re 
 
 
 APR 5 1948 ^1 
 
 
 6 
 
 0: 
 
 1^1 MEMORANDA ON CUBA. 
 
 July 12, 191 2. 
 Article 111 of the treaty of 1903 between .the United 
 States and Cuba (which incorporates the so-tailed Piatt 
 Amendment) reads as follows: 
 
 "That the Government of Cuba consents that the United 
 States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation 
 of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government ade- 
 quate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, 
 and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed 
 by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed 
 and undertaken by the Government of Cuba." 
 
 It will be observed that the treaty provision may be 
 analyzed as follows : 
 
 1. The treaty stipulates that "the Government of Cuba 
 consents that the United States may exercise the right to 
 intervene", etc. 
 
 II. The Government of Cuba consents to the exercise 
 of this rijrht of intervention — 
 • I. "For the preservation of Cuban independence". 
 
 2. For "the maintenance of a government adequate — 
 {a) " For the protection of life, property, and 
 
 individual liberty", and 
 
 {b) "For discharging the obligations with respect 
 
 to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris 
 
 on the United States, now to be assumed 
 
 and undertaken b\- the Government of 
 
 Cuba." 
 
 With reference to I, supra, it will be observed thai the 
 
 .treaty provision is not ?i grant of a right but a consent to the 
 
 exercise of a right. In other words, the treaty distinctly 
 
 recognizes the rio;ht of the United States to intervene irre- 
 
 spective of the terms of the treaty itself, the treaty stipula-
 
 tion being nothing more than an anticipatory consent of the 
 Cuban Government to the exercise of that right. The 
 treaty, therefore, need not be primarily invoked to estabHsh 
 the right of intervention, but only to meet any objection 
 which the Government of Cuba might at any time be dis- 
 posed to raise, in the absence of such a treaty stipulation, to 
 the exercise of such admitted rights. 
 
 In this connection it is of interest to call attention to 
 the statements made in the letter from Secretarv of War 
 Root to Governor Wood, of February 9, 1901 (while the 
 Cuban Constitutional Convention was drafting the Consti- 
 tution of Cuba), in which the Secretary of War set forth 
 certain provisions which "the people of Cuba should desire 
 to have incorporated in their fundamental law", with a state- 
 ment that while these provisions might not be ultimately 
 adopted by our own Congress they should be binding upon 
 Governor Wood as the expressions of the Executive on the 
 matters covered. 
 
 The third of the provisions submitted recited: 
 
 "That upon the transfer of the control of Cuba to the Gov- 
 ernment established under the new constitution, Cuba consents 
 that the United States reserve and retain the right oi intervention 
 for the", etc., etc. (See attached memorandum.) 
 
 In connection with this question, reference should also 
 be made to President McKinley's message of December 5, 
 1899, in which, speaking of the relationship between the 
 United States and Cuba, he said: 
 
 "This nation has assumed before the world a grave responsi- 
 bility for the future good government of Cuba. We have 
 accepted a trust the fulfillment of which calls for the sternest 
 integrity of purpose and the exercise of the highest wisdom. " 
 (For. Rels., 1899, p. xxix.) 
 
 Again, as was said by Secretary of War Root in the let- 
 ter above referred to — 
 
 "The United States has, and will always have, the most 
 vital interest in the preservation of that island from the domi- 
 nation and control of any foreign power whatever. The pres-
 
 SRLF 
 YRL 
 
 ervation of that independence by a country so small as Cuba, so 
 incapable, as she must always be, to contend by force against 
 the great powers of the world, must depend upf>n her strict 
 performance of international obligations, upon her giving due 
 protection to the lives and property of the citizens of all other 
 countries within her borders, and upon her never contracting 
 any public debt which in the hands of citizens of foreign powers 
 shall constitute an obligation she is unable to meet. The 
 United States has, therefore, not merely a moral obligation 
 arising from her destruction of Spanish authority in Cuba and 
 the obligations of the Treaty of Paris for the establishment of a 
 stable and adequate government in Cuba, but it has a sub- 
 stantial interest in the maintenance of such a government. 
 
 "We are placed in a position where, for our own protection, 
 we have, by reason of e.xpelling Spain from Cuba, become the 
 guarantors of Cuban independence and the guarantors of a stable 
 and orderly government protecting life and property in that 
 island. " 
 
 It will be observed that these principles were announced 
 before the enactment of the Piatt Amendment, therefore 
 before the adoption of the Piatt Amendment in the Cuban 
 Constitution, and therefore obviously before the adoption of 
 the Piatt Amendment in the form of a convention between 
 the two Governments. 
 
 It is therefore submitted that, upon reason and upon 
 principle, as well as upon the wording of the convention 
 itself, the right of the United States to intervene in affairs 
 in Cuba comes from .sources other than the Piatt Amend- 
 ment, or the Constitution of Cuba, or from the provisions of 
 the treaty of 1903; and that the Cuban Constitution and 
 the conventional undertakings do no more, and in terms 
 profess to do no more, than to give Cuba's consent to the 
 exercise of such rights. 
 
 The fact that wc ha\'c fundamental interests in Cuba 
 which are not the subject of treaty or other grant and which 
 exist independently thereof is specitically admitted in Article 
 V of the treaty of 1903, which recognizes but does not 
 create the interest of the United States and its people in the 
 sanitation of Cuba, and in Article \'1I, which likewise recog- 
 nizes but does not create the interest (that arises out of the 
 imperative necessities of self-defense) which the United
 
 , States has in tlie mainienance on Cuban soil of coaling and 
 naval stations. 
 
 Moreover, it may well be, and such is probably the fact, 
 that neither the Piatt Amendment, the constitution, nor the 
 treatv is to be res^arded as containing a schedule of all of the 
 conditions and circumstances under which this Government 
 has the rigJit to intervene, and that it may well be that 
 conditions will arise where it will be necessary for this Gov- 
 ernment to intervene in the affairs of Cuba under conditions 
 not specified in anv of the documents named. 
 
 Before passing to the second phase of this discussion, it 
 seems desirable to consider the meaning of the word "inter- 
 vene" as that term is used in international parlance. 
 
 Hall states that — 
 
 " Intervention takes place when a state interferes in the rela- 
 tions of two other states without tl^e consent of both or either 
 of them, or when it interferes in the domestic affairs of another 
 state irrespectively of the will of the latter for the purpose of 
 either maintaining or altering the actual condition of things 
 within it. * * * In the case moreover of intervention in the 
 internal affairs of a state, it is generally directed only against a 
 party within the state, or against a particular form of state life, 
 and it is frequently carried out in the interest of the government 
 or of persons belonging to the invaded state. It is therefore 
 compatible with friendship towards the state as such, and it may 
 be a pacific measure, which becomes war in the intention of its 
 authors only when resistance is offered, not merely by persons 
 within the state and professing to represent it, but by the state 
 through the persons whom the invading power chooses to look 
 upon as its authorized agents."" (Hall, International Law, sixth 
 edition, p. 278.) 
 
 The pertinent comments made by VVestlake are in the 
 following language: 
 
 "The term intervention is used in international law to ex- 
 press two very different cases of political action. One is the 
 interference of a state in affairs pending between two or more 
 other states, the other is the interference of a state in the in- 
 ternal affairs of another state. * * * 
 
 "Intervention in the internal affairs of another state is jus- 
 tifiable in two classes of cases. The first is when the object is
 
 to put down a government which attacks the peace, external or 
 internal, of foreign countries, or of which the conduct or 
 avowed policy amounts to a standing threat of such an attack. 
 The second is when a country has fallen into such a condition 
 of anarchy or misrule as unavoidably to disturb the peace, ex- 
 ternal or internal of its neighbors, whatever the conduct or 
 policy of its government may be in that respect. 
 
 ******* 
 
 "In considering anarchy and misrule as a ground for inter- 
 vention the view must not be confined to the physical conse- 
 quences which they may have beyond the limits of the territory 
 in which they rage. Those are often serious enough, such as 
 the frontier raids in which anarchy often boils over, or the 
 piracy that may arise in seas in which an enfeebled government 
 can no longer maintain the rule of law. The moral effect on 
 the neighboring populations is to bfe taken into account. Where 
 these include considerable numbers allied by religion, language 
 or race to the populations suffering from misrule, to restrain 
 the former from giving support to the latter in violation of the 
 legal rights of the misruled state may be a task beyond the 
 power of their government, or requiring it to resort to modes 
 of constraint irksome to its subjects, and not necessary for their 
 good order if they were not excited by the spectacle of miseries 
 which they must feel acutely. It is idle to argue in such a case 
 that the duty of the neighboring people is to look on quietly. 
 Laws are made for men and not for creatures of the imagina- 
 tion, and they must not create or tolerate for them situations 
 which are beyond the endurance, we will not say of average 
 human nature, since laws may fairly expect to raise the stand- 
 ard by their operation, but of the best human nature that at the 
 time and place they can hope to meet witli. It would be out- 
 side our scope to pass judgment on present or recent cases, but 
 it is by these principles that we must try such interventions as 
 have taken place in Turkey, or as that of the United States in 
 Cuba." (I Westlake International Law, pp. 304-306.) 
 
 Hallcck seems to classify intervention into two sorts — 
 armed intervention and pacific intervention, which latter he 
 speaks of as " interference", and upon whicli hr makes the 
 following comment : 
 
 "The principal grounds upon which such interference has 
 been justified are: first, self-defence; second, tlie obligations 
 of treaty stipulations; third, humanity; and fourth, the invi-
 
 tation of the contending parties in a civil war. We will here 
 examine each of these grounds, with respect to pacific inter- 
 ference reserving for another place a discussion of how far 
 thev will justify a resort to force or a war of intervention." 
 
 Calvo, in liis Dictionaire de Droit International, makes 
 the followinc: definition of the term "intervention": 
 
 "In international law, intervention signifies the interposi- 
 tion of one state in the affairs of other states. 
 
 "The different species of intervention are distinguished 
 according to the forms under which they occur; (i) Unofficial 
 intervention, which is exercised by oral or written representa- 
 tions or by so called notes verbale: one may consequently call it 
 also diplomatic intervention; (2) Official intervention, which is 
 exercised by notes delivered publicly; (3) Pacific or arbitral 
 intervention; (4) Armed intervention, which manifests itself by 
 a simple menace supported by tlie employment of military 
 force." (See Pradier Fodere, vol. i, sec. 363, for the same dis- 
 tinction as to pacific and armed intervention.) 
 
 These definitions, which may be almost indefinitely mul- 
 tiplied, make it perfectly clear that the term "intervention" 
 includes not merely the use of armed forces or the military 
 occupation of a country, but that it comprises also such 
 pacific measures as may in any case be taken by a govern- 
 ment in its interference with the internal domestic affairs of 
 another government. 
 
 It therefore follows naturally that this Government may 
 iiitervene in Cuba in other ways than by landing forces and 
 undertaking a military occupation, and that by its constitu- 
 tion and the treaty the Government of Cuba has given an 
 anticipatory consent to such intervention. 
 
 With reference to II, supra, it will be observed, as 
 already pointed out, that the rights recognized are desig- 
 nated under two headings, as follows: 
 
 1. Intervention "for the preservation of Cuban independence. " 
 
 No argument is necessary to establish that the interven- 
 tion here contemplated, whether it be pacific or armed, is to 
 be exercised for the purpose oi preserving Qwh^iW independ- 
 ence and not for the purpose of restoring it. This being
 
 true, it is the riijht of tiie Government of the United States, 
 to the exercise of which right Cuba has consented, to inter- 
 vene in Cuban affairs by either warhke or pacific measures, 
 whenever it considers that conditions arise threatening the 
 independence of Cuba, in order that such independence may 
 be preserved. It need not wait until the independence is 
 lost before acting. That is to sa\', to make use of a homely 
 illustration, the barn door is to be locked before and not 
 after the horse is stolen. 
 
 In connection willi this comment the terms of Article 
 VII of the treaty should be considered, which provide as 
 follows : 
 
 "To enable the United States to maintain the independence 
 of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its 
 own defences, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the 
 United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations, at 
 certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of 
 the United States." 
 
 Reference is made to the comments already set forth 
 upon the significance of this stipulation. 
 
 2. Intervention for "the maintenance of a government 
 
 adequate" — 
 
 {a) ''For the protection of life, property, and individual 
 
 liberty''. 
 
 Attention is called here to the fact that this stipulation, 
 like the one preceding, contemplates preventive measures and 
 not measures of restoration — that is to say, the treaty recog- 
 nizes the rieht of this Government to intervene to maintain 
 a government adequate for the purposes named, and not 
 merelv to intervene to reestablish a government of retjuired 
 effectiveness. In other words, Cuba has consented that this 
 Government shall intervene not to reestablish an efficient 
 government, but to preserve and maintain an efficient gov- 
 ernment. So that whenever, in tlie estimation of this Gov- 
 ernment, the maintenance of a government adequate for the 
 protection of life, property, and liberty in Cuba is threatened,
 
 8 
 
 the Government of Cuba has consented that the Government 
 of the United States shall intervene for the purpose of main- 
 taining such a government, and from the discussion already 
 had it must be admitted that such intervention may be either 
 pacific or by force of arms. 
 
 (p) ''For discJiargmg the obligations with respect to Cuba im- 
 posed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to 
 be assumed and undertaken by the Government of CubaT 
 
 Secretary of War Root, in his letter dated February 9, 
 1 90 1, and already referred to, to Military Governor Wood, 
 said : 
 
 ''The treat}' of peace concluded at Paris on the loth of 
 December, 1898, provides in the first article that 'as the island 
 is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United 
 States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall 
 last, assume and discharge the obligations that may, under 
 international law, result from the fact of its occupation for the 
 protection of life and property.' 
 
 " It contains numerous obligations on the part of the United 
 States in respect of the treatment of the inhabitants of the ter- 
 ritory relinquished by Spain, such as the provision of the tenth 
 article, that the inhabitants shall be secured in the free exercise 
 of their religion; of the eleventh article, that they sliall be sub- 
 ject to the jurisdiction of the courts, pursuant to the ordinary 
 laws governing the same; and of the ninth article, that they 
 shall retain all their rights of property, including the right to 
 dispose thereof, and the right to carry on their industry, com- 
 merce, and professions. The sixteenth article of the treaty 
 provides that the obligations assumed in the treaty by the 
 United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of 
 its occupancy thereof, but that it shall, upon the termination 
 of such occupancy, advise any government established in the 
 island to assume the same obligations." 
 
 The treaty provision as above quoted, therefore, consents, 
 on the part of Cuba, to the intervention by the United 
 States whenever such intervention becomes necessary to 
 secure the discharge of these obligations, and, under the dis- 
 cussion already set forth above, it is clear that such interven- 
 tion may be either pacific or military.
 
 It is fundamental Id the pi iiiciplcs of intervention and to 
 the ri^rlits, duties, and ohliij^ations llowing therefrom, that 
 tlie time, occasion, and manner of intervention must be 
 determineci by the intervening state or states. This follows 
 naturally from the hypothesis, which is also the fact, that 
 any and all interference by one state in the internal or exter- 
 nal affairs of another is an exception to the fundamental 
 doctrine of the equality and absolute independence, one from 
 another, of states ; and from the further fact that, c\\ hypotheca, 
 interference is to remedy evils which threaten the interfering 
 state, which state obviously can alone, and must alone, deter- 
 mine when such evils threaten and the methods it will adopt 
 to obviate them. 
 
 If a disposition should appear to argue that while the 
 above is a correct statement of the principles governing 
 intervention in the absence of treaty, nevertheless where a 
 treaty authorization or consent is involved it is necessarv (a 
 treaty being a bilateral contract) that the two (rovernments 
 parties thereto should be in agreeement as to the time, the 
 occasion, and the manner of intervention, it may be replied 
 that quite obviously a treaty of that kind (/. c, where the two 
 parties must agree upon such matters) might be made, and 
 that, being made, it would be necessary that the two Gov- 
 ernments should be in such agreement upon the time, the 
 occasion, and the manner of intervention as the treaty might 
 contemplate. But the treaty under discussion is not such a 
 treaty, for the reason, in the first place, that, as already 
 pointed out, it does not grant rights of intervention, but 
 recognizes and consents to their exercise; that it uses the 
 term "intervene" without qualification and therefore in its 
 general, unrestricted, international law sense; and that it does 
 not attempt to define either the time, the occasion, or the 
 manner of intervention, but merely states the purposes to 
 accomplish which Cuba has given an anticipatory consent for 
 intervention. In other words, the treaty uses the term 
 "intervene" without any restriction whatsoever and without 
 any attempted definition save as to the purposes of interven- 
 tion, thus leaving the term "intervene" in every other respect
 
 lO 
 
 to be interpreted in accordance with its international law 
 
 meanmg. 
 
 Now, regarding the import and effect of the treaty state- 
 ment regarding the purposes of intervention, as already 
 pointed out, since the h-eaty does not create, but merely 
 recognizes, the right of this Government to intervene; and 
 since the rights which this Government has are predicated, 
 first, upon the fact, as pointed out by President Mc- 
 Kinley in iiis message of December 15, 1899, that "this 
 nation has assumed before the world a grave responsibility 
 for the future good government of Cuba" (p. 2, supra) ; sec- 
 ondly, upon the fact that, as the Secretary of War said, "'for 
 our ozuji protection, ive have, by reason of expelling Spain from 
 Cuba, become the giLarantors of Cuban independence and the 
 guarantors oj a stable and orderly government protecting life 
 and property in that island'' (p. 3, supra); and, thirdly, upon 
 the fact that we are under certain treaty obligations to Spain 
 with reference to the Cuban Republic (see p. 8, supra) — it 
 becomes obvious that, in view of these interests and obliga- 
 tions, which latter impose upon us responsibilities as toward 
 third powers, this Government must, in order properly to 
 protect its interests, as well as adequately to meet such 
 responsibilities, determine for itself when such interests are 
 impaired as well as when such responsibilities arise, as it must 
 also determine for itself when its interests are threatened or 
 its responsibility likely to be invoked. In no other way 
 could the rights recognized, /;/// 7iot created, by the treaty be 
 effectively enjoyed, because if it were necessary for the two 
 Governments to come to an agreement either as to the im- 
 pairment or as to the threatened impairment of our interests, 
 and the same as to our responsibilities toward other nations, 
 this Government might find that the rights recognized and 
 the treaty stipulations themselves might and probably would 
 become of no force and effect by reason of the disposition 
 of Cuban officials to postpone the exercise of the rights 
 until the evils which were intended to be avoided were 
 fully upon this Government. The treaty should not 
 be so interpreted as practically to nullify its provisions.
 
 1 I 
 
 Or, to look at the matter from a slightly different angle, 
 the treaty purports to do nothing more than to set forth 
 the purposes for which intervention should take j)lace, leav- 
 ing all else untouched, and, therefore, while it might he 
 argued that this Government could not intervene in Cuba 
 for any other piLrpose than that mentioned in the treaty, 
 save bv an agreement with Cuba, vet that is the utmost that 
 could be properly contended, for the reason that the treaty 
 stipulation being solely as to \\\q purpose of intervention, the 
 only question that could arise under the treaty would be as 
 to that purpose. Therefore, the only question in which 
 Cuba could under any theory have a right to a voice or 
 expression of opinion would be as to whether the particular 
 purpose of intervention under discussion in any given case 
 fell within the treaty provisions. But when this Govern- 
 ment intervenes avowedly for one of i\\e purposes named in 
 the treaty, Cuba has absolutely nothing to say, under the 
 treaty, unless it is prepared to contest the bona fides of our 
 statement of purpose — that is, unless it is in a position to 
 say that our intervention is not for any of the purposes 
 named in the convention, but for some other purpose out- 
 side and beyond the convention. 
 
 It therefore naturally follows from these principles that 
 the Government of the United States must determine in 
 every case the time, the occasion, and the manner of inter- 
 vention by it in Cuba, and that in this matter it is wholly 
 uncontrolled save by its own interests and iis national 
 conscience. 
 
 Applving the principles above set forth to the existing 
 state in Cuba, with reference to its financial policy and con- 
 ditions, it would result that, if the Government of the United 
 States is convinced that such j)olicy and conditions are not 
 such as will insure the "maintenance of a government ade- 
 quate for the protection of life, property, and individual 
 libertv" in Cuba, or that such policv and condition threaten 
 the independence of Cuba, or that ihcy make impossible the 
 discharge bv Cuba of the obligations imposed by the Treaty 
 of Paris, then this Government has the right to intervene in
 
 12 
 
 such form as it may see fit, either by pacific means or by 
 miHtary measures, in order that any of the purposes named 
 may be accomplished. 
 
 Interference by one or more powers in the fiscal affairs 
 of other powers, in and through pacific measures (though 
 obviously and of course with the sanction behind such 
 measures of a force necessary to make such intervention 
 effective) is well recognized in international law. Bonfils, in 
 his De Droit International Public, has the following discus- 
 sion on this point : 
 
 "The case of foreign creditors of a state claiming protection 
 of their government to obtain payment of their credits, was fre- 
 quently realized in the Nineteenth Century — the century of 
 international loans (Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Servia, Portugal, 
 &c.) In pure theory, a" state is not authorized to constrain 
 another state to the payment of this kind of debts. Lord Palm- 
 erston very justly said in a despatch of January 1848: To con- 
 fide one's capital to foreign go'Cernments, to subscribe to a loan 
 opened by a foreign state, is to make a financial speculation. 
 The risk inherent in all operations of this kind is also found in 
 subscriptions to a government loan. The lenders should fore- 
 see the eventuality of the insolvency of a state as of a simple 
 individual. 
 
 " In fact, European governments have intervened in favor 
 of their national creditors with weak states incapable of resist- 
 ing, but not with strong states who will not permit any inter- 
 vention whatever between them and their creditors. 
 
 "An example distinguishing intervention to protect the 
 pecuniary interests of nationals, is offered in the European con- 
 trol established in Egypt in 1876 — a control provoked by the 
 detestable financial administration of the Khedive — a control 
 confided to two functionaries, one English, the other French. 
 A Khedival decree of January 27, 1878, established a commis- 
 sion of international investigation. The Ministry of Finance 
 was given to an Englishman ; that of Public Works, to a French- 
 man. The Khedive sought to rid himself of ftjreigners by pro- 
 voking a national movement. Upon protest of the powers, and 
 notably of England and France, Ismail Pacha was deposed by 
 the Sultan in June, 1879. The new khedive named a commis- 
 sion of liquidation composed of representatives of Germany, 
 England, Austria, France, and Italy. This commission prepared 
 the law of liquidation of March 31, 1880. After the English
 
 13 
 
 « 
 
 occupation of 1882 a new loan was necessary; it was guaranteed 
 l)y the ptjwers, who took a decisive influence in financial mat- 
 ters. It was issued July 30, 1885. The European powers inter- 
 vened again in 1890 and authorized the conversion of the 
 privileged debt. 
 
 "The financial vcontrol of foreign powers was established in 
 Tunis in 1869. By agreement with the Bey of Tunis, England, 
 France, Italy, instituted a financial commission at the head of 
 which was placed a French Inspector General of Finance. Since 
 then France has established a protectorate and the law of Feb- 
 ruary 9, 1889, has converted the Tunisian debt, in bonds redeem- 
 able in ninety-nine years and guaranteed by France. 
 
 "After the war of 1897 between Greece and Turkey, the 
 great powers determined to establish a control over Hellenic 
 finances, partly with the object of assuring the protection of 
 their nationals, holders of Greek bonds. 
 
 "Intervention in favor of nationals, creditors of a foreign 
 state, besides striking at the right of independence, are dan- 
 gerous in their consequences. They excite the resentment of 
 the people against foreigners, tliey complicate international 
 relations." 
 
 The custom of nations thus recognizes, as one mode of 
 intervention, interference with the fiscal affairs of another 
 state, even though such interference has received the ani- 
 madversion of certain international hiw writers. Being a 
 recognized type of intervention, and irrespective of its pro- 
 priety or impropriety as discussed by theoretical writers, 
 interference in the fiscal affairs of Cuba falls within the 
 intervention to which Cuba has given lier consent in the 
 treaty. The Government of the United States may there- 
 fore exercise such measures of interference or intervention in 
 the fiscal affairs of Cuba b\- pacific or military means as in 
 the judgment of tiiis Government is necessary in order to 
 accomplish the purposes indicated in the treaty, and this 
 Government must be the judge of the character and extent 
 of such measures. 
 
 Attached hereto is a nuMiiorandum collecting togcilicr 
 the various statements and expressions of governmental 
 ofificers from which ma\- be gatiiered suggestions as to the 
 meaniuLr of the term " intervene ".
 
 THE PLATT AMENDMENT. 
 
 Interpretation of Article III in Connection with the Matter of this 
 Government's Right of Protest or Control in Cases of Financial 
 Maladministration in Cuba. 
 
 Article III of the Treaty of Relations of 1903 between 
 this Government and Cuba, which embodied Article III of 
 the Piatt Amendment, reads: 
 
 "The Government of Cuba consents that the United States 
 mav exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban 
 independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for 
 the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and 
 for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed 
 by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed 
 and undertaken by the Government of Cuba." 
 
 The question arises whether "intervention" in this 
 article means only actual occupation of Cuban territory by 
 American forces or whether it has also the broader mcaninfr 
 of "intervention" as employed in international law. whicli 
 comprehends the giving of advice or the making of demands 
 or requests by diplomatic representation. 
 
 The object of this memorandum is to summarize the 
 results of an investigation of possible sources of interpreta- 
 tion of this article found in the events connectetl with the 
 adoption of the amendment by the Congress of the United 
 States and by the Cuban Constitutional Convention and in 
 the opening events of the Second Intervention. 
 
 DEBATES IN CONGRESS. 
 
 The Piatt Amendment, an amendment to the Army Ajv 
 propriation Bill of 1901. was submitted to the Senate on 
 February 25, 1901, adopted by that body on February 27, and 
 
 15
 
 i6 
 
 concurred in bv the House of Representatives on March i. 
 It reads as follows : 
 
 '''' Provided further, Tliat in fultillment of tlie declaration con- 
 tained in the joint resolution approved April 20, 1898, entitled 
 'For the recognition of the independence of the people of 
 Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its 
 authority and government in the island of Cuba, and to with- 
 draw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, 
 and directing the President of the United States to use the 
 land and naval forces of the United States to carry these reso- 
 tions into effect,' the President is hereby authorized to 'leave 
 the government and control of the island of Cuba to its people' 
 so soon as a government shall have been established in said 
 island under a constitution which, either as a part thereof or 
 in an ordinance appended thereto, shall define the future rela- 
 tions of the United States with Cuba, substantially as follows: 
 
 "I. 
 
 "That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any 
 treat}' or other compact with any foreign power or powers 
 which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, 
 nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or 
 powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval pur- 
 poses or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of 
 said island. 
 
 "ii. 
 
 "The said government shall not assume or contract any 
 public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make rea- 
 sonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of 
 which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the 
 current expenses of government, shall be inadequate. 
 
 "III. 
 
 "That the government of Cuba consents that the United 
 States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation 
 of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government ade- 
 quate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, 
 and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba 
 imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be 
 assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba.
 
 '7 
 
 "W. 
 
 "That all acts of the United States in Cuba durinj^ its 
 military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all 
 lawful rights acquired thereundt^r shall l)c maintained and 
 protected. 
 
 "V. 
 
 "That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far as 
 necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to 
 be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the 
 island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious 
 diseases may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the 
 people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of 
 the Southern ports of the United States and the people residing 
 therein. 
 
 "VI. 
 
 "That tlie Isle oi Pines shall be omitted from the proposed 
 constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left 
 to future adjustment by treaty. 
 
 "VII. 
 
 " That to enable the United States to maintain the inde- 
 pendence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as 
 for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease 
 to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations 
 at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President 
 of the United States. 
 
 "VIII. 
 
 "That by way of further assurance the government of Cuba 
 will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with 
 the United States." 
 
 As appears from its text, the Flatt Amendment pro- 
 vided, as a condition precedent to the withdrawal of the 
 American forces of occupation, tliat Cuba should adopt as a 
 part of its constitution, then in the making, tiic provisions 
 set forth in the amendment in regard to the future relations 
 between this Government and Cuba. These provisions, as 
 above indicated, were, subsequent to their adoption as a part 
 of the Cuban Constitution, embodied in a treaty of relations 
 between this Government and Cuba in the year 1903.
 
 i8 
 
 The amendment was introduced, as indicated above, at 
 the close of the session of Congress, and the debate on its 
 provisions, both in the Senate and in the House, was neces- 
 sarily limited. The report of the final discussion in the 
 Senate is contained at pages 3145 to 3149 of volume 34, 
 part 4, of the Congressional Record, The final discussion 
 in the House appears at pages 3338-3384 of the same vol- 
 ume. The principal objection to the amendment on the 
 part of the Democratic minority seems to have been that it 
 provided for a form of })rotectorate or suzerainty over Cuba 
 and consequently was a violation of the promise of the 
 United States contained in the final part of the resolution of 
 April 20, 1898, adopted as a preliminary to the war with 
 Spain. The part of the resolution in question reads: 
 
 "The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or 
 intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over 
 said island [Cuba], except for the pacification thereof, and 
 asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave 
 the government and control of the island to its people." 
 
 The principal arguments in favor of the amendment 
 made by the Republican majority seem to have been that 
 its provisions were necessary, first, in order to make the 
 Monroe Doctrine effective with respect to Cuba, and secondly, 
 to insure the performance of this Government's moral obliga- 
 tions under the Treaty of Paris. 
 
 Nowhere in the debates does there appear to be a dis- 
 cussion of the meaning of "intervention" in the aspect 
 now under consideration, namely, its possible meaning of 
 interference in Cuban affairs through diplomatic representa- 
 tion. In the record, however, there is a considerable amount 
 of discussion indicating that in the references in the debate 
 to intervention the legislators had in mind actual occupation 
 of Cuban territory. The force of this, however, would seem 
 to be minimized by the fact that the question now under 
 consideration seems never to have been definitely raised.
 
 19 
 
 ADOPTION OF THE AMENDMENT BY THE CUHAN CONSTITU- 
 TIONAL CONVENTION. 
 
 The followiiifr data has been taken i^rinci|:)allv from a 
 book entitled "Cuba and the Interveniiuii " (Long-mans, 
 Green c\. Co., New York, 1905), by Albert G. Robinson, a 
 newspaper correspondent, who appears to have been in Cuba 
 for considerable periods of time during the events described 
 in his book. 
 
 As a result of several orders issued by the executive 
 authorities of the iVmerican Provisional Government a con- 
 vention, called for the purpose of adopting a Cuban Consti- 
 tution, mot in Habana in the early part of 1900. The 
 convention was to adopt a constitution for Cuba and to pro- 
 vide what should be the future relations between Cuba and 
 the United States. 
 
 Subsequent to the framing of the constitution proper 
 Secretary of War Root addressed to General Wood, Militarv 
 Governor of Cuba, the following letter: 
 
 "War Department, 
 ' ' Washington, February p, igoi. 
 "Sir: As the time approaches for the Cuban constitutional 
 convention to consider and act upon Cuba's relations uitli the 
 United States, it seems desirable that you should be informed 
 of the views of the Executive Department of our Government 
 upon that subject in a more official form than that in which 
 they have been communicated to you hitherto. The limitations 
 upon the power of the Executive by the resolution of Congress 
 of April 20, 1898, are such that the final determination upon the 
 whole subject may ultimately rest in Congress, and it is imprac- 
 ticable now to forecast what the action of Congress will be. In 
 the meantime, until Congress shall have acted, the military 
 branch of the Government is bound to refrain from any com- 
 mittal, or apparent committal, of the United States to any policy 
 which should properly be determined upon by Congress, and, at 
 the same time, so far as it is called upon to act or to make sug- 
 gestions bearing upon the course of events, it must determine 
 its own conduct by reference to the action already taken by 
 Congress, the established policy of the United States, the objects 
 of our present occupation, and the manifest interests of the two 
 countries.
 
 20 
 
 "The jtjini resoluiion of Congress of April 20, 1898, which 
 authorized the President to expel the Spanish forces from Cuba, 
 declared — 
 
 "'that the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or 
 intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over 
 said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its 
 determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the govern- 
 ment and the control of the island to its people.' 
 
 "The treaty of peace concluded at Paris on the loth of 
 December, 189S, and ratified by the Senate on the 6th of Feb- 
 ruary, 1899, provides in the first article that — 
 
 " 'as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied 
 by the United States, the United States will, so long as such 
 occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations 
 that may, under international law, result from the fact of its 
 occupation, for the protection of life and property.' 
 
 " I,t contains numerous obligations on the part of the United 
 States in respect of the treatment of the inhabitants of the 
 territory relinquished by Spain, such as the provision of the 
 tenth article, that the inhabitants shall be secured in the free 
 exercise of their religion; of the eleventh article, that they 
 shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts, pursuant to 
 the ordinary laws governing the same, and of the ninth article, 
 that they shall retain all their rights of property, including the 
 right to sell or dispose thereof, and the right to carry on their 
 industry, commerce, and professions. The sixteenth article of 
 the treaty provides that the obligations assumed in the treaty 
 by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the 
 time of its occupancy thereof, but that it shall, upon the termi- 
 nation of such occupancy, advise any government established 
 in the island to assume the same obligations. 
 
 "Our occupation of Cuba has been under the binding 
 force both of the resolution and of the treat}', and the pacifica- 
 tion mentioned in the resolution has necessarily been construed 
 as coextensive with the occupation provided for by the treaty, 
 during which we were to discharge international obligations, 
 protect the rights of the former subjects of Spain, and cause or 
 permit the establishment of a government to which we could, 
 in good faith, commit the protection of the lives and property 
 and personal rights of those inhabitants from whom we had 
 compelled their former sovereign to withdraw her protection. 
 // IS plain that the goverfii/ie/it to ivhich we were thus to transfer our 
 temporary obligations should be a* government based upon the peaceful 
 suffrages of the people of Cuba, representing the entire people and hold-
 
 21 
 
 ing their power from the people^ and subject to the limitations and safe- 
 guards which the experience of constitutional government has shown to 
 be necessary to the preservation of individual rights. This is plain as 
 a duty to the people of Cuba under the resolution of April 20, 
 1898, and it is plain as an obligation of good faith under the 
 treaty of Paris. Such a government we have been persistently 
 and with all practicable speed building up in Cuba, and we 
 hope to see it established and assume control under the pro- 
 visions which shall be adopted by the present convention. It 
 seems to me that no one familiar with the traditional and estab- 
 lished policy of this country in respect to Cuba can find cause 
 for doubt as to our remaining duty. It would be hard to find 
 any single statement of public policy which has been so often 
 officially declared by so great an array of distinguished Ameri- 
 cans authorized to speak for the Government of the United 
 States, as the proposition stated, in varying but always uncom- 
 promising and unmistakable terms, that the United States would 
 not under any circumstances permit any foreign power other 
 than Spain to acquire possession of the island of Cuba. 
 
 "Jefferson and Monroe and John Quincy Adams and Jackson 
 and Van Buren and Grant and Clay and Webster and Buchanan 
 and Everett have all agreed in regarding this as essential to the 
 interests and the protection of the United States. The United 
 States has, and will always have, the most vital interest in the preser- 
 vation of the independe?ice which she has secured for Cuba, and in pre- 
 serving the people of that island from the domination and control of any 
 foreign power ^vhatever. The preservation of that independence by a 
 country so small as Cuba, so incapable, as she must always be, to contend 
 by force against the great po^uers of the world, must depend upon her 
 strict performance of international obligatiofis, upon her giving due 
 protection to the lives and property of the citizens of all other countries 
 within her borders, and upon her never contracting any public debt 
 which in the hands of the citizens of foreign pozcers shall constitute an 
 obligation she is unable to meet. The United States has, therefore, 
 not merely a moral obligation arising from her destruction of Spanish 
 authority in Cuba and the obligations of the treaty of Paris for the 
 establishment of a stable and adequate government in Cuba, but it has 
 a substantial interest in the maintenance of such a governmetit. 
 
 * ' We arc placed in a position where, for our own protection, we 
 have, by reason of expelling Spain from Cuba, become the guarantors 
 of Cuban independence and the guarantors of a stable and orderly gov- 
 ernment protecting life and property in that island. Fortunately the 
 condition which we deem essential for our own interests is the 
 condition for which Cuba has been struggling, and whicli the
 
 oo 
 
 duty we have assumed toward Cuba on Cuban grounds and for 
 Cuban interests requires. It would be a most lame and impo- 
 tent conclusion if, after all the expenditure of blood and treas- 
 ure bv the people of the United States for the freedom of Cuba 
 and by the people of Cuba for the same object, we should, 
 through tlie constitution of the new government, by inadvert- 
 ence or otherwise, be placed in a worse condition in regard to 
 our own vital interests than we were while Spain was in posses- 
 sion, and the people of Cuba should be deprived of that protec- 
 tion and aid from the United States which is necessary to the 
 maintenance of their independence. It was, undoubtedly, in 
 consideration of these special relations between the United 
 States and Cuba that the president said in his message to Con- 
 gress of the nth of April, 1898: 
 
 " 'The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which 
 can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. 
 In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf 
 of endangered American interests which give us the right and 
 the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop. 
 
 " 'In view of these facts and of these considerations I ask 
 the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take 
 measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities 
 between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and 
 to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, 
 capable of maintaining order and observing its international 
 obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of 
 its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval 
 forces of the United States as may be necessary for these pur- 
 poses.' 
 
 "And in his message of December 5, 1899: 
 
 " 'This nation has assumed before the world a grave respon- 
 sibility for the future good government of Cuba. We have 
 accepted a trust, the fulfillment of. which calls for the sternest 
 integrity of purpose and the exercise of the highest wisdom. 
 The new Cuba yet to arise from the ashes of the past must 
 needs be bound to- us by ties of singular intimacy and strength 
 if its enduring welfare is to be assured. Whether those ties 
 shall be organic or conventional, the destinies of Cuba are in 
 some rightful form and manner irrevocably linked with our 
 own, but how and how far is for the future to determine in 
 the ripeness of events. Whatever be the outcome, we must see 
 to it that free Cuba be a reality, not a name, a perfect entity, 
 not a hasty experiment bearing within itself the elements of 
 failure. Our mission, to accomplish which we took up the 
 wager of battle, is not to be fulfilled by turning adrift any 
 loosely framed commonwealth to face the vicissitudes which 
 too often attend weaker states whose natural wealth and
 
 23 
 
 abundant resources are offset by the incongruities of their 
 political organization and the recurring occasions for internal 
 rivalries to sap their strength and dissipate their energies.' 
 
 "And it was with a view to the proper settlement and dis- 
 position of these necessar}! relations that the order for the 
 election of delegates to the present constitutional convention 
 provided that they should frame and adopt a constitution for 
 the people of Cuba, and as a part thereof provide for and 
 agree with the Government of the United States upon the rela- 
 tions to exist between that Government and the government of 
 Cuba. 
 
 ''The people of Cuba should desire to have incorporated in 
 her fundamental law provisions in substance as follows: 
 
 " I. That no government organized under the constitution 
 shall be deemed to have authority to enter into any treaty or 
 engagement with any foreign power which may tend to impair 
 or interfere with the independence of Cuba, or to confer upon 
 such foreign power any special right or privilege without the 
 consent of the United States. 
 
 "2. That no government organized under the constitution 
 shall have authority to assume or contract any public debt in 
 excess of the capacity of the ordinary revenues of the island 
 after defraying the current expenses of government to pay the 
 interest. 
 
 "3. That upon the transfer of the control of Cuba to the 
 government established under the new constitution Cuba con- 
 sents that the United States reserve and retain the right of 
 intervention for the preservation of Cuban independence and 
 the maintenance of a stable government, adequately protecting 
 life, property, and individual liberty, and discharging the obli- 
 gations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on 
 the United States and now assumed and undertaken by the 
 government of Cuba. 
 
 "4. That all the acts of the military government, and all 
 rights acquired thereunder, shall be valid and shall be main- 
 tained and protected. 
 
 "5. That to facilitate the United States in the performance 
 of such duties as may devolve upon her under the foregoing 
 provisions and for her own defense, the United States may 
 acquire and hold the title to land for naval stations, and main- 
 tain the same at certain specified points. 
 
 "These provisions may not, it is true, prove to be in accord 
 with the conclusions which Congress maj' ultimately reach when 
 that body comes to consider the subject, but as, until Congress
 
 24 
 
 has acted, the Executive must necessarily witliin its own sphere 
 of action be controlled bj' its own judgment, you should now 
 be guided by the views above expressed. 
 
 " It is not our purpose at this time to discuss the cost of our 
 intervention and occupation, or advancement of money for dis- 
 armament, or our assumption under the treaty of Paris of the 
 claims of our citizens against Spain for losses which they had 
 incurred in Cuba. These can well be the subject of later con- 
 sideration. 
 
 " \^ery respectfully, 
 
 •' Ei.iHU Root, 
 
 '"''Secretary of War. 
 "Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, 
 
 '"'' Military Governor of Cuba., 
 
 '''' Habana, Cuba." 
 
 It will be noticed that shortly after the receipt of this 
 letter the Piatt Amendment, which had been foreshadowed 
 by it, was passed by the American Congress. There appears 
 to have been considerable opposition to the amendment in 
 Cuba and uncertainty as to the precise effect of Article III. 
 
 Under date of April 3, 1901, the following official state- 
 ment of the meaning of Article III was made by the Secre- 
 tary of War : 
 
 "Wood, Habana. 
 
 "You are authorized to state officially that in the view of 
 the President the intervention described in the third clause of 
 the Piatt amendment is not synonymous with intermeddling or 
 interference with the affairs of the Cuban government, but the 
 formal action of the Government of the United States, based 
 upon just and substantial grounds, for the preservation of Cuban 
 independence, and the maintenance of a government adequate 
 for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and 
 adequate for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba 
 imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States. 
 
 "Elihu Root, Secretary of War.'' 
 
 On pages 263 to 276 of Robinson appears an account of 
 the final steps in the adoption of the amendment by the 
 Cuban convention. This, in summary, is as follows: Sug- 
 gestion was made in the convention that a commission be 
 sent to Washington to confer with the administration con- 
 cerning the interpretation of the amendment and its finality.
 
 25 
 
 A commission was appointed, came to Washington, and on 
 April 25, 1901, after a call on the President, engaged in a 
 conference with Secretary Root. This conference was secret 
 and the details have never been made public. The commis- 
 sion took away with them on their return to Cuba an analysis 
 of the measure as interi)reted by Secretary Root, but were 
 gi\'cn to understand that the ultimatum of the Piatt Amend- 
 ment was a decision in which there could be no change and 
 from which there could be no withdrawal. On the 2<Sth of 
 May the amfiidmcnt was adopted bv the con\ention bv a 
 vote of I 5 to 14. 'Ihe majority report uj)on which the vote 
 was taken, after quoting Article I of the Treaty of Paris, the 
 joint resolution of April 20, 1898, and the terms of the Piatt 
 Amendment, proceeded with the following explanations: 
 
 ' ''Inasmuch as Secretary Root, being authorized by President Mc- 
 Kinley^ says that 'the Piatt la^v has for its object the guaranteeing of 
 the independence of Cuba, and does not mean interference with its gov- 
 ernment, or the exercise of a protectorate or of sovereignty, and also 
 that intervention will only take place wheti independence is endangered 
 by outside potvers or grave interior disturbances creating anarchy, and 
 inasmuch as Secretary Root has said that the naval stations 
 will not be used for vantage poiats of intervention, but only to 
 protect Cuba against foreign powers, we report as follows: 
 
 "That, in virtue of the fact that the Piatt law in its pre- 
 amble says it is a fulfillment of the Joint Resolution, and has 
 been adopted by Congress with the principal object of estab- 
 lishing independence, we do propose to the Convention to accept 
 the following as an appendix to the Constitution." 
 
 The Robinson narration continues as follows: 
 
 "The first, second, fourth, and^ lifth clauses of the Piatt 
 Amendment are quoted in their entirety. The third clause has 
 the following addition: 
 
 ''^ '' It being understood that the United States have the right to 
 intervene to prevent the action of a foreign power or disturbances caus- 
 ing a state of anarchy, and that the intervention shall always be ihe act 
 of the United States, and not of isolated agents. The intervention 
 shall suppose neither sovereignty nor a protectorate, and shall last onl\ 
 sufficiently long to establish normal conditions. Said intervention, it 
 is also understood, shall not have the right to interfere in the Govern- 
 ment, but only the right to preserve independence. '
 
 26 
 
 "An addition to the sixth clause says that the Ownership of 
 the Isle of Pines shall be settled by a future treaty. 
 "An addition to the seventh clause says: 
 
 " 'It sliall be understood that the naval stations do not give 
 the United States the right to intervene in the interior govern- 
 ment, but are established with the sole purpose of protecting 
 American waters from foreign invasion directed against Cuba 
 or the United States. Cuba will sell or lease the necessary 
 land at points to be agreed upon later.' 
 
 "An addition to the eighth clause says that the Government 
 of Cuba suggests at the same time a treaty of commerce based 
 upon reciprocity. 
 
 ' ' The accepted report was also made to include a letter addresed to 
 Secretary Root by Senator Flatt, a copy of which had been given to 
 Mendez Capote while the Commission was in Washington. The letter 
 was as folloivs : 
 
 " '/ am in receipt of your letter of this date {April 26), in which 
 you sax that the members of the Commission of the Cuban Constitu- 
 tional Convention fear that the provisions relative to intervention, made 
 in the third clause of the Amendment which has come to bear my name, 
 may have the effect of preventing the independence of Cuba, and in 
 reality establish a protectorate or suzerainty by the United States; and 
 you request that I express my views on the questions raised. In reply I 
 beg to state that the Amendment was carefully prepared with the object 
 of avoiding any possible idea that by the acceptance thereof the Consti- 
 tutional Convention will thereby establish a protectorate or suzerainty, 
 or in any manner whatsoever compromise the independence or sover- 
 eignty of Cicba; and speaking for myself it seems impossible that such 
 an interpretation can be given to the clause. I believe that the 
 Amendment should be considered as a whole ; and it ought to be 
 clear on reading it that its well-defined purpose is to secure and 
 safeguard Cuban independence and set forth at once a clear 
 idea of the friendly disposition of the I'nited States toward the 
 Cuban people, and the express intention on their part to aid 
 them if necessary in the maintenance of said independence. 
 These are my ideas; and although, as you say, I cannot speak 
 for the entire Congress, my belief is that such a purpose was 
 well understood by that body.' 
 
 " This act of the Convention encountered the disapproval of 
 the authorities in Washington. After several conferences 
 between the President, Secretary Root, and Senator O. H. Piatt 
 and Senator Spooner, it was decided at a Cabinet meeting to 
 notify the Convention that its action could not be regarded as 
 a satisfactory compliance witli tlie American requirements. 
 Instructions were therefore telegraphed to General Wood to inform the 
 Convention that it could not proceed with the work of establishing a 
 government, and that the troops would not be withdrawn until the Piatt 
 Amendment had been accepted without qualifications. "
 
 27 
 
 On June 12, 1901, the convention voted to accept the 
 amendment without ciuaHlication. 
 
 The foregoing official statements (quoted by Mr. Rcjbin- 
 son are set forth as a record of the known declarations of this 
 Government concerning the reasons, force, and scope of the 
 amendment. It will he observed, however, that these state- 
 ments concerning the interpretation of Article HI are so 
 general in their nature as to furnish little certain warrant for 
 a precise definition of "intervention" at the present time. It 
 may be said, however, that, negatively at least, they are no 
 obstacle to adopting the broader meaning of "intervention" 
 now under discussion. 
 
 The report of the Secretary of War for 1901 contains 
 practically no information which would shed light upon the 
 present question in addition to that given in the Robinson 
 narrative. It contains the letter of February 9, 1901, sent 
 to Military Governor Wood and the despatch to Governor 
 Wood of April 3, 1901, which have already been quoted. 
 No comment is made on these instructions. 
 
 A request was made by the writer of this memorandum 
 to the Insular Bureau of the War Department for any record 
 which the Bureau might have either in regard to the confer- 
 ence between the commission of the Cuban convention and 
 the Secretary of War of April 25, 1901, or in general con- 
 cerning the War Department's interpretation of the terms of 
 Article III. The Insular Bureau reported that a search of 
 its records and of the records of the olficc of the Secretary 
 of War showed nothing in addition to the data hitherto set 
 forth obtained from other sources. 
 
 REPORT ON "CUBAN T.-VCl FK ATK ).\ ", i;V SECRETARY OF WAR 
 TAFT AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE BACON OF DE- 
 CEMBER I I, 1906. 
 
 The report described in the foregoing caption is one of 
 the action taken by the officers mentioned, under the direc- 
 tion of the President, in assisting to bring about peace in 
 Cuba during the period from the 14th of September to the
 
 28 
 
 13th of October, 1906, at which latter date the officers left 
 Cuba, the Provisional Government of Cuba having in the 
 meantime been established under the Piatt Amendment. 
 
 As apposite to the present question, reference may be 
 made to the following correspondence set forth on pages 445 
 to 446 of the report, which would seem to indicate that in 
 the minds of the writers there mioht be under Article III 
 various kinds of " intervention ". 
 
 "Department of State, 
 
 "" Washingtoji^ September 10, igo6. 
 "Steinhart, Habana: 
 
 "Your cable received. Two ships have been sent, due to 
 arrive Wednesday. The President directs me to state that per- 
 haps you do not yourself appreciate the reluctance with which 
 this country would intervene. President Palma should be 
 informed that in the public opinion here it would have a most 
 damaging effect for intervention to be undertaken until the 
 Cuban Government has exhausted every effort in a serious 
 attempt to put down the insurrection and has made this fact 
 evident to the world. At present the impression certainly 
 would be that there was no real popular support of the 
 Cuban Government or else that the Government was 
 hopelessly weak. As conditions at-e at this motnent tve are not pre- 
 pared to say what shape the intervention should take. It is, of course, 
 a very serious thing to undertake forcible intervention, and before going 
 into it we should have to be absolutely certain of the equities of the case 
 and of the needs of the situation. Meanwhile we assume that every 
 effort is being made b}' the Government to come to a working 
 agreement which will secure peace vviih the insurrectos, pro- 
 vided they are unable to hold their own with them in the field. 
 Until such efforts have been made we are not prepared to con- 
 sider the question of intervention at all. 
 
 " Bacon, Acting Secretary." 
 
 "Department of State, 
 
 ''September 11, igo6. 
 " Steinhart, 
 
 ''American Consul- General, Habana: 
 
 " Your letter of Septetnber jfh has had the careful consideration of 
 the President, who, for your private information, believes actual, imme- 
 diate intervention to be out of the question. We are considering, 
 however, and would like your opinion, as to whether or not to
 
 send a word of emphatic warning as to the certainty that inter- 
 vention will come in the end unless the people of Cuba, for the 
 sake of their country, find some way to settle their difficulties, 
 irrespective of personalities, cease their contentions, and live in 
 peace. This you may convey confidentially to President Palma, 
 but not for publication. Vou will urge President Palma to use 
 in the most effective manner all the resources at his command 
 to quell the revolt. 
 
 "Bacon." 
 
 " Habana, September lo, igo6. 
 "Secretary of State, 
 ' ' Washington : 
 " Your cable received and directly cofnmunicated to the President, 
 who asks ships remain for a considerable time to give security 
 to foreigners in the island of Cuba, and says that he loill do as 
 much as possible 7vith his forces to put down insurrection, but if unable 
 to conquer or cotnpromise Cuban Congress will indicate kind of ititerven- 
 tion desirable. I appreciate reluctance on our part to intervene, 
 especially in view of Secretary Root's recent statements. Few, 
 however, understand Cuban situation and a less number are 
 able to appreciate the same. This is, of course, without any 
 reference to superior authority. Palma applied public funds in 
 public works and public education, but not in purchase war 
 material. Insurrectionists for a considerable time prepared for 
 present condition, hence Government's apparent weakness at 
 the commencement. Yesterday's defeat of rebels gives the 
 Government hope. Attempts useless from the start. 
 
 " S T e 1 N H A R T , Consul- General. ' ' 
 
 Reference in this same connection mav also be made to 
 the following extracts from an opinion of the Judge Advo- 
 cate General, dated September 15, 1906, concerning the 
 force and operation of Article III of the treaty, which ap- 
 pears at page 494 of the report : 
 
 "It is assumed, for purposes of discussion, that an insur- 
 rectionary movement has come into being in the island of 
 Cuba with which the Cuban Government is powerless to deal; 
 it is also assumed that the existence of such conditions has 
 become known to the President either as the result of his own 
 observations or of authoritative representations which have 
 been made to him, or upon the admission of the Government 
 of Cuba that it has exhausted its powers and is unable, by its
 
 30 
 
 own agencies and instrumentalities, to maintain order in the 
 island. 
 
 '* Upon the happening and tuUiUment of the conditions above 
 described the duty of intervention with a view to the establish- 
 ment and maintenance of public order will have accrued, /n 
 the execution of the interi'ention the first steps are or may be political 
 and advisory. The Goveriuiioit and people of the island may be offi- 
 cially notified of the power and duty of the Executive under the treaty^ 
 and negotiations may be undertaken with a view to the restoration of 
 order by pacific methods^ or by a resort to good offices, or by a compro- 
 mise, or a redress of grievances. J f these methods faiL however, the 
 next step in execution will consist in the issue of a proclamation by the 
 President calling upon all persons composing insurrectionary combina- 
 tions to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within a 
 specified number of days from the date of such proclamation." 
 
 As showing the same general trend of thought, reference 
 may also be made to a letter addressed to the Peace Com- 
 missioners by Alfredo Zeyas, representing the Cuban Liberal 
 party, concerning a peace proposal which had recently been 
 made. The pertinent part of the letter, for the present pur- 
 poses, reads as follows : 
 
 ' ' They [the Moderate party] knoio that President Roosevelt and the 
 American people wished to avoid armed intervention in Cuba, and they 
 proposed to force that intervention, their plans even going to 
 the extreme of provoking it by insurrectionary acts of their 
 guerillas and militia, by attacks on American detachments, and 
 by burning foreign property. We formally call your attention 
 to these plans, and you will remember that several days ago I 
 advised you of the possibility that deeds of this kind might be 
 committed in Cienfuegos. 
 
 '■^ Armed intervention would be for us, sincere friends of the 
 Atnericans but ardent friends of liberty and national dignity, a sad 
 event, though we may respect and accept it as a means, painful 
 to vou also, to attain the end we both desire.- For this reason 
 we earnestly beg you to try to avoid it, and that inasjnach as the 
 Piatt Amendmetit establishes neither the form nor extent of interven- 
 tion by your Government, it be limited so long as other occur- 
 rences do not determine more direct and efficacious action, to 
 order the institution of a provisional president designated in 
 the proclamation and empowered to act in accordance with the 
 law in all matters relating to administration; but such procla- 
 mation should likewise contain the necessary provisions that
 
 31 
 
 shall enable a gradual termination of the transitory period, and 
 such proclamation shall approach existing law in so far as may 
 be compatible, although ignoring the i)recepts of such laws 
 wherever necessary." 
 
 RECENT RESOLUTIONS IN CONGRESS. 
 
 An exaniinalion has been made of ihe discussion repoi ted 
 in ihe Congressional Record concerning a resolution and a bill 
 introduced by Senators Nelson and Bacon, respectively, on 
 June 8 and lo in regard to the pending Cuban disturbances. 
 This discussion, however, was found to be not helpful with 
 respect to the question under consideration. 
 
 Finally, reference may be made to the fact that recent 
 newspaper reports evidence a growing custom to speak of 
 "fiscal intervention" as distinguished from "military inter- 
 vention". For example, an article in the New York Amer- 
 ican, dated Habana, June 25, reads in part as follows: 
 
 " It is stated here that Washington is in possession of facts 
 concerning conditions here which demand both fiscal and military 
 intervention. "
 
 CASES OF MALADMINISTRATION OF CUBAN 
 
 FINANCE. 
 
 Improvident Concession Contracts. 
 
 The following- is a rough list of the principal cases of 
 maladministration of Cuban finance which have occurred or 
 been proposed during the Gomez administration. The list 
 does not purport to be a complete one of the class of cases 
 chosen, and, moreover, takes no account of the various minor 
 cases of the same nature which have from time to time been 
 reported by the American legation at Habana. The de- 
 scriptions of the projects are, of course, only of a very gen- 
 eral nature. The list includes pending projects, projects 
 which have been defeated, and projects which have gone 
 through. 
 
 I. PORTS IMPROVEMENT PROJECT. 
 
 This is a law which was rushed through the Cuban Con- 
 gress providing for the dredging and improving of Cuban 
 ports, whereby in return for work which has been estimated 
 would cost not over $12,500,000 the concessionary compan\' 
 is' given, for a period of 30 years, the right to collect all ton- 
 nage dues paid in Cuban ports at new advanced rates pro- 
 vided for in the bill. The present estimates of the annual 
 •revenue from this tax show it amounts to over $1,000,000, 
 which fio^ure will, of course, constant Iv increase with the 
 development of Cuban trade, and will greatly increase after 
 the opening of the Panama Canal. Upon the basis of the 
 present revenue the comj-tanx' will, at the vcrv latest, be 
 reimbursed for its work during half the life of the concession 
 and consequentlv will take all the revenues of the latter half 
 
 33
 
 34 
 
 of the concession as clear profit. There are other consider- 
 able sources of profit in the contract. The Department is 
 now endeavoring to have the contract amended and put upon 
 an equitable basis. 
 
 2. CAIBARIEN-NUEVITAS RAILWAV CONCESSION. 
 
 During tlie past year or so a number of railway projects 
 have been mooted under which the Cuban Government was 
 to give substantial assistance to companies or persons who 
 should undertake railway construction in Cuba, y\gainst 
 the Department's protest a bill was recently passed by the 
 Cuban Congress authorizing the construction of the Caiba- 
 rien-Nuevitas Railway under a subvention of about $10,000 
 per mile. It is said that this subvention will more than 
 suffice for the construction of the road. Consequently Cuba 
 is to pay for the road which will be owned and operated by 
 the concessionaire. It has been said, however, that the sub- 
 vention is not payable until about 191 7. 
 
 3. COMPULSORY IRRIGATION PROJECT. 
 
 In xA.pril, 191 1, a bill was introduced in the Cuban Con- 
 gress providing for a scheme of compulsory irrigation. The 
 work of installing an irrigation system, to cost about 
 $25,000,000, was to be let to a concessionary company. To 
 this company a concession was to be given for sixty years, 
 during the life of which it should have the right to collect 
 various taxes graded according to the kinds of crops raised 
 by the cultivators. As indicated by the title of the bill irri- 
 gation was to be compulsory. The Department instructed 
 the legation to register a protest against the bill as loosely 
 drawn, ill advised, and improvident. This bill appears to 
 have been shelved. Thereafter, a commission was appointed 
 to study the irrigation problem. Following upon this the 
 Department has had presented for its consideration a new 
 irrigation project which purports to solve the problem by 
 furnishing a cheap fuel to be used by irrigators in power 
 engines employed to pump water for irrigation from wells.
 
 35 
 
 4- PETROLKIM MONOPOLY PROJErT. 
 
 The hill indicated in the concluding portion of the pre- 
 ceding section is one recently introduced in the Cuhan Con- 
 gress giving the concessionary conipanx the right to import 
 crude petroleum and its dci^ivatives free of all import duties, 
 which duties at present are reported to amount to over 200 
 j)er cent ad valorem. This privilege of free import is granted 
 as an exclusive concession t(j the concessionary company and 
 gives it a practical monopol)' of the oil trade in Cuba. \w 
 return for this privilege the company is to install a storage 
 and distributing system for fuel oil (which system is said to 
 be necessary in order to make the use of oil fuel practicable 
 in Cuba), and agrees to sell to irrigators all (jil used as fuel 
 at cost. 
 
 The various drafts of the bill which have so far been 
 examined by the Department leave the impression that the 
 company will derive a handsome revenue from its concession. 
 In the drafts of the bill first submitted to the Department 
 the obligations of the concessionaire were so vaguely defined 
 as to leave it open to the concessionaire to furnish little or 
 no consideration for its privileges. The last draft submitted is 
 far from satisfactory in this respect. It is estimated that on 
 the basis of the present importations under the excessively 
 high duty, the company's annual profit would amount to at 
 least $400,000. 
 
 5. SANITATION AND PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT EXPENDITURES 
 FROM THE $16,000,000 SPEVER LOAN. 
 
 For some time past the Department has received com- 
 plaints from various contractors employed to do the work, 
 under the sanitation and public improvement contracts pro- 
 jected in connection with the $16,000,000 Spe^er loan to 
 the effect that they were unable to secure the payment of 
 current accounts and were ajiprehensive as to future pay- 
 ments because of theii information that the proceeds of the 
 loan, instead of being applied to the payment for work done 
 under the contracts, were being flittered awa\- to pay the
 
 36 
 
 salaries of a huge force of polilical personnel in the Cuban 
 Department of Public Works. The legation reported, for 
 example, with respect to the work of extending and improv- 
 ing the water supply of Habana, that of the $2,000,000 ap- 
 propriated for this item of improvement about $700,000 
 had been expended, of which latter sum half has gone to 
 pay personnel; or, in other words, that the personnel charge 
 has been 50 per cent rather than the 10 per cent originally 
 estimated. It is said that the monthly charge of the Depart- 
 ment of Public Works is about $40,000, and that if this 
 charge continues it will not be long before the loan proceeds 
 will be exhausted without the payment for the work origi- 
 nally contemplated. It has been reported that the Cuban 
 Government is desirous of floating a new loan of $1 1,000,000 
 to provide for the obligations of these contracts. 
 
 6. HEYDRICH CONCESSION FOR THE VENTO WATER WORKS. 
 
 In June, 191 1, the Department had occasion to consider 
 a bill introduced in the Cuban Congress granting to Alfredo 
 Heydrich a concession for the construction and operation of 
 the Vento Water Works, a part of the proposed Habana 
 water-works .system. The bill appeared to be ill-advised and 
 improvident. It was alleged that the annual profit to the con- 
 cessionaire, the total expenditure called for being $2,000,000, 
 would amount to $835,000. The legation protested and the 
 bill did not fjo throui^^h. 
 
 7. PAULA WHARVES CONCESSION. 
 
 In December, 1910, the Cuban Government entered into 
 an arrangement with the United Railways Co. of Habana 
 whereby it transferred the "Arsenal" water-front property 
 owned by fhe Government in exchange for the " Villanueva" 
 property owned by the comj)any. Since, under the assessed 
 valuations of the two properties, the "Arsenal" property was 
 valued at $1,500,000 more than the "\^illanueva" property, it 
 was stipulated that the company should pay for certain i)ul)lic 
 improvements for the city of Habana, among which were
 
 three slccl and concrete piers and warehouses on the site of 
 the old Paula wharves. Recently it was reported that Presi- 
 dent Gomez had issued a decree grantin^j^ a concession for 
 the operation of these wharves to one Leopoldo Autran, a 
 customhouse broker, who was said to be a "dummy" for 
 other interests. The one consideration moving from the 
 concessionaire was his agreement to defray the charges of 
 maintenance of the wharves during the life of the concession, 
 which was 30 years. I-*rotest by the legation, coujjled with 
 the pressure of local public opinion, resulted in the cancella- 
 tion of the decree. 
 
 8. RODRIGUEZ HANK-NOTE CONTRACT. 
 
 Last summer the Department received a complaint from 
 the American Bank-Note Company, which then had the 
 contract for printing Cuban revenue stamps, that it had been 
 approached by a person said to be near the President of 
 Cuba with a proposition to pay to this individual for his 
 principals a substantial sum in consideration of the renewal 
 of the company's expiring contract. This was accompanied 
 by a threat to place the contract elsewhere if this sum were 
 not given. Subsequently the contract was given without 
 any public bidding to one "Pote" Rodriguez, the printer of 
 the Cuban lottery tickets, who was claimed to have entirely 
 inadequate facilities for executing the work in question. 
 
 9. PURCHASE OF MILITARY TRAINING GROUND. 
 
 The legation recently reported that a deal had been 
 brought to its attention in which one Barlow had engaged 
 with President Gomez to sell to Cuba land needed for a 
 military training ground valued at $200,000 for the price of 
 $350,000. It was said that this deal was not consummated 
 because interference from "Washington" was apprehended. 
 
 10. ZAPATA MARSH CONCESSION, 
 
 Very recently the legation has reported that a concession 
 is proposed whereby the privilege of exploitation of the
 
 38 
 
 Zapata marsh, a territory of i,ooo square miles principally 
 public land, is to be given in perpetuity to private interests. 
 This is said to he a "reclamation" project. It is reported by 
 the legation, however, that the object of the concession is to 
 give to the concessionaire the privilege of exploiting the 
 very valuable timber on the land and the material used in the 
 manufacture of charcoal, the universal cooking fuel in Cuba. 
 In addition to the loss of the timber the Government would 
 lose by the concession what is said to be a present consider- 
 able revenue derived from permits for the taking of charcoal 
 material. The alleged consideration moving from the con- 
 cessionaire is its undertaking to drain and reclaim the land. 
 It is reported, however, that as the concession is drafted the 
 concessionaire may freely avail itself of the benefits of the 
 concession while failing with impunity to perform any of its 
 "obligations".
 
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