* ^ 
 
 V 

 
 THE 
 
 SANKHYA APHORISMS 
 
 KAPILA, 
 
 WITH 
 
 dfciratts from % Commentaries. 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 JAMES R. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., 
 
 LATE PRINCIPAL OP THE BENARES COLLEGE. 
 
 THIRD EDITION. 
 
 LONDON : 
 TRUBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL. 
 
 1885. 
 
 [All rights reserved.]
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 THE present work, both in its Sanskrit portion and in its 
 English, is an amended reprint of three volumes/ pub- 
 lished in India, which have already become very scarce. 
 An abridged form of those volumes, 2 which subsequently 
 
 1 Their titles here follow : 
 
 "The Aphorisms of the Sankhya Philosophy of Kapila, with 
 Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries. [Book I.] Printed for 
 the use of the Benares College, by order of Govt. N. W. P. Allahabad : 
 Printed at the Presbyterian Mission Press. Kev. L. G. HAT, Sup't. 
 1852." 
 
 " The Aphorisms of the Sankhya Philosophy, by Kapila, with 
 Illustrative Extracts from the Commentary. Books II., III., & IV. 
 In Sanskrit and English. Printed for the use of the Benares 
 College, by order of Govt. N. W. P. (1st Edition, 550 Copies . 
 Price 12 annas.) Allahabad : Printed at the Presbyterian Mission 
 Press. Eev. L. G. HAT, Superintendent. 1854." 
 
 " The Aphorisms of the Sankhya Philosophy, by Kapila, with 
 Illustrative Extracts from the Commentary by Vijnana- Bhikshu. 
 Books V. & VI. Sanskrit and English. Translated by James 
 K. Ballantyne, LL.D., Principal of the Govt. College, Benares. 
 Printed for the use of the Benares College, by order of Govt. N. W. P. 
 (1st Edition, 550 Copies .Price 12 annas.) Allahabad : Printed 
 at the Presbyterian Mission Press. Rev. L. G. HAT, Sup't. 1856." 
 
 s Occupying Fasciculi 32 and 81 of the New Series of the Biblio- 
 theca Indica, issued in 1862 and 1865. The proof-sheets of only 
 32 pages of the whole, from the beginning, were read by Dr. Bal- 
 lantyne ; the rest, by Professor Cowell. 
 
 The title of the abridged form runs : " The Sankhya Aphorisms 
 of Kapila, with Extracts from Vijnana Bhiks[h]u's Commentary," &c. 
 But this is a misrepresentation, as regards Book I., which takes up 
 63 pages out of the total of 175. The expository matter in that 
 Book is derived, very largely, from other commentators than Vijnana. 
 
 2GG5597
 
 iy ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 appeared, contains nothing of the Sanskrit original but 
 the Aphorisms. 
 
 While, in the following pages, all the corrections 
 obtainable from the abridgment have been turned to 
 account, an immense number of improved readings have 
 been taken from another source. Three several times I 
 carefully read Dr. Ballantyne's translation in as many 
 different copies of it ; entering suggestions, in the second 
 copy, without reference to those which had been entered 
 in the first, and similarly making independent sug- 
 gestions in my third copy. All these ' were, on various 
 occasions, submitted to Dr. Ballantyne ; and such of them 
 as did not meet his approval were crossed through. The 
 residue, many more than a thousand, have been embodied 
 
 Vedanti Mahadeva mainly supplies it at the outset, and, towards 
 the end, well nigh exclusively, Aniruddha. Some share of it, however, 
 will not be traced ; it having been furnished by one of Dr. Ballantyne's 
 pandits, whom I have repeatedly seen in the very act, as by his own 
 acknowledgment, of preparing his elucidations. 
 
 1 Many of them, especially in Books II. VI., rest on readings 
 of the original preferable to those which had been accepted. 
 
 Though not fully published till 1856, my edition of the Sdnkhya- 
 pravachana-bhdshya, its preface alone excepted, was in print as early 
 as 1853 ; and Dr. Ballantyne had a copy of it. A few arbitrarily 
 chosen words apart, his text, after Book I., is borrowed from it 
 throughout, but with no mention of the fact. My advice was unheeded, 
 that he should profit by the copious emendations which I had amassed 
 and digested from better manuscripts than those to which I at first 
 had access. Greatly to his disservice, he would not be induced even 
 to look at them. It faring the same with my typographical cor- 
 rections, he has, here and there, reproduced errors, more or less gross, 
 which might easily have been avoided. See, for specimens, pp. 197, 
 288, 357, 373, 374, 381, 390.
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. V 
 
 in the ensuing sheets, but are not indicated, 1 as succes- 
 sively introduced. The renderings proposed in the foot- 
 notes are, for the most part, from among those which have 
 recently occurred to me as eligible. 
 
 That Dr. Ballantyne had any thought of reissuing, in 
 whatever form, the volumes mentioned at the beginning 
 of this Advertisement, I was unaware, till some years 
 after he had made over the abridgment of them to 
 Professor Co well, for publication. 2 Otherwise, I should 
 have placed at his disposal the materials towards improve- 
 ment of his second edition, which, at the cost of no slight 
 drudgery, are here made available. 
 
 The Sankhya Aphorisms, in all the known com- 
 mentaries on them, are exhibited word for word. The 
 variants, now given, of the Aphorisms, afforded by acces- 
 sible productions of that character, have been drawn from 
 the works, of which only one has yet been printed, about 
 to be specified : s 
 
 I. The Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhashya, by Vijnana Bhikshu. 
 Revelant particulars I have given elsewhere. My oldest 
 MS. of it was transcribed in 1654. 
 
 1 Nor has attention been topically directed to sundry blemishes of 
 idiom which have been removed ; as, for example, by the substitution 
 of ' unless ' for 'without,' of ' in time ' for ' through time,' of 'presently' 
 for 'just,' and of ' between the two ' for ' between both.' 
 
 2 "At the time of his departure from India, in 1860, Dr. Ballantyne 
 left with me the MS. of his revised translation of the Sankhya 
 Aphorisms." " Notice," in the Bibliotheca Indica, New Series, No. 81. 
 
 3 For details respecting these commentaries and their authors, see 
 my Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the 
 Indian Philosophical Systems, or my Preface to the Sdnkhya-sdra.
 
 v [ ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 II. The Kdpila-sankhya-pravachana-sutra-vritti, by 
 Aniruddha. Of this I have consulted, besides a MS. 
 copied in 1818, formerly the property of Dr. Ballantyne, 
 one which I procured to be copied, in 1855, from an old 
 MS. without date. 1 
 
 TTT. The Laghu-sdnkhya-sutra-vritti, by Nagesa. Of 
 this I have two MSS., both undated. One of them is 
 entire ; but the other is defective by the three first Books. 
 
 IV. The Sdnkhya-pravachana-sutra-vritti-sara, by Ve- 
 danti Mahadeva. Here, again, only one of two MSS. 
 which I possess is complete. The other, which breaks off 
 in the midst of the comment on Book II., Aph. 15, is, in 
 places, freely interpolated from No. I. Neither of them 
 has a date. 
 
 Nearly all my longer annotations, and some of the 
 shorter, were scrutinized, while in the rough, by the 
 learned Professor Co well, but for whose searching criti- 
 cisms, which cannot be valued too highly, they would, in 
 several instances, have been far less accurate than they 
 
 F. H. 
 
 MARLESFORD, SUFFOLK, 
 Aug. 28, 1884. 
 
 1 I once had a second copy of this very rare work, bearing no date, 
 but most venerable in appearance. Like many of my manuscript 
 treasures, it was lent, and never found its way back to me.
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 THE great body of Hindu Philosophy is based upon six 
 sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary, 
 the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible ; they being 
 designed, not so much to communicate the doctrine of 
 the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible 
 suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine 
 shall have been already communicated. To this end they 
 are admirably adapted ; and, this being their end, the 
 obscurity which must needs attach to them, in the eyes 
 of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a 
 fault. 
 
 For various reasons it is desirable that there should be 
 an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much 
 of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. 
 A class of pandits in the Benares Sanskrit College having 
 been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a 
 version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive 
 portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, 
 and, through them, of other learned Brahmans, so that 
 any errors in the version may have the best chance of 
 being discovered and rectified. The employment of such 
 a version as a class-book is designed to subserve, further, 
 the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the 
 philosophical terminology of the East, as regards that of 
 the West. 
 
 These pages, now submitted to the criticism of the 
 pandits who read English, are to be regarded as proof- 
 sheets awaiting correction. They invite discussion. 
 
 J. E. B. 
 
 BENARES COLLEGE, 
 
 6th January, 1852.
 
 THE 
 
 SANKHYA APHOEISMS 
 
 OF 
 
 KAPILA. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 a. Salutation to the illustrious sage, Kapila! 1 
 
 b. Well, the great sage, Kapila, desirous of raising the 
 world [from the Slough of Despond in which he found it 
 sunk], perceiving that the knowledge of the excellence of 
 any fruit, through the desire [which this excites] for the 
 fruit, is a cause of people's betaking themselves to the 
 means [adapted to the attainment of the fruit], declares 
 [as follows] the excellence of the fruit [which he would 
 urge our striving to obtain] : 2 
 
 TV* subject propose,!. A P h ' L Well > the complete cessation 
 of pain [which is] of three kinds is the 
 complete end of man.
 
 2 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. The word 'well' serves as a benediction; 1 [the 
 particle atha being regarded as an auspicious one]. 
 
 b. By saying that the complete cessation of pain, which 
 is of three kinds, viz., (1) due to one's self (ddhyatmika), 
 
 (2) due to products of the elements (adhibhautika], and 
 
 (3) due to supernatural causes (ddhidainkd), is the com- 
 plete end of man, he means to say that it is the chief end 
 of man, among the four human aims, [viz., merit, wealth, 
 pleasure, and liberation (see Sdhitya-darpana,^ 2)] ; 2 because 
 the three are transitory, whereas liberation is not transi- 
 tory : such is the state of the case. 
 
 c. But then, let it be that the above- 
 endwy l t1e attained mentioned cessation [of all the three 
 kinds of pain] is the complete end of 
 man ; still, what reason is there for betaking one's self to a 
 doctrinal system which is the cause of a knowledge of the 
 truth, in the shape of the knowledge of the difference 
 between Nature and Soul, when there are easy remedies 
 for bodily pains, viz., drugs, &c., and remedies for mental 
 pains, viz., beautiful women and delicate food, &c., and 
 remedies for pains due to products of the elements, viz., 
 the residing in impregnable localities, &c., as is enjoined 
 in the institutes of polity, and remedies for pains due to 
 supernatural causes, viz., gems [such as possess marvellous 
 prophylactic properties], and spells, and herbs of mighty
 
 BOOK I., APH. 2. 3 
 
 power, &c.; and when [on the other hand], since it is hard 
 to get one to grapple with that very difficult knowledge 
 of truth which can be perfected only by the toil of many 
 successive births, it must be still more hard to get one to 
 betake himself to the doctrinal system [which treats of the 
 knowledge in question] ? Therefore [i. e., seeing that this 
 may be asked] he declares [as follows] : a 
 
 Aph. 2. The effectuation of this [coni- 
 
 The end is not to be plete cessation of pain] is not [to be 
 
 mean's. ^ mary expected] by means of the visible [such 
 
 as wealth, &c.] ; for we see [on the 
 
 loss of wealth, &c.,] the restoration [of the misery and 
 
 evil,] after [its temporary] cessation. 
 
 2 Instead of r^STfl'J, the reading of Aniruddha, and of most 
 MSS., Vijnana has, to the same effect, f1f ' Ed.
 
 4 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. ' The visible,' in the shape of the drugs, &c., above- 
 mentioned 1 [ I.e.]. 
 
 b. ' The effectuation of this,' i.e., the effectuation of the 
 complete cessation of pain. 2 
 
 c. Why is it not [to be thus effected] ? Because, after 
 the cessation (the cessation of pain is understood), we see 
 its restoration, the springing up again of pain in general, 3 
 [from whichever of its three sources ( 1. 6.)]. 
 
 d. The state of the matter is this : not by the expedients 
 above-mentioned is there such a removal of pain, that no 
 pain arises thereafter; for, when, by this or that expedient, 
 this or that pain has been destroyed, we see other pains 
 springing up. Therefore, though it be not easy [1. <?.], 
 the knowledge of truth [as a complete remedy] is to be 
 desired.* 
 
 e. But then, grant that future pain is not debarred by 
 drugs, &c., [employed to remove present pain], still, by 
 
 : I 
 
 fa - 

 
 BOOK I., APH. 4. 
 
 again and again obviating it [as often as it presents itself], 
 there may be the cessation of future pain, also. This doubt 
 he states [as follows] : l 
 
 MiqrlH II ? II 
 
 Aph. 3. [Let us consider the doubt] 
 that the soul's desire [the cessation of 
 P ain ' may result] from exertions for 
 the obviation [of pain], as is the case 
 with the obviation of daily hunger. 
 
 a. When pain shall arise [let us suppose one to argue], 
 then it is to be obviated ; and thus there is the soul's 
 desire, the cessation of pain ; just as one should eat, when 
 there is hunger; and thus there is the soul's desire of the 
 eater, viz., the cessation of hunger. In regard to this 
 [doubt] he states the recognized decision : 2 
 
 frj 
 
 frf 
 
 The more ordinary reading of MSS., and that of Aniruddha, is 
 'excellence,' not ^^SfJO with Vijnana. Ed.
 
 " " WM '** neffa ' 
 
 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 4. This [method of palliatives 
 tid (3)] is to be rejected by those who are 
 
 versed in evidence ; because it is not 
 everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even 
 if this were possible, there would be an impossibility as 
 regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the agents 
 employed], 
 
 a. For there are not physicians, &c., in every place and 
 at all times ; and [to rely on physicians, &c., would not be 
 advisable] , even if there were the possibility, i. e., even if 
 these were [always at hand], since physicians are not per- 
 fect [in their art] ; for pain cannot with certainty be got 
 rid of by means of physicians, &c., with their drugs, &c. 
 Moreover, when corporeal pain has departed, there may 
 still be that which is mental, &c. ; so that there is not 
 [under such circumstances], in every respect, liberation 
 from pain. For these reasons, such a soul's aim [as that 
 which contents itself with temporary palliatives] is to be 
 rejected by those who are versed in evidence, 1 [i.e., who are 
 acquainted with authoritative treatises] . 
 
 b. He mentions another proof 2 [of his assertion] :
 
 BOOK I., APH. 5. 
 
 * II M 
 
 Aph. 5. Also [an inferior method 
 Scriptural evidence in ought not to be adopted,] because of 
 
 favour of this view. . A 
 
 the preeminence 01 Liberation [as 
 proved] by the text [of Scripture declaratory] of its pre- 
 eminence above all else. 
 
 a. One ought not to endeavour after the removal of this 
 or that pain by these and those expedients [| I.e.] ; since 
 Liberation (moksha), by being eternal, is transcendent as 
 a remover of all pains. Moreover, one ought to endeavour 
 only after the knowledge of truth, which is the means 
 thereof [i.e., of Liberation] ; because the Scripture tells 
 its pre-eminence above all [other objects of endeavour], in 
 the text : ' There is nothing beyond the gaining of Soul/ 
 [with the utter exclusion of pain].' 
 
 b. But then [it may be suggested] , when you say libera- 
 tion, we understand you to mean from bondage. And is 
 that bondage essential ? Or is it adventitious ? In the 
 former case, it is incapable of destruction ; if it come under 
 the latter head, it will perish of itself, [like any other 
 adventitious and, therefore, transitory thing]. What 
 have we to do with your ' knowledge of truth,' then ? To 
 this he replies [as follows] : 2
 
 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 6. And there is no difference 
 
 An objection met. between the tWO. 
 
 a. There is no difference in the applicability of libera- 
 tion, on either of the suppositions, that the bondage is 
 essential, and that it is adventitious, [supposing it were 
 either (see 19. 6.)]. That is to say, we can tell both 
 how the bondage takes place, and how the liberation takes 
 place. 1 
 
 b. Now, with the view of demonstrating [the real nature 
 of] Bondage and Liberation, he declares, exclusively, in 
 the first place, the objections to Bondage's being essential 2 
 [f5.J.J: 
 
 H $ II 
 
 Aph. 7. There would be no rule in 
 the enjoining of means for the libera- 
 tion of one bound essentially. 
 
 ft " 
 
 H
 
 BOOK I., APH. 7. 9 
 
 a. Since Liberation has been stated [ 1] to result from 
 the complete cessation of pain, [it follows that] Bondage 
 is the junction of pain; and this is not essential in man. 
 For, if that were the case, then there would be no rule, 
 i. e., no fitness, in the Scriptural or legal injunction of 
 means for liberation : such is what must be supplied, [to 
 complete the aphorism] . Because, to explain our mean- 
 ing [by an illustration], fire cannot be liberated from its 
 heat, which is essential to it ; since that which is essential 
 exists as long as the substance exists. 1 
 
 b. And it has been declared in the Divine Song [the 
 fswara-gitd,'] : ' If the soul were essentially foul, or im- 
 pure, or changeable, then its liberation could not take 
 place even through hundreds of successive births/ 2 
 
 c. [Since some one may be disposed to say] ' Grant that 
 there is no fitness [in the Scriptural and legal injunctions, 
 ( 7. a.)], what have we to do with that?' Therefore he 
 declares [as follows] : 3 
 
 * i 
 
 *Tff
 
 1Q THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 8. Since an essential nature 
 Scripture would be imperishable, unauthoritativeness, 
 
 nwiutory, if patn were r . "<_* r 11 
 
 inevitable. betokened by impracticableness, [would 
 
 be chargeable against the Scripture, if pain were essential 
 to humanity]. 
 
 a. That is to say : since the essential nature of anything 
 is imperishable, i. e., endures as long as the thing itself, 
 it would follow [on the supposition that pain is essential 
 to humanity], that, since Liberation is impossible, the 
 Scripture which enjoins the means for its attainment is a 
 false authority, inasmuch as it is impracticable x [in its 
 injunctions. And this is out of the question ; Scripture 
 being assumed, here, as in all the others of the six systems, 
 to be an exact measure of truth] . 
 
 b. But then [some one may say], let it be an injunction 
 [to use means for the attainment of an unattainable 
 object], on the mere strength of Scripture; 2 [and, since 
 Scripture is an unquestionable authority, we may be ex- 
 cused from asking or answering the question, why the 
 injunction is given] . To this he replies [as follows] : 
 
 " S ^ f* ^ -^ ^ *V 
 
 1 1 ^ <W I H ^ I ^T^n^T^S^ H <v*J II Q. H 
 
 : H
 
 BOOK I., APH. 10. 11 
 
 An impracticable in- Aph. 9. There is no rule, where 
 something impossible is enjoined: 
 though it be enjoined, it is no injunction. 
 
 a. There can be no fitness, or propriety, in an injunc- 
 tion with a view to an impossible fruit ; seeing that, though 
 something be enjoined, or ordered [to be effected] by 
 means that are impracticable, this is no injunction at all, 
 but only the semblance of an injunction; because it stands 
 to reason, that not even the Veda can make one see sense 
 in an absurdity : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 d. Here he comes upon a doubt : 2 
 
 II ^o || 
 
 A dU Metier ike A ^> 10 If C 8Ome One ^ in 
 
 essential be not remov- the case of white cloth, or of a seed, 
 [something essential may be not irre- 
 movable, then he will find his answer in the next 
 aphorism] . 
 
 a. But then [the doubter is supposed to argue], the 
 destruction even of what is essential [in spite of what is 
 stated under 7] is seen ; as, for example, the essential 
 whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the 
 essential power of germination in a seed is removed by
 
 12 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 fire. Therefore, according to the analogy of the white 
 cloth and the seed, it is possible that there should be the 
 removal of the bondage of the soul, even though it were 
 essential So, too, there may be [without any impropriety] 
 the enjoinment of the means thereof. Well, /[any one 
 argues thus], such is the meaning 1 [of the aphorism, to 
 which he proceeds to reply]. - 
 
 6. He declares 2 [the real state of the case, with reference 
 to the doubt just raised] : 
 
 1L Since ^^ perceptibleness 
 tential property may be and [subsequent] non-perceptiblcness 
 hidden, bat not removed. ^^ belong to some power [which is 
 indestructible], it is not something impracticable that is 
 enjoined, [when one is directed to render some inde- 
 structible power imperceptible]. 
 
 a. In regard even to the two examples above-mentioned 
 [ 10] , people do not give an injunction for [the positive 
 destruction of] something essential, which is indestructible 
 [ 8]. Why [do we say this] ? Because, in these two
 
 BOOK I., APH. 11. 13 
 
 instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of 
 a power [the powers, namely, of appearing white and of 
 germinating (see 10. a.)"], there are merely the manifes- 
 tation and [afterwards] the hiding of the whiteness, &c., 
 but not the removal of the whiteness, or of the power of 
 germination ; because, that is to say, the whiteness of the 
 dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted 
 seed can again be brought out by the processes of the 
 bleacher, &c., [in the case of the dyed cloth], and by the 
 will of the Yogi, [the possessor of supernatural powers, in 
 the case of the roasted seed], &C. 1 
 
 b. Having thus disproved the notion that bondage is 
 essential [to man], wishing to disprove also the notion 
 that it is the result of some [adherent] cause, he rejects 
 the [various supposable] causes, viz., Time, &c.: 2 
 
 P iti
 
 14 THE 8ANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 II <R H 
 
 J^. 12. Not from connexion with 
 
 Time, vhich applies f -, t> ^^ ,1 n 
 
 to all, cannot be the cause time [does bondage befall the soulj; 
 because this, all-pervading and eter- 
 nal, is [eternally] associated with all, [and not with those 
 alone who are in bondage]. 
 
 a. The bondage of man is not caused by time ; because 
 [if that were the case,] there could be no such separation 
 as that of the liberated and unliberated ; because time, which 
 applies to everything, and is eternal, is at all times asso- 
 ciated with all men, 1 [and must, therefore, bring all into 
 bondage, if any]. 
 
 H S II 
 
 Aph. 13. Nor [does bondage arise] 
 a 2i from connexion with place, either, for 
 eou e - the same [reason]. 
 
 a. That is to say : bondage does not arise from con- 
 nexion with place. Why ? ' For the same reason/ i.e., for 
 that stated in the preceding aphorism, viz., that, since it 
 [viz., place] is connected with all men, whether liberated 
 
 : n
 
 BOOK I., APH. 14. 15 
 
 or not liberated, bondage would [in that case] befall the 
 liberated, also. 1 
 
 Aph. 14. Nor [does the bondage of 
 
 The soul is not kept the soul arise] from its being condi- 
 
 %%ulo% e d by it$ lei " ff tioned [by its standing among circum- 
 
 stances that clog it by limiting it] ; 
 
 because that is the fact in regard to [not the soul, but] 
 
 the body. 
 
 a. By ' condition ' we mean the being in the shape of a 
 sort of association. The bondage [of the soul] does not 
 arise from that; because that is the property of the body 
 [and not of the soul] ; because, that is to say, bondage 
 might befall even the liberated [which is impossible], if 
 that which is the fact in regard to another could occasion 
 the bondage of one quite different. 2 
 
 b. But then [some one might say], let this conditioned 
 state belong to the soul. On this point [to prevent mis- 
 takes], he declares : 8 
 
 I cffiT
 
 16 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 15. Because this soul is 
 Tietmdi* abtoiute. [unassociated with any conditions or 
 circumstances that could serve as its 
 bonds, it is] absolute. 
 
 a. The word iti here shows that it [i.e., the assertion 
 conveyed in the aphorism] is a reason ; the construction 
 with the preceding aphorism being this, that, since the 
 soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the body to be 
 conditioned. 1 
 
 Aph. 16. Nor [does the bondage of 
 
 L > 80ul arise ] from an y work ? because 
 [works are] the property of another 
 [viz., the mind], and because it [the bondage] would be 
 eternal, 8 [if the case were as you imagine]. 
 
 * II 
 
 1 The commentator Aniruddha omits the final word, ^f . Ed. 
 
 8 Professor Wilson's Dictionary erroneously gives ' uninterrupted 
 continuance ' as one of the definitions of atiprasanga ; and that 
 definition, in all probability, suggested ' eternal ' to the translator, 
 who here had to do with atiprasakti. Near the end of a, in the 
 next page but one, atiprasanga is rendered ' undue result.' For the 
 synonymous atiprasakti and atiprasanga, respectively, see Aph. 53, 
 with the comment on it, and the comment on Aph. 151, of this Book. 
 
 Cftlebrooke, on various occasions, represents one or other of these 
 terms by 'wrest,' ' straining a rule,' 'room for misconstruction,' &c. 
 As technicalities, they generally signify ' illegitimately extended 
 application ' of a canon, notion, or the like. Ed.
 
 BOOK. I., APH. 16. 17 
 
 a. That is to say : moreover, the bondage of the soul 
 does not arise from any work, whether enjoined or forbid- 
 den ; because works are the property of another, i.e., not 
 the property of the soul [but of the mind]. And, if, through 
 a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct 
 could take place, then bondage might befall even the libe- 
 rated l , [through some acts of some one else]. 
 
 b. But then [some one may say], this objection does not 
 apply, if we hold that bondage may arise from the acts of 
 the associate- [viz., the mental organ] : so, with allusion to 
 this, he states another reason, ' and because it would be 
 eternal,' i.e., because bondage, in the shape of connexion 
 with pain, would occur [where it does not,] even in such 
 cases as the universal dissolution 3 [of the phenomenal 
 universe, including the mental organ, but not the soul] . 
 
 c. But then [some one may say], if 
 
 A dout,t ickther Hi ' -. . , , ,, , , ,, , j 
 
 bondage, aho,ieionqs not that be the case, then let the bondage, 
 
 tMH too > in the sha P e of connexion with 
 pain, belong [not to the soul, but] to 
 the mind alone, in accordance with the principle that it 
 have the same locus as the works [to which it is due] ; 
 and, since it is an established point that pain is an affection 
 
 2 Upddhi, for which see p. 53, 1, infra. Ed. 
 
 3
 
 18 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 of the mind, why is bondage [i e., connexion with pain] 
 assumed of the soul, also ? With reference to this doubt, 
 he declares [as follows] :' 
 
 Aph. 17. If it were the property of 
 Why it fa to the x>,ii any o ther. then there could not be 
 
 the bondage must * ' . 
 
 diverse experience. 
 
 a. If bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, 
 were the property of another, i.e., a property of the mind, 
 there could be no such thing as diverse experience ; there 
 could be no such different experience as one man's ex- 
 periencing pain, and another man's not : [for, it must be 
 remembered, it is not in point of mind, but of soul, that 
 men are held, by Kapila, to be numerically different]. 
 Therefore, it must be admitted that pain is connected with 
 the soul, also. And this [pain that belongs to the soul] 
 is in the shape merely of a reflexion of the pain [that at- 
 taches to its attendant organism] ; and this reflexion is of 
 its own attendant [organism] only ; so that there is no undue 
 result 2 [deducible from our theory].
 
 BOOK I., APH. 18. 19 
 
 b. He rejects also the notion that Nature (prakriti) is 
 directly the cause of bondage : * 
 
 Aph. 18. If [you say that the soul's 
 
 Nature ts not the * ** , _ 
 
 immediate cause of the bondage arises] from Nature, as its 
 cause, [then I say] < no ;' [because] that, 
 also, is a dependent thing. 
 
 a. But then [some one may say], let bondage result from 
 Nature, as its cause. If you say so, I say ' no ;' because 
 that, also, i.e., Nature, also, is dependent on the conjunction 
 which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism ; because, 
 if it [Nature] were to occasion bondage, even without that 
 [conjunction which is next to be mentioned], then bond- 
 age would occur even in such cases as the universal 
 dissolution, 3 [when soul is altogether disconnected from the 
 phenomenal]. 
 
 H^cftfrf 
 
 2 Here and in the comment, I have corrected cT^mT^T* Ed. 
 
 3 
 
 II 
 
 s
 
 20 THE SANKHYA APHO1USMS. 
 
 b. If the reading [in the aphorism] be nibandhana l [in 
 the 1st ease, and not in the 5th], then the construction will 
 be as follows: 'If [you say that] the bondage is caused 
 by Nature/ &c. a 
 
 c. Therefore, since Nature can be the cause of bondage, 
 only as depending on something else [i.e., on the conjunc- 
 tion to be mentioned in the next aphorism], through this 
 very sort of conjunction [it follows that] the bondage is 
 reflexional, like the heat of water due to the conjunction of 
 fire ; :1 [water being held to be essentially cold, and to seem 
 hot only while the heat continues in conjunction with it]. 
 
 d. He establishes his own tenet, while engaged on this 
 point, in the very middle 4 [of his criticisms on erroneous 
 notions in regard to the matter; for there are more to 
 come] : 
 
 1 This is the lection preferred by Aniruddha and his followers. Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 5 Here follows, in the first edition, the particle ^ for which no 
 authority has been discovered. The word translating it I have re- 
 tained, but bracketed. Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 19. 21 
 
 Aph. 19. [But] not without the con- 
 What really is the junction thereof [i.e., of Nature] is 
 
 relation of its bondaye J , , . ,, , r . _ 
 
 tot/tesoul. there the connexion 01 that [i.e., of 
 
 pain] with that [viz., the soul,] which is 
 ever essentially a pure and free intelligence. 
 
 a. Therefore, 1 without the conjunction thereof, i.e., with- 
 out the conjunction of Nature, there is not, to the soul, 
 any connexion with that, i.e., any connexion with bond- 
 age ; but, moreover, just through that [connexion with 
 Nature] does bondage take place. 2 
 
 b. In order to suggest the fact that the bondage 
 [of the soul] is reflexional [and not inherent in it, either 
 essentially or adventitiously], he makes use of the indirect 
 expression with a double negative, [' not without ']. For, 
 if bondage were produced by the conjunction [of the soul] 
 with Nature, as colour is produced by heating [in the case 
 of a jar of black clay, which becomes red in the baking], 
 then, just like that, it would continue even after disjunc- 
 tion therefrom ; [as the red colour remains in the jar, after 
 the fire of the brick-kiln has been extinguished, whereas 
 the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, 
 while it occurs not without the China-rose, ceases, on the 
 removal thereof] . Hence, as bondage ceases, on the dis- 
 junction [of the soul] from Nature, the bondage is merely 
 reflexional, and neither essential [ 5. b.~] nor adventitious 3 
 [11.*.]. 
 
 1 The Sanskrit word thus rendered was inadvertently omitted in 
 the first edition. Vijnana here supplies the comment. Ed. 
 
 i ^rfa <r <T<T 
 TO: H
 
 22 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 c. In order that there may not be such an error as that 
 of the Vaiseshikas, viz., [the opinion that there is] an abso- 
 lutely real conjunction [of the soul] with pain, lie says 
 ' which is ever,' &c. [ 19]. That is to say : as the con- 
 nexion of colour with essentially pure crystal does not take 
 place without the conjunction of the China-rose [the hue 
 of which, seen athwart the crystal, seems to belong to the 
 crystal], just so the connexion of pain with the soul, ever 
 essentially pure, &c., could not take place without the con- 
 junction of some accidental associate ; that is to say, pain, 
 &c., cannot arise spontaneously, 1 [any more than a red 
 colour can arise spontaneously in the crystal which is 
 essentially pure]. 
 
 d. This has been declared, in the Saura, as follows: 
 ' As the pure crystal is regarded, by people, as red, in con- 
 sequence of the proximity of something [as a China-rose] 
 
 HT Hcfi n I *TOT
 
 BOOK I., APH. 19. 23 
 
 that lends its colour, in like manner the supreme soul 1 [is 
 regarded as being affected hy pain]/ 
 
 e. In that [aphorism, 19], the perpetual purity means 
 the being ever devoid of merit and demerit ; the perpetual 
 intelligence means the consisting of uninterrupted thought; 
 and the perpetual liberatedness means the being ever dis- 
 sociated from real pain : that is to say, the connexion with 
 pain in the shape of a reflex-ion is not a real bondage, 2 [any 
 more than the reflexion of the China-rose is a real stain 
 in the crystal]. 
 
 /. And so the maker of the aphorism means, that the 
 cause of its bondage is just a particular conjunction [ 19. c.]. 
 And now enough as to that point. 3 
 
 ff. Now he rejects [18.</.] certain causes of [the soul's] 
 bondage, preferred by others: 4 
 
 : ii 
 
 3 rRT
 
 24 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 The Veddntic tenet on Aph. 20. Not from Ignorance, too, 
 this point disputed. [does the soul's bondage arise] ; be- 
 
 cause that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding. 
 
 a. The word 'too' is used with reference to the previously 
 mentioned 'Time/ &c./ [ 12, which had been rejected, as 
 causes of the bondage, antecedently to the statement, in 
 19, of the received cause]. 
 
 ft. Neither, too, does [the soul's] union with bondage 
 result directly from ' Ignorance,' as is the opinion of those 
 who assert non-duality [or the existence of no reality save 
 one (see Vcddnta-sdra, 20. ft.)] ; because, since their 'Ig- 
 norance' is not a real thing, it is not fit to bind; because, 
 that is to say, the binding of any one with a rope merely 
 dreamt of was never witnessed. 2 
 
 e. But, if 'Ignorance ' be a reality [as some assert], then 
 he declares [as follows] : 8 
 
 'T: n ?\ n 
 
 Aph. 21. If it ['Ignorance'] be [as- 
 The Ved&vti cannot serted, by you, to be] a reality, then 
 
 evade the objection, with- A . , > f ,1 TTT- 
 
 out stultifying himself '. there is an abandonment of the [Ye- 
 dantic] tenet, [by you who profess to 
 follow the Vedanta]. 
 
 nm*i<Mr*u
 
 BOOK. I., APH. 22. 25 
 
 a. That is to say : and, if you agree that ' Ignorance ' is 
 a reality, then you abandon your own implied dogma [see 
 Nyaya Aphorisms I., 31] of the unreality of ' Ignorance ;' l 
 [and so you stultify yourself]. 
 
 b. He states another objection : 2 
 
 i 1 ^ H ^ H 
 
 Aph. 22. And [if you assume * Igno- 
 The. Ved&nti cannot ranee ' to be a reality, then] there would 
 
 evade tie Ejection, with- , 7 . . , , r fi , . _ 
 
 out conceding a duality. be a duality, through [there being] 
 something of a different kind [from 
 soul ; which you asserters of non-duality cannot contem- 
 plate allowing]. 
 
 a. That is to say : if ' Ignorance ' is real and without a 
 beginning, then it is eternal, and coordinate with Soul : if 
 [therefore] it be not soul, then there is a duality, through 
 [there being] something of a different kind [from soul ; 
 and this the Vedantis cannot intend to establish] ; because 
 these followers of the Veddnta, asserting non-duality, hold 
 that there is neither a duality through there being some- 
 thing of the same kind [with soul], nor through there 
 being something of a different kind. 3 
 
 ii 
 
 wj 
 
 f?
 
 26 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. He ponders a doubt : l 
 
 H ^ II 
 
 s 
 
 Aph. 23. If [the Yedanti alleges, re- 
 garding ' Ignorance/ that] it is in the 
 
 "a? once real and un- shape of both these opposites, [then we 
 shall say ' no/ for the reason to be 
 
 assigned in the next aphorism]. 
 
 a. The meaning is : if [the Vedanti says that] ' Igno- 
 rance ' is not real, else there would be a duality through 
 [there being] something of a different kind [from soul, 
 which a follower of the Vedanta cannot allow], and, 
 moreover, it is not unreal, because we experience its 
 effects ; but it is in the shape of something at once real 
 and unreal, 2 [like Plato's bv teal fj,rj ov. (see Vedanta- 
 sdra, 21)]. 
 
 Aph. 24. [To the suggestion that 
 There is no such thing ' Ignorance ' is at once real and unreal, 
 
 as a thing at once real -. . , , , , . 
 
 and unreal. we say] ' no ; because no such thing is 
 
 known [as is at once real and unreal.] 
 
 a. That is to say: it is not right to say that ( Ignorance ' 
 is at once real and unreal. The reason of this he states 
 in the words ' because no such thing/ &c. ; because any 
 such thing as is at once real and unreal is not known.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 25. 27 
 
 For, in the case of a dispute, it is necessary that there 
 should be an example of the thing [i. e. (see Nyaya Apho- 
 risms, I., 25), a case in which all parties are agreed that 
 the property in dispute is really present] ; and, as regards 
 your opinion, such is not to be found ; [for, where is there 
 anything in regard to which both parties are agreed that 
 it is at once real and unreal, as they are agreed that fire 
 is to be met with on the culinary hearth ?] : such is the 
 import. 1 
 
 b. Again he ponders a doubt r 
 
 Aph. 25. [Possibly the Vedanti may 
 A question u-hetter the remonstrate] ' We are not asserters of 
 
 Vedanti is bound to a- f1 . _. J ... _ . 
 
 void self-contradiction. any bix Categories, like the Vaiseshi- 
 kas and others.' 
 
 a. ' We are not asserters of a definite set of categories 
 [like the Vaiseshikas, who arrange all things under six 
 heads, and the Naiyayikas, who arrange them under six- 
 teen]. Therefore, we hold that there is such a thing, 
 unknown though it be [to peoplein general], as 'Igno- 
 rance ' which is at once real and unreal, or [if you prefer 
 it] , which differs at once from the real and the unreal [see
 
 28 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Veddnta-sdra, 21] ; because this is established by proofs,' l 
 [Scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to us, 
 although they may not comply with all the technical requi- 
 sitions of Gotama's scheme of argumentative exposition 
 (see Nyaya Aphorisms, I., 35)]. 
 
 b. By the expression [in the aphorism] ' and others ' are 
 meant the Naiydyikas ; for the Naiydyika is an asserter 
 of sixteen categories 2 [see Nyaya Aphorisms, I., ]]. 
 
 c. He confutes 8 [this pretence of evading the objection, 
 by disallowing the categories of the Nyaya] : 
 
 II 3 II 
 
 Aph. 26. Even although this be not 
 
 The self-contradictory compulsory [that the categories be 
 
 'rtu,* 09 six, or sixteen], there is no acceptance 
 
 of the inconsistent; else we come to 
 
 the level of children, and madmen, and the like. 
 
 a . Let there be [accepted] no system of categories [such 
 as that of the Vaiseshika, 25] ; still, since being and not- 
 being are contradictory, it is impossible for disciples to 
 
 II
 
 BOOK I., APH. 26. 29 
 
 admit, merely on Your Worship's assertion, a thing at 
 once real and unreal, which is inconsistent, contrary to 
 all fitness : otherwise, we might as well accept also the 
 self -contradictory assertions of children and the like: 
 such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. Certain heretics [deniers of the authority of the 
 Vedas] assert that there exist external objects of momen- 
 tary duration [individually; each being, however, replaced 
 by its facsimile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted 
 series of productions becomes something equivalent to 
 continuous duration], and that by the influence 2 of these 
 the bondage of the soul [is occasioned]. This he objects 
 to, [as follows] : 3 
 
 2 Vdsand, a term which Dr. Ballantyne has rendered variously, in 
 divers passages of the present work, and also elsewhere. It is well 
 defined, in Prof. Benfey's Sanskrit -English Dictionary: 'An 
 impression remaining unconsciously in the mind, from past actions, 
 etc., and, by the resulting merit or demerit, producing pleasure or 
 pain.' Ed. 
 
 irfcfi'i
 
 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 1 II *9 II 
 
 Theoretical theory of a ^p/ lt 27. [The bondage] thereof, 
 
 tuccession of 'momentary . , , 
 
 oijects from all eternity, moreover, is not caused by any m- 
 a d^r^l e d S . OUlS *""" fluence of objects from all eternity. 
 
 a. 'Thereof/ i.e., of the soul. An eternal influence of 
 objects, an influence of objects the effect of which, in the 
 shape of a continued stream, has had no commence- 
 ment, not by this, either, is it possible that the bondage 
 [of the soul] has been occasioned : such is the meaning. 2 
 
 b. He states the reason of this [impossibility] : 3 
 
 5 II ^t II 
 
 1 Instead of -M^^Rfi*, Auiruddha has the substantially 
 equivalent -f^TTI^f:. Ed. 
 
 * I 
 
 II 
 
 4 Dr. Ballantj-ne had, most probably by mere oversight, the un- 
 authorized 'cfTty lrfT O 5 w ^ich I have corrected. The reading 
 , here followed, is, perhaps, that of Aniruddha. TJIf- 
 is the form of the word recognized by Vijnana ; and I know 
 of no manuscript warrant for the alteration of it seen in the following 
 page, 1, an extract from his commentary. It is, further, a regular 
 derivative, which the other is not, if it is not even unjustified by 
 grammatical prescription. Ed. 
 
 6 Aniruddha has -}^O 'division,' in place of 
 separation." Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 28. 31 
 
 Aph. 28. Also [in my opinion, as 
 
 oT"" ' *"* wel1 as in J ours ' apparently], between 
 the external and the internal there is 
 not the relation of influenced and influencer ; because 
 there is a local separation ; as there is between him that 
 stays at Srughna and him that stays at Pataliputra. 
 
 a. In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are 
 at present objecting to], the soul is circumscribed, residing 
 entirely within the body ; and that which is thus icithin 
 cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the 
 influencer, as regards an external object. Why ? Because 
 they are separated in regard to place ; like two persons 
 the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in 
 Pataliputra : such is the meaning. Because the affection 
 which we call ' influence ' (vdsand) is seen only when 
 there is conjunction, such as that of madder and the cloth 
 to which it gives its colour], or that of flowers and the 
 flower-basket 1 [to which they impart their odour.] 
 
 b. By the word 'also' the absence of conjunction 
 [between the soul and objects (see 15)], &c., which he 
 himself holds, is connected 2 [with the matter of the pre- 
 sent aphorism].
 
 32 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 c. Srughna and Pataliputra [Palibothra, or Patna] are 
 two several places far apart. 1 
 
 d. But then [these heretics may reply], 'The influence 
 of objects [on the soul] may be asserted, because there is 
 a contact with the object ; inasmuch as the soul, according 
 to us, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses, 
 according to Your Worship.' Therefore he declares [as 
 follows] : 
 
 II ^ II 
 
 Aph. 29. [It is impossible that the 
 On the heretical view, soul's bondage should arise] from an 
 
 the free soul tcould I* . n . , . A , J , 
 
 equally liable to bondage. influence received in the same place 
 [where the object is ; because, in that 
 case] , there would be no distinction between the two, [the 
 bond and the free], 
 
 a. To complete the sense, we must supply as follows : 
 ' It is impossible that the bondage should arise from an 
 influence received in one and the same place with the 
 object.' Why ? Because there would be no distinction 
 between the two, the soul bound and the soul free ; because 
 bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated soul, also ; 
 [the free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just 
 as likely to come across objects as any other] : such is 
 the meaning. 3 
 
 
 rRTf II
 
 BOOK I., APH. 31. 33 
 
 b. Here he ponders a doubt z 1 
 
 Aph. 30. If [the heretic, wishing to 
 save his theory, suggests that a differ- 
 ence between the two cases (see 29) 
 does exist] in virtue of the unseen, [i.e., of merit and 
 demerit, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism]. 
 
 a. That is to say, [the heretic may argue] : ' But then, 
 granting that they [the free soul and the bound] are alike 
 in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when 
 they become conjoined with them in one and the same 
 locality ; yet the reception of the influence may result merely 
 from the force of the unseen, [i.e., from the merit and 
 demerit of this or that soul; the soul that is liberated 
 alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter, with 
 impunity, the object that would enchain one differently 
 circumstanced]': if 2 [this be urged, then we look forward]. 
 
 a. This he disputes, 3 [as follows] :
 
 34 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 31. They cannot stand in 
 Each lack must Lear fa e re l a tion of deserver and bestower, 
 
 tts oira burden. 
 
 since the two do not belong to one 
 and the same time. 
 
 a. Since, in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are 
 distinct, and do not belong to the same time [believing, as 
 thou heretically dost, not only that objects (see 26. b.) 
 momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration 
 of souls, also, is of a like description*] , there is positively 
 no such relation [between the soul at one time and its suc- 
 cessor at another] as that of deserver and bestower [or 
 transmitter of its merits or demerits] ; because it is impos- 
 sible that there should be an influence of objects [27] 
 taking effect on a patient [say, the soul of to-day], occa- 
 sioned by the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] belonging to 
 an agent [say, the soul of yesterday, which, on the hypo- 
 thesis in question, is a numerically different individual] : 
 such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He ponders a doubt: 2 
 
 %rT II $* II 
 
 Aph. 32. If [the heretic suggests 
 
 the Ca8e is like that of the cere ' 
 monies in regard to a son, [then he 
 
 will find his reply by looking forward] . 
 
 a. But then [the heretic, admitting the principle that 
 
 ^ 
 
 *in 
 
 : 11
 
 BOOK I., APH. 33. 35 
 
 the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the 
 agent, may urge that], as the son is benefited by ceremonies 
 in regard to a son, such as that [ceremony (see Colebrooke's 
 ' Hindu Law/ Vol. III., p. 104) celebrated] in anticipation 
 of conception, which [no doubt] belongs to the father 
 [who performs the ceremonies, to propitiate the gods], in 
 like manner there may be an influence of objects on the 
 experiencer [say, the soul of to-day], through the ' unseen ' 
 [merit or demerit] that belongs even to a different subject 
 [say, the soul of yesterday] : such is the meaning 1 [of the 
 heretic]. 
 
 b. He refutes this, by showing that the illustration is 
 not a fact : 2 
 
 Aph. 33. [Your illustration proves 
 nothing ;] for, in that case, there is no 
 one permanent soul which could be 
 
 consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of concep- 
 
 tion, &c. 
 
 a. 'In that case/ i.e., on thy theory, too, the benefit of 
 
 *Rf?r 
 
 3 Aniruddha has IHTVT^T^W^OT ; an<i Dr - Ballan- 
 tyne's rendering suits it. Ed. 
 
 1 A common reading, but inferior, is ^|^S^^^. Ed.
 
 36 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 the son, by [means of the performance of] 1 the ceremonies in 
 anticipation of conception, &c., could not take place ; ' for/ 
 i. e., because, on that theory, there is not one [self -identi- 
 cal] soul, continuing from the [time of] conception to 
 birth, which could be consecrated [by the ceremonies in 
 question], so as to be a fit subject for the duties that per- 
 tain to the time subsequent to birth [such as the investiture 
 with the sacred thread, for which the young Brahman 
 would not be a fit subject, if the ceremonies in anticipation 
 of his conception had been omitted] : and thus your illus- 
 tration is not a real one,' 2 [on your own theory : it is not a 
 thing that you can assert as a fact]. 
 
 b. And, according to my theory, also, your illustration 
 is not a fact ; seeing that it is possible that the benefit to 
 the son should arise from the ' unseen ' [merit] deposited 
 in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son : 
 for it is an implied tenet [of my school], that it [the soul] 
 is permanent [in its self-identity]; and there is the injunc- 
 tion" [of Manu, (Ch. II., v. 26), with regard to the cere- 
 monies in question, which proceeds on the same grounds]. 
 
 1 The brackets are of my inserting. Ed. 
 
 ^rrfe ^T 
 
 T cRT
 
 BOOK I., APH. 34. 37 
 
 c. Some other heretic may encounter us, on the strength 
 of [the argument here next stated, viz.,] ' But then, since 
 bondage, also, [like everything else] is momentary, let 
 this bondage have nothing determinate for its cause, or 
 nothing at all for its cause,' 1 [which view of matters is 
 propounded in the next aphorism] : 
 
 98 n 
 
 Aph. 34. Since there is no such 
 Whetlier bondage may thing as a permanent result [on the 
 
 not Its momentary, and so - i i i re 
 
 require no cause. heretical view], the momentarmess [or 
 
 bondage, also, is to be admitted]. 
 
 a. ( Of bondage ' : this must be supplied, [to complete 
 the aphorism]. 2 
 
 b. And thus the point relied on is, that it [i.e., bondage] 
 have no cause at all. And so this is the application [of 
 the argument, viz.] : 
 
 (1) Bondage, &c., is momentary ; 
 
 (2) Because it exists, 
 
 (3) [Everything that exists is momentary,] as 
 the apex of the lamp-flame, or the like. 3 
 
 fi^lfijfcll
 
 38 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 c. And [continues the heretic,] this [reason, viz., 'exist- 
 ence '] does not extend unduly l [as you may object,] to the 
 case of a jar, or the like ; because that, also [in my opinion], 
 is like the subject in dispute, [in being momentary]. 
 This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the ex- 
 pression, ' since there is no such thing as a permanent 
 result'- 8 [34]. 
 
 d. He objects 8 [to this heretical view] : 
 
 Aph. 35. No, [things are not mo- 
 Tk fact of recoffni- mentary in their duration] ; for the 
 
 /ion proves that things . ,, ,, . . j -L 
 
 are not momentary. absurdity of thlS IS proved by TCOg- 
 
 nition. 
 
 a. That is to say : nothing is momentary ; because the 
 absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite 
 argument [to that under 34. &.], taken from such facts 
 of recognition as, ' what I saw, that same do I touch,' 
 [an argument which may be stated as follows], viz. : 
 
 (1) Bondage, &c., is permanent ; 
 
 (2) Because it exists, 
 
 1 Vyabhickdra is the expression here paraphrased. In this work 
 and others, the translator has given it many meanings ; and so has 
 Colebrooke, who renders it, in various contexts, by ' contradiction,' 
 ' derogation,' ' failure,' ' impossibility,' ' unoperativeness,' &c. As a 
 logical technicality, it denotes the presentation of the reason, or middle 
 term, unaccompanied by the major term. Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 37. 39 
 
 (3) [Everything that exists is permanent,] as a 
 jar, or the like. 1 
 
 Tkat things are mo- A P k ' 36 ' And [ tflin gS * not mo- 
 
 mentary is contradicted mentary ;] because this is contradicted 
 
 Ity Scripture and rea- , o . " , , 
 
 swing. by scripture and by reasoning. 
 
 a. That is to say : nothing is momentary ; because the 
 general principle, that the whole world, consisting of 
 effects and causes, is momentary, is contradicted by such 
 texts as this, viz., * [All] this, ingenuous one, was 
 antecedently existing,' and by such Scriptural and other 
 arguments as this, viz., * How should what exists proceed 
 from the non-existent ? ' 2 
 
 ^"Rnft^si n ?$ n 
 
 Aph. 37. And [we reject the argu- 
 lustra- men t o f t n { s heretic ;] because hia 
 instance is not a fact. 
 
 
 ti ^ i <4 n rq
 
 40 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. That is to say : the general principle of the momen- 
 tariness [of all things] is denied ; because this momentary 
 character does not [in fact] belong to the apex of the 
 lamp-flame, &c., the instance [on which thou, heretic, 
 dost ground thy generalization, ( 34. 6.)]. Moreover, thou 
 quite errest in regard to momentariness, in that instance, 
 from not taking account of the minute and numerous 
 instants [really included in a duration which seems to thee 
 momentary] : such is the import. 1 
 
 b. Moreover, if the momentary dura- 
 f/ things ^remomen- tion, &c., [of things] be asserted, then 
 
 lation of cause and effect, in the case 
 of the earth and the jar, and the like. 
 And you must not say that there is no such thing as that 
 [relation of cause and effect] ; because it is proved to be a 
 reality by the fact that, otherwise, there would be no such 
 thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect, [and 
 who, therefore, sets in operation the causes adapted to its 
 production]. With reference to this, he declares [as 
 follows] : 2 
 
 * II ?b II 
 
 fefi 
 
 ?Rf?T HTf II 
 
 f^R
 
 BOOK I., APH. 39. 41 
 
 Aph. 38. It is not between two things 
 The camal relation is coming simultaneously into existence. 
 
 not betn-een things that , J . . J -, a- 1 
 
 arise simultaneously. that the relation ot cause and enect 
 exists. 
 
 c. Let us ask, does the relation of product and [material] 
 cause exist between the earth and the jar, as simultaneously 
 coming into [their supposed momentary] existence, or as 
 successive ? Not the first ; because there is nothing to 
 lead to such an inference, and because we should not [in 
 that case] find the man, who wants a jar, operating with 
 earth, &c., [with a view to the jar's subsequent production]. 
 Neither is it the last ; in regard to which he declares [as 
 follows] :' 
 
 o 
 
 Aph. 39. Because, when the antece- 
 : dent de P arts ' the consequent is unfit 
 [to arise, and survive it]. 
 
 a. The relation of cause and effect is, further, inconsis- 
 tent with the theory of the momentary duration of things ; 
 because, at the time when the antecedent, i. e., the cause, 
 departs, the consequent, i.e., the product, is 'unfit,' i.e., is 
 not competent to arise ; because, that is to say, a product 
 is cognized only by its inhering in [and being substan- 
 tially identical with, however formally different from,] its 
 
 : fifi 
 
 P
 
 42 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 substantial cause, 1 [and is incapable, therefore, of sur- 
 viving it]. 
 
 b. With reference to this same [topic, viz., the] substan- 
 tial cause, he mentions another [the converse] objection 2 
 [to the theory of the momentary duration of things] : 
 
 II o II 
 
 Aph. 40. Moreover, not [on the 
 The coexistence of sub- theory of the momentary duration of 
 
 and 
 
 things, can there be such a relation as 
 that of cause and effect] ; because, while 
 
 the one [the antecedent] exists, the 
 other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two 
 ler. 3 
 
 a. To complete [the aphorism], we must say, ' moreover, 
 [on the theory objected to], there can be no such relation 
 as that of cause and effect ; because, at the time when the 
 antecedent exists, the consequent cannot coexist with it, 
 the two being mutually exclusive.' 4 The two suggesters 
 of the relation of cause and effect, in product and sub 
 
 c. 
 
 8 For vyabhichdra, the word used in the original, see 1, at p. 38, 
 tupra. Ed. 
 
 * Here again occurs, in the Sanskrit, the term vyabhichdra. Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 40. 43 
 
 stance, 1 are (1) this concomitancy of affirmatives, that, 
 while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and 
 (2) this concomitancy of negatives, 2 that, when the sub- 
 stance no longer exists, the product no longer exists : and 
 these two [conditions, on your theory] cannot be ; because, 
 since things [in your opinion,] are momentary in their 
 duration, the two [viz., the substance and the product], 
 inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent, 3 belong 
 to opposite times, 4 [and cannot, therefore, coexist ; for the 
 product, according to you, does not come into existence 
 until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the 
 nature of the causal relation just defined]. 
 
 b. But then, [the heretic may say, do not let the co- 
 existence of substance and product be insisted upon, as 
 indispensable to the causal relation between the two, but] 
 ' let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause, 
 
 1 I have inserted the words ' in product and substance.' Ed. 
 
 2 The original dual of ' concomitancy of affirmatives ' and ' con- 
 comitancy of negatives ' is anwayavyatirekau. For other English 
 equivalents of this term, occurring in the singular number, see 
 Book VI., Aph. 15 and 63. Ed. 
 
 8 'Antecedent and consequent ' renders kramika, translated 'suc- 
 cessive' in Aph. 38, a, at p. 41, supra. Ed. 
 
 fn
 
 44 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 as it belongs to the instrumental cause, in respect merely of 
 its antecedence.' To this he replies i 1 
 
 : ii ^ n 
 
 Aph. 41. If there were merely an- 
 
 Antecedencetothepra- tecedence, then there would be no deter- 
 
 dui does not digti^uM mma tion [of a substantial or material 
 
 the Matter from the In- L . 
 
 strunient. cause, as distinguished from an instru- 
 
 mental cause]. 
 
 a. And it could not be determined that this was the 
 substance [of this or that product], on the granting of 
 nothing more than its antecedence [to the product] ; because 
 antecedence constitutes no distinction between it and the 
 instrumental causes ; for, [as we need scarcely remind you], 
 that there is a distinction between instrumental and sub- 
 stantial causes, the whole world is agreed: such is the 
 meaning. 2 
 
 b. Other heretics say : ' Since no- 
 Tke question whether thing [really] exists, except Thought, 
 
 anyUuug exists besides .> . -i 
 
 Tfiougtit. neither does Bondage ; just as the 
 
 things of a dream [have no real exist- 
 
 : H
 
 BOOK I., APH. 43. 45 
 
 ence]. Therefore it has no cause ; for it is absolutely false.' 
 He rejects the opinion of these 1 [heretics] : 
 
 : 11 *te u 
 
 Aph. 42. Not Thought alone exists ; 
 
 We have the evidence , ,, . , ... / i 
 
 of intuition for the Ed~- because there is the intuition 01 the 
 
 tental, as we/I as for tlie external 
 Internal. 
 
 a. That is to say : the reality is not Thought alone ; be- 
 cause external objects, also, are proved to exist, just as 
 Thought is, by intuition. 2 
 
 b. But then [these heretics may rejoin], 'From the 
 example of intuitive perception in dreams [see Butler's 
 'Analogy/ Part I., Ch. I.], we find this [your supposed 
 evidence of objective reality] to exist, even in the absence 
 of objects ! ' To this he replies : 3 
 
 Aph. 43. Then, since, if the one 
 
 The denial of the ex- does not exist, the other does not exist, 
 
 fenuK amounts to Ni- , . ., r . , . 
 
 lulism. there is a void, [i.e., nothing exists 
 
 at all]. 
 
 II 
 
 2 
 
 I <rFTi;
 
 46 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. That is to say : if external things do not exist, then 
 a mere void offers itself. Why ? Because, if the external 
 does not exist, then thought does not exist ; for it is in- 
 tuition that proves the objective : and, if the intuition of 
 the external did not establish the objective, then the 
 intuition of thought, also, would not establish [the existence 
 of] thought. 1 
 
 b. ' Then let the reality be a mere void ; and, therefore, 
 the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just 
 because a void is all : ' with such a proposal [as recorded 
 in the next aphorism] does [some one who may claim the 
 title of] the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in 
 opposition : 2 
 
 II 88 H 
 
 The heretic ? oes the A P h ' 44 ' The reality is a void : what 
 lenyth of asserting sheer i s perishes ; because to perish is the 
 
 Nihilism. , -f. . 
 
 habit oi things. 
 
 a. The void alone [says this prince of heretics, or the 
 fact that nothing exists at all] is the reality, [or the only 
 
 : ii
 
 BOOK I., APH. 45. 47 
 
 truth]. Since everything that exists perishes, and that 
 which is perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore, as of 
 all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonenti- 
 ties, Bondage, &c., in the midst [of any beginning and end- 
 ing], has merely a momentary existence, is phenomenal, 
 and not real. Therefore, who can be bound by what ? 
 This [question] is what we rest upon. The reason assigned 
 for the perishableness of whatever exists is, 'because to 
 perish is the habit of things;' because to perish is the 
 very nature of things : but nothing continues, after quitting 
 its own nature ; [so that nothing could continue, if it ceased 
 to perish] : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He rejects 2 [this heretical view] : 
 
 Nihilism denied; as ^ p ^ 45. This is a mere counter- 
 
 the indiscerptible is in- * . 
 
 destructible. assertion of unintelligent persons. 
 
 a. 'Of unintelligent persons,' i.e., of blockheads, this 
 is 'a mere counter-assertion/ i.e., a mere idle counter- 
 assertion, that a thing must needs be perishable, because it 
 
 ftror 
 
 f^R %7
 
 48 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 exists ; [and such an assertion is idle,] because things that 
 are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the 
 destruction of such things, cannot perish. 1 
 
 b. [But] what need of many words ? It is not the fact, 
 that even products perish ; [for] just as, by the cognition 
 that ' the jar is old ' [we mean that it has passed from the 
 condition of new to that of old], so, too, by such a cognition 
 as this, that ' the jar has passed away,' it is settled only 
 that the jar, or the like, is in the condition of having passed 
 away. 2 
 
 c. He states another objection 8 [to the heretical view] : 
 
 Aph. 46. Moreover, this [nihilistic 
 
 A T j7/t*/i5//i is oven to 1 i i , -i * 
 
 the same oi,jections as theory is not a right onej ; because it 
 
 taS the 8ame fortune as botn the v 
 
 [which were confuted just before]. 
 
 * Aniruddha, according tx> the MSS. which I have seen, reads 
 
 - Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 46. 49 
 
 a. This view, moreover [ 44], is not a good one ; 
 because it has the same fortune as, i. e., is open to similar 
 reasons for rejection as, the theory that external things 
 are momentary [ 26. &.], and as the theory that nothing 
 exists besides Thought [ 41. b]. The reason for the 
 rejection of the theory that things are momentary in their 
 duration, viz. [as stated in 35], the fact of recognition, &c., 
 [which is, at least, as little consistent with Nihilism as it 
 is with the momentary duration of things], and the reason 
 for the rejection of the theory that nothing exists besides 
 Thought, viz. [as stated in 42], the intuition of the ex- 
 ternal, &c., apply equally here [in the case of Nihilism] : 
 such is the import. 1 
 
 b. Moreover, as for the opinion which is accepted by 
 these [heretics], viz., ' Let the mere void [of absolute 
 nonentity] be the soul's aim [and summum bonuni], since 
 herein consist at once the cessation of pain [which cannot 
 continue, when there is absolutely nothing], and also the 
 means thereof [since there can be no further means re- 
 quired for the removal of anything, if it be settled that 
 the thing positively does not exist],' this, too, can hardly 
 be : so he declares [as follows] : 2 
 
 ^fcf HFP
 
 50 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 47. In neither way [whether as 
 The souTs aim is not a means, or as an end,] is this [anni- 
 hilation] the soul's aim. 
 
 a. ' Let the void [of mere nonentity] be the soul's aim, 
 whether as consisting in the cessation of pain, or as pre- 
 senting the means for the cessation of pain,' [says the 
 heretic. And this cannot be ; because the [whole] world 
 agrees, that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., 
 that shall abide in it ; that is to say, because [they hold, 
 while] you do not hold, that there is a permanent soul, 
 [ (see 33) in respect of which the liberation or beatifica- 
 tion would be possible, or even predicable]. 1 
 
 b. Now [certain] other things, also, entertained, as 
 causes of [the soul's] bondage, by [imperfectly instructed] 
 believers, remaining over and above those [proposed by 
 unbelievers, and] already rejected, are to be set aside : 2 
 
 *te II 
 
 Aph. 48. Not from any kind of 
 
 n is by no movement , . r , ., . 
 
 that the soul gets into motion [such as its entrance into a 
 body, does the soul's bondage result]. 
 
 I rf ^ 
 
 II
 
 BOOK I., APH. 49. 51 
 
 a. ' Bondage * [required to complete the aphorism] is 
 understood from the topic l [of discussion]. 
 
 b. The meaning is, that the soul's bondage, moreover, 
 does not result from any sort of motion, in the shape, for 
 instance, of its entrance into a body. 2 
 
 c. He states a reason for this : 3 
 
 Aph. 49. Because this is impossible 
 
 fol> wllat is inactive > [ Or in otn er Words, 
 
 without motion]. 
 
 a. That is to say: because this is impossible, i.e., motion 
 is impossible, in the case of the soul, which is inactive, 
 [because] all-pervading, [and, therefore, incapable of 
 changing its place]. 4 
 
 6. But then [the objector may say], 'Since, in the 
 books of Scripture and of law, we hear of its going and 
 coming into this world and the other world, let soul be 
 [not all-pervading, as you allege, but] merely limited [in 
 its extent] : and to this effect, also, is the text, ' Of the size 
 
 f^HT*
 
 52 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 of the thumb is the soul, the inner spirit,' and the like : l 
 [but] this conjecture he repels : 2 
 
 HMO a 
 
 ApJi. 50. [We cannot admit that the 
 soul is other than all-pervading; be- 
 cause] by its being limited, since it 
 would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., there 
 would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishable- 
 ness]. 
 
 a. That is to say : and, if the soul were admitted to be, 
 like a jar, or the like, limited, i.e. circumscribed [in di- 
 mension], then, since it would resemble a jar, or the like, 
 in being made up of parts, and [hence] in being perish- 
 able, &c., this would be contrary to our settled principle/ 
 [that the soul is imperishable]. 
 
 b. He now justifies the text [see 49. &.] referring to 
 the motion 4 ' [of the soul, by showing that the motion is 
 not really of the soul, but of an accessory] : 
 
 1 Swetdswatara Upanishad, iii., 13. Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 * II
 
 BOOK I., APH. 51. 53 
 
 f * ' I ^3** I ^'^^ H M^ II 
 
 ApTi. 51. The text regarding the 
 
 Soul moves not, any r , ,-, . - 
 
 more Hum. Space. motion [oi the soul], moreover, is [ap- 
 
 plicable, only] because of the junction 
 of an attendant ; l as in the case of the Ether [or Space, 
 which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in 
 a jar, as moving with the jar]. 
 
 a. Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimited- 
 ness, as the declaration that ' It is eternal, omnipresent, 
 permanent,' 2 the text 3 regarding its motion is to be explained 
 as having reference to a movement pertaining [not to the 
 soul, but] to an attendant; for there is the text, ' As the 
 Ether [or space] included in a jar, when the jar is removed, 
 [in this case] the jar may be removed, but not the space ; 
 and in like manner is the soul, which is like the sky, 
 [incapable of being moved]'; 4 and because we may con- 
 clude that the motion [erroneously supposed to belong to 
 the soul (49. 3.),] belongs to Nature[see Veddnta Aphorisms, 
 Part I., 4. /.], from such maxims 3 as this, that ' Nature 
 does the works the fruits of which are blissful or baneful ; 
 
 1 Upddhi; often, below, 'investment' and ' adjunct.' Ed. 
 
 2 Bhagavad-gitd, ii., 24. Ed. 
 
 3 ' Text ' and ' maxim ' are here meant to represent sruti and 
 smriti, taken in their more limited senses. Elsewhere the translator 
 has, for the same terms, in wider acceptations, ' books of Scripture 
 and of law,' &c. The first is ' revealed law,' the Vedas ; the second, 
 ' memorial law,' or a code of such law, as the Mdnava, and also any 
 composition of a man reputed to be inspired. Both are held to have 
 originated from a superhuman source ; but only the former is regarded 
 as preserving the very words of revelation. Ed. 
 
 4 The anacoluthism observable in the translation follows that of 
 the original, with reference to which see the Indische Studien, 
 vol. ii., p. 61.
 
 54 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 and it is wilful Nature that, in the three worlds, reaps 
 these ' : such is the import. 1 2 
 
 b. It has already been denied [ 16] that the bondage [of 
 the soul] is occasioned by works, in the shape either of 
 enjoined or of forbidden actions. Now he declares that 
 the bondage, moreover, does not arise from the ( unseen ' 
 [merit or demerit] resulting therefrom : 3 
 
 Aph. 52. Nor, moreover, [does the 
 The bondage of the bondage of the soul result from the 
 
 soul is no result of any . , ., -, n -, 
 
 merit or demerit. merit or demerit arising] from works ; 
 
 because these belong not thereto. 
 
 a. That is to say : the bondage of the soul does not 
 arise directly from the ' unseen ' [merit or demerit] occa- 
 
 ^TT^R^q if^TT UlTRFTT- 
 * II d ^mTnn'Rl^ I'm'RTT 
 
 2 For another rendering, see my translation of the Rational 
 Refutation, &c., p. 57. Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 53. 55 
 
 sioned by works. 1 Why? Because this is no property 
 thereof, i.e., because this [merit or demerit (see 16. .)] is 
 no property of the soul. 2 
 
 b. But then [some one may say], ' Let it be that the 
 bondage resulting from the ' unseen/ i.e., the merit [or 
 demerit] even of another, should attach to a different per- 
 son ; J whereupon he declares [as follows] : 3 
 
 ^TIwf^TT^H^ II M? II 4 
 
 Aph. 53. If the case were otherwise 
 Else, bondage might [than as I say] , then it [the bondage of 
 
 ding even to the emancz- , .-, . , V j i r 
 
 puted. the soul] might extend unduly, [even 
 
 to the emancipated]. 
 
 a. That is to say : if the case were otherwise, if bondage 
 and its cause were under other conditions [than we have 
 declared them to be], then there might be an undue exten- 
 sion ; bondage would befall even the emancipated, 5 [for the 
 same reasons as those stated under 16. a.]. 
 
 1 Dr. Ballantyne should have taken ' unseen ' and ' works ' as in 
 apposition, and should have made the former explanatory of the latter. 
 Clearer than his original, and yielding substantially his sense, is the 
 gloss of Vedanti Mahadeva : 
 
 * Aniruddha transposes Aphorisms 53 and 54. Ed, 
 
 5
 
 56 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. What need of so much [prolixity]? He states a 
 general objection why the bondage of soul cannot result 
 from any one or other [of these causes], beginning with 
 its essence [see 6. b.], and ending with its [supposed] 
 works [see 16] ; inasmuch as it is contrary to Scripture, 1 
 [that any one of these should be the cause] : 
 
 Aph. 54. And this [opinion, that the 
 A tingle text of Scrip- bondage of the soul arises from any of 
 
 tare upsets, equally, all 11,11 i 
 
 the heretical notions of these causes alleged by the heretics,] is 
 fe.r,**ft4 contrary to such texts as the one that 
 
 declares it [the soul] to be without 
 qualities : and so much for that point. 
 
 a. And, if the bondage of the soul arose from any one 
 or other of those [supposed causes already treated of,] 
 among which its essential character [ 6. b.] is the first, 
 this would be contradictory to such texts as, ' Witness, 
 intelligent, alone, and without the [three] qualities [is 
 the soul :' 2 such is the meaning. 8 
 
 b. The expression ' and so much for that point 3 means, 
 
 2 Suxtdtwatara Upanishad, vi., 11. Ed. 
 
 ^T^rtr ^TT 
 
 It
 
 BOOK I., APH. 55. 57 
 
 that the investigation of the cause of the bondage [of the 
 soul] here closes. 1 
 
 c. The case, then, stands thus : since [all] other [theories] 
 are overthrown by the declaratory aphorisms, ' There 
 would be no fitness in the enjoining ' [see 7], &c., it is 
 ascertained that the immediate cause of the bondage 
 [of the soul] is just the conjunction of Nature and of the 
 soul. 2 
 
 d. But then, in that case, [some one may say], this con- 
 junction of Nature and of the soul [ 54. c.], whether it be 
 essential, or adventitiously caused by Time or something 
 else [ 5. #.], must occasion the bondage even of the eman- 
 cipated. Having pondered this doubt, he disposes of it [as 
 follows] : 3 
 
 II MM II 
 
 Aph. 55. Moreover, the conjunction 
 How the true cause of thereof does not, through non-discrimi- 
 
 bondaye affects not tte 
 
 emanciftuted. nation, take place [in the case of the 
 
 emancipated] ; nor is there a parity, 
 
 
 
 ! rTO tt $f r Wrotr H 
 
 ' f the reading which I find in MSS. of Aniruddha, 
 seems to be indefensible. Ed.
 
 58 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 [in this respect, between the emancipated and the uneman- 
 cipated]. 
 
 a. 'The conjunction thereof/ i.e., the conjunction of 
 Nature and of the soul ; this conjunction, moreover, does 
 not take place again 'through n on -discrimination/ i.e., 
 through the want of a discrimination [between Nature and 
 soul] in the emancipated, [who do discriminate, and who 
 thus avoid the conjunction which others, failing to dis- 
 criminate, incur, and thus fall into bondage] : such is the 
 meaning. And thus the emancipated and the bound are 
 not on a level, [under the circumstances stated at 54. c.] : 
 such is the import. 1 
 
 ii 
 
 Aph. 56. Bondage arises from the 
 
 The true cause of bond- r , . . . . 
 
 age, in other words, error [of not discriminating between 
 
 non^iscrimination. Nature and SOul]. 
 
 a. Having thus declared the cause of that [bondage] 
 
 * These words, a bad reading of the 24th Aphorism of Book III., 
 were pointed out, by me, as having, with the sentence of comment 
 attached to them, no place here ; and Dr. Ballantyne, when he re- 
 publisbed the Sankhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, omitted 
 them. Hence the brackets now inserted, and my alteration of the 
 numbering of the Aphorisms throughout the remainder of Book I. 
 Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 56. 59 
 
 which is to be got rid of, he declares the means of getting 
 rid of it :* 
 
 Aph. 56. The removal of it is to be 
 
 Non-discrimination is , , , , 
 
 removable ty discrimi- effected by the necessary means, just 
 
 nation alone. Hke darkness. 
 
 a. The necessary means, established throughout the world, 
 in such cases as ' shell-silver ' [i.e., a pearl-oyster-shell mis- 
 taken for silver], viz., the immediacy of discrimination, by 
 this alone is ' its removal/ i. e., the removal of the non-dis- 
 crimination [between Nature and soul], to be effected, and 
 not by icorks, or the like : such is the meaning : just as 
 darkness, the dark, is removed by light alone, 2 [and by no 
 other means]. 
 
 b. f But then [some one may say], if merely the non- 
 discrimination of Nature and soul be, through the conjunc- 
 tion [of the two, consequent on the want of discrimination], 
 the cause of bondage, and if merely the discrimination of 
 the two be the cause of liberation, then there would be 
 liberation, even while there remained the conceit of [one's 
 possessing] a body, &c. ; and this is contrary to Scripture, 
 
 C 
 II]
 
 60 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 to the institutes of law, and to sound reasoning/ To this 
 he replies : l 
 
 Aph. 57. Since the non-discrimina- 
 
 The discrimination of ti<> n of other things [from soul] results 
 
 Nature, as other than f rom fa e non- discrimination of Nature 
 
 soul, involves all dis- , 
 
 crimination. [from soulj, the cessation 01 this will 
 
 take place, on the cessation of that 
 [from which it results]. 
 
 a. By reason of the non-discrimination of Nature from 
 the soul, what non-discrimination of other things there is, 
 such as the non-discrimination of the understanding [as 
 something other than the soul], this necessarily ceases, on 
 the cessation of the non-discrimination of Nature ; because, 
 when the non-discrimination of the understanding, for 
 example, [as something other than soul,] does occur, it is 
 based on the non-discrimination [from soul] of that cause 
 to which there is none antecedent [viz., Nature] ; since 
 the non-discrimination of an effect [and the ' under- 
 standing ' is an effect or product of Nature,] is, itself, an 
 effect, 2 [and will, of course, cease, with the cessation of its 
 cause]. 
 
 I <T3TTf II
 
 61 
 
 &. The state of the case is this : as, when the soul has 
 been discriminated from the body, it is impossible but that 
 it should be discriminated from the colour and other [pro- 
 perties] , the effects of the body, [which is the substantial 
 cause of its own properties] ; so, by parity of reasoning, 
 from the departure of the cause, when soul, in its charac- 
 ter of unalterableness, &c., has been discriminated from 
 Nature, it is impossible that there should remain a conceit 
 of [the soul's being any of] the products thereof [i. e., 
 of Nature], such as the ' understanding/ and the like, 
 which have the character of being modifications 1 [of primal 
 Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is a thing un- 
 alterable]. 
 
 c. But then [some one may say], ' What proof is there 
 that there is a conceit [entertained by people in general,] 
 of a Nature [or primal principle] different from the conceit 
 of an 'understanding/ &c., [which, you tell us, are products 
 of this supposed first principle] ? For all the various con- 
 ceits [that the soul falls into], such as, ' I am ignorant/ and 
 so on, can be accounted for on the ground simply of an 
 'understanding/ &c., [without postulating a primal Nature 
 which is to assume the shape of an ' understanding/ &c.] :' 
 
 'm HT^J 
 
 ^lm
 
 62 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 well, if any one says this, I reply, ' no ;' because, unless 
 there were such a thing as Nature, we could not account 
 for such conceits as the following, viz., 'Having died, 
 having died, again, when there is a creation, let me be a 
 denizen of Paradise, and not of hell ;' because no products, 
 such as the ' understanding,' when they have perished, can 
 be created anew, 1 [any more than [a. gold-bracelet, melted 
 down, can be reproduced, though another like it may be 
 produced from the materials]. 
 
 d. Moreover, it is inadmissible to 
 The soid" $ confounding g^ that men's conceit of [the identity 
 
 itself with Nature is Lo- J i i i i V 
 
 gically antecedent to its OI themselves With their] ' Understand- 
 
 affiw'd**'^ "** ing/ &c-> is [the primary cause of the 
 soul's bondage, and is] not preceded by 
 anything; because 'understanding' and the rest [as you 
 will not deny] are effects. Now, while it is to be expected 
 that there should be some predetermining agency to esta- 
 blish a conceit of [ownership in, or of one's identity with,] 
 any effects, it is clear that it is a conceit of [ownership, 
 &c.,] in respect of the cause, and nothing else, that must 
 be the predetermining agency : for we see this in ordinary 
 life ; and our theories are bound to conform [deferentially] 
 to experience. For [to explain,] we see, in ordinary life, 
 that the conceit of [the ownership of] the grain, &c., pro- 
 
 _ 
 
 *jtr wfif
 
 BOOK I., APH. 57. 63 
 
 duced by a field, results from the conceit of [the ownership 
 of] the field ; and, from the conceit of [the ownership of] 
 gold, the conceit of [the ownership of] the bracelets, or 
 other things, formed of that gold ; and, by the removal of 
 these [i. e., the removal of the logically antecedent con- 
 ceits, that the field, or the gold, is one's property], there 
 is the removal of those, 1 [i. e., the removal of the conceits 
 that the grain, &c., and that the bracelets, &c., the corres- 
 ponding products or effects of the field and of the gold, 
 are one's property : and so the soul will cease to confound 
 itself with the 'understanding/ when it ceases to confound 
 itself with Nature, of which the ' understanding ' is held 
 to be a product], 
 
 e. [And, if it be supposed that we thus lay ourselves 
 open to the charge of a regressus in infinitum, seeing that, 
 whatever we may assign as \\\& first cause, we may, on our 
 own principles, be asked what was the ' predetermining 
 agency ' in regard to it ; or if it be supposed that we are 
 chargeable with reasoning in a circle, when we hold that 
 the soul's confounding itself with Nature is the cause of 
 
 tr 
 
 f?
 
 64 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 its continuing so to confound itself, and its continuing so to 
 confound itself is, reciprocally, the cause why it confounds 
 itself ; we reply, that] there is no occasion to look for any 
 other ' predetermining agency/ in the case of the conceit 
 of [the identity of the soul with] Nature, or in the case of 
 the self-continuance 1 thereof, [i.e., of that error of con- 
 founding one's self with Nature] ; because [these two are 
 alike] without antecedent, like seed and sprout, 2 [of which 
 it is needless to ask which is the first ; the old puzzle, 
 * which was first, the acorn, or the oak ? ' being a frivolous 
 question]. 
 
 /. But then [some one may say], if we admit the soul's 
 bondage [at one time], and its freedom [at another], and 
 its discrimination [at one time], and its non-discrimination 
 [at another], then this is in contradiction to the assertion 
 [in 19], that it is ' ever essentially a pure and free intelli- 
 gence ;' and it is in contradiction to such texts as this, 
 viz., ' The absolute truth is this, that neither is there 
 destruction [of the soul], nor production [of it] ; nor is it 
 bound, nor is it an effecter [of any work], nor is it desirous 
 of liberation, nor is it, indeed, liberated; [seeing that that 
 cannot desire or obtain liberation, which was never bound].' 3 
 This [charge of inconsistency] he repels : 4 
 
 1 To render vdsdna, on which see 2, at p. 29, supra. Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 fnu*i c ni f tKiM$if?!' H 
 
 8 Amritabindu Upanishad, v. 10. See Dr. Albrecht Weber's 
 Indische Studien, vol. ii., p. 61, note 2. Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 58. 65 
 
 : II Mb II 
 
 Aph. 58. It is merely verbal, and 
 
 to m?re(Tverbai, tke not a realit J [ tbis so-called bondage of 
 the soul] ; since it [the bondage] resides 
 in the mind, [and not in the soul]. 
 
 a. That is to say : since bondage, &c., all reside only in 
 the mind [and not in the soul], all this, as regards the soul, 
 is merely verbal, i. e., it is vox ft praeterea nihil ; be- 
 cause is is merely a reflexion, like the redness of [pellucid] 
 crystal [when a China-rose is near it], but not a reality, 
 with no false imputation, like the redness of the China - 
 rose itself. Hence there is no contradiction to what had 
 been said before, [as the objector (under 57. /.) would 
 insinuate] : such is the state of the case. 2 
 
 cTT TTcT II 
 
 1 Aniruddha has, instead of ^1 H > ^ ^f Hence : ' But it 
 is merely verbal, not a reality/ &c. Ed. 
 
 Ml 
 
 F
 
 66 THE 6ANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. But then, if bondage, &c., as re- 
 Whether Testimony, or gards the soul, be merely verbal, let 
 
 Inference, without Per- & . . ' , . . nt/Tii 
 
 , might not mail them be set aside by hearing [that they 
 *** " r ' are merel y verbal], or by argument 
 [establishing that they are so]. Why, 
 in the Scripture and the Law, is there enjoined, as the 
 cause of liberation, a discriminative knowledge [of Soul, 
 as distinguished from Non-soul], going the length of 
 immediate cognition ? To this he replies r 1 
 
 u 
 
 Aph. 59. Moreover, it [the non- 
 The truth must be di- discrimination of Soul from Nature,! 
 
 rectlt/ discerned, and not 
 
 merely accepted on ttie is not to be removed by argument ; 
 
 e . St ' mony ' r as that of the person perplexed about 
 the points of the compass [is not to be 
 removed] without immediate cognition. 
 
 a. By ' argument ' we mean thinking. The word 
 ' moreover ' is intended to aggregate [or take in, along 
 with 'argument'] ' testimony,' 2 [or verbal authority, which, 
 no more than ' argument,' or inference, can remove the 
 evil, which can be removed by nothing short of direct 
 intuitive perception of the real state of the case]. 
 
 c 
 TT ^TT rf^I ^TVT
 
 BOOK I./ APH. 59. 67 
 
 b. That is to say : the bondage, &c., of the soul though 
 [granted to be] merely verbal, are not to be removed by 
 merely hearing, or inferring, without immediate cognition, 
 without directly perceiving; just as the contrariety in 
 regard to the [proper] direction, though merely verbal [as 
 resulting from misdirection], in the case of l a person who 
 is mistaken as to the points of the compass [and hence as 
 to his own bearings], is not removed by testimony, or by 
 inference, without immediate cognition, i. e., without [his] 
 directly perceiving 2 [how the points of the compass really 
 lie, to which immediate perception ' testimony/ or ' in- 
 ference,' may conduce, but the necessity of which these 
 media, or instruments of knowledge, cannot supersede]. 
 
 c. Or it [Aph. 59] may be explained as follows, viz. : 
 But then, [seeing that] it is declared, by the assertion [in 
 Aph. 56], viz., that ' The removal of it is to be effected by 
 the necessary means/ that knowledge, in the shape of dis- 
 crimination [between Soul and Nature], is the remover of 
 wow-discrimination [in regard to the matter in question], 
 tell us, is that knowledge of a like nature with the hearing 
 
 1 Here I have had to make several insertions and other alterations. 
 Dr. Ballantyne had : ' That is to say, the bondage, &c., [of the soul] 
 is not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without 
 perceiving ; just as the contrariety in regard to the proper direction, 
 in the case,' &c. Ed.
 
 68 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 [of Testimony], &c.? Or is it something peculiar ? A reply 
 to this being looked for, he enounces the aphorism [ 59] : 
 'Moreover, it is not to be removed by argument/ &c. 
 That is to say : non-discrimination is not excluded, is not 
 cut off, by argument, or by testimony, unless there be 
 discrimination as an immediate perception ; just as is the 
 case with one who is bewildered in regard to [his] direction ; 
 because the only thing to remove an immediate error is an 
 immediate individual perception 1 [of the truth. For 
 example, a man with the jaundice perceives white objects 
 as if they were yellow. He may infer that the piece of 
 chalk which he looks at is really white ; or he may believe 
 the testimony of a friend, that it is white ; but still nothing 
 will remove his erroneous perception of yellowness in the 
 chalk, except a direct perception of its whiteness]. 
 
 d. Having thus, then, set forth the fact that Liberation 
 results from the immediate discrimination [of Soul from
 
 BOOK I., APH. 60. 69 
 
 Nature], the next thing to be set forth is the ' discrimina- 
 tion' 1 [here referred to]. 
 
 e. This being the topic, in the first place, since only if 
 Soul and Nature exist, liberation can result from the dis- 
 crimination of the one from the other, therefore that 
 ' instrument of right knowledge' (pramdna) which esta- 
 blishes the existence of these [two imperceptible realities] 
 is [first] to be set forth : 2 
 
 n 
 
 Aph. 60. The knowledge of things 
 i m P erce ptible is by means of Inference ; 
 as that of fire [when not direct!}' per- 
 ceptible,] is by means of smoke, &c. 
 
 a. That is to say : ' of things imperceptible/ i. e., of 
 things not cognizable by the senses, e. g., Nature and the 
 Soul, ' the knowledge,' i. e., the fruit lodged in the soul, is 
 brought about by means of that instrument of right know- 
 ledge [which may be called] ' Inference ' (anumdna), [but 
 which (see Nyaya Aphorisms, I., 5) is, more correctly, 'the 
 recognition of a Sign'] ; as [the knowledge that there is] 
 fire [in such and such a locality, where we cannot directly
 
 70 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 perceive it,] is brought about by the 'recognition of a Sign/ 
 occasioned by smoke, &C. 1 
 
 b. Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is 
 [true, but yet is] not established by ' Inference/ is esta- 
 blished by Revelation. But, since ' Inference ' is the chief 
 [among the instruments of knowledge], in this [the San- 
 khya] System, * Inference ' only is laid down [in the 
 aphorism,] as the chief thing; but Revelation is not disre- 
 garded 2 [in the Sankhya system; as will be seen from 
 Aph. 88 of this Book]. 
 
 c. He [next] exhibits the order of creation of those things 
 among which Nature is the first, and the relation of cause 
 and effect [among these, severally], preparatorily to the 
 argument that will be [afterwards] stated : 8 
 
 H 
 3 
 
 H
 
 BOOK I., APH. 61. 71 
 
 n 
 
 Aph. 61. Nature (prakriti) is the 
 state of 6( l ui P oi8e of Goodness (sattwa), 
 Passion (rajas), and Darkness (tamos) : 
 from Nature [proceeds] Mind (mahat] ; from Mind, Self- 
 consciousness (ahankdra) ; from Self -consciousness, the five 
 Subtile Elements (tan-mdtra), and both sets [external and 
 internal,] of Organs (indriyd) ; and, from the Subtile Ele- 
 ments, the Gross Elements (sthula-bhuta) . [Then there is] 
 Soul (purusha). Such is the class of twenty-five. 
 
 a. ' The state of equipoise ' of the [three] things called 
 ( Goodness/ &c., is their being neither less nor more 
 [one than another] ; that is to say, the state of not being 
 [developed into] an effect [in which one or other of 
 them predominates]. And thus ' Nature ' is the triad of 
 ' Qualities ' (gwna), distinct from the products [to which 
 this triad gives rise] : such is the complete meaning. 2 s 
 
 6. These things, viz., ' Goodness/ &c., [though spoken 
 of as the three Qualities], are not ' Qualities ' (guna) in the 
 Vaiscshika sense of the word ; because [the * Qualities ' of 
 
 1 My MSS. of Aniruddha omit 
 
 2 ' 
 
 For a translation of a slightly different text, see the Rational 
 Refutation, &c., p. 43. Ed.
 
 72 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 the Vaifseshika system have, themselves, no qualities (see 
 Kanada's IGthAph.); while] these have the qualities of 
 Conjunction, Disjunction, Lightness, Force, 1 Weight, &c. 2 
 In this [Sankhya] system, and in Scripture, &c., the word 
 ' Quality ' (guna} is employed [as the name of the three 
 things in question], 3 because they are subservient to Soul 
 [and, therefore, hold a secondary rank in the scale of being], 
 and because they form the cords [which the word guna also 
 signifies], viz., ' Mind/ &c., which consist of the three [so- 
 called] ' Qualities,' and which bind, as a [cow, or other] 
 brute-beast, the Soul. 4 5 
 
 c. Of this [Nature] the principle called ' the great one ' 
 (mahat], viz., the principle of ' Understanding ' (buddhi), 
 is the product. ' Self-consciousness ' is a conceit [of sepa- 
 rate personality]. Of this there are two products, (1) the 
 
 1 Balavattwa ; for which I find the variant chalatwa, 'mobility.' 
 Ed. 
 
 2 Read : ' Goodness and the rest are substances, not specific 
 qualities; for they [themselves] possess [qualities, viz., those of] 
 contact and separation, and also have the properties of levity, mobility, 
 gravity, &c.' Vaiseshikd gunaH is equivalent to the visesha-gundK 
 in the original of Book V., 25. a. For the ' specific qualities,' see the 
 Bhdshd-parichchheda, st. 90. Ed. 
 
 3 For 'is employed,' &c., read, 'is applied to these (teshu), 
 [namely, goodness, passion, and darkness].' Ed. 
 
 6 For a different translation, see the Rational Refutation, &c., 
 pp. 43, 44. Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 62. 73 
 
 ' Subtile Elements ' and (2) the two sets of < Organs.' The 
 ' Subtile Elements ' are [those of] Sound, Touch, Colour, 
 Taste, and Smell. The two sets of 'Organs/ through 
 their division into the external and the internal, are of 
 eleven kinds. The products of the * Subtile Elements ' 
 are the five ' Gross Elements/ But ' Soul ' is something 
 distinct from either product or cause. Such is the class of 
 twenty-five, the aggregate of things. That is to say, be- 
 sides these there is nothing. 1 
 
 d. He [next], in [several] aphorisms, declares the order 
 of the inferring 2 [of the existence of these principles, the 
 one from the other : 
 
 I II 
 
 Aph. 62. [The knowledge of the 
 The e ^ s tence of the existence] of the five 'Subtile Ele- 
 
 '.Subtt/e Elements* is in- . J 
 
 /erred from that of the ments is [by inference,] from the 
 >Gross: 'Gross Elements/ 
 
 I H^Htci
 
 74 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. f The knowledge, by inference/ so much is supplied, 1 
 [to complete the aphorism, from Aph. 60]. 
 
 b. Earth, &c., the ' Gross Elements/ are proved to exist, 
 by Perception ; [and] thereby [i. e., from that Perception ; 
 for Perception must precede Inference, as stated in Go- 
 tama's 5th Aphorism,] are the ' Subtile Elements ' in- 
 ferred, [the a-roL-^da a-roiyeltov of Empedocles]. And so the 
 application [of the process of inference to the case] is as 
 follows : 
 
 (1) The Gross Elements, or those which have not 
 reached the absolute limit [of simplification, or of the 
 atomic], consist of things [Subtile Elements, or Atoms,] 
 which have distinct qualities ; [the earthy element having 
 the distinctive quality of Odour ; and so of the others] : 
 
 (2) Because they are gross ; 
 
 (3) [And everything that is gross is formed of some- 
 thing less gross, or, in other words, more subtile,] as jars, 
 webs, &c.; 3 [the gross web being formed of the less gross 
 threads ; and so of the others]. 
 
 II ?? M 
 
 Aph. 63. [The knowledge of the 
 f existence] of Self-consciousness is [by 
 inference,] from the external and inter - 
 
 i 
 
 : 11 
 
 8 In my MSS. of Aniruddha there is no xf after J . Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 63. 75 
 
 nal [organs], and from these [' Subtile Elements,' mentioned 
 in Aph. 62]. 
 
 a. By inference from [the existence of] the external and 
 internal organs, and from [that of] these 'Subtile Ele- 
 ments,' there is the knowledge of [the existence of such a 
 principle as] Self-consciousness. 1 
 
 b. The application [of the process of inference to the 
 case] is in the following [somewhat circular] manner : 
 
 (1) The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up 
 of things consisting of Self-consciousness : 
 
 (2) Because they are products of Self-consciousness : 
 
 (3) Whatever is not so [i. e., whatever is not made out 
 of Self-consciousness] is not thus [i. e., is not a product of 
 Self-consciousness] ; as the Soul, [which, not being made 
 up thereof, is not a product of it]. 1 
 
 c. But then, if it be thus [i. e., if it be, as the Sankhyas 
 declare, that all objects, such as jars, are made up of 
 Self- consciousness, while Self-consciousness depends on 
 * Understanding/ or ' Intellect,' or ' Mind/ the first pro- 
 duct of ' Nature ' (see Aph. 61)], then [some may object, 
 that], since it would be the case that the Self-conscious- 
 ness of the potter is the material of the jar, the jar made 
 by him would disappear, on the beatification of the potter, 
 whose internal organ [or ' Understanding'] then surceases. 
 
 I
 
 76 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 And this [the objector may go on to say,] is not the case ; 
 because another man [after the beatification of the potter,] 
 recognizes that ' This is that same jar 1 [which, you may 
 remember, was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance]/ 
 
 d. [In reply to this we say,] it is not thus ; because, 
 on one's beatification, there is an end of only those modi- 
 fications of his internal organ [or ' Intellect'] which 
 could be causes [as the jar no longer can be,] of the 
 emancipated soul's experiencing [either good or ill], but not 
 an end of the modifications of intellect in general, nor 
 [an end] of intellect altogether: 2 [so that we might 
 spare ourselves the trouble of further argument, so far as 
 concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that 
 the intellect of the potter surceases, on his beatification : 
 but we may go further, and admit, for the sake of argu- 
 ment, the surcease of the ' intellect ' of the beatified potter, 
 without conceding any necessity for the surcease of his 
 pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be stated 
 as follows] : 
 
 e. Or [as Berkeley suggests, in his Principles of Human 
 knowledge, Ch. vi.], let the Self-consciousness of the Deity 
 be the cause why jars and the like [continue to exist], and 
 
 - 
 rf
 
 BOOK I., APH. 64. 77 
 
 not the Self-consciousness of the potter, &C., 1 [who may 
 lose their Self- consciousness, whereas the Deity, the sum 
 of all life, Hiranyagarbha (see Vedanta-sam, 62), never 
 loses his Self-consciousness, while aught living continues]. 
 
 ll II 
 
 Aph. 64. [The knowledge of the ex- 
 tkat f istence ] of Intellect is [by inference,] 
 from that [Self-consciousness, 63]. 
 
 a. That is to say : by inference from [the existence of] 
 ' that/ viz., Self-consciousness, which is a product, there 
 comes the knowledge of ' Intellect ' (buddhi), the great 
 ' inner organ ' (antahkarana), [hence] called ' the great one ' 
 (ma hat), [the existence of which is recognized] under the 
 character of the cause of this 2 [product, viz., Self-con- 
 sciousness]. 
 
 b. And so the application [again rather circular, of the 
 process of inference to the case,] is as follows : 
 
 (1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of 
 the things that consist of the moods of judgment [or mind] ; 
 
 (2) Because it is a thing which is a product of judgment 
 [proceeding in the Cartesian order of cogito, ergo sum; and]
 
 78 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 (3) Whatever is not so [i. e., whatever is not made out 
 of judgment, or mental assurance], is not thus [i. e., is not 
 a product of mental assurance] ; as the Soul, [which is not 
 made out of this or of anything antecedent], &C. 1 
 
 c. Here the following reasoning is to be understood : 
 Everv one, having first determined anything under a con- 
 cept [i. e., under such a form of thought as is expressed by 
 a general term; for example, that this which presents 
 itself is a jar, or a human body, or a possible action of one 
 kind or other], after that makes the judgment, ' This is 
 I/ or ' This ought to be done by me,' and so forth : so 
 much is quite settled ; [and there is no dispute that the 
 fact is as here stated]. Now, having, in the present in- 
 stance, to look for some cause of the thing called ' Self- 
 consciousness ' [which manifests itself in the various 
 judgments just referred to], since the relation of cause and 
 effect subsists between the two functions [the occasional 
 conception, and the subsequent occasional judgment, which 
 is a function of Self-consciousness], it is assumed, for sim- 
 plicity, merely that the relation of cause and effect exists 
 between the two substrata to which the [two sets of] func- 
 tions belong ; [and this is sufficient,] because it follows, as 
 a matter of course, that the occurrence of a function of the 
 effect must result from the occurrence of a, function of the 
 cause ; 2 [nothing, according to the Sankhya, being in any 
 
 i
 
 BOOK I., APH. 65. 79 
 
 product, except so far, and in such wise, as it preexisted in 
 the cause of that product]. 
 
 <TCT: n: ii tfM n 
 
 Aph. 65. [The knowledge of the exis- 
 
 t/ience tltat f tence l of Nature is P>y inference,] from 
 that [< Intellect/ 64]. 
 
 a. By inference from [the existence of] * that/ viz., the 
 principle [of Intellect, termed], ' the Great one/ which is 
 a product, there comes the knowledge of [the existence of] 
 Nature, as [its] cause. 1 
 
 b. The application [of the process of inference to the 
 case] is as follows : 
 
 (1) Intellect, the affections whereof are Pleasure, Pain, 
 and Dulness, is produced from something which has these 
 affections, [those of] Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness : 
 
 (2) Because, whilst it is a product [and must, therefore, 
 have arisen from something consisting of that which 
 itself now consists of], it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and 
 Dulness; [and]
 
 80 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 (3) [Every product that has the affections of, or that 
 occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in some- 
 thing which consists of these] ; as lovely women, &C. 1 
 
 c. For an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her hus- 
 band, and, therefore, [is known to be mainly made up of, 
 or] partakes of the quality of ' Goodness ;' the indiscreet 
 one gives pain to him, and, therefore, partakes of the 
 quality of ' Foulness ;' and she who is separated [and per- 
 haps forgotten,] occasions indifference, and so partakes of 
 the quality of ' Darkness.' 2 
 
 d. And the appropriate refutation [of any objection], in 
 this case, is [the principle], that it, is fitting that the quali- 
 ties of the effect should be [in every case,] in conformity 
 with the qualities of the cause. 3 
 
 e Now he states how, in a different way, we have [the 
 evidence of] inference for [the existence of] Soul, which is 
 void of the relation of cause and effect that has been men- 
 
 i 
 
 f^frl H 
 
 f?
 
 BOOK I., APH. 66. 81 
 
 tioned, 1 [in the four preceding aphorisms, as existing 
 between Nature and its various products] : 
 
 Aph. 66. [The existence] of Soul [is 
 
 the i nferred ] from tne fact tnat the com- 
 bination [of the principles of Nature 
 into their various effects] is for the sake of another [than 
 unintelligent Nature, or any of its similarly unintelligent 
 products]. 
 
 a. 'Combination,' i.e., conjunction, which is the cause 
 [of all products ; these resulting from the conjunction of 
 their constituent parts]. Since whatever has this quality, 
 as Nature, 2 Mind, and so on [unlike Soul, which is not 
 made up of parts], is for the sake of some other ; for this 
 reason it is understood that Soul exists : such is the re- 
 mainder, 3 [required to complete the aphorism]. 
 
 b. But the application [of the argument, in this particu- 
 lar case, is as follows] : 
 
 (1) The thing in question, viz., Nature the ' Great one,' 
 with the rest [of the aggregate of the unintelligent], has, 
 as its fruit [or end], the [mundane] experiences and the 
 [eventual] Liberation of some other than itself : 
 
 * Here indicated by the adjective avyakta, ' the indiscrete.' Sec 
 Aph. 136 of this Book. Ed.
 
 52 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 (2) Because it is a combination [or compages] ; 
 
 (3) [And every combination,] as a couch, or a seat, or the 
 like, [is for another's use, not for its own ; and its several 
 component parts render no mutual service]. 1 
 
 c. Now, in order to establish that it is the cause of all 
 [products], he establishes the eternity of Nature (prakriti} : 2 
 
 II 
 
 Arqumsntfortheetcr- ' ' rOOt a8 DO r ot > 
 
 nily of Nature. the TOOt [of all] is TOOtleSS. 
 
 a. Since 'the root' (mula), i.e., the cause of the twenty- 
 three principles, [which, with Soul and the root itself, make 
 up the twenty-five realities recognized in the Sankhya,] 
 ' has no root/ i.e., has no cause, the ' root/ viz., Nature 
 (pradhdna),is ' rootless/ i.e., void of root. That is to say, 
 there is no other cause of Nature ; because there would be 
 
 t<l>fl H't 
 
 II 
 
 J This seems to mean : ' There being no root to a root, the root 
 [or radical principle, in the Sankhya,] is rootless.' 
 
 In several MSS. which I consulted in India I found the strange 
 reading: ^ JJ^THNI<4JrH ^T^T^ I 'The 
 root of roots, since it has no root, is rootless.' This is very like 
 saying that A=A. Ed.
 
 BOOK 1., APH. 68. 83 
 
 a regressus in infinitum? [if we were to suppose another 
 cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require 
 another cause ; and so on without end]. 
 
 b. He states the argument [just mentioned] in regard 
 to this, [as follows] : 2 
 
 n b n 
 
 The source of the preceding exposition I have not ascertained. 
 Vijn&na has : ^%f^ff^Trf ?3TRT "TTff If- 
 
 t I Kages'a : *Jptf 
 
 5 I Aniruddha: 
 
 I Vedanti Mahadeva : ^^ff =| ^1 f
 
 84 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 68. Even if there be a succes- 
 TJ* employment *f the gion, there is a halt at some one point ; 
 
 term Primal Aofnry, or , r , 
 
 erely to de- and so it is merely a name [that we 
 " tuin infi " give to the point in question, when we 
 speak of the root of things, under the 
 the name of ' Nature ']. 
 
 a. Since there would be the fault of regressus in infi- 
 niturn, if there were a succession of causes, another cause 
 of Nature, and another [cause] of that one, again, there 
 must be, at last, a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, 
 somewhere or other, at some one, uncaused, eternal thing. 
 Therefore, that at which we stop is the Primal Agency 
 (pra-kriti); for this [word prakriti, usually and conve- 
 niently rendered by the term Nature^ is nothing more 
 than a sign to denote the cause which is the root : such is 
 the meaning. 1 
 
 b. But then [some Vedanti may object, according to tlaa 
 view of matters], the position that there are just twenty- 
 five realities is not made out; for, in addition to 2 the 
 ' Indiscrete' [or primal Nature], which [according to you,] 
 is the cause of Mind, 3 another unintelligent principle, 
 named 'Ignorance' [see Veddnta-sara, 21], presents 
 
 I ^RTT TR MJNttlj IN 
 
 11 
 
 1 Bead ' in connexion with." Ed. 
 
 1 Literally, instead of ' Mind/ ' the principle [termed] the Great 
 .' d.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 69. 85 
 
 itself. Having pondered this doubt, he declares [as 
 follows] : l 
 
 n 
 
 Nature and Soul alike Aph. 69. Alike, in respect of Nature, 
 and of both [Soul and Nature, is the 
 argument for the uncreated existence]. 2 
 
 a. In the discussion of the Primal Agent [Nature], the 
 cause which is the root [of all products], the same side is 
 taken by us both, the asserter [of the Sankhya doctrine] 
 and the opponent [Vedanti]. This may be thus stated : 
 As there is mention, in Scripture, of the production of 
 Nature, so, too, is there of that of Ignorance, in such texts 
 as this, viz. : ' This Ignorance, which has five divisions, 
 was produced from the great Spirit.' Hence it must 
 needs be that a figurative production is intended to be 
 asserted, in respect of one of these [and not the literal pro- 
 duction of both ; else we should have no root at all] ; and, 
 of the two, it is with Nature only that a figurative pro- 
 duction, in the shape of a manifestation through conjunc- 
 tion with Soul, &c., is congruous. A production [such as 
 that metaphorical one here spoken of,] the characteristic 
 of which is conjunction is mentioned ; for there is mention 
 
 rm <fiR<U I M rb I H 3f *i Tf 
 
 2 This is Dr. Ballantyne's revised translation, suggested by a 
 remark of Vijnana, quoted and translated below, in b. The rendering 
 now replaced runs: 'Alike [is the opinion] of both [of us], in respect 
 of Nature.' The side-note was formerly correspondent to a., viz. : 
 4 He meets a Vedantic objection.' Ed.
 
 86 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 of [such] a figurative origination of Soul and Nature, in a 
 passage of the Kaurma \_Purana] , beginning, ' Of action 
 [or the Primal Agency], and knowledge [or Soul],' and 
 so on. And, as tnere is no mention, in Scripture, of the 
 origin of Ignorance, as figurative, it is not from eternity. 
 And Ignorance, which consists of false knowledge, has 
 been declared, in an aphorism of the Yoga, to be [not a 
 separate entity, but] ' an affection of the mind/ Hence 
 there is no increase to the [list of the twenty-five] Realities, 1 
 [in the shape of a twenty-sixth principle, to be styled 
 Ignorance] . 
 
 b. Or [according to another, and more probable, inter-
 
 BOOK I., APH. 70. 87 
 
 pretation of the aphorism,] the meaning is this, that the 
 argument is the same in support of both, i.e., of both Soul 
 and Nature : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 c. But then, there being [as has been shown,] a mode of 
 arriving, by inference, at [a knowledge of the saving truth 
 in regard to] Nature, Soul, &c., whence is it that reflexion, 
 in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature], 
 does not take place in the case of all [men]? In regard to 
 this point, he states [as follows]: 2 
 
 n so 
 
 All do not profit by Aph. 70. There is no rule [or neces- 
 
 tlie saving truth ; because ! A_ A i_ j i 11 i -in 
 
 it is wd the best kind sity, that a^should arrive at the truth] ; 
 
 because those who are privileged [to 
 engage in the inquiry] are of three 
 descriptions. 
 
 a. For those privileged [to engage in the inquiry] are 
 of three descriptions, through their distinction into those 
 who, in reflecting, are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these, 
 by the dull the [Sankhya] arguments are frustrated [and 
 altogether set aside], by means of the sophisms that have 
 been uttered by the Bauddhas, &c. By the mediocre they 
 [are brought into doubt, or, in other words,] are made to 
 appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the 
 other side, by means of arguments which really prove the 
 reverse [of what these people employ them to prove], or by
 
 88 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 arguments which are not true : [see the section on Fallacies 
 in the Tarka-sangraha]. But it is only the best of those 
 privileged, that reflect in the manner that has been set 
 forth [in our exposition of the process of reflexion which 
 leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature] : such is 
 the import. But there is no rule that all must needs 
 reflect in the manner so set forth: such is the literal 
 meaning. 1 
 
 6. He now, through two aphorisms, defines ' the Great 
 one' and 'Self-consciousness'; 2 [the reader being pre- 
 sumed to remember that Nature consists of the three 
 ' Qualities ' in equipoise, and to be familiar with the other 
 principles, such as the ' Subtile elements ' (see 61)] : 
 
 I W II 
 
 Aph. 71. The first product [of the 
 J2* Mind* ne ' '* Primal Agent, N ature], which is called 
 ' the Great one/ is Mind. 
 
 a. 'Mind' (manas). 'Mind' [is so called], because its 
 function is ' thinking ' (manand). By ' thinking ' is here 
 meant 'judging' (nUchaya). That of which this is the func-
 
 BOOK I., APH. 72. 89 
 
 lion is '' intellect ' (buddhi) ; and that is the first product, 
 that called ' the Great one ' (mahat] : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 ii 
 
 Th relation of Self- Aph. 72. ' Self-consciousness' is that 
 copiousness to Mind. w hi cn is subsequent [to Mind.] 
 
 a. ' Self-consciousness/ the function of which is a con- 
 ceit [that I exist/ < J do this, that, and the other thing '], 
 is that which is subsequent : that is to say, ' Self-conscious- 
 ness ' is the next after ' the Great one ' 2 [ 71] . 
 
 b. Since ' Self-consciousness ' is that whose function is a 
 conceit [which brings out the Ego, in every case of cog- 
 nition, the matter of which cognition would, else, have lain 
 dormant in the bosom of Nature, the formless Objective], 
 it therefore follows that the others [among the phenomena 
 of mundane existence,] are effects of this [Self-conscious- 
 ness] ; and so he declares [as follows] : 8 
 
 > i 
 
 * II
 
 90 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 73. To the others it belongs 
 
 All products, save - 1 * o ir 
 
 Mind, result from Self- to be products thereof, [i.e., of Self- 
 consciousness] . 
 
 a. ' To be products thereof,' i.e., to be products of Self- 
 consciousness : that is to say, the fact of being products 
 thereof belongs to the others, 2 the eleven 'Organs' (indriya], 
 the five ' Subtile elements,' and, mediately, to the [gross] 
 Elements, also, the products of the Subtile elements. 3 
 
 b. But then, if it be thus [some one may say], you relin- 
 quish your dogma, that Nature is the cause of the whole 
 world. Therefore he declares [as follows] : 4 
 
 1 Instead of ^^f^EfTj which seems to be peculiar to Vijnana, 
 Aniruddha and others have the preferable lection ^*4|m. Ed. 
 
 2 To render ^rZJ"CJT. Paragraph a is taken, with slight 
 alterations at the beginning and at the end, from Aniruddha. Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 75. 91 
 
 Aph. 74. Moreover, mediately, 
 Nature, immediately through that [i. e., the ' Great one ' 
 
 !LSS.^2 (* 71 )]' the first t cause ' viz -> Nature >] 
 
 a// otto- products. i s the cause [of all products] ; as is the 
 
 case with the Atoms, [the causes, 
 though not the immediate causes, of jars, &c.]. 
 
 a. 'Moreover, mediately/ i.e., moreover, not in the 
 character of the immediate cause, e the first/ i.e., Nature, 
 is the cause of 'Self- consciousness' and the rest, [mediately,] 
 through ' the Great one ' and the rest ; as, in the theory of 
 the Vaiseshikas, the Atoms are the cause of a jar, or the 
 like, only [mediately,] through combinations of two atoms, 
 and so on : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. But then, since, also, both Nature and Soul are eternal, 
 which of them is [really] the cause of the creation's com- 
 mencing ? In regard to this, he declares [as follows] : 2 
 
 11 
 
 3 Slightly better, perhaps, than this reading is that of Aniruddha : 
 
 * I Ani - 
 
 Cs 
 ruddha's explanation here follows :
 
 92 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 75. While both [Soul and Na- 
 
 to K^ atWre " ^ ture l are antecedent t to al1 products], 
 since the one [viz., Soul,] is devoid [of 
 this character of being a cause], it is applicable [only] to 
 the other of the two, [viz., Nature]. 
 
 a. That is to say : ' while both/ viz., Soul and Nature, 
 are preexistent to every product, still, ' since the one/ viz., 
 Soul, from the fact of its not being modified [into any- 
 thing else, as clay is modified into a jar], must be 'devoid/ 
 or lack the nature of a cause, 'it is applicable/ i.e., the 
 nature of a cause must belong, to the other of the two. 1 
 
 b. But then [some one may say], let Atoms alone be 
 causes; since there is no dispute [that these are causal]. 
 In reply to this, he says : 2 
 
 ii 
 
 * I 
 
 8 Aniruddha has, according to both my MSS. 
 , Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 77. 93 
 
 Aph. 76. What is limited cannot be 
 
 Why the theory of a f r . _ 
 
 plastic Nature is prefer- the SUDStance OI all [things] . 
 able tu that of Atoms. 
 
 a. That which is limited cannot be 
 
 the substance of all [things] ; as yarn cannot be the 
 [material] cause of a jar. Therefore it would [on the 
 theory suggested,] be necessary to mention separate causes 
 of [all] things severally ; and it is simpler to assume a 
 single cause. Therefore Nature alone is the cause. Such 
 is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He alleges Scripture in support of this : * 
 
 II 33 II 
 
 Aph. 77. And [the proposition that 
 Nature is the cause of all is proved] 
 from the text of Scripture, that the 
 origin [of the world] is therefrom, [i. e., from Nature]. 
 
 a. An argument, in the first instance, has been set forth 
 [in 76 ; for, till argument fails him, no one falls back 
 upon authority]. Scripture, moreover, declares that 
 Nature is the cause of the world, in such terms as, ' From 
 Nature the world arises/ &c. 8 
 
 II 
 
 i ^rfcTrf^ mn*r^r w\- 
 
 II
 
 94 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. But then [some one may say], a jar which ante- 
 cedently did not exist is seen to come into existence. Let, 
 then, antecedent non-existence be the cause [of each product] ; 
 since this is an invariable antecedent, [and, hence, a cause ; 
 ' the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause,' 
 if Dr. Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be trusted]. To 
 this he replies : l 
 
 II $t II 
 
 Aph. 78. A thin? is not made out 
 ofnothing . 
 
 a. That is to say : it is not possible that out of nothing, 
 i.e., out of a nonentity, a thing should be made, i.e., an 
 entity should arise. If an entity were to arise out of a 
 nonentity, then, since the character of a cause is visible in 
 its product, the world, also, would be unreal : such is the 
 meaning. 2 
 
 b. Let the world, too, be unreal : what harm is that to 
 us? [If any ask this,] he, therefore, declares [as follows] : 3 
 
 ii se ii 
 
 ^frf ^ 
 
 : II
 
 BOOK I., APH. 79. 95 
 
 Aph. 79. It [the world] is not unreal ; 
 Reasons why the world because there is no fact contradictory 
 
 is not to be supposed un- r ,., -, , , . . 
 
 real. [to its reality], and because it is not 
 
 the [false] result of depraved causes, 
 [leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed]. 
 
 a. When there is the notion, in regard to a shell [of a 
 pearl-oyster, which sometimes glitters like silver], that it 
 is silver, its being silver is contradicted by the [subsequent 
 and more correct] cognition, that this is not silver. But, 
 in the case in question [that of the world regarded as a 
 reality], no one ever has the cognition, ' This world is not 
 in the shape of an entity/ by which [cognition, if any one 
 ever really had such,] its being an entity might be op- 
 
 b. And it is held that that is false which is the result 
 of a depraved cause ; e.g., some one's cognition of a [white] 
 conch-shell as yellow, through such a fault as the jaundice, 
 [which depraves his eye-sight]. But, in the case in ques- 
 tion, [that of the world regarded as a reality] , there is no 
 such [temporary or occasional] depravation [of the senses] ; 
 because all, at all times, cognize the world as a reality. 
 Therefore the world is not an unreality. 2 
 
 sfT^T ^ **iclf*rfrT sJT- 
 
 sfR 
 
 2 
 
 J m <H*1 d V^sj'R ^WPERT I
 
 96 THK SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 c. But then [some one may suggest], let a nonentity be 
 the [substantial] cause of the world ; still the world will 
 not [necessarily, therefore,] be unreal. In regard to this, 
 he declares [as follows] i 1 
 
 rRTI^R 
 
 H to ii 
 
 Aph. 80. If it [the substantial cause,] 
 The product of some- t e an entity, then this would be the 
 
 thing is tomeuaag ; and r , " , , . 
 
 that of nothing, nothing, case, [that the product would be an 
 entity], from its union [or identity] 
 therewith ; [but] if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how 
 could it possibly be the case [that the product would be 
 real] , since it is a nonentity, [like the cause with which it 
 is united, in the relation of identity] ? 
 
 a. If an entity were the substantial cause [of the world], 
 then, since [it is a maxim that] the qualities of the cause 
 present themselves in the product, 'this would be the 
 case/ i.e., it would be the case that the product was real, 
 ' because of union therewith/ i.e., because of the union [of 
 the product] with the reality [which is its substratum]. 
 [But,] since, [by parity of reasoning], if a nonentity [were 
 the substantial cause], the world would be a nonentity, 
 then, by reason of its being a nonentity, i.e., by reason of 
 the world's being [on that supposition,] necessarily a non- 
 entity, [like its supposed cause], how could this be the case, 1 
 [that it would be real] ?
 
 BOOK I., APH. 81. 97 
 
 b. But then [a follower of the Mimdnsd may say], since 
 [it would appear that] nonentity can take no shape but 
 that of nonentity, let works alone be the cause of the 
 world. What need have we of the hypothesis of 'Nature'? 
 To this he replies r 1 
 
 Aph. 81. No; for works are not 
 a? adapted to be the substantial cause [of 
 any product]. 
 
 a. Granting that ' the unseen ' [merit or demerit arising 
 from actions] may be an instrumental cause, [in bringing 
 about the mundane condition of the agent] , yet we never 
 see merit or demerit in the character of the substantial 
 cause [of any product] : and our theories ought to show 
 deference to our experience. ' Nature ' is to be accepted ; 
 because Liberation arises [see 56," and 83,] from dis- 
 cerning the distinction between Nature and the Soul. 4 
 
 I f^R HVT^i^T^^TcT ^TTf 
 
 " is the Action accepted by Vij- 
 
 nana, and by him only. Ed. 
 
 3 It is the bracketed Aph. 56, at p. 58, supra, that is here re- 
 ferred to. Ed.
 
 98 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. But then [some one may say], since Liberation can 
 be attained by undertaking the things directed by the 
 Veda, what occasion is there for [our troubling ourselves 
 ubout] Nature ? To this he replies : l 
 
 || fe* II 
 
 Aph. 82. The accomplishment there- 
 is not to i*. o f n e o f Liberation,! is not. more- 
 
 Mained by ritual obser- L ' i_ o A i t*. ^ 
 
 vances. over, through Scriptural rites : the 
 
 chief end of man does not consist in 
 this [which is gained through such means] ; because, since 
 this consists of what is accomplished through acts, [and 
 is, therefore, a, product, and not eternal], there is [still left 
 impending over the ritualist,] the liability to repetition of 
 births. 
 
 a. ' Scriptural means/ such as sacrifices, [are so called], 
 because they are heard from [the mouth of the instructor 
 in] Scripture. Not thereby, moreover, is ' the accomplish- 
 ment thereof/ i.e., the accomplishment of Liberation ; 
 'because one is liable to repetition of births, by reason of 
 the fact that it [the supposed Liberation,] was accom- 
 plished by means,' i.e., because the [thus far] liberated
 
 BOOK I., APH. 83. 99 
 
 [soul] is still liable to repetition of births/ inasmuch as 
 this [its supposed Liberation,] is not eternal, [just] because 
 it is [the result of] acts. For this reason, the chief end of 
 man does not consist in this, 2 [which is gained through 
 ritual observances]. 
 
 b. He shows what does constitute the chief end of man : r> 
 
 II b II 
 
 Aph. 83. There is Scripture for it, 
 chie,f end^of that he who has attained to discrimina- 
 
 tion > in re g ard to &**\.., Nature 
 and Soul], has no repetition of births. 
 
 a. ' In regard to these/ i. e., in regard to Nature and 
 Soul, of him who has attained to discrimination, there is a 
 text declaring, that, in consequence of his knowledge of 
 the distinction, there will be no repetition of births ; the 
 text, viz., ' He does not return again/ 4 &c. 5 
 
 1 Literally, ' liable to return to mundane existence. 1 JUd. 
 
 I - 
 
 i 
 
 4 Compare the Chhdndogya Upanishad, viii., xv. Ed, 
 
 5
 
 100 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. He states an objection to the opposite view : l 
 
 Aph. 84. From pain [occasioned, e. g., 
 Pain can lead only to to victims in sacrifice,] must come pain 
 
 pain, not to liberation _ . J . r 
 
 from it. [to the sacriticer, and. not liberation 
 
 from pain] ; as there is not relief from 
 chilliness, by affusion of water. 
 
 a. If Liberation were to be effected by acts, [such as 
 sacrifices], then, since the acts involve a variety of pains, 
 Liberation itself [on the principle that every effect in- 
 cludes the qualities of its cause,] would include a variety of 
 pains ; and it would be a grief, from the fact that it must 
 eventually end : for, to one who is distressed by chilliness 
 the affusion of water does not bring liberation from his 
 chilliness, but, rather, [additional] chilliness. 2 
 
 b. But then [some one may say], the fact that the act 
 is productive of pain is not the motive [to the performance 
 of sacrifice] ; but the [real] reason is this, that the act is 
 productive of things desirable. And, in accordance with this, 
 there is the text, 'By means of acts [of sacrifice] they 
 may partake of immortality/ &c. To this he replies : s 
 
 <I'WT?
 
 BOOK I., APH. 85. 101 
 
 II bM II 
 
 Aph. 85. [Liberation cannot arise 
 The character of the f rom ac t s ] . because, whether the end 
 
 end contemplated makes J . ' . ' . 
 
 no difference in regard be something desirable, or undesirable, 
 [and we admit that the motive of the 
 sacrifice is not the giving pain to the 
 victim], this makes no difference in regard to its being 
 the result of acts, [and, therefore, not eternal, but tran- 
 sitory]. 
 
 a. Grant that pain is not what is [intended] to be 
 accomplished by works done without desire, [on the part 
 of the virtuous sacrificer], still, though there is a difference 
 [as you contend,] between [an act done to secure] some- 
 thing enjoyable and an act done without reference to 
 enjoyment, this makes no difference with respect to the 
 fact of the Liberation's being produced by acts, [which, I 
 repeat, permanent Liberation cannot be] : there must still 
 again be pain ; for it [the Liberation supposed to have 
 been attained through works,] must be perishable, because 
 it is a production. The text which declares that works 
 done without desire are instruments of Liberation has 
 reference to knowledge, [which, I grant, may be gained by 
 such means] ; and Liberation comes through knowledge ; 
 so that these [works] are instruments of Liberation 
 
 
 \>*jd r* *i I rf^TKKT I 
 
 1 The reading of Aniruddha, according to my MSS., is cjff-
 
 102 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 mediately : 1 [but you will recollect that the present inquiry 
 regards the immediate cause]. 
 
 b. [But then, some one may say], supposing that 
 Liberation may take place [as you Sankhyas contend,] 
 through the knowledge of the distinction between Nature 
 and Soul, still, since, from the perishableness [of the 
 Liberation effected by this means, as well as any other 
 means], mundane life may return, we are both on an 
 equality, [we, whose Liberation you Sankhyas look upon 
 as transitory, and you Sankhyas, whose Liberation we, 
 again, look upon as being, by parity of reasoning, in much 
 the same predicament]. To this he replies : 2 
 
 *UT5f 'HTV'i rn ^m sfFTT^T 
 
 II 
 
 3 Dr. Ballantyne, on republishing the Sankhya Aphorisms in the 
 Sibliotheca Indica, adopted the genuine reading, 
 
 instead of that given above, which I find, indeed, in the Serampore 
 edition of the Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhdshya, but in no MS. He 
 ought, however, at the same time, to have altered his translation,
 
 BOOK I., APH. 86. 103 
 
 Apli, 86, Of him who is essentially 
 Crated, Ms bonds having absolutely 
 perished, it [i.e., the fruit of his saving 
 knowledge,] is absolute : there is no parity [between his 
 case and that of him who relies on works, and who may 
 thereby secure a temporary sojourn in Paradise, only to 
 return again to earth]. 
 
 a. Of him ' who is essentially liberated/ who, in his very 
 essence, is free, there is the destruction of bondage. The 
 bond [see 56, 1 ] is Non-discrimination [between Nature 
 and Soul]. By the removal thereof there is the destruc- 
 tion, the annihilation, of Non-discrimination : and how is 
 it possible that there should again be a return of the mun- 
 dane state, when the destruction of Non- discrimination is 
 absolute? Thus there is no [such] similarity, 2 [between 
 the two cases, as is imagined, by the objector, under 85. b.]. 
 
 b. It has been asserted [in 61,] that there is a class of 
 twenty-five [things which are realities] ; and, since these 
 cannot be ascertained [or made out to be true], except by 
 
 which, in conformity with the unadulterated text, might have run 
 somewhat as follows : ' Of him who is, in himself, liberated all ex- 
 tinction of bondage is final,' &c. Such is the interpretation which, 
 on comparison of the various commentaries, seems to be the most 
 eligible. Ed. 
 
 1 This is the Aphorism bracketed at p. 58, supra. Ed. 
 
 ri
 
 104 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 proof, therefore he displays this j 1 [i.e., he shows what he 
 means by proof] : 
 
 . 87. The determination of some- 
 ' thing not [previously] lodged in both 
 
 [the Soul and the Intellect], nor in one 
 or other of them, is * right notion * ( prama) . What is, in 
 the highest degree, productive thereof [i. e., of any given 
 ' right notion J ], is that ; [i. e., is what we mean by proof, 
 or evidence, (pramana)]. 
 
 a. ' Not lodged/ i. e., not deposited in ' one rightly 
 cognizing* (pramdtri)', in short, not previously known. 
 The ' determination/ i.e., the ascertainment [or right 
 apprehension] of such a thing, or reality, is ' right notion '; 
 and, whether this be an affection ' of both/ i.e., of Intellect, 
 and also of Soul [as some hold that it is], or of only one or 
 other of the two, [as others hold,] either way, ' what is, in 
 the highest degree, productive * of this ' right notion ' is 
 [what we term proof, or] evidence, (pramana) : such is the 
 definition of evidence in general ; [the definition of its 
 several species falling to be considered hereafter] : such is 
 the meaning. 4 
 
 * Nagesa has 
 
 s Some MSS. have the inferior reading - 
 
 4 4ttirHcpg: IFRTrRH I^T
 
 BOOK I., APH. 87. 105 
 
 b. It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, 
 and Doubt, in their order, that we employ [when speaking 
 of the result of evidence,] the expressions ' not previously 
 known ' [which excludes things remembered], and ' reality ' 
 [which excludes mistakes and fancies], and ' discrimina- 
 tion/ 1 [which excludes doubt]. 
 
 c. In regard to this [topic of knowledge and the sources 
 of knowledge], if ' right notion/ is spoken of as located in 
 the Soul [see 87. .], then the [proof, or] evidence is an 
 affection of the Intellect. If [on the other hand, the ' right 
 notion ' is spoken of as] located in the Intellect, in the 
 shape of an affection [of that the affections of which are 
 mirrored by the Soul] , then it [the proof, or evidence, or 
 whatever we may choose to call that from which " right 
 notion ' results,] is just the conjunction of an organ [with 
 its appropriate object; such conjunction giving rise to 
 sense-perception], &c. But, if both the Soul's cognition 
 and the affections of the Intellect are spoken of as [cases 
 of] ' right notion/ then both of these aforesaid [the affec- 
 tion of the Intellect, in the first case, and the conjunction 
 of an organ with its appropriate object, &c., in the other 
 
 I 
 
 WRT
 
 106 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 case,] are [to receive the name of] proof (pramana). You 
 are to understand, that, when the organ of vision, &c., are 
 spoken of as 'evidence/ it is only as being mediately 1 [the 
 sources of right knowledge] . 
 
 d. How many [kinds of] proofs [then,] are there? To 
 this he replies : 2 
 
 w*n<!j 
 
 bb 
 
 Aph. 88. Proof is of three kinds : 
 thrte kinds there is no establishment of more ; 
 because, if these be established, then 
 all [that is true] can be established [by one or other of 
 these three proofs]. 
 
 a. ' Proof is of three kinds ; ' that is to say, ' perception ' 
 
 8 So reads Aniruddha ; but Vijnana, Nageaa, and Vedanti 
 Mahadeva end the eighty-seventh Aphorism with these two words. 
 Hence : ' That which is, in the highest degree, productive thereof is 
 proof, of three kinds.' Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 88. 107 
 
 (pratyaksha), ' the recognition of signs ' (anumdna), and 
 ( testimony ' (sabda) , are the [three kinds of] proofs. 1 
 
 b. But then [some one may incline to say], let 'com- 
 parison ' [which is reckoned, in the Nyaya, a specifically 
 distinct source of knowledge], and the others [such as 
 * Conjecture,' &c., which are reckoned, in like manner, in 
 the Mimarisa], also be instruments of right knowledge, [as 
 well as these three], in [the matter of] the discriminating 
 of Nature and Soul : he therefore says, ' because, if these 
 [three] be established,' &c. And, since, if there be the 
 three kinds of proof established/ everything [that is really 
 true] can be established [by means of them], there is no 
 establishment of more ;' no addition to the proofs can be 
 fairly made out ; because of the cumbrousness [that sins 
 against the philosophical maxim, that we are not to assume 
 more than is necessary to account for the case] : such is 
 the meaning. 2 
 
 c. For the same reason, Manu, also, has laid down only 
 a triad of proofs, where he says [see the Institutes, Ch. 
 xii., v. 105] : * By that man who seeks a distinct knowledge 
 of his duty, [these] three [sources of right knowledge] 
 must be well understood, viz., Perception, Inference, and 
 Scriptural authority in its various shapes [of legal institute! 
 
 I 3lcT ^TTf
 
 108 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 &c.]/ And 'Comparison/ and ' Tradition ' (aitihya), and 
 the like, are included under Inference and Testimony ; and 
 ' Non-perception ' (anupalabdhi) and the like are included 
 under Perception j 1 [for the non-perception of an absent 
 jar on a particular spot of ground is nothing else than the 
 perception of that spot of ground without a jar on it]. 
 
 d. He [next] states the definitions of the varieties 2 [of 
 proof, having already (5 87) given the general definition] : 
 
 II t<> II 
 
 Aph. 89. Perception (pratyaksha) is 
 
 Perception defined. 
 
 that discernment which, being m con- 
 junction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form 
 thereof. 
 
 a. ' Being in conjunction/ [literally,] ' existing in con- 
 
 3 Aniruddha has IJrH^'^T? <T^T, yielding ' deter- 
 mined by,' &c., instead of ' being in,' &c. Ed. 
 
 4 Vedanti Mahadeva has ^rH^^ (?) %*
 
 BOOK I., APH. 90. 109 
 
 junction;' 'portrays the form thereof/ i.e., assumes the 
 form of the thing with which it is in conjunction [as water 
 assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured] ; 
 what ' discernment/ or affection of the Intellect, [does this], 
 that [affection of the Intellect (see Yoga Aphorisms, I., 
 5 and 8. .)] is the evidence [called] Perception : such is 
 the meaning. 1 
 
 b. But then, [some one may say,] this [definition of 
 Perception (89)] does not extend [as we conceive it 
 ought, and presume it is intended, to do,] to the perception, 
 by adepts in the Yoga, of things past, future, or concealed 
 [by stone walls, or such intervening things as interrupt 
 ordinary perception] ; because there is, here, no ' form of 
 the thing, in conjunction ' [with the mind of him who per- 
 ceives it, while absent] : having pondered this doubt, he 
 corrects it by [stating, as follows,] the fact, that this [super- 
 natural sort of perception] is not what he intends to de- 
 fine: 2 
 
 n oo 11
 
 110 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 90. It is not a fault [in the 
 iJuamf^h l it definition, that it does not apply to the 
 should not' apply to the perceptions of adepts in the Togo]; 
 
 perceptions o/ the mystic. e f r y J > 
 
 because that of the adepts in the Yoga 
 is not an external perception. 
 
 a. That is to say : it is only sense-perception that is 
 to be here defined ; and the adepts of the Yoga do not per- 
 ceive through the external [organs of sense]. Therefore there 
 is no fault [in our definition] ; i.e., there is no failure to 
 include the perceptions of these ;* [because there is no 
 intention to include them]. 
 
 b. [But, although this reply is as much as the objector 
 has any right to expect,] he states the real justification 2 
 [of the definition in question] : 
 
 Aph. 91. Or, there is no fault 
 
 dof a' ! he totKrce n ^ n ^ e definition], because of the 
 
 tioits of the mystic. ' conjunction, with causal things, of 
 
 that [mystical mind] which has at- 
 
 tained exaltation. 4 
 
 3 Thus Yijnana and Vedanti Mahadeva. Aniruddha has 
 ^t"^*- The ^ading of Nagesa is - 
 
 Ed. 
 
 4 For the term atisaya, again rendered, in the next page, by 
 exaltation,' vide infra, p. 116, note 4. Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 91. Ill 
 
 a. Or, be it so that the perception of the Yogi, also, 
 shall be the thing to be defined ; still there is no fault [in 
 our definition, 89] ; it does not fail to extend [to this, 
 also]; since the mind of the Yogi, in the exaltation gained 
 from the habitude produced by concentration, does come 
 into conjunction with things [as existent] in their causes, 1 
 [whether or not with the things as developed into products 
 perceptible by the external senses]. 
 
 b. Here the word rendered ' causal ' (Una) denotes the 
 things, not in conjunction [with the senses], alluded to by 
 the objector [in 89. 6.] ; for we, who assert that effects 
 exist [from eternity, in their causes, before taking the shape 
 of effects, and, likewise, in these same causes, when again 
 resolved into their causes], hold that even what is past, 
 &c., still essentially exists, and that, hence, its conjunction 
 [with the mind of the mystic, or the clairvoyant,] is pos- 
 sible. 2 
 
 c. But then, [some one may say,] 
 fi n ?twnds Hotoppb To still this [definition] does not extend to 
 
 *** t ^ ie -L r d >s perceptions ; because, since 
 these are from everlasting, they can- 
 
 *|(Wre45J*l 
 
 fa 
 
 fm <j s | r^T"
 
 112 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 not result from [emergent] conjunction. To this he re- 
 plies :' 
 
 H ^ H 
 
 Aph. 92. [This objection to the de- 
 fi nition of Perception has no force]; 
 because it is not proved that there 
 is a Lord (iswara). 
 
 a. That there is no fault [in the definition of Perception], 
 because there is no proof that there is a Lord, is supplied 3 
 [from 90]. 
 
 b. And this demurring to there being any ' Lord ' is 
 merely in accordance with 3 the arrogant dictum of [certain] 
 partisans [who hold an opinion not recognized by the ma- 
 jority]. Therefore, it is to be understood, the expression 
 employed is, ' because it is not proved that there is a 
 Lord,' but not the expression, ' because there is no Lord.'* 
 
 II 
 
 8 Rather, 'And this [mere] taking exception to a Lord is ex- 
 pressly owing to,' &c. The aphorist would not be confounded 
 with those who denied what he waited to see evidenced. The attitude 
 which he assumed is that of suspense of judgment on the point of 
 theism, as against thepositiveness of the professed atheist. Vijnana,here 
 
 followed, then goes on to say: 
 
 | Tor, otherwise [i.e., if the aphorist had been atheistic], 
 it would have been explicitly declared, Because of the non-existence of 
 a Lord.' Ed. 
 4
 
 BOOK I., APH. 93. 113 
 
 c. But, on the implication l that there is a ' Lord,' what 
 we mean to speak of [in our definition of Perception, (89).] 
 is merely the being of the [same] kind with what is pro- 
 duced by conjunction 2 [of a sense-organ with its object; 
 and the perceptions of the ' Lord ' may be of the same 
 kind with such perceptions, though they were not to come 
 from the same source]. 
 
 d. Having pondered the doubt, ' How should the Lord 
 not be proved [to exist] by the Scripture and the Law, 
 [which declare his existence] ? ' he states a dilemma which 
 excludes [this] : 3 
 
 Aph. 93. [And, further,] it is not 
 A dilemma to exclude p rove d that he [the ' Lord,'] exists; 
 
 proof that there is any r L i i 
 
 ' Lord: because [whoever exists must be either 
 
 free or bound; and], of free and 
 bound, he can be neither the one nor the other. 
 
 a. The ' Lord ' whom you imagine, tell us, is he free 
 from troubles, &c. ? Or is he in bondage through these ? 
 
 fh i 
 
 1 Eather, 'the view being accepted' (alhyupagame). 
 
 2 
 
 rf
 
 114 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Since he is not, cannot be, either the one or the other, it 
 is not proved that there is a ' Lord :' such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He explains this very point : 2 
 
 ii etf ii 
 
 The force of the A P h - 94 - [Because,] either way, he 
 would be inefficient. 
 
 a. Since, if he were free, he would have no desires, &c., 
 which [as compulsory motives,] would instigate him to 
 create ; and, if he were bound, he would be under delu- 
 sion ; he must be [on either alternative,] unequal to the 
 creation, &c. 4 [of this world]. 
 
 b. But then, [it may be asked,] if such be the case, 
 what becomes of the Scripture-texts which declare the 
 ' Lord ?' To this he replies : 5 
 
 t f^R 
 
 
 II 
 
 3 The reading, in a later handwriting, of one of my MSS. of 
 Aniruddha is - 
 
 : II 
 
 f ^RT rfa:
 
 BOOK I., APH. 95. 115 
 
 ^rr n <>M 11 
 
 Aph. 95. [The Scriptural texts which 
 make mention of the 'Lord' are] 
 either glorifications of the liberated 
 
 Soul, or homages to the recognized 3 [deities of the Hindu 
 
 pantheon].* 
 
 a. That is to say : accordingly as the case may be, some 
 text [among those in which the term ' Lord ; occurs,] is 
 intended, in the shape of a glorification [of Soul], as the 
 ' Lord/ [as Soul is held to be], merely in virtue of junction 
 [with Nature], to incite [to still deeper contemplation], to 
 exhibit, as what is to be known, the liberated Soul, i. e., 
 absolute Soul in general ; and some other text, declaratory, 
 for example, of creatorship, &c., preceded by resolution 
 [to create, is intended] to extol [and to purify the mind of 
 the contemplator, by enabling him to take a part in ex- 
 tolling] the eternity, &c., of the familiarly known 3 Brahma, 
 
 Another reading, that of Xagesa and of Vedanti Mahadeva, 
 , makes this word of the singular number. Ed. 
 
 2 r. . _ . 
 
 Xj M H"l I H"i ^i TH> a compound, is the reading of Aniruddha, 
 followed by Vedanti Mahadeva. See 4, below. Ed. 
 
 3 In both places, siddha, 'possessor of supernatural powers.' Ed. 
 
 4 Aniruddba's exposition of this Aphorism is as follows : ^J- 
 
 I (TrBWT
 
 116 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Vishnu, Siva, or other wow-eternal ' Lord ;' since these, 
 though possessed of the conceit [of individuality], &c., [and, 
 in so far, liable to perish], have immortality, &c., in a se- 
 condary sense j 1 [seeing that the Soul , in every combina- 
 tion, is immortal, though the combination itself is not so]. 
 
 b. But then, [some one may say], even if it were thus [as 
 alleged under 95], what is heard in Scripture, [viz.], the 
 fact that it [viz., Soul] is the governor of Nature, &c., would 
 not be the case ; for, in the world, we speak of govern- 
 ment in reference only to modifications [preceded and 
 determined] by resolutions [that so and so shall take place], 
 &c. To this he replies : 2 
 
 I According to this, the term iswara, 
 ' mighty one," ' lord,' is applied, by way of eulogy, either to a soul as 
 it were liberated, or to a person who, through devotion, has acquired 
 transcendent faculties, that is to say, the Yogi. Resolution, agent- 
 ship, and the like, are impredicable of one absolutely liberated ; and 
 such a one, being inert and impassive, cannot be intended by iswara> 
 ' a power.' Hence the expression, ' as it were liberated.' Also see, 
 for atisaya, translated, above, ' transcendent faculties,' Book IV., 
 Aph. 24. Ed. 

 
 BOOK I., APH. 96. 117 
 
 II <& II 
 
 Aph. 96. The governorship [thereof, 
 Soul, like the lode- i. e o f Soul over Nature] is from [its] 
 
 stone, acts not by resolve, J L J 
 
 but throuyh proximity. proximity thereto, [not from its re- 
 solving to act thereon] ; as is the case 
 with the gem, [the lodestone, in regard to iron], 
 
 a. If it were alleged that [its, Soul's,] creativeness, or 
 [its] governorship, was through a resolve [to create, or to 
 govern], then this objection [brought forward under 95. 
 b.~\ would apply. But [it is not so; for,] by us [Sankhyas,] 
 it is held that the Soul's governorship, in the shape of 
 creatorship, or the like, is merely from [its] proximity 
 [to Nature] ; ' as is the case with the [lodestone] gem/ 1 
 
 b. As the gem, the lodestone, is attracted by iron 
 merely by proximity, without resolving [either to act or 
 to be acted on], &c., so, by the mere conjunction of the 
 primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle [called] 
 the 'Great one/ [or Mind, (see 61. e.)~\. And in this 
 alone consists [what we speak of as] its acting as creator 
 towards that which is superadded to it : such is the mean- 
 ing. 2 
 
 II
 
 118 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 c. And thus it is declared, [in some one of the Puranas *] : 
 ' As the iron acts, whilst the gein [the lodestone,] stands 
 void of volition, just so this world is created by a deity 
 who is mere Existence. Thus it is, that there are, in the 
 Soul, both agency [seemingly,] and non-agency, [really]. 
 It is not an agent, inasmuch as it is void of volition ; 
 [and it '*] an agent, merely through approximation [to 
 Nature].' 2 
 
 d. In respect of worldly products, also, animal souls 
 overrule, merely through their approximation [to Nature] : 
 so he declares [as follows] : 8 
 
 . II Q3 II 
 
 1 The Translator's authority for this attribution has not been 
 discovered. Ed. 
 
 i 
 
 rq TH^n II 
 
 Aniruddha has c - Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 97. 119 
 
 in like manner, em- ^ph. 97. In the case of individual 
 
 bodied souls do nut ener- i . ' i r i 
 
 ffize. products, also, [the apparent agency] 
 
 of animal souls [is solely through proximity]. 
 
 a. ' The agency is solely through proximity : ' so much 
 is supplied 1 [from 96]. 
 
 b. The meaning is this, that, in the case, also, of par- 
 ticular productions, the creation, &c., of things individual 
 [as contradistinguished from that of all things in the 
 lump, (see Veddnta-sdra, 67)], animal souls, i. e., souls in 
 which the intellects [of individuals] reflect themselves [see 
 99. a.], overrule, merely through proximity, but not 
 through any effort ; seeing that these [animal souls] are 
 none other than the motionless Thought. 2 
 
 c. But then, [some one may say], if there were no eternal 
 and omniscient 'Lord,' through the doubt of a blind 
 tradition, [in the absence of an intelligently effective 
 guardianship], the Vedas would cease to be an authority ; 
 [a possibility which, of course, cannot be entertained for 
 an instant]. To this he replies : 8 
 
 I
 
 120 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 98. The declaration of the 
 How the Vedas need texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahma> 
 t?n d ' f autken ' for example], since he knows the truth, 
 [is authorative evidence]. 
 
 a. To complete [the aphorism, we must say], ' since 
 Hiranyagarlha [i.e., Brahma,'} and others [viz., Vishnu 
 and Siva], are knowers of what is certain, i.e., of what is 
 true, the declaration of the texts or sense of the Vedas, 
 where these are the speakers, is evidence 1 [altogether 
 indisputable]. 
 
 b. But then, if Soul, by its simple proximity [to Nature 
 ( 96)], is an overruler in a secondary sense [only of the 
 term, as the magnet may be said, in a secondary sense, to 
 draw the iron, while the conviction is entertained, that, 
 actually and literally, the iron draws the magnet], 
 who is the primary [or actual,] overruler ? In reference to 
 this, he says : 2
 
 BOOK I., APH. 99. 121 
 
 II ee II 
 
 Aph. 99. The internal organ, through 
 It is in the shape of its being enlightened thereby [i.e., by 
 
 the internal organ, that o ln . ,, , A 
 
 Nature affects Soul. ooul], is the overruler ; as is the iron, 
 
 [in respect of the magnet]. 
 
 a. The internal organ, i.e., the understanding, is the 
 overruler, through its fancying itself to be Soul, [as it does 
 fancy,] by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul, 
 through its happening to reflect itself in [and contemplate 
 itself in,] Soul; 'just as the iron/ that is to say, as the 
 attracting iron, though inactive, draws [the magnet], in 
 consequence of [its] mere proximity, 2 [and so acquires 
 magnetism by magnetic induction]. 
 
 b. He [now, having discussed the evidence that consists 
 in direct perception,] states the definition of inference 3 
 (anumdna) : 
 
 1 Aniruddha has +jSfJ | S*T{'^RT^U^4 ' P re fi x i n g to ' the 
 internal organ' the synonymous 'the Great One.' Ed. 
 
 xi 
 
 i ^fl
 
 122 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 B Kl ^ ^5 5 MflRT'TR' II ^oo II 
 
 Aph. 100. The knowledge of the con- 
 nected [e.g., fire], through perception 
 of the connexion [e.g., of fire with smoke], is inference. 
 
 a. That is to say : inference [or conviction of a general 
 truth,] is [a kind of] evidence consisting in a [mental] 
 modification, [which is none other than] the knowledge 
 of the connected, i.e., of the constant accompanier, through 
 the knowledge of the constant accompaniment : by ' con- 
 nexion ' (pratibandha) here being meant ' constant at- 
 tendedness ' (vyapti) ; and through the perception thereof 2 
 [it being that the mind has possession of any general 
 principle] . 
 
 b. But a conclusion (anumiti) is knowledge of the soul ; 3 
 [whilst an Inference, so far forth as it is an instrument in 
 the establishment of knowledge deducible from it, is an 
 affection of the internal organ, or understanding (see 
 87.*.)] 
 
 c. He [next] defines testimony * (sabda) : 
 
 * is the readin of Nagesa and of Vedanti 
 Mahadeva. Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 sfR 
 
 n 
 3
 
 BOOK I., APH. 102. 123 
 
 a 
 
 Apli. ,101. Testimony [such as is 
 
 Valid testimony defined. . , . . . ., -, 
 
 entitled to the name ot evidence,] is a 
 declaration by one worthy [to be believed]. 
 
 a. Here 'fitness' means ' suitableness ; ' and so the 
 evidence which is called ' Testimony ' is the knowledge 
 arising from a suitable declaration : such is the meaning. 
 And [while this belongs to the understanding, or internal 
 organ (see 100. .)] the result is that [knowledge] in the 
 Soul, [which is called] 'knowledge by hearing n (sabda- 
 bodha). 
 
 b. He [next] volunteers to tell us what is the use of his 
 setting forth [the various divisions of] evidence: 2 
 
 Aph. 102. Since the establishment 
 
 Why the kinds of Evi- o f [the existence of] both [soul and 
 
 dence nave been here set ,_ . J ., . r 
 
 forth. non-soul] is by means of evidence, the 
 
 declaration thereof [i.e., of the kinds of 
 evidence, has been here made]. 
 
 a. It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and 
 non-soul are established as being distinct, [the one from the 
 
 cTOT
 
 124 THE SAXKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 other] : therefore has this, viz., evidence, been here de- 
 clared : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. Among these [several kinds of proof], he [now] describes 
 that one by which, especially, viz., by a proof which is 
 one kind of inference, Nature and Soul are here to be 
 established discriminatively : 2 
 
 The existence of Soul Aph. 103. The establishment of both 
 a ^ 9 T targW * Lfr0n [Nature and Soul] is by analogy. 
 
 a. [Analogy (samanyato drishta) is that kind of evidence 
 which is employed in the case] where, by the force [as an 
 argument,] which the residence of any property in the sub- 
 ject derives from a knowledge of its being constantly 
 accompanied [by something which it may therefore be- 
 token], when we have had recourse to [as the means of 
 determining this constant accompaniment,] what is, for 
 instance, genetically of a perceptible kind, [where, under 
 such circumstances, we repeat,] anything of a different kind, 
 i.e., not cognizable by the senses, is established; as when, 
 
 "fafe ITRT- 
 
 cT^T 
 
 3 My Ma of Nagesa has lTJ - Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 103. 125 
 
 for example, having apprehended a constant accompani- 
 ment, [e.g., that an act implies an instrument], by taking 
 into consideration such instruments as axes, &c., which are 
 of earthy and other kinds, a quite heterogeneous, imper- 
 ceptible, instrument of knowledge, viz., [the instrument 
 named] Sense, is established [or inferred to exist] ; such is 
 what we mean by Analogy ; and it is by this [species of 
 inference], that both, [viz.,] Nature and Soul, are proved [to 
 exist]: such is the meaning. 1 
 
 h. Of these [viz., Nature and Soul,] the argument from. 
 analogy for [the existence of] Nature is as follows : the 
 Great Principle [viz., Understanding (see 61. <?.)] is 
 formed out of the things [called] Pleasure, Pain, and 
 Delusion, [to the aggregate of which three in equipoise 
 (see 61) the name of Nature is given] ; because, whilst it 
 is [undeniably,] a production, it has the characters of Plea- 
 sure, Pain, arid Delusion ; just as a bracelet, or the like, 
 formed of gold, or the like, 2 [has the characteristic pro- 
 
 : \\
 
 126 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 perties of the gold, or the like, and is thereby known to 
 have been formed out of gold, or the like]. 
 
 c. But, [as regards the argument from analogy, in proof 
 of the existence] of Soul, [it is, as stated before, under 66, 
 to the following effect]: Nature is for the sake of another ; 
 because it is something that acts as a combination ; as a 
 house, for instance, [which is a combination of various 
 parts combined for the benefit of the tenant]. In this 
 instance, having gathered, in regard to houses, &c., the 
 fact established on sense-perception, that they exist for the 
 sake of [organized] bodies, for example, something of a 
 different kind therefrom, [i.e., from Nature, viz.], Soul, 
 is inferred [by analogy,] as something other than Nature, 
 &c., [which, as being a compound thing, is not designed 
 for itself] : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 d. But then [some one may say], since Nature is eternal, 
 and exertion is habitual to her, [and the result of her 
 action is the bondage of the Soul], there should constantly 
 be experience [whether of pleasure or of pain], and, hence, 
 no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he 
 replies : 2 
 
 n 
 
 rf WR
 
 BOOK I., APH. 105. 127 
 
 Apli. 104. Experience [whether of 
 
 When it is that ex- . -, i j vis. n.1. j- 
 
 perience ceases. P ain r pleasure,] ends with [the dis- 
 
 cernment of] Thought, [or Soul, as 
 contradistinguished from Nature]. 
 
 a. By 'Thought' [we mean] Soul. Experience [whether 
 of pain or pleasure,] ceases, on the discerning thereof. As 
 ' antecedent non-existence,' though devoid of a beginning, 
 [see Tarka-sangraha, 92], surceases [when the thing 
 antecedently non-existent begins to be], so, eternal Nature 
 [eternal, as regards the absence of any beginning,] con- 
 tinues [no further than] till the discernment of the diffe- 
 rence [between Nature and Soul] ; so that experience 
 whether of pain or pleasure,] does not at all times occur : 
 such is the state of the case. 1 
 
 b. [But some one say], if Nature be agent, and Soul 
 experiencer, then it must follow [which seems unreason- 
 able,] that another is the experiencer of [the results of] 
 the acts done by one different. To this he replies : 2 
 
 II ^oq II 
 
 Aph. 105. The experience of the 
 fruit *y belong even to another than 
 the agent ; as in the case of food, &c.
 
 128 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 c. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., 
 and to one who was not the agent, viz., the master, to 
 enjoy the fruit [thereof, i.e., the fruit of the cook's actions], 
 so is the case here, also. 1 
 
 b. Having stated an exoteric principle [which may serve, 
 in practice, to silence, by the argumentum ad hominem, him 
 on whose principles it may be valid] , he [next] declares 
 his own doctrine, 2 [in regard to the doubt started under 
 104. 6.] : 
 
 n 
 
 v9 
 
 Aph. 106. Or, [to give a better ae- 
 ro suppose that Soul count of the matter than that given in 
 
 acts and experiences is * rt B i /> j 
 
 an error. 105], since it is from non-discrimma- 
 
 tion that it is derived, the notion that 
 the agent [soul being mistaken for an agent,] has the fruit 
 [of the act is a wrong notion]. 
 
 a. The soul is neither an agent nor a patient ; but, from 
 the fact that the Great Principle [the actual agent (see 
 97. .)] is reflected in it, there arises the conceit of its 
 being an agent. ' Or, since it is from non- discrimination ;' 
 that is to say, because it is from the failure to discriminate 
 between Nature and Soul, that this takes place, i.e., that 
 conceit takes place, that it is the agent that experiences 
 the fruit ; 3 [whereas the actual agent is Nature, which, being 
 unintelligent, can experience neither pain nor pleasure].
 
 BOOK 1., APH. 108. 
 
 h. The opposite of this [wrong view, referred to in 106,] 
 he states [as follows] : l 
 
 II ^0$ II 
 
 Aph. 107. And, when the truth is 
 ~ told, there is[seen to be] neither [agency, 
 in Soul, nor experience]. 
 
 a. 'When the truth is told' [and discerned], i.e., when, 
 by means of evidence, Nature and Soul are perceived [in 
 their entire distinctness, one from the other], ' there is 
 neither/ i.e., neither the condition [as regards soul,] of an 
 agent nor that of a patient. 2 
 
 b. Having discussed [the topic of] evidence, he [now] 
 states the distribution of the subject-matter of evidence : ;i 
 
 cf II 
 II
 
 130 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 What rvrcepttile 
 
 ,,der certain circum- ject [perceptible], and also [at another 
 
 time,] not an object, through there 
 being, in consequence of great distance, 
 &c., a want of [conjunction of the sense with the thing], 
 or [on the other hand,] an appliance of the sense [to the 
 thing]. 
 
 a. An object [is a perceived object], through the 
 proximity, or conjunction, of the sense [with the object]. 
 [A thing may be] not an object [perceived], through the 
 want of the sense, i.e., through the want of conjunction 
 [between the sense and what would otherwise be its object]. 
 And [this] want of conjunction [may result] from the 
 junction's being prevented by great distance, &C. 1 
 
 b. [To explain the ' &c./ and to ex- 
 preveni em P lif y tne causes that may prevent 
 the conjunction, required in order to 
 perception, between the thing and the sense, we may 
 remark, that] it is in consequence of great distance, that 
 a bird [flying very high up] in the sky is not perceived ; 
 [then again,] in consequence of extreme proximity, the 
 collyrium located in the eye [is not perceived by the eye 
 itself] ; a thing placed in [the inside of, or on the opposite 
 side of,] a wall [is not perceived], in consequence of the 
 obstruction ; from distraction of mind, the unhappy, or 
 other [agitated person], does not perceive the thing that is 
 at his side [or under his very nose] ; through its subtilty,
 
 BOOK I., APH. 109. 131 
 
 an atom [is not perceived] ; nor is a very small sound, 
 when overpowered by the sound of a drum ; and so on. 1 
 
 c. How [or, for which of the possible reasons just 
 enumerated,] comes the imperceptibleness of Nature ? In 
 regard to this, he declares : 2 
 
 : 3 (I 
 
 Aph. 109. Her imperceptibleness 
 
 The sullilty of Nature. * TUT I^LTI* 
 
 arises irom [her] subtilty. 
 
 a. 'Her/ i.e., Nature's, imperceptibleness is from 
 subtilty. By subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult 
 to investigate ; not [as a Naiyayika might, perhaps, here 
 prefer understanding the term,] the consisting of atoms ; 
 for Nature is [not atomic, in the opinion of the Sankhyas, 
 but] all-pervasive. 4 
 
 i 
 
 H 
 
 3 Aniruddha, according to the MSS. seen by me, has
 
 132 THE BANKHTA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. How, then, [it may be asked,] is [the existence of] 
 Nature determined ? To this he replies : l 
 
 N.Uure inferred fron, ^ ' 
 
 t/te. existence of produc- her existence is gathered from the 
 beholding of productions. 
 
 a. As the knowledge of [there being such things as] 
 atoms comes from the beholding of jars, &c., [which are ag- 
 glomerations], so the knowledge of Nature comes from the 
 beholding of products which have the three Qualities ; 2 
 [(see 62. a.) and the existence of which implies a 
 cause, to which the name of Nature is given, in which 
 these constituents exist from eternity], 
 
 b. Some [the Vedantis,] say that the world has Brahma as 
 its cause ; others [the Naiyayikas], that it has atoms as its 
 cause ; but our seniors [the transmitters of the Sankhya 
 doctrine], that it has Nature as its cause. So he sets forth 
 a doubt [which might naturally found itself] thereon : 3
 
 BOOK I., APH. 112. 133 
 
 Aph. 111. If [you throw out the 
 
 A douht thrown on the j / , , ^ - r . , 
 
 existence of Nature i> y doubt thatj it [viz., the existence of 
 
 Nature,] is not established, because of 
 the contradiction of asserters [of other 
 views, then you will find an answer in the next aphorism]. 
 
 a. 'Because of the contradiction of asserters [of the 
 Yedanta or Nyaya], it is not established/ i. e., Nature [as 
 asserted by the Sankhyas,] is not established. 1 
 
 b. But then, [to set forth the objection of these counter- 
 asserters] , if a product existed antecedently to its produc- 
 tion [as that product], then an eternal Nature [such as you 
 Sankhyas contend for,] would be proved to exist as the 
 [necessary] substratum thereof; since you will declare 
 that a cause is inferred only as the [invariable] accom- 
 panier of an effect ; but it is denied, by us asserters [of the 
 Vedanta, &c.], that the effect does exist [antecedently to 
 its production ; well,] if [this doubt be thrown out] : such 
 is the meaning 2 [of the aphorism]. 
 
 c. He states [his] doctrine [on this point] : 8 
 
 VTTrRT fa^T U3Rf?T* 
 
 : ii
 
 134 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Mutual d*M, ^k A P h ' 112 ' Still *<* 6ach I>ctrme] 
 
 nothing. { s established in the opinion of each, 
 
 a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive] . 
 
 a. If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of 
 the opponent, then [look you,] there is dissent against the 
 other side, too : so how could it be established ? If the 
 one side is established by there being inevitably attendant 
 the recognition of the constant accompanier, on the re- 
 cognition of that which is constantly accompanied [by it] , 
 it is the same with my [side], also : therefore [my] infe- 
 rence from effect [to cause] is not to be denied 2 [in this 
 peremptory fashion]. 
 
 b. Well, then, [the opponent may say], let [the infe- 
 rence of] cause from effect be granted ; how is it that this 
 [cause] is Nature, and nothing else, [such as Atoms, for 
 instance] ? To this he replies : 3 
 
 1 I have corrected the translator's ' But, since thus,' which 
 rendered the unwarranted reading (^ZJj cT > now replaced by 
 ^TUftf, the correlative of Tiff at the end of the preceding 
 Aphorism. Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 fa M fa <.ttfl fr 
 
 \\
 
 BOOK I., APH. 113. 135 
 
 Aph. 113. Because [if we were to 
 
 Nature the only hypo- . , , -L AT j. 1 
 
 thesis consistent with infer any other cause than Nature,] we 
 trio* appears. should have a contradiction to the 
 
 threefold [aspect which things really exhibit]. 
 
 a. Quality is threefold [see 61. a.], viz., Goodness, 
 Passion, and Darkness : there would be a contradiction to 
 these : such is the meaning. 2 
 
 b. The drift here is as follows : If the character of 
 cause [of all things around us] belonged to Atoms, or the 
 like, then there would be a contradiction to the fact of 
 being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and delusion, which 
 is recognizable in the world ; 3 [because nothing, we hold, 
 can exist in the effect, which did not exist in the cause 
 and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms]. 
 
 c. He now repels the doubt as to whether the produc- 
 tion of an effect is that of what existed [antecedently], or 
 of what did not exist :* 
 
 1 Vedanti Mahadeva ends this Aphorism with the word T| ; and 
 so does Vijnana, according to some MSS. Ed. 
 
 2
 
 136 THE 8ANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 114. The production of what is 
 ******* no ent i tv as a m an's horn, does not 
 take place. 
 
 a. Of that which, like the horn of a man, is not an en- 
 tity, even the production is impossible : such is the mean- 
 ing. And so the import is, that that effect alone which 
 [antecedently] exists is [at any time] produced. 1 
 
 b. He states an argument why an effect must be some 
 [previously existent] entity : 2 
 
 II 
 
 Aph. 115. Because of the rule, that 
 Cannot be there must be some material [of which 
 the product may consist]. 
 
 a. And only when both are extant is there, from the 
 presence of the cause, the presence of the effect. Other- 
 wise, everywhere and always, every [effect] might be 
 produced ; [the presence of the cause being, on the suppo- 
 sition, superfluous]. This he insists upon [as follows] : 3 
 
 i ^u cv?*4 ^ TO ?T 
 
 I
 
 BOOK I., APH. 117. 137 
 
 n 
 
 Aph. 116. Because everything is not 
 Ehe anything might possible everywhere and always, [which 
 
 occur at any time, any- ? J , L , 
 
 u-ktre. might be the case, if materials could be 
 
 dispensed with]. 
 
 a. That is to say : because, in the world, we see that 
 everything is not possible, i. e., that everything is not 
 produced ; ' everywhere/ i. e., in every place ; ' always/ 
 i. e., at all times. 1 
 
 b. For the following reason, also, he declares, there 
 is no production of what existed not 2 [antecedently]: 
 
 preexist, po- Aph. 117. Because it is that which is 
 My, in their causes, competent [to the making of anything] 
 that makes what is possible, [as a product of it]. 
 
 a. Because the being the material [of any future pro- 
 duct] is nothing else than the fact of [being it, potentially, 
 i. e., of] having the competency to be the product ; and 
 [this] competency is nothing else than the product's 
 condition as that of what has not yet come to pass : there- 
 fore, since ' that which is competent,' viz., the cause, 
 makes the product which is ' possible ' [to be made out of 
 it], it is not of any nonentity that the production takes
 
 138 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 place, [but of an entity, whose esse, antecedently, was 
 possibility] : such is the meaning. 1 
 b. He states another argument : 2 
 
 U W II 
 
 Aph. 118. And because it [the pro- 
 
 duct J is [ notliin g else than l the cause 
 
 [in the shape of the product] . 
 
 a. It is declared, in Scripture, that, previously to pro- 
 duction, moreover, there is no difference between the 
 cause and its effect ; and, since it is thereby settled that a 
 product is an entity, production is not of what [previously] 
 existed not : such is the meaning. 8 
 
 b. He ponders a doubt: 4 
 
 II W II 
 
 A ** dWbrte 4* 119 ' If P' te alleged that] 
 which is can be said to there is no possibility of that s becom- 
 ing which already is, [then the answer 
 will be found in the next aphorism]. 
 
 : a
 
 BOOK I., APH. 120. 139 
 
 a. That is to say : but then, if it be thus [that every 
 effect exists antecedently to its production], since the 
 effect [every effect,] must be eternal [without beginning 1 ], 
 there is no possibility of [or room for] the adjunction of 
 becoming, the adjunction of arising, in the case of a product 
 which is [already, by hypothesis,] in the shape of an 
 entity ; because the employment of [the term] ' arising ' 
 [or the fact of being produced] has reference solely to 
 what did not exist [previously] ; if this be urged : such is 
 the meaning. 1 
 
 6. He declares the doctrine [in regard to this point] : 2 
 
 H 
 
 Aph. 120. No ; [do not argue that 
 
 Production is only w b a f; j s canno t become ; for] the em- 
 
 mamfestation ; and so of J r 
 
 the opposite. ployment and the non-employment [ot 
 
 the term 'production'] are occasioned 
 by the manifestation [and the non-manifestation of what 
 is spoken of as produced, or not]. 
 
 a. 'No;' the view stated [in 119] is not the right one : 
 such is the meaning. 3 
 
 b. As the whiteness of white cloth [which has become] 
 dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c.,
 
 140 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 so, by the operation of the potter, is the pot brought into 
 manifestness ; [whereas], on the blow of a mallet, it becomes 
 hidden, 1 [and no longer appears as a pot\. 
 
 c. And manifestation [is no fiction of ours ; for it] is 
 seen ; for example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by 
 pressure ; of milk, from the cow, by milking ; of the statue, 
 which resided in the midst of the stone, by the operation of 
 the sculptor ; of husked rice, from rice in the husk, by 
 threshing ; &c. 2 
 
 d. Therefore, the employment and the non-employment 
 of the [term] ' the production of an effect ' are dependent on 
 manifestation, dependent on the manifestation of the effect : 
 that is to say, the employment of [the term] ' production ' 
 is in consequence of the manifestation [of what is spoken 
 of as produced] ; and the non- employment of [the term] 
 ' production ' is in consequence of there being no manifes- 
 tation [of that which is, therefore, not spoken of as pro- 
 duced] ; but [the employment of the term ' production ' is] 
 not in consequence of that's becoming an entity which was 
 not an entity. 8
 
 BOOK I., APH. 121. 141 
 
 e . But if [the employment of the term] ' production ' is 
 occasioned by [the fact of] manifestation, by what is occa- 
 sioned [the employment of the term] destruction ? l To this 
 he replies : 2 
 
 n 
 
 Aph. 121. Destruction [of anything] 
 is the resolution [ f tne thing spoken 
 of as destroyed,] into the cause [from 
 which it was produced]. 
 
 a. The resolution, by the blow of a mallet, of a jar into 
 its cause [i.e., into the particles of clay which constituted 
 the jar], to this are due both [the employment of] the term 
 ' destruction/ and the kind of action [or behaviour] be- 
 longing to anything 3 [which is termed its destruction]. 4 
 
 J H 
 
 1 ' If production is occasioned by manifestation, by what is de- 
 struction occasioned?' Aniruddha, here quoted, has, in my MSS. : 
 
 : ?T%- 
 
 4 ' From the blow of a mallet [results] the resolution of a jar into 
 its material cause : by this the destruction [of it] is occasioned. Such is the 
 meaning of the word [ndia], and [such is] the particular action [which]
 
 142 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. [But some one may say], if there were [only] a reso- 
 lution [of a product into that from which it arose] , a re- 
 surrection [or TraXiyyeveaia] of it might be seen ; and this 
 is not seen : well [we reply], it is not seen by blockheads ; 
 but it is seen by those who can discriminate. For ex- 
 ample, when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the 
 shape of earth [as when burned to ashes] ; and the earth 
 is changed into the shape of a cotton-tree ; and this [suc- 
 cessively] changes into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread 
 [spun again from the fruit ot the cotton-plant]. So is it 
 with all entities. 1 
 
 c. Pray [some one may ask], is [this] manifestation [that 
 you speak of under 120] something real, or something 
 not real? If it be something real [and which, therefore, 
 never anywhere ceases to be], then [all] effects [during 
 this constant manifestation] ought constantly to be per- 
 ceived; and, if it be not real, then there would be the 
 absence of [all] products, [in the absence of all manifes- 
 tation. Manifestation, therefore, must be something real; 
 and] there must be [in order to give rise to it,] another 
 manifestation of it, and of this another ; [seeing that a mani- 
 festation can be the result of nothing else than a manifes- 
 
 it expresses.' This is from Aniruddha, who, in the MSS. to which I 
 have access, has no TJj before ^r|4j! . Ed. 
 
 HFTT
 
 BOOK I., APH. 122. 143 
 
 tation, on the principle that an effect consists of neither 
 more nor less than its cause] ; and thus we have a reyressus 
 in infinitum. To this he replies :' 
 
 HOW manifestation A P*" 122. Because they seek each 
 an y entit ur """"^ ***** oi ^ GT reci P rocall y 5 3 as is the case with 
 seed and plant, [manifestation may 
 generate manifestation, from, eternity to eternity]. 
 
 a. Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations ; 
 still there is no fault ; for there is no starting-point ; as is 
 the case with seed and plant/ [which people may suppose 
 to have served, from eternity, as sources, one to another, 
 reciprocally]. 
 
 I ^Wrft 
 
 . the reading here given, is that of Ani- 
 V -s 
 
 ruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva. Vijnana has ^${*C| C|<l{ | . Ed. 
 
 3 Translating the Sankhya Aphorisms in the Sibliotheca Indica, 
 Dr. Ballantyne, adopting the lection anveshand, inconsiderately ren- 
 dered : ' You are to understand, that, successively,' instead of ' There 
 is a continual following of one after the other.' Vijnana explains 
 anveshand by anudhdvana ; and Vedanti Mahadeva has, in defini- 
 tion of it, the synonymous anusarana. Ed. 
 
 4
 
 144 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. He states another argument : l 
 
 : II S^ II 
 
 77* objections to the A P k ' 123 ' T > I** 
 
 theory of manifestation theory of 'manifestation* is as] blame- 
 
 less as [your theory of] 'production.' 
 a. Pray [let us ask], is product ion produced, or is it not ? 
 If it is produced, then of this [production of production] 
 there must be production ; so that there is a regressus in 
 infinUum, [such as you allege against our theory, under 
 121. c.]. If it be not produced, then, pray, is this 
 because it is unreal, or because it is eternal ? If because it 
 is unreal, then production never is at all ; so that it would 
 never be perceived, [as you allege that it is]. Again, if 
 [production is not something produced,] because it is eternal, 
 then there would be at, all times, the production of [all 
 possible] effects, [which you will scarcely pretend is the 
 case] . Again, if you say, since ' production ' itself consists 
 of production, what need of supposing an ulterior produc- 
 tion [of production] ? then, in like manner, [/ ask,] since 
 ' manifestation ' itself consists of manifestation, what need 
 of supposing an ulterior manifestation [of manifestation] ? 
 The view which you hold on this point is ours, also ; 2 [and
 
 BOOK I., APH. 124. 145 
 
 thus every objection stated or hinted under 121. c. } is 
 capable of being retorted]. 
 
 b. He [now] states the community of properties [that 
 exists] among the products of Nature, mutually : l 
 
 n ^g n 
 
 The characters com- Aph. 124. [A product of Nature is] 
 mon to all products. cau8eA> ^eternal, not all-pervading, 
 mutable, multitudinous, dependent, mergent. 
 
 a. ' Caused/ i.e., having a cause. ' Uneternal/ i.e., de- 
 structible. 'Not all-pervading/ i.e., not present every- 
 where. 'Mutable/ i.e., distinguished by the acts of leaving 
 [one form], and assuming [another form], &c. It [the 
 soul,] leaves the body it has assumed, [and, probably, takes 
 another] ; and bodies, &c., move [and are mutable, as is 
 notorious]. 'Multitudinous/ i.e., in consequence of the 
 distinction of souls ; [every man, e.g., having a separate 
 body]. ' Dependent/ [i.e.,] on its cause. 'Mergent/ that 
 is to say, it [i.e., every product, in due time,] is resolved 
 into that from which it originated. 3 
 
 2 Aniruddha omits ->|cij |ftf. Ed. 
 
 ~w 
 
 L
 
 146 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. [But, some one may say], if realities be the twenty- 
 five [which the Sankhyas enumerate (see 61), and no 
 more], pray, are such common operations as knowing, en- 
 joying, &c., absolutely nothing ; you accordingly giving up 
 what you see, [in order to save an hypothesis with which 
 what you see is irreconcilable] ? To this he replies : l 
 
 Aph. 125. There is the establish- 
 
 The Dualities of the m ent of these [twenty-four ' Qualities' 
 
 NyAya arc, implied in _ , r i /. 
 
 the term Nature. of the JNyaya, which you fancy that we 
 
 do not recognize, because we do not 
 explicitly enumerate them], either by reason that these 
 ordinary qualities [as contradistinguished from the three 
 Qualities of the Sankhya], &c., are, in reality, nothing 
 different ; or [to put it in another point of view,] because 
 they are hinted by [the term] Nature, [in which, like our 
 own three Qualities, they are implied].
 
 BOOK I., APH. 125. 147 
 
 a. Either from their being nothing different from the 
 twenty-four principles, ' in reality,' truly, quite evidently, 
 since the character of these [twenty-four] fits the ordi- 
 nary qualities, &c., [which you fancy are neglected in our 
 enumeration of things,] ' there is the establishment of 
 these,' i.e., there is their establishment [as realities,] 
 through their being implied just in those * [twenty-four 
 principles which are explicitly specified in the Sankhya]. 
 
 b. The word ' or ' shows that there is another alternative 
 [reply, in the aphorism, to the objection in question]. 'Or 
 because they are hinted by [the term] Nature/ that is to 
 say, the qualities, &c. [such as Knowledge], are established 
 [as realities], just because they are hinted by [the term] 
 Nature, by reason that [these] qualities are, mediately, 
 products of Nature ; for there is no difference between pro- 
 duct and cause. But the omission to mention them [ex- 
 plicitly] is not by reason of their not being at all. 2 
 
 c. He [next] mentions the points in which Nature and 
 [her] products agree : 8 
 
 II
 
 148 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 : II II 
 
 Aph. 126. Of both [Nature and her 
 
 The characters com- f L 
 
 mon to Nature and her products] the fact that they Consist OI 
 
 the three Qualities [ 61. a.], and that 
 they are irrational, &c., [is the common property], 
 
 a. Consisting of the three qualities, and being irrational, 
 [such in the meaning of the compound term with which 
 the aphorism commences]. By the expression ' &c.' is 
 meant [their] being intended for another, [see 66]. ' Of 
 both/ i.e., of the cause [viz., Nature], and of the effects 
 [viz., all natural products]. Such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He [next] states the mutual differences of character 
 among the three Qualities which [see 61] are the [consti- 
 tuent] parts of Nature : 2 
 
 II W II 
 
 Aph. 127. The Qualities [ 62] differ 
 to* three in character, mutually, by pleasantness, 
 unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which 
 forms, severally, the Qualities present themselves]. 
 
 a. f Pleasantness,' i. e., Pleasure. By the expression
 
 BOOK I., APH. 128. 149 
 
 ' &c.' ismeant Goodness (sattwa), which is light [i. e., not 
 heavy,] and illuminating. 'Unpleasantness/ i. e., Pain. 
 By the expression ' &c.' [in reference to this,] is meant 
 Passion (rajas), which is urgent and restless. l Lassitude/ 
 i. e., stupefaction. By the expression * &c/ is meant 
 Darkness (tamas), which is heavy and enveloping. It is 
 by these habits that the Qualities, viz., Goodness, Passion, 
 and Darkness, differ: such is the remainder, 1 [required to 
 complete the aphorism]. 
 
 b. At the time of telling their differences, he tells in 
 what respects they agree : 2 
 
 II 
 
 Aph. 128. Through Lightness and 
 
 In what respects the . , , . , ^ ,. . , n 
 
 Qualities agree, as well other habits the (Dualities mutually 
 
 agree and differ. 
 The meaning is as follows : the enunciation [in the 
 
 II 
 
 3 So reads Aniruddha only. Vijnana, Nagesa, and V 
 Mahadeva have . 
 Ed.
 
 150 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 shape of the term laghit, ( light,' is not one intended to call 
 attention to the concrete, viz., what things are light, but] 
 is one where the abstract [the nature of light things, viz., 
 ' lightness ' (laghutwa}~\ is the prominent thing. ' Through 
 Lightness and other habits,' i. e., through the characters 
 of Lightness, Restlessness, and Heaviness, the Qualities 
 differ. Their agreement is through what is hinted by the 
 expression ' and other/ And this consists in their mu- 
 tually predominating [one over another, from time to 
 time], producing one another, consorting together, and 
 being reciprocally present, [one in another], for the sake 
 of Soul. 1 
 
 b. By [the expressions, in 124,] ' caused/ &c., it is 
 declared that the ' Great one' [or Mind], &c., are products' 
 He states the proof of this : 2 . 
 
 Aph. 129. Since they are other than 
 " both [ Soul and Nature, the only two 
 uncaused entities], Mind and the rest 
 are products ; as is the case with a jar, or the like. 
 
 a. That is to say : like a jar, or the like, Mind and the 
 
 H 
 
 N
 
 BOOK I., APH. 131. 151 
 
 rest are products ; because they are something other than 
 the two which [alone] are eternal, viz., Nature and Soul. 1 
 b. He states another reason : ' 
 
 II 
 
 Aph. 130. Because of [their] measure, 
 
 A second proof. ...... -,. ^ , -V 
 
 [which is a limited one]. 
 
 a. That is to say : [Mind and the rest are products]; be- 
 cause they are limited in measure; 3 [whereas the only two 
 that are uncaused, viz., Nature and Soul, are unlimited]. 
 
 b. He states another argument : 4 
 
 Aph. 131. Because they conform [to 
 
 A tMrdproof 
 
 a. [Mind and the rest are products] ; because they well 
 [follow and] correspond with Nature; i. e., because the 
 Qualities of Nature [ 61] are seen in all things : 5 [and it 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 5
 
 152 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 is a maxim, that what is in the effect was derived from 
 the cause and implies the cause. 
 
 b. He states the same thing, 1 [in the next aphorism] : 
 
 Aph. 132. And, finally, because it is 
 through the power [of the cause alone, 
 that the product can do aught]. 
 
 a. It is by the power of its cause, that a product ener- 
 gizes, [as a chain restrains an elephant, only by the force 
 of the iron which it is made of] ; so that Mind and the rest, 
 being [except through the strength of Nature,] powerless, 
 produce their products in subservience to Nature. Other- 
 wise, since it is their habit to energize, they would at all 
 times produce their products, 2 [which it will not be alleged 
 that they do]. 
 
 b. And the word iti, in this place, is intended to notify 
 the completion of the set of [positive] reasons 3 [why Mind 
 and the others should be regarded as products]. 
 
 c. He [next] states [in support of the same assertion,] 
 the argument from negatives, 4 [i.e., the argument drawn 
 
 II 
 
 ii
 
 BOOK I., APH. 134. 153 
 
 from the consideration as to what becomes of Mind and 
 the others, when they are not products] : 
 
 -5TT 
 
 Aph. 133. On the quitting thereof 
 
 ^Converse proof of the [ qui tting tte condition of product], 
 
 there is Nature, or Soul, [into one or 
 other of which the product must needs have resolved 
 itself]. 
 
 a. Product and non-product ; such is the pair of alter- 
 natives. 'On the quitting thereof;' i. e., when Mind and 
 the rest quit the condition of product, Mind and the rest 
 [of necessity] enter into Nature, or Soul ; l [these two alone 
 being non-products]. 
 
 b. [But perhaps some one may say, that] Mind and the 
 rest may exist quite independently of the pair of alterna- 
 tives [just mentioned]. In regard to this, he declares 
 [as follows] : 2 
 
 i 
 
 SNagesahas
 
 154 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Mind and the rest 4ph. 134. If they were other than 
 
 product. that there is nothing self -existent, 
 
 besides Soul and Nature] . 
 
 a. If Mind and the rest were ( other than these two/ 
 i. e., than product or non-product [ 133], they would be 
 in the shape of what is 'void/ i. e., in the shape of 
 nonentity. 1 
 
 b. Well now, [some one may say,] why should it be 
 under the character of a product, that Mind and the rest 
 are a sign of [there being such a principle as] Nature ? 
 They may be [more properly said to be] a sign, merely in 
 virtue of their not occurring apart from it. To this he 
 replies : 2 
 
 irttli^rqicT II S$M II 
 
 Aph. 135. The cause is inferred from 
 the effect > [^ the case of Nature and 
 their ejects. ner products] ; because it accompa- 
 
 nies it. 
 
 a. That [other relation, other than that of material and 
 product, which you would make out to exist between 
 Nature and Mind,] exists, indeed, where the nature [or
 
 BOOK I., APH. 136. 155 
 
 essence] of the cause is not seen in the effect ; as [is the 
 case with] the inference, from the rising of the moon, that 
 the sea is swollen [into full tide ; rising, with maternal 
 affection, towards her son who was produced from her 
 bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the 
 Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur 
 apart from the rising of the moon, yet here the cause, 
 moon-rise, is not seen in the effect, tide ; and, consequently, 
 though we infer the effect from the cause, the cause could 
 not have been inferred from the effect]. But, in the 
 present case, since we see, in Mind and the rest, the cha- 
 racters of Nature, the cause is inferred from the effect. 
 ' Because it accompanies it/ i. e., because, in Mind and 
 the rest, we see the properties of Nature, 1 [i. e., Nature 
 herself actually present ; as we see the clay which is the 
 cause of a jar, actually present in the jar], 
 
 b. [But it may still be objected,] if it be thus, then let 
 that principle itself, the ' Great one ' [or Mind], be the 
 cause of the world : what need of Nature ? To this he 
 replies : 2
 
 156 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 136. The indiscrete, [Nature, 
 
 a"aeS ""* ^ must be inferred ] f rom its [discrete and 
 resolvable] effect, [Mind], in which are 
 the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature]. 
 
 a. ' It is resolved ;' such is the import of [the term] 
 linga, [here rendered] ' effect/ From that [resolvable 
 effect] , viz., the ' Great principle ' [or Mind], in which are 
 the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. And that 
 the 'Great principle/ in the shape of ascertainment [or 
 distinct intellection], is discrete [or limited] and perish- 
 able, is established by direct observation. Therefore [i. e., 
 since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into 
 something else,] we infer that into which it is resolvable, 1 
 [in other words, its ' cause,' here analogously termed lin- 
 gin } since ' effect ' has been termed lingo], 
 
 b. But then, [some one may say], still something quite 
 different may be the cause [of all things] : what need of 
 [this] Nature [of yours] ? In regard to this, he remarks [as 
 follows]: 8 
 
 II
 
 BOOK I., APH. 138. 157 
 
 Aph. 137. There is no denying 
 
 Why Nature, and no- r Jo 
 
 thing else, must be the that it [Nature,] IS J DCCaUSe of its 
 
 effects, [which will be in vain attri- 
 buted to any other source]. 
 
 a. Is the cause of this [world] a product, or not a pro- 
 duct ? If it were a product, then, the same being [with 
 equal propriety to be assumed to be] the case with its 
 cause, there would be a regressus in infinitum. If effects be 
 from any root [to which there is nothing antecedent], 
 then this is that [to which we give the name of Nature]. 
 ' Because of its effects,' that is to say, because of the effects 
 of Nature. There is no denying ' that it is,' i. e., that 
 Nature is. 1 
 
 b. Be it so, [let us grant,] that Nature is ; yet [the oppo- 
 nent may contend,] Soul positively cannot be ; for [if the 
 existence of causes is to be inferred from their products, 
 Soul cannot be thus demonstrated to exist, seeing that] 
 it has no products. In regard to this, he remarks [as 
 follows] : 2 
 
 cTf =RT-
 
 158 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 138. [The relation of cause 
 
 // is nut from any ._ 
 
 fffect that Soul is in- and effect is] not [alleged as] the means 
 *? rf * i of establishing [the existence of Soul] ; 
 
 because, as is the case with [the disputed term] ' merit/ 
 there is no dispute about there being such a kind of 
 thing ; [though what kind of thing is matter of dispute]. 
 
 a. There is no dispute about ' there being such a kind of 
 thing/ i.e., as to there being Soul, simply ; [since every- 
 body who does not talk stark nonsense must admit a Soul, 
 or self, of some kind] ; for the dispute is [not as to its 
 being, but] as to its peculiarity [of being], as [whether it 
 be] multitudinous, or sole, all-pervading, or not all-per- 
 vading, and so forth ; just as, in every [philosophical 
 system, or] theory, there is no dispute as to [there being 
 something to which may be applied the term] ' merit ' 
 (dharma) ; for the difference of opinion has regard to the 
 particular kind of [thing, such as sacrifices, according 
 to the Mimansa creed, or good works, according to the 
 Nyaya, which shall be held to involve] ' merit/ l 
 
 b. 'Not the means of establishing' that [viz., the exis- 
 tence of soul] ; i. e., the relation of cause and effect is 
 not the means of establishing it. This intends, ' I will 
 mention another means of establishing it/ 2 
 
 ftf- 
 II%r 
 
 H 
 
 N l
 
 BOOK I., APH. 140. 159 
 
 b. [But some one may say,] Souls are nothing else than 
 the body, and its organs, &c. : what need of imagining 
 anything else ? To this he replies : l 
 
 ApJi. 139. Soul is something else 
 
 Materialism scouted, , > .1110 
 
 than the body, &c. 
 
 a. [The meaning of the aphorism is] plain. 2 
 
 b. He propounds an argument in support of this : 8 
 
 ApA. 140. Because that which is 
 The discerptible it combined [and is, therefore, discerp- 
 
 ivbsen-ient to the indis- ., , -. . -T , , /. ., 
 
 cerptMe. tible,] is tor the sake ot some other, 
 
 [not discerptible]. 
 
 a. That which is discerptible is intended for something 
 else that is indiscerptible. If it were intended for some- 
 thing else that is discerptible, there would be a regressus 
 in Infinitum? 
 
 b. And combinedness [involving (see 67) discerptible- 
 
 II
 
 160 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 ness,] consists in the Qualities' making some product by 
 their state of mutual commixture ; or [to express it other- 
 wise,] combinedness is the state of the soft and the hard, 
 [which distinguishes matter from spirit]. And this exists 
 occultly in Nature, as well as the rest; because, other- 
 wise, discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in the 
 products thereof, viz., the 'Great one,' &C. 1 
 
 c. He elucidates this same point : 2 
 
 II 
 
 Apli. 141. [And Soul is something 
 
 Soul presents no else than the body, &c.] ; because there 
 
 indication of being ma- r in goulj the reverse of the three 
 
 terial. <- '-I 
 
 Qualities, &c. 
 
 a. Because there is, in Soul, ' the reverse of the three 
 Qualities,' &c., i. e., because they are not seen [in it]. By 
 the expression ' &c.' is meant, because the other characters 
 of Nature, also, are not seen 3 [in Soul]. 
 
 b. He states another argument :*
 
 BOOK I., APH. 143. 161 
 
 Apk. 142. And [Soul is not ma- 
 
 Another proof that , i i i p r T 
 
 Soul i, not material. terial ;] because of [its] superinten- 
 dence [over Nature]. 
 
 a. For a superintendent is an intelligent being ; and 
 Nature is unintelligent : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He states another argument : 2 
 
 HT^HFTTrT II <\$3 II 
 
 w \ 
 
 ApJi. 143. [And Soul is not ma- 
 Anotker proof. terial ;] because of [its] being the ex- 
 
 periencer. 
 
 a. It is Nature that is experienced ; the experiencer is 
 Soul. Although Soul, from its being unchangeably the 
 same, is not [really] an experiencer, still the assertion 
 [in the aphorism,] is made, because of the fact that the 
 reflexion of the Intellect befalls it, 8 [and thus makes it 
 seem as if it experienced (see 58. a.)]. 
 
 b. Efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. 
 Pray, is this [tor the benefit] of the Soul, or of Nature ;
 
 162 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 [since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the ex- 
 periencer] ? To this he replies : l 
 
 Aph. 144. [It is for Soul, and not 
 e> for Nature ;] because the exertions are 
 with a view to isolation [from all 
 qualities ; a condition to which Soul is competent, but 
 Nature is not]. 
 
 a. The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it 
 [so as to leave it in the state of absolute, solitary isolation 
 contemplated] ; because the three Qualities are its very 
 essence, [the departure of which from it would leave no- 
 thing behind], and because it would thus prove to be not 
 eternal, [whereas, in reality, it is eternal] . The isolation 
 (kaivalya) of that alone is possible of which the qualities 
 are reflexional, [and not constitutive (see 58. a.)] ; and 
 that is Soul. 8 
 
 b. Of what nature is this [Soul] ? To this he replies :* 
 
 : I HT 
 
 2 This lection is that of Aniruddha alone. Vijnana, Nagesa, and 
 Veil an ti Mahadeva end the Aphorism with Tf , necessitating ' and 
 because,' &c. Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 145. 163 
 
 II 
 
 Aph. 145. Since light does not per- 
 
 Tlie nature of the Soul. ... ,, "A ' * v vj. r i. 
 
 tain to the unintelligent, light, [which 
 must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the 
 Soul, which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is 
 manifest]. 
 
 a. It is a settled point, that the unintelligent is not 
 light ; [it is not self-manifesting]. If Soul, also, were 
 unintelligent [as the Naiyayikas hold it to be, in sub- 
 stance ; knowledge being, by them, regarded not as its 
 essence or substratum, but as one of its qualities], then 
 there would need to be another light for it; and, as 
 the simple theory, let Soul itself consist, essentially, of 
 light. 1 
 
 b. And there is Scripture [in support of this view ; for 
 example, the two following texts from the Brihaddranyaka 
 Upanishad 2 ] : ' Wherewith shall one distinguish that 
 wherewith one distinguishes all this [world] ? ' ' Where- 
 with shall one take cognizance of the cognizer ? ' s 
 
 c. [But the Naiyayika may urge,] let Soul be unintelli- 
 gent [in its substance], but have Intelligence as its 
 
 ?f?T frrTR i 
 
 2 II., 4,14; or Satapatha-brdhmana, xiv., 5,4,16. The t 
 sentences quoted are continuous. Ed. 
 
 I 
 
 \
 
 164 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 attribute. Thereby it manifests all things ; but it is not, 
 essentially, Intelligence. To this he replies : l 
 
 f^T^TT II <\X% II 
 
 Aph. 146. It [Soul,] has not Intel- 
 s no ^utility. ligencc as its attribute ; because it is 
 without quality. 
 
 a. If soul were associated with attributes, it would be 
 [as we hold everything to be, that is associated with 
 at tributes,] liable to alteration; and, therefore, there would 
 be no Liberation ; 2 [its attributes, or susceptibilities, 
 always keeping it liable to be affected by something or 
 other ; or, the absolutely simple being the only un- 
 alterable]. 
 
 b. He declares that there is a contradiction to Scripture 
 in this, 3 [i. e., in the view which he is contending against] : 
 
 ftnr^r i \ HSU i m^rnc* ^TVT? H ^8$ 11 
 
 Sen ure it hvhtr ' ' DO denial [to be 
 
 evidence than supposed allowed] of what is established by 
 Scripture ; because the [supposed] 
 evidence of intuition for this [i. e., for the existence of 
 qualities in the Soul,] is confuted [by the Scriptural de- 
 claration of the contrary]. 
 
 ^TTf II 
 II 
 
 II
 
 BOOK I., APH. 148. 165 
 
 a. The text, 'For this Soul is uncompanioned/ l &c., 
 would be confuted, if there were any annexation of 
 qualities 2 [to Soul : and the notion of confuting Scripture 
 is not to be entertained for a moment]. 
 
 d. But the literal meaning [of the aphorism] is this, 
 that the fact, established by Scripture, of its [i. e., soul's,] 
 being devoid of qualities, &c., cannot be denied ; because 
 the Scripture itself confutes the [supposed] intuitive 
 perception thereof, i. e., the [supposed] intuitive perception 
 of qualities, &c., 3 [in the soul]. 
 
 II ^1: II 
 
 Aph. 148. [If soul were unintelli- 
 gent,] it would not be witness [of its 
 9 fnt - own comfort,] in profound [and dream- 
 
 less] sleep, &c. 
 
 a. If soul were unintelligent, then, in deep sleep, &c., 
 it would not be a witness, a knower. But that this is not 
 
 1 Brihaddranyaka Upanishad, iv., 3, 1C ; or Satapatha-brdh- 
 mana, xiv., 7, 1, 17. Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 I Ndgesa. 
 
 I Vedanti Mahadeva. Ed.
 
 166 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 the case [may be inferred] from the phenomenon, that ' I 
 slept pleasantly' By the expression ' &c.' [in the aphorism,] 
 dreaming is included. 1 
 
 6. The Vedantis say that * soul is one only'; and so, 
 again, 'For Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void 
 of blemish :' ' Being one [only] , it is divided [into a 
 seeming multitude] by Nature (sakti), i.e., Illusion (mdya), 
 but not through its own essence, [to which there does not 
 belong multiplicity].' In regard to this, he says [as 
 follows] : 2 
 
 Aph. 149. From the several allot- 
 
 o/Hu"." 1 lultiplicity ment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of 
 souls [is to be inferred]. 
 
 a. ' Birth, &c.' By the '&c.,' growth, death, &c., are 
 included. ' From the several allotment } of these, i. e., 
 from their being appointed ; [birth to one, death to another, 
 and so on]. 'A multiplicity of souls ;' that is to say, souls 
 
 J \ rf^IT "^T I 
 
 ^TT^TT 
 
 : i ^r^if n 
 
 Vedanti Mahadeva has, agreeably to some copies of his work,
 
 BOOK I., APH. 150. 167 
 
 are many. If soul were one only, then, when one is born, 
 alt must be born, &C. 1 
 
 b. He ponders, as a doubt, the opinion of the others, 2 
 [viz., of the Yedantis] : 
 
 TRPTR 
 
 ApJi. 150. [The Yedantis say, that,] 
 
 ' tliere bein a difference in its invest- 
 ments, moreover, multiplicity attaches 
 [seemingly,] to the one [Soul] ; as is the case with Space, 
 by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that they 
 occupy]. 
 
 a. As Space is one, [and yet], in consequence of the 
 difference of adjuncts, [as] jars, &c., when a jar is destroyed, 
 it is [familiarly] said, 'the jar's space is destroyed' [for 
 then there no longer exists a space marked out by the jar] ; 3 
 so, also, on the hypothesis of there being but one Soul, 
 since there is a difference of corporeal limitation, on the 
 destruction thereof, [i. e., of the limitation occasioned by 
 any particular human body], it is merely a way of talking 
 [to say], 'The soul has perished/ [This, indeed, is so 
 far true, that there is really no perishing of Soul ; but 
 
 3 Vide supra, p. 53, Aph. 51, &c. Ed.
 
 168 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 then it is true,] also on the hypothesis that there are many 
 souls. [And it must be true :] otherwise, since Soul is 
 eternal, [without beginning or end, as both parties agree], 
 how could there be the appointment of birth and death ? l 
 
 b. He states [what may serve for] the removal of doubt* 
 [as to the point in question] : 
 
 Aph. 151. The investment is differ- 
 ' ent > [^cording to the Vedantfc], but 
 not that to which this belongs ; [and 
 the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen]. 
 
 a. ' The investment is different/ [there are diverse bodies 
 of John, Thomas, &c.] ; ' that to which this belongs/ i. e. 
 that [Soul] to which this investment [of body, in all its 
 multiplicity,] belongs, is not different, [but is one only] : 
 such is the meaning. And, [now consider], in consequence 
 of the destruction of one thing, we are not to speak as if 
 there were the destruction of something else ; because this 
 [if it were evidence of a thing's being destroyed,] would 
 present itself where it ought not ; 3 [the destruction of De- 
 
 3 Vide tupra, p. 16, note 3. Ed.
 
 BOOK I., APH. 152. 
 
 169 
 
 vadatta, e. g., presenting itself, as a fact, when we are con- 
 sidering the case of Yajnadatta, who is not, for that rea- 
 son, to be assumed to be dead] : and, on the hypothesis 
 that Soul is one, the [fact that the Vedanta makes an] im- 
 putation of inconsistent conditions is quite evident ; since 
 Bondage and Liberation do not [and cannot,] belong 
 [simultaneously] to one. But the conjunction and [simul- 
 taneous] n on- con junction of the sky [or space] with smoke, 
 &c., [of which the Yedanti may seek to avail himself, as an 
 illustration,] are not contradictory ; for Conjunction is not 
 pervasion j 1 [whereas, on the other hand, it would be non- 
 sense to speak of Bondage as affecting one portion of a 
 monad, and Liberation as affecting another portion ; as a 
 monkey may be in conjunction with a branch of a tree, 
 without being in conjunction with the stem]. 
 
 b. What may be [proved] by this? To this he 
 
 The SdnUyai.fr* 
 
 from the charye of ah- 
 
 i'trdity to which the Ve- 
 
 ddnta is open. 
 
 A P h - 152 ' Thu8 > P" 6 " ^taking the 
 
 Sankhva view,] there is no imputation 
 
 J .. J ,. . r O 1 
 
 of contradictory conditions to [a, boul 
 
 cT 
 
 2 
 
 I ^TcT
 
 170 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 supposed to be] everywhere present as one [infinitely 
 extended monad]. 
 
 a. 'Thus/ i. e., [if you regard the matter rightly,] ac- 
 cording to the manner here set forth, there is no ' imputa- 
 tion/ or attribution, ' of incompatible conditions/ Bondage, 
 Liberation, &c., to a soul ' existing everywhere/ through- 
 out all, as one, 1 [i. e., as a monad]. 
 
 b. [But, the Vedanti may contend,] we see the condition 
 of another attributed even to one quite different ; as, e.g., 
 Nature's character as an agent [is attributed] to Soul, 
 which is another [than Nature]. To this he replies : * 
 
 II 
 
 Aph, 153. Even though there be 
 " " Ot [^puted to Soul] the possession of the 
 condition of another, this [i.e., that it 
 really possesses such,] is not established by the imputa- 
 tion ; because it [Soul,] is one [absolutely simple, unquali- 
 fied entity]. 
 
 a. [The notion] that Soul is an agent is a mistake ; be- 
 cause, that Soul is not an agent is true, and the imputa- 
 tion [of agency to Soul] is not true, and the combination of 
 the true and the untrue is not real. Neither birth nor
 
 BOOK I., APH. 154. 171 
 
 death or the like is compatible with Soul ; because it is 
 uncompanioned, 1 [i. e., unattended either by qualities or by 
 actions]. 
 
 b. [But the Vedanti may say :] and thus there will be 
 an opposition to the Scripture. For, according to that, 
 ' Brahma is one without a second :' 5 ' There is nothing here 
 diverse ; death after death does he [deluded man,] obtain, 
 who here sees, as it were, a multiplicity.' 3 To this he 
 replies : * 
 
 Aph. 154. There is no opposition to 
 e, shaking of the Scriptures [declaratory] of the 
 
 Soul as one, is siteakmg . r *- .. , 
 
 non-duality [of Soul] ; because the 
 
 reference [in such texts,] is to the 
 genus, [or to Soul in general]. 
 
 a. But there is no opposition [in our Sankhya view of 
 the matter,] to the Scriptures [which speak] of the oneness 
 of Soul ; because those [Scriptural texts] refer to the genus. 
 
 2 Chhdndogya Upanishad, vi., 1. But the word S(^\ does not 
 occur there. Ed. 
 
 3 Katha Upanishad, iv., 1 1. Instead of ^TTRT T?T however, 
 the con-ect reading is * \ -t \ ft . -Ed. 
 
 I cT^T
 
 172 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 By genus we mean sameness, the fact of being of the same 
 nature : and it is to this alone that the texts about the 
 non-duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indi- 
 visibleness [of Soul, meaning, by its indivisibleness, the 
 impossibility that there should be more souls than one, 
 that is meant in such texts] ; because there is no motive 
 [for viewing Soul as thus indivisible] : such is the mean- 
 ing. 1 
 
 6. But then, [the Yedanti may rejoin,] Bondage and 
 Liberation are just as incompatible in any single soul, on 
 the theory of him who asserts that souls are many, [and 
 that each is at once bound and free]. To this he replies :' 
 
 3 All the commentators but Aniruddha read . 
 
 and they differ widely from him, as they often do, in their elucidations 
 of the Aphorism. Nagesa's explanation of it is as follows
 
 BOOK I., APH. 155. 173 
 
 Apli. 155. Of him [i. e., of that soul,] 
 The compatibility of b y w k om the cause of Bondage is 
 
 Bondage and Freedom. J . & 
 
 known, there is that condition [of iso- 
 lation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact, 
 that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he, really, was 
 not bound, even when he seemed to be so]. 
 
 a. B} T whom is known ( the cause of bondage/ viz., the 
 non-perception that Nature and soul are distinct, of him, 
 t by the perception ' [of it], i. e., by cognizing the distinc- 
 tion, there is ' that condition/ viz., the condition of isola- 
 tion, [the condition (see 144) after which the soul aspires. 
 The soul in Bondage which is no real bondage may be 
 typified by Don Quixote, hanging, in the dark, from the 
 ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and holding on 
 for life, as he thought, from not knowing that his toes 
 were within six inches of the ground]. 1 
 
 T||7T y^f^fj | The substance of this is, that, only in the eyes 
 
 of the mistaken man who is influenced by the notorious cause of 
 bondage, or in other words, who is unable to discriminate, is the 
 essential condition of souls multeity, a condition the rever.-e of the 
 one before referred to, unity ; and that is inconclusive. The Aphorism, 
 thus understood, must be assumed to proceed from aVedantic disputant 
 against the Sankhya. Whether as read by Aniruddha, or as read by 
 others, it is susceptible, with reference to the previous context, of a 
 variety of renderings. Ed. 
 
 cT|q 
 
 II
 
 174 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. [Well, rejoins the Vedanti,] Bondage [as you justly 
 observe,] is dependent on non-perception [of the truth], 
 and is not real. It is a maxim, that non-perception is 
 removed by perception ; and, on this showing, we recog- 
 nize as correct the theory that Soul is one, but not that 
 of Soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies : l 
 
 Aph. 156. No : because the blind do 
 m jeer* the Vedanti. not see, can those who have their eye- 
 sight not perceive ? 
 
 a. What ! because a blind man does not see, does also 
 one who has his eyesight not perceive ? There are many 
 arguments [in support of the view] of those who assert 
 that souls are many, [though you do not see them] : such 
 is the meaning. 2 
 
 b. He declares, for the following reason, also, that Souls 
 are many : 3
 
 BOOK I., APH. 157. 175 
 
 1 H IMS n 
 
 Aph. 157. Yamadeva, as well as 
 
 So^aremany^ * others > has been liberated, [if we are 
 to believe the Scriptures ; therefore] 
 non-duality is not [asserted, in the same Scriptures, in the 
 Ved antic sense]. 
 
 a. In the Puranas, &c., we hear, * Yamadeva has been 
 liberated,' ' Suka has been liberated/ and so on. If Soul 
 were one, since the liberation of all would take place, on 
 the liberation of one, the Scriptural mention of a diversity 
 [of separate and successive liberations] would be self- 
 contradictory. 3 
 
 b. [But the Yedanti may rejoin :] on the theory that 
 Souls are many, since the world has been from eternity, 
 and from time to time some one or other is liberated, so, 
 by degrees, all having been liberated, there would be a 
 universal void. But, on the theory that Soul is one, 
 Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct, [which, 
 the Yedanti flatters himself, does not involve the incon- 
 sistency which he objects to the Sankhya]. To this he 
 replies : 3 
 
 1 Aniruddha perhaps has 
 
 Sd,
 
 176 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 II ^Mb II 
 
 ApJi. 158. Though it [the world,] 
 
 Ai it has been, to will since, Up to 
 
 this day, there has not been [an entire 
 emptying of the world] , the future, also, [may be infe- 
 rentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore] . 
 
 a. Though the world has leen from eternity, since, up 
 to this day, we have not seen it become a void, there is no 
 proof [in support] of the view that there will be Libera- 
 tion l [of all Souls, so as to leave a void]. 
 
 6. He states another solution [of the difficulty] : 2 
 
 ii 
 
 The stream of mun- A P L 159 ' A ? n 
 
 done things will flow on everywhere [will they continue to go 
 on : hence there will be] no absolute 
 cutting short [of the course of mundane things]. 
 
 a. Since souls are [in number,] without end, though 
 Liberation successively take place, there will not be [as a 
 necessary consequence,] a cutting short of the world. As 
 now, so everywhere, i.e., in time to come, also, there
 
 BOOK I., APH. 159. 177 
 
 will be Liberation, but not, therefore, an absolute cutting 
 short [of the world]; since of this the on-flowing is 
 eternal. l 
 
 b. On the theory, also, that Liberation is the departure 
 of an adjunct [ 157. .], we should find a universal void ; 
 so that the doubt 2 is alike, [in its application to either 
 view] . Just as there might be an end of all things, on 
 the successive liberation of many souls, so, since all ad- 
 juncts would cease, when [the fruit of] works [this fruit 
 being in the shape of Soul's association with body, as its 
 adjunct,] came to an end, the world would become void, 3 
 [on the Vedanta theory, as well as on the Sankhya]. 
 
 c. Now, [if the Yedanti says,] there will not be a void, 
 because adjuncts are [in number,] endless, then it is the 
 same, on the theory that Souls are many. And thus [it 
 has been declared] : 4 ' For this very reason, indeed, though 
 those who are knowing [in regard to the fact that Nature 
 
 2 Anuyoga, here rendered ' doubt/ rather signifies ' difficulty 
 raised,' * question.' Ed. 
 
 3 
 
 II 
 
 4 The source of the stanza here translated I have not ascer- 
 tained. Ed. 
 
 N
 
 178 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 and Soul are different], are continually being liberated, 
 there will not be a void, inasmuch as there is no end of 
 multitudes of souls in the universe.' 1 
 
 d. Pray, [some one may ask,] is Soul [essentially] bound ? 
 Or free ? If [essentially] bound, then, since its essence 
 cannot depart, there is no Liberation ; for, if it [the es- 
 sence,] departed, then it [Soul,] would [cease, with the 
 cessation of its essence, and] not be eternal. If [on the 
 other hand, you reply that it is essentially] free, then 
 meditation and the like [which you prescribe for the attain- 
 ment of liberation,] are unmeaning. To this he replies : * 
 
 *wr: 3 n <^o 11 
 
 CRT ^ i 
 
 I ^TcT ^TT? II 
 
 3 This reading I find nowhere, but, instead of it, 
 
 'Clear of both conditions [i.e., that of being bound and 
 that of being freed, is Soul, which is eternally free].' 
 
 Messrs. Bohtlingk and Roth call Dr. Ballantyne's ^^^Tf: 
 ' Fehlerhaft fur ^TZJ^^tf / Their substitute is, so far as I know, 
 conjqptuxaL 
 
 According to most interpreters, however, the preceding Aphorism 
 has reference to the question whether it be only after Soul is
 
 BOOK I., APH. 160. 179 
 
 Soul it ever free, Aph. 160. It [Soul,] IS altogether 
 
 though it may seem f ree r^ see minglyl multiform, [or 
 
 bound in all sorts of ' L . o JJ 
 
 ways. different, in appearance, from a free 
 
 thing, through a delusive semblance of being bound]. 
 
 a. It is not bound ; nor is it liberated ; but it is ever 
 free, [see 19]. But the destruction of ignorance [as to 
 its actual freedom,] is effected by meditation, &C., 1 [which 
 are, therefore, not unmeaning, as alleged in 159. rf.]. 
 
 b. It has been declared that Soul is a witness. 2 Since it 
 is a witness [some one may object], even when it has at- 
 tained to discriminating [between Nature and Soul], there 
 
 liberated, or, on the other hand, at all times, that simplicity, or un- 
 changing fixedness, of essential condition (eJcarupatwa) is predi- 
 cable of it. 
 
 Introductions to the Aphorism, with expositions of it, here follow. 
 Vedanti Mahadeva 
 
 i Veddnti 
 
 Mahadeva : 
 
 ^f?r 
 
 Nagesa : 
 
 ^ | Also see the commentaries on the Sdnkhya- 
 kdrikd, st. 19 ; and 144. a., at p. 162, supra. Ed. 
 
 2 Vide supra, p. 56, 54. a., and p. 165, 148. Ed.
 
 180 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 is no Liberation ; [Soul, on this showing, being not an 
 absolutely simple entity, but something combined with the 
 character of a spectator or witness]. To this he replies : l 
 
 II ^s II 
 
 Aph. 161. It [Soul,] is a witness, 
 jiow Soul u a spec- through its connexion with sense- 
 organs, [which quit it, on liberation]. 
 
 a. A sense-organ is an organ of sense. Through its 
 connexion therewith, it [Soul.] is a witness. And where 
 is [its] connexion with sense-organs, [these products of 
 Nature (see 61)], when discrimination [between Nature 
 and Soul] has taken place ? s 
 
 b. [Well, some one may ask], at all times of what nature 
 is Soul ? To this he replies : * 
 
 II 
 
 i 
 
 2 Only Aniruddha recognizes this reading. Vijnana, Nagesa, 
 and Vedanti Mahadeva have ^ff^Jf^O Ed. 
 
 3 I cTrti ^^n^nfrci* I f^f- 
 
 I ^Trf ^T II 
 
 5 Vijnana says that this Aphorism and that next following specify 
 notes of Soul which establish that its essential condition is neither
 
 BOOK I., APH. 163. 181 
 
 The real condition of Aph. 162. [The nature of Soul is] 
 Soul - constant freedom. 
 
 a. ' Constant freedom : ' that is to say ; Soul is, positively, 
 always devoid of the Bondage called Pain [see 1 and 19]; 
 because Pain and the rest are modifications of Under- 
 standing, 1 [which (see 61) is a modification of Nature, 
 from which Soul is really distinct]. 
 
 ii ^ n 
 
 Aph. 163. And, finally, [the nature 
 Soui't indifference. of Soul is] indifference [to Pain and 
 Pleasure, alike]. 
 
 a. By ' indifference ' is meant non-agency. The word iti 
 [rendered 'finally,'] implies that the exposition of the 
 Nature of Soul is completed. 2 
 
 b. [Some one may say, the fact of] Soul's being an 
 agent is declared in Scripture. How is this, [if, as you 
 say, it be not an agent] ? To this he replies : 3 
 
 of those alluded to in Aph. 160 : xJ^TOTl^THT <=! m 4 ^ 
 
 II 
 
 3 
 
 II
 
 182 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 n 
 
 soul, M is .^. [Soul's/* of] being an 
 
 not an agent, is yet agent is, through the influence [of 
 Nature], 1 from the proximity of Intel- 
 lect, from the proximity of Intellect. 
 
 a. [Its] ' being an agent/ i. e., Soul's fancy of being an 
 agent, is ' from the proximity of Intellect/ ' through the 
 influence ' of Nature, 2 [(see 19,) of which Intellect 
 (see 61) is a modification], 
 
 b. The repetition of the expression ' from the proximity 
 of Intellect ' is meant to show that we have reached the 
 conclusion : for thus do we see [practised] in the Scrip- 
 tures, 3 [e. g., where it is said, in the Veda : ' Soul is to be 
 known ; it is to be discriminated from Nature : thus it does 
 not come again, it does not come again' 4 ] . 
 
 1 The translator inadvertently omitted the words ' through/ &c. 
 Ed. 
 
 II 
 
 * These words are taken from Colebrooke : see his Miscellaneous 
 Essays (Prof. Cowell's edition), vol. i., p. 249. The original is found, 
 as a quotation, &c., in Vachaspati Misra's Tattwa-kaumudi, near 
 the beginning of the comment on st. 2 of the Sdnkhya-kdrikd :
 
 BOOK I., APH. 164. 183 
 
 c. So much, in this Commentary 1 on the illustrious 
 Kapila's Aphorisms declaratory of the Sankhya, for the 
 First Book, that on the [topics or] subject-matter 2 [of the 
 Sankhya system]. 
 
 I or 
 
 there is a variant, ^T^*|t, in one of my MSS. The words 
 JJO ylJO are obviously a gloss ; and I have punctuated ac- 
 
 cordingly. They are preceded, I take it, by one text, and are followed 
 by another. The source of the first has not been discovered. For 
 what is very similar to the second, see the conclusion of the Chhdn- 
 doyya Upanishad. Colebrooke's 'thus' is unrepresented in the 
 Sanskrit as I find it. Ed. 
 
 1 Aniruddha's is intended, though many passages in the preceding 
 pages are from other commentaries. JSd. 
 
 ri i 
 
 END OF BOOK I.
 
 184 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 a. The subject-matter [of the Institute] has been set forth 
 [in Book I.]. Now, in order to prove that it is not the Soul 
 that undergoes the alterations [observable in the course of 
 things], he will tell, very diffusely, in the Second Book, how 
 the creation is formed out of the Primal Principle. There, 
 too, the nature of the products of Nature is to be declared 
 fully, with a view to the very clear discrimination of Soul 
 from these. Therefore, according to [the verses], 1 
 
 b. ' Whoso rightly knows its changes, and the Primal 
 Agent [Nature], and Soul, the eternal, he, thirsting no 
 more, is emancipated/ 
 
 c. we remark, that, with reference to the character, &c., 
 of Emancipation, all the three [things mentioned in 
 these verses] require to be known. And here, in the first 
 place, with advertence to the consideration, that, if Nature, 
 which is unintelligent, were to create without a motive, we 
 should find even the emancipated one bound, he states the 
 motive for the creation of the world : 2 
 
 1 Here add, 'in the Moksha-dharma, &c.'; and read, instead 
 of ' we remark .... Emancipation,' ' there is the declaration that.' 
 
 The verses quoted are from the Mahdbhdrata, xii., 7879, and occur 
 in Chap, ccxvi., in the Section entitled Moksha-dharma. Ed. 
 
 fn^facH I *u*flcf
 
 BOOK II., APH. 1. 185 
 
 Aph. 1. Of Nature [the agency, or 
 
 The motive for creation. , . . . i - i 
 
 the being a maker, is] for the 
 emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently,] 
 emancipated, or else for [the removal of] itself. 
 
 a. The expression ' the being a maker ' is borrowed 
 from the last aphorism of the preceding Book. Nature 
 makes the world for the sake of removing the pain, which 
 is [really] a shadow [Book I., 58], belonging to the Soul, 
 which is, in its very nature, free from the bonds of pain ; or 
 [to explain it otherwise,] for the sake of removing pain. 
 [connected] by means of but a shadowy link ; or [on the 
 other hand,] it is ' for the sake of itself, ' that is to say, for 
 the sake of removing the actually real pain [which consists] 
 of itself. 1 
 
 ftrer *m 
 
 M <s ^ t*J TtTR I 

 
 186 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 I. Although experience [of good and ill], also, as well as 
 Emancipation, is a motive for creation, yet Emancipation 
 alone is mentioned, inasmuch as it is the principal one. 1 
 
 c. But then, if creation were for the sake of Emancipa- 
 tion, then, since Emancipation might take place through 
 creation once for all, there would not be creation again 
 and again ; to which he replies : 2 3 
 
 n * n 
 
 Apli. 2. Because this [Emancipation] 
 
 Successive creation why. r i i * r -\ L -IP ' 
 
 is [only] of him that is void of passion. 
 
 a. Emancipation does not take place through creation 
 once for all ; but it is [the lot only] of him that has been 
 extremely tormented many times by the various pain of 
 birth, death, sickness, &c. ; and, therefore, [successive 
 creation goes on] because Emancipation actually occurs in 
 the case only of him in whom complete dispassion has 
 
 : n 
 
 u 
 
 3 For another rendering of the original of a., b., and c., see my 
 translation of the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 62. Ed.
 
 BOOK II., APH. 3. 187 
 
 arisen through the knowledge of the distinctness of Nature 
 and Soul : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He tells the reason why dispassion does not take place 
 through creation once for all : 2 
 
 Aph. 3. It is not effected by the 
 
 rnn. ******** mere hearing ; because of the forcible- 
 
 ness of the impressions 4 from eternity. 
 
 a. Even the hearing [of Scripture, in which the distinct- 
 ness of Nature from Soul is enounced,] comes [not to all 
 alike, but only] through the merit of acts done in many 
 births, [or successive lives]. Even then dispassion is not 
 established through the mere hearing, but through direct 
 cognition ; and direct cognition does not take place sud- 
 denly, because of the forcibleness of false impressions that 
 
 * II 
 
 35 This reading is peculiar to Vijnana, but seems to have some 
 countenance from Nagesa. Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva have 
 
 4 Vdsand. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.
 
 188 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 have existed from eternity, but [the required direct cogni- 
 tion takes place] through the completion of Concentration ; 
 and there is an abundance of obstacles to Concentration 
 [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book II] : therefore, only after 
 many births do dispassion and Emancipation take place at 
 any time of any one at all : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He states another reason for the continuous flow of 
 creation : 2 
 
 reason for Aph. 4. Or as people have, severally, 
 
 continuous creation. many dependants. 
 
 a. As householders have, severally, many who are depen- 
 dent upon them, according to the distinctions of wife, 
 children, &c., so, also, the Qualities, viz., Goodness, &c., 
 [Book I., 61. &.] have to emancipate innumerable Souls, 
 severally. Therefore, however many Souls may have been 
 emancipated, the onflow of creation takes place for the 
 emancipation of other Souls ; for Souls are [in number,] 
 without end : such is the meaning. And so the Yoga 
 aphorism [Book II., 22] says : ' Though it have ceased 
 
 : rf
 
 BOOK II., APH. 5. 189 
 
 to be, in respect of him that has done the work, it has not 
 [absolutely] ceased to be ; because it is common to others 
 besides him.' 1 
 
 b. But then why is it asserted that Nature alone creates, 
 when, by the text, ' From that or this Soul proceeded the 
 Ether,' 2 &c., it is proved that Soul, also, creates ? To this 
 he replies : 3 
 
 H M n 
 
 Aph. 5. And, since it [the character 
 creat 
 follow 
 to Soul. 
 
 Nature, not Soul, o f creator,] belongs, really, to Nature, 
 it follows that it is fictitiously attributed 
 
 ^ <fzu 
 
 cT^TT 
 
 - Taittiriya UpanisJiad, ii., 1. But read : ' From this, from 
 this same self,' &c. Ed. 
 
 3
 
 190 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. And, since Nature's character of creator is decided 
 to be real, there is, really, in the Scriptures, only a fictitious 
 [or figurative] attribution of creativeness to Soul. 1 
 
 b. But then, if it be thus, how is it laid down that Nature's 
 creativeness, moreover, is real; since we are told [in 
 Scripture,] that creation, moreover, is on a level with a 
 dream ? To this he replies : 2 
 
 : 3 II If ll 
 
 The, reality of Na- Aph. 6. Since it is proved from the 
 products. 
 
 a. That is to say : because the real creative character 
 of Nature is established just * from the products, ' viz., by 
 that evidence [see Book I., 110,] which acquaints us with 
 the subject [in which the creative character inheres] ; for 
 products are real, inasmuch as they produce impressions 
 and exhibit acts. 4 [The reality of eternal things is 
 established here, just as it is by Locke, who says : c I think 
 
 fair 
 
 8 Aniruddha alone has oRT^T^Cl ITM I ^*, which reading 
 Dr. Ballantyne at first accepted. JEd.
 
 BOOK II., APH. 7. 191 
 
 God has given me assurance enough as to the existence of 
 things without me ; since, by their different application, I 
 can produce, in myself, both pkasure and pain (artha), 
 which is one great concernment of my present state. ' 
 These existing products being admitted, the Sankhya 
 argues that they must have a cause ; and, as this cause 
 means neither more nor less than something creative, 
 whatever proves the existence of the cause proves, at the 
 same time, its creative character.] 
 
 b. But then [it may be said], on the alternative [see 1] 
 that Nature works for herself, she must energize with 
 reference to the emancipated Soul, also. To this he replies : l 
 
 II 3 II 
 
 Aph. 7. The rule is with reference 
 Who escape nature, to one knowing ; just as escape from 
 a thorn. 
 
 a. 'The word chef ana here means 'one knowing;' because 
 the derivation is from chit, 'to be conscious'. As one and 
 the same thorn is not a cause of pain to him who, being 
 f one knowing/ i.e., aware of it, escapes from that same, but 
 actually is so in respect of others; so Nature, also, is escaped 
 by ' one knowing/ one aware, one who has accomplished 
 the matter: to him it does not consist of pain ; but to others, 
 who are not knowing, it actually is a cause of pain : such is 
 
 ii 
 
 I cRTf II
 
 192 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 the ' rule/ meaning, the distribution. Hence, also, of 
 Nature, which is, by its own nature, bound [inasmuch as it 
 consists of bonds], the self-emancipation is possible; so 
 that it does not energize with reference to the emancipated 
 Soul ' [ 6. &.]. 
 
 b. But then [suggests some one], what was said [at 5], 
 that, in respect of Soul, the creative character is only 
 fictitiously attributed, this is not proper ; because it is 
 fitting, that, by the conjunction of Nature, Soul, also, should 
 be modified into Mind, &c. ; for a modification of wood, 
 &c., resembling earth, &c., through the conjunction of 
 earth, &c., is seen : to which he replies : 2 
 
 s 
 
 r TT 
 
 ff Tj
 
 BOOK II., APH. 8. 193 
 
 Aph. 8. Even though there be con- 
 
 Soul not creative, though . . r ,-, . . , , _ . 
 
 o. junction [of Soulj with the other [viz., 
 
 Nature], this [power of giving rise to 
 products] does not exist in it immediately ; just like the 
 burning action of iron. 
 
 a. Even though there be conjunction with Nature, there 
 belongs to Soul no creativeness, 'immediately/ i.e., directly. 
 An illustration of this is, ' like the burning action of 
 iron:' as iron does not possess, directly, a burning power; 
 but this is only fictitiously attributed to it, being through 
 the fire conjoined with it : such is the meaning. But, in 
 the example just mentioned, it is admitted that there is an 
 alteration of both ; for this is proved by sense-evidence : 
 but, in the instance under doubt, since the case is accounted 
 for by the modification of one only, there is cumbrousness 
 in postulating the modification of both ; because, otherwise, 
 by the conjunction of the China-rose, it might be held 
 that the colour of the crystal was changed. 1
 
 194 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. It has already been stated [ 1] that the fruit of crea- 
 tion is emancipation. Now he states the principal occasional 
 cause of creation : l 
 
 1 o. 11 
 
 6 
 Aph. 9. When there is passion, or 
 
 Creation tche*. ,. . , . r . 
 
 dispassion, there is concentration, [in 
 the latter case, and] creation, [in the former]. 
 
 . When there is passion, there is creation ; and, when 
 there is dispassion, there is ' concentration/ i. e., the 
 abiding [of Soul] in its own nature [see Yoga Aphorisms, 
 Book I., 3 2 ] ; in short, emancipation, or the hindering of 
 the modifications of the thinking principle [Yoga Apho- 
 risms, Book I., 2 2 ] : such is the meaning. And so the 
 import is, that Passion is the cause of creation ; because of 
 their being 3 simultaneously present or absent. 4 
 
 b. After this he begins to state the manner of creation : 6 
 
 i 
 
 II 
 
 2 Vide infra, p. 211, note 6. Ed. 
 
 3 ' Simultaneously,' &c., is to render antoayavyatirekau, on which 
 ride supra, p. 43, note 2. Ed. 
 
 TTT*
 
 BOOK II., APH. 11. 195 
 
 Aph. 10. In the order [see 12. b.} 
 
 Order of creation. f ,,. , p r . , . -, . , J 
 
 of Mind, &c., [is the creation] of the 
 five elements, [or of the material world]. 
 
 a. ' Creation' is supplied from the preceding aphorism.* 
 
 b. He mentions a distinction 3 [between these successively 
 creative energies and the primal one ] : 
 
 Nature's products not Aph. II. Since creation is for the 
 /or t/temseives. 8a k e o f Soul, the origination of these 
 
 [products of Nature] is not for their own sake. 
 
 a. ' Of these/ i.e., of Mind, &c., since the creativeness is 
 ' for the sake of Soul/ i. e., for the sake of the emancipation 
 of Soul, the ' origination/ i. e., the creativeness, is not for 
 the sake of themselves ; since, inasmuch as they are 
 perishable, they [unlike Nature, (see ^ 1)] are not 
 susceptible of emancipation : such is the meaning.* 
 
 6. He declares the creation of limited space and time : 6 
 
 Nagesa has, instead o TJ^O, ^f. Ed. 
 
 ii
 
 196 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 II 
 
 Relate time and A ? h ' 12 ' [Relative] Space and Time 
 tpace whence. [arise] from the Ether, &c. 
 
 a. The Space and Time which are eternal [and absolute], 
 being the source of the Ether, are, really, sorts of qualities 
 of Nature : therefore it is consistent that Space and Time 
 should be all-pervading. But the Space and Time which 
 are limited arise from the Ether, through the conjunction 
 of this or that limiting object : such is the meaning. 
 By the expression * &c./ [in the aphorism,] is meant ' from 
 the apprehending of this or that limiting object.' 1 
 
 b. Now he exhibits, in their order, through their nature 
 and their habits, the things mentioned [in 10] as 'in the 
 order of Mind, &c.' : 2 
 
 II <=)? II 
 
 Aph. 13. Intellect is judgment. 
 
 ^ ( InteUect , ^ ft 8ynonym of * the 
 
 Great Principle ' [or Mind (see Book I., 
 71)] ; and 'judgment,' called [also] ascertainment, is its 
 
 <U 
 
 ^ 
 
 cTT 
 : I 
 
 lM ^ <uTK[f?T II
 
 BOOK II., APH. 14. 197 
 
 peculiar modification : such is the meaning. But they are 
 set forth as identical, because a property and that of which 
 it is the property are indivisible. 1 And it is to be under- 
 stood, that this Intellect is * Great/ because it pervades all 
 effects other than itself, and because it is of great power.* 
 
 b. He mentions other properties, also, of the Great 
 Principle : s 
 
 :* II ^ II 
 
 Product i of intellect. 
 
 Aph. 14. Merit, &c., are products 
 
 of it. 
 
 a. The meaning is, that Merit, Knowledge, Dispassion, 
 and Supernatural Power, moreover, are formed out of 
 intellect, not formed of self-consciousness (ahankard) , &c. ; 
 because intellect alone [and not self-consciousness,] is a 
 product of superlative Purity,* [without admixture of 
 Passion and Darkness]. 
 
 1 See, for a different rendering, the Rational Refutation, Ac. 
 p. 45. Ed. 
 
 II 
 
 4 From copying a typographical error, Dr. Ballantyne had, 
 both his editions, V^lf?* . Ed. 
 
 6
 
 198 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. But then, if it be thus, how can the prevalence of 
 demerit, in the portions of intellect lodged in men, cattle, 
 &c., be accounted for ? To this he replies : * 
 
 II SM II 
 
 prod*,, of Aph. 15. The Great one [intellect,] 
 becomes reversed through tincture. 2 
 
 a. That same ' Great one/ i.e., the Great Principle [or 
 intellect], through being tinged with Passion and Dark- 
 ness, also becomes ' reversed ' [see 14. a.], i. e., vile, with 
 the properties of Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and 
 want of Supernatural Power : such is the meaning. 3 
 
 b. Having characterized the Great Principle, he defines 
 its product, Self-consciousness : * 
 
 I 
 
 \ 
 
 2 I. e., ' influence.' JZd. 
 
 3
 
 BOOK II., APH. 17. 199 
 
 A P h ' 16 Self-consciousness is a 
 conceit. 
 
 a. ' Self-consciousness ' is what makes the Ego, as a 
 potter [makes a pot] ; the thing [called] the internal 
 instrument (antah-karana) : and this, inasmuch as a pro- 
 perty and that of which it is the property are indivisible, 
 is spoken of as ' a conceit,' 1 [viz., of personality], in order 
 to acquaint us that this is its peculiar modification. Only 
 when a thing has been determined by intellect [i.e., by an 
 act of judgment (see 13. a.)], do the making of an Ego 
 and the making of a Meum take place. 8 
 
 b. He mentions the product of Self-consciousness, which 
 has arrived in order: 3 
 
 Aph. 17. The product of it [viz., of 
 of Self-con- Self-consciousness,] is the eleven [or- 
 gans], and the five Subtile Elements. 
 
 a. The meaning is, that the eleven organs, with the 
 
 1 For another version, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 45. 
 Ed.
 
 200 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 five Subtile Elements, viz., Sound, &c., are the product 
 of Self-consciousness. 1 
 
 b. Among these, moreover, he mentions a distinction :* 
 
 II i t U 
 
 Aph. 18. The eleventh, consisting of 
 
 T/te Mind whence. r , r i nn-^ 3 
 
 [the principle of] runty, proceeds 
 from modified Self- consciousness. 
 
 a. The 'eleventh/ i.e., the completer of the eleven, viz., 
 Mind, [or the ' internal organ/ which is not to be con- 
 founded with ' the Great one/ called also Intellect and 
 Mind, alone,] among the set consisting of sixteen [ 17], 
 consists of Purity ; therefore it is produced from Self- 
 consciousness 'modified/ i.e., pure : such is the meaning. 
 And hence, too, it is to be reckoned that the ten organs 
 are from the Passionate Self-consciousness ; and the Sub- 
 tile Elements, from the Dark Self-consciousness. 3 
 
 6. He exhibits the eleven organs : 4 
 
 !' 1 411+1* cr <J ft rti 
 
 : i
 
 BOOK II., APH. 20. 201 
 
 "^ "^ 
 
 ^TT'^H^fR^J^i^ II ^Q. II 
 
 Aph. 19. Along with the organs of 
 
 Of the Organs. A . . A , . 6 .. 
 
 action and the organs of understanding 
 another is the eleventh. 
 
 a. The organs of action are five, viz., the vocal organ, 
 the hands, the feet, the anus, and the generative organ ; 
 and, the organs of understanding are five, those called the 
 organs of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Along 
 with these ten, ' another,' viz., Mind, is ' the eleventh,' i.e., 
 is the eleventh organ : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He refutes the opinion that the Organs are formed of 
 the Elements : 2 
 
 II *o II 
 
 Aph. 20. Thev [the organs.] are not 
 
 TfoNydyaview rejected. F * L \ 
 
 formed of the Elements ; because there 
 is Scripture for [their] being formed of Self-consciousness. 
 
 a. Supply ' the organs/ 3 
 
 b. Pondering a doubt, he says : * 
 
 *sr: H 
 
 II
 
 202 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 A te* explained. .. The Scripture regarding 
 
 absorption into deities is not [decla- 
 ratory] of an originator. 
 
 a. That Scripture which there is about absorption into 
 deities is not ' of an originator/ that is to say, it does not 
 refer to an originator ; because [although a thing, e. g., a 
 jar, when it ceases to be a jar, is usually spoken of as being 
 resolved into its originator, viz., into earth, yet] we see 
 the absorption of a drop of water into what, nevertheless, 
 is not its originator, viz., the ground ; [and such is the 
 absorption into a deity from whom the Mind absorbed did 
 not originally emanate]. 2 
 
 b. Some say that the Mind, included among the organs, 
 is eternal. He repels this : s 
 
 1 Aniruddha has, instead of -^5?TJ -^SfTJ . His comment 
 isasfollows: 
 
 I Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 ^TT
 
 BOOK II., APH. 23. 203 
 
 Aph. 22. [None of the organs is 
 
 No organ eternal. , viij-i-n/r-iit i 
 
 eternal, as some hold the Mind to be ;] 
 because we have Scripture for their beginning to be, and 
 because we see their destruction. 
 
 a. All these organs, without exception, have a begin- 
 ning ; for the Scripture says, ' From this are produced 
 the vital air, the mind, and all the organs ;' 2 &c., and because 
 we are certified of their destruction by the fact that, in the 
 conditions of being aged, &c., the mind, also, like the sight 
 and the rest, decays, &c. : such is the meaning. 3 
 
 I. He rebuts the atheistical opinion that the sense [for 
 example,] is merely the set of eye-balls, [&c.] : 4 
 
 1 Aniruddha's reading is 
 Ed. 
 
 2 Mundaka Upanishad, ii., i., 3. Ed. 
 
 3^_. _as_ai fc 
 
 5 This is taken from my edition, where, however, it is corrected 
 in the corrigenda. See the next two notes. Ed.
 
 204 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 23. The Sense is supersen- 
 suous; [it being the notion] of mistaken 
 persons [that the Sense exists] in [iden- 
 tity with] its site. 
 
 a. Every Sense is supersensuous, and not perceptible ; 
 but only in the opinion of mistaken persons does the Sense 
 exist 'in its site,' e.g., [Sight,] in the eye-ball, in the 
 condition of identity [with the eye-ball] : such is the 
 meaning. The correct reading is: ['The sense is some- 
 thing supersensuous ; to confound it with] the site, 1 [is a 
 mistake]/ 2 
 
 b. He rebuts the opinion that one single Sense, through 
 diversity of powers, performs various offices : 3 
 
 Aph. 24. Moreover, a difference 
 ansarenot being established if a difference of 
 powers be [conceded], there is not a 
 oneness [of the organs]. 
 
 
 H 
 
 2 The original of this shows that Vijnana emphasizes 
 
 as the true reading. He seems to point to ^ j^j^jjt^ which 
 Aniruddha has, and, after him, Vedanti Mahadeva. Ed. 
 
 8
 
 BOOK II., APH. 25. 205 
 
 a. Even by the admission that a diversity of powers 
 belongs to one single organ, the diversity of organs is 
 established; because the pacers are, assuredly, organs; 
 therefore, there is not a singleness of organ : such is the 
 meaning. 1 
 
 b. But then [it may be said], there is something unphilo- 
 sophical in supposing various kinds of organs to arise from 
 one single Self-consciousness. To this he replies : 2 
 
 Aph. 25. A theoretical discordance 
 is not [of any weight,] in the case of 
 what is matter of ocular evidence. 
 
 a. This is simple. 4 
 
 b. He tells us that, of the single leading organ, the 
 Mind, the other ten are kinds of powers : 5 
 
 II 
 
 3 Nagesa is peculiar in having 
 
 *w\tm u 
 
 ^3 X 
 
 6
 
 206 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 H H 
 
 Diversified operation Aph. 26. The Mind identifies itself 
 
 of Mind. w jth both. 
 
 a. That is to say : the Mind identifies itself with the 
 organs of intellection and of action. 2 
 
 b. Of his own accord, he explains the meaning of the 
 expression * identifies itself with both :' 3 
 
 Rx 
 ^ ^ - l<lilW^I3Mir**1<m*n'^c^ II 3S II 
 
 Aph. 27. By reason of the varieties 
 How this happens. Q{ trans f ormat i on o f [ w hi c h] the Quali- 
 
 ties [are susceptible], there is a diversity [of their product, 
 the Mind,] according to circumstances. 
 
 a. As one single man supports a variety of characters, 
 through the force of association, being, through associa- 
 tion with his beloved, a lover; through association with 
 one indifferent, indifferent ; and, through association with 
 some other, something other, so the Mind, also, through 
 association with the organ of vision, or any other, becomes 
 various, from its becoming one with the organ of vision, or 
 any other; by its being [thereby] distinguished by the 
 modification of seeing, or the like. The argument in sup- 
 port of this is, ' of the Qualities/ &c. ; the meaning being, 
 because of the adaptability of the Qualities, Goodness, &c., 
 to varieties of transformation. 4 
 
 1 All the commentators but Vijnana here insert "rf . Ed. 
 
 i II 
 
 s ' H 
 
 4 TT; fl^'WR'RTFr H RT-
 
 BOOK II., APH. 29. 207 
 
 b. He mentions the object of the organs of intellection 
 and of action : l 
 
 : II ^t II 
 
 What the organ* deal ^-ph. 28. Of both [sets of organs the 
 "** object is that list of things], beginning 
 
 with Colour, and ending with the dirt of Taste. 
 
 a. The 'dirt' of the tastes of food, &c., means ordure, 
 &c., 3 [into which the food, consisting of the quality Taste, 
 &c., is partly transformed]. 
 
 b. Of what Soul (indrd), through what service, these 
 are termed Organs (indriya), both these things he tells us :* 
 
 f*i 1 
 
 ; 
 
 * 11 
 
 2 Aniruddha reads, in lieu of -^i^tJO, -op^O . Ed. 
 
 8
 
 208 THE 8ANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 29. The being the seer, &c., 
 belongs to the Soul; the instrumen- 
 tality belongs to the Organs. 
 
 a. For, as a king, even without himself energizing, be- 
 comes a warrior through his instrument, his army, by 
 directing this by orders simply, so the Soul, though 
 quiescent, through all the organs, of vision, &c., becomes 
 a seer, a speaker, and a judger, and the like, merely 
 through the proximity called ' Conjunction ; ' because it 
 moves these, as the lodestone 1 [does the iron, without 
 exerting any effort]. 
 
 b. Now he mentions the special modifications of the 
 triad of internal organs : 2 
 
 Aph. 30. Of the three [internal 
 r g ans ] there is a diversity among 
 themselves.
 
 BOOK II., APH. 31. 209 
 
 a. The aspect of Intellect is attention 1 ; of Self-conscious- 
 ness, conceit [of personality] ; of the Mind, decision and 
 doubt. 4 
 
 b. He mentions, also, a common aspect of the three:' 
 
 Aph. 31. The five airs, viz., Breath, 
 nma &c., are the modification, in common, of 
 the [three internal] instruments. 
 
 a. That is to say : the five, in the shape of Breath, &c., 
 which are familiarly known as ' airs', because of their cir- 
 culating as the air does, these [animal spirits] are the 
 joint or common ' modification/ or kinds of altered form, 
 'of the instruments/ i.e., of the triad of internal instru- 
 ments.* 
 
 I. The opinion is not ours, as it is that of the Vaiseshi- 
 
 1 Adhyavasdya, rendered 'ascertainment' and 'judgment' at 
 pp. 156 and 196, supra. Also see the Rational Refutation, Ac., 
 p. 46. Ed. 
 
 2
 
 210 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 kas, that the modifications of the organs take place succes- 
 sively only, and not simultaneously. So he says : l 
 
 Aph. 32. The modifications of the 
 i* or gans take place both successively and 
 simultaneously. 
 
 a. This is simple. 2 
 
 b. Lumping the modifications of the understanding, with 
 a view to showing how they are the cause of the world, he, 
 in the first place, exhibits [them] : 3 
 
 : 4 n ?? n 
 
 Aph. 33. The modifications [of the 
 understanding, which are to be shown 
 to be the cause of the world, and] 
 
 which are of five kinds, are [some of them,] painful and 
 
 [others,] not painful. 
 
 fa m*i i^ 'TR 
 
 II 
 
 \ 
 
 * Literally the same words are found in the Yoga Aphorisms, 
 Book I., 5. Ed.
 
 BOOK II., APH. 34. 211 
 
 a. That the modifications are of five sorts is declared by 
 Patanjali's aphorism, 1 [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., 6 2 ]. 
 
 b. He acquaints [us] with the nature of Soul : 3 
 
 Aph. 34. On the cessation thereof 
 
 Soul's relation thereto. ^ Qf mundane i n fl ue nces], its tinc- 
 
 ture 4 ceasing, it [Soul,] abides in itself. 
 
 a. That is to say: during the state of repose of these 
 modifications, it [the Soul], the reflexion of these having 
 ceased, is abiding in itself; being, at other times, also, as it 
 were, in isolation, [though seemingly not so]. And to this 
 effect there is a triad of Aphorisms of the Yoga, 5 [viz., Book 
 I., 2, 3, and 4 6 ]. 
 
 2 Namely : 
 Evidence, misprision, chimera, unconsciousness, memory.' Ed. 
 
 3 II 
 
 4 I. e., ' influence', as in Aph. 15, at p. 198, supra. Ed. 
 
 5 
 
 ' l rl *T5CtV I 'Concentration (yoga) is 
 the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle.' ^f^T 
 
 ' Then t 1 - 6 " at the time of Con -
 
 212 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. lie explains this by an illustration : l 
 
 Aph. 35. And as [bv] a flower, the 
 
 Tkis illustrated. 
 
 a. The * and ' implies that this is the reason [of what was 
 asserted in the preceding aphorism] ; the meaning being, 
 as the gem [is tinged, apparently,] by a flower. As the 
 gem called rock-crystal, by reason of a flower of the Hi- 
 biscus, becomes red, not abiding in its own state, and, 
 on the removal thereof, becomes colourless, abiding in its 
 own state, in like manner 2 [is the Soul apparently tinged 
 by the adjunction of the Qualities]. 
 
 b. But then [it may be asked], by whose effort does the 
 aggregate of the organs come into operation ; since Soul 
 is motionless, and since it is denied 3 that there is any 
 Lord [or Demiurgus] ? To this he replies : 4 
 
 centration,] it [the Soul,] abides in the form of the spectator [without 
 
 a spectacle].' ^^T^2T?rTT^ I <At otlier time8 [tin 
 
 that of Concentration] it [the Soul,] is in the same form as the 
 modifications [of the internal organ].' Dr. Ballantyne's translation 
 is here quoted. Ed. 
 
 : I 
 
 3 ' Demurred to ' is preferable. Vide supra, p. 112. Ed. 
 
 4 
 
 >> v3
 
 BOOK II., APH. 37. 213 
 
 Aph. 36. The Organs also arise, for 
 
 tlie 6ake of Soul> from tlie devel P ment 
 of desert. 
 
 a. The meaning is, that, just as Nature energizes 'for the 
 sake of Soul/ so 'the Organs also arise;' i. e., the ener- 
 gizing of the Organs is just in consequence of the develop- 
 ment of the deserts of the Soul : [see Yoga Aphorisms, 
 Book II., 13. &.]. And the desert belongs entirely to 
 the investment; 1 [the Soul not really possessing either 
 merit or demerit]. 
 
 b. He mentions an instance of a thing's spontaneously 
 energizing for the sake of another: 2 
 
 An illustration. Aph. 37. As the cow for the calf. 
 
 a. As the cow, for the sake of the calf, quite sponta- 
 neously secretes milk, and awaits no other effort, just so, for 
 the sake of the master, Soul, the Organs energize quite 
 spontaneously : such is the meaning. And it is seen, that, 
 
 Pf<1 
 
 CRT? II
 
 214 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 out of profound sleep, the understanding of its own accord 
 wakes up. 1 
 
 b. With reference to the question, how many Organs 
 there are, external and internal combined, he says : 2 
 
 H ?b II 
 
 The number of the Aph. 38. Organ is of thirteen sorts, 
 Or ff ant - through division of the subordinates. 
 
 a. The triad of internal organs, and the ten external 
 organs, combined, are thirteen. He says ' sorts/ in order 
 to declare that, of these, moreover, there is an infinity, 
 through [their] distinction into individuals. He says 
 ' through division of the subordinates/ with a reference to 
 the fact, that it is understanding which is the principal 
 organ ; the meaning being, because the organs [or func- 
 tions,] of the single organ, called understanding, are more 
 than one.* 
 
 3 The reading of Vedanti Mahadeva, and of him alone, is
 
 BOOK II., APH. 39. 215 
 
 6. But then, since understanding [it seems,] alone is the 
 principal instrument in furnishing its object [of emanci- 
 pation] to Soul, and the instrumentality of the others is 
 secondary, in this case what is [meant by] secondariness ? l 
 [Why are they said to be instrumental at all ?] In regard 
 to this he says : 2 
 
 II ?Q. II 
 
 Aph. 39. Because the quality of 
 0f ^ r ' being most efficient is conjoined with 
 the organs ; as in the case of an axe. 
 
 a. The quality of the [principal] organ, the understand- 
 ing, in the shape of being most efficient on behalf of 
 soul, exists, derivatively, in the [other derivative] organs. 
 Therefore it is made out that an organ is of thirteen 
 kinds : such is the connexion with the preceding 
 aphorism. 3 
 
 1 Instead of in this case,' &c., read, ' what is the character of 
 these [i. e., organs] ? ' Ed.
 
 216 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. ' As in the case of an axe.' As, although the blow 
 itself, since it is this that puts an end to our non-posses- 
 sion of the result, is the principal efficient in the cutting, 
 yet the axe, also, is an efficient, because of its close prox- 
 imity to the quality of being the principal efficient, so [here, 
 also] : such is the meaning. He does not here say that 
 Self-consciousness is secondarily efficient, meaning to imply 
 that it is one with the internal organ. 1 
 
 c. Specifying the precise state of the case in regard to 
 the condition of secondary and principal, he says : 2 
 
 
 II go II 
 
 Aph. 40. Among the two [the ex- 
 ternal and the internal organs], the 
 principal is Mind ; just as, in the world, 
 among troops of dependants. 
 
 a. ' Among the two,' viz., the external and the internal, 
 Mind,' i. e., understanding, simply, is ( the principal/ i. e., 
 
 i II
 
 BOOK II., APH. 41. 217 
 
 chief ; in short, is the immediate cause ; because it is that 
 which furnishes Soul with its end ; just as, among troops 
 of dependants, some one single person is the prime minister 
 of the king ; and the others, governors of towns, &c., are 
 his subordinates : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. Here the word ' Mind ' does not mean the third 
 internal organ, 2 [( 30. a.) but Intellect, or ' the Great 
 One/] 
 
 c. He tells, in three aphorisms, the reasons why Intel- 
 lect [or understanding] is the principal : s 
 
 Aph. 41 . [And Intellect is the prin- 
 cipal, or immediate and direct, efficient 
 in Soul's emancipation ;] because there 
 is no wandering away. 
 
 fl. That is to say: because it [understanding,] per- 
 
 J II 
 
 2 T
 
 218 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 vades all the organs ; or because there is no result apart 
 from it. 1 
 
 Aph. 42. So, too, because it [the 
 
 Another reason. , ,. _ '. ' 
 
 understanding,] is the depository of all 
 self-continuant impressions. 
 
 a. Understanding alone is the depository of all self- 
 continuant impressions, and not the Sight, &c., or Self- 
 consciousness, or the Mind ; else it could not happen that 
 things formerly seen, and heard, &c., would be remembered 
 by the blind, and deaf, &c. 2 
 
 Aph. 43. And because we infer this 
 Ano/her reason. [its preeminence] by reason of its 
 
 meditating. 
 
 a. That is to say : and because we infer its preeminence, 
 'by reason of its meditating/ i.e., its modification in the 
 shape of meditation. For the modification of thought 
 called ' meditation ' is the noblest of all the modifications 
 [incident to Soul, or pure Thought, whose blessedness, or 
 state of emancipation, it is to have no modification at all] ; 
 and the Understanding itself, which, as being the deposi- 
 tory thereof, is, further, named Thought [chitta, from the
 
 BOOK II., APH. 44. 21$ 
 
 same root as chintd l "\, is nobler than the organs whose 
 modifications are other than this : such is the meaning. 2 
 
 b. But then, suppose that the modification ( meditation ' 
 belongs only to the Soul, [suggests some one]. To this he 
 replies: 3 
 
 II 88 II 
 
 Meditation not e^e*. A P h ' 44 Xt Cannot be f it8 OWn 
 
 tiai to Soul. nature. 
 
 a. That is to say : meditation cannot belong to Soul 
 essentially ; because of the immobility* [of Soul ; whereas 
 ' meditation ' is an effort]. 
 
 b. But then, if thus the preeminence belongs to under- 
 standing alone, how was it said before [at 26,] that it is 
 the Mind that takes the nature of both [sets of organs, in 
 
 1 The two words are, respectively, from chit and chint, which are 
 cognate. Ed. 
 
 *
 
 220 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 apparent contradiction to the view propounded at 39] ? 
 To this he replies: 1 
 
 II 
 
 Aph. 45. The condition [as regards 
 An organ may i>e, re- Soul's instruments,] of secondary and 
 
 IcUive/y, principal, or . , . , . i> t 
 
 ttcondary. principal is relative ; because of the 
 
 difference of function. 
 
 a. In respect to the difference of function, the condition, 
 as secondary, or principal, of the instruments [of Soul] is 
 relative. In the operations of the Sight, &c., the Mind is 
 principal ; and, in the operation of the Mind, Self-con- 
 sciousness, and, in the operation of Self-consciousness, 
 Intellect, is principal 2 [or precedent]. 
 
 6. But then, what is the cause of this arrangement ; 
 viz., that, of this [or that] Soul, this [or that] Intellect, 
 alone, and not another Intellect, is the instrument ? With 
 reference to this, he says : 3 
 
 HT\TRI 
 
 H
 
 BOOK II., APH. 46. 221 
 
 Aph. 46. The energizing [of this or 
 that InteUect] is for the sake of this 
 [or that Soul] ; because of [its] having 
 
 been purchased by the works [or deserts] of this [or that 
 
 Soul] ; just as in the world. 
 
 a. The meaning is, that, 'the energizing/ i.e., all 
 operation, of the instrument is for the sake of this [or that] 
 Soul ; because of [its] having been purchased by this [or 
 that] Soul's works [or deserts] ; just as in the world. As, 
 in the world [or in ordinary affairs], whatever axe, or the 
 like, has been purchased by the act, e.g., of buying, by 
 whatever man, the operation of that [axe, or the like], 
 such as cleaving, is only for the sake of that man [who 
 purchased it] : such is the meaning. The import is, that 
 therefrom is the distributive allotment of instruments 2 
 [inquired about under 45. b.~] 
 
 b. Although there is no act in Soul, because it is im- 
 
 Nagesa differs from all the other commentators in reading
 
 222 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 movable, still, since it is the means of Soul's experience, it 
 is called the act of Soul; just like the victories, &c., of a 
 king [which are, really, the acts of his servants] ; because 
 of Soul's being the owner 1 [of the results of acts ; as the 
 king is of the results of the actions of his troops]. 
 
 c. In order to make clear the chiefship of Intellect, he 
 sums up, 2 [as follows] : 
 
 TTRTO 
 II 8$ II 
 
 Aph. 47. Admitting that they [the 
 various instruments of Soul, all] equally 
 act, the preeminence belongs to Intellect ; j ust as in the 
 world, just as in the world. 
 
 a. Although the action of all the instruments is the 
 same, in being for the sake of Soul, still the preeminence 
 belongs to Intellect alone : just as in the world. The 
 meaning is, because it is just as the preeminence, in the 
 world, belongs to the prime minister, among the rulers of 
 towns, and the rest, even although there be no difference 
 so far as regards their being [all alike workers] for the 
 sake of the king. Therefore, in all the Institutes, Intellect 
 alone is celebrated as 'the Great One/ The repetition 
 
 TTsJT 

 
 BOOK II., APH. 47. 223 
 
 [viz., 'just as in the world, just as in the world,'] implies 
 the completion of the Book. 1 
 
 6. So much for [this abstract of] the Second Book, on 
 the Products of Nature, in the commentary, on Kapila's 
 Declaration of the Sankhya, composed by the venerable 
 Vijnana Acharya. 2 
 
 q H I <tci ^ 
 ^ 
 
 ffcft^I* 
 
 END OF BOOK II.
 
 224 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 a. In the next place, the gross product of Nature, viz., 
 the great elements and the dyad of bodies, is to be 
 described ; and, after that, the going into various wombs, 
 and the like ; [this description being given] with a view 
 to that less perfect degree of dispassionateness which is the 
 cause of one's engaging upon the means of knowledge ; 
 and, after that, with a view to perfect freedom from 
 passion, all the means of knowledge are to be told : so the 
 Third [Book] commences: 1 
 
 11 *\ 11 
 
 Aph. 1. The origination of the diver- 
 
 The element* wlience. n j r 11 e i f T_A 
 
 sified [world of sense] is from that 
 which has no difference. 
 
 a. '[Which] has no difference/ i.e., that in which there 
 exists not a distinction, in the shape of calmness, fierceness, 
 dulness, &c., viz., the Subtile Elements, called ' the five 
 somethings, simply ;' from this [set of five] is the origina-
 
 BOOK III., APH. 2. 225 
 
 tion of ' the diversified/ [so called] from their possessing 
 a difference, in the shape of the calm, &c., viz., the gross, 
 the great Elements : such is the meaning. For, the fact 
 of consisting of pleasure, or the like, in the shape of the 
 calm, and the rest, is manifested, in the degrees of greater, 
 and less, &c., in the gross Elements only, not in the 
 Subtile ; because these, since they have but the one form 
 of the calm, are manifest to the concentrated, 1 [practitioners 
 of meditation, but to no others]. 
 
 b. So then, having stated, by composing the preceding 
 Book, the origin of the twenty-three Principles, he states 
 the origination, therefrom, of the dyad of bodies : 2 
 
 The Body u-iience. Aph, 2. Therefrom, of the Body. 
 
 a. ( Therefrom/ i.e., from the twenty-three Principles, 
 
 ff ^TT-
 
 226 THK SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 there is the origination of the pair of Bodies, the Gross 
 [Body] and the Subtile : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. Now he proves that mundane existence could not be 
 accounted for otherwise than on the ground of the twenty- 
 three Principles : 2 
 
 Aph. 3. From the seed thereof is 
 Mundane existence mundane existence. 
 
 whence. 
 
 a. 'Thereof/ i.e., of the Body; 
 
 'from the seed/ i. e., from the Subtile one, as its cause, in 
 the shape of the twenty-three Principles, is 'mundane 
 existence/ i.e., do the going and coming of Soul take 
 place ; for it is impossible that, of itself, there should be a 
 going, &c., of that which, in virtue of [its] all-pervading- 
 ness, is immovable : such is the meaning. For Soul, 
 being conditioned by the twenty- three Principles, only by 
 means of that investment migrates from Body to Body, 
 with a view to experiencing the fruits of previous works. 3 
 
 ii 
 Differ ^h" 
 
 H
 
 BOOK in., Ape. 5. 227 
 
 b. He states, also, the limit of mundane existence i 1 
 
 11 11 
 
 Aph. 4. And, till there is discrimina- 
 
 JUunda istencetill ^ ^^ ^ ^ energizing of thesej 
 
 which have no differences. 
 
 a. The meaning is, that, of all Souls whatever, void of 
 the differences of being Lord, or not Lord, &c., [though, 
 seemingly, possessed of such differences,] 'energizing/ 
 i.e., mundane existence, is inevitable, even till there is 
 discrimination [of Soul from its seeming investments] ; 
 and it does not continue after that. 2 
 
 b. He states the reason of this : 3 
 
 ii M ii 
 
 Aph. 5. Because of [the necessity of] 
 
 The reason of this. ., , , . J * 
 
 the other s experiencing. 
 a. The meaning is : because of the necessity that the
 
 228 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 other, i.e., that that very [Soul], which does not discri- 
 minate, should experience the fruit of its own [reputed] 
 acts. 1 
 
 b. He states, that, even while there is a Body, during 
 the time of mundane existence, fruition [really] is not: 2 
 
 n n 
 
 Sour, bondage only A P h ' 6 - Tt [ Soul J is now quite free 
 
 seeminy. f rom both. 
 
 a. 'Now,' i.e., during the time of mundane existence, 
 Soul is quite free ' from both/ i. e., from the pairs, viz., 
 cold and heat, pleasure and pain, &c. : such is the meaning. 4 
 
 b. He next proceeds to describe, separately, the dyad of 
 Bodies : 5 
 
 ITR^T ^cTT^ cRT II 3 II 
 
 Aph. 7. The Gross [Body] usually 
 
 The Gross and the . . f ^ 3 V Al 
 
 SMie Bodies didin- arises from father and mother; the 
 9 ulihed - other one is not so. 
 
 HFFT 
 
 3 Aniruddha has l( | <^lSc| ^fj J, and comments accordingly. Ed.
 
 BOOK III., APH. 8. 229 
 
 a. The Gross one arises from father and mother, ' usually/ 
 i.e., for the most part ; for there is mention also of a Gross 
 Body not born of a womb : and * the other,' i. e., the Subtile 
 Body, is 'not so,' i.e., does not arise from a father and 
 mother ; because it arises from creation, &c. : such is the 
 meaning. 1 
 
 b. He decides [the question], through disguise by which 
 one of the Bodies, Gross and Subtile, the conjunction of the 
 pairs [pleasure and pain, &c.,] with Soul takes place. 2 
 
 ~s ^ "N -v "X 
 
 ?l trt r^TRI r^T HPTTi^r ^TrTT^ZJ II b II 
 
 Aph: 8. To that which arose antece- 
 
 Which of the bodies , , . . , 
 
 is tit* cause of SouFs dently it belongs to be that whose result 
 is this ; because it is to the one that 
 there belongs fruition, not to the other. 
 
 a. ' To be that whose result is this,' i.e., to have pleasure 
 and pain as its effect [reflected in Soul], belongs to that 
 Subtile Body alone whose origin was ' antecedent/ i. e., at 
 the commencement of the creation [or annus magnus]. 
 Why ? Because the fruition of what is called pleasure and 
 pain belongs only to ' the one/ i. e., the Subtile Body, but 
 not to ' the other/ i. e., the Gross Body ; because all are 
 
 
 fari"5r 
 

 
 2'JO THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 agreed that there is neither pleasure nor pain, &c., in a 
 body of earth : such is the meaning. 1 
 b. He tells the nature of the Subtile Body just mentioned: 2 
 
 II Q. II 
 
 Th Subtile Body how A P h ' 9 - The seventeen, as one, are the 
 constituted. Subtile Body. 
 
 a. The Subtile Body, further, through its being container 
 and contained, is twofold. Here the seventeen, [presently 
 mentioned,] mingled, are the Subtile Body ; and that, at 
 the beginning of a creation, is but one, in the shape of an 
 aggregate ; [as the forest, the aggregate of many trees, is 
 but one] : such is the meaning. The seventeen are the 
 eleven organs, the five Subtile Elements, and Understand- 
 ing. Self-consciousness is included under Understanding. 3 
 
 ' H 
 
 fcT I ?R 
 
 -3
 
 BOOK III., APH. 10. 231 
 
 b. But [one may ask,] if the Subtile Body be one, 
 how can there be diverse experiences accordingly as Souls 
 are [numerically] distinct, [one from another] ? To this 
 he replies : l 
 
 n so ii 
 
 flow Oure come to be A h ' 10 ' There is Distinction of indi- 
 
 individuals. viduals, through diversity of desert. 
 
 a. Although, at the beginning of the creation [or annus 
 magnus], there was but one Subtile Body, in the shape of 
 that investment [of Soul (see Veddnta-sdra, 62,) named] 
 Himnyagarbha, still, subsequently, moreover, there becomes 
 a division of it into individuals, a plurality, partitively, in 
 the shape of individuals ; as, at present, there is, of the 
 one Subtile Body of a father, a plurality, partitively, in 
 the shape of the Subtile Body of son, daughter, &c. He 
 tells the cause of this, saying, ' through diversity of desert ;' 
 meaning, through actions, &c., which are causes of the 
 experiences of other animal souls. 2 3 
 
 rRlftf 
 
 ft <T- 
 
 3 bee, for another rendering, the Rational Refutation, &c.,p.36. Jid.
 
 232 THE 8ANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. But then, on this showing, since the Subtile one alone, 
 from its being the site of fruition, is [what ought to be de- 
 noted by the term] Body, how is the term Body applied 
 to the Gross one ? To this he replies : l 
 
 Aph. 11. From its being applied to 
 B dy Mviz., to the Subtile one], it is ap- 
 plied to the Body, which is the taber- 
 nacle of the abiding thereof. 
 
 #. But then, what proof is there of another body, other 
 than the one consisting of the six sheaths, serving as a 
 tabernacle for the Subtile Body ? With reference to this, 
 he says : 2 
 
 *R II 
 
 Aph. 12. Not independently [can 
 The Suitiie Body de- fae Subtile Body exist], without that 
 
 jienaent on the Gross m j J 
 
 Body. [Gross Body]; just like a shadow and 
 
 a picture. 
 
 a. That is to say : the Subtile Body does not stand inde- 
 pendently, ' without that/ i. e., without a support ; as a 
 shadow, or as a picture, does not stand without a support. 
 And so, having abandoned a Gross Body, in order to go 
 
 I cT^Tf II
 
 BOOK III., APH. 13. 233 
 
 to another world, it is settled that the Subtile Body takes 
 another body, to serve as its tabernacle : such is the import. 1 
 
 6. But then [it may be said], of the Subtile Body, since 
 it is limited substance, as the Air, or the like, let the Ether 
 [or Space], without [its] being attached [to anything], be 
 the site : it is purposeless to suppose [its] attachment to 
 anything else. To this he replies : 2 
 
 Aph. 13. No, even though it be 
 limited; because of [its] association 
 with masses ; just like the sun. 
 
 a. Though it be limited, it does not abide independently, 
 without association ; for, since, just like the sun, it consists 
 of light-, it is inferred to be associated with a mass : such is 
 the meaning. All lights, the sun and the rest, are seen only 
 under the circumstances of association [of the luminiferous 
 imponderable] with earthy substances; and the Subtile Body 
 
 f^RT 
 falTVTTT H 
 
 I cf^Tf H
 
 234 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 consists of ' Purity,' which is Light : therefore it must be 
 associated with the Elements. 1 
 
 b. He determines the magnitude of the Subtile Body: 2 
 
 ii ^8 ii 
 
 Size of the Subtile ApTi. 14. It is of atomic magnitude ; 
 
 Body ~ for there is a Scripture for its acting. 
 
 a. 'It,' the Subtile Body, is ' of atomic magnitude,' I. e., 
 limited, but not absolutely an atom ; because it is declared 
 to have parts. Wherefore ? ' For there is Scripture for its 
 acting ; ' i. e., because there is Scripture about its acting. 
 When a thing is all-prevading, it cannot act ; [action being 
 motion]. But the proper reading is, ' because there is 
 Scripture for its moving'* 
 
 
 ^>5J^, on which Vijnana remarks, is 
 accepted by Nagesa. 
 
 Aniruddha is singular in here inserting, as an Aphorism :
 
 BOOK III., APH. 15. 235 
 
 b. He states another argument for its being limited : l 
 
 [ 3 II iM II 
 
 Bother proof of Ms. A P h ' 15 ' Alld beCaU86 ther6 is 
 
 ture for its being formed of food. 
 
 a. That is to say : it, viz., the Subtile Body, cannot be 
 all-pervading ; because there is a Scripture for its being 
 partially formed of food ; for, if it were all-prevading, it 
 would be eternal. Although Mind, &c., are not formed of 
 the Elements, still it is to be understood that they are 
 spoken of as formed of food, &c. ; because they are filled with 
 homogeneous particles, through contact with food ; 4 [as 
 the light of a lamp is supplied by contact with the oil]. 
 
 b. For what purpose is the mundane existence, the 
 migrating from one body to another [Gross] body, of Sub- 
 
 f^rr 
 
 II 
 
 a Nagesa has the reading ^^ Ed. 
 
 3 Aniruddha and Nagesa omit the word ^ . Ed. 
 
 II
 
 236 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 tile Bodies, which are unintelligent ? "With reference to 
 this, he says: 1 
 
 II 
 
 Aph. 16. The mundane existence of 
 dy Subtile Bodies is for the sake of Soul; 
 just like a king's cooks. 
 
 a. That is to say : as the cooks of a king frequent the 
 kitchens for the sake of the king, so the Subtile Bodies 
 transmigrate for the sake of Soul. 2 
 
 b. The Subtile Body has been discussed in respect of all 
 its peculiarities. He now likewise discusses the Gross 
 Body, also : 3 
 
 TTT^^fk^T ^f: II <\3 II 
 
 The Gross Body Aph. 17. The Body consists of the 
 
 wlience - five elements. 
 
 I 
 
 rf^TT
 
 BOOK III., APH. 19. 237 
 
 . That is to say : the Body is a modification of the five 
 elements mingled. 1 
 
 b. He mentions another opinion : 2 
 
 H lb II 
 
 AnoiJiero inion Aph. 18. Some say it consists of four 
 
 elements. 
 
 a. This [is alleged] with the import that the Ether does 
 not originate 3 [anything]. 
 
 n m H 
 
 Another opinion Apli. 19. Others say that it consists 
 
 of one element. 
 
 a. The import is, that the body is of Earth only, and the 
 other elements are merely supporters. Or 'of one element ' 
 means, of one or other element : 5 [see the Rosicrucian doc- 
 trine in the Tarka-sangraha, 13., &c]. 
 
 : H 
 2 
 
 * One of my MSS. of Aniruddha omits the word ^f . Ed. 
 
 5
 
 238 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. He tells us what is proved by the fact that the Body 
 consists of the Elements : l 
 
 11 30 11 
 
 Aph. 20. Intellect is not natural [a 
 ? resM natural result of organization] ; because 
 it is not found in them severally. 
 
 a. That is to say : since we do not find intellect in the 
 separated Elements, intellect is not natural to the Body, 
 which consists of the Elements, but is adventitious. 3 
 
 b. He states another refutation 3 [of the notion that 
 Intellect is a property of the Body] : 
 
 n ^ n 
 
 tellect natural to it,] there would not 
 be the death, &c., of anything. 
 
 a. That is to say : and, if the Body had intellect natural 
 to it, there would not be the death, the profound sleep, &c., 
 ' of anything/ of all things. For death, profound sleep, 
 &c., imply the body's being non-intelligent ; and this, if 
 it were, by its own nature, intelligent, would not take
 
 BOOK III., APH. 22. 239 
 
 place; because the essential nature of a thing remains as 
 long as the thing remains. 1 
 
 b. Pondering a doubt, as to the assertion [in 20], viz., 
 ' because it is not found in them severally/ he repels it : 2 
 
 : ii ;>;> n 
 
 Apli. 22. If [you say that Intellect 
 bJeC ' results from organization, and that] it 
 is like the power of something intoxi- 
 cating, [the ingredients of which, separately, have no 
 intoxicating power, we reply, that] this might arise, on 
 conjunction, if we had seen, in each [element, something 
 conducive to the result]. 
 
 a. But then, as an intoxicating power, though not 
 residing in the substances severally, resides in the mixed 
 substance, so may Intellect, also, be ; if any one say this, 
 it is not so. If it had been seen in each [constituent], its 
 appearance in the compound might have had place ; but, in 
 the case in question, it is not the case that it is seen in each. 
 
 srfir 
 
 HT 
 
 3 Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva read 
 Ed.
 
 240 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Therefore, in the illustration [of something intoxicating 
 resulting from mixture], it being established, by the In- 
 stitutes, &c., that there is, in each ingredient, a subtile 
 tendency to intoxicate, it is settled only that, at the time 
 when these combine, there will be a manifestation of the 
 [latent] power of intoxicating; but, in the thing illustrated, 
 it is not established, by any proof whatsoever, that there is 
 intelligence, in a subtile [or undeveloped] state, in the 
 elements separately : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. It was stated [ 16,] that the Subtile Bodies trans- 
 migrate for the sake of Soul. In regard to this, he tells, in 
 two aphorisms, by what operation, dependent on the birth 
 of the Subtile Bodies, which means their transmigrations 
 into Gross Bodies, what aims of Soul are accomplished: 2 
 
 ft IT ^ 
 
 >r 
 
 : ii 
 
 i ?R fk-
 
 BOOK III., APH. 24. 241 
 
 
 Purpose of the Subtile A P h ' 23 From knowledge [acquired 
 taking a gross during mundane existence, comes] sal- 
 vation, [Soul's chief end]. 
 
 a. That is to say : by the transmigration of the Subtile 
 Body, through birth, there takes place the direct operation 
 of discrimination [between Soul and Non-Soul] ; [and] 
 thence, in the shape of emancipation, Soul's [chief] End. 1 
 
 Bondage u-kence. , A ^' 24 ' Bondage [which may be 
 
 viewed as one of the ends which Soul 
 could arrive at only through the Subtile Body,] is from 
 Misconception. 
 
 a. Through the transmigration of the subtile body, from 
 misconception, there is that [less worthy] end of soul, in 
 the shape of bondage, consisting of pleasure and pain : 
 such is the meaning. 2 
 
 b. Liberation and Bondage, [resulting] from knowledge 
 and misconception [respectively], have been mentioned. 
 Of these, in the first place, he explains Liberation [arising] 
 from knowledge : 3 
 
 3
 
 242 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 II 3M II 
 
 , A P k ' 25 '. SinCe this [ viz '> knowledge,] 
 
 cooperutor nor suhsti- is the precise cause [of liberation], there 
 
 Me, in liberating Soul. . . f . . r . , J , 
 
 is neither association [of anything else 
 with it, e. g., good works,] nor alternativeness, [e. g., of 
 good works, in its stead]. 
 
 a. In respect of there being neither association nor 
 alternativeness, he states an illustration :* 
 
 Aph. 26. The emancipation of Soul 
 
 Thit illustrated. . * . . . n 
 
 does not depend on bota [knowledge 
 and works, or the like] ; as [any end that one aims at 
 is not obtained] from dreams and from the waking state, 
 [together, or alternatively, which are, severally,] illusory 
 and not illusory. 
 
 a. But, even if it be so, [some one may say,] there may 
 be association, or alternativeness, of knowledge of the truth 
 with that knowledge which is termed Worship of [the One, 
 all-constitutive, divine] Soul ; since there is no illusoriness 
 in this object of Worship. To this he replies : 2 
 
 sjnTR 'BJpR'P 
 
 f\ *S 
 
 II
 
 BOOK III., APH. 28. 243 
 
 II ^9 II 
 
 x 
 
 Aph. 27. Even of that other it is not 
 complete. 
 
 a. Even of 'that other/ i.e., of the 
 
 [just-mentioned] object of worship, the non-illusoriness 
 is not complete ; because imaginary things, also, enter 
 into [our conception of, and overlie, and disguise,] the 
 object of worship, the [One, all-constitutive] Soul : such 
 is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He states in what part [of it] is the illusoriness of 
 the [object of] Worship, 2 [just referred to] : 
 
 N II ^b II 
 
 Aph. 28. Moreover, it is in what i s 
 fancied that it is thus [illusory]. 
 
 a. That is to say: ' moreover, it is thus/ i.e., moreover, 
 there is illusoriness, in that portion of the thing meditated 
 which [portion of it] is fancied by the Mind, [while it 
 does not exist in reality] ; for, the object of worship having 
 been declared in such texts as, ' All this, indeed, is 
 Brahma/ 3 the illusoriness belongs entirely to that portion 
 [of the impure conception of ' the All ' which presents 
 itself, to the undiscriminating, under the aspect] of the 
 world.* 
 
 cT^Tf II 
 
 3 Chhdndogya Upanishad, iii., xiv., 1. Ed.
 
 244 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. Then what profit is there in Worship ? With refer- 
 ence to this, he declares [as follows] r 1 
 
 Aph. 29. From the achievement of 
 
 The fruit of Worship. r , . . ..-. ,. . 
 
 [the worship termed] meditation there 
 is, to the pure [Soul], all [power] ; like Nature. 
 
 a. Through the effecting of the worship which is termed 
 meditation, there becomes, to the ' pure/ i. e., the sinless, 
 Soul, all power ; as belongs to Nature : such is the 
 meaning. That is to say : as Nature creates, sustains, and 
 destroys, so also the Purity of the understanding of the 
 worshipper, by instigating Nature, creates, &c. 2 [But 
 this is not Liberation, or Soul's chief end.] 
 
 b. It has been settled that Knowledge alone is the means 
 of Liberation. Now he mentions the means of Know- 
 ledge: 3 
 
 "fa
 
 BOOK III., APH. 32. 245 
 
 H ?o n 
 
 of obstacle, *pk. 30. Meditation is [the cause of] 
 to knowledge. f^g remO val of Desire. 
 
 a. That is to say : Meditation is the cause of the removal 
 of that affection of the mind by objects, which is a hinderer 
 of knowledge. 1 
 
 6. With advertence to the fact that knowledge arises 
 from the effectuation of Meditation, and not from merely 
 commencing upon it, he characterizes the effectuation of 
 Meditation: 2 
 
 Apli. 31. It [Meditation,] is perfected 
 "*" b J the repelling of the modifications 
 [of the Mind, which ought to be ab- 
 stracted from all thoughts of anything] . 
 
 a. He mentions also the means of Meditation : s 
 
 II 3^ I' 
 
 Aph. 32. This [Meditation,] is per- 
 fected b y Restraint, Postures, and one's 
 Duties.
 
 246 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. That is to say : Meditation results from the triad, 
 which shall be mentioned, viz., Restraint, &C. 1 
 
 b. By means of a triad of aphorisms he characterizes, in 
 order, Restraint, &c. : 2 
 
 II 33 II 3 
 
 Aph. 33. Restraint [of the breath] is 
 
 Restraint of the breath. . .. i 
 
 by means of expulsion and retention. 
 
 a. That it is 'of the breath' is gathered from the 
 notoriousness* [of its being so]. 
 
 b. He characterizes Postures, which come next in order: 5 
 
 Aph. 34. Steady and [promoting] 
 ease is a [suitable] Posture. 
 
 . That is to say : that is a Posture which, being 
 steady, is a cause of pleasure ; such as the crossing of the 
 arms. 6 
 
 3 Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva transpose Aphorisms 33 
 and 34. Ed. 
 
 t H^frT
 
 BOOK III., APH. 36. 247 
 
 6. He characterizes one's Duty : l 
 
 i H II ?M II 
 
 Aph. 35. One's Duty is the per- 
 
 One s duty. , J ., , 
 
 lormance 01 the actions prescribed 
 for one's religious order. 
 
 a. Simple. 2 
 
 T H 9r H 
 
 Knowledge by Concert- Aph. 36. Through Dispassion and 
 
 <r<tfto &HD attained. Practice. 
 
 a. Simply through mere Practice, in the shape of Medi- 
 tation, accompanied by Dispassion, Knowledge, with its 
 instrument, Concentration, takes place in the case of those 
 who are most competent [to engage in the matter] : such 
 is the meaning. Thus has liberation through knowledge 
 been expounded. 3 
 
 b. After this, the cause of Bondage, viz., Misconception, 
 declared in [the assertion,] ' Bondage is from Miscon- 
 ception/ [ 24], is to be expounded. Here he first states 
 the nature of Misconception : 4 
 
 1 ^^ ^^cqf?r 
 
 3 Ji._
 
 248 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 37. The kinds of Misconcep- 
 
 Misconception divided. , . ~ 
 
 tion are five. 
 
 a. That is to say : the subdivisions of Misconception, 
 which is the cause of Bondage, are Ignorance, Egoism, 
 Desire, Aversion, and Fear of Dissolution ; the five men- 
 tioned in the Yoga, 1 [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book II., 3 1 ]. 
 
 b. Having stated the nature of Misconception, he states 
 also the nature of its cause, viz., Disability : 3 
 
 The varieties of Dis- -Aph. 38. But Disability is of twenty - 
 eight sorts. 5 
 
 a. Simple ; 6 [as explained in the Toga]. 
 
 2 The five are there called ' afflictions' (Mesa). Ed. 
 
 3 
 
 4 This word is omitted by Aniruddha and by Vedanti Maha- 
 deva. Ed. 
 
 6 See, for these, Dr. Ballantyne's edition of the Tattwa-samdsa, 
 63. Ed.
 
 BOOK III., APH. 41. 249 
 
 b. In a couple of aphorisms he mentions [those] two, 
 Acquiescence and Perfection, on the prevention of which 
 come two sorts of Disability of the Understanding : l 
 
 II ?e II 
 
 A^icence. ^ ^ Acquiescence is c 
 
 sorts. 
 
 a. He will, himself, explain how it is of nine sorts. 8 
 
 II #0 || 
 
 Perfections. Aph. 40. Perfection is of eight sorts, 
 
 o. This, also, he will, himself, explain. 8 
 
 b. Of the aforesaid, viz., Misconception, Disability, Ac- 
 quiescence, and Perfection, since there may be a desire to 
 know the particulars, there is, in order, a quaternion of 
 aphorisms : * 
 
 II W II 
 
 \ 
 
 II 
 
 
 n 
 
 3 ^cT^ftf ^^i ^r^rfh n 
 *
 
 250 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 41. The subdivisions [of Mis- 
 
 Their subdivisions. .-. t --, 
 
 conception] are as [declared] aforetime. 
 
 a. The subdivisions of Misconception, which, in a general 
 way, have been stated as five, are to be understood to be 
 particularized 'as aforetime/ i.e., just as they have been 
 declared by preceding teachers : they are not explained 
 here, for fear of prolixity : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 ii 
 
 Aph. 42. So of the other [viz., Dis- 
 
 Of tJiisfurtlier. . ., f" n 
 
 ability]. 
 
 a. That is to say : ' so,' i. e., just as aforetime [ 41], the 
 divisions ' of the other/ viz., of Disability, also, which are 
 twenty-eight, are to be understood, as regards their par- 
 ticularities. 2 
 
 <rf%: u 8? 
 
 Aph. 43. Acquiescence is ninefold, 
 
 Acquiescence divided. , 1,1 j- , , /<_.!_ 
 
 through the distinctions of the in- 
 ternal and the rest.'
 
 BOOK III., APH. 44. 251 
 
 a. This aphorism is explained by a memorial verse, 1 
 [No. 50 s ]. 
 
 : ftrfe: 11 88 n 
 
 Perfection divided. . ^' 44 ' ThrOU g h Basoning, &C., 
 
 [which are its subdivisions,] Perfec- 
 tion [is eightfold] . 
 
 a. That is to say : Perfection is of eight kinds, through 
 its divisions, viz., Reasoning, &c. This aphorism, also, 
 has been explained in a memorial verse, 3 [No 5 1 4 ]. 
 
 \\ 
 
 2 Quoted below, from the Sdnkhya-kdrikd, with Mr. John Davies's 
 translation : 
 
 ' Nine varieties of acquiescence are set forth ; four internal, named 
 from Nature, means, time, and fortune; five external, relating to 
 abstinence from objects of sense.' Ed. 
 
 : i 
 
 Here appended, with Mr. Davies's translation : 
 
 ' The eight perfections (or means of acquiring perfection) are reason- 
 ing (uha), word or oral instruction (s'abda), study or reading (adhya-
 
 252 
 
 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. But then, how is it said that Perfection consists only 
 of ' Reasoning, &c.,' seeing that it is determined, in all the 
 Institutes, that the eight Perfections, viz., [the capacity of 
 assuming] atomic bulk, &c., result from recitations, 
 austerity, meditation, &c. ? To this he replies : l 
 
 f^FTI It &M 
 
 Aph. 45. Not from any other [than 
 
 *" what we have J ust 8tated does real 
 Perfection arise ; because what does 
 
 arise therefrom, e.g., from austerities, is] without abandon- 
 ment of something else, [viz., Misconception]. 
 
 a. ' From any other,' i. e., from anything different from 
 the pentad, ' Reasoning, &c./ e. g., from Austerity, &c., 
 there is no real Perfection. Why ? ' Without abandon- 
 ment of something else;' i. e., because that Perfection 
 [which you choose to call such] takes place positively 
 without abandonment of something else, i.e., of Misconcep- 
 tion : therefore [that Perception], since it is no antagonist 
 to mundane existence, is only a semblance of a Perfection, 
 and not a real Perfection : such is the meaning. 2 
 
 yana), the suppression of the three kinds of pain, acquisition of friends, 
 and liberality (ddna). The three fore-mentioned (conditions) are 
 checks to perfection.' Ed. 
 
 : I 
 
 f^^TT
 
 BOOK III., APH. 46. 253 
 
 b. Now the individuated creation, which was mentioned 
 concisely in the assertion, 'There is distinction of in- 
 dividuals through diversity of desert,' [ 10], is set forth 
 diffusely :* 
 
 I 80 II 
 
 Apk. 46. [The creation is that] of 
 which the subdivisions are the de- 
 mons, &c. 
 
 a. Supply, such is that creation, of which 'the sub- 
 divisions,' the included divisions, are the demons, &c. This 
 is explained in a memorial verse, 2 [No. 53 3 ]. 
 
 cTT- 
 
 ?RT 
 n 
 
 3 It here follows, with the translation of Mr. Davies : 
 
 ' The divine class has eight varieties ; the animal, five. Mankind 
 is single in its class. This is, in summary, the world (sarga, emana- 
 tion,) of living things.' Ed.
 
 254 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. He states that the aforesaid subdivided creation, also, 
 is for the sake of Soul : l 
 
 H 89 II 
 
 This creation, also, for Ajph.47. From Brahma down to a 
 Soul's fake. pogt^ f or its [Soul's,] sake is creation, 
 
 till there be discrimination [between Soul and Nature]. 
 
 a. He mentions, further, the division of the subdivided 
 creation, in three aphorisms : 2 
 
 u 8t 11 
 
 Ar>h. 48. Aloft, it [the creation,] 
 
 The celestial world. , , . r i i. *-, -^ 
 
 abounds in [the quality of] Purity. 
 
 a. That is to say : ' aloft/ above the world of mortals, the 
 creation has chiefly [the Quality of] Purity. 8 
 
 u 80. u 
 
 Aph. 49. Beneath, it [the creation.] 
 
 The infernal world. u J i\ 1 
 
 abounds in Darkness. 
 a. ' Beneath/ that is to say, under the world of mortals.* 
 
 2 ' II 
 
 : s^rrftrerr
 
 BOOK III., APH. 51. 255 
 
 H MO II 
 
 Aph. 50. In the midst, it [the crea- 
 
 The world of mortal,. ^ abounds in 
 
 a. ' In the midst/ that is to say, in the world of mortals. 1 
 
 b. But then, for what reason are there, from one single 
 Nature, creations diverse in having, affluently, purity and 
 the rest ? With reference to this, he says : 2 
 
 Aph. 51. By reason of diversity of 
 desert is Nature's [diverse] behaviour; 
 like a born-slave. 
 
 a. Just by reason of diverse desert is the behaviour of 
 Nature, as asserted, in the shape of diversity of operation. 
 An illustration of the diversity is [offered in the example] , 
 f like a born-slave/ That is to say : as, of him who is a 
 slave from the embryo-state upwards, there are, through 
 the aptitude arising from the habit 3 of being a dependant, 
 various sorts of behaviour, i. e., of service, for the sake 
 of his master, so 4 [does Nature serve Soul in various 
 ways]. 
 
 3 Vdsand. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed. 
 
 4
 
 256 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. But then, if the creation aloft is abundant in Purity 
 [the element of joy], since Soul's object is really thereby 
 effected, what need is there of Liberation ? To this he 
 replies : l 
 
 (I M^ II 
 
 Why Heaven is to be dph. 52. Even there there is return 
 shunned. [to miserable states of existence] : it is 
 
 to be shunned, by reason of the successive subjections to 
 birth, [from which the inhabitants of Heaven enjoy no 
 immunity] . 
 
 a. Moreover : 2 
 
 * H M (I 
 
 Aph. 53. Alike [belongs to all] the 
 
 Transitoriness of , , , , , -, , 
 
 heavenly Mis*. sorrow produced by decay and death. 
 
 ?Tf I 
 
 ( 
 
 i 
 
 8 Vedanti Mahadeva has, instead of ^{4-| | rf , ^^^ . Ed. 
 
 * Nagesa, according to my sole MS., has
 
 BOOK TIL, APH. 54. 257 
 
 . Common to all alike, those that are aloft and those 
 beneath, beginning with Brahma and ending with a stock, 
 is the ' sorrow produced by decay and death ' ; therefore, 
 moreover, it [heaven,] is to be shunned : such is the 
 meaning. 1 
 
 b. What need of more? The end is not effected by 
 absorption into the cause, either ; as he tells us : 2 
 
 II M 8 II 
 
 Absorption into Na- ^ph. 54. Not by absorption into the 
 ture ineffectual. cause is there accomplishment of the 
 
 end ; because, as in the case of one who has dived, there is 
 a rising again. 
 
 a. In the absence of knowledge of the distinction 
 [between Soul and Nature], when indifference towards 
 Mind, &c., has resulted from worship of Nature, then 
 absorption into Nature takes place ; for it is declared : 
 'Through Dispassion there is absorption into Nature.' 
 Even through this, i.e., the absorption into the cause, the 
 end is not gained; 'because there is a rising again ; as in 
 the case of one who has dived. 5 As a man who has dived 
 under water rises again, exactly so do Souls which have been 
 absorbed into Nature reappear, [at the commencement of a 
 new annusmagnus],in the condition of Lords ; because it is
 
 258 THE SAXKHTA APHORISMS. 
 
 impossible that one's Faults should be consumed, without a 
 familiarity with the distinction [between Soul and Nature], 
 in consequence of the reappearance of Passion, by reason of 
 the non-destruction of habits/ &c.: such is the meaning. 2 
 
 6. But then, the cause is not by any one caused to act. 
 Being independent, then, why does she [Nature,] make that 
 grief-occasioning resurrection of her own worshipper? 
 To this he replies: 5 
 
 MM 
 
 Aph. 55. Though she be not con- 
 strained to act, yet this is fitting ; 
 because of her being devoted to another. 
 
 1 To raider ta**Mra. Ed. 
 
 rTTT 
 
 ^ 
 
 TTcT 

 
 BOOK III., APH. 56. 259 
 
 a. Though Nature is ' not constrained to act/ not insti- 
 gated, not subject to the will of another, yet e this is fitting;' 
 it is proper that he who is absorbed in her should rise 
 again. Why ? ' Because of her being devoted to another ; ' 
 i. e., because she seeks Soul's end. The meaning is, that 
 he who is absorbed in her is again raised up, by Nature^ 
 for the sake of SouPs end, which consists in knowledge 
 of the distinction [between Nature and Soul]. And Soul's 
 end, and the like, are not constrainers of Nature, but 
 occasions for the energizing of her whose very being is to 
 energize ; so that there is nothing detracted from her 
 independence. 1 
 
 b. He mentions, further, a proof that Soul rises from 
 absorption into Nature: 2 
 
 ff tr 
 
 Aph. 56. [He who is absorbed into 
 into Nature. Nature must rise again ;] for he becomes 
 
 omniscient and omnipotent [in a subsequent creation]. 
 
 : i 
 
 ucftrqi TJit*rl|U|<T 
 
 : f^fi
 
 260 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. For ' he/ viz., he who, in a previous creation, was 
 absorbed into the Cause, in a subsequent creation becomes 
 'omniscient and omnipotent;' the Lord, the First Spirit l 
 
 b. But then, if that be so, it is impossible to deny * a 
 Lord, [which, nevertheless, the Sankhyas seem to do]. To 
 this he replies : * 
 
 ftr^r H MS ii 
 
 in what sense there A P h - 57. The existence of such a 
 it a Lord. L or cl is a settled point. 
 
 a. It is quite agreed, by all, that there is an emergent 
 Lord, he who had been absorbed into Nature ; for the 
 ground of dispute [between Sdnkhyas and the rest,] is 
 altogether about an eternal Lord : such is the meaning. 4 
 
 b. He expounds diffusely the motive for Nature's 
 creating, which was mentioned only indicator ily in the 
 first aphorism of the Second Book : s 
 
 1 ^R fff 
 
 II 
 
 2 Pratishedha, on which vide supra, p. 112, note 3. Ed. 
 
 4
 
 BOOK III., APH. 59. 261 
 
 II Mb II 
 
 \ 
 
 Aph. 58. Nature's creating is for the 
 
 Nature's disinterested' -\ p ,-1 ,i_ !_'*.? 
 
 nen. sake of another, though it be sponta- 
 
 neous ; for she is not the experiencer ; 
 like a cart's carrying saffron [for the sake of its 
 master]. 
 
 a. But then, it is quite impossible that Nature, being 
 unintelligent, should be, spontaneously, a creator ; for we 
 see that a cart, or the like, operates only by reason of 
 the efforts of another. To this he replies: 1 
 
 II MO. II 
 
 Aph. 59. Though she be unintelli- 
 gent, yet Nature acts ; as is the case with 
 milk. 
 
 a. That is to say : as milk, without reference to men's 
 efforts, quite of itself changes into the form of curd, so 
 Nature, although she be unintelligent, changes into the 
 form of Mind, &c., even without the efforts of any other. 2
 
 262 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. This is not rendered tautological by this aphorism, 
 ' As the cow for the calf/ [Book II., 37] ; because there 
 the question was only of the operation of instruments, and 
 because cows are intelligent. 1 
 
 c. By means of the exhibition of another illustration, he 
 mentions the cause of the thing asserted as aforesaid : 2 
 
 : 3 11 t?o 11 
 
 Aph. 60. Or as is the case with the 
 Another iiiuttraiion. acts [or on-goings] for we see them 
 of Time, &c. 
 
 a. Or as is the case with the acts [or on-goings,] of 
 Time, &c., the spontaneous action of Nature is proved from 
 what is seen. The action of Time, for example, takes place 
 quite spontaneously, in the shape of one season's now 
 departing and another's coming on : let the behaviour of 
 Nature, also, be thus ; for the supposition conforms to 
 observed facts : such is the meaning. 4 
 
 m^nstW 
 
 3 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha has 
 
 4
 
 BOOK III., APH. 61. 263 
 
 b. But, still, a senseless Nature would never energize, or 
 would energize the wrong way ; because of there being [in 
 her case,] no such communing as, ' This is my means of 
 producing experience, &c/ To this he replies : * 
 
 ftj?TH1 
 
 Aph. 61. From her own nature she 
 
 ^Nature act* from ^ n()t from thougllt . Hke a 8er . 
 
 vant. 
 
 a. That is to say : as, in the case of an excellent servant, 
 naturally, just from habit, 2 the appointed and necessary 
 service of the master is engaged in, and not with a view to 
 his own enjoyment, just so does Nature energize from 
 habit alone. 3 
 
 IT5[f%: 
 
 As here, so again just below, this word renders sanskdra. Ed.
 
 264 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Or through the inflw A P&' 62 - Or from attraction by De- 
 tnce ofDetert. serts, which have been from eternity. 
 
 a. Here the word ' or ' is for connecting [this aphorism 
 with the preceding one]. Since Desert has been from 
 eternity, therefore, moreover, through attraction by Deserts, 
 the energizing of Nature is necessary and rightly distri- 
 buted : 2 such is the meaning. 8 
 
 b. It being thus settled, then, that Nature is creative for 
 the sake of another, he tells us, in the following section, 4 
 that, on the completion of that other's purpose, Liberation 
 takes place through Nature's quite spontaneously ceasing 
 to act : 5 
 
 1 Aniruddha inserts ^lf after ^f- Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 : II 
 
 * See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 36. Ed. 
 
 . 4 Bead, instead of 'in the following section,' 'by an enunciation. 
 Ed. 
 
 "ft?%
 
 BOOK III., APH. 64. 265 
 
 Aph. 63. From discriminative know- 
 en ledge there is a cessation of Nature's 
 creating ; as is the case with a cook, 
 when the cooking has been performed. 
 
 a. When Soul's aim has been accomplished, by means 
 of indifference to all else, through discriminative knowledge 
 of Soul, Nature's creating ceases ; as, when the cooking 
 is completed, the labour of the cook ceases : such is the 
 meaning. 1 
 
 b. But, at that rate, since Nature's creating ceases 
 through the production of discriminative knowledge in 
 the case of a single Soul, we should find all liberated. 
 To this he replies : 2 
 
 Liberation of one in- Aph. 64. Another remains like an- 
 
 volves not that of all. other> t h roug h her fault. 
 
 a. But ' another,' i. e., one devoid of discriminative know- 
 ledge, remains ' like another/ i. e., just like one bound by 
 
 n 
 
 I RT II 
 
 3 Aniruddha's lection of this Aphorism is : 
 
 \ Ed.
 
 266 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Nature. Why? 'Through her fault/ i.e., through the 
 fault which may be described as her not accomplishing that 
 sours aim : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 6. He mentions the fruit of Nature's ceasing to act : J 
 
 Aph. 65. [The fruit of Nature's 
 
 Deration consists of ceaging to M Q ^ the so litarineS8 of both 
 
 [Nature and Soul], or [which comes to 
 the same thing,] of either, is liberation. 
 
 a. * Of both,' i.e., of Nature and Soul, the ' solitariness,' 
 i.e., the being alone, the mutual disjunction, in short, this 
 is liberation. 3 
 
 b. But then, how would Nature, having attained indif- 
 ference, through the mood in the shape of discrimination, 
 on the liberation of a single Soul, again engage in creation, 
 for the sake of another Soul ? And you are not to say 
 that this is no objection, because Nature consists of different 
 portions, [it is not another Nature, but the same] ; because 
 we see, that, even out of the [mortal] constituents of the 
 
 fcnrRr i ?n i 
 
 8
 
 BOOK III., APH. 66. 267 
 
 liberated person, viz., his dust, &c., things are created for 
 the experience of another. To this he replies : l 
 
 ^FHrr 
 
 i 
 
 ?T I cfTH? II 
 
 * Nagesa has ^RT^^TCT TP^ - E: ^ 
 
 8 Vijnana's genuine reading seems to be T^fT^TS' ^' s com ' 
 
 ment, however, recognizes also f H^T*4ffSj tne reading of Ani- 
 ruddha. One MS. of his work which has been consulted has, like 
 Vedanti Mahadera, f<4^HcTS' Nagesa has fV^cf^^fS- Ed- 
 
 -^21, instead of -^2| o , appears to have very little good 
 warrant; and Dr. Ballantyne, indeed, translates ^ToT not |^c| -E 1 ^- 
 
 6 Of this Aphorism, and of the comment on it, MSS. of Vijnana's 
 treatise afford a much better text than that here reprinted. In one 
 of its more approved forms, that which Vijnana seems to elect, the 
 
 original enunciation runs thus : ^ MtH S5M M iTlST^ T T^T" 
 
 TrTTSK^^iTSlfl^al^dj^J^T* I ' Furthermore, she [Na- 
 ^ s3 
 
 ture,] does not give over effecting creation, with reference to another, 
 
 [i. e., another soul than that of the spiritual sage, though she creates 
 for such a sage no longer ; and she acts, in so doing,] analogously to 
 a snake, with reference to him who is unenlightened as to the real
 
 268 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 66. Moreover, [when Nature 
 has left off distressing the emancipated,] 
 she does not desist, in regard to her 
 creative influence on another ; as is the case with the 
 snake, [which ceases to be a terror,] in respect of him who 
 is aware of the truth in regard to the rope [which another 
 mistakes for a snake]. 
 
 a. Nature, though, in respect of one Soul, she have de- 
 sisted, in consequence of discriminative knowledge, does not 
 desist as regards her creative influence on another Soul, 
 but does create in respect of that one ; as the snake [so 
 to speak,] does not produce fear, &c., in the case of him 
 who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope, but does 
 produce it, in respect of him who is ignorant [that what 
 
 character of the rope ' [which is mistaken for it ; this illusory snake 
 keeping him constantly in a state of alarm, though it ceases to affect 
 him who has discovered that it is nothing more formidable than a 
 yard or two of twisted hemp]. More closely, so far as regards the 
 construction of the original : ' Furthermore, in like manner as a snake 
 goes on influencing him who ..... [Nature persists] in effecting 
 creation,' &c. 
 
 That upardga, as embodied in the expression srishtyupardga, 
 signifies ' causing,' ' effecting,' is the view of both Aniruddha and 
 Vedauti Mahadeva, who define it by karana. 
 
 The Aphorism in question, mainly as just exhibited, together with 
 preferable deviations from the comment as given by Dr. Ballantyne, 
 will be found at p. 13 of the variants appended to my edition of the 
 Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhdshya. Nagesa, following Vijnana very 
 
 closely, explains the Aphorism as follows : 4JVJ | \\ c( -rf 4 -T-jf rl ^cf 
 
 pf f 
 
 nfrf 
 
 i irfa *rfr IR^CT ssw i
 
 BOOK III., APH. 67. 269 
 
 he looks upon is a rope, and not a snake] : such is the 
 meaning. And Nature is likened to a snake, because of 
 her disguising Soul, which is likened to a rope. Certain 
 unintelligent persons, calling themselves Veddntts, having 
 quite failed to understand that such is the drift of such 
 examples as those of the rope, the snake, &c., suppose that 
 Nature is an absolute nothing, or something merely 
 imaginary. The matters of Scripture and of the legal 
 institutes are to be elucidated by means of this [or that] 
 example offered by the Sdnk/iyas, who assert the reality of 
 Nature : it is not the case that the matter is simply esta- 
 blished to be as is the example; 1 [the analogy of which is 
 not to be overstrained, as if the cases were parallel 
 throughout]. 
 
 ii 
 
 irfa ?r 
 
 M < !
 
 270 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Another consideration Aph. 67. And from connexion with 
 
 why Nature should act. D e8ert> ^fefc J 8 fa e cauge> 
 
 a. ' Desert/ which is the cause of creation, in consequence 
 of the conjunction of this, also, she creates, for the sake of 
 another Soul [than the emancipated one] : such is the 
 meaning. 1 
 
 b. But then, since all Souls are alike indifferent, inas- 
 much as they do not desire [Nature's interference], what 
 is it that here determines Nature to act only in regard to 
 this one, and to desist in regard to that one ? And Desert 
 is not the determiner ; because here, too, there is nothing 
 to determine of which Soul what is the Desert ; [Desert 
 being inferrible only from, and, therefore, not cognizable 
 antecendently to, its fruits]. To this he replies: 2 
 
 Natures selection koto Aph. 68. Though there is [on Soul's 
 determined. part, this] indifference, yet want of dis- 
 
 crimination is the cause of Nature's service. 
 
 T IRcftT 
 I
 
 BOOK III., APH. 69. 271 
 
 a. That is to say : although Souls are indifferent, yet 
 Nature, just through [her own] non-discrimination, saying, 
 ' This is my master/ < This is I myself/ serves Souls, [to- 
 wards their eventual emancipation], by creation, &c. And 
 so, to what Soul, not having discriminated herself [there- 
 from], she has the habit 1 of showing herself, in respect just 
 of that one does Nature energize ; and this it is that 
 determines her : such is the import.* 
 
 b. Since it is her nature to energize, how can she desist, 
 even when discrimination has taken place ? To this he 
 replies : 3 
 
 f TrT^ II 
 
 Nature energizes only Apll. 69. Like a dancer does she, 
 
 till the end is attained. th h 8he had been energizing, desist ; 
 because of the end's having been attained, 
 
 a. Nature's disposition to energize is only for the sake 
 of Soul, and not universally. Therefore is it fitting that 
 
 1 Vdsand. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. JSd. 
 
 2 
 
 cf 
 
 f^Rrm^ftrf?r m 1 ^: u
 
 272 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Nature should desist, though she has been energizing, when 
 the end has been attained, in the shape of the effectuation of 
 Soul's aim ; as a dancer, who has been performing, 
 with the view of exhibiting a dance to the spectators, 
 desists, on the accomplishment of this : such is the mean- 
 ing. 1 
 
 b. He states another reason for the cessation: 2 
 
 \ 
 
 II SO II 
 
 Aph. 70. Moreover, when her fault 
 
 This illustrated. J ^ 
 
 is known, Nature does not approach 
 [Soul] ; like a woman of good family. 
 
 a. That is to say : Nature, moreover, ashamed at Soul's 
 having seen her fault, in her transformations, and her 
 taking the shape of pain, &c., does not again approach 
 Soul; 'like a woman of good family/ i. e. ; as a [frail] woman 
 of good family, ashamed at ascertaining that her fault
 
 BOOK III., APH. 71. 273 
 
 has been seen by her husband, does not approach her 
 husband. 1 2 
 
 b. But then, if Nature's energizing be for the sake of 
 Soul, Soul must be altered by Bondage and Liberation, 
 [and not remain the unalterable entity which you allege it 
 to be]. To this he replies: 3 
 
 Aph. 71. Bondage and Liberation 
 
 Bndaye dat do not actually belong to Soul, [and 
 
 would not even appear to do so,] but 
 for non-discrimination. 
 
 a. Bondage and Liberation, consisting in the conjunction 
 of Pain, and its disjunction, do not 'actually,' i. e., really, 
 belong to Soul ; but, in the way mentioned in the fourth 
 aphorism, they result only from non-discrimination : such 
 is the meaning. 4 
 
 2 See the National Refutation, Ac., p. 61. 
 
 3 
 
 v 
 
 T
 
 274 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. But, in reality, Bondage and Liberation, as declared, 
 belong to Nature alone : so he asserts : l 
 
 Bondage is really Aph. 72. They really belong to Na- 
 
 ture, through consociation ; like a beast. 
 
 a. Bondage and Liberation, through Pain, really belong 
 to Nature, 2 ' through consociation/ i. e., through her being 
 hampered by the habits, &c., which are the causes of 
 Pain ; as a beast, through its being hampered by a 
 rope, experiences Bondage and Liberation : such is the 
 meaning. 3 
 
 b. Here, by what causes is there Bondage ? Or by what 
 is there Liberation ? To this he replies : * 
 
 2 Read : ' Bondage and Liberation belong to Nature alone ; be- 
 cause to it, in truth, belongs misery.' JEd.
 
 BOOK III., APH. 73. 275 
 
 Aph. 73. In seven ways does Nature 
 bind herself; like the silk- worm : in 
 one way does she liberate herself. 
 
 a. By Merit, Dispassion, Supernatural Power, Demerit, 
 Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and Want of Power, viz., by 
 habits, causes of Pain, in the shape of these seven, ' does 
 Nature bind herself with Pain; ' like the silk- worm ; ' i. e., 
 as the worm that makes the cocoon binds itself by means 
 of the dwelling which itself constructs. And that same 
 Nature liberates herself from Pain 'in one way/ i.e., by 
 Knowledge alone : such is the meaning. 8 
 
 b. But then, that which you assert, viz., that Bondage 
 and Liberation result from Non-discrimination alone, is 
 improper ; because Non-discrimination can neither be 
 
 1 NageSa has 
 
 2 Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva have - 
 
 (Tf rT x I IN 
 
 : (I
 
 276 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 quitted nor assumed, and because, in the world, Pain, and 
 its negative, Pleasure, &c., can, themselves, be neither 
 quitted nor assumed : otherwise, [if you still insist on 
 retaining the opinion objected to], there is disparagement 
 of sense-evidence. Having pondered this, he himself [not 
 leaving it to a commentator,] explains what was asserted 
 in the fourth aphorism : l 
 
 Aph. 74. Non-discrimination is the 
 
 An objection met. * 
 
 cause [not the thing itself] ; [so that] 
 there is no disparagement of sense-evidence. 
 
 a. What was asserted before was this, that Non-dis- 
 crimination is only the occasion of Bondage and Liberation 
 in souls, and not that Non- discrimination itself is these two ; 
 therefore ' there is no disparagement of sense- evidence ;' 
 [for, though we see that Pain and Pleasure cannot be 
 directly assumed or quitted, yet we also see that causes of 
 them can be assumed or quitted] : such is the meaning. 2
 
 BOOK III., APH. 76. 277 
 
 b. He mentions, among the means conducive to Dis- 
 crimination, Study, which is the essence of them : l 
 
 Aph. 75. Discrimination is perfected 
 
 ^Meajts of Di si through abandonment [of everything], 
 
 expressed by a ' No, No/ through study 
 of the [twenty- five] Principles. 
 
 a. Discrimination is effected through study of the 
 Principles, in the shape of abandoning, by a ' No, No,' 
 in regard to things unintelligent, ending with Nature, the 
 conceit [that Nature, or any of her products, is Soul]. 
 
 ~A11 the others [enumerated in the list of means] are only 
 supplemental to Study : such is the meaning. 2 
 
 b. He states a speciality in regard to the perfecting of 
 Discrimination : 3 
 
 II 
 
 m I s cTT- 
 
 : ii 
 ii 
 
 Vedanti Mahadeva has
 
 278 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 76. Through the difference of 
 
 JfJSSS*"' those competent [to engage in the 
 matter at all], there is no necessity 
 [that each and every one should at once be successful]. 
 
 a. Since there is a division, among those competent, into 
 the sluggish, &c., though study be made, there is no cer- 
 tainty that, in this very birth, Discrimination will be 
 accomplished : such is the meaning. Therefore, every one 
 should, by strenuousness in study, acquire for himself the 
 highest degree of competency : such is the import. 1 
 
 b. He states that Liberation takes place solely through 
 the effecting of Discrimination, and not otherwise : 2 
 
 Aph. 77. Since what [Pain] has been 
 repelled returns^ again, there comes, 
 even from medium [but imperfect,] 
 
 Discrimination, experience, [which it is desired to get en- 
 
 tirely rid of]. 
 
 a. But sluggish Discrimination [lower even than the 
 
 HFC: H 
 
 ' The reading of Aniruddha is
 
 BOOK III., APH. 79. 279 
 
 middling variety], antecedently to direct intuition, consists 
 only of Hearing, Pondering, and Meditating : such, is the 
 division 1 [of Discrimination]. 
 
 Of Liberation during Aph. 78. And he who, living, is libe- 
 '^- rated. 
 
 a. That is to say : he, also, who, while living, is liberated 
 is just in the condition of medium Discrimination. 3 
 
 b. He adduces evidence for there being some one libe- 
 rated, though still living : * 
 
 <^E 
 
 r^^t 
 
 (V* H $ II 
 
 Proof ihattkismay be. . A P*- 79 ' Jt is P FOVed b 7 the fact f 
 
 instructed and instructor. 
 
 a. That is to say : it is proved that there are such as are 
 liberated during life, by the mention, in the Institutes, on 
 the subject of Discrimination, 5 of the relation of preceptor 
 
 2 The T[ is omitted by Yedanti Mahadeva. Ed. 
 
 3 
 
 5 This I have substituted for ' Liberation,' a mere oversight. Ed.
 
 280 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 and pupil; i. e., because it is only one liberated during life 
 that can be an instructor 1 [in this matter]. 
 
 H to n 
 
 Further proof . Aph, go. And there is Scripture. 
 
 a. There is also Scripture for there being persons 
 liberated during life. 3 
 
 b. But then, merely through hearing, too, one might 
 become [qualified to be] an instructor. To this he replies : 4 
 
 A suggests repelled. A P h ' 8L [And not through merely 
 hearing is one qualified to become an 
 instructor] : otherwise, there were blind tradition. 
 
 a. That is to say : otherwise, since even a person of slug- 
 gish Discrimination [but who, yet, had heard^\ would be 
 an instructor, we should have a blind handing down 5 [of 
 doctrines which would speedily become corrupted or lost]. 
 
 H 
 
 2 None of the commentators but Vijnana recognizes an Aphorism 
 in these words ; and it is very doubtful whether even he does so. Ed. 
 
 3 
 
 4 FTRf I cRT? II 
 
 5 
 
 : H
 
 BOOK III., APJi. 82. 281 
 
 b. But then, when, through Knowledge, one's works 
 [which are the cause of mundane existence,] have perished, 
 how can there [still] be life ? To this he replies : l 
 
 Aph. 82. Possessed of a body, [the 
 
 How life is compatible j ! i 1*1 
 
 with Liberaton. emancipated sage goes on living] ; like 
 
 the whirling of a wheel. 
 
 a. Even on the cessation of the action of the potter, the 
 wheel, of itself, revolves for some time, in consequence of 
 the motal inertia resulting from the previous action. So, 
 after knowledge, though actions do not arise, yet, through 
 the [self-continuant] action of antecedent acts, possessing 
 an energizing body, he remains living, yet liberated ; 2 
 [and, if he did not, but if every one who gained true 
 knowledge were, on gaining it, to disappear, true know- 
 ledge would cease to be handed down orally ; and Kapila, 
 probably, did not contemplate books, or did not think 
 these a secure depository of the doctrine] : such is the 
 meaning. 8 
 
 2 For another rendering, see the Rational Refutation, &c., 
 p. 31. Ed. 
 
 3 
 
 ^ cf
 
 282 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. But then, since the continuance l of experience, &c., 
 is put an end to by that ' Meditation with distinct recog- 
 nition of the object/ which [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., 
 17, 2 ] is the cause of knowledge, how can one retain a 
 body ? To this he replies : 3 
 
 H J II b$ II 
 
 Aph. 83. This [retention of a body] 
 occasioned by the least vestige of 
 impression. 
 
 a. That is to say : the retention of a body is caused by 
 even the least remains of those impressions 4 of objects 
 which are the causes of having a body. 5 
 
 b. He recapitulates the sense of the declarations of the 
 Institute : 6 
 
 1 Vaan&. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed. 
 
 2 Which here follows, with Dr. Ballantyne's translation : 
 
 I '[Medi- 
 
 tation, of the kind called] that in which there is distinct recognition 
 [arises, in its fourfold shape,] from the attendance of (1) argumenta- 
 tion (vitarka), (2) deliberation (vichAra), (3) beatitude (dnanda), 
 and (4) egotism (asmitd).' Ed. 
 
 I 
 
 4 This is to render the technicality sanskdra. Ed. 
 f\ -^ "^ rs 
 
 I "*!
 
 BOOK III., APH. 84. 283 
 
 Recapitulation. ' 84 ' That which Wa8 to be done 
 
 has been done, when entire Cessation of 
 Pain has resulted from Discrimination ; not otherwise, not 
 otherwise. 
 
 a. So much for the Third Book, on Dispassion. 8 
 
 1 Vijnana, according to some copies of his work, has 
 the preferable reading, and that of all the other commentators known 
 to me. Ed. 
 
 END OF BOOK III.
 
 284 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 
 Now, by means of a collection of narratives, recognized 
 in the Institutes, the means of discriminative knowledge 
 are to be displayed : so, for this purpose the Fourth Book 
 is commenced. 1 
 
 Soul set right by hear' Aph, 1. As in the case of the king's 
 son, from instruction as to the truth 
 [comes discrimination between Soul and Nature]. 
 
 a. ' Discrimination ' is supplied from the concluding 
 aphorism of the preceding section. The meaning is : as, 
 in the case of the king's son, discrimination is produced 
 by instruction as to the truth. The story, here, is as 
 follows : A certain king's son, in consequence of his being 
 born under the [unlucky] star of the tenth portion 2 [of the 
 twenty-seven portions into which the ecliptic is divided], 
 having been expelled from his city, and reared by a certain 
 forester, remains under the idea, that ' I am a forester.' 
 Having learned that he is alive, a certain minister informs 
 him : ' Thou art not a forester ; thou art a king's son/ 
 
 ii 
 
 2 The Sanskrit yields ' under the star [named] Ganda.' Ed.
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 1. 285 
 
 As he, immediately, having abandoned the idea of his 
 being an outcast, betakes himself to his true royal state, 
 saying, ' I am a king' so, too, it [the Soul], in consequence 
 of the instruction of some kind person, to the effect that 
 'Thou, who didst originate from the First Soul, which mani- 
 fests itself merely as pure Thought, art [thyself,] a portion 
 thereof/ having abandoned the idea of its being Nature [or 
 of being something material or phenomenal], rests simply 
 upon its own nature, saying, 'Since I am the son of 
 Brahma, I am, myself, Brahma, and not something 
 mundane, different therefrom :' such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He exhibits another story, to prove that even women, 
 
 I ct ifN^ sJTr^T 
 
 c
 
 286 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Sudras, &c., may gain the [one desirable] end, through a 
 Brahman, by hearing the instructions of a Brahman : * 
 
 H ^ ii 
 
 Aph. 2. As in the case of the gob- 
 Even when the instrw H n , even when the instruction was for 
 
 lion is not addressed to , . _ , r , . , 
 
 the hearer. the sake of another, [the chance hearer 
 
 may be benefited]. 
 
 a. That is to say : though the instruction in regard to 
 the truth was being delivered, by the venerable Krishna, 
 for Arjuna's benefit, knowledge of the distinction [between 
 Soul and Nature] was produced in the case of a goblin 
 standing near [and overhearing the discourse] : and so 
 it may happen in the case of others, too. 2 
 
 b. And, if knowledge is not produced from once instruct- 
 ing, then a repetition of the instruction is to be made ; to 
 which effect he adduces another story : 8 
 
 J H
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 4. 287 
 
 Aph. 3. Repetition [is to be made], if 
 &**** f inCUl1 not, from once instructing, [the end be 
 gained]. 
 
 a. That is to say : a repetition of instruction, also, is to 
 be made ; because, in the Chhandogya [ Upanishad], 1 and 
 the like, there is mention of Aruni, and others, as 
 having more than once instructed Swetaketu and others. 2 
 
 6. "With a view to the removal of desire, he sets forth, 
 with an illustration, the fragility, &c., of Soul's accompani- 
 ments : 3 
 
 iTcT II 8 II 
 
 Aph. 4. As in the case of father and 
 son; since both are seen; [the one, to 
 die, and the other, to be born]. 
 
 a. That is to say : Discrimination takes place, through 
 dispassion, in consequence of its being inferred, in respect 
 of one's own self, also, that there is death and birth ; since 
 these are seen in the case of father and son. This has 
 
 1 VI., i., &c. Ed. 
 
 *
 
 288 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 been stated as follows : ' The coming into being, and the 
 departure, of Soul [entangled in Nature], 1 may be inferred 
 from [the case of] father and son. 2 
 
 b. He next explains, by illustrative stories, the subser- 
 vients to the perfecting of knowledge in him in whom 
 knowledge has arisen, and who is devoid of passion : 3 
 
 II M II 
 
 Voluntary aland**- ^ph. 5. One experiences pleasure or 
 ment distinguished from 'pain [alternatively], from [voluntary] 
 
 involuntary. r* 1.1 T _ 
 
 abandonment or [forcible] separation ; 
 as in the case of a hawk. 
 
 a. That is to say : since people become happy by the 
 abandonment of things, and unhappy by [forcible] separa- 
 tion from them, acceptance of them ought not to be made ; 
 ' as in the case of a hawk/ 4 For a hawk, when he has food 
 [before him], if he be driven away 5 by any one, is grieved 
 
 1 Read, instead of ' of Soul,' &c., ' of one's self.' Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 n 
 
 * See the Mahdbhdrata, xii., 6648. Ed. 
 
 6 Read, ' molested ' (upahatya). Dr. Ballantyne followed an error 
 of the press, apahatya, which he did not observe that I had pointed
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 6. 289 
 
 at being separated from the food; [but] if, of his own 
 accord, he leaves it, then he is free from grief. 1 
 
 How S:>ui ouy/it to Aph. 6. As in the case of a snake and 
 its skin. 
 
 a. That is to say : as a snake readily abandons its old skin, 
 from knowing that it ought to be quitted, just so he who 
 desires liberation should abandon Nature, experienced 
 through a long period, and effete, when he knows that it 
 ought to be quitted. Thus it has been said : ' As a snake 
 . . its old skin/ &c. 3 
 
 out in the corrigenda to my edition of the Sdnkhya-pravachana- 
 bhdshya. Ed. 
 
 
 2 Two of my MSS. have -T ,' the rest, - 
 
 . I have restored the etymological form of the word. Ed. 
 
 . u
 
 290 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 I. And, when abandoned, he should not again accept 
 Nature and the rest. So, in regard to this, he says : * 
 
 II 9 II 
 
 > 7- Or as an amputated hand. 
 
 a. As no one takes back again an amputated hand, just 
 so this [Nature], when abandoned, he should not readmit : 
 such is the meaning. The word ' Or ' is used in the sense 
 of ' moreover ;' 2 [the import of the conjunction being 
 superadditive, not alternative]. 
 
 II 
 
 Aph. 8. "What is not a means [of 
 Duty to (>e sacrificed liberation is] not to be thought about, 
 [as this conduces only] to bondage ; as 
 in the case of Bharata. 
 
 a. That which is not an immediate cause of Discrimina- 
 tion, even though it may be a duty, still is 'not to be 
 thought about;' i.e., intention of the mind towards the 
 performance thereof is not to be made ; since it tends 
 to Bondage, from its making us forget Discrimination. 
 ' As in the case of Bharata : > that is to aay, as was the case
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 9. 291 
 
 with the royal sage Bharata's cherishing Dinanatha's 1 
 fawn, though [this was] in accordance with duty. 2 
 
 fartvf 
 
 Company to be avoided. A P h ' 9 ' . Fr m [association with] 
 
 many there is obstruction to concentra- 
 tion, through passion, &c. ; as in the case of a girl's shells. 4 
 
 a. Association is not to be made with many ; because, 
 when there is association with many, there is disturbance, 
 through the manifestation of Passion, &c., which destroys 
 concentration ; as a jingling is produced by the mutual 
 
 1 The original, dindndtJia, compounded of dina and andtha, 
 ' miserable and having no master/ is an epithet of ' fawn.' 
 
 For the story of Bharata and the fawn, see the Vishnu-pur ana, 
 Book ii., Chap. xiii. Ed. 
 
 : n 
 
 is the ^ading of Aniruddha. Ed. 
 
 See the Mahdlhdrata, xii., 6652. Ed.
 
 292 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 contact of the shells on a girl's wrist : such is the 
 
 meaning. 1 
 
 Even that of one. 1 ' 10< Just 8 > fr m [ the Company 
 
 of] two, also. 
 
 a. Just so, even from two there is obstruction to concen- 
 tration ; therefore one ought to abide quite alone : such is 
 the meaning. 2 
 
 a w \\ 
 
 Biewdnru of those Aph. 11. He who is without hope is 
 
 who expect nothing. happy . 
 
 a. Having abandoned hope, let a man become possessed 
 of the happiness called contentment; 'like Pin gala;' 
 that is to say, as the courtesan called Pingala, desiring 
 a lover, having found no lover, being despondent, became 
 happy, when she had left off hoping. 4 
 
 1 ^ff fa: *wt ^r SRTOT srifa: BW ff 
 
 ^ r- 
 
 3 See the Mahdbhdrata, xii., 644,7. Ed. 
 
 4
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 11. 293 
 
 b. But then, granting that Pain may cease, on the cessa- 
 tion of hope, yet how can there be happiness, in the absence 
 of causes thereof? It is replied : That natural happi- 
 ness, resulting from the predominance of Purity in the 
 mind, which remains obscured by hope, itself resumes its 
 influence, on the departure of hope ; as is the case with 
 the coolness of water which [supposed natural coolness] 
 had been hindered [from manifesting itself,] by heat : 
 there is not, in this case, any need of means. And it is 
 laid down that precisely this is happiness of Soul. 1 
 
 c. Since it is an obstructer of Concentration, exertion 
 with a view to experience is not to be made, since this will 
 be effected quite otherwise ; as he states : 2
 
 294 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph 12. [One may be happy,] even 
 Exertion needless. without exertion ; like a serpent happy 
 in another's house. 
 
 a. Supply, ' he may be happy/ The rest is simple. So 
 it has been said : l ' The building of a house is, assuredly, 
 painful, and in no way pleasant. A serpent, having entered 
 the dwelling made by another [e. g., a rat], does find 
 comfort/ 2 
 
 b. From Institutes, and from preceptors, only the essence 
 is to be accepted ; since, otherwise, it may be impossible 
 to concentrate the attention, from there being, by 
 reason of implications, 3 discussions, &c., discrepancies in 
 declared unessential parts, and from the multiplicity of 
 topics. So he says : * 
 
 l Quoted from the MaMbhdrata, xii., 6649. Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 H 
 
 3 Abhyupagama, ' acceptings ' (of positions, &c.).
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 14. 295 
 
 ApTi. 13. Though he devote himself 
 to many Institutes and teachers, a 
 taking of the essence [is to be made] ; 
 as is the case with the bee. 
 
 a. Supply ' is to be made/ The rest is simple. Thus 
 it has been said : 'From small Institutes, and from great, 
 the intelligent man should take, from all quarters, the 
 essence ; as the bee does from the flowers.' l 
 
 b. Be the other means what they may, the direct posses- 
 sion of Discrimination is to be effected only by intentness, 
 through maintaining Meditation ; as he tells us :* 
 
 n ^8 n 
 
 Intentness on one object. A P h ' K The Meditation IS not inter- 
 
 rupted of him whose mind is intent on 
 one object ; like the maker of arrows. 3 
 
 a. As, in the ease of a maker of arrows, with his mind 
 intent solely on the making of an arrow, the exclusion of 
 
 II 
 
 3 See the MaJidbhdrata, in., 6651. Ed.
 
 296 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 other thoughts is not interrupted even by a king's passing 
 at his side, so, too, of him whose mind is intent on one 
 point there is in no way an ' interruption of meditation/ 
 i. e., a failure to exclude other thoughts. 1 
 
 n 
 
 Aph. 15. Through transgression of 
 the enjoined rules there is failure in 
 the aim ; as in the world. 
 
 a. Whatever rule, for the practisers of Concentration, 
 has been laid down in the Institutes, if it be transgressed, 
 then the end, viz., the effecting of knowledge, is not 
 attained. ' As in the world/ That is to say : just as, in 
 ordinary life, if the enjoined procedures, &c., in regard to a 
 medicine, or the like, be neglected, this or that effect 
 thereof will not be obtained. 4 
 
 II 
 
 2 Aniruddha reads ^^TTjTf . Ed. 
 
 3 Nagesa is singular in here, apparently, adding, as an aphorism : 
 
 f ( These words occur in the midst of Vijnana's comment, 
 and there introduce a quotation from the Mahdbhdrata. Ed. 
 
 4
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 16. 297 
 
 6. He states, further, that, if the rules be forgotten, the 
 end will not be gained : l 
 
 ples must not be Aph. 16. Moreover, if they be for- 
 
 forgotten. 
 
 a. This is plain. And the story of the female frog is this : 
 A certain king, haying gone to hunt, saw a beautiful 
 damsel in the forest. And she, being solicited in marriage 
 by the king, made this stipulation : * When water shall 
 be shown to me by thee, then I must depart.' But, on one 
 occasion, when wearied with sport, she asked the king, 
 ' Where is water ? ' The king, too, forgetting his agree- 
 ment, showed her the water. Then she, haying become 
 the she-frog Kdmarupini* daughter of the king of the 
 frogs, entered the water. And then the king, though he 
 sought her with nets, &c., did not regain her. 3 
 
 : ii 
 
 a Probably this is an epithet, ' changing one's form at will/ not a 
 proper name. Ed. 
 
 JTrRfTT 
 cT^T
 
 298 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. He mentions a story with reference to the necessity 
 of reflecting on the words of the teacher, as well as hear- 
 ing them : l 
 
 Aph. 17. Not even though instruction 
 
 Reflexion necessary, v i j -1 j j ,i 
 
 as well as hearing. " e heard is the end gained, without re- 
 
 flexion ; as in the case of Virochana.* 
 
 a. By ' reflexion ' is meant such consideration as deter- 
 mines the import of the teacher's words. Without this, 
 though the instruction be heard, knowledge of the truth 
 does not necessarily follow ; for it is written, that, though 
 hearing the instruction of Prajapati, Virochana, as 
 
 TT5TT 
 
 II 
 
 2 Vedanti Mahadeva has simply 
 The reading of Aniruddha is 
 See the Chhdndogya TTpanishad, viii., viii., 4 Ed. 
 
 3 The reading of Aniruddha is oR^fcR^J . Ed.
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 19. 299 
 
 between Indra and Virochana, wanted discrimination, 
 from want of reflexion -, 1 
 
 U II 
 
 Of this further Apk. 18. Of those two, it [reflexion,] 
 
 was seen in the case of Indra [only]. 
 
 a. Of those two who are mentioned, [indicated] by the 
 expression ' of those two/ reflexion [was seen, &c.]. And, 
 as between those two, viz., Indra and Virochana, reflexion 
 was seen in the case of Indra : such is the meaning. 2 
 
 b. And be tells us, that, by him. who desires to under- 
 stand thoroughly, attendance on the teacher should be 
 practised for a long time : 3 
 
 i ct 
 
 : II
 
 300 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 The process requires Aph. 1 9. Having performed reverence, 
 the duties of a student, and attendance, 
 one has success after a long time ; as in his case. 
 
 a. ( As in his case/ That is to say : as in the case of 
 Indra, so in the case of another, too, only after having 
 practised, under a preceptor, reverence, study of the Vedas, 
 service, &c., is there ' success/ i. e., the revelation of truth ; 
 not otherwise. 1 
 
 H ^o || 2 
 
 The time for the pro- A P h ' 20 ' There is no determination 
 cess may embrace sue- of the time ; as in the case of Yama- 
 
 cessine states of being. , 3 
 
 a. In the arising of knowledge, there is ' no determina- 
 tion of the time/ as, for instance, in its taking place only 
 from causes dependent on the senses. ' As in the case of 
 Vamadeva.' That is to say : as, in consequence of causes 
 pertaining to a previous life, knowledge arose, in the case 
 of Vamadeva, even when in embryo, so it may in the case 
 of another. 4 
 
 I vsj|T*rt^lfi? 'et 
 
 : II 
 
 2 Aniruddha seems to intend, as an aphorism, after No. 20, 
 these words : 
 
 f^ |^J | . But perhaps there has been tampering with the text, on 
 the part of copyists. Ed. 
 
 3 See the Aitareya Upanishad, ii., iv., 5. Ed. 
 
 4
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 21. 301 
 
 6. But then, since it is written, that the means of 
 knowledge need be nothing other than devotion to those 
 [viz., Brahma, &c.,] who [unlike the Absolute,] have 
 Qualities, knowledge may result from this. Why, then, 
 a hard and subtle process of Concentration ? To this he 
 replies :* 
 
 ^ ii 
 
 Apli. 21. Through devotion to some- 
 
 Inferior means not , i j j j p 
 
 alligator unprofitable, thing under a superinduced form, 
 [attainment to, or approach towards, 
 knowledge takes place] by degrees ; as in the case of those 
 who devote themselves to sacrifices. 
 
 a. Supply ' there is attainment.' Through devotion to 
 Souls, e.g., Brahma, Vishnu, Siva, under the forms 
 superinduced on them, the effecting of knowledge takes 
 place ' by degrees/ i. e., by the successive attainment of 
 
 ffftrr 
 
 II 
 
 2 Here the aphorism ends, in my copies of Nagesi's commentary, 
 and also in some copies of Tijuana's commentary which 1 examined 
 in India. JSd.
 
 302 
 
 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 the worlds of Brahma, &c., or else through the purification 
 of the Good principle, &c., but not directly; as is the 
 case with sacrificers [whose slaughter of animals, requiring 
 to be expiated, throws them back, so far, in the road to 
 emancipation] : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He tells us, that, moreover, there is no certainty that 
 successive rise to the worlds of Brahma, &c., would effect 
 knowledge : 2 
 
 Aph. 22. Moreover, after the attain- 
 Scriptural proof tlat men t of wh at flike the world of Brahma.] 
 
 tteaven gives not liliera- r , , - . ~ 
 
 tion. ' is other [than the state of emancipated 
 
 soul], there is return [to mundane 
 existence] ; because it is written [in the 5th Prapathaka of 
 the Chhdndogya Upanishad*]: f From conjunction with the 
 five fires there is birth/ &c. 
 
 [T 
 
 ii 
 
 8 One of my copies of Aniruddha omits 
 
 after 
 
 Ed. 
 
 4 This reference is taken from Vijnana, who, however, does not
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 23. 303 
 
 a. He exhibits an illustration, to the effect that the 
 effecting of knowledge takes place only in the case of 
 him who is free from passion :* 
 
 Aph. 23. By him who is free from 
 '" passion what is to be left is left, and 
 
 what is to be taken is taken ; as in the 
 case of the swan and the milk. 
 
 a. That is to say : only by him who is free from passion 
 is there a quitting ' of what is to be left/ i, e., of Nature, 
 &c., and a taking ' of what is to be taken,' i. e., of Soul ; as 
 it is only the swan, and not the crow, or the like, that, 
 out of milk and water mingled, by means of leaving the 
 unimportant water, takes the valuable milk, 3 [as the Hindus 
 insist that it does]. 
 
 represent that the original of the words ' From conjunction,' &c., is 
 found, literally, in the Chhdndogya Upanishad. Ed. 
 
 n 
 
 2 Vijnana, according to some MSS , has, peculiarly, 
 s . 
 
 n^M and his comment, in those MSS., follows this 
 
 reading. Ed. 
 
 i *T^frl* 
 
 rl*
 
 304 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.' 
 
 I. He tells us that both of these also take place in 
 consequence of association with a perfect l man : 2 
 
 II *$ II 
 
 Benefit of good society. A ? h ' 24 ' r through association 
 
 with one who has obtained excellence ; 4 
 as in the case thereof. 
 
 a. That is to say : moreover, from association with him 
 by whom ' excellence/ i. e., excellence in knowledge, has 
 been obtained, the .aforesaid [discrimination] takes place; 
 just as in the case of the swan, [ 23] ; as, in the case 
 of Alarka, 4 Discrimination manifested itself spontaneously, 
 merely through simple association with Dattatreya. 5 
 
 6. He tells us that we ought not to associate with those 
 who are infected with desire : 6 
 
 1 Siddha. Vide supra, p. 115, note 3. For the cognate siddhi, 
 vide infra, p. 310, note 4. Ed. 
 
 3 Nagesa omits cf J . Ed. 
 
 4 See the Mdrkandeya-purdna, ch. xvi. Ed. 
 
 5 
 
 7 Aniruddha has rj 
 
 Ed.
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 26. 305 
 
 Aph. 25. Not of his own accord 
 
 Jiff" 0/un5uiiab!e should he go near one who is in- 
 fected with desire ; like the parrot. 
 
 a. Association is not to be made, voluntarily, with a 
 person infected with desire. 'Like the parrot/ That 
 is to say : just as the bird [called a] parrot, by reason of its 
 being exceedingly beautiful, does not [by going near 
 people,] act in a rash manner, through fear of being 
 imprisoned by those who covet it for its beauty. 1 
 
 b. And he states the harm of association with those who 
 labour under desire : 2 
 
 Oftkisfurther. 
 
 bound, by conjunction with the cords ; 
 as in the case of the parrot. 
 
 a. And, in the case of associating with those persons, he 
 may become bound, f by conjunction with the cords/ i.e., 
 by conjunction with their Desire, &c., [the Qualities, 
 punningly compared to cords] ; just ' as in the case of the 
 
 I 
 
 \ 
 
 ii 
 
 3 All the commentators but Tijuana read c|^t, instead of
 
 306 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 parrot ; ' that is to say, just as the bird [called a] parrot 
 becomes bound by the cords, i. e., the ropes, of the hunter. 1 
 
 6. He determines, by two [aphorisms], the means of 
 [effecting] dispassion : 2 
 
 Aph. 27. Not by enjoyment is desire 
 Mean, of disunion. ap p eas ed ; as in the case of the saint. 
 
 a. That is to say : as, in the case of the saint, Saubhari, 8 
 desire was not appeased by enjoyment, so, also in the case 
 of others, it is not.* 
 
 6. But, further : 5 
 
 H 
 
 Of this further. ^P h ' 28> FrOm 8eein S tbe fault 
 
 both. 
 
 Ct Hrfh 
 
 3 See the Vishnu-pur ana, Book iv., Ch. ii. and iii. Ed. 
 
 *
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 29. 307 
 
 a. That is to say : only ' from seeing the fault/ e. g., of 
 being changeable, of consisting of pain, &c., ' of both,' 
 i. e., of Nature and her productions, does the appeasing of 
 desire take place ; just as in the case of the saint [ 27]. 
 For it is written, that Saubhari, just from seeing the evil 
 of society, was afterwards dispassionate. 1 
 
 6. He tells us that incompetency even to accept in- 
 struction attaches to him who is infected with the fault 
 of desire, &c : 2 
 
 Agitation excludes in- Aph. 29. Not in the case of him 
 whose mind is disturbed does the seed 
 of instruction sprout ; as in the case of Aja. 
 
 a. In him whose mind is disturbed by desire, &c., 
 not even does a sprout spring up from that seed of the 
 tree of knowledge which is in the shape of instruction. ' As 
 in the case of Aja.' That is to say : as not a sprout from 
 
 w^ra ii 
 
 3 Vijnana, agreeably to some MSS., has 
 
 - of Aniruddha has Tr . Ed.
 
 308 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 the seed of instruction, though delivered to him by Va- 
 sishtha, sprang up in the king named Aja, whose mind 
 was disturbed by grief for his wife. 1 2 
 
 b. What need of more ? 3 
 
 II $o II 
 
 Of this further Aph. 30. Not even a mere semblance 
 
 [of this true knowledge arises in him 
 whose mind is disturbed] ; as in the case of a foul mirror. 
 
 a. Even superficial knowledge does not arise, from 
 instruction, in one whose mind is disturbed, through the 
 obstruction caused by its wandering away, e. g., to other 
 objects ; as an object is not reflected in a foul mirror, 
 through the obstruction caused by the impurities : such is 
 the meaning. 4 
 
 sfo 
 
 2 See Kalidasa's Raghuvunsa, Book viii. Ed. 
 
 3 
 
 : Kf 
 
 c 
 
 : u
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 31. 309 
 
 b. Or, if knowledge should spring up in any kind of 
 way, still it may not, he tells us, be in accordance with 
 the instruction : l 
 
 rf^rTT tfljSRcT 3 II ?*! II 
 
 Aph. 31. Nor, even though sprung 
 Knowledge not wees- therefrom, is that [knowledge, neces- 
 
 sarilyperfectknowledffe. sarily j ^ accordance therewith J like 
 
 the lotus. 
 
 a. Though sprung ' therefrom,' i. e., from instruc- 
 tion, knowledge is not [necessarily,] in accordance with 
 the instruction, in case this has not been entirely under- 
 stood. ' Like the lotus/ That is to say : just as the 
 lotus, though the seed be of the best, is not in accordance 
 with the seed, when the mud is faulty. The mind of the 
 student is compared to the mud 4 [in which the lotus- seed 
 was sown], 
 
 "3TT ^TOT^TO sJFT ITTcT 
 
 2 Vedanti Mahadeva reads ^^frq^l'CJ'- Ed. 
 
 3 Aniruddha has t|S*^tffF'cf > . Ed.
 
 310 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. But then, since the Soul's end is, indeed, gained by 
 [the attainment of] supernatural power in the worlds 
 [ 21. aj] of Brahma, &c., to what purpose is the effecting 
 of knowledge, with so much toil, for liberation ? To this 
 he replies : l 
 
 ii 3* n 
 
 Aph. 32. Not even on the attain- 
 
 Hiss" " Ot PCrfeCt ment of glorification has that been 
 done which was to be done ; as is the 
 case with the perfection 4 of the objects worshipped, as is 
 the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped. 
 
 a. Even though one attain to supernatural power, ' that 
 has not been done which was to be done/ i. e., the end has 
 not been gained ; because it is attended by the grief of de- 
 ficiency and excess. ' As is the case with the perfection 
 of the objects worshipped/ That is to say : as, though the 
 possession of perfection [so called,] belongs to ' the objects 
 
 - I <FrT5 II 
 
 N 
 
 2 According to Nagesa and Vedanti Mahadeva, ^^T ; and this 
 
 Cs 
 bJiuta, a synonym of bhuti, the former explains by aiswarya. See 
 
 note 4, below. Ed. 
 
 3 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha omits ^ j l| . Ed. 
 
 4 Nagesa, commenting on this aphorism, explains siddhi, here 
 rendered ' perfection,' by aiswarya, ' supernatural power.' Ed.
 
 BOOK IV., APH. 32. 311 
 
 worshipped/ i. e., to Brahma, &rc., [still] that has not been 
 done which was to be done ; since it is written, that even 
 these, while in the sleep of Concentration, &c., [still] 
 practise Concentration, [from fear of losing what they have 
 attained to]. Just in like manner is the case with him who, 
 by the worship of these, has attained to their supernatural 
 power. Such is the meaning. 1 
 
 6. So much for the Fourth Book, that of Tales, in the 
 Commentary, composed by Yijnana Bhikshu, on Kapila's 
 Declaration of the Sankhya. 2 
 
 i faf^tnsfr 
 
 END OF BOOK IV.
 
 812 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 a. The tenets of his Institute are completed. Next is 
 begun a Fifth Book, in order to set aside the prima facie 
 notions of others in regard to his Institute. Among those, 
 in the first place he disposes of the objection that the 
 Benediction implied by the expression ' Well,* in the 
 first Aphorism [of Book I.], is purposeless r 1 
 
 fcT 2 II 1 II 
 
 Reasons for a Bcne- A P l1 ' L Tne [ use of a ] Benediction 
 
 dictory Opening. p s justified] by the practice of the 
 
 good, by our seeing its fruit, and by Scripture. 
 
 a. The [use of a] Benediction, which we made, is proved 
 to be proper to be made, by these proofs : such is the 
 
 ^jcf 
 
 2 Aniruddha has, instead of ^5cT> ^T?T O Vide su l> ra 
 p. 310, note 2, for bhuti. Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 2. 313 
 
 meaning. The word Hi is intended to preclude the expect- 
 ation of any other reasons. 1 
 
 b. He repels those who entertain the prima facie view, 
 that what was asserted in the expression, ' because it is not 
 proved that there is a Lord ' [see Book I., Aph. 92], is 
 not made out ; because [forsooth,] his existence is proved 
 by his being the giver of the fruits of works : 2 3 
 
 : n ^ 11 
 
 of a -^ph. 2. Not from its [the world's,] 
 Lord - being governed by a Lord is there the 
 
 effectuation of fruit ; for it is by works [i.e., by merit and 
 demerit,] that this is accomplished. 
 
 a. That is to say : it is not proper [to suppose] the effec- 
 tuation of the change [of the elements] into the shape of 
 the [appropriate] fruit of works, on the ground that the 
 cause is ' governed by a Lord ;' because it is possible for 
 
 : OTTO: ^ut- 
 
 3 For another rendering, see the Rational Refutation, <fcc., 
 p. 78. Ed. 
 
 4 Aniruddha's reading is "lJJ^t[^flff%J, and Vedanti Maha- 
 dera has Ttl: . Ed.
 
 314 THE SAXKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 the fruit to be effected by the works [i.e., the merit and 
 demerit,] alone, which are indispensable ; [and, if we do 
 make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, 
 he cannot reward a man otherwise than according to 
 his works]. 1 2 
 
 b. He declares, further, in [several] aphorisms, that it 
 is not the case that the Lord is the giver of fruit : 3 
 
 II II 
 
 
 The supposed Lord A P^- 3 - [ If a Lord were governor, 
 would be selfish. then,] from intending his own benefit, 
 
 his government [would be selfish], as is the case [with or- 
 dinary governors] in the world. 
 
 a. If the Lord were the governor, then his government 
 would be only for his own benefit ; as is the case [with 
 ordinary rulers] in the world : such is the meaning. 4 
 
 2 See, for a somewhat different translation, the Rational Refuta- 
 tion, &c., p. 78. Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 5. 315 
 
 6. In reply to the doubt, grant that the Lord, also, be 
 benefited : what harm ? ' he says : l 
 
 And, therefore, not Aph. 4. [He must, then, bel iust 
 
 the Lord spoken of. vi iji , , P ,-, , . 
 
 like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise 
 [than you desire that we should conceive of him]. 
 
 a. If we agree that the Lord, also, is benefited, he, also, 
 must be something mundane, ' just like a worldly lord ;' 
 because, since his desires are [on that supposition,] not 
 [previously] satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c.: 
 such is the meaning. 2 
 
 6. In reply to the doubt, ' be it even so,' he says : 3 
 
 fit ^TT II M II 
 
 The difficulty perhaps Aph. 5. Or [let the name of Lord 
 
 originates in a mistaken . -. , . , 
 
 Cession. be] technical. 
 
 a. If, whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, 
 then let yours, like ours, be merely a technical term for 
 
 *ftrrtt 
 
 3 cf*N
 
 316 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 that soul which emerged at the commencement of the 
 creation ; since there cannot he an eternal lordship, be- 
 cause of the contradiction between mundaneness and the 
 having an unobstructed will : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He states another objection to the Lord's being the 
 governor : 2 
 
 Objection to there A ^- 6 - This [position, viz., that 
 being a Lord. there is a Lord,] cannot be established 
 
 without [assuming that he is affected by] Passion ; because 
 that is the determinate cause [of all energizing], 
 
 . That is to say : moreover, it cannot be proved that he 
 is a governor, unless there be Passion ; because Passion is 
 the determinate cause of activity. 4 
 
 J i s the lection of Vedanti Mahadeva, in the 
 
 text, and also in the comment. Ed. 
 
 t f^RT
 
 BOOK V., APH. 7. 317 
 
 6. But then, be it so, that there is Passion in the 
 even. To this he replies : l 
 
 : II II 
 
 Aph. 7. Moreover, were that FPas- 
 
 This o!>jection,further. -, i -i i , , 
 
 sionj conjoined with him, he could not 
 be eternally free. 
 
 a. That is to say : moreover, if it be agreed that there 
 is conjunction [of the Lord] with Passion, he cannot be 
 eternally free ; and, therefore, thy tenet [of his eternal 
 freedom] is invalidated. 2 
 
 b. Pray [let us ask], does lordship arise from the imme- 
 diate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to 
 be properties of Nature, [not properties of Soul] ? Or from 
 an influence by reason of the mere existence of proximity, 
 as in the case of the magnet ? Of these he condemns the 
 former alternative: 3 
 
 I cT^Tf II 
 
 f^fi
 
 318 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 *i | ^[ m ft i^THf J 1 II t II 
 
 Objection, on one Aph. 8. If it Were from the COD- 
 
 branck of an alternative. j unction of the propert i es o f Nature, it 
 
 would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture 
 denies of Soul]. 
 
 a. From the conjunction, with Soul, of ' the properties 
 of Nature/ i. e. } Desire, &c., Soul, also, would turn out 
 [contrary to Scripture,] to be associated with properties. 2 
 
 b. But, in regard to the latter [alternative], he says : s 
 
 s II Q II 
 
 i, on the other Aph. 9. If it were from the mere 
 existence [of Nature, not in association, 
 but simply in proximity], then lordship would belong to 
 every one. 
 
 '* is the ^ading of Vijnana, in 
 
 some MSS., and, in some, that of Nagesa, who, however, in others, 
 
 -x 
 omits "x[< Ed. 
 
 F*T? II 
 
 4 Some MSS. of Vijnana exhibit, instead of
 
 BOOK V., APH. 10. 319 
 
 0. That is to say : if lordship is by reason of the mere 
 existence of proximity, as in the case of the magnet 
 [which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron], 
 then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that 
 even all men, indifferently, experiencers in this or that 
 [cycle of] creation, [may] have lordship ; because it is only 
 by conjunction with all experiencers, that Nature pro- 
 duces Mind, &c. And, therefore, your tenet of there 
 being only one Lord is invalidated. 1 
 
 b. Be it as you allege ; yet these are false reasonings ; 
 because they contradict the evidence which establishes [the 
 existence of] a Lord. Otherwise, Nature, also, could be 
 disproved by thousands of false reasonings of the like sort. 
 He therefore says : 2 
 
 Aph. 10. It is not established [that 
 
 Denial that there is J . L 
 
 any evidence of a. Lord, there is an eternal Lord] ; because 
 there is no evidence of it. 
 
 *rfw*of
 
 320 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. Its establishment, i.e., the establishing that there is 
 an eternal Lord. Of the Lord, in the first place, there is 
 not sense-evidence ; so that only the evidences of inference 
 and of testimony can be offered ; and these are inapplicable : 
 such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. The inapplicability he sets forth in two aphorisms : 2 
 
 II 
 
 Denial that it can I* A P h ' 1L There is no inferential 
 established by inference, proof [of there being a Lord] ; because 
 there is [here] no [case of invariable] association [between 
 a sign and that which it might betoken], 
 
 a. 'Association/ i.e., invariable concomitancy. 'There 
 is none/ i.e., none exists, [in this case]. And so there is 
 no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in 
 such arguments as, ' Mind, or the like, has a maker, be- 
 cause it is a product,' [the fact of] invariable concomitancy 3 
 is not established; since there is no compulsion [that 
 every product should have had an intelligent maker]. 
 Such is the meaning. 4 
 
 I t^ft 
 
 u 
 
 3 Vydpyatica, here rendered, is regarded as a synonym of vydpti, 
 by which sambandha, ' association,' is interpreted just above. Hence 
 I have bracketed the words ' the fact of.' Ed. 
 
 i ^s i
 
 BOOK V., APH. 12. 321 
 
 b. Nor, moreover, he tells us, is there [the evidence of] 
 Testimony 1 [to there being a Lord] : 
 
 Denial that fare * A P Jt - 12 - Moreover, there is Scrip- 
 Scripture/or it. ture for [this world's] being the pro- 
 
 duct of Nature, [not of a Lord]. 
 
 a. Scripture asserts, exclusively, that the world is the 
 product of Nature, not that it has Soul for its cause. 2 
 
 b. He refutes, diffusely, by a cluster [of seven apho- 
 risms], 8 the opinion of an opponent in regard to that which 
 was established in the first Section, 4 viz., 'Bondage 
 does not arise from Ignorance/ [conjoined with Soul] . 5 
 
 q n+i i [^E- 
 
 II 
 
 3 Read, instead of ' by a cluster,' &c., ' by enunciations.' Vide 
 p. 264, note 4, supra. Ed. 
 
 4 Pada, here used for adhydya, which the translator renders by 
 ' Book.' For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, 
 vide supra, p. 24. Ed. 
 
 "SRI
 
 322 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 II S3 II 
 
 Conjunction, in the Aph. 13. With that which is solitary 
 would ife a^coriradic- there cannot be conjunction of th e 
 ti<M - property of Ignorance. 
 
 a. Since Soul has no association [with anything what- 
 ever], it is plainly impossible for it to be united with the 
 property of Ignorance. 1 
 
 b. But then, [it may be replied,] what is to be asserted 
 is, that the conjunction of Ignorance is simply through 
 force of Ignorance [which is a negation, or nonentity] ; 
 and so, since this is no reality, there is no association occa- 
 sioned thereby. To this he replies : 2 
 
 Aph. 14. Since the existence of this 
 
 A tuggestion repelled. r ., ., / T 1 
 
 [alleged negative IgnoranceJ is esta- 
 blished [only] on the ground of its [pretended] conjunction, 
 there is a vicious circle. 3 
 
 a. And, if it is by the conjunction of Ignorance that 
 Ignorance is established, there is ' a vicious circle/ [lite- 
 
 rRT 
 
 3 For a different translation of this Aphorism, and of what intro- 
 duces and succeeds it, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 257. Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 15. 323 
 
 rally, a resting of each on the other, alternately], a rest- 
 ing a thing on itself, or, in short, a regressus in infinitum. 1 
 
 l>. In reply to the doubt [suggested by the Naiyayika], 
 ' but then, as in the case of seed and sprout, the regressus 
 in infinitum is no objection/ he replies : 2 
 
 Aph, 15. It is not as in the case of 
 
 hat **' 8eed and 8 P rout 5 for Scripture teaches 
 that the world has a beginning. 
 
 a. There cannot belong to it such a regressus in infini- 
 tum as that of seed and sprout ; because there is Scripture 
 for the fact that the mundane state of souls, consisting of 
 all undesirable things, viz., Ignorance, &c., had a begin- 
 ning. For we hear, in Scripture, that these cease to exist 
 at the dissolution of all things, in profound sleep, &c. 
 Such is the meaning. 3 
 
 b. But then, [you Vedantis will say], according to us, 
 Ignorance is technically so termed, and is not, e. g., iu
 
 324 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 the shape, specified by the Yoga, of supposing what is not 
 soul to be soul ; and so, just like your ' Nature/ since this 
 [Ignorance] of ours has an unbroken eternity, though it 
 be lodged in Soul, there is no disparagement of the solitari- 
 ness thereof : in regard to this doubt, having deliberated 
 on this artificial sense of the word ' Ignorance,' he objects 
 to it : l 
 
 II 
 
 Soul and knowledge A P h - 16 - Then Brahma would be 
 not identical. found to be excluded [from existence] ; 
 
 because he is something else than knowledge. 
 
 a. If the meaning of the word ' Ignorance' (amdya) be 
 only ' otherness than knowledge/ then Brahma, soul itself, 
 would be found to be excluded, to perish, through hia 
 being annihilable by knowledge ; since lie is other than 
 knowledge : such is the meaning. 4 [Further] : 
 
 II 
 
 2 One of my MSS. of Nagesa has |c( J|rqf^ . Ed. 
 
 *. found in some MSS. of Vijnana, is the reading of 
 Aniruddha and of Nagesa. Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 18. 325 
 
 Knowledge, noterdu- Aph. 17. "Were there not exclusion, 
 
 atn</ tc/norunce. would be ,-1 , , , 
 
 reiuU'iess. tnen there would be resultlessness. 
 
 a. But, if the existence of ignorance were really not 
 excluded by knowledge, then there would be resultlessness 
 of knowledge, because of its not debarring Ignorance, 
 [which is the only result competent to knowledge] : such 
 is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He censures the other alternative, 8 [viz., that know- 
 ledge might exclude Soul] : 
 
 I sb II 
 
 Aph. 18. If it [Ignorance,] meant 
 the bei *g excludible by Knowledge, it 
 nish - would be [predicable], in like manner, 
 
 of the world, also. 
 
 a. If, on the other hand, the being excludible by Know- 
 ledge, in the case of the soul, which possesses properties, 
 
 : a
 
 326 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 be, indeed, what is meant by the being Ignorance, in that 
 case ' the world/ the whole mundane system, viz., Nature, 
 Mind, &c., would, also, in like manner, be Ignorance. 
 And so, the whole mundane system being merely Igno- 
 rance, since the Ignorance would be annihilated by one 
 man's knowledge, the mundane system would become in- 
 visible to others, also. Such is the import. 1 
 
 Aph. 19. If it [Ignorance,] were of 
 
 that nature > {i would be something 
 that had a commencement. 
 
 a. Or suppose it to be the case, that to be Ignorance 
 means simply the being excludible by Knowledge, still 
 such a thing could not have had an eternal existence in 
 souls [as held by Vedantis (see 15, *.)], but must have 
 had a commencement. For it is proved, by such re- 
 
 (TOT 
 
 1 Owing to a clerical defect, both my MSS. of Nagesa's work 
 omit this Aphorism, and also much of the comment preceding and 
 following it. Ed.
 
 BOOK, V. APH. 19. 327 
 
 cited texts as, 'Consisting of knowledge alone/ 12 &c., 
 that, at the time of the universal dissolution, &c., the soul 
 consists of Knowledge alone. Such is the meaning. 
 Therefore, it is settled that there is no other Ignorance, 
 annihilable by Knowledge, than that stated in the Yoga 
 system ; and this is a property of the understanding 
 only, not a property of the soul. 3 
 
 b. By a cluster of [six] aphorisms, 4 he clears up the 
 prim facie view of an opponent, in regard to that which 
 was stated in the same Book [Book V., 2], that Na- 
 ture's energizing is due to Merit : 6 
 
 1 SrihaddranyakaUpanishad,\\.4i,\ l 2i\ or Sataf>atha-brdhmana y 
 riv., 6, 4, 12. Ed. 
 
 2 Professor Gough has, ' a pure indifference of thought.' Philosophy 
 of the Upanishads, p. 153. Ed. 
 
 8 
 
 \ 
 
 4 Bead, instead of ' by a cluster,' Ac., ' by enunciations.' Ed.
 
 328 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 20. There is no denying Me- 
 
 Merit is undeniable. . -i CJ.~L.J- L_ A 
 
 rit ; because of the diversity m the 
 operations of Nature. 
 
 a. Merit is not to be denied on the ground of its being 
 no object of sense ; because it is inferred ; since, other- 
 wise, ' the diversity in the operations of Nature ' [accommo- 
 dating one person, and inconveniencing another,] would 
 be unaccounted for : such is the meaning. l 
 
 b. He states further proof, also : 2 
 
 II ^ II 
 
 ApJi. 21. It [the existence of Me 
 Proofs of tu$. rit,] is established by Scripture, by 
 
 tokens, &c. 
 
 a. He shows to be a fallacy the argument of the oppo- 
 nent, that Merit exists not, because of there being no 
 sense-evidence of it : 3
 
 BOOK V., APH. 24. 329 
 
 Aph. 22. There is, here, no ne- 
 
 Sense-evidence not the f ,-, . /, , 
 
 only kind of evidence. cessity ; lor there is room for other 
 proofs. 
 
 a. That is to say : there is no necessity that a thing of 
 which there is no mundane sense-evidence must be non- 
 existent ; because things are subject to other proofs. 1 
 
 b. He proves that there exists Demerit, as well as 
 Merit : 2 
 
 Demerit as certain as Aph. 23. It is thus, moreover, in 
 
 both cases. 
 
 a. That is to say : the proofs apply to Demerit, just as 
 they do to Merit. 3 
 
 Aph. 24. If the existence [of Merit] 
 
 J2' proo/0/eacA *** be as of course, [because, otherwise, 
 something would be unaccounted for], 
 the same is the case in respect of both. 
 
 a. But then, merit is proved to exist by a natural conse- 
 quence in this shape, viz., that, otherwise, an injunction 
 
 2 
 
 3 H
 
 330 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 would be unaccounted for ; but there is none such in re- 
 spect of demerit : so how can Scriptural or logical argu- 
 ment be extended to demerit ? If any one says this, it is not 
 so ; since there is proof, in the shape of natural consequence, 
 ' it is alike, in respect of both,' i. e., of both merit and 
 demerit ; because, otherwise, a prohibitory injunction, such 
 as, ' He should not approach another's wife,' would be 
 unaccounted for. Such is the meaning. 1 
 
 d. He repels the doubt, that, if Merit, &c., be ac- 
 knowledged [to exist], then, in consequence of souls' 
 having properties, &c., they must be liable to modifi- 
 cation, &c. : 9 - 
 
 Aph. 25. It is of the internal organ 3 
 
 Merit, ^..inhere in - not Q f ^ 
 
 properties. 
 
 (VK<*I i ^ut 
 
 3 The 'great internal organ' (mahat), called also buddhi, is here 
 referred to. See Book I., Aph. 64, a. Aniruddha's comment runs :
 
 BOOK V., APH. 26. 331 
 
 a. In the expression ' &c.' are included all those that 
 are stated, in the Vaiseshika Institute, as peculiar qualities 
 of soul. 1 * 
 
 b. [To the objection, that the existence of an internal 
 organ, as well as of the Qualities from which such might 
 arise, is debarred by Scripture, he replies] : 
 
 11 
 
 Aph. 26. And of the Qualities, &c., 
 there is not absolute debarment. 
 
 a. The Qualities, viz., Purity, &c., and their properties, 
 viz., happiness, &c., and their products, also, viz., Mind, &c., 
 are not denied essentially, but are denied only adjuno- 
 tively in respect of soul ; just as we deny that heat [in red- 
 hot iron,] belongs to the iron. 8 
 
 b. In regard to the doubt, ' Why, again, do we not deny 
 
 2 Vide supra, p. 71, Aph. 61, b. Ed. 
 
 8 
 
 <T
 
 33 2 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 them an essence, as we do to what is meant by the words 
 sleep, wish, &c ?' he says : * 
 
 The a)>ove thesis or- Aph. 27. By a conjunction of the five 
 sved - members [of an argumentative state- 
 
 ment] we discern [that] Happiness [exists]. 
 
 a. Here, in order to get a particular subject of his 
 assertion, he takes happiness alone, one portion of the 
 matter in dispute, as a representative of the entire matter. 
 But the better reading is, ' we discern [that] Happiness, 
 &c., [exist]/ The five members of an argumentative 
 statement are the Proposition, Reason, Example, Syn- 
 thesis [of the two premises], and Conclusion ; and, by the 
 ' conjunction/ i. e., the combination, of these, all things, 
 viz., Happiness, &c., are proved to exist. Such is the 
 
 2 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha has 
 
 N 
 
 3 Nagesa has ^?TslTf<J'RT^H ^ ^e lection which, according 
 
 to Vijnana, is to be preferred. Ed, 
 
 4
 
 BOOK V., APH. 28. 333 
 
 b. And the employment [of the argument] is this : 
 
 (1) Pleasure is real ; 
 
 (2) Because it produces motion in something. 
 
 (3) Whatever produces motion in anything is 
 
 real, as are sentient beings ; 
 
 (4) And pleasure produces motion in things, in 
 
 the way of horripilation, &c. : 
 
 (5) Therefore, it is real. l 
 
 c. But then the Charvaka, next, doubts whether there be 
 any evidence other than sense-evidence; since [he contends,] 
 there is no truth in the assertion [of an inductive conclu- 
 sion], that such and such is pervaded by such and 
 such, &c. 2 s 
 
 II ^t II 
 
 i 
 
 I 
 
 3 For the Charvakas' rejection of the authority of inference, see 
 pp. 5, et seq., of the translation of the Sarva-darsana-sangraha by 
 Professors Co well and Gough. Ed.
 
 334 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 The validity of infer- Aph. 28. Not from once apprehend- 
 ence questioned. -^ j g & connexion established. 
 
 a. That is to say : from once apprehending concomitance 
 [of a supposed token and the thing betokened] , a ' con- 
 nexion/ i. e., a pervadedness [or invariable attendedness 
 of the token by the betokened,] is not established ; and 
 frequency [of the same apprehension] follows 1 [the rule of 
 the single apprehension j just as a thousand times nothing 
 amount to nothing]. Therefore [argues the sceptic,] 
 since the apprehending of an invariable attendedness 
 is impossible, nothing can be established by Inference. 
 [This] he clears up : 2 
 
 Aph. 29. Pervadedness is a constant 
 Tins point cleared up. consociation of characters, in the case 
 of both, or of one of them. 
 
 a. ' Consociation of characters ', i. e., consociation in the 
 fact of being characters [or properties of something] ; in 
 short, concomitancy. And so we mean, that that concomi- 
 tancy is ' pervadedness/ [furnishing solid ground for infer- 
 
 i As suggestive of the correction here required, see Professor 
 Cowell's Aphorisms of Sdndilya, <fcc., p. 8, text and foot-note. Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 H 
 
 3 Nagesa has, instead of |(T o , rf^( . Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 30. 335 
 
 ence], which is invariably non-errant, whether in the case 
 of ' both/ the predicate and the reason, or in the case of ' one 
 of them/ the reason only. 'Of both' is mentioned with 
 reference to the case of 'equal pervadedness ': [e. g., every 
 equilateral triangle is equiangular, and, conversely, every 
 equiangular triangle is equilateral]. And the in variableness 
 may be apprehended through an appropriate confutation 
 [or reductio ad absurdum of the denial of it] ; so that there 
 is no impossibility in apprehending ' pervadedness/ [and 
 of inferring on the strength of it]. Such is the import. 1 
 
 b. He declares that Pervadedness is not an additional 
 principle, consisting, e. g., of some such power as is to be 
 mentioned 2 [in 31] : 
 
 H ?0 (I 
 
 Aph. 30. It fPervadedness,] is not 
 
 Pervadedness not an r - 1 i / s o i \ T " j j 
 
 additional principle. [as some think (see 31),] an addi- 
 tional principle [over and above the 
 twenty-five (Book I., 61)]; for it is unsuitable to postulate 
 entities [praeter rationem\. 
 
 \ntcTRf 
 
 cTOT 
 
 i
 
 336 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. ' Pervadedness ' is not an entity other than a fixed con- 
 sociation of characters ; because it is unsuitable to suppose, 
 further, some entity as the residence of what constitutes 
 ' pervadedness.' But we consider that what constitutes 
 ' pervadedness ' belongs to extant things simply. Such ia 
 the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He states the opinion of others : 2 
 
 A heterodo* opinion A P h > 31 - [ But certain] teachers say 
 regarding 'Pervaded- that it [Pervadedness,] is [another prin- 
 ciple, in addition to the twenty-five,] 
 resulting from the power of the thing itself. 
 
 a. But other teachers assert that ' Pervadedness ' is, 
 positively, a separate principle, in the shape of a species of. 
 power, generated by the native power of the ' pervaded.' 
 But [they continue,] ' Pervadedness ' is not simply a power 
 of the [pervaded] thing itself; else it would exist wherever 
 the thing is, [which ' pervadedness ' does not do]. For 
 smoke, when it has gone to another place [than the point 
 of its origination], is not attended by fire ; and, by going 
 into another place, that power is put an end to. Therefore 
 [contend these teachers,] there is no over-extension in the 
 
 H-
 
 BOOK V., APH. 32. 337 
 
 above-stated definition ; for, according to our doctrine, the 
 smoke [which betokens fire] is to be specialized as that which 
 is at the time of origination. Such is the import. l 
 
 ii $^ ii 
 
 Aph. 32. Panchasikha 2 says that it 
 
 Opinion of Pancha- 1-,-i-v j j >-\ ,1 / 
 
 StMa. L "ervadedness, J is the possession of 
 
 the power of the sustained. 
 
 a. That is to say : Panchasikha holds that pervadingness 
 is the power which consists in being the sustainer, and that 
 ' Pervadedness ' 3 is the having the power which consists in 
 being the sustained ; for Intellect, and the rest, are treated 
 as being pervaded [or invariably attended,] by Nature, &c.; 4 
 
 2 The translator's 'the Panchasikha' I have everywhere cor- 
 rected. Ed. 
 
 3 This is to render vydpyatwa, on which vide supra, p, 320, 
 note 3. Ed.
 
 338 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 [and this means that each product, in succession, is sus- 
 tained by what precedes it in the series]. 
 
 6. But then, why is a ' power of the sustained' postulated ? 
 Let ' Pervadedness ' be simply an essential power of the 
 thing pervaded. To this he [Panchasikha,] replies : * 
 
 Aph. 33. The relation is not an es- 
 
 Panchdsikha's reply to , i n i_ ij i. r" 
 
 an Action. scntial power ; for we should have [in 
 
 that case,] a tautology. 
 
 a. But ' the relation/ viz., ' Pervadedness,* is not an 
 essential power ; for we should [thus] have a tautology ; 
 because, just as there is no difference between ' water-jar ' 
 and 'jar for water/ so, also, there is none in the case of 
 ' Intellect ' and ' what is Pervaded ' [by Nature, of which 
 Intellect consists]. Such is the meaning. 3 
 
 : II 
 
 I 
 
 i CRT n 
 
 2 Aniruddha and Veddnti Mahadeva read
 
 BOOK V., APH. 35. 339 
 
 6. He himself explains the ( Tautology ' l 
 
 F~S 
 ?3 
 
 TJie reason why Aph. 34. Because we should find the 
 
 distinction unmeaning; [as Intellect does 
 not differ from Nature at all, except as does the sustained 
 from the sustainer]. 
 
 a. This is almost explained by the preceding aphorism. 2 
 d. He [Panchasikha,] mentions another objection : 3 
 
 4 ii ?M ii 
 
 Aph. 35. And because it [Pervaded- 
 A further reason. ness,] would not be reconcilable in 
 shoots, &c. 
 
 a. Because shoots, &c., are invariably attended [at their 
 origination,] by trees, &c. But this cannot be called simply 
 an essential power [in the shoot] ; because, since the essen- 
 tial power [that which belongs to the shoot as being a shoot,] 
 does not depart, even in the case of an amputated shoot, we 
 should, even then, find it attended [by the tree, which, how- 
 ever, no longer accompanies it]. Such is the sense. But 
 the power [(see 32), which consists in having the 
 
 2 TTcf 
 
 3 H 
 
 4 Aniruddha omits "rf . Ed.
 
 340 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 character] of the ' sustained ' is destroyed at the time of 
 amputation ; so that there is no ' Pervadedness ' then. Such 
 is the import. 1 
 
 b. But then what? Panchasikha says that ( Pervaded- 
 ness ' is not a result of any essential power. Then, since 
 smoke is not sustained by fire [see 32, where he contends 
 that 'sustainedness' is what really expresses pervasion], 
 it would turn out that it [viz., smoke,] is not [as token of 
 something that is betokened,] accompanied by fire. To this 
 he says : 2 
 
 Aph. 36. Were it [thus] settled that 
 W Uld ^ is a power of the sustained,' then, by 
 the like argument, its dependence on 
 an essential power, [as pretended by the heterodox teachers 
 
 I 
 W^rfrf 
 
 ^R f^R 
 I (fff 
 
 "M M I
 
 BOOK V., APtf. 36. 341 
 
 referred to in 31, might be proved, also; and thus 
 the argument proves nothing, since it proves too 
 much]. 
 
 a. That is to say : ' were it settled ' that * a power of the 
 sustained ' constitutes the fact of ' Pervadedness/ it would 
 be really settled ' by the like argument,' i.e., by parity of 
 reasoning, that the fact of ' Pervadedness ' results from 
 essential power, also, [31, a.]. 1 
 
 b. It was with a view to substantiate what was stated 
 [in 27], viz., that the Qualities, and the rest, are esta- 
 blished [as realities,] by the employment of the five- 
 membered [form of argumentative exposition], that he has 
 repelled, by an exposition of ' Pervadedness/ the objection 
 to Inference as evidence, [or as a means of attaining right 
 notions]. 2 
 
 c. Now, in order to establish the fact that words, of 
 which the five-membered [exposition] consists, are genera- 
 tors of knowledge, the objection of others to a word's being 
 a means of right knowledge, 3 in the shape of [the objection 
 
 ftn 
 
 3 ' Being a means of right knowledge ' here renders prdmdnya, 
 represented, j ust before, by ' as evidence.' Ed.
 
 342 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 of] its being inadequate, is disposed of, by means of an 
 exposition of the powers, &c., of words : 1 
 
 Sound and sense Apli. 37. The connexion between 
 
 word and meaning is the relation of 
 expressed and expresser. 
 
 a. To the ' meaning ' belongs the power termed expres- 
 sibleness ; to the ' word/ the power termed expression : sim- 
 ply this is their ' connexion ; ' their interrelation, as it were. 3 
 
 is the reading of Aniruddha. Ed. 
 
 3 Instead of ' simply,' &c., read, ' this itself is their connexion, 
 such [a connexion] as [is seen] in anatheticity.' 
 
 The ' connexion ' in question is the swarupa-sambandha, for which 
 see Professor Cowell's translation of the Kusumanjali, p. 13, note f . 
 
 A better reading than the one which Dr. Ballantyne accepted from 
 me is, certainly, that which omits the clause rendered, ' to the word, 
 the power termed expression.' According to Nagesa, ' the expressi- 
 bleness inherent in the meaning is the connexion [intended]' : 
 
 Anuyogin and anuyogitd, as Professor Cowell informs me, are the 
 opposites of pratiyogin and pratiyogitd, which latter I would repre- 
 sent, provisionally, by ' antithetic ' and ' antitheticity.' 
 
 Pratiyogin, a very much commoner technicality than anuyogin, 
 occurs in the comment on Aph. 95 of this Book. It must suffice, 
 here, to add, that, as I learn from Professor Cowell, the anuyogin,
 
 BOOK V., APH. 38. 343 
 
 From one's knowing this [connexion between a given 
 word and meaning], the meaning is suggested [or raised 
 in the mind,] by the word. Such is the import. 1 
 
 b. He mentions what things cause one to apprehend the 
 powers 2 [in question] : 
 
 f%fa: *hn*ifaf%: 3 n ?t ii 
 
 Aph. 38. The connexion [between a 
 
 Sense of words how j j . -, . , i i 
 
 learned. word and its sense] is determined by 
 
 three [means]. 
 
 a. That is to say : the connexion [just] mentioned [in 
 37,] is apprehended by means of these three, viz., 
 information from one competent [to tell us the meaning], 
 the usage of the old man [whose orders to his sons we hear, 
 and then observe what actions ensue, in consequence (see 
 the Sdhitya-darpana, 11)], and application to the same 
 thing which has a familiar name/ [whence we gather the 
 sense of the less familiar synonym]. 
 
 or 'anathetic,' of ghatdbhdva, 'non-existence of a jar," is ghatd- 
 bhdva itself, and the pratiyogin, or ' antithetic,' of ghatdbhdva is 
 ghat a, 'jar.' d. 
 
 IN 
 
 ic! 
 
 3 Aniruddha has ^-cv^t . Ed. 
 
 4 
 
 ^ II
 
 344 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 rf cfipf ftRH ^Wri ^NTcT II 
 
 Aph. 39. There is no restriction to 
 what is to be done; because we see it 
 both ways. 
 
 a. That is to say : and there is no necessity that this 
 apprehension of the powers [ 37,] should occur only 
 in the case of ' something [directed] to be done ; ' because, in 
 [the secular life and dealings of] the world, we see the usage 
 of the old man, &c., [ 38,] in regard to what is not to 
 be done [being something already extant], also, as well as 
 in regard to what is to be done. 1 
 
 : 3 II tfo II 
 
 Aph. 40. He who is accomplished in 
 Scriptural and secu- the secular [connexion of words with 
 
 lar senses of words the . L 
 
 *ame. meanings] can understand the sense 
 
 of the Veda. 
 
 a. Here he entertains a doubt : 4 
 
 J II 
 
 3 Vijnana is singular as regards the lection 
 instead of -"R^ft^: . Ed. 
 
 4
 
 BOOK V., APH. 42. 345 
 
 II 8S II 
 
 A doubt. ^-P* 1 - 41. Not by the three [means 
 
 mentioned in 38, objects some one, can 
 the sense of the Veda be gathered] ; because the Veda is 
 superhuman, and what it means transcends the senses. 
 
 a. Of these he first repels the assertion, that what is 
 meant [by the Veda] is something transcending the 
 senses : 2 
 
 IK, cleared up. A P k ' 42 ' . Not SO I> e -> ^ hat is meant 
 
 by the Veda is not something transcend- 
 ing the senses] ; because sacrificings, &c.,are, in themselves, 
 what constitutes merit, preeminently. 
 
 a. What is asserted [in 41,] is not the case; since 
 sacrificings, gifts, &c., in the shape, e.g., of the re- 
 linquishment of some thing for the sake of the gods, 
 are really, in themselves, 'what constitutes merit,' i.e., 
 what is enjoined by the Veda, ' preeminently/ i. e., be- 
 cause of their having preeminent fruit. And sacrificings, 
 &c., since they are in the shape of wishings, &c., [of 
 which we are perfectly conscious,] are not something 
 transcending intuition. But ' what constitutes merit ' 
 [which the objector supposes to transcend intuition,] does 
 not belong to something mysterious that resides in sacri- 
 
 1 Aniruddha exhibits the reading ^f <Sf ^ | A| ff| f
 
 346 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 ficings, &c., whence wliat is enjoined in the Veda must be 
 beyond intuition. Such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. He repels also what was asserted [in 41], viz., that, 
 inasmuch as it [the Veda,] is superhuman, there can be no 
 instruction by any competent person, 2 [in regard to its 
 import] : 
 
 II &? II 
 
 Aph. 43. The natural force [of the 
 terms in the Veda] is ascertained 
 through the conversancy [therewith of 
 those who successively transmit the knowledge]. 
 
 a. But then, still, how can there be apprehension of the 
 sense of Vaidic terms, in the case of gods, fruits [of ac- 
 tions], &c., which transcend sense ? To this he replies : 3 
 
 I 
 
 : ii 
 
 2 
 
 FfTcT I rl^T? II
 
 BOOK V., APH. 46. 347 
 
 fir* 1 II 88 It 
 
 Aph. 44. This really takes place; 
 /ifnfniity of the because they [viz., the words,] give 
 
 Veda undemMe. . . 
 
 rise to knowledge, in the case both 
 of things adapted [to sense] and of things not [so] 
 adapted. 
 
 a. He defines the peculiarities which belong to words, 
 just because this matter is connected with the question 
 of the power of words to cause right knowledge: 2 s 
 
 4 ii 8M H 
 
 Aph. 45. The Vedas are not from 
 
 ^Eternity of the Veda, eternity ; for there is Scripture for their 
 being a production. 
 
 a. Then are the Vedas the work of [the Supreme] Man ? 
 To this he replies, ' No ': 5 
 
 1 Aniruddha, according to one of my MSS., has (t 1 fH^T* 
 
 Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 3 ' Power to cause right knowledge ' is to render prdmdnya. Ed. 
 
 4 One of my MSS., of Aniruddha originally had efiTZpSTfTJ. 
 
 Ed. 
 
 6 crft ft ^I^^T ^T: i ^Tf ii
 
 348 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 46. They [the Vedas,] are not 
 
 . L rd Mi tke the work of [the Supreme] Man ; be- 
 cause there is no such thing as the 
 [Supreme] Man, [whom you allude to as being, possibly,] 
 their maker. 
 
 a. Supply, ' because we deny that there is a Lord.' 1 
 [This is] simple. 2 
 
 b. Adverting to the anticipation that there may be 
 some other author, he says : 3 
 
 II 
 
 Aph. 47. Since the liberated is un- 
 
 ofS v?das" 0t authort suited [to the work, by his indif- 
 ference], and the unliberated is so, 
 [by his want of power, neither of these can be author 
 of the Yedas] . 4 
 
 a. But then, in that case, since they are not the work of 
 [the Supreme] Man, it follows that they are eternal. To 
 this he replies : 5 
 
 1 Vide supra, p. 112, note 3. Ed. 
 
 2 1 
 3 
 
 4 See Book I., Aph. 93 and 94, at pp. 113, 114, supra. Ed. 
 
 5
 
 BOOK V., APH. 49. 349 
 
 An illustration. p * ' f 
 
 &c., their eternity does not follow from 
 their not being the work of [any Supreme] Man. 
 
 a. [This is] plain. 1 
 
 b. But then, since sprouts, &c., also, just like jars, &c., 
 are productions, we must infer that they are the work of 
 [the Supreme] Man. To this he replies : 2 
 
 : *& II 
 
 Aph. 49. Were this the case with 
 denied l le these, also, [i.e., if it were the case 
 that vegetables were works], we should 
 find a contradiction to experience, &c. 
 
 a. It is seen, in the world, as an invariable fact, 3 that 
 whatever is the work of Man is produced by a body. This 
 would be debarred, &c., were the case as you contend ; 
 [for we see no embodied Supreme Man to whose handiwork 
 the sprouts of the earth can be referred]. Such is the 
 meaning. 4 
 
 b. But then, since they were uttered by the Primal 
 
 I cl^T? II 
 
 3 ' Invariable fact ' is to translate vydpti. Ed. 
 
 4
 
 350 THE 8ANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Man, the Vedas, moreover, are, really, the work of [the 
 Supreme] Man. To this he replies : l 
 
 
 II MO II 
 
 ^ph. 50. That [only] is Man's work, 
 i a work. j n re spect of which, even be it 
 
 something invisible, an effort of understanding takes 
 place. 2 
 
 a. As in the case of what is visible, so, too, in the case 
 of what is invisible, in respect of what thing there takes 
 place ' an effort of understanding/ i.e., a consciousness 
 that Thought preceded, 3 that thing alone is spoken of as 
 Man's work : such is the meaning. Thus it has been re- 
 
 ^rfo 
 
 2 Read : ' Even where an invisible [originator] is in question, that 
 [thing] in respect of which there arises the idea of [its] heing made 
 is [what is meant by] a production by a person.' 
 
 Aniruddha, Nagesa, and Vedanti Mahadeva agree in supplying 
 kartari after adrinhte. Ed. 
 
 3 Instead of Vijnana's expression, ' the idea of [its] being pre- 
 ceded by consciousness,' Nagesa has: cjf^jT 
 
 t, ^ 
 
 ' the idea that [its] being made was preceded by consciousness,' i,e., 
 
 the notion that it was produced aforethought. 
 
 Vedanti Mahadeva impliedly contrasts with a jar, as being a pro- 
 duction of an intelligent and self-conscious maker, a sprout, which 
 originates as a factor of a series of causes and effects alternating from 
 the time when vegetation was first evolved. Also see the two 
 aphorisms preceding the one commented on. Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 50. 351 
 
 marked that a thing is not Man's work merely through it8 
 having been uttered by Man ; for no one speaks of the 
 respiration during profound sleep as being Man's work, 
 [or voluntary act]. But what need to speak of antece- 
 dence of Understanding ? The Vedas, just like an expi- 
 ration, proceed, of themselves, from the Self-existent, 
 through the force of fate, wholly unpreceded by thought. 
 Therefore, they are not [a Supreme] Man's work. 1 2 
 
 s9 C\ 
 
 n 
 
 2 Instead of ' a thing is not Man's work/ &c., I have translated, 
 in the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 65 : ' Not from the mere fact of 
 [its] being uttered by a person [can one say there is] producedness 
 [of a thing] by [that] person ; since it is not the wont to speak of the 
 respiration of deep sleep as the production of a person : but, by [reason 
 of its] production consciously, [a thing is said to be produced by a 
 person]. The Vedas, however, just like an expiration, and by virtue 
 of desert [of souls], issue, spontaneously, from Brahma, without ever 
 being consciously produced [by him]. Hence they are not productions 
 of a person.' 
 
 Dr. Ballantyne was misled by the full stop mistakenly put, in my 
 
 edition of the Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhdshya, before |^l ff Ed
 
 352 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 6. But then, in that case, since they are not preceded 
 by a correct knowledge of the sense of the sentences, 1 the 
 Vedas, moreover, like the speech of a parrot, can convey 
 no right knowledge. 2 To this he replies 3 : 
 
 Aph. 51. They are, spontaneously, 
 
 Jd'enc tMr conveyers of right knowledge, from 
 the patentness of their own power 
 [to instruct rightly]. 
 
 a. That is to say : the authoritativeness 5 of the very 
 whole of the Vedas is established, not by such a thing as 
 its being based on the enouncer's knowledge of the truth, 
 but quite ' spontaneously ;' because, as for the Vedas' 
 'own/ i.e., natural, power of generating right knowledge, 
 thereof we perceive the manifestation in the invocations 6 
 [which produce the result promised], and in the Medical 
 
 1 Read, instead of ' since they are,' &c., ' since the true sense of 
 their sentences was not originated consciously.' Ed. 
 
 2 The implied ' power to convey right knowledge ' represents 
 pramdnya. Ed. 
 
 'flrq I t <8i c li c l- 
 
 I rRT? 
 
 4 Vedanti Mahadeva has the reading | f 
 and comments accordingly : 
 
 5 As in the aphorism, pramdnya, which, soon after, is rendered 
 by ' validity.' Ed. 
 
 6 Mantra, a word of various meanings, Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 52. 353 
 
 Scripture, [the following of which leads to cures], &c. 
 And so there is the aphorism of the Nydya [Book II., 
 68 l ] : 'And [the fact of] its being a cause of right know- 
 ledge, like the validity of invocations, and the Medical 
 Scripture,' &c. 2 
 
 b. In regard to the proposition [laid down in 26, viz.], 
 ' And of the [existence of the] Qualities, &c., there is not 
 absolute debarment/ there was duly alleged, and developed 
 [under 27], one argument, viz., by the establishing the 
 existence of Happiness, &c. Now he states another 
 argument in respect of that 3 [same proposition] : 
 
 11 M* n 
 
 coition is evidence A P^ & There is no Cognition of 
 of existence. what is no entity, as a man's horn. 
 
 1 The correct reading of the aphorism is 
 
 sfit IT 
 
 : i ?RT 
 
 II 
 3
 
 354 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. Be it, moreover, that the existence of pleasure, &c., 
 is proved by the reasoning [under 27] ; it is proved by 
 mere consciousness, also. Of pleasure, &c., were they 
 absolutely nonentities, even the consciousness could not be 
 accounted for ; because there is no cognition of a man's 
 horn, and the like. Such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. But then, [interposes the Naiydyika,] if such be the 
 case, let the Qualities, &c., be quite absolutely real; and 
 then, in the expression ' not absolute debarment ' [in 26], 
 the word ' absolute ' is [superfluous, and, hence,] unmean- 
 ing. To this he replies : 2 
 
 II M? II 
 
 Aph. 53. It is not of the real [that 
 -'^ there is here cognizance]; because 
 exclusion is seen [of the Qualities]. 
 
 a. It is not proper [to say], moreover, that the cogni- 
 zance of the Qualities, &c., is that of the absolutely real ; 
 because we see that they are excluded [and not admitted 
 
 ii 
 
 rRT
 
 BOOK V., APH. 54. 355 
 
 to exist,] at the time of destruction [of the mundane 
 system], &C. 1 
 
 b. But then, even on that showing, let the world be 
 different both from real and from unreal ; nevertheless, the 
 demurring to absolute debarment [in 26,] is untenable. 
 To this he replies : 2 
 
 A Veddntic advance Aph. 54. It is not of what cannot be 
 *&*** [intelligibly] expressed [that there is 
 
 cognizance] ; because there exists no such thing. 
 
 a. And there takes place, moreover, no cognizance of 
 such [a thing] as is not to be expressed as either existing 
 or not existing ; ' because there exists no such thing,' i.e., 
 because nothing is known other than what exists or what 
 does not exist : such is the meaning. The import is, be- 
 cause it is proper to form suppositions only in accordance 
 with what is seen. 3 
 
 I cf^Tf II
 
 356 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. But then, on that showing, do you really approve 
 of [the Nydya notion of] 'cognizing otherwise/ [or our 
 fancying that nature to belong to one, which belongs to 
 another] ? He replies, ' No' : 1 
 
 II MM II 
 
 Aph. 55. There is no such thing as 
 rejected. cognizing otherwise [or cognizing that 
 as belonging to one, which belongs to another] ; because 
 your own proposition is self-destructive. 
 
 a. This, also, is not proper [to be said], viz., that one 
 thing appears under the character of another thing [e.g., 
 a rope, under the character of a serpent, for which it may 
 be mistaken, in the dusk] ; ' because your own proposition 
 is self-destructive.' 4 Of another nature [e.g., snakehood], 
 in a different thing [e.g., a rope], equivalence to a man's 
 horn, is [what is virtually] expressed by the word ' other- 
 wise ' [than the truth ; both a man's horn, and the pre- 
 sence of snakehood in a rope mistaken for a snake, being, 
 alike, otherwise than real] ; and [yet] its cognition [thus] 
 othencise is asserted, [as if that could be cognized which is 
 equivalent to what can not be cognized] : hence your own 
 
 i rr? n 
 
 2 Dr. Goldstiicker, in his Sanskrit Dictionary, erroneously speaks 
 of anyathd-khydti as if it were a technicality of the Sankhya 
 philosophy, and quotes, by way of proof, the aphorism to which this 
 note is appended. Ed. 
 
 3 In one of my MSS. of Aniruddha was, originally, - 
 
 instead of -^I^KlTcT Ed. 
 
 4 See Book III., Aphorism 66, at p. 267, supra. Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 56. 357 
 
 proposition is self-destructive. For even those who con- 
 tend for 'cognizing otherwise' [as one mode of cognition,] 
 declare that the cognition of what does not exist is impos- 
 sible. Such is the meaning. 1 2 
 
 b. Expounding what he had said above, [in 26,] ' not 
 absolute debarment/ he sums up his doctrine : 3 
 
 II Mtf II 
 
 Summi u Aph ' 56 * They t the Qualities,] are 
 
 cognized rightly or wrongly, through 
 their being denied and not denied [appropriately or other- 
 wise]. 
 
 a. All the Qualities, &c., 'are cognized rightly and 
 
 2 The text followed, in this paragraph is, throughout, very 
 inferior ; and the rendering of it also calls for some alteration. Espe- 
 cially, as to the original, ^|K4'v|| | "xf copies an error of the press, 
 
 my correction of which to ^^| "rf was not heeded. See, for the 
 purer text, pp. 23, 24, of the Appendix to my edition of the Sdnkhya- 
 pravachana-bhdshya, Ed.
 
 358 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 wrongly.' How ? ' Through their being denied and not 
 denied.' There is non-denial, as far as regards their exist- 
 ing at all ; because all things [and things are made up 
 of the Qualities,] are eternal. But there is denial, relatively, 
 in Soul, of all things ; just as is the case with the ima- 
 ginary silver, for example, in a pearl-oyster, &c., or with 
 the redness, &c., in crystal, &C., 1 [which has no redness, 
 without its following that redness, altogether and every- 
 where, is non-existent]. 
 
 I. This investigation is concluded. Now the considera- 
 tion of Words, it having presented itself in this connexion, 
 is taken in hand incidentally, at the end ; 2 [the Sankhya 
 not allowing to Testimony a coordinate rank with Sense 
 and Inference] : 
 
 Aph. 57. A word does not consist of 
 f [what the Yogas call] the ' expresser ' 
 (sphota) ; by reason both of cognizance 
 [which would disprove the existence of such imaginary 
 
 : I
 
 BOOK V., APH. 57. 359 
 
 thing,] and of non-cognizance, [which, would, in like 
 manner, disprove it]. 
 
 a. It is held, by the followers of the Yoga, that there 
 exists, in distinction from the several letters, an indivisible 
 [unit, the] word, such as ' jar/ &c.,[ which they call] the 
 ' expression ; ?1 just as there is a jar, or the like, possessing 
 parts, which is something else than the parts, viz., the shell- 
 shaped neck, &c. ; and that particular sound, termed a word, 
 is called the ' expresser,' because of its making apparent 
 the meaning : such a word [we Sankhyas assert, in oppo- 
 sition to the Yogas,] is without evidence [of its existence] . 
 Why ? ' By reason both of cognizance and of non-cogni- 
 zance,' [as thus] : Pray, is that word -[which you choose 
 to call the ' expression/] cognized, or not ? On the 
 former alternative, what need of that idle thing, [the sup- 
 posed ' expression ' ? For,] by what collection of letters, 
 distinguished by a particular succession, this ['expression'] 
 is manifested, let that be what acquaints us with the 
 meaning. But, on the latter alternative, [viz., that it is 
 not cognized], the power of acquainting us with a mean- 
 ing does not belong to an ' expression ' which is not cog- 
 nized. Therefore, the hypothesis of an 'expresser' is 
 useless. Such is the meaning. 2 
 
 1 For sphota, ' eternal word,' which the translator renders by 
 ' expresser,' and also by ' expression,' see Professor Cowell's edition of 
 Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 331, foot-notes 2 and 3 ; and the 
 translation of the Sarva-darsana-sangraha by Professors Cowell and 
 Gough, pp. 209, et seq. 
 
 It is likewise observable that, in what precedes and follows, sabda 
 is variously rendered, besides that sabda and pada are not dis- 
 criminated. Ed.
 
 360 THE S-ANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. The eternity of the Vedas was contradicted * before, 
 [under 45]. Now he contradicts also the eternity of 
 letters : 2 
 
 ^ 3 *j*3firoF4 sirRnrTOrft^: n Mt n 
 
 The eternity of letters A P h - 58 - Sound is not eternal; be- 
 denied. cause we perceive it to be made. 
 
 a. It is not proper [to say, as the Mimansakas say], that 
 letters are eternal, on the strength of our recognizing, e.g., 
 that ' This is that same G ' ; for they are proved to be 
 non-eternal, by the cognition, e.g., that '[the sound of] Gr 
 has been produced' : such is the meaning. And the recog- 
 
 
 1 Pratishiddha, ' demurred to.' Ed. 
 
 2 Tp
 
 BOOK V., APH. 59. 361 
 
 nition has reference to the homogeneomness with that [one 
 which had been previously heard] ; for, otherwise, it would 
 turn out that a jar, or the like, is eternal, inasmuch as it is 
 recognized. 1 
 
 b. He ponders a doubt : 2 
 
 Aph. 59. [Suppose that] there is [in 
 the case of sounds,] the manifestation 
 of something whose existence was previously settled ; as 
 [the manifestation] of a [preexistent] jar by a lamp. 
 
 a. But then [some one may say], of Sound, whose exis- 
 tence was ' previously settled,' the manifestation, through 
 noise, &c., that alone is the object in the cognition of its 
 production, [which you speak of in 58]. An example of 
 manifestation [of a thing previously existing] is, * as of a 
 jar by a lamp.' 3
 
 362 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. He repels this : l 
 
 II ! II 
 
 Aph. 60. If the dogma of products' 
 Disposed of. being real j-. 8 accepted by y^ then 
 
 this is a proving of the already proved. 
 
 . If you say that ' manifestation ' means the taking of 
 a present condition by means of rejecting an unarrived 
 [or future,] condition, then this is our dogma of the reality 
 of products [Book I., 115] ; and such an eternity belongs 
 to all products, [not specially to Sound] ; so that you are 
 proving the already proved [or conceded] : such is the 
 meaning. And, if 'manifestation' is asserted to be just in 
 the shape of the cognition of what is presently real, then 
 we should find [on your theory,] that jars, &c., also, are 
 eternal ; because it would be proper [on that theory,] that 
 the object in the perception of production, by the operation 
 of the causes [the potter, &c.], should be that of knowledge 
 only, as in the case of words, &c., and also in the case of 
 jars, &c. ; [for the jar is shown by the lamp, not made by 
 it]. Such is the import. 2 3 
 
 rT^T 
 
 cT^T 
 
 m 
 
 Vide supra, p. 142, c. Ed.
 
 BOOK, V., APH. 62. 363 
 
 b. An objection to the non-duality of Soul, not pre- 
 viously mentioned, is to be adduced ; therefore the refuta- 
 tion of the non-duality of Soul is recommenced, 1 [bavin* 
 been already handled under Book I., 149] : 
 
 Non-duality of Soul -4*^61. Non-duality of Soul is not; 
 denied on grounds of for its distinctions are cognized through 
 
 Inference. 
 
 signs. 
 
 a. That is to say : because it is proved to be really dif- 
 ferent [in different persons], by the sign that one quits 
 Nature [or escapes from the mundane condition], while 
 another not does quit it, &c. 3 
 
 b. But, he tells us, there is even sense-evidence destruc- 
 tive of the non-distinction of Soul from things [that are] 
 non-Soul, asserted in the Scriptural texts, 'All this is Soul 
 only/ 4 ' All this is Brahma only :' 5 6 
 
 n 
 
 2 Nagesa, as also some copies of Vijnana's work, has r| j ^fl- 
 f, ' non-duality of Souls.' Ed. 
 
 n 
 
 4 Chhdndogya Upanishad, vii., xxv., 2. Ed. 
 
 6 For a very similar passage, vide supra, p. 243, near the foot. Ed.
 
 364 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Non-duality denied A P h - 62 - Moreover, there is not 
 on grounds of Sense. [non-distinction of Soul] from non- 
 Soul ; because this is disproved by sense-evidence. 
 
 a. That is to say : moreover, there is not a non-distinc- 
 tion between the non-Soul, i.e., the aggregate of the ex- 
 perienceable, and Soul ; because this is excluded also by 
 sense-evidence, [as well as by signs, ( 61)] ; because, 
 if Soul were not other than the whole perceptible, it 
 would also not be different from a jar and a web; 
 since the jar, e.g., would not be other than the 
 web, which [by hypothesis,] is not other than the 
 Soul : and this is excluded by sense-evidence, which 
 constrains us to apprehend a distinction 1 [between a jar 
 and a web] . 
 
 6. In order to clear the minds of learners, he illustrates 
 this point, though already established : 2 
 
 n $$ a 
 
 Aph. 63. Not between the two [Soul 
 
 The reasons combined. , 01-1 T/TT 
 
 and non-Soul, is there non-difference] ; 
 for that same [couple of reasons]. 
 
 a. 'Between the two/ i. e., between Soul and non-Soul, the 
 two together, also, there is not an absolute non-difference ; 
 
 I 
 
 ftj ^ ^f 
 
 : II 
 II
 
 BOOK V., APH. 64. 365 
 
 for the couple of reasons [given in 61 and 62] : such 
 is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. But then, in that case, what is the drift of such 
 Scriptural texts as, ' [All] this is Soul only ? ' To this he 
 replies : 2 
 
 Scriptureaccommodates 64 ' There Jt is fol> ^ "ke of 
 
 itself to human frailty of something else, in respect of the un- 
 
 understanding. ,. 
 
 discriminating. 
 
 a. That is to say : ' in respect of the undiscriminating/ 
 with reference to undiscriminating persons, in the case of 
 non-difference [between Soul and non-Soul, apparently 
 asserted in Scripture], it is ' there for the sake of some- 
 thing else ;' i. e., the observation 3 is [designed to be] 
 provocative of worship. For, in the secular world, through 
 want of discrimination, body and the embodied, the ex- 
 perienced and the experiencer, are regarded as indifferent; 4 
 
 H 
 
 3 To render anuvdda, which, as defined by Professor Cowell, 
 signifies ' the reiteration or reinculcation of an injunction, it may be 
 with further details, but without dwelling on the purpose of the 
 injunction itself.' Aphorisms of Sdndilya, &c., p. 75, foot-note. 
 At pp. 24 and 25, he translates anuvdda by ' confirmatory repetition' 
 and ' illustrative repetition.' Ed.
 
 366 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 [and Scripture humours the worldling's delusion, with a 
 view to eventually getting him out of it]. 
 
 d. He declares, that, according to the asserters of Non- 
 duality [of Soul], there can be no material cause of the 
 world, either : l 
 
 rCTcT II M II 
 
 The Veddnta system A P h ' 65 - Neither Soul, nor Igno- 
 suppiies no material fur ranee, nor both, can be the material 
 cause of the world ; because of the 
 solitariness of [Soul]. 
 
 a. The soul alone, or Ignorance lodged in the soul, or 
 both together, like a pair of jar-halves [conjoined in the 
 formation of a jar], cannot be the material of the world ; 
 'because of the solitariness' of Soul. For things under- 
 go alteration only through that particular conjunction 
 
 2 According to Nagesa's reading, 
 ' Ignorance ' is qualiBed as ( beginningless,' or ' eternal a parte ante.' 
 Vedanti Mahadeva reads, as do some MSS. of Vijuana,
 
 BOOK V., APH. 65. 367 
 
 which is called ' association ' hence the [ever] solitary 
 Soul, without a second, since it is not associated, cannot 
 serve as a material cause. Nor can it do so by means of 
 [association with] Ignorance, either; because the conjunc- 
 tion of Ignorance has been already excluded by the fact 
 of solitariness. Moreover, that the two together should be 
 the material is impossible, even as it is that either, seve- 
 rally, should be the material ; simply ' because of the soli- 
 tariness/ Such is the meaning. And, if you choose that 
 Ignorance should subsist as a substance located in the soul, 
 as the air in the heavens, then there is an abandonment 
 of the non-duality of Soul, 1 [for which you Vedantis con- 
 tend]. 
 
 b. He himself [in Book L, 145,] decided that the soul 
 consists of light, [or knowledge] . In regard to this, he 
 repels the prima facie view, founded on the text, 'Brahma 
 
 f?? ^ 
 
 I
 
 368 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 is reality, knowledge, and joy/ l that the essence of the 
 soul is joy, also : 2 
 
 Aph. 66. The two natures, joy and 
 knowledge, do not belong to one; be- 
 cause the two are different. 
 
 a. A single subject has not the nature both of joy and 
 of intelligence ; because, since pleasure is not experienced 
 at the time of knowing pain, pleasure and knowledge are 
 different : such is the meaning. 3 
 
 b. But then, in that case, what becomes of the Scripture, 
 that it [Soul,] consists of joy ? To this he replies : 4 
 
 n 9 ii 
 
 1 The passage thus rendered looks as if it were taken, with the 
 addition of its opening word, from the Brihaddranyaka Upanishad, 
 iii., 9, 28 ; or Satapatha-lrdhmana, xiv., 6, 9, 34. Ed. 
 
 "^ f^TT^trfrf 
 
 : ^RT ifcT* I
 
 BOOK V., APH. 68. 369 
 
 Aph. 67. Metaphorical [is the word 
 joy, in the sense] of the cessation of 
 pain. 
 
 a. That is to say : the word ' joy/ in the Scriptural ex- 
 pression which means, really, the cessation of pain, is 
 metaphorical. This is stated in [the maxim], ' Pleasure is 
 the departure of both pain and pleasure/ l 
 
 b. He states the cause of this metaphorical employ- 
 ment : 2 
 
 Wkythttermwasused A P h ' 68 ' Jt is M a ^lldotlOn of 
 
 a tense not literal. emancipation, for the sake of the dull. 
 
 a. That is to say : the Scripture, as an incitement to 
 'the dull/ i.e., the ignorant, lauds, as if it were Joy, the 
 emancipation, consisting in the cessation of pain, which 
 [cessation] is the essence of the soul ; s * [for the soul is 
 such joy as consists of the absence of pain], 
 
 b. In order to manifest immediately the origin, already 
 
 
 4 For another translation, beginning with the introduction to 
 Aphorism 67, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 34. Ed. 
 
 2 B
 
 370 THE SA.NKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 declared, 1 of the internal organ, he repels the prima 
 facie view, that the Mind is all-pervading : 2 
 
 ll 
 
 Aph. 69. The Mind is not all-per- 
 vading; because it is an instrument, 
 and because it is, moreover, an organ. 
 
 a. The Mind, meaning the totality of the internal instru- 
 ments,* is not all-pervading ; for it is an instrument, as an 
 axe, or the like, is. The word ' and ' [literally, ' or,' in 
 the Aphorism,] implies a distributive alternative, [not an 
 optional one]. The meaning is this, that, [while the 
 whole of the internal instruments are instruments^] the par- 
 ticular internal instrument, the third 3 [the Mind, 
 
 1 Dr. Ballantyne, under the misapprehension that ' the subtile 
 body ' was pointed to, here added, in brackets, ' in B. III., 14, 15, 
 &c.' Ed. 
 
 3 Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva seem to add the words 
 ^ .r* 
 
 See the passage immediately fol- 
 
 lowing the aphorism. Ed. 
 
 4 The term manas, the translator's 'Mind,' denotes not only 
 one of the three internal organs, but, sometimes, as here, all three 
 taken together. See the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 45, 4G, text 
 and foot-notes. Ed. 
 
 5 See Book II., Aph. 30, at p. 208, supra. Ed. 
 
 6 The words here bracketed I have substituted for ' the subtile 
 body, mentioned under B. III., 12, a.' Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 70. 371 
 
 is not all-pervading ; because it is, moreover, an organ. 1 
 But knowledge, &c., pervading the body, are demonstrable 
 ily of medium extent, 2 [neither infinite nor atomic]. 
 
 on 
 
 6. Here, there being a doubt whether this be con- 
 vincing, he propounds an appropriate confutation : z 
 
 Aph. 70. [The Mind is not all-per- 
 vading] ; for it is movable ; since there 
 is Scripture regarding the motion. 
 
 a. That is to say ; since, inasmuch as there is Scripture 
 regarding the going of the Soul [which, being all-perva- 
 ding, cannot go] into another world, it being settled that 
 it is its adjunct, the internal organ, that is movable, [see 
 Book I., 51], it cannot be all-pervading. 4 
 
 1 See Book II., Aph. 26, at p. 206, supra. Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 t|rt 
 8
 
 372 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. In order to prove that it is a product, he repels also 
 the opinion that the Mind is without parts : l 
 
 II W II 
 
 Aph. 71. Like a iar, it fthe Mind,] 
 
 Tlie Mind has parts. . .,, , , ., 
 
 is not without parts ; because it comes 
 in contact therewith, [i.e., with several Senses, simul- 
 taneously]. 
 
 a. The word 'therewith' refers to 'organ,' which occurs 
 in a preceding aphorism, [ 69]. The Mind is not with- 
 out parts ; ' because it comes in contact,' simultaneously, 
 with several sense-organs. But, ' like ajar/ it is of medium 
 size, [neither infinite nor atomic], and consists of parts. 
 Such is the meaning. And it is to be understood that the 
 internal organ, when in the state of a came, [and not 
 modified and expanded, e.g., into knowledge, which is its 
 product,] is, indeed, atomic. 3 
 
 , in both my MSS. of Aniruddha, is changed, by 
 
 a later hand, to ^^"lK^|cT > the reading of Vedanti Mahadeva. 
 Ed. 
 
 3 1 I
 
 BOOK v., APH. 72. 373 
 
 b. He demurs to the eternity of Mind, Time, &c. : l 
 
 *?' Ever 7^^g except Nature 
 
 and Soul is uneternal. 
 
 a. [This is] plain. And the Mind, 2 the Ether, &c., when 
 in the state of cause, [not developed into product], are 
 called Nature, and not Intellect, 3 &c., by reason of the 
 absence of the special properties, viz., judgment, 4 &c. 5 
 
 b. But then, according to such Scriptural texts as, ' He 
 should know Illusion to be Nature, and him in whom is 
 Illusion to be the great Lord, and this whole world to be 
 pervaded by portions of him,' 6 since Soul and Nature, 
 
 irfrrwfcT 
 
 8 Intended to represent antaKkarana, 'internal organ.' Vide 
 gupra, p. 370, note 4. Ed. 
 
 3 The very inferior, because ambiguous, reading, in the original, 
 manas, I have changed to buddhi, and have displaced Dr. Ballantyne's 
 corresponding ' Mind.' Ed. 
 
 4 Vyavasaya. For its synonym, adhyavasdya, vide supra, 
 p. 209, note 1. Ed. 
 
 I 
 
 6 Swetd'swatara TTpanishad, iv., 10. Professor Gough trans- 
 lates, differently : ' Let the sage know that Prakriti is Maya, and 
 that Mahegwara is the Mayin, or arch-illusionist. All this shifting 
 world is filled with portions of him." A foot-note explains ' Mahes- 
 wara ' as intending ' Iswara, Kudra, Hara, or &va.' Philosophy of 
 the Upanishads, p. 224. Ed.
 
 374 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 also, are made up of parts, they must be uneternal. To 
 this he replies : l 
 
 I rf^Tf II 
 
 2 This reading is peculiar ; many MSS. of Vijnana, with which 
 agree Aniruddha, Nagesa, and Vedanti Mahadeva, having ^T M J I *1 * 
 Their elucidations of the aphorism here follow. Aniruddha : r^ 
 
 i Then 
 
 follows the quotation as in Vijnana. Vedanti Mahadeva : 
 
 ' I Some MSS. of Vijnana 
 have precisely the words of Nagesa, transcribed above, barring the quite 
 
 f" -T "^ 
 
 immaterial substitution of TfcfjTff Q {^|"cfTif^l at the beginning. 
 
 is, without doubt, the correct reading. Vijnana 
 and Nagesa take it to denote ' Soul and Nature ; ' Aniruddha and 
 Vedanti Mabadeva, ' Nature ' only. Bhdgin means, literally, ' that 
 which is made up of parts,' or 'the Whole.' Hence, 'Whole' is to take 
 the place of Dr. Ballantyne's ' Experiencer.' It occurs again in 
 Aph. 81 of this Book, at p. 379, infra. Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 74. 375 
 
 Aph. 73. No parts [from the pre- 
 sence of which in the discerptible, one 
 might infer destructibility,] are found 
 
 in the Experiencer ; for there is Scripture for its being 
 
 without parts. 
 
 a. Parts are not appropriate to ( the Experiencer/ i. e., 
 to Soul, or to Nature ; for there is Scripture for their 
 being without parts ; that is to say, because of such [texts] 
 as, 'Without parts, motionless, quiescent, unobjectionable, 
 
 b. It has been stated [in Book L, 1,] that Emancipa- 
 tion is the cessation of pain. In order to corroborate this, 
 he then repels the doctrines of others, in regard to Eman- 
 cipation : 3 
 
 II 
 
 ^.74. Emancipation is not a 
 tion disputed. manifestation of joy ; because there 
 
 2 Swetdsicatara Upanishad, vi., 19. Professor Gough renders 
 as follows : ' Without parts, without action, and without change ; 
 blameless and unsullied.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 232, 
 233. Ed. 
 
 4 Vedanti Mahadeva omits 7TT> according to my sole MS. 
 Most probably, however, there is, here, a mistake of the copyist. Ed .
 
 376 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 are no properties [in Soul, as, e.g., in the shape of 
 
 joy]. 
 
 a. There belongs to Soul no property in the shape of joy, 
 or in the shape of manifestation ; and the essence [of Soul] 
 is quite eternal, and, therefore, not something to be pro- 
 duced by means : therefore, Emancipation is not a mani- 
 festation of joy : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 Aph. 75. Nor, in like manner, is it 
 Second view disputed. [Emancipation,] the destruction of 
 special qualities. 
 
 a. Emancipation is, moreover, not the destruction of all 
 special qualities, ' In like manner.' Because there are 
 absolutely no properties [in Soul, (see 74)]. Such is the 
 meaning. 2 
 
 Aph. 76. Nor is it [Emancipation,] 
 A third view disputed. any particular going of that [Soul,] 
 which is motionless. 
 
 a. Moreover, emancipation is not a going to the world 
 
 : II
 
 BOOK V., APH. 78. 377 
 
 of Brahma j 1 because the Soul, since it is motionless, does 
 not go. z 
 
 Aph. 77. Nor is it [Emancipation,! 
 
 A fourth view disputed. , f . . . 
 
 the destruction of the influence of [intel- 
 lectual] forms, by reason of the faults of momentariness, &o. 
 
 a. The meaning is, that also the doctrine of the Nihilist, 
 that the Soul consists merely of momentary knowledge, 
 that Bondage is the modifying thereof by objects, and 
 that emancipation is the destruction of the influence 
 thereof called Memory, 3 is inadmissible ; because, by reason 
 of the faults of momentariness, &c., [such] emancipation is 
 not the Soul's aim. 4 
 
 b. He censures another [conception of] emancipation 
 of the Nihilist's : 5 
 
 ii 
 
 1 See Book IV., Aph. 21, a., and Aph. 31, 5., at pp. 301 and 310, 
 a. Ed. 
 
 supra 
 
 II 
 
 3 Vdsand ; for which vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed.
 
 378 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 A fifth* disputed ApL 78 ' Nor is {t [Emancipation;] 
 
 destruction of all ; for this has, among 
 other things, the fault of not being the SouFs aim. 
 
 a. Likewise, the entire destruction of the Soul, which 
 consists of knowledge, is not emancipation ; because, 
 among other things, we do not see, in the world, that the 
 Jtnnihilation of the soul is the soul's aim: such is the 
 meaning. 1 
 
 A sixth view disputed. Aph. 79. So, too, the Void. 
 
 a. The annihilation of the whole universe, consisting of 
 cognition and the cognizable, is, thus, also, not emancipa- 
 tion ; because Soul's aim is not effected by Soul's annihila- 
 tion : such is the meaning. 2 
 
 a bo n 
 
 Aph. 80. And conjunctions termi- 
 
 A seventh view disputed. . . . J . _ 
 
 nate in separations; therefore, it [Eman- 
 cipation,] is not the acquisition of lands, &c., either. 
 
 2 . J^.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 81. 379 
 
 a. From its perishableness, possessorship is not Emanci- 
 pation. 1 
 
 H t<\ ii 
 
 Aph. 81. Nor is it [Emancipation,] 
 
 An eighth view disputed. .. f -^ . , , JCn i o 
 
 conjunction of a Part with the Whole. 2 
 
 a. Emancipation is not absorption of ' a Part,' i.e., 
 the Soul, into ' the Whole/ i. e., that of which it is [on 
 the view in question,] a part, viz., the Supreme Soul ; for 
 the reason assigned [in 80], viz., ( conjunctions terminate 
 in separations/ and because we do not admit a Lord [Book I., 
 92], and because, thus, self-dissolution is not Soul's aim : 
 such is the meaning. 3 
 
 f * Tjferftfa II 
 
 2 Aniruddha writes as follows, in his elucidation of the eighty-first 
 Aphorism: rf ^TWt *TPTf 
 
 * I His introduction to the Aphorism runs :
 
 380 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 ?f nt 
 
 II t* II 
 
 A ninth * disputed. ' " Nor t [Emancipation], 
 
 moreover, conjunction with the [power 
 of] becoming as small as an atom, &c.; since, as is the 
 case with other conjunctions, the destruction of this must 
 necessarily take place. 
 
 a. Moreover, conjunction with superhuman power, e.g., 
 the assuming the size of an atom, is not Emancipation ; 
 because, just as is the case with connexions with other 
 superhuman powers, the destruction of this, also, follows, 
 of necessity : such is the meaning. 2 
 
 Aph. 83. Nor, just as in that case, 
 
 A tenth view disputed. . , L rr( . , . J n 
 
 is it [Emancipation], moreover, con- 
 junction with the rank of Indra, &c. 
 
 a. Nor is the attainment of the superhuman power of 
 Indra, &c., Emancipation, just as is the case with other 
 superhuman powers [such as assuming atomic bulk] ; by 
 reason of perishableness : such is the meaning. 3 
 
 1 Both my MSS. of Aniruddha exhibit the questionable reading
 
 BOOK V., APH. 85. 381 
 
 b. He repels the objection of an opponent to what has 
 been stated [in Book I., 61], that the Organs are 
 products of Self -consciousness : l 
 
 : 2 II ttJ II 
 
 The organs vJtence. A P k ' 84 ' ^ T S^ are Dot f rme <l 
 
 of the Elements [as the Naiydyikas 
 assert] ; because there is Scripture for their being derived 
 from Self-consciousness. 
 
 a. With advertence to the opinion that Power, &c., also, 
 are principles, he repels the determination of categories 
 [insisted upon by the various sects] of his opponents, and 
 the notion that Emancipation comes through a know- 
 ledge of these [categories] merely : 8 
 
 bM 
 
 II 
 
 2 Vedanti Mabadeva has, instead of 
 
 4 Nagesa and Vedanti Mahadeva add x[, as does Vijnana, ac- 
 cording to the best MSS. Ed.
 
 382 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 85. The rule of six categories 
 
 Emancipation result from acquaintance 
 therewith, [as the Vaiseshikas maintain]. 
 
 II 
 
 . 86. So, too, is it in the case 
 
 And those of the - *. . A r A . , 
 
 Nydya, $c. of the sixteen [categories of the 
 
 Nydya\, &c. 
 
 a. In order to establish, what has been already stated 
 [in Book I., 62], that the five Elements are products, he 
 rejects the eternity of the Earthy and other Atoms, which 
 is held by the Vaiseshikas and others : l 
 
 
 R 
 
 
 Aph. 87. [The five Elements being 
 
 unscripturaL ' products, as declared in Book I., 61], 
 Atoms are not eternal, [as alleged 
 in the Nynya\ ; for there is Scripture for their being 
 products. 
 
 a. Although that text of Scripture is not seen by us, 
 because it has disappeared, in the lapse of time, &c., yet 
 it is to be inferred from the words of teachers, and from 
 the tradition of Manu, 2 [Ch. I., y. 27] . 
 
 ^rr
 
 BOOK V., APH. 88. 383 
 
 b. But then, how can an Atom, which is without parts, 
 be a product ? To this he replies : l 
 
 ^ f^HFTrf ^rRrTTcT II bb II 
 
 The Scripture decisive Aph. 88. Since it is a product, it is 
 
 of the question. not without parts> 
 
 a. That is to say : since the fact, established by Scrip- 
 ture, of their being products, cannot be otherwise accounted 
 for, the [so-called] Atoms of Earth, &c., are not without 
 parts. 3 
 
 6. He repels the objection of the Nihilist, that direct 
 cognitioD of Nature, or of Soul, is impossible ; because 
 [forsooth,] the cause of a thing's being directly cognizable 
 is colour :* 
 
 I cRTf II 
 
 2 Aniruddha reads rf
 
 384 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 II bQ. II 
 
 Aph. 89. There is no necessity that 
 A cavil disposed of. Direct cognition should have colour as 
 its cause. 
 
 a. It is no rule, that to be directly cognizable should 
 result from colour only, [or other object of sense], as the 
 cause ; because direct cognition may result from Merit, 
 &c., [viz., mystical practices, and so forth], also: such is 
 the meaning. 8 
 
 b. Well, if that be the case, pray is the dimension of an 
 Atom a reality, or not ? With reference to this, he decides 
 the question of dimension,* [as follows] : 
 
 1 A marginal note in one of my MSS. of Aniruddha mentions 
 as a variant. Both my MSS. of Nagesa have, erroneously, 
 
 . instead o - 
 x x 
 
 2 Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva have 
 
 Ed. 
 
 3 
 
 II 
 
 ^ifrf^T 
 
 One of my MSS of Aniruddha has
 
 BOOK V., APH. 91. 385 
 
 Aph. 90. There are not four varieties 
 
 Dimension of what ,. . , , 
 
 kinds. or dimension ; because those can be 
 
 accounted for by two. 
 
 a. There are not four kinds of dimension, viz., small, 
 great, long, and short ; but there are only two sorts. 
 ' Because those can be accounted for by two :' that is to say, 
 the four varieties can be accounted for by merely two, the 
 atomic [or positively small,] and the great. Such is the 
 meaning. For the short and the long are merely subordi- 
 nate kinds of the dimension called great ; else we should 
 have, e. g., no end of dimensions, in the shape of the 
 crooked, &C. 1 
 
 d. He rebuts the Nihilist's denial of genera, 2 [as follows] : 
 
 n <& ii 
 
 Aph. 91. Though these [individuals] 
 be uneternal, recognition, as being as- 
 sociated with constancy, is of genus. 
 
 +i i < -*\ ( 
 
 i 
 
 T I 
 
 3 Nagesa, according to one of my MSS. omits ^tf . Ed. 
 
 2 c
 
 386 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. Hence, he says, it is not proper to deny [the exist- 
 ence of] genus: 1 
 
 
 II 03 II 
 
 And not to oe denied. A P h - 9 ?' Therefore it [genus,] is not 
 to be denied. 
 
 a. But then [it may be said], recognition is to be accounted 
 for simply by a non-existence, in the shape of the exclusion 
 of what is not the thing [recognized] : and let this be what 
 is meant by the word ' genus/ To this he replies : 2 
 
 r 3 *TRUcft?T II 0$ II 
 
 Genus positive, not Aph. 93. It [genus,] does not COn- 
 
 sist in exclusion of something else ; 
 because it is cognized as an entity. 
 
 a. That is to say: genus does not consist in exclusion 
 [of something else] ; because ' This is that same ' is the 
 cognition of something positive ; for, otherwise, the only 
 thing cognized would be, ' This is not a non-jar.' 4 
 
 IN ^r HTrrT^^^i^is^ci i ff^Tf 11 
 
 3 One of my MSS. of Nagesa has, pretty obviously by mere error, 
 
 - Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 95. 387 
 
 b. But still, recognition may be caused by likeness. To 
 this he replies r 1 
 
 : II 0.8 H 
 
 Likeness not a distinct Aph, 94. Likeness is not a separate 
 principle ; for it is directly appre 
 h ended, [as one manifestation of Community]. 
 
 a. That is to say : likeness is nothing other than same- 
 ness in many parts, &c. ; for it is directly apprehended as 
 consisting in sameness ; 2 [the likeness of a fair face to the 
 moon, e. g., consisting in the sameness of the pleasurable 
 feeling, &c., occasioned by the sight of either]. 
 
 b. The conjecture, ' But then, let likeness be really an 
 inherent power, and not [a modified aspect of] Community,' 
 he repels : s 
 
 . 11 Q.M n 
 
 II 
 
 2 
 
 Aniruddha has
 
 388 THE SlNKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Nor a peculiar pou-er. A P h - 95 - Nor is {t [likeness,] a ma- 
 nifestation of [something's] own power ; 
 because the apprehension of it is different. 
 
 a. Moreover, likeness is not the manifestation of a 
 particular natural power of a thing ; because the appre- 
 hension of likeness is different from the apprehension 
 of power. For the cognition of a power is not depen- 
 dent on the cognition of another thing; the cognition 
 of likeness, on the other hand, is dependent on the cog- 
 nition of a correlative, 1 as is the case with the cognition 
 of a non-existence ; so that the two conceptions are hete- 
 rogeneous. Such is the meaning. 2 
 
 6. But still, let the likeness among individual jars, &c., 
 be merely that they have [all alike,] the name, e. g., of 
 jar. To this he replies : 8 
 
 n 
 
 Pratiyogin ; on which vide supra, p. 342, note 3. Ed. 
 
 I 
 
 The reading of Nage'sa is rf 
 . Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 97. 389 
 
 Aph. 96. Nor, moreover, is it [like- 
 
 Nor the relation be- -, , . 
 
 tween names und things. ness,J tne connexion between name 
 and named. 
 
 a. Because even he who does not know the connexion 
 between a name and the thing named may cognize a 
 likeness, 1 [e. g., between two jars]. 
 
 b. Moreover : 2 
 
 Hote it cannot be so. ^ph. 97. That connexion [viz., be- 
 tween name and named,] is not eternal ; 
 since both [the correlatives] are uneternal. 
 
 a. Since both the name and the named are uneternal, 
 the relation between them, also, is not eternal. How, 
 then, can there be, through that, the likeness of a 
 departed thing in a thing present ? Such is the meaning. 3 
 
 b. But then, though the correlatives be uneternal, let 
 
 f^frf II 
 
 II 
 
 * II
 
 390 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 the relation be eternal. What is to hinder this ? To this 
 he replies : l 
 
 Aph. 98. The connexion is not so 
 Sttffgestion [not eternal], for this reason, viz., 
 because this is debarred by the evidence 
 which acquaints us with the thing ; [i. e., the supposition 
 is inconsistent with the definition of the term]. 
 
 a. Connexion is proved only where disjunction incidentally 
 subsists; because, otherwise, there is no room for the 
 supposition of connexion ; the case being accounted for, 
 as will be explained, simply by the natural state of the 
 matter. And this incidental disjunction is impossible, if 
 connexion be eternal. Therefore, connexion is not eternal ; 
 for this is debarred by the very evidence that acquaints 
 us with Connexion. Such is the meaning. 4 
 
 i 
 
 2 Bead H|-^1 *, ' n t unoriginated,' i.e., ' not eternal,' qualifying 
 ' connexion.' ' For this reason ' renders ^JT^ . The reading "||f| , 
 
 the manuscript authority for which is of the slightest, is treated as if 
 no better than a typographical error, in the corrigenda to my edition 
 of Vijnana's work. Ed. 
 
 3 Aniruddha has, instead of -JTJr^O, -IWftQ . In the 
 margin of one of my MSS. of his commentary is the variant 
 
 -*inHTm .
 
 BOOK V., APH. 99. 391 
 
 b. But, on this showing, there could be no such thing 
 as the eternal [connexion called] Coinherence 1 between. 
 those two eternals, a Quality and the thing qualified ; 
 [which Coinherence, or intimate relation, is one of the 
 categories of the Nydya\. To this he replies :* 
 
 TOTWTRTrT II OR II 
 
 
 The Category of in- Aph. 99. There is no [such thing 
 limate Relation rejected. ^ Coinherence, [such as the Naiya- 
 yikas insist upon] ; for there is no evidence [for it]. 
 
 a. But then [it may be said], the evidence of it is, the 
 perception that something is qualified [or conjoined with 
 a quality which inheres in it] , and the unaccountableness, 
 otherwise, of the cognition of something as qualified. To 
 this he replies : 4 
 
 i 
 
 : II 
 
 I Samavdya; of which the preferable rendering, proposed by 
 Professor Cowell, is ' interpenetration.' Ed. 
 
 I cf^Tf II 
 
 3 The reading of Nagesa is ^^"TOft^* His gloss runs : 
 
 M M- 
 I
 
 392 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 100. Neither perception nor 
 
 This argued. m * ... 
 
 inference [is evidence for the existence 
 of Coinherence] ; since, as regards both alike, the case is 
 otherwise disposed of. 8 
 
 a. Since, ' as regards both alike/ i. e., the perception of 
 qualifiedness, and the inferring of it, ' the case is otherwise 
 disposed of ;'* viz., simply by the natural state [of the thing 
 and its qualities], neither of the two is evidence for [the 
 imaginary category called] Coinhereuce : such is the 
 meaning. 5 
 
 b. It is a tenet, that, from the agitation of Nature the 
 conjunction of Nature and Soul takes place, and thence 
 results creation. In regard to that, there is this objection 
 of the atheists, that ' Nothing whatever possesses the 
 action called agitation ; everything is momentary ; where 
 
 l One of my MSS. of Aniruddha simply omits "f ; while the 
 other has ^M^^ 1 ^ U~lU Ed. 
 
 2 Nagesa gives 
 
 3 Bead, instead of 'the case is otherwise disposed of/ 'the 
 establishment [which they lead to] is otherwise.' Ed. 
 
 4 See the preceding note. Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 101. 393 
 
 it arises, even there it perishes ; therefore, no motion is 
 proved to be inferrible from conjunction [of anything] with 
 another place;' [the fruit, for instance, which appears to 
 reach the ground not being that fruit, any longer existent, 
 which appeared to drop from the tree]. To this he 
 replies : l 
 
 n 
 
 Motion is matter of Aph. 101. Motion is not a matter 
 perception. Q inference ; for he who stands very 
 
 near has, indeed, direct cognition both of it and of 
 what it belongs to. 
 
 a. In Book Second the different opinions were merely 
 mentioned, that the Body is formed of five elements, and 
 so forth ; but no particular one was considered. In regard 
 to this question, he denies the view of an opponent :* 
 
 i ri 
 
 f^T "fe^lcftfh I 
 
 2 Some MSS. of Vijnana omit ^ef , as does Nages'a. Ed. 
 8 NageSa omits ITcf . Ed. 
 
 4
 
 394 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 II 
 
 The Body is of earth Aph. 102. The Body does not consist 
 only ' of five elements ; because many [hete- 
 
 rogeneous things] are unsuitable as the material. 
 
 a. He will mention, that, whilst there is but one 
 material, the material of every Body is earth i 1 
 
 
 
 II ^0$ II 
 
 There is a Subfile as Aph. 103. It ("the Body,] is not. 
 
 well as a Gross, Body. * ., ,, J- "I ., 
 
 necessarily, the (jross one; for there 
 is, also, the vehicular [transmigrating or Subtile] one. 
 
 a. Senses, [the organ of vision, for example,] distinct 
 from the eye-balls, have been already mentioned. In 
 order to substantiate this [point], he refutes the opinion, 
 that the senses reveal what they do not reach to : 2 
 
 ^*4 1 <! i \ 
 II ^08 ||
 
 BOOK V., APH. 104. 395 
 
 Connexion between <Aph. 104. The senses do not reveal 
 
 Knseandotiject. 
 
 of their not reaching, or because [else,] they might reach 
 everything. 
 
 a. The senses do not reveal things unconnected with 
 them. ' Because of their not reaching.' For we do not 
 see that lamps, or the like, reveal what they do not reach 
 to ; and because, if they were to reveal what they do not 
 reach to, we should find them revealing all things, viz., those 
 intercepted, and the like. Such is the meaning. Therefore 
 there is an organ, other than the eye-ball, for the sake of 
 connexion with the distant sun, &c. Such is the import. 
 And the instruments reveal the objects simply by deliver- 
 ing the object to the soul, for they are, themselves, 
 unintelligent ; as a mirror reveals the face. Or [in other 
 words], their revealing an object is simply their taking 
 up an image of the object. 1 
 
 b. He repels the conjecture : But then, in that case, 
 the opinion [of the Naiyayikas,] that the sight is luminoua 
 
 I
 
 396 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 is quite right ; for we see Light alone glide rapidly to a 
 distance, in the form of rays : l 
 
 4*1 M <u T^f ^ 
 
 : n ^OM ii 
 
 The sight not formed Aph. 105. Not because Light glides 
 
 ofLigld. j- and t h e g^t does go ^ toQ> J ig t}ie 
 
 Sight luminous [or formed of Light] ; because the thing 
 is accounted for by [the theory of] modifications, [to be 
 now explained]. 
 
 a. The Sight is not to be asserted to be luminous, on 
 the ground that light is seen to glide. Why ? Because, 
 just as in the case of the vital air, where there is no 
 luminosity, the gliding forth can be accounted for through 
 a kind of modification. Such is the meaning. For, as 
 the vital air, without having at all parted from the body, 
 glides out ever so far from the end of the nose, under the 
 modification called breathing, [and thus smells a distant 
 flower], just so the Sight, though a non-luminous sub- 
 stance, without, indeed, quitting [connexion with] the 
 body, all in a moment will dart off [like the protruded 
 feeler of a polyp,] to a-distant object, such as the sun, by 
 means of the species of change called modification. 2 
 
 ^firf
 
 BOOK V., APH. 107. 397 
 
 b. But what is the proof that there is any such 
 modification ? To this he replies : l 
 
 Aph. 106. By the sign of the dis- 
 Proof of his theory play of the attained obiect the 
 
 of vision, that it ac- r . J 
 
 counts for the pheno- [existence of the] modification [which 
 could alone account for that display,] is 
 proved. 
 
 a. He shows [us] the nature of the modification, to 
 account for the going, though without parting from the 
 Body : 
 
 rftfcT II ^09 II 
 
 O/the theory, further. A P h ' 107. ^ The 'modification' IS 
 
 another principle than a fragment, or 
 
 i 
 
 f^R TTTT'RI I cTTR?
 
 398 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a quality, [of the Sight, or other sense] ; because it is for 
 the sake of connexion that it glides forth. 
 
 a. The modification is not a fragment of the Sight, or 
 other sense, [serving as] the cause of the revealing of 
 objects, a part disjoined like a spark, or a quality, 
 like, e. g., Colour ; but the modification, whilst a portion 
 thereof, is something else than a fragment, or a quality. 
 For, if there were disruption, connexion of the sun, &c., 
 with the Sight would not, through it, take place ; and, 
 if it were a quality, the motion called ' gliding forth' 
 would be unaccountable ; [for a quality cannot move by 
 itself]. Such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. But, if, thus, the * modifications ' are substances, how 
 is [the term] ' modification ' applied to the qualities of 
 intellect, in the shape of Desire, &c. ? To this he re- 
 plies : 2 
 
 8 
 
 flf?T 
 
 t II 
 
 J I cRT II 
 
 * Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva have the reading <J ot|, 
 Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 109. 399 
 
 ' may . 4^108. It [the term < modifica- 
 be qualities, as well as tion, J is not confined to substances ; 
 
 because it is etymological, [not techni- 
 cal, and applies, etymologically, to a quality, as well]. 
 
 a. Since it is also stated, in Scripture, that the sense- 
 organs are formed of the Elements, the doubt may occur, 
 whether the Scriptural texts are, perhaps, to be applied 
 distributively, according to the difference of particular 
 worlds. In regard to this, he says :* 
 
 The materials of the A P L 109 ' Not th U g h there be * 
 
 organs everywhere the difference of locality, is there a dif- 
 ference in the material [of which 
 the organs are formed] : the rule is as with the like 
 of us. 
 
 a. Not through ' difference of locality/ as the world of 
 Brahma, and the like, is it, again, the fact, that the organs 
 have any other material than self-consciousness; but the rule 
 is, that those of all alike are formed of self-consciousness ; as 
 is the case, e. g., with us who live in this terrestrial world. 
 For we hear, in Scripture, of only one Subtile Body 
 
 ff- 
 
 a Some MSS. of Vijnana 
 the lection of Nagesa. Ed.
 
 400 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 [made up of the organs], transmigrating generally 
 through the different localities. Such is the meaning. 1 
 
 6. But then, in that case, how is the Scripture relating 
 to the materiality [of the organs] to be accounted for ? 
 To this he replies : 2 
 
 II 
 
 ApJi. 110. The mention thereof [viz., 
 
 A non-literal text ac- ... . - . , , , , 
 
 counted for. of materiality, as if it belonged to the 
 
 organs,] is because there is [intended 
 to be made, thereby, a more emphatic] mention of the 
 concomitant cause. 4 
 
 a. There is designation as the material cause, in the 
 case even where the cause is [but] concomitant, with a 
 
 II 
 
 3 Probably from mere oversight, my MS. of Vedanti Maliadeva's 
 
 work omits t^ Ed. 
 
 4 Nimitta, 'instrumental cause.' Nimitta-lcdrana is rendered 
 'occasional cause' at p. 194, supra. Colebrooke's representatives art 
 ' chief or especial cause ' and ' efficient cause.' Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 111. 401 
 
 view to indicating its importance ; just as fire is [spoken 
 of as arising] from fuel, [which fuel is a necessary con- 
 comitant of, though not really the substance of, the fire]. 
 Hence are they [the organs,] spoken of as being formed of 
 the Elements. Such is the meaning. For, only in reliance 
 on the support of Light, or other Element, do the Organs, 
 viz., the Sight, &c., [formed] from the accompanying Self- 
 consciousness, come to exist ; as fire, in reliance on the 
 support of earthly fuel, results from the attendant Light, 1 
 [or Heat, which cannot manifest itself alone]. 
 
 b. As the subject presents itself, he determines the variety 
 that belongs to Gross Body : a 
 
 Aph. 111. The heat-born, egg-born, 
 r "" womb-born, vegetable, thought-born, 
 and spell-born ; such is not an exhaus- 
 tive division [of Gross Body, though a rough and customary 
 one]. 
 
 wrfir 
 
 ff 
 
 2 D
 
 402 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. It was stated, before, that Body has only one Element 
 as its material. In this same connexion, he observes dis- 
 criminatively, as follows : l 
 
 h^tj M | <n^rTTOTV7T<lH I tl SI H <TST J 
 
 n w n 
 
 c\ \ 
 
 ' 112 ' ^ ftl1 [ B .*<l. Earth is 
 
 the material : in consideration [how- 
 ever,] of some speciality, there is designation as this [or 
 that other element than earth, as entering into the consti- 
 tution of some given body], as in the preceding case 
 [treated under 110]. 
 
 a. In all Bodies the material is Earth only. ( In conside- 
 ration of some speciality ; ' i.e., in consequence of intensity 
 through excess, &c., in the case of Body, as before [in the 
 case of the Organs], there is, however, designation as con- 
 sisting of Elements, five, or four, &c., on the ground only 
 of there being a support, as in the case of the materiality 
 of the Organs. Such is the meaning. 2 
 
 b. But then, since the vital air is the principal thing in 
 
 X 
 I ^TT'
 
 BOOK V., APH. 113. 403 
 
 the Body, let the vital air itself be the originant of the 
 Body. To this he replies r 1 
 
 4 - 2 II ^ II 
 
 Aph, 113. The vital air is not [on 
 the allegation that it is the principal 
 thing in the Body, to be considered] 
 the originant of the Body ; because it [the vital air, or 
 spirit,] subsists through the power of the organs. 
 
 a. The vital air, consisting in the function of the organs, 
 does not subsist in the absence of the organs. Therefore, 
 since, in a dead Body, in consequence of the absence of the 
 organs, there is the absence of the vital air, the vital air is 
 not the originant of the Body. 3 
 
 b. But then, in that case, since the vital air is not the 
 cause of the Body, the Body might come into existence 
 even without the vital air. To this he replies : * 
 
 I rf^Tf II 
 
 2 Instead of f^ffR^, Vedanti Mahadeva has 
 Ed. 
 
 3
 
 404 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 114. The site of experience 
 l t0 ' [viz, the Body,] is constructed [only] 
 through the superintendence of the 
 experiencer [Soul] : otherwise, we should iind putrefaction. 
 
 a. ' Through the superintendence/ i. e., only through 
 the operation, ' of the experiencer/ i. e., Soul [literally, 
 that which has the vital airs], is ' the construction of the 
 site of experience/ i. e., the Body ; because, ' otherwise/ 
 i. e., if the operation of the vital airs were absent, we 
 should find putrefaction in the semen and blood, just as in 
 a dead body. Such is the meaning. And thus, by the 
 several operations of circulating the juices, &c., the vital 
 air is a concomitant cause 2 of the Body, through the sus- 
 taining of it : such is the import. 3 
 
 6. But then [it may be said], it is only the vital air, itself, 
 that can be the superin tender ; because it is this which 
 
 1 Aniruddha reads -Tf^^J ; Vedanti Mahadeva, " 
 
 m. 
 
 2 Nimitta-Jcdrana. Vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed. 
 
 3 
 
 H"5rf?T I ^RJ*TT UT- 
 
 UTWt 
 
 ii
 
 BOOK V., APH. 115. 405 
 
 operates, not the Soul, since it is motionless, and since there 
 is no use in the superintendence of what does not operate. 
 To this he replies : l 
 
 Aph. 115. Through a servant, not 
 
 The Soul ' acting by j- ,1 -, r n 
 
 another's actions.' directly, is superintendence [exercised] 
 
 by the master. 
 
 a. In the construction of the Body, ' superintendence,' 
 in the shape of energizing, is not 'directly,' i. e., imme- 
 diately, [exercised] ' by the master/ i. e., by Soul, but 
 ' through its servant,' in the shape of the vital airs ; as 
 in the case of a king's building a city: such is the 
 meaning. 3 
 
 6. It was stated before [Book II, 1,] that Nature's 
 [agency] is ' for the emancipation of what is [really, though 
 not apparently,] emancipated.' In reference to the objec- 
 tion of opponents in regard to this, viz., ' How can the 
 
 i 
 
 2 According to one of my MSS., the lection of Aniruddha is
 
 406 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 soul be eternally free, when we see it bound ? ' with a view 
 to demonstrating its eternal freedom, he says : l 
 
 Aph. 116. In Concentration, pro- 
 Soul ever free. found sleep, and emancipation, it [Soul,] 
 
 consists of Brahma. 3 
 
 a. Then what is the difference of emancipation from 
 profound sleep and concentration ? To this he replies : 3 
 
 II 
 
 Aph. 117. In the case of the two, it 
 with a seed ; in the case of the other, 
 this is wanting. 
 
 a. ' In the case of the two/ viz., concentration and pro- 
 found sleep, the identity with Brahma 5 is ' with a seed,' 
 i. e., associated with some cause of Bondage, [or reappear- 
 ance in the mundane state] ; 'in the case of the other/ i. e., 
 
 ? II 
 
 a See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 33. Ed. 
 
 3 erf? ^ J 
 
 * Aniruddha has ^Qf^l^^^^ '> an ^ so has Vedanti 
 Mahadeva, according to some copies. Ed. 
 
 6 Brahmatwa, the abstract of Brahma. Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 118. 407 
 
 in emancipation, this cause is absent : this is the distinc- 
 tion. Such is the meaning. 1 
 
 6. But then, Concentration and profound sleep are 
 evident; but what evidence is there of Emancipation ? This 
 objection of the atheist he repels : 2 
 
 i n 
 
 Aph. 118. But there are not the two 
 The reality ofEman- [only] ; because the triad, also [Eman- 
 a * ** cipation inclusive], is evident; as are 
 
 the two. 
 
 a. The meaning is, that, since Emancipation, also, is 
 ' evident/ i. e., is inferrible, through the example of Con- 
 centration and profound sleep, there are not the two, viz., 
 profound sleep and Concentration, only ; but Emancipation, 
 also, really is. And the argument is thus. The quitting 
 of that identity with Brahma 4 which [identity] exists 
 during profound sleep, &c., takes place only through a 
 fault, viz., Desire, or the like, lodged in the mind ; and, if 
 this fault be annihilated by knowledge, then there results 
 
 <jt ^t 
 
 i <c TK^<Trf II 
 
 3 Vedanti Mahadeva omits ^flf . Ed. 
 
 4 Brahma-bhdva, the same as brahmatwa. Ed.
 
 408 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a permanent condition, quite similar to profound sleep, &c. ; 
 and it is precisely this that is Emancipation. 1 2 
 
 b. But then [suggests some one, with reference to 117], 
 granting, that, even notwithstanding the existence of the 
 ' seed ' [or source of return to the mundane state,] called 
 Memory, 8 a mental modification after the form of any 
 object does not arise during concentration, inasmuch as 
 Memory is [then] dulled [or deadened] by apathy, &c., yet, 
 in the case of a person in profound sleep, since Memory 
 prevails, there will really be cognition of objects ; 
 consequently, it is not proper to say that there is 
 identity with Brahma during profound sleep. To this he 
 replies : 4 
 
 a 
 
 2 See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 33. Ed. 
 
 8 Here and below, this renders vdsand, on which vide supra, 
 p. 29, note 2. Ed. 
 
 4 T 
 
 cT 
 
 I cRT? II
 
 BOOK V., APH. 119. 409 
 
 II 
 
 Aph. 119. There is not the revelation, 
 dur ' by memory, of an object likewise during 
 the conjunction of a [more potent] fault 
 [such as sleep] : the secondary cause does not debar the 
 principal. 2 
 
 a. As in the case of apathy, so, also when there is the 
 conjunction of the fault of sleep, Memory does not reveal 
 its own objects, does not remind us of its objects ; for the 
 ' secondary,' the subordinate, Memory, 3 cannot defeat the 
 
 1 This I find nowhere ; and I believe it to be without warrant. 
 I have printed, agreeably to the reading of Aniruddha, Vedanti Maha- 
 
 deva, and the best MSS. of Vijnana, 
 
 and have noticed, in some copies of the last-named commentator, the 
 variant o|f^rj*(| ^ ^T^^IT' C ?^' Nagesa has the latter 
 reading, followed by <^|E| if | Jff f[ } with omission of ^ffTf . 
 The Serampore edition of the Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhdshya has 
 
 cfP^TTTZn *T ^Tr^n^TCr^, for whicla X find no authority. 
 Ed. 
 
 2 The rendering given above is susceptible of improvement ; and 
 so, very probably, is that which follows : 'Where, moreover, there is 
 influence from an obstruction [like that offered by sleep], mental 
 impression does not inform one of objects [and, hence, one is then 
 exempt from desires, &c., and in a state identical with that of emanci- 
 pation]: a cause [of desires, &c.; and such is mental impression,] 
 does not countervail what is predominant, [e.g., sleep, which is, as it 
 were, temporary Brahmahood or emancipation].' 
 
 Aniruddha's interpretation of this obscure aphorism, possibly by 
 reason of his elliptical mode of expression, is far from clear. His view 
 of its sense is, certainly, peculiar. J?d. 
 
 3 Sanskdra, here used as synonymous with vdsand , Ed.
 
 410 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 more potent fault of Sleep : such is the meaning. For 
 the really more potent fault makes the memory powerless, 
 incompetent to produce its effects ; [and so there is nothing, 
 in this, to prevent identification of Soul with Brahma, 
 during profound sleep, any more than during apathetic 
 Concentration] : such is the import. 1 
 
 b. It was stated, in the Third Book [ 83], that the re- 
 tention of a Body by him who is emancipated while still 
 living, is ' in consequence of a mere vestige of impres- 
 sion.' 2 To this it is objected as follows. Experience 
 is observed, in the case of the [alleged person] emancipated 
 during life, just as in the case of the like of us, [and this 
 experience continuous,] even though it may be constantly 
 in respect of a single object : now, this is unaccountable 
 [on the hypothesis of his really being emancipated] ; be- 
 cause the antecedent impression is annihilated, exactly on 
 its having produced the first [instant of] experience, and 
 because no subsequent impression arises, inasmuch as know- 
 ledge debars it ; just as is the case with Merit. To this he 
 replies : 3 
 
 fcf 
 
 2 Here, and often below, ' impression ' is to render sanskdra. Ed. 
 
 3
 
 BOOK V., APH. 120. 411 
 
 H 
 
 An objection met to A P h ' 120 ' A sin g le impression [ 8 uf- 
 
 the possibility of 'emanci- fices to generate, and] lasts out 2 the 
 
 potion in one stilt living. , . J . 
 
 experience : but there are not different 
 impressions, one to each [instant of] experience ; else, we 
 should have a postulation of many, [where a single one may 
 suffice]. 
 
 a. In like manner, in the case of the whirling of the 
 potter's wheel, the self-continuant principle, 8 called motal 
 inertia, is to be regarded as only one, continuing till the 
 completion of the whirling. 1 
 
 b. It has been stated [ 111,] that there are vegetable 
 Bodies. He repels the objection of the atheist, that, in 
 the case in question, there is not a Body, inasmuch as there 
 is no knowledge of the external : 5 
 
 I cRTf II 
 
 1 The reading -*Tfcr O , f un( i i Q several MSS., is a gross 
 error. Ed. 
 
 2 Read, instead of ' lasts out,' ' brings about.' Ed. 
 8 This phrase is meant to translate sanskdra. Ed. 
 
 " N "^ "
 
 412 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 II 
 
 Aph. 121. Knowledge of the external 
 is not indispensable [to constitute a 
 Body] : trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, 
 trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, &c., [which 
 have internal consciousness], are, also, sites of experiencer 
 and experience ; as in the former case. 
 
 a. There is no necessity that that only should be a Body, 
 in which there is knowledge of the external ; but it is to 
 be held that the being a Body, in the form of being the 
 site of experiencer and experience, belongs also to trees, 
 &c., which have internal consciousness ; because, ' as 
 in the former case/ meaning the putrescence already 
 mentioned [see 114], of the Bodies of men, &c., [which 
 takes place] in the absence of the superintendence of an 
 experiencer [the living soul], even in the same way do 
 withering, &c., take place in the Bodies of trees, &c., also : 
 such is the meaning. And to this effect there is Scripture. 2 
 
 1 Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva here end one aphorism, and 
 treat what follows as a second. Vijnana formally defends the reading 
 to which he gives the preference. Ed. 
 
 8
 
 BOOK V., APH. 123. 413 
 
 II 
 
 Aph. 122. And from the Legal In- 
 
 teiV TJii*ritf r /o'r 8titutes [ the sam e fact may be inferred, 
 <* viz., that vegetables have bodies and 
 
 are conscious]. 
 
 a. But then, from the fact that trees, &c., also, are thus 
 conscious, we should find merit and demerit accruing to 
 them. To this he replies : 2 
 
 Vegetables not moral <Aph 123. Not merely through a 
 <v ents - Body is there susceptibility of Merit 
 
 and Demerit ; for Scripture tells us the distinction. 
 
 a. The vital spirit is not liable to the production of 
 Merit and Demerit through a Body merely. Why ? ' For 
 Scripture tells us the distinction :' because we are told, in 
 Scripture, that the liability results just from the being 
 
 c\ 
 
 : i T^r ^ ?r: n 
 
 1 NageSa pretty evidently does not regard these words as an 
 aphorism. Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 : I cT^Tf II
 
 414 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 distinguished by a Brahmanical Body, or the like [animal 
 body, not vegetable]. Such is the meaning. 1 
 
 6. Showing that the liability to Merit and Demerit is 
 solely through the kind of Body, he mentions how Body 
 is of three kinds : 2 
 
 u 
 
 Aph. 124. Among the three there is 
 a threefold distribution; the Body 
 of merit, the Body of experience, 
 and the Body of both. 
 
 a. There is a threefold distribution of Body ' among the 
 three,' i. e., among those highest, lowest, and interme- 
 diate, all living beings, viz., the Body of merit, the 
 Body of experience, and the Body of both : such is the 
 meaning. Of these, a Body of merit belongs to the pre- 
 eminent sages; a Body of experience, to Indra and others, 
 and to things immovable, &c. ; and a Body of both, to 
 the royal sages. Here the division is [not exhaustive, 
 but] into three, because of the preeminence [of these] ; for, 
 
 3 Vedanti Mahadeva, if my single copy of his work may be relied 
 on, omits this word. Ed.
 
 BOOK V., APH. 125. 415 
 
 otherwise, we should have all alike possessed of a Body of 
 experience, 1 [like Indra]. 
 
 b. He mentions also a fourth Body : 2 
 
 pr: n 
 
 A fourth kind of Aph. 125. Not any one [of these], 
 
 Body ' moreover, is that of the apathetic. 
 
 a. That is to say : the Body which belongs to the 
 ascetics is different from all these three ; such as was that 
 of Dattatreya, Jadabharata, and others ; for they possessed 
 bodies consisting of mere knowledge. 3 
 
 b. In order to establish the non-existence of a Lord, 
 which was stated before, he disproves the eternity of 
 
 : I THC
 
 416 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 knowledge, desire, action, &c., which is accepted by others 1 
 [as existing in the case of the Lord] : 
 
 Aph. 126. Eternity does not [as is 
 alle g ed by tiiose who wish to esta- 
 blish the existence of a Lord,] belong 
 to knowledge, 2 &c., even in the case of the particular 
 site, [viz., that of the supposed Lord] ; as is the case 
 with fire. 
 
 a. That is to say : just as we infer, from the example of 
 ordinary fire, that the empyrean fire, 3 also, is not eternal.* 
 
 ii w ii 
 
 uf?Rl|fcT II 
 
 SuddJii, rendered ' intellect ' at pp. 196, &c., supra. Much as 
 
 at p. 209, supra, Vijnana hereupon remarks 
 
 3 The world, viewed as Brahma's egg, is fabled to be surrounded 
 by seven envelopes. One of these is the dvaraya-tejas, Dr. Ballan- 
 tyne's 'empyrean fire.' See Professor Wilson's translation of the 
 Vishnu-purdna (ed. 1864, &c.), vol. i., p. 40. I have to thank Prof. 
 Covvell for this reference. Ed. 
 
 II
 
 BOOK V., APH. 128. 417 
 
 Aph. 127. And, because the site 
 re<dly [, ^e supposed Lord,] is unreal, 
 [it matters not, in the present instance, 
 whether knowledge, &c., may be eternal, or not]. 
 
 a. But then, in that case, how can it, indeed, be possible 
 that there should arise Omniscience, &c., adequate to the 
 creation of the universe ; since we do not behold, in mun- 
 dane life, such superhuman powers [though we do see 
 some,] arising from penance and the rest [of the alleged 
 means of acquiring superhuman powers]? To this he 
 replies : l 
 
 II 
 
 Aph. 128. The superhuman powers 2 
 of concentration, just like the effects 
 of drugs, &c., are not to be gainsaid. 
 
 a. That is to say : by the example of the effects of 
 drugs, &c., even the superhuman powers of assuming 
 atomic magnitude, &c., which result from concentration, 
 and are adapted to the work of creation, &c., are esta- 
 blished. 3 
 
 I cRTf II 
 
 2 Vide supra, p. 310, note 4. Ed. 
 
 3
 
 418 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 6. He refutes him who asserts that Thought belongs to 
 the Elements ; since this is hostile to the establishment 
 [of the existence] of Soul : l 
 
 sfa ^ H 
 
 Aph. 129. Thought does not belong 
 . to the Elements ; for it is not found 
 
 in them separately, or, moreover, in 
 the state of combination, or, moreover, in the state of 
 combination. 
 
 a. That is to say : Thought does not exist in the five' 
 Elements, even when in the state of combination; because 
 we do not find Thought in them, severally, at the time of 
 disjunction ; 4 [and there can be nothing in the product 
 which does not preexist in the cause] . 
 
 < c 
 
 u 
 
 2 Aniruddhahas ^^4^1^^^^: ; NageSa, 
 Ed. 
 
 3 Both here and just before, Nagesa reads ^c|^J o as does 
 Vijnana, also, according to some MSS. Ed. 
 
 4 ft 
 
 END OF BOOK V.
 
 BOOK VI., APH. I. 419 
 
 BOOK VI. 
 
 HAVING explained, in four Books, all the matter of the 
 Institute, and having, in the Fifth Book, thoroughly 
 established it, by refuting the opinions of opponents, now, 
 in a Sixth Book, he recapitulates the same matter, which 
 is the essence of the Institute, while condensing it. For, 
 in addition [to what has preceded], an enumeration of the 
 matters before mentioned, namely, a summary, having 
 been composed, learners acquire an undoubting, accurate, 
 and more solid knowledge ; so that, therefore, reiteration 
 is not here to be imputed as a fault ; because the method 
 is that of fixing a stake, [viz., by repeated blows], and 
 because arguments, &c., not previously stated, are adduced. 1 
 
 rrttd r^ iVtTRT^TcT II ^ II 
 
 2 Vedanti Mahadeva, in my single accessible MS., read* 
 
 . Ed.
 
 420 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Aph. 1. Soul is ; for there is no 
 
 The existence of Soul. ^ ^ ^ . g ^ 
 
 a. Soul really is existent, generically; since we are 
 aware of this, that ' I think ;' because there is no evidence 
 to defeat this. Therefore, all that is to be done is to 
 discriminate it [from things in general]. Such is the 
 
 b. The discrimination of it he establishes by means of 
 two proofs : 2 
 
 Aph. 2. This [Soul,] is different from 
 
 oul is not Body, &c. ^ 3^ &Q . becauge of heteroge . 
 
 , [or complete difference between the two]. 
 
 n 11 
 
 Aph. 3. Also because it [Soul,] is 
 expressed by means of the sixth [or 
 ,] case. 
 
 a. That is to say : Soul is different from Body, &c., also 
 because the learned express it by the possessive case, in 
 
 ITcffaWRrRT 
 
 : it 
 
 fc 
 
 Some copies of Vedanti Mabadeva's work omit ^T^fJ. Ed.
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 4. 421 
 
 such examples as, 'This [is] my body/ 'This [is] my 
 understanding;' for the possessive case would be unac- 
 countable, if there were absolute non-difference 1 [between 
 the Body, or the like, and the Soul, to which it is thus 
 attributed as a possession]. 
 
 b. But then, suppose that this, also, is like the expres- 
 sions, 'The Soul's Thought' [Soul and Thought being 
 identical], 'Rahu's head' [the trunkless Rahu being all 
 head] , ' The statue's body/ &c. To this he replies : 2 
 
 II 8 II 
 
 Aph. 4. It is not as in the case of 
 An objection disposed of. the gtatue . 4 because there is [there] a 
 
 contradiction to the evidence which acquaints us with 
 the thing. 
 
 a. This expression by means of the possessive case, 
 
 v\ * II 
 
 3 Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva have TlCMI M^cfi . 
 
 Sildputra is ' grindstone,' according to the dictionaries ; sildpu- 
 traka, in the few places where I have seen it, may well signify 
 ' torso.' Ed. 
 
 4 With reference to the word thus rendered, see the preceding 
 note. Ed.
 
 422 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 [viz., ' My body' ( 3)] is not like < The statue's body/ &c. 
 In such a case as ' The statue's body,' there is a mere fic- 
 tion ; 'for it is contradicted by the evidence which acquaints 
 us with the thing ;' [sense being the evidence that there 
 is here no body other than the statue]. But, in such an 
 expression as 'My body,' there is no contradiction by 
 evidence ; for the contradiction, by Scripture and other 
 evidences, is only in supposing the Body to be the Soul. 
 Such is the meaning. 1 
 
 &. Having settled that Soul is different from Body, &c., 
 he settles its emancipation : 2 
 
 II M II 
 
 Aph. 5. Through the entire cessa- 
 
 tion of P ain > there is done what was 
 to be done. 
 
 a. But then, since there is an equality of gain and loss, 
 inasmuch as, through the cessation of Pain there is the 
 
 8
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 6. 423 
 
 ceasing of Pleasure, also, that cannot be Soul's aim. To 
 this he replies : l 
 
 H n 
 
 Aph. 6. Not such desire for pleasure 
 
 Pleasure no compen- ,1 01 xi_ 
 
 tationfor Pain. ls there to ISoul, as there is annoyance 
 
 from Pain. 
 
 a. And so the aversion to Pain, having excluded also 
 the desire for Pleasure, gives rise to a wish for the cessa- 
 tion of Pain simply ; so that there is not an equality of 
 gain and loss, 3 [but a clear gain, in the desired release]. 
 
 b. He declares that Soul's aim is simply the cessation 
 of Pain ; because Pain is, indeed, abundant, in comparison 
 of Pleasure :* 
 
 ^TT Mm*} lf?T I 
 
 2 Instead of f(l3?, some MSS. of Vijnana's commentary, as 
 
 also Nagesa and Vedanti Mahadeva, have ^EfJ > } and a marginal 
 note in one of my copies of Aniruddha states this to be the true 
 reading. Ed. 
 
 3 
 
 Srq( H
 
 424 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 II 3 II 
 
 Pleasure sparingly Aph. 7. For [only] some one, some- 
 
 dispensed. where, is happy. 
 
 a. Among innumerable grasses, trees, brutes, birds, 
 men, &c., very few, a man, a god, or the like, are 
 happy : such is the meaning. 2 
 
 : H b II 
 
 Aph. 8. It [Pleasure,] is also mixed 
 Pleasure undeserving with Pain ; therefore the discrimina- 
 
 ofthe name. 
 
 ting throw it to the side of [and reckon 
 it as so much,] Pain. 
 
 a. He rejects the opinion that Soul's aim is not the 
 simple cessation of Pain, but this [cessation] tinctured 
 with Pleasure : 8 
 
 Wist i HTHT ^ I <M ^M I ^q^ 
 
 Vedanti Mahadeva prefixes 7J . Ed. 
 
 <j 
 
 * Aniruddha has "^f^ of . Ed. 
 
 ^^ 
 5 One of my MSS. of Aniruddha has GjIxCam^ . Ed.
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 10. 425 
 
 Aph. 9. If you say that this [( 
 
 ,-.S?* 0n0/S "^ er% tion of Pain ] is not Sou1 ' 8 aim > 
 
 much as there is no acquisition of 
 Pleasure, then it is not as you say ; for there are two kinds 
 [of things desired]. 
 
 a. For we see, amongst men, quite a distinct aspiration : 
 [the first,] ' May I be happy ;' [the second,] ' May I not 
 be miserable ;' [and the latter is our conception of beati- 
 tude]. 1 
 
 b. He ponders a doubt : 2 
 
 ii ^ ii 
 
 Aph. 10. The Soul [some one may 
 
 Adovbt. -11 T L xi 
 
 suggest,] has no quality ; for there is 
 Scripture for its being unaccompanied, &c. 
 
 <z. Therefore the cessation of Pain, indeed, [a property 
 which does not belong to it,] cannot be Soul's aim : such 
 is the meaning. 4 
 
 b. He clears up this 5 [doubt] : 
 
 H 
 
 3 Aniruddha has ^N^lf^^ ; Nage'sa, 
 Ed. 
 
 4
 
 426 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 II 
 
 \ 
 
 the property of something else, yet it 
 exists in it [the Soul,] through non-discrimination. 
 
 a. Though qualities, viz., pleasure, pain, &c., belong 
 [only] to the Mind, they exist, i.e., they abide, in the 
 shape of a reflexion, in it, viz., in Soul, 'through non- 
 discrimination/ as the cause, owing to the conjunction of 
 Nature with Soul : such is the meaning. And this has 
 been set forth in the First Book. 1 
 
 b. The binding of Soul by the qualities [or fetters,] 
 arises from non- discrimination : but from what does non- 
 discrimination arise ? With reference to this, he says : 2 
 
 H ^ ll 
 
 12 Non -discrimination [of 
 discrimination musthuve Soul from Nature] is beginningless ; 
 
 been from eternity. , if _ . J 5 . . 6 . 
 
 because, otherwise, two objections 
 would present themselves. 
 
 a. For, had it a beginning, then, if [first,] it arose quite 
 spontaneously, bondage might befall even the liberated ; 
 
 ^T Ul 
 
 x 
 
 J I *U I 
 
 : I
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 13. 427 
 
 and, if [secondly,] it were produced by Desert, &c., there 
 would be a regressus in infinitum, inasmuch as we should 
 have to search for another [previous instance of] non- 
 discrimination, to stand as the cause of [that] Desert, 
 &c., also : such is the meaning. 1 
 
 b. And then, if it be without beginning, it must be 
 everlasting. To this he replies : 2 
 
 r: 3 II i? II 
 
 Non-ditcrimination, ' [non-discrimination,] 
 
 though from eternity, cannot be everlasting [in the same 
 manner] as the soul is ; else, it could 
 not be cut short, [as we affirm that it can be]. 
 
 a. It is not everlasting, indivisible, and beginningless, 
 in the same way as the soul is ; but it is beginningless, in 
 the shape of an on-flow [which may be stopped]. For, 
 otherwise, the cutting short of a beginningless entity 
 would, as is established by Scripture, be unfeasible, 
 [though the beginniugless antecedent non-entity of a given 
 jar may be readily understood to terminate, on the pro- 
 duction of the jar]. Such is the meaning. 4 
 
 fl? 
 
 irerfa 
 
 i ?r- 
 
 3 Mgesa has 
 
 4
 
 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. Having stated the cause of [Soul's] Bondage, he 
 states the cause of Liberation : l 
 
 H ^8 II 
 
 Aph. 14. It [Bondage,! is annihi- 
 
 Bondagehowdestruc- , ,, , ,, .>. , r . ,. 
 
 fi&k. lable by the allotted cause, [viz., dis- 
 
 crimination of Soul from Nature] ; 
 as darkness is [annihilable by the allotted cause, viz., 
 Light]. 
 
 This enforced. A P h 15 ' Her6 > also, [viz., in the 
 
 case of Bondage and Discrimination, 
 as in the case of Darkness and Light,] there is allotment, 
 [as is proved] both by positive and negative conso- 
 ciation ; 2 [Liberation taking place where Discrimination 
 is, and not where it is not]. 
 
 a. He reminds [us] of what was mentioned in the first 
 Book, 3 viz., that Bondage cannot be innate, &c : 4 
 
 H M ri K 
 
 II 
 
 2 Vide supra, p. 43, note 2, and p. 194, note 3. Prof. Co well 
 defines anwaya-vyatirelca as ' affirmative and negative induction,' in 
 his edition of Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 315, note 3. See also 
 his translation of the Kusumdnjali, pp. 7 and 23. Ed. 
 
 3 Vide supra, p. 8. Ed.
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 17. 429 
 
 Aph. 16. Since it cannot be [ac- 
 counted for] in any other way, it is 
 non-discrimination alone that is [the cause of] Bondage, 
 [which cannot be innate]. 
 
 a. ' Bondage ' here means the cause of Bondage, named 
 the conjunction of pain. The rest is plain. 2 
 
 6. But then, since liberation, also, from its being a pro- 
 duct, is liable to destruction, Bondage should take place 
 over again. To this he replies : 3 
 
 Apli. 17. Further, Bondage does not 
 
 Bondage does not recur. . , -i j. ,1 vv j. j i_ 
 
 again attach to the Liberated ; because 
 there is Scripture 4 for its non-recurrence. 
 
 1 Vedanti Mahadeva has 
 
 I cT^T? 
 
 4 Yijnana and Nagesa quote the text: 7f 
 Aniruddha and Vedanti Mahadeva cite the longer passage 
 
 See note 4, at p. 182, supra. Since that note was written, I have 
 observed the words ^T|^|| ofT
 
 430 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 Avh. 18. Else, it [liberation.] would 
 
 Evidence of this. ?Y _ ,, . r , . , .^ . , J 
 
 not be Souls aim, [which it is] . 
 a. He states the reason why this is not Soul's aim : 2 
 
 . 19. What happened to both 
 Force of the evidence. WO uld be alike, [if liberation were 
 perishable]. 
 
 a. That is to say : there would be no difference between 
 the two, the liberated and the bound ; because of their 
 being alike liable to future bondage ; and, therefore, such 
 [perishable emancipation] is not Soul's aim, 3 [but emanci- 
 pation final and complete]. 
 
 b. But then, in that case, if you acknowledge that there 
 is a distinction between the bond and the free, how is it 
 
 ranyaka Upanishad, ii., 4, 5, and Satapatha-brdhmana, xiv., 5, 4, 5. 
 Aniruddha, in his comment on an Aphorism which soon follows, the 
 twenty -third, quotes them correctly, with their ensuing context; a 
 fact which suggests that my criticism on Yachaspati Misra's quotation, 
 ventured in the note above referred to, may he hasty. Ed. 
 
 i Aniruddha, in one of my MSS., and Yedanti Mahadeva have
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 21. 431 
 
 that you have asserted [Book I., 19,] the eternal freedom 
 [of all souls alike] ? To this he replies :* 
 
 The nature of liberation. A P h - 20 - Liberation is nothing other 
 than the removal 3 of the obstacle [to 
 the Soul's recognition of itself as free]. 
 
 a. But then, in that case, since Bondage and Liberation 
 are unreal, Liberation must be contradictory to the texts, 
 &c., which set forth what is Soul's aim, [as some positive 
 and real acquisition, not merely the removal of a screen] ; 
 to which he replies :* 
 
 II ^ n 
 
 An Ejection repelled. A P h ' 21 Even in tha * **> there 18 
 
 no contradiction. 
 
 a. That is to say : ' even in that case/ i.e., even if 
 Liberation consists [only] in the removal of an obstacle, 
 there is no contradiction in its being Soul's aim. 5 
 
 I cT^T II 
 
 Nagesa reads Ip^f . Ed. 
 
 3 The rare word dhwasti, thus rendered, Vijnana and Vedanti 
 Mahadeva explain by dhwansa. Ed.
 
 432 THE 6ANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. But then, if Liberation be merely the removal of an 
 obstacle, then it should be accomplished through mere 
 hearing [of the error which stands in the way]; just as a 
 piece of gold on one's neck, [which one has sought for in 
 vain, while it was] withheld from one by ignorance [of the 
 fact that it has been tied round one's neck with a string], 
 is attained, [on one's hearing where it is]. To this he 
 replies : l 
 
 11 
 
 Aph. 22. This [attainment of Libera- 
 "* n ' tion, on the mere hearing of the truth,] 
 is no necessity ; for there are three sorts 
 of those competent [to apprehend the truth ; but not all 
 are qualified to appropriate it, on merely hearing it]. 
 
 a. He mentions that not mere hearing alone is seen to be 
 the cause of knowledge, but that there are others, also :* 
 
 2 Nagtsa, in some copies, and, according to some copies, Vijnana 
 read 
 
 3 This Aphorism, as given, is a literal repetition of Book I., 70, 
 at p. 87, supra. Ed. 
 
 4 
 
 u
 
 BOOK vi., APH. 25. 433 
 
 Utility of otter means , ^ f * Of others [viz., other means 
 tides hearing. besides hearing], for the sake of con- 
 
 firmation, [there is need]. 
 
 a. He speaks of these same other means :* 
 
 n ^# it 
 
 A *\ 2 i . T1 ; ere . is no 
 
 u* imperative. necessity that what is steady and pro- 
 
 moting ease should be a [particular] 
 posture, [such as any of those referred to in Book III., 
 34]. 
 
 a. That is to say : there is no necessity that a ' posture ' 
 should be the ' lotus-posture/ or the like ; because what- 
 ever is steady and promotes ease is a [suitable] ' posture/ 2 
 
 b. He states the principal means 3 [of Concentration] : 
 
 The efficient mean* of Aph.^t. Mind without an object 
 
 Concentration. ^ Meditation. 
 
 a. That is to say : what Internal Organ is void of any 
 modification, that is ' Meditation,' i. e., Concentration, in 
 the shape of exclusion of the modifications of Intellect : 
 by reason of the identity [here,] of effect and cause, the 
 word ' cause ' is employed for ' effect/ For it will be 
 
 * ii 
 
 2F
 
 434 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 declared how Meditation effects this 1 [exclusion of the 
 modifications of Intellect]. 
 
 b. But then, since Soul is alike, whether there be Con- 
 centration or Non-concentration, what have we to do with 
 Concentration? Having pondered this doubt, he clears 
 it up : 2 
 
 II i H 
 
 Aph. 26. If you say that even both 
 ways there is no difference, it is not so : 
 there is a difference, through the exclu- 
 
 sion [in the one case,] of the tinge [of reflected pain which 
 
 exists in the other case]. 
 
 a. But how can there exist a tinge in that which is 
 unassociated [with anything whatever, as Soul is alleged 
 to be] ? To this he replies : 3 
 
 3
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 29. 435 
 
 Soul tinged by what Aph. 27. Though it [Soul,] be un- 
 does not belong to it. associated, still there is a tingeing 
 [reflexionally,] through Non-discrimination. 
 
 a. That is to say : though there is not a real tinge in 
 that which is unassociated [with tincture, or anything else], 
 still there is, as it were, a tinge ; hence the tinge is treated 
 as simply a reflexion, by those who discriminate the tinge 1 
 [from the Soul, which it delusively seems to belong to]. 
 
 b. He explains this same : 2 
 
 ' fa 
 II *t II 
 
 Aph. 28. As is the case with the 
 pruam Hibiscus and the crystal [Book I., 
 19, e.], there is not a tinge, but a 
 fancy [that there is such]. 
 
 a. He states the means of excluding the aforesaid tinge : s 
 
 II *Q II 
 
 Aph. 29. It [viz., the aforesaid tinge,] 
 
 How to be got rid of . * L . V J 
 
 is debarred by Meditation, .Restraint, 
 Practice, Apathy, &c. 
 
 : n 
 2 
 
 3
 
 436 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 a. He shows the means settled by the ancient teachers, 
 in regard to the exclusion through Meditation, &c., 
 lodged in the Mind, of the tingeing of Soul .- 1 
 
 Aph. 30. It is by the exclusion of 
 dissolution 2 and distraction, say the 
 teachers. 
 
 a. That is to say : through the removal, by means of 
 Meditation, &c., of the Mind's condition of [being dissolved 
 in] Sleep, and condition of [waking] Certainty, &c., there 
 takes place also the exclusion of the tingeing of Soul by 
 the condition ; because, on the exclusion of any [real] 
 object, there is the exclusion also of its reflexion : so say 
 the ancient teachers. 3 
 
 b. He states that there is no compulsion that Meditation, 
 &c., should take place in caves and such places : 4 
 
 II 
 
 M < 
 
 2 ' Inertness [of mind] ' is a better rendering of lay a. Ed. 
 
 3 
 
 nf?ff^iwrftf 
 
 6 Aniruddha has, to a very different effect, -"
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 32. 437 
 
 Aph. 31. There is no rule about 
 
 Meditation may take > >, a , n .-,,. 
 
 place anywJiere. localities ; for it is from tranquillity 
 
 of Mind. 
 
 a. That is to say : Meditation, or the like, results simply 
 ' from tranquillity of Mind.' Therefore, such a place as a 
 cave is not indispensable for it. 1 
 
 b. The discussion of Liberation is completed. Now, 
 with an eye to the unchangeableness of Soul, he handles 
 compendiously the cause of the world: 8 
 
 Aph. 32. Nature is the primal ma- 
 
 Nature the material j_ -\ t> ,-t o r i 
 
 of the world. tenal ; for there is Scripture [to the 
 
 effect] that the others are products. 
 
 a. That is to say : since we learn, from Scripture, that 
 Mind, &c., are products, Nature is established under the 
 character of the radical cause of these. 3 
 
 (5. But then, let Soul be the material. To this he replies : 4 
 
 His comment runs : 7^ nflTOT ^ *^KT fHT 
 
 I 
 
 : u 
 
 I rRT? H
 
 438 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 II ?? II 
 
 Aph. 33. Not to Soul does this [viz., 
 to be the material of the world,] be- 
 long, though it be eternal; because 
 of its want of suitableness. 
 
 a. That is to say : suitableness to act as material implies 
 the possession of qualities, and the being associable : [and,] 
 by reason of the absence of both of these, Soul, though 
 eternal, [and, therefore, no product,] cannot serve as 
 material. 1 
 
 b. But then, since, from such Scriptural texts as, ' Many 
 creatures have been produced from Soul/ 2 we may gather 
 the fact that Soul is a cause, the assertions of an illusory 
 creation, &c., ought to be accepted. Having pondered 
 this adverse suggestion, he replies : 8 
 
 H ?# 11 
 
 Aph. 34. The despicable sophist 4 does 
 n t gain [a correct apprehension of] 
 Soul ; because of the contradictoriness 
 [of his notions] to Scripture. 
 
 2 Mundaka Upanishad, ii., i., 5. Ed, 
 
 Here I have offered a substitute for ' illogical outcaste.' Ed.
 
 "BOOK vi., APH. 34. 439 
 
 a. That is to say : the various views, in regard to SouFs 
 being a cause, which are conceivable are, all, opposed to 
 Scripture ; therefore, the lowest of the bad reasoners, and 
 others, who are accepters thereof, 1 have no knowledge of 
 the nature of Soul. Hence it is to be understood that 
 those, also, [e.g., the NaiydyiJcas,] who assert that Soul 
 is the substance of the qualities Pleasure, Pain, &c., are 
 quite illogical ; these, also, have no correct knowledge of 
 Soul. And, if it be asserted that Soul is a cause [of the 
 world], just as the sky is the recipient cause of the clouds, 
 &c., [and stands, towards it, in the relation of a cause, 
 in so far as, without the room afforded by it, these could 
 not exist], then we do not object to that ; for, what we 
 deny is only that there is transformation 2 [of Soul, as 
 material, into the world, as product], 
 
 6. Since we see, that, in the case of things motionless, 
 locomotive, &c., the material cause is nothing else than 
 
 1 'Lowest .... thereof I have put instead of 'base illogical 
 holders of these.' Ed. 
 
 j H i <; i 
 
 TT- 
 
 ?RT 
 
 ii
 
 440 
 
 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 earth, &c., how can Nature be the material of all ? To this 
 he replies : l 
 
 mediate causes 
 
 H ?M 11 
 
 Aph. 35. Though but mediately [the 
 cause of products], Nature is inferred 
 [as the ultimate cause of the inter- 
 ,] ; just as are Atoms, [by the Vaiseshikas\. 
 
 Aph. 36. It [Nature,] is all-per- 
 Nature all-pervading. vading ; because [its] products are seen 
 everywhere. 
 
 a. But then, only if it be limited, can it be said that, 
 ' Wherever a product arises, there does it [Nature,] go [or 
 act] ;' [for what is unlimited, and fills all space, can find 
 no other space to move into]. To this he replies : 2 
 
 T^ H ?$ II 
 
 Aph. 37. Though motion may attach 
 to it, this does not destroy its cha- 
 racter as ultimate cause ; just as is the case with Atoms. 
 
 a. ' Motion ' means action. Though it be present, 
 this does not prevent its [Nature's,] being the radical 
 cause; just as is the case with the earthy and other
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 39. 441 
 
 Atoms, according to the opinion of the VaisesMkas : such 
 is the meaning. 1 
 
 H $t it 
 
 Nature the proper -4ph. 38. Nature is something in 
 
 rit^/t' addition to tte n o fc <> [^ne Sub- 
 Nydya list. stances of the Naiydyikas] : it is no 
 
 matter of necessity [that there should be precisely nine]. 
 
 a. And the argument, here, is the Scriptural declaration, 
 that eight [of the pretended primitive substances] are pro- 
 ducts : such is the import. 2 
 
 Aph. 39. Purity and the others are 
 * not properties of it [viz., Nature]; 
 because they are its essence. 
 
 a. That is to say : Purity and the other Qualities are 
 not properties of Nature ; because they are what constitutes 
 Nature. 3 
 
 b. He determines the motive of Nature's energizing ;
 
 442 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 since, if we held the energizing to be without a motive, 
 Emancipation would be inexplicable : l 
 
 tature's disinterested- enQy 
 
 II 80 || 
 
 Aph. 40. Nature, though it does not 
 
 gizing], creates for the sake of Soul ; 
 like a cart's carrying saffron, [for the use of its master. 
 See Book III., 58]. 
 
 a. He states the concomitant 3 cause of diversified 
 creation :* 
 
 Nature treat, every . ' 4L The diversit J f Creation 
 
 one according to his is in consequence of the diversity of 
 Desert. 
 
 II 
 
 2 Nagesa is peculiar in giving, as an Aphorism, in substitution 
 for these words, the clause from the introduction to it, printed just 
 
 above, viz., f^"G5f > &c., but ending with the nominative case 
 
 -^rfH'C|f%J . The Serampore edition of the Sdnkhya-prava* 
 chana-bhdshya has, as the Aphorism, very corruptly, in part: 
 
 I Ed. 
 
 8 Nimitta, on which vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed. 
 
 *
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 42. 443 
 
 a. But then, granting that creation is due to Nature, 
 yet whence is destruction ? For a couple of opposite results 
 cannot belong to one and the same cause. To this he 
 replies : l 
 
 * n 
 
 Aph. 42. The two results are through 
 equipoise and the reverse of equi- 
 poise. 
 
 a. Nature is the triad of Qualities, viz., Purity, &c. ; 
 and their ' reverse of equipoise' is their aggregation in 
 excess or defect ; the absence of this [reverse of equipoise] 
 is c equipoise :' 2 through these two causes two opposite 
 results, in the shape of creation and destruction, arise from 
 one and the same : such is the meaning. 3 
 
 . b. But then, since it is Nature's attribute to create, there 
 should be the mundane state, even after [the discrimina- 
 tive] knowledge, [which, it is alleged, puts an end to it]. 
 To this he replies : 4 
 
 2 Compare Book I., Aph. 61, a, at p. 71, supra. Ed. 
 
 ^ II 
 T 
 
 i
 
 444 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 x II 8? II 
 
 Aph. 43. Since [or when,] the eman- 
 ci P ated has d erstood [that he never 
 was really otherwise], Nature does not 
 create ; just as, in the world, [a minister does not toil, when 
 the king's purpose has been accomplished]. 1 
 
 a. But then, Nature does not rest from creating ; for we 
 see the mundane condition of the ignorant : and so, since 
 Nature goes on creating, to the emancipated, also, Bon- 
 dage may come again. To this he replies : 2 
 
 u 
 
 
 ture 
 
 Aph. 44. Even though it [Nature,] 
 
 JVb reason why Na- j ,-, r ..-i .. 
 
 re should invade tte my invade others [with its creative 
 emancipated. influences], the emancipated does not 
 
 experience, in consequence of the absence of a concurrent 
 cause, 4 [e.g., Non-discrimination, in the absence of which 
 there is no reason why the emancipated should be subjected 
 to Nature's invasion]. 
 
 * Compare Aph. 66 of Book III., at p. 267, supra. Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 
 I rl^Tf II 
 
 3 Some copies of Vijnana here introduce i"T^f T^f ', aQ d Nagesa 
 has the lection "fcj H rft^TT'lj H^Tl^ Ed" 
 
 * Nimitta, on which vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed.
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 45. 445 
 
 a. But then, this arrangement could be possible then, 
 [only] if there were a multiplicity of souls : but that is 
 quite excluded by the text of the non-duality of Soul. 
 Having pondered this doubt, he says r 1 
 
 Aph. 45. The multeity of Soul [is 
 tL vfda. P roved ] ^ tte distribution [announced 
 by the Veda itself]. 
 
 a. That is to say : the multeity of Soul is proved, abso- 
 lutely, by the distribution of Bondage and Emancipation 
 mentioned in such Scriptural texts as, ' Whoso understand 
 this, these are immortal, while others experience only 
 sorrow.' 2 3 
 
 b. But then, the distribution of Bondage and Liberation 
 may be through the difference of adjunct. To this he 
 replies : 4 
 
 rl^T 
 
 Satapatha-lrdhmana, xiv., 7, 2, 15. Ed.
 
 446 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 1 #< \\ 
 
 Aph. 46. If [you acknowledge] an 
 adjunct [of Soul], then, on its being 
 established, there is duality, [upsetting 
 the dogma founded on in 44]. 
 
 a. But then, the adjuncts, moreover, consist of ' Igno- 
 rance/ [which, according to the Vedanta, is no reality] ; so 
 that by these there is no detriment to [the Vedantic dogma 
 of] non-duality. "With reference to this doubt, he says : a 
 
 : a 8$ u 
 
 The Veddnta cannot Aph. 47. Even by the two the au- 
 eade von-duaiity. thority is contradicted. 
 
 a. That is to say : even by acknowledging the two, viz., 
 Soul and Ignorance, a contradiction is constituted to the 
 text, [which is alleged as] the authority for non-duality. 3 
 
 b. He states another couple of objections, also : 4 
 
 II tffr II 
 
 1 Nages'a has 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 * u
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 49. 447 
 
 Aph. 48. The prima facie view [of 
 The establishment of the Vedantal is not [to be allowed anv 
 
 the Vedanta tenet implies J . . J 
 
 a contradiction. lorce, as an objection] ; because, by 
 
 [admitting] two, [viz., Soul and Igno- 
 rance], there is no opposition [to our own dualistic theory 
 of Soul and Nature] : and the subsequent [dogma, viz., 
 that one single Soul is the only reality, is not to be allowed]; 
 because of the non-existence of a proof, [which, if it did 
 exist, would, along with Soul, constitute a duality]. 
 
 a. But then, Soul will be demonstrated by its self-mani- 
 festation. To this he replies : l 
 
 fa: 2 u 8e ii 
 
 Aph. 49. [And.] in its [Soul's,] being 
 demonstrated by the light [of itself, as 
 you Vedantis say it is], there is the 
 
 [unreconciled] opposition of patient and agent [in one, 
 
 which is a contradiction]. 
 
 a. That is to say : if Soul be demonstrated by the light 
 which Soul consists of, there is the ' opposition of patient 
 and agent' 3 [in one]. 
 
 b. But then, there is no contradiction [here,] between 
 patient and agent; because it [the Soul], through the 
 property of light which is lodged in it, can, itself, furnish 
 
 I cT^T II 
 
 2 Aniroddhaha. ^: ; Nagesa, 
 
 Ed -
 
 448 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 the relation to itself ; just as the Vaiseshikas declare, that, 
 through the intelligence lodged in it, it is, itself, an object 
 to itself. To this he replies : l 
 
 * II MO || 
 
 Aph. 50. This [Soul], in the shape of 
 Thought, discrepant from the non-in- 
 telligent, reveals the non-intelligent. 
 
 a. But then, in that case, if duality be established in 
 accordance with proofs, &c., what becomes of the Scriptural 
 text declaring non-duality ? To this he replies : 4 
 
 II MS II 
 
 Aph. 51. There is no contradiction 
 ^ Scr i pture [i n O ur view] ; because 
 that [text of Scripture which seems to 
 
 II 
 
 2 Aniruddha has - 
 
 3 From this point, Vedanti Mahadeva, according to my one poor 
 MS. of his work, has a very different reading, which, however, owing 
 to the carelessness of the copyist, I am unable to reproduce. Ed. 
 
 4
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 52. 449 
 
 assert absolute non- duality] is [intended] to produce apathy 
 in those who have desires, [and who would be better for 
 believing in * the nothingness of the things of time ']. 
 
 a. He tells us that the assertors of non-duality are to be 
 shunned, not only for the reason above mentioned, but, also, 
 because of the non-existence of evidence to convince us 
 that the world is unreal : l 
 
 II M* II 
 
 Aph. 52. The world is real ; because 
 
 irrefragable. * " * 9 ^ results from an unobjectionable cause, 
 and because there is [in Scripture,] no 
 debarrer [of this view of the matter]. 
 
 <z. We see, in the world, that no reality belongs to dream- 
 objects, or to the [fancied] yellowness of [invariably white] 
 conch-shells, and the like ; inasmuch as these are results 
 of the internal organ, &c., when [not normal, but] injured 
 by [i.e., under the injurious influence of] Sleep, 2 &c.: and 
 this is not [the state of things] in the [waking] Universe, 
 in which Mind is the first, 3 4 [according to Book I., 71]. 
 
 2 For 'injured,' <fec., read, 'impeded by the obstruction [offered] 
 by Sleep.' Ed. 
 
 3 Instead of ' in which,' &c., read, ' [consisting of] the Great One, 
 &c.' Ed. 
 
 11lfj1 II 
 
 2 G
 
 450 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 b. He declares that the Universe is real, not merely in 
 its existent state [at any given instant], but, also, always : J 
 
 : U M? H 
 
 Creation eluded. A P h ' 53 ' Since {i cannot be [ac- 
 
 counted for] in any other way, mani- 
 festation [of whatever is manifested] is of what is real, 
 [i.e., of what previously existed]. 
 
 a. That is to say : since, through the aforesaid reasons, 
 it is impossible that the unreal should come into existence, 
 what does come into existence, or is manifested, is what 
 really existed [previously,] in a subtile form. 2 
 
 I. Though [it is declared that] the being the agent and 
 the being the experiencer belong to diverse subjects, he 
 asserts the distribution [of agency to Self-consciousness, 
 and of experience to Soul,] by two aphorisms : 3 
 
 Aph. 54. Self-consciousness, not Soul, 
 
 The real agent who. . . 
 
 is the agent. 
 
 1 T 
 
 2 
 
 II 
 
 c\ \
 
 BOOK VI., APB. 56. 451 
 
 x H MM n 
 
 Aph. 55. Experience ceases at [dis- 
 
 E.rperience is aol rid in a i r t. 
 
 of when. crimination oij Soul, [as being quite 
 
 distinct from Nature] ; since it arises 
 from its [SouFs,] Desert, [which is not, really, Soul's, but 
 which, while Non-discrimination lasts, is made over to 
 Soul ; just as the fruits of the acts of a king's ministers are 
 made over to the king]. 
 
 a. He shows the reason for what was stated before, viz., 
 that cessation of action does not result from enterings into 
 the world of Brahma : l 
 
 2 II Ml? II 
 
 Aph. 56. Even in the world of the 
 
 tyftuS^ZJS^ moon, &c., there is return [to mundane 
 existence] ; because of there really 
 being a cause [of such return]. 
 
 a. ' A cause/ viz., Non-discrimination, Desert, &c. s 
 
 b. But then, through the counsels of the persons 
 dwelling in these various [supermundane] worlds, thee 
 oujrht to be no return [to mundane existence]. To this he 
 replies 1 .* 
 
 2 Instead of -H^T^TrT . Anirnddha has - 
 
 3 n 
 
 * I (T^Tf
 
 452 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 M9 II 
 
 Tins point forced. A ^' 5? " *[ot ^ ^6 COUHSel of 
 
 [supermundane] people is there effectu- 
 ation [of Emancipation] ; just as in the former case, [the 
 case, viz., of counsel given by mundane instructors]. 
 
 a. But, in that case, what becomes of the text that there 
 is no return from the world of Brahma ? To this he replies : 2 
 
 n II Mb II 
 
 ^ ^9 
 
 Aph. 58. There is Scripture [declara- 
 *"*" tory] of Emancipation, [on going to the 
 world of Brahma] ; this [Emancipation] 
 being effected [more readily in that world than in this, but 
 only] by intermediary [of the appropriate means]. 
 
 a. He alleges the Scriptural text of Soul's going [to the 
 locality where it is to experience], even though it be all- 
 filling, 3 [and can, therefore, have no place into which to 
 move] : 
 
 x ii Me ii 
 
 Aph. 59. And, in accordance with 
 the text of its * going/ though it [Soul,] 
 
 Aniruddha has, instead of ftrf%> ffff^fgJJ . Ed.
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 60. 453 
 
 is all-pervading, yet, in time, it reaches its place of experi- 
 ence [or body], through conjunction with an adjunct; aa 
 in the case of Space. 
 
 a. For, as Space, though it is all-pervading, is spoken of 
 as moving to some particular place, in consequence of its 
 conjunction with an adjunct, such as a jar, [when we say 
 'the space occupied by the jar is moved to the place to 
 which the jar is carried '], just so is it 1 [here]. 
 
 b. He expounds the statement, that the site of experi- 
 ence [the body,] is formed through the superintendence 
 of the experiencer, 2 [Soul] : 
 
 Aph. 60. This [constitution of a 
 is not accomplished in the case of 
 what is [organic matter] not superin- 
 tended [by Soul] ; because we find putrefaction [in organic 
 matter where Soul is absent]. 
 
 a. But then, let the construction of a site of experience 
 [or a body,] for Experiences [i.e., Souls,] take place 
 
 H 
 
 3 The reading of Aniruddha is 1fl'(THT' 3 RT T TT^ . Ed - 
 
 V
 
 454 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 without any superintendence at all, through Desert. To 
 this he replies : J 
 
 H & H 
 
 ApTi. 61. If you say that [indepen- 
 dent ty of an y superintendence,] it is 
 through Desert [that a Body is formed, 
 it is not so] ; since what is unconnected [with the matter 
 to be operated upon] is incompetent thereto; as is the 
 case with [unapplied] water, &c., in respect of a plant. 
 
 a. That is to say : because it is impossible that Desert, 
 which is not directly conjoined with the semen and other 
 [elements of the Body], should operate through Soul, in 
 the construction of the Body, &c. ; just as it is for water, 
 &c., unconnected with the seed, to operate through tillage, 
 &c., in the production of a plant. 8 
 
 b. According to the system of the Vaiseshibaz and 
 others, it is settled that Soul is the superintendent, [in 
 the construction of the Body], in virtue of its being con- 
 joined with Desert. But he tells us, that, in his own doc- 
 
 2 Nagesa reads x|T5f^f o . Ed. 
 
 u
 
 BOOK VI., APH, 62, 455 
 
 trine, since Desert, &c., are not properties of Soul, the 
 Soal cannot, through these, be the cause 1 [of the Body] : 
 
 Aph. 62. For this is impossible [viz., 
 that the Soul should, through its Desert, 
 fyc., be the cause of Body] ; because it has no qualities 
 for these [viz., Desert, fee.,] are properties of Self-con- 
 sciousness, not of Soul]. 
 
 a. And so, in our opinion, it is settled that Soul 
 superintends [in the causing of the Body,] quite directly, 
 by conjunction simply, without reference to anything 
 intermediate : such is the import. 2 
 
 b. But, if Soul be all-pervading, thea the limitedness of 
 the living soul, which is set forth in Scripture, is unfounded. 
 To repel this doubt, lie says :*
 
 456 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 II & II 
 
 Aph. 63. The nature of a living soul 
 ""' Belongs to that whicb - is qualified, [not 
 to Soul devoid of qualities, as is proved] 
 by direct and indirect arguments. 1 
 
 a. To be a living soul is the being possessed of the vital 
 airs ; and this is the character of the soul distinguished by 
 personality, not of pure Soul, 2 [which is unlimited]. 
 
 b. Desiring, now, to set forth the difference between 
 the products of Mind [or the Great Principle,] and of 
 Self-consciousness, he first states the products of Self-con- 
 sciousness : 3 
 
 TTRT- 
 
 u & \\ 
 
 Aph. 64. The effectuation of works 
 
 The real agent what. . / , , . . 
 
 is dependent on the agent Sen-con- 
 sciousness, not dependent on a Lord, [such as is feigned 
 by the Vaiseshikai\ ; because there is no proof [of the 
 reality of such]. 4 
 
 o. By this aphorism are set forth, as are also established 
 
 1 On antcaya-vyatireka, vide tnpra, p. 428, note 2. Ed. 
 
 2 
 
 See Book I., Aph. 92, at p. 112, supra. Ed.
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 65. 457 
 
 by Scripture and the Legal Institutes, the creative and the 
 destructive agencies of Brahma and Budra 1 [respectively], 
 owing to their adjunct, Self-consciousness,* [or per- 
 sonality]. 
 
 b. But then, grant that Self-consciousness is the maker 
 of the others, still who is the maker of Self -consciousness? 
 To this he replies : 3 
 
 fM (I 
 
 . 65. It is the same as in the 
 
 The real agent whence. . . - _. 
 
 arising of Desert. 
 
 a. Just as, at the creations, &c., the manifestation of 
 Desert, which sets Nature energizing, results solely from 
 the particular time, since, if we were to suppose other 
 Desert as the instigator of this, we should have an infinite 
 regress, just so Self-consciousness arises from time alone, 
 as the cause; but there is not another maker thereof, 
 also : thus, the two [cases] are alike : such is the meaning. 4 
 
 This is an appellation of Siva. Jd.
 
 458 THE SANKHYA. APHORISMS. 
 
 Orthodox recognition ^^ QQ, The rest is from Mind, [the 
 
 of Bralimd, Siva, and ~ c . -. . . , , 
 Vishnu, put forward. Grea * Principle]. 
 
 a. "What is other than the products of Self-conscious- 
 ness [or personality], viz., Creation, &c., that, viz., Preser- 
 vation, &c., results from the Great Principle alone ; 
 because, inasmuch as it consists of pure Goodness, having 
 no Conceit, Passion, &c., it is moved solely by benevolence 
 towards others : such is the meaning. And by this apho- 
 rism is established the character, as Preserver, of Vishnu, 
 owing to the Great Principle, as adjunct 1 2 [of the soul, 
 which, without adjunct, would neither create, preserve, 
 nor destroy (see 64)]. 
 
 b. It has been stated, before, that the relation of 
 Nature and Soul, as experienced and experiencer, is 
 caused by Non-discrimination [of the one from the other]. 
 Here, what is Non-discrimination, itself, caused by? 
 
 2 The text here followed is very inferior. Ed .
 
 BOOK VI., APH. 68. 459 
 
 With reference to this doubt, he states that all phi- 
 losophers reject, in common, the doubt whether we should 
 have an infinite regress, on the supposition of a stream of 
 Non-discrimination ; because this [regress] is valid? [since 
 an infinite regress which is in conformity with the truth 
 is no sound cause of objection] : 
 
 M 
 
 Aph. 67. The relation of possession 
 and possessor, also, if attributed [as it 
 to tk argu- { a by some,] to Desert, in the case of 
 Nature [and Soul], like [the relation of] 
 seed and plant, [which takes the shape of an infinite re- 
 gress of alternants], is beginningless. 
 
 ii tft ii 
 
 Aph 68. Or [the case is, likewise, 
 
 one of an infinite regress,] if it [the 
 
 relation between Nature and Soul,] be attributed to Non- 
 
 discrimination [of Soul from Nature], as Panchasikha 
 
 [holds]. 
 
 11 
 
 "1 '1 1^1 cf h* is the reading of Aniruddha. Ed.
 
 460 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. 
 
 I ffQ. II 
 
 Aph. 69. [The case is the same,] if, 
 as the teacher Sanandana does, we 
 attribute it [the relation between Nature and Soul,] to 
 the Subtile Body, [which, in the shape of its elemental 
 causes, attends Soul, even during the periodical annihila- 
 tions of the world]. 
 
 a. He sums up the import of the declarations of the 
 Institute : l 
 
 II $o II 
 
 Aph. 70. Be that the one way, or the 
 The summing up. o fa eT) the cutting short thereof [viz., 
 of the relation between Nature and Soul,] is Soul's aim ; 
 the cutting short thereof is Soul's aim. 
 
 THE END.
 
 CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS. 
 
 IN THE BODY OF THE PAGE. 
 
 P. 12, 1. 19. Instead of ' indestructible,' read ' impracticable.' 
 
 P. 23, 1. 7. ' That is to say,' &c. See, for a more correct ren. 
 dering, the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 63. 
 
 P. 25, 1. 2. Read, instead of 'your own implied dogma,' 'the 
 dogma which you accept.' 
 
 P. 32, 1. 8. The reference to the second note is omitted. 
 
 P. 35, 1. 14. IT^R ^I^HI is the reading of Aniruddha and 
 Nagesa; Ic|5T?ITT > that of Vijnana and Vedanti Mahadeva. 
 
 P. 44, 1. 3. Aniruddha has 
 
 P. 46, 1. 14. Read, instead of ff?{, 
 P. 52, 1. 10. * That is to say,' &c. For another version, see the 
 Rational Refutation, &c., p. 119. 
 
 P. 56, 1. 7. Read f^^TJTJ . 
 
 x^ 
 
 P. 58, 1, 13. Almost certainly, this interpolation was taken from 
 the Serampore edition of the Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhdshya. My 
 copy of that work was lent, in 1851, to Pandit Hirananda Chaube, 
 who prepared, for Dr. Ballantyne, the Sanskrit portion of what 
 corresponds to pp. 1 183, supra, in which, additions, compressions, 
 interpolations, and other alterations lawlessly made by him, and 
 scholia of his own devising, were introduced with regrettable fre- 
 quency. 
 
 P. 59, 1. 15 p. 61, 1. 18. For another rendering, from a text 
 here and there somewhat different, see the Rational Refutation, &c. 
 pp. 12, 13. 
 
 P. 69, 1.10. Read of |f:. 
 
 P. 85, 1. 13. 'This Ignorance,' &c. The original of this is i., 
 v., 4, of the Vishnu-purdna. 
 
 P. 143, 1. 4. Read -C^d h 
 P. 149, 1. 1. Read ' is meant.' X
 
 462 CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS. 
 
 P. 199, 1. 5. 'An internal ' is better. 
 
 P. 216, 1. 8. Instead of * it is oiie with the internal organ,' read 
 ' the internal organ is really one.' The implication is, that buddhi, 
 ahankdra, and manas really make one whole, called manas, in the 
 wider sense of that term. 
 
 P. 233, 1. 8. Read 
 P. 246, 1. ]2. Remove the brackets which enclose 'promoting.' 
 Compare p. 433, 1. 7. 
 
 P. 272, 1. 16. Bead ' family ;' i.e., as.' 
 
 P. 292, 1. 9. Eead " 
 P. 437, 1.10. Eead 
 
 IN THE NOTES. 
 
 P. 13, 1. 1. Read ^EJcTWcftM I Rl *U , and remove, 
 in p. 12, a., the brackets enclosing the words ' the positive destruction 
 of.' Dr. Ballantyne's maimed expression I find nowhere but in the 
 Serampore edition of the Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhdshya. 
 * -^ 
 
 P. 18, 1. 2. Read 
 
 P. 30, 1. 1. Nagesa has -f^|+H tiff* w Wch Vijnana and 
 Vedanti Mahadeva recognize as a reading. 
 
 P. 35, 1. 5. Read 'Aniruddha and NdgeSa have.' 
 
 P. 39, 11. 5, 6. See, for the true reading of what is here given 
 corruptly, the Chhdndogya Upanishad, vi., ii., 1, 2. 
 
 ^ s 
 
 P. 47, 1. 5. Read 
 
 P. 54, 1. 3. In the Serampore edition of the Sdnkhya-pravachana- 
 bhdshya, the reading is ^1^^'^^ ^ I ^ I '< which obviates 
 the anacoluthism spoken of in p. 53, note 4. 
 
 P. 54, 1. 4. From the Indische Studien, where referred to at the 
 foot of p. 53, it appears that Professor Weber found, in the Amrita- 
 
 lindu Upanishad, v. 13, here quoted, TT|^H , instead of 
 r^-| j l<|4-| t- Compare, further, Gaudapada's Mdndukyopanishat- 
 MriM, iii., 4, et xeq. 
 
 P. 55, 1. 4. Read, instead of 'Vedasti Mahadeva,'
 
 CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS. 463 
 
 P. 63, 1. 4. Read *2(T , and so in p. 70, 1. 5, and 
 p. 107, 1. 6. 
 
 P. 64, 1. 1. Read vdsand. 
 
 P. 64, 1. 4. The verses in question also occur as ii., 32, of Gau- 
 dapada's MdndukyopanisJiat-kdrikd. They are quoted and trans- 
 lated in the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 189, 190, where they are 
 professedly taken, I cannot now say how tenably, from the Viveka- 
 chuddmani, which is credulously affiliated on Sankara A'cbarya. 
 
 P. 68, 1. 6. Read 
 P. 77, 1. 1. Read 
 P. 102, 1. 4. Read - 
 
 P. 118, 1. 3. The quotation in question is xvi., 3, 4, of the Toga" 
 vdsishtha. For a more correct translation of it, see the Rational 
 Refutation, &c., p. 214. 
 
 P. 182, 1. 7. For emendations of sundry matters in note 4, 
 see p. 429, note 4. 
 
 P. 204, 11. 2, 3. The Serampore edition of the SdnMya-pravacAana- 
 
 bhdshya has r^f^^T^f answering to its 
 
 Aphorism ; also, ^rRTSTlfi?^!^ cfT 
 P. 326, 1.6. Read 'clerical.' 
 
 In the foregoing pages, reference has been made, again and again, 
 to the Serampore edition of the Sdnkhya-pravachana-lhdshya 
 published in 1821. Of the imperfections of that edition some notion 
 may be formed from the facts, tbat it gives, as if they were com- 
 mentary, no fewer than twenty-six of the Aphoi'isms, that it wholly 
 omits six others, repeats two, curtails or mangles several, and, more 
 than once, represents, as Aphorisms, fragments of Vijnana's ex- 
 position. Still, if great liberties have not been taken with his 
 materials by the pandit who prepared it for the press, it may be 
 considered as possessing the value of an inferior manuscript. Hence 
 it has been thought worth while to extract from it, as below, its 
 principal peculiar readings of the Aphorisms, over and above those 
 already remarked on. The pages and notes referred to are those of 
 the present work.
 
 464 
 
 CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS. 
 
 BOOK I. Aph. 2. 
 
 Aph. 24. (TT^^T Aph. 41. 
 
 I A P h - 43 - <Tn is omi tted. 
 Aph. 67. As in the MSS. spoken of in p. 82, note 3. Aph. 73. 
 . Aph. 81. rf cRT * * \ "f I A P h - 97 - 
 
 BOOK II. Aph. 3. Only f ^f[<lH 1^1*111 \ 
 
 Aph. 6. As in Aniruddha. See p. 190, note 3. Aph. 26. T[ 
 is inserted. See p. 206, note 1. 
 
 BOOK III. Aph. 12. 4^|dt^j ff^?T A P h - 15 - "^ is 
 omitted. See p. 235, note 3. Aph. 63. fcK^\4| . Aph. 66. 
 f^[TTf (TS . See p. 267, note 8. 
 
 BOOK IV. Aph. 26. cplf J . See p. 305, note 3. 
 
 BOOK V. Aph. 4. ITcf , instead of ^f| Ol | Aph. 6. ff 
 
 is added at the end. Aph. 33. As in Aniruddha and Vedanti 
 Mahadeva. See p. 338, note 2. Aph. 39. cfi|4jfr|4J44t . Aph. 40, 
 -H(ft?T See P- 344 note 3 - A P h - 51. As in Vedanti Mahadeva. 
 See p. 352, note 4. Aph. 57. tHM^^J^* instead of ^C^^JT- 
 A P fl - 80 - CT^fcT' instead of ^%. Aph. 89. 
 
 See p. 384, note 1. Aph. 98. 
 See p. 390, note 3. Aph. 120. 
 
 | ^ cf . Aph. 123. 
 
 BOOK VI. Aph. 11. 
 
 Aph. 13. 
 A b- 26. 
 
 -f.
 
 iiUlJIii 
 
 (jfr> A 000018031 5 
 
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