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ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE 
 SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 BEING THE FORD LECTURES 
 
 DELIVERED AT OXFORD IN 1910 
 
 BY THE 
 
 REV. GEORGE EDMUNDSON, M.A. 
 
 F.R.G.s!" F.R. Hist. S. 
 
 LATE FELLOW AND TUTOR OF BPASENOSE COLLEGE 
 
 HONORARY MEMBER OF THE DUTCH HISTORICAL SOCIETY (uTRECHT) 
 
 FOREIGN MEMBER OF THE SOCIETY OF NETHERLANDS LITERATURE (lEYDEN) 
 
 OXFORD 
 
 AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
 
 1911 
 

 HENRY FROWDE, M.A. 
 
 PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 
 
 LONDON, EDINBURGH, NEW YORK 
 
 TORONTO AND MELBOURNE 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The varying fortunes of the obstinate and fiercely 
 contested struggles with the Dutch for maritime and 
 commercial supremacy in the days of the Common- 
 wealth and the Restoration are familiar to all readers 
 of English history, and especially of English naval 
 history. Never did English seamen fight better than 
 in these Dutch wars, and never did they meet more 
 redoubtable foes. The details of the many dogged 
 contests marked by alternate victory and defeat are 
 now more or less unintelligible save to the expert in 
 the naval strategy and tactics of the times, but legends 
 have grown round the story of Martin Tromp sailing 
 down the Channel with a broom at his mast-head, and 
 of the exploit of Michael de Ruyter in burning the 
 English ships at Chatham, which are never likely to be 
 forgotten. The names of these two famous seamen 
 are probably better known to Englishmen than those 
 of any of the contemporary English admirals save that 
 of Robert Blake alone. This fact should bespeak for 
 the attempt that is here made to trace the causes and 
 the growth of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry at sea and in 
 commerce, which culminated in the collision between 
 Blake and Tromp off Dover on May 29, 1652, and 
 the declaration of war that followed. It has been my 
 object in these Ford Lectures to treat of the relations 
 between England and the United Provinces during the 
 half-century that preceded the first outbreak of hostili- 
 
 226584 
 
M UlylO ': : ..; A ..PREFACE 
 
 ties, and to make it clear that these wars of 1652-4, 
 1665-7, 1672-4 were the inevitable outcome of a long- 
 continued clashing of interests, which were of funda- 
 mental importance and indeed vital to the welfare of 
 both nations. 
 
 The first half of the seventeenth century was one of 
 the most critical periods in English history. In any 
 account of the reigns of the first two sovereigns of the 
 House of Stewart political and religious questions of 
 primary significance thrust themselves into the fore- 
 ground of a picture full of deepening dramatic interest, 
 with the result that other questions, apparently sub- 
 ordinate but in reality closely bound up with the 
 national destinies, have been either relegated to the 
 background or wholly overlooked and neglected. It 
 has been so in regard to the questions dealt with in 
 these pages. 
 
 The history of the revolt of the Netherlands and of 
 the rise of the Dutch Republic shows to us Englishmen 
 and Dutchmen united by bonds of sympathy and fight- 
 ing side by side against a common foe. To both 
 alike the Spaniard and the Inquisition were hateful, 
 and in shedding their blood freely for the cause of 
 Dutch freedom Englishmen were in fact acting in their 
 own self-defence against the ambitious projects of 
 Philip II. At first sight then it appears strange that 
 the conclusion of the truce for twelve years in 1609 
 should have been followed by a coolness and growing 
 estrangement in the relations between the two coun- 
 tries, and by a series of endless bickerings, grievances, 
 and disputes which all the resources of diplomacy in 
 protracted negotiations proved unable to settle amic- 
 ably to the satisfaction of both parties. The truth is 
 
PREFACE 5 
 
 that the very points of resemblance in the racial 
 characteristics of the English and the Dutch brought 
 them into collision in almost every part of the world. 
 Born colonizers, traders, and explorers, each people was 
 instinctively conscious that its destiny was upon the 
 water, and that mastery of the seas was a necessity of 
 national existence. Hence a rivalry which was un- 
 avoidable, inexorable, a rivalry which could eventually 
 have only one of two issues, either the voluntary 
 submission of one of the rivals to the other, or a trial 
 of strength by ordeal of battle. 
 
 James I and Charles I, whatever the deficiencies and 
 mistakes of their foreign policies, were not blind to the 
 significance of the appearance of this new sea-power on 
 the other side of the * narrow seas ', and were quick 
 to recognize that the Dutch menace to the essential 
 interests of their island kingdom was at least as 
 formidable as the Spanish menace had ever been. The 
 diplomacy of both these kings was on the face of it 
 vacillating, uncertain, and opportunist, but it is unjust 
 to attribute this wholly to constitutional infirmity of 
 purpose, or to an innate propensity to carry through 
 their schemes by tortuous by-ways and dubious in- 
 trigues. There was no lack of steadfast determination 
 on the part either of James or Charles in their resolute 
 attempts to conduct the government and administration 
 of their kingdoms autocratically without that adequate 
 financial aid which Parliament alone could grant. But 
 in consequence their treasury was generally empty, and 
 it is therefore not surprising that, confronted with the 
 constant fear of imminent bankruptcy, they were 
 compelled to be shifty in their dealings with foreign 
 powers, and to work for the achievement of their ends 
 
 A3 
 
6 PREFACE 
 
 by the processes of a devious diplomacy rather than 
 risk the costly charges of an appeal to arms. Never- 
 theless it will be seen that in their negotiations with 
 the United Provinces never for a single moment would 
 either James or Charles make the slightest concession 
 in regard to the claims of the British Crown to undis- 
 puted sovereignty ' in the narrow seas ', and they 
 insisted that every foreign vessel should recognize that 
 sovereignty by striking its flag when meeting a British 
 war-ship in those waters. 
 
 The period with which I am dealing was one of 
 chartered companies, of trade monopolies, and of com- 
 mercial protection in its most aggressive form. Pro- 
 bably at that stage in the world's history no other 
 economical system was conceivable or would have 
 proved workable. In any case most of the disputes 
 and differences between the English and the Dutch at 
 this time arose from questions connected with trading 
 privileges, and these lectures contain much concerning 
 them. It is still, however, extremely interesting and 
 not without instruction to read the arguments that were 
 used and the principles that were upheld by these 
 statesmen and diplomatists of former days. Economical 
 questions are always with us, and men's opinions differ 
 now as to their right solution as much as they did three 
 
 centuries ago. 
 
 GEORGE EDMUNDSON. 
 
 II Sumner Place, S.W. 
 May 24, 1911. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 1 : 1600-1610 
 
 The Elizabethan spirit of enterprise. Ehzabeth and the revolt of the 
 Netherlands. Mission of Leicester. Rise of the Dutch Republic. Its 
 cumbrous form of government. Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice of Nassau. 
 Character of Elizabeth's policy. Treaty of 1598. Attitude of James I to 
 the Dutch. Negotiations for the twelve years' truce. Intrigues of the 
 Spaniards to gain James's support. The Venetian, Nicolo Molin's review 
 of the situation. Conclusion of the truce. Changed relations between 
 England and the States. Royal proclamation of 1609 restricting liberty 
 of fishing in the British seas. Indignation in Holland. Dutch embassy 
 sent to London. The States-General promise protection to their fisher- 
 men. Winwood's interview with Oldenbarneveldt. The Fisheries ques- 
 tion. Magnus Intercursus. Treaty of Binche. The Great (or Herring) 
 Fishery. Its importance. The basis of Dutch trade. The Proclamation 
 popular in England. James's motives. Grotius's Mare Liberum. Con- 
 ferences with the Dutch envoys. The Jiilich-Cleves Succession. Siege of 
 Jiilich. Execution of Fisheries Proclamation postponed. The Spanish 
 Marriage question. Situation in 161 1 as reported by the Venetian, 
 Marcantonio Correr Pages 11-33. 
 
 II: 1610-1618 
 
 Growing rivalry between the English and Dutch. English public 
 opinion expresses itself in pamphlets. Ralegh's Observations. England's 
 Way to Win Wealth, by Tobias Gentleman. The Trades' Increase, by 
 J. R. Views of the Venetian, Pietro Contarini. Gondomar, Spanish 
 ambassador in London. His influence with James. Deaths of Robert 
 Cecil and Prince Henry. Effect on English policy. Rapid progress of 
 the United Provinces in trade and wealth. Oldenbarneveldt ransoms the 
 Cautionary Towns. Sir Dudley Carleton, ambassador in Holland. The 
 Greenland (or Spitzbergen) Fishery dispute. Monopoly granted to the 
 Muscovy Company. Dutch opposition. The rival claims. Sir H. Wot- 
 ton's mission. Armed collision of 1618. History of the cloth trade 
 between England and the Netherlands. The Merchant Adventurers. 
 Alva expels them from Antwerp. Their settlement at Middelburg, 1598. 
 Revocation of Charter by James, 161 5. Patent granted to Cockayne's 
 Company. Dutch prohibition. Failure of Cockayne. Adventurers' Char- 
 ter restored. Anger of James. Attempt to levy a toll on the Dutch fish- 
 ing busses. The John Browne affair. Browne arrested. English repri- 
 sals. Satisfaction given by the States. Fishing dispute remains an open 
 sore. Rivalry of the two East India Companies. The spice trade. Situa- 
 tion acute. Carleton demands that a special embassy be sent to London 
 to discuss all points of difference Pages 34-57. 
 
8 CONTENTS 
 
 III: 1618-1623 
 
 Civil discord in the United Provinces. The embassy of 161 8 to Eng- 
 land. Its powers limited to the Greenland and East Indian questions. 
 The herring fishery and cloth disputes not to be discussed. James de- 
 mands peremptory settlement of fishery question. Reply of the States' 
 envoys. Difficulties insuperable. James grants a brief delay. Long dis- 
 cussions upon the Greenland and East Indian differences. No agreement 
 arrived at. Outbreak of the Thirty Years* War. Disasters of the Elector 
 Palatine in Bohemia. Confronted by a common danger, English and 
 Dutch negotiators become more amenable. Temporary modus vivendi 
 agreed upon. James's Spanish proclivities feared in Holland. Dutch em- 
 bassy of 1 62 1. Presses for an alliance for mutual defence and recovery 
 of the Palatinate. James's difficulties with his Parliament and financial 
 straits. Strong influence of Gondomar with the King. James demands 
 settlement of disputes as the preliminary to an alliance. Embassy returns 
 without result. The Merchant Adventurers set up their Court and Staple 
 at Delft. Another Dutch embassy in 1622. Francis Aerssen van Som- 
 melsdijk at its head. Its instructions. Conferences in London. Testi- 
 ness and ill-humour of the King. An East Indian accord. After fourteen 
 months in England the embassy returns, leaving all other points of dispute 
 unsettled Pages 58-81. 
 
 IV: 1623-1629 
 
 Prince Charles and Buckingham at Madrid. The English and Scottish 
 regiments in the Dutch service. The Dutch West India Company. Con- 
 ciliatory policy of the States General. Effect of the failure of the Spanish 
 Marriage project. James's hand forced. Interview of Carleton with 
 Maurice of Nassau. Mission of Aerssen and Joachimi, February, 162^. 
 Defensive alliance concluded, June 15. English levies for the Nether- 
 lands. Negotiations interrupted. Death of Caron, December 12 ; James I, 
 March 27 ; Maurice of Nassau, April 25. Albert Joachimi succeeds Noel 
 Caron as Dutch resident minister in England. Francis van Aerssen and 
 Rienck van Burmania, with Joachimi, sent (June, 1625) on special embassy 
 to Charles I on his accession. Treaty of Southampton (an offensive and 
 defensive alliance) signed September 17. A Dutch squadron takes part 
 in the ill-fated expedition to Cadiz. The old differences between the two 
 countries revive. States-General refuse to give the English Resident a 
 seat on the Council of State. Complaints of the Merchant Adventurers. 
 Right of search for contraband. Jacob Cats goes to London, 1627. The 
 massacre of Amboina, and fishery questions. Dutch policy of delay. 
 No settlement reached. Comment of Aitzema on the Cats' mission. 
 Difficulties of Charles I. The disastrous expedition to La Rochelle. 
 Lord Carleton sent as envoy extraordinary to the Hague. His secret 
 instructions and attempts at negotiation. Another Dutch embassy dis- 
 patched to England, January, 1628. Lord Carlisle sent to join Carleton 
 
CONTENTS 9 
 
 at the Hague with further instructions (May). Small results of so much 
 diplomacy. Assassination of Buckingham. Final breach of Charles with 
 his Parliament. Dutch mediation brings about peace with France, 
 April 24, 1629 Pages 82-104. 
 
 V: 1629-1641 
 
 Vacillating foreign policy of Charles I. Alliance between France and 
 the United Provinces, 1635. Cornelis van Beveren sent by the States- 
 General (March, 1636) to try in conjunction with the French ambassador 
 at Whitehall to draw England into a triple alliance. Charles issues a 
 Proclamation (April), prohibiting fishing upon His Majesty's coasts and 
 seas without a licence and payment of a toll. John Selden's Mare ClaU' 
 suitt seu Do7niniu7n Maris. Joachimi summoned to the Hague. An 
 English fleet sails north to enforce payment of the toll. Instructions 
 given to Joachimi. He returns and meets the King at Woodstock, Sep- 
 tember 3. The King obdurate. Dutch squadron sent to protect the 
 fishermen. No collision between the rival fleets. The toll uncollected. 
 Van Beveren renews negotiations. Offers Dutch co-operation in the 
 Palatinate for withdrawal of fishing proclamation. Charles undertakes 
 not to enforce the licence, but will not yield on question of the sovereignty 
 of the seas. Conference arranged at Hamburg for conclusion of a quad- 
 ruple Protestant alliance. Insincerity of Charles. Suspicions of the 
 Dutch. Difficulties, delays and intrigues. Failure of the Conference. 
 The King turns again to Spain. Sailing of Spanish armada under Admi- 
 ral Oquendo in 1639. Encounter with a Dutch squadron, September 21. 
 Driven to seek refuge in English waters. Battle of the Downs, October 21. 
 Total destruction of the Spanish fleet by Tromp. Infringement of English 
 neutrality. Indignation of Charles. Aerssen sent over on a mission of 
 conciliation. His diplomatic skill and tact. The matter hushed up. 
 The King has no alternative. His bankrupt state. Compelled to sum- 
 mon Parliament. His domestic complications and difficulties. Meeting 
 of the Long Parliament. Evidence to show that the King did not invite 
 the Spaniards to take refuge in English waters. They arrived unex- 
 pectedly and as unwelcome guests. Heenvliet arrives in London to nego- 
 tiate a marriage between William, the only son of the Stadholder, and 
 Mary, Princess Royal of England. His overtures successful. The mar- 
 riage takes place amidst public rejoicings, May 12, 1641 Pages IC5-31. 
 
 VI: 1641-1653 
 
 Ominous political state of England at the time of the marriage of 
 William and Mary. Confidential relations of Heenvliet with Henrietta 
 Maria. Visit of the Queen to Holland. Her efforts to secure help for 
 the royalist cause. Goodwill of Frederick Henry. The Dutch people 
 generally anti-royalist. Mission of Walter Strickland from the Parlia- 
 ment. The States-General refuse to receive him. Under pressure from 
 Holland they declare for strict neutrality. They send two envoys in 1644 
 
lo CONTENTS 
 
 to offer mediation between the King and the Parliament. After more 
 than a year of futile effort they return. Death of Frederick Henry, 
 March, 1647. Peace of Munster, January, 1648. Character and ambitions 
 of William II, Prince of Orange. His affection for and generosity to his 
 English relatives. Mission of Dr. Doreslaar. The States-General will 
 not grant him audience. Adrian Pauw and Albert Joachimi commis- 
 sioned to intercede for the life of Charles I. The news of the King's 
 execution excites universal horror and detestation in the States. Condo- 
 lences are officially offered to King Charles II. The English Council 
 of State send over Isaac Doreslaar and Walter Strickland to propose 
 closer relations between the two republics. Doreslaar is assassinated. 
 Recall of Strickland. Joachimi ordered to leave London. The province 
 of Holland takes independent action. The States of Holland send Gerard 
 Schaep to London to bring about a better understanding, January, 1650. 
 The Prince of Orange engages in a struggle for supremacy with the States 
 of Holland. Supported by the States-General, he compels the submission 
 of the Hollanders by armed force. His ultimate aim with the aid of 
 France to attempt a Stewart restoration. His sudden death by small-pox, 
 November 6, 1650. His death followed by revolution. The Stadholderate 
 is abolished. The Great Gathering. Holland supreme in the State. The 
 Commonwealth recognized. Joachimi returns to London. St. John and 
 Strickland make a state entry into the Hague. Hostile reception. Nego- 
 tiations for ' a more strict and intimate alliance and union '. Divergence of 
 views. No prospect of agreement. The English envoys leave the Hague, 
 July, 165 1. Bitterness in England against the Dutch. All the old grievances 
 raked up. Navigation Act. Deadly blow to Dutch commerce. Mission of 
 Cats, Schaep, and Perre, December 27, 165 1. Both sides arming. Exor- 
 bitant English demands. Refusal of the Dutch to accept them. Conflict 
 between Tromp and Blake off Dover, May 19. Final negotiations. Dutch 
 envoys leave England, June 30. War declared . . Pages 132-57. 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 PAGES 
 
 A. The Great OR Herring Fishery 158-61 
 
 B. The Narrow Seas . 161-2 
 
 C. The Julich-Cleves Succession Question . . . 162-3 
 
 D. The Origin and Early History of the Merchant 
 
 Adventurers 163-8 
 
 E. The Interlopers 169 
 
 F. The English and Scottish Regiments in the Dutch 
 
 Service 169-73 
 
 G. King Charles's Proclamation on the Restraint of 
 
 Fishing, 1636 173-4 
 
 Bibliography 175 
 
1 : 1600-1610 
 
 The last two decades of the sixteenth century hold 
 a place apart in English History. The exploits of the 
 great Elizabethan seamen helped to shatter the 
 supremacy of Spain upon the sea, but they did more 
 than this. They aroused in the English people the 
 instinct of their true destiny, as a maritime, trading, 
 and colonizing power. The granting of Charters to 
 the Eastland (Baltic) Company (1579), to the Levant 
 Company (1581), to the Guinea Company (1588), the 
 foundation of the great East India Company (1600), 
 the opening out by the Muscovy Company of a new 
 trade route to Persia by way of Astrachan, the daring 
 efforts to discover a North- West and a North- East 
 passage to Cathay and the Indies, the first attempts to 
 erect colonies in Virginia and Newfoundland, all testify 
 to the spirit of enterprise which animated the nation, 
 a spirit whose many-sided activity never failed to 
 command the Queen's sympathy and encouragement. 
 In thus entering, however, upon that path of colonial 
 and commercial expansion which in later times was to 
 become world-wide, the Englishman found himself in 
 the first half of the seventeenth century confronted by 
 a more formidable rival than the Spaniard. The defeat 
 of the Invincible Armada was followed^ by the rise of 
 a new Sea-Power. At the opening of the seventeenth 
 century the Dutch Republic had not only succeeded 
 in resisting all the efforts made for its subjugation to 
 Spanish rule, but, after more than thirty years of con- 
 tinuous and desperate struggle, was thriving in the 
 
 ^ See the admirable monograph on the subject by the late Professor 
 Robert Fruin, Tienjaren uit de Tachtigjarigen Oorlog^ 1588-98. 
 
12 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 midst of war. In the course of that struggle much 
 help had been given, both in money and men, by 
 Elizabeth. But the English Queen was not for many 
 years whole-hearted in her support. She saw in the 
 revolt of the Netherlands a means for draining the 
 resources of a dangerous adversary. It was no small 
 relief to her that the coast lying opposite to the mouth 
 of the Thames, with its many ports and hardy sea-faring 
 population, should no longer be at the disposal of the 
 master of the strongest navy in the world. She felt 
 a certain amount of sympathy with the Dutch on reli- 
 gious grounds, but a sympathy tempered by political 
 considerations, and strictly subordinated to them. To 
 support the rebellion of subjects against their legitimate 
 ruler was to the instincts of the Tudor Queen a course 
 which only necessity could justify. Hence her repeated 
 refusal of the proffered sovereignty, her niggardly aid, 
 her temporizing and apparently capricious attitude. 
 As a matter of fact, throughout this critical period of 
 her reign the policy of Elizabeth was not governed 
 either by sentiment or by caprice. She always kept 
 steadily in view the welfare and the security of England, 
 with whose interests those of her own throne were 
 identified, and she held aloof from entanglements which 
 might be dangerous to the safety of her kingdom. 
 Not until after the assassination of William the Silent, 
 followed by the success of Parma in capturing Antwerp, 
 August, 1585, did she make reply to the threatening 
 attitude of Spain by openly taking sides with the rebel 
 provinces. Still refusing the sovereignty, she sent 
 Leicester at the head of a strong body of English 
 troops to act in her name, as Governor-General, at the 
 same time characteristically bargaining that the sea- 
 
1 : 1600-1610 13 
 
 ports Flushing and Brill with the fort of Rammekens 
 should be delivered to her in pledge for the repayment 
 of her costs. The mission of Leicester was a failure, 
 whether it be regarded from the military or the political 
 standpoint, but it gave the Dutch at a transition period 
 of disorganization and pressing peril a disciplined force 
 to assist in their defence, and a breathing space for 
 recuperation. 
 
 The resignation of his post by Leicester (April, 1588) 
 may be taken as the date at which the history of the 
 United Netherlands as a self-governing State really 
 begins. The treaty with England still subsisted by 
 the terms of which the Commander of the English 
 auxiliary troops with two colleagues had seats in the 
 Council of State, but the Council of State ceased ere 
 long to have any but executive functions. The conduct 
 of affairs affecting the whole Union was vested in the 
 States-General as representing the States of the seven 
 sovereign provinces from which its authority was 
 derived. A more cumbrous system of government 
 than that under which the United Provinces were 
 now to develop rapidly into a powerful and flourishing 
 State, probably never existed. That it was workable 
 was due to two facts. The voices of the provinces 
 were nominally of equal weight in the States-General, 
 in reality that of Holland was dominant. Holland 
 contributed 60 per cent, of the general expenses and 
 contained about one-half of the entire population of the 
 Union. With Zeeland she furnished almost the whole 
 of the navy and was already becoming one of the most 
 thriving centres of commerce in the world. At this 
 time the influence of an exceptionally able statesman, 
 John van Oldenbarneveldt, who filled the office of 
 
14 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 Advocate of Holland, was supreme in the States of 
 that province, and as their representative and spokes- 
 man he was able to exercise an authority in the States- 
 General which placed for thirty years in his hands the 
 general administration of the country and the control 
 of foreign affairs. By his side stood Maurice of Nassau, 
 respected and honoured as the son of William the 
 Silent, wielding as Captain and Admiral-General 
 authority over all the armed forces of the Republic, 
 and exercising as Stadholder of five provinces large 
 executive powers. A consummate general but no 
 politician, Maurice was content to leave the business 
 of administration and the conduct of diplomacy in the 
 hands of the statesman who had been his father's friend. 
 Thus by the efforts of these two men, each eminent in 
 his separate sphere, the youthful Republic, despite the 
 inherent weaknesses of a confederacy so loosely com- 
 pacted as that of the United Provinces, was able to 
 carry out a wise and consistent foreign policy, to defend 
 its borders, and meanwhile to thrive and flourish. 
 
 The relations between England and the States 
 required the most careful handling during the whole 
 of the period that intervened between the return of 
 Leicester and the death of Elizabeth. The assistance 
 given by the English Queen had not been without 
 a return : it had been fully repaid by the services 
 rendered by the Dutch fleet during the spring and 
 summer of 1588 in blockading the ports in which lay 
 the transports collected by the Duke of Parma for the 
 invasion of England. When the Armada entered the 
 Channel, Parma with his splendid veteran army was 
 thus compelled to remain a helpless spectator of events, 
 unable to take any part in promoting the success of 
 
I : 1600-1610 15 
 
 the great enterprise which Philip had been so long 
 preparing. But Elizabeth had been piqued by the 
 opposition that Leicester had encountered, and by the 
 evident determination of the States, under the leader- 
 ship of Holland, not to permit any interference on 
 the part of the representative of a foreign power with 
 their provincial rights and privileges. She did not 
 withdraw her help, but it was given from motives of 
 pure self-interest rather than from any love for the 
 cause she was supporting, and in a huckstering spirit. 
 With her it was a question of give and take, and the 
 military successes of Maurice, accompanied as they 
 were by the rapid growth of commercial prosperity in 
 Holland and Zeeland, only encouraged her to drive 
 a harder bargain in her negotiations and to press for 
 repayment of the loans she had advanced. 
 
 In these circumstances friction in the relations 
 between England and the Republic was at times 
 inevitable, but the community of interests was so 
 strong that friendly co-operation never ceased. An 
 English contingent took part in the campaigns of 
 Maurice ; a powerful Dutch squadron sailed with the 
 fleet of Essex to the sack of Cadiz in 1595. The 
 conclusion of peace between France and Spain in 
 May, 1598, brought about a fresh treaty between 
 England and the United Provinces, the terms of which 
 point clearly to the great change which had taken 
 place in the relative position of the two States since 
 the time of Leicester's mission. The Dutch were now 
 in a position to promise the repayment of their debt 
 to Elizabeth by equal annual instalments ^ and to under- 
 
 * The towns of Flushing and Brill and the fort of Rammekens were 
 delivered into the hands of Elizabeth, as security for repayment. 
 
i6 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 take in case of a Spanish attack upon England to 
 come to the assistance of their allies with thirty ships 
 of war and a force of 5,000 infantry and five cornets 
 of cavalry. On the other hand, only one Englishman 
 henceforth was to have a seat upon the Council of 
 State, and the English auxiliary troops in the Nether- 
 lands were transferred to the service of the States as 
 their paymasters and were required to take an oath 
 of allegiance to them. This English brigade in the 
 Dutch service, now first formed, was to have a long 
 and honourable career. It was speedily to prove its 
 worth and gain immortal fame by the share that 
 it took in winning the great victory of Nieuwport 
 (July 2, 1600), and in the heroic defence of Ostend 
 (160 1 -4). 
 
 Such was the state of things when James I ascended 
 the English throne. From him the Netherlands could 
 hope for little active aid. The chief aim of James's 
 policy from the first was to live on friendly terms with 
 Spain, and in 1604 he concluded a treaty of peace 
 with Philip III and with the Archdukes, as sovereigns 
 of the Netherlands. His attitude to the United Pro- 
 vinces was not indeed unfriendly. He still retained 
 the cautionary towns, as a pledge for the debt, and his 
 representative sat in the Council of State, but as one 
 of the conditions of peace he promised to lend no 
 assistance to the Dutch. The privilege of recruiting 
 in England for the regiments in their service was not 
 withdrawn, but in return a like privilege was extended 
 to the Spaniards. Thus there were occasions on which 
 Englishmen were found fighting against one another 
 on opposite sides. The Court of Madrid on their 
 part, exhausted by the long and costly struggle, were 
 
I : 1 600-1610 17 
 
 already in 1606 making tentative proposals to the 
 rebel provinces for the conclusion of a peace or truce, 
 and meanwhile spared no efforts to prejudice the 
 mind of James against a people for whose cause as 
 a stanch Protestant it was feared he might have 
 secret leanings, and at the same time to secure his 
 benevolent support in the coming negotiations. The 
 arguments that were used and their effect upon the 
 King are well summed up in the words of the keen- 
 eyed Venetian Ambassador, Nicolo Molin, who in 1607 
 thus reports : — 
 
 ' The Spaniards are ceaselessly urging upon the 
 King that for his own interests he ought to use his 
 utmost endeavours in this negotiation in order to bring 
 it to some conclusion, since by continuance of the war 
 the Dutch might come to make themselves masters of 
 those seas. Having their fleets ordinarily of a hundred 
 or more ships, and these widely scattered in different 
 places, they can thus say, and with truth, that they are 
 masters of those seas for the possession of which the 
 ancient kings of England have made very long and 
 very costly wars against the princes of Europe. The 
 King knows all this to be true, but is likewise of 
 opinion that at a single nod of his the Dutch would 
 yield to him all that dominion that they have gained ; 
 which without doubt would follow so long as the war 
 with the Spaniards lasted, since they are not able at 
 one and the same time to contend with two of the 
 greatest princes of Christendom. But if with time 
 that ripens affairs peace should be effected between 
 them and the Crown of Spain, I do not know if they 
 would be so ready to yield as the King of England 
 promises himself; since just as this profession of the 
 sea is manifestly more and more on the wane in Eng- 
 land, so more and more is it increasing and acquiring 
 force and vigour among the Dutch.' 
 
 "07 B 
 
i8 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 The perspicacity of this review of the situation was 
 completely justified by the events. On April 9, 1609, 
 after prolonged and acrimonious negotiations, a treaty 
 for a truce of twelve years between the belligerents 
 was signed, but on conditions imposed by the Dutch. 
 To the Spaniards the terrible drain on their resources 
 made a respite from war a matter not of choice, but of 
 necessity. To obtain it they had to treat with the 
 United Provinces 'as if they were an independent 
 State \ and, worst of all, they had by a secret clause to 
 concede liberty of trading in the Indies. From this 
 moment the relations of the States with England were 
 sensibly changed. The attitude of King James had 
 hitherto been a mixture of condescension and aloof- 
 ness, and he had not troubled himself to consider 
 seriously the question of Dutch rivalry upon the seas 
 and in commerce, which had so profoundly impressed 
 the Venetian envoy. Nicolo Molin was in 1607 "^' 
 doubtedly correct in his supposition that at that date 
 James still looked upon the Dutch as dependents on 
 his favour, who would not venture to run counter to 
 any expression of his will. The course of the negotia- 
 tions for the truce must have gradually undeceived 
 him, and their issue left him face to face with a power 
 compelled to maintain to the utmost the interests of 
 the extensive commerce on the proceeds of which its 
 very existence as a State depended. 
 
 No sooner were the signatures appended to the 
 treaty than James took a step which exposed to a 
 very severe strain his relations with the people whose 
 emancipation from Spanish rule he had, ostensibly at 
 least, worked hard to accomplish. Many indeed in 
 Holland had been suspicious of the real friendliness of 
 
I : 1600-1610 19 
 
 his attitude during the negotiations, but very few 
 probably imagined that he was preparing, as soon as 
 they were ended, to put to the test their sense of the 
 value of his services and of his alliance by striking 
 a deadly blow at the most important of their indus- 
 tries. On May 16, 1609, the King issued a proclama- 
 tion, in which, after stating that though he had hitherto 
 tolerated the promiscuous liberty that had been 
 granted to foreigners to fish in the British seas, he has 
 now determined, seeing that this liberty 
 * hath not only given occasion of over great Encroach- 
 ments upon our Regalities, or rather questioning of 
 our Right, but hath been a means of daily Wrongs to 
 our own People that exercise the Trade of Fishing 
 ... to give notice to all the World that our express 
 Pleasure is, that from the beginning of the Month of 
 August next coming, no Person of what Nation or 
 Quality soever, be permitted to fish upon any of our 
 Coasts and Seas of Great Britain, Ireland and the rest 
 of the Isles adjacent, until they have orderly demanded 
 and obtain'd Licences from us . . .' 
 
 The news of the publication of this edict caused in 
 Holland no small surprise, not unmingled with indigna- 
 tion. On June 12 the matter was discussed in the 
 States of that Province, and it was resolved ^ that the 
 States-General be requested to adopt measures for 
 the vigorous defence of the land's rights as based 
 upon the treaties. The States-General on their part 
 resolved ^ that a full inquiry should be made into the 
 question of treaty rights and a special embassy be 
 sent to London, and as early as July 6, King James 
 agreed^ to receive such a deputation, and to appoint 
 
 ^ Res. HoU. June 12, 1609. ^ Res. St.-Gen. June 12, 1609. 
 
 ' Art. 6 of the Treaty between James and the States, July 6 
 (June 25, 1609, O.S.). 
 
20 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 commissioners to enter into conference with it on the 
 subject of the privileges and immunities for freedom of 
 commerce claimed in virtue of ancient treaties. Mean- 
 while the States-General promised the fishermen their 
 protection, at the same time bidding them to be very 
 careful not to give any cause for new complaints on 
 the part of the King. So far indeed were the Dutch 
 from yielding immediate submission to the demand of 
 James, or from admitting its justice, that Sir Ralph 
 Winwood (the resident English ambassador at the 
 Hague), reporting to the Secretary of State, Lord 
 Salisbury, the results of an interview he had had with 
 Oldenbarneveldt September i6, 1609, informs him : — 
 
 * the States do write expressly to their ambassador 
 [Noel Caron] urging him to advertise his Majesty their 
 purpose to send to beseech him upon the necessity of 
 this affair [i.e. liberty of fishing] in the meantime to 
 have patience with their people trading upon his coast 
 that without impeachment they may use their accus- 
 tomed Liberty and antient Privelidges ; which he 
 [Oldenbarneveldt] said they were so far from fear 
 that his Majesty upon due consideration will abridge, 
 as that they hope he will be pleased to inlarge and 
 increase into new ones/^ 
 
 For a right understanding of the importance of the 
 fisheries question and of the reasons which led 
 King James at this particular time to issue his procla- 
 mation, a short retrospect is necessary. 
 
 Special rights of free fishing in English waters had 
 been granted to the Hollanders and Zeelanders, as early 
 as 1295, by King Edward I, and afterwards renewed by 
 several of his successors. Finally a treaty was con- 
 cluded, dated February 24, 1496, known as the Magnus 
 * Winwood, Memorials^ vol. iii. 
 
I : 1600-1610 21 
 
 Intercursus, between Henry VII and Philip the Fair, 
 Duke of Burgundy, which was destined to regulate the 
 commercial relations between England and the Nether- 
 lands during the whole of the Tudor period, and was 
 still in force in 1609. Article XIV of this treaty ran 
 as follows : — 
 
 * Conventum, concordatum et conclusum est quod 
 Piscatores utriusque Partis Partium praedictarum 
 (cujuscunque conditionis existant) poterunt ubique Ire, 
 Navigare per Mare, secure Piscari absque aliquo Im- 
 pedimento, Licentia, seu Salvo Conductu/ 
 
 Nc/thing could be more explicit or complete, and it 
 was to this clause of the Magnus Inter cur sus and 
 the rights it had so long recognized that Oldenbarne- 
 veldt referred when he spoke to Winwood of the 
 Dutch fishermen*s ' accustomed Liberty and antient 
 Privelidges/ 
 
 The rights of the Netherlanders to trade and navi- 
 gate in Scottish waters, ' sine aliquo salvo conductu aut 
 licentia generali aut speciali ', were guaranteed by the 
 Treaty of Binche, dated December 15, 1550, which had 
 been confirmed by James himself, as King of Scotland, 
 in 1594. But neither in this treaty of 1550, nor in an 
 earlier treaty of 1541 to which it expressly refers, 
 * circa Piscationem et liberwrn usuni Maris, ea quae per 
 Tractatum anno 1541 . . . inita, conclusa ac conventa 
 fuerint debite ac sincere observari debebunt ', is there 
 any definite statement that the free use of the sea 
 carried with it the right to fish without payment, though 
 undoubtedly that right seems to be implied, and was 
 certainly exercised without let or hindrance before 1609. 
 
 The question at issue was of vital consequence to the 
 Dutch. It may be asserted without any exaggeration 
 
 B3 
 
22 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 that the commerce and prosperity of Holland and 
 Zeeland had been built upon the herring fishery, and 
 rested upon it. The discovering of the art of curing 
 the herring by Willem Beukelsz at the close of the 
 fourteenth century had transformed a perishable article 
 of local consumption into a commodity for traffic and 
 exchange. Soon the 'great fishery', as it was called, 
 afforded, directly or indirectly, occupation and a means 
 of livelihood to a large part of the entire population of 
 the Province of Holland.^ Not only did many thou- 
 sands of Hollanders put out to sea to follow the track 
 of the herring shoals along the British coasts, but 
 thousands more found employment on shore in building 
 the busses, pinks, and other boats engaged in the lucra- 
 tive industry, and in providing them with ropes, nets, 
 and other necessaries. The profit from the fishery 
 alone before the outbreak of the revolt was estimated 
 by Guicciardini at 500,000 Flemish pounds. But such 
 an estimate was far from representing the real value of 
 what was styled by the States-General in an official 
 document * one of the chiefest mines of the United 
 Netherlands '.- Salt was required for the curing. It 
 was brought in Dutch bottoms in its rough state from 
 French and Spanish ports, or direct from Punta del 
 Rey on the coast of Venezuela, and salt-refineries 
 quickly sprang up at Enkhuysen, Hoorn, and other 
 fishing centres. In a land which had no natural pro- 
 ducts, the cured herrings and the refined salt which were 
 not required for home use served as articles of com- 
 
 ^ The Zeelanders in the seventeenth century, though they sent out 
 many fishermen to the Dogger Bank, to Greenland and Spitzbergen, 
 did not take much part in the herring fishery. See note. 
 
 - Groot Placaet-Boek (July 19, 1606). 
 
I: I 600-1610 23 
 
 merce, and freights were dispatched to the neighbour- 
 ing lands but specially to the Baltic to be exchanged 
 for corn, timber, hemp, and other ' Eastland ' commo- 
 dities. The enterprising Hollanders and Zeelanders, 
 at first competed with the Hanse towns in the Baltic 
 ports, but long before the opening of the seventeenth 
 century had practically driven their rivals from the field, 
 and at the time with which we are dealing it has been 
 computed that no less than 3,000 Dutch vessels were 
 engaged in the ' Eastland ' traffic through the Sound. 
 The corn in its turn brought by so vast a fleet far more 
 than sufficed even for the needs of a country where no 
 corn was grown. Some thousands of other ships laden 
 with grain voyaged along the coast of France, the 
 Peninsula and the Western Mediterranean, discharging 
 their cargoes and returning with freights of wine, silk, 
 olive oil, and other staple products of the South. The 
 Spaniards and Portuguese were in fact largely depen- 
 dent upon the Hollanders for their necessary food 
 supplies, and these keen traders had no scruples in 
 enriching themselves at the cost of their foes. An abun- 
 dance of timber and hemp also came from the Baltic 
 and furnished the raw material for flourishing ship- 
 building and ropemaking industries. Sawmills sprang 
 up on the banks of the Zaan, and before long Zaandam 
 became the chief centre of the timber trade of Europe. 
 It will thus be seen at once how many Dutch interests 
 were involved in the full maintenance of the rights to 
 free fishing on the British coasts guaranteed by treaty, 
 and why it was that the States-General under pressure 
 from the States of Holland should have determined to 
 send a special embassy to protest strongly and firmly 
 against the edict of King James, and should have 
 
24 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 meantime promised the fishermen their protection in 
 case of any attempt being made to compel them by 
 armed force to pay the licences. 
 
 The step taken by King James had, however, from 
 the English point of view much to recommend it. The 
 English people saw the growing maritime strength and 
 rapidly increasing commercial prosperity of the Dutch 
 with jealous eyes. Their practical monopoly of the 
 British fisheries was deeply resented. Pamphlets were 
 written lamenting the decadence of English shipping 
 and trade. ^ It was felt that the ancient claim of Eng- 
 land to the sovereignty and dominion of the narrow 
 seas was being challenged, and that its maintenance 
 depended upon the numbers and the experience of the 
 sea-faring population, for whom the fisheries were the 
 best and most practical school. A petition is extant 
 from the fishermen of the Cinque Ports to the King, 
 showing that the Netherlanders drive them from their 
 fishing, and sell fresh fish contrary to the laws, and be- 
 seeching His Majesty to impose on them a tax of fifteen 
 shillings upon every last of fish, the same as they im- 
 posed on the English. 2 James was far from indisposed 
 to listen to their complaints. Early in his reign, in 
 1604, an attempt had been made to enforce the eating 
 
 * A Pollitique Flatty by Robert Hitchcock, 1580. 
 Observations made upon the Dutch fishery about the year 1601, by 
 
 John Keymer. Ralegh, WorkSy i. 144. 
 
 Sir Thomas Overbury's observations in his travels in 1609 : Harleian 
 Misc. viii. 349. 
 
 Discourse addressed to the King by Sir Nicholas Hales, on the 
 benefit derived by the Dutch from English fisheries. Terms suggested 
 for granting them a licence to fish for twenty-one years. Calendar of 
 State Papers y Dom. Ser.y 1603-10, p. 509. 
 
 * Cal. State Papers, Dom. Ser.^ 1603-10, p. 509. 
 
I : 1600-1610 25 
 
 of fish in England on fast-days, and the motive of it 
 was plainly stated. It had little to do with religious 
 observances. It was ' for the better increase of Seamen, 
 to be readie at all times to serve in the Kings Majesties 
 Navie, of which the fishermen of England have euer 
 been the chiefest Seminarie and Nurserie.'^ The 
 suggestion that licences should be required for which 
 a tax or toll should be paid naturally presented 
 itself to the King, at this time in sore straits for money 
 and at his wit's end how to obtain it, as a welcome 
 expedient. It also afforded a means by which the sove- 
 reignty and jurisdiction of the British King in the 
 British seas could be asserted and his regalities safe- 
 guarded.'^ The large revenue derived by Christian IV 
 of Denmark from the tolls in the Sound had no doubt 
 often made-^J:he impecunious James envious of his 
 brother-in-law, whose right to levy such an import in 
 Danish waters differed in no way from the right, which 
 as King of Great Britain and Ireland he was now 
 asserting, to demand a licence from all foreigners who 
 desired to fish on the British coasts. His decision to 
 issue the proclamation was confirmed by the appear- 
 ance in March, 1609, of the famous treatise of Hugo 
 Grotius, entitled Mare Liberum. The argument in 
 this work seemed to be directed against the principle 
 of a dominium maris such as the English Kings had 
 claimed for centuries in the * narrow seas ', and its 
 publication at this time aroused the resentment of 
 James, always tenaciously jealous of any infringement 
 of his sovereign prerogatives. As a matter of fact, as 
 
 ^ Statutes of the Realm, iv. 2, p. 1058. 
 
 - Letter of Salisbury to Cornwallis, June 8, 1609. Winwood's 
 State Papers, iii. 44-50. 
 
26 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 has been shown by the late Professor Robert Fruin ^, 
 the Mare Liber um was originally a chapter of a larger 
 unpublished work of Grotius, written to prove that the 
 Portuguese had no exclusive rights in the Indian Ocean 
 but that the Eastern seas and all others were open to 
 the traders of every nation. The most burning ques- 
 tion in the negotiations for the twelve years' truce, then 
 just drawing to a close, had been that of the liberty to 
 trade in the Indies, demanded with insistence by the 
 Dutch, refused up to the very last peremptorily by the 
 Spanish King, and conceded by him finally not directly 
 but by a kind of subterfuge. The Mare Liberum of 
 Grotius saw the light at a time when it was hoped that 
 his learned arguments might tend to allay the acuteness 
 of the dispute by showing the reasonableness and 
 legality of the position taken up by the Dutch. It is 
 clear now that these arguments, though their appli- 
 cation was general, had their special reference to Portu- 
 guese and not to British pretensions. Curiously enough, 
 as will be seen later, it was in the long succession of 
 Anglo-Dutch negotiations over the fisheries in the seas 
 over which the Crown of England claimed paramount 
 sovereignty and jurisdiction that the thesis put forward 
 by the author of the Mare Liberum was destined to 
 be the source of embittered controversy. The acute 
 mind of King James was quick in grasping its impor- 
 tance. 
 
 Delayed by various causes, it was not till April i6, 
 1610, that the embassy from the States set sail from 
 Brill for England. The object of the mission was 
 ostensibly a complimentary one — to thank the King 
 for the active part he had taken, as a mediator, in 
 ' Fruin's Verspreide Geschriften^ vol. iii, pp. 408-45. 
 
I : 1600-1610 27 
 
 bringing the truce negotiations to a favourable issue. 
 The two matters which called for serious discussion 
 were : (i) the critical situation which had arisen in the 
 Julich-Cleves Duchies owing to a disputed succession ; 
 (2) the proclamation about the fisheries. The impor- 
 tance of the last question was revealed by the fact 
 that all the five envoys originally selected were repre- 
 sentatives of the two maritime provinces. One of the 
 five died at Brill just before starting. The four who 
 actually sailed (April 16) were : Johan Berck, pen- 
 sionary of Dort ; Albert de Veer, pensionary of 
 Amsterdam ; Elias van Oldenbarneveldt, pensionary 
 of Rotterdam; and a Zeelander, Albert Joachimi, who 
 was later to show himself a skilful diplomatist during 
 the twenty-five years that he was resident Dutch 
 ambassador in London. Elias van Oldenbarneveldt 
 was the brother of the Advocate of Holland. Accord- 
 ing to a letter from Sir Ralph Winwood^ to Lord 
 Salisbury he had special charge of the fishery question, 
 a proof of the peculiar interest felt by the Advocate in 
 the issue raised. With them was joined the resident 
 ambassador, Noel Caron. Their instructions required 
 them to seek from His Majesty an explanation of his 
 intentions in the proclamation, 'since their High 
 Mightinesses the States-General could not believe 
 that he meant to include the inhabitants of the 
 United Netherlands among those who were bidden 
 to pay for a licence to fish, since this was con- 
 trary to the ancient treaties subsisting between them 
 and the Crowns of England and Scotland. After 
 audiences with the King (April 27) and with the Privy 
 
 * Winwood's Memorials^ March 16, (o.s.), 1610. See also letter of 
 April 6 (o.s.). 
 
28 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 Council (May 8), it was arranged that a Con- 
 V ference on the fisheries question should be held, 
 
 ^ with a Committee of the Council, two of whose mem- 
 bers were Sir Julius Caesar, Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer, and Sir Thomas Parry, Chancellor of the 
 Duchy of Lancaster. The Conference opened on 
 May 1 6, and the points in dispute were argued at 
 length. The Dutch case was presented in a memo- 
 randum drawn up with much skill, probably by the 
 hand of Hugo Grotius himself. The freedom of 
 
 1 fishing was claimed on two grounds : (i) that of the 
 
 I privileges granted by ancient treaties still in force ; 
 
 \(2) that of abstract right, because the sea, like the air, 
 is for the common use of all and cannot be private 
 property. The weak point of the case lay in the fact 
 that these two grounds, that of treaty right and that 
 of the Mare Liber um, seemed to be in a certain sense 
 contradictory. The English, however, would not admit 
 that the question of the immemorial claim of the Kings 
 of England to sovereignty and jurisdiction in the seas 
 adjoining the British coasts was open to discussion, 
 and seizing upon the argument placed in their hands 
 by the Dutch memorandum itself, pleaded with great 
 force that the granting of privileges implied the power 
 to take them away or modify them, should the King 
 deem such a step necessary to protect the interests of 
 his own subjects. The Conference therefore effected 
 nothing more than the bringing out in relief of the 
 differences of view of the two parties. But reflection 
 brought wisdom. There was no wish on either side 
 to press matters to extremities. Already on May lo 
 the States-General, unwilling to run the risk of making 
 James an enemy, at a time when they were very 
 
1 : 1 600-1610 29 
 
 anxious to secure his help in the settlement of the 
 Jiilich-Cleves succession question ^ had sent instructions 
 to their ambassadors not to make difficulties or unplea- 
 santness about the fisheries, but rather to propose 
 that the execution of the proclamation should be 
 postponed for two years, in order that the question 
 might be thoroughly investigated. There were several 
 claimants to the Jlilich-Cleves inheritance, Protestant 
 and Catholic, and it was of vital importance to the 
 States, and also to a lesser extent to all Protestant 
 princes in Germany and to James, that this frontier 
 territory on the Rhine should not fall under the rule 
 of a Catholic sovereign. But the Archduke Leopold 
 had seized the fortress of Jlilich, and Henry IV of 
 France, jealous of the power of the House of Habsburg 
 in Europe, had put himself at the head of a coalition 
 to secure the succession to the Elector of Brandenburg, 
 and William, Count Palatine of Neuburg, as joint 
 possessors. There was a general desire to avoid 
 hostilities, but Henry IV had pushed for^vard his 
 preparations for a great campaign, and war seemed 
 inevitable. At this moment the assassination of the 
 French king at the very time the Conference was 
 being held in London changed the whole aspect of 
 affairs. The new French Government was favourably 
 disposed to Spain. The Dutch therefore were left 
 face to face with the task of expelling the Archduke 
 from Julich, and they felt that all other matters were 
 for the moment of secondary importance to that of 
 having the friendly co-operation of James in case of the 
 outbreak of war. Their attitude to the fisheries ques- 
 tion was therefore considerably modified. It became 
 
 » See Note C. 
 
30 . ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 much more conciliatory, and for precisely similar reasons 
 a like change took place in the attitude of the English 
 King. He too felt that the friendship of the Dutch 
 was essential to him at such a critical juncture, and at 
 a meeting with the Earls of Salisbury and Northampton, 
 May 24, the Dutch envoys were agreeably surprised 
 to find that the King, while not formally abating one 
 jot of his sovereign rights in the matter of issuing 
 licences for fishing, was willing to postpone the execu- 
 tion of his edict for two years. The ambassadors took 
 leave of the King the same day and started on their 
 return journey. Of this audience the Lords of the 
 Council, in a letter to Winwood, dated May 18, i6ia 
 (o.s.), write : 
 
 ' For the States Ambassadors, His Majesty is now 
 dismissing them with sufficient assurance of his inward 
 affections towards them and the preservation of their 
 State, which next to his own he holdeth most dear 
 above all other respects in the world. And as for the 
 matter of fishing and Reglement of commerce, His 
 Majesty thinketh not fit now to spend any more time 
 in it, but to refer the one and the other to some better 
 season ; and in the meanwhile that things may remain 
 in the same state as now they are. So as we conceive 
 these Deputies will return with good contentment, 
 having no other cause either for the public or for the 
 private ; and His Majesty having also been careful to 
 give them the rights that appertain to their title, 
 and all other external courtesy and honour in their 
 reception.* 
 
 This good understanding was to bear good fruit. 
 The army, which Maurice of Nassau led into the duchy 
 in June, contained a fine body of English troops under 
 the command of Sir Edward Cecil. J ulich was besieged 
 
I: 1600-1610 31 
 
 and surrendered to the Dutch on September i, and 
 the Archduke Leopold was compelled to leave the 
 territory. Of this achievement Sir Ralph Winwood, 
 writing to Lord Salisbury from Dtisseldorf, August 22 
 (o.s.), says : * The honor of the conduct of this seige 
 no man will detract from the Count Maurice, who is the 
 Maistre-ouvrier in that Mestier. But that this Seige 
 hath had so happy an end, himself will and doth attri- 
 bute it to the Diligence and Judgement of Sir Edward 
 Cecil/ The capture of Jiilich did not indeed end this 
 thorny little dispute. Anglo- Dutch and Spanish- 
 Imperial armies, under Maurice and Spinola respect- 
 ively, manoeuvred within a short distance of one 
 another. But the quarrel was localized, no further 
 hostilities took place, and finally by the Treaty of 
 Xanten, November 12, 16 14, an arrangement was 
 arrived at. During all this time the relations between 
 James and the States were friendly. The King, how- 
 ever, had quarrelled with his Parliament, and even had 
 he wished to take a stronger line in foreign politics, 
 lack of funds compelled him to temporize. The 
 English contingent in Maurice's army was recruited 
 indeed in England, but the troops were in the pay of 
 the States. Moreover, James was all the time hankering 
 after a Spanish marriage for the Prince of Wales, from 
 mixed motives doubtless, but chiefly from a misguided 
 notion that such an alliance between the leading 
 Catholic and the leading Protestant State would 
 enable him to play the part of arbiter in the religious 
 differences which were dividing Europe into two 
 hostile camps, and by his influence to prevent an 
 actual breach of the peace. This was the underlying 
 motive which prompted all the apparent fluctuations 
 
32 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 of his policy. Hence the persistence with which for 
 so many years he pursued the chimaera of a Spanish 
 match, while at the same time he allowed his only 
 daughter to marry the Elector Palatine, the head of 
 the Protestant Union in Germany, and endeavoured 
 to maintain good relations with the United Provinces, 
 notwithstanding the continual friction between his 
 subjects and the Dutch regarding the increasing 
 monopoly by the latter of the fisheries and of sea- 
 borne trade. The situation in 1 6 1 1 is thus described 
 by the Venetian, Marcantonio Correr ^ : — 
 
 'With the lords of the United Provinces of the Low 
 Countries, there exists at present perfect friendship 
 and union ; formerly he [James] used to despise them, 
 as rebels, but now he loves and esteems them, as 
 princes of valour and quality, an effect of the truce 
 made with the Catholic king. . . . Now H.M. desires 
 and procures the preservation of the Dutch, but not 
 a further increase of their greatness, since their forces 
 on sea are not inferior to those of any potentate 
 whatsoever, because that in time of war necessity has 
 been their best mistress. Of these forces the English 
 are not without some jealousy, seeing their own dimin- 
 ished, and the dominion of the sea, that they have been 
 accustomed to hold in that part of the ocean transferred 
 to others. ... In the herring fishery alone they [the 
 Dutch] send out every year to the east coast of the 
 Kingdom of England 1,700 vessels, in which perhaps 
 30,000 men are employed.- After the truce the King 
 made a proclamation, that no one was allowed to fish 
 in those parts without licence, perhaps incited by the 
 great sums of money, that formerly the Spaniards 
 offered Queen Elizabeth to have the user of it; but 
 just as at that time that scheming did not succeed in 
 
 * Relazioni venete^ Inghilterra^ serie iv, p. 128. 
 ^ See Note A. 
 
I : 1600-1610 33 
 
 despoiling the Dutch, so now these with two special 
 ambassadors have not obtained any promise of an 
 alteration, as he [the King] is always intent upon the 
 conservation of his jurisdiction and the increase of the 
 royal incomings. The King at present regards the 
 possession of such great sea power as being in itself of 
 great moment for the needs of England, and united 
 with his own it could with difficulty be resisted. He 
 holds further that these same provinces are a barrier 
 rampart of his kingdoms, and he is interested in them 
 through the debt of a million and a half of gold that 
 remains to him of the sum of more than two millions 
 already lent by Queen Elizabeth, the repayment of 
 which is at present spread over a number of years, a 
 portion every year. Meanwhile three principal places 
 are pledges in the hands of his Majesty. . . .' 
 
 The possession of these fortresses was indeed at 
 this time placing King James in a position of no small 
 advantage in his dealings with the States, and he was 
 well aware of it. On the other hand, it was galling to 
 the Dutch, now that they had compelled the Spaniard 
 to treat with the United Provinces as if it were an 
 independent State, to feel that two chief doors of 
 entrance into their land were in the hands of foreign 
 garrisons. James professed to be their good friend, 
 and it appeared to be his interest to cultivate their 
 alliance, but it was inevitable that his assiduous advances 
 to gain the goodwill of Spain and to obtain the hand 
 of an Infanta for his son should render him suspect. 
 
II: i6io-i6i8 
 
 The resolve of the King in 1610 to postpone any 
 action in the matter of his proclamation on the fish- 
 eries question seems not to have aroused any popular 
 expression of disapproval. The English people were 
 from the political and religious standpoint well dis- 
 posed to the Dutch. What they suspected and dreaded 
 was the King's obvious leaning to Spain. Their in- 
 tense dislike to the Spanish marriage, concerning 
 which it was common knowledge that negotiations were 
 on foot, led them to favour a good understanding with 
 the United Provinces. But the spectacle of the grow- 
 ing Dutch monopoly of the carrying trade, and the 
 decline of English commerce in the face of these for- 
 midable rivals, could not fail before long to stir public 
 opinion. 
 
 A succession of noteworthy pamphlets drew atten- 
 tion to the subject. Foremost among these, from the 
 personality of the writer, was Ralegh's^ Observations 
 touching trade and commerce with the Hollanders and 
 others^ wherein is proved that our sea and land com- 
 modities serve to enrich and strengthen other countries 
 than our own. These Observations were, as the title 
 page informs us, presented to King James, and there 
 are indications that the date of their presentation was 
 about the time of the Dutch embassy of 16 10. Their 
 object was to show how Dutch trade was prospering at 
 the expense of that of England. Ralegh pointed out 
 
 * Ralegh's Works ^ viii. 351-76. 
 
II : i6io-i6i8 35 
 
 in particular the immense profit derived by the Hol- 
 landers from their fishing in the British seas, and he 
 asks why * this great sea-business of fishing ' should 
 not be kept in English hands, and suggests that the 
 King should appoint Commissioners to inquire into 
 the matter, and ' forthwith set forward some scheme 
 for preventing foreigners from reaping all the fruits of 
 this lucrative industry on his Majesty's coasts/ He 
 warns the King that ' the Hollanders possess already 
 as many ships as eleven kingdoms, England being one 
 of them ', and expresses his conviction that * they [the 
 Hollanders] hoped to get the whole trade and shipping 
 of Christendom into their own hands, as well for trans- 
 portation, as otherwise for the command and mastery 
 of the seas/ 
 
 Ralegh's pamphlet did not affect the King's decision 
 to defer, for political reasons, taking any active steps 
 concerning the fisheries, but we may well believe that 
 the hint about * the command and mastery of the seas ' 
 would not pass unheeded. It touched a question 
 about which James was peculiarly sensitive. That 
 question, though for a few years apparently dormant, 
 was one that neither King nor people could afford to 
 disregard. The command of the sea — then as at all 
 times — was vital to an island power. The English 
 were beginning to see in the Dutch not merely com- 
 petitors in trade, who were ousting them from every 
 market, but possible rivals for the dominion even of 
 those 'narrow seas^' in which the Kings of England 
 had so long claimed to have paramount sovereignty 
 and jurisdiction. Thus a feeling of dissatisfaction and 
 resentment gathered head which found vent, as was 
 
 ' See Note B. 
 
36 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 the custom of those days, in political pamphlet- writing. 
 Two of these pamphlets \ no less than that of Ralegh, 
 call for particular notice, for they are full of material 
 bearing upon the subject of the relations between the 
 English and Dutch at the time of their publication, 
 and throwing light upon the causes of the growing 
 estrangement between the two people. 
 
 England's Way to win Wealth, by Tobias Gentle- 
 man, Fisherman and Mariner, bears the date 1614. 
 The purpose of the writer is thoroughly practical. He 
 sets out in great detail the statistics of the fisheries on 
 the British coasts, and of the immense profits derived 
 by the Hollanders from the pursuit of this industry, 
 and he then proceeds to urge upon his countrymen to 
 take a lesson from the foreigners, and not to neglect, 
 as they are doing, a source of wealth which lies at 
 their very doors. The following quotation is a good 
 specimen of the homely vigour and directness of 
 Gentleman's arguments ; it will be seen that here, as 
 throughout the pamphlet, they profess to be based on 
 his own personal experience : — 
 
 ' What their [the Hollanders] chiefest trade is, or 
 their principal gold mine is well known to all mer- 
 chants, that have used those parts, and to myself and 
 all fishermen ; namely, that his Majesty's seas is their 
 chiefest, principal, and only rich treasury whereby they 
 have so long maintained their wars, and have so 
 greatly prospered and enriched themselves. If their 
 little country of the United Provinces can do this (as 
 is most manifest before our eyes they do) then what 
 may we, his Majesty's subjects, do, if this trade of 
 fishing were once erected among us, we having, in our 
 own countries, sufficient store of all necessaries to 
 
 * See Note. 
 
II: i6io-i6i8 37 
 
 accomplish the like business ? . . . And shall we 
 neglect so great blessings, O slothful England and 
 careless countrymen ! Look but on these fellows, that 
 we call the plump Hollanders, behold their diligence 
 in fishing and our own careless negligence/^ 
 
 Another pamphlet, The Trades Increase"^, was of 
 wider scope. It was directly inspired, as its anonymous 
 author J. R. informs us, by the reading of England s 
 Way to win Wealth, It deals not only with the ques- 
 tion of the fisheries, but of shipping and trade 
 generally, and rightly with shipping first of all. ' As 
 concerning ships,' J. R. writes — and how true do his 
 words ring in an Englishman's ears to-day — * by these 
 in a manner we live, the kingdom is, the King reigneth 
 . . . If we want ships, we are dissolved.* As Gentle- 
 man's pamphlet is valuable for its detailed statistics of 
 the fishing industry of the Hollanders, even more so is 
 that of J. R. for its broad survey of and comparison 
 between the Dutch and English trade in every part of 
 the world. From country to country and sea to sea in 
 all branches of commerce he shows how the English 
 are being driven out by their more enterprising com- 
 petitors. 
 
 * In consequence want of employment is breeding 
 discontents and miseries, while the means for remedy- 
 ing threatened disaster are in our own hands, the place 
 our own seas and within his Majesty's dominions.* 
 
 Nor is J. R. content with mere assertion. Basing his 
 arguments on those of Gentleman, he proceeds to set 
 forth how by the encouragement of English fishing 
 
 * we shall repair our Navy, breed seamen abun- 
 dantly, enrich the subject, advance the King's custom, 
 
 * Harleian Misc. iii, pp. 397-8. 
 
 ^ Ibid, iv, pp. 212-31. 
 
 C3 
 
3a ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 and assure the Kingdom, and all this out of fishing 
 and especially out of herrings/ 
 
 As to the Hollanders, he remarks significantly : — 
 
 * Howsoever it pleaseth his Majesty to allow of his 
 royal predecessor's bounty, in tolerating the neighbour 
 nations to fish in his streams, yet other princes take 
 more straight courses/ 
 
 This powerful and reasoned summary of a condition 
 of affairs so threatening to England's supremacy as 
 a maritime power, and to the welfare of her people, 
 testifies to the mixture of indignation and alarm with 
 which the English people regarded the rapid progress 
 in commerce and wealth of ' their neighbours the new 
 Sea-Herrs', as J. R. names the Dutch. If further 
 evidence were wanting as to the state of feeling in the 
 country, it is furnished by the striking language of the 
 Venetian envoy, Pietro Contarini (i 6 17/18). Accord- 
 ing to the report of this impartial observer^ : — 
 
 * Loud praises of past times and the worthy deeds of 
 forefathers form the topic of conversation. I have 
 heard great lords with tears of the deepest affliction 
 lamenting the present state of things and grieving how 
 England has already fallen in reputation with all the 
 world, England whose name and whose forces were 
 feared by foes and esteemed by friends. Now the 
 memory of past glory lost, as it were fallen into forget- 
 fulness of herself, she abandons not only the interests 
 of others, but even her own.' 
 
 Such was the result of the forciful feeble policy of 
 James, striving to pose as the keeper of the peace of 
 Europe, and to hold the balance between the rival 
 forces of Catholicism and Protestantism already arming 
 for the terrible struggle of the Thirty Years' War. After 
 * Relazioni Venete, Inghilterra^ iv. 206. 
 
II : i6io-i6i8 39 
 
 the marriage of his only daughter with the head of the 
 Protestant Union in Germany, he was soon once more 
 in eager pursuit of the phantasmal Spanish match, 
 which was for so many years to make him follow 
 a vacillating policy. The skilful diplomacy of Diego 
 Sarmiento d'Acuna, Count of Gondomar, who repre- 
 sented Philip III in London after 1613, enabled him 
 at this time to acquire a great ascendancy over James, 
 which with brief intervals he maintained for some years. 
 The Spanish envoy left no steps untried in the course 
 of the disputes which arose with the United Provinces 
 to prejudice the King's mind against the Dutch. He 
 found the moment peculiarly favourable for making 
 his influence felt, and he used his opportunities to the 
 utmost. It must be remembered that the year 161 2, 
 in which first Robert Cecil, Lord Salisbury, died, and 
 then six months later Henry, Prince of Wales, a youth 
 of great promise and popularity, whose strong person- 
 ality must have impressed itself on the history of his 
 times, is a critical dividing point in the reign of James I. 
 Ranke has in his account of this period laid considerable 
 stress on this fact : — 
 
 ' In the first years of his reign in England', he writes, 
 * so long as Robert Cecil lived, King James exercised 
 no great influence. The Privy Council possessed to 
 the full the authority, which belonged to it of old cus- 
 tom. James used simply to confirm the resolutions, 
 which were adopted in the bosom of the Council under 
 the influence of the treasurer. He appears in the 
 reports of ambassadors as a phantom King, and the 
 minister as the real ruler of the country. After the death 
 of Cecil all this was changed. The King knew the party 
 divisions which prevailed in the Council ; he knew how 
 to hold the balance between them, and in the midst of 
 
40 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 their divisions to carry out his views. . . . Great affairs 
 were generally transacted between the King and the 
 favourite in the ascendant at the time in conferences 
 to which only a few others were admitted, and some- 
 times not even these. The King himself decided, and 
 the resolutions that were taken were communicated to 
 the Privy Council, which gradually became accustomed 
 to do nothing more than invest them with the custom- 
 ary forms.' ^ 
 
 It was at this very time, when King James, yielding 
 himself more and more to the persuasive blandishments 
 of Gondomar, began to take a more markedly personal 
 part in the direction of foreign policy, that a succession 
 of fresh difficulties with the Dutch arose. The execu- 
 tion of the proclamation, which had been deferred for 
 two years in 1610, actually remained a dead letter until 
 1 616. Not that there had been any removal of the 
 causes which had originally called it forth. On the 
 contrary, the first years of the truce were a period of 
 marked activity and vigorous forward policy in the 
 United Provinces. In every direction, through the 
 energetic and vigilant statesmanship of Oldenbarne- 
 veldt, the commercial enterprise of the people was 
 enabled to open out fresh outlets for trade, and finally 
 to secure the recognition of the young Republic as an 
 influential member of the European family of nations. 
 Diplomatic missions were dispatched to Venice in 1609 
 and to Constantinople in 161 2, which prepared the way 
 for a great extension of Dutch trade in the Eastern 
 Mediterranean. Even more important were the close 
 relations established with Sweden and Russia. Gote- 
 burg became after 1609 virtually a Dutch town, and 
 before the middle of the century all Swedish industries 
 ^ Ranke, Hist, of England (Oxf. trans.), i. 473. 
 
II : i6io-i6i8 41 
 
 and Swedish commerce had passed more or less into 
 Dutch management or under Dutch control. In the 
 reign of Elizabeth the friendliest relations had subsisted 
 with the Tsar, Ivan the Terrible and his successors, so 
 that for some years the English Muscovy Company had 
 almost a monopoly of Russian trade by the White Sea. 
 But all this was now changed. A famous Dutch mer- 
 chant, Balthazar de Moncheron, established a factory 
 at Archangel in 1584, and from that time forward the 
 Dutch, at first vigorous competitors with the English 
 for the Russian market, gradually gained the supremacy. 
 The appearance of a Russian embassy at the Hague in 
 1 614 was the mark of the triumph of Dutch diplomacy 
 at Moscow : henceforth Russia was practically closed 
 to all but Netherlanders. In 161 5 a treaty with the 
 Hanse towns placed the Baltic trade even more com- 
 pletely than it had been in Dutch hands. In the East 
 Indies the English Company could not compete with its 
 far wealthier and more thoroughly organized rival. 
 
 There was, however, one element of weakness in the 
 position of the United Provinces on which the English 
 were never weary of insisting. By his possession of 
 the cautionary towns the King of England appeared 
 in the eyes of the world to be recognized as a pro- 
 tector of the Dutch Republic, who had certain rights 
 over it. Oldenbarne veldt in his negotiations had doubt- 
 less been hampered by the plain evidence which the 
 presence of English garrisons in Flushing, Brill, and 
 Rammekens afforded, that the States did not exercise 
 full sovereign authority within their own borders. In 
 these circumstances he (Oldenbarneveldt) knowing full 
 well the financial straits to which King James was 
 reduced through the long-standing disagreement be- 
 
42 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 tween him and his Parliament, made overtures in 1615 
 through the resident ambassador Caron to redeem the 
 towns by the payment of a sum of ready money. The 
 annual charge of ;^40,ooo received from the States 
 was barely more than sufficient for the maintenance 
 of the garrisons. The total amount claimed by the 
 English Government was ;^6oo,ooo ; the Dutch offered 
 ^100,000 in cash, and three further sums of ;^50,0C)0 
 in half-yearly instalments, or ;^2 50,000 in all. The 
 offer was accepted and in June, 16 16, the cautionary 
 towns were transferred into the hands of the Dutch. 
 
 It was, however, agreed that, for the sake of main- 
 taining good relations between the two countries, the 
 new English ambassador. Sir Dudley Carleton, should 
 like his predecessor. Sir Ralph Winwood, retain his 
 seat in the Council of State. This was the more 
 important, as the King had (as already stated) for the 
 past three years been steadily moving towards a Spanish 
 alliance. What were his precise aims and what his 
 ultimate purpose it was difficult even for the practised 
 and penetrating insight of a statesman of Oldenbarne- 
 veldt's experience to discover. Perhaps James scarcely 
 knew himself. But the retention of fortresses like 
 Flushing and Brill at the mouths of two most impor- 
 tant Dutch waterways by a foreign sovereign, who was 
 intriguing to win the favour of the Spanish foe, was for 
 the Republic a most serious danger. Their redemption 
 therefore at so trifling a cost was a stroke of policy by 
 which the aged Advocate did a great service to his 
 country. Certain it is that James felt a grudge against 
 Oldenbarneveldt, and that, when shortly afterwards 
 civil strife broke out in the United Provinces, Sir 
 D. Carleton, acting on the King's instructions, did his 
 
II : i6io-i6i8 43 
 
 utmost to bring about the great statesman's downfall 
 and to support his enemies in compassing his death. 
 
 But to return. Sir Dudley Carleton, when entering 
 upon his duties at the Hague in January, 1616, found, 
 in addition to the negotiations for the *reddition' of 
 the cautionary towns, several thorny questions requiring 
 delicate handling. In his instructions^ the following 
 somewhat enigmatical passage occurs : — 
 
 ' Some two years since there did arise between the 
 Company of our Muscovy Merchants and the Merchants 
 of Amsterdam a great difference concerning the naviga- 
 tion of Greenland ^ and the fishing of whales in those 
 parts. Our desire is that alV- good correspondence 
 may be maintained, as between our Crowns and their 
 Provinces, so between our and their subjects. There- 
 fore, whenever the subject shall fall into discourse, 
 either in public or in private, you may confidently 
 relate, when this question was debated before the lords 
 of the Council, between Sir Noel Caron their embassa- 
 dor and the Governor of our Muscovian Company, it 
 was evidently proved, and in a manner without contra- 
 diction, that our subjects were first discoverers of that 
 negotiation and that trade of fishing ; that privately they 
 were possessed of that island, and there had planted and 
 erected our standard, thereby to signify and notify to the 
 world the property, which we challenge ; which our sub- 
 jects, by their industries, having appropriated to them- 
 selves, did not hold it reasonable they should be forced 
 to communicate to others the fruits of their labours.* 
 
 The origin and cause of this new fishery dispute 
 
 * Dated Jan. 6/16. Letters to and from Sir Dudley Carleton 
 during his embassy in Holland from January 1615/16, to December 
 1620. London, 1757. 
 
 ^ Greenland here stands for Spitzbergen. All through these dis- 
 putes, owing to geographical ignorance, the two terms are used almost 
 interchangeably. 
 
44 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 requires to be briefly told, as it is characteristic of the 
 times and of the way in which, in almost every part 
 of the world, the English trader and the Dutch trader 
 met in rivalry, and with the inevitable result that 
 their interests clashed and bad feeling arose. Certain 
 English fishing vessels as early as 1608 made their 
 way to the Arctic Ocean to fish for whales off the 
 shores of Spitzbergen. The adventure was successful, 
 and was repeated. The news of it attracted some 
 Biscayans, then other foreigners, and in 16 12 two 
 Dutch ships to try their fortune in the same waters. 
 But King James in the following year {16 13) granted 
 to the Muscovy Company an exclusive monopoly of 
 the Greenland, meaning thereby the Spitzbergen, whale 
 fishery. He claimed these northern waters as the 
 property of the British Crown, because, so it was 
 averred, Hugh Willoughby had in 1553 discovered 
 Spitzbergen. The conferring of this monopoly caused 
 in 161 3 a numerous fishing fleet, some of the vessels 
 strongly armed, to set sail from England for Spitzbergen. 
 A landing was made, and the whole archipelago formally 
 annexed and named King James Newland. The next 
 step of the Muscovy Company's fleet was to clear the 
 ground of intruders, whether foreigners or English 
 * interlopers.' Among the foreigners were several 
 Dutch boats. These were attacked, boarded, plundered, 
 and then sent home. 
 
 Such an act of violence naturally aroused resent- 
 ment in Holland. The States-General took the 
 matter up, and refused to admit the right of James 
 to interfere with the fishermen. They denied that 
 Hugh Willoughby had sighted Spitzbergen at all in 
 I553» ^^d confidently afiirmed that the discovery of 
 
II : i6io-i6i8 45 
 
 the island was made by Jacob van Heemskerk in 1596, 
 who named it Spitzbergen, planted the Dutch flag upon 
 it, and spent the winter on its shores. If, then, any 
 people had preferential rights in the waters surrounding 
 Spitzbergen, it was the Dutch, but the States did not 
 claim or admit any such rights. They held that the 
 sea was open to all to navigate and to fish in without 
 let or hindrance. To Winwood, who in August, 161 3, 
 quitted the Hague to become Secretary of State in 
 London, was entrusted the mission of bringing the 
 complaints and the protest of the States to the notice 
 of James, and further, of asking for reparation to the 
 Amsterdammers, whose vessels had been seized and 
 plundered. The King at this time was anxious to be 
 on friendly terms with the Dutch, and an answer was 
 returned (October 25) that 'not only reparation should 
 be made, but that steps should be taken to prevent 
 a recurrence of such disorders.' The States were not 
 satisfied, however, with so general a reply, and wished 
 that the English claim to exclusive rights in the fish- 
 eries should be abandoned. The ambassador Caron 
 was instructed to present to the King an argument 
 from the pen of the geographer Plancius, in which 
 this claim was shown to be without foundation. It 
 produced no effect upon James, always unwilling to 
 yield in a matter affecting his sovereign prerogatives, 
 however shadowy. But the States were equally 
 determined. Their reply to the non-possumus attitude 
 of the King was the granting of a charter, early in 
 16 14 (January 27), to a company, generally known as 
 
 Iie Northern (sometimes as the Greenland) Company, 
 hich conferred on a group of merchants the exclusive 
 rivilege of fishing for whales and walrus, and of trading 
 
46 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 and exploring in the Northern seas between the limits 
 of Nova Zembla and Davis's Straits ; Spitzbergen, Bear 
 Island, and Greenland therein included.^ The States- 
 General likewise consented that warships at the charges 
 of the company should be allowed to accompany the 
 fishing fleet for their protection (April 4). The effect 
 of these strong measures was seen in the changed 
 attitude of the Muscovy Company, who in the summer 
 of 1 6 14 (July 2) made an agreement with their rivals, 
 that they should each of them use a portion of the 
 island as a basis for their fishery, and should unite in 
 keeping out all intruders. The extraordinary mission 
 of Sir Henry Wotton in February, 161 5, to the Hague 
 to treat for a settlement of the Julich-Cleves question, 
 gave an opportunity for proposing that he should, 
 while in the Netherlands, meet Commissioners of the 
 States to discuss also other important matters, and 
 among these the dispute about the so-called * Green- 
 land ' fisheries. In April the conference took place. 
 The Dutch, while laying stress upon their primary 
 rights as discoverers, disclaimed any desire to exclude 
 the English ; on the contrary, they endeavoured to 
 arrive at a friendly arrangement by which the two 
 nations should share the fishery * in unity and security ' 
 together. Nothing, however, was effected. The language 
 of King James in his ambassador's instructions, in which 
 mention is made of the differences that had arisen ' on 
 account of the fishery in the North Sea, near the shores 
 of Greenland, of right solely belonging to us and our 
 people, but interrupted by the Hollanders ', showed that 
 he approached the subject in an irreconcilable spirit. 
 All that Wotton could say was that he would report 
 ^ Aitzema Saken van Siaet en Oorlog^ ii. 356. 
 
II : i6io-i6i8 47 
 
 the matter to the King, who would inform Caron later 
 of his decision. The affair was, in other words, hung 
 up, and the dangerous spectacle was again witnessed 
 of two fishing fleets carrying on their trade in close 
 proximity, each under the protection of warships. 
 
 The Dutch force in 1615 was, however, far stronger, 
 and no hostilities took place. For the same reason an 
 armed peace was maintained in 1 6 1 7, but in the follow- 
 ing year acts of aggression were committed, and loud 
 complaints were raised on both sides. An attempt 
 was now made by the King to strengthen the hands of 
 the Muscovy Company by sanctioning for the purposes 
 of the whale fishery an alliance with the East India 
 Company. The two companies were, as far as regards 
 the Spitzbergen enterprise, to be regarded as one, 
 thus making a larger amount of capital available for 
 the outfit of the fishing fleet and for the maintenance 
 of the storage huts and so-called * cookeries ' on shore. 
 Thirteen well-equipped ships sailed for Spitzbergen in 
 1 61 8, and an even superior number from Holland and 
 Zeeland, accompanied by two war vessels. Neither 
 the English nor the Dutch sailors were in the mood to 
 brook interference, and from the outset it was almost 
 certain that if they met there would be mischief. The 
 English were the first aggressors, but were in their 
 turn attacked by the Dutch with the result that their 
 fleet was dispersed and many of their vessels plundered. 
 The ' Greenland ' fisheries question had reached an 
 acute stage. Such a condition of things could not con- 
 tinue, and Sir Dudley Carleton, the English ambassa- 
 dor, appeared in person before the States-General 
 (October 3, 161 8) to utter a strong remonstrance and 
 to urge the States, if they wished to remain on good 
 
48 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 terms with the King, to dispatch a special embassy to 
 deal with the disputes that had arisen between the two 
 countries, not only concerning the ' Greenland * fishing, 
 but in the East Indies, and about the herring fishery 
 and the cloth trade also. 
 
 At this point, before giving an account of the em- 
 bassy of 1 6 1 8, we must turn back and bring up to date 
 the history of the herring fishery question from i6io, 
 when the execution of the proclamation requiring 
 a licence from the fishermen was postponed, and also 
 briefly touch upon the two other causes of grievance in 
 regard to the cloth trade and the disputes between the 
 two East India Companies. 
 
 For several years after the return of the embassy of 
 i6io the Dutch herring fishery appears to have been 
 quietly carried on as usual without let or hindrance from 
 the English Government. No attempt was made to 
 enforce the proclamation until i6i6. The cause of the 
 alteration of James's policy at that date was due to 
 the refusal of the States-General to admit English 
 dyed cloths into the United Provinces. The manufac- 
 ture of woollen cloth had long been the chief of English 
 industries, and the monopoly of the trade in wool and 
 woollen goods in the Netherlands, Northern France 
 and Western Germany had been in the hands of one 
 of the oldest of English Chartered Companies, the Fel- 
 lowship of Merchant Adventurers ^ whose first charter 
 was granted by Henry VI in 1462. The Adventurer's 
 Court and Staple were for many years placed at 
 Antwerp. But in 1 568 they were driven away from the 
 Netherlands by Alva, and forced to settle elsewhere. 
 They went first to Emden, then to Hamburg. But the 
 * See Note D. 
 
 I 
 
II : i6io-i6i8 49 
 
 Hanse towns were jealous of their trade and prosperity, 
 and the Emperor was induced in 1597 to banish them 
 from Germany. At this date the authority of Spain 
 was no longer recognized north of the Scheldt. The 
 Adventurers accordingly in 1598 moved to Middelburg 
 in Zeeland, and extensive privileges were conferred 
 upon them by the States-General, the States of Zeeland, 
 and the town of Middelburg, including freedom from 
 duties on imports or exports, as well as from charges 
 for staple rights and harbour dues, and the right to be 
 tried in their own courts. 
 
 The trade of the Adventurers consisted entirely in 
 undyed cloths. The English, though the best weavers 
 of woollen cloth in the world, had not learnt as yet the 
 art of dyeing, and the unfinished cloths were imported 
 into the Netherlands, there to be dressed and dyed for 
 the continental markets. The consequence was that 
 a great industry sprang up in the provinces, especially 
 in Holland, and many thousands of skilled hands were 
 employed in this work. 
 
 When James I came to the throne, he listened 
 eagerly to every one who could point out to him any 
 means of raising money by the sale of monopolies or 
 patents. Among the proposals that attracted him was 
 me made by Alderman Sir William Cockayne, who 
 represented to his Majesty the great profit which might 
 be derived from finishing and dyeing English cloth 
 before exportation. The Merchant Adventurers 
 naturally used their utmost influence on the one hand 
 to persuade the King not to grant to Cockayne a patent, 
 which would be subversive of the rights granted to 
 their Company under their Charter, and on the other 
 to obtain the help of the States in preventing such 
 
 I 
 
50 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 a breach of existing privilege to the injury of the Dutch 
 dyers and finishers. The monopoly of the Adven- 
 turers had, however, many enemies among the English 
 merchants who did not belong to the Fellowship, and 
 who already, under the name of * Interlopers ' \ carried 
 on an extensive illegitimate trade through the ports of 
 Amsterdam and Flushing. Cockayne and his adhe- 
 rents prevailed. A patent was granted to him in 1608, 
 his Majesty reserving to himself the monopoly of the 
 sale of all home-dyed goods. It was clear, however, 
 that the existence of the two monopolies side by side 
 could not continue. After much friction and constant 
 complaints, James, in 1615, took decisive action. He 
 forbade the export of undyed and unfinished cloth from 
 England, and commanded the Merchant Adventurers 
 to return their Charter. Cockayne immediately formed 
 a company, but his hopes of creating a new and lucra- 
 tive English industry were speedily dashed to the , 
 ground. The States of Holland passed a resolution 1 
 forbidding the importation of dyed cloths into their 
 province, and their example was followed by the other 
 provinces separately, and by the States-General. The 
 English woollen trade was stricken fatally by such 
 a prohibition, Cockayne's Company failed, and James 
 was at last compelled in 161 7 to renew the Charter of 
 the Adventurers. 
 
 It is needless to say that the King, who had hoped 
 to replenish his empty treasury through his active pro- 
 motion of Cockayne's scheme, was sorely disappointed 
 at the issue, and deeply resented the strong measures 
 taken by Holland and the United Provinces generally 
 to checkmate his plan for the creation of a new English 
 
 * See Note E. 
 
II : i6io-i6i8 51 
 
 industry to their injury. Baulked in this direction, 
 James, on his side, turned his thoughts to reprisals, and 
 in so doing had on this occasion the full approval of his 
 subjects. Secretary Winwood wrote, September 14, 
 1 616, to Sir Dudley Carleton, at the Hague : — 
 
 * It is in the mouth of every true-hearted Englishman 
 that as a reprisal for the publication of the rigorous 
 placard against English dyed and dressed cloths, that 
 his Majesty with justice and equity and in reason of 
 state ought to forbid the Hollanders, by a fresh revival 
 of former proclamations, to continue their yearly fishing 
 on our coast.' 
 
 But Winwood had had long personal knowledge of 
 the Dutch, and he did not like the prospect of the two 
 nations, so long and closely bound together by ties of 
 friendship and alliance, thus drifting apart through 
 trade rivalries into enmity. 
 
 * If we come *, he writes, * to these extremities I know 
 both we and they shall suffer and smart for it '. And 
 then he continues in words rendered weighty by the 
 experience which lay behind them : * I know well the 
 nature of that people and the humour of those mas- 
 ters, who sit at the stern of that State. They will not 
 be willingly crossed in their courses — et quod volunt, 
 valde volunt. Yet it is never too late to be wise, and 
 no counsel is evil but that which cannot be changed. 
 
 ' I profess unto you I am in great anguish of spirit, how 
 to accommodate these differences to the full content- 
 ment of all parties. This is most certain — couste que 
 couste — and though coelum terris misceatur, his Majesty 
 is resolved not to swallow, much less to digest, these 
 indignities. As before I have said, only the Spaniards 
 have cause to triumph and to make bonfires of joy and 
 gladness.' He requests Carleton to see Oldenbarne- 
 veldt and urge accommodation for the mutual good of 
 
52 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 both countries. ' If the States \ he adds, * do persist in 
 their resolutions, actum est de amicitia' ^ 
 
 But although Winwood speaks in this letter, dated 
 September 24, as if the King was only considering the 
 question of a revival of the proclamation of 1 609, steps 
 had already been taken (apparently with his know- 
 ledge) to levy a toll upon the fishers on the Scottish 
 coast. As early as June 16, the Duke of Lennox, in 
 his capacity as Admiral of Scotland, had received 
 instructions from the Scottish Council to take from 
 every fishing *buss' a payment either in money (an 
 angelot) or in kind (one ton of herring and twelve cod- 
 fish). Accordingly, on August 7, a vessel appeared in 
 the midst of the fishing fleet, having on board a certain 
 John Browne, the Duke's Secretary. The Dutch en- 
 voy (Caron) had been induced, under a misconception 
 of the purpose for which it was required, to write a 
 commendatory letter for this man to show to the cap- 
 tains of the Dutch convoy-ships. Browne demanded 
 in the name of the King from the skippers of each 
 ' buss ' the above-named toll or excise, and he pro- 
 ceeded to make a list of all their names and the names 
 of the boats, giving receipts to those who paid, and 
 informing those who did not do so that they would 
 have to pay double the following year. The greater 
 part paid without opposition, until the two convoy- 
 ships arrived on the scene. Browne was seized and 
 requested to produce his commission. At the sight of 
 Caron's letter, however, they dismissed him, as he had 
 used no violence, but they would not allow him to 
 collect any more toll. 
 
 ^ Carleton's letters during his embassy in Holland, January 16 15/16, 
 to December 1620, p. iii. 
 
II : i6io-i6i8 53 
 
 The two captains, as in duty bound, reported the 
 matter at once to the home authorities. Great was 
 the surprise and indignation at Enkhuysen and other 
 centres of the fishing industry at the reception of the 
 news. On August 27 it was discussed by the States- 
 General, who denounced the attempt to levy a toll as 
 ' an unheard-of and unendurable novelty, conflicting 
 with previous treaties'. Two dispatches were sent, 
 ont to Caron telling him * that the States had taken 
 the matter extremely to heart, and desired him to seek 
 for redress by every possible means ' ; the other to the 
 captains of the convoy bidding them * not to permit 
 any toll to be exacted'. In obedience to his instruc- 
 tions Caron made repeated representations to the 
 King, to Lennox, to the Scottish Council, but his argu- 
 ments and remonstrances fell on deaf ears, and his 
 efforts to obtain satisfaction proved fruitless. In these 
 circumstances the opening of the fishing season of 161 7 
 was awaited in Holland with anxiety, and by those 
 acquainted with the temper of the Dutch seamen, with 
 apprehension. Their fears were justified. 
 
 Browne again visited the fishing fleet, and began his 
 task of levying toll, which according to all testimony 
 he carried out in a tactful and considerate manner. 
 Arriving at the Rotterdam convoy-ship he met with 
 a flat refusal from the captain, Andries Tlieff of 
 Rotterdam, in his own name and that of the other 
 Dutch fishermen. After having received this refusal 
 in writing, Browne was preparing quietly to go away 
 to visit the other fishing boats, mostly French, when 
 Jan Albertsz, captain of the Enkhuysen convoy-ship, 
 stepped on board. He was one of the two captains 
 who had in the previous year forcibly compelled 
 
 r 
 
 ti 
 
54 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 Browne to stop his collection of toll. Albertsz now 
 declared that he had orders to arrest Browne, and, 
 despite his protests, the Scottish official was made 
 a prisoner and carried to Holland. 
 
 The indignation of James, when he heard of what 
 had taken place, knew no bounds. Two captains of 
 Dutch vessels in the Thames were seized, as hostages, 
 and Carleton was instructed to go in person to the 
 States-General and demand satisfaction for the insult 
 and injury done to his Majesty's honour by the 'exem- 
 plary punishment and in a public and open fashion of 
 those, who had committed such an act : a satisfaction 
 such as may hold a just proportion unto the insolency 
 of the grievance.' ^ On August 23, Carleton, describing 
 the result of an interview with the Advocate, spoke of 
 * Barneveldt not knowing what to say, but that the 
 taking of Browne was ill-done, and desiring me with 
 his hat in his hand (much differing from his use) to 
 make report thereof to his Majesty.' Both he and 
 also Maurice disavowed Albertsz's action, and the 
 States-General in their turn declared that the captains 
 had acted without instructions, and ordered Browne 
 to be released. At the same time they respectfully 
 insisted that their fishermen were specially exempted 
 from paying any toll for their fishing. They ask 
 Carleton to beg James, as Browne had been set free, 
 to release the hostages that he had seized. But 
 Winwood peremptorily informed Carleton (August 27, 
 O.S.), * His Majesty will take no satisfaction, but to 
 have the captains and chief officers of the ships sent 
 
 ^ Carleton's Letters^ pp. 156-7. Report of the Lords of the Council 
 with the King in Scotland, to the Lords of the Council in England, 
 Aug. 4/14, 1617. 
 
II : i6io-i6i8 55 
 
 over prisoners to England/ This demand, however, 
 was most unpalatable in Holland. The States of that 
 province stood upon their privileges. The captains 
 should be tried, they said, but only by their own courts 
 and laws. James, however, would not give way. In 
 Winwood's words * he insisted, fort et ferme, on the 
 offenders being delivered into his hands'. Thus for 
 many months the obstinate dispute continued. At last 
 (February i) the States of Holland, the opposition of 
 the towns of Rotterdam and Enkhuysen to deliver up 
 their citizens having been overcome, consented that 
 Albertsz and Tlieff should be sent to Noel Caron to 
 submit themselve to his Majesty's mercy, * for which,' 
 says Carleton,^ * in a letter they sue, and ' he adds 
 * they also ask for the freedom of fishing on the coast 
 of Scotland, to which they lay claim, without molesta- 
 tion.' Not till April did Tlieff actually set sail for 
 England, and then without the worse offender, Al- 
 bertsz, who was very ill, and in fact died shortly after- 
 wards. James now, however, professed himself satis- 
 fied, the hostages were set free, and the Browne inci- 
 dent closed without a breach of the peace. 
 
 The fishery dispute meanwhile remained an open 
 sore. Loud complaints were made by the Scottish 
 Council that the Dutch not only claimed the right to 
 fish free from any toll, but they under the protection of 
 their armed convoy hindered the Scottish boats from 
 fishing, and took away their nets and otherwise treated 
 them * with daily outrages and insolences '. This was 
 the state of affairs in 1617. Carleton made many and 
 strong remonstrances, but in 1618 the complaints of 
 the Scotch that they were driven away from the fishing 
 * Carleton's Letters^ October 11. 
 
56 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 grounds by acts of violence were louder than ever. 
 Instructions had been given to Carleton (April lo, 
 1618) that, as a means for avoiding these disputes and 
 encounters, he should request the States to order their 
 fishermen to ply their trade out of sight of land, as 
 had been, so he averred, their former custom. After 
 a delay of two months the States, while promising to 
 punish severely all who could be shown to have com- 
 mitted such acts as those complained of, declared that 
 after examination of witnesses on oath they could not 
 discover that any offences such as those spoken of by 
 the King had taken place. As to the Netherlanders 
 fishing out of sight of land, they denied any knowledge 
 of such a custom, and prayed the King not to disturb 
 their countrymen in the exercise of that right of free 
 fishing granted them from time immemorial by a suc- 
 cession of treaties. 
 
 Thus in the summer of 1618 we have seen that no 
 less than three burning questions — the Greenland or 
 Spitzbergen fishery, the Great or Herring fishery, and 
 the refusal to admit English dyed or dressed cloths 
 into the Netherlands — were causing the relations 
 between England and the United Provinces to be 
 very strained. A fourth question, that of the disputes 
 of the rival East India Companies as to trading rights 
 in the Banda Islands, Amboyna, and the Moluccas, 
 where the Dutch, being in far stronger force, prevented 
 the English from sharing in the lucrative commerce in 
 spices, was also becoming acute. Several islands — 
 among them one named Pulo Run, which the English, 
 by the consent of the natives, had occupied — were 
 seized by the Dutch, and actual hostilities between 
 the fleets representing the two nations in those waters 
 
II : i6io-i6i8 57 
 
 were only avoided because the English were not in 
 a position to offer effective resistance to their superior 
 adversaries. Negotiations had therefore been set on 
 foot as early as 1 6 1 5 to effect a friendly understanding 
 by which the English should be allowed a fair share in 
 the spice trade, and the companies co-operate for their 
 common interest. So far, however, in 16 18, were 
 matters from being arranged, that a strong fleet had 
 been dispatched from London in that year under Sir 
 Thomas Dale to restore the balance of power in the 
 Bunda archipelago. 
 
 When, therefore, as has been already related, 
 Carleton on October 3 appeared in the States-General 
 to protest in the strongest possible language against 
 the acts of hostility committed against the fishing fleet 
 of the Muscovy Company off Spitzbergen, he did not 
 confine himself to this one cause of embittered dispute, 
 but demanded that the States should send at once, 
 promptly and without delay, the special embassy, which 
 had been often spoken of but never taken seriously in 
 hand, to discuss in London all the points of difference 
 between the two nations — the East Indian spice trade, 
 the herring fishery, and the dyed cloth question — and 
 to strive to arrive at a friendly arrangement. O therwise, 
 he warned them that the King, though he had shown 
 himself willing to bear much at their hands, had now 
 reached the limit of his endurance. 
 
 / 
 
Ill: 1618-1623 
 
 In the Netherlands the minds of all men were 
 throughout the year 161 8 preoccupied with the fierce 
 political and religious discords that had brought civil 
 strife into the land. The sword of Maurice had, in the 
 name of the States-General of the Union, overthrown 
 the power of the provincial oligarchies, and despite the 
 strenuous opposition of the States of Holland under 
 the leadership of Oldenbarne veldt, had made good the 
 claim of the States-General to sovereign authority in 
 the Republic. The aged Advocate of Holland, so long 
 supreme in the administration of public affairs, with his 
 chief adherents, lay in prison awaiting trial and con- 
 demnation. Anxious, therefore, at such a crisis, to 
 avoid a breach with King James, or to provoke on his 
 part measures of reprisal (especially in view of the 
 approaching meeting of the Synod of Dort, at which 
 James was to be officially represented), the States 
 announced their readiness (October 18) to accede to 
 Carleton's request for the speedy dispatch of a special 
 embassy. But they wished to confine the subjects of 
 discussion to the East Indian and Greenland disputes. 
 In vain Carleton pressed upon the States the urgency 
 of including the Great (Herring) Fishery and dyed 
 cloth questions in the instruction. The reply was that 
 it would be dangerous in the disturbed condition of the 
 country to touch matters of such great importance 
 affecting the interests of so large a portion of the 
 population of the maritime provinces. A clear indica- 
 tion was moreover given that on these two points there 
 was little possibility of concession. 
 
Ill: 1618-1623 59 
 
 The ambassadors arrived in England (December 7) 
 accompanied by five commissioners of the East India 
 Company. The King received them with expressions 
 of friendHness (December 20), but the examination of 
 their instructions by the Privy Council at once revealed 
 that the subject of the Great Fisheries, which had 
 most interest for the English, was omitted. The Dutch 
 envoys accordingly were informed that the King was 
 very astonished that the warnings of Carleton had been 
 without effect, and that their mission would be fruitless 
 unless this point, which concerned the King's sovereign 
 rights, were placed in the forefront of the negotiations. 
 ( James, indeed, refused to proceed unless the instructions 
 were altered, and held out the threat of an alliance 
 with Spain if his wishes were not complied with. 
 Carleton, indeed, in a long and angry representation 
 made to the States-General, January 1 2, 16 19, practically 
 demanded, not only that the ambassadors should be 
 instructed to deal with the Great Fishery question, but 
 to admit that their rights under ancient treaties and 
 their contention as to the freedom of the sea were 
 claims that could not be sustained in face of the King's 
 * lawful title and exclusive sovereign rights and property 
 in the fisheries upon the coasts of his three kingdoms '. I 
 In case of delay, England would maintain her rights 
 with the armed hand. The King was resolved that 
 the grievances of which his subjects complained must 
 cease. 
 
 The States-General, however, dared not in the midst 
 of the crisis through which the country was passing, 
 interfere with the fishery question. Maurice, as Captain- 
 General of the Union, had by military force overpowered 
 the resistance of the Province of Holland to the will of 
 
6o ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 the States-General. Its leaders had been incarcerated, 
 and the town magistracies throughout Holland changed. 
 Feelings were very embittered, and the position of the 
 new magistrates would have been seriously endangered 
 had the dominant party consented to yield to English 
 threats the rights of free fishing, an industry on which 
 some 50,000 persons in Holland depended for their 
 livelihood. Both Maurice and his cousin and trusted 
 adviser, William Lewis of Nassau, Stadholder of Fries- 
 land, were agreed that such a course was at the moment 
 unwise, if not impracticable. These considerations 
 were laid before James, who had throughout the dis- 
 cussions in the Republic strongly sympathized with 
 the triumphant Contra-Remonstrant party. The result 
 was a modification in his unbending attitude. 1 The King 
 agreed to defer the discussion of the * Great Fishery ' 
 question until the internal state of the Netherlands 
 had become more settled, and to proceed with the 
 Greenland fishery and East Indian matters first, on 
 condition that the delay was to be as short as possible 
 and not to extend beyond the end of the year. ! Indeed, 
 September i was named as the actual limit of time. 
 The States were quickly informed (January 21) of the 
 English concession, and now that the tension was 
 relieved, took more than three weeks in which to 
 consider carefully the terms of their answer to Carleton. 
 They were in a difficult position, and they finally 
 (February 1 3) gave in general terms a non-committal 
 undertaking that ' so soon as the affairs of this land, 
 political and religious, shall be brought into a better 
 state — if possible within a year ', they will send ambas- 
 sadors to treat of the Great Fishery, the cloth trade, 
 and other points, as a preliminary to the revision of 
 
Ill: 1618-1623 6r 
 
 the treaties of intercourse. Meanwhile they trusted 
 that all should go on as before, and that the English 
 would make no innovation in contravention of the 
 ancient customs and treaties. So the matter rested, 
 the States being warned that the King demanded that 
 the placard of June 5, 161 8, forbidding the Dutch 
 fishermen to commit further outrages and excesses 
 ' on pain of severe penalties ', or to approach within 
 sight (the English said within 14 miles, but to this the 
 Dutch objected) of the Scottish coast, should be rigidly 
 enforced during the intermediate period of delay. 
 
 The efforts of the Dutch ambassadors to settle the 
 two questions which according to their instructions 
 were the chief object of their mission nevertheless 
 encountered serious difficulties, and it was soon ap- 
 parent that the views of the two parties were almost 
 irreconcilable. The scheme for a working union of 
 the two East India Companies was speedily given 
 up. For months, however, the rights and wrongs of 
 the two nations with regard to the Greenland (Spitz- 
 bergen) fisheries were the subject of many conferences 
 and interchanges of notes. The English maintained 
 that they, on the ground of first discovery and of being 
 the first to fish in the Spitzbergen waters, had exclu- 
 sive rights of sovereignty both on the land and the 
 seas that surrounded it. The Dutch set up the counter- 
 claim that they had not only first discovered, but first 
 occupied the land, and they held firmly that the sea 
 was free to all nations. For the damages suffered by 
 the English fishing fleet at the hands of the Nether- 
 landers in 1 61 8 an indemnity was demanded by the 
 English Government amounting to ^43,800, and this 
 did not include the amounts due to private ship-owners 
 
/ 
 
 62 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 for the loss of their trade, and to the relatives of those 
 who had been killed or wounded. The Dutch replied 
 by pointing to the repeated provocations the Hollanders 
 and Zeelanders had had year by year to endure, and 
 to the losses they on their side had suffered not only 
 through being hindered in their fishing, but through 
 actual plundering of their goods. The ambassadors 
 promised to give reparation, if the EngHsh would do 
 the same. Tired at last of fruitless discussions, pro- 
 longed month after month, the Dutch envoys sought 
 a personal interview with the King, July lo, at Green- 
 wich, to see if any modus vivendi could be arrived at. 
 All the old arguments on both sides were repeated, 
 and neither would yield on the point of their several 
 ' rights ' ; the utmost the King would concede was 
 a suggestion that, as a favour, he might connive at the 
 Netherlanders fishing in his waters. I This did not 
 satisfy the ambassadors, and they fell back on the 
 familiar device of asking that the question should be 
 put off for later settlement. To this finally James 
 agreed, and it was arranged that the matter should 
 be deferred for further negotiations for a period of 
 three years, and that meanwhile the English and Dutch 
 were to fish peaceably together. The King insisted 
 that restitution should be made for the damage done 
 by the armed attack on the English fleet in 1618 
 within three months, and for all other losses inflicted 
 by the Dutch within the three years. As soon as 
 the full English claims were settled (such was the 
 ultimatum), the question of the satisfaction due to the 
 Netherlanders should be considered. With this deci- 
 sion, however unpalatable to them, the envoys had 
 perforce to be content. I They sailed from Gravesend, 
 
Ill: 1618-1623 63 
 
 on August I, without having really effected anything 
 but a postponement of disputes, which mere delay 
 was more likely to aggravate than to appease. 
 
 /The results then of the embassy of 1618 were dis- 
 appointing to both parties. The English resented the 
 continued presence of the Dutch fishermen both in 
 the home waters and in the Northern Seas, for they 
 not only carried off the profits from what were regarded 
 as British industries, but behaved with overbearing 
 arrogance as if in their own domain. The Hollanders '''' 
 found themselves permitted, as it were on sufferance, to 
 continue an occupation which supplied a large part of 
 their population with sustenance and was the basis of 
 their prosperity./ The States-General, though they were 
 committed by their envoys to send a fresh embassy to 
 deal with the question of the Great Fisheries, as soon 
 as the jnternal troubles of the country were settled, t^fere 
 in no hurry to move in the matter. It was in vain that 
 Carleton in the early months of 1620 reminded them of 
 their undertaking. /The general opinion in Holland, and 
 in this Prince Maurice himself shared, was that there // 
 could be no surrender of the treaty right to free fishing, 
 even though it should be at the cost of war. ' 
 
 Their position was greatly strengthened by the mo- 
 mentous events that had been occurring in Germany. 
 The Elector Palatine, Frederick — King James's son-in- 
 law — had accepted the Crown of Bohemia (November, 
 16 19) but a year later his forces were crushed by the 
 Imperial army at the White Hill near Prague (Novem- 
 ber 5). Meanwhile his hereditary dominions had been 
 invaded and conquered by a Spanish force under Spinola. 
 Frederick was head of the Protestant Union, but the 
 forces of the Union were disunited (indeed it was soon 
 
64 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 afterwards dissolved), and although Sir Horace Vere, 
 at the head of a fine body of 2,000 English volunteers, 
 escorted by a strong Dutch force, made his way to the 
 scene of conflict, he was unable to prevent the Spanish 
 conquest of the Lower Palatinate. The unfortunate 
 King of Bohemia, a homeless fugitive, was compelled 
 with his wife, Elizabeth of England, to seek refuge 
 with his uncle, the Prince of Orange, at the Hague. 
 /The Dutch were greatly disturbed, as the twelve years' 
 truce was drawing to an end, at the prospect of the 
 Spaniards being able through their alliance with the 
 /7 Emperor to march from their post of vantage on 
 vV the Rhine straight upon the Netherlands, and were 
 therefore anxious to secure the goodwill and help of 
 England in the serious struggle which they saw before 
 them./ They felt confident that, despite his love of 
 peace, James would be forced to take active steps to 
 defend his son-in-law's lands from conquest, and the 
 cause of Protestantism in Germany from ruin. The 
 news of the complete defeat of Frederick at the White 
 Hill therefore, together with the necessity of renewing 
 the treaty between the two countries, which expired in 
 April, 162 1, at the end of the truce, had more effect 
 than Carleton's remonstrances and threats in hastening 
 a renewal of negotiations. The English ambassador 
 was instructed to assure the States that James would 
 lend assistance for the recovery of the Palatinate, and 
 it was resolved by them that a special mission should 
 be dispatched as soon as possible. It was well known 
 that the King was still on the most confidential terms 
 with Gondomar, and that the Spanish envoy continued 
 to exercise a strong influence upon the royal policy, 
 and that the project of a Spanish marriage had not 
 
Ill : 1618-1623 65 
 
 been abandoned. /It was felt therefore that a strong 
 effort should be made to counteract this secret leaning 
 of James to listen to the subtle counsels of the Spaniard, 
 and to persuade him to break with Spain and to take IV 
 decisively the Protestant side in the war against the 
 allied forces of the House of Habsburg. / 
 
 The ambassadors set sail from Veere, January 28, 
 162 1, and arrived in London on February i. They 
 were six in number, representing the three maritime 
 provinces of Holland, Zeeland, and Friesland, in itself 
 a proof that though the affairs of the Palatinate were 
 the principal subject that filled their instructions, the 
 fishery questions, for the moment placed in the back- 
 ground, had in reality lost none of their importance. 
 The names of the special envoys were Jonkheer Jacobus 
 van Wijngaerden, Johan Camerling, Albert Sonck, 
 Albert Bruyninck, Jacobus Schotte, and Jonkheer Fre- 
 derik van Vervou tot Martenahuys, and with them was 
 associated the resident in London, Noel Caron. At 
 their first audience with the King (February 7) the 
 situation in Germany was almost exclusively referred 
 to. They laid stress upon the extent of the Spanish 
 conquests on the Rhine, and after pointing out that 
 the States had been paying monthly subsidies to certain 
 of the Protestant princes and had collected a great 
 army on the frontier, expressed their gratification at the 
 information that had been received through Sir Dudley 
 Carleton to the effect that the King would, if diplomacy 
 failed, restore his children in the possessions by force. 
 Should he indeed be prepared to take steps for military 
 intervention, they were commissioned to assure him 
 that the States would be ready to second his action 
 and to go to war. 
 
66 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 The embassy had arrived at a critical moment in the 
 reign of James I, and after some words of friendly com- 
 pliment their conference with the Privy Council was 
 deferred until February 15. In the interval James s 
 third Parliament had met (February 9). The King's 
 financial necessities had forced him to summon a Par- 
 liament, and the session was to prove a very stormy 
 one. The leaders of the Commons at once demanded 
 the redress of many grievances and proceeded to attack 
 those whom they charged with being the cause of the 
 abuses they denounced, more especially the omnipotent 
 favourite, Buckingham himself. The sojourn of the 
 Dutch mission therefore coincided with a period of 
 political stress and anxiety. / But the envoys had the 
 satisfaction of knowing that the English Parliament, 
 which in this was thoroughly representative of public 
 opinion in the country, was enthusiastically in favour of 
 active support being given to the King of Bohemia for 
 the recovery of the Palatinate. Subsidies were without 
 delay voted for that purpose, and the vote was accom- 
 panied by a petition urging the King to make war with 
 Spain and to break off the negotiations for the Spanish 
 marriage. / 
 
 But Gondomar found no difficulty in trading upon 
 James's habitual preference for peaceful methods. Ac- 
 cording to the testimony of the Venetian, Girolamo 
 Lando, the Spanish ambassador ' had access to the 
 King at any hour, and found all doors open to him 
 which were accustomed to be shut to others ', and he is 
 described as ' with ever-increasing boldness carrying on 
 a campaign against these kingdoms with unspeakable 
 intrigues and corruption.' Through his counsels the 
 King entered upon a series of negotiations with the 
 
Ill: 1618-1623 67 
 
 Courts of Madrid and Vienna in the interests of Fre- 
 derick, which were perfectly futile and merely afforded 
 the Catholic powers time to strengthen their position 
 upon the Rhine. At the same time James, by opposing 
 himself to the expressed wishes of his Parliament and 
 people in this matter of the Palatinate, only heightened 
 the determination of the House of Commons to assert 
 their privileges and insist upon their demand for a re- 
 dress of grievances, /in foreign no less than in domestic 
 affairs, the views of the King and those of the represen- // 
 tatives of his people proved to be diametrically opposed. / 
 In December accordingly, no compromise being pos- ■ 
 sible, Parliament was dissolved, and James, left in .' 
 desperate financial straits, was unable to carry out any // 
 policy that involved expenditure. In considering the 
 course of the negotiations with the Dutch, these facts 
 must be borne in mind, for they are vitally important 
 for a right understanding of the situation. 
 
 The embassy, delayed by the opening of Parliament, 
 had a conference with the Privy Council on February 1 5. 
 Once more they impressed upon their audience the 
 seriousness of the dangers which threatened both the 
 United Provinces and England from the war in Ger- 
 many, and urged, now that the truce with Spain was 
 almost expired, the renewal of the treaty of alliance 
 between the two countries to defend the Protestant 
 cause against a common enemy. In the words of the 
 contemporary historian Aitzema, ' they laid strong 
 emphasis upon this last point as if it were the only 
 object and aim of the embassy.' But the Council had 
 no desire, so immediately after the meeting of Parlia- 
 ment, to commit themselves on the subject of military 
 intervention, for they were well aware of the King's 
 
68 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 disinclination to break with Spain. The question 
 was accordingly put to the Dutchmen as to whether 
 there were no other points in their instructions, men- 
 tion being specially made of the fisheries, the cloth, 
 and the East Indian disputes. The reply was that 
 in the present critical condition of European affairs 
 the interest of both States required that secondary 
 questions should be allowed to rest and continue on 
 the same footing as before in the presence of the 
 grave danger (now the truce was drawing to an end) 
 from a mighty enemy. Some lesser differences which 
 had arisen about the * tare ' in the cloth trade, and 
 the * mint ', they were ready to discuss, but nothing 
 more. 
 
 The matter was referred to the King, and on 
 March 2 the envoys had a second conference with the 
 Council, when it was made clear to them that the 
 fisheries questions must be settled as a preliminary to 
 any treaty of alliance. The Dutch could only answer 
 (March 10) that they had received no powers to nego- 
 tiate upon the fisheries, but in accordance with their 
 instructions they pointed out the difficulty and the 
 danger of trying to interfere with an industry in which 
 so large a part of the population were interested, while 
 civil discords were scarcely appeased and a renewal of 
 the war with Spain was on the point of breaking out. 
 So much was this the case that though the value of the 
 fishing (so they said) was steadily decreasing, the States 
 were granting large subsidies for convoys in order to 
 provide the means of sustenance for so large a number 
 of their subjects. The smallest toll or charge, they 
 argued, would either cause * their fishery to be entirely 
 destroyed and ruined, or possibly stir up this rude sea- 
 
Ill: 1618-1623 69 
 
 faring population to fresh commotions to the manifest 
 peril of the repose of the Republic, scarcely cured of the 
 wounds of its late infirmity.' They begged therefore 
 that the consideration of the matter might be put off 
 to a more fitting time, and meanwhile that the old 
 privileges should continue in force. As to the Green- 
 land fishery, it was pleaded that the three years' delay 
 that had been granted in 16 19 was not yet expired. 
 Similarly in the East Indian disputes, which continued 
 with no less frequency and bitterness, although an 
 accord between the two companies had been agreed 
 upon in June, 161 9, the Netherlanders met the com- 
 plaints of the representatives of the English Company 
 with excuses and counter-protests. There was much 
 talking, but practically no progress made. After several 
 interviews with the Council and the King himself it 
 was finally arranged that things should remain as they 
 were for a short time longer, but the King insisted 
 (April 8) that * the fishery questions concerned his 
 right and his honour and that he could not allow them 
 to be any longer in debate and suspense ', and that 
 a special Commission must be sent by the States to 
 deal with these disputes, and further, that he would 
 not wait longer than May 31. He also demanded 
 a settlement of the quarrels in the East Indies, and 
 a withdrawal of the * tare ' edict, which was declared 
 to be the ruin of the cloth industry in England. So 
 soon as these matters were satisfactorily arranged, he 
 promised that he would conclude an alliance with the 
 States. The Dutch envoys left London on their return 
 journey on April 26. 
 
 As a proof of the very close relations subsisting at 
 this time between England and the United Provinces. 
 
 E3 
 
70 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 it may be mentioned that in the very same months 
 that the Wijngaerden embassy was thus holding in- 
 effectual conferences in London with the King of 
 England and his Privy Council, the Fellowship of the 
 Merchant Adventurers were transferring their Court to 
 the Prinsenhof at Delft. 
 
 Driven from Antwerp in 1582 the Adventurers had, 
 as already related, set up their Great Court first at 
 Emden, then at Hamburg and Stade. But in 1598 
 the enmity of the Hanse towns compelled them to 
 leave Stade, and to establish themselves at Middelburg 
 in Zeeland. Until the suppression of the Adventurers' 
 Charter in 161 5, this town was the staple for English 
 cloth and wool in the Netherlands, though the ' inter- 
 lopers \ as they were called, succeeded in carrying on 
 an active smuggling trade through Amsterdam and 
 Flushing. After the renewal of the Charter in 161 7 
 the Adventurers returned to Middelburg, but on ac- 
 count of the unhealthiness of the place, and other 
 reasons, they determined to remove to Delft. To 
 effect this involved elaborate negotiations with the 
 Town Corporation, with the States of Holland, and 
 with the States-General. Moreover, the consent of the 
 King was necessary as a preliminary step. Sir Dudley 
 Carleton was largely instrumental in bringing the mat- 
 ter to a successful issue. James gave his consent that 
 the Court should move from Zeeland within the 
 borders of Holland, ' to show his Majesty's great affec- 
 tion for that Province'. On April 21, 162 1, the con- 
 tract with Delft was signed, just as the Dutch envoys 
 were leaving England. But Amsterdam, with whose 
 cloth merchants the ' interlopers ' had been engaged in 
 a profitable trade, sent in to the States of Holland 
 
Ill : 1618-1623 71 
 
 a very strongly worded remonstrance. They objected 
 to the privileges which the Delft Corporation had 
 granted to the Adventurers as injurious to themselves 
 and the interests of the province. The States of 
 Holland on receiving this remonstrance resolved that 
 the contract made by Delft and the monopoly of the 
 Adventurers should be examined by a commission. 
 Against this Delft and a number of other towns sent 
 in a counter-remonstrance, but the influence of Amster- 
 dam outweighed theirs in the provincial States, who 
 by a majority of votes persisted in their determination. 
 The Merchant Adventurers, however, appealed from 
 the provincial authorities to the States-General, who 
 had always been their protectors. And now began 
 one of those curious struggles so common in Dutch 
 history between the town of Delft, the States of 
 Holland, and the States-General, all of them claiming 
 independent authority to deal with the matter. The 
 Corporation of Delft refused to hand over their con 
 tract with the Merchant Adventurers to be examined 
 by the Commission of the States of Holland. At last, 
 however, it was agreed by both parties that it should 
 be placed in the hands of Prince Maurice and some 
 impartial persons, who should then confer with the 
 States, and draw * a good regulation for the preserving 
 of the common industries \ Maurice appointed a com- 
 mission on which the ten towns interested in the cloth 
 trade (of which naturally Delft was one) were repre- 
 sented, to take the matter in hand, and on June 19, 
 1 62 1, the * Regulation' was drawn up which defined 
 the privileges and conditions under which the Adven- 
 turers henceforth for many years carried on their trade 
 in Holland. Its terms therefore deserve to be briefly 
 
^2 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 indicated. The old privileges giving freedom from 
 import and export duties, harbour and market tolls, 
 &c., originally granted in 1598, were not revoked, but 
 defined afresh and modified. Art. i gave the Fellow- 
 ship permission to have their Court at Delft, but only 
 with the licences ' which we [the States of Holland] and 
 the States-General shall be pleased to accord, in trust 
 that the Netherlanders shall enjoy their old privileges 
 in England/ 1 This last clause clearly referred to the 
 / fishing rights, with which at that very moment the 
 English Government were proposing to interfere.' 
 Art. ii reminded the Adventurers that when residing 
 in Holland ' they would be subject to all our edicts 
 and enactments made or still to make.' Art. iii dealt 
 with the excise recently imposed on foreign woollen 
 cloth. On this no concession was made; it must be 
 promptly paid. Art. iv insisted on the strict carrying 
 out of the edict of 16 14 forbidding the importation of 
 dyed or prepared cloth, and also of the edict on the 
 * tare', which had been renewed in 161 7. Both these 
 edicts were regarded as grievances by the English, 
 and had in 16 18 and in 1621 been among the subjects 
 on which negotiations had proved fruitless. 
 
 Before this ' Regulation' of June 19, 162 1, had come 
 into force the time fixed by King James for the 
 dispatch of another embassy to settle all outstanding 
 disputes had passed by. Through the representations 
 of Carleton at the Hague, and the letters of their own 
 ambassador Caron from London, it was made clear, 
 however, to the States that a temporizing policy was 
 no longer possible. Indefinite delay would not be 
 brooked. Steps were accordingly taken to approach 
 certain of those who claimed damages against the 
 
I 
 
 III: 1618-1623 73 
 
 Greenland Company with an offer to compound with 
 them by a cash payment. Nor did the States confine 
 themselves to words, but gave practical proof of their 
 desire for peace, for when the Greenland Company 
 applied for a convoy of warships to accompany the 
 whale-fishing fleet to Spitzbergen, the States-General, 
 after consultation with the States of Holland, declined 
 to grant the request, April 28. The determined atti- 
 tude of Carleton, who threatened reprisals in the 
 Channel upon the ships returning from the East Indies 
 had its effect, and the slow-moving Netherlanders were 
 at last stirred to action. The new envoys were ap- 
 pointed early in October, and though even after their 
 nomination there was further delay while the instruc- 
 tions were being drawn up, within two months all 
 preliminaries were completed, and the embassy finally 
 arrived in London, December 8, 1621. 
 
 f Its arrival coincided with the final rupture between 
 James and his Parliament, and the situation was far \/ 
 from favourable to a really friendly settlement, j The 
 King was in bad health, worried and embittered in 
 temper by the affronts which he had just been endur- 
 ing from what he regarded as the insolent demands of 
 a House of Commons which neither by threats nor by 
 persuasion had he been able to bend to his will. Both 
 Philip III of Spain and the Archduke Albert of the 
 Netherlands had recently died. A young king reigned 
 in Madrid, but his favourite, the Count of Olivares, 
 held the reins of power, a man filled with the ambition 
 of raising Spain once again to her old position of 
 ascendancy in Europe. His policy, as stated in the 
 Cortes of Castile, was to assist the Emperor to crush 
 the Protestant cause in Bohemia and in Germany, to 
 
74 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 attack the Dutch rebels now that the truce was expired, 
 and to defend with all the power of the monarchy * the 
 sacred Catholic faith and the authority of the Holy 
 / See'. Yet in spite of so clear a declaration James fell 
 more and more under the spell exercised over him by 
 Gondomar, who had Buckingham and other English 
 councillors in his pay, and who continued to dangle 
 before the eyes of the infatuated King, still dreaming 
 
 I of a Spanish match for his son, the hope that by the 
 friendly intervention of Philip IV at Vienna, he might 
 be able to secure without hostilities good terms for his 
 son-in-law, and a settlement of the Dutch and other 
 questions in a manner satisfactory to all parties, 'it 
 was, of course, a purely visionary project, nevertheless 
 it is probable that James was sincere in his aims, and 
 thought that he was acting nobly in playing the part of 
 arbiter of peace and war. But he was really a puppet 
 in the hands of those who were far more astute than 
 himself, and who, while he was negotiating, were 
 grimly preparing for the prosecution in real earnest of 
 the longest and most cruel war Europe has ever seen, 
 /it was well known moreover to the statesmen, who 
 treated him as their dupe, that the breach between 
 
 /v James and his Parliament effectually prevented him, 
 even if he wished it, from serious intervention. ./ 
 
 The Dutch Embassy, which was accompanied by 
 three Commissioners on behalf of the East India 
 Company, had at its head Francis van Aerssen, Lord of 
 Sommelsdijk. Aerssen, already distinguished as a 
 diplomatist and noted for the prominent part he had 
 taken in the recent overthrow of Oldenbarne veldt, was 
 for many years to be the trusted councillor of the 
 Stadholders Maurice and Frederick Henry. Richelieu, 
 
Ill: 1618-1623 75 
 
 at a later time, spoke of him as one of the three ablest 
 statesmen of his time. He had now before him a long 
 and difficult task. Aitzema lays special emphasis on 
 the duration and the expense of this special mission. 
 It lasted, he tells us, 454 days, and cost 80,850 guilders. 
 * In the course of it ', he further remarks, ' King James 
 at the audiences made very particular and most remark- 
 able discourses, which were replied to by the Lord of 
 Sommelsdijk with exceptional prudence, he being a man 
 of great sharp-sightedness, eloquence, and experience/ 
 
 The skill of Aerssen is shown in the instructions for 
 the embassy, which, once more according to Aitzema, 
 were drawn up by himself The following are the 
 important points. Art. vii deals with the 'questions 
 which have arisen on the whale fishery between the 
 English nation and the Greenland Company of their 
 lands and their differences concerning the pretended 
 losses suffered on either side.' The envoys are in- 
 structed, if possible, to come to a friendly understanding, 
 ' if not, by authoritative decision to draw up for the 
 future a Regulation of the aforesaid fishery' on the 
 lines of the previous negotiations, but ' not so as to 
 cause any disadvantage to the land's service or to 
 the rights of the privileged company.' Above all, 
 nothing is to be concluded on this matter without 
 awaiting the orders of the States- General, should time 
 and opportunity permit. The next five articles treat 
 of the affairs of the two East India Companies, which 
 were, in fact, the main object of the mission. The cloth 
 trade disputes are next dealt with. If complaints should 
 be made about the raising by the States of Holland of 
 the duty on foreign woollen goods, the lines of defence 
 are laid down in Arts, xiv and xv. In Art. xvi the 
 
76 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 envoys are bidden to avoid any reopening of the ' tare ' 
 question, but should the placard enforcing an examina- 
 tion of the goods by the tare-masters be denounced, 
 it must be shown to be necessary in the interests of the 
 cloth trade, and for the prevention of fraud. If English 
 subjects pretend to suffer any injury through the * tare \ 
 let them bring their grievances before their High 
 Mightinesses, who will see that justice is done. 
 Likewise on the subject of the * interlopers ' (Art. xvii) 
 silence is enjoined. The reply, however, to any com- 
 plaint is that his Majesty has the remedy in his own 
 hands by forbidding the * interlopers * to trade. It 
 would be far easier to prevent their egress from 
 England than their ingress into the United Provinces. 
 Art. xviii deals with the question of the Mint. Last 
 of all, the instructions arrive at the Great Fisheries 
 difficulty. The envoys are carefully to avoid any 
 reference to this matter. If compelled to speak about 
 it, they are to say that they have received no instruc- 
 tions thereon, 
 
 * as their High Mightinesses had hoped that the 
 King would leave this matter untouched, as His Majesty 
 had thought good to delay this whole question for a 
 further period still and a more fitting season. In any 
 case this industry is necessary for the subsistence of 
 many thousands of the sea-faring folk of their Lands, 
 and to consent to a course that would ruin them is 
 impossible, and there is no hope that such consent 
 would be given either now or hereafter.* 
 
 Conferences were held with the Privy Council on 
 January 15, February 17, and March 14, the Dutch 
 trying to concentrate attention on the East Indian 
 differences, about which public opinion in England as 
 well as in Holland had been much stirred, and about 
 
Ill : 1618-1623 77 
 
 the renewal of the treaty of alliance, urging that the 
 King should take sides with his old allies against the 
 Spaniards and active steps to recover the Palatinate 
 for his son-in-law. /Buckingham's efforts to discuss the 
 alleged acts of violence by the Dutch fishermen to the 
 King's Scottish subjects only led to the reply that the ^/ 
 States had issued a strong edict against such acts and 
 would punish them if proved./ As no progress to any 
 agreement was being reached, the envoys suggested 
 a personal audience with the King. This was granted 
 on April 27. James was far from well, and in a very 
 irritable humour. He received them alone, and, con- 
 trary to his habit, sat in his chair during the interview 
 with his hat on, while the ambassadors stood the whole 
 time with uncovered heads. Aerssen, after the usual 
 compliments, spoke at considerable length, in accordance 
 with the terms of his instructions, upon the East Indian 
 and other matters on which the States desired to treat. 
 The effect of this speech is best told in the words of 
 the original report of the proceedings : — 
 
 *They [the envoys] noted that His Majesty was 
 entirely prejudiced and prepared by his Council to set 
 his heart against them. To their compliments he gave 
 no reply, letting them pass unnoticed. When they 
 (through their spokesman Aerssen) were entering into 
 the business, he said, '* Make an end of your long 
 harangue. I will give a short and good answer. You 
 are a good orator, I know it well ; when I was younger, 
 so was I also ; now my memory fails me." Six times 
 with great discourtesy did he interrupt them.' 
 
 The violence of the ' short and good answer ' in 
 which he finally poured forth the pent-up vials of his 
 wrath upon the Dutchmen is at least a proof that 
 James, despite his age and infirmities, still possessed 
 
78 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 considerable powers of invective. Speaking of the 
 East Indian disputes, he exclaimed : — 
 
 'You have taken away the goods of my subjects^ 
 have made war on, murdered and mishandled them, 
 without once thinking of what you have enjoyed from 
 this Crown, which has made you and maintained you. 
 You must give them satisfaction. ... I hold that 
 you ought to show respect to my nation. You are 
 speaking of the accord (of 1619), I decline to treat with 
 you on equal terms. You have in the Indies a Man ^ 
 who well deserves to be hanged. Your people over 
 there represent everywhere your Prince of Orange as 
 a great King and Lord, and hold me up as a little 
 kinglet, as if I stood under him, thus misleading the 
 barbarian kings. 
 
 Tell me w^hat you are thinking of doing, whether you 
 will take action and give me satisfaction or not ? Will 
 you do it, then do it the sooner the better ; it will be 
 best for you ; when will you begin ? Surely you are 
 like leeches, bloodsuckers of my realm, you draw the 
 blood from my subjects and seek to ruin me ; there are 
 six points that show it clearly; take the great fishery — 
 you come here to land against the will of my subjects, 
 you do them damage, you injure them, you desecrate 
 the Churches, doing filthy acts in them, you hinder 
 them from fishing; the Greenland whale fishery you 
 wish to dispute with me, without making good the loss ; 
 France and Spain have ceded it to me, with Denmark 
 I have come to an agreement, you alone wish to main- 
 tain it against me. I would not endure it either from 
 France or from Spain, do you think I either can or will 
 bear it from you ? In the Cloths you are playing at 
 passe-passe, as if you were laying a burden on your 
 inhabitants, and yet this is the cause ; these (the Cloths) 
 are no more carried, therefrom as you may have heard 
 a mutiny and wellnigh a rebellion exists in my Realm.' 
 * The Governor-General, Jan Pietersz Coen. 
 
Ill : 1618-1623 79 
 
 Having mentioned these three points, the other 
 three appear to have escaped his Majesty's memory. 
 After this outburst the negotiations were renewed, the 
 East Indian questions being taken first. This admir- 
 ably suited the Dutch, who knew they had the upper 
 hand in the Indies and were anxious to shelve the 
 fishery dispute as long as possible. For months the 
 weary negotiations proceeded, until in August there 
 was once more a deadlock. The King again granted 
 an audience (August 16), was again angry, and with 
 small result. An event now occurred which gave rise 
 to fresh complaint. The Dutch fishermen off the 
 Scottish coast had encountered an Ostend vessel with 
 some Dutch prisoners on board. The Ostender was 
 attacked and an attempt made to set the captives free. 
 A conference was held on the matter in the King's 
 presence, September 25, and the Hollanders were 
 accused of a breach of neutrality. The envoys rejoined 
 that it was the Ostender which had committed a breach 
 of neutrality by bringing prisoners into Scottish waters, 
 and pointed out * that no one had so great an interest 
 as his Majesty to prevent Spain from sharing the sove- 
 reignty of the sea on which his Majesty was so mighty 
 and whereon his chief security lay'. This reference 
 to James's relations with Spain was more than the testy 
 King could brook. 
 
 * It is you ', he said, ' who are masters of the sea, far 
 and wide, you do just what you like, you hinder my own 
 subjects from fishing on my coasts, who at any rate 
 according to all Rights ought to enjoy the first benefit, 
 but when I raise the question, and urge you to observe 
 my rights, to listen to what I have to say, you will not 
 agree to a single word being spoken about it ; yes, 
 my ambassador writes to me that he might just as well 
 
8o ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 speak to you of the rights of my fishery, as of a decla- 
 ration of war with you. When you are at war, you 
 say that your Government has not yet been granted 
 time for your community to get on its legs. In peace, 
 you have other excuses. The long and the short is, 
 you don't want to enter into it.' 
 
 \ The ambassadors were, however, not to be entrapped 
 into a discussion of the Great Fisheries ; remarking that 
 his Majesty had agreed to defer speaking about this 
 question, they skilfully turned his attention to other 
 subjects\\One result of this conference was the 
 resolve of the Privy Council to make a serious effort 
 to accommodate the Greenland fishery dispute. A 
 formal statement of the English grievances was set 
 forth in a letter to the ambassadors, and they were 
 requested, now that far more than the three months' 
 delay which the King had conceded was past, to pay 
 up the indemnity of ;^ 2 2,000 for the losses that had 
 been suffered. The Netherlanders at once replied that 
 they were ready to consider the Greenland differences 
 as soon as the East Indian were settled, but not before. \ 
 Unless the East Indian negotiations were pushed on, 
 they threatened to return home (October 3). For 
 some two months accordingly the Indies held the field. 
 When, however, the middle of December had arrived 
 the Council once more repeated their demand that the 
 indemnity, which had been promised in 1619, should 
 now be handed over. The envoys denied having any 
 knowledge of such a promise. They would make 
 inquiries about it, meanwhile their instructions only 
 allowed them to discuss the Greenland question as 
 a whole and without prejudice. They asked for proofs 
 of the alleged promise. None were forthcoming. So 
 
Ill: 1618-1623 81 
 
 by raising this side-issue the Dutch achieved their 
 object of gaining time. \An accord at last having 
 been reached on East Indian affairs, the envoys 
 announced that after fourteen months' sojourn in v 
 London they were unable to remain longer. \ Caron, 
 they said, would have full powers to carry on nego- 
 tiations about the Greenland matter. \So far as any 
 real settlement of disputes was concerned, the embassy yV 
 was again a complete failure. Even the accord in 
 the East was a sham. \ The English Company had 
 obtained a nominal position of equality with its Dutch 
 rival in the Indies, and a definite share of the coveted 
 trade in the Spice islands. But all the power was in 
 the hands of the Dutch, and such an artificial arrange- 
 ment was more likely, as events were speedily to show, 
 to breed fresh discords than to allay the old ones. 
 
IV: 1 623- 1 629 
 
 vThe embassy of 1622 returned to the Netherlands 
 early in February, 1623. A few weeks later Prince 
 Charles, accompanied by the Duke of Buckingham, 
 was on his way to Madrid to woo in person his pro- 
 spective Spanish bride. \ No more conclusive proof 
 could have been shown of the lack of success of Aerssen 
 in obtaining any assurance of armed support from 
 King James for the States in their renewed war with 
 Spain or for the recovery of the Palatinate. 
 
 Yet, strangely enough, at this very time of increasing 
 political alienation, four English and two Scottish regi- 
 ments formed (as indeed was the case throughout the 
 remainder of the eighty years' war) the very kernel of 
 the States army, and campaign after campaign bore 
 the brunt of the fighting. When the Spaniards laid 
 siege to Bergen-op-Zoom in July, 1622, Maurice had 
 reinforced the garrison by fourteen English and Scot- 
 tish companies. The gallant defence of the town first 
 by Colonel Henderson, then, after this officer fell mor- 
 tally wounded, by Sir Charles Morgan, excited general 
 admiration in Europe. In October, Spinola, after 
 making repeated and desperate efforts to capture the 
 place, was compelled to raise the siege. These troops 
 were recruited by royal permission in England and 
 Scotland, remained British subjects, and were distin- 
 guished by their national uniforms and colours, by the 
 beat of the drum and the march. They were, however, 
 in Dutch pay, and took an oath of allegiance to the 
 
IV: 1623-1629 S^ 
 
 States-General, from whom the officers received their 
 commissions.^ 
 
 This same period saw also the beginnings of rivalry 
 in the West as well as in the East. In 162 1 a Charter 
 was granted to the Dutch West India Company. This 
 Charter was framed on the model of that of the East 
 India Company, and it was hoped that the new venture 
 might be attended by the same good fortune and phe- 
 nomenal success as had followed Dutch enterprise in 
 Java and the Malayan Archipelago. \Far from being 
 a mere commercial undertaking, it was intended from 
 the firstn:H^t the West India Company should be 
 required to equip considerable armed forces, naval and / 
 military, wherewith to strike a blow at the Spanish 
 power in America, and cut off those sources of revenue 
 which supplied King Philip with the sinews of war. \ 
 In carrying out such projects of aggression in the 
 Spanish main there was less risk of disputes arising 
 between the Dutch and English than had been the case 
 in the East Indies. Nevertheless, the colonists and 
 traders of the two nationalities were in America also 
 rivals and competitors in the same localities. Nether- 
 landers and Englishmen had already for some years 
 before 162 1 been carrying on traffic with the natives 
 and setting up trading posts side by side in the estuary 
 of the Amazon, and in the various river mouths along - 
 the coast of Guiana. In 1 609, by letters patent, a grant 
 was made by James I to Robert Harcourt, of Stanton 
 Harcourt, in the county of Oxford, for the planting 
 and inhabiting of the whole coast of Guiana between 
 the rivers Amazon and Essequibo, and this grant was 
 renewed to Roger North in 16 19, and again by Charles I 
 ^ See special note F. 
 
84 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 to the Duke of Buckingham in 1626. Yet within the 
 limits of these grants the Dutch in 16 16 established 
 themselves permanently on the river Essequibo, and in 
 1627 on the river Berbice, while a number of abortive 
 attempts were made to set up trading posts and colonies 
 at other points of this coast. More important than any 
 of these, a settlement had been made in 16 14 on the 
 island of Manhattan at the mouth of the Hudson river, 
 a grant having been given at that date by the States- 
 General to a body of Amsterdam merchants of all un- 
 occupied land between Chesapeake Bay and Newfound- 
 land. This settlement and those in Guiana were in 
 1622 taken over by the newly erected West India 
 Company. Thus in North America the Dutch took 
 possession of the best harbour on the coast, and their 
 J colony of New Netherland with its capital New Am- 
 "* sterdam (afterwards New York) was thrust in like 
 a wedge between the English colonies of Virginia and 
 New England.. In the West Indian islands and on the 
 Gold Coast of West Africa the keen traders of the two 
 nations also found themselves side by side, with the 
 result in almost all cases, as has been well said, that 
 the Dutch extracted the marrow, leaving the English 
 the bone.^V It will at once be seen therefore that the 
 I activities of the Dutch West India Company, though 
 ^^ it came into being primarily for the purpose of ' beard- 
 ing the King of Spain in his treasure house ', were cer- 
 tain, sooner or later, to come into conflict with English 
 enterprise and to enlarge the area within which their 
 respective interests and claims were divergent.'- 
 
 But to return to my immediate subject. The ill- 
 success of the embassy of 1622 in effecting any settle- 
 ^ Cambridge Modern History^ iv. 758. 
 
IV: 1623-1629 85 
 
 ment except the accord relating to the East Indies, an 
 accord which was not regarded in Holland with much 
 favour and which was speedily to prove a failure, 
 caused considerable disquietude to the States. It was 
 resolved therefore to make another real effort to accom- 
 modate the old grievances of the English in regard to 
 the acts of violence charged against the Dutch fisher- 
 men both on the coast of Scotland and off Spitzbergen. 
 It was hoped that by so doing, any further raising of 
 the question of fishing rights might be avoided. The 
 news of the journey of Prince Charles to Madrid 
 changed disquietude into genuine alarm, lest James, 
 irritated as he was by a succession of fruitless negotia- J 
 tions and long-protracted disputes, might be tempted 
 to cement the Spanish marriage by an alliance with 
 the hereditary foe, and to seek redress against the 
 United Provinces by force of arms. Steps were accord- 
 ingly taken to enforce strictly the placards by which 
 the skippers of the herring- busses were forbidden under 
 heavy pains and penalties to interfere with or to disturb 
 the Scottish fisherfolk in their industry (April 20, 27, 
 May 6, 1623), and they were also warned not to 
 approach too near to the coast. Caron was requested 
 to inform the English Council of these measures of 
 precaution. The States-General were likewise anxious 
 in their desire to arrive at a friendly understanding 
 that the claims for damages against the Greenland 
 (Northern) Company should be paid. But the old 
 difficulties supervened. The directors of the Green- 
 land Company reminded them of the counterclaim for 
 damages suffered at the hands of the English. To pay 
 therefore the English claim before demanding from the 
 Muscovy Company a simultaneous settlement of Dutch 
 
 F 3 
 
ki 
 
 86 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 grievances would be, they pointed out, playing into 
 King James's hands. It would be regarded as an 
 admission of his exclusive and particular rights in the 
 Spitzbergen fishery, rights which the Greenland Com- 
 pany and the States had repeatedly refused to acknow- 
 ledge. So, despite pressure both from Carleton and 
 Caron, the matter dragged on. At last, December 14, 
 a letter was sent to Caron, denying that any promise 
 had been given by the embassy of 16 18-9 of a one- 
 sided payment of damages, as stated by the English, 
 but expressing the willingness of the Dutch to make 
 a mutual settlement. As, however, so often before in 
 these negotiations, delay had served its purpose. 
 
 When this letter reached Caron, a dramatic change 
 in the English policy had taken place to the advan- 
 tage of the Netherlands. \rhe negotiations with Spain 
 for the restitution of the Palatinate had broken down. 
 Philip IV and Olivares had never intended to purchase 
 the friendship of England at such a price, and the mar- 
 riage prospect, on which for so many years his heart 
 had been set, had to be reluctantly abandoned by 
 King James. ' I like not', he said, 'to marry my son 
 with a portion of my daughter's tears.'X 
 
 xThe return of the Prince of Wales and the Duke 
 of Buckingham, October 5, angry at the treatment 
 accorded to them at Madrid, led to the overthrow of the 
 party at Court which had favoured a Spanish alliance.\ 
 Parliament was summoned, and Buckingham in advo- 
 cating an anti-Spanish policy found himself for once 
 a popular favourite. Pressed by his son, by Bucking- 
 ham, by Parliament, and by public opinion, the aged 
 King with a heavy heart saw himself compelled to 
 abandon his cherished scheme of recovering the Pala- 
 
IV: 1623-1629 8; 
 
 tinate by peaceful negotiations, and to take steps for 
 armed intervention. The States-General, on seeing 
 the turn that events were taking, wisely determined to 
 send another embassy to London to take advantage of 
 the opportunity for concluding the wished-for offensive 
 and defensive alliance between England and the 
 United Provinces. There was this time no delay in 
 drawing up the instructions, and Aerssen and Joachimi, 
 the two best men they could have chosen, departed on 
 their mission February 24. 
 
 There can be little question that the moving cause 
 for the sending of this embassy with such unusual 
 dispatch is to be found in an interview between Sir 
 Dudley Carleton and Prince Maurice, which the former 
 records in a letter to the Duke of Buckingham dated 
 December 9, 1623. 
 
 * I have thought fit ', wrote the ambassador, * to set 
 down at large (whilst it is fresh in my memory) an 
 opportunity as properly given unto me this day by the 
 Prince of Orange (who is the only person of power and 
 confidence we have here to treat withal) as I hope your 
 Grace will think it seasonably taken.' 
 
 Some business at the Council of State, at which both 
 were present, having been got through more quickly 
 than was expected, Maurice, so Carleton informed his 
 correspondent, 
 
 * gave me a long hour's leisure afterwards in his gar- 
 den, which he himself desired of me ... he asked me 
 bluntly (after his manner) Qui aHl de vostremariage ?^ 
 I told him it was now at a stay upon this point, that 
 the restitution of the Palatinate must be first concluded. 
 And that the Queen of Bohemia was not only well 
 comforted with this assurance, but pleased herself with 
 * The orthography of the original. 
 
88 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 a further conceit that the opportunity was never fairer 
 for this State to regain the King her father's favour, 
 and return to the ancient support of his Crowns, which 
 by way of gratitude for her good usage, since she had 
 her refuge into these parts, she could not but admonish 
 his Excellency of and advise him not to let it slip. 
 Here I took occasion to play my own part, and to 
 remember unto him how things had passed within the 
 compass of my experience from the beginning, letting 
 him know what friendship his Majesty had shewed this 
 State in making their truce ; what sincerity in render- 
 ing their cautionary towns according to contract when 
 they were demanded; what affection in supporting 
 their affairs during their late domestic disputes ; what 
 care in settling our East-Indian differences ; finally, 
 what patience in conniving at all the misdemeanours 
 and insolences of their seamen without seeking revenge.' 
 
 Carleton then proceeds to defend the King's attitude 
 to the Dutch, ' whose ill course, pursued through some 
 years' continuance, bred a deserved distaste in his 
 Majesty'; and his listening on the part of Spain to 
 *fair overtures of friendship, being continually made 
 and confirmed by the tender of a match . . . But (he 
 is careful to add) now the cause is removed, the effect 
 may possibly cease in like manner.' The reply of 
 Maurice was ' that nothing could be more certain than 
 the affection of this State to a Prince embracing their 
 cause of opposition to Spain. And if his Majesty could 
 take that resolution, he might dispose of these their 
 lives and fortunes.' \A further discussion led finally to 
 the Prince's declaration, 'When the King would be 
 / to this State as Queen Elizabeth was, this State would 
 < be to him as it was to Queen Elizabeth.' The advice 
 of Carleton to the Duke is to seize the chance of effect- 
 ing a good understanding with the Netherlands. \ The 
 
IV: 1623-1629 89 
 
 present opportunity [to quote the actual words] of the 
 Prince of Orange s good affection, and strength of these 
 provinces both by sea and land as it yet stands, but 
 not possible so long to continue, being seasonably laid 
 hold of, his Majesty may have with this State a firm 
 and fruitful alliance.' 
 
 \The embassy then, which reached England on Feb- 
 ruary 26, 1624, had a comparatively easy task before 
 it. It was received by the populace with acclamations, 
 and by the King, now completely under the influence 
 of Buckingham, with friendliness and distinction. \ 
 Even the news of the (so-called) massacre of Amboina 
 in the far East, which was to arouse in England for 
 many years a bitter feeling of resentment against the 
 Dutch, did not now lead to any delay in the negotia- 
 tions, which proceeded smoothly from the first. Aer- 
 ssen and Joachimi had English public opinion with 
 them, and a treaty for a defensive alliance between the 
 two countries was signed on June 15. By this treaty 
 James allowed an additional force of 6,000 men to be 
 raised in England, the pay to be at his charges, the 
 States undertaking to refund the amount advanced on 
 the conclusion of a peace or truce. So quickly was the 
 enlistment carried out, that four regiments of 1,500 men 
 each, commanded by the Earls of Oxford, Essex, and 
 Southampton and Lord Willoughby de Eresby, landed 
 in Holland ready for service on July 23. The contingent 
 arrived at an opportune moment, as Spinola had just 
 invaded Dutch Brabant at the head of an army of 
 24,000 foot and 3,000 horse, and had laid siege to Breda. 
 \This treaty of alliance of June 15, 1624, was fol- 
 lowed as a matter of course, by negotiations for a settle- 
 ment of the long-standing disputes about the Greenland 
 
90 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 fisheries indemnity and other questions, but despite the 
 efforts of the States-General and the two residents 
 Carleton and Caron, but little progress was made.'\^ The 
 directors of the Greenland (Northern) Company had 
 the powerful influence of Amsterdam behind them, and 
 they raised, with the same obstinacy as on previous 
 occasions, strong opposition to making any payment for 
 damages, unless the English agreed to satisfy their 
 counter-claim for losses sustained in 1613 and 161 7. 
 Matters were still further delayed by the illness and 
 death of Noel Caron, December 11, 1624. Caron was 
 a real loss at this moment, for he had during fourteen 
 difficult and anxious years filled the post of ambassador 
 of the United Provinces in London with conspicuous 
 industry, ability, and tact. The selection of Albert 
 Joachimi, Lord of Ostend,as his successor was probably 
 the best that could have been made, and met with 
 general approval. He was a man of proved experience, 
 and had been recently in England with Aerssen with 
 the mission that so successfully concluded the treaty. 
 It was intended that he should at once enter upon his 
 duties and take with him to England instructions for 
 a prompt settlement of the Greenland indemnity, if 
 possible by a friendly agreement ; if not, in any case 
 ' decisively and authoritatively ', and in their turn the 
 other pending disputes and complaints. 
 
 Events, however, occurred which effected so complete 
 a change in the political situation that his departure was 
 perforce delayed. On March 27, 1625, James I died. 
 A month later, Maurice, Prince of Orange, breathed his 
 last, April 25, i62^^Charles I ascended the throne of 
 England, and it was hoped this would mean a more 
 decisive intervention of England in foreign politics. 
 
IV: 1623-1629 9^ 
 
 The new King was embittered against Spain, and it 
 was known that the Duke of Buckingham, who at this 
 time professed friendship for Holland, and through 
 private pique was even more hostile to the Spaniards 
 than his master, held an influence over him greater 
 even than that which he had exercised over his father. 
 It was largely through his efforts that, after the rupture 
 of the Spanish match, a marriage had been arranged be- 
 tween the Prince of Wales and the sister of Louis XIII. 
 The accomplishment of this union was one of the very 
 first acts of the new reign. Charles and Henrietta 
 Maria were married at Paris by proxy, May 1 1 , and at 
 Canterbury, June 12, with Anglican rites. 
 \Richelieu was now firmly established in power, and in 
 his hands Henry IV's policy of hostility to the ascen- 
 dancy in Europe of the house of Habsburg was revived, li 
 Charles was therefore not without hopes of obtaining "* 
 armed assistance from France in that war with Spain 
 for the recovery of the Palatinate on which his heart 
 was set. \ In the United Provinces, Frederick Henry, 
 Prince of Orange, succeeded to all the posts and to 
 more than the influence of his brother. He was, as a 
 general, the equal of Maurice, and was far superior to 
 him as a statesman. During his Stadholderate, strong 
 in the support and affection of all parties and classes, 
 Frederick Henry was able for many years, despite the 
 cumbersome and intricate machinery of government in 
 the Dutch Republic, to exercise a control over the 
 conduct of foreign affairs that was practically undis- 
 puted. \He, as the son of Louise de Coligny, had 
 throughbut his life strong French leanings, and the aim jj 
 of his diplomacy was from the first to secure the good- 
 will of Richelieu and the help of French troops and 
 
v^ 
 
 $2 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 subsidies for the Netherlands.' To send Joachimi at 
 such a juncture to London to discuss the settlement of 
 a fishery indemnity was clearly inadequate. It was 
 resolved accordingly that with the newly appointed 
 resident ambassador a special embassy should go to 
 England to congratulate the King upon his accession 
 and his marriage, and, in view of the strained relations 
 between Charles and Spain, to negotiate a treaty be- 
 tween the two countries on the basis of an offensive 
 and defensive alliance. Francis van Aerssen and 
 Rienck van Burmania were chosen as envoys extra- 
 ordinary for this mission. NjThey set sail, accompanied 
 by Joachimi, on June i6. All the circumstances were 
 favourable to the success of their mission, no difficulties 
 supervened, and on September 1 7 the treaty of South- 
 ampton was signed. By this time a great expedition 
 was being prepared in England for the destruction of 
 the port of Cadiz and the capture of the Plate fleet.\ 
 Already, efforts had been made by Buckingham to 
 persuade the States to allow 2,000 seasoned English 
 troops in their pay to serve on the great fleet he was 
 equipping, in exchange for 2,000 recruits. But although 
 the 2,000 recruits were sent over (June 19) to Rotterdam, 
 the States-General would not part with their veterans, 
 whose services they sorely needed. Sickness carried 
 off numbers of the raw levies, who were not allowed to 
 land, and the remains had to return in miserable plight 
 to Plymouth at the end of August. Being without pay, 
 these unhappy men had lived during the interval at the 
 personal charges of Sir Dudley Carleton. In a letter 
 to Sir F. Nethersole, secretary to the Queen of Bohemia, 
 dated August 30, the ambassador wrote : 
 
 * I have had no small trouble with 2,000 soldiers sent 
 
IV: 1623-1629 93 
 
 hither out of the North of England to be exchanged 
 with the States for so many old musquettiers, which 
 the weakness of the States' army, especially in the 
 English nation, could not admit, and, having understood 
 his Majesty's intention to use these 2,000 in the service 
 of the fleet, I caused them three weeks since to be 
 embarqued at Rotterdam, where they have layn ever 
 since, attending the wind, but I hope they will now get 
 away.' 
 
 Charles, having already quarrelled with his first Par- 
 liament, which was dissolved August 12, had failed to 
 obtain the subsidies he required for carrying out his 
 ambitious foreign policy. The States, however, con- 
 sented to allow General Sir Edward Cecil and several 
 other officers of experience in their service to absent 
 themselves for three months and take part in the expedi- 
 tion against Spain, provided that they took none of their 
 soldiers with them. Cecil, although a land soldier with- 
 out any naval experience, was induced by Buckingham 
 to take command of the great armada, a post for which 
 he was quite unfitted. The fleet, after many delays, 
 at last set sail October 5, badly equipped, with victuals 
 only for six weeks, foredoomed to failure. In accordance 
 with the terms of the treaty, a squadron of twenty Dutch 
 ships under William of Nassau, a natural son of Maurice, 
 took part in the expedition. There is no need to follow 
 its fortunes further here. ' One by one,' says Dr. Gar- 
 diner, 'all through the winter months the shattered 
 remains of the once powerful fleet came staggering 
 home, to seek refuge in whatever port the winds and 
 waves would allow.' 
 
 Such an ignominious issue to this great enterprise 
 was of evil omen to the new reign. It was wounding 
 to English pride and roused public indignation against 
 
94 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 Buckingham to a high pitch. In these circumstances 
 it is not to be wondered at that the alliance between 
 Great Britain and the United Provinces did not prevent 
 a fresh crop of differences arising between them. The 
 massacre of Amboina rankled in the mind of Charles, 
 
 '^ and it had not been forgotten or forgiven by his people. 
 The right of the English ambassador at the Hague 
 to a seat on the Council of State had strictly ceased 
 when the treaty which granted it came to an end with 
 the close of the truce in 1621. But Dudley Carleton 
 had continued without gainsaying, so long as Maurice 
 lived, to enjoy his former privileges. By a resolution 
 of the States, June 5, 1626, however, he was informed 
 that henceforth he was permitted to take part in the 
 deliberations of the Council not as a right, but simply 
 by courtesy. Carleton attempted to obtain a with- 
 drawal of the resolution, but in vain. \As the most 
 important affairs were at this time no longer transacted 
 in the Council of State but in the States-General, the 
 
 / loss of influence was not really great, nevertheless the 
 mere passing of such a resolution when the treaty of 
 Southampton was not yet a year old was resented by 
 
 f the English as a slight. Difficulties had also arisen 
 
 // over the restrictions placed and the duties levied upon 
 *^ the Merchant Adventurers, who had the staple of the 
 English cloth trade at Delft. Worse than all, a number 
 of Dutch merchant vessels had been seized and searched 
 on the ground that they were carrying contraband and 
 trading with the Spanish enemy. The Hollanders 
 throughout the War of Independence had always 
 insisted on the right to freedom of commerce even 
 with their foes, and by supplying the Spaniards not only 
 with food but with arms and munitions, had made 
 
IV : 1623-1629 95 
 
 Immense profits, which helped largely to fill the rebel 
 war-chest. It was the attempt of Leicester to stop 
 this commerce, which chiefly caused his unpopularity 
 in the Netherlands. The treaty of Southampton (arts. 
 20-23) had forbidden all such traffic, but the keen 
 traders of Amsterdam could not be restrained frorfi the 
 secret evasion of a restriction, to which they had so 
 long refused to submit. Hence acts of reprisal on the 
 part of the English Government, and bitter complaints 
 on both sides. 
 
 /Once again it was necessary to send a special envoy ^ 
 to London. / The chosen ambassador this time was 
 Jacob Cats, better known as the People's Poet of the 
 Netherlands than as a statesman, though he was far 
 from being undistinguished in the latter capacity, see- 
 ing that he was to fill for a number of years the impor- 
 tant post of Grand Pensionary of Holland. He 
 departed upon his mission March 9, 1627. /His object 
 was to negotiate a Navigation Treaty (traitd de Marini) 
 dealing with the various thorny questions regarding / 
 contraband of war and right of search at sea which had 
 been causing so much trouble.,^ But no sooner had the 
 conferences with the Privy Council begun than the 
 Dutch envoy was confronted with complaints that 
 the old outstanding disputes, the indemnities claimed 
 in reparation for the Amboina massacre, and for the 
 acts of violence committed by the herring fishers off 
 the coast of Scotland, and by the whale fishers at Spitz- 
 bergen, had never been settled. Cats had to plead 
 that these matters were not included in his instructions, 
 
 Ind after some controversy he succeeded in securing 
 le postponement of these obtrusive and troublesome 
 
V 
 
 96 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 to be discussed with the resident ambassador, Joachimi, 
 who would b^ furnished with special instructions from 
 the States. The policy of delay, which had proved so 
 successful in the past, once more gained for the Nether- 
 landers all that they required. The fisheries went on, 
 under protest indeed, but undisturbed. The indemnities 
 continued to be claimed, but remained unpaid. The 
 main purpose of Cats's mission was, however, not 
 achieved. No agreement about contraband and right 
 of search and seizure was reached. / The comment of 
 Aitzema upon the negotiations is worth reproducing ; it 
 is scarcely possible to describe what took place more 
 pithily or with greater acuteness : 
 
 * With these and such-like proposals, with plaints and 
 counterplaints, was the time spent, without either the 
 one or the other being made any the wiser. Each one 
 thinks that he is most in the right ; everybody looks 
 outwards, nobody homewards, and for much of the time 
 each was taxing the other with offences in which they 
 themselves were the more guilty. The big fishes eat 
 the small ones. He who has the might uses it ; every 
 one speaks merely of uprightness, of sincerity, of affec- 
 tion, and there is nothing but deception and hypocrisy 
 on all sides. The English thought also (as was quite 
 true) that they had done much for the common cause 
 and for the Reformed Religion : and that it behoved 
 this State likewise to suffer some inconvenience in their 
 commerce ; because otherwise all business which was 
 in England, would find its way to the United Provinces, 
 if these with too great and undisturbed freedom should 
 use the sea, and not the English. Thus the Ministers 
 of this State did not accomplish much. To Heer Cats, 
 however, an honourable farewell was accorded with 
 the usual present, and the dignity of Knighthood. He 
 returned to the Hague August 30.' 
 \The spring of 1627 had found the Government of 
 
I 
 
 IV : 1623-1629 97 
 
 Charles I involved in so many difficulties that it is not 
 surprising that the King should not have found it pos- 
 sible to take any decisive line in his negotiations with ^y 
 the Dutch. He had quarrelled with his Parliament, 
 and knew not where to turn to raise the money to 
 meet the heavy liabilities in which he had involved him- 
 self. \ The attack on Cadiz had utterly miscarried, and 
 had failed to give any help to the cause of the Palati- 
 nate. At this moment of sore disappointment he had 
 seen with misgiving that the new Stadholder, Fre- 
 derick Henry, and his minister Aerssen, had turned to 
 France with friendly overtures, and had found Richelieu 
 willing to receive them. France had promised to the 
 States a yearly subsidy, and a loan of troops on con- 
 dition that the Dutch would send a squadron to assist 
 in the blockade of La Rochelle, and would undertake 
 not to conclude a peace or truce with Spain without the 
 knowledge and consent of the French King. Charles 
 felt that his strenuous efforts to increase his fleet and 
 render it more efficient, with the aim of making the 
 English navy supreme in the Channel and the North 
 Sea, were directly threatened by such an alliance. \ It 
 was known that it was the policy of Richelieu to 
 strengthen the position of France as a maritime power, . 
 and the traditional English jealousy of French aggran-J'^ 
 dizement was increased rather than diminished by the 
 close bond which united the royal families.\The French 
 marriage had always been unpopular in England, great 
 resentment being felt at the concessions that had been 
 made with regard to the public performance of Roman 
 Catholic rites. Charles himself found the position of 
 things at Court so difficult that he was obliged finally 
 to take the strong step of sending back the French 
 
 1207 G 
 
98 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 attendants of the young Queen. This gave great 
 offence at Paris, and the soreness between the two 
 countries was aggravated by the high-handed action of 
 the English on the sea during the Spanish war. French 
 " ships had been searched and seized, and in reprisals an 
 embargo had been laid upon English vessels and goods 
 at La Rochelle and other places. \ Finally, the countries 
 |l drifted into war. Charles hoped that he might secure 
 the friendly neutrality of Spain, but his efforts failed, 
 and Spain allied herself with France. \ 
 
 In June a great expedition sailed under the command 
 of Buckingham to relieve La Rochelle. To meet its 
 cost without the help of his Parliament, Charles had 
 been compelled to have recourse to forced loans and 
 other unpopular expedients, and the issue was to be 
 a disaster even more humiliating than that of Cadiz. 
 \In these circumstances, while this fleet in the spring of 
 1627 was being prepared, but its destiny still unknown, 
 / it was necessary for the King to keep on good terms 
 with the United Provinces, and to pursue a temporizing 
 policy with regard to the grievances that he had against 
 them. \ While therefore Jacob Cats, as special ambassa- 
 dor from the States, was busily engaged in negotiations 
 with the English Government in London, Charles sent 
 on his part an envoy extraordinary to the Hague, 
 nominally for the presentation of the Order of the 
 Garter to the Prince of Orange, in reality to sound 
 the disposition of the Dutch Statesmen and to make 
 proposals to them. 
 
 The man selected to carry out this commission was 
 the former ambassador at the Hague, Sir Dudley (now 
 Lord) Carleton, who had returned to London in the 
 previous year. In his secret instructions (dated May, 
 
IV : 1623-1629 99 
 
 1627) are several interesting passages.^ The docu- 
 ment opens thus : — 
 
 ' The mayne scope of your imployment consisting of 
 two points ; the one to prevent the practices of the 
 French, who seeke by presentation of new treatyes, 
 and profers of summes of money, to make, as it were, 
 a purchase of the affection of that State, and to gaine 
 it from us; the other, to provide that no misunder- 
 standing growe upon such overtures of pacification as 
 are made unto us by the Spanyard ; we may well 
 consider that in cases of this nature, with people so 
 composed as they are, there is required a very cautious 
 
 proceeding We would have you begin with 
 
 declaration of our purpose constantly to continue our 
 preparations against Spayne, as against a common 
 enemie, in conformity to the league, offensi"<^e and 
 defensive, betwixt us and that State, and to make the 
 same more manifest, you shall have a list of the 
 Shipping now sett out under our High Admiral, the 
 Duke of Buckingham, with such as we are now further 
 preparing for the security of these seas ; and hereupon 
 you are to require them to arme, in like manner extra- 
 ordinarely to sea, according to treaty. . . .' 
 
 Thus was Carleton to attempt to blind the Dutch 
 statesmen as to the overtures that had been made to 
 Spain and as to the purpose of the fleet gathered at 
 Portsmouth. With regard to the second point, the 
 instructions proceed : — 
 
 * We would have you take knowledge of such griefs 
 and discontentments, as their resident Ambassador 
 Joachimi, and Catz their extraordinary deputy, have 
 complained of against our seamen, and thereupon make 
 knowen the charge (wherewith you are well acquainted) 
 we have given certaine select persons of our Council to 
 treate with them, of all due and reasonable satisfaction 
 
 ^ Sir Dudley Carleton's State Letters, 1627, pp. 5-15. 
 
lOo ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 for what is past, and a reglement for the future ; but 
 with all you are to remember unto them, that, as we 
 are to have a care of their contentments, so we are not 
 to neglect the protection we owe to our own subjects.' 
 
 And then follows a setting out of the old grievances, 
 the Amboina affair and the differences between the 
 East India Companies generally, and the exactions 
 upon the Merchant Adventurers now having their 
 Court in the staple town of Delft under the title of 
 tare. There is no mention here of the fisheries. As 
 regards the choice of friendship with France or with 
 England, the instruction, after a recitation of all that 
 the Republic has owed to English goodwill in the past, 
 thus presents the alternative : — 
 
 ' Therefore, as things may growe to greate extremity 
 betwixt us and the French King, in case you find no 
 disposition in the States to joyne with us in assistance, 
 as their enemys do with France, we like well you should 
 persuade them to hold themselves neutrall, whereby 
 to reserve to themselves the liberty of mediation of 
 attonement, to which we shall be at all times ready to 
 lend a willing ear to them, as common friends. And 
 as they may apprehend danger to their State, by want 
 of such pecuniary ayde as is verbally presented to them 
 by the French King as the price of their affections ; 
 or may be prest to the renewing of the triennial treaty 
 of Compiegne, let them in their wisdomes, waigh 
 what is the less of evils, in forbearing for a while the 
 acceptation of the weak and faltering friendship of 
 France, which, being in warre with England, cannot 
 have meanes to assist them, though never so willing 
 and constant; or provoking England to the necessity 
 of conjoyning with their enemies, for which they cannot 
 but know the doore is allways open to us; and then 
 consider that when the flame betwixt France and us 
 hath no such fewell from this country as is ministered 
 
IV: 1623-1629. , .;, j iil'y'.il^tQtl 
 
 to the French from Spayne, it will be the sooner 
 extinguished and these crownes may be quickly re- 
 united, not only to their ayde as formerly, but likewise 
 to the support and restitution of such friends in Ger- 
 many, in whose welfare they, with us, have common 
 interest ' 
 
 Finally, Carleton is requested to remonstrate with 
 the States for the difficulties they had raised to the 
 admission of his successor at the Hague — a nephew, 
 named Dudley Carleton like himself — to a seat in the 
 Council of State, which had always hitherto been granted 
 to all English ambassadors and agents since 1585. 
 
 Carleton had his first audience in the assembly of 
 the States-General, June 14/24, and a second five days 
 later. In the first he read an address setting forth the 
 various objects of his diplomatic mission ; in the second 
 he asked permission of the States for the Prince of 
 Orange to accept the Garter. In a letter dated June 
 27 (o.s.), to Lord Killultagh, the ambassador gives an 
 account of a conference that he had with a deputation 
 of the States-General, consisting of one member repre- 
 senting each province. ' He laid open to them ', he 
 writes, * all that had passed from the beginning to the 
 end*, and tried to persuade them of the advantage of 
 clinging to the English in preference to the French 
 alliance. He found it, however, a difficult task to remove 
 the apprehensions that were felt that Charles's quarrel 
 with France meant a drawing nearer to Spain. Carleton, 
 at the same time, does not scruple to point out that the 
 fact that he has gone to Holland without any money 
 to pay even interest on the expenses that had been 
 incurred by the States for the maintenance of Mans- 
 feld's English levies in 1625, or for the creditors of the 
 
 G3 
 
\tp^<hiy^ ANaLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 Queen of Bohemia, or for preventing the forfeiture 
 of * His Majesty's Jewells, which are in pawn at 
 Amsterdam \ would be ruinous to his mission, and begs 
 for the necessary cash to be sent. The money, it is 
 needless to say, was not forthcoming, and such was the 
 suspicion against England that, despite Carleton's efforts 
 to secure for the English resident ambassador a seat 
 on the Cpuncil of State, the proposal was rejected by 
 the vote of every province separately. Nevertheless 
 there was genuine alarm in the Netherlands that the 
 continuance of the war between France and England 
 would be injurious to their interests by forcing one of 
 the combatants to seek the alliance of Spain. The 
 missions of Cats to England and of Carleton to the 
 Hague, though they failed in bringing about any real 
 settlement of the differences between the two powers, 
 at least effected an understanding that, for a time at 
 any rate, grievances were not to be pressed. The 
 interests of Dutch trade rendered the undisturbed 
 passage of the Channel, free from interference by 
 hostile fleets or cruisers, a consideration of the very 
 utmost importance. 
 
 It was resolved, therefore, to send yet another special 
 embassy to England to offer the mediation of the States 
 between the belligerent powers, and to negotiate for 
 the release of the many Dutch ships which had been 
 seized on the high seas and kept in English harbours. 
 The lord of Randwijk and Adrian Pauw, pensionary of 
 Amsterdam, were accordingly sent. They arrived in 
 London, January 25, 1628, and stayed in England some 
 fourteen months. Carleton meantime remained at the 
 Hague. In May of this same year the Earl of Carlisle 
 Joined him, bringing further instructions from the King. 
 
IV: 1623-1629 I03 
 
 By these instructions he was bidden to assist Carleton 
 in pressing upon the States the advantages of friendship 
 with England in preference to France, and the necessity, 
 if they wished to obtain it, of forbidding the construction 
 of French war-vessels in the Dutch ports, and of pun- 
 ishing adequately the perpetrators of 'the foule and 
 bloody fact' of Amboina. It will thus be seen that 
 diplomacy during these years 1627 and 1628 was indeed 
 busy, so busy that it is by no means easy to see light 
 clearly amidst such a tangled web of negotiations. 
 This is certain, that they had small result. The Prince 
 of Orange, and his chief adviser Francis van Aerssen, 
 had made the French alliance the sheet-anchor of their 
 policy. They wished to be on friendly terms with 
 England, and to bring the war, which was so injurious 
 to Dutch interests, to a speedy conclusion, but they 
 distrusted the intentions of Charles I, and knew that 
 the breach with his Parliament in any case must deprive 
 him of the resources for carrying out any bold and 
 active intervention in the German war. They suspected, 
 moreover, that it was not unlikely that Charles might 
 follow in his father's footsteps and strive to help his 
 relatives in the Palatinate by means of negotiations 
 with Spain rather than by hostilities against that power. 
 The efforts of Carleton and Carlisle met therefore with 
 little or no success. The influence of Amsterdam in the 
 States of Holland was too strong for any steps to be 
 taken to punish those who had been concerned in the 
 Amboina tragedy, and the English demands were met 
 by evasion and delay. But though Carleton was un- 
 successful, the envoys in London, in carrying out their 
 task as mediators between England and France, were 
 helped by the pressure upon Charles of the financial 
 
I04 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 difficulties in which, after the assassination of Bucking- 
 ham (August 23, 1628), he was becoming more and more 
 involved. The dissolution of March, 1629, was a final 
 breach with his Parliament. The King had therefore 
 little or no alternative but to bring his war with France 
 to a speedy conclusion. The Dutch envoys, on their 
 part, did their best to remove the obstacles to an Anglo- 
 French understanding, and peace was signed April 24, 
 1629. 
 
V: 1629-1641 
 
 The foreign policy of Charles I during the eleven 
 years of autocratic rule which followed the dissolution 
 of Parliament in 1629, was conditioned by his lack 
 of money. His schemes were ambitious and were 
 obstinately pursued, and the charge that has frequently 
 been preferred against him of inconstancy and fickle- 
 ness, though it has a basis of truth, is on the whole 
 unjust. Charles's projects had to be frequently modified, 
 because he found himself without the means for carry- 
 ing them out. In November, 1630, peace was con- 
 cluded with Spain. It was his dearest desire to see 
 the Palatinate restored to the Elector Frederick, and 
 his sister, to whom he was much attached, freed from 
 the necessity of living as an exile in Holland ; but 
 the cost of a military expedition to the aid of the 
 Protestants in Germany was prohibitive. He was also 
 suspicious of French motives and of the policy under- 
 lying their alliance with the Dutch. Perhaps at this 
 time the predominant idea before Charles's mind was 
 the restoration of the navy to a position of supremacy 
 in the British seas. His most earnest endeavours 
 were for some years directed to this end, but its 
 attainment was seriously threatened by the close 
 bonds which united the powerful fleets of the Dutch 
 Republic with the growing naval strength of France. 
 
 In these circumstances, he attempted to pursue his 
 father's policy of seeking to counterbalance the Franco- 
 Dutch alliance by a good understanding with Spain, 
 through whose intervention with the Emperor he 
 
io6 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 hoped he might be able to secure for Frederick V 
 some portion at any rate of his ancestral possessions. 
 In 1 63 1 a treaty with Spain for the partition of the 
 Netherlands was actually drawn up, but it came to 
 nothing, and its failure was followed by negotiations 
 with Gustavus Adolphus. These also were fruitless, 
 for Charles was unable to offer the Swedish King the 
 military assistance without which the proffered alliance 
 had no value. Hopes, however, no doubt lingered in 
 Charles's mind that the phenomenal success of Gustavus 
 would lead to the restoration of the Elector Palatine 
 to his rights, but Gustavus was slain at Lutzen 
 (November, 1632), and the disastrous defeat of the 
 Swedes and their Protestant allies at Nordlingen 
 (August, 1634) gave a decisive superiority in Germany 
 to the Hispano- Imperialist forces. The Habsburg 
 family alliance had for the time completely gained the 
 upper hand. 
 
 Charles, who had been tentatively making overtures 
 to France, now turned once more to Spain (October, 
 1 634) with a fresh scheme for the partition of the Nether- 
 lands, and though the time was now past for any real 
 change in Spanish policy, a treaty was actually signed 
 (May I, 1635) by which the English King agreed to 
 assist the Spaniards with a naval force against the 
 Dutch. He had been impelled to take this step from 
 fear of French designs. The battle of Nordlingen 
 had had the effect of drawing the French and Dutch 
 nearer together in the common dread of a Habsburg 
 predominance. A treaty of subsidies was at once 
 agreed upon, and it was followed (February, 1635) by 
 an offensive and defensive alliance between the two 
 powers. Both France and the United Provinces 
 
V: 1629-1641 I07 
 
 bound themselves not to make a separate peace, and 
 it was provided that the Spanish Netherlands — the 
 southern provinces, by the death of the Archduchess 
 Isabel, had in 1633 reverted to Spain — should be con- 
 quered and partitioned between the two contracting 
 parties. Charles had therefore looked to a Spanish 
 alliance as a counterpoise to a Franco-Dutch supremacy 
 in the ^ narrow seas \ He hoped also that he might at 
 the same time secure favourable terms for his nephew 
 — Frederick V had died in November, 1632 — in the 
 Palatinate. He was soon to learn by the publication 
 of the Treaty of Prague (May 30, 1635) that the 
 Emperor had transferred the territory and the electoral 
 dignity of the Palatinate to the Duke of Bavaria. 
 Direct negotiations with Vienna, backed, as they were, 
 by no force, were barren, and Charles was compelled 
 to see in the aid of France, who had concluded an 
 offensive and defensive alliance with the Swedes, two 
 months after that with the States, his only hope for 
 the furtherance of his nephew's interests. Richelieu 
 had now definitely ranged himself with the two leading 
 Protestant powers in a league against the house of 
 Austria, and had pledged all the military and financial 
 resources of France to the task of carrying out the 
 policy of Henry IV, which a quarter of a century 
 before had been rendered abortive by the dagger of 
 Ravaillac. 
 
 The States judged this to be a fitting time to send 
 over to England a special envoy, and Cornelis van 
 Beveren, lord of Strevelshoek, was selected for the 
 post. He set out for London, March 19, 1636. His 
 instructions were to act in concert with Joachimi and 
 the French ambassador De Senneterre, in urging 
 
io8 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 Charles to join in a triple bond with the United 
 Provinces and France for the purpose of making 
 a combined attack upon Spain. Van Beveren was to 
 point out that only by such a course could he lend any 
 effectual assistance to his nephew. It was hoped that 
 Charles Lewis, who was now residing at the English 
 Court, would use all his influence in forwarding the 
 objects of the mission. 
 
 The negotiations, however, were doomed to take 
 a very different direction from what had been intended. 
 On April 5 the Secretaries of State, Windebank and 
 Coke, came to Van Beveren with a communication 
 from the King. It was to the effect that Charles was 
 preparing to send out a fleet * to preserve and maintain 
 his sovereignty and hereditary rights over the sea, and 
 for the preservation and protection of commerce ', and 
 the Dutch envoy was informed that no one would in 
 future be allowed ' to fish in the King's seas without 
 express licence and suitable acknowledgement.* So 
 long a time had elapsed since the last attempt at 
 interference with the Dutch fishing that all mention of 
 it had been omitted from the instructions of Van 
 Beveren ; it was hoped, indeed, that the question 
 would not be revived. On Van Beveren expressing 
 his astonishment at this sudden change of policy, and 
 asking for the reasons which had prompted it, he was 
 referred to the recently published Mare Clausum sen 
 Dominium Maris ^ by John Selden, in which he would 
 find a complete exposition of the King's rights and of 
 the object he had in asserting them. This famous 
 work, written originally, as the author himself tells us, 
 at the command of James I, to establish the claims of 
 the King to the exclusive sovereignty of the British 
 
V: 1629-1641 I09 
 
 seas, had for some years remained unprinted. The 
 attention of Charles having been drawn to it, he. read 
 it carefully, and immediately commanded its publica- 
 tion. Its appearance in December, 1635, had thus an 
 official character, for its principles and policy were 
 henceforth adopted by Charles, as matters demonstrated 
 by irrefutable proofs, and they were endorsed by 
 English public opinion wherever Seldens treatise, 
 which rapidly passed through two editions, was read. 
 
 Van Beveren, seriously disturbed, at once wrote home 
 for further instructions, and his fears were not allayed 
 when at an audience, April 15, the King declined the 
 proffered alliance, and expressed his wish for a dis- 
 cussion of the question of maritime rights. His 
 dispatch at this very time of Thomas Howard, Earl of 
 Arundel, on a special mission to Vienna, showed 
 indeed that he still trusted to the result of direct 
 negotiations with the Emperor. Arundel had to pass 
 through Holland, where his presence on such an 
 errand warned the Dutch that the attitude of Charles 
 was anything but friendly, and that grave dangers 
 might be threatening them. In these circumstances 
 the States-General, leaving Van Beveren to continue 
 his negotiations in England, summoned Joachimi to 
 the Hague to consult with them as to the course it 
 was best to take should Charles persist in his purpose. 
 They had need of his advice, for May 10/20, 1636, 
 a proclamation was issued by the King^ — ' for restraint 
 of Fishing upon His Majesty's Seas and Coasts with- 
 out licence ' — which plainly stated the King s intention 
 ' to keepe such a competent strength of shipping upon 
 Our Seas, as may by God's Blessing be sufficient, both 
 to hinder further encroachments on Our Regalities, 
 
no ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 and assist and protect those our good Friends and 
 Allies, who shall, henceforth, by vertue of Our Licences 
 (to be first obtained) endeavour to take the benefit 
 of Fishing upon our Coasts and Seas, in the places 
 accustomed.* ^ 
 
 For some weeks no steps were taken to enforce the 
 proclamation, but on July 20 news reached Van Beve- 
 ren that an English fleet of fifteen vessels was ready 
 to sail to the fishing; ^^rounds with orders to seize as 
 prizes any boats that refused to pay the toll. To plead 
 for delay was the only course open to the Dutch envoy. 
 He had an interview with the King in person at Wind- 
 sor, July 27, but was able to effect nothing. Charles 
 assured him that the object of the fleet, so far from 
 being hostile, was intended for the protection of the 
 fisher-folk especially against the Dunkirk pirates (from 
 whose daring attacks they had as a matter of fact 
 suffered much during the past few years), and that the 
 payment of a small toll was but a recognition of the 
 benefit they would receive. With this doubtful assur- 
 ance he had perforce to rest content. On July 31 
 twelve ships under Vice-Admiral Pennington actually 
 sailed northwards, and compelled the fishermen that they 
 encountered — most of the boats had already returned 
 home, it being late in the season — to pay the toll. No 
 opposition was made. One of the captains of the Dutch 
 guard-ships had, however, in consequence of his protest 
 against these proceedings, been taken prisoner. 
 
 The Dutch Government on hearing this news took 
 decided action. Joachimi was ordered at once to return 
 to England, and as soon as possible to seek an audience 
 with the King. Armed with instructions, Joachimi 
 
 ^ See note G. 
 
V: 1 629- 1 64 1 III 
 
 accordingly left Holland, August 18, convoyed by 
 a fleet under Lieutenant-Admiral Van Dorp. He 
 landed at Southwold, and finding that Charles was at 
 Woodstock he made his way at once to that place. 
 The interview took place September 3. 
 
 In accordance with his instructions the ambassador 
 expressed their High Mightinesses astonishment that 
 an Armada should have appeared in the midst ' of the 
 poor fishers and herring-catchers of these lands ', and 
 had seized one of the captains of the guard-ships and 
 caused such terror among the fisher-folk that the larger 
 part of them had fled and dared no longer pursue their 
 avocation. His Majesty was courteously requested to 
 withdraw his demand for a licence and to allow the 
 fishers to ply their trade as heretofore, and it was pro- 
 posed that a conference should be held to consider 
 the fishery question in its entirety. Joachimi did not 
 neglect the opportunity of pointing out how closely the 
 questions of the fisheries and of the Palatinate hung 
 together. Charles was unmoved by these representa- 
 tions, and finally, September 9, declined the proposal 
 of a conference. * There could be no debating ', he 
 said, 'about his Majesty's rights already confirmed 
 publickly before all the world '. The recognition of his 
 rights was a condition which must precede negotiation. 
 After discussion with Van Beveren, seeing that the 
 situation was serious, Joachimi determined to return to 
 the Hague. His start was, however, delayed by various 
 causes, and he did not make his appearance before the 
 States-General until November 22. 
 
 Meanwhile the aspect of affairs had not improved. 
 Admiral Van Dorp, who had in the middle of August 
 convoyed Joachimi to England, also had his instructions. 
 
112 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 He was first to sail with his fleet to the fishing grounds 
 to prevent any injury being done to the fishermen. 
 This accompHshed, he was to blockade Dunkirk, and to 
 destroy any privateers or Spanish ships cruising in the 
 Channel. His orders were strict, that he was not to 
 allow his ships to be visited or searched, and during 
 his blockade of Dunkirk he was to keep a watchful eye 
 upon the fisheries of the land and to protect them 
 against the Spaniards or any others who should wish to 
 molest them. These instructions were in fact a direct 
 reply and challenge to the proclamation of King Charles. 
 
 The Dutch herring fleet having recovered from their 
 alarm had ventured out, as was their custom, about the 
 middle of September, to the English coasts for a second 
 catch of fish. The Earl of Northumberland had been 
 charged with the collection of the toll from them. He 
 had, however, at this time but three ships with him, 
 and learning that a Dutch squadron of sixteen sail was 
 near at hand he promptly sent for reinforcements. In 
 response, twelve vessels were dispatched from the 
 Thames, October 8. Actual hostilities, however, did 
 not take place. One large detachment of ' busses ', not 
 having a sufficient convoy, was made to pay, the rest 
 were left unmolested. The English commander find- 
 ing himself in the presence of thirteen Dutch war-ships 
 did not venture to attack them. Both sides showed in 
 factwnore caution than aggressiveness. The authorities 
 in Holland, however, did not approve Van Dorp's atti- 
 tude and conduct, and he was requested to resign his 
 command. 
 
 The course of events was fortunately to relieve 
 a strain that was rapidly approaching the breaking 
 point. Charles's negotiations with the Emperor had led 
 
V : 1629-1641 113 
 
 to no satisfactory result. It was at last made clear to 
 him that by this means there was no hope of obtaining 
 a restoration of the Palatinate. Van Beveren seized 
 the opportunity of placing himself in communication 
 with Charles Lewis, at this time residing in London, 
 with the hope of securing through his aid a better 
 understanding between England and the States. 
 Charles Lewis was only too willing in his own interests 
 to act as intermediatory, and his influence with his 
 uncle was great. His mother, the Queen of Bohemia, 
 was at this time writing pressing letters to her brother 
 begging for his active intervention, and it was urged 
 upon King Charles that the assistance of the Dutch 
 army and navy would be far more valuable to him than 
 any sum of money that could be extracted in the shape 
 of toll from the fisher fleet. On the point of the toll 
 the King showed himself not unwilling to yield, but not 
 one inch would he concede of his claims to the undis- 
 puted sovereignty of the sea. If he withdrew his pro- 
 clamation and allowed the Dutch, as heretofore, free- 
 dom of fishing without licence, it would be in compen- 
 sation for services rendered in the cause of the Palatinate, 
 not as a right based upon ancient treaties and long 
 usage. The Dutch, on the other hand, were keenly 
 alive to all that was involved in any admission of such 
 a dominion of the sea as that claimed by the English 
 King, and were determined not to grant it. On 
 Charles's side, however, financial difficulties at this 
 time rendered any straightforward course impracticable. 
 The King had not the means to fit out an expedition 
 for the help of his nephew, and he hovered hither and 
 thither between divergent policies in the vain hope that 
 without recourse to a Parliament he could find some 
 
 1207 H 
 
114 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 way of furthering the cause of Charles Lewis, without 
 involving himself in an outlay that he was unable to 
 meet. Scheme after scheme floated before his mind, 
 all of them equally visionary when confronted with the 
 stern realities of impecuniousness. From Ferdinand 
 and Philip he turned to Richelieu. The French armies 
 were advancing in Lorraine and Elsass, and were co- 
 operating with the Dutch in the Netherlands, and with 
 the Swedes and their Protestant allies in Germany. 
 For awhile it appeared as if Richelieu were inclined to 
 an English alliance. In February and March, 1637, 
 a treaty was indeed actually drawn up. It is strongly 
 suspected, however, that the Cardinal was never in real 
 earnest, and only wished to amuse the English King 
 with negotiations, and thus at any rate keep him back 
 from purchasing Spain's goodwill on the Rhine by an 
 offer to take part in a joint naval attack upon the 
 United Provinces. Charles was quite aware of the 
 solidarity of the bond which united France and the 
 States, and that a French alliance implied friendly rela- 
 tions with the Dutch. On February 1 3 therefore he 
 sent the Secretary of State, Coke, to Van Beveren, 
 who was still in London, to reopen direct negotiations. 
 It was now proposed that there should be a combined 
 Anglo-Dutch naval expedition in which a French 
 squadron should be invited to participate, which, after 
 driving the Spanish fleets from the sea, should effect 
 a landinor in the Peninsula and dictate terms to 
 Philip IV. Meanwhile the King expressed his willing- 
 ness to allow the Dutch fishermen to pursue their 
 industry along the coasts of his kingdoms freely and 
 without hindrance. During the following season the 
 English fleet would blockade the Flemish ports, but 
 
V: 1629-1641 115 
 
 would not appear on the fishing grounds nor make any 
 demands for licences. But with this latter concession 
 the States were not satisfied. Such an act of toleration 
 implied that Charles maintained to the full his claim to 
 the undisputed sovereignty of the sea. He would not 
 during the time of the allied operations press his rights 
 to issue licences and exact toll, he only waived them as 
 a favour. Further than this he could not go. On the 
 question of the dominium maris, despite the earnest 
 entreaties of Charles Lewis, he refused any compromise. 
 But on the other side there was no less obstinacy. The 
 Prince of Orange himself wrote (March i) to Van Be- 
 veren, that he was on no account to commit himself or 
 assent to any terms unless the proclamation concerning 
 the fishing licences was first withdrawn. With France 
 the negotiations for an alliance appeared to be proceed- 
 ing smoothly, the treaty lay ready for signature, and on 
 March 4 Charles sent full powers to his ambassador at 
 Paris to conclude the matter. On the 23rd came the 
 news that difficulties had arisen, and that France also 
 required that the proclamation should be withdrawn, 
 at least during the period of the treaty. But Charles, 
 though the negotiations still dragged on, absolutely 
 declined to discuss a question which concerned his 
 rights and honour, and so he now once more lent a not 
 unwilling ear to the tempting offers made to him by 
 the Spanish ambassador. Spain was willing in return 
 for an offensive and defensive alliance against the 
 United Provinces to recognize the King's sovereign 
 rights on the seas, and to hand over at once the Lower 
 Palatinate. They even went so far as to promise the 
 surrender of certain towns in Flanders as pledges for 
 the ultimate restitution of the Upper Palatinate and 
 
ii6 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY . 
 
 the electoral dignity to Charles Lewis. It is extremely 
 doubtful whether these proposals were serious, in any 
 case they were not seriously entertained. 
 
 The mere prospect of an Anglo-Spanish agreement 
 had, however, the effect which Charles probably 
 intended it to have in making the French and Dutch 
 more conciliatory. Negotiations were resumed, and 
 the fishery question by mutual consent was relegated 
 to the background. It was finally arranged that 
 a conference should be held at Hamburg at the end of 
 June to settle the terms of a quadruple alliance between 
 France, England, the United Provinces, and Sweden. 
 Terms of peace were to be laid before the Emperor by 
 the four powers conjointly. In case of their rejection 
 the King of England was to declare war against Austria 
 and Spain. Everything now seemed to be working 
 smoothly, and no one doubted that the conference 
 would meet and that its issue would be favourable. 
 The Dutch fishermen had not been interfered with, 
 and such was the confidence in the States that England 
 had now finally thrown in her lot with the coalition 
 against the house of Austria, that instructions were 
 sent to Van Beveren to return home where his presence 
 was required. 
 
 Nevertheless the Dutch after his recall did not show 
 any eagerness to proceed. Reflection made them doubt- 
 ful about Charles's bona fides. They misliked the high 
 pretensions of the English to the sovereignty of the 
 seas, for in his insistence on this point the King was 
 but voicing the sentiment of his people. It was 
 becoming a really grave issue of practical politics. 
 With astonishment the Dutch learnt that Charles had 
 even given a patent granting exclusive rights of fishing 
 
V: 1629-1641 117 
 
 off the shores of Newfoundland, and had forbidden / 
 foreigners to fish in those waters without his licence, 
 April, 1637. If he claimed the right to do this, where 
 was the line to be drawn ? Under pressure from their 
 French allies, Charles van Cracauw, the ambassador 
 of the States in Denmark, was at length appointed to 
 represent the United Provinces at the Hamburg Con- 
 ference, but his instructions were not drawn up, and he 
 continued to reside for some time longer in Copenhagen. 
 Throughout the whole of 1637 the Dutch could not be 
 moved to take any further steps in the matter. In the 
 letters of Hugo Grotius (at this time Swedish resident 
 ambassador at Paris) to the Chancellor Axel Oxen- 
 stierna many interesting references are made to the 
 attitude of the States, and it must be remembered that 
 Grotius not only had access to the best sources of in- 
 formation, but had an unrivalled acquaintance with the 
 question which was uppermost in the minds of all 
 Dutch statesmen, the freedom of the sea and of the 
 fisheries. On June 4, the very day after the nomination 
 of Cracauw as delegate for the conference, Grotius 
 writes : — 
 
 * The ambassador of the States in England informs 
 me that the Spaniards there have great power — that 
 they wish that the restitution of the Palatinate should 
 be regarded as a certain thing ; that they promise aid 
 for the safeguarding of the possession of the sea against 
 the Dutch. Would that these things were not true! 
 The same adds that proposals were made by the 
 Spaniards that after the death of this Bavarian the 
 electoral law should be altered, conditions were even 
 offered by the Spaniard to the English, if they could 
 be dragged into war against the Dutch Republic, which 
 however I do not fear. For I see that the action of 
 
 H 3 
 
ii8 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 the English is principally directed to the aim of having 
 their commerce into all nations free and to deprive 
 others of theirs. The Dutch had formed a hope that 
 the contest about the fishery would this year be at 
 rest ; but I see that the English envoys, who are here 
 [at Paris] hold that for uncertain.' 
 
 A fortnight later (June i8) occurs the following 
 passage : — 
 
 'After I had written this there came to me the 
 English Envoy Extraordinary, Lord Leicester. ... He 
 says, that Northumberland (to whom he is nearly re- 
 lated) is again about to disturb the Dutch in their 
 liberty of using the sea, unless the Dutch purchase it 
 by great services to the Palatine house and by declara- 
 tions not injurious to English rights. I, restraining 
 myself from a definite declaration about the contro- 
 versy, have been content to demonstrate, how necessary 
 liberty of fishing was to that Republic and how neces- 
 sary the Republic itself to the security of all Europe.' ^ 
 
 Such being the feelings and the relations subsisting 
 between the two countries, it can excite no astonishment 
 that the States were exceedingly cautious before com- 
 mitting themselves to an alliance, which might entail 
 further sacrifice upon them, and tie their hands in a 
 matter of primary importance to their welfare. Accord- 
 ing to Grotius, proposals were made for holding the 
 conference at the Hague instead of Hamburg, in order 
 to make sure of Dutch co-operation. But they came 
 to nothing. Charles, however, in the spring of 1638 
 appears to have been really in earnest. Again and 
 again the English Resident at the Hague appeared before 
 the States-General to urge them to send a representative 
 to the conference. Not, however, until fresh pressure 
 
 ^ Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstierna^s Skrifter och Brefvexling^ Hugo 
 Grotii brtf, ii. 1633-9, PP- 335-58. 
 
V: 1629-1641 119 
 
 had been put upon them in the name of France and 
 Sweden by the French ambassador, D'Estampes, were 
 definite orders sent to Van Cracauw to go to Hamburg, 
 April 8. Even now he did not have any powers given 
 to him to negotiate as plenipotentiary, but was required 
 to refer all matters to the States-General for their 
 decision. Already, on March 4, a new treaty had been 
 concluded between France and Sweden for the joint 
 prosecution of the war, but the quadruple alliance was 
 never accomplished. Difficulties and intrigues pre- 
 vented the ratification either of the Anglo-French or 
 Anglo-Swedish Treaties, and the States were more than 
 half-hearted in the business. The ill success of the 
 young Elector Palatine, who had taken the field in the 
 spring of this year at the head of a force raised by the 
 help of his uncle Charles I, virtually brought the con- 
 ference to an end. Charles Lewis's army was completely 
 defeated at Lemco on October 8. Differences, which 
 had been for some little time endangering the friendly 
 relations of England and France, now came to a head.^ 
 Tharepresentatives of the powers gathered at Hamburg, 
 only to disperse without result. The long drawn out 
 negotiations gave birth to nothing but sterile discussions. 
 The outbreak, indeed, of the troubles in Scotland regard- 
 ing ' Laud's Liturgy ', and the resistance that was being 
 offered to the collectionof ship-money, effectually crippled 
 Charles's efforts on behalf of his nephew in Germany. 
 Richelieu no longer saw any advantage in tying his 
 hands by entering into an alliance which promised so 
 little. He preferred therefore to cut himself adrift from 
 the English connexion, and to trust to his alliances with 
 
 ^ Grotii bref^ April 9, 1639, p. 595, 'video cum dolore inter 
 Anglos et Gallos veteres recrudescere inimicitias.' 
 
I20 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 Sweden and the United Provinces^ for pushing on the 
 war vigorously. It was not for Protestantism that he 
 was fighting, but for the aggrandizement of France at 
 the cost of the House of Habsburg. 
 
 This faikire of his efforts to bring about, in conjunction 
 with France, a coalition of the Protestant powers for 
 the reconquest of the Palatinate and the restoration of 
 his nephew to his electoral dignity and possessions, made 
 Charles turn his eyes once more to Spain. The presence 
 at the English Court of Mary de Medicis and the 
 Duchess de Chevreuse in 1638 gave fresh life to that 
 party, who had always favoured a Spanish alliance. 
 The news that the Spaniards were making great pre- 
 parations for a determined attack upon the United 
 Provinces led the King to hope that, despite previous 
 disappointments, he might be able to forward by friendl) 
 negotiations with Spain the cause of Charles Lewis. 
 The help of the English fleet could not but be service- 
 able to a Spanish naval expedition, and possibly Charles 
 had visions of being able to attain through this means 
 that undisputed sovereignty of the British seas which, 
 since the publication of Selden s book, he had set before 
 himself, as we have seen, as one of the chief and un- 
 changeable objects of his policy, and at the same time, 
 perhaps, the pecuniary assistance he so much needed 
 for the suppression of the Scottish rebellion against his 
 authority. With characteristic uncertainty and waver- 
 
 ^ Grotii bref, April 23, 1639, p. 602, ' Haud equidem afiirma- 
 verim, quod suspicantur Angli, Gallicis pecuniis sustentari Scoticam 
 factionem pauperiorem ceteroqui quam ut bello diu sufficiat. Credun- 
 tur autem id facere Galli, non tantum ex aemulatu vetere, verum etiam 
 quod cum Batavi nunc consilia socient ad capienda Flandriae oppida 
 maritima, quod cum solus prohibere possit Anglus, domestico ob id 
 negotio distinendus sit.' 
 
V : 1629-1641 121 
 
 ing, however, while negotiating with Spain, the King 
 did not cease his endeavours to gain French support 
 for his nephew. The Spanish preparations caused 
 uneasiness in Paris, as well as at the Hague, and the 
 English fleet was an asset not to be despised in the 
 event of a Spanish armada threatening to dominate 
 the Channel. The death of Duke Bernhard of Saxe- 
 Weimar in July, 1639, left the powerful force of mer- 
 cenaries which he had commanded without a leader. 
 Charles wished to buy their services for the Elector 
 Palatine, but he could only do this through the good 
 offices of Richelieu, who was already offering good terms 
 to the * Bernardines ' to enter the French service. A 
 treaty between the French Government and the chief 
 officers of the ' Bernardine * army was in fact on the 
 point of being concluded, when Charles Lewis made his 
 appearance at the head-quarters with a supply of English 
 money and tried to induce the leaders to place them- 
 selves under his command, as an independent force. 
 The result was his immediate arrest by Richelieu's 
 command, October, 1639. He was imprisoned at Vin- 
 cennes for several months. This act was a final breach 
 of good relations between France and England. 
 
 Meanwhile Charles's approaches to Spain had been 
 equally unfortunate. The Cardinal Infant, Ferdinand, 
 the victor of Nordlingen, had, as Governor-General of 
 the Netherlands, been successful in the conduct of the 
 war against the Dutch and French in the years 1638 
 and 1639. In the latter year Olivares determined to 
 dispatch a powerful Spanish reinforcement by sea to 
 the Netherlands to take part in the next campaign. 
 Accordingly, early in September, a fleet left the Spanish 
 ports consisting of seventy-seven vessels, many of them 
 
T22 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 of the largest size, commanded by a veteran admiral 
 who had seen much service, Antonio de Oquendo. Its 
 object was to disembark at Dunkirk an expeditionary- 
 force of 10,000 men. A Dutch squadron had been 
 cruising in the Channel all the summer, keenly on the 
 look-out for the Spaniards, under the command of 
 Lieutenant- Admiral Martin Harpertzoon Tromp. On 
 September 16 he sighted the armada. He had with 
 him at the moment only thirteen ships. But without 
 hesitation he fiercely attacked the Spaniards, and after 
 a tremendous fight he forced Oquendo to fly for refuge 
 to the English coast. Oquendo, after passing through 
 the Straits of Dover, anchored under the lee of the 
 Downs, side by side with an English squadron of ten 
 ships under Vice-Admiral Pennington. Tromp sent at 
 once urgent messages to Holland for reinforcements. 
 With a squadron that joined him from Dunkirk he lay 
 in the offing blockading the Spanish fleet in the Downs. 
 In all the harbours of Holland and Zeeland the greatest 
 efforts were now made to send every available ship to 
 sea at the earliest moment. Day by day Tromp's fleet 
 increased in number. His orders were uncompromising. 
 He was to attack the Spaniards wherever he found 
 them, as soon as he was in a position to do so with 
 success. Accordingly, on October 21, being now at the 
 head of a fleet of 105 sail with 12 fireships, the Dutch 
 admiral, although the Spaniards still lay in English 
 waters, resolved to take the offensive. Detaching thirty 
 ships under Vice-Admiral De With to watch Pennington, 
 he sailed straight for the enemy's galleons as they 
 sheltered under the cliffs between Dover and Deal. 
 The contest was sharp, but decisive. Under cover of 
 a fog, Oquendo himself with seven vessels made his 
 
V: 1629-1641 123 
 
 way to Dunkirk. All the rest were captured or de- 
 stroyed. Some 1 5,000 Spaniards perished, about 1,800 
 were taken prisoners. The Dutch only lost two ships 
 and about 100 killed and wounded. Tromp had won 
 one of the most crushing of naval victories, and had 
 annihilated the power of Spain upon the sea. 
 
 This daring infringement of English neutrality could 
 not but give deep offence to King Charles, and be 
 hurtful to the feelings of the English people. It was 
 at once felt in the States that an explanation must be 
 offered for the instructions given to Tromp, which had 
 been so successfully carried out. It was accordingly 
 resolved to dispatch a special envoy to London, and 
 Francis van Aerssen (now generally known as Lord of 
 Sommelsdijk) was himself chosen to undertake the 
 difficult mission. His instructions were that he should 
 complain of the help frequently afforded to the 
 Spaniards by the English, and plead that the attack 
 of Tromp at the Downs was a necessary sequel to the 
 previous encounter from which the Spanish fleet had 
 fled to seek refuge in English waters, and that it was 
 justified by Art. 15 of the Treaty of Southampton. 
 He was further to express the readiness of the States 
 to conclude with the King a fresh treaty of alliance. 
 Sommelsdijk found everything against him. The 
 King was very angry at the gross aflront to his honour 
 and his sovereignty of the seas, and the most influential 
 of his counsellors, among them Strafford and Laud, 
 were strongly anti-Dutch. The affair was made an 
 excuse for pressing forward the collection of ship- 
 money, and the Spanish party continually gained 
 strength. The Queen-Mother of France and Madame 
 Chevreuse, who were then at the English Court, did 
 
124 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 their utmost to further the cause of Spain, and there 
 was talk of cementing an alliance by the marriage 
 of the Princess Royal with the heir to the Spanish 
 crown. 
 
 Sommelsdijk, finding he could effect no good result, 
 asked permission to return to Holland.^ He probably 
 knew that Charles was anxious not to break with the 
 States, for his request brought about a change in the 
 King s demeanour. Charles requested him to remain, 
 and showed himself more friendly. On January i6 
 the ambassador, whose correspondence with Frederick 
 Henry at this time is of great interest, wrote to the 
 Stadholder that he was not without some hopes now 
 of soothing the resentment of the King by abstaining 
 as far as possible from the irritating topic of the 
 Downs, and letting it fall into oblivion by drawing his 
 attention to other subjects of discussion. Sommelsdijk 
 had persuasive manners, and by the exercise of patience, 
 tact, and conciliation, he did succeed to a large extent 
 in his aim. He was much helped in his task by 
 another negotiation which was now set on foot. 
 Frederick Henry, in this same month of January, 1640, 
 sent over a secret envoy, Jan van der Kerkhoven, Lord 
 of Heenvliet, to propose a marriage between his only 
 son and an English princess. The matter had been 
 first suggested by Marie de Medicis during a visit to 
 the Hague in 1638. The proposal was favourably 
 received, and became the ground for a long-continued 
 struggle between the Spanish and the Franco-Dutch 
 factions at Court. In the meantime, gradually * the 
 
 * Archives de la Maison (T Orange-Nassau, 2nd ser., iii. 171, 'des 
 aussitdt que j'auray endormi le faict des Duyns, qui est le seul object 
 de ma commission.' 
 
V : 1629-1641 125 
 
 bitterness of the pill ' of the Downs was ' sweetened ' 
 by marriage negotiations, and the ' scandal ' of the ] 
 infringement of the King's sovereignty over his own 
 waters was, if not forgiven, at least overlooked. 
 
 The King saw in fact that it was wiser to keep 
 silence. Spain was clearly a broken reed, and the 
 Dutch had given a signal proof of their possession 
 of a naval strength that it would be dangerous to 
 challenge. Sommelsdijk was quite content on his part 
 to let the matter drop. On February 8, 1646, he 
 wrote to the Stadholder ^ : — 
 
 ' The scandal of the Downs has been so thoroughly 
 justified, that the greater part of the Council, in the 
 presence of the King, has sustained that we both 
 could and were obliged to do it ; so it is sufficiently 
 lulled to sleep, seeing that up to now there has not 
 been made any further complaint. As long as I remain 
 I will take good care that neither on one occasion nor 
 another shall it be revived.' ^ 
 
 And two days later (February 10) he wrote again : — 
 
 * It is not our business to stir up again the affair of 
 the Downs. If we were to press for an answer, it 
 could be none other than condemnation after so much 
 noise and menaces ; silence then must suffice us, as 
 a kind of answer, in place of an open approval, which 
 neither the state of the time or of men's minds permits 
 one to hope.' 
 
 Sommelsdijk had judged rightly that his mission, so 
 far as the matter of the Downs was concerned, had 
 achieved all the success that was necessary. 
 
 The truth is that Charles, though his pride had 
 been so deeply hurt by the destruction of the Spanish 
 fleet in the presence of an English squadron close to 
 
 * Archives de la Maison d^ Orange-Nassau^ 2nd ser., iii. 200, 201. 
 
126 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 the English shore, was secretly displeased with the 
 Spaniards for having, so to speak, forced his hands in 
 the matter. It was generally assumed at the time, 
 and the statement has frequently been made in histories 
 since, that Charles was aware of the intention of the 
 Spanish admiral to make use of the anchorage at the 
 Downs, should it be necessary for him to seek a place 
 of refuge either from storms or hostile attacks, and 
 that he had previously given permission for him to do 
 so before the fleet left the Spanish harbours. This 
 was not the case. , A dispatch ^ from the Secretary of 
 State, Windebank, to Sir Arthur Hopton, the English 
 ambassador at Madrid, dated September 29 (o.s.), that 
 is nearly three weeks after the arrival of Oquendo at 
 the Downs, is conclusive testimony to the contrary. 
 It runs as follows : — 
 
 ' Your lordship s dispatch of the 3/1 3 September gives 
 account of a message delivered to you by the Secretary 
 of the Council of War in the King s [Philip IV] name, 
 that he was resolved to put his great fleet to sea for 
 the transportation of his forces to Dunkirk, with inten- 
 tion to chastise the insolences of the French and 
 Hollanders ; and thereupon desired his Majesty to 
 afford the fleet a good passage in his seas and accommo- 
 dations in his harbours, with supplies of the necessary 
 commodities, if it should happen to put into any of 
 them. These letters though they came in extra- 
 ordinary diligence, yet they arrived not until the fleet 
 had been here in the Downs some days. Now that so 
 great a force of near seventy vessels should put into 
 any of his Majesty's ports, with such numbers of men 
 of war, without his Majesty's leave at all, or so much 
 as his knowledge until they were actually in the ports, 
 besides the neglect and disrespect, is beyond the 
 
 ' Clarendon' State Papers^ ii. 71. 
 
V: 1629-1641 127 
 
 articles of the peace, and gives occasion enough of 
 jealousy, and would no question be taken highly by 
 them, had his Majesty done the like within their 
 dominions. I am sure it has cast his Majesty into 
 some difficulties and jealousies with the French and 
 Hollanders, and what prejudice it may bring upon his 
 treaties with them is much to be apprehended. It is 
 very true that Don Alonso [the Spanish ambassador, 
 de Cardenas] gave some intimation when his Majesty 
 was in the North that some vessels were preparing in 
 Spain for the transportation of forces into Flanders, 
 and desired his Majesty would not take apprehension 
 at it, but that they might have a friendly reception 
 and treatment in his ports, as occasion should be 
 presented. But he spoke not of so great a number 
 nor such a strength ; and it was to be presumed he 
 had meant no other than those English merchant ships 
 that first transported the 1,400 or 1,500 soldiers, and 
 were intercepted and visited by the Hollanders. . . . 
 When the fleet was come in, notwithstanding they were 
 in distress, having been shrewdly torn and beaten by 
 only seventeen of the Holland ships in their first 
 encounter (a shameful thing, considering the number 
 of the Spanish ships and their vastness, and their 
 ostentation before to chastise both the French and 
 the Hollanders), they refused to do the usual duties by 
 striking to the King's ships ; insomuch as Sir John 
 Pennington, our Vice- Admiral, was enforced to threaten 
 to shoot them, if they did it not, and then, after some 
 dispute and much unwillingness, it was yielded to.* 
 
 Nothing can be more clear from this whole state- 
 ment of the situation than the two facts that the 
 Spaniards were not expected, and that they were un- 
 welcome guests. 
 
 Why then, it may well be asked, did Charles endure 
 their presence so long in English waters, when it was 
 known that the Dutch were collecting a great fleet in 
 
128 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 the offing ? or why, having endured, did he not take 
 steps to secure his guests from attack by a plain 
 declaration that any breach of neutrality would be 
 treated as a declaration of war and would be resisted 
 by the English admiral ? It was because he hoped to 
 be paid for his protection. ' It must be money that 
 must carry the business ', wrote Windebank to Hopton. 
 Charles in fact asked for ;^ 150,000 sterling, of which 
 ;^50,ooo was to be paid at once; and the Cardinal 
 Infant was busily engaged in obtaining the required 
 sum from the Antwerp money-lenders, when the blow 
 fell and there ceased to be any longer a Spanish fleet 
 to protect. As a striking instance, however, of the 
 diplomatic double-dealing of the times, and one pecu- 
 liarly characteristic of Stuart policy, it may be mentioned 
 that a dispatch of the French ambassador, Bellievre, 
 dated October 9, testifies to the fact that the Queen 
 was at this very time in the name of the King promising 
 the French Government that, if they would consent to 
 the Palatine prince assuming command of the late Duke 
 Bernhard's army, Me roi feroit tout ce que nous et 
 les Hollandois pourrons souhaiter en leur faveur contre 
 la flotte d'Espagne, sans neanmoins se declarer ennemi, 
 en sorte toutefois que les Hollandois auroient lieu 
 d'entreprendre et de faire tout ce que bon leur 
 sembleroit.* ^ Hence the explanation of Pennington's 
 inactivity. Charles was in reality far more angry that 
 Tromp had marred his prospects of striking a good 
 bargain with one or other of the belligerents than at 
 his venturing to infringe a neutrality which was actually 
 in the market. He had not reckoned on the Dutch 
 being able to put so formidable a fleet to sea in so 
 ^ Ranke, Englische Geschichte, ii. 362. 
 
V : 1629-1641 129 
 
 short a time, or bold enough to strike home with such 
 tremendous energy and effect. 
 
 Charles, however, should not be altogether blamed 
 for not pursuing at this crisis of his reign a firmer and 
 more consistent policy. Scotland was in rebellion, and 
 he had no funds to raise an army strong enough to 
 restore order. He was face to face with seething dis- 
 affection in England. In April, 1640, he found himself 
 compelled, after an interval of ten years, to summon 
 a Parliament in the hopes of obtaining a grant of supplies. 
 Supplies were refused until grievances were amended, 
 and the Short Parliament, as it was called, was dissolved 
 after sitting three weeks. The Long Parliament was 
 to meet in November. It is no wonder that in such 
 circumstances the King became a pure opportunist in 
 his conduct of foreign policy. His domestic troubles 
 and his financial bankruptcy made it exceedingly diffi- 
 cult for him to steer a straightforward course. The 
 bitter pill of the battle of the Downs had to be 
 swallowed, however disagreeable it might be. It was 
 an accomplished fact, the results of which could not be 
 undone save by war against France and the States, 
 which was in 1640 absolutely impossible. His high 
 pretensions to the sovereignty of the seas, and his 
 claims to demand licences for the fisheries could no 
 longer be insisted upon, his whole interest and attention 
 henceforward were concentrated on the struggle with 
 his own subjects and the maintenance of his sovereign 
 rights within his own Kingdoms. 
 
 The proposal therefore for a marriage between the 
 young prince William of Nassau and one of the English 
 princesses was not unwelcome. The Princes of Orange 
 were not of royal rank, but they filled a position of so 
 
\ 
 
 130 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 much dignity and influence in the United Provinces, 
 that it was felt that a union between the families might 
 be advantageous to Charles in securing to him the 
 goodwill of the Dutch in the dangers and difficulties 
 which were thickening round his throne. William was 
 only fifteen years of age, and at first the hand of the 
 younger princess Elizabeth was proposed, that of the 
 Princess Royal being assigned to a Spanish Infant. 
 But Elizabeth was only five years old, the prospect of 
 a Spanish match fell through, and at last in February, 
 1 64 1, it was arranged that Mary the Princess Royal 
 should be the bride. 
 
 The greater part of one of the volumes of the 
 archives of the House of Orange- Nassau, edited by 
 Groen van Prinsterer, is filled with the negotiations con- 
 cerning this marriage, and the study of the endless notes 
 and dispatches on the subject is repletewith interest both 
 for the student of the manners of the times, and be- 
 cause they contain many passages giving lifelike and 
 charming touches concerning the Court of Charles I and 
 Henrietta Maria, and their intimate domestic life. Here 
 it is not possible to treat the subject in greater detail. 
 
 The proposed marriage was very popular in England, 
 whose people saw in it the definite adhesion of the King, 
 after many tergiversations, to the Protestant cause. On 
 May 2, Prince William disembarked at Gravesend and 
 proceeded to London in great state to meet '\\\'^ fiancee. 
 He was convoyed from Holland by a strong squadron 
 under the command of Admiral Tromp ; and was ac- 
 companied by the special envoys, Brederode, Aerssen 
 van Sommelsdijk, Heenvliet, and the resident ambas- 
 sador, Joachimi. In their report to the Stadholder of 
 the reception (May 2, 1641), the envoys write : 
 
V: 1629-1641 131 
 
 ' We had to pass through so many people, it was 
 almost impossible to reach the Court, except for the 
 good order which was kept from street to street. 
 Your Highness could not imagine with what blessings 
 and acclamations his Highness was received, and we 
 would venture to say that not for a century has a 
 reception taken place in which great and small have 
 testified so much joy and satisfaction.' 
 
 It was to be the last glimmer of brightness in the 
 life of Charles and Henrietta Maria. The boy and 
 girl, aged respectively fifteen and ten years, were 
 married in state on May 12, 1641, in the chapel at 
 Whitehall — a marriage destined to sorrow, but which 
 was to have such important results upon the future 
 relations of England and the United Provinces. Nine 
 years later William was suddenly cut off by an attack of 
 small-pox in the midst of a promising career. A week 
 after his death Mary gave birth to a son, who was to 
 be famous in history as William HI, Prince of Orange 
 and King of England. 
 
VI: 1641-1653 
 
 The marriage of the Princess Royal with the son of 
 Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange, on May 12, 1641, 
 took place at an ominous time. Ten days later 
 Strafford was executed. There can be little or no 
 doubt, that the eagerness of the King and Queen for 
 the accomplishment of this union was due to the desire 
 to secure the goodwill of the Stadholder, and through 
 him of the States, in the troublous times which they 
 saw before them, f It fulfilled two objects. It gave 
 satisfaction to the Puritan party in England as being 
 a Protestant alliance, and it was accompanied by secret 
 assurances on the part of Frederick Henry of friendly 
 support to the King in his coming conflict with his 
 subjects. These assurances, we may well believe, were 
 very guarded and strictly personal, for no one knew 
 better than the Stadholder the limitations of his actual 
 power. The following passage from a letter in the 
 hand of Sommelsdijk, written March 5 in the name of 
 the envoys to Frederick Henry, puts the matter very 
 clearly : 
 
 * We have found so much frankness and affection 
 on the part of the King and Queen for the furtherance 
 of the marriage, that we have no fear in recommending 
 your Highness to hasten the departure of Monseigneur 
 the Prince your son, as much as possible, so as to put 
 everything in security ; for their Majesties have resolved 
 to push forward without allowing themselves to be 
 stopped by any machinations to the contrary from 
 whatever part they come, and whatever they write to 
 you, upon the good faith and confidence of Mr. de 
 
VI: 1641-1653 133 
 
 Heenvliet, remains secret without anything of it es- 
 caping either here or there, for fear lest the cognizance 
 of it should come to the knowledge of the Parliament.'^ 
 
 William returned to Holland at the end of May 
 alone, leaving his child-bride for awhile in her parents 
 home. But the Grand Remonstrance, the impeach- 
 ment of the five members, and other events now 
 followed in rapid succession, and soon it was seen that 
 the issues which divided King and Parliament admitted 
 of no accommodation by peaceful means. Heenvliet, 
 who was still in England, became the trusted confidant 
 of the distracted King and Queen, and his letters to 
 Frederick Henry at this time show how anxious Charles 
 was to avoid a civil war, if by any concessions that did 
 not utterly despoil him — ' le depouiller tout-a-fait ' — he 
 could come to terms with the Parliament. In private 
 interviews Henrietta Maria was urgent with Heenvliet 
 to use his good offices, and many times expressed 
 the hope that should matters come to an extremity 
 ' the Prince would not allow the King to perish '. In 
 reply the Stadholder impressed upon their Majesties 
 not to have recourse to arms, for victory was uncertain. 
 A reconciliation on whatever terms could not but be 
 to the profit and advantage of the King. Unfortunately 
 such advice was already too late to be of any avail 
 (February, 1642). 
 
 At the beginning of March Henrietta Maria accom- 
 panied the Princess Royal to Holland. Her real object 
 was to collect funds and to secure, if possible, the 
 active assistance of the Prince of Orange. She was 
 received with much distinction and magnificence, but 
 her thoughts were not upon the shows of state. 
 * Archives J 2nd series, iii. 381. 
 13 
 
134 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 Letter upon letter passed from her to the Stadholder 
 in his camp, begging him to help her in procuring 
 supplies of money, arms, men, and munitions of war for 
 her husband's service. She tried to borrow upon her 
 jewels, but the Jews would give her nothing without 
 the guarantee of the Prince. Lords Jermyn and Digby 
 hurried backwards and forwards upon her confidential 
 missions, and she had many interviews with Heenvliet, 
 with whom she had become . so intimate during his 
 sojourn in London. What a picture of the feverish 
 state of anxiety to which her troubles had brought the 
 once gay and buoyant Henrietta Maria, is contained 
 in a report of one of her conversations with him sent 
 by Heenvliet to the Prince of Orange. 
 
 * I confess that this interview has troubled me not a 
 little. The Queen did not speak to me on the .subject 
 without trembling, and she kept asking me so piteously, 
 if there were not any hope that by any means your 
 Highness could be persuaded to assist her, that I am 
 still troubled at it/ 
 
 Frederick Henry did his very best to give all the 
 help he could, both in his private and official capacity. 
 He allowed the English officers serving in his army to 
 return home and join the King s forces, where their ser- 
 vices were of great value. He gave the guarantee she 
 required for a loan upon the Crown jewels, he advanced 
 a considerable sum of money out of his private purse, 
 and he connived at arms and ammunition being secretly 
 bought and sent to England from Dutch ports ; but he 
 was unable to promise any assistance from the States, 
 nor indeed could he venture even to suggest it. The 
 bulk of the Dutch people in the opening stages of the 
 Civil War took the side of the Parliament, more es- 
 
VI : 1641-1653 135 
 
 pecially the Hollanders. The Prince's influence could 
 still command the support of a majority in the States- 
 General, but he, like all the Stadholders of his House, 
 had constantly to struggle with the opposition of the 
 aristocratic burgher-regents of the towns of Holland, 
 who controlled the States of that dominant ^province. 
 Maurice had crushed by force in 161 8 the attempt 
 of Oldenbarneveldt to claim for each province of the 
 Union independent sovereign rights, but the spirit of 
 Oldenbarneveldt survived, and the Hollanders, con- 
 scious of the power of the purse that they possessed, 
 were ready to thwart the plans and policy of the 
 Stadholders, though these were supported by the other 
 provinces, and indeed did thwart them by raising diffi- 
 culties in the way of obtaining supplies. Frederick 
 Henry, during the first decade of his Stadholderate, 
 exercised a larger personal authority in the direction of 
 the affairs of the Republic than any of his predecessors 
 or successors. But during the last years of his life, 
 prematurely worn out by constant campaigning, he had 
 continually to confront the bitter opposition of the 
 town corporations of Holland to that vigorous prosecu- 
 tion of the war that he desired. The Prince of Orange 
 then was not his own master, and could not in face of 
 the strong leanings of a large part of the population, in 
 Holland particularly, towards the Parliamentary cause 
 in the Civil War give effect to his own inclination to 
 lend the King active support in his efforts to suppress 
 rebellion by armed force. 
 
 Matters came to a crisis when, at the end of August, 
 a special envoy from the Parliament, Walter Strickland, 
 appeared at the Hague with instructions to protest 
 against the dispatch of warlike stores to the King from 
 
136 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 Dutch ports, and the permitting of officers in the Dutch 
 service to join his army. The Queen was highly indig- 
 nant. The English resident ambassador, Boswell, at 
 her bidding immediately presented himself before the 
 States-General to protest and demand that Strickland 
 should not be received or acknowledged. To the Prince 
 she wrote, September 6, 1642, begging him to prevent 
 such an affront being offered to the King, 'for assuredly', 
 to quote her actual words, ' it would be so great, that 
 he could never have any friendship with these States 
 after this ; and, God be thanked, he is not yet in such 
 a state as to be despised.' But although the majority 
 of the States-General were ready to refuse Strickland 
 any audience, they were forced by the insistance of the 
 States of Holland to make a compromise. They would 
 not admit him to the assembly of the States- General, 
 but they agreed to send two deputies to confer with him. 
 f^ The result was, again by the pressure of Holland, that 
 the States-General declared for strict neutrality, and 
 forbade the export to either side in the Civil War of 
 arms or munitions of war. Despite this prohibition, 
 by the connivance of the Stadholder, friends of the 
 royal cause contrived to dispatch ammunition and 
 other stores to Dunkirk, and from thence to ship it to 
 England. Strickland, having heard of this, ventured 
 to make a written complaint to the States-General of 
 the Prince's conduct. Frederick Henry thereupon de- 
 clared that such an aspersion was an insult to his person 
 and demanded satisfaction. The States-General, May 7, 
 1643, declared thereupon the accusation of Strickland 
 to be false, and broke off all relations with him. 
 
 Henrietta Maria had returned to England the pre- 
 vious February, never ceasing to the end her tireless 
 
VI: 1641-1653 ^37 
 
 efforts on her husband's behalf. Before leaving she 
 had broached the project of a second alliance between 
 the families, that of the Prince of Wales with the eldest 
 daughter of the Stadholder. It was not a mere ephe- 
 meral project, for the following year a certain Dr. Goff, 
 who had been chaplain to one of the English regiments 
 in the Dutch service, was sent over by the Queen, with 
 a letter in which she says ' from me you will only know 
 that the King my lord has given me full and authentic 
 powers to negotiate and to conclude the marriage of my 
 son the Prince of Wales with Mademoiselle d' Orange.' 
 With these powers Dr. Goff was entrusted. In his 
 instructions were contained the onerous conditions, 
 which must be the price paid for the honour of such 
 a match. The States were to break with France unless 
 the latter would consent to give armed assistance to the 
 King, or in default of this to make peace with Spain, 
 one of the conditions of such a peace being a promise 
 of help to Charles. It is needless to say that the pro- 
 posal was not acceptable, for the simple reason that 
 Frederick Henry had no power to comply with the 
 conditions, even if he had wished. The negotiations, 
 however, went on all through 1645, although the des- 
 perate state of the King's affairs after the battle of 
 Naseby rendered any successful issue impossible. 
 Louise of Nassau became shortly afterwards the wife 
 of the Great Elector. 
 
 I n 1 644 two envoys, William Boreel and J an van Rheede, 
 were sent to England to attempt to mediate between the 
 King and the Parliament. Their instructions, containing 
 fifty-seven articles, are dated October 6, 1643, but they 
 did not actually set out until January 1 5 following. They 
 had interviews with Lord Denbigh, Sir Harry Mildemay, 
 
138 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 and Sir William Strickland, representing the Parliament, 
 and afterwards, February 19, an audience with the King 
 in the hall of Christ Church at Oxford. During the 
 whole of the year 1 644 they remained in England, and 
 took part in the abortive negotiations of Uxbridge, which 
 came to an end February 22, 1645. It became now 
 evident to the ambassadors that they could do no further 
 good, more especially as the Parliament more and more 
 showed a disinclination to accept foreign mediation. 
 After farewell audiences they reached the Hague again, 
 May 4, 1 645, and made their report to the States- General. 
 It was unfavourable to the attitude of the Parliament. 
 On being informed of this by their representative, 
 Strickland, who was again at the Hague, the Parliament 
 requested him to appear before the States-General and 
 offer a justification on their behalf in reply to Boreel 
 and Van Rheede. The States-General, by the votes of 
 Utrecht, Groningen, Zeeland, and Overyssel against 
 Holland, Gelderland, and Friesland, refused him admis- 
 sion, while at the same time they permitted the King's 
 resident, Boswell, to appear in their assembly and 
 address them. The Parliament on this had their justifi- 
 cation printed in English and Dutch, and secretly dis- 
 tributed throughout the Provinces. 1 1 was eagerly read, 
 the mass of the people being in favour of what they 
 regarded as the cause of civil and religious freedom 
 against despotic rule, especially as there were many 
 points of resemblance between the struggle in England 
 and their own long drawn out struggle against Spanish 
 tyranny. This marked division of opinion in the Nether- 
 lands effectually prevented any further steps being 
 taken to interfere in English 'affairs during the two 
 next years. 
 
VI: 1641-1653 139 
 
 Events, however, had been moving fast during that 
 interval. On March 14, 1647, Frederick Henry died. 
 At the very end of his life he had deserted the French 
 alliance, of which he had so long been a strong advocate, 
 and had joined his great influence to that of the Province 
 of Holland in bringing about a separate peace with 
 Spain. With the increasing growth of the military 
 strength of France, the project of a division of the 
 Spanish Netherlands with that power ceased to have 
 attractions for him. At the time of his death all the 
 conditions of peace with Spain had been practically 
 settled, the terms being virtually those dictated by the 
 Dutch. By the treaty which was actually signed at 
 Munster, January 30, 1648, Spain, after eighty years of 
 strife, was at last compelled to recognize the indepen- 
 dence of the United Provinces, and all the conquests 
 made by Frederick Henry in Flanders, Brabant, and 
 Limburg remained in the hands of the Dutch, as prizes 
 of war. At this proud moment in commerce, in sea- 
 borne trade, in finance, in colonial expansion and enter- 
 prise, in arts and in letters, the Dutch Republic had 
 reached the zenith of its prosperity. The Civil War in 
 England had paralysed the energies of its chief rival 
 upon the seas, and left the way clear for the United 
 Provinces to step into the very first rank of maritime 
 powers. 
 
 Frederick Henry was succeeded in his posts and 
 dignities by his son. William H, Prince of Orange, had 
 only reached his twenty-second year at the time of his 
 father's death, but he was full of talent and energy, fired 
 with ambition, eager to emulate the great deeds of his 
 ancestors, and, if possible, to excel them. His wife, 
 Mary of England, was still a girl. Haughty in manner, 
 
I40 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 and exceedingly tenacious of her royal rank, she pre- 
 ferred always to be styled the Princess Royal, rather 
 than Princess of Orange. The relations between the 
 youthful pair were, however, thoroughly sympathetic, 
 /^ and William was ever ready to lend a helping hand to 
 his English relations and never made any secret of his 
 zeal in their cause. His hospitality to them was un- 
 bounded, and his purse open. First, the Duke of York 
 made his escape from England to Holland, April, 1648, 
 and he was followed by the Prince of Wales in July. 
 As the Queen of Bohemia was still residing at the Hague 
 with her daughters, quite a family party were assembled 
 at the Court of William and Mary. The Prince of 
 Wales, who was courteously received by a deputation 
 of the States-General, found a loyal squadron assembled 
 at Hellevoetsluys, of which he assumed command. He 
 also raised some troops for his service in the islands of 
 Borkum and Juist. There was at one time danger of a 
 collision in Dutch waters between the royal ships and 
 a Parliamentary squadron under the Earl of Warwick. 
 The Parliament dispatched an envoy, Dr. Doreslaar, 
 a native of Enkhuysen, who had settled in England and 
 had become Professor of History at Cambridge, to pro- 
 test against the protection and assistance accorded to 
 the royalists. The States-General refused to grant him 
 an audience. Towards the close of the year, Walter 
 Strickland was again sent to the Hague, furnished with 
 fresh credentials, to join Dr. Doreslaar and demand in 
 the name of the Parliament that the royal fleet should 
 not be furnished with arms and stores in Dutch harbours. 
 He was escorted by Lord Warwick, with a fleet of 
 twenty-one ships. The States-General took steps to 
 prevent a hostile encounter between the rival fleets, but 
 
VI: 1641-1653 HI 
 
 could not be moved even to give a hearing to the 
 Parliament's request. The States of Holland, however, 
 received Doreslaar, and passed a resolution forbidding 
 the royal ships and stores to remain in the harbours 
 of that province. 
 
 The news of the impending trial of Charles I for 
 high-treason caused consternation in the States, and 
 especially in Orangist circles. The Prince of Wales 
 himself, who had now handed over the command of 
 his fleet to Prince Rupert and was residing with his 
 brother-in-law at the Hague, appeared in person before 
 the States-General to ask them to intercede for his 
 father. All parties concurred in granting his request, 
 and it was unanimously resolved that an extraordinary 
 embassy should be sent to London, and in order to 
 strip it of any appearance of partisanship, the chosen 
 envoy was not an Orangist, but Adrian Pauw, lord of 
 Heemstede, the veteran leader of the Aristocratic- 
 Hollander party. With him was associated Albert 
 Joachimi, who through the whole of the Civil War 
 had remained at his post, as resident ambassador in 
 London. Besides his credentials, Pauw carried with 
 him letters for Fairfax, Cromwell, and other Parlia- 
 mentary leaders. The embassy was received with 
 courtesy Feb. 5/Jan. 26, 1649, and Pauw pressed for 
 an immediate audience. It was too late. On the 
 following day the death sentence was pronounced. 
 The envoys now approached, Sunday, Feb. 7/Jan. 28, 
 Fairfax, Cromwell, and others privately, asking for 
 a respite of the sentence, but failed to get any definite 
 answer. On the Monday they were granted an 
 audience at a special sitting of the House of Commons, 
 and in the name of the States-General, Pauw and 
 
142 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 Joachimi read an address Interceding for the King's 
 life, and setting out the reasons for the course for 
 which they were pleading. A general answer was 
 given, that what they had said should be considered. 
 In reality the decision had already been taken for 
 the public execution of the King the next morning, 
 Tuesday, Feb. 9/Jan. 30. The ambassadors had their 
 address translated from French into English, and on 
 seeing the preparations in Whitehall, again made an 
 effort to obtain an immediate audience, but they found 
 the way barred by troops, and knew that the object of 
 their mission could no longer be achieved. 
 
 Not till February 25/15 was an official answer given 
 to Pauw and Joachimi, in which, after thanking the 
 States for their friendly intentions, the Parliament 
 declined to discuss the question of the King's execution. 
 But at the same time an earnest desire was expressed 
 for the establishment of a firm peace, a right under- 
 standing and good correspondence between the govern- 
 ments of the two countries, which had so many common 
 interests. ' We shall ', they said, * be ever ready not 
 only to hear but to contribute with them all good 
 means and offices to fulfil such works as shall be 
 necessary for the general good of Christendom, as well 
 as our own.' There can be no doubt that Cromwell's 
 influence may be seen in this friendly overture. 
 Cromwell had already given Pauw an assurance in 
 a private interview of his wish for the establishment 
 of close relations of friendship with the Dutch, and 
 ^ had spoken of a proposal being made for giving the 
 Netherlanders the same commercial privileges in 
 England as the inhabitants of the country. Already 
 there was floating before his eyes that idea, which he 
 
VI : 1641-1653 143 
 
 was afterwards in a position to try and realize, of 
 effecting such a close union between the two republics 
 as would make them into one State. 
 
 In 1649 any thought of such a thing was a mere 
 dream. The news of the King's execution caused 
 a wave of horror and indignation to sweep over the 
 Netherlands without distinction of class or party. 
 The States-General decided unanimously to offer their 
 condolences to the Prince of Wales and also to con- 
 gratulate him on his accession. The Orangists would 
 have liked his full title to have been given to him of 
 King of Great Britain and Ireland, but the States of 
 Holland and Zeeland, who were the most interested 
 in trade and shipping, opposed this, as they were 
 afraid of the resentment of the new government in 
 England. So it was agreed that he should be addressed 
 simply as King Charles II. To this title he had an 
 undoubted right, as he had been proclaimed king in 
 Scotland on his father's death. The States of Holland 
 separately also sent a deputation to him for the same 
 purpose. The number of broadsheets and pamphlets 
 that issued from the press are a proof of how deeply 
 moved the whole country was at the tragic death of 
 the English King. What was most remarkable was 
 the fact recorded by Clarendon ^ as to the change of 
 attitude among the preachers, who had hitherto been 
 strongly on the side of the Parliament. ' The body of 
 the clergy', he writes, *in a Latin oration delivered 
 by the chief preacher of the Hague, lamented the 
 misfortune in terms of as much asperity, and detesta- 
 tion of the actors, as unworthy the name of Christians, 
 as could be expressed.' Nevertheless, in order to 
 
 ^ History of the Rebellion, v. 418. 
 
V 
 
 144 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 avoid an open breach with the Commonwealth, as it 
 was now styled, Joachimi was allowed to remain, as 
 the States' resident ambassador in London. 
 
 The English Council of State, on their part, deter- 
 mined to send over once more Dr. Isaac Doreslaar to 
 join Strickland at the Hague, with instructions to pro- 
 pose to the States-General the knitting together in 
 closer relations of the common interests of the two 
 countries. He arrived May 9. Doreslaar was especially 
 hateful to the royalists, who were gathered at that 
 time in large numbers in the Dutch capital, as he had 
 taken part in the King's trial, and rumour had even 
 designated him as the masked headsman. It was an 
 unhappy choice, which had serious consequences. 
 Three days after his arrival, Doreslaar, as he sat at 
 table in his hotel, was attacked by five or six men, and 
 assassinated. The assassins, their work accomplished, 
 walked off undisturbed. The body was sent back to 
 England, and was honoured with a public interment in 
 Westminster Abbey. ' Though all who were engaged 
 in this enterprise *, writes Clarendon, ' went quietly 
 away, and so out of the town, insomuch as no one of 
 them was ever apprehended or called in question, yet 
 they kept not their own counsel so well (believing they 
 had done a very heroic act) but that it was generally 
 known that they were all Scottish men, and most of them 
 servants or dependents upon the Marquis of Montrose.' 
 
 The States of Holland, as soon as news reached 
 them of what had happened, made great efforts to 
 track the murderers, but in vain, and Joachimi was 
 commissioned to express their horror at the act, and 
 to try and appease the Parliament. The Parliament, 
 on their side, did not feel themselves sufficiently secure 
 
VI: 1641-1653 145 
 
 to take decisive action, and Strickland was instructed 
 to approach the States-General once more with offers 
 of friendship. But the influence of the Prince of 
 Orange in the States- General was paramount, and 
 Strickland was refused an audience. On the other 
 hand, despite Strickland's protest, the Scottish envoy, 
 Macdowell, sent by Charles 1 1 to announce his accession 
 to the throne of the northern kingdom, was received 
 by them. The English Council of State were unable 
 to regard this conduct in any other light than as 
 a deliberate insult to them and their representative. 
 Strickland was recalled, and Joachimi was informed 
 that unless he was provided with fresh letters of credit 
 to the Republican Government within a fixed time he 
 must leave the land. Strickland left Holland, July 22, 
 1650. Joachimi received orders to quit London, 
 September 26. All this time the States of Holland ^ 
 had been doing their utmost to effect an accommoda- 
 tion. The trade interests of the province with England 
 were so great that they were most anxious to avoid 
 a breach with the new Commonwealth. They on - 
 their own authority received Strickland in a public 
 audience, and even ventured so far as to send a com- 
 missary, Gerard Schaep by name, to London, January 22. 
 This high-handed act of independence only had the 
 effect, however, of stiffening the backs of the States- 
 General. All the efforts of Holland to change their 
 attitude towards England failed. 
 
 The acute differences of view in regard to this 
 particular line of policy between the self-willed province 
 and the Stadholder were but the signs of a general 
 estrangement ; and the struggle for predominance was 
 destined to come to a head at the very time of the 
 
146 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 return of Joachimi. The Prince of Orange had been 
 f^^^ altogether opposed to the abandonment of the French 
 alliance and the conclusion of a separate treaty with 
 Spain in 1648. The peace of Munster had carried 
 into effect the policy of the States of Holland, and 
 William H was determined, as soon as he got the 
 reins of power firmly into his hands, to reverse it. 
 He entered into secret negotiations with Mazarin for 
 a renewal of a French alliance against Spain, with the 
 aim of conquering and partitioning the Spanish Nether- 
 lands. Devotedly attached to the Stuart cause, it was 
 his intention with French help to try to overthrow the 
 English Commonwealth and establish Charles H on 
 his father s throne. His generosity to his wife's exiled 
 relations was so great that he impoverished himself 
 and had to raise large loans on his estates. With 
 ambitious schemes bf war and conquest filling his brain, 
 he found himself speedily in disagreement with the 
 merchant burghers of the Province of Holland. The 
 chief interest of the Hollanders was peace, which would 
 reduce taxation and increase commerce. They had 
 long grudged the heavy charges of the war, and the 
 Provincial States, as soon as peace was concluded, 
 clamoured for the disbanding of a large number of 
 the regiments, which, though they formed part of the 
 federal army, were in the pay of the Province of 
 Holland. William, as Captain-General of the Union, 
 opposed this, and was supported by the States-General. 
 Into the details of this contest for supremacy it is 
 needless to enter here. It was to a certain extent 
 a repetition of that between Maurice and Oldenbarne- 
 veldt. Armed with the authority of the States- General, 
 William in the summer of 1650, at the head of a strong 
 
 I 
 
VI: 1641-1653 147 
 
 body of troops, forced the States of Holland to sub- 
 mission. In the previous year Charles, on his departure 
 for Scotland, had begged the support of the States- 
 General, and had promised in return to settle favour- 
 ably the long-standing differences about Amboina 
 and Pulo Run in the East Indies, and other ques- 
 tions, but owing to the opposition of Holland and 
 Zeeland no active assistance was given. The States- 
 General, however, as a mark of sympathy and good- 
 will, assembled in a body to bid him farewell. The 
 royal cause had at first prospered in Scotland, until 
 September 13/3, 1650, when the battle of Dunbar 
 shattered Charles's fair prospects. But at this very 
 time his brother-in-law had just brought his contest 
 with the Province of Holland to a triumphant issue. 
 William II was now in a position to bring about that 
 active intervention of the States in alliance with France 
 in support of the Stuart cause, and for the expulsion 
 of the Spaniards from the Southern Netherlands, on 
 which his heart was set. To the Prince of Orange 
 therefore the eyes of the English royalist party were 
 turned, as their chief hope in the hour when it seemed 
 as if nothing could stem the tide of Cromwell's victo- 
 ries. They were doomed to a terrible disappointment. 
 William, in the very midst of secret negotiations with 
 France, suddenly fell sick of the small-pox, and after 
 a week's illness died, November 6, 1650. He was 
 but twenty-four, and in him Charles 1 1 lost a chivalrous 
 and true-hearted friend. Eager for farne, gifted with 
 uncommon abilities, William, had he lived, was un- 
 doubtedly prepared to have put his far-reaching plans 
 into execution, and to have risked much for the up- 
 holding of his kinsman's rights. 
 
148 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 His decease brought about a revolution in the 
 United Provinces. He left no one of his family to take 
 his place. His only child was not born until a week 
 after his death. The Province of Holland straight- 
 way seized the opportunity to assert that predominance 
 in the Union for which it had been striving so long. 
 Its leaders at once took steps to call an extraordinary 
 assembly, known as the * Great Gathering ', to take 
 into consideration the state of the Union, of religion, 
 and military affairs. The Great Gathering met at 
 . ^ the Hague, January i8, 1651. The office of Stadholder 
 was abolished, in all the provinces but Friesland, as 
 were also the posts of Captain- General and Admiral- 
 General of the Union. The population and the wealth 
 of Holland gave henceforth to the States of that 
 province a position of supremacy in the federation, 
 and, as in the days of Oldenbarneveldt, all the threads 
 of administration and the conduct of foreign affairs 
 passed during the Stadholderless period into the hands 
 of its chief functionary, the Raad-Pensionaris or Grand 
 Pensionary. 
 
 This complete change in the system of government 
 of the United Provinces caused much satisfaction in 
 London. The aristocratic burgher oligarchy, who were 
 now in power at the Hague, had no special sympathy 
 for Charles H. Indeed it was embittered against him 
 at this time, since Prince Rupert's ships from their 
 head-quarters in the Scilly Islands had been plundering 
 Dutch merchantmen in their passage up channel. The 
 Parliament therefore determined to send a special 
 embassy to propose that close alliance between the 
 two neighbouring republics, almost amounting to a 
 political union, which Cromwell had already set before 
 
VI : 1641-1653 149 
 
 him as an end to be aimed at for the mutual advantage 
 of both States. The States-General on their side had, 
 on the proposal of the States of Holland, determined, 
 January 28, 1651, to recognize the English Common- 
 wealth as a free republic, and to receive its envoys, 
 and Joachimi again went to London to take up his old 
 post as the resident ambassador of the States. 
 
 The English ambassadors were Oliver St. John 
 and Walter Strickland, the latter of whom, as we have 
 seen, had spent many years in Holland without being 
 able to obtain an audience with the States-General. 
 The Parliament were now determined that their repre- 
 sentatives should make their state entry into the 
 Hague with a splendour befitting the envoys of so 
 mighty a power. They were accompanied by a suite 
 of some 250 persons in brilliant uniforms and liveries, 
 and travelled in twenty-five state coaches. On 
 March 27, 1651, the solemn entry took place. The 
 ambassadors were, however, to pass through the ordeal 
 of an unpleasant experience. As the procession made 
 its way through the crowded streets, St. John and 
 Strickland were greeted with loud cries of ' Regicides ', 
 'Executioners', 'Cromwell's bastards', and other 
 abusive epithets. No doubt there were many royalist 
 refugees in the Hague, but though these may have 
 given the lead to the mob, there can be little question 
 of the general hostility at this time of the masses of 
 the people, even in Holland itself, to the Parliament. 
 It is a common mistake to suppose that the Orangist 
 was the aristocratic, the republican, or so-called 
 'States' party, the popular party in the United Pro- 
 vinces. The States of Holland, which was the strong- 
 hold of the republican party, was entirely in the 
 
 K3 
 
ISO ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 hands of the close oligarchic corporations of the chief 
 towns of the province. In each town a few aristocratic 
 
 r-., burgher families monopolized all offices and authority, 
 the rest of the townsmen had no votes or representa- 
 tion, and the country people were ignored altogether. 
 The great influence and executive powers of the 
 Stadholders of the house of Orange were therefore 
 a check upon the domination of these burgher oli- 
 garchies, and so by them resented accordingly. On 
 the other hand, the Princes of Orange were loved and 
 respected by the people, alike for their high qualities 
 and the great services they had rendered to the 
 country, and there was scarcely any time when they 
 had not the enthusiastic support of the great majority 
 of those classes, the bulk of the population, who were 
 excluded from any share in the government of the 
 State. A knowledge of these facts is absolutely 
 necessary to a right understanding of what the * Stad- 
 
 ^^ holderless' regime in the time of John de Witt really 
 meant. 
 
 The parliamentary ambassadors were really alarmed, 
 remembering the fate of Doreslaar, at this hostile 
 reception. Neither they nor their attendants dared to 
 venture into the streets but in parties of five or six and 
 sword in hand ; and everywhere they were followed by 
 
 '^-^ the cry of ' Regicides'. On March 29, St. John and 
 Strickland presented their credentials before the 'Great 
 Gathering', and in a long speech expressed the desire of 
 the English Government for the establishment of good 
 relations of enduring friendship between the two repub- 
 lics. 'It is the wish of the Parliament to conclude', 
 they said, * a closer union of the two States, which would 
 be for both more advantageous than heretofore, since it 
 
VI: 1641-1653 151 
 
 would not be dependent upon the life and will and 
 private interests of a single individual.' Six com- 
 missioners were appointed by the Assembly to discuss 
 their proposals, and a conference was opened on April 4. 
 The grounds on which the English proposed to the 
 Netherlanders that ' a more strict and intimate Alliance 
 and Union bee entred into by them, whereby there 
 may bee a more intrinsecall and mutual interest of 
 each other, than hath hitherto beene for the good 
 of both', were: (i) community of religion, (2) community 
 of political liberty, (3) community of interest in freedom 
 of trade and navigation. The Dutch, however, showed 
 themselves very wary. They had no intention of 
 giving their consent to any general propositions before 
 informing themselves of their precise meaning. There 
 was considerable variety of opinion in the different 
 provinces and much indecision. On April 6, the com- 
 missioners were only empowered to reply, that the 
 States were willing *not only to renew the ancient 
 friendship between the two nations, but also to con- 
 clude a treaty for common interests'. This response 
 did not satisfy the English envoys, who rejoined that 
 * the union for common interests ' they had in view 
 *was one closer than at any previous time'. These 
 words required explanation, but it seemed that they 
 could only point to an alliance so intimate and binding 
 as to be another term for coalition. Such was indeed 
 its meaning in the minds of those who proposed it, 
 and so the Dutch interpreted it. To them, however, 
 not unnaturally, the only idea suggested by a coalition 
 with the English Commonwealth was the loss by the 
 smaller republic of its independence, and its practical 
 absorption in the larger. Such an idea was simply 
 
152 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 unthinkable to men who had just won the recognition 
 of their independence after eighty years of heroic 
 struggle. The reply of the Assembly was not hurriedly 
 given. At last, on April 26, it came, and was so far 
 unsatisfactory that, while expressing their readiness for 
 a closer union, the reservation was made that it must 
 be one ' in which both States could better promote their 
 interests for themselves and for the common welfare*. 
 St. John and Strickland now went a step further, and 
 gave a hint that if an offensive and defensive con- 
 federation such as they had in mind could be accom- 
 plished, it would be accompanied by many advan- 
 tageous concessions to the Dutch. At this point the 
 negotiations came to an end. The Parliament did not 
 believe that in the present temper of the Dutch their 
 proposals were likely to be received in the spirit in 
 which they were offered, and the ambassadors were 
 recalled. They and their attendants were constantly 
 insulted by Royalists and Orangists whenever they 
 showed themselves out of doors, and though the pro- 
 vincial authorities strictly forbade such outrages on 
 pain of severe penalties, and urged the citizens to 
 assist in the protection of the representatives of a 
 foreign power, they effected little. Some of the offen- 
 ders were of high rank ^, and they openly braved the 
 threats of the magistracy and remained unpunished. 
 Earnest representations were now made to the English 
 Parliament on behalf of the States of Holland by their 
 agent, Gerard Schaep, who was still residing in London, 
 that they would allow the envoys of the Commonwealth 
 to remain awhile longer and continue the negotiations. 
 The Parliament, however, would only consent to do this 
 * Among them Prince Edward, son of the Queen of Bohemia. 
 
VI: 1641-1653 153 
 
 on condition that full satisfaction be made to St. John and 
 Strickland for all that they had endured, and that the 
 attacks upon them should cease. The States of Holland 
 promised to do this. Prince Edward of the Palatine 
 and other prominent offenders were summoned before 
 a court of justice, and warned; some of their servants 
 were punished. It was a sorry piece of business. But 
 it was an index to the real feeling of the populace that 
 such a state of things should have been possible in a 
 town like the Hague. 
 
 The negotiations were accordingly renewed by the 
 presentation of fresh proposals, May 10, by St. John 
 and Strickland. There was now no mention of coali- 
 tion, only of an offensive and defensive alliance, but 
 there was an ominous addition : both States were 
 required to bind themselves severally not to permit 
 the sojourn on their soil of declared enemies of the 
 other. This was especially directed against the adhe- 
 rents of the Stuarts and the members of the Orange 
 and Palatinate families. The great desire of the party 
 now in power in the Netherlands was the maintenance 
 of peace. The Hollanders were willing to conclude 
 a treaty extending their trade privileges, but they were 
 anxious not to be drawn into the war in Scotland, and 
 in face of the popular affection for the house of Orange 
 they dared not venture at the dictation of a foreign 
 power to treat the young prince and his mother 
 harshly. They responded therefore, after some delay, 
 by counter proposals for the renewal of the Treaty 
 of 1496, the Mag7ius Inter cur sus, but revised in favour 
 of the Dutch to suit present-day conditions. Complete 
 freedomjpf trade, navigation, and fishery without pass, 
 toll,^or_ptii^Jiindrances in each other's domains was 
 
154 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 what was aimed at. No mention was made of the 
 English proposal to banish from the Netherlands thosg^ 
 who gave help to the Stuart cause. With such differ- 
 ences oi view there was of course no prospect of any 
 agreement being reached. The English embassy 
 accordingly left the Hague, July 31, 165 1, and returned 
 home. 
 
 The report made to Parliament created a bad im- 
 pression in England, and led to all the old complaints 
 against the Dutch being raked up once more: the 
 ' massacre of Amboina, the seizure of Pulo Run and other 
 high-handed acts in the East Indies, their monopoly of 
 the fisheries on the British coasts, their attacks on the 
 English whalers off Spitzbergen, and their attempts to 
 drive out English trade from the Baltic, from Russia, 
 and elsewhere. Then on the top of this the shameful 
 treatment to which the parliamentary envoys had been 
 persistently exposed was angrily recalled, the refusal 
 of the States-General for years to admit Strickland to 
 an audience, the murder of Doreslaar, and lastly the 
 insults offered to the latest embassy. All these things 
 formed a formidable bill of indictment. As the efforts 
 of the Parliament to effect a close union between the 
 republics for their common interest had failed, it be- 
 came the clear duty of the English Government to take 
 measures to protect the national interests against un- 
 scrupulous rivals. There was no delay in taking drastic 
 action. 
 
 \^ On October 9, 1651, the famous Navigation Act was 
 passed, which forbade the importation of foreign goods 
 pv and products into English harbours save in English 
 bottoms, or those of the countries from whence the goods 
 and products came. A deadly blow was thus struck at 
 
VI: 1641-1653 155 
 
 the Netherlanders, who had at that time almost a mono- 
 poly of the most important branches of sea-borne trade 
 and were the carriers of the world. Scarcely less serious 
 was the prohibition to foreigners to fish in British waters. 
 Every infringement of this edict would be punished by 
 the confiscation of the offending vessels. It has already 
 been seen in previous lectures of what vital importance 
 these fisheries were to the welfare of Holland. 
 
 The States-General now determined to make a serious 
 effort to resume the negotiations which had been broken 
 off, and Jacob Cats, Gerard Schaep, and Paulus van 
 der Perre were sent on a special embassy to England. 
 They reached London, December 27. Their task was 
 a difficult one. They pressed for the revocation of the 
 Navigation Act and of the embargo upon fishing, and 
 for the release of the confiscated ships, and proposed 
 that negotiations should again be set on foot for the 
 conclusion of a treaty based upon the Magnus Inter- 
 cursus. The news at this critical moment that the 
 Dutch were fitting out 150 new war vessels for the 
 protection of free navigation did not tend to smooth 
 the way to an understanding. It was regarded in 
 England as a threat. The English now formulated 
 their demands. These were such as they must have 
 known would never be conceded. They required the 
 payment of the arrears of toll due for the fishing on 
 the British coasts, the surrender of the Spice Islands, 
 the punishment of the survivors of those concerned in 
 the Amboina massacre, satisfaction for the murder of 
 Doreslaar, and the payment of the indemnities due for 
 losses sustained by Englishmen at the hands of the 
 Dutch in various parts of the world. It is clear that 
 these demands were practically an ultimatum. The 
 
156 ANGLO-DUTCH RIVALRY 
 
 Netherlanders were required to choose between coali- 
 tion or humiliation, and in case neither were accepted, 
 war. Both sides were, however, averse to taking the 
 final step, and conferences and negotiations still dragged 
 on for some months, while strenuous preparations were 
 at the same time being made on both sides of the 
 Channel for hostilities. It was a dangerous situation, 
 and was made wellnigh desperate by a conflict which 
 took place off Folkestone, May 19, 1652, between the 
 Dutch fleet under Tromp and an English squadron 
 under Blake, through a misunderstanding about the 
 question of striking the flag. This event excited public 
 opinion in England to fever pitch, and made war prac- 
 tically inevitable. The Dutch Government, however, 
 knew that they were not prepared for such a mighty 
 conflict. The peace party in Holland had insisted on 
 the disbanding of a large part of the land forces after 
 the death of William, and the navy had been neglected 
 and was far from being as formidable as a few years 
 before. In all haste therefore the experienced Adrian 
 Pauw, now holding the important post of Grand Pen- 
 sionary of Holland, was sent over to London to join 
 Cats, Schaep, and van Perre, and endeavour even at 
 the last moment to avoid a final breach between the two 
 nations. His efforts proved vain, for the English would 
 not give way in their demands for conditions too humili- 
 ating for the Netherlanders to accept. The 'States' party 
 in power had, in fact, not a free hand, even had they 
 been inclined to preserve peace at the cost of submis- 
 sion to English dictation, for the Orangists were de- 
 lighted at the thought of trying conclusions with the 
 hated Commonwealth, and they had strong support 
 throughout the country. The fear of a revolution 
 
VI: 1641-1653 
 
 <:ompelled the States-General to refuse the only Wafi 
 by which war could be avoided. The die was cast. 
 The Dutch ambassadors left England, June 30, and 
 the struggle between the two maritime powers for 
 supremacy, which had been so frequently imminent 
 but so long delayed, at last began. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 A. The Great or Herring Fishery. 
 
 From the nature of the land, Holland and Zeeland 
 were always the home of fisher-folk. The herring 
 fishery oif the coast of Great Britain was from early 
 times an industry pursued by many Hollanders and 
 Zeelanders, but it was comparatively limited, until the 
 invention of 'curing' made by Willem Beukelsz of 
 Biervliet in the latter part of the fourteenth century 
 (he probably died in 1397) converted a perishable 
 article of food into a commercial commodity. The 
 method of Beukelsz, which remained practically un- 
 changed for some five centuries, without going into 
 minute particulars, consisted in the following processes. 
 Immediately after the hauling in of the nets the guts 
 were in a particular manner removed from the fish, 
 which were then packed in layers in barrels with salt 
 between the layers. In the brine or pickle that was 
 formed they were allowed to lie some time, fresh salt 
 being added every fortnight. At first the Zeelanders 
 were the chief herring fishers, but afterwards the towns 
 on the Zuyder Zee and on the Maas became the head- 
 quarters of the industry. During the Burgundian 
 period many laws were enacted regulating the herring 
 fisheries, but the edict^ of Charles V, May 18, 15 19, 
 which extended and codified all previous enactments, 
 remained the permanent basis of future legislation on 
 the subject. The chief regulations concerned the 
 branding of the barrels, the sorting of the fish, and 
 the date of the beginning of the fishing. This date 
 was originally August 24 (St. Bartholomew), but was 
 
 ^ 'Placaet ende Ordonnantie op 't stuk van den Haring-Vaert, 
 't branden van de tonnen en 't soorten van den Haringh.' Dcrde 
 Memoriae! boek 's Hofv. Holland. 
 
APPENDIX 159 
 
 afterwards changed first to July 25 (St. James), and 
 finally to June 24 (St. John the Baptist). It is possible 
 that some change in the habits of the herring shoals 
 may have led to this considerable shifting of the date. 
 After 15 19 there were many fresh enactments made, 
 referring particularly to matters concerning convoys 
 and their cost, the duties levied, and many details in 
 regard to the boats, tackle, and crews, and again a codi- 
 fication of all laws was carried out by a series of edicts in 
 1580, 1582, and 1584. These edicts of 1580 and 1582 
 (Groot Placaetboek van Holland en West Vriesland, 
 tomi., 684-691, 696-707, 715-727, 748-751), continued 
 to regulate the fisheries during the period with which 
 these lectures deal ; i. e. the first half of the seventeenth 
 century. Especial attention was given in these regula- 
 tions to the branding of the barrels in which the herrings 
 were packed. Each fishing town had its official in- 
 spectors, who themselves branded the barrels with the 
 mark of the cooper and that of the town, and no others 
 were allowed to be used. The kind of salt for the 
 curing was rigorously prescribed, and careful precau- 
 tions taken that no other kind or damaged salt was 
 smuggled on board. Not less minute were the regu- 
 lations to ensure that the quality of the fish which 
 came to the market should be guaranteed. All fish 
 had to be sorted. Such as were caught before July 25 
 (St. James), being not fully developed, had to be kept 
 apart. Such as were caught after July 25 had to be 
 divided according to technical categories, 'full and sweet', 
 ' empty ', ' undersized or damaged'; and the skipper was 
 enjoined under oath to place his own mark upon each 
 barrel and to be personally responsible for the quality 
 assigned, and not only so, the fisherman who packed 
 the fish in the barrel was required to place his mark 
 upon it. The most stringent rules were laid down as 
 the correct method of curing. In fact, everything was 
 done to show the importance of the industry, and the 
 necessity of securing that the market was supplied with 
 
i6o APPENDIX 
 
 no counterfeit article, but only with herrings prepared 
 in Dutch fashion by Dutch hands. In order to keep 
 a fast hold upon the monopoly, the fishermen were for- 
 bidden under heavy penalties to sell their fish in foreign 
 ports. In the seventeenth century, the interests of those 
 engaged in this profitable trade were vigilantly looked 
 after by a body known as the * College of the Great 
 Fishery ', which met at Delft. The College consisted 
 of five deputies from the towns of Enkhuysen, Schiedam, 
 Delft, Rotterdam, and Brill, and so exclusive were they 
 that during the period with which we are concerned 
 other towns, even such important places as Amsterdam, 
 Dordrecht, and Hobrn, were refused admission. One 
 of the chief tasks of the College was to enforce the 
 carrying out of the regulations. 
 
 During the reigns of the two first Stuarts, the Dutch 
 fishing fleet was accustomed to sail out for the Scottish 
 waters between the Shetlands and Cape Buchan Ness 
 in the middle of June, so as to begin their fishing 
 operations on St. John's Day, June 24. From June 24 
 to July 25, the fishing was wholly in the north ; from 
 July 25 to September 14 to the south of Buchan Ness, 
 but still along the Scottish coast; from September 25 
 to November 25 in the neighbourhood of Yarmouth ; 
 from November 25 to January 31 off the mouth of the 
 Thames and the Kentish coast. The fleet sailed out 
 twice only, in June and again in the autumn, the task 
 of conveying the barrels of fish from the fishing 
 'busses' to the Dutch harbours being carried out by 
 a number of light vessels called ' ventjagers.' The 
 herring fleet was always accompanied by an armed 
 convoy, to the upkeep of which the State contributed 
 20,000 florins annually. In war time a small naval 
 squadron was also detached to keep watch and ward 
 against the attacks of Spanish cruisers and Dunkirk 
 pirates. 
 
 The Herring or Great Fishery was compulsorily 
 closed on January 31. During the spring months the 
 
APPENDIX i6i 
 
 fishermen occupied themselves with fishing by hook 
 on the Dogger Bank, for cod, soles, and other fish. 
 This was named ' The Small Fishery \ 
 
 B. The Narrow Seas. 
 
 The expression * the Narrow Sea ', or ' the Narrow 
 Seas ', which so often appears in seventeenth-century 
 diplomatic dispatches and controversial writings, is a 
 term upon whose exact signification geographically 
 there has been much dispute. The English kings from 
 ancient times claimed ' sovereignty ' — dominium maris — 
 in the * narrow seas ' or mare britannicum. Evidence 
 is fairly conclusive that the term under the Tudors and 
 until the friction with the Dutch arose on the questions 
 of free fishery and the striking of the flag in the reign 
 of James I, was confined to the Channel, the narrow 
 sea between England and France. Lord Salisbury, as 
 late as 1609, writing to Sir R. Winwood at the Hague 
 (Winwood, Mem. iii, p. 50), speaks of ' his Majesty's 
 narrow seas between England and France, where the 
 whole appertayneth to him in right, and hath been 
 possessed tyme out of mind by his progenitors.' It 
 soon, however, became the accepted interpretation of 
 English statesmen, jurists, and writers that the ' narrow 
 seas ' meant the two seas between England and France, 
 and England and the Netherlands ; thus Rapin [Hist. 
 cfAngleterrevxx, p. 454), ' la domination des deux Mers, 
 c est-a-dire, des deux bras de Mer qui se trouvent entre 
 TAngleterre et la France et entre I'Allemagne et la 
 Grande-Bretagne.' This extension of the term was 
 vigorously contested by the Dutch. In the peace nego- 
 tiations at Cologne in 1673 the Dutch protested that 
 no treaty between England and any other power * n'ait 
 mesl^ la Mer Britannique avec celle du septentrion' 
 (Verbaal der Amb. 1673/74). The English popular 
 view of the question appears clearly in an anonymous 
 pamphlet, The Dutch Drawn to the Life^ published 
 
i62 APPENDIX 
 
 in 1664, just before the outbreak of the Second Dutch 
 War. The writer speaks of 'the command of the Narrow 
 Sea, the Dutch coast and ours ' (p. 5 3 ) ; and again, referring 
 to the action taken by King Charles I in 1640 (p. 148), 
 ' When our neighbours the Dutchmen minded their 
 interest and were almost Masters at Sea in the Northern 
 Fishing .... upon our Fishmongers' complaint the 
 King encouraged several overtures and projects con- 
 cerning Busses for our own Coasts service, the preven- 
 tion of strangers, and the improvement of the Narrow 
 Seas, &c.' 
 
 C. The Julich-Cleves Succession Question. 
 
 The death of John William (March 9, 1609), the mad 
 Duke of Julich-Cleves, without issue, raised the important 
 question of the succession to his territory, which lay 
 astride the Rhine on the eastern frontier of the United 
 Provinces. It was felt to be essential for the protection 
 of Protestant interests in Germany and the Netherlands 
 that the Duchies should not fall into the hands of a 
 partisan of the house of Habsburg. Duke J ohn William 
 had four sisters, but only the claims of the descendants 
 of the two eldest really counted. Maria Eleanora had 
 married Duke Albert Frederick of Prussia. All her 
 sons, however, had died young, but it was held that her 
 claims had passed to the son of her daughter Anna, who 
 had married John Sigismund, Elector of Brandenburg. 
 This was disputed by the Count Palatine, Philip Lewis 
 of Neuburg, who had married the second sister of the 
 deceased duke, also named Anna. Eventually the Elec- 
 tor and the Count Palatine agreed to occupy the disputed 
 territory jointly, and were known as ' the Possessors '. 
 The Dutch recognized the title of ' the Possessors ', but 
 the Emperor Rudolph refused to do so, and with his 
 sanction the Archduke Leopold, Bishop of Passau, at the 
 head of an armed force, made his way into the Duchies 
 and seized the fortress of Julich. Henry IV of France, 
 
APPENDIX 163 
 
 who had been meditating an expedition for the over- 
 throw of the Habsburg power, seized the opportunity 
 for planning a great alliance with the Dutch, James I 
 of England, and the Protestant princes of Germany for 
 the expulsion of the Archduke and the recovering of 
 Jlilich. His assassination, May 14, 16 10, put an end 
 to his ambitious schemes, but though deprived of the 
 help of a great French army, Maurice of Nassau, at the 
 head of a considerable force of Dutch and English troops, 
 entered the Duchies and was joined by the troops of the 
 * Possessing' princes. On September i, Jlilich surren- 
 dered, and Archduke Leopold left the territory. The 
 troubles were not, however, yet over. The ' Possessors*, 
 as perhaps might have been expected, quarrelled. John 
 Sigismund of Brandenburg became a Calvinist, Wolf- 
 gang William of Neuburg married the sister of the 
 Duke of Bavaria, and announced his conversion to 
 Catholicism. In September, 16 14, Maurice of Nassau, 
 with Dutch troops, and Spinola at the head of a Spanish 
 force, both entered the Duchies, and a hostile encounter 
 seemed inevitable. Hostilities were, however, avoided, 
 and by the treaty of Xanten (November 12) the two 
 rivals agreed to a partition of the territory. 
 
 D. The Origin and Early History of the Fellow- 
 ship OF the Merchant Adventurers. 
 
 The Fellowship of Merchant Adventurers has the 
 distinction of holding the first place, not only in England, 
 but in Western and Central Europe, as the pioneer of 
 great trading corporations. The Gilds of the Middle 
 Ages were municipal and local institutions. The Hansa 
 League in Germany was a bond, not between merchants 
 dealing in particular wares, but between a group of towns. 
 
 England in the fourteenth century had no manufac- 
 tures. Her only industries were cattle-breeding and 
 agriculture; her exports were raw materials, chiefly wool. 
 English wool was famed for its quality, and was much 
 
164 APPENDIX 
 
 sought after by the cloth weavers of the Netherlands, 
 Germany, and Italy. The trade was almost entirely in 
 the hands of the Hansa and of Italians, who sent over 
 agents to England to buy up the wool and export it to 
 the Continent. In England itself, before a. d. 1300, the 
 sale of the best wool, that of the royal flocks and of the 
 great landowners, was conducted under the royal licence 
 by an official body or group of merchants, known as 
 * Merchants of the Staple '. A Staple {stabile emporium) 
 was a place set apart for the export and import of certain 
 articles ; and there were ten or a dozen English towns, 
 known as Staple Towns — among them Newcastle, York, 
 Norwich,Westminster, and Bristol — where alone the wool 
 traffic could be carried on. Also on the Continent there 
 was a Staple Town, which was the recognized centre of 
 the foreign trade, having exclusive rights. No wool 
 could legally be shipped from England to any other 
 port. During almost the whole of the fourteenth cen- 
 tury the Staple was at Bruges. The institution by 
 Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, of the famous 
 Order of the Golden Fleece, at Bruges in 1430, had a 
 direct reference to the English wool, which had so much 
 contributed to the town's prosperity. By that date, how- 
 ever, a change had already taken place in England. 
 Flemish refugees had, during the troubled times of the 
 Arteveldes, fled across the Channel, taking with them 
 their skill in the textile industries. Many of them settled 
 at Norwich, then one of the Staple towns, and intro- 
 duced the art of cloth -weaving. Only the coarser fabrics, 
 rough white cloths, baize, and kersey, were produced, 
 and these were sent over to Ghent, Bruges, Ypres, and 
 other places, to be finished and dyed. To a monopoly 
 of this trade the Staple Company, which had in 1359 
 removed from Bruges to Calais, had no claim, and the 
 exporting of cloth fell into other hands. Enterprising 
 English traders, under the name of Merchant Adven- 
 turers, had already begun to visit foreign countries with 
 their wares, the pioneers of a commerce which was one 
 
APPENDIX 165 
 
 day to encircle the world. Their first official recognition 
 came from the Kings of the house of Lancaster. By a 
 letter patent of Henry IV, 1407, they were granted the 
 privilege of appointing a governor or consul to represent 
 them in certain towns, where they traded. Their con- 
 solidation into an organized society appears to have 
 been a gradual process, and little is known of the actual 
 steps by which the court or central governing body of 
 the Merchant Adventurers came into being, but in the 
 middle of the fifteenth century it was in existence, and 
 at the same time Antwerp became the port to which 
 exclusively their goods were sent and from which they 
 were distributed to other parts of the continent — in other 
 words, their Staple. At Antwerp a wharf, warehouse, 
 and dwellings were erected for their use, and extensive 
 privileges granted to them, including a certain auto- 
 nomous jurisdiction. 
 
 The Charter which constituted them into an organ- 
 ized corporation was granted by Henry VI in 1462. 
 By this Charter the Fellowship obtained the monopoly 
 of the trade in woollen goods, at least all traders who 
 were not members of the Fellowship had to pay a tax 
 for their privilege, low at first, but which at the end of 
 the century had risen so high as to be practically pro- 
 hibitive. By this Charter the right of jurisdiction at 
 Antwerp was confirmed and placed in the hands of 
 a court consisting of a governor and twelve assistants, 
 the governor being appointed by the King, the assist- 
 ants elected by the members. Shortly after the 
 granting of this Charter the activity of the Adventurers 
 at Antwerp aroused the hostility of the Flemish 
 weavers, and Duke Philip the Good was induced by 
 their complaints to forbid in 1464 the importation of 
 English woollen goods into his dominion. They had 
 therefore for awhile to withdraw to Utrecht. On 
 Philip's death in 1467 the interdict was removed, and 
 Antwerp again became the Staple of the Adventurers, 
 and was to be their home for wellnigh two centuries. 
 
 L3 
 
i66 APPENDIX 
 
 The period of the greatest prosperity of the Fellow- 
 ship was the sixteenth century, the period of the 
 Tudors. This prosperity was built up on the privi- 
 leges and monopoly granted to them by the Charter 
 of Henry VII in 1501, which was extended in 1505 
 and remained in force until the reign of James I. 
 The governing body consisted of a governor and 
 twenty-four assistants, elected by the * General Court ', 
 as the whole assembly of members was styled. This 
 governing body had extensive powers, legislative, exe- 
 cutive, and judicial. Their jurisdiction over the 
 members was not confined to civil actions, but they 
 had the power of inflicting heavy fines and even 
 imprisonment for criminal offences. To become a 
 member — ' a free and sworn brother ' — of the Fellow- 
 ship an apprenticeship of not less than eight years had 
 to be served, except in the case of sons of members ; 
 and proof had to be given of English birth and 
 parentage. A * brother ' who married a foreigner or 
 acquired foreign property was disqualified. 
 
 Four times a year the ships of the Fellowship 
 gathered at London and sailed to Antwerp, carrying 
 a cargo of half-finished white cloths, kerseys, and 
 baize. The merchants themselves had to accompany 
 their goods, for it was prescribed * that every one must 
 sell his own wares'. These sales could only take 
 place in the Court-house, and only three times a 
 week, on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. The 
 carrying out of these regulations and jurisdiction within 
 the Staple was entrusted to a secondary governing 
 body or court consisting, like the head body in London, 
 of an elected governor and assistants. The great 
 rival of the Adventurers had been the Staple Com- 
 pany and the Hansa League, but both these bodies 
 became in the sixteenth century decadent, and with 
 the capture of Calais in 1558 the Staple Company 
 ceased to exist. But though the loss of Calais made 
 Antwerp more than ever the centre of the English 
 
APPENDIX 167 
 
 continental trade, troubles were in store for the 
 Merchant Adventurers. 
 
 With the accession of Elizabeth disputes arose be- 
 tween the English and Spanish Governments about 
 the interpretation of the treaty of commerce, known 
 as the Magnus Inter cur sus, concluded in 1496 be- 
 tween Henry VII and Philip the Fair. Margaret of 
 Parma, the Governor of the Netherlands, took in 1563 
 the strong step of forbidding the entrance of English 
 goods into the Netherlands. Elizabeth replied by 
 closing the English harbours to ships from the Nether- 
 lands. For about a year this state of things spelt 
 ruin to the Adventurers, but no less so to Antwerp. 
 In 1564, accordingly, an understanding was reached, 
 and the Court once more returned to its old quarters 
 on the Scheldt. But for a brief space only. The 
 outbreak of the Revolt led to the banishment of the 
 Adventurers from the Netherlands, and at the end 
 of 1564 they left Antwerp finally. 
 
 Shut out from the Netherlands, the Fellowship now 
 tried to set up their Staple further north in the region 
 dominated by their chief rivals the Hansa League. 
 At first they found a resting-place at Emden, but in 
 1567 they were tempted by an invitation from Hamburg 
 to set up their Court in that great seaport, from whence 
 by the Elbe they had access to the German market. 
 Hamburg thus played for its own profit the part of 
 traitor to the League, of which it was one of the fore- 
 most members. The residence at Hamburg lasted ten 
 years, but the bitter opposition of the Hansa to their 
 presence proved too strong, and by an Imperial decree 
 of Rudolph II they were in 1577 banished from Ger- 
 man soil. The energies of the Adventurers were now 
 diverted into different channels, small factories being 
 placed at Stade, Emden, and even at Elbing near 
 Dantzic. A more important move was the attempt to 
 re-enter the Netherlands by the erection of a subsidiary 
 court at Middelburg in 1582. Holland and Zeeland 
 
 I 
 
i6B APPENDIX 
 
 had now practically freed themselves from Spanish rule, 
 and Middelburg, on the island of Walcheren, was the 
 capital of Zeeland, and at that time a flourishing port. 
 With the growth of the United Provinces in power 
 and wealth, it was clearly the best policy of the Fellow- 
 ship to establish its chief Staple and Court within the 
 boundaries of the Republic. There were many claimants, 
 among them Groningen, Delft, and Rotterdam. But 
 after many negotiations, an influential deputation sent 
 by Middelburg in January, 1598, to London, decided 
 the choice of the English Government and of the 
 General Court of the Adventurers in favour of making 
 this town their sole Staple upon the Continent, and the 
 seat of their Great Court. Many points concerning 
 the rights and privileges to be enjoyed, together with 
 the restrictions imposed, were the subject of much dis- 
 cussion before the terms of the agreement was finally 
 settled between the town of Middelburg, the States of 
 Zeeland, and the States-General on the one hand, and 
 the English Privy Council and the governing body of 
 the Fellowship on the other. The principal conditions 
 were that the Adventurers should carry on their entire 
 business within the Republic at the one Staple-town, 
 and all English subjects were forbidden to bring woollen 
 goods to any other port of the United Provinces. Their 
 later history is told in the lectures that precede. The 
 Staple and Court remained at Middelburg from 1 598 to 
 162 1 ; at Delft from 162 1 to 1634; at Rotterdam from 
 1634 to 1656 ; at Dordrecht from 1656 to 1665. After 
 the close of the Second English War the States-General 
 in 1668 refused to grant the Adventurers their old 
 privileges, and the long connexion with the Nether- 
 lands ceased. 
 
APPENDIX 169 
 
 E. The Interlopers. 
 
 This name for the smugglers who, despite the ex- 
 clusive rights of the Merchant Adventurers, carried 
 English woollen goods to other Dutch ports than the 
 privileged Staple, was derived from the Dutch term 
 inter- or entre-loopers, i.e. * runners-in '. During the 
 whole time that the Court and Staple were at Middel- 
 burg, the port of Flushing, only a few miles distant on 
 the same island of Walcheren, was in English hands, 
 being one of the so-called ' cautionary ' towns, which 
 were a pledge to Queen Elizabeth for the repayment 
 of her loans, and were garrisoned by English troops. 
 Flushing was during this period a centre of smuggling, 
 and the Flushing * interlopers ' a great annoyance to 
 the Adventurers. The smuggling went on, however, 
 with activity after the retrocession of Flushing in 16 16, 
 especially to the port of Amsterdam. The powerful 
 Amsterdam merchants, who profited by the illicit trade, 
 did their utmost to encourage the * interlopers \ and to 
 protect them in spite of the angry protests of the 
 Adventurers, and of the corporations of the interested 
 Staple-towns. 
 
 The word * interlopers ' was soon universally applied 
 to all private traders who trespassed against the privi- 
 leges of a Chartered Company, more especially in the 
 East Indies. 
 
 F. The English and Scottish Regiments in 
 THE Dutch Service. 
 
 Bodies of English volunteers were to be found 
 fighting under the Prince of Orange against the 
 Spaniards from the very beginning of the Dutch War 
 of Independence. In 1572 a force of 1,500 men under 
 Sir Humphrey Gilbert landed at Flushing, with the 
 connivance of Queen Elizabeth, and from this time 
 forward English, troops took part in all the fiercest 
 fighting. In 1571 there were four English regiments 
 
l^o APPENDIX 
 
 in the field, commanded by Colonels Norris, Cavendish, 
 Cotton, and Morgan. During the time of Leicester's 
 Governor-Generalship, 1585-7, the number of the 
 English army in the Netherlands amounted to 8,000 
 men, horse and foot. After his departure, a con- 
 siderable though reduced force was left under the 
 command of Lord Willoughby. In 1589 he was suc- 
 ceeded in this post by the famous Sir Francis Vere, 
 the hero of the battle of Nieuport, 1600, and of the 
 siege of Ostend, 160 1-4, and many another desperate 
 struggle. It was during the time of his command 
 that in 1595 an arrangement was made between the 
 States-General and Queen Elizabeth, by the terms of 
 which the English troops were henceforth to enter the 
 service of the States and receive Dutch pay. The 
 English Government allowed them to be recruited in 
 England, and they were to wear distinctive English 
 uniforms, carry English colours, and have their own 
 national march and beat of the drum, but were to take 
 during their service an oath of allegiance to the States- 
 General from whom the officers received their com- 
 missions. The number was fixed at 4,000. 
 
 Sir Francis Vere was followed in the command by 
 his younger brother Sir Horace Vere, afterwards Lord 
 Vere of Tilbury, in 1608. During the twelve years* 
 truce, 1609-21, the English regiments were retained 
 in the service of the States, and in 16 10 under 
 Sir Edward Cecil, afterwards Lord Wimbledon, dis- 
 tinguished themselves at the siege of Jiilich. From 
 the outbreak of the war again in 1621 to the peace of 
 Munster in 1648, the English regiments took part in 
 all the campaigns of Maurice (died 1625) and of 
 Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange. In 1622 the 
 names of the four Colonels were Edward Vere, Edward 
 Cecil, Charles Morgan, and Edward Harwood. On 
 them and the Scottish Brigade always fell the brunt 
 of the fighting. They particularly distinguished them- 
 selves in the defence of Bergen-op-zoom (1622), and in 
 
APPENDIX 171 
 
 the capture of Hertogenbosch (1622), of Maestricht 
 (1632), and of Breda (1637). In 1626, the army of 
 Frederick Henry included 14,500 English troops and 
 5,000 Scottish. At Hertogenbosch, Colonel Sir Edward 
 Vere was killed; at Maestricht, Colonel Sir Edward 
 Harwood and the Earl of Oxford ; at Breda, Colonels 
 Sir Charles Morgan and Goring were wounded. In 
 1644, the names of the four Colonels were Craven, 
 Cromwell, Herbert, and Goring. 
 
 After the peace of Munster {1648), followed in 1650 
 by the death of the Stadholder William II, the repub- 
 lican party in the States, now predominant, resolved to 
 reduce the number of their standing army, but the 
 English regiments were retained until the outbreak of 
 the war with the Commonwealth, when they were all dis- 
 banded. I n 1 6 5 6, however , when peace had been restored, 
 a single regiment was recruited from the veterans, who 
 had remained in Holland, chiefly royalist refugees, and 
 it was henceforth known as the Holland regiment. 
 The command was conferred on Colonel John Crom- 
 well, a cousin of the Protector, but a stanch loyalist. 
 
 On the declaration of war between England and the 
 United Provinces in 1665, the Holland regiment was 
 summoned home. It became the 4th Regiment of Foot, 
 but still retained its old name, the Holland Regiment, 
 until 1689. In that year William III changed its 
 title to ' Prince George of Denmark's Regiment ', and 
 it became the 3rd Foot. On the death of Prince 
 George in 1708, their style was once more altered, 
 and this time, from the colour of their waistcoats, 
 breeches, and stockings, they were styled * the Buffs,' 
 a name they were to retain until our own day. They 
 are now the East Kent Regiment. 
 
 Not less interesting, and even more prolonged, is the 
 story of the Scottish regiments in the Netherlands. 
 The first record of Scottish volunteers is in 1573. 
 From 1603 to 1628 there were two regiments. After 
 1628 there were three, except during the reign of 
 
172 APPENDIX 
 
 William III, when their number was increased. The 
 group of regiments was always known as the Scots 
 Brigade, and it was continuously in the Dutch service 
 receiving Dutch pay for more than two centuries, 
 except the decade 1688-98, when, under the Dutch 
 King of Great Britain, they received British pay. 
 Even during the Anglo-Dutch wars of 1653, 1665, 
 and 1672 they were not disbanded, but were converted 
 for the time into Dutch regiments, and in consequence 
 of this their composition during this period became 
 considerably leavened with an admixture of foreigners. 
 Of the Scots who remained, it must always be remem- 
 bered that a number of them had been settled in the 
 Netherlands for two or three generations. After 1674 
 their thoroughly Scottish character was restored. From 
 that date until 1781 the Scots Brigade remained in 
 Holland. But when Great Britain declared war against 
 the United Provinces in that year, the question of the 
 position of the Scottish regiments was raised, and the 
 States-General resolved that they should be completely 
 denationalized and the officers be required to take an 
 oath abjuring allegiance to their own country. The 
 large majority at once threw up their commissions, 
 and the Scots Brigade in the Dutch service ceased to 
 exist. The subsequent history is curious. In 1794 
 the Scots Brigade was by order of the British 
 Government reformed. In 1803 its strength was 
 reduced, and the ' Brigade ' became the 94th Regiment. 
 Until 1809 the 94th wore Highland dress, but this 
 was then discontinued. The regiment, however, 
 retained the green facings which they had inherited 
 from one of the Dutch regiments. Disbanded in 18 18, 
 but reconstituted in 1878, the facings remained green, 
 and a diced band round the shako still proclaimed the 
 Scottish connexion. Its last service as the 94th was 
 in the Boer War of 1880, when a part of the regiment 
 when on march in time of peace was suddenly attacked 
 at Bronker's Spruit, and had heavy losses. The army 
 
APPENDIX 173 
 
 reorganization of 1881 led to the 94th becoming the 
 battalion linked to the 88th, an Irish regiment, probably 
 for no other reason than the green facing. The 
 glorious Scottish tradition therefore of three centuries 
 was henceforth lost, and the regiment which repre- 
 sented the Scots Brigade became the 2nd battalion 
 of the Connaught Rangers, with its head-quarters at 
 Galway. 
 
 G. King Charles's Proclamation for the Restraint 
 OF Fishing upon His Maiesties Seas and 
 Coasts without Licence (1636). 
 
 Whereas our Father of blessed memory King 
 James did in the seuenth yeere of His reigne of 
 Great Brittaine, set forth a Proclamation touching 
 Fishing ; whereby for the many important reasons 
 therein expressed, all persons of what Nation or 
 quality soeuer (being not His naturall borne Subjects) 
 were restrained from Fishing vpon any the Coasts 
 and Seas of Great Brittaine, Ireland and the rest of 
 the Isles adjacent, where most vsually heretofore 
 Fishing had been, vntill they had orderly demanded, 
 and obtained Licences from Our said Father or His 
 Commissioners in that behalfe, vpon paine of such 
 chastisement as should be fit to be inflicted vpon such 
 wiifull Offenders : Since which time, albeit neither 
 Our said Father, nor Our Selfe haue made any con- 
 siderable execution of the said Proclamation, but haue 
 with much patience expected a voluntary conformity 
 of Our Neighbours and Allies to so iust and reasonable 
 Prohibitions and Directions as are contained in the 
 same. 
 
 And now finding by experience, that all the incon- 
 ueniences which occasioned that Proclamation, are 
 rather increased than abated : We being very sensible 
 of the premisses, and well knowing how farre we are 
 obliged in Honour to maintaine the rights of our 
 
 I 
 
174 APPENDIX 
 
 Crowne, especially of so great consequence, haue 
 thought it necessary, by the aduice of Our priuie 
 Councell, to renew the aforesaid restraint of Fishing 
 vpon Our aforesaid Coasts and Seas, without Licence 
 first obtained from Us, and by these presents to make 
 publique Declaration, that Our resolution is (at times 
 conuenient) to keepe such a competent strength of 
 Shipping vpon Our Seas, as may (by God's blessing) 
 be sufficient, both to hinder such further encroach- 
 ments vpon Our Regalities, and assist and protect 
 those Our good Friends and Allies, who shall hence- 
 forth, by vertue of Our Licences (to be first obtained) 
 endeauour to take the benefit of Fishing vpon Our 
 Coasts and Seas, in the places accustomed. 
 
 (jiuen at Our Palace of Westminster the tenth day 
 of May, in the twelfth yeere of Our Reigne of England, 
 Scotland, France, and Ireland. 
 
 God saue the King. 
 
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