^/sa3AiNn]v\v -«;^tLIBRARY^/C ^/iaMiNnj^kV^ ^^ojiwD-jo^ AOFCAlIFOff^ so ^OFCAIIFO/?^ ft ^^Aavaani^ AMEUNIVERS/a t?Ayvaan# j>:lOSANCElfj> ^lOS-ANCEl£r^ ^lUBRARYO^^ § 1 li"^ ^ ^lUBRARYQ^ aofcaufo% ^OFCAIIFO% ft fiS AMEUNlVERi"//, ^Aa3AINn-3WV^ "^^^OJITVO-JO^ '^^OJIWDJO'^ <^130NVSO\^ ^VEUNIVERS/A ^/5a3A!K()-3ViV^ "^(^AHvaanii^ '^^Aavaani^ ^riiaoNvsoi^"^ ^ILIBHARYOc ^tllBRARYQ^ ^tllBRARYQ^ ^Hmmo/-^ .J -^ ^ » <) ^OFCAIIFO% ^•OFCAIIFOfiUA. ^'^JAavuaiH^ ^'^mrnvf^ ^^WFUNIVERS/A \WElINIVER5y>- oo w\ U "^/sajAiNrt-jwv^ ^lOSANCElfj-^ o / -^^vrurn 1(^1 IMiM... UK POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY AUGUSTE COMTE. JOHN STUART MILL, NEW YORK UEXRV HOLT AND COMPtVXY 1873. ->i^ ^ i?^ HI • ^A ^mo,S4. 6^ ( HA; THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF^UGUSTE COMTE. Fou some time much has been said, in England and on the Continent, concerning " Positivism " and "the Positive Philosopliy." Those plu-ascs, wliich during tlie hf'e of tlic eminent thinker who introduced tlicm had ia:i(le their way into no writings or discussions but those of his very few direct discipk\<, have emerged from the depths" and manifested tliemselves on the surface of tlie philosophy of the age. It is not very widely knowii whfit they represent, but it is understood that they rei)rescut something. They arc symbols of a rec- oiiuizcd mode of thought, and one of sufficient import- ance to induce almost all who now discuss the great jiroI)lcms of philosophy, or survey from any elevated point of view the opinions of the age, to take what is termed the Posltivist view of things into serious con- ?i ,\ !-,■ tliau we arc already, it may be left unnoticed until the time comes wjicn his errors can do harm. But the high place whicli M. Comtc has now assumed among European thinkers, and the Increasing intlmiico of his principal work, while they make it a more hopeful task than be- fore to impress and enforce the strong points of his philosophy, have rendered it, i'ov the first time, not in- opportune to discuss his mistakes. Wiiatcver ei-rors he may have fallen into are now in a position to be inju- rious, while the free exposure of them can no longer be so. We propose, then, to puss in review the main prin- ciples of M. Comtc's philosophy ; confining ourselves for the present to tlic great treatise by which, in this country, he is chiefly known, and leaving out of con- sideration the writings of the last ten years of his life, except for the occasional Illustration of detached points. When we extend our examination to these later produc- tions, as we hope hereafter to do, we shall have, in the main, to reverse our judgment. Instead of recognizing, as in the " Cours de Philosophic Positive," an essentially sound view of phIloso[)hy, with a few capital errors, it is in their general character that we deem the subse- quent speculations false and nusleading, while in the midst of this wrong general tendency, we find a crowd of valuable thoughts, and suggestions of tliought, in OF AUGUSTE COMTE. • detail. For tlic present we put out of the question this sl"-nal anomaly in M. Comte's intellectual career. . We shall consider only the principal gift which he has left to the world, his clear, full, and comprehensive exposi- tion, and in part creation, of what he terms the Positive Philosopliy : endeavoring to sever what in our estima- tion is true, from the nuich less which is erroneous, in that philosophy as he conceived it, and distinguishing, as we proceed, the part which is specially his, from that whicli hclongs to the phIlo60[)]jy of the age, and is tlie common inheritance of thinkers. This last discrimina- tion has been partially made in a late pamphlet, by Mr. Herbert Spencer, in vindication of his own indcpcud- cnce of thought ; but this does not diminish the utility of doing it, with a less limited purpose, here ; especially as j\Ir. Spencer rejects .nearly all which properly belongs to M. Comte, and in his abridged mode of statement does scanty justice to what he rejects. The separation is not difficult, even on the direct evidence given by ^^. Comte himself, who, far from claiming any originality not really belonging to him, was eager to connect his own most original thoughts with every germ of any thing similar which he observed in previous thinkers^ The fundamental docti'ine of a true philosophy, ac- cording to ]\I. Comte, and the character by which he defines Positive Philosophy, is the following : — "We have no knowledge of any thing but Phenomena ; and our knoAvledge of phenomena is relative, not absolute. AVe know not the essence, nor the real mode of produc- tion, of aiiy fact, but only its relations to otiicr facts in the way of succession or of similitude. These relations are constant ; that is, always the same in the same 8 THE POSITIVE rillLOSOPHY circumstances. The constant resemblances wliich link phenomena together, and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws. The laws of phenomena are all we know resi)ecting them. Their essential nature, and their ulti- mate causes, either efficient or final, arc unknown and inscrutable to us. M. Comtc claims no originality for this conception of human knowledge. He avows that it has been virtually acted on from the earliest period by all mIio have made any real contribution to science, and became distinctly present to the minds of speculative men from the time of Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo, whom he regards as collectively the founders of the Positive Philosoj)hy. As he says, the knowledge which mankind, even in the ear- liest ages, chieHy [)ursued, being that which they most needed, was foreknowledge : "savoir, pour prevoir." When they sought for the cause it was mainly in order to control the effect, or if it was uncontrollable, to fore- know and adapt their conduct to it. Now, all foresight of phenomena, and power over (hem, depend on knowledge of their sequences, and not upon any no- tion we may have formed respecting their origin or inmost nature. We foresee a fact or event by means of facts which are signs of it, because experience has shown them to be its antecedents. We bring about any fact, other than our own muscular contractions, by means of some fact which experience has siiown to be followed by it. All foresight, therefore, and all intelli- gent action, have only been possible in proportion as men have successfully attempted to ascertain the suc- cessions of phenomena. Neither foreknowledge, nor OP AUGUSTE COMTE. 51 the knowledge which is practical power, can be acquired by any other means. The conviction, however, that knowledge of the suc- cessions and co-existences of phenomena is the sole knowledge accessible to us, could not be ai-rived at in a very early stage of the progress of thought. Men have not even now left off hoping for other knowledge, nor believing that they have attained it ; and tliat, when at- tained, it is, in some undcfinablc manner, greatly more precious than mere knowledge of sequences and co-cxist- cnccs. The true doctrine was not seen in its full clear- ness even by Bacon, though it is the result to which all his speculations tend : still less by Descartes. It was, however, correctly apprehended by Newton.* But it was probably first conceived in its entire generality by Hume, who carries it a step further than Comte, main- taining not merely tiiat tiie only causes of phenomena which can be known to us are other phenomena, their invariable antecedents, but that tiiere is no other kind of causes : cause, as he interprets it, means the in- variable antecedent. "J'his is the only part of Hume's doctrine which was contested by his great adversary, Kant ; who inalntnining as strenuously as Comte that we know nothing of things in themselves, of Noumena, of real Substances and real Causes, yet peremptorily asserted their existence. But neither does Comte ques- tion this : on the contrary, all his language implies it. Among the direct successors of Hume, the writer wlio has best stated and defended Couite's fundamental doc- trine is Dr. Thomas Brown. The doctrine and spirit • See tlie Chapter on EfRcient Causes in Eeid's " Essays on the Activa Powers," which is avowedly grounded on Newton's ideas. 10 THE rOSITIVE nilLOSOPHY of Brown's philosophy arc entirely Positivist, aiul no better introduction to Positivism than the early part of his "Lectures " has yet been produced- Of living tliink- ers wc do not speak ; but the same great truth formed the groundwork of all the speculative philosophy of Bentham, and pre-eminently of James ]Mill : and Sir V.'iiliam Hamilton's famous doctrine of the Relativity of I'.uman knowledge has guided many to it, though wc cannot credit Sir William Hamilton himself with having understood the principle, or been willing to assent to it if he had. The foundation of ]M. Comte's philosophy is thus in no way peculiar to him, but the general j)roperty of the age, however far as yet from being universally accei)ted even by thoughtful minds. The philosophy called Posi- tive is not a recent invention of M. Comte, but a simple adherence to the traditions of all the great scientific minds whose discoveries have made the hiunan race what it is. M. Comte has never presented it in any otiier light. But he has made the doctrine his own by his manner of treating it. To know rightly what a thing is, Ave require to know, with eijual distinctness, what it is not. To enter into the real character of onv mode of thought, we must imderstand what other modes of thought compote with it. M. Comte lias taken care that we should do so. The modes of philosophizing which, according to him, dispute ascendancy with the Positive, arc two in number, both of them anterior to it in date; the Theological, and the Metaphysical. We use the words Theological, iMetaphysical, and Positive, because they are chosen by M. Comte as a vehicle for M. Comte's ideas. Any philosopher whose OF AUOUSTE COJITE. 11 thoughts another person undertakes to set forth, has a right to rcquu'e that it should be done by means of liis own nomencLiture, Tliey arc not, however, the terms we should ourselves choose. In all languages, but especially in English, they excite ideas other than those intended. The words Positive and Positivism, in the mcaninir assiu'ncd to them, are ill fitted to take root in Englisli soil ; while Metaphysical suggests, and suggest- ed even to ]M. Comte, much that in no way deserves to be included in his denunciation. The term Theological is less wide of the mark, though the use of it as a term of condemnation implies, as we shall see, a greater reach of ne'^xtion than need be included in the Positive creed. Instead of the Theological we should prefer to speak of the Personal, or Volitional explanation of nature; in- stead of INIetaphysical, the Abstractional or Ontological : and the meaning of Positive would be less ambiguously expressed in the objective aspect by Phenomenal, in the subjective by Experiential. But ]\I. Comte's o[)inions are best stated in his own phraseology ; several of them, indeed, can scarcely be presented in some of their bear- ings without it. The Theological, which is the original and sponta- neous form of thought, regards the facts of the universe as governed not by invariable laws of sequence, but by single and direct volitions of beings, real or imaginary, possest^ed of life and intelligence. In the infantile state of reason and experience, individual objects are looked upon as animated. The next step is the conception of invisible beings, each of whom superintends and governs an entire class of objects or events. The last merges this multitude of divinities in a single God, who made 12 THE POSITIVE riiiLosoi'iiy the Avlmlc universe in the beginning, and guides and carries on its phenomena by his continued action, or, as others think, only modifies them from time to time by special interferences. The mode of thought which M. Comte terms Meta- physicrd, accounts for phenomena by ascribing them, not to volitions either sublunary or celestial, but to real- ized abstractions. In this stage it is no longer a god that causes and directs each of the various agencies of nature : it is a power, or a force, or an occult quality, considered as real existences, inherent in but distinct from the concrete bodies in which they reside, and which they in a manner animate. Instead of Dryads presiding over trees, producing and regulating their phenomena, every ])]ant or animal has now a Vegetative Soul, the Ppf— lained by matter and motion, that is, not by abstractions but by invariable physical laws : though his own explanations were many of them hypothetical, and turned out to be erroneous. Long after him, how- ever, fictitious entities (as they arc happily termed by IJentliam) continued to be imagined as means of ac- counting for the more mysteri(»us phenomena ; above all, in phvsiology, wherv-, under great varieties of phrase, mysterious forc'^ and priDclplas were the ex- planation, or sid)stitutc for ex[)lanation, of the phenom- ena of organized beings. To modern philosophers, these a fictions sire merely the abstract names of the das.-es of phenomena which correspond to them ; and it is one of the puzzles of [diilosophy, how mankind, after invent- ing a set of njerc names to keej) tctgether certain com- binations of ideas or images, could have so far foi-gotten their own act as to invest these creations of their will with objective reality, and mistake the name of a phe- nomenon for its ctKcient cause. A\'hat was a mystery from the purely dogmatic point of view, is cleared up by the historical. These abstract words are indeed now mere names of phenomena, but were not .="0 in their origin. To us they denote only the phenomena, be- cause we have ceased to believe in w hat else they once OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 19 (Icsi^Kitcd ; aiul (lie cinployincnt of tlicin in explanation is to us evidently, as i\r, Conitc says, the na'if repro- duction of tiic phenomenon as the reason for itself: but it was not so in the beginning-. The nietaphysieal point of view was not a perversion of the positive, but fi transformation of the theological. The human niind, in framing a class of objects, did not set out frcnn the notion of a name, but from that of :i divinity. The realization of abstractions Avas not th/ embodiment of a word, but the gradual disembodimeii- of a Fetish. The primiti\e tendency or instinct of mankind is ti! assimilate all the ageneies which they perceive in Xa- turc, to the only one of which they are directly conscious, their own voluntary activity. Every object wliich seems to originate power, that is, to act without being first visiblv acted upon, to connnunicatc motion without hav- ing first icceivcd it, they suppose to possess life, con- sciousness, will. This first rude conception of nature can scarcely, however, have been at any time extended to all phenomena. The siin[)lest observation, withoui which the [ircservation of life would have been impos- sible, nnist have pointed out many uniformities in na- ture, many objects which, under given circumstances, acted exactly like one another : and whenever this was observed, men's natiu-al and untutored faculties led them to form the similar objects into a class, and to think of them togetlicr : of which it was a natural consequence to refer effects, Avhich were exactly alike, to a single will, rather than to a number of wills precisely accordant. But this single will could not be the will of the objcct.s thenisclvca, since they were many : it must be the will ot 20 THE rosiTivE niiLOSOPiir an invisible bcinu, apart from tlic objects, and ruling tlicni from an iniknown (li.stancc. Tbis is Polytlici^ni. AA'e are not aware tbat in any tribe ot't;avagcs or negroes who have been oI).serve(l, Fetichisin has been found totally unmixed with Polytheism, and it is probable that the tw.» co-existed from the earliest period at whleh the hu- man mind was capable of forming objects into classes. Fetichisin proper gradually becomes limited to objects i'lOsscssing a marked individuality. A particular moun- tain or river is Avorshippcd bodily (as it is even now by the Hindoos and the South-Sea Islanut the halilt being acquired of ascribing not only substantive existence, but real and efficacious agency, to the abstract entities, the consequence was that when belief in the deities declined 22 THE rosiTivE riiiLOSoriir and faded away, the entities were left standing, and a semblance of explanation of phenomena, equal to what existed before, was furnislied by tiic entities alone, with- out referring them to any volitions, AVhen things had reached this point, the metaphysical mode of thought had completely substituted itself for the theological. Thus did the difl'ercnt successive states of the human intellect, even at an early stage of its progress, overlap one another, the Fetichistic, the Polytheistic, and the ^Ieta[)hysical modes of thought co-existing e\eu in the same minds, while the belief in invariable laws, which constitutes the Positive mode of thought, was slowly winning its way beneath them all, as observation and experience disclosed in one chiss of phenomena after another the laws to which they arc really subject. It was this growth of positive knowledge which princi- pally determined the next transition in the tlicological conception of the universe, iVoni Polytheism Lo I\l()nu- theism. It cannot be doubted that this transition took }ilace very tardily. Tiic conception of a unity in Nature, which would admit of attrii)uting it to a single will, is far from being natural to man, and only finds admit- tance after a long period of discipline and i)rcparation, the obvious appearances all pointing to the idea of a government by many conflicting principles. AVe know how high a degree both of material civilization and of moral and intellectual develo{)mcnt jn-occded the con- version of the leading populations of the world to the belief in one God. The superficial observations by whicli Christian travellers have iicrsuadcd themselves that they found their own ^Monotheistic belief in some OF AUGU8TE COMTE. 23 tribes of savages, liavc always been contradicted by more accurate knowledge : those who have read, tor in- stance, INIr. Kohl's " Kitchiganii," know what to think of the Great Spirit vf tlie American Indians, who belongs to a well-defined SA'stcm of l\)ly theism, interspersed with large remains of an original Fetichisni. AVe have no wisii to dispute the matter with those Avho believe that ^Monotheism was the primitive religion, transmitted to our race from its first parents in uninterrupted tradi- tion. By their own acknowledgment, the tradition was lost by all the nations of the world except a small and peculiar pcojile, in whom it was miraculously kept alive, but who were themschcs contiiuially la[)sing from it, and in all the earlier parts of their history did not hold it at all in its full meaning, but admitted the real exist- ence of otlier gods, though believing tiieir own to be the most powerful, and to be the Creator of the world. A greater proof of the unnaturaluess of i\ronotheism to the human mind before a certain i)eriod in its develo[)iucnt, could not well be required. The highest form of Mono- theism, Ciivi-^^< y the l!ii>roug!;;y po]yl]i'.':>(;e c.');K\''pl!?)ii of n (kMil, \\'hcn ]Monotiieism, after many ecnlurlc-;, made its way to the Greeks and Komans from the small corner of the world where it existed, we know how the notion of demons facilitated its reception, by making it unnecessary for Chrislians to deny the existence of the gods jjrcviously Relieved in, it being sufficient to place them under the absolute power of the new God, as the gods of Olympus were already under that of Zeus, and as the local deities 24 THE POSITIVE riiiLosoriiY of all the subjugated nations liad been subordinated by conquest to the divine patrons of the Jvoinan State. In wliatever mode, natural or supernatural, we choose to account for the early monotheism of the Hebrews, there can be no question that its rece[)tion by tlie Ci en- tiles was only rendered possible by tlie slow preparation which the human mind had undergone IVom the philoso- phers. In the age of the Gcsars, nearly the whole edu- cated and cultivated class had outgrown the polytheistic creed, and though individually liable to returns of the superstition of tlieir childhood, were predisposed (such of them as did not reject all religion whatever) to the acknowledgment of one Supreme Providence. It is vain to object that Christianity did not find the majority of its early proselytes among the educated class : since, except in Palestine, its teachers and propagators were mainly of that class — many of them, like St. Paul, well versed in the mental culture of their time ; and they had evidently found no intellectual obstacle to the new doctrine in their own minds. AVe must not be de- ceived by the recrudescence, at a nmch later date, of a metaphysical Paganism in the Alexandrian and other philosophical schools, provoked not by attachment to polytheism, but by distaste for the political and social ascendency of the Christian teachers. The fact was, that Monotheism had become congenial to the cultivat- ed mind : and a belief which has gained the cultivated minds of any society, unless put down by force, is cer- tain, sooner or later, to reach the multitude. Indeed the nmltitude itself had been prepared for it, as already hinted, by the more and more complete subordination of all other deities to the supremacy of Zeus ; from OF AUGUSTE C03ITE. 25 wliicli tlic Step to a single Deity, suiToundcd by a host of angels, and keeping in recalcitrant subjection an army of devils, was by no means difficult. By Avhat means, then, had the cultivated minds of the Roman Empire been educated for Monotheism? By the growth of a jiractical feeling of the invariability of mitural laws, Monotheism had a natural adaptation to this belief, while Polytheism naturally and necessarily conliicled with it. As men could not easily, and in fact never did, suj>pose that beings so powerful had their power absolutely restricted, each to its special de- partment, the will of any divinity might always be frus- trated by another : and unless all their wills were in complete harmony (which would itself be the most dif- ficult to credit of all cases of invariability, and would rcfpiire beyond any thing else the ascendency of a Supreme Deity) it was imp(jssible that the course of any of the phenomena under their government could be invariable. But if, on the contrary, all the phenomena of the universe were under the exclusive and uncontrol- lable inrtuenee of a single will, it was an admissible sup- jiosition that this will might be always consistent with itself, and might choose to conduct each class of it- operations in an invariable manner. In proportion. tlicrefore, as the invariable laws of phenomena revealed themselves to observers, the tlieory which ascribed them all to one will began to grow plausible ; but must still have aj)peared improbable until it had come to seem likely that invariability was the common rule of all na- ture. The Greeks and Romans at the Christian era had leached a point of advancement at which this suppo- sition had become probable. The admirable height to 26 THE POSITIVE nilLOSOrilY \vl)Icli geometry had already been carried, liad familiar- ized the educated mind with the conception of laws absolutely invariahle. The logical analysi.s ol" the intel- lectual i)r()ce.<:?cs oy Aristotle had r^hown ii similar luii- formit}' of law in the realm of mind. In the concrete external world, the luost iniposing [)hcnomena, those of the heavenly bodies, which by their power over the im- ngination had done most to l<(;c]) uj) the whole system of ideas connected with supeinatural agency, had been ascertained to take place in so regular an order as to admit of being predicted with a precision which to the notions of those d;!ys nmst have appeared perfect. .Vnd though an ecpial degree of regularity had not bcendis- ccrned in natural phenomena generally, e\en the most enipirical observation had ascertained so many cases of an uniformity almost complete, that inquiring minds ■were eagerly on the lookout for f'urther indications point- ing in the same direction ; and vied with one another in the formation of theories which, though hypothetical and essentially premature, it was hoped would turn out to be correct represcjitations of in\arial»le laws governing large classes of phenomena. AVhcn this hope and ex- pectation became general, they were already a great encroachment on the original domain of the theoloLiical principle. Instead of the old conception, of events regulated from day to day by the unforseen and changc- able volitions of a legion oj' deities, it seemed more and more i)robable that all the phenomena of the universe t(Mjk place according to rules, which must have been planned from the beginning ; by which coucei)tion the function of the gods seemed to be limited to forming the plans, and setting the machinery in motion : their OF AUGUSTE CO.'MTE. 27 subsequent office appeared to be reduced to a sinecure, or if they continued to reii^n, it was in the manner of con- stitutional kings, bound by the laws to wliicli they had previniisly given their assent. Accordingly, the [)rcte!!- sion of philosophers to explain phy.-icul plicnoniena ])y plivsical causes, or to predict tlieir occurrence, was, up t<» a Ncry late period of polytheism, rcLiJirded as a sacri- legious insult to the gods. Anaxagcn-as was banished for it, Aristotle had to Hy lor his iile, and tiic mere imfoimded suspicion of it contributed greatly to the con- demnation of Socrates. "Wc arc too well ncquainte I with this form of the religious sentiment even now, {■■ have any difficulty in comprehending what must have been its violence then. It was inevitable that philoso- phers should be anxious to get rid of at least l/icsc gods, and so escape from the particular fables which stood immediately in their way ; acce})ting a notion of divine iiovernmcnt which harmonized better witii the lessons tliey learnt from the study of nature, and a God conccrninii; whom no mvthos, as far as they knew, had vet been invented. Again, when the idea became prevalent that the con- stitution of every part of Nature had been ])lanned from the beginning, and continued to take place as it had been planned, this was itself a striking feature of reseui- blance extendins; through all Xatiu'C, and affordinu' i\ l)resumption that the whole was the work, not of m:;ny, l>ut of the same hand. It must have appeared vaslly more probable that tiicre should be one indefinitely foio- sceing Intelligence and immovable Will, than iumdrcds and thousands of such. The philoso[)hers had not .u that time the arguments which micfht have been ground- 28 THE rosrnvE philosophy cd on universal laws, not yet suspected, such as tlie law of gravitation and tlic laws of licat ; tlicro wat? a nuilti- tiidc, obvious even to lliciu, of analogies and houiolo- gics in natural plicnomcna, wliicii suggested unity of plan; and a still greater number were raided up by their active fancy, aided by tlxMr pr(Mr.ature scientific theories, all of which aimed at interpreting some plieuoinenon by the analogy of others sui)posed to be better known ; assuming, indeed, a much greater simihu'ity among the vaiuous process of Xaturc, tlian ampler e.\[)erience lias since shown to exist. The tlieological mode of tliought thus advanced from Polytheism to Monotheisni througli the direct influence of tlie l\)*itivc mode of thought, not yet aspiring to complete specidativc ascendency. But, inasmuch as the belief in the invariability of natural laws was still imperfect e\en in highly cultivated minds, and in the merest infancy in the uncultivated, it gave rise to the belief in one God, but not in an immovable one. For many centuries the God believed in was flexible by entreaty, was incessantly ordering the affairs of mankind l)y direct volitions, and continually reversing the course of nature by nu'raculous interpositions ; and this is be- lieved still, wherever the invariability of law has cstal)- llslied Itself in men's convictions as a general, but not as an universal truth. In the change from Polytheism to ]\[onollieism, the ^letaphysical mode of thought contributed Ifs i)art, affording great aid to the up-hill struggle which the Positive spirit had to maintain against the prevailing form of the Theological. M. Comte, indeed, has con- siderably exaggerated the share of the Metaphysical spmt in this mental revolution, since by a lax use of OF AUGUSTE COMTE, 29 terms he credits the Metaphysical mode of thouglit with all that is due to dialectics and negative criticism — to the exposure of inconsistencies and absiu"ditic.s in tlic received religions. But this operation is quite independ- ent of tlie ]\reta[)liy8ical mode (tf thought, and was no otherwise connected witli it tiian in being very generally carried on by the same minds (Plato is a brilliant ex- ample),. since the most eminent efficiency in it docs not. necessarily depend on the possession of positive scieu- tific knowledge. But the iNIetaphysical spirit, strictly so called, did contribute largely to the advent of Monothe- ism. The conception of impersonal entities, interposed l)etween the governing deity and the ])henoniena, and forming the machinery through which these are imme- diately produced, is not repugnant, as the theory of di- rect supernatural volitions is, to the belief in invariable laws. The entities not being, like the gods, framed after the exemplar of men — being neither, like them, invested with human passions, nor supposed, like tliem, to have power beyond the plicnomcna which are the special department of each, there was no fear of offend- ing them by the attempt to foresee and define their ac- tion, or by the sujiposilion that it took place according to fixed laws. The popular tribunal which condemned Anaxagoras had evidently not risen to the metaphysical point of view. Hippocrates, who was concerned only with a select and instructed class, coidd say with impu- nity, speaking of what were called the god-inflicted diseases, that to his mind they were neither more nor less god-inflicted than all others. The doctrine of ab- stract entities Avas a kind of instinctive conciliation between the observed uniformity of the facts of nature, 30 TiiE POSITIVE rniLOSornr and their dependence on arbitrary volition ; since it was ca^^icr to conceive a single volition as setting a niacliin- crv to work, which afterwards went on of itself, than to suppose an inflexible constancy in so capricious and changeahle a thing as volition nui.^t then have appeared. Jjut though the regime of abstractions was in strictness compatible with Polytheism, it demanded ^fonothcism as the condition of its free development. The received Polytheism being only the first remove from Fetichism, its gods were too closely mixed up in the daily details of phenomena, and (he habit of propitiating them and ascertaining their will before any important action of life was too in\cterate to admit withont the strongest shock t<» the received system, tlie notion that tlicy did not habitually rule by special intei'[)ositi(»ns, but left {>henomena in all ordinary eases to the o[)cration of the Essences or jteculiar Natures wliich tiicy had first im- planted in them. Any modification of Polytheism which would have made it fully compatible with the ^Metaphys- ical conception of the world, would have been more dif- ficidt to eflcct tb.an the transltictn to ^Monotheism, as MohoilKiUiii wiia Hi Ib'pl i'uncciMMl. We have given, in our own way, and at some length, this important portion of M. Comte's view of the evolu- tion of human thought, as a sam[>lc of the manner in which his theory corresponds with and intcr[)rcts histor- ical facts, and also to obviate some objections to it, grounded on an imperfect comjtrehension, or rather on a mere first glance. Some, for c.\anii)le, think the doc- trine of the three successive stages of speculation and belief, inconsistent with the fact that they all three ex- isted contemporaneously ; much as if the natural sue- OF AUGUSTE C03ITE. 31 cession of the hunting, the nomad, and the agricultural state could be i-efuted by the fact that there arc still iiunters and nomads. That the three states were con- tcm[)orancous, that they all began before authentic history, and still co-exi.-^t, is ^I. Comte's express state- ment : as well as that the advent of the two later modes of thought was the very cause which disorgan- ized and is gradually destroying the primitive one. The Theological mode of ex[)laining phenomena was once universal, with tlie exception, doubtless, of the familiar facts which, being even then seen to be controllable by humanVill, belonged already to the Positive mode of thought. The first ;uid easiest generalizations of com- mon observation, anterior to the first traces of the scien- tific .'Spirit, determined the birth of the Metaphysical mode of thought ; and every further advance in the ob- servation of nature, gradually l)ringing to light its in- variable laws, determined a further development of the ^Metaphysical spirit at the expense of the Theological, this being the only medium through which the conclu- sions of the Positive mode of thought and the premises of the Theohtgical could l)e temporarily mahysical, and afterwards into the {)in-cly positive stage; and this order ^I. Comte proceeds to investigate, jflie result is his rem:;r1;al)le conception of a scale of sulxn'dliiation of the sciences, being the order of the logical dependence of those whicli follow on those Avliich jirccede. It is not at first obvious how :i mere classification of the sciences can be not merely a help to their study, but itself an important part of a body of doctrine ; the classification, however, is a very important part of M. Comte's philosoj)hy. lie first distinguishes between the Abstract and the Concrete sciences. The abstract sciences have to do with the laws which govern the cleiuentary facts of Nature ; laws on which all phenomena actually icalized must of course depend, but which would have been equally compatible with many other combination.) than those which actually come to pass. The concntc sciences, on the contrary, concern themselves only with the particular condjinations of phenomena which arc found in existence. For example ; the minerals which compose our planet, or are found in it, have been ])ro- duccd and arc held together by the laws of mechanical OF AUGUSTE C05ITE, 33 aggregation and by those of chemical union. It \s the business of the abstract sciences, Physics and Chemistiy, to ascertain these laws : to discover how and under wliat conditions bodies may become aggregated, and wliat arc the j)Ossiblc modes and results of chemical c()ml)ination. Tlie groat majority of these aggregations and combinations take place, so far as we are aware, only in our laboratories ; with these the concrete science, ^Mineralogy, has nothing to do. Its business is with those aggregates, and those chemical compounds, which form themselves, or liave at some period been formed, in the natur.il world. Again, Physiolog}', the abstract science, investigates, by such means as are available to it, the general laws of organization and life. Those laws determine wliat living beings arc possible, and maintain the existence and determine the phenomena of those which actually exist : but they would be equally capable of maintaining in existence plants and animals very diflerent from these. The concrete sciences, Zoology and Botany, confine themselves to species which really exist, or can be shown to have really existed : and do not concern themselves with the mode in which even these would comport themselves under all circumstances, but only under those which really take place. They set forth the actual mode of existence of plants and animals, the phenomena which they in fact present : but they set forth all of these, and take into simultaneous consideration the whole real existence of each species, however various the ultimate laws on which it depends, and to whatever number of different abstract sciences these laws may belong. The existence of a date-tree, or of a lion, is the joint result of many « 34 THE rOSITIVE nilLOSOPIIY natural laws, physical, clicmlcal, biological, and even astronomical. Abstract t^cicncc deals with these laws gcparatcly, but considers each of them in all its aspects, all its possibilities of opeiation : concrete science con- siders them only in coml)ination, and so i'ar as they exist and manifest themselves in the animals or phmts of which we have ex[)cricnce. Tlie distinctive attril)utes of the two arc sunnned up by ]\[. Comte in the ex[)res- sion, that concrete science relates to Beings, or Objects, abstract science to Events.* The concrete sciences are inevitably later in their development than the abstract sciences ou which they * Mr. ITorbcrf Spencer, who also (lisliiij;iiislirs bctwocn nbs^tract nnil Cdn- crefn f 'siological phenomena, oa the laws of physics and chemistry, and their own la.vs ill addition. The phenoriiena of human society oh^iy laws of their own, but do riOt depend solely upon these : tlicy depend ii[)on all the laws of organic and anim: i life, together with those of inorganic nature, these hv-t iuiluencing society not only through tlicir influence 0:1 life, but by determining the physical conditions uiuh r which society has to be carried on. " Chacun dc ct 6 degres succcssifs cxigc des inductions qui lui sont pvo- [)rcs ; niais elles ne peuvent jamais dcvenir syst(ima- tiqucs que sous I'impulsion deductive rcsultcc de tous les ordres moins compllques." * Thus arranged by ]M. Comte in a series, of which each term represents an advance in speciality beyond the term preceding it, and (what necessarily accom- panies increased speciality) an increase of complexity — a set of phenomena determined by a more munerous combination of laws ; the sciences stand in the following order ; 1st, jNIathematics ; its three branches following- one another on the same principle, Number, Geome- try, Mechanics. 2d, Astronomy. 3d, Physics. 4th, Chemistry, oih, Biology. Gth, Sociology, or the Social • " Systiimc de Politique Positive," ii. 36. 38 TirE POSITIVE nilLOSOPHY Science, the plicnomcna of winch depend on, and can- not be understood without, the i)rii)cipal truths of all the other sciences. The suhject-niattcr and contents of these various sciences arc obvious of themselves, M-ith the exception of Physics, which is a group of sciences rather than a single science, and is again divided by I\I. Conite into five departments : Barology, or the science of weight ; Thermology, or that of heat ; Acoustics, Optica, and Elcctrology. These he attemj)tH to arrange; on the same jirinciple of increMsing spt'cinlily and complexity, but they hardly admit of such a scalo, and ]M. Comte's mode of j)lacing them varied at differ- ent periods. All the five being essentially independent of one anotlier, he attached little importance to their order, excei)t that barology ought to come fnvt, as the connecting link with astronomy, and elcctrology last, as the transition to chemistry. If the best elassification is that which is grounded on the properties njost important for our purposes, this classification will stand the test, liy placing the sciences in the order of the complexity of their subject-matter, it presents them in the order of their difticulty. ICach science proposes to itself a more arduous inrpiiry than those which precede it in the series : it is therefore likely to be su8CC[)tible, even finally, of a less degree of per- fection, nnl('r and more general ones, but still more, their methndsi. The scieutilic intellect, both in the individunl and in the race, must learn in the more clenientar\ studies that art of investigation and those canons of proof which arc to be })ut in practice in the more elevated. Xo intellect is properly qualified for the higher part of the scale, without due practice in the lower. ]\Ir. Herbert Spencer, in his essay entitled " The Genesis of Sciences," and more recently in a pamphlet on " The Classification of the Sciences," has criticised and condemned ^f. Comtc's classification, and pi-oposcd a more elaborate one of his own : and ]M. Littre, in his valuable biographical and philosophical work on M. Comte ("Augustc Conite et la Philosophic Positive"), lias at some length criticised the criticism. ]\Ir. Spencer is one of the small ninnbcf of persons who by the soli- dity and.cncyclopedica! character of their knowledge, and their [)owcr of co-ordination and concatenation, may claim to be the peers of M. Comte, and entitled to u vote in the estimation of him. But after srivintr to his animadversions the respectful attention due to all that comes from Mr. Si)encer, we cannot find that he has 40 THE rOSITIVE I'lIILOSOrilV made out Jiny case. It is always easy to find fault with i\ classification. There arc a hundred possible ways of arranging any set of objects, and something may almost always be said against the best, and in favor of the worst of them. But the merits ol" a classification de- pend on the purposes to which it is instrumental. We have shown the jjurposes for which ^I. Comte's classi- fication is intended. ]Mr. Spencer has not shown that it is ill adapted to those purpo.'^cs ; and we cannot per- ceive that his own answers any ends cqu;dly important. His chief ol)jcction is that if the more special sciences need the truths of the more general ones, the latter also need some of those of the former, and have at times been stopped in their progress by the imperfect state of sciences which follow long after them in M. Comte's ticale ; so that, the dependence lieing mutual, there is a conscufni'^', but not an ascending scale or hierarchy of the sciences. That tlie earlier sciences derive lie][) from the later is undoubtedly true ; it is part of M. Comte's theory, and aniply exemplified in the details of his work. When ho affirms that one science historically precedes another, he does not mean that the perfection of the first precedes the humblest commencement oi' those which follow. Mr vSpencer docs not distinguish be- tween the empirical stage of the cultivation of a branch of knowledge, and the scientific sta^rc. The commence- ment of every studv consists in f]^athering together un- analyzed facts, and treasuring up such spontanccMis generalizations as present themselves to natural sagacity. In this stage any branch of inquiry can be carried on independently of every other ; and it is one of M. Comte's own remarks that the most complex, in a OF AL'GUSXE C03ITE. 41 scientific point of view, of all studies, the latest in his scries, the ^tiuly of man as a moral and social being, since from its ahsorbing interest it is cultivated more or less I)y every one, and pre-eminently by the great practical minds, acquired at an early period a greater stock of just liiough unscientific observations than the more elementary sciences. It is tliesc cnipirical truths that the later and more special sciences lend to tin; earlier : or, at most, some extrcaicly elementary scienti- fic truth, which Iwtppening to be easily ascertainable by direct experiment, could be made available for carrying a previous science already founded, to a higher stage of development ; a rc-aetlon of the later sciences on the earlier which ^I. Comtc not only fully recognized, but attached great importance to systematizing.* • The struii;»cst case wliiih yiv. Spvuccr i>rotUiccs of a scicntificully a.'sccrtaiiicd law, wliicli, ihoii^'li bclonijinf^ to a later science, was lu-ccssarj' to the fcicntinc roniiatioii of one occupviii^ an earlier place in "SI. Coiiite's scries, is the law of the accelerating force of ^'ravity; which JI. Cor.ite . places in Thysics, hut without wiiich the Newtonian theory of the celestial motions couM not have been discovered, nor could even now he proved. This fact, as is judicionsly roniarkcd by M. Littre, is not valid aj^ainst the plan of .M. Comic's classification, but discloses .1 slight error in the detail. y{. Comic should not liavc placed the laws of fersestrial i^ravity under I'hysics. They are part of the fjcneral fheory of gravitation, and belong to H>lroiiomy. Jlr. Spencer has hit one of the weak points in ^^. Comte's scientific scale; weak, however, only because left unguarded, .\stronomy, the second of M. Comte's abstract sci.-nccs, answers to his own definition of a I (increte science. jI. Comte, however, was only wrong in overlooking a ilisiinition. There is an abstract science of astronomy, namely, tlie theory "f ;:ravitation, which would equally agree with and cNphiin the facts of a toialiy diii'ereiit solar system from the one of which our e.irtli forms ,1 jKin. The actual facts of our own .system, the (liniensions, distances, velocities, temperatures, pln'sical composition, &c., of the sun, earth, and planets, are properly the subject of a concrete science, similar to natural history: but the concrete is more inseparably imited to the abstract science than in any other case, (*iiicc the few celestial facts really .tccessible to us, are nearly .tII required for discovering and proving the law of gravitation as an univer- sal property of bodies, and have tiierefore an inclisp»'i,.-ablc place in the abstract science a« its fundantenfal data. 42 THE rosiTivE niiLOsoriiY But thoujili dctaclicd truths relating: to the mora conij)lcx order of jihenoniena may bo einpii-ically ob- ecrvcd, and a few of thciu even >ci('iitiri<;iliy c:-:ta!)lis]io(l, contemporaneously with an early t^taiic of 8onie <)f the sciences anterior in the scale, such detacljed truths, as ^I. Littrc justly remarks, do not constitute a science. AVhat is known of a suitject, oidy becomes .1 science when it is made a connected body of truth ; in which the relation between the general principles and the details is definitely made out, and each particular truth can be recognized as a case of the operation of widi'r laws. This point of progress, at which the ^t\u]y passes from a [(relinilnary state of mere preparation, into a science, cannot be reached by the more complex studies until it has been attained by the simpler ones. A certain regularity of recurrence in the celestial ap- pearances was ascertained empirically before much pro- gress had been made in geometry ; but astronomy could no more be a science until geometry was a highly advanced one, than the rule of three could have been practised before addition and subtraction. The truths of the simpler sciences are a [)art of the laws to whicji the phenomena of thy more cou)[)lcx sciences conform : and are not oidy a necessary element in their cxi)lana- tion, but nuist be so well understood as to be traceable through complex combinations, before the special laws which co-exisl and co-operate with them can be brought to light. This is all that M. Comte alnnns, and enough fiu* his purpose.* lie no doubt ocasionallv • Tlic only point at wliidi the ;;rncral principle of llip t-i-iics fails in its application, is tlio sul)ilivision of riiv.-ics; nn <'iiMsc(|iicnri>. Thennolo{jy, iudced, is nltoijetiicr an exception to t!ic principle of decreasing; OF AUGUSTE COMTK. 43 indulijcs in more unqualified expressions than can be completely jii^tlHed, regard in j^ the logical perfection of the conf^truction of his sci-ies, and its exact corre3])ond- encc with tlie hi.storical evolution of the bcienccs : exag- gerations confined to language, and which the details of his cx[)osition ui'ten correct. Uut he is sufHcicntly near the truth, in both res[»ects, for every pi-actical purpose.* Elinor inaccuracies must often be forgiven even to great f^Liicrality, heat, as Mr. Sponcer truly says, bcinj; as universal as gravitation. IJiit lilt! place ol'TlKTMioidyfy is marked out, williia certain narrow limits, by tliu ends of the classilication, though not l>y its principle. The desideratum i.-, that every science .-iiould ]irecede thusc which cannot be scientilically constituted or rationally studied until it is known. It is as a means to this end tliat the arrangement ot'the phenomena in (he order of their dependonro on one another is iniptpoued to a raiher advanced stage. IJiit the phenomena of Chemistry and IJiology de])end on them orteu lor their very existence. The ends of the elassilicjition require theretbre that Thermology bhould precede Chemistry and iJiology, but do not demand that it should bo tiirown farther back. Cbi the other hand, those same ends, in another point of view, require that it sliotdd be subsequent to Astronomy, for reasons not of doctrine but of method: .\stronomy being the best school of the true art of interpreting Xature, by which Thermology prolits like other sciences, but which it was ill-ada)>ted to firiginate. * The philosophy of the subject is perhaps nowlierc so well expressed as in the ".Systi'me de r<>li!ique I'ositive," (iii. 41). "Coufu liigique- nient, Tordre suivant lequel nos ]n-incipales theories nccomplissent I't'volu- tion fondamcntalc resultc necessairement de leur dependance mutuellc. Toutcs les sciences peuvent, sans doute el re ebauchees a la fois: Icui usage pratique exige niC'uic cette culture siniultani'e. Ifais elle ne pout conceiner que les inductions proprcs a cliaque classc de speculatioji*. ( )r cet essor inductif ne saurait iburnir de.s principes sullisants qu'cnvei-s Ich plus simples (^tudcs. Parlout aillcurs, ils ne peuvent ctre I'tahlis qu'en subordonnnnt chnque genre d'inductions scientiliques h renscmble des de- ductions <'nian<^es des domaincs moins compliijut's, et di's-lors moiiis di'peud- unts. Ainsi nos divcrscs theories reposent dogmaticiucment les iines sur les autres, Suivant un ordre invariable, qui slfi\e, * " Sciciii-c," (s.'iys ;\Ir. Spcncir in liis " Gi'iicsis," "while jiuivly in- ductive is purely qualitative. ... Ail quniilitativo prevision is rcaciied ilctiuc- tivciy; inductiiin ran aeliievc only (inalitalivc prevision." Now, i(' \\f rcmenilnr fliat tlic very first accurate (inanlilative law of pliy.-ical iilicnoni- eiia ever e.-tal.-li.-heJ, tlic law of tlie iicceK'raliu'j; force of j;ravily, was discovered an'l jjrovcd l>y Galileo strictly l)y experiment ; that the iiiianli- ta'tivc laws on whkh tiic wlioio llicory ol" Ihc celestial motions is ;;roundcd, were generalized l>y Kejilcr from direct comparison of olwervations; that the (juantitative law of thy condensation of gases by pressure, (lie law of Hoy lo and ^fariotte. was arrived at hy direct experiment; that Ihc propor- tional quantities in which every Nnown subslancc combines ciieinieally with every other, were ascertained by innumcralile experiments, from which the general law of chemical e(|uivalenls, now the groun'hrascs gave currency and colie- rcjicc to .1 false abstraction and generalization, setting inquirers to look out for one cau-c of complex pheiu)m- ena which undoubtedly depend on many. According to M. Comte, chemistry entered into tiie positive stage with Lavoisier, in the latter half of the last century (in a subsequent treatise he })laces the date a generation earlier) ; and biology at the beginning of the present, when ]>ichat drew the fnndamental distinc- tion between nutritive or vegetative and properly animal life, and referred the properties of organs to the general laws of the component tissues. The most com])lex of all spiences, the Social, liad not, he maintained, beeonm positive at all, but was the subject of an ever-renewed and barren conJest between the theological and tlie metaphysical modes of thought. To make tliis highest of tlie sciences positive, and thereby conqdete the j)0sitivc character of ail human speculations, was the principal aim of his labors, and lie believed himself to have accomplished it in the last three volumes of his Treatise. But the term Positive is not, any more than Metaphysical, always used by ]\I. Comte in the same meaning. There never can have i)een a period in any sclcneo when it wiim not in Home degree positive, nincc it always professed to draw conclusions from experience and observation. M. Comte would have been the last OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 49 to deny, that, previous, to his own speculations, tlie world possessed a multitude of truths, of greater or less certainty, on social subjects, the evidence of wliicli was obtained by inductive or deductive processes from observed sequences of ])henomena. Nor could it be denied that the best writers on subjects upon which so many men of the higliest mental capacity had em- ployed tlieir powers, had accepted as thoroughly the jiositive point of view, and rejected the theological and metaphysical as decidedly, as M. Comte himself. ^Nlon- tesquicu ; even ]Maccliiavelli ; Adam Smith and the political economists universally, botli in France and in England; Bcntliam, and all thinkers initiated by him, had a full conviction that social phenomena conform to invariable laws, the discovery and iUustrati(jn of which was their great object as speculative thinkers. All that can be said is, that tliose philosophers did not get .cen reached, how shall wc know that it is true? How assure ourselves that the process has been performed correctly ; and that our premises, whether consisting of generalitic:^ or of particular facts, really prove tlie con- clusion wc have grounded on them? On this question M. Comte throws no light. He supi)]ies no test of proof. As regards deduction, he neither recognizes the syllogistic system of Aristotle and his successors (the insufficiency of which is as evident as its utility is real), nor proj»oses any other in lieu of it ; and of induction he has no canons "whatever. lie does not seem to ad- mit the ])ossibility of any general critcri(»u by which to decide whether a given inductive inference is correct or not. Yet he docs not, with Dr. Whewell, regard an inductive theory as proved if it accounts for the facts : on the contrary, he sets himself in the strongest oppo- sition to those scientific hypotheses, which, like the luminiferous ether, are not susceptible of direct proof, and are accepted on the sole evidence of their aptitude OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 53 for explaining phenomena. lie maintains tliat no hy- pothesis is legitimate unless it is susceptible of verifica- tion ; and that none ought to be accepted as true unless it can be shown, not only that it accords with the facts, but that its falsehood would be inconsistent witli theni. lie therefore needs a test of ijiductive proof; and, in as- signing none, he seems to give up as impracticable the main problem of Logic properly so called. At the be- ginning of his treatise, he speaks of a doctrine of jNIethod, apart from [lartindar npplioations, as conceivable, but nut needUil : method, accoi'dhig to hhn, Is learnt only Ijy seeing it in operation, and the logic of a science can only usefully be taught tiu'ough the science itself. To- wards the end of the work, he assumes a more deci- dedly negative tone, and treats the very conception of studying Logic otherwise than in its applications as chimerical. He got on, in his subsequent writings, to considering it as wrong. This indispensable part of Positive Philosophy he not only left to be supplied by others, but did all that depended on him to discourage them from attempting it. This hiatus in j\I. Comte's system is not unconnected with a defect in his original conception of the subject- matter of scientiiic investigation, which has been gener- ally noticed, for it lies on the surface, and is more apt to be exaggerated than overlooked. It is often said of him that he rejects the study of causes. This is not, in the correct acceptation, true ; for it is only questions of ultimate origin, and of Efficient as distinguished from what are called Physical causes, that he rejects. The causes that he I'cgards as inaccessible arc causes which ai'C not themselves phenomena. Like other people, he 54 THE POSITIVE rillLOSOrilY admits the study of causes, in every sense in which one physical fact can be tlie cause of anotlicr. But he has an objection to the tcord cause ; he will only, consent to speak of Laws of Succession : and depriving himself of the use of a word which has a Positive meaning, he "misses the meaning it expresses. lie sees no difference between such generalizations as Kepler's laws, and such as the theory of gravitation. lie fails to perceive the real distinction between the laws of succession and co- existence which thinkers of a diflcrent school call Laws of Phenomena, and those of what ihey call the action of Causes : the former exemplified l)y the succession of day and night, the latter by the earth's rotation which causes it. The succession of ({ny and night is as niudi an invariable sequence, as the alternate exposure of op- posite sides of the earth to the sun. Yet day and niglit arc not the causes of one another ; why ? Because their sequence, though invariable in our experience, is not unconditionally so : those facts only succeed eacli other, provided that the presence and absence of tlie sun succeed each other ; and if this alternation were to cease, we might have cither day or night unfollowed by one another. There are thus two kinds of uniformities of succession, the one unconditional, the other conditional on the first : laws of causation, and other successions dependent on those laws. All ultimate laws are laws of causation, and the only universal law beyond the pale of mathematics is the law of universal causation, namely, that every phenomenon has a plicnomenal cause ; has some phenomenon other than itself, or some combina- tion of phenomena, on which it is invariably and un- conditionally consequent. It is on the universality of OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 55 this law that tlic possibility rests of establishing a canon of Induction. A general proposition inductively ob- tained is only then proved to be true, when the instan- ces on which it rests arc such that if they have been correctly observed, the falsity of the generalization would be inconsistent with the constancy of causa- tion ; with the universality of the fact that the i)hc- noniena of nature take place according to invariable laws of succession.* It is probable, therefore, that ^I. Conitc's dctcrniined abstinence from the Avord and the idea of Cause, had much to do with his inability to con- ceive an Inductive Logic, by diverting his attention from the only basis upon which it could be founded. M'g are afraid it must also be said, — though shown only by slight indications in his fundamental work, and coming out in full evidence only in his later writings, — tiiat ]M. Comte, at bottom, was not so solicitous about completeness of proof as becomes a positive philoso- pher, and that the vmimpeachable objectivity, as he would have called it, of a conception — its exact cor- respondence to the realities of outward fact — was not, with him, an indispensable condition of adopting it, if it was subjectively useful, by affording facilities to the mind for grouping phenomena. This appears very curiously in his chapters on the philosophy of Chemis- try. He recommends, as a judicious use of " the • Those who wish to sec this idea followed out are referred to " A Sys- tem of I'Ogic, Katiociiiativc and Inductive." It i? not irrelevant to state that M. Couite, sodH allor tlic piil)lication of that worlc, expressed, both in a let- ter (publislied in M. l^ictre's volume) and in print, his high approval of it (especially of the Inductive part) as a real contribution to the construction of the I'lisitivc Method. Hut wc cannot discover that ho was indebted to it for a H\\n\>.\ Idea, or thiit it iiillueneod, in tlio innaHest purtiouiur, the cuurMO of his Mub.tc(iuent speculations. 56 TiiE rosiTivE piiiLosoniv Uegree of liberty left to our intelligence by tlic end and purpose of positive science," that we sljould acec[)t as a convenient fjcncraiization the doctrine that all dTcniical composition is between two elements only ; that every substance which our analysis decomposes, let us say into four elements, has for its immediate constituents two hypothetical substances, each compounded of two sim- pler ones. There would have been notliing to object to in this as a scientific hypothesis, assumed tentatively as a means of suggesting experiments by which its truth might be tested. With this for its destination, the con- ception would have been legitimate and philosophical ; the more so, as, if confirmed, it would have afforded an explanation of the fact that some substances which analysis shows to be composed of the same elementary substances in the same proportions, dld'er in their gen- eral properties, as, for instance, sugar and gum.* And if, besides affording a reason for diilcrence between things which differ, the hypothesis had afforded a reason for agreement l)etween thin^js which a^jree ; if the inter- mediate Hide by which the quaternary compoimd was res(»lved into two binary ones, could have been so chosen as to brinjf each of them within the analojiics of some known class of binary compounds (which it is easy to suppose possible, and which, in some particular in- stances, actually happens) ; f the universality of binary composition would have been a successful example of * The force, Iiowevcr, of tliis Inst considcnitioii lias boon imuli wi-akciictl l»3' the prof^rcss of discovery nince >[. Comfo left oil' (itiidyiiif; chemistry; it hcing now probable that most if not all substances, even elementary, are fuscepiible o( allolropic forms; ns in the case of oxygen and ozuuc, the two forms of phosphorus, &c. \ Thus; by considcrftijj jirussle acid as a compound of hyilrofjeii and C3'anogeu rather than of hydrogen and the elements of cyanogen (carbon OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 57 an liypotlicsls in anticipation of a positive theory, to ^ive a direction to inquiry which might end in its being either proved or abandoned. But ]\I. Comtc evidently thought tliat even though it sliould never be i)rovcd — however many cases of chemical composition might al- ways remain in which tlie theory was still as hyj)otheti- cal as at first — so long as it was not actually disproved (which it is scarcely in the nature of the case that it should ever be) it would deserve to be retained for its mere convenience in bringing a large body of phenom- ena under a general concc[)tion. In a resume of the general principle of the positive method at the end of the work, he claims, in express terms, an unlimited license of adopting " without any vain scruple " hy[)o- thctical conceptions of this sort ; " in order to satisfy, within proper limits, our just mental inclinations, which always turn, with an instinctive predilection, towards simplicity, continuity, and generality of conceptions, while always respecting the reality of external hnvs in so far as accessible to us" (vi. 639). "The most philosophic point of view leads us to conceive the study of natural laws as destined to represent the external world so as to give as much satisfaction to the essential inclinations of our intelligence, as is consistent with the degree of exactitude commanded by the aggregate of our practical wants" (vi. Q>-i2^, Among these "essen- tial inclinations " he includes not only our " instinctive [M'edilcction for order and harmony," which makes us relish any conception, even fictitious, that helps to re- nnd nitrogen) it is assimilated to a whole class of acid compounds, between Iiyili-n;;eii and otlicr substances, and a reason is tlius found for its agreeing in their acid properties. 58 THE POSITIVE nilLOSOrilY duce plienomena to system ; but even our feelings of taste, "les convenances puremcnt esthdtlques," wliicli, he savs, have a lenitimatc part in the cniploymcnt of the "genre de libcrtu reste facultatif pour notrc intelli- jrencc." After tlie due satisfaction of our " most eminent mental inclinations," there will still remain "a consider- able niaririn of indetermiiiateness, which should be made use of to give a direct gratification to our hcsoin of ideality, by embellishing our scientific thonglits, with- out injury to their essential reality"' (vi. (ii7). In consistency with all this, ^l. Comtc warns thinkers against too severe a scrutiny of the exact truth of scien- tific laws, and stamps with " severe reprobation " those who break down " by too minute an investigation " gen- eralizations already made, without being able to substi- tute others (vi. 031)) : as in the ease of Lavoisier's general theory of chemistry, which would have made that science more satisfactory than at present to " the instinctive inclinations of our intelligence " if It had turned out true, but unhapi»ily it did not. These men- tal dispositions in M. Comtc account for his not Iiaving found or sought a logical criterion of proof ; but they are scarcely consistent witjj his inveterate hostility to the hypothesis of the luminiferous ether, which (rertainly gratifies our " predilection for order and harmony," not to sav our " bcsoin d'idcalitd," in no ordinary de'h poli- tic'ji. But [jolitics ij? not tlic whole art of social exist- ence : ethics is still a dee[)cr and more vital part of It j and III that, as much in EnglaJid as elsewhere, the cur- rent opinions are still divided between the theological mode of thought and the metaphysical. What is the whole doctrine of Intuitive Morality, which reigns su- j)reme wherever the idolatry of Scripture texts has abated and the influence of BciUhaui's philosophy lias not reacheortant ends, under the con- ditions and with the limitations which those ends im- pose. The general residt of ]M. ConUc's criticism on the rcvohitionarv philosophy, is that lie dcenjs it not only incapable of aiding the necessary reorganization of society, but a serious im[)cdlment tliereto. i)y setting" uj), on all the great interests of mankind, the mere negation of authority, direction, or organization, as the most perfect state, and the solution of all problems ; the extreme point of this aberration being reached by Konsseau and his followers, when they extolled the savage state, as an ideal from which civilization was only a degeneracy, more or less marked and com[)lete. The state of sociological speculation being surli as has been described, — divided between a feudal and the(dogical school, now effete, and a democratic and metaphysical one, of no value except for the destruction of the former, — the problem how to render the social i^cience positive, must naturally have jjrescntcd itself, more or less distinctly, to superior minds. ]M. Comtc examines and criticises, for the n)ost part justly, soiuo of the principal efforts which have been made by indi- vidual thinkers for this purj)osc. I'ut the weak side of his philosophy conies out [(romincntly in his sti-i"tin"es on the only systematic attcmj)! yet made by any body of thinkers, to constitute a science, not indeed of social or AUGITHTK COMTK. 75 phenomena generally, but of one great class or divisloTi of llieni. We mean, of course, })olitical economy, wliicli (wltii a reservation in favor of the speculations of Adam Smith as valuable preparatory studies for science) he deems unscientific, unpositivc, and a mer<> branch of metaphysics, that comprehensive category of condcnmation in which he places all attempts nt positive science Nvhich arc not in his opinion directed by a right scientific method. Any one acquainted with tlie writ- ings of [)olitical economists need only read his few pages of aniniad versions on tliem (iv. 193 to 205) to learn how extremely superficial ^l. Comte can sometimes be. lie afiinns that they have added nothing really new to the original (tpcrfus of Adam Smith ; when e\cry one Avho has read tiiem knows that they have added so much as to have changed the whole aspect of the science, besides rectifying and clearing up in the most essential points the cqwiyus themselves. He lays an almost puerile stress, for tlic })urpose of disparagement, on the discussions about the meaning of Avords which are found in the best books on political economy, as if such dis- cussions were not an indispensable accompaniment of the progress of thongiit, and abundant in the history of every physical science. On the whole cpiestiou he has but one remark of any value, and that he misapplies ; namely, that the study of the conditions of national wealth as a detached sul)ject is unphilosopliical, because, all the dilferent aspects of social phenomena acting and reacting on one another, they cannot be rightly under- stood apart ; which by no means proves that the material and industrial phenomena of society arc not, even by themselves, susceptible of useful generalizations, but 76 THE POSITIVE nilLOSOPHY only that these generalizations niu&t necessarily be re- lative to a given i'ovm of civilization and a given stage of social advancement. Tliis, we ajiprclicnd, is what no political economist would deny. None of them pretend that the laws of wages, profits, values, prices, and the like, set down in their treatises, would be true in the savage state (for cxain[)le), or in a conununity composed of masters and slaves. But they do think, with good reason, that whoever understands the })olitical economy of a country witli the complicated and manifold civilization of the nations of Europe, can deduce with- out difficulty the i)olitIcal economy of any other state of society, with the particular circumstances of which he is equally well acquainted.* Wo do not pretend that political economy has never been prosecuted or taught in a contracted spirit. As often as a study is cultivated by narrow minils, they will draw from it narrow con- clusions. If a political economist is deficient in general knowledge, he will exaggerate the importance and uni- versality of the limited class of truths which he knowSo All kinds of scientific men arc liable to this imputation, and M. Comtc is never weary of urging it against them ; reproaching them with their narrowness of mind, the petty scale of their thoughts, their incapacity for large • M. Littrc", wlio, though a ■warm admirer, and acceptin;^ thu pioitioii of a disciple of >[. Comtc, is sin;;ularly free from his errors, makes tlic equally ingenious and ju>t remark, that Political Kconomy corresjiond.-i in social K-ience to the theory of the nutritive functions in hiology, wliich M. Cointe, with all good jihysiologi^t.", thinks it not only permissible, hut a great ami fundamental improvement, to treat, in the (irst place, separately, as the necessary basis of the higher branches of the science; although the nutritive functions can no more be withdrawn in fuel from the influence of the animal and human attributes, than the economical phenomena of society from that 'of the political and moral. OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 77 views, and the stupidity of tliose they occasionally at- tempt beyond the bounds of their own subjects. Politi- cal economists do not deserve these reproaches more than other classes of positive enquirers, but less than most. The princij^al error of narrowness with which the'']are frequently chargeable, is that of regarding, not any economical doctrine, but their present experience of mankind, as of universal validity ; mistaking tempo- rary or local phases of human character for human nature itself; having no faith in the wonderful pliability of the human mind ; deeming it impossible, in spite of the strongest evidence, that the earth can produce human beings of a different type from that which is familiar to them in their own age, or even, perhaps, in their own country. The only security against this narrowness is a liberal mental cultivation, and all it proves is tliat a person is not likely to be a good politi- cal economist who is nothing else. Tlius far, we have had to do with M. Comte, as a sociologist, only in his critical capacity. We have now to deal with him as a constructor, — the author of a. sociological system. The first question is that of the Method proper to the study. His view of this is highly instructive. T!ic ^Method proper to the Science of Society must be, iu substance, the same as in all other sciences, — the interrogation and interpretation of experience, by the twofold process of Induction and Deduction. But its mode of practising these operations has features of pecu- liarity. In general, Induction furnishes to science the laws of the elementary facts, from which, when known, those of the complex combinations are thought out 78 THE rosiTiVE niiLosoriiY deductively : specific obscrvntion of complex phenomena yields no general laws, or only empirical ones ; its scientific function is to verity the laws obtained by de- duction. This mode of philosophizing is not adequate to the exigences of sociological investigation. In so- cial phenomena the elenjcntary facts are feelings and actions, and the laws of these arc tlie laws of human nature, social facts being the results of human acts and situations. Since, then, tlic phenomena of man in society result from his nature as an indi\i(hial being, it might be thought that the proper mode of coustructing u positive Social Science must be by deducing it from the general laws of human nature, using the facts of history merely for verification. Such, accordingly, has been the conce[)tion of social science by many of those who have endeavored t(» ronder it ])ositive, particularly by the school of Bcntham. M. Comtc considers this as an error. AVc may, he says, draw from the universal laws of human natiuv some conclusions (though even these, we think, rather [trccariods) concerning the very earliest stages of hiunan j)rogi-css, of whicii there are either no, or very im[>erfect, historical records. Ihit as society j)rocccds in its development, its phenomena arc determined, more and more, not by the sim{)le tendencies of universal human nature, but by the accumulated In- fluence of past generations over the present. The human beings themselves, on the laws of whose nature the facts of history depend, are not abstract or universal but historical human beings, already s]ia[)ed, and made what they arc, by human society. This being the ease, no powers of deduction could enable anyone, starting from the mere conception of the Being Man, pl.accd in a OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 79 world siicli .IS the earth ni;iy have been before the com- mencement of human agency, to predict and calculate the phenomena of his development sucli as they have in fact proved. If the facts of history, empirically con- sidered, had not given rise to any generalizations, a deductive study of history could never have ivached higher than more or less [)lausible conjecture. By good fortune (for the case might easily have been otherwise) the history of our species, looked at as a comprehensive whole, does exliibit a determinate course, a certain order of development ; tht)ugh history alone c;uinot prove this to be a necessary law, as distinguished from a tcm[)orary accident. Here, therefore, begins the office of Biology (or, as we should say, of Psychology) in the social science. The universal laws of human nature arc jjart of the data of sociology, but in using them we nmst reverse the method of the deductive physical sciences ; for while in these, specific ex[)erience commonly serves to verlfv laws arrived at by deduction, in sociology it is specific experience which suggests the laws, and deduction which verifies them. If a socio- logical theory, collected from historical evidence, con- tradicts the cstal)llshed general laws of human nattu'c; if (to use M. Comte's instances) it Im[)lies, in the mass of mankind, any very decided natural bent, cither in a good or in a bad direction ; if it supposes that the reason, in average hmnan beings, predominates over the desires, or the disinterested desires over the i)crsimal, we may know that history has been misinterpreted, and that the theory is false. On the other hand, if laws of social phenomena, em[>lrlcally gencrali;^ed from history, can, when once suggested, be affiliated to the known la\v3 80 THE POSITIVE nilLOSOPIIY of human nature ; if the direction actually taken hy the devclojjnicnts and changes of human society, can be seen to be such as tlie properties of man and of his dwelling-place made antecedently probable, the empiri- cal generalizations are raised into positive laws, and Sociology becomes a science. Much has been said and written, for centuries past, by the practical or empirical school of politicians, in con- demnation of theories founded on })rinciples of human nature, without an historical basis ; and the theorists, In their turn, have successfully retaliated on the practi- calists. ^ But we know not any thinker who, before ^[. Comte, had penetrated to the philosophy of the matter, and placed the necessity of historical studies as the foundation of sociological speculation on the true foot- ing. From this time any political thinker who fancies himself able to dispense with a connected view of the great facts of history, as a chain of causes and eft'ects, must be regarded as below the level of the age ; wliile the vulgar mode of using history, by looking in it for parallel cases, as if any cases were parallel, or as if a single instance, or even many instances not compared and analysed, could reveal a law, will be more than ever, and irrevocably, discredited. The inversion of the ordlnarv relation between De- duction a,nd Induction is not the only point in which, according to ^l. Comte, the ]\fethod proper to Sociology differs from that of the sciences of inorganic nature. The common order of science proceeds from the details to the whole. The method of Sociology should proceed from the whole to the details. There is no universal principle for the order of study, but that of proceeding OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 81 from the known to the unknown ; finding our way to the facts at whatever point is most open to our obser- vation. In the phasnomena of the social state the collective phenomenon is more accessible to us than the parts of whicii it is composed. Tiiis is already, in a great degree, true of the mere animal body. It is essential to the idea of an organism, and it is even more true of the social organism tlian of the individual. The state of every part of the, social wiiolc at any time, is intimately connected with the contemporaneous state of all the others. Religious belief, philosophy, science, the fine arts, the industrial arts, commerce, navigation, government, all ai'e in close mutual dependence on one another, insomuch that, when any considerable cliange takes place in one, we may know that a parallel change in all the others has preceded or will follow it. The progress of society from one general state to another is not an aggregate of partial changes, but the product of a single impulse, acting tlirough all the partial agencies, and can therefore be most easily traced by studying them together. Could it even be detected in tiiem separately, its true nature could not be understood except by examining tlicm in the ensemble. In con- structing, therefore, a theory of society, all the diffiu'cnt aspects of the social organization must be taken into consideration at once. Our space is not consistent with enquiring into all the limitations of this doctrine. It requires many of which ^I. Comte's theory takes no account. There is one, in particular, dependent on a scientific artifice familiar to students of science, especially of the applications of mathematics to the study of nature. When an effect 8 82 THE POSITIVE PiiiLosornY depends on several variable conditions, some of which change lec weakest part of tlic treatise. lie can liardly have seemed even to lilmself to have originated, in the statics of society, any thing new,* unless his revival of the Catholic idea of a spiritual Power may be so considered. The remainder, with the exception of detached thouglits, in which even his feeblest productions arc always rich, is trite, while in our judgment far from being always true. He begins by a statement of the general properties of human nature which make social existence possible. Man has a spontaneous propensity to the society of his fellow-beings, and seeks it instinctively, for its own t^ake, and not out of regard to the advantages it pro- cures for him, which, in many conditions of humanity, nmst appear to him very problematical. Man has also a certain, though moderate, amount of natural ben- evolence. On the other hand, these social propensities arc by nature weaker than liis selfish ones ; and the social state, being mainly kept in existence through tiic former, involves an habitual antagonism between the two. Further, our wants of all kinds, from the purely organic u{)wards, can only be satisfied by means of labor ; nor does bodily labor suffice, without the guidance of intelligence. But labor, especially when prolonged and monotonous, is naturally hateful, and mental labor the most irksome of all ; and hence a * Indeed Iiis cl.iim to be the creator of Sociology does not extend to this branch of tlie scioni-e: on the contrary, he, in a subsequent work, expressly declares that the real founder of it was Aristotle, by whom the tlieory of tho conditions of social existence was carried as far towards perfection as was possible in the absence of any theory of I'rojjress. Without going quite this length, we think it hardly possible to appreciate too highly tiic merit of those early elTorts, beyond which little progress had been naade, until a rciy recent period, cither in ethical or in political science. 84 THE rosrrivE piiilosophy second antagonism, which must exist in all societies •whatever. The character of the society is principally detcnnined by the degree in which the better incentive, in each of these cases, makes head against the worse. In I)otli the points, human nature is capable of great amelioration. The social instincts may ap[)roximatc much nearer to the strength of the personal ones, though never entirely coming up to it ; the aversion to labor in general, and to intellectual labor in [)articular, may I^e much weakened, and the predominance of the inclina- tions over the reason ijreatlv diminished, thou^di never completely destroyed. The spirit of im[)rovcment re- sults from the increasinf; strenirth of the social instincts, combined with the growth of an intellectual activity, which, guiding the personal i)ropcnsities, inspires each individual with a deliberate desire to improve his con- dition. The personal instincts left to their own guidance, and the indolence and apathy natural to mankind, are the sources which mainly feed the spirit of Conserva- tion. The struggle between the two spirits is a uni- versal incident of the social state. The next of the universal elements in human society is family life ; which INI. Comte regards as ori^-inallv the sole, and always the principal, source of the social feelings, and the only school open to mankind in general, in which unselfishness can be learnt, and the feelings and conduct demanded by social relations be made habitual. ^I. Comte takes this opportunity of declaring his opinions on the [)roper constitution of the family, and in particular of the marriage institution. They are of the most orthodox and conservative sort. M. Comte adheres not only to the popular Christian, but to the OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 85 Catholic view of nuirriagc iu its utmost strictness, and rebukes Protestant nations for liaving tampered with the indissohibility of tlic engagement, by permitting divorce. He admits that tlie marriage institution has been, iu vax'ious respects, beneficially modified with the advance of society, and that we may not yet have reached the last of tliese modifications ; but strenuously maintains that such changes cannot possibly aflTect what he regards as the essential principles of the institution, — the irre- vocability of the engagement, and the complete subor- dination of the wife to tlie husband, and of women generally to men ; which are precisely the great vulner- able points of tlic existing constitution of society on this important subjects It is unpleasant to have to say it of a philosopher, but tlic incidents of his life which have been made public by his biographers aflford an explanation of one of these two opinions, — he had quarrelled with his wife.* At a later period, under the influence of circumstances equally personal, his opinions and feelings respecting women were very much modified, vvitiiout becominix more rational : iu his final scheme of society, instead of being ti'catcd as grown children, they were exalted into goddesses ; honors, jnivileges, and immunities were lavished on them, only not simple justice. On the otiicr question, the irrevocability of marriage, M. Comte must receive credit for impartiality, since the opposite doctrine would have better suited his personal convenience; but we can give hun no other credit, for his argument is not only futile, but refutes * It is due to tiicni both to say, that ho continued to expross, in lottcre whicl» liave been published, a high opinion of her, both morally and intcl- lectunlly; and her persistent and strong concern for his interests and his £amc is attested both by M. Littrii aud by his own correspondence. 8Q TiiE POSITIVE niiLOSoriir itself. He s.ays, that, with liberty of divorce, life would be spent in a constant succession of experiments and failures ; and in (he same breath congratulates himself on the fact that modern manners and sentiments have in the main prevented the baneful ciTocts which the toleration of divorce in Protestant countries might have; l)cen expected to produce. He did not perceive that if modern habits and feelings have successfully resisted •what he deems the tendency of a less rigorous marriage- law, it must be because modern habits and feelinirs are inconsistent with the perpetual series of new trials which be dreaded. If there are tendencies in human nature which seek change and variety, there are others which demand fixity, in matters which touch tlie daily sources of happiness; and one who Jiad studied history as much as M. Comte, ought to have known that ever since the nomad mode of life was exchanged for the agricultural, the latter tendencies have becii alwavs nfjdninLr lifround on the former. All experience testifies that regidarity in domestic relations is almost in direct proportion to industrial civilization. Idle life, and military life with its long intervals of idleness, are the conditions to which cither sexual profligacy, or prolonged vagaries of ima- gination on that subject, arc congenial. Busy men have no time for them, and have too much other occu- pation for their thoughts : they require that home should be a place of rest, not of incessantly renewed excitement and disturbance. In the condition, therefore, into which modern society has passed, there 1h no probubillly that marriages would often be contracted ^^•ithout a sincere desire on both sides that they should be permanent. That this has been the case hitherto in countries where OF AUGUSTE COMTE. ' 87 divorce was permitted, wc have on M. Comtc's own showing ; and every thing leads us to believe that the power, if granted elsewhere, would in general be used only for its legitimate purpose, — for enabling those who, by a blameless or excusable mistake, have lost their first tiirow for domestic happiness, to free tliemselves (with due regard for all interests concerned) from the burthensome yoke, and try, under more favorable auspices, another chance. Any further discussion of these great social questions would evidently be ineonn- patiblc with the nature and limits of the present paper. Lastly, a phenomenon universal in all societies, and constantly assuming a wider extension as tliey advance in their progress, is the co-operation of mankind one with another, by the division of employments and in- terchange of commodities and services ; a conununiou which extends to nations as well as individuals. The economic imi)ortance of this spontaneous organization of mankind as joint-workers with and for one another, has often been illustrated. Its moral eftccts, in con- necting them by their interests, and, as a more remote consequence, by their sympathies, are equally salutary. But there arc some things to be said on the other side. The increasing specialisation of all employments ; the division of mankind into innumerable small fr-ictions, each engrossed by an extremely minute fragment of the business of society, is not without inconveniences, art well moral as intclleotnal, whieh, if they eoidd not be remedied, would be a serious abatement from the benefits of advanced civilization. The interests of the whole — the bearings of thinjrs on the ends of the 88 THE POSITIVE PHILOSOniY social union — arc less and less present to the minds of men ■who have so contracted a sphere of activity. The Insignificant detail ^vhIch forms their wliole occu- pation — the infinitely minute \Yhecl they help to turn in the maclnnery of society — does not arouse or gratify any feeling bf public spirit or unity with their fellow- men. Their work Is a mere tribute to physical neces- sity, not the glad performance of a social office. This lowering effect of the extreme division of labor tells most of all on those who arc set up as the lights and teachers of the rest. A man's mind Is as fatally narrowed, and his feelings towards the great ends of humanity as miserably stunted, by giving all his thoughts to the classification of a few insects or the resolution of a few equations, as to sharpening the points or putting on the heads of pins. The "disper- sive speciality " of the present race of scientific men, who, unlike their picdcccsxors, have u positive iivcr.'-iion to enlarged views, and seldom cither know or care for any of the Interests of mankind beyond the narrow limits of their pursuit. Is dwelt on by M. Comte as one of the great and growing evils of tlic time, and the one whicli most retards moral and intellectual rciren- cration. To contend against it is one of the main purposes towards which he thinks the forces of society should be directed. The obvious remedy Is a large and liberal general education, preparatory to all special pursuits; and this is ]\I. . Comte's opinion. But the education of youth is not in his estimation enougli : he lerpilres an agency set apart for obtruding upon all classes of persons through the whole of life, the para- mount claims of the general interest, and the compre- OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 89 licnsivc ideas that demonstrate the mode in which human actions promote or impair it. In other words, he demands a moral and intellectual authority, charged with the duty of guiding men's opinions and enlighten- ing and warning their consciences ; a 8[)iritual Power, whose judgments on all matters of high moment should deserve, and receive, the same universal respect and deference which is paid to the united judgments of astronomers in matters astronomical. The very idea of such an authority implies that a unanimity has been attained, at least in essentials, among moral and politi- cal thinkers, corresponding or approaching to that which already exists in the other sciences. There cannot be this unanimity, until the true methods of positive science have been applied to all subjects, as completely as they have been applied to the study of j)hysical science. To this, however, there is no real em, hy their mixed appeal to the sentiments and the understanding, admirably fitted to educate the feelings of abstract thinkers, .and enlarge the intellectual horizon of people of the world.* lie regards the law of progress as applicable, in spite of aj)pcarances, to poetry and art as much as to science and politics. The common im- pression to the contrary he ascribes solely to tlie fact, that the perfection of aisthetic creation requires as its condition a conscntanoousness in the feelings of man- kind, which depends for its existence on a fixed and settled state of opinions ; while the last five centuries have been a period, not of settling, but of unsettling and decomposing, the most general beliefs and sentiments of mankind. The numerous monuments of poetic and artistic genius which the modern mind has produced • He goes still further nn' thing else. Of course the sup- position was not to be heard of that any other person could require, or be the better for, what ^I. Comte did not value. " Unity " and " systcmatization " absolutely demanded that all other people should model themselves after M. Comte. It would never do to suppose that there could be more than one road to human happiness, or more than one ingredient in it. OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 120 The most prejudiced must admit, that this religion without theology is not chargeable with any relaxtion of moral restraints. On the contrary, it prodigiously cxaijijcrates them. It makes the same ethical mistake as the theory of Calvinism, that every act in life should be done for the glory of God, and that whatever is not a duty is a sin. It does not perceive that between the region of duty and that of sin there is an interme- diate space, the region of positive worthiness. It is not good that persons should be bound, by other peo- ple's opinion, to do every thing that they would deserve praise for doing. There is a standard of altruism to which all should be required to come up, and a degree beyond it which is not obligatory, but meritorious. It is incumbent on every one to restrain the pursuit of his personal objects within the limits consistent with the essential interests of others. What those limits are it Is the province of ethical science to determine ; and to keep all individuals and aggregations of individuals within them, is the proper office of punishment and of moral blame. If, in addition to fulfilling this obliga- tion, persons make the good of others a direct object of disinterested exertions, postponing or sacrificing to it even innocent personal Indulgences, they deserve gi-atltude and honor, and are fit objects of moral praise. So long as they are in no way compelled to this con- duct by any external pressure, there cannot be too much of It ; but a necessary condition is its sponta- neity ; since the notion of a happiness for all, procured by the self-sacrifice of each, if the abnegation Is really felt to be a sacrifice, is a contradiction. Such spon- taneity by no means excludes sympathetic encourago- 9 130 LATER SPECULATIONS ment ; but the encouragement should take the form of making self-devotion pleasant, not that of making every thing else j)ainrul. The object should be to stim- ulate services to humanity by their natural rewards ; not to render the pursuit of our own good in any other manner impossible, by visiting it with the reproaches of others and of our own conscience. The proper office of those sanctions is to enforce upon every one the conduct necessary to give all other persons their fair chance : conduct which chiefly consists in not doing them harm, and not impeding them in any thing which without harming others docs good to them- selves. To this must of course be added that, when we cither expressly or tacitly imdcrtakc to do more, we are bound to keep our promise. And inasmuch as every one who avails himself of the advantages of society, lends others to expect from him all such positive good olHccs and disintcroisted Horvicon nm tho moral improvement attained by mankind has rendered cus- tomary, he deserves moral blame if, without just cause, he disappoints that exi)CCtation. Througii this principle the domain of moral duty is always widening. When what once was uncommon virtue becomes com- mon virtue, it comes to be numbered among obligations, while a degree exceeding what has grown common, remains simply meritorious. M. Comte is accustomed to draw most of his ideas of moral cultivation from the discipline of the Catholic Church. Had he followed that guidance in the present case, he would have been less wide of the mark. For the distinction which we have drawn was fully recog- nized by the sagacious and far-sighted men who created OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 131 the Catholic ethics. It is even one of the stock re- proaches against Catholicism, that it lias two standards of morality, and docs not make obligatory on all Chris- tians the highest rule of Christian perfection. It has one standard which faithfully acted up to, suffices for salvation, another and a higher which when realized constitutes a saint. M. Conite, perhaps unconsciously, for there is nothing that he would have been more unlikely to do if he had been aware of it, has taken a leaf out of the book of the despised Protestantism. Like the extreme Calvinists, he requires that all believ- ers shall be saints, and damns them (after his own fashion) if they are not. Our conception of human life is different. We do not conceive life to be so rich in enjoyments that it can afford to forego the cultivation of all those which address themselves to what M. Comte terms the cgotis- (iu propt'UtiJlioM. On the eoutniry, wo bollovo that a sufficient gratification of these, short of excess, but up to the measure wliich rendci's the enjoyment greatest, is almost always favorable to the benevolent affections. The moralization of the personal enjoyments we deem to consist, not in reducing them to the smallest possible amount, but in culti\ating the habitu.al wish to share them with others, and with all others, and scorning to desire any thing for one's self which is incapable of being so shax'cd. There is only one passion or inclination which is permanently incompatible with this condition — the love of domination, or superiority, for its own sake; which implies, and is grounded on, the equiva- lent depression of other people. As a rule of conduct, to be enforced by moral sanctions, we think no more 132 LATER SPECULATIONS should be attempted than to prevent people from doing- harm to others, or omitting to do such good as they have undertaken. Demanding no more tlian tins, gociety, in any tolerable circumstances, obtains much more ; for the natural activity of human nature, shut out from all noxious directions, will expand itself in useful ones. This is our conception of the moral rule prescribed by the religion of Humanity. But above this standard there is an unlimited range of moral worth, up to the most exalted heroism, which should be fostered by every positive encouragement, though not converted into an obligation. It is as much a part of our scheme as of M. Comte's, that the direct cultivation of altruism, and the subordination of egoism to it, far beyond the point of absolute moral duty, should be one of the chief aims of education, both individual and collective. We even recognize the value, for this end, of ascetic discipline, in the original Greek sense of the word. We think witli Dr. John- son, that he who has never denied himself any thing which is not wrong, cannot be fully trusted for denying himself every thing which is so. We do not doubt that children and young persons will one day be again systematically disciplined in self-mortification ; that they will be taught, as in antiquity, to control their appetites, to brave dangers, and submit voluntarily to pain, as simple exercises in education. Something has been lost as well as gained" by no longer giving to every citizen the training necessary for a soldier. Xor can any pains taken be too great, to form the habit, and develop the desire, of being useful to others and to the world, by the practice, independently of reward OF AUGLMK COMTE. 133 and of every personal consideration, of positive virtue beyond the bounds of prescribed duty. No efforts should be spared to associate the pupil's self-respect, und his desire of the respect of others, with service rendered to Humanity ; when possible, collectively, but at all events, what is always possible, in the per- sons of its individual members. There arc many remarks and precepts in jNI. Comtc's volumes which, as no less pertinent to our conception of morality than to his, we fully accept. For cxaujplc : without admitting tiiat to make " calculs personnels " is contrary to mo- rality, %ve agree with him in the opinion, that the prin- cipal hygienic precepts should be inculcated, not solely or principally as maxims of prudence, but as ia matter of duty to others, since by squandering our health we disable ourselves from rendering to our fellow-creatures the services to which they are entitled. As M. Comte truly says, the prudential motive is by no means fully sufficient for the purpose, even physicians often disre- garding their own precepts. The personal penalties of neglect of health are commonly distant, as well as more or less uncertain, and require the additional and more immediate sanction of moral responsibility. M. Comte, therefore, in this instance, is, we conceive, right in principle ; though we have not the smallest doubt that he would have fjone into extreme cxa^ijera- tion in practice, and would have wholly ignored the legitimate liberty of the individual to judge for himself respecting his own bodily conditions, with due relation to the sufficiency of his means of knowledge, and taking the responsibility of the result. Connected with the same considerations is another 134: LATER SPECULATIONS idea of M. Comtc, which has great beauty and grandeur in it, and the realization of Avhich, witiiin the hounds of possibility, would be a cultivation of tiic social feel- ings on a most essential point. It is, that every person who lives by any useful work, should be habituated to regard himself not as an individual workini; for his private benefit, but as a public functionary ; and his wages, of whatever sort, as not the remuneration or purchase-money of his labor, which should be given freely, but as the provision made by society to enable him to carry it on, and to replace the- nmtcrials and products which have been consumed in the process. M. Comte observes, that in modern industry every one in fact works much more for others than for him- self, since his productions are to be consumed by others, and it is only necessary that his thoughts and imagina- tion should adapt themselves to the real state of the fact. The practical problem, however, is not quite so simple, for a strong sense that he is working for others m.ay lead to nothing better than feeling himself necessary to them, and, instead of freely giving his commodity, may only encourage him to put a high price upon it. What M. Comte really means is, that we should regard work- ing for the benefit of others as a good in itself; that we should desire it for its own sake, and not for the sake of remuneration which cannot justly be claimed for doing what we like : that the proper return for a service to society is the gratitude of society ; and that the moral claim of any one in regard to the pro^ ision for his personal wants, is not a question of quid pro quo in respect to his co-operation, but of how much the circumstances of society permit to be assigned to OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 135 him, consistently with the just claims of others. To this opinion we entirely subscribe. The rough method of settling the hiborer's share of the produce, by the competition of the market, may represent a practical necessity, but certainly not a moral ideal. Its defence is, that civilization has not hitherto been equal to organ- izing any thing better than this first rude approach to an equitable distribution. Rude as it is, we for the present go less wrong by leaving the thing to settle itself, than by settling it artificially in any mode which has yet. been tried. But in wliatever manner that question may ultimately be decided, the true moral and social idea of Labor is in no way affected by it. Until labor- ers and employers perform the work of industry in the S2)irit in which soldiers perform tliat of an army, indus- try will never be moralized, and military life will remain, what, in spite of the anti-social character of its direct object it has hitherto been — the chief school of moral co-operation. Thus far of the general idea of M. Comte's ethics and religion. We must now say something of the details. Here we approach the ludici'ous side of the subject : but we shall unfortunately have to relate other things far more really ridiculous. There cannot be a religion without a cidtus. We use this term for want of any other, for its nearest equivalent, worship, suggests a different order of ideas. T\'e mean by it a set of systematic observances, in- tended to cultivate and maintain the religious sentiment. Though M. Comte justly api}reciates the superior effi- cacy of acts, in keeping up and strengthening the feeling which prompts them, over any mode whatever 136 LATER SPECULATIONS of mere expression, he takes pains to organize the latter also witli great minuteness. lie provides an equivalent both for the private devotions, and for tlie public ceremonies of other faiths. Tiie reader will be surprised to learn, that the former consists of prayer. But prayer, as understood by M. Comte, docs not mean asking ; it is a mere outpouring of feeling ; and for this view of it he claims the authority of tiic Chris- tian mystics. It is not to be addressed to the Grand Etre, to collective Humanity ; though he occasionally carries metaphor so far as to style this a goddess. The honors to collective Humanity are reserved for the pub- lic celebrations. Private adoration is to be addressed to it in the persons of Avorthy individual representa- tives, who may be either living or .dead, but must in all cases be women ; for women, being the scxe aimant, represent the best attribute of humanity, that which ought to regulate all human life, nor can Humanity possibly be symbolized in any form but that of a woman. The objects of private adoration arc the mother, the wife, and the daughter, representing sev- erally the past, the present, and the futiu'c, and calling into active exercise the three social sentiments, vener- ation, attachment, and kindness. We are to regard them, whether dead or alive, as our guardian angels, "les vrais anges gardiens." If the two last have never existed, or if, in the particular case, any of the three types is too faulty for the office assigned to it, their place may be supplied by some other type of womanly excellence, even by one merely historical. Be tho object living or dead, tho adoration (as wo understand it) is to be addressed only to the idea. The prayer OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 137 consists of two parts ; a commemoration, followed by an effusion. By a commemoration M. Comte means an cifoi't of memory and imagination, summoning up with the utmost possible vividness the image of the object : and every artifice is exhausted to render the image as life-like, as close to the reality, as near an approach to actual hallucination, as is consistent with . sanity. This degree of intensity having been, as far as practicable, attained, the effusion follows. Every person sliould compose his own form of prayer, which should be repeated not mentally only, but orally, and may be added to or varied for sufficient cause, but never arbitrarily. It may be interspersed with passages from the best poets, when they present themselves sj^ontaneously, as giving a felicitous expression to the adorer's own feeling. These observances ^f. Corate j)ractised to the memory of his Clotildc, and he enjoins them on all true believers. They are to occupy two hours of every day, divided into three parts ; at rising, in the middle of the working-hours, and in bed at night. The first, which should be in a kneeling atti- tude, will commonly be the longest, and the second the shortest. The t'.iird is to be extended as nearly as possible to the moment of falling asleep, that its effect may be felt in disciplining even the dreams. The public cultus consists of a series of celebrations or festivals, eighty-four in the year, so arranged that at least one occurs in every week. They are devoted to the successive glorification of Humanity itself; of tlie various ties, political and domestic, among mankind; of the buc'cestilvo stages in tlio past evolution of our gpecies ; and of the several classes into which M. 138 LATER SPECULATIONS Gimte's polity divides mankind. M. Comte's religion has, moreover, nine Sacraments ; consisting in the solenm consecration, by tlie priests of Humanity, with appropriate exhortations, of all the great transitions in life ; the entry into life itself, and into each of its suc- cessive stages : education, marriage, the choice of a profession, and so forth. Among these is death, which receives the name of transformation, and is considered as a passage from objective existence to subjective — to livin"- in the memorv of our fcllow-ercaturcs. llavin'j no eternity of objective existence to offer, M. Comte's religion gives all it can, by holding out the hope of subjective immortality — of existing in the remem- brance and in the posthumous adoration of mankind at large, if we have done any thing to deserve remem- brance from them ; at all events, of those whom we loved during life ; and when tliey too are gone, of being included in the collective adoration paid to the Grand Etre. People are to be taught to look forward to this as a sufficient recompense for the devotion of a whole life to the service of Humanity. Seven years aflnr death comes the last Sacrament: a public judgment, by the priesthood, on the memory of the defunct. This is not designed for purposes of reprobation, but of honor; and anyone may, by declaration during life, exempt himself from it. If judged and found worthy, he is solemnly incorporated with the Grand Etre ; and his remains are transferred fron\ the civil to the religious place of sepulture : '* le bois 6acr<* qui doit entourer chaque temple de THumanitiJ." This brief abstract gives no idea of the minuteness of M. Comte's prescriptions, and the extraordinary OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 139 height to wliich he carries the mania for regulation by which Frcnclimen arc distinguished among Europeans, and ]\r. Comtc among Frenchmen. It is this which throws an irresistible air of ridicule over the whole subject. There is nothing really ridiculous in the devo- tional practices which M. Comte recommends towards a cherished memory or an ennobling ideal, when they come unj^rompted from the depths of the individual feeling ; but there is something ineffably ludicrous in enjoining that everybody shall practise them three times daily for a period of two hours, not because his feelings require them, but for the premeditated purpose of get- ting his feelings up. The ludicrous, however, in any of its shapes, is a phenomenon with which M. Comte seems to have been totally unacquainted. There is nothing in his writings from which it could be inferred that he knew of the existence of such things as wit and humor. The only writer possessed of either for whom he shows any admiration is ]\Ioliere, and him he admires not for his wit but for his wisdom. We notice this without intending any reflection on M. Comte ; for a profound conviction raises a person above the feeling of ridicule. But there ai*e passages in his writings which, it really seems to us, could have been written by no man who had ever laughed. We will give one of these instances. Besides the regular prayers, M. Comte's religion, like the Catholic, has need of forms which can be applied to casual and unforeseen occa- sions. These, he says, must in general be left to the believer's own choice ; but he suggests as a very suita- ble one the repetition of the " fundamental formula of Positivism," viz., "I'amour pour principe, I'ordre pour 140 LATER SrECULATIONS base, et le progres pour but." Not content, however, with an equivalent for tlje Paters and Aves of Catholi- cism, he must have one for the sign of the cross also ; and he thus delivers himself:* " Cette expansion peut etre perfection nde par dcs signes univcrsels. . . . Afin de micux d(5velo[)pcr I'aptitude nccessaire de la formule positiviste a representor toujours la condition humaine, il convicnt ordinairement de Tcnoncer en touchant suc- cessivement Ics j^rincipaux organcs rpie la th(^orie c6r6-' brale assigne a ses trois Elements." This mat/ be a very appropriate mode of expressing one's devotion to the Grand Etre : but any one who had ajipreciated its effect on the profane reader, would have thought it judi- cious to keep it back till a considerably more advanced stage in the propagation of the Positive licligion. As M. Comte's religion has a cultus, so also it has a clergy, who are the pivot of his entire social and political system. Their nature and office will be best shown by describing his ideal of political society in its normal state, with the various classes of which it is composed. The necessity of a Spiritual Power, distinct and separate from the temporal government, is the essential principle of M. Comte's political scheme ; as it may well be, since the Spiritual Power is the only counter- poise he provides or tolerates to the absolute dominion of the civil rulers. Nothing can exceed his combined detestation and contempt for government by assemblies, and for parliamentary or representative institutions in any form. They are an expedient, in his opinion, only • SjBtSme de Politique Positive, ir. 100 OP AUGUSTE COMTE. 141 suited to a state of transition, and even that nowhere hut in England. The attempt to naturalize them in France, or any Continental nation, he regards as mis- chievous quackery. Louis Napoleon's usurpation is absolved, is made laudable to him, because it overthrew a representative government. Election of superiors by inferiors, except as a revolutionary expedient, is an abomination in his sight. Public functionaries of all kinds should name their successors, subject to the approbation of their own superiors, and giving public notice of the nomination so long beforehand as to admit of discussion, and the timely revocation of a wrong choice. But, by the side of the temporal rulers, he places another authority, with no power to command, but only to advise and remonstrate. The family being in his mind as in that of Frenchmen generally, the foundation and essential type of all society, the separa- tion of the two .powers commences there. The spiritual, or moral and religious power, in the family, is the women of it. The positivist family is composed of the "fundamental couple," their children, and the pa- rents of the man, if alive. The whole government of the household, except as regards the education of the children, resides in the man ; and even over that he has complete power, but should forbear to exert it. The part assigned to the women is to improve the man through his affections, and to bring up the children, who, until the age of fourteen, at which scientific instruction begins, are to be educated wholly by their mother. That women may be better fitted for these functions, they are peremptorily excluded from all others. No woman is to work for her living. Every 142 LATER SPECULATIONS woman is to be supported by her husband or her male relations, and, if she has none of these, by the State. She is to have no powers of goverament, even domes- tic, and no property, ller legal rights of inlieritance are preserved to her, that her feelings of duty may make her voluntarily forego them. There are to be no marriage portions, that women may no longer be sought in marriaiie from interested motives. Marriages arc to be rigidly indissoluble, except for a single cause. It is remarkable that the bitterest enemy of divorce among all philosophers, nevertheless allows it, in a case which the laws of England, and of other countries reproached by him with tolerating divorce, do not admit ; namely, when one of the parties has been sentenced to an infa- mizing punishment, involving loss of civil rights. It is monstrous that condenmation, even for life, to a felon's punishment, should leave an unhappy victim bound to, and in tiie wife's case under the legal author- ity of, the culprit. M. Comtc could feel for the injustice in this special case, because it chanced to be the unfortunate situation of his Clotilde. Minor degrees of unworthiness may entitle the innocent party to a legal separation, but without the power of re- marriage. Second marriages, indeed, arc not permitted by the Positive Religion. There is to be no impediment to them by law, but morality is to condemn them, and every couple who are married religiously as well as civilly arc to make a vow of eternal widowhood, " le veuvage ^ternel." This absolute monogany is, in M. Comte'a opinion, essential to the complete fusion be- tween two beings, which is the essence of marriage ; and moreover, eternal constancy is required by the post- OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 14.3 humous .idoratlon, which is to be continuously paid by the survivor to one who, though objectively dead, still lives "subjectively." The domestic spiritual power, which resides in the women of the family, is chiefly concentrated in the most venerable of them, the hus- band's mother, while alive. It has an auxiliary in the influence of age, represented by the husband's father, who is supposed to have passed the period of retirement from active life, fixed by M. Comte (for he fixes every thing) at sixty-three ; at which age the head of the family gives up the reins of authority to his son, retaining only a consultative voice. This domestic Spiritual Power, being principally moral, and confined to private life, requires the support and guidance of an intellectual power exterior to it, the sphere of which will naturally be wider, extending also to public life. This consists of the clergy, or priest- hood, for jM. Couite is fond of borrowing the conse- crated expressions of Catholicism to denote the nearest equivalents which his own system affords. The clergy are the theoretic or philosophical class, and are sup- ported by an endowment from the State, voted periodi- cally, but administered by themselves. Like wonien, they are to be excluded from all riches, and from all participation in power (except the absolute power of each over his own household). They are neither to inherit, nor to receive emolument from any of their functions, or from their writings or teachings of any description, but are to live solely on their small salaries. This M. Comte deems necessary to the complete disin- terestedness of their counsels. To have the confidence of the masses, they must, like the masses, be poor. 144 LATER SPECULATIONS Their exclusion from political and from all other prac- tical occupations is indispensable for the same reason, and for others equally peremptory. Those occupations arc, he contends, incompatible with the habits of mind necessary to philosophers. A practical position, cither private or public, chains the mind to specialities and details, while a philosopher's business is with general truths and connected views (vucs d'enscmble). These, again, require an habitual abstraction from details, which unfits the mind for judging well and rapidly of individual cases. The same person cannot be both a good theorist, and a good practitioner or ruler, though practitioners and rulers ougiit to have a solid theoretic education. The two kinds of function must be abso- lutely exclusive of one another : to attempt them both, is inconsistent with fitness for either. But as men may mistake their vocation, up to the age of thirty-five they arc allowed to change their career. To the clergy is entrusted the theoretic or scientific instruction of youth. The medical ai't also is to be in their hands, since no one is fit to be a physician who does not study and understand the whole man, moral as well as physical. M. Comte has a contemptuous opinion of the existing race of physicians, who, he says, deserve no higher name than that of vctcrinaires, since they concern themselves with man only in his animal, and not in his hum.an character. In his last years, M. Comte (as we learn from Dr. Robinet's vol- lime) indulged in the wildest speculations on medical science, declaring all maladies to be one and tiie same disease, the disturbance or destruction of " I'unitd c(jrd- brale.*' The other functions of the clergy are moral, OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 145 much more than intellectual. They are the spu'itual directors, and venerated advisers, of the active or prac- tical classes, including the politicaL They are the mediators in all social differences ; between the laborers, for instance, and their employers. They are to advise and admonish on all important violations of the moral law. Especially, it devolves on them to keep the rich and powerful to the performance of their moral dutie.-> towards their inferiors. If private remonstrance fails, public denunciation is to follow : in extreme cases they may proceed to the length of excommunication, wliich. though it only operates through opinion, yet, if it carrie.- opinion with it, may, as M. Comte complacently ob- serves, be of such powerful efficacy, that the richest man may be driven to produce his subsistence by his own manual labor, through the impossibility of inducing any other person to work for him. In this as in all other cases, the priesthood depends for its authority on carrying with it the mass of the people, — those who, possessing no accumulations, live on the wages of daily labor; popularly but incorrectly termed the working classes, and by French writers, in their Eoman-law phraseology, proletaires. These, therefore, who are not allowed the smallest political rights, are incorpo- rated into the Spiritual Power, of which they form, after women and the clergy, the third element. It remains to give an account of the Temporal Power, composed of the rich and the employers of labor, two classes who in M. Comte's system are reduced to one, for he allows of no idle rich. A life made up of mere amusement and self-indulgence » though not interdicted by law, is to be deemed so dis- 10 146 LATER SPECULATIONS graceful, that nobody with the smallest sense of shame would choose to be guilty of it. Here, we think, M. Comte has liglitcd on a true principle, towards which the tone of opinion in modern Europe is more and more tending, and which is destined to be one of tlie constitutive principles of regenerated society. We be- lieve, for example, with him, that in the future there will be no class of landlords living at case on their rents, but every landlord will be a capitalist trained to agriculture, himself superintending and directing the cultivation of his estate. Xo one but he who guides the work should have the control of tiie tools. In M. Conjte's system, the rich, as a rule, consist of the "captains of industry:" but the rule is not entirely without exception, for M. Comte recognizes other use- ful modes of employing riches. In particular, one of his favorite ideas is that of an order of Ciiivalry, com- posed of the most generous and self-devoted of the rich, voluntarily dedicating themselves, like knights- errant of old, to the redressin": of wronsfs, and the protection of the weak and oppressed. He remarks, that oppression, in modern life, can seldom reach, or even venture to attack, the life or liberty of its victims (lie forgets the case of domestic tyranny), but only their pecuniary means, and it is therefore by the purse chiefly that individuals can usefully interpose, as they formerly did by the sword. The occupation, however, of nearly all the rich, will be the direction of labor, and for this work they will be educated. Reciprocally, it is in M. Comte's opinion essential, that all directors of labor should be rich. Capital (in which he includes land) should be concentrated in a few holders, so that . OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 147 every capitalist may conduct the most extensive opera- tions which one mind is capable of superintending. This is not only demanded by good economy, in order to take the utmost advantage of a rare kind of prac- tical ability, but it necessarily follows from the principle of M. Comte's scheme, which regards a capitalist as a public functionary. M. Comte's conception of the rela- tion of capital to society is essentially that of Socialists, but he would bring about by education and opinion, what they aim at effecting by positive institution. The owner of capital is by no means to consider himself its absolute proprietor. Legally he is not to be controlled in his dealings with it, for power should be in propor- tion to responsibility : but it does not belong to him for his own use ; he is merely intrusted by society with a portion of the accumulations made by the past pro\'i- dence of mankind, to be administered for the benefit of the present generation and of posterity, under the obligation of preserving them unimpaired, and handing them down, more or less augmented, to our successors. He is not entitled to dissipate them, or divert them from the service of Huuianity to his own pleasures. Nor has he a moral right to consume on himself the whole even of his profits. He is bound in conscience, if they exceed his reasonable wants, to employ the sur- plus in improving either the efficiency of his operations, or the physical and mental condition of liis laborers. The portion of his gains which he may appropriate to Lis own use, must be decided by himself, under account- ability to opinion ; and opinion ought not to look very» narrowly into the matter, nor hold him to a rigid reck- oning for any moderate indulgence of luxury or osten- 148 LATER SPECULATIONS tation ; since under the gi-eat responsibilities that will be iniposed on him, the position of an employer of labor ■will be 80 much less desirable, to any one in wliom the instincts of pride and vanity are not strong, than the "heureuse insouciance" of a laborer, that those instincts must be to a certain degree indulged, or no one would undertake the office. With this limitation, every em- ployer is a mere administrator of his possessions, for his work-people and for society at large. If he indulges himself lavishly, without reserving an ample remunera- tion for all who are employed under him, he is morally culpable, and will incur sacerdotal admonition. This state of things necessarily implies that capital sliould be in a few hands, because, as M. Cumte observes, without great riches, the obligations which society ought to impose, could not be fulfilled without an amount of ])ersonal abnegation that it would be hopeless to expect. If a person is conspicuously qualified for the conduct of an industrial enterprise, but destitute of the fortune necessary for undertaking it, M. Comte recommends that he should be enriched by subscription, or, in cases of sufficient importance, by the State. Small landed proprietors and capitalists, and the middle classes alto- gether, he regards as a parasitic growth, destined to dis- appear, the best of the body becoming large capitalists, and the remainder proletaires. Society will consist only of rich and poor, and it will be the business of the rich to make the best possible lot for the poor. The remuneration of the laborers will continue, as at preisent, to be a matter of voluntary arrangement between them and their employers, the last resort on either side being refusal of co-operation, "refus de concours," in other or AUGUSTE COMTE. 149 words, a strike or a lock-out ; with the 6acei;dotal order for mediators in case of need. But though wages are to be an affair of free contract, their standard is not to be the competition of the market, but the apphcation of the products in equitable proportion between tlic wants of the laborers and the wants and dignity of the employer. As it is one of M. Comte's principles that a question cannot be usefully proposed without an attempt at a solution, he gives his ideas from the begin- ning as to what the normal income of a laboring family (should be. They are on such a scale, that until some great extension shall have taken place in the scientific resources of mankind, it is no wonder he thinks it necessary to limit as nmch as possible the number of those who are to be supported by what is left of the produce. In the first place the laborer's dwelling, which is to consist of seven rooms, is, with all that it contains, to be his own property : it is the only landed property he is allowed to possess, but every family should be the absolute owner of all things which are destined for its exclusive use. LodTis : Paris, however, (need it be said?) succeeding to Eome as tlie religious metropolis of the world, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, are to be separated from England, which is of course to detach itself from all its transmarine dependencies. In each state thus consti- tuted, the powers of government are to be vested in a triumvirate of the three principal bankers, who are to take the foreign, home, and financial departments re- spectively. How they are to conduct the government and remain bankers, does not clearly appear ; but it must be intended that they should combine both offices, for they are to receive no pecuniary remuneration for the political one. Their power is to amount to a dicta- torship (^I. Comte's own word) : and he is hardly justified in saying that he gives political power to the rich, since he gives it, over the rich and every one else, to three individuals of the number, not even chosen by the rest, but named by their predecessors. As a check on the dictators, there is to be complete freedom of s]>eech, writing, printing, and voluntary association ; and all important acts of the government, except in cases of emergency, are to be announced sufficiently long beforehand to ensure ample discussion. This, and OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 153 the influence of the Spiritual Power, arc the only guar- antees provided against misgovernment. When we consider that the complete dominion of every nation of mankind is thus handed over to only four men — for the Spiritual Power is to be under the absolute and undivided control of a single Pontiff for the whole human race — one is appalled at the picture of entire subjugation and slavery, which is recommended to us as the last and higliest result of the evolution of Humanity. But the conception rises to the temfic, when we are told the mode in which the single High Priest of Humanity is intended to use his authority. It is the most warning example we know, into what frightful aberrations a powerful and comprehensive mind may be led by the exclusive following-out of a single idea. The single idea of M. Comtc, on this subject, is that the intellect should be wholly subordinated to the feel- ings ; or, to translate the meaning out of sentimental into logical language, that tlic exercise of the intellect, as of all our other faculties, should have for its sole object tlie general good. Every other employment of it should be accounted not only idle and frivolous, but morally culpable. Being indebted wholly to Humanity for the cultivation to which we owe our mental powers, we arc bound in return to consecrate them wholly to her service. Having made up his mind that this ought to be, there is with M. Comte but one step to con- cluding that the gi-and Pontiff of Humanity must take care that it shall be ; and on this foundation he organ- izes an elaborate system for the totnl suppression of all independent thought. He does not, indeed, invoke the 154 LATER SPECULATIONS arm of the law, or call for any proliibitions. The clergy arc to have no monopoly. Any one else may cultivate science if he can, may write and piiblii^h if he can find readers, may give private instrnction if any- body consents to receive it. But since the sacerdotal body will absorb into itself all but those whom it deems cither intellectually or morally unccpial to the vocation, all rival teachers will, as he calculates, be so discredited beforehand, that their competition will not be formida- ble. Within the body itself, the High Priest has it in his power to make sure that there shall be no opinions, and no exercise of mind, but such as he apjiroves ; for he alone decides the duties and local residence of all its members, and can even eject them from the body. Before electinjr to be under tiiis rule, we feel a natural curiosity to know in what manner it is to be exercised. Humanity has only yet had one P<»ntifF, whose mental qualifications for the post are not likely to be often sur- passed, ]M. Comte himself. It is of some importance to know what are the ideas of this High Priest, con- cerning the moral and religious government of the human intellect. One of the doctrines which ]\I. Comte most strenu- ously enforces in his latter writings, is, that during the preliminary evolution of humanity, terminated by the foundation of Positivism, the free development of our forces of all kinds was the important matter, but tliat from this time forward the principal need is to regulate them. Formerly the danger was of their being insuf- ficient, but henceforth, of their being abused. Let ut; express, in passing, our entire dissent from this doc- trine. Whoever thinks that the wretched cducatLou OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 155 which mankind as yet receive, calls forth theirmcntal powers (except those of a select few) in a sufficient or even tolerable degree, must be very easily satisfied : and the abuse of them, far from becoming proportion- ally greater as knowledge and mental capacity increase, becomes rapidly less, provided always that the diffusion of those qualities keeps pace with their growth. The abuse of intellectual power is only to be dreaded, when society is divided between a few highly cultivated intel- lects and an ignorant and stupid multitude. But men- tal power is a thing which M. Comtc does not want — - or Avants infinitely less than he wants submission and obedience. Of all the ingredients of human nature, he continually says, the intellect most needs to be disci- plined and reined in. It is the most turbulent, "les plus perturbatcur," of all the mental elements ; more so than even the selfish instincts. Thi'oughout the whole modern transition, bcgiiming with ancient Greece, (for M. Comtc tells us that we have always been in a state of revolutionary transition since then,) the intellect has been in a state of systematic insurrection sigainst "Ic cccur." The metaphysicians and literati (lettr(js), after helping to pull down the old religion and social order, are rootcdly hostile to the construction of the new, and desire only to prolong the existing scepticism and intel- lectual anarchy, which secure to them a cheap social ascendency, without the labor of earning it by solid scientific preparation. The scientific class, ft'om whom better might have been expected, ai*e, if possible, worse. Void of enlarged views, despising all that is too largo for their comprehension,' devoted exclusively, each to his special science, contemptuously indiflfercnt to moral and 156 LATER SPECULATIONS political interests, their sole aim is to acquire an easy reputation, and in France (through paid Academies and professorships) personal lucre, by pushing their sciences into idle and useless inquiries (speculations oiseuses), of no value to the real interests of mankind, and tending to divert the thouu^lits from them. One of the duties most incumbent on opinion and on the Spirit- ual Power, is to stigmatize as immoral, and effectually suppress, these useless employments of the speculative faculties. All exercise of thought should be abstained from, which has not some beneficial tendency, some actual utih'ty to mankind. M. Comte, of course, is not the man to say that it nmst be a merely material utility. If a speculation, though it has no doctrinal, has a logical value — if it tiirows any light on univer- sal Method — it is still more deserving of cultivation than if its usefulness was merely practical : but either as method or as doctrine, it must brinj; fortli fruits to Humanity, otherwise it is not only contemptible, but criminal. That there is a portion of trutli at the bottom of all this, we should be the last to deny. No respect is due to any employment of the intellect which docs not tend to the good of mankind. It is precisely on a level witli any idle amusement, and should be condemned as waste of time, if carried beyond the limit within which amusement is permissible. And whoever devotes pow- ers of thought which could render to Humanity services it urgently needs, to speculations and studies wliich it could dispense with, is liable to the discredit attaching to a well-grounded suspicion of earing little for Human- ity. But who can affirm positively of any speculations, OF AUGUSTS COMTE. 157 guided by right scientific methods, on subjects really accessible to the human faculties, that they are incapable of being of any use ? Nobody knows what knowledge will prove to be of use, and what is destined to be useless. The most that can be said is that some kinds are of more certain, and above all, of more present, utility than others. How often the most important practical results have been the remote consequence of studies which no one would have expected to lead to them I Could the mathematicians, who, in the schools of Alex- andria, investigated the properties of the ellipse, have foreseen that nearly two thousand years afterwards their speculations would explain the solar system, and a little later would enable ships safely to circumnavi- gate the c.ai-th? Even in jVI. Comte's opinion, it is well for mankind that, in those early days, knowledge was thought worth pursuing for its own sake. Nor has the "foundation of Positivism," we imagine, so fur changed the conditions of human existence, that it should now be criminal to acquire, by observation and reasoning, a knowledge of the facts of the universe, leaving to posterity to find a use for it. Even in the last two or three years, has not the discovery of new metals, which may prove important even in the prac- tical arts, arisen from one of the investigations which M. Comte most unequivocally condemns as idle, the research into the internal constitution of the sun ? How few, moreover, of the discoveries which have changed the face of the world, either were or could have been arrived at by investigations aiming directly at the object 1 Would the mariner's compass ever have been found by direct efforts for the improvement of 158 LATER SPECULATIONS navigation? Should we liave reached the electric tele- gi*aph by any amount of striving for a means of instan- taneous communication, if Franklin had not identified electricity with lightning, and Ampere with magnetism? The most .apparently insignificant archaeological or geo- lo":ical fact, is often found to throw a liijht on human history, which M. Comte, the basis of whose social philosophy is history, should be the last person to dis- parage. The direction of the entrance to the great PjTaraid of Ghizch, by showing the position of the circumpolar stars at the time when it was built, is the best evidence wo even now have of the immense antiquity of Egyptian civilization. The one point on which ]M. Comte's doctrine has some color of reason, is the case of sidereal astronomy : so little knowledge of it being really accessible to us, and the connexion of that little with any terrestrial interests being, according to all our means of judgment, infinitesimal. It is cer- tainly difficult to conceive how any considerable benefit to humanity can be derived from a knowledge of the motions of the double stars : should these ever become important to us it will be in so prodigiously remote an age, that we can afford to remain ignorant of them until, at least, all our moral, political, and social diffi- culties have been settled. Yet the discovery that gravi- tation extends even to those remote regions, j;ives some additional strength to the conviction of the universality of natural laws ; and the habitual meditation on such vast objects and distances is not without an aesthetic usefulness, by kindling and exalting the imagination, the worth of which in itself, and even its re-action on the intellect, M. Comte is qtn'te capable of appreciating. OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 159 He would reply, however, tliat there are better means of accomplishing these purposes. In the same spirit he condemns the study even of the solar system, when extended to any planets but those wliich arc visible to the naked eye, and which alone exert an appreciable gravitativc influence on the earth. Even the perturba- tions lie thinks it idle to study, beyond a mere general conception of them, and tliinks that astronomy may well limit its domain to the motions and mutual action of the earth, sun, and moon. He looks for a similar expurgation of all the other sciences. In one passage he expressly says that the greater part of the researches which arc really accessible to us are idle and useless^. He would pare down the dimensions of all the sciences as narrowly as possible. He is continually repeating that no science, as an abstract study, should be carried further than is necessary to lay the foundation for the science next above it, and so ultimately for moral sci- ence, the principal purpose of them all. Any further extension of the mathematical and physical sciences should be merely " episodic ?" limited to what may from time to time be demanded by the requirements of industry and the arts ; and should be left to the indus- trial classes except when they find it necessary to a[)ply to the sacerdotal order for some additional development of scientific theory. This, he evidently thinks, would be a rare contingency, most physical truths sufficiently concrete and real for practice being empirical. Accord- ingly in estimating the number of clergy necessary for France, Eux'ope, and our entire planet (for his fore- thought extends thus far) , he proportions it solely to their moral and religious attributions (overlooking, by 160 LATER SPECULATIONS the way, even their medical) ; and leaves nobody with any time to cultivate tlie sciences, except abortive can- didates for the priestly office, who having been refused admittance into it for insufficiency in moral excellence or in strength of character, may be thought worth retaining as " pensioners " of the sacerdotal order, on account of their theoretic abilities. It is no exaggeration to say, that M. Comte gradu- ally acquired a real hatred for scientific and all purely intellectual pursuits, and was bent on retaining no more of them than was strictly indispensable. The greatest of his anxieties is lest people should reason, and seek to know more than enough. He regards all abstraction and all reasoning as morally dangerous, by developing an inordinate pride (orgucil), and still more, by pro- ducing dryness (sdcheresse). Abstract thought, he says, is not a wholesome occupation for more than a small number of human beings, nor of them for more than a small part of their time. Art, which calls the emotions into play along with and more than the rcjison, is the only intellectual exercise really adapted to human nature. It is nevertheless indispensable that the chief theories of the various abstract sciences, togctiier with the modes in which those theories were historically and logically arrived at, should form a part of universal education : for, first, it is only thus that the methods can be learnt, by which to attain the results sought by the moral and social sciences : though we cannot per- ceive that M. Comte got at his own moral and social results by those processes. Secondly, the principal truths of the subordinate sciences are necessary to the Bystematization (still systematization 1) of our coneep- OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 161 tions, by binding together our notions of the world in a set of propositions, which arc coherent, and a suf ficiently correct representation of fact for our practical wants. Thirdly, a familiar knowledge of the inv.ariable laws of natural piienomena is a great elementary lesson of submission, which, he is never weary of saying, is the first condition both of morality and of happiness. For these reasons, he would cause to be taught, from the age of fourteen to that of twenty-one, to all per- sons, rich and poor, girls or youths, a knowledge of the whole series of abstract sciences, such as none but the most highly instructed persons now possess, and of a far more systematic and philosophical character than is usually possessed even by them. (N,B. — They are to learn, during the same years, Greek and Latin, hav- ing previously, bet\yeen the ages of seven and fourteen, learnt the five principal modern languages, to the degree necessary for reading, with due appreciation, the chief poetical compositions in each). But they arc to be taught all this, not only without encouraging, but stifling as much as possible, the examining and ques- tioning spirit. The disj^osition Avhich should be encour- aged is that of recei\ing all on the authority of the teacher. The Positivist faith, even in its scientific part is la foi demontrable^ but ought by no means to be la foi toujours demontrce. The pupils have no busi- ness to be over-solicitous about proof. The teacher should not even present the proofs to them in a com pletc form, or as proofs. The object of instruction is to make them understand the doctrines themselves, per- ceive their mutual connection, and form by means of them a consistent and systematized conception of nature. 11 162 LATER SPECULATIONS As for the demonstrations, it is ratlier desirable than otherwise that even tlicorists should forget them, retain- ing only the results. Among all the aberrations of gcientific men, M. Conitc thinks none greater thiin the pedantic anxiety they show for complete proof, and [)er- fect rationalization of scientific proccst-cs. It ou^ht to be enough that the doctrines afford an explanation of phenomena, consistent with itself and witli known facts, and that tlie processes are justified by their fruits. This over-anxiety for proof, he'conj{)lains is breaking down, by vain scruples, the knowledge whicli seemed to have been attained ; witness the present state of chemistry. The demand of proof for what has been acce{)ted by Hiniiamty, is itself a mark of "distrust, if not hostility, to the sacerdotal order" (the naivete of this woidd be charming, if it were not deplorable), and is a revolt against the traditions of the human race. So early had the new High Priest adopted the feelings and taken up the inheritance of the old. One of his favorite aphorisms is the strange one, that the living are more and more governed by the dead. As is not uncommon with him, he introduces the dictum in one sense, and uses it in another. What he at first means by it is, that as civilization advances, the sum of our possessions, physical and intellectual, is due in a decreasing proportion to ourselves, and in an increasing one to our progenitors. The use he makes of it is, that we should submit ourselves more and more im[)lic- itly to the authority of previous generations, and suffer ourselves less and less to doubt their judgment, or test by our own reason the grounds of their opinions. The unwillingness of the human intellect and conscience, in OF AUGUSTE COMTE. , 163 their present state of " anarchy," to sign their own abdi- cation, he calls "the insurrection of the living against the dead." To this complexion has Positive Philosophy come at last ! ^\'^orse, however, remains to be told. M. Corate selects a hundred volumes of science, philosophy, poetry, history, and general knowledge, which he deems a sufficient library for every positivist, even of the theoretic order, and actually proposes a systematic iiolocaust of books in general — it would almost seem of all books except these. Even that to which he shows most indulgence, poetry^ except the very best, is to undergo a similar fate, with the reservation of select passages, on the ground that, poetry being intended to cultivate our instinct of ideal perfection, any kind of it that is less than the best is worse than none^ Tiiis imitation of the error, we will call it the crime, of the early Christians — and in an exaggerated foi'm, for even they destroyed only those writings of pagans or heretics which were directed against themselves — is the one thing in iNl. Comte's projects which merits real indignation. When once ]M. Comte has decided, all evidence on the other side, nay the very historical evi- dence on which he grounded his decision, had better perish, AVhcn mankind have enlisted under his ban- ner, they must burn their ships. There is, though in a less offensive form, the same overweening presumption in a suggestion he makes, that all species of animale; and plants which are useless to man should be syste- matically rooted out. As if any one could presume to assert that the smallest weed may not, as knowledge advances, be found to have some property serviceable 164 LATER SPECULATIONS to man. "When we consider that the united power of the whole human race cannot reproduce a species once eradicated — that what is once done, in the extirpation of races, can never be repaired ; one can only l)e thankful that amidst all which the past rulers of jnan- kind have to answer for, they have never come iq) to tlie measure of the great regenerator of Humanity ; mankind have not yet been under the rule of one who assumes that he knows all there is to be known, and that when he puts himself at the head of humanity, the book of human knowledge may be closed. Of course M. Conite does not make this assumption consistently. He docs not imagine that he actually possesses all knowledge, but only that he is an infallible judge what knowledge is worth possessing. He does not believe that mankind have I'eachcd in all directions the extreme limits of useful and laudable scientific inquiry. He thinks there is a large scope for it still, in adding to our power over the external world, but chiefly in perfecting our own physical, intellectual, and moral nature. He holds that all our mental strength should be economized, for the pursuit of this object in the mode leading most directly to the end. Witli this view, some one problem should always be selected, the solution of which would be more important than any other to the interests of humanity, and upon this the entire intellectual resources of the theoretic mind should be concentrated, until it is either resolved, or has to be given up as insoluble : after which mankind should go on to another, to be pursued with similar exclusivcness. The selection of this problem of course rests with tho sacerdotal order, or in other words, with the High OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 165 Priest. We should tlien see the whole speculative intellect of the human race simultaneously at work on one question, by orders from above, as a French min- ister of public instruction once boasted that a million of boys wei'c saying the same lesson during the same half-hour in every town and village of France. The reader will be anxious to know, how much better and more wisely the human intellect will be applied under this absolute monarchy, and to what degree this system of government will be preferable to the present anarchy, in which every theorist does what is intellectually right in his own eyes. M. Comte has not left us in igno- rance on this point. He gives us am})le means of judging. The Pontiff of Positivism informs' us what problem, in his oi)inion, should be selected before all others for this united pursuit. What this problem is, we must leave those who are curious on the subject to learn from the treatise itself. When they have done so, they will be qualified to form their own opinion of the amount of advantage which the general good of mankind would be likely to derive, from exchanging the present "dispersive speciality" and " intellectual anarchy " for the subordination of the intellect to the cceur, personified in a High Priest, pre- scribing a single problem for the undivided study of the theoretic mind. We have given a sufficient general idea of M. Comte's plan for the regeneration of human society, by put- ting an end to anai'chy, and "systematizing" human thought and conduct under the direction of feeling. I3ut an adequate conception will not have been formed of the height of his self-confidence, until something 166 LATER SrECULATIONS more has been told. Be it known, then, that M. Comte by no means proposes this new constitution of society for realization in the remote future. A com- plete plan of measures of transition is ready prepared, and he dotcrnjincs the year, heforc tlic end of the present century, in wliich the new spiritual and tem- poral powers will be installed, and the rc^in)e of our maturity will begin. lie did not indeed cal(?u]ate on converting to Positivism, within tiiat time, more tliau a thousandth part of all the heads of familiet* in Western Europe and its ofF-shoots beyond the Atlantic, But he fixes the time necessary for the complete political estab- lishment of Positivism at thirty-three years, divided into three periods, of seven, five, and twenty-one years respectively. At the expiration of seven, the direction of public education in France would be placed in M. Comte's hands. In five years more, the Emperor Na- poleon, or his successor, will resign his power to a provisional triumvirate, composed of three eminent pro- letaircs of the positivist faith ; for proletaires, though not fit for permanent rule, arc the best agents of the transition, being most free from the prejudices which are the chief obstacle to it. These riders will employ the rcm-iining twenty-one years in preparing society for its final constitution ; and after duly installing the Spiritual Power, and cfTectlng the decomposition of France into the seventeen republics before mentioned, will give jover the temporal government of each to the normal dictatorship of the three bankers. A man may be deemed happy, but scarcely modest, who had such boundless confidence in his own powers of foresight, and expected to complete a triumph of his own ideas OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 167 on tlic rcconstltutlon of society within the possible limits of his lifetime. If he could live (he said) to the age of Fontenelle, or of Ilobbes, or even of Voltaire, he should see all this realized, or as good as realized. lie died, however, at sixty, without leaving any dis- ciple sutticicntly advanced to be appointed his successor. There is now a College, and a Director, of Positivism ; but Humanity no longer possesses a High Priesto What more remains to be said may be despatched more summarily. Its interest is philosopliic rather than practical. In his four volumes of "Politique Posi- tive," M. Comte revises and re-elaborates tlie scientific and historical expositions of his first treatise. His object is to systematize (again to systematize) knowl- edge from the human, or subjective point of view, the only one, he contends, from which a real synthesis is possible. For (he says) tlie knowledge attainable by us of the laws of the universe is at best fragmentary, and incapable of reduction to a real unity. An objec- tive syntliesis, the dream of Descartes and the best thinkers of old, is impossible. The Laws of the real world are too numerous, and the manner of their work- ing into one another too intricate, to be, as a general rule, correctly traced and represented by our reason. The only connecting principle in our knowledge is its relation to our wants, and it is upon that we must found our systematization. The answer to this is, first, that there is no necessity for an universal syntljesis ; and secondly, that the same arguments may be used against the possibility of a complete subjective, as of a complete objective systematization. A subjective synthesis must consist in the arranjjement and co-ordination of all use- 168 LATER SPECULATIONS fill knowledge, on tlie basis of its relation to human wants and interests. But tliose wants and interests are, like the laws of the universe, extremely nuiltifiirious, and the order of [)rcference among them in all their dif- erent gradations (for it varies according to the degree of each) cannot be cast into precise general proposi- tions. ^I. Comte's subjective synthesis consists only in eliminating from the sciences every thing tliat he deems useless, and presenting as far as possible every theoreti- cal investigation as the solution of a practical problem. To this, however, he cannot consistently adhere ; for, m every science, the theoretic truths are much more closely connected with one another, than with the iuiman purposes Avhich they eventually serve, and can only be made to cohere in the intellect bv bcin^j, to a f^reat degi'ce, presented as if they were truths of pure reason, irrespective of any practical application. There are many things eminently characteristic of M. Comte's second career, in this revision of the results of his first. Under the head of Biology, and tor the better combination of that science with Sociology and Ethics, he found that he required a new system of Phrenology, being justly dissatisfied with that of Gall and his suc- cessors. Accordingly he set about constructing one d priori, grounded on the best enumeration and classi- fication he could make of the elementary faculties of our intellectual, moral, and animal nature ; to each of which he assigned an hypothetical jdace in the skull, the most conformable that he could to the few positive facts on the subject which he considered as established, and to the general presumption that functions which re-act strongly on one another must have their organs adja- OF AUGUSTS COMTE. 109 cent : leaving the localities avowedly to be hereafter verified, by anatomical and inductive investigation. There is considerable merit in this attempt, though it is liable to obvious criticisms of the same nature as his own upon Gall. But tlic characteristic thing is, that while [)rescnting all this as hypothesis waiting for veri- fication, lie could not have taken its truth more coui- pletely for granted if the verification liad been made. In all that he afterwards wrote, every detail of his thory of the brain is as unhesitatingly asserted, and as confidently built upon, as any other doctrine of sciencco This is his first great attempt in the " Subjective ^Icth- od," which, originally meaning only the subordination of the pursuit of truth to human uses, had already come to mean drawing truth itself from the fountain of his own mind. He had become, on the one hand, almost indifferent to proof, provided he attained theo- retic coherency, and on the otiier, serenely confident that even tlic guesses which originated with himself could not but come out true. There is one point in his later view of tlic sciences, which appears to us a decided improvement on his earlier. He adds to the six fundamental sciences of his original scale, a seventh under the name of Morals, forming the highest step of the ladder, immediately after Sociology : remarking tliat it might, with still greater [)roprIcty, be termed Anthropology, being the science of individual human nature, a study, when rightly understood, more special and complicated than even that of Society. For it is obliged to take inti» consideration the diversities of constitution and temper- ament (la reaction ccrdbrale des visceres vegetatifs) 170 LATER SPECULATIONS tlie effects of wliicli, still very imperfectly understood, .ire ln;Ljlily important in the individual, but in tlie theory of society mny be neglected, because, differing jn dif- ferent jiersons, they neutralize one anotlier on tlie large hcaie. I'his is a remark worthy of ^M. Comtc in his best days ; and the science thus conceived is, as he pays, the true scientific foundation of the art of Morals (and indeed of the art of human life) which, therefore, may, l)oth philosopliically and didactically, be properly combined with it. His philosophy of general history is recast, and in many respects changed ; we cannot but say, greatly for the worse. He gives much greater develoi»ment than before to the Fetishistic, and to what he terms the Theocratic, periods. To the Fetishistic view of nature he evinces a partiality, whicli aj)pears strange in a Posi- tive [)hilosophcr. But the reason is that Fetish-worship is a religion of the feelings, and not at all of the intel- ligence. He regards it as cultlvatini; universal love : as a practical fact it cultivates much rather universal fear. He looks upon Fetishism as nuich more akin to Positi\ism than any of tlie forms of Theology, inas- much as these consider matter as inert, and moved only by forces, natural and supernatural, exterior to itself: wJiile Fetishism resemi)les Positivism in conceiving mat- ter as spontaneously active, and errs only by not distin- guishing activity from life. As if the superstiti«)n of the Fetishist consisted only in believing that the ol)jcct3 whicli produce the [)henomena of nature involuntarily, produce them voluntarily. The Fetishist thinks not merely that his Fetish is .alive, but that it can help him in war, can cure him of diseases, can grant him OF AUGU8TE COMTE. 171 prosperity, or afflict him witli all the contrary evils. Therein consists the lamentable effect of Fetishism — its degrading and prostrating influence on the feelings and conduct, its conflict with all genuine experience, and antajifonlsm to all real knowledge of nature. y{. Comte had also no small sympathy with the Oriental theocracies, as lie calls the sacerdotal castes, who indeed often deserved it by their eai'ly services to intellect and civilization ; by the aid they gave to the establishment of regidar government, the valuable though empirical knowledge they accumulated, and the height to which they helped to carry some of the useful arts. M. Comtc admits tliat they became oppressive, and that the prolongation of their ascendency came to be incompatible with further improvement. But he ascribes this to their having arrogated to themselves the tem- poral government, which, so far as we have any authen- tic information, they never did. The reason why the sacerdotal corporations became oppressive, was because they were organized : because they attempted the " unity " and^ " systematization " so dear to M. Comte, and allowed no science and no speculation, except with their leave and under their direction. M. Comte's sacerdotal order, which, in his system, has all the power tiiat ever they had, would be oppressive in the same manner : witli no variation but that which arises from the altered state of society and of the human mind. M. Comte's partiality to the theocracies is strikingly contrasted with his dislike of the Greeks, whom as a people he thoroughly detests, for their undue addiction to intellectual speculation, (ind considers to have been, by an inevitable fatality, morally sacrificed to the forma- 172 LATER SPECULATIONS tion of a few gi'cat scientific intellects, — principally Aristotle, Archiincdcs, Apollonius, and IIip[)archus. Any one who knows Grecian hij^tory as it can now be known, will be amazed at ^I. Comte's travcstie of it, in which the vulgarest historical [)rcjudiccs are accepted and exajj^reratcd, to illustrate the mischiefs of intel- lectual culture left to its own guidance. There is no need to analyze further M. Comtc's second view of universal history. The best chapter is that on the Komans, to whom, because they were greater in practice than in theory, and for centuries worked together in obedience to a social sentiment (though only that of tiielr country's aggrandizement), jM. Comte is as favorably affected, as he is inimical to all but a small selection of eminent thinkers among the Greeks. The greatest blemish in tliis cha[)ter is the idolatry of Julius Caesar, whom M. Comte regards as one of the most illustrious characters in history, and of the greatest practical benefactors of mankind. Ocsar had many eminent qualities, but what he did to deserve such praise we are at a loss to discover, except subvert- ing a free government : that merit, however, with M. Comte goes a great way. It did not, in his former days, suffice to rehabilitate Napoleon, whose name and memory he regarded with a bitterness highly honorable to hijnsclf, and whose career he deemed as one of the greatest calamities in modern history. But in his later writings these sentiments arc considerably mitigated : he regards Xapoleon as a more estimable "dictator" than Louis Philippe, and thinks that his greatest erx'or was re-establishing the Academy of Sciences I That this should be said by M. Comte, and said of Napoleon, OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 173 incasurea tlic depth to which his moral standard had fallen. The last volume which he published, that on the Philosophy of Mathematics, is in some respects a still !rcsentative of Fatality in general. "The final ?/«//^ disposes us to cultivate sympathy i)y developing our gratitude to whatever serves the Grand Etre. It must dis[)ose us to venerate the Fatalitv on which reposes the whole a^jTrciirate of our existence.*' Wc should conceive this Fatality as hav- ing a fixed seat, and that seat must be considered to be Space, wliich should be conceived as possessing feeling, but not activity or intelligence. And in our abstract speculations we should imagine all our concejjtions as located in free space. Our images of all sorts, down to our geometrical diagrams, and even our cyphers and algebraic symbols, should always be figured to our- gelves as written in space, and not on p.aper or any other material substance. M. Comic adds that they should be conceived as green on a white ;rround. Wc cannot go on any longer with this trash. In spite of it all, the volume on mathematics is full of profound thoughts, and will be very suggestive to those who take up the subject after M. Comte. What deep meaning there is, for example, in the idea that the infinitesimal calculus is a conce[)tion analogous to the corpuscular hypothesis in physics ; which last M. OF AUGUSTE COMTEo 177 Coaite has always considered as a logical artifice, not an opinion respecting matters of fact. The assim- ilation, us it seems to us, throws a flood of light on both conceptions ; on the physical one still more than the mathematical. We might extract many ideas of similar, though none perhaps of equal, suggc-^tive- ness. But mixed with these, what pitiable niaisciics ! One of his great points is the importance of the " moral and intellectual properties of numbers." lie cultivates ;i superstitious reverence for some of them. The first three are sacred, Ics nombrcs sucrcs : One being the type of all Synthesis, Two of all Combination, which he now says is always binary (in his first treatise he only said that we may usefully represent it to ourselves as being so), and Three of 'all Progression, which not only requires three terms, but as he now maintains, never ought to have any more. To these sacred num- bers all our mental operations must be made, as far as possible, to adjust themselves. Next to them, he has a great partiality for the number seven ; for these whimsi- cal reasons : " Composed of two progressions followed by a synthesis, or of one progression between two couples, the number seven, coming next after the sum of the three sacred numbers, determines the largest group which we can distinctly imagine. Reciprocally, it marks the limit of the divisions which we can directly conceive in a magnitude of any kind." The number Beveu, therefore, must be foisted in wherever possible, and among other things, is to be made the basis of numeration, which is hereafter to be scptimal instead of decimal : producing all the inconvenience of a change of system, not only without getting rid of, but greatly 12 178 liATEIi SPECULATIONS asrsravatinff, the disadviinta'res of the existing one. CO O' o o But then, he says, it is absolutely necessary that the basis of niuncration should be a prime number. All other people think it absolutely necessary that it should not, and regard the present basis as only objectionable in not being divisible enough. But M. Comtc's puerile predilection for prime numbers almost passes belief. His reason is that they are the type of irrcductibility : each of them is a kind of ultimate arithmetical fact. This, to any one who knows M. Comtc in his later aspects, is amply sufficient. Nothing can exceed his delight in any thing which says to the human mind, Thus far shalt thou go and no fiirthcr. If prime num- bers are precious, doubly prime numbers arc doubly so ; meaning those which arc not only themselves prime numbers, but the number which marks their place in the series of prime numbers is a prime number. Still greater is the dignity of trebly ^n'ime numbers ; when the number mai-king the place of this second number is also prime. The number thirteen fulfils these condi- tions : it is a prime number, it is the seventh prime number, and seven is the fifth prime number. Accord- ingly he has an outrageous pai'tiality to the number thirteen. Though one of the most inconvenient of all small numbers, he insists on introducing it everywhere. These strange conceits are connected with a highly characteristic exam|)le of M. Comtc's frenzy for rcmda- tion. lie cannot bear that any thing shoidd be Icfl unregulated : there ought to be no such thing as hesita- tion ; nothing should remain arbitrary, for Vai'hitvaire is always favorable to egoism. Submission to artificial prescriptions is as indispensable as to natural laws, and OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 179 lie boasts that under the reign of sentiment, human life may be made equally, and even more, regular than the courses of the stars. But the great instrument of exact reguhition for the details of life is numbers : fixed numbers, therefore, should be introduced into all our conduct. ^[. Comtc's first application of this sys- tem was to the correction of his own literary style- Complaint had been made, not undeservedly, that in his first great work, especially in the latter part of it, the sentences and paragra[»hs were long, clumsy, and involved. To correct this fault, of which he was aware, he imposed on himself the following rules. No sentence was to exceed two lines of his manuscripts equivalent to five of print. Xo paragraph was to con- sist of more than seven sentences. He further applied to his prose writing the rule of French versification which forbids a hiatus (the concourse of two vowels), not allowing it to himself even at the break between two sentences or two paragraphs ; nor did he permit himself ever to use the same word twice, either in the same sentence or in two consecutive sentences, though belonging to difierent paragraphs : with the exception of. the monosyllabic auxiliaries.* All this is well enough, es[)ecially the first two precepts, and a good way of breaking through a bad habit. But M. Comte persuaded himself that any arbitrary restriction, though in no way emanating from, and therefore necessarily disturbing the natural order and proportion of tlio thoughts, is a benefit in itself, and tends to improve style. If it renders composition vastly more difficult, • Preface to the fourth volume of the " SystSme de Politique Positive." 180 LATEi: SPECULATIONS he rejoices at it, as tending to confine writing to supe- rior mind-s. Accordingly, in the Synthese Subjective, he institutes the following " plan for all compositions of importance." "Every volume really capable of form- ing a dis^tinct treatise" should consist of "seven chap- ters, besides the introduction and the conclusion ; and each of these should be composed of three parts." Each third part of a chapter should be divided into ^ seven sections, each composed of seven groups of sen- tences, separated by the usual i>rcak of line. Normally formed, the section offers a central group of seven sen- tences, preceded and followed by three groups of five. The first section of each part reduces to three sentences three of its groups, symmetrically placed ; the last sec- tion gives seven sentences to each of its extreme groups. These rules of composition make ])rosc approach to the regularity of poetry, when combined with my previous reduction of the maximum length of a sentence to two manuscript or five printed lines, that is, 2i)0 letters." ** Normally constructed, great poems consist of thirteen cantos, decomposed into parts, sections, and groups like iny chapters, saving the complete equality of the groups and of the sections." "This difference of structure I)c- tween volumes of poetry and of philosophy is more apparent than real ; for the introduction and the con- clusion of a poem should comprehend six of its thirteen cantos," leaving, therefore, the cabalistic number seven for the body of the poem. And all this regulation not being sufficiently meaningless, fantastic, and oi)pressivc, Jic invents an elaborate system for compelling each i>f his sections and groups to begin with a letter of the alphabet, determined Ijeforehand, the letters being se- OF AUGUSTE COMTE. 181 Icctcd so as to compose words having " a synthetic or eyiupathctic signification," and as close a relation as possible to the section or part to which they are appro- priated. Others may laugh, but we could far rather weep at this melancholy decadence of a great intellect. M. Comte used to reproach his early English admirers with maintaining the " conspiracy of silence " concerning hia hUer performances. The reader can now judge whether such reticence is not more than sufficiently explained by tenderness for his fame, and a conscientious fear of bi'inging undeserved discredit on the noble speculationa of his earlier career. M. Comte was accustomed to consider Descartes and Leibnitz as his principal pi'ccursors, and the only great phllosojihers (among many thinkers of high philosophic capacity) in modern times- It was to their minds tiiat he considered his own to bear the nearest resemblance. Though we have not so lofty an opinion of any of the three as M.. Comte had, we think the assimilation just : these were, of all recorded thinkers, the two who bore most resemblance to ]M. Comte. They were like him in earnestness, like lilm, though scarcely equal to him, in confidence in tiiemsclves ; they had the same extra- ordinary power of concatenation and co-ordination; they enriclied human knowlcdi^e with jji-cat truths and fjrcat conception of method ; they were, of all great scientific thinkers, the most consistent, and for that reason often the most absurd, because they shrunk from no conse- quences, however contrary to common sense, to wliich their premises appeared to lead. Accordingly their iiamcs have come down to us associated with in*aud 182 LATER SPECULATIONS OF COMTE. thoughts, wltli most imjiortant discoveries, and .also with some of tlic most extravagantly wild and ludi- iTously absurd conceptions and tlicorics which ever were solemnly proj)oinidcd by thoughtful men. Wc think ]M. Comte as great as cither of these philosophers, and hardly more extravagant. Were we to speak our whole mind, we should call him superior to them : not intrin- sically, but by the exertion of equal intellectual power in a more advanced state of human preparation, but also in an age less tolerant of palpable absurdities, and to which those he has committed, if not in themselves greater, at least appear more ridiculous. ?■■' ^^p^li < ^^AavaaiH^"^ e^tllBRARYQA %ojnv3jo>' ^ ^TiHDNVSOl^ %a3AIN(l-3WV^ %OJI1V3JO^ ^OFCALIFO/?^^ ^^Aavaain^ .^WEUNIVERJ/A '^^J130NVS01^ ^lOSANCElfx^ o _ ^ _ SO > SO ^/Sainh-ivw^ .^,OF-CAIIFO% ^^Aaviiaii# •OSANCEl^^ 3 _ I %il3AINfl-3l\V^ .J^^, ^lllBRARYQ^ -..^ILIBRARY^^ %ojnv3-30'^ %ojnvojo'^ ,5.ME0NIVERS/A o %13DNVS0# f v^lOSANCEl%^ ^ ^V'-^N-^^ T//rin»mn ii\V^ ^OFCAllFOff^ ^OFCAIIFO/?^ .^\\E•UNIVERS•/A OS Cfp, f 9 gfoCIi i\.^ 1158 01155 997 University of California SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY •?05 De Neve Drive - Parking Lot 17 • Box 951388 ^°' LOS InGELES, CALIFORNIA 90095-1388 Returnthismateriano^^ ^^l^lQl* iSANCnfJ-^ WRY FACILITY 111111 10 8 RARY<9>r llf0%. 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