LIBRARY OF THK UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. OK Received Accession No . . 189"^. Class No. 4 FOR GENERAL READERS How to Get Good Judges A STUDY OF THE DEFECTS OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF THE STATES b WITH A PLAN FOR A SCIENTIFIC JUDICIAL SYSTEM BY JOHN A. WRIGHT Member of the Committee of the San Francisco Bar Association on the Judiciary VBRSITT SAN FRANCISCO: S. darson Company publtabers 1802. COPYRIGHT, 1892, BY JOHN A. WRIGHT, SAN FRANCISCO. " The object of the profession of the law, of jurisprudence seen on its PRACTICAL side, is not so much that the" law be discovered and made known, as that it be applied and obeyed." PROFESSOR LORIMER. HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. POPULAR DISTRUST OF THE JUDICIARY ITS NATURE AND CAUSES. No honest and sensible man who reads the newspapers and converses with his fellows can deny that a large class of people throughout the United States entertains a growing distrust of our judges and judicial systems. This dis- trust prevails, undoubtedly, to a greater extent in some States than in others, and among some classes more than among others. It exists side by side with the utmost respect for the charac- ter and attainments of particular courts and particular judges. Sometimes it appears in some old State, and is attributed to special and passing conditions ; sometimes it appears in HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. some new State, and is said to be the natural result of crude conditions and heterogeneous society. At an early period in California, the scorn of the judiciary and judicial methods, as means to beneficial ends, was so great among the best classes in the community that the Vig- ilance Committee arose to do lawless justice ; many years later, in Louisiana, a similar men- tal attitude on the part of the people provoked a disgraceful, though perhaps unavoidable, mas- sacre. In almost every State of the West and South, during the long time between the pe- riod of the California Vigilance Committee and that of the New Orleans Committee, there have been lynchings innumerable, because neither the judicial system nor the judges were trusted. For full forty years the same political disease has in some form appeared in almost every State in the Union, and we are apparently no nearer its cure to-day than when it first horri- fied Americans. Recently, in New York, cer- tain judges were forced by operation of law to confess that they had bought their nomina- tions. Some form of distrust surely arises against them. Are we to go on forever so far distrusting our judges and judicial systems that HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. we must on occasion seek relief in murder, massacre, and riot ? Some recent manifestations of the distrustful attitude of the public mind towards the judici- ary in the State of California have prompted the publication of this essay. For so long as feeling has not taken the. form of violence, there seems some hope that the suggestions here offered will be patiently and attentively examined with a view toward their adoption, if apparently practicable. Indeed I have noticed, (or thought I had), evidence that the remedies which I shall propose were at last dimly dis- cerned by some honest and thoughtful minds in Louisiana, and this gives me further hope that they will be somewhere weighed with care. Moreover, the marvelous strides which scien- tific methods to reform the ballot and the civil service have made in the minds of all classes, still farther encourage me to offer a proposal for the reformation of the most important branch of our State governments by means which will be found to be in their nature born of the political ideas and aspirations that gave birth to the Australian ballot system, the mod- ern notions of a proper civil service, and the American system of free public schools. 5* 17 B RSI T 7 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. For the benefit of such readers as may not be familiar with the recent events in the State of California, as well as for the purpose of pointing to the primary grounds for public dis- trust of the judges, I shall open with a brief statement of recent occurrences in California, " \ confining myself, however, exclusively to the manifestations of distrust contained in thosq occurrences. The grounds of distrust are fun- damentally the same everywhere as in Cali- fornia, but California at this time happens to offer especially clear evidence of the sources of disease. With slight variations the remedies must be the same if the disease is the same. A great public question recently arose out of the action of one of the judges of our Superior Court in undertaking to impanel a Grand Jury for the city of San Francisco by means of an elisor, without the intervention of the Sheriff. Rumors had filled the air that the State Legis- lature and the Municipal Boards were corrupt, root and branch were, indeed, but organized bands of public plunderers existing for years under the leadership of political bosses of the most degraded and skillful type. The judge referred to assembled and swore in a body of HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. citizens as a Grand Jury, who immediately is- sued subpoenas summoning several persons as witnesses, who were said to have some knowl- edge of corruption in public place. One of these witnesses refused to obey the subpoena on the ground that the Grand Jury was not regularly organized. He was brought up for contempt before the judge who formed the jury, and convicted. But immediately another judge of the same Court issued a writ of habeas cor- pus, reviewed the commitment, declared the Grand Jury unlawful, and released the pris- oner. Then there was assembled a public meet- ing which denounced in unmeasured terms the judge who released the prisoner, ascribing to him base subservience to the mandates of a faction said to be interested in thwarting the inquiry of the Grand Jury, with this reason for the subservience added: That he owed his nom- ination and election to the faction. The spectacle of one judge of a Court reversing the act of an- other judge of the same Court without possess- ing appellate jurisdiction, was forcibly com- mented on. Another witness, summoned by the same Grand Jury, undertook to get the opinion of the Supreme Court (the highest Ap- 6 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. pellate Court) on the legality of the Grand Jury, in order to set the matter at rest. Ac- cordingly, he refused to obey, was committed for contempt, but sued out a writ of habeas cor- pus from the Supreme Court, and not from an- other judge of the lower Court. The Supreme Court held the summons lawful and the com- mitment authorized. The public press then teemed with explanations and illustrations of the rebuke, presumed to be implied in this action of the Supreme Court, to the judge who released the first recalcitrant witness. The Grand Jury proceeded with its work, and in due time found an indictment against a mem- ber of the late Legislature for corruption in office. The indicted legislator immediately ap- plied to the Supreme Court for a writ of pro- hibition, to prevent any trial from taking place in the Court below, on the ground that the Grand Jury had been unlawfully summoned, and therefore could not indict him. His ap- plication was argued in the Supreme Court most elaborately by counsel on both sides, and submitted for decision. While it was under consideration, the newspaper press cajoled and threatened the Court in a manner that I am HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. certain was never before witnessed in a civil- ized community. Undoubtedly, all the " cor- rupt influences " of the State were opposed to the existence of the Grand Jury, but in sup- port of the cause of " honesty," the newspapers who espoused that side did not hesitate to threaten the judges with the election of a Leg- islature that would summarily remove them from office if they decided in favor of the point raised by the prisoner. The same newspapers insinuated that some of the judges were offered (by interests opposed to the Grand Jury and its work) appointments on the vacant Federal Bench, and warned the judges not to swallow the bait. The whole tone of the newspaper press expressed the idea that the several judges of the Supreme Court were creatures of politi- cal faction, hoping for promotion only through subserviency to the powers that created them. A majority of the Court sustained the law point made on behalf of the prisoner ; the Grand Jury was declared unlawful, and he was discharged. Then, again, the press attacked the Court more fiercely and bitterly than ever, and again the key-note of the attack was a ref- erence to the methods and men, by means of 8 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. which the several judges were nominated. Finally, the judge of the lower Court, whose action had been reviewed and reversed, assem- bled the unlawful Grand Jury, and from the Bench pronounced to them a carefully pre- pared opinion, criticizing and controverting the reasoning of the Supreme Court. This action was pronounced heroic by one section of the press, and by another demagogic and subversive of all ideas of judicial decorum and good government. It is not to the purpose to ask, what in real- ity are the characters of those men who in California have been so fiercely assailed ? The vilest scandals have been circulated from time to time against so many other judges in Cali- fornia, both by public gossip and public print, without an effective demand from any source, either for punishment or vindication ; the judges are changed so often, and old scandals are so readily forgotten by the public when new ones appear, that public opinion has be- come contemptible in the eyes of honest and dishonest judges alike. The very judge who impaneled and supported this Grand Jury, and who at the end of the litigation was on the HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 9 topmost wave of popular esteem, only a few months before he impaneled the Grand Jury was himself the object of a newspaper attack, if possible more virulent and scandalous than that made on the abused Court that disbanded his Grand Jury. An honorable man who fully appreciates the lofty nature of judicial func- tions will shrink from ascribing to any judge, without the most convincing evidence, a design to shape his decisions so as to win favor with the people. as utterly as he would shrink from ascribing to any judge, a design to win the favor of a clique: for " popularity " or "un- popularity," whether with a large class or with a small class, is. if it influences a judge, as much a bribe to him as money. It is far from my purpose to make mean insinuations against, or institute invidious comparisons between any of the judges to whom I have alluded. I ascribe no reasons for their decisions except those given in their official opinions. I desire to point out merely, that, from time to time, all shades of opinion, respecting the conduct of all the judges indifferently, were indulged in with readiness, except the opinion that they would of necessity be governed by their judi- 10 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. cial oaths, indifferent to public or private favor, and competent to arrive at correct conclusions. Many of them I know ( and doubtless others of them whoni I do not know ) enjoy in their private circles the highest respect and admira- tion of a large number of honorable men and women ; and, humanly speaking, the insight into the character and motives of a man which is obtained by his personal acquaintances is the best knowledge we can obtain of him. I am not dealing with their private characters, but with the fact that from time to time the press and other influences have made it ap- pear, and honest people have believed, whether justly or unjustly, that those judges have been governed in their official action either by the basest bias towards and subordination to the corrupt ends of great corporations, factions, and private interests, or by the equally base purpose of winning popularity or avoiding un- popularity with the masses. Nor do I intend to argue, as many worthy X and all unworthy ) lawyers argue, that the reputations of our courts and judges have suf- fered merely because the press is wantonly licentious or moved by vicious lust of money HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 11 and political power. The assertion is made idly when it is not knowingly false. Were our judicial system as vigorous and well adapted to fulfil its functions as is our press, not alone would the reputations of our courts and judges be unassailable, but there could exist no licen- tious use of free speech. Any judicial system is demonstrated to be rotten, or at least in- effectual, if we assert that a vicious press has power to blast the reputations of the courts. One of the very foremost purposes of a judi- cial system is to protect reputations those of its own officers included. If it be a healthy judicial system, it will accomplish this purpose by creating and fostering in its members wor- thiness palpable to all men ; if it be an un- healthy system, it will aim rather to -suppress criticism. The truth is, the rude vigor with which the press asserts and exercises the func- tion of criticizing the judicial system to the peo- ple, and the weakness with which the judicial system sustains the attack before the people, demonstrates in the highest degree the value of free, and, on occasion, of very free speech. The weak spot is pointed out, and though nau- seous medicine is administered, with the bless- 12 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. ing of Providence, it may prove the means to a cure. We know that all these courts were consti- tuted, and all these judges elected, by meth- ods prescribed by the people, not carelessly or indifferently, but with the most jealous and scrupulous regard on the part of the peo- ple for their own interests. We know that every effort has been made to keep the courts and judges in " touch with the people," and to prevent them from becoming tyrannous, auto- cratic, aristocratic, "bureaucratic, or anything else ghost-like and horrible to the popular imagination. Salaries are kept low that the judges may not have proud stomachs ; term of office is made short in order that they may un- derstand that they are servants who must earn the approval of their masters, and solicit re- employment as a grace and a favor, not in any degree as a right earned. Yet, notwithstand- ing all the devices and desires of the people, notwithstanding they reserve strict control, they have not succeeded in getting courts or judges in whom they place that confidence that a master should have in his chief em- ployees. HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 13 And we know ; or at least we may fairly assume, that some high-minded men on the Bench have suffered or may suffer obloquy for the faults of base men and a base system : for trial by newspaper or public gossip is not adapted to the purpose of reaching nicely ac- curate conclusions. And we know that suspi- cious and ungenerous masters have no right to find trusty and faithful servants. Can judges who may be one day on the summit of " popu- larity " and another day in the depths of " un- popularity " administer real, impartial, God- given justice between man and man for any long space? Must they not sometimes be tempt- ed to suit their decisions so as to win favor and obtain promotion from the people or from some one else ? If many of them yield to such temptation, or if even we suspect them to yield, are they to us any longer judges ? Are they not rather mere political hirelings ? And should we not better at once discard the pre- tense that we have any judicial system what- ever ? Do we not present a pitiful, nay, contemp- tible, aspect to humanity ? This government is part of ourselves. And if we are afflicted 14 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. with a loathsome disease, should we make an exhibition to the world of our sores ? If we proclaim to humanity that we are incompetent to create efficient tribunals, or to select just judges, how can we hope to be respected ? How can we expect our children to grow up with love of country, or regard for morality ? If a government can secure to us neither prop- erty nor honor, how long shall we endure it ? And though we may be willing to live our lives in cowardly suspicion and distrust of those to whom we commit the sacred trust of adminis- tering justice, shall not a better generation arise to destroy a system of government that debases the soul of man ? Let us look the facts plainly in the face. We cannot go on forever distrusting our judges. If the day is not approaching when we shall put faith in the impartiality of our tribunals, the day is approaching when an end will be put to our present form of civil society. I dare not think that Republican institutions on the American continent are doomed to die of corruption. But I do think it is high time that something was done to restore confidence in our institutions, and I am certain that until HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 15 we shall establish a judicial system possessing the utmost confidence and respect of the people, we cannot make a sure step toward any other substantial improvement in government. That absolute confidence in the ability and integrity of the law officers of the State would go far toward preventing corruption and mal- administration in all branches of the govern- ment nay, would almost entirely reform the government is a proposition which will com- mend itself to any one who comprehends the mighty influence which the law officers of the State have upon the government. The object of this essay is to suggest means of creating and justifying confidence in the law officers of the government. - / And I think it must be apparent that at the bottom of our distrust in our Courts and judges lie the facts that under our present system the great corporations and private interests of the State, the corrupt politicians, their retainers and patrons, are the persons by ivhom our judges are principally nominated and elected, and that we have no adequate means of disciplining or vindi- cating our judges when their reputations are as- sailed. fuNI7BRSITr] 16 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. So long as any method of selecting the judges is employed that is palpably amenable to po- litical influences of a low order, so long shall we necessarily feel this distrust. For this reason a system of selecting the judges by appoint- ment of the Governor, with or without the con- sent of the Legislature, would only be a shade better than the present system. Governors, as well as political conventions, may be influenced in their choice by unworthy motives and are 110 more competent to select the best men. Therefore, some system of selection radically different from any yet tried ; some system adapted in a more scientific manner than any that has hitherto been suggested to the task of obtaining the best men for the place, must be found and put in practice before we shall feel that perfect trust in the impartiality of our judges so essential to our self-respect and pros- perity as an organized community. But there is another ground for the dimin- ished public respect for our high tribunals. During the past forty years the law Courts throughout the United States have steadily be- come less capable of satisfactorily dispatching HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 17 business. Never at any period in the history of the race has justice been more unconscion- ably delayed. Yet, during these forty years of decadence in businesslike efficiency on the part of our Courts, a steady and marvelous growth of that very ability which the Courts lack has created and fostered" gigantic corpora- tions, private fortunes and enormous enter- prises of all kinds. There is no comparison between the efficiency for its ends of the great- est Court of many a great State, and the effi- ciency for its ends of a Board of Directors of many a corporation under the ostensible juris- diction of the State. Until the Courts are on a par with private organizations in capacity for work ; until litigation is promptly and efficient- ly dispatched, public respect for our tribunals will not be what it should be. The causes of this business inefficiency of our judicial system are not many nor far to seek. The chief cause is, that during these forty years, the talent and industry that should have been engaged on the bench and in the administrative law offices, in developing the science of jurisprudence for the benefit of the whole people, have been attracted by greater 18 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. rewards to the support of the private interests I have alluded to ; have been repelled from the public service by State parsimony and public distrust. Of course, there are exceptions to this gener- alization. Sometimes a State offers its judges compensation and security of tenure of office somewhat approaching in value the rewards of private practice; then admiration for the func- tions of judicial office-^ which, thank heaven, is still ingrained in lawyers attracts occa- sionally a thoroughly able man to the service of the State. But the number of such men (in most of the States) is insufficient to accom- plish any great result, and is inconsiderable compared to the number of able men remain- ing at the bar in the service of great private interests. Now, in order to accomplish any- thing in the way of substantial law reform, the Bench and the administrative law officers of the State, as a class, should be markedly superior in experience and capacity to the remainder of the bar as a class. It must be evident that so long as better work is done in waging litigation at the bar than is done by the Bench in terminating litigation, the mass HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 19 of law suits will grow. While judges are gen- erally inferior in capacity to the lawyers em- ployed by private interests, public interests are necessarily delayed and thwarted. No reform in mere procedure can prevent it. That at present the general effectiveness of the lawyers who serve great private interests is markedly greater than the general effectiveness of the lawyers in the public service, cannot be questioned. Shall we wonder, then, that the efforts of the former class must slowly, inter- mittently, imperceptibly, perhaps, but still steadily prevail in all minor conflicts between public policy and private interests ? Let us ask ourselves a courageous ques- tion : If this tendency to general combination between persons of great wealth, persons of great business capacity and persons of great legal attainments be not arrested or counter- balanced what shall come to the " plain people of the United States " ? Class government or ? " The monopolies have the best lawyers; the State can only now and then get other than second-rate men." Such is and has been for a long time the universal observation. But 20 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. are not the causes obvious ? " The monopo- lies " offer the greatest careers that professional attainments can reach in the life of an Ameri- can lawyer to-day; and ability alone is the pass- port to these careers. The monopolies ask for the utmost loyalty and the best efforts of the men who serve them, but they offer in ex- change wealth, social consideration, relief from anxiety; thus they keep the minds of those they employ free for and encouraged to the utmost exertion. But the State offers no career at all comparable to this; its service attracts few men of eminent ability, seriously sensible of the responsibilities they owe to themselves and their families. Nor is capacity alone the passport to the State's service, but the favor of politicians. Offices that call for the noblest qualities of the human mind must be sought through the paths of low political intrigue ; and the reward offered to a lofty mind for this abasement is a stinted compen- sation, an insecure tenure no provision for growing domestic necessities, no provision for old age, not even public confidence. How can we expect dispatch of business and independ- ence of conduct on the part of our judges if JU7BESITYJ HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 21 the only stimulus we offer them consists of such nice problems as how to make ends meet at home, how to secure a re-nomination and how to account for the " luck " of men who " amass fortunes at the bar in doing work of the same character " (if not the same quality) " for which men on the beneh are rewarded with anxiety and humiliation " ? 22 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. II. GENERAL NATURE OF THE REMEDIES. The general nature of the remedies to be applied to this state of things is sufficiently obvious, but the means of applying the reme- dies could only be discovered by diligent thought and observation. I believe, however, that those means are now within our reach, though I fear we may not have the courage to adopt them. I do not mean to say we can weed the bench, the law offices of the State, and the bar, at once, and by a single act, of all incompetent and unworthy persons. The weeds, through a long course of stupid neglect, have been allowed to grow to surpassing luxu- riance ; but I do confidently submit that a system can be devised on lines that will, in time, accomplish the results we have in view, so far as those results are attainable outside of Paradise. In general terms we must aim : HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 23 1st. To make a career in the service of the State more attractive to lawyers than any career at the bar ; 2nd. To make entrance to the legal service of the State, as far as possible, unattainable by any but the most suitable men at the bar ; 3rd. To make dismissal from the service of the State certain to follow misconduct ; and, 4th. To elevate the character and capacity of the entire bar. These ends cannot be reached in a day, nor yet in a year under any system. Under the present system they never can be reached. And I do not lose sight of the fact that what- ever system be devised it must work with and upon the material we now have at the bar and on the Bench, good, bad or indifferent as that material may be. Common sense points out that (except, per- haps, in the City of New York, where the judges receive salaries of $17,500 a year) the first thing to be done toward reaching our end is to exercise more liberality ; to increase largely the salaries of the judges ; to increase considerably the salaries of all other law offi- cers, and to make tenure of office dependent 24 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. on good behavior. Able lawyers will then turn their attention to the public service. If the people want the best lawyers in their service and we know that the want is urgent then the people must outbid the u mo- nopolists " in competition for such men. The people are the greatest and the richest corpora- tion within the limits of the State. Why should they hesitate ? How long can they be powerful if their rivals or enemies possess the services of the ablest men in the community ? What would any one say of the good sense of a commercial or manufacturing house possessed of practically unlimited capital, and engaged in a most important, extensive and compli- cated business, that nevertheless refused to pay its most indispensable employees what they are offered by rival houses of small im- portance ? Lest I should be misunderstood in respect to the extent of the emoluments that a State should offer, I assert that on moral grounds quite apart from any grounds of expediency the salary of a Justice of the Highest Appellate Court should not be less than the salary of the highest paid official in any private corporation HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 25 in the State, and the respective salaries of the Judges of the Superior Courts should be pro- portionately dignified. There is no Court in the State, above that of Justice of the Peace, that does not administer affairs, merely finan- cial, of quite as much importance as the affairs of many corporations, and, that does not re- quire of its presiding magistrate, for the prop- er discharge of his duty, higher mental and moral qualities than any private business, however extensive. Consider the enormous financial interests finally disposed of by the Supreme Appellate Courts every year and the enormous fortunes that pass through the Pro- bate Courts. But, apart from the merely financial importance of the work done by our Courts, no bank or railroad corporation affects the rights, morals and growth of the whole people of the State to half the extent that one Court does. To obtain the best men for our Courts is a moral duty ; it is no less a moral duty' to offer them commensurate reward. If it is worth while for the stockholders of Wells, Fargo & Co. and the California Bank to offer their respective presidents salaries of $15,000 or $20,000 a year, how much is worth the while 26 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. of the people of the great State of California to offer their Chief Justice ? Even if the scale of salaries which I suggest be adopted, the best judicial salary would not be at all equal to the income of some of the leading lawyers to-day at the bar. But if ten- ure of office were made " during good behav- ior/ 7 with a provision for retirement at a cer- tain age like that granted by the Federal Gov- ernment, the service of the State would be attractive to almost every lawyer who leads at the bar, though to enter it might involve some financial sacrifice. Really high attain- ments in the profession of the law are rarely accompanied by absolute sordidness. A broad philosophical study of the law, successfully applied to the affairs of every day life (even under the lowering influences that now sur- round the profession) breeds nay, requires, generosity and honesty of spirit. If avarice and its accompanying vices are bred by the modern practice of the law in some men who would not otherwise fall, it is because the people by their fatal policy of penuriousness and absurd dread of " founding an aristo- cracy " allow profit and honor to be dispensed HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 27 solely by avaricious clients. And yet, finan- cial ease, reasonable provisions for a growing family, and reasonable security against old age and sickness, may be offered by the State with- out offering great fortunes. And honor may, likewise, be offered by the State without breed- ing the slightest aristocratic tendency, if the State will make the road to its service such an one as high minded and competent men may pursue. Having made the office of judge attractive, it becomes at once an object of desire as well to the unworthy as to the worthy ; consequently, without a system adequate to prevent the office from being captured by political methods, there would be little advantage in making it desir- able to worthy men. It is plain that merely to stimulate the desire of all classes of men at the bar to be judges or law officers of the State would not make it certain that the best and most suitable persons among those who enter- tained the desire would succeed in obtaining the coveted place. And while it is essential for the proper administration of law that every lawyer should, from the moment of entering 28 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. into his profession, look forward to a place upon the Bench as the highest reward which his professional life could reach, it would be a lamentable error if that ambition, so worthy in itself, could only be gratified by means of chicanery and intrigue. Not alone must^ de- sire to serve the State be stimulated in the best men, but the entire career of a lawyer should, so far as possible, be a continued train- ing for the worthy and efficient discharge of judicial functions. The bar should be so or- ganized that unworthiness would be equivalent to failure, would be almost invariably a pre- ventive to the highest success, while real merit would plainly appear to be the only road to fortune. " It is important, above all other things, to properly define and stimulate the moral character of the advocate the advocate considered in the spontaneity and intimacy of his actions, independently of his dealings with other people." The most essential qualities in a judge are precisely the most essential and rare qualities in an advocate. Probity, disin- terestedness, moderation and independence are as essential to a great lawyer as to a great judge. From plain virtues alone should power HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 29 come. Some ancient writer speaking on this subject has said, " one cannot be a perfect ad- vocate if one be not a good and honest man." So it becomes an essential part of any sys- tem that shall attempt to give us any approach to a perfect judiciary, not only that the system should offer adequate reward for worth and promote the growth of those qualities in mem- bers of the bar that produce good, great judges, but should be adequate to exclude unworthy persons from the judiciary put it beyond their reach. The problem of how to make entrance to the legal service of the State unattainable by any but the most suitable men at the bar neces- sarily involves the problem of how to elevate the character and capacity of the entire bar. But it is plain that to accomplish any marked elevation of the character and capacity of an entire class requires time and care, while in the meantime we must have judges and should have the best that the present material at our command affords. I have, therefore, aimed to provide a system which shall contain tempo- rary expedients tending to set in operation and promote the growth of the general scheme. 30 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. Adequate reward is the first essential, as I have pointed out. But measurably to prevent the offices in the judicial service of the State from falling to inefficient and untried men, as so often happens under the present system, I propose next to render every man ineligible to the Bench, until he shall have continuously practiced for at least ten years at the bar. I shall not stay to argue the question whether any man, whatever his talents, can be mature enough to administer properly the affairs of a court of record, without at least ten years' ex- perience at the bar. I content myself with pointing out, what no man can deny, that ten years' experience at the bar will at least be some training that may with advantage be undergone by the greatest " natural genius." But, above all, this requirement will be some immediate barrier against the capture of such offices by certain so-called lawyers who are really mere politicians; it will limit the choice of judicial candidates to persons whose char- acters have become somewhat well known; thus, though it is intended to form part of the gen- eral system which I propose, the immediate advantage of such provision, even under the present conditions of the bar, must be apparent. HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 31 This brings me to the heart of the system which I have in mind. How can we select from among those men at the bar, who have been ten years in practice, those best qualified to be our judges ? Can we devise some scheme by which, making allowance for human error, we shall get the best attainable men ? An examination of the faults inherent in the methods hitherto employed by us has led me to believe that such a scheme can be devised. The scheme which commends itself to me I shall endeavor to unfold as it developed itself in my mind. I shall first speak of the fault inherent in the method originally employed in the United States, viz.: appointment by the Executive. This method has apparently now produced in England judges whose probity is unquestioned by any class of the English people; but appar- ently the same method at one time produced utterly unworthy judges in England, while in the United States, after long trial, it was re- jected by the people of most of the States. I think the people of the United States were right in rejecting the method of appointing judges empolyed in the early history of the 32 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. republic. Governors and executive officers did not use the power entrusted to them wisely or well. But the early American method of appointment, and the early English method from which it was borrowed, were not in re- ality the same as the modern English method. The difference is this : While the early American governor and the English Crown had absolute power to select any member of the bar whom they chose to favor, the English Crown now has riot such absolute power. In England at the present day the bar practically chooses the judges. Constitutional methods in England, as every one knows, are largely matters of custom and precedent. Custom and precedent, there, have all, perhaps more than all, the force of our written constitutions. The British Crown cannot now appoint to ju- dicial place any but the leading members of the bar; and leadership at the bar is acquired only by the exhibition of those qualities of mind and morals that recommend themselves to the admiration of every member of the bar. One class of lawyers in England employs another class; employment is naturally given to those only who are competent ; competen- HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 33 cy naturally wins its way to extensive prac- tice and fame; and thus, while on the road upwards to place, the scrutiny of opponents and associates alike forms and establishes the character of the lawyer. Once at the head of his profession he becomes entitled, by a custom which has slowly grown to be now almost a part of the British constitution, to the next judicial place, and this right no government can deny him without danger. Thus, the British judges, though appointed by the gov- ernment, are no longer tyrannous partisans (as they once were), but are substantially the choice of the British bar. The system of ap- pointment by the executive never assumed this limitation in America; and, for this reason chiefly, the American system of appointment failed to give satisfaction to our democratic communities. The American people did not suffer, as the English people did, from judicial tyranny, but, with the jealous distrust of power that inheres in the nature of democracies, they saw that their judges were often appointed for other qualities than absolute merit and fitness, and they justly feared that the judicial power might some day be used to their serious det- 34 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. riment. They could not trust judges ap- pointed for political considerations. They could not always have governors honest enough to be above political influences. Moreover, no American governor, with rare exceptions, had a sufficiently extensive ac- quaintanceship with members of the bar and their methods of practice to enable him, how- ever honest his motive, to make the best choice. The people thought that they collect- ively were better capable of choosing their judges. So they took the power to themselves. But they have not been satisfied with the ex- periment. They have found themselves as frequently fooled and imposed upon as ever. The common sense of the matter would seem to be that it is essential to a proper system to provide some means of ascertaining scienti- fically what men are really worthy to be judges before proceeding either to appoint or elect judges. It will, of course, be understood that the British bar does not exercise or claim any right to choose the judges. It simply selects, or evolves, a certain number of persons for its upper rank. By force of long usage, it has HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 35 come to be obligatory on the Government to appoint one of this number only. The Gov- ernment cannot now appoint obscure or un- tried men, though it has a choice among sev- eral known to be competent. The British judiciary, as a whole, for many years, has had the confidence and respect of the British peo- ple. Exceptions, no doubt, can be found, but truly it must be said, that taken all in all, it is the most satisfactory judiciary in the world. I shall next speak of the system in vogue with us of nominating judges by partisan con- ventions ; but of this system I shall speak very briefly, because its defects must be already manifest. Traditional respect for the lofty nat- ure of judicial functions has somewhat re- strained these conventions from following their natural bent. For this reason we occasionally find conventions nominating candidates for ju- dicial office without regard to political expedi- ency or partisanship. But these cases are aber- rations. Nominating conventions, of the sort I refer to, require only time to exhibit their true nature. Very soon judges are selected, or seem to be selected, for political reasons, or even for less worthy reasons. But, conceding 36 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. to such bodies the utmost good faith, they are from their very nature totally incapable of testing or determining the fitness of lawyers for judicial place. They can neither possess the intimate acquaintance with the personality of the men, nor the accurate knowledge of the nature of the work to be done, that is essential to the exercise of an efficient choice. It sometimes happens that " Bar Associa- tions " recommend to nominating conventions or governors candidates for judicial place. As a rule, the persons so recommended are more suitable than those otherwise chosen, but this is by no means invariably the case, and there are several plain reasons why experiments in this direction have not succeeded as well as might be expected. The first reason is that owing to the inadequate salaries and short term of office offered by the State, only a com- paratively small, and generally unsuccessful class of practitioners can be found willing to be candidates ; hence the choice afforded to the association is limited not to the most suit- able but to the merely willing members of the bar. The most suitable men are absolutely ex- cluded from choice. Another reason is that HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 37 the system of voting for candidates generally in vogue within the " Bar Association " is not calculated to obtain the unbiased judgment of the individual members of the association. It is a system of canvassing, and electioneering, precisely similar to the system adopted by the political conventions, except- that, generally speaking, unworthy motives are not present in the minds of the friends of candidates. A system of this sort is wholly unfit to determine accurately what person stands highest in the regard of the several members. Each member is more or less biased or swayed by the advice or entreaty of some other member or class of members, and too often votes, not upon his personal knowledge, nor for his first and per- sonal choice, but upon the opinions of others, and for the choice of others. Moreover, Bar Associations, generally speaking, contain com- paratively few members of the whole bar, and thus not only is the choice of candidates of- fered to them meagre, and the method of vot- ing illy calculated to stimulate the individual independence and obtain the secret judgment of the members, but, by reason of the compar- atively small number of associates, the more 38 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. influential members have undue facilities for swaying the mass. I do not mean to be un- derstood as intimating that, even under such conditions, Bar Associations ever consciously recommend any candidate from unworthy mo- tives. I simply mean that they cannot select the best men at the bar ; that the stronger and more influential members have too great an influence to leave the choice of the Associa- tions entirely free, and that they produce, in consequence, no result on the judicial system other than to put on the Bench weaker men than those who remain at the bar. Finally, there is very little in the nature of the organizations tending to elevate their mem- bers above the rank and file of the profession, except what advantage may possibly be de- rived in manners from greater opportunities of social contact. These advantages, however, if they arise at all in any valuable degree, do not accrue to any persons outside the Association often constituting the larger part of the pro- fession. For Bar Associations are little more than social clubs. They have no powers de- rived from, or duties imposed by the State, and consequently share the fate of all men and HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 39 bodies who attempt to command without power to enforce obedience. They are apt to be de- spised by those whom they attempt to criticize, and in turn to feel a sense of their own insig- nificance, which is not encouraging to the growth of civism. Being powerless to stem the current of what they reprobate, the members retain, as their first and chief thought, the in- terests of the clients from whom chiefly they derive not only sustenance^ but what little of reputation can be obained in the practice of the law under existing conditions. In propor- tion as the association is small in numbers and its members eminent and able, so in propor- tion are they to be found in the employ of those classes who have withdrawn so largely the talent and capacity of the bar from the service of the State. If those classes dominate in the general affairs of the community, the independence of the Bar Association, even in respect to its utterances, is weakened in direct proportion to the domination. This is spe- cially noticeable in small communities of com- mercial activity, while it is not so observable in larger places, or in small communities where commercial activity is not great. Un- 40 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. doubtedly the New York Bar Association ob- tains much of its comparatively greater inde- pendence of character from, the very size of the community, the consequent isolation of the lawyers who compose it from each other, and the isolation, and comparative powerless- ness likewise, of individuals and interests that might dominate in a smaller place. But every- where the evils produced by our general judi- cial systems affect the esprit de corps and the conduct of our Bar Associations, though some- times in a less degree, always quite in the same way, that they affect the public spirit and disin- terestedness of the bar generally. To sum up, the Associations have no power to utter a sin- gle legal command, nor can they be compelled to exercise even the function of prosecution when the greatest public need demands it; they have no organization adequate to fulfil even the slender public tasks they fitfully assume; they can confer no reward for, nor even give any protection to the exercise of honest inde- pendence. They have thus necessarily failed to gratify all the hopes that prompted their formation, but they have nevertheless done a great work on the whole in keeping alive the HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 41 fires of high and suitable aspiration, and have demonstrated, by the trust which they have obtained in so many places, that the innate common sense of the people recognizes some- thing of their nature as essential to our judi- cial systems, and is ready to confer upon the bar, properly organized, sufficient power to attain its noblest ends. Let usrecall our object. Our object is to place the stronger and more influential men upon the Bench ; to deprive them of the un- due weight and power they now exercise for interests adverse to the interests of the general public ; to identify their interests and aspira- tions with the interests and aspirations of the entire people, and to elevate surely and per- manently the character and capacity of the entire Bar. I have intimated that the proper and most suitable persons for judicial place are such as should be selected or evolved for the purpose by a scientific system which will bring into action, if humanly possible, the freest, least biased, most disinterested and most intelli- gent choice of each and every member of the 42 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. whole bar. It seems to me that I need not argue that such a method is the true republi- can method of obtaining judges for a republi- can community. We have constant evidence that this is the opinion of the most intelligent, of our fellow-citizens outside of the legal pro- fession. When a judge goes wrong, or offends public judgment, lawyers as a class are re- proached, or called upon to take action. The public assumes that the legal profession should possess and exercise an influence in the selec- tion of judges, and at least a disciplinary pow- er over members of the bar. Common sense dictates that the best persons to estimate ex- cellence in any art, trade or calling are per- sons who follow that art, trade or calling. The judgment of painters upon painting; of musicians upon music; of architects upon ar- chitecture ; of mechanicians upon mechanics, was confessed by the populace in the days of Plato to be the best sort of judgment. Our peo- ple are not afraid to concede to their lawyers presumptive superiority in discerning their most excellent members. Still, it is not to be expected, nor would it be advisable, that the people shall relegate to the lawyers the power HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 43 of appointing the judges without control or choice on the part of the body of the people. The utmost that is necessary or advisable is to concede to the lawyers the power of selecting a number of persons from whom the people can safely choose, and whose characters and at- tainments, after being certified to by the law- yers, may be scrutinized by the people at large. When we reflect also that no government can exist without a judiciary, that this judiciary must necessarily be chosen exclusively from the lawyers, we perceive at once that the whole body of lawyers is in reality a part of the ju- dicial system of the State. But when the State grants to a citizen a license to practice law, it confers upon him under our present system a powerful privilege, without demand- ing from him the exercise of any civic duty in his capacity as a factor of the judicial arm of the government. It is this duty, necessarily resulting from and existing in a license to prac- tice law, that the people at large dimly per- ceive when they blame the body of lawyers for any fault in our judicial system. And as it is 44 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. essential to the proper exercise of those civic duties attaching to the profession of the law that the profession at large shall be given the power necessary for the purpose, we easily per- ceive not only that the lawyers should desig- nate those fit to be judges, but that the whole body of the lawyers should be organized for the purpose of making the choice and enforc- ing discipline. Many more reasons might be given by me in support of this fundamental idea, but I deem it better for the sake of brevity to state at once the outlines of the system of organiza- tion I propose, with the hope that the more re- flection is given to it, the deeper will grow con- viction that it has been in general accurately conceived. Of course, I do not mean to assert that improvements may not at once present themselves to many minds in the details of the system. Nor do I mean to say that in matter of detail, if the system is ever put in practice, experience may not demonstrate the advisabil- ity or necessity of some other changes. HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 45 III. OUTLINES OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM. to The general plan, underlying the system I propose, is that the bar shall, by the Constitu- tion of the State, be included within the ju- dicial system of the State, and the whole judi- cial system thus created shall be so organized that its functions shall serve: (A) to establish and maintain suitable qualifications for admis- sion to its several ranks; (B) to establish and maintain suitable discipline within its several ranks ; and (C) to naturally evolve a number of lawyers, proven to be fitted in character and attainments, for the judicial office, from whom the judges shall be chosen by the people. To render this general plan comformable to our ideas of government, I suggest details that are subsidiary to, and limit or aid the general plan. The most essential of these details are so designed : (D) that the bar shall not be permitted to assume an un-democratic or un- 46 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. American form ; and (E) that its best mem- bers shall be willing to become judges when chosen by the people. Other details, almost as essential, are likewise applied, viz.: (F) that while every citizen shall find wherever there is a free American High School adequate means of freely acquiring the necessary academic prep- aration for entrance upon the study of the law, and no citizen shall be excluded from the bar on account of fortuitous circumstances like race, color, poverty or number of persons already at the bar, nevertheless no person shall be able to finally enter the bar without adequate knowl- edge of the law and appreciation of the nature of the duties of a lawyer to himself, his clients and the State; (G) that while the system of en- forcing discipline at the bar shall be adequate to maintain a high standard of professional conduct, it shall not be so rigid as to destroy individual force of character; (H) that while the choice of candidates for the Bench shall be limited to those persons whose character and capacity are ascertained and certified by the bar, and while adequate means shall be adopted to secure the independence of the judiciary, there shall also be such ready means of enforc- HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 47 ing proper judicial conduct that popular clamor against the judiciary shall become equally un- necessary and disgraceful. I shall now state the outlines of such a system as I think sufficient for the accomplishment of the ends in view. Details shall be stated with special reference to conditions existing in the State of California, because I am more familiar at present with conditions in that State. But I must not be understood as attempting to em- ploy, at any place in this article, language suf- ficiently exact for actual employment in the laws I suggest. My design is only to suggest outlines and purposes, even where I appear to enter into details. It will be found, however, that with alterations, or special forms of legis- lation, that will readily suggest themselves, the general system can be adapted to the needs of every State; and I shall consequently leave to the reader the task of altering and suiting the method to his own ideas of statutory forms and the exigencies of any particular state. FIRST. The service of the State shall be made attractive as a career by suitable salaries, tenure of office during good behavior and retiring al- lowance. This is a condition without which the 48 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. best class of lawyers cannot be obtained for the Bench under any system, as I have already en- deavored to show. Provisions for the retirement of incapacitated judges and for the removal of unworthy judges will be stated hereafter. SECOND. The whole bar of the State shall be divided into sections or chapters, and each chapter shall be required to select, in the man- ner hereinafter stated, a Council of Juristic Discipline, which shall be convertible as here- after described, into a Court of Juristic Disci- pline. In general terms, the division of the bar into sections or chapters shall be so ar- ranged: (a) that the several members of each chapter shall be residents, or have offices with- in the same territorial district, so as to enable them to assemble when necessary, with as little inconvenience as possible; (b) that the number of members in each chapter shall be as nearly equal as possible; (c) that each chapter shall contain a sufficient number of lawyers to afford ample choice in selecting members for the Councils or Courts of Discipline. For example, the State of California may be conveniently di- vided for this purpose into five territorial dis- HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 49 tricts, each containing about as many lawyers as now practice in the City of San Francisco, and each district, chapter, or section of the bar will be large enough to elect an efficient Coun- cil or Court of Juristic Discipline containing as many members as there are judges of the Su- perior Courts of Record within the district. (It will be obvious that in some States in which there are large cities, it may not be necessary or advisable to found the chapters of the bar on territorial limitations merely. If the numerical strength of the bar be sufficiently great in a thickly populated district, more than one chap- ter may be established within such a district, and no obligation imposed upon the members of any chapter to reside in any particular part of the district. In other words, in such cases the chapters may be established upon maxi- mum and minimum limitations in point of numbers, and every lawyer in the district be associated by lot, or otherwise, with a particular chapter within the district. Details of this kind are not material.) THIRD. Each section or chapter shall be re- quired to assemble within its district, and elect from among those of its members who shall 50 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. have been practicing ten years and over, a Council (convertible into a Court) of Juristic Discipline. The number of persons constitut- ing this Council of Discipline shall, in Cali- forniai be about equal to the number of judges of the Superior Court within the district. The elections shall be by the Australian Ballot Sys- tem, that is to say: the clerk of the Supreme Court (who has custody of the roll of attorneys) shall be required to print a suitable number of ballots for each chapter, every ballot containing in alphabetical order the names of every lawyer of ten years' standing on the roll of the Court, and having an office within the district rele- gated to the chapter. Every duly admitted practitioner within the district (chapter) shall be entitled to vote for the whole number of members of the Council of Juristic Discipline, and the persons receiving the highest number of votes shall be declared elected, except as fol- lows: not more than one member of any co- partnership of lawyers shall ever, at the same time, be eligible to a seat in the Council ; and while the name of every lawyer of over ten years' standing must appear on the ballot, whether he be in co-partnership or not, if at an HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 51 election more than one member of a co-partner- ship shall appear to be chosen, only the member of the co-partnership who shall receive the highest number of votes, as between all the co- partners, shall be deemed elected, and the votes cast for the other members of the co-partner- ship shall be deemed to have been cast for him. (N. B. The provision against allowing more than one member of a co-partnership to belong to the council at the same time should be made permanent, to prevent the undue as- cendency of great firms ; but the method of limiting the choice to one member of a firm is intended only for the first elections. When organized, the chapters may be trusted to devise, if necessary, a better method within the lines of the Australian system.) The first meetings of these several chapters shall be presided over by one of the Justices of the Supreme Court appointed for the purpose by the Governor ; the president so appointed to have charge of the ballots, and be entrusted with the duty of conducting the election. This duty will, of course, include the duty of seeing that no one but regularly admitted prac- titioners having offices within the district be 52 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. allowed to vote ; that an oath be administered to each practitioner that he shall, without bias or any other motive than the public good, vote for those persons only as members of the Council of Discipline who, in his private opin- ion, are by character and attainments most worthy to perform the duties assigned to them as members of the Council of Discipline and thereafter to become judges. Provision shall be made empowering the president of these initial meetings to compel by fine, or by sus- pension from practice, the attendance and vote of each and every member of the bar within the district. The method of calling the meet- ings is non-essential ; but I deem requirements that the voting shall be by ballot ; that none but lawyers of ten years' standing shall be eligible to be members of the Council of Dis- cipline ; and that all the members of the chap- ter shall be required to vote, unless, of course, sick or absent from the State, essential for the proper working of the system. FOURTH. Whenever the term of office of any of the present judges of the Superior Court within any district is about to expire, the name of such judge with the names of all the HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 53 members of the Council of Juristic Discipline of the district shall be printed on the State ballot as candidates, from among whom the people at large may choose a new judge ; and no other person shall be eligible for the office. Of course, when a vacancy occurs on the Superior Bench by reason of -the death, volun- tary retirement, or removal from office of any of the present incumbents, only the names of the members of the Council of Juristic Disci- pline of the district shall be printed on the State ballot as candidates. And when a mem- ber of the Council of Juristic Discipline is elected judge, or dies, or is removed from the council for any cause, the vacancy in the coun- cil shall be immediately filled by the chapter at an election to be conducted on the Austral- ian ballot system, as provided in paragraph 3. As seen up to this point, the proposed sys- tem presents at least these points of advantage: (a) the Bench is made attractive to the ablest class of lawyers ; (b) no one but a lawyer of at least ten years' standing, or a judge already tested, can be elected to the Superior Bench. There is, moreover, little likelihood that com- 54 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. binations will be formed to promote unworthy men to the Bench. All the general arguments in favor of the Australian ballot system apply in support of the belief that the choice made by the chapters will be as good as is humanly possible under any democratic form of govern- ment so far as hitherto developed. Profes- sional jealousy will give added caution to each lawyer in casting his vote, for every man will desire to select only such men as will give him an equal chance with every one of 1iis brethren in a trial for breach of discipline. And no set of lawyers sufficiently numerous to elect a single member of the Disciplinary Council can expect to be always employed on the same side in every litigation in the ordinary Courts. They must anticipate that at some time in their professional career they may find themselves opponents of each other. Hence, every law- yer's interest is to secure not only impartial members of the Councils of Discipline, but members who are likely to be unbiased judges. Moreover, the people at large have the ultimate scrutiny of all the candidates for the Bench and the ultimate selection of the judge. I propose, however, to add another powerful HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 55 incentive to a careful choice by the bar. I pro- pose to confer upon those Councils of Juristic Discipline such weighty powers over each and every member of the profession as will not, from motives of self-preservation, be entrusted by the bar to any but its best men. h FIFTH. Every Council of Juristic Discipline shall be vested with power (1st) to issue licenses to practice law; (2nd) to hear and determine, as a Court, all charges of unprofessional conduct brought against members of the chapter; (3rd) to inflict disciplinary punishment for infrac- tions of professional ethics; and (4th) to exer- cise such other powers as may be conferred 011 it by the chapter, or by general convention of the bar, as hereafter provided. When sitting as a Court for the trial of a member of the bar, I propose that the Council shall be organized and conduct its proceedings somewhat after the manner of courts-martial; that is to say, that the number of members of the Council neces- sary to constitute a Court of Juristic Discipline shall be fixed; that the accused and the accuser shall have suitable rights of challenging the members of the Court for bias; that the votes of 56 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. the Court on the question submitted to it shall be kept secret; that the Court shall have power to issue subpoenas, punish for contempt, and so forth. Of course, to guard against arbitrary conduct there may be power reserved in the Supreme Court to restrain excess of jurisdiction by certiorari, etc. But details of all these mat- ters may be relegated to the care of the General Council of the bar hereafter described. As it is manifest that general provisions should be made of uniform application through- out the State for the qualifications of. persons applying for admission to the bar; for the offi- cers necessary to properly conduct the business of the chapters; for the organization of the councils into Courts of Juristic Discipline, and for procedure on trials for infraction of profes- sional ethics; and as it may be advisable, in the opinion of the bar, to confer other powers or duties of a disciplinary nature on these coun- cils, I propose an Assembly of all the Councils of the several chapters to be held at some par- ticular place in the State within a suitable period after the first election of the councils. SIXTH. All of the Councils of Discipline HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 57 elected by the various chapters of the bar shall be required to meet as one body within a cer- tain period after their election at some place within the State, and there enact a Code of Jur- istic Discipline: (A) Providing the course of study to be pur- sued by persons studying law outside of law schools; the times and places for the periodic examinations of students, as hereafter required; the method of registering law students, and the results of their periodic examinations on the books of the several chapters; and the ultimate qualifications for admission to the bar. (Cer- tain other matters pertaining to legal education shall be rigidly provided for by law, as here- after stated, without power in the General Council of the bar to interfere therewith.) (B) Denning the general duties 'of a lawyer; his duty toward his client; his duty toward his brother lawyers; his duty toward the judges; and his duty toward the State. ( C ) Providing, so far as may appear neces- sary, for a uniform constitution for the several chapters : that is to say, prescribing the neces- sary administrative officers with common pow- ers and duties ; common methods and times 58 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. for calling meetings of the members of the chapters ; and regulating all other matters in which it may appear advisable to preserve uni- formity in the business methods of the several chapters, but leaving to each chapter sufficient freedom to enact special by-laws suitable to its local ( or otherwise peculiar ) conditions. ( D ) Prescribing the penalties to be in- flicted by Courts of Juristic Discipline for un- professional conduct on the part of members of the bar. ( E ) Regulating the method of organizing the councils into Courts of Juristic Discipline for the trial of members of the bar, and the procedure on such trials. ( F ) Regulating the method of organizing the councils into Courts of Juristic Discipline for preliminary inquiries into charges affect- ing the conduct of judges, as hereinafter pro- vided, and the procedure on such inquiries. ( G ) Regulating the method of organizing the councils into Courts of Inquiry concerning the retirement of incapacitated judges, as here- inafter provided, and the procedure on such inquiries. The project of empowering this representa- HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 59 live body of lawyers to provide for certain details of legal education will probably meet with neither serious objection nor approval from the general reader. Nor will there be any serious objection to empowering this body to regulate the methods of organizing the vari- ous disciplinary courts spoken of, or the course of procedure at trials before those courts, pro- vided the advisability of having the courts as part of the judicial system of the State suffi- ciently appears. When the further details of the reform I propose are read, proper reflection can be given by the reader to all these matters. It will doubtless appear, however, to some minds, trivial to require an elaborate statement of ethical rights and duties in the practice of their profession, and a table of penalties for unprofessional conduct, to proceed from this body. To other minds, the objection will oc- cur that the Code of Civil Procedure of this State has already announced, with all the force of legislative enactment, the duties of attorneys and counselors, and no greater force would attach to a declaration of those duties proceed- ing from a representative body of lawyers than now attaches to the section of the Code of Pro- 60 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. eedure. Since these objections cannot suitably be considered elsewhere in this essay, a few words on these subjects may be pardoned here. That we must have some code or standard of ethics for the government of attorneys and counselors at law in the practice of their pro- fession cannot be gainsaid so long as there re- mains on the Statute-book such a section as Section 282 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For the benefit of lay readers of this essay, I reproduce here that section : " Section 282. It is the duty of an attorney " and counselor : " 1. To support the Constitution and laws " of the United States and of this State ; " 2. To maintain the respect due to courts "and judicial officers ; " 3. To counsel or maintain such actions, " proceedings, or defenses only as appear to " him legal or just, except the defense of a per- " son charged with a public offense ; " 4. To employ for the purpose of maintain- " ing the causes confided to him such means " only as are consistent with truth, and never " seek to mislead a judge, or any judicial offi- " cer by an artifice, or false statement of fact " or law ; HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 61 " 5. To maintain inviolate the confidence, " and at every peril to himself, to preserve the " secrets of his client ; " 6. To abstain from all offensive personal- " ity, and to advance no fact prejudicial to the " honor or reputation of a party or witness, " unless required by the jastice of the cause " with which he is charged ; " 7. Not to encourage the commencement " or continuance of an action or proceeding " from any corrupt motive of passion or in- " terest ; " 8. Never to reject, for any consideration " personal to himself, the cause of the defense- " less or the oppressed." If this section is carefully analyzed it will be seen that the Legislature imposes upon attor- neys and counselors many duties which, though absolutely essential to the proper and honest discharge of their functions, are habitually dis- regarded. This is principally because the con- ditions surrounding the practice of the law under our judicial system are such that the duty to the client almost obliterates every other sense of duty. The client's interests overween the State's interests, because the client possesses 62 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. and employs adequate means both of rewarding successful and punishing unsuccessful methods. The State, on the other hand, neither offers suitable rewards for observance of the duties of lawyers toward it, nor provides tribunals suit- able to examine cases of alleged infraction and punish delinquencies. The fact is undoubted that most of the provisions of Section 282 of the Code of Civil Procedure are habitually disre- garded by otherwise honorable lawyers, because most of the duties seem impossible to be strictly observed, under existing conditions, and hence are not binding on professional consciences. The only duty imposed by the State that is rarely disregarded, and when disregarded ever meets with adequate punishment, is the duty to the client. For while it is true that the Su- preme Court possesses the power of punishing lawyers for all breaches of professional ethics, it commonly moves against and punishes only cases of gross swindling or deception. I think I have never heard of a charge being made against a lawyer for failing to maintain the re- spect due to Courts and judicial officers, though I have often heard lawyers malign judges; nor have I heard of a charge of counseling an il- HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 63 legal or unjust action; or indulging in offensive personality; or of advancing unnecessarily facts prejudicial to the honor of a witness; or of en- couraging an action from a corrupt motive of passion or interest; yet, though I do not intend unnecessarily to disparage rny profession, if all the infractions of those duties that occur daily were brought to the attention of the Court for adjudication, it is not unlikely that the Court would have little time to spare for any work on the congested mass of litigation now before it. The Supreme Court is thus, obviously, not a tribunal adequate to preserve such discipline as the Legislature has enacted for the bar. I pro- pose to confer upon the bar itself the power to discipline its members. The English bar does this effectively through the Benchers of its Inns of Court. The French bar has always been effectively organized for its own govern- ment, and through all the revolutions and changes of society in France has maintained a very high standard of professional honor. It has always had similar bodies to the Councils of Discipline which I propose. Long ago these bodies formulated a thoroughly practical and elevating code of professional ethics (which is 64 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. little more than an elaboration of the duties of attorneys and counselors prescribed by our code) and provided different kinds of disciplin- ary punishment, viz.: " the Warning," "the Private Reprimand," " the Public Reprimand/' " Temporary Suspension from Practice," "Total Expulsion from the Profession." There is very little in the French code of professional ethics which is unsuited to our methods, and which might not be adopted by us with thoroughly good results. But even if we cannot expect our bar to be so rigid in its discipline, we can ob- tain from it, at least, a statement of some simple duties which it is willing to acknowledge. The voluntary statement of a duty is, to any set of men that ventures to state it, a substantial stim- ulus to the performance of the duty; and if there be a tribunal charged with the power of enforc- ing the performance of that duty, composed of the best men who have assisted in enunciating the duty, we shall have a still greater stimulus to its general performance. Supposing that the tone of our bar is now so low that it will only enunciate the simplest duties, still, from the ex- ercise of simple duties a knowledge and appre- ciation of the value of more refined duties will HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 65 in time arise. If it be not true that there is a subtler and more powerful compulsion to per- form a duty we have voluntarily assumed, and to obey tribunals we have ourselves constituted, than there is to perform duties and obey tri- bunals forcibly imposed upon us by others, then there is no ground for all bur hope in self- government. Self-government according to function is surely the complement of the ideas of national and local self-government. For these reasons, and others which space prevents me from elaborating, I propose to confer upon the bar power to discipline itself according to a code, and through officers of its own choice; and I propose to recruit our Bench from the most worthy members of a self-re- specting bar. This will superadd to our sys- tem the best feature of the modern English bar, viz.: its influence on the choice of judges, and the best feature of the French bar, viz.: its system of maintaining the integrity of its members. The English system evolves to the front rank the best and most honorable law- yers for the purpose of providing judges ; the French system, while it does not provide judges (for the French judges are not selected 66 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. from the bar, but are a special profession), still maintains admirably the integrity of its advo- cates. Granting the superior American tal- ent for self-government, the American system should be better than either. SEVENTH. The judges of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeals) shall be chosen by, and from among, the judges of the Superior Court (highest Court of original jurisdiction). When- ever a judge of the Supreme Court is to be elected, the name of the out-going judge (if there be one) shall be printed on a State ballot with the names of all the judges of the Super- ior Courts, in alphabetical order. This ballot shall be furnished in sufficient numbers to a general convocation of the judges of the Super- ior Courts, assembled for the purpose of elect- ing a person to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Bench. Each Superior Judge shall be entitled to two votes, one to be termed "[first choice/' and the other "second choice." The person receiving the highest number of votes to be declared elected. The classical origin of this method of vot- ing will be readily perceived. Each judge HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 67 may vote for himself for first choice, while all may unite on a Solon for second choice. Solon would be elected. It is best for many reasons that the judges of the high courts of original jurisdiction shall select the judges of the Supreme Appellate Courts. It often happens noV that the Appel- late Courts contain some judges of marked infe- riority to some of the judges of the lower courts. This is one great cause of uncertainty in the law, and plainly is not conducive to respect for the accuracy of ultimate judicial conclusions. If the members of the appellate tribunal are chosen by a method which implies an ac- knowledgment of their peculiar adaptability to the function and that implied acknowl- edgment is, moreover, made by the judicial officers whose supposed errors are to be exam- ined the judgments of such a tribunal must of necessity command the greatest weight. The most logical method of selecting the members of appellate tribunals, then, is by free vote of the judges over whom they are to sit. But, if a more " popular " system of election be pre- ferred, a similar result might be reached ( in a lesser degree ) by a law providing that no one 68 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. but a judge of the highest court of original jurisdiction shall be eligible for a seat in the Court of Appeals, and requiring that the names of all the judges of the lower court be printed on a State ballot, for choice by the body of the people. This latter method might, however, be a temptation to some judges to court " pop- ularity," or at least attach to those elected the suspicion of having courted " popularity," and, therefore, I much prefer the idea of having the judges of the lower courts select their superior officers. If militia men may select company officers, and those officers again may select field officers, it is not plain to me why a simi- lar method may not be followed in the judicial service of the State. I now proceed to the next general proposi- tions which relate to preparation for and ad- mission to the Bar : EIGHTH. No Court shall possess power to admit persons to the practice of the law, but instead, every Council of Juristic Discipline throughout the State shall appoint an Exami- ner of law students ; all the Examiners shall act together as a board, and be required to at- HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 69 tend, once in each year, within every district, for the purpose of examining all such persons as shall desire to enter upon and those who may be already pursuing the study of the law with the intention of becoming law practi- tioners. It shall be the duty of the Board of Examiners to strictly examine every person applying to be enrolled as a student at law in respect to his general educational qualifications and moral character. Every person applying to be enrolled as a law student, and who shall pass such an examination as is required for graduation at a free high school of the State, or for admission to a State university, shall be enrolled in the books of the chapter of the bar within whose district he intends to pursue his studies, and shall thereafter be examined every year, by the Board of Legal Education, in re- spect to his advancement in the course of study prescribed by the General Council of the bar, and a suitable record kept of his progress, unless he shall give proof that he is in regular attendance at some law school requiring an adequate course of study. No person pursuing his law studies outside of a law school shall be admitted to practice law until he shall have 70 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. pursued a course of five years' study and shall have successfully passed all the annual exami- nations. Every person, whether attending a law school or not, who shall enter upon the study of the law with the intention of becom- ing a practitioner, shall first be enrolled as a law student, with a statement of the method by which he intends to pursue his studies, on the books of the local Council of Juristic Dis- cipline, and shall be subject to such discipline as the council may enact. But no fees shall ever be required for enrollment, examination or admission to the bar, and no person shall ever be refused admission as a student, or as an attorney or counselor, on account of age, color, physical infirmity or number of persons already enrolled as students, attorneys or coun- selors. Every student, before final admission as attorney or counselor (whether he may have studied within or without a law school), shall be finally examined as to his qualifica- tions by the Board of Legal Education, who, if he shall satisfactorily acquit himself, must re- port the fact to the local Council of Juristic Discipline, and the council shall be required thereupon (unless he has been disciplined for HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 71 cause) to issue to him a license to practice law in all the Courts of the State. Thereupon, he shall be enrolled as a member of whatever chapter of the bar may exercise its functions within the district selected by him for com- mencing practice. The subject of legal education is a very large one, and I shall touch only upon such aspects of it as will serve to elucidate some of the ideas contained in the last preceding provisions. It is a singular fact that, though the legal profes- sion has never been jealous of the admission of new members, there yet grew up in the minds of the people of the United States, about the " Forties," an idea that the profession was exclusive and aristocratic. As a result, an em- inent member of the New York bar infected the popular mind many years ago with the vicious notion that every, one who chose to ap- ply should be permitted to practice law, be- cause ( he argued ) only those who were com- petent could succeed. While this notion is supported by the undoubted facts that a law- yer's work must always run the gauntlet of criticism and opposition, and that entirely in- competent men cannot make great successes, 72 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. more important facts, that in time demon- strated the falsity of the theory, were over- looked for many years. The law is not a pro- fession which can be followed by illiterate, in- competent, or dishonest men, without inflicting the gravest injuries not only upon clients, but also upon the entire body politic. While a man is demonstrating his special unfitiiess to be a lawyer (and perhaps making money in the process), he may ruin many a client, or in- troduce many a scandalous practice irretrieva- bly injurious to the reputation of legal methods in general. They found this out in New York after an interval of about twenty-five years, and recognized, almost too late, what would seem to be apparent at first sight, viz.: that the State owes the duty to itself and to its citizens that its license to practice law shall import that the individual to whom it is issued has given some evidence of adequate attainments. So the State of New York has, within the past ten years, begun to make some stringent re- quirements for admission to practice. California ( following the earliest crudities ) has, in order to provide its citizens with com- petent lawyers, made a futile enactment that HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 73 " every applicant for admission as attorney " and counselor must produce satisfactory tes- " timonials of good moral character, and un- " dergo a strict examination in open court " (I \ !) " as to his qualifications by the justices of the " Supreme Court," etc., and so disposes of the whole matter. With the best intentions in the world, our overworked judges cannot adequate- ly perform all that they know to be necessary and that is here impliedly required of them. Consequently, there are persons at the bar who must have obtained their " satisfactory testi- monials of good moral character " in a former state of existence, and who, if they ever under- went a " strict examination " in open court as to their professional qualifications, were on that lucky day gifted by Providence with a miracu- lous intellect " for the occasion only." This must be apparent to many judges before whom some of the practioners they created now ap- pear. So I conclude that a single examination of " testimonials of good moral character," and " qualifications in the law," however much the Legislature may require it to be strict, cannot give such assurance of capacity for the practice of the law as a probationary period of five 74 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. years, passed under watchful eyes, with power to discipline for unbecoming conduct, and with periodical examinations into the diligence, ca- pacity and advancement of the student. If a single strict " examination in open court" is advisable for the State's purposes, surely a yearly examination for five years will be more advantageous. True, some students may have greater minds than others and be prepared sooner for the work of life ; but such lucky men can afford to wait, for they will bring with them to the bar superior reputations. Moreover, the time of the Courts should be devoted to other work than this of examining students highly important though the work is. I propose, in view of its importance and the labor it involves, to have it performed in an- other and better way. And while I provide that no one who can attend and profit by the free public schools shall find the profession of the law closed to him for any undemocratic reason, I provide also that the State shall be as- sured that its license to practice law cannot be obtained by any one unfit to hold it. NINTH. The State shall pay reasonable sala- ries to the examiners to be appointed under this HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 75 system; it shall also pay traveling expenses and per diem allowances to the members of the General Council of Juristic Discipline, while in session, equal in amount to the allowances made to members of the Legislature; it shall also pay like per diem allowances to the members of every Court of Juristic Discipline for every day engaged in the actual hearing of trials. If I am right in hoping that the general sys- tem which I propose will in time elevate the character of the bench and bar, and will in time inspire public confidence in the administration of justice, surely no money can be better ex- pended by the State. Leaving out of view the inestimable value of an increased self-respect as Americans, the financial saving that will be ef- fected by a well ordered judicial system is in- calculable. There ought to be no hesitancy to provide suitable salaries for such important functionaries as persons charged with the duty of training and examining American youth for admission to the American bar. And as to the per diem allowances suggested for members of the Disciplinary Courts while in actual session, it ought to be sufficient to point out that such allowances will rarely be adequate "compensa- 76 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. tion" to the persons likely to be members of such Courts for the time withdrawn from their regular practice for the performance of the duties imposed on them; and, consequently (following the principle on which we pay mem- bers of our Legislature), the payments suggest- ed are mainly intended to empha'size the duties imposed, and their effect to relieve somewhat the burden of performance is a mere incident. TENTH. All licenses to practice law at pres- ent held, and all licenses hereafter granted, shall be held and granted upon condition that the holder shall accept the office, and diligently fulfil all the duties of member of any and every Coun- cil or Court of Juristic Discipline to which he may be elected.. If any person shall decline to accept the office of member of a Council of Dis- cipline, except for physical incapacity to perform its duties, or if any person shall decline to act as a member of a Court of Discipline, except for actual bias or interest in the result of a trial, such person shall ipso facto cease to be a mem- ber of the bar. If a member of a Council of Discipline shall desire not to accept the office of judge, he must announce his unwillingness in HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 77 writing to the chapter of the bar to which he belongs, within a stated period (say not less than three months) before the time appointed by law for the next election of judges at which his name would otherwise appear as one of the chosen candidates. Upon such announcement the member declining to become a candidate for judge shall ipso facto cease to be a member of the Council of Discipline, and forever after be ineligible to be a member of any Council or Court of Juristic Discipline, and an election shall forthwith be held by the chapter of the bar to which he belongs to fill his place in the council. He shall not, however, be restricted in the practice of his profession or otherwise dis- ciplined for his refusal to become a judge. If the State should offer its judges salaries so large that no practice at the bar, however lucrative, would afford an equal income, there would be no injustice in providing that if a lawyer, having physical capacity to perform the duties, shall refuse to accept the office of member of a Council of Juristic Discipline, or that of judge when elected thereto, he shall ipso facto cease to have the right to practice law. But salaries as large as the largest re- 78 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. wards of private practice are hardly to be ex- pected from the State. Liberal salaries and tenure of office during good behavior, with retiring allowances to faithful judges, are abso- lutely essential to, and if they are granted will insure the successful working of the reform I propose ; but salaries, tenure of office and le- tiring allowances may be liberal and sufficient, and yet there may sometimes arise such a case as that of a member of the bar receiving a larger income from his profession than the sal- ary attached to the office of judge, but having a large family to maintain, and requiring all his professional income for the maintenance of his family. The injustice of forcing a man, under such circumstances, to surrender his necessary means of support would operate strongly, in many minds, against the radical measure of expelling him from the bar for re- fusal to become judge. But, on the other hand, some minds may apprehend that since it is almost certain that the most successful lawyers will be chosen for the members of the Councils of Juristic Discipline, and since no one but a member of one of those councils is eligi- ble to be a judge, there is danger that combi- HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. nations may be formed among some members of the councils to decline to accept the office of judge, and thus, by limiting the number of can- didates to be presented to the people, such combinations might practically appoint to the Bench persons of their own selection. It might be apprehended, moreover^ that if, after hav- ing so managed to select a judge, the members of the council unwilling to be judges remain in the council, they will possess a most unwhole- some influence, if not practical control over the Bar and Bench; for, so long as the combina- tion continued, only the newly elected members of the council would be presented as candi- dates for the office of judge, and the linger- ing members of the council would practically be governors of the bar and nominators of the judges. Now, while I regard it equally un- likely that any lawyer shall refuse to go on the Bench, or that there will arise any such com- binations, if the State will offer reasonably lib- eral salaries, tenure of office and retiring allow- ances, and put into operation the other measures of reform I have and shall indicate, still, to relieve the apprehensions that arise in so many minds, that there is lurking danger in 80 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. every scheme of reform, I have endeavored to provide here, as everywhere throughout the system, a practical safe-guard against abuse. Hence, I provide in this tenth step of reform that every lawyer, without exception, must serve on the Councils and Courts of Juristic Discipline, if elected thereto, and thus be of- fered an opportunity to go on the Bench if chosen by the people ; nevertheless, if any person, eligible to the Bench, shall prefer the rewards of private practice, he must take his place in the rank and file of Jiis profession, to pursue his financial aims subject to the super- vision of better or less necessitous men. I advance now to some general propositions for the discipline of the Bench: ELEVENTH. The Governor, or any District Council of Discipline, shall have power to con- vene a General Court of Juristic Discipline for the purpose of hearing any accusations that may be brought against a judge for conduct unbecoming the judicial office. The General Court of Juristic Discipline assembled for this purpose shall consist ( if deemed advisable ) of a. larger number of members than a Court of HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 81 Juristic Discipline for the trial of a member of the bar. And, in order that local prejudice or passion shall not s'way the Court, its members shall be chosen from all the Councils of Juris- tic Discipline throughout the State by lot, with challenges allowed for bias, etc., as juries are selected from a large panel. "The inquiry of the General Court of Juristic Discipline shall merely be : Is there reasonable ground to be- lieve that conduct unbecoming a judicial offi- cer has been committed by the accused ; and the judgment shall extend only to a suspension of the accused judge until such time as he may be tried by the ordinary High Court of Im- peachment of the State. The General Court of Juristic Discipline shall be granted all neces- sary powers to conduct its proceedings and may appoint prosecutors before the Court of Impeachment, if deemed necessary. TWELFTH. The Governor, or any District Council of Discipline, shall have power to con- vene a General Court of Juristic Discipline to act as a retiring board, in case it shall appear that any judge has become physically or men- tally incapable of performing the duties of his 82 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. office, and such Court so assembled shall have power to retire the judge for cause shown. THIRTEENTH. Every chapter of the bar shall designate a place for the preservation of its records, and a place for holding its meetings, and for the meetings of the Council of Disci- pline elected by it. At the request of any chapter of the bar, the Board of Supervisors ( or other suitable county officials ) shall be re- quired to provide suitable rooms and furniture for keeping the records of the chapter, and for the meetings of the chapter and of its Council of Discipline. FOURTEENTH. Whenever any member of a Council of Discipline shall, in any manner, be- come aware that any charge has been made against any judge or member of the bar, of official or professional misconduct, or ineffi- ciency, or of conduct which might have a ten- dency to impair respect for the administration of the law, it shall be the duty of such member of the Council of Discipline, within twenty- four hours after he shall have received such information, to serve notice in writing, through the mails, on each and every other member of HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 83 the council to assemble at a specified time, which shall be not less than than four days thereafter, at the meeting place designated by the chapter of the bar for the transaction of its business, then and there to consider what may be necessary to be done in respect to such charge. The failure of -the member of the council becoming aware of such charge to issue and mail the notices above required with- in twenty-four hours after he becomes aware of the charge, or the failure of any member of the council to attend when notified, shall ipso facto cause his suspension from practice, and he shall not be restored to the right to practice, unless he shall by affidavit, filed in the records of the chapter, make oath that such failure was in no wise deliberate, and state the true cause of such failure. FIFTEENTH. The members of the Council so assembled shall forthwith inquire into the nat- ure of the charges, and shall be vested with the necessary powers for pursuing the inquiry, and shall, if it appear to be proper and necessary, be empowered to issue a warrant for the assem- bling of a suitable Court of Juristic Discipline or Court of Inquiry as before provided. 84 HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. The object of the two last provisions is to en- able the public to force the bar to take cogni- zance of and act upon scandals affecting the administration of justice. Thus the humblest citizen may set in motion the whole machinery of the System of Discipline against the merest " shyster," or the highest judge. I observe, once more, that the foundation of judicial reform is better salaries, tenure of office during good behavior, suitable provision for a faithful public servant on retirement, and a scientific method of evolving the best men for the Bench. Unless the people are willing to concede all this not much can be done; once granted, every safe-guard that can be devised to promote discipline and prevent the growth of a bureaucratic or exclusive spirit should be welcomed. Valuable additions to or alterations in the details of the system I propose, no doubt can be suggested, but, in the main, I submit that it is a practical method of creating an or- ganized bench and bar, which, while in no sense exclusive or bureaucratic in its spirit, but hav- ing its foundation on the American ideas of free HOW TO GET GOOD JUDGES. 85 education and self-government, will neverthe- less, by the very nature of the organization, of necessity be true to the present needs of the country and the perpetuation of democratic government. UNIVERSITY OF OALIFORNIA LIBRARY This is the date on which this book was charged out. [30m-6,'ll] YC 677Z8