mm :■•« ^- u V V ^ ("a-.^^ /^ ?-ui^ //CS Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2007 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/elementsofmilitaOOIabarich ELEMEE"TS OP MILITARY AET AND HISTORY; COMPRISING THE HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS; THE COMBINATION OF THE ARMS; AND THE MINOR OPERATIONS OF WAR. BY ED. DE LA BARRE DUPARCQ, CAPTAIN OF ENGINEERS IN THE ARMY OP FRANCE, PROFESSOR OP THE MILITARY ART IN THE IMPERIAL SCHOOL OP SAINT-CYR. TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY BRia.-GEN. GEORGE W. CULLUM, CHIEF OP STAFF OF THE GENERAL-IN-CIIIEF OF THE ARMIES OF THE ITNITED STATES; LATE AIDE-DE-CAMP TO LIEUTENAKT-GENERAL SCOTT ; AND CUIKP OF STAFF AND OF ENGINEERS OF MAJOR GENERAL IIALLECK, WHILE COMMANDING THE DEPARTMENTS OF fuE MISSOURI AND MIS8ISSIPPL NEW YOEK: VAN" NOSTRANTD, 192 BROADWAY, 1863. Enteeed, according to Act of Congress, in tlie year 1862, by D. YAN NOSTEAND, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. • • • • • • JOHN F. TROW, Fbimter, Stbekotvpeb, and Elbctbotvpbr, 60 Greene Street, New York. PREFACE OF THE TRANSLATOR. . For some years I have been strongly urged by many of my army friends to prepare a work on Military Art and History, suited to our service^ for which. I had a large amount of material; but not feeling the same confi- dence in my ability as those who solicited me to undertake the task, I shrank from it, from time to time, till the breaking out of the rebellion of the Southern States, since which my arduous duties have precluded the possi- bility of preparing such a work, though fully aware of the importance of its being under- taken by some one, especially for the benefit of our volunteer officers, most of whom have not enjoyed the benefits of a military education. I now submit to our vast army and the public a translation of the best book on Mili- tary Art and History I could find among the many excellent productions of the French and Germans, and which will be found far better 4 PREFACE OF THE TRANSLATOE. than any original work I could have pro- duced under existing circumstances. My time being almost entirely occupied with important professional duties, I sought the aid of a competent translator, and was truly fortunate in securing the assistance of that ripe scholar, Professor W. Chauvenet, formerly of the U. S. Naval Academy at Anna- polis, and now of Washington University, at St. Louis, Mo. GEOEGE "W. CULLUM, Beig.-Gen., Chief of Staff and Engineers of the Department of the Mississippi, Headquaetees, Department of the Mississippi, Camp in Corinth, Miss., July 4:th, 1862. PREFACE OF THE EDITOR. In collecting, under the title of '^ Elements/^ many of the studies of Military Art and .His- tory, which my service as Professor at the Imperial Special Military School put it within my power to do, and my particular labors enabled me to improve, I do not pretend to offer a complete treatise, for writing which I do not feel sufficiently prepared. I wish sim- ply to publish essays, carefully elaborated, it is true, though imperfect, and which time alone can improve by successive retouches. If eight years of a conscientious professor- ship — if more than ten years devoted to as- siduous researches, to grave publications, all relating to the profession of arms, are guaran- tees — I am authorized to present this work to my chiefs, to my comrades, and to the pupils of the school of Saint-Cyr. May the latter profit by it. May the young officers espe- cially, whose professor I have been, welcome it 6 PEEFACE OF THE EDITOE. as an old friend — one of the youthful^ smiling friends which they re-find with pleasure at all periods of life. To me^ I confess^ it recalls happy moments passed with them in the faith- ful study of an art eleven centuries old^ and which even now exercises so much influence over the destinies of our glorious country. ED. DE LA BAKKE DUPAKCQ. l5^ October, 1857. ELEMEInTTS OF MILITAEY AET AND HISTORY. PKELlMllSrAEY DEFmiTIONS. War may be defined, a state of armed struggle between two nations: tlie nation which attacks makes offensive "war, and that which defends itself sustains a defensive one. The art of loar is the art of concentrating and employing, at the opportune moment, a superior force of troops upon the decisive point. An army is a large collected force, raised and paid by a government. An arm is a union of combatants, having the same mode of action. Thus, the union of foot combatants forms the infantry arm; the cavalry arm comprises all those who fight on horseback ; the artillery arm those having the management of ordnance ; and the engineer arm those charged with the construction, attack, and defence of fortifications. A single kind of combatant in each arm is not sufiicient for the dif- ferent circumstances which arise in war; experience 8 PEELIMINAEY DEFINITIOIfS. demonstrates the necessity of the following subdivi- sions in the several arms: Light and line infantry; light, line, and reserve cavalry; field, siege, coast, and mountain artillery ; and in the engineers, sappers and miners. In the first three arms, the U7iit of force^ or tac- tical unit^ is the largest fraction, acting separately, under the command of a single chief: in the infantry it is the battalion ; in the cavalry, the squadron ; in the artillery, the battery ; and in the engineers, the com- pany. The unit of force, placed on the ground, has a figure called the formation or order. The part of the troop facing the adversary is the front, the op- posite side the o^ear ; the lateral extremities, the flanhs of the formation. We call ranh the line of soldiers parallel to the front ; and file, the line of men perpendicular to the same front. The number of ranks of a troop determine its de^tTi. Troops are not formed for attack as for defence ; there are deep, or ployed formations, and thin, or de- ployed ; we understand by manoeuvres, the move- ments for passing from one to another formation. The column is a disposition of troops whose ele- ments remain placed parallel to each other, and on the same axis. When the axes become different, they are said to be in echelons. We ordinarily desig- nate the first and last subdivision of a column as its head or foot The distance is the interval between the foot of one corps and the bead of that which follows it ; or PRELIMINAKY DEFINITIOI^S. 9 between the toes of one soldier and the heels of the one preceding him. The interval is the space be^ tween the adjacent flanks of two troops, or of two men in the same line. Troops placed upon the same front, whether in column or deployed, constitute a line ; the line may be either /i^Z? (like a wall), or with intervals. The checker 'f or m^ as its name indicates, is a forma- tion upon many lines, with intervals; the intervals in each line equalling the full spaces ; and the lines are arranged so that the void spaces of the one are opposite the full ones of the other. An or^er is more than a reunion of lines ; it is the general and combined disposition of troops of different kinds, grouped together for the same purpose. Tactics determines the best mode of distribut- ing, arranging, and moving the units of force. The tactics of an arm make known the special properties of this arm, and the most advantageous method of using it. General or grand tactics, show the com- binations of the arms, and the ensemble of movements, suited to obtain the maximum effect. Strategy^ the science essential to the general-in- chief, is the art of properly directing masses upon the theatre of war, for the defence of our own, or the invasion of the enemy's country. Logistics is the practical application of the art of moving armies ; the science of chiefs of staff. In a military operation, we ought to attend to three principal things : the line from whence we de- 10 PRELIMINARY DEFESriTIOlTS. part, the point where we wish to arrive, and the line to be followed to reach it. The line upon which an army is supported, and from which it departs to act offensively, is called the hase of operations. For example, the French, desir- ing to attack Germany, would take the Ehine for their base of operations ; the Alps, if they wished to en- ter Italy; and the Pyrenees, if they would invade Spain. When we are reduced to dispute with the enemy the possession of the base, without going beyond it, this base takes the name of line of defence. All the points we desire to reach, and the possession of which would influence the success of the campaign, are called objective points^ or simply ohjectives. Since the political concentration of the European states, their capitals form excellent objective points, and, for that reason, many of them have recently been fortified. The road passed over by the army to reach the objectives, is called the line of operations; and takes the name of line of retreat^ when we are com- pelled, after a defeat, to follow it in a contrary di- rection, in order to gain a line of defence, behind which to resist the conqueror. PART FIRST. HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. CHAPTER FIRST. HISTORY OF IKFANTRY, The specific history of an arm possesses the advantage of exhibiting, one by one, in the order of their discovery or adoption, the several improve- ments effected in its organization, armament, and mode of combat; and consequently, of indicating successively, in the order of date, each of the proper- ties of this arm. History is thus brought to the aid of theory ; and for this reason, the present work contains summaries of the history of each of the arms. The most important, and to us the most in- teresting of these summaries, is doubtless that which relates to the principal basis of armies — the infantry. It will form the subject of the present chapter. To unfold it in due order, we shall distribute it 12 inSTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. into eighteen sections, eacb. devoted to a single epoch. Thus, Sect. 1 will treat of the infantry of the ancient people of Asia and Africa ; 2d, of infantry among the Greeks ; 3d, of the Eoman infantry ; 4th, of the infantry of the barbarous nations who over- turned the Koman empire, and especially that of our ancestors, the Franks. From the downfall of Kome, infantry plays a less prominent part than in ancient times : we shall examine it in its decline, under four aspects : 5th, the feudal infantry ; 6th, the communal infantry ; Tth, the infantry of the soldiers of fortune; and 8th, that of the English archers. In the fourteenth century the Swiss reinstated the infantry, and proved its power by brilliant successes^ as we shall show in section 9th ; which will be fol- lowed, in the 10th, by some particulars respecting the Spanish infantry, the best of the sixteenth century. In the three succeeding sections we shall study the French infantry, under Charles VII., Francis I., Henry II., and Henry IV. In the 14th we shall speak of the diminution of the depth of the infantry by Gustavus Adolphus; the 15th will group together the charac- teristic features of the infantry in the reigns of Louis XIV. and Louis XV. ; the 16 th will treat of the improvements made in the Prussian infantry the first half of the eighteenth century ; the 17th will indicate the more recent progress; and the 18th and last will contain some remarks on the entire history of this arm. Our object in selecting, for each epoch, the in- fantry of some one nation as a type, is to abridge HISTORY OF INFANTEY. 13 details, and to bring them within the limits of a chapter ; citing, nevertheless, in our historic sketch such facts as, for soldiers, are most curious, most characteristic, and most instructive. To have fol- lowed the history of each arm, during each period, in all nations, would have involved us too far, and would have produced a narrative which, though perhaps more connected, would most surely have less hold upon the memory. With this preface, we enter upon our subject. 1. Ancients. — In the oriental countries, where the himian race and the art of war had birth, caval- ry and war chariots were the most esteemed arms. This was due, 1st, to the level character of the ground, which allowed complete and extended manoeuvres of both cavalry and chariots ; 2d, to the impression produced by every elevated object, in accordance with which, in those primitive times, the highest combatant appeared to be the strongest. The character of these countries also modified the formation of the infantry, which was in deep order ; that is, more solid than mobile. ^ The Egyptian infantry was formed in heavy square battalions of 100 men to a side; these bat- talions were subdivided into fractions of 1,000, 100, 10. The heavy-armed foot soldiers carried each a large shield, a long pike, a hatchet, a hel- met; the light-armed foot soldiers were archers or slingers. The Jews formed their infantry upon a single 14 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. line, from 10 to 30 men in depth ; tlie archers and slingers occupied tlie front ranks, tlie lieavy-armed troops tlie rear. The troop formations of this people, 1,000 strong, were subdivided into groups of 100 men. The Persian infantry, originally armed solely with offensive weapons, was composed of heavy battalions, 24 to 30 men deep. Cyrus the elder reduced this depth to 12 ranks, and introduced the use of defensive weapons into his army. The Persian troops were divided into bodies of 10, 100, 1,000, 10,000 men. Thus, among all the early nations we have mentioned, the decimal subdivision appears as the basis of their infantry formations. Every deep formation upon a single line was, in ancient times, called a phalanx. The Jews and the Persians, then, ranged their infantry in phalanx. The Greeks adopted, with some modifications, the Asiatic phalanx, and it is especially among them that we must study this species of formation. 2. Greek Phalanx. — ^The Greek phalanx was a corps of heavy infantry, formed in a single line 16 men deep, and designed to act e7i masse, and to fall upon the enemy like a solid block. Its organiza- tion, instead of being decimal, like that of the Per- sian, was founded upon the powers of the number two. Thus, taking as its primitive element a file of sixteen men, — TETRARCHIA. PPPP HISTOEY OF INFANTE Y. 15 Two files formed one dilochia ; Two dilochias one tetrarchia ; ^ Two tetrarchias one taxiarchia ; Two taxiarcliias one syntagma ; Two syntagmas one pentacosiarchia ; Two pentacosiarcliias . . . one chiliarcMa ; Two chiliarchias one merarcliia ; Two merarchias one phalangarchia ; Two phalangarcliias .... one diphalangarcliia ; Two diphalangarcLias . . . one tetraphalangarchia. The tetrarcMa, a body of 64 men, corresponded to our modern company, and was the constituent element of the phalanx. The syntagma com- prised 256 men; the chiliarchia, 1,024; the PPPP phalangarchia, or small phalanx, 4,096. This PPPP last fraction was composed of 16 syntag- ^^^^ mas, the syntagma being 16 files of 16 men. PPPP The tetraphalangarchia, or complete phalanx, PPPP embraced 16,384 men. All these soldiers, when heavy-armed, were called Tioplites, PPPP It frequently happened that the small ^ P P ^ Greek states could not set on foot even one PPPP PPPP phalangarchia, still less a tetraphalangarchia. PPPP In such cases the name o^ phalanx was given ^^^^ to any combination of tetrarchias, without PPPP . . ... fixing any definite number. This facility of organizing any number of men whatever in phalanx, had great advantages. The hoplite occupied a space, in open rant and file, of four cubits (6 feet) each way ; in close rank and file, two cubits (3 feet) ; in very close rank, one cubit (1\ feet). The phalanx charged in close • 16 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. ranks; it received a charge in very close ranks, a formation called a synapisma. The principal arms of the hoplites were the shield and the sarissa^ a long pike of fourteen cubits (21 feet) in length, which the first ^lyq ranks held horizontally, whilst the others held them vertically. The sarissa being seized at a point four cubits from the but, and each soldier occupying in close rank two cubits, it is apparent that in this close forma- tion the sarisssB of even the fifth rank projected two cubits (3 feet) beyond the front rank of the pha- lanx. This front, bristling with pikes, presented a formidable aspect. Besides the soldiers of the rank and file, oi* hoplites, the Greek phalanx also comprised light- armed troops, designated psiletes. In fact, the num- ber of these psiletes was usually half that of the hoplites, or 8,192 for the complete phalanx. They were divided into archers, slingers, and darters or jaculatoi'-Sj who threw arrows with the hand. Formed eight men in depth, they skirmished about the phalanx, and were employed in all operations which required lightness and promptitude. Sometimes the hoplites, imitating the formation of the psiletes, reduced their files to one half, and the phalanx became but 8 men deep ; but this mo- bile order was an exception; moreover, the inter- vals between the divisions of the phalanx w^ere not strongly marked, and it formed a nearly contin- uous line. There was a class of Grecian foot soldiers inter- HISTORY OF INFANTKY. lY mediate between tlie heavy and the light armed : they were called j^eltastes^ from the small round - shield (jitXvri) with which they were armed; they carried a shorter pike than the hoplites. Alexan- der the Great made frequent use of them. The chief end of the Grecian system of educa- tion, as well as of the laws and customs, was to make a good soldier of every citizen. Thus, the young were from their infancy familiarized with the idea of war, and their first plays were military exer- cises ; the system of rewards was more honorable than lucrative, and the system of punishments based rather upon sentiment than actual infliction ; and hence, the lack of courage, or any censurable act committed in war, even when it was not pun- ished, subjected the soldier to public reprobation, and disgrace with his friends and relatives. In Sparta, mothers rejoiced when they received the announcement of the death of their sons upon the field of battle, and their dead bodies were brought home upon their shields, preferring to see them stretched lifeless upon that defensive arm than alive without it, for its loss was branded with infamy. The Greek foot soldiers, moreover, excelled in every soldierly quality; robust, skilful, and coura- geous even to an extreme, he thought nothing more glorious than to die for his country. But it is to be remarked, that the formation in phalanx in a meas- ure counterbalanced these qualities in the hoplite ; for this formation upon a single line nearly con- 2 18 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. tiniious was not sufficiently pliant to fight advan- tageously in broken and mountainous countries, where the waverings of the march produced fatal gaps, into which the enemy could penetrate and at- tack the body in flank and in rear. For this reason, the phalanx was very successful only in level coun- tries. To be just, however, let us add that when- ever it was commanded by generals of the highest order (and such always understand how to adapt the aiTangement of their troops to local circumstances), the phalanx was equally victorious upon irregular oTound; as was exemplified under Alexander the Great, and especially under Xenophou. 3. Roman L.egioii — -At the first glance we observe a characteristic of the Eomaii legion w^hich distinguishes it fi^om the phalanx: it is not ham- pered by close order ; its organization breathes mobility. It forms three lines, each divided into ten mani- ples or companies, ten men deep. The Tiastati are in the front line, the p^inciipes in the second, the triarii in the third. In each line, the maniples are separated by a distance equal to their front, and the maniples of each line behind are placed opposite to the spaces of the preceding line, which produces a checker-board formation. The interval between the lines equals the depth of a maniple ; the space between two soldiers, in any direction, is six Koman feet (5 feet Y inches). HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 19 MAISIPLE FORMATION OF THE LEGION. iiASTATr, nnnnnnnnnn 10 ranks and 12 files. ' '' — '' — '' '' '' — '' '' — II— il — I ,o.rM^.os. nnnnnnnnnn :«rarrd"«me. DDDDDDDDDD In tlie first two lines, the maniple contains 12 files, which, with a depth of 10 men, gives the mani- ple a force of 120 men. In the triarii^ the maniple contains but 6 files, so that it numbers but 60 men. The light-armed troops attached to the legion were called velites^ and formed 10 maniples of 120 men each, like those of the liastati and princijpes. They constituted the inferior class of the legion, and fought outside and around the lines. It w^as the reward for brave deeds to be promoted to the regu- lar ranks. The Eoman legion, therefore, embraced 1,200 hastati^ 1^200 principes^ 600 triarii^ and 1,200 velites] or, in all, 4,200 foot soldiers. This is the usual num- ber, but there were legions of a smaller as well as those of a larger effective force. The organization of the legion allowed the ready formation of detachments embracing the same classes of soldiers, and in the same proportions as in the legion itself Thus, one maniple of hastati, one of pviiicipes^ one of triarii^ and one of velites^ formed a small legion of 420 men, to which could also be added a turma of cavalry, or the tenth part of a cavalry legion. By doubling or tripling the num- ber of maniples, detachments were obtained of 840 20 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. or 1,260 foot soldiers, wMch still retained tlie like- ness of the legion. A lielmet, a shield, a sword, and seven javelins constituted the armament of the velites, who fought as skirmishers, either on the front or flanks. They took advantage of the spaces left by the checker- board formation, to advance and retire. The defensive arms of the Jiastati and principes were a helmet, a brass breastplate, and a convex shield; their offensive arms, two light spears or darts (called pild)^ two javelins, and a sword. This sword was the favorite weapon of the Ko- mans: being broad and strong, it served, in the hands of a vigorous man, the purpose of an axe, and inflicted wide and deep wounds, which terrified the enemy. The liastati received or gave the first charge ; the princi])€S supported them, either by advancing in front of them, by passing through the intervals of the first line, or by simply filling up the spaces, so as to form a full and more solid line ; the legion then fought as a veritable phalanx, which not unfrequently happened. This facility of trans- formation at pleasure, according to circumstances and localities, so as to possess either extreme mobil- ity or great solidity, renders the Roman legion su- perior to the Greek phalanx. The triarii^ who were tried soldiers, were armed with the shield, the pike, and the sword. During the combat of the first two lines, they remained im- movable, their pikes resting upon the ground. Their mission was to throw themselves into the HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 21 weak places, and reclaim a victory about to be lost : they constituted, therefore, a reserve. It was only when the battle was becoming desperate, that they were called into action ; and hence the Latin prov- erb : Res ad triarios pervenitj expressive of a final struggle. The soldier of the Koman legion was a valiant combatant, well skilled in manoeuvres and the exer- cise of arms, and especially inured to fatigue of every kind. The Greek foot soldier, the hoplite, ordinarily carried no burden, leaving the transpor- tation of his munitions to servants or slaves ; but the soldier of the legion, at least during the better days of the republic, carried not only his arms, but his baggage, a stake, a pioneer tool, and a leather pouch containing his provision of corn for fifteen days. Reckoning the weight, piece by piece, of his arms and all his effects, we find that his load amounted to about 100 pounds, or double that which is usually carried by our foot soldiers."^* With these enormous loads the Roman soldiers, neverthe- less, travelled some 20 miles or more in a day on ordinary occasions, and in forced marches as much as 33 miles. The soldier of the legion was, moreover, accus- tomed to digging the ground ; for the Romans were in the constant practice of surrounding their camps with intrenchments, even when they encamped but * In tlie Russian campaign (1812) the soldiers of Marshal Davoust adjusted upon their knapsacks, already filled, 6^ lbs. of bread, 4| lbs. of biscuit, and 11 lbs. of flour, thus carrying a total weight of QQ lbs. 22 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. for a single niglit— a prudent habit, to wMcli may be ascribed in a great degree tbeir remarkable exemption from reverses, and whicli also liad tlie advantage of keeping the soldiers in training, and making them robust and healthy. We may ob- serve however, that the practice of intrenching camps and positions, though excellent with the projectile arms of the ancients, all of which were de- structive only at small distances, presents but unim- portant advantages with our modern fire-arms. The legion, by its formation in small bodies drawn up in several lines, with intervals, always had a reserve, was possessed of great mobility, and could fight upon all kinds of ground. It had, there- fore, that character of universality which is indis- pensable to armies, and especially to infantry: it was a military machine, eminently fitted to serve the Eomans in their projects of universal conquest, to which they always aspired, and w^hich constituted their strength,' — a machine precisely adapted to their political constitution ; for it is worthy of particular re- mark, that the Eomans differed from all other nations, ancient or modern, in this : that whilst other nations made war only to maintain themselves in a position to administer their government, they administered their government solely with a view to making war. The lines with intervals were objectionable, in- asmuch as a quick and resolute enemy might pene- trate the open spaces. Convinced of this, Marius, the celebrated conqueror of the Cimbri and Teu- toni, substituted for the formation by maniples HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 23 the formation by cohorts, which assimilated th^ or- ganization to that of the phalanx. In this new for- mation there was now but one class of soldiers : the hastati, the principes, and the triarii were mingled, all armed with the pihim^ and divided into ten co- horts of an equal force. The number of ranks, and the intervals between the ranks and files, remained the same as in the formation by maniples. Marius formed his legion upon two lines, each consisting of two cohorts, separated by small inter- vals. Csesar, as the following diagram shows, dis- posed the Eoman legion in three lines, the first of four cohorts, the second and third each of three co- horts. The third line formed a reserve, and it was for that purpose that CaBsar restored it. COIIOKT FORMATION OF THE LEGION UNDEll C^SAE. 4th coh. 8(1 coh. 2(1 coh. Istcoli. 1st line, p in 10 ranks. L 1 1 1 1 II 1 5th coh. 2(1 line, in 10 ranks. 7tli coh. Gth coh. r 1 1 1 1 1 lOth coh. 9tli coh. 8th coh. in 10 ranks. 1 1 1 1 1 1 In the formation by cohorts, the lines being full, the first could no longer retire between the inter- vals of the second, as in the foimation by maniples. The second line alone could advance and insert it- self in the first, the fresh files stepping into the in- tervals between the fatigued files, so that the front of the legion doubled in number, without increasing its length. The possibility of such a manoeuvre de- pended upon the opening of the ranks and files 24 HISTORY AOT) TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. whicli cliaracterized tlie Koman legion, in whicli eacli man occupied, as we have said, a space of six Eoman feet (5 feet 7 inches) ; the difficulty was to preserve this space, and hence all their drills were conducted so as to make the soldier preserve his in- tervals both in rank and file. Under the new form of cohorts, the infantry legion again rendered most excellent service, and gained as much celebrity as under the manipular form. From that time the cohort became so well established as the unit of the Koman infantry, that their historians, and especially Cgesar, frequently say : " We had so many cohorts," without even naming the legion. During the period of the Roman emperors, the legion deteriorated; and nothing shows this more clearly than the organization of the legion, described by Vegetius.'^ This legion, of 6,100 foot soldiers, divided into ten cohorts, ranged in the checker form, in two lines, each of ^ve cohorts, embraced all kinds of foot combatants: thus there were in each cohort, in the first rank the heavy-armed troops, in the second the mailed archers, in the third and fomiih the velites, in the fifth a projectile machine called oiiageVjj- flanked by slingers and crossbowmen, and in the sixth the triarii, forming the reserve. This confused formation could not last. They re- turned to the isolated cohorts, of an efiective force of from 500 to 1,000 men, some composed entfrely of infantry, others, of infantry and cavalry. They * In the third century. — T}\ t A machine which threw stones. — Tr. HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 25 allowed substitutes in tlie military service, a decided mark of degeneration; they abandoned defensive- arms ; tliey exclianged tlie use of that broad and trenchant sword, which had gained so many battles, for projectile arms, whose light weight agreed better with the effeminacy of the times ; they went further, and threw javelins from engines . called carrohalistce^ the number of which became considerable. Disci- pline declined ; the troops were no longer drilled ; they forgot the maxims which had given them vic- tory. The decline was rapid, and the Roman colos- sus soon succumbed under the repeated blows of enemies, who poured down in such numbers that their native countries were designated in the Latin idiom as the officina gentium (the factory of nations). Let us now pursue the study of infantry among their enemies : those new people to whom custom has given the traditional name of BaTharians, 4. Barbarous Nations. — ^With the exception of the Sarmatians and the Vandals, the barbarians who overwhelmed the Roman empire fought almost exclusively on foot, and we may apply to them the expression of Tacitus, when speaking of the Ger- mans : " Omne robur in peditey The German infantiy had a decimal organiza- tion : it attacked in wedge fonu, sometimes in pha- lanx, always with loud cries. Let us especially consider the infantry of the Franks. Here is the portrait which historians have left us of the Frank foot soldier : He tied his flaxen hair 26 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARx\IS. on the top of his head in a tuft, which fell back and flowed behind li^e a horse's tail. He shaved his face, leaving only two long and pendent mustaches. His linen clothes fitted closely to his body ; a large belt sustained his sword. His favorite weapon was the francisque, a battle-axe with one or two edges and a very short handle. His left arm bore a long and narrow shield, the only defensive armor with which he was furnished. He also had a spear, or pike, of moderate length, designated in the Frank tongue by the name hang. This pike could be used both at small and at great distances ; its shaft was covered with plates of iron, which protected it against the sword cuts of the enemy, and its point was curved in the form of a double claw. In the fight, the Frank foot soldier threw this HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 27 weapon at liis adversary : if it caught in the flesh, it was difficult to disengage it, on account of the. small iron hooks at its point, and thus it produced serious wounds. When the enemy parried the blow, the hang struck the shield, and fastening in it, drew it down ; while, its but end dragging upon the ground, it hung to the shield like a very troublesome weight ; which, from its construction, could neither be torn out nor cut by the sword. Then the Frank sprang forward, placed one foot upon the shaft, pressed upon it with his whole weight, and thus forcing his adversary to lower his shield, could easily strike the exposed breast or head. In this advantageous position the arm which held the bat- tle-axe usually aimed at the face or the neck. The Franks preserved this warlike aspect down to the end of the sixth century. The Frank infantry, like that of the Germans, fought in phalanx and in wedge form, the latter formation being often little more than a deep and close column ; it attacked with terrible shouts, and with a velocity almost equal to that of cavalry. In consequence of its sojourn in Gaul, it adopted by de- grees some of the military usages of the Romans. At the battle of Tours (732), in which Charles Martel conquered the Saracens, the masses of the Frank infantry were drawn up in great depth, whence the celebrated expression : " God was ^vitli his lieavy hattalionsr Having to do with mounted enemies, who fought skirmishing, the Frank war- rior opposed to them heavy columns drawn up to 28 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. act with ensemble. There is every reason to "believe that he was acquainted with and employed the agmen quadratum (square formation). This massing, the source of power in infantr}^, disappears from the organization of this arm, from the time of Charles Martel. 5. Feudal Infantry. — In the wars of invasion of Charlemagne, the grandson and second successor of Charles Martel, cavalry increased, and at the death of that powerful monarch constituted the half of the French armies. The feudal system, which arose soon after, and which was created with the view of maintaining in subjection the recently conquered people, instituted nobles, who desired no other occupation than the honorable profession of arms. They monopolized this vocation to their own profit, and being wealthy, covered them- selves with heavy armor and rode upon chargers bai'bed Avith iron. All the chiefs adopted this fashion ; the taste for mounted combat became general. From that time the infantry was ineffi- cient, for no one attended to giving it a good or- ganization, without which it can never accomplish anything; and it remained especially powerless against the gensdarmes^ whose armor rendered them invulnerable. The feudal infantry was composed of the ser- vants of the gensdarmes, and peasants taken from the plough. Their principal and most common office was to pick up their masters when they fell to the HISTOEY OF INFANTRY. 29 ground, and remount tliem, as also to despatch the disarmed cavaliers of the enemy. Sometimes they skirmished at the beginning of the action. Their offensive arms were the sword, the crossbow, the mace, and the sling ; they earned no defensive arms, and nevertheless were often made to face great dan- gers, as the history of the battles of that period proves. The victors always made horrible carnage of this defenceless infantry. Two historic facts will show the state of deg- radation to which the feudal infantry fell : At the battle of Bou vines (1214), the Count de Boulogne formed his infantry into a hollow square, within which he, with six other cavaliers, after a certain period of combat, retired to recover breath ; they came out in due time, refreshed, and ready to renew the strife. This was using their infantry as a kind of rampart. At the battle of Crecy (1346), the Genoese bow- men, who formed a part of the French army, being thrown into confusion by the well-directed shafts of the English archers, and unable to advance, the king, Philip of Valois, enraged at seeing them re- tire, called out to the cavaliers : " Or tot tiiez toute cette ribaiidaille qui nous emptclie la vote sans rai- sony The French gensdarmes fell upon the unfortu- nate Genoese infantry ; but while they were thus engaged, the enemy gained the upper hand, and they suffered a complete defeat, — a defeat which, to- gether with the sad and fatal names of Poictiers and Agincourt, will ever be for us and our descend- 30 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE ARMS. ants a striking proof of the errors committed by our ancestors, wliicli brought France to tlie very brink of ruin, and had wellnigh caused us to be to this day a colony of England, instead of boasting the proud title of Frenchmen. The coiidottieri^ those warriors by contract who afflicted the Italian peninsula in the middle ages, also diminished the usefulness of infantry in the interest of their trade; for the petty princes who employed them could afford neither to support a large body of foot, nor to pay their wages; they succeeded, indeed, in reducing the number of effec- tive foot to the tenth part of their mail-clad horse;* a proportion which shows how completely the principles which should govern the mutual rela- tion of these two arms were at that time reversed. Let us see how the infantry rose from this use- less condition. 6. Communal Infantry. — In the twelfth century, several European nations, as the English, the Flemish, the Swiss, and the Lombards, still looked upon infantry with favor. In France, they were brought back to similar views by the crusades. In those distant expeditions the foot soldier could not be replaced as upon the soil of the mother country ; he became of more value, was armed with more care, and drilled; and henceforth could render ser- vices which Avere appreciated. The introduction of fire-arms soon also favored the regeneration of * The Prince^ by Macliiavelli, chap. xii. HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 31 infantry. At the same time the excessive tension of the feudal system brought together the two powers of the political hierarchy before most widely separated, namely, the sovereign and the burghers of the towns. These powers, both incommoded by the system, came to an understanding: the towns were erected into communes enjoying political rights, on condition of paying a tax and raising militia, which should march at the call of the king. Such is the orio^in of the communal militia. The creation of these citizen troops rendered the feudal troops ever after less important, and thus broke down the exclusive use of cavalry. The communal force, raised by the authority of the commune, sometimes embraced mounted men, but was generally composed of infantry alone ; the number of soldiers, or rather, to use the expression of the time, sergeants (servientes^^ rarely exceeded 500. Two thirds of the communal infantry carried bows or crossbows ; the rest used maces, sticks loaded with lead, and halberds. Moreover, imple- ments of agriculture, or the tools of the improvised soldier, frequently served him as arms, and he even wore in the ranks one of his ordinary garments, the blouse of the iield-laborer. The infantry of the communes marched to the army under the parochial banner ; an advowee of the bishop, or a municipal chief, or a representative of the king, commanded. It was not compelled to go beyond the limits of the commune more than a certain distance, reckoned in days' marches (at most forty days) ; beyond this dis- 32 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. tance, its maintenance devolved upon the king or the nobleman wlio employed it; and in default of the necessary funds for this purpose, the communal troops frequently dispersed. In the order of battle, the communal infantry was placed between the squadrons of horse : this intermixture is all that is known of its tactics. This infantry proved, in its struggles against the nobles who surrounded a city, that men on foot could contend advantageously with knights com- ipletely mailed, whose prestige thus began to disap- pear. Nevertheless, this infantry was not Avorth much, although superior to the feudal infantry in organization, armament, discipline, and courage. Still, the institution of communes did not re- lieve the dukes and counts from obeying the call of the king and taking part in war. In the rear of their gensdarmes, there always followed a body of infantry, composed of servants and peasants — these continuing to be badly organized, and more ready to pillage than to fight. To put an end to the con- fusion which reigned among these foot soldiers, Louis IX., in 1226, gave them a commandant under the name of Grand Master of the Bowmen^ and this office was preserved down to the reign of Francis I., but contributed very little to the improvement of the condition of the infantry: at least, not until Charles VII. T. Soldiers of Fortune — Besides the feudal and communal infantry, there arose in France, at the HISTOEY OF INFANTEY. 33 close of tLe twelfth century, bands of soldiers of fortune, all on foot, known under various names, such as CotereauXj Boudoyers^ Tard-venus^ Malmh drins^ Rouiiers^ Brabangons, Chaperons^ JEscor- clieurSj PastoureauXj Hihauds^ Tondeurs^ Mille- diahles. These mercenaries, gathered from all na- tions, formed undisciplined, vagabond troops, who, when not engaged in war, spent their time in pil- laging — always taking the part of the sovereign who paid the highest wages. The French king, Louis VII., had as many as twenty thousand in his pay. Their depredations becoming intolerable, Philip Augustus, in 1183, sent an army which overcame them near Bourges. They recruited their force, and continued to fight and steal until the reign of Charles V. This monarch, taking pity on the French provinces which they were laying waste, ordered Du Guescliii to take command of theii^ grandes compagnies and to lead them out of the kingdom ; which difficult mission the Breton hero successfully accomplished (1366). At this period, the French infantry, principally composed of crossbowmen, was drawn up in three or four ranks. In the order of battle, it was placed in the first line, in front of, or at the side of the first line of gensdarmes: in attacks it always occu- pied the front. §. Englisli Arcbers. — ^The English archers who did the French so much harm in the days of Crecy (1346) and Poictiers (1356), constituted one of the 3 34 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. best bodies of infantry of tlie fourteentli century. Their defensive arms were a mailed jacket, a bas- sinet (or liglit helmet), and a round shield. Vig- orous, and exercised in shooting from their infancy, they carried the long and stout bow, the string of which could be removed when it rained, an advan- tao-e not possessed by the crossbow. To arrest the impetuosity of the French gendarmery, they took their positions in front of their cavaliers, in a long line of little depth, each planting before him a stake 11 feet in length, like a cheval-de-frise ; thence they discharged as many as ten arrows a minute, aimed at the horses, and dismounted our gensdarmes in a very short time, who, when once on foot, were very much embarrassed by their armor. We thus per- ceive that the English began to reason upon the art of war. The Hussite infantry, such as was employed by the famous Bohemian Zisca about 1418, was also one of the first which succeeded in withstanding the gendarmery in open country, fighting behind a barricade of wagons, called a tabor, 9. Swiss Infantry. — From the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Swiss were compelled by ne- cessity to resuscitate the ancient infantry, both be- cause they were too poor to maintain cavalry, and because the country was ill adapted to its evolutions. They adopted a compact formation, and made use of a pike 18 feet in length, which they held by the mid- dle with both hands, as our soldiers now hold the HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 35 musket wlien crossing Ibayonets. The Swiss battalion was compared to a forest of ilioims ; it was often called tlie hedgehog. From tlie year 1386, the Swiss made use of culverins (a kind of long 18-pounder). In 14T6, at the battles of Granson and Morat, in which they were victorious, they fought in full squares, having halberdiers, pikemen, and culverin artillerists in various proportions. The halberds were used in the melee; the pikes rested on the ground to resist the onset of the cavalry ; the cul- verins were employed chiefly on the flanks, occasion- ally on the front. Their order of battle consisted of three masses arranged in echelons^ the distance be- tween the echelons being the range of a culverin : thus the cavalry could not break through them. In receiving an artillery attack, they awaited the first discharge,* then, taking advantage of the slow firing of that day, rushed upon the cannon and captured them. The Swiss always fought with great courage; but this courage, stimulated at that time by the desire of independence, was not all that sustained them against the impetuous horsemen of the Duke of Burgundy. The true secret of the success of their infantry was their discipline, and the ensemble of action which is the result of discipline. This disci- pline was severe ; it prescribed the most absolute silence, and prohibited leaving the ranks under pain of death. Thenceforth, the popular element of com- * At Cerisoles (1544) they threw themselves on the ground, so that the balls might pass over them. 36 HISTOEY AlH) TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. Unation is found arrayed against tlie feudal element of isolation; but with tMs exception, tlie Swiss have not contributed to tlie improvement of tlie military art. Nevertheless, we shall find them, subsequently, looked upon as models, and European nations in the following century imitating their formation and tak- ing bodies of Swiss infantry into their pay. It is therefore to the Swiss that we must ascribe the more extensive introduction of infantry in the composition of armies after the fifteenth century. 10. Spanisb Infantry — ^The Spanish infantry was the next most celebrated after the Swiss, which it subsequently surpassed. Brave, disciplined, tem- perate, indefatigable ; — such were the foot soldiers of Spain who fought in Italy or in the Netherlands under Charles V. and Philip II. Their contact with the S"\viss taught them the art of forming close bat- talions ; their conipact order, bristling with pikes, be- came as difficult to break as the phalanx. Besides the pike, they carried as offensive weapons the sword, the poignard or dagger, and the arquebus : as defen- sive, a coat of mail. When the Swiss, or the large foot soldiers of Germany broke them, instead of fly- ing they returned individually to the charge, rushing between the ranks of the victors and attacking with the poignard. In these duels and hand-to-hand fights, the Spanish soldier often fell, and always had every chance against him ; but his bravery is nowhere more conspicuously proved. The arquebus, with which the Spaniards were mSTOEY OF INFANTEY. 37 armed, took the place of the Swiss culverin ; it was provided with a forked prop, which relieved its weight while being discharged ; whereas, before this time, it was discharged only when resting upon a tripod. This improved arquebus subsequently re- ceived in France the name of mousquet. The Spanish infantry, being constantly required to fight, could not be disbanded at the end of each campaign ; it therefore became a permanent body, and this circumstance, together with its courage, rendered it so thoroughly disciplined and warlike, that its proud battalions remained for more than a century the terror of the soldiers fighting in Italy and Flanders. The Spaniards often mingled their arquebusiers with the cavalry ; a mixture which Gus- tavus Adolphus imitated, but which is at the present day proscribed. The Spanish infantry was distinguished for its good discipline and esprit; a simple sergeant was obeyed like an officer. When a new recruit ar- rived, the older ones helped him with their advice and their purse, to put him at once in a condition to do honor to his country. "Their barracks," wrote La Noue, " were like schools, where the ordi- nary topics were the duties of the soldier and of the officer, honor, and whatever related to arms." Charles V. had solidly organized the tercios (regiments) of his infantry, which out of Spain usually numbered 3,000 men, divided into fifteen companies of 200 men each ; the tercio was com- manded by a colonel of horse, or the senior captain. 38 inSTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. The celebrated emperor had also instituted bounties as rewards for acts of courage, the least of which was two crowns; and the Spanish soldier consid- ered it an honor to obtain them. Similar organization and usages, it must be con- fessed, are wanting in the sixteenth century, among the infantry of other nations. Let us return to the French infantry. 11. Frank Archers. — The Spaniards were not the only people who maintained a standing infantry. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries two attempts to establish it in a permanent form were made by the French kings ; the first by Charles VII. This monarch, having recovered his kingdom from the English, desired to consolidate his throne by surrounding it with regular troops. For this purpose he instituted the " free companies " of cav- slrjj and formed the infantry of the Frank archers. By an edict of 1448, he ordered each parish to raise and maintain one archer, well formed, and skilful in the use of the bow, whose duty it was to prac- tise on Sundays and holidays, and to take the field at the royal command. In consideration of the military service to which he was bound, which was more extensive than that of the communal militia, and attached him exclusively to the king, the Frank archer was exempted from taxes. This exemption was, indeed, an indirect method of paying him ; but in active service he received, in addition, the sum of 56 francs per month, which, together with niSTOKY OF mFANTRY. 39 his equipment and armament, was cliargecl to the , parish. He wore over his ordinary dress a kini of doublet, which came at least to the knees, formed of thirty thicknesses of linen cloth, enclosed be- tween buckskins. They had great confidence in this defensive article, which, however, was sometimes covered by a steel corselet. On his head he wore a helmet without a crest or a visor. He was armed with the long bow and quiver, and a sword of mode- rate len2:th. Louis XL, in 1469, increased the number of Frank archers to 16,000. This force was distrib- uted in four corps of 4,000 men, each commanded by a captain-general, over whom there was a chief of all the archers. France was divided into four military departments; within the limits of each a captain-general had to recruit his soldiers. Each corps of 4,000 was divided into eight bodies of 500. The first of these remained under the immediate or- der of the captain-general ; a captain took command of each of the remaining seven. This reorganization by Louis XL carried out the views of Charles VIL This instituting of archers just at the time when portable fire-arms were beginning to spread, is sin- gular enough; but they proved their inefficiency, and finally disappeared, not so much on account of their armament, which reduced them to light troops, as for other reasons. Scattered through the parishes, and drilling separately, the Frank archers could not but remain under the influence of the parish church, losing the habits of the soldier and taking 40 HISTOKY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AKMS. those of tlie laborer and tlie artisan. In fact, this came to pass : after having behaved valiantly in some engagements, they could not, when peace came, yield to discipline, and sustain the esprit dii corps: in short, they could not be soldiers. It became difficult to reassemble them; officers disliked to command them, and, sarcasm lending its aid, the institution was undermined. Toward the end of his reign, Louis XI. substituted for them 6,000 Swiss, 10,000 French soldiers of fortune, and a corps of German foot soldiers known under the name of lansquemts (Lands-knecht). These lansquenets consisted of soldiers of for- tune recruited in the German districts, near the Ehine. Being strong and tall, they at first formed bodies of pikemen ; but, unlike the Swiss, they held the pike by the end of the shaft, and nevertheless managed it with skill. They were better than the French infantry, and on that account, for want of Swiss troops, they were intrusted with the guard of the cannon. The infantry having rendered valuable service to Charles VIIL, upon his return from the conquest of Naples, the greater part of the crowned heads comprehended the importance of this arm, and formed bodies of pikemen, in imitation of the Swiss. The French kings did not follow this exam- ple, but, trusting to the Swiss and the German soldiers of fortune enlisted in their pay, dispensed with the formation of regular national infantry. Louis XII., however, endeavored to discipline his I HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 41 infantry, and to give it more importance. He was the first to succeed in dismounting the gentry. At his solicitation, several of the most distinguished cava- liers, among others Bayard, accepted the command of bodies of foot. From that time the prejudices of the nobles against infantry were overcome, and num- bers of young gentlemen, of whom Blaise de Montluc was one, exchanged the lance for the pike. This happy reform dates from 1507. By relieving the French infantry from the contempt under which it had suffered, it increased its valor tenfold, and con- tributed to the success of Louis XII. in Italy. 12. Liegions of Francis I, — Francis I. did even more than Louis XII. for the improvement of the French infantry. At the battle of Marignan (1515) he commanded it in person on foot, and, armed with a pike, rushed to the charge, exclaiming, ^^Qui TfHaime me suive^ Stimulated by his example, our infantry that day proved their superiority to the Swiss, and conquered them. It was at this very time that Machiavelli laid it down as a maxim that "well organized infantry could hardly be beaten, except by infantry;" thus proclaiming the superiority of the foot soldiers. The idea was a profound and bold one, especially for one who had never worn a sword. Francis I., entertaining, doubtless, the same view as the gi^eat writer, and unwilling to remain longer at the mercy of the capricious and exacting for- eigners, resolved to create a national infantry. For 42 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. some time lie liesitated as to the organization to be adopted; but finally, influenced by the revival of learning, wLicli turned the minds of men back to tbe ideas of the ancients, he decided to imitate the Koman formation; but he copied it in little else than in name. In 1534 he formed seven legions, each bearing the name of the province in which it was raised.* Each legion consisted of six bands, the band having the following effective force : {Captain, 1 1 Lieutenants, .... 2 I 5 Ensigns, 2 J Non-commissioned Officers. Centurions, 10 Corporals, 40 Quartermaster sergeants, 4 ^ Sergeants, 6 ^ 60 4 Deijmmers and 2 Fifeks, Soldiers. Arquebusiers, 4 Pikemen, . . I Crossbowmen, 200 600 200 1,000 Total, 1,071 The entire legion was commanded by one of the six captains of the band. Its force, according to the above schedule, amounted to 6,426 men, and that of the seven legions together to 44,982 men, including officers. The officers and non-commissioned * The legion of Normandy, tlie legion of Brittany, the legion of Picardy, the legion of Languedoc, the legion of Guyenne, the legion of Champagne (raised also in Burgundy and Nivernais), the legion of the Dauphine (raised also in Provence, Lyonnais, and Auvergne). HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 43 officers were required to be of tlie province in whicli the legion was raised. The arquebusiers formed but the fifth part of the soldiers of a band, but, being frequently de- tached to fight as eiifants perdus (forlorn hope), there were assigned to them exclusively one of the lieutenants and his ensign. Among his privileges, the soldier of the legion enjoyed exemption from taxes to the amount of 20 sols ; obtained a decoration, consisting of a gold ring, if he distinguished himself by a brilliant action, and attained to nobility by the simple fact of pro- motion to the grade of lieutenant. Those who were invalided by wounds served in the garrisons under pay, exempt for life from all tax or subsidy. This project was never fully carried into ejffect, for it was at that time impossible in France to maintain nearly 45,000 foot soldiers, in addition to the old bands. At the death of Francis I., the le- gionary formation fell at once into disuse, and was followed by a return to isolated bands. 13. French Bands. — From this period, the band (hande) became the only foot corps in France possess- ing a regular and peiTQanent organization. It was the real unit of formation of the infantry, and as it mostly numbered as many as 500 or 600 men, it cor- responded very nearly to our modern battalion. A captain commanded the band, seconded by a lieutenant, an ensign, quartermaster sergeants, ser- geants, and corporals. The band marched to the 44 HISTORY AKD TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. drum and fife. Among the soldiers there were those distino-uished as a first class, called anspessades, a name at first written lanspessades^ derived from the Italian lance spezzate, broken lance, and originally ap- plied to dismounted gensdarmes accepting service in the infantry. The officers and pikemen were armed alike; a long pike, a sword, a helmet covering the ears, corselets or cuirasses, armlets, gauntlets, and cuisses. The arquebusiers had little helmets, mailed frocks and sleeves, and a sword or dirk. The former, therefore, belonged to the heavy-armed troops, or, as we should now say, to the infantry of the line ; whilst the lat- ter were of the light-armed kind. The band was formed in full square, the pike- men in the centre, the arquebusiers outside. The captain took his place in front; the lieutenant stood as file closer ; the ensign occupied the centre of the front rank of pikemen. In combat, the pike- men stood fast, while the arquebusiers scattered, under the direction of the lieutenant, and skir- mished. If the battle became serious, the arquebusiers took refuge behind the pikemen, who received a charge with crossed pikes, or charged the enemy in close order. In this charge, they went almost shoul- der to shoulder, and turned themselves obliquely to break through the enemy — a practice which seems to be a vestige of the ancient influence of the shield, which gave the infantry a tendency to extend itself to the right, because each soldier endeavored to cover himself with the shield of his neighbor. mSTOEY OF INFANTRY. 45 On tlie battle field, the imposing masses of in- fantry were drawn up in large hattailles^ square or rectangular, varying from 3,000 to 10,000 men. Manuscripts of the time represent these battailles as 42, or even 68 men in depth. The number of men covered with corselets was gradually diminished, and the pikemen were stripped of defensive arms. It was on account of this formation in full square, that military works of the sixteenth century contained tables of square roots for any given number of sol- diers, which tables formed the tactical manual of the epoch. In these formations, the ranks, as well as the files, were separated by one step. Occasionally, in presence of the enemy, this distance was closed, and they formed in compact order, as in the case of the foot soldiers under Montluc at Cerisoles (1544). During the religious wars which troubled France under the last Valois, fire-arms were multiplied in the ranks of the French infantry, being better suited to the character of wars consisting of skirmishes, cap- tures and recaptures of posts ; but as these arms were then used only for firing, the infantry, deprived of pikes, were incapable of either charging or receiving a charge. Hence this maxim of a contemporary war- rior : " The arquebusiers without pikes are arms and legs without bodies." The pikemen were, in fact, retained down to the time when, by the invention of * They already began to use the word lattalions ; subsequently, the name of the whole became the name of a part. 46 HISTORY AND TACTICS OP THE SEPARATE ARMS. the "bayonet, tlie fire-arm became at once an offensive and a defensive weapon. The French "bands were known under two grand divisions, according to their origin; the bands of Piedmont, which, for more than a century fought for the so much desired conquest of the Milanese and of Italy, and the bands of Picardy, which, on the northern frontier, contended against the Flemish and the English. After Francis I., there were far- ther distinguished, the bands of Champagne, op- posed to the Germans, and the bands of Guyenne and Navarre, charged with the defence of the king- dom, on the side of the Pyrenees, against the Span- iards. Piedmont, Picardy, Champagne, Navarre ! glorious names, which the oldest corps of our infantry bore even to the time of the Eevolution. The system of isolated bands was suited to the French character, inasmuch as it allowed the cap- tains to distinguish themselves individually, and did not subject them to any superior authority. It was soon discovered, however, that it was necessary to combine several of these bands under the command of a single chief, in order to give greater impetus to the combatants, as well as to facilitate the direction and administration of the whole. Henry II., con- vinced of this necessity, tried to renew the legionary organization of Francis I. ; but the peace of Cateau- Cambresis deferred the realization of his projects by rendering them, for the time, useless. It was in the minority of Charles IX., in the early months of 1561, that the first regiments were formed, consisting of I HISTOEY OF IITFAISTTRY. 47 several bands — the chief officers receiving the title of colonel. The regimental organization of the old bands was completed in 1569. The political troubles very much increased the number of regiments from the first, since each influ- ential partisan received a commission to raise one ; but these corps usually lasted no longer than the credit of theii^ chiefs, and were disbanded in time of peace. Indeed, until the reign of Louis XIII., there were not many permanent regiments of infantry. The only regiments which, having their origin before this agi- tated period, survived it unbroken, were those re- sulting from the fusion of the old bands already known by the distinctive title of the vieux corps^ which they retained to the end of the eighteenth century — the moyens vieux and the petits vieux fol- lowing them in respect of seniority. The order of battle of a regiment was at first a line of small squares, either full or hollow, each company forming a square. In serious actions the line was made full. For resisting cavalry they had already conceived of the formation in squares ar- ranged in echelons so as to flank each other. The introduction of the musket was almost simultaneous with the institution of the first regi- ments of French infantry. The musketeers fought only as skirmishers. Besides the musket, their whole armament and equipment consisted of a morion (small helmet), a buff leather vest without sleeves, a dirk, a knapsack, and a powder flask. To act with greater rapidity, some were mounted upon small horses, thus 48 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. forming in tlie infantry regiments an accidental por- tion of cavalry. The heavy arquebus was gradually superseded by the musket. The depth of the infantry formation was dimin- ished, as defensive armor and the pike were aban- doned. Even with the disposition of the regiment in a line of squares by companies, the depth of the lines could not exceed 10 or 12 men; for this cor- responds to an effective force of 100 or 144 men in a company. This depth, habitually preserved, al- though the intervals were lessened, became the standard depth. Indeed, the depth of ten ranks may be regarded as that of the reign of Henry IV., as the following diagram, extracted from a contem- porary author, shows.^* It relates to the order of battle of a battalion of 500 men, the jp standing for pikemen, and the m for musketeers. FEENCH BATTALIOIT ABOUT 1610. mmmmmmmmmm pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp mmmmmmmmmm mminmmmmmmm pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp mmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmm pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp mmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmm pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp mmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmm pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp mmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmm pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp mmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmm pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp mmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmm pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp mmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmm pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp mmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmm pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp mmmmmmmmmm In this formation, the musketeers are placed in a position favorable to their action as light troops in skirmishing, and the pikemen stHl form, as in the old band, a solid centre, capable of sustaining a charge. * Principes de Vart militaire, par J. de Billon, 1622, in 4to., p. 156. HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 49 The fire-arms in this battalion constitute two iffclis of the whole force. The proportion went on increasing, and became two thirds in the reign of Louis XIIL* 14. Swedish Infantry. — The French infantry, un- der Henry IV., derived both its formation and tac- tics, in part, from the Dutch infantry, trained by the celebrated captain, Maurice of Nassau. So, also, the infantry under Louis XIV. borrowed some of its im- provements from the Swedish infantry, formed in the school of the great war under Gustavus Adolphus. Let us, therefore, before proceeding to speak of its progress under the greatest of the Bourbons, first consider the improvements made by the conqueror of Leipsic. Having to deal with the heavy Austrians, who were w^edded to the use of large battalions, Gustavus Adolphus turned his attention to mobility. He ren- dered his infantry more manageable by dividing it into small independent corps, under separate com- manders, and reducing its depth to six ranks. Some- times, in battle, he made his files deploy to extend his front, so that the line was reduced to a depth of three ranks. He usually drew up his infantry in two lines, the full spaces of the first corresponding to the vacant ones of the second. This formation is exhibited in the following diagram, in which P denotes the pikemen, and M the musketeers. * At this epoch the proportion of fire-arms was about the same in the Spanish infantry ; for in 1637 the regiment of Jaen numbered 190 men, to wit : 60 pikemen, 90 arquebusiers, and 40 musketeers. 4 50 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. FOBMATION OF THE SWEDISH IXFANTRY, UNDER GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. f-pi m\::e2\m2le2\m l^ [mIIIpDEJCIIIImI [mILZJCSLZHIM] By diminisMng the depth of his infantry, the Swedish king extended his front, and thereby in- creased the effect of the fire-arms; and this effect was the more increased in consequence of the greater number of musketeers in his troops than in preceding formations ; for they numbered 72 in a company to 54 pikemen, which gives nearly three fifths as the proportion of portable fire-arms. With the duninished depth he could also shorten the pike to 12 feet (English). He abolished the cuirasse of the pikemen, leaving as their sole de- fensive armor the helmet, called a salade. He light- ened the musket, so that it could be fired without a rest, and carried upon the shoulder without a cushion ; he adopted the cartridge carried in a pouch, instead of charges hung upon cords, which frequently became entangled with the soldiers' belts; and introduced firing in three ranks, very much like that of the present day. All these innovations, increasing the mobility of the infantry, rendered it easy to pass from line into column; and thenceforth, in marches and in battles, the advantage was with Gustavus Adol- phus, whose adversaries adhered to the formation 10 ranks deep, and used muskets of such clumsy construction that they could be loaded only by 94 commands. I HISTOEY OF mFANTRY. 51 f Sweden also put companies of mus- :eteers between Ms squadrons of horse, a mixture whicli at that time, when the cavalry movements were slow, was both feasible and profitable. 15. Infantry of Lionis XIT. and I^ouis XT. — ^The fire-arms used by the Swedish infantry were muskets with the match or wheel-lock, which had to be borne on the shoulder horizontally : consequently, the ranks could not be closed. Two inventions appeared which changed this state of things. One was the flint-lock musket, which was introduced into the French army in 1652. The bayonet had already been in existence some years. It was then constructed with a wooden stock, so that, when placed upon the end of the musket, it prevented firing ; but it was, nevertheless, an im- portant improvement, inasmuch as it furnished the soldier with a weapon which was at once both offen- sive and defensive. These inventions, which date from the time of the Fronde^ were especially opportune, since Turenne had, in 1640, adopted for the French infantry the Swedish depth of six ranks. Lighter arms and a lighter formation, therefore, in combination, worked rapid progress. With this depth of six ranks, the French bat- talion was drawn up as in the times of Henry IV. ; pikemen in the centre, musketeers on the flanks. This formation is exhibited in the following dia- 52 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE ARMS. gram, taken from a contemporaneous work.^ Tke battalion liere forms a regiment. s g P^ s S Ti TS -d ni •d -rJ B a a a a a n3 d ^ B a a a a a < X! B B a a a a a a a a a a t3 cS J2 B a a a a a > B a a a a a n3 M ,£5 B a a a a a O w ei n B a a a a a -d B B a a a a a o o Xi a a a a a a h) g a a a a a -CJ O rt Si B a a a a a ;z; B a a a a g 'd 2 o 2 a a a a a A. Colonel. cJ t> S B a a a a a a a a a a 13 B. Lieutenant-Colonel. o &. p^ PL, ft ft ft aa. Captains. fa o ci C3 a, ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ns bb. Lieutenants. O p. p^ ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft rS cc. Sub-lieutenants and o g s ei O p- p. Pi P- ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ensigns. 5 O p4 p4 ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ns dd. Sergeants. » cJ u P. Pi P. ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft o Ti ee. Drummers. e o P. Pi ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft F. Major. ei o P. P- Ph P4 ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft "d G. Adjutant. "z u a 2 a a a a 111. Musketeers. i eS CJ a B a a a a a a a a a a '« P- Pikemen. o B a a a a a tS ^ eJ ^ B a a a a a B a a a a a rC n ^ B a a a a a cd B a a a a a O ei -a B a a a a a -d fa ^ B a a a a a o B a a a a a -a ei ja B a a a a a W B a a a a a 73 ja B a a a a a c3 JS B a a a a a -a a a a a a a 'd TS -d 'd r3 TS o In forming a square, tke pikemen occupied tlie centre and tke musketeers surrounded tkem on the * rart de la guerre, par Gaya, 1689, p. 158. HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 5H four sides, as in the following diagram^* of a company of 100 men, 36 pikemen and 64 musketeers. COMPANl ' SQUARE (1673). m m m m m m m m m m m ni m ni m in m m m m m m P P P P P P m ra m m P P P P P P 111 m m m P P P P P P m m m m P P P P P P in m m m P P P P P P m m m m P P P P P P m m m ni m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m I The new musket (the fusil) easily supplanted the old one (the mousqitetj firelock), which completely disappeared from the French ranks in the last year of the seventeenth century. The bayonet took the place of the pike, but not without a struggle ; for it was not until 1703 that Louis XIV., following the advice of Vauban against that of Montesquiou, finally abolished the latter. As the musket was now the only arm of the foot soldier, and its length was much less than that of the pike, it became necessary to re- duce the depth of the line, which was now drawn up in four ranks. The diagram on the next page, taken from Puysegur,f shows this reduced formation. The c*ommandant of the battalion stands in front of the cen- tre, having behind him the three colors, which are in * From a work entitled Les Devoirs militaires d^ qfficiers (Vlnfanterie et de camlerie, par De La Fontaine, 1673, p. 404. t Art de la guerre par principes et par regies^ par le marechal de Puys^gnr, edition in 4to., t. i., p. 120. 64 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. o o o o o O o o o o o o o o o o o o . "ti^^ ^^ charge bayonets, fires from the place he oc- cupies, without moving his foot. We give a view of the rallied group seen in perspective, in order to illustrate more clearly the re- spective position of the four comrades. * By a recent decision the Zouaves are also furnished with tliis arm. I INFANTRY FOKMATION AND TACTICS. 93 In com'bats of skir- «^^^^^° «^«^^' ^^ perspective. mishers, besides tlie sig- nals given by tlie bugle, wliicli may often fail to be heard in consequence of the firing, or a con- trary wind, the officers and non - commissioned officers are authorized to use a whistle, to communicate with their men. The selection of suitable men to form the best light infantry, is a matter of some importance. The recruits should be quick of hearing, keen-sighted, light- footed, and clear-headed. In France, we find these several qualities best combined in the inhabitants of the mountainous and forest-covered departments. The light infantry soldier requires more time for his instruction than the soldier of the line ; for both his physical and intellectual faculties must be de- veloped with the greatest care. He must be taught to climb, to run, to leap a barrier, or a brook, and to scale a wall or an escarpment. He will be instructed in the method of reconnoitring a piece of ground, ex- ploring a copse, and examining a house, a farm, or a vil- lage. He will learn what kind of obstacles may serve as covers, how they are to be occupied ; and, in short, how to see without being seen. One of the Russian writers even requires that he should be taught some- thing of topography. Moreover, his quickness of sight is to be cultivated, and accuracy of aim imparted, by frequent target practice. It is only by this detailed 94 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. instraction of eacli soldier, that light infantry can be formed fully able to discharge the service required of it in war— a service which embraces watching the move- ments of the enemy, reconnoitring, beginning and fin- ishing combats, covering retreats, escorting convoys, giving secure repose to the troops by performing pa- trol duty in advance of and about them, acting as flankers, advance guards, etc. 10. Skirmisiiers. — Before closing this chapter, we must say a few words more, especially in relation to the branch of infantry designated as skirmishers. All soldiers fighting dispersed or scattered, are called skirmishers, whatever may be the object they have in view. A body, detached as skirmishers, al- ways leaves a reserve of one third of its force in the rear of the point upon which it spreads, as a centre upon which to rally. Those soldiers make the best skirmishers who de- velop the instinct of the chasseur and the partisan, in taking advantage of peculiarities of the ground, and employing judicious ruses. The skirmisher, unless covered by the broken character of the ground, should not stand still while loading his piece ; and, when necessary, he should lie flat upon the ground, to avoid the fire of the enemy. The battalions of chasseurs a])ied^ who take the place of our former light infantry, will furnish the best skir- mishers ; nevertheless, we should add that in France even the soldier of the line may be used for this ser- vice, for which he is well fitted by his vivacity of spirit, his activity, and his skill. I INF^VOT^EY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 95 There are three classes of skirmishers : skirmishers of march, skinnishers of battle, skirmishers en grande bande, Shirmisliers of march, — These skirmishers perform the duty of reconnoitring on the flanks and on the front and rear of columns in march ; of giving warning of the approach of the enemy ; of masking the move- ments and formations of the troops ; of skirmishing against the enemy, in order to gain time for making defensive dispositions. When the two parties are marching at a short distance from each other, as, for example, in a pursuit, both throw out skirmishers, and the result is a petty warfare. These skirmishers necessarily travel two or three times as far as the col- umns, and that over the most broken parts of the ground, thus rendering their duty extremely arduous. They must, therefore, be frequently relieved, and, con- sequently, must not be detached in too great numbers. Sldrmisliers of hattle. — ^When two bodies or two annies are drawn up in line face to face, each detaches upon its front a line of skirmishers, designed to drive back the advanced posts of the adversary, and to try the strength of his position. If allowed to approach, these skirmishers should harass the enemy by well arranged attacks, which can be met only by the skir- mishers on the other side. However, it is rare that anything decisive results from the action of skirmishers on either side, since they generally neutralize each other ; and this is a reason why, in this case alone, they should not be detailed in greater numbers than are actually necessary to repel those of the enemy. 96 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. SUrmishers en grande hande. — The chief business of the fii'st class of skirmishers is to see^ and to give warning ; that of the second class, to initiate the com- bat ; that of the third, to cany a position, that is, to perform the real business of war. The distinction be- tween them is thus distinctly marked. The employ- ment of skirmishers en grande hande occurs as far back as the sixteenth century ; they w^ere used by Coligny, Montluc, and Henry IV. Disused during the seven- teenth century, they were again revived by the wars of the Kevolution ; and this is not surprising, as their action is especially appropriate in the case of intrepid though imperfectly drilled troops. If a formidable position is to be captured, instead of approaching it by the front, at the risk of great loss, skirmishers will be thrown upon the flanks — either a battalion, a regiment, or even a whole brigade — whilst a body of troops, drawn up in column be- yond the reach of the artillery, menaces the front of the position. These skirmishers eri grande hande, climb the slopes, surmount obstacles, assail the posi- tion in flank or rear, and, having arrived within mus- ket range, rush with the bayonet upon the defenders, who, held in check on the front, are obliged to retire. As examples of the employment of skirmishers en grande hande, we may cite the battle of Jemmapes (November 6, 1T92), when they were used with suc- cess by Dumouriez ; and the battle of Hanau (Octo- ber 30, 1813), in which there were at one time more than 5,000 French skirmishers engaged in the great forest, two leagues from the town. CHAPTEE THIED. HISTOEY OF CAVALEY. We shall liei:e be more brief than in the history of infantry; and shall treat the subject under three heads only : antiquity, middle ages, and modern times. 1. Antiquity. — As the military art had its origin in Asia, a country abounding in arid plains, where manceuvres even of chariots were easy, mounted com- batants at first prevailed. "War chariots appeared first, because the art of guiding horses in harness presents fewer difficulties than equitation ; cavalry proper is of later origin. Mounted upon the platform of a car, the warrior overlooks the field of battle, has the free use of his arms (the horses being managed by a driver), and can strike his adversary as he comes suddenly upon him. This method of combat was well suited to warriors who were of a select order — warriors d'elite. The Egyptians and Persians made great use of chariots for thus conveying the combatants ; but there were also two other kinds of war chariots : those armed with scythes, which mowed their bloody swath through the ranks of the enemy ; and those carrying warlike machines, which may be said to have composed the 7 98 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. portable artillery of those times. The Greeks and Ro- mans made but little use of war chariots ; they opened their lines to let those of the enemy pass. They also employed against these chariots rows of stakes, placed along their front, and caltrops. Mounted horse existed in China more than twenty centuries before our era. The elder Cyrus was the first who (560 B. C.) introduced a cavalry corps into Persia. The Greeks began to make use of cavalry in the earliest period of their history ; but until the battle of Leuctra (371 B. C), although they had made great advances in the art of war, this people were yet igno- rant of the advantages to be derived from numerous and well instructed cavalry, and their armies were com- posed almost entirely of foot soldiers. The Theban general Epaminondas was the first who had a just appreciation of the importance of cav- alry in charging and in pursuing. He, with great perseverance, trained a body of 5,000 regular , horse- men, and habituated them to fighting en masse. His efforts were crowned with success; for, thanks to his cavalry, he was victorious at Leuctra, and Mantinea, and undermined the old reputation of the Spartans. These two victories opened the eyes of the other Grecian states, and they increased the number of their mounted troops. Froni that time, improved cavalry sus- tained a more important part in the wars of Greece. Two nations of Greece distinguished themselves by the excellence of their cavaliers : the Thessalians, whose numerous cavalry contributed to the success of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great ; and the I I HISTORY OF CAVALRY. 99 EtoHans, whose renowned squadrons rendered so mncli service to tlie Eomans in their struggle against Mace- donia, at the beginning of the second century B. C. The Thessalian horsemen were invincible when they fought in line, massed, but were worthless when once broken ; the contrary was the case with the Etolian cavaliers. According to the Greek theorists, the cavalry should be one sixth of the infantry ; and this propor- tion was adopted by Alexander at the time of his en- trance into Asia ; for, of the 35,000 men which com- posed his expedition, 5,000 were horsemen ; but, more frequently, the proportion observed in the Greek ar- mies was one eleventh. The fii^t Eoman cavalry was but mediocre, and served either on foot or on horseback, according to circumstances. Subsequently, when they fought alto- gether on horseback, they were interspersed with foot soldiers. These vicious methods of employing caval- ry were not attended by any bad consequences in the wars of Eome against the people of the Italian penin- sula, but they well-nigh proved disastrous in their efforts to repel the attacks of the Gauls and of Pyrrhus. We may well be astonished at this mediocrity of the Roman cavalry ; for, in Rome, to be a horse- man, or rather hniglit^ required the possession of a certain income. In the social hierarchy, the order of knights came next after that of senators, and each knight wore a gold ring, as a distinctive badge. It was not until the wars with Carthage that the Romans began to understand how much could be done with good and numerous cavalry. They enticed into 100 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. their service the foreign cavalry, wMch constituted the force of the Carthaginians ; and from that time the face of things was changed. Hannibal had maintained himself in Italy victoriously for thirteen years, by the aid of his excellent Numidian, Spanish, and Gallic cavalry; but when these useful auxiliaries passed over to the Eomans, fortune deserted his standard. From this time Eome maintained two kinds of cav- alry : one composed of Roman citizens or knights, the other furnished by their allies. The former, which was attached to the legions, was always mediocre ; the latter became skilful, and distinguished itself under the designation of auxiliary cavaliy. The proportion of cavalry which formed a part of the legion varied from a tenth to a twentieth ; but at each epoch the number of cavalry attached to each le- gion was almost always invariable and independent of circumstances and localities : a practice to be con- demned, for the cavalry of an army should be more numerous in level than in mountainous countries, and it was not always possible for the Roman consuls to find at hand all the auxiliary cavalry which they needed. The cavalry of the Greeks and Romans was di- vided into heavy and light cavalry: both used the shield. Tbe heavy cavalry also wore either a helmet and cuirass, or complete armor ; in the latter case, the horse was protected by iron plates. The light cavalry wore the helmet, as well as a small cuirass of metal or leather. As to their offensive weapons, the heav}'- armed cavaliers had the sword, the javelin, and the double-lance, with iron on both ends ; this lance was I HISTORY OF CAVALRY. 101 held at a point about one third of its lengtli from one end, so that, if the longer part broke, the other part might still be used. The light cavaliy used the sword, the javelin, the bow, and even the sling. The ancients paid little attention to swiftness in the action of cavalry, and this explains why, in the formation of this arm, they multiplied the number of ranks. The Greeks extended their preference for the deep order to their mounted troops, to which, how- ever, it is even less appropriate than to infantry. The Greek cavalry was drawn up in 4, 5, or 8 ranks ; the Thessalians adopted this last depth. As to the formation of this cavalry, it was sometimes a square or a rectangle ; sometimes, also, a triangle, which was the favorite form with Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander. The triangle, the point of which was directed toward the enemy, in order to break them with more certainty, is supposed to have originated in the imitation of the figure formed by a flock of birds flying through c c c c c the air. The habitual form of ccccccccc HESSALIAN LOZENGE. O C C C the Greek squadrons appears to ccccccccccc have been the lozenge, which ccccccccccccc ^' . occccccccccccco offers the advantage of frontmg ccccccccccccc on all sides. This form is repre- ccccccccccc ccccccccc sented in the annexed diagram, in c c c c c c c which the chiefs are denoted by c c c c c the letter a '"" o The Romans divided the cav- alry of a legion into ten turmce, or squadrons ; each 102 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. turma was composed of 30 soldiers and 5 cliiefs ; tlie wliole drawn up in tliree ranks, EOMAX TUEMA. . ^ as siiown m tlie annexed figure occcccccccco (tlie letter o denoting a chief). cccccccccc Sometimes . tlie turma con- c c c c c c c c c tained 32 men, and was formed in a similar manner, in four ranks. In combat tlie turmse were placed on the front or the flanks of the legion. The auxiliary cavalry adopted in its formations either the square, the loz- enge, or the triangle ; but in every case its depth was less than amons: the Greeks. The best among all the cavalry which figures in the Koman armies is unquestionably that of the Nu- midians and the Gauls. The latter rendered important services to Csesar, and maintained its preeminence dur- ing the period of the Roman emperors, to such an ex- tent that at the commencement of our era all the terms of manege most in use were Gallic. In the latter days of the empire, cavalry increased beyond measure in the Eoman armies. The barbarian nations who overwhelmed the Eo- man empire had but little cavalry ; adhering to their practice of fighting on foot, they displayed great skill in that kind of combat. But the establishment of the feudal system, which happened soon after, produced a marked preponderance among them of cavalry, which is said to have composed one half of the armies in the reign of Charlemagne. The ancients were not acquainted with the saddle ; they used, instead of it, skins or housings, placed so k HISTOEY OF CAVALRY. 103 as to afford the rider a firm seat without hurting the horse. The saddle was invented under the reign of Constantine ; and this led, naturally, to the use of stirrups, which could be more firmly sustained by the saddle than by housings. The invention of stirrups is attributed to the Franks,^' and their use caused the her- nias and the numerous diseases of the legs, with which horsemen were afflicted, to disappear. Besides lessen- ing fatigue, the use of stirrups enabled the horseman to remain a longer time in the saddle, and also, by giving him a point of support, permitted him to give more certain blows to the enemy. The absence of stirrups is, indeed, a distinctive feature of the ancient cavalry ; without them, the heavy feudal cavaliers had perhaps never existed. 2. middle Age§. — During the middle ages, the history of cavalry is interwoven with that of the feu- dal system and chivalry. We are not here required to treat of chivalry under its political asj)ect ; but will merely remark that this institution, during a pe- riod of trouble and general anarchy, powerfully con- tributed to the suppression of violence and the purifi- cation of morals ; and that the knights-errant them- selves^ notwithstanding the absurdities of some of their number, so well satirized by Cervantes, were useful to society, for their generous protection of the weak, wherever they went, was really the only police * Before this invention the cavalier mounted his horse by the aid of one of the milestones disposed along the Eoman roads, or else by means of a projection, provided for the purpose, near the but of his lance. 104 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE AKMS. whicli could be exercised in tlie rural districts and on tlie liigli roads. It was not in the nature of the feudal system to employ methods of warfare based upon observation and reflection : the distribution of power, as then con- stituted, is alone sufficient to explain this remark. Besides, tactics and chivalry could not exist simul- taneously ; the fundamental principle of the former being ensemble^ the emplopuent of masses ; that of the latter, individual courage, the isolated feat of arms — prowess. The nobles who held fiefs owed their military ser- vice to the king, for a period of sixty days, at their own expense ; beyond that period, it was at the royal charge. At the call of the monarch, they rej)aired to the army, accompanied by mounted combatants taken from the nobility of their fiefs, and bearing the name of cavaliers, or knights. Each knight had a reti- nue armed with the long bow or the crossbow, con- stituting the light cavalry, whilst he himself, wholly cased in iron mail, pursuant to the privilege of his rank, fought in line, face to face with the enemy. To aspire to the dignity of knighthood, it was ne- cessary to be a gentleman, to have given proofs of courage, and to have reached the age of majority. The induction of a knight into his office was accom- panied with pomp and ceremony; but, most singu- larly, this induction took place on the eve of battle, a practice plainly unjust, and destructive of emulation. This custom was infringed by Francis I. when he caused himself to be knighted by Bayard the evening HISTORY OF CAVALRY. 105 after tlie battle of Marignan (1515) ; Montluc was also kniglited by tbe Duke of EngMen after tlie battle of Cerisoles (1544). Any kniglit could confer tlie or- der of knighthood upon a compatriot.* The knights were divided into hannerets^ those sufficiently powerful to raise a banner, and lachelors^ or lower knights, gentlemen less powerful than the preceding, who carried only an ensign, called a pen- non, attached to their lance. The force of an army was estimated by the number of its banners and its pennons ; the infantry not being thought worth count- ing. To rise to the dignity of a banneret, the knight had to be able to embrace under his command 5 or 6 lances, in all 30 or 36 horses. A lance was the term applied to a small band formed by a man-at-arms and his attendants, the latter consisting of a coutillier (so named from the long, broad dirk in his belt), one page or varlet, and three archers. The coutillier frequently marched on foot and conducted the baggage horse ; the page, or varlet, brought the war-horse to the knight when he was going to battle, carried his lance and shield, and guarded his prisoners ; the archers were young gen- tlemen entering upon the military career, and aspir- ing to become men-at-arms. The man-at-arms was covered with iron, when his fortune allowed it, and wore, as much as possible. * A case is cited in which an English chief, the Count of Suffolk, at the combat of Jargeau (1429), knighted the French gentleman, Guillaume Renaud, before surrendering to him. But, in my opinion, we should not draw any general conclusion from this instance. 106 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. only armor from Milan. Tlie details of this armor are as follows : Over a vestment of leather, called a gamheson, lie buckled on a shirt of mail called a liau- be7% and over this a cuirass. In addition to the cui- KNIGHT IN AEMOE. 1. Helmet 2. Gorget. 3. Cuirass. 4. Epaulicres. 5. Brassarts. 6. Gauntlet. 7. Tasses. 8. Cuishes. 9. Genouill^res. 10. Greaves. rass, the complete armor embraced the gorget, which de- fended the neck ; brassarts, which protected the arms ; epauUeres, covering the shoulders; tasses, protecting the lower part of the body ; cuisJies, for the thighs ; and greaves, for the legs. Over the whole was sometimes thrown the sagum (saye), a kind of embroidered HISTORY OF CAVALRY. 107 doublet, made of woollen cloth {serge or say), A helmet and a shield, either round, oval, or demi-oval, completed the defensive armor. As offensive arms the knight carried the sword, the mace, the battle axe, and the lance, the latter being about 15 feet in length. The lance with which the gendarme unhorsed his enemy was regarded as a noble arm, and was for- bidden to villains^ or serfs. Upon a march, the knight did not wear his armor, which would unne- cessarily fatigue him in advance ; but it was carried after him upon a horse or in a wagon. For a like reason, he then rode upon a small horse, called a courtaud; but on the day of action he armed himself cap-a-pie and mounted his war-horse, an animal of lofty stature and great strength. The French cavalry charged in a single line — a formation which resulted in part from the tendency of the feudal lords to consider themselves as equals, possessing equal rights. This claim of equality was satisfied by the formation in a single rank, which gave each knight a free field for attacking the enemy and displaying his own prowess. The pages, or varlets, ready to support their chiefs, formed a second rank behind that of the gensdarmes ; but the latter attacked alone, which necessarily occasioned successive charges of a small number of horses. The cavalry ignored the laws of tactics, and sub- mitted but little to discipline ; still, such was the de- fective organization of the infantry, that the former bore all the burden of war, and not only fought bat- tles, but also laid sieges. 108 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE ARMS. Toward the middle of the fourteenth century, and the beginning of the fifteentli, the expert English archers and the excellent Swiss pikemen, all foot sol- diers, frequently forced the chivalry to convert itself into infantry ; and this lasted so long as armies did not contain a body of infantry, properly so called, sufficiently compact to sustain a charge. This was illustrated at the battles of Poictiers, Cocherel, Mon- teil, Agincourt, and Formigny. When the knights dismounted, they often shortened their lances to five feet, to render them easier to manage, and of stouter resistance ; they took off their spurs, to use them as caltrops, planting them in the ground, row^els up. Moreover, the men-at-arms, with their heavy mail, made but clumsy foot soldiers; they could march against their adversaries only by resting several times on the way. They were obliged to fix in advance the number of poses, or rests, of which an attack should consist. It would have been impossible for them to perform a long march; and when dismounted, they were compelled to divest themselves of their armor. After the crusades, chivalry fell into decline, the principal causes of which were the destruction of the feudal system, the establishment of the communal militia, the invention of fire-arms, and the ignorance and vices of the knights. This decline ended in com- plete extinction about the middle of the fifteenth cen- tury, when the modern epoch begins. 3. Modern Times — Dissatisfied with an intract- able nobility frequently absenting itself from the I HISTOEY OF CAVALRY. 109 rankSj the kings soon began to supplant the feudal armies by permanent troops more obedient to their wishes. In the middle of the fifteenth century more correct ideas of organization, and the employment of armies, effected a revolution in war, which again be- came an art. In France, Charles VII. was the iirst to institute permanent troops of infantry and cavalry. He suc- ceeded better with the latter than the former, for the corps of cavaliers which he created lasted as long as the old monarchy. In 1445 he organized fifteen companies of cavalry, called compagnies (T ordonnance^ each containing 100 lances. Counting six men in a lance, this gives 600 combatants per company, and 9,000 for the whole body estalished, not including the supernumeraries or candidates who followed voluntarily, in the hope of one day becoming full gensdarmes. Besides the captain, there were in each company a lieutenant, an ensign, and a guidon, all chosen from the gentlemen most reputed for valor. There was also a quartermaster. Every gendarme had four horses : one for his ser- vant, one' for his baggage, a war-horse, and a cour- taud. Each archer had two horses. The gensdarmes w^ere paid after a review, or muster, held by a spe- cial commissioner; and the means for that purpose were raised by a tax called the gendarme tax, levied upon the people of the towns and the rural districts. After the institution of these companies, the feu- dal lords no longer brought their vassals into service. 110 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. Except in the rare cases wlien the king summoned the arriere-ban^^ the use of banners and pennons ceased, gentlemen of high rank preferring the position of captain of an independent company (which con- ferred a real command) to that of cavaliers. The companies thns created by Charles VII. were imitated by the neighboring nations ; but, with the exception of those of the duchy of Burgundy, the for- eign companies never reached the excellence of ours. Upon the accession of Francis I., the French gen- darmery still formed in a single rank ; a formation too thin, especially for resisting German squadrons, which were sometimes drav/n up in squares, but al- ways in deep order. The depth of these squadrons was usually seventeen ranks. Charles V. reduced it to ten, and finally to eight ranks. This deep formation of the German squadrons re- sulted from their being composed entirely of the com- mon people, to whom the reasons which led the French gendarmery to form in a single rank, and which we have above explained, were no longer ap- plicable. . Fire-arms began to be introduced in the cavalry. In Germany, about the middle of the sixteenth cen- tury, they reckoned one arquebusier for every four lances. They also began to employ special corps of light cavalry for skinnishing, who, when necessary, dismounted. They were called chevau-legers when they carried the lance, and stradiots when they * Body of arriere- vassals, or inferior feudatories of the sovereign. — TraiMlator. HISTOEY OF CAVALKY. Ill served as scouts. There existed also cranequiniers^ or mounted crossbowmen, wlio used a hook called a cranequin to draw the cord of their crossbow ; malan- drinSj mounted soldiers of fortune, armed with a bo^v ; argoulets, horsemen carrying the escojpette (wall-piece with wheel-lock and rifled barrel) ; carahins^ when the escopette was changed to the carbine ; and, finally, re- itres^ OY pistoliers^ when armed with the pistol. The origin of dragoons dates also from this epoch, since history informs us that, in 1543, in the environs of Landrecy, Peter Strozzi placed 500 arquebusiers on horseback, in order that they might not he fatigued. This fact explains how dragoons were at first but mounted infantry ; and this character they preserved for a long period, sometimes serving as horsemen, and sometimes as foot soldiers. The deep formation of the German squadrons was attended with little inconvenience in the sixteenth century, on account of the feebleness of artillery ; and these masses of cavalry did, in fact, contribute to the success of several battles. Defeated by these squad- rons on the days of Pavia (1525) and Saint-Quentin (1577), the French gendarmery were compelled to abandon its single-line formation, although the deep order wounded to the quick the self-love and sus- ceptibility of the cavalier. From that time a remark- able change is observable in the organization of the cavalry. All the European states, France included,* * In France this adoption toot place as early as 1556 ; but this power returned occasionally to the single-line formation, especially at the battle of Saint-Denis, in 1567. 112 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. adopted tlie German formation of eiglit ranks deep ; tlie cavaliy immediately lost a part of tlie mobility it had possessed in tlie times of chivalry, when the knights charged at the fastest gait, and now manoeuvred at a walk or trot, and made more use of fire-arms than of other weapons.* The first deep squadrons were very strong in num- ber. They rose to 1,500 and even 2,000 men-at-arms, all equal, all cavaliers without a retinue. Reflection soon showed how little effect was produced by these heavy, almost immovable masses. This, together with the ravages produced in these elevated living rectan- gles by the projectiles of improved artillery, led to the reduction of the depth to six ranks. Henry IV. further reduced it to ^ve ranks, and formed no squad- rons of more than 600 horses. Louis XIII., in 1635, organized the companies of light cavalry into regiments, each commanded by a colonel. The compagnies (P ordonnance continued to form the body of the gendarmery. Gustavus Adolphus made several improvements in the cavalry, dividing it into small squadrons, form- ing it in four or three ranks, ordering it to fire only when very near, and to charge with the sabre. This new system of tactics struck the Imperials with astonishment, who with difficulty accustomed them- selves to it; and yet the Swedish cavaliers still charged only at a trot. The king of Sweden, to resist the heavy cavalry of the Austrians, placed companies * Nevertheless, according to La ISToue, if the reitres charged at a trot, the French cavalrj of that period sometimes " galloped." HISTOEY OF CAVALKY. 113 COMPANY OP FRENCH CAVALRY IN OEDEB OF BATTLE, (1750). of musketeers between Ms squadrons of horse ; but this mixture of the two arms has since been aban- doned as incompatible with the diversity in the nature and tactics of these two arms. The cavalry retained for a long time its depth of three ranks, which it still pos- sessed at the close of the reign of Louis XIV., and during a part of the reign of Louis XV. The annexed cut shows the or- der of battle of a company of French cavalry about 1750. In the time of Louis XV., the armament of the cavalry was very different from that of the fourteenth century. Down to Henry IV., the gensdarmes were still armed cap-a-pie, and their horses were barbed ; whilst the light-horsemen wore either simple cuirasses or coats of mail. From the reign of this monarch, the armor was gradually simplified, and the defensive pieces with which the cavaliers were covered, one by one, shared the faf e of the deep squadrons. Under Louis XIII. the lance was no longer used ; under Louis XIV. only the cui- rass and the helmet were retained ; under Louis XV. the buff-leather vest took the place of the cuirass, and the sabre-proof cap supplanted the helmet ; helmet and cuirass reappeared only during the Consulate, and were worn very nearly as at the present day. Marshal Saxe paid great attention to the improve- ment of cavalry, insisting especially that they should 114 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. not charge as foragers, as was in his time tlie practice of the French cavalry ; but he had not sufficient authority to produce any important amelioration, and the reform came finally from Prussia. Before Frederic II., the Prussian cavalry was neg- lected, except for parade. They charged only at a trot, firing with the pistol or musketoon. This monarch, himself a good horseman, proscribed this routine method of fighting, and gave orders that, without paying any attention to the firing of the Austrian squadrons, his cavalry should rush forward at a gallop and fearlessly attack them, sword in hand. The su- periority which this mode of action gave him on most occasions, confirmed what his genius had foreseen, and which others stubbornly refused to appreciate ; namely, that the real qualities of cavalry lie in the charge^ and not in firing, Frederic always retained in his army some squad- rons formed in three ranks ; nevertheless, by the ad- vice of Seydlitz, he adopted the formation in two ranks for the greater part of his regiments. Seydlitz deserves to be considered as the first general of caval- ry of modern times ; he brought equitation again into repute, and perfected fencing upon horseback ; then, starting from this basis, he imparted to evolutions the regularity, ensemble, rapidity, and certainty which permitted them to be executed in the face of the ene- my with the same precision as on the drill-ground ; moreover, in spite of the opinion of Frederic the Great, he placed the guide upon the flanks instead of the centre, an arrangement ever since preserved. HISTORY OF CAVALRY. 115 The adoption of the formation in two ranks goes back to the year 1766, and took place simultaneously, after several attempts, in France, Hanover, and Prus- sia. It was brought about by the fact that, with the rapid gait recently adopted, the second rank could not keep a sufficient distance, unless the third rank remained in the rear, or even halted; in which case it became useless. The result of trials was that in two ranks the movements of cavalry were both more rapid and more precise. The formation in two ranks did not become general in Europe until 1790. The Austrians* and the Russians were the last to adopt it. Since that time, cavalry has advanced in the science of manoeu- vres and the tactics of battle, and its progress has rendered it formidable. The campaigns of the Revo- lution and of the Empire have definitively established its formation in two ranks. There is, besides, an essential difference between the cavalry of the nineteenth century and that which existed at the close of the eighteenth century ; the uniform of the horsemen at the present day is loose, and the burden canied by the horse is equally dis- tributed before and behind. Let us now proceed to consider the details of the present formation and tactics of cavalry. * It even appears that the official adoption in Austna only took place in 1806, upon the recommendation of the Archduke Charles. CHAPTER FOURTH. CAVALRY FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 1. Use of Cavalry. — In mounting on horseback, tlie soldier sacrifices several advantages to gain speed : thus lie can no longer make an efficacious use of his fire-arms, and all are an obstacle to him. It is in rapidity, then, that his strength chiefly consists : we do not say wholly consists, for boldness is a qual- ity equally indispensable to him. The ordinary use of cavahy is to complete a suc- cess prepared or obtained by infantry, assisted by ar- tillery ; it is, consequently, an accessoi^y arm. To ac- complish this end, it must rout the already broken masses of the enemy, and then pursue them. To pro- duce a rout, cavalry must take the initiative, and at- tack at the propitious moment.* Indeed, the offensive is its only practicable mode of combat; for, if it awaits the enemy, it will be infallibly overthrown by the velocity of its adversary, if cavaliy,f and by * At Marengo, the prodigious effects of the vigorous and timely charge of General Kellermann with his 400 horse would have been lost if he had charged but three minutes later. t At Guada-Hortuna (Spain), July 25, 1823, 1,200 Spanish horse, CAVALKY FOEMATIOIS- AND TACTICS. 117 amount of its fire, if infantry. For this reason Frederic* and Napoleon wished their cavalry to at- tack continually ; but in attacking, the great matter is to seize the opportune moment, whence the designa- tion applied to cavalry of arme du moment. From the twofold use of cavalry, routing and pur- suing, results the division of this arm into at least two kinds : the one, adapted for the charge, composed of men and horses of great stature, provided with defen- sive armor — ^this is the heavy cavalry ; the other, for the pursuit, composed of smaller men and horses, wearing no armor — this is the ligTit cavalry. Between these extremes there is an intermediate species — mixed cavalry — employing men and horses of a medium height which takes the place, in case of need, either of the heavy or of the light cavalry ; and when it ac- companies these in war, serves to save the former from unnecessary fatigue, and supports the latter by giving it greater solidity. The heavy cavalry embraces the carahiniers and the cuirassiers. Its business is to appear upon the day of hattle and mahe decisive charges^ as was done at the battle of Austerlitz by a corps of 4,000 French cuirassiers. It may, in case of need, be employed to sustain light cavalry ; but this must be done in mode- ration. Heavy cavalry should be saved from unne- having awaited a charge, were overthrown by 450 French horse, com- manded by General Bonnemains. * This monarch said, at the beginning of the Seven Years' "War : " C'est le diable que mes officiers n'agissent que defensivement, mais j'y mettrai bon ordre, u quoi il a bien r6ussi." ("Warnery, Commentaires sur Ttcrpin et MontecuculU.) 118 IIISTOEY AISTD TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. cessary fatigue, even on a marcli ; but on tlie field of battle, it will be charged with the most perilous duties. The dragoons, theoretically speaking, now compose all the mixed cavalry; for they only wear a sin- gle piece of defensive armor, the helmet. For a long time the dragoons were intended to fight both on foot and on horseback. A consequence of this ambiguity of character was a total loss of confidence in themselves, which made them indiiferent troops.* At the present day they are exclusively horsemen. Being better mounted than the light cavalry, they support the chasseurs and hussars against the numer- ous cavalry of the enemy, fight the dragoons with equal arms, and can even measure themselves, with some chance of success, against cuirassiers, whom they surpass in lightness. Since dragoons have become altogether horsemen, all the cavalry seems to have abandoned forever the idea of dismounting and fight- ing on foot. This rule should not, however, be exclu- sively followed ; for there are circumstances in which a real advantage may be gained by some platoons of cavalry temporarily dismounting ; as, for example, in the attack or defence of a bridge, a wood, or a de- file. "I have seen one occasion," says Warnery, " where a regiment of hussars were surprised and beaten in their camp, because they had been refused 30 foot * "When engaged as foot soldiers, it was difficult for them to regain their horses in case of defeat ; as is illustrated in the case of the 14 squadrons of French dragoons sent to retake the village of Franquenies at the commencement of the battle of Eamillies (May 23, 1706). I CAVALRY F0RMATI0:N^ AIS^D TACTICS. 119 soldiers to defend a deiile." In a reconnoissance amono" the mountains around Hostalrich, in 1808, Gouvion Saint-Cyr, having fallen into an ambuscade of guerillas, would have been destroyed, had not his dragoons dismounted, and rapidly scaling the heights, in spite of their heavy boots, put the Spaniards to flight. The light cavalry embraces the chasseurs, the has- sarSj and the lancers. The chasseurs and the hussars have, however, the same kind of horses, the same weapons, the same n^thods of combat ; they are, therefore, but varieties of the same arm. They are employed to give security to the army, by forming advance-guards, flanking marches, protecting evolu- tions, masking reconnoissances, and covering retreats. These various duties, at all times necessary, are those for which their light and agile horses especially fit them. The lancers, besides rendering similar services, are especially useful against confused masses, and in pursuits. At the present day there is no longer any irregular cavalry either in France or in other nations. Austria has consolidated her Hungarians and Croats, who now fight in regular formations and in line : even Kussia has begun to systematize the Cossacks.* * We may here quote a singular remark of Count Heraclius de Polig- nac, who had been a colonel in the Russian service. This officer has said: "The Cossacks have great military knowledge, ride excellent horses, and understand the art of defending themselves ; bnt they have not that elan, that ardor of attack, which is almost always crowned with success. The Cossacks charge boldly only upon fugitives, or when they are sure of being at least ten to one." (See the preface to his translation of General Davidoff's Essay on Partisan War/are, 1841.) 120 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. 2. Armament — ^Tlie use to whicli cavalry is ap- plied necessitates special kinds of dress and arma- ment. The jacket, wide trowsers, and tlie long sabre are proper for all kinds of cavalry. The kelmet is in- dispensable to tlie heavy cavalry and dragoons ; and the cuirass (of the model of 1826, which is proof against musket balls at the distance of 40 yards) is also necessary to the heavy cavalry. The lance is an excellent arm, and both the light and the mixed cav- alry of several foreign nations are now wholly armed with it ; its use is indeed spreading, and may occasion modifications in the armament of infantry. Fire-arms are useful to cavalry only when serving on detach- ments and as skirmishers. 3. Numerical Data. — The numerical relation of the cavalry to the infantry has been very variable. It depends upon the character of a people, and the facilities for the supply of horses which the country affords. As a general rule, however, we may say that when the army is to operate in a level country, the number of its cavalry should be one fifth tl^at of its infantry; but only one tenth when in mountainous regions. The weight carried by cavalry horses in France is as follows : Chasseurs Cuirassiers. and Hussars. Horseman, about, 176 pounds. 143 pounds. Horseman's arms, 32 " 18 " Horseman's equipment, 24 " 24 " Horse equipment, 51 « ^ 49 " Spare shoes, 4 « 4 « Utensils, 2 days' provisions, 2 rations oats, 22 " 22 " Total, 309 " 251 " CAVALRY FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 121 The horse of a carabinier carries about ^j\ lbs. more than that of a cuirassier, and the horse of a dra- goon 22 lbs. more than that of a chasseur or a hussar. All these numbers will be increased some 6 or 8 lbs. in wet weather, on account of the increase in weight of the horseman's cloak ; and the same increase is to be allowed when the cavalry is obliged to carry hay or straw in addition to the oats included in the pre- ceding table. A horse travels, in a minute : At a walk, about 110 to 120 yards At a trot, " 220 " 240 " Atagallop, " 330 " 380 " If we take the first of these numbers for each gait, we see that the trot is about twice, and the gallop about three times as fast as a walk. When the horses are in a body, they have less freedom of movement, and accidents of the ground impede them more ; consequently, a column of cavalry will not march as rapidly as a single horse. With the weight above given, a column can make as much as 3 1 miles per hour at a walk, and 7i miles per hour at a long trot. 4. Tactical Unit. — ^The tactical unit of cavalry is the squadron, which, being' composed of a much smaller force than the battalion, seldom fights sepa- rately, as the latter does. The French squadron is usually composed of 4 platoons, forming together 48 files. The following is its figure in order of battle ; 122 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. SQUADRON OF CAVALKY IN OEDEE OF BATTLE. 2(1 L. Cd 8. L. C. C. 1st S. L. 1st L. a a fl a a mtmmmmmmmmmmmm i i 5 i ^ 2dC. The shaded spaces represent the non-commissioned officers. "We see by this figure that the captain com- manding the squadron is in the centre, the crupper of his horse one yard in front of the heads of the horses of the first rank. The second captain is three yards in the rear of the centre of the squadron; he is charged with the alignment of the second rank, and of the file-closers. The 1st lieutenant' commands the 1st platoon ; the 2d lieutenant the 4th platoon ; the 1st sub-lieutenant, the 2d platoon; the 2d sub-lieu- tenant, the 3d platoon. Each of these officers is placed in front of the centre of his platoon, the crupper of his horse at a distance of one yard in front of the heads of the horses of the first rank. Each horse occupies 1 metre (39 inches) in breadth, and 3 metres (nearly 10 feet) in depth. The front of the squadron, therefore, occupies a space of 52 yards, and that of a platoon 13 yards. The two ranks are at a distance of one yard, measured from the heads of the horses of the second rank to the cruppers of the horses of the first. The oldest troops in each platoon are placed in the front rank, and from right to left in each rank. I CAVALRY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 123 The minimum effective force of a squadron is 48 files ; tlie maximum is 64 files — a number wliicli ad- mits of easy subdivision. Within the limits of 48 and 64 files, the squadron combines all the conditions re- quisite for manoeuvring and fighting with order and facility. Whatever may be its effective force, the squadron is always divided into four platoons. When several squadrons are drawn up in line, the intervals between them are each equal to one fourth of the front of one of them. The squadron is now formed in two ranks. .Only the front rank can strike the enemy ; nevertheless the rear rank has its use, and should be preserved : 1st, because it supports the front rank, and increases its moral force ; 2d, because it fills the voids occasioned in the front rank ; 3d, because it fights as well as the front rank in case of a melee — a rare case, in which it is wxll to have as large a number of horsemen as possible gathered upon the same point; 4th, and finally, because it compels the front rank to march more correctly. It is only in exceptional cases, there- fore, that cavalry may be drawn Tip in a single line, and then there should be some fall files on the flanks of the squadrons ; it may be done as a ruse, to deceive the enemy as to its real force ; but even then, to do it safely, there should be no danger to be apprehended from the attack of vigorous cavalry. The formation in three ranks has been abandoned, because it did not allow the middle rank sufficient freedom and quick- ness of movement, and disorder was not so easily remedied. 124 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. 5. Manoeuvres.— As tlie length occupied by the horse is three times his breadth, the horseman cannot make apwot-tuTn in his place in the rank, as the foot soldier can, for he is wedged in the rank ; and we shall presently see why it should be so. In order to bring a troop of cavalry promptly by the flank, and with a depth of column equal to the front in line, it was necessary to devise the movement called the movement hy fours, which is executed either to the right or the left, and gives a front of 8 horsemen. In this movement, the object of which is to gain ground to the right (or left), at the command " To tlie right (or left) hy fours^'' each group of 4 men, in each rank, wheels by itself upon a fixed pivot. The move- MOVEMENT BY EOUES. K \^ \ > > > > \ ■ > \ > \ > ment being completed, the four horses of the rear rank in each group of four files are found at the right of those of the front rank. Cavalry also breaks by fours in making an ad- vance diagonally. These oblique marches, and the movements by fours, were much in vogue in the last century, and Marshal Saxe set a high value upon them ; but they are no longer employed, except in the elementary instruction of the platoon and the squad- ron ; in actual manoeuvres, movements by platoons take their place. The platoons are, then, frequently CAVALRY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 125 required to wteel ; tlie consequence of wliicli is, that tlie horses on tlie flanks, always going at a quicker gait, are more fatigued tkan in the movements by- fours ; but, on the other hand, in the movements by fours there are, in a squadron of 48 files, 24 pivots and 24 flanks, which very much increases the liability to disorder, and also requires better trained horsemen. Cavalry, not making use of their fire-arms, cannot have any lateral action, like that of infantry. In order to defend themselves, they must be able to post them- selves facing the enemy, and at a sufficient distance to give full scope to the horse in charging ; and this is the reason why changing the front is for them a fre- quent and indispensable evolution. These changes of front are, like the other manoeuvres of cavalry, effected by means of the movement by platoons ; but as the obstacles of the ground or an unforeseen attack may often paralyze the manoeuvre, it is prudent to cover the flanks of cavalry. The ordinary gait in manoeuvres is the trot ; but the horsemen should also be able to execute them all at a gallop. • 6. Mode of Action. — ^The horseman incurs less danger in war than the foot soldier. He therefore gains but little training in the field except in the way of confidence in himself; consequently, he must be very carefully instructed in time of peace. This in- struction is always indispensable, and is to be con- tinued whenever' practicable ; for the great object of cavalry is to act with ensemhle and precision. Besides, 126 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. the horses are to be trained to the sound of war ; for, notwithstanding the assertion of poets of all ages, they are easily frightened and not fond of combats * The mode of action of cavalry fighting in a body consists in actual collision, the efi*ect of which is pre- pared by a charge. The combination of horse and rider does not form a perfectly dense body ; but we may nevertheless consider the intensity of the col- lision of a line of cavalry as proportional to its mass and its velocity. Hence, to increase its force, the ve- locity must be accelerated as much as possible, and its mass increased by forming the troop into a united and compact whole, by the adhesion and alignment of the horsemen. The whole secret of the instruction of cavalry will therefore be to teach them to gallop in close order and well aligned^ even under the fire of the enemy. 7. Charge. — The decisive action of cavalry, the charge, is employed either at the commencement or at the end of a battle, and as much as possible on the flanks of the infantry, chiefly when the latter has be- come engaged. At the favorable moment, and at 300 yards from the opposing line, the commandant orders sabres to be drawn, and puts his troop in motion at a trot, to bring the horses by degrees to their work, and to enable the horsemen to adjust their alignment ; at 150 yards, he orders the ordinary gallop, and at 60 yards the full charging gallop. The horsemen should ' * This is the observation of Mottin de la Balme. See his Tactique pour la cavalerie, p. 180 to 184. CAVALRY rOEMATION AND TACTICS. 127 remain united and masters of their movements, not- withstanding their rapid motion. Thus the progres- sive acceleration of gait is an important feature in the charge, and necessary to be observed, if Ave would not quickly ruin the cavalry ; nevertheless, in case of sur- prise, when an enemy unexpectedly debouches from an ambuscade, the charge may be begun at a gallop, in order to regain a part of the advantage lost by the omission of the first movement. In order to make the soldier charge vigorously, he must be convinced that his officers mean to persevere in the charge to the last, and that, if it fails at first, they will lead him again and again to the combat, until it succeeds ; otherwise there will be indecision and weak- ness of action. In this resj)ect, the French cavalry is preeminent ; for, according to reliable testimony, " it is the best in the world for combat, and always charges a fondP ^' To this. Marshal Marmont, in his Memoires^^ adds : " Les Allemands nous sont supe- rieurs pour Tordre et I'esprit de conservation; mais pour I'emploi ils sont loin de nous : la cavalerie fran- gaise, h. egalite de force, a toujours battu la cavalerie etrangere." During the charge, the horseman should not fire, for firing makes the horses restive, and produces but little effect upon the adversary. As for his arms de main^ the lance may serve for the moment of ren- contre, and the sabre will be useful after the collision, during the very short period of the melee. The van- * Marmont, Esprit dea institutions militaires^ p. 48. t Tome i., p. 221. 128 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS, quished party, however, quickly betake tkemselves to flight, and there are usually very few men killed or wounded in a charge. Velocity of movement and close adhesion of the horsemen stirrup to stirrup, are the two essential ele- ments of a good charge, to which the officers should especially direct their attention — ^the more, since the men, to avoid being pressed in the rank, are apt to spread themselves. After all the watchfulness of the officers, and their own example, a charge not unfre- quently fails from a very slight cause, as a panic may be produced in a body of troops going at full speed, by the most trifling circumstance : for example, the noise of a ball striking the cuirass of a horseman and throwing him off, may suffice to produce a failure in a charge. On this account, cavalry should be drawn up in two lines, at from 300 to 400 yards apart. As far as possible, the flanks of the second line should extend beyond those of the first. With this arrange- ment, if the first line fails in its charge, it will rally behind the second, and the latter will charge in turn ; observing, however, that, to avoid all disorder occa- sioned by the scattering and retreat of the first line, the second line is to be formed in columns by pla- toons, so as to present intervals sufficiently great for the escape of the fugitives ; which produces the fol- lowing figure : * * This figure represents the charge in parallel order. The charge in oUique order is executed according to the same principles, and is to he preferred when the line of the enemy is extended, in order to compen- sate this advantage hy the refusal of one wing. CAVALEY FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 129 For want of a second line of cavalry, the troop whicli fails in a charge, will rally behind a line of in- fantry, which will be suddenly unmasked, to arrest FOEMATION FOE THE CHARGE. J:: C^^ U^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ la Zl IZl a IZI a a the enemy by its fire, or behind an obstacle ; but al- ways beyond the range of the enemy, for the neglect of this precaution might expose it to certain de- struction. If the charge succeeds, the success must be com- pleted by a pursuit. In this pursuit, the victors constantly endeavor to gain one of the flanks of the vanquished party, in order to take them on their weak point ; or if some obstacle prevents this, they try to get between the columns of the enemy, and to fight them in detail : but care must be taken to guard against retaliative operations, coming from ambus- cades, the troops of the second line, and the reserves of the enemy. In the charge, the officers retain their respective places in line, except the commanding officer, who 9 130 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. goes to any point at whicli lie judges liis presence to be most necessary to insure success. Against artillery, cavalry charges as foragers. By this term we designate a dispersive charge, by means of which the scattered horsemen reach their point of destination more quickly, and suffer less from the pro- jectiles of the artillery. Whilst the platoons which arrive first repel and keep in check the troops which protect the artillery, some of the horsemen throw themselves upon the pieces, carry them off, or spike them, and break or carry away the implements, es- pecially the rammers. We will add that, against the Arabs, the charge as foragers should always be used.*" 8. Formations. — Cavalry employs four forma- tions — order in line^ order in column^ order in ecJidons^ order in square. Its orders of attack are — in line, in column, and in echelons. It attacks cavalry in line : it attacks infan- tryf in echelons or in column : in echelons, when the in- fantry is deployed, and cannot be turned ; in column, when the infantry is formed in column or in square ; % the column of cavalry is in that case a column by squadrons aif double distance. The attack in echelons * In the French army of Algiers, the Bpahis form the light cavalry, and the Chasseurs d'Afrique the cavalry of the line. t Cavalry has heaten infantry in several hattles, particularly at Ceri- soles (1544), at Rocroy (1G43), at Fehrbellin (1675). X In the rain, cavalry has the advantage of infantry, as the fire of the latter is impaired : example, the battle of Dresden (1818). The use of percussion arms at the present day lessens this advantage. CAVALEY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 131 is well suited to cavalry in this, that it allows the charge to be renewed on several points, and facilitates the outflanking of the enemy. Moreover, the mutual protection of the echelons is the more efficacious, be- cause cavalry protects the ground on its front, within charging distance, better than the ground it occupies ; and the successive charges of the echelons succeed pretty well against infantry by harassing them, and causing them to throw away their fire precipitately. The attack in columns against a square of infantry is directed against one side of the square, if a small one, or against two angles adjacent to the same side, if the square is of considerable size. In all cases, with one or two columns, four or five horsemen thrown forward are sufficient to make a breach by means of their dead horses ; and having once gained entrance by this breach into the interior of the square, the horsemen who follow sweep down the thii'd rank, and, aiming at the eyes of the foot soldiers, compel them to raise their guns, thus rendering their fire harmless. It would seem that cavalry should have no forma- tion for defence, since we have seen that it should never allow itself to be attacked. Nevertheless, in an exceptional case, it may be drawn up for defence, and should then be formed in squares. Heavy and even mixed cavalry, thus formed, may, in case of need, re- ceive the attack of light cavalry. Thus, in 1813, at Juterbogk, the division of dragoons of General De- france formed a square against the Cossacks. The emperor Napoleon I. without doubt approved of this method of combat, for he seldom had a regiment of 132 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. cavalry manoeuvred in his presence without ordering tlie formation in square. The marching formation of cavalry is the column by platoons. A detachment on a march should gen- erally keep the left side of the road, because, in case of attack, each horseman then presents his strong side — the right — to the enemy. The checker-formation, formerly much used in re- treat, has been abandoned by cavalry, on account of the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility, in a retro- grade movement, of keeping the squadrons of the sec- ond line opposite to the intervals of the first. 0. Sciaircurs. — By this name are designated the horsemen scattered in front, in rear, and on the flanks of a troop, to cover its movements or its position. They are the skirmishers of the cavalry. They should be selected from the troops who are armed with guns or carbines. Their principal duties are to scour the country, reconnoitre the enemy, cover the preparations for a charge, escort convoys, support the infantry skirmishers, etc. A body of cavalry, in retreat, may also throw out a screen of skirmishers, behind which the broken squadrons may rally. Good results will be obtained by combining the action of these edaireurs with the skirmishers of the infantry, according to the nature of the ground. The French regulations with regard to the evolu- tions of the cavalry, fixes the number of eclaireurs at one fourth the number of the troop from which they are detailed. CHAPTER FIFTH HISTOET OF AETIXUEEY. I The history of artillery presents tliis particular in- terest : that it is connected with the highest efforts and most notable progress of human genius. The motive force of the projectile-machines of anti- quity, of which the halista, the onager^ and the catapulta are Lest known, were either weights, or springs made of cords of hide or sinew, raised or stretched by a wind- lass or levers, and suddenly abandoned to the effect of gravity or elasticity. CATAPULT. These machines, constructed almost wholly of wood, carried upwards of 1,000 yards, and the strong- 134 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. est threw projectiles weighing from 600 to YOO pounds. Besides stones, tliey threw arrows, beams, red-hot balls, and fire-pots. As they were transported with armies, they corre- sponded to our field pieces. The Greeks, excepting Alexander the Great and his successors, made but lit- tle use of them. The Komans, in the time of the Ee- public, employed them only for the defence of their camps ; under the Empire, they ventured to take them with their armies. These machines multiplied as the courage and military skill of the Komans declined, and in the legions of the Lower Empire there were even as many as 11 machines to 1,000 men. Thus, also, Frederic II. and Napoleon I., at the close of their reigns, increased the number of their pieces of artillery in the armies which were composed of young soldiers. This coincidence proves, that, from the introduction of projectile machines, the number of them^ required has always been the greater the poorer the troops. The ancient machines were put liors du comhat by setting them on fire, or else by cutting the cords and springs — a manoeuvre corresponding to our spiking of guns. The first kings of France took into their service the projectile machines captured from the enemies' legions, but their people were ignorant of the art of using them, and considered their employment as dis- honorable, for which double reason balistics were of little service to them, and began to decline under their successors. This decline stopped under the reign of Charlemagne; but after this great emperor, it con- HISTOEY OF ARTILLERY. 135 tinued, and the balistic art soon perislied, with all the arts, in the midst of the feudal system. During the Crusades, both parties made use of projectile machines of the ancient kind. Philip Augustus brought them back to France (1191). They were perfected in the thirteenth century, and the onager and catapult re- appeared, under the names of ^erriere and man- gonneau. Several of these machines were of enormous di- mensions, and required a great quantity of wood in their construction ; moreover, if they threw very large masses they could not give them great velocity ; but notwithstanding these inconveniences, they were pre- served for a long time after the invention and use of the first cannon, with which they competed during nearly two centuries. Many persons still attribute the invention of gun- powder to that celebrated English monk Koger Bacon, who astonished the world by his great scientific discov- eries in the thirteenth century ; nevertheless, powder — that is, the mixture of saltpetre, sulphur, and charcoal — was known, several centuries before our era, to the Chinese, who employed it in the manufacture of various fire-works, which they put into tubes, and thus formed what we should now call fuses. The knowledge of powder was gradually transmitted to the people of Asia, through India and Persia, and at last to the Arabs, who communicated it to the Greeks of the Lower Empii^e ; and a recent opinion is, tliat the fa- mous Greek-fire of the last-mentioned people, was nothing more than an incendiary composition made of 136 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF TIIE SEPARATE ARMS. gunpowder. Tlie invasions of the Arabs, and espe- cially tlie Crusades, introduced a knowledge of gun- powder to the people of western Europe ; and tlie great number of European claimants to the invention of this agent of war (the English Roger Bacon^ the German ATbertus Magnus^ Bertliold Schwartz^ Con- stantin Anklitzen^ etc.), evidently indicates that the epoch was ripe for the invention : that is, this inven- tion was but the reproduction of a thing already in existence, but of which only confused and vague ideas were entertained, diffused throughout Europe by the crusaders returning to their homes. But if Europe can no longer lay claim to the in- vention of gunpowder, she is still justly entitled to that of fire-arms, with which neither the Chinese, nor the Indians, nor the Persians, nor the Arabs were ac- quainted before ourselves ; these ancient people being indeed acquainted with powder, but ignorant of the fact that it could be used to project heavy masses to a distance. This point seems now to be established in favor of our science. The obscurity of the chronicles of the middle ages, and the confusion of names, make it difficult to ^x the precise epoch when the projectile property of powder was discovered, and when the first cannon were introduced. It appears, however, that their em- ployment in war does not go back beyond the four- teenth century. In fact, the earliest mention of can- non appears to be that of instruments in the form of funnels, or vases, used by the Genoese in 1319. The first field artillery differed little from the port- HISTORY OF ARTILLERY. ISY BOMBAKD. k able fire-arms, and was frequently mounted upon sta- tionary frames, for wliicli wheels were afterward sub- stituted. . The cannon called vases were, from their form, capable of throwing large stones ; they soon received the name of homlards. The annexed figure shows the nature of their con- struction. Bombards soon increased their proportions, and at the end of the fourteenth century must have obtained remarkable length and weight ; for we find mention of one 50 feet long, and of another weighing 2,000 pounds. The ancient machines could not contend against bombards ; the smallest ball caused their fragile frames to fly to pieces. They were supplanted by pieces of ordnance, which, from the year 1376, were em- ployed to open breaches, and thenceforth were exclu- sively used (with some rare exceptions) in sieges and on fields of battle. The term artillery existed before the invention of fire-arms. It designated all the arms fabricated by the artilUer (original form of the word artUleur)^ namely, balistic engines, bows, arrows, lances, darts, shields, 1 * The old French verb artiller signifies to fasMon ly art^ and had nearly its equivalent in the old English verb to artilize, while artilUer was nearly equivalent to artisan; but its modern form, artilleur^ is re- stricted to the signification of artillerist. — Tr, 138 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. etc. Masters of artillery commanded the artilUers, These masters of artillery were cliarged with the fa- brication as well as the distribution to the army, of A the new and the old artillery ; they consequently also \ made fire-arms, pieces of ordnance, powder, balls, bul- lets, and had under their orders soldiers called cannon" iers^ instituted about 1411, for manoeuvring and servin^, cannon. The first masters of artillery were subordinate to the grand master of the crossbowmen, to whom they ren- dered direct account of the matters intrusted to their charge. But under Charles VII. the master-general of the artillery, who was chief of this branch of ser- vice, succeeded in making his office independent ; and from that time its prerogatives went on increasing daily. The first field artillery, considered, so to speak, as an obstacle^ was scattered about the army, and inter- spersed among the wagons; it was soon separated from the baggage and placed on the front or flanks. Cannon, in those days, produced an especial effect upon the spirit of the troops by the noise of their dis- j^ charges ; they increased the importance of defensive positions, and were employed in secondary operations ; but, being difficult to manoeuvre and slow to load, they could be used but imperfectly in an open country. Louis XL, about 1475, distributed among three the duties of master-general of artillery ; and profiting by the experience of his father, whose artillery had rendered him important aid in the reconquest of his kingdom from the English, he maintained a large HISTORY OF ARTILLERY. 139 amount of artillery. During liis reign, twelve pieces of tlie caliber 45 were cast, wMcli were celebrated under tlie name of tlie tivelve peers of France.^' One of these pieces was taken at the battle of Montlheri (1465). Charles VIII., in 1493, reestablished a single mas- ter-general of the artillery. His expedition into Italy exhibits the first important employment of artillery in a campaign. All the powers, following the French ex- ample, set about improving their artillery. The definite foundation of the French artillery dates from this epoch. Charles VIII. left France with about 100 cannon of mean caliber ; at Sarzanne his park of artillery was augmented by about 40 large pieces. It was already understood how to place these pieces so as to take the enemy's troops obliquely ; nevertheless, in this expe- dition, artillery played a more important part against fortresses than in the open country ; it was fired with precision. Under Louis XII., artillery of lighter construction was introduced, in order to be a less hinderance to the march of an army. The small calibers became sufficiently portable to take advantageous positions during the combat, to compel the enemy to keep at a distance, and thus to complicate his movements. This monarch established two masters-general of artil- lery, one in France and one in Italy. At this epoch the infantry was often made to lie down on the ground, to be less exposed to the balls. The Swiss, in one battle, endeavored to seize * This name recalls the twelve apostles, which Charles V. had cast at Malaga for his expedition against Tunis. 140 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. upon tlie artillery of their adversaries, by advancing as sMrmisliers against the batteries. Under Francis I. the French artillery was increased and' systematized; and in its outfit the use of stout horses was made im- perative. At Marignan (1515), our cannon gave us the victory. At Pavia (1525), Francis I., after the success of his right, thinking to surprise the army of the enemy, advanced at the head of his gensdarmery, thus masMng the fire of his pieces. This false manoeu- vre caused his defeat. At Cerisole (1544), French pieces, by having better horses, amved at their place on the field of battle as soon as the cavalry. Finally, let us observe that in the sixteenth century, it was artillery that arrested the progress of the Turks, and thus pro- tected European civilization. From a military point of ^'iew, we may say that the increase of fire-arms complicated the art of war only for mediocre minds, while making it more simple for great captains. In 1543, Francis I. gave to the master-general of his artillery the title of grand master and captain- I general of the artillery. The ofiice of grand master continued without change during the subsequent reigns. In 1599, Henry IV. conferred it upon Sully, in whose hands it acquired increased importance; and two years later, in behalf of this celebrated minister, he erected it into an ofiice of the crown. This office lasted until 1755, when it disappeared. It l^has since been temporarily reestablished, at several jepochs, but with diminished prerogatives, under the jname of first inspector-general of artillery. s The first cannon were only combinations of large HISTOEY OF ARTILLERY. 141 bars and iron hoops. From the fifteentli and the six- teenth centuries they were cast of iron, of copper, and of bronze. The balls employed were also successively of stone, lead, ii^on, and bronze. As to the guard of the pieces, — as much importance was attached to their preservation, they were entrusted to detachments of the best infantry, that is, to the Swiss, and for want of them, to the lansquenets (German foot soldiers). Henry II. adopted five calibers for his ordnance, varying from 1 to 33 pounds ; Henry IV. added a sixth caliber of f of a pound, and collected at the ar- senal of Paris as many as 100 pieces of ordnance — a large number for that epoch, which is indicative of the projects of conquest entertained by him at the time of his assassination. The artillery of Henry IV., like that of Henry II., had no limbers ; but the can- non of 33 pounds caliber had a four-wheeled carriage, and spare carriages for all the large pieces accompanied the train. In 1609, Henry IV., reviving the edicts of Charles IX., forbade the casting of any piece approach- ing to the six calibers which he had just adopted. In the battles of this monarch, the artillery, placed at the extremities of a crescent, endeavored to take the enemy obliquely, and to flank the whole line of battle, keeping itself upon the defensive. About the middle of the sixteenth century we find the artillery of Protestant Germany possessing great lightness, and firing with extraordinary rapidity. That of Prussia also possessed a good and powerful organi- zation, and later served as a model to Gribeauval. Gustavus Adolphus reduced the weight of aiiiillery, 14:2 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. accelerated and improved its fire, and adopted the calibers 3, 4, 6, 12, 16, and 30. His ordnance was of bronze, of cast iron, and of sheet iron bound with leather thongs. This sovereign employed it especially in attacking, w^hereas it had been before used chiefly for defence. He divided the artillery on marches, and oTouped it in large batteries on the field of battle, placing these batteries on the flanks and in the centre of his lines. He always carried with him a large number of pieces : at the crossing of the Lech (1631), he had 12 of large caliber. In 1634, Louis XHL added two new calibers to those existing in France under Henry IV., the 24 and the 12. In the same year bombs were brought into use by the French, who threw the first missiles of this kind at the siege of Lamothe, in Lorraine. From that time, in order to make artillery lighter, the larger cali- bers began to be left in the rear, and only field pieces, drawn by four or six horses, were carried with the army. Under Louis XIV., Vauban invented ricochet firing (1688), and specially employed cannon instead of the mine to make breaches. The invention of carcasses^ an incendiary projectile of ellipsoidal form, belongs also to this period ; the French used them for the first time in 1672. In the preceding year, the king had taken from the Swiss the guarding of the artillery, and replaced them by the regiment oi fusiliers of the Mng^ created for that service. The matchlock was still the ordinary arm of the infantry, and the new name of this regiment was derived from the fact that h HISTORY OF ARTILLEEY. 143 the soldiers who composed it were tlie first who were armed with the new muskets (fuslh) with bayonets. Upon its reorganization, in 1693, the regiment of fusi- liers of the king took the name of Royal Artillery ; and this is the proper date of the organization of the artillery corps. But though the great monarch insti- tuted, as we have said, the first permanent corps of artillery, and gave great extension to the materiel of this arm, no great improvement was made under his reign : in fact, they persisted in employing the same kind of artillery in sieges and on the battle field, without considering that the purpose of this arm is quite different in these two cases. Under Louis XIV., the ordnance generally used consisted of long pieces of the calibers 36, 24, 16, 12, 8 and 4. During the reign of this monarch, the number of pieces of ordnance in the army was increased, as well as the effective force of the troops. The French had at Fleurus (1690) 100 pieces ; at Malplaquet, 200. In this last battle (1709) a battery of 50 cannon, placed on the French right and loaded with grape shot, put 2,000 of the enemy Iwrs du combat in a single discharge. By his large masses of artillery, Louis XIV. silenced Spain and Holland, and made himself master of Up- per Burgundy and Alsace. In the middle period of his wars, his artillery rendered him good service in battles as well as sieges. At the end of his reign, the artillery, as well as the other corps of his armies, was exhausted. Turenne still placed his artillery in ad- vance of his lines : after him, care was taken to dis- tribute it anion Of the several divisions. 144 HISTOKY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. In 1732, Louis XV. adopted the artillery system of Lieutenant-general Valliere, and decreed that the calibers 24, 16, 12, 8 and 4, should be exclusi\^ely employed in the French armies ; the 24 and the 16 principally for sieges : the others indifferently, either for sieges or for battles. We owe to Frederic IL the introduction of horse artillery (so useful for accompanying the movements of cavalry), and also the use of howitzers in the field. This monarch improved the tactics of artillery, and instead of distributing it on the whole front of his line of battle, as was formerly done, he combined it in large masses. He was indebted to this system for several of his successes. We see him fighting at Czas- law (1742) with 106 cannon and 3 howitzers ; at Zorn- dorf (1758) with 117 pieces of ordnance; at Torgan (1760) with 244 pieces. These are large numbers, considering the effective force of his armies. Vaquette de Gribeauval, a celebrated French gene- ral, who fought for Maria Theresa against Frederic IL, and distinguished himself at the defence of Schweidnitz in 1762, was inspector-general of artil- lery, and carried the science of this arm to a high de- gree of perfection. His system of field artillery was adopted in France in 1765, and soon after by all Europe; and, with some modifications, is still fol- lowed. In this system, the pieces, reduced in length and only of about one half the weight of the old ones, are mounted on carriages which are at once solid and light. The different calibers are the 12, the 8, and HISTOEY OF AKTILLERY. 145 blie 4 ; and tlie 1 was promptly suppressed. To these must be added a howitzer of 6 inches for field service. It is to Gribeauval that we owe the use of the TmuS'Sej by which cannon can be pointed both promptly and with precision. This illustrious man changed scarcely anything in siege pieces, but he improved their accessories ; he invented the garrison carriage, the use of which renders embrasures unnecessary, and the coast carriage, by means of which the movement of ships can be followed while pointing. He fixed the calibers of mortars at 12, 10 and 8 inches ; that of stone mortars at 15 inches ; and for these different pieces he introduced cast-iron carriages. He divided the personnel of the arm in a happy manner, by establishing as the unit of artillery force, the battery of 8 pieces served by one company of cannoniers. In the year 1801, the First Consul created bat- talions of the train, to convey the materiel of the ar- tillery — a service formerly performed by contractors, to the great inconvenience of the army. Under the Empire, the personnel of the artillery was raised to 60,000 men. Napoleon employed tliis arm in large masses : thus, at the battle of Wagram, 100 pieces were rapidly moved to occupy moment- arily a portion of the line of battle. This partic- ular circumstance taught us the necessity of training a mass of pieces to manoeuvre with ensemble and promptness ; and consequently, during the ensuing peace, attention was paid to drawing up manoeuvres of one or several batteries. The methods which 10 146 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE AEMS. were developed had a happy influence upon the last battles of the imperial period. It is hardly necessary to say that Napoleon I. placed his artillery in order of battle as we place it at the present day. Finally, in 1829, the " Committee of Artillery,'^ taking the English models, adopted a new materiel of artillery, called the neio system. At the present time, the siege and other calibers are 24, 16, 12 and 8 ; the last two, the 12 and the 8, are those of which field batteries are exclusively composed ; for the new car- riages, having great mobility, enable us to carry can- non of powerful effect to the field of battle. The new howitzers have the length of cannon; those of the field are of the caliber 24 and of 6 inches ; those for siege, 8 inches. Mountain ai-tillery consists only of howitzers of the caliber 12. The mortars have a coni- cal chamber, and their calibers are 12, 10, and 8 inches ; the stone mortars have a caliber of 15 inches. The battery is now reduced to six pieces, with their accessories ; of these six pieces, four are cannon and two howitzers. Several arrangements observed in the construction of the carriages and limbers, give the new system great mobility. It also possesses remarkable simplicity ; for it contains but two kinds of carriages, one for the can- non of 12 and the howitzer of 6 inches, the other for the cannon of 8 and the howitzer of 24 ; moreover, the limber of the caisson is the same as that of the piece, so that the can-iage can be refurnished by a simple exchange of limber. The wheels are also of the same size, and can be interchanged. HISTORY OF ARTILLERY. 147 Another advantage of tlie new system is that the cannoniers can sit upon the ammunition-chests, and thus be carried with the piece. In consequence of this im- provement, the foot batteries manoeuvre, in case of need, with the same rapidity as the horse batteries, and the artillery can conform itself to all the move- ments of the infantry and of the cavalry. The present French system is sometimes called the " Systeme Valee,^ after the general officer, since a mar- shal of France, who is its author, and had already proved its merits at the camp of Saint-Omer (Sept., 182T). This system is now modified, in its materiel j by the adoption of the 12-pounder cannon-howitzer (Na- poleon-gun) ; and in \t^ personnel^ by the organization of 1854, in which existing defects are corrected, and two important principles established : 1st. The division of the artillery arm into three distinct branches : light artillery, the cannoniers riding on horseback ; line artillery, they being mounted on the ammunition-chests ; and reserve artillery, where they are on foot. Each is thus enabled to perform its appropriate functions, the first having to manoeuvre with the cavalry, the second with the divisions of in- fantry, and the last to serve in the attack and defence of fortified places. In preceding organizations, the ar- tillery-men were frequently diverted from their special instruction to acquire a knowledge of horsemanship. 2d. The artillery train-corps was entirely suppressed and absorbed in the foot regiments, forming park-bat- teries. CHAPTER SIXTH. AETILLEEY FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 1. Purpose of Artillery. — ^The purpose of artillery IS to destroy^ either the troops of the enemy, opposing artillery, or obstacles ; and by sucli destruction to fa- cilitate the attack of infantry or cavalry. To accom- plisli this purpose in a decisive manner, artillery should act in large masses ; for if it operate against a line of foot soldiers, it will by this means alone be able to make large breaches, which will divide the line into several detached groups, which it will after- ward be easy to assail and to beat in detail. There are, however, cases where isolated discharges produce a useful moral effect upon the enemy ; as, for example, when a ball carries off some officer, or simply a bearer of orders. To accomplish its mission, the artillery must have recourse to different means, according to the nature of the object to be destroyed; hence there are two kinds of ordnance — afield pieces and siege guns. But in a broken and hilly country, even the first, which are the lightest, are yet too heavy to be transported ; and hence there is a third kind of ar- I ARTILLEEY FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 149 tillery — mountain artillery^ carried on the backs of mules ; whereas the field and siege guns are placed on carriages drawn by horses. We have just spoken of the transportation of artil- lery : this is indispensable, not only on the march, but upon the battle field ; for, at the present time, this arm acts not only by its fire, but also by its move- ments ; while, in foimer days, it was thought that the purpose of artillery was only to fire from a fixed point. It is evident that the different portions of the army cannot all use the same calibers, since mobility de- pends upon the weight of the balls. Hence the divi- sion of field artillery attached to an army, into divi- sion-hatteries and reserve-latteries — the former com- posed of light artillery, attached to divisions, and al- ways in action ; the latter composed of heavy artil- lery, forming part of the reserve, and, like it, acting only at the decisive moment, or at the last extremity. Besides the general service of guns, and the con- struction of all batteries, the corps of French artillery is also charged in the field with : 1st, the furnishing of arms and munitions of war to the army ; 2d, the repair of arms, which repairs are entrusted to the companies of armorers ; 3d, the construction and placing of movable bridges, and crossing streams by boats. The artillery, however, is not a self-sustaining arm ; it needs immediate protection to accomplish its various objects, and especially when it is engaged in firing, or in the construction either of a battery or 150 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. a bridge. In fact, if tlie artillery were not supported by troops of infantry or cavalry, the artillerists would be obliged, in case of attack, to abandon their special functions and convert themselves temporarily into foot soldiers, or into cavalry (according as they were on foot or mounted), to repel the enemy; which would often be injurious to the interests of the whole, .by interfering with their special duty at the most critical moment. But if the artillery cannot act with security except under the aegis of the other arms, it renders them, in return, the most important service ; and we may confidently assert that it now constitutes an indispensable accessory in the composition of armies. 2. Numerical Data. — ^The number of pieces of ordnance of an army depends upon the quantity and quality of the troops which compose it. It is usually fixed by stating the number for every 1,000 men. The experience of our later wars has demonstrated that we could adopt two pieces of ordnance to 1,000 infantry ; but this number must be regarded as a min- imuTYi^ adapted to the best troops — for, the more ex- perienced and inured the soldiers, the less their need of support. In the generality of cases, three pieces to 1,000 men is a more suitable proportion. Foreign na- tions have often gone beyond this number ; the Prus- sians, for example, have employed four pieces of ord- * A minimum, that is, for the continent of Europe : for, against fee- ble troops, we come down to a lower figure ; thus, in 1830, in the expe- dition which conquered Algiers, there was scarcely one piece of ordnance to 1,000 men. AETILLEEY FOKMATION AND TACTICS. 151 nance, and tlie Russians even as many as seven, to every 1,000 men. As to tlie cavalry, it is usual to support it by twice as many pieces as would be used for tbe same number of infantry. Artillery being always an impediment to long ex- peditions, it is proper, in fixing its amount, to take into account its weight in reference to tbe nature of the ground on wbicb it may iave to act ; especially as it will be preferable to take a smaller number of pieces than to be reduced to the dire necessity of abandoning some of them to facilitate the march. The supply of ammunition carried by the artillery, is 200 rounds for each piece of ordnance, and 50 car- tridges for each infantry soldier. Each piece, or caisson, drawn by six horses, as in France, occupies 13 metres (14 yards) of depth in file. The limber, with six horses, occupies but 10 metres. The depth of the piece in battery, including the hand- spike, is 5 metres ; the front of each piece and carriage is 2 metres. 3. Tactical Unit. — A lattery is the tactical unit of artillery. In France a field battery consists of six pieces * which, with the accessories and the cannoniers necessary to manoeuvre it, produces an eftective of 30 carriages and wagons, 200 men, and 200 horses, suffi- * The field battery, composed of four cannon and t-wo howitzers, forms now the exception ; there are no longer any such, except in the reserve (where they are of four cannon of the 12 caliber, and two howitzers of 16 centimetres), and not even all the batteries of the reserve have this composition. 152 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. cient to form a single command. Tlie personnel of this battery is now composed of homogeneous elements, inasmucli as tlie artillerists who serve the guns and the drivers who conduct them have the same rank. Some foreign powers compose their batteries of eight pieces, six cannon and two howitzers; others, again, attach to their armies special batteries of howit- zers. In France they have just adopted, for field ar- tillery, as the principal kind of ordnance, howitzer- cannon of the calibre 12 (light 12 -pounder), which throw either balls or shells, — thus affording the advan- tage, that the six pieces composing a battery may all fire at the same time either balls or shells, as required. These howitzer-guns were proposed by the Emperor in 1849.* The French field-battery is divided into three sec- tions of two pieces each ; f the 1st lieutenant com- mands the right section, the 2d lieutenant the left sec- tion, and the adjutant the centre section. The mountain-battery is composed of six howitzers of the calibre 12, divided into three sections ; but more frequently mountain artillery is organized simply in sec- tions of two howitzers, each section requiring 22 mules for its transportation : this mode is followed in Algiers. 4. Formations. — ^The field artillery has no defen- swe formations. In manoeuvring and combating, it * The new system of field artillery whicli they constitute has been ex- plained and defended by Colonel Fave, in two pamphlets, published in 1850 and 1851. t In the battery of 4 cannon and 2 howitzers, the 2 howitzers form a section. AETILLERY FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 153 FOEMATION IN COLUMN. ^ ad^ 144 -^^ 11 has three different formations : in columji, in line, and in battery. We will point out the distinctive features of these formations for a French foot battery. 1st. Formation in Column. — This formation is that in which the battery, formed in sections, has its carriages drawn up in two files, each piece being followed or pre- ceded by its caisson. For a foot battery the interval be- tween the files is as much as 12 metres; the distance be- tween two carriages of a file is 1 metre. The annexed fig- ure shows the position of each carriage and each officer, non- commissioned officer, and of the cannoniers in this forma- tion. The letter c designates the captain commanding ; the letter I the lieutenant, com- manding a flank section ; the letters ad the adjutant, com- manding the centre section; mc the chief quartermaster, commanding the line of caissons ; m assistant-quarter- masters, chiefs of pieces ; a artificers, chiefs of caissons ; t the trumpeter. A foot battery in column by sec- tions occupies 16 metres of front and 83 metres in depth. The artillery, like the other arms, employs /a \-6-A-6-y, % — a ^ 154 HISTORY AITD TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. the formation in column for manoeuvre, especially when prolonged. It is used equally for attack and march. In the march in column, each carriage should care- fully preserve its interval and distance. The column of attack is formed upon the centre section taken as the head of the column, the two other sections being each in column hy piece^ behind one of the pieces of the centre section ; a formation which facilitates the deployment of this column by a forward into line. It is evident that, for the purjDose of passing over a narrow road, the whole battery may be formed in column of pieces. 2d. Formation in Line, — In this formation the carriages are arranged upon two parallel lines, the m mi FORMATION IN LINE. cl ad^ Ttii pieces, limbered up, forming one line ; and the caissons, each following or in front of its own piece, forming the second line. The horses of all the carriages face in the same direction. For a foot battery, the interval be- tween the carriages is 12 metres ; the distance between the lines is 1 metre, as in the above figure, in which the reference letters have the same signification as in AETILLERY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 155 k the figure on page 153. This formation is especially an order of review ; * yet it may be used for advancing a few hundred paces, when the ground is sufficiently clear to permit the passage of a body, which, though but a single battery, presents a front of 72 metres and a depth of 27 metres. 3d. Formation in Battery. — ^This formation is that in which the pieces in line are prepared to fire ; the pieces, their limbers, and the caissons remain turned toward the enemy, and are formed on three parallel lines. For a foot battery, the interval between the pieces is 12 metres ; the distance between the line of pieces and the line of limbers is 6 metres, and the dis- tance between the latter and the line of caissons is 10 metres. The following figure illustrates this formation, FOEMATION IN BATTERY. iT"i ■*j[^ i"*!*". \Tt iTi OTk il <— -/2— > * On reviews and parades, the order is modified by throwing back the caissons to the distance of 15 metres from the pieces, and grouping the cannoniers in a small detachment at a distance of 6 metres in rear of the muzzle of the pieces. 156 HISTOET AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE AEMS. wliicli occupies 72 metres of front, and 44 in depth. The letters have the same signification as before. This is the true formation of the artillery for combat. After the firing has commenced, the battery can be carried, in parts and successively, to more advanced positions — a movement usually executed by half-bat- teries, the right half-battery firing while the other half marches, and reciprocally. In the particular case where a battery, fully formed in the order in battery, retires while firing, the limbers and caissons, after the first retrograde movement, should remain with their backs to the enemy, in order to continue the movement more readily. 5. HantBuvres. — ^To pass from one to the other of the preceding formations, the artillery necessarily makes use of manmuvres : moreover, it is proper for it to be able to manoeuvre, in order to participate in the transformations to which the contingencies of battle may give rise in the tactical disposition of the troops which it supports ; and this, both for foot and horse batteries. What shall be the character of the manoeuvres of artillery ? This arm is complex ; it embraces men, horses, carriages : consequently great precision of movement cannot be exacted of it. All that can be re- quired is, that it shall manoeuvre promptly ; and, when the manoeuvre is completed, that it fire quickly upon the enemy. It will therefore manoeuvre rather like cavalry than like infantry ; and, even thus, the presence of carriages must render the movements somewhat AETILLERY FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 157 disjointed. This slight inconvenience will be made to disappear rather by skill in manoeuvring than by quickness of motion ; for artillery does not admit of a faster gait than a trot in its movements. It is evident, indeed, that if it were manoeuvred at a gallop, the horses, harnessed to such heavy carriages, would soon be ruined ; nevertheless, in a critical moment, a bat- tery may, by way of exception and for a short time only, effect a movement at the gallop. As we have just remarked, artillery manoeuvres somewhat after the manner of cavalry ; consequently it employs for the most part oblique movements and wheeling, which are adapted to combatants who can- not follow the compact and right-angled movements of infantry. This will be readily seen from some examples. 1st. The battery being in column, either at a halt or marching, to form it in line upon the head of the column while gaining ground to the left, the command is to be given to the two rear sections — left oblique — which oblique movement they continue until, by resuming a direct march, they will be severally at their proper interval from the next section on the side toward the guide ; and then they continue their march on a line parallel to the axis of the column until they reach the front of the section at the head of the column. If they wish to gain ground to the right, the formation in line is effected in an analogous manner by a right obliqued The choice of the * The " TigM oblique {or left) " is performed by artillery at an an- gle of 45 degrees ; it is, therefore, in reality, a half turn to the right (or left). 158 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE AEMS. ' side on which it will be most advantageous to form is to be determined by the ground alone ; for, as artil- lery now makes no account of inversions in its ma- noeuvres, it is a matter of indifference whether the two rear sections are carried to the right or to the left of the leading section of a column. 2d. To form the column of attack upon the centre, the battery being in line at a halt, the centre section ad- vances ; when it has left sufficient space the right sec- tion oUiques to ilie leftj and comes up in column by piece in rear of the right file of the centre section ; while the left section ohliques to the rigJit^ forms in column by pieces, and takes up its position behind the left file of the centre section. The formation of the column of attack is formed in an analogous manner, if the battery, instead of being at a halt, is marching in line. 3d. The column being in march, the formation in line to the right or to the left is effected by a wheel to the right or to the left, performed simultaneously by all the sections. To form line on the left or right the movement is analogous, except that it is performed first by the leading section, which halts when it has fully completed its wheel, the other sections wheeling successively when opposite their proper places in the line to be formed, upon which they halt and dress upon the leading section already on the line. 4th. The battery being in line at a halt, or march- ing in line, may effect a change of front to a line making a greater or less angle with the former front, by means of a wheel in line, which is executed by the AETILLEEY FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 159 pivot-carriage moving at a walk while tlie others pro- ceed at a trot. It is likewise by wheels in line, fol- lowed by marcli in line, executed by each battery separately and in parallels, that in evolutions of sev- eral batteries combined, changes of front upon one flank are effected, the other flank being thrown for- ward or to the rear. The evolutions of several batteries, of which we have just spoken, present some analogy to the evolu- tions of the line of several battalions, taking into ac- count the essential differences of constitution which distinguish the artillery from the infantry. In the manoeuvres of artillery there are neither general nor particular guides; the direction of the column or of the line, in march, or while being formed, is intrusted to the chief of the piece upon which the formation is made. Since the adoption of the new materiel^ but one mode of wheeling is admitted in the movements of artillery, which is that of infantry on the side of the guide, and is always executed upon a moving pivot^ the pivot-piece describing an arc of a circle, to clear the ground where the movement begins. We must also remark that countermarches and ahouts of carriages are always made to the left, because the drivers ride on the near horses. 6. Positions. — ^The term hattery is used not only to designate the unit of force of artillery, but also any collection of several pieces upon any determined point of the field of battle. The choice of positions to be given to the batteries is not indifferent, for the 160 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. skill of tte gunner would be paralyzed by a bad location. An open ground, witli tlie flanks supported, and slightly overlooking the position occupied by the ene- my, offers an eligible site for a battery. The soil should be solid, but not stony ; for the smallest pro- jectiles of the enemy striking the stones would pro- duce flying fragments quite injurious to those serving the pieces. The position should also afford commo- dious and safe exits, not only for the offensive, but also for retreat — for which prudence requires that we should always be prepared. As much as possible, the artil- lery should be posted so as to see without heing seen^ by concealing it behind some obstacle, provided al- ways that this obstacle does not interfere with the certainty and facility of its firing, or with the con- venience of exit. The position having been determined upon, the direction of the line of fire of the pieces is to be fixed more or less obliquely with respect to the front of the enemy, so as to produce the greatest damage possible in his ranks by the angle under which the balls will reach them. Hence the different names given to bat- teries. Thus a direct iattery is one which strikes the front of the enemy perpendicularly, which is de- structive in proportion to the deptli of the opposing force ; an oblique lattery is that whose line of fire is oblique to the front of the enemy ; a reverse lattery is that which plays upon the rear of a body of troops already exposed to direct fire — a difficult position to take, but one which is exceedingly harassing to the ARTILLERY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 161 torce thus menaced ; an enfilading lattery^ tliat which fires on the flank in the direction of the prolongation of the enemy's line — a battery which light artillery can easily establish w^hen the enemy offer their flank and thus expose themselves to this most murderous fire, which not unfrequently occurs in manoeuvring; a cross lattery^ one whose pieces firing obliquely, cross their fire ; or, by extension, one which crosses its fire with another — a very destructive kind of battery, as it concentrates a large number of projectiles upon the same point. When speaking of the purpose for which artillery is destined, we subdivided field artillery into division- batteries and reserve-batteries. The former, also called artillery of the line, because it is permanently attached to the line, are active from the first to the last mo- ment of the combat; the latter, destined to sustain the feebler portions of the line, act but temporarily. Hence they have two very different kinds of position in battle. The division-batteries are placed (say 150 or 200 yards) in advance of the first line of troops, or behind the extreme flanks of the lines. The re- serve-batteries, in the mean time, keep out of reach of the enemy's fire, ready to throw themselves quickly upon any points that may be menaced, or to accom- pany an attacking force. In battle, moreover, care must be taken to post the caissons in a strong and well-sheltered place, as they are constantly needed, and their preservation is of the first importance. 11 CHAPTEE SEVENTH. HISTOKY OF ENGESTEEES. The history of the engineer arm, as constituted at the present day with a staff and troops, may be com- prised in a small compass, for it is not of ancient origin. In the sixteenth century, after the invention of bastioned fortifications, the Italian engineers, reputed the most skilful, were spread over all Europe ; Cath- erine de Medicis employed several in the French ser- vice. At the close of the civil war which marked the end of the dynasty of the Valois, Sully, having been made superintendent of fortifications, undertook to repair the French fortified places then in ruins, and to consolidate the engineers charged with these works, calling them ingenieurs ordinaires du roi (this about 1602). Until 1690, these engineers held their rank in the arms or staflfe of which they were a part. After that date, being charged with the coast defences as well as those of the interior of the kingdom, and placed under the immediate orders of the Minister of "War, HISTORY OF ENGINEERS 163 tliey formed- a wholly military corps, and served at the fortifications, or with armies in the field, according to circumstances. Under Louis XIV., a prince who delighted in the war of sieges, their corps was in- creased ; and from 55 officers in 1688, it grew to 600 in 1697 — a number which it has never since attained.* Under Louis XV., from 1755 to 1758, the corps of engineers was, for the time, united to the staff of the artillery. In the year 1758, when the two corps were again separated, the military engineers adopted a uniform, consisting of a blue coat faced with black velvet ; and from that time, the black velvet has re- mained the characteristic feature of the French engi- neer dress. In 1762, the number of engineers was fixed at 400, and has since varied but little, being sometimes greater and sometimes less. In 1776 this * Under the direction of Yaubau, the corps of French engineers ren- dered eminent services in the long wars of this period, and won in Europe such a preeminence, that everywhere its usages, its regulations, its traces or forms of fortifications, and its methods of attack, were fol- lowed and imitated. It was to reward the whole corps, in the person of its real chief, both by rank and merit, that the great king gave the baton of marshal toYauban. The science of the Attack and Defence of Places made prodigious ad- vances under this distinguished engineer, who invented parallels, tremcli- cataliers^ and ricochet-firing. The art of fortifying places felt the power of his skilful hand ; the demi-lune was enlarged, the bastion perfected, the redoubt of the demi-lune invented, the tenaille given a more advan- tageous form, water made useful in defence, and fortifications were ad- mirably conformed or adapted to the ground. • The great increase of armies made a resort to field fortifications indis- pensable ; immense lines were constructed, supported by rivers or the sea, to protect entire countries ; but the great extent of these lines ren- dered them weak, for it was impossible to guard them everywhere ; hence they were almost always forced, and consequently fell into discredit. — Tr. 164 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. corps received the official designation of Corj^s Royal du Genie. Soon after tlie employes charged with the care of buildings, fortifications, magazines, dams, etc., received the name of gardes du genie?' * Few changes took place in the French engineers until the Revolu- tion, when, in common with the other branches of the service, they lost many valuable officers by emigration, among them Bousmard, the author of an able work on fortifications. The number of officers was kept up to 310 in 1791, 450 in 1795, and 371 in 1802, by introduction of engineers from other corps — the ;ponU et chaussees, etc. During the reign of the great IiTapoleon, the officers of engineers, who had, in Germany, more the duty of staff officers than continually making a war of sieges, found in Spain the opportunity of devoting themselves an'ew to the art of attacking places. The engineer arm had a staff of nearly the same strength as in 1802, having at its head a first inspector-general of the arm, who was a grand officer of the Empire. In 1813, when France was constrained, after twenty years of a glo- rious offensive war, to defend the ancient frontiers of the monarchy, the staff of engineers, distributed in a great number of fortified places, which she still occupied in Europe, was found too small to satisfy the wants of the service. She was consequently obliged (without incorporating them in the corps du genie) to employ a large number of engineers of ponts et chaus- sees, and even surveyors. In the engineers, as in the artillery, the general officers present at Paris formed, under the orders of the first inspector-general, a consulting committee, called to give its advice upon the different branches of the service of the engineer arm : the influence of these committees was then less than it has been since. From 1840 to 1846, Louis Philippe, at an expense of 140,000,000 francs, caused to be constructed the fortifications of Paris, consisting of a continuous bastioned enceinte, or line, and a chain of detached forts, the perimiter of the whole of these stupendous works being nearly forty miles. They were designed to defend the capital, and modify the plan of attack against France. The entire works were skilfully constructed by the corps du genie, under the direction of Marshal Dode de la Brunerie. From the first to the second Empire, the number of engineers of the HISTOEY OF ENGINEERS. 165 As to the troops of engineers in France, the crea- tion of sa])])ers^ called for by Vauban, dates from 1671 ; tlie first company of miners was raised two years later. In 1695 there existed one company of sappers and tliree companies of miners. Vauban commanded the company of sappers. Mes- grigny, who died after seventy-two years of service ; Goulon, subsequently chief of the corps of military en- gineers of the Empire ; and Esprit, a brave officer, who fell at the siege of Barcelona in 1697, commanded the three companies of miners, which remained at first in- dependent, and were not all finally attached to the ar- tillery until 1705.* The sappers and miners, from their creation until the Revolution, constituted at one time a part of the artillery, at another a part of the engineers. Thus, from 1759 to 1761, when there existed six com- panies of miners, each consisting of 6 officers and 60 men, these companies were under the orders of the en- gineers. It was the Convention that really established the troops of engineers ; for, in 1793, it took the sap- pers and miners from the artillery, to assign them to the engineers. In the following year, the officers of en- gineers had under their orders twelve battalions of sap- pers, six companies of miners, and two companies of ae- ronauts {aer ostlers). The troops of engineers remained throughout the reign of ISTapoleon I, organized in bat- talions.f At the restoration they formed three regi- staff has steadily increased, until Napoleon III., in 1855, fixed them at 460, of which IGO were superior ofiicers, and 800 captains or lieutenants. — Tr. * Allent, Histoire du corps imperial du genie., 1st part, 1805, p. 368. t Of engineer troops in the French army there were, in 1812 : two bat- 166 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. ments. At present these troops also include two com- panies of workmen, and three companies of sapper- drivers; one of the latter companies is attached to each regiment."^ talions of miners ; five battalions of sappers; one battalion of Walcheren sappers, created in 1811 ; two battalions of Spanish sappers, created in 1811 ; two battalions of the engineer train ; and two companies of ar- tificers. The battalions of French sappers and miners had each nine companies, the other battalions four companies, and the battalions of the train seven companies, of which one remained in depot. The battalions of Spanish sappers were formed by Napoleon, w^ho utilized everything, of mechan- ics selected from the Spanish prisoners. These battalions wore a white uniform, the others sky-blue, to distinguish them from the national sap- perg, and served till 1814 with fidelity and bravery. The two companies of artificers were attached, one to the arsenal of engineers of Metz, and the other to the arsenal of engineers at Allessandria. — Tr. * In striking contrast with the ample numbers of officers and troops of engineers in the French service, is the meagre Corps of Engineers of the United States, now engaged in the most gigantic revolution on the page of history. It numbers but three companies of sappers, miners and pontoniers, and fifty officers, of which latter more than one half are unavailable as engineers in the field, being engaged in the construc- tion of one vast line of Atlantic, Pacific and Lake coast-defences, on duty at the Military Academy and Engineer Bureau, or serving with volun- teers as generals and colonels. Recently, as the Chief Engineer of the Department of the Mississippi, in which 150,000 men were in active campaign, I had not one regular engineer soldier, and but a single oflScer of the Corps of Engineers to assist in directing the varied operations of that service, extending over the States of Missouri, Kentucky and Ten- nessee, and parts of Arkansas, Mississippi and Alabama. — Tr, CHAPTER EIGHTH. rUHCTIONS OF THE ENGINEEES. I The engineers, on account of the important ser- vices they rendered in the great continental wars of the French Kepublic and Empire, and by the exten- sion given to their personnel, may be considered as a fourth arm. The general functions of this accessory arm are now exclusively military, and are fixed by the regulations of the French army as follows : 1st. All the works of permanent fortification ; that is, the construction and repairs of fortified places and military posts. 2d. The construction and repairs of all military edifices, such as infantry barracks, quarters for caval- ry, guard houses, cisterns, hospitals, workshops, bake- houses, magazines and stables. The artillery is still charged with the buildings destined for its special ser- vice : nevertheless, the engineers construct the powder magazines situated in the interior of works of fortifi cation, and when finished, turn them over to the artillery. 3d. The construction of field fortifications, which > 168 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS. the generals in chief or generals of division think proper to put up in the field, such as breastworks, trenches, redoubts, small forts, block-houses, lunettes, fleches, tetes-de-pont, intrenched lines and camps, and dykes. The engineers also construct ovens for baking bread in campaign. 4th. The construction, reestablishment and destruc- tion of roads, in campaign; the opening of certain thoroughfares : in a word, the various works which in war may facilitate the march of columns. 5th. The construction, in campaign, of raft-bridges, and bridges with fixed supports which can be impro- vised with the materials drawn from the country ; such as trestle-bridges, pile-bridges, bridges of trees, draw-bridges ; in short, the construction of bridges for which it is necessary to saw, hew, and frame wood. 6th. The various works required in the defence or attack of places, and the reconnoissances connected with these works. These functions appertain to them in times of peace as well as war. In peace, the engineers have their works executed by contract by workmen drawn from various localities : for their execution in time of war, they have under their orders military workmen,* organized and trained in advance — namely, the sap- pers and miners; and are also frequently aided by auxiliary laborers taken from the other arms, prin- cipally from the infantry. * The engineer soldiers are chiefly recruited from artificers of wood and iron, such as carpenters, joiners, wheelwrights, and blacksmiths; from masons and builders ; and from miners and quarry-men. FUNCTIOISrS OF THE ENGINEERS. 169 In campaign, tliere is attaclied to each division of infantry, one company of sappers, which, upon the war-footing, numbers from 120 to 150 men. In the engineer arm, then, the unit of force is a company, at- tended by a four-horse wagon and its drivers. This wagon carries spare tools, to replace those carried by the men, when these are worn out or damaged. Each sapper, besides his sword, which may be of some ser- vice to him in cutting and trimming light wood, is also kept supplied with one tool, as a paii; of his equipment — either a shovel, a pick, or an axe with a very short handle, which is KNAPSACK OF A SAPPER. placed in a sheath passing through the knapsack, as shown in the annexed cut. In a company of 120 sap- pers, there should be 40 picks, 40 shovels, 30 axes, and 10 bill-hooks. The companies of mi- ners carry special tools, useful in working mines. They usually march with the engineer tram accom- panying the army, which, with its heavy auxiliary ma- terials, travels in the rear, carrying sappers' and mi- ners' tools, cuirasses, helmets, sap-hooks and sap-forks, utensils for bridges, a pile-driver and its appurte- nances, t^YO or three travelling forges, and various ar- ticles of equipment and re-supply. The sappers and miners are drilled as foot soldiers 170 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. in all tlie manoeuvres of infantry * and in gymnastic practice. They form, in case of need, excellent infan- try for disputing a post and figMing in the midst of obstacles ; but, not to divert them from their special- ty, they are rarely employed as foot soldiers, and they usually brave death with their implements in hand, if the enemy falls upon them while they are engaged in opening a road, constructing a bridge, or erecting a field-work. We will close this chapter with a single observa- tion. In France the engineer corps is charged with the construction of those bridges only which require the use of tools for working wood ; other bridges, chiefly those which are constructed with suppo]*ts prepared in advance and transported with the army, such as bridges of boats or pontons, are intrusted to the artillery, which is the arm best supplied with conveyances. The case is different with the other great powers ; in Prussia, in Spain, and in the United States, the pontonniers are a part of the en- gineer corps ; in Austria and Eussia they form a sep- arate and distinct corps. Several French authors have expressed the opinion that it would be advantageous in France to annex the pontonniers to the engineer arm. * The engineer troops have retained the old equipment, and are armed with the musket of the voltigeurs. The total weight of the armament and equipment carried by a man amounts to about 45 pounds. PART SECOND. COMBINATION OF THE ARMS, CHAPTER FIRST. OEGANIZATION OF ACTIVE ARMIES. Tiius far we have considered the several arms separately, as they are constituted and instinicted in time of peace; but in war it is manifest that, in order to afford each other mutual support, they must be comhined^ and must operate under the orders of one and the same chief, who will direct their com- mon action in the way which promises the most certain victory. Let us, then, see how they are to be united under one head, or in what manner they are to be grouped to constitute an army. 1. Principles of Organization. — ^The unit of force of each of the three arms which fight in line — the bat- talion, the squadron, and the battery — may enter di- rectly into the composition of a brigade, and then there is no intermediate commander between the general of the brigade and the commandant of the battalion, the 172 COMBmATION OF THE AEMS. squadron or tlie battery. Witli reference exclusively to its application in war, tMs is evidently a practicable organization, and, in fact, it is tliat Avhich exists in the federal army of Switzerland. But in most countries, and especially in France, we have combined together, in order to centralize the administration and instruc- tion, and also to keep alive discipline, many units of force into regiments. In the same manner, in the or- ganization of active armies, brigades are composed of a certain number of regiments — two at least. Above the brigade comes the fraction of the army called a division^ which includes troops of the various arms, in the proportion required by circumstances; and usually consists of either two or three brigades, either of infantry or of cavalry. The division is to be regarded as the essential component fraction of an active army; and accord- ingly, the French regulations respecting .campaign service declare that, " The division is the funda- mental element in the constitution of every armyr A division, in fact, is a sufficiently large body to form a first separate command in which the generalship of the officer may be tested and his qualifications for a chief command may be proved ; it does not require an expensive staff ; and is, in short, the force best adapt- ed to the scale of promotion which it is desirable to preserve in the hierarchy of the general officers. Fre- quently, the combination of several divisions forms an army, commanded by a general-in-chief, without hav- ing larger permanent fractions ; and, in this case, the chief of the army transmits his orders directly to the ORGANIZATION OF ACTIVE ARMIES. 1Y3 generals of division. We ^ecj permanent fractions, for there may exist temporary ones, under tlie names wing^ centre^ reserve; thus, supposing an army to be composed of eight divisions, it may be drawn up upon a line con- taining six divisions (two in the centre, and two on each wing), with a reserve of two divisions ; and then each of the wings, as also the centre or the reserve, will form a fraction larger than a division. These temporary fractions depend upon the general-in-chief, who can vary their amount according to the number of troops at his disposition ; and for this reason their command, equally temporary and variable, is assigned at his discretion. The case is different with corps (Tarmee, These are permanent fractions, established in the organization of an army, commanded by generals appointed by the sovereign at the same time with the general-in- chief. As a general rule, it is more advantageous to compose the army solely of divisions ; but, in certain cases, we should resort to the organization in corps d'armee ; for example, 1 st, when the force of the army is so great that, in marching in a single column, there would be an interval of several miles between the front and rear ; 2d, when the resources of the country, which is the scene of warfare, are not sufficient to maintain the army in a single body ; 3d, when cir- cumstances render it necessary to make a diversion, to succor an ally, or to operate eccentrically ; in a word, to act separately, although in the same theatre of operations. Thus we perceive that an army may contain the 174 COMBINATION OF THE AEMS. following fractions, taken in tlie order of their import- ance : tlie corps d'armee^ tlie wings, the centre, tlie re- serve, the divisions and the brigades. There are, also the parks and accessories. Let us stop for a moment to consider each of these fractions. A corps Warmee is required to act independently ; it must therefore be selfsustaining, at least for a certain time. It is to be constituted in a manner to give it a maximum of force ; that is, in its formation it should embrace all the arms, each proportioned to the nature of the theatre of war, and the kind of enemy to be met. Corps d'armee composed of a single arm are an exception. Nevertheless, under the Em- pire, corps d'armee existed composed entirely of cav- alry. These did not conform to the condition of maxi- mum of force, but they were able to retire or to iight according to circumstances : and when they fought, they possessed the advantage of a large mass, well suited to overwhelm the enemy at the close of an action ; and this is the reason why Napoleon often employed them : but he finally discovered that beyond twenty- four squadrons, a body of cavalry loses the qualities which constitute the chief excellence of that arm, namely, the power of command, opportuneness of movement, celerity, and precision in execution.* Let us return to the ordinary corps d'armee^ which are principally composed of infantry, with some cavalry and a little artillery. The force of each corps should be at least two divisions; but two divisions are ill * Pr^veil, Commentaires du projet cVordonnance sur le service en cam- pagne, p. 14. ORGANIZATION OF ACTIVE ARMIES. 175 adapted to tactical formations, and tliree divisions give an order of battle upon a single line ; hence four divi- sions will be tlie most suitable number. For, witli this number, a corps may be drawn up in order of battle witli a centre, two wings, and a reserve, eacli of these fractions being determinate and complete, under the orders of a chief, with whom it is already acquainted ; and, thus formed, the corps d^armee will maintain a stout resistance, in conformity with the rules of tactics. Moreover, four divisions are well suited to the formation in checker-form. Beyond four divisions OKDER OF BATTLE OF A CORPS D'ARM^E. 3d div. 2d div. 1st div. I I I I I I Left wing Centre Eight wing 4th div. I I Eeserve. the command becomes too unwieldy, and many details escape the notice of the chief. Under the Empire the C(y)ps (Parmee were rarely formed of a greater number. As to the division, if it be composed of three bri- gades, it will have an independent reserve not taken OEDEE OF BATTLE OF A DIVISION. 2d brigade 1st brigade 1 I I 3d brigade. I Eeserve. out of its line of battle, and its tactical formation will remain complete ; and this composition, therefore, 176 COMBINATION OF THE AEMS. should be adopted whenever it is called upon to act separately, or when the army does not contain any corps d)armee. Some authors have proposed to con- stitute the divisions unequally, in order to deceive the enemy as to the force of the army, making it necessary for them to observe each division individually, in or- der to judge of the force ; but this trifling ruse goes a very little way, and it is, moreover, wiser to realize it by withdrawing some troops out of line and success- ively annexing them to one or another of the divisions. If the army is divided into corps dJarmee^ a centre or a wing will contain one or more of these corps ; and one or more divisions, if the army is subdivided only into divisions. The reserve will also embrace one or more corps d'armee^ or one or more divisions, according to circumstances. In order that it may not be a delusive support, by being too feeble, nor ex- haust the army by being too numerous, it is now uni- versally agreed to form it at least of one fifth or at most of one third of the whole army. The reserve plays a most important part : placed out of reach of the enemy's artillery, it remains fresh until the mo- ment, when the general-in-chief thinks proper to bring it into action to strike a decisive blow ; and history proves that victory usually declares for those who succeed in being the last to bring their reserve into play. Nevertheless, it must not be inferred that it is best to keep them indefinitely intact ; for, if the opportune moment for their employment is allowed to pass,* they often prove useless. Besides the offensive * Marshal Marmont observes that Napoleon brought up his reserve OKGANIZATION OF ACTIVE ARMIES. 177 part they may take in deciding a victory, tlie reserves also have a defensive part to perform, in protecting the flanks and rear of the army, and serving as a ral- lying point, behind which the beaten troops may re- form, either for the purpose of making a second at- tack, or of retiring in good order. The reserves will embrace the heavy cavalry and the pieces of large caliber. If composed of infantry, they should be the most veteran troops ; for the effect of a last argument cannot be too certain. Napoleon usually employed a corps d^armee as a reserve ; he also had for this pur- pose the Imperial Guard and the Oudinot grenadiers. The practice of taking away the companies of grena- diers and voltigeurs from the regiments of infantry, to form them into battalions of select soldiers, is objec- tionable, as it enervates these regiments, by taking away their best soldiers ; and on this point the ordi- nance upon campaign service directs that : " The select companies be not drawn away from their regi- ments, except during the time when the latter are not in line, and then only for operations of brief duration." Notwithstanding this prohibition, it is probable that, in the case of a continental war, France would be obliged to return to the use of battalions of grenadiers, though the Imperial Guard has again been reestablished in her army ; because solid re- serves are imperatively necessary in the field. too late at Moscow and at Waterloo, thus violating his own favorite maxim : " Those who keep their troops fresh for the day after a battle, are almost always beaten." {Esprit des institutions militaires^ p. 29, et Memoires^ t. viii. p. 143.) 12 178 COMBmATION OP THE ARMS. According to tlie regulations, brigades are formed of at least two regiments ; there appears to be no rea- son for forming tliem of more tlian three regiments. Besides brigades composed of a single arm, either in- fantry or cavalry, the regulations permit the formation of mixed brigades, of infantry and light cavalry, more specially destined for the service of advanced-guards. There are various appendages belonging to and following armies ; such as the parks of artillery, bridge trains, engineer-parks, ambulances, and wagons for the transportation of hospital stores, provisions, clothing, &c., the latter belonging to the service or drawn from the country by requisition. An army is also accom- panied by a special reserve of heavy cavalry ; but a Gorj^'S d'armee does not have this great accessory. For its supply, the army also possesses large and small depots. The former are established at places so far from the scene of active operations as not to be subject to frequent removal ; the latter exist with the army itself, and embrace, as far as possible, the establishments for convalescents and the hospitals, and occupy posi- tions where they may serve as halting places and points of reunion for the detachments rejoining the army ; so that any disposable men may be added to these detachments, and those may be taken out of them who have become disabled for continued service. 2. Commands. — The command of an army or of a Gooys Warmee in the French service, devolves either upon a marshal or a general of division, who re- ceives from the Emperor a temporary commission as OEGANIZATION OF ACTIVE AEMIES. 179 commandant-in-cJiief in the first case, or commandant of (a particular) coiys d'^armee in the latter. The chief of the army designates the commandant of each wing, of the centre, and of the reserve, whose functions, being temporary, and conferring but transitoiy hon- ors, should be confined to the direction of the troops in their movements and upon the field of battle. This temporary command is given to a general of division, the principal tactical fraction* being, however, re- served to the commandant-in-chief Every division is commanded by a general of division ; every brigade by a general of brigade. Usually, the distribution of the general officers is made by the Minister of War at the time of the composition of the army. In the field, where many commands become vacant, it would often produce too great delay to wait for the orders of the Minister to provide for them ; and it would be impru- dent to fill them by appointments according to senior- ity, as was still done in the time of Louis XIV., until the ordinance of February 1, l'r03,f notwithstanding the example of Turenne and Catinat, who, as generals- in-chief, understood the necessity of breaking through the custom. Hence the fifth article of the ordinance of * "We may distinguish the fractions of an army as tactical fractions and. fractions of organization. Each wing, as well as the centre, is a tac- tical fraction ; each corps cVarmee, each division, each hrigade, is a frac- tion of organization ; the reserve is at once a tactical fraction and a frac- tion of organization. t By this ordinance, Louis XIV. " wills and requires that the general of each army shall choose from among the lieutenant-generals therein serving, those whom he may judge ft for the command of the two wings of cavalry, and those who should command the corps of infantry." 180 COMBINATION OF THE ARMS. May 3, 1832, in relation to service in the field, author- izes the commandant-in-chief of the army to effect, during the course of the campaign^ the changes which losses or the good of the service render necessary. The functions of the commandant-in-chief are facil- itated by the existence of the various fractions of the army, since he communicates only with the generals who command those fractions ; and consequently has more time and greater latitude for combining his plan of operations. Nevertheless, he would not be equal to the multiplied exigencies and responsibilities of his command (at the present day esj)ecially, when a general-in-chief is overburdened with written papers by the somewhat excessive complications of admin- istrative practices), unless he were assisted by a chief of staff, an intendant, a general commanding the artillery, and a general commanding the engineers. The chief of staff "^^ of an army is either a general of division or a general of brigade. He is assisted by a general of brigade or a colonel of the staff, called sub-chief of staff. In a corps Warmee^ unless its im- portance requires it, there will be no sub-chief of staff. Officers of the staff corps, of various grades, serve as aids to the chief of staff, whose functions, in the French army, are defined by the eighth article of the ordi- nance of May 3, 1832, to be as follows : " 1st. To transmit the orders of the general, and to execute those he receives himself for detached duties, such as the establishment of camps, recon- * If several armies be combined to form one grand armj, the chief of staff temporarily takes the title of major general in France. OKGAJ^IZATION OF ACTIVE AKMIES. 181 noissances, inspections of posts and all other parts of tlie service. " 2d. To correspond with tlie commandants of ar- tillery and engineers, and with the intendants * in order to keep the general correctly informed of the condition of the various branches of the service. " 3d. To maintain constant correspondence with the different corps, and to have a thorough knowledge of their condition in detail. " 4th. To furnish to the commandant-in-chief and to the Minister of War tabular statements of the strength and position of corps and posts, reports of marches and other operations; in a word, all neces- sary information." There is attached to each army and to each corps cVarrnee a military intendant, who has under his orders sub-intendants or deputies, employes of the various administrative services, and troops belonging to the administrative corps. The military intendant makes reports to the commandant-in-chief or to his chief of staff; he centralizes all the details of administration and accounts of the army, and also those of the corps and detachments composing it, except in what relates to the materiel of the artillery and engineers. In each army, and in each corps cVarmeej a general officer commands the artillery, and another general offi- cer commands the engineers. Each has under his or- ders a certain number of officers of his arm, among others a colonel or lieutenant-colonel, chief of staff of * Tlie military intendance of the French army embraces the quarter- master's, subsistence, medical, clothing, and pay departments. — Tr. 182 COMBINATION OF THE ARMS. the arm, and a superior officer as director of the park, together with the number of guards and employes, indicated by the wants of the service. He centralizes all the details relating to the personnel and the mate- riel of his arm. The system which exists in each army and in each corps d'armeej is reproduced, for the same reason, in each division. To assist him in his command, and to leave him more libei'ty with respect to military opera- tions, the general of division has near his person a colonel of etat-majo7\ who is chief of staff of the divi- sion, an officer of artillery, an officer of engineers, and a military sub-intendant. The officers of artillery and eno-ineers attached to a division receive the orders of the general with whom they are employed, either di- rectly or through the chief of staff of the division. They should communicate to that general the orders they may receive respecting their specialty from the general or superior officers of their particular arm. We will add that" all the general officers attached to an active army, or to a corps d'armee of any kind, have, in addition, a certain number of aides- de-camp and orderly officers, proportioned to their grade. Among the officers attached to the general head- quarters — that is to say, the quarters occupied by the commandant-in-chief — -we should mention three in particular : 1st. The Commandant of the general head- quarters. This is a superior officer of the staff, charged with establishing the quarters, placing the posts and guards, and, in conjunction with the gendarmery, I ORGANIZATIONS' OF ACTIVE AEMIES. 183 preserving order at headquarters. 2d. The Pro- vost-marshalrgeneral. This title is given to the com- mandant of the brigades of gensdarmes attached to the army. His province is to protect the inhabitants of the country from pillage and violence ; to maintain good police; to institute proceedings against those suspected of crimes or misdemeanors committed with- in the precincts of the army, or of C07j:)s d'armee ; to pursue and arrest the offenders ; to watch all the non-military persons or camp followers ; * to follow the columns on a march and bring up the stragglers. He reports daily to the commandant-in- chief and receives his orders ; and every week makes a report of his service to the chief of staff. Besides these duties, which are assigned to him by arjny regulations, the provost-marshal-general (also the pro- vost of each division), since the promulgation of the Code de justice militaire^ exercises jurisdiction over the territory occupied by the army (or the division), and assisted by a clerk (a non-commissioned officer or corporal of his arm), decides of himself in all penal cases involving a penalty of not more than six months' imprisonment, or a fine of not more than 200 francs ; and in all cases of claims for damages which do not exceed 150 francs.f 3d. The Wagon-master of the general headquarters, a superior officer charged with the direction of the equipages following the army, and * The provosts can inflict a fine to the amount of 100 francs. (Service en camjmgne^ art. 175.) t Code de justice militaire pour Varmee de terre, du 9 juin 1857, art. 52, 75. 184 COJVIBINATION OF THE ARMS. the preservation of order among tlie wagons and do- mestics of tlie staff. There are also connected witli each division a commandant of headquarters, a provost, and a wagon- master — officers of a grade inferior to that of the offi- cers who hold similar positions in the general head- quarters. 3. standing Armies. — ^In Ranee, active armies are formed only in case of war, or, as exceptions, upon certain points of the national domain, when the security of the interior is in danger. This pol- icy, which is also that of Austria, leaves the enemy uncertain as to the mode of organization which is to be finally adopted in the armies formed to oppose him ; and, besides, reserves the power of varying this mode, according to the nature of the war to be un- dertaken. Eussia and Prussia have adopted a different policy, and, both in peace and in war, keep their troops con- stantly formed, in co?ys d'^armee, divisions, and bri- gades. Thus the Prussian army, besides the Koyal Guards, and the brigades garrisoning Mayence and Luxemburg (fortified places of the Germanic Con- federation), consists of eight permanent corps dJarmee^ each embracing two divisions of infantry, two brigades of cavalry, one regiment of artillery, and one battalion of engineers. Under this system, the troops complete their education better, especially with respect to com- bined mancBUvres, become accustomed to the generals who command them, and are eminently qualified to ORGANIZATION OF ACTIVE ARMIES. 185 act promptly or to repel an invasion ; but they remain a long time in the same garrisons, and this is a posi- tive disadvantage, on account of the habits which the soldiers may there acquire. The troops who fre- quently travel, as they do in France, and are therefore not accustomed to any fixed garrisons, are, in conse- (j[uence, more easily mobilized. CHAPTER SECOND. MARCHES. The army being organized, it is next to be trans- ported from the place of its formation to a point more favorable for its action. This requires a march of a greater or less number of days. 1. Marches of Concentration. — ^The march will be of easy and simple execution when it takes place far from the enemy, and is thus performed as a mardi of concentration. The army is then put in motion by small fractions, and moves upon several parallel routes. Each fraction will march in open lines on each side of the road to leave a free circulation ; will make a grand halt at about the middle of the march ; will travel from six to ten leagues per day, and will observe the most perfect discipline in any town where it may be lodged for the night or receive its daily supplies. All marches should be performed by day ; for a night march, especially from midnight to four o'clock in the morning, gains nothing that is not more than lost by the relatively greater fatigue suffered by the I I MARCHES. 187 soldiers. The soldier needs at least six liours of sleep : to assert the contrary is to utter nonsense. A march should be conducted slowly, in order to save the strength of the troops. Assuming that there is sufficient time, one hour at least should be allowed for a league, including the short halt necessary after each league, and an additional half to three quarters of an hour should bfe allowed for the principal halt. Slowness, and especially uniformity of gait, are equally important for cavalry. When far from the enemy, this arm need not govern its rate of motion by that of the infantry. 2. Marches of IWaiaceiivre. — If the march takes place in presence of the enemy, it assumes the char- acter of a march of manoeuvre^ and requires addi- tional precautions. Its disposition should be based upon the principle of being always in a condition to check and to repel an attack. With this object, in- stead of proceeding in fractions distributed on each side of a road, the army will still march upon several routes,* but grouped on each route in column of one section at least, or one division at most. Each column should be sufficiently strong in front to resist, and should at the same time be so short that the front and rear can support each other. While beyond the circle of activity of the enemy, the column may ad- vance at full distance,f but within this circle, or, so * 111 order to subsist more easily bj requisitions, and also to keep the enemy in uncertainty. t It is assumed that the column then occupies the same space as in order of battle. 188 COMBII^ATION OF THE ARMS. to speak, under tlie cannon of the enemy, and pre- paring for combat,* it will gain ground in more com- pact order. In a mixed column, tlie infantry, accompanied by its artillery, march at the head ; and the cavalry always in the rear. A different arrangement would compromise the whole column in the case of a strong attack on the front, as was proved in the case of the central column of the French forces at the battle of the Trebbia (June 19, 1799). The number of columns will often vary, according to the kind of troops, the nature of the ground, and the end to be attained. Their distance will be calcu- lated so as to permit easy communication between them, and also of their reunion ; and for this purpose, the chief of one column should know the effective force and the direction of the other columns.f Notwithstanding this multiplicity of columns they should not habitually reckon upon mutual protec- tion, which their distance and their specific object may prevent ; and, besides, prudence dictates that each should rely upon itself for this protection. In this view, we employ the ancient and well known sys- tem, the result of experience, of detaching a small portion of the moving force in advance, in rear and upon the flanks of the column, so as to surround it with almost a continuous chain, as mobile as the column itself, and destined to parry the first blows. * The place of combat is usually reached first hj the head of the column. t Service en camj^agne^ art. 120. MAKCHES. 189 This covering portion is in preference chosen from the light troops ; it embraces an advance-guard^ a rear gitard^ and flanhers. The advance-guard precedes the column. It is of mixed composition, but variable, according to the dif- ficulties of the road and the proximity of the enemy ; it scours the country and watches for any attempted attack, whether open or covert, baffles it or restrains it, and, in all cases, gains time for the column to dis- pose itself for combat. For this purpose the advance- guard also protects itself by an advance-guard or some scouts. It should also open the road or make it prac- ticable, and for this reason a company of sappers often accompanies it. At branch roads, it will be careful to indicate the direction taken by landmarks, in order to avoid all mistakes and to point out the road to be- lated soldiers and vehicles. In the daytime this is effected by blazing trees or tying bundles of straw to posts along the proper road ; but at night, by station- ing non-commissioned officers, who are successively relieved. The commandant of an advance-guard should pos- sess all the qualities required of a chief of detach- ment. It is his duty to avail himself of all the aux- iliary expedients employed in reconnoissances, espe- cially to draw information from the guides, from the inhabitants, and from prisoners ; and also to cause prompt reconnoissances to be made by the officers under his orders. He turns all villages, woods, or defiles, through which it might be dangerous to pass ; levies contributions upon the villages to keep his troops 190 COMBmATION OF THE AEMS. constantly supplied with subsistence for two or three days ; makes his grand halt in a covered place, sur- rounding it with sentinels posted upon the eminences or on the roads ; and is careful during his march not to betray his approach by the noise of trumpet or drum. The advance-guard will vary in force from one fifth to one tenth of the column. Its distance from the column will be at least equal to the length of the column, so that, even in the most unfavorable case, that is, when the advance-guard is driven back, and does not succeed in retarding the approach of the ene- my, the rear of the column may yet have time to re- join the front, and also to come into line. The rear-guard closes the march, and is smaller than the advance-guard. Its province is to arrest any adverse detachment, or any suspected individual, prowling in the rear of the column. It frequently protects itself also by an extreme rear-guard. In a forward march, it escorts the baggage, which is always separated from the body of the troops, and brings up the stragglers. In a retreat, it performs the principal and most glorious part : in that case, relieved of the baggage, which then goes on the side farthest from pursuit, it avails itself of the resources of petty w^ar- fare, and of the obstacles of the ground, to paralyze the forces of the pursuer. The chief of the rear- guard should possess high qualifications : perhaps he does not need to be as fertile in invention as the chief of the advance-guard, but he certainly requires more energy and coolness. jN'ey, in the retreat from Eussia, immortalized himself as the chief of the rear-guard. I MAECHES. 191 The flankers^' marcli parallel to the column, upon each of its flanks. They scatter themselves in groups of three^ at 400 or 500 paces from the road, and recon- noitre, while protecting themselves behind the inequal- ities of the ground, but also exploring every recess and every obstacle. To give warning, they despatch one of their number, and never have recourse to discharg- ing their guns, except in the case of a surprise. We are now acquainted with the order of march of a separate column : let us return to an assemblage of columns — an army. This assemblage will be preceded by a general ad- vance-guard, relatively to all the columns ; each of these still requires its special advance-guard. There will also be a general rear-guard. We may deceive the enemy as to the general di- rection about to be adopted by an army (or by a column), by ordering the preparation of provisions as if for a movement in another direction. This ruse, to which every one may resort, is always effective. The chief of a column thrown forward for a spe- cial purpose in advance of an army, even beyond the general advance-guard, will scatter along his route small posts of cavalry, for the purpose of conveying his messages promptly ; and when he despatches an officer upon a mission to the general-in-chief, he should also send after him two others, at intervals of a half hour from each other, as the first might lose his way.f * Do not confound these flankers with tlie skirmishers, which the advance and rear-guards detach for their own security, t Letter of Napoleon to Marmont, July 11, 1809. 192 COMBLN^ATIOIS" OF THE AKMS. MAECH OP MAN(EU7EE BY THE FEONT. £ Adyance-guard. ■ 7 E ear-guard. d Marches of manoeuvre of an army are executed either by the front or by the flank. In the first case, the columns remain grouped to- gether, adopt a close formation, and follow parallel routes, in such a man- ner as not to occupy much more space on the front of the marcW than the ex- tent of the front of the army in order of battle; for an attack then presents few dangers, even when it comes from the side. In fact, if this combi- nation of ^^ columns, instead of continuing its march in the direction ah^ is suddenly obliged to take the per- pendicular direction istribiitioii of the Ontposts. — The proper dis- tance to leave between the most advanced outpost and the camp or cantonment, may be fixed at about three quarters of a league, as an average estimate ; let us say 3,500 yards.* The distance of the small posts from the grand guards, and from the line of sen- tinels or vedettes, will be from 400 to 500 yards each, which, if we take the higher number, gives a distance of 1,000 yards between the extreme line of sentinels or vedettes, and the line of the grand guards. The enemy will thus have at least 1,000 yards to pass over after they have been signalled, before they can reach the grand guards. Supposing the ground perfectly free from all obstacles, it will take them about three min- utes to traverse this space, and this wdll give time enough to the grand guards to bridle and mount their horses, and to advance to the succor of their small posts. With these distances, therefore, the army will be sufficiently covered ; and yet they are not so great as to prevent the parties at the different posts seeing each other distinctly, which considerations have led to their adoption. According to these distances, the network of outposts upon level ground forms the following figure. Upon more uneven ground, the figure would * Lallemaiid, Traite des operations secondaires, t. i., p. 2. OUTPOSTS. 229 become more irregular, and the various lines would SYSTEM OF OUTPOSTS. I Advanced post of police guard. %- X— Bivouac of a Begiment. AAA A AAAA AAA A A AAA A AAA AAA A arms. .• :^- X— ..O O O O O O O O o o o o o. ..o o o o o_ .0 0- Soldiera' .0 o o o o o o Jires. Officers' . O O jiygg^ .o Staff fires Police — " " guard. 230 MINOR OPERATIONS. become more curved, the general proportions, how- ever, remaining the same. It must not be forgotten that these distances cor- respond to the positions assumed during the day. At night, it will often be prudent to contract the whole system of outposts, and especially to bring the line of sentinels or vedettes nearer. 5. Posts of Support. — Sometimes posts of support are established between the grand guards and the front of the camp or bivouac, for the purpose of re- sisting for some time an enemy who may succeed in passing the first lines of the outposts, and thus give the army time to take up arms. These posts are furnished with cannon, and composed chiefly of in- fantry, taken from the camp and not from the grand guards, for the latter should attend only to the ground in their front. These posts of support, therefore, form a fourth line of outposts, nearest to the army. They are to be placed at the outlets of valleys and woods, and the approaches of bridges and defiles, which the grand guards may have to pass in their retreat. 6. Patrols, I.ook-oiits, Rounds. — ^The service of outposts being one which requires to be thoroughly performed, it should be subject to an active and se- vere surveillance. The brigadier-general and superior ofiicer of each regiment supervise the grand guards ; the commandant of each grand guard supervises his small posts and sentinels, or vedettes, by means of I OUTPOSTS. 231 patrols and rounds, tlie number of which, and their circuits, he fixes according to circumstances. A round is the general name given to a circuit made either by a commissioned or a non-commissioned officer, attended by two or three men, for the purpose of inspecting the small posts and sentinels, and keep- ing them upon the alert. Patrols may be defined as small detachments of infantry or cavalry, taken from a post, to perambulate its vicinity and to watch over its safety. Sometimes the patrols go beyond the ex- terior cordon of outposts, to have a better look-out upon the doings of the enemy, and then receive the designation of loohouts. The latter must not be too numerous, for the sentinels, seeing them frequently coming in, would become negligent ; but when there is occasion to employ them, notice is to be given to the sentmels near whom they must pass in coming in, lest they be taken for parties of the enemy. The neglect of this precaution was the occasion, near Placentia, in 1796, of a fatal mistake, whereby the French general, Laharpe, was killed by his own soldiers. We may also distinguish the patrol from the look-outs, by say- ing that the former is defensive and the latter offensive. The defensive patrol evidently embraces the rounds. Arrangement of a defensive patrol, — It is composed of from three to eight men, commanded by a corporal — a small force, which can readily escape in case of need. These move not in straight lines, but in zig-zag courses, in order to embrace more ground. During the day they should preserve a distance from each other of 150 yards, which, at night, will be reduced to 20 or 30 yards. 232 MEN^OR OPERATIONS. If the patrol consists of only three men (fig. 1), they will be placed on a straight line. If there are four men (^g. 2), they will form a loz- enge, one point in advance, the corporal at the oppo- site point. If there are ^ve men (fig. 3), they will still form a lozenge, and the corporal will occupy the centre. DEFENSIVE PATKOLS. A ••. • •. / s • Fig. 1. < * V c Fig. 2. Fig. 3. C / Fig. 4 A .....m ""\ / \ .• 9,^ I \ P •^ e \ P • • • • / 'v. \ • fi ""■■■■/ Fig. 5. V Fig. 6. Y Fig. 7. If there are six men (fig. 4), the corporal remains at the centre, but the lozenge will be truncated, by putting two men in advance, the figure thus becoming an irregular pentagon. If there are seven men (fig. 5), we have the same arrangement, only the corporal will have one man by his side. If there are eight men (figs. 6 and 'T), either the same arrangement, putting two men with the corpo- ral ; or else the patrol will form a lozenge, with three men in each side. Arrangement of an off ensive patrol. — ^These patrols OUTPOSTS. 233 are usually composed of cavalry, and tlieir force varies from ten to thirty men. Like the defensive patrols, they should never remain in too compact mass, so as not to be liable to being captured at once ; but they OFFENSIVE PATEOLS. (Patrol of 15 horses.) t Advance-guard. o i CMef o Flanker, o Flan o o o o (Patrol of 30 horses.) X Bead of the advance-guard. ° ^ ^ Advance-guard. near-guard. Flankers, o o oQiief o o o o o o o o o o o o o Flankers. o Bear-guard. 234 MmOR OPERATIONS. should spread out as mucli as their force and the localities will allow. The foregoing diagram exhibits the mode of forma- tion according to general La Roche-Aymon. In each formation two men are placed at the head and rear, in order that if one has something to com- municate to the chief of the patrol, the otheii^may keep his post without taking his eyes from the object which has seemed worthy of an immediate report. During night patrols, the chief of a patrol may need to know the hour, but he should not light a lan- tern, which would reveal his position to the enemy. Frederic recommended, in this case, that the officer should light a piece of tinder under his cloak, which, being passed over the watch face, would give light enough to show the hands.^ In concluding this chapter, we will recommend to our readers to refer to article VIII. of the Ordonnance sur le service en cam])agne^ which contains circumstan- tial details, indispensable to be known, respecting out- posts, the study of which will involve no difficulties after what we have above given. * Instruction secrete, chap. iii. [In these days of friction matches, a simpler expedient will suggest itself to every reader.— 2V.] CHAPTER SECOND. DETACHMENTS.* 1. General Observations. — Outposts may be re- garded as purely defensive detachments, Tlie detach- ments which are the subject of the present chapter, may, in contradistinction to outposts, be called offen- sive detacliments. Their object is to occupy a post of observation, or to capture such a post ; to protect or to attack a con- voy, a foraging party, a reconnoissance, or cantonment ; to levy contributions in the neighboring localities, either in kind or in money ; to destroy a magazine, to make a diversion, to harass a marching column by repeated skirmishes, to lay ambuscades, to cut the communications of the enemy, to make prisoners, to take hostages, or to throw a supply of men and muni- tions into a besieged town. In the composition of a detachment, we must have regard : 1st, to the object and the duration of its ser- vice ; and 2d, to the nature of the country and to the * Upon detachments, consult art. ix. of the Ordonnance sur le service des armees en campagne, of May 3, 1832. 236 MINOR OPEEATIONS. disposition of its inliabitaiits. According to tlie nature of these various data, tlie detachment will be composed either of infantry alone, or of cavalry alone, or of a combination of both. Infantry and cavalry are usually to be detached only in the regularly constituted frac- tions of a regiment, such as the battalion, squadron, company, platoon, or section, as this method facili- tates its administration, and is more conducive to dis- cipline. The artillery and the engineers do not enter into the composition of detachments except by acci- dent. In the following pages we will distinguish be- tween detachments of infantry^ detacliments of cavalry^ and mixed detacliments. By the French army regulations, the commandant of a detachment has the same authority over the troops placed under his orders as a chief of a corps. He is responsible for the safety of his force, and, up to a cer- tain pointy for the result of the combats in which he engages. Upon his return, he makes a report to the officer who detached him, in relation to his proceed- ings, in conformity with his instructions and their re- sults ; and also a report to each of the chiefs of the corps which furnished soldiers for his detachment, in relation to the police, discipline, and administration of the forces. The officer selected for the command of a detach- ment should be firm, prudent, and experienced ; he * This qualified language of the regulations was necessary; for a chief of a detachment may sometimes be beaten without having omitted any duty. "We should also not forget the saying of Turenne ; " Quand un homme n'a pas fait de fautes a la guerre, il ne I'a pas faite longtemps." I DETACHMENTS. 2 3 7 should know how to observe, and also how to relate what he observes in exact terms, without drawing upon his imagination ; he should also be able to speak the language of the country, and be accustomed to estimate distances. He must supply himself with a telescope and accurate charts. He will employ good guides, and will derive from them all possible information respect- ing the distances and the nature of the roads over which he must pass. Before starting, he will make himself thoroughly acquainted with the precise pur- port of his mission, and will ask for any necessary ex- planations from the chief who sends him ; after start- ing, he will execute his instructions to the letter. Some important but unforeseen circumstance may, however, compel him to depart from them in part ; in this case he should conform to their spirit, and con- duct himself with reference to the general interests of the service ; but, to justify this, there must exist real impossibility. Should he extricate himself skilfully from such a position, he will prove his capacity for war, and earn a title to be selected for diflScult com- mands.* Before setting out, he will assemble his detach- ment, carefully pass it in review, and assure himself that it is provided with everything necessary, pro- visions, munitions, stores, etc. He will inspect the arms, equipment, and clothing. In the infantry, he will direct his attention to the shoes and the knap- sacks ; in the cavalry he will inspect the packing, and see that the horses' shoes are in good condition. * Jacquinot de Presles, p. 390. 238 MINOR OPERATIONS. A detachment, wlien marching, is always in a state of feebleness, since the column is lengthened, and the order of march is not suitable for combat, especially when the distances have been lost. Hence it is indispensable that it should have time to form itself in case of a sudden attack ; and on this account it is preceded by a small body, called the advance- guard^ which explores the country and gives notice of the approach of the enemy. For similar purposes, a small body is placed in rear of the detachment, called the rear-guavd. Thus a detachment marches between an advance-guard and rear-guard. But it is not suffi- cient to be guarded in front and rear ; a hostile body might debouch perpendicularly to the route, and fall upon the flank or the centre of the column, and the advance and rear-guards would not be able to oppose them. This danger is guarded against by throwing out skirmishers or flankers on the right and left, upon the flanks of the detachment, whose duty it is to scour the surrounding country and to examine all the by- ways, going across the fields, if necessary, marching in various directions, watching for unusual sounds, and inspecting every suspicious object ; without, how- ever, separating too far from the main body, as they would be liable to be cut ofi*. No fixed rules can be given for all detachments as to the force of the ad- vance and rear-guards, and the number of flankers : it is evident, however, that their importance increases with the effective force of the detachment and the complications of the ground. Some authors consider DETACHMENTS. 239 one fourth tlie force of a detaclimeiit as the proper jDroportion for the advance-guard."^"* The commandant of a detachment will usually re- main at the head of its principal portion. Sometimes he will stop to see the whole force defile before him, and take that occasion of correcting the order of march. He will frequently go forward to the ad- vance-guard to give his instructions, and to reconnoitre the country in front ; or, if he has a staff officer under his orders, he may send him upon this reconnoissance, as the special qualifications of such an officer will ena- ble him to gain speedy and exact intelligence. It is important for the chief of a detachment to know the cardinal points at night, and if he has no compass, he will regulate his course by the stars, chiefly by the jpole stai\ which is very nearly at the north pole of the heavens. This recommendation is especially ap- plicable to the war in Algeria, where, on account of the uncertainty of the Arabic roads southward, it is important that every soldier should be acquainted with this star, which will be of great use to him, in case he loses his way. "A chief of a detachment," says Jacquinot de Presles,f " should often suppose himself on the point of being attacked, and ask himself wliat course lie would take if the enemy were suddenly to qp^ear ; if * The details of this paragraph have been substantially given in Part Second, chapter ii., in speaking of columns on the march ; but thej are so important that their repetition in connection with detachments will not be thought useless. t Cours d'art militairc, p. 404. 240 MIIfOR OPERATIOJS-S. the answer embarrasses him, if a course at once pru- dent and honorable does not occur to Ms mind, lie is not yet a good officer^ and his detachment is very much exposed ; for it is probable that he will lose his pres- ence of mind if he be attacked." Moreover, the detachment which is commanded by a skilful chief is necessarily, at the moment of battle, more composed and better prepared for the contest, than one indifferently commanded ; and the energy of its action ought to give evidence of this fact. As a last general observation, we will add that a detachment, whether of infantry or cavalry, or of both (without artillery), should not be deterred from the fulfilment of its mission by having to cross a river. Detachments, like partisans,* have a right to shares of booty. 2. Betacliineiits of Infantry. — A detachment of infantry may undertake all kinds of enterprises, even the most daring. They are mostly charged with noc- turnal expeditions ; with coups-de-main in a hilly or wooded country ; with the attack and defence of ob- stacles, such as houses, barricades, woods, defiles ; with escorting or attacking convoys, and with ambuscades. When a detachment is sent to maintain a position, it should at once intrench itself there, and make use of all the resources which the locality affords for the purpose. Thus, for example, for want of trees in the vicinity, it may, if necessary, demolish some huts and * See, hereafter, chapter vi. of this Part. DETACHMENTS. 241 use the wood in the construction of barricades ; but the commandant must, nevertheless, remember that the regulations respecting campaign service prescribe that all destruction of property is to he avoided which is not indispensable. A detachment of infantry can easily conceal and barricade itself; it can be covered by almost anything ; and therefore its march, which is comparatively noise- less, is readily screened from observation ; it scarcely leaves any trace of its passage, and can travel consid- erable distances without renewing its supply of pro- visions; all these are advantages which it possesses over a detachment of cavalry. When 'a detachment of infantry falls in with the enemy, the best course for it to pursue, is to assume a bold front and rush to the attack. At night especially, and in favorable localities, this course will have the best chance of success. Hilly ground is the most fa- vorable for its action ; but upon a plain it will be at a disadvantage against cavalry. It should, therefore, avoid travelling a great extent of level country, at least during the day. Frequently, when it has not been able to accomplish its purpose in a single night, it will halt and conceal itself during the day behind some obstacle, and not set out again upon its march until night. In mountainous districts it may march by day, but it will yet be proper to avoid the villages and frequented roads. In order to offer greater resistance to the enemy, a detachment of infantry should march in column by sections. It must not be obliged to put files in the 16 242 MESrOR OPERATIONS. rear in contracted ground, for it is a vicious formation, and an embarrassing one in case of attack ; lience the sections should be formed upon a small front : ten or twelve files will be sufficient. There should be an even number of sections, so as to facilitate the foima- tion of a square. Like all detachments, it will have an advance and a rear-guard ; and we can here assign a more precise limit for the approximate force to be given to these two fractions of a detachment of infan- try, namely one half (at most) of the whole force, if the latter be under 500 men ; but if the force be over 500 men, the advance-guard, the rear-guard, and the flankers should not together exceed one tJiird the force. For a forward march, the advance-guard will be the most considerable of the secondary portions of the detachment; for a retrograde movement, it will be the rear-guard. According to these considerations, the marching formation of a detachment of infantry is as follows : DETACHMENT OF 150 MEN. (In three ranks.) 1 1 15 men, ■• 1 DETACHMENT OF 90 MEN. (In two ranks.) f t^ 8 men. Advance-guard. ■< 3C \ Q 5 men. Principal corps . and nankers. Eear-guard, 2U CJ 6 men. DETACHMENTS. 243 3. Betaclimeiits of Cavalry. — Detacliments of cav- alry are principally used in such service as requires celerity, as that of escorts, rapid reconnoissances, levy- ing contributions, posts of observation, etc. In opera- tions of tHs kind, the mounted soldier may make good use of his fire-arms. The duty of the advance-guard of a detachment of cavalry will be to give warning of the presence of the enemy. The detachment, upon this warning, may either charge or retreat, according to circumstances ; but it should not remain stationary unless it has not been itself discovered. A detachment of cavalry has the advantage upon level ground ; but irregular ground is unfavorable to it. Defiles are dangerous to it, as infantry can there easily lie in ambush ; these should, therefore, be avoided by a detour ; but if that is not possible, they should first be explored by scouts, or by some of the horsemen themselves (on foot, however) ; and after- ward the defile should be passed at a gallop. When the defile is more than a league in length, the recon- noissance of it must be abandoned ; and in this case it must be entered with caution, breaking up the de- tachment into platoons of ten or twelve horsemen each, and marching in a disconnected manner, so as to present more void than full space to the fire of an ambuscaded enemy. In this way, and aided by the rapidity of movement, the detachment will probably escape serious damage. It would be an excellent safeguard to occupy the overlooking heights before 244 MmOR OPERATIONS. entering into tlie defiles, but this is often a difficult operation for cavalry. A detachment of cavalry will usually form by platoons, which is the most suitable order for combat. The extent of the front of each platoon should be such that the detachment leaves a portion of the road free, in order that it may easily make a half turn in the event of a sudden attack, which does not permit it to deploy. It will also be prudent to keep the left side of the road ; for, in a rencontre, it will then be at- tacked by the right flank, which is the strong side of the horseman. 4. Mixed i>etachiiaeiits. — Mixed detachments pos- sess more coherence or stability than those consisting of a single arm. No others should be employed in insurgent districts. The escorts of a convoy, of a for- aging party, or of a park, having to act over a great extent of country, should be mixed. The order of march of a mixed detachment varies according to the nature of the ground it traverses. On level ground, the cavalry takes the lead, and watches over the safety of the detachment ; but in a country cut up by mountains and ravines, and covered by woods, the infantry forms the advance-guard, and also flanks the column. It is the same at night, with the difference only, that the distances between the ad- vance and rear-guards and the principal body are di- minished.^' In a varied region, sometimes level and * L^orier, Theorie de Vofficier superieure, p. 138. DETACHMENTS. 245 at other times broken, tlie detadiment will observe the same order as in broken ground and at night ; be- cause but one order of march can be adopted, if we do not wish to disorganize the detachment by fre- quent interchanges of the troops of the advance-guard and of the principal body ; and also because, when the infantry takes the lead, the cavalry may always, in case of necessity, come up rapidly to the head of the column. When a mixed detachment meets the enemy, it may either retire or fight. If it fights, it will be draivn up in two lines, either in echelons, or checker- wise — the force of the echelons depending upon the total effective force of the detachment, and being, if necessary, even as small as a half squadron. The dis- positions for combat, however, are of infinite variety, but are almost always determined by the nature of the ground. If the flanks of the position are covered by woods, and are thus favorable to a protracted de- fence, it will be well to throw out a part of the infan- try upon these flanks, as skirmishers. To complete this brief sketch, we give on the fol- lowing pages the order of march of two mixed detach- ments, one marching on level ground, the other in broken or hilly ground. These figures (in which the symbol denotes a single horseman, and O a single foot soldier) explain themselves. 246 MINOE OPERATIONS. MIXED DETACHMENT OF 800 FOOT AND 50 HOKSE, MAECHING ON LEVEL GKOUND. «% » It « JSIIbrses ♦ 3 Infantry Principal corps (Infantry— 240 men). 10 3 o o o • o ,0 vvv <>00 o ^ Q ^ Infantry 00 DETACHMENTS. 247 MIXED DETACHMENT OF 200 FOOT AND 50 HOPwSE, MAECHING IN BROKEN GEOUND. « o 31 Hnrry^ Patrol of 10 foot I [ Principal corps (132 men). il 3\ z:::^ ~ 1 ^ fl o s- s , ^ s ,4 ^ □ Patrol of 10 foot. o o o 4 InfryO CHAPTER THIRD. ARMED EECOIS^NOISSANCES. IisTTEODUcTiois-. — Armed reconnaissance * is the des- ignation applied to any movement of troops, made with the object of discovering or verifying one or more particulars respecting the position, the force, the movements, or even the intentions of the enemy. This definition shows that such a reconnoissance constitutes the basis of every military operation, and ought to precede it. Without a reconnoissance, we should be constantly liable to surprises. Since armies generally cover their marches by flankers, and their camps and cantonments by a chain of outposts, it follows that, in order to obtain a view of their disposition, we must push beyond these flank- ers or this chain, by a reconnoissance, which can clear away the obstacles to such an inspection. We see, therefore, in advance, that the service of reconnois- sances is attended with difficulties and complications. We must not confound the reconnoissance by * In these Elements we are not required to treat of topograpMcal re- connoissancee. AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 249 patrol, made by tlie gi^and guards for tlieir security, witli a reconnoissance proper. Tlie patrol reconnoi- tres within narrower limits, confining itself to its chief purpose — that of assuring itself of the position in which the enemy is posted, without troubling itself with their tactical arrangement, or with the topo- graphical strength of their position; while a recon- noissance examines in detail the position of the enemy, the weak points of his position, the mode of attack- B ing it, the composition of the opposing corps in troops ■ of the several arms, the character of the soldiers, the ■ vigilance of the officers, the condition of their sup- ■ plies, the designs of their chief, the confidence he in- ■ spires, etc. ; in short, sees and collects as much infor- ^^^ mation as possible. ^^t "We shall distinguish ^ve kinds of reconnoissance : ^^B 1st. Daily reconnoissances ; ^^B 2d. Special reconnoissances ; ^^B 3d. Secret reconnoissances ; P^B 4th. Offensive reconnoissances ; 5th. Reconnoissances in Africa. I Before entering upon these last, we shall speak of the reports which should accompany every reconnois- sance, and shall cite some historical examples, calcu- ^^ lated to show the importance of this minor operation mm of war. Armed reconnoissances do not always bring back all the information needed, even when they are suc- cessful, and it becomes necessary to complete them by accessory means, which we shall also study. We shall first say a few words respecting the maps which ex- 250 MESrOR OPERATIO]S"S. Mbit tlie form and character of tlie country ; we shall speak of tlie guides who conduct the columns safely through their various detours ; we shall point out the questions to be put to deserters, to the inhabitants, to travellers, to prisoners, in order to make a profitable use of them ; we shall treat of spies and of the proper treatment of them ; and we shall conclude with details respecting the principal signs, the observation of which may develop some particulars respecting the enemy. 1. l>aiiy Reconifloissances.* — Daily reconnoissances are made to ensure the safety either of the camps or cantonments, or of the advanced posts. They should ascertain the designs of the enemy, and whether he is preparing to march, to surprise, or to fight. Cer- tain signs will guide them in this respect, especially what occurs at the outposts ; for if they are increased, it is a sign of stagnation ; if such posts are modified, it denotes a change of position. In a level country the reconnoissances will be made by light cavalry ; but in mountainous countries, they will be made by infantry, which, however, should be accompanied by some horsemen for the prompt trans- mission of intelligence. In a varied country the re- connoitring body will be composed of troops of both arms, and in all cases the numbers should be small. The service of reconnoissances, like that of out- posts, must be divested of regularity, for this would * The reader will do well to consult, in relation to daily reconnois- sances, the Ordonnance sur le service en campagne, art. x., chap. i. AKMED RECONNOISSANCES. 251 soon give the enemy tlie knowledge of the usages practised, and would facilitate the destruction of the corps of reconnoissance. It is an essential principle in reconnoissances that to reconnoitre is not to attack. Moreover, a reconnoi- tring body should march with precaution, conceal its presence, and avoid compromising itself It should consider combat not as its end, but solely as the ex- treme means of obtaining information, by taking pris- oners. There is also another case in which it may re- sort to combat ; namely, when it falls in with a de- tachment of the enemy marching rapidly upon the camp ; it will then retard their advance by assailing them, having first detached a horseman to give warn- ing to the camp. In such a case, it should not hesi- tate ; it should, nevertheless, take advantage of local peculiarities to the utmost extent, to compensate for its numerical inferiority. A reconnoissance should march as a detachment, with an advance-guard, a rear-guard and flankers. The latter should take care never to be out of sight of the principal body during the day, as one or more of them carried off would suffice to guide the enemy upon the track of the reconnoissance, and would enable them to surprise it before it suspected danger. In order to avoid ambuscades, a reconnoissance should not traverse inhabited districts before having examined them thoroughly, and taken, when necessary, hostages for the peaceful disposition of the inhabi- tants. It should arrest all individuals following its 252 MINOR OPERATIONS. path or attempting to pass it, who might, otherwise, give notice of its movements to the enemy. "When a reconnoissance cannot accomplish its pur- pose without halting, it should do so behind some accident of ground, a wood, or a wall, which will con- ceal it ; and should also cover itself, during the halt, by some vedettes stationed on the roads on the side from whence an attack is to be feared. A reconnoissance may successfully reconnoitre a column of the enemy on the march. For this purpose it will follow the column, keep alongside of it without allowing itself to be perceived, see it defile before it- self, count it, note the number of troops of each of the different arms, its materiel and its accessories ; will observe whether it appears formidable, and how it protects itself; what are its habits in setting out, in halting, and in passing through defiles ; in what part it appears most vulnerable ; w^hat its designs appear to be ; whether its troops are fatigued ; in a word, it will gather the most circumstantial information possible respecting the column. 2. Special Reconnoissances. — In the language of the Ordinance respecting field service, the object of special reconnoissances will be, in general, as follows : " 1st. To determine distances, the condition of the roads and the repairs they may require, the configura- tion of the ground, and facilities or obstacles it pre- sents, in order to regulate, thereby, the march of the columns and of the different arms ; " 2d. To explore, in all their parts, the positions to • AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 253 be successively occupied by the columns, either for the purpose of supporting all attacks, or of sustaining themselves in case of resistance or an offensive demon- stration on the part of the enemy, or of insuring their retreat. " 3d. To reconnoitre the position and the force of the principal or intrenched posts of the enemy, the configuration of his positions, the defences he may have established there, the difficulty or the means of attacking them. f" 4th. Finally, to estimate, as nearly as possible, the forces of the enemy at every point." Special reconnoissances belong to the province of the officers of the several staffs. Thus, for example, when the object of the reconnoissance is to prepare the way for the march of the columns, or to ascertain the force of the enemy, it is intrusted to an officer of the staff corps ; if it relates to the condition of the roads, or to the intrenched posts of the enemy, or to the establishment of field works, it should be executed by an officer of engineers ; when it relates to the means of reaching the enemy's position from a dis- tance, by means of artillery favorably placed, it is put in charge of an artillery officer. Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine circumstances in the field in which such a distribution could not be rigorously observed, and in which an officer of engineers might at some point execute a reconnoissance which more properly belonged to the province of a general staff officer, while, at another point, the latter might reconnoitre the most favorable location of some field work. 254 MINOR OPEEATIONS. The general officer who orders a special reconnois- sance, gives particular instructions to tlie officer to whom lie intrusts it : the latter communicates these instructions to the general of the brigade whose out- posts he must pass. The general of brigade adds to these instructions whatever his own special knowl- edge of the localities and the acts of the enemy may- suggest, and furnishes the reconnoitring officer with a detachment. If the latter finds it necessary to the success of his expedition to carry some posts of the enemy, he should not make the attack without the authority of the brigadier-general. The observance of this rule is indispensable, as the engagement in ques- tion might assume large proportions, compromise the brigade, and sometimes even force it to an untimely combat ; and the brigadier-general is the only one in a proper position to judge of the opportuneness of a contest on his front. 3. Secret Reconnoissances. — ^The daily and spe- cial reconnoissances of which we have spoken, usually require but a few hours for their execution, and are usually made in broad daylight. But, besides this general case, in which reconnnoissances of this kind may be designated as ostensible (or open)^ there are cases where it is important to make them secretly: they are then called secret reconnoissances, and may occupy several days and nights, according to the greater or less distance of the enemy, his greater or less strength, and the more or less hilly character of the country. AKMED EECONNOISSANCES. 255 The importance of keeping reconnoissances secret is obvious ; for if it be advantageous to obtain information respecting tlie position and intentions of tlie enemy and to baffle bis designs, it is still more desirable that the enemy should not know that v^e have obtained possession of his secrets and the key of all his opera- tions, whereby we are enabled with certainty to para- lyze his eflPorts. However, while it is important to conduct a reconnoissance secretly, it rarely happens that absolute secrecy is possible ; the enemy frequent- ly discovers it, and it then resolves itself into the open reconnoissance. Let us consider these secret reconnoissances more Miy. A secret reconnoissance is a delicate and difficult operation ; for it is necessary first to find the enemy without allowing one's self to be perceived, then to reconnoitre him, that is, to examine him with care, and to collect the greatest amount of information re- specting him. It should be intrusted to officers of light troops, often assisted by a staff officer. The officer in charge of it should be experienced, and have under his orders none but veteran soldiers ; for fresh re- cruits, unaccustomed to combat, might cause total failure. He will act with prudence, as his mission requires, but yet, in decisive moments, he will display boldness, or, at least, resolution, without which he would often be liable to see nothing and fail of his object ; for the best conducted reconnoissance is that which brings back the greatest amount of useful infor- mation. An irresolute officer will fear to expose his 256 MusroE opeeations. detacliment or his person, and at tlie last moment, either from negligence, or sometimes even fr-om fear, will not approach sufficiently near ; and then he will make a false report, assuredly more dangerous than the absence of all information concerning the enemy. "What we have said in relation to the chief of the se- cret reconnoissances is applicable to the officers under him, and the non-commissioned officers to whom he in- trusts some particular duty, or who accompany him in his nearest approaches to the enemy : these officers and soldiers should be mature, experienced in war- fare, zealous, and faithful. To the same effect Mar- shal Montluc says, in his Commentaries : " Cajntaines^ mes amis^ il faut plus tost vous Tiazarder d'^estre pris et sQavoir le. vray^ que non pas vous fonder sur le rapport des mlains. lis out la peur si avant dans le ventre^ quHl leur semhle que tous les huisso7is sont des esquadrons^ et Vasseurent^ et cependant fiez-vous Id / c'est comme quand Us voyent cent escuSj il leur semhle advis qvHil y en a mille, Envoyes tousjours quelques soldats sans peur^ et que plus tost Us se Jiazardent / et si vous voulez faire mieux^ allez-y vous mesme. Ainsi ay-je tousjours faict^ et m^en suis hien trouvSr A no less indispensable quality of the commandant of a secret reconnoissance is sang-froid^ for this will often save him, and in all cases will qualify him to approach close to the enemy, and there determine with his own eyes his position and his defences. The * Under the date 1545, Montluc cites the case of an officer who saw four hundred horsemen in a valley where there was not a single soldier. AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. "25T career of the most illustrious of engineers furnishes in this connection a striking example. At the siege of Luxembourg (1683), Vauban, in order to reconnoitre the place, went every night to within a short distance of the outer works, accompanied by some grenadiers, who remained at the foot of the glacis, lying flat on the ground, while he ascended the glacis and ap- proached the covered way. On one occasion he was perceived by some of the garrison, who aimed their pieces at him ; but continuing to advance, and raising his hand to signify to them that they must not fire, was taken for one of their own officers, continued his inspection, then slowly retired, saved by his admirable sang-froid and his excess of temerity. The chief of the reconnoissance should also be able to speak the language of the country, and if he can also write it, it will be still better. By employing the idiom of the country, he will not appear to be so much of a stranger to the inhabitants and prisoners whom he may question, and this will render them more communicative. This condition, which is appli cable also to all kinds of reconnoissances, more espe- cially requires to be mentioned, because we are, in France, generally too indifferent to the study of for- eign languages — a study of great utility in war, as this example shows. If the non-commissioned officers of the reconnoissance can also speak the language of the country, they can supply the place of their supe- rior officers, and can be employed upon the thousand ruses which serve to extricate a detachment from an unfortunate position. For want of a knowledge of 17 258 MIlSrOR OPERATIONS. the language of the country, that of the Latin may be of advantage to the officer, by enabling him to con- verse with the priests and educated persons ; but for that purpose he should also have acquired the accent with w^hich the Latin is spoken by the inhabitants. The chief of a secret reconnoissance should supply himself with a good telescope and an accurate chart of the country he is to traverse, or, at least, with a sketch prepared at head-quarters. If he can obtain any statistical or military information from officers who have been over the surrounding localities, he will, of course, not neglect to avail himself of it. The detachment charged with the performance of a secret reconnoissance will, in general, be composed of light cavalry. Its effective force should be suffi- ciently small to permit it to conceal its march, and yet strong enough to enable it to resist an enemy's patrol. From fifteen to forty horses* will satisfy these conditions. If, besides its ordinary duty of col- lecting information, the reconnoissance have to at- tempt some minor operation — such as carrying a post, firing a magazine, disorganizing a convoy — there may be some foot soldiers added to it. Unless the ground be exceedingly intricate, secret reconnoissances may al- most always be performed by experienced light caval- ry troops, for the horseman can go anywhere, if he is * The Cossacks often make reconnoissances with a smaller number. Some five or six set out, and have been known to go as far as twenty leagues from their camp or cantonment. This results from their peculiar habits of living, for they are, in fact, mounted partisans, and, in case of need, exist upon almost nothing. AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 259 bent upon it. Tlie reconnoissance sets out secretly, without covering itself by numerous and scattered flankers, who would attract attention. It will move with alacrity, in order to arrive near the enemy's posts before day. It should not, however, go so rapidly as to exhaust its strength before the end of the opera- tion. " The powers of the horse," says General Brack,^ " are the fortune of the horseman ; if they are all ex- !■ pended in one hour, what is left ? The little strength H that prudence might have husbanded, would save life B and obtain the cross of honor. Let the officer upon H a reconnoissance especially remember this." I The reconnoissance marches with an advance- ■ guard, which is accompanied by a guide. It will be I prudent to mount the latter upon a white horse dur- I ing a nocturnal march, in order that he may always be I distinguished, however thick the darkness may be. I^^ft When near the enemy, the chief of the reconnois- sance will point out to his men a rallying point, situ- ated in the rear, to which every horseman, at his or- der, or upon a preconcerted signal, shall repair, in case it becomes necessary to disperse in order to escape from a pursuit. In anticipation of the possibility of a forced dispersment, it is prudent to send back, from time to time, to the point of departure, a note con- taining the information already collected. It should be written in very fine characters upon a small piece of paper, which the messenger places. in his glove. In case of attack, if he sees he cannot escape, he has * Avant-postes de cavalerie legere, p. 189. 260 MmOE OPERATIONS. orders to swallow tMs paper, or to put it into Lis pistol as a wad, so as to destroy it in firing. After tlie rallying point has been pointed out, tlie commanding officer will form tlie reconnoitring body in three echelons; then, availing himself of the va- rious obstacles of the ground as covers, he will ad- vance with a guide and an escort of two or three horsemen to the lines of the enemy's patrols. If he is not perceived, he will observe whatever is of interest ; if discovered, he will fall back to his troop, which has remained in rear. The successive appearance of the echelons will deceive the enemy as to the force of the detachment, and it is probable that some favoring ob- stacle may be reached while he is hesitating. If not, the troop should disperse. The echelons formed by the reconnoissance need not be very regular. Their distance depends upon the ground, but it will be prudent not to make it more than 1,000 yards, in order that each may see the others. When the reconnoissance has been discovered, it is often best to renew it as soon as the enemy has re- turned to his position, which will surprise him, and thus secure better opportunities of seeing. Again, the officer in charge of a secret reconnois- sance may accomplish his purpose sometimes, by leav- ing his troop at one or two leagues' distance from the enemy's outposts^ g^^'^g forward alone with a guide, and establishing himself by the break of day in a bush or tree, or in any position from which he can observe during the day and the following night. I ARMED EECONNOISSANCES. 261 Finally, wlien we do not succeed in gaining suffi- cient information by other means, we endeavor to make prisoners ; but tben it will be better to do so by stratagem than by open force. We must not forget that, in secret reconnoissances, as in all others, notwithstanding the difficulty of the operation, promptness and dispatch are necessary to give reliable value to the results, for in war every- thing changes with such rapidity as to make any in- formation a little old totally false. The object being attained, the secret reconnois- sance retires as quickly as possible ; and, to escape the ^ enemy's attention, makes itself as small as possible. Sometimes its return is secured by intermediate posts, which it has echeloned upon the road in its advance movement. 4. Offensive Reconnoissances. — When even the secret reconnoissances have failed, and the Auxiliary resources for obtaining information prove insufficient, there is nothing left but open force. In the case where two armies, having been for some time at a distance from each other, come suddenly face to face, it is also well to obtain positive information of the situation of the enemy by a grand reconnoissance, which, like other open reconnoissances, is called an offensive reconnaissance. This designation is given to it, because it attacks in order to reconnoitre, where- as the other reconnoissances, already treated of, not only shun combat, but are cautious not even to put themselves in danger. 262 MINOR OPERATIOIirS. To effect an offensive reconnoissance, a detachment is expressly formed for tlie purpose, composed, when possible, of artillery and light cavalry, in order that it may be master of its movements. This detachment pierces the net-work of outposts, drives back whatever covers the enemy, and penetrates to some commanding point, and keeps up the skirmish until the reconnoi- tring officer has s^en everything. Prudence requires that a force should be in con- stant readiness to sustain the detachment engaged in an offensive reconnoissance, or to collect it again if it has been too quickly withdrawn. The infantry is charged with the duty of affording this support ; and the whole army should be prepared to march in case some accidental and favorable circumstance should suddenly afford an opportunity of falling upon the enemy ."^ Care should also be taken to throw out patrols in various directions, to guard against a manoeuvre to turn the flanks and rear of the recon- noissance. It is frequently the general-in-chief himself who directs the offensiv^e reconnoissance, and he then usu- ally executes it with the advance-guard of the army. Frederic and Napoleon both followed this course — chiefly upon the eve of a battle — in order to reconnoi- tre for themselves the position of the enemy, and to settle their plans of attack. In this case the reconnois- sance becomes, in a manner, an experimental comhat ; f * Marrnont, Esprit des institutions militaires, pp. 162, 1G5. t The officers used to call this reconnoissance the rehearsal of the play. I p ARMED RECONNOISSANCES. 263 and, if it fails, it will be better to postpone the battle until a superiority of force is secured. As offensive reconnoissances, notwithstanding the precautions taken not to accept a serious combat, may go farther than is intended, and bring on unexpected consequences, the regulations upon field service pre- scribe that they shall be ordered only by the general- in-chief, and add : " They are allowed to be under- taken by other general ofiicers only in cases where they are acting apart and out of the reach of all co- operation ; or, finally, in those urgent cases in which they should not hesitate to take the responsibility." 5. Report. — ^The regulations recommend that a report be made of each reconnoissance, drawn up in a clear, simple, and positive manner, distinguishing in- formation obtained from actual observation, from that obtained by hearsay, and giving the spelling of proper names with care. For special and offensive reconnois- sances they prescribe, in addition, a sketch of the ground and of the defensive arrangements of the enemy. The written report which accompanies a reconnois- sance is as indispensable to the general-in-chief as the map of the country in which he operates. The clear- ness and precision required in its style should not pre- vent its embracing all the details necessary to throw light upon the results of the reconnoissance ; and it is better that it be too explicit (provided it be correct) than too concise — for an incomplete statement always embarrasses the person who receives it. The proper preparation of a report requkes an officer sufficiently 264 MINOR OPERATIONS. accustomed to reflection not to be easily led into er- ror, and sufficiently calm to exercise judgment and to compare with coolness tLat wliicli lie lias observed with that which he has merely glanced at, without allowing himself to be affected either by the dangers he may have incurred, or by the rapidity with which he is compelled to conduct his operations. This rapid- ity, indeed, is such that, often in the space of a few hours, an officer may have assembled his detachment, executed the reconnoissance, prepared his report, and finished his sketch. For this reason, officers cannot take too much pains to qualify themselves, as soon as possible, for the preparation of such reports, by suit- able studies and practice ; because, if they become ex- pert in them, they will be capable of rendering good service to armies, and while making themselves useful to their country, will earn distinction and honorable reward. In practising the preparation of such reports, the officer should aim at doing it both quickly and well — two essential conditions in many circumstances of military life, especially in war ; for to do it quickly and badly is worse than doing nothing, which, at least, would not lead the general into error by an in- exact account ; and to do it well, but slowly, is often to work to no purpose, for in the field all things change so rapidly that exact and true information at the middle of the day becomes faulty and consequent- ly worthless before night. It is enough to say that a mind slow to conceive is not fit for the service of reconnoissances ; in the words of Allent : ^* " In war, * Essai sur les reconnoissances militaires. t AEMED EECOKKOISSAlSrCES. 265 in those reconnoissances where the time, the general, or the enemy, does not allow more than a coup d'oeil^ all is lost if the officer stops to reflect : the moment of action passes whilst he is deliberating." In many cases the officer charged with a reconnois- sance, instead of reducing his observations to writing, should confine himself to rendering a verbal report ; for examjole, when the operation admits of no delay. It is also very important for officers to exercise them- selves in making this species of report, in order to acquire the rare faculty of describing in few words, and yet with clearness, everything of consequence that they have seen or learned. It is evident that, to make a report, written or oral, in a suitable manner, we should have acquired the habit of putting our thoughts into shape quickly, and of giving them a form which renders them intelli- gible, and a dress which renders them acceptable to everybody. This habit is, indeed, almost the whole art of writing or speaking well — a more difficult art than is commonly thought, and one which is only ac- quired by assiduous labor, whatever may be our nat- ural gifts. 6. Historical Examples. — ^The following examples will serve to demonstrate the importance of exact and circumstantial reconnoissances to the success of mili- tary operations. I. In 1706 : " If M. de la Feuillade had been better acquainted with the plain of Piedmont and the foot of the Alps, he would not have wasted two months in 266 MINOR OPEEATIOlJfS. running after tlie Duke of Savoy, after the latter had left Turin with his cavalry: and when he had led that prince to the entrance of the valley of Luzerne, he would not have sent word to the king (Louis XIV.), as he so imprudently did, that he held the enemy in a country from which he could not escape ; for he would have known that there are none of the valleys terminating in Piedmont, which do not possess one or more practicable routes of communication with the neighboring towns; and that, consequently, the duke could pass out of the valley of Luzerne by his left or his right, as might please him, and thus get out of the way of M. de la Feuillade, who was on his front." * IL In the early part of the month of November, 1805, after the capture of Ulm, Marmont, charged with occupying Leoben, followed the course of the river Enns from Steyer to the village of Reifling, and after reach- ing the latter place was desirous of obtaining informa- tion respecting the enemy, who was endeavoring to reach the mountains : " I then sent," he states in his Memoir es^^- " Captain Testot-Ferry, one of my aides- de-camp, an experienced and distinguished soldier, wdth two hundred horse of the Eighth Chasseurs, and ordered him to go up the river Salza. "When within one league of the grand route, some peasants informed- him that an Austrian battalion had just arrived, and had encamped a league beyond. Determining to re- connoitre it before returning, he inspected the shoes of the horses-, and selected those which could best march over the ice-covered ground. The rest he left behind * Memoires de FenquUre, chap. liii. t Vol. ii., 185T, pp. 331, 332. ARMED EECONNOISSANCES. 267 as a reserve, and set out witli 120 horses. Having ar- rived near the place where he had "been informed the camp was situated, he went alone through a wood to observe them without being seen. He there saw the battalion wholly engaged in establishing the camp, in careless security, having placed no guard. He rejoined his detachment, left his trumpeters on the skirts of the woods, and at the instant they sounded the charge, fell upon the camp, throwing down and breaking the muskets. He collected the disarmed battalion and brought it to my head-quarters. This battalion numbered 450 men and 19 officers. This feat is certainly one of the handsomest peiformances of light troops on record." HI. After the battle of Austerlitz, the French army made a false movement, in consequence of a badly executed reconnoissance. Lannes and the cavalry of the reserve started in pursuit of the vanquished forces by the road to Olmutz ; but only the baggage and parks of the enemy had gone by this road, and it was necessary to countermand all the orders to reach the route to Hungary by Goeding, which was the actual line of retreat. IV. The following example exhibits the import- ance of boldness in secret reconnoissances. In 1809, Captain (afterward General) Curely was charged with the reconnoissance of the Austrian army, com- manded by the Archduke John, in the environs of Eaab. At the head of one hundred horse, he left his division behind some ten leagues, hung about the rear of the enemy, and succeeded in secreting himself in a 268 MmOR OPERATIONS. wood about 3,000 yards from tlie Lead-quarters of the archduke. A long, dusty plain separated him from the village in which these head-quarters were estab- lished. In his ambuscade he waited for night, in the mean time questioning some Austrian marauders ar- rested by his soldiers, to obtain information, upon which to base his plan. A considerable drove of oxen happening to pass, he seized upon it, and penned it within the woods. At nightfall he set the drove in motion, with his horsemen in the midst of it, leading their horses by the bridle ; and, covered by the thick dust raised by this pretended convoy, he approached the village without being in the least disturbed by the enemy, who imagined themselves perfectly secure on the side of the wood from which he was coming. Having thus reached the village, Curely shot down one of the Austrian sentries, and thereupon (the dis- charge of his pistol being the preconcerted signal), his horsemen mounted and rushed forward, dealing sabre strokes for some minutes in all directions. The sur- prised enemy were so completely disordered and stupe- fied that the detachment left the village and rejoined its division without losing a man or a horse. Upon his return, Captain Curely communicated the most precise information respecting the position of the Austrian army, and from this position was also in- ferred that of the French army of Italy, which was in pursuit of the Archduke John,^* V. At the battle of Busaco (1810), the position of Wellington, although very strong, '^ could have * De Brack, Avant-postes de cavalerie legere^ 1831, p. 200. ARMED EECONNOISSANCES. 269 been turned by tlie left ; and if the reconnoissances ordered by Massena liad been well executed, the army of the enemy might have been attacked in reverse and thrown upon the Mondego. But these reconnoissan- ces were not made, or were but imperfectly made, and as the ground did not permit Massena to embrace the whole field of battle, he had not time to change his dispositions in order to afford Ney and Eeynier the cooperation which would probably have insured suc- cess." * This battle of Busaco, between Massena and Wellington, belongs to the campaign of Portugal in 1810, and was, as is known, bloody and indecisive. VI. Frequently an ofiicer or non-commissioned officer may run the risk of reconnoitring alone, and should then resort to ruse. In this connection the following fact is deserving of mention : In 1814, in the vicinity of Vic-de-Bigorre, the French had posted one of their bodies of rear-guards on a hill, the end of which abutted on the high road, the slope be- ing clothed with trees and defended by skirmishers. "Lord "Wellington was desirous to know whether a small or a large force thus barred his way, but all who endeavored to ascertain the fact were stopped by the fire of the enemy. At last Cap- tain William Light, distinguished by the variety of his attainments, an artist, musician, mechanist, seaman and soldier, made the trial. He rode forward as if he would force his way through the French skirmishers, but when in the wood dropped his reins and leaned * Memoires de Massena^ par le g^ndral Koch, avec on atlas dress6 par lo commandant Lapie, du corps d'etat-major, t. i., p, lii. 270 MINOE OPERATIONS. back, as if badly wounded ; Lis horse appeared to canter wildly along tlie front of tlie enemy's light troops, and they, thinking him mortally hurt, ceased their fire and took no further notice. He thus passed unobserved throus^h the wood to the other side of the hill, where there were no skirmishers, and ascending to the open summit above, put spurs to his horse, and galloped along the French main line, counting their regiments as he passed. His sudden appearance, his blue undress, his daring confidence, and his speed, made the French doubt if he was an enemy, and a few shots only were discharged, while he, dashing down the opposite declivity, broke from the rear through the very line of skirmishers whose fire he had first essayed in front. Reaching the spot where Lord Wellington stood, he told him there were but ■^ve battalions on the hill." * 7. Reconi&oissauces in Africa.-j- — In Africa, it is almost impossible to get a view of the enemy; the Arab camp is everywhere and nowhere at the same time. It would, therefore, be dangerous to make re- connoissances in force in that region ; it is better to rely exclusively upon Arab Umiers, and to meet the enemy's cunning by cunning. The name limiers (hloodJiounds^ i. e., spies) is ap- plied to some native horsemen, who are under the ex- clusive direction of the commandant of a column, and * Napier, History of the Peninsular War^ book xxiv., chap. iv. t This article is extracted from the pamphlet entitled De la guerre en Afrique^ by General Yusuf. AEMED KECONNOISSANCES. 211 can report directly to him at all times. They disguise themselves by putting on the bornouse worn by the inhabitants of the country. They act by day or by night, on foot or on horseback, according to circum- stances ; and four or five are sufficient. They take various dii^ections, and when they have important in- formation to give and are not able to return in person, they communicate it by preconcerted signals ; for example, by fires combined in a particular manner, the light of which they conceal with their bornouses and again uncover it, alternately, so as to produce in- termittent lights, the longer or shorter duration of which has a predetermined signification. In critical moments, these spahis may feign to de- sert ; but this desertion ought to appear to be real in the eyes of the troops, and especially in the eyes of the Arab allies, and the general alone should know that it is but feigned. By this means, in the campaign in Morocco (1844), Marshal Bugeaud knew all that oc- curred in the army of the enemy, and even the con- versations that took place in the imperial tent. These limiers convey their messages with certainty by scattering themselves along the road between the enemy and the body from which they have been sent. This method is especially applicable to night attacks. If it becomes necessary to take some prisoners, they get up a mock skirmish with the rear-guard of their own column. At the sound of the firing, some veritable enemies make their appearance, and aft(»* some minutes of pretended skinnishing, in w^hich the skirmishers of the column participate to only a small 272 MINOR OPERATIONS. extent, tlie limiers seize upon several of the real com- batants, from whom tlie desired information is after- ward obtained. These limiers are also employed to discover tlie secret provision pits of the Arabs, the guards of which are always invisible to Europeans. Several limiers assemble near the supposed position of the pits, and warmly discuss a project of attacking the French. Their words arousing the patriotism of the guardian of the pit, he soon comes out of his hole to join with those whom he supposes to be friends. They imme- diately seize upon him, and compel him to reveal the location of the pits. This ruse is not to be neglected, as an expeditionary column may subsist anywhere if it finds these pits ; in fact, the corn which they con- tain, serves, in case of need, both for the sustenance of the men and of the horses. 8. Maps. — Maps are of indispensable utility to the officers, since, without them, they can neither make nor study war. There are two kinds, general or geo- graphical maps, and special or topographical maps : the first serve for the ensemble of operations, the sec- ond for the details of the contest. The great development of public works and the progress of industry at the present day, conspire to disturb the accuracy of maps ; for the positions of highways and manufactories are now rapidly changed or modified. We should, therefore, even when the map is of recent date, and executed by an author of distinc- tion, always verify it before trusting to it. ARMED EECONNOISSANCES. 273 This verification presents no difficulty when we are acquainted witli the country represented. "We carefully examine and compare the cities, towns, vil- lages, rivers, brooks, mountain-chains, forests, woods, roads : thus we observe whether the inhabited places are properly located on the water courses ; whether the rivers are shown to rise in the mountains and to follow the valleys ; whether the roads pass through certain towns or villages. If the portions compared are found exact, we may infer that the whole map is worthy of confidence. If we are acquainted with but one portion of the country, we verify this portion, and if we find it cor- rect, we infer the probable accuracy of the whole map. Finally, if we know nothing whatever of the country, we survey a portion of it, and if our survey agrees with the map, the latter is considered to be reliable. Besides this general verification of the map, we must rectify the topographical maps, especially in the environs of inhabited places, by questioning persons familiar with the recent state of the country, or else, by making a survey of some particular locality, which we first draw upon a sheet of tracing paper, and then transfer to the map itself. The importance of thus verifying the maps is illustrated by the case of the Allies who, during the campaign in the interior of France in 1814, were often led into error with respect to the roads by the maps of Cassini, which they used without testing them. The necessity of such verifica- 18 274 3^ms^0R operations. tion is most especially felt in the case of the maps of the Algerian districts, which are, for the most part, unfinished, and are far from being satisfactory. Of the charts which are found on sale, we should prefer those which are executed in the countries they represent, foreign maps being usually defective. We may add, however, that we may confide in the maps prepared since 1815 by the staffs of several European armies, even for foreign countries, but especially in those which emanate from the war office of the French government. The road maps^ that is, those on which the dis- tances from point to point are marked, are especially useful to military men, as they save the trouble of using the dividers and scale : but unfortunately, since the introduction of railways, scarcely any road maps are made, and perhaps the only one of the kind is the station map {carte (Tetapes), The public, therefore, no longer possesses the means of knowing the distances from point to point, except as calculated by the rail- road lines and from tables of distances. Military men should not be satisfied with this, for railroads do not always follow the shortest route between two points, and, moreover, in war they may be broken up ; and in no case will they suffice for operations of detail. 9. Onndes. — ^The best topographical maps, even those which omit nothing, would not always suffice to guide the columns or detachments of an army through the labyrinth of roads and paths of an ene- my's country, without the aid of men specially em- I AKMED RECONNOISSANCES. 275 ployed to direct them to the desired place by the most convenient route. These persons are called guides. In the employment of guides, we have the addi- tional advantage over the exclusive use of maps, of being able to gain information from them respecting the disposition of the inhabitants, the resources of the country, and the preparations of the enemy. In case of need, when we are assured of their fidelity, they may also serve as emissaries to collect on their way secret information, without exciting suspicion. For these reasons, an army cannot dispense with men who are acquainted with the country in which it is to fight. History indeed furnishes numerous in- stances of detachments beaten or destroyed in conse- quence of not having taken guides, or of having em- ployed bad ones, or of having neglected to watch over them. Guides should be chosen from the class of persons best acquainted with every irregularity of the ground and its most concealed paths ; such as the rural police- guards, country letter-carriers, forest-keepers and game- keepers, good huntsmen, poachers, shepherds, wood- cutters, smugglers, partisans, certain outlaws, the cice- rones who in times of peace conduct travelers in their search for natural curiosities, the difi^erent categories of migratory laborers, emigrants, peddlers. All these are poor, easy to gain over, and suitable for guides. In some cases, especially when we have need of in- formation requiring intelligence, we may take these guides from a higher class of the population, but always from among those who thoroughly understand 276 MINOR OPERATIONS. the country, as, for example, among tlie employes of tlie excise, tax gatherers, land surveyors, constructors of bridges and roads, giving a preference to those who speak our own language. In order to obtain guides, when they have not been procured in advance, we apply to the mayor or other prominent functionary of the locality to name them. If the individuals designated refuse from pa- triotic motives to act as guides, we compel them to do so by force. If we perceive that their refusal results from the fear of compromising themselves in the eyes of their fellow-citizens, we make a show of maltreat- ing them, that they may appear to yield only to force, and afterward reward them liberally. In case the local authorities are reluctant to name suitable per- sons for guides, when there must always be some who are capable of acting in that capacity, we seize these functionaries themselves and compel them to march with the columns as guides. This course was often adopted by the French in the Peninsular war. History, moreover, abounds in examples of the ne- cessity of employing violence in order to find guides. Thus the king of Prussia, Frederic the Great, in his " Military Instruction," relates that, " in the year 1760, while crossing Lusatia to march into Silesia, we had need of guides. Some were found in the Vandal villages, but when brought in they pretended not to understand the German language, which embarrassed us greatly. We bethought ourselves of administering some blows, and they forthwith spoke German like parrots." ARMED RECONlSrOISSANCES. 277 Before trusting a guide, we must, by questioning him, assure ourselves of his intelligence. With this object we should interrogate them separately, without formality, as if in ordinary conversation. This is an art of itself, for the peasants, especially such as usually serve as guides, are much more astute than they appear to be. We should compare their answers w^ith each other, and with the topographical maps. If there seems to be a sufficient degree of accordance, we may conclude that they do in fact possess the knowledge B to which they pretend. To facilitate this comparison, B and to avoid errors, we should be careful, when speak- B ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ guides, to pronounce the names of towns B and provinces in the same manner as the inhabitants ft of the country. ^^^B We should also endeavor to discover the failings \W or vices of a guide ; for if he be a drunkard, he will lead us astray ; if open to bribery, he will sell us ; if a coward, he will lose his head at the first whistle of the enemy's bullets.* A knowledge of his character, moreover, enables us to draw some inferences respect- ing the march he is leading us ; for, suppose he is I naturally timid, if he appears unwontedly bold, you may be sure the road he is causing you to follow is not so fine as he represents ; if he is sad and fearful, the road adopted is more favorable than he pretends.f * This may happen to him though he be not altogether a co-ward, for he can hardly be wholly indifferent when bringing death to his own friends, and when he is liable to be struck down by a friendly ball. t Santa-Crnz, Bejlexiona militaires etpolitiques^ translation of Vergy, V. iii., p. 265. 218 MINOR OPERATIOTTS. The degree of confidence to be reposed in a guide also deserves some consideration. If lie belongs to the nation with which you are at war, you should fear his patriotism, for he may seek to serve his country by leading you astray. If he professes a different religious faith from your own, put yourself upon your guard against his fanaticism, for he may be- lieve he is serving God by betraying you. There- fore choose your guides as much as possible from people of your own country ; or, when these cannot be found, from men who have some direct interest in your success and whose fidelity you have put to the proof. Even when the guides are deserving of confidence, some precautions are to be observed. Take as hos- tages their wives and children ; seize upon their pro- perty; threaten them with severe penalties if they betray you, such as the burning of their houses, or the death of their hostages and themselves : promise them abundant reward for their fidelity, and keep your promises scrupulously. Treat them, moreover, with kindness ; pay them liberally ; put them on horseback if it is necessary for the rapidity of your march ; though, if you distrust them, you may let them ride bareback. As you ad- vance into the country discharge them, for they are mostly well acquainted only with the surroundings of their own villages. It will be proper, however, to detain, and even to imprison those who, from your questions, may have been able to guess your designs, which they might communicate to the enemy. I I AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 279 Wlien you interrogate guides respecting the char- acter of the roads, never rely entirely upon the repre- sentations of a single guide, not only because he may intend to deceive you, but because persons unused to military operations make no distinction between roads suitable for artillery and those suitable for cavalry or infantry. The following fact, related by Frederic, fully confirms this observation : " In 1745," he says, "after the battle of Sorr, when the Prussian army wished to retire into Silesia, I had some persons brought from Trautenau and Schazlar, to question them as to the roads over which I desired to take the columns. They told me confidently that these roads were admirable, and that they passed over them with their carriages with the greatest ease, and that many wagoners did the same. A few days after, the army made this march. I was obliged to make my arrange- ments for retreat in these parts. Our rear-guard was briskly attacked, but, by the precautions I took, we lost nothing. These roads, in a military point of view, were very bad ; but those from whom I had ob- tained information respecting them understood noth- ing about them, and what they told me was in good faith, and wdtli no intention of deceiving me. We should, therefore, not trust to the report of ignorant persons, but, with the map in hand, should consult them upon every configuration of the ground, and see whether we cannot sketch something additional upon the paper, which wdll convey a more exact notion of the road than the map itself." In general, at least two guides are to be attached 280 MINOR OPERATIONS. to eacli column or detacliment ; one is to marcL. with the advance-guard, the other to remain near the com- manding officer. These two guides should not be ac- quainted with each other, but should be used so as to make one act as a check upon the other. It is well, besides, to have two guides, for the purpose of sup- plying the place of one who may be killed or severely wounded. If we have more than two, one of them is often placed with the rear-guard. A detachment should always take a guide, even "svhen it is pursuing a frequented road, because a sud- den attack may compel it to resort to the cross roads, w^here, without this precaution, it might go astray. The guide placed with the advance-guard, who, in fact, conducts the column, may be allowed to march unrestrained, if we are sure of him ; nevertheless, it is always prudent to place him between tw^o non-commis- sioned officers or soldiers, who are instructed to fire upon him at the least attempt at escape — a fate of which he is to be duly warned. In woody and moun- tainous countries, especially in night marches, even this precaution is not sufficient, for the peasants are very dexterous in slipping away and disappearing be- hind irregularities of the ground, and especially at the approach of danger. For this reason it is well to search them and take away their knives or any other cutting instruments, then to tie them with a rope about their middle, and even to bind their hands be- hind them; it will then be impossible for them to escape except by cutting the rope with their teeth — an operation which would probably be discovered in ARMED EECONNOISSAiq^CES. 281 time to prevent its success. The column will thus be insured against tlie contingency of being left without a guide upon unknown roads. When the guide is thus tied, an occasional pull on the rope will serve to keep him awake on his horse — for if he should fall asleep, the conducting of the col- umn would be abandoned to the instinct of *the horse. This expedient is constantly resorted to in night marches of the French columns in Algeria. 10. Deserters. — Deserters from the enemy are ar- rested and disaiTued at the outposts. They are inter- rogated relative to the situation of their posts by the commandant of the grand guards, who sends them to the general of the brigade. The latter questions them, and then orders them to the head-quarters of the divi- sion, where they are subjected to a systematic exami- nation by the chief of the staff. These are the rules laid down for them in the regulations respecting field service. Deserters are not to be trusted : they should not be allowed to communicate with any but the proper officers, and should be promptly escorted out of the army, for they are sometimes spies in disguise. Deserters are always very apt to give information respecting the enemy which is calculated to insure them a welcome, for this purpose exaggerating the critical situation of the army they have just left. Therefore we should not too readily put faith in the answers of these unfortunates, but should skilfully in- terrogate several of them separately, and compare their 282 MINOE OPEKATIONS. answers A deserter should be asked tlie cause of his desertion, how he effected his escape through the chain of outposts of the enemy, the number and force of his regiment, whether his regiment contains many recruits, w^here it is encamped, how duty is performed in it, what is the character of its superior officers, whether the camp is abundantly supplied, the propor- tion of sick, the various rumors that are current in it, etc. The questions are to be varied according to the character of the army to which he belongs, and accord- ing as he has left an encamped troop, or one upon a march. He is also to be questioned as to the points upon which he has seen intrenchments being erected, roads repaired, magazines established, provisions sup- plied, boats collected, convoys organized, arms distrib- uted, reenforcements arriving, ambulances prepar- ing, etc. 11. Inhabitants — By preference we interrogate the mayor, or chief magistrate, the postmaster, the curate, the schoolmaster, the distinguished or most in- fluential man, superintendents of work-shops or fac- tories, the superintendent of the railway depot, men who have served as guides for the enemy, the directors and agents of the mails, the superiors of religious so- cieties, tavern-keepers, messengers, etc. The questions put to them, according to their intel- ligence, will be : Where is the enemy ? In what direc- tion is he marching ? What is his force ? What is the state of his discipline ? Of what arms do the troops consist? Do the men appear fatigued, and are the I i AEMED RECONNOISSANCES. 283 liorses lean ? "What language do the soldiers speak ? Do tliey belong to tlie line, or are they of tlie militia ? How does the enemy guard himself? Does he often make reconnoissances, and how does he conduct these operations ? What route leads to the enemy ? Has it any defiles, and, if so, can they be turned? How does the enemy behave toward his guides ? Do the officers appear restless and dejected ? What is the population of this or that village, its distance, and its resources ? Is the road leading to it broad, paved, or macadamized ? By what fords or bridges may the neighboring water courses be passed ? etc. The inhabitants should be separately questioned, and, as much as possible, in their own language ; and this again illustrates the importance of a knowledge of foreign languages to officers of light troops, who are specially charged with making reconnoissances. 12. Traveller§. — ^Travellers, whether on foot, on horseback, or in carriages, who come from the direc- tion of the enemy, will probably have nothing import- ant to communicate, as the enemy would not have al- lowed them to pass if he had in preparation any ope- ration which could be jeopardized by their indiscre- tion. It will, therefore, be sufficient to demand, as La Eoche-Aymon suggests,* their names and pass- ports ; whence they come, and their destination ; whether they have met troops marching ; their kind and number, or, rather, the time it required to 23ass the length of the column ; the effective force of the * Des troupe Ugeres^ p. 531. 284 MINOR OPERATIONS. masses of troops occupying towns tlirongh whicli they have passed or sojourned ; the condition of these troops, the proportion of their sick and of their re- cruits; what villages are occupied by the enemy; whether his outposts are close together and well sup- ported ; what is the condition of the roads and bridges, and which of them is the enemy repairing ; or what points is he fortifying ; whether there is any scarcity of provision, of forage, or of ready money ; whether the country people are suffering, and whether their cattle are preserved or have been seized by the enemy ; what are the public rumors ; what does the last newspaper they have read contain ? These interrogatories are to be put with the greater calmness and attention, as they often may serve to discover spies who are passing themselves off as trav- ellers. In order to succeed in their detection, we try to bring about manifest contradictions in their an- swers, and then, by severity and menace, provoke con- fessions which usually reveal a part of the intentions of the enemy. We should add the remark, in relation to in- habitants and travellers, that they are not military persons, and consequently do not describe the country in the way a soldier would do. This circumstance must not be lost sight of in questioning them, and their testimony must be rectified by discussing with them the positions of places and the directions of the roads laid down on the maps. 13. Prisoners. — ^The questions to be put to prison- ers are about the same as those put to deserters. AEMED KECONNOISSANCES. 285 Some authors have expressed the opinion that we should rely upon their testimony even less than upon, that of deserters ; but Marshal Marmont is of a differ ent opinion: ^'The answers of prisoners," says he, "are almost always frank and sincere. We learn more from them than from the most faithful spies. The latter often confound the names of corps and of generals, and very imperfectly estimate the force of the troops upon which they report It is sur- prising to see with what candor, simplicity, and truth I a prisoner will reply to questions, without suspecting their bearing, without imagining that he is faithless rto the cause he has zealously served, and which he is far from wishing to betray.'' * There is no stronger proof of the utility of the in- formation gained from prisoners than the pains taken to capture soldiers and stragglers of the enemy, not only in the daily reconnoissances, but even by special coups-de-main, of which the following is an example : On the 20th of February, 1814, in his defensive cam- ]3aign in the south of France against the English army under Wellington, Marshal Soult, " wishing to make some prisoners in order to obtain positive informa- tion respecting the force and positions of the enemy, ordered a night attack upon the troops who were before Sauveterre (near Orthez). Two or three hours after sunset, when the enemy had abandoned themselves to repose, and the soldiers, stretched out before good fires, had become oblivious of fatigue and danger, a French detachment, commanded by an * Esprit des institutions militaires, pp. 161, 277. 286 3imOR OPERATIONS. officer wlio combined prudence witli audacity, crept with stealthy steps into the bivouac without being perceived. At a given signal he seized upon the allies ; an outcry was raised ; night increased the danger ; the enemy rushed to arms, fired at random and at each other. The French handful of brave fellows, in accordance with their orders, recrossed the Gave, and returned to Sauveterre without a man wounded, bringing with them some fifty prisoners, yet half asleep, and quite ashamed at finding themselves taken in such a manner. It may be imagined that this little scene afforded no small amount of amusement to the French soldiers." * 14. Spies. — One of the most ready means of pro- curing detailed information consists in the employ- ment of spies. We may define a spy as a person sent out by a military chief to examine the movements of the enemy, to discover his plans, and to report them. There are sometimes to be found persons who, from devotion to their prince or their country, will undertake to act temporarily as spies.f " The debt which the State incurs by deeds of this kind cannot be paid by money, and the government which desires to be worthy of such subjects should proportion the reward rather to their devotion than to the service rendered. J " These spies are rare. * Pellot, Memoire sur la campagne des Pyrenees, p. 104. t Thus an officer disguised as a peasant may gain entrance to a place to discover the means of surprising it ; e. g., M. de Gouru (an officer of the regiment of Count Saxe), at Prague, in 1741, and Ney at Manheira, 1798. X Manuel des etats-majors, par le general Thiebault, p. 96. I ARMED RECOKNOISSANCES. 287 As to the spies who follow this trade for money, they must be regarded as miserable beings, who, for the most part, are the slaves of passions which require gold for their gratification. These are the more nu- merous class. Notwithstanding their baseness, we are obliged to employ them, because they are often the only means of obtaining secret information indis- pensable to success. All classes furnish such spies. Even at the topmost round of the social ladder they are found, of the most devoted kind, provided they are liberally paid, according to their condition ; men and women, priests and laymen, are equally open to the enticements of this shameful trafiic. Here are two examples : 1st. Pnnce Eugene of Savoy, one of the most for- midable adversaries of France during the reign of Louis XIV., for a long time had the postmaster of Versailles in his service as a spy, paying him a fat pension. This miscreant opened the dispatches ad- dressed to the generals, and sent copies of them to the head of the imperial armies, who usually received them sooner than the chiefs of the French armies. 2d. Marshal Luxembourg had corrupted one of the secretaries of the English king, William III., who informed him of the movements of his enemies. This was discovered by the English, and the traitor was made to write to the French general that the Allies would on the next day go uj)on a grand foraging ex- pedition/'^' Lulled into tranquillity by this announce- ment, which was also confirmed by numerous reports, * Memoircs des Marquis de La Fare, 1734, p. 222 288 MmOR OPERATIONS. Luxembourg remained in his camp at Steenkirk. At break of day, tke whole army of tbe Allies fell upon his sleeping troops ; but the courage and discipline of the soldiers, the coolness and the skilful manoeuvres of Luxembourg, changed this surprise into a complete victory (1692).^- The service of espionnage requires great celerity, for the information thereby obtained gets old quickly. It requires persons of adroitness and boldness, who are accustomed to find their way through any intri- cacies of the country, and whose faculties are stimu- lated by the love of gain. In every country such will be found among smugglers, peddlers, poachers, and the various traders who visit the cantonments. In the large towns, they may also be obtained among keepers of inns and restaurants, and all those who have frequent and numerous relations with the pub- lic.f Non-commissioned officers, and sometimes intel- ligent soldiers, are instructed to talk with these indi- viduals, discover those who would consent to act as spies, and bring them to the chief of the staff. When the army is distributed in cantonments, these non- commissioned officers or soldiers may engage the in- habitants who lodge them to play the part of spies, which they can generally do without difficulty, as * The French soldiers then wore the cravat. On the occasion of this surprise they tied their cravats in haste, and the cravat tlms knotted be- came the fashion, under the name of cravate d la Stebikerque. t From the time of his arrival in Spain (1710) and during the stay of the Austrians in Madrid, Vendome employed as a spy in that capital, a keeper of a billiard saloon, a Frenchman who had established himself in the Peninsula, and spoke several languages. AKMED KECOOTJOISSANCES. 289 there will almost always exist some secret means of communication between the neighboring localities of a territory occupied by the enemy. At outposts, when two armies remain for a long time face to face, the soldiers of the two sides sometimes get together to chat and drink. In these moments of familiarity, a sly overture may sometimes be made to one of the sol- diers of the enemy, to try his disposition to serve as a spy, which, if favorably received, can afterward be followed up by a seductive offer. When all these means fail in procuring spies, the usages of war authorize a last resort — cruel indeed, but justified by the necessity of obtaining intelligence of the enemy. It is to select a rich proprietor, the father of a family, to compel him to go over to the enemy under the pretext of escaping from violence, and then to require him to report all that he knows, under penalty of seeing his wife and his children imprisoned or put to death, and his property burned, should he fail to perform the part thus forced upon him. An intelligent man, acquainted with the language of the country, is often associated with him, who passes for his servant, accompanies him everywhere, and some- times himself reports the results of the espionnage. The proprietor is answerable for this man, and is threatened with the same consequences in case he is lost, as would follow his own negligence in the per- formance of his mission. This plan, which should be resorted to only in the last extremity, was suggested by Frederic the Great. When we are fighting in our own country, we 19 290 MmOR OPERATIONS. should expect almost all the inhabitants to serve as spies upon the enemy, and to hold it to be honorable to point out the way of attacking him, in defiance of the dangers to which this patriotic conduct may ex- pose him. It is then useful to cause a soldier to as- sume the garb of a citizen, as he may then more com- pletely observe whatever relates to the movements of the enemy without exciting suspicion. If we are carrying on war in a country which is divided by two political ]3arties, by giving our aid to one of these parties, we can know everything done by the enemy, since the party whose cause we espouse will espy the other, as occurred with the French army in the campaign of 1823 in Spain. If, on the contrary, we are fighting in the midst of an uprising people, who are undertaking a national resistance, it becomes exceedingly difficult to procure intelligence, for all espionnage fails, as the French experienced in 1812 in Russia, and in 1813 in Germany."^ We satisfy ourselves of the fidelity of spies, either by comparing the information, with respect to the same object, as furnished independently by several, or by determining whether the intelligence they bring really secures to us some great advantage over the enemy, since, in this case, it is evident that they are not betraying you to serve him ; f or else by making * We may then try the expedient of dressing up a detachment of our soldiers in the uniform of the enemy, selecting for this purpose those who speak the language of the country. The peasants may thus be imposed upon and led to relate what they know. But this plan is not always successful. t Reflexions militaires et politiques, par Santa-Cruz, traduit par Vergy, t. ii., p. 372. I AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 291 one spy act as a spy upon another. As soon as we begin to suspect a spy, we warn him that the report he has made will be verified, that he will be put under guard until this verification is completed, and that his life is staked upon his veracity * Notwithstanding all these precautions, spies are frequently double^ that is, they serve both parties at the same time. If we suspect this state of things, the best course is to endeavor to gain them over by rich presents and more distinguished treatment, and then to get rid of them altogether, if their reports do not offer anything of special interest. We may also adroitly let fall some words in their presence, convey- ing the idea of some false movement to be executed, in order that they may lead the opposing general into en'or by reporting it as a real movement, which they have had the skill to discover. The celebrated Rus- sian general Suwarrow, well known for his energy and his singularities, perceiving one day, in Poland, that there was a spy among the men of his suite, gave or- ders that the army should hold itself in readiness to march at the first crowing of the cock. The spy noti- fied the enemy that they would be attacked about midnight ; but at eight o'clock in the evening, Suwar- row went through his camp imitating the crowing of a cock ; his troops were immediately put in motion, and the enemy, surprised by this early attack, were beaten. I cite this whimsical feat, to show the kind of ruses to which one may have recourse, in case of necessity, to deceive double spies. * Manuel dca Hats-majors^ par Thi6bault, p. 99. 292 MINOR OPEEATIONS. Spies sliould not reside in a camp, nor communi- cate with the soldiers. They should not be acquainted with each other ; and that they may not be compro- mised, they should be known under an assumed name — nom de guerre. As spies adopt all sorts of disguises to obtain ad- mission into a camp, we should watch all persons who present themselves with that object, such as beggars, traders, itinerant musicians, and even the inhabitants who are attracted by simple curiosity. Courtezans often play the part of spies ; and soldiers should avoid going far to find them, for they not unfrequently pay for a moment of forgetfulness with their lives. They should never forget the case of the Duke de Guise, who, in 1647, lost Naples for a rendezvous with a woman who sold him to the Spaniards. Ecclesiastics and monks, especially in the countries of Southern Europe, also sometimes act as spies, and perform the part in a superior style, which renders them very dan- gerous, of which the French troops had cruel expe- rience in Spain and in Italy. The best course in rela- tion to them is to attach them to us as much as possi- ble, as they may furnish useful intelligence, but yet always to mistrust them. If our army is fighting in a country where the prevailing religion is different from our own, we shall have on our side those of the inhabitants who profess our religion, and conse- quently a large number of spies will be at our dis- posal. This was Napoleon's experience in 1806 and 1807 upon the Prussian territory, where, according to La Roche- Aymon, the French army had no partisans I AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 293 more zealous tlian the Catholic priests of Khenish Prussia. Amoug other individuals attached to an army, a watch should be kept upon sutlers, who hear the con- versations of the non-commissioned officers and sol- diers, and also upon quartermasters' and commissaries' clerks, who must approximately know the condition and effective force of the several corps. Both often serve as spies for the enemy. The information received from spies, as, indeed, almost every matter in war, should be kept a pro- found secret, and especially when in presence of the enemy ; for the most trifling undertaking usually be- comes impossible from the moment it is noised abroad. Therefore, do not allow it to be known that you are frequently and accurately informed of the doings of your adversary, as he will then set about discovering the sources of your information, and will adopt meas- ures to render it useless. The king of Castile, Al- phonso X., speaking one day with the Count d'Artois, heedlessly told him that he was perfectly acquainted with every secret negotiation entered upon by France. This imprudent speech put the French upon the alert, and led them to discover that the spy who gave Al- phonso his information was a valet-de-chambre of the king of France. To conclude this article, we will add that spies, as soon as they are arrested, should be thoroughly searched, and their every movement carefully watched, for they frequently endeavor to destroy the dispatches they carry. Sometimes these dispatches are concealed 294 MmOE OPEEATIOl^fS. in some part of tlieir clothing. Two examples will illustrate tins : In 1704, a spy charged by the Elector of Bavaria with carrying a letter from Marshal Marsin to a Hungarian chief, rolled it and compressed it so completely that he succeeded in enclosing it in a but- ton of his coat, though his dexterity did not save him from being discovered and hung.* In the campaign of 1777, during the American war of Independence^ an English spy, being discovered, swallowed a silver ball. The Americans got it from him by administer- ing an emetic. It proved to be hollow, and contained a message consisting of six lines from a generaLf 15. Indications. — In addition to the various auxil- iary and complementary methods of obtaining informa- tion upon a reconnoissance, which we have above con- sidered, the observation of indications is of great im- portance. "We understand by this expression the no- tation of any sign, mark, or signal whatever, visible or audible, which reveals in any degree the presence, the force, or the plans of the enemy. The art of divining the intention of the enemy from slight indications is one which rarely misleads, and is one of the most precious attributes of military genius. In the familiar spirit which inspired Socrates, in the white hind which followed and counselled Ser- torius, in the god IsTeptune from whom Scipio-Africa- nus the younger pretended to receive revelations, we see figured the art of using indications. To become * Mauvillon, Vie de Prince Eugene de Savoie, 1740, t. ii., p. 139. t Sparks' Writings of "Washington. AHMED KECONNOISSANCES. 295 skilful in this art, we should study tlie character, the customs,* and the interests of the nation, the general, and the troops with whom we are contending; we must acquire habits of observation and comparison, so as to distinguish the least sign of change in the campf or in the movements of the enemy. This art of inter- preting indications belongs to the moral part of war, and is mostly based upon a knowledge of the human heart. Marshal Villars was so well skilled in it that the Duke of Savoy remarked of him, " This Duke of Villars is a wizard ; he divines everything I am about to do." The observation of indications may be useful to non-commissioned officers ^s well as to their chiefs. The principal indications may be enumerated as fol- lows: If the enemy is distributing shoes in the canton- ments, and if the soldiers are cleaning their arms, it is an indication of movement. — If numerous supplies are arriving, or if new uniforms are seen, new troops are about to be added to the old ones to make an attack. — ^If storehouses of provisions are established at cer- tain points, it indicates that troops are to assemble * " I liave been assured that the entire success of the passage of the To by Prince Eugene of Savoy, in 1706, depended upon a game of cards at which a certain general regularly played at a particular hour, and from ■which it -was not possible to divert him." {Essai sur les qualites cfun general, in 4to., Milan, 1758, p. 67.) t Before the battle of the Metaurus (B. 0. 208) Hasdrubal, the broth- er of Hannibal, heard the command sounded once m the camp of the pra3- tor and twice in that of the consul, and from that time had no doubt that the two Roman consuls were combined against him. (Livy, xxvii. 47.) 296 MINOR OPERATIONS. there. — A collection of boats "brought from a distance to one point of the same bank of a river, denotes an attempt at its passage ; if they are burned, an unob- structed retreat is in contemplation. — If important bridges are destroyed, the retreat will be long. — If they are collecting ladders in a bivouac, there will be an assault upon some fortified place. — "When the ene- my masks his movements upon the field of battle and masses his squadrons, he is preparing a formidable attack ; if he deploys his troops, he is about to take a position. — ^If he sends his artillery, ambulances, and parks to the rear, it is an indication either of retreat or a change of front. — If the bivouac fires appear to be more numerous but smaller, or if they are, from their position, too visible, successively lighted and quickly extinguished, it denotes feebleness or retreat. — When the enemy attacks at the break of day, his move- ment will be general ; if he attacks in the evening, his movement will be partial, and probably for no other purpose than to reconnoitre, to take position, or to gain time to cover a retreat. — Foot-prints of men and horses, tracks of wheels, observed in respect to their direction, their greater or less depth, and their num- ber, furnish information in relation to the direction, force, and composition of a column. — ^The dust raised by a column gives similar indications; it forms a dense and slightly elevated cloud in the case of infan- try, less dense and more elevated in that of cavalry, very dense in that of the parks and equipages ; the dust of foragers is lighter and more extended than that of squadrons. — ^The sound of marching reveals a AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 297 passing column in^the vicinity. — If tlie glitter of tlie aiTJS of a body discovered in tlie distance is very bright, tlie troops are probably facing you ; if other- wise, their backs are toward you. — In an insurgent country, a timid or an insolent bearing of the popula- tion indicates that the adversary is remote and feeble, or near and strong. — By the number of bivouac fires w^e may calculate approximately the force of the ene- my ; for to each fire there are reckoned 10 Frenchmen, 4 Kussians, 5 Dutchmen, 6 Englishmen, or 6 Germans. — ^The particular enemy that is advancing is recog- nized by the shape of the masses, the straightness of the lines, the form and size of the head-gear,* the color of the pantaloons and of the shoulder-straps and belts ; also by the color of the coats or cloaks, which varies with the different European nations, being green in Russia, red in England, white in Austria, sky blue in Bavaria, deep blue in Prussia, Spain, Wurtemberg, and the smaller states of Germany. In the observation of indications, we must en- deavor to distinguish those which are only apparent, and which are sometimes employed by the enemy to deceive ; such, for example, as running fires (^feux volanti) in bivouacs. * Prussia and Russia have adopted a leather helmet ; in other nations, the shako, the straw hat, the cap, and the chachia are found. CHAPTEE FOUETH. PASSAGE OF EIVEES. Water courses are among tlie most frequent and most formidable obstacles to tlie prosecution of war ; and it is therefore of the first importance to know how to overcome them. They are crossed in various ways, according to their nature and to the means at our dis- posal : sometimes by bridges, which always require both material and labor ; sometimes in the most prim- itive and simple manner, that is, by passing through the water, either wading or swimming ; sometimes by waiting until the cold of winter has congealed the liquid element and converted it into a firm highway. We are here concerned chiefly with the consider- ation of expeditious methods of crossing rivers; in short, with improvised passages : but these especially require that we carefully examine the peculiarities of the water course, and for this purpose, as in all mili- tary matters, a preliminary operation is necessary. 1. Reconnois§aiice of a River. — The recomiois- sance of a river should determine the following par- ticulars : II PASSAGE OF KtVERS. 299 1st. Its course from its source to its moutli ; the windings of this course and the most decided bends ; its islands, and whether these are bare or covered with plantations ; the nature of its banks ; the exist- ence of any tow-path, and of roads terminating upon it ; the direction of the current ; dams, mills, sluices ; the means of changing the channel ; the nature of the bed ; its periodical or sudden risings ; the frequency of its freezing, and the usual strength of the ice. 2d. Its tributaries and their military importance ; the distance to which the ocean tide ascends; the point at which it begins to be navigable ; the kind and the number of boats existing upon its waters. 3d. Its depth and breadth ; the velocity of the current ; the probable time required to cross it — ele- ments which we should determine for ourselves, and not from hearsay. 4th. The fortified places or posts which it washes ; the use that may be made of it in defensive or offen- sive operations. 5th. All the points of crossing ; either points suit- able for an improvised bridge, or where fords are practicable ; whether bridges are already in existence, and rest upon stone or wooden piers ; swivel, draw or flying bridges (ferry or trail) ; giving for each its length and breadth, its degree of strength, and the mode of defending or of destroying it. These various points are to be brought together and explained with the utmost exactness. For we must be prepared to avail ourselves of every natural or artificial advantage, if we wish to obstruct the pas- 300 MmOE OPERATIONS. sage of the river, and to avoid all kinds of obstacles if we wish to cross it in force. 3. Discovery, Destruction, and Repair of Fords.^ — A ford is any part of the river where the water is so low that we can cross without boats and without swimming. The depth of a ford should not exceed three feet for infantry, nor four feet for cavalry and for vehicles whose load may be wet without injury ; but for those loaded with materials that should be kept dry, the depth should not exceed two feet. As the existence of a ford renders all other less expeditious means of crossing a river wholly unneces- sary, it is important to make a careful search for them. They are to be discovered as follows : If we see a path or road starting from each of the opposite banks, we may almost always infer the exist- ence of a ford ; but a road on one side only, often in- dicates merely a point to which horses are brought to water. If, at the time of low water, the river flows rapidly between two banks of sand, there is a probability of the existence of a ford from one of these banks to the other, although this ford may not have been used, and may not be known to the inhabitants."^ Fords of this kind are produced by the swollen waters at the end of winter, and are not entirely safe. Eivers of moderate breadth are frequently ford- * It is not prudent to rely upon the statements of the peasants res- pecting the number or nature of fords. PASSAGE OF EIVERS. 301 able below mill sites, or near tbeir mouths or con- fluence with another river; for in these cases the meeting of different currents produces a loss of ve- locity, and hence a deposit of earthy matter, form- ing a bank of sufficient height to constitute a ford. A ford is reconnoitred by an officer in a boat, rowed from bank to bank. He holds a sounding lead at the end of a rope about a yard in length (for ex- ample) from a float, and wherever the lead touches the bottom, a stake is planted ; a continuous line of stakes indicating the course of the ford. A ford may be easily traced also by a body of lancers trying the bottom with their lances ; or, in- ^ deed, by a number of swimmers, wading as long as they find a foothold, and swimming over the deeper parts. In general, a river presents fewer fordable places in the winding portions of its course, than in the straight ones, except in the case of double bends. For, as the following figure shows, the current which FORD IN A DOUBLE BEND. strikes at A carries off the earth from that point and throws it toward the bank BC, near which, therefore, 302 MIXOR OPEEATIONS. the deptli is soon diminislied ; in like manner tlie cur- rent, skirting at E, wears away the bank and increases the quantity of water on that side, at the expense of the portion near FG ; thus the simultaneous eleva- tion of the corresponding parts BC and FG may form a ford. Sometimes rivers, which are not fordable in a di- rection at right angles to their banks, present a ford in an oblique direction, not suspected at first. These oblique fords possess the advantage that the current frequently aids the soldier in reaching the opposite shore. A good ford satisfies six princij)al conditions : 1st. The hank of the river from which we set out shovld he higher tlian that we wish to reach, in order that we may manoeuvre without being discovered by the enemy, and may also command his position with our batteries. 2d. Wide fords are prefer able, because it is im- portant to the assailant to present a strong front to the enemy. 3d. The toater should not he rapid, for strong cur- rents fatigue the soldier, and sometimes carry him away. 4th. The hottom of the ford should he even and firm, for loose soil fatigues and mires the foot soldier, while one scattered with stones wounds his feet. A rocky bottom, moreover, is too slippery. Hence a gravel bottom is the best. 5th. Tlie hank on the side next the enemy should have a gentle slope ; for, if it were abrupt and steep, Il PASSAGE OF EIVEES. 303 the enemy might witli great ease prevent the soldier from climbing the ascent, or from making an effective use of his weapons. 6th. A ford which the enemy could destroy hy open- ing duices in his possession^ would he a had one ; and the same may he said of one which could he washed away hy a heavy rain or a sudden thaw. In such cases, the enemy, or chance, might interrupt the pas- sage at a moment when but a small number of troops, insufficient to withstand the enemy, had reached the opposite shore. Every ford, the utility of which has been estab- lished, should be guarded and protected with as much care as a bridge ; and, in case of need, by field forti- fications. On the other hand, every ford which may probably be of use to the enemy should be destroyed or in some way obstructed. From the preceding enumeration of the various conditions which a good ford must fulfil, we readily infer the mode of obstructing or destroying it. A ford may be obstructed by throwing into it trees with all their branches, and with their tops di- rected toward the opposite shore, turning them obliquely to the course of the stream when the cur- rent is rapid. It would appear to be expedient, when possible, to bind these trees together, either with iron chains* or tarred ropes. We may substitute for this abatis, or combine with it, stakes of various lengths, * As was clone by Count de la Roche in two fords of the Montre, a small stream of Alsace. (See his Essai sur la petite guerre^ 1770, in 12mo.) 304 MINOR OPERATIONS. driven witli great force, whieli cannot be pulled npj without much difficulty; also caltrops, planks filled with nails, or harrows. By distributing these differ-] ent obstructions in all parts of the ford, its passage! will be rendered almost impossible. We may also] render a ford inaccessible by vertically cutting awa^ the bank of which we are in possession. To break up or destroy a ford, we may dig a broad and deep ditch, or several smaller ones, across] it, following the direction of the stream ; scattering the! excavated earth upon the surface of the water, instead of throwing it upon the bank, where it would lead the enemy to suspect that the ford had been disturbed.] These ditches being filled with water and unknown to] the enemy will cause the loss of a part of their sol- diers and will arrest the progress of the rest. For] the same purpose we may dig wells or pits, eithei near the shore or in the middle of the ford, planting a heavy stake in the centre of each. The soldiers and horses plunging into these will greatly paralyze the action of a column attempting to cross. Finally, a ford may be destroyed by increasing the volume of water flowing over it, which may be done either by constructing a dam below it, or by removing dams, artificial or natural, above it. The repair of a ford that has been broken up or destroyed, or the improvement of a defective one, is to be undertaken in the following manner : If the volume of water has been increased by means of a dam, we endeavor to obtain possession of the dam and destroy it : if a dam has been removed I PASSAGE OF EIVEKS. 305 above the ford, we, of course, restore it. If tlie enemy has dug ditches or wells in the middle of the ford these are to be filled with stones covered with fascines, If the ford has been obstructed with caltrops, stakes, spiked planks, and harrows, all these mischievous ar tides are to be removed by means of rakes, the ope ration being protected by sharpshooters concealed behind the trees on the banks. Folard recommends for this purpose the use of iron claws or grapples, at- tached to long ropes, and thrown out as far as possible into the ford. As to caltrops, this author doubts " whether they can ever be entirely removed where the bottom is of gravel, and firm;"'^* and the best course is then to sink upon the bottom a series of hur- dles loaded with stone. But sometimes this method fails, and it becomes necessary to abandon a passage that is too perilous. It is evident, moreover, that the broader the river, the more difficult will it be to clear the ford. When the bottom of a ford is not sufficiently firm, it may be improved by sinking a bed of fascines or hurdles weighted with stones. The entrance and exit of the ford are to be rendered easy, when necessary, by constructing gentle slopes on the two banks. If only a small portion of the breadth is not fordable, the deep part may be filled with fascines loaded with stones, or with boxes filled with stone, sand, or earth. * Polyle^ avec Commentaire, par le Chevalier de Folard, 1Y29, t. v., p. 147. In a muddy or sandy bottom they are quickly sunk, and are for- midable only to the first soldiers who cross. 20 306 MINOE OPEEATIONS. A ford that is too narrow, is widened in the same manner. It is a good precaution, especially in broad and rapid rivers, to mark out the whole ford, by planting two rows of strong stakes, upon which marks can be made which will show whether any change in the depth of the water occurs. In reference to such changes, it is proper to ob- serve : 1st. That, as a ford is easily broken up, we must not rely upon it as a sure means of communication between two corj^s d'armee, 2d. That it is imprudent to trust to fords in rivers and brooks in mountainous countries, where even a very moderate rain may dig them out, or swell their waters. We will corroborate this second observation by a passage from Colonel de Carrion-Nisas.* " The river Cinca," he says, " which caused the disasters of Csesarf and of the Duke of Orleans,J was no less fatal to the French in the Spanish war from 1808 to 1813. The garrison of a small town, washed by this stream, was ordered to cross it. According to the usual practice, but in this position imprudently, five companies, which were destined to form the advance-guard, were * Essai SILT Vhistoire generate de Vart miUtaire, 1824, t. ii,, p. 142. t Read attentively chapters xl. and xlviii. of Book I. of Caesar's Com- mentaries (on the Civil "War). The words of the great writer suggest the improvidence of the general who neglects to ohtain sufficient informa- tion, or who does not take into consideration the accidents to which he is liable from the nature of the country in which he is waging war. J At the siege of Lerida (1707), which he nevertheless captured » PASSAGE OF RIVERS. 307 passed over on the preceding day. During the night the river rose and cut off these five companies from their companions, who saw them slaughtered by the guerillas without being able to help them." 3. Fording a River. — Fords rarely answer for the passage of a whole army, but are of frequent use for detachments, and facilitate the minor operations of war. Before allowing your troops to plunge into the water, to cross a ford, see that they are not overheated and perspiring — a hygienic precaution which prevents many serious diseases, and which should be especially observed when the waters are cold and swollen. If the ford has not previously been staked out, let it be done by some horsemen, or take an expe- rienced guide from the country, or stretch ropes on the right and left to confine the extreme files, so that the soldiers may not get off the track and lose their foothold. Where a river, though fordable, is sufliciently rapid to carry away men, place in its bed, up-stream, anything which will act as an obstacle and break the force of the current, such as trees, wagons, and even horsemen. Also place below the ford a line of men on horseback, to pick up the soldiers who may be car- ried away. These horsemen, whether up-stream or down, must not be too close together, as they would, if in a compact body, form a sort of dam, and would have the pressure of too great a volume of water to support. 308 MINOR OPERATIONS. The same remark applies to foot soldiers: the] should never march in close order in a somewhat] rapid ford, as this would render the file on the sid( up stream liable to be overturned. Infantry should enter a ford obliquely, unless th( direction of the solid path of the ford prevents. The] should also cross in regular platoons, with intervals between them. They take off their shoes, roll u] their pantaloons, put their cartridge-boxes upon thei^ knapsacks, and carry their arms at will, though it best to carry them upon the shoulder which is uj stream. The object of the last two precautions is keep the ammunition and arms from getting wet." The men of the same rank grasp each other by the sword belt, so as to form a chain to assist in support- ing inexperienced, feeble, or clumsy soldiers. The}' should not look at the water, but direct their eyes to a fixed and elevated point upon the shore. Cavalry crosses a ford without difficulty. It is only necessary for the men to raise their feet to avoid getting wet, hold up their horses, and fix their eyes upon some tree or steeple on the opposite shore. These precautions are more particularly useful where the water course is broad. Occasionally, each horseman may successfully carry across a foot soldier riding behind. When the several arms cross a ford separately, the cavalry and artillery should cross after the infantry ; otherwise they would break up the bottom and make the crossing for the latter difficult or impossible. Several fords near each other facilitate the passage, II I PASSAGE OF EIVEES. 309 if they are not too narrow : tlie proceeding for each is the same as above. Alexander the Great crossed the Granicus by a ford, oUiquely and in several columns. One of the most celebrated modern instances of the passage of a river by a ford, is that of the Tagliamento, in 1797, by three French divisions conducted by Bonaparte, push- ing before them the Archduke Charles in the direction of the capital — Vienna, which was the objective point of the campaign. To show the importance which a ford may ac- quire, we will cite two facts in French history as exam- ples : If (in August, 1346) a prisoner had not pointed out to Edward III. the ford of Blanquetaque below Abbeville, the English, being thus arrested by the river Somme and pursued by the superior forces of Philip VI. of France, would have come to the end of their good fortune, and there would have been no Crecy to tarnish the glory of the French arms. If (in the early part of August, 1809), after the battle of Tal- avera, Marshal Ney had been able to find the ford of Almaraz on the Tao;us, the forces of Soult would have effected a passage and menaced the rear of the English army, and ruined it, by compelling a disastrous re- treat, despite the recent victory of Wellington. 4. Swimming a River. — An officer who can swim has it in his power to perform important services. We will cite two examples : At the siege of Lille, in 1708, Captain Dubois introduced himself into the place by the river Deule, often swimming below 310 MINOE OPERATIONS. the surface. He conferred witli Marshal Boufflers, be- took himself again to the water with a note enveloped with waxed muslin in his mouth, and although he got entangled in the weeds, had the fortune to escape and to bring back to the Duke of Burgundy an account of the situation of the defenders. — On the 26th of May, 1800, Franceschi, an aide-de-camp of General Soult, having left the First Consul at the foot of the Great Saint-Bernard, approached the besieged and famished city of Genoa in a boat pulled by three oarsmen. He passed the English cruisers in the night, and had nearly escaped, when daylight appeared. Immediately a shower of balls poured upon his boat, killing one of his oarsmen and wounding another. In this perilous moment he did not hesitate, but resolved to swim the remaining distance to the city. Tying his dispatches about his neck, he plunged into the water, but subsequently, remembering that he had left his sword, and not being willing to allow it to fall into the hands of the English, returned to the boat, seized his weapon, and carrying it between his teeth, suc- ceeded in reaching the shore, though almost exhaust- ed. He bore to Massena, the general-in-chief, the promise that in three weeks Bonaparte would, by forced marches, come to the relief of the city.* A knowledge of swimming may enable an officer to save his life. When Prince Eugene Poniatowski, while covering the French retreat after the battle of Leipsic, plunged into the Elster rather than surrender * Traite de natation, essai sur son application a I'art de la guerre, par le vicomte de Conrtivron, officier superieur; tliird edition, 1836, p. 166. I I \ PASSAGE OF EIVERS. 311 (October 19th, 1813), lie would not liave been drowned if he had known how to swim * Soldiers, as well as officers, should know how to swim. In fact, a detachment of infantry composed of troops who cannot swim, will be retarded by an in- significant stream, and paralyzed in its operations. We must confess that the Frencli are far behind- hand in the art of swimming. Notwithstanding the occasional and temporary existence of bodies of swim- mers in its ranks,f their army has suffered itself to be surpassed in this respect by several foreign armies, and especially by the Prussian. J But notwithstanding this lamentable condition of things, w^e will add a few words upon the passage of rivers by swimming : To effect sucli a passage, a point of the river should be chosen where the current is least rapid and the banks are of easy access. The latter condition is * Pouiatowski had before narrowly escaped drowning in the Sereth, at the siege of Jassy. t For example, Soult organized a company of 150 swimmers at the passage of the Linth (September 25 th, 1799). This company, command- ed by the first adjutant, Dellard, threw themselves into the water, with, their sabres between their teeth, and pistols tied on their heads, and, under the protecting fire of the artillery, reached the opposite shore in a few seconds and dispersed the advance-posts of the enemy. Consult the Memoires de Massena, par Roch, t. iii., p. 36T. In 1853, I proposed the creation of a battalion of swimmers for the French army as a specialty, ■which it was desirable to establish and to perfect by study and practice. (See Duparcq's " Commentaires sur Claiisewitz^ livre vi,, observation Ko. 22, p. 193, 197.) X See Duparcq's " JEtudes Jiistoripces et militaires sur la Prusse " (1854), t. i., p. 227. 312 MmOR OPERATIONS. desirable for infantry, but indispensable for cavalry ; for without a point of support upon whicli the horse can place his hind feet, and hence spring upon the bank, he will often be drowned. The infantry swimmers should put their effects and arms upon their heads and shoulders, their sabres between their teeth, in order to have one weapon available at the moment of landing. Sometimes they can place these effects and arms upon a small raft, or a wherry, if they can construct or procure one. They should swim obliquely to the current, and down stream, so as to be assisted by the propelling force of the water. If they are accompanied by horsemen, the latter should take to the water above the infantry, so as to break the force of the current.* With a proper degree of boldness, cavalry may likewise cross a river by swimming. Almost all authors say the horse is a good swimmer ; still, ac- cording to Warnery,f he should be exercised at it. This animal swims with his crupper under water, and hence the necessity of placing the valise of the horseman, and everything which, by being wetted, would become too heavy, either upon the rider's * This method was followed by Cffisar in the passage of the Loire, and by the Prince of Orange in the passage of the Meuse (15G9). — Infan- try swimmers, supported by a number of skirmishers, will be of especial service in capturing boats collected by the enemy, near the opposing shore, for effecting a passage, or boats that are drifting down the stream. t This author, in fact, informs us that in the first war of Silesia, three hundred hussars, attempting to cross the Oder, were for the most part drowned with their horses, although these horses were of the swim- ming species. {Commentaires sur Montecuculli et Turpin, t. ii., p. 183.) PASSAGE OF RIVERS. 313 shoulders, or in a boat, or upon a raft. Cavalry should also cut the water obliquely to the current, moving in ranh and preserving some distance between the two ranks. The men should manage their horses with gentleness, and speak to them encouragingly. Each platoon of cavalry may also be carried across a river by putting the horsemen in a boat, and letting the horses swim behind it, held by the reins in the hands of the men. This mixed mode is not entirely safe ; the horses, abandoned by their riders, lose con- fidence, press toward the boat, and may overturn it. Sometimes a number of the horses refuse to enter the water in this manner.* The plan of making each horseman carry a foot soldier mounted behind, has also been tried. It was in this way that Marshals Turenne and Gramont crossed the Necker in 1645. The Tartars cross rivers on rafts constructed of tnisses of straw or of reeds. They send their horses into the water in front of their frail little rafts, and while holding them by the tail with their left hands, apply stout blows with the right, drive them, swim- ming, to the opposite shore. One of the most celebrated passages of a river by swimming was that of the Rhine at Tolhuys by the * For want of other means, the Spanish general Sancho Darilla fol- lowed this plan in crossing the Douro with his cavalry in 1580, when going to meet the king of Portugal. According to Folard (Polybius, v. iv., p. 55), this method was successful in 1639, in the passage of the Rhine bv the Duke of Longueville, and in 1708 in the passage, by a regiment of dragoons, over the arm of the sea which separates the town of Sluis from the island of Cadzand. 314 MmOE OPERATIONS. Frencli army in 1672. At this place tlie river proved to be fordable in part, and tliere was only a distance of about 150 yards to be crossed by swimming. Louis XIV. directed the operation. His body-guard crossed by squadrons in regular formation, and in the words of Quincy, " it was an extraordinary spectacle to see these magnificent troops swimming in order of battle, in the midst of so broad and rapid a stream." * 5. Passage upon Ice. — Where a river is not frozen across its channel, plant two or three pointed trunks of trees, upright, in the bed of the river at a short distance down the stream, which wdll serve as a bar- rier to the floating ice, and thereby hasten the total congelation of the surface. Ice is not to be ventured upon where it does not touch the water ; for if it does not float, but forms arches, an excess of weight, and especially any sudden jar, may break it. It should be at least three inches thick for infantry, and four and a half inches for cav- alry and light artillery. From six and a half inches upwards, it supports the largest and most heavily loaded wagons. When the cold season continues, the thickness of * Histoire militaire de Louis XIV., t. i., p. 822. This river passage is almost always cited as one effected by fording alone. Santa-Cruz, however, says {Eejlexions militaires etpoUtiques, traduction Vergy, t. ii., p. 288) that the king's guard crossed the Ehine " more swimming than fording." This is the famous crossing commemorated by Boileau, and which Feuquiere characterizes as " a performance in which success was the result of temerity only, and which should never be cited as an exam- ple to be followed." (Memoires, part iii., chap. Isx.) PASSAGE OF EIVEES. 315 the ice may be artificially increased, if it appears to be insufficient : for this purpose, cover it with straw, sand, and hurdles; sprinkle with water frequently, especially in the evening, and wait a night. In crossing upon ice, the infantry should break step, and horsemen and drivers of vehicles should dismount. Sand and earth should be spread upon the ice, to save the men and horses from slipping. As to vehicles, artillery, eta, it is important to dis- tribute their weight over a large extent of the frozen surface, instead of allowing it to rest upon a single point : this will be accomplished by laying the road with two continuous rows of planks for the wheel tracks. But it will be still better to substitute sliding for rolling : for this purpose fasten the two wheels of each side upon a strong plank by quoins and clamps, thus converting the vehicle into a sledge, which can be readily dragged from one shore to the other. In all passages upon ice, particularly when they are executed by an army in retreat, redouble your activity and vigilance to avoid disorder and confusion, which would inevitably prove disastrous. We have two fine examples of river passages upon ice, in the progress of the Grand Elector of Branden- burg upon the frozen Frische-Haif (1679) with 9,000 men in sledges ; and in the capture of the Netherland fleet on the ice of the Zuyder Zee, by the French cav- aby, in the conquest of Holland by Pichegru, in 1795. 6. ImproTised Bridges. — The construction of most improvised bridges belongs to the artillery service. 316 MINOR OPERATIONS. We shall briefly consider only some of tlie most sim- ple kinds. Bridge of ladders. — A foot bridge sufficient for tlie passage of a small detachment over a brook, may be very quickly made of two stout ladders laid hori- zontally from bank to bank, and firmly secured. The rounds are placed vertically, and the distance between the two ladders may be about one yard. Planks laid closely throughout the whole length and secured to the two ladders, bind the whole together, and give a solid footpath. Bridges of undressed trees, — ^This is the simplest of all the bridges suitable for a river. It consists of trunks of trees in the bark, only their branches being trimmed off, thrown from one bank to the other — to the number of five or six, or more, according to the breadth desired for the bridge — and covered with any kind of planking. The possibility of constructing such bridges depends upon finding trees of sufficient length, which does not often happen except where the rivers are narrow. Bridge of wagons. — This kind of bridge, being more ingenious, than really useful, is rarely em- ployed ; but as it may serve in a case of urgency, we will describe it. One or more wagons are rolled into the water (where the stream is not more than forty yards wide, a single wagon in the middle will answer) and are secured with stakes. These serve as piers, upon which are laid beams, which are then covered with planks, to form the bridge-floor. Pieces of plank, or blocks, are inserted between the tops of the wagons \ PASSAGE OF RIVERS. 31T and the beams, to compensate for tlie inequalities of tlie bed, and to raise tlie level of the floor to the re- quisite height. This bridge can be employed only in a gentle cur- rent, and a depth of not more than two yards. In the year 1543, the French army in Italy had r(i- course to a similar bridge ; for we read in the Com- mentaires of Marshal Montluc that " the next day we passed the river Po, over which we constructed a bridge of wagons for the infantry, for the cavalry did not re- quire it, as the water only reached the horses' bellies." Bridge of ropes, — ^This bridge is used in moun- tainous countries, over torrents with precipitous banks, and where the construction of other kinds of bridges seems impossible. The most simple kind* consists of half a dozen ropes, an inch and a half in diameter, stretched from one bank to the other, about twenty inches apart, and kept in position by cross-pieces of Avood : upon these ropes a floor of plank is then laid. Such a bridge is only suitable for infantry. It is prudent also to pro- vide it with guard ropes answering as hand-rails ; and further, to diminish its oscillation by means of diag- onal ropes fastened to the banks. Its application is confined to streams of about twenty-five yards in breadth at the maximum. * In the wild parts of America, a simple cable stretched from one bank to the otlier answers for crossing brooks or torrents flowing at the bottom of a ravine ; but as we must then make use of our hands and feet to get across, and as the passage is always long, dangerous, and un- certain, this method cannot be recommended in a military point of view. 318 MINOR OPERATIOIS'S. A rope-bridge may also be constructed upon the principle employed for wire suspension-bridges. In this case, heavy pieces of timber are planted verti- cally on the two banks, in the place of abutments, to which two long cables are attached, w^hich hang in the catenary form and support the floor. This floor rests upon a number of cross-pieces, which are suspended by small vertical cords from the various points of the catenary. Small pile-hridge, — For the purpose of bringing two posts into communication, bridges are thrown over small rivers or brooks, resting ujoon j)iles, which are nothing more than heavy stakes or stout branches of trees. One or two rows of such piles, parallel to the direction of the stream, usually suffice. Strong transoms of plank are nailed upon the tops of the opposite piles, upon which beams are laid extending from bank to bank, forming the bridge-floor. Such a bridge is easily improvised, as these small piles may be driven with a simple maul, or hand pile- driver. p • CHAPTER FIFTH. CONVOYS. Introductiois'. — A convoy is an expedition de- signed to furnisli an army, body of troops, place, camp, or post, either witli money, arms, materiel, am- munition, provisions, live stock, or stores of any kind. The term is also applied to the conveyance of the sick, the wounded, and prisoners. For want of convoys an army may perish,* and therefore their organization demands the greatest care. Their outfit and superintendence come under two dif- ferent heads : one purely administrative, and apper- taining to the military intendance ; the other tactical, and appertaining to the command. We shall here con- sider only the latter, and shall regard a convoy as one of the minor operations of war From this point of view, a convoy should never march without an escort, for it is in vain to suppose that, because it is hehind the army, upon ground swept beforehand by the moving columns, it needs no protec- * " Lines of convoys," said Bulow, " are the muscles of the military body, whicli would become paralytic if they were sundered." (Esprit du systcme de guerre modeme^ trad. Laverne, p. 51, 52.) 320 MmOK OPERATIONS. tion of its own. The force and composition of this escort must be determined by the nature of the con- voy and the character of the country to be crossed, by the importance attached to its success, the distance to be travelled, the situation of the enemy, the disposi- tion of the inhabitants, and other circumstances of va- rious kinds. The escort is always larger for a convoy of materiel, and especially of powder, which it is im- portant to keep at a distance from the scene of com- bat, and out of danger from fire. It should generally be composed of infantry and a small body of cavalry, the number of the latter being diminished in propor- tion as the country is more woody or mountainous. This cavalry will serve to reconnoitre and watch the enemy. The principle is that the escort should be mixed^ so as to overcome all kind of difficulties and any obstacles it may meet ; consequently there should be added to it some artillery and a few sappers (or, for want of these, workmen of the country with their implements), who can be employed to level roads or to construct places of shelter. The grade of the commandant of a convoy is pro- portioned to the importance of the expedition. His authority is absolute over the troops of all the arms which compose the escort. The regulations prescribe merely that in the case of convoy of ammunition, he should defer to the advice of the artillery officer in respect to the precautions to be observed during the march and in halts. The command of such a convoy is usually given to an artillery officer, an arrangement which avoids all complication. CONVOYS. 321 Besides his verbal orders and explanations, the chief of a convoy receives the most detailed written instructions from the general who detaches him. No superior officer on the route can modify these instruc- tions, nor can he retard the march of the convoy ; but every one should rather, for the general good, endea- vor to promote its object. " The command of a convoy," says Jacquinot de Presle,* " is one of the most delicate missions with which an officer can be charged. In fact, nothing is more difficult to defend, or easier to attack, than a file of wagons, sometimes extending a long distance, which the least obstacle may impede. Whatever difficulties this operation may present, the officer to whom it is intrusted should nevertheless remember that, with in- telligence and courage, obstacles are often surmounted before which an ignorant man, without energy, would succumb ; for though the defence of a convoy is diffi- cult, the attack upon it is sometimes badly conceived or imperfectly managed." I 1. Organization of the Convoy. — As SOOn as the commanding officer has received his instructions and the necessary explanations, he collects the convoy and examines into the means placed at his disposal. I In respect to the troops, he reviews them as any chief of a detachment must, and sees that both infan- try and cavalry are provided with everything neces- ^^ sary in the way of ammunition and equipment. ^H In respect to the materiel, he examines in detail L ■ CouTB (Vart militaire, 1829, p. 554. 21 322 MINOR OPERATIONS. every wagon and its harness, as well as its load, to see whether the former are in good condition and the latter suitably distributed. Should they prove other- wise, he requires them to be changed, or at least to be repaired ; and should his demand not be complied with, he should represent distinctly the condition in which he is thus placed, in order to diminish, to that extent, his own responsibility in case of a reverse. For prudence, he requires several empty wagons, and also spare pieces; for example, wheels, poles, horse-shoes, ropes, etc. If the convoy is large, he divides it into several divisions, each of 500 wagons at the maximum,"^ and each division is then also subdivided into component groups of about 50 wagons each. In all cases, each isolated group should have a portion of the foot sol- diers of the escort to watch over and protect it ; and this will limit the subdivision and necessitate propor- tioning it to the number of the escort. Besides, the forces must not be so minutely parcelled off that they cannot act together ; in fact, an excessive distribution would convert a military expedition into a civic pro- cession, artistically grouped. The more valuable wagons are placed at the head of each division, in the following order : money, the j)apers and documents of the staff, arms, ammunition, provisions, equipment, officers' baggage in the order of grade, sutlers' and traders' equipages. By the liead^ we here mean the portion of the convoy which is the * One hundred wagons to a division is a good number. CONVOYS. 323 strongest or best protected.^ To speak more generally, this portion should embrace those vehicles the pres- ei-vation of which is of the greatest importance, in re- lation to the special object in view. In a convoy of prisoners, those who are known to be the most hostile and dangerous are to be placed at the head. In a mixed convoy, composed of wagons and beasts of bur- den, the latter will take the head,f in order that the roads may not be cut up by the wheels before they pass, and also that they may more readily escape in case of attack. Like every marching column, the convoy is organ- ized with an advance-guard and a rear-guard. The lat- ter is required, because in this operation an attack upon the rear is as probable as any other ; in addi- tion, it is well to have a reserve to act as a guard and to fight upon the most exposed flank. The advance- guard, the rear-guard, the main body, and the reserve, have each their own commander ; the commandant of the convoy reserves no special command, in order to be free to go everywhere and examine everything. In the organization of a convoy, it is necessary to bear in mind certain numerical data, the most useful of which are given in the following summary : One caisson carries, \ ^^^^ ^'""'''^'^ .... 1,650 pounds.^ ( with oxen, .... 770 " One mule carries, on his back, on the average, 220 " One horse " " " 190 " One ox " " " 130 " * The enemy frequently allows the head to pass, in order that the rest of the convoy may feel more secure. t Thus pack horses, for example, should go before the wagons. I Including the weight of the caisson, the load being thus only 1,320 lbs. 324 MINOR OPERATIONS. A caisson witli four horses occupies in the iile about thirteen yards, with a breadth of five feet, and requires an interval of at least one yard in the rank and one and a half yards in the file. On level ground it can move at the rate of two and a half miles per hour; in hilly country only one and three quarter miles per hour. It will be well rather to fall below these numbers than to exceed them ; and in order that the loads may not be increased beyond the amount fixed at the out- set, the soldiers should be forbidden to put their knapsacks upon the wagons. 2. OTarcli of tlie Convoy. — Before setting out, the country through which the convoy is to pass is to be examined ; this service is performed by spies or partisans, and is also to be continued during the march. The march should be performed at a uniform rate, rather too slow than too fast, in order that the slowest team may keep up with the rest ; for it is im- portant that the convoy should not increase its length, since it would become disjointed, and more exposed to attack. The advance-guard precedes the convoy. The common rule is that it should start two hours in ad- vance when the country is level, and only one houi' when it is broken. It is better to be governed by the principle that its distance from the main body should increase with the length of the convoy, in order that it may, by reason of this very distance, give the latter time to make its defensive preparation. When this 1 CONVOYS. 325 distance is considerable, it would be well to have a second advance-guard of quite small force, and very near, capable of resisting an enemy who had escaped the notice of the first. The business of the advance-guard is to reconnoi- tre, to remove obstacles, and to transmit information to the commandant. For these purposes, it reexam- ines places of concealment, such as woods, villages, and defiles, and keeps up a communication with the convoy through horsemen distributed along the route. The march is generally in two files.* On the out- =;ide, two soldiers keep a watch upon the drivers of wagons which have been drawn from the country by requisition. These drivers, being also taken from the country, may be treacherous, for example, by upset- ting their vehicle in some difficult spot, where there might be an ambuscade ; or, not being soldiers, they may attempt to escape in time of danger. The guards have orders to fire upon any one who attempts to run away. In each fraction of the convoy, a number of work- men are charged with the examination of the wagons during the march, and to point out, in advance, as far as possible, any one in which an accident is likely to occur. If, notwithstanding this precaution, a wagon breaks, or if for any reason it requires repair, it is * If the road is too narrow, and does not admit of two files for more than a league at a time, it will be better to march in single file altogeth- er, so as not to lose time and produce disorder by continual changes of formation. 326 MINOR OPERATIONS. taken off the road, and when repaired, takes its place in the rear. If the repair is impossible, the load and 'the horses are distributed among the nearer wagons. The escort, in protecting the convoy, takes posses- sion of all dangerous positions or outlets in the vicin- ity of the route,* and does not abandon them till all the wagons have passed. If, for example, a defile is to be passed, the escort occupies the neighboring heights, and endeavors to discover the enemy from as great a distance as possible. In this case it is proper to divide the escort into several parts — especially when the defile is not sufficient for the passage of more than one wagon — so that the defenders may be nearer to the objects which the^^ are required to guard : they are to be reunited after the passage is effected. When arriving at the point of destination, so far from becoming careless and negligent, the command- ant redoubles his care and vigilance, to make a proper disposition of affairs in conjunction with the friendly detachment that has been sent out to meet the con- voy, or else to join the outposts of the camp or the place without producing confusion. 3. Halts and Parks. — The convoy stops every hour to give the horses time to breathe, and to allow lagging wagons to come up ; these are short halts of ^ve min- utes. Long halts, during which the convoy may be attacked, or at least be observed and counted by the * For example, the debouches of a river or of a chain of mountains, when the convoy is moving parallel to one of these almost impassable obstacles. CONVOYS. 327 emissaries of the enemy, should be avoided. They should be indulged in only at strong positions, in places previously reconnoitred, and known to be fa- vorable for defence. In all cases, the horses are not to be unharnessed, even for feeding, and the drivers should remain near them. While resting, a military guard must be maintained. The expedition may occupy several days, and then the convoy is parked at night. Sometimes, also, it is parked by day, as well as by night, when it is obliged to stop in consequence of the occupation of the road by a considerable force of the enemy ; the park then assumes a more defensive and solid form than in the first case. In the park of a convoy, the wagons occupy the exterior, or perimeter, whilst the horses, whether har- nessed or not, being more vulnerable, are upon the interior. If there are caissons loaded with inflam- mable materiel, they are drawn up with the horses as much in the centre and as completely sheltered from the projectiles of the enemy as possible. The form of the park may be either closed or open. When closed, it offers more resistance, and somewhat resembles an intrenchment ; it is, in fact, a barricade of wagons, sometimes circular, sometimes rectangular, employed for a regular and obstinate defence. We here give three examples of it : The park 'No. 1, which we take from Joly de Maizeroy,* is protected on the outside by the grand I * Cours de tactique, 1785, t. ii. la this park, the wagons might also be placed at right angles to the circumference (the figure represents them II 328 MmOR OPERATIONS. guards and several pieces of artillery, and tlie platoons of the infantry of the escort are placed within, behind the circle formed by the wagons. When the wagons are very numerous, this author recommends that two such parks be formed and connected tactically by cavalry placed between them in one or two lines. This cavalry takes the place of a curtain in fortifi- cation. PAEK NO. 1. El ^v /^ c:=^ ^ < y ^ r, ^ ^ ^\ / / ISI The park No. 2, taken from the " Eegulations for the Prussian Cavalry," established by Frederic the Great, presents a solid arrangement with an interior space, which is very useful. With the rear resting upon a river, it is defended on the front and flanks by platoons of infantry covered by chevaux-de-frise ; and upon the most advanced angles, by cannon, firing with their length in the circumference) the hind wheels being outside and the poles toward the centre. This would require more wagons, but the barricade would be more dense and solid. CONVOYS. 329 either balls or grape, according as tlie enemy is at a PAKK NO. 2. WW -WW WW AAAK AAAA AAA a . 'Ill II III! III! . [] WACONS FACING EACH OTHER U \ HllflmlrtmlllmmmmWm i nlji()KnlnttKlnhllrilHln m WOUNDED Ui Hi III til Iff lb' i!t iSi A til 111 III ^n WAGONS FACING EACH OTHER ' iUiiUtlltt PAKK NO. 8. JxZFimeel GnarcL greater or less distance. This park is fally prepared to receive the enemy. A close formation, with the horses in the interior, shown in park No. 3, is that to which we would naturally resort, when the convoy is marching in two files upon a wide road, and is suddenly met by an imposing force of the enemy. [1 The park No. 4, given by the Arch- duke Charles,* is suitable in cases of attacks by a small force. Being formed of partial parks by divisions, situated at the same distances as in columns, it possesses the advantage, both in ' forming and in breaking up, of resuming the march iijl * Principes de la grand guerre^ p. TO, and plate ix. of Diiparcq's translation. 330 MINOR OPEEATIONS. with great facility, as all the divisions can move at the same time without incommoding each other. PARK NO. 4. Ijf y 1 1 1 iiiif In the parks 2, 3, 4, the horses remain harnessed to the wagons, whilst in No. 1 they are stationed in the centre. In all the parks, the drivers bivouac near their horses and watch them. In general, the parks are to be formed far from in- habited places and woods which would afford facil- ities to the enemy ; and advantage is to be taken of any obstacles of the ground to diminish the number of points of attack. These details respecting parks show that convoys, while supplying an army, may also become a defen- sive accessory : they then receive the name of tahors (intrenchment of baggage for defence against cavalry). Zisca, the chief of the Hussites, made great use of CONVOYS. 331 them in the early paii: of the fifteenth century ; and more recently the Cossacks have employed them very successfully in resisting superior armies and extricat- ins: themselves from critical situations. 4. Befeiice of the Convoy. — As a convoy includes a large number of non-combatants, and may therefore be seized with a sudden panic upon the appearance of the enemy, it is prudent and useful to exercise the whole body, from time to time, in the manoeuvre it would be required to execute in case of attack. At the first intimation of the approach of the ene- my, the files are closed and greater order is observed in marching. Without seeking the combat, the escort watches the positions which overlook the route, and in case of necessity disputes them ; but if the enemy is in too great force, it will be necessary to halt. In this case, the best course is at once to put the horses in safety, to prevent their being hamstrung. The manoeuvre is simple : the right file turns to the left, and the left file to the right, bringing the heads of the teams toward each other, as in the park No. 3 : no wagons are placed across the front and rear unless the contest becomes serious, and calls for the employment of every resource. The essential point is, in general, to keep the ene- my at a distance, especially from a convoy of ammuni- tion or of sick and wounded. This is to be done by the skirmishers, and while the fight is carried on at a distance, the convoy, covered on all sides, should file off at increased speed and endeavor to gain some 332 MINOR OPEEATIONS. woods or village, or any obstacle which may serve as a shelter. This method will be successful where the attack is only upon the flank. If the position of the enemy is not exactly known, it would be better, pro- vided the force of the assailant is not too formidable, to halt the convoy during the action, and to resume the march after the road has been cleared. The attack on the flank will almost always be central. As soon as this is ascertained, the reserve or the main body of the escort is to be reenforced at the expense of the advance and rear-guards. This main body is to occupy the threatened positions along the route, during the whole time the convoy is passing. In the case of an attack on the front, the advance- guard occupies these positions, which are successively relieved, but no position is abandoned until the last wagon has passed. An attack in the rear is repelled by the rear-guard, which makes a stubborn defence while retiring by echelons, throwing up obstructions and cutting off all communication. The rear-guard in this case keeps up a communication with the convoy, for the transmis- sion of intelligence, by horsemen distributed along the road. In passing a dangerous place, it is proper not only to occupy the heights and threatening positions in good season, but also to divide the convoy into small convoys completely organized, each having its own advance-guard, rear-guard, reserve, and even flankers : under this multiple protection they will be able to pass in security, one after the other. CONVOYS. 333 Should tlie defence fail, and tlie enemy prove vie- - torious, the wagons should not be suffered to fall into his hands untouched. In the first place, a certain number of them are to be sacrificed, and employed, in. a dilapidated condition, to obstruct the road, while the remainder, to which the horses of the broken wagons will be added, are hurried away. If this sacrifice does not avail, everything is to be destroyed ; the wagons burned, and the horses killed, or at least hamstrung ; and then, sword in hand, the escort must cut its way through the surrounding foi'ce of the enemy. The escort should be satisfied with repelling the enemy, and never attempt to pursue ; for its principal duty is to remain near the wagons and protect them ; besides, it would run the risk of falling into an am- buscade. In the defence of a convoy of prisoners, it is neces- sary to observe the precaution of compelling the prisoners to lie down during the engagement with the enemy, and not to rise, under pain of death, until the signal is given ; ^ otherwise, many a prisoner would be able to assist the assailant by signs, or by various attempts of a dangerous character. In this connection the regulations recommend that the convoy reach some village as soon as possible, where the prisoners can be shut up in some large building, the approach to which is to be defended. This method exposes the escort to a more destinictive fire, as the enemy will no 11 * The same penalty is to be inflicted, during the march, upon any prisoner who resists orders or attempts to leave the ranks. 334 3^nN0R OPERATIONS. longer be deterred by tlie fear of hitting their own men when these are protected behind walls. In the conduct and defence of a convoy, the ele- ments of success are activity, resolution, coolness, and perpetual vigilance. In the words of Frederic, " The officer in command must preserve his temper under all provocations and difficulties, and should especially be on his guard against false reports." 5. Attack of a Convoy. — We may attack a convoy with a force inferior to the escort ; for in this species of action the advantage is on the side of the assailant, who chooses his own time and place, and brings a solid force against a scattered one ; and if he also re- sorts to stratagem and false attacks, he will stand a good chance of success in his principal attack. The attack of a convoy is based upon previous in- formation respecting the nature of this convoy, the management of those who conduct it, and local pecu- liarities. A convoy of prisoners or of animals may be carried off by cavalry alone. In other cases it is necessary to have infantry, cavalry, and a few howit- zers. These last are indispensable, as, wdthout them, we could hardly undertake an attack upon a park. The corps of attack is divided into three masses : one destined to engage the escort, a second to fall upon the wagons, and the third to remain in reserve. The first mass commences by harassing the escort, so as to weary it and lead it into the commission of some error; then, profiting by this error, the uncovered convoy is attacked with lightning speed. In ground CONVOYS. 335 more or less hemmed in by elevations, attacking botli extremities of the colmnn has the advantage of throw- ing the centre itself into confusion and uncertainty. Upon level open ground, we should confine the attack to the centre, thereby cutting the convoy in two, and gaining a cheaper victory over the separated por- tions. In the midst of such an attack, a few well- timed shells spread terror among the enemy, and hasten the result. If the convoy forms into a park to resist, the at- tack becomes more difiicult. We must then prepare to make a breach in the park, precisely as in a wall. If we have not sufficient artillery to cut an opening through the perimeter of the park, it will be better to wait until the convoy resumes its march, and then to take it in the rear. In attacking a convoy, it is not always intended to capture and carry off all the wagons. In general, we are satisfied with seizing those w^hich, from certain indications, or information given by prisoners, are known to be the most valuable. Frequently, indeed, the design of an attack is still less ambitious, the only object being to disorganize the convoy by thrusts at one or more points. For this purpose the attacking body ambuscades the con- voy sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other, and rushes through it several times, each time doing as much damage as possible, by cutting the traces, hamstringing the horses, upsetting, breaking, and setting fire to the wagons. In this operation, where it is necessary to move among numerous obsta- 336 MmOE OPEKATIOI^S. cles, the chasseurs, and especially tlie foot chasseurs, are most suitable. 6. Convoys toy "Water. — We have thus far been speaking exclusively of convoys by land. Convoys by water* are also important. They transport bulky and heavy supplies with extremely simple means and at small expense : for example, we consider ourselves for- tunate if we have a water conveyance for bringing a supply of siege equipage before a fortified place. The infantry of the escort is distributed in small bodies upon the several boats ; there are, in addition, an advance-guard and a rear-guard of foot, in boats specially provided for them ; sometimes also flankers, on light boats, where the river is sufficiently wide to allow it. The cavalry of the escort follows upon the borders of the stream, and keeps open its communica- tion with the convoy. It is preceded and followed by an advance-guard and rear-guard of mixed composi- tion ; these are frequently useful in bearing import- ant intelligence to the floating convoy touching its safety. For greater security, there should be some spare boats, to convey the infantry from one side of the river to the other, when required, in order to line both banks where the progress of the convoy is re- tarded ; as, for example, at a bridge or a dam, or in shallow water. When the river flows between steep hills, almost all the infantry of the escort marches on land, with * Upon rivers or canals. Convoys hy sea are of nrncli assistance in provisioning an army ; but as they are in general protected by a maritime force, they do not come ■within the scope of this work. CONVOYS. 337 advance and rear-guards, for the purpose of preventing the enemy from occupying the heights, from which they could easily annoy the convoy. The defence of a water convoy is simple. While the attacked escort is fighting upon the bank (employ- ing chiefly fire-arms), the convoy halts in the vicinity. If the escort gains the ascendency, the convoy pro- ceeds under its protection ; if otherwise, it makes all speed to escape ; but if this becomes impossible, the boats are scuttled. Ik A convoy by water is easily destroyed, even with a small force.* The best plan is to ambuscade it in a bend of the river, in a wooded spot, and where the channel runs near the shore, so as to be able to attack (especially with cannon) both on the front and the flank, and even to enfilade the convoy, which is occa- l| sionally possible, as the an- nexed figure shows. If this multiplied attack does not bring the convoy to a halt, the cannon are aimed at the water line of each boat, to sink them by letting in water; at the same time, the conductors and defenders of the boat are picked off by musket shots. In this way, the attack being con- stantly renewed, the boats will be obliged to surrender. ATTACK OF A CONVOY BOATS. OF * We raay damage such a convoy by filling its route with obstacles in advance, such as iron chains stretched under the surface of the water, sunken boats, fireships, stockades, etc. In combination with one or more of these obstacles, the attack will be formidable. 22 338 MINOR OPERATIONS. After tlie convoy is captured, a difficulty presents itself: for to carry it by water is to follow a route marked out and known by tke enemy, and upon wkick the convoy is expected ; and to carry it by land requires considerable means of transportation, prob- ably more than the country can furnish. Of these two j)roceedings, the latter is to be preferred, except in a case of extreme scarcity of transportation ; but order to carry it out, it may be necessary to sacrifi< and destroy a considerable portion of the materiel o: the convoy. •y. Historical Sxamples. — I. Tlie siege of Ooi'hie prevented hy the entrance of a convoy. — After the taking of the towns Thionville and Arlon by the French army in 1558, the king of Spain marched with his troops in great haste to lay siege to Corbie. The French were at a loss how to get succor to the place, for, from Marches, where they then lay, to Corbie, the distance is some thirty leagues, and in that day troops marched slowly. Nevertheless, Montluc offered to undertake the expedition, promising to reach Corbie before the king of Spain. His advice was at first rejected in the council, and was attributed to his boasting disposition ; but he, in his usual man- ner, flew into a passion and cried, " If the king will but permit, I will succor the town, or perish ; " upon which he was authorized to act as he desired. Quickly enrolling in his service seven ensigns, and collecting together bread, w^ine, oats, hay, and a chest full of powder, drawn by three horses, this adventurous sol- CONVOYS. 339 dier, who excelled in petty warfare, was about to start, when the king sent him word that, as " colonel-gen- eral " of the infantry ad interim^ he must remain to command the regiments in person in case of a battle, and that the command of the convoy that had been prepared was assigned to Captain Brueil. The latter acquitted himself with credit ; he marched chiefly by night, with prudence and circumspection, stopping in hidden places, and avoiding the villages ; and was only two nights out. At sunrise after the second night, he appeared before Corbie. At about 300 paces from the town he was assailed by the Spanish cavalry, but, putting his troop on the gallop, he reached the gate of the city, and then made a stand against the enemy upon the edge of the ditch. The convoy lost seven or eight stragglers, but succeeded in entering the place with the powder, after which the Spaniards no longer ventured to undertake the siege. This example illustrates the value of celerity and prudence in conducting a convoy, and proves that a little timely succor thrown into a place may save it from being besieged. II. Partial success of a convoy introduced into Lille in 1708. — In this year, Prince Eugene, covered by the army of Marlborough, after his conquest of Oudenarde, proceeded to lay siege to Lille. The French marshal Boufflers, with 1,600 men, immor- talized himself by his defence of the city, which is re- garded as one of the most brilliant defences on record. Nevertheless, Lille fell, and history proves that this was in a great measure due to the want of skill of the 340 MmOE OPEEATIONS. French army of relief, in suffering convoys sent to the famished troops of Eugene to pass. We have, how- ever, one instance of a brilliant coup-de-main, which makes some amends for this want of skill in other, cases. At the commencement of the siege, the Chevalier de Luxembourg, who was subsequently made Marshal of Montmorency, was sent from Douai to introduce a convoy of powder into Lille. He collected " 150 grenadiers and 2,000 cavalry, each carrying a musket, a bayonet, and a bag of fifty pounds of powder. To deceive the enemy, these troops assumed the dress of the Dutch soldiers." ^ After several demonstrations, with a view to divert the attention of the allies, Lux- embourg gave Marshal Boufflers notice of his design, and commenced his march. Upon leaving Douai, at Pont-a-Kache, several horsemen of the centre of the column carelessly spilled some powder upon the pave- ment, which was ignited by sparks struck from the stones by the iron shoes of the horses in the rear of the column ; a number of men and horses were scorched, but the expedition was still able to proceed. It reached the camp of the besiegers upon a dark night, and represented itself as bringing ammunition to the allies, and being pursued by the French. A senti- nel hailed them in Dutch, and an officer replied in the * De Vault, Memoires relatifs d, la succession cfEspagne^ t. viii., p. 107. The supply destined for Lille appears, therefore, to have consisted of 2,000 muskets and 100,000 pounds of powder. It was also designed that two regiments of infantry should be thrown into the place at the same time. I I same language, " Soldiers of Marlborough." Having reached the interior barrier, a close scrutiny by the captain of the guard had to be undergone, but all his questions were satisfactorily answered, and the gate was opened. Some 1,900 had already passed, when one of the officers, impatient at the slow move- ment of some of the horsemen, gave the imprudent or- der Serre^ serre (Close up, close up). At these words the officer of the guard at once suspected the ruse, and ordered the detachment to halt. Luxembourg paying no attention to the order, the enemy fired, and three bags of the powder were exploded, killing sixty Frenchmen with their horses. Nevertheless, nearly the whole body penetrated into the town with their ammunition, while the rear of the convoy succeeded in escaping back to Douai. But for the untimely exclamation of the French officer, the entire convoy would have succeeded in en- tering the place. This illustrates the necessity of pos- sessing sufficient presence of mind, in ruses of this kind, to carry them out successfully to the end. Bet- ter not attempt them at all, than to unmask the de- sign too soon. III. Attach of a water convoy. — In the campaign of 1710, Marshal Villars learning that a convoy was on the way, by water, to the allies, who were besieging Aire, formed a project to cut it off: This convoy, consisting of fifty barks, came down the river Lys, escorted by 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. The attack was made at the village of Saint- Eloi-Vive, between Deynse and Courtrai. The convoy 842 MINOR OPERATIONS. halted, and the escort formed its order of battle, with the cavalry on the right, without protection, the in- fantiy in the centre and on the left, the front covered by three ditches, the left resting upon an impassable marsh connecting with the river. The attacking corps detached by Villars was under the orders of Kavignau, and consisted of 800 grena- diers, 1,500 fusiliers, and 300 dragoons. Eavignau extended his left to outflank the enemy's right, and occupied a road by which the opposing cavalry might debouch upon his infantry. His right, composed of fusiliers, confined itself to firing across the marsh ; his centre, consisting of grenadiers, crossed the three ditches and beat down the enemy at the point of the bayonet ; his left, which included the dragoons, over- threw the cavalry of the allies, and, turning to the right, took their infantry by the flank. Almost all the allied detachment were taken prisoners (500 men), slain, or drowned. The horses who pulled the trans- ports were also taken, and used by the victors to car- ry off their prey. As to the powder, instead of throw- ing it into the water, the victorious troops adopted the singular expedient of setting fire to the three trans- ports which contained it ; the consequence of which imprudence was an explosion of such magnitude that the Lys was separated into two unnavigable branches, and the village of Saint-Eloi-Vive laid in ruins.* IV. Attack of a land convoy. — In the month of June, 1758, Frederic, having laid siege to Olmutz with * Histoire de Marlborough., an anonymous work emanating from the imperial press, Paris, 1806, t. iii., p. 229 to 232. I CONVOYS. 343 an army of comparatively feeble force, found Limself in need of large supplies of ammunition. He expected from Silesia a convoy of 3,000 wagons, wliicli should have come by Troppau, and took, unfortunately, a road in the possession of the enemy. The convoy started with an escort of 9,000 men, under the orders of Colonel Mosel. Its march was slow and irregular, in consequence of the bad state of the roads, which were gullied by heavy rains, and a large number of the wagons stuck fast in the mud. Mosel left one third of his wagons behind, and, thus lightenea, continued his march. While passing along a deep road, he was assailed by some Croates posted in a wood, and repulsed them ; but a number of the peasant drivers being panic-struck, unhitched their teams during the fight, and ran off with the horses. The convoy was thus reduced to one half. ISTeverthe- less, being strengthened by a reenforcement sent by Frederic, it continued to advance, until it was stopped near a wooded defile by 25,000 Austrians, who, firing upon the horses to disable them, and upon the cais- sons of powder to explode them, spread confusion in all directions. The escort drew up by platoons upon the whole line of wagons, and covering them in this way, sustained the conflict for two hours ; but being everywhere weak, they were comj)elled to yield to the attacking columns in spite of their brave and stubborn resistance. All the convoy was destroyed excepting only 250 wagons, including 37 loaded with money, which reached the camp of the king. The Prussians were compelled by this loss to raise the 344 MmOR OPERATIONS. siege of Olmutz ; * and tHs event had an important influence upon tlie whole campaign. V. Rescue of a convoy of prisoners, — In 1806, after the battle of Jena, the Prussian lieutenant Hel- wig planned and executed an attack upon a convoy of prisoners. This convoy, containing 8,000 Prussian prisoners, was on its way to Mayence, and had to pass through Erfurt. He waited for it with eighty horses in ambush near Eichrodt, which is in the vicinity of Erfurt, on the route from Eisenach to Goth a, and not far from the entrance into the defiles of Thuringia. Dividing his force into three platoons, he fell apon the four companies of infantry composing the whole escort, and finally routed them, as they proved too feeble both to fight and at the same time guard so many men.f The escort retreated, and the prisoners were rescued. J This is one of the most striking examples of the bad consequences resulting from the employment of too small an escort, especially for a convoy of pris- oners. VI. He-capture of a convoy, — In the year 1811, in the environs of Placentia, Spain, some French dra- goons seized upon a convoy of seventy mules loaded with wine, which made them drunk, and in this con- dition attacked a body of Portuguese infantry. It * Arclienholtz, Histoire de la guerre de Sept Ans, traduction clu Baron de Bock, Metz, 1789, 12mo. ; t. i., p. 102 to 106. t At the same period I find a French escort composed of eighteen com- panies and two pieces of artillery, for a convoy of 22,000 prisoners. This is also weak, but much less so than four companies for 8,000 prisoners. J I borrow this fact from Jacquinot de Presle. CONVOYS. 345 need hardly be said that they were repulsed and the convoy taken from them.* This example shows that when a convoy has been once captm^ed, the first care should be to put it out of reach of danger. * Napier's History of the Peninsular War. CHAPTER SIXTH PAKTISANS* The term partisans is given to isolated bodies in- tended to reconnoitre for the army from whicli they are sent, and also to protect it,f or else to harass, to retard, and to deceive the enemy ; to cut off their sup- plies, and to weaken them, by comjDelling them to send off detachments ; or again to punish the popula- tion by levying contributions, etc. Partisans do not act solely at a venture, as might be supposed, nor do they trust themselves rashly to chance ; but their operations are connected with the general plan of campaign, and depend upon the gen- eral-in-chief under whose orders they are undertaken. This condition shows at once the restrictions under * The reader is referred to art. xi. of the Ordonnance sur le service en campagne. Notwithstanding the official existence of this article in re- spect to partisans, we would observe that in the present century the French (and also the English) have almost wholly dispensed with parti- san warfare. t Hence they are frequently also q,q[\q(\. JlanTcers. The Ordonnance says ^^ corps of partisans,'''' and ^'■detachments of fianlcers,'''' whence it ap- pears that the latter may be less numerous and have not the same need of a separate organization. PAETISANS. 347 wbicli partisans at the present day exist, being sub- jected (except as to the execution of their orders) to that regularity and centralization which distinguish not only modern armies, but all associations ; and hence, also, we see how widely they differ from the ]3artisans of the Thirty Years' War, and even from those of the Seven Years' War, in respect to the free- dom of their movements. The composition and force of these corps are pre- scribed in the French regulations, according to the object to be accomplished, the difficulties to be sur- mounted, the length of the route to be travelled, and the probable duration of the expedition. They may sometimes embrace troops of different arms,* but in preference should consist of light cavalry, which is able to surprise, to strike, and to retire, almost before being perceived, and certainly before being compro- mised. The aim should be to form them, not of many Soldiers, but of very good ones — for here quality is mch more important than quantity, as history fully roves. Therefore, select your volunteer partisans (I ay volunteer^ because the first condition is to secure len whose disposition leads them to this kind of ser- ice), from among men who are experienced in war nd in outpost service, good marksmen, skilful with he bayonet and sabre, accustomed to gymnastic exer- ises, and good horsemen ; men who will not object to * This is stated in conformity with the regulations referred to. Gen- ..ral Dufour {Cours de Tactique, second edition, p. 346), thinks there should be no mixture of the two arms (infantry and cavab-y), in order that there may be less embarrassment in marching, and greater mobility. 348 MINOR OPERATIONS. taking hold of a spade or a pickaxe when necessary, and who are fond of the soldier's life ; men of honor and self devotion ; especially let them be temperate and robust men, for they will be compelled to suffer the privations and hardships of the smuggler in addi- tion to those of the soldier. One half the infantry of a corps of partisans should be pioneers, with some artillerists. The light cavalry will answer very well if com- posed of ^\^ hundred men, taken by fifties, from the regiments of chasseurs, hussars, and lancers. The best corps of partisans will be found to be those free and irregular corps which are raised during war by officers of reputation, who are detailed both to form and command them ; or better still, those who rise into notice in consequence of political events, and choose their own leaders. The latter free corps should have their existence legalized by a species of letter of marque : they may be called land privateers.* There are certain essential qualities which should be combined in a partisan chief, even more than in a commandant of a detachment, and the proper selec- tion of such a chief is of even greater importance than the composition of the corps. He is to be chosen from among the officers of the most willing dispo- sition, without regard to priority of rank ; further, he should be young and yet experienced, and should be able to speak the language of the country. This com- * Some authors give the name of partisans only to these free and ir- regular corps; regarding those as provisional, and properly to be desig- nated as " parties," which are composed of detachments of light troops. PARTISANS. 349 bination of qualities will certainly be difficult to find ; yet not impossible, if the general is possessed of suffi- cient penetration and decision to distinguish and at tlie same time disregard the jealousies which are so apt to be excited by rising talent. A partisan chief should be of an ardent temperament and glowing imascination, rather than a cool thinker or methodical calculator. He should, besides, be vigilant, firm, col- lected, disinterested, prompt, adroit, vigorous both in conception and in execution, of strong will, and the determined resolution to succeed.* The operations of partisans embrace all those which belong to petty warfare ; and since the corps which executes them is not strong in numbers, it must have recourse to a thousand expedients to compen- sate for its feebleness, relying especially upon cunning and audacity, and should make its preparations and act with secrecy. For such a corps, to obtain much with little, is a necessity ; and therefore, except when upon a special mission, it may in general try its fortune and venture upon hazardous and doubtful enterprises ; for if it succeeds it renders an important service, and if it perishes the loss is comparatively small. Above all, it must cause itself to be respected. In a friendly country, there will be no difficulty in this respect, if the conduct of the corps is such as to in- spire confidence and admiration. In a hostile country, it should keep the population in a state of quiet sub- mission, and for this purpose it must not hesitate to * Davidoff, Essai sur la guerre de partisans, traduction du colonel comte Heraclius do Polignac, p. 65, 66. 350 MmOR OPERATIONS. make examples when necessary. It must, moreover, multiply itself, so to speak, and wherever it goes must create alarm and disturbance, to conceal the feebleness of its actual numbers. Even when surprised and almost surrounded by treachery, the corps should never surrender ; but, as such an event must have been provided for in advance, each soldier, at a given signal of the chief, should make his escaj)e and steal away among the obstacles of the ground, to meet his comrades at some previously appointed place of ren- dezvous. When once separated from the army, partisans should bid adieu to idleness and rest, which would lose them the chance of more than one attack. Their eyes must never close, and if they are overcome for an instant by fatigue, they must throw out a line of spies, to give them warning of the approach of danger. They march, as much as possible, concealed from the enemy by the elevations of the ground. Informa- tion previously obtained from maps or from the in- habitants, will direct the march, which is also to be facilitated by a guide, while it is reconnoitred and protected by flankers, posts, and sometimes sentinels or vedettes. They march chiefly by night, and always with order, silence, and discipline. To ferret out everything, they make frequent and radical changes of direction. They must be hindered by nothing, for the lightness of their equipment gives them the great- est mobility. They avoid inhabited places. When obliged to pass through them, they search them, or take hostages I PARTISANS. 351 from among the most notable persons. "Wlien merely obliged to pass near them, they make requisitions upon them for provisions and forage for a larger number of men than their troop contains, which little ruse serves to intimidate the population, and keep them in check. They conceal their approach to the enemy until the last moment. Having arrived at the favorable point, they attack with vigor and spirit, and so that neither their designs nor their numbers can be dis- covered. Their action is doubled in value by its un- expectedness and by the vigor of its blows. In this respect they have been compared to vultures darting i upon their prey. Or else, they ambuscade and wait ; I which is a game they can easily play, especially in I rainy and foggy weather. ^B When an engagement appears doubtful, they at l^^once retire without hesitation. I The regulations recommend that the chief of a I corps of partisans should communicate the object of his expedition to the chief who comes immediately after him. This formality should always be strictly observed ; for he may perish, while the orders con- cerning the object and extent of the operation, as well as the point of rendezvous, are secret orders, which cannot be understood by anybody merely from an inspection and comparison of the first acts of the ! corps, as may be done in the case of most other de- tachments. Accordino; to article 119 of the " Service en Gam- pagne^'^ prizes taken by partisans belong to them, when it has been shown by the authentic declaration 352 MINOR OPERATIONS. of a competent authority, that these prizes consist of things taken from the enemy.* They are sold for the benefit of the partisans, with the exception of arms and munitions of war, which are appropriated to the use of the army, an allowance nearly equivalent to their value being made for them. The division of the profits of this sale, or indemnity, among the partisans, is made according to rank : Each superior officer receives . . . .5 parts. Each captain 4 " Each lieutenant (first or second) .... 3 " ,■ Each non-commissioned officer . . . . 2 " Each corporal or soldier 1 " The commandant of the expedition has six parts besides what his grade gives him. This arrangement applies to any isolated detachment which succeeds in bringing in a prize : " It would be unjust and impoli- tic," says General Preval, " to deprive detachments of this privilege." It appears from this that the hope of gain serves also to excite the zeal and increase the courage of par- tisans. But another consequence is a tendency to ra- pacity, which is constantly fed by new gains. The general-in-chief will therefore find it expedient to force them to make an exact list of all the requisitions which they have exacted, and to produce this list upon their return, accompanied with certificates from the local authorities. A number of partisan leaders have made them- selves distinguished names. In the beginning of the * Things taken from the inhabitants are returned to them. PARTISANS. 353 Thirty Years' War (1618), Count Ernest de Mansfeld, a man of excessive ferocity, distinguislied himself as a partisan chief. In lYOO, we have in France Dumoulin, who in the midst of winter, marched with his dragoons fifteen leagues without halting, to form an ambuscade. In the wars for the succession in Austria (from 1T40 to 1745), we notice among the Austrians the fierce Mentzel, Trenck, a cousin of the celebrated pris- oner of Frederic II. at Magdebourg, and Nadasty, with his Pandours ; and among the French, Fischer, the founder of a corps which bore his name, Grassin, and La Morliere. During the Seven Years' War, we may mention Lieutenant-colonel Emmerich, the author of a small work upon the special duties of partisans ; in the campaign of 1809, the Prussian major Schill ; and between 1812 and 1814, the Eussians. Seslawine and Michel Orloffi We cite a few historical examples, to illustrate the nature of the operations executed by partisans. 1st. Dangeau relates that on the 21st June, 1710, a French partisan, leaving Namur with 250 men, succeeded in entering Lille, overcame the guard which was at the gate, proceeded to the centre of the town, and took the whole guard, killing their commander. He then pillaged the houses of the minister of the emperor and the residence of a Dutch officer who com- manded in Liege, and having secured a large amount of booty, left the city with 50 prisoners. In this afi'air, there was but one soldier killed and one wounded." * * Journal de Dangeau^ nouvelle 4(1., par MM. Souli^, Dnssieux, de Chemievidres, etc. 23 354 3IIN0E OPERATIONS. 2d. In 1712, Marshal Villars detached " Pasteur, a brigadier of the troops from Spain, and a very good partisan, for the purpose of penetrating into Holland, where there were no troops. This officer acquitted himself well ; he approached very close to Rotterdam, and burned the small towns of Tortolles and Sleim- bourg. This expedition astonished the Dutch, who were not accustomed to see us so near to them." * 3d. " A partisan officer having remarked that two regiments of the enemy, w^hile on a march, had en- camped on the two opposite sides of a ravine, to pass the night, stole into the ravine and caused his soldiers to fire a volley to the right and left upon the two regiments. The latter fired in lurn, supposing the enemy to be before them " (but, as it appears, fired upon each other), " and were very much astonished on the following day to find so many killed on each side." t 4th. "I remember," says Le Miere de Corvey,J " that in 1798, while in command of a company of partisans in Belgium, I was sent to Loo-Christi, some leagues from Ghent. I had no more than 25 men with me, and was suiTounded by more than 400 of the enemy. I had been ordered to wait for the arrival of the rest of my company, which had dispersed, and * Vie de Villars, publiee par Anquetil, 1784, 12mo., t. ii., p. 232. t Harangue latine sur Vart militaire, traduite par Tabb^ Creyssent de la Moseille, a la suite de VExamin de plusieurs observations sur la lit- terature, Paris, 1779, p. 379. I adduce this fact because it contains a hint of a useful ruse, but I regret not being able to give a clearer account of it. t Bes partisans et des corps irreguliers, 1823, p. 256, 257. I PARTISANS. 355 l( could not collect until tlie next day. This village, being open on all sides, was not tenable, and I made use of a ruse. I sent for tlie bailiff, and told him I was in momentary expectation of the arrival of 100 horses and 250 infantry, and ordered an immediate supply of 100 rations of forage and 350 of provisions, which the bailiff furnished in the shortest possible time. I then ordered the inhabitants to return to their homes and to keep quiet. After dark, I secretly sent out small detachments, which returned by another road with my drummer in front, beating the night march. This manoeuvre I repeated several times. The ruse was successful, and I passed the night undisturbed ; but the officer who relieved me the next day with 75 men was beaten two days after by the enemy, who had concentrated their forces and knew they had but 75 men to contend with." CHAPTER SEVENTH. SUEPEISES AND A3IBUSCADES. Inteoduction. — Against every anticipated and open attack there exists a metliod of defence wMcIl isi taught by the military art ; and to put it in practice, even before superior forces and under unfavorable cir- cumstances, requires only that we have sufficient time to make the proper preparations. But this time is in- dispensable, and if it is not given, we are surprised^ and find ourselves in a critical situation. A surprise, therefore, offers a priori an advantage to the assailant, by reason of its unforeseen character — an advantage which may enable a feeble troop to overcome and to crush a numerous one, and which compensates largely for the uncertainty incident to this kind of operations. To succeed in them, surprises must be prepared in concealment, and hence they are most frequently em- ployed in a hilly country. They demand prompt exe- cution ; for the data upon which they are based soon change, and delay produces uncertainty as to the po- sition and plans of the enemy. They should also have reference to troops imperfectly guarded; and hence SUEPKISES AND AMBUSCADES. S51 they will be attempted against detachments rather than against armies, for in these days the latter all make use of thoroughly organized measures for their security. These measures, remarks Clausewitz,* ren- der surprises very rare in modern warfare ; yet they are not impossible, for vigilant and experienced troops, even against an army. Surprises may be employed either in offensive or defensive operations. The assailant effects them by an unexpected march, or the suddenness of his attack : and the defender, by the secrecy and thoroughness of his arrangements ; but a true surprise is most effective in offensive warfare, and constitutes one of its most important elements. Two methods of preparing a surprise offer them- selves : 1st. To resolutely await the adversary and ambuscade him near the route he is pursuing ; 2d. To advance upon the enemy by a rapid and circuitous march. Let us examine these two methods. The gi'eater part of the precautions to be used in the one will apply also to the other. 1. Surprises by Ambuscade. — ^The term ambus- cade comes from a word in the low Latin, copied by the Spanish and Italian languages,f and signifies in the woods; in fact, wooded places are favorable for this kind of operation. * De la guen'e^ traduction Neuens, t. iii., p. 800. t In low Latin, emboscata^ in Spanish, emhoscada, in Italian, imbosca- According to the translator of Santa-Cruz, the Spaniards in the last mtnry said emlosques, and hosque in their language signifies a wood. 358 MINOR OPERATIONS. The purpose of an ambuscade may be to capture a post, a cantonment, a patrol, a drove of cattle, or a convoy of military stores or merchandise ; or to seize upon some of the inhabitants, especially an important personage (a prince, general, ambassador, bearer of dispatches, etc.) ; sometimes, also, to make a recon- noissance, or, again, to fall upon a troop, which is either on a march or already engaged in a combat. The composition of the corps charged with an am- buscade requires the most minute attention. The offi- cers and the soldiers should be experienced and ready, 1 full of -confidence in those who direct them, quick to] strike, in darkness and in the midst of obstacles, wherever and whenever ordered. The selection of the horses is of the same importance. White ones are too easily seen at a distance ; therefore take those of a dark color in preference. As the least noise might give the alarm, reject animals which snort from fear, as also those which neigh upon the slightest occasion. Hence, it will be seen that mares are to be preferred for surprises; besides, they are more quiet, support heat and thirst better, and can urinate without halt- ing. For these reasons the Arabs prefer them in all adventurous enterprises ; * but we ought to add that, in case of a pursuit, if they are wounded, they have less force and energy to carry their riders beyond the reach of danger. Since it is evident that profound silence is here one of the first elements of success, both in the march * Les chevaux de Sahara, par le general Daumas, third ed., 18mo., 1855, p. Y6, note 2. SURPRISES AND AMBUSCAD] 359 and in the ambuscade, no dogs should be allowed to accompany the expedition, notwithstanding their qual- ities as watches, for it would be difficult to prevent being betrayed by their untimely barking. The expe- dition should start by night to conceal its departure, and so as to reach the place of ambuscade by the break of day, which is the more favorable time for discovering. It should follow paths that are little frequented and free from stones, for the horses' feet among them would make too much noise. The horse- men should also be directed to secure their equipment in a solid manner, and to cover their scabbards with hay, in order to avoid all clanking sounds. If the road to the place of ambuscade has been sof- tened by rain and retains footprints, these must be obliterated by a roller or by sweeping the road with long branches of trees — an operation that may be in- trusted to a small rear-guard of foot soldiers ; ^ other- wise the enemy will follow your tracks and will dis- cover you; unless, indeed, you deceive him, as has been often recommended, by going considerably be- yond the place of ambuscade, and returning to it by a bend across fields and over very dry ground. The position selected for the ambuscade should be of sufficient extent to contain the force, an " out of the way " and lonely place, but open, with a sufficiently extended front, and with at least two outlets, one suitable for retreat, the other for making a sudden attack upon the enemy. "When the ambuscade is probably to be occupied more than one day, select * Santa-Cruz, Reflexions militaires, t. ii., p. 242. 360 MmOR OPERATIONS. tlie position near some spring, if possible, so as to se- cure a supply of water: provisions you can readily carry with you. Cavalry is in its nature more difficult to conceal and place in ambuscade tlian infantry ; ^ but this in- convenience is in a measure compensated by its celer- ity, wMcli enables it to attack at tlie instant of its discovery. This arm should lie in wait in winding valleys, in woods, in broad ravines with not very steep sides, or in isolated farm-yards ; and in this last case, if but one outlet exists, care should be taken to provide a second, by removing, when necessary, any high wall or fence. Infantry can be concealed at the bottom of a ditch, behind a bank, along a railway, under a rock, among hedges, vines, growing grain — almost anywhere, indeed, for they can, if necessary, sit down, or even lie at fall length. The position of an ambuscade should also be such that the adversary can bring but a portion of his forces into action. If the purpose is to surprise an enemy on the march, the position should be not far from some steep descent, a ford, or a plateau favor- able for a halt ; in short, near places where the enemy will slacken their speed and preserve less order. If, on the contrary, the enemy to be surprised is encamped or cantoned, you will place yourself so that you may emerge from the ambuscade when the men are going to their meals, or when they are leading their horses to water. * Nevertheless, ambuscades are often composed of mixed troops, that is, of both infantry and cavahy. SURPRISES AND AIUBUSCADES. 361 I After having decided upon tlie position of the am- buscade, do not, in any case, enter it until you Lave previously searched it. Place your troops in the most concealed manner possible. Surround them with sen- tinels and even vedettes, who must endeavor to fulfil the twofold and difficult condition of seeing without being seen ; they must fall back, when necessary, but must never challenge any one. You can second these sentinels and increase your facilities of acquir- ing information by placing near the road a soldier disguised as a peasant and affecting to be engaged in tilling the ground. Let none pass, especially in- habitants, but put them imder guard, and even some- times tie them up. As soon as the troops are in ambuscade, they should observe increased caution. Talking, smoking, moving about, or going off upon any pretext, making any kind of noise, and lighting a fire, should all be forbidden. Going to sleep should be especially prohibited. All the soldiers must remain awake,* and even in constant readiness for combat, especially in an ambuscade of cavalry. The infantry should sit or lie down, and in either case their arms should be placed on the ground ; for if they remain standing with their arms in hand, or if they sit with them between their legs, a gun might be accidentally discharged (as they are all loaded), and thus betray the existence of the am- buscade. * Several general oflScers have said that a part of the troop miglit sleep during the day ; but in all cases it would be very dangerous at 1' night, as one of the examples cited at the end of this chapter proves. 362 MmOE OPEKATIOI^S. The attack upon the enemy must be sndden, and rather upon the rear than the front of his column, in order to produce more indecision and disorder in the ranks. The infantry, after discharging a full volley,^ will rush upon the enemy with loud cries : the cav- alry will take him in reverse by making a detour, for the purpose of blocking his way. To attack at the proper instant, neither too soon nor too late, is the most important and delicate point to be decided by the commanding officer. Soldiers in ambush cannot but feel a certain degree of emotion in beholding the enemy passing carelessly and gaily almost within arms' length, unconscious of the danger which is about to fall upon him, and against which his bravery may prove powerless ; and this emotion will naturally be increased when they recall the fatigue they have un- dergone and the risk they have run in concealing themselves, and when they reflect that the most trifling incident may rob them of the fruit of all their labor ; hence it is not surprising that, in their anxiety to put an end to this uncertainty and to grasp the coveted object, they often act with too much precipi- tation, and thus cause the failure of the enterprise. The success of this operation of petty warfare, there- fore, depends greatly upon coolness, as well as upon the quickness of eye and the skill which are the nat- ural attendants of coolness. If a corps purposely fleeing before the enemy can thereby draw them in front of the ambuscade, success * Some sharpshooters, properly posted, should at this time aim at the officers. SUEPEISES AND AMBUSCADES. 36& becomes almost certain. This ruse is cMeily employed in retreats, and serves to aid tlie vanquislied party in retarding and weakening tlie pursuing force. When we liave discovered tlie existence of an am- buscade prepared by the adversary, an excellent way to meet it is to prepare a counter-ambuscade, for tbe enemy will infallibly be disconcerted when be finds himself surprised where he expected to surprise others. 2. Surprises by a March, — ^This kind of surprise enables us to avoid the inconvenience of a too precipi- tate attack, but depends upon the exactness of a cal- culation. The march must be calculated so as to fall upon the enemy just at the most propitious place and time, and the difficulty in this calculation is to make proper allowance for delays and for accidents. It appears best to attack at the break of day, when the patrols of the enemy have gone in, and the fatigued outpost guards are reposing, or have relaxed their vigilance. By choosing this time we also have the advantage of daylight for the end of the operation, and are better able to extricate ourselves from any unforeseen difficulties. In the case where we are aiming at troops that are on the march, we should follow a route either at right angles or very oblique to theirs, in order not to fall among their flankers, and to remain masters of the time when we shall choose to make our appearance. In the present century surprises effected by means of a march are of more frequent occurrence than am- buscades. This march may remain very secret, by 364 MmOR OPERATIOl^S. imitating tlie plan pursued by the French in tlie Por- tuguese campaign to surprise tlie Englisli posts, name- ly, by wrapping tlie horses' feet in pieces of sheep- skin, with the wool inside, tied above the hoof We cannot conclude these remarks more appropri- ately than by repeating, with General Kleber : " A surprise is more dishonorable than a defeat," and by quoting the following precept from his orders of the day : " The bravest man may be beaten ; but whoever allows himself to be surprised no longer deserves to be an officer." 3, Historical Examples, — I, We should emerge from an ambuscade in a solid hody. — During the war in Africa, in the 44th year before the Christian era, "Labienus, seeing that Caesar would be obliged to cross a certain valley and a wood, placed an ambus- cade there. Not knowing the existence of the snare, Caesar had sent his cavalry in advance ; and when they reached the valley, the troops of Labienus, for- getting their orders, or executing them unskilfully, or perhaps fearing to be overthrown in the valley by the cavalry, began to emerge from their ambuscade in sin- gle file and one soldier at a time, for the jDurpose of gaining the neighboring summit. Our horsemen (says Caesar) forthwith went in pursuit of them, killed a large number, took many prisoners, and then, turning to the hill, obtained possession of it, having first driven off the troops that had been posted there by Labienus, who had much difficulty in saving himself, with a part of his cavalry." ''* * Caasar's " Commentaries : The "War in Africa," chap. 1. 1 I SUKPEISES AND AMBUSCADES. 365 II. In surprises, do not forget to adopt some dis- tingidsliing feature of dress, or a rallying signal,^ — In 1667, ViUars, tlien a colonel, was sent by night to reconnoitre and ascertain wlietlier an embankment was guarded. He advanced witli 300 borse, leaving tbe remainder of bis troop in tbe rear, marcbed along tbe causeway, sent bis drummers and trumpeters abead to make an uproar and distract tbe attention of tbe enemy, wbile be fell suddenly upon bim tbrougb a breacb in a deserted barrier, and routed bim, in spite of bis force of 2,000 men. In tbe very beigbt of tbe action, tbe Frencb reserve arrived, and took tbe combatants in tbe rear. " ViUars, supposing bis troop surrounded, turned back. Tbere was a sbort, but murderous' combat of Frenchmen witb Frencbmen, wbicb ceased only witb tbe rallying cry of ^ ViUars^ This unfortunate mistake saved a part of tbe enemy, wbo, nevertheless, were dislodged." f III. Soldiei's in amhusTi sJioidd not sleep, — On this point, the Marquis of Santa-Cruz, J one of the best military wTiters of Spain, relates the following fact : " In the night ambuscade wbicb we formed (in 1710) against our enemies near Mora de Ebro, care was not taken to prevent the soldiers from going to sleep. They were in a profound slumber when, a lit- tle before day, a horse of Don Joseph Miranda got * For example, the shirt thrown over the dress, as at the taking of Pontoise in 1419. A surprise was then called a camisade (from chemise). t Vie de ViUars, par Anquetil, t. i., p. 18, 19. In attacking, instead of simply reconnoitring, the impetuous, Yillars transgressed his orders. t Reflexions militaires et politiques, traduction Vergy, t. ii., p. 260. 366 MmOR OPEEATIONS. loose ; and hardly had he begun to run across the fields, when the soldiers, awakened by the noise, be- gan to call to arms, some firing without knowing where, some flying, and some taking each other for enemies, so that the ambuscade was discovered before its time and came to nothing." IV. During the siege of Mayence (1793), the be- sieged French failed in a surprise attempted upon the Prussian headquarters located at Marienborn, in conse- quence of the cry Vive la nation, which they gave at an untimely moment. V. In 1796, the republicans sent a chief of a bat- talion with 200 grenadiers and 25 mounted chasseurs to surprise a farmhouse (la metairie de la Saugreniere). This small body marched in four different ways, with a column of fifty men in each, and thus debouched in silence at the four cardinal points of the plateau on which the farmhouse was situated, surrounded the house by placing four men with loaded guns at each of the corners of the ground-floor, while two patrols of four men knocked at each of the doors and summoned the Vendean chief Stoiflet and the three officers who had taken refuge in this asylum, to sur- render. VI. Tlie vanquished party who in retreating too near to the pursuer, without some covering obstacle, may he easily surprised, — Marshal Marmont, arriving at Champaubert on the evening of the battle of Vau- champs, February 14th, 1814, learned that the van- quished enemy had just settled themselves about two thirds of a mile off, at Etoges. He marched upon the SUEPEISES AND AMBUSCADES. 367 position in tie most profound silence and by night, witli 800 foot soldiers, flanked on eacli side by 50 skirmishers, fell upon the Kussian outposts, routed them at the point of the bayonet, entered the village, found the enemy scattered and engaged in establish- ing themselves, and took nearly the whole of them prisoners, to the number of 4,000 men, without having fired more than 500 shots. YII. In July, 1845, in Algeria, a detachment of 300 foot and 25 horse, in command of Manselon, had marched for a night in a wooded gorge four feet wide, when they found themselves, at the first dawn of day, within ten minutes of the Douars of the Sbeahs, a tribe whose hospitality had just been shown to Bou- Maza, and which it was intended to surprise. After a moment's halt, the march continued, every one on the alei-t and watchful ; but in making a detour around an earthwork, a foot soldier stumbled against a stone, and his fall caused his gun to go off. " Au galops cavalierSj'' cried the commandant at once, " and try to make amends for the blundering of that fool : we will follow you upon the run." The Arabs, warned by the discharge of the gun, were already starting off, for between the untimely signal and the first charge of the mounted chasseurs, they had had three minutes to make their preparations ; but notwithstanding the confusion, the coup-de-main was successful.* * Souvenirs de la vie militaire enAfrique^ par le comte de Castellane, in 18mo., 1852, pp. 196-198. CHAPTEE EIGHTH. HEIGHTS. The skilful and timely occupation of positions of this kind, and tlieir proper defence and attack, exer- cise an important influence upon the final result of warlike operations. "We shall therefore treat of them first in order. 1. Reconnoissance. — Before occupying a height, we must first reconnoitre it. We first examine the outline of the height. In this outline there should be shown the direction of the crest or ridge which bounds the plateau, the natural line of retreat, the course of valleys bordering upon it, and the character of the slopes should be indicated. Every road, and every path, even the smallest, should also receive attention, for the light foot soldier may climb up anywhere, and we should indicate even the steep paths followed by the goats. We must also examine i^iQpi'ofile of the height, its contour, its relief from the bottom of the valley to the summit, the peculiarities of the slopes, the abrupt es- carpments and projections, the intermediate plateaux, and the successive rises. HEIGHTS. 369 I We must also indicate the places in wiicli a com- bat may be engaged, either in line or skirmishing, those in which cavalry might, as an exception, have a chance of success, and finally those in which artil- lery may be posted with advantage. 2. Defence. — In a height, as upon any field of bat- tle, there exists a line of demarcation between the ground of the defence, or plateau^ and the ground of the attack, or dope. This line has been named the military crest, because it is, in fact, analogous in posi- tion to the exterior crest of a parapet. Without wishing to ascribe undue importance to a military crest, we will observe that this line, which has a somewhat vague existence, and is to be found approximately by trial, has nevertheless its use in the contest. In fact, it is upon this line that the assailant is to be stopped, for if he once gains the plateau he Defender. Assailant will soon master it. In order to accomplish the object in the best manner possible/ the defender should be 24 370 MINOR OPEEATIONS. placed in rear of the military crest^ and very near to it. By very near, we here mean from a yard and a half to nine yards, according to the inclination of the slope. Thus, while the defender, with his gun point- ed, will be uncovered only to the shoulders, he will see the whole body of the assailant as he climbs the ascent, for a distance of fifty or sixty yards ; whereas, if he were stationed forty yards, for example, behind the crest, he would be below the prolongation of the slope, and would, therefore, be unable to reach his Assailant. Defender. adversary while climbing ; at the same time he would receive the grazing fire of his antagonist, from the mo- ment the latter arrived within a yard and a half of the top of the crest.* The first line of defenders will, therefore, stand on the plateau, near the military crest. I say first line, for it will be well to have two lines and a reserve. * We may, however, take our position at some fifty paces behind the crest, when the assailant is ignorant of the precise position of the enemy he is attempting to find ; for in this case his grazing fire will probably not take place, for he will not see the defender while ascending, what- ever may be the inclination of the slope. HEIGHTS. 371 The first line will be in order of battle, or spread out as skirmishers if the plateau abounds in under- growth, and will receive the assailant by a fire at a short distance, a little before he reaches the crest. If this discharge does not arrest him, they must charge upon him with the bayonet, and, having overthrown him, must retire coolly to their first position. The second line will stand generally in order of battle, ready to second and to assist the first. The sole business of the reserve will be to oppose any flanking movements of the enemy; for which purpose it will watch the passages by which such movements might be effected. "With such a mode of defence, repeated several times if there is a succession of plateaux, always exe- cuted with patience and coolness, and without under- taking a dangerous and useless pursuit, it is probable that the height will be preserved. We may add to our chance of success by resorting also to well-com- bined flanking fires. It is in the latter kind of firing that cannon may here become of real service. As to cavalry, it is evident that it should act chiefly with the reserve on the plateau. This mode of defence, which requires solid and ex- perienced infantry, was inaugurated and put in prac- tice by the English against the valorous but too impulsive French soldiers in Spain ; first at the bat- tle of Talavera (July 28, 1809), and in the most me- morable instance, on the heights of Pampeluna (July 28, 1813). In this last affair, the French ascended the slope in close columns by divisions, and an English 372 MIlSrOE OPEEATIONS. line received them witli a close volley, charged upoi them with the bayonet and threw them back, thei returned to their position upon a run, with three hi rahs. They met a second attack attempted by thi resolute French columns, in precisely the same mannei and with the same success. 3. Attack. — In the first place, as an attempt upoi the front would be too destructive, we should endei vor to turn the position, and until the last momed seek for a path by which this may be accomj^lished. If we are finally compelled to attack in front, w( should make one or too false attacks, designed, as usual, to divide the attention of the defender, and to promote the success of the principal attack. This principal attack (the others being analogous) will be made by a large number of light troops, sup- ported close at hand by small and mobile columns.* A single broad and deep column would be a false measure, and a failure to place skirmishers in front would be a most grave and disastrous error — the er- ror, in fact, which was committed on the heights of Pampeluna, of which we have just spoken. For these skirmishers will break up any manoeuvre by the Eng- lish mode of defence, by compelling the defenders also to disperse in order to meet them, or else to waste their fire, and in any case will deprive the defenders of the ensemble and of the expectant situation which constitutes all their strength.f * Columns of one company, for example. t See Quelques reflexions sur Vinfanterie de nos jours^ par le g6n6ral de Chambray, in the Melanges of that author. HEIGHTS. 373 ^ > The skirmishers can go anywhere, and consequent- ly will finally succeed in advancing up the slope. Under their protection the small columns will gain some intermediate plateau or some commanding posi- tion, from which they can fire directly upon the de- fenders. If this fire produces effect, they will ascend another step ; a third will bring them upon the up- per plateau, and if at that instant one of the false at- tacks makes a more violent and noisy demonstration to alarm one of the flanks, it is probable that the de- fenders will yield, and, fearing to be turned, will retire. The good discipline of the assailant, his confidence, and his assurance of victory, will go far to remove the obstacles and to diminish the perils of such an attaqk. 4. Attack of au isolated liciglit in Africa by a company of infantry. — A company frequently acts alone in Africa, and as a young ofiicer may occasion- ally be called to command one, it may be useful to point out this mode of attack, which we derive from the verbal instructions of Marshal Bugeaud. The company, divided into foui^ half sections, takes ATTACK OF A HEIGHT IN AFEICA. 374 MmOR OPERATIONS. * its position at 200 yards from tlie height. The half sections on the extreme right (a) and left (d) are de- tached to the right and left, scattering, so as to take the Arabs defending the height by the flanks, and even somewhat in the rear. When these skirmishers have succeeded in producing some confusion among the de- fenders by their firing, the two half sections of the centre (b and 6') advance under the orders of the cap- tain, with arms at a shoulder, until within about fifty yards of the foot of the height, and then fire a full volley to complete the confusion of the defend- ers ; then they rush forward at a run with fixed bayo- nets and scale the height. This discharge serves as a signal to the skirmishers on the right and left, and apprises them of the instant when they must rapidly move upon the flank and almost upon the rear of the defenders, who will thus find themselves taken, so to speak, in a closed circle, unless they decide to aban- don their position. CHAPTER NINTH. WOODS. I Woods, like heigMs, are positions where infantry plays tlie principal part, and hence their importance has grown with the increase of that arm and the mul- tiplication of fire-arms. 1. Reconnoissance. — ^The greater the obstacle of- xered by a wood, the greater is the necessity of recon- i noitring it. |t The officer sent to reconnoitre a wood, leaves from a fifth to a fourth part of his detachment at the en- trance as a reserve. Taking the principal road him- j self with four men and a guide, he sends into each of the lateral and secondary roads a patrol of from four to six men, who should keep on the same level and in ■ communication with him. He completes the general indications contained in the map of the country, and gathers the materials for his report, from the informa- tion which these patrols furnish, from his own obser- vation, and from the replies of the wood-cutters, game- keepers, poachers, and other individuals whom he meets in the wood. This report must show : 1st, tJie extent of the wood, i 376 MINOR OPERATIONS. in order that tlie time necessary to pass tlirougli or to turn it may be inferred ; 2d, its exterior form>^ its salient and reentrant portions, and whetlier it is sur- rounded by a ditdi; 3d, the nature of the wood^ wlietlier forest or coppice ; forest trees furnisli abatis ; coppice offers little hindrance to light infantry, and, if the ground is sterile, even light cavalry may some- times pass through it ; 4th, the openings in the wood, and whether these openings are favorable for the operations of cavalry ; 5th, the number, direction, and condition of the principal roads ^ which may be adapt- ed to the mechanism of the defence, by permitting the employment of artillery and cavalry ; 6th, the same respecting cart roads^ and any other roads auxiliaiy to the principal ones; '7th,the form of the j^a^A^, their courses, and their points of intersection, for the paths facilitate the action of skirmishers in defence, as well as the march of patrols and guards ; 8th, the situ- ation and sufficiency of Tunning streams and stagnant loaters^ which may be serviceable in ambuscades, and offer facilities in offensive manoeuvres: in a word, those which may be a protection to the defenders and an obstacle to the assailants ; 9th, finally, the neigh- boring villages, hamlets, country seats, abbeys, farm- houses, and isolated buildings in general, which are capable of serving as habitations or storehouses for the defender, together with their distances from the verge of the wood. 2. defence. — The prime object of the defence is to arrest the assailant at the verge of the wood, for WOODS. 377 I when once witliin it, the assailant will likewise profit by the nature of the obstacle (namely, by the trees and the underwood), to fight and to advance under cover. The outlets, therefore, are to be closed, and the projecting points protected by abatis ; these project- ing points may also have additional protection by stationing pieces of artillery so as to give an effective fire, and yet not exposed to be readily taken. A cen- tre of action is to be selected, either naturally or arti- ficially connected with the skirts of the wood by con- venient communications. DEFENCE OF A FOREST. m * .^ ■■Kv ,lJ&^/ -s-yt^Vs^ ^i^W f^^j -^ ^^-.s.>^. ^ ^r<> ^ The distribution of the troops will be based upon the fact that in this case a numerous reserve would not have free scope for its action. As large a number of men as possible will therefore be put into action at once, one half the force being thrown upon the con- 378 MINOE OPERATIOIS^S tour of the wood as skirmisliers, and tlie remaining half divided into two parts, the first of wliich will be placed in a second line, while the other forms a re- serve. This reserve will occupy a central position, DEFENCE OF A COPPICE. resting upon the structures prepared for the defence, if there are any, and keeping a watch upon any flank or rear movements which the enemy may attempt. In a forest, the second line will spread itself in small col- umns ; and in a coppice, partly in small columns and partly as skirmishers ; in all cases, this line should keep at about two hundred yards from the verge of the wood. 3, Attack — ^The preparations for attack are made at a distance from the wood, and beyond the extreme range of the fire of the defence. When these prepara- WOODS. 379 tions are completed, the assailant passes rapidly over the clear space which separates him from the wood, so as to be but a short time exposed to the lire of the enemy^ yet not so fast as to get out of breath, for the tremor of the hand produced by running will prevent his making an effective use of his weapon * The point of attack is chosen so as to reach or to threaten the enemy's line of communication or of re- treat. We here refer to the principal attack, which is always to be seconded by a flanking or turning move- ment. The troops who attack should be vigorous and veteran soldiers ; for if they fail at the verge of the wood, it will hardly be possible to renew the attack, and many lives will be uselessly sacrificed. These troops adopt the ordinary subdivision into two lines and a reserve, the second line about one hundred yards behind the first, and the reserve about three hundred yards behind the second line. When the wood is very dense, the two lines should remain spread as skirmishers, while the reserve fol- lows it, in columns, along the principal roads. When the wood is sufiiciently clear, the second line may fonn in small columns, capable of passing everywhere, the first line and the reserve acting as before. If the wood presents openings, the assailant should have a special corps, independent of the reserve, destined to fight in these openings. With this addition, the attack will be made according to the above methods. Besides this special and exceptional corps, and be- * The carbine is the best arm for forest combats. 380 MINOR OPERATIONS. sides the reserve, wticli always exists, it has been recommended to protect the rear of all the troops en- gaged, hj placing, at some distance from the reserve, a sufficiently strong rear-guard, which should carefully watch its own flanks and preserve itself in readiness to meet any counter attack. 4. Example. — The battle of Hohenlinden (Decem- ber 3, 1800), won by General Moreau over the Aus- trians, illustrates the advantage of a turning move- ment in forest combats. The French were deployed between Hohenlinden and Harthofen ; the Austrian centre, engaged in the defile of the forest extending from Mattenboett toward Hohenlinden, tried to debouch in advance of their flanks, upon the plain of Hohenlinden. This centre was twice checked and driven back by the French soldiers. In the mean time, General Richepanse, sent by Moreau, marched by the Ebersberg road upon the village of Saint-Christophe and upon Mattenboett, which he finally reached, after incredible labor. There, he obstructed the defile which 'Nej was de- fending in front, and in which the enemy was en- closed. He rushed intrepidly upon the Austrians, advanced in spite of showers of grapeshot, threw the enemy into the most complete disorder, and made a junction with Ney, who had penetrated from the Ho- henlinden side. The enemy's centre, beaten on all sides and hemmed in, surrendered ; and to this beau- tiful and persevering manoeuvre of Richepanse the success of the day is almost w^holly due. WOODS. 381 \ We must liere call especial attention to the fact that in this action the conquerors understood the art of formation better than the conquered. When they penetrated into the forest occupied by the enemy, they did so by isolated companies, marching either by sec- tions or by the flank, and connected together by skir- mishers ; they could thus introduce themselves every- where without ceasing to present sufficiently strong and formidable groups. The conquered party, on the contrary, as a contemporary writer observes, adopted and preserved ^' an extraordinary order of march, hardly conceivable even in time of peace. Their ad- vance-guard remained composed of some battalions of grenadiers ; then followed the whole park of artil- lery, then the body of the army, and then the cavahy, which was still at the entrance of the wood while Richepanse was taking his position at Mattenboett and arresting the march." * * Moreau et sa derniere campagne, par un officier de son ^tat-major a Tarm^e du Rhin, Munich, 1801 ; traduction Frangaise, Paris et Metz, 1814, 8vo., p. 88. CHAPTER TENTH. FARMS, OR HOUSES.* A FARM enclosure, or a house, rudely and hastily fortified, when occupied hj some companies, within some ^ve hundred paces of an army, or at a greater distance, according to circumstances, may, in spite of the projectiles and incendiary missiles of the assailant, disconcert all attacks, greatly promote the success of a battle, aid in the preservation of a post, and thus save an entire army, notwithstanding its own rela^ tively small importance. For this purpose, the farm enclosure or the house is not required to be well constructed and perfectly solid; the most wretched hovel is hard to take when its garrison possess resolution, and are determined to sell their lives or their freedom dearly.f However, when there is a choice between two farm enclosures or two houses, we prefer the one most * The French word ferme^ used by the author (literally farm), is ap- plied here only to the structures upon the farm ; that is, the house, out- buildings and their masonry enclosure, in Europe often grouped together, and thus forming a strong defensible position. — Tr, t An officer frequently gains glory by the heroic defence of the most dilapidated post. FAEMS, OR HOUSES. 383 defensible. Brick walls liave an advantage over those of rubble or of dressed stone, as tbey are not so easily breached by cannon. What we liave to say respecting the defence and attack of a farm enclosure or of a bouse, will be, in the main, aj^plicable to those of a block-house, with the difference only, that the latter is more combus- tible. 1. ]>efieiice. — We shall not here treat of the meth- od of putting the farm enclosure or a house in a con- dition of defence, as that subject belongs rather to fortification than to the military art. We will merely observe that in all farm enclosures, as in every house which is to be separately defended, we should select a solid portion of the structure to serve as a small re- doubt, that is, as a rendezvous or last place of refuge for the defenders when they have been driven out of the other parts. In the conduct of the defence we endeavor to com- pel the assailant to follow a sort of regular siege. The points which the enemy must occupy are illu- minated at night by the light of burning brush or of torches, that we may be able to direct upon him the most certain and destructive fire; and in order to keep him under fire as long as possible, all the ave- nues and approaches, previously cleared of dangerous shelters, are to be intercepted by accessory defences. Every enclosure, or portion of an enclosure, every court and outbuilding, should receive for its defence a portion of the garrison proportioned to its importance. 384 MINOR OPEEATIONS. Tliis portion of the soldiers fire from witMn, tliroiigli loopholes pierced beforehand through the walls. Behind the barricades of any barrier, or of a door- way, there should be eight or ten men, drawn up in a semicircle, firing with coolness and concentrically upon the point attacked, and charging with the bayonet when the obstruction is thrown down. Folard pre- fers to leave a door open and to obstruct it with strong abatis, protected by firing from the ground floor, and especially by firing through openings in the floor of the second story (machicoulis). In all cases, while the assailant is taking his position against the door and is endeavoring to break it down, we rain down upon him from the upper stories eveiything which can be turned into a projectile, gathered for thej purpose in advance ; and we take him in the rear bj musketry from any neighboring outbuildings. Any ladder placed against a wall is immediately] pushed away by a pitchfork, or any other suitable^ implement, passed through one of the openings of thai first story and worked as a lever. A similar proceed- ing answers against the light troops of the enemy, who may be sufficiently nimble and dexterous to havCj reached the roof itself The defenders must not be sparing of destructivej sorties upon the works of the attacking party an( upon their preparations for the attack, nor of countei attacks in the portions already conquered ; sorties and counter attacks which require in their conception as well as in their execution a certain mixture of auda- city and prudence. p 385 I I He looks out for incendiary attempts, and promptly extinguishes any fire which, the enemy kindles ; and should the roof be set on fire, he must, without hesi- tation, tear it ofi; It is true this amounts to depriving the building of its helmet, as it were ; still, even with- out this piece of armor, the defence may be continued. The garrison, forced by degrees, retire from build- ing to building till they reach the redoubt, where they make another and a final defence. When they con- clude to evacuate, they leave a small troop in this redoubt, who make for a time as much noise as possi- ble (while the main body escapes), and finally capitu- late upon the best terms they can make. 2. Attack. — ^The method of attack is of course founded upon a preliminary reconnoissance, as in all the minor operations of war. The following is the most common : The cavalry watches the supporting troops with- out, and guards the entrances through which succor can come. In a night attack,* we commence by extinguishing the fires kindled by the defenders, while we endeavor to illuminate the exterior parts of the farm enclosure, and especially the weak portions. If we have any cannon at our disposal, we place a battery (by preference of howitzers) about three hun- dred yards from the farm enclosure or the house, with which we try to breach, in its lower part or at the * Ordinary attacks commonly commence a little before day. 25 386 MmOE OPERATIONS. angles, the most solid building of tlie first enclosure, and to burn tlie roofs. Skirmishers, ambuscaded upon the flanks at two hundred yards, second this cannonade, aim at the windows and other openings, prevent the defenders from showing themselves there, and thus obstruct their firing upon the attacking troops. As soon as the artillery and the skirmishers have produced their efi^ect, two or three columns of assault advance upon the breaches, the doors, and other weak parts, preceded by laborers carrying scaling-ladders, tools, and sandbags,*^* and protected by the skirmish- ers, who now come nearer and shoot at everything which shows itself during the entire contest. We burn or burst in, or tear from their hinges, the doors that have escaped destruction by the cannon. We make search for secret and concealed passages. We debouch simultaneously from several adjacent openings upon some broad front which is not too much exposed to a fire from the buildings in the rear ; we convert this space into a place of arms, and, as far as possible, we enlarge the communications con- necting this place of arms with the points already mastered. If there is a second enclosure, this as well as the redoubt is to be carried, if possible, by several attacks, all supported by a common reserve. These attacks, like those directed against the outer enclosure, should be made simultaneously, with the aid of ladders placed against those walls which are * To mask the lower loopholes of the defence. 38T neither flanked nor commanded. If the escalade is successful, we sprinkle the roof with expert skirmish- ers, who, firing from behind the chimneys and dormer windows, will compel the garrison to abandon the upper stories, and especially the staircases : it is never necessary to venture in these latter until success is probable. If the garrison make a sortie during the operation, the assailants surround them and take them prisoners, or better, pursue at their heels to enter with them, and follow them everywhere in the interior. This method of attack, which is employed in tah ing possession of a farm enclosure or house, requires infantry troops chiefly. If we merely wish to destroy a house — for example, one containing large quantities of stores — cavalry is almost sufficient ; for they have only to blockade the house until it is set on fire by shells from a number of howitzers, the operation being covered by a reserve of several squadrons. CHAPTER ELEVENTH. EEDOUBTS. We shall be brief upon tlie subject of redoubts, as they belong rather to fortification. Redoubts are employed to defend assailable points which are open to attack on all sides, but nevertheless within reach of support, such as hillocks, the entrance or exit of a defile, or the flanks of a position. They are, in certain cases, very suitable for fortifying the front of a line of battle. 1. Defence. — The troop charged with the defence of a redoubt is divided into two parts: a reserve equal to the third of the troop, and an active pai composed of the other two thirds, for manning th( parapet. To obtain a good defence, this active part should be sufiiciently strong to furnish two men for each running yard of the parapet. The reserve is di- vided into two sections : the special duty of the first is to repulse any turning attacks upon the entrance of the redoubt ; the second stands in readiness to go to any point that is threatened. The commandant of the redoubt should explain to REDOUBTS. 389 I tte chief of eacli fraction of tlie troops under his or- ders, the nature of the duty he is to perform. Up to the moment of attack, the sentinels alone are charged with guarding the redoubt. When the enemy appears, he is to be received with cannon at four hundred yards' distance, and with musketry at only one hundred and fifty yards. It is best to execute the firing of musketry slowly and witli careful aim ; at the moment of beginning this firing the soldiers mount upon the banquette. When the assailant has descended into the ditch, and is attempting to climb the scarp, the defenders mount upon the superior slope and pour a destructive fire upon him along the exterior slope. However, if during the operation of the escalade the assailant has left some men on the edge of the counterscarp to fire upon the defenders, the latter cannot mount upon the superior slope, but remain behind the parapet. The assault being repulsed, a well-sustained fire is turned upon the enemy as he retires, and then the troops come down from the banquette. If, on the con- trary, the assault succeeds, it is the part of the reserve to fall upon the first enemies who enter the redoubt, and to drive them back, forcing them into the ditch. 2. Attack. — ^To attack a redoubt, the attacking force is divided into three columns. Each column embraces some sappers with tools, whose principal business is to destroy the accessory defences. A sup- porting troop, or reserve, marches in rear of these columns. 390 MINOR OPEEATIONS. In order to occupy the enemy, and to harass him, two of these columns make false attacks. The principal, or veritable attack, is made at a point determined by the situation and form of the redoubt, as much as by the position and force of the attacking body. We begin by silencing the artillery and musketr}^ of the defence by means of a sustained cannonade. Then the columns, preceded by the sappers and pro- tected by skirmishers, advance upon the capital, and without firing. The sappers remove the accessory de- fences, and, that done, the columns descend into the ditch. Meanwhile, some skirmishers posted upon the counterscarp fire without intermission to prevent the defenders from showing themselves upon the superior slope. We scale the scarp, and after an instant of repose on the berme, we ascend the exterior slope. Having reached the top of this exterior slope, we fire upon the defenders, and when upon the superior slope we fall upon them with the bayonet. At this moment it is necessary to avoid scattering, for it is important that each attacking column which succeeds in its undertak- ing should present itself in mass upon a single point. The skirmishers who had remained upon the coun- terscarp immediately march after the columns to sup- port them, and the reserve endeavors to turn the re- doubt by the entrance. The columns, once in the redoubt, throw them- selves upon the gari'ison and upon their reserve, beat- ing them down, and advancing until they reach the EEDOUBTS. 391 i entrance, from wliicli they remove tlie barrier to give admission to the flanking corps. The work being taken, the assailant establishes his reserve facing the enemy, in order to parry counter attacks, and to give his columns, which have neces- sarily suffered in the attack, time to form again. Such is the systematic method of attacking a re- doubt, but it supposes a considerable attacking force. A small detachment, a half company, for example, is often all that can be spared for the attack of a re- doubt. In fact, this slight force will be sufficient where but one redoubt is to be carried, as frequently occurs in battles, containing some pieces of artillery, and only twenty or thirty men. Considering the feeble- ness of the assailants, they should no longer think of threatening the flanks of the redoubt, nor of ambus- cading sharpshooters for the purpose of firing upon the defenders with all the precision of aim attainable by the use of the new carbines. The best method of attack in this case, is a species of charge as foragers^ that is, the attacking body, in order to escape the grape showered from the redoubt, throws itself preci- pitately upon it at a full run, all the soldiers spreading at great distance, advancing as much as possible in a creeping ijosture, and rallying together upon the berme or the parapet of the redoubt, which they endeavor to escalade on different sides at the same time. Such an attack requires much courage and skill, and especially good luck. In fact, during the wars of Napoleon, the taking of such a redoubt was found in some cases to involve the loss of two or three detachments com- 392 MINOR OPERATIONS. manded by an officer ; and we may well conceive that tlie successful commander received a brilliant reward. 3. Example — The most memorable example of the employment of redoubts was at the battle of Pultawa. We will permit Marshal Saxe, the great advocate of redoubts, to relate the affair in his own words.^* "In the month of July, 1709, Charles XII., having laid siege to Pultawa, Peter the Great arrived with his forces to relieve the place. " The king of Sweden, although wounded, declared to his generals that he would attack the Russian army on the next day. The arrangements were made, the forces were drawn up, and the march commenced a little before day. "The czar had established seven redoubts on thej front of his infantry, and they were constructed withj care. There were two battalions in each, and all the Russian infantry remained in the rear, with the caval- ry on the flanks. It was therefore impossible to reach the Russian infantry without taking these redoubts, for the Swedish forces could neither leave them in their rear nor pass between them without being over- whelmed by their fire. The king of Sweden and his generals, who were ignorant of this arrangement, did not comprehend the state of things until they were in^ the very midst of them. But as the machine had beenj set in motion, it was impossible to stop it and to retreat. "The Swedish cavalry of the two flanks at thej outset overthrew that of the Russians, and even went] * Mes reveries^ liv. ii., chap. 12. REDOUBTS. 393 too far ; but tlie infantry of tlie centre was arrested by these redoubts. The Swedes attacked them, and were met with a stout resistance. They neverthe- less took three of them, but w^ere repulsed by the others with great loss. It was impossible for the Swedish infantry not to be broken by attacking these redoubts, whilst that of the Kussians, drawn up in order, were looking on at a distance of two hundred paces. '' Charles and his generals saw the danger they were in, and the inaction of the Russians gave them some hope of being able to retire; however, order could not be restored, for the whole line was broken, and to attack was to lead the troops to slaughter. To retire was the only course to be pursued : the troops who had taken some of the redoubts, as well as those who were being overwhelmed by the others, were therefore Avithdrawn. ^' There was no w^ay to form them under the fire which proceeded from the redoubts, and consequently they retired in confusion and disorder. At this junc- tui^e the czar called his generals and asked them what it was proper to do. One of the youngest, Allart, without giving the others time to express their opin- ions, addressed his royal master in these words : ^ If your majesty does not attach the Swedes at this moment^ it will he too late^. The whole line was immediately set in motion, and marched in good order, with pikes erect, between the intervals of the redoubts, which were left manned, to cover a retreat, in case of ne- cessity. 394 MINOK OPERATIONS. " Hardly had the Swedes halted to form, and to restore order, when they saw the Eussians on their heels. Their disorder and confusion became general. Still, they did not fly at once ; they even made one more valorous effort, and turned back to charge ; but order, the soul of battles, being gone, they were scat- tered without resistance. " The Eussians, who were not accustomed to vic- tory, did not venture to pursue them, and the Swedes retired in disorder as far as the Borysthenes, where they were all taken prisoners. Thus it is that, by skilful arrangements, we can propitiate fortune." I CHAPTEE TWELFTH. BARRICADES. 1. Coiistrnction. — Barricades are often constructed in the streets of places besieged or in revolt, for the purpose of resisting the entrance of the enemy for a longer time by obliging him to overcome successively a number of obstacles. Barricades being nothing else than defensive works, the rules for their construction are the same as those prescribed for field intrenchments ; in other words they should, as far as possible, be located, 1st, at elevated points^ in order that they may command the portion of the street or place extending before them ; 2d, at the middle of hlochs^ rather than at their extremities against the two houses forming an angle, for in the latter position they are more easily turned. Barricades may be composed of all kinds of mate- rials, and for those which are erected in haste any- thing is used that comes to hand. The best are con- structed either of alternate layers of paving stones and earth, or of wood and earth, in a form resembling 396 MINOR OPERATIONS. the sluice in dams employed in hydraulic works. In all cases, it is well to make the slope that is turned to- ward the enemy as steep as possible, like the face of a wall, in order to make it difficult to scale the bar- ricade. It need not be said that the higher the barricade, the more difficult it will be to carry by assault ; and that if j)rovided in front with a ditch and pits, it will present accessory obstacles to be surmounted in the first place. On the inside the wall of the barricade should be provided with steps, upon which the defenders can mount for the purpose of firing on the enemy. 2. Defence. — In defending a barricade the occu- pants fire in succession upon the assailing columns as they present themselves. A small mine-chamber may also be prepared in advance, opening outward, some ten or twelve yards in front of the barricade, which may be sprung by a train from the inside at the in- stant the assailant reaches it. When the enemy begins to scale the barricade, the crest is defended either with the bayonet and sword, or by musketry. The defence of a barricade requires great coolness and calm and deliberate courage, not to be too readily daunted by numerous assaults upon so feeble an in- trench ment ; and to make these assaults fruitless, which is the important and sole object in view, we can only advise indefatigable activity and incessant vigilance. I BAREICADES. 397 If the defender of the barricade possesses artillery, he will throw grape-shot, but this is a rare case. When one barricade becomes untenable, the de- fenders abandon it and retire to another, at the same time taking care to obstruct the way between the two barricades. 3. Attack. — Carrying a barricade is a dangerous operation, as we cannot here deploy an array of force, and must of necessity, on account of the narrowness of the street, fight upon a small front, which gives the chief advantage to the defenders. In general, this obstacle should be carried by ruse, by surprise, or by a flanking movement. In fact, after a careful examination of the locality, by a reconnois- sance or bird's-eye view from the top of some high building, we shall seldom fail to discover some pas- sage or court situated near the barricade by which it is possible to gain an entrance within the barricade, or from which we may at least be able to inspect the space occupied by the defenders. We must forthwith endeavor by all means to secure the occupation of such a passage or court. We may also occupy the upper stories of the neighboring houses, and thence dislodge the defend- ers by a plunging fire into the interior of the bar- ricade. Finally, we may resort to blowing up the barricade by running a mine beneath it, or at least to throwing it down by petards or barrels of powder placed against the outer face. But we are frequently de- 398 MINOR OPERATIONS. terred from employing these means by our unwilling- ness to destroy tlie houses in the vicinity. On account of the small breadth of the street, it will rarely be possible to run a sap to carry a barri- cade : besides, we should in this operation be too much exposed to the plunging fire of the defence. The only way would be to advance against the barri- cade behind high movable mantlets, furnished, if re- quired, with a banquette, such as have been proposed for this purpose. These means failing, we must come to a direct and open attack, notwithstanding the danger it involves. It is to be conducted as follows : If we have cannon or howitzers, we first endeavor to batter down the barricade by their heavy projec- tiles judiciously directed. Otherwise we dislodge the defenders by rapid and well-aimed musketry fire. This firing is continued until the defence shows signs of hesitation ; then a column of assault throws itself at full speed upon the barricade, sappers having previously filled up the ditch and pits. This column endeavors to escalade the barricade, while the sappers proceed to open it in any part that has been sufiicient- ly damaged by the cannon. At the same time, the sharpshooters of the assail- ant, posted in the neighboring houses which command the interior of the barricade, redouble their fire to paralyse the defence of the crest, and thus to promote the success of the assault. If the street is wide, it is usual to employ two columns of assault instead of one ; but in all cases the BAREICADES. 399 first columns should be supported by others which put themselves in motion shortly after the first. When, after a number of assaults, we find our- selves unable to obtain possession of the barricade, we can only resort to the extreme measure of bom- barding it and reducing it to ashes, together with the adjacent houses. This method unfortunately involves the destruction of a number of the inhabitants who are not among the defenders of the barricade ; never- theless, we should not hesitate to employ it rather than to suffer the destruction of large numbers of valuable soldiers, before these barriers raised by revolt or despair. CHAPTER THIRTEENTH. FOEAGES. 1. Object. — A forage is the name applied to the operation in which troops who have exhausted the resources of their bivouacs or cantonments, go to more distant parts to obtain the food needed for their horses. There are two kinds of foraging — foraging upon the inhabitants, or dry foraging^ and foraging in the fields, or green foraging. Formerly, and even in the last century, forages were regarded as important ojDcrations. They were preceded by reconnoissances, and undertaken with every precaution ; frequently two thirds of the army were employed in their execution. They served as Gourps d'essai^ in which the young officer could test his abilities ; and Folard advises officers " never to omit a single opportunity of conducting them, as they tend greatly to cultivate quickness of eye and acute- ness of judgment." In the wars of the Revolution and of the Empire, forages became of secondary im- portance, in consequence of the extreme mobility of the armies, which, remaining but a short time in pres- ence of each other, could subsist everywhere. From FOEAGES. 401 that time not a single general forage was ever made ; each division and each brigade making those which their wants required. ]N'evertheless, foraging is still indispensable, and especially for light cavalry. General Brack says : " 1 have served in eight campaigns under the Empire, and always at outposts, and in the whole time have never seen a single commissary, nor have I drawn a single ration from the stores of the army. Was there then no military administration? Never was the chief military administration in more skilful hands. Why then did this administration not have its agents at our outposts of light cavalry ? Because the Emperor had judged that it was impossible, and that it was folly to subject a troop which was irregular in all its move- ments to the regularity of the distributions of pro- visions." And he explains how this system, at first practised in foraging upon the enemy, continued to exist when the French were afterward forced to the defensive, and had to draw upon their allies and their own people."^ 2. i>i§tribiitioii. — As soon as the country in which we are to sojourn has been reconnoitred, its foraging resources must be distributed among the different corps of troops ; that is, the fields must be appor- tioned for green foraging, and the houses, barns, or hay-mows, for dry foraging. This distribution is the more necessary, because it not only puts an end to vexatious rivalry between the corps and to other * Atant-postes de ca/vaUrie Ugere, 1831, p. 143. 26 402 MINOR OPERATIONS. causes of disorder, but prevents extravagant waste * and thus husbands the foraging wealth of the coun- try as long as possible, without which precaution the cavalry would soon be deprived of food for their horses, f To effect this distribution for dry foraging, we commence by measuring the cubic contents of the granaries, stacks, or barns. This measure is converted into weight, by the rule that one cubic foot of straw weighs about eight pounds ; and hence the number of rations of straw will be found by dividing the whole weight by the weight of the ration, which varies from ten to twenty pounds, and which is usually fixed by the orders of the day. The number of rations of grain will be reduced from the total number of cubic feet of grain to be disposed of, by multiplying that number by 3^, which is about the average number of rations in a cubic foot. For green foraging, on the other hand, we first as- certain from the inhabitants the yield of their mea- dows, which usually varies between 1,500 and 5,000 * General Brack says with reason : " In peace wanton waste is a wrong ; in war it is a crime." " The use of cut straw by the German cavahy, and the order and system of their green foraging, have often facilitated the means of their subsistence." {Approvisionnement des arinees au XIX^ siecle., par le g6n6ral Roguet, p. 153.) t In support of the distribution recommended, we will remind the reader that when Moncey was about to enter Spain in 1823 in the vicin- ity of Carcassone and Narbonne, he was obliged to extend his canton- ments " because the first estimate of the resources of the communes had been made in an inexact manner." (Marcillac, Hist, de la campagne de Catalogue en 1823, Paris, 1824, p. G3.) FORAGES. 403 pounds per acre; and then, if we have time, also make an actual experiment. We mow a portion of a meadow, an acre, for example ; then, having measured the area of all the meadows in our possession, we mul- tiply the number of acres by the number of rations we have found in a single acre, to determine the whole number of rations at our disposal. We should ob- serve that the weight of the green ration is much greater than that of the dry, its regulation weight being as much as 88 pounds,* so that a mounted for- ager can bring in but a small number of green rations. It will also be useful to remember that a liberal al- lowance should be made in the distribution of green forage, for waste — about one thirdf — for the forage is often mowed when short, and much of it is then lost, with all the care that may be observed in the opera- tion.J When the number of rations of the locality has been determined, the assistant intendant and staff offi- cers to whom this duty is assigned, make an exact dis- tribution of the granaries or the meadows among the different corps, in proportion to the number of their * For the light cavahy horse. t Some authors allow as much as one half. I The following recommendations in respect to green forage will be found useful when we have our choice of the food to be given to the horse. Green forage is more valuable than new hay ; the best is mown grass that is not too young. Next comes rye, which is the most digest- ible of all green forage, but is not so nutritious as lucern grass and clover. These latter should be cut a day before they are given to the horses, for when fresh they contain injurious principles, particularly clover, which, if eaten in too large quantities, will kill the horses. When grasses or grain fail, give them the leaves of trees, and especially leaves of elm. 404 MmOR OPERATIONS. horses, and in such a manner that the limits of the grounds assigned shall present no possible confusion. 3. Dry Foraging. — Having arrived at the com- mune in which the forage is to be made, the detach- ment which has been sent for the purpose takes pos- session of its outlets and surrounds it by sentinels. The chief of the detachment then presents to the com- munal authority the requisition for forage, signed by the general-in-chief or at least by a general officer (ex- cept in case of a detached corps). If this authority complies, willingly or unwillingly, with the requisi- tion, he is required to transport the forage to the spot where the foragers are in waiting. But the foragers are not allowed to carry away this forage on their horses until the amount of forage delivered has been verified : it will be better if we have the privilege of employing the wagons of the country for the trans- portation. But if the communal authority refuses to comply with the requisition, we enter the village by force, and we assign to each company the granaries, farms, or stacks from which they are to forage. Outside the village, we take further precautions, and place addi- tional outposts, in order not to be surprised by the enemy during the operation. Inside the village, we prevent marauding by patrols. "We do not permit all the foragers to enter the houses at once, as this would be too dangerous in case of surprise ; they are allowed to enter only by squads, and in succession. If we do not fear the arrival of the enemy during the operation, FOEAGES. 405 we may, for greater convenience, have tlie horses brought near to the houses; otherwise they are to be left outside the village, of course under escort. In the first case, we send off the foragers in small bodies, as fast as they are loaded ; in the second, they do not start until the whole detachment is collected together. It will be expedient to forage in but one village at a time,* so that the cavalry may not be too much dispersed in positions more or loss obstructed, and al- ways dangerous. 4. Oreen Foraging. — ^For green foraging, the for- agersf are each furnished with two forage ropes and a bag. They retain their stoutest head-gear J (the hel- met or shako) and their sabre, and carry sickles or scythes, according to circumstances. Each of them should make two bundles or trusses, w^eighing together from 200 to 300 pounds.§ He ties them with his ropes, and balances them upon his horse. The grain is put into the bag and carried on the pommel of the saddle. In making a green forage, we first take military possession of the ground and place a reserve on the right or left. Then we surround ourselves by out- 23osts, so as to be apprized in season of the approach of the enemy. * Instruction de Frederic le Grand d ses generanx, article 4. t Often called corvee horsemen, in contradistinction to the horsemen of the escort. I So as to he safer from sahre hlows coming down upon them while they are cutting the forage. § As much as 550 pounds was once allowed. See the Eeveries du marechal de Saxe, liv. i., chap. 3, art. 6. 406 MINOR OPERATIONS. In order that the horses may not be in the way during the operation, they are left outside of the for- aging ground. When all these dispositions are made, the operation is commenced and prosecuted with diligence. If the enemy appears during the operation, we first make a defence on the exterior, and the reserve goes forward to repel him ; but the foragers should not quit their work until the last extremity. If we have wagons at our disposal, we load them and send them off under a small escort, while the reserve obstructs the advance of the enemy. We may thus save the forage contained in these wagons at least, by getting it to some secure place. Green foraging, being executed wholly in the open field, is less dangerous than dry foraging, in which it is often difficult to assemble the foragers in case of alarm. We must only observe not to embrace too much ground in the operation, but should rather for- age twice in succession on a smaller scale. 5. Attack of a Foraging Party. — For attacking a party engaged in green foraging, cavalry will be sufii- cient ; but infantry will be required in an attack upon those engaged in a dry forage. In the attack upon a forage, as in a surprise, se- crecy is the great element of success. We show ourselves toward the end of the opera- tion, and endeavor to separate the foragers from the posts, or from their escorts, according as they are at their station, or on the march. The attack, especially, rOKAGES. 40T must be sudden and rapid ; and several false attacks should be made, to distract tbe attention of the enemy. If we succeed in compelling the enemy to abandon the forage in which he is engaged, we have completely accomplished our object, and therefore we should not pursue the foragers* Failing to attain so complete a result, we at least harass the foragers during the operation, both going and returning, so as to retard them, or cause them to fail in their enterprise. Euse, well employed, may become an excellent auxiliary in an attack upon a foraging party * Carrying off the horses of the cavalry, whether on a forage or in pasture, hy a special ruse, was formerly called donner le liaraux. This ruse," descrihed hy Marshal Saxe {Reveries^ liv. ii., chap. 7), had almost wholly gone out of use hefore the middle of the eighteenth century. CHAPTER FOURTEENTH. DEFILES. We apply the term defile to a certain extent of country or of ground shut in between lateral obsta- cles, as well as to any contraction of a road through which we can pass only in a column of small front, or by the flank. Defiles may be divided into two classes : 1st. Those whose outlets alone can be seen and sd tacked by the enemy, and whose flanks may be advai tageously occupied to strengthen their defence. 2d. Those which give scope to the projectiles oi the enemy throughout their whole extent, as well at their outlets, and whose flanks, therefore, can nei- ther be strengthened nor defended. Roads through narrow valleys, and those betweei mountains, ditches, woods, and passages through vil- lages which cannot be turned, are defiles of the first class. Bridges, narrow necks of land, dikes through marshes, are examples of defiles of the second class. A defile which can be turned will often become but a fatal trap, in spite of all precautions. Nevertheless, the greater niunber of defiles may be easily obstruct- DEFILES. 409 ed; they afford facilities for ambuscades; they pre- sent a narrow front for the combat ; and, like water courses, exert a very important influence in military operations. Those of the first class, when their flanks have been strengthened, present positions that are almost impregnable. As an example, we may cite Theimopylse, of classic renown. Formed by Mount CEta and the sea, they close the entrance of Greece toward Thessaly, and are impregnable when the sur- rounding heights are also occupied. But for treach- ery, the Persians would have been baffled by this for- midable position. Defiles of the second class are fa- vorable for defensive operations, and are forced with difficulty, as was illustrated by the triple combat of Areola, fought by Bonaparte in the Italian campaign of 1796, against the Austrians, commanded by Alvinzi. The defence and attack of defiles come specially within the province of infantry and artillery. Cav- alry should participate only as an exception : it is ex- cellent for turning them, but even this requires that the roads by which it may be ejffected are such as they can traverse. 1. Occupation and defence of a Defile. — The method of occupying a defile and the distribution of the troops in it, depend upon the nature and conform- ation of this defile, and also upon the object we pro- pose to accomplish. This object may be, either to preserve the defile for our own use, or to prevent its passage by ihe enemy. In the first case, Ave occupy all the points in front 410 MINOR OPERATIOlSrS. and on tlie flanks of tlie defile whicli are suitable for an obstinate defence, and establish the reserve at the rear outlet in a position chosen so as to prevent the enemy from taking possession of it and to protect the retreat in case we are driven back. This reserve should cooperate with the supporting corps. We should especially not neglect to occupy the outlets of the various roads or transverse defiles which debouch upon the interior of the main defile. Communication must be carefully maintained between the main body and the different posts occupying these outlets on the one hand, and the favorable defensive positions situ- ated on the front and the flanks of the defile on the other, in order that these posts may fall back or be supported in season. In the second case, or where the object is to pre- vent the enemy from passing the defile, we should take a position in the rear and at the point most fa- vorable for assailing the enemy on the front or flank ^ at the moment he attempts to debouch. This rule is more particularly applicable to the defiles whose flanks are inaccessible, such as bridges and dikes. We may, however, in many instances, occupy some im-, portant points within the defile, especially the inter- j sections of roads, since we may thus arrest the enemy] at various points successively. 2. Pas§age of a Befiie — The passage of a defile, in an advance movement, when it is not occupied by the enemy in force, presents few difiSculties. We first re- connoitre the defile, its approaches, its outlets, and the DEFILES. 411 roads and paths running into it ; and having assured ourselves that it contains no ambuscade nor intrench- ment, we occupy it as above stated. When possession has been taken, the advance-guard passes first and clears the ground, in conjunction with some skirmish- ers ; then the several bodies of troops pass successively, observing all the usual precautions, that is, continu- ally throwing out scouts and never trusting to a de- lusive feeling of security. These troops, upon their exit from the defile, finding the front freed from the presence of any detachments of the enemy (which should have been driven ofi^ by the advance-guard and the skirmishers), can easily take position. The passage being completed, a detachment is left to occupy and defend the defile, if its possession is re- quired for the safety of the rear of the army. We are thus saved the trouble of subsequently taking it when the necessity arises. The passage of a defile in a retreat is a more deli- cate operation. After having taken military posses- sion and covered its flanks, especially by detachments, the main body of the army is left in advance, facing the enemy. The cavalry and artillery accelerate their speed and are the first to pass the defile, because they require more time in passing, and are important to be preserved ; then comes the infantry, which retires slow- ly, leaving the rear-guard before the front of the defile in the place of the main body, and rallying, as they pass, the several detachments which j)rotect the flanks. The first troop which debouches forms facing the defile, within musket range, in order to enfilade it 412 MINOR OPEEATIONS. with their fire, and as the other troops debouch, they successively take position on the flanks. The rear-guard waits until the army is entirely formed before it retires. It unmasks the latter slowly, and proceeds to post itself upon the extremities of the line of battle. The retreat from the defile is a critical moment for the rear-guard ; for it has to pass from a narrow field of battle, where it could resist superior forces, into open ground, where it no longer enjoys this advantage. When there are lateral avenues falling upon the flanks of the defile, it is essential that their outlets be occupied by detachments, for the purpose of protect- ing the retreat of the rear-guard — a retreat which is sufficiently perilous in itself, and should not be ex- posed to the additional danger of a flank attack. In irregular ground, the retreat of the rear-guard] should be covered by a chain of skirmishers, but in^ open ground, where only the good order and disci- pline of the troops can give security to their march, it should be covered by some companies ; and if the rear- guard should find itself pressed too sharply by the enemy, these companies must make a half turn and charge the latter with the bayonet. A modern military writer* compares a column of troops in a defile to a serpent, which defends all the parts of its long body by its head, which sees best and acts best, and upon which the whole can best fold itself back. This head is the advance-guard in a for- * Voffwier dHnfanterie en campagne^ par le g^n^ral Eoguet, 1846, p. 111. DEFILES. ward movement through, a defile, and the rear-guard in a retreat. However, in both cases, this serpent col- umn should have eyes not only in the head, but also in the tail, and often on both sides, in order to pre- vent a surprise ; hence, besides its advanced guard, it should thi'ow out skii^mishers on the flanks. 3. Attack of a l^efile. — In this attack we are, a 2yriori^ at a disadvantage, on account of the small front upon which we are compelled to fight. In respect to the method of attacking, two kinds of defiles are to be distinguished ; those whose flanks are diflicult of access or well defended by field fortifi- cation, and those whose flanks are not covered by de- tachments of troops. It is difficult to attack those of the first kind, nor should we attempt to take them unless theii* posses- sion is of essential importance to the success of the campaign. The available means of attack are, first, to drive away the troops who guard the entrance of the defile, and then to protect the operation of passing. To accomplish this, we should commence by stagger- ing the enemy with an overwhelming fire, and as soon as we perceive hesitation in his ranks, the infantry should fall upon him with the bayonet in close col- umn. The artillery of the enemy being by this time dismounted, at least in part, the close column should advance without firing, protected on the front by an advance-guard and on the flanks by skirmishers, who generally succeed in insinuating themselves every- where. As fast as the infantry debouch from the de- 414 MINOR OPERATIONS. file they should deploy, taking care to rest their flanks upon the obstacle formed by the defile. The reserve should remain massed at the entrance of the defile, to guard against a counter attack and reinforce the cen- tre and flanks when necessary. As soon as we have mastered the defile and the obstacles which support it, a part of the reserve and the whole of the cavalry will pass through it and go forward. The main body of the artillery, which had also remained in the rear, will take position on the flanks of the defile, as soon as the infantry has completed its passage and gained ground in front, and will then fire briskly upon the retiring enemy as long as he is within range. When the ground does not permit a direct attack of this "kind, we must have recourse to ruse. We should harass the enemy by false demonstrations, es- pecially by making a pretence of forcing a passage in some other quarter ; and we should search for some road or path comj3aratively little known, which the enemy has neglected to guard, and by which we may be able to turn the defile. The important point is to succeed by these means in pushing some comjDanies quite to the extremity of the defile, as these companies, thus advantageously posted, assist the march of the column, support its flanks, and thereby facilitate the capture of the defile. As to the attack of defiles whose flanks are covered by detachments, the following is the usual method of proceeding : We begin by attacking these detachments briskly, with the sielect detachments which flank the march of » DEFILES. 415 the column intended to force the defile. These select detachments are followed by reserves, who support them when necessary, and enable them to rally and make head against the enemy. If these attacks are repulsed, they are nevertheless renewed again and again, until the detachments which cover the flanks of the defile are completely driven from all the points which they have occupied. Meanwhile the main body, stationed in front of the entrance of the defile, keeps the enemy in check by making demonstrations of attack, and throwing forward skirmishers, in order to prevent the enemy from reinforcing the posts which cover their flanks. "When these posts have been driven out, we en- deavor, by still pushing forward, to take the enemy in the rear, availing ourselves of the paths, cuts, and valleys which present the shortest and most favorable route. If we succeed, in this way, in reaching the openings leading into the defile and in rear of the posts of the enemy, he is necessarily forced to retire without delay, or to take the alternative of laying rlown his arms. 4. Historical Examples. — I. Omit no precaution when near a defile, — In the campaign in Silesia, about the middle of December, 1745, when the Prince of Anhalt arrived before the city of Meissen, his cavalry sufi*ered a slight check, because, being fatigued, they neglected to reconnoitre the approaches of the places which they had to traverse. They had to defile, man by man, through a deep cut in the road before entering 416 MlNOn OPEEATIONS. tliat city. This occupied quite a long time, during wMcli two Prussian regiments of dragoons dismount- ed to wait their tui^n to warm themselves. But a Saxon detachment, perceiving their situation, stole into a neighboring wood, and falling unexpectedly upon these two regiments, killed 180 of their men be- fore being repulsed. This instance aptly illustrates the importance of always reconnoitring, especially when a defile is to be passed. "The smallest mis- takes in war are punished," says Frederic in relation to this subject, " for the enemy never pardons." * II. Cavalry may^ as an exception^ force a defile. — The attack of the defile of Somo-Sierra, in Spain (Nov. 1808), is often cited as proving that no obstacle can resist the imjyetuosity of good cavalry. This attack was made by the third squadron of the regiment of Polish light cavalry of the Guard, which regiment was commanded by Count, afterward General Krasinski. The position seemed to be unassailable, for the contracted road, situated between rocks whose sides and summits were covered with infantry, formed four bends or angles, at each of which four cannon were stationed, defending the passage and sweeping every- thing which appeared on the road. Across the road the Spaniards had made a ditch, fortunately, however, not very broad. The fire of their infantry and artillery not only prevented the French infantry from carrying the position, but even from * Example taken from my Eistoire militaire de la Prusse amnt 1756, p. 338. I DEFILES. 417 tilling this ditcli witli fascines. It was proposed to carry tlie defile by cavalry, which, from its rapidity, would be less exposed to the efi^ect of the fire. The thii^d squadron of the Polish light cavalry, under the command of Kozietulski, rushed forward in column hy fours^ kept on in spite of their heavy losses, fell upon the cannoniers, sabred them before they could reload their pieces, and were so impetuous in their attack, that the Spanish infantry abandoned their positions in terror and fled, thus in a moment leaving an insur- mountable obstacle without defence, and opening the route to Madrid to Napoleon and his whole army. If the squadron had stopped during the charge, it would probably have been lost, for the Spanish can- noniers would have had time to reload, and having decimated it by the first discharge, would doubtless have annihilated it by the second. The charge was executed with the rapidity of lightning^ without regard to killed and wounded, and the squadron scarcely per- ceived that its chief (Kozietulski), having had his horse killed under him at the commencement of the charge, and being unable to follow on foot, had retired."^ III. Employment of flanking attacks, — Marshal Moncey (July 24, 1808), forced the supposed impreg- nable defile of las Cabreras by two turning attacks on the flanks, executed by General Harispe,f the intrepid * Extracted from the pamphlet Les Polonais d Somo-Sierra en 1808 (being a refutation of a passage in the ninth volume of Thiers' History of the Consulate and the Empire), bj Colonel Niegolevrski, a lieutenant of the squadron which forced the defile ; Paris, 1854. t Since a marshal of France. 27 418 MINOR OPERATIOll^S. chief of the Basque chasseurs, at the head of a body of good marksmen without hnapsacke^ who conquered the position rock by rock, and thus descended upon the rear of the defenders. In Algeria, at the beginning of its conquest, to pass the defile of Mouzaia (November 21, 1830), an attack by the front was combined with a flanking at- tack upon the ridges on the left. IV. Passage of a defile. — Before the battle of Cas- tiglione (August 5, 1796), Marmont, wishing to de- ploy for the action with five companies of artillery (nineteen pieces), found himself compelled to pass through a rather wide defile, swept by the enemy's fire. He threw forward his column (with a front of two pieces), at a gallop^ placing at its head the com- pany upon which he counted least. This head was crushed, but the rest passed, deployed, and quickly dismounted half the pieces of heavy calibre posted on Mount Medola.* This example, which again illustrates the import- ance of passing defiles as rapidly as possible, justifies the saying of the Archduke Charles,f that " every passage of a defile is subject to difficulties in propor- tion to the space to be passed over and the delay to be suffered." Y. An army may sometimes he drawn up in order of hattle in front of a defile. — This has been much dis- puted, but seems at the present day to be more fa- vorably considered. The Emperor (Napoleon III.), * Memoires de Marmont, 1857, t. i., p. 209, 210. t Campagne de 1799, traduction fran^aise, t. ii., p. 123. DEFILES. 419 in his great work * remarks, in reference to a position of this kind, which was assumed (so to speak) by Gustavus Adolphus at Leipsic and at Lutzen, that *' its sole advantage lies in compelling the soldiers to conquer or to die." General Jomini goes farther ; he says : " It is still a question to be resolved, whether defiles behind a beaten anny do not rather favor the retreat than render it difficult.-' f 5. Defence and Attack of a Bridge. — It frequent- ly happens in war that we wish to preserve a bridge in order to make use of it subsequently ; at other times we wish to destroy it, but our troops have not the ne- cessary tools or powder for the purpose, especially if it is of stone. In both cases we must seek to defend it. Suppose then, for example, an officer to be sent upon such a mission at the head of a detachment of fifty men. He will station about thirty men as skirmishers on the right and left of the bridge, along the bank of the stream, in the places which have been shown to be favorable by a previous reconnoissance, and will so dispose them that their fire will cross in front of the bridge and thus keep the enemy from approaching it. He will knock down its parapets to facilitate the fire of the defence. J He will obstruct the bridge at both * Etudes 8ur le passe et Vatenir de Vartillerie^ 1846, t. i., in 4:to., p. 341. t Traite des grandes operations^ fourth edition, 1851, t. i., p. 130. On this point of tactics, the reader may consult the Histoire de Welling- ton^ par M. Briahnont, 1857, t, ii., p. 412, 413. X There is a historical fact in support of this recommendation. At the attack of the bridge of Goito (April 8, 1848) by the Piedmontese, the 420 MINOE OPERATIOI^^S. extremities. The first obstacle cannot be directly de- fended ; it will consist of a low barrier, or an abatis, or, better still, of a simple cut, v/itli tlie object of re- tarding the march of the enemy, and bringing him to a stand at the entrance of the bridge. The second obstacle will be defended with the greatest energy by the remainder of the detachment If the number of defenders were greater, a reserve would assist in this second defence. Finally, one or two posts may be es- tablished to oppose any flanking manoeuvres. Artil- lery would here be an excellent auxiliary. A chief of a detachment, charged with the attack of a bridge, will first make a minute reconnoissance of the bridge, to ascertain the defensive arrangements of the enemy. He will then distribute his skirmishers and his artillery along the bank ; the latter for the pur- pose of silencing the fire of the enemy, or of distracting their attention, while he throws himself upon the bridge at the head of his best soldiers, climbs over the obsta- cles in his way, and strives to drive off the defenders. We should, however, always endeavor to turn a bridge by fording or swimming, at a point above or below it, in order to avoid an attack by the front upon a position in which the enemy has fortified him- self and is prepared to make a firm stand. explosion of a mine rendered the bridge impassable ; but the parapet of the bridge remained almost uninjured, and the sharpshooters (hersaglieri), using it as a foot bridge, crossed the Mincio and pursued the Austrians, who retired by the road to Mantua. — As an analogous instance, it may be remembered that, in 1796, the French crossed the Lavis upon the beams of a bridge from which the planking had been removed. DEFILES. 421 As an example, we will cite the attack of the bridge of Lodi (May 11, 1796). The Austrians had not had time to cut away the bridge, and Beaulieii, instead of defending it solely in the rear, had commit- ted the error of leaving some battalions in front of it. The French reached Lodi at '^ve o'clock in the even- ing, after a march of ten leagues, and immediately made their preparations. The columns of grenadiers charged with the attack were sheltered behind the ancient ramparts of the city from the grapeshot of thirty pieces of artillery (drawn up concentrically upon the opposite bank), until the signal for the at- tack was given. This attack, seconded by the fire of the French artillery, was made with such impetuosity that its success was instantaneous (notwithstanding the 175 yards' length of the bridge), and remained a long time engraved in the memory of the Austrians. Tlie retreat of the latter was precipitated by the ap- pearance on their right flank of 2,000 French horse- men, who had crossed the Adda above Lodi by the ford of Montanaso. 6. Defence and Attack of a I>ike.^ — As COmbats in marshes can seldom take place except on dikes, it will be useful to say a word upon their defence and attack. The dikes best adapted for defence, are those which can be defended both in front and on the flanks, especially when the troops intrusted with the defence of the flank can occupy an inaccessible post. But in general a dike can only be defended in front. 422 MINOR OPERATIONS. In this case, when its length does not exceed musket range, our force is to be placed in rear of the dike, and is to be divided into three troops of about equal numbers, one posted (with the artillery, if we have it) at the terminus of the dike, to receive the first attack of the enemy, the second about thirty yards in rear, to fall upon the enemy when he debouches from the dike, and the third as a reserve, still farther in the rear. But if the length of the dike is greater than musket range, our force is usually to be placed at first in advance of the dike, to defend it ; then, having de- fended it as long as possible in this position, retire rapidly over the dike and make a second defence from a position in the rear. There is, however, danger in thus placing ourselves in advance of the dike, as this position the enemy, if in superior force, may easil] surround us, and, as it were, corner us. Besides, h< will often avail himself of our retreat to pass the dik< at the same time with ourselves. The attack of a dike by the front, when it cai neither be turned nor attacked by the flank, consisi in first driving back the defenders to the rear of th( dike by an overwhelming and well sustained fire, an( especially by the galling fire of a large number oi skilful sharpshooters; and then, at the moment the defenders show signs of hesitation, rushing upon th( dike at a run and forcing the passage. In such an attack we must exhibit great vigor, for the longer we remain on the dike exposed to the fire of the defend- ers, the more men we shall lose, and the greater will be the probability of our being obliged to retreat — DEFILES. 423 especially if tlie defenders possess any pieces of artil- lery loaded with grape, which enfilade the whole length of the dike. In this case, the assailant will be obliged to employ artillery to silence these pieces; otherwise he will fail to pass, or will succeed only by losing many men. CHAPTER FIFTEENTH. VILLAGES. 1, Occupation — ^Villages should be occupied only when the locality is favorable for defence (for if it is unfavorable, their occupation by the enemy will pro- duce but little inconvenience), and when, also, this defence is connected with the execution of the general plan of operations. This rule will save us from unne- cessarily drawing away troops from the main object in view. Villages of a rounded form, in which the houses are pretty close together and have streets of a certain degree of regularity, are always more favorable for defence, other things being equal, than those of an elongated form, or those composed of habitations scat- tered here and there without connection or plan : for regular and short streets possess the advantage of be- ing good strategic routes, in Avhich the troops and the artillery produce most effect. The villages the occupation of which may be of importance to an army, are : 1st, those which form a defile, that is, those which are the key of a defile, or protect a defile ; 2d, those which form the salient angle of a position ; 3d, those which cover the front I VILLAGES. 425 or flanks of a line of battle, and would consequently become dangerous if the enemy were to take posses- sion of tliem ; 4tli, those wliicli may enable us to stop a pursuit and insure a retreat ; that is, in many cases, those which are in defiles ; 5th, those which come into a chain of posts, as it is necessary that everything which occurs in that chain should be known ; 6th, and finally, those which are within a short distance of the army, and contain magazines, convoys, and manufactures, which we cannot dispense with, and are, therefore, to be protected, as places of supply, with as much care as our lines of communication. A glance by the general-in-chief at the general and particular position of a village may have given suffi- cient ground for ordering its occujDation ; but to effect this occupation in a suitable manner, we must first obtain information respecting a number of particulars which may be classed in seven categories : 1st, as to the environs, their advantages and disadvantages as a battle-field, and the kind of troops that can be em- ployed there ; 2d, whether they are commanding posi- tions or othermse, and their relative advantages in this respect ; 3d, the distribution and construction of the houses, which may be of wood, clay (torcliis), brick, or stone ; 4th, as to the church, the chateau, the court- liouse, the large factories and other considerable edi- fices, which may serve as redoubts ; 5th, as to the time and means necessary to prepare these and the whole village for defence ; 6th, as to the number and kind of troops to be placed there ; 7th, as to the re- sources of all kinds which the place may offer in pro- 426 MmOR OPERATIOI^S. visions, forage, materials for accessory defences, and for making powder and balls. An isolated village, whicli would not be protected by escarpments or by a water course, or by a disposi- tion of troops in tlie rear and on tlie flanks of the vil- lage, in a word, one wliich the enemy could approach on all sides, could not be efficiently defended, and should not be occupied. Nor should any one be occu- pied which the enemy may without inconvenience neglect and pass by, for om* object in occupying a vil- lage is to arrest the enemy and obstruct his progress. 2. Defence. — The first thing is to organize the de- fence. If time permits^ we close all the avenues by ditches, abafcis, epaulements, and barricades of suffi- cient solidity to compel the enemy to breach them ; we make loopholes in the walls and banquettes hind the hedges, in order to obtain a fire from the' whole perimeter ; we give especial care to the organi- zation of the defence of the church, of the chateau, and of every position the fire from which may arrest the assailant, and most especially of those houses which have a commanding view of the entrances of the streets ; in short, we make use of all the resources of field fortification. The redoubt is to be selected in a strong and central spot, situated in the part where the final defence is made. Although the artillery should be at first placed at the most vulnerable points, and where it may produce the greatest efiect (as, for example, points from which it can sweep the open spaces and enfilade the streets), we should never- VILLAGES. 427 theless be able to move it at all times, and carry it to the points most threatened, and have epaulements and platforms prepared in various places, to receive it. Firing is the principal agent of the defence, but especially flank and oblique firing, at short ranges. A small body of cavalry may remain in the inte- rior of the village, but the greater part of this arm should be echeloned in rear of the two flanks, to pre- vent our being turned. It may frequently be employed also for repelling the enemy in front. The infantry is divided into three portions. The first covers the village, and defends the approaches, because we must, if jDossible, repulse the enemy on the exterior. Behind hedges, loopholed walls, and palisades, a single rank of soldiers will be sufficient ; but the streets and other wide passages, although they may have been closed, when there was time, by abatis, barricades, epaulements, or ditches, should be occupied by companies in mass. Detached men occupy those houses from which they may protect the exterior line of defence. The second portion, divided into small posts communicating with each other and easily rallied, is placed behind the most exposed points, and in the cross-roads near the boundaries of the village, these posts being destined to support and relieve the advanced troops. The third j)ortion remains concen- trated in the centre of the village, in as open a place as possible, equally distant from all the points of at- tack. The purpose of this reserve is to repulse the enemy at any point at which he presents himself, and to receive the advanced troops and cover their retreat 428 MINOR OPERATIONS. in case we are obliged to evacuate the village. In this formation in three masses we find reproduced the two lines and the reserve of the usual order of battle. As to the numerical force of each of these portions, it must depend upon the configuration of the village ; the reserve should amount to about one fourth. The principal point being to keep up a promj^t and easy communication between the centre and circumference, we make as many openings in the walls and hedges as may be necessary for that purpose. The sorties, if a favorable occasion offers, should be conducted briskly, but still with caution ; strengthening the side of the village by which the troops must return, and enjoining upon these troops to confine themselves to repulsing the enemy, and not to abandon themselves to an ii prudent pursuit. The resistance should be displaye( at first in the defence of the exterior, and afterwar( in that of the village itself, and there the groun( must be defended inch by inch. If the enemy gel in, the reserve charges upon his flank, while he arrested by the barricades and the filing from the^ houses. If we are forced to evacuate certain portions of the village where we find ourselves too seriousb threatened, we assume a new line of defense markec out within the village, we attempt counter attacks and fight to the last extremity, always taking care however, while maintaining ourselves in the redoubi to keep open a line of retreat. 3. Attack. — " Attacks upon villages cost too many men," is the confession of Frederic {Instruction^ art. I VILLAGES. 429 23), and, in fact, villages form obstacles wliicli it is proper to attack only when other means are not avail- able for accomplishing the end in view. The mere fact that the localities are against the assailant, makes it necessary that he should possess a superiority of force. He should, especially, have a great number of howitzers, in order to set on fire and destroy the obstacles which are thrown in his way. It is considered that, in general, our efforts against villages should be reduced to three j)oints : a genuine attack and two false attacks. We therefore divide our force into six parts : three to act at once ; two to protect the flanks of the attacks, supporting and rein- forcing them, and manoeuvring at small distances in the rear; and the sixth, of greater force than the others, to act as a reserve. If the enemy occupies some positions outside, he must first be driven from them and thrown back into the village. In this, cav- alry will be useful. The batteries, directed upon the village at the outset, form the most advantageous posi- tions possible, and having produced sufiicient effect, the first three parts advance in columns, accompanied by a detachment of sappers, and preceded by numerous skirmishers, who expel the defenders from the circum- ference, and silence their fire. The other three parts follow the movement at variable distances. We take care to avail ourselves of every local peculiarity, how- ever trifling, to conceal our march, to put the enemy on the WTong scent, and to keep ourselves under cover. We must be neither imprudent nor rash: courage alone is required. The time of starting of the three 430 MINOE OPEEATIOIs^S. columns, and the velocity of their march, must be so regulated that they may come upon the village in succession to renew the alarm of the defenders, and to commence the false attacks, whilst they are engaged in repelling the true one. These columns will generally be formed by sections, and will consist of a half bat- talion at most. Having arrived within range of the first obstacles, the sappers advance with their imple- ments to open passages. The heads of the columns, which up to this time have not fired, will now unite their fire with that of the skirmishers, in order to pro- tect the work of the sappers, upon which the success of the attack mainly depends. The columns penetrate by the openings, attack and beat down the masses opposed to them, pushing, them with vigor both in the streets and in the opei places. The skirmishers, whose circular chain hf naturally closed in while advancing, leap the hedges scale the walls, and take possession of some house oi eminence from which they can fire with effect. Being^ free in their movements, they are frequently the first: to penetrate. If the attack is repulsed, we renew itj with fresh troops. When the outer precincts have^ been mastered, the sappers open the secret communi- cations of the defenders or make new ones, tear do^vni whatever interferes with combining the attacks, which favors counter attacks, and thereby diminisl the difficulties which the permanent obstacles (namely,; the houses) present to the assailant. Then, as sooi as we have gained a footing in the interior of the village, the reserves come up quickly, either to aid VILLAGES. 431 in overtlu'owing the reserve of the enemy, or to secm*e the occupation of the village or of the conquered parties. In fact, we should be well assured of the possession of one portion before passing to the con- quest of another. The cavalry of the assailant repulses that of the defenders, clears the field, and endeavors to flank the village. 4. Sudden Attack. — In battles, we depart more or less from the regular attack which we have just con- sidered : we give quicker blows, we act by surprise, we carry positions by assault, and we make but one or two attacks. These are then two flanking attacks, which are executed while a strong reserve remains on the front. This mode is especially employed in Al- geria, where the villages are often carried by the in- fantry at a run, without artillery, to put which in battery would alone leave the soldiers too long ex- posed to the skilful fire of the Arabs. It compels the enemy to abandon his position without giving time for any real engagement. 5. Historical Examples. — It is easy to cite battles in which villages have played a part. On the day of Nerwinden (July 29, 1693), the allies had their army drawn up from the Gehte to the brook of Landen, between the villages of JSTerwinden and Romdorf, their front covered by intrencliments. Luxembourg commenced by attacking the two vil- lages, and carried the first, from which, however, he was soon driven. A second attack was followed by 432 MINOR OPERATIOI^S. the same result, because wlien they had got into Ner- winden, the French officers neglected to tear down the hedges and low walls with which the streets were filled, so that our columns were unable to communicate with each other, and their action was disjointed. Luxem- bourg did not allow himself to be discouraged: he took fresh troops, returned a third time to the attack of Nerwinden, and this time remained in possession of it. The enemy had stripped his left to defend Nerwinden, in consequence of which the attack of our right, being throughout well conducted, was successful, and we were able in that quarter to carry the intrench- ments of the allies. Upon this, Luxembourg passed beyond Nerwinden, outflanked the enemy's line, threw it into confusion, and drove a large part back upon the Gehte. In the battle of Fontenoy (May 11, 1745), tl village of Fontenoy was three times attacked by thl English, and the village of Antoin twice by thl Dutch. At Essling (1809), the villages of Essling and Aspern were each taken and retaken several times. At Leipsic (1813), the village of Schoenfeld was retaken eight times. APPENDIX KOTES UPON HYGIENE IN THE FIELD. k It is difficult for one who is not a physician to \\Tite upon hygiene. We will confine ourselves to a few simple notes. Hygiene is the science, the object of which is the preservation of health and the prolongation of the average duration of human life. Now that the foot soldier wears a cotton shirt, a flannel waistband, easy-fitting garments, light head- gear, the cravat instead of the stock, trowsers inserted in the gaiters, and cloth trowsers only, a cloak^^ over his w^hole dress for cold w^eather, and often an overcoat with a folding-down collar, he is no longer dressed in obedience to the caprices of fashion, but more in ac- cordance with the rules of hygiene. It may be, how- ever, that in endeavoring to give him a greater degree of lightness and to fit him for service in all climates, we have had too much reference to warm, and not enough to temperate and cold ones. But we shall not enter into details respecting the hygienic preparations * The Zouaves and foot chasseurs have a dread-nought with a hood. 28 434 APPENDIX. for a campaign, either for tlie foot or mounted soldier ; our present purj)ose being merely to point out tlie precautions necessary for the troops after going into tlie field, in tlie observance of which every officer, in a certain measure, should cooperate. 1. Marclies. — We must limit marches to the human strength, make them at the most suitable hours,'^ and avoid passing through unhealthy districts. We must especially be careful to husband the strength of the soldier when he is obliged to climb steep ascents, for this purpose diminishing the weight of his baggage,f moderating his gait,J and stopping from time to time to allow him to breathe. In every kind of march, we must carefully guard against sudden transitions, which are always perni- cious. § Thus, during halts, the men should not lay off their coats, especially if perspiring, and they should not drink until after a moment of rest. In preference to water alone, their drink should consist of water mixed with a little brandy or coffee, which they may carry with them. We should add, however, what M. Michel Levy says, that " soldiers on a march who * In Slimmer, we should avoid the heat of the day. t In all circumstances the men, when fatigued, may he permitted to put their knapsacks on the wagons, and invalid soldiers should ride in them. \ The step should in general he such that the left will not he obliged to run. § These transitions are as objectionable in military hfe generally as in a simple march. We send our southern soldiers in preference to the colonies. The English detail for the Indies those regiments which have already been acclimated at Gibraltar, Malta, or Corfu. I NOTES UPON HYGIEKE IN THE FIELD. 435 drink cold water and immediately continue their jour- ney, do not suffer." * In a warm climate a marcli is fatiguing, and should be abridged, if possible. We should not give the sol- dier much to carry, and should allow him to march with the route step. He may, for example, be allowed to unbutton his coat and loosen his cravat, with the proviso that he shall observe a stricter bearing if the breeze springs up. It is also a good precaution to cover the back of the neck with a white handkerchief fastened to the cap. A ration of wine or coffee should be added to the ordinary fare. If the march is in a cold climate, we should try to accustom the soldier to it by degrees. He should be well clothed and abundantly fed. He should warm himself rather by active motion than by a fire.f He should avoid alcoholic drinks. In the summer, at the end of a march, it is salutary to wash the face and eyes ; and at all seasons the feet should be washed at each stopping-place at least. A strict attention to cleanliness conduces greatly to the soldier's power of endurance. When the halting-place is reached, the sick are to be visited, and those threatened with any serious affec- tion sent to the hospital. 2. Camps. — The French regulations recommend that the site of a camp be chosen near wood and wa- ter. Water, indeed, is necessary for the preservation * Traite d^hygiene^ third edition, 1857, t. ii., p. 31. t In extreme cold, if a fatigued person lies down, he goes to sleep ; and sleep, in this case, in the open air, is death. 436 APPENDIX. of the health of the men ; a running stream is prefer- able, and the camp may be pitched near its banks. Woods in the vicinity are desirable for furnishing fuel for cooking, but, as the soil of forests is moist, we should avoid pitching the camp within them, if we would avoid miasmatic influences. The position of the camp should, moreover, be sufficiently high to be well ventilated, and .gently sloping, that the rain may flow off;'^ under these con- ditions, a dry and sandy plain will be suitable.f In camp, the troop is lodged in huts or in tents. If the rapidity of our operations does not prevent their construction, the former are preferable to tents, which are too close in summer and too cold in winter.^ The straw used for beds should be renewed every two weeks, and that which is removed should be hurned^ as a precaution against infection. With the same ob- ject, the dung should be carried off and burned evei day, and offal of all kinds buried in the ground. The soldiers should be prohibited from going ou| at night in their shirts and with bare feet, as this prf tice is highly injurious, and produces dysentery. We should keep a camp as free as possible from all incumbrances ; a crowded camp is always fatal where there is a large collection of men. Inactivity is also attended with danger to the health of the troops, and we should therefore multiply * Otherwise the camp will be liable to be inundated. Ditches or drains should be made, to assist in carrying off the water. t An eastern (western, on this side of the Atlantic) exposure will be preferable. p NOTES UPON HYGIEKE IN THE FIELD. 437 detachments as mucli as possible, and employ large numbers of tlie men in extra work. 3. Bivouacs. — " A bivouac," says Jacquinot de Presle, " althougli unhealthy in a rainy time, is not generally so much so as is commonly supposed. The soldier sleeps with his feet to the fire, which at the same time dries the ground. This is impossible in a tent, where the cold is felt severely, and the men col- lected in so small a space soon vitiate the air they breathe." * Although this remark is, on the whole, correct, yet the bivouac is always attended by more discomfort than the camp ; and therefore bivouacking is frequent- ly prescribed only to the troops who are charged with the duty of watching over the safety of the army, and a double ration of brandy is allowed them.f The location of a bivouac should fulfil the same conditions as that of a camj). If fires cannot be lighted, on account of the prox- imity of the enemy, the condition of the men in the Ijivouac becomes more critical, as they may be over- come by the cold. In this case, we must give a gen- eral order making it the duty of every one who sees another falling asleep, to shake him until he is thor- oughly aroused. The portable tent (tente-ahri) is especially suited * Cours cVart ct dliiatoire militaire, 1829, p. 321. t In general, the drawbacks of the bivouac are compensated in a great degree by good food, but it is prudent also to combine attention to clean- liness as in marches, and activity as in the camp. 438 APPENDIX. to the bivouac * The officers should see that it is properly set up. 4. Field Hospitals. — ^These temporary establish- ments are divided into field hospitals of the regiment, of the division, and of head-quarters. They are de- signed to afford the first relief to the wounded and sick, and to serve as places in which surgical opera- tions may be performed before sending the men either to the temporary or permanent hospitals. The field hospitals of the head-quarters, however, are usually of such dimensions that the soldier may be taken care of in them for a longer time. Field hospitals are established in houses, under a tent, or even in the open air ; but in all cases in rear^ of the army, sheltered from the fire of the enemy, an( where water can be readily obtained. The army sur| geons attend to those placed in them. Each corps is provided with litters and stretchers. Every wounded man, deprived of consciousness oi loss of blood, or with a deep wound in the breast abdomen, will be sent at once to a field hospital, and, if possible, to the special field hospital which the a requires. Others may be temporarily aided on t spot, by stopping the wound from which the bloo( flows with a plug of lint, bound tightly with a linei bandage. * Captain Zaccone published, in 1850, a small pamphlet on the tente- obrL to which the reader will do well to refer. OOISTTElNrTS Preface op the Translator, Preface of the Editor, . . PAGE . 3 PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS. "War, offensive and defensive, 7 Art of War 7 Army 7 Arm 7 Infantry arm 7 Cavalry arm 7 Artillery arm 7 Engineer arm 7 Light and line infantry 8 Light, line, and reserve cavalry 8 Field, siege, coast, and mountain artillery.. 8 Sappers and miners S Unit of force, or tactical unit 8 Formation, or order 8 Front, rear, and flanks of formation 8 Eauk, me, and depth of troops 8 Ployed and deployed formations 8 Manoeuvres 8 Column 8 Echelons 8 Head or foot of column 8 Distance atid interval of troops 8 Checker-form 9 Order, or combined disposition of troops. . 9 Tactics 9 Strategy 9 Logistics 9 Base of operations 10 Lino of defence 10 Objectives, or objective points 10 Line of operations 10 Lino of retreat 10 PART FIRST. niSTOEY AND TACTI03 OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS. CHAPTER I. HISTORY OP INFANTRY. Iktroduction 11 1. Ancients. Chivalry and war chariots most used 13 Infantry more solid than mobile 13 Egyptian infantry 13 Jewish infantry 13 Persian infantry 14 Phalanx, or deep formation 14 2. Greek Phalanx. Character and formation 14 Subdivisions 15 Complete phalanx 15 Mode of action 15 Hoplltes and their arms 15 Sarissa, or long piko 16 Psiletes, or light troops 16 Proportion of hoplites to psiletes 16 Subdivisions of psiletes 16 Mobile formation of phalanx 16 Peltastes 17 Greek education chiefly military 17 Heroism of Spartan mothers 17 Excellence of Greek infantry 17 Immobility of phalanx formation 17 Alexander, Xcnophon, &c, victorious with phalanx IS 3. Roman Iieg-ion. Characteristics 18 Organization more mobile than phalanx.. 18 440 COIS^TENTS. PAGE Maniple formation 18 Ilastati, principes, triarii, and veletes 18 Strength and subdivisions of legion 19 Turma of cavalry added to legion 19 Arms of legionaries , 20 Veletes the skirmishers of the legion 20 Mode of action of the classes of legionaries, 20 Military character of legionary 21 Heavy loads and long marches of legionary, 21 Intrenching customary with legions 21 Mobility of legion 22 Adaptation to universal conquest 22 Eoman government suited to war.^ . . . 22 Objections to formation by maniples 22 Marius' formation by cohorts 22 Cohorts comprise but one class of troops. . 23 Cohorts armed with pilum 23 Legion divided into ten cohorts 23 Caesar's cohort formation 28 Cohort compared with maniple formation, 23 Deterioration of legion under the Empire, 24 Degeneration of soldiers in decline of Eome, 25 4. Barbarous Nations. Barbarians mostly foot soldiers 25 German infantry 25 Frank foot soldiers described 25 Combat of Frank soldiers 26 Deep formation of Frank infantry 27 Massing infantry disappeared with Charles Martel 23 5. Feudal Infantry. Charlemagne's army half cavalry 28 bfobles monopolized profession of arms.. . 28 Knights wore armor and rode mailed chargers 28 Infantry powerless against gensdarmes 28 Infantry composed of servants and peasants, 28 Menial condition of feudal infantry 28 Arms of feudal infantry 29 Used as rampart at battle of Bouvines 29 Slaughtered at battle of Crecy 29 Condottieri substituted 80 6. Communal Infantry. Infantry regenerated in 12th century 80 Origin of communal militia 81 Communal force chiefly infantry 81 Arms of communal infantry 81 Marched under parochial banner 31 Served within or not far from commune. . 81 Maintained by king on distant service 32 Position in battle 32 Superior to feudal infantry 82 Nobles not relieved from military service. 82 Infantry more ready to pillage than fight. 82 Grand Master of the Bowmen instituted. . 82 7. Soldiers of Fortune. Names of vagabond bands in 12th century, 88 Depredations committed by bands 33 [ PAGE Du Guesclin drives them from France 33 Formation in battle of French infantry. . . 83 8. English. Archers. Archers best infantry of 14th century 34 Arms and mode of fighting 84 Hussite infantry under Zisca 34 Tabor, or barricade of wagons 34 9. Swiss Infantry. Swiss resuscitate infantry in 14th century, 84 Compact formation of Swiss infantry.. .. 34 Arms of Swiss infantry 34 Culverins used by Swiss in 13S6 85 Swiss squares at Granson and Morat 35 Echelon formation of Swiss 35 Discipline and courage of Swiss 85 Swiss infantry extensively used in Europe, 86 10. Spanish Infantry. Character of Spanish infantry 36 Arms of Spanish infantry 36 Desperate mode of fighting 36 Arquebus substituted for culverin 86 Mousquet, or improved arquebus 3T Spanish infantry terror of Europe 37 Education and esprit of Spanish soldier. .. 37 Torcios of Charles V 87 11. Frank Archers. Charles YII. established a standing army, 33 Free companies of cavalry 83 Frank archers the infontry of Charles VII., 8S Kecruiting and exercises of archers 38 Mode of compensation of archers 38 Arms and dress of archers 89 Force and command under Louis XI 89 France divided into military departments, 89 Causes of decline of Frank archers 39 Substitution of Swiss and other troops. ... 40 Lansquenets adopted Swiss pike 40 Pikemen in most European armies 40 Foreign, substituted for French infantry.. 40 Louis XII. dismounted the gentry 41 Improved infantry victorious in Italy 41 12. Legions of Francis I. French superior to Swiss at Marignan., .. 41 Machiavelli's estimate of infantrj^ 41 Francis I. created a national infantry 41 Organization of legions of Francis 1 42 Command and force of legion 42 Proportion and duties of arquebusiers.... 43 Privileges of legionaries 43 Isolated bands substituted for legions.... 43 13. French Bands. French band corresponded nearly to bat- talion 43 Oflicers of band 43 Anspessades, or first class infantry 44 Arms of heavy and light troops of bands.. 44 COIfTENTS. 441 PAGE Formation and mode of fighting of bands . . 44 Formation in battailles 45 Fire arms increased during religious wars, 45 Loss of pikes felt till invention of bayonet, 45 Bands of Piedmont and Picardy 46 Bands of Cliampagne and Navarre 46 Isolated bands suited to French character, 46 Necessity of combining bands 46 Regimental organization of old bands 47 Character and name of bands 47 Order of battle of regiments 47 Arms of French regiments 47 Mounted infantry served as cavalry 47 Arquebus superseded by musket 48 Henry IV. diminished depth of infantry, 48 French battalion about 1610 48 14. Swedish Infantry. Gus. Adolphus gave mobility to infantry, 49 Formation of infantry under Gustavus 49 Depth diminished and fire-arms increased, 50 Improvement in arms by Gustavus 50 Advantages of Gustavus' innovations 50 Mixed formation of horse and foot 51 15. Infantry of Louis XTV. and XV. Flint-lock musket introduced in 1652 51 Turenne adopted six-rank formation 51 Lighter arms and formation advantageous, 51 Formation of battalion under Louis XIV. 52 Company square in 1673 53 Musket and bayonet universally adopted . . 53 French battalion in 1703 54. Grenadiers originated under Louis XIV.. 54 1 PAGE Light infantry introduced by Fischer 54 Chasseurs introduced by Fischer in 1743. . 55 French infantry formed in four ranks 55 Cadenced and lock-step introduced by Saxe, 55 Formation of grenadier company (1757). . . 55 16. Prussian Infantry. Excellence of Prussian infantry 55 Superiority of Prussian gun 55 Firing,tho mode of battle ol Frederic II. . 56 Tactics gi-eatly improved by Frederic II. . 56 Formation of Prussian battalion (1752). . . . 56 Formation of Prussian company 67 Firing while marching to the charge 57 Mobility and solidity of Prussian soldiers, 68 17. Modem Infantry. Three-rank formation adopted in France.. 53 Prussian drill introduced in French army, 58 Chasseur and elite company of regiment. . 58 Voltigcurs substituted for elite in 1S04 68 Voltigeur and grenadier company to each battalion 58 Army corps of select troops for a reserve, 59 Infantry organization nearly fixed 59 Success due to legs as much as to arms. . . 59 Two-rank formation of some armies 59 Approval of two-rank formation 60 Percussion substituted for flint-lock 60 Kifled arms and elongated balls adopted.. 60 18. Remarks. Depth of infantry constantly diminished. . 60 One-rank formation probable 61 Success cbiefly due to good infantry 61 CHAPTER SECOND. INFANTRY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 1. General Principles. Advantages of infimtry over other arms ... 63 Infantry the basis of an army 63 Qualifications for infantry soldier 63 Clothing suitable to infantry 64 Arms requisite for Infantry 64 Physical and moral force, how increased.. 64 Load and march of infantry 05 Infantry outmarclies cavalry 65 Instruction, from individual to the mass.. 65 Step and different marching paces 06 Space occupied in rank and file 66 Two and three-rank formation compared. 66 Infantry and cavalrynecessary to each other, 67 2. Modes of Action of Infantry. By firing, or with sabro and bayonet * 63 Sabre a poor arm for infantry 68 Bayonet an Inferior weapon 68 Bayonet the " weapon of the French " 68 Bayonet only good for a demonstration. . . 63 Bayonet collision of rare occurrence 68 Bayonet charge produces moral effect 69 Bayonet mClce at siege of Genoa 69 Marching prepares, firing secures victorj', 69 Firing— simultaneous and at will 69 Firing in three ranks difficult 69 Firing by battalions, divisions, and ranks, 70 Firing by command impracticable in battle, 70 Fire by file best for combat 71 Direct and oblique firing 71 Firing improper while marching 71 Bugeaud's maxims on firing 71 Saxe condemned excessive firing 72 3. The Battalion. Tactical unit of infantry 72 Composition of, in France 72 Conditions necessary in its constitution.. . 72 Subdivisions same for drill and disci- pline 73 Subdivisions symmetrical and equal 73 442 CONTENTS. PAGE 4. Manoeuvres. Tactics consist of manoeuvres 73 Eequisites for their success in war 73 Drills indispensable to train troops 73 Manoeuvres should be prompt and covered, 74 Fixed by regulations " 74 5. Order of Battle. Positions of infantry in order of battle 74 First line deployed, second ployed 75 Evolution of lines generally separate 75 6. Marcliing Pormations. Infantry has four marching formations 75 Marching in line 75 Marching by the flank 76 Marching by column 76 Marching in square 77 Historical examples of marching in square, 77 7. Formations of Attack. Infantry has five formations of attack 78 Attack in line 78 Advantages and defects of attack in line . . 78 Attack in column 79 Double-central column best for attack 79 Columns of attack by platoons and sections, 80 Depth of column limited 80 Column should steadily move to attack. . . 80 Advantages of attack in column 80 French successful in attack by columns. . . 81 Infantry mode of attacking intrenchments, 82 Exposure of columns to artillery fire 82 Mixed formation for attack 82 Historical examples of attack in column . . 82 Attack as skirmishers 83 Skirmishers en grande bande 83 Skill and valor required in skirmishers... 83 Bayonet useful against horsemen 84 Attack in echelons 84 Echelons should mutually flank each other, 84 Direct and oblique echelons 84 Echelon cannot exceed sis battalions 85 Attack in squares 85 Attack in squares in Egypt 85 Square by battalion best for oifensive 85 Rectangular formation of battalion 85 8. Pormations of Defence. Infantry has five formations for defence. . . 86 Defence in line 86 Action of deployed line in defence 86 I PAGE I Formation defending intrenchments 86 I Genoa's defence aided by outside reserves, 87 Defence in column S7 Column good only against cavalry 87 Defence in square 87 Regulation square 87 Russian and English manceuvre against cavalry 87 Schramm's square 88 Square half full formed from column 88 Square by regiment best for defensive 88 Square by battalion best for off'ensive 88 Bugeaud's square of a battalion 89 Weak points of square 89 Bayonet better than fire against cavalry.. 89 Squares echeloned to flank each other 89 Artillery formidable against square 89 Cavalry may break square 89 Square termed formation of resistance .... 90 Square has defects of a redoubt 90 Desaix' square 90 Wurtembera square 90 Defence in echelons 90 Echelons good defence in retreat 90 Defence in checker-form 91 Advantages and disadvantages of checker- formation 91, 9. Liig-lat Infantry. Light troops now all regularly organized.. 911 Light troops have special tactics 913 Chasseurs a pied of France Drill, arms, duty, and organization of chas- seurs Deployed and rallied group by fours 92'.| Signals by whistle as well as bugle 98| Selection and instruction of chasseurs... Important functions of light infantry 941 10. Skirmishers. Fight dispersed, leaving reserve of a third, 94 j Qualifications for .skirmishers 9i\ Should keep moving, or lie down to load, 94 Chasseurs furnish best skirinishers 94 Line infantry sometimes used as skir- mishers 94 Skirmishers of march 95 Skirmishers of battle 95 Skirmishers en grande hande 96 Service of each kind of skirmishers 96 Historical examples of use of skirmishers, 96 CHAPTER THIRD. HISTORY OP CATALRY, 1. Antiquity. Mounted combatants first prevailed 97 War chariots much used by ancients 97 Chariots armed with scythes 97 Chariots carrying military machines 97 Chariots little used by Greeks and Romans, 98 COKTENTS. 443 PAGE ! Eows of stakes defence against chariots. . 9S | Cavalry existed in Cliina 2,0UU years B. 0., &S ! Cyrus introduced cavalry in I'ersia 9S Greeks early used cavalry 93 Epaminondas appreciated value of cavalry, 98 Cavalry increased after Epaminondas. ... 98 Thessalian and Etoliau cavalry 99 Proportion of cavalry in Grecian armies, 99 Koman cavalry mediocre 99 Vicious method of Roman use of cavalry, 99 Causes of inferiority of Koman cavalry. . . 99 Cavalry of Hannibal superior to Roman . . 100 Cavalry of Roman citizens or knights 100 Auxiliary cavalry of allies of Rome 100 Proportion of cavalry to Roman legion.. 100 Arms of cavalry of Greece and Rome 100 Ancient cavalry moved slow 101 Deep formation of Greek cavalry 101 Thessalian lozenge 101 Cavalry of legion divided into ten turmce, 101 Roman turma, or squadron 102 Position of cavalry of legion 102 Depth of auxiliary cavalry less than Greek, 102 Superiority of cavalry of Numidians, &c., 102 Increase of cavalry in decline of Rome.. . 102 Barbarians had little cavalry 102 Cavalry much increased in feudal ages. . . 102 Saddle invented in reign of Constantine, 103 Stirrups invented by Franks 103 Advantages of stirrups 103 2. Middle Ag-es. Chivalry c()ntributed to good police 103 Tactics and chivalry antagonistic 104 Service of knights and their retinue 104 Qualification and installation of knights . 104 Knighthood conferred before battle 104 Banneret and bachelor knights 105 Lance and coutillier 105 Names of pieces of a knight's armor 106 Offensive arms of knights 107 PAGE Villains prohibited use of lance 107 Knights, except in battle, rode a courtaud, 107 French cavalry charged in single line 107 Pages, or vai lets, in second line 107 Cavalry ignored tactics and discipline. . . . 107 Cavalry fought battles and laid sieges. ... 107 Cavalry often fought dismounted 108 Mode of fighting of knights as infantry . . . 103 Causes of decline of chivalry 108 3. Modern Times. FeudaljSupplanted by standing armies. . . 109 Charles VII. institutes permanent troops, 109 Compagnies d'ordonnance 109 Horses for gensdarmes aild archers 109 Gendarme tax 109 Nobles prefer being captains to cavaliers, 110 Companies of Charles VII. best 110 Formation too thin against German horse, 110 Causes of German deep formation 110 Fire-arms adopted by cavalry 1 10 Chevaux-legers and stradiots 110 Cranequiniers and malandrins Ill Argoulets and carabins Ill Reitres, or pistoliers Ill Origin of dragoons HI Change to deep formation Ill Mobility of cavalry lessened 112 Reduction to five rank formation '. 112 Light cavalry formed into regiments 112 Improvements of Gustavus Adolphus.. . 112 Mixture of infantry with cavalry bad 113 Company in order of battle in 1750 118 Changes in arms and armor 113 Improvements made by Marshal Saxe. .. 113 Improvements made by Frederic II 114 Excellence lies in the charge, not firing. . 114 Frederic's formation mostly two ranks.. 114 Improvements made by Seydlitz 114 Two-rank formation generally adopted.. 115 Uniform loose, and load of horse dis- tributed 115 CHAPTER FOUETH. CAVALRY FORMATION AND TACTIC! 1. TJse of Cavalry. Strength of cavalry mostly in speed 116 Pursuit after rout main use of cavalry.. . 116 Offensive, the mode of combat of cavalry, 116 Heavy, light, and mixed cavalry 117 Carabiniers and cuirassiers 117 Heavy cavalry for decisive charges 117 Dragoons include all mixed cavalry 118 Dragoons rarely fight on foot 118 Service of dragoons 118 Chasseurs hussars, and lancers 119 Duties of light cavalry 119 Irregular cavalry seldom used 119 Cossacks charge boldly only on fugitives, 119 2. Armament. Uniform and arms of cavalry 120 Fire-arms useful only for skirmishers, &c., 120 3. Numerical Data. Cavalry one-tenth to fifth of infantry. . . . 120 Weight carried by cavalry horses 120 Rate of travel of a horse 121 Rate of march of cavalry column 121 4. Tactical Unit. Squadron, tactical unit of cavalry., , 121 Composition of French squadron 121 Squadron in order of battle 122 444 CO]S^TEjS^TS. PAGE Length of front and depth of squadron . . . 122 Oldest troops in front and on right 122 Effective force of squadron 123 Two-rank formation best for cavalry 123 5. Manoeuvres. Movement by fours 124 Oblique marches by fours discontinued.. 124 Movement by platoons 124 Trot ordinary gait iu manoeuvres 125 6. Mode of Action. Danger to horseman less than to footman, 125 Instruction to man and horse essential. . . 125 Compactness and velocity in charge 12C 7. Charg-e. Charge made at beginning or end of battle, 12G Charge made on flanks of infantry 12G Mode of charging 126 Charge to be persevered in to the last 127 Cavalry should not fire in charging 127 Few killed or wounded in charge 128 Charge often fails from small cause 128 PAGE Object of two lines in charges 123 Formation for the charge 129 Successful charge completed by pursuit.. 129 Pursuit, how conducted i29 Position of officers in the charge 129 Charge as foragers against artillery 180 Charge as foragers against Arabs 130 8. Formations. Order in line, column, echelons, and square, 130 Cavalry attacks cavalry in line 1-30 Attacks infantry in echelons or column . . 130 Advantages of attack in echelons 131 Attack in column against square 131 Cavalry forms square for defence 131 Column by platoon for marching 182 Cavalry should march on left of road ... 182 Checker-formation little used 132 0. Eclair eurs. Skirmishers of the cavalry 182 Duties, and how selected 132 Advantages of combination with infantry, 132 One-fourth of troop from which detailed, 132 CHAPTER FIFTH. HISTORY OF ARTILLERY. Balista, onager, and catapulta 133 Weight of projectiles, and how far thrown, 133 Moved with armies like field pieces 134 Increased use among ancients 134 Destroyed by fire, or by cutting cords. . . 134 Causes of decline of balistic art 134 Projectile machines during Crusades 135 Porriere and mangonneau 135 Invention of gunpowder 135 Cannon introduced in 14th century 136 Genoese used funnels or vases in 1319 136 Field artillery first on stationary frames, 137 Bombards 137 Hugo dimensions of bombards ... - 137 Bombards superior to ancient machiaeg, 137 Bombards supplanted in 1376 137 Artillery derived from artillier 137 Duties of masters of artillery 13S Cannoniers instituted about 1411 138 Master-general of artillery of Charles VII., 138 Distribution of artillery in armies 138 Cannon eff"ective by noise chiefly 138 Importance for defence 138 Unsuitable for open country 188 Duties of chief of artillery divided 138 Louis XL maintained much artillery.... 138 Twelve peers of France 139 Single chief of artillery reestablished 139 Charles VIIPs use of artillery in campaign, 139 Lighter artillery adopted by Louis XII.. 139 Two chiefs of artillery under Louis XII . . 139 Artillery Increased and systematized 14 Examples of success of artillery in battle, 14 Grand master and captain-general 14 Sully held it as an office of the crown.. First inspector-general of artillery First cannon made of bars and hoops . . . Cast iron, copper, and bronze adopted.. Materials of projectiles Swiss and German infantry, guard of pieces, U Artillery of Henry II. and I V 14 Artillery of Germany in 16th century.. . 14 Gus. Adolphus' improvements in artillery, 14| Introduction of 12 and 24-poHndcrs 14 Bombs introduced in France 14S Light pieces only carried to field 14 Yauban invented ricochet firing (16SS). . . 142 Breaches made by cannon 143J Carcasses invented and used in 1672 143 Fusiliers, the guard of artillery 142 i Name of fusilier from fusil 148 French artillery corps instituted 143 Artillery under Louis XIV 143 Position of artillery in battle 143 Valliere's system of artillery 144 Horse artillery introduced by FrederlcIL, 144 Howitzers used in field by Fredciic II.. . 144 Artillery tnctics improved by Frrderic II., 144 Amount of artillery large under Frederic, 144 Gribeauval's system introduced (1765) ... 144 Great improvements by Gribeauval 145 Battery established as unit of artillery.. . 145 b CONTENTS. 445 PAGE Battalions of the train adopted (ISOl). . . . 145 Napoleon used large masses of artillery, . 145 Valee's system, adopted from English... 146 Four guns and two howitzers to battery, 146 Simplicity of Value's system 146 Cannonlers ride on ammunition-chests.. 147 PAGE Mobility of artillery of new system 147 Modifications in Viil6e's system (1854). .. 147 Napoleon-gun introduced 147 Light, line, and reserve artillery 147 Advantages of these three divisions 147 Train-corps form park-batteries 147 CHAPTER SIXTH. ARTILLERY FORMATION AND TACTICS. I I 1. Purpose of Artillery. Destruction of troops and obstacles 148 Facilitating attack of infantry or cavalry, 148 Artillery should act in large masses 14S Object of field and siege artillery 14S Mountain artillery carried on mules 149 Artillery movable in march and battle.. . 149 Division and reserve batteries 149 Duties of French artillery corps 149 Artillery requires support of other arms, 149 2. Numerical Data. Proportion of artillery to infantry 150 Proportion of artillery to cavalry 151 ■Weight considered in fixing amount 151 Supply of ammunition carried 151 Space occupied by artillery carriages 151 3. Tactical Unit. Battery the tactical unit 151 Composition of field-battery 151 Napoleon-guns adopted in France 152 Subdivisions and commands of battery. . . 152 Composition of mountain battery 152 4. Formations. Field artillery no defensive formation... 152 Formation in column 153 Formation in lino 154 Formation in battery 155 Advancing and retiring by half-battery.. 156 5. Manoeuvres. Necessity of manoeuvres 156 Artillery should manoeuvre promptly . . . , 156 Manoeuvres more as cavalry than infantry, 156 Manoeuvres mostly at a trot 157 Oblique movements and wheeling 157 Kight or left oblique 157 Artillery disregards inversions 153 Formation of column of attack 153 Formation from column to line 158 Change of front from line 153 Evolutions of batteries on same principles, 159 Guides not used in manoeuvres 159 Wheeling made on moving pivot 159 Countermarches and abouts 159 6. Positions. Battery also applied to artillery in position, 159 Choice of positions important for batteries, 159 Commanding open ground eligible site. . . 160 Soil should be solid, but not stony 160 Commodious and safe exits necessary 160 Concealed, to see without being seen.... 160 Fixed to produce greatest damage 160 Direct, oblique, and reverse batteries., ,. 160 Enfilading and cross batteries 161 Division batteries fire throughout battle, 161 Reserve butteries act temporarily 161 Former in front and on flanks of lines. . . 161 Latter for menaced points and attacks. . . 161 Caissons placed in strong and safe places, 161 CHAPTER SEVENTH. HISTORY OF ENGINEERS. Engineer arm not of ancient origin 162 Italian engineers employed in all Europe, 162 French fortifications repaired by Sully.. 162 Jngenieurs ordiriaires du roi (1602) 162 Engineers part of staff till 1690 162 Military corps serving with armies in the field and on fortifications 163 Louis XIV. largely increased engineers.. 163 Eminent services of engineers under Vau- ban in siege and battle 163 French fortifications, methods of attack, and usages, imitated everywhere 163 Vauban made marshal for his services. .. 163 Vauban much advanced art of engineers, 163 Immense lines of field-works constructed, 163 Extent made them weak everywhere 163 Engineers united with artillery in 1755.. 163 Separated after but three years' trial 163 Uniform of French engineers 163 Engineers fixed at 400 in 1762 163 Styled, in 1776, Cor pa Royal dv. Genie.. 164 Duties of gardes du genie 1 64 Revolution caused emigrationof engineers, 164 Numbers during French Revolution 164 Employed more as staff officers till ISOO. . 164 Engineers too few in 1S13 to defendFrance, 164 Employed in sieges in Peninsular "War. . . 164 French consulting committee of engineers, 164 446 CONTENTS. PAGE Cost and extent of fortifications of Paris, 164 Engineers fixed at 460 by Napoleon III., 165 Sappers created in 1671, and mi iicrs in 1673, 165 Vauban, &c., commanded sappers and miners 165 PAGE Convention established engineer troops. . 165 Number and organization of engineer troops under Napoleon 165 Meagre force of engineer officers and troops in United States army 166 CHAPTER EIGHTH. FUNCTIONS OF THE ENGINEERS. Engineers one of the arms of service 167 Duties of engineers 167 Construction and repair of permanent for- tifications 167 Construction, &c. of military buildings.. 167 Construction of all field works and ovens, 167 Making and destroying military roads.. . 168 Construction and destruction of bridges Avith fixed supports 168 "Works for attack and defence of places. . 168 Military reconnoissanco 168 Works executed by contract in peace 168 Executed by military workmen in war. . 168 Engineer troops recruited from mechanics, 168 Company of sappers to a division, in war, 169 Company the unit of engineer force 169 Wagon to each company 169 Arms and tools carried by sappers 169 Proportion of tools to a company 169 Miners carry special mining tools 169 Miners accompany engineer train 169 Articles carried by engineer train 169 Sappers and miners drilled as infantry. . . 169 Devotion to duty of sappers and miners, 170 Floating bridges, transported with armies, built by artillery in France 170 Pontonniers belong to engineers in most armies 170 Pontonniers a distinct corps in Austria and Russia 170 Pontonniers should belong to engineers in France 170 Arms and equipment of French engineer troops 170 PART SECOND. COMBINATION OF THE AEMB. CHAPTER FIRST. ORGANIZATION OF ACTIVE ARMIES. 1. Principles of Organization. Brigades, how organized and commanded, 171 Divisions, how organized 172 Division, fundamental element of an army, 172 Advantages of division formation 172 Army composed of several divisions 172 Relation of commanders in armies 172 Permanent and temporary fractions 173 Organization by divisions best for armies, 173 Organization by army-corps in some cases, 173 Cases where army-corps preferred 173 Fractions in order of importance 174 Army-corps must be self-sustaining 174 Army-corps usually composed of all arms, 174 Army-corps of cavalry under Napoleon. . 174 Limits of cavalry army-corps 174 Composition and strength of army-corps, 174 Order of battle of an army-corps 175 Order of battle of a division 175 Divisions had better be of equal force 176 Purpose and proportion of reserves 176 Reserves f<»r defence as well as for offense, 177 Reserve composed of veteran troops 177 Embrace heavy cavalry and artillery 177 Napoleon used an army-corps for reserve, 177 Imperial guard and grenadiers in reserve, 17T] Withdrawal of select troops objectionable, 1771 Withdrawal should be only temporary.. 177J Solid reserves indispensable in field 177] Composition of brigades 178i Mixed brigades for advanced-guards, &c., 178 Appendages of an army-parks, trains, &c., 17 Special reserve of heavy cavalry 1791 Depots of an army, and where established, 178 j 2. Commands. Command of army or corps,how regulated. Command of wings, centre, and reserve, Command of divisions and brigades General assigns temporary commanders. . General -in-chief assisted by staff officers. Chief of staff and sub-chiefs Duties of the etat-major (staff-corps) Administrative services for an army Duties of intendant and his assistants Duties of chief and staff of engineers Duties of chief and staff of artillery Command and staff' of divisions, &c CONTENTS. 447 PAGE A-ides-de-camp and orderly ofliccrs 182 Duties of commandant of headquarters.. 1S2 Duties of provost marshal-general 183 Duties of wagon-master of headquarters, 183 Command, &c., of division headquarters, 184 3. Standing Armies. Organized in France and Austria for war, 184 Organized in Prussia for peace and war . . 184 Advantages of both systems 184 CHAPTER SECOND. MARCHES. 1. Marches of Concentration. Performed at a distance from enemy 186 Mode of conducting and details 186 Made by day if practicable 186 Rate of travel and halts 187 Uniformity of gait essential for cavalry. . 187 2. Marches of Manoeuvre. Performed in presence of the enemy 187 Made cautiously, and prepared for attack, 187 Made in strong, short columns 187 Position of dift'erent arms in march 188 Number and distance ap;irt of columns. . ISS Column must be covered by light troops, 183 Duties of advance-guard of a column 189 Duties, &c., of commander of advance- guard 189 Strength of advance-guard, and position . . 190 Duties of rear-guard of a column 190 Qualifications of chief of rear-guard 190 Duties of flankers of a column 191 General advance and rear-guard of colv.mns, 19! Kuse to deceive the enemy as to march. . 191 Conveyance of messages 191 March of manoeuvre by front, flank, or rear, 192 March by flank in single long column 192 Precautions to be taken in march by flank, 193 Examples of flank marches 193 Marches of manceuvro must be rapid. . . . 193 Massena's celebrated march at Eivoli 193 Defeat of Austriaus in 1809 from inactivit}^ 194 Eapidity of march indispensable in pursuit, 194 Retreat, a series of retrograde marches. . . 194 Precautions to be taken in retreat 194 CHAPTER THIRD. BATTLES. 1. Primitive Order of Battle. Three lines in battle 196 First line brings on the action 196 Second line supports first 196 First line is deployed in order of battle. . 197 Second line in columns, by battalions .... 197 Second linedcployed if exposed to artillery, 197 Reserve in column, by brigades 197 Second line should be 300 yards from first, 198 Reserve 1,000 to 1,200 yards in its rear. . . 19S Cavalry should be on, and support flanks, 199 Exception when cavalry may be at centre, 199 Artillery in front, opposite intervals 199 Second line in rear of flanks and intervals, 199 Artillery of reserve close to main reserve, 199 Parks, Ac, in safe place in rear of reserve, 199 Entire division usually in same line 200 Primitive order of battle delineated 200 Circumstances modify this review order, 201 2. Orders of Battle. Parallel order of battle 201 I'arallel.the ancient order of battle 202 Modifications of parallel order 202 Oblique order of battle 202 Examples of oblique order of battle 203 Perpendicular, a case of oblique order. .. . 203 I Concave order of battle Examples of concave order Convex order of battle Convex, a bad order, except in few cases, Turks' transformation of convex to con- cave i Practically, orders are mere approxima- tions , Continuous lines preferable 1 3. Conduct of the Battle. ! Object and necessity of battles \ Superiority offeree not indispensable ■ Victors try to cut enemy's line ; Vanquished try to preserve its line General conforms his order to circum- stances I Point of attack determined bystrategy,&c., i Avoid obstacles, and strike at weak points, ! Genius and experience decide battles I Long circuits to be avoided in flanking.. ; Attacks on many points objectionable. . . • Examples of attacks ' Attacks should be sudden and concealed, j Provision to be made for reverses i Orders completed by verbal instructions, ; Discretionary powers to subordinates. .. 204 204 204 205 205 205 206 206 200 203 448 CONTENTS. PAGE I PAGE Mode of conducting an offensive battle... 210 j Squares to be used in defensive battles.. 214 Conduct of pursuit after victory 212 | Eet'stablisbing an uncovered flank 214 Kequisites of position for defensive battle, 212 j Assuming offensive from defensive 214 Precautions for vigorous defence 213 \ Mode of conducting a retreat 215 Mode of conducting a defensive battle ... 213 i History of battles to be studied 216 PART THIRD. MINOR OPERATIONS, CHAPTER FIRST. OUTPOSTS. Introduction. Portion of army must guard the whole. . 217 Functions of outposts 217 Outposts take place of scouts of ancients, 218 Outposts the eyes of an army Composed to watch most active enemy. Covering, not fighting, corps of army. . . Safety in vigilance Surveillance active, not too regular Posted to watch and impede enemy Outposts extend beyond advance-guard. Transient or permanent,posted alike Number for outposts, and how supplied. Constituent parts of outposts 218 218 218 219 219 219 220 220 220 220 1. Grand Guards. Advanced posts of camp or cantonment. . 221 Number, force, position, how regulated.. 221 Infantry and cavalry guard combined 221 Force and command of regimental guard, 221 Positions to be occupied by grand guards, 222 Seldom dispensed with 222 Posts protected by temporary defences.. 222 Intrenching, like ancients, disapproved.. 222 Communications to be secured 222 Obstructions made toward enemy 223 Duties of grand guards 223 Precautions to be taken by grand guards, 223 Conduct of grand guard when attacked.. 224 Posted 2,500 yards in advance of army. . . 224 2. Small Posts. Covering force of grand guard 224 Positions, force, and communications 225 Instructions and duties of commanders.. 225 Precautions at small posts 225 Cossack-posts 220 3. Sentinels and Vedettes. Covering force of small posts 226 Posted 500 yards in front of small posts.. 226 Infantry sentinels and cavalry vedettes.. 226 Duties of sentinels and vedettes 227 Precautions by sentinels and vedettes. .. 227 4. Distribution of the Outposts. Distances and system of outposts 223 Modified by nature of ground 228 Distances diminished at night 230 5. Posts of Support. Location, object, and armament 230 Form fourth line of outpost defence 230 6. Patrols, Lookouts, Rounds. Outposts must be under surveillance 230 Duties and object of round, patrols, &c... 281 Arrangement of a defensive patrol 2-31 Arrangement of an offensive patrol 232 Patrols should not remain in mass 233 Precautions to be observed by patrols... 234 CHAPTER SECOND. DETACHMENTS. 1. General Observations. Object and duties of offensivcdetachmcnts, 235 Made up of fixed fractions of regiments.. 236 Artillery and engineers not included 236 Qualifications and duties of the chiefs.. .. 236 Feeble on the march 238 Advance and rear-guard and flankers. .. 238 Force of guards and flankers 238 Precautions to be taken by chief 239 Should always be ready for defence 239 Should not be stopped by a river 240 Have a right to shares of booty 240 2. Detachments of Infantry. Duties and precautions to be taken 240 Marching formation and force 241 3. Detachments of Cavalry. Used where celerity is required 243 Duty of their advance-guards 243 COITTENTS. 449 PAGE Dangers of defiles to bo avoided 243 Formation and march 244 4. Mixed Detachments. Possess more stability than of a single arm, 244 PAGE Duties for which most suitable 244 Order of march In diflerent cases 244 Dispositions for combat 245 Marching formation on level ground 246 Marching formation on broken ground. . . 247 CHAPTER THIRD. ARMED RECONNOISS ANCES. Introduction. Armed reconnoissauce defined 24S Basis of every military movement 248 Diflieult and complicated 248 Designed to see and collect all information, 249 Five kinds of reconnoissances 249 Proposed manner of treating the subject, 249 1. Daily Reconnoissances. Object, and indications for guidance 250 Kind of troops varied by nature of country, 250 Must be divested of regularity 250 Aim, information and not combat 251 Cases where combat is proper 251 Has advance, rear-guard and flankers 251 Flankers not far from main body 251 Precautions to avoid ambuscades 251 Precautions when halting 252 Manner of observing columns on march, 252 2. Special Heconnoissances. Facilitating march of columns 252 Exploring positions to be occupied 252 Ascertaining enemy's posts and defences, 253 Estimating enemy's forces at all points.. 253 Made by oflicers according to speciality. . 253 Instructions to whom and how given. . . . 254 Posts not to be attacked without authority, 254 3. Secret Reconnoissances. Occupy sometimes several days and nights, 254 Secret if possible, and open if necessary, 255 Intrusted only to veteran light troops,. . . 255 Requisites in the chief and subordinates, 255 Striking example ofVauban's sang-froid, 257 Chief should know language of country. . 257 Chief should have telescope, maps, &c. .. 258 Detachment composed of light cavalry.. 258 Composed of fifteen to forty horsemen ... 258 Moves secretly and rapidly 259 Accompanied by advance-guard and guide, 259 Rallying point to be designated 259 Messages to be destroyed to avoid capture, 259 Formed in three unequal echelons 260 Mode of conducting reconnolssance 260 When discovered to be renewed 260 Chief sometimes advances with guide only, 260 Prisoners to be made if other means fail . . 261 Promptness and despatch indispensable. . 261 Retires after object is accomplished 261 29 4. Offensive Reconnoissances. Made openly by force of anns 261 Composed of artillery and light cavalry. . 262 Penetrates to point where all can be seen, 262 Supported in force if necessary 262 Made by general himself on eve of battle, 262 Ordered usually by general-in-chief 263 5. Report. Drawn up in clear and positive manner. , 268 Accompanied by sketch of ground, &c. . . 263 Better to be too explicit than too concise, 263 Indispensable to be made quickly and well, 264 Made verbally often to avoid delay 265 "Written or oral, must be clear and concif-e, 2C5 6. Historical Examples. Pursuit of Duke of Savoy from Turin. . . 265 Capture of Austrian battalion in 1805 266 Lannes' false march after Austerlitz 267 Euse of Capt. Curely near Eaab in 1809, 267 Defeat of Massena at Busaco in 1810 268 Capt. Light's exploit near Vic-de-Bigorre, 269 7. Reconnoissances in Africa. Difiiculty and danger 270 Arab limiers' various ruses 270 8. Maps. Indispensable in conducting war 272 Verification of correctness necessary 272 Mode of verifying maps 273 Cassini's maps deceived Allies in 1814.. . 273 Foreign maps usually defective 274 Governmental maps to be trusted 274 Road and station maps 274 9. Guides. Give information not on maps 275 Indispensable to success of armies 275 Class of persons from whom selected 276 How procured and treated 276 Mode of ascertaining their intelligence. .. 277 Must obtain knowledge of their character, 277 Selected from those in your interest 273 Punishment and rewards 278 Interrogate several, and not rely upon one, 279 Two necessary to every detachment 279 Precautions to prevent their escape 280 Must be prevented falling asleep 281 I 450 CONTENTS. PAGE 10. Deserters. Disarmed and interrogated 281 Not to be trusted, often spies in disguise, 281 Exaggerate information to be welcomed, 281 Manner of interrogation and questions. . . 282 11. Inhabitants. Officials and other persons interrogated . . 2S2 Questions to be asked 282 Questioned separately in tlieir language. . 283 12. Travellers. Questions asked of comers from enemy.. 233 Interrogated to ascertain whether spies. . 284 Testimony to be rectified 284 13. Prisoners. Questions to be put same as to deserters, 284 Information from them quite reliable 285 Capture of prisoners to obtain information, 285 14. Spies. Definition of a spy 286 Spies from devotion to prince or countr)'-, 286 Spies procured from all conditions of life, 287 Examples of noted spies 287 PAGE Qualifications for spies, and where found, 288 Inhabitants and soldiers of enemy spies. . 2S8 Cruel last resort to obtain spies 289 Soldiers, disguised as inhabitants, used,. 289 Spies easily got among a divided people, 290 Diflicult to obtain among uprising people, 290 Verification of spies' information 291 Double spies, how treated and made use of, 291 Whimsical ruse of Suwarrow in Poland, 291 Spies must not reside in camp 29i Spies kept apart with assumed names.., 292 Precautions against disguises of spies 292 Sutlers and clerks must be watched 293 Spies' reports should be kept secret 293 Imprudent speech of Alphonso X 293 Arrested spies searched and watched 293 Examples of concealed despatches 294 15. Indications. Divining enemy's intentions gift of genius, 294 Mythological illustration of indications . 294 Historical illustrations of indications.... 294 Skill by observation and comparison 295 Interpreting,a moral part of war 295 Principal indications enumerated 295 True from false, how distinguished 297 CHAPTER PASSAGE Introduction. Water-courses formidable obstacles in war, 298 Various modes of crossing streams 298 Improvised passages chiefly considered.. 298 1. Keconnoissance of a River. Particulars to be ascertained enumerated, 299 Various points to be exactly explained.. 299 2. Discovery, Destruction, and Hepair of Fords. Maximum depth of fords for different arms, 300 Careful search should be made for fords. . 300 Existence of fords, how indicated 300 Below mills and near mouths of streams, 301 Mode of reconnoitring a ford 301 Mode of tracing a ford 301 Ford usually found in double bends 301 Oblique fords 802 Essential requisites of a good ford 302 Fords useful to us must be protected 303 Enemy's fords destroyed or obstructed. . . 303 Modes of obstructing fords 803 Modes of breaking up or destroying fords, 304 Modes of repairing and improving fords, 304 Fords should be staked out 306 Fords not to be relied upon for passage. , 306 Fords of mountain torrents not reliable . . 806 Disasters by changes of the ford of Cinca, 806 FOURTH. F R I T E II S . 3. Fording" a River. Fords suffice for detachments, not armies, 307 Troops when heated must not pass a ford, 307 Stakes or guard-ropes required for fords, 307 Precautions taken in fording rapid streams, 307 Mode of fording by the several arms 303 Precedence of arms in fording 808 Fording of Granicus and Tagliamento. . . 309 Historical examples of importance of fords 309 English won Crecy by discovering a ford, 309 Soult's failure to ford Tagus saved Wel- lington ". 809 4. Swimming a River. Examples of swimming with despatches, 809 Lille saved, in 1708 310 Defence of Genoa prolonged, in 1800.... 810 Poniatowski, not a swimmer, drowned.. 810 Importance of swimming to soldiers 811 French soldiers not good SAvimmers 311 Passage of Linlh, in 1799 811 Choice of place for swimming a stream.. 811 Precautions essential for infantry 812 Passage of Loire by Ctsar 812 Passage of Meuse by Prince of Orange.. . 812 Precautions to be observed by cavalry . . 812 Horses drowned in crossing Oder 312 Swimming horses behind boats ' . . • • 813 CONTENTS 451 PAGE Horseman carrying a foot soldier behind, 813 Passage of Douro, in 15S0 313 Passage of Rhine, in 1639 313 Arm of sea crossed, in 170S 313 Mode of Tartar cavalry swimming rivers, 313 Celebrated swimming of Rhine by Louis XIV 313 5. Passage upon Ice. 1 Fastening congelation of channel of river, 314 Ice not trusted if it does not lay on water, 314 Thickness of ice for passage of all arms. . 814 Artificially increasing thickness of ice ... . 314 PAGE Precautions to be taken in crossing ice,. 315 Disorder and confusion to be prevented . . 815 Crossing the frozen Frische-Haff, in 1679, 315 Dutch fleet captured by cavalry, in 1795, 315 6. Improvised Bridges. Construction belong mostly to artillery, . 815 Foot-bridge of ladders 316 Bridges of undressed trees 816 Bridge of wagons for shallow streams. ,. 816 Rope bridges on narrovvmountain torrents, 817 Suspension bridges of ropes 818 Small pile-bridges 318 CHAPTER FIFTH. CONVOYS. Introduction. Definition and object of a convoy 319 Convoys,muscles of army 319 Organization of convoysdcmand great care, 319 Outfit,&c.,both adminisi rative and tactical, 319 Convoys never march without escort 319 Force, Ac, determined by circumstances, 320 Composed of infantry and a little cavalry, 320 Ready to overcome difficulties 320 Some artillery and sappers attached 320 Grade of commandant of convoy 320 Artillery officer usually convoys ammu- nition 320 Chief has detailed written instructions,, .321 Not to be modified by any one on the route, 821 Command of convoy a delicate mission,, 821 1. Org-anization of tlie Convoy. Chief ccdlocts and examines convoy 821 Everything necessary must be provided. . 321 Materiel must be examined in detail 321 Spare wagons and parts carried along 322 Large convoys divided and subdivided, . . 322 Portion of escort guards each subdivision, 322 Wagons of most value at heads of divisions, 322 Hostile prisoners at heads of convoys 323 Beasts of burden precede convoy-wagons, 823 Convoy has advance and rear-guard 323 Chief reserves no special command 823 Weight carried by wagons and animals. , 323 Space occupied and rateoftravelof wagons, 324 Forbidden to put knapsacks on wagons.. 324 2. March of the Convoy. Examination of route of march to be made, 324 March made slow at uniform rate 824 Ad vance-guai-d precedes convoy sometime, 824 Duties of advance-guard 825 March in two files, and drivers watched, 825 Wagons kept repaired, or thrown out. . . . 325 Escort holds all dangerous positions 826 Vigilance never relaxed 326 3. Halts and Parks. Long halts made only in strong positions, .S26 Ilorseskept harnessed andwagons guarded, 32? Convoy parked at night and on halts. . . 327 Wagons occupy exterior, and horses and valuables interior of park 327 Park resembles barricade or intrenchment, 327 Circular park, with horses in interior 827 Rectangular park used in Prussia S2S Park formed from marching column 329 Archduke Charles, parks, by divisions 829 Parks far from towns, woods, «fec 330 Defensive accessories, called tabors 030 4. Defence of the Convoy. Convoys should be drilled to resist attack, 831 Measures taken on approach of enemy. . . 831 Skirmishers keep enemy at distance .331 Convoy eains shelter and halts S3 1 Enemy dispersed, and march resumed.. oS2 Escort recnforccd to resist centra! attack, 832 Threatened positions to be occupied.... 332 Attack in rear repelled by rear-guard 332 Convoy subdivided in dangerous i»laces, 3.32 Defence failing wagons to be destroyed, 333 Escort does not pursue enemy 833 Prisoners must lie down during attack. . . 883 Prisoners confined in defensible houses, . 833 Requisites for the defence of a convoy.. 834. 5. Attack of a Convoy. Advantage in attacks with assailant 834 Attack based on previous information.. . S84 Corps of attack divided into three masses, 884 First engages the escort 884 Second falls upon the wagons 8:34 Third remains in reserve 3.34 Attack made on centre in level ground.. 885 Parks attacked in rear or breached 335 Attacks generally for seizing valuables.. 385 Often limited to disorganizing convoys.. 835 452 CONTENTS. PAGE 6. Convoys by Water. Transport bulky and heavy supplies 836 Distribution of escort on boats and shore, 336 High banks to be occupied 337 Convoy halts during attack 337 Convoy proceeds if escort is victorious. . . 337 Boats sunk If escort is beaten 337 Attack of convoy of boats in bend of river, 337 I PAGE Captured convoy best be removed by laud, 338 7. Historical Examples. Corbie relieved by entrance of convoy.. 83y Success of convoy introduced into Lille. . 339 Attack of water convoy for relief of Aire, 341 Attack of land convoy for relief of Olmutz, 342 Kescue of a convoy of Prussian prisoners, 344 Eccapture of convoy in Spain, in 1811 344 CHAPTER SIXTH. PARTISANS. Definition and duties of partisans 346 Act not at a venture, nor trust to chance, 346 Operations of, part of plan of campaign . . 346 Dispensed with by French and English. . 346 Sometimes termed flankers in France. . . 346 Modern restriction in movements 347 Composition &c., vary with circumstances, 347 Quality more than quantity necessary.. . 347 Qualifications needed for partisans 347 Free corps, specially raised, good material, 848 Corps,rising through political events,best, 343 Essential qualificationsof partisan chief. . 348 Partisans rely mainly on expedients 349 Inspire respect at home and terror abroad, 349 Must bid adieu to idleness and rest 350 March concealed anddiscipline maintained, 8o0 Discover everything and be stopped by nothing 350 Avoid towns, take hostages, resort to ruses, 850 Dart on their prey like vultures 351 Success being doubtful, should retreat.. . 851 Chief's orders given to next in command, 351 Apportionment of prize money 351 Statement of requisitions to be made.. .. 352 Mansfeld, and other celebrated partisans, 353 Historical examples of partisan operations, 353 CHAPTER SEVENTH. SURPRISES AND AMBUSCADES. Introduction. Surprises aid the weak against the strong, 356 Essential conditions and preparations 856 Used in offensive or defensive operations, 357 1. Surprises by Ambuscade. Derivation of the term ambuscade 357 Purpose of an ambuscade S5S Eequisites in composition of force 358 Precautions on march to designated place, 359 Selection of position for an ambuscade. . . 359 Locations for concealing troops 360 Surprise of camp or cantonment 360 Position of ambuscade to be first searched, 361 Precautions in guarding ambuscade 361 Noise, fire, lights, sleep, &c., forbidden.. . 361 Conduct of an attack from an ambuscade, 862 Ruse employed in retreats 362 Counter-ambuscade against ambuscade.. 363 2. Surprise by a March. Calculated for the proper time and place, 3C3 Break of day best time for surprise 363 March at right angles to enemy's march, 368 More frequent than surprise by am- buscade 863 Wrapping horses' hoofs in sheepskin 364 Surprise more dishonorable than defeat. . 864 Kleber's precept respecting surprises 364 3. Historical Examples. Should emerge from ambuscade in a body, 854 Example of Labienus in 44 B. C 364 Badge or rallying signal necessary 365 Example of Villars' reconnoissance in 1667 865 Soldiers in ambush should not sleep 865 Example of night ambuscade in Spain.... 865 Failed at Mayence through imprudent cry, 866 Capture of the Vendean chief, Stofliet. . . 866 Covering obstacle against surprise 866 Marmonfs surprise of Eussian outposts, 866 Surprise in Algeria nearly frustrated 367 CHAPTER EIGHTH. HEIGHTS. 1. Reconnoissance. Heights first to be reconnoitred 868 Essential information to be obtained 868 Places for combat to be indicated 869 2. Defence. Military crest between slope and plateau, 369 Position of defender to repel attack 369 First line near military crest 370 COIfTENTS. 453 PAGE Assailant fired upon before rouching crest, 371 Second line placed to support first 371 Ueserve to watch flanking movements. . . 871 Plateaux to be successively defended. . .. 871 Flanking fires particularly useful 371 Cavalry acts chiefly with reserve 871 Solid and experienced infantry necessarj-, 371 Examples of Talavera and Pampeluna. . . 371 3. Attack. Should seek to turn position 872 PAGE Attack in front accompanied by false ones, 372 Main attack chiefly by light troops 372 Supported by small and mobile colnmns, 372 Attack must be covered by skirmishers, 372 Columns, so covered, advance step by step, 878 4. Attack of Height by Company of Infantry. Bugeaud's instructions for attack 373 Company divided into four half-sections, 373 Conduct of the attack described 374 CHAPTER NINTH. WOODS. I 1. Beconnoissance. Necessity of reconnoitring woods Mode of conducting reconnoissance Objects to be noted and fully reported. . 2. Defence. Assailant to be arrested at verge of wood. Close outlets and protect projecting points. Centre of action to be selected Distribution of troops for defence of forest. Distributing troops for defence of coppice. 875 375 376 377 877 377 S7S i 3. Attack. Preparations for attack made at a distance, 378 Force moves rapidly to attack woods 879 Principal attack to cut line of retreat 379 Vigorous and veteran troops required 879 Distance between lines and reserve 379 Mode of attack of different kinds of woods, 379 Eear-guard to cover reserve 3S0 4. Example. Eichepanse's success at IIohenlinden(1S00),3S0 CHAPTER TENTH. FARMS, OR HOUSES. Introduction. Importance of farm or house for defence, 382 Hovel even hard to take if well defended, 3S2 Brick walls best, not being easily breached, 3S3 Attack or defence of block-house 383 1. Defence. Engineers prepare defence SS3 Strongest structure converted into citadel, 383 Assailant should be compelled to lay siege, 8S3 Points of attack must be lit up 383 Enclosures or buildings are garrisoned... 333 Loopholes must be pierced through walls, 884 Harricades of openings to be well defended, 384 Flank and machicoulis fires upon openings, 384 Ladders must be overthrown imme- diately 884 Climbers must bo dislodged from roof. . . 384 Vigorous sorties and counter-attacks made, 384 Fires kindled byenemy to be extinguished, 385 Garrison makes final defence in redoubt, 885 Main body escapes while few hold redoubt, 885 2. Attack. Eeconnoissance preliminary to attack. Cavalry watches supports and entrances.. Defenders' night-fires extinguished Exterior and weak points lit up Breaches to be made and roofs burned. . . Ambuscaded skirmishers fire on openings, Columns assault breaches and openings. . Scaling-ladders, sand-bags, &c., provided, Skirmishers cover assaulting columns Doors to be forced and passages explored. Sheltered area seized for place of arms. .. Communications made to place of arms.. Second enclosure carried like first Skirmishers secure roof and staircases... . Sorties captured, or followed into house. . Infiintry troops chiefly employed in attack. Houses fired under protection of cavalry, 385 3S5 885 385 880 386 386 886 386 886 387 887 387 387 CHAPTER ELEVENTH. R K D U B T S . Introduction. I 1. Defence. Eedoubts properly belong to fortification, 388 Garrison, a reserve and active part 388 Defend points assailable on all sides 888 I Active part, of two-thirds, man parapets, 888 Protect hillocks, debouches of defiles, &c., 888 | Two men to every yard of parapet 888 Used for fortifying front of line of battle.. 888 ' Eeserve (first section) to protect entrance, 388 454 contejs:ts. PAGE llt'serve(second section) for assailed points, 3S8 Commandant explains duties to troops. . . 388 Sentinels guard redoubt till attacked 389 Artillery fire opens at 400 yards 389 Musketry opens at 150 yards 389 Mode of repelling assault 389 Repulsed enemy fired upon in retreat. . . 389 Successful enemy to be attacked by re- serve 389 2. Attack. Force divided into three columns 339 PAGE Sappers destroy accessory defences 389 Supports march in rear of coluuins 389 Two columns make false attacks 890 Principal point of attack, bow selected. . 890 Systematic mode of attack of redoubt 390 Duties of assailants when within redoubt, 890 Precautious taken after gaining redoubt, 391 Attack of small force made as foragers. . . 391 3. Example. Attack on redoubts at Pultawa 892 Ketreat of Swedes to Borysthenes 394 CHAPTER TWELFTH. B ARRI CADES. 1. Construction. Barricades often constructed in streets... 395 Rules for construction same as field works, 395 Placed at elevations and middle of blocks, 395 Constructed of all kinds of materials 395 Best of paving stones and earth 395 High and steep, with ditch and banquette, 396 2. Defence. Defenders Are in succession on assailants, 396 Prepared mine outside fired from within, 396 Defence, if necessary, hand to hand 396 Activity, vigilance, and courage required, 396 Artillery, if any, will fire grapeshot 397 Retreat how made, and Avay obstructed.. 397 3. Attack. Dangerous when made on small front 397 Carried by ruse, surprise, or turned 397 Reconnoissance made for rear approach. . .397 Defenders dislodged by fire from houses, 397 Destroyed sometimes by mine or petard, 397 Streets too narrow for attack by sap 398 Moving martlets have been suggested 898 Open attack the last resort 398 Mode of assault by open force 893 Assault failing, bombardment made 399 CHAPTER THIRTEENTH. FORAGES. 1. Object. Forage, the obtaining food for horses 400 Dry foraging, and green foraging 400 Forages formerly important operations.. 400 Forages unimportant at present time 400 Forages indispensable for light cavalry.. 401 Brack's experience in eight campaigns. . . 401 2. Bistribtition. Foraging distributed among troops 401 Necessity of, and mode of distribution. . . 402 Number of rations of forage, how settled, 402 Unit of measure determined by trial 403 Distribution, by whom made 403 3. Dry Foraging". Place of foraging surrounded and guarded, 404 Supplied on requisition, or taken by force, 404 Surprise or marauding, how prevented. . . 404 Forages made in but one village at a time, 405 4. Green Porag-ing-. Preparations for making a green forage.. 405 Occupation and guarding place of foraging, 405 Horses left outside of foraging ground 406 Defence and escort of foraging party 406 Green foraging less dangerous than dry.. 406 Must not embrace too much ground 406 5. Attack of a Forag-ing Party. Cavalry attacks green, and infantry dry.. 406 Seci-ecy great element of success in attack, 406 Foragers cut off from posts and escorts.. 406 Attack sudden and rapid, with false ones, 407 Foragers to be driven off, but not pursued, 407 Forage, if not broken up, to be harrassed, 407 Ruse excellent auxiliary in attack 407 CHAPTER FOURTEENTH. DEFILES. Introduction. Defiles defined and divided into two classes, 408 Roads in gorges, ditches, &c.— first class, 408 Exert important influence in war Bridges, necks, dikes, &c.— second class.. 408 Easily obstructed, good for ambuscades,&c. 409 CONTE?fTS. 465 PAGE First class almost impregnable 409 Example of defile of Tliermopylii; 409 Second class forced with difficulty 409 Example of dike of Areola 409 Arms used iu attack and defence 409 1. Occupation and Defence of a Defiie. Depends upon character, jtc, of defile . . . 409 Preserved, or use by enemy prevented.. 409 Positions to be occupied for defence 409 2. Passag-e of a Defile. In advance not difficult, if unoccupied. . . 410 Mode of advancing through defile 410 Passage of a defile in retreat more difficult, 411 Mode of passage of defile in retreat 411 Precautions to be observed by rear-guard, 412 Troops in ia defile assimilated to a serpeut, 412 3. Attack of a Defile. Difficulty of attack with narrow front .. . 413 Difficult to attack with fianks protected, 413 Not attacked unless essential to success. . 413 Mode of conducting the attack of a defile, 413 Euse tried if direst attack impracticable, 414 PAGE I Capturing defile by false demonstrations, 414 I Attacking defiles with occupied flanks. . . 414 I 4. Historical Examples. j Omit no precautions when near a defile, 415 ! Passage of defile near Meissen, in 1T45 . . . 415 Cavalry may, as an exception, force a defile, 416 Passage of defile of Somo-Sierra, in 1S03, 416 Employment of flanking attacks 417 Harispe'sforciugdeflle of Cabreras, in 180S, 417 Passage of defile in Algeria, in ISoO 413 Passage of a defile rapidly 418 ! Passage of defile on Mount Medola, in 1796, 418 } Army in order of battle before a defile. . 418 ! Gus, Adolphus at Leipsic and Leutzen.. 419 j 5. Defence and Attack of a Bridge. j Mode of defending a bridge 419 I Mode of attacking a bridge 420 Bridge should be turned by fording, &c. . 420 ! Passage of bridge of Lodi, in 1796 421 ; 6. Defence and Attack of a Dike. i Dikes, generally, only defended in front, 421 I Mode of defence of a dike in front 422 I Mode of attack of a dike in front 422 CHAPTER FIFTEENTH. TILLAGES. 1. Occupation. Villages occupied when defensible 424 Select those compactly and regularly built, 424 Occupied if important to the army 424 Information to be obtained before occu- pation 425 "Without some natural defence not to be occupied 425 2. Defence. Preparing a village to make a good defence, 426 Redoubt to be in central position 426 Artillery posted at vulnerable points 426 Artillery sweep streets and open places. . 426 Flank and oblique firing most effective. . 427 Cavalry, how i>osted for the best defence, 427 Infantry, how divided and posted 427 Reserve should amount to about one fourth, 428 Communications to bo opened 428 Sorties conducted briskly and with caution, 428 Enemy to be repulsed, but not pursued.. 428 Exterior and interior defence 428 Reserve charges, while enemy is checked,428 Counter-attacks made and retreat secured, 428 3. Attack. Attacks on villages cost too many men., 428 Superior forces and howitzers required.. 429 One real and two false attacks to be made, 429 Division of force, and mode of attack.. . 429 Duties of cavalry in assault of a village. . . 431 4. Sudden Attack. Made by surprise or vigorous assault 431 Adopted in Algeria in attack of villages.. 431 Tillages carried by infantry on the run. . 431 5. Historical Examples. Attack of Xerwinden, in 1693 431 Attack of Fontenoy, in 1745 432 Attack of Essling and Aspern, in 1809. . . 482 Attack of Schcenfeld, in 1813 432 APPEl^DIX. UPON nYGIENE IX THE FIELD, Introduction. Difficult for soldier to write on hygiene . . 433 Science of hygiene defined 433 Comfortable clothing contributes to health, 433 Attention paid most to warm climates. . . 433 1. Marches. Limited to strength, hours, and districts, 434 Care observed in climbing steep ascents, 434 Sudden transitions to be guarded against, 434 Indulgences allowed in warm climate .... 435 456 CONTENTS. PAor. Meu well clothed and fed in cold climate, 435 Warmed by exercise, not alcoholic drinks, 435 Strict attention to be paid to cleanliness, 435 yick seriously threatened sent to hospital, 435 S. Camps. Must be located near wood and water. . . . 4;35 Pitched near banks of running streams. . 430 Wood required for cooking and fuel 430 Forests moist and miasmatic 430 High, ventilated, sloping, and drained. .. 430 Huts preferable to tents except on march, 430 Straw bedding renewed and old burned. . 436 Ofial burned, buried, or carried off 436 Night exposure, in shirts or bare feet, bad, 436 Incumbrances to be removed from camps, 430 Crowded camps liital to troops 430 Troops should be kept active and at work, 43G PAOB 3. Bivouacs. Generally more healthy than tents 487 More uncomfortable than camps 437 Outposts and guards generally bivouac. . . 437 Should fulfil same conditions as camps. . . 437 Troops must not sleep in cold without fires, 4S1 Shelter tents especially suited to bivouacs, 437 4. Field Hospitals. llegimental, division, and of headquarters, 488 For immediate relief of sick and wounded, 438 Those of headquarters commodious 438 Established in liouses, tents, or open air, 488 Near water, and removed from enemy.. 43S Provided with litters, stretchers, &c 438 Severely wounded sent at once to them, 438 Slight wounds staunched on the spot — 433 THE END. * ?