internationals into permanent
organization in two directions. One was in setting up Dis-
trict Steel Councils, designed to maintain united, or quasi-
industrial, action in dealing with separate plants. In most
districts the weight of organizing and striking was carried
chiefly by these councils; some of them survived the strike.
The other Committee effort, specifically authorized by the
May 25 congress, was toward setting up a national council,
or Iron and Steel Department within the A. F. of L., like
other trades departments in the A. F. of L. The A. F. of
L. convention, on the recommendation of an administration
committee, gave short shrift to this project.
With the foregoing analysis in mind, it is possible to sum-
marize the principal causes of the failure of the strike, list-
ing all but laying chief emphasis (in this section) on the
apparent defects in the labor organization. To clarify the
issue it is necessary to view the strike in two aspects: first,
as the struggle of 300,000 newly organized workers against
the Steel Corporation, — a limited aspect; second, the larger
warfare of which the strike was a part, — the after-war battle
for power between organized employers of the nation and
organized labor, or as it has been termed, " between the
money trust and the labor trust,"
OEGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 177
In the narrower aspect, the first cause of failure was the
size of the Steel Corporation. The United States Steel Cor-
paration was too big to be beaten by 300,000 workingmen.
It had too large a cash surplus, too many allies among other
businesses, too much support from government officers, local
and national, too strong influence with social institutions such
as the press and the pulpit, it spread out over too much of
the earth — still retaining absolutely centralized control — to
be defeated by widely scattered workers of many minds,
many fears, varying states of pocketbook and under a com-
paratively improvised leadership. The " independent " steel
companies gave the Corporation solid speechless support ; not
a spokesman was heard but Mr. Gary. In the crucial west-
em Pennsylvania districts two decisive factors were the Gov-
ernor of Pennsylvania, who sent in the State Constabulary,
and the Sheriff of Allegheny County, who controlled an army
of deputies. In a dozen towns the burgesses and police chiefs
are salaried employees of the steel companies. It is im-
possible to pass over such facts as illustrating the size of the
steel interests.
The second cause was the successful use of strike breakers,
principally negroes, by the steel companies, in conjunction
with the abrogation of civil liberties. As a fighting proposi-
tion the strike was broken by the successful establishment of,
first, the theory of " resuming production " and, second, the
fact of it. Production was maintained without any inter-
ruption in some plants. On this basis the companies created
a belief that it was being resumed everywhere. Then by the
use of strike breakers they spread the actual resumptions and
reinforced the theory. Negro workers were imported and
were shifted from plant to plant: in Gary the negroes were
marched ostentatiously through the streets; in Youngstown
and near Pittsburgh they were smuggled in at night. " Nig^
gers did it," was a not uncommon remark among company
178 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STEIKE
officers. Besides the comparatively small bands of avowed
strike breakers, shifted from plant to plant, it is evident that
the great numbers of negroes who flowed into the Chicago
and Pittsburgh plants were conscious of strike breaking. For
this attitude, the steel strikers rightly blamed American
organized labor. In the past the majority of A. F. of L.
unions have been white unions only. Their constitutions
often so provide. Through many an experience negroes came
to believe that the only way they could break into a unionized
industry was through strike breaking. The recent change in
A. F. of L. official attitude toward negroes has not had time
to be effective. At Youngstown, for example, one lone negro
machinist striker, who stuck to the end, was never admitted
to the striking machinists' local.
Through strike breakers the companies played on one of
the two great fears which always contend in workers' minds
in time of strike. One fear is, " My job, somebody will get
my job." The other fear is, " What will my neighbors say
if I go back ? " " Resuming production " makes the first fear
overbalance the second. Fears of other communities were
played on. In Pittsburgh the strikers heard, " They are
going back in Chicago." In Chicago they feared, " They are
going back in Pittsburgh." Committees of strikers, some-
times sponsored by mill officials or by Chambers of Com-
merce, went from Milwaukee to visit Chicago, and from
Chicago, from Cleveland and from Wheeling to inspect Pitts-
burgh. The newspapers kept reporting resumptions every-
where ; other businesses were getting steel and were declaring
they were getting all they wanted.
In their efforts to counteract this, in the pivotal Pittsburgh
district, the strikers were in the main denied the rights of
picketing and of assemblage. The local leader could not
reach them; he feared to visit strikers' homes lest he be
arrested for " intimidation." To counteract the newspapers
OEGANIZmG FOR CONFERENCE 179
they had only their strike bulletin, no local labor press.
Constabulary and sheriff's proclamations kept them scattered.
Separated, the great fear undermined them. By mid-
November over half had forgotten the pure and simple trade
unionist doctrine, — " organize and all these things shall be
added unto you," — and had gone back convinced that " this
thing is not succeeding." Mr. Foster's dictmn that " no
worker is vs^orth his salt who isn't willing to eat his hide in
a strike " turned out to be " a counsel of perfection."
The third cause was the disunity of labor, limiting this
consideration to the twenty-four unions involved and to the
steel workers themselves. The skilled workers feared the
semi-skilled, the semi-skilled feared the common labor : in the
vast hierarchy of steel jobs each feared being put in a lower
rank even if the strike were won. The Americans feared
that the "foreigners" were pushing into the skilled jobs;
the foreigners feared that the Americans were going back in
the mill to conspire " to keep the hunkies down." Americans
in the Pittsburgh district, who stayed at work, justified them-
selves on the ground that " the organizers had not appealed to
them, only to the ' foreigners.' " The foreigners felt the
newspaper criticisms that the strike was one of " un-American
aliens." The strike's end saw the racial split deepened, many
immigrants feeling that they had been " let down " by the
American labor movement. Many immigrants told their
leaders, " When you ' Americanize ' the Americans and the
negroes, we'll strike again."
Among the twenty-four unions, besides the fights over seg-
regating recruits, there came up in devastating form the un-
solved problem of the " sacredness of contracts." The Amal-
gamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, which
had had agreements with certain " independent " mills,
finally " remembered " these contracts and began " living up
to them.". The Amalgamated was acrimoniously charged
180 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
with choosing between its contracts with employers and its
contracts with fellow unions ; its choice was called "treason."
Rather, the difficulty was the recrudescence of an old dilemma
hitherto unsolved by A. F. of L. unions in mass action.
Moreover there was no unity, at all comparable to that
among the steel companies, as between the steel unions and
the A. F. of L. The A. F. of L. sent out the strike fund
appeal and Mr. Gompers battled for the strike in the Indus-
trial Conference in Washington, but from the start the knowl-
edge was widespread that Mr. Gompers had tried to have
the strike postponed.
Three attitudes were distinguishable, at the end of the
strike, concerning labor unity. One was that of Mr. Fitz-
patrick and Mr. Foster, that " the strike had wonderful sup-
port from unions all over the country ; Mr. Gompers and the
A. F. of L. did everything that could have been expected in
view of all the other strikes and troubles at the same period ;
the steel workers appreciate how the unions stood by them."
A second view was that expressed by an International
president not involved in the strike : " The A. F. of L. doesn't
control strikes and the International Unions are primarily
business organizations for carrying on constructive negotia-
tions for workers. Why should they bankrupt themselves for
immigrants who originally took the steel jobs away from
Americans and who wouldn't go on strike for Americans in
the next trouble ? "
A third view was put by a local strike leader, an experi-
enced American unionist, without bitterness, as follows:
" The A. F. of L. was not ' massed behind this strike.' The
A. F. of L. didn't even hold a mass-meeting that I know of.
When the hunkies tell me they were let dovTU, I know it.
The unions say they're ' always on the firing line ' for labor
and one reason they're always there is because they've never
learned to fire together. If the railwaymen in the steel plant
ORGANIZING FOR CONFEEENCE 181
yards had struck, this strike would have been won. In
October the railway men's locals near Pittsburgh voted to
strike but they got no assurance of support from their
Brotherhoods. In the Calumet district the Switchmen re-
fused to pull out their men because, the organizer said, ' trade
control was at stake.' The Switchmen were rivals of the
Trainmen for the men in the plant yards and if they'd have
struck the Trainmen would have stuck, filled up the places,
broke the strike and the Switchmen could never have got
back. The Amalgamated's stand made them strike breakers.
When Mike Tighe [President of the Amalgamated Associa-
tion of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers] ordered back his men at
that mill near Cleveland, he started an avalanche. One Amal-
gamated organizer got four hundred men into one big union
with an Amalgamated charter at a miU near Steubenville
and they all struck. Mike ordered them all back and tore
up that organizer's card.
" At Wheeling, after the gun riot there, some hunkie
strikers went to their A. F. of L. organizer for a lawyer to
get their fellows out of jail. He told them he wouldn't use
union funds for that; let them hire their own lawyer.
Foster, I believe, made him move. At Gary, Central Union
officials, jealous of the Steel Council, made speeches advising
the men to go back. At Sparrows Point a big Amalgamated
official did the same thing. I've heard Electrical Interna-
tional officers say their people didn't want steel organized,
because electrical workers, during slack times in union shops,
like to be free to get steel jobs, which they couldn't if steel
was organized.
" All these old habits of our unions played hob with the
strike. There's no use denying it — the Steel Corporation
knows these things and counts on them. And all the remedies
for them, like having all contracts date from the same day,
get tied up with radical proposals, like May Day. During
182 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
the strike, Cleveland foreigner locals tried to get together in
one separate steel industrial union. They got jumped on by
the Internationals there. After the strike half a dozen towns'
Steel Councils met in Gary to start an independent Steel
Industrial Union. They'll get nowhere. If they take
I.W.W. leadership, or W.I.I.U., they'll he outlawed. If
they go it alone, secessionist, they'll be fought tooth and nail
by the A. F. of L., with more success than the A. F. of L.
fought the Amalgamated Clothing Workers.
" And all the while the twenty-four Internationals won't
install the universal transfer card or the low re-installment
fee or remit dues or do any of the things they've got to do to
keep these new steel locals alive. They'll let 'em slide because
there'd be no money in it.
" These selfish narrow habits wreck the movement. But
we've got to take things as they are. Still there's no use
being just optimistic like Foster. We'd better admit it since
the steel companies just bank on our making the same mis-
takes."
The above is cited as a temperate statement of what many
strikers and strike leaders expressed savagely.
The fourth cause of defeat was labor's failure to state its
war aims, meaning, in the narrower aspect, the steel workers'
plight and the unions' intentions in regard to steel jobs.
Those most involved were the steel workers; they did the
fighting; they seemed sometimes totally forgotten as workmen.
The facts about their lives, their earnings, their jobs, were
not set forth. The press may or may not have been hostile
to such facts, but the facts were not prepared by the leaders
and were not offered to the press. The facts mostly were not
known to the leaders. Particularly when it came to actual
knowledge of steel jobs and what changes might be necessary
to make steel under union conditions and how the country's
steel consumers might fare, such research had not been made
ORGANIZING FOE CONFERENCE 183
by the unions. It was consciously ignored, partly on tlie
ground that '^ the press and public opinion never count in a
strike," and partly on the ground that the whole problem
was not their business, which was solely " to organize the
workers as they found them and any business can stand hav-
ing its workers organized." But even this position was
never clearly published. The leaders' overwhelming concern
was with their strikers as union men. But the strike was
to force a conference : that " public opinion " which might
have helped to force it, never had an oversupply of facts on
which to proceed ; not even " workmen's opinion," outside of
steel areas, was furnished with the facts.
As to the effects of unions on the steel industry, and labor's
" failure to state its war aims," it is necessary to turn to the
wider aspects of the strike, to that greater war in which the
steel strike became engulfed and, in the public mind, almost
forgotten as a separate entity after October.
This greater war was the clash between employer and em-
ployed experienced by each belligerent nation in the " read-
justments " after the war, marked in America by more un-
thinking simplicity than in most countries. In England, for
example, this clash was pressed by the workers, organized
both economically and politically; in this country the drive
seems to have been made by big industrial interests, bent on
halting the unions' development or " encroachments." Par-
ticularly, big business associations were determined to end
what they termed the " unfair gifts to labor in war time."
The result was that a pretty solid association of manufac-
turers caught the inchoate body of labor at a time of crisis,
split everywhere by a gulf between leadership and rank and
file, split between old ideas and new, without a unifying pro-
gram in terms of public service such as it had during the
war, or even a plan of fighting for things that had been
" given " to it during the war. Despite organized labor's
184 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
boasts of power it was rather handily beaten everywhere in
the fall of 1919.
Why did " public opinion " apparently join with the
nation's employers generally to support a corporation, which
in time past it had often attacked as the " menacing steel
trust " ?
First, because of the size and ramifications of the Steel
Corporation. By its root connection with other businesses
and especially with the sources of money-control, the Cor-
poration has been, and is, naturally fitted to head the coun-
try's private producing employers. Its business ramifications
lead;
(1) into the " independent " steel companies. Corporation
men frequently head the " independents."
(2) into railroads. The Corporation operates thousands of
miles of railroads, primarily for the transportation of
ore. Also its directors are heavily involved in the di-
rectorates of the large railroads.
(3) into mines. The Corporation owns vast coal fields and
limitless metal mines.
(4) into shipbuilding and ships. The Corporation owns
ship lines, docks, etc. ; it owns great ship-building yards.
(5) into general industries. The Corporation owns cement
works, many by-product plants, and its regular product
goes into a dozen basic utilities from railroads and build-
ings to farm implements and household utensils.
(6) into banks. The Corporation, primarily a great finance
concern, is most closely tied into the country's financial
reservoirs and in a directing capacity.
The Corporation owns towns. In many localities institu-
tions, such as churches, schools and newspapers, are depen-
dent on it for existence. Through its very size its social in-
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 185
fluence is enormous. Its power over national legislation in
the past has been the text of voluminous criticism. During
the war it paid no more attention to the national labor policies
as enunciated by the "War Labor Board than as if the govern-
ment had never made awards based on the " right to organ-
ize in trade and labor unions " and the " right to collective
bargaining."
Apart from its size, what ideas obtained for the Corpora-
tion such support ? x\nalysis indicates why so many smaller
business men, employers who had " scorned to take their labor
policy from trusts," and representatives of public opinion,
generally supported Mr. Gary in all sincerity.
In the first place, employers all over the country were
paying higher wages than they were used to before the war
and as consumers were paying prices which seemed to them
unreasonable, for all sorts of commodities from " labor " to
laundry. Especially was this true of little employers and
what may be called middle business men.
These new wage scales, insofar as they were set by the
action of labor, resulted from the operation of Mr. Gompers'
theory of pure and simple trade unionism. The theory con-
sidered nothing but wages, hours and conditions, and jacked
these up as high as the traffic would stand, having little
regard to comparisons with other industries, or to the inherent
value of the service rendered, or to any standard (with the
exception of roughly approximating rises in the cost of liv-
ing). Comparative standards were "not labor's business."
Moreover, organized labor was showing no disposition to
share responsibility for production, nor had it had oppor-
tunity to demonstrate marked ability to " share industrial
control," an ambition newly proclaimed by it. Labor was
emphatically refusing the kind of " responsibility " advo-
cated by employers, that is, incorporation of trade unions and
making them subject to the courts, whose tradition, rooted in
186 REPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE
the old conspiracy laws, is far from friendly to labor unions.
For all that, labor was showing no disposition to supply any
other schemes for assuming responsibility for production or
responsible share in control. As the steel strike broke, the
American labor movement was definitely opposed to any har-
ness of " responsibility." This was a big fact in the con-
sciousness of the country's employers and of the public.
Then came (1) the threat of the steel strike, and the strike
itself; (2) a month later the great coal strike; (3) all along
the threat of great railroad strikes. The upshot was that
the country's employers as a class took fright at what seemed
to be the rolling up of uncontrolled power by trade unions.
Because the government after the war, as before, had shown
no ability to formulate any plan for having labor share
responsibility and control, employers were afraid of the gov-
ernment. They saw no leadership there.
The only leadership they saw was Mr. Gary's. Employers
who feared the sweeping character of his statements about
labor, men who were getting along very well with trade
unions in their own businesses, " supported Mr. Gary " be-
cause they could not see where it would all end if labor won
the steel strike, the coal strike, the railroad strike and every
other strike.
Moreover, all through the country, the middle classes, or
great body of consumers outside of organized labor, were
mainly conscious that prices of everything consumed were
getting beyond reach. In considerable part they accepted the
explanation that labor was partly to blame ; " high wages,
high prices." They too " supported Mr. Gary," though
many expressed fear as to what the outcome would be if they
supported Mr. Gary to the hilt. Against him they saw only
Mr. Gompers; they never really saw the steel workers or
learned anything about the hunkies and the twelve-hour day.
It is quite true that " public opinion," especially in these
ORGANIZING FOE CONFERENCE 187
days of organized propaganda, may be a singularly meaning-
less, vague and artificial thing. It is notorious that public
opinion is ordinarily " roused " in behalf of strikes chiefly
by murder, preferably murder of women and children, by
flame and machine gun for choice, as at Ludlow, Colorado.
In this sense too few strikers were killed, or those killed
were not young enough or not the right sex to " rouse public
opinion " for the steel strikers. So far labor leaders of the
old type merely retort, '' When unions are strong enough we'll
take care of public opinion."
On the other hand it is possible that the unions' present
lack of strength is caused considerably by failing to take
thought for the public now. "When labor thinks out where it
purposes to go and publishes its fair intent and even its clear
ambition, it may demolish much adverse public opinion.
Otherwise another 300,000 strikers in another industry may
find their justified cause hopelessly entangled in another lost
battle over the " open shop " or some even more indefinite
shibboleth.
In England, in the same week in which the steel strike
started, the labor unions, far more powerfully organized than
the American unions, spent $100,000 in six days for pub-
licity to " care for public opinion " and by forcing that pub-
lication of their case they added a weight sufficient to save
their national railroad strike against the government itself.
The steel strike leaders in 108 days did not spend 100,000
cents to present the steel workers' case to " public opinion."
In taking care of public opinion, moreover, the British
leaders were automatically informing and fortifying their
own forces, the workingmen's public opinion, which now-
adays is becoming decisive. The American steel leaders tried
to maintain their strikers' morale with a lonely weekly bul-
letin, which however good, was not good enough to offset the
same strikers' reading of hostile newspapers.
188 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE
Conclusions, which are not so remote as they seem from
the hunky in the steel towns, may be summed up as follows ;
Causes of defeat, which were second in importance only to
the fight waged by the Steel Corporation, lay in the
organization and leadership, not so much of the strike
itself, as of the American labor movement.
The immigrant steel worker was led to expect more of the
twenty-four Internationals than they, through indiffer-
ence, selfishness or narrow habit, were ready to give.
" Public opinion " cannot reasonably demand consideration
or generosity from trade unions as long as trade unions
are kept fighting for existence or for ordinary human
rights, denied them under the sanction of " public
opinion."
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 189
APPENDIX TO SECTION VI
Organized hy the National Committee
The following extracts from the duly audited and approved
final report and accounting of the Secretary-Tteasurer of the
National Committee give illuminating statistics on the strike.
The first tabulates, "by districts and by crafts, the recruits oh-
tained by the National Committee directly, based on the financial
accounting. That is, each direct recruit is represented in the
Committee's finance accounts by $1, the Committee's share of
the $3 initiation fee. The Committee claims that the number
of workers " swept out " with the walkout of new union mem-
bers was 100,000. It seems probable that half that number was
nearer correct.
The first extract reads:
" 250,000 members enrolled by the National Committee for Organiz-
ing Iron and Steel Workers during the American Federation of Labor
organizing campaign in the steel industry, from August 1, 1918, to
January 21, 1920.'
190
EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
Location
South Chicago
Chicago Heights
Misc. Chicago. Dist ,
Pittsburgh
Johnstown
Butler ,
Monessen, Donora
New Castle •
Homestead
Braddock, Rankin
Clairton
McKeesport
Gary
Indiana Harbor
Joliet
Milwaukee
Waukegan
De Kalb
Aurora
Pullman
Kenosha
Hammond
Wheeling District
Farrell, Sharon
Cleveland
Sparrows' Point
Brackenridge, Natrona . .
East Pittsburgh
East Liverpool
Warren, Niles
Minnesota Dist
Pueblo
Coatesville
Steuben, Mingo, Wlerton
Birmingham
Canton, Massillon
Vandergrift
Buffalo, Lackawanna . . .
Youngstown
Peoria
Decatur
Total by Trades . . .
Black-
smiths
153
41
128
571
503
75
145
18
136
91
39
109
129
161
52
4
8
1
1
157
4
62
38
106
2,230
'23
Boiler
Makers
143
'23
99
137
30
25
3
63
110
48
33
285
95
50
2
1
3
*ii
57
231
35
37
17
3
40
41
35
36
13
65
56
37
2
91
101
389
336
3
3
12
5,699
2.097
Brick
and
Clay
Wkrs.
1
3
18
187
Brick
Layers
21
2
22
43
122
1
2
10
21
4
95
11
48
4
2
22
1
40
'io
16
67
1
"ii
581
Coopers
1
71
65
138
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE
191
Elect.
Foundry
Hod
Iron,
Steel
Iron
Machin-
Metal
Polish-
era
Mine.
Mill and
Wkrs.
Employees
Carriers
and Tin
Workers
Workers
ists
Smelter
Workers
1,078
139
2.112
326
676
798
16
27
. . .
145
2
148
4
73
228
212
1,673
657
"5
3
402
444
787
4,089
280
965
320
719
108
4.452
731
1,131
437
21
26
290
15
126
238
320
7
5.543
103
451
792
12
"60
1.116
6
317
221
21«
iis
71
2.307
144
237
8
148
184
102
1,265
276
853
1,022
136
11
105
947
70
166
1.158
91
14
2,452
69
249
500
761
121
83
2,855
353
929
534
270
407
26
1,494
235
473
. . .
212
152
66
1,814
180
142
444
21
. * .
547
16
19
11
i39
758
9
73
'21
'22
4
1
"2
256
24
3
13
31
3
'is
119
193
12
106
4
255
* 5 .'.'.
42
17
187
34
165
7
207
6
2
34
...
127
3,109
28
226
226 535
150
16
2,386
22
118
403
434
33
7,820
93
38
1,296
85 2,599
i54
-22
492
1,007
'is
ios
146
'.'.'. '63
...
! !!
■56
22
• • •
240
'27
"36
;;•
24
185
*6i
2,281
26
i43
279
48
632
21
32
238
• • •
2,499
288
.319
26
115
i74
195
691
397
63
1,929
208
335
16
92
■3
13
1,560
16
87
60
539
191
2,242
242
477
1,033
1,273
443
10,364
449
1,019
. . .
2,305
23
ii
746
17
71
. . .
1
45
3
120
8,481
2,406
2,335
70,026
5,829
12.406
349
15,223
192
REPOET ON THE HTEEL STRIKE
Location
South Chicago
Chicago Heights
Misc. Chicago Dist
Pittsburgh
Johnstown
Butler
Monessen, Donora
New Castle
Homestead
Braddocli, Ranl^ln
Clairton
McKeesport
Gary
Indiana Harbor
Joliet
Milwaulsee
Wauljegan
De Kalb
Aurora
Pullman
Kenosha
Hammond
Wheeling District
Farrell, Sharon
Cleveland
Sparrows' Point
Brackenridge, Natrona . .
East Pittsburgh
East Liverpool
Warren, Niles
Minnesota Dist
Pueblo
Coatesville
Steuben, Mingo, Wlerton
Birmingham
Canton, Masslllon
Vandergrift
Buffalo, Laclsawanna . .
Youngstown
Peoria
Decatur
Total by Trades
United
Mine
Wl£rs.
1,427
11
1,538
Holders
46
13
94
168
71
■51
11
3
56
2
31
98
211
12
*i4
1
4
11
1
17
2
6
319
'i4
1
41
14
38
31
1,382
Pat-
tern
Makers
Plumb-
ers
195
8
38
24
210
78
39
103
23
2
6
21
25
19
'87
■45
84
354
4
2
1,369
Quarry
Wkrs.
616
725
Rail-
way
Carmen
38
17
267
22
566
329
20
'it
'26
42
2
,819
751
30
50
17
38
5,045
ORGANIZING FOE CONFEEENCE
193
Sea-
men
She
Met
Wki
et Station-
al ary En-
's, gineers
Station-
ary Fire-
men
Steam
Shovel-
men
Switch-
men
Unclassi-
fied
Totals by
Localities
1
9 116
585
68
94
6,616
6
i 4
6
1
71
569
1
4 7
43
18
196
408
541
3,871
8,970
324
441
207
314
11,846
1
9
1,337
2,519
32
52
41
' i
1,144
287
8,865
2,710
'47
118
10
11
3.571
19
300
108
4,044
66
73
111
2,970
20
64
327
3,963
2t
1
i 99
5 105
) 84
250
298
255
'34
40
14
210
487
45
7,092
4,654
3,497
1]
L 3
2
1
27
50
22
2
2
29
98
20
681
1,212
332
"i(
1 ...
6
30
242
3?
i 48
48
269
4,073
i 3
3
12
88
3
585
1,102
287
233
152
5,028
156
10
12.S
3,794
28
509
' "4
1,734
17,305
93
'ie
'78
"5
'19
'9i
'56
2,110
146
50
474
185
*77
'so
"i4
3,113
52
828
205
206
iso
4,108
u
» 64
7
1,470
V
r 32
30
148
'i5
20
366
"4
8
2,527
43
627
5,705
1,986
6,179
in
71
900
'25
804
19,040
1
26
1
73
984
le
2
119
320
371
2,194
5,321
2
440
12,552
156,702
194 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
" This detailed report includes only those members signed up by the
National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers and from
whose initiation fees $1.00 each was deducted and forwarded to the
general office of the National Committee. It represents approximately
50 per cent, to 60 per cent, of the total number of steel workers organ-
ized during the campaign and is a minimiun report in every respect.
" The report does not include any of the many thousands of men
signed up at Bethlehem, Steelton, Reading, Apollo, New Kensington,
Leechburg and many minor points which felt the force of the drive but
where the National Committee made no deductions upon initiation fees.
In Gary, Joliet, Indiana Harbor, South Chicago and other Chicago Dis-
trict points, the National Committee ceased collecting on initiation fees
early in 1919, hence this report makes no showing of the thousands of
men signed up in that territory during the last few months of the
campaign before the strike. Likewise, at Coatesville and Sparrows'
Point, during only a short space of the campaign were deductions made
for the National Committee. Many thousands more men were signed up
directly by the multitude of local unions in the steel industry that
were not reported to the National Committee. These do not show in
this calculation. Nor do the great number of ex-soldiers who were
taken into the unions free of initiation fees — in Johnstown alone 1,300
ex-soldier steel workers joined the unions under this arrangement. Of
course no accounting is here included for the army of workers in out-
side industries who became organized as a result of the tremendous
impulse given by the steel campaign.
" In view of these exceptions it may be conservatively estimated that
well over 250,000 actual steel workers joined the unions during the
campaign, notwithstanding the opposition of the Steel Trust, which
discharged thousands of its workers, completely suppressed free speech
and free assembly in Peimsylvania and used every known tactic to pre-
vent the organization of its employees."
In publishing this report, Mr. Jay G. Brown, who suc-
ceeded Mr. Foster as Secretary-Treasurer, made the follow-
ing claims (undiscouraged, to say the least) :
" It represents an accomplishment without a parallel in the history
of the labor movement. This report will forever silence if not shame
the class of men who are fond of saying, ' The steel industry cannot be
organized.' It was organized. It also furnished a crushing answer to
Judge Gary who asserted that only about 10 per cent, of the steel
workers were organized. This report represents an irreducible minimum.
Local unions when organized did not as a rule make accounting to the
National Committee for additional members enrolled."
" The National Committee began its work on the theory that any men
in any industry could be organized if they could be reached with the
message of unionism. This report proves the correctness of this theory.
This report should convey a lesson and furnish an inspiration to the
labor movement of this country. It means that with the application
of those same principles any industry in America can be organized.
" The report of the Relief Fund is equally noteworthy. It must be
remembered that at the beginning of the steel strike, there were, as
nearly as could be calculated, 367,000 men involved. 100,000 of these
men were still on strike when it was called off."
ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE
195
Another extract is from the twenty-foiir-page printed
financial account dealing with strike relief. It includes the
following summaries of the moneys contributed through the
A. F. of L. officials to the steel strikes. Note the late date
at which efforts to raise a fund were inaugurated ; six weeks
after the strike began (September 22).
" Repoet on Receipts and Disbursements.
" All moneys contributed to the undersigned for the Steel Strike
Relief Fund, except those from organizations regularly affiliated with
the National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers, were
forwarded to Mr. Frank Morrison, Secretary of the American Federa-
tion of Labor, and appear in his report. The moneys contributed by
the affiliated organizations are duly accounted for in the regular
monthly reports of the Secretary-Treasurer of the National Committee
for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers.
1919
Nov.
Dec
RECEIPTS
From Frank Morrison per John Fitzpatrick $ 2
5,
17
13
57
11
15
26
27
1920
Jan. 3
8
" 30
107
17
45
9
10
8
12
19
9
24
9
400.00
000.00
665.13
783.50
835.70
387.53
.067.39
438.56
,208.82
,658.47
,807.28
,522.03
,845.73
918.10
,519.12
147.04
,738.92
15,125.76
11,043.30
12,028.76
Total Receipts $418,141.14
DISBURSEMENTS
Meat and Groceries $178,695.64
Commissary Checks for points outside Pittsburgh District . . 93,082.82
Labor and Expenses 3,612.44
Freight and Drayage 3,757.24
Bread 46,739.54
Potatoes 22,622.04
Total $348,509.72
196 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
RECAPITULATION
Total Receipts from Nov. 4, 1919, to Jan. 31, 1920 (com-
prising total fund) $418,141.14
Total Disbursements from Oct. 27, 1919, to Jan. 31, 1920 348,509.72
Bal. Deposited in Gen'l Fund of Natl Com. for Organizing
Iron and Steel Workers $ 69,631.42
In addition to the above extracts it may be noted that the
bulk of the strike relief fund came from the Jewish clothing
and furriers' unions, principally of New York, some of these
unions being outside the A. F. of L and long opposed by it.
Approximately $100,000 additional to the above was con-
tributed by the twenty-four unions affiliated with the Committee.
The year's organizing campaign cost the Committee approx-
imately $75,000. It was reported that the financial cost of the
year's work to one or two of the twenty-four unions of the
Committee, in maintaining organizers, contributions, meetings,
etc., approximated $200,000 apiece.
VII
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF AEBITRAKY
CONTROL
In this section are analyzed the data obtained by the
Commission on the second or larger phase of control, i.e.
industrial relations, outlined in Section V. Analysis war-
rants the following conclusions :
Inasmuch as the Steel Corporation never offered plans or
developed a working substitute for arbitrary control,
present conditions in the industry constitute the actually
existent alternative to " the kind of conference the labor
unions wanted."
Maintenance of this non-unionism alternative entailed seri-
ous social consequences for steel communities and for
the nation. The consequences were normal in the in-
dustry; they became pronounced and grave during the
strike.
Maintaining the non-unionism alternative entailed, for the
employers, (1) discharging workmen for unionism, (2)
blacklists, (3) espionage and the hiring of " labor de-
tective agencies' " operatives, (4) strike breakers, prin-
cipally negroes.
Maintaining the non-unionism alternative entailed, for com-
munities, (1) the abrogation of the right of assembly,
the suppression of free speech and the violation of per-
sonal rights (principally in Pennsylvania) ; (2) the use
of state police, state troops and (in Indiana) of the U. S.
Army; (3) such activities on the part of constituted
authorities and of the press and the pulpit as to make
the workers believe that these forces oppose labor.
197
198 EEPOKT ON THE STEEL STEIKE
In sum, the actually existent state of the steel industry is
a state of latent war over rights of organization con-
ceded by public opinion in other civilized countries.
The analysis centers around the Steel Corporati^on because
" independents " such as the Midvale-Cambria, Youngstown
Sheet & Tube, Inland Steel, Harvester and Colorado Fuel
& Iron, have offered or developed other alternatives to arbi-
trary control in the shape of shop committees or company
unions ; and smaller " independents " have signed trade
unionist agreements.
The analysis attempts to investigate to what extent the
Steel Corporation's policy of non-unionism modifies American
social institutions. The following problem, at once larger
and more specific, is not dealt with: the relation between the
facts that (1) America's trade union movement is, relative to
industrial populations, the smallest, with the possible excep-
tion of that of France, among the Atlantic industrial nations ;
(2) America's private industrial monopolies or trusts are the
largest among the western industrial nations.
The social consequences of arbitrary control by corpora-
tions are set forth in the present Main Summary Section,
which attempts to analyze the subject as a whole, and in the
following sub-reports :
1. Civil Liberties, in western Pennsylvania; including an
analysis of some 300 affidavits or statements from
strikers.
2. Blacklists, Elections and Discharges for Unionism; in-
cluding several hundred signed statements from strikers
and letters and lists sent out by steel companies.
3. " Undercover " Mei}; being a study of 600 reports in the
" labor file " of a steel company, together with affidavits,
interviews and revelations by " labor detectives."
SOCIAL CONSEQUEi^CES 199
4. The Press and the Strike; being an intensive analysis of
the Pittsburgh newspapers.
5. The Pulpit and the Strike; an analysis of the Pittsburgh
Protestant churches, including the answers to a question-
naire sent out during the strike.
6. History of Steel Corporation's Labor Relations, in-
cluding developments during preceding strikes.
To be considered with these are many separate interviews
or observations made by the Commission or its investigators
and public records, etc.
Consideration of social consequences is consideration of
that larger, decisive aspect of industrial relations outlined in
Section V on " Grievances and Control." Two aspects of
control were distinguished; one, the problem of personnel
management, lying largely within the plant and centering in
the separate jobs; the second, the problem of industrial rela-
tions, extending outside the plant, decisively influencing the
first problem, and concerned with the relation of the mass of
workers to the sum of jobs. Bringing this distinction to a
statement of conclusions (a) hitherto discussed and (b)
treated in the present section, the following is warranted by
the analysis:
The system of arbitrary control — the actually existent alter-
native to trade union collective bargaining — resulted
in —
(a) markedly excessive hours for half the workers, under-
payment for three quarters of the workers and daily
grievances due to arbitrary management of personnel;
and —
(b) opposition and repression, exerted primarily by the com-
panies and secondarily by governmental officers and
social institutions, against workers' organization for
change of their industrial relations.
200 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
Viewed chronologically, in normal times the Steel Corpora-
tion's system of industrial relations functioned under the
dominating idea of opposition to workers' organization. In
strike times the Corporation's opposition was more actively
supplemented by similar repression by organized society.
This section, then, concerns —
1. The causes and characteristics of the Steel Corporation's
opposition to trade union collective bargaining ;
2. The effects of such opposition on the worker as citizen
and on executive and judiciary authorities and pulpit
and press, particularly during the strike.
A record of the minutes of the Corporation's Executive
Committee meetings preceding and during the strike would,
of course, shed much light on the personal character of
arbitrary control. Lacking such data it is necessary to use
the Executive Committee minutes which the Government ob-
tained and published ten years ago, giving the financial con-
trol's ideas and debates in adopting the Corporation's labor
policy in 1901 ; comparison seems to indicate that the same
ideas govern the present-day execution of that policy.
The minutes ^ record the Corporation's manner of adopt-
ing a labor policy (previously quoted) in the following reso-
lution :
That we are unalterably opposed to any extension of union
labor and advise subsidiary companies to take firm position when
these questions come up and say that they are not going to
recognize it; that is, any extension of unions in mills where
they do not now exist; that great care should be used to pre-
vent trouble and that they promptly report and confer with
this corporation.
* Printed in Senate Document 110, Vol. Ill, pp. 497-506.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 201
The following extracts from the minutes give the ideas
adopted by the Committee. (The names, of course, are the
names of the original financial control whose formulation
of policies has since been followed by the Steel Corporation.)
April 20, 1901.
Mr. Edenborn thinks it expedient to inform the newspapers
and the public generally that the United States Steel Corpora-
tion is not the one employer, but that the individual companies
are distinct and separate for themselves ^; that the labor troubles
of any one company must be settled by that particular company
as an individual company, and a strike in one must be settled
independently of any other company.
Attention was called to the fact that certain newspapers
seem to publish any and everything that will create sufficient
sentiment to influence newspaper sales; that we ought to do
all we reasonably can to keep public sentiment right and the
facts before the public. It was the opinion of one member
that he would like to have the workmen understand that we do
not purpose to allow them to run our mills, but that we do pur-
pose always to treat the men fairly as individuals and give them
good, liberal wages.
At the close of this whole discussion it was decided that the
sense of this iCommittee is that the general policy should be
to temporize for the next six months or year until we get fuUy
established, and that the prevalent conditions of labor and labor
unions at the different plants should be undisturbed, and that
if any changes do occur later they cam, he handled indi-
vidually.
Three members of the Committee have very positive ideas on
the expediency of permitting any change in the labor relations
now prevailing at the different plants. They insist that they
believe we must accept whatever conditions now exist at our
plants; that it is not wise at this time to institute any change
ourselves; that any attempt on the part of anyone else to bring
about an alteration in a certain direction should be promptly
^Italics are the editor's.
202 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STEIKE
discouraged hy the ordinary means; that if it is found and de-
sired that changes he brought about later hy our companies they
can be done when business reasons would permit. These gentle-
men further maintain that long experience in these matters has
taught them that if certain situations which naturally arise
from time to time be not quickly disposed of on the spot with
a firm hand, you will then witness the beginning of the
end.
They favored the prompt reporting here of any trouble and
stated that matters that were serious or are likely to cause
trouble should be handled upon the advice of this Committee.
They do not approve of the local manager attempting to decide
any and all questions of this kind that may arise at the plant,
but these small affairs that require nipping in the bud should
be disposed of by him and then reported here.
One gentleman thinks this whole question is so big and grave
in its possible effect to the United States Steel Corporation that
we ought to proceed with great caution and if necessary consult
with some of our associates on the suljject.
He believes that it would he a great mistake if it were under-
stood we had adopted a policy of antagonism: that the effect
might be disastrous ; that we must not lose sight of the financial
interests of the corporation and must endeavor to keep clear of
anything that might be prejudicial to these interests.
June 17, 1901.
The next question is, Should we establish a rule and announce
that rule to presidents, viz., that they are authorized to take
up the question and dispose of it promptly on the basis that
under no circumstances ivill any union he recognized where there
are no unions ? ... It has been suggested in this Committee
that when that question comes up the president of the sub-
sidiary company should reply that he wished to consider and
would make answer the next day, and in the meantime could
take it up with the president of this company, and then finally
report to the representative that the matter had been carefully
considered and the decision reached is so and so.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 203
To this last proposition the president commented that it would
then be perfectly clear that such president had taken it up with
this corporation.
Mr. Converse feels . . . that public opinion would he with us
inasmuch as we had not attempted to crush unions, bu)t had
simply accepted the various situations as they were; that we
had left the management at the individual plants just as here-
tofore and advised the local officers to use their judgment. He
pointed out that we are assured by certain presidents that they
can run everything in their non-union plants.
(The following lines in the minutes occur immediately after
an expression by the one member of the Finance Committee
expressing any toleration for unions.)
The president informs the Committee that there is in the
air a well defined feeling that the corporation is indifferent as
to fighting the extension of the labor unions.
(The situation before the Board on June 17, 1901, was tPte
threat of a strike by the Amalgamated Association of Iron,
Steel and Tin Workers. In this the labor union for the first
time grappled with the new conditions of consolidation brought
about by the formation of the Steel Corporation. This Asso-
ciation had agreements in about one-third of the Corporation's
mills.)
Mr. Converse put this proposition that as a matter of fact
it is not a question of finessing the situation except up to a cer-
tain point; that the very worst the Association can do is with
about 33 1-3 per cent., and he believes it will not do it with
that low percentage; that if our president says to the presidents
that they will please understand that the United States Steel
Corporation is a large financial institution and it expects you
to go ahead now and handle this situation just exactly as if the
United States Steel Corporation did not exist, they will he very
careful not to get into trouble.
This met the unqualified approval of the president, Mr.
Steele, and Mr. Eeid.
(The following from the minutes of July 3 refer to the
growing threat of a strike by the Amalgamated Association and
204 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
the specific statement of the understood remedy hinted at
throughout the minutes.)
The chairman stated that he would be willing to concede
two mills as union mills, to sign the scale for the McKeesport
mill and to keep it shut down.
July 2, 1901.
The chairman stated that probably the men would be satis-
fied if they gained a point; that while it is very humiliating,
nevertheless it is a critical period and we had better temporize
if it can be done.
(After a decision to send representatives to confer with the
Amalgamated Association.)
The chairman stated that it should be clearly understood that
the United States Steel Corporation has nothing whatever to
do with it ; that the representatives of the three subsidiary com-
panies are not to state that they are acting in concert, or even
hy consultation, with any of the officials of the United States
Steel Corporation.
The chairman explained his opinion that the men who go
should be pretty big men and able men, who if necessary might
be competent to decide pretty promptly what to do ; they should
be men with sense enough not to he wntagonistic to the views
here without full consultation with New York.
In response to an inquiry from the chairman, the president
stated that he had been assured hy the head of the financial
house that he will stand by whatever action the president thinks
best. The president has also stated that the junior partners
expressed themselves as very anxious to have this matter set-
tled, but did not at any time state that it should be settled.
The chairman called attention to the fact that it seems from
the statements made to be clearly understood what policy ought
to be pursued.
(The tense situation between the Amalgamated Association
and the Corporation over signing the new scale was greatly
increased by the episode recorded in the minutes of July 8,
1901.)
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 205
The president reported that the superintendent of the Wells-
ville sheet mill down on the Ohio Eiver had discharged twelve
men who were endeavoring to institute a lodge. Later in the
meeting the chairman read an Associated Press dispatch refer-
ring to this and stating that the men were discharged on Sat-
urday last and that Shaffer ^ had announced that the men would
have to be reinstated before any conference could be had.
Mr. Edenborn believes that we have the matter well in hand
and that even if we have to face a tin-plate strike we should
not give in to labor.
The mill is not a union mill because it has not been recog-
nized by the owners as a union mill.
The president would now approve of meeting the people and
making the best arrangement possible and learn what they
wanted.
The chairman stated that we all labored under the impres-
sion based on the statement of the president that we could keep
so close track that we would know pretty well what the men
were doing; but that if this union at McKeesport mill had been
formed between last April and the time the presidents were here
we did not have the information.
July 12, 1901.
Mr. Steele reported to this meeting that an informal talk
over the labor situation had taken place this morning between
Buch of the directors as could be reached at that time, and there
were present Messrs. J. P. Morgan, H. H. Rogers, Eobert Bacon,
Abram Hewitt, Charles Steele, and the president of this com-
pany; that during this talk the whole labor situation was again
gone over; . . . that it was the unanimous opinion of those
present that we should say we were willing to sign the scales
in all of our union mills as we had last year as submitted, but
that we refuse to negotiate with the association in any particular
for the mills known as non-union mills.
Analyzed, these minutes indicate that —
* President of the Amalgamated Association.
206 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
1. The Executive Committee (financiers) control absolutely
the Steel Corporation's labor policy.
Mr. Gary told the Senate Investigating Committee that
this was true today.
2. The nature and extent of the Executive Committee's con-
trol was to be kept secret from the public and the an-
nouncement made that each subsidiary company con-
trolled its own labor policy.
3. Opposition to labor unions by the financial control was
instinctive and complete. The bases of opposition were
pride and fear ; e.g. "we do not purpose to allow the
workmen to run our mills." " If certain situations
which naturally arise be not disposed of with a firm
hand, you will then witness the beginning of the end."
Fear of colleagues' opinion existed, e.g. the president's
reference to the feeling in the air that " the Corporation
is indifferent as to fighting the extension of labor
unions."
4. Opposition to labor unions was to be kept secret and not
avowed ; e.g. " public opinion would be with us inas-
much as we had not attempted to crush labor unions but
had simply accepted the various situations " ; and " it
would be a great mistake if it were understood that we
had adopted a policy of antagonism."
6. Opposition to labor unions was to be through " the ordi-
nary means " with final reliance on shutting down union
mills where agreements had to be signed and turning the
production over to the corporation's non-union mills;
e.g. " to sign the scale for McKeesport mill and to keep
it shut down."
6. Subsidiary presidents and superintendents were respon-
sible for any methods of their own, which must " not be
antagonistic to the views " of New York and which in-
cluded discharge of workers for forming labor unions.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 207
Method;; were questioned only when the results threat-
ened to be " disastrous/' i.e. strikes.
7. Opposition to union labor included " temporizing,"
" finessing " and opportunistic reliance on subordinates
with concern only for " results."
8. Workmen were not consulted and no systematic above-
board means of hearing workmen's views was considered.
Workmen's right to organize was considered a " natu-
ral " thing, to be repressed.
9. Final decision on labor policy rested with Wall Street
which was ready to support the anti-union policy.
The sole concern of the Steel Corporation was whether
the anti-union policy could be carried out, without too great
damage to immediate profits. The decision was on a weigh-
ing of chances; the decision did not concern the rights of
man.
The history of the Steel Corporation's dealings with labor
since 1901 shows a consistent and successful carrying
out of the anti-union policy. Largely by shutting down
mills " conceded " to be " union" and by discharging
workmen for forming other unions this result has come
about: whereas in 1901 one-third of the Corporation's mills
dealt with unions, in 1919 these and all other unions had
been ousted ; no unions were dealt with. Besides the stock-
holders' report of 1912 hitherto quoted, which " justifies "
the Corporation's " repression of the workmen," Mr. Gary
made plain to the Senate Investigating Committee that the
same ideas and the same methods held all along.
He told the Senate Committee that " unionism is not a
good thing for employer or employee." At the same time he
declared that the Corporation did not carry this belief into
practice by " opposing labor unions as such " ; that no work-
man " was discriminated against because he was a union
208 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
man " ; that the Corporation did not attempt to crush unions.
All this was in accord with the principles of 1901 of disclaim-
ing the opposition, in the belief that " it would be a great
mistake if it were understood that we had adopted a policy of
antagonism."
Decisions in 1919 were made the same as in 1901, on the
basis of what the Corporation might have to do, not what
ought to be done. Mr. Gary said, " Now of course when
there is only one thing to do or when there are various evils
confronting us, the position to take is the one least unfavor-
able." His judgment on the vastly different conditions in
England in no way concerned whether labor had reached
power there because of any justice in labor's position j "I
think England is inclined to go further than the people of
this country would go, simply because she is compelled to."
So far the Steel Corporation has not been " compelled to ; " —
" we are not obliged to contract with unions if we do not
choose to do so."
It is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between Mr.
Gary's arguments based on possible evils, — the " closed shop "
argument, — and his arguments based on the Corporation's
actual practice. The difference was illustrated in this state-
ment by Mr. Gary to members of the Commission of Inquiry
on December 5 : " I am just as much opposed to one big union
of all the steel companies of the country as to one big union
of all the steel workmen. Both would be bad for the nation."
Mr. Gary was not brought to a discussion based on the actual
fact: whether one big union of half the steel companies of
the country, with no recognized union among that half's steel
workmen, was " bad for the nation." An analysis of fact,
such as attempted in this report, must deal with the badness
or justice of what actually exists, — with the alternative en-
forced by the Corporation's practice.
In sum, then, Mr. Gary could tell the Senate Committee
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 209
in the same breatli that " of course workmen had a right to
belong to unions " but that " it is my policy and the policies
of the Corporation not to deal with union labor leaders at
any time." The Corporation never proposed any plan be-
tween the horns of this dilemma. The dilemma was actually
resolved by the Corporation's practice. "What the Corpora-
tion actually did, and does, is dealt with here.
The Commission's data show that the practice of the anti-
unionism alternative by the Corporation and by a large num-
ber of independents entailed in 1919 —
1. Discharging workmen for unionism, just as the twelve men
were discharged at Wellsville in 1901 " for forming a lodge";
also the eviction of workmen from company houses and sim-
ilar coercions.
2. Blacklisting strikers.
3. Systematic espionage through '^ under-cover men."
4. Hiring strike-breaking spies from " labor detective agencies."
These will be considered before passing on to the wider social
consequences affecting governmental and social institutions.
In 1919 the Corporation had no further need for the practice
of signing up agreements with unions in certain mills and
then shutting those mills down. The threat of this practice,
however, was well understood in 1919. In half a dozen towns
investigators found evidences of it ; for example, this remark
made by a roller in New Kensington, once a union man but,
in October, 1919, no union man and no striker, " If the
union is started again you've got to remember that there is
nothing to keep the company from starting its old policy of
shutting down the mills. Then where'd you be with your
better wages and shorter hours ? "
1. Discharge for unionism.
The Commission's special evidence consists of hundreds of
signed statements by steel workers who were discharged.
210 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
Mr. Gary flatly denied to the Senate Committee that such
was the practice. lie said :
" If that has been done in a single case or a few cases, if it
has ever been done, which I deny, it has been contrary to our
positive instructions and would not have been permitted, and
the man would be disciplined if he disobeyed these instructions
the second time. . . .
" Now, it is quite possible that a man, or more than one man,
who is a member of a labor union, unknown to us or known to
us — that is unimportant — has gotten up some proposition, has
built up some straw man, for the purpose of making trouble,
and of reporting that he was discriminated against because he
was a union man. Or, it is possible, though I do not think
probable, that some foreman may in some instances have shown
some feeling against a union man when he discovered it. I do
not know of any such case. It would be directly contrary to
our orders, contrary to all our reports and contrary to the in-
formation I have. I have denied the proposition emphatically.
It is not true." ^
It is true and Mr. Gary's subordinates explained one phase
of how it works. Mr. Buffington of the Illinois Steel, also
Mr. Williams' representative for the Carnegie Steel and other
officers put it uniformly in these words : " We don't discharge
a man for belonging to a union, but of course we discharge
men for agitating in the mills."
Who settles what constitutes agitating in the mills? The
foreman. Two men during a breathing spell in the mill con-
verse for a moment. One has been found out to be a union
man. That talk, a word in passing, a gesture (which may be
a union lodge secret sign in the foreman's belief) is sufficient
for the foreman's judgment, once he has learned that the com-
pany wants the man got rid of.
• Senate Document No. 202. Vol. I, p. 166, p. 174.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 211
Mr. Burnett, assistant to the President of Carnegie Steel,
volunteered the information in a conversation that the dis-
charge of eight men at a shears in their works was because
" they were agitating in the mill " by having invited labor
leaders to come and organize them. The practice varied
widely: it was worst in the Pittsburgh District. And this
fact must be borne in mind in considering the number of men
discharged : the discharge of a single man in a department
may be enough to stop unionizing among the five hundred
men left. The spectacle of one old employee summarily fired,
and the union he belongs to helpless to give him a job, may
settle the fate of that union for a whole works. Only where
" examples " fail to deter was discharge by the hundred
resorted to, as at Johnstown.
The statements of discharged workers included eases where
the foreman admitted the cause of the discharge and told who
gave the order ; cases of men secretly elected officers in a new
union local and fired the next day ; cases of men thirty-five
years in companies' employ and fired after admitting joining
to some man later proved a spy.
These are specific cases. More important is the feeling
throughout the Corporation's workmen that the price of join-
ing a union may he discharge at any minute. All workmen
know it. Their first concern after secretly signing up is
" protection." Moreover discharge is only the symbol for a
whole system of opposition just as persistent and almost as
effective as the more drastic act. The system works in dis-
charge from a job, but not from the plant, i.e. in transfer of
known union men from good jobs to worse ones, even from
skilled jobs to common labor, until the man discharges him-
self from the industry. Finally, discharge is peculiarly ef-
fective in steel towns because generally no other jobs exist
there. The discharged man must move himself and his
family.
212 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
" Agitating in the mill " may include the mail a man
receives at his home. At the Jones & Laughlin plant in
Woodlawn, Pa., one department had twenty-four Finns.
Finns are known as especially intelligent workmen and espe-
cially likely to join unions. In February, 1919, the plant
management learned that these Finns were visiting a great
deal with each other at night, meeting in the cellars of their
own houses. Finally it was observed that the Finns seemed
to be getting more mail than the other " foreigners," includ-
ing newspapers and pamphlets. The twenty-four were called
up one morning and fired without explanation. In Sep-
tember, 1919, the plant management were congratulating
themselves: they observed in the list of union workers de-
ported by plant guards from Weirton the names of some of
their Finns. The plant had " spotted 'em all right."
Discharges for joining the union were so common in the
months before the strike that the union organizers did not
even keep records of the cases. Cases were too common to
need proving and the organizer could only say to the victim,
" After we're recognized you'll get your job back."
Pencil marks on a typewritten slip of paper in the Mones-
sen " labor file " illustrated the principle of discharge. The
paper was the report of a spy, plainly inside the union, and
contained a list of names which were referred to in a letter,
also in the file, from a labor detective agency. The appear-
ance of the paper with the first five names crossed out, was
as follows :
MONONGAHELA LODGE NO. 127, PA.
The employees of the Page Steel and Wire Fence Company,
Monessen, Pa., have formed a strong lodge of the A. A. Or-
ganizer M. E. Donehue acted as master of ceremonies in insti-
tuting this new addition. The officers of Monongahela Lodge
No. 127, Pa., are :
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 313
President, AnthonV Paulaj^ski, wire mill.
Vice-President, Josqsh Tirer, wire mill.
Eccording Secretary, Vudy Gladysz, wire mill.
Financial Secretan/^Joeeph Kissell, wire mill.
Treasurer, Frany^tockiiS, wire mill.
Guide, Nick Bachovcliese, open. hearth.
Inside Guard, John Uring, page.
Outside Guard, Akym Cymbale, page.
Journal Agent, John Baran, wire milL
Corresponding I^cpresentative, Paul KisSell, 31G Knox Ave.,
Monessen, Pa.
It is the Capuan punishment principle — strike off the heads
of the leaders. The " examples " will take care of the rest
of the would-be unionists.
In Johnstown where unionism spread through the entire
Midvale-Cambria works, including even the office force,
" examples " were not sufficient and literally thousands of
men were summarily discharged. An investigator in Novem-
ber, 1919, obtained in two days ahout two hundred signed
statements and sworn affidavits of discharged workmen who
had been told or who believed that the cause was union af-
filiation. The forty pages of these statements make monoto-
nous reading; specimens follow:
Joseph Yart, 216 Woodville Ave., Johnstown, was em-
ployed by the Cambria Steel Company for forty years in the
car works and was never discharged before. He became a mem-
ber of the union on February 3rd, and was discharged on May
12th by Superintendent Hill. When Mr. Yart asked him for
the reason of his discharge, he was told " there is no more work
for you here." He went to the employment agency to apply
again in June and was told by Agent McGrew, " You can't work
for Cambria any more, better look for something outside." Mr.
Yart protested that he had worked there for forty years, that
he is now 54 years of age and can't work very well on the out-
214 jJEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
side and the only reply he got was " You can't work here any
more — you are an agitator and a disturbance maker in the car
department." Mr. Yart denied this charge and protested that
he never spoke to anyone there about his union aihliations, but
no attention was paid to his protest. Mr. Yart has been unable
to find another job ever since and has been out of work now for
the past eight months, as every place he goes to his age handi-
caps him in securing a job. Mr. Yart was born and lived all
his life in Johnstown and was one of the first employees that
helped to organize the Cambria Employees' Beneficial Associa-
tion. One of Mr. Yart's sons was in the army of occupation, and
Mr. Yart now complains : '' My son went to fight for democracy
and I am thrown out on the streets without any means of live-
lihood."
(Signed) Joseph Yart.
Charles Bacha, 811 Virginia Ave., Johnstown, was employed
by the Cambria Steel Company for seven years and never
discharged before. On April 1st he participated in the miners'
parade, and although he was not a member of the union at that
time, he was discharged on the 2nd of April by Superintendent
Donk May. The foreman, May, gave him no explanation for
his dismissal. He tried to find further employment with the
Cambria and when he saw Mr. Lumpkin, the General Superin-
tendent, he was told, " My boy, if you want union work, go down
to a union town and get it — no work for you here."
Mr. Bacha applied again four times, but was refused work
continuously. Mr. Bacha is a U. S. citizen and has been out
of a job now for eight months, as he could not find another
job.
(Signed) Charles Bacha.
William Barnhart, 50 Messenger St., Johnstown. On Oc-
tober 24, 1918, he was hired by Telford & Jones Coal Company
and started to work, when the foreman came over and said, " I'm
sorry, I'll have to take you off — they telephoned me from the
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 215
main office to take you off/* He asked the foreman whether this
was because he belonged to the union, to which the foreman
replied, " I have nothing against the union, but I got to be on
the other side." Mr. Barnhart is a U. S. citizen.
(Signed) William Barnhart.
Bernard Heeney, 336 Honnan Ave., Johnstown, worked for
the Cambria Steel Company for seven years and was never dis-
charged before. He Joined the union on March 2-1, 1919, and
was discharged on June 6th by Assistant Superintendent F. W.
Bryan. When he asked the Assistant Superintendent why he
was laid off and explained to him that he was in charge of about
twelve men and was the oldest employee in the department,
Bryan said, " I don't know — we have orders here to take you
off." When he asked him where these orders came from he
said, " They may have come from New York, Philadelphia or
Chicago." Mr. Heeney is a native of the U. S.
(Signed) Bernard Heeney.
Joe Mandorgotz, 1320 Virginia Ave., Johnstown. Worked
for the Cambria Steel Company on and off for about twenty
years. He joined the union about March, 1919, and took part in
the miners' parade on April 1st. About April 7th, Davie Mal-
comb, foreman, asked him whether he belonged to a union. He
admitted he did and was discharged two days later. Mr. Man-
dorgotz is a IT. S. citizen, lived in Johnstown for twenty-seven
years and has a wife and three children to support. He could
not find another job for four months.
(Signed) Joe Mandorgotz.
Theodore Salitski, 206 Broad Ave., Johnstown, Pa., worked
for Cambria seven years — never discharged before. Was dis-
charged by foreman, Donk May. Joined the union March 17th
and was discharged April 7th. Took part in parade held April 1,
1919. When asked for reason, told him " Because you stayed
216 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
home April 1st." Applied again and was told by May that
"There is no work for a Bolshevist." Out of work six weeks.
Married man — wife and one child. Lived in Johnstown eight
years.
(Signed) Theodore Salitski.
I, the undersigned, do hereby testify that I have been employed
by the Cambria Steel Company for almost eight (8) years in
the capacity of unloading steel.
I have at all times been an eflBcient and reliable employee.
W. H. Walter, the Foreman of the stockyard Department
called me into his office this morning and then he asked me if
I belonged to the Union. I answered " Yes." He then asked
why I joined the Union. I told him the men were joining and
I thought I should belong. Mr, Walters then asked " If the
men jumped into the furnace would you follow them ? " I
answered " Yes, if they would I would." I did not believe it
was any of his business, as I believe I have a right to join a
labor organization for my protection.
I asked Mr. Walters why he discharged me. He answered
"Because you joined the Union."
The foregoing occurred the forenoon of February 22nd, 1919.
his
(Signed) Nick (X) Poppovich.
mark
Witness to mark: Thos. A. Daley.
State of Pennsylvania,
ss
County of Cambria,
Before me, a Notary Public, in and for said County personally
came Nick Poppovich, who being by me duly sworn according
to law deposed and said that the foregoing statement is true
and correct. bis
(Signed) Nick (X) Poppovich.
mark
Witness to mark: Thos. A. Daley (Signed).
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 217
Sworn and subscribed, before me
this 22nd day of February, 1919.
Eay Patton Smith (Signed),
Notary Public (Seal).
My commission expires March 12, 1921.
Paper not drafted by Notary.
State of Pennsylvania,
County of Cambria,
Personally appeared before me. Myrtle E. Johnston, a Notary
Public in and for said County and State, John Kubanda, per-
sonally known to me, who being by me first duly sworn deposes
and says:
That I worked for the Cambria Steel Company for nine
(9) years, the 1st two (2) years in the blast furnace department,
always was a steady and dependable man. On Thrusday, Feb-
ruary 13th, 1919, Peter Eiley, Foreman, sent a man to tell me
to come and get my time. I went in to the office and asked
him why I was laid off. He said " I got my orders from the
office.*' I told him I don't belong to the Union. He said,
" What were you doing at the meeting ? " I said, " Anyone
can go over to the meeting." He said " go down to the general
office and fix it up with them."
I verily believe that it was through Union affiliations that
I was discharged.
(Signed) John Kubanda (Seal).
Sworn and subscribed, before me
this 24th day of February, A. D. 1919.
(Signed) Myrtle E. Johnston,
Notary Public (Seal).
My commission expires February 27th, 1921.
Affidavit on affidavit, the cases prove incontestibly the ter-
rorism, sometimes with purpose avo"wed, more often with
purpose disavowed, so that the discharged man has nothing
left even for arg-ument if argument would be heard. The
218 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
nameless terror was more commonly applied, the answer,
" You know why," as if the cause were some secret unspeak-
able disease in the victim, like leprosy.
It was much the same in Corporation miUs :
Joe Mayor, 440 Beach Way, Homestead — Aug. 15, 1919.
Mayor said that he had worked for the Carnegie Steel Co.
in the car wheel shop 12 years and had never been discharged
before.
He joined the union on August 5th, He was discharged
August 15th by Supt. Munle, who called him into his office
but said "Were you at the meeting Tuesday night?"
M. — I was. How do you know?
Supt. — Somebody turned your name in and I am going to
discharge you.
M. — What's matter? what I do, rob company of couple of
dollars ?
Supt. — We don't want you to attend union meetings. I don't
want union men to work for me.
When the Superintendent inquired what they had told him
at the meeting, he refused to answer and further refused to
answer when the Superintendent asked him for the names of
others present at the meeting. The Superintendent then called a
policeman and he was taken out of the shop.
M. got a job for two weeks under a different name, as he
knew himself to be blacklisted. Is a citizen and married; has
lived in Homestead 14 years.
John Dablonski, 320% Syria St., Duquesne, Pa.
Dablonski said that he had worked three years in the Carnegie
Steel Plant and had never before been discharged. Early in
September, he attended a Sunday meeting, at which Mother
Jones spoke, in Duquesne, a few days later, Mr. Buswick, a
foreman of the Carnegie Steel Co., told him he was discharged.
D. asked why but Mr. Buswick would not tell him.
He is married and has taken out his first papers.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 219
These are examples. The range of the Commission's data
is given in a sub-report. The Pittsburgh District saw the
most extensive use of this weapon.
2. Blacklists.
Blacklists as an integral part of the anti-union alternative
of course are ordinarily kept secret by the companies. The
steel plant in Monessen, however, which freely lent its " labor
file " to an investigator to study, included among the detec-
tives' reports, etc., several blacklists. To most actual plant
managers, as distinguished from Mr. Gary, blacklists seem
after all too common to be deeply concealed. With the lists
examined by the Commission are evidences of the system of
inter-company exchange like the detective reports where the
names of " independent " and Corporation mills were mixed
together.
Pittsburgh Steel Products Company
Mill Office
M. Wikstrom,
Gen'l Supt.
Jas. H. Dunbar,
Ass't to Gen'l Supt.
Monessen, Pa., November 7th, 1919.
George A. Paff, Supt.,
Page Steel and Wire Company,
Monessen, Pa.
Dear Sir:
Attached hereto is list of former employees who have failed
to return to work in our Plant.
This list is forwarded to you so that proper action can be
taken — should they apply for employment at your Plant.
We would ask that you kindly consider this as confidential.
Yours very truly,
Pittsburgh Steel Products Company,
(Signed) M. Wikstrom,
SW/F Gen'l Superintendent.
320 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
November 20, 1919.
Mr. M. Wikstrom, General Superintendent,
Pittsburgh Steel Products Company,
Monessen, Pa.
Dear Mr. Wikstrom:
In compliance with your request, we are submitting herewith
a complete list of our employees who have not as yet returned
to work.
Naturally, we expect to re-employ the larger portion of these
men, although we have underscored the names of some radicals
who, I believe, nobody would want around a plant.
Very truly yours.
Page Steel and Wire Company,
GAP/M General Superintendent.
Monessen Foundry and Machine Company
Monessen, Pa., November 4th, 1919.
Mr. Geo. Paff,
Page Steel and Wire Co.,
Monessen, Pa.
Dear Sir:
We attach herewith list of former employees, who are striking
for Closed Shop. This list is forwarded to you at this time, as
we understand several of these men are applying for work at
your plant.
Very truly yours,
Monessen Foundry & Mach. Co.,
(Signed) Louis X. Ely,
LXE/OH Secretary.
Copy to PMW 11/15
It is a regular system ; " in compliance with your re-
quest." It is secret; "consider confidential." It is dis-
ingenuous ; " striking for closed shop." The attached lists,
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 221
principally " hunkies," nm from fifty to two hundred names
apiece. A sub-report gives the range of the Commission's
data, of which the above are samples.
3. Espionage. (" Under-cover " men.)
Great systems of espionage are an integral part of the anti-
union alternative; spies are integral to warfare.
Espionage was of two general classes : spies directly in the
employ of the steel companies; and spies hired from profes-
sional " labor detective "^ agencies. The Steel Corporation
plants have their own detective forces ; one case of hiring ont-
side agencies by a Corporation subsidiary was charged pub-
licly during the strike.
Espionage was of two general characters: spies pure and
simple who merely furnished information; and spies who
also acted as propagandist strike breakers, mingling with the
strikers and whispering that the strike was failing, that the
men in other towns had gone back, that the union leaders were
crooks, etc. The Monessen " labor file " contained some six
hundred daily reports by " under-cover " spies of both char-
acters, mere detectives and strike-breaking propagandists.
These company spy-systems carry right through into the
United States Government.
Federal immigration authorities testified to the Commis-
sion that raids and arrests, for " radicalism," etc., were made
especially in the Pittsburgh District on the denunciations and
secret reports of steel company " under-cover " men, and the
prisoners turned over to the Department of Justice.
The Monessen " labor file " enabled the student to follow
one such paper through to the government. It is given here
as offering light upon the question why many workingmen,
especially steel workers, have come to suspect that the gov-
ernment, as govemnuent, has taken sides in industrial war-
fare; has taken sides against workingmen.
223 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
In this freely offered " file/' among the blacklists, detec-
tive agency contracts, " under-cover men's " reports, typed
letters of big concerns on high grade paper with luxurious
letter-heads, there was a scrap of dirty paper the size of one's
palm. Scribbled on both sides it read exactly as follows :
Charleroi, Pa., Oct. 13th, 1919.
Dear Sir:
I am an employee of the Pitts Steele Proct of Allenport I
went to work last Fri and would like to work so I will give you
some names of some Belgian dogs that made it so hard for me
and my family I had to quite they are a menace to our country
so Please keep there names in mind
Yours truly
Over
Charle Ballue
209 Shady ave Charleroi Pa
Arthur Ballue
Oakland ave between 3 and 4 st Charleroi Pa
Tony Jarruse
208 Shady ave Charleroi Pa
Gus Vanduzene
312 Shady ave Charleroi Pa
Albert Balue
3 st Charleroi Pa
Make these suffer as they are making other just now when
you start your mills.
The investigator of the file wondered what happened to
spiteful scraps of paper in the steel industry. Beside the
scrap was a letter as follows :
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 223
Pittsburgh Steel Products Company
Mill Office
Monessen, Pa., October 15, 1919.
M. Wikstrom, Gen'l Supt.
Jas. H. Dunbar,
Ass't to Gen'l Supt.
Messrs :
George A. Paff,
C. J. Mogan,
U. S. Smiley,
W. S. Bumbaugh,
W. C. Sutherland,
J. W. Connery,
Gentlemen :
We are in receipt of an anonjmious communication under date
of October 13th, which reads as follows:
" I am an employee of the Pittsburgh Steel Products Company
of Allenport. I went to work last Friday and would like to
work, so I will give you some names of some Belgian Dogs that
made it so hard for me and my family, I had to quit. They
are a menace to our country — so please keep these names in
mind when you start your mill.
Charles Ballue,
209 Shady Ave., Charleroi, Pa.,
Arthur Ballue,
Between 3rd and 4th Sts., Charleroi, Pa.
Tony Jarouse,
208 Shady Ave., Charleroi, Pa.,
(Formerly worked in our mill under Check No. 5321).
Gus Vanduzen,
312 Shady Ave., Charleroi, Pa.
Albert Ballue,
3d St., Charleroi, Pa.
Make these men suffer as they are making me suffer just now
when you start your mill."
224 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
This is for your information and files.
Yours very truly,
Pittsburgh Steel Products Company,
(Signed) Malcolm Wikstrom,
JDH/W General Superintendent.
The list at the top of the letter represented every steel
concern in Monessen. The promptness with which the list
of names was speeded back and forth among the companies
was illustrated in another letter in the file, sent out the same
day the above was received.
Pittsburgh Steel Company
Mill Office
Monessen, Pa., October 15, 1919.
C. J. Mogan, Gen'l Supt.
D. P. King, Ass't Gen'l Supt.
A. Allison, Ass't Gen'l Supt.
Messrs.,
M. Wikstrom, Pgh. Steel Products.
U. S. Smiley, American Sheet & Tin Co.
F. D. Bumbaugh, Monessen Fdry. & Mach. Co.
J. L. Hoffman, Carnegie Steel Co.
G. A. Paff, Page Steel & Wire Co.
Dear Sirs:
Enclosed is a list of men who are some of the leading agitators
in keeping the men from going to work by all kinds of
threats.
Yours very truly,
(Signed) C. J. Mogan,
CJM/C General Superintendent.
Attached to this letter was a copy of the same little list,
with one additional name. Of the mills catalogued, beneath
the letterhead, as on the circuit of vital information, two
were Corporation subsidiaries, — American Sheet & Tin, and
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 225
Carnegie Steel, — the rest " independents." The letters
crossed and recrossed, so that the Pittsburgh Steel Products
Co. officer who started the list out got the same list back
from the Pittsburgh Steel Co. (another " independent ") the
same day.
Finally in the file was the carbon of a letter transmitting
the same list to the Department of Justice at Washington,
asserting that the men named were " leading radicals."
From a scrap of dirty paper, rising through stages of
typed and embossed letterhead dignity, to those dossiers,
marked "Important — very secret," in Government
Bureaus in Washington! The circumstances at either end
of the chain were not investigated.
The testimony of a Federal officer of long official experi-
ence, made at a hearing of the Commission of Inquiry in
November in Pittsburgh was :
... 90 per cent, of all the radicals arrested and taken into
custody were reported by one of the large corporations, either
of the steel or coal industry. I mean by that, that these cor-
porations are loaded up with what they call " under-cover "
men who must earn their salaries, and they go around and get
into these organizations and report the cases to the detectives
for the large companies. The detectives in turn report to the
chief of police of the city. Generally, the chiefs of police in
these small cities around Pittsburgh were placed there by the
corporations.
The corporation orders an organization raided by the police
department, the members are taken into custody, thrown into
the police station and the department of justice is notified. They
send a man to examine them to see if there are any extreme
radicals or anarchists among them. They usually let all but a
few go. In one instance seventy-nine were taken. The Depart-
ment of Justice let all go but three; of those we asked for
warrants for two, and at the hearing we made a case against
one of them,
226 EBPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
The Steel Corporation has been using every possible endeavor
for the last 20 years to fill its mills with foreigners, and to
a large extent has done so ; then you must see why the foreigner
is taking the front of the stage in this conflict. When the large
corporations put these foreigners in they thought they had a
class of men who wouldn't strike. Now they want to get rid
of some of them.
During the war a number of able patriotic American citi-
zens, lawyers, etc., as officers in the army or as Federal of-
ficials under the Department of Justice, became acquainted
with this widespread intimate connection between " under-
cover " systems and Federal authorities and became seriously
disquieted, partly because of the possibility that, in such a
system, governmental power might be put at the mercy of
mercenary and interested men, or might lead to the flagrant
misuse of such influence in behalf of private ends. Since
the armistice several of these ex-officials have publicly criti-
cized the whole system, without visible reform resulting.
During the steel strike the same system, a year after the
armistice, "was worked hard. The undoubted existence of
a fractional percentage of " alien radicals " was capitalized,
with Government assistance, in order to disorganize bodies
of strikers whose loyalty was of unquestionable legal stand-
ing.
Before considering the data on this phase of the inquiry,
reference should be made to the character of the under-cover
organizations.
Two extensive labor-detective strike-breaking corporations,
with offices in a dozen cities, had a hand in fighting the steel
strike. Documents and reports from one of the concerns
filled half the Monessen " labor file." Affidavits and docu-
ments were obtained from the other, which operated chiefly
in the Chicago District. Also in the Monessen " labor file "
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 237
were the reports furnished by two other " detective " agencies.
In the file were the forms of contracts under which these
concerns were hired and operate. Their " operatives " re-
ports run from the illiterate scribblings of professional para-
sites to the most accurate transcriptions of union locals' secret
meetings. Interviews with the officers of these strike-break-
ing concerns gave further insight into the range of their
" work " in the steel strike. A sub-report furnishes the ma-
terial for building up a day by day story of the strike in
Monessen. The other documents and the interviews show
the extent. It is all of a piece and it is the least noble
side of the war waged for the " open shop " in steel.
The manager of the detective strike-breaking corporation
whose reports and contracts appeared in the Monessen " labor
file," when interviewed spoke fairly freely of his concern's
views and activities. He had over five hundred " operatives "
at work in the steel strike. Some of his operatives had been
injected into the steel plants a year before. Many of his
operatives had become officers of labor unions. He said that
there was on the National Strike Committee a labor leader
who took his money. He denied that his concern was a mere
detective or strike-breaking concern.
He used the same arguments as Mr. Gary in explaining
why he supported Mr. Gary. He said workmen had a right
to organize but the " open shop " must be preserved. He said
that labor unions had rights but that the unions had fallen
into the hands of radical leaders.
Like Mr. Gary he denied that he wanted to crush unions.
He denied that his operatives were really strike breakers;
though the " labor file " contained full details of his opera-
tives' strike breaking activities and the following letter:
228 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
New York Office, 680 Hudson Terminal.
Chicago Office, 1051 Peoples' Gas Bldg.
Cleveland Office, 1835 Euclid Ave.
Pittsburgh Office, Wabash Bldg.
St. Louis Office, Chemical Bldg.
Cincinnati Office, Union Trust Bldg.
Detroit Office, Book Bldg.
The Corporations Auxiliary Company
Wabash Building,
Pittsburgh, Pa.
J. H. Smith, Pres. & Treas.
John Weber, Secy.
D. G. Ross, Gen. Mgr.
H. C. Breton, Res, Mgr.
, Gen'l Mgr.,1 October 11th, 1919.
Co.,
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Dear Sir:
Confirming conversation between your Mr. ■*
and the writer on 3^esterday, we will furnish 5'-ou as quickly a3
possible with two Slavish speaking operatives to work along the
lines as agreed between the writer and Mr. on yesterday.
This is as per the terms of our regular $225 monthly contract
with the usual wage credits of $3.00 per day allowed as per
the copy of attached contract, with the exception that it is under-
stood that this service will terminate at the end of 30 days from
commencement of same unless otherwise extended.
We wish to thank you very much for this business and will
endeavor to make same as valuable to you as possible and trust
that it will be instrumental in having the morale of your foreign
strikers broken.
We will thank you very much for your cooperation in the
* Deleted names are in original letter ; copy in possession of Com-
mission.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 229
handling of this service and will appreciate your calling upon
us at any time we can be of special service to you.
Yours very truly,
The Corporations Auxiliary Company,
By (Signed) S. Dewson,
Resident Manager.
B-W: P-11
ISTo other country in the world has such large widespread,
well-financed, strike-breaking corporations, making money
out of " labor trouble " as America. Their existence is an
integral part of the industrial corporations' policy of " not
dealing with labor unions." The steel strike was harvest-
home for them. Outside the plants and inside, outside the
strikers and inside the labor unions, their " operatives "
spied, secretly denounced, engineered raids and arrests, and
incited to riot. The concerns' managers spoke the same argu-
ments as Mr. Gary in justification of their activities. The
companies concealed but were not ashamed of hiring " opera-
tives " ; it was a customary inevitable part of the anti-union
alternative.
ISTor was it the custom of certain strike-breaking concerns
to wait for " labor trouble." When business was slack they
made " trouble." The sub-report details, from affidavits of
former operatives, how certain concerns provoked strikes in
peaceful shops in the past to create " business,'* set union to
fighting union, organized unions in order to be called in to
break the unions. They bled both sides; and the Federal
Government files contained their patriotic reports.
In the Chicago-Gary District one such great strike-break-
ing concern became so active in the steel strike that its offices
were raided and one of its officers was indicted for " intent
to create riots " and for intent to " kill and murder divers
large numbers of persons." This officer after five months had
330 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
still not been brought to trial. A sample of the riot-inciting
instructions given to this concern's operatives in the South
Chicago steel mills follows :
A 563-D October 2, 1919.
Rep.
Dear Sir:
We have talked to you and instructed you. We want you
to stir up as much bad feeling as you possibly can between
the Serbians and Italians. Spread data among the Serbians that
the Italians are going back to work. Call up every question you
can in reference to racial hatred between these two nationalities ;
make them realize to the fullest extent that far better results
would be accomplished if they will go back to work. Urge them
to go back to work or the Italians will get their jobs.
Daily Maxim — Send to every representative today:
Conserve your forces on a set point — ^begin before the other
fellow starts.
Eemail.
This operative's duties, according to The New Majority
(November 11, 1919), were as follows:
He was assigned to the client whose code was A 536 D, the
number appearing at the top of the Italian-Serbian letter. This
code means the South Chicago plant of the Illinois Steel Com-
pany.
Then he received the regular course of instruction given
" representatives." He was told to move around among the
strikers and get them to go back to work. He was told to go
to Indiana Harbor, Ind., and get strikers from the Inland Steel
Company plant there to go to South Chicago and go to work as
strike breakers for the Illinois Steel Company. He was told
to go to the vicinity of employment agencies and get strike
breakers and to take them into the plant by automobile or
otherwise, at night.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 231
He was also instructed to move around among the strikers
for the purpose of reporting what conversations he heard, as
well as urging them to go to work. He was given a union
card in a local of one of the international unions affiliated with
the American Federation of Labor, and told to use it to pass
himself off as a union man.
The Hlinois Steel Company is the Steel Corporation's big-
gest western subsidiary. Its president, Mr. Buffington, de-
clared to the Commission of Inquiry that the first he had
heard of the matter was when he saw it in the Chicago
papers; that the Illinois Steel Co. did not hire this strike-
breaking concern ; that he was " confident that at the trial
no evidence involving the Illinois Steel Co. would be brought
out."
The manager of the strike-breaking concern, with offices
in the same building as Mr. Buffington, declared to Com-
mission investigators that their operatives were hired by the
Illinois Steel Co.
Meanwhile the raided concern was defending itself in page
advertisements in papers in many cities as follows:
WHY IS SHERMAN SERVICE BEING ATTACKED?
Sherman Service is a national institution composed of men
and women who have made Industrial Kelationship their life
work .
They cause the employer (their client) to recognize and prac-
tice the basic principles of " square dealing " in his relations
with his employees. A spirit of sympathetic understanding
follows — the result is harmony, cooperation, maximum produc-
tion, high quality and lessened waste.
The community, which comprises both employee and employer
and invested capital, is able, through such harmonious and pro-
ductive rplfitionRhiji, to provide the greatest opportunities af-
forded under our free form of government, to the advantage of
233 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
all agreeably concerned. Americanization, in its fullest sense,
is made possible and does follow; our national structure is pre-
served and enforced, and we are all better off for it.
SHERMAN SERVICE, INC.
John Francis Sherman, Chairman Executive Board New York
City Boston St. Louis Chicago Philadelphia Cleveland New
Haven Providence Detroit Toronto.
Postscript: Sherman Service is not a detective agency. It
renders no detective service of any description whatsoever.
Concerning the last line, investigators noted that the Sher-
man Service Co. was elsewhere carr^'ing on suit in court to
protect its " rights as a detective agency." According to the
private " house organ " of this concern it also serves the gov-
ernment ; for this purpose its operatives become " apparent
reds."
"Wherever such organizations exist in the community and
try to influence the workers it becomes the duty of the Sherman
representatives to pretend sympathy and join so as to learn who
the leaders are. Such information is then supplied to the
government."
Some steel companies placed implicit confidence in the
reports and advice of these strike-breaking spy-corporations.
Other companies were skeptical and dissatisfied but puzzled
as to what else to do. But no managers doubted what they
wanted the detective agencies to accomplish — to keep work-
men from organizing and if they organized to break up or
nullify the organizations. The attitude of steel company
managers was the same ; it was illustrated by the reply of a
general superintendent in Monessen to an investigator's re-
quest to be allowed to talk with the men in the plant (during
the strike). He said: "We've got about 300 men in there
now ; generally we have 3,000. And those 300 men have cost
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 233
us just about $500 apiece to get. Now if you go in there and
ask them questions they may all get nervous and walk out
again."
Just as in this plant in Monessen where, as the superin-
tendent and the investigator knew, two " detective agencies "
had propagandist-spies mixed with the real workers, so
throughout the domain of steel, watchers — from subsidized
workers to hired detectives — ^peek and glower at the labor
force and try to guess, by the way men walk or look or talk
or stay silent or spit, what they are thinking.
The reach of the industrial spy system and the reliance
placed on it were brought home to the Commission of Inquiry
by the spy report on the Commission which was sent to Mr.
Gary. It has been referred to before; the Commission in
November read the report, knew that it was being distributed
in the territory of the Steel Corporation's plants, and dis-
regarded so amusingly false a document; in December when
the Commission made its effort to settle the strike, Mr. Gary
exhibited it and cross-examined the Commissioners on its
charges. Someone had set a spy on the Commission
and on the Interchurch World Movement. The anonymous
" special report " was dated November 12. The Commis-
sion's first interview with Mr. Gary had been on November
10.
The " special report " names (misspelling the names) some
of the Commission's investigators, names others as investi-
gators who were not, and calls all named " radicals," " mem-
bers of the I.W.W.," " Keds " and " active in the organiza-
tion known as the People's Print . . . formerly known as
the People's Peace Council, better known as the National
Civil Liberties League." N^o statement made about the in-
vestigators was true. The capacity of the spy and the pur-
poses of the persons who hired him are indicated in the
following excerpt:
234 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
In fact none of these people that are now here in Pittsburgh
investigating for this Church movement should be told anything
at all, nor should they be allowed to get any information from
the Mills in any manner.
After paying a visit to their offices in New York and talking
to a large number of the officials there I find that this organiza-
tion could be used to a very good advantage if handled by the
right parties. This organization could become a power in both
the Industrial Field and the Church Field.
There are a large number of the men and women connected
with this organization that are know as Pink Tea Socialists
and Parlor Reds, and are not considered dangerous. I would
suggest that these kind of people be weeded out of the organiza-
tion. These are the worst kind of Reds to be connected with
as they are to a certain extent high up in circles that are hard
to reach and they can spread propaganda that hurts the work
of others.
I found that this Organization is now making a canvass for
money among the rich and the Corporation in the East, and
that they have already had a Committee see Judge Gary, asking
for money to carry on their work with.
A Mr, Blacenhorn will arrive in Pittsburgh on Thursday
morning to assist the ones that are already here on the Steel
Strike investigation.
No money should be given or any assistance granted this
organization until they recall all of the ones that they have in
the Pittsburgh District, and furthermore if there is any way
at all of forcing them to get rid of the ones that I have mentioned
they should be let go.
The literary qualities of this report can be profitably studied
by comparison with the reports in the Monessen " labor file."
The maintenance of the non-unionism alternative, there-
fore, entailed for the steel companies activities running from
spies in church offices in New York to sealed carloads of
negroes shipped into Pittsburgh plant yards at night. For
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 235
communities and for states the alternative entailed activities
of greater import and greater menace. These affected civil
liberties in whole communities, local legislative bodies, police
authorities, judges, state police troops, Federal government
departments and the U. S. Army.
The consequences (which are studied in sub-reports) are
perhaps most important in regard to the abrogation of civil
liberties. War-experiences especially have accustomed the
American people to the thought that the right of assembly,
the right of free speech, and traditional personal rights can
be abrogated when the cause is deemed sufficiently great.
The practise of western Pennsylvania proved that these rights
were abrogated for the purpose of preventing the organiza-
tion of trade unions among steel workers, or of defeating
organized unions. The abrogations largely persist four
months after the strike.
The salient fact is as follows :
Denial of the rights of assemblage and free speech did not
primarily grow out of the strike but was a precedent
fact, directly related to the policies of preventing labor
organization maintained by the Steel Corporation and
certain " independents." It was for years the rule in
towns about Pittsburgh that labor organizers could not
hold meetings.
To quote from the sub-report : ^
Local public officials assert that it was necessary to prohibit
meetings in order to prevent violence. This statement is open
to question, but if it is accepted, still the connection between
labor policy and absence of civil liberty remains. Whatever
danger of violence there was, arose from the industrial conflict.
On account of the long-continued refusal of the employers to deal
with organized labor, industrial conflict became inevitable the
* From "Civil Liberties," in Western Pennsrlvaiiia, by Oeorge Soule.
236 REPOET ON" THE STEEL STEIKB
moment workmen began to assemble for the purpose of forming
unions. If, therefore, the right to assemble led to the forming
and strengthening of unions, and unions led to industrial conflict,
and industrial conflict led to breaches of the peace, the only way
to prevent violence was, in the minds of the local officials, to
prevent meetings. In other words, if the officials were right,
the industrial situation was such that civil peace could be pre-
served only by interference with the exercise of ordinary civil
liberties on the part of a large proportion of the population.
To maintain steel companies' non-union policies, communi-
ties lost their rights of assembly so completely that in some
towns government agents, sent to give patriotic lectures, were
denied the right to hold meetings ; one such was arrested.
The extent to vs^hich rights were abrogated depended largely
upon the extent to which non-unionism was endangered. If
labor organizers were aggressive and local restrictive ordi-
nances were insufficient the most arbitrary executive acts were
resorted to. During the strike the repression was complete.
Legally the Interchurch Commission of Inquiry being com-
posed of " three or more persons " broke the Sheriif's orders
by the simple act of assembling and " loitering " in the streets
of Pittsburgh. A Commissioner conversed with strikers in
the office used as their headquarters in Braddock; five min-
utes after his departure State troopers broke into the place
demanding " that speaker " and started to close down the
office because " a meeting " had been held.
Concerning the " violence " justification for such abroga-
tions the following facts were noted :
The argument that the right of assembly would lead to violence
met this contradiction in McKeesport ; a riot there, the only one,
resulted from the authorities' cancellation of a meeting for which
a permit had been granted.
In Johnstown no restriction was ever laid on meetings and no
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 237
violence ever resulted; the only attempt at violence was the
action of a Citizens' Committee, led by a Y. M. C. A. secretary,
which drove labor organizers out of town.
In Sharon and Farrell the workers, prohibited from assembly
marched weekly across the state line into Ohio where they held
great mass meetings without a sign of violence.
Comparison of the Pittsburgh District with Wlieeling, West
Va., and Ohio districts proves that the reasons given by the
Pennsylvania authorities were without basis in fact.
The progressive nature of the restrictions imposed was illus-
trated in the South Side of Pittsburgh where labor organizers
obtained a hall after every pressure had been put on the owner
to cancel the lease. Thereupon the Mayor of Pittsburgh forbade
outright all meetings on the South Side.
The whole case for the abrogations is epitomized in the
preamble to the Sheriff's proclamation issued September 20
(two days before the strike) :
Whereas I, William S. Haddock, sheriff of Allegheny County,
have been formally notified by many citizens, industrial cor-
porations, and employers that printed inflammatory circulars and
other information have been distributed and disseminated among
the people calling a general strike of all employees of various
industrial manufactories throughout Allegheny County, with the
request that they cease work and leave their places of employment
and by reason thereof there now exists among the people great
unrest, uncertainty, and doubt as to the safety of life, liberty,
and property: Therefore . . .
Now Sheriff Haddock has admitted that he never saw the
" printed inflammatory circulars " alleged to have been dis-
tributed ; neither did any " citizens, industrial corporations
and employers " produce any such circulars issued by the
strike leadership in the period immediately preceding Sep-
tember 20.
238 REPOKT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
These abrogations, before, during and after the strike,
must be considered with this fact :
" Free elections " were customarily impossible in steel towns
in Western Pennsylvania due to clearly understood manipulations
by steel company officials or by steel company officials who were
also public officials.
That is, democratic practises as well as constitutional rights
are decisively modified by the steel companies in western
Pennsylvania and the " modifications " are for the purpose of
defeating labor organization.
During the strike violations of personal rights and personal
liberty were wholesale ; men were arrested without warrants,
imprisoned without charges, their homes invaded without
legal process, magistrates' verdicts were rendered frankly on
the basis of whether the striker would go back to work or
not. But even these things would seem to be less a concern
to the nation at large than the degradation, persistent and
approved by " public opinion," of civil liberties in behalf of
private concerns' industrial practices.
To the steel workers the import of the violations of civil
and personal rights resulted as follows :
Great numbers of workers came to believe —
that local mayors, magistrates and police officials try to
break strikes;
that state and Federal officials, particularly the Federal
Department of Justice, help to break strikes, and that
armed forces are used for this purpose ;
that most newspapers actively and promptly exert a strike-
breaking influence ; most churches passively.
Workers generally attributed such strike breaking to the
men filling the offices rather than to the Governmental and
social institutions per se.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 239
The above beliefs were imdoubtedly widespread among
steel workers ; many expressed the beliefs with ferocity; many
more in a dumb, deep-seated suspiciousness of everything and
everybody connected with public executives, courts. Federal
agents, army officers, reporters or clergy. The steel strike
made tens of thousands of citizens believe that our American
institutions are not democratic or not democratically admirir
istered.
The basis of such beliefs (detailed in sub-reports) will
be hastily summarized here. The data concern chiefly west-
ern Pennsylvania, secondarily Indiana and Illinois.
Local magistrates, police authorities, etc., around Pitts-
burgh were very frequently steel mill officials or relations
of mill officials. In other cases steel mill officials exercised
police authority without the excuse of having been previously
elected to public office. For example, besides Sherifi Had-
dock of Allegheny County whose brother was superintendent
of an American Sheet & Tin Plate plant (Corporation sub-
sidiary), Mayor Crawford of Duquesne was the brother of
the President of the McKeesport Tin Plate Co. ; President
Moon of the Borough Council of Homestead was chief of the
mechanical department of the Homestead mill ; Burgess Lin-
coln of Munhall was a department superintendent in the same
mill. The Burgess of Clairton was a mill official ; etc., etc.
When a striker was taken before mill-official public-officials
he was likely to suspect connections between his fate and the
steel company's desires. In many other cases officials of
mills only, personally, gave the orders for arrests, and the
decisions as to whether the arrested should be jailed or not,
generally after learning whether the striker would return to
work or not.
The charges on which strikers were arraigned before local
magistrates, then imprisoned or fined, were often never
recorded and never learned by the prisoners. Recorded
340 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
formal specifications included " stopping men from going to
work," " cursing " (the state police or deputies), " abusing,"
" refusing to obey orders " (to move on, etc.), " going out of
his house before daylight," " laughing at the police," " throw-
ing strike cards out on the street," " smiling at the state
police." Fines ran from $10 to $50 or $60. Imprisonment
terms ran up to months. Arrested men were frequently
taken, not to jail, but inside the steel mill and held there.
The charges of beatings, clubbings, often substantiated by
doctors' and eye-witnesses' affidavits, were endless and
monotonous; in most communities the only public official to
appeal to turned out to be another mill official.
Federal officials* active intervention concerned chiefly (1)
the Department of Justice, whose connections with steel com-
pany " under-cover men " were referred to earlier, and whose
public activities dealt with raids in search of " reds " and
Attorney General Palmer's statements about " reds " in the
steel strike; and (2) the IT. S. Army. Both cases contrib-
uted to steel workers' beliefs about strike-breaking activities.
The Administration left the field to the Department of Justice
and the Army, so far as the steel workers could see. Con-
gressional intervention in the shape of the investigation and
report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Education filled
the strikers with a bitterness only to be understood by de-
tailed comparison of the Committee's report and the facts.
The principal use of armed forces outside of Pennsylvania
was at Gary, Ind., occupied first by the State militia, then by
the U. S. Army under General Leonard Wood. Previous to
these occupations newspapers throughout the country printed
stories of "bloody riots" in Gary and that the city was a
" hotbed of reds." The facts were as follows :
The walkout on September 22 at Gary was almost com-
plete. Agreements, subject to various disputes over interpre-
tation, were reached with the city authorities concerning
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 241
picket line rules. Huge mass-meetings were held in the ojien
air. The strikers made frequent complaints of violent raids
carried out by bands of citizens calling themselves " Loyal
American Leaguers " who were charged with clubbing groups
of strikers on street corners at nights. A crowd of strikers
leaving a mass-meeting tried to pull a negro strike breaker off
a street car : the negro was slightly injured and a number of
strikers were clubbed. On this case of " mob violence," the
only one alleged, Indiana state guards were sent in. Parades
were forbidden. Ex-service men among the strikers, inde-
pendently of the strike leadership, put on their old army
uniforms and started a march to exhibit the uniforms to the
guardsmen. There were about two hundred of these ex-
soldiers and about ten thousand strikers in the streets fell
in behind the procession which wound through the town in
disregard of the guardsmen and quietly disbanded in the
park where meetings were held. On this second case of
" mob violence," known as the " outlaw parade," the U. S.
regulars occupied Gary, with General Wood in personal
charge, proclaiming martial law. The regulars were
equipped with bayonets and steel helmets and the force in-
cluded many trucks mounting machine guns and bringing
field artillery.
General Wood declared that "the army would be neutral."
He established rules in regard to picketing. These rules
were so interpreted and carried out as to result in breaking up
the picket line. One picket, for example, would be permitted
at a certain spot; if the striker who came up to relieve the
picket stopped to converse with him and to receive reports
and instructions, both strikers would be arrested. Delays and
difficulties would attend the release of these men from jail
or " bull pen." The picket line thus dwindled and its dis-
appearance signalled to the Gary workers that the strike was
breaking. Army officers sent soldiers to arrest union oflScers
243 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
in other trades, for example, for threatening to call a strike
on a local building operation. Workers throughout the city
believed that the Federal Government opposed them and that
the regulars would stay as long as the steel workers remained
on strike. The army was not withdrawn until the strike was
declared off.
The maintenance of the Steel Corporation's non-union
policy in Gary, therefore, entailed the use of the Federal
army and the expenditure of public money with results which
helped to break the strike.
The feeling of the steel workers, then, might be summed up
thus: that local and national government not only was not
their government (i.e. in their behalf) but was government in
behalf of interests opposing theirs ; that in strike times govern-
ment activities tended to break strikes. So far the steel
workers' suspicions concern the administrators, rather than
the institutions, of government.
Finally the press in most communities, and particularly
in Pittsburgh, led the workers there to the belief that the
press lends itself instantly and persistently to strike breaking.
They believed that the press immediately took sides, printed
only the news favoring that side, suppressed or colored its
records, printed advertisements and editorials urging the
strikers to go back, denounced the strikers and incessantly
misrepresented the facts. All this was found to be true in
the case of the Pittsburgh papers (as analyzed in a sub-
report). Foreign language papers largely followed the lead
of the English papers. The average American-born discrimi-
nating citizen of Pittsburgh could not have obtained from his
papers sufficient information to get a true conception of the
strike ; basic information was not in those papers. The steel
worker-reader, moreover, gave attention not only to the omis-
sions of the press but to commissions plainly directed against
the strike. In the minds of workingmen outside steel areas
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 243
the newspapers' handling of the steel strike added weight to
the conviction that the press of the country is not the work-
ingmen's press.
The pulpit as carefully analyzed in the Pittsburgh district
proved itself largely dependent on the press. The sub-report
finds that a fair and comprehensive history of the strike
would not require mention of either the Protestant Church or
Catholic Church as organizations in Allegheny County. In
one or two communities individual clergymen were the
heart of either the support of the strike or of the opposition
to it. Research among clergymen revealed a large minority
deeply suspicious of the newspaper version of the strike but
ineffective for organizing concerted action, even for purposes
of self-information. The workers' attitude to the church
followed mainly these few individuals, deeming the church
another strike breaker where some clergyman preached or
wrote against the strike or where another gift to a local
church by a steel company became public, or deeming it a
comfort at least, where some clergyman worked for the
strike. The great mass of steel workers paid no heed to the
church as a social organization.
This difference in workers' attitudes to press and to pulpit
was noted: after the strike workers generally were making
no effort to make the church their church; but workers in
many sections of the nation, in steel towns and out, redoubled
efforts to set up their own press and inaugurated their own
federated news service.
To sum up the social consequences of a non-union labor
policy, especially that of the Steel Corporation, is plainly
difficult; the manifestations were so wide and so various.
The Corporation's policy dominated the industry. The in-
dustry's practise entailed discharge for unionism, coercion,
espionage, the use of under-cover men and strike-breaking
detective agencies. Maintenance of the industry's practise
244 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
changed the complexion of governmental and social institu-
tions. In the eyes of the strikers and a host of their fellow-
workingmen these changed governmental and social institu-
tions tended, in greater or less degree, more or less promptly,
to strike breaking. In the eyes of less interested observers
the facts at least raised the questions :
Whether there is any influence at present more powerful in
American civilization than the influence of great industrial cor-
porations or trusts?
Whether any single influence works more effectively on our
national life than the non-union policy of our greatest Cor-
poration for vicious or beneficial results ?
For the great part of the country^s beaten steel strikers the
answer was over-simplified. The steel worker went back to
the twelve-hour day, earnings under a living "wage, ruthlessly
arbitrary anti-organization control. For escape he had
turned to the A. F. of L. and in 1920 the A. F. of L. was
not succeeding in freeing him. He hesitated to turn to the
I.W.W., for the I.W.W. was "outlawed.'' He could not
turn to the Steel Corporation or the other great companies for
they were standing pat. He did not turn to the press.
Among American democratic institutions he found none to
fit his need, no Federal body or machinery for acting on his
case nor even any governmental institution of inquiry, which
in 1920 was reaching out to learn his grievances.
The beaten steel worker displayed little interest in govern-
mental institutions; instead he had acquired a rather active
distrust of them. While many of the " foreigners " began
piling up money to get themselves out of America the great
majority began waiting for " the next strike." That was the
only resource thoughtfully provided for them among the
democratic American institutions.
CONCLUDING
The Summarized Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Eeport have been transferred for convenience to pages 11-19
in Chapter I (Introduction) from the end of the book, where
they belong naturally, inasmuch as they were formulated
after all the foregoing analyses and discussion had been
drafted.
The gist of the Conclusions is that conditions in the steel
industry " gave the workers just cause for complaint and
for action " and that " these unredressed grievances still
exist."
The gist of the Recommendations is that the Federal Gov-
ernment set up a commission for the industry, in order to
initiate free, open conference between those who must always
be chiefly responsible for settlement of the industry's prob-
lems: — its owners and its workers. To this is added recom-
mendation for persistent investigation and publicity.
In pursuit of its recommendations and in concluding its
immediate task, the Commission put this report before the
American people and the American people's government, in
the person of President Wilson. The action of the Commis-
sion virtually raised this question of fundamental impor-
tance :
Is the nation helpless before conditions in a basic industry
which promise a future crisis ? Can our democratic society
be moved to do industrial Justice without the pressure of
crisis itself?
As a part of the task of publishing the facts and as a
means of expressing their judgment as Christians, the Com-
missioners requested a committee to draw up, for separate
free distribution, if possible, a compact form of General
245
246 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE
Findings based on the Conclusions of the Report. Necessar-
ily they are in part repetitious, but they were designed to in-
clude expressions of moral judgment, such as were not the
first concern of the Report. A sub-committee, of which Dr.
Alva W. Taylor was chairman, drafted these findings, which
were presented to the Executive Committee of the Inter-
church Movement with the Report on May 10, 1920, as
adopted by the Commission.
FINDINGS
1. The fundamental grievances were found to be:
(a) Excessive hours.
(b) The " boss system."
(c) No right to organize or to representation.
2. The remedies desired were:
(a) Shorter day and week with a living wage.
(b) Representation and conference, and an end to the
" boss system " which so often subjects common
labor to petty tyrannies.
(c) Right to unionize and a substitution of industrial
democracy for industrial autocracy.
3. These grievances were of long standing, but had found no
expression because:
(a) They were limited largely to foreigners of many
races and languages without industrial tradition,
education or leadership to organize.
(b) Race prejudice effectually kept the more skilled,
more intelligent and better paid American workmen
from taking up the cause of the foreign-speaking
workmen.
(c) Labor unions have been accustomed to look upon the
foreigner as an actual or potential strike breaker.
(d) The steel companies have most effectually deterred
men from joining labor organizations.
4. These long-standing grievances were brought to expres-
sion by:
CONCLUDING 247
(a) The part these workingmen played in the war and
the treatment afforded them for the sake of war
production which gave them a new sense of worth
and independence.
(b) The fight for democracy and news of a larger work-
ingmen's freedom in their native lands together with
a growing sense of real Americanism, which brought
a spirit of democracy to their ranks.
(c) The decision of the American Federation of Labor
to organize them and its actual work of organizing
them into Craft Unions.
We found:
(a) That the strike was regularly conducted in orthodox
fashion according to the A. F. of L. rules and
principles.
(b) That while radicals sympathized with the strikers,
as was natural, they were effectually debarred by
the strike leaders and that far from having influence
in it, they often denounced and opposed those who
conducted the strike.
We find the grievances to have been real:
(a) The average week of 68.7 hours, the twelve-hour
day, whether on a straight twelve-hour shift or on
a broken division of 11-13 or 10-14 hours, the un-
broken 24-hour work period at the turn of a shift
and the underpayment of unskilled labor, are all
inhuman.
(b) It is entirely practicable to put all processes requir-
ing continuous operation on a straight eight-hour
basis as is illustrated by the Colorado Fuel and Iron
Company. These processes require the services of
only a fraction of the workers.
(c) The " boss system " is bad, the plant organization
is military and the control autocratic. The com-
panies' claims, that they accord the right to join
unions and the opportunity of conference, are
theoretical; neither is allowed in practice.
(d) The use of " under-cover " men is severely con-
demned. It breeds distrust, breaks down morals and
248 KEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE
Btimulates ill-will; it is imdemocratic and un-
American.
(e) The refusal of the United States Steel Corporation
to confer, to accept mediation and its attitude of
hauteur as shown by its refusal to follow the recom-
mendations of the War Labor Board incited labor
strife and because of the strength and influence of
this Corporation, forms one of the greatest obstacles
to a just settlement of industrial grievances and
unrest at this time.
7. The Strike was defeated by :
(a) The strike-breaking methods of the steel companies
and their effective mobilization of public opinion
against the strikers through the charges of radical-
ism, bolshevism, and the closed shop, none of which
were justified by the facts; and by the suppression
of civil rights.
(b) The hostility of the press giving biased and colored
news and the silence of both press and pulpit on the
actual question of justice involved; Vhich attitudes
of press and pulpit helped to break the strikers'
morale.
(c) Public fear of a general labor war, to the coincidence
of the coal strike and threat of the railroad strike,
together with labor's failure to formulate and ex-
plain its purposes with regard to public service.
(d) The prevailing prejudice in the steel towns and in
the general public mind and among the English-
speaking workingmen against the foreigners who
constituted the overwhelming number of the strikers.
(e) The ineffective support given the strike by most of
the twenty-four affiliated Craft Unions through
which it was organized, and by the A. F. of L.
8. Recommendations :
1. The adoption of the eight-hour shift on all contin-
uous processes.
2. Limiting of the day to not more than ten hours on
duty, with not more than a six-day and a fifty-four
hour week, with at least a minimum comfort wage.
CONCLUDING 249
3. Eecognition of right to join regular Craft Unions
or any other freely chosen form of labor organiza-
tion; recognition of right to open conference, either
through shop conunittees or union representatives;
recognition of right of collective bargaining.
4. A vast extension of house building — by the com-
munities where possible; by the steel companies
where community building is inadequate or im-
possible.
5. That organized labor:
(a) Democratize and control the unions, es-
pecially in regard to the calling, conduct
and settlement of strikes.
(b) Eeorganize unions with a view of sharing in
responsibility for production and in control
of production processes ; to this end :
1. Eepudiating restriction of production
as a doctrine.
2. Formulating contracts which can be
lived up to.
3. Finding a eubstitute for the closed
shop wherever it is a union practice.
(c) Scrupulously avoid all advocates of violence.
(d) Accept all possible proffers of publicity and
conciliation.
(e) Promote Americanization in all possible
ways and insist upon an American standard
of living for all workingmen.
(f) Prepare more adequate technical informa-
tion for the public in regard to all condi-
tions bearing upon the calling and the con-
duct of a strike.
(g) Seek alliance and council from the salaried
class known as brain workers.
6. That the President's Industrial Conference's plan
for standing tribunals of conciliation and publicity
be given a fair trial. We believe that the most ef-
fective step to be taken for the obtaining of justice
in a strike situation is through publicity, concilia-
tion and a voluntary system of arbitration ; and as
a beginning we recommend the fullest publication
350 REPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE
of these findings and of our more complete reports.
7. That minimum wage commissions be established
and laws enacted providing for an American stan-
dard of living through the labor of the natural
bread-winner permitting the mother to keep up a
good home and the children to obtain at least a
high school education.
8. That the Federal Government investigate the re-
lations of Federal authorities to private corpora-
tions' " under-cover " men and to "labor detective
agencies."
9. That the eight-hour day be accepted by labor, capi-
tal and the public as tlie immediate goal for the
working day and that government provide by law
against working days that bring over-fatigue and de-
prive the individual, his home and his community of
that minimum of time which gives him an oppor-
tunity to discharge all his obligations as a social
being in a democratic society.
We recommend to the press that it free itself of the all too
well founded charge of bias, favoring capital as against labor
and redeem its power as a promoter of truth and a formulator of
public opinion by searching out all the facts in regard to indus-
trial questions and publishing them without fear or favor.
We plead with the pulpit that it be diligent to discharge its
legitimate prophetic role as an advocate of justice, righteousness
and humanity in all such conflicts of human interest as those
involved in industrial strife.
We condemn unsparingly those authorities who suspended the
right of free speech and peaceful assemblage before, during and
after the steel strike.
We recommend that the Industrial Department of the Inter-
church World Movement and the Social Service Commission of
the Federal Council of Churches continue this type of impartial
investigation of industrial strife and unrest and extend it to
studies of general conditions in industry affecting the life, peace,
and welfare of all concerned and that their findings be published
CONCLUDING 251
as a means of enlightening public opinion, begetting impartial
judgment, and promoting industrial justice and peace.
Conclusion.
All the conditions that caused the steel strike continue to
exist. We feel that unless changes are made approximating in
some degree the findings here presented, further unrest is in-
evitable and another strike must come. In the measure that
workingmen become intelligent and Americanized, will they
refuse to labor under such conditions.
APPENDICES
Appendix A
MINIMUM OF SUBSISTENCE AND
MINIMUM COMFORT BUDGET
From report made for this Inquiry by the Bureau of Applied
Economics, Washington, D. C. (November, 1919.)
Various students of the subject have endeavored to establish
the amount of income necessary to support a family in health and
decency. In doing so several budget levels of living have been
analyzed. The two most clearly distinguished are:
1. The Minimum of Subsistence Level. This level is based
essentially on animal well being with little or no attention to
the comforts or social demands of human beings.
2. The Minimum of Comfort Level. This represents a level
somewhat above that of mere animal subsistence and provides in
some measure for comfortable clothing, insurance, a modest
amount of recreation, etc. This level provides for health and
decency but for very few comforts, and is probably much below
the idea had in mind in the frequent but indefinite expression
"The American Standard of Living."
All of the studies have taken as a basis a family of five —
husband, wife and three children. This is done (1) because
the average American family is of this- size and (2) because it
is necessary that marriage should be practically universal and
result in a minimum of three children of the race is to perpetuate
itself.
The results of the various studies are closely similar and
indicate that the annual cost of maintaining a family of five at
a mifaimum of subsistence level at prices prevailing in the latter
part of 1919 was approximately $1,575. This would be equiv-
alent in purchasing power to approximately $885 in 1914.
The cost of maintaining the minimum of comfort level has
not been so thoroughly studied. Prof. Ogburn's estimate as of
255
256 APPENDICES
June, 1918, was $1,760, With an increase of 15 per cent, in
living costs since that time the cost of this budget would now be
approximately $2,000. This sum would be equivalent in pur-
chasing power to approximately $1,125 in 1914. Prof. Ogburn's
conclusions miay be taken as a conservative minimum, as it is
much below the estimate recently put forth by the U. S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics as to the cost of maintaining a government
employee's family in Washington at a level of health and decency.
This budget, at August, 1919, prices, cost $2,262.
All of the studies referred to dealt with larger Eastern cities,
chiefly New York. The costs would, therefore, not be strictly
applicable to all cities and towns of the country. The differences,
however, except in a few exceptional cases, would not be very
great.
A more detailed analysis of these studies is made in the fol-
lowing paragraphs:
1. THE COST OF A MINIMUM OF SUBSISTENCE BUDGET.
Professor W. F. Ogburn, of Columbia University, and one of
the best known authorities on cost of living, in a recently pub-
lished article made a very careful analysis of all preceding
studies of minimum of subsistence levels and also submits a
carefully prepared budget of his own.^ Professor Ogburn's
calculations are all based on prices prevailing in June, 1918.
Prices between that time'and the Autumn of 1919 have advanced
about 15 per cent., and these changes, of course, would have to
be taken into consideration in arriving at the cost of the budgets
at the present time. In order, however, to make the reasoning
entirely clear the details of the various studies are first sum-
marized from Professor Ogburn's article.
* Published in "Standards of Living," Bureau of Applied Economics,
Washington, 1919.
APPENDICES 257
(a) Professor Oghurn's Budget
Food $615
Clothing:
Man 76
Woman 55
11 to 14 years 40
7 to 10 years 33
4 to 6 years 30
Rent 180
Fuel and light 62
Insurance 40
Organizations 12
Eeligion 7
Street-car fare 40
Paper, books, etc 9
Amusements, drinks, and tobacco 50
Sickness 60
Dentist, occulist, glasses, etc 3
Furnishings 35
Laundry 4
Cleaning sxipplies 15
Miscellaneous 20
Total $1,386
This budget is for a large eastern city and is the result of
etudies of GOO actual budgets of shipyard workers in the New
York shipbuilding district.
(b) Professor Chapm's Bvdget Brought Up to Date
Another way of estimating a minimum budget for the Amer-
ican subsistence level in 1918 is to take minimum budgets of
past years that have been accepted as standard and apply the
increases from the date of the budget to the present time in
the prices of the various items of the budget, thus bringing them
up to date. This method assumes no change in minimum
standards. It is of course subject to possible inaccuracies in
measuring the rising cost of living between specific dates for
specific places. This inaccuracy is thought to be slight, however.
For instance, one of the most famous and perhaps most gen-
erally accepted budget estimates is that of Prof. Chapin, who
made a study lasting several years of New York families, pub-
lishing his result in 1907. He said, " An income under $800
is not enough to permit the maintenance of a normal standard.
An income of $900 or over probably permits the maintenance
258 APPENDICES
of a normal standard at least as far as the physical man is
concerned." If we take the increase in the cost of living from
1907 to June, 1918, to be 55 per cent., then Chapin's $900 be-
comes $1,395. If we take the increase to be 60 per cent, then
Chapin's $900 becomes $1,440. Probably the best estimates of
increasing cost of living place the increase from January 1, 1915,
to June 1, 1918, as 55 per cent.
(c) Mvnvmum Budget of New York Factory Commission
Brought Up to Date
In 1915 the New York State Factory Investigation Com-
mission set a minimum budget for 1914 in New York City
at the figure $876. Applying increases in items of the budget
by classes from January 1, 1915, to June 1, 1918, we get, as
seen from the following table, a budget of $1,356.
Budget Increase in cost New York Factory
New York Factory of living to Budget Brought
Commission 1914 June 1, 1918 Up to Date
Per cent.
Food $325 65 $536
Rent 200 29 258
Fuel and light 20 44 28
Clothing 140 76 246
Sundries 191 51 288
$876 $1,356
MINIMUM BUDGET OF THE NEW YORK FACTORY INVESTI-
GATING COMMISSION, 1915
Estimate of Cost of Living of Normal Family of Five in New York City
Food $325.00
Rent 200.00
Fuel and light 20.00
Clothing 140.00
Car fare 31.20
Insurance :
Man 20.00
Family 15.60
Health 22.00
Furnishings 700
Education, newspaper 5,63
Recreation and amusement 50.00
Miscellaneous 40.00
Total $876.43
APPENDICES 259
(d) Minimum Budget of New York Board of Estimate
Brought Up to Date
In February, 1915, the Bureau of Personal Service of the
Board of Estimate and Apportionment of New York City made a
minimum budget estimate for an unskilled laborer's family in
New York City of $845. Applying increases in items of the
budget by classes from January 1, 1915, to June 1, 1918, we
get, as seen from the following table, a budget of $1,317.
Budget Increase in New York Board
New York Board cost of living to of Estimate Budget
of Estimate, 1915 June 1, 1918 Brought Up to Date
Food $384 65 $634
Rent 168 29 217
Fuel and light 43 44 62
Clothing 104 76 183
Sundries 146 51 221
Total $845 $1,317
It is possible to criticize this budget as being too low in
allowances for health, furniture, and education, and very low
indeed in other sundries.
BUDGET OF NEW YORK BOARD OF ESTIMATE FOR 1915
Housing $168.00
Car fare 30.30
Food 383.81
Clothing 104.20
Fuel and light 42.75
Health 20.00
Insurance 22.88
Papers and other reading matter 5.00
Recreation 40.00
Furniture, utensils, fixtures, moving expenses, etc 18.00
Church dues 5.00
Incidentals — soap, washing material, stamps, etc 5.00
Total $844.94
(e) Estimating the Budget from Food Expenditure
It is generally accepted that a man at moderate physical labor
needs 3,500 calories a day and Atwater has estimated the needs
of the individual members of his family in per cents of his needs.
Thus his wife consumes 0.8 as much; a boy of 16 years of
260 APPENDICES
age, 0.9 as much; a girl 15 to 16, 0.8; a child from 6 to 9
years, 0.5; and so on. We thus express a family in terms of
adult males. We say that a family of five — man, wife, and three
children — will equal 3.3 adult males when the children are at
a certain age.
The average food budget of 600 families of shipyard workers
in the New York district collected by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics was found to cost $607 for 3.6 equivalent adult males.
This was submitted to calory analysis and yielded 3,115 calories
of energy for man per day, not including any waste. This
means that $607 did not furnish enough food for the New York
families. A food expert might have bought the necessary
amount, but the families in actual practice did not.
Dietaries should be well balanced also, but this analysis was
not undertaken. So the important conclusion results that in
the New York shipbuilding area $607 is not enough of an
allowance for food.
Prof. Chapin's study shows that at the point where the
families cease to be undernourished, food is 44 per cent, of
the total budget. Now, if the low figure of $615 is taken as
the food allowance for a family of 3.3 or 3.4 equivalent adult
males and estimated at 44 per cent, of the budget, we get a
minimum budget of $1,396.
Summary of Estimates on Minimum Budgets for American
Subsistence Level in 1918
From three angles, therefore, an estimate may be formed of
a minimum budget: (1) from study of actual budgets, (2)
from applying increased costs of living to recognized standard
budgets, (3) from estimates of adequate food allowance and its
percentage of expenditures.
These estimates for New York district in 1918 are as follows :
1. Prof. Ogburn's detailed budget from family studies $1,386
2. Chapin's budget brought to date . . 1,395
New York Factory Investigation Commissions* Budget
brought to date 1,356
New York Board of Estimate budget brought to date 1,317
3. From food allowance 1,396
APPENDICES 261
The Above Studies Brought Up to 1919
The above estimates were all made as of June, 1918, or, if
made at an earlier date, were brought up only to that date in
Professor Ogburn's analysis. Between June, 1918, and the
present time (i.e. the latter part of 1919) figures compiled by
the IT. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics show an increase of
about 15 per cent, in general cost of living. Applying this
percentage increase to the figures compiled by Professor
Ogburn in the preceding table, the following results are ob-
tained :
VARIOUS AUTHORITATIVE ESTIMATES OF THE ANNUAL COST
OF MAINTAINING A FAMILY AT A MINIMUM OF SUB-
SISTENCE LEVEL, BROUGHT UP TO AUGUST, 1919
June August
1918 1919
Ogburn's Budget $1,386 $1,594
Chapin's Budget 1,395 1,604
New York Factory Investigation Commission .... 1,356 1,559
New York Board of Estimate Budget 1,317 1,515
Budget compiled from food allowance 1,396 1,605
Average of all five estimate $1,370 $1,575
Inasmuch as these various estimates are so closely similar, the
average of the five — namely $1,575 — may be taken as the ap-
proximate amount necessary to maintain a family of five at a
minimum of subsistence level at prices prevailing in the latter
part of 1919.
2. THE COST OF A MINIMUM OP COMFORT BUDGET
(a) Professor Ogburn's Budget
Professor W. F. Ogburn prepared in 1918, for the consid-
eration of the National War Labor Board and of Judge Samuel
Alschuler, arbitrator in the Chicago Packing house industries,
a budget for an average workingman's family of five which
would include not only subsistence requirements but a minimum
of comfort and recreation. The cost of this budget was placed
at $1,760. This was at prices prevailing in June, 1918, Since
262 APPENDICES
that date the cost of living, as above noted, has increased 15
per cent. This would make the present cost of the budget
$2,024. By major items, this budget was distributed as fol-
lows:
Cost June Cost August
1918 1919
Food $625.00
Clothing 313.50
Rent, fuel and light 295.00
Sundries 527.00
Total $1,760.50 $2,024.00
(b) V. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Budget for
Government Employee's Family
The TJ. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has just published,
after very considerable investigation, a quantity and cost budget
for a Government employee's family in Washington, D. C.
The budget level aimed at is one of heMth^.and decency — that
is to say — a level at which the family will have just enough
to maintain itself in health and decency, but with none of the
"trimmings" and very few of the comforts of life. This
budget had in mind primarily the clerical employee, but except
possibly in the matter of clothes there seems no reason why the
levelof a clerical worker should be more costly than that of a
'Mechanic or l^OTer! On Ihe other ^and, Washington prices
"~were undoubtedly above the average for the country as a whole.
This budget, at August, 1919, prices, cost $2,263. The dis-
tribution of its principal items is shown in the following table:
'^U SUMMARY OF BUDGET
Cost of Quantity Budget at Market Prices
^:^^:^0 I. Food $773.93
II. Clothing:
,L '?„ Husband $121.16
^'^ ^ Wife 166.46
Boy (11 years) 96.60
Girl (5 vears) 82..50
, Boy (2 Vears) 47.00 513.72
( , f > III. Housing, fuel and light 428.00
" IV. Miscellaneous 546.82
tV; (, V Total budget at market prices $2,262.47
^Ji-A
APPENDICES 263
Possible saving upon market cost by a family of extreme
thrift, of high intelligence, great industry in shopping,
good fortune in purchasing at lowest prices, and in which
the wife is able to do a maximum amoiuit of home work.
I. Food (71/2 per cent. ) $58.04
II. Clothing (10 per cent.) 51.37
III. Housing 30.00
IV. Miscellaneous 97.50
Total economies 236.91
Total budget minus economies $2,025.56
Savings. — No provision is made in this budget for savings,
other than the original cost of household furniture and equip-
ment, which would average about $1,000 in value. No definite
estimate, of course, can be made as to the amount which a low-
salaried Government employee should be expected to save. But
an average saving of 12% per cent, of yearly salary during an
employee's single and early married life would seem to be the
maximum which could be expected. Over a period of, say, 15
years this would result in a total accumulation of about $2,000.
Assuming $1,000 of this to be invested in household equipment,
there would be a net sum of $1,000 available for investment
in a home or in other direct income-producing form. In any
case, it would represent an annual income of approximately $50
per year.
Eecognizing the high prices prevailing in Washington, and
recognizing also that the Government employee's family may
have certain necessary expenses not falling upon the working-
man's family, it would seem that the fact that this budget cost
$2,662 would tend to confirm the $2,000 minimum comfort
budget of Professor Ogburn as conservative for workingmen's
families generally in the country as a whole.
Appendix B
Wi^GES IN IRON AND STEEL AND OTHER
INDUSTRIES
From report made for this inquiry by the Bureau of Applied
Economics, Washington, D. C.
Information regarding hourly earnings and full time hours
per week in the iron and steel industry is presented in consid-
erable detail in an article in the Monthly Labor Review of the
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for October, 1919. Similar
information of recent date is not available for many other in-
dustries, but there is sufficient to make possible a valuable com-
parison of earnings and hours of labor in the steel industry
with conditions in other lines of emplo3rment.
The data presented below are divided into four groups:
1. WAGES AND HOURS IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY COMPARED WITH
OTHER INDUSTRIES, FOR THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE
The following table gives the hourly earnings, full time hours
per week and full time earnings per week, for specified classes
of labor in the steel industry and in all other important indus-
tries for which information in comparable form is available.
All figures are for 1919, and, with few exceptions, for the latter
part of 1919. The sources of the information are given on a
later page.
The full time hours per week, it is important to note, are
the regular weekly working hours for the occupation. The
actual hours worked by individuals and, in consequence, their
weekly earnings may be considerably less,
264
APPENDICES
265
AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS AND HOURS PER FULL TIME
WEEK IN VARIOUS INDUSTRIES
Average Full Time Earnings
Hourly Hours per Full
Rate per Week Week
IRON AND STEEL
All employeej 68.1 68.7 $46.78
Common labor 46.2 74.0 34.19
Other labor (including skilled and
semi-skilled) 78.4 66.0 51.74
MINING
1. Anthracite:
Company miners 58.1 51.6 29.98
Contract miners 84.2 51.6 43.45
Company miners' laborers 52.6 51.6 27.14
Contract miners' laborers 63.9 51.6 32.97
Laborers 51.9 52.2 26.90
Average for all inside occupations . . 67.3 52.0 35.00
2. Bituminous :
Miners, hand 78.4 47.3 37.08
Miners, machine 94.7 48.1 45.55
Loaders 80.2 47.4 38.01
Laborers 57.5 52.0 29.90
Average for all inside occupations . . 74.4 51.9 38.42
UNITED STATES ARSENALS:
Common labor 46.0 4.80 22.08
All other employees, average 76.1 48.0 36.53
BUILDING TRADES:
Average for all building trades 85.4 44.0 37.58
Common labor 52.0 44.0 22.88
Bricklayers 89.3 44.2 39.47
Carpenters 78.2 44.2 34.56
Cement workers and finishers 80.8 44.9 36.28
Wiremen, inside 79.9 44.3 35.40
Painters 76.2 42.8 32.61
Plasterers 89.5 43.6 39.02
Plumbers 92.4 44.0 40.66
Sheet-metal workers 80.9 44.0 35.60
Steam fitters 92.8 44.0 40.83
Structural iron workers 94.2 44.0 41.45
New York, N. Y.
Average for all building trades 83.5 44.0 36.74
NAVY YARDS:
Laborers, common 44.5 48.0 21.36
All other occupations 79.9 48.0 38.35
Boilermakers 80.0 48.0 38.40
Coppersmiths 86.0 48 41.28
Electricians 80.0 48.0 38.40
Machinists 80.0 48.0 38.40
Machinists, electrical 80.0 48.0 38.40
Molders 80.0 48.0 38.40
Patternmakers 86.6 48.0 41.57
Pipefitters 80.0 48.0 38.40
266
APPENDICES
Average
Hourly
NAVY YARDS (cont.) i Rate
Plumbers 80.0
Riveters 80.0
Shipfitters 80.0
Shipsmitha 80.0
Toolmakers 86.0
Holders-on 60.6
PRINTERS: Various Cities.
Linotype Operators
Newspapers, day
Book and job
Compositors
Newspapers, day
Book and job
RAILROAD EMPLOYEES:
Shopmen
Machinists 72.0
Blacksmiths 72.0
Boilermakers 72.0
Road freight
Engineers and motormen 82.5
Firemen 60.0
Conductors 69.2
Road passenger
Engineers and motormen 98.7
Firemen 88.0
Conductors 83.3
Yard Service
Firemen 52.0
Hostlers 53.1
Laborers
Mechanics' helpers and apprentices 47.1
Section men 37.2
Levermen 49.6
Yard switch tenders 34.7
Other yard employees 37.4
Enginehouse men 42.3
Other unskilled laborers 41.3
SHIPYARDS:
Pacific Coast District
Laborers 52.0
Other occupations 75.8
Atlantic Coast District
Laborers 36.0
All occupations (including laborers) 72.7
STREET RAILWAY EMPLOYEES:
Average for various cities
North Atlantic 49.8
South Atlantic 39.8
North Central 49.6
Western 49.4
* 5 hours per day.
Full Time
Earnings
Hours
per Full
per Week
Week
48.0
38.40
48.0
38.40
48.0
38.40
48.0
38.40
48.0
41.28
48.0
29.09
35.72
...
30.50
35.59
...
26.28
48.0
34.56
48.0
34.56
48.0
34.56
48.0
30.0
48.0
48.0
28.80
26.40
24.96
25.49
48.0
48.0
24.96
36.38
48.0
48.0
17.28
34.90
56.4
56.4
56.4
56.4
28.09
22.45
27.97
27.86
APPENDICES 267
3. PITTSBURGH DISTRICT. WAGES AND HOURS OF LABOR IN THE
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY COMPARED WITH WAGES IN
OTHER INDUSTRIES IN THE PITTSBURGH DISTRICT.
The next table compares hourly earnings, full time hours per
week, and full time weekly earnings in the iron and steel in-
dustry with other industries in the Pittsburgh District for
which information was available. As available information is
not very extensive the comparison was necessarily limited, but
is believed to be sufficient to indicate how wage rates and hours
of employees in the steel industry compare with other lines of
employment.
Inasmuch as the primary comparison desired is one which will
bring out the extent to which the relatively high full time weekly
earnings in the steel industry may be due to long hours, there
is added to a table a column showing how much would be
earned by each group for 44 hours per week, at the prevailing
hourly rates. In doing so, 44 hours is used as a base simply
because a number of trades in the table were already working
44 hours per week. For the purpose of the comparison, of
course, it would make no difference what base were chosen.
Again, it Is important to emphasize that the weekly hours
here presented are the regular full time hours per week of the
occupation, not the actual hours worked by individuals.
COMPARISON OF EARNINGS PER HOUR, REGULAR FULL TIME
HOURS PER WEEK, AND EARNINGS PER FULL TIME WEEK
IN VARIOUS INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS IN THE
PITTSBURGH (PA.) DISTRICT
Average Regular Earnings Earn-
Hourly Hours per per Full Inga for
Rate Week Week 44 Hours
per Week
IRON AND STEEL:
All employees , 72.8 T4.2 54.02 32.03
Common labor 48.0 77.8 37.34 21.12
Other labor (including skilled
and semi-skilled) 87.1 72.1 62.80 38.32
368
APPENDICES
Average Regular
Hourly Hours per
Rate Week
BITUMINOUS COAL MINING:
Miners, hand 78.4
Miners, machine 94.7
Loaders 80.2
Laborers 57.5
Average for all inside occupa-
tions 74.4
METAL TRADES:
Blacksmiths 70.0
Boilermakers 66.0
Molders, iron 75.0
RAILROAD EMPLOYEES:
Shopmen
Machinists 72.0
Blacksmiths 72.0
Boilermakers 72.0
Road freight
Firemen 60.0
BUILDING TRADES:
Laborers
Building laborers 50.0
Hod carriers 70.0
Plasterers' laborers 70.0
Average for laborers 63.3
Bricklayers 112.5
Carpenters 90.0
Cement finishers 82.5
Granite cutters, inside 84.4
Wiremen, inside 90.0
Painters 87.5
Plasterers 97.5
Plumbers 93.8
Sheet-metal workers 90.0
Structural iron workers 100.0
STREET RAILWAY EMPLOYEES:
Motormen and conductors 54.0
PRINTERS:
Linotj^De operators
Newspapers, day 87.5
Book and job 68.8
Compositors . .
Newspapers, day 77.0
Book and job 60.4
Earnings Earn-
per Full ings for
Week 44 Hours
per Week
47.3
48.1
47.4
52.0
51.9
48.0
50.0
48.0
48.0
48.0
48.0
48.0
56.4
48.0
48.0
48.0
48.0
37.08
45.55
38.01
29.90
38.61
33.60
33.00
36.00
34.56
34.56
34.56
28.80
30.46
42.00
33.02
36.96
28.99
34.50
41.67
35.29
25.30
32.74
30.80
29.04
33.00
31.68
31.68
31.68
26.40
48.0
24.00
22.00
44.0
30.80
30.80
44.0
30.80
30.80
45.3
28.67
27.85
44.0
49.50
49.50
44.0
39.60
39.60
44.0
36.30
36.30
44.0
37.14
37.14
44.0
39.60
39.60
44.0
38.50
38.50
44.0
42.90
42.90
44.0
41.27
41.27
44.0
39.60
39.60
44.0
44.00
44.00
23.76
38.50
30.27
33.88
26.58
APPENDICES
269
SOURCES OF DATA USED IN COMPILING DATA ON WAGES
AND HOURS USED IN THIS STUDY
Iron and Steel;
Mining:
United States
Arsenal :
Building Trades
Navy Yards:
Printers :
Railroad
Employees:
Shipyards :
Street Railway
Employees :
Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 1919.
Press Report of U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
entitled " Hours and Earnings of Employees in the
Coal Mining Industry," dated Nov. 2, 1919.
Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Department of Labor
Statistics, October, 1910.
; (1) Union wages for various trades for most of the
larger cities of the country, as compiled by the United
States Bureau of Labor Statistics and supplemented
by data furnished by union officials;
(2) Wage rates of building laborers under the scales
of the Hod Carriers' and Building Laborers' Union, and
(3) Prevailing wages in the building trades of New
York as published by the Building Trades Council of
that city.
Data supplied by United States Navy Department.
The data presented were obtained from the wage scales
and advances as published in the journals and Bul-
letins of the Typographical Union and from computa-
tions made by the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
From a Statement prepared by the U. S. Railroad
Administration under date of April 8, 1919.
From the award of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjust-
ment Board in October, 1918, still in effect. This
award provided for two general scales of shipyard
wages — one for the Atlantic Coast and one for the
Pacific Coast.
The compilation gives the hourly maximum rates of
motormen and conductors in representative cities.
The information was compiled from trade and labor
publications and is believed to be closely accurate.
The data for full time hours per week is based on an
estimate made by Arthur Sturgis in his "Analysis
of Electric Railway Operating Costs and the Cost of
Living as Related to Wages of Conductors, Motormen,
and Other Trainmen " and presented to the Electric
Railway Commission, Washington, D. C, in October,
1919.
APPENDIX C
CLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO SKILL
The classification of unskilled, semi-skilled and skived fol-
lowed in this report is that used by the government survey in
1910 (Senate Document 110, 4 vols.), and is based primarily on
wage rates. That division made all earnings under 18 cents
an hour, unskilled; all 25 cents an hour or over, skilled; and
those between, semi-skilled. The percentages of the three classes
for the industry were derived from the table for a typical estab-
lishment. (S. D. 110, vol. Ill, p. 80.)
These percentages were, in Section IV of this report, applied
to the exhaustive tables of full time earnings (S. D. 110, vol.
Ill, pp. 550-551) in order to discover the corresponding per-
centages of total payrolls. The percentages thus applied and
carried over to the column of weekly earnings made all below
$12 weekly, unskilled (median wage $10.25) ; all over $15.50
weekly, skilled (median wage $19.10) ; all between, semi-skilled
(median wage $13.50).
It is perfectly understood that this three-fold classification,
with dividing lines drawn at percentages in decimal points, rep-
resents no corresponding precision of classification in the in-
dustry itself, either as organized or as possible. The gradations
according to pay were used by the government (and by this
report) solely because they formed the only accurate measure-
ment existent of relative skill, a measurement which is very
exact in the industry, meaning a hundred gradations in typical
departmental payrolls. The usefulness of any precise classifica-
tion is obvious ; the use of the threefold classification is a make-
shift, partly to conform to industry nomenclature, partly to dis-
tinguish the three chief differing types of worker, who may be
described as being found clearly recognizable in the middle of
each class. At the two edges of the semi-skilled class there is
no definable dividing line in points of observable skill. These
270
APPENDICES 271
three clear types are (a) common labor, learning in a day how
to do something; (b) skilled labor, unreplaceable by men who
have not had many years of training; (c) semi-skilled labor,
men of months or years of training, potentially able to do skilled
work, but never having had opportunity actually to do it.
It is an indication of the backwardness of steel as an industry
that no exact classifications of jobs have been generally worked
out in it. Observation indicates that a classification much closer
to facts would be five-fold, as follows:
(a) common labor; — shiftable, replaced by "anybody," learning the
" know how " in from 1 day to 2 months.
(b) low-skilled; — common labor, but assigned steadily to set jobs re-
quiring considerable " knack " and some responsibility.
(c) semi-skilled; — trained men, potentially able to take over a job, or
occasionally doing it; of the next higher class (d).
(d) skilled; — men not only of many years' training but long experience
on set jobs involving adeptness, judgment and responsibility.
(e) high-skilled; — long-experienced men, characterized by judgment
amounting to " genius," and by executive ability.
That is a gamut of (a) yard labor; (b) "skip" operators; (c)
melters' third helpers; (d) melters' first helpers; (e) rollers,
blowers, etc.
INDEX
Absenteeism, 148
Accidents in steel industry, 66-67
A. F. of L., 157; steel department
wanted, 176; strike support,
180; strikers' attitude towards,
244; unions involved, 145
Agents — provocateurs, 230, 232
Agitators, 43, 210, 212
" Anonymous report " on Commis-
sion of Inquiry, 28, 233, 234
Amalgamated Association of Iron,
Steel and Tin Workers, 164, 169,
175, 179, 181
Amalgamated Clot"hing Workers,
176, 182
Americanization, 12, 82, 179, 249
Americans, distrust foreigners, 30,
ers; distrust foreigners, 30,
179; as trade unionists, 162-164
Arbitration and conciliation rec-
ommended, 249
Armour, Mr., Conference with
John Fitzpatrick, 165-167
Blacklists, 15, 27, 74, 121, 198,
209, 219-221
Blast furnace, hours of labor, 52;
continuous operation, 57; job
description, 62-63 ; seven-day
week, 69
Bolshevism, 15, 20-42
"Boring from within," 156, 158,
159
Braddock, Pa., 104
British experience, 41, 56, 57, 187
Brown, Jay G., 194
Budgets, see Family Budgets
BufSngton, E. J., 210; on Bol-
shevism of strikers, 33; on
John Fitzpatrick, 165; on labor
detectives, 231; on twelve-hour
day, 59
Bureau of Applied Economics, 6;
study of family budgets, 255-
263; study of hours of labor,
55-56, 264-268
Bureau of Industrial Research, 6
Burnett, H. D., 211
Carnegie Steel Co., 32, 49, 60, 64,
76
Chapin, Prof., family budget, 257-
258
Churches, see Pulpit
Civil liberties, denied, 15, 235,
238, 239, 240, 248; inquiry rec-
ommended, 17-18, 250; sub-re-
port cited, 198
Classification of steel workers,
270-271
Clergy, see Pulpit
Close, Charles L., 22-23
Collective bargaining, in packing
industry, 165-167; U. S. War
Labor Board policy, 149
Colorado Fuel and Iron Company,
shop committees, 10-11; eight-
hour day, 49, 57, 247
Communism, 31, 36, 38, 151
Company houses, 103-104
Company unions, 10, 19
Corporations Auxiliary Company,
228-229
Cost of living, see Family bud-
gets. Standard of living
Debs, Eugene V., criticises steel
strike, 36
Detectives and spies, 15; co-opera-
tion with Department of Justice,
221, 225-226; investigation rec-
ommended, 18, 250; used by
Corporation, 26
Dickson, W, B., on twelve-hour
day, 46
Discharge for unionism, 171, 205,
209-218
Dorchester laborers' case, 41-42
Eight-hour day, see Hours of labor
Employment management, 22, 120,
121
Employment managers, 137
Espionage, see Detectives and spies
Family budgets, 86, 100, 101, 105-
118; Chapin's budget, 257; mini-
273
274
INDEX
mum comfort level, 261-263;
minimum subsistence level, 256-
261; Ogburn's budget, 256, 257,
262; N. Y. Board of Estimate,
259-260; U. S. Bureau of Labor
_ Statistics, 262-263; N. Y. Fac-
" tory Commission, 258
Family life, effect of twelve-hour
day, 65-66
Farrell, James A., 24, 25
Fatigue, 65, 82, 147. 8ee also
Hours
Federal Council of Churches, 250
Federal government, see United
States
Financial control of Corporation
labor policy, 11, 125, 201-206
Findings, Christian, 246
Finns, socialism of, 150
Fitzpatrick, John, 145, 147; or-
ganizes packing workers, 157,
165-168
Foreigners, see Immigrants
Foremen, handle grievances, 24,
26; power of discharge, 210
Foster, William Z., 145, 169; and
Bolshevism, 33 ; boring from
within policy, 156-159; Elbert
H. Gary on, 33, 165; on immi-
grants as trade unionists, 161-
164; on strike causes, 147-148;
on strike support, 180
Freedom of speech, 173, 235
Gary, Elbert H., Bolshevism of
strikers, 33; conferences with
employees, 122; handles griev-
ances, 23-26; Interchurch Com-
mission interview, 28-29; job of
steel worker, 63-64; John Fitz-
patrick, 33; no-conference pol-
icy, 23-26; quotes spy reports,
233-234; right to organize, 210;
seven-day week, 68-69, 74, 75;
spokesman of steel industry, 8-9,
47; testimony, 23-25, 43, 46-49,
78, 79, 87, 88, 123-124, 206-210;
twelve-hour day, 47-51, 55, 56,
58, 59, 75, 76; wages, 86; Will-
iam Z. Foster, 33, 165
Gary, Indiana, 38, 170, 240, 241,
242
General strike, 31
Gompers, Samuel, 156, 160, 161,
164; asks strike postponement.
174-175; defends strike at in-
dustrial conference, 180; organ-
ization policy, 160
Great Britain, see British experi-
ence
Haddock, William S., sheriff's
proclamation, 237, 239
Herd-psychology, 154
Homestead, Pa., 49, 50, 60, 133,
148
Hours of labor, blast furnaces, 72;
building trades, 268; coal min-
ers, 268 ; continuous industries,
55; eight-hour day, 45, 57, 76,
79, 80, 81, 83; Elbert H. Gary
on, 58; independent steel com-
panies, 49 ; open-hearth fur-
naces, 72; printers, 268; rail-
road workers, 268; shipyard
workers, 268; sources of data,
269; steel industry. Great Brit-
ain, 56; steel workers compared
with others, 264-268; twelve-
hour day, 5, 12, 44, 47, 55, 57,
59-63, 71, 72, 78, 81, 84; eight-
hour day recommended, 248
Housing of steel workers, 14, 103-
107, 249
Illinois Steel Co., 28, 33; use of
labor detectives, 231
Immigrants, 246; as trade union-
ists, 161-164; Bolshevism of,
150-155, 161-164; favored indus-
trial unionism, 160; housing,
104-118; job discrimination, 14,
136-143; nationality of steel
workers, 132-133; segregation,
30; twelve-hour day wanted by
some, 78-79, 99
Independent steel companies, hours
of labor, 49, 65; labor repre-
sentation, 198
Industrial conference, Washington,
165, 180, 249
Industrial unionism, 37, 158, 159-
161, 182; favored by immi-
grants, 161-164; of immigrants,
16; opposed by Wm. Z. Foster,
35
Interchurch World Movement,
Commission of Inquiry, 6-11, 28,
29, 236; industrial relations de-
partment, 250
INDEX
275
International Harvester Co., in-
dustrial councils, 11
International unions in steel in-
dustry, 145, 146, 168, 172, 174,
175
Intimidation, 43, 154, 178
I. W. W., 36, 155, 156, 158, 161;
strikers' attitude towards, 244
Johnstown, Pa., 65, 164, 213, 236
Kazinci, Father A., on Sunday
work, 70-71, 83, 84
Labor autocracy, 167
Labor contracts, 179-180
Labor file, 27-28, 222-229; black-
lists in, 219-221
Labor press, 37, 151, 152
Labor representation, 10, 19; in
independent steel mills, 198
Labor shortage, 76
Labor turnover, 148
Lackawanna Steel Co., on eeven-
day week, 75
Mediation, 7-8, 28
Midvale-Cambria Co., 10, 46, 198
Ministers, see Pulpit
Molnar, (Rev.) Charles V., on
Sunday work, 70
Monotony, 134
National Association of Corpora-
tion Schools, 82
National Civil Liberties Bureau,
233
National Committee for Organiz-
ing Iron and Steel Workers, 36,
153, 159, 169, 170, 174, 175,
176; affiliated unions, 145-146;
strike report, 188-196
National Red Cross Association,
100
Negroes, as strike breakers, 177,
178
New Majority, quoted on labor-
detectives, 230-231
Newspapers, see Press
N. Y. Board of Estimate family
budget, 259-260
N. Y. Factory Commission family
budget, 258
New York Sun, 88-89
New York Times, 31
Night schools, 82
Ogburn, W. F., on standards of
living, 93, 255-263
One Big Union, 36, 160-161
Open-hearth furnaces, hours of la-
bor, 52; job description, 61-62;
wages of gang, 98
Organize, right to, see Right to
organize
Oursler, Sup't, 48
Overtime, 98
Packing industry, 157, 165-167
Palmer, Mitchell, 149; on agi-
tators, 43
Parker, Carleton H., 95, 96,
125
Picketing, 240-241
Pittsburgh Survey, housing, 104
Polakov, W. N., on inefficient
management of steel industry,
77-78
Postponement of strike, 171, 174,
175, 180
Press, see also Labor press, 182,
183, 199; as strike breaker,
242; ignorance concerning in-
dustrial relations, 29, 30, 31;
recommendations to, 250; sub-
report cited, 199
Prices, effect on public opinion,
185-186
Production, 57, 77, 177; trade
union responsibility for, 168,
185, 186, 249
Profits, 13, 14
Promotion, favoritism, 136; skilled
workers, 129; semi-skilled
workers, 132; unskilled workers,
136
Psychology of strikers, "bound to
fail" idea, 155; eff"ect of charge
of Bolshevism, 39-40; fear of
discharge, 163; fear of strike
breakers, 178; sense of labor's
importance, 148-149; "some-
thing doing " idea, 154 ; William
Z. Foster on, 161-164
Public opinion, 206; Ignorance
concerning industrial relations,
20-21 ; ignored by trade unions,
182-184, 187; influenced by high
prices, 185-186; influence of U.
S. Steel Corporation, 184-185;
might aid collective bargaining,
183; on collective bargaining,
276
INDEX
167-168; and hours of labor, 46;
roused by atrocities, 187
Pulpit, 243; sub-report cited, 199;
recommendations, 250
Radicalism, see Bolshevism
Rail mills, hours of labor, 53
Railroad Brotherhoods, 162
Rank and file, 170, 172, 174
Red Cross, see National Red Cross
Association
Red book (Foster's), 34
Right to organize, 249; denied by
Corporation, 10, 29, 122, 123;
Elbert H. Gary on, 210; on rail-
roads, 163; recognized in Great
Britain, 41; U. S. War Labor
Board policy, 149; see also dis-
charge for unionism
Russia, 150, 152
Safety devices and measures, 66
Schiller, W. B., on twelve-hour
day, 59, 68
Secret service men, see Detectives
and spios
Semi-skilled workers, classifica-
tion, 270-271; distrust skilled,
179; housing, 104-118; increas-
ing in steel industry, 134; pro-
motion, 132; wages compared
with family budget, 93-101
Seven-day week, 11-12, 68-75
Sherman Service, 230-232
Shop committees, 19, 198
Skilled workers, classification,
270-271 ; distrust semi-skilled,
179; favored by Corporation,
128; grievances, 129-132; wages,
13, 85, 91-92
Spies, see Detectives and spies
Standard of living, 12, 13, 256;
definition, 93; minimum com-
fort level, 85; minimum sub-
sistence level, 85; steel workers,
45, 79, 93-101; see also Family
budgets
State police, 240
Steel Workers' Council, 170, 176
Stewart, Ethelbert, Civil liberties
report, 18
Strike-ballot, 154
Strike breakers, 197, 248; detec-
tives, 29, 209, 226, 235; federal
officials, 240-242; local magis-
trates, 239; negroes, 177; press,
242; pulpit, 243; state police,
240; U. S. army, 241-242;
U. S. department of justice, 240;
U. S. Steel Corporation, 177;
strike bulletin, 179
Sunday work, see Seven-day week
Times, London, on steel strike, 41,
42
Trade unions, democratization,
249 ; Elbert H. Gary on, 208 ; ig-
nore public opinion, 182-184,
187; in U. S. weak, 198; oppose
twelve-hour day, 57; responsi-
bility for production, 19, 168,
185-186, 249; see also American
Federation of Labor, Company
unions. Industrial imionism
Under-cover men, 26, 27, 29, 38,
228; see also Detectives and
spies
Unemployment, 46
Union button, 171
Union fee, 170, 189, 194
U. S. Army, 240-242
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
family budget, 262-263
U. S. Department of Justice, 18,
149; co-operation with indus-
trial spies, 27, 221, 225, 226; as
strike breaker, 240-242
U. S. government, civil rights in-
quiry recommended, 17-18; steel
commission recommended, 17 ;
investigation of detective agen-
cies recommended, 18
U. S. Senate Committee, 18; steel
investigation, 29
U. S. Steel Corporation, division
of wage budget, 91-92, 96, 98;
dominates steel industry, 8-9,
13; financial control, 200-207;
finance committee quoted, 201-
207 ; influence on public opinion,
184-185; labor policy, 5-6, 23-30,
51, 99, 197, 241; sub-report
cited, 199 ; military organization,
128-129; minutes, 126, 200-207;
rejects Interchurch mediation,
7-8; report of, 123; seven-day
week, 68-75; shut down of union
INDEX
377
mills, 204; size, 84; twelve-hour
day, 44-84; use of spies, 26-30;
wages, 85-118
U. S. War Labor Board, 149, 185,
248
Unskilled workers, backbone of
strike, 8, 44; classification, 270-
271; mistrust skilled, 179;
grievances, 135-143 ; housing,
104-118; job description, 132-
134; job discrimination, 128;
promotion, 136; standard of
living, 85; wages, 5, 12, 13, 90,
92, 93, 101
Violence, 30, 236, 241
Wages, annual average, 97; build-
ing trades, 102; coal miners,
102; compared with family
budgets, 93-101 ; compared with
wages of other trades, 101-102,
264-268; metal trades, 103;
printers, 103, 268; railroad
workers, 103, 268; shipyard
workers, 268; skilled workers,
12-13; sources of data, 269; un-
skilled workers, 5, 12, 90
War aims (Labor's), 182-183
Welfare work, 22, 39, 120, 126,
127, 137
West, George F., steel strike re-
port, 18
Williams, H. D., 49, 66, 76; on
Bolshevism of strikers, 32; on
twelve-hour day, 59
Wilson, Woodrow, 182; asks strike
postponement, 174-175; attempts
to mediate, 165, 166
Wood, Leonard, 240-242
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co.,
hours of labor, 49
DATE DUE
JUL
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