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ELEMEE"TS

MILITARY AET AND HISTORY;

COMPRISING

THE HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS;

THE COMBINATION OF THE ARMS; AND THE

MINOR OPERATIONS OF WAR.

ED. DE LA BARRE DUPARCQ,

CAPTAIN OF ENGINEERS IN THE ARMY OP FRANCE,
PROFESSOR OP THE MILITARY ART IN THE IMPERIAL SCHOOL OP SAINT-CYR.

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

BRia.-GEN. GEORGE W. CULLUM,

CHIEF OP STAFF OF THE GENERAL-IN-CIIIEF OF THE ARMIES OF THE ITNITED STATES;

LATE AIDE-DE-CAMP TO LIEUTENAKT-GENERAL SCOTT ; AND

CUIKP OF STAFF AND OF ENGINEERS OF MAJOR GENERAL IIALLECK, WHILE COMMANDING

THE DEPARTMENTS OF fuE MISSOURI AND MIS8ISSIPPL

NEW YOEK:
VAN" NOSTRANTD, 192 BROADWAY,
1863.

Enteeed, according to Act of Congress, in tlie year 1862, by
D. YAN NOSTEAND,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the
Southern District of New York.

• • • •

• •

JOHN F. TROW,

Fbimter, Stbekotvpeb, and Elbctbotvpbr,

60 Greene Street, New York.

PREFACE OF THE TRANSLATOR. .

For some years I have been strongly
urged by many of my army friends to prepare
a work on Military Art and History, suited
to our service^ for which. I had a large amount
of material; but not feeling the same confi-
dence in my ability as those who solicited me
to undertake the task, I shrank from it, from
time to time, till the breaking out of the
rebellion of the Southern States, since which
my arduous duties have precluded the possi-
bility of preparing such a work, though fully
aware of the importance of its being under-
taken by some one, especially for the benefit
of our volunteer officers, most of whom have
not enjoyed the benefits of a military education.

I now submit to our vast army and the
public a translation of the best book on Mili-
tary Art and History I could find among the
many excellent productions of the French and
Germans, and which will be found far better

4 PREFACE OF THE TRANSLATOE.

than any original work I could have pro-
duced under existing circumstances.

My time being almost entirely occupied
with important professional duties, I sought
the aid of a competent translator, and was
truly fortunate in securing the assistance of
that ripe scholar, Professor W. Chauvenet,
formerly of the U. S. Naval Academy at Anna-
polis, and now of Washington University, at
St. Louis, Mo.

GEOEGE "W. CULLUM, Beig.-Gen.,

Chief of Staff and Engineers of the

Department of the Mississippi,

Headquaetees, Department of the Mississippi,

Camp in Corinth, Miss., July 4:th, 1862.

PREFACE OF THE EDITOR.

In collecting, under the title of '^ Elements/^
many of the studies of Military Art and .His-
tory, which my service as Professor at the
Imperial Special Military School put it within
my power to do, and my particular labors
enabled me to improve, I do not pretend to
offer a complete treatise, for writing which I
do not feel sufficiently prepared. I wish sim-
ply to publish essays, carefully elaborated, it
is true, though imperfect, and which time
alone can improve by successive retouches.

If eight years of a conscientious professor-
ship — if more than ten years devoted to as-
siduous researches, to grave publications, all
relating to the profession of arms, are guaran-
tees — I am authorized to present this work to
my chiefs, to my comrades, and to the pupils
of the school of Saint-Cyr. May the latter
profit by it. May the young officers espe-
cially, whose professor I have been, welcome it

6 PEEFACE OF THE EDITOE.

as an old friend — one of the youthful^ smiling
friends which they re-find with pleasure at all
periods of life. To me^ I confess^ it recalls
happy moments passed with them in the faith-
ful study of an art eleven centuries old^ and
which even now exercises so much influence
over the destinies of our glorious country.

ED. DE LA BAKKE DUPAKCQ.
l5^ October, 1857.

ELEMEInTTS

MILITAEY AET AND HISTORY.

PKELlMllSrAEY DEFmiTIONS.

War may be defined, a state of armed struggle
between two nations: tlie nation which attacks
makes offensive "war, and that which defends itself
sustains a defensive one.

The art of loar is the art of concentrating and
employing, at the opportune moment, a superior
force of troops upon the decisive point.

An army is a large collected force, raised and
paid by a government.

An arm is a union of combatants, having the same
mode of action. Thus, the union of foot combatants
forms the infantry arm; the cavalry arm comprises
all those who fight on horseback ; the artillery arm
those having the management of ordnance ; and the
engineer arm those charged with the construction,
attack, and defence of fortifications. A single kind
of combatant in each arm is not sufiicient for the dif-
ferent circumstances which arise in war; experience

8 PEELIMINAEY DEFINITIOIfS.

demonstrates the necessity of the following subdivi-
sions in the several arms: Light and line infantry;
light, line, and reserve cavalry; field, siege, coast,
and mountain artillery ; and in the engineers, sappers
and miners.

In the first three arms, the U7iit of force^ or tac-
tical unit^ is the largest fraction, acting separately,
under the command of a single chief: in the infantry it
is the battalion ; in the cavalry, the squadron ; in the
artillery, the battery ; and in the engineers, the com-
pany.

The unit of force, placed on the ground, has a
figure called the formation or order. The part of
the troop facing the adversary is the front, the op-
posite side the o^ear ; the lateral extremities, the
flanhs of the formation. We call ranh the line of
soldiers parallel to the front ; and file, the line of
men perpendicular to the same front. The number
of ranks of a troop determine its de^tTi.

Troops are not formed for attack as for defence ;
there are deep, or ployed formations, and thin, or de-
ployed ; we understand by manoeuvres, the move-
ments for passing from one to another formation.

The column is a disposition of troops whose ele-
ments remain placed parallel to each other, and on
the same axis. When the axes become different,
they are said to be in echelons. We ordinarily desig-
nate the first and last subdivision of a column as its
head or foot

The distance is the interval between the foot of
one corps and the bead of that which follows it ; or

PRELIMINAKY DEFINITIOI^S. 9

between the toes of one soldier and the heels of the
one preceding him. The interval is the space be^
tween the adjacent flanks of two troops, or of two
men in the same line.

Troops placed upon the same front, whether in
column or deployed, constitute a line ; the line may
be either /i^Z? (like a wall), or with intervals.

The checker 'f or m^ as its name indicates, is a forma-
tion upon many lines, with intervals; the intervals
in each line equalling the full spaces ; and the lines
are arranged so that the void spaces of the one are
opposite the full ones of the other.

An or^er is more than a reunion of lines ; it is
the general and combined disposition of troops of
different kinds, grouped together for the same
purpose.

Tactics determines the best mode of distribut-
ing, arranging, and moving the units of force. The
tactics of an arm make known the special properties
of this arm, and the most advantageous method of
using it. General or grand tactics, show the com-
binations of the arms, and the ensemble of movements,
suited to obtain the maximum effect.

Strategy^ the science essential to the general-in-
chief, is the art of properly directing masses upon
the theatre of war, for the defence of our own, or
the invasion of the enemy's country.

Logistics is the practical application of the art
of moving armies ; the science of chiefs of staff.

In a military operation, we ought to attend to
three principal things : the line from whence we de-

10 PRELIMINARY DEFESriTIOlTS.

part, the point where we wish to arrive, and the
line to be followed to reach it.

The line upon which an army is supported, and
from which it departs to act offensively, is called the
hase of operations. For example, the French, desir-
ing to attack Germany, would take the Ehine for their
base of operations ; the Alps, if they wished to en-
ter Italy; and the Pyrenees, if they would invade
Spain.

When we are reduced to dispute with the enemy
the possession of the base, without going beyond it,
this base takes the name of line of defence. All
the points we desire to reach, and the possession of
which would influence the success of the campaign,
are called objective points^ or simply ohjectives.

Since the political concentration of the European
states, their capitals form excellent objective points,
and, for that reason, many of them have recently been
fortified.

The road passed over by the army to reach the
objectives, is called the line of operations; and
takes the name of line of retreat^ when we are com-
pelled, after a defeat, to follow it in a contrary di-
rection, in order to gain a line of defence, behind
which to resist the conqueror.

PART FIRST.

HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

CHAPTER FIRST.

HISTORY OF IKFANTRY,

The specific history of an arm possesses the
advantage of exhibiting, one by one, in the order of
their discovery or adoption, the several improve-
ments effected in its organization, armament, and
mode of combat; and consequently, of indicating
successively, in the order of date, each of the proper-
ties of this arm. History is thus brought to the
aid of theory ; and for this reason, the present work
contains summaries of the history of each of the
arms. The most important, and to us the most in-
teresting of these summaries, is doubtless that
which relates to the principal basis of armies — the
infantry. It will form the subject of the present
chapter.

To unfold it in due order, we shall distribute it

12 inSTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

into eighteen sections, eacb. devoted to a single
epoch. Thus, Sect. 1 will treat of the infantry of the
ancient people of Asia and Africa ; 2d, of infantry
among the Greeks ; 3d, of the Eoman infantry ; 4th,
of the infantry of the barbarous nations who over-
turned the Koman empire, and especially that of
our ancestors, the Franks. From the downfall of
Kome, infantry plays a less prominent part than in
ancient times : we shall examine it in its decline,
under four aspects : 5th, the feudal infantry ; 6th, the
communal infantry ; Tth, the infantry of the soldiers
of fortune; and 8th, that of the English archers.
In the fourteenth century the Swiss reinstated the
infantry, and proved its power by brilliant successes^
as we shall show in section 9th ; which will be fol-
lowed, in the 10th, by some particulars respecting the
Spanish infantry, the best of the sixteenth century.
In the three succeeding sections we shall study the
French infantry, under Charles VII., Francis I., Henry
II., and Henry IV. In the 14th we shall speak of the
diminution of the depth of the infantry by Gustavus
Adolphus; the 15th will group together the charac-
teristic features of the infantry in the reigns of Louis
XIV. and Louis XV. ; the 16 th will treat of the
improvements made in the Prussian infantry the first
half of the eighteenth century ; the 17th will indicate
the more recent progress; and the 18th and last
will contain some remarks on the entire history of
this arm.

Our object in selecting, for each epoch, the in-
fantry of some one nation as a type, is to abridge

HISTORY OF INFANTEY. 13

details, and to bring them within the limits of a
chapter ; citing, nevertheless, in our historic sketch
such facts as, for soldiers, are most curious, most
characteristic, and most instructive. To have fol-
lowed the history of each arm, during each period,
in all nations, would have involved us too far, and
would have produced a narrative which, though
perhaps more connected, would most surely have
less hold upon the memory.

With this preface, we enter upon our subject.

1. Ancients. — In the oriental countries, where
the himian race and the art of war had birth, caval-
ry and war chariots were the most esteemed arms.
This was due, 1st, to the level character of the
ground, which allowed complete and extended
manoeuvres of both cavalry and chariots ; 2d, to the
impression produced by every elevated object, in
accordance with which, in those primitive times, the
highest combatant appeared to be the strongest.

The character of these countries also modified
the formation of the infantry, which was in deep
order ; that is, more solid than mobile. ^

The Egyptian infantry was formed in heavy
square battalions of 100 men to a side; these bat-
talions were subdivided into fractions of 1,000,
100, 10. The heavy-armed foot soldiers carried
each a large shield, a long pike, a hatchet, a hel-
met; the light-armed foot soldiers were archers or
slingers.

The Jews formed their infantry upon a single

14 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

line, from 10 to 30 men in depth ; tlie archers and
slingers occupied tlie front ranks, tlie lieavy-armed
troops tlie rear. The troop formations of this people,
1,000 strong, were subdivided into groups of 100

men.

The Persian infantry, originally armed solely
with offensive weapons, was composed of heavy
battalions, 24 to 30 men deep. Cyrus the elder
reduced this depth to 12 ranks, and introduced
the use of defensive weapons into his army. The
Persian troops were divided into bodies of 10,
100, 1,000, 10,000 men. Thus, among all the
early nations we have mentioned, the decimal
subdivision appears as the basis of their infantry
formations.

Every deep formation upon a single line was, in
ancient times, called a phalanx. The Jews and the
Persians, then, ranged their infantry in phalanx.
The Greeks adopted, with some modifications, the
Asiatic phalanx, and it is especially among them
that we must study this species of formation.

2. Greek Phalanx. — ^The Greek phalanx was a
corps of heavy infantry, formed in a single line 16
men deep, and designed to act e7i masse, and to fall
upon the enemy like a solid block. Its organiza-
tion, instead of being decimal, like that of the Per-
sian, was founded upon the powers of the number
two. Thus, taking as its primitive element a file of
sixteen men, —

TETRARCHIA.
PPPP

HISTOEY OF INFANTE Y. 15

Two files formed one dilochia ;

Two dilochias one tetrarchia ; ^

Two tetrarchias one taxiarchia ;

Two taxiarcliias one syntagma ;

Two syntagmas one pentacosiarchia ;

Two pentacosiarcliias . . . one chiliarcMa ;

Two chiliarchias one merarcliia ;

Two merarchias one phalangarchia ;

Two phalangarcliias .... one diphalangarcliia ;
Two diphalangarcLias . . . one tetraphalangarchia.

The tetrarcMa, a body of 64 men, corresponded
to our modern company, and was the constituent
element of the phalanx. The syntagma com-
prised 256 men; the chiliarchia, 1,024; the
PPPP phalangarchia, or small phalanx, 4,096. This
PPPP last fraction was composed of 16 syntag-
^^^^ mas, the syntagma being 16 files of 16 men.
PPPP The tetraphalangarchia, or complete phalanx,
PPPP embraced 16,384 men. All these soldiers,

when heavy-armed, were called Tioplites,
PPPP It frequently happened that the small

^ P P ^ Greek states could not set on foot even one

PPPP

PPPP phalangarchia, still less a tetraphalangarchia.

PPPP In such cases the name o^ phalanx was given

^^^^ to any combination of tetrarchias, without
PPPP . . ...

fixing any definite number. This facility of

organizing any number of men whatever in phalanx,

had great advantages.

The hoplite occupied a space, in open rant and

file, of four cubits (6 feet) each way ; in close rank

and file, two cubits (3 feet) ; in very close rank,

one cubit (1\ feet). The phalanx charged in close

•

16 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

ranks; it received a charge in very close ranks, a
formation called a synapisma. The principal arms
of the hoplites were the shield and the sarissa^ a
long pike of fourteen cubits (21 feet) in length,
which the first ^lyq ranks held horizontally, whilst
the others held them vertically.

The sarissa being seized at a point four cubits
from the but, and each soldier occupying in close
rank two cubits, it is apparent that in this close forma-
tion the sarisssB of even the fifth rank projected two
cubits (3 feet) beyond the front rank of the pha-
lanx. This front, bristling with pikes, presented a
formidable aspect.

Besides the soldiers of the rank and file, oi*
hoplites, the Greek phalanx also comprised light-
armed troops, designated psiletes. In fact, the num-
ber of these psiletes was usually half that of the
hoplites, or 8,192 for the complete phalanx. They
were divided into archers, slingers, and darters or
jaculatoi'-Sj who threw arrows with the hand.
Formed eight men in depth, they skirmished about
the phalanx, and were employed in all operations
which required lightness and promptitude.

Sometimes the hoplites, imitating the formation
of the psiletes, reduced their files to one half, and
the phalanx became but 8 men deep ; but this mo-
bile order was an exception; moreover, the inter-
vals between the divisions of the phalanx w^ere not
strongly marked, and it formed a nearly contin-
uous line.

There was a class of Grecian foot soldiers inter-

HISTORY OF INFANTKY. lY

mediate between tlie heavy and the light armed :
they were called j^eltastes^ from the small round -
shield (jitXvri) with which they were armed; they
carried a shorter pike than the hoplites. Alexan-
der the Great made frequent use of them.

The chief end of the Grecian system of educa-
tion, as well as of the laws and customs, was to
make a good soldier of every citizen. Thus, the
young were from their infancy familiarized with the
idea of war, and their first plays were military exer-
cises ; the system of rewards was more honorable
than lucrative, and the system of punishments based
rather upon sentiment than actual infliction ; and
hence, the lack of courage, or any censurable act
committed in war, even when it was not pun-
ished, subjected the soldier to public reprobation,
and disgrace with his friends and relatives. In
Sparta, mothers rejoiced when they received the
announcement of the death of their sons upon
the field of battle, and their dead bodies were
brought home upon their shields, preferring to see
them stretched lifeless upon that defensive arm than
alive without it, for its loss was branded with
infamy.

The Greek foot soldiers, moreover, excelled in
every soldierly quality; robust, skilful, and coura-
geous even to an extreme, he thought nothing more
glorious than to die for his country. But it is to be
remarked, that the formation in phalanx in a meas-
ure counterbalanced these qualities in the hoplite ;
for this formation upon a single line nearly con-
2

18 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

tiniious was not sufficiently pliant to fight advan-
tageously in broken and mountainous countries,
where the waverings of the march produced fatal
gaps, into which the enemy could penetrate and at-
tack the body in flank and in rear. For this reason,
the phalanx was very successful only in level coun-
tries. To be just, however, let us add that when-
ever it was commanded by generals of the highest
order (and such always understand how to adapt the
aiTangement of their troops to local circumstances),
the phalanx was equally victorious upon irregular
oTound; as was exemplified under Alexander the
Great, and especially under Xenophou.

3. Roman L.egioii — -At the first glance we
observe a characteristic of the Eomaii legion w^hich
distinguishes it fi^om the phalanx: it is not ham-
pered by close order ; its organization breathes
mobility.

It forms three lines, each divided into ten mani-
ples or companies, ten men deep. The Tiastati are
in the front line, the p^inciipes in the second, the
triarii in the third. In each line, the maniples are
separated by a distance equal to their front, and the
maniples of each line behind are placed opposite to
the spaces of the preceding line, which produces a
checker-board formation. The interval between the
lines equals the depth of a maniple ; the space
between two soldiers, in any direction, is six Koman
feet (5 feet Y inches).

HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 19

MAISIPLE FORMATION OF THE LEGION.

iiASTATr, nnnnnnnnnn

10 ranks and 12 files. ' '' — '' — '' '' '' — '' '' — II— il — I

,o.rM^.os. nnnnnnnnnn

:«rarrd"«me. DDDDDDDDDD

In tlie first two lines, the maniple contains 12
files, which, with a depth of 10 men, gives the mani-
ple a force of 120 men. In the triarii^ the maniple
contains but 6 files, so that it numbers but 60 men.

The light-armed troops attached to the legion
were called velites^ and formed 10 maniples of 120
men each, like those of the liastati and princijpes.
They constituted the inferior class of the legion, and
fought outside and around the lines. It w^as the
reward for brave deeds to be promoted to the regu-
lar ranks.

The Eoman legion, therefore, embraced 1,200
hastati^ 1^200 principes^ 600 triarii^ and 1,200 velites]
or, in all, 4,200 foot soldiers. This is the usual num-
ber, but there were legions of a smaller as well as
those of a larger effective force.

The organization of the legion allowed the ready
formation of detachments embracing the same classes
of soldiers, and in the same proportions as in the
legion itself Thus, one maniple of hastati, one of
pviiicipes^ one of triarii^ and one of velites^ formed
a small legion of 420 men, to which could also be
added a turma of cavalry, or the tenth part of a
cavalry legion. By doubling or tripling the num-
ber of maniples, detachments were obtained of 840

20 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

or 1,260 foot soldiers, wMch still retained tlie like-
ness of the legion.

A lielmet, a shield, a sword, and seven javelins
constituted the armament of the velites, who fought
as skirmishers, either on the front or flanks. They
took advantage of the spaces left by the checker-
board formation, to advance and retire.

The defensive arms of the Jiastati and principes
were a helmet, a brass breastplate, and a convex
shield; their offensive arms, two light spears or
darts (called pild)^ two javelins, and a sword.
This sword was the favorite weapon of the Ko-
mans: being broad and strong, it served, in the
hands of a vigorous man, the purpose of an axe, and
inflicted wide and deep wounds, which terrified the
enemy. The liastati received or gave the first
charge ; the princi])€S supported them, either by
advancing in front of them, by passing through the
intervals of the first line, or by simply filling up
the spaces, so as to form a full and more solid line ;
the legion then fought as a veritable phalanx, which
not unfrequently happened. This facility of trans-
formation at pleasure, according to circumstances
and localities, so as to possess either extreme mobil-
ity or great solidity, renders the Roman legion su-
perior to the Greek phalanx.

The triarii^ who were tried soldiers, were armed
with the shield, the pike, and the sword. During
the combat of the first two lines, they remained im-
movable, their pikes resting upon the ground.
Their mission was to throw themselves into the

HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 21

weak places, and reclaim a victory about to be lost :
they constituted, therefore, a reserve. It was only
when the battle was becoming desperate, that they
were called into action ; and hence the Latin prov-
erb : Res ad triarios pervenitj expressive of a final
struggle.

The soldier of the Koman legion was a valiant
combatant, well skilled in manoeuvres and the exer-
cise of arms, and especially inured to fatigue of
every kind. The Greek foot soldier, the hoplite,
ordinarily carried no burden, leaving the transpor-
tation of his munitions to servants or slaves ; but
the soldier of the legion, at least during the better
days of the republic, carried not only his arms, but
his baggage, a stake, a pioneer tool, and a leather
pouch containing his provision of corn for fifteen
days. Reckoning the weight, piece by piece, of his
arms and all his effects, we find that his load
amounted to about 100 pounds, or double that
which is usually carried by our foot soldiers."^* With
these enormous loads the Roman soldiers, neverthe-
less, travelled some 20 miles or more in a day on
ordinary occasions, and in forced marches as much
as 33 miles.

The soldier of the legion was, moreover, accus-
tomed to digging the ground ; for the Romans were
in the constant practice of surrounding their camps
with intrenchments, even when they encamped but

* In tlie Russian campaign (1812) the soldiers of Marshal Davoust
adjusted upon their knapsacks, already filled, 6^ lbs. of bread, 4| lbs.
of biscuit, and 11 lbs. of flour, thus carrying a total weight of QQ lbs.

22 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

for a single niglit— a prudent habit, to wMcli may
be ascribed in a great degree tbeir remarkable
exemption from reverses, and whicli also liad tlie
advantage of keeping the soldiers in training, and
making them robust and healthy. We may ob-
serve however, that the practice of intrenching
camps and positions, though excellent with the
projectile arms of the ancients, all of which were de-
structive only at small distances, presents but unim-
portant advantages with our modern fire-arms.

The legion, by its formation in small bodies
drawn up in several lines, with intervals, always
had a reserve, was possessed of great mobility, and
could fight upon all kinds of ground. It had, there-
fore, that character of universality which is indis-
pensable to armies, and especially to infantry: it
was a military machine, eminently fitted to serve
the Eomans in their projects of universal conquest,
to which they always aspired, and w^hich constituted
their strength,' — a machine precisely adapted to their
political constitution ; for it is worthy of particular re-
mark, that the Eomans differed from all other nations,
ancient or modern, in this : that whilst other nations
made war only to maintain themselves in a position
to administer their government, they administered
their government solely with a view to making war.

The lines with intervals were objectionable, in-
asmuch as a quick and resolute enemy might pene-
trate the open spaces. Convinced of this, Marius,
the celebrated conqueror of the Cimbri and Teu-
toni, substituted for the formation by maniples

HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 23

the formation by cohorts, which assimilated th^ or-
ganization to that of the phalanx. In this new for-
mation there was now but one class of soldiers : the
hastati, the principes, and the triarii were mingled,
all armed with the pihim^ and divided into ten co-
horts of an equal force. The number of ranks, and
the intervals between the ranks and files, remained
the same as in the formation by maniples.

Marius formed his legion upon two lines, each
consisting of two cohorts, separated by small inter-
vals. Csesar, as the following diagram shows, dis-
posed the Eoman legion in three lines, the first of
four cohorts, the second and third each of three co-
horts. The third line formed a reserve, and it was
for that purpose that CaBsar restored it.

COIIOKT FORMATION OF THE LEGION UNDEll C^SAE.

4th coh. 8(1 coh. 2(1 coh. Istcoli.

1st line, p
in 10 ranks. L

1 1

II 1

5th coh.

2(1 line,
in 10 ranks.

7tli coh.

Gth coh.

r 1

1 1

lOth coh.

9tli coh.

8th coh.

in 10 ranks.

1 1

In the formation by cohorts, the lines being full,
the first could no longer retire between the inter-
vals of the second, as in the foimation by maniples.
The second line alone could advance and insert it-
self in the first, the fresh files stepping into the in-
tervals between the fatigued files, so that the front
of the legion doubled in number, without increasing
its length. The possibility of such a manoeuvre de-
pended upon the opening of the ranks and files

24 HISTORY AOT) TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

whicli cliaracterized tlie Koman legion, in whicli
eacli man occupied, as we have said, a space of six
Eoman feet (5 feet 7 inches) ; the difficulty was to
preserve this space, and hence all their drills were
conducted so as to make the soldier preserve his in-
tervals both in rank and file. Under the new form
of cohorts, the infantry legion again rendered most
excellent service, and gained as much celebrity as
under the manipular form. From that time the
cohort became so well established as the unit of the
Koman infantry, that their historians, and especially
Cgesar, frequently say : " We had so many cohorts,"
without even naming the legion.

During the period of the Roman emperors, the
legion deteriorated; and nothing shows this more
clearly than the organization of the legion, described
by Vegetius.'^ This legion, of 6,100 foot soldiers,
divided into ten cohorts, ranged in the checker
form, in two lines, each of ^ve cohorts, embraced
all kinds of foot combatants: thus there were in
each cohort, in the first rank the heavy-armed troops,
in the second the mailed archers, in the third and
fomiih the velites, in the fifth a projectile machine
called oiiageVjj- flanked by slingers and crossbowmen,
and in the sixth the triarii, forming the reserve.

This confused formation could not last. They re-
turned to the isolated cohorts, of an efiective force
of from 500 to 1,000 men, some composed entfrely
of infantry, others, of infantry and cavalry. They

* In the third century. — T}\

t A machine which threw stones. — Tr.

HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 25

allowed substitutes in tlie military service, a decided
mark of degeneration; they abandoned defensive-
arms ; tliey exclianged tlie use of that broad and
trenchant sword, which had gained so many battles,
for projectile arms, whose light weight agreed better
with the effeminacy of the times ; they went further,
and threw javelins from engines . called carrohalistce^
the number of which became considerable. Disci-
pline declined ; the troops were no longer drilled ;
they forgot the maxims which had given them vic-
tory. The decline was rapid, and the Roman colos-
sus soon succumbed under the repeated blows of
enemies, who poured down in such numbers that
their native countries were designated in the Latin
idiom as the officina gentium (the factory of nations).
Let us now pursue the study of infantry among
their enemies : those new people to whom custom
has given the traditional name of BaTharians,

4. Barbarous Nations. — ^With the exception
of the Sarmatians and the Vandals, the barbarians
who overwhelmed the Roman empire fought almost
exclusively on foot, and we may apply to them the
expression of Tacitus, when speaking of the Ger-
mans : " Omne robur in peditey

The German infantiy had a decimal organiza-
tion : it attacked in wedge fonu, sometimes in pha-
lanx, always with loud cries.

Let us especially consider the infantry of the Franks.

Here is the portrait which historians have left
us of the Frank foot soldier : He tied his flaxen hair

26 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARx\IS.

on the top of his head in a tuft, which fell back and
flowed behind li^e a horse's tail. He shaved his
face, leaving only two long and pendent mustaches.
His linen clothes fitted closely to his body ; a large
belt sustained his sword. His favorite weapon was
the francisque, a battle-axe with one or two edges
and a very short handle. His left arm bore a long
and narrow shield, the only defensive armor with
which he was furnished. He also had a spear, or
pike, of moderate length, designated in the Frank
tongue by the name hang. This pike could be used
both at small and at great distances ; its shaft was
covered with plates of iron, which protected it
against the sword cuts of the enemy, and its point
was curved in the form of a double claw.

In the fight, the Frank foot soldier threw this

HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 27

weapon at liis adversary : if it caught in the flesh,
it was difficult to disengage it, on account of the.
small iron hooks at its point, and thus it produced
serious wounds. When the enemy parried the
blow, the hang struck the shield, and fastening in it,
drew it down ; while, its but end dragging upon the
ground, it hung to the shield like a very troublesome
weight ; which, from its construction, could neither
be torn out nor cut by the sword. Then the Frank
sprang forward, placed one foot upon the shaft,
pressed upon it with his whole weight, and thus
forcing his adversary to lower his shield, could
easily strike the exposed breast or head. In this
advantageous position the arm which held the bat-
tle-axe usually aimed at the face or the neck.

The Franks preserved this warlike aspect down
to the end of the sixth century.

The Frank infantry, like that of the Germans,
fought in phalanx and in wedge form, the latter
formation being often little more than a deep and
close column ; it attacked with terrible shouts, and
with a velocity almost equal to that of cavalry. In
consequence of its sojourn in Gaul, it adopted by de-
grees some of the military usages of the Romans.

At the battle of Tours (732), in which Charles
Martel conquered the Saracens, the masses of the
Frank infantry were drawn up in great depth,
whence the celebrated expression : " God was ^vitli
his lieavy hattalionsr Having to do with mounted
enemies, who fought skirmishing, the Frank war-
rior opposed to them heavy columns drawn up to

28 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

act with ensemble. There is every reason to "believe
that he was acquainted with and employed the agmen
quadratum (square formation).

This massing, the source of power in infantr}^,
disappears from the organization of this arm, from
the time of Charles Martel.

5. Feudal Infantry. — In the wars of invasion
of Charlemagne, the grandson and second successor
of Charles Martel, cavalry increased, and at the
death of that powerful monarch constituted the
half of the French armies. The feudal system,
which arose soon after, and which was created with
the view of maintaining in subjection the recently
conquered people, instituted nobles, who desired no
other occupation than the honorable profession of
arms. They monopolized this vocation to their
own profit, and being wealthy, covered them-
selves with heavy armor and rode upon chargers
bai'bed Avith iron. All the chiefs adopted this
fashion ; the taste for mounted combat became
general. From that time the infantry was ineffi-
cient, for no one attended to giving it a good or-
ganization, without which it can never accomplish
anything; and it remained especially powerless
against the gensdarmes^ whose armor rendered them
invulnerable.

The feudal infantry was composed of the ser-
vants of the gensdarmes, and peasants taken from the
plough. Their principal and most common office
was to pick up their masters when they fell to the

HISTOEY OF INFANTRY. 29

ground, and remount tliem, as also to despatch the
disarmed cavaliers of the enemy. Sometimes they
skirmished at the beginning of the action. Their
offensive arms were the sword, the crossbow, the
mace, and the sling ; they earned no defensive arms,
and nevertheless were often made to face great dan-
gers, as the history of the battles of that period
proves. The victors always made horrible carnage
of this defenceless infantry.

Two historic facts will show the state of deg-
radation to which the feudal infantry fell :

At the battle of Bou vines (1214), the Count de
Boulogne formed his infantry into a hollow square,
within which he, with six other cavaliers, after a
certain period of combat, retired to recover breath ;
they came out in due time, refreshed, and ready to
renew the strife. This was using their infantry as a
kind of rampart.

At the battle of Crecy (1346), the Genoese bow-
men, who formed a part of the French army, being
thrown into confusion by the well-directed shafts
of the English archers, and unable to advance, the
king, Philip of Valois, enraged at seeing them re-
tire, called out to the cavaliers : " Or tot tiiez toute
cette ribaiidaille qui nous emptclie la vote sans rai-
sony The French gensdarmes fell upon the unfortu-
nate Genoese infantry ; but while they were thus
engaged, the enemy gained the upper hand, and
they suffered a complete defeat, — a defeat which, to-
gether with the sad and fatal names of Poictiers
and Agincourt, will ever be for us and our descend-

30 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE ARMS.

ants a striking proof of the errors committed by our
ancestors, wliicli brought France to tlie very brink
of ruin, and had wellnigh caused us to be to this
day a colony of England, instead of boasting the
proud title of Frenchmen.

The coiidottieri^ those warriors by contract who
afflicted the Italian peninsula in the middle ages,
also diminished the usefulness of infantry in the
interest of their trade; for the petty princes who
employed them could afford neither to support a
large body of foot, nor to pay their wages; they
succeeded, indeed, in reducing the number of effec-
tive foot to the tenth part of their mail-clad
horse;* a proportion which shows how completely
the principles which should govern the mutual rela-
tion of these two arms were at that time reversed.

Let us see how the infantry rose from this use-
less condition.

6. Communal Infantry. — In the twelfth century,
several European nations, as the English, the
Flemish, the Swiss, and the Lombards, still looked
upon infantry with favor. In France, they were
brought back to similar views by the crusades. In
those distant expeditions the foot soldier could not
be replaced as upon the soil of the mother country ;
he became of more value, was armed with more
care, and drilled; and henceforth could render ser-
vices which Avere appreciated. The introduction
of fire-arms soon also favored the regeneration of

* The Prince^ by Macliiavelli, chap. xii.

HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 31

infantry. At the same time the excessive tension
of the feudal system brought together the two
powers of the political hierarchy before most widely
separated, namely, the sovereign and the burghers
of the towns. These powers, both incommoded by
the system, came to an understanding: the towns
were erected into communes enjoying political
rights, on condition of paying a tax and raising
militia, which should march at the call of the king.
Such is the orio^in of the communal militia. The
creation of these citizen troops rendered the feudal
troops ever after less important, and thus broke
down the exclusive use of cavalry.

The communal force, raised by the authority of
the commune, sometimes embraced mounted men,
but was generally composed of infantry alone ; the
number of soldiers, or rather, to use the expression
of the time, sergeants (servientes^^ rarely exceeded
500. Two thirds of the communal infantry carried
bows or crossbows ; the rest used maces, sticks
loaded with lead, and halberds. Moreover, imple-
ments of agriculture, or the tools of the improvised
soldier, frequently served him as arms, and he even
wore in the ranks one of his ordinary garments,
the blouse of the iield-laborer. The infantry of the
communes marched to the army under the parochial
banner ; an advowee of the bishop, or a municipal
chief, or a representative of the king, commanded.
It was not compelled to go beyond the limits of the
commune more than a certain distance, reckoned in
days' marches (at most forty days) ; beyond this dis-

32 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

tance, its maintenance devolved upon the king or
the nobleman wlio employed it; and in default of
the necessary funds for this purpose, the communal
troops frequently dispersed. In the order of battle,
the communal infantry was placed between the
squadrons of horse : this intermixture is all that is
known of its tactics.

This infantry proved, in its struggles against the
nobles who surrounded a city, that men on foot
could contend advantageously with knights com-
ipletely mailed, whose prestige thus began to disap-
pear. Nevertheless, this infantry was not Avorth
much, although superior to the feudal infantry in
organization, armament, discipline, and courage.

Still, the institution of communes did not re-
lieve the dukes and counts from obeying the call
of the king and taking part in war. In the rear of
their gensdarmes, there always followed a body of
infantry, composed of servants and peasants — these
continuing to be badly organized, and more ready
to pillage than to fight. To put an end to the con-
fusion which reigned among these foot soldiers,
Louis IX., in 1226, gave them a commandant under
the name of Grand Master of the Bowmen^ and this
office was preserved down to the reign of Francis I.,
but contributed very little to the improvement of
the condition of the infantry: at least, not until
Charles VII.

T. Soldiers of Fortune — Besides the feudal and
communal infantry, there arose in France, at the

HISTOEY OF INFANTEY. 33

close of tLe twelfth century, bands of soldiers of
fortune, all on foot, known under various names,
such as CotereauXj Boudoyers^ Tard-venus^ Malmh
drins^ Rouiiers^ Brabangons, Chaperons^ JEscor-
clieurSj PastoureauXj Hihauds^ Tondeurs^ Mille-
diahles. These mercenaries, gathered from all na-
tions, formed undisciplined, vagabond troops, who,
when not engaged in war, spent their time in pil-
laging — always taking the part of the sovereign who
paid the highest wages. The French king, Louis
VII., had as many as twenty thousand in his pay.
Their depredations becoming intolerable, Philip
Augustus, in 1183, sent an army which overcame
them near Bourges. They recruited their force, and
continued to fight and steal until the reign of
Charles V. This monarch, taking pity on the
French provinces which they were laying waste,
ordered Du Guescliii to take command of theii^
grandes compagnies and to lead them out of the
kingdom ; which difficult mission the Breton hero
successfully accomplished (1366).

At this period, the French infantry, principally
composed of crossbowmen, was drawn up in three
or four ranks. In the order of battle, it was placed
in the first line, in front of, or at the side of the
first line of gensdarmes: in attacks it always occu-
pied the front.

§. Englisli Arcbers. — ^The English archers who
did the French so much harm in the days of Crecy
(1346) and Poictiers (1356), constituted one of the

34 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

best bodies of infantry of tlie fourteentli century.
Their defensive arms were a mailed jacket, a bas-
sinet (or liglit helmet), and a round shield. Vig-
orous, and exercised in shooting from their infancy,
they carried the long and stout bow, the string of
which could be removed when it rained, an advan-
tao-e not possessed by the crossbow. To arrest the
impetuosity of the French gendarmery, they took
their positions in front of their cavaliers, in a long
line of little depth, each planting before him a stake
11 feet in length, like a cheval-de-frise ; thence they
discharged as many as ten arrows a minute, aimed
at the horses, and dismounted our gensdarmes in a
very short time, who, when once on foot, were very
much embarrassed by their armor. We thus per-
ceive that the English began to reason upon the art
of war.

The Hussite infantry, such as was employed by
the famous Bohemian Zisca about 1418, was also
one of the first which succeeded in withstanding
the gendarmery in open country, fighting behind a
barricade of wagons, called a tabor,

9. Swiss Infantry. — From the beginning of the
fourteenth century, the Swiss were compelled by ne-
cessity to resuscitate the ancient infantry, both be-
cause they were too poor to maintain cavalry, and
because the country was ill adapted to its evolutions.
They adopted a compact formation, and made use of
a pike 18 feet in length, which they held by the mid-
dle with both hands, as our soldiers now hold the

HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 35

musket wlien crossing Ibayonets. The Swiss battalion
was compared to a forest of ilioims ; it was often
called tlie hedgehog. From tlie year 1386, the Swiss
made use of culverins (a kind of long 18-pounder).
In 14T6, at the battles of Granson and Morat, in
which they were victorious, they fought in full
squares, having halberdiers, pikemen, and culverin
artillerists in various proportions. The halberds
were used in the melee; the pikes rested on the
ground to resist the onset of the cavalry ; the cul-
verins were employed chiefly on the flanks, occasion-
ally on the front. Their order of battle consisted of
three masses arranged in echelons^ the distance be-
tween the echelons being the range of a culverin :
thus the cavalry could not break through them. In
receiving an artillery attack, they awaited the first
discharge,* then, taking advantage of the slow firing
of that day, rushed upon the cannon and captured
them.

The Swiss always fought with great courage;
but this courage, stimulated at that time by the
desire of independence, was not all that sustained
them against the impetuous horsemen of the Duke
of Burgundy. The true secret of the success of their
infantry was their discipline, and the ensemble of
action which is the result of discipline. This disci-
pline was severe ; it prescribed the most absolute
silence, and prohibited leaving the ranks under pain
of death. Thenceforth, the popular element of com-

* At Cerisoles (1544) they threw themselves on the ground, so that
the balls might pass over them.

36 HISTOEY AlH) TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

Unation is found arrayed against tlie feudal element
of isolation; but with tMs exception, tlie Swiss have
not contributed to tlie improvement of tlie military
art. Nevertheless, we shall find them, subsequently,
looked upon as models, and European nations in the
following century imitating their formation and tak-
ing bodies of Swiss infantry into their pay.

It is therefore to the Swiss that we must ascribe
the more extensive introduction of infantry in the
composition of armies after the fifteenth century.

10. Spanisb Infantry — ^The Spanish infantry
was the next most celebrated after the Swiss, which
it subsequently surpassed. Brave, disciplined, tem-
perate, indefatigable ; — such were the foot soldiers of
Spain who fought in Italy or in the Netherlands
under Charles V. and Philip II. Their contact with
the S"\viss taught them the art of forming close bat-
talions ; their conipact order, bristling with pikes, be-
came as difficult to break as the phalanx. Besides
the pike, they carried as offensive weapons the sword,
the poignard or dagger, and the arquebus : as defen-
sive, a coat of mail. When the Swiss, or the large
foot soldiers of Germany broke them, instead of fly-
ing they returned individually to the charge, rushing
between the ranks of the victors and attacking with
the poignard. In these duels and hand-to-hand fights,
the Spanish soldier often fell, and always had every
chance against him ; but his bravery is nowhere more
conspicuously proved.

The arquebus, with which the Spaniards were

mSTOEY OF INFANTEY. 37

armed, took the place of the Swiss culverin ; it was
provided with a forked prop, which relieved its
weight while being discharged ; whereas, before this
time, it was discharged only when resting upon a
tripod. This improved arquebus subsequently re-
ceived in France the name of mousquet.

The Spanish infantry, being constantly required
to fight, could not be disbanded at the end of each
campaign ; it therefore became a permanent body,
and this circumstance, together with its courage,
rendered it so thoroughly disciplined and warlike,
that its proud battalions remained for more than a
century the terror of the soldiers fighting in Italy
and Flanders. The Spaniards often mingled their
arquebusiers with the cavalry ; a mixture which Gus-
tavus Adolphus imitated, but which is at the present
day proscribed.

The Spanish infantry was distinguished for its
good discipline and esprit; a simple sergeant was
obeyed like an officer. When a new recruit ar-
rived, the older ones helped him with their advice
and their purse, to put him at once in a condition
to do honor to his country. "Their barracks,"
wrote La Noue, " were like schools, where the ordi-
nary topics were the duties of the soldier and of the
officer, honor, and whatever related to arms."

Charles V. had solidly organized the tercios
(regiments) of his infantry, which out of Spain
usually numbered 3,000 men, divided into fifteen
companies of 200 men each ; the tercio was com-
manded by a colonel of horse, or the senior captain.

38 inSTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

The celebrated emperor had also instituted bounties
as rewards for acts of courage, the least of which
was two crowns; and the Spanish soldier consid-
ered it an honor to obtain them.

Similar organization and usages, it must be con-
fessed, are wanting in the sixteenth century, among
the infantry of other nations.

Let us return to the French infantry.

11. Frank Archers. — The Spaniards were not
the only people who maintained a standing infantry.
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries two attempts
to establish it in a permanent form were made by the
French kings ; the first by Charles VII.

This monarch, having recovered his kingdom
from the English, desired to consolidate his throne
by surrounding it with regular troops. For this
purpose he instituted the " free companies " of cav-
slrjj and formed the infantry of the Frank archers.
By an edict of 1448, he ordered each parish to raise
and maintain one archer, well formed, and skilful
in the use of the bow, whose duty it was to prac-
tise on Sundays and holidays, and to take the field
at the royal command. In consideration of the
military service to which he was bound, which was
more extensive than that of the communal militia,
and attached him exclusively to the king, the Frank
archer was exempted from taxes. This exemption
was, indeed, an indirect method of paying him ;
but in active service he received, in addition, the
sum of 56 francs per month, which, together with

niSTOKY OF mFANTRY. 39

his equipment and armament, was cliargecl to the

, parish. He wore over his ordinary dress a kini

of doublet, which came at least to the knees, formed
of thirty thicknesses of linen cloth, enclosed be-
tween buckskins. They had great confidence in this
defensive article, which, however, was sometimes
covered by a steel corselet. On his head he wore a
helmet without a crest or a visor. He was armed
with the long bow and quiver, and a sword of mode-
rate len2:th.

Louis XL, in 1469, increased the number of
Frank archers to 16,000. This force was distrib-
uted in four corps of 4,000 men, each commanded
by a captain-general, over whom there was a chief
of all the archers. France was divided into four
military departments; within the limits of each a
captain-general had to recruit his soldiers. Each
corps of 4,000 was divided into eight bodies of 500.
The first of these remained under the immediate or-
der of the captain-general ; a captain took command
of each of the remaining seven. This reorganization
by Louis XL carried out the views of Charles VIL

This instituting of archers just at the time when
portable fire-arms were beginning to spread, is sin-
gular enough; but they proved their inefficiency,
and finally disappeared, not so much on account of
their armament, which reduced them to light
troops, as for other reasons. Scattered through the
parishes, and drilling separately, the Frank archers
could not but remain under the influence of the parish
church, losing the habits of the soldier and taking

40 HISTOKY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AKMS.

those of tlie laborer and tlie artisan. In fact, this
came to pass : after having behaved valiantly in some
engagements, they could not, when peace came, yield
to discipline, and sustain the esprit dii corps: in
short, they could not be soldiers. It became difficult
to reassemble them; officers disliked to command
them, and, sarcasm lending its aid, the institution
was undermined. Toward the end of his reign,
Louis XI. substituted for them 6,000 Swiss, 10,000
French soldiers of fortune, and a corps of German
foot soldiers known under the name of lansquemts
(Lands-knecht).

These lansquenets consisted of soldiers of for-
tune recruited in the German districts, near the
Ehine. Being strong and tall, they at first formed
bodies of pikemen ; but, unlike the Swiss, they held
the pike by the end of the shaft, and nevertheless
managed it with skill. They were better than the
French infantry, and on that account, for want of
Swiss troops, they were intrusted with the guard
of the cannon.

The infantry having rendered valuable service
to Charles VIIL, upon his return from the conquest
of Naples, the greater part of the crowned heads
comprehended the importance of this arm, and
formed bodies of pikemen, in imitation of the
Swiss. The French kings did not follow this exam-
ple, but, trusting to the Swiss and the German
soldiers of fortune enlisted in their pay, dispensed
with the formation of regular national infantry.

Louis XII., however, endeavored to discipline his

HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 41

infantry, and to give it more importance. He was
the first to succeed in dismounting the gentry. At
his solicitation, several of the most distinguished cava-
liers, among others Bayard, accepted the command
of bodies of foot. From that time the prejudices of
the nobles against infantry were overcome, and num-
bers of young gentlemen, of whom Blaise de Montluc
was one, exchanged the lance for the pike. This
happy reform dates from 1507. By relieving the
French infantry from the contempt under which it
had suffered, it increased its valor tenfold, and con-
tributed to the success of Louis XII. in Italy.

12. Liegions of Francis I, — Francis I. did even
more than Louis XII. for the improvement of the
French infantry. At the battle of Marignan (1515)
he commanded it in person on foot, and, armed with
a pike, rushed to the charge, exclaiming, ^^Qui
TfHaime me suive^ Stimulated by his example, our
infantry that day proved their superiority to the
Swiss, and conquered them.

It was at this very time that Machiavelli laid
it down as a maxim that "well organized infantry
could hardly be beaten, except by infantry;" thus
proclaiming the superiority of the foot soldiers.
The idea was a profound and bold one, especially
for one who had never worn a sword.

Francis I., entertaining, doubtless, the same view
as the gi^eat writer, and unwilling to remain longer
at the mercy of the capricious and exacting for-
eigners, resolved to create a national infantry. For

42 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

some time lie liesitated as to the organization to be
adopted; but finally, influenced by the revival of
learning, wLicli turned the minds of men back to
tbe ideas of the ancients, he decided to imitate the
Koman formation; but he copied it in little else
than in name.

In 1534 he formed seven legions, each bearing
the name of the province in which it was raised.*
Each legion consisted of six bands, the band having
the following effective force :

{Captain, 1 1
Lieutenants, .... 2 I 5

Ensigns, 2 J

Non-commissioned
Officers.

Centurions, 10

Corporals, 40

Quartermaster sergeants, 4
^ Sergeants, 6 ^

4 Deijmmers and 2 Fifeks,
Soldiers.

Arquebusiers,
4 Pikemen, . .
I Crossbowmen,

200
600
200

1,000

Total, 1,071

The entire legion was commanded by one of the
six captains of the band. Its force, according to
the above schedule, amounted to 6,426 men, and
that of the seven legions together to 44,982 men,
including officers. The officers and non-commissioned

* The legion of Normandy, tlie legion of Brittany, the legion of
Picardy, the legion of Languedoc, the legion of Guyenne, the legion
of Champagne (raised also in Burgundy and Nivernais), the legion
of the Dauphine (raised also in Provence, Lyonnais, and Auvergne).

HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 43

officers were required to be of tlie province in whicli
the legion was raised.

The arquebusiers formed but the fifth part of
the soldiers of a band, but, being frequently de-
tached to fight as eiifants perdus (forlorn hope),
there were assigned to them exclusively one of the
lieutenants and his ensign.

Among his privileges, the soldier of the legion
enjoyed exemption from taxes to the amount of 20
sols ; obtained a decoration, consisting of a gold ring,
if he distinguished himself by a brilliant action,
and attained to nobility by the simple fact of pro-
motion to the grade of lieutenant. Those who were
invalided by wounds served in the garrisons under
pay, exempt for life from all tax or subsidy.

This project was never fully carried into ejffect,
for it was at that time impossible in France to
maintain nearly 45,000 foot soldiers, in addition to
the old bands. At the death of Francis I., the le-
gionary formation fell at once into disuse, and was
followed by a return to isolated bands.

13. French Bands. — From this period, the band
(hande) became the only foot corps in France possess-
ing a regular and peiTQanent organization. It was
the real unit of formation of the infantry, and as it
mostly numbered as many as 500 or 600 men, it cor-
responded very nearly to our modern battalion.

A captain commanded the band, seconded by a
lieutenant, an ensign, quartermaster sergeants, ser-
geants, and corporals. The band marched to the

44 HISTORY AKD TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

drum and fife. Among the soldiers there were those
distino-uished as a first class, called anspessades, a
name at first written lanspessades^ derived from the
Italian lance spezzate, broken lance, and originally ap-
plied to dismounted gensdarmes accepting service in
the infantry.

The officers and pikemen were armed alike; a
long pike, a sword, a helmet covering the ears,
corselets or cuirasses, armlets, gauntlets, and cuisses.
The arquebusiers had little helmets, mailed frocks and
sleeves, and a sword or dirk. The former, therefore,
belonged to the heavy-armed troops, or, as we should
now say, to the infantry of the line ; whilst the lat-
ter were of the light-armed kind.

The band was formed in full square, the pike-
men in the centre, the arquebusiers outside. The
captain took his place in front; the lieutenant
stood as file closer ; the ensign occupied the centre
of the front rank of pikemen. In combat, the pike-
men stood fast, while the arquebusiers scattered,
under the direction of the lieutenant, and skir-
mished. If the battle became serious, the arquebusiers
took refuge behind the pikemen, who received a
charge with crossed pikes, or charged the enemy in
close order. In this charge, they went almost shoul-
der to shoulder, and turned themselves obliquely to
break through the enemy — a practice which seems to
be a vestige of the ancient influence of the shield,
which gave the infantry a tendency to extend itself
to the right, because each soldier endeavored to
cover himself with the shield of his neighbor.

mSTOEY OF INFANTRY. 45

On tlie battle field, the imposing masses of in-
fantry were drawn up in large hattailles^ square or
rectangular, varying from 3,000 to 10,000 men.
Manuscripts of the time represent these battailles as
42, or even 68 men in depth. The number of men
covered with corselets was gradually diminished,
and the pikemen were stripped of defensive arms.

It was on account of this formation in full square,
that military works of the sixteenth century contained
tables of square roots for any given number of sol-
diers, which tables formed the tactical manual of the
epoch.

In these formations, the ranks, as well as the
files, were separated by one step. Occasionally, in
presence of the enemy, this distance was closed, and
they formed in compact order, as in the case of the
foot soldiers under Montluc at Cerisoles (1544).

During the religious wars which troubled France
under the last Valois, fire-arms were multiplied in the
ranks of the French infantry, being better suited to
the character of wars consisting of skirmishes, cap-
tures and recaptures of posts ; but as these arms were
then used only for firing, the infantry, deprived of
pikes, were incapable of either charging or receiving
a charge. Hence this maxim of a contemporary war-
rior : " The arquebusiers without pikes are arms and
legs without bodies." The pikemen were, in fact,
retained down to the time when, by the invention of

* They already began to use the word lattalions ; subsequently, the
name of the whole became the name of a part.

46 HISTORY AND TACTICS OP THE SEPARATE ARMS.

the "bayonet, tlie fire-arm became at once an offensive
and a defensive weapon.

The French "bands were known under two grand
divisions, according to their origin; the bands of
Piedmont, which, for more than a century fought for
the so much desired conquest of the Milanese and
of Italy, and the bands of Picardy, which, on the
northern frontier, contended against the Flemish
and the English. After Francis I., there were far-
ther distinguished, the bands of Champagne, op-
posed to the Germans, and the bands of Guyenne
and Navarre, charged with the defence of the king-
dom, on the side of the Pyrenees, against the Span-
iards. Piedmont, Picardy, Champagne, Navarre !
glorious names, which the oldest corps of our infantry
bore even to the time of the Eevolution.

The system of isolated bands was suited to the
French character, inasmuch as it allowed the cap-
tains to distinguish themselves individually, and
did not subject them to any superior authority. It
was soon discovered, however, that it was necessary
to combine several of these bands under the command
of a single chief, in order to give greater impetus to
the combatants, as well as to facilitate the direction
and administration of the whole. Henry II., con-
vinced of this necessity, tried to renew the legionary
organization of Francis I. ; but the peace of Cateau-
Cambresis deferred the realization of his projects by
rendering them, for the time, useless. It was in the
minority of Charles IX., in the early months of 1561,
that the first regiments were formed, consisting of

HISTOEY OF IITFAISTTRY. 47

several bands — the chief officers receiving the title of
colonel. The regimental organization of the old bands
was completed in 1569.

The political troubles very much increased the
number of regiments from the first, since each influ-
ential partisan received a commission to raise one ; but
these corps usually lasted no longer than the credit
of theii^ chiefs, and were disbanded in time of peace.
Indeed, until the reign of Louis XIII., there were not
many permanent regiments of infantry. The only
regiments which, having their origin before this agi-
tated period, survived it unbroken, were those re-
sulting from the fusion of the old bands already
known by the distinctive title of the vieux corps^
which they retained to the end of the eighteenth
century — the moyens vieux and the petits vieux fol-
lowing them in respect of seniority.

The order of battle of a regiment was at first a
line of small squares, either full or hollow, each
company forming a square. In serious actions the
line was made full. For resisting cavalry they had
already conceived of the formation in squares ar-
ranged in echelons so as to flank each other.

The introduction of the musket was almost
simultaneous with the institution of the first regi-
ments of French infantry. The musketeers fought
only as skirmishers. Besides the musket, their whole
armament and equipment consisted of a morion (small
helmet), a buff leather vest without sleeves, a dirk, a
knapsack, and a powder flask. To act with greater
rapidity, some were mounted upon small horses, thus

48 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

forming in tlie infantry regiments an accidental por-
tion of cavalry. The heavy arquebus was gradually
superseded by the musket.

The depth of the infantry formation was dimin-
ished, as defensive armor and the pike were aban-
doned. Even with the disposition of the regiment
in a line of squares by companies, the depth of the
lines could not exceed 10 or 12 men; for this cor-
responds to an effective force of 100 or 144 men in
a company. This depth, habitually preserved, al-
though the intervals were lessened, became the
standard depth. Indeed, the depth of ten ranks
may be regarded as that of the reign of Henry IV.,
as the following diagram, extracted from a contem-
porary author, shows.^* It relates to the order of
battle of a battalion of 500 men, the jp standing for
pikemen, and the m for musketeers.

FEENCH BATTALIOIT ABOUT 1610.

mmmmmmmmmm pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp mmmmmmmmmm

mminmmmmmmm pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp mmmmmmmmmm

mmmmmmmmmm pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp mmmmmmmmmm

In this formation, the musketeers are placed in
a position favorable to their action as light troops in
skirmishing, and the pikemen stHl form, as in the old
band, a solid centre, capable of sustaining a charge.

* Principes de Vart militaire, par J. de Billon, 1622, in 4to., p. 156.

HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 49

The fire-arms in this battalion constitute two
iffclis of the whole force. The proportion went on
increasing, and became two thirds in the reign of
Louis XIIL*

14. Swedish Infantry. — The French infantry, un-
der Henry IV., derived both its formation and tac-
tics, in part, from the Dutch infantry, trained by the
celebrated captain, Maurice of Nassau. So, also, the
infantry under Louis XIV. borrowed some of its im-
provements from the Swedish infantry, formed in the
school of the great war under Gustavus Adolphus.
Let us, therefore, before proceeding to speak of its
progress under the greatest of the Bourbons, first
consider the improvements made by the conqueror of
Leipsic.

Having to deal with the heavy Austrians, who
were w^edded to the use of large battalions, Gustavus
Adolphus turned his attention to mobility. He ren-
dered his infantry more manageable by dividing it
into small independent corps, under separate com-
manders, and reducing its depth to six ranks. Some-
times, in battle, he made his files deploy to extend his
front, so that the line was reduced to a depth of
three ranks. He usually drew up his infantry in two
lines, the full spaces of the first corresponding to the
vacant ones of the second. This formation is exhibited
in the following diagram, in which P denotes the
pikemen, and M the musketeers.

* At this epoch the proportion of fire-arms was about the same in the
Spanish infantry ; for in 1637 the regiment of Jaen numbered 190 men, to
wit : 60 pikemen, 90 arquebusiers, and 40 musketeers.
4

50 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

FOBMATION OF THE SWEDISH IXFANTRY, UNDER GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

f-pi m\::e2\m2le2\m l^

[mIIIpDEJCIIIImI [mILZJCSLZHIM]

By diminisMng the depth of his infantry, the
Swedish king extended his front, and thereby in-
creased the effect of the fire-arms; and this effect
was the more increased in consequence of the greater
number of musketeers in his troops than in preceding
formations ; for they numbered 72 in a company to
54 pikemen, which gives nearly three fifths as the
proportion of portable fire-arms.

With the duninished depth he could also shorten
the pike to 12 feet (English). He abolished the
cuirasse of the pikemen, leaving as their sole de-
fensive armor the helmet, called a salade. He light-
ened the musket, so that it could be fired without a
rest, and carried upon the shoulder without a cushion ;
he adopted the cartridge carried in a pouch, instead
of charges hung upon cords, which frequently became
entangled with the soldiers' belts; and introduced
firing in three ranks, very much like that of the
present day.

All these innovations, increasing the mobility
of the infantry, rendered it easy to pass from line
into column; and thenceforth, in marches and in
battles, the advantage was with Gustavus Adol-
phus, whose adversaries adhered to the formation
10 ranks deep, and used muskets of such clumsy
construction that they could be loaded only by 94
commands.

HISTOEY OF mFANTRY. 51

f Sweden also put companies of mus-
:eteers between Ms squadrons of horse, a mixture
whicli at that time, when the cavalry movements
were slow, was both feasible and profitable.

15. Infantry of Lionis XIT. and I^ouis XT. — ^The
fire-arms used by the Swedish infantry were muskets
with the match or wheel-lock, which had to be borne
on the shoulder horizontally : consequently, the ranks
could not be closed.

Two inventions appeared which changed this
state of things. One was the flint-lock musket,
which was introduced into the French army in 1652.
The bayonet had already been in existence some
years. It was then constructed with a wooden stock,
so that, when placed upon the end of the musket,
it prevented firing ; but it was, nevertheless, an im-
portant improvement, inasmuch as it furnished the
soldier with a weapon which was at once both offen-
sive and defensive.

These inventions, which date from the time of the
Fronde^ were especially opportune, since Turenne
had, in 1640, adopted for the French infantry the
Swedish depth of six ranks. Lighter arms and a
lighter formation, therefore, in combination, worked
rapid progress.

With this depth of six ranks, the French bat-
talion was drawn up as in the times of Henry IV. ;
pikemen in the centre, musketeers on the flanks.
This formation is exhibited in the following dia-

52 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE ARMS.

gram, taken from a contemporaneous work.^ Tke
battalion liere forms a regiment.

-d

•d

-rJ

B
B

a
a

,£5

-d

-CJ

;z;

Colonel.

a
a

Lieutenant-Colonel.

PL,

aa.

Captains.

ft
ft

bb.

Lieutenants.

p.
p^

ft
ft

cc.

Sub-lieutenants and

P-

ft
ft
ft

ensigns.

ft
ft

dd.

Sergeants.

Pi
P.

ft
ft

ee.

Drummers.

P.
Pi

ft
ft

Major.

P.
P-

ft
ft

Adjutant.

111.

Musketeers.

a
a

'«

P-

Pikemen.

-a

-d

-a

-d

In forming a square, tke pikemen occupied tlie
centre and tke musketeers surrounded tkem on the

* rart de la guerre, par Gaya, 1689, p. 158.

HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 5H

four sides, as in the following diagram^* of a company
of 100 men, 36 pikemen and 64 musketeers.

COMPANl

' SQUARE (1673).

m m

m ni

m m

m ra

m m

111 m

m m

in m

m m

m ni

m m

The new musket (the fusil) easily supplanted the
old one (the mousqitetj firelock), which completely
disappeared from the French ranks in the last year
of the seventeenth century. The bayonet took the
place of the pike, but not without a struggle ; for it
was not until 1703 that Louis XIV., following the
advice of Vauban against that of Montesquiou, finally
abolished the latter. As the musket was now the
only arm of the foot soldier, and its length was much
less than that of the pike, it became necessary to re-
duce the depth of the line, which was now drawn up
in four ranks. The diagram on the next page, taken
from Puysegur,f shows this reduced formation. The
c*ommandant of the battalion stands in front of the cen-
tre, having behind him the three colors, which are in

* From a work entitled Les Devoirs militaires d^ qfficiers (Vlnfanterie
et de camlerie, par De La Fontaine, 1673, p. 404.

t Art de la guerre par principes et par regies^ par le marechal de
Puys^gnr, edition in 4to., t. i., p. 120.

64 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

o
o
o
o
o

O
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

<o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

o o
o o
oo

tlie middle of tlie line formed
by tlie captains of compa-
nies and some other officers ;
a number of sergeants are
placed in a line of file-closers
behind tlie fonrtli rank. Tlie
distance of tlie ranks is about
12 feet ; upon engaging with
the enemy the ranks close to
about 3 feet, and the officers
in front fall back into the
front rank of soldiers. The
drummers are on the flanks.

Louis XIV. also originat-
ed the grenadiers, a wholly
French creation, since copied
by other nations. The first
grenadiers were designed to
throw grenades in sieges. In
1670 they became selected
soldiers, and each regiment
contained one company of
them.

At the beginning of the
reign of Louis XV.,* therefore,

* Light infantry dates from the reign
of Louis XY. At the close of 1742, a
simple servant, named Fischer, collected,
near Prague, some of his comrades, and
repulsed the attacks of the Austrian
pandours. With his handful of men he

HISTOKY OF INFANTRY. 55

the Frencli infantry was drawn up in four ranks, but
these were still open ranks. A vast improvement in
tactics soon followed, "by the introduction of the ca-
denced and lock step, recommended by Marshal Saxe,
which permitted marching and manoeuvring in close
ranks, each man then occupying the minimum space,
both in rank and file. This is, consequently, the
period from which we must date the light but com-
pact infantry formation which covers the least possible
ground ; as may be seen by this figure, extracted from
a work of that time."^

COMPANY OF FRENCH GEEXADIERS IN OEDEE OF BATTLE (175T).

1st lieutenant. »fYTTnnnOnnnO® Captain.

2d lieutenant.

16. Prussian Infantry. — At the death of Marshal
Saxe, the Prussian infantry was the best in Europe.
Trained by the Prince of Anhalt under Frederic- Wil-
liam I., and brought to perfection by Frederic the
Great after his conquest of Silesia, it was familiar
with marching in order of battle, forming and deploy-
ing close columns, and executing rapid firing. The
Prussian gun had a cylindrical iron rammer, and a

displayed so much bravery and comprehension of military matters, that
this small corps obtained, Nov. 1, 1743, through the influence of Count
Saxe, rank in the army, under the name of Chasseurs de Fischer. At the
end of the war, Fischer had under his command 400 foot and 200 mounted
chasseurs. He was distinguished in the Seven Years' War. With him
originated the foot and horse chasseurs. — Tr.

* Amusements Militaires, par Dupain, 1757, p. 226.

56 HISTORY Al^D TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

conical or funnel-shaped vent, wliich allowed powder
to pass from the barrel into the pan, two features
which saved two commands in loading, namely prim-
ing and reversing the rammer. The soldier being,
moreover, trained in the most minute drill, under
severe discipline, could fire six times in a minute ; a
degree of rapidity of execution which gave him the
same advantage as if he were nearer, and fired more
accurately ; and hence firing was the chief mode of
action of the Prussian infantry, although, in several
battles, it attacked with the bayonet.

Modern infantry tactics • came forth completely
formed from the Prussian camps of the eighteenth
century. The basis and the principles of the manoeu-
vres of this arm, as now practised by the several na-
tions, are the immediate results of the manoeuvres
either perfected or introduced by Frederic the Great,
who was the first to combine precision of movement
with celerity.

The Prussian battalion, drawn up in three ranks,
was divided into eight equal companies, usually com-
posed only of soldiers from the ^ve companies of fusi-
leers, the grenadiers fighting separately. The conse-
quence was that men of different companies were
united into one, and that the soldiers were not
always under the same officers in the camp and in
the field. To this twofold inconvenience there was
added the anomaly of having in each battalion one
company of fusileers commanded by a lieutenant,
whilst each of the others was under the orders of a
first or second captain.

HISTORY OF INFANTEY. 5?

In order of battle the officers in the front rank
occupied the interval between the companies ; behind
them stood a non-commissioned officer. In a single
rank, four paces in the rear, stood all the officers and
non-commissioned officers who were not between the

PEUSSIAN BATTALION (1752).

<K®A

10 1 ! oi u 1 g i Qi I d l or

@C0©©00©©00©©00© @oo®©oo@©oo@©oo©

companies. The colors were in the centre, dividing
the battalion into two equal parts, called wings, each
wing formed of two divisions, and each division of
tw^o companies. On each side of the colors, three of
the files always reserved their fire. The commandant
of the battalion stood in front of the colors. The pre-
ceding diagram represents this formation : • designates
an officer ; O a non-commissioned officer.

The Prussian company, when drawn up se})arately,
was divided into four sections^ the supernumeraries
forming a separate detachment, in three ranks, in rear
of the left flank, as is shown in the following figure.

PEUSSIAN COMPANY.

1st lieut.

2(1 lieut.

Ensign.

Captain.

®
O O O Drummers.

1 lot

|o|

|oI

o o

_ _ Non-commissioned offi
O O eers.

1 J Supernumeraries.

It was one of the features of the Prussian infantry
to execute firing while marching to the charge, a prac-

58 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE AEMS.

tice since abandoned, as producing more disorder than
effect. They were also distinguished for their close-
fitting dress and very precise carriage. Under the
fire of the enemy, without losing in any degree theii*
quickness of movement, they preserved the most im-
movable solidity, which, more than once, contributed
to save Frederic the Great from impending defeat.

17, Progress to the present time.^ — From the time
of the great Frederic, the history of infantry may be
summed up in a few words. The formation in three
ranks was definitely adopted in France with the in-
troduction of the Prussian drill among the troops,
with a view to giving them uniform instruction.

The principal minister of war of the reign of Louis
XVI., Count de Saint-Germain, instituted (1775) in
each regiment of infantry, a company of chasseurs,
a second company of elite, to which good soldiers
could be promoted, as a reward for distinguished
services, without regard to their stature. In 1804
this company, which had disappeared during the Rev-
olution, reappeared, under the name of voUigeurs ;
but there was now one company to each battalion, in-
stead of one to a regiment, as formerly. As each bat-
talion contained also a company of grenadiers, its two
flanks, in the order of battle, were each supported by
a company of picked men, which rendered unnecessary
the select detachment formerly placed in reserve on the
left flank, when the depth of the line had been reduced.

In the subsequent campaigns, the French select
soldiers, like the grenadiers of Frederic, fought apart

HISTORY OF mFANTRY. 59

iTom their regiment, no longer forming merely select
battalions, but distinct army-corps, used as a reserve.

From this epoch, the infantry organization has re-
mained very nearly the same, with the exception of
the number of centre companies of a battalion, and
the number of battalions to a regiment, which have
varied from time to time.

As to the tactics of the infantry during this period,
it may be said to consist no longer in solidity and
firing ; the Prussian method is disappearing, and the
secret of success is possessed by those who best un-
derstand marching and attacking. All the wars of
the first republic and of the reign of Napoleon I., ^es-
pecially the campaigns of 1796, in Italy, and of 1805,
in Germany, clearly set forth this characteristic fea-
ture in the progress of modern military art."^

We have yet to point out two essential modi-
fications :

The first is the formation in two ranks, adopted in
1810 by the English ; a formation which is particu-
larly suited to their solid and phlegmatic troops. The
Swiss infantry has also followed the example of the
English, and now forms in only two ranks. The Eus-
sian infantry, in great manoeuvres, has begun to form
in two ranks ; but as yet has never appeared upon
the battle-field in less than three. In France, we have
adhered to the habitual depth of three ranks, as offer-

* The secret of Napoleon's success was as mucli in the legs as arms —
in marching more than fighting. Massing his forces, and profiting by any
fault of the enemy, he fell upon his exposed points like a thunderbolt,
crushing him at a blow. — Tr.

60 HISTORY AKD TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

ing better resistance to cavalry; but higli military
authorities have pronounced in favor of two ranks,
which we have, indeed, occasionally employed *

The second modification relates to the armament.
The flint lock becomes sluggish in damp weather, and
a continued rain may silence it completely. Frederic
the Great, in order to remedy this evil, which was the
more fatal because his infantry operated principally
by firing, had provided each soldier with a piece of
leather as a cover for the lock, to protect it from
moisture ; but this was but a palliative, for the leather
covering, attached to the cartridge-box during a march,
soon became unfit for its purpose. The modern in-
vention of percussion arms has more satisfactorily re-
solved the problem. These arms, adopted in France
in 1840, are now in the hands of all European sol-
diers. In all probability, it will not be long before
the fire-arm of the infantry will be constructed
throughout the civilized world with the rifled bore,
and the foot soldier will thenceforth project the im-
proved elongated ball with such precision of aim, and
at such distances, as greatly to increase his importance
as a combatant.

18. Remarks — The rapid history which we have
just sketched, shows that the depth of infantry regu-
larly diminished with the progress of the military art.
Thus we see that the formation of this arm has passed
successively, from the earliest times to the present,
from the Egyptian square battalions of 100 men on a

* See the following chapter, Sect.

HISTORY OF INFANTRY. 61

side, to tlie compact formation of the Greek phalanx,
16 men in depth, and to the subdivided formation of
the Koman legion, six men deep ; and from the square
formation of the French bands, to the thinner ones of
six ranks, under Gustavus Adolphus and Turenne ; of
four ranks under Maurice de Saxe ; and of three ranks
under Frederic- William I. ; while, at the present day,
it consists of three ranks among the French, and of
but two among the English. There is little probability
that this depth will be further diminished until the for-
mation is reduced to a single rank ; * nevertheless, the
recent improvements in portable fire-arms, and the
employment of Congreve rockets against troops, would
seem to make such a result not absolutely impossible.

We will remark, in conclusion, that victorious na-
tions, from the beginning of the world, have owed
their success to good infantry.

Alexander the Great overturned Darius and his
empire with the Macedonian phalanx, thoroughly or-
ganized by his father Philip, and the excellent Greek
soldiers who accompanied him.

The Komans were correct in their estimate of the
Greek phalanx, and conquered almost the whole known
world with the legion; for their armies never con-
tained any considerable proportion of cavalry.

Charles V. and Philip II., of Spain, owed their
victories to their brave infantry.

Frederic the Great obtained his first successes with
the Prussian infantry, formed and disciplined under
the reign of his predecessor.

* This would almost amount to converting the whole formation into
that of skirmishers.

62 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

Napoleon I. conquered at Austerlitz, Jena, Fried-
land, and Wagram, witli tlie infantry inured by tlio
wars of tlie Kevolution, and trained in the camp of
Boulogne.

Finally, without their infantry, the English would
not have met with the success that attended their
arms in the war in Spain from 1809 to 1814.

CHAPTER SECOND.

INFANTRY FORMATION AND TACTICS.

1. Oeneral Principles. — Infantry is capable of
fighting upon all kinds of ground, and under all cir-
cumstances ; it is readily recruited, easily instructed,
and maintained at small expense. Whether receiv-
ing the enemy's attack, or marching to the charge,
it can, in case of need^ dispense with the other arms.
It constitutes, therefore, par excellence^ the corps which
should be the chief basis of an army.

The foot soldier is required to be, — 1st, skilful^
because his arm is effective only when managed with
dexterity ; 2d, agile ^ that he may be able to overcome
all the obstacles of the ground ; 3d, robust^ that he
may readily support privation and fatigue; 4th,
intelligent^ that he may not be a mere machine, but a
thinking being, whose moral nature may be appealed
to. He must be able to fight at all hours, and in all
countries, whatever may be the season or climate ; in
short, he must possess the character of universality in
the highest possible degree.

64 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

His clothing should be simple, convenient, and
warm ; contrived solely with a view to his health,
subject neither to caprice nor to fashion; his shoes
should be strong, and well-fitting ; his head-gear light,
but yet such as to resist the sabre of cavalry.

The percussion gun, with the bayonet, is a port-
able implement, as perfect (nearly*) as the present
state of the mechanic arts permits ; the certainty of its
fire makes it an excellent arm for the infantry, and
the bayonet is the only arm which is suitable for the
foot soldier in personal encounters. The sabre worn
by the non-commissioned ofiicers and privates of select
foi'mations is of very little use except at the bivouac,
where it serves, to some extent, as a bill-hook and
an axe.

The physical force of the infantry soldier is to be
increased by drills,, such as those of the manual,
marches in line and by flank, various manoeuvres, etc. ;
as also by gymnastics, which impart suppleness to his
limbs. His moral force is to be increased by means
of discipline, which, properly observed, gives uniform
and increased power of action, and also by the in-
culcation of the most elevated ideas of his strength,
his importance, and his superiority over those with
whom he has to contend. It is, especially, to be
proved to him that with his bayonet he should never
fear cavalry, notwithstanding the apparently com-
manding position of the mounted soldier. He is to
be rendered habitually calm in the most critical mo-
ments, amid showers of grape-shot, and in despite of

* We put in this qualification in view of the rifled gun.

INFANTRY FORMATION AND TACTICS.

hunger and tliirst. His moral education, however,
can be properly completed only by war.

An infantry soldier, with a load of 55 pounds,*
should be able to march during ten hours of the day :
any troop of foot, at this rate, will outdo the best cav-
alry, and can even overtake it in pursuit in a short
time, the horse having more need of repose than man.
Thus, in 1805, when the Archduke Ferdinand, upon
his leaving Ulm, was pursued by the French, the
grenadiers of Oudinot marched as much as fourteen
leagues (over 35 miles) a day, never permitting the
cavalry of the enemy to rest, and finally causing a part
of them to fall into the hands of the French cavalry.

The battalion is the unit of the infantry force, and
in the instruction of the soldier, his ultimate destina-
tion as a constituent of the battalion must be kept in
view. This is to be effected synthetically, by proceed-
ing from the simple to the compound, from the indi-
vidual to the mass. We should begin with a single
man, then two men, three men, four men, etc., in a
single rank. When they have become sufficiently
skilful in one rank, they are to be combined in two
and three ranks.

We have observed in the preceding chapter that
we owe to Marshal Saxe the introduction of the lock-

* " There are five tilings from wliicli the soldier must never be sepa-
rated : his gun, his cartridges, his knapsack, his provisions for at least
four days, and his pioneer tool. Let the knapsack be reduced to the
smallest size, let him carry in it a shirt, a pair of shoes, a stock, a
handkerchief, a tinder-box ; but let him have it always with him ; for
once separated from him, it never returns." — Memoires de Napoleon /'',
seconde note sur les considerations sur Vart de la guerre.

(56 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

step, wliicli enables troops to marcli and manoeuvre in
cbsed ranks; tMs step is fundamental in all good
evolutions. Tlie infantry step is two Frencli feet
(28 inches in our service) in lengtli. There are two
kinds of step : — the direct and oUiqiie ; the latter is
equivalent to a wheel of one fourth and a direct step.
With the direct step, the foot soldier goes, in one
minute, 50 metres at the ordinary pace, 60 metres at
the marching pace, 66 metres at the quick pace, 81
metres at charging pace, and 100 metres (109 yards
English) upon a run. He occupies a space, in the
rank, of one half a metre (20 inches) ; and in the tile,
with his knapsack, the same space ; there is an inter-
val of 0°'.32 (14 inches) between the ranks. But we
need not dwell any longer upon these special details.
The formation in three ranks gives more firmness
than that in two, chiefly for resisting cavalry, and for
attack in line, and on this account it has been pre-
served in France down to the present time, excepting
for the chasseurs a pied. . The English draw up their
infantry in two ranks, and a number of authorities
have advocated it ; ^' but the French formation com-

* Napoleon I. in his Menioires, and in a letter to Marmont, Oct. 13,
1813 ; Marshal Marmont {de VEsprit des institutions militaires, p. 40) ;
Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cjr (Meinoires, toI. i., p. 16) ; Generals Jomini,
Chambray, and Decker.

General Dufour, who has been at the head of the federal army of
Switzerland, expresses a preference for three ranks, for the infantry of
his country, as stronger and more defensive, although the official depth
is there but two (see his Cours de Tactiqve, 1851, p. 59). Marshal Bu-
geaud (Aperffus sur la guerre) thinks that infantry should have both
formations, so that either may be employed according to circumstances
and the views of the general. Marshal Saint- Arnaud, at the commence-

INFANTRY FORMATION AND TACTICS. G7

bines the advantages of both, since it is easy to pass
from the formation in three ranks to that in two. As
for the reason why the three-rank has prevailed over
the six-rank formation of Gustavus Adolphus, and
over the still deeper ones of antiquity, it may be given
in a few words : it is, that our predecessors had but
a single mode of formation, whereas we have several,
and can pass from one to the other, by means of
manoeuvres.

But although the infantry is, as we have above re-
marked, that arm which is, par excellence^ the basis of
an army — the only one which, in case of need^ can rely
upon itself alone — it must, nevertheless, not be sup-
posed that it can by itself produce, in all cases, the
maximwn of effect '^ for, in pursuit, the enemy will
often escape from it ; '''* and, when overcome, it will be
easily picked up by the cavalry.f Without cavalry,
the infantry will be perpetually harassed by the ene-
my, fatigued by the advance guard-duty which its
own safety requires, and very much exposed, in case
of defeat, in an entirely open country. It is apparent,
therefore, a priori^ that infantry and cavalry are
necessary to each other, and should be considered as
indispensable parts of the same whole, whether of an
army-corps or an aiTay.

inent of the war in the East, adopted the formation in two ranks for his
troops, and proclaimed it in the orders of the day. The Imperial Guard
usually manoeuvres in two ranks.

* At Bautzen (1813), for want of cavalry, the result of our victory
was not as complete as at Austerlitz.

t At Rivoli (1796) we picked up the Austrian battalions which had
become separated from their cavalry and artillery.

68 HISTORY AND TACTICS OP THE 8EPAEATE AEMS.

2. nodes of Action of Infantry. — ^The infantry
has two modes of action, or, if tlie expression be pref-
erable, two methods of operating. It operates :

1st. By firing, distant or near.*

2d. Witli sabre or bayonet.

Tlie present sabre of tlie infantry, however, is a
very poor arm, and is, besides, given only to the non-
commissioned officers and the soldiers of the select
companies. We may, therefore, consider the attack or
defence with the bayonet, as the only mode of action
of the infantry in close fight.

The bayonet should be sparingly employed ; it is,
after all, but an extremely inferior weapon; and it
can hardly be required of soldiers to expose themselves
to a hand-to-hand fight whilst the means of defence
are so imperfect.

The French have, indeed, gained a well-deserved
reputation abroad by the energy of their charge with
the bayonet ; for this mode of attack agrees admirably
with their character, and is perfectly suited to the
furia Francesa : thus with some reason the bay-
onet has been distinguished as the "weapon of the
French."

The bayonet attack is only good when it is re-
quired to make a sudden demonstration. We may even
say that, in general, it is but a demonstration, inas-
much as very few cases are cited in which it was really
a charge, — ^that is to say, in which there really was a
collision. The only authentic case, indeed, is that in

* Near, that is, at a very short distance, as for example, in the
defence of a military crest. See, hereafter, Part III., Chap, viii., sec. 2.

IKFANTRY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 69

wliicli the grenadiers of Oudinot, at Amstetten, in
1805, met tlie Russian rear guard of Bagration.

This demonstration generally forces the enemy to
fall back, by the moral effect produced by such a
charge ; * and it is in this sense alone, compelling the
enemij to fall hack^ that we use the phrase bayonet
charge^ in cases where this attack occurs between con-
siderable bodies of troops. Nevertheless, there are
cases in which the bayonet charge has not only been
followed by collision, but has degenerated into a
melee ; as, for example, in 1800, during the siege of
Genoa, on the part of the troops of Soult, the day of
the 10th Floreal (April 30th).f

If, then, the bayonet is only to be used in mod-
eration, the distant mode of action remains the
principal mode of action ot infantry. Frederic II.
placed victory in well executed firing, as Marshal Saxe
placed it in the legs (marching and manoeuvring) ;
and these two celebrated warriors were both right :
for while the legs prepare the victory, firing secures it.

There are two kinds of firing, — simultaneous, by
battalions, companies, &c., and firing at will. The for-
mer, when executed by the three ranks, produces the
maximum effect^ but on account of the attention it re-
quires on the part of both officers and troops, is with
difficulty practised in the field. Firing by command

* General Duliesme, at the battle of Caldiero (1805), finding himself
exposed to the fire of an Austrian corps, superior in numbers, made a
demonstration with the bayonet ; the Austrians fell back, aWiough an
'impassable ravine separated the two armies.

t In this contest " they fought hand-to-hand ; they even seized each
other by the hair." Thiebault, Blocus de Oenes^ 3d ed., 1847, vol. !., p. 231.

70 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

is divided into firing by battalions, by half battalions,
and by companies, succeeding each other in alterna-
tion, in such a manner as always to keep a portion of
the pieces loaded.

Firing by battalions, or even by half-battalions, is
used either in an offensive movement, or in retreat.
The force halts, delivers one or more rounds, then re-
news the march. This kind of firing may also be used
with advantage before coming out of an ambuscade.
Firing in a charge must be the most destructive pos-
sible, and consequently should consist of the simulta-
neous firing of three ranks.

Firing by di\^sions, or by companies, is especially
suitable for infantry in position, when repelling feeble
attacks.

Firing by command by ranks, w^hich was tried in
the early part of this century against cavalry, has been
abandoned as ineffective.

But all firing by command can continue but a
short time in battle, and becomes impracticable in any
brisk action ; for the orders of the different officers are
confounded together, and the noise of the artillery and
even of the musketry, the excitement of the combat,
increased by the cries of the wounded, make it im-
possible for the soldiers to give the attention necessary
•for loading and firing together. Moreover, all firing
by command, ends in firing by two ranks ; and even
the latter cannot be long maintained in the mode pre-
scribed by the French regulations— for the man in the
third rank is loth to part with his habitual arm,
and, becoming impatient at not taking part in the

INrAlNTRY FORMATION AND TACTICS. Yl

combat, at last takes to firing on liis own account,
instead of loading for the man in tlie second rank.
Again, if the man in tke third rank remains in his
place and fires horizontally, he runs the risk of wound-
ing the men of the first and second ranks ; if he re-
mains in his place and fires high, his fire does not
reach the enemy, and becomes useless ; finally, if he
pushes into the second rank, he crowds it, and im-
pedes its action, whence result disorder and accidents.
The advocates of the formation in two ranks argue
from these facts in favor of their views. It follows
that the fire hy file is the most destructive, gives the
soldier the best chance of loading and aiming, and is
suited to all cases ; being, in fact, that into w^hich any
other kind of firing degenerates ; in shoi-t, it is the
veritable /^z^ de combat.

Firing, as the reader is aware, may be either
direct or oblique; but one should never fire on the
march, which only produces disorder, and but little
effect. Besides, when a movement is made on the battle
field, it is with a view to reach a certain position, and
then it should be reached with the least possible delay.

We will terminate these details respecting firing
by two maxims, extracted from the Aperqiis sur
quelques details de la guerre of Marshal Bugeaud :

1st. Firing at too great a distance is the mark of
bad infantry ; good soldiers are sparing of their fire.

2d. The waste of ammunition is the greatest
fault with which infantry can be reproached.*"*

* Marshal Bugeaud also recommends loading with two balls, and
advises that every infantry officer should, in the field, carry a double-
"barrelled piece, as practised in the Austrian army.

72 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

Marshal Saxe long ago condemned excessive firing
Uirerie)'^ an opinion the more remarkable, that, in
his day, the successes of the Prussians were ascribed to
their firing. He says, sjaeaking of the abuse of firing:
" En tirant^ on fait plus de hruit que de mal et on est
toujour s hattu.^

11 'A-

3, The Battalion. — ^The battalion is the tactical
unit of infantry. In France it is composed of 8 pla-
toons,f which, grouped two-and-two, form 4 divisions.

" The battalion is the true military element, the
unit in the battle ; we move and manoeuvre by battal-
ions ; we fight by battalions."

" Two conditions are to be observed in the numer-
ical constitution of the battalion : 1st, it must not be
unwieldy; and 2d, it should be of such size that,
when deployed, the voice of the commander may be
heard at both extremities." J

According to this principle, the front of the bat-
talion should not exceed 170 yards, which embraces a
force of about 1,000 men,§ if formed in three ranks ;
which is the maximum limit calculated with reference
to the unavoidable losses which a body of troops suf-
fer in passing from the inactivity of the garrison to
the laborious life of the camp.

It is one of the advantages of our modern bat-

* Reveries^ chap, i., art. 6.

t The French platoon corresponds to our company. — Tr.

\ Marrnont, Esprit des institutions militaires, pp. 38, 89.

§ A front of 170 yards, or 155 metres, at the rate of two men in the
rank for each metre, gives 310 men in a rank, 930 in three ranks, and
1,000 men for the total force, if we count 70 file-closers, that is, about-
one file-closer for each two metres of front.

!•

INFANTEY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 73

tallon, tliat its subdivisions, for administrative dis^
cipline and for evolutions, are identical ; so that the
soldiers are always under the orders of the same offi-
cers : thus the regime of the camp and the regime of
the field are in entire accordance. It was not so in
France under the reign of Louis XIV., nor in Prussia
during the wars of the great Frederic.

Moreover, all the subdivisions of the battalion are
symmetrical and equal, which is a great convenience
in evolutions.

4. mraiioeuvres — By a manoeiivve we understand
any movement, the object of which is to change a
body from one condition or position to another. Tac-
tics consist of manoeuvres.

In order to secure their successful performance,
especially in war, they should combine simplicity,
clearness, promptness, and facility of execution. The
manoeuvres prescribed by the French regulations ful-
fil these conditions.

The training of troops to manoeuvres, and familiar-
izing them with the most rapid and complicated move-
ments, are among the most important duties of the
officers, in which they can succeed only by continual
and often wearisome repetitions ; but so many unfore-
seen causes of disorder occur on the field in the pres-
ence of the enemy, that we cannot be too careful to
provide in advance against their ill effects, by regular-
ity, ensemble, solidity and steadiness in manoeuvres —
qualities acquired only by numerous drills practised
in times of peace.

74 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

Every body of troops during a maiiceuvre is in a
condition of danger ; for, while manoeuvring, they can-
not defend themselves. This axiom is especially ap-
plicable to infantry. Manoeuvring must therefore be
effected in the shortest possible time ; all manoeuvres
should, when practicable, be covered, and executed, in
preference, in rear of the line of battle.

To prevent innovations and secure uniformity, the
instructions to be given to the men are invariably fixed
by the regulations for each arm of the service.

5. Order of Battle. — To resist the enemy, a num-
l)er of battalions of infantry are drawn up in two
lines ; the first line deployed with but small intervals
of about 50 feet between the flanks of the battalions;
the second line of battalions is ployed in double col-
umn, in order to be the more able to come to the aid
of the first, which is its proper duty. When the first
line yields, the second advances and takes its place ;
or else, if the first line breaks, it can disperse through
the intervals of the second, and the latter, once un-
masked, deploys and receives the charge of the adver-
sary. In order to do this effectively, the second line
must have been kept fresh during the engagement of
the first, and hence it is posted about 300 yards in its
rear,^* at which distance the enemy's fire will hardly
reach it. If the broken character of the ground cov-
ers the second line, it can be brought within 100 yards
of the first, but seldom nearer. To take it beyond

* The distancG of the two lines is thus about double the front of a
battalion.

INFANTRY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 7o

300 yards would deprive the first of its support ; this
distance, therefore, should not be exceeded ; but if the
second line, even 300 yards in rear, suffers too much
from the artillery of the enemy, it should be deployed.
It is usual to extend the second line beyond the first,
in order to protect the flanks of the latter.

OKDER OF BATTLE OF THE INFANTRY.
' « ' ' I I I ^ I I I I i I

The regulations of 1831 respecting the manoeu-
vring of the infantry, treat first of the evolutions in a
single line, and then of those performed in two lines.
But the second line is dependent upon the first, inas-
much as it should perform the same movements to
keep itself in the same relative position. The two
lines, however, execute their movements separately,
and in practice it can hardly be otherwise, since the
difference of the ground which they severally occupy
may occasion modifications in the details of execution.

6. Msurciiiiig formations. — The infantry has four
marching formations :
1st. Marching in line ;
2d. Marching by flank ;
3d. Marching in column ;
4th. Marching in square.
A battalion (and a fortiori a larger body of troops).

76 HISTOEY AKD TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

in consequence of its extended front and slight depth,
cannot long march in line without suffering injurious
breaks, produced either by the march itself, or by en-
countering various obstacles : besides, there are very
few localities sufficiently wide and clear to permit the
execution of such a march without inconvenience. A
battalion will therefore never march in line except to
charge with the bayonet, or when, having engaged
the infantry of the enemy, it may be necessary
to advance or retire progressively a few hundred
paces.

Marching hy the flanh allows the battalion to pass
through the narrowest roads; but in this kind of
march, as soon as the step is broken, which quickly
happens, the distances are lost and the column is
lengthened, so that if it were required suddenly to
face to the front, the line which it would form would
be irregular. Besides, in the march by flank of a bat-
talion, the front and the rear are too far apart for mu-
tual support in case of attack. Hence, a battalion
should never march by the flank in presence of the
enemy, unless it be to lean to the right or to the left
a few steps only, and not even for that purpose, if it
is seriously engaged.

Marching hy column is not subject to the same
inconveniences as marching in line or by flank ; it is
consequently the most appropriate for movements or
manoeuvres. The column by sections or by platoons,
at full distance, is the best marching column. The
march of a column is quite simple ; takmg care only
to preserve the distances. The men may march at

INFANTEY FORMATION AND TACTICS.

MARCH IN COLUMN OF THE INFANTET
Adjutant-major ... ^ wmimm

ease and cany their guns at will. Changes of direc-
tion are made either
by turning or wheel-
ing^ according as the
new direction is or is
not on the side of the
guide.

It is a general prin-
ciple respecting col-

umns, and an essential

Adjutant

one for columns on a Chief of battalion .

march, that they never
occupy a greater space
from the front to the
rear, than they would
occupy in line, so that it
may always he easy to
pass from one order of
formation to the other.

Marching in square is employed to reach a shel-
ter not far distant, during a respite from attacking
cavalry. It is often more prudent, in open country, to
march in square than to re-form the column. To
march in square, the two lateral lines relatively to the
direction of the march, form hy the flank, and the
fourth faces to the front. The march in square is al-
ways undulating and uncertain : it should be regarded
as purely accidental. In the wars .of the Revolution
and Empire, squares were marched with success ; we
need only recall in this connection the battles of Heli-
opolis (April, 1800), Auerstadt (October 14, 1806),

78 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

Lutzen (May 2, 1813). In Egypt they marched in
squares, even for days; but this was for the purpose
of assuring the soldiers against a new enemy, and to
cover the sick and wounded, and the artillery ; and
with this object the squares were at first formed with
six ranks, a superfluous depth, which was afterward
reduced to three, and even to two ranks.

7. Formations of Attack. — We shall consider five
kinds of formations of attack for the infantry :

1st. Attack in line;

2d. Attack in column ;

3d. Attack as skirmishers ;

4th. Attack in echelon ;

5th. Attack in squares.

Attack in line. — ^This attack permits the troops to
make use of their whole fire, to come upon the enemy
upon a greater front, and thus to menace him with
danger at all points ; to render his defeat more com-
plete and more certain ; finally, it offers less exposure
to the enemy's artillery.

These are real advantages, and the attack in line,
executed by solid and ivell trained troops, ought to be
preferred in a variety of circumstances.

To these considerations we may add this formal
opinion of Marshal Bugeaud : " The deployed order is
the veritable order of combat."

The attack in line will generally be employed
against infantry : nevertheless, it has occasionally suc-
ceeded against cavalry badly managed, but it then re-
(piires very solid infantry.

INFANTEY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 79

But tliis order is not suited to all kinds of ground.
The greater part of tlie officers and non-commissioned
officers are in the position of iile-closers ; the others are
inserted in the ranks: the soldier is thus deprived
of the stimulus of their example. Artillery and mus-
ketry may produce voids in the ranks, which can be
filled only at the expense of the rapidity of march ; it
may, perhaps, become necessary to halt, and thence-
forth there is no longer any impetus ; and, the natural
instinct of the soldier prompting him to use his arms
at the sight of danger, firing begins in spite of the offi-
cers, and the charge fails. In such a case, a battalion
may be defeated, and cause a general rout, by uncov-
ering the flanks of the neighboring battalions.

Attack in column, — The inconveniences of the at-
tack in line which we have just stated, frequently lead
to a preference for the attack in column.

The best offensive column is the double-central^ as
prescribed by the regulations ; which is very quickly
formed and deployed, and in which the grenadiers and
voltigeurs constitute a reserve in the rear, which can
be formed and deployed in face of the enemy, while
kept at a distance by the fire of the fourth and fifth

DOUBLE-CENTEAL COLUMN.
Q 7 c; S <t 3 2 1

,v C 3 I

7 2

platoons on the line of battle. This last advantage
is important, for generally, after the charge, it is ne-

80 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

cessary to deploy tlie column of attack, to preserve
tlie point wliicli has been gained.

There are also employed, occasionally, columns by
platoons or by sections, at half distance, which can
fight mth advantage on narrow ground. When sev-
eral of such columns are made to act upon broken
ground, it is prudent to throw one or more com-
panies of skirmishers on the front and flanks of each
column, to unite it with the neighboring columns,
and protect its march against the skirmishers of the
enemy.

According to Guibert, the depth of an offensive
column should not exceed eight subdivisions. Since
this writer, the experience of the nineteenth century
has caused this depth to be reduced to four subdivi-
sions only, as shown by the figure of the double-cen-
tral column.

In the column, the officers and non-commissioned
officers, being all placed between the platoons or divi-
sions, or on their flanks, exercise a very powerful
physical and moral influence upon the soldiers.

Once in motion, the column of attack should
neither stop to fire nor to deploy ; on the contrary,
taking advantage of its first ardor and the impetus
given by its depth, it should be precipitated in com-
pact form upon the enemy, sweeping away all opposi-
tion. To stop within reach of the enemy to deploy
would be a dangerous operation, which might lead to
defeat in case the enemy knew how to profit by it.

The formation in column offers three principal ad-
vantages : 1st, the men being grouped en mas-se^ are

INFANTE Y FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 81

more easily electrified witli entliusiasm than in the thin
and extended formation in line ; 2d, the leading divi-
sion of the column has more boldness, because it feels
itself followed and supported, and is conscious that it
cannot stop without being overthrown ; 3d, the other
divisions, seeing themselves covered by the first, march
resolutely. As to the loss of fire in this formation, it
is compensated by throwing out skirmishers on the
flanks.

The column acts by a succession of efforts depend-
ing upon its depth ; nevertheless, the first subdivision
has no greater velocity than those which follow it ;
for if it had, the velocity of a column would in-
crease with its depth, whereas just the contrary takes
place.

The order in column allows marching without
wavering ; is adaj^ted to all kinds of ground, and may
take advantage of the irregularities of the surface, to
shelter itself from the fire of the enemy. Columns,
moreover, can resist cavalry, and the destruction of
one column does not, necessarily, involve that of the
others. All these are advantages which the order in
column offers over the order in line, as an offensive
formation.

Troops who are but partially trained may be made
to fight in column ; for it is not essential in the attack
in column that the soldier should know how to march
well ; it is sufficient that the guides and officers are
intelligent, firm, and have sufficient authority to re-
strain the soldier.

The French have obtained their most notable suc-
6

82 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

cesses by tlie attack in columns, wMcli is perfectly
congenial to their national character.

Infantry attacks intrencliments in numerous col-
umns, of little depth and narrow front ; it exposes
thus fewer to the enemy's fire lining the parapets, and
reserves to itself the power of reenforcing the attack
upon the weakest point.

The great objection to columns of attack is their
liability to suffering from the fire of artillery, especially
in a flat country ; and this often becomes so serious
as to compel them to deploy without delay.

We have sometimes employed, in dangerous ope-
rations, an order of attack compounded of the attack
in line and the attack in column, which we have just
analyzed. It consists in marching one battalion in
line, while two others, in column, occupy each of the
flanks of the deployed battalion ; thus, in each group
of three battalions, the advantages of the two methods
are combined, and their disadvantages lessened. It

MIXED FOEMATION.

3d. 2d bat. 1st.

was in this order that the French army, in 1797, ford-
ed the broad bed of the Tagliamento in presence
of the Austrians ; and that a part of the Eussians
fought at Eylau (1807).

In several modem battles, particularly at Wagram
(1809), offensive columns composed of a large number
of battalions have been employed ; but they should
be regarded as exceptionable formations, for under the

INFANTRY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 83

sweeping fire of the adversary's artillery they are al-
ways cruelly decimated, even in case of success.

Attach as skirmishers, — In mountainous and
woody countries there are positions which can be at-
tacked neither in line nor in column, the ground being
too much covered or cut up by ravines and escarp-
ments to allow any order of march to be observed.
They are then attacked by skirmishers ; but these
must be in large numbers ; thus battalions, sometimes
even regiments, or a whole brigade, are detached for
this purpose, and in this case they are designated as
skirmishers en grande lande?'

Much greater skill and valor are required of the
soldier for fighting and advancing in this manner,
than in combats in close ranks, where the touch of the
elbow and the unity of the command sustains him.

The influence of the ofiicers being purely moral,
they can do no more than set the example of bravery.
The soldier has here every facility for lagging behind,
wandering away, and hiding from the surveillance of
his superiors.

The men feel themselves less supported and more
exposed to the chances of hand-to-hand combats than
when they form parts of a mass, where the danger
threatens no individual specially.

In this sort of combat, if the soldiers are not brave
and enthusiastic, they will fire a whole day without
advancing, and will squat behind trees, hedges, and
walls, doing very little mischief, and scarcely receiv-

* We shall again speak of these skirmishers at the end of this
chapter, Sect. 10, when treating of the different kinds of skirmishers.

84 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE AEMS.

ing any. Sucli attacks are without vigor, and must
often fail.

The bayonet, which is of no advantage to the sol-
dier, in the rank, against cavalry, may become the
principal arm in the hands of skirmishers against
detached horsemen, for these skirmishers have the
greatest freedom of movement.

Attach in echelon, — ^The order in echelons is favor-
able for attack, because it readily conforms to the nature
of the ground, and does not necessitate engaging more
than a part of the forces ; it is adopted for the pur-
pose of attacking a particular point of the enemy's
line. In this order, the battalions may be either de-
ployed or in column. The echelons should mutually
flank each other, even with musketry, and hence their
distance should not exceed some 200 yards ; it would
not do to reduce the distance below 100 yards, for
then two echelons would be engaged at the same time.

OEDEE IN ECHELONS.

1st. "Rat.

3d. Bat.

ysy*;

2fl. Bat.

The intervals between the echelons should be at
least 18 yards.

A line may be broken up into direct echelons or
oblique echelons. In any case, the possibility of an at-

INFAITTEY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 85

tack by cavalry forbids the formation of ecbelons of
more tban six battalions, or a brigade. For, in or-
der to resist tbe cavalry, they will have to form
squares ; but, supposing the echelons to consist of a
brigade, and each to form one square, they will be too
far apart to flank each other properly ; if formed into
two squares, of a regiment, they will imperfectly flank
each other; and it will be impossible to place six
squares, each of a battalion, upon 200 yards. Thus,
six battalions may be well considered as the maximum
of force which should compose each echelon.*

Attack in squares, — Whenever a square can
march, it may also act on the offensive. In the cam-
paign in Egypt (1799-1800), the French army not
only marched in squares, but also attacked in squares.
The attack in squares may,f then, be ranked among
the forms of attack for infantry ; its special employ-
ment is against cavalry.

According to Jomini,;]; the square by battalion is
the best for the offensive.

A long square of a front of three companies, closed
on one side by the grenadiers, and on the other by
the voltigeurs, gives a good formation for a battalion
to attack in square.

* This is based upon the supposition that the front of the battalion
measures a little over 150 yards.

t In this kind of attack the protecting artillery will eave its ammu-
nition for the critical moment which may arrive unexpectedly, but during
which it will be necessary to act with all the energy possible. The
French artillery observed this rule in the battle of Heliopolis (April,
1800), gained by Kleber over the army of the Grand Vizier. {Tactique
des trois armes, par le colonel Favi^ p. 208.)

X Precis de Vart de la guerre^ t. ii., p. 229.

86 IIISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AKMS.

8. Formations of Defence. — We shall consider five
kinds of formations of defence, for infantry •

1st. Defence in line ;

2d. Defence in column ;

3d. Defence in square ;

4th. Defence in echelon ;

5th. Defence in checker-form.

Defence in line, — ^The infantry assumes the thin
order for combat, whenever its business is to occupy
and defend an advantageous position; it then cuts
off the approaches by covering them with its fire,
which is directed upon the attacking columns.

Infantry adopt the deployed line for defence,
especially against troops of the same kind ; they then
cover the ground which the enemy must traverse to
reach them, with skirmishers ; and when the adver-
sary has been worried by a stubborn resistance, the
infantry move and march to the attack at charging step.

Circumstances may also sometimes require that a
body of- deployed infantry, though acting upon the
defensive, should follow up their fire by a bayonet
charge. This case occurs when they are stationed
near and behind the crest of a hill, awaiting a column
which is ascending the slope. We shall return to this
point when speaking of the defence of heights.*

Again, infantry employ the thin order when
firing to defend intrenchments, natural or artificial, by
lining the parapets with one or two ranks of mus-
kets ; but this passive means of defence is not suffi-
cient, except when combined with the active and judi-

* Part III., Chap. viii.

INFANTHY FOEMATION AND TACTICS.

8-7

EEGULATION SQUAllE.

^ 4

eious employment of reserves outside the intrencliment,
as was done by Massena in Ms energetic defence of
Genoa in tlie year 1800.

Defence in column, — Infantry in column can with-
stand neither artillery nor deployed infantry, the for-
mer raking its great depth with its horizontal fire, and
the latter riddling it with its musketry. The column
is, therefore, useful in defence only against cavalry.

A defensive column will often change to the square.

Defence in square?' — ^The square is the true for-
mation of the infantry against
cavalry, because it is closed, and
resists on all sides. The double
column at half distance forms, in
the presence of cavalry, a liol-
low square. The mode of form-
ing it, according to official regu-
lations, is shown in the annexed
figure.

This square may also be ob-
tained directly from the line in '" '"""" '

order of hattle^ without the intervention of the column,
as is shown in the following figure, extracted from
General Schramm's Album de manoeuvres dHnfanterie^
Paris, 1850, p. 15.

■^

* The Kussians, and the English in Spain, occasionally substituted
the following manoeuvre for the square against cavalry. The infantry
(even in two ranks) awaited the cavalry in line ; the first rank fired
upon the charging horsemen ; the second rank threw themselves upon
the ground until the cavalry, riding at full speed, had passed them, then
rising discharged their fire at the backs of the horsemen. This

88 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE AEMS.

SCHRAMM'S SQUARE.

S- ry M

r .r .r

V V\ v\

3
2

The square half full is notMng more than the
regulation column against cavalry?' This formation
is assumed by a column closed en masse, so suddenly
threatened by cavalry as not to have time to resume
the regular distances required in forming a square in
the usual manner. It then forms a provisional square,
by breaking as many files from the right and left of
each company as may be necessary to close the in-
tervals.

General Jomini considers the square by a regiment
the best for the defensive, whilst, as we have said, the
square by a battalion is the best for the offensive.

"A large square," says Marshal Bugeaud, "has
not an increased fire in proportion to its size, and is
no stronger than a small one. The only portion of
the charging cavalry really to be feared is that which
can strike the face of a square ; the portions extend-
ing beyond are mill. By extending the face of a
square, though we do indeed increase its fire, we in-
crease in the same proportion the number of its ene-

manoeuvre may answer, but requires for its execution soldiers of great
coolness and experience.

* Evolutions de la ligne. No. 925.

INFANTRY FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 89

mies.- A large square broken, is as mucli lost as a
small one, and everything is tlius risked at once.
For these reasons, I think, we should form none but
deep squares of a single battalion." The annexed
fig^ure illustrates the square

° BUGEAUD'S SQUAEE.

proposed by the conqueror of Grenadiers , -.

1st company, ^

Isly. ,_ _

The weak points of a 3^ „ ^^^ ^^

square are not the angles, uh - j= =

which are protected by the sth • {^ "

oblique fire of two faces,"^ but vouigeurs ■ — ■

rather the middle of the faces, which present but a
front fire, and have more void space behind them.f

The infantry of a square should find its defence
rather in its fire than in the bayonet. During the
war in the East, instead of the regulation fire of two
ranks, the preference was given to a fire (P ensemhle^
aimed at the horses' noses at forty paces, after which
they were received upon the bayonet.

When several squares are to act together, they
should be echeloned^ so as to flank each other.

Artillery is the most formidable oj^ponent of the
square. Nevertheless, in favorable circumstances,
brought about by skilful manoeuvres, cavalry alone
may break a square mthout the assistance of artil-
lery ; as happened, for example, at the battle of Dres-
den (1813).

* In a tactical square, there are no sectors totally deprived of fire,
since we can admit oblique firing, whicli is not done in fortification.

t Upon the heights of Elbodon (Spain, 1811) the cavalry of Montbrun
charged an English square upon three of its faces.

90 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

The formation in square is often designated by tlie
i^mm formation of resistance.

In conclusion, we will remark that a square, not-
withstanding its mobility, acts, in fact, as a redoubt,
and has the same disadvantages ; its faces, for exam-
ple, stand in need of flanking. In order to flank them,
Desaix, when in Egypt, placed on the prolongations
of the diagonals of the great square four small squares,
each composed of 200 men, to which were added, in
case of attack, the companies of skirmishers.

WURTEMBEKG SQUARE.

DESAIX' SQUAKE.

1 1 1

III

o o

1 1 1

o o

1 1 1

111

o o
o o

oo
oo

111

III

We may also here notice a good formation of the
square, adopted by the army of Wurtemberg. The 2d
division closes in mass upon the 1st, the 4th upon the
3d, the 3d being at double distance from the 2d. The
3d and 4th front to the rear, the files of the extrem-
ities front to the right and left, and the flanks are
filled out by the file-closers and picked sharpshooters.
This square is strong, and marches with more ease
than the ordinary square.

Defence in echelon. — The order in echelons, which
we have spoken of in connection with attacks, an-
swers also for defence. It is especially employed in

INFANTRY FOEMATION AND TACTICS, 91

retreating slowly and gradually, after receiving a
clieck.

Wliat we have said above respecting the relative
disposition of the echelons and the distances between
them, is also applicable here.

Defence in cliecker-form, — ^The column, square,
and echelons are all suited both to offensive and de-
fensive operations. The order in checker-form, on the
contrary, is purely defensive. The regulations with
regard to manoeuvres prescribe its employment in re-
treats ; but, as it requires level ground, its application
is often limited.

CHECKER-FOEMATION.

8d. Bat. 1st. Bat.

I \ I I

4th. Bat. 2d. Bat.

I I I I

The advantage of this formation consists in allow-
ing the force to retreat in successive portions, oblig-
ing the enemy, meanwhile, to remain in a position
parallel to the line of battle ; its disadvantage is, that
it offers feeble resistance to cavalry, which can easily
enter between its several parts.

In this order the odd battalions (1st, 3d, etc.) oc-
cupy the first line, nearest to the enemy, and the
even ones (2d, 4th, etc.), the second line.

9. liigbt Infantry. — All light troops, at the pres-
ent day, are regularly organized, and have a system
of tactics ; even Austria has decided to methodize her
Croatian and Tyrolean Chasseurs.

92 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

la France, tlie light infantry is composed of tlie
chasseurs a lyied^ who are accustomed to performing
their manceuvres at the double-quick pace (^jpas gym-
nastique), and running ; they are drilled in all kinds
of leaping; are formed in two ranks, and always
fire at will. They are all armed with the rifled
carbine,^ whose extreme range, upon masses, is as
great as 1,300 metres (over 1,400 yards), and they
are trained to great accuracy of aim. The battalions
of chasseurs a pied are created for outpost service, and
that of skirmishers. In their evolutions they follow a
special system, established by the ordinance of July
22, 1845. Their organization is, in one respect, pecu-
liar : in each company, placed in two ranks, an odd
file and its adjacent even file together form a group
of four men, who are designated by the name com-
rades of battle {camarades de combat) ; the company
deploys as skirmishers, and rallies hy fours. Upon en-
countering foraging cavalry, the rally by fours takes
the place of the rally upon the reserve ; each group
of four men assumes a radiated formation, in which,
placing their right feet together, the four men mutu-
ally support each other;

DEPLOYED GEOUP. EALLIED GEOUP. J rr i

1 and each, taking the posi-

i 1 i i -^ J^->. "ti^^ ^^ charge bayonets,

fires from the place he oc-
cupies, without moving his
foot. We give a view of the rallied group seen in
perspective, in order to illustrate more clearly the re-
spective position of the four comrades.

* By a recent decision the Zouaves are also furnished with tliis arm.

INFANTRY FOKMATION AND TACTICS. 93

In com'bats of skir- «^^^^^° «^«^^' ^^ perspective.
mishers, besides tlie sig-
nals given by tlie bugle,
wliicli may often fail to
be heard in consequence
of the firing, or a con-
trary wind, the officers
and non - commissioned
officers are authorized to
use a whistle, to communicate with their men.

The selection of suitable men to form the best
light infantry, is a matter of some importance. The
recruits should be quick of hearing, keen-sighted, light-
footed, and clear-headed. In France, we find these
several qualities best combined in the inhabitants of
the mountainous and forest-covered departments.

The light infantry soldier requires more time for
his instruction than the soldier of the line ; for both
his physical and intellectual faculties must be de-
veloped with the greatest care. He must be taught
to climb, to run, to leap a barrier, or a brook, and to
scale a wall or an escarpment. He will be instructed
in the method of reconnoitring a piece of ground, ex-
ploring a copse, and examining a house, a farm, or a vil-
lage. He will learn what kind of obstacles may serve
as covers, how they are to be occupied ; and, in short,
how to see without being seen. One of the Russian
writers even requires that he should be taught some-
thing of topography. Moreover, his quickness of sight
is to be cultivated, and accuracy of aim imparted, by
frequent target practice. It is only by this detailed

94 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

instraction of eacli soldier, that light infantry can be
formed fully able to discharge the service required of it
in war— a service which embraces watching the move-
ments of the enemy, reconnoitring, beginning and fin-
ishing combats, covering retreats, escorting convoys,
giving secure repose to the troops by performing pa-
trol duty in advance of and about them, acting as
flankers, advance guards, etc.

10. Skirmisiiers. — Before closing this chapter, we
must say a few words more, especially in relation to
the branch of infantry designated as skirmishers.

All soldiers fighting dispersed or scattered, are
called skirmishers, whatever may be the object they
have in view. A body, detached as skirmishers, al-
ways leaves a reserve of one third of its force in the
rear of the point upon which it spreads, as a centre
upon which to rally.

Those soldiers make the best skirmishers who de-
velop the instinct of the chasseur and the partisan, in
taking advantage of peculiarities of the ground, and
employing judicious ruses.

The skirmisher, unless covered by the broken
character of the ground, should not stand still while
loading his piece ; and, when necessary, he should lie
flat upon the ground, to avoid the fire of the enemy.
The battalions of chasseurs a])ied^ who take the place
of our former light infantry, will furnish the best skir-
mishers ; nevertheless, we should add that in France
even the soldier of the line may be used for this ser-
vice, for which he is well fitted by his vivacity of
spirit, his activity, and his skill.

INF^VOT^EY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 95

There are three classes of skirmishers : skirmishers
of march, skinnishers of battle, skirmishers en grande
bande,

Shirmisliers of march, — These skirmishers perform
the duty of reconnoitring on the flanks and on the
front and rear of columns in march ; of giving warning
of the approach of the enemy ; of masking the move-
ments and formations of the troops ; of skirmishing
against the enemy, in order to gain time for making
defensive dispositions. When the two parties are
marching at a short distance from each other, as, for
example, in a pursuit, both throw out skirmishers,
and the result is a petty warfare. These skirmishers
necessarily travel two or three times as far as the col-
umns, and that over the most broken parts of the
ground, thus rendering their duty extremely arduous.
They must, therefore, be frequently relieved, and, con-
sequently, must not be detached in too great numbers.

Sldrmisliers of hattle. — ^When two bodies or two
annies are drawn up in line face to face, each detaches
upon its front a line of skirmishers, designed to drive
back the advanced posts of the adversary, and to try
the strength of his position. If allowed to approach,
these skirmishers should harass the enemy by well
arranged attacks, which can be met only by the skir-
mishers on the other side. However, it is rare that
anything decisive results from the action of skirmishers
on either side, since they generally neutralize each
other ; and this is a reason why, in this case alone,
they should not be detailed in greater numbers than
are actually necessary to repel those of the enemy.

96 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

SUrmishers en grande hande. — The chief business
of the fii'st class of skirmishers is to see^ and to give
warning ; that of the second class, to initiate the com-
bat ; that of the third, to cany a position, that is, to
perform the real business of war. The distinction be-
tween them is thus distinctly marked. The employ-
ment of skirmishers en grande hande occurs as far back
as the sixteenth century ; they w^ere used by Coligny,
Montluc, and Henry IV. Disused during the seven-
teenth century, they were again revived by the wars
of the Kevolution ; and this is not surprising, as their
action is especially appropriate in the case of intrepid
though imperfectly drilled troops.

If a formidable position is to be captured, instead
of approaching it by the front, at the risk of great
loss, skirmishers will be thrown upon the flanks —
either a battalion, a regiment, or even a whole brigade
— whilst a body of troops, drawn up in column be-
yond the reach of the artillery, menaces the front of
the position. These skirmishers eri grande hande,
climb the slopes, surmount obstacles, assail the posi-
tion in flank or rear, and, having arrived within mus-
ket range, rush with the bayonet upon the defenders,
who, held in check on the front, are obliged to retire.

As examples of the employment of skirmishers en
grande hande, we may cite the battle of Jemmapes
(November 6, 1T92), when they were used with suc-
cess by Dumouriez ; and the battle of Hanau (Octo-
ber 30, 1813), in which there were at one time more
than 5,000 French skirmishers engaged in the great
forest, two leagues from the town.

CHAPTEE THIED.

HISTOEY OF CAVALEY.

We shall liei:e be more brief than in the history
of infantry; and shall treat the subject under three
heads only : antiquity, middle ages, and modern times.

1. Antiquity. — As the military art had its origin
in Asia, a country abounding in arid plains, where
manceuvres even of chariots were easy, mounted com-
batants at first prevailed. "War chariots appeared first,
because the art of guiding horses in harness presents
fewer difficulties than equitation ; cavalry proper is
of later origin.

Mounted upon the platform of a car, the warrior
overlooks the field of battle, has the free use of his
arms (the horses being managed by a driver), and can
strike his adversary as he comes suddenly upon him.
This method of combat was well suited to warriors
who were of a select order — warriors d'elite. The
Egyptians and Persians made great use of chariots for
thus conveying the combatants ; but there were also
two other kinds of war chariots : those armed with
scythes, which mowed their bloody swath through
the ranks of the enemy ; and those carrying warlike
machines, which may be said to have composed the
7

98 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

portable artillery of those times. The Greeks and Ro-
mans made but little use of war chariots ; they opened
their lines to let those of the enemy pass. They also
employed against these chariots rows of stakes, placed
along their front, and caltrops.

Mounted horse existed in China more than twenty
centuries before our era. The elder Cyrus was the first
who (560 B. C.) introduced a cavalry corps into Persia.

The Greeks began to make use of cavalry in the
earliest period of their history ; but until the battle
of Leuctra (371 B. C), although they had made great
advances in the art of war, this people were yet igno-
rant of the advantages to be derived from numerous
and well instructed cavalry, and their armies were com-
posed almost entirely of foot soldiers.

The Theban general Epaminondas was the first
who had a just appreciation of the importance of cav-
alry in charging and in pursuing. He, with great
perseverance, trained a body of 5,000 regular , horse-
men, and habituated them to fighting en masse. His
efforts were crowned with success; for, thanks to his
cavalry, he was victorious at Leuctra, and Mantinea,
and undermined the old reputation of the Spartans.

These two victories opened the eyes of the other
Grecian states, and they increased the number of their
mounted troops. Froni that time, improved cavalry sus-
tained a more important part in the wars of Greece.

Two nations of Greece distinguished themselves
by the excellence of their cavaliers : the Thessalians,
whose numerous cavalry contributed to the success of
Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great ; and the

I
I

HISTORY OF CAVALRY. 99

EtoHans, whose renowned squadrons rendered so mncli
service to tlie Eomans in their struggle against Mace-
donia, at the beginning of the second century B. C. The
Thessalian horsemen were invincible when they fought
in line, massed, but were worthless when once broken ;
the contrary was the case with the Etolian cavaliers.

According to the Greek theorists, the cavalry
should be one sixth of the infantry ; and this propor-
tion was adopted by Alexander at the time of his en-
trance into Asia ; for, of the 35,000 men which com-
posed his expedition, 5,000 were horsemen ; but, more
frequently, the proportion observed in the Greek ar-
mies was one eleventh.

The fii^t Eoman cavalry was but mediocre, and
served either on foot or on horseback, according to
circumstances. Subsequently, when they fought alto-
gether on horseback, they were interspersed with foot
soldiers. These vicious methods of employing caval-
ry were not attended by any bad consequences in the
wars of Eome against the people of the Italian penin-
sula, but they well-nigh proved disastrous in their efforts
to repel the attacks of the Gauls and of Pyrrhus.

We may well be astonished at this mediocrity
of the Roman cavalry ; for, in Rome, to be a horse-
man, or rather hniglit^ required the possession of a
certain income. In the social hierarchy, the order of
knights came next after that of senators, and each
knight wore a gold ring, as a distinctive badge.

It was not until the wars with Carthage that the
Romans began to understand how much could be done
with good and numerous cavalry. They enticed into

100 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

their service the foreign cavalry, wMch constituted the
force of the Carthaginians ; and from that time the
face of things was changed. Hannibal had maintained
himself in Italy victoriously for thirteen years, by the
aid of his excellent Numidian, Spanish, and Gallic
cavalry; but when these useful auxiliaries passed
over to the Eomans, fortune deserted his standard.

From this time Eome maintained two kinds of cav-
alry : one composed of Roman citizens or knights, the
other furnished by their allies. The former, which
was attached to the legions, was always mediocre ; the
latter became skilful, and distinguished itself under
the designation of auxiliary cavaliy.

The proportion of cavalry which formed a part of
the legion varied from a tenth to a twentieth ; but at
each epoch the number of cavalry attached to each le-
gion was almost always invariable and independent
of circumstances and localities : a practice to be con-
demned, for the cavalry of an army should be more
numerous in level than in mountainous countries, and
it was not always possible for the Roman consuls to find
at hand all the auxiliary cavalry which they needed.

The cavalry of the Greeks and Romans was di-
vided into heavy and light cavalry: both used the
shield. Tbe heavy cavalry also wore either a helmet
and cuirass, or complete armor ; in the latter case, the
horse was protected by iron plates. The light cavalry
wore the helmet, as well as a small cuirass of metal or
leather. As to their offensive weapons, the heav}'-
armed cavaliers had the sword, the javelin, and the
double-lance, with iron on both ends ; this lance was

HISTORY OF CAVALRY. 101

held at a point about one third of its lengtli from one
end, so that, if the longer part broke, the other part
might still be used. The light cavaliy used the sword,
the javelin, the bow, and even the sling.

The ancients paid little attention to swiftness in
the action of cavalry, and this explains why, in the
formation of this arm, they multiplied the number of
ranks. The Greeks extended their preference for the
deep order to their mounted troops, to which, how-
ever, it is even less appropriate than to infantry.

The Greek cavalry was drawn up in 4, 5, or 8
ranks ; the Thessalians adopted this last depth. As
to the formation of this cavalry, it was sometimes a
square or a rectangle ; sometimes, also, a triangle,
which was the favorite form with Philip of Macedon
and his son Alexander. The triangle, the point of
which was directed toward the enemy, in order to
break them with more certainty,
is supposed to have originated in
the imitation of the figure formed
by a flock of birds flying through c c c c c

the air. The habitual form of ccccccccc

HESSALIAN LOZENGE.

O
C C C

the Greek squadrons appears to ccccccccccc
have been the lozenge, which ccccccccccccc

^' . occccccccccccco

offers the advantage of frontmg ccccccccccccc
on all sides. This form is repre- ccccccccccc

ccccccccc

sented in the annexed diagram, in c c c c c c c

which the chiefs are denoted by c c c c c

the letter a '""

The Romans divided the cav-
alry of a legion into ten turmce, or squadrons ; each

102 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

turma was composed of 30 soldiers and 5 cliiefs ; tlie
wliole drawn up in tliree ranks,

EOMAX TUEMA. .

^ as siiown m tlie annexed figure

occcccccccco (tlie letter o denoting a chief).

cccccccccc Sometimes . tlie turma con-

c c c c c c c c c tained 32 men, and was formed

in a similar manner, in four
ranks. In combat tlie turmse were placed on the front
or the flanks of the legion. The auxiliary cavalry
adopted in its formations either the square, the loz-
enge, or the triangle ; but in every case its depth
was less than amons: the Greeks.

The best among all the cavalry which figures in
the Koman armies is unquestionably that of the Nu-
midians and the Gauls. The latter rendered important
services to Csesar, and maintained its preeminence dur-
ing the period of the Roman emperors, to such an ex-
tent that at the commencement of our era all the
terms of manege most in use were Gallic.

In the latter days of the empire, cavalry increased
beyond measure in the Eoman armies.

The barbarian nations who overwhelmed the Eo-
man empire had but little cavalry ; adhering to their
practice of fighting on foot, they displayed great skill
in that kind of combat. But the establishment of the
feudal system, which happened soon after, produced a
marked preponderance among them of cavalry, which
is said to have composed one half of the armies in the
reign of Charlemagne.

The ancients were not acquainted with the saddle ;
they used, instead of it, skins or housings, placed so

HISTOEY OF CAVALRY. 103

as to afford the rider a firm seat without hurting the
horse. The saddle was invented under the reign of
Constantine ; and this led, naturally, to the use of
stirrups, which could be more firmly sustained by the
saddle than by housings. The invention of stirrups is
attributed to the Franks,^' and their use caused the her-
nias and the numerous diseases of the legs, with which
horsemen were afflicted, to disappear. Besides lessen-
ing fatigue, the use of stirrups enabled the horseman to
remain a longer time in the saddle, and also, by giving
him a point of support, permitted him to give more
certain blows to the enemy. The absence of stirrups
is, indeed, a distinctive feature of the ancient cavalry ;
without them, the heavy feudal cavaliers had perhaps
never existed.

2. middle Age§. — During the middle ages, the
history of cavalry is interwoven with that of the feu-
dal system and chivalry. We are not here required
to treat of chivalry under its political asj)ect ; but
will merely remark that this institution, during a pe-
riod of trouble and general anarchy, powerfully con-
tributed to the suppression of violence and the purifi-
cation of morals ; and that the knights-errant them-
selves^ notwithstanding the absurdities of some of
their number, so well satirized by Cervantes, were
useful to society, for their generous protection of the
weak, wherever they went, was really the only police

* Before this invention the cavalier mounted his horse by the aid of
one of the milestones disposed along the Eoman roads, or else by means
of a projection, provided for the purpose, near the but of his lance.

104 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE AKMS.

whicli could be exercised in tlie rural districts and on
tlie liigli roads.

It was not in the nature of the feudal system to
employ methods of warfare based upon observation
and reflection : the distribution of power, as then con-
stituted, is alone sufficient to explain this remark.
Besides, tactics and chivalry could not exist simul-
taneously ; the fundamental principle of the former
being ensemble^ the emplopuent of masses ; that of
the latter, individual courage, the isolated feat of
arms — prowess.

The nobles who held fiefs owed their military ser-
vice to the king, for a period of sixty days, at their
own expense ; beyond that period, it was at the royal
charge. At the call of the monarch, they rej)aired
to the army, accompanied by mounted combatants
taken from the nobility of their fiefs, and bearing the
name of cavaliers, or knights. Each knight had a reti-
nue armed with the long bow or the crossbow, con-
stituting the light cavalry, whilst he himself, wholly
cased in iron mail, pursuant to the privilege of his
rank, fought in line, face to face with the enemy.

To aspire to the dignity of knighthood, it was ne-
cessary to be a gentleman, to have given proofs of
courage, and to have reached the age of majority.
The induction of a knight into his office was accom-
panied with pomp and ceremony; but, most singu-
larly, this induction took place on the eve of battle, a
practice plainly unjust, and destructive of emulation.
This custom was infringed by Francis I. when he
caused himself to be knighted by Bayard the evening

HISTORY OF CAVALRY. 105

after tlie battle of Marignan (1515) ; Montluc was
also kniglited by tbe Duke of EngMen after tlie battle
of Cerisoles (1544). Any kniglit could confer tlie or-
der of knighthood upon a compatriot.*

The knights were divided into hannerets^ those
sufficiently powerful to raise a banner, and lachelors^
or lower knights, gentlemen less powerful than the
preceding, who carried only an ensign, called a pen-
non, attached to their lance. The force of an army
was estimated by the number of its banners and its
pennons ; the infantry not being thought worth count-
ing. To rise to the dignity of a banneret, the knight
had to be able to embrace under his command 5 or 6
lances, in all 30 or 36 horses.

A lance was the term applied to a small band
formed by a man-at-arms and his attendants, the latter
consisting of a coutillier (so named from the long,
broad dirk in his belt), one page or varlet, and three
archers. The coutillier frequently marched on foot
and conducted the baggage horse ; the page, or varlet,
brought the war-horse to the knight when he was
going to battle, carried his lance and shield, and
guarded his prisoners ; the archers were young gen-
tlemen entering upon the military career, and aspir-
ing to become men-at-arms.

The man-at-arms was covered with iron, when his
fortune allowed it, and wore, as much as possible.

* A case is cited in which an English chief, the Count of Suffolk, at
the combat of Jargeau (1429), knighted the French gentleman, Guillaume
Renaud, before surrendering to him. But, in my opinion, we should not
draw any general conclusion from this instance.

106 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

only armor from Milan. Tlie details of this armor
are as follows : Over a vestment of leather, called a
gamheson, lie buckled on a shirt of mail called a liau-
be7% and over this a cuirass. In addition to the cui-

KNIGHT IN AEMOE.

1. Helmet

2. Gorget.

3. Cuirass.

4. Epaulicres.

5. Brassarts.

6. Gauntlet.

7. Tasses.

8. Cuishes.

9. Genouill^res.
10. Greaves.

rass, the complete armor embraced the gorget, which de-
fended the neck ; brassarts, which protected the arms ;
epauUeres, covering the shoulders; tasses, protecting
the lower part of the body ; cuisJies, for the thighs ; and
greaves, for the legs. Over the whole was sometimes
thrown the sagum (saye), a kind of embroidered

HISTORY OF CAVALRY. 107

doublet, made of woollen cloth {serge or say), A
helmet and a shield, either round, oval, or demi-oval,
completed the defensive armor. As offensive arms the
knight carried the sword, the mace, the battle axe,
and the lance, the latter being about 15 feet in length.
The lance with which the gendarme unhorsed his
enemy was regarded as a noble arm, and was for-
bidden to villains^ or serfs. Upon a march, the
knight did not wear his armor, which would unne-
cessarily fatigue him in advance ; but it was carried
after him upon a horse or in a wagon. For a like
reason, he then rode upon a small horse, called a
courtaud; but on the day of action he armed himself
cap-a-pie and mounted his war-horse, an animal of
lofty stature and great strength.

The French cavalry charged in a single line — a
formation which resulted in part from the tendency
of the feudal lords to consider themselves as equals,
possessing equal rights. This claim of equality was
satisfied by the formation in a single rank, which gave
each knight a free field for attacking the enemy and
displaying his own prowess. The pages, or varlets,
ready to support their chiefs, formed a second rank
behind that of the gensdarmes ; but the latter attacked
alone, which necessarily occasioned successive charges
of a small number of horses.

The cavalry ignored the laws of tactics, and sub-
mitted but little to discipline ; still, such was the de-
fective organization of the infantry, that the former
bore all the burden of war, and not only fought bat-
tles, but also laid sieges.

108 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE ARMS.

Toward the middle of the fourteenth century,
and the beginning of the fifteentli, the expert English
archers and the excellent Swiss pikemen, all foot sol-
diers, frequently forced the chivalry to convert itself
into infantry ; and this lasted so long as armies did
not contain a body of infantry, properly so called,
sufficiently compact to sustain a charge. This was
illustrated at the battles of Poictiers, Cocherel, Mon-
teil, Agincourt, and Formigny. When the knights
dismounted, they often shortened their lances to five
feet, to render them easier to manage, and of stouter
resistance ; they took off their spurs, to use them as
caltrops, planting them in the ground, row^els up.
Moreover, the men-at-arms, with their heavy mail,
made but clumsy foot soldiers; they could march
against their adversaries only by resting several times
on the way. They were obliged to fix in advance the
number of poses, or rests, of which an attack should
consist. It would have been impossible for them to
perform a long march; and when dismounted, they
were compelled to divest themselves of their armor.

After the crusades, chivalry fell into decline, the
principal causes of which were the destruction of the
feudal system, the establishment of the communal
militia, the invention of fire-arms, and the ignorance
and vices of the knights. This decline ended in com-
plete extinction about the middle of the fifteenth cen-
tury, when the modern epoch begins.

3. Modern Times — Dissatisfied with an intract-
able nobility frequently absenting itself from the

HISTOEY OF CAVALRY. 109

rankSj the kings soon began to supplant the feudal
armies by permanent troops more obedient to their
wishes. In the middle of the fifteenth century more
correct ideas of organization, and the employment of
armies, effected a revolution in war, which again be-
came an art.

In France, Charles VII. was the iirst to institute
permanent troops of infantry and cavalry. He suc-
ceeded better with the latter than the former, for the
corps of cavaliers which he created lasted as long as
the old monarchy.

In 1445 he organized fifteen companies of cavalry,
called compagnies (T ordonnance^ each containing 100
lances. Counting six men in a lance, this gives 600
combatants per company, and 9,000 for the whole
body estalished, not including the supernumeraries or
candidates who followed voluntarily, in the hope of
one day becoming full gensdarmes.

Besides the captain, there were in each company a
lieutenant, an ensign, and a guidon, all chosen from
the gentlemen most reputed for valor. There was also
a quartermaster.

Every gendarme had four horses : one for his ser-
vant, one' for his baggage, a war-horse, and a cour-
taud. Each archer had two horses. The gensdarmes
w^ere paid after a review, or muster, held by a spe-
cial commissioner; and the means for that purpose
were raised by a tax called the gendarme tax, levied
upon the people of the towns and the rural districts.

After the institution of these companies, the feu-
dal lords no longer brought their vassals into service.

110 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

Except in the rare cases wlien the king summoned
the arriere-ban^^ the use of banners and pennons
ceased, gentlemen of high rank preferring the position
of captain of an independent company (which con-
ferred a real command) to that of cavaliers.

The companies thns created by Charles VII. were
imitated by the neighboring nations ; but, with the
exception of those of the duchy of Burgundy, the for-
eign companies never reached the excellence of ours.

Upon the accession of Francis I., the French gen-
darmery still formed in a single rank ; a formation
too thin, especially for resisting German squadrons,
which were sometimes drav/n up in squares, but al-
ways in deep order. The depth of these squadrons
was usually seventeen ranks. Charles V. reduced it
to ten, and finally to eight ranks.

This deep formation of the German squadrons re-
sulted from their being composed entirely of the com-
mon people, to whom the reasons which led the
French gendarmery to form in a single rank, and
which we have above explained, were no longer ap-
plicable.

. Fire-arms began to be introduced in the cavalry.
In Germany, about the middle of the sixteenth cen-
tury, they reckoned one arquebusier for every four
lances. They also began to employ special corps of
light cavalry for skinnishing, who, when necessary,
dismounted. They were called chevau-legers when
they carried the lance, and stradiots when they

* Body of arriere- vassals, or inferior feudatories of the sovereign. —
TraiMlator.

HISTOEY OF CAVALKY. Ill

served as scouts. There existed also cranequiniers^
or mounted crossbowmen, wlio used a hook called a
cranequin to draw the cord of their crossbow ; malan-
drinSj mounted soldiers of fortune, armed with a bo^v ;
argoulets, horsemen carrying the escojpette (wall-piece
with wheel-lock and rifled barrel) ; carahins^ when the
escopette was changed to the carbine ; and, finally, re-
itres^ OY pistoliers^ when armed with the pistol.

The origin of dragoons dates also from this epoch,
since history informs us that, in 1543, in the environs
of Landrecy, Peter Strozzi placed 500 arquebusiers on
horseback, in order that they might not he fatigued.
This fact explains how dragoons were at first but
mounted infantry ; and this character they preserved
for a long period, sometimes serving as horsemen, and
sometimes as foot soldiers.

The deep formation of the German squadrons was
attended with little inconvenience in the sixteenth
century, on account of the feebleness of artillery ; and
these masses of cavalry did, in fact, contribute to the
success of several battles. Defeated by these squad-
rons on the days of Pavia (1525) and Saint-Quentin
(1577), the French gendarmery were compelled to
abandon its single-line formation, although the deep
order wounded to the quick the self-love and sus-
ceptibility of the cavalier. From that time a remark-
able change is observable in the organization of the
cavalry. All the European states, France included,*

* In France this adoption toot place as early as 1556 ; but this
power returned occasionally to the single-line formation, especially at the
battle of Saint-Denis, in 1567.

112 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

adopted tlie German formation of eiglit ranks deep ;
tlie cavaliy immediately lost a part of tlie mobility it
had possessed in tlie times of chivalry, when the knights
charged at the fastest gait, and now manoeuvred at a
walk or trot, and made more use of fire-arms than
of other weapons.*

The first deep squadrons were very strong in num-
ber. They rose to 1,500 and even 2,000 men-at-arms,
all equal, all cavaliers without a retinue. Reflection
soon showed how little effect was produced by these
heavy, almost immovable masses. This, together with
the ravages produced in these elevated living rectan-
gles by the projectiles of improved artillery, led to
the reduction of the depth to six ranks. Henry IV.
further reduced it to ^ve ranks, and formed no squad-
rons of more than 600 horses.

Louis XIII., in 1635, organized the companies of
light cavalry into regiments, each commanded by a
colonel. The compagnies (P ordonnance continued to
form the body of the gendarmery.

Gustavus Adolphus made several improvements
in the cavalry, dividing it into small squadrons, form-
ing it in four or three ranks, ordering it to fire only
when very near, and to charge with the sabre. This
new system of tactics struck the Imperials with
astonishment, who with difficulty accustomed them-
selves to it; and yet the Swedish cavaliers still
charged only at a trot. The king of Sweden, to resist
the heavy cavalry of the Austrians, placed companies

* Nevertheless, according to La ISToue, if the reitres charged at a trot,
the French cavalrj of that period sometimes " galloped."

HISTOEY OF CAVALKY.

113

COMPANY OP FRENCH CAVALRY IN
OEDEB OF BATTLE, (1750).

of musketeers between Ms squadrons of horse ; but
this mixture of the two arms has since been aban-
doned as incompatible with the diversity in the nature
and tactics of these two arms.

The cavalry retained for a long time its depth of
three ranks, which it still pos-
sessed at the close of the reign
of Louis XIV., and during a
part of the reign of Louis XV.
The annexed cut shows the or-
der of battle of a company of
French cavalry about 1750.

In the time of Louis XV.,
the armament of the cavalry
was very different from that of
the fourteenth century. Down to Henry IV., the
gensdarmes were still armed cap-a-pie, and their
horses were barbed ; whilst the light-horsemen wore
either simple cuirasses or coats of mail. From the
reign of this monarch, the armor was gradually
simplified, and the defensive pieces with which the
cavaliers were covered, one by one, shared the faf e of
the deep squadrons. Under Louis XIII. the lance
was no longer used ; under Louis XIV. only the cui-
rass and the helmet were retained ; under Louis XV.
the buff-leather vest took the place of the cuirass, and
the sabre-proof cap supplanted the helmet ; helmet
and cuirass reappeared only during the Consulate,
and were worn very nearly as at the present day.

Marshal Saxe paid great attention to the improve-
ment of cavalry, insisting especially that they should

114 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

not charge as foragers, as was in his time tlie practice
of the French cavalry ; but he had not sufficient
authority to produce any important amelioration, and
the reform came finally from Prussia.

Before Frederic II., the Prussian cavalry was neg-
lected, except for parade. They charged only at a trot,
firing with the pistol or musketoon. This monarch,
himself a good horseman, proscribed this routine
method of fighting, and gave orders that, without
paying any attention to the firing of the Austrian
squadrons, his cavalry should rush forward at a gallop
and fearlessly attack them, sword in hand. The su-
periority which this mode of action gave him on most
occasions, confirmed what his genius had foreseen, and
which others stubbornly refused to appreciate ; namely,
that the real qualities of cavalry lie in the charge^ and
not in firing,

Frederic always retained in his army some squad-
rons formed in three ranks ; nevertheless, by the ad-
vice of Seydlitz, he adopted the formation in two
ranks for the greater part of his regiments. Seydlitz
deserves to be considered as the first general of caval-
ry of modern times ; he brought equitation again into
repute, and perfected fencing upon horseback ; then,
starting from this basis, he imparted to evolutions the
regularity, ensemble, rapidity, and certainty which
permitted them to be executed in the face of the ene-
my with the same precision as on the drill-ground ;
moreover, in spite of the opinion of Frederic the
Great, he placed the guide upon the flanks instead of
the centre, an arrangement ever since preserved.

HISTORY OF CAVALRY. 115

The adoption of the formation in two ranks goes
back to the year 1766, and took place simultaneously,
after several attempts, in France, Hanover, and Prus-
sia. It was brought about by the fact that, with
the rapid gait recently adopted, the second rank
could not keep a sufficient distance, unless the third
rank remained in the rear, or even halted; in which
case it became useless. The result of trials was that
in two ranks the movements of cavalry were both
more rapid and more precise.

The formation in two ranks did not become
general in Europe until 1790. The Austrians* and
the Russians were the last to adopt it. Since that
time, cavalry has advanced in the science of manoeu-
vres and the tactics of battle, and its progress has
rendered it formidable. The campaigns of the Revo-
lution and of the Empire have definitively established
its formation in two ranks.

There is, besides, an essential difference between
the cavalry of the nineteenth century and that which
existed at the close of the eighteenth century ; the
uniform of the horsemen at the present day is loose,
and the burden canied by the horse is equally dis-
tributed before and behind.

Let us now proceed to consider the details of the
present formation and tactics of cavalry.

* It even appears that the official adoption in Austna only took place
in 1806, upon the recommendation of the Archduke Charles.

CHAPTER FOURTH.

CAVALRY FOEMATION AND TACTICS.

1. Use of Cavalry. — In mounting on horseback,
tlie soldier sacrifices several advantages to gain speed :
thus lie can no longer make an efficacious use of
his fire-arms, and all are an obstacle to him. It
is in rapidity, then, that his strength chiefly consists :
we do not say wholly consists, for boldness is a qual-
ity equally indispensable to him.

The ordinary use of cavahy is to complete a suc-
cess prepared or obtained by infantry, assisted by ar-
tillery ; it is, consequently, an accessoi^y arm. To ac-
complish this end, it must rout the already broken
masses of the enemy, and then pursue them. To pro-
duce a rout, cavalry must take the initiative, and at-
tack at the propitious moment.* Indeed, the offensive
is its only practicable mode of combat; for, if it
awaits the enemy, it will be infallibly overthrown
by the velocity of its adversary, if cavaliy,f and by

* At Marengo, the prodigious effects of the vigorous and timely charge
of General Kellermann with his 400 horse would have been lost if he had
charged but three minutes later.

t At Guada-Hortuna (Spain), July 25, 1823, 1,200 Spanish horse,

CAVALKY FOEMATIOIS- AND TACTICS. 117

amount of its fire, if infantry. For this reason
Frederic* and Napoleon wished their cavalry to at-
tack continually ; but in attacking, the great matter
is to seize the opportune moment, whence the designa-
tion applied to cavalry of arme du moment.

From the twofold use of cavalry, routing and pur-
suing, results the division of this arm into at least two
kinds : the one, adapted for the charge, composed of
men and horses of great stature, provided with defen-
sive armor — ^this is the heavy cavalry ; the other, for
the pursuit, composed of smaller men and horses,
wearing no armor — this is the ligTit cavalry. Between
these extremes there is an intermediate species —
mixed cavalry — employing men and horses of a medium
height which takes the place, in case of need, either
of the heavy or of the light cavalry ; and when it ac-
companies these in war, serves to save the former from
unnecessary fatigue, and supports the latter by giving
it greater solidity.

The heavy cavalry embraces the carahiniers and
the cuirassiers. Its business is to appear upon the
day of hattle and mahe decisive charges^ as was done
at the battle of Austerlitz by a corps of 4,000 French
cuirassiers. It may, in case of need, be employed to
sustain light cavalry ; but this must be done in mode-
ration. Heavy cavalry should be saved from unne-

having awaited a charge, were overthrown by 450 French horse, com-
manded by General Bonnemains.

* This monarch said, at the beginning of the Seven Years' "War : " C'est
le diable que mes officiers n'agissent que defensivement, mais j'y mettrai
bon ordre, u quoi il a bien r6ussi." ("Warnery, Commentaires sur Ttcrpin
et MontecuculU.)

118 IIISTOEY AISTD TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

cessary fatigue, even on a marcli ; but on tlie field of
battle, it will be charged with the most perilous
duties.

The dragoons, theoretically speaking, now compose
all the mixed cavalry; for they only wear a sin-
gle piece of defensive armor, the helmet. For a
long time the dragoons were intended to fight both
on foot and on horseback. A consequence of this
ambiguity of character was a total loss of confidence
in themselves, which made them indiiferent troops.*
At the present day they are exclusively horsemen.
Being better mounted than the light cavalry, they
support the chasseurs and hussars against the numer-
ous cavalry of the enemy, fight the dragoons with
equal arms, and can even measure themselves, with
some chance of success, against cuirassiers, whom they
surpass in lightness. Since dragoons have become
altogether horsemen, all the cavalry seems to have
abandoned forever the idea of dismounting and fight-
ing on foot. This rule should not, however, be exclu-
sively followed ; for there are circumstances in which
a real advantage may be gained by some platoons of
cavalry temporarily dismounting ; as, for example, in
the attack or defence of a bridge, a wood, or a de-
file. "I have seen one occasion," says Warnery,
" where a regiment of hussars were surprised and beaten
in their camp, because they had been refused 30 foot

* "When engaged as foot soldiers, it was difficult for them to regain
their horses in case of defeat ; as is illustrated in the case of the 14
squadrons of French dragoons sent to retake the village of Franquenies
at the commencement of the battle of Eamillies (May 23, 1706).

CAVALRY F0RMATI0:N^ AIS^D TACTICS. 119

soldiers to defend a deiile." In a reconnoissance
amono" the mountains around Hostalrich, in 1808,
Gouvion Saint-Cyr, having fallen into an ambuscade
of guerillas, would have been destroyed, had not his
dragoons dismounted, and rapidly scaling the heights,
in spite of their heavy boots, put the Spaniards to
flight.

The light cavalry embraces the chasseurs, the has-
sarSj and the lancers. The chasseurs and the hussars
have, however, the same kind of horses, the same
weapons, the same n^thods of combat ; they are,
therefore, but varieties of the same arm. They are
employed to give security to the army, by forming
advance-guards, flanking marches, protecting evolu-
tions, masking reconnoissances, and covering retreats.
These various duties, at all times necessary, are those
for which their light and agile horses especially fit
them. The lancers, besides rendering similar services,
are especially useful against confused masses, and in
pursuits. At the present day there is no longer any
irregular cavalry either in France or in other nations.
Austria has consolidated her Hungarians and Croats,
who now fight in regular formations and in line : even
Kussia has begun to systematize the Cossacks.*

* We may here quote a singular remark of Count Heraclius de Polig-
nac, who had been a colonel in the Russian service. This officer has
said: "The Cossacks have great military knowledge, ride excellent
horses, and understand the art of defending themselves ; bnt they have
not that elan, that ardor of attack, which is almost always crowned with
success. The Cossacks charge boldly only upon fugitives, or when they
are sure of being at least ten to one." (See the preface to his translation
of General Davidoff's Essay on Partisan War/are, 1841.)

120 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

2. Armament — ^Tlie use to whicli cavalry is ap-
plied necessitates special kinds of dress and arma-
ment. The jacket, wide trowsers, and tlie long sabre
are proper for all kinds of cavalry. The kelmet is in-
dispensable to tlie heavy cavalry and dragoons ; and
the cuirass (of the model of 1826, which is proof
against musket balls at the distance of 40 yards) is
also necessary to the heavy cavalry. The lance is an
excellent arm, and both the light and the mixed cav-
alry of several foreign nations are now wholly armed
with it ; its use is indeed spreading, and may occasion
modifications in the armament of infantry. Fire-arms
are useful to cavalry only when serving on detach-
ments and as skirmishers.

3. Numerical Data. — The numerical relation of
the cavalry to the infantry has been very variable.
It depends upon the character of a people, and the
facilities for the supply of horses which the country
affords. As a general rule, however, we may say that
when the army is to operate in a level country, the
number of its cavalry should be one fifth tl^at of its
infantry; but only one tenth when in mountainous
regions. The weight carried by cavalry horses in
France is as follows :

Chasseurs
Cuirassiers. and Hussars.

Horseman, about, 176 pounds. 143 pounds.

Horseman's arms, 32 " 18 "

Horseman's equipment, 24 " 24 "

Horse equipment, 51 « ^ 49 "

Spare shoes, 4 « 4 «

Utensils, 2 days' provisions, 2 rations oats, 22 " 22 "

Total, 309 " 251 "

CAVALRY FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 121

The horse of a carabinier carries about ^j\ lbs.
more than that of a cuirassier, and the horse of a dra-
goon 22 lbs. more than that of a chasseur or a hussar.
All these numbers will be increased some 6 or 8 lbs.
in wet weather, on account of the increase in weight
of the horseman's cloak ; and the same increase is to
be allowed when the cavalry is obliged to carry hay
or straw in addition to the oats included in the pre-
ceding table.

A horse travels, in a minute :

At a walk, about 110 to 120 yards

At a trot, " 220 " 240 "

Atagallop, " 330 " 380 "

If we take the first of these numbers for each gait,
we see that the trot is about twice, and the gallop
about three times as fast as a walk.

When the horses are in a body, they have less
freedom of movement, and accidents of the ground
impede them more ; consequently, a column of cavalry
will not march as rapidly as a single horse. With
the weight above given, a column can make as much
as 3 1 miles per hour at a walk, and 7i miles per hour
at a long trot.

4. Tactical Unit. — ^The tactical unit of cavalry
is the squadron, which, being' composed of a much
smaller force than the battalion, seldom fights sepa-
rately, as the latter does. The French squadron is
usually composed of 4 platoons, forming together 48
files. The following is its figure in order of battle ;

122 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

SQUADRON OF CAVALKY IN OEDEE OF BATTLE.
2(1 L. Cd 8. L. C. C. 1st S. L. 1st L.

a a fl a a

mtmmmmmmmmmmmm
i i 5 i ^

2dC.

The shaded spaces represent the non-commissioned
officers. "We see by this figure that the captain com-
manding the squadron is in the centre, the crupper of
his horse one yard in front of the heads of the horses
of the first rank. The second captain is three yards
in the rear of the centre of the squadron; he is
charged with the alignment of the second rank, and
of the file-closers. The 1st lieutenant' commands the
1st platoon ; the 2d lieutenant the 4th platoon ; the
1st sub-lieutenant, the 2d platoon; the 2d sub-lieu-
tenant, the 3d platoon. Each of these officers is placed
in front of the centre of his platoon, the crupper of his
horse at a distance of one yard in front of the heads
of the horses of the first rank.

Each horse occupies 1 metre (39 inches) in breadth,
and 3 metres (nearly 10 feet) in depth. The front of
the squadron, therefore, occupies a space of 52 yards,
and that of a platoon 13 yards. The two ranks are
at a distance of one yard, measured from the heads
of the horses of the second rank to the cruppers of the
horses of the first.

The oldest troops in each platoon are placed in the
front rank, and from right to left in each rank.

CAVALRY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 123

The minimum effective force of a squadron is 48
files ; tlie maximum is 64 files — a number wliicli ad-
mits of easy subdivision. Within the limits of 48 and
64 files, the squadron combines all the conditions re-
quisite for manoeuvring and fighting with order and
facility. Whatever may be its effective force, the
squadron is always divided into four platoons. When
several squadrons are drawn up in line, the intervals
between them are each equal to one fourth of the
front of one of them.

The squadron is now formed in two ranks. .Only
the front rank can strike the enemy ; nevertheless the
rear rank has its use, and should be preserved : 1st,
because it supports the front rank, and increases its
moral force ; 2d, because it fills the voids occasioned in
the front rank ; 3d, because it fights as well as the
front rank in case of a melee — a rare case, in which it
is wxll to have as large a number of horsemen as
possible gathered upon the same point; 4th, and
finally, because it compels the front rank to march
more correctly. It is only in exceptional cases, there-
fore, that cavalry may be drawn Tip in a single line,
and then there should be some fall files on the flanks
of the squadrons ; it may be done as a ruse, to deceive
the enemy as to its real force ; but even then, to do it
safely, there should be no danger to be apprehended
from the attack of vigorous cavalry. The formation
in three ranks has been abandoned, because it did not
allow the middle rank sufficient freedom and quick-
ness of movement, and disorder was not so easily
remedied.

124 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

5. Manoeuvres.— As tlie length occupied by the
horse is three times his breadth, the horseman cannot
make apwot-tuTn in his place in the rank, as the foot
soldier can, for he is wedged in the rank ; and we
shall presently see why it should be so. In order to
bring a troop of cavalry promptly by the flank, and
with a depth of column equal to the front in line,
it was necessary to devise the movement called
the movement hy fours, which is executed either to
the right or the left, and gives a front of 8 horsemen.
In this movement, the object of which is to gain
ground to the right (or left), at the command " To tlie
right (or left) hy fours^'' each group of 4 men, in each
rank, wheels by itself upon a fixed pivot. The move-

MOVEMENT BY EOUES.

>
>
>
>

\ ■ >
\ >
\ >

ment being completed, the four horses of the rear rank
in each group of four files are found at the right of
those of the front rank.

Cavalry also breaks by fours in making an ad-
vance diagonally. These oblique marches, and the
movements by fours, were much in vogue in the last
century, and Marshal Saxe set a high value upon
them ; but they are no longer employed, except in the
elementary instruction of the platoon and the squad-
ron ; in actual manoeuvres, movements by platoons
take their place. The platoons are, then, frequently

CAVALRY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 125

required to wteel ; tlie consequence of wliicli is, that
tlie horses on tlie flanks, always going at a quicker
gait, are more fatigued tkan in the movements by-
fours ; but, on the other hand, in the movements by
fours there are, in a squadron of 48 files, 24 pivots
and 24 flanks, which very much increases the liability
to disorder, and also requires better trained horsemen.

Cavalry, not making use of their fire-arms, cannot
have any lateral action, like that of infantry. In order
to defend themselves, they must be able to post them-
selves facing the enemy, and at a sufficient distance to
give full scope to the horse in charging ; and this is
the reason why changing the front is for them a fre-
quent and indispensable evolution. These changes
of front are, like the other manoeuvres of cavalry,
effected by means of the movement by platoons ; but
as the obstacles of the ground or an unforeseen attack
may often paralyze the manoeuvre, it is prudent to
cover the flanks of cavalry.

The ordinary gait in manoeuvres is the trot ; but
the horsemen should also be able to execute them all
at a gallop.

•

6. Mode of Action. — ^The horseman incurs less
danger in war than the foot soldier. He therefore
gains but little training in the field except in the way
of confidence in himself; consequently, he must be
very carefully instructed in time of peace. This in-
struction is always indispensable, and is to be con-
tinued whenever' practicable ; for the great object of
cavalry is to act with ensemhle and precision. Besides,

126 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

the horses are to be trained to the sound of war ; for,
notwithstanding the assertion of poets of all ages, they
are easily frightened and not fond of combats *

The mode of action of cavalry fighting in a body
consists in actual collision, the efi*ect of which is pre-
pared by a charge. The combination of horse and
rider does not form a perfectly dense body ; but we
may nevertheless consider the intensity of the col-
lision of a line of cavalry as proportional to its mass
and its velocity. Hence, to increase its force, the ve-
locity must be accelerated as much as possible, and
its mass increased by forming the troop into a united
and compact whole, by the adhesion and alignment
of the horsemen.

The whole secret of the instruction of cavalry will
therefore be to teach them to gallop in close order and
well aligned^ even under the fire of the enemy.

7. Charge. — The decisive action of cavalry, the
charge, is employed either at the commencement or at
the end of a battle, and as much as possible on the
flanks of the infantry, chiefly when the latter has be-
come engaged. At the favorable moment, and at 300
yards from the opposing line, the commandant orders
sabres to be drawn, and puts his troop in motion at a
trot, to bring the horses by degrees to their work, and
to enable the horsemen to adjust their alignment ; at
150 yards, he orders the ordinary gallop, and at 60
yards the full charging gallop. The horsemen should

' * This is the observation of Mottin de la Balme. See his Tactique
pour la cavalerie, p. 180 to 184.

CAVALRY rOEMATION AND TACTICS. 127

remain united and masters of their movements, not-
withstanding their rapid motion. Thus the progres-
sive acceleration of gait is an important feature in the
charge, and necessary to be observed, if Ave would not
quickly ruin the cavalry ; nevertheless, in case of sur-
prise, when an enemy unexpectedly debouches from
an ambuscade, the charge may be begun at a gallop,
in order to regain a part of the advantage lost by the
omission of the first movement.

In order to make the soldier charge vigorously, he
must be convinced that his officers mean to persevere in
the charge to the last, and that, if it fails at first, they
will lead him again and again to the combat, until it
succeeds ; otherwise there will be indecision and weak-
ness of action. In this resj)ect, the French cavalry is
preeminent ; for, according to reliable testimony, " it
is the best in the world for combat, and always
charges a fondP ^' To this. Marshal Marmont, in his
Memoires^^ adds : " Les Allemands nous sont supe-
rieurs pour Tordre et I'esprit de conservation; mais
pour I'emploi ils sont loin de nous : la cavalerie fran-
gaise, h. egalite de force, a toujours battu la cavalerie
etrangere."

During the charge, the horseman should not fire,
for firing makes the horses restive, and produces but
little effect upon the adversary. As for his arms de
main^ the lance may serve for the moment of ren-
contre, and the sabre will be useful after the collision,
during the very short period of the melee. The van-

* Marmont, Esprit dea institutions militaires^ p. 48.
t Tome i., p. 221.

128 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS,

quished party, however, quickly betake tkemselves to
flight, and there are usually very few men killed or
wounded in a charge.

Velocity of movement and close adhesion of the
horsemen stirrup to stirrup, are the two essential ele-
ments of a good charge, to which the officers should
especially direct their attention — ^the more, since the
men, to avoid being pressed in the rank, are apt to
spread themselves. After all the watchfulness of the
officers, and their own example, a charge not unfre-
quently fails from a very slight cause, as a panic may
be produced in a body of troops going at full speed,
by the most trifling circumstance : for example, the
noise of a ball striking the cuirass of a horseman and
throwing him off, may suffice to produce a failure in a
charge. On this account, cavalry should be drawn
up in two lines, at from 300 to 400 yards apart.
As far as possible, the flanks of the second line should
extend beyond those of the first. With this arrange-
ment, if the first line fails in its charge, it will rally
behind the second, and the latter will charge in turn ;
observing, however, that, to avoid all disorder occa-
sioned by the scattering and retreat of the first line,
the second line is to be formed in columns by pla-
toons, so as to present intervals sufficiently great for
the escape of the fugitives ; which produces the fol-
lowing figure : *

* This figure represents the charge in parallel order. The charge in
oUique order is executed according to the same principles, and is to he
preferred when the line of the enemy is extended, in order to compen-
sate this advantage hy the refusal of one wing.

CAVALEY FOEMATION AND TACTICS.

129

For want of a second line of cavalry, the troop
whicli fails in a charge, will rally behind a line of in-
fantry, which will be suddenly unmasked, to arrest

FOEMATION FOE THE CHARGE.

J::

C^^ U^

IZl

IZI

the enemy by its fire, or behind an obstacle ; but al-
ways beyond the range of the enemy, for the neglect
of this precaution might expose it to certain de-
struction.

If the charge succeeds, the success must be com-
pleted by a pursuit. In this pursuit, the victors
constantly endeavor to gain one of the flanks of the
vanquished party, in order to take them on their weak
point ; or if some obstacle prevents this, they try to
get between the columns of the enemy, and to fight
them in detail : but care must be taken to guard
against retaliative operations, coming from ambus-
cades, the troops of the second line, and the reserves
of the enemy.

In the charge, the officers retain their respective
places in line, except the commanding officer, who
9

130 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

goes to any point at whicli lie judges liis presence to
be most necessary to insure success.

Against artillery, cavalry charges as foragers. By
this term we designate a dispersive charge, by means
of which the scattered horsemen reach their point of
destination more quickly, and suffer less from the pro-
jectiles of the artillery. Whilst the platoons which
arrive first repel and keep in check the troops which
protect the artillery, some of the horsemen throw
themselves upon the pieces, carry them off, or spike
them, and break or carry away the implements, es-
pecially the rammers.

We will add that, against the Arabs, the charge as
foragers should always be used.*"

8. Formations. — Cavalry employs four forma-
tions — order in line^ order in column^ order in ecJidons^
order in square.

Its orders of attack are — in line, in column, and in
echelons. It attacks cavalry in line : it attacks infan-
tryf in echelons or in column : in echelons, when the in-
fantry is deployed, and cannot be turned ; in column,
when the infantry is formed in column or in square ; %
the column of cavalry is in that case a column by
squadrons aif double distance. The attack in echelons

* In the French army of Algiers, the Bpahis form the light cavalry,
and the Chasseurs d'Afrique the cavalry of the line.

t Cavalry has heaten infantry in several hattles, particularly at Ceri-
soles (1544), at Rocroy (1G43), at Fehrbellin (1675).

X In the rain, cavalry has the advantage of infantry, as the fire of the
latter is impaired : example, the battle of Dresden (1818). The use of
percussion arms at the present day lessens this advantage.

CAVALEY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 131

is well suited to cavalry in this, that it allows the
charge to be renewed on several points, and facilitates
the outflanking of the enemy. Moreover, the mutual
protection of the echelons is the more efficacious, be-
cause cavalry protects the ground on its front, within
charging distance, better than the ground it occupies ;
and the successive charges of the echelons succeed
pretty well against infantry by harassing them, and
causing them to throw away their fire precipitately.
The attack in columns against a square of infantry is
directed against one side of the square, if a small one,
or against two angles adjacent to the same side, if the
square is of considerable size. In all cases, with one
or two columns, four or five horsemen thrown forward
are sufficient to make a breach by means of their dead
horses ; and having once gained entrance by this
breach into the interior of the square, the horsemen
who follow sweep down the thii'd rank, and, aiming
at the eyes of the foot soldiers, compel them to raise
their guns, thus rendering their fire harmless.

It would seem that cavalry should have no forma-
tion for defence, since we have seen that it should
never allow itself to be attacked. Nevertheless, in an
exceptional case, it may be drawn up for defence, and
should then be formed in squares. Heavy and even
mixed cavalry, thus formed, may, in case of need, re-
ceive the attack of light cavalry. Thus, in 1813, at
Juterbogk, the division of dragoons of General De-
france formed a square against the Cossacks. The
emperor Napoleon I. without doubt approved of this
method of combat, for he seldom had a regiment of

132 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

cavalry manoeuvred in his presence without ordering
tlie formation in square.

The marching formation of cavalry is the column
by platoons. A detachment on a march should gen-
erally keep the left side of the road, because, in case of
attack, each horseman then presents his strong side —
the right — to the enemy.

The checker-formation, formerly much used in re-
treat, has been abandoned by cavalry, on account of
the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility, in a retro-
grade movement, of keeping the squadrons of the sec-
ond line opposite to the intervals of the first.

0. Sciaircurs. — By this name are designated the
horsemen scattered in front, in rear, and on the flanks
of a troop, to cover its movements or its position.
They are the skirmishers of the cavalry.

They should be selected from the troops who are
armed with guns or carbines. Their principal duties
are to scour the country, reconnoitre the enemy, cover
the preparations for a charge, escort convoys, support
the infantry skirmishers, etc. A body of cavalry, in
retreat, may also throw out a screen of skirmishers,
behind which the broken squadrons may rally. Good
results will be obtained by combining the action of
these edaireurs with the skirmishers of the infantry,
according to the nature of the ground.

The French regulations with regard to the evolu-
tions of the cavalry, fixes the number of eclaireurs at
one fourth the number of the troop from which they
are detailed.

CHAPTER FIFTH

HISTOET OF AETIXUEEY.

The history of artillery presents tliis particular in-
terest : that it is connected with the highest efforts
and most notable progress of human genius.

The motive force of the projectile-machines of anti-
quity, of which the halista, the onager^ and the catapulta
are Lest known, were either weights, or springs made of
cords of hide or sinew, raised or stretched by a wind-
lass or levers, and suddenly abandoned to the effect
of gravity or elasticity.

CATAPULT.

These machines, constructed almost wholly of
wood, carried upwards of 1,000 yards, and the strong-

134 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

est threw projectiles weighing from 600 to YOO pounds.
Besides stones, tliey threw arrows, beams, red-hot
balls, and fire-pots.

As they were transported with armies, they corre-
sponded to our field pieces. The Greeks, excepting
Alexander the Great and his successors, made but lit-
tle use of them. The Komans, in the time of the Ee-
public, employed them only for the defence of their
camps ; under the Empire, they ventured to take them
with their armies. These machines multiplied as the
courage and military skill of the Komans declined,
and in the legions of the Lower Empire there were
even as many as 11 machines to 1,000 men. Thus,
also, Frederic II. and Napoleon I., at the close of their
reigns, increased the number of their pieces of artillery
in the armies which were composed of young soldiers.
This coincidence proves, that, from the introduction of
projectile machines, the number of them^ required has
always been the greater the poorer the troops.

The ancient machines were put liors du comhat by
setting them on fire, or else by cutting the cords and
springs — a manoeuvre corresponding to our spiking
of guns.

The first kings of France took into their service
the projectile machines captured from the enemies'
legions, but their people were ignorant of the art of
using them, and considered their employment as dis-
honorable, for which double reason balistics were of
little service to them, and began to decline under their
successors. This decline stopped under the reign of
Charlemagne; but after this great emperor, it con-

HISTOEY OF ARTILLERY. 135

tinued, and the balistic art soon perislied, with all the
arts, in the midst of the feudal system. During the
Crusades, both parties made use of projectile machines
of the ancient kind. Philip Augustus brought them
back to France (1191). They were perfected in the
thirteenth century, and the onager and catapult re-
appeared, under the names of ^erriere and man-
gonneau.

Several of these machines were of enormous di-
mensions, and required a great quantity of wood in
their construction ; moreover, if they threw very large
masses they could not give them great velocity ; but
notwithstanding these inconveniences, they were pre-
served for a long time after the invention and use of
the first cannon, with which they competed during
nearly two centuries.

Many persons still attribute the invention of gun-
powder to that celebrated English monk Koger Bacon,
who astonished the world by his great scientific discov-
eries in the thirteenth century ; nevertheless, powder —
that is, the mixture of saltpetre, sulphur, and charcoal —
was known, several centuries before our era, to the
Chinese, who employed it in the manufacture of various
fire-works, which they put into tubes, and thus formed
what we should now call fuses. The knowledge of
powder was gradually transmitted to the people of
Asia, through India and Persia, and at last to the
Arabs, who communicated it to the Greeks of the
Lower Empii^e ; and a recent opinion is, tliat the fa-
mous Greek-fire of the last-mentioned people, was
nothing more than an incendiary composition made of

136 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF TIIE SEPARATE ARMS.

gunpowder. Tlie invasions of the Arabs, and espe-
cially tlie Crusades, introduced a knowledge of gun-
powder to the people of western Europe ; and tlie
great number of European claimants to the invention
of this agent of war (the English Roger Bacon^ the
German ATbertus Magnus^ Bertliold Schwartz^ Con-
stantin Anklitzen^ etc.), evidently indicates that the
epoch was ripe for the invention : that is, this inven-
tion was but the reproduction of a thing already in
existence, but of which only confused and vague ideas
were entertained, diffused throughout Europe by the
crusaders returning to their homes.

But if Europe can no longer lay claim to the in-
vention of gunpowder, she is still justly entitled to
that of fire-arms, with which neither the Chinese, nor
the Indians, nor the Persians, nor the Arabs were ac-
quainted before ourselves ; these ancient people being
indeed acquainted with powder, but ignorant of the
fact that it could be used to project heavy masses to
a distance. This point seems now to be established
in favor of our science.

The obscurity of the chronicles of the middle ages,
and the confusion of names, make it difficult to ^x
the precise epoch when the projectile property of
powder was discovered, and when the first cannon
were introduced. It appears, however, that their em-
ployment in war does not go back beyond the four-
teenth century. In fact, the earliest mention of can-
non appears to be that of instruments in the form of
funnels, or vases, used by the Genoese in 1319.

The first field artillery differed little from the port-

HISTORY OF ARTILLERY.

ISY

BOMBAKD.

able fire-arms, and was frequently mounted upon sta-
tionary frames, for wliicli wheels were afterward sub-
stituted. .

The cannon called vases were, from their form,
capable of throwing large stones ;
they soon received the name of
homlards. The annexed figure
shows the nature of their con-
struction.

Bombards soon increased
their proportions, and at the end
of the fourteenth century must
have obtained remarkable length
and weight ; for we find mention
of one 50 feet long, and of another weighing 2,000
pounds.

The ancient machines could not contend against
bombards ; the smallest ball caused their fragile frames
to fly to pieces. They were supplanted by pieces
of ordnance, which, from the year 1376, were em-
ployed to open breaches, and thenceforth were exclu-
sively used (with some rare exceptions) in sieges and
on fields of battle.

The term artillery existed before the invention of
fire-arms. It designated all the arms fabricated by the
artilUer (original form of the word artUleur)^ namely,
balistic engines, bows, arrows, lances, darts, shields,

* The old French verb artiller signifies to fasMon ly art^ and had
nearly its equivalent in the old English verb to artilize, while artilUer
was nearly equivalent to artisan; but its modern form, artilleur^ is re-
stricted to the signification of artillerist. — Tr,

138 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

etc. Masters of artillery commanded the artilUers,
These masters of artillery were cliarged with the fa-
brication as well as the distribution to the army, of
A the new and the old artillery ; they consequently also
\ made fire-arms, pieces of ordnance, powder, balls, bul-
lets, and had under their orders soldiers called cannon"
iers^ instituted about 1411, for manoeuvring and servin^,
cannon.

The first masters of artillery were subordinate to the
grand master of the crossbowmen, to whom they ren-
dered direct account of the matters intrusted to their
charge. But under Charles VII. the master-general
of the artillery, who was chief of this branch of ser-
vice, succeeded in making his office independent ; and
from that time its prerogatives went on increasing
daily.

The first field artillery, considered, so to speak, as
an obstacle^ was scattered about the army, and inter-
spersed among the wagons; it was soon separated
from the baggage and placed on the front or flanks.
Cannon, in those days, produced an especial effect
upon the spirit of the troops by the noise of their dis-
j^ charges ; they increased the importance of defensive
positions, and were employed in secondary operations ;
but, being difficult to manoeuvre and slow to load, they
could be used but imperfectly in an open country.

Louis XL, about 1475, distributed among three
the duties of master-general of artillery ; and profiting
by the experience of his father, whose artillery had
rendered him important aid in the reconquest of his
kingdom from the English, he maintained a large

HISTORY OF ARTILLERY. 139

amount of artillery. During liis reign, twelve pieces of
tlie caliber 45 were cast, wMcli were celebrated under
tlie name of tlie tivelve peers of France.^' One of these
pieces was taken at the battle of Montlheri (1465).

Charles VIII., in 1493, reestablished a single mas-
ter-general of the artillery. His expedition into Italy
exhibits the first important employment of artillery in
a campaign. All the powers, following the French ex-
ample, set about improving their artillery. The definite
foundation of the French artillery dates from this epoch.
Charles VIII. left France with about 100 cannon of
mean caliber ; at Sarzanne his park of artillery was
augmented by about 40 large pieces. It was already
understood how to place these pieces so as to take the
enemy's troops obliquely ; nevertheless, in this expe-
dition, artillery played a more important part against
fortresses than in the open country ; it was fired with
precision.

Under Louis XII., artillery of lighter construction
was introduced, in order to be a less hinderance to
the march of an army. The small calibers became
sufficiently portable to take advantageous positions
during the combat, to compel the enemy to keep at
a distance, and thus to complicate his movements.
This monarch established two masters-general of artil-
lery, one in France and one in Italy.

At this epoch the infantry was often made to
lie down on the ground, to be less exposed to the
balls. The Swiss, in one battle, endeavored to seize

* This name recalls the twelve apostles, which Charles V. had cast at
Malaga for his expedition against Tunis.

140 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

upon tlie artillery of their adversaries, by advancing
as sMrmisliers against the batteries. Under Francis
I. the French artillery was increased and' systematized;
and in its outfit the use of stout horses was made im-
perative. At Marignan (1515), our cannon gave us
the victory. At Pavia (1525), Francis I., after the
success of his right, thinking to surprise the army of
the enemy, advanced at the head of his gensdarmery,
thus masMng the fire of his pieces. This false manoeu-
vre caused his defeat. At Cerisole (1544), French pieces,
by having better horses, amved at their place on the
field of battle as soon as the cavalry. Finally, let us
observe that in the sixteenth century, it was artillery
that arrested the progress of the Turks, and thus pro-
tected European civilization. From a military point
of ^'iew, we may say that the increase of fire-arms
complicated the art of war only for mediocre minds,
while making it more simple for great captains.

In 1543, Francis I. gave to the master-general of
his artillery the title of grand master and captain-
I general of the artillery. The ofiice of grand master
continued without change during the subsequent
reigns. In 1599, Henry IV. conferred it upon Sully,
in whose hands it acquired increased importance;
and two years later, in behalf of this celebrated
minister, he erected it into an ofiice of the crown.
This office lasted until 1755, when it disappeared. It
l^has since been temporarily reestablished, at several
jepochs, but with diminished prerogatives, under the
jname of first inspector-general of artillery.
s The first cannon were only combinations of large

HISTOEY OF ARTILLERY. 141

bars and iron hoops. From the fifteentli and the six-
teenth centuries they were cast of iron, of copper, and
of bronze. The balls employed were also successively
of stone, lead, ii^on, and bronze. As to the guard of
the pieces, — as much importance was attached to their
preservation, they were entrusted to detachments of
the best infantry, that is, to the Swiss, and for want
of them, to the lansquenets (German foot soldiers).

Henry II. adopted five calibers for his ordnance,
varying from 1 to 33 pounds ; Henry IV. added a
sixth caliber of f of a pound, and collected at the ar-
senal of Paris as many as 100 pieces of ordnance — a
large number for that epoch, which is indicative of
the projects of conquest entertained by him at the
time of his assassination. The artillery of Henry IV.,
like that of Henry II., had no limbers ; but the can-
non of 33 pounds caliber had a four-wheeled carriage,
and spare carriages for all the large pieces accompanied
the train. In 1609, Henry IV., reviving the edicts of
Charles IX., forbade the casting of any piece approach-
ing to the six calibers which he had just adopted.

In the battles of this monarch, the artillery, placed
at the extremities of a crescent, endeavored to take
the enemy obliquely, and to flank the whole line of
battle, keeping itself upon the defensive.

About the middle of the sixteenth century we find
the artillery of Protestant Germany possessing great
lightness, and firing with extraordinary rapidity. That
of Prussia also possessed a good and powerful organi-
zation, and later served as a model to Gribeauval.

Gustavus Adolphus reduced the weight of aiiiillery,

14:2 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

accelerated and improved its fire, and adopted the
calibers 3, 4, 6, 12, 16, and 30. His ordnance was
of bronze, of cast iron, and of sheet iron bound with
leather thongs. This sovereign employed it especially
in attacking, w^hereas it had been before used chiefly
for defence. He divided the artillery on marches, and
oTouped it in large batteries on the field of battle,
placing these batteries on the flanks and in the centre
of his lines. He always carried with him a large
number of pieces : at the crossing of the Lech (1631),
he had 12 of large caliber.

In 1634, Louis XHL added two new calibers to
those existing in France under Henry IV., the 24 and
the 12. In the same year bombs were brought into
use by the French, who threw the first missiles of this
kind at the siege of Lamothe, in Lorraine. From that
time, in order to make artillery lighter, the larger cali-
bers began to be left in the rear, and only field pieces,
drawn by four or six horses, were carried with the
army.

Under Louis XIV., Vauban invented ricochet firing
(1688), and specially employed cannon instead of the
mine to make breaches. The invention of carcasses^
an incendiary projectile of ellipsoidal form, belongs
also to this period ; the French used them for the first
time in 1672. In the preceding year, the king had
taken from the Swiss the guarding of the artillery,
and replaced them by the regiment oi fusiliers of the
Mng^ created for that service. The matchlock was
still the ordinary arm of the infantry, and the new
name of this regiment was derived from the fact that

HISTORY OF ARTILLEEY. 143

the soldiers who composed it were tlie first who were
armed with the new muskets (fuslh) with bayonets.
Upon its reorganization, in 1693, the regiment of fusi-
liers of the king took the name of Royal Artillery ;
and this is the proper date of the organization of the
artillery corps. But though the great monarch insti-
tuted, as we have said, the first permanent corps of
artillery, and gave great extension to the materiel of
this arm, no great improvement was made under his
reign : in fact, they persisted in employing the same
kind of artillery in sieges and on the battle field,
without considering that the purpose of this arm is
quite different in these two cases. Under Louis XIV.,
the ordnance generally used consisted of long pieces
of the calibers 36, 24, 16, 12, 8 and 4.

During the reign of this monarch, the number of
pieces of ordnance in the army was increased, as well
as the effective force of the troops. The French had at
Fleurus (1690) 100 pieces ; at Malplaquet, 200. In
this last battle (1709) a battery of 50 cannon, placed
on the French right and loaded with grape shot, put
2,000 of the enemy Iwrs du combat in a single discharge.
By his large masses of artillery, Louis XIV. silenced
Spain and Holland, and made himself master of Up-
per Burgundy and Alsace. In the middle period of
his wars, his artillery rendered him good service in
battles as well as sieges. At the end of his reign, the
artillery, as well as the other corps of his armies, was
exhausted. Turenne still placed his artillery in ad-
vance of his lines : after him, care was taken to dis-
tribute it anion Of the several divisions.

144 HISTOKY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

In 1732, Louis XV. adopted the artillery system
of Lieutenant-general Valliere, and decreed that the
calibers 24, 16, 12, 8 and 4, should be exclusi\^ely
employed in the French armies ; the 24 and the 16
principally for sieges : the others indifferently, either
for sieges or for battles.

We owe to Frederic IL the introduction of horse
artillery (so useful for accompanying the movements
of cavalry), and also the use of howitzers in the field.
This monarch improved the tactics of artillery, and
instead of distributing it on the whole front of his
line of battle, as was formerly done, he combined it in
large masses. He was indebted to this system for
several of his successes. We see him fighting at Czas-
law (1742) with 106 cannon and 3 howitzers ; at Zorn-
dorf (1758) with 117 pieces of ordnance; at Torgan
(1760) with 244 pieces. These are large numbers,
considering the effective force of his armies.

Vaquette de Gribeauval, a celebrated French gene-
ral, who fought for Maria Theresa against Frederic
IL, and distinguished himself at the defence of
Schweidnitz in 1762, was inspector-general of artil-
lery, and carried the science of this arm to a high de-
gree of perfection. His system of field artillery was
adopted in France in 1765, and soon after by all
Europe; and, with some modifications, is still fol-
lowed.

In this system, the pieces, reduced in length and
only of about one half the weight of the old ones, are
mounted on carriages which are at once solid and
light. The different calibers are the 12, the 8, and

HISTOEY OF AKTILLERY. 145

blie 4 ; and tlie 1 was promptly suppressed. To these
must be added a howitzer of 6 inches for field service.

It is to Gribeauval that we owe the use of the
TmuS'Sej by which cannon can be pointed both promptly
and with precision. This illustrious man changed
scarcely anything in siege pieces, but he improved
their accessories ; he invented the garrison carriage,
the use of which renders embrasures unnecessary, and
the coast carriage, by means of which the movement
of ships can be followed while pointing. He fixed
the calibers of mortars at 12, 10 and 8 inches ; that
of stone mortars at 15 inches ; and for these different
pieces he introduced cast-iron carriages.

He divided the personnel of the arm in a happy
manner, by establishing as the unit of artillery force,
the battery of 8 pieces served by one company of
cannoniers.

In the year 1801, the First Consul created bat-
talions of the train, to convey the materiel of the ar-
tillery — a service formerly performed by contractors,
to the great inconvenience of the army.

Under the Empire, the personnel of the artillery
was raised to 60,000 men. Napoleon employed tliis
arm in large masses : thus, at the battle of Wagram,
100 pieces were rapidly moved to occupy moment-
arily a portion of the line of battle. This partic-
ular circumstance taught us the necessity of training
a mass of pieces to manoeuvre with ensemble and
promptness ; and consequently, during the ensuing
peace, attention was paid to drawing up manoeuvres
of one or several batteries. The methods which
10

146 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE AEMS.

were developed had a happy influence upon the last
battles of the imperial period. It is hardly necessary
to say that Napoleon I. placed his artillery in order
of battle as we place it at the present day.

Finally, in 1829, the " Committee of Artillery,'^
taking the English models, adopted a new materiel of
artillery, called the neio system. At the present time,
the siege and other calibers are 24, 16, 12 and 8 ; the
last two, the 12 and the 8, are those of which field
batteries are exclusively composed ; for the new car-
riages, having great mobility, enable us to carry can-
non of powerful effect to the field of battle. The new
howitzers have the length of cannon; those of the
field are of the caliber 24 and of 6 inches ; those for
siege, 8 inches. Mountain ai-tillery consists only of
howitzers of the caliber 12. The mortars have a coni-
cal chamber, and their calibers are 12, 10, and 8
inches ; the stone mortars have a caliber of 15 inches.

The battery is now reduced to six pieces, with
their accessories ; of these six pieces, four are cannon
and two howitzers.

Several arrangements observed in the construction
of the carriages and limbers, give the new system great
mobility. It also possesses remarkable simplicity ; for
it contains but two kinds of carriages, one for the can-
non of 12 and the howitzer of 6 inches, the other for
the cannon of 8 and the howitzer of 24 ; moreover, the
limber of the caisson is the same as that of the piece,
so that the can-iage can be refurnished by a simple
exchange of limber. The wheels are also of the same
size, and can be interchanged.

HISTORY OF ARTILLERY. 147

Another advantage of tlie new system is that the
cannoniers can sit upon the ammunition-chests, and thus
be carried with the piece. In consequence of this im-
provement, the foot batteries manoeuvre, in case of
need, with the same rapidity as the horse batteries,
and the artillery can conform itself to all the move-
ments of the infantry and of the cavalry.

The present French system is sometimes called the
" Systeme Valee,^ after the general officer, since a mar-
shal of France, who is its author, and had already
proved its merits at the camp of Saint-Omer (Sept.,
182T).

This system is now modified, in its materiel j by
the adoption of the 12-pounder cannon-howitzer (Na-
poleon-gun) ; and in \t^ personnel^ by the organization
of 1854, in which existing defects are corrected, and
two important principles established :

1st. The division of the artillery arm into three
distinct branches : light artillery, the cannoniers riding
on horseback ; line artillery, they being mounted on
the ammunition-chests ; and reserve artillery, where
they are on foot. Each is thus enabled to perform its
appropriate functions, the first having to manoeuvre
with the cavalry, the second with the divisions of in-
fantry, and the last to serve in the attack and defence
of fortified places. In preceding organizations, the ar-
tillery-men were frequently diverted from their special
instruction to acquire a knowledge of horsemanship.

2d. The artillery train-corps was entirely suppressed
and absorbed in the foot regiments, forming park-bat-
teries.

CHAPTER SIXTH.

AETILLEEY FOEMATION AND TACTICS.

1. Purpose of Artillery. — ^The purpose of artillery
IS to destroy^ either the troops of the enemy, opposing
artillery, or obstacles ; and by sucli destruction to fa-
cilitate the attack of infantry or cavalry. To accom-
plisli this purpose in a decisive manner, artillery
should act in large masses ; for if it operate against a
line of foot soldiers, it will by this means alone be
able to make large breaches, which will divide the
line into several detached groups, which it will after-
ward be easy to assail and to beat in detail. There
are, however, cases where isolated discharges produce
a useful moral effect upon the enemy ; as, for example,
when a ball carries off some officer, or simply a bearer
of orders.

To accomplish its mission, the artillery must
have recourse to different means, according to the
nature of the object to be destroyed; hence there
are two kinds of ordnance — afield pieces and siege
guns. But in a broken and hilly country, even the
first, which are the lightest, are yet too heavy to
be transported ; and hence there is a third kind of ar-

ARTILLEEY FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 149

tillery — mountain artillery^ carried on the backs of
mules ; whereas the field and siege guns are placed on
carriages drawn by horses.

We have just spoken of the transportation of artil-
lery : this is indispensable, not only on the march, but
upon the battle field ; for, at the present time, this
arm acts not only by its fire, but also by its move-
ments ; while, in foimer days, it was thought that
the purpose of artillery was only to fire from a fixed
point.

It is evident that the different portions of the army
cannot all use the same calibers, since mobility de-
pends upon the weight of the balls. Hence the divi-
sion of field artillery attached to an army, into divi-
sion-hatteries and reserve-latteries — the former com-
posed of light artillery, attached to divisions, and al-
ways in action ; the latter composed of heavy artil-
lery, forming part of the reserve, and, like it, acting
only at the decisive moment, or at the last extremity.

Besides the general service of guns, and the con-
struction of all batteries, the corps of French artillery
is also charged in the field with : 1st, the furnishing
of arms and munitions of war to the army ; 2d, the
repair of arms, which repairs are entrusted to the
companies of armorers ; 3d, the construction and
placing of movable bridges, and crossing streams by
boats.

The artillery, however, is not a self-sustaining
arm ; it needs immediate protection to accomplish its
various objects, and especially when it is engaged in
firing, or in the construction either of a battery or

150 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

a bridge. In fact, if tlie artillery were not supported by
troops of infantry or cavalry, the artillerists would be
obliged, in case of attack, to abandon their special
functions and convert themselves temporarily into
foot soldiers, or into cavalry (according as they were
on foot or mounted), to repel the enemy; which
would often be injurious to the interests of the whole,
.by interfering with their special duty at the most
critical moment. But if the artillery cannot act with
security except under the aegis of the other arms, it
renders them, in return, the most important service ;
and we may confidently assert that it now constitutes
an indispensable accessory in the composition of armies.

2. Numerical Data. — ^The number of pieces of
ordnance of an army depends upon the quantity and
quality of the troops which compose it. It is usually
fixed by stating the number for every 1,000 men.
The experience of our later wars has demonstrated
that we could adopt two pieces of ordnance to 1,000
infantry ; but this number must be regarded as a min-
imuTYi^ adapted to the best troops — for, the more ex-
perienced and inured the soldiers, the less their need
of support. In the generality of cases, three pieces to
1,000 men is a more suitable proportion. Foreign na-
tions have often gone beyond this number ; the Prus-
sians, for example, have employed four pieces of ord-

* A minimum, that is, for the continent of Europe : for, against fee-
ble troops, we come down to a lower figure ; thus, in 1830, in the expe-
dition which conquered Algiers, there was scarcely one piece of ordnance
to 1,000 men.

AETILLEEY FOKMATION AND TACTICS. 151

nance, and tlie Russians even as many as seven, to
every 1,000 men.

As to tlie cavalry, it is usual to support it by
twice as many pieces as would be used for tbe same
number of infantry.

Artillery being always an impediment to long ex-
peditions, it is proper, in fixing its amount, to take
into account its weight in reference to tbe nature of
the ground on wbicb it may iave to act ; especially
as it will be preferable to take a smaller number of
pieces than to be reduced to the dire necessity of
abandoning some of them to facilitate the march.

The supply of ammunition carried by the artillery,
is 200 rounds for each piece of ordnance, and 50 car-
tridges for each infantry soldier.

Each piece, or caisson, drawn by six horses, as in
France, occupies 13 metres (14 yards) of depth in file.
The limber, with six horses, occupies but 10 metres.
The depth of the piece in battery, including the hand-
spike, is 5 metres ; the front of each piece and carriage
is 2 metres.

3. Tactical Unit. — A lattery is the tactical unit
of artillery. In France a field battery consists of six
pieces * which, with the accessories and the cannoniers
necessary to manoeuvre it, produces an eftective of 30
carriages and wagons, 200 men, and 200 horses, suffi-

* The field battery, composed of four cannon and t-wo howitzers, forms
now the exception ; there are no longer any such, except in the reserve
(where they are of four cannon of the 12 caliber, and two howitzers of
16 centimetres), and not even all the batteries of the reserve have this
composition.

152 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

cient to form a single command. Tlie personnel of
this battery is now composed of homogeneous elements,
inasmucli as tlie artillerists who serve the guns and
the drivers who conduct them have the same rank.

Some foreign powers compose their batteries of
eight pieces, six cannon and two howitzers; others,
again, attach to their armies special batteries of howit-
zers. In France they have just adopted, for field ar-
tillery, as the principal kind of ordnance, howitzer-
cannon of the calibre 12 (light 12 -pounder), which
throw either balls or shells, — thus affording the advan-
tage, that the six pieces composing a battery may all
fire at the same time either balls or shells, as required.
These howitzer-guns were proposed by the Emperor
in 1849.*

The French field-battery is divided into three sec-
tions of two pieces each ; f the 1st lieutenant com-
mands the right section, the 2d lieutenant the left sec-
tion, and the adjutant the centre section.

The mountain-battery is composed of six howitzers
of the calibre 12, divided into three sections ; but more
frequently mountain artillery is organized simply in sec-
tions of two howitzers, each section requiring 22 mules
for its transportation : this mode is followed in Algiers.

4. Formations. — ^The field artillery has no defen-
swe formations. In manoeuvring and combating, it

* The new system of field artillery whicli they constitute has been ex-
plained and defended by Colonel Fave, in two pamphlets, published in
1850 and 1851.

t In the battery of 4 cannon and 2 howitzers, the 2 howitzers form a
section.

AETILLERY FOEMATION AND TACTICS.

153

FOEMATION IN COLUMN.

ad^

144 -^^

has three different formations : in columji, in line, and
in battery. We will point out the distinctive features
of these formations for a French foot battery.

1st. Formation in Column. — This formation is that
in which the battery, formed
in sections, has its carriages
drawn up in two files, each
piece being followed or pre-
ceded by its caisson. For a
foot battery the interval be-
tween the files is as much as
12 metres; the distance be-
tween two carriages of a file
is 1 metre. The annexed fig-
ure shows the position of each
carriage and each officer, non-
commissioned officer, and of
the cannoniers in this forma-
tion. The letter c designates
the captain commanding ; the
letter I the lieutenant, com-
manding a flank section ; the
letters ad the adjutant, com-
manding the centre section;
mc the chief quartermaster,

commanding the line of caissons ; m assistant-quarter-
masters, chiefs of pieces ; a artificers, chiefs of caissons ;
t the trumpeter. A foot battery in column by sec-
tions occupies 16 metres of front and 83 metres in
depth. The artillery, like the other arms, employs

\-6-A-6-y,

% — a ^

154 HISTORY AITD TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

the formation in column for manoeuvre, especially when
prolonged. It is used equally for attack and march.

In the march in column, each carriage should care-
fully preserve its interval and distance. The column
of attack is formed upon the centre section taken as
the head of the column, the two other sections being
each in column hy piece^ behind one of the pieces of
the centre section ; a formation which facilitates the
deployment of this column by a forward into line.
It is evident that, for the purjDose of passing over a
narrow road, the whole battery may be formed in
column of pieces.

2d. Formation in Line, — In this formation the
carriages are arranged upon two parallel lines, the

m mi

FORMATION IN LINE.
cl

ad^ Ttii

pieces, limbered up, forming one line ; and the caissons,
each following or in front of its own piece, forming the
second line. The horses of all the carriages face in the
same direction. For a foot battery, the interval be-
tween the carriages is 12 metres ; the distance between
the lines is 1 metre, as in the above figure, in which
the reference letters have the same signification as in

AETILLERY FORMATION AND TACTICS.

155

the figure on page 153. This formation is especially an
order of review ; * yet it may be used for advancing
a few hundred paces, when the ground is sufficiently
clear to permit the passage of a body, which, though
but a single battery, presents a front of 72 metres and
a depth of 27 metres.

3d. Formation in Battery. — ^This formation is that
in which the pieces in line are prepared to fire ; the
pieces, their limbers, and the caissons remain turned
toward the enemy, and are formed on three parallel
lines. For a foot battery, the interval between the
pieces is 12 metres ; the distance between the line of
pieces and the line of limbers is 6 metres, and the dis-
tance between the latter and the line of caissons is 10
metres. The following figure illustrates this formation,

FOEMATION IN BATTERY.

iT"i ■*j[^ i"*!*". \Tt iTi OTk il

<— -/2— >

* On reviews and parades, the order is modified by throwing back the
caissons to the distance of 15 metres from the pieces, and grouping the
cannoniers in a small detachment at a distance of 6 metres in rear of
the muzzle of the pieces.

156 HISTOET AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE AEMS.

wliicli occupies 72 metres of front, and 44 in depth.
The letters have the same signification as before.
This is the true formation of the artillery for combat.
After the firing has commenced, the battery can be
carried, in parts and successively, to more advanced
positions — a movement usually executed by half-bat-
teries, the right half-battery firing while the other
half marches, and reciprocally. In the particular
case where a battery, fully formed in the order in
battery, retires while firing, the limbers and caissons,
after the first retrograde movement, should remain
with their backs to the enemy, in order to continue
the movement more readily.

5. HantBuvres. — ^To pass from one to the other
of the preceding formations, the artillery necessarily
makes use of manmuvres : moreover, it is proper for
it to be able to manoeuvre, in order to participate in
the transformations to which the contingencies of
battle may give rise in the tactical disposition of the
troops which it supports ; and this, both for foot and
horse batteries.

What shall be the character of the manoeuvres of
artillery ? This arm is complex ; it embraces men,
horses, carriages : consequently great precision of
movement cannot be exacted of it. All that can be re-
quired is, that it shall manoeuvre promptly ; and, when
the manoeuvre is completed, that it fire quickly upon
the enemy. It will therefore manoeuvre rather like
cavalry than like infantry ; and, even thus, the presence
of carriages must render the movements somewhat

AETILLERY FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 157

disjointed. This slight inconvenience will be made
to disappear rather by skill in manoeuvring than by
quickness of motion ; for artillery does not admit of a
faster gait than a trot in its movements. It is evident,
indeed, that if it were manoeuvred at a gallop, the
horses, harnessed to such heavy carriages, would soon
be ruined ; nevertheless, in a critical moment, a bat-
tery may, by way of exception and for a short time
only, effect a movement at the gallop.

As we have just remarked, artillery manoeuvres
somewhat after the manner of cavalry ; consequently
it employs for the most part oblique movements and
wheeling, which are adapted to combatants who can-
not follow the compact and right-angled movements of
infantry. This will be readily seen from some examples.

1st. The battery being in column, either at a halt
or marching, to form it in line upon the head of the
column while gaining ground to the left, the command
is to be given to the two rear sections — left oblique
— which oblique movement they continue until, by
resuming a direct march, they will be severally at
their proper interval from the next section on the side
toward the guide ; and then they continue their march
on a line parallel to the axis of the column until they
reach the front of the section at the head of the
column. If they wish to gain ground to the right,
the formation in line is effected in an analogous
manner by a right obliqued The choice of the

* The " TigM oblique {or left) " is performed by artillery at an an-
gle of 45 degrees ; it is, therefore, in reality, a half turn to the right
(or left).

158 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE AEMS. '

side on which it will be most advantageous to form is
to be determined by the ground alone ; for, as artil-
lery now makes no account of inversions in its ma-
noeuvres, it is a matter of indifference whether the
two rear sections are carried to the right or to the
left of the leading section of a column.

2d. To form the column of attack upon the centre,
the battery being in line at a halt, the centre section ad-
vances ; when it has left sufficient space the right sec-
tion oUiques to ilie leftj and comes up in column by
piece in rear of the right file of the centre section ;
while the left section ohliques to the rigJit^ forms in
column by pieces, and takes up its position behind the
left file of the centre section. The formation of the
column of attack is formed in an analogous manner,
if the battery, instead of being at a halt, is marching
in line.

3d. The column being in march, the formation in
line to the right or to the left is effected by a wheel
to the right or to the left, performed simultaneously
by all the sections. To form line on the left or right
the movement is analogous, except that it is performed
first by the leading section, which halts when it has
fully completed its wheel, the other sections wheeling
successively when opposite their proper places in the
line to be formed, upon which they halt and dress
upon the leading section already on the line.

4th. The battery being in line at a halt, or march-
ing in line, may effect a change of front to a line
making a greater or less angle with the former front,
by means of a wheel in line, which is executed by the

AETILLEEY FOEMATION AND TACTICS. 159

pivot-carriage moving at a walk while tlie others pro-
ceed at a trot. It is likewise by wheels in line, fol-
lowed by marcli in line, executed by each battery
separately and in parallels, that in evolutions of sev-
eral batteries combined, changes of front upon one
flank are effected, the other flank being thrown for-
ward or to the rear.

The evolutions of several batteries, of which we
have just spoken, present some analogy to the evolu-
tions of the line of several battalions, taking into ac-
count the essential differences of constitution which
distinguish the artillery from the infantry.

In the manoeuvres of artillery there are neither
general nor particular guides; the direction of the
column or of the line, in march, or while being formed,
is intrusted to the chief of the piece upon which the
formation is made. Since the adoption of the new
materiel^ but one mode of wheeling is admitted in
the movements of artillery, which is that of infantry
on the side of the guide, and is always executed upon
a moving pivot^ the pivot-piece describing an arc
of a circle, to clear the ground where the movement
begins. We must also remark that countermarches
and ahouts of carriages are always made to the left,
because the drivers ride on the near horses.

6. Positions. — ^The term hattery is used not only
to designate the unit of force of artillery, but also any
collection of several pieces upon any determined point
of the field of battle. The choice of positions to be
given to the batteries is not indifferent, for the

160 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

skill of tte gunner would be paralyzed by a bad
location.

An open ground, witli tlie flanks supported, and
slightly overlooking the position occupied by the ene-
my, offers an eligible site for a battery. The soil
should be solid, but not stony ; for the smallest pro-
jectiles of the enemy striking the stones would pro-
duce flying fragments quite injurious to those serving
the pieces. The position should also afford commo-
dious and safe exits, not only for the offensive, but also
for retreat — for which prudence requires that we should
always be prepared. As much as possible, the artil-
lery should be posted so as to see without heing seen^
by concealing it behind some obstacle, provided al-
ways that this obstacle does not interfere with the
certainty and facility of its firing, or with the con-
venience of exit.

The position having been determined upon, the
direction of the line of fire of the pieces is to be fixed
more or less obliquely with respect to the front of the
enemy, so as to produce the greatest damage possible
in his ranks by the angle under which the balls will
reach them. Hence the different names given to bat-
teries. Thus a direct iattery is one which strikes the
front of the enemy perpendicularly, which is de-
structive in proportion to the deptli of the opposing
force ; an oblique lattery is that whose line of fire is
oblique to the front of the enemy ; a reverse lattery
is that which plays upon the rear of a body of troops
already exposed to direct fire — a difficult position to
take, but one which is exceedingly harassing to the

ARTILLERY FORMATION AND TACTICS. 161

torce thus menaced ; an enfilading lattery^ tliat which
fires on the flank in the direction of the prolongation
of the enemy's line — a battery which light artillery
can easily establish w^hen the enemy offer their flank
and thus expose themselves to this most murderous
fire, which not unfrequently occurs in manoeuvring;
a cross lattery^ one whose pieces firing obliquely, cross
their fire ; or, by extension, one which crosses its fire
with another — a very destructive kind of battery, as it
concentrates a large number of projectiles upon the
same point.

When speaking of the purpose for which artillery
is destined, we subdivided field artillery into division-
batteries and reserve-batteries. The former, also called
artillery of the line, because it is permanently attached
to the line, are active from the first to the last mo-
ment of the combat; the latter, destined to sustain
the feebler portions of the line, act but temporarily.
Hence they have two very different kinds of position
in battle. The division-batteries are placed (say 150
or 200 yards) in advance of the first line of troops,
or behind the extreme flanks of the lines. The re-
serve-batteries, in the mean time, keep out of reach of
the enemy's fire, ready to throw themselves quickly
upon any points that may be menaced, or to accom-
pany an attacking force. In battle, moreover, care
must be taken to post the caissons in a strong and
well-sheltered place, as they are constantly needed,
and their preservation is of the first importance.

CHAPTEE SEVENTH.

HISTOKY OF ENGESTEEES.

The history of the engineer arm, as constituted at
the present day with a staff and troops, may be com-
prised in a small compass, for it is not of ancient
origin.

In the sixteenth century, after the invention of
bastioned fortifications, the Italian engineers, reputed
the most skilful, were spread over all Europe ; Cath-
erine de Medicis employed several in the French ser-
vice. At the close of the civil war which marked
the end of the dynasty of the Valois, Sully, having
been made superintendent of fortifications, undertook
to repair the French fortified places then in ruins, and
to consolidate the engineers charged with these works,
calling them ingenieurs ordinaires du roi (this about
1602).

Until 1690, these engineers held their rank in the
arms or staflfe of which they were a part. After that
date, being charged with the coast defences as well
as those of the interior of the kingdom, and placed
under the immediate orders of the Minister of "War,

HISTORY OF ENGINEERS 163

tliey formed- a wholly military corps, and served at
the fortifications, or with armies in the field, according
to circumstances. Under Louis XIV., a prince who
delighted in the war of sieges, their corps was in-
creased ; and from 55 officers in 1688, it grew to 600
in 1697 — a number which it has never since attained.*
Under Louis XV., from 1755 to 1758, the corps
of engineers was, for the time, united to the staff of
the artillery. In the year 1758, when the two corps
were again separated, the military engineers adopted
a uniform, consisting of a blue coat faced with black
velvet ; and from that time, the black velvet has re-
mained the characteristic feature of the French engi-
neer dress. In 1762, the number of engineers was
fixed at 400, and has since varied but little, being
sometimes greater and sometimes less. In 1776 this

* Under the direction of Yaubau, the corps of French engineers ren-
dered eminent services in the long wars of this period, and won in
Europe such a preeminence, that everywhere its usages, its regulations,
its traces or forms of fortifications, and its methods of attack, were fol-
lowed and imitated. It was to reward the whole corps, in the person of
its real chief, both by rank and merit, that the great king gave the baton
of marshal toYauban.

The science of the Attack and Defence of Places made prodigious ad-
vances under this distinguished engineer, who invented parallels, tremcli-
cataliers^ and ricochet-firing. The art of fortifying places felt the power
of his skilful hand ; the demi-lune was enlarged, the bastion perfected,
the redoubt of the demi-lune invented, the tenaille given a more advan-
tageous form, water made useful in defence, and fortifications were ad-
mirably conformed or adapted to the ground. •

The great increase of armies made a resort to field fortifications indis-
pensable ; immense lines were constructed, supported by rivers or the
sea, to protect entire countries ; but the great extent of these lines ren-
dered them weak, for it was impossible to guard them everywhere ; hence
they were almost always forced, and consequently fell into discredit. — Tr.

164 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

corps received the official designation of Corj^s Royal
du Genie. Soon after tlie employes charged with the
care of buildings, fortifications, magazines, dams, etc.,
received the name of gardes du genie?'

* Few changes took place in the French engineers until the Revolu-
tion, when, in common with the other branches of the service, they lost
many valuable officers by emigration, among them Bousmard, the author
of an able work on fortifications.

The number of officers was kept up to 310 in 1791, 450 in 1795, and
371 in 1802, by introduction of engineers from other corps — the ;ponU et
chaussees, etc.

During the reign of the great IiTapoleon, the officers of engineers, who
had, in Germany, more the duty of staff officers than continually making
a war of sieges, found in Spain the opportunity of devoting themselves
an'ew to the art of attacking places.

The engineer arm had a staff of nearly the same strength as in 1802,
having at its head a first inspector-general of the arm, who was a grand
officer of the Empire.

In 1813, when France was constrained, after twenty years of a glo-
rious offensive war, to defend the ancient frontiers of the monarchy, the
staff of engineers, distributed in a great number of fortified places, which
she still occupied in Europe, was found too small to satisfy the wants of the
service. She was consequently obliged (without incorporating them in the
corps du genie) to employ a large number of engineers of ponts et chaus-
sees, and even surveyors.

In the engineers, as in the artillery, the general officers present at
Paris formed, under the orders of the first inspector-general, a consulting
committee, called to give its advice upon the different branches of the
service of the engineer arm : the influence of these committees was then
less than it has been since.

From 1840 to 1846, Louis Philippe, at an expense of 140,000,000
francs, caused to be constructed the fortifications of Paris, consisting of a
continuous bastioned enceinte, or line, and a chain of detached forts, the
perimiter of the whole of these stupendous works being nearly forty
miles. They were designed to defend the capital, and modify the plan
of attack against France. The entire works were skilfully constructed by
the corps du genie, under the direction of Marshal Dode de la Brunerie.

From the first to the second Empire, the number of engineers of the

HISTOEY OF ENGINEERS. 165

As to the troops of engineers in France, the crea-
tion of sa])])ers^ called for by Vauban, dates from
1671 ; tlie first company of miners was raised two
years later. In 1695 there existed one company of
sappers and tliree companies of miners.

Vauban commanded the company of sappers. Mes-
grigny, who died after seventy-two years of service ;
Goulon, subsequently chief of the corps of military en-
gineers of the Empire ; and Esprit, a brave officer, who
fell at the siege of Barcelona in 1697, commanded the
three companies of miners, which remained at first in-
dependent, and were not all finally attached to the ar-
tillery until 1705.* The sappers and miners, from their
creation until the Revolution, constituted at one time a
part of the artillery, at another a part of the engineers.
Thus, from 1759 to 1761, when there existed six com-
panies of miners, each consisting of 6 officers and 60
men, these companies were under the orders of the en-
gineers. It was the Convention that really established
the troops of engineers ; for, in 1793, it took the sap-
pers and miners from the artillery, to assign them to
the engineers. In the following year, the officers of en-
gineers had under their orders twelve battalions of sap-
pers, six companies of miners, and two companies of ae-
ronauts {aer ostlers). The troops of engineers remained
throughout the reign of ISTapoleon I, organized in bat-
talions.f At the restoration they formed three regi-

staff has steadily increased, until Napoleon III., in 1855, fixed them at 460,
of which IGO were superior ofiicers, and 800 captains or lieutenants. — Tr.

* Allent, Histoire du corps imperial du genie., 1st part, 1805, p. 368.

t Of engineer troops in the French army there were, in 1812 : two bat-

166 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

ments. At present these troops also include two com-
panies of workmen, and three companies of sapper-
drivers; one of the latter companies is attached to
each regiment."^

talions of miners ; five battalions of sappers; one battalion of Walcheren
sappers, created in 1811 ; two battalions of Spanish sappers, created in
1811 ; two battalions of the engineer train ; and two companies of ar-
tificers.

The battalions of French sappers and miners had each nine companies,
the other battalions four companies, and the battalions of the train seven
companies, of which one remained in depot. The battalions of Spanish
sappers were formed by Napoleon, w^ho utilized everything, of mechan-
ics selected from the Spanish prisoners. These battalions wore a white
uniform, the others sky-blue, to distinguish them from the national sap-
perg, and served till 1814 with fidelity and bravery. The two companies
of artificers were attached, one to the arsenal of engineers of Metz, and
the other to the arsenal of engineers at Allessandria. — Tr.

* In striking contrast with the ample numbers of officers and troops
of engineers in the French service, is the meagre Corps of Engineers of
the United States, now engaged in the most gigantic revolution on the
page of history. It numbers but three companies of sappers, miners and
pontoniers, and fifty officers, of which latter more than one half are
unavailable as engineers in the field, being engaged in the construc-
tion of one vast line of Atlantic, Pacific and Lake coast-defences, on duty
at the Military Academy and Engineer Bureau, or serving with volun-
teers as generals and colonels. Recently, as the Chief Engineer of the
Department of the Mississippi, in which 150,000 men were in active
campaign, I had not one regular engineer soldier, and but a single oflScer
of the Corps of Engineers to assist in directing the varied operations of
that service, extending over the States of Missouri, Kentucky and Ten-
nessee, and parts of Arkansas, Mississippi and Alabama. — Tr,

CHAPTER EIGHTH.

rUHCTIONS OF THE ENGINEEES.

The engineers, on account of the important ser-
vices they rendered in the great continental wars of
the French Kepublic and Empire, and by the exten-
sion given to their personnel, may be considered as a
fourth arm. The general functions of this accessory
arm are now exclusively military, and are fixed by
the regulations of the French army as follows :

1st. All the works of permanent fortification ; that
is, the construction and repairs of fortified places and
military posts.

2d. The construction and repairs of all military
edifices, such as infantry barracks, quarters for caval-
ry, guard houses, cisterns, hospitals, workshops, bake-
houses, magazines and stables. The artillery is still
charged with the buildings destined for its special ser-
vice : nevertheless, the engineers construct the powder
magazines situated in the interior of works of fortifi
cation, and when finished, turn them over to the
artillery.

3d. The construction of field fortifications, which

168 HISTORY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPARATE ARMS.

the generals in chief or generals of division think
proper to put up in the field, such as breastworks,
trenches, redoubts, small forts, block-houses, lunettes,
fleches, tetes-de-pont, intrenched lines and camps, and
dykes. The engineers also construct ovens for baking
bread in campaign.

4th. The construction, reestablishment and destruc-
tion of roads, in campaign; the opening of certain
thoroughfares : in a word, the various works which in
war may facilitate the march of columns.

5th. The construction, in campaign, of raft-bridges,
and bridges with fixed supports which can be impro-
vised with the materials drawn from the country ;
such as trestle-bridges, pile-bridges, bridges of trees,
draw-bridges ; in short, the construction of bridges for
which it is necessary to saw, hew, and frame wood.

6th. The various works required in the defence or
attack of places, and the reconnoissances connected
with these works.

These functions appertain to them in times of
peace as well as war. In peace, the engineers have
their works executed by contract by workmen drawn
from various localities : for their execution in time of
war, they have under their orders military workmen,*
organized and trained in advance — namely, the sap-
pers and miners; and are also frequently aided by
auxiliary laborers taken from the other arms, prin-
cipally from the infantry.

* The engineer soldiers are chiefly recruited from artificers of wood
and iron, such as carpenters, joiners, wheelwrights, and blacksmiths;
from masons and builders ; and from miners and quarry-men.

FUNCTIOISrS OF THE ENGINEERS.

169

In campaign, tliere is attaclied to each division
of infantry, one company of sappers, which, upon the
war-footing, numbers from 120 to 150 men. In the
engineer arm, then, the unit of force is a company, at-
tended by a four-horse wagon and its drivers. This
wagon carries spare tools, to replace those carried by
the men, when these are worn out or damaged. Each
sapper, besides his sword, which may be of some ser-
vice to him in cutting and trimming light wood, is
also kept supplied with one tool, as a paii; of his
equipment — either a shovel, a pick, or an axe with a
very

short handle, which is

KNAPSACK OF A SAPPER.

placed in a sheath passing
through the knapsack, as
shown in the annexed cut.
In a company of 120 sap-
pers, there should be 40
picks, 40 shovels, 30 axes,
and 10 bill-hooks.

The companies of mi-
ners carry special tools,
useful in working mines.
They usually march with
the engineer tram accom-
panying the army, which, with its heavy auxiliary ma-
terials, travels in the rear, carrying sappers' and mi-
ners' tools, cuirasses, helmets, sap-hooks and sap-forks,
utensils for bridges, a pile-driver and its appurte-
nances, t^YO or three travelling forges, and various ar-
ticles of equipment and re-supply.

The sappers and miners are drilled as foot soldiers

170 HISTOEY AND TACTICS OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

in all tlie manoeuvres of infantry * and in gymnastic
practice. They form, in case of need, excellent infan-
try for disputing a post and figMing in the midst of
obstacles ; but, not to divert them from their special-
ty, they are rarely employed as foot soldiers, and they
usually brave death with their implements in hand,
if the enemy falls upon them while they are engaged
in opening a road, constructing a bridge, or erecting
a field-work.

We will close this chapter with a single observa-
tion. In France the engineer corps is charged with
the construction of those bridges only which require
the use of tools for working wood ; other bridges,
chiefly those which are constructed with suppo]*ts
prepared in advance and transported with the army,
such as bridges of boats or pontons, are intrusted
to the artillery, which is the arm best supplied
with conveyances. The case is different with the
other great powers ; in Prussia, in Spain, and in the
United States, the pontonniers are a part of the en-
gineer corps ; in Austria and Eussia they form a sep-
arate and distinct corps. Several French authors have
expressed the opinion that it would be advantageous
in France to annex the pontonniers to the engineer
arm.

* The engineer troops have retained the old equipment, and are armed
with the musket of the voltigeurs. The total weight of the armament
and equipment carried by a man amounts to about 45 pounds.

PART SECOND.

COMBINATION OF THE ARMS,

CHAPTER FIRST.

OEGANIZATION OF ACTIVE ARMIES.

Tiius far we have considered the several arms
separately, as they are constituted and instinicted
in time of peace; but in war it is manifest that,
in order to afford each other mutual support, they
must be comhined^ and must operate under the orders
of one and the same chief, who will direct their com-
mon action in the way which promises the most
certain victory. Let us, then, see how they are to be
united under one head, or in what manner they are to
be grouped to constitute an army.

1. Principles of Organization. — ^The unit of force
of each of the three arms which fight in line — the bat-
talion, the squadron, and the battery — may enter di-
rectly into the composition of a brigade, and then there
is no intermediate commander between the general of
the brigade and the commandant of the battalion, the

172 COMBmATION OF THE AEMS.

squadron or tlie battery. Witli reference exclusively
to its application in war, tMs is evidently a practicable
organization, and, in fact, it is tliat Avhich exists in the
federal army of Switzerland. But in most countries,
and especially in France, we have combined together,
in order to centralize the administration and instruc-
tion, and also to keep alive discipline, many units of
force into regiments. In the same manner, in the or-
ganization of active armies, brigades are composed of
a certain number of regiments — two at least.

Above the brigade comes the fraction of the army
called a division^ which includes troops of the various
arms, in the proportion required by circumstances;
and usually consists of either two or three brigades,
either of infantry or of cavalry.

The division is to be regarded as the essential
component fraction of an active army; and accord-
ingly, the French regulations respecting .campaign
service declare that, " The division is the funda-
mental element in the constitution of every armyr
A division, in fact, is a sufficiently large body to form
a first separate command in which the generalship of
the officer may be tested and his qualifications for a
chief command may be proved ; it does not require an
expensive staff ; and is, in short, the force best adapt-
ed to the scale of promotion which it is desirable to
preserve in the hierarchy of the general officers. Fre-
quently, the combination of several divisions forms an
army, commanded by a general-in-chief, without hav-
ing larger permanent fractions ; and, in this case, the
chief of the army transmits his orders directly to the

ORGANIZATION OF ACTIVE ARMIES. 1Y3

generals of division. We ^ecj permanent fractions, for
there may exist temporary ones, under tlie names wing^
centre^ reserve; thus, supposing an army to be composed
of eight divisions, it may be drawn up upon a line con-
taining six divisions (two in the centre, and two on
each wing), with a reserve of two divisions ; and then
each of the wings, as also the centre or the reserve,
will form a fraction larger than a division. These
temporary fractions depend upon the general-in-chief,
who can vary their amount according to the number
of troops at his disposition ; and for this reason their
command, equally temporary and variable, is assigned
at his discretion.

The case is different with corps (Tarmee, These are
permanent fractions, established in the organization
of an army, commanded by generals appointed by
the sovereign at the same time with the general-in-
chief. As a general rule, it is more advantageous to
compose the army solely of divisions ; but, in certain
cases, we should resort to the organization in corps
d'armee ; for example, 1 st, when the force of the army
is so great that, in marching in a single column, there
would be an interval of several miles between the
front and rear ; 2d, when the resources of the country,
which is the scene of warfare, are not sufficient to
maintain the army in a single body ; 3d, when cir-
cumstances render it necessary to make a diversion, to
succor an ally, or to operate eccentrically ; in a word,
to act separately, although in the same theatre of
operations.

Thus we perceive that an army may contain the

174 COMBINATION OF THE AEMS.

following fractions, taken in tlie order of their import-
ance : tlie corps d'armee^ tlie wings, the centre, tlie re-
serve, the divisions and the brigades. There are, also
the parks and accessories. Let us stop for a moment
to consider each of these fractions.

A corps Warmee is required to act independently ;
it must therefore be selfsustaining, at least for a
certain time. It is to be constituted in a manner to
give it a maximum of force ; that is, in its formation
it should embrace all the arms, each proportioned to
the nature of the theatre of war, and the kind of
enemy to be met. Corps d'armee composed of a single
arm are an exception. Nevertheless, under the Em-
pire, corps d'armee existed composed entirely of cav-
alry. These did not conform to the condition of maxi-
mum of force, but they were able to retire or to iight
according to circumstances : and when they fought, they
possessed the advantage of a large mass, well suited
to overwhelm the enemy at the close of an action ;
and this is the reason why Napoleon often employed
them : but he finally discovered that beyond twenty-
four squadrons, a body of cavalry loses the qualities
which constitute the chief excellence of that arm,
namely, the power of command, opportuneness of
movement, celerity, and precision in execution.* Let
us return to the ordinary corps d'armee^ which are
principally composed of infantry, with some cavalry
and a little artillery. The force of each corps should
be at least two divisions; but two divisions are ill

* Pr^veil, Commentaires du projet cVordonnance sur le service en cam-
pagne, p. 14.

ORGANIZATION OF ACTIVE ARMIES. 175

adapted to tactical formations, and tliree divisions give
an order of battle upon a single line ; hence four divi-
sions will be tlie most suitable number. For, witli
this number, a corps may be drawn up in order of
battle witli a centre, two wings, and a reserve, eacli
of these fractions being determinate and complete,
under the orders of a chief, with whom it is already
acquainted ; and, thus formed, the corps d^armee will
maintain a stout resistance, in conformity with the rules
of tactics. Moreover, four divisions are well suited to
the formation in checker-form. Beyond four divisions

OKDER OF BATTLE OF A CORPS D'ARM^E.
3d div. 2d div. 1st div.

I I I I I I

Left wing Centre Eight wing

4th div.

I I

Eeserve.

the command becomes too unwieldy, and many details
escape the notice of the chief. Under the Empire the
C(y)ps (Parmee were rarely formed of a greater number.
As to the division, if it be composed of three bri-
gades, it will have an independent reserve not taken

OEDEE OF BATTLE OF A DIVISION.

2d brigade 1st brigade

1 I I

3d brigade.
I

Eeserve.

out of its line of battle, and its tactical formation will
remain complete ; and this composition, therefore,

176 COMBINATION OF THE AEMS.

should be adopted whenever it is called upon to act
separately, or when the army does not contain any
corps d)armee. Some authors have proposed to con-
stitute the divisions unequally, in order to deceive the
enemy as to the force of the army, making it necessary
for them to observe each division individually, in or-
der to judge of the force ; but this trifling ruse goes a
very little way, and it is, moreover, wiser to realize it
by withdrawing some troops out of line and success-
ively annexing them to one or another of the divisions.
If the army is divided into corps dJarmee^ a centre
or a wing will contain one or more of these corps ;
and one or more divisions, if the army is subdivided
only into divisions. The reserve will also embrace
one or more corps d'armee^ or one or more divisions,
according to circumstances. In order that it may not
be a delusive support, by being too feeble, nor ex-
haust the army by being too numerous, it is now uni-
versally agreed to form it at least of one fifth or at
most of one third of the whole army. The reserve
plays a most important part : placed out of reach of
the enemy's artillery, it remains fresh until the mo-
ment, when the general-in-chief thinks proper to bring
it into action to strike a decisive blow ; and history
proves that victory usually declares for those who
succeed in being the last to bring their reserve into
play. Nevertheless, it must not be inferred that it
is best to keep them indefinitely intact ; for, if the
opportune moment for their employment is allowed to
pass,* they often prove useless. Besides the offensive

* Marshal Marmont observes that Napoleon brought up his reserve

OKGANIZATION OF ACTIVE ARMIES. 177

part they may take in deciding a victory, tlie reserves
also have a defensive part to perform, in protecting
the flanks and rear of the army, and serving as a ral-
lying point, behind which the beaten troops may re-
form, either for the purpose of making a second at-
tack, or of retiring in good order. The reserves will
embrace the heavy cavalry and the pieces of large
caliber. If composed of infantry, they should be the
most veteran troops ; for the effect of a last argument
cannot be too certain. Napoleon usually employed a
corps d^armee as a reserve ; he also had for this pur-
pose the Imperial Guard and the Oudinot grenadiers.
The practice of taking away the companies of grena-
diers and voltigeurs from the regiments of infantry, to
form them into battalions of select soldiers, is objec-
tionable, as it enervates these regiments, by taking
away their best soldiers ; and on this point the ordi-
nance upon campaign service directs that : " The
select companies be not drawn away from their regi-
ments, except during the time when the latter are
not in line, and then only for operations of brief
duration." Notwithstanding this prohibition, it is
probable that, in the case of a continental war, France
would be obliged to return to the use of battalions
of grenadiers, though the Imperial Guard has again
been reestablished in her army ; because solid re-
serves are imperatively necessary in the field.

too late at Moscow and at Waterloo, thus violating his own favorite
maxim : " Those who keep their troops fresh for the day after a battle,
are almost always beaten." {Esprit des institutions militaires^ p. 29, et
Memoires^ t. viii. p. 143.)
12

178 COMBmATION OP THE ARMS.

According to tlie regulations, brigades are formed
of at least two regiments ; there appears to be no rea-
son for forming tliem of more tlian three regiments.
Besides brigades composed of a single arm, either in-
fantry or cavalry, the regulations permit the formation
of mixed brigades, of infantry and light cavalry, more
specially destined for the service of advanced-guards.

There are various appendages belonging to and
following armies ; such as the parks of artillery, bridge
trains, engineer-parks, ambulances, and wagons for the
transportation of hospital stores, provisions, clothing,
&c., the latter belonging to the service or drawn from
the country by requisition. An army is also accom-
panied by a special reserve of heavy cavalry ; but a
Gorj^'S d'armee does not have this great accessory. For
its supply, the army also possesses large and small
depots. The former are established at places so far
from the scene of active operations as not to be subject
to frequent removal ; the latter exist with the army
itself, and embrace, as far as possible, the establishments
for convalescents and the hospitals, and occupy posi-
tions where they may serve as halting places and
points of reunion for the detachments rejoining the
army ; so that any disposable men may be added to
these detachments, and those may be taken out of
them who have become disabled for continued service.

2. Commands. — The command of an army or of
a Gooys Warmee in the French service, devolves either
upon a marshal or a general of division, who re-
ceives from the Emperor a temporary commission as

OEGANIZATION OF ACTIVE AEMIES. 179

commandant-in-cJiief in the first case, or commandant
of (a particular) coiys d'^armee in the latter. The chief
of the army designates the commandant of each wing,
of the centre, and of the reserve, whose functions,
being temporary, and conferring but transitoiy hon-
ors, should be confined to the direction of the troops
in their movements and upon the field of battle. This
temporary command is given to a general of division,
the principal tactical fraction* being, however, re-
served to the commandant-in-chief Every division is
commanded by a general of division ; every brigade
by a general of brigade. Usually, the distribution of
the general officers is made by the Minister of War at
the time of the composition of the army. In the field,
where many commands become vacant, it would often
produce too great delay to wait for the orders of the
Minister to provide for them ; and it would be impru-
dent to fill them by appointments according to senior-
ity, as was still done in the time of Louis XIV., until
the ordinance of February 1, l'r03,f notwithstanding
the example of Turenne and Catinat, who, as generals-
in-chief, understood the necessity of breaking through
the custom. Hence the fifth article of the ordinance of

* "We may distinguish the fractions of an army as tactical fractions
and. fractions of organization. Each wing, as well as the centre, is a tac-
tical fraction ; each corps cVarmee, each division, each hrigade, is a frac-
tion of organization ; the reserve is at once a tactical fraction and a frac-
tion of organization.

t By this ordinance, Louis XIV. " wills and requires that the general
of each army shall choose from among the lieutenant-generals therein
serving, those whom he may judge ft for the command of the two wings
of cavalry, and those who should command the corps of infantry."

180 COMBINATION OF THE ARMS.

May 3, 1832, in relation to service in the field, author-
izes the commandant-in-chief of the army to effect,
during the course of the campaign^ the changes which
losses or the good of the service render necessary.

The functions of the commandant-in-chief are facil-
itated by the existence of the various fractions of the
army, since he communicates only with the generals
who command those fractions ; and consequently has
more time and greater latitude for combining his
plan of operations. Nevertheless, he would not be
equal to the multiplied exigencies and responsibilities
of his command (at the present day esj)ecially, when
a general-in-chief is overburdened with written papers
by the somewhat excessive complications of admin-
istrative practices), unless he were assisted by a
chief of staff, an intendant, a general commanding the
artillery, and a general commanding the engineers.

The chief of staff "^^ of an army is either a general
of division or a general of brigade. He is assisted by
a general of brigade or a colonel of the staff, called
sub-chief of staff. In a corps Warmee^ unless its im-
portance requires it, there will be no sub-chief of staff.
Officers of the staff corps, of various grades, serve as
aids to the chief of staff, whose functions, in the French
army, are defined by the eighth article of the ordi-
nance of May 3, 1832, to be as follows :

" 1st. To transmit the orders of the general, and
to execute those he receives himself for detached
duties, such as the establishment of camps, recon-

* If several armies be combined to form one grand armj, the chief
of staff temporarily takes the title of major general in France.

OKGAJ^IZATION OF ACTIVE AKMIES. 181

noissances, inspections of posts and all other parts
of tlie service.

" 2d. To correspond with tlie commandants of ar-
tillery and engineers, and with the intendants * in
order to keep the general correctly informed of the
condition of the various branches of the service.

" 3d. To maintain constant correspondence with
the different corps, and to have a thorough knowledge
of their condition in detail.

" 4th. To furnish to the commandant-in-chief and
to the Minister of War tabular statements of the
strength and position of corps and posts, reports of
marches and other operations; in a word, all neces-
sary information."

There is attached to each army and to each corps
cVarrnee a military intendant, who has under his orders
sub-intendants or deputies, employes of the various
administrative services, and troops belonging to the
administrative corps. The military intendant makes
reports to the commandant-in-chief or to his chief of
staff; he centralizes all the details of administration
and accounts of the army, and also those of the corps
and detachments composing it, except in what relates
to the materiel of the artillery and engineers.

In each army, and in each corps cVarmeej a general
officer commands the artillery, and another general offi-
cer commands the engineers. Each has under his or-
ders a certain number of officers of his arm, among
others a colonel or lieutenant-colonel, chief of staff of

* Tlie military intendance of the French army embraces the quarter-
master's, subsistence, medical, clothing, and pay departments. — Tr.

182 COMBINATION OF THE ARMS.

the arm, and a superior officer as director of the park,
together with the number of guards and employes,
indicated by the wants of the service. He centralizes
all the details relating to the personnel and the mate-
riel of his arm.

The system which exists in each army and in each
corps d'armeej is reproduced, for the same reason, in
each division. To assist him in his command, and to
leave him more libei'ty with respect to military opera-
tions, the general of division has near his person a
colonel of etat-majo7\ who is chief of staff of the divi-
sion, an officer of artillery, an officer of engineers, and
a military sub-intendant. The officers of artillery and
eno-ineers attached to a division receive the orders of
the general with whom they are employed, either di-
rectly or through the chief of staff of the division.
They should communicate to that general the orders
they may receive respecting their specialty from the
general or superior officers of their particular arm.

We will add that" all the general officers attached
to an active army, or to a corps d'armee of any
kind, have, in addition, a certain number of aides-
de-camp and orderly officers, proportioned to their
grade.

Among the officers attached to the general head-
quarters — that is to say, the quarters occupied by the
commandant-in-chief — -we should mention three in
particular : 1st. The Commandant of the general head-
quarters. This is a superior officer of the staff, charged
with establishing the quarters, placing the posts and
guards, and, in conjunction with the gendarmery,

ORGANIZATIONS' OF ACTIVE AEMIES. 183

preserving order at headquarters. 2d. The Pro-
vost-marshalrgeneral. This title is given to the com-
mandant of the brigades of gensdarmes attached to
the army. His province is to protect the inhabitants
of the country from pillage and violence ; to maintain
good police; to institute proceedings against those
suspected of crimes or misdemeanors committed with-
in the precincts of the army, or of C07j:)s d'armee ;
to pursue and arrest the offenders ; to watch all
the non-military persons or camp followers ; * to
follow the columns on a march and bring up the
stragglers. He reports daily to the commandant-in-
chief and receives his orders ; and every week makes
a report of his service to the chief of staff. Besides
these duties, which are assigned to him by arjny
regulations, the provost-marshal-general (also the pro-
vost of each division), since the promulgation of the
Code de justice militaire^ exercises jurisdiction over
the territory occupied by the army (or the division),
and assisted by a clerk (a non-commissioned officer or
corporal of his arm), decides of himself in all penal
cases involving a penalty of not more than six months'
imprisonment, or a fine of not more than 200 francs ;
and in all cases of claims for damages which do not
exceed 150 francs.f 3d. The Wagon-master of the
general headquarters, a superior officer charged with
the direction of the equipages following the army, and

* The provosts can inflict a fine to the amount of 100 francs. (Service
en camjmgne^ art. 175.)

t Code de justice militaire pour Varmee de terre, du 9 juin 1857,
art. 52, 75.

184 COJVIBINATION OF THE ARMS.

the preservation of order among tlie wagons and do-
mestics of tlie staff.

There are also connected witli each division a
commandant of headquarters, a provost, and a wagon-
master — officers of a grade inferior to that of the offi-
cers who hold similar positions in the general head-
quarters.

3. standing Armies. — ^In Ranee, active armies
are formed only in case of war, or, as exceptions,
upon certain points of the national domain, when
the security of the interior is in danger. This pol-
icy, which is also that of Austria, leaves the enemy
uncertain as to the mode of organization which is
to be finally adopted in the armies formed to oppose
him ; and, besides, reserves the power of varying this
mode, according to the nature of the war to be un-
dertaken.

Eussia and Prussia have adopted a different policy,
and, both in peace and in war, keep their troops con-
stantly formed, in co?ys d'^armee, divisions, and bri-
gades. Thus the Prussian army, besides the Koyal
Guards, and the brigades garrisoning Mayence and
Luxemburg (fortified places of the Germanic Con-
federation), consists of eight permanent corps dJarmee^
each embracing two divisions of infantry, two brigades
of cavalry, one regiment of artillery, and one battalion
of engineers. Under this system, the troops complete
their education better, especially with respect to com-
bined mancBUvres, become accustomed to the generals
who command them, and are eminently qualified to

ORGANIZATION OF ACTIVE ARMIES.

185

act promptly or to repel an invasion ; but they remain
a long time in the same garrisons, and this is a posi-
tive disadvantage, on account of the habits which the
soldiers may there acquire. The troops who fre-
quently travel, as they do in France, and are therefore
not accustomed to any fixed garrisons, are, in conse-
(j[uence, more easily mobilized.

CHAPTER SECOND.

MARCHES.

The army being organized, it is next to be trans-
ported from the place of its formation to a point more
favorable for its action. This requires a march of a
greater or less number of days.

1. Marches of Concentration. — ^The march will
be of easy and simple execution when it takes place
far from the enemy, and is thus performed as a mardi
of concentration. The army is then put in motion by
small fractions, and moves upon several parallel routes.
Each fraction will march in open lines on each side of
the road to leave a free circulation ; will make a grand
halt at about the middle of the march ; will travel
from six to ten leagues per day, and will observe the
most perfect discipline in any town where it may be
lodged for the night or receive its daily supplies.

All marches should be performed by day ; for a
night march, especially from midnight to four o'clock
in the morning, gains nothing that is not more than
lost by the relatively greater fatigue suffered by the

MARCHES. 187

soldiers. The soldier needs at least six liours of sleep :
to assert the contrary is to utter nonsense.

A march should be conducted slowly, in order to
save the strength of the troops. Assuming that there
is sufficient time, one hour at least should be allowed
for a league, including the short halt necessary after
each league, and an additional half to three quarters
of an hour should bfe allowed for the principal halt.

Slowness, and especially uniformity of gait, are
equally important for cavalry. When far from the
enemy, this arm need not govern its rate of motion
by that of the infantry.

2. Marches of IWaiaceiivre. — If the march takes
place in presence of the enemy, it assumes the char-
acter of a march of manoeuvre^ and requires addi-
tional precautions. Its disposition should be based
upon the principle of being always in a condition to
check and to repel an attack. With this object, in-
stead of proceeding in fractions distributed on each
side of a road, the army will still march upon several
routes,* but grouped on each route in column of one
section at least, or one division at most. Each column
should be sufficiently strong in front to resist, and
should at the same time be so short that the front
and rear can support each other. While beyond the
circle of activity of the enemy, the column may ad-
vance at full distance,f but within this circle, or, so

* 111 order to subsist more easily bj requisitions, and also to keep the
enemy in uncertainty.

t It is assumed that the column then occupies the same space as in
order of battle.

188 COMBII^ATION OF THE ARMS.

to speak, under tlie cannon of the enemy, and pre-
paring for combat,* it will gain ground in more com-
pact order.

In a mixed column, tlie infantry, accompanied by
its artillery, march at the head ; and the cavalry
always in the rear. A different arrangement would
compromise the whole column in the case of a strong
attack on the front, as was proved in the case of the
central column of the French forces at the battle of
the Trebbia (June 19, 1799).

The number of columns will often vary, according
to the kind of troops, the nature of the ground, and
the end to be attained. Their distance will be calcu-
lated so as to permit easy communication between
them, and also of their reunion ; and for this purpose,
the chief of one column should know the effective
force and the direction of the other columns.f

Notwithstanding this multiplicity of columns they
should not habitually reckon upon mutual protec-
tion, which their distance and their specific object
may prevent ; and, besides, prudence dictates that
each should rely upon itself for this protection. In
this view, we employ the ancient and well known sys-
tem, the result of experience, of detaching a small
portion of the moving force in advance, in rear and
upon the flanks of the column, so as to surround it
with almost a continuous chain, as mobile as the
column itself, and destined to parry the first blows.

* The place of combat is usually reached first hj the head of the
column.

t Service en camj^agne^ art. 120.

MAKCHES. 189

This covering portion is in preference chosen from the
light troops ; it embraces an advance-guard^ a rear
gitard^ and flanhers.

The advance-guard precedes the column. It is of
mixed composition, but variable, according to the dif-
ficulties of the road and the proximity of the enemy ;
it scours the country and watches for any attempted
attack, whether open or covert, baffles it or restrains
it, and, in all cases, gains time for the column to dis-
pose itself for combat. For this purpose the advance-
guard also protects itself by an advance-guard or some
scouts. It should also open the road or make it prac-
ticable, and for this reason a company of sappers often
accompanies it. At branch roads, it will be careful to
indicate the direction taken by landmarks, in order to
avoid all mistakes and to point out the road to be-
lated soldiers and vehicles. In the daytime this is
effected by blazing trees or tying bundles of straw to
posts along the proper road ; but at night, by station-
ing non-commissioned officers, who are successively
relieved.

The commandant of an advance-guard should pos-
sess all the qualities required of a chief of detach-
ment. It is his duty to avail himself of all the aux-
iliary expedients employed in reconnoissances, espe-
cially to draw information from the guides, from the
inhabitants, and from prisoners ; and also to cause
prompt reconnoissances to be made by the officers
under his orders. He turns all villages, woods, or
defiles, through which it might be dangerous to pass ;
levies contributions upon the villages to keep his troops

190 COMBmATION OF THE AEMS.

constantly supplied with subsistence for two or three
days ; makes his grand halt in a covered place, sur-
rounding it with sentinels posted upon the eminences
or on the roads ; and is careful during his march not
to betray his approach by the noise of trumpet or drum.

The advance-guard will vary in force from one
fifth to one tenth of the column. Its distance from
the column will be at least equal to the length of the
column, so that, even in the most unfavorable case,
that is, when the advance-guard is driven back, and
does not succeed in retarding the approach of the ene-
my, the rear of the column may yet have time to re-
join the front, and also to come into line.

The rear-guard closes the march, and is smaller
than the advance-guard. Its province is to arrest any
adverse detachment, or any suspected individual,
prowling in the rear of the column. It frequently
protects itself also by an extreme rear-guard. In a
forward march, it escorts the baggage, which is always
separated from the body of the troops, and brings up
the stragglers. In a retreat, it performs the principal
and most glorious part : in that case, relieved of the
baggage, which then goes on the side farthest from
pursuit, it avails itself of the resources of petty w^ar-
fare, and of the obstacles of the ground, to paralyze
the forces of the pursuer. The chief of the rear-
guard should possess high qualifications : perhaps he
does not need to be as fertile in invention as the chief
of the advance-guard, but he certainly requires more
energy and coolness. jN'ey, in the retreat from Eussia,
immortalized himself as the chief of the rear-guard.

MAECHES. 191

The flankers^' marcli parallel to the column, upon
each of its flanks. They scatter themselves in groups
of three^ at 400 or 500 paces from the road, and recon-
noitre, while protecting themselves behind the inequal-
ities of the ground, but also exploring every recess and
every obstacle. To give warning, they despatch one
of their number, and never have recourse to discharg-
ing their guns, except in the case of a surprise.

We are now acquainted with the order of march
of a separate column : let us return to an assemblage
of columns — an army.

This assemblage will be preceded by a general ad-
vance-guard, relatively to all the columns ; each of these
still requires its special advance-guard. There will also
be a general rear-guard.

We may deceive the enemy as to the general di-
rection about to be adopted by an army (or by a
column), by ordering the preparation of provisions
as if for a movement in another direction. This ruse,
to which every one may resort, is always effective.

The chief of a column thrown forward for a spe-
cial purpose in advance of an army, even beyond the
general advance-guard, will scatter along his route
small posts of cavalry, for the purpose of conveying
his messages promptly ; and when he despatches an
officer upon a mission to the general-in-chief, he should
also send after him two others, at intervals of a half
hour from each other, as the first might lose his way.f

* Do not confound these flankers with tlie skirmishers, which the
advance and rear-guards detach for their own security,
t Letter of Napoleon to Marmont, July 11, 1809.

192

COMBLN^ATIOIS" OF THE AKMS.

MAECH OP MAN(EU7EE BY THE FEONT.

£ Adyance-guard.

■ 7 E ear-guard.

Marches of manoeuvre of an army are executed
either by the front or by the flank.

In the first case, the columns remain grouped to-
gether, adopt a close formation, and follow parallel

routes, in such a man-
ner as not to occupy
much more space on
the front of the
marcW than the ex-
tent of the front of
the army in order of
battle; for an attack
then presents few
dangers, even when it
comes from the side.
In fact, if this combi-
nation of ^^ columns, instead of continuing its march
in the direction ah^ is suddenly obliged to take the per-
pendicular direction <?cZ, it still has an advance-guard in
the column 2, a rear-guard in the column 6, and two
flanking corps, in the columns 1 and T ; and the case
would be the same for the directions ha and dc. Thus,
with this arrangement, a sudden change in either di-
rection becomes easy, and the possibility of such
changes sometimes constitutes the whole secret of
marches. The march of the Austro-Eussian army
under Kutusoff, from Olmutz to Wischau and Aus-
terlitz, in 1805, is an example of this arrangement.

In the second case, in which a march by the flank
is vigorously executed in a single and long column,

* We Q.2^ front of the march the space between the columns 2 and 6.

MAKCHES. tH^^ 193

either to move along the positions of the enemy or to
traverse a narrow and unavoidable route, in order to
arrive promptly before a town, or upon the field of
battle, the army in movement runs greater danger;
since, by the manoeuvre itself, it is already in a state
of crisis, and in this situation exposes its flank. Never-
theless, these dangers are sometimes voluntarily in-
curred, principally with a view to gaining time. In
this event, besides observing the precaution of form-
ing at full distances, to preserve exactly the inter-
vals, and to conceal the march under the cover of
night, or of a fog, it will be best to place on the men-
aced side, at about 1,000 yards from the column, a
flanking corps, marching, as much as possible paral-
lel to it, and possessing its own protecting auxiliaries,
namely, an advance-guard, a rear-guard, and flankers.
Frederic the Great usually fell upon his enemies by a
march by the flank, and he succeeded by this method,
because he employed soldiers expert in manoeuvres
against troops of little mobility ; nevertheless, at Kol-
lin (June 18, 1757), a march of this kind, executed
under the fire of the Austrians, was fatal to him, in
spite of the tenacious energy of his foot soldiers, who
returned seven times in succession to the charge.

Whether made by the front or flank, marches of
manoeuvres must be rapid. Without the celebrated
march of Massena's division, running on the 13th of
January from Verona to Rivoli, fighting on the 14th
by the side of the soldiers of Joubert, returning on the
15th upon Mantua, and fighting on the 16th at Favo-
rita, Bonaparte would not have obtained his two final
13

194 combi]S"atio:n^ of the arms.

victories, and so happily terminated tlie campaign of
1796. Fifteen years later, in the month of April,
1809, during the operations about Eatisbonne, if the
army of the Archduke Charles had not been so slow
in his offensive operations amidst our scattered forces,
and had not taken three days (from the 19th to the
22d of April) to move about six leagues (from Rohr
to Eckmiihl), the first part of the campaign would
have resulted more favorably to his arms.

It is principally when the march of manoeuvre is
directed against an enemy wholly defeated, and be-
comes, in consequence, a pursuit, that rapidity becomes
indispensable, — provided, be it well understood, that
this rapidity is not prejudicial to the strength and
prudence which it is essential to preserve in the
presence of an energetic though vanquished enemy,
capable of turning again and assuming the offensive.

The march of the vanquished party, who is retiring
— in a word, the retreat — is also a march of manoeuvre.
This, indeed, is implied in what we have said. But
to constitute a retreat, we must not forget that there
must be a series of retrograde marches. Napoleon, on
the eve of the battle of Austerlitz, certainly did not
beat a retreat, but he nevertheless made one retro-
grade march, in order to entice the Austrians and Eus-
sians upon the battle-field which he had selected and
studied ! We have above indicated the important
parts to be performed by the general, and the particu-
lar rear-guards, which, in this case, become the head
of the army or of the column.

We will add that, to have any chance of success in

MAECHES.

195

retreat, we must carefully guard the flanks, as being
more vulnerable than in a forward movement ; and
endeavor to preserve a certain distance in advance
of the rear-guard, to gain which the latter will give
special battle, as was done by the prince Bagration at
Hollabrunn, November 16, 1805.

We will confine our remarks upon marches to
these brief hints, as we do not intend to enter upon
strategy, which would exceed the limits prescribed for
these Mements,

CHAPTEK THIED.

BATTLES.

1. Primitive Order of Battle. — After a marcli de-
signed for tlie purpose, or in case of a fortuitous ren-
conter, an army meets the enemy and gives Hm battle.
How is it to be disposed for tlie action ? This we
are now about to consider, at first from a theoretical
point of view, under the most ordinary circumstances,
and upon the supposition that the field of combat is
perfectly horizontal, and free from all kinds of obstacles.

In preparing for battle, the whole army is drawn
up in three distinct masses, destined to take part in
the contest at different times — a first line, a second
line, and a reserve.

The first line brings on the action. The mission
of the second line is to afford the first both moral and
material support : moral support, by inspiring confi-
dence by its simple presence ; material support, either
by offering a rallying point, or by taking its place in
the contest. Therefore, from the instant when the
first line becomes engaged, we should, in general,
avoid withdrawing the troops of the second line from
their position, to take them to another ; for this would

BATTLES. 19.7

botli discourage the combatants, who would no longer
feel themselves supported, and would embolden the
enemy, who would take the movement for the begin-
ning of a retreat. The duty of the reserve has already
been explained.

According to its particular destination, each of the
masses of the order of battle will have a distinct for-
mation. The fii^st line will be deployed, for it is ne-
cessary that it offer a large front, with the smallest
possible intervals ; for large intervals would be, in fact,
breaches, and would weaken its resistance. The sec-
ond line will usually be formed in columns by bat-
talions at deploying distance, in which form it will be
better prepared to advance to assist the first line. But,
if the position of the second line upon the battle-field
is such as to expose it to the fire of the enemy's artil-
lery, it will be better to deploy it,* since, when ex-
tended upon a front of little depth, it will suffer less
from the projectiles. The reserve not being required
for immediate combat, should always remain grouped
under the hand of the general-in-chie£ It will there-
fore be massed in columns, by brigades, in rear of
the second line.

The next question is, at what distance from each
other should the three masses of this primitive order
of battle be established ?

* At the battle of Moscow a brigade of the second line lost 500 men
in ten minutes, because it preserved the order in column. (Marbot,
Itemarques critiques sur les considerations sur Vart de la guerre^ p. 436.)
In similar circumstances, at the battle of Konieh (December 21, 1832),
Ibrahim Pacha saved his troops by deploying the second line.

198 COMBINATION OF THE ARMS.

Supposing the field of battle to be wholly free
from all obstacles, the local circumstances will be the
same upon the whole extent of the front, and the sec-
ond line should hold itself at a distance of 300 yards
in rear of the first. At this distance the fire of the
enemy will probably reach it with difficulty, and
yet it will be sufficiently near* to give effective sup-
port to the first line. The same interval is equally
applicable to both infantry and cavalry. If, however,
the plateau on which the combat takes place is of such
small dimensions that the second line, at a distance
of 300 yards from the first, should find itself near the
extreme boundary, this distance may be reduced, but
not beyond the limit that would bring the line under
the fire of the enemy.

As the reserve should remain fresh and intact un-
til the decisive moment, while the lines are engaged,
conjointly or separately, it will be posted at 1,000 or
1,200 yards from the second line.'

The cavalry should never form the centre of the
line of battle, for all their power depends upon move-
ment, and in that position they could neither move
forward nor backward without breakino^ the line. Be-
sides, as they do not make use of their fire-arms, they
are not so capable as infantry of standing the fire of
the enemy's musketry or cannon without stirring.
For these reasons, they are usually placed on the

* At the battle of PJo-Secco, or, rather, at the battle known by that
name, the Spaniards were beaten, in spite of their bravery, in conse-
quence of having placed their second line 1,400 or 1,500 yards in rear of
the first.

BATTLES. 199

flanks, where they have the best opportunity to start
quickly (^pendre carrier e)^^ and to throw themselves
in every direction for attacking and turning the ene-
my's flanks. In this position, too, they serve as a sup-
port to the extremities of the line of infantry. As an
exception, however, the cavalry may form the centre
of a line of battle, when the two bodies of the infan-
try placed upon the wings are suflaciently near to each
other to give adequate protection, by their fire, to the
cavalry placed between them, and thus still to keep
the different parts of the army united.f

The artillery of the first line will occupy with
strong batteries many positions, from 150 to 200
yards in advance of the front, opposite the great in-
tervals of the order of battle : to increase this dis-
tance would expose the artillery to be captured ; to
diminish it would render the fire of the artillery dan-
gerous to the infantry posted in its rear. The artil-
lery of the second line will wait in column in rear of
the flanks and intervals of this line ; the artillery of
the reserve will remain close to the main body of the
reserve.

The parks, ambulances, and. other accessories, will
be posted in a safe place in rear of the reserve, and
covered by troops of the rear-guard.

For the facility of command, and the entire inde-

* That is, to assume the charging distance of about 300 yards from
the point to be attacked.

t Ternay, Traite de Tactique^ t. i., p. 24G. We may add that this
may also be done upon a contracted battle-field, when the wings of the
position are formed by villages, as at Essliug.

200 COMBmATION OF THE ARMS.

pendence of the lines, the troops of the same division
will generally form a part of the same line, especially
the infantry troops.

Such are the principles according to which an
army, whatever its force, is drawn up, according to
the primitive order of battle ; and it is only necessary
to add that, if the army contains several divisions, or
corps cParmee^ care must be taken to leave intervals
between them, proportioned to their effective force,
and the number of cannon to be employed in front of
the line of battle.

In the following figure of the primitive order of
battle, we give a greater development to the second
line than the first, to protect the flanks of the first,
both by infantry and cavalry.

PKIMITIVE OEDEE OF BATTLE.

tt tt

CZ] 13 EH ^ E!] IS 13

This primitive order of battle is in reality but a
diagram to regulate the position and the disposition
of the various elements of the army — merely an order

BATTLES. 201

of review^ from wliicli innumerable circumstances
in war may often compel us to depart. Accidents
of ground, tlie superiority of tlie enemy in cav-
alry or in artillery, the defective composition of the
army itself, may force the general-in-chief to adopt a
less symmetrical order of battle ; but in all cases he
must save himself a reserve, and, as far as possible,
draw up his forces upon two lines, in addition to the
reserve, even when it might be necessary for that pur-
pose to reduce the extent of the front which he pre-
sents to the enemy.

2. Orders of Battle. — Whatever the number of
lines of an order of battle, it is useful to know the
various figures that order may assume, and any good
reasons for such dispositions of troops.^ The forms
of these figures will be more readily understood by
tracing a single line to represent each of the opposing
orders of battle.

The various figures may be reduced to four prin-
cipal ones :

1st. Parallel order, — When the two armies are
drawn up parallel to each other upon the whole line.

PAEALLEL OEDEE.

Assailant.

the order is the simplest of all ; the assailing army is
everywhere equally weak, everywhere equally strong,

202 COMBIN-ATION OF THE AEMS.

and there is notliing to indicate tlie point upon whicli
its first efforts will be directed.

This was the habitual order of battle of the first
nations of antiquity, among whom the art of war was
not far advanced ; but it is used even at the present
day, upon the defensive, when the object is to bar
the wav of an assailant.

Sometimes, in this order, the centre of the assailant
is strengthened, and presents a column instead of one
or two lines ; or a wing may receive an increase of
troops, or else have a particular corps perpendicular
to, and in front of the line,''^ forming a crotchety or L.
In the latter two cases, the order approximates to the
following, and possesses several of its properties.

2d. Ohlique order, — The assailant advances one
wing, the right, for instance, and refuses the other, so
that he keeps the whole line of his adversary in check,
and yet engages but a small portion of his troops.
This is, consequently, the most suitable order for an
army of inferior force, which thus has its first reserve
in the wing refused.

OBLIQUE OEDER.

Assailant.

In reality, excepting the case of an attack by the
centre, almost every offensive order of battle partakes

* The same order in rear of tlie line is called apotence.

BATTLES. / 203

of the nature of tlie oblique, for it is very rare that
one portion of the line does not attack before another.

Epaminondas at Leuctra and at Mantinsea, Caesar
at Pharsalia, Gustavus Adolphus at Leipsic, Frederic
at several battles, and especially at Leuthen, Bona-
parte at Marengo, employed the oblique order.

If the obliquity of the assailing line is so great as
to make this line form a right angle with the front of
the adversary, the order of battle takes the name of
the perpendicular order. This particular case of the
oblique order hardly deserves mention, since it must
always be of short duration, the interest of the enemy
evidently requiring him, in such case, to effect at least
a partial change of front.

3d. Concave order, — This order may be formed by
echelons, as in the following figure, or in a semicircle ;
but it is better for the march to be by echelons. Its
advantage consists in great concentration of fire ; but,
on the other hand, the flanks are very much exjDosed,
and require to rest firmly upon some obstacle, a river,

COXCAYE OEDEE.

I I I I i

Assailant.

for example, as in the formation adopted by the
Archduke Charles, against the French, in the battle
of Essling.

204 COMBmATION OF THE AEMS.

In general, this order is rather the result of changes
incident to the contest, than of premeditated design.

A successful use of the concave order was made
by the famous Hannibal at Cannae, by the Eoman
general Narses at Casilinum (a. d. 553) against the
Franks, and by the English at Crecyo

4th. Convex order, — ^This order is formed either
by echelons on the centre, or in a semicircle. It serves
for the defence of a defile or a bridge indispensable to
a retreat, or better still to resist a concave formation.
Except in these two cases, it is a bad disposition to
adopt against an unbroken and compact line, for its
flanks are more feeble than in any other order, and if

CONVEX ORDEE.

Assailant.

the centre gives way, the defeat of the army is certain.
It has no chance of success except against an exces-
sively extended and disjointed line, or against an at-
tack in four or ^y^ columns, firing in divergent di-
rections.*

The Turks formed for attack in the convex order,
almost in a triangle. After the first shock, the two

* The fire of the convex order takes place in diverging lines from the
moment that its echelons are so much subdivided and increased in num-
ber as to approximate to the semicircular form.

BATTLES. 205

wings formed again and advanced beyond tlie centre,
thereby transforming their order into the concave.

In practice, none of these orders of battle could be
assumed with the exactness indicated by the figure.
We endeavor to conform to the system indicated as
much as possible, taking this system, however, as a
mere approximation.

We must not forget that an order of battle, what-
ever may be its tactical form, its figure, or its name,
may be traced continuously , or with intervals^ either in
whole or part. With intervals^ it possesses little so-
lidity, and gives less fire ; and it should never be so
formed unless at a sufficient distance from the enemy,
or when the cavalry forms the second line and stands
ready to charge in the intervals threatened by the
enemy. A continuous order has but small intervals,
which are indispensable for the movement of the
corps which constitute it.

3. Conduct of the Battle. — ^We have now learned
the number of lines in which an army is drawn up
for combat, and the figure which its order of battle
assumes. There are, however, yet other conditions to
be fulfilled to secure a fair chance of success in the
struo^ojle.

We fight a battle either to repel an attack and
preserve a favorable camj), or voluntarily to strike a
decisive blow, conquer a region of country, reach
an important city or relieve it, or to terminate the

* By intervals are usually meant spaces equal to the front of the full
portions, as in the checker-formation.

206 COMBINATION- OF THE AKMS.

campaign and secure a peace. After having, from
various motives, deferred this great act, we must
almost always come to it at last, as the only prompt
solution and frequently less costly than the prolon-
gation of the war.

He who wishes to give battle need not have at his
disposition a number of troops much superior to that
of his adversary ; it is sufficient that the character of
his soldiers, the ground on which the contest is to
take place, the genius of his officers, or any circum-
stances whatever, affi)rd him some probability of
success.

He will, a priori^ calculate the possible issues of
the action, and will place himself so as to augment
them if he is victor, and diminish them if he is van-
quished. In the former case, the best he can do is to
cut the line of operations of the enemy ; in the latter,
it will be to preserve his own line, and his depots.

The general-in-chief will determine upon his order
of battle according to the means at his disposal, and
the obstacles to be surmounted. He will especially
adapt it to the ground, making it weaker where the
ground is strong, and vice versa^ ]30sting light troops
in the more irregular portions, and artillery upon the
commanding points ; each, in short, upon the locality
where they can act at once with the greatest facility
and the greatest energy. As far as possible, he will
have those vulnerable parts of his formation, the
flanks, supported by natural obstacles, or he Avill
strengthen them by bodies of troops, principally in-
fantry troops, for cavalry is no longer a protection

BATTLES. 20T

against a flanking attack from the moment it has been
compelled to move at a gallop and to charge from a
distance. If he refuses one wing, he will place his
heavy artillery there * in order to keep the opposing
wing at a distance and to prevent its advancing suffi-
ciently to destroy the effect of this oblique arrange-
ment by restoring the parallelism of the two orders
of battle.

The choice of the point of attack will be deter-
mined by principles of strategy, tactics, or character
of ground. If the enemy keeps one of his wings in
proximity to his lines of communication or to his fron-
tier, strategy requires that the attack should com-
mence upon that wing. Where the enemy is near
some dangerous obstacle, which covers him, do not,
on any account, attack him on the side nearest that
obstacle, but direct your blows beyond, so as to
penetrate the lines which face you, and drive him
headlong upon the obstacle. There is also another
case in which a tactical principle determines the
direction of the attack. Suppose the order of battle
of the enemy presents a void, or any other defect,
then you should doubtless throw yourself upon
this weak point, always guarding yourself by small
flanking reserves against any traps he may lay for
you. Finally, a topographic reason will determine
the choice of a point of attack when the enemy occu-

* The same recommendation may be offered, though it is not of so
much consequence, in the case of a refusal of the centre, in order to pre-
vent the enemy from advancing the middle of his line, and opposing a
convex order to a concave order.

208 COMBES'ATION OF THE AEMS.

pies some elevations/^ tlieii aim at tlie mastery of tlie
higliest, and if you succeed, all Ms other positions
must fall. A village or a wood may sometimes per-
form tlie same part as such an eminence, and will, for
the same reasons, require your special attention.

The general-in-chief most frequently determines his
point of attack by a combination of principles : thus,
for example, he may be governed by both tactical and
topographical reasons. This is a matter of inspira-
tion — of genius — much more than of experience.

"When his choice turns upon one of the wings, his
object will be, in some cases, to surround his adver-
sary ; in others, to take him in flank. An enveloping
attack should not be executed by a long circuit, for
the corps intrusted with its execution may then get
astray, or appear too late. To attempt it upon several
sides at once, moreover, divides the army, and makes
it weak throughout, an evil of the greatest magnitude
in the presence of a bold and active adversary. This
was experienced by Alvinzi in I'? 9 6, on the day of
Eivoli, when one of his two flanking columns, that
of Quasdanowich, was unable to debouch upon the
plateau, on which were the two divisions of Bona-
parte ; and the other, that of Lusignan, appeared at
the end of the action, when the French were already
victorious, and was itself surrounded. If one's whole
army is thrown upon the enemy's flank, it amounts to
the oblique order pushed to its extreme limits. The
enemy usually opposes it by a similar manoeuvre, and

* All this information respecting the enemy is obtained by means of a
preliminary reconnoissance, called an offensive or open reconnoissance.

BATTLES. 209

attacks the weakened flank. Nevertheless, sucli an
attack may be greatly favored by local circumstances :
thus, when Bonaparte was advancing to attack the
Austrians at Areola, his movement was covered both
by the Adige from Verona to Konco, and by the
marshes between the Adige and the Alpon : hence he
threw his forces upon the dykes of the marsh, where
he had only to fear a resistance in front, and thus
placed himself on the left fianh of Alvinzi. Even
if the village of Areola had yielded to his arms
at the commencement of the first day of this triple
battle, he would have reached Villa-Nova* and estab-
lished himself in rear of the enemy, who still occupied
Caldiero.

Whatever may be the kind of attack, or the point
upon which it is directed, we must make our own
force at this point superior to that of the enemy. In
bringing our forces to the points of attack, we must
especially endeavor to cover the preparatory steps,
either by some inequalities of the ground, or by a
screen of skirmishers, or by false attacks. Perfection
consists in not receiving the fire (even partial) of the
enemy imtil the action is engaged, which, however,
is not always possible. By concealing our intentions
till the last moment, we prevent the enemy from
making his first dispositions with certainty.

The attack being arranged, the measures to be
taken by each independent portion of the order of
battle, in case of failure, are again to be prescribed and

* A hamlet at the intersection of the Alpon with the road from Vero-
na to Yicenza.
14

210 COMBINATION OF THE AEMS.

explained, and the posts to be occupied successively
in tlie retrograde movement are to be indicated, some
as simple points of transit, others as rallying points.
The order of the day, often completed by verbal in-
structions, also exhibits each person's part in the at-
tack, develops and explains the principal manoeuvre,
sometimes gives the reasons upon v^^hich it is based,
in order that each general may intelligently perform
his part toward the success of the manoeuvre, even
should circumstances oblige him to depai-t from his
orders, and to make use of the large discretionary
powers necessarily intrusted to him.

The general-in-chief now gives the signal, and the
action commences. A combat of skirmishers upon the
front of nearly the whole line, and especially of the
centre, is the necessary prelude. Under the screen
formed by these scattered soldiers, the deployment of
the first line is completed, if it had not before been
effected, and the columns of attack advance. At the
moment when the skirmishers, having advanced some
1,000 yards, retire and unmask the front, everything
is ready, and the first line comes into play. It begins
by fire of artillery, which approximately indicates the
distance which usually separates two armies drawn
up in order of battle at the beginning of the action ; *
then fire of musketry follows, as soon as the distance
has been sufficiently reduced, either by the regular
progress of the attack, or, sometimes, by the mutual
advance movements of the two armies. If the firing

* Artillery becomes fonnidable at about 1,200 yards.

BATTLES. 211

throws tlie enemy into disorder, the opportunity is
seized for making a bayonet-charge upon the chosen
point of attack. This first charge, resolutely conduct-
ed, may succeed : in this case, we must not give way
to excitement and momentary enthusiasm, but should
re-form our ranks, take breath, and march with ensem-
ble upon the second line. If our first charge fails, we
fall back calmly upon our second line, which, in its
turn, charges, either alone, or in combination with the
unbroken portions of the first line. Now, the fighting
must be desperate, especially in the decisive direction ;
for this struggle of the principal arm decides the fate
of the day.

The artillery continues to fire, to assist the charges
of the infantry, and its action is kept up throughout
the whole contest, so long as no friendly column
masks its fire.

The light cavalry skirmishes from the time the
first blow is struck, and at the end pursues. The
cavalry of the line charges at any propitious moment,
but chiefly at the end, to finish the victory, by over-
throwino; the last masses that make a stand.

If the action of the two lines does not suffice,
the general-in-chief "^^ detaches a part, or nearly the

* During the action, the general-in-chief occupies some elevated point,
with a chart before him, and a telescope in his hand. He is calm and
watchful, and gives his orders according to what he sees, and the intelli-
gence brought to him. It is obviously of the first importance that every
aide-de-camp should be able to find him readily. The same is true,
tliough in a less degree, of every general officer, w ho, when he leaves his
usual position, should make it known, and take care to indicate how and
where he is to be found.

212 COMBmATION OF THE AEMS.

whole of Hs reserve, at tlie decisive moment, of whicli
lie is the sole judge.'^*

Success crowning the last vigorous blow, the vic-
tor may commence the pursuit without delay, but
with circumspection, so long as he is not certain of the
total defeat of the enemy ; for if one wing on each
side is victorious, the party that starts first upon a
pursuit will be easily surrounded or taken in flank,
and will ultimately lose the battle.

To these various ojDerations, add the more or less
complete cooperation of a false attack, as well as the
inevitable episodes of corps imprudently engaged or
overcome by numbers, which have to be supported,
and you have before you a foreshortened picture of
the action as carried on by the attacking party, or, to
use the common expression, a picture of an offensive
hattle.

The army which accepts instead of offering battle,
and thus fights a defensive hattle^ observes still greater
precaution in the choice of its position. This position
should be : 1st, somewhat elevated, with respect to
that of the attacking party; 2d, firmly supported
upon the flanks ; 3d, intersected on the front and in
the salient parts of the front, by thickets, villages,
farms, obstacles easy to occupy and defend, and which
divide the attack of the assailant ; f 4th, it should al-
low suflicient freedom of movement among these ob-

* "We have already treated of the functions of the reserve in the first
chapter of this Second Part.

t In the absence of natural obstacles, redoubts are thrown up, as was
done by Peter the Great at the battle of Pultowa.

BATTLES. 213

stacles ; and, 5th, should offer in the rear several ave-
nues of retreat. If its force is weak, the repelling army
forms no second line, except in uncovered and easily-
accessible places ; which, however, be it observed, does
not obviate the necessity of stationing the heaviest
and most destructive ordnance at the principal point,
upon which the assailant will most probably make his
strongest demonstration, and which is the key of the
position. It keeps a watch upon its flanks, and pro-
tects them by battalions en 'potence^ which close the
extremities of the lines of infantry, and assure the
order of battle independently of the cavalry — an ad-
vantageous arrangement adopted by Frederic the
Great in his first two battles, at Mollwitz and Czaslaw.
Some squadrons specially posted in echelons in the
rear of the second line, near the wing, may also, by
their sudden appearance, fulfil the same purpose. It is
also recommended, as a final means, to extend the sec-
ond line beyond the fii\st, and the reserve (which, in
this case, is placed almost wholly upon the flanks)
beyond the second : this renders flanking manoeuvres
difficult and hazardous undertakings for the enemy.

In defensive battles, the general-in-chief awaits the
enemy, and acts by fire of artillery and musketry,
everywhere prepared, but not announcing any other
intention than that of resisting. The assailant con-
tinues his movement, and when his manoeuvre is in
full tide, the defender redoubles his fire, catches at the
least indication of disorder or mistake, and throws

* See note, p. 202.

214 COMBIIS'ATIOK OF THE AEMS.

himself forward to profit by it, with tlie whole of the
troops still remaining fresh. If no such indication of
disorder or mistake is presented, he charges only
when the first line is too much pressed, taking for
that pm-pose the columns of the second line and a
portion of the cavalry.

In actions of this kind, when we do not succeed in
repelling the enemy, we resort to squares. If they
are well combined and flank each other, they resist a
long time, and may defy an enemy who is already fa-
tigued ; and, in all cases, they facilitate the defence,
inch by inch, of an irregular field of battle, make the
retreat more respected, and often serve to gain suffi-
cient time to enable the defeated party to commence
this retreat under cover of night. Squares may also
serve against an enemy very superior in cavalry :
example, the French at the battle of Lutzen (1813).

A flank deprived of support, being uncovered in
consequence of the progress of the assailant, may again
be established by carrying it against some other ob-
stacle, or even, for entire security, by setting fire to a
village in its vicinity. The battle of Warsaw (1656),
between the Poles and the Swedo-Brandenburgers,
presents such a case on the second day of the contest.

There are circumstances in which an army upon
the defensive will change its tactics before or during
the contest, and will suddenly assume the offensive.
It may be that the commander may resolve upon a
desperate blow, to parry an attack which comes be-
fore his preparations are completed ; or it may be
pure audacity on his part. In such case, it is best to

BATTLES. 215

attack tlie assailant upon liis flank, with tlie best
troops, or reserves, at the same time exciting the en-
thusiasm of the soldiers and exalting the courage
with which such a resolution inspires them.

Every expedient being exhausted, if you are de-
feated, abandon the field of battle, beat a retreat, but
with order and as slowly as possible. Send off
your baggage in advance, under escort : send a force
to occupy the defiles through which you must pass.
Adopt for your two lines the checker-formation by
battalions ; for the first line, when fatigued, can then
retire through the open spaces of the second, or, still
better, the second line may, by a slight movement, be
brought in front through the spaces of the first, which
slight offensive demonstration is always effective.
When both line& are disorganized, they retire and
rally beyond the reserve, which should be formed in
squares, and stubbornly stand its ground.

The retreat having successfully begun, the line
nearest to the enemy turns, from time to time, and
makes a stand, seconded by repeated charges of the
cavalry upon the flank of the pursuers. In this man-
ner, tune is gained until night supervenes ; then, fa-
vored by darkness, we make a forced march, to put
a respectable distance between ourselves and the ene-
my, and the next day the rear-guard suffices and or-
ganizes an obstinate defence.

Here we will terminate our exposition of the mech-
anism proper of the contest. To dwell longer upon it,
in an abstract and didactic manner, would be of little
use in the way of instruction. To obtain a just idea

216 COMBINATION OF THE AEMS.

of a battle, it is necessary to read a great number of
narratives, to know the antecedents and tlie issues of
the day, to possess a detailed plan, upon wMch we
mark the disposition of the troops, and correct or
change this disposition according to the views we ac-
quire as we read ; in short, we must give ourselves up
to systematic and extended research. We must, es-
pecially, consider each battle not as an isolated fact,
but as the necessary and calculated end of a march, or
of a combined strategic movement, or sometimes of a
whole campaign ; and we must therefore endeavor to
trace in it the denouement, more or less happy, of each
of the measures taken.

PART THIRD.

MINOR OPERATIONS.

CHAPTER FIRST.

OUTPOSTS.

Introduction. — In the field, an encamped or can-
toned army does not know when it may be attacked ;
and therefore, that it may not be surprised, it must
be at all times prepared for combat. But as keeping
constantly upon the qui vive would fatigue it too
much, a. portion is charged with the duty of watching
over the safety of the whole.

This portion of the army incurs a twofold respon-
sibility: 1st, it must watch the enemy, in order to
give notice of its approach ; and 2d, it must then stop
it, in order to give time for making the preparations
for combat. That it may fulfil these purposes, it must
necessarily be posted in advance of the main body of
the troops, on the side toward the adversary : hence
the various fractions of this portion are collectively
designated by the term outposts,

"We thus see that outposts perform the same ser-

218 MINOR OPEEATIOITS.

vice for an army at rest, as sMrmisliers and scouts
for one upon a marcli. Outposts take the place of tlie
scouts (hatteurs d'estrade)^ employed by tlie ancients,
wHcli would be insufficient with the modern methods
of warfare.

The composition of outposts is based upon the
character* and force of the adversary ; but that army
will be the best guarded whose outposts are calculated
upon the supposition that the enemy is the most active.
We must, indeed, consider outposts as the eyes^
which constantly watch the enemy, and prevent him
from approaching unperceived.

It is a fundamental rule that outposts are never to
fight merely for the sake of fighting. Thus, on the
eve of the battle of Emmendingen, October 18, 1796,
a skirmish occun'ed between the patrols of the out-
posts, and in this untimely action the Austrians lost
the village of Malterdingen, which, notwithstanding
their occupation of the heights in the rear, they had a
hard struggle to regain on the following day.f A
chief of outposts must, then, consider the injurious
consequences which might ensue were he to hazard
an attatjk, and will refrain from useless combats. His
duty, in fact, consists in covering the army, and not
in displaying his courage.

The outposts will have accomplished their end, if

* According to Decker, the German, in this kind of service, is zeal-
ous ; the Russian dangerous (on account of his numerous and vigilant
Cossacks) ; the English, heavy ; the Spaniard, indolent; to which we will
add, the Frenchman is often too confident.

t See Principea de strategie de I'Archiduc Charles, translated by
General Jomini, 1818, v. iii., p. 253, 260.

OUTPOSTS. 219

the enemy dare not attack them, and is obliged to de-
fer the combat to the time and place when and where
it will be accepted ; but to attain this result, they
must rely solely upon their own vigilance, and not
upon the inactivity of the enemy. A single oversight
committed by an outpost may lead to the destruction
of the whole army ; and it were better, therefore, for
the army to have no outposts, and to watch over its
own safety, than to have negligent and inefficient
ones.

In outpost warfare, both sides act with caution,
for in most cases neither party knows precisely the
position of his adversary ; which leads the Prussian
general. Decker, to say that, in this sort of warfare,
" one sword keeps the other in its scabbard."* Never-
theless, we must not push this caution to the extreme
of putting all the force on foot at once, nor so far as
to introduce too great regularity in surveillance ; since
we should thereby unnecessarily weary the men, and
also expose ourselves to be surprised by the enemy,
who would base his attack upon this very uniformity.
It was in consequence of this regularity that, in May,
1762, Prince Henry of Prussia was able to surprise
and overcome the Austrians in the environs of Frey-
burg.f

' In accordance with their twofold mission, of both
watching and impeding the approach of the enemy,
the outposts are to be placed so as to overlook the

* De la petite guerre^ traduction Unger, p. 67.

t Vie du prince Henri de Pritsse, 1809, p. 112. This anonymous
work is due to general the Marquis de Bouill6.

220 MmOR OPERATIOIS-S.

surrounding ground and whatever happens there, and
also so as to be able to fight advantageously, notwith-
standing their numerical weakness.

If the advance-guard covers the army, the chain
of outposts will extend beyond the advance-guard ;
but if this guard camps Avith the army, the chain will
be formed just outside the camp. In both cases the
method of placing it is the same ; and it is also the
same whether the outposts are transient (as those
which are established every night before an army in
march), qy permanent (as those which protect an army
in winter quarters, or in a defensive position).

When the army marches, the advance or rear-
guard of each column furnishes the troops for the out-
posts ; when it occupies a position, the advance and
rear-guards resume their places in the order of battle,
and the outposts are supplied from the corps of the
first line. In all cases, not more than one sixth of the
whole army should be employed upon outpost service.

Outposts consist of:

1st. Grand guards ;

2d. Small posts ;

3d. Vedettes, or sentinels ;

4th. Patrols ;

5th. Sometimes, posts of support.

We will examine each of these in succession.

1. Grand Guards.— The network of outposts al-
ways foiTQS at least three distinct lines : first that of
the grand guards, who are nearest to the army, then
that of the small posts, and lastly, that of the sentinels

OUTPOSTS. 221

or vedettes. This distribution results from tlie neces-
sity which every body of troops, whatever its force, is
under of guarding itself against surprise, and of dis-
closing the ground as far as possible in advance and
on all sides.

To begin with the grand guards : these are, ac-
cording to the ordinance of May 3, 1832, respecting
the service of the army in the field, " the advanced
posts of a camp or cantonment, the approaches to
which they should cover."

Their number, their force, and their position are
regulated : 1st, in a detached corps, by the officer in
command of that corps; 2d, in an army, by each
brigade severally, for the purpose of giving to that
fraction the unity which is the more necessary, since,
in actual engagements, an army manoeuvres and fights
by brigades. Besides, when the outpost service is
filled from a number of combined brigades, the gen-
eral commanding the division still has it in his power
to modify it, and point out to the brigades the best
posts to occupy to maintain their mutual connection
and protect their flanks.*

As far as possible, the infantry grand guards,
which serve for support, will be combined with the
cavalry grand guards, which perform the duty of ad-
vanced sentinels. If it can be done, it will be useful
to attach to the infantry grand guards a certain num-
ber of horsemen, whose duty it will be to obtain
prompt intelligence respecting the enemy.

The grand guard of a regiment, or even of a bat-

* Pr^val, Commentaires sur le service en campagne^ p. 73.

222 MINOR OPERATIOl^S.

talion, whetlier infantry or cavalry, is commanded by
a captain. Its force depends upon its object and the
means at disposal, and also upon tbe rule that it re-
quires four men for one sentinel ; but subsequent data
may modify this force.

The- grand guards are placed at the outlets whose
defence is of the highest importance, else in a com-
manding and covered position in the centre of the re-
gion to be observed. To place them with a wood in
their rear would be exposing them to destruction.
Their position may be changed at the close of the day.
Upon hilly ground, and especially in the midst of a
hostile population, it is prudent to keep them near to
the army. Even upon level ground, if they are placed
at a great distance, it will be proper to establish inter-
mediate posts.

The grand guards are seldom dispensed with, and
never without orders from the general. But the ordi-
nance authorizes those who are exposed upon a plain
to attacks of cavalry, to erect barricades, dig a circu-
lar ditch, or cover themselves by an abatis. Among
the ancients, all posts were required to be in-
trenched, or, at least, covered by embankments. This
practice rendered the troops timid, by causing them
to imagine that they could be secured only by a kind
of rampart ; besides, it was inconsistent with the rules
of offensive warfare which is most congenial to the
French character, and has consequently been aban-
doned.

The commandant of a grand guard should estab-
lish a sure communication between himself and his

OUTPOSTS.

small posts, and also between himself and tlie corps
from whicli it lias been detached. For this purpose,
he will open the ground and clear it of obstacles. On
the side toward the enemy, he will, on the contrary,
obstruct the roads, destroy the bridges, and bar de-
files, to avoid surprises.

Each grand guard may receive special" orders, ac-
cording to the position it occupies. Its general orders
will be to give notice to the neighboring posts, to the
corps from which detached, and to the general, of the
movements of the enemy, and of apprehended attacks ;
it should also examine all individuals which come into
its vicinity, and arrest those who are not provided
with passports signed by a known general, and all
soldiers who may attempt to pass beyond the line of
outposts.

The grand guard must not allow its fire to give
much light, but should mask it on the side of the ene-
my, either by a wall, or a rise of the ground, or by
kindling it in a hole dug in the ground for the pur-
pose. In all cases, a pile of moist earth should be
kept at hand, with which to extinguish the fire sud-
denly, if necessary, in case of surprise. The enemy
may be deceived as to the position of the grand guard
by means of flying-fires kept up by sentinels.

During the night, the grand guard must exercise
increased vigilance, for it is then most important to
be guarded against unforeseen attacks. If an infantr}^
grand guard, one half of the men should keep watch,
whilst the other half sleep : if a cavalry grand guard,
the horses should be kept bridled, and the men should

224 MmOE OPEEATIONS.

not sleep. The commandant of tlie grand guard is
forbidden to rest or sleejD.

In case of an attack by the enemy, the conduct of
the grand guard should be as follows. As soon as it is
threatened, or as soon as it is attacked, the grand
guard gives notice to the general of the brigade or the
colonel of its regiment ; then, if it does not occupy
a defile or an enclosed post, it marches toward the
enemy and measures strength with it if not in too
great force, or else manoeuvres so as to embarrass
its progress. In all cases it avoids committing
itself too far, for, if once cut off, there is no longer any
obstacle between the enemy and the camp; but it
keeps its ground until the army is in line, or until it
is relieved. When the grand guard occupies a defile,
or an intrenched post, it maintains its ground so long
as its supplies last, or until the greater part of the
men are killed ; then it endeavors to rejoin the army,
still trying to inflict damage upon the enemy.

The line of grand guards is usually as much as
2,500 yards in advance of the army.

2. Small Posts. — The small posts are to the grand
guards what the grand guards are to the army : that
is, while the grand guard covers the army, it has
need to be itself covered in turn. For this purpose it
detaches advanced posts, placed between it and the
line of vedettes and sentinels, the total force of which
should not exceed one third of its own force. These
smaller posts are placed 500 yards in advance of the
grand guards.

OUTPOSTS. 225

The first care of the commandant of a grand guard
is to reconnoitre all kinds of communications by
which his position may be reached ; and in accordance
with this reconnoissance he determines the force and
the position of his small posts and of the sentinels or
vedettes beyond them. These positions may be modi-
fied in cases of necessity. Sometimes they are not
the same by night as by day. In all cases the small
posts should not change place at the same time with
the grand guards.
jL The small posts are established at cross-roads, the
debouches of villages, woods, and defiles, at the corners
of marshes, or on hill tops. It is an essential condition
that they should be seen by their grand guard, and
that they should see their sentinels or vedettes. They
should never be placed opposite to obstacles suffi-
ciently near to cover a surprise.

A small post is, according to its importance, com-
manded by an officer, or non-commissioned officer.
The commandant of the grand guard gives the chief
of each small post detailed instructions upon the sur-
veillance to be exercised, and the measures to be
taken to defend themselves and effect a retreat.

As soon as he has taken his position, a chief of a
post should reconnoitre the surrounding localities, and
avail himself of the means they may offer to insure
his own safety and that of his sentinels and vedettes.
He will make his chief preparations to resist an attack
in the rear, which is not an uncommon occurrence
with isolated posts.

The small posts are forbidden to light fires, when
15

226 MESrOR OPERATIONS.

these fires might contribute to their being surprised.
The small posts of cavalry may be relieved, under
certain circumstances, either every four or every eight
hours.

Besides the ordinary line of small posts, some of
the other nations often station upon points favorable
for observation, in advance of the line of sentinels or
vedettes, posts of four or five men, two of whom are
always on the watch. These are called Cossack-posts^
but the French army makes no use of this kind of posts.

3. Sentinels and Tedettes. — ^The sentinels (or ve-
dettes) cover the small posts, as the latter cover the
grand guards. They constitute the last link of the
chain of outposts, and are placed 500 yards in ad-
vance of the small posts.

The small posts of infantry detach sentinels ; those
of cavalry, vedettes. "Whether foot soldiers or horse-
men, these sentries are so placed as to command a dis-
tant view of the surrounding ground. They are to be
concealed from the enemy by a wall, a hedge, a tree,
a hillock, a pile of earth or of any materials, or a hay-
stack ; and they must never expose any other por-
tion of their persons than the head. Even in level
country, they can be sheltered by digging a hole in
the ground about 4 J feet deep, in which they bury
themselves as far as the chest, placing around the
hole, to protect their heads, some fresh branches of
trees, planted in such a form as to resemble a clump
of bushes.*

* This expedient may also be employed to coTer a post, by substitut-

OUTPOSTS. 227

The sentinels and vedettes watch closely the
movements of an enemy who is within range, and ap-
prize their small posts of an attack by the discharge
of a gun. If the enemy is at a distance, they listen
for the slightest noise, redoubling their vigilance at
the most trifling incident, and call attention by signals
to everything which appears to them to be of a meii-
acing nature. According to the character of their sig-
nals, the chief of a small post repairs in person to the
point which it occupies, either alone or with a por-
tion of his force.

The vedettes should keep the collar of their cloaks
turned down, in order that they may hear the better.
If they are lancers, they may take off the flamme of
their lance in order not to be so conspicuous to the
enemy. They should keep their eye upon the neigh-
boring vedettes, to see that none of them are destroyed.
In case of imminent peril, the sentinels and vedettes
are doubled, so that, if there is need for it, one of
them may be detached to give warning. Double
vedettes are principally useful among heights ; for a
vedette posted upon an eminence to watch the en-
virons, would easily be turned while his attention was
engaged, if another vedette at the foot of the slope
did not baffle the enemy in the attempt. During the
night all the vedettes remain on the lower grounds.

Sentinels and vedettes are forbidden to talk or to

ing for the hole a ditch of sufficient size. To deceive the enemy, the
branches of trees must be frequently renewed. We borrow this idea from
the TraiU des troupes Ugeres (p. 589) of the general, Count de la Eoche-
Aymon.

228 MINOE OPERATIONS.

smoke. They should be wholly absorbed in their im-
portant and delicate mission ; for the slightest negli-
gence on their part may involve the loss of their small
post and compromise the whole army.

4. l>istribiitioii of the Ontposts. — The proper dis-
tance to leave between the most advanced outpost
and the camp or cantonment, may be fixed at about
three quarters of a league, as an average estimate ;
let us say 3,500 yards.* The distance of the small
posts from the grand guards, and from the line of sen-
tinels or vedettes, will be from 400 to 500 yards each,
which, if we take the higher number, gives a distance
of 1,000 yards between the extreme line of sentinels
or vedettes, and the line of the grand guards. The
enemy will thus have at least 1,000 yards to pass over
after they have been signalled, before they can reach
the grand guards. Supposing the ground perfectly free
from all obstacles, it will take them about three min-
utes to traverse this space, and this wdll give time
enough to the grand guards to bridle and mount their
horses, and to advance to the succor of their small
posts. With these distances, therefore, the army will
be sufficiently covered ; and yet they are not so great
as to prevent the parties at the different posts seeing
each other distinctly, which considerations have led to
their adoption.

According to these distances, the network of
outposts upon level ground forms the following
figure. Upon more uneven ground, the figure would

* Lallemaiid, Traite des operations secondaires, t. i., p. 2.

OUTPOSTS.

229

become more irregular, and the various lines would

SYSTEM OF OUTPOSTS.

Advanced post of
police guard.

X—

Bivouac of a Begiment.
AAA A AAAA AAA A A AAA A AAA AAA A arms.

.• :^-

X—

..O O O O O O O O o o o o o.

..o o o o o_

.0 0-

Soldiera'
.0 o o o o o o Jires.

Officers'

. O O jiygg^

.o Staff fires

Police
— " " guard.

230 MINOR OPERATIONS.

become more curved, the general proportions, how-
ever, remaining the same.

It must not be forgotten that these distances cor-
respond to the positions assumed during the day. At
night, it will often be prudent to contract the whole
system of outposts, and especially to bring the line of
sentinels or vedettes nearer.

5. Posts of Support. — Sometimes posts of support
are established between the grand guards and the
front of the camp or bivouac, for the purpose of re-
sisting for some time an enemy who may succeed in
passing the first lines of the outposts, and thus give
the army time to take up arms. These posts are
furnished with cannon, and composed chiefly of in-
fantry, taken from the camp and not from the grand
guards, for the latter should attend only to the ground
in their front.

These posts of support, therefore, form a fourth
line of outposts, nearest to the army. They are to be
placed at the outlets of valleys and woods, and the
approaches of bridges and defiles, which the grand
guards may have to pass in their retreat.

6. Patrols, I.ook-oiits, Rounds. — ^The service of
outposts being one which requires to be thoroughly
performed, it should be subject to an active and se-
vere surveillance. The brigadier-general and superior
ofiicer of each regiment supervise the grand guards ;
the commandant of each grand guard supervises his
small posts and sentinels, or vedettes, by means of

OUTPOSTS. 231

patrols and rounds, tlie number of which, and their
circuits, he fixes according to circumstances.

A round is the general name given to a circuit
made either by a commissioned or a non-commissioned
officer, attended by two or three men, for the purpose
of inspecting the small posts and sentinels, and keep-
ing them upon the alert. Patrols may be defined as
small detachments of infantry or cavalry, taken from
a post, to perambulate its vicinity and to watch over
its safety. Sometimes the patrols go beyond the ex-
terior cordon of outposts, to have a better look-out
upon the doings of the enemy, and then receive the
designation of loohouts. The latter must not be too
numerous, for the sentinels, seeing them frequently
coming in, would become negligent ; but when there
is occasion to employ them, notice is to be given to the
sentmels near whom they must pass in coming in, lest
they be taken for parties of the enemy. The neglect
of this precaution was the occasion, near Placentia, in
1796, of a fatal mistake, whereby the French general,
Laharpe, was killed by his own soldiers. We may
also distinguish the patrol from the look-outs, by say-
ing that the former is defensive and the latter offensive.
The defensive patrol evidently embraces the rounds.

Arrangement of a defensive patrol, — It is composed
of from three to eight men, commanded by a corporal —
a small force, which can readily escape in case of need.
These move not in straight lines, but in zig-zag courses,
in order to embrace more ground. During the day they
should preserve a distance from each other of 150 yards,
which, at night, will be reduced to 20 or 30 yards.

232 MEN^OR OPERATIONS.

If the patrol consists of only three men (fig. 1),
they will be placed on a straight line.

If there are four men (^g. 2), they will form a loz-
enge, one point in advance, the corporal at the oppo-
site point.

If there are ^ve men (fig. 3), they will still form a
lozenge, and the corporal will occupy the centre.

DEFENSIVE PATKOLS.

••.

• •.

s •

Fig. 1.

< *

Fig. 2.

Fig. 3.

C /

Fig. 4

A .....m

""\

/ \

.• 9,^

P •^

• •

'v.

• fi

""■■■■/

Fig. 5.

Fig. 6.

Fig. 7.

If there are six men (fig. 4), the corporal remains
at the centre, but the lozenge will be truncated, by
putting two men in advance, the figure thus becoming
an irregular pentagon.

If there are seven men (fig. 5), we have the same
arrangement, only the corporal will have one man by
his side.

If there are eight men (figs. 6 and 'T), either the
same arrangement, putting two men with the corpo-
ral ; or else the patrol will form a lozenge, with three
men in each side.

Arrangement of an off ensive patrol. — ^These patrols

OUTPOSTS.

233

are usually composed of cavalry, and tlieir force varies
from ten to thirty men. Like the defensive patrols,
they should never remain in too compact mass, so as
not to be liable to being captured at once ; but they

OFFENSIVE PATEOLS.

(Patrol of 15 horses.)

Advance-guard.
o

CMef

Flanker, o

Flan
o o o

o
(Patrol of 30 horses.)

Bead of the advance-guard. ° ^ ^

Advance-guard.

near-guard.

Flankers, o
o

oQiief

o o o o o o
o o o o o o

o Flankers.
o

Bear-guard.

234 MmOR OPERATIONS.

should spread out as mucli as their force and the
localities will allow.

The foregoing diagram exhibits the mode of forma-
tion according to general La Roche-Aymon.

In each formation two men are placed at the head
and rear, in order that if one has something to com-
municate to the chief of the patrol, the otheii^may keep
his post without taking his eyes from the object which
has seemed worthy of an immediate report.

During night patrols, the chief of a patrol may
need to know the hour, but he should not light a lan-
tern, which would reveal his position to the enemy.
Frederic recommended, in this case, that the officer
should light a piece of tinder under his cloak, which,
being passed over the watch face, would give light
enough to show the hands.^

In concluding this chapter, we will recommend to
our readers to refer to article VIII. of the Ordonnance
sur le service en cam])agne^ which contains circumstan-
tial details, indispensable to be known, respecting out-
posts, the study of which will involve no difficulties
after what we have above given.

* Instruction secrete, chap. iii. [In these days of friction matches, a
simpler expedient will suggest itself to every reader.— 2V.]

CHAPTER SECOND.

DETACHMENTS.*

1. General Observations. — Outposts may be re-
garded as purely defensive detachments, Tlie detach-
ments which are the subject of the present chapter,
may, in contradistinction to outposts, be called offen-
sive detacliments.

Their object is to occupy a post of observation, or
to capture such a post ; to protect or to attack a con-
voy, a foraging party, a reconnoissance, or cantonment ;
to levy contributions in the neighboring localities,
either in kind or in money ; to destroy a magazine, to
make a diversion, to harass a marching column by
repeated skirmishes, to lay ambuscades, to cut the
communications of the enemy, to make prisoners, to
take hostages, or to throw a supply of men and muni-
tions into a besieged town.

In the composition of a detachment, we must have
regard : 1st, to the object and the duration of its ser-
vice ; and 2d, to the nature of the country and to the

* Upon detachments, consult art. ix. of the Ordonnance sur le service
des armees en campagne, of May 3, 1832.

236 MINOR OPEEATIONS.

disposition of its inliabitaiits. According to tlie nature
of these various data, tlie detachment will be composed
either of infantry alone, or of cavalry alone, or of a
combination of both. Infantry and cavalry are usually
to be detached only in the regularly constituted frac-
tions of a regiment, such as the battalion, squadron,
company, platoon, or section, as this method facili-
tates its administration, and is more conducive to dis-
cipline. The artillery and the engineers do not enter
into the composition of detachments except by acci-
dent. In the following pages we will distinguish be-
tween detachments of infantry^ detacliments of cavalry^
and mixed detacliments.

By the French army regulations, the commandant
of a detachment has the same authority over the troops
placed under his orders as a chief of a corps. He is
responsible for the safety of his force, and, up to a cer-
tain pointy for the result of the combats in which he
engages. Upon his return, he makes a report to the
officer who detached him, in relation to his proceed-
ings, in conformity with his instructions and their re-
sults ; and also a report to each of the chiefs of the
corps which furnished soldiers for his detachment, in
relation to the police, discipline, and administration
of the forces.

The officer selected for the command of a detach-
ment should be firm, prudent, and experienced ; he

* This qualified language of the regulations was necessary; for a
chief of a detachment may sometimes be beaten without having omitted
any duty. "We should also not forget the saying of Turenne ; " Quand
un homme n'a pas fait de fautes a la guerre, il ne I'a pas faite longtemps."

DETACHMENTS. 2 3 7

should know how to observe, and also how to relate
what he observes in exact terms, without drawing upon
his imagination ; he should also be able to speak the
language of the country, and be accustomed to estimate
distances. He must supply himself with a telescope
and accurate charts. He will employ good guides, and
will derive from them all possible information respect-
ing the distances and the nature of the roads over
which he must pass. Before starting, he will make
himself thoroughly acquainted with the precise pur-
port of his mission, and will ask for any necessary ex-
planations from the chief who sends him ; after start-
ing, he will execute his instructions to the letter.
Some important but unforeseen circumstance may,
however, compel him to depart from them in part ; in
this case he should conform to their spirit, and con-
duct himself with reference to the general interests of
the service ; but, to justify this, there must exist real
impossibility. Should he extricate himself skilfully
from such a position, he will prove his capacity for
war, and earn a title to be selected for diflScult com-
mands.*

Before setting out, he will assemble his detach-
ment, carefully pass it in review, and assure himself
that it is provided with everything necessary, pro-
visions, munitions, stores, etc. He will inspect the
arms, equipment, and clothing. In the infantry, he
will direct his attention to the shoes and the knap-
sacks ; in the cavalry he will inspect the packing, and
see that the horses' shoes are in good condition.

* Jacquinot de Presles, p. 390.

238 MINOR OPERATIONS.

A detachment, wlien marching, is always in a
state of feebleness, since the column is lengthened,
and the order of march is not suitable for combat,
especially when the distances have been lost. Hence
it is indispensable that it should have time to form
itself in case of a sudden attack ; and on this account
it is preceded by a small body, called the advance-
guard^ which explores the country and gives notice
of the approach of the enemy. For similar purposes,
a small body is placed in rear of the detachment, called
the rear-guavd. Thus a detachment marches between
an advance-guard and rear-guard. But it is not suffi-
cient to be guarded in front and rear ; a hostile body
might debouch perpendicularly to the route, and fall
upon the flank or the centre of the column, and the
advance and rear-guards would not be able to oppose
them. This danger is guarded against by throwing
out skirmishers or flankers on the right and left, upon
the flanks of the detachment, whose duty it is to scour
the surrounding country and to examine all the by-
ways, going across the fields, if necessary, marching
in various directions, watching for unusual sounds,
and inspecting every suspicious object ; without, how-
ever, separating too far from the main body, as they
would be liable to be cut ofi*. No fixed rules can be
given for all detachments as to the force of the ad-
vance and rear-guards, and the number of flankers : it
is evident, however, that their importance increases
with the effective force of the detachment and the
complications of the ground. Some authors consider

DETACHMENTS. 239

one fourth tlie force of a detaclimeiit as the proper
jDroportion for the advance-guard."^"*

The commandant of a detachment will usually re-
main at the head of its principal portion. Sometimes
he will stop to see the whole force defile before him,
and take that occasion of correcting the order of
march. He will frequently go forward to the ad-
vance-guard to give his instructions, and to reconnoitre
the country in front ; or, if he has a staff officer under
his orders, he may send him upon this reconnoissance,
as the special qualifications of such an officer will ena-
ble him to gain speedy and exact intelligence. It is
important for the chief of a detachment to know the
cardinal points at night, and if he has no compass, he
will regulate his course by the stars, chiefly by the
jpole stai\ which is very nearly at the north pole of
the heavens. This recommendation is especially ap-
plicable to the war in Algeria, where, on account of
the uncertainty of the Arabic roads southward, it is
important that every soldier should be acquainted
with this star, which will be of great use to him, in
case he loses his way.

"A chief of a detachment," says Jacquinot de
Presles,f " should often suppose himself on the point
of being attacked, and ask himself wliat course lie
would take if the enemy were suddenly to qp^ear ; if

* The details of this paragraph have been substantially given in Part
Second, chapter ii., in speaking of columns on the march ; but thej are so
important that their repetition in connection with detachments will not
be thought useless.

t Cours d'art militairc, p. 404.

240 MIIfOR OPERATIOJS-S.

the answer embarrasses him, if a course at once pru-
dent and honorable does not occur to Ms mind, lie is
not yet a good officer^ and his detachment is very much
exposed ; for it is probable that he will lose his pres-
ence of mind if he be attacked."

Moreover, the detachment which is commanded by
a skilful chief is necessarily, at the moment of battle,
more composed and better prepared for the contest,
than one indifferently commanded ; and the energy
of its action ought to give evidence of this fact.

As a last general observation, we will add that a
detachment, whether of infantry or cavalry, or of both
(without artillery), should not be deterred from the
fulfilment of its mission by having to cross a river.

Detachments, like partisans,* have a right to
shares of booty.

2. Betacliineiits of Infantry. — A detachment of
infantry may undertake all kinds of enterprises, even
the most daring. They are mostly charged with noc-
turnal expeditions ; with coups-de-main in a hilly or
wooded country ; with the attack and defence of ob-
stacles, such as houses, barricades, woods, defiles ; with
escorting or attacking convoys, and with ambuscades.

When a detachment is sent to maintain a position,
it should at once intrench itself there, and make use
of all the resources which the locality affords for the
purpose. Thus, for example, for want of trees in the
vicinity, it may, if necessary, demolish some huts and

* See, hereafter, chapter vi. of this Part.

DETACHMENTS.

241

use the wood in the construction of barricades ; but
the commandant must, nevertheless, remember that
the regulations respecting campaign service prescribe
that all destruction of property is to he avoided which
is not indispensable.

A detachment of infantry can easily conceal and
barricade itself; it can be covered by almost anything ;
and therefore its march, which is comparatively noise-
less, is readily screened from observation ; it scarcely
leaves any trace of its passage, and can travel consid-
erable distances without renewing its supply of pro-
visions; all these are advantages which it possesses
over a detachment of cavalry.

When 'a detachment of infantry falls in with the
enemy, the best course for it to pursue, is to assume a
bold front and rush to the attack. At night especially,
and in favorable localities, this course will have the
best chance of success. Hilly ground is the most fa-
vorable for its action ; but upon a plain it will be at a
disadvantage against cavalry. It should, therefore,
avoid travelling a great extent of level country, at
least during the day. Frequently, when it has not
been able to accomplish its purpose in a single night,
it will halt and conceal itself during the day behind
some obstacle, and not set out again upon its march
until night. In mountainous districts it may march
by day, but it will yet be proper to avoid the villages
and frequented roads.

In order to offer greater resistance to the enemy,
a detachment of infantry should march in column by
sections. It must not be obliged to put files in the
16

242

MESrOR OPERATIONS.

rear in contracted ground, for it is a vicious formation,
and an embarrassing one in case of attack ; lience the
sections should be formed upon a small front : ten or
twelve files will be sufficient. There should be an
even number of sections, so as to facilitate the foima-
tion of a square. Like all detachments, it will have
an advance and a rear-guard ; and we can here assign a
more precise limit for the approximate force to be
given to these two fractions of a detachment of infan-
try, namely one half (at most) of the whole force, if
the latter be under 500 men ; but if the force be over
500 men, the advance-guard, the rear-guard, and the
flankers should not together exceed one tJiird the
force. For a forward march, the advance-guard will
be the most considerable of the secondary portions of
the detachment; for a retrograde movement, it will
be the rear-guard. According to these considerations,
the marching formation of a detachment of infantry is
as follows :

DETACHMENT OF 150 MEN.
(In three ranks.)
1 1 15 men,

■• 1

DETACHMENT OF 90 MEN.
(In two ranks.)
f t^ 8 men.

Advance-guard. ■<

Q 5 men.

Principal corps .
and nankers.

Eear-guard,

CJ 6 men.

DETACHMENTS.

243

3. Betaclimeiits of Cavalry. — Detacliments of cav-
alry are principally used in such service as requires
celerity, as that of escorts, rapid reconnoissances, levy-
ing contributions, posts of observation, etc. In opera-
tions of tHs kind, the mounted soldier may make
good use of his fire-arms.

The duty of the advance-guard of a detachment
of cavalry will be to give warning of the presence of
the enemy. The detachment, upon this warning, may
either charge or retreat, according to circumstances ;
but it should not remain stationary unless it has not
been itself discovered.

A detachment of cavalry has the advantage upon
level ground ; but irregular ground is unfavorable to
it. Defiles are dangerous to it, as infantry can there
easily lie in ambush ; these should, therefore, be
avoided by a detour ; but if that is not possible, they
should first be explored by scouts, or by some of the
horsemen themselves (on foot, however) ; and after-
ward the defile should be passed at a gallop. When
the defile is more than a league in length, the recon-
noissance of it must be abandoned ; and in this case
it must be entered with caution, breaking up the de-
tachment into platoons of ten or twelve horsemen
each, and marching in a disconnected manner, so as
to present more void than full space to the fire of an
ambuscaded enemy. In this way, and aided by the
rapidity of movement, the detachment will probably
escape serious damage. It would be an excellent
safeguard to occupy the overlooking heights before

244 MmOR OPERATIONS.

entering into tlie defiles, but this is often a difficult
operation for cavalry.

A detachment of cavalry will usually form by
platoons, which is the most suitable order for combat.
The extent of the front of each platoon should be such
that the detachment leaves a portion of the road free,
in order that it may easily make a half turn in the
event of a sudden attack, which does not permit it to
deploy. It will also be prudent to keep the left side
of the road ; for, in a rencontre, it will then be at-
tacked by the right flank, which is the strong side of
the horseman.

4. Mixed i>etachiiaeiits. — Mixed detachments pos-
sess more coherence or stability than those consisting
of a single arm. No others should be employed in
insurgent districts. The escorts of a convoy, of a for-
aging party, or of a park, having to act over a great
extent of country, should be mixed.

The order of march of a mixed detachment varies
according to the nature of the ground it traverses.
On level ground, the cavalry takes the lead, and
watches over the safety of the detachment ; but in a
country cut up by mountains and ravines, and covered
by woods, the infantry forms the advance-guard, and
also flanks the column. It is the same at night, with
the difference only, that the distances between the ad-
vance and rear-guards and the principal body are di-
minished.^' In a varied region, sometimes level and

* L^orier, Theorie de Vofficier superieure, p. 138.

DETACHMENTS.

245

at other times broken, tlie detadiment will observe
the same order as in broken ground and at night ; be-
cause but one order of march can be adopted, if we
do not wish to disorganize the detachment by fre-
quent interchanges of the troops of the advance-guard
and of the principal body ; and also because, when the
infantry takes the lead, the cavalry may always, in
case of necessity, come up rapidly to the head of the
column.

When a mixed detachment meets the enemy, it
may either retire or fight. If it fights, it will be
draivn up in two lines, either in echelons, or checker-
wise — the force of the echelons depending upon the
total effective force of the detachment, and being, if
necessary, even as small as a half squadron. The dis-
positions for combat, however, are of infinite variety,
but are almost always determined by the nature of
the ground. If the flanks of the position are covered
by woods, and are thus favorable to a protracted de-
fence, it will be well to throw out a part of the infan-
try upon these flanks, as skirmishers.

To complete this brief sketch, we give on the fol-
lowing pages the order of march of two mixed detach-
ments, one marching on level ground, the other in
broken or hilly ground. These figures (in which the
symbol denotes a single horseman, and O a single
foot soldier) explain themselves.

246

MINOE OPERATIONS.

MIXED DETACHMENT OF 800 FOOT AND 50 HOKSE, MAECHING ON
LEVEL GKOUND.

«%

» It «

JSIIbrses

♦

3 Infantry

Principal corps (Infantry— 240 men).
10

3
o

•

vvv

<>00

^ Infantry

DETACHMENTS.

247

MIXED DETACHMENT OF 200 FOOT AND 50 HOPwSE, MAECHING IN
BROKEN GEOUND.

« o 31 Hnrry^

Patrol of 10 foot I [

Principal corps (132 men).
il

3\ z:::^

□ Patrol of 10 foot.

o o

InfryO

CHAPTER THIRD.

ARMED EECOIS^NOISSANCES.

IisTTEODUcTiois-. — Armed reconnaissance * is the des-
ignation applied to any movement of troops, made
with the object of discovering or verifying one or
more particulars respecting the position, the force, the
movements, or even the intentions of the enemy.

This definition shows that such a reconnoissance
constitutes the basis of every military operation, and
ought to precede it. Without a reconnoissance, we
should be constantly liable to surprises.

Since armies generally cover their marches by
flankers, and their camps and cantonments by a chain
of outposts, it follows that, in order to obtain a view
of their disposition, we must push beyond these flank-
ers or this chain, by a reconnoissance, which can clear
away the obstacles to such an inspection. We see,
therefore, in advance, that the service of reconnois-
sances is attended with difficulties and complications.

We must not confound the reconnoissance by

* In these Elements we are not required to treat of topograpMcal re-
connoissancee.

AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 249

patrol, made by tlie gi^and guards for tlieir security,
witli a reconnoissance proper. Tlie patrol reconnoi-
tres within narrower limits, confining itself to its
chief purpose — that of assuring itself of the position
in which the enemy is posted, without troubling itself
with their tactical arrangement, or with the topo-
graphical strength of their position; while a recon-
noissance examines in detail the position of the enemy,
the weak points of his position, the mode of attack-
B ing it, the composition of the opposing corps in troops

■ of the several arms, the character of the soldiers, the

■ vigilance of the officers, the condition of their sup-

■ plies, the designs of their chief, the confidence he in-

■ spires, etc. ; in short, sees and collects as much infor-
^^^ mation as possible.

^^t "We shall distinguish ^ve kinds of reconnoissance :
^^B 1st. Daily reconnoissances ;
^^B 2d. Special reconnoissances ;
^^B 3d. Secret reconnoissances ;
P^B 4th. Offensive reconnoissances ;

5th. Reconnoissances in Africa.
I Before entering upon these last, we shall speak of

the reports which should accompany every reconnois-
sance, and shall cite some historical examples, calcu-
^^ lated to show the importance of this minor operation
mm of war.

Armed reconnoissances do not always bring back
all the information needed, even when they are suc-
cessful, and it becomes necessary to complete them by
accessory means, which we shall also study. We shall
first say a few words respecting the maps which ex-

250 MESrOR OPERATIO]S"S.

Mbit tlie form and character of tlie country ; we shall
speak of tlie guides who conduct the columns safely
through their various detours ; we shall point out the
questions to be put to deserters, to the inhabitants, to
travellers, to prisoners, in order to make a profitable
use of them ; we shall treat of spies and of the proper
treatment of them ; and we shall conclude with details
respecting the principal signs, the observation of which
may develop some particulars respecting the enemy.

1. l>aiiy Reconifloissances.* — Daily reconnoissances
are made to ensure the safety either of the camps or
cantonments, or of the advanced posts. They should
ascertain the designs of the enemy, and whether he
is preparing to march, to surprise, or to fight. Cer-
tain signs will guide them in this respect, especially
what occurs at the outposts ; for if they are increased,
it is a sign of stagnation ; if such posts are modified,
it denotes a change of position.

In a level country the reconnoissances will be made
by light cavalry ; but in mountainous countries, they
will be made by infantry, which, however, should be
accompanied by some horsemen for the prompt trans-
mission of intelligence. In a varied country the re-
connoitring body will be composed of troops of
both arms, and in all cases the numbers should be
small.

The service of reconnoissances, like that of out-
posts, must be divested of regularity, for this would

* The reader will do well to consult, in relation to daily reconnois-
sances, the Ordonnance sur le service en campagne, art. x., chap. i.

AKMED RECONNOISSANCES. 251

soon give the enemy tlie knowledge of the usages
practised, and would facilitate the destruction of the
corps of reconnoissance.

It is an essential principle in reconnoissances that
to reconnoitre is not to attack. Moreover, a reconnoi-
tring body should march with precaution, conceal its
presence, and avoid compromising itself It should
consider combat not as its end, but solely as the ex-
treme means of obtaining information, by taking pris-
oners. There is also another case in which it may re-
sort to combat ; namely, when it falls in with a de-
tachment of the enemy marching rapidly upon the
camp ; it will then retard their advance by assailing
them, having first detached a horseman to give warn-
ing to the camp. In such a case, it should not hesi-
tate ; it should, nevertheless, take advantage of local
peculiarities to the utmost extent, to compensate for
its numerical inferiority.

A reconnoissance should march as a detachment,
with an advance-guard, a rear-guard and flankers.
The latter should take care never to be out of sight
of the principal body during the day, as one or
more of them carried off would suffice to guide the
enemy upon the track of the reconnoissance, and
would enable them to surprise it before it suspected
danger.

In order to avoid ambuscades, a reconnoissance
should not traverse inhabited districts before having
examined them thoroughly, and taken, when necessary,
hostages for the peaceful disposition of the inhabi-
tants. It should arrest all individuals following its

252 MINOR OPERATIONS.

path or attempting to pass it, who might, otherwise,
give notice of its movements to the enemy.

"When a reconnoissance cannot accomplish its pur-
pose without halting, it should do so behind some
accident of ground, a wood, or a wall, which will con-
ceal it ; and should also cover itself, during the halt,
by some vedettes stationed on the roads on the side
from whence an attack is to be feared.

A reconnoissance may successfully reconnoitre a
column of the enemy on the march. For this purpose
it will follow the column, keep alongside of it without
allowing itself to be perceived, see it defile before it-
self, count it, note the number of troops of each of the
different arms, its materiel and its accessories ; will
observe whether it appears formidable, and how it
protects itself; what are its habits in setting out, in
halting, and in passing through defiles ; in what part
it appears most vulnerable ; w^hat its designs appear to
be ; whether its troops are fatigued ; in a word, it will
gather the most circumstantial information possible
respecting the column.

2. Special Reconnoissances. — In the language of
the Ordinance respecting field service, the object of
special reconnoissances will be, in general, as follows :

" 1st. To determine distances, the condition of the
roads and the repairs they may require, the configura-
tion of the ground, and facilities or obstacles it pre-
sents, in order to regulate, thereby, the march of the
columns and of the different arms ;

" 2d. To explore, in all their parts, the positions to

• AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 253

be successively occupied by the columns, either for
the purpose of supporting all attacks, or of sustaining
themselves in case of resistance or an offensive demon-
stration on the part of the enemy, or of insuring their
retreat.

" 3d. To reconnoitre the position and the force of
the principal or intrenched posts of the enemy, the
configuration of his positions, the defences he may
have established there, the difficulty or the means of
attacking them.

f" 4th. Finally, to estimate, as nearly as possible,
the forces of the enemy at every point."
Special reconnoissances belong to the province of
the officers of the several staffs. Thus, for example,
when the object of the reconnoissance is to prepare
the way for the march of the columns, or to ascertain
the force of the enemy, it is intrusted to an officer of
the staff corps ; if it relates to the condition of the
roads, or to the intrenched posts of the enemy, or to
the establishment of field works, it should be executed
by an officer of engineers ; when it relates to the
means of reaching the enemy's position from a dis-
tance, by means of artillery favorably placed, it is put
in charge of an artillery officer. Nevertheless, it is
easy to imagine circumstances in the field in which
such a distribution could not be rigorously observed,
and in which an officer of engineers might at some
point execute a reconnoissance which more properly
belonged to the province of a general staff officer,
while, at another point, the latter might reconnoitre
the most favorable location of some field work.

254 MINOR OPEEATIONS.

The general officer who orders a special reconnois-
sance, gives particular instructions to tlie officer to
whom lie intrusts it : the latter communicates these
instructions to the general of the brigade whose out-
posts he must pass. The general of brigade adds
to these instructions whatever his own special knowl-
edge of the localities and the acts of the enemy may-
suggest, and furnishes the reconnoitring officer with a
detachment. If the latter finds it necessary to the
success of his expedition to carry some posts of the
enemy, he should not make the attack without the
authority of the brigadier-general. The observance of
this rule is indispensable, as the engagement in ques-
tion might assume large proportions, compromise the
brigade, and sometimes even force it to an untimely
combat ; and the brigadier-general is the only one in
a proper position to judge of the opportuneness of a
contest on his front.

3. Secret Reconnoissances. — ^The daily and spe-
cial reconnoissances of which we have spoken, usually
require but a few hours for their execution, and are
usually made in broad daylight. But, besides this
general case, in which reconnnoissances of this kind
may be designated as ostensible (or open)^ there are
cases where it is important to make them secretly:
they are then called secret reconnoissances, and may
occupy several days and nights, according to the
greater or less distance of the enemy, his greater or
less strength, and the more or less hilly character of
the country.

AKMED EECONNOISSANCES. 255

The importance of keeping reconnoissances secret is
obvious ; for if it be advantageous to obtain information
respecting tlie position and intentions of tlie enemy
and to baffle bis designs, it is still more desirable that
the enemy should not know that v^e have obtained
possession of his secrets and the key of all his opera-
tions, whereby we are enabled with certainty to para-
lyze his eflPorts. However, while it is important to
conduct a reconnoissance secretly, it rarely happens
that absolute secrecy is possible ; the enemy frequent-
ly discovers it, and it then resolves itself into the open
reconnoissance.

Let us consider these secret reconnoissances more

Miy.

A secret reconnoissance is a delicate and difficult
operation ; for it is necessary first to find the enemy
without allowing one's self to be perceived, then to
reconnoitre him, that is, to examine him with care,
and to collect the greatest amount of information re-
specting him. It should be intrusted to officers of light
troops, often assisted by a staff officer. The officer in
charge of it should be experienced, and have under
his orders none but veteran soldiers ; for fresh re-
cruits, unaccustomed to combat, might cause total
failure. He will act with prudence, as his mission
requires, but yet, in decisive moments, he will display
boldness, or, at least, resolution, without which he
would often be liable to see nothing and fail of his
object ; for the best conducted reconnoissance is that
which brings back the greatest amount of useful infor-
mation. An irresolute officer will fear to expose his

256 MusroE opeeations.

detacliment or his person, and at tlie last moment,
either from negligence, or sometimes even fr-om fear,
will not approach sufficiently near ; and then he will
make a false report, assuredly more dangerous than
the absence of all information concerning the enemy.
"What we have said in relation to the chief of the se-
cret reconnoissances is applicable to the officers under
him, and the non-commissioned officers to whom he in-
trusts some particular duty, or who accompany him in
his nearest approaches to the enemy : these officers
and soldiers should be mature, experienced in war-
fare, zealous, and faithful. To the same effect Mar-
shal Montluc says, in his Commentaries : " Cajntaines^
mes amis^ il faut plus tost vous Tiazarder d'^estre pris
et sQavoir le. vray^ que non pas vous fonder sur le
rapport des mlains. lis out la peur si avant dans
le ventre^ quHl leur semhle que tous les huisso7is sont
des esquadrons^ et Vasseurent^ et cependant fiez-vous
Id / c'est comme quand Us voyent cent escuSj il leur
semhle advis qvHil y en a mille, Envoyes tousjours
quelques soldats sans peur^ et que plus tost Us se
Jiazardent / et si vous voulez faire mieux^ allez-y vous
mesme. Ainsi ay-je tousjours faict^ et m^en suis hien
trouvSr

A no less indispensable quality of the commandant
of a secret reconnoissance is sang-froid^ for this will
often save him, and in all cases will qualify him to
approach close to the enemy, and there determine
with his own eyes his position and his defences. The

* Under the date 1545, Montluc cites the case of an officer who saw
four hundred horsemen in a valley where there was not a single soldier.

AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. "25T

career of the most illustrious of engineers furnishes in
this connection a striking example. At the siege of
Luxembourg (1683), Vauban, in order to reconnoitre
the place, went every night to within a short distance
of the outer works, accompanied by some grenadiers,
who remained at the foot of the glacis, lying flat on
the ground, while he ascended the glacis and ap-
proached the covered way. On one occasion he was
perceived by some of the garrison, who aimed their
pieces at him ; but continuing to advance, and raising
his hand to signify to them that they must not fire,
was taken for one of their own officers, continued his
inspection, then slowly retired, saved by his admirable
sang-froid and his excess of temerity.

The chief of the reconnoissance should also be able
to speak the language of the country, and if he can
also write it, it will be still better. By employing the
idiom of the country, he will not appear to be so
much of a stranger to the inhabitants and prisoners
whom he may question, and this will render them
more communicative. This condition, which is appli
cable also to all kinds of reconnoissances, more espe-
cially requires to be mentioned, because we are, in
France, generally too indifferent to the study of for-
eign languages — a study of great utility in war, as
this example shows. If the non-commissioned officers
of the reconnoissance can also speak the language of
the country, they can supply the place of their supe-
rior officers, and can be employed upon the thousand
ruses which serve to extricate a detachment from an
unfortunate position. For want of a knowledge of
17

258 MIlSrOR OPERATIONS.

the language of the country, that of the Latin may be
of advantage to the officer, by enabling him to con-
verse with the priests and educated persons ; but for
that purpose he should also have acquired the accent
with w^hich the Latin is spoken by the inhabitants.

The chief of a secret reconnoissance should supply
himself with a good telescope and an accurate chart
of the country he is to traverse, or, at least, with a
sketch prepared at head-quarters. If he can obtain
any statistical or military information from officers
who have been over the surrounding localities, he
will, of course, not neglect to avail himself of it.

The detachment charged with the performance of
a secret reconnoissance will, in general, be composed
of light cavalry. Its effective force should be suffi-
ciently small to permit it to conceal its march, and
yet strong enough to enable it to resist an enemy's
patrol. From fifteen to forty horses* will satisfy
these conditions. If, besides its ordinary duty of col-
lecting information, the reconnoissance have to at-
tempt some minor operation — such as carrying a post,
firing a magazine, disorganizing a convoy — there may
be some foot soldiers added to it. Unless the ground
be exceedingly intricate, secret reconnoissances may al-
most always be performed by experienced light caval-
ry troops, for the horseman can go anywhere, if he is

* The Cossacks often make reconnoissances with a smaller number.
Some five or six set out, and have been known to go as far as twenty
leagues from their camp or cantonment. This results from their peculiar
habits of living, for they are, in fact, mounted partisans, and, in case of
need, exist upon almost nothing.

AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 259

bent upon it. Tlie reconnoissance sets out secretly,
without covering itself by numerous and scattered
flankers, who would attract attention. It will move
with alacrity, in order to arrive near the enemy's posts
before day. It should not, however, go so rapidly as
to exhaust its strength before the end of the opera-
tion. " The powers of the horse," says General Brack,^
" are the fortune of the horseman ; if they are all ex-
!■ pended in one hour, what is left ? The little strength
H that prudence might have husbanded, would save life
B and obtain the cross of honor. Let the officer upon
H a reconnoissance especially remember this."
I The reconnoissance marches with an advance-

■ guard, which is accompanied by a guide. It will be
I prudent to mount the latter upon a white horse dur-
I ing a nocturnal march, in order that he may always be
I distinguished, however thick the darkness may be.
I^^ft When near the enemy, the chief of the reconnois-
sance will point out to his men a rallying point, situ-
ated in the rear, to which every horseman, at his or-
der, or upon a preconcerted signal, shall repair, in case
it becomes necessary to disperse in order to escape
from a pursuit. In anticipation of the possibility of a
forced dispersment, it is prudent to send back, from
time to time, to the point of departure, a note con-
taining the information already collected. It should
be written in very fine characters upon a small piece
of paper, which the messenger places. in his glove. In
case of attack, if he sees he cannot escape, he has

* Avant-postes de cavalerie legere, p. 189.

260 MmOE OPERATIONS.

orders to swallow tMs paper, or to put it into Lis
pistol as a wad, so as to destroy it in firing.

After tlie rallying point has been pointed out, tlie
commanding officer will form tlie reconnoitring body
in three echelons; then, availing himself of the va-
rious obstacles of the ground as covers, he will ad-
vance with a guide and an escort of two or three
horsemen to the lines of the enemy's patrols. If he is
not perceived, he will observe whatever is of interest ;
if discovered, he will fall back to his troop, which
has remained in rear. The successive appearance of the
echelons will deceive the enemy as to the force of the
detachment, and it is probable that some favoring ob-
stacle may be reached while he is hesitating. If not,
the troop should disperse.

The echelons formed by the reconnoissance need
not be very regular. Their distance depends upon
the ground, but it will be prudent not to make it
more than 1,000 yards, in order that each may see the
others.

When the reconnoissance has been discovered, it
is often best to renew it as soon as the enemy has re-
turned to his position, which will surprise him, and
thus secure better opportunities of seeing.

Again, the officer in charge of a secret reconnois-
sance may accomplish his purpose sometimes, by leav-
ing his troop at one or two leagues' distance from the
enemy's outposts^ g^^'^g forward alone with a guide,
and establishing himself by the break of day in a
bush or tree, or in any position from which he can
observe during the day and the following night.

ARMED EECONNOISSANCES. 261

Finally, wlien we do not succeed in gaining suffi-
cient information by other means, we endeavor to
make prisoners ; but tben it will be better to do so
by stratagem than by open force.

We must not forget that, in secret reconnoissances,
as in all others, notwithstanding the difficulty of the
operation, promptness and dispatch are necessary to
give reliable value to the results, for in war every-
thing changes with such rapidity as to make any in-
formation a little old totally false.

The object being attained, the secret reconnois-
sance retires as quickly as possible ; and, to escape the

^ enemy's attention, makes itself as small as possible.
Sometimes its return is secured by intermediate posts,
which it has echeloned upon the road in its advance
movement.
4. Offensive Reconnoissances. — When even the
secret reconnoissances have failed, and the Auxiliary
resources for obtaining information prove insufficient,
there is nothing left but open force. In the case
where two armies, having been for some time at a
distance from each other, come suddenly face to face,
it is also well to obtain positive information of the
situation of the enemy by a grand reconnoissance,
which, like other open reconnoissances, is called an
offensive reconnaissance. This designation is given
to it, because it attacks in order to reconnoitre, where-
as the other reconnoissances, already treated of, not
only shun combat, but are cautious not even to put
themselves in danger.

262 MINOR OPERATIOIirS.

To effect an offensive reconnoissance, a detachment
is expressly formed for tlie purpose, composed, when
possible, of artillery and light cavalry, in order that it
may be master of its movements. This detachment
pierces the net-work of outposts, drives back whatever
covers the enemy, and penetrates to some commanding
point, and keeps up the skirmish until the reconnoi-
tring officer has s^en everything.

Prudence requires that a force should be in con-
stant readiness to sustain the detachment engaged in
an offensive reconnoissance, or to collect it again if it
has been too quickly withdrawn. The infantry is
charged with the duty of affording this support ; and
the whole army should be prepared to march in case
some accidental and favorable circumstance should
suddenly afford an opportunity of falling upon the
enemy ."^ Care should also be taken to throw out
patrols in various directions, to guard against a
manoeuvre to turn the flanks and rear of the recon-
noissance.

It is frequently the general-in-chief himself who
directs the offensiv^e reconnoissance, and he then usu-
ally executes it with the advance-guard of the army.
Frederic and Napoleon both followed this course —
chiefly upon the eve of a battle — in order to reconnoi-
tre for themselves the position of the enemy, and to
settle their plans of attack. In this case the reconnois-
sance becomes, in a manner, an experimental comhat ; f

* Marrnont, Esprit des institutions militaires, pp. 162, 1G5.
t The officers used to call this reconnoissance the rehearsal of the
play.

ARMED RECONNOISSANCES. 263

and, if it fails, it will be better to postpone the battle
until a superiority of force is secured.

As offensive reconnoissances, notwithstanding the
precautions taken not to accept a serious combat, may
go farther than is intended, and bring on unexpected
consequences, the regulations upon field service pre-
scribe that they shall be ordered only by the general-
in-chief, and add : " They are allowed to be under-
taken by other general ofiicers only in cases where
they are acting apart and out of the reach of all co-
operation ; or, finally, in those urgent cases in which
they should not hesitate to take the responsibility."

5. Report. — ^The regulations recommend that a
report be made of each reconnoissance, drawn up in a
clear, simple, and positive manner, distinguishing in-
formation obtained from actual observation, from that
obtained by hearsay, and giving the spelling of proper
names with care. For special and offensive reconnois-
sances they prescribe, in addition, a sketch of the ground
and of the defensive arrangements of the enemy.

The written report which accompanies a reconnois-
sance is as indispensable to the general-in-chief as the
map of the country in which he operates. The clear-
ness and precision required in its style should not pre-
vent its embracing all the details necessary to throw
light upon the results of the reconnoissance ; and it is
better that it be too explicit (provided it be correct)
than too concise — for an incomplete statement always
embarrasses the person who receives it. The proper
preparation of a report requkes an officer sufficiently

264 MINOR OPERATIONS.

accustomed to reflection not to be easily led into er-
ror, and sufficiently calm to exercise judgment and to
compare with coolness tLat wliicli lie lias observed
with that which he has merely glanced at, without
allowing himself to be affected either by the dangers
he may have incurred, or by the rapidity with which
he is compelled to conduct his operations. This rapid-
ity, indeed, is such that, often in the space of a few
hours, an officer may have assembled his detachment,
executed the reconnoissance, prepared his report, and
finished his sketch. For this reason, officers cannot
take too much pains to qualify themselves, as soon as
possible, for the preparation of such reports, by suit-
able studies and practice ; because, if they become ex-
pert in them, they will be capable of rendering good
service to armies, and while making themselves useful
to their country, will earn distinction and honorable
reward. In practising the preparation of such reports,
the officer should aim at doing it both quickly and
well — two essential conditions in many circumstances
of military life, especially in war ; for to do it quickly
and badly is worse than doing nothing, which, at
least, would not lead the general into error by an in-
exact account ; and to do it well, but slowly, is often
to work to no purpose, for in the field all things
change so rapidly that exact and true information at
the middle of the day becomes faulty and consequent-
ly worthless before night. It is enough to say that a
mind slow to conceive is not fit for the service of
reconnoissances ; in the words of Allent : ^* " In war,

* Essai sur les reconnoissances militaires.

AEMED EECOKKOISSAlSrCES. 265

in those reconnoissances where the time, the general,
or the enemy, does not allow more than a coup d'oeil^
all is lost if the officer stops to reflect : the moment
of action passes whilst he is deliberating."

In many cases the officer charged with a reconnois-
sance, instead of reducing his observations to writing,
should confine himself to rendering a verbal report ;
for examjole, when the operation admits of no delay.
It is also very important for officers to exercise them-
selves in making this species of report, in order to
acquire the rare faculty of describing in few words,
and yet with clearness, everything of consequence that
they have seen or learned.

It is evident that, to make a report, written or
oral, in a suitable manner, we should have acquired
the habit of putting our thoughts into shape quickly,
and of giving them a form which renders them intelli-
gible, and a dress which renders them acceptable to
everybody. This habit is, indeed, almost the whole
art of writing or speaking well — a more difficult art
than is commonly thought, and one which is only ac-
quired by assiduous labor, whatever may be our nat-
ural gifts.

6. Historical Examples. — ^The following examples
will serve to demonstrate the importance of exact and
circumstantial reconnoissances to the success of mili-
tary operations.

I. In 1706 : " If M. de la Feuillade had been better
acquainted with the plain of Piedmont and the foot
of the Alps, he would not have wasted two months in

266 MINOR OPEEATIOlJfS.

running after tlie Duke of Savoy, after the latter had
left Turin with his cavalry: and when he had led
that prince to the entrance of the valley of Luzerne,
he would not have sent word to the king (Louis
XIV.), as he so imprudently did, that he held the
enemy in a country from which he could not escape ;
for he would have known that there are none of the
valleys terminating in Piedmont, which do not possess
one or more practicable routes of communication with
the neighboring towns; and that, consequently, the
duke could pass out of the valley of Luzerne by his left
or his right, as might please him, and thus get out of
the way of M. de la Feuillade, who was on his front." *
IL In the early part of the month of November,
1805, after the capture of Ulm, Marmont, charged with
occupying Leoben, followed the course of the river Enns
from Steyer to the village of Reifling, and after reach-
ing the latter place was desirous of obtaining informa-
tion respecting the enemy, who was endeavoring to
reach the mountains : " I then sent," he states in his
Memoir es^^- " Captain Testot-Ferry, one of my aides-
de-camp, an experienced and distinguished soldier,
wdth two hundred horse of the Eighth Chasseurs, and
ordered him to go up the river Salza. "When within
one league of the grand route, some peasants informed-
him that an Austrian battalion had just arrived, and
had encamped a league beyond. Determining to re-
connoitre it before returning, he inspected the shoes
of the horses-, and selected those which could best march
over the ice-covered ground. The rest he left behind

* Memoires de FenquUre, chap. liii. t Vol. ii., 185T, pp. 331, 332.

ARMED EECONNOISSANCES. 267

as a reserve, and set out witli 120 horses. Having ar-
rived near the place where he had "been informed the
camp was situated, he went alone through a wood to
observe them without being seen. He there saw the
battalion wholly engaged in establishing the camp, in
careless security, having placed no guard. He rejoined
his detachment, left his trumpeters on the skirts of
the woods, and at the instant they sounded the
charge, fell upon the camp, throwing down and
breaking the muskets. He collected the disarmed
battalion and brought it to my head-quarters. This
battalion numbered 450 men and 19 officers. This
feat is certainly one of the handsomest peiformances
of light troops on record."

HI. After the battle of Austerlitz, the French
army made a false movement, in consequence of a badly
executed reconnoissance. Lannes and the cavalry of
the reserve started in pursuit of the vanquished forces
by the road to Olmutz ; but only the baggage and
parks of the enemy had gone by this road, and it was
necessary to countermand all the orders to reach the
route to Hungary by Goeding, which was the actual
line of retreat.

IV. The following example exhibits the import-
ance of boldness in secret reconnoissances. In 1809,
Captain (afterward General) Curely was charged
with the reconnoissance of the Austrian army, com-
manded by the Archduke John, in the environs of
Eaab. At the head of one hundred horse, he left his
division behind some ten leagues, hung about the rear
of the enemy, and succeeded in secreting himself in a

268 MmOR OPERATIONS.

wood about 3,000 yards from tlie Lead-quarters of the
archduke. A long, dusty plain separated him from
the village in which these head-quarters were estab-
lished. In his ambuscade he waited for night, in the
mean time questioning some Austrian marauders ar-
rested by his soldiers, to obtain information, upon
which to base his plan. A considerable drove of oxen
happening to pass, he seized upon it, and penned it
within the woods. At nightfall he set the drove in
motion, with his horsemen in the midst of it, leading
their horses by the bridle ; and, covered by the thick
dust raised by this pretended convoy, he approached
the village without being in the least disturbed by
the enemy, who imagined themselves perfectly secure
on the side of the wood from which he was coming.
Having thus reached the village, Curely shot down
one of the Austrian sentries, and thereupon (the dis-
charge of his pistol being the preconcerted signal), his
horsemen mounted and rushed forward, dealing sabre
strokes for some minutes in all directions. The sur-
prised enemy were so completely disordered and stupe-
fied that the detachment left the village and rejoined
its division without losing a man or a horse. Upon
his return, Captain Curely communicated the most
precise information respecting the position of the
Austrian army, and from this position was also in-
ferred that of the French army of Italy, which was in
pursuit of the Archduke John,^*

V. At the battle of Busaco (1810), the position
of Wellington, although very strong, '^ could have

* De Brack, Avant-postes de cavalerie legere^ 1831, p. 200.

ARMED EECONNOISSANCES. 269

been turned by tlie left ; and if the reconnoissances
ordered by Massena liad been well executed, the army
of the enemy might have been attacked in reverse and
thrown upon the Mondego. But these reconnoissan-
ces were not made, or were but imperfectly made, and
as the ground did not permit Massena to embrace
the whole field of battle, he had not time to change
his dispositions in order to afford Ney and Eeynier the
cooperation which would probably have insured suc-
cess." * This battle of Busaco, between Massena and
Wellington, belongs to the campaign of Portugal in
1810, and was, as is known, bloody and indecisive.

VI. Frequently an ofiicer or non-commissioned
officer may run the risk of reconnoitring alone, and
should then resort to ruse. In this connection the
following fact is deserving of mention : In 1814, in
the vicinity of Vic-de-Bigorre, the French had posted
one of their bodies of rear-guards on a hill, the end
of which abutted on the high road, the slope be-
ing clothed with trees and defended by skirmishers.
"Lord "Wellington was desirous to know whether
a small or a large force thus barred his way, but
all who endeavored to ascertain the fact were
stopped by the fire of the enemy. At last Cap-
tain William Light, distinguished by the variety of
his attainments, an artist, musician, mechanist, seaman
and soldier, made the trial. He rode forward as if he
would force his way through the French skirmishers,
but when in the wood dropped his reins and leaned

* Memoires de Massena^ par le g^ndral Koch, avec on atlas dress6 par
lo commandant Lapie, du corps d'etat-major, t. i., p, lii.

270 MINOE OPERATIONS.

back, as if badly wounded ; Lis horse appeared to
canter wildly along tlie front of tlie enemy's light
troops, and they, thinking him mortally hurt, ceased
their fire and took no further notice. He thus passed
unobserved throus^h the wood to the other side of the
hill, where there were no skirmishers, and ascending
to the open summit above, put spurs to his horse, and
galloped along the French main line, counting their
regiments as he passed. His sudden appearance, his
blue undress, his daring confidence, and his speed,
made the French doubt if he was an enemy, and a
few shots only were discharged, while he, dashing
down the opposite declivity, broke from the rear
through the very line of skirmishers whose fire he
had first essayed in front. Reaching the spot where
Lord Wellington stood, he told him there were but
■^ve battalions on the hill." *

7. Reconi&oissauces in Africa.-j- — In Africa, it is
almost impossible to get a view of the enemy; the
Arab camp is everywhere and nowhere at the same
time. It would, therefore, be dangerous to make re-
connoissances in force in that region ; it is better to
rely exclusively upon Arab Umiers, and to meet the
enemy's cunning by cunning.

The name limiers (hloodJiounds^ i. e., spies) is ap-
plied to some native horsemen, who are under the ex-
clusive direction of the commandant of a column, and

* Napier, History of the Peninsular War^ book xxiv., chap. iv.
t This article is extracted from the pamphlet entitled De la guerre en
Afrique^ by General Yusuf.

AEMED KECONNOISSANCES. 211

can report directly to him at all times. They disguise
themselves by putting on the bornouse worn by the
inhabitants of the country. They act by day or by
night, on foot or on horseback, according to circum-
stances ; and four or five are sufficient. They take
various dii^ections, and when they have important in-
formation to give and are not able to return in person,
they communicate it by preconcerted signals ; for
example, by fires combined in a particular manner,
the light of which they conceal with their bornouses
and again uncover it, alternately, so as to produce in-
termittent lights, the longer or shorter duration of
which has a predetermined signification.

In critical moments, these spahis may feign to de-
sert ; but this desertion ought to appear to be real in
the eyes of the troops, and especially in the eyes of the
Arab allies, and the general alone should know that
it is but feigned. By this means, in the campaign in
Morocco (1844), Marshal Bugeaud knew all that oc-
curred in the army of the enemy, and even the con-
versations that took place in the imperial tent.

These limiers convey their messages with certainty
by scattering themselves along the road between the
enemy and the body from which they have been sent.
This method is especially applicable to night attacks.

If it becomes necessary to take some prisoners,
they get up a mock skirmish with the rear-guard of
their own column. At the sound of the firing, some
veritable enemies make their appearance, and aft(»*
some minutes of pretended skinnishing, in w^hich the
skirmishers of the column participate to only a small

272 MINOR OPERATIONS.

extent, tlie limiers seize upon several of the real com-
batants, from whom tlie desired information is after-
ward obtained.

These limiers are also employed to discover tlie
secret provision pits of the Arabs, the guards of which
are always invisible to Europeans. Several limiers
assemble near the supposed position of the pits, and
warmly discuss a project of attacking the French.
Their words arousing the patriotism of the guardian
of the pit, he soon comes out of his hole to join with
those whom he supposes to be friends. They imme-
diately seize upon him, and compel him to reveal the
location of the pits. This ruse is not to be neglected,
as an expeditionary column may subsist anywhere if
it finds these pits ; in fact, the corn which they con-
tain, serves, in case of need, both for the sustenance
of the men and of the horses.

8. Maps. — Maps are of indispensable utility to the
officers, since, without them, they can neither make
nor study war. There are two kinds, general or geo-
graphical maps, and special or topographical maps :
the first serve for the ensemble of operations, the sec-
ond for the details of the contest.

The great development of public works and the
progress of industry at the present day, conspire to
disturb the accuracy of maps ; for the positions of
highways and manufactories are now rapidly changed
or modified. We should, therefore, even when the map
is of recent date, and executed by an author of distinc-
tion, always verify it before trusting to it.

ARMED EECONNOISSANCES. 273

This verification presents no difficulty when we
are acquainted witli the country represented. "We
carefully examine and compare the cities, towns, vil-
lages, rivers, brooks, mountain-chains, forests, woods,
roads : thus we observe whether the inhabited places
are properly located on the water courses ; whether
the rivers are shown to rise in the mountains and to
follow the valleys ; whether the roads pass through
certain towns or villages. If the portions compared
are found exact, we may infer that the whole map is
worthy of confidence.

If we are acquainted with but one portion of the
country, we verify this portion, and if we find it cor-
rect, we infer the probable accuracy of the whole
map.

Finally, if we know nothing whatever of the
country, we survey a portion of it, and if our survey
agrees with the map, the latter is considered to be
reliable.

Besides this general verification of the map, we
must rectify the topographical maps, especially in the
environs of inhabited places, by questioning persons
familiar with the recent state of the country, or else,
by making a survey of some particular locality, which
we first draw upon a sheet of tracing paper, and then
transfer to the map itself. The importance of thus
verifying the maps is illustrated by the case of the
Allies who, during the campaign in the interior of
France in 1814, were often led into error with respect
to the roads by the maps of Cassini, which they used
without testing them. The necessity of such verifica-
18

274 3^ms^0R operations.

tion is most especially felt in the case of the maps of
the Algerian districts, which are, for the most part,
unfinished, and are far from being satisfactory.

Of the charts which are found on sale, we should
prefer those which are executed in the countries they
represent, foreign maps being usually defective. We
may add, however, that we may confide in the maps
prepared since 1815 by the staffs of several European
armies, even for foreign countries, but especially in
those which emanate from the war office of the French
government.

The road maps^ that is, those on which the dis-
tances from point to point are marked, are especially
useful to military men, as they save the trouble of
using the dividers and scale : but unfortunately, since
the introduction of railways, scarcely any road maps
are made, and perhaps the only one of the kind is the
station map {carte (Tetapes), The public, therefore, no
longer possesses the means of knowing the distances
from point to point, except as calculated by the rail-
road lines and from tables of distances. Military men
should not be satisfied with this, for railroads do not
always follow the shortest route between two points,
and, moreover, in war they may be broken up ; and
in no case will they suffice for operations of detail.

9. Onndes. — ^The best topographical maps, even
those which omit nothing, would not always suffice
to guide the columns or detachments of an army
through the labyrinth of roads and paths of an ene-
my's country, without the aid of men specially em-

AKMED RECONNOISSANCES. 275

ployed to direct them to the desired place by the most
convenient route. These persons are called guides.

In the employment of guides, we have the addi-
tional advantage over the exclusive use of maps, of
being able to gain information from them respecting
the disposition of the inhabitants, the resources of the
country, and the preparations of the enemy. In case
of need, when we are assured of their fidelity, they
may also serve as emissaries to collect on their way
secret information, without exciting suspicion.

For these reasons, an army cannot dispense with
men who are acquainted with the country in which it
is to fight. History indeed furnishes numerous in-
stances of detachments beaten or destroyed in conse-
quence of not having taken guides, or of having em-
ployed bad ones, or of having neglected to watch
over them.

Guides should be chosen from the class of persons
best acquainted with every irregularity of the ground
and its most concealed paths ; such as the rural police-
guards, country letter-carriers, forest-keepers and game-
keepers, good huntsmen, poachers, shepherds, wood-
cutters, smugglers, partisans, certain outlaws, the cice-
rones who in times of peace conduct travelers in their
search for natural curiosities, the difi^erent categories
of migratory laborers, emigrants, peddlers. All these
are poor, easy to gain over, and suitable for guides.
In some cases, especially when we have need of in-
formation requiring intelligence, we may take these
guides from a higher class of the population, but
always from among those who thoroughly understand

276 MINOR OPERATIONS.

the country, as, for example, among tlie employes of
tlie excise, tax gatherers, land surveyors, constructors
of bridges and roads, giving a preference to those
who speak our own language.

In order to obtain guides, when they have not
been procured in advance, we apply to the mayor or
other prominent functionary of the locality to name
them. If the individuals designated refuse from pa-
triotic motives to act as guides, we compel them to do
so by force. If we perceive that their refusal results
from the fear of compromising themselves in the eyes
of their fellow-citizens, we make a show of maltreat-
ing them, that they may appear to yield only to force,
and afterward reward them liberally. In case the
local authorities are reluctant to name suitable per-
sons for guides, when there must always be some who
are capable of acting in that capacity, we seize these
functionaries themselves and compel them to march
with the columns as guides. This course was often
adopted by the French in the Peninsular war.

History, moreover, abounds in examples of the ne-
cessity of employing violence in order to find guides.
Thus the king of Prussia, Frederic the Great, in his
" Military Instruction," relates that, " in the year
1760, while crossing Lusatia to march into Silesia, we
had need of guides. Some were found in the Vandal
villages, but when brought in they pretended not to
understand the German language, which embarrassed
us greatly. We bethought ourselves of administering
some blows, and they forthwith spoke German like
parrots."

ARMED RECONlSrOISSANCES.

277

Before trusting a guide, we must, by questioning
him, assure ourselves of his intelligence. With this
object we should interrogate them separately, without
formality, as if in ordinary conversation. This is an
art of itself, for the peasants, especially such as usually
serve as guides, are much more astute than they appear
to be. We should compare their answers w^ith each
other, and with the topographical maps. If there
seems to be a sufficient degree of accordance, we may
conclude that they do in fact possess the knowledge
B to which they pretend. To facilitate this comparison,
B and to avoid errors, we should be careful, when speak-
B ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ guides, to pronounce the names of towns
B and provinces in the same manner as the inhabitants
ft of the country.

^^^B We should also endeavor to discover the failings
\W or vices of a guide ; for if he be a drunkard, he will
lead us astray ; if open to bribery, he will sell us ; if
a coward, he will lose his head at the first whistle of
the enemy's bullets.* A knowledge of his character,
moreover, enables us to draw some inferences respect-
ing the march he is leading us ; for, suppose he is
I naturally timid, if he appears unwontedly bold, you
may be sure the road he is causing you to follow is
not so fine as he represents ; if he is sad and fearful,
the road adopted is more favorable than he pretends.f

* This may happen to him though he be not altogether a co-ward, for
he can hardly be wholly indifferent when bringing death to his own
friends, and when he is liable to be struck down by a friendly ball.

t Santa-Crnz, Bejlexiona militaires etpolitiques^ translation of Vergy,
V. iii., p. 265.

218 MINOR OPERATIOTTS.

The degree of confidence to be reposed in a guide
also deserves some consideration. If lie belongs to
the nation with which you are at war, you should fear
his patriotism, for he may seek to serve his country
by leading you astray. If he professes a different
religious faith from your own, put yourself upon
your guard against his fanaticism, for he may be-
lieve he is serving God by betraying you. There-
fore choose your guides as much as possible from
people of your own country ; or, when these cannot
be found, from men who have some direct interest in
your success and whose fidelity you have put to the
proof.

Even when the guides are deserving of confidence,
some precautions are to be observed. Take as hos-
tages their wives and children ; seize upon their pro-
perty; threaten them with severe penalties if they
betray you, such as the burning of their houses, or
the death of their hostages and themselves : promise
them abundant reward for their fidelity, and keep
your promises scrupulously.

Treat them, moreover, with kindness ; pay them
liberally ; put them on horseback if it is necessary for
the rapidity of your march ; though, if you distrust
them, you may let them ride bareback. As you ad-
vance into the country discharge them, for they are
mostly well acquainted only with the surroundings
of their own villages. It will be proper, however, to
detain, and even to imprison those who, from your
questions, may have been able to guess your designs,
which they might communicate to the enemy.

AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 279

Wlien you interrogate guides respecting the char-
acter of the roads, never rely entirely upon the repre-
sentations of a single guide, not only because he may
intend to deceive you, but because persons unused to
military operations make no distinction between roads
suitable for artillery and those suitable for cavalry or
infantry. The following fact, related by Frederic,
fully confirms this observation : " In 1745," he says,
"after the battle of Sorr, when the Prussian army
wished to retire into Silesia, I had some persons
brought from Trautenau and Schazlar, to question
them as to the roads over which I desired to take the
columns. They told me confidently that these roads
were admirable, and that they passed over them with
their carriages with the greatest ease, and that many
wagoners did the same. A few days after, the army
made this march. I was obliged to make my arrange-
ments for retreat in these parts. Our rear-guard was
briskly attacked, but, by the precautions I took, we
lost nothing. These roads, in a military point of
view, were very bad ; but those from whom I had ob-
tained information respecting them understood noth-
ing about them, and what they told me was in good
faith, and wdtli no intention of deceiving me. We
should, therefore, not trust to the report of ignorant
persons, but, with the map in hand, should consult
them upon every configuration of the ground, and see
whether we cannot sketch something additional upon
the paper, which wdll convey a more exact notion of
the road than the map itself."

In general, at least two guides are to be attached

280 MINOR OPERATIONS.

to eacli column or detacliment ; one is to marcL. with
the advance-guard, the other to remain near the com-
manding officer. These two guides should not be ac-
quainted with each other, but should be used so as to
make one act as a check upon the other. It is well,
besides, to have two guides, for the purpose of sup-
plying the place of one who may be killed or severely
wounded. If we have more than two, one of them is
often placed with the rear-guard.

A detachment should always take a guide, even
"svhen it is pursuing a frequented road, because a sud-
den attack may compel it to resort to the cross roads,
w^here, without this precaution, it might go astray.

The guide placed with the advance-guard, who, in
fact, conducts the column, may be allowed to march
unrestrained, if we are sure of him ; nevertheless, it is
always prudent to place him between tw^o non-commis-
sioned officers or soldiers, who are instructed to fire
upon him at the least attempt at escape — a fate of
which he is to be duly warned. In woody and moun-
tainous countries, especially in night marches, even
this precaution is not sufficient, for the peasants are
very dexterous in slipping away and disappearing be-
hind irregularities of the ground, and especially at the
approach of danger. For this reason it is well to
search them and take away their knives or any other
cutting instruments, then to tie them with a rope
about their middle, and even to bind their hands be-
hind them; it will then be impossible for them to
escape except by cutting the rope with their teeth —
an operation which would probably be discovered in

ARMED EECONNOISSAiq^CES. 281

time to prevent its success. The column will thus be
insured against tlie contingency of being left without
a guide upon unknown roads.

When the guide is thus tied, an occasional pull on
the rope will serve to keep him awake on his horse —
for if he should fall asleep, the conducting of the col-
umn would be abandoned to the instinct of *the
horse. This expedient is constantly resorted to in
night marches of the French columns in Algeria.

10. Deserters. — Deserters from the enemy are ar-
rested and disaiTued at the outposts. They are inter-
rogated relative to the situation of their posts by the
commandant of the grand guards, who sends them to
the general of the brigade. The latter questions them,
and then orders them to the head-quarters of the divi-
sion, where they are subjected to a systematic exami-
nation by the chief of the staff. These are the rules
laid down for them in the regulations respecting field
service.

Deserters are not to be trusted : they should not
be allowed to communicate with any but the proper
officers, and should be promptly escorted out of the
army, for they are sometimes spies in disguise.

Deserters are always very apt to give information
respecting the enemy which is calculated to insure
them a welcome, for this purpose exaggerating the
critical situation of the army they have just left.
Therefore we should not too readily put faith in the
answers of these unfortunates, but should skilfully in-
terrogate several of them separately, and compare their

282 MINOE OPEKATIONS.

answers A deserter should be asked tlie cause of his
desertion, how he effected his escape through the
chain of outposts of the enemy, the number and force
of his regiment, whether his regiment contains many
recruits, w^here it is encamped, how duty is performed
in it, what is the character of its superior officers,
whether the camp is abundantly supplied, the propor-
tion of sick, the various rumors that are current in it,
etc. The questions are to be varied according to the
character of the army to which he belongs, and accord-
ing as he has left an encamped troop, or one upon a
march. He is also to be questioned as to the points
upon which he has seen intrenchments being erected,
roads repaired, magazines established, provisions sup-
plied, boats collected, convoys organized, arms distrib-
uted, reenforcements arriving, ambulances prepar-
ing, etc.

11. Inhabitants — By preference we interrogate
the mayor, or chief magistrate, the postmaster, the
curate, the schoolmaster, the distinguished or most in-
fluential man, superintendents of work-shops or fac-
tories, the superintendent of the railway depot, men
who have served as guides for the enemy, the directors
and agents of the mails, the superiors of religious so-
cieties, tavern-keepers, messengers, etc.

The questions put to them, according to their intel-
ligence, will be : Where is the enemy ? In what direc-
tion is he marching ? What is his force ? What is the
state of his discipline ? Of what arms do the troops
consist? Do the men appear fatigued, and are the

I
i

AEMED RECONNOISSANCES. 283

liorses lean ? "What language do the soldiers speak ?
Do tliey belong to tlie line, or are they of tlie militia ?
How does the enemy guard himself? Does he often
make reconnoissances, and how does he conduct
these operations ? What route leads to the enemy ?
Has it any defiles, and, if so, can they be turned?
How does the enemy behave toward his guides ? Do
the officers appear restless and dejected ? What is
the population of this or that village, its distance, and
its resources ? Is the road leading to it broad, paved,
or macadamized ? By what fords or bridges may the
neighboring water courses be passed ? etc.

The inhabitants should be separately questioned,
and, as much as possible, in their own language ; and
this again illustrates the importance of a knowledge
of foreign languages to officers of light troops, who are
specially charged with making reconnoissances.

12. Traveller§. — ^Travellers, whether on foot, on
horseback, or in carriages, who come from the direc-
tion of the enemy, will probably have nothing import-
ant to communicate, as the enemy would not have al-
lowed them to pass if he had in preparation any ope-
ration which could be jeopardized by their indiscre-
tion. It will, therefore, be sufficient to demand, as
La Eoche-Aymon suggests,* their names and pass-
ports ; whence they come, and their destination ;
whether they have met troops marching ; their kind
and number, or, rather, the time it required to 23ass
the length of the column ; the effective force of the

* Des troupe Ugeres^ p. 531.

284 MINOR OPERATIONS.

masses of troops occupying towns tlirongh whicli
they have passed or sojourned ; the condition of these
troops, the proportion of their sick and of their re-
cruits; what villages are occupied by the enemy;
whether his outposts are close together and well sup-
ported ; what is the condition of the roads and bridges,
and which of them is the enemy repairing ; or what
points is he fortifying ; whether there is any scarcity
of provision, of forage, or of ready money ; whether the
country people are suffering, and whether their cattle
are preserved or have been seized by the enemy ; what
are the public rumors ; what does the last newspaper
they have read contain ?

These interrogatories are to be put with the greater
calmness and attention, as they often may serve to
discover spies who are passing themselves off as trav-
ellers. In order to succeed in their detection, we try
to bring about manifest contradictions in their an-
swers, and then, by severity and menace, provoke con-
fessions which usually reveal a part of the intentions
of the enemy.

We should add the remark, in relation to in-
habitants and travellers, that they are not military
persons, and consequently do not describe the country
in the way a soldier would do. This circumstance
must not be lost sight of in questioning them, and
their testimony must be rectified by discussing with
them the positions of places and the directions of the
roads laid down on the maps.

13. Prisoners. — ^The questions to be put to prison-
ers are about the same as those put to deserters.

AEMED KECONNOISSANCES. 285

Some authors have expressed the opinion that we
should rely upon their testimony even less than upon,
that of deserters ; but Marshal Marmont is of a differ
ent opinion: ^'The answers of prisoners," says he,
"are almost always frank and sincere. We learn
more from them than from the most faithful spies.
The latter often confound the names of corps and of
generals, and very imperfectly estimate the force of
the troops upon which they report It is sur-
prising to see with what candor, simplicity, and truth
I a prisoner will reply to questions, without suspecting
their bearing, without imagining that he is faithless

rto the cause he has zealously served, and which he is
far from wishing to betray.'' *
There is no stronger proof of the utility of the in-
formation gained from prisoners than the pains taken
to capture soldiers and stragglers of the enemy, not
only in the daily reconnoissances, but even by special
coups-de-main, of which the following is an example :
On the 20th of February, 1814, in his defensive cam-
]3aign in the south of France against the English army
under Wellington, Marshal Soult, " wishing to make
some prisoners in order to obtain positive informa-
tion respecting the force and positions of the enemy,
ordered a night attack upon the troops who were
before Sauveterre (near Orthez). Two or three
hours after sunset, when the enemy had abandoned
themselves to repose, and the soldiers, stretched out
before good fires, had become oblivious of fatigue
and danger, a French detachment, commanded by an

* Esprit des institutions militaires, pp. 161, 277.

286 3imOR OPERATIONS.

officer wlio combined prudence witli audacity, crept
with stealthy steps into the bivouac without being
perceived. At a given signal he seized upon the allies ;
an outcry was raised ; night increased the danger ; the
enemy rushed to arms, fired at random and at each other.
The French handful of brave fellows, in accordance
with their orders, recrossed the Gave, and returned to
Sauveterre without a man wounded, bringing with
them some fifty prisoners, yet half asleep, and quite
ashamed at finding themselves taken in such a manner.
It may be imagined that this little scene afforded no
small amount of amusement to the French soldiers." *

14. Spies. — One of the most ready means of pro-
curing detailed information consists in the employ-
ment of spies. We may define a spy as a person sent
out by a military chief to examine the movements of
the enemy, to discover his plans, and to report them.

There are sometimes to be found persons who,
from devotion to their prince or their country, will
undertake to act temporarily as spies.f " The debt
which the State incurs by deeds of this kind cannot
be paid by money, and the government which desires
to be worthy of such subjects should proportion the
reward rather to their devotion than to the service
rendered. J " These spies are rare.

* Pellot, Memoire sur la campagne des Pyrenees, p. 104.

t Thus an officer disguised as a peasant may gain entrance to a place
to discover the means of surprising it ; e. g., M. de Gouru (an officer of
the regiment of Count Saxe), at Prague, in 1741, and Ney at Manheira,
1798.

X Manuel des etats-majors, par le general Thiebault, p. 96.

ARMED RECOKNOISSANCES. 287

As to the spies who follow this trade for money,
they must be regarded as miserable beings, who, for
the most part, are the slaves of passions which require
gold for their gratification. These are the more nu-
merous class. Notwithstanding their baseness, we
are obliged to employ them, because they are often
the only means of obtaining secret information indis-
pensable to success. All classes furnish such spies.
Even at the topmost round of the social ladder they
are found, of the most devoted kind, provided they
are liberally paid, according to their condition ; men
and women, priests and laymen, are equally open to
the enticements of this shameful trafiic. Here are two
examples :

1st. Pnnce Eugene of Savoy, one of the most for-
midable adversaries of France during the reign of
Louis XIV., for a long time had the postmaster of
Versailles in his service as a spy, paying him a fat
pension. This miscreant opened the dispatches ad-
dressed to the generals, and sent copies of them to
the head of the imperial armies, who usually received
them sooner than the chiefs of the French armies.

2d. Marshal Luxembourg had corrupted one of
the secretaries of the English king, William III., who
informed him of the movements of his enemies. This
was discovered by the English, and the traitor was
made to write to the French general that the Allies
would on the next day go uj)on a grand foraging ex-
pedition/'^' Lulled into tranquillity by this announce-
ment, which was also confirmed by numerous reports,

* Memoircs des Marquis de La Fare, 1734, p. 222

288 MmOR OPERATIONS.

Luxembourg remained in his camp at Steenkirk. At
break of day, tke whole army of tbe Allies fell upon
his sleeping troops ; but the courage and discipline of
the soldiers, the coolness and the skilful manoeuvres
of Luxembourg, changed this surprise into a complete
victory (1692).^-

The service of espionnage requires great celerity,
for the information thereby obtained gets old quickly.
It requires persons of adroitness and boldness, who
are accustomed to find their way through any intri-
cacies of the country, and whose faculties are stimu-
lated by the love of gain. In every country such will
be found among smugglers, peddlers, poachers, and
the various traders who visit the cantonments. In
the large towns, they may also be obtained among
keepers of inns and restaurants, and all those who
have frequent and numerous relations with the pub-
lic.f Non-commissioned officers, and sometimes intel-
ligent soldiers, are instructed to talk with these indi-
viduals, discover those who would consent to act as
spies, and bring them to the chief of the staff. When
the army is distributed in cantonments, these non-
commissioned officers or soldiers may engage the in-
habitants who lodge them to play the part of spies,
which they can generally do without difficulty, as

* The French soldiers then wore the cravat. On the occasion of this
surprise they tied their cravats in haste, and the cravat tlms knotted be-
came the fashion, under the name of cravate d la Stebikerque.

t From the time of his arrival in Spain (1710) and during the stay
of the Austrians in Madrid, Vendome employed as a spy in that capital,
a keeper of a billiard saloon, a Frenchman who had established himself
in the Peninsula, and spoke several languages.

AKMED KECOOTJOISSANCES. 289

there will almost always exist some secret means of
communication between the neighboring localities of
a territory occupied by the enemy. At outposts,
when two armies remain for a long time face to face,
the soldiers of the two sides sometimes get together to
chat and drink. In these moments of familiarity, a sly
overture may sometimes be made to one of the sol-
diers of the enemy, to try his disposition to serve as
a spy, which, if favorably received, can afterward be
followed up by a seductive offer.

When all these means fail in procuring spies, the
usages of war authorize a last resort — cruel indeed,
but justified by the necessity of obtaining intelligence
of the enemy. It is to select a rich proprietor, the
father of a family, to compel him to go over to the
enemy under the pretext of escaping from violence, and
then to require him to report all that he knows, under
penalty of seeing his wife and his children imprisoned
or put to death, and his property burned, should he
fail to perform the part thus forced upon him. An
intelligent man, acquainted with the language of the
country, is often associated with him, who passes for
his servant, accompanies him everywhere, and some-
times himself reports the results of the espionnage.
The proprietor is answerable for this man, and is
threatened with the same consequences in case he is
lost, as would follow his own negligence in the per-
formance of his mission. This plan, which should be
resorted to only in the last extremity, was suggested
by Frederic the Great.

When we are fighting in our own country, we
19

290 MmOR OPERATIONS.

should expect almost all the inhabitants to serve as
spies upon the enemy, and to hold it to be honorable
to point out the way of attacking him, in defiance of
the dangers to which this patriotic conduct may ex-
pose him. It is then useful to cause a soldier to as-
sume the garb of a citizen, as he may then more com-
pletely observe whatever relates to the movements of
the enemy without exciting suspicion.

If we are carrying on war in a country which is
divided by two political ]3arties, by giving our aid
to one of these parties, we can know everything done
by the enemy, since the party whose cause we espouse
will espy the other, as occurred with the French army
in the campaign of 1823 in Spain. If, on the contrary,
we are fighting in the midst of an uprising people,
who are undertaking a national resistance, it becomes
exceedingly difficult to procure intelligence, for all
espionnage fails, as the French experienced in 1812 in
Russia, and in 1813 in Germany."^

We satisfy ourselves of the fidelity of spies, either
by comparing the information, with respect to the
same object, as furnished independently by several, or
by determining whether the intelligence they bring
really secures to us some great advantage over the
enemy, since, in this case, it is evident that they are
not betraying you to serve him ; f or else by making

* We may then try the expedient of dressing up a detachment of our
soldiers in the uniform of the enemy, selecting for this purpose those who
speak the language of the country. The peasants may thus be imposed upon
and led to relate what they know. But this plan is not always successful.

t Reflexions militaires et politiques, par Santa-Cruz, traduit par
Vergy, t. ii., p. 372.

AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 291

one spy act as a spy upon another. As soon as we
begin to suspect a spy, we warn him that the report
he has made will be verified, that he will be put
under guard until this verification is completed, and
that his life is staked upon his veracity *

Notwithstanding all these precautions, spies are
frequently double^ that is, they serve both parties at
the same time. If we suspect this state of things,
the best course is to endeavor to gain them over by
rich presents and more distinguished treatment, and
then to get rid of them altogether, if their reports do
not offer anything of special interest. We may also
adroitly let fall some words in their presence, convey-
ing the idea of some false movement to be executed,
in order that they may lead the opposing general into
en'or by reporting it as a real movement, which they
have had the skill to discover. The celebrated Rus-
sian general Suwarrow, well known for his energy and
his singularities, perceiving one day, in Poland, that
there was a spy among the men of his suite, gave or-
ders that the army should hold itself in readiness to
march at the first crowing of the cock. The spy noti-
fied the enemy that they would be attacked about
midnight ; but at eight o'clock in the evening, Suwar-
row went through his camp imitating the crowing of
a cock ; his troops were immediately put in motion,
and the enemy, surprised by this early attack, were
beaten. I cite this whimsical feat, to show the kind
of ruses to which one may have recourse, in case of
necessity, to deceive double spies.

* Manuel dca Hats-majors^ par Thi6bault, p. 99.

292 MINOR OPEEATIONS.

Spies sliould not reside in a camp, nor communi-
cate with the soldiers. They should not be acquainted
with each other ; and that they may not be compro-
mised, they should be known under an assumed name
— nom de guerre.

As spies adopt all sorts of disguises to obtain ad-
mission into a camp, we should watch all persons who
present themselves with that object, such as beggars,
traders, itinerant musicians, and even the inhabitants
who are attracted by simple curiosity. Courtezans
often play the part of spies ; and soldiers should avoid
going far to find them, for they not unfrequently pay
for a moment of forgetfulness with their lives. They
should never forget the case of the Duke de Guise,
who, in 1647, lost Naples for a rendezvous with a
woman who sold him to the Spaniards. Ecclesiastics
and monks, especially in the countries of Southern
Europe, also sometimes act as spies, and perform the
part in a superior style, which renders them very dan-
gerous, of which the French troops had cruel expe-
rience in Spain and in Italy. The best course in rela-
tion to them is to attach them to us as much as possi-
ble, as they may furnish useful intelligence, but yet
always to mistrust them. If our army is fighting in
a country where the prevailing religion is different
from our own, we shall have on our side those of the
inhabitants who profess our religion, and conse-
quently a large number of spies will be at our dis-
posal. This was Napoleon's experience in 1806 and
1807 upon the Prussian territory, where, according to
La Roche- Aymon, the French army had no partisans

AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 293

more zealous tlian the Catholic priests of Khenish
Prussia.

Amoug other individuals attached to an army, a
watch should be kept upon sutlers, who hear the con-
versations of the non-commissioned officers and sol-
diers, and also upon quartermasters' and commissaries'
clerks, who must approximately know the condition
and effective force of the several corps. Both often
serve as spies for the enemy.

The information received from spies, as, indeed,
almost every matter in war, should be kept a pro-
found secret, and especially when in presence of the
enemy ; for the most trifling undertaking usually be-
comes impossible from the moment it is noised abroad.
Therefore, do not allow it to be known that you are
frequently and accurately informed of the doings of
your adversary, as he will then set about discovering
the sources of your information, and will adopt meas-
ures to render it useless. The king of Castile, Al-
phonso X., speaking one day with the Count d'Artois,
heedlessly told him that he was perfectly acquainted
with every secret negotiation entered upon by France.
This imprudent speech put the French upon the alert,
and led them to discover that the spy who gave Al-
phonso his information was a valet-de-chambre of the
king of France.

To conclude this article, we will add that spies,
as soon as they are arrested, should be thoroughly
searched, and their every movement carefully watched,
for they frequently endeavor to destroy the dispatches
they carry. Sometimes these dispatches are concealed

294 MmOE OPEEATIOl^fS.

in some part of tlieir clothing. Two examples will
illustrate tins : In 1704, a spy charged by the Elector
of Bavaria with carrying a letter from Marshal Marsin
to a Hungarian chief, rolled it and compressed it so
completely that he succeeded in enclosing it in a but-
ton of his coat, though his dexterity did not save him
from being discovered and hung.* In the campaign
of 1777, during the American war of Independence^
an English spy, being discovered, swallowed a silver
ball. The Americans got it from him by administer-
ing an emetic. It proved to be hollow, and contained
a message consisting of six lines from a generaLf

15. Indications. — In addition to the various auxil-
iary and complementary methods of obtaining informa-
tion upon a reconnoissance, which we have above con-
sidered, the observation of indications is of great im-
portance. "We understand by this expression the no-
tation of any sign, mark, or signal whatever, visible or
audible, which reveals in any degree the presence, the
force, or the plans of the enemy.

The art of divining the intention of the enemy
from slight indications is one which rarely misleads,
and is one of the most precious attributes of military
genius. In the familiar spirit which inspired Socrates,
in the white hind which followed and counselled Ser-
torius, in the god IsTeptune from whom Scipio-Africa-
nus the younger pretended to receive revelations, we
see figured the art of using indications. To become

* Mauvillon, Vie de Prince Eugene de Savoie, 1740, t. ii., p. 139.
t Sparks' Writings of "Washington.

AHMED KECONNOISSANCES. 295

skilful in this art, we should study tlie character, the
customs,* and the interests of the nation, the general,
and the troops with whom we are contending; we
must acquire habits of observation and comparison, so
as to distinguish the least sign of change in the campf
or in the movements of the enemy. This art of inter-
preting indications belongs to the moral part of war,
and is mostly based upon a knowledge of the human
heart. Marshal Villars was so well skilled in it that
the Duke of Savoy remarked of him, " This Duke
of Villars is a wizard ; he divines everything I am
about to do."

The observation of indications may be useful to
non-commissioned officers ^s well as to their chiefs.
The principal indications may be enumerated as fol-
lows:

If the enemy is distributing shoes in the canton-
ments, and if the soldiers are cleaning their arms, it is
an indication of movement. — If numerous supplies are
arriving, or if new uniforms are seen, new troops are
about to be added to the old ones to make an attack.
— ^If storehouses of provisions are established at cer-
tain points, it indicates that troops are to assemble

* " I liave been assured that the entire success of the passage of the
To by Prince Eugene of Savoy, in 1706, depended upon a game of cards
at which a certain general regularly played at a particular hour, and from
■which it -was not possible to divert him." {Essai sur les qualites cfun
general, in 4to., Milan, 1758, p. 67.)

t Before the battle of the Metaurus (B. 0. 208) Hasdrubal, the broth-
er of Hannibal, heard the command sounded once m the camp of the pra3-
tor and twice in that of the consul, and from that time had no doubt that
the two Roman consuls were combined against him. (Livy, xxvii. 47.)

296 MINOR OPERATIONS.

there. — A collection of boats "brought from a distance
to one point of the same bank of a river, denotes an
attempt at its passage ; if they are burned, an unob-
structed retreat is in contemplation. — If important
bridges are destroyed, the retreat will be long. — If
they are collecting ladders in a bivouac, there will be
an assault upon some fortified place. — "When the ene-
my masks his movements upon the field of battle and
masses his squadrons, he is preparing a formidable
attack ; if he deploys his troops, he is about to take a
position. — ^If he sends his artillery, ambulances, and
parks to the rear, it is an indication either of retreat
or a change of front. — If the bivouac fires appear to be
more numerous but smaller, or if they are, from their
position, too visible, successively lighted and quickly
extinguished, it denotes feebleness or retreat. — When
the enemy attacks at the break of day, his move-
ment will be general ; if he attacks in the evening, his
movement will be partial, and probably for no other
purpose than to reconnoitre, to take position, or to
gain time to cover a retreat. — Foot-prints of men and
horses, tracks of wheels, observed in respect to their
direction, their greater or less depth, and their num-
ber, furnish information in relation to the direction,
force, and composition of a column. — ^The dust raised
by a column gives similar indications; it forms a
dense and slightly elevated cloud in the case of infan-
try, less dense and more elevated in that of cavalry,
very dense in that of the parks and equipages ; the
dust of foragers is lighter and more extended than
that of squadrons. — ^The sound of marching reveals a

AEMED EECONNOISSANCES. 297

passing column in^the vicinity. — If tlie glitter of tlie
aiTJS of a body discovered in tlie distance is very
bright, tlie troops are probably facing you ; if other-
wise, their backs are toward you. — In an insurgent
country, a timid or an insolent bearing of the popula-
tion indicates that the adversary is remote and feeble,
or near and strong. — By the number of bivouac fires
w^e may calculate approximately the force of the ene-
my ; for to each fire there are reckoned 10 Frenchmen,
4 Kussians, 5 Dutchmen, 6 Englishmen, or 6 Germans.
— ^The particular enemy that is advancing is recog-
nized by the shape of the masses, the straightness of
the lines, the form and size of the head-gear,* the
color of the pantaloons and of the shoulder-straps and
belts ; also by the color of the coats or cloaks, which
varies with the different European nations, being
green in Russia, red in England, white in Austria,
sky blue in Bavaria, deep blue in Prussia, Spain,
Wurtemberg, and the smaller states of Germany.

In the observation of indications, we must en-
deavor to distinguish those which are only apparent,
and which are sometimes employed by the enemy to
deceive ; such, for example, as running fires (^feux
volanti) in bivouacs.

* Prussia and Russia have adopted a leather helmet ; in other nations,
the shako, the straw hat, the cap, and the chachia are found.

CHAPTEE FOUETH.

PASSAGE OF EIVEES.

Water courses are among tlie most frequent and
most formidable obstacles to tlie prosecution of war ;
and it is therefore of the first importance to know how
to overcome them. They are crossed in various ways,
according to their nature and to the means at our dis-
posal : sometimes by bridges, which always require
both material and labor ; sometimes in the most prim-
itive and simple manner, that is, by passing through
the water, either wading or swimming ; sometimes by
waiting until the cold of winter has congealed the
liquid element and converted it into a firm highway.

We are here concerned chiefly with the consider-
ation of expeditious methods of crossing rivers; in
short, with improvised passages : but these especially
require that we carefully examine the peculiarities of
the water course, and for this purpose, as in all mili-
tary matters, a preliminary operation is necessary.

1. Reconnois§aiice of a River. — The recomiois-
sance of a river should determine the following par-
ticulars :

PASSAGE OF KtVERS. 299

1st. Its course from its source to its moutli ; the
windings of this course and the most decided bends ;
its islands, and whether these are bare or covered
with plantations ; the nature of its banks ; the exist-
ence of any tow-path, and of roads terminating upon
it ; the direction of the current ; dams, mills, sluices ;
the means of changing the channel ; the nature of the
bed ; its periodical or sudden risings ; the frequency
of its freezing, and the usual strength of the ice.

2d. Its tributaries and their military importance ;
the distance to which the ocean tide ascends; the
point at which it begins to be navigable ; the kind
and the number of boats existing upon its waters.

3d. Its depth and breadth ; the velocity of the
current ; the probable time required to cross it — ele-
ments which we should determine for ourselves, and
not from hearsay.

4th. The fortified places or posts which it washes ;
the use that may be made of it in defensive or offen-
sive operations.

5th. All the points of crossing ; either points suit-
able for an improvised bridge, or where fords are
practicable ; whether bridges are already in existence,
and rest upon stone or wooden piers ; swivel, draw
or flying bridges (ferry or trail) ; giving for each its
length and breadth, its degree of strength, and the
mode of defending or of destroying it.

These various points are to be brought together
and explained with the utmost exactness. For we
must be prepared to avail ourselves of every natural
or artificial advantage, if we wish to obstruct the pas-

300 MmOE OPERATIONS.

sage of the river, and to avoid all kinds of obstacles
if we wish to cross it in force.

3. Discovery, Destruction, and Repair of Fords.^ —

A ford is any part of the river where the water is so
low that we can cross without boats and without
swimming.

The depth of a ford should not exceed three feet
for infantry, nor four feet for cavalry and for vehicles
whose load may be wet without injury ; but for those
loaded with materials that should be kept dry, the
depth should not exceed two feet.

As the existence of a ford renders all other less
expeditious means of crossing a river wholly unneces-
sary, it is important to make a careful search for them.
They are to be discovered as follows :

If we see a path or road starting from each of the
opposite banks, we may almost always infer the exist-
ence of a ford ; but a road on one side only, often in-
dicates merely a point to which horses are brought to
water.

If, at the time of low water, the river flows rapidly
between two banks of sand, there is a probability of
the existence of a ford from one of these banks to the
other, although this ford may not have been used, and
may not be known to the inhabitants."^ Fords of this
kind are produced by the swollen waters at the end
of winter, and are not entirely safe.

Eivers of moderate breadth are frequently ford-

* It is not prudent to rely upon the statements of the peasants res-
pecting the number or nature of fords.

PASSAGE OF EIVERS.

301

able below mill sites, or near tbeir mouths or con-
fluence with another river; for in these cases the
meeting of different currents produces a loss of ve-
locity, and hence a deposit of earthy matter, form-
ing a bank of sufficient height to constitute a ford.

A ford is reconnoitred by an officer in a boat,
rowed from bank to bank. He holds a sounding lead
at the end of a rope about a yard in length (for ex-
ample) from a float, and wherever the lead touches
the bottom, a stake is planted ; a continuous line of
stakes indicating the course of the ford.

A ford may be easily traced also by a body of
lancers trying the bottom with their lances ; or, in-

^ deed, by a number of swimmers, wading as long as
they find a foothold, and swimming over the deeper
parts.
In general, a river presents fewer fordable places
in the winding portions of its course, than in the
straight ones, except in the case of double bends.
For, as the following figure shows, the current which

FORD IN A DOUBLE BEND.

strikes at A carries off the earth from that point and
throws it toward the bank BC, near which, therefore,

302 MIXOR OPEEATIONS.

the deptli is soon diminislied ; in like manner tlie cur-
rent, skirting at E, wears away the bank and increases
the quantity of water on that side, at the expense of
the portion near FG ; thus the simultaneous eleva-
tion of the corresponding parts BC and FG may form
a ford.

Sometimes rivers, which are not fordable in a di-
rection at right angles to their banks, present a ford
in an oblique direction, not suspected at first. These
oblique fords possess the advantage that the current
frequently aids the soldier in reaching the opposite
shore.

A good ford satisfies six princij)al conditions :

1st. The hank of the river from which we set out
shovld he higher tlian that we wish to reach, in order
that we may manoeuvre without being discovered by
the enemy, and may also command his position with
our batteries.

2d. Wide fords are prefer able, because it is im-
portant to the assailant to present a strong front to
the enemy.

3d. The toater should not he rapid, for strong cur-
rents fatigue the soldier, and sometimes carry him
away.

4th. The hottom of the ford should he even and
firm, for loose soil fatigues and mires the foot soldier,
while one scattered with stones wounds his feet. A
rocky bottom, moreover, is too slippery. Hence a
gravel bottom is the best.

5th. Tlie hank on the side next the enemy should
have a gentle slope ; for, if it were abrupt and steep,

PASSAGE OF EIVEES. 303

the enemy might witli great ease prevent the soldier
from climbing the ascent, or from making an effective
use of his weapons.

6th. A ford which the enemy could destroy hy open-
ing duices in his possession^ would he a had one ; and
the same may he said of one which could he washed
away hy a heavy rain or a sudden thaw. In such
cases, the enemy, or chance, might interrupt the pas-
sage at a moment when but a small number of troops,
insufficient to withstand the enemy, had reached the
opposite shore.

Every ford, the utility of which has been estab-
lished, should be guarded and protected with as much
care as a bridge ; and, in case of need, by field forti-
fications. On the other hand, every ford which may
probably be of use to the enemy should be destroyed
or in some way obstructed.

From the preceding enumeration of the various
conditions which a good ford must fulfil, we readily
infer the mode of obstructing or destroying it.

A ford may be obstructed by throwing into it
trees with all their branches, and with their tops di-
rected toward the opposite shore, turning them
obliquely to the course of the stream when the cur-
rent is rapid. It would appear to be expedient, when
possible, to bind these trees together, either with iron
chains* or tarred ropes. We may substitute for this
abatis, or combine with it, stakes of various lengths,

* As was clone by Count de la Roche in two fords of the Montre, a
small stream of Alsace. (See his Essai sur la petite guerre^ 1770, in
12mo.)

304 MINOR OPERATIONS.

driven witli great force, whieli cannot be pulled npj
without much difficulty; also caltrops, planks filled
with nails, or harrows. By distributing these differ-]
ent obstructions in all parts of the ford, its passage!
will be rendered almost impossible. We may also]
render a ford inaccessible by vertically cutting awa^
the bank of which we are in possession.

To break up or destroy a ford, we may dig a
broad and deep ditch, or several smaller ones, across]
it, following the direction of the stream ; scattering the!
excavated earth upon the surface of the water, instead
of throwing it upon the bank, where it would lead
the enemy to suspect that the ford had been disturbed.]
These ditches being filled with water and unknown to]
the enemy will cause the loss of a part of their sol-
diers and will arrest the progress of the rest. For]
the same purpose we may dig wells or pits, eithei
near the shore or in the middle of the ford, planting
a heavy stake in the centre of each. The soldiers
and horses plunging into these will greatly paralyze
the action of a column attempting to cross. Finally,
a ford may be destroyed by increasing the volume
of water flowing over it, which may be done either
by constructing a dam below it, or by removing dams,
artificial or natural, above it.

The repair of a ford that has been broken up or
destroyed, or the improvement of a defective one, is to
be undertaken in the following manner :

If the volume of water has been increased by
means of a dam, we endeavor to obtain possession of
the dam and destroy it : if a dam has been removed

PASSAGE OF EIVEKS. 305

above the ford, we, of course, restore it. If tlie enemy
has dug ditches or wells in the middle of the ford
these are to be filled with stones covered with fascines,
If the ford has been obstructed with caltrops, stakes,
spiked planks, and harrows, all these mischievous ar
tides are to be removed by means of rakes, the ope
ration being protected by sharpshooters concealed
behind the trees on the banks. Folard recommends
for this purpose the use of iron claws or grapples, at-
tached to long ropes, and thrown out as far as possible
into the ford. As to caltrops, this author doubts
" whether they can ever be entirely removed where
the bottom is of gravel, and firm;"'^* and the best
course is then to sink upon the bottom a series of hur-
dles loaded with stone. But sometimes this method
fails, and it becomes necessary to abandon a passage
that is too perilous. It is evident, moreover, that the
broader the river, the more difficult will it be to clear
the ford.

When the bottom of a ford is not sufficiently firm,
it may be improved by sinking a bed of fascines or
hurdles weighted with stones. The entrance and exit
of the ford are to be rendered easy, when necessary,
by constructing gentle slopes on the two banks. If
only a small portion of the breadth is not fordable,
the deep part may be filled with fascines loaded with
stones, or with boxes filled with stone, sand, or earth.

* Polyle^ avec Commentaire, par le Chevalier de Folard, 1Y29, t. v., p.
147. In a muddy or sandy bottom they are quickly sunk, and are for-
midable only to the first soldiers who cross.

306 MINOE OPEEATIONS.

A ford that is too narrow, is widened in the same
manner.

It is a good precaution, especially in broad and
rapid rivers, to mark out the whole ford, by planting
two rows of strong stakes, upon which marks can be
made which will show whether any change in the
depth of the water occurs.

In reference to such changes, it is proper to ob-
serve :

1st. That, as a ford is easily broken up, we must
not rely upon it as a sure means of communication
between two corj^s d'armee,

2d. That it is imprudent to trust to fords in rivers
and brooks in mountainous countries, where even a
very moderate rain may dig them out, or swell their
waters.

We will corroborate this second observation by a
passage from Colonel de Carrion-Nisas.* " The river
Cinca," he says, " which caused the disasters of Csesarf
and of the Duke of Orleans,J was no less fatal to the
French in the Spanish war from 1808 to 1813. The
garrison of a small town, washed by this stream, was
ordered to cross it. According to the usual practice,
but in this position imprudently, five companies,
which were destined to form the advance-guard, were

* Essai SILT Vhistoire generate de Vart miUtaire, 1824, t. ii,, p. 142.

t Read attentively chapters xl. and xlviii. of Book I. of Caesar's Com-
mentaries (on the Civil "War). The words of the great writer suggest the
improvidence of the general who neglects to ohtain sufficient informa-
tion, or who does not take into consideration the accidents to which he
is liable from the nature of the country in which he is waging war.

J At the siege of Lerida (1707), which he nevertheless captured

PASSAGE OF RIVERS. 307

passed over on the preceding day. During the night
the river rose and cut off these five companies from
their companions, who saw them slaughtered by the
guerillas without being able to help them."

3. Fording a River. — Fords rarely answer for the
passage of a whole army, but are of frequent use
for detachments, and facilitate the minor operations
of war.

Before allowing your troops to plunge into the
water, to cross a ford, see that they are not overheated
and perspiring — a hygienic precaution which prevents
many serious diseases, and which should be especially
observed when the waters are cold and swollen.

If the ford has not previously been staked out,
let it be done by some horsemen, or take an expe-
rienced guide from the country, or stretch ropes on
the right and left to confine the extreme files, so that
the soldiers may not get off the track and lose their
foothold.

Where a river, though fordable, is sufliciently
rapid to carry away men, place in its bed, up-stream,
anything which will act as an obstacle and break the
force of the current, such as trees, wagons, and even
horsemen. Also place below the ford a line of men
on horseback, to pick up the soldiers who may be car-
ried away. These horsemen, whether up-stream or
down, must not be too close together, as they would,
if in a compact body, form a sort of dam, and would
have the pressure of too great a volume of water to
support.

308 MINOR OPERATIONS.

The same remark applies to foot soldiers: the]
should never march in close order in a somewhat]
rapid ford, as this would render the file on the sid(
up stream liable to be overturned.

Infantry should enter a ford obliquely, unless th(
direction of the solid path of the ford prevents. The]
should also cross in regular platoons, with intervals
between them. They take off their shoes, roll u]
their pantaloons, put their cartridge-boxes upon thei^
knapsacks, and carry their arms at will, though it
best to carry them upon the shoulder which is uj
stream. The object of the last two precautions is
keep the ammunition and arms from getting wet."
The men of the same rank grasp each other by the
sword belt, so as to form a chain to assist in support-
ing inexperienced, feeble, or clumsy soldiers. The}'
should not look at the water, but direct their eyes to
a fixed and elevated point upon the shore.

Cavalry crosses a ford without difficulty. It is
only necessary for the men to raise their feet to avoid
getting wet, hold up their horses, and fix their eyes
upon some tree or steeple on the opposite shore.
These precautions are more particularly useful where
the water course is broad.

Occasionally, each horseman may successfully carry
across a foot soldier riding behind.

When the several arms cross a ford separately, the
cavalry and artillery should cross after the infantry ;
otherwise they would break up the bottom and make
the crossing for the latter difficult or impossible.

Several fords near each other facilitate the passage,

PASSAGE OF EIVEES. 309

if they are not too narrow : tlie proceeding for each is
the same as above.

Alexander the Great crossed the Granicus by a
ford, oUiquely and in several columns. One of the
most celebrated modern instances of the passage of a
river by a ford, is that of the Tagliamento, in 1797, by
three French divisions conducted by Bonaparte, push-
ing before them the Archduke Charles in the direction
of the capital — Vienna, which was the objective point
of the campaign.

To show the importance which a ford may ac-
quire, we will cite two facts in French history as exam-
ples : If (in August, 1346) a prisoner had not pointed
out to Edward III. the ford of Blanquetaque below
Abbeville, the English, being thus arrested by the
river Somme and pursued by the superior forces of
Philip VI. of France, would have come to the end of
their good fortune, and there would have been no
Crecy to tarnish the glory of the French arms. If (in
the early part of August, 1809), after the battle of Tal-
avera, Marshal Ney had been able to find the ford of
Almaraz on the Tao;us, the forces of Soult would have
effected a passage and menaced the rear of the English
army, and ruined it, by compelling a disastrous re-
treat, despite the recent victory of Wellington.

4. Swimming a River. — An officer who can swim
has it in his power to perform important services.
We will cite two examples : At the siege of Lille,
in 1708, Captain Dubois introduced himself into
the place by the river Deule, often swimming below

310 MINOE OPERATIONS.

the surface. He conferred witli Marshal Boufflers, be-
took himself again to the water with a note enveloped
with waxed muslin in his mouth, and although he got
entangled in the weeds, had the fortune to escape and
to bring back to the Duke of Burgundy an account
of the situation of the defenders. — On the 26th of
May, 1800, Franceschi, an aide-de-camp of General
Soult, having left the First Consul at the foot of the
Great Saint-Bernard, approached the besieged and
famished city of Genoa in a boat pulled by three
oarsmen. He passed the English cruisers in the night,
and had nearly escaped, when daylight appeared.
Immediately a shower of balls poured upon his boat,
killing one of his oarsmen and wounding another. In
this perilous moment he did not hesitate, but resolved
to swim the remaining distance to the city. Tying his
dispatches about his neck, he plunged into the water,
but subsequently, remembering that he had left his
sword, and not being willing to allow it to fall into
the hands of the English, returned to the boat, seized
his weapon, and carrying it between his teeth, suc-
ceeded in reaching the shore, though almost exhaust-
ed. He bore to Massena, the general-in-chief, the
promise that in three weeks Bonaparte would, by
forced marches, come to the relief of the city.*

A knowledge of swimming may enable an officer
to save his life. When Prince Eugene Poniatowski,
while covering the French retreat after the battle of
Leipsic, plunged into the Elster rather than surrender

* Traite de natation, essai sur son application a I'art de la guerre, par
le vicomte de Conrtivron, officier superieur; tliird edition, 1836, p. 166.

PASSAGE OF EIVERS. 311

(October 19th, 1813), lie would not liave been drowned
if he had known how to swim *

Soldiers, as well as officers, should know how to
swim. In fact, a detachment of infantry composed of
troops who cannot swim, will be retarded by an in-
significant stream, and paralyzed in its operations.

We must confess that the Frencli are far behind-
hand in the art of swimming. Notwithstanding the
occasional and temporary existence of bodies of swim-
mers in its ranks,f their army has suffered itself to
be surpassed in this respect by several foreign armies,
and especially by the Prussian. J

But notwithstanding this lamentable condition of
things, w^e will add a few words upon the passage of
rivers by swimming :

To effect sucli a passage, a point of the river
should be chosen where the current is least rapid and
the banks are of easy access. The latter condition is

* Pouiatowski had before narrowly escaped drowning in the Sereth,
at the siege of Jassy.

t For example, Soult organized a company of 150 swimmers at the
passage of the Linth (September 25 th, 1799). This company, command-
ed by the first adjutant, Dellard, threw themselves into the water, with,
their sabres between their teeth, and pistols tied on their heads, and,
under the protecting fire of the artillery, reached the opposite shore in a
few seconds and dispersed the advance-posts of the enemy. Consult the
Memoires de Massena, par Roch, t. iii., p. 36T. In 1853, I proposed the
creation of a battalion of swimmers for the French army as a specialty,
■which it was desirable to establish and to perfect by study and practice.
(See Duparcq's " Commentaires sur Claiisewitz^ livre vi,, observation
Ko. 22, p. 193, 197.)

X See Duparcq's " JEtudes Jiistoripces et militaires sur la Prusse "
(1854), t. i., p. 227.

312 MmOR OPERATIONS.

desirable for infantry, but indispensable for cavalry ;
for without a point of support upon whicli the horse
can place his hind feet, and hence spring upon the
bank, he will often be drowned.

The infantry swimmers should put their effects
and arms upon their heads and shoulders, their sabres
between their teeth, in order to have one weapon
available at the moment of landing. Sometimes they
can place these effects and arms upon a small raft, or
a wherry, if they can construct or procure one. They
should swim obliquely to the current, and down
stream, so as to be assisted by the propelling force of
the water. If they are accompanied by horsemen, the
latter should take to the water above the infantry, so
as to break the force of the current.*

With a proper degree of boldness, cavalry may
likewise cross a river by swimming. Almost all
authors say the horse is a good swimmer ; still, ac-
cording to Warnery,f he should be exercised at it.
This animal swims with his crupper under water,
and hence the necessity of placing the valise of the
horseman, and everything which, by being wetted,
would become too heavy, either upon the rider's

* This method was followed by Cffisar in the passage of the Loire,
and by the Prince of Orange in the passage of the Meuse (15G9). — Infan-
try swimmers, supported by a number of skirmishers, will be of especial
service in capturing boats collected by the enemy, near the opposing
shore, for effecting a passage, or boats that are drifting down the stream.

t This author, in fact, informs us that in the first war of Silesia,
three hundred hussars, attempting to cross the Oder, were for the most
part drowned with their horses, although these horses were of the swim-
ming species. {Commentaires sur Montecuculli et Turpin, t. ii., p. 183.)

PASSAGE OF RIVERS. 313

shoulders, or in a boat, or upon a raft. Cavalry should
also cut the water obliquely to the current, moving in
ranh and preserving some distance between the two
ranks. The men should manage their horses with
gentleness, and speak to them encouragingly.

Each platoon of cavalry may also be carried across
a river by putting the horsemen in a boat, and letting
the horses swim behind it, held by the reins in the
hands of the men. This mixed mode is not entirely
safe ; the horses, abandoned by their riders, lose con-
fidence, press toward the boat, and may overturn it.
Sometimes a number of the horses refuse to enter the
water in this manner.*

The plan of making each horseman carry a foot
soldier mounted behind, has also been tried. It was
in this way that Marshals Turenne and Gramont
crossed the Necker in 1645.

The Tartars cross rivers on rafts constructed of
tnisses of straw or of reeds. They send their horses
into the water in front of their frail little rafts, and
while holding them by the tail with their left hands,
apply stout blows with the right, drive them, swim-
ming, to the opposite shore.

One of the most celebrated passages of a river by
swimming was that of the Rhine at Tolhuys by the

* For want of other means, the Spanish general Sancho Darilla fol-
lowed this plan in crossing the Douro with his cavalry in 1580, when
going to meet the king of Portugal. According to Folard (Polybius, v. iv.,
p. 55), this method was successful in 1639, in the passage of the Rhine
bv the Duke of Longueville, and in 1708 in the passage, by a regiment of
dragoons, over the arm of the sea which separates the town of Sluis from
the island of Cadzand.

314 MmOE OPERATIONS.

Frencli army in 1672. At this place tlie river proved
to be fordable in part, and tliere was only a distance
of about 150 yards to be crossed by swimming. Louis
XIV. directed the operation. His body-guard crossed
by squadrons in regular formation, and in the words
of Quincy, " it was an extraordinary spectacle to see
these magnificent troops swimming in order of battle,
in the midst of so broad and rapid a stream." *

5. Passage upon Ice. — Where a river is not frozen
across its channel, plant two or three pointed trunks
of trees, upright, in the bed of the river at a short
distance down the stream, which wdll serve as a bar-
rier to the floating ice, and thereby hasten the total
congelation of the surface.

Ice is not to be ventured upon where it does not
touch the water ; for if it does not float, but forms
arches, an excess of weight, and especially any sudden
jar, may break it. It should be at least three inches
thick for infantry, and four and a half inches for cav-
alry and light artillery. From six and a half inches
upwards, it supports the largest and most heavily
loaded wagons.

When the cold season continues, the thickness of

* Histoire militaire de Louis XIV., t. i., p. 822. This river passage
is almost always cited as one effected by fording alone. Santa-Cruz,
however, says {Eejlexions militaires etpoUtiques, traduction Vergy, t. ii.,
p. 288) that the king's guard crossed the Ehine " more swimming than
fording." This is the famous crossing commemorated by Boileau, and
which Feuquiere characterizes as " a performance in which success was
the result of temerity only, and which should never be cited as an exam-
ple to be followed." (Memoires, part iii., chap. Isx.)

PASSAGE OF EIVEES. 315

the ice may be artificially increased, if it appears to
be insufficient : for this purpose, cover it with straw,
sand, and hurdles; sprinkle with water frequently,
especially in the evening, and wait a night.

In crossing upon ice, the infantry should break
step, and horsemen and drivers of vehicles should
dismount. Sand and earth should be spread upon
the ice, to save the men and horses from slipping.

As to vehicles, artillery, eta, it is important to dis-
tribute their weight over a large extent of the frozen
surface, instead of allowing it to rest upon a single
point : this will be accomplished by laying the road
with two continuous rows of planks for the wheel
tracks. But it will be still better to substitute sliding
for rolling : for this purpose fasten the two wheels of
each side upon a strong plank by quoins and clamps,
thus converting the vehicle into a sledge, which can
be readily dragged from one shore to the other.

In all passages upon ice, particularly when they
are executed by an army in retreat, redouble your
activity and vigilance to avoid disorder and confusion,
which would inevitably prove disastrous.

We have two fine examples of river passages upon
ice, in the progress of the Grand Elector of Branden-
burg upon the frozen Frische-Haif (1679) with 9,000
men in sledges ; and in the capture of the Netherland
fleet on the ice of the Zuyder Zee, by the French cav-
aby, in the conquest of Holland by Pichegru, in 1795.

6. ImproTised Bridges. — The construction of most
improvised bridges belongs to the artillery service.

316 MINOR OPERATIONS.

We shall briefly consider only some of tlie most sim-
ple kinds.

Bridge of ladders. — A foot bridge sufficient for
tlie passage of a small detachment over a brook, may
be very quickly made of two stout ladders laid hori-
zontally from bank to bank, and firmly secured. The
rounds are placed vertically, and the distance between
the two ladders may be about one yard. Planks laid
closely throughout the whole length and secured to
the two ladders, bind the whole together, and give a
solid footpath.

Bridges of undressed trees, — ^This is the simplest
of all the bridges suitable for a river. It consists of
trunks of trees in the bark, only their branches being
trimmed off, thrown from one bank to the other — to
the number of five or six, or more, according to the
breadth desired for the bridge — and covered with any
kind of planking. The possibility of constructing such
bridges depends upon finding trees of sufficient length,
which does not often happen except where the rivers
are narrow.

Bridge of wagons. — This kind of bridge, being
more ingenious, than really useful, is rarely em-
ployed ; but as it may serve in a case of urgency, we
will describe it. One or more wagons are rolled into
the water (where the stream is not more than forty
yards wide, a single wagon in the middle will answer)
and are secured with stakes. These serve as piers,
upon which are laid beams, which are then covered
with planks, to form the bridge-floor. Pieces of plank,
or blocks, are inserted between the tops of the wagons

PASSAGE OF RIVERS. 31T

and the beams, to compensate for tlie inequalities of
tlie bed, and to raise tlie level of the floor to the re-
quisite height.

This bridge can be employed only in a gentle cur-
rent, and a depth of not more than two yards.

In the year 1543, the French army in Italy had r(i-
course to a similar bridge ; for we read in the Com-
mentaires of Marshal Montluc that " the next day we
passed the river Po, over which we constructed a bridge
of wagons for the infantry, for the cavalry did not re-
quire it, as the water only reached the horses' bellies."

Bridge of ropes, — ^This bridge is used in moun-
tainous countries, over torrents with precipitous
banks, and where the construction of other kinds of
bridges seems impossible.

The most simple kind* consists of half a dozen
ropes, an inch and a half in diameter, stretched from
one bank to the other, about twenty inches apart, and
kept in position by cross-pieces of Avood : upon these
ropes a floor of plank is then laid. Such a bridge is
only suitable for infantry. It is prudent also to pro-
vide it with guard ropes answering as hand-rails ; and
further, to diminish its oscillation by means of diag-
onal ropes fastened to the banks. Its application is
confined to streams of about twenty-five yards in
breadth at the maximum.

* In the wild parts of America, a simple cable stretched from one
bank to the otlier answers for crossing brooks or torrents flowing at the
bottom of a ravine ; but as we must then make use of our hands and
feet to get across, and as the passage is always long, dangerous, and un-
certain, this method cannot be recommended in a military point of view.

318 MINOR OPERATIOIS'S.

A rope-bridge may also be constructed upon the
principle employed for wire suspension-bridges. In
this case, heavy pieces of timber are planted verti-
cally on the two banks, in the place of abutments, to
which two long cables are attached, w^hich hang in the
catenary form and support the floor. This floor rests
upon a number of cross-pieces, which are suspended by
small vertical cords from the various points of the
catenary.

Small pile-hridge, — For the purpose of bringing
two posts into communication, bridges are thrown
over small rivers or brooks, resting ujoon j)iles, which
are nothing more than heavy stakes or stout branches
of trees. One or two rows of such piles, parallel to
the direction of the stream, usually suffice. Strong
transoms of plank are nailed upon the tops of the
opposite piles, upon which beams are laid extending
from bank to bank, forming the bridge-floor.

Such a bridge is easily improvised, as these small
piles may be driven with a simple maul, or hand pile-
driver.

•

CHAPTER FIFTH.

CONVOYS.

Introductiois'. — A convoy is an expedition de-
signed to furnisli an army, body of troops, place,
camp, or post, either witli money, arms, materiel, am-
munition, provisions, live stock, or stores of any kind.
The term is also applied to the conveyance of the sick,
the wounded, and prisoners.

For want of convoys an army may perish,* and
therefore their organization demands the greatest care.
Their outfit and superintendence come under two dif-
ferent heads : one purely administrative, and apper-
taining to the military intendance ; the other tactical,
and appertaining to the command. We shall here con-
sider only the latter, and shall regard a convoy as one
of the minor operations of war

From this point of view, a convoy should never
march without an escort, for it is in vain to suppose
that, because it is hehind the army, upon ground swept
beforehand by the moving columns, it needs no protec-

* " Lines of convoys," said Bulow, " are the muscles of the military
body, whicli would become paralytic if they were sundered." (Esprit
du systcme de guerre modeme^ trad. Laverne, p. 51, 52.)

320 MmOK OPERATIONS.

tion of its own. The force and composition of this
escort must be determined by the nature of the con-
voy and the character of the country to be crossed, by
the importance attached to its success, the distance to
be travelled, the situation of the enemy, the disposi-
tion of the inhabitants, and other circumstances of va-
rious kinds. The escort is always larger for a convoy
of materiel, and especially of powder, which it is im-
portant to keep at a distance from the scene of com-
bat, and out of danger from fire. It should generally
be composed of infantry and a small body of cavalry,
the number of the latter being diminished in propor-
tion as the country is more woody or mountainous.
This cavalry will serve to reconnoitre and watch the
enemy. The principle is that the escort should be
mixed^ so as to overcome all kind of difficulties and
any obstacles it may meet ; consequently there should
be added to it some artillery and a few sappers (or,
for want of these, workmen of the country with their
implements), who can be employed to level roads or
to construct places of shelter.

The grade of the commandant of a convoy is pro-
portioned to the importance of the expedition. His
authority is absolute over the troops of all the arms
which compose the escort. The regulations prescribe
merely that in the case of convoy of ammunition, he
should defer to the advice of the artillery officer in
respect to the precautions to be observed during the
march and in halts. The command of such a convoy
is usually given to an artillery officer, an arrangement
which avoids all complication.

CONVOYS. 321

Besides his verbal orders and explanations, the
chief of a convoy receives the most detailed written
instructions from the general who detaches him. No
superior officer on the route can modify these instruc-
tions, nor can he retard the march of the convoy ; but
every one should rather, for the general good, endea-
vor to promote its object.

" The command of a convoy," says Jacquinot de
Presle,* " is one of the most delicate missions with
which an officer can be charged. In fact, nothing is
more difficult to defend, or easier to attack, than a file
of wagons, sometimes extending a long distance, which
the least obstacle may impede. Whatever difficulties
this operation may present, the officer to whom it is
intrusted should nevertheless remember that, with in-
telligence and courage, obstacles are often surmounted
before which an ignorant man, without energy, would
succumb ; for though the defence of a convoy is diffi-
cult, the attack upon it is sometimes badly conceived
or imperfectly managed."

I 1. Organization of the Convoy. — As SOOn as the

commanding officer has received his instructions and
the necessary explanations, he collects the convoy and
examines into the means placed at his disposal.
I In respect to the troops, he reviews them as any
chief of a detachment must, and sees that both infan-
try and cavalry are provided with everything neces-
^^ sary in the way of ammunition and equipment.
^H In respect to the materiel, he examines in detail

■ CouTB (Vart militaire, 1829, p. 554.
21

322 MINOR OPERATIONS.

every wagon and its harness, as well as its load, to
see whether the former are in good condition and the
latter suitably distributed. Should they prove other-
wise, he requires them to be changed, or at least to be
repaired ; and should his demand not be complied with,
he should represent distinctly the condition in which
he is thus placed, in order to diminish, to that extent,
his own responsibility in case of a reverse.

For prudence, he requires several empty wagons,
and also spare pieces; for example, wheels, poles,
horse-shoes, ropes, etc.

If the convoy is large, he divides it into several
divisions, each of 500 wagons at the maximum,"^ and
each division is then also subdivided into component
groups of about 50 wagons each. In all cases, each
isolated group should have a portion of the foot sol-
diers of the escort to watch over and protect it ; and
this will limit the subdivision and necessitate propor-
tioning it to the number of the escort. Besides, the
forces must not be so minutely parcelled off that they
cannot act together ; in fact, an excessive distribution
would convert a military expedition into a civic pro-
cession, artistically grouped.

The more valuable wagons are placed at the head
of each division, in the following order : money, the
j)apers and documents of the staff, arms, ammunition,
provisions, equipment, officers' baggage in the order
of grade, sutlers' and traders' equipages. By the liead^
we here mean the portion of the convoy which is the

* One hundred wagons to a division is a good number.

CONVOYS. 323

strongest or best protected.^ To speak more generally,
this portion should embrace those vehicles the pres-
ei-vation of which is of the greatest importance, in re-
lation to the special object in view. In a convoy of
prisoners, those who are known to be the most hostile
and dangerous are to be placed at the head. In a
mixed convoy, composed of wagons and beasts of bur-
den, the latter will take the head,f in order that the
roads may not be cut up by the wheels before they
pass, and also that they may more readily escape in
case of attack.

Like every marching column, the convoy is organ-
ized with an advance-guard and a rear-guard. The lat-
ter is required, because in this operation an attack
upon the rear is as probable as any other ; in addi-
tion, it is well to have a reserve to act as a guard and
to fight upon the most exposed flank. The advance-
guard, the rear-guard, the main body, and the reserve,
have each their own commander ; the commandant of
the convoy reserves no special command, in order to
be free to go everywhere and examine everything.

In the organization of a convoy, it is necessary to
bear in mind certain numerical data, the most useful
of which are given in the following summary :

One caisson carries, \ ^^^^ ^'""'''^'^ .... 1,650 pounds.^

( with oxen, .... 770 "
One mule carries, on his back, on the average, 220 "
One horse " " " 190 "

One ox " " " 130 "

* The enemy frequently allows the head to pass, in order that the
rest of the convoy may feel more secure.

t Thus pack horses, for example, should go before the wagons.

I Including the weight of the caisson, the load being thus only 1,320 lbs.

324 MINOR OPERATIONS.

A caisson witli four horses occupies in the iile
about thirteen yards, with a breadth of five feet, and
requires an interval of at least one yard in the rank
and one and a half yards in the file. On level ground
it can move at the rate of two and a half miles per
hour; in hilly country only one and three quarter
miles per hour.

It will be well rather to fall below these numbers
than to exceed them ; and in order that the loads may
not be increased beyond the amount fixed at the out-
set, the soldiers should be forbidden to put their
knapsacks upon the wagons.

2. OTarcli of tlie Convoy. — Before setting out, the
country through which the convoy is to pass is to
be examined ; this service is performed by spies or
partisans, and is also to be continued during the
march. The march should be performed at a uniform
rate, rather too slow than too fast, in order that the
slowest team may keep up with the rest ; for it is im-
portant that the convoy should not increase its length,
since it would become disjointed, and more exposed to
attack.

The advance-guard precedes the convoy. The
common rule is that it should start two hours in ad-
vance when the country is level, and only one houi'
when it is broken. It is better to be governed by the
principle that its distance from the main body should
increase with the length of the convoy, in order that
it may, by reason of this very distance, give the latter
time to make its defensive preparation. When this

CONVOYS. 325

distance is considerable, it would be well to have a
second advance-guard of quite small force, and very
near, capable of resisting an enemy who had escaped
the notice of the first.

The business of the advance-guard is to reconnoi-
tre, to remove obstacles, and to transmit information
to the commandant. For these purposes, it reexam-
ines places of concealment, such as woods, villages,
and defiles, and keeps up a communication with the
convoy through horsemen distributed along the
route.

The march is generally in two files.* On the out-
=;ide, two soldiers keep a watch upon the drivers of
wagons which have been drawn from the country by
requisition. These drivers, being also taken from the
country, may be treacherous, for example, by upset-
ting their vehicle in some difficult spot, where there
might be an ambuscade ; or, not being soldiers, they
may attempt to escape in time of danger. The guards
have orders to fire upon any one who attempts to
run away.

In each fraction of the convoy, a number of work-
men are charged with the examination of the wagons
during the march, and to point out, in advance, as far
as possible, any one in which an accident is likely to
occur. If, notwithstanding this precaution, a wagon
breaks, or if for any reason it requires repair, it is

* If the road is too narrow, and does not admit of two files for more
than a league at a time, it will be better to march in single file altogeth-
er, so as not to lose time and produce disorder by continual changes of
formation.

326 MINOR OPERATIONS.

taken off the road, and when repaired, takes its place
in the rear. If the repair is impossible, the load and
'the horses are distributed among the nearer wagons.

The escort, in protecting the convoy, takes posses-
sion of all dangerous positions or outlets in the vicin-
ity of the route,* and does not abandon them till all
the wagons have passed. If, for example, a defile is
to be passed, the escort occupies the neighboring
heights, and endeavors to discover the enemy from as
great a distance as possible. In this case it is proper
to divide the escort into several parts — especially
when the defile is not sufficient for the passage of
more than one wagon — so that the defenders may be
nearer to the objects which the^^ are required to guard :
they are to be reunited after the passage is effected.

When arriving at the point of destination, so far
from becoming careless and negligent, the command-
ant redoubles his care and vigilance, to make a proper
disposition of affairs in conjunction with the friendly
detachment that has been sent out to meet the con-
voy, or else to join the outposts of the camp or the
place without producing confusion.

3. Halts and Parks. — The convoy stops every hour
to give the horses time to breathe, and to allow lagging
wagons to come up ; these are short halts of ^ve min-
utes. Long halts, during which the convoy may be
attacked, or at least be observed and counted by the

* For example, the debouches of a river or of a chain of mountains,
when the convoy is moving parallel to one of these almost impassable
obstacles.

CONVOYS. 327

emissaries of the enemy, should be avoided. They
should be indulged in only at strong positions, in
places previously reconnoitred, and known to be fa-
vorable for defence. In all cases, the horses are not
to be unharnessed, even for feeding, and the drivers
should remain near them. While resting, a military
guard must be maintained.

The expedition may occupy several days, and then
the convoy is parked at night. Sometimes, also, it is
parked by day, as well as by night, when it is obliged
to stop in consequence of the occupation of the road
by a considerable force of the enemy ; the park then
assumes a more defensive and solid form than in the
first case.

In the park of a convoy, the wagons occupy the
exterior, or perimeter, whilst the horses, whether har-
nessed or not, being more vulnerable, are upon the
interior. If there are caissons loaded with inflam-
mable materiel, they are drawn up with the horses as
much in the centre and as completely sheltered from
the projectiles of the enemy as possible.

The form of the park may be either closed or open.
When closed, it offers more resistance, and somewhat
resembles an intrenchment ; it is, in fact, a barricade
of wagons, sometimes circular, sometimes rectangular,
employed for a regular and obstinate defence. We
here give three examples of it :

The park 'No. 1, which we take from Joly de
Maizeroy,* is protected on the outside by the grand

I * Cours de tactique, 1785, t. ii. la this park, the wagons might also

be placed at right angles to the circumference (the figure represents them

328 MmOR OPERATIONS.

guards and several pieces of artillery, and tlie platoons
of the infantry of the escort are placed within, behind
the circle formed by the wagons. When the wagons
are very numerous, this author recommends that two
such parks be formed and connected tactically by
cavalry placed between them in one or two lines.
This cavalry takes the place of a curtain in fortifi-
cation.

PAEK NO. 1.

^v /^ c:=^ ^ < y

^ r, ^ ^ ^\

ISI

The park No. 2, taken from the " Eegulations for
the Prussian Cavalry," established by Frederic the
Great, presents a solid arrangement with an interior
space, which is very useful. With the rear resting
upon a river, it is defended on the front and flanks
by platoons of infantry covered by chevaux-de-frise ;
and upon the most advanced angles, by cannon, firing

with their length in the circumference) the hind wheels being outside
and the poles toward the centre. This would require more wagons, but
the barricade would be more dense and solid.

CONVOYS. 329

either balls or grape, according as tlie enemy is at a

PAKK NO. 2.

WW -WW WW

AAAK AAAA AAA a

. 'Ill II III! III! .

[] WACONS FACING EACH OTHER U \

HllflmlrtmlllmmmmWm i

nlji()KnlnttKlnhllrilHln m

WOUNDED

Ui Hi III til Iff lb' i!t iSi A til 111 III
^n WAGONS FACING EACH OTHER

' iUiiUtlltt

PAKK NO. 8.

JxZFimeel GnarcL

greater or less distance. This park is fally prepared
to receive the enemy.

A close formation, with the horses
in the interior, shown in park No. 3,
is that to which we would naturally
resort, when the convoy is marching
in two files upon a wide road, and
is suddenly met by an imposing force
of the enemy. [1

The park No. 4, given by the Arch-
duke Charles,* is suitable in cases of
attacks by a small force. Being formed
of partial parks by divisions, situated
at the same distances as in columns,
it possesses the advantage, both in '

forming and in breaking up, of resuming the march

iijl

* Principes de la grand guerre^ p. TO, and plate ix. of Diiparcq's
translation.

330

MINOR OPEEATIONS.

with great facility, as all the divisions can move at
the same time without incommoding each other.

PARK NO. 4.

Ijf y 1 1 1

iiiif

In the parks 2, 3, 4, the horses remain harnessed
to the wagons, whilst in No. 1 they are stationed in
the centre. In all the parks, the drivers bivouac near
their horses and watch them.

In general, the parks are to be formed far from in-
habited places and woods which would afford facil-
ities to the enemy ; and advantage is to be taken of
any obstacles of the ground to diminish the number
of points of attack.

These details respecting parks show that convoys,
while supplying an army, may also become a defen-
sive accessory : they then receive the name of tahors
(intrenchment of baggage for defence against cavalry).
Zisca, the chief of the Hussites, made great use of

CONVOYS. 331

them in the early paii: of the fifteenth century ; and
more recently the Cossacks have employed them very
successfully in resisting superior armies and extricat-
ins: themselves from critical situations.

4. Befeiice of the Convoy. — As a convoy includes
a large number of non-combatants, and may therefore
be seized with a sudden panic upon the appearance
of the enemy, it is prudent and useful to exercise the
whole body, from time to time, in the manoeuvre it
would be required to execute in case of attack.

At the first intimation of the approach of the ene-
my, the files are closed and greater order is observed
in marching. Without seeking the combat, the escort
watches the positions which overlook the route, and
in case of necessity disputes them ; but if the enemy
is in too great force, it will be necessary to halt. In
this case, the best course is at once to put the horses
in safety, to prevent their being hamstrung. The
manoeuvre is simple : the right file turns to the left,
and the left file to the right, bringing the heads of the
teams toward each other, as in the park No. 3 : no
wagons are placed across the front and rear unless the
contest becomes serious, and calls for the employment
of every resource.

The essential point is, in general, to keep the ene-
my at a distance, especially from a convoy of ammuni-
tion or of sick and wounded. This is to be done by
the skirmishers, and while the fight is carried on at a
distance, the convoy, covered on all sides, should file
off at increased speed and endeavor to gain some

332 MINOR OPEEATIONS.

woods or village, or any obstacle which may serve as
a shelter. This method will be successful where the
attack is only upon the flank. If the position of the
enemy is not exactly known, it would be better, pro-
vided the force of the assailant is not too formidable,
to halt the convoy during the action, and to resume
the march after the road has been cleared.

The attack on the flank will almost always be
central. As soon as this is ascertained, the reserve or
the main body of the escort is to be reenforced at the
expense of the advance and rear-guards. This main
body is to occupy the threatened positions along the
route, during the whole time the convoy is passing.

In the case of an attack on the front, the advance-
guard occupies these positions, which are successively
relieved, but no position is abandoned until the last
wagon has passed.

An attack in the rear is repelled by the rear-guard,
which makes a stubborn defence while retiring by
echelons, throwing up obstructions and cutting off all
communication. The rear-guard in this case keeps up
a communication with the convoy, for the transmis-
sion of intelligence, by horsemen distributed along the
road.

In passing a dangerous place, it is proper not
only to occupy the heights and threatening positions
in good season, but also to divide the convoy into
small convoys completely organized, each having its
own advance-guard, rear-guard, reserve, and even
flankers : under this multiple protection they will be
able to pass in security, one after the other.

CONVOYS. 333

Should tlie defence fail, and tlie enemy prove vie- -
torious, the wagons should not be suffered to fall into
his hands untouched. In the first place, a certain
number of them are to be sacrificed, and employed, in.
a dilapidated condition, to obstruct the road, while
the remainder, to which the horses of the broken
wagons will be added, are hurried away. If this
sacrifice does not avail, everything is to be destroyed ;
the wagons burned, and the horses killed, or at least
hamstrung ; and then, sword in hand, the escort must
cut its way through the surrounding foi'ce of the
enemy.

The escort should be satisfied with repelling the
enemy, and never attempt to pursue ; for its principal
duty is to remain near the wagons and protect them ;
besides, it would run the risk of falling into an am-
buscade.

In the defence of a convoy of prisoners, it is neces-
sary to observe the precaution of compelling the
prisoners to lie down during the engagement with the
enemy, and not to rise, under pain of death, until the
signal is given ; ^ otherwise, many a prisoner would
be able to assist the assailant by signs, or by various
attempts of a dangerous character. In this connection
the regulations recommend that the convoy reach
some village as soon as possible, where the prisoners
can be shut up in some large building, the approach
to which is to be defended. This method exposes the
escort to a more destinictive fire, as the enemy will no

11 * The same penalty is to be inflicted, during the march, upon any

prisoner who resists orders or attempts to leave the ranks.

334 3^nN0R OPERATIONS.

longer be deterred by tlie fear of hitting their own
men when these are protected behind walls.

In the conduct and defence of a convoy, the ele-
ments of success are activity, resolution, coolness, and
perpetual vigilance. In the words of Frederic, " The
officer in command must preserve his temper under
all provocations and difficulties, and should especially
be on his guard against false reports."

5. Attack of a Convoy. — We may attack a convoy
with a force inferior to the escort ; for in this species
of action the advantage is on the side of the assailant,
who chooses his own time and place, and brings a
solid force against a scattered one ; and if he also re-
sorts to stratagem and false attacks, he will stand a
good chance of success in his principal attack.

The attack of a convoy is based upon previous in-
formation respecting the nature of this convoy, the
management of those who conduct it, and local pecu-
liarities. A convoy of prisoners or of animals may
be carried off by cavalry alone. In other cases it is
necessary to have infantry, cavalry, and a few howit-
zers. These last are indispensable, as, wdthout them,
we could hardly undertake an attack upon a park.

The corps of attack is divided into three masses :
one destined to engage the escort, a second to fall
upon the wagons, and the third to remain in reserve.
The first mass commences by harassing the escort, so
as to weary it and lead it into the commission of some
error; then, profiting by this error, the uncovered
convoy is attacked with lightning speed. In ground

CONVOYS.

335

more or less hemmed in by elevations, attacking botli
extremities of the colmnn has the advantage of throw-
ing the centre itself into confusion and uncertainty.
Upon level open ground, we should confine the attack
to the centre, thereby cutting the convoy in two, and
gaining a cheaper victory over the separated por-
tions. In the midst of such an attack, a few well-
timed shells spread terror among the enemy, and
hasten the result.

If the convoy forms into a park to resist, the at-
tack becomes more difiicult. We must then prepare
to make a breach in the park, precisely as in a wall.
If we have not sufficient artillery to cut an opening
through the perimeter of the park, it will be better
to wait until the convoy resumes its march, and then
to take it in the rear.

In attacking a convoy, it is not always intended
to capture and carry off all the wagons. In general,
we are satisfied with seizing those w^hich, from certain
indications, or information given by prisoners, are
known to be the most valuable.

Frequently, indeed, the design of an attack is still
less ambitious, the only object being to disorganize
the convoy by thrusts at one or more points. For
this purpose the attacking body ambuscades the con-
voy sometimes on one side and sometimes on the
other, and rushes through it several times, each time
doing as much damage as possible, by cutting the
traces, hamstringing the horses, upsetting, breaking,
and setting fire to the wagons. In this operation,
where it is necessary to move among numerous obsta-

336 MmOE OPEKATIOI^S.

cles, the chasseurs, and especially tlie foot chasseurs,
are most suitable.

6. Convoys toy "Water. — We have thus far been
speaking exclusively of convoys by land. Convoys by
water* are also important. They transport bulky and
heavy supplies with extremely simple means and at
small expense : for example, we consider ourselves for-
tunate if we have a water conveyance for bringing a
supply of siege equipage before a fortified place.

The infantry of the escort is distributed in small
bodies upon the several boats ; there are, in addition,
an advance-guard and a rear-guard of foot, in boats
specially provided for them ; sometimes also flankers,
on light boats, where the river is sufficiently wide to
allow it. The cavalry of the escort follows upon the
borders of the stream, and keeps open its communica-
tion with the convoy. It is preceded and followed by
an advance-guard and rear-guard of mixed composi-
tion ; these are frequently useful in bearing import-
ant intelligence to the floating convoy touching its
safety. For greater security, there should be some
spare boats, to convey the infantry from one side of
the river to the other, when required, in order to line
both banks where the progress of the convoy is re-
tarded ; as, for example, at a bridge or a dam, or in
shallow water.

When the river flows between steep hills, almost
all the infantry of the escort marches on land, with

* Upon rivers or canals. Convoys hy sea are of nrncli assistance in
provisioning an army ; but as they are in general protected by a maritime
force, they do not come ■within the scope of this work.

CONVOYS.

337

advance and rear-guards, for the purpose of preventing
the enemy from occupying the heights, from which
they could easily annoy the convoy.

The defence of a water convoy is simple. While
the attacked escort is fighting upon the bank (employ-
ing chiefly fire-arms), the convoy halts in the vicinity.
If the escort gains the ascendency, the convoy pro-
ceeds under its protection ; if otherwise, it makes all
speed to escape ; but if this becomes impossible, the
boats are scuttled.

Ik A convoy by water is easily destroyed, even with
a small force.* The best plan is to ambuscade it in a
bend of the river, in a wooded spot, and where the
channel runs near the shore, so as to be able to attack
(especially with cannon) both on the front and the
flank, and even to enfilade the convoy, which is occa-

l| sionally possible, as the an-
nexed figure shows. If this
multiplied attack does not
bring the convoy to a halt, the
cannon are aimed at the water
line of each boat, to sink them
by letting in water; at the
same time, the conductors and
defenders of the boat are picked

off by musket shots. In this way, the attack being con-
stantly renewed, the boats will be obliged to surrender.

ATTACK OF A CONVOY
BOATS.

* We raay damage such a convoy by filling its route with obstacles in
advance, such as iron chains stretched under the surface of the water,
sunken boats, fireships, stockades, etc. In combination with one or more
of these obstacles, the attack will be formidable.
22

338 MINOR OPERATIONS.

After tlie convoy is captured, a difficulty presents
itself: for to carry it by water is to follow a route
marked out and known by tke enemy, and upon
wkick the convoy is expected ; and to carry it by land
requires considerable means of transportation, prob-
ably more than the country can furnish. Of these
two j)roceedings, the latter is to be preferred, except
in a case of extreme scarcity of transportation ; but
order to carry it out, it may be necessary to sacrifi<
and destroy a considerable portion of the materiel o:
the convoy.

•y. Historical Sxamples. — I. Tlie siege of Ooi'hie
prevented hy the entrance of a convoy. — After the
taking of the towns Thionville and Arlon by the
French army in 1558, the king of Spain marched with
his troops in great haste to lay siege to Corbie. The
French were at a loss how to get succor to the place,
for, from Marches, where they then lay, to Corbie,
the distance is some thirty leagues, and in that
day troops marched slowly. Nevertheless, Montluc
offered to undertake the expedition, promising to
reach Corbie before the king of Spain. His advice
was at first rejected in the council, and was attributed
to his boasting disposition ; but he, in his usual man-
ner, flew into a passion and cried, " If the king will
but permit, I will succor the town, or perish ; " upon
which he was authorized to act as he desired. Quickly
enrolling in his service seven ensigns, and collecting
together bread, w^ine, oats, hay, and a chest full of
powder, drawn by three horses, this adventurous sol-

CONVOYS. 339

dier, who excelled in petty warfare, was about to start,
when the king sent him word that, as " colonel-gen-
eral " of the infantry ad interim^ he must remain to
command the regiments in person in case of a battle,
and that the command of the convoy that had been
prepared was assigned to Captain Brueil. The latter
acquitted himself with credit ; he marched chiefly by
night, with prudence and circumspection, stopping in
hidden places, and avoiding the villages ; and was
only two nights out. At sunrise after the second night,
he appeared before Corbie. At about 300 paces from
the town he was assailed by the Spanish cavalry, but,
putting his troop on the gallop, he reached the gate
of the city, and then made a stand against the enemy
upon the edge of the ditch. The convoy lost seven
or eight stragglers, but succeeded in entering the place
with the powder, after which the Spaniards no longer
ventured to undertake the siege.

This example illustrates the value of celerity and
prudence in conducting a convoy, and proves that a
little timely succor thrown into a place may save it
from being besieged.

II. Partial success of a convoy introduced into
Lille in 1708. — In this year, Prince Eugene, covered
by the army of Marlborough, after his conquest of
Oudenarde, proceeded to lay siege to Lille. The
French marshal Boufflers, with 1,600 men, immor-
talized himself by his defence of the city, which is re-
garded as one of the most brilliant defences on record.
Nevertheless, Lille fell, and history proves that this
was in a great measure due to the want of skill of the

340 MmOE OPEEATIONS.

French army of relief, in suffering convoys sent to the
famished troops of Eugene to pass. We have, how-
ever, one instance of a brilliant coup-de-main, which
makes some amends for this want of skill in other,
cases.

At the commencement of the siege, the Chevalier
de Luxembourg, who was subsequently made Marshal
of Montmorency, was sent from Douai to introduce a
convoy of powder into Lille. He collected " 150
grenadiers and 2,000 cavalry, each carrying a musket,
a bayonet, and a bag of fifty pounds of powder. To
deceive the enemy, these troops assumed the dress of
the Dutch soldiers." ^ After several demonstrations,
with a view to divert the attention of the allies, Lux-
embourg gave Marshal Boufflers notice of his design,
and commenced his march. Upon leaving Douai, at
Pont-a-Kache, several horsemen of the centre of the
column carelessly spilled some powder upon the pave-
ment, which was ignited by sparks struck from the
stones by the iron shoes of the horses in the rear
of the column ; a number of men and horses were
scorched, but the expedition was still able to proceed.
It reached the camp of the besiegers upon a dark
night, and represented itself as bringing ammunition to
the allies, and being pursued by the French. A senti-
nel hailed them in Dutch, and an officer replied in the

* De Vault, Memoires relatifs d, la succession cfEspagne^ t. viii., p.
107. The supply destined for Lille appears, therefore, to have consisted
of 2,000 muskets and 100,000 pounds of powder. It was also designed
that two regiments of infantry should be thrown into the place at the
same time.

same language, " Soldiers of Marlborough." Having
reached the interior barrier, a close scrutiny by the
captain of the guard had to be undergone, but all
his questions were satisfactorily answered, and the
gate was opened. Some 1,900 had already passed,
when one of the officers, impatient at the slow move-
ment of some of the horsemen, gave the imprudent or-
der Serre^ serre (Close up, close up). At these words
the officer of the guard at once suspected the ruse, and
ordered the detachment to halt. Luxembourg paying
no attention to the order, the enemy fired, and three
bags of the powder were exploded, killing sixty
Frenchmen with their horses. Nevertheless, nearly
the whole body penetrated into the town with their
ammunition, while the rear of the convoy succeeded
in escaping back to Douai.

But for the untimely exclamation of the French
officer, the entire convoy would have succeeded in en-
tering the place. This illustrates the necessity of pos-
sessing sufficient presence of mind, in ruses of this
kind, to carry them out successfully to the end. Bet-
ter not attempt them at all, than to unmask the de-
sign too soon.

III. Attach of a water convoy. — In the campaign
of 1710, Marshal Villars learning that a convoy was on
the way, by water, to the allies, who were besieging
Aire, formed a project to cut it off:

This convoy, consisting of fifty barks, came down
the river Lys, escorted by 1,000 infantry and 500
cavalry. The attack was made at the village of Saint-
Eloi-Vive, between Deynse and Courtrai. The convoy

842 MINOR OPERATIONS.

halted, and the escort formed its order of battle, with
the cavalry on the right, without protection, the in-
fantiy in the centre and on the left, the front covered
by three ditches, the left resting upon an impassable
marsh connecting with the river.

The attacking corps detached by Villars was under
the orders of Kavignau, and consisted of 800 grena-
diers, 1,500 fusiliers, and 300 dragoons. Eavignau
extended his left to outflank the enemy's right, and
occupied a road by which the opposing cavalry might
debouch upon his infantry. His right, composed of
fusiliers, confined itself to firing across the marsh ; his
centre, consisting of grenadiers, crossed the three
ditches and beat down the enemy at the point of the
bayonet ; his left, which included the dragoons, over-
threw the cavalry of the allies, and, turning to the
right, took their infantry by the flank. Almost all
the allied detachment were taken prisoners (500 men),
slain, or drowned. The horses who pulled the trans-
ports were also taken, and used by the victors to car-
ry off their prey. As to the powder, instead of throw-
ing it into the water, the victorious troops adopted
the singular expedient of setting fire to the three trans-
ports which contained it ; the consequence of which
imprudence was an explosion of such magnitude that
the Lys was separated into two unnavigable branches,
and the village of Saint-Eloi-Vive laid in ruins.*

IV. Attack of a land convoy. — In the month of
June, 1758, Frederic, having laid siege to Olmutz with

* Histoire de Marlborough., an anonymous work emanating from the
imperial press, Paris, 1806, t. iii., p. 229 to 232.

CONVOYS. 343

an army of comparatively feeble force, found Limself
in need of large supplies of ammunition. He expected
from Silesia a convoy of 3,000 wagons, wliicli should
have come by Troppau, and took, unfortunately, a
road in the possession of the enemy.

The convoy started with an escort of 9,000 men,
under the orders of Colonel Mosel. Its march was
slow and irregular, in consequence of the bad state of
the roads, which were gullied by heavy rains, and a
large number of the wagons stuck fast in the mud.
Mosel left one third of his wagons behind, and, thus
lightenea, continued his march. While passing along
a deep road, he was assailed by some Croates posted
in a wood, and repulsed them ; but a number of the
peasant drivers being panic-struck, unhitched their
teams during the fight, and ran off with the horses.
The convoy was thus reduced to one half. ISTeverthe-
less, being strengthened by a reenforcement sent by
Frederic, it continued to advance, until it was stopped
near a wooded defile by 25,000 Austrians, who, firing
upon the horses to disable them, and upon the cais-
sons of powder to explode them, spread confusion in
all directions. The escort drew up by platoons upon
the whole line of wagons, and covering them in this
way, sustained the conflict for two hours ; but being
everywhere weak, they were comj)elled to yield to
the attacking columns in spite of their brave and
stubborn resistance. All the convoy was destroyed
excepting only 250 wagons, including 37 loaded with
money, which reached the camp of the king. The
Prussians were compelled by this loss to raise the

344 MmOR OPERATIONS.

siege of Olmutz ; * and tHs event had an important
influence upon tlie whole campaign.

V. Rescue of a convoy of prisoners, — In 1806,
after the battle of Jena, the Prussian lieutenant Hel-
wig planned and executed an attack upon a convoy
of prisoners. This convoy, containing 8,000 Prussian
prisoners, was on its way to Mayence, and had to pass
through Erfurt. He waited for it with eighty horses
in ambush near Eichrodt, which is in the vicinity of
Erfurt, on the route from Eisenach to Goth a, and not
far from the entrance into the defiles of Thuringia.
Dividing his force into three platoons, he fell apon the
four companies of infantry composing the whole escort,
and finally routed them, as they proved too feeble
both to fight and at the same time guard so many
men.f The escort retreated, and the prisoners were
rescued. J

This is one of the most striking examples of the
bad consequences resulting from the employment of
too small an escort, especially for a convoy of pris-
oners.

VI. He-capture of a convoy, — In the year 1811, in
the environs of Placentia, Spain, some French dra-
goons seized upon a convoy of seventy mules loaded
with wine, which made them drunk, and in this con-
dition attacked a body of Portuguese infantry. It

* Arclienholtz, Histoire de la guerre de Sept Ans, traduction clu Baron
de Bock, Metz, 1789, 12mo. ; t. i., p. 102 to 106.

t At the same period I find a French escort composed of eighteen com-
panies and two pieces of artillery, for a convoy of 22,000 prisoners. This
is also weak, but much less so than four companies for 8,000 prisoners.

J I borrow this fact from Jacquinot de Presle.

CONVOYS.

345

need hardly be said that they were repulsed and the
convoy taken from them.*

This example shows that when a convoy has been
once captm^ed, the first care should be to put it out
of reach of danger.

* Napier's History of the Peninsular War.

CHAPTER SIXTH

PAKTISANS*

The term partisans is given to isolated bodies in-
tended to reconnoitre for the army from whicli they
are sent, and also to protect it,f or else to harass, to
retard, and to deceive the enemy ; to cut off their sup-
plies, and to weaken them, by comjDelling them to
send off detachments ; or again to punish the popula-
tion by levying contributions, etc.

Partisans do not act solely at a venture, as might
be supposed, nor do they trust themselves rashly to
chance ; but their operations are connected with the
general plan of campaign, and depend upon the gen-
eral-in-chief under whose orders they are undertaken.
This condition shows at once the restrictions under

* The reader is referred to art. xi. of the Ordonnance sur le service en
campagne. Notwithstanding the official existence of this article in re-
spect to partisans, we would observe that in the present century the
French (and also the English) have almost wholly dispensed with parti-
san warfare.

t Hence they are frequently also q,q[\q(\. JlanTcers. The Ordonnance
says ^^ corps of partisans,'''' and ^'■detachments of fianlcers,'''' whence it ap-
pears that the latter may be less numerous and have not the same need
of a separate organization.

PAETISANS. 347

wbicli partisans at the present day exist, being sub-
jected (except as to the execution of their orders) to
that regularity and centralization which distinguish
not only modern armies, but all associations ; and
hence, also, we see how widely they differ from the
]3artisans of the Thirty Years' War, and even from
those of the Seven Years' War, in respect to the free-
dom of their movements.

The composition and force of these corps are pre-
scribed in the French regulations, according to the
object to be accomplished, the difficulties to be sur-
mounted, the length of the route to be travelled, and
the probable duration of the expedition. They may
sometimes embrace troops of different arms,* but in
preference should consist of light cavalry, which is
able to surprise, to strike, and to retire, almost before
being perceived, and certainly before being compro-
mised. The aim should be to form them, not of many
Soldiers, but of very good ones — for here quality is
mch more important than quantity, as history fully
roves. Therefore, select your volunteer partisans (I
ay volunteer^ because the first condition is to secure
len whose disposition leads them to this kind of ser-
ice), from among men who are experienced in war
nd in outpost service, good marksmen, skilful with
he bayonet and sabre, accustomed to gymnastic exer-
ises, and good horsemen ; men who will not object to
* This is stated in conformity with the regulations referred to. Gen-
..ral Dufour {Cours de Tactique, second edition, p. 346), thinks there
should be no mixture of the two arms (infantry and cavab-y), in order
that there may be less embarrassment in marching, and greater mobility.

348 MINOR OPERATIONS.

taking hold of a spade or a pickaxe when necessary,
and who are fond of the soldier's life ; men of honor
and self devotion ; especially let them be temperate
and robust men, for they will be compelled to suffer
the privations and hardships of the smuggler in addi-
tion to those of the soldier.

One half the infantry of a corps of partisans should
be pioneers, with some artillerists.

The light cavalry will answer very well if com-
posed of ^\^ hundred men, taken by fifties, from the
regiments of chasseurs, hussars, and lancers.

The best corps of partisans will be found to be
those free and irregular corps which are raised during
war by officers of reputation, who are detailed both
to form and command them ; or better still, those who
rise into notice in consequence of political events, and
choose their own leaders. The latter free corps should
have their existence legalized by a species of letter of
marque : they may be called land privateers.*

There are certain essential qualities which should
be combined in a partisan chief, even more than in a
commandant of a detachment, and the proper selec-
tion of such a chief is of even greater importance than
the composition of the corps. He is to be chosen
from among the officers of the most willing dispo-
sition, without regard to priority of rank ; further, he
should be young and yet experienced, and should be
able to speak the language of the country. This com-

* Some authors give the name of partisans only to these free and ir-
regular corps; regarding those as provisional, and properly to be desig-
nated as " parties," which are composed of detachments of light troops.

PARTISANS. 349

bination of qualities will certainly be difficult to find ;
yet not impossible, if the general is possessed of suffi-
cient penetration and decision to distinguish and at
tlie same time disregard the jealousies which are so
apt to be excited by rising talent. A partisan chief
should be of an ardent temperament and glowing
imascination, rather than a cool thinker or methodical
calculator. He should, besides, be vigilant, firm, col-
lected, disinterested, prompt, adroit, vigorous both in
conception and in execution, of strong will, and the
determined resolution to succeed.*

The operations of partisans embrace all those
which belong to petty warfare ; and since the corps
which executes them is not strong in numbers, it must
have recourse to a thousand expedients to compen-
sate for its feebleness, relying especially upon cunning
and audacity, and should make its preparations and act
with secrecy. For such a corps, to obtain much with
little, is a necessity ; and therefore, except when upon
a special mission, it may in general try its fortune and
venture upon hazardous and doubtful enterprises ; for
if it succeeds it renders an important service, and if it
perishes the loss is comparatively small.

Above all, it must cause itself to be respected. In
a friendly country, there will be no difficulty in this
respect, if the conduct of the corps is such as to in-
spire confidence and admiration. In a hostile country,
it should keep the population in a state of quiet sub-
mission, and for this purpose it must not hesitate to

* Davidoff, Essai sur la guerre de partisans, traduction du colonel
comte Heraclius do Polignac, p. 65, 66.

350 MmOR OPERATIONS.

make examples when necessary. It must, moreover,
multiply itself, so to speak, and wherever it goes
must create alarm and disturbance, to conceal the
feebleness of its actual numbers. Even when surprised
and almost surrounded by treachery, the corps should
never surrender ; but, as such an event must have
been provided for in advance, each soldier, at a given
signal of the chief, should make his escaj)e and steal
away among the obstacles of the ground, to meet his
comrades at some previously appointed place of ren-
dezvous.

When once separated from the army, partisans
should bid adieu to idleness and rest, which would
lose them the chance of more than one attack. Their
eyes must never close, and if they are overcome for
an instant by fatigue, they must throw out a line of
spies, to give them warning of the approach of danger.

They march, as much as possible, concealed from
the enemy by the elevations of the ground. Informa-
tion previously obtained from maps or from the in-
habitants, will direct the march, which is also to be
facilitated by a guide, while it is reconnoitred and
protected by flankers, posts, and sometimes sentinels
or vedettes. They march chiefly by night, and always
with order, silence, and discipline. To ferret out
everything, they make frequent and radical changes
of direction. They must be hindered by nothing, for
the lightness of their equipment gives them the great-
est mobility.

They avoid inhabited places. When obliged to
pass through them, they search them, or take hostages

PARTISANS. 351

from among the most notable persons. "Wlien merely
obliged to pass near them, they make requisitions upon
them for provisions and forage for a larger number of
men than their troop contains, which little ruse serves
to intimidate the population, and keep them in check.
They conceal their approach to the enemy until
the last moment. Having arrived at the favorable
point, they attack with vigor and spirit, and so that
neither their designs nor their numbers can be dis-
covered. Their action is doubled in value by its un-
expectedness and by the vigor of its blows. In this
respect they have been compared to vultures darting
i upon their prey. Or else, they ambuscade and wait ;
I which is a game they can easily play, especially in
I rainy and foggy weather.

^B When an engagement appears doubtful, they at
l^^once retire without hesitation.

I The regulations recommend that the chief of a

I corps of partisans should communicate the object of
his expedition to the chief who comes immediately
after him. This formality should always be strictly
observed ; for he may perish, while the orders con-
cerning the object and extent of the operation, as
well as the point of rendezvous, are secret orders,
which cannot be understood by anybody merely from
an inspection and comparison of the first acts of the
! corps, as may be done in the case of most other de-
tachments.

Accordino; to article 119 of the " Service en Gam-
pagne^'^ prizes taken by partisans belong to them,
when it has been shown by the authentic declaration

352 MINOR OPERATIONS.

of a competent authority, that these prizes consist of
things taken from the enemy.* They are sold for the
benefit of the partisans, with the exception of arms
and munitions of war, which are appropriated to the
use of the army, an allowance nearly equivalent to
their value being made for them. The division of the
profits of this sale, or indemnity, among the partisans,
is made according to rank :

Each superior officer receives . . . .5 parts.

Each captain 4 "

Each lieutenant (first or second) .... 3 " ,■

Each non-commissioned officer . . . . 2 "
Each corporal or soldier 1 "

The commandant of the expedition has six parts
besides what his grade gives him. This arrangement
applies to any isolated detachment which succeeds in
bringing in a prize : " It would be unjust and impoli-
tic," says General Preval, " to deprive detachments of
this privilege."

It appears from this that the hope of gain serves
also to excite the zeal and increase the courage of par-
tisans. But another consequence is a tendency to ra-
pacity, which is constantly fed by new gains. The
general-in-chief will therefore find it expedient to force
them to make an exact list of all the requisitions
which they have exacted, and to produce this list
upon their return, accompanied with certificates from
the local authorities.

A number of partisan leaders have made them-
selves distinguished names. In the beginning of the

* Things taken from the inhabitants are returned to them.

PARTISANS. 353

Thirty Years' War (1618), Count Ernest de Mansfeld,
a man of excessive ferocity, distinguislied himself as a
partisan chief. In lYOO, we have in France Dumoulin,
who in the midst of winter, marched with his dragoons
fifteen leagues without halting, to form an ambuscade.
In the wars for the succession in Austria (from
1T40 to 1745), we notice among the Austrians the
fierce Mentzel, Trenck, a cousin of the celebrated pris-
oner of Frederic II. at Magdebourg, and Nadasty,
with his Pandours ; and among the French, Fischer,
the founder of a corps which bore his name, Grassin,
and La Morliere. During the Seven Years' War, we
may mention Lieutenant-colonel Emmerich, the author
of a small work upon the special duties of partisans ;
in the campaign of 1809, the Prussian major Schill ;
and between 1812 and 1814, the Eussians. Seslawine
and Michel Orloffi

We cite a few historical examples, to illustrate
the nature of the operations executed by partisans.

1st. Dangeau relates that on the 21st June, 1710,
a French partisan, leaving Namur with 250 men,
succeeded in entering Lille, overcame the guard which
was at the gate, proceeded to the centre of the town,
and took the whole guard, killing their commander.
He then pillaged the houses of the minister of the
emperor and the residence of a Dutch officer who com-
manded in Liege, and having secured a large amount of
booty, left the city with 50 prisoners. In this afi'air,
there was but one soldier killed and one wounded." *

* Journal de Dangeau^ nouvelle 4(1., par MM. Souli^, Dnssieux, de
Chemievidres, etc.
23

354 3IIN0E OPERATIONS.

2d. In 1712, Marshal Villars detached " Pasteur, a
brigadier of the troops from Spain, and a very good
partisan, for the purpose of penetrating into Holland,
where there were no troops. This officer acquitted
himself well ; he approached very close to Rotterdam,
and burned the small towns of Tortolles and Sleim-
bourg. This expedition astonished the Dutch, who
were not accustomed to see us so near to them." *

3d. " A partisan officer having remarked that two
regiments of the enemy, w^hile on a march, had en-
camped on the two opposite sides of a ravine, to pass
the night, stole into the ravine and caused his soldiers
to fire a volley to the right and left upon the two
regiments. The latter fired in lurn, supposing the
enemy to be before them " (but, as it appears, fired
upon each other), " and were very much astonished
on the following day to find so many killed on each
side." t

4th. "I remember," says Le Miere de Corvey,J
" that in 1798, while in command of a company of
partisans in Belgium, I was sent to Loo-Christi, some
leagues from Ghent. I had no more than 25 men
with me, and was suiTounded by more than 400 of
the enemy. I had been ordered to wait for the arrival
of the rest of my company, which had dispersed, and

* Vie de Villars, publiee par Anquetil, 1784, 12mo., t. ii., p. 232.

t Harangue latine sur Vart militaire, traduite par Tabb^ Creyssent
de la Moseille, a la suite de VExamin de plusieurs observations sur la lit-
terature, Paris, 1779, p. 379. I adduce this fact because it contains a
hint of a useful ruse, but I regret not being able to give a clearer account
of it.

t Bes partisans et des corps irreguliers, 1823, p. 256, 257.

PARTISANS.

355

could not collect until tlie next day. This village,
being open on all sides, was not tenable, and I made
use of a ruse. I sent for tlie bailiff, and told him I was
in momentary expectation of the arrival of 100 horses
and 250 infantry, and ordered an immediate supply
of 100 rations of forage and 350 of provisions, which
the bailiff furnished in the shortest possible time. I
then ordered the inhabitants to return to their homes
and to keep quiet. After dark, I secretly sent out
small detachments, which returned by another road
with my drummer in front, beating the night march.
This manoeuvre I repeated several times. The ruse
was successful, and I passed the night undisturbed ;
but the officer who relieved me the next day with 75
men was beaten two days after by the enemy, who
had concentrated their forces and knew they had but
75 men to contend with."

CHAPTER SEVENTH.

SUEPEISES AND A3IBUSCADES.

Inteoduction. — Against every anticipated and
open attack there exists a metliod of defence wMcIl isi
taught by the military art ; and to put it in practice,
even before superior forces and under unfavorable cir-
cumstances, requires only that we have sufficient time
to make the proper preparations. But this time is in-
dispensable, and if it is not given, we are surprised^
and find ourselves in a critical situation.

A surprise, therefore, offers a priori an advantage
to the assailant, by reason of its unforeseen character
— an advantage which may enable a feeble troop to
overcome and to crush a numerous one, and which
compensates largely for the uncertainty incident to
this kind of operations.

To succeed in them, surprises must be prepared in
concealment, and hence they are most frequently em-
ployed in a hilly country. They demand prompt exe-
cution ; for the data upon which they are based soon
change, and delay produces uncertainty as to the po-
sition and plans of the enemy. They should also have
reference to troops imperfectly guarded; and hence

SUEPKISES AND AMBUSCADES.

S51

they will be attempted against detachments rather
than against armies, for in these days the latter all
make use of thoroughly organized measures for their
security. These measures, remarks Clausewitz,* ren-
der surprises very rare in modern warfare ; yet they
are not impossible, for vigilant and experienced troops,
even against an army.

Surprises may be employed either in offensive or
defensive operations. The assailant effects them by
an unexpected march, or the suddenness of his attack :
and the defender, by the secrecy and thoroughness of
his arrangements ; but a true surprise is most effective
in offensive warfare, and constitutes one of its most
important elements.

Two methods of preparing a surprise offer them-
selves : 1st. To resolutely await the adversary and
ambuscade him near the route he is pursuing ; 2d. To
advance upon the enemy by a rapid and circuitous
march. Let us examine these two methods. The
gi'eater part of the precautions to be used in the one
will apply also to the other.

1. Surprises by Ambuscade. — ^The term ambus-
cade comes from a word in the low Latin, copied by
the Spanish and Italian languages,f and signifies in
the woods; in fact, wooded places are favorable for
this kind of operation.

* De la guen'e^ traduction Neuens, t. iii., p. 800.
t In low Latin, emboscata^ in Spanish, emhoscada, in Italian, imbosca-
According to the translator of Santa-Cruz, the Spaniards in the last
mtnry said emlosques, and hosque in their language signifies a wood.

358 MINOR OPERATIONS.

The purpose of an ambuscade may be to capture
a post, a cantonment, a patrol, a drove of cattle, or a
convoy of military stores or merchandise ; or to seize
upon some of the inhabitants, especially an important
personage (a prince, general, ambassador, bearer of
dispatches, etc.) ; sometimes, also, to make a recon-
noissance, or, again, to fall upon a troop, which is
either on a march or already engaged in a combat.

The composition of the corps charged with an am-
buscade requires the most minute attention. The offi-
cers and the soldiers should be experienced and ready, 1
full of -confidence in those who direct them, quick to]
strike, in darkness and in the midst of obstacles,
wherever and whenever ordered. The selection of
the horses is of the same importance. White ones are
too easily seen at a distance ; therefore take those of
a dark color in preference. As the least noise might
give the alarm, reject animals which snort from fear,
as also those which neigh upon the slightest occasion.
Hence, it will be seen that mares are to be preferred
for surprises; besides, they are more quiet, support
heat and thirst better, and can urinate without halt-
ing. For these reasons the Arabs prefer them in all
adventurous enterprises ; * but we ought to add that,
in case of a pursuit, if they are wounded, they have
less force and energy to carry their riders beyond the
reach of danger.

Since it is evident that profound silence is here
one of the first elements of success, both in the march

* Les chevaux de Sahara, par le general Daumas, third ed., 18mo.,
1855, p. Y6, note 2.

SURPRISES AND AMBUSCAD]

359

and in the ambuscade, no dogs should be allowed to
accompany the expedition, notwithstanding their qual-
ities as watches, for it would be difficult to prevent
being betrayed by their untimely barking. The expe-
dition should start by night to conceal its departure,
and so as to reach the place of ambuscade by the
break of day, which is the more favorable time for
discovering. It should follow paths that are little
frequented and free from stones, for the horses' feet
among them would make too much noise. The horse-
men should also be directed to secure their equipment
in a solid manner, and to cover their scabbards with
hay, in order to avoid all clanking sounds.

If the road to the place of ambuscade has been sof-
tened by rain and retains footprints, these must be
obliterated by a roller or by sweeping the road with
long branches of trees — an operation that may be in-
trusted to a small rear-guard of foot soldiers ; ^ other-
wise the enemy will follow your tracks and will dis-
cover you; unless, indeed, you deceive him, as has
been often recommended, by going considerably be-
yond the place of ambuscade, and returning to it by a
bend across fields and over very dry ground.

The position selected for the ambuscade should be
of sufficient extent to contain the force, an " out of the
way " and lonely place, but open, with a sufficiently
extended front, and with at least two outlets, one
suitable for retreat, the other for making a sudden
attack upon the enemy. "When the ambuscade is
probably to be occupied more than one day, select

* Santa-Cruz, Reflexions militaires, t. ii., p. 242.

360 MmOR OPERATIONS.

tlie position near some spring, if possible, so as to se-
cure a supply of water: provisions you can readily
carry with you.

Cavalry is in its nature more difficult to conceal
and place in ambuscade tlian infantry ; ^ but this in-
convenience is in a measure compensated by its celer-
ity, wMcli enables it to attack at tlie instant of its
discovery. This arm should lie in wait in winding
valleys, in woods, in broad ravines with not very
steep sides, or in isolated farm-yards ; and in this last
case, if but one outlet exists, care should be taken to
provide a second, by removing, when necessary, any
high wall or fence.

Infantry can be concealed at the bottom of a
ditch, behind a bank, along a railway, under a rock,
among hedges, vines, growing grain — almost anywhere,
indeed, for they can, if necessary, sit down, or even lie
at fall length. The position of an ambuscade should
also be such that the adversary can bring but a portion
of his forces into action. If the purpose is to surprise
an enemy on the march, the position should be not far
from some steep descent, a ford, or a plateau favor-
able for a halt ; in short, near places where the enemy
will slacken their speed and preserve less order.

If, on the contrary, the enemy to be surprised is
encamped or cantoned, you will place yourself so that
you may emerge from the ambuscade when the men
are going to their meals, or when they are leading
their horses to water.

* Nevertheless, ambuscades are often composed of mixed troops, that
is, of both infantry and cavahy.

SURPRISES AND AIUBUSCADES.

361

After having decided upon tlie position of the am-
buscade, do not, in any case, enter it until you Lave
previously searched it. Place your troops in the most
concealed manner possible. Surround them with sen-
tinels and even vedettes, who must endeavor to fulfil
the twofold and difficult condition of seeing without
being seen ; they must fall back, when necessary,
but must never challenge any one. You can second
these sentinels and increase your facilities of acquir-
ing information by placing near the road a soldier
disguised as a peasant and affecting to be engaged
in tilling the ground. Let none pass, especially in-
habitants, but put them imder guard, and even some-
times tie them up.

As soon as the troops are in ambuscade, they should
observe increased caution. Talking, smoking, moving
about, or going off upon any pretext, making any kind
of noise, and lighting a fire, should all be forbidden.
Going to sleep should be especially prohibited. All
the soldiers must remain awake,* and even in constant
readiness for combat, especially in an ambuscade of
cavalry. The infantry should sit or lie down, and in
either case their arms should be placed on the ground ;
for if they remain standing with their arms in hand,
or if they sit with them between their legs, a gun
might be accidentally discharged (as they are all
loaded), and thus betray the existence of the am-
buscade.

* Several general oflScers have said that a part of the troop miglit
sleep during the day ; but in all cases it would be very dangerous at
1' night, as one of the examples cited at the end of this chapter proves.

362 MmOE OPEKATIOI^S.

The attack upon the enemy must be sndden, and
rather upon the rear than the front of his column, in
order to produce more indecision and disorder in the
ranks. The infantry, after discharging a full volley,^
will rush upon the enemy with loud cries : the cav-
alry will take him in reverse by making a detour, for
the purpose of blocking his way. To attack at the
proper instant, neither too soon nor too late, is the
most important and delicate point to be decided by
the commanding officer. Soldiers in ambush cannot
but feel a certain degree of emotion in beholding the
enemy passing carelessly and gaily almost within
arms' length, unconscious of the danger which is about
to fall upon him, and against which his bravery may
prove powerless ; and this emotion will naturally be
increased when they recall the fatigue they have un-
dergone and the risk they have run in concealing
themselves, and when they reflect that the most
trifling incident may rob them of the fruit of all their
labor ; hence it is not surprising that, in their anxiety
to put an end to this uncertainty and to grasp the
coveted object, they often act with too much precipi-
tation, and thus cause the failure of the enterprise.
The success of this operation of petty warfare, there-
fore, depends greatly upon coolness, as well as upon
the quickness of eye and the skill which are the nat-
ural attendants of coolness.

If a corps purposely fleeing before the enemy can
thereby draw them in front of the ambuscade, success

* Some sharpshooters, properly posted, should at this time aim at the
officers.

SUEPEISES AND AMBUSCADES. 36&

becomes almost certain. This ruse is cMeily employed
in retreats, and serves to aid tlie vanquislied party in
retarding and weakening tlie pursuing force.

When we liave discovered tlie existence of an am-
buscade prepared by the adversary, an excellent way
to meet it is to prepare a counter-ambuscade, for tbe
enemy will infallibly be disconcerted when be finds
himself surprised where he expected to surprise others.

2. Surprises by a March, — ^This kind of surprise
enables us to avoid the inconvenience of a too precipi-
tate attack, but depends upon the exactness of a cal-
culation. The march must be calculated so as to fall
upon the enemy just at the most propitious place and
time, and the difficulty in this calculation is to make
proper allowance for delays and for accidents.

It appears best to attack at the break of day,
when the patrols of the enemy have gone in, and the
fatigued outpost guards are reposing, or have relaxed
their vigilance. By choosing this time we also have
the advantage of daylight for the end of the operation,
and are better able to extricate ourselves from any
unforeseen difficulties.

In the case where we are aiming at troops that are
on the march, we should follow a route either at right
angles or very oblique to theirs, in order not to fall
among their flankers, and to remain masters of the
time when we shall choose to make our appearance.

In the present century surprises effected by means
of a march are of more frequent occurrence than am-
buscades. This march may remain very secret, by

364 MmOR OPERATIOl^S.

imitating tlie plan pursued by the French in tlie Por-
tuguese campaign to surprise tlie Englisli posts, name-
ly, by wrapping tlie horses' feet in pieces of sheep-
skin, with the wool inside, tied above the hoof

We cannot conclude these remarks more appropri-
ately than by repeating, with General Kleber : " A
surprise is more dishonorable than a defeat," and by
quoting the following precept from his orders of the
day : " The bravest man may be beaten ; but whoever
allows himself to be surprised no longer deserves to
be an officer."

3, Historical Examples, — I, We should emerge
from an ambuscade in a solid hody. — During the war
in Africa, in the 44th year before the Christian era,
"Labienus, seeing that Caesar would be obliged to
cross a certain valley and a wood, placed an ambus-
cade there. Not knowing the existence of the snare,
Caesar had sent his cavalry in advance ; and when
they reached the valley, the troops of Labienus, for-
getting their orders, or executing them unskilfully, or
perhaps fearing to be overthrown in the valley by the
cavalry, began to emerge from their ambuscade in sin-
gle file and one soldier at a time, for the jDurpose of
gaining the neighboring summit. Our horsemen (says
Caesar) forthwith went in pursuit of them, killed a
large number, took many prisoners, and then, turning
to the hill, obtained possession of it, having first driven
off the troops that had been posted there by Labienus,
who had much difficulty in saving himself, with a
part of his cavalry." ''*

* Caasar's " Commentaries : The "War in Africa," chap. 1.

SUKPEISES AND AMBUSCADES. 365

II. In surprises, do not forget to adopt some dis-
tingidsliing feature of dress, or a rallying signal,^ —
In 1667, ViUars, tlien a colonel, was sent by night to
reconnoitre and ascertain wlietlier an embankment
was guarded. He advanced witli 300 borse, leaving
tbe remainder of bis troop in tbe rear, marcbed along
tbe causeway, sent bis drummers and trumpeters
abead to make an uproar and distract tbe attention of
tbe enemy, wbile be fell suddenly upon bim tbrougb
a breacb in a deserted barrier, and routed bim, in
spite of bis force of 2,000 men. In tbe very beigbt
of tbe action, tbe Frencb reserve arrived, and took tbe
combatants in tbe rear. " ViUars, supposing bis troop
surrounded, turned back. Tbere was a sbort, but
murderous' combat of Frenchmen witb Frencbmen,
wbicb ceased only witb tbe rallying cry of ^ ViUars^
This unfortunate mistake saved a part of tbe enemy,
wbo, nevertheless, were dislodged." f

III. Soldiei's in amhusTi sJioidd not sleep, — On
this point, the Marquis of Santa-Cruz, J one of the
best military wTiters of Spain, relates the following
fact : " In the night ambuscade wbicb we formed (in
1710) against our enemies near Mora de Ebro, care
was not taken to prevent the soldiers from going to
sleep. They were in a profound slumber when, a lit-
tle before day, a horse of Don Joseph Miranda got

* For example, the shirt thrown over the dress, as at the taking of
Pontoise in 1419. A surprise was then called a camisade (from chemise).

t Vie de ViUars, par Anquetil, t. i., p. 18, 19. In attacking, instead
of simply reconnoitring, the impetuous, Yillars transgressed his orders.

t Reflexions militaires et politiques, traduction Vergy, t. ii., p. 260.

366 MmOR OPEEATIONS.

loose ; and hardly had he begun to run across the
fields, when the soldiers, awakened by the noise, be-
gan to call to arms, some firing without knowing
where, some flying, and some taking each other for
enemies, so that the ambuscade was discovered before
its time and came to nothing."

IV. During the siege of Mayence (1793), the be-
sieged French failed in a surprise attempted upon the
Prussian headquarters located at Marienborn, in conse-
quence of the cry Vive la nation, which they gave at
an untimely moment.

V. In 1796, the republicans sent a chief of a bat-
talion with 200 grenadiers and 25 mounted chasseurs
to surprise a farmhouse (la metairie de la Saugreniere).
This small body marched in four different ways, with
a column of fifty men in each, and thus debouched in
silence at the four cardinal points of the plateau on
which the farmhouse was situated, surrounded the
house by placing four men with loaded guns at
each of the corners of the ground-floor, while two
patrols of four men knocked at each of the doors and
summoned the Vendean chief Stoiflet and the three
officers who had taken refuge in this asylum, to sur-
render.

VI. Tlie vanquished party who in retreating too
near to the pursuer, without some covering obstacle,
may he easily surprised, — Marshal Marmont, arriving
at Champaubert on the evening of the battle of Vau-
champs, February 14th, 1814, learned that the van-
quished enemy had just settled themselves about two
thirds of a mile off, at Etoges. He marched upon the

SUEPEISES AND AMBUSCADES. 367

position in tie most profound silence and by night,
witli 800 foot soldiers, flanked on eacli side by 50
skirmishers, fell upon the Kussian outposts, routed
them at the point of the bayonet, entered the village,
found the enemy scattered and engaged in establish-
ing themselves, and took nearly the whole of them
prisoners, to the number of 4,000 men, without having
fired more than 500 shots.

YII. In July, 1845, in Algeria, a detachment of
300 foot and 25 horse, in command of Manselon, had
marched for a night in a wooded gorge four feet wide,
when they found themselves, at the first dawn of day,
within ten minutes of the Douars of the Sbeahs, a
tribe whose hospitality had just been shown to Bou-
Maza, and which it was intended to surprise. After
a moment's halt, the march continued, every one on
the alei-t and watchful ; but in making a detour
around an earthwork, a foot soldier stumbled against
a stone, and his fall caused his gun to go off. " Au
galops cavalierSj'' cried the commandant at once, " and
try to make amends for the blundering of that fool :
we will follow you upon the run." The Arabs, warned
by the discharge of the gun, were already starting off,
for between the untimely signal and the first charge
of the mounted chasseurs, they had had three minutes
to make their preparations ; but notwithstanding the
confusion, the coup-de-main was successful.*

* Souvenirs de la vie militaire enAfrique^ par le comte de Castellane,
in 18mo., 1852, pp. 196-198.

CHAPTEE EIGHTH.

HEIGHTS.

The skilful and timely occupation of positions of
this kind, and tlieir proper defence and attack, exer-
cise an important influence upon the final result of
warlike operations. "We shall therefore treat of them
first in order.

1. Reconnoissance. — Before occupying a height,
we must first reconnoitre it.

We first examine the outline of the height. In this
outline there should be shown the direction of the
crest or ridge which bounds the plateau, the natural
line of retreat, the course of valleys bordering upon it,
and the character of the slopes should be indicated.
Every road, and every path, even the smallest, should
also receive attention, for the light foot soldier may
climb up anywhere, and we should indicate even the
steep paths followed by the goats.

We must also examine i^iQpi'ofile of the height, its
contour, its relief from the bottom of the valley to the
summit, the peculiarities of the slopes, the abrupt es-
carpments and projections, the intermediate plateaux,
and the successive rises.

HEIGHTS.

369

We must also indicate the places in wiicli a com-
bat may be engaged, either in line or skirmishing,
those in which cavalry might, as an exception, have
a chance of success, and finally those in which artil-
lery may be posted with advantage.

2. Defence. — In a height, as upon any field of bat-
tle, there exists a line of demarcation between the
ground of the defence, or plateau^ and the ground of
the attack, or dope. This line has been named the
military crest, because it is, in fact, analogous in posi-
tion to the exterior crest of a parapet.

Without wishing to ascribe undue importance to
a military crest, we will observe that this line, which
has a somewhat vague existence, and is to be found
approximately by trial, has nevertheless its use in the
contest. In fact, it is upon this line that the assailant
is to be stopped, for if he once gains the plateau he

Defender.

Assailant

will soon master it. In order to accomplish the object

in the best manner possible/ the defender should be
24

370

MINOR OPEEATIONS.

placed in rear of the military crest^ and very near to
it. By very near, we here mean from a yard and a
half to nine yards, according to the inclination of the
slope. Thus, while the defender, with his gun point-
ed, will be uncovered only to the shoulders, he will
see the whole body of the assailant as he climbs the
ascent, for a distance of fifty or sixty yards ; whereas,
if he were stationed forty yards, for example, behind
the crest, he would be below the prolongation of the
slope, and would, therefore, be unable to reach his

Assailant.

Defender.

adversary while climbing ; at the same time he would
receive the grazing fire of his antagonist, from the mo-
ment the latter arrived within a yard and a half of
the top of the crest.*

The first line of defenders will, therefore, stand on
the plateau, near the military crest. I say first line,
for it will be well to have two lines and a reserve.

* We may, however, take our position at some fifty paces behind the
crest, when the assailant is ignorant of the precise position of the enemy
he is attempting to find ; for in this case his grazing fire will probably
not take place, for he will not see the defender while ascending, what-
ever may be the inclination of the slope.

HEIGHTS. 371

The first line will be in order of battle, or spread
out as skirmishers if the plateau abounds in under-
growth, and will receive the assailant by a fire at a
short distance, a little before he reaches the crest. If
this discharge does not arrest him, they must charge
upon him with the bayonet, and, having overthrown
him, must retire coolly to their first position.

The second line will stand generally in order of
battle, ready to second and to assist the first.

The sole business of the reserve will be to oppose
any flanking movements of the enemy; for which
purpose it will watch the passages by which such
movements might be effected.

"With such a mode of defence, repeated several
times if there is a succession of plateaux, always exe-
cuted with patience and coolness, and without under-
taking a dangerous and useless pursuit, it is probable
that the height will be preserved. We may add to
our chance of success by resorting also to well-com-
bined flanking fires. It is in the latter kind of firing
that cannon may here become of real service. As to
cavalry, it is evident that it should act chiefly with
the reserve on the plateau.

This mode of defence, which requires solid and ex-
perienced infantry, was inaugurated and put in prac-
tice by the English against the valorous but too
impulsive French soldiers in Spain ; first at the bat-
tle of Talavera (July 28, 1809), and in the most me-
morable instance, on the heights of Pampeluna (July
28, 1813). In this last affair, the French ascended the
slope in close columns by divisions, and an English

372 MIlSrOE OPEEATIONS.

line received them witli a close volley, charged upoi
them with the bayonet and threw them back, thei
returned to their position upon a run, with three hi
rahs. They met a second attack attempted by thi
resolute French columns, in precisely the same mannei
and with the same success.

3. Attack. — In the first place, as an attempt upoi
the front would be too destructive, we should endei
vor to turn the position, and until the last momed
seek for a path by which this may be accomj^lished.

If we are finally compelled to attack in front, w(
should make one or too false attacks, designed, as
usual, to divide the attention of the defender, and to
promote the success of the principal attack.

This principal attack (the others being analogous)
will be made by a large number of light troops, sup-
ported close at hand by small and mobile columns.*
A single broad and deep column would be a false
measure, and a failure to place skirmishers in front
would be a most grave and disastrous error — the er-
ror, in fact, which was committed on the heights of
Pampeluna, of which we have just spoken. For these
skirmishers will break up any manoeuvre by the Eng-
lish mode of defence, by compelling the defenders
also to disperse in order to meet them, or else to waste
their fire, and in any case will deprive the defenders
of the ensemble and of the expectant situation which
constitutes all their strength.f

* Columns of one company, for example.

t See Quelques reflexions sur Vinfanterie de nos jours^ par le g6n6ral
de Chambray, in the Melanges of that author.

HEIGHTS.

373

The skirmishers can go anywhere, and consequent-
ly will finally succeed in advancing up the slope.
Under their protection the small columns will gain
some intermediate plateau or some commanding posi-
tion, from which they can fire directly upon the de-
fenders. If this fire produces effect, they will ascend
another step ; a third will bring them upon the up-
per plateau, and if at that instant one of the false at-
tacks makes a more violent and noisy demonstration
to alarm one of the flanks, it is probable that the de-
fenders will yield, and, fearing to be turned, will retire.

The good discipline of the assailant, his confidence,
and his assurance of victory, will go far to remove the
obstacles and to diminish the perils of such an attaqk.

4. Attack of au isolated liciglit in Africa by a
company of infantry. — A company frequently acts
alone in Africa, and as a young ofiicer may occasion-
ally be called to command one, it may be useful to
point out this mode of attack, which we derive from
the verbal instructions of Marshal Bugeaud.

The company, divided into foui^ half sections, takes

ATTACK OF A HEIGHT IN AFEICA.

374 MmOR OPERATIONS.

its position at 200 yards from tlie height. The half
sections on the extreme right (a) and left (d) are de-
tached to the right and left, scattering, so as to take
the Arabs defending the height by the flanks, and even
somewhat in the rear. When these skirmishers have
succeeded in producing some confusion among the de-
fenders by their firing, the two half sections of the
centre (b and 6') advance under the orders of the cap-
tain, with arms at a shoulder, until within about
fifty yards of the foot of the height, and then fire
a full volley to complete the confusion of the defend-
ers ; then they rush forward at a run with fixed bayo-
nets and scale the height. This discharge serves as a
signal to the skirmishers on the right and left, and
apprises them of the instant when they must rapidly
move upon the flank and almost upon the rear of the
defenders, who will thus find themselves taken, so to
speak, in a closed circle, unless they decide to aban-
don their position.

CHAPTER NINTH.

WOODS.

Woods, like heigMs, are positions where infantry
plays tlie principal part, and hence their importance
has grown with the increase of that arm and the mul-
tiplication of fire-arms.

1. Reconnoissance. — ^The greater the obstacle of-
xered by a wood, the greater is the necessity of recon-
i noitring it.
|t The officer sent to reconnoitre a wood, leaves from
a fifth to a fourth part of his detachment at the en-
trance as a reserve. Taking the principal road him-
j self with four men and a guide, he sends into each of
the lateral and secondary roads a patrol of from four
to six men, who should keep on the same level and in
■ communication with him. He completes the general
indications contained in the map of the country, and
gathers the materials for his report, from the informa-
tion which these patrols furnish, from his own obser-
vation, and from the replies of the wood-cutters, game-
keepers, poachers, and other individuals whom he
meets in the wood.

This report must show : 1st, tJie extent of the wood,

376 MINOR OPERATIONS.

in order that tlie time necessary to pass tlirougli or
to turn it may be inferred ; 2d, its exterior form>^ its
salient and reentrant portions, and whetlier it is sur-
rounded by a ditdi; 3d, the nature of the wood^
wlietlier forest or coppice ; forest trees furnisli abatis ;
coppice offers little hindrance to light infantry, and, if
the ground is sterile, even light cavalry may some-
times pass through it ; 4th, the openings in the wood,
and whether these openings are favorable for the
operations of cavalry ; 5th, the number, direction, and
condition of the principal roads ^ which may be adapt-
ed to the mechanism of the defence, by permitting the
employment of artillery and cavalry ; 6th, the same
respecting cart roads^ and any other roads auxiliaiy
to the principal ones; '7th,the form of the j^a^A^, their
courses, and their points of intersection, for the paths
facilitate the action of skirmishers in defence, as well
as the march of patrols and guards ; 8th, the situ-
ation and sufficiency of Tunning streams and stagnant
loaters^ which may be serviceable in ambuscades, and
offer facilities in offensive manoeuvres: in a word,
those which may be a protection to the defenders and
an obstacle to the assailants ; 9th, finally, the neigh-
boring villages, hamlets, country seats, abbeys, farm-
houses, and isolated buildings in general, which are
capable of serving as habitations or storehouses for the
defender, together with their distances from the verge
of the wood.

2. defence. — The prime object of the defence is
to arrest the assailant at the verge of the wood, for

WOODS.

377

when once witliin it, the assailant will likewise profit
by the nature of the obstacle (namely, by the trees
and the underwood), to fight and to advance under
cover.

The outlets, therefore, are to be closed, and the
projecting points protected by abatis ; these project-
ing points may also have additional protection by
stationing pieces of artillery so as to give an effective
fire, and yet not exposed to be readily taken. A cen-
tre of action is to be selected, either naturally or arti-
ficially connected with the skirts of the wood by con-
venient communications.

DEFENCE OF A FOREST.

* .^

■■Kv ,lJ&^/ -s-yt^Vs^

^i^W

f^^j

-^ ^^-.s.>^.

^r<>

The distribution of the troops will be based upon
the fact that in this case a numerous reserve would not
have free scope for its action. As large a number of
men as possible will therefore be put into action at
once, one half the force being thrown upon the con-

378

MINOE OPERATIOIS^S

tour of the wood as skirmisliers, and tlie remaining
half divided into two parts, the first of wliich will be
placed in a second line, while the other forms a re-
serve. This reserve will occupy a central position,

DEFENCE OF A COPPICE.

resting upon the structures prepared for the defence, if
there are any, and keeping a watch upon any flank or
rear movements which the enemy may attempt. In a
forest, the second line will spread itself in small col-
umns ; and in a coppice, partly in small columns and
partly as skirmishers ; in all cases, this line should
keep at about two hundred yards from the verge of
the wood.

3, Attack — ^The preparations for attack are made
at a distance from the wood, and beyond the extreme
range of the fire of the defence. When these prepara-

WOODS.

379

tions are completed, the assailant passes rapidly over
the clear space which separates him from the wood, so
as to be but a short time exposed to the lire of the
enemy^ yet not so fast as to get out of breath, for the
tremor of the hand produced by running will prevent
his making an effective use of his weapon *

The point of attack is chosen so as to reach or to
threaten the enemy's line of communication or of re-
treat. We here refer to the principal attack, which is
always to be seconded by a flanking or turning move-
ment.

The troops who attack should be vigorous and
veteran soldiers ; for if they fail at the verge of the
wood, it will hardly be possible to renew the attack,
and many lives will be uselessly sacrificed.

These troops adopt the ordinary subdivision into
two lines and a reserve, the second line about one
hundred yards behind the first, and the reserve about
three hundred yards behind the second line.

When the wood is very dense, the two lines should
remain spread as skirmishers, while the reserve fol-
lows it, in columns, along the principal roads. When
the wood is sufiiciently clear, the second line may fonn
in small columns, capable of passing everywhere, the
first line and the reserve acting as before. If the wood
presents openings, the assailant should have a special
corps, independent of the reserve, destined to fight in
these openings. With this addition, the attack will
be made according to the above methods.

Besides this special and exceptional corps, and be-

* The carbine is the best arm for forest combats.

380 MINOR OPERATIONS.

sides the reserve, wticli always exists, it has been
recommended to protect the rear of all the troops en-
gaged, hj placing, at some distance from the reserve,
a sufficiently strong rear-guard, which should carefully
watch its own flanks and preserve itself in readiness
to meet any counter attack.

4. Example. — The battle of Hohenlinden (Decem-
ber 3, 1800), won by General Moreau over the Aus-
trians, illustrates the advantage of a turning move-
ment in forest combats.

The French were deployed between Hohenlinden
and Harthofen ; the Austrian centre, engaged in the
defile of the forest extending from Mattenboett toward
Hohenlinden, tried to debouch in advance of their
flanks, upon the plain of Hohenlinden. This centre
was twice checked and driven back by the French
soldiers. In the mean time, General Richepanse, sent
by Moreau, marched by the Ebersberg road upon the
village of Saint-Christophe and upon Mattenboett,
which he finally reached, after incredible labor.
There, he obstructed the defile which 'Nej was de-
fending in front, and in which the enemy was en-
closed. He rushed intrepidly upon the Austrians,
advanced in spite of showers of grapeshot, threw the
enemy into the most complete disorder, and made a
junction with Ney, who had penetrated from the Ho-
henlinden side. The enemy's centre, beaten on all
sides and hemmed in, surrendered ; and to this beau-
tiful and persevering manoeuvre of Richepanse the
success of the day is almost w^holly due.

WOODS.

381

We must liere call especial attention to the fact
that in this action the conquerors understood the art
of formation better than the conquered. When they
penetrated into the forest occupied by the enemy, they
did so by isolated companies, marching either by sec-
tions or by the flank, and connected together by skir-
mishers ; they could thus introduce themselves every-
where without ceasing to present sufficiently strong
and formidable groups. The conquered party, on the
contrary, as a contemporary writer observes, adopted
and preserved ^' an extraordinary order of march,
hardly conceivable even in time of peace. Their ad-
vance-guard remained composed of some battalions
of grenadiers ; then followed the whole park of artil-
lery, then the body of the army, and then the cavahy,
which was still at the entrance of the wood while
Richepanse was taking his position at Mattenboett
and arresting the march." *

* Moreau et sa derniere campagne, par un officier de son ^tat-major
a Tarm^e du Rhin, Munich, 1801 ; traduction Frangaise, Paris et Metz,
1814, 8vo., p. 88.

CHAPTER TENTH.

FARMS, OR HOUSES.*

A FARM enclosure, or a house, rudely and hastily
fortified, when occupied hj some companies, within
some ^ve hundred paces of an army, or at a greater
distance, according to circumstances, may, in spite of
the projectiles and incendiary missiles of the assailant,
disconcert all attacks, greatly promote the success of
a battle, aid in the preservation of a post, and thus
save an entire army, notwithstanding its own rela^
tively small importance.

For this purpose, the farm enclosure or the house
is not required to be well constructed and perfectly
solid; the most wretched hovel is hard to take when
its garrison possess resolution, and are determined to
sell their lives or their freedom dearly.f

However, when there is a choice between two
farm enclosures or two houses, we prefer the one most

* The French word ferme^ used by the author (literally farm), is ap-
plied here only to the structures upon the farm ; that is, the house, out-
buildings and their masonry enclosure, in Europe often grouped together,
and thus forming a strong defensible position. — Tr,

t An officer frequently gains glory by the heroic defence of the most
dilapidated post.

FAEMS, OR HOUSES. 383

defensible. Brick walls liave an advantage over those
of rubble or of dressed stone, as tbey are not so easily
breached by cannon.

What we liave to say respecting the defence and
attack of a farm enclosure or of a bouse, will be, in
the main, aj^plicable to those of a block-house, with
the difference only, that the latter is more combus-
tible.

1. ]>efieiice. — We shall not here treat of the meth-
od of putting the farm enclosure or a house in a con-
dition of defence, as that subject belongs rather to
fortification than to the military art. We will merely
observe that in all farm enclosures, as in every house
which is to be separately defended, we should select a
solid portion of the structure to serve as a small re-
doubt, that is, as a rendezvous or last place of refuge
for the defenders when they have been driven out of
the other parts.

In the conduct of the defence we endeavor to com-
pel the assailant to follow a sort of regular siege.

The points which the enemy must occupy are illu-
minated at night by the light of burning brush or of
torches, that we may be able to direct upon him the
most certain and destructive fire; and in order to
keep him under fire as long as possible, all the ave-
nues and approaches, previously cleared of dangerous
shelters, are to be intercepted by accessory defences.

Every enclosure, or portion of an enclosure, every
court and outbuilding, should receive for its defence a
portion of the garrison proportioned to its importance.

384 MINOR OPEEATIONS.

Tliis portion of the soldiers fire from witMn, tliroiigli
loopholes pierced beforehand through the walls.

Behind the barricades of any barrier, or of a door-
way, there should be eight or ten men, drawn up in a
semicircle, firing with coolness and concentrically upon
the point attacked, and charging with the bayonet
when the obstruction is thrown down. Folard pre-
fers to leave a door open and to obstruct it with
strong abatis, protected by firing from the ground
floor, and especially by firing through openings in the
floor of the second story (machicoulis). In all cases,
while the assailant is taking his position against the
door and is endeavoring to break it down, we rain
down upon him from the upper stories eveiything
which can be turned into a projectile, gathered for thej
purpose in advance ; and we take him in the rear bj
musketry from any neighboring outbuildings.

Any ladder placed against a wall is immediately]
pushed away by a pitchfork, or any other suitable^
implement, passed through one of the openings of thai
first story and worked as a lever. A similar proceed-
ing answers against the light troops of the enemy,
who may be sufficiently nimble and dexterous to havCj
reached the roof itself

The defenders must not be sparing of destructivej
sorties upon the works of the attacking party an(
upon their preparations for the attack, nor of countei
attacks in the portions already conquered ; sorties and
counter attacks which require in their conception as
well as in their execution a certain mixture of auda-
city and prudence.

385

He looks out for incendiary attempts, and promptly
extinguishes any fire which, the enemy kindles ; and
should the roof be set on fire, he must, without hesi-
tation, tear it ofi; It is true this amounts to depriving
the building of its helmet, as it were ; still, even with-
out this piece of armor, the defence may be continued.

The garrison, forced by degrees, retire from build-
ing to building till they reach the redoubt, where they
make another and a final defence. When they con-
clude to evacuate, they leave a small troop in this
redoubt, who make for a time as much noise as possi-
ble (while the main body escapes), and finally capitu-
late upon the best terms they can make.

2. Attack. — ^The method of attack is of course
founded upon a preliminary reconnoissance, as in all
the minor operations of war. The following is the
most common :

The cavalry watches the supporting troops with-
out, and guards the entrances through which succor
can come.

In a night attack,* we commence by extinguishing
the fires kindled by the defenders, while we endeavor
to illuminate the exterior parts of the farm enclosure,
and especially the weak portions.

If we have any cannon at our disposal, we place a
battery (by preference of howitzers) about three hun-
dred yards from the farm enclosure or the house, with
which we try to breach, in its lower part or at the

* Ordinary attacks commonly commence a little before day.
25

386 MmOE OPERATIONS.

angles, the most solid building of tlie first enclosure,
and to burn tlie roofs.

Skirmishers, ambuscaded upon the flanks at two
hundred yards, second this cannonade, aim at the
windows and other openings, prevent the defenders
from showing themselves there, and thus obstruct
their firing upon the attacking troops.

As soon as the artillery and the skirmishers have
produced their efi^ect, two or three columns of assault
advance upon the breaches, the doors, and other weak
parts, preceded by laborers carrying scaling-ladders,
tools, and sandbags,*^* and protected by the skirmish-
ers, who now come nearer and shoot at everything
which shows itself during the entire contest.

We burn or burst in, or tear from their hinges, the
doors that have escaped destruction by the cannon.
We make search for secret and concealed passages.
We debouch simultaneously from several adjacent
openings upon some broad front which is not too
much exposed to a fire from the buildings in the
rear ; we convert this space into a place of arms, and,
as far as possible, we enlarge the communications con-
necting this place of arms with the points already
mastered.

If there is a second enclosure, this as well as the
redoubt is to be carried, if possible, by several attacks,
all supported by a common reserve.

These attacks, like those directed against the outer
enclosure, should be made simultaneously, with the
aid of ladders placed against those walls which are

* To mask the lower loopholes of the defence.

38T

neither flanked nor commanded. If the escalade is
successful, we sprinkle the roof with expert skirmish-
ers, who, firing from behind the chimneys and dormer
windows, will compel the garrison to abandon the
upper stories, and especially the staircases : it is never
necessary to venture in these latter until success is
probable.

If the garrison make a sortie during the operation,
the assailants surround them and take them prisoners,
or better, pursue at their heels to enter with them, and
follow them everywhere in the interior.

This method of attack, which is employed in tah
ing possession of a farm enclosure or house, requires
infantry troops chiefly. If we merely wish to destroy
a house — for example, one containing large quantities
of stores — cavalry is almost sufficient ; for they have
only to blockade the house until it is set on fire by
shells from a number of howitzers, the operation being
covered by a reserve of several squadrons.

CHAPTER ELEVENTH.

EEDOUBTS.

We shall be brief upon tlie subject of redoubts, as
they belong rather to fortification.

Redoubts are employed to defend assailable points
which are open to attack on all sides, but nevertheless
within reach of support, such as hillocks, the entrance
or exit of a defile, or the flanks of a position. They
are, in certain cases, very suitable for fortifying the
front of a line of battle.

1. Defence. — The troop charged with the defence
of a redoubt is divided into two parts: a reserve
equal to the third of the troop, and an active pai
composed of the other two thirds, for manning th(
parapet. To obtain a good defence, this active part
should be sufiiciently strong to furnish two men for
each running yard of the parapet. The reserve is di-
vided into two sections : the special duty of the first
is to repulse any turning attacks upon the entrance
of the redoubt ; the second stands in readiness to go
to any point that is threatened.

The commandant of the redoubt should explain to

REDOUBTS.

389

tte chief of eacli fraction of tlie troops under his or-
ders, the nature of the duty he is to perform.

Up to the moment of attack, the sentinels alone
are charged with guarding the redoubt.

When the enemy appears, he is to be received
with cannon at four hundred yards' distance, and with
musketry at only one hundred and fifty yards. It is
best to execute the firing of musketry slowly and witli
careful aim ; at the moment of beginning this firing
the soldiers mount upon the banquette.

When the assailant has descended into the ditch,
and is attempting to climb the scarp, the defenders
mount upon the superior slope and pour a destructive
fire upon him along the exterior slope. However, if
during the operation of the escalade the assailant has
left some men on the edge of the counterscarp to fire
upon the defenders, the latter cannot mount upon the
superior slope, but remain behind the parapet.

The assault being repulsed, a well-sustained fire is
turned upon the enemy as he retires, and then the
troops come down from the banquette. If, on the con-
trary, the assault succeeds, it is the part of the reserve
to fall upon the first enemies who enter the redoubt,
and to drive them back, forcing them into the ditch.

2. Attack. — ^To attack a redoubt, the attacking
force is divided into three columns. Each column
embraces some sappers with tools, whose principal
business is to destroy the accessory defences. A sup-
porting troop, or reserve, marches in rear of these
columns.

390 MINOR OPEEATIONS.

In order to occupy the enemy, and to harass him,
two of these columns make false attacks.

The principal, or veritable attack, is made at a
point determined by the situation and form of the
redoubt, as much as by the position and force of the
attacking body.

We begin by silencing the artillery and musketr}^
of the defence by means of a sustained cannonade.
Then the columns, preceded by the sappers and pro-
tected by skirmishers, advance upon the capital, and
without firing. The sappers remove the accessory de-
fences, and, that done, the columns descend into the
ditch. Meanwhile, some skirmishers posted upon the
counterscarp fire without intermission to prevent the
defenders from showing themselves upon the superior
slope.

We scale the scarp, and after an instant of repose
on the berme, we ascend the exterior slope. Having
reached the top of this exterior slope, we fire upon
the defenders, and when upon the superior slope we
fall upon them with the bayonet. At this moment it
is necessary to avoid scattering, for it is important that
each attacking column which succeeds in its undertak-
ing should present itself in mass upon a single point.

The skirmishers who had remained upon the coun-
terscarp immediately march after the columns to sup-
port them, and the reserve endeavors to turn the re-
doubt by the entrance.

The columns, once in the redoubt, throw them-
selves upon the gari'ison and upon their reserve, beat-
ing them down, and advancing until they reach the

EEDOUBTS.

391

entrance, from wliicli they remove tlie barrier to give
admission to the flanking corps.

The work being taken, the assailant establishes his
reserve facing the enemy, in order to parry counter
attacks, and to give his columns, which have neces-
sarily suffered in the attack, time to form again.

Such is the systematic method of attacking a re-
doubt, but it supposes a considerable attacking force.

A small detachment, a half company, for example,
is often all that can be spared for the attack of a re-
doubt. In fact, this slight force will be sufficient
where but one redoubt is to be carried, as frequently
occurs in battles, containing some pieces of artillery,
and only twenty or thirty men. Considering the feeble-
ness of the assailants, they should no longer think of
threatening the flanks of the redoubt, nor of ambus-
cading sharpshooters for the purpose of firing upon
the defenders with all the precision of aim attainable
by the use of the new carbines. The best method of
attack in this case, is a species of charge as foragers^
that is, the attacking body, in order to escape the
grape showered from the redoubt, throws itself preci-
pitately upon it at a full run, all the soldiers spreading
at great distance, advancing as much as possible in a
creeping ijosture, and rallying together upon the berme
or the parapet of the redoubt, which they endeavor to
escalade on different sides at the same time. Such an
attack requires much courage and skill, and especially
good luck. In fact, during the wars of Napoleon, the
taking of such a redoubt was found in some cases to
involve the loss of two or three detachments com-

392 MINOR OPERATIONS.

manded by an officer ; and we may well conceive that
tlie successful commander received a brilliant reward.

3. Example — The most memorable example of the
employment of redoubts was at the battle of Pultawa.
We will permit Marshal Saxe, the great advocate of
redoubts, to relate the affair in his own words.^*

"In the month of July, 1709, Charles XII., having
laid siege to Pultawa, Peter the Great arrived with
his forces to relieve the place.

" The king of Sweden, although wounded, declared
to his generals that he would attack the Russian army
on the next day. The arrangements were made, the
forces were drawn up, and the march commenced a
little before day.

"The czar had established seven redoubts on thej
front of his infantry, and they were constructed withj
care. There were two battalions in each, and all the
Russian infantry remained in the rear, with the caval-
ry on the flanks. It was therefore impossible to reach
the Russian infantry without taking these redoubts,
for the Swedish forces could neither leave them in their
rear nor pass between them without being over-
whelmed by their fire. The king of Sweden and his
generals, who were ignorant of this arrangement, did
not comprehend the state of things until they were in^
the very midst of them. But as the machine had beenj
set in motion, it was impossible to stop it and to retreat.

"The Swedish cavalry of the two flanks at thej
outset overthrew that of the Russians, and even went]

* Mes reveries^ liv. ii., chap. 12.

REDOUBTS. 393

too far ; but tlie infantry of tlie centre was arrested
by these redoubts. The Swedes attacked them, and
were met with a stout resistance. They neverthe-
less took three of them, but w^ere repulsed by the
others with great loss. It was impossible for the
Swedish infantry not to be broken by attacking
these redoubts, whilst that of the Kussians, drawn
up in order, were looking on at a distance of two
hundred paces.

'' Charles and his generals saw the danger they
were in, and the inaction of the Russians gave them
some hope of being able to retire; however, order
could not be restored, for the whole line was broken,
and to attack was to lead the troops to slaughter. To
retire was the only course to be pursued : the troops
who had taken some of the redoubts, as well as those
who were being overwhelmed by the others, were
therefore Avithdrawn.

^' There was no w^ay to form them under the fire
which proceeded from the redoubts, and consequently
they retired in confusion and disorder. At this junc-
tui^e the czar called his generals and asked them what
it was proper to do. One of the youngest, Allart,
without giving the others time to express their opin-
ions, addressed his royal master in these words : ^ If
your majesty does not attach the Swedes at this moment^
it will he too late^. The whole line was immediately
set in motion, and marched in good order, with pikes
erect, between the intervals of the redoubts, which
were left manned, to cover a retreat, in case of ne-
cessity.

394 MINOK OPERATIONS.

" Hardly had the Swedes halted to form, and to
restore order, when they saw the Eussians on their
heels. Their disorder and confusion became general.
Still, they did not fly at once ; they even made one
more valorous effort, and turned back to charge ; but
order, the soul of battles, being gone, they were scat-
tered without resistance.

" The Eussians, who were not accustomed to vic-
tory, did not venture to pursue them, and the Swedes
retired in disorder as far as the Borysthenes, where
they were all taken prisoners. Thus it is that, by
skilful arrangements, we can propitiate fortune."

CHAPTEE TWELFTH.

BARRICADES.

1. Coiistrnction. — Barricades are often constructed
in the streets of places besieged or in revolt, for the
purpose of resisting the entrance of the enemy for a
longer time by obliging him to overcome successively
a number of obstacles.

Barricades being nothing else than defensive
works, the rules for their construction are the same
as those prescribed for field intrenchments ; in other
words they should, as far as possible, be located, 1st,
at elevated points^ in order that they may command
the portion of the street or place extending before
them ; 2d, at the middle of hlochs^ rather than at
their extremities against the two houses forming an
angle, for in the latter position they are more easily
turned.

Barricades may be composed of all kinds of mate-
rials, and for those which are erected in haste any-
thing is used that comes to hand. The best are con-
structed either of alternate layers of paving stones
and earth, or of wood and earth, in a form resembling

396 MINOR OPERATIONS.

the sluice in dams employed in hydraulic works. In
all cases, it is well to make the slope that is turned to-
ward the enemy as steep as possible, like the face of
a wall, in order to make it difficult to scale the bar-
ricade.

It need not be said that the higher the barricade,
the more difficult it will be to carry by assault ; and
that if j)rovided in front with a ditch and pits, it will
present accessory obstacles to be surmounted in the
first place.

On the inside the wall of the barricade should be
provided with steps, upon which the defenders can
mount for the purpose of firing on the enemy.

2. Defence. — In defending a barricade the occu-
pants fire in succession upon the assailing columns as
they present themselves. A small mine-chamber may
also be prepared in advance, opening outward, some
ten or twelve yards in front of the barricade, which
may be sprung by a train from the inside at the in-
stant the assailant reaches it.

When the enemy begins to scale the barricade,
the crest is defended either with the bayonet and
sword, or by musketry.

The defence of a barricade requires great coolness
and calm and deliberate courage, not to be too readily
daunted by numerous assaults upon so feeble an in-
trench ment ; and to make these assaults fruitless,
which is the important and sole object in view, we
can only advise indefatigable activity and incessant
vigilance.

BAREICADES. 397

If the defender of the barricade possesses artillery,
he will throw grape-shot, but this is a rare case.

When one barricade becomes untenable, the de-
fenders abandon it and retire to another, at the same
time taking care to obstruct the way between the two
barricades.

3. Attack. — Carrying a barricade is a dangerous
operation, as we cannot here deploy an array of force,
and must of necessity, on account of the narrowness
of the street, fight upon a small front, which gives the
chief advantage to the defenders.

In general, this obstacle should be carried by ruse,
by surprise, or by a flanking movement. In fact, after
a careful examination of the locality, by a reconnois-
sance or bird's-eye view from the top of some high
building, we shall seldom fail to discover some pas-
sage or court situated near the barricade by which it
is possible to gain an entrance within the barricade,
or from which we may at least be able to inspect the
space occupied by the defenders. We must forthwith
endeavor by all means to secure the occupation of
such a passage or court.

We may also occupy the upper stories of the
neighboring houses, and thence dislodge the defend-
ers by a plunging fire into the interior of the bar-
ricade.

Finally, we may resort to blowing up the barricade
by running a mine beneath it, or at least to throwing
it down by petards or barrels of powder placed
against the outer face. But we are frequently de-

398 MINOR OPERATIONS.

terred from employing these means by our unwilling-
ness to destroy tlie houses in the vicinity.

On account of the small breadth of the street, it
will rarely be possible to run a sap to carry a barri-
cade : besides, we should in this operation be too
much exposed to the plunging fire of the defence.
The only way would be to advance against the barri-
cade behind high movable mantlets, furnished, if re-
quired, with a banquette, such as have been proposed
for this purpose.

These means failing, we must come to a direct and
open attack, notwithstanding the danger it involves.
It is to be conducted as follows :

If we have cannon or howitzers, we first endeavor
to batter down the barricade by their heavy projec-
tiles judiciously directed. Otherwise we dislodge the
defenders by rapid and well-aimed musketry fire.

This firing is continued until the defence shows
signs of hesitation ; then a column of assault throws
itself at full speed upon the barricade, sappers having
previously filled up the ditch and pits. This column
endeavors to escalade the barricade, while the sappers
proceed to open it in any part that has been sufiicient-
ly damaged by the cannon.

At the same time, the sharpshooters of the assail-
ant, posted in the neighboring houses which command
the interior of the barricade, redouble their fire to
paralyse the defence of the crest, and thus to promote
the success of the assault.

If the street is wide, it is usual to employ two
columns of assault instead of one ; but in all cases the

BAREICADES.

399

first columns should be supported by others which put
themselves in motion shortly after the first.

When, after a number of assaults, we find our-
selves unable to obtain possession of the barricade,
we can only resort to the extreme measure of bom-
barding it and reducing it to ashes, together with the
adjacent houses. This method unfortunately involves
the destruction of a number of the inhabitants who
are not among the defenders of the barricade ; never-
theless, we should not hesitate to employ it rather
than to suffer the destruction of large numbers of
valuable soldiers, before these barriers raised by
revolt or despair.

CHAPTER THIRTEENTH.

FOEAGES.

1. Object. — A forage is the name applied to the
operation in which troops who have exhausted the
resources of their bivouacs or cantonments, go to
more distant parts to obtain the food needed for
their horses. There are two kinds of foraging —
foraging upon the inhabitants, or dry foraging^ and
foraging in the fields, or green foraging.

Formerly, and even in the last century, forages
were regarded as important ojDcrations. They were
preceded by reconnoissances, and undertaken with
every precaution ; frequently two thirds of the army
were employed in their execution. They served as
Gourps d'essai^ in which the young officer could test
his abilities ; and Folard advises officers " never to
omit a single opportunity of conducting them, as they
tend greatly to cultivate quickness of eye and acute-
ness of judgment." In the wars of the Revolution
and of the Empire, forages became of secondary im-
portance, in consequence of the extreme mobility of
the armies, which, remaining but a short time in pres-
ence of each other, could subsist everywhere. From

FOEAGES. 401

that time not a single general forage was ever made ;
each division and each brigade making those which
their wants required.

]N'evertheless, foraging is still indispensable, and
especially for light cavalry. General Brack says : " 1
have served in eight campaigns under the Empire, and
always at outposts, and in the whole time have never
seen a single commissary, nor have I drawn a single
ration from the stores of the army. Was there then
no military administration? Never was the chief
military administration in more skilful hands. Why
then did this administration not have its agents at our
outposts of light cavalry ? Because the Emperor had
judged that it was impossible, and that it was folly to
subject a troop which was irregular in all its move-
ments to the regularity of the distributions of pro-
visions." And he explains how this system, at first
practised in foraging upon the enemy, continued to
exist when the French were afterward forced to the
defensive, and had to draw upon their allies and their
own people."^

2. i>i§tribiitioii. — As soon as the country in which
we are to sojourn has been reconnoitred, its foraging
resources must be distributed among the different
corps of troops ; that is, the fields must be appor-
tioned for green foraging, and the houses, barns, or
hay-mows, for dry foraging. This distribution is the
more necessary, because it not only puts an end to
vexatious rivalry between the corps and to other

* Atant-postes de ca/vaUrie Ugere, 1831, p. 143.
26

402 MINOR OPERATIONS.

causes of disorder, but prevents extravagant waste *
and thus husbands the foraging wealth of the coun-
try as long as possible, without which precaution the
cavalry would soon be deprived of food for their
horses, f

To effect this distribution for dry foraging, we
commence by measuring the cubic contents of the
granaries, stacks, or barns. This measure is converted
into weight, by the rule that one cubic foot of straw
weighs about eight pounds ; and hence the number
of rations of straw will be found by dividing the
whole weight by the weight of the ration, which
varies from ten to twenty pounds, and which is
usually fixed by the orders of the day. The number
of rations of grain will be reduced from the total
number of cubic feet of grain to be disposed of, by
multiplying that number by 3^, which is about the
average number of rations in a cubic foot.

For green foraging, on the other hand, we first as-
certain from the inhabitants the yield of their mea-
dows, which usually varies between 1,500 and 5,000

* General Brack says with reason : " In peace wanton waste is a
wrong ; in war it is a crime."

" The use of cut straw by the German cavahy, and the order and
system of their green foraging, have often facilitated the means of their
subsistence." {Approvisionnement des arinees au XIX^ siecle., par le
g6n6ral Roguet, p. 153.)

t In support of the distribution recommended, we will remind the
reader that when Moncey was about to enter Spain in 1823 in the vicin-
ity of Carcassone and Narbonne, he was obliged to extend his canton-
ments " because the first estimate of the resources of the communes had
been made in an inexact manner." (Marcillac, Hist, de la campagne de
Catalogue en 1823, Paris, 1824, p. G3.)

FORAGES. 403

pounds per acre; and then, if we have time, also
make an actual experiment. We mow a portion of a
meadow, an acre, for example ; then, having measured
the area of all the meadows in our possession, we mul-
tiply the number of acres by the number of rations
we have found in a single acre, to determine the whole
number of rations at our disposal. We should ob-
serve that the weight of the green ration is much
greater than that of the dry, its regulation weight
being as much as 88 pounds,* so that a mounted for-
ager can bring in but a small number of green rations.
It will also be useful to remember that a liberal al-
lowance should be made in the distribution of green
forage, for waste — about one thirdf — for the forage is
often mowed when short, and much of it is then lost,
with all the care that may be observed in the opera-
tion.J

When the number of rations of the locality has
been determined, the assistant intendant and staff offi-
cers to whom this duty is assigned, make an exact dis-
tribution of the granaries or the meadows among the
different corps, in proportion to the number of their

* For the light cavahy horse.

t Some authors allow as much as one half.

I The following recommendations in respect to green forage will be
found useful when we have our choice of the food to be given to the
horse. Green forage is more valuable than new hay ; the best is mown
grass that is not too young. Next comes rye, which is the most digest-
ible of all green forage, but is not so nutritious as lucern grass and clover.
These latter should be cut a day before they are given to the horses, for
when fresh they contain injurious principles, particularly clover, which,
if eaten in too large quantities, will kill the horses. When grasses or
grain fail, give them the leaves of trees, and especially leaves of elm.

404 MmOR OPERATIONS.

horses, and in such a manner that the limits of the
grounds assigned shall present no possible confusion.

3. Dry Foraging. — Having arrived at the com-
mune in which the forage is to be made, the detach-
ment which has been sent for the purpose takes pos-
session of its outlets and surrounds it by sentinels.
The chief of the detachment then presents to the com-
munal authority the requisition for forage, signed by
the general-in-chief or at least by a general officer (ex-
cept in case of a detached corps). If this authority
complies, willingly or unwillingly, with the requisi-
tion, he is required to transport the forage to the spot
where the foragers are in waiting. But the foragers
are not allowed to carry away this forage on their
horses until the amount of forage delivered has been
verified : it will be better if we have the privilege of
employing the wagons of the country for the trans-
portation.

But if the communal authority refuses to comply
with the requisition, we enter the village by force,
and we assign to each company the granaries, farms, or
stacks from which they are to forage. Outside the
village, we take further precautions, and place addi-
tional outposts, in order not to be surprised by the
enemy during the operation. Inside the village, we
prevent marauding by patrols. "We do not permit all
the foragers to enter the houses at once, as this would
be too dangerous in case of surprise ; they are allowed
to enter only by squads, and in succession. If we do
not fear the arrival of the enemy during the operation,

FOEAGES. 405

we may, for greater convenience, have tlie horses
brought near to the houses; otherwise they are to
be left outside the village, of course under escort. In
the first case, we send off the foragers in small bodies,
as fast as they are loaded ; in the second, they do not
start until the whole detachment is collected together.
It will be expedient to forage in but one village
at a time,* so that the cavalry may not be too much
dispersed in positions more or loss obstructed, and al-
ways dangerous.

4. Oreen Foraging. — ^For green foraging, the for-
agersf are each furnished with two forage ropes and a
bag. They retain their stoutest head-gear J (the hel-
met or shako) and their sabre, and carry sickles or
scythes, according to circumstances. Each of them
should make two bundles or trusses, w^eighing together
from 200 to 300 pounds.§ He ties them with his ropes,
and balances them upon his horse. The grain is put
into the bag and carried on the pommel of the saddle.

In making a green forage, we first take military
possession of the ground and place a reserve on the
right or left. Then we surround ourselves by out-
23osts, so as to be apprized in season of the approach
of the enemy.

* Instruction de Frederic le Grand d ses generanx, article 4.

t Often called corvee horsemen, in contradistinction to the horsemen
of the escort.

I So as to he safer from sahre hlows coming down upon them while
they are cutting the forage.

§ As much as 550 pounds was once allowed. See the Eeveries du
marechal de Saxe, liv. i., chap. 3, art. 6.

406 MINOR OPERATIONS.

In order that the horses may not be in the way
during the operation, they are left outside of the for-
aging ground.

When all these dispositions are made, the operation
is commenced and prosecuted with diligence. If the
enemy appears during the operation, we first make a
defence on the exterior, and the reserve goes forward
to repel him ; but the foragers should not quit their
work until the last extremity. If we have wagons at
our disposal, we load them and send them off under a
small escort, while the reserve obstructs the advance
of the enemy. We may thus save the forage contained
in these wagons at least, by getting it to some secure
place.

Green foraging, being executed wholly in the open
field, is less dangerous than dry foraging, in which it
is often difficult to assemble the foragers in case of
alarm. We must only observe not to embrace too
much ground in the operation, but should rather for-
age twice in succession on a smaller scale.

5. Attack of a Foraging Party. — For attacking a
party engaged in green foraging, cavalry will be sufii-
cient ; but infantry will be required in an attack upon
those engaged in a dry forage.

In the attack upon a forage, as in a surprise, se-
crecy is the great element of success.

We show ourselves toward the end of the opera-
tion, and endeavor to separate the foragers from the
posts, or from their escorts, according as they are at
their station, or on the march. The attack, especially,

rOKAGES.

40T

must be sudden and rapid ; and several false attacks
should be made, to distract tbe attention of the enemy.

If we succeed in compelling the enemy to abandon
the forage in which he is engaged, we have completely
accomplished our object, and therefore we should not
pursue the foragers*

Failing to attain so complete a result, we at least
harass the foragers during the operation, both going
and returning, so as to retard them, or cause them to
fail in their enterprise.

Euse, well employed, may become an excellent
auxiliary in an attack upon a foraging party

* Carrying off the horses of the cavalry, whether on a forage or in
pasture, hy a special ruse, was formerly called donner le liaraux. This
ruse," descrihed hy Marshal Saxe {Reveries^ liv. ii., chap. 7), had almost
wholly gone out of use hefore the middle of the eighteenth century.

CHAPTER FOURTEENTH.

DEFILES.

We apply the term defile to a certain extent of
country or of ground shut in between lateral obsta-
cles, as well as to any contraction of a road through
which we can pass only in a column of small front, or
by the flank.

Defiles may be divided into two classes :

1st. Those whose outlets alone can be seen and sd
tacked by the enemy, and whose flanks may be advai
tageously occupied to strengthen their defence.

2d. Those which give scope to the projectiles oi
the enemy throughout their whole extent, as well
at their outlets, and whose flanks, therefore, can nei-
ther be strengthened nor defended.

Roads through narrow valleys, and those betweei
mountains, ditches, woods, and passages through vil-
lages which cannot be turned, are defiles of the first
class. Bridges, narrow necks of land, dikes through
marshes, are examples of defiles of the second class. A
defile which can be turned will often become but a
fatal trap, in spite of all precautions. Nevertheless,
the greater niunber of defiles may be easily obstruct-

DEFILES. 409

ed; they afford facilities for ambuscades; they pre-
sent a narrow front for the combat ; and, like water
courses, exert a very important influence in military
operations. Those of the first class, when their flanks
have been strengthened, present positions that are
almost impregnable. As an example, we may cite
Theimopylse, of classic renown. Formed by Mount
CEta and the sea, they close the entrance of Greece
toward Thessaly, and are impregnable when the sur-
rounding heights are also occupied. But for treach-
ery, the Persians would have been baffled by this for-
midable position. Defiles of the second class are fa-
vorable for defensive operations, and are forced with
difficulty, as was illustrated by the triple combat of
Areola, fought by Bonaparte in the Italian campaign of
1796, against the Austrians, commanded by Alvinzi.

The defence and attack of defiles come specially
within the province of infantry and artillery. Cav-
alry should participate only as an exception : it is ex-
cellent for turning them, but even this requires that
the roads by which it may be ejffected are such as
they can traverse.

1. Occupation and defence of a Defile. — The

method of occupying a defile and the distribution of
the troops in it, depend upon the nature and conform-
ation of this defile, and also upon the object we pro-
pose to accomplish. This object may be, either to
preserve the defile for our own use, or to prevent its
passage by ihe enemy.

In the first case, Ave occupy all the points in front

410 MINOR OPERATIOlSrS.

and on tlie flanks of tlie defile whicli are suitable for
an obstinate defence, and establish the reserve at the
rear outlet in a position chosen so as to prevent the
enemy from taking possession of it and to protect the
retreat in case we are driven back. This reserve
should cooperate with the supporting corps. We
should especially not neglect to occupy the outlets of
the various roads or transverse defiles which debouch
upon the interior of the main defile. Communication
must be carefully maintained between the main body
and the different posts occupying these outlets on the
one hand, and the favorable defensive positions situ-
ated on the front and the flanks of the defile on the
other, in order that these posts may fall back or be
supported in season.

In the second case, or where the object is to pre-
vent the enemy from passing the defile, we should
take a position in the rear and at the point most fa-
vorable for assailing the enemy on the front or flank ^
at the moment he attempts to debouch. This rule is
more particularly applicable to the defiles whose flanks
are inaccessible, such as bridges and dikes. We
may, however, in many instances, occupy some im-,
portant points within the defile, especially the inter- j
sections of roads, since we may thus arrest the enemy]
at various points successively.

2. Pas§age of a Befiie — The passage of a defile, in
an advance movement, when it is not occupied by the
enemy in force, presents few difiSculties. We first re-
connoitre the defile, its approaches, its outlets, and the

DEFILES. 411

roads and paths running into it ; and having assured
ourselves that it contains no ambuscade nor intrench-
ment, we occupy it as above stated. When possession
has been taken, the advance-guard passes first and
clears the ground, in conjunction with some skirmish-
ers ; then the several bodies of troops pass successively,
observing all the usual precautions, that is, continu-
ally throwing out scouts and never trusting to a de-
lusive feeling of security. These troops, upon their
exit from the defile, finding the front freed from the
presence of any detachments of the enemy (which
should have been driven ofi^ by the advance-guard
and the skirmishers), can easily take position. The
passage being completed, a detachment is left to
occupy and defend the defile, if its possession is re-
quired for the safety of the rear of the army. We are
thus saved the trouble of subsequently taking it when
the necessity arises.

The passage of a defile in a retreat is a more deli-
cate operation. After having taken military posses-
sion and covered its flanks, especially by detachments,
the main body of the army is left in advance, facing
the enemy. The cavalry and artillery accelerate their
speed and are the first to pass the defile, because they
require more time in passing, and are important to be
preserved ; then comes the infantry, which retires slow-
ly, leaving the rear-guard before the front of the defile
in the place of the main body, and rallying, as they
pass, the several detachments which j)rotect the flanks.

The first troop which debouches forms facing the
defile, within musket range, in order to enfilade it

412 MINOR OPEEATIONS.

with their fire, and as the other troops debouch, they
successively take position on the flanks.

The rear-guard waits until the army is entirely
formed before it retires. It unmasks the latter slowly,
and proceeds to post itself upon the extremities of the
line of battle. The retreat from the defile is a critical
moment for the rear-guard ; for it has to pass from a
narrow field of battle, where it could resist superior
forces, into open ground, where it no longer enjoys this
advantage.

When there are lateral avenues falling upon the
flanks of the defile, it is essential that their outlets be
occupied by detachments, for the purpose of protect-
ing the retreat of the rear-guard — a retreat which is
sufficiently perilous in itself, and should not be ex-
posed to the additional danger of a flank attack.

In irregular ground, the retreat of the rear-guard]
should be covered by a chain of skirmishers, but in^
open ground, where only the good order and disci-
pline of the troops can give security to their march, it
should be covered by some companies ; and if the rear-
guard should find itself pressed too sharply by the
enemy, these companies must make a half turn and
charge the latter with the bayonet.

A modern military writer* compares a column of
troops in a defile to a serpent, which defends all the
parts of its long body by its head, which sees best
and acts best, and upon which the whole can best fold
itself back. This head is the advance-guard in a for-

* Voffwier dHnfanterie en campagne^ par le g^n^ral Eoguet, 1846,
p. 111.

DEFILES.

ward movement through, a defile, and the rear-guard
in a retreat. However, in both cases, this serpent col-
umn should have eyes not only in the head, but also
in the tail, and often on both sides, in order to pre-
vent a surprise ; hence, besides its advanced guard, it
should thi'ow out skii^mishers on the flanks.

3. Attack of a l^efile. — In this attack we are, a
2yriori^ at a disadvantage, on account of the small
front upon which we are compelled to fight.

In respect to the method of attacking, two kinds
of defiles are to be distinguished ; those whose flanks
are diflicult of access or well defended by field fortifi-
cation, and those whose flanks are not covered by de-
tachments of troops.

It is difficult to attack those of the first kind, nor
should we attempt to take them unless theii* posses-
sion is of essential importance to the success of the
campaign. The available means of attack are, first, to
drive away the troops who guard the entrance of the
defile, and then to protect the operation of passing.
To accomplish this, we should commence by stagger-
ing the enemy with an overwhelming fire, and as soon
as we perceive hesitation in his ranks, the infantry
should fall upon him with the bayonet in close col-
umn. The artillery of the enemy being by this time
dismounted, at least in part, the close column should
advance without firing, protected on the front by an
advance-guard and on the flanks by skirmishers, who
generally succeed in insinuating themselves every-
where. As fast as the infantry debouch from the de-

414 MINOR OPERATIONS.

file they should deploy, taking care to rest their flanks
upon the obstacle formed by the defile. The reserve
should remain massed at the entrance of the defile, to
guard against a counter attack and reinforce the cen-
tre and flanks when necessary. As soon as we have
mastered the defile and the obstacles which support
it, a part of the reserve and the whole of the cavalry
will pass through it and go forward. The main body
of the artillery, which had also remained in the rear,
will take position on the flanks of the defile, as soon
as the infantry has completed its passage and gained
ground in front, and will then fire briskly upon the
retiring enemy as long as he is within range.

When the ground does not permit a direct attack
of this "kind, we must have recourse to ruse. We
should harass the enemy by false demonstrations, es-
pecially by making a pretence of forcing a passage in
some other quarter ; and we should search for some
road or path comj3aratively little known, which the
enemy has neglected to guard, and by which we may
be able to turn the defile. The important point is to
succeed by these means in pushing some comjDanies
quite to the extremity of the defile, as these companies,
thus advantageously posted, assist the march of the
column, support its flanks, and thereby facilitate the
capture of the defile.

As to the attack of defiles whose flanks are covered
by detachments, the following is the usual method of
proceeding :

We begin by attacking these detachments briskly,
with the sielect detachments which flank the march of

DEFILES. 415

the column intended to force the defile. These select
detachments are followed by reserves, who support
them when necessary, and enable them to rally and
make head against the enemy.

If these attacks are repulsed, they are nevertheless
renewed again and again, until the detachments which
cover the flanks of the defile are completely driven
from all the points which they have occupied.

Meanwhile the main body, stationed in front of
the entrance of the defile, keeps the enemy in check
by making demonstrations of attack, and throwing
forward skirmishers, in order to prevent the enemy
from reinforcing the posts which cover their flanks.

"When these posts have been driven out, we en-
deavor, by still pushing forward, to take the enemy
in the rear, availing ourselves of the paths, cuts, and
valleys which present the shortest and most favorable
route. If we succeed, in this way, in reaching the
openings leading into the defile and in rear of the
posts of the enemy, he is necessarily forced to retire
without delay, or to take the alternative of laying
rlown his arms.

4. Historical Examples. — I. Omit no precaution
when near a defile, — In the campaign in Silesia, about
the middle of December, 1745, when the Prince of
Anhalt arrived before the city of Meissen, his cavalry
sufi*ered a slight check, because, being fatigued, they
neglected to reconnoitre the approaches of the places
which they had to traverse. They had to defile, man
by man, through a deep cut in the road before entering

416 MlNOn OPEEATIONS.

tliat city. This occupied quite a long time, during
wMcli two Prussian regiments of dragoons dismount-
ed to wait their tui^n to warm themselves. But a
Saxon detachment, perceiving their situation, stole
into a neighboring wood, and falling unexpectedly
upon these two regiments, killed 180 of their men be-
fore being repulsed. This instance aptly illustrates
the importance of always reconnoitring, especially
when a defile is to be passed. "The smallest mis-
takes in war are punished," says Frederic in relation
to this subject, " for the enemy never pardons." *

II. Cavalry may^ as an exception^ force a defile. —
The attack of the defile of Somo-Sierra, in Spain
(Nov. 1808), is often cited as proving that no obstacle
can resist the imjyetuosity of good cavalry.

This attack was made by the third squadron of
the regiment of Polish light cavalry of the Guard,
which regiment was commanded by Count, afterward
General Krasinski.

The position seemed to be unassailable, for the
contracted road, situated between rocks whose sides
and summits were covered with infantry, formed four
bends or angles, at each of which four cannon were
stationed, defending the passage and sweeping every-
thing which appeared on the road.

Across the road the Spaniards had made a ditch,
fortunately, however, not very broad. The fire of their
infantry and artillery not only prevented the French
infantry from carrying the position, but even from

* Example taken from my Eistoire militaire de la Prusse amnt 1756,
p. 338.

DEFILES. 417

tilling this ditcli witli fascines. It was proposed to
carry tlie defile by cavalry, which, from its rapidity,
would be less exposed to the efi^ect of the fire. The
thii^d squadron of the Polish light cavalry, under the
command of Kozietulski, rushed forward in column hy
fours^ kept on in spite of their heavy losses, fell upon
the cannoniers, sabred them before they could reload
their pieces, and were so impetuous in their attack,
that the Spanish infantry abandoned their positions in
terror and fled, thus in a moment leaving an insur-
mountable obstacle without defence, and opening the
route to Madrid to Napoleon and his whole army.

If the squadron had stopped during the charge, it
would probably have been lost, for the Spanish can-
noniers would have had time to reload, and having
decimated it by the first discharge, would doubtless
have annihilated it by the second. The charge was
executed with the rapidity of lightning^ without regard
to killed and wounded, and the squadron scarcely per-
ceived that its chief (Kozietulski), having had his
horse killed under him at the commencement of the
charge, and being unable to follow on foot, had retired."^

III. Employment of flanking attacks, — Marshal
Moncey (July 24, 1808), forced the supposed impreg-
nable defile of las Cabreras by two turning attacks on
the flanks, executed by General Harispe,f the intrepid

* Extracted from the pamphlet Les Polonais d Somo-Sierra en 1808
(being a refutation of a passage in the ninth volume of Thiers' History
of the Consulate and the Empire), bj Colonel Niegolevrski, a lieutenant
of the squadron which forced the defile ; Paris, 1854.

t Since a marshal of France.
27

418 MINOR OPERATIOll^S.

chief of the Basque chasseurs, at the head of a body
of good marksmen without hnapsacke^ who conquered
the position rock by rock, and thus descended upon
the rear of the defenders.

In Algeria, at the beginning of its conquest, to
pass the defile of Mouzaia (November 21, 1830), an
attack by the front was combined with a flanking at-
tack upon the ridges on the left.

IV. Passage of a defile. — Before the battle of Cas-
tiglione (August 5, 1796), Marmont, wishing to de-
ploy for the action with five companies of artillery
(nineteen pieces), found himself compelled to pass
through a rather wide defile, swept by the enemy's
fire. He threw forward his column (with a front of
two pieces), at a gallop^ placing at its head the com-
pany upon which he counted least. This head was
crushed, but the rest passed, deployed, and quickly
dismounted half the pieces of heavy calibre posted on
Mount Medola.*

This example, which again illustrates the import-
ance of passing defiles as rapidly as possible, justifies
the saying of the Archduke Charles,f that " every
passage of a defile is subject to difficulties in propor-
tion to the space to be passed over and the delay to
be suffered."

Y. An army may sometimes he drawn up in order
of hattle in front of a defile. — This has been much dis-
puted, but seems at the present day to be more fa-
vorably considered. The Emperor (Napoleon III.),

* Memoires de Marmont, 1857, t. i., p. 209, 210.

t Campagne de 1799, traduction fran^aise, t. ii., p. 123.

DEFILES. 419

in his great work * remarks, in reference to a position
of this kind, which was assumed (so to speak) by
Gustavus Adolphus at Leipsic and at Lutzen, that
*' its sole advantage lies in compelling the soldiers to
conquer or to die." General Jomini goes farther ; he
says : " It is still a question to be resolved, whether
defiles behind a beaten anny do not rather favor the
retreat than render it difficult.-' f

5. Defence and Attack of a Bridge. — It frequent-
ly happens in war that we wish to preserve a bridge in
order to make use of it subsequently ; at other times
we wish to destroy it, but our troops have not the ne-
cessary tools or powder for the purpose, especially if it
is of stone. In both cases we must seek to defend it.

Suppose then, for example, an officer to be sent upon
such a mission at the head of a detachment of fifty men.
He will station about thirty men as skirmishers on the
right and left of the bridge, along the bank of the
stream, in the places which have been shown to be
favorable by a previous reconnoissance, and will so
dispose them that their fire will cross in front of the
bridge and thus keep the enemy from approaching it.
He will knock down its parapets to facilitate the fire
of the defence. J He will obstruct the bridge at both

* Etudes 8ur le passe et Vatenir de Vartillerie^ 1846, t. i., in 4:to.,
p. 341.

t Traite des grandes operations^ fourth edition, 1851, t. i., p. 130.
On this point of tactics, the reader may consult the Histoire de Welling-
ton^ par M. Briahnont, 1857, t, ii., p. 412, 413.

X There is a historical fact in support of this recommendation. At
the attack of the bridge of Goito (April 8, 1848) by the Piedmontese, the

420 MINOE OPERATIOI^^S.

extremities. The first obstacle cannot be directly de-
fended ; it will consist of a low barrier, or an abatis,
or, better still, of a simple cut, v/itli tlie object of re-
tarding the march of the enemy, and bringing him to
a stand at the entrance of the bridge. The second
obstacle will be defended with the greatest energy by
the remainder of the detachment If the number of
defenders were greater, a reserve would assist in this
second defence. Finally, one or two posts may be es-
tablished to oppose any flanking manoeuvres. Artil-
lery would here be an excellent auxiliary.

A chief of a detachment, charged with the attack
of a bridge, will first make a minute reconnoissance of
the bridge, to ascertain the defensive arrangements of
the enemy. He will then distribute his skirmishers
and his artillery along the bank ; the latter for the pur-
pose of silencing the fire of the enemy, or of distracting
their attention, while he throws himself upon the bridge
at the head of his best soldiers, climbs over the obsta-
cles in his way, and strives to drive off the defenders.

We should, however, always endeavor to turn a
bridge by fording or swimming, at a point above or
below it, in order to avoid an attack by the front
upon a position in which the enemy has fortified him-
self and is prepared to make a firm stand.

explosion of a mine rendered the bridge impassable ; but the parapet of
the bridge remained almost uninjured, and the sharpshooters (hersaglieri),
using it as a foot bridge, crossed the Mincio and pursued the Austrians,
who retired by the road to Mantua. — As an analogous instance, it may
be remembered that, in 1796, the French crossed the Lavis upon the
beams of a bridge from which the planking had been removed.

DEFILES. 421

As an example, we will cite the attack of the
bridge of Lodi (May 11, 1796). The Austrians had
not had time to cut away the bridge, and Beaulieii,
instead of defending it solely in the rear, had commit-
ted the error of leaving some battalions in front of it.
The French reached Lodi at '^ve o'clock in the even-
ing, after a march of ten leagues, and immediately
made their preparations. The columns of grenadiers
charged with the attack were sheltered behind the
ancient ramparts of the city from the grapeshot of
thirty pieces of artillery (drawn up concentrically
upon the opposite bank), until the signal for the at-
tack was given. This attack, seconded by the fire of
the French artillery, was made with such impetuosity
that its success was instantaneous (notwithstanding
the 175 yards' length of the bridge), and remained a
long time engraved in the memory of the Austrians.
Tlie retreat of the latter was precipitated by the ap-
pearance on their right flank of 2,000 French horse-
men, who had crossed the Adda above Lodi by the
ford of Montanaso.

6. Defence and Attack of a I>ike.^ — As COmbats in
marshes can seldom take place except on dikes, it
will be useful to say a word upon their defence and
attack.

The dikes best adapted for defence, are those
which can be defended both in front and on the
flanks, especially when the troops intrusted with the
defence of the flank can occupy an inaccessible post.
But in general a dike can only be defended in front.

422 MINOR OPERATIONS.

In this case, when its length does not exceed musket
range, our force is to be placed in rear of the dike,
and is to be divided into three troops of about equal
numbers, one posted (with the artillery, if we have
it) at the terminus of the dike, to receive the first
attack of the enemy, the second about thirty yards in
rear, to fall upon the enemy when he debouches from
the dike, and the third as a reserve, still farther in the
rear. But if the length of the dike is greater than
musket range, our force is usually to be placed at first
in advance of the dike, to defend it ; then, having de-
fended it as long as possible in this position, retire
rapidly over the dike and make a second defence from
a position in the rear. There is, however, danger in
thus placing ourselves in advance of the dike, as
this position the enemy, if in superior force, may easil]
surround us, and, as it were, corner us. Besides, h<
will often avail himself of our retreat to pass the dik<
at the same time with ourselves.

The attack of a dike by the front, when it cai
neither be turned nor attacked by the flank, consisi
in first driving back the defenders to the rear of th(
dike by an overwhelming and well sustained fire, an(
especially by the galling fire of a large number oi
skilful sharpshooters; and then, at the moment the
defenders show signs of hesitation, rushing upon th(
dike at a run and forcing the passage. In such an
attack we must exhibit great vigor, for the longer we
remain on the dike exposed to the fire of the defend-
ers, the more men we shall lose, and the greater will
be the probability of our being obliged to retreat —

DEFILES. 423

especially if tlie defenders possess any pieces of artil-
lery loaded with grape, which enfilade the whole
length of the dike. In this case, the assailant will be
obliged to employ artillery to silence these pieces;
otherwise he will fail to pass, or will succeed only by
losing many men.

CHAPTER FIFTEENTH.

VILLAGES.

1, Occupation — ^Villages should be occupied only
when the locality is favorable for defence (for if it is
unfavorable, their occupation by the enemy will pro-
duce but little inconvenience), and when, also, this
defence is connected with the execution of the general
plan of operations. This rule will save us from unne-
cessarily drawing away troops from the main object in
view. Villages of a rounded form, in which the houses
are pretty close together and have streets of a certain
degree of regularity, are always more favorable for
defence, other things being equal, than those of an
elongated form, or those composed of habitations scat-
tered here and there without connection or plan : for
regular and short streets possess the advantage of be-
ing good strategic routes, in Avhich the troops and the
artillery produce most effect.

The villages the occupation of which may be of
importance to an army, are : 1st, those which form a
defile, that is, those which are the key of a defile, or
protect a defile ; 2d, those which form the salient
angle of a position ; 3d, those which cover the front

VILLAGES. 425

or flanks of a line of battle, and would consequently
become dangerous if the enemy were to take posses-
sion of tliem ; 4tli, those wliicli may enable us to stop
a pursuit and insure a retreat ; that is, in many cases,
those which are in defiles ; 5th, those which come into
a chain of posts, as it is necessary that everything
which occurs in that chain should be known ; 6th,
and finally, those which are within a short distance
of the army, and contain magazines, convoys, and
manufactures, which we cannot dispense with, and
are, therefore, to be protected, as places of supply,
with as much care as our lines of communication.

A glance by the general-in-chief at the general and
particular position of a village may have given suffi-
cient ground for ordering its occujDation ; but to effect
this occupation in a suitable manner, we must first
obtain information respecting a number of particulars
which may be classed in seven categories : 1st, as to
the environs, their advantages and disadvantages as a
battle-field, and the kind of troops that can be em-
ployed there ; 2d, whether they are commanding posi-
tions or othermse, and their relative advantages in this
respect ; 3d, the distribution and construction of the
houses, which may be of wood, clay (torcliis), brick,
or stone ; 4th, as to the church, the chateau, the court-
liouse, the large factories and other considerable edi-
fices, which may serve as redoubts ; 5th, as to the
time and means necessary to prepare these and the
whole village for defence ; 6th, as to the number and
kind of troops to be placed there ; 7th, as to the re-
sources of all kinds which the place may offer in pro-

426 MmOR OPERATIOI^S.

visions, forage, materials for accessory defences, and for
making powder and balls.

An isolated village, whicli would not be protected
by escarpments or by a water course, or by a disposi-
tion of troops in tlie rear and on tlie flanks of the vil-
lage, in a word, one wliich the enemy could approach
on all sides, could not be efficiently defended, and
should not be occupied. Nor should any one be occu-
pied which the enemy may without inconvenience
neglect and pass by, for om* object in occupying a vil-
lage is to arrest the enemy and obstruct his progress.

2. Defence. — The first thing is to organize the de-
fence. If time permits^ we close all the avenues by
ditches, abafcis, epaulements, and barricades of suffi-
cient solidity to compel the enemy to breach them ;
we make loopholes in the walls and banquettes
hind the hedges, in order to obtain a fire from the'
whole perimeter ; we give especial care to the organi-
zation of the defence of the church, of the chateau, and
of every position the fire from which may arrest the
assailant, and most especially of those houses which
have a commanding view of the entrances of the
streets ; in short, we make use of all the resources of
field fortification. The redoubt is to be selected in a
strong and central spot, situated in the part where
the final defence is made. Although the artillery
should be at first placed at the most vulnerable
points, and where it may produce the greatest efiect
(as, for example, points from which it can sweep the
open spaces and enfilade the streets), we should never-

VILLAGES. 427

theless be able to move it at all times, and carry it
to the points most threatened, and have epaulements
and platforms prepared in various places, to receive
it. Firing is the principal agent of the defence, but
especially flank and oblique firing, at short ranges.

A small body of cavalry may remain in the inte-
rior of the village, but the greater part of this arm
should be echeloned in rear of the two flanks, to pre-
vent our being turned. It may frequently be employed
also for repelling the enemy in front.

The infantry is divided into three portions. The
first covers the village, and defends the approaches,
because we must, if jDossible, repulse the enemy on
the exterior. Behind hedges, loopholed walls, and
palisades, a single rank of soldiers will be sufficient ;
but the streets and other wide passages, although
they may have been closed, when there was time, by
abatis, barricades, epaulements, or ditches, should be
occupied by companies in mass. Detached men occupy
those houses from which they may protect the exterior
line of defence. The second portion, divided into
small posts communicating with each other and easily
rallied, is placed behind the most exposed points, and
in the cross-roads near the boundaries of the village,
these posts being destined to support and relieve the
advanced troops. The third j)ortion remains concen-
trated in the centre of the village, in as open a place
as possible, equally distant from all the points of at-
tack. The purpose of this reserve is to repulse the
enemy at any point at which he presents himself, and
to receive the advanced troops and cover their retreat

428 MINOR OPERATIONS.

in case we are obliged to evacuate the village. In this
formation in three masses we find reproduced the two
lines and the reserve of the usual order of battle. As
to the numerical force of each of these portions, it
must depend upon the configuration of the village ;
the reserve should amount to about one fourth. The
principal point being to keep up a promj^t and easy
communication between the centre and circumference,
we make as many openings in the walls and hedges as
may be necessary for that purpose. The sorties, if a
favorable occasion offers, should be conducted briskly,
but still with caution ; strengthening the side of the
village by which the troops must return, and enjoining
upon these troops to confine themselves to repulsing
the enemy, and not to abandon themselves to an ii
prudent pursuit. The resistance should be displaye(
at first in the defence of the exterior, and afterwar(
in that of the village itself, and there the groun(
must be defended inch by inch. If the enemy gel
in, the reserve charges upon his flank, while he
arrested by the barricades and the filing from the^
houses. If we are forced to evacuate certain portions
of the village where we find ourselves too seriousb
threatened, we assume a new line of defense markec
out within the village, we attempt counter attacks
and fight to the last extremity, always taking care
however, while maintaining ourselves in the redoubi
to keep open a line of retreat.

3. Attack. — " Attacks upon villages cost too many
men," is the confession of Frederic {Instruction^ art.

VILLAGES. 429

23), and, in fact, villages form obstacles wliicli it is
proper to attack only when other means are not avail-
able for accomplishing the end in view. The mere
fact that the localities are against the assailant, makes
it necessary that he should possess a superiority of
force. He should, especially, have a great number
of howitzers, in order to set on fire and destroy the
obstacles which are thrown in his way.

It is considered that, in general, our efforts against
villages should be reduced to three j)oints : a genuine
attack and two false attacks. We therefore divide
our force into six parts : three to act at once ; two to
protect the flanks of the attacks, supporting and rein-
forcing them, and manoeuvring at small distances in
the rear; and the sixth, of greater force than the
others, to act as a reserve. If the enemy occupies
some positions outside, he must first be driven from
them and thrown back into the village. In this, cav-
alry will be useful. The batteries, directed upon the
village at the outset, form the most advantageous posi-
tions possible, and having produced sufiicient effect, the
first three parts advance in columns, accompanied by
a detachment of sappers, and preceded by numerous
skirmishers, who expel the defenders from the circum-
ference, and silence their fire. The other three parts
follow the movement at variable distances. We take
care to avail ourselves of every local peculiarity, how-
ever trifling, to conceal our march, to put the enemy
on the WTong scent, and to keep ourselves under cover.
We must be neither imprudent nor rash: courage
alone is required. The time of starting of the three

430 MINOE OPEEATIOIs^S.

columns, and the velocity of their march, must be so
regulated that they may come upon the village in
succession to renew the alarm of the defenders, and to
commence the false attacks, whilst they are engaged in
repelling the true one. These columns will generally
be formed by sections, and will consist of a half bat-
talion at most. Having arrived within range of the
first obstacles, the sappers advance with their imple-
ments to open passages. The heads of the columns,
which up to this time have not fired, will now unite
their fire with that of the skirmishers, in order to pro-
tect the work of the sappers, upon which the success
of the attack mainly depends.

The columns penetrate by the openings, attack
and beat down the masses opposed to them, pushing,
them with vigor both in the streets and in the opei
places. The skirmishers, whose circular chain hf
naturally closed in while advancing, leap the hedges
scale the walls, and take possession of some house oi
eminence from which they can fire with effect. Being^
free in their movements, they are frequently the first:
to penetrate. If the attack is repulsed, we renew itj
with fresh troops. When the outer precincts have^
been mastered, the sappers open the secret communi-
cations of the defenders or make new ones, tear do^vni
whatever interferes with combining the attacks,
which favors counter attacks, and thereby diminisl
the difficulties which the permanent obstacles (namely,;
the houses) present to the assailant. Then, as sooi
as we have gained a footing in the interior of the
village, the reserves come up quickly, either to aid

VILLAGES. 431

in overtlu'owing the reserve of the enemy, or to secm*e
the occupation of the village or of the conquered
parties. In fact, we should be well assured of the
possession of one portion before passing to the con-
quest of another.

The cavalry of the assailant repulses that of the
defenders, clears the field, and endeavors to flank the
village.

4. Sudden Attack. — In battles, we depart more or
less from the regular attack which we have just con-
sidered : we give quicker blows, we act by surprise,
we carry positions by assault, and we make but one
or two attacks. These are then two flanking attacks,
which are executed while a strong reserve remains on
the front. This mode is especially employed in Al-
geria, where the villages are often carried by the in-
fantry at a run, without artillery, to put which in
battery would alone leave the soldiers too long ex-
posed to the skilful fire of the Arabs. It compels the
enemy to abandon his position without giving time
for any real engagement.

5. Historical Examples. — It is easy to cite battles
in which villages have played a part.

On the day of Nerwinden (July 29, 1693), the
allies had their army drawn up from the Gehte to the
brook of Landen, between the villages of JSTerwinden
and Romdorf, their front covered by intrencliments.
Luxembourg commenced by attacking the two vil-
lages, and carried the first, from which, however, he
was soon driven. A second attack was followed by

432 MINOR OPERATIOI^S.

the same result, because wlien they had got into Ner-
winden, the French officers neglected to tear down the
hedges and low walls with which the streets were filled,
so that our columns were unable to communicate with
each other, and their action was disjointed. Luxem-
bourg did not allow himself to be discouraged: he
took fresh troops, returned a third time to the attack
of Nerwinden, and this time remained in possession
of it. The enemy had stripped his left to defend
Nerwinden, in consequence of which the attack of our
right, being throughout well conducted, was successful,
and we were able in that quarter to carry the intrench-
ments of the allies. Upon this, Luxembourg passed
beyond Nerwinden, outflanked the enemy's line, threw
it into confusion, and drove a large part back upon
the Gehte.

In the battle of Fontenoy (May 11, 1745), tl
village of Fontenoy was three times attacked by thl
English, and the village of Antoin twice by thl
Dutch.

At Essling (1809), the villages of Essling and
Aspern were each taken and retaken several times.

At Leipsic (1813), the village of Schoenfeld was
retaken eight times.

APPENDIX

KOTES UPON HYGIENE IN THE FIELD.

It is difficult for one who is not a physician to
\\Tite upon hygiene. We will confine ourselves to a
few simple notes.

Hygiene is the science, the object of which is the
preservation of health and the prolongation of the
average duration of human life.

Now that the foot soldier wears a cotton shirt, a
flannel waistband, easy-fitting garments, light head-
gear, the cravat instead of the stock, trowsers inserted
in the gaiters, and cloth trowsers only, a cloak^^ over
his w^hole dress for cold w^eather, and often an overcoat
with a folding-down collar, he is no longer dressed in
obedience to the caprices of fashion, but more in ac-
cordance with the rules of hygiene. It may be, how-
ever, that in endeavoring to give him a greater degree
of lightness and to fit him for service in all climates,
we have had too much reference to warm, and not
enough to temperate and cold ones. But we shall not
enter into details respecting the hygienic preparations

* The Zouaves and foot chasseurs have a dread-nought with a hood.
28

434 APPENDIX.

for a campaign, either for tlie foot or mounted soldier ;
our present purj)ose being merely to point out tlie
precautions necessary for the troops after going into
tlie field, in tlie observance of which every officer, in a
certain measure, should cooperate.

1. Marclies. — We must limit marches to the human
strength, make them at the most suitable hours,'^ and
avoid passing through unhealthy districts.

We must especially be careful to husband the
strength of the soldier when he is obliged to climb
steep ascents, for this purpose diminishing the weight
of his baggage,f moderating his gait,J and stopping
from time to time to allow him to breathe.

In every kind of march, we must carefully guard
against sudden transitions, which are always perni-
cious. § Thus, during halts, the men should not lay
off their coats, especially if perspiring, and they should
not drink until after a moment of rest. In preference
to water alone, their drink should consist of water
mixed with a little brandy or coffee, which they may
carry with them. We should add, however, what
M. Michel Levy says, that " soldiers on a march who

* In Slimmer, we should avoid the heat of the day.

t In all circumstances the men, when fatigued, may he permitted to
put their knapsacks on the wagons, and invalid soldiers should ride in
them.

\ The step should in general he such that the left will not he obliged
to run.

§ These transitions are as objectionable in military hfe generally as in
a simple march. We send our southern soldiers in preference to the
colonies. The English detail for the Indies those regiments which have
already been acclimated at Gibraltar, Malta, or Corfu.

NOTES UPON HYGIEKE IN THE FIELD. 435

drink cold water and immediately continue their jour-
ney, do not suffer." *

In a warm climate a marcli is fatiguing, and should
be abridged, if possible. We should not give the sol-
dier much to carry, and should allow him to march
with the route step. He may, for example, be allowed
to unbutton his coat and loosen his cravat, with the
proviso that he shall observe a stricter bearing if the
breeze springs up. It is also a good precaution to
cover the back of the neck with a white handkerchief
fastened to the cap. A ration of wine or coffee should
be added to the ordinary fare.

If the march is in a cold climate, we should try to
accustom the soldier to it by degrees. He should be
well clothed and abundantly fed. He should warm
himself rather by active motion than by a fire.f He
should avoid alcoholic drinks.

In the summer, at the end of a march, it is salutary
to wash the face and eyes ; and at all seasons the feet
should be washed at each stopping-place at least. A
strict attention to cleanliness conduces greatly to the
soldier's power of endurance.

When the halting-place is reached, the sick are to
be visited, and those threatened with any serious affec-
tion sent to the hospital.

2. Camps. — The French regulations recommend
that the site of a camp be chosen near wood and wa-
ter. Water, indeed, is necessary for the preservation

* Traite d^hygiene^ third edition, 1857, t. ii., p. 31.
t In extreme cold, if a fatigued person lies down, he goes to sleep ;
and sleep, in this case, in the open air, is death.

436 APPENDIX.

of the health of the men ; a running stream is prefer-
able, and the camp may be pitched near its banks.
Woods in the vicinity are desirable for furnishing fuel
for cooking, but, as the soil of forests is moist, we
should avoid pitching the camp within them, if we
would avoid miasmatic influences.

The position of the camp should, moreover, be
sufficiently high to be well ventilated, and .gently
sloping, that the rain may flow off;'^ under these con-
ditions, a dry and sandy plain will be suitable.f

In camp, the troop is lodged in huts or in tents.
If the rapidity of our operations does not prevent
their construction, the former are preferable to tents,
which are too close in summer and too cold in winter.^
The straw used for beds should be renewed every two
weeks, and that which is removed should be hurned^
as a precaution against infection. With the same ob-
ject, the dung should be carried off and burned evei
day, and offal of all kinds buried in the ground.

The soldiers should be prohibited from going ou|
at night in their shirts and with bare feet, as this prf
tice is highly injurious, and produces dysentery.

We should keep a camp as free as possible from
all incumbrances ; a crowded camp is always fatal
where there is a large collection of men.

Inactivity is also attended with danger to the
health of the troops, and we should therefore multiply

* Otherwise the camp will be liable to be inundated. Ditches or
drains should be made, to assist in carrying off the water.

t An eastern (western, on this side of the Atlantic) exposure will be
preferable.

NOTES UPON HYGIEKE IN THE FIELD. 437

detachments as mucli as possible, and employ large
numbers of tlie men in extra work.

3. Bivouacs. — " A bivouac," says Jacquinot de
Presle, " althougli unhealthy in a rainy time, is not
generally so much so as is commonly supposed. The
soldier sleeps with his feet to the fire, which at the
same time dries the ground. This is impossible in a
tent, where the cold is felt severely, and the men col-
lected in so small a space soon vitiate the air they
breathe." *

Although this remark is, on the whole, correct, yet
the bivouac is always attended by more discomfort
than the camp ; and therefore bivouacking is frequent-
ly prescribed only to the troops who are charged with
the duty of watching over the safety of the army, and
a double ration of brandy is allowed them.f

The location of a bivouac should fulfil the same
conditions as that of a camj).

If fires cannot be lighted, on account of the prox-
imity of the enemy, the condition of the men in the
Ijivouac becomes more critical, as they may be over-
come by the cold. In this case, we must give a gen-
eral order making it the duty of every one who sees
another falling asleep, to shake him until he is thor-
oughly aroused.

The portable tent (tente-ahri) is especially suited

* Cours cVart ct dliiatoire militaire, 1829, p. 321.

t In general, the drawbacks of the bivouac are compensated in a great
degree by good food, but it is prudent also to combine attention to clean-
liness as in marches, and activity as in the camp.

438 APPENDIX.

to the bivouac * The officers should see that it is
properly set up.

4. Field Hospitals. — ^These temporary establish-
ments are divided into field hospitals of the regiment,
of the division, and of head-quarters. They are de-
signed to afford the first relief to the wounded and
sick, and to serve as places in which surgical opera-
tions may be performed before sending the men either
to the temporary or permanent hospitals. The field
hospitals of the head-quarters, however, are usually of
such dimensions that the soldier may be taken care
of in them for a longer time.

Field hospitals are established in houses, under a
tent, or even in the open air ; but in all cases in rear^
of the army, sheltered from the fire of the enemy, an(
where water can be readily obtained. The army sur|
geons attend to those placed in them. Each corps is
provided with litters and stretchers.

Every wounded man, deprived of consciousness oi
loss of blood, or with a deep wound in the breast
abdomen, will be sent at once to a field hospital, and,
if possible, to the special field hospital which the a
requires. Others may be temporarily aided on t
spot, by stopping the wound from which the bloo(
flows with a plug of lint, bound tightly with a linei
bandage.

* Captain Zaccone published, in 1850, a small pamphlet on the tente-
obrL to which the reader will do well to refer.

OOISTTElNrTS

Preface op the Translator,
Preface of the Editor, . .

PAGE

. 3

PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS.

"War, offensive and defensive, 7

Art of War 7

Army 7

Arm 7

Infantry arm 7

Cavalry arm 7

Artillery arm 7

Engineer arm 7

Light and line infantry 8

Light, line, and reserve cavalry 8

Field, siege, coast, and mountain artillery.. 8

Sappers and miners S

Unit of force, or tactical unit 8

Formation, or order 8

Front, rear, and flanks of formation 8

Eauk, me, and depth of troops 8

Ployed and deployed formations 8

Manoeuvres 8

Column 8

Echelons 8

Head or foot of column 8

Distance atid interval of troops 8

Checker-form 9

Order, or combined disposition of troops. . 9

Tactics 9

Strategy 9

Logistics 9

Base of operations 10

Lino of defence 10

Objectives, or objective points 10

Line of operations 10

Lino of retreat 10

PART FIRST.

niSTOEY AND TACTI03 OF THE SEPAEATE AEMS.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORY OP INFANTRY.

Iktroduction 11

1. Ancients.

Chivalry and war chariots most used 13

Infantry more solid than mobile 13

Egyptian infantry 13

Jewish infantry 13

Persian infantry 14

Phalanx, or deep formation 14

2. Greek Phalanx.

Character and formation 14

Subdivisions 15

Complete phalanx 15

Mode of action 15

Hoplltes and their arms 15

Sarissa, or long piko 16

Psiletes, or light troops 16

Proportion of hoplites to psiletes 16

Subdivisions of psiletes 16

Mobile formation of phalanx 16

Peltastes 17

Greek education chiefly military 17

Heroism of Spartan mothers 17

Excellence of Greek infantry 17

Immobility of phalanx formation 17

Alexander, Xcnophon, &c, victorious with

phalanx IS

3. Roman Iieg-ion.

Characteristics 18

Organization more mobile than phalanx.. 18

440

COIS^TENTS.

PAGE

Maniple formation 18

Ilastati, principes, triarii, and veletes 18

Strength and subdivisions of legion 19

Turma of cavalry added to legion 19

Arms of legionaries , 20

Veletes the skirmishers of the legion 20

Mode of action of the classes of legionaries, 20

Military character of legionary 21

Heavy loads and long marches of legionary, 21

Intrenching customary with legions 21

Mobility of legion 22

Adaptation to universal conquest 22

Eoman government suited to war.^ . . . 22

Objections to formation by maniples 22

Marius' formation by cohorts 22

Cohorts comprise but one class of troops. . 23

Cohorts armed with pilum 23

Legion divided into ten cohorts 23

Caesar's cohort formation 28

Cohort compared with maniple formation, 23
Deterioration of legion under the Empire, 24
Degeneration of soldiers in decline of Eome, 25

4. Barbarous Nations.

Barbarians mostly foot soldiers 25

German infantry 25

Frank foot soldiers described 25

Combat of Frank soldiers 26

Deep formation of Frank infantry 27

Massing infantry disappeared with Charles

Martel 23

5. Feudal Infantry.

Charlemagne's army half cavalry 28

bfobles monopolized profession of arms.. . 28
Knights wore armor and rode mailed

chargers 28

Infantry powerless against gensdarmes 28

Infantry composed of servants and peasants, 28

Menial condition of feudal infantry 28

Arms of feudal infantry 29

Used as rampart at battle of Bouvines 29

Slaughtered at battle of Crecy 29

Condottieri substituted 80

6. Communal Infantry.

Infantry regenerated in 12th century 80

Origin of communal militia 81

Communal force chiefly infantry 81

Arms of communal infantry 81

Marched under parochial banner 31

Served within or not far from commune. . 81

Maintained by king on distant service 32

Position in battle 32

Superior to feudal infantry 82

Nobles not relieved from military service. 82
Infantry more ready to pillage than fight. 82
Grand Master of the Bowmen instituted. . 82

7. Soldiers of Fortune.

Names of vagabond bands in 12th century, 88
Depredations committed by bands 33

[ PAGE

Du Guesclin drives them from France 33

Formation in battle of French infantry. . . 83

8. English. Archers.

Archers best infantry of 14th century 34

Arms and mode of fighting 84

Hussite infantry under Zisca 34

Tabor, or barricade of wagons 34

9. Swiss Infantry.

Swiss resuscitate infantry in 14th century, 84
Compact formation of Swiss infantry.. .. 34

Arms of Swiss infantry 34

Culverins used by Swiss in 13S6 85

Swiss squares at Granson and Morat 35

Echelon formation of Swiss 35

Discipline and courage of Swiss 85

Swiss infantry extensively used in Europe, 86

10. Spanish Infantry.

Character of Spanish infantry 36

Arms of Spanish infantry 36

Desperate mode of fighting 36

Arquebus substituted for culverin 86

Mousquet, or improved arquebus 3T

Spanish infantry terror of Europe 37

Education and esprit of Spanish soldier. .. 37
Torcios of Charles V 87

11. Frank Archers.

Charles YII. established a standing army, 33

Free companies of cavalry 83

Frank archers the infontry of Charles VII., 8S

Kecruiting and exercises of archers 38

Mode of compensation of archers 38

Arms and dress of archers 89

Force and command under Louis XI 89

France divided into military departments, 89

Causes of decline of Frank archers 39

Substitution of Swiss and other troops. ... 40

Lansquenets adopted Swiss pike 40

Pikemen in most European armies 40

Foreign, substituted for French infantry.. 40

Louis XII. dismounted the gentry 41

Improved infantry victorious in Italy 41

12. Legions of Francis I.

French superior to Swiss at Marignan., .. 41

Machiavelli's estimate of infantrj^ 41

Francis I. created a national infantry 41

Organization of legions of Francis 1 42

Command and force of legion 42

Proportion and duties of arquebusiers.... 43

Privileges of legionaries 43

Isolated bands substituted for legions.... 43

13. French Bands.

French band corresponded nearly to bat-
talion 43

Oflicers of band 43

Anspessades, or first class infantry 44

Arms of heavy and light troops of bands.. 44

COIfTENTS.

441

PAGE

Formation and mode of fighting of bands . . 44

Formation in battailles 45

Fire arms increased during religious wars, 45
Loss of pikes felt till invention of bayonet, 45

Bands of Piedmont and Picardy 46

Bands of Cliampagne and Navarre 46

Isolated bands suited to French character, 46

Necessity of combining bands 46

Regimental organization of old bands 47

Character and name of bands 47

Order of battle of regiments 47

Arms of French regiments 47

Mounted infantry served as cavalry 47

Arquebus superseded by musket 48

Henry IV. diminished depth of infantry, 48
French battalion about 1610 48

14. Swedish Infantry.

Gus. Adolphus gave mobility to infantry, 49

Formation of infantry under Gustavus 49

Depth diminished and fire-arms increased, 50

Improvement in arms by Gustavus 50

Advantages of Gustavus' innovations 50

Mixed formation of horse and foot 51

15. Infantry of Louis XTV.
and XV.

Flint-lock musket introduced in 1652 51

Turenne adopted six-rank formation 51

Lighter arms and formation advantageous, 51
Formation of battalion under Louis XIV. 52

Company square in 1673 53

Musket and bayonet universally adopted . . 53

French battalion in 1703 54.

Grenadiers originated under Louis XIV.. 54 1

PAGE

Light infantry introduced by Fischer 54

Chasseurs introduced by Fischer in 1743. . 55

French infantry formed in four ranks 55

Cadenced and lock-step introduced by Saxe, 55
Formation of grenadier company (1757). . . 55

16. Prussian Infantry.

Excellence of Prussian infantry 55

Superiority of Prussian gun 55

Firing,tho mode of battle ol Frederic II. . 56

Tactics gi-eatly improved by Frederic II. . 56

Formation of Prussian battalion (1752). . . . 56

Formation of Prussian company 67

Firing while marching to the charge 57

Mobility and solidity of Prussian soldiers, 68

17. Modem Infantry.

Three-rank formation adopted in France.. 53
Prussian drill introduced in French army, 58
Chasseur and elite company of regiment. . 58

Voltigcurs substituted for elite in 1S04 68

Voltigeur and grenadier company to each

battalion 58

Army corps of select troops for a reserve, 59

Infantry organization nearly fixed 59

Success due to legs as much as to arms. . . 59

Two-rank formation of some armies 59

Approval of two-rank formation 60

Percussion substituted for flint-lock 60

Kifled arms and elongated balls adopted.. 60

18. Remarks.

Depth of infantry constantly diminished. . 60

One-rank formation probable 61

Success cbiefly due to good infantry 61

CHAPTER SECOND.

INFANTRY FORMATION AND TACTICS.

1. General Principles.

Advantages of infimtry over other arms ... 63

Infantry the basis of an army 63

Qualifications for infantry soldier 63

Clothing suitable to infantry 64

Arms requisite for Infantry 64

Physical and moral force, how increased.. 64

Load and march of infantry 05

Infantry outmarclies cavalry 65

Instruction, from individual to the mass.. 65

Step and different marching paces 06

Space occupied in rank and file 66

Two and three-rank formation compared. 66
Infantry and cavalrynecessary to each other, 67

2. Modes of Action of Infantry.

By firing, or with sabro and bayonet * 63

Sabre a poor arm for infantry 68

Bayonet an Inferior weapon 68

Bayonet the " weapon of the French " 68

Bayonet only good for a demonstration. . . 63

Bayonet collision of rare occurrence 68

Bayonet charge produces moral effect 69

Bayonet mClce at siege of Genoa 69

Marching prepares, firing secures victorj', 69

Firing— simultaneous and at will 69

Firing in three ranks difficult 69

Firing by battalions, divisions, and ranks, 70

Firing by command impracticable in battle, 70

Fire by file best for combat 71

Direct and oblique firing 71

Firing improper while marching 71

Bugeaud's maxims on firing 71

Saxe condemned excessive firing 72

3. The Battalion.

Tactical unit of infantry 72

Composition of, in France 72

Conditions necessary in its constitution.. . 72
Subdivisions same for drill and disci-
pline 73

Subdivisions symmetrical and equal 73

442

CONTENTS.

PAGE

4. Manoeuvres.

Tactics consist of manoeuvres 73

Eequisites for their success in war 73

Drills indispensable to train troops 73

Manoeuvres should be prompt and covered, 74
Fixed by regulations " 74

5. Order of Battle.

Positions of infantry in order of battle 74

First line deployed, second ployed 75

Evolution of lines generally separate 75

6. Marcliing Pormations.

Infantry has four marching formations 75

Marching in line 75

Marching by the flank 76

Marching by column 76

Marching in square 77

Historical examples of marching in square, 77

7. Formations of Attack.

Infantry has five formations of attack 78

Attack in line 78

Advantages and defects of attack in line . . 78

Attack in column 79

Double-central column best for attack 79

Columns of attack by platoons and sections, 80

Depth of column limited 80

Column should steadily move to attack. . . 80

Advantages of attack in column 80

French successful in attack by columns. . . 81
Infantry mode of attacking intrenchments, 82

Exposure of columns to artillery fire 82

Mixed formation for attack 82

Historical examples of attack in column . . 82

Attack as skirmishers 83

Skirmishers en grande bande 83

Skill and valor required in skirmishers... 83

Bayonet useful against horsemen 84

Attack in echelons 84

Echelons should mutually flank each other, 84

Direct and oblique echelons 84

Echelon cannot exceed sis battalions 85

Attack in squares 85

Attack in squares in Egypt 85

Square by battalion best for oifensive 85

Rectangular formation of battalion 85

8. Pormations of Defence.

Infantry has five formations for defence. . . 86

Defence in line 86

Action of deployed line in defence 86

I PAGE

I Formation defending intrenchments 86

I Genoa's defence aided by outside reserves, 87

Defence in column S7

Column good only against cavalry 87

Defence in square 87

Regulation square 87

Russian and English manceuvre against

cavalry 87

Schramm's square 88

Square half full formed from column 88

Square by regiment best for defensive 88

Square by battalion best for off'ensive 88

Bugeaud's square of a battalion 89

Weak points of square 89

Bayonet better than fire against cavalry.. 89

Squares echeloned to flank each other 89

Artillery formidable against square 89

Cavalry may break square 89

Square termed formation of resistance .... 90

Square has defects of a redoubt 90

Desaix' square 90

Wurtembera square 90

Defence in echelons 90

Echelons good defence in retreat 90

Defence in checker-form 91

Advantages and disadvantages of checker-
formation 91,

9. Liig-lat Infantry.

Light troops now all regularly organized.. 911

Light troops have special tactics 913

Chasseurs a pied of France

Drill, arms, duty, and organization of chas-
seurs

Deployed and rallied group by fours 92'.|

Signals by whistle as well as bugle 98|

Selection and instruction of chasseurs...
Important functions of light infantry 941

10. Skirmishers.

Fight dispersed, leaving reserve of a third, 94 j

Qualifications for .skirmishers 9i\

Should keep moving, or lie down to load, 94

Chasseurs furnish best skirinishers 94

Line infantry sometimes used as skir-
mishers 94

Skirmishers of march 95

Skirmishers of battle 95

Skirmishers en grande hande 96

Service of each kind of skirmishers 96

Historical examples of use of skirmishers, 96

CHAPTER THIRD.

HISTORY OP CATALRY,

1. Antiquity.

Mounted combatants first prevailed 97

War chariots much used by ancients 97

Chariots armed with scythes 97

Chariots carrying military machines 97

Chariots little used by Greeks and Romans, 98

COKTENTS.

443

PAGE !

Eows of stakes defence against chariots. . 9S |
Cavalry existed in Cliina 2,0UU years B. 0., &S !

Cyrus introduced cavalry in I'ersia 9S

Greeks early used cavalry 93

Epaminondas appreciated value of cavalry, 98
Cavalry increased after Epaminondas. ... 98

Thessalian and Etoliau cavalry 99

Proportion of cavalry in Grecian armies, 99

Koman cavalry mediocre 99

Vicious method of Roman use of cavalry, 99
Causes of inferiority of Koman cavalry. . . 99
Cavalry of Hannibal superior to Roman . . 100

Cavalry of Roman citizens or knights 100

Auxiliary cavalry of allies of Rome 100

Proportion of cavalry to Roman legion.. 100

Arms of cavalry of Greece and Rome 100

Ancient cavalry moved slow 101

Deep formation of Greek cavalry 101

Thessalian lozenge 101

Cavalry of legion divided into ten turmce, 101

Roman turma, or squadron 102

Position of cavalry of legion 102

Depth of auxiliary cavalry less than Greek, 102
Superiority of cavalry of Numidians, &c., 102
Increase of cavalry in decline of Rome.. . 102

Barbarians had little cavalry 102

Cavalry much increased in feudal ages. . . 102
Saddle invented in reign of Constantine, 103

Stirrups invented by Franks 103

Advantages of stirrups 103

2. Middle Ag-es.

Chivalry c()ntributed to good police 103

Tactics and chivalry antagonistic 104

Service of knights and their retinue 104

Qualification and installation of knights . 104

Knighthood conferred before battle 104

Banneret and bachelor knights 105

Lance and coutillier 105

Names of pieces of a knight's armor 106

Offensive arms of knights 107

PAGE

Villains prohibited use of lance 107

Knights, except in battle, rode a courtaud, 107

French cavalry charged in single line 107

Pages, or vai lets, in second line 107

Cavalry ignored tactics and discipline. . . . 107
Cavalry fought battles and laid sieges. ... 107

Cavalry often fought dismounted 108

Mode of fighting of knights as infantry . . . 103
Causes of decline of chivalry 108

3. Modern Times.

FeudaljSupplanted by standing armies. . . 109
Charles VII. institutes permanent troops, 109

Compagnies d'ordonnance 109

Horses for gensdarmes aild archers 109

Gendarme tax 109

Nobles prefer being captains to cavaliers, 110

Companies of Charles VII. best 110

Formation too thin against German horse, 110

Causes of German deep formation 110

Fire-arms adopted by cavalry 1 10

Chevaux-legers and stradiots 110

Cranequiniers and malandrins Ill

Argoulets and carabins Ill

Reitres, or pistoliers Ill

Origin of dragoons HI

Change to deep formation Ill

Mobility of cavalry lessened 112

Reduction to five rank formation '. 112

Light cavalry formed into regiments 112

Improvements of Gustavus Adolphus.. . 112

Mixture of infantry with cavalry bad 113

Company in order of battle in 1750 118

Changes in arms and armor 113

Improvements made by Marshal Saxe. .. 113

Improvements made by Frederic II 114

Excellence lies in the charge, not firing. . 114
Frederic's formation mostly two ranks.. 114

Improvements made by Seydlitz 114

Two-rank formation generally adopted.. 115
Uniform loose, and load of horse dis-
tributed 115

CHAPTER FOUETH.

CAVALRY FORMATION AND TACTIC!

1. TJse of Cavalry.

Strength of cavalry mostly in speed 116

Pursuit after rout main use of cavalry.. . 116
Offensive, the mode of combat of cavalry, 116

Heavy, light, and mixed cavalry 117

Carabiniers and cuirassiers 117

Heavy cavalry for decisive charges 117

Dragoons include all mixed cavalry 118

Dragoons rarely fight on foot 118

Service of dragoons 118

Chasseurs hussars, and lancers 119

Duties of light cavalry 119

Irregular cavalry seldom used 119

Cossacks charge boldly only on fugitives, 119

2. Armament.

Uniform and arms of cavalry 120

Fire-arms useful only for skirmishers, &c., 120

3. Numerical Data.

Cavalry one-tenth to fifth of infantry. . . . 120

Weight carried by cavalry horses 120

Rate of travel of a horse 121

Rate of march of cavalry column 121

4. Tactical Unit.

Squadron, tactical unit of cavalry., , 121

Composition of French squadron 121

Squadron in order of battle 122

444

CO]S^TEjS^TS.

PAGE

Length of front and depth of squadron . . . 122

Oldest troops in front and on right 122

Effective force of squadron 123

Two-rank formation best for cavalry 123

5. Manoeuvres.

Movement by fours 124

Oblique marches by fours discontinued.. 124

Movement by platoons 124

Trot ordinary gait iu manoeuvres 125

6. Mode of Action.

Danger to horseman less than to footman, 125
Instruction to man and horse essential. . . 125
Compactness and velocity in charge 12C

7. Charg-e.

Charge made at beginning or end of battle, 12G

Charge made on flanks of infantry 12G

Mode of charging 126

Charge to be persevered in to the last 127

Cavalry should not fire in charging 127

Few killed or wounded in charge 128

Charge often fails from small cause 128

PAGE

Object of two lines in charges 123

Formation for the charge 129

Successful charge completed by pursuit.. 129

Pursuit, how conducted i29

Position of officers in the charge 129

Charge as foragers against artillery 180

Charge as foragers against Arabs 130

8. Formations.

Order in line, column, echelons, and square, 130

Cavalry attacks cavalry in line 1-30

Attacks infantry in echelons or column . . 130

Advantages of attack in echelons 131

Attack in column against square 131

Cavalry forms square for defence 131

Column by platoon for marching 182

Cavalry should march on left of road ... 182
Checker-formation little used 132

0. Eclair eurs.

Skirmishers of the cavalry 182

Duties, and how selected 132

Advantages of combination with infantry, 132
One-fourth of troop from which detailed, 132

CHAPTER FIFTH.

HISTORY OF ARTILLERY.

Balista, onager, and catapulta 133

Weight of projectiles, and how far thrown, 133

Moved with armies like field pieces 134

Increased use among ancients 134

Destroyed by fire, or by cutting cords. . . 134

Causes of decline of balistic art 134

Projectile machines during Crusades 135

Porriere and mangonneau 135

Invention of gunpowder 135

Cannon introduced in 14th century 136

Genoese used funnels or vases in 1319 136

Field artillery first on stationary frames, 137

Bombards 137

Hugo dimensions of bombards ... - 137

Bombards superior to ancient machiaeg, 137

Bombards supplanted in 1376 137

Artillery derived from artillier 137

Duties of masters of artillery 13S

Cannoniers instituted about 1411 138

Master-general of artillery of Charles VII., 138

Distribution of artillery in armies 138

Cannon eff"ective by noise chiefly 138

Importance for defence 138

Unsuitable for open country 188

Duties of chief of artillery divided 138

Louis XL maintained much artillery.... 138

Twelve peers of France 139

Single chief of artillery reestablished 139

Charles VIIPs use of artillery in campaign, 139
Lighter artillery adopted by Louis XII.. 139
Two chiefs of artillery under Louis XII . . 139

Artillery Increased and systematized 14

Examples of success of artillery in battle, 14

Grand master and captain-general 14

Sully held it as an office of the crown..

First inspector-general of artillery

First cannon made of bars and hoops . . .
Cast iron, copper, and bronze adopted..

Materials of projectiles

Swiss and German infantry, guard of pieces, U

Artillery of Henry II. and I V 14

Artillery of Germany in 16th century.. . 14
Gus. Adolphus' improvements in artillery, 14|

Introduction of 12 and 24-poHndcrs 14

Bombs introduced in France 14S

Light pieces only carried to field 14

Yauban invented ricochet firing (16SS). . . 142

Breaches made by cannon 143J

Carcasses invented and used in 1672 143

Fusiliers, the guard of artillery 142 i

Name of fusilier from fusil 148

French artillery corps instituted 143

Artillery under Louis XIV 143

Position of artillery in battle 143

Valliere's system of artillery 144

Horse artillery introduced by FrederlcIL, 144
Howitzers used in field by Fredciic II.. . 144
Artillery tnctics improved by Frrderic II., 144
Amount of artillery large under Frederic, 144
Gribeauval's system introduced (1765) ... 144

Great improvements by Gribeauval 145

Battery established as unit of artillery.. . 145

CONTENTS.

445

PAGE

Battalions of the train adopted (ISOl). . . . 145
Napoleon used large masses of artillery, . 145
Valee's system, adopted from English... 146
Four guns and two howitzers to battery, 146

Simplicity of Value's system 146

Cannonlers ride on ammunition-chests.. 147

PAGE

Mobility of artillery of new system 147

Modifications in Viil6e's system (1854). .. 147

Napoleon-gun introduced 147

Light, line, and reserve artillery 147

Advantages of these three divisions 147

Train-corps form park-batteries 147

CHAPTER SIXTH.

ARTILLERY FORMATION AND TACTICS.

1. Purpose of Artillery.

Destruction of troops and obstacles 148

Facilitating attack of infantry or cavalry, 148

Artillery should act in large masses 14S

Object of field and siege artillery 14S

Mountain artillery carried on mules 149

Artillery movable in march and battle.. . 149

Division and reserve batteries 149

Duties of French artillery corps 149

Artillery requires support of other arms, 149

2. Numerical Data.

Proportion of artillery to infantry 150

Proportion of artillery to cavalry 151

■Weight considered in fixing amount 151

Supply of ammunition carried 151

Space occupied by artillery carriages 151

3. Tactical Unit.

Battery the tactical unit 151

Composition of field-battery 151

Napoleon-guns adopted in France 152

Subdivisions and commands of battery. . . 152

Composition of mountain battery 152

4. Formations.

Field artillery no defensive formation... 152

Formation in column 153

Formation in lino 154

Formation in battery 155

Advancing and retiring by half-battery.. 156

5. Manoeuvres.

Necessity of manoeuvres 156

Artillery should manoeuvre promptly . . . , 156

Manoeuvres more as cavalry than infantry, 156

Manoeuvres mostly at a trot 157

Oblique movements and wheeling 157

Kight or left oblique 157

Artillery disregards inversions 153

Formation of column of attack 153

Formation from column to line 158

Change of front from line 153

Evolutions of batteries on same principles, 159

Guides not used in manoeuvres 159

Wheeling made on moving pivot 159

Countermarches and abouts 159

6. Positions.

Battery also applied to artillery in position, 159
Choice of positions important for batteries, 159

Commanding open ground eligible site. . . 160

Soil should be solid, but not stony 160

Commodious and safe exits necessary 160

Concealed, to see without being seen.... 160

Fixed to produce greatest damage 160

Direct, oblique, and reverse batteries., ,. 160

Enfilading and cross batteries 161

Division batteries fire throughout battle, 161

Reserve butteries act temporarily 161

Former in front and on flanks of lines. . . 161

Latter for menaced points and attacks. . . 161

Caissons placed in strong and safe places, 161

CHAPTER SEVENTH.

HISTORY OF ENGINEERS.

Engineer arm not of ancient origin 162

Italian engineers employed in all Europe, 162
French fortifications repaired by Sully.. 162

Jngenieurs ordiriaires du roi (1602) 162

Engineers part of staff till 1690 162

Military corps serving with armies in the

field and on fortifications 163

Louis XIV. largely increased engineers.. 163
Eminent services of engineers under Vau-

ban in siege and battle 163

French fortifications, methods of attack,

and usages, imitated everywhere 163

Vauban made marshal for his services. .. 163
Vauban much advanced art of engineers, 163

Immense lines of field-works constructed, 163

Extent made them weak everywhere 163

Engineers united with artillery in 1755.. 163

Separated after but three years' trial 163

Uniform of French engineers 163

Engineers fixed at 400 in 1762 163

Styled, in 1776, Cor pa Royal dv. Genie.. 164

Duties of gardes du genie 1 64

Revolution caused emigrationof engineers, 164

Numbers during French Revolution 164

Employed more as staff officers till ISOO. . 164
Engineers too few in 1S13 to defendFrance, 164
Employed in sieges in Peninsular "War. . . 164
French consulting committee of engineers, 164

446

CONTENTS.

PAGE

Cost and extent of fortifications of Paris, 164
Engineers fixed at 460 by Napoleon III., 165
Sappers created in 1671, and mi iicrs in 1673, 165
Vauban, &c., commanded sappers and
miners 165

PAGE

Convention established engineer troops. . 165
Number and organization of engineer

troops under Napoleon 165

Meagre force of engineer officers and

troops in United States army 166

CHAPTER EIGHTH.

FUNCTIONS OF THE ENGINEERS.

Engineers one of the arms of service 167

Duties of engineers 167

Construction and repair of permanent for-
tifications 167

Construction, &c. of military buildings.. 167
Construction of all field works and ovens, 167
Making and destroying military roads.. . 168
Construction and destruction of bridges

Avith fixed supports 168

"Works for attack and defence of places. . 168

Military reconnoissanco 168

Works executed by contract in peace 168

Executed by military workmen in war. . 168
Engineer troops recruited from mechanics, 168
Company of sappers to a division, in war, 169

Company the unit of engineer force 169

Wagon to each company 169

Arms and tools carried by sappers 169

Proportion of tools to a company 169

Miners carry special mining tools 169

Miners accompany engineer train 169

Articles carried by engineer train 169

Sappers and miners drilled as infantry. . . 169
Devotion to duty of sappers and miners, 170
Floating bridges, transported with armies,

built by artillery in France 170

Pontonniers belong to engineers in most

armies 170

Pontonniers a distinct corps in Austria

and Russia 170

Pontonniers should belong to engineers

in France 170

Arms and equipment of French engineer

troops 170

PART SECOND.

COMBINATION OF THE AEMB.

CHAPTER FIRST.

ORGANIZATION OF ACTIVE ARMIES.

1. Principles of Organization.
Brigades, how organized and commanded, 171

Divisions, how organized 172

Division, fundamental element of an army, 172

Advantages of division formation 172

Army composed of several divisions 172

Relation of commanders in armies 172

Permanent and temporary fractions 173

Organization by divisions best for armies, 173
Organization by army-corps in some cases, 173

Cases where army-corps preferred 173

Fractions in order of importance 174

Army-corps must be self-sustaining 174

Army-corps usually composed of all arms, 174
Army-corps of cavalry under Napoleon. . 174

Limits of cavalry army-corps 174

Composition and strength of army-corps, 174

Order of battle of an army-corps 175

Order of battle of a division 175

Divisions had better be of equal force 176

Purpose and proportion of reserves 176

Reserves f<»r defence as well as for offense, 177

Reserve composed of veteran troops 177

Embrace heavy cavalry and artillery 177

Napoleon used an army-corps for reserve, 177
Imperial guard and grenadiers in reserve, 17T]
Withdrawal of select troops objectionable, 1771
Withdrawal should be only temporary.. 177J

Solid reserves indispensable in field 177]

Composition of brigades 178i

Mixed brigades for advanced-guards, &c., 178
Appendages of an army-parks, trains, &c., 17

Special reserve of heavy cavalry 1791

Depots of an army, and where established, 178 j

2. Commands.

Command of army or corps,how regulated.
Command of wings, centre, and reserve,

Command of divisions and brigades

General assigns temporary commanders. .
General -in-chief assisted by staff officers.

Chief of staff and sub-chiefs

Duties of the etat-major (staff-corps)

Administrative services for an army

Duties of intendant and his assistants

Duties of chief and staff of engineers

Duties of chief and staff of artillery

Command and staff' of divisions, &c

CONTENTS.

447

PAGE

A-ides-de-camp and orderly ofliccrs 182

Duties of commandant of headquarters.. 1S2

Duties of provost marshal-general 183

Duties of wagon-master of headquarters, 183
Command, &c., of division headquarters, 184

3. Standing Armies.

Organized in France and Austria for war, 184
Organized in Prussia for peace and war . . 184
Advantages of both systems 184

CHAPTER SECOND.

MARCHES.

1. Marches of Concentration.

Performed at a distance from enemy 186

Mode of conducting and details 186

Made by day if practicable 186

Rate of travel and halts 187

Uniformity of gait essential for cavalry. . 187

2. Marches of Manoeuvre.

Performed in presence of the enemy 187

Made cautiously, and prepared for attack, 187

Made in strong, short columns 187

Position of dift'erent arms in march 188

Number and distance ap;irt of columns. . ISS
Column must be covered by light troops, 183

Duties of advance-guard of a column 189

Duties, &c., of commander of advance-
guard 189

Strength of advance-guard, and position . . 190

Duties of rear-guard of a column 190

Qualifications of chief of rear-guard 190

Duties of flankers of a column 191

General advance and rear-guard of colv.mns, 19!
Kuse to deceive the enemy as to march. . 191

Conveyance of messages 191

March of manoeuvre by front, flank, or rear, 192

March by flank in single long column 192

Precautions to be taken in march by flank, 193

Examples of flank marches 193

Marches of manceuvro must be rapid. . . . 193

Massena's celebrated march at Eivoli 193

Defeat of Austriaus in 1809 from inactivit}^ 194
Eapidity of march indispensable in pursuit, 194
Retreat, a series of retrograde marches. . . 194
Precautions to be taken in retreat 194

CHAPTER THIRD.

BATTLES.

1. Primitive Order of Battle.

Three lines in battle 196

First line brings on the action 196

Second line supports first 196

First line is deployed in order of battle. . 197
Second line in columns, by battalions .... 197
Second linedcployed if exposed to artillery, 197

Reserve in column, by brigades 197

Second line should be 300 yards from first, 198
Reserve 1,000 to 1,200 yards in its rear. . . 19S
Cavalry should be on, and support flanks, 199
Exception when cavalry may be at centre, 199

Artillery in front, opposite intervals 199

Second line in rear of flanks and intervals, 199
Artillery of reserve close to main reserve, 199
Parks, Ac, in safe place in rear of reserve, 199

Entire division usually in same line 200

Primitive order of battle delineated 200

Circumstances modify this review order, 201

2. Orders of Battle.

Parallel order of battle 201

I'arallel.the ancient order of battle 202

Modifications of parallel order 202

Oblique order of battle 202

Examples of oblique order of battle 203

Perpendicular, a case of oblique order. .. . 203

I Concave order of battle

Examples of concave order

Convex order of battle

Convex, a bad order, except in few cases,
Turks' transformation of convex to con-
cave

i Practically, orders are mere approxima-
tions

, Continuous lines preferable

1 3. Conduct of the Battle.

! Object and necessity of battles

\ Superiority offeree not indispensable

■ Victors try to cut enemy's line

; Vanquished try to preserve its line

General conforms his order to circum-
stances

I Point of attack determined bystrategy,&c.,
i Avoid obstacles, and strike at weak points,

! Genius and experience decide battles

I Long circuits to be avoided in flanking..
; Attacks on many points objectionable. . .

• Examples of attacks

' Attacks should be sudden and concealed,

j Provision to be made for reverses

i Orders completed by verbal instructions,
; Discretionary powers to subordinates. ..

204
204

204

205
205

205
206
206
200

203

448

CONTENTS.

PAGE I PAGE

Mode of conducting an offensive battle... 210 j Squares to be used in defensive battles.. 214

Conduct of pursuit after victory 212 | Eet'stablisbing an uncovered flank 214

Kequisites of position for defensive battle, 212 j Assuming offensive from defensive 214

Precautions for vigorous defence 213 \ Mode of conducting a retreat 215

Mode of conducting a defensive battle ... 213 i History of battles to be studied 216

PART THIRD.

MINOR OPERATIONS,

CHAPTER FIRST.

OUTPOSTS.

Introduction.

Portion of army must guard the whole. . 217

Functions of outposts 217

Outposts take place of scouts of ancients, 218

Outposts the eyes of an army

Composed to watch most active enemy.
Covering, not fighting, corps of army. . .

Safety in vigilance

Surveillance active, not too regular

Posted to watch and impede enemy

Outposts extend beyond advance-guard.

Transient or permanent,posted alike

Number for outposts, and how supplied.
Constituent parts of outposts

218
218
218
219
219
219
220
220
220
220

1. Grand Guards.

Advanced posts of camp or cantonment. . 221
Number, force, position, how regulated.. 221

Infantry and cavalry guard combined 221

Force and command of regimental guard, 221
Positions to be occupied by grand guards, 222

Seldom dispensed with 222

Posts protected by temporary defences.. 222
Intrenching, like ancients, disapproved.. 222

Communications to be secured 222

Obstructions made toward enemy 223

Duties of grand guards 223

Precautions to be taken by grand guards, 223
Conduct of grand guard when attacked.. 224
Posted 2,500 yards in advance of army. . . 224

2. Small Posts.

Covering force of grand guard 224

Positions, force, and communications 225

Instructions and duties of commanders.. 225

Precautions at small posts 225

Cossack-posts 220

3. Sentinels and Vedettes.

Covering force of small posts 226

Posted 500 yards in front of small posts.. 226
Infantry sentinels and cavalry vedettes.. 226

Duties of sentinels and vedettes 227

Precautions by sentinels and vedettes. .. 227

4. Distribution of the Outposts.

Distances and system of outposts 223

Modified by nature of ground 228

Distances diminished at night 230

5. Posts of Support.

Location, object, and armament 230

Form fourth line of outpost defence 230

6. Patrols, Lookouts, Rounds.

Outposts must be under surveillance 230

Duties and object of round, patrols, &c... 281

Arrangement of a defensive patrol 2-31

Arrangement of an offensive patrol 232

Patrols should not remain in mass 233

Precautions to be observed by patrols... 234

CHAPTER SECOND.

DETACHMENTS.

1. General Observations.

Object and duties of offensivcdetachmcnts, 235
Made up of fixed fractions of regiments.. 236

Artillery and engineers not included 236

Qualifications and duties of the chiefs.. .. 236

Feeble on the march 238

Advance and rear-guard and flankers. .. 238

Force of guards and flankers 238

Precautions to be taken by chief 239

Should always be ready for defence 239

Should not be stopped by a river 240

Have a right to shares of booty 240

2. Detachments of Infantry.

Duties and precautions to be taken 240

Marching formation and force 241

3. Detachments of Cavalry.

Used where celerity is required 243

Duty of their advance-guards 243

COITTENTS.

449

PAGE

Dangers of defiles to bo avoided 243

Formation and march 244

4. Mixed Detachments.

Possess more stability than of a single arm, 244

PAGE

Duties for which most suitable 244

Order of march In diflerent cases 244

Dispositions for combat 245

Marching formation on level ground 246

Marching formation on broken ground. . . 247

CHAPTER THIRD.

ARMED RECONNOISS ANCES.

Introduction.

Armed reconnoissauce defined 24S

Basis of every military movement 248

Diflieult and complicated 248

Designed to see and collect all information, 249

Five kinds of reconnoissances 249

Proposed manner of treating the subject, 249

1. Daily Reconnoissances.

Object, and indications for guidance 250

Kind of troops varied by nature of country, 250

Must be divested of regularity 250

Aim, information and not combat 251

Cases where combat is proper 251

Has advance, rear-guard and flankers 251

Flankers not far from main body 251

Precautions to avoid ambuscades 251

Precautions when halting 252

Manner of observing columns on march, 252

2. Special Heconnoissances.

Facilitating march of columns 252

Exploring positions to be occupied 252

Ascertaining enemy's posts and defences, 253
Estimating enemy's forces at all points.. 253
Made by oflicers according to speciality. . 253
Instructions to whom and how given. . . . 254
Posts not to be attacked without authority, 254

3. Secret Reconnoissances.

Occupy sometimes several days and nights, 254
Secret if possible, and open if necessary, 255
Intrusted only to veteran light troops,. . . 255
Requisites in the chief and subordinates, 255
Striking example ofVauban's sang-froid, 257
Chief should know language of country. . 257
Chief should have telescope, maps, &c. .. 258
Detachment composed of light cavalry.. 258
Composed of fifteen to forty horsemen ... 258

Moves secretly and rapidly 259

Accompanied by advance-guard and guide, 259

Rallying point to be designated 259

Messages to be destroyed to avoid capture, 259

Formed in three unequal echelons 260

Mode of conducting reconnolssance 260

When discovered to be renewed 260

Chief sometimes advances with guide only, 260
Prisoners to be made if other means fail . . 261
Promptness and despatch indispensable. . 261
Retires after object is accomplished 261

4. Offensive Reconnoissances.

Made openly by force of anns 261

Composed of artillery and light cavalry. . 262
Penetrates to point where all can be seen, 262

Supported in force if necessary 262

Made by general himself on eve of battle, 262
Ordered usually by general-in-chief 263

5. Report.

Drawn up in clear and positive manner. , 268
Accompanied by sketch of ground, &c. . . 263
Better to be too explicit than too concise, 263
Indispensable to be made quickly and well, 264

Made verbally often to avoid delay 265

"Written or oral, must be clear and concif-e, 2C5

6. Historical Examples.

Pursuit of Duke of Savoy from Turin. . . 265

Capture of Austrian battalion in 1805 266

Lannes' false march after Austerlitz 267

Euse of Capt. Curely near Eaab in 1809, 267

Defeat of Massena at Busaco in 1810 268

Capt. Light's exploit near Vic-de-Bigorre, 269

7. Reconnoissances in Africa.

Difiiculty and danger 270

Arab limiers' various ruses 270

8. Maps.

Indispensable in conducting war 272

Verification of correctness necessary 272

Mode of verifying maps 273

Cassini's maps deceived Allies in 1814.. . 273

Foreign maps usually defective 274

Governmental maps to be trusted 274

Road and station maps 274

9. Guides.

Give information not on maps 275

Indispensable to success of armies 275

Class of persons from whom selected 276

How procured and treated 276

Mode of ascertaining their intelligence. .. 277
Must obtain knowledge of their character, 277

Selected from those in your interest 273

Punishment and rewards 278

Interrogate several, and not rely upon one, 279

Two necessary to every detachment 279

Precautions to prevent their escape 280

Must be prevented falling asleep 281

450

CONTENTS.

PAGE

10. Deserters.
Disarmed and interrogated 281

Not to be trusted, often spies in disguise, 281
Exaggerate information to be welcomed, 281
Manner of interrogation and questions. . . 282

11. Inhabitants.

Officials and other persons interrogated . . 2S2

Questions to be asked 282

Questioned separately in tlieir language. . 283

12. Travellers.

Questions asked of comers from enemy.. 233

Interrogated to ascertain whether spies. . 284

Testimony to be rectified 284

13. Prisoners.

Questions to be put same as to deserters, 284

Information from them quite reliable 285

Capture of prisoners to obtain information, 285

14. Spies.

Definition of a spy 286

Spies from devotion to prince or countr)'-, 286
Spies procured from all conditions of life, 287
Examples of noted spies 287

PAGE

Qualifications for spies, and where found, 288
Inhabitants and soldiers of enemy spies. . 2S8

Cruel last resort to obtain spies 289

Soldiers, disguised as inhabitants, used,. 289
Spies easily got among a divided people, 290
Diflicult to obtain among uprising people, 290

Verification of spies' information 291

Double spies, how treated and made use of, 291
Whimsical ruse of Suwarrow in Poland, 291

Spies must not reside in camp 29i

Spies kept apart with assumed names.., 292

Precautions against disguises of spies 292

Sutlers and clerks must be watched 293

Spies' reports should be kept secret 293

Imprudent speech of Alphonso X 293

Arrested spies searched and watched 293

Examples of concealed despatches 294

15. Indications.

Divining enemy's intentions gift of genius, 294

Mythological illustration of indications . 294

Historical illustrations of indications.... 294

Skill by observation and comparison 295

Interpreting,a moral part of war 295

Principal indications enumerated 295

True from false, how distinguished 297

CHAPTER

PASSAGE

Introduction.

Water-courses formidable obstacles in war, 298

Various modes of crossing streams 298

Improvised passages chiefly considered.. 298

1. Keconnoissance of a River.

Particulars to be ascertained enumerated, 299
Various points to be exactly explained.. 299

2. Discovery, Destruction, and
Hepair of Fords.

Maximum depth of fords for different arms, 300
Careful search should be made for fords. . 300

Existence of fords, how indicated 300

Below mills and near mouths of streams, 301

Mode of reconnoitring a ford 301

Mode of tracing a ford 301

Ford usually found in double bends 301

Oblique fords 802

Essential requisites of a good ford 302

Fords useful to us must be protected 303

Enemy's fords destroyed or obstructed. . . 303

Modes of obstructing fords 803

Modes of breaking up or destroying fords, 304
Modes of repairing and improving fords, 304

Fords should be staked out 306

Fords not to be relied upon for passage. , 306
Fords of mountain torrents not reliable . . 806
Disasters by changes of the ford of Cinca, 806

FOURTH.

F R I T E II S .

3. Fording" a River.

Fords suffice for detachments, not armies, 307
Troops when heated must not pass a ford, 307
Stakes or guard-ropes required for fords, 307
Precautions taken in fording rapid streams, 307

Mode of fording by the several arms 303

Precedence of arms in fording 808

Fording of Granicus and Tagliamento. . . 309
Historical examples of importance of

fords 309

English won Crecy by discovering a ford, 309
Soult's failure to ford Tagus saved Wel-
lington ". 809

4. Swimming a River.

Examples of swimming with despatches, 809

Lille saved, in 1708 310

Defence of Genoa prolonged, in 1800.... 810
Poniatowski, not a swimmer, drowned.. 810

Importance of swimming to soldiers 811

French soldiers not good SAvimmers 311

Passage of Linlh, in 1799 811

Choice of place for swimming a stream.. 811

Precautions essential for infantry 812

Passage of Loire by Ctsar 812

Passage of Meuse by Prince of Orange.. . 812
Precautions to be observed by cavalry . . 812

Horses drowned in crossing Oder 312

Swimming horses behind boats ' . . • • 813

CONTENTS

451

PAGE

Horseman carrying a foot soldier behind, 813

Passage of Douro, in 15S0 313

Passage of Rhine, in 1639 313

Arm of sea crossed, in 170S 313

Mode of Tartar cavalry swimming rivers, 313
Celebrated swimming of Rhine by Louis
XIV 313

5. Passage upon Ice.

1 Fastening congelation of channel of river, 314
Ice not trusted if it does not lay on water, 314
Thickness of ice for passage of all arms. . 814
Artificially increasing thickness of ice ... . 314

PAGE

Precautions to be taken in crossing ice,. 315
Disorder and confusion to be prevented . . 815
Crossing the frozen Frische-Haff, in 1679, 315
Dutch fleet captured by cavalry, in 1795, 315

6. Improvised Bridges.

Construction belong mostly to artillery, . 815

Foot-bridge of ladders 316

Bridges of undressed trees 816

Bridge of wagons for shallow streams. ,. 816
Rope bridges on narrovvmountain torrents, 817

Suspension bridges of ropes 818

Small pile-bridges 318

CHAPTER FIFTH.

CONVOYS.

Introduction.

Definition and object of a convoy 319

Convoys,muscles of army 319

Organization of convoysdcmand great care, 319
Outfit,&c.,both adminisi rative and tactical, 319

Convoys never march without escort 319

Force, Ac, determined by circumstances, 320
Composed of infantry and a little cavalry, 320

Ready to overcome difficulties 320

Some artillery and sappers attached 320

Grade of commandant of convoy 320

Artillery officer usually convoys ammu-
nition 320

Chief has detailed written instructions,, .321
Not to be modified by any one on the route, 821
Command of convoy a delicate mission,, 821

1. Org-anization of tlie Convoy.

Chief ccdlocts and examines convoy 821

Everything necessary must be provided. . 321

Materiel must be examined in detail 321

Spare wagons and parts carried along 322

Large convoys divided and subdivided, . . 322
Portion of escort guards each subdivision, 322
Wagons of most value at heads of divisions, 322

Hostile prisoners at heads of convoys 323

Beasts of burden precede convoy-wagons, 823

Convoy has advance and rear-guard 323

Chief reserves no special command 823

Weight carried by wagons and animals. , 323
Space occupied and rateoftravelof wagons, 324
Forbidden to put knapsacks on wagons.. 324

2. March of the Convoy.

Examination of route of march to be made, 324

March made slow at uniform rate 824

Ad vance-guai-d precedes convoy sometime, 824

Duties of advance-guard 825

March in two files, and drivers watched, 825
Wagons kept repaired, or thrown out. . . . 325

Escort holds all dangerous positions 826

Vigilance never relaxed 326

3. Halts and Parks.

Long halts made only in strong positions, .S26
Ilorseskept harnessed andwagons guarded, 32?
Convoy parked at night and on halts. . . 327
Wagons occupy exterior, and horses and

valuables interior of park 327

Park resembles barricade or intrenchment, 327

Circular park, with horses in interior 827

Rectangular park used in Prussia S2S

Park formed from marching column 329

Archduke Charles, parks, by divisions 829

Parks far from towns, woods, «fec 330

Defensive accessories, called tabors 030

4. Defence of the Convoy.

Convoys should be drilled to resist attack, 831
Measures taken on approach of enemy. . . 831

Skirmishers keep enemy at distance .331

Convoy eains shelter and halts S3 1

Enemy dispersed, and march resumed.. oS2
Escort recnforccd to resist centra! attack, 832
Threatened positions to be occupied.... 332

Attack in rear repelled by rear-guard 332

Convoy subdivided in dangerous i»laces, 3.32
Defence failing wagons to be destroyed, 333

Escort does not pursue enemy 833

Prisoners must lie down during attack. . . 883
Prisoners confined in defensible houses, . 833
Requisites for the defence of a convoy.. 834.

5. Attack of a Convoy.

Advantage in attacks with assailant 834

Attack based on previous information.. . S84
Corps of attack divided into three masses, 884

First engages the escort 884

Second falls upon the wagons 8:34

Third remains in reserve 3.34

Attack made on centre in level ground.. 885

Parks attacked in rear or breached 335

Attacks generally for seizing valuables.. 385
Often limited to disorganizing convoys.. 835

452

CONTENTS.

PAGE

6. Convoys by Water.

Transport bulky and heavy supplies 836

Distribution of escort on boats and shore, 336

High banks to be occupied 337

Convoy halts during attack 337

Convoy proceeds if escort is victorious. . . 337

Boats sunk If escort is beaten 337

Attack of convoy of boats in bend of river, 337

I PAGE

Captured convoy best be removed by laud, 338

7. Historical Examples.

Corbie relieved by entrance of convoy.. 83y
Success of convoy introduced into Lille. . 339
Attack of water convoy for relief of Aire, 341
Attack of land convoy for relief of Olmutz, 342
Kescue of a convoy of Prussian prisoners, 344
Eccapture of convoy in Spain, in 1811 344

CHAPTER SIXTH.

PARTISANS.

Definition and duties of partisans 346

Act not at a venture, nor trust to chance, 346
Operations of, part of plan of campaign . . 346
Dispensed with by French and English. . 346
Sometimes termed flankers in France. . . 346

Modern restriction in movements 347

Composition &c., vary with circumstances, 347
Quality more than quantity necessary.. . 347

Qualifications needed for partisans 347

Free corps, specially raised, good material, 848
Corps,rising through political events,best, 343
Essential qualificationsof partisan chief. . 348
Partisans rely mainly on expedients 349

Inspire respect at home and terror abroad, 349

Must bid adieu to idleness and rest 350

March concealed anddiscipline maintained, 8o0
Discover everything and be stopped by

nothing 350

Avoid towns, take hostages, resort to ruses, 850

Dart on their prey like vultures 351

Success being doubtful, should retreat.. . 851
Chief's orders given to next in command, 351

Apportionment of prize money 351

Statement of requisitions to be made.. .. 352
Mansfeld, and other celebrated partisans, 353
Historical examples of partisan operations, 353

CHAPTER SEVENTH.

SURPRISES AND AMBUSCADES.

Introduction.

Surprises aid the weak against the strong, 356

Essential conditions and preparations 856

Used in offensive or defensive operations, 357

1. Surprises by Ambuscade.

Derivation of the term ambuscade 357

Purpose of an ambuscade S5S

Eequisites in composition of force 358

Precautions on march to designated place, 359
Selection of position for an ambuscade. . . 359

Locations for concealing troops 360

Surprise of camp or cantonment 360

Position of ambuscade to be first searched, 361

Precautions in guarding ambuscade 361

Noise, fire, lights, sleep, &c., forbidden.. . 361
Conduct of an attack from an ambuscade, 862

Ruse employed in retreats 362

Counter-ambuscade against ambuscade.. 363

2. Surprise by a March.

Calculated for the proper time and place, 3C3

Break of day best time for surprise 363

March at right angles to enemy's march, 368
More frequent than surprise by am-
buscade 863

Wrapping horses' hoofs in sheepskin 364

Surprise more dishonorable than defeat. . 864
Kleber's precept respecting surprises 364

3. Historical Examples.

Should emerge from ambuscade in a body, 854

Example of Labienus in 44 B. C 364

Badge or rallying signal necessary 365

Example of Villars' reconnoissance in

1667 865

Soldiers in ambush should not sleep 865

Example of night ambuscade in Spain.... 865
Failed at Mayence through imprudent cry, 866
Capture of the Vendean chief, Stofliet. . . 866

Covering obstacle against surprise 866

Marmonfs surprise of Eussian outposts, 866
Surprise in Algeria nearly frustrated 367

CHAPTER EIGHTH.

HEIGHTS.

1. Reconnoissance.

Heights first to be reconnoitred 868

Essential information to be obtained 868

Places for combat to be indicated 869

2. Defence.

Military crest between slope and plateau, 369

Position of defender to repel attack 369

First line near military crest 370

COIfTENTS.

453

PAGE

Assailant fired upon before rouching crest, 371

Second line placed to support first 371

Ueserve to watch flanking movements. . . 871
Plateaux to be successively defended. . .. 871

Flanking fires particularly useful 371

Cavalry acts chiefly with reserve 871

Solid and experienced infantry necessarj-, 371
Examples of Talavera and Pampeluna. . . 371

3. Attack.
Should seek to turn position 872

PAGE

Attack in front accompanied by false ones, 372

Main attack chiefly by light troops 372

Supported by small and mobile colnmns, 372
Attack must be covered by skirmishers, 372
Columns, so covered, advance step by step, 878

4. Attack of Height by Company
of Infantry.

Bugeaud's instructions for attack 373

Company divided into four half-sections, 373
Conduct of the attack described 374

CHAPTER NINTH.

WOODS.

1. Beconnoissance.

Necessity of reconnoitring woods

Mode of conducting reconnoissance

Objects to be noted and fully reported. .

2. Defence.

Assailant to be arrested at verge of wood.
Close outlets and protect projecting points.

Centre of action to be selected

Distribution of troops for defence of forest.
Distributing troops for defence of coppice.

875

375

376
377
877
377

S7S i

3. Attack.

Preparations for attack made at a distance, 378

Force moves rapidly to attack woods 879

Principal attack to cut line of retreat 379

Vigorous and veteran troops required 879

Distance between lines and reserve 379

Mode of attack of different kinds of woods, 379
Eear-guard to cover reserve 3S0

4. Example.

Eichepanse's success at IIohenlinden(1S00),3S0

CHAPTER TENTH.

FARMS, OR HOUSES.

Introduction.
Importance of farm or house for defence, 382
Hovel even hard to take if well defended, 3S2
Brick walls best, not being easily breached, 3S3
Attack or defence of block-house 383

1. Defence.

Engineers prepare defence SS3

Strongest structure converted into citadel, 383
Assailant should be compelled to lay siege, 8S3

Points of attack must be lit up 383

Enclosures or buildings are garrisoned... 333
Loopholes must be pierced through walls, 884
Harricades of openings to be well defended, 384
Flank and machicoulis fires upon openings, 384
Ladders must be overthrown imme-
diately 884

Climbers must bo dislodged from roof. . . 384
Vigorous sorties and counter-attacks made, 384
Fires kindled byenemy to be extinguished, 385

Garrison makes final defence in redoubt, 885
Main body escapes while few hold redoubt, 885

2. Attack.

Eeconnoissance preliminary to attack.

Cavalry watches supports and entrances..

Defenders' night-fires extinguished

Exterior and weak points lit up

Breaches to be made and roofs burned. . .
Ambuscaded skirmishers fire on openings,
Columns assault breaches and openings. .
Scaling-ladders, sand-bags, &c., provided,

Skirmishers cover assaulting columns

Doors to be forced and passages explored.
Sheltered area seized for place of arms. ..
Communications made to place of arms..

Second enclosure carried like first

Skirmishers secure roof and staircases... .
Sorties captured, or followed into house. .
Infiintry troops chiefly employed in attack.
Houses fired under protection of cavalry,

385
3S5

885

385
880

386
386
886
386
886
387
887
387
387

CHAPTER ELEVENTH.

R K D U B T S .

Introduction. I 1. Defence.

Eedoubts properly belong to fortification, 388 Garrison, a reserve and active part 388

Defend points assailable on all sides 888 I Active part, of two-thirds, man parapets, 888

Protect hillocks, debouches of defiles, &c., 888 | Two men to every yard of parapet 888

Used for fortifying front of line of battle.. 888 ' Eeserve (first section) to protect entrance, 388

454

contejs:ts.

PAGE

llt'serve(second section) for assailed points, 3S8
Commandant explains duties to troops. . . 388

Sentinels guard redoubt till attacked 389

Artillery fire opens at 400 yards 389

Musketry opens at 150 yards 389

Mode of repelling assault 389

Repulsed enemy fired upon in retreat. . . 389
Successful enemy to be attacked by re-
serve 389

2. Attack.
Force divided into three columns 339

PAGE

Sappers destroy accessory defences 389

Supports march in rear of coluuins 389

Two columns make false attacks 890

Principal point of attack, bow selected. . 890

Systematic mode of attack of redoubt 390

Duties of assailants when within redoubt, 890
Precautious taken after gaining redoubt, 391
Attack of small force made as foragers. . . 391

3. Example.

Attack on redoubts at Pultawa 892

Ketreat of Swedes to Borysthenes 394

CHAPTER TWELFTH.

B ARRI CADES.

1. Construction.

Barricades often constructed in streets... 395
Rules for construction same as field works, 395
Placed at elevations and middle of blocks, 395

Constructed of all kinds of materials 395

Best of paving stones and earth 395

High and steep, with ditch and banquette, 396

2. Defence.

Defenders Are in succession on assailants, 396
Prepared mine outside fired from within, 396

Defence, if necessary, hand to hand 396

Activity, vigilance, and courage required, 396

Artillery, if any, will fire grapeshot 397

Retreat how made, and Avay obstructed.. 397

3. Attack.

Dangerous when made on small front 397

Carried by ruse, surprise, or turned 397

Reconnoissance made for rear approach. . .397
Defenders dislodged by fire from houses, 397
Destroyed sometimes by mine or petard, 397

Streets too narrow for attack by sap 398

Moving martlets have been suggested 898

Open attack the last resort 398

Mode of assault by open force 893

Assault failing, bombardment made 399

CHAPTER THIRTEENTH.

FORAGES.

1. Object.

Forage, the obtaining food for horses 400

Dry foraging, and green foraging 400

Forages formerly important operations.. 400

Forages unimportant at present time 400

Forages indispensable for light cavalry.. 401
Brack's experience in eight campaigns. . . 401

2. Bistribtition.

Foraging distributed among troops 401

Necessity of, and mode of distribution. . . 402
Number of rations of forage, how settled, 402

Unit of measure determined by trial 403

Distribution, by whom made 403

3. Dry Foraging".

Place of foraging surrounded and guarded, 404
Supplied on requisition, or taken by force, 404

Surprise or marauding, how prevented. . . 404
Forages made in but one village at a time, 405

4. Green Porag-ing-.

Preparations for making a green forage.. 405
Occupation and guarding place of foraging, 405

Horses left outside of foraging ground 406

Defence and escort of foraging party 406

Green foraging less dangerous than dry.. 406

Must not embrace too much ground 406

5. Attack of a Forag-ing Party.

Cavalry attacks green, and infantry dry.. 406
Seci-ecy great element of success in attack, 406
Foragers cut off from posts and escorts.. 406
Attack sudden and rapid, with false ones, 407
Foragers to be driven off, but not pursued, 407
Forage, if not broken up, to be harrassed, 407
Ruse excellent auxiliary in attack 407

CHAPTER FOURTEENTH.

DEFILES.

Introduction.

Defiles defined and divided into two classes, 408

Roads in gorges, ditches, &c.— first class, 408 Exert important influence in war

Bridges, necks, dikes, &c.— second class.. 408
Easily obstructed, good for ambuscades,&c. 409

CONTE?fTS.

465

PAGE

First class almost impregnable 409

Example of defile of Tliermopylii; 409

Second class forced with difficulty 409

Example of dike of Areola 409

Arms used iu attack and defence 409

1. Occupation and Defence of a
Defiie.

Depends upon character, jtc, of defile . . . 409
Preserved, or use by enemy prevented.. 409
Positions to be occupied for defence 409

2. Passag-e of a Defile.

In advance not difficult, if unoccupied. . . 410

Mode of advancing through defile 410

Passage of a defile in retreat more difficult, 411

Mode of passage of defile in retreat 411

Precautions to be observed by rear-guard, 412
Troops in ia defile assimilated to a serpeut, 412

3. Attack of a Defile.

Difficulty of attack with narrow front .. . 413
Difficult to attack with fianks protected, 413
Not attacked unless essential to success. . 413
Mode of conducting the attack of a defile, 413
Euse tried if direst attack impracticable, 414

PAGE

I Capturing defile by false demonstrations, 414
I Attacking defiles with occupied flanks. . . 414

I 4. Historical Examples.

j Omit no precautions when near a defile, 415

! Passage of defile near Meissen, in 1T45 . . . 415

Cavalry may, as an exception, force a defile, 416

Passage of defile of Somo-Sierra, in 1S03, 416

Employment of flanking attacks 417

Harispe'sforciugdeflle of Cabreras, in 180S, 417

Passage of defile in Algeria, in ISoO 413

Passage of a defile rapidly 418

! Passage of defile on Mount Medola, in 1796, 418
} Army in order of battle before a defile. . 418
! Gus, Adolphus at Leipsic and Leutzen.. 419

j 5. Defence and Attack of a Bridge.

j Mode of defending a bridge 419

I Mode of attacking a bridge 420

Bridge should be turned by fording, &c. . 420
! Passage of bridge of Lodi, in 1796 421

; 6. Defence and Attack of a Dike.

i Dikes, generally, only defended in front, 421

I Mode of defence of a dike in front 422

I Mode of attack of a dike in front 422

CHAPTER FIFTEENTH.

TILLAGES.

1. Occupation.

Villages occupied when defensible 424

Select those compactly and regularly built, 424

Occupied if important to the army 424

Information to be obtained before occu-
pation 425

"Without some natural defence not to be
occupied 425

2. Defence.

Preparing a village to make a good defence, 426

Redoubt to be in central position 426

Artillery posted at vulnerable points 426

Artillery sweep streets and open places. . 426
Flank and oblique firing most effective. . 427
Cavalry, how i>osted for the best defence, 427

Infantry, how divided and posted 427

Reserve should amount to about one fourth, 428

Communications to bo opened 428

Sorties conducted briskly and with caution, 428
Enemy to be repulsed, but not pursued.. 428

Exterior and interior defence 428

Reserve charges, while enemy is checked,428
Counter-attacks made and retreat secured, 428

3. Attack.

Attacks on villages cost too many men., 428
Superior forces and howitzers required.. 429
One real and two false attacks to be made, 429
Division of force, and mode of attack.. . 429
Duties of cavalry in assault of a village. . . 431

4. Sudden Attack.

Made by surprise or vigorous assault 431

Adopted in Algeria in attack of villages.. 431

Tillages carried by infantry on the run. . 431

5. Historical Examples.

Attack of Xerwinden, in 1693 431

Attack of Fontenoy, in 1745 432

Attack of Essling and Aspern, in 1809. . . 482
Attack of Schcenfeld, in 1813 432

APPEl^DIX.

UPON nYGIENE IX THE FIELD,

Introduction.

Difficult for soldier to write on hygiene . . 433

Science of hygiene defined 433

Comfortable clothing contributes to health, 433
Attention paid most to warm climates. . . 433

1. Marches.

Limited to strength, hours, and districts, 434
Care observed in climbing steep ascents, 434
Sudden transitions to be guarded against, 434
Indulgences allowed in warm climate .... 435

456

CONTENTS.

PAor.

Meu well clothed and fed in cold climate, 435
Warmed by exercise, not alcoholic drinks, 435
Strict attention to be paid to cleanliness, 435
yick seriously threatened sent to hospital, 435

S. Camps.

Must be located near wood and water. . . . 4;35
Pitched near banks of running streams. . 430

Wood required for cooking and fuel 430

Forests moist and miasmatic 430

High, ventilated, sloping, and drained. .. 430
Huts preferable to tents except on march, 430
Straw bedding renewed and old burned. . 436

Ofial burned, buried, or carried off 436

Night exposure, in shirts or bare feet, bad, 436
Incumbrances to be removed from camps, 430

Crowded camps liital to troops 430

Troops should be kept active and at work, 43G

PAOB

3. Bivouacs.

Generally more healthy than tents 487

More uncomfortable than camps 437

Outposts and guards generally bivouac. . . 437
Should fulfil same conditions as camps. . . 437
Troops must not sleep in cold without fires, 4S1
Shelter tents especially suited to bivouacs, 437

4. Field Hospitals.

llegimental, division, and of headquarters, 488
For immediate relief of sick and wounded, 438

Those of headquarters commodious 438

Established in liouses, tents, or open air, 488
Near water, and removed from enemy.. 43S

Provided with litters, stretchers, &c 438

Severely wounded sent at once to them, 438
Slight wounds staunched on the spot — 433

THE END.

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