OFISMM
1
lORACE W. CARFENTIER
d
THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
THE
NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
BY
LOTHROP STODDARD, A.M., Ph.D. (Harv.)
AUTHOR OP "the rising TIDE OF COLOR,"
"the stakes op the war,"
" present dat europe: its national states op mind,"
"the fbench rkvolution in san domingo," etc.
WITH MAP
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1921
COPTEIGHT, 1921, BT'
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S 80N8
Published September, 1921
THE SCRIBNER PRESS
PREFACE
The entire world of Islam is to-day iii profound fer-
ment. From Morocco to China and from Turkestan
to the Congo, the 250,000,000 followers of the Prophet
Mohammed are stirring to new ideas, new impulses, new
aspirations. A gigantic transformation is taSiing place
whose results must affect all mankind.
This transformation was greatly stimulated by the
late war. But it began long_before. More than a hun-
dred years ago the seeds were sown, and ever since then
it has been evolving; at first slowly and obscurely; later
more rapidly and perceptibly; until to-day, under the
stimulus of Armageddon, it has burst into sudden and
startling bloom.
The story of that strange and dramatic evolution I
have endeavored to tell in the following pages. Con-
sidering in turn its various aspects — religious, cultural,
poHtical, economic, social — I have tned to portray their
genesis and development, to analyze their character, and
to appraise their potency. While making due allowance
for local differentiations, the intimate correlation and
underlying unity of the various movements have ever
been kept in view.
Although the book deals primarily with the Moslem
world, it necessarily includes the non-Moslem Hindu
V
vi PREFACE
elements of India. The field covered is thus virtually
the entire Near and Middle East. The Far East has
not been directly considered, but parallel developments
there have been noted and should always be kept in
mind.
LOTHEOP StODDAED.
Brookline, Mass,,
May 8, 1921.
CONTENTS
PAOB
Introduction: The Decline and Fall op the Old
Islamic World 3
THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
CHAPTBB
^. The Mohammedan Revival 25
^I. Pan-Islamism 45
s/III. The Influence of the West 90
~^IV. Political Change 131
V. Nationalism 157
VI. Nationalism in India 239
VII. Economic Change 268
VIII. SocLiL Change 296
■ — IX. SocLVL Unrest and Bolshevism 323
Conclusion 355
Index 357
MAP
The World of Islam ......... at end of volume
THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
INTRODUCTION
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE OLD
ISLAMIC WORLD
The rise of Islam is perhaps the most amazing event in
human history. Springing from a land and a people alike
previously negligible, Islam spread within a century over
half the earth, shattering great empires, overthrowing
long-established rehgions, remoulding the souls of races,
and building up a whole new world — the world of Islam.
The closer we examine this development the more
extraordinary does it appear. The other great religions
won their way slowly, by painful struggle, and finally
triumphed with the aid of powerful monarchs converted
to the new faith. Christianity had its Constantino,
Buddhism its Asoka, and Zoroastrianism its Cyrus, each
lending to his chosen cult the mighty force of secular
authority. Not so Islam. Arising in a desert land
sparsely inhabited by a nomad race previously undis-
tinguished in human annals, Islam sallied forth on its
great adventure with the slenderest human backing and
against the heaviest material odds. Yet Islam triumphed
with seemingly miraculous ease, and a couple of genera-
tions saw the Fiery Crescent borne victorious from the
P3Tenees to the Himalayas and from the deserts of Central
Asia to the deserts of Central Africa.
3
4 THE NS7*7 WORLD OF ISLAM
This amazing success was due to a number of con-
tributing factors, chief among them being the character
of the Arab race, the nature of Mohammed's teachuig,
and the general state of the contemporaiy Eastern world.
Undistinguished though the Arabs had hitherto been,
Ihey were a people of remarkable potentialities, which
were at that moment patently seeking self-realization.
For several generations before Mohammed, Arabia had
been astir w^ith exuberant \dtality. The Ai-abs had out-
gro\Mi their ancestral paganism and were instinctively
yearnuig for better things. Athwart this seething fer-
ment of mind and spirit Islam rang like a tnmipet-call.
Mohammed, an Arab of the Ai'abs, was the very incarna-
tion of the soul of his race. Preaching a simple, austere
monotheism, free from priestcraft or elaborate doctrinal
trappings, he tapped the well-springs of religious zeal
always present in the Semitic heart. Forgetting the
chronic rivalries and blood-feuds which had consulted
their energies in internecine strife, and wielded into a glow-
ing unity by the fire of their new-found faith, the Arabs
poured forth from their deserts to conquer the earth for
AUah, the One True God.
Thus Islam, like the resistless breath of the sirocco,
the desert wind, swept out of Arabia and encountered —
a spiritual vacuimi. Those neighboring Byzantine and
Persian Empires, so imposmg to the casual eye, were
mere dried husks, devoid of real vitality. Their religions
were a mocker}'- and a sham. Persia's ancestral cult of
Zoroaster had degenerated mto "Magism" — a pompous
priestcraft, tjTannical and persecuting, hated and secretly
despised. As for Eastern Christianity, bedizened with
the gewgaws of paganism and bedevilled by the mad-
INTRODUCTION 5
dening theological speculations of the decadent Greek
mind, it had become a repellent caricature of the teachings
of Christ. Both Magism and Byzantine Christendom
were riven by great heresies which engendered savage
persecutions and furious hates. Furthermore; both the
Byzantine and Persian Empires were harsh despotisms
wliich crushed their subjects to the dust and killed out
all love of coimtiy or loyalty to the state. Lastly, the
two empires had just fought a terrible war from which
they had emerged mutually bled white and utterly ex-
hausted.
Such was the world compelled to face the lava-flood of
Islam. The result was inevitable. Once the disciplined
strength of the East Roman legions and the Persian
cuirassiers had broken before the fiery onslaught of the
fanatic sons of the desert, it was all over. There was no
patriotic resistance. The down-trodden populations pas-
sively accepted new masters, while the numerous heretics
actually welcomed the overthrow of persecuting core-
Hgionists whom they hated far worse than their alien
conquerors. In a short time most of the subject peoples
accepted the new faith, so refreshingly simple compared
with their own degenerate cults. The Arabs, in their
turn, knew how to consohdate their rule. They were no
bloodthirsty savages, bent solely on loot and destruction.
On the contraiy, they were an mnately gifted race, eager
to learn and appreciative of the cultural gifts which older
civiHzations had to bestow. Intermarrying freely and
professing a common belief, conquerors and conquered
rapidly fused, and from, this fusion arose a new civilization
— the Saracenic civilization, in which the ancient cultures
of Greece, Rome, and Persia were re\dtahzed by Arab
6 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
vigor and synthesized by the Arab genius and the Islamic
spirit. For the first three centuries of its existence
(circ. 650-1000 A. D.) the reahn of Islam was the most
civilized and progressive portion of the world. Studded
with splendid cities, gracious mosques, and quiet imiversi-
ties where the wisdom of the ancient world was preserved
and appreciated, the Moslem East offered a striking con-
trast to the Christian West, then sunk in the night of the
Dark Ages.
However, by the tenth century the Saracenic civili-
zation began to display unmistakable S3Tnptoms of dechne.
This decline was at first gradual. Down to the terrible
disasters of the thirteenth century it still displayed vigor
and remained ahead of the Christian West. Still, by the
year 1000 A. D. its golden age was over. For tliis there
were several reasons. In the first place, that inveterate
spirit of faction which has always been the bane of the
Arab race soon reappeared once more. Rival clans strove
for the headship of Islam, and their quarrels degenerated
into bloody civil wars. In this fratricidal strife the ferv^or
of the first days cooled, and saintly men Hke Abu Bekr
and Omar, Islam's first standard-bearers, gave place to
worldly minded leaders who regarded their position of
"Khalifa"^ as a means to despotic power and self-
glorification. The seat of government was moved to
Damascus in Syria, and afterward to Bagdad in Meso-
potamia. The reason for this was obvious. In Mecca
despotism was impossible. The fierce, free-born Arabs
of the desert would tolerate no master, and their innate
democracy had been sanctioned by the Prophet, who had
exphcitly declared that all Believers were brothers. The
^ I. 6., "Successor." Anglicized into the word "Caliph."
INTRODUCTION 7
Meccan caliphate was a theocratic democracy. Abu
Bekr and Omar were elected by the people, and held
themselves responsible to public opinion, subject to the
divine law as revealed by Mohammed in the Koran.
But in Dam.ascus, and still more in Bagdad, things were
different. There the pure-blooded Ai'abs were only a
handful among swarms of Syrian and Persian converts
and "Neo-Arab" mixed-bloods. These people were filled
with traditions of despotism and were quite ready to
yield the caHphs obsequious obedience. The caliphs, in
their turn, leaned more and more upon these complaisant
subjects, drawing from their ranks courtiers, officials, and
ultimately soldiers. Shocked and angered, the proud
Arabs gradually returned to the desert, while the govern-
ment fell into the weU-worn ruts of traditional Oriental
despotism. When the caliphate ^as moved to Bagdad
after the founding of the Abbaside dynasty (750 A. D.),
Persian influence became preponderant. The famous
Caliph Haroun-al-Rashid, the hero of the Arabian
Nights, was a typical Persian monarch, a true successor
of Xerxes and Chosroes, and as different from Abu Bekr
or Omar as it is possible to conceive. And, in Bagdad,
as elsewhere, despotic power was fatal to its possessors.
Under its blight the "successors" of Mohammed became
capricious tyrants or degenerate harem puppets, whose
nerveless hands were wholly incapable of guiding the great
Moslem Empire.
The empire, in fact, gradually went to pieces. Shaken
by the civil wars, bereft of strong leaders, and deprived
of the in\dgorating amalgam of the unspoiled desert
Arabs, political unity could not endure. Everywhere
there occurred revivals of suppressed racial or particu-
8 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
larist tendencies. The very rapidity of Islam's expansion
turned against it, now that the well-springs of that
expansion were dried up. Islam had made millions of
converts, of many sects and races, but it had digested
them very imperfectly. Mohammed had really converted
the Arabs, because he merely voiced ideas which were
obscurely germinating in Arab minds and appealed to
impulses innate in the Arab blood. When, however,
Islam was accepted by non-Arab peoples, they instinc-
tively interpreted the Prophet's message according to their
particular racial tendencies and cultural backgroimds,
the result being that primitive Islam was distorted or
perverted. The most extreme example of this was in
Persia, where the austere monotheism of Mohammed was
transmuted into the elaborate mystical cult known as
Shiism, which presently cut the Persians off from full
communion with the orthodox Moslem world. The same
transmutive tendency appears, in lesser degree, in the
saint-worship of the North African Berbers and in the
pantheism of the Hindu Moslems — ^both developments
which Mohammed would have unquestionably exe-
crated.
These doctrinal fissures in Islam were paralleled by the
dismption of poHtical unity. The first formal spht oc-
curred after the accession of the Abbasides. A member
of the deposed Ommeyyad family fled to Spain, where he
set up a rival caHphate at Cordova, recognized as lawful
not only by the Spanish Moslems but by the Berbers of
North Africa. Later on another caliphate was set up in
Egypt — the Fatimite caHphate, resting its title on descent
from Mohammed's daughter Fatima. As for the Abba-
side caliphs of Bagdad, they gradually decHned in power.
INTRODUCTION 9
until they became mere puppets in the hands of a new
racial element, the Tui-ks.
Before describing that shift of power from Neo-Arab
to Turkish hands which was so momentous for the histoiy
of the Islamic world, let us first consider the decHne in
cultural and intellectual vigor that set in concurrently
with the disruption of political and religious unity dming
the later stages of the Neo-Arab period.
The Arabs of Mohanmied's day were a fresh, unspoiled
people in the full flush of pristine vigor, eager for adven-
ture and inspired by a high ideal. They had their full
share of Semitic fanaticism; but, though fanatical, they
were not bigoted; that is to say, they possessed, not closed,
but open minds. They held firmly to the tenets of their
religion, but this rehgion was extremely simple. The
core of Mohammed's teaching was theism plus certain
practices. A strict belief in the unity of God; an equally
strict belief in the divine mission^ of Mohammed as set
forth in the Koran, and certain clearly defined duties —
prayer, ablutions, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage —
these, and these alone, constituted the Islam of the Arab
conquerors of the Eastern world.
So simple a theology could not seriously fetter the
Arab mind, alert, curious, eager to learn, and ready to
adjust itself to conditions ampler and more complex than
those prevailing in the parched environment of the desert.
Now, not only did the Arabs rehsh the material advan-
1 To be carefully distinguished from divinity. Mohammed not only
did not make any pretensions to divinity, but specifically disclaimed any
such attributes. He regarded himself as the last of a series of divinely
inspired prophets, beginning with Adam and extending through Moses
and Jesus to himself, the mouthpiece of God's last and most perfect revela-
tion.
10 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
tages and luxuries of the more developed societies which
they had conquered; thej^ also appreciated the art, litera-
ture, science, and ideas of the older civilizations. The
efifect of these novel stimuli was the remarkable cultural
and intellectual flowering which is the glory of Saracenic
civilization. For a time thought was relatively free and
produced a wealth of original ideas and daring specula-
tions. These were the work not only of Arabs but also
of subject Christians, Jews, and Persians, many of them
being heretics previously depressed under the iron bands
of persecuting Byzantine orthodoxy and Magism.
Gradually, however, this enhghtened era passed away.
Reactionary forces appeared and gained in strength.
The liberals, who are usually known under the general
title of "MotazeHtes," not only clung to the doctrinal
simplicity of primitive Islam, but also contended that the
test of all things should be reason. On the other hand,
the conservative schools of thought asserted that the test
should be precedent and authority. These men, many of
them converted Christians imbued with the traditions of
Byzantine orthodoxy, undertook an immense work of
Koranic exegesis, combined with an equally elaborate
codification and interpretation of the reputed sajdngs or
"traditions" of Mohammed, as handed down by his
immediate disciples and followers. As the result of these
labors, there gradually arose a Moslem theology and
scholastic philosophy as rigid, elaborate, and dogmatic
as that of the mediaeval Christian West.
Naturally, the struggle between the fimdamentally
opposed tendencies of traditionalism and rationalism was
long and bitter. Yet the ultimate outcome was almost
a foregone conclusion. Everything conspired to favor
INTRODUCTION 11
the triumph of dogma over reason. The whole historic
tradition of the East (a tradition largely induced by racial
and climatic factors^ was toward absolutism. This
tradition had been intermpted by the inrush of the wild
libertarianism of the desert. But the older tendency
presently reasserted itself, stimulated as it was by the
political transformation of the caliphate from theocratic
democracy to despotism.
This triumph of absolutism in the field of government
in fact assured its eventual triumph in all other fields as
well. For, in the long run, despotism can no more tolerate
liberty of thought than it can liberty of action. Some of
the Damascus caHphs, to be sure, toyed with Motazelism,
the Ommeyyads being mainly secular-minded men to
whom freethinking was intellectually attractive. But
presently the cahphs became aware of Uberalism's political
implications. The Motazelites did not confine themselves
to the realm of pure philosophic speculation. They also
trespassed on more dangerous ground. Motazehte voices
were heard recalhng the democratic days of the Meccan
caHphate, when the Commander of the Faithful, instead
of being an hereditaiy monarch, was elected by the peo-
ple and responsible to public opinion. Some bold spirits
even entered into relations with the fierce fanatic sects of
^ The influence of environment and heredity on human evolution in
general and on the history of the East in particular, though of great im-
portance, cannot be treated in a summary such as this. The influence of
climatic and other envh-onmental factors has been ably treated by Pro-
fessor Ellsworth Huntington in his various works, such as The Pulse of
Asia (Boston, 1907); Civilization and Climate (Yale Univ. Press, 1915),
and World-Power and Evolution (Yale Univ. Press, 1919). See also chap.
Ill in Arminius Vambery — Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert. Eine
cuUurgeschichtliche Studie (Leipzig, 1875). For a summary of racial in-
fluences in Eastern history, see Madiaon Grant — The Passing of the Great
Race (N. Y., 1916).
12 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
inner Arabia, like the Kharijites, who, upholding the
old desert freedom, refused to recognize the caliphate
and proclaimed theories of advanced republicanism.
The upshot was that the caliphs turned more and more
toward the conservative theologians as against the liberals,
just as they favored the monarchist Neo-Arabs in prefer-
ence to the intractable pure-blooded Arabs of the desert.
Under the Abbasides the government came out frankly
for religious absolutism. Standards of dogmatic ortho-
doxy were established, Motazelites were persecuted and
put to death, and by the twelfth centuiy A. D. the last
vestiges of Saracenic liberalism were extirpated. The
canons of Moslem thought were fixed. All creative
activity ceased. The very memory of the great Motaze-
lite doctors faded away. The Moslem mind was closed,
not to be reopened mitil our own day.
By the beginning of the eleventh century the decline of
Saracenic civilization had become so pronounced that
change was clearly in the air. Having lost their early
vigor, the Neo-Arabs were to see their political power pass
into other hands. These political heirs of the Neo-Arabs
were the Turks. The Turks were a western branch of
that congeries of nomadic tribes which, from time imme-
morial, have roamed over the limitless steppes of Eastern
and Central Asia, and which are known collectively under
the titles of " Uralo-Altaic " or "Turanian" peoples.
The Arabs had been in contact with the Turkish nomads
ever since the Islamic conquest of Persia, when the
Moslem generals found the Turks beating restlessly against
Persia's northeastern frontiers. In the caHphate's palmy
days the Turks were not feared. In fact, they were pres-
ently found to be very useful. A dull-witted folk with
INTRODUCTION 13
few ideas, the Turks could do two things superlatively
well — obey orders and fight like devils. In other words,
they made ideal mercenaiy soldiers. The caliphs were de-
lighted, and enlisted ever-larger numbers of them for their
armies and their body-guards.
This was all very well while the caliphate was strong,
but when it grew weak the situation altered. Rising
everywhere to positions of authority, the Turkish mer-
cenaries began to act like masters. Opening the eastern
frontiers, they let in fresh swarms of their countrymen,
who now came, not as individuals, but in tribes or
"hordes" under their hereditary chiefs, wandering about
at their own sw^eet will, settling where they pleased, and
despoiling or evicting the local inhabitants.
The Turks soon renounced their ancestral paganism for
Islam, but Islam made little change in their natures.
In judging these Turkish newcomers we must not con-
sider them the same as the present-day Ottoman Turks
of Constantinople and Asia Minor. The modern Osmanli
are so saturated with European and Near Eastern blood,
and have been so leavened by Western and Saracenic ideas,
that they are a very different people from their remote
immigrant ancestors. Yet, even as it is, the modern
Osmanh display enough of those unlovely Turanian
traits which characterize the unmodified Turks of Central
Asia, often called "Turkomans," to distinguish them from
their Ottoman kinsfolk to the west.
Now, what was the primitive Turkish nature? First
and foremost, it was that of the professional soldier.
Discipline was the Turk's watchword. No originaHty
of thought, and but little curiosity. Few ideas ever
penetrated the Turk's slow mind, and the few that did
14 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
penetrate were received as militar}'- orders, to be obeyed
without question and adhered to without reflection.
Such was the being who took over the leadership of Islam
trom the Saracen's faihng grasp.
No greater misfortune could have occurred both for
Islam and for the world at large. For Islam it meant the
rule of dull-witted bigots under which enlightened progress
was impossible. Of course Islam did gain a great acces-
sion of warlike strength, but this new power was so
wantonly misused as to bring down disastrous repercus-
sions upon Islam itself. The first notable exploits of the
immigrant Turkish hordes were their conquest of Asia
Minor and their capture of Jerusalem, both events taking
place toward the close of the eleventh century.^ Up
to this time Asia Minor had remained part of the Christian
world. The original Arab flood of the seventh century,
after overrunning Syiia, had been stopped by the barrier
of the Taurus Mountains; the Byzantine Empire had
pulled itself together; and thenceforth, despite border
bickerings, the Byzantine-Saracen frontier had remained
substantially mialtered. Now, however, the Turks broke
the Byzantine barrier, overran Asia Minor, and threatened
even Constantinople, the eastern bulwark of Christendom.
As for Jerusalem, it had, of course, been in Moslem hands
since the Arab conquest of 637 A. D., but the caliph Omar
had carefully respected the Christian "Holy Places," and
his successors had neither persecuted the local Christians
nor maltreated the numerous pilgrims who flocked peren-
nially to Jeiaisalem from eveiy part of the Christian world.
^ The Turkish overrunning of Asia Minor took place after the destruc-
tion of the Byzantine army in the great battle of Manzikert, 1071 A. D.
The Turks captured Jerusalem in 1076.
INTRODUCTION 15
But the Turks changed all this. Avid for loot, and filled
with bigoted hatred of the "Misbehevers," they sacked
the holy places, persecuted the Christians, and rendered
pilgrimage impossible.
The effect of these twin disasters upon Christendom,
occurring as they did almost simultaneously, was tremen-
dous. ITie ChiTstian West, then at the height of its
reHgious fervor, quivered with mingled fear and wrath.
Myriads of zealots, Hke Peter the Hermit, roused all
Europe to frenzy. Fanaticism begat fanaticism, and the
Christian West poured upon the Moslem East vast hosts
of warriors in those extraordinary expeditions, the Cru-
sades.
The Turkish conquest of Islam and its counterblast,
the Crusades, were an immense misfortune for the world.
They permanently worsened the relations between East
and West. In the year 1000 A. D. Christian-Moslem
relations were fairly good, and showed every prospect of
becoming better. The hatreds engendered by Islam's
first irruption were dying away. The frontiers of Islam
and Christendom had become apparently fixed, and
neither side showed much desire to encroach upon the
other. The only serious debatable ground was Spain,
where Moslem and Christian were continually at hand-
grips; but, after all, Spain was mutually regarded as a
frontier episode. Between Islam and Christendom, as a
whole, intercourse was becoming steadOy more friendly
and more frequent. This friendly intercourse, if con-
tinued, might ultimately have produced momentous
results for human progress. The Moslem world was at
that time still well ahead of western Europe in knowledge
and culture, but Saracenic civilization was ossif}dng,
16 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
whereas the Christian West, despite its ignorance, rude-
ness, and barbarism, was bursting with lusty life and
patently aspiring to better things. Had the nascent
amity of East and West in the eleventh century continued
to develop, both would have greatly profited. In the
West the influence of Saracenic culture, containing, as it
did, the ancient learning of Greece and Rome, might have
awakened our Renaissance much earlier, while in the
East the influence of the mediaeval West, with its aboimd-
ing vigor, might have saved Moslem civilization from the
creeping paralysis which was overtaking it.
But it was not to be. In Islam the reflned, easy-going
Saracen gave place to the bigoted, brutal Turk. Islam
became once more aggressive — not, as in its early days,
for an ideal, but for sheer blood-lust, plunder, and destruc-
tion. Henceforth it was war to the knife between the
only possible civilization and the most brutal and hope-
less barbarism. Furthermore, this war was destined to
last for centuries. The Crusades were merely Western
counter-attacks against a Turkish assault on Christendom
which continued for six hundred years and was definitely
broken only under the waUs of Vienna in 1683. Naturally,
from these centuries of unrelenting strife furious hatreds
and fanaticisms were engendered which stiU envenom
the relations of Islam and Christendom. The atrocities
of Mustapha KemaFs Turkish "Nationalists" and the
atrocities of the Greek troops in Asia Minor, of which we
read in our morning papers, are in no small degree a
"carrying on" of the mutual atrocities of Turks and
Crusaders in Palestine eight hundred years ago.
With the details of those old wars between Turks and
Christians this book has no direct concern. The wars
INTRODUCTION 17
themselves should simply be noted as a chronic barrier
between East and West. As for the Moslem East, with
its declining Saracenic civilization bowed beneath the
brutal Turkish yoke, it wa? presently exposed to even
more terrible misfortunes. These misfortunes were also of
Turanian origin. Toward the close of the twelfth century
the eastern branches of the Turanian race were welded
into a temporary unity by the genius of a mighty chieftain
named Jenghiz IChan. Taking the sinister title of "The
Inflexible Emperor," this arch-savage started out to loot
the world. He first overran northern Chiaa, which he
hideously ravaged, then turned his devastating course
toward the west. Such was the rise of the terrible
"Mongols," whose name still stinks in the nostrils of
civilized mankind. Carrying with them skilled Chinese
engineers using gunpowder for the reduction of fortified
cities, Jenghiz Khan and his mounted hosts proved every-
where irresistible. The Mongols were the most appalling
barbarians whom the world has ever seen. Their object
was not conquest for settlement, not even loot, but in
great part a sheer satanic lust for blood and destruction.
They revelled in butchering whole populations, destroying
cities, laying waste countiysides — and then passing on to
fresh fields.
Jenghiz Khan died after a few years of his westward
progress, but his successors continued his work with
unabated zeal. Both Christendom and Islam were
smitten by the Mongol scourge. All eastern Europe was
ravaged and rebarbarized, the Russians showing ugly
traces of the Mongol imprint to this day. But the woes
of Christendom were as nothing to the woes of Islam.
The Mongols never penetrated beyond Poland, and west-
18 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
ern Europe, the seat of Western ci\dlization, was left
imscathed. Not so Islam. Pouiing down from the north-
east, the IMongol hosts whii'led like a cyclone over the
Moslem world from India to 'Egypt, pillaging, mm-dering,
and destroying. The nascent civilization of mediaeval
Persia, just struggling into the hght beneath the incubus
of Turkish hai'iyings, was stamped flat under the Mongol
hoofs, and the Mongols then proceeded to deal with the
Moslem culture-centre — ^Bagdad. Bagdad had declined
considerably from the gorgeous days of Haroun-al-
Rashid, with its legendary milHon souls. However, it
was still a great city, the seat of the caliphate and the
unquestioned centre of Saracenic ci\ilization. The Mon-
gols stormed it (1258 A. D.), butchered its entire popula-
tion, and Hterally wiped Bagdad off the face of the earth.
And even this was not the worst. Bagdad was the capital
of Mesopotamia. This "Land between the Rivers" had,
in the very dawn of history^, been reclaimed from swamp
and desert by the patient labors of half -forgotten peoples
who, with infinite toil, built up a marvellous system of
irrigation that made Mesopotamia the perennial garden
and granary of the world. Ages had passed and Mesopo-
tamia had known many masters, but all these conquer-
ors had respected, even cherished, the irrigation works
which were the source of all prosperity. These works
the Mongols wantonly, methodically destroyed. The
oldest ci\dlization in the world, the cradle of human cul-
ture, was hopelessly ruined; at least eight thousand years
of continuous human effort went for naught, and Mesopo-
tamia became the noisome land it stiU remains to-day,
parched during the droughts of low water, soaked to
fever-stricken marsh in the season of river-floods, ten-
INTRODUCTION 19
anted only by a few mongrel fellahs inhabiting wretched
mud villages, and cowed by nomad Bedouin browsing
their flocks on the sites of ancient fields.
The destruction of Bagdad was a fatal blow to Saracenic
civilization, especially in the east. And even before that
dreadful disaster it had received a terrible blow in the
west. Traversing North Africa in its early days, Islam
had taken firm root in Spain, and had so flourished there
that Spanish Moslem culture was fully abreast of that in
the Moslem East. The capital of Spanish Islam was
Cordova, the seat of the Western cafiphate, a mighty
city, perhaps more wonderful than Bagdad itself. For
centuries Spanish Islam Hved secure, confining the Chris-
tians to the mountainous regions of the north. As
Saracen vigor declined, however, the Christians pressed
the Moslems southward. In 1213 Spanish Islam was
hopelessly broken at the tremendous battle of Las Navas
de Tolosa. Thenceforth, for the victorious Christians
it was a case of picking up the pieces. Cordova itself
soon fell, and with it the glory of Spanish Islam, for the
fanatical Christian Spaniards extirpated Saracenic civili-
zation as effectually as the pagan Mongols were at that
time doing. To be sure, a remnant of the Spanish Mos-
lems held their ground at Granada, in the extreme south,
until the year Columbus discovered America, but this was
merely an episode. The Saracen civilization of the West
was virtually destroyed.
Meanwhile the Moslem East continued to bleed under
the Mongol scourge. Wave after wave of Mongol raiders
passed over the land, the last notable invasion being that
headed by the famous (or rather infamous) Tamerlane,
early in the fifteenth century. By this time the western
20 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Mongols had accepted Islam, but that made little differ-
ence in their conduct. To show that Tamerlane was a
true scion of his ancestor Jenghiz Khan, it may be re-
marked that his foible was pyramids of human skulls, his
prize effort being one of 70,000 erected after the storming
of the Persian city of Ispahan. After the cessation of
the Mongol incursions, the ravaged and depopulated
Moslem East feU under the sway of the Ottoman Turks.
The Ottoman Turks, or "OsmanH," were originally
merely one of the many Tm-kish hordes which entered
Asia Minor after the downfall of Byzantine rule. They
owed their greatness mainly to a long line of able sultans,
who gradually absorbed the neighboring Turkish tribes
and used this consolidated strength for ambitious con-
quests both to east and w^est. In 1453 the Osmanli
extinguished the old Byzantine Empire by taking Con-
stantinople, and within a century thereafter they had
conquered the Moslem East from Persia to Morocco, had
subjugated the whole Balkan peninsula, and had ad-
vanced through Hungary to the walls of Vienna. Unlike
their Mongol cousins, the Ottoman Turks built up a
durable empire. It was a barbarous sort of empire, for
the Turks understood very httle about culture. The only
things they could appreciate were military improvements.
These, however, they thoroughly appreciated and kept
fully abreast of the times. In their palmy days the
Turks had the best artillery and the steadiest infantry in
the world, and were the terror of Europe.
Meantime Europe was awakening to true progress and
higher civihzation. While the Moslem East was sinking
under Mongol harrjnngs and Turkish militarism, the
Christian West was thrilling to the Renaissance and the
INTRODUCTION 21
discoveries of America and the water route to India.
The effect of these discoveries simply cannot be over-
estimated. When Columbus and Vasco da Gama made
their memorable voyages at the end of the fifteenth
century, Western civiKzation was pent up closely within
the restricted bounds of west-central Europe, and was
waging a defensive and none-too-hopeful struggle with the
forces of Turanian barbarism. Russia lay under the heel
of the Mongol Tartars, while the Turks, then in the full
flush of their martial vigor, were marching triumphantly
up from the southeast and threatening Europe's very
heart. So strong were these Turanian barbarians, with
Asia, North Africa, and eastern Europe in their grasp, that
Western civilization was hard put to it to hold its own.
Western civilization was, in fact, fighting with its back to
the wall — ^the wall of a boundless ocean. We can hardly
conceive how our mediaeval forefathers viewed the ocean.
To them it was a numbing, constricting presence; the
abode of darkness and horror. No wonder mediaeval
Europe was static, since it faced on mthless, aggressive
Asia, and backed on nowhere. Then, in the twinkling of
an eye, the sea-wall became a highway, and dead-end
Europe became mistress of the ocean — and thereby
mistress of the world.
The greatest strategic shift of fortune in all human
history had taken place. Instead of fronting hopelessly
on the fiercest of Asiatics, against whom victoiy by direct
attack seemed impossible, the Europeans could now flank
them at wiU. Furthermore, the balance of resources
shifted in Europe's favor. Whole new worlds were un-
masked whence Europe could draw limitless wealth to
quicken its home life and initiate a progress that would
22 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
soon place it immeasurably above its once-dreaded Asiatic
assailants. What were the resources of the stagnant
Moslem East compared with those of the Americas and
the Indies? So Western civiHzation, quickened, ener-
gized, progressed with giant strides, shook off its mediaeval
fetters, grasped the talisman of science, and strode into
the light of modern times.
Yet all this left Islam unmoved. Wrapping itself in
the tatters of Saracenic civiHzation, the Moslem East
continued to fall behind. Even its mihtar}^ power
presently vanished, for the Turk sank into lethargy and
ceased to cultivate the art of war. For a time the West,
busied with internal conflicts, hesitated to attack the
East, so great was the prestige of the Ottoman name.
But the crushing defeat of the Turks in their rash attack
upon Vienna in 1683 showed the West that the Ottoman
Empire was far gone in decrepitude. Thenceforth, the
empire was harried mercilessly by Western assaults and
was saved from collapse only by the mutual jealousies of
Western Powers, quarrelling over the Turkish spoils.
However, not until the nineteenth century did the
Moslem world, as a whole, feel the weight of Western
attack. Throughout the eighteenth century the West
assailed the ends of the Moslem battle-line in eastern
Europe and the Indies, but the bulk of Islam, from
Morocco to Central Asia, remained almost immune. The
Moslem world failed to profit by this respite. Plunged
in lethargy, contemptuous of the European "Misbe-
lievers," and accepting defeats as the inscrutable will of
Allah, Islam continued to Uve its old life, neither knowing
nor caring to know anything about Western ideas or
Western progress.
INTRODUCTION 23
Such was the decrepit Moslem world which faced
nineteenth-centuiy Europe, energized by the Industrial
Revolution, armed as never before by modern science and
invention which had unlocked nature's secrets and placed
hitherto-undreamed-of weapons in its aggressive hands.
The result was a foregone conclusion. One by one, the
decrepit Moslem states fell before the Western attack, and
the whole Islamic world was rapidly partitioned among
the European Powers. England took India and Egypt,
Russia crossed the Caucasus and mastered Central Asia,
France conquered North Africa, while other European
nations grasped minor portions of the Moslem heritage.
The Great War witnessed the final stage in this process of
subjugation. By the terms of the treaties which marked
its close, Turkey was extinguished and not a single
Mohammedan state retained genuine independence. The
subjection of the Moslem world was complete — on paper.
On paper ! For, in its very hour of apparent triumph.
Western domination was challenged as never before.
During those hundred years of Western conquest a mighty
internal change had been coming over the Moslem world.
The swelHng tide of Western aggression had at last moved
the "inomovable" East. At last Islam became conscious
of its decrepitude, and with that consciousness a vast
ferment, obscure yet profoimd, began to leaven the
250,000,000 followers of the Prophet from Morocco to
China and from Turkestan to the Congo. The first
spark was fittingly struck in the Arabian desert, the
cradle of Islam. Here, at the opening of the nineteenth
century, arose the Wahabi movement for the reform of
Islam, which presently kindled the far-flung "Moham-
medan Revival," which in its turn begat the movement
24 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
known as "Pan-Islamism." Furthermore, athwart these
essentially internal movements there came pouring a
flood of external stimuli from the West — ideas such as
parhamentary government, nationalism, scientific educa-
tion, industriaHsm, and even ultramodern concepts hke
feminism, socialism, Bolshevism. Stirred by the inter-
action of all these novel forces and spurred by the cease-
less pressure of European aggression, the Moslem world
roused more and more to life and action. The Great War
was a shock of terrific potency, and to-day Islam is seeth-
ing with mighty forces fashioning a new Moslem world.
What are those forces moulding the Islam of the future?
To their analysis and appraisal the body of this book is
devoted.
THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
"Das Alte sturzt, es andert sich die Zeit,
Und neues Leben bliiht aus den Ruinen."
Schiller: Wilhelm Tell.
CHAPTER I
THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL
By the eighteenth century the Moslem world had sunk
to the lowest depth of its decrepitude. Nowhere were
there any signs of healthy vigor; everywhere were stag-
nation and decay. Manners and morals were alike
execrable. The last vestiges of Saracenic culture had
vanished in a barbarous luxury of the few and an equally
barbarous degradation of the multitude. Learning was
virtually dead, the few universities which survived fallen
into dreary decay and languishing in poverty and neglect.
Government had become despotism tempered by anarchy
and assassination. Here and there a major despot hke
the Sultan of Turkey or the Indian "Great Mogul"
maintained some semblance of state authority, albeit
provincial pashas were forever striving to erect inde-
pendent governments based, like their masters', on
tyranny and extortion. The pashas, in turn, strove
ceaselessly against unruly local chiefs and swarms of
brigands who infested the countryside. Beneath this
sinister hierarchy groaned the people, robbed, bullied,
and ground into the dust. Peasant and townsman had
alike lost all incentive to labor or initiative, and both
agriculture and trade had fallen to the lowest level com-
patible with bare survival.
As for religion, it was as decadent as everything else.
25
26 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
The austere monotheism of Mohammed had become over-
laid with a rank growth of superstition and puerile
mysticism. The mosques stood unfrequented and ruin-
ous, deserted by the ignorant multitude, which, decked
out in amulets, charms, and rosaries, listened to squalid
fakirs or ecstatic der^^ishes, and went on pilgrimages
to the tombs of "holy men," worshipped as saints
and "intercessors" with that Allah who had become too
remote a being for the direct devotion of these benighted
souls. As for the moral precepts of the Koran, they were
ignored or defied. Wine-drinking and opium-eating were
well-nigh universal, prostitution was rampant, and the
most degrading vices flaunted naked and unashamed.
Even the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, were sink-holes
of iniquity, while the "Hajj," or pilgrimage ordained by
the Prophet, had become a scandal through its abuses. In
fine: the life had apparently gone out of Islam, leaving
naught but a dry husk of soulless ritual and degrading
superstition behind. Could Mohammed have returned
to earth, he would unquestionably have anathematized
his followers as apostates and idolaters.
Yet, in this darkest hour, a voice came crying out of the
vast Arabian desert, the cradle of Islam, calling the
faithful back to the true path. This puritan reformer,
the famous Abd-el-Wahab, kindled a fire which presently
spread to the remotest comers of the Moslem world,
purging Islam of its sloth and reviving the fervor of olden
days. The great Mohammedan Revival had begun.
Mahommed ibn Abd-el-Wahab was born about the year
1700 A. D. in the heart of the Arabian desert, the region
known as the Nejd. The Nejd was the one clean spot
in the decadent Moslem world. We have already seen
THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 27
how, with the transformation of the caHphate from a
theocratic democracy to an Oriental despotism, the free-
spirited Arabs had returned scornfully to their deserts.
Here they had maintained their wild freedom. Neither
caliph nor sultan dared venture far into those vast
solitudes of burning sand and choking thirst, where the
rash invader was lured to sudden death in a whirl of
stabbing spears. The Arabs recognized no master, wan-
dering at will with their flocks and camels, or settled here
and there in green oases hidden in the desert's heart.
And in the desert they retained their primitive political
and religious virtues. JTh e nomad B edouin lived undgr
_the_sway of patriarchal ^^ sheiks "; the se ttledjiwellers
jn the oases usuaT^^^acknowledged the authority of some
leading famHy? But these rulers"possessed the slenderest
aulEorily, narrowly circumscribed by well-established
custom and a jealous public opinion which they trans-
gressed at their peril. The Turks, to be sure, had managed
to acquire a precarious authority over the holy cities and
the Red Sea littoral, but the Nejd, the vast interior, was
free. And, in religion, as in politics, the desert Arabs kept
the faith of their fathers. Scornfully rejecting the corrup-
tions of decadent Islam, they held fast to the simple theol-
ogy of primitive Islam, so congenial to their Arab natures.
Into this atmosphere of an older and better age, Abd-
el-Wahab was bom. Displa3ang from the first a studious
and religious bent, he soon acquired a reputation' for
learning and sanctity. Making the Meccan pilgrimage
while still a young man, he studied at Medina and trav-
elled as far as Persia, returning ultimately to the Nejd.
He returned burning with holy wrath at what he had seen
and determined to preach a puritan reformation. For
J
28 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
years he wandered up and down Arabia, and at last he
converted Mahommed, head of the great clan of Saud,
the most powerful chieftain in all the Nejd. This gave
Abd-el-Wahab both moral prestige and material strength,
and he made the most of his opportunities. Gradually
the desert Arabs were welded into a politico-religious
unity like that effected by the Prophet. Abd-el-Wahab
was, in truth, a faithful counterpart of the first caliphs,
Abu Bekr and Omar. When he died in 1787 his disciple,
Saud, proved a worthy successor. The new Wahabi
\ state was a close counteipart of the Meccan caliphate.
Though possessing great military power, Saud always
considered himself responsible to public opinion and never
I encroached upon the legitimate freedom of his subjects.
j Government, though stern, was able and just. The
Wahabi judges w^ere competent and honest. Robbery
became almost unknown, so well was the public peace
maintained. Education was sedulously fostered. Every
oasis had its school, while teachers were sent to the
Bedouin tribes.
Having consolidated the Nejd, Saud was now ready to
undertake the greater task of subduing and purifying
J the Moslem world. His first objective was of course the
holy cities. This objective was attained in the opening
years of the nineteenth century. Nothing could stand
against the rush of the Wahabi hosts burning with fanatic
hatred against the Turks, who were loathed both as
apostate Moslems and as usurpers of that supremacy in
Islam which all Arabs believed should rest in Arab hands.
When Saud died in 1814 he was preparing to invade
Syria. It looked for a moment as though the Wahabis
were to sweep the East and puritanize all Islam at a blow.
THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 29
But it was not to be. Unable to stem the Wahabi
flood, the Sultan of Turkey called on his powerful vassal,
the famous Mehemet Ali. This able Albanian adventurer
had by that time made himself master of Egypt. Frankly
recognizing the superiority of the West, he had called in
numerous European officers who rapidly fashioned a
formidable army, composed largely of hard-fighting
Albanian highlanders, and disciplined and equipped after
European models. Mehemet Ali gladly answered the
Sultan's summons, and it soon became clear that even
Wahabi fanaticism was no match for European muskets
and artillery handled by seasoned veterans. In a short
time the holy cities were recaptured and the Wahabis
were driven back into the desert. The nascent Wahabi
empire had vanished like a mirage. Wahabism's political
role was ended. ^
However, Wahabism's spiritual role had only just
begun. The Nejd remained a focus of puritan zeal
whence the new spirit radiated in all directions. Even
in the holy cities Wahabism continued to set the religious
tone, and the numberless "Hajjis," or pilgrims, who came
annually from every part of the Moslem world returned to
their homes zealous reformers. Soon the Wahabi leaven
began to produce profound disturbances in the most dis-
tant quarters. For example, in northern India a Wahabi
fanatic, Seyid Ahmed,^ so roused the Punjabi Moham-
1 On the Wahabi movement, see A. Le Chatelier, U Islam au dix-
neuvieme Siede (Paris, 1888); W. G. Palgrave, Essays on Eastern Ques-
tions (London, 1872); D. B. Macdonald, Muslim Theology (London,
1903); J. L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys (2 vols.,
London, 1831); A. Chodzko, "Le Deisme des Wahhabis," Journal
Asiatique, IV, vol. II, pp. 168 et seq.
^ Not to be confused with Sir Syed Ahmed of Aligarh, the Indian Moslem
liberal of the mid-nineteenth century.
30 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
medans that he actually built up a theocratic state, and
only his chance death prevented a possible Wahabi
conquest of northern India. This state was shattered by
the SikhS; about 1830, but when the English conquered
the country they had infinite trouble with the smouldering
embers of Wahabi feeling, which, in fact, lived on, con-
tributed to the Indian mutiny, and permanently fanati-
cized Afghanistan and the wild tribes of the Indian
Northwest Frontier.' It was during these years that
the famous Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi came from
his Algerian home to Mecca and there imbibed those
Wahabi principles which led to the founding of the great
Pan-Islamic fraternity that bears his name. Even the
Babbist movement in Persia, far removed though it
was doctrinally from Waliabi teaching, was indubitably
a secondary' reflex of the Wahabi urge.^ In fact, \\dthin a
generation, the strictly Wahabi movement had broadened
into the larger development known as the Mohammedan
Re\ival, and this in turn was developing numerous
phases, chief among them being the movement usually
termed Pan-Islamism. That movement, particularly on
its political side, I shall treat in the next chapter. At
present let us examine the other aspects of the Moham-
medan Revival, with special reference to its religious and
cultural phases.
The Wahabi movement was a strictly puritan reforma-
tion. Its aim was the reform of abuses, the abolition of
1 For English alarm at the latent fanaticism of the North Indian Mos-
lems, down through the middle of the nineteenth century, see Sir W. W.
Hunter, The Indian Musalmans (London, 1872).
2 For the Babbist movement, see Clement Huart, La Religion de Bab
(Paris, 1889) ; Comte Arthur de Gobineau, Trois Ans en Perse (Paris, 1867).
A good summary of all these early movements of the Mohammedan revival
is found in Le Chatelier, op. cit.
THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 31
superstitious practices, and a return to primitive Islam.
All later accretions — the writings and interpretations of
the mediaeval theologians, ceremonial or mystical inno-
vations, saint worship, in fact every sort of change, were
condemned. The austere monotheism of Mohammed
was preached in all its uncompromising simplicity, and
the Koran, literally interpreted, was taken as the sole
guide for human action. This doctrinal simplification
was accompanied by a most rigid code of morals. The
prayers, fastings, and other practices enjoined by Mo-
hammed were scrupulously observed. The most austere
manner of living was enforced. Silken clothing, rich
food, wine, opium, tobacco, coffee, and all other indul-
gences were sternly proscribed. Even religious architec-
ture was practically tabooed, the Wahabis pulling down
the Prophet's tomb at Medma and demolishing the
minarets of mosques as godless innovations. The Waha-
bis were thus, despite their moral earnestness, excessively
narrow-minded, and it was very fortunate for Islam that
they soon lost their political power and were compelled
thenceforth to confine their efforts to moral teaching.
Many critics of Islam point to the Wahabi movement
as a proof that Islam is essentially retrograde and imiately
incapable of evolutionary development. These criticisms,
however, appear to be unwarranted. The initial stage
of every religious reformation is an uncritical return to
the primitive cult. To the religious reformer the only
way of salvation is a denial of all subsequent innovations,
regardless of their character. Our own Protestant Ref-
ormation began in just this way, and Humanists like
Erasmus, repelled and disgusted by Protestantism's
puritanical narrowness, could see no good in the move-
32 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
ment, declaring that it menaced all true culture and merely
replaced an infallible Pope by an infallible Bible.
As a matter of fact; the puritan beginnings of the
Mohammedan Revival presently broadened along more
constructive lines, some of these becoming tinged with
undoubted liberalism. The Moslem reformers of the
early nineteenth century had not dug ver^^ deeply into
their religious past before they discovered — Motazelism.
We have already reviewed the great struggle which had
raged between reason and dogma in Islam's early days,
in which dogma had triumphed so completely that the
very memory of Motazelism had faded away. Now,
however, those memories were revived, and the hberal-
minded reformers were delighted to find such striking
confirmation of their ideas, both in the writings of the
Motazehte doctors and in the sacred texts themselves.
The principle that reason and not blind prescription was
to be the test opened the door to the possibility of all
those reforms which they had most at heart. For
example, the reformers found that in the traditional
writings Mohammed was reported to have said: "I am
no more than a man ; when I order you anything respecting
religion, receive it ; when I order you about the affairs of
the world, then I am nothing more than man." And,
again, as though foreseeing the day when sweeping changes
would be necessary: "Ye are in an age in which, if ye
abandon one-tenth of that which is ordered, ye will be
ruined. After this, a time will come when he who shall
observe one-tenth of what is now ordered will be re-
deemed." ^
Before discussing the ideas and efforts of the modem
^ Mishkat-el-Masabih, I, 46, 51.
THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 33
Moslem reformers, it might be well to examine the asser-
tions made by nmnerous Western criticS; that Islam is
by its very nature incapable of reform and progressive
adaptation to the expansion of human knowledge. Such
is the contention not only of Christian polemicists/ but
also of rationalists like Renan and European adminis-
trators of Moslem populations like Lord Cromer. Lord
Cromer, in fact, pithily summarizes this critical attitude
in his statement: "Islam cannot be reformed; that is to
say, reformed Islam is Islam no longer; it is something
else." 2
Now these criticisms, coming as they do from close
students of Islam often possessing intimate personal
acquaintance with Moslems, deserve respectful considera-
tion. And yet an historical survey of reHgions, and
especially a survey of the thoughts and accomplishments
of Moslem reformers during the past century, seem to
refute these pessimistic charges.
In the first place, it should be remembered that Islam
to-day stands just about where Christendom stood in
the fifteenth century, at the beginning of the Reformation.
There is the same supremacy of dogma over reason, the
same blind adherence to prescription and authority, the
same suspicion and hostility to freedom of thought or
scientific knowledge. There is no doubt that a study
of the Mohammedan sacred texts, particularly of the
^ The best recent examples of this polemical literature are the writings
of the Rev. S. M. Zwemer, the well-known missionary to the Arabs; espe-
cially his Arabia, the Cradle of Islam (Edinburgh, 1900), and The Reproach
of Islam (London, 1915). Also see volume entitled The Mohammedan
World of To-day, being a collection of the papers read at the Protestant
Missionary Conference held at Cairo, Egypt, in 1906.
2 Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. II, p. 229 (London, 1908). For Renan'a
attitude, see his L'Islamisme et la Science (Paris, 1883).
34 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
"sheriat" or canon law, together with a glance over
Moslem history for the last thousand years, reveal an
attitude on the whole quite incompatible with modern
progress and civilization. But was not precisely the
same thing true of Christendom at the beginning of the
fifteenth century? Compare the sheriat with the Chris-
tian canon law. The spirit is the same. Take, for
example, the sheriat's prohibition on the lending of money
at interest; a prohibition which, if obeyed, renders im-
possible anything like business or industry in the modern
sense. This is the example oftenest cited to prove Islam's
innate incompatibility with modern civilization. But
the Christian canon law equally forbade interest, and
enforced that prohibition so strictly, that for centuries
the Jews had a monopoly of business in Europe, while the
first Christians who dared to lend money (the Lombards)
were regarded almost as heretics, were universally hated,
and were frequently persecuted. Again, take the matter
of Moslem hostility to freedom of thought and scientific
investigation. Can Islam show anything more revolting
than that scene in Christian history when, less than
three hundred years ago,^ the great Galileo was haled
before the Papal Inquisition and forced, under threat of
torture, to recant the damnable heresy that the earth
went round the sun ?
As a matter of fact, Mohammed reverenced knowledge.
-J His own words are eloquent testimony to that. Here
are some of his sayings:
f "Seek knowledge, even, if need be, on the borders of
China."
"Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave."
» In the year 1633.
THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 35
^ "One word of knowledge is of more value than the
reciting of a hundred prayers."
"The ink of sages is more precious than the blood of
martyrs."
"One word of wisdom, learned and communicated to a
Moslem brother, outweighs the prayers of a whole year."
"Wise men are the successors of the Prophet."
^'God has created nothing better than reason."
"In truth, a man may have prayed, fasted, given alms,
made pilgrimage, and all other good works; nevertheless,
he shall be rewarded only in the measure that he has used
his common sense."
These citations (and there are others of the same
tenor) prove that the modern Moslem reformers have
good scriptural backing for their Hberal attitude. Of
course I do not imply that the reform movement in
Islam, just because it is liberal and progressive, is thereby
ipso jado assured of success. History reveals too many
melancholy instances to the contrary. Indeed, we have
already seen how, in Islam itself, the promising liberal
movement of its early days passed utterly away. What
history does show, however, is that when the times fa-
vor progress, religions are adapted to that progress by
being reformed and liberalized. No human society once
fairly on the march was ever turned back by a creed.
Halted it may be, but if the progressive urge persists, the
doctrinal barrier is either surmounted, undermined,
flanked, or swept aside. Now there is no possibility that
the Moslem world will henceforth lack progressive in-
fluences. It is in close contact with Western civilization
and is being increasingly permeated with Western ideas.
Islam cannot break away and isolate itself if it would.
36 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Everything therefore portends its profound modification.
Of course critics like Lord Cromer contend that this
modified Islam will be Islam no longer. But why not ? If
the people continue to call themselves Mohammedans and
continue to draw spiritual sustenance from the message
of Mohammed, why should they be denied the name?
Modern Christianity is certainly vastly different from
mediaeval Christianity, while among the various Christian
churches there exist the widest doctrinal variations.
Yet aU who consider themselves Christians are considered
Christians by all except bigots out of step with the times.
Let us now scrutinize the Moslem reformers, judging
them, not by texts and chronicles, but by their words and
deeds; since, as one of their number, an Algerian, very
pertinently remarks, "men should be judged, not by the
letter of their sacred books, but by what they actually
do."i
Modern Moslem Hberalism, as we have seen, received
; its first encouragement from the discover}^ of the old
J Motazelite literature of nearly a thousand years before.
To be sure, Islam had never been quite destitute of liberal
minds. Even in its darkest days a few voices had been
raised against the prevailing obscurantism. For example,
in the sixteenth century the celebrated El-Gharani had
written: "It is not at all impossible that God may hold
in reserve for men of the future perceptions that have not
been vouchsafed to the men of the past. Divine munifi-
cence never ceases to pour benefits and enlightenment
into the hearts of wise men of every age." ^ These isolated
voices from Islam's Dark Time helped to encourage the
^ Ismael Hamet, Les Musulmans fran^ais du Nord de I'Afriqrie (Paris,
1906).
* Quoted by Dr. Perron in his work Ulslamisme (Paris, 1877).
THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 37
modem reformers, and by the middle of the nineteenth
century every Moslem land had its group of forward-
looking men. At first their numbers were, of course, in-
significant, and of course they drew down upon them-
selves the anathemas of the fanatic MoUahs^ and the
hatred of the ignorant multitude. The first country
where the reformers made their influence definitely felt
was in India. Here a group headed by the famous Sir
Syed Ahmed Khan started an important liberal move-
ment, founding associations, publishing books and news-
papers, and establishing the well-known college of Ali-
garh. Sir Syed Ahmed is a good type of the early Hberal
reformers. Conservative in temperament and perfectly
orthodox in his theology, he yet denounced the current
decadence of Islam with truly Wahabi fervor. He also
was frankly appreciative of Western ideas and eager to
assimilate the many good things which the West had to
offer. As he wrote in 1867: "We must study European
scientific works, even though they are not written by
Moslems and though we may find in them things con-
trary to the teachings of the Koran. We should imitate
the Arabs of olden days, who did not fear to shake their
faith by studying Pj^thagoras." ^
^ The Mollahs axe the Moslem clergy, though they do not exactly cor-
respond to the clergy of Christendom. Mohammed was averse to anything
like a priesthood, and Islam makes no legal provision for an ordained
priestly class or caste, as is the case in Christianity, Judaism, Brahmanism,
and other religions. Theoretically any Moslem can conduct religious
services. As time passed, however, a class of men developed who were
learned in Moslem theology and law. These ultimately became practically
priests, though theoretically they should be regarded as theological lawyers.
There also developed religious orders of dervishes, etc.; but primitive
Islam knew nothing of them.
^ From the article by Leon Cahun in Lavisse et Rambeaud, Histoire
Generale, vol. XII, p. 498. This article gives an excellent general survey
of the intellectual development of the Moslem world in the nineteenth
century.
38 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
This nucleus of Indian Moslem liberals rapidly grew in
strength, producing able leaders like Moulvie Cheragh
Ali and Syed Amir Ali, whose scholarly works in faultless
EngHsh are known throughout the world. ^ These men
called themselves "Neo-Motazelites" and boldly advo-
cated reforms such as a thorough overhauling of the
sheriat and a general modernization of Islam. Their
view-point is well set forth by another of their leading
figures, S. Khuda Bukhsh. '* Nothing was more distant
from the Prophet's thought/' he writes, "than to fetter
the mind or to lay down fixed, immutable, unchanging
laws for his followers. The Quran is a book of guidance
to the faithful, and not an obstacle in the path of their
social, moral, legal, and intellectual progress." He la-
ments Islam's present backwardness, for he continues:
"Modem Islam, with its hierarchy of priesthood, gross
fanaticism, appalling ignorance, and superstitious prac-
tices is, indeed, a discredit to the Islam of the Prophet
Mohammed." He concludes with the following liberal
confession of faith: "Is Islam hostile to progress? I will
emphatically answer this question in the negative. Islam,
stripped of its theology, is a perfectly simple religion.
Its cardinal principle is belief in one God and belief in
Mohammed as his apostle. The rest is mere accretion,
superfluity." 2
Meanwhile, the liberals were making themselves felt
in other parts of the Moslem world. In Turkey hberals
actually headed the government during much of the
generation between the Crimean War and the despotism
^ Especially his best-known book, The Spirit of Islam (London, 1891).
* S. Khuda Bukhsh, Essays : Indian and Islamic, pp. 20, 24, 284 (London,
1912).
THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 39
of Abdul Hamid/ and Turkish liberal ministers like
Reshid Pasha and Midhat Pasha made earnest though un-
availing efforts to liberalize and modernize the Ottoman
Empire. Even the dreadful Hamidian tyranny could not
kill Turkish liberalism. It went underground or into exile,
and in 1908 put through the revolution which deposed the
tyrant and brought the "Young Turks" to power. In
Egypt liberalism took firm root, represented by men like
Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, Rector of El Azhar University
and respected friend of Lord Cromer. Even outlying
fragments of Islam like the Russian Tartars awoke to the
new spirit and produced liberal-minded, forward-looking
men.2
The liberal reformers, whom I have been describing, of
course form the part of evolutionary progress in Islam.
They are in the best sense of the word conservatives,
receptive to healthy change, yet maintaining their heredi-
tary poise. Sincerely religious men, they have faith in
Islam as a living, moral force, and from it they continue
to draw their spiritual sustenance.
There are, however, other groups in the Moslem world
who have so far succumbed to Western influences that
they have more or less lost touch with both their spiritual
and cultural pasts. In all the more civilized portions of
the Moslem world, especially in countries long under
European control like India, Egypt, and Algeria, there
are many Moslems, Western-educated and Western cul-
ture-veneered, who have drifted into an attitude vary-
ing from easy-going rehgious indifference to avowed ag-
» 1856 to 1878.
* For the liberal movement among the Russian Tartars, see Arminiua
Vamb6ry, Western Culture in Eastern Lands (London, 1906),
40 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
nosticism. From their minds the old Moslem zeal has
entirely departed. The Algerian Ismael Hamet well de-
scribes the attitude of this class of his fellow countrymen
when he writes: "European scepticism is not without
influence upon the Algerian Moslems, who, if they have
kept some attachment for the external forms of their
religion, usually ignore the unhealthy excesses of the
rehgious sentiment. They do not give up their rehgion,
but they no longer dream of converting all those who do
not practise it ; they want to hand it on to their children,
but they do not worr}^ about other men's salvation. This
is not unbelief; it is not even free thought; but it is luke-
warmness." ^
Beyond these tepid latitudinarians are still other
groups of a very different character. Here we find com-
bined the most contradictory sentmients: young men
whose brains are seething with radical Western ideas —
atheism, sociaHsm, Bolshevism, and what not. Yet,
cmiously enough, these fanatic radicals tend to join
hands with the fanatic reactionaries of Islam in a common
hatred of the West. Considering themselves the bom
leaders (and exploiters) of the ignorant masses, the radi-
cals hunger for poHtical power and rage against that
Western domination which vetoes their ambitious pre-
tensions. Hence, thej^ are mostly extreme "National-
ists," while they are also deep in Pan-Islamic reactionary
schemes. Indeed, we often mtness the strange spectacle
of atheists posing as Moslem fanatics and affecting a
truly dervish zeal. Mr. Bukhsh well describes this type
when he writes: "I know a gentleman, a Mohammedan
^ Ismael Hamet, Les Musvlmans frangais du Nord de VAfrigue, p. 268
(Paris, 1906).
THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 41
by profession, who owes his success in Ufe to his faith.
Though, outwardly, he conforms to all the precepts of
Islam and occasionally stands up in public as the cham-
pion and spokesman of his corehgionists; yet, to my utter
horror, I found that he held opinions about his religion
and its founder which even Voltaire would have rejected
with indignation and Gibbon with commiserating con-
tempt." ^
Later on we shall examine more fully the activities of
these gentry in the chapters devoted to Pan-Islamism
and Nationalism. What I desire to emphasize here is
their pernicious influence on the prospects of a genuine
Mohammedan reformation as visuaHzed by the true re-
formers whom I have described. Their malevolent de-
sire to stir up the fanatic passions of the ignorant masses
and their equally malevolent hatred of everything West-
em except military improvements are revealed by out-
bursts like the following from the pen of a prominent
"Young Turk." "Yes, the Mohammedan religion is in
"-/ open hostiHty to all your world of progress. Learn, ye
European observers, that a Christian, whatever his posi-
tion, by the mere fact that he is a Christian, is in our
eyes a being devoid of all human dignity. Our reasoning
is simple and definitive. We say: the man whose judg-
ment is so perverted as to deny the evidence of the One
God and to fabricate gods of different kinds, cannot be
other than the most ignoble expression of human stu-
pidity. To speak to him would be a humiliation to our
reason and an offense to the grandeur of the Master of
the Universe. The worshipper of false gods is a monster
of ingratitude; he is the execration of the universe; to
» S. Khuda Bukhsh, op. cit., p. 241.
/
42 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
combat him, convert him, or annihilate him is the holiest
task of the Faithful. These are the eternal commands
of om- One God. For us there are in this world only
Believers and MisbeHevers; love, charity, fraternity to
Believers; disgust, hatred, and war to Misbelievers.
Among Misbelievers, the most odious and criminal are
those who, while recognizing God, create Him of earthly
parents, give Him a son, a mother; so monstrous an aber-
ration surpasses, in our eyes, all bounds of iniquity; the
presence of such miscreants among us is the bane of our
existence; their doctrine is a direct insult to the purity of
our faith; their contact a pollution for our bodies; any
relation with them a torture for our souls.
"While detesting you, we have been studying your po-
litical institutions and your military organizations. Be-
sides the new arms which Providence procures for us by
your own means, you yourselves have rekindled the inex-
tinguishable faith of our heroic martyrs. Our Young
Turks, our Babis, our new fraternities, all are sects in
their varied forms, are inspired by the same thought, the
same purpose. Toward what end? Christian civiliza-
tion? Never !"^
Such harangues unfortunately find ready hearers among
the Moslem masses. Although the liberal reformers are
a growing power in Islam, it must not be forgotten that
they are as yet only a minoritj^, an elite, below whom lie
the ignorant masses, still suffering from the blight of age-
long obscurantism, wrapped in admiration of their own
world, which they regard as the highest ideal of human
I J \ * Sheikh Abd-ul-Haak, in Sherif Pasha's organ, Mecheroutietie, of August,
^ I 1912. Quoted from: A. Servier, Le Nationalisme musulman, Constantine,
Algeria, 1913.
THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 43
existence, and fanatically hating everything outside as
wicked, despicable, and deceptive. Even when compelled
to admit the superior power of the West, they hate it
none the less. They rebel blindly against the spirit of
change which is forcing them out of their old ruts, and
their anger is still further heightened by that ubiquitous
Western domination which is pressing upon them from
all sides. Such persons are as clay in the hands of the
Pan-Islamic and Nationalist leaders who mould the multi-
tude to their own sinister ends.
Islam is, in fact, to-day torn between the forces of
liberal reform and chauvinistic reaction. The liberals
are not only the hope of an evolutionary reformation,
they are also favored by the trend of the times, since the
Moslem world is being continually permeated by Western
progress and must continue to be thus permeated unless
Western civilization itself coUapses in ruin. Yet, though
the ultimate triumph of the Hberals appears probable,
what delays, what setbacks, what fresh barriers of war-
fare and fanaticism may not the chauvinist reactionaries
bring about ! Neither the reform of Islam nor the rela-
tions between East and West are free from perils whose
ominous possibilities we shall later discuss.
Meanwhile, there remains the hopeful fact that through-
out the Moslem world a mmierous and powerful minority,
composed not merely of Westernized persons but also of
orthodox conservatives, are aware of Islam's decadence
and are convinced that a thoroughgoing reformation
along Hberal, progressive lines is at once a practical
necessity and a sacred duty. Exactly how this reforma-
tion shall be legally effected has not yet been determined,
nor is a detailed discussion of technical machinery neces-
>f
44 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
saiy for our consideration.^ History teaches us that
where the will to reform is vitally present, reformation
will somehow or other be accomplished.
One thing is certain: the reforming spirit, in its various
manifestations, has already produced profound changes
throughout Islam. The Moslem world of to-day is vastly
different from the Moslem world of a century ago. The
Wahabi leaven has destroyed abuses and has rekindled
a purer religious faith. Even its fanatical zeal has not
been without moral compensations. The spread of lib-
eral principles and Western progress goes on apace. If
there is much to fear for the future, there is also much
to hope.
^ For such discussion of legal methods, see W. S. Blunt, The Future of
Islam (London, 1882); A. Le chatelier, U I slam au dix-neuvihne SiM,e
(Paris, 1888); Dr. Perron, L'Islamisme (Paris, 1877); H. N. Brailsford,
"Modernism in Islam," The Fortnightly Review, September, 1908; Sir
Theodore Morison, "Can Islam be Reformed," The Nineteenth Century
and After, October, 1908; M. Pickthall, "La Morale islamique," Revue
Politique Internatiormle, July, 1916; XX, "L'Islam aprSs la Guerre,"
Revue de Paris, 15 January,' 1916.
CHAPTER n
PAN-ISLAMISM
Like all great movements, the Mohammedan Revival
is highly complex. Starting with the simple, puritan
protest of Wahabism, it has developed many phases,
widely diverse and sometimes almost antithetical. In
the previous chapter we examined the phase looking
toward an evolutionary reformation of Islam and a
genuine assimilation of the progressive spirit as well as
the external forms of Western civilization. At the same
time we saw that these liberal reformers are as yet only
a minority, an elite; while the Moslem masses, still
plunged in ignorance and imperfectly awakened from
their age-long torpor, are influenced by other leaders of
a very different character — men inchned to militant
rather than pacific courses, and hostile rather than re-
ceptive to the West. These militant forces are, in their
turn, complex. They may be grouped roughly imder
the general concepts known as " Pan-Islamism " and
"NationaHsm." It is to a consideration of the first of
these two concepts, to Pan-Islamism, that this chapter
is devoted. ^
P^afcl slamism, whi ch in its broadest sense is the feehng^
of soHdaritvJbetw e^ ^^TrueBeES fiia. '/ is as old as
the Prophet, when_j ^hammed and his few followers
were b oimd together by the tie of faith against their
pagan compatnots^ who sougSOheir destruction. To
45
46 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Mohammed the principle of fraternal solidarity among
Moslems was of transcendent importance, and he suc-
ceeded in implanting this so deeply in Moslem hearts
that thirteen centuries have not sensibly weakened it.
The bond between Moslem and Moslem is to-day much
stronger than that bet^\'een Christian and Christian.
Of course Moslems fight bitterly among themselves, but
these conflicts never quite lose the aspect of family
quarrels and tend to be adjourned in presence of infidel
aggression. Islam's profound sense of solidarity prob-
ably explains in large part its extraordinary hold upon
its followers. No other rehgion has such a grip on its
votaries. Islam has won vast territories from Christi-
anity and Brahmanism/ and has driven Magism from
the face of the earth; ^ yet there has been no single in-
stance where a people, once become Moslem, has ever
abandoned the faith. Extirpated they may have been,
like the Moors of Spain, but extirpation is not apostasy.
Islam's solidarity is powerfully buttressed by two of
its fundamental institutions: the "Hajj," or pilgrimage
to Mecca, and the cahphate. Contrary to the general
opinion in the West, it is the Hajj rather than the cali-
phate which has exerted the more consistently imifying
influence. Mohammed ordained the Hajj as a supreme
act of faith, and every year fully 100,000 pilgrims arrive,
drawn from every quarter of the Moslem world. There,
before the sacred Kaaba of Mecca, men of all races,
* Islam has not only won much ground in India, Brahmanism's home-
land, but has also converted virtually the entire populations of the great
islands of Java and Sumatra, where Brahmanism was formerl}^ ascendant.
^ The small Parsi communities of India, centring in Bombay, are the
sole surviving representatives of Zoroastrianism. They were founded by
Zoroastrian refugees after the Mohammedan conquest of Persia in the
seventh century A. D.
PAN-ISLAMISM 47
tongues, and cultures meet and mingle in an ecstacy of
common devotion, returning to their homes bearing the
proud title of "Hajjis/' or Pilgrims — a title which insures
them the reverent homage of their fellow Moslems for all
the rest of their days. The political implications of the
Hajj are obvious. It is in reality a perennial Pan-
Islamic congress, where all the interests of the faith are
discussed by delegates from eveiy part of the Moham-
medan world, and where plans are elaborated for Islam's
defense and propagation. Here nearly all the militant
leaders of the Mohammedan Revival (Abd-el-Wahab,
Mahommed ben Sennussi, Djemal-ed-Din el Afghani,
and many more) felt the imperious summons to their
task.^
As for the cahphate, it has played a great historic
role, especially in its early days, and we have already
studied its varying fortunes. Reduced to a mere shadow
after the Mongol destruction of Bagdad, it was revived
by the Turkish sultans, who assumed the title and were
recognized as caliphs by the orthodox Moslem world.^
However, these sultan-caliphs of Stambul' never suc-
ceeded in winning the religious homage accorded their
predecessors of Mecca and Bagdad. In Arab eyes, espe-
* Though Mecca is forbidden to non-Moslems, a few Europeans have
managed to make the Hajj in disguise, and have written their impressions.
Of these, Snouck Hurgronje's Mekka (2 vols., The Hague, 1888) and Het
Mekkaansche Feest (Leiden, 1889) are the most recent good works. Also
see Burton and Burckhardt. A recent account of value from the pen of a
Mohammedan liberal is: Gazanfar Ali Khan, With the Pilgrims to Mecca;
The Great Pilgrimage of A. H. 1319 (A. D. 1902), with an Introduction by
Arminius Vambery (London, 1905).
^ The Shiite Persians of course refused to recognize any Sunnite or
orthodox caliphate; while the Moors pay spiritual allegiance to their own
Shereefian sultans.
* The Turkish name for Constantinople.
48 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
cially, the spectacle of Turkish caHphs was an anach-
ronism to which they could never be truly reconciled.
Sultan Abdul Hamid, to be sure, made an ambitious
attempt to revive the caliphate's pristine greatness, but
such success as he attained was due more to the general
tide of Pan-Islamic feeling than to the inherent potency
of the caliphal name. The real leaders of modern Pan-
Islamism either gave Abdul Hamid a merely qualified
allegiance or were, like El Sennussi, definitely hostile.
This was not realized in Europe, which came to fear
Abdul Hamid as a sort of Mohammedan pope. Even
to-day most Western observers seem to think that Paa-
Islamism centers in the caliphate, and we see European
publicists hopefully discussing whether the cahphate's
retention by the discredited Turkish sultans, its trans-
ferrence to the Shereef of Mecca, or its total suppression,
will best clip Pan-Islam's wing§. This, however, is a
distinctly short-sighted view. The caHphal institution
is still undoubtedly venerated in Islam. But the shrewd
leaders of the modem Pan-Islamic movement have long
been working on a much broader basis. They realize
that Pan-Islamism's real driving-power today lies not
in the caliphate but in institutions like the Hajj and
the great Pan-Islamic fraternities such as the Sennussiya,
f which I shall presently speak.*
Let us now trace the fortunes of modern Pan-Islamism.
Its first stage was of course the Wahabi movement.
The Wahabi state founded by Abd-el-Wahab in the
^ On the caliphate, see Sir W. Muir, The Caliphate : Its Rise, Decline, and
Fall (Edinburgh, 1915); Sir Mark Sykes, The Caliph's Last Heritage
(London, 1915); XX, "L'Islam aprls la Guerre," Revue de Paris, 15
January, 1916; "The Indian Khilafat Delegation," Foreign Affairs, July,
1920 (Special Supplement).
f
PAN-ISLAMISM 49
Nejd was modelled on the theocratic democracy of the
Meccan caHphs, and when Abd-el-Wahab's princely
disciple, Saud, loosed his fanatic hosts upon the holy
cities, he dreamed that this was but the first step in a
puritan conquest and consolidation of the whole Moslem
world. Foiled in this grandiose design, Wahabism, nev-
ertheless, soon produced profound political disturbances
in distant regions hke northern India and Afghanistan,
as I have already narrated. They were, however, all
integral parts of the Wahabi phase, being essentially
protests against the political decadence of Moslem states
and the moral decadence of Moslem rulers. These out-
breaks were not inspired by any special fear or hatred
of the West, since Europe was not yet seriously assail-
ing Islam except in outlying regions Hke European Tur-
key or the Indies, and the impending peril was conse-
quently not appreciated. ^
By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the
situation had radically altered. The French conquest of
Algeria, the Russian acquisition of Transcaucasia, and
the English mastery of virtually all India, convinced
thoughtful Moslems everywhere that Islam was in deadly
peril of falling under Western dommation. It was at this
time that Pan-Islamism assumed that essentially anti-
Western character which it has ever since retained.
At first resistance to Western encroachment was spo-
radic and uncoordinated. Here and there heroic fig-
ures Hke Abd-el-Kader in Algeria and Shamyl in the
Caucasus fought brilHantly against the European in-
vaders. But, though these paladins of the faith were
accorded wide-spread sympathy from Moslems, they re-
ceived no tangible assistance and, unaided, fell.
50 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Fear and hatred of the West, however, steadily grew
in intensity, and the seventies saw the Moslem world
swept from end to end by a wave of militant fanaticism.
In Algeria there was the Kabyle insmrection of 1871,
while all over North Africa arose fanatical "Holy Men"
preaching holy wars, the greatest of these being the
Mahdist insurrection in the Egyptian Sudan, which
maintained itself against England's best efforts down
to Kitchener's capture of Khartum at the very end of
the century. In Afghanistan there was an intense ex-
acerbation of fanaticism awakening sympathetic echoes
among the Indian Moslems, both of which gave the
British much trouble. In Central Asia there was a sim-
ilar access of fanaticism, centring in the powerful Nake-
chabendiya fraternity, spreading eastward into Chinese
territory and culminating in the great revolts of the
Chinese Mohammedans both in Chinese Turkestan and
Yunnan. In the Dutch East Indies there was a whole
series of revolts, the most serious of these being the At-
chin War, which dragged on interminably, not being
quite stamped out even to-day.
The salient characteristic of this period of militant
unrest is its lack of co-ordination. These risings were all
spontaneous outbursts of local populations; animated, to
be sure, by the same spirit of fear and hatred, and in-
flamed by the same fanatical hopes, but with no evi-
dence of a central authority laying settled plans and
moving in accordance with a definite programme. The
risings were inspired largely by the mystical doctrine
known as "Mahdism." Mahdism was unknown to prim-
itive Islam, no trace of it occurring in the Koran. But
in the "traditions," or reputed sayings of Mohammed,
PAN-ISLAMISM 51
there occurs the statement that the Prophet predicted
the coming of one bearing the title of "El Mahdi" ^
who would fill the earth with equity and justice- From
this arose the wide-spread mystical hope in the appear-
ance of a divinely inspired personage who would effect
the universal triumph of Islam, purge the world of infi-
dels, and assure the lasting happiness of all Moslems.
This doctrine has profoundly influenced Moslem history.
At various times fanatic leaders have arisen claiming to
be El Mahdi, "The Master of the Hour/' and have won
the frenzied devotion of the Moslem masses; just as cer-
tain "Messiahs" have similarly excited the Jews. It
was thus natural that, in their growing apprehension
and impotent rage at Western aggression, the Moslem
masses should turn to the messianic hope of Mahdism.
Yet Mahdism, by its very nature, could effect nothing
constructive or permanent. It was a mere straw fire;
flaring up fiercely here and there, then dying down, leav-
ing the disillusioned masses more discouraged and apa-
thetic than before.
"^~-, Now all this was recognized by the wiser supporters
of the Pan-Islamic idea. The impotence of the wildest
outbursts of local fanaticism against the methodical
might of Europe convinced thinking Moslems that long
preparation and complete co-ordination of effort were
necessary if Islam was to have any chance of throwing
off the Em-opean yoke. Such men also realized that
they must study Western methods and adopt much of
the Western technic of power. Above all, they felt that
the political liberation of Islam from Western domination
must be preceded by a profound spiritual regeneration,
^ Literally, "he who is guided aright."
52 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
thereby engendeiing the moral forces necessary both for
the war of Hberation and for the fruitful reconstruction
which should follow thereafter. At this point the ideals
of Pan-Islamists and liberals approach each other. Both
recognize Islam's present decadence; both desire its
spiritual regeneration. It is on the nature of that regen-
^j^ eration that* the two parties are opposed. The liberals
beheve that Islam should really assimilate Western ideas.
The Pan-Islamists, on the other hand, believe that prim-
itive Islam contains all that is necessary for regenera-
tion, and contend that only Western methods and ma-
terial achievements should be adopted by the Moslem
world.
1 The begiimings of self-conscious, systematic Pan-
Islamism date from about the middle of the nineteenth
/ u- -'^ century. The movement cr^^staUizes about two foci:
^ y^' ' the new-type rehgious fraternities Hke the Sennussiya,
,^ {^ and the propaganda of the group of thinkers headed by
Djemal-ed-Din. Let us first consider the fraternities.
Rehgious fraternities have existed in Islam for cen-
turies. They all possess the same general type of or-
ganization, being divided into lodges ("Zawias") headed
by Masters known as "Mokaddem," who exercise a
more or less extensive authority over the "Khouan" or
Brethren. Until the foundation of the new-type organ-
izations Hke the Sennussi, however, the fraternities ex-
erted little practical influence upon mundane affairs.
Their interests were almost wholly rehgious, of a mysti-
cal, devotional nature, often characterized by great aus-
terities or by fanatical excesses hke those practised by
the whirling and howling dervishes. Such poHtical in-
fluence as they did exert was casual and local. Any-
PAN-ISLAMISM 53
thing like joint action was impossible, owing to their
mutual rivalries and jealousies. These old-type fraterni-
ties still exist in great numbers, but they are without
political importance except as they have been leavened
by the new-type fraternities.
The new-type organizations date from about the middle
of the nineteenth century, the most important in every
way being the Sennussiya. Its founder, Seyid Ma-
hommed ben Sennussi, was born near Mostaganem,
Algeria, about the year 1800. As his title "Seyid"
indicates, he was a descendant of the Prophet, and was
thus born to a position of honor and importance.^ He
early displayed a strong bent for learning and piety,
studying theology at the Moorish University of Fez
and afterward travelling widely over North Africa
preaching a reform of the prevailing religious abuses. He
then made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and there his re-
formist zeal was still further quickened by the Wahabi
teachers. It was at that time that he appears to have
definitely formulated his plan of a great puritan order,
and in 1843 he returned to North Africa, setthng in
TripoH, where ho built his first Zawia, known as the
"Zawia Baida," or White Monastery, in the mountains
near Derna. So impressive was his personahty and so
great his organizing abiUty that converts flocked to him
from all over North Africa. Indeed, his power soon
alarmed the Turkish authorities in Tripoli, and relations
became so strained that Seyid Mahommed presently
moved his headquarters to the oasis of Jarabub, far to
the south in the Lybian desert. When he died in 1859,
1 "Seyid" means "Lord." This title is borne only by descendants of
the Prophet.
54 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
his organization had spread over the greater part of
North Africa.
Seyid Mahommed's work was carried on uninter-
ruptedly by his son, usually known as Sennussi-el-Mahdi.
The manner in which this son gained his succession typ-
ifies the Sennussi spirit. Seyid Mahommed had two
sons, El-Mahdi being the younger. While they were
still mere lads, their father determined to put them to a
test, to discover which of them had the stronger faith.
In presence of the entire Zawia he bade both sons chmb
a tall palm-tree, and then adjured them by Allah and his
Prophet to leap to the ground. The younger lad leaped
at once and reached the ground unharmed; the elder boy
refused to spring. To El-Mahdi, "who feared not to
commit himself to the will of God," passed the right to
rule. Throughout his long life Sennussi-el-Mahdi justi-
fied his father's choice, displaying wisdom and piety of a
high order, and further extending the power of the fra-
ternity. During the latter part of his reign he removed
his headquarters to the oasis of Jowf, stiU farther into the
Lybian desert, where he died ia 1902, and was succeeded
by his nephew, Ahmed-el-Sherif, the present head of the
order, who also appears to possess marked ability.
With nearly eighty years of successful activity behind
it, the Sennussi Order is to-day one of the vital factors in
Islam. It counts its adherents in every quarter of the
Moslem world. In Arabia its followers are very numer-
ous, and it profoundly influences the spiritual life of the
holy cities, Mecca and Medina. North Africa, however,
stiU remains the focus of Sennussism. The whole of
northern Africa, from Morocco to SomaHland, is dotted
with its Zawias, or lodges, all absolutely dependent upon
PAN-ISLAMISM 55
the Grand Lodge, headed by The Master, El Sennussi.
The Sennussi stronghold of Jowf lies in the very heart of
the Lybian Sahara. Only one European eye^ has ever
seen this mysterious spot. Surrounded by absolute des-
ert, with wells many leagues apart, and the routes of
approach known only to experienced Sennussi guides,
every one of whom would suffer a thousand deaths
rather than betray him, El Sennussi, The Master, sits
serenely apart, sending his orders throughout North
Africa.
^^ The influence exerted by the Sennussiya is profound.
The local Zawias are more than mere "lodges." Besides
the Mokaddem, or Master, there is also a "Wekil," or civil
governor, and these ojBBcers have discretionary authority
not merely over the Zawia members but also over the
community at large — at least, so great is the awe inspired
by the Sennussiya throughout North Africa, that a word
from Wekil or Mokaddem is always listened to and
obeyed. Thus, besides the various European colonial
authorities, British, French, or ItaHan, as the case may
be, there exists an occult government with which the
colonial authorities are careful not to come into con-
flict.
On their part, the Sennussi are equally careful to avoid
a downright breach with the European Powers. Their
long-headed, cautious policy is truly astonishing. For
more than half a century the order has been a great force,
yet it has never risked the supreme adventure. In many
of the fanatic risings which have occurred in various
parts of Africa, local Sennussi have undoubtedly taken
part, and the same was true during the Italian campaign
^ The explorer Dr. Nachtigal.
56 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
in TripoK and in the late war; but the order itself has
never officially entered the Hsts.
In fact; this attitude of mingled cautious reserve and
haughty aloofness is maintained not only toward Chris-
tians but also to^vard the other powers that be in
Islam. The Sennussiya has always kept its absolute
freedom of action. Its relations with the Turks have
never been cordial. Even the wily Abdul Hamid, at
the height of his prestige as the champion of Pan-Islam-
ism, could never get from El Sennussi more than coldly
platonic expressions of approval, and one of Sennussi-el-
Mahdi's favorite remarks was said to have been: "Turks
and Christians: I will break both of them with one and
the same stroke." Equally characteristic was his attitude
toward Mahommed Ahmed, the leader of the "Mahdist"
uprising in the Egyptian Sudan. Flushed with \dctory,
Mahommed Ahmed sent emissaries to El Sennussi, ask-
ing his aid. El Sennussi refused, remarking haughtily:
"What have I to do with this fakir from Dongola? Am
I not myself Mahdi if I choose?"
These Fabian tactics do not mean that the Sennussi
are idle. Far from it. On the contrary, they are cease-
lessly at work with the spiritual arms of teaching, disci-
pline, and conversion. The Sennussi programme is the
welding, first, of Moslem Africa and, later, of the whole
Moslem world into the revived "Imamat" of Islam's
early days; into a great theocracy, embracing aU True
Believers — ^in other words, Pan-Islamism. But they be-
heve that the pohtical liberation of Islam from Christian
domination must be preceded by a profound spiritual
regeneration. Toward this end they strive ceaselessly
to improve the manners and morals of the populations
PAN-ISLAMISM ^ 57
under their influence, while they also strive to improve
material conditions by encouraging the better cultivation
of oaseS; digging new wells, building rest-houses along the
caravan routes, and promoting trade. The slaughter and
rapine practised by the Sudanese Mahdists disgusted the
Sennussi and drew from their chief words of scathing
condemnation,
sjv All this explains the order's unprecedented self-re-
straint. This is the reason why, year after year and
decade after decade, the Sennussi advance slowly, calmly,
coldly; gathering great latent power, but avoiding the
temptation to expend it one instant before the proper
time. Meanwhile they are covering North Africa with
their lodges and schools, disciplining the people to the
voice of their Mokaddems and Wekils ; and, to the south-
ward, converting millions of pagan negroes to the faith
of Islam. ^
* On the Islamic fraternities in general and the Sennussiya in particular,
see W. S. Blunt, The Future of Islam (London, 1882) ; O. Depont and X.
Coppolani, Les Confreries religieuses musulmanes (Paris, 1897) ; H. Duvey-
rier. La Confrerie mu^ubnane de Sidi Mohammed hen Ali es Senoussi (Paris,
1884) ; A. Le Chatelier, Les Confrbries musulmanes du Hedjaz (Paris, 1887) ;
L. Petit, Confreries musulmanes (Paris, 1899) ; L. Rinn, Marabouts et Khouan
(Algiers, 1884); A. Servier, Le Nationalisme musulman (Constantine,
Algeria, 1913); Simian, Les Confreries islamiqu^s en Algerie (Algiers, 1910);
Achmed Abdullah (himself a Sennussi), "The Sennussiyehs," The Forum,
May, 1914; A. R. Colquhoun, "Pan-Islam," North American Review,
June, 1906; T. R. Threlfall, "Senussi and His Threatened Holy War,"
Nineteenth Century, March, 1900; Captain H. A. Wilson, "The Moslem
Menace," Nineteenth Century and After, September, 1907; . . . "La
Puissance de I'lslam: Ses Confreries Religieuses," Le Correspondant, 25
November and 10 December, 1909. The above judgments, particularly
regarding the Sennussiya, vary greatly, some being highly alarmist, others
minimizing its importance. A full balancing of the entire subject is that of
Commandant Binger, " Le Peril de ITslam," Bulletin du Comite de VAfriqv^
frangaise, 1902. Personal interviews of educated Moslems with El Sen-
nussi are Si Mohammed el Hechaish, "Chez les Senoussia et les Touareg,"
L' Expansion Coloniale franqaise, 1900; Muhammad ibn Utman, Voyage au
Pays des Senoussia d travers la Tripolitaine (translated from the Ajabic),
Paris, 1903.
58 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Nothing better shows modem Islam's quickened vital-
ity than the revival of missionar}^ fervor during the past
hundred years. Of course Islam has always displayed
strong proselytising power. Its missionary successes in
its early days were extraordinary, and even in its period
of decline it never wholly lost its propagating vigor.
Throughout the Middle Ages Islam continued to gain
ground in India and China; the Turks planted it firmly
in the Balkans; while between the fourteenth and six-
teenth centuries Moslem missionaries won notable tri-
umphs in such distant regions as West Africa, the Dutch
Indies, and the Philippines. Nevertheless, taking the
Moslem world as a whole, rehgious zeal undoubtedly
declined, reaching low-water mark during the eighteenth
century.
The first breath of the Mohammedan Revival, however,
blew the smouldering embers of proselytism into a new
flame, and everywhere except in Europe Islam began once
more advancing portentously along all its far-flung
frontiers. Every Moslem is, to some ex-tent, a born
missionary and instinctively propagates his faith among
his non-Moslem neighbors, so the work was carried on
not only by priestly specialists but also by multitudes of
travellers, traders, and humble migratory workers.^ Of
course numerous zealots consecrated their lives to the
task. Tliis was particularly true of the religious fra-
ternities. The Sennussi have especially distinguished
themselves by their apostolic fervor, and from those
natural monasteries, the oases of the Sahara, thousands
1 On Moslem missionary activity in general, see Jansen, Verbreitung des
IskiTns (Berlin, 1897); M. Townsend, Asia and Europe, pp. 46-49, 60-61, 81;
A. Le Chatelier, L' Islam au dix-neuvihtne Siecle (Paris, 1888); various
papers in The Mohammedan World To-day (London, 1906).
PAN-ISLAMISM 59
of "Marabouts" have gone forth with flashing eyes and
swelling breasts to preach the marvels of Islam, devoured
with a zeal like that of the Christian mendicant friars of
the Middle Ages. Islam's missionary triumphs among
the negroes of West and Central Africa during the past
century have been extraordinary. Every candid Euro-
pean observer tells the same story. As an Englishman
very justly remarked some twenty years ago: "Moham-
medanism is making marvellous progress in the interior
of Africa. It is crushing paganism out. Against it
the Christian propaganda is a myth."^ And a French
Protestant missionary remarks in similar vein: "We see
Islam on its march, sometimes slowed down but never
stopped, toward the heart of Africa. Despite all obsta-
cles encountered, it tirelessly pursues its way. It fears
nothing. Even Christianity, its most serious rival, Islam
regards without hate, so sure is it of victory. While
Christians dream of the conquest of Africa, the Moham-
medans do it." 2
The way in which Islam is marching southward is dra-
matically shown by a recent incident. A few years ago
the British authorities suddenly discovered that Moham-
medanism was pervading Nyassaland. An investigation,
brought out the fact that it was the work of Zanzibar
Arabs. They began their propaganda about 1900. Ten
years later almost every village in southern Nyassaland
had its Moslem teacher and its mosque hut. Although
IT. R. Threlfall, "Senussi and His Threatened Holy War," Nineteenth
Century, March, 1900.
* D. A. Forget, L'Islam et le Christianisme dans VAfrique centrale, p. 65
(Paris, 1900). For other statements regarding Moslem missionary activity
in Africa, see G. Bonet-Maury, Ulslamisme et le Christianisme en Afrique
(Paris, 1906); E. W. Blyden, Christianity, Islam, and the Negro Race
(London, 1887); Forget, op. cit.
60 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
the movement was frankly anti-European, the British
authorities did not dare to check it for fear of reper-
cussions elsewhere. Many European observers fear that
it is only a question of time when Islam will cross the
Zambezi and enter South Africa.
And these gains are not made solety against paganism.
They are being won at the expense of African Christianity
as well. In West Africa the European missions lose many
of their converts to Islam, while across the continent the
ancient Abyssinian Church, so long an outpost against
Islam, seems in danger of submersion by the rising Moslem
tide. Not by warlike incursions, but by peaceful pene-
tration, the Abyssinians are being Islamized. "Tribes
which, fifty or sLxty years ago, comited hardly a Moham-
medan among them, to-day live partly or wholly according
to the precepts of Islam. "^
Islam's triumphs in Africa are perhaps its most note-
worthy missionary victories, but they by no means tell
the whole story, as a few instances drawn from other
quarters of the Moslem world will show. In the previous
chapter I mentioned the liberal movement among the
Russian Tartars. That, however, was only one phase of
the Mohammedan Revival in that region, another phase
being a marked resm'gence of proselyting zeal. These
Tartars had long been mider Russian rule, and the Ortho-
dox Church had made persistent efforts to convert them;
in some instances with apparent success. But when the
Mohammedan Revival reached the Tartars early in the
nineteenth centuiy, they immediately began laboring
1 A. Guerinot, " L'Islam et I'Abyssinie," Revue du Monde musulman, 1918.
Also see similar opinion of the Protestant missionary K. Cederquist,
"Islam and Christianity in Abyssinia," The Moslem World, April, 1912.
PAN-ISLAMISM 61
with their Christianized brethren, and in a short time
most of these reverted to Islam despite the best efforts of
the Orthodox Church and the pmiitive measures of the
Russian governmental authorities. Tartar missionaries
also began converting the heathen Turko-Finnish tribes
to the northward, in defiance of every hindrance from their
Russian masters.^
In China, likewise, the nineteenth century witnessed
an extraordinary development of Moslem energy. Islam
had reached China in very early times, brought in by
Arab traders and bands of Arab mercenary soldiers.
Despite centuries of intermarriage with Chinese women,
their descendants still differ perceptibly from the general
Chinese population, and regard themselves as a separate
and superior people. The Chinese Mohammedans are
mainly concentrated in the southern province of Yunnan
and the inland provinces beyond. Besides these racially
Chinese Moslems, another centre of Mohammedan popu-
lation is found in the Chinese dependency of Eastern or
Chinese Turkestan, inhabited by Turkish stocks and
conquered by the Chinese only in the eighteenth century.
Until comparatively recent times the Chinese Moslems
were well treated, but gradually their proud-spirited
attitude alarmed the Chinese Government, which with-
drew their privileges and persecuted them. Early in the
nineteenth century the breath of the Mohammedan
Revival reached China, as it did every other part of the
Moslem world, and the Chinese Mohammedans, inflamed
by resurgent fanaticism, began a series of revolts culmi-
nating in the great rebellions which took place about the
IS. Brobovnikov, ''Moslems in Russia," The Moslem World, January,
1911. !
62 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
year 1870, both in Yunnan and in Eastern Turkestan.
As usual, these fanaticized Moslems displayed fierce fight-
ing power. The Turkestan rebels found an able leader,
one Yakub Beg, and for some years both Turkestan and
Yunnan were virtually independent. To many European
observers at that time it looked as though the rebels
might join hands, erect a permanent Mohammedan state
in Western China, and even overrxm the whole empire.
The fame of Yakub Beg spread through the Moslem
world, the Sultan of Turkey honoring him with the high
title of Commander of the Faithful. After years of bitter-
fighting, accompanied by frightful massacres, the Chinese
Government subdued the rebels. The Chinese Moslems,
greatly reduced in numbers, have not yet recovered their
former strength; but their spirit is still unbroken, and
to-day they number fully 10,000,000. Thus, Chinese
Islam, despite its setbacks, is a factor to be reckoned with
in the future.^
The above instances do not exhaust the list of Islam's
activities during the past century. In India, for example,
Islam has continued to gain ground rapidly, while in the
Dutch Indies it is the same story.^ European domination
actually favors rather than retards the spread of Islam,
for the Moslem finds in Western improvements, like the
railroad, the post-office, and the printing-press, useful
adjuncts to Islamic propaganda.
Let us now consider the second originating centre of
1 Broomhall, Islam in China (London, 1910); Nig4r6nd6, "Notes sur les
Musulmans Chinois," Revue du Monde musvlman, January, 1907; paper on
Islam in China in The Mohammedan World To-day (London, 1906).
* See papers on Islam in Java and Sumatra in The Mohammedan World
To-day (London, 1906); A. Cabaton, Java, Sumatra, and the Dutch East
Indies (translated from the Dutch), New York, 1916.
PAN-ISLAMISM 63
modem Pan-Isiamism — the movement especially asso-
ciated with the personaHty of Djemal-ed-Din.
Seyid Djemal-ed-Din el- Afghani was born early in the
nineteenth century at A^adabad, near Hamadan, in
Persia, albeit, as his name shows, he was of Afghan rather
than Iranian descent, while his title '' Seyid," meaning
descendant of the Prophet, implies a strain of Arab blood.
Endowed with a keen intelligence, great personal magnet-
ism, and abomiding vigor, Djemal-ed-Din had a stormy
and checkered career. He was a great traveller, know-
ing intimately not only most of the Moslem world but
western Europe as well. From these travels, supple-
mented by wide reading, he gamed a notable fund of
information which he employed effectively in his mani-
fold activities. A bom propagandist, Djemal-ed-Din at-
tracted wide attention, and wherever he went in Islam
his strong personality started an intellectual ferment.
Unlike El Sennussi, he concerned himself very Kttle with
theology, devoting himself to poHtics. Djemal-ed-Din
was the first Mohammedan who fully grasped the im-
pending peril of Western domination, and he devoted
his Hfe to warning the Islamic world of the danger and
attempting to elaborate measures of defense. By Euro-
pean colonial authorities he was soon singled out as a
dangerous agitator. The English, in particular, feared
and persecuted him. Imprisoned for a while in India,
he went to Egypt about ISSO, and had a hand in the
anti-European movement of Arabi Pasha. When the
English occupied Egypt in 1882 they promptly expelled
Djemal, who continued his wanderings, finally reaching
Constantinople. Here he found a generous patron in
Abdul-Hamid, then evolving his Pan-Islamic policy.
i
64 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Naturally, the Sultan was enchanted with Djemal, and
promptly made him the head of his Pan-Islamic propa-
ganda bureau. In fact, it is probable that the success
of the Sultan's Pan-Islamic policy was largely due to
Djemal's ability and zeal. Djemal died in 1896 at an
advanced age, active to the last.
Djemal-ed-Din's teachings may be summarized as
follows:
"The Christian world, despite its internal differences
of race and nationality, is, as against the East and espe-
I cially as against Islam, united for the destruction of all
' Mohammedan states.
'^ "The Crusades still subsist, as well as the fanatical
spirit of Peter the Hermit. At heart, Christendom still
regards Islam ^ith fanatical hatred and contempt. This
is shown in many ways, as in international law, before
which Moslem nations are not treated as the equals of
Christian nations.
± " Christian governments excuse the attacks and humil-
iations inflicted upon Moslem states by citing the latter's
backward and barbarous condition; yet these same gov-
ernments stifle by a thousand means, even by war, every
attempted effort of reform and re\dval in Aloslem lands.
"V- "Hatred of Islam is common to all Christian peoples,
not merely to some of them, and the result of this spirit
is a tacit, persistent effort for Islam's destruction.
i "Every Moslem feeling and aspiration is caricatured
P and calumniated by Christendom. 'The Europeans call
in the Orient "fanaticism" what at home they call
"nationalism" and "patriotism." And what in the
West they call "self-respect," "pride," "national honor,"
in the East they call "chaminism." ^Vhat in the West
PAN-ISLAMISM 65
they esteem as national sentiment, in the East they con-
sider xenophobia.' ^
"From all this, it is plain that the whole Moslem world
must unite in a grea.t defensive alliance, to preserve itself
from destmction; and, to do this, it must acquire the
technic of Western progress and learn the secrets of Eu-
ropean power."
Such, in brief, are the teachings of Djemal-ed-Din,
propagated with eloquence and authority for many years.
Given the state of mingled fear and hatred of Western
"1^ encroachment that was steadily spreading throughout the
Aloslemjvprld, it is easy to see how great DjemaFs in-
fluence must have been. And of course Djemal was
not alone in his preaching. Other influential Moslems
were agitating along much the same Hnes as early as the
middle of the nineteenth century. One of these pioneers
was the Turkish notable Aali Pasha, who was said to
remark: "What we want is rather an increase of fanati-
cism than a diminution of it." ^ Arminius Vambery, the
eminent Hungarian Oriental scholar, states that shortly
after the Crimean War he was present at a militant
Pan-Islamic gathering, attended by emissaries from far
parts of the Moslem world, held at Aali Pasha's palace.^
Such were the foundations upon which Sultan Abdul
Hamid built his ambitious Pan-Islamic structure. Abdul
Hamid is one of the strangest personalities of modern
^ Quoted from article by "X, " "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme,"
Revue du Monde musulman, March, 1913. This authoritative article is,
so the editor informs us, from the pen of an eminent Mohammedan — "un
homme d'etat musulman." For other activities of Djemal-ed-Din, see
A. Servier, Le Nationalisme musulman, pp. 10-13.
'^ Quoted from W. G. Palgrave, Essays on Eastern Questions, p. Ill
(London, 1872).
* A. Vambery, Western Culture in Eastern Lands, p. 351 (London, 1906).
i'«4 ■
66 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
times. A man of miusual intelligence, his mind was
yet warped by strange twists which went to the verge
of insanity. Nursing ambitious, grandiose projects, he
tried to carry them out by dark and tortuous methods
which, though often cleverly Macchiavellian, were some-
times absurdly puerile. An autocrat by nature, he
strove to keep the smallest decisions dependent on his
arbitrary will, albeit he was frequently guided by clever
sycophants who knew how to play upon his supersti-
tions and his prejudices.
Abdul Hamid ascended the throne in 1876 under very
difficult circumstances. The country was on the verge
of a disastrous Russian war, while the government was
in the hands of statesmen who were endeavoring to trans-
form Tui'key into a modern state and who had introduced
all sorts of Western political innovations, including a par-
Hament. Abdul Hamid, however, soon changed all this.
Taking advantage of the confusion which marked the
close of the Russian war, he abolished parliament and
made himself as absolute a despot as any of his ancestors
had ever been. Secure in his autocratic power, Abdul
Hamid now began to evolve his own peculiar policy,
which, from the first, had a distinctly Pan-Islamic trend.^
Unhke his immediate predecessors, Abdul Hamid deter-
mined to use his position as caliph for far-reaching po-
litical ends. Emphasizing his spiritual headship of the
Mohammedan world rather than his political headship
of the Turkish state, he endeavored to win the active
support of all Moslems and, by that support, to intinii-
^ Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic schemes were first clearly discerned by the
French pubUcist Gabriel Charmes as early as 1881, and his warnings were
published in his prophetic book L'Avenir de la Turquie — Le Panislamisme
(Paris, 1883).
PAN-ISLAMISM 67
date European Powers who might be formulating aggres-
sive measures against the Ottoman Empire. Before long
Abdul Hamid had built up an elaborate Pan-Islamic
propaganda organization, working mainly by secretive,
tortuous methods. Constantinople became the Mecca of
all the fanatics and anti- Western agitators like Djemal-
ed-Din. And from Constantinople there went forth
swarms of picked emissaries, bearing to the most distant
parts of Islam the Cahph's message of hope and im-
pending deHverance from the menace of infidel rule.
Ajjdul Hamid ^s Pa n-Islajnicj)ropaganda went on unin-
t erruptedly for nearly thirt;^ _years. Precisely what jhis
propaganda accomplishedisjver^ difficult^jto estimate.
In the first place, it was cut short, and to some extent
reversed, by the Young-Turk revolution of 1908 which
drove Abdul Hamid from the throne. It certainly was
never put to the test of a war between Turkey and a first-
class European Power. This is what renders any theo-
retical appraisal so inconclusive. Abdul Hamid did suc-
ceed in gaining the respectful acknowledgment of his
spiritual authority by most Moslem princes and notables,
and he certainly won the pious veneration of the Moslem
masses. In the most distant regions men came to regard
the mighty Cahph in Stambul as, in very truth, the
Defender of the Faith, and to consider his empire as the
bulwark of Islam. On the other hand, it is a far cry
from pious enthusiasm to practical performance. Fur-
thermore, Abdul Hamid did not succeed in winning
over powerful Pan-Islamic leaders like El Sennussi, who
suspected his motives and questioned his judgment;
while Moslem liberals everywhere disliked him for his
despotic, reactionary, ineflScient rule. It is thus a very
68 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
debatable question whether, if Abdul Hamid had ever
called upon the Moslem world for armed assistance in a
"holy war/' he would have been generally supported.
Yet Abdul Hamid undoubtedly furthered the general
spread of Pan-Islamic sentiment throughout the Moslem
world. In this larger sense he succeeded; albeit not so
much from his position as caliph as because he incarnated
the growing fear and hatred of the West. Thus we may
conclude that Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda
did produce profound and lasting effects which will have
to be seriously reckoned with.
The Young-Turk revolution of 1908 greatly complicated
the situation. It was soon followed by the Persian
revolution and by kindred symptoms in other parts of
the East. These events brought into sudden prominence
new forces, such as constitutionalism, nationalism, and
even social imi-est, which had long been obscurely germi-
nating in Islam but which had been previously denied
expression. We shall later consider these new forces in
detail. The point to be here noted is their comphcating
effect on the Pan-Islamic movement. Pan-Islamism was,
in fact, cross-cut and deflected from its previous course,
and a period of confusion and mental uncertainty super-
vened.
This interim period was short. By 1912 Pan-Islamism
had recovered its poise and was moving forward once
more. The reason was renewed pressure fr^ )m the West.
In 1911 came Italy's barefaced raid on Turkey's African
dependency of Tripoli, while in 1912 the allied Chris-
tian Balkan states attacked Turkey in the Balkan War,
which sheared away Turkey's European provinces to
the very walls of Constantinople and left her crippled
PAN-ISLAMISM 69
and discredited. Moreover, in those same fateful years
Russia and England strangled the Persian revolution,
while France, as a result of the Agadir crisis, closed her
grip on Morocco. Thus, in a scant two years, the
Moslem world had suffered at European hands assaults
not only unprecedented in gravity but, in Moslem eyes,
quite without provocation.
The effect upon Islam was tremendous. A flood of
mingled despair and rage swept the Moslem world from
end to end. And, of course, the Pan-Islamic implication
was obvious. This was precisely what Pan-Islam's agi-
tators had been preaching for fifty years — the Crusade
of the West for Islam's destruction. What could be
better confirmation of the warnings of Djemal-ed-Din?
The results were soon seen. In Tripoli, where Turks
and Arabs had been on the worst of terms, both races
clasped hands in a sudden access of Pan-Islamic fervor,
and the Italian invaders were met with a fanatical fury
that roused Islam to wild applause and inspired Western
observers with grave disquietude. "Why has Italy
found 'defenseless' Tripoli such a hornet's nest?" queried
Gabriel Hanotaux, a former French minister of foreign
affairs. "It is because she has to do, not merely with
Turkey, but with Islam as well. Italy has set the ball
rolling — so much the worse for her — and for us all."^
The Anglo-Russian manhandling of Persia likewise roused
much wrathful comment throughout Islam, ^ while the
* Gabriel Hanotaux, "La Crise m6diterran6enne et I'IsIam," Revue
Hebdomadaire, April 13, 1912.
^ See "X," "La Situation politique de la Perse," Revue du Monde
mv^ulman, June, 1914; B. Temple, "The Place of Persia in World-Politics."
Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, May 4, 1910; W. M. Shuster,
The Strangling of Persia (New York, 1912).
70 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
impending extinction of Moroccan independence at
French hands was discussed with mournful indignation.
But with the coming of the Balkan War the wrath of
Islam knew no bounds. From China to the Congo,
pious Moslems watched with bated breath the swaying
battle-lines in the far-off Balkans, and when the news of
Turkish disaster came, Islam's cry of wrathful anguish
rose hoarse and high. A prominent Indian Mohammedan
well expressed the feelings of his coreligionists every-
where when he wrote: "The King of Greece orders a
new Crusade. From the London Chancelleries rise calls
to Christian fanaticism, and Saint Petersburg already
speaks of the planting of the Cross on the dome of
Sant' Sophia. To-day they speak thus; to-morrow they
will thus speak of Jerusalem and the Mosque of Omar.
Brothers! Be ye of one mind, that it is the duty of
every True Believer to hasten beneath the Khalifa's
banner and to sacrifice his life for the safety of the
faith." ^ And another Indian Moslem leader thus ad-
jured the British authorities: "I appeal to the present
government to change its anti-Turkish attitude before
the fury of millions of Moslem fellow subjects is kindled
to a blaze and brings disaster." ^
Most significant of aU were the appeals made at this
time by Moslems to non-Mohammedan Asiatics for sym-
pathy and solidarity against the hated West. This was a
development as unprecedented as it was startling. Mo-
hammed, revering as he did the Old and New Testa-
ments, and regarding himself as the successor of the
1 Quoted from A. Vamb^ry, "Die tiirkiache Katastrophe und die Islam-
welt," Deutsche Remie, July, 1913.
^Shah Mohammed Naimatullah, "Recent Turkish Events and Moslem
India," Asiatic Review, October, 1913.
PAN-ISLAMISM 71
divinely inspired prophets Moses and Jesus, had en-
joined upon his followers relative respect for Christians
and Jews ("Peoples of the Book") in contrast with
other non-Moslems, whom he stigmatized as "Idola-
ters." These injunctions of the Prophet had always
been heeded, and down to our own days the hatred of
Moslems for Christians, however bitter, had been as
nothing compared with their loathing and contempt for
"Idolaters" like the Brahmanist Hindus or the Bud-
dhists and Confucianists of the Far East.
The first s\Tnptom of a change in attitude appeared
during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. So great had
Islam's fear and hatred of the Christian West then be-
come, that the triumph of an Asiatic people over Euro-
peans was enthusiastically hailed by many Moslems,
j^even though the victors were "Idolaters." It was quite
in keeping with Pan-Islamism's strong missionary bent
that many pious Moslems should have dreamed of
bringing these heroes within the Islamic fold. Efforts to
get in touch with Japan were made. Propagandist
papers were founded, missionaries were selected, and the
Sultan sent a warship to Japan with a Pan-Islamic dele-
gation aboard. Throughout Islam the projected conver-
sion of Japan was widely discussed. Said an Egyptism
journal in the year 1906: "England, with her sixty mil-
lion Indian Moslems, dreads this conversion. With a
Mohammedan Japan, Mussulman policy would change
entirely."^ And, at the other end of the Moslem world,
a Chinese Mohammedan sheikh wrote: "If Japan thinks
of becoming some day a very great power and making
^ Quoted by F. Farjanel, "Le Japon et I'Islam," Retme du Mcmde musul-
man, November, 1906.
72 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Asia the dominator of the other continents, it will be
only by adopting the blessed reHgion of Islam." ^
Of course it soon became plain to these enthusiasts
that while Japan received Islam's emissaries with smil-
ing courtesy, she had not the faintest intention of turn-
ing Mohammedan. Nevertheless, the first step had been
taken toward friendly relations with non-Moslem Asia,
and the Balkan War drove Moslems much further in this
direction. The change in Moslem sentiment can be
gauged by the numerous appeals made by the Indian
Mohammedans at this time to Hindus, as may be seen
from the following sample entitled significantly "The
Message of the East." "Spirit of the East," reads this
noteworthy document, "arise and repel the swelling flood
of Western aggression! Children of Hindustan, aid us
with your wisdom, culture, and wealth; lend us your
power, the birthright and heritage of the Hindu ! Let the
Spirit Powers hidden in the Himalayan mountain-peaks
arise. Let prayers to the god of battles float upward;
prayers that right may triumph over might; and call to
your myriad gods to annihilate the armies of the foe!"^
To any one who realizes the traditional Moslem atti-
tude toward "Idolaters," such words are simply amaz-
ing. They betoken a veritable revolution in outlook.
And such sentiments were not confined to Indian Mos-
lems; they were equally evident among Chinese Moslems
as well. Said a Mohammedan newspaper of Chinese
Turkestan, advocating a fraternal union of all Chinese
against Western aggression: "Europe has grown too
presumptuous. It will deprive us of our hberty; it wiU
destroy us altogether if we do not bestir ourselves
^ Farjanel, supra. * Quoted by Vamb^ry, supra.
PAN-ISLAMISM 73
promptly and prepare for a powerful resistance." ^ Dur-
ing the troublous first stages of the Chinese revolution,
the Mohammedans, emerging from their sulky aloofness,
co-operated so loyally with their Buddhist and Confucian
fellow patriots that Doctor Sun-Yat-Sen, the Republican
leader, announced gratefully: "The Chinese will never
forget the assistance which their Moslem fellow country-
men have rendered in the interest of order and liberty." ^
The Great War thus found Islam everywhere deeply
stirred against European aggression, keenly conscious of
its own solidarity, and frankly reaching out for Asiatic
allies in the projected struggle against European domina-
tion.
Under these circumstances it may at first sight appear
strange that no general Islamic explosion occurred when
Turkey entered the lists at the close of 1914 and the
Sultan-Caliph issued a formal summons to the Holy War.
Of course this summons was not the flat failure which
Allied reports led the West to believe at the time. As
a matter of fact, there was trouble in practically every
Mohammedan land under Allied control. To name only
a few of many instances: Egypt broke into a tumult
smothered only by overwhelming British reinforcements,
Tripoli burst into a flame of insurrection that drove the
Italians headlong to the coast, Persia was prevented from
joining Turkey only by prompt Russo-British interven-
tion, while the Indian northwest frontier was the scene
of fighting that required the presence of a quarter of a
milHon Anglo-Indian troops. The British Government
^ Vambery, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists," Nineteenth
Century and After, April, 1912.
Uhid.
74 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
has officially admitted that during 1915 the Allies' Asiatic
and African possessions stood within a hand's breadth
of a cataclysmic insurrection.
That insm-rection would certainly have taken place if
Islam's leaders had everyivhere spoken the fateful word.
But the word was not spoken. Instead, influential
Moslems outside of Turkey genei'ally condemned the
latter's action and did all in their power to calm the
passions of the fanatic multitude.
The attitude of these leaders does credit to their dis-
cernment. They recognized that this was neither the
time nor the occasion for a decisive struggle with the
West. They were not yet materially prepared, and they
had not perfected their understandings either among
themselves or with their prospective non-Moslem alHes.
Above all, the moral urge was lacking. They knew that
athwart the IChalifa's writ was stencilled "Made in
Germany." They knew that the "Young-Turk" cHque
which had engineered the coup was made up of Euro-
peanized renegades, many of them not even nominal
Moslems, but atheistic Jews. Far-sighted Moslems had
no intention of pulling Germany's chestnuts out of the
fire, nor did they wish to further Prussian schemes of
world-dominion which for themseh^es would have meant
a mere change of masters. Far better to let the West
fight out its desperate feud, weaken itself, and reveal
fuUy its future intentions. Meanwhile Islam could bide
its time, grow in strength, and await the morrow.
The Versailles peace conference was just such a revela-
tion of European intentions as the Pan-Islamic leaders
had been waiting for in order to perfect their pro-
grammes and enlist the moral solidarity of then fol-
PAN-ISLAMISM 75
lowers. At Versailles the European Powers showed un-
equivocally that they had no intention of relaxing their
hold upon the Near and Middle East. By a number of
secret treaties negotiated during the war, the Ottoman
Empire had been virtually partitioned between the vic-
torious AlKes, and these secret treaties formed the basis
of the Versailles settlement. Furthermore, Egj'pt had
been declared a British protectorate at the very begin-
ning of the war, while the Versailles conference had
scarcely adjourned before England announced an "agree-
ment" with Persia which made that coimtry another
British protectorate in fact if not in name. The upshot
was, as already stated, that the Near and Middle East
were subjected to European political domination as never
before.
But there was another side to the shield. During the
war years the Allied statesmen had officially proclaimed
times without number that the war was being fought to
estabhsh a new world-order based on such principles as
the rights of small nations and the Hberty of all peoples.
These pronouncements had been treasured and memor-
ized throughout the East. \Vhen, therefore, the East
saw a peace settlement based, not upon these high profes-
sions, but upon the imperialistic secret treaties, it was
fired with a moral indignation and sense of outraged jus-
tice never known before. A tide of impassioned determi-
nation bogan rising which has already set the entire East
in tumultuous ferment, and which seems merely the pre-
monitory ground-swell of a greater storm. So ominous
were the portents that even before the Versailles confer-
ence had adjourned many European students of Eastern
affairs expressed grave alarm. Here, for example, is the
76 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
judgment of Leone Caetani, Duke of Sermoneta; an Ital-
ian authority on Mohammedan questions. Speaking in
the spring of 1919 on the war's effect cp. the East, he
said: "The convulsion has shaken Islamic and Oriental
civilization to its foundations. The entire Oriental
world, from China to the Mediterranean, is in ferment.
Everywhere the hidden fire of anti-European hatred is
burning. Riots in Morocco, risings in Algiers, discon-
tent in Tripoh, so-called Nationalist attempts in Egypt,
Arabia, and Lybia are all different manifestations of the
same deep sentiment, and have as their object the re-
bellion of the Oriental world against European civiliza-
tion."i
Those words are a prophetic forecast of what has since
occurred in the Moslem world. Because recent events
are perhaps even more involved with the nationalistic
aspirations of the Moslem peoples than they are with the
strictly Pan-Islamic movement, I propose to defer their
detailed discussion tiU the chapter on NationaHsm. We
should, however, remember that Moslem nationalism
and Pan-Islamism, whatever their internal differences,
tend to unite against the external pressure of European
domination and equally desire Islam's Hberation from
European political control. Rem.embering these facts,
let us survey the present condition of the Pan-Islamic
movement.
Pan-Islamism has been tremendously stimulated by
Western pressure, especially by the late war and the re-
cent peace settlements. However, Pan-Islamism must
not be considered as merely a defensive political reaction
against external aggression. It springs primarily from
^ Special cable to the New York Times, dated Rome, May 28, 1919.
PAN-ISLAMISM 77
that deep sentiment of unity which links Moslem to
Moslem by bonds much stronger than those which unite
the members of the Christian world. These bonds are
not merely religious, in the technical sense; they are so-
cial and cultural as well. Throughout the Moslem world,
despite wide differences in local customs and regulations,
the basic laws of family and social conduct are eveiy-
where the same. " The truth is that Islam is more than
a creed, it is a complete social system; it is a civiliza-
tion with a philosophy, a culture, and an art of its own;
in its long struggle against the rival civilization of Chris-
tendom it has become an organic unit conscious of it-
self."^
To this Islamic civilization aU Moslems are deeply
attached. In this larger sense, Pan-Islamism is universal.
Even the most liberal-minded Moslems, however much
they may welcome Western ideas, and however strongly
they may condemn the fanatical, reactionary aspects of
the political Pan-Islamic movement, believe fervently in
Islam's essential solidarity. As a leading Indian Moslem
liberal. The Aga Khan, remarks: "There is a right and
legitimate Pan-Islamism to which every sincere and be-
hoving Mohammedan belongs — that is, the theoiy of the
spiritual brotherhood and unity of the children of the
Prophet. The real spiritual and cultural unity of Islam
must ever grow, for to the follower of the Prophet it is
the foundation of the life and the soul."^
If such is the attitude of Moslem liberals, thoroughly
conversant with Western culture and receptive to West-
1 Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," Nineteenth Century and After,
July, 1919.
2 H. H. The Aga Khan, India in Transition, p. 158 (London, 1918).
78 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
em progress, what must be the feelings of the Moslem
masses, ignorant, reactionary, and fanatical? Besides
perfectly understandable fear and hatrifid due to Western
aggression, there is, among the Moslem masses, a great
deal of genuine fanaticism caused, not by European po-
litical domination, but by religious bigotry and blind
hatred of Western civilization.^ But this fanaticism has,
of course, been greatly inflamed by the political events of
the past decade, until to-day religious, cultural, and po-
litical hatred of the West have coalesced in a state of
mind decidedly ominous for the peace of the world. We
should not delude ourselves into minimizing the danger-
ous possibilities of the present situation. Just because
the fake "Holy War" proclaimed by the Young-Turks
at German instigation in 1914 did not come off is no rea-
son for believing that a real holy war is impossible. As
a German staff-oflicer in Turkish service during the late
struggle very candidly says: "The Holy War was an
absolute fiasco just because it was not a Holy War." ^
I have already explained how most Moslems saw
through the trick and refused to budge.
However, the long series of European aggressions,
culminating in the recent peace settlements which sub-
jected virtually the entire Moslem world to European
domination, have been steadily rousing in Moslem hearts
a spirit of despairing rage that may have disastrous con-
sequences. Certainly, the materials for a holy war have
long been heaping high. More than twenty years ago
Arminius Vambery, who knew the Moslem world as few
^ This hatred of Western civilization, as such, will be discussed in the
next chapter.
■' Ernst Paraquin, formerly Ottoman lieutenant-colonel and chief of
general staff, in the Berliner Tageblatt, January 24, 1920.
PAN-ISLAMISM 79
Europeans have ever known it, warned the West of the
perils engendered by recklessly imperialistic policies.
"As time passes/' he wrote in 1898, "the danger of a
general war becomes ever greater. We should not forget
that time has considerably augmented the adversary's
force of resistance. I mean by this the sentiment of
soKdarity which is becoming Hvelier of late years among
the peoples of Islam, and which in our age of rapid com-
munication is no longer a negligible quantity, as it was
even ten or twenty years ago.
"It may not be superfluous to draw the attention of
our nineteenth century Crusaders to the importance of
the Moslem press, whose ramifications extend all over
Asia and Afiica, and whose exhortations sink more pro-
foundly than they do with us into the souls of their read-
ers. In Turkey, India, Persia, Central Asia, Java, Egypt,
and Algeria, native organs, daily and periodical, begin
to exert a profound influence. Everything that Europe
thinks, decides, and executes against Islam spreads
through those countries with the rapidity of lightning.
Caravans carry the news to the heart of China and to the
equator, where the tidings are commented upon in very
singular fashion. Certain sparks struck at our meetings
and 1)anquets kindle, little by Httle, menacing flames.
Hence, it would be an unpardonable legerity to close
our eyes to the dangers lurking beneath an apparent
passivity. What the Terdjuman of Crimea says between
the lines is repeated by the Constantinople Ikdam, and
is commented on and exaggerated at Calcutta by The
Moslem Chronicle.
"Of course, at present, the bond of Pan-Islamism is
composed of tenuous and dispersed strands. But West-
80 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
ern aggression might easily miite those strands into a
solid whole, bringing about a general war." ^
In the decades which have elapsed since Vambery
wrote those Hnes the situation has become much more
tense. Moslem resentment at' European dominance has
increased, has been reinforced by nationalistic aspirations
almost unknown during the last century, and possesses
methods of highly efficient propaganda. For example,
the Pan -Islamic press, to which Vambery refers, has
developed in truly extraordinaiy fashion. In 1900 there
were in the whole Islamic world not more than 200 propa-
gandist journals. By 1906 there were 500, while in 1914
there were well over 1,000.^ Moslems fully appreciate
the post-office, the railroad, and other modern methods
of rapidly interchanging ideas. "Every Moslem country
is in communication with every other Moslem coimtry:
directly, by means of special emissaries, pilgrims, travel-
lers, traders, and postal exchanges; indirectly, by means
of Mohammedan newspapers, books, pamphlets, leaflets,
and periodicals. I have met with Cairo newspapers in
Bagdad, Teheran, and Peshawar; Constantinople news-
papers in Basra and Bombay; Calcutta newspapers in
Mohammerah, Kerbela, and Port Said."^ As for the
professional Pan-Islamic propagandists, more particu-
larly those of the religious fraternities, they swarm ev-
erywhere, rousing the fanaticism of the people. "Travel-
Hng under a thousand disguises — as merchants, preachers,
students, doctors, workmen, beggars, fakirs, mountebanks,
' A. Vambery, La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans, pp. 71,
72 (Paris, 1898).
^ A Servier, Le Nationalisme musulman, p. 182.
8B. Temple, "The Place of Persia in World-Politics," Proceedings of
the Central Asian Society, May, 1910.
PAN-ISLAMISM 81
pretended fools or rhapsodists, these emissaries are every-
where well received by the Faithful and are efficaciously
protected against the suspicious investigations of the
European colonial authorities."^
Furthermore, there is to-day in the Moslem world a
wide-spread conviction, held by Hberals and chauvinists
ahke (albeit for very different reasons), that Islam is
entering on a period of Renaissance and renewed glory.
Says Sir Theodore Morison: "No Mohammedan beHeves
that Islamic civiKzation is dead or incapable of further
development. They recognize that it has fallen on evil
days; that it has suffered from an excessive veneration
of the past, from prejudice and bigotry and narrow
scholasticism not unHke that which obscured European
thought in the Middle Ages; but they believe that Islam
too is about to have its Renaissance, that it is receiving
from Western learning a stimulus which will quicken it
into fresh activity, and that the evidences of this new
life are everyw^here manifest." ^
Sir Theodore Morison describes the attitude of Moslem
hberals. How Pan-Islamists with anti-Western senti-
ments feel is well set forth by an Egyptian, Yahya Sid-
dyk, in his well-known book. The Awakening of the Is-
lamic Peoples in the Fourteenth Century of the Hegira.^
The book is doubly interesting because the author has a
thorough Western education, holding a law degree from
the French university of Toulouse, and is a judge on
the Egyptian bench. Although writing nearly a decade
before the cataclysm, Yahya Siddyk clearly foresaw the
^ L. Rinn, Marabouts et Khotuin, p. vi.
2 Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," op. cit.
3 Yahya Siddyk, Le Reveil des Pewples islamiques au quatorzi^me Sihcle
de VHegire (Cairo, 1907). Also published in Arabic.
82 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
imminence of the European War. "Behold," he writes,
"these Great Powers ruining themselves in terrifying
armaments; measm-ing each other's strength with defiant
glances; menacing each other; contracting alhances
which continually break and which presage those terrible
shocks which overturn the world and cover it with ruins,
fire, and blood! The future is God's, and nothing is
lasting save His Will."
Yahya Siddyk considers the Western world degenerate.
"Does this mean," he asks, "that Europe, our 'enhght-
ened guide,' has already reached the summit of its evo-
lution ? Has it already exhausted its vital force by two
or three centuries of hyperexertion ? In other words : is
it already stricken with senility, and will it see itseK soon
obliged to ^aeld its ci\dlizing role to other peoples less de-
generate, less neurasthenic; that is to say, younger, more
robust, more healthy, than itself? In my opinion, the
present marks Europe's apogee, and its immoderate colo-
nial expansion means, not strength, but weakness. De-
spite the aureole of so much grandeur, power, and glory,
Europe is to-day more divided and more fragile than ever,
and iU conceals its malaise, its sufferings, and its anguish.
Its destiny is inexorably working out ! . . .
"The contact of Europe on the East has caused us both
much good and much evil: good, in the material and
intellectual sense; evil, from the moral and pohtical point
of view. Exhausted by long struggles, enervated by a
brilliant civihzation, the Moslem peoples inevitably fell
into a malaise; but they are not stricken, they are not
dead ! These peoples, conquered by the force of cannon,
have not in the least lost their unity, even under the
PAN-ISLAMISM 83
oppressive regimes to which the 'Europeans have long
subjected them. . . .
"I have said that the European contact has been
salutary to us from both the material and intellectual
point of view. What reforming Moslem princes wished to
impose by force on their Moslem subjects is to-day real-
ized a hundredfold. So great has been oiu" progress in
the last twenty-five years in science, letters, and art that
we may well hope to be in all these things the equals of
Europe in less than half a century. . . .
"A new era opens for us with the fourteenth century of
the Hegira, and this happy century will mark our Renais-
sance and our great future! A new breath animates
the Mohammedan peoples of all races; all Moslems are
penetrated with the necessity of work and instruction!
We all wish to travel, do business, tempt fortune, brave
dangers. There is in the East, among the Mohamme-
dans, a surprising activity, an animation, unknown
twenty-five years ago. There is to-day a real public
opinion throughout the East."
The author concludes: "Let us hold firm, each for all,
and let us hope, hope, hope ! We are fairly launched on
the path of progress : let us profit by it ! It is Europe's
very tyranny which has wrought our transformation !
It is our continued contact with Europe that favors our
evolution and inevitably hastens our revival ! It is
simply history repeating itself; the Will of God fulfilling
itself despite all opposition and all resistance. . . .
Europe's tutelage over Asiatics is becoming more and
more nominal — the gates of Asia are closing against the
European ! Surely we glimpse before us a revolution
84 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
without parallel in the world's annals. A new age is at
hand!"
If this was the way Pan-Islamists were thinking in the
opening years of the century, it is clear that their views
must have been confirmed and intensified by the Great
War.^ The material power of the West was thereby
greatly reduced, while its prestige was equally sapped by
the character of the peace settlement and by the atten-
dant disputes which broke out among the victors. The
mutual rivalries and jealousies of England, France, Italy,
and their satellites in the East have given Moslems much
food for hopeful thought, and have caused correspond-
ing disquietude in European minds. A French pubHcist
recently admonished his fellow Em-opeans that "Islam
does not recognize our colonial frontiers," and added
warningly, "the great movement of Islamic union inaugu-
rated by Djemal-ed-Din el- Afghani is going on."^
The menacing temper of Islam is shown by the furious
agitation which has been going on for the last three years
among India's 70,000,000 Moslems against the dismem-
berment of the Ottoman Empu-e. This agitation is not
confined to India. It is general throughout Islam, and
Sir Theodore Morison does not overstate the case when
he says: "It is time the British pubhc reahzed the gravity
of what is happening in the East. The Mohammedan
world is ablaze with anger from end to end at the partition
of Turkey. The outbreaks of violence in centres so far
remote as Kabul and Cairo are sjmaptoms only of this
1 For a full discussion of the effect of the Great War upon Asiatic and
African peoples, see my book The Rising Tide of Color against White
World-Supremacy (New York and London, 1920).
^L. Massignon, "L'Islam et la Politique des Allies," Revue des Sciences
poUtiques, June, 1920.
PAN-ISLAMISM 85
wide-spread resentment. I have been in close touch with
Mohammedans of India for close upon thirty years and I
think it is my duty to warn the British public of the pas-
sionate resentment which Moslems feel at the proposed
dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. The diplomats
at Versailles apparently thought that outside the Turkish
homelands there is no sympathy for Turkey. This is a
disastrous blunder. You have but to meet the Mo-
hammedan now in London to reaHze the white heat
to which their anger is rising. In India itself the whole
of the Mohamirxedan community from Peshawar to Ar-
cot is seething with passion upon this subject. Women
inside the Zenanas are weeping over it. Merchants who
usually take no interest in pubKc affairs are leaving their
shops and counting-houses to organize remonstrances and
petitions; even the mediaeval theologians of Deoband
and the Nadwatul-Ulama; whose detachment from the
modern world is proverbial, are coming from their clois-
ters to protest against the destiiiction of Islam."*
Possibly the most serious aspect of the situation is that
the Moslem Hberals are being driven into the camp of
poHtical Pan-Islamism. Receptive though the liberals
are to Western ideas, and averse though they are to Pan-
Islamism's chauvinistic, reactionary tendencies, Europe's
intransigeance is forcing them to make at least a tem-
porary aUiance with the Pan-Islamic and Nationahst
groups; even though the liberals know that anything
Mke a holy war would dig a gulf between East and West,
stop the influx of Western stimuli, favor reactionary
fanaticism, and perhaps postpone for generations a mod-
ernist refomiation of Islam.
^Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," op. cit.
86 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Perhaps it is symptomatic of a more bellicose temper
in Islam that the last few years have witnessed the rapid
spread of two new puritan, fanatic movements — the Ikh-
wan and the Salafiya. The Ikhwan movement began
obscurely about ten years ago in imier Arabia — the Nejd.
It is a direct outgrowth of Wahabism, from which it dif-
fers in no essential respect. So rapid has been Ikhwan-
ism's progress that it to-day absolutely dommates the
entire Nejd, and it is headed by desert Arabia's most
powerful chieftain, Bin Saud, a descendant of the Saud
who headed the Wahabi movement a hundred years ago.
The fanaticism of the Ikhwans is said to be extraordi-
nary, while their programme is the old Wahabi dream of
a puritan conversion of the whole Islamic world.^ As for
the Salafi movement, it started in India even more ob-
scurely than Ikhwanism did in Arabia, but during the
past few years it has spread widely through Islam. Like
Ikhwanism, it is puritanical and fanatical in spirit, its
adherents being found especially among dervish organi-
zations.^ Such phenomena, taken with everything else,
do not augur well for the peace of the East.
So much for Pan-Islamism's religious and poHtical
sides. Now let us glance at its commercial and industrial
aspects — at what may be called economic Pan-Islamism.
Economic Pan-Islamism is the direct result of the
permeation of Western ideas. Half a century ago the
Moslem world was economically still in the Middle Ages.
The provisions of the sheriat, or Moslem canon law, such
* For the Ikhwan movement, see P. W. Harrison, "The Situation in
Arabia," Atlantic Monthly, December, 1920; S. Mylrea, "The PoHtico-
Religious Situation in Arabia," The Moslem World, July, 1919.
2 For the Salafi movement, see " Wahhabisme — Son Avenir sociale et le
Mouveraent salafi," Revue du Monde musulman, 1919.
PAN-ISLAMISM 87
as the prohibition of interest rendered economic life in
the modern sense impossible. What little trade and in-
dustry did exist was largely in the hands of native Chris-
tians or Jews. Furthermore, the whole economic Hfe of
the East was being disorganized by the aggressive com-
petition of the West. Europe's poHtical conquest of the
Moslem world was, in fact, paralleled by an economic
conquest even more complete. Everywhere percolated
the flood of cheap, abundant European machine-made
goods, while close behind came European capital, tempt-
ingly offering itself in return for loans and concessions
which, once granted, paved the way for European po-
litical domination.
Yet in economics as in politics the very completeness
of Europe's triumph provoked resistance. Angered and
alarmed by Western exploitation, Islam frankly recognized
its economic inferiority and sought to escape from its
subjection. Far-sighted Moslems began casting about
for a modus Vivendi with modern life that would put
Islam economically abreast of the times. Western
methods were studied and copied. The prohibitions of
the sheriat were evaded or quietly ignored.
The upshot has been a marked evolution toward
Western economic st^andards. This evolution is of course
still in its early stages, and is most noticeable in lands
r^:'st exposed to Western influences like India, Egypt,
and Algeria. Yet everywhere in the Moslem world the
trend is the same. The detafls of this economic trans-
fonnation wfll be discussed in the chapter devoted to
economic change. What we are here concerned with is
its Pan-Islamic aspect. And that aspect is very strong.
Nowhere does Islam's innate solidarity come out better
88 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
than in the economic field. The rehgious, cultural, and
customary ties which bind Moslem to Moslem enable
Mohammedans to feel more or less at home in every part
of the Islamic world, while Western methods of transit
and communication enable Mohammedans to travel and
keep in touch as they never could before. New types of
Moslems — wholesale merchants, steamship owners, busi-
ness men, bankers, even factory industrialists and brokers
— are rapidly evolving; t}^es which would have been
simply unthinkable a century, or even half a century, ago.
And these new men understand each other perfectly.
Bound together both by the ties of Islamic fraternity
and by the pressure of Western competition, they co-
ordinate their efforts much more easily than pohticals
have succeeded in doing. Here Hberals, Pan-Islamists,
and NationaHsts can meet on common ground. Here is
no question of poHtical conspiracies, revolts, or holy
wars, challenging the armed might of Europe and risking
bloody repression or blind reaction. On the contrary,
here is merely a working together of fellow Moslems for
economic ends by business methods which the West
cannot declare unlawful and dare not repress.
"^^ What, then, is the specific programme of economic
Pan-Islamism? It is easily stated: the wealth of Islam
for Moslems. The profits of trade and industry for Mos-
lem instead of Christian hands. The eviction of West-
ern capital by Moslem capital. Above all, the breaking
of Europe's grip on Islam's natural resources by the ter-
mination of concessions in lands, mines, forests, railways,
custom-houses, by which the wealth of Islamic lands is
to-day drained away to foreign shores.
Such are the aspirations of economic Pan-Islamism.
PAN-ISLAMISM 89
They are wholly modern concepts, the outgrowth of those
Western ideas whose influence upon the Moslem world I
shall now discuss.^
^ On the general subject of economic Pan-Islamism, see A. Le Chatelier,
"Le Reveil de I'Islam — Sa Situation 4conomique," Revue Economique
intemationale, July, 1910; also his article "Politique musuknane," Revue
du Monde musulman, September, 1910; M. Pickthall, "La Morale isla-
mique," Revue Politique Internationale, July, 1916; S. Khuda Bukhsh,
Essays : Indian and Islamic (London, 1912).
CHAPTER III
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST
The influence of the West is the great djmamic in the
modern transformation of the East. The ubiquitous im-
pact of Westernism is modifying not merely the Islamic
world but all non-Moslem Asia and Africa/ and in subse-
quent pages we shall examine the effects of Western
influence upon the non-Moslem elements of India. Of
course Western influence does not entirely account for
Islam's recent evolution. We have already seen that, for
the last hundred years, Islam itself has been engendering
forces which, however quickened by external Western
stimuh, are essentially internal in their nature, arising
spontaneously and working toward distinctive, original
goals. It is not a mere copying of the West that is to-
day going on in the Moslem world, but an attempt at
a new synthesis — an assimilation of Western methods
to Eastern ends. We must always remember that the
Asiatic stocks which constitute the bulk of Islam's fol-
lowers are not primitive savages like the African negroes
or the Australoids, but are mainly peoples with genu-
ine civilizations built up by their own efforts from the
remote past. In \dew of their historic achievements,
therefore, it seems safe to conclude that in the great fer-
ment now stirring the Moslem world we behold a real
Renaissance, whose genuineness is best attested by the
^ For the larger aspects, see my book The Rising Tide of Color against
White World-Supremacy (New York and London, 1920).
90
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 91
fact that there have been similar movements in former
times.
The modern influence of the West on the East is quite
unprecedented in both intensity and scope. The far
more local, partial influence of Greece and Rome cannot
be compared to it. Another point to be noted is that this
modem influence of the West upon the East is a very-
recent thing. The full impact of Westernism upon the
Orient as a whole dates only from about the middle of
the nineteenth century. Since then, however, the process
has been going on by leaps and bounds. Roads and rail-
ways, posts and telegraphs, books and papers, methods
and ideas, have penetrated, or are in process of penetrat-
ing, every nook and cranny of the East. Steamships sail
the remotest seas. Commerce drives forth and scatters
the multitudinous products of Western industry among
the remotest peoples. Nations which only half a century
ago Kved the Hfe of thirty centuries ago, to-day read
newspapers and go to » business in electric tram-cars.
Both the habits and thoughts of Orientals are being
revolutionized. To a discussion of the influence of the
West upon the Moslem world the remainder of this book
will be devoted. The chief elements will be separately
analyzed in subsequent chapters, the present chapter
being a general siurey of an introductory character.
' The permeation of Westernism is naturally most ad-
vanced in those parts of Islam which have been longest
under Western political control. The penetration of the
British "Raj " into the remotest Indian jungles, for exam-
ple, is an extraordinary phenomenon. By the coinage,
the post-office, the railroads, the administration of justice,
the encouragement of education, the relief of famine, and
92 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
a thousand other ways, the great organization has pene-
trated all India. But even in regions where European
control is still nominal, the permeation of Westernism has
gone on apace. The customs and habits of the people
have been distinctly modified. Western material im-
provements and comforts like the kerosene-oil lamp and
the sewing-machine are to-day part and parcel of the
daily hfe of the people. New economic wants have been
created; standards of living have been raised; canons of
taste have been altered.^
In the intellectual and spiritual fields, likewise, the
leaven of Westernism is clearly apparent. We have
already seen how profoundly Moslem Hberal reformers
have been influenced by Western ideas and the spirit of
Western progress. Of course in these fields Westernism
has progressed more slowly and has awakened much
stronger opposition than it has on the material plane.
Material innovations, especially mechanical improve-
ments, comforts, and luxuries, make their way much
faster than novel customs or ideas, which usually shock
estabUshed beliefs or ancestral prejudices. Tobacco was
taken up with extraordinary rapidity by ever}^ race and
clime, and the kerosene-lamp has in haK a century pene-
trated the recesses of Central Asia and of China; whereas
customs like Western dress and ideas like Western educa-
tion encounter many setbacks and are often adopted
with such modifications that their original spirit is dena-
' On these points, see Arminius Vamb6ry, Western Culture in Eastern
Lands (London, 1906); also his La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant
Quarante Ans (Paris, 1898); C. S. Cooper, The Modernizing of the Orient
(New York, 1914); S. Khuda Bukhsh, Essays: Indian and Islamic (Lon-
don, 1912); A. J. Brown, "Economic Changes in Asia," The Century,
March, 1904.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 93
tured or perverted. The superior strength and skill of
the West are to-day generally admitted throughout the
East, but in many quarters the first receptivity to West-
ern progress and zeal for Western ideas have cooled or
have actually given place to a reactionary hatred of the
very spirit of Western civilization.^
Western mfluences are most apparent in the upper and
middle classes, especially in the Western-educated intelli-
gentsia which to-day exists in every Eastern land. These
eHtes of course vary greatly in numbers and influence,
but they all possess a more or less definite grasp of West-
ern ideas. In their reactions to Westernism they are
sharply differentiated. Some, while retaining the funda-
mentals of their ancestral philosophy of Hfe, attempt a
genuine assimilation of Western ideals and envisage a
higher synthesis of the spirits of East and West. Others
break with their traditional pasts, steep themselves in
Westernism, and become more or less genuinely West-
ernized. Still others conceal behind their Western ve-
neer disillusionment and detestation.^
Of course it is in externals that Westernization is
most pronounced. The Indian or Turkish "intellectual,"
holding Western university degrees and speaking fluently
several European languages, and the wealthy prince or
pasha, with his motor-cars, his racing-stables, and his
^ For the effect of the West intellectually and spiritually, see Vamb^ry,
op. cit. ; Sir Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest (London, 1910) ; J. N. Far-
quhar, Modern Religious Movements in India (New York, 1915); Rev. J.
Morrison, New Ideas in India : A Study of Social, Political, and Religious
Developments (Edinburgh, 1906); the Earl of Cromer, Modem Egypt,
especially vol. II, pp. 228-243 (London, 1908).
^ For the Westernized elites, see L. Bertrand, Le Mirage Orientale
(Paris, 1910); Cromer, op. cit.; A. M^tin, L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Stude
Sociale (Paris, 1918); A. Le Chatelier, "PoUtique musulmane," Revue du
Monde mu^ulman, September, 1910.
94 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
annual "cure" at European watering-places, appear very
Occidental to the casual eye. Such men wear European
clothes, eat European food, and Hve in houses partly or
wholly furnished in European style. Behind this fagade
exists every possible variation of inner life, from earnest
enthusiasm for Western ideals to inveterate reaction.
These varied attitudes toward Westernism are not
parked off by groups or locahties^ hey coexist among the
indi\nduals of every class and every land in the East.
The entire Orient is, in fact, undergoing a prodigious
transformation, far more sudden and intense than any-
thing the West has ever known. Our civilization is
mainly self-evolved; a natural growth developing by
normal, logical, and relatively gradual stages. The East,
on the contrary, is undergoing a concentrated process of
adaptation which, with us, was spread over centuries, and
the result is not so much evolution as revolution — ^polit-
ical, economic, social, idealistic, religious, and much more
besides. The upshot is confusion, imcertainty, grotesque
anachronism, and glaring contradiction. Single genera-
tions are sundered b}^ unbridgable mental and spiritual
gulfs. Fathers do not understand sons; sons despise
their fathers. Everj'where the old and the new struggle
fiercely, often wathin the brain or spirit of the same indi-
vidual. The infinite complexity of this struggle as it
appears in India is well summarized by Sir Valentine
Chirol when he speaks of the many "currents and cross-
currents of the confused movement w^hich is stirring the
stagnant waters of Indian life — the steady impact of
ahen ideas on an ancient and obsolescent civihzation;
the more or less imperfect assimilation of those ideas by
the few; the dread and resentment of them by those
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 95
whose traditional ascendancy they threaten; the disin-
tegration of old beHefs, and then again their aggressive
revival; the careless diffusion of an artificial system of
education, based none too firmly on mere intellectuahsm,
and bereft of all moral or rehgious sanction; the applica-
tion of Western theories of administration and of juris-
prudence to a social formation stratified on lines of
singular rigidity; the play of modern economic forces
upon primitive conditions of industry and trade; the
constant and unconscious but inevitable friction between
subject races and their ahen rulers; the reverberation of
distant wars and distant racial conflicts; the exaltation
of an Oriental people in the Far East."^ These lines,
though written about India, apply with fair exactitude to
every other portion of the Near and Middle East to-day.
As a French writer remarks with special reference to the
Levant: "The truth is that the Orient is in transforma-
tion, and the Mohammedan mentality as well — though
not perhaps exactly as we might wish. It is undergoing
a period of crisis, wherein the past struggles eveiywhere
against the present; where ancient customs, impaired by
modem innovations, present a hybrid and disconcerting
spectacle." ^
To this is largely due the unlovely traits displayed by
most of the so-called "Westernized" Orientals; the
"stucco civilization "3 of the Indian Babu, and the boule-
vardier "culture" of the Turkish "Effendi" — syphihzed
iChirol, op. cit., pp. 321-322.
2 Bertrand, oj>. cit., p. 39. See also Bukhsh, op. cit. ; Farquhar, op. cit.;
Morrison, op. cit. ; R. Mukerjee, The Foundations of Indian Economics
(London, 1916); D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition in India," Econo-
mic Journal, December, 1910.
» W. S. Lilly, India and Its Problems, p. 243 (London, 1902).
96 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
rather than civilized. Any profound transformation
must engender many worthless bj^-products, and the
contemporaiy Westernization of the Orient has its dark
as well as its bright side. The very process of reform,
however necessary and inevitable, lends fresh virulence
to old ills and imports new evils previously unknown.
As Lord Cromer says: "It is doubtful whether the price
which is being paid for introducing European civiUzation
into these backward Eastern societies is always recog-
nized as fully as it should be. The material benefits
derived from European civihzation are unquestionably
great, but as regards the ultimate effect on public and
private morality the future is altogether uncertain."^
The good and the evil of Westernization are alike
mostly clearly evident among the ranks of the educated
elites. Some of these men show the happiest effects of
the Western spirit, but an even larger number fall into
the gulf between old and new, and there miserably
perish. Lord Cromer characterized many of the "Eu-
ropeanized" Egyptians as "at the same time de-
Moslemized Moslems and invertebrate Europeans";^
while another British writer thus pessimistically de-
scribes the superficial Eiu-opeanism prevalent in India:
"Beautiful Mogul palaces furnished with cracked furni-
ture from Tottenham Court Road. That is what we
have done to the Indian mind. We have not only made
it despise its own culture and throw it out; we have
asked it to fill up the vacant spaces with furniture which
will not stand the chmate. The mental Em'asianism of
India is appalling. Such minds are nomad. They be-
long to no civilization, no country, and no history.
1 Cromer, op. cit., vol. II, p. 231. ' lUd., p. 228.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 97
They create a craving that cannot be satisfied; and
ideals that are unreal. They falsify Hfe. They deprive
men of the nourishment of their cultural past, and the
substitutes they supply are unsubstantial. . . . We
sought to give the Eastern mind a Western content and
environment; we have succeeded too well in establish-
ing intellectual and moral anarchy in both." ^
These patent evils of Westernization are a prime cause
of that implacable hatred of everything Western which
animates so many Orientals, including some well ac-
quainted with the West. Such persons are precious
auxiliaries to the ignorant reactionaries and to the rebels
against Western political domination.
The poHtical predominance of the West over the East
is, indeed, the outstanding factor in the whole question
of Western influence upon the Orient. We have already
surveyed Europe's conquest of the Near and Middle
East during the past century, and we have seen how
helpless the backward, decrepit Moslem world was in
face of the twofold tide of pohtical and economic subju-
gation. In fact, the economic phase was perhaps the
more important factor in the rapidity and completeness
of Europe's success. To be sure, some Eastern lands
were subjugated at a stroke by naked mihtary force, as
in the French expedition to Algiers, the Russian conquest
of Central Asia, and the Italian descent upon Tripoli.
Much oftener, however, subjection began by the essen-
^ J. Ramsay Macdonald, The Government of India, pp. 171-172 (London,
1920). On the evils of Westernization, see further: Bukhsh, Cromer,
Dodwell, Mukerjee, ahready cited; Sir W. M. Ramsay, "The Turkish
Peasantry of Anatolia," Quarterly Review, January, 1918; H. M. Hynd-
man. The Awakening of Asia (New York, 1919); T. Rothstein, Egypt's
Ruin (London, 1910); Captain P. Azan, Recherche d'une Solution de la
Question indigene en Algerie (Paris, 1903).
98 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
tially economic process known as "pacific penetration" —
the acquirement of a financial grip upon a hitherto inde-
pendent Oriental country by Western capital in the form
of loans and concessions, until the assimiption of Western
political control became little more than a formal regis-
tration of what already existed in fact. Such is the
story of the subjection of Egypt, Morocco, and Persia,
while England's Indian Empire started in a purely trad-
ing venture — the East India Company. The tremendous
potency of "pacific penetration" is often not fully appre-
ciated. Take the significance of one item alone — rail-
way concessions. Says that keen student of Weltpolitik,
Doctor Dillon; "Railways are the iron tentacles of
latter-day expanding Powers. They are stretched out
caressingly at first. But once the iron has, so to say, en-
tered the soul of the weaker nation, the tentacles swell
to the dimensions of brawny arms, and the embrace
tightens to a crushing grip." ^
On the question of the abstract rightness or wrongness
of this subjection of the East by the West, I do not pro-
pose to enter. It has been exhaustively discussed, pro
and con, and every reader of these pages is undoubtedly
famihar with the stock arguments on both sides. The
one thing certain is that this process of subjugation was,
broadly speaking, inevitable. Given two worlds at such
different levels as East and West at the beginning of the
nineteenth century — the West overflowing with vitahty
and striding at the forefront of human progress, the East
sunk in lethargy and decrepitude — and it was a fore-
gone conclusion that the former would encroach upon
the latter.
* E. J. Dillon, "Persia," Contemporary Review, June, 1910.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 99
What does concern us in our present discussion is the
effect of European pohtical control upon the general proc-
ess of Westernization in Eastern lands. And there can
be no doubt that such Westernization was thereby great-
ly furthered. Once in control of an Oriental country,
the European rulers were bound to favor its Westerniza-
tion for a variety of reasons. Mere self-interest impelled
them to make the country peaceful and prosperous, in
order to extract profit for themselves and reconcile the
inhabitants to their rule. This meant the replacement
of inefficient and sanguinary native despotisms inhibiting
progress and engendering anarchy by stable colonial gov-
ernments, maintaining order, encouraging industry, and
introducing improvements like the railway, the post,
sanitation, and much more besides. In addition to these
material innovations, practically all the Western govern-
ments endeavored to better the social, intellectual, and
spiritual condition of the peoples that had come under
their control. The European Powers who built up colo-
nial empires during the nineteenth century were actuated
by a spirit far more enlightened than that of former
times, when the early colonial empires of Spain, Portugal,
Holland, and the English East India Company had been
run on the brutal and short-sighted doctrine of sheer
exploitation. In the nineteenth century all Western rule
in the Orient was more or less impregnated with the ideal
of "The White Man's Burden." The great empire-
builders of the nineteenth century, actuated as they were
not merely by self-interest and patriotic ambition but
also by a profound sense of obligation to improve the
populations which they had brought under their coun-
try's sway, felt themselves bearers of Western enlighten-
100 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
ment and labored to diffuse all the benefits of Western
civilization. They honestly believed that the extension
of Western political control was the best and quickest,
perhaps the only, means of modernizing the backward
portions of the world.
That standpoint is ably presented by a British "lib-
eral imperiahst/' Professor Ramsay Muir, who writes:
"It is an undeniable fact that the imperiahsm of the
European peoples has been the means whereby European
civilization has been in some degree extended to the
whole world, so that to-day the whole world has become
a single economic unit, and all its members are parts of
a single poHtical system. And this achievement brings
us in sight of the creation of a world-order such as the
wildest dreamers of the past could never have antici-
pated. Without the imperialism of the European peo-
ples North and South America, Australia, South Africa,
must have remained wildernesses, peopled by scattered
bands of savages. Without it India and other lands of
ancient civiHzation must have remained, for all we can
see, externally subject to that endless succession of wars
and arbitrary despotisms which have formed the sub-
stance of their history through untold centuries, and
under which neither rational and equal law nor pohtical
liberty, as we conceive them, were practicable concep-
tions. Without it the backward peoples of the earth
must have continued to stagnate under the dominance of
an unchanging primitive customary regime, which has
been their state thi'oughout recorded time. If to-day
the most fruitful poHtical ideas of the West — the ideas of
nationality and self-government — which are purely prod-
ucts of Western civiKzation, are beginning to produce a
THE INFLUENCE OF THE* WE'St "M
healthy fermentation in many parts of the non-European
world, that result is due to European imperialism." ^
The ethics of modern imperialism have nowhere been
better formulated than in an essay by Lord Cromer.
"An imperial pohcy," he writes, "must, of course, be
carried out with reasonable prudence, and the principles
of government which guide our relations with whatso-
ever races are brought under our control must be politi-
cally and economically sound and morally defensible.
This is, in fact, the keystone of the imperial arch. The
main justification of imperialism is to be found in the use
which is made of imperial power. If we make good use
of our power, we may face the future without fear that
we shall be overtaken by the Nemesis which attended
Roman misrule. If the reverse is the case, the British
Empire will deserve to fall, and of a surety it will ulti-
mately faU."2
Such are the basic sanctions of Western imperialism
as evolved during the nineteenth century. Whether or
not it is destined to endure, there can be no question
that this prodigious extension of European pohtical con-
trol greatly favored the spread of Western influences of
every kind. It is, of course, arguable that the East
would have voluntarily adopted Western methods and
ideas even if no sort of Western pressure had been ap-
plied. But they would have been adopted much more
slowly, and this vital element of time renders such argu-
ments mere academic speculation. For the vital, ex-
panding nineteenth-century West to have deliberately
^Ramsay Muir, "Europe and the Non-European World," The NeW'
Europe, June 28, 1917.
* The Earl of Cromer, Political and Literary Essays, p. 5 (London, 1913).
102 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
restrained itself while the backward East blunderingly
experimented with Westernism, accepting and rejecting,
buying goods and refusing to pay for them, negotiating
loans and then squandering and repudiating them, invit-
ing in Europeans and then expelling or massacring them,
would have been against all history and human nature.
As a matter of fact, Western pressure was applied, as
it was bound to be apphed; and this constant, ubiqui-
tous, unrelenting pressure, broke down the barriers of
Oriental conservatism and inertia as nothing else could
have done, forced the East out of its old ruts, and com-
pelled it to take stock of things as they are in a "v\ orld of
hard facts instead of reminiscent dreams. In subse-
quent chapters we shall examine the manifold results of
this process which has so profoundly transformed the
Orient during the past hundred years. Here we will con-
tinue our general survey by examining the more recent
aspects of Western control over the East and the reac-
tions of the East thereto.
In my opinion, the chief fallacy involved in criticisms
of Western control over Eastern lands arises from
failure to discriminate between nineteenth-century and
twentieth-century imperialism. Nineteenth-century im-
periaHsm was certainly inevitable, and was apparently
beneficial in the main. Twentieth-century imperialism
cannot be so favorably judged. By the year 1900 the
Oriental peoples were no longer mere fanatical obscur-
antists neither knowing nor caring to know anything
outside the closed circle of their ossified, decadent civili-
zations. The East had been going to school, and wanted
to begin to apply what it had been taught by the West.
It should have been obvious that these peoples, whose
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 103
past history proved them capfble of achievement and
who were now showing an apparently genuine desire for
new progress, needed to be treated differently from what
they had been. In other words, a more hberal attitude
on the part of the West had become advisable.
But no such change was made. On the contrary, in
the West itself, the liberal idealism which had prevailed
during most of the nineteenth century was giving way to
that spirit of fierce poHtical and economic rivalry which
culminated in the Great War.^ Never had Europe been
so avid for colonies, for "spheres of influence," for con-
cessions and preferential markets; in fine, so "imperial-
istic," in the unfavorable sense of the term. The result
was that with the beginning of the twentieth century
Western pressure on the East, instead of being relaxed,
was redoubled; and the awakening Orient, far from being
met with sympathetic consideration, was treated more
ruthlessly than it had been for two hundred years. The
way in which Eastern countries like Turkey and Persia,
striving to reform themselves and protect their indepen-
dence, were treated by Europe's new Realpolitik would
have scandahzed the liberal imperialists of a generation
before. It certainly scandalized present-day liberals, as
witness these scathing lines written in 1912 by the well-
known British pubUcist Sidney Low:
"The conduct of the Most Christian Powers during
the past few years has borne a striking resemblance to
that of robber-bands descending upon an imarmed and
helpless population of peasants. So far from respecting
the rights of other nations, they have exhibited the most
' For a full discussion of these changes in Western ideas, see ray Rising
Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy, especially chaps. VI and VII.
104 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
complete and cynical d'sregard for them. They have,
in fact, asserted the claim of the strong to prey upon the
weak, and the utter impotence of all ethical considera-
tions in the face of armed force, with a crude nakedness
which few Eastern mihtary conquerors could well have
surpassed.
"The great cosmic event in the history of the last
quarter of a century' has been the awakening of Asia
after centuries of somnolence. The East has suddenly
sprung to life, and endeavored to throw itself vigorously
into the full current of Western progress. Japan started
the enterprise; and, fortunately for herself, she entered
upon it before the new Western policy had fully devel-
oped itself, and while certain archaic ideals about the
rights of peoples and the sanctity of treaties still pre-
vailed. When the new era was inaugurated by the great
Japanese statesmen of the nineteenth century, Europe
did not feel called upon to interfere. We regarded the
Japanese renaissance with interest and admiration, and
left the people of Nippon to work out the difficulties of
their own salvation, unobstructed. If that revolution
had taken place thirty years later, there would probably
have been a different story to tell; and New Japan, in
the throes of her travail, would have found the armed
Great Powers at her bedside, each stretching forth a
mailed fist to grab something worth taking. Other
Eastern countries which have endeavored to follow the
example of Japan during the present century have had
worse luck. During the past ten years a wave of sheer
materiahsm and absolute contempt for international
morality has swept across the Foreign Offices of Europe,
and has reacted disastrously upon the various Eastern
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 105
nations in their desperate stiUt^gles to reform a constitu-
tional system. They have been attempting to carry out
the suggestions made to them for generations by benevo-
lent advisers in Christendom.
"Now, when they take these counsels to heart, and
endeavor, with halting steps, and in the face of immense
obstacles, to pursue the path of reform, one might sup-
pose that their efforts would be regarded with sympa-
thetic attention by the Governments of the West; and
that, even if these offered no direct aid, they would at
least allow a fair trial." But, on the contrary, "one
Great Power after another has used the opportunity pre-
sented by the internal diflSculties of the Eastern coun-
tries to set out upon a career of annexation." ^
We have already seen how rapid was this career of
annexation, extinguishing the independence of the last
remaining Mohammedan states at the close of the Great
War. We have also seen how it exacerbated Moslem
fear and hatred of the West. And the West was already
feared and hated for many reasons. In the preceding
chapter we traced the growth of the Pan-Islamic move-
ment, and in subsequent chapters we shall trace the
development of Oriental nationalism. These pohtico-
religious movements, however, by no means exhaust the
list of Oriental reactions to Westernism. There are
others, economic, social, racial in character. In view of
the complex nature of the Orient's reaction against
Westernism, let us briefly analyze the problem in its
various constituent elements.
Anti-Western feeling has been waning in some quarters
'Sidney Low, "The Most Christian Powers," Fortnightly Review,
March, 1912.
106 THE NEW WOKLD OF ISLAM
and waxing in others ciunag the past hundred years.
By temperamental reactionaries and fanatics things
Western have, of course, always been abhorred. But,
leaving aside this intransigeant minority, the attitude of
other categories of Orientals has varied greatly accord-
ing to times and circumstances. By hberal-minded per-
sons Western influences were at first hailed with cor-
diality and even with enthusiasm. In the opening
chapter we saw how the liberal reformers welcomed the
Western concept of progress and made it one of the bases
of their projected religious reformation. And the Hber-
als displayed the same attitude in secular matters. The
liberal statesmen who governed Turkey during the third
quarter of the nineteenth century made earnest efforts
to reform the Ottoman state, and it was the same in
other parts of the Moslem world. An interesting exam-
ple is the attempt made by General Kheir-ed-Din to
modernize Tunis. This man, a Circassian by birth, had
won the confidence of his master, the Bey, who made
him vizier. In 1860 he toured Europe and returned
greatly impressed with its civilization. Convinced of
Europe's infinite superiority, he desired passionately to
transplant Western ideas and methods to Tunis. This
he beHeved quite feasible, and the result would, so he
thought, be Tmiis's rapid regeneration. Kheir-ed-Din
was not in the least a hater of the West. He merely
recognized clearly the Moslem world's peril of speedy
subjection to the West if it did not set its house rapidly
in order, and he therefore desired, in a perfectly legiti-
mate feeling of patriotism, to press his country along the
road of progress, that it might be able to stand alone
and preserve its independence.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 107
So greatly was the Bey impressed by Kheir-ed-Din's
report that he gave him a free hand in his reforming en-
deavors. For a short time Kheir-ed-Din displayed great
activity, though he encountered stubborn opposition
from reactionary officials. His work was cut short by
his untimely death, and Tunis, still unmodemized, fell
twenty years later under the power of France. Kheir-
ed-Din, however, worked for posterity. In order to
rouse his compatriots to the realities of their situation
he published a remarkable book. The Surest Means of
Knowing the State of Nations. This book has profoundly
influenced both Hberals and nationalists throughout the
Near East, especially in North Africa, where it has be-
come the bible of Tunisian and Algerian nationalism.
In his book Kheir-ed-Din shows his coreHgionists the
necessity of breaking with their attitude of blind admira-
tion for the past and proud indifference to everything
else, and of studying what is going on in the outer world.
Europe's present prosperity is due, he asserts, not to
natural advantages or to religion, but "to progress in
the arts and sciences, which facihtate the circulation of
wealth and exploit the treasures of the earth by an
enhghtened protection constantly given to agriculture,
industry, and commerce: all natural consequences of
justice and hberty — two things which, for Europeans,
have become second nature." In past ages the Moslem
world was great and progressive, because it was then
liberal and open to progress. It declined through big-
otry and obscurantism. But it can revive by reviving
the spirit of its early days.
I have stressed the example of the Tunisian Kheir-ed-
Din rather than the better-known Turkish instances
108 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
because it illustrates the general receptivity of mid-
nineteenth-century Moslem liberals to Western ideas
and their freedom from anti- Western feeling.^ As time
passed, however, many of these erstwhile liberals, disil-
lusioned with the West for various reasons, notably
European aggression, became the bitterest enemies of
the West, hating the very spirit of Western civilization.^
This anti-Western feehng has, of course, been greatly
exacerbated since the beginning of the present century.
As an influential Mohammedan wrote just before the
Great War: "The events of these last ten years and the
disasters which have stricken the Mohammedan world
have awakened in its bosom a sentiment of mutual cor-
diaHty and devotion hitherto unknown, and a unanimous
hatred against all its oppressors has been the ferment
which to-day stirs the hearts of all Moslems." ^ The
bitter rancor seething in many Moslem hearts shows in
outbursts hke the following, from the pen of a popular
Turkish writer at the close of the Balkan Wars: "We
have been defeated, we have been shown hostihty by
the outside world, because we have become too dehb-
erative, too cultured, too refined in our conceptions of
right and wrong, of humanity and civiHzation. The
example of the Bulgarian army has taught us that every
^ On this point see" also A. Vamb6ry, Western Culture in Eastern Lands
(London, 1906); W. S. Blunt, The Future of Islam (London, 1882); also the
two articles by L6on Cahun on intellectual and social developments in
the Islamic world during the nineteenth century in Lavisse et Rambaud,
Histoire Generate, vol. XI, chap. XV; vol. XII, chap. XIV.
^ See A. Vambery, Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, chap. VI
(Leipzig, 1875).
3 "X," "La Situation poHtique de la Perse," Revue du Monde musulman,
June, 1914. As already stated, the editor vouches for this anonymous
writer as a distinguished Mohammedan official — "un homme d'^tdt
musulman."
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 109
soldier facing the enemy must return to the days of bar-
barism, must have a thirst of blood, must be merciless
in slaughtering children and women, old and weak, must
disregard others' property, life, and honor. Let us
spread blood, suffering, wrong, and mourning. Thus
only may we become the favorites of the civilized world
like King Ferdinand's army." ^
The Great War itself was hailed by multitudes of
Moslems as a well-merited Nemesis on Western arro-
gance and greed. Here is how a leading Turkish news-
paper characterized the European Powers: "They would
not look at the evils in their own countries or elsewhere,
but interfered at the slightest incident in our borders;
every day they would gnaw at some part of our rights
and our sovereignty; they would perform vivisection on
our quivering flesh and cut off great pieces of it. And
we, with a forcibly controlled spirit of rebellion in our
hearts and with clinched but powerless fists, silent and
depressed, would murmur as the fire burned within:
*0h, that they might fall out with one another! Oh,
that they might eat one another up!' And lo! to-day
they are eating each other up, just as the Turk wished
they would." ^
Such anti-Western sentiments are not confined to
journalists or politicians; they are shared by all classes,
from princes to peasants. Each class has its special rea-
^ Ahmed Emin, The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its
Press, p. 108 (Columbia University Ph.D. Thesis, New York, 1914).
2 The Constantinople Tanine. Quoted from The Literary Digest, Octo-
ber 24, 1914, p. 784. This attitude toward the Great War and the Euro-
pean Powers was not confined to Mohammedan peoples; it was common
to non-white peoples ever3Tvhere. For a survey of this feeling through-
out the world, see my Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy,
pp. 13-16.
no THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
sons for hating European political control. The native
princes, even when maintained upon their thrones and
confirmed in their dignities and emoluments, bitterly
resent their state of vassalage and their loss of limitless,
despotic power. "Do you know, I can hardly buy a pen
or a sword for myself without asking the Resident for per-
mission?" remarked an Indian rajah bitterly. His atti-
tude was precisely that of Kiedive Tewfik Pasha, who,
in the early daj^s of the British occupation of Egypt,
while watching a review of British troops, said to one of
his ministers: "Do you suppose I hke this? I tell you, I
never see an Enghsh sentinel in my streets without long-
ing to jump out of my carriage and strangle him with
my own hands." ^ The upper classes feel much the same
as their sovereigns. They regret their former monopoly
of privilege and office. This is especially true of the
Western-educated intelligentsia, who beHeve that they
should hold all government posts and resent bitterly the
reservation of high-salaried directive positions for Euro-
peans. Of course many intelligent Hberals reahze so
fuUy the educative effect of European control that they
acquiesce in a temporary loss of independence in order
to complete their modernization and ultimately be able
to stand alone without fear of reaction or anarchy. How-
ever, these liberals are only a small minority, hated by
their upper-class fellows as time-servers and renegades,
and sundered by an immense gulf from the ignorant
masses.
At first sight we might think that the masses would,
on the whole, be favorably disposed toward European
* Both the above instances are taken from C. S. Cooper, The Modern-
izing of the Orieni, pp. 339-340 (New York, 1914).
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 111
political control. Despite certain economic disadvan-
tages that Westernization has imposed, the masses have
unquestionably gained most by European rule. For-
merly exploited ruthlessly by both princes and upper
classes, the peasants and town workers are to-day as-
sured peace, order, justice, and security for their land-
holdings and the fruits of their toil. Now it would be a
mistake to think that the masses are insensible to all
this. The fact is, they do recognize the benefits of
European rule. Nevertheless, the new rulers, while tol-
erated and even respected, are never beloved. Further-
more, as the generation which knew the old regime dies
off, its evils are forgotten, and the younger generation,
taking present benefits for granted, murmurs at the flaws
in the existing order, and lends a readier ear to native
agitators extolling the glories of independence and ideal-
izing the "good old times."
The truth of the matter is that, despite all its short-
comings, the average Oriental hankers after the old way
of life. Even when he recognizes the good points of the
new, he nevertheless yearns irrationally for the old. "A
Moslem ruler though he oppress me and not a kafir^
though he work me weal " is a Moslem proverb of long
standing. Every colonial administration, no matter
how enhghtened, runs counter to this ineradicable aver-
sion of Moslems for Christian rule. A Russian admin-
istrator in Central Asia voices the sentiments of European
officials generally when he states: "Pious Moslems cannot
accommodate themselves to the government of Giaours y^
Furthermore, it must be remembered that most Ori-
^ An "Unbeliever" — in other words, a Christian.
^ Quoted by A. Woeikof, Le Turkestan russe (Paris, 1914).
112 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
entals either do not recognize much benefit in European
rule, or, even though they do recognize considerable
benefits, consider these more than offset by many points
which, in their eyes, are maddening annoyances or bur-
dens. The very things which we most pride ourselves
on having given to the Orient — peace, order, justice,
security — are not valued by the Oriental anjrwhere near
as highly as we might expect. Of course he likes these
things, but he would prefer to get less of them if what he
did get was given by native rulers, sharing his preju-
dices and poiat of view. Take the single factor of jus-
tice. As an English writer remarks: "The Asiatic is not
delighted with justice 'per se; indeed, the Asiatic really
cares but little about it if he can get sympathy in the
sense in which he understands that misunderstood word.
. . . This is the real reason why every Asiatic in his
heart of hearts prefers the rule of his own nationality,
bad though it be, to the most ideal rule of ahens. For
when he is ruled by his own countrymen, he is dealt
with by people who understand his frailties, and who,
though they may savagely punish him, are at least in
sympathy with the motives which prompt his delin-
quencies." ^
Take again the matter of order. The average Oriental
not only does not appreciate, but detests, our well-regu-
lated, systematic manner of life. Accustomed as he has
been for centuries to a slipshod, easy-going existence,
in which, if there was much injustice, there was also much
favoritism, he instinctively hates things Hke sanitary
measures and police regulations. Accustomed to a wide
"personal liberty" in the anarchic sense, he is not will-
1 B. L. Putnam Weale, The Conflict of Color, p. 193 (London, 1910).
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 113
ing to limit this liberty for the common weal. He wants
his own way, even though it involves possible dangers
to himself — dangers which may always be averted by
bribery, favoritism, or violence. Said an American who
had listened to a Filipino's glowing words on indepen-
dence: ""What could you do, if you were independent,
that you cannot do now?" "I could build my house
there in the middle of the street, if I wanted to." "But
suppose your neighbor objected and interfered?" "I
would 'get' him." "But suppose he 'got' you?" A
shrug of the shoulders was the only answer.^
The fact is that the majority of Orientals, despite the
considerable penetration of Western ideas and methods
that has been going on for the last century, still love
their old ruts and hate to be budged out of them. They
reahze that Western rule furthers more than anything
else the Westernization of their social system, their tra-
ditional manner of life, and they therefore tend to react
fanatically against it. Every innovation imposed by
the colonial autho.'^ies is apt to rouse the most pur-
blind resistance. For example, compulsory vaccination
was bitterly opposed for years by the natives of Algeria.
The French officials pointed out that smallpox, hitherto
rampant, was being rapidly extirpated. The natives re-
phed that, in their opinion, it was merely a crafty scheme
for sterilizing them sexually and thus make room for
French colonists. The officials thereupon pointed to the
census figures, which showed that the natives were in-
creasing at an unprecedented rate. The natives merely
shrugged their shoulders and continued to inveigh against
the innovation.
1 Quoted from H. H. Powers, The Great Peace, p. 82 (New York, 191S).
114 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
This whole matter has been well summarized by a
French writer with a wide knowledge of Mohammedan
lands. Says Louis Bertrand:
"In reality, all these peoples, indisposed as they are by
their traditions, customs, and climates to live according
to our social ideal, hate to endure the constraint of our
police, of our administration — in a word, of any sort of
regulated government, no matter how just and honest.
Delivered from the most anarchic and vexatious of tyr-
annies, they remain in spirit more or less like our vaga-
bonds, always hoping to escape from the gendarmes. In
vain do we point out to the Arabs of North Africa that,
thanks to the protection of France, they are no longer
pillaged by Turkish despots nor massacred and tortured
by rival tribes. They see only one thing: the necessity
of paying taxes for matters that they do not understand.
We shall never realize the rage, the fury, aroused in our
Algerian to\\Tis by the simple health department ordi-
nance requiring the emptying of a garbage-can at a fixed
hour. At Cairo and elsewhere I have observed the same
rebellious feelings among the donkey-boys and cab-
drivers subjected to the regulations of the English police-
man.
"But it is not merely our municipal and administra-
tive regulations which they find insupportable; it is all
our habits, taken en hloc — in a word, the order which
regulates our civilized Hf e. For instance : on the railway-
line from Jaffa to Jerusalem the train stops at a station
beside which stands the tomb of a holy man. The
schedule calls for a stop of a minute at most. But no
sooner had we arrived than what was my stupefaction to
see all the Mohammedans on the train get off, spread
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 115
their prayer-rugs, and tranquilly begin their devotions.
The station-master blew his whistle, the conductor yelled
at them that he was going to leave them behind; nobody
budged. A squad of railway employees had to be mo-
bilized, who, with blows and curses, finally bundled these
pious persons back into the train again. The business
lasted a good quarter of an hour, and was not easy.
The more vigorous of the worshippers put up an ener-
getic resistance.
"The above is only a casual instance, chosen at ran-
dom. What is certain is that these peoples do not yet
imderstand what we mean by exactitude, and that the
concept of a well-regulated existence has not yet pene-
trated their heads." ^
What has just been written of course applies primarily
to the ignorant masses. But this attitude of mind is
more or less common to all classes of Oriental peoples.
The habits of centuries are not easily transformed. In
fact, it must not be forgotten that the upper classes were
able to enjoy most fully the capricious personal liberty
of the unmodified East, and that, therefore, though they
may be better able to understand the value of Western-
ization, they have in one sense the most to lose.^
In fact, for all Orientals, high and low alike, the "good
old times" had charms which they mournfully regret.
For the prince, the pasha, the courtier, existence was
truly an Oriental paradise. To be sure, the prince
might at any moment be defeated and slain by a rival
monarch; the pasha strangled at his master's order;
* L. Bertrand, Le Mirage oriental, pp. 441-442 (Paris, 1910).
"^ On this point see the very interesting essay by Meredith Townsend
entitled "The Charm of Asia for Asiatics," in his book Asia and Europe,
pp. 120-128.
116 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
the courtier tortured through a superior's whim. But,
meanwhile, it was "Hfe," rich and full. "Each of these
men had his own character and his own renown among
his countrymen, and each enjoyed a position such as is
now imattainable in Europe, in which he was released
from laws, could indulge his own fancies, bad or good,
and was fed every day and aU day with the special flat-
tery of Asia — that willing submissiveness to mere voli-
tion which is so hke adoration, and which is to its recipi-
ents the most intoxicating of delights. Each, too, had
his court of followers, and every courtier shared in the
power, the luxury, and the adulation accruing to his
lord. The power was that of Hfe and death; the luxury
included possession of every woman he desired; the adula-
tion was, as I have said, almost religious worship." ^
But, it may be asked, what about the poor man, ex-
ploited by this hierarchy of capricious despots? What
had he to gain from all this? Well, in most cases, he
got nothing at all; but he might gain a great deal. Life
in the old Orient was a gigantic lotter}^ Any one, how-
ever humble, who chanced to please a great man, might
rise to fame and fortune at a bound. And this is just
what pleases the Eastern temperament; for in the East,
"luck" and caprice are more prized than the "security"
cherished in the West. In the Orient the favorite stories
are those narrating sudden and amazing shifts of fortune
— beggars become viziers or viziers become beggars, and
all in a single night. To the majority of Orientals it is
still the unc'Ttainties of hfe, and the capricious favor of
the pow^erful, which make it most worth living; not the
sure reward of honesty and well-regulated labor. All
^Townsend, op. cit., p. 104.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 117
these things made the Hfe of the Orient infinitely inter-
esting to all. And it is precisely this gambler's interest
which Westernization has more or less destroyed. As an
English writer very justly remarks a propos of modern
Egypt: "Our rule may be perfect, but the East finds it
dull. The old order was a ragged garment, but it was
gay. Its very vicissitude had a charm. *Ah ! yes,' said
an Egyptian to a champion of English rule, 'but in the
old days a beggar might sit at the gate, and if he were
found pleasing in the eyes of a great lady, he might be
a great man on the morrow.' There is a natural and in-
evitable regret for the gorgeous and perilous past, when
favor took the place of justice, and fife had great heights
and depths — for the Egypt of Joseph, Haroun-al-Rashid,
and Ismail Pasha. We have spread the coat of broad-
cloth over the radiant garment."^
Saddened and irritated by the threatened loss of so
much that they hold dear, it is not strange that many
Eastern conservatives glorify the past as a sort of Golden
Age, infinitely superior to anything the West can pro-
duce, and in this they are joined by many quondam
liberals, disillusioned with Westernism and flying into
the arms of reaction. The result is a spirit of hatred
against everything Western, which sometimes assumes
the most extravagant forms. Says Louis Bertrand:
"During a lecture that I attended at Cairo the speaker
contended that France owed Islam (1) its civilization and
sciences; (2) half of its vocabulary; (3) all that was best
in the character and mentality of its population, seeing
that, from the Middle Ages to the Revolution of 1789,
1 H. Spender, "England, Egypt, and Turkey," Contemporary Review,
October, 1906.
118 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
all the reformers who labored for its enfranchisement-^
AlbigensianS; Vaudois, Calvinists, and Camisards — were
probably descendants of the Saracens. It was nothing
less than the total annexation of France to Morocco."
Meanwhile, "it has become the fashion for fervent
(Egyptian) nationalists to go to Spain and meditate in
the gardens of the Alcazar of Seville or in the patios of
the Alhambra of Granada on the defunct splendors of
Western Islam." ^
Even more grotesque are the rhapsodies of the Hindu
wing of this Golden Age school. These Hindu enthu-
siasts far outdo the wildest flights of their Moslem fel-
lows. They solemnly assert that Hindustan is the
nursery and home of all tme religion, philosophy, cul-
ture, ci^dHzation, science, invention, and evervi,hing else;
and they aver that when India's present regrettable
eclipse is past (an echpse of course caused entirely by
English rule) she is again to shine forth in her glory for
the salvation of the wliole world. Employing to the fuU
the old adage that there is nothing new under the smi,
they have "discovered" in the Vedas and other Hindu
sacred texts "irrefutable" evidence that the ancient
Hindu sages anticipated all our modern ideas, including
such up-to-date matters as bomb-dropping aeroplanes
and the League of Nations.^
All this rhapsodical laudation of the past will, in the
long run, prove futile. The East, like the West, has its
1 Bertrand, pp. 209, 210.
2 For discussion of this Hindu attitude see W. Archer, India and the
Future (London, 1918); Young and Ferrers, India in Conflict (London,
1920). Also see Hindu writings of this nature: H. Maitra, Hinduism:
The World-Ideal (London, 1916); A. Coomaraswamy, The Dance of Siva
(New York, 1918); M. N. Chatterjee, "The World and the Next War,"
Journal of Race Development, April, 1916.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 119
peculiar virtues; but the East also has its special faults,
and it is the faults which, for the last thousand years,
have been gaining on the virtues, resulting in backward-
ness, stagnation, and inferiority. To-day the East is
being penetrated — and quickened — ^by the West. The
outcome will never be complete Westernization in the
sense of a mere wholesale copying and absolute transfor-
mation; the East will always remain fundamentally it-
self. But it wiU be a new self, the result of a true as-
similation of Western ideas. The reactionaries can only
delay this process, and thereby prolong the Orient's
infeiiority and weakness.
Nevertheless, the reactionary attitude, though unin-
telligent, is intelligible. Westernization hurts too many
cherished prejudices and vested interests not to arouse
chronic resistance. This resistance would occur even if
Western influences were all good and Westerners all
angels of hght. But of course Westernization has its
dark side, while our Western culture-bearers are ani-
mated not merely by altruism, but also by far less worthy
motives. This strengthens the hand of the Oriental
reactionaries and lends them the cover of moral sanc-
tions. In addition to the extremely painful nature of
any transformative process, especially in economic and
social matters, there are many incidental factors of an
extremely irritating nature.
To begin with, the mere presence of the European,
with his patent superiority of power and progress, is a
constant annoyance and himiiliation. This physical
presence of the European is probably as necessary to
the Orient's regeneration as it is mevitable in view of
the Orient's present inferiority. But, however benefi-
120 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
cial, it is none the less a source of profound irritation.
These Europeans disturb everything, modify customs,
raise Hving standards, erect separate "quarters" in the
cities, where they form "extraterritorial" colonies ex-
empt from native law and customary regulation. An
Enghsh town rises in the heart of Cairo, a "Little Paris"
eats into Arabesque Algiers, while European Pera flaunts
itself opposite Turkish Stambul.
As for India, it is dotted with British "enclaves."
"The great Presidency towns, Calcutta, Bombay, Mar
dras, are European cities planted on Indian soil. All the
prominent buildings are European, though in some of
the more recent ones an endeavor has been made to
adopt what is known as the 'Indo-Saracenic' style of
architecture. For the rest, the streets are called by
Enghsh names, generally the names of bygone vicero3''s
and governors, or of the soldiers who conquered the land
and quelled the mutiny — ^heroes whose effigies meet you
at every tmTi. The shops are Enghsh shops, where
English or Eurasian assistants traffic in English goods.
Enghsh carriages and motors bowl along the macad-
amized or tarred roads of Old England. On every hand
there is evidence of the instinctive effort to reproduce,
as nearly as the climate will permit, English conditions
of life. . . . Almost the whole life of the people of
India is relegated to the back streets, not to say the
slums — frankly called in Madras, the Black Town. There
are a few points — clubs and gjonkhanas specially estab-
Hshed to that end — where Enghsh men, and even women,
meet Indian men, and even women, of the wealthier
classes, on a basis of social equahty. But few indeed are
the points of contact between the Asian town and the
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 121
European city which has been superimposed upon it.
The missionary, the Salvation Army outpost, perhaps
the curiosity-hunting tourist, may go forth into the
bazaars; but the European community as a whole cares
no more for the swarming brown multitudes around it
than the dwxUers on an island care lor the fishes in the
circumambient sea." ^ And what is tine of the great
towns holds good for scores of provincial centres, "sta-
tions," and cantonments. The scale may be smaller,
but the type is the same.
The European in the Orient is thus everywhere pro-
foundly an alien, living apart from the native life. And
the European is not merely an aloof alien; he is a ruling
alien as well. Always his attitude is that of the superior,
the master. This attitude is not due to brutahty or
snobbery; it is inherent in the very essence of the situa-
tion. Of course many Europeans have bad manners,
but that does not change the basic reality of the case.
And this reality is that, whatever the future may bring,
the European first established himself in the Orient be-
cause the West was then infinitely ahead of the East;
and he is still there to-day because, despite all recent
changes, the East is still behind the West. Therefore the
European in the Orient is still the ruler, and so long as
he stays there must continue to rule— justly, temper-
ately, with politic regard for Eastern progress and Hberal
devolution of power as the East becomes ripe for its lib-
eral exercise — but, nevertheless, rule. Wherever the Oc-
cidental has established his political control, there are
but two alternatives: govern or go. Furthermore, in his
governing, the Occidental must rule according to his own
^ Archer, pp. 11, 12.
122 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
lights; despite all concessions to local feeling, he must,
in the last analysis, act as a Western, not as an Eastern,
ruler. Lord Cromer voices the heart of all true colonial
government when he says: "In governing Oriental races
the first thought must be what is good for them, but not
necessarily what they think is good for them." *
Now all this is inevitable, and should be self-evident.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that even the most en-
lightened Oriental can hardly regard it as other than
a bitter though salutaiy medicine, while most Orientals
feel it to be humiliating or intolerable. The very vir-
tues of the European are piime causes of his unpopu-
larity. For, as Meredith Townsend well says: "The
Em-opean is, in Asia, the man who will insist on his
neighbor doing business just after dinner, and being exact
when he is half-asleep, and being 'prompt' just when he
wants to enjoy, — and he rules in Asia and is loved in
Asia accordingly." ^
Furthermore, the European in the Orient is disliked
not merel}' as a ruler and a disturber, but also as a man
of widely different race. This matter of race is very
complicated,^ but it cuts deep and is of fundamental
importance. Most of the peoples of the Near and Mid-
dle East with which our present discussion is concerned
belong to what is known as the "brown" category of
the human species. Of course, in strict anthropology,
the term is inexact. Anthropologically, we cannot set
off a sharply differentiated group of "brown" types as a
"brown race," as we can set off the "white" types of
* Cromer, Political and Literary Essays, p. 25.
2 Townsend, Asia and Europe, p. 128.
' I have dealt with it at length in my Rising Tide of Color against White
World-Supremacy.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 123
Europe as a "white race" or the "yellow" Mongoloid
t>pes of the Far East as a "yellow race." This is be-
cause the Near and Middle East have been racially a
vast melting-pot, or series of melting-pots, wherein con-
quest and migration have continually poured new hetero-
geneous elements, producing the most diverse ethnic
amalgamations. Thus to-day some of the Near and
Middle Eastern peoples are largely white, Hke the Per-
sians and Ottoman Turks; others, Hke the southern
Indians and Yemenite Arabs, are largely black; while
still others, like the Himalayan and Central Asian peo-
ples, have much yellow blood. Again, as there is no
brown racial type-nomi, as there are white and yellow
type-norais, so there is no generalized brown culture
like those possessed by yellows and whites. The great
brown spiritual bond is Islam, yet in India, the chief seat
of brown population, Islam is professed by only one-fifth
of the inhabitants. Lastly, while the spiritual fron-
tiers of the Moslem world coincide mainly with the eth-
nic frontiers of the brown world, Islam overlaps at
several points, including some pure whites in eastern Eu-
rope, many true yellows in the Far East, and multitudes
of negroes in Africa.
Nevertheless, despite these partial modifications, the
terms "brown race" and "brown world" do connote
genuine realities which science and politics alike recog-
nize to be essentially true. There certainly is a funda-
mental comity between the brown peoples. This comity
is subtle and intangible in character; yet it exists, and
under certain circumstances it is capable of momentous
manifestations. Its salient feature is the instinctive
recognition by all Near and Middle Eastern peoples that
124 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
they are fellow "Asiatics," however bitter may be their
internecine feuds. This instinctive "Asiatic" feeUng has
been noted by historians for more than two thousand
years, and it is tme to-day as in the past.
The great racial divisions of mankind are the most
fundamental, the most permanent, the most ineradica-
ble things in human experience. They are not mere
diverse colorations of skin. Matters like complexion,
stature, and hair-formation are merely the outward,
visible symbols of correlative mental and spiritual dif-
ferences which reveal themselves in shaiply contrasted
temperaments and view-points, and which translate
themselves into the infinite phenomena of divergent
group-life.
Now it is one of these basic racial lines of cleavage
which runs between "East" and "West." Broadly
speaking, the Near and Middle East is the "brown
world," and this differentiates it from the "white world"
of the West in a way which never can be really obhter-
ated. Indeed, to attempt to obHterate the difference by
racial fusion would be the maddest of follies. East and
West can mutually quicken each other by a mutual
exchange of ideas and ideals. They can only harm each
other by transfusions of blood. To unite physically
would be the greatest of disasters. East and West have
both given much to the world in the past, and promise
to give more in the future. But whatever of tme value
they are to give can be given only on condition that
they remain essentially themselves. Ethnic fusion would
destroy both their race-souls and would result in a dreary
mongrehzation from which would issue nothing but de-
generation and decay.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 125
Both East and West instinctively recognize the truth
of this, and show it by their common contempt for the
"Eurasian" — the mongrel offspring of unions between
the two races. As Meredith Townsend well says: "The
chasm between the brown man and the white is un-
fathomable,' has existed in all ages, and exists still ev-
erywhere. No white man marries a brown wife, no
brown man marries a white wife, without an inner sense
of having been false to some unintelligible but irresisti-
ble command." ^
The above summary of the political, economic, social,
and racial differences between East and West gives us a
fair idea of the numerous cross-currents which complicate
the relations of the two worlds and which hinder West-
ernization. The Westernizing process is assuredly going
on, and in subsequent chapters we shall see how far-
reaching is its scope. But the factors just considered will
indicate the possibilities of reaction and will roughly assign
the limits to which Westernization may ultimately extend.
One thing is certain: Western political control in the
Orient, however prolonged and however imposing in
appearance, must ever rest on essentially fragile founda-
tions. The Western rulers will always remain an alien
caste; tolerated, even respected, perhaps, but never
loved and never regarded as anything but foreigners.
Furthermore, Western rule must necessarily become more
precarious with the increasing enhghtenment of the sub-
ject peoples, so that the acquiescence of one generation
may be followed by the hostile protest of the next. It
is indeed an unstable equilibrium, hard to maintain and
easily upset.
1 Townsend, p. 97.
126 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
The latent instability of European political control
over the Near and Middle East was dramatically shown
by the moral effect of the Russo-Japanese War. Down
to that time the Orient had been so helpless in face of
Eiu-opean aggression that most Orientals had come to
regard Western supremacy with fatalistic resignation.
But the defeat of a first-class European Power by an
Asiatic people instantly broke the spell, and all Asia and
Africa thrilled with a wild intoxication which we can
scarcely conceive. A Scotch missionaiy thus describes
the effect of the Japanese \^ctories on northern India,
where he was stationed at the time: "A stir of excite-
ment passed over the north of India. Even the remote
villagers talked over the victories of Japan as they sat
in their circles and passed round the huqqa at night.
One of the older men said to me, 'There has been nothing
like it since the mutiny.' A Turkish consul of long ex-
perience in Western Asia told me that in the interior you
could see everywhere the most ignorant peasants 'tin-
gling' with the news. Asia was moved from end to
end, and the sleep of the centuries was finally broken.
It was a time when it was 'good to be ahve,' for a new
chapter was being written in the book of the world's
histor>\" 1
Of course the Russo-Japanese War did not create this
new spirit, whose roots lay in the previous epoch of sub-
tle changes that had been going on. The Russo-Japa-
iRev. C. F. Andrews, The Renaissance in India, p. 4 (London, 1911).
For other similar accounts of the effect of the Russo-Japanese War upon
Oriental peoples generally, see A. M. Low, "Egyptian Unrest," The
Forum, October, 1906; F. Farjanel, "Le Japon et I'Islam," Revue du Monde
musul-man, November, 1906; "Oriental Ideals as Affected by the Russo-
Japanese War," American Review of Reviews, February, 1905; A. Vam-
bery, "Japan and the Mahometan World," Nineteenth Century and After,
April, 1905; Yahya Siddyk, op. cit., p. 42.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 127
nese War was thus rather the occasion than the cause of
the wave of exultant self-confidence which swept over
Asia and Africa in the year 1904. But it did dramatize
and clarify ideas that had been germinating half-uncon-
sciously in millions of Oriental minds, and was thus the
sign manual of the whole nexus of forces making for a
revivified Orient.
Furthermore, this new temper profoundly influenced
the Orient's attitude toward the series of fresh European
aggressions which then began. It is a curious fact that
just when the Far East had successfully resisted Euro-
pean encroachment, the Near and Middle East should
have been subjected to European aggressions of unpar-
alleled severity. We have already noted the furious
protests and the unwonted moral solidarity of the Mos-
lem world at these manifestations of Western Realpolitik.
It would be interesting to know exactly how much of
this defiant temper was due to the heartening example
of Japan. Certainly our ultraimperiaHsts of the West
were playing a. dangerous game during the decade be-
tween 1904 and 1914. As Arminius Vambery remarked
after the Italian raid on Tripoh: "The more the power
and authority of the West gains ground in the Old World,
the stronger becomes the bond of unity and mutual
interest between the separate factions of Asiatics, and
the deeper burns the fanatical hatred of Europe. Is it
wise or expedient by useless provocation and unnecessary
attacks to increase the feehng of animosity, to hurry on
the struggle between the two worlds, and to nip in the
bud the work of modern culture which is now going on
in Asia?" 1
1 A. Vambery, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists,"
Nineteenth Century and After, April, 1912.
128 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
The Great War of course immensely aggravated an
already critical situation. The Orient suddenly saw the
European peoples, who, in racial matters, had hitherto
maintained something Hke solidarity, locked in an inter-
necine death-grapple of unparalleled ferocity; it saw
those same peoples put one another furiously to the ban
as irreconcilable foes; it saw white race-miity cleft by
moral and political gulfs which white men themselves
continuously iterated would never be filled. The one
redeeming feature of the struggle, in Oriental eyes, was the
Hberal programme which the Allied statesmen inscribed
upon their banners. But when the war was over and
the AlHes had won, it promptly leaked out that at the
very time when the Allied leaders were making their
liberal speeches they had been negotiating a series of
secret treaties partitioning the Near East between them
in a spirit of the most cynical imperialism; and in the
peace conferences that closed the war it was these secret
treaties, not the Hberal speeches, which determined the
Oriental settlement, resulting (on paper at least) in the
total subjugation of the Near and Middle East to Euro-
pean political control.
The wave of wrath which thereupon rolled over the
East was not confined to furious remonstrance like the
protests of pre-war days. There was a note of immedi-
ate resistance and rebellion not audible before. This re-
beUious temper has translated itself into warlike action
which has already forced the European Powers to abate
some of their extreme pretensions and which will un-
doubtedly make them abate others in the near future.
The details of this post-war unrest will be discussed in
later chapters. Suffice it to say here that the Great
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 129
War has shattered European prestige in the East and
has opened the eyes of Orientals to the weaknesses of
the West. To the Orient the war was a gigantic course
of education. For one thing, milhons of Orientals and
negroes were taken from the remotest jungles of Asia
and Africa to serve as soldiers and laborers in the White
Man's War. Though the bulk of these auxiHaries were
used in colonial operations, more than a milKon of them
were brought to Europe itself. Here they killed white
men, raped white women, tasted white luxuries, learned
white weaknesses — and went home to tell their people
the whole story. ^ Asia and Africa to-day know Europe
as they never knew it before, and we may be sure that
they wiU make use of their knowledge. The most seri-
ous factor in the situation is that the Orient realizes
that the famous Versailles "Peace" which purports to
have pacified Europe is no peace, but rather an uncon-
structive, unstatesmanhke futility that left old sores un-r
healed and even dealt fresh wounds. Europe to-day lies
debihtated and uncured, while Asia and Africa see in
this a standing incitement to rash dreams and violent
action.
Such is the situation to-day: an East, torn by the con-
flict between new and old, facing a West riven with dis-
sension and sick from its mad foUies. Probably never
before have the relations between the two worlds con-
tained so many incalculable, even cataclysmic, possi-
bilities. The point to be here noted is that this strange
* For the effect of the wax on Asia and Africa, see A. Demangeon, Le
Declin de V Europe (Paris, 1920); H. M. Hyndman, The Awakening of
Asia (New York, 1919); E. D. Morel, The Black Man's Burden (New York,
1920) ; F. B. Fisher, India's Silent Revolution (New York, 1919) ; also, my
Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy.
130 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
new East which now faces us is mainly the result of
Western influences permeating it in unprecedented fash-
ion for the past hundred years. To the chief elements
in that permeation let us now turn.
CHAPTER IV
POLITICAL CHANGE
The Orient's chief handicap has been its vicious political
tradition. From earhest times the typical form of gov-
ernment in the East has been despotism — the arbitrary
rule of an absolute monarch, whose subjects are slaves,
holding their goods, their honors, their very lives, at his
wiU and pleasure. The sole consistent check upon
Oriental despotism has been rehgion. Some critics may
add "custom "; but it amounts to the same thing, for in
the East custom always acquires a religious sanction.
The mantle of religion of course covers its ministers, the
priests forming a privileged caste. But, with these
exceptions. Oriental despotism has usually known no
bounds; and the despot, so long as he respected rehgion
and the priesthood, has been able to act pretty much as
he chose. In the very dawn of history we see Pharaoh
exhausting all Eg3^t to gratify his whim for a colossal
pyramid tomb, and throughout history Oriental Hfe has
been cursed by this fatal political simplicity.
Now manifold human experience has conclusively
proved that despotism is a bad form of government in
the long run. Of course there is the legendary "benevo-
lent despot" — the "father of his people," surrounded by
wise coimseUors and abolishing evils by a nod or a stroke
of the pen. That is all very well in a fairy-tale. But
in real life the "benevolent despot" rarely happens and
131
132 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
still more rarely succeeds himself. The "father of his
people" usually has a pompous son and a vicious grand-
son, who bring the people to ruin. The melancholy
trinity — David, Solomon, Rehoboam — has reappeared
with depressing regularity throughout history.
Furthermore, even the benevolent despot has his
limitations. The trouble with all despots, good or bad,
is that their rule is entirely personal. Everything, in
the last analysis, depends on the despot's personal will.
Nothing is fixed or certain. The benevolent despot him-
self may discard his benevolence overnight, and the
fate of an empire may be jeopardized by the monarch's
infatuation for a woman or by an upset in his digestion.
We Occidentals have, in fact, never known "despot-
ism," in its simon-pure. Oriental sense; not even under
the Roman Empire. Indeed, we can hardly conceive
what it means. When we speak of a benevolent despot
we usually think of the "enHghtened autocrats" of
eighteenth-century Europe, such as Frederick the Great.
But these monarchs were not "despots" as Orientals
understand it. Take Frederick, for example. He was
regarded as absolute. But his subjects were not slaves.
Those proud Prussian officers, starched bureaucrats,
stiff-necked burghers, and stubborn peasants each had
his sense of personal dignity and legal status. The un-
questioning obedience which they gave Frederick was
given not merely because he was their king, but also be-
cause they knew that he was the hardest-working man
in Prussia and tireless in his devotion to the state. If
Frederick had suddenly changed into a lazy, depraved,
capricious tyrant, his "obedient" Prussians would have
soon showed him that there were limits to his power.
POLITICAL CHANGE 133
In the Orient it is quite otherwise. In the East "there
lies upon the eyes and foreheads of all men a law which
is not found in the European decalogue; and this law runs:
'Thou shalt honor and worship the man whom God
shall set above thee for thy King: if he cherish thee,
thou shalt love him; and if he plunder and oppress thee
thou shalt still love him, for thou art his slave and his
chattel.'"^ The Eastern monarch may immure himself
in his harem, casting the burdens of state upon the shoul-
ders of a grand vizier. This vizier has thenceforth
limitless power; the life of every subject is in his hands.
Yet, any evening, at the pout of a dancing-girl, the
monarch may send from his harem to the vizier's palace
a negro "mute," armed with the bowstring. And when
that black mute arrives, the vizier, doffing his robe of
office, and with neither question nor remonstrance, will
bare his neck to be strangled. That is real despotism —
the despotism that the East has known.
■ Such is the political tradition of the Orient. And it is
surely obvious that under such a tradition neither ordered
government nor consistent progress is possible. Eastern
histoiy is, in fact, largely a record of sudden flowerings
and equally sudden dechnes. A strong, able man cuts
his way to power in a period of confusion and decay.
He must be strong and able, or he would not win over
other men of similar nature struggling for the coveted
prize. His energy and ability soon work wonders. He
knows the rough-and-ready way of getting things done.
His vigor and resolution supply the driving-power re-
quired to compel his subordinates to act with reasonable
efficiency, especially since incompetence or dishonesty
* T. Morison, Imperial Bvk in India, p. 43 (London, 1899).
134 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
are punished with the terrible severity of the Persian
king who flayed an unjust satrap ahve and made the skin
into the seat of the oflScial chair on which the new satrap
sat to administer justice.
While the master lives, things may go well. But the
master dies, and is succeeded by his son. This son, even
assuming that he has inherited much of his father's
ability, has had the worst possible upbiingiiag. Raised
in the harem, surrounded by obsequious slaves and de-
signing women, neither his pride nor his passions have
been effectively restrained, and he grows up a pompous
tyrant and probably precociously depraved. Such a
man will not be apt to look after things as his father
did. And as soon as the master's eye shifts, things begin
to go to pieces. How can it be otherwise? His father
built up no governmental machine, functioning almost
automatically, as in the West. His oflScers worked from
fear or personal loyalty; not out of a patriotic sense of
duty or impersonal esprit de corps. Under the grandson,
matters get even worse, power slips from his incompetent
hands and is parcelled out among many local despots, of
whom the strongest cuts his way to power, assuming that
the decadent state is not overrun by some foreign con-
queror. In either eventuality, the old cycle — David, Sol-
omon, Rehoboam — ^is finished, and a new cycle begins —
with the same destined end.
That, in a nutshell, is the political history of the East.
It has, however, been modified or temporarily inter-
rupted by the impact of more liberal political infiuences,
exerted sometimes from special Eastern regions and
sometimes from the West. Not all the Orient has been
given over to unrelieved despotism. Here and there
POLITICAL CHANGE 135
have been peoples (mostly mountain or pastoral peoples)
who abhorred despotism. Such a people have always
been the Arabs. We have already seen how the Arabs,
fired by Islam, estabhshed a mighty caliphate which,
in its early days, was a theocratic democracy. Of
course we have also seen how the older tradition of
despotism reasserted itself over most of the Moslem
world, how the democratic caliphate turned into a des-
potic sultanate, and how the liberty-loving Arabs re-
tired sullenly to their deserts. Political liberalism, like
reHgious liberalism, was crushed and almost forgotten.
Almost — not quite; for memories of the Meccan cali-
phate, like memories of Motazelism, remained in the
back of men's minds, ready to come forth again with
better days. After all, free Arabia still stood, with
every Arab tribesman armed to the teeth to see that it
kept free. And then, there was Islam. No court theo-
logian could entirely explain away the fact that Mo-
hammed had said things hke "All Believers are broth-
ers" and "All Moslems are free." No court chroni-
cler could entirely expunge from Moslem annals the
story of Islam's early days, known as the Wakti-Seadet,
or "Age of Blessedness." Even in the darkest times
Moslems of hberal tendencies must have been greatly
interested to read that the first caliph, Abu Bekr, after
his election by the people, said: "Oh nation! you have
chosen me, the most unworthy among you, for your
caliph. Support me as long as my actions are just. If
otherwise, admonish me, rouse me to a sense of my duty.
Truth alone is desirable, and lies are despicable. . . .
As I am the guardian of the weak, obey me only so long
as I obey the Sheriat [Divine Law]. But if you see
136 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
that I deviate but in the minutest details from this
law, you need obey me no more." ^
In fine, no subsequent distortions could entirely ob-
literate the fact that primitive Islam was the supreme
expression of a freedom-loving folk whose religion must
necessarily contain many hberal tendencies. Even the
sheriat, or canon law, is, as Professor Lybyer states,
"fundamentally democratic and opposed in essence to
absolutism." ^ Vambery well summarizes this matter
when he writes: "It is not Islam and its doctrines which
have devastated the western portion of Asia and brought
about the present sad state of things; but it is the
tyranny of the Moslem Princes, who have wilfully per-
verted the doctrines of the Prophet, and sought and
found maxims in the Koran as a basis for their despotic
rule. They have not allowed the faintest suspicion of
doubt in matters of rehgion, and, efficaciously distorting
and crushing all liberal principles, they have prevented
the dawn of a Moslem Renaissance." ^
In the opening chapter we saw how Oriental despot-
ism reached its evil maximum in the eighteenth cen-
tury, and how the Mohammedan Revival was not merely
a puritan reformation of religion but was also in part
a political protest against the vicious and contempti-
ble tyrants who misruled the Moslem world. This in-
ternal movement of poHtical hberalism was soon cross-
cut by another political current coming in from the
West. Comparing the miserable decrepitude of the Mos-
1 Quoted from Arminius Vambery, Western Culture in Eastern Lands,
pp. 305-306 (London, 1906).
2 A. H. Lybyer, "The Turkish Parliament," Proceedings of the American
Political Science Association, vol. VII, p. 67 (1910).
3 Vambery, op. cit., p. 307.
POLITICAL CHANGE 137
lem East with Europe's prosperity and vigor, think-
ing Moslems were beginning to recognize their short-
comings, and they could not avoid the conclusion that
their woes were in large part due to their wretched gov-
ernments. Indeed, a few even of the Moslem princes
came to reahze that there must be some adoption of
Western political methods if their countries were to be
saved from destruction. The most notable examples
of this new type of Oriental sovereign were Sultan Mah-
mud II of Turkey and Mehemet Ali of Egypt, both of
whom came to power about the beginmhg of the nine-
teenth century.
Of course none of these reforming princes had the
slightest idea of granting their subjects constitutional
liberties or of transforming themselves into limited
monarchs. They intended to remain absolute, but ab-
solute more in the sense of the "enlightened autocrat"
of Europe and less in the sense of the purely Oriental
despot. What they wanted were true organs of govern-
ment — army, civil service, judiciary, etc. — which would
function efficiently and semi-automatically as govern-
mental machinery, and not as mere amorphous masses
of individuals who had to be continuously prodded and
punished by the sovereign in order to get anything
done.
Mahmud II, Mehemet Ali, and their princely col-
leagues persisted in their new policies, but the outcome
of these "reforms from above" was, on the whole, dis-
appointing. The monarchs might build barracks and
bureaux on European models and fill them with soldiers
and bureaucrats in European clothes, but they did not
get European results. Most of these "Western-type"
138 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
officials knew almost nothing about the West and were
therefore incapable of doing things in Western fashion.
In fact, they had small heart for the business. Devoid
of any sort of enthusiasm for ideas and institutions which
they did not comprehend, they applied themselves to
the work of reform with secret ill mil and repugnance,
moved only by bhnd obedience to their sovereign's
command. As time passed, the mihtary^ branches did
gain some modern efficiency, but the civil services made
little progress, adopting many Western bureaucratic
vices but few or none of the virtues.
Meanwhile reformers of quite a different sort began to
appear: men demanding Western innovations like con-
stitutions, parliaments, and other phenomena of modem
political life. Their numbers were constantly recruited
from the widening circles of men acquainted with West-
em ideas through the books, pamphlets, and news-
papers which were being increasingly published, and
through the education given by schools on the Western
model which were springing up. The third quarter of
the nineteenth centur}^ saw the formation of genuine
political parties in Turkey, and in 1876 the liberal groups
actually wrung from a weak sultan the grant of a parlia-
ment.
These early successes of Moslem political liberalism
were, however, followed by a period of reaction. The
Moslem princes had become increasingly alarmed at
the growth of liberal agitation among their subjects and
were determined to maintain their despotic authority.
The new Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Hamid, promptly
suppressed his parliament, savagely persecuted the Ub-
erals, and restored the most uncompromising despotism.
POLITICAL CHANGE 139
In Persia the Shah repressed a nascent liberal move-
ment with equal severity, while in Egypt the spendthrift
rule of Khedive Ismail ended all native pohtical life
by provoking Eiu-opean intervention and the imposition
of British rule. Down to the Young-Turk revolution
of 1908 there were few overt signs of liberal agitation
in those Moslem countries which still retained their
independence. Nevertheless, the agitation was there,
working underground. Hundreds of youthful patriots
fled abroad, both to obtain an education and to conduct
their liberal propaganda, and from havens of refuge like
Switzerland these "Young-Turks," "Young-Persians,"
and others issued manifestoes and published revolution-
ary literature which was smuggled into their homelands
and eagerly read by their oppressed brethren.^
As the years passed, the ciy for liberty grew steadily
in strength. A young Turkish poet wrote at this time:
"All that we admire in European culture as the fruit of
science and art is simply the outcome of liberty. Every-
thing derives its light from the bright star of liberty.
Without liberty a nation has no power, no prosperity;
without Hberty there is no happiness; and without hap-
piness, existence, true life, eternal Ufe, is impossible.
Everlasting praise and glory to the shining light of free-
dom 1"^ By the close of the nineteenth century keen-
sighted European observers noted the working of the
liberal ferment under the surface calm of absolutist re-
^ A good account of these liberal movements during the nineteenth
century is found in Vambery, " Freiheitliche Bestrebungen im mosU-
mischen Asien," Deutsche Rundschau, October, 1893; a shorter summary
of Vambery's views is found in his Western Culture in Eastern Lands,
especially chap. V. Also, see articles by Leon Cahun, previously noted,
in Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire Generale, vols. XI and XII.
* Vambery, supra, p. 332.
140 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
pression. Thus, Armiiiius Vambery, revisiting Con-
stantinople in 1896, was astounded by the liberal evolu-
tion that had taken place since his first sojourn in Turkey
forty years before. Although Constantinople was sub-
jected to the severest phase of Hamidian despotism,
Vambery wrote: "The old attachment of Turkey for
the absolute regime is done for. We hear much in
Europe of the 'Young-Turk' Party; we hear even of a
constitutional movement, poHtical emigres, revolutionary
pamphlets. But what we do not realize is the ferment
which exists in the different social classes, and which
gives us the conviction that the Turk is in progress and
is no longer clay in the hands of his despotic potter.
In Turkey, therefore, it is not a question of a Young-
Turk Party, because every civilized Ottoman belongs
to this party." ^
In this connection we should note the stirrings of un-
rest that were now rapidly developing in the Eastern
lands subject to European pohtical control. By the
close of the nineteenth century only four considerable
Moslem states — ^Turkey, Persia, Morocco, and Afghan-
istan — retained anything Hke independence from Euro-
pean domination. Since Afghanistan and Morocco were
so backward that they could hardly be reckoned as civi-
lized countries, it was only in Turkey and Persia that
genuine liberal movements against native despotism
could arise. But in European-ruled countries like In-
dia, Egypt, and Algeria, the cultural level of the in-
habitants was high enough to engender hberal political
aspirations as well as that mere dislike of foreign rule
^ Vambery, La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d^avant Qtiarante Ans, p. 22
(Paris, 1898).
POLITICAL CHANGE 141
which may be felt by savages as well as by civilized
peoples.
These liberal aspirations were of course stimulated
by the movements against native despotism in Turkey
and Persia. Nevertheless, the two sets of phenomena
must be sharply distinguished from each other. The
Turkish and Persian agitations were essentially move-
ments of liberal reform. The Indian, Egyptian, Al-
gerian, and kindred agitations were essentially move-
ments for independence, with no settled programme as to
how that independence should be used after it had been
attained. These latter movements are, in fact, "na-
tionalist" rather than liberal in character, and it is in
the chapters devoted to nationahsm that they will be
discussed. The point to be noted here is that they are
really coalitions, against the foreign ruler, of men hold-
ing very diverse political ideas, embracing as these
"nationalist" coaHtions do not merely genuine Hberals
but also self-seeking demagogues and even stark reac-
tionaries who would hke to fasten upon their liberated
countries the yoke of the blackest despotism. Of course
all the nationahst groups use the familiar slogans "free-
dom" and "liberty"; nevertheless, what many of them
mean is merely freedom and liberty Jrom foreign tute-
lage — in other words, independence. We must always
remember that patriotism has no essential connection
with liberaHsm. The Spanish peasants, who shouted
"liberty" as they rose against Napoleon's armies, greeted
their contemptible tyrant-king with delirious enthusiasm
and welcomed his glorification of absolutism with cries
of "Long live chains!"
The period of despotic reaction which had afflicted
142 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Turkey and Persia since the beginning of the last quarter
of the nineteenth century came dramatically to an end
in the year 1908. Both countries exploded into revo-
lution, the Turks deposing the tyrant Abdul Hamid,
the Persians rising against their infamous ruler Mu-
hammad Ali Shah, "perhaps the most perverted, cow-
ardly, and vice-sodden monster that had disgraced the
throne of Persia in many generations."^ These revolu-
tions released the pent-up Hberal forces which had been
slowly gathering strength under the repression of the
previous generation, and the upshot was that Turkey
and Persia alike blossomed out with constitutions, par-
Haments, and all the other pohtical machinery of the
West.
How the new regimes would have worked m normal
times it is profitless to speculate, because, as a matter
of fact, the times were abnormal to the highest degree.
Unfortunately for the Turks and Persians, they had
made their revolutions just when the world was enter-
ing that profound malaise which culminated in the
Great War. Neither Turkey nor Persia were allowed
time to attempt the difficult process of poHtical trans-
formation. Lynx-eyed Western chancelleries noted every
blunder and, in the inevitable weakness of transition,
pounced upon them to their undoing. The Great War
merely completed a process of Western aggression and
intervention which had begun some years before.
This virtual absence of specific fact-data renders
largely academic any discussion of the much-debated
question whether or not the peoples of the Near and
Middle East are capable of "self-government"; that is,
' W. Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, p. xxi (New York, 1912).
POLITICAL CHANGE 143
of establishing and maintaining ordered, constitutional
political life. Opinions on this point are at absolute
variance. Personally, I have not been able to make up
my mind on the matter, so I shall content myself with
stating the various arguments without attempting to
draw any general conclusion. Before stating these con-
trasted view-points, however, I would draw attention to
the distinction which should be made between the Mo-
hammedan peoples and the non-Mohammedan Hindus
of India. Moslems everywhere possess the democratic
poHtical example of Arabia as well as a religion which,
as regards its own followers at least, contains many
liberal tendencies. The Hindus have nothing like this.
Their poHtical tradition has been practically that of un-
reheved Oriental despotism, the only exceptions being
a few primitive self-governing communities in very early
times, which never exerted any wide-spread influence and
quickly faded away. As for Brahminism, the Hindu
rehgion, it is perhaps the most illiberal cult which ever
afflicted mankind, dividing society as it does into an in-
finity of rigid castes between which no real intercourse
is possible; each caste regarding all those of lesser rank
as unclean, polluting creatures, scarcely to be distin-
guished from animals. It is obvious that with such
handicaps the establishment of true self-government
wiU be apt to be more difficult for Hindus than for Mo-
hammedans, and the reader should keep this point in
mind in the discussion which follows.
Considering first the attitude of those who do not
beUeve the peoples of the Near and Middle East capable
of real self-government in the Western sense either now
or in the immediate future, we find this thesis both ably
144 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
and emphatically stated by Lord Cromer. Lord Cro-
mer believed that the ancient tradition of despotism was
far too strong to be overcome, at least in our time.
"From the dawn of history," he asserts, "Eastern poli-
tics have been stricken with a fatal simplicity. Do not
let us for one moment imagine that the fatally simple
idea of despotic rule will readily give way to the far
more complex conception of ordered Hberty. The trans-
formation, if it ever takes place at all, will probably be
the work, not of generations, but of centuries. . . .
Our primary duty, therefore, is, nol to introduce a sys-
tem which, under the specious cloak of free institutions,
will enable a small minority of natives to misgovern
their countrymen, but to estabhsh one which will enable
the mass of the population to be governed according to
the code of Christian morality. A freely elected Egyp-
tian parHament, supposing such a thing to be possible,
would not improbably legislate for the protection of the
slave-owner, if not the slave-dealer, and no assurance
can be felt that the electors of Rajputana, if they had
their own way, would not re-estabhsh suttee. Good
government has the merit of presenting a more or less
attainable ideal. Before Orientals can attain anything
approaching to the British ideal of self-government,
they will have to midergo very numerous transmigra-
tions of political thought." And Lord Cromer concludes
pessimistically: "It will probably never be possible to
make a Western silk purse out of an Eastern sow's ear."^
In similar vein, the veteran English pubHcist Doctor
Dillon, writing after the Turkish and Persian revolu-
tions, had little hope in their success, and ridiculed the
* Cromer, Political and Literary Essays, pp. 25-28.
POLITICAL CHANGE 145
current "faith in the sacramental virtue of constitutional
government." For, he continues: "No parchment yet
manufactured, and no constitution drafted by the sons
of men, can do away with the foundations of national
character. Flashy phrases and elegant declamations
may persuade people that they have been transmuted;
but they alter no facts, and in Persia's case the facts
point to utter incapacity for self-government." Refer-
ring to the Persian revolution, Doctor Dillon continues:
"At bottom, only names of persons and things have been
altered; men may come and men may go, but anarchy
goes on forever. . . . Financial support of the new
government is impossible. For foreign capitahsts will
not give money to be squandered by filibusters and
irresponsible agitators who, like bubbles in boiling water,
appear on the surface and disappear at once."^
A high French colonial official thus characterizes the
Algerians and other Moslem populations of French
North Africa: "Our natives need to be governed. They
are big children, incapable of going alone. We should
guide them firmly, stand no nonsense from them, and
crush intriguers and agents of sedition. At the same
time, we should protect them, direct them paternally,
and especially obtain influence over them by the con-
stant example of our moral superiority. Above all: no
vain humanitarian illusions, both in the interest of
France and of the natives themselves." ^
Many observers, particularly colonial officials, have
been disappointed with the way Orientals have used
^E. J. Dillon, "Persia not Ripe for Self -Government," Contemporary
Review, April, 1910.
^E. Mercier, La Question indigene, p. 220 (Paris, 1901).
146 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
experimental first steps in self-government like Advisory
Comicils granted by the Eui'opean rulers; have used
them, that is, to play politics and grasp for more power,
instead of devoting themselves to the duties assigned.
As Lord Kitchener said in his 1913 report on the state
of Egypt: "Representative bodies can only be safely
developed when it is shown that they are capable of per-
forming adequately their present functions, and that
there is good hope that they could undertake still more
important and arduous responsibilities. If representa-
tive government, in its simplest form, is found to be un-
workable, there is little prospect of its becoming more
useful when its scope is extended. No government
would be insane enough to consider that, because an
Advisory Comicil had proved itself unable to carry out
its functions in a reasonable and satisfactory manner,
it should therefore be given a larger measure of power
and control."^
These nationalist agitations arise primarily among the
native upper classes and Western-educated elites, how-
ever successful they may be in inflaming the ignorant
masses, who are often quite contented with the material
benefits of enlightened European rule. This point is
well brought out by a leading American missionary in
India, with a lifetime of experience in that countiy,
who wrote some years ago: "The common people of
India are, now, on the whole, more contented with their
government than they ever were before. It is the classes,
rather, who reveal the real spirit of discontent. . . .
If the common people were let alone by the agitators,
there would not be a more loyal people on earth than
1 "Egypt," No. 1 (1914), p. 6.
POLITICAL CHANGE 147
the people of India. But the educated classes are cer-
tainly possessed of a new ambition, politically, and will
no longer remain satisfied with inferior places of responsi-
bility and lower posts of emolument. . . . These peo-
ple have Httle or no sympathy with the kind of govern-
ment which is gradually being extended to them. Ulti-
mately they do not ask for representative institutions,
which will give them a share in the government of their
own land. What they really seek is absolute control.
The Brahmin (only five per cent of the commimity)
believes that he has been divinely appointed to rule the
country and would withhold the franchise from all
others. The Sudra — the Bourgeois of India — would no
more think of giving the ballot to the fifty miUion Pa-
riahs of the land than he would give it to his dog. It is
the British power that has introduced, and now main-
tains, the equaUty of rights and privileges for all the
people of the land."^
The apprehension that India, if liberated from British
control, might be exploited by a tyrannical Brahmin
ohgarchy is shared not only by Western observers but
also by multitudes of low-caste Hindus, known collec-
tively as the "Depressed Classes." These people op-
pose the Indian nationalist agitation for fear of losing
their present protection under the British "Raj." They
beheve that India still needs generations of education
and social reform before it is fit for "home rule," much
less independence, and they have organized into a pow-
erful association, the "Namasudra," which is loyalist
and anti-nationalist in character.
^Rev. J. P. Jones, "The Present Situation in India," Journal of Race
Development, July, 1910.
148 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
The Namasudra \aew-point is well expressed by its
leader, Doctor Nair. "Democracy as a catchword/' he
sayS; "has already reached India and is widely used.
But the spirit of democracy still pauses east of Suez,
and will find it hard to secure a footing in a country
^here caste is strongly intrenched. ... I do not want
to la}^ the charge of oppressing the lower castes at the
door of any particular caste. AU the higher castes take
a hand in the game. The Brahmin oppresses all the
non-Brahmin castes. The high-caste non-Brahmin op-
presses all the castes below him. . . . We want a real
democracy and not an ohgarchy, however camouflaged
by many high-sounding words. Moreover, if an oli-
garchy is established now, it will be a perpetual oligarchy.
We further say that we should prefer a delayed democ-
racy to an immediate oligarch}", having more trust in a
s}Tiipathetic British bureaucracy than in an unsympa-
thetic oligarchy of the so-called high castes who have
been oppressing us in the past and will do so again but
for the British Government. Our attitude is based, not
on 'faith' alone, but on the instinct of self-preserva-
tion." 1
Many Mohammedans as well as Hindus feel that
India is not ripe for self-government, and that the re-
laxing of British authority now, or in the immediate
future, would be a grave disaster for India itself. The
Moslem loyalists reprobate the nationahst agitation for
the reasons expressed by one of their representative
men, S. Khuda Bukhsh, who remarks: "Rightly or
wrongly, I have always kept aloof from modern Indian
poHtics, and I have always held that we should devote
1 Dr. T. Madavan Nair, "Caste and Democracy," Edinburgh Review,
October, 1918.
POLITICAL CHANGE 149
more attention to social problems and intellectual ad-
vancement and less to politics, which, in our present
condition, is an unmixed evil. I am firmly persuaded
that we would consult our interest better by leaving
poHtics severely alone. ... It is not a handful of men
armed with the learning and culture of the West, but it
is the masses that must feel, understand, and take an
intelligent interest in their own affairs. The infinitesi-
mal educated minority do not constitute the population
of India. It is the masses, therefore, that must be
trained, educated, brought to the level of unassailable
uprightness and devotion to their countiy. This goal
is yet far beyond measurable reach, but until we attain
it, our hopes will be a chimera, and our efforts futile
and illusory. Even the educated minority have scarcely
cast off the swaddling-clothes of political infancy, or
have risen above the illusions of power and the ambi-
tions of fortune. We have yet to learn austerity of
principle and rectitude of conduct. Nor can we hope
to raise the standard of private and public morality so
long as we continue to subordinate the interest of our
community and country to our own,"^
Such pronomicements as these from considerable por-
tions of the native population give pause even to those
liberal EngHsh students of Indian affairs who are con-
vinced of the theoretical desirability of Indian home
rule. As one of these, Edwyn Bevan, says: "When
Indian Nationahsts ask for freedom, they mean au-
tonomy; they want to get rid of the foreigner. Our
answer as given in the reforms is:^ 'Yes, autonomy you
* Bukhsh, Essays: Indian and Islamic, pp. 213-214 (London, 1912).
"^ I. e., the increase of self-government granted India by Britain as a
result of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.
150 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
shall have, but on one condition — that you have democ-
racy as well. We will give up the control as soon as
there is an Indian people which can control its native
rulers; we will not give up the control to an Indian oli-
garchy.' This is the root of the disagreement between
those who say that India might have self-government
immediately and those who say that India can only be-
come capable of self-government with time. For the
former, by ^self-government/ mean autonomy, and it
is perfectly true that India might be made autonomous
immediately. If the foreign control were withdrawn
to-day, some sort of indigenous government or group
of governments would, no doubt, after a period of con-
fusion, come into being in India. But it would not be
democratic government; it would be the despotic rule
of the stronger or more cimning." ^
The citations just quoted portray the standpoint of
those critics, both Western and Oriental, who main-
tain that the peoples of the Near and Middle East are
incapable of self-government in our sense, at least to-
day or m the immediate future. Let us now examine
the views of those who hold a more optimistic attitude.
Some observers stress strongly Islam's liberal tendencies
as a fomidation on which to erect poHtical structures in
the modem sense. Vambery says: "Islam is still the
most democratic rehgion in the world, a rehgion favoring
both liberty and equality. If there ever was a consti-
tutional government, it was that of the first Caliphs." ^
A close English student of the Near East declares: "Tri-
^E. Bevan, "The Reforms in India," The New Europe, January 29,
1920.
^ Vambery, La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d^avant Quarante Ans, p. 58.
POLITICAL CHANGE 151
bal Arabia has the only true form of democratic govern-
ment, and the Arab tribesman goes armed to make sure
that it continues democratic — as many a would-be
despot knows to his cost."^ Regarding the Young-
Turk revolution of 1908, Professor Lybyer remarks:
"Turkey was not so unprepared for parliamentary in-
stitutions as might at first sight appear. There lay hid-
den some precedent, much preparation, and a strong
desire, for parliamentary government. Both the re-
ligious and the secular institutions of Turkey involve
precedents for a parliament. Mohammed himself con-
ferred with the wisest of his companions. The Ulema^
have taken counsel together up to the present time.
The Sacred Law (Sheriat) is fundamentally democratic
and opposed in essence to absolutism. The habit of
regarding it as fundamental law enables even the most
ignorant of Mohammedans to grasp the idea of a Consti-
tution." He points out that the early sultans had their
"Divan/' or assemblage of high officials, meeting regu-
larly to give the sultan information and advice, while
more recently there have been a Council of State and a
Council of Ministers. Also, there were the parhaments
of 1877 and 1878. Abortive though these were and fol-
lowed by Hamidian absolutism, they were legal prece-
dents, never forgotten. From all this Professor Lybyer
concludes: "The Turkish Parfiament may therefore be
regarded, not as a complete innovation, but as an en-
largement and improvement of familiar institutions."^
Regarding Persia, the American W. Morgan Shuster,
iG. W. Bury, Pan-Islam, pp. 202-203 (London, 1919).
* The assembly of religious notables.
' A. H. Lybyer, "The Turkish Parliament," Proceedings of the American
Political Science Association, vol. VII, pp. 66-67 (1910).
152 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
whom the Persian Revolutionary Government called in
to organize the country's finances, and who was ousted
in less than a year by Russo-British pressure, expresses
an optimistic regard for the pohtical capacities of the
Persian people.
"I believe/' he says, "that there has never been in
the history of the world an instance where a people
changed suddenly from an absolute monarchy to a
constitutional or representative form of government
and at once succeeded in displaying a high standard of
pohtical wisdom and Imowledge of legislative procedure.
Such a thing is inconceivable and not to be expected
by any reasonable person. The members of the first
Medjlis^ were compelled to fight for their very existence
from the day that the Parliament was constituted. . . .
They had no time for serious legislative work, and but
little hope that any measures which they might enact
would be put into effect.
"The second and last Medjlis, practically all of whose
members I knew personally, was doubtless incompetent
if it were to be judged by the standards of the British
Parliament or the American Congress. It would be
strange indeed if an absolutely new and untried govern-
ment in a land fiUed with the decay of ages should, from
the outset, be able to conduct its business as well as
governments with generations and even centuries of
experience behind them. We should make allowance
for lack of technical knowledge; for the important ques-
tion, of course, is that the Medjhs m the main repre-
sented the new and just ideals and aspirations of the
Persian people. Its members were men of more than
* The name of the Persian Parhament.
POLITICAL CHANGE 153
average education; some displayed remarkable talent,
character, and courage. . . . They re^onded enthusi-
astically to any patriotic suggestion which was put
before them. They themselves lacked any great knowl-
edge of governmental finances, but they realized the
situation and were both willing and anxious to put their
full confidence in any foreign advisers who showed them-
selves capable of resisting political intrigues and bribery
and working for the welfare of the Persian people.
"No Parhament can rightly be termed incompetent
when it has the support of an entire people, when it
recognizes its own hmitations, and when its members
are willing to undergo great sacrifices for their nation's
dignity and sovereign rights. . . .
"As to the Persian people themselves, it is difficult
to generaUze. The great mass of the population is com-
posed of peasants and tribesmen, all densely ignorant.
On the other hand, many thousands have been educated
abroad, or have travelled after completing their educa-
tion at home. They, or at least certain elements among
them which had had the support of the masses, proved
their capacity to assimilate western civiHzation and
ideals. They changed despotism into democracy in the
face of untold obstacles. Opportunities were equalized
to such a degree that any man of abiHty could occupy
the highest official posts. As a race they showed dur-
ing the past five years an imparalleled eagerness for
education. Hundreds of schools were estabUshed dur-
ing the Constitutional regime. A remarkable free press
sprang up overnight, and fearless writers came forward
to denounce injustice and tyranny whether from within
their country^ or without. The Persians were anxious
154 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
to adopt wholesale the political, ethical, and business
codes of the most modern and progressive nations.
They burned with that same spirit of Asiatic unrest
which pervades India, which produced the 'Young-
Turk' movement, and which has more recently mani-
fested itseK in the establishment of the Chinese Re-
pubHc"!
Mr. Shuster concludes: "Kipling has intimated that
you cannot hustle the East. This includes a warning
and a reflection. Western men and Western ideals can
hustle the East, provided the Orientals realize that they
are being carried along lines reasonably beneficial to
themselves. As a matter of fact, the moral appeal and
the appeal of race-pride and patriotism, are as strong in
the East as in the West, though it does not he so near
the surface; and naturally the Oriental displays no great
desire to be hustled when it is along lines beneficial only
to the Westerner." 2
Indeed, many Western Hberals believe that European
rule, however benevolent and efficient, will never pre-
pare the Eastern peoples for true self-government; and
that the only way they will learn is by trj^g it out
themselves. This view-point is admirably stated by the
well-known British publicist Lionel Curtis. Speaking
of India, Mr. Curtis says that education and kindred
benefits conferred by British rule will not, of themselves,
"avail to prepare Indians for the task of responsible
government. On the contrary, education will prove a
danger and positive mischief, unless accompanied by
a definite instalment of pohtical responsibility. It is
1 Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, pp. 240-246.
2 Ibid., p. 333.
POLITICAL CHANGE 155
in the workshops of actual experience alone that elec-
torates will acquire the art of self-government, however
highly educated they may be.
"There must, I urge, be a devolution of definite pow-
ers on electorates. The oflScers of Government^ must
give every possible help and advice to the new authori-
ties, for which those authorities may ask. They must
act as their foster-mothers, not as stepmothers. But if
the new authorities are to learn the art of responsible
government, they must be free from control from above.
Not otherwise will they leam to feel themselves respon-
sible to the electorate below. Nor will the electorates
themselves leam that the remedy for their sufferings
rests in their own hands. Suffering there will be, and it
is only by suffering, self-inflicted and perhaps long en-
dured, that a people will leam the faculty of seK-help,
and genuine electorates be brought into being. . . .
"I am proud to think that England has conferred
immeasurable good on India by creating order and show-
ing Indians what orderly government means. But, this
having been done, I do not beheve the system can now
be continued as it is, without positive damage to the
character of the people. The bm'den of trusteeship
must be transferred, piece by piece, from the shoulders
of Englishmen to those of Indians in some sort able to
bear it. Their strength and numbers must be devel-'
oped. But that can be done by the exercise of actual
responsibility steadily increased as they can bear it. It
cannot be done by any system of school-teaching, though
such teaching is an essential concomitant of the process.
"The goal now set by the recent announcement of
* /. e., the British Government of India.
156 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
the Secretaiy of State ^ will only be reached through
trouble. Yet troublous as the times before us may be,
we have at last reached that stage of om* work in India
which is truly consonant with our own traditions. The
task is one worthy of this epoch in our histor^^, if only
because it calls for the effacement of ourselves." ^
Mr. Curtis's concluding words foreshadow a process
which is to-day actually going on, not only in India but
in other parts of the East as well. The Great War has
so strengthened Eastern nationalist aspirations and has
so weakened Em-opean power and prestige that a wide-
spread relaxing of Em'ope's hold over the Orient is tak-
ing place. This process may make for good or for ill,
but it is apparently inevitable; and a generation (perhaps
a decade) hence may see most of the Near and Middle
East autonomous or even independent. WTiether the
liberated peoples will misuse their opportunities and
fall into despotism or anarchy, or whether they succeed
in establishing orderly, progressive, constitutional gov-
ernments, remains to be seen. We have examined the
factors, pro and con. Let us leave the problem in the
only way in which to-day it can scientifically be left — on
a note of interrogation.
^ I. e., the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, previously noted.
"^ Lionel Curtis, Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government,
pp. 159-160 (London, 1918).
CHAPTER V
NATIONALISM
The spirit of nationaKty is one of the great dynamics
of modern times. In Europe, where it first attained
self-conscious maturity, it radically altered the face of
things dming the nineteenth century, so that that cen-
tury is often called the Age of Nationalities. But na-
tionalism is not merely a European phenomenon. It
has spread to the remotest corners of the earth, and is
apparently still destined to effect momentous trans-
formations.
Given a phenomenon of so vital a character, the ques-
tion at once arises: What is nationalism? Curiously
enough, this question has been endlessly debated. Many
theories have been advanced, seeking variously to iden-
tify nationalism with language, culture, race, pohtics,
geography, economics, or rehgion. Now these, and even
other, matters may be factors predisposing or contribut-
ing to the formation of national consciousness. But, in
the last analysis, nationalism is something over and above
all its constituent elements, which it works into a new
and higher synthesis. There is really nothing recondite
or mysterious about nationaHsm, despite all the argu-
ments that have raged concerning its exact meaning.
As a matter of fact, nationalism is a state of mind. Na-
tionaHsm is a belief, held by a fairly large number of
individuals, that they constitute a "Nationahty"; it
157
158 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
is a sense of belonging together as a "Nation." This
"Nation/' as visualized in the minds of its behevers, is
a people or community associated together and organized
under one government; and dwelling together in a dis-
tinct territory. When the nationalist ideal is reahzed,
we have what is known as a body-politic or "State."
But we must not forget that this "State" is the material
manifestation of an ideal, which may have pre-existed
for generations as a mere pious aspiration with no tangi-
ble attributes like state sovereignty or physical fron-
tiers. Conversely, we must remember that a state need
not be a nation. Witness the defimct Hapsburg Empire
of Austria-Hungar}^ — an assemblage of discordant na-
tionahties which flew to pieces imder the shock of war.
The late war w^as a liberal education regarding nation-
aHstic phenomena, especially as applied to Europe, and
most of the fallacies regarding nationahty were \a\'idly
disclosed. It is enough to cite Switzerland — a country
whose very existence flagrantly \dolates "tests" like
language, culture, rehgion, or geography, and where
nevertheless a lively sense of nationahty emerged tri-
umphant from the ordeal of Armageddon.
So famihar are these matters to the general pubUc
that only one point need here be stressed: the difference
between nationality and race. Unfortunately the two
terms have been used very loosely, if not interchange-
ably, and are stiU much confused in current thinking.
As a matter of fact, they connote utterly different things.
Nationahty is a psychological concept or state of mind.
Race is a physiological fact, which may be accurately
determmed by scientific tests such as skull-measurement,
hair-formation, and color of eyes and skin. In other
NATIONALISM 159
words, race is what people anthropologically rmlly are;
nationaHty is what people politically think they are.
Right here we encounter a most curious paradox.
There can be no question that, as between race and
nationahty, race is the more fundamental, and, in the
long run, the more important. A man's innate capacity
is obviously dopendent upon hi? heredity, and no matter
how stimulating maj^ be his enviroimaent, the potential
limits of his reaction to that environment are fixed at
his birth. Nevertheless, the fact remains that men pay
scant attention to race, while nationahsm stirs them to
their very souls. The main reason for this seems to be
because it is only about half a century since even savants
realized the true nature and importance of race. Even
after an idea is scientifically established, it takes a long
time for it to be genuinely accepted by the public, and
only after it has been thus accepted will it form the
basis of practical conduct. Meanwhile the far older
idea of nationaHty has permeated the popular conscious-
ness, and has thereby been able to produce tangible
effects. In fine, our poHtical Hfe is still dominated by
nationahsm rather than race, and practical poHtics are
thus conditioned, not by what men really are, but by
what they think they are.
The late war is a striking case in point. That war
is very generally regarded as having been one of "race."
The idea certainly lent to the struggle much of its bit-
terness and imcompromising fury. And yet, from the
genuine racial standpoint, it was nothing of the kind.
Ethnologists have proved conclusively that, apart from
certain palaeolithic survivals and a few historically re-
cent Asiatic intruders, Europe is inhabited by only three
160 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
stocks: (1) The blond, long-headed "Nordic" race, (2)
the medium-complexioned, round-headed "Alpine" race,
(3) the binmet, long-headed "Mediterranean" race.
These races are so dispersed and intermingled that
every European nation is built of at least two of these
stocks, while most are compounded of all three. Strictly-
speaking, therefore, the European War was not a race-
war at all, but a domestic struggle between closely knit
blood-relatives.
Now all this was known to most well-educated Euro-
peans long before 1914. And yet it did not make the
sKghtest difference. The reason is that, in spite of
everything, the vast majority of Europeans still believe
that they fit into an entirely different race-category.
They think they belong to the "Teutonic" race, the
"Latin" race, the "Slav" race, or the "Anglo-Saxon"
race. The fact that these so-called "races" simply do
not exist but are really historical differentiations, based
on language and culture, which cut sublimely across
genuine race-lines— all that is quite beside the point.
Your European may apprehend this intellectually, but
so long as it remains an intellectual novelty it will have
no appreciable effect upon his conduct. In his heart of
hearts he will still believe himself a Latin, a Teuton, an
Anglo-Saxon, or a Slav. For his blood-race he mil not
stir; for his thought-race he will die. For the glory of
the dolichocephaHc "Nordic" or the brachycephahc
"Alpine" he will not prick his finger or wager a groat;
for the triumph of the "Teuton" or the "Slav" he will
give his last farthing and shed his heart's blood. In
other words: Not what men really are, but what they
think they are.
NATIONALISM . 161
At first it may seem strange that in contemporary
Europe thought-race should be all-powerful while blood-
race is impotent. Yet there are very good reasons.
Not only has modern Europe's great dynamic been
nationalism, but also nationalism has seized upon the
nascent racial concept and has perverted it to its own
ends. Until quite recent times "NationaHty" was a
distinctly intensive concept, connoting approximate iden-
tity of culture, language, and historic past. It was the
logical product of a relatively narrow European outlook. :
Indeed, it grew out of a still narrower outlook which had
contented itseK with the regional, feudal, and dialectic
loyalties of the Middle Ages. But the first half of the
nineteenth century saw a still fiu-ther widening of the
European outlook to a continental or even to a world
horizon. At once the early concept of nationality ceased
to satisfy. Nationalism became extensive. It tended
to embrace all those of kindred speech, culture, and his-
toric tradition, however distant such persons might be.
Obviously a new terminology was required. The key-
work was presently discovered — "Race." Hence we get
that whole series of pseudo "race" phrases — "Pan-
Germanism," "Pan-Slavism," "Pan-Angleism," "Pan-
Latinism," and the rest. Of course these are not racial
at all. They merely signify nationalism brought up to
date. But the European peoples, with all the fervor of
the nationalist faith that is in them, beheve and pro-
claim them to be racial. Hence, so far as practical poli-
tics is concerned, they are racial and will so continue
while the nationalist dynamic endures.
This new development of nationalism (the "racial"
stage, as we may call it) was at first confined to the older
162 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM "
centres of European civilization, but with the spread of
Western ideas it presently appeared in the most unex-
pected quarters. Its advent in the Balkans, for exam-
ple, quickly engendered those fanatical propagandas,
"Pan-Hellenism," "Pan-Serbism," etc., which turned
that unhappy region first into a bear-garden and latterly
into a witches' sabbath.
Meanwhile, by the closing decades of the nineteenth
century, the first phase of nationalism had patently
passed into Asia. The "Young-Turk" and "Young-
Egyptian" movements, and the "Nationalist" stirrings
in regions so far remote from each other as Algeria,
Persia, and India, were unmistakable signs that Asia
was gripped by the initial throes of nationahst self-
consciousness. Furthermore, with the opening years
of the twentieth century, numerous symptoms pro-
claimed the fact that in Asia, as in the Balkans, the
second or "racial" stage of nationalism had begun.
These years saw the definite emergence of far-flung
"Pan-" movements: "Pan-Turanism," "Pan-Arabism,"
and (most amazing of apparent paradoxes) "Pan-Islamic
Nationalism."
Let us now trace the genesis and growth of national-
ism in the Near and Middle East, devoting the present
chapter to nationalist developments in the Moslem world
with the exception of India. India requires special
treatment, because there nationalist activity has been
mainly the work of the non-Moslem Hindu element.
Indian nationalism has followed a course differing dis-
NATIONALISM 163
tinctly from that of Islam, and will therefore be con-
sidered in the following chapter.
Before it received the Western impact of the nine-
teenth century, the Islamic world was virtually devoid
of self-conscious nationalism. There were, to be sure,
strong local and tribal loyalties. There was intense
dynastic sentiment Hke the Turks' devotion to their
"Padishas," the Ottoman sultans. There was also
marked pride of race such as the Arabs' conviction that
thej^ were the "Chosen People." Here, obviously, were
potential nationalist elements. But these elements were
as yet dispersed and micoordinated. They were not
yet fused into the new sjmthesis of self-conscious na-
tionalism. The only Moslem people which could be
said to possess anything like true nationalist feeling were
the Persians, with their traditional devotion to their
plateau-land of "Iran." The various peoples of the
Moslem world had thus, at most, a rudimentary, in-
choate nationalist consciousness: a dull, inert unitary
spirit; capable of development, perhaps, but as yet
scarcely perceptible even to outsiders and certainly un-
perceived by themselves.
Furthermore, Islam itself was in many respects hos-
tile to nationalism. Islam's insistence upon the brother-
hood of all True Behevers, and the Islamic poHtical ideal
of the "Imamat," or universal theocratic democracy,
naturally tended to inhibit the formation of sovereign,
mutually exclusive national units; just as the nascent
nationalities of Renaissance Europe conflicted with the
mediaeval ideals of universal papacy and "Holy Roman
Empire."
Given such an unfavorable environment, it is not
164 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
strange to see Moslem nationalist tendencies germinat-
ing obscurely and confusedly throughout the first half
of the nineteenth century. Not until the second half
of the century is there any clear conception of "Na-
tionalism" in the Western sense. There are distinct
nationalist tendencies in the teachings of Djemal-ed-Din
el-Afghani (who is philosophica,lly the comiecting link
between Pan-Islamism and JMoslem nationahsm), while
the Turkish reformers of the mid-nineteenth century
were patently influenced by nationalism as they were
by other Western ideas. It waS; in fact, in Turkey
that a true nationahst consciousness first appeared.
Working upon the Turks' traditional devotion to their
djmasty and pride in themselves as a ruling race lord-
ing it over many subject peoples both Christian and
Moslem, the Tm^kish nationalist movement made rapid
progress.
Precisely as in Europe, the nationalist movement in
Turkey began with a revival of historic memories and a
purification of the language. Half a centur}'- ago the
Ottoman Turks knew almost nothing about their origins
or their history. The martial deeds of their ancestors
and the Stirling annals of their empire were remem-
bered only in a vague, legendary fashion, the study of
the national history being completely neglected. Re-
ligious discussions and details of the hfe of Mohammed
or the early days of Islam interested men more than the
spread of Ottoman power in three continents. The
nationalist pioneers taught their fellow countrymen their
historic glories and awakened both pride of past and
confidence in the future.
Similarly with the Turkish language; the early na-
NATIONALISM 165
tionalists found it virtually cleft in twain. On the one
hand was "official" Turkish — a clumsy hotchpotch,
overloaded with flowers of rhetoric and cryptic expres-
sions borrowed from Arabic and Persian. This extraor-
dinary jargon, couched in a bombastic style, was vir-
tually unintelligible to the masses. The masses, on the
other hand, spoke "popular" Turkish — a primitive,
limited idiom, divided into many dialects and despised
as uncouth and boorish by "educated" persons. The
nationalists changed all this. Appreciating the simple,
direct strength of the Turkish tongue, nationalist en-
thusiasts trained in European principles of grammar and
philology proceeded to build up a real Turkish language
in the Western sense. So well did they succeed that in
less than a generation they produced a simplified, flexi-
ble Turkish which was used effectively by both journal-
ists and men of letters, was intelligible to all classes,
and became the unquestioned vehicle for thought and
the canon of style. ^
Of course the chief stimulus to Turkish nationalism
was Western poHtical pressure. The more men came to
love their country and aspire to its future, the more
European assaults on Turkish territorial integrity spurred
them to defend their threatened independence. The
nationahst ideal was "Ottomanism" — the welding of a
real "nation" in which all citizens, whatever their origin
or creed, should be "Ottomans," speaking the Turkish
language and inspired by Ottoman patriotism. This,
' For these early stages of the Turkish nationalist movement, see Vam-
b^ry, La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans; and his Western
Culture in Eastern Lands. Also the articles by L^on Cahun in Lavisse
et Rambaud, previously cited; and L. Rousseau, L' Effort Ottoman (Paris,
1907).
166 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
however, conflicted sharply with the rival (and prior)
nationalisms of the Christian peoples of the empire,
to say nothing of the new Arab nationalism which was
taking shape at just this same time. Turkish national-
ism was also fro\\med on by Sultan Abdul Haniid. Ab-
dul Hamid had an instinctive aversion to all nationalist
movements, both as limitations to his personal absolut-
ism and as conflicting with that universal Pan-Islamic
ideal on which he based his policy. Accordingly, even
those Turkish nationalists who proclaimed complete
loyalty were suspect, while those wdth Hberal tendencies
were persecuted and driven into exile.
The revolution of 1908, however, brought nationahsm
to power. WTiatever their differences on other matters,
the Young-Turks were all ardent nationalists. In fact,
the very ardor of their nationahsm was a prime cause
of their subsequent misfortunes. With the rashness of
fanatics the Young-Turks tried to "Ottomanize" the
whole empire at once. This enraged all the other na-
tionahties, aHenated them from the revolution, and gave
the Christian Balkan states their opportunity to attack
disorganized Turkey in 1912.
The truth of the matter was that Turkish nationalism
was evolving in a direction which could onl}^ mean
heightened antagonism between the Turkish element on
the one side and the non-Tuj-kish elements, Christian
or Moslem, on the other. Tm-kish nationahsm had, in
fact, now reached the second or "racial" stage. Pass-
ing the bounds of the limited, mainly territorial idea
connoted by the term "Ottomanism," it had embraced
the far-flung and essentially racial concepts known as
' ' Pan-Turkism ' ' and ' ' Pan-Turanism . ' ' These wider de-
NATIONALISM 167
velopments we shall consider later on in this chapter.
Before so doing let us examine the beginnings of na-
tionalism's "first stage" in other portions of the Moslem
world.
Shortly after the Ottoman Turks showed signs of a
nationahstic awakening, kindred symptoms began to
appear among the Arabs., As in all self-conscious na-
tionahst movements, it was largely a protest against
some other group. In the case of the Arabs this protest
was naturally directed against their Turkish rulers. We
have already seen how Desert Arabia (the Nejd) had
always maintained its freedom, and we have also seen
how those Arab lands Uke Syria, Mesopotamia, and the
Hedjaz which fell under Turkish control nevertheless
continued to feel an ineradicable repugnance at seeing
themselves, Islam's "Chosen People," beneath the yoke
of a folk which, in Arab eyes, were mere upstart barba-
rians. Despite a thousand years of Turkish domination
the two races never got on well together, their racial
temperaments being too inrompatible for really cordial
relations. The profomid temperamental incompatibility
of Turk and Arab has been well summarized by a French
writer. Says Victor Berard: "Such are the two lan-
guages and such the two peoples: in the latitude of Rome
and in the latitude of Algiers, the Turk of Adrianople,
like the Turk of AdaKa, remains a man of the north
and of the extreme north; in all climates the Arab re-
mains a man of the south and of the extreme south.
To the Arab's suppleness, mobility, imagination, artistic
feeling, democratic tendencies, and anarchic individu-
alism, the Turk opposes his slowness, gravity, sense of
discipline and regularity, innate militarism. The Turk-
168 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
ish master has alwaj^s felt disdain for the 'artistic
canaille/ whose pose, gesticulations, and indiscipline,
shock him profomidly. On their side, the Arabs see in
the Tm^k only a blockhead; in his placidity and taci-
turnity only stupidity and ignorance; in his respect for
law onl}- slavisliness; and in his 1o\'g of material well-
being only gross bestiality. Especiall}' do the Ai-abs
jeer at the Turk's artistic incapacity: after having gone
to school to the Chinese, Persians, Arabs, and Greeks,
the Turk remains, in Ai-ab eyes, just a big booby of bar-
rack and barnyard." ^
Add to this the fact that the Arabs regard the Turks
as pen^erters of the Islamic faith, and we need not be
surprised to find that Turkey's Arab sulijects ha^^e ever
displayed sjTnptoms of rebeUious mirest. We have seen
how the Wahabi movement was specifically directed
against Tm^kish control of the holy cities, and despite
the Wahabi defeat, Arab discontent lived on. About
1820 the German explorer BmTkhardt wrote of Ai-abia:
" Allien Tm^kish power in the Hedjaz decKnes, the Arabs
will avenge themselves for their subjection." ^ And
some twenty years later the Shereef of Mecca remarked
to a French traveller: "We, the direct descendants of
the Prophet, have to bow our heads before miserable
Pashas, most of them former Christian slaves come to
power by the most shameful courses."^ Thi'oughout
the nineteenth centmy every Turkish defeat in Europe
was followed by a seditious outbm'st in its Arab prov-
inces.
Down to the middle of the nineteenth centurj^ these
1 Berard, Le Sultan, VIslam et les Puissances, p. 16 (Paris, 1907).
2 Cited by Berard, p. 19. ^ /^j^.^ p. 20.
NATIONALISM 169
seditious stirrings remained sporadic, uncoordinated out-
bursts of religious, regional, or tribal feeling, with no
genuinely "Nationalistic" programme of action or ideal.
But in the later sixties a real nationaHst agitation ap-
peared. Its birthplace was Syria. That was what
might have been expected, since Syria was the part of
Turkey's Arab dominions most open to Western influ-
ences. This first Arab nationalist movement, however,
did not amount to much. Directed by a small group of
noisy agitators devoid of real ability, the Turkish Gov-
ernment suppressed it without much difficulty.
The disastrous Russian war of 1877, however, blew
the scattered embers into a fresh flame. For several
years Turkey's Arab provinces were in full ferment.
The nationalists spoke openly of throwing off the Turk-
ish yoke and welding the Arab lands into a loose-knit
confederation headed by a rehgious potentate, probably
the Shereef of Mecca. This was obviously an adaptation
of Western nationaHsm to the traditional Arab ideal of
a theocratic democracy already realized in the Meccan
caliphate and the Wahabi government of the Nejd.
This second stirring of Arab nationaHsm was likewise
of short duration. Turkey was now ruled by Sultan
Abdul Hamid, and Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic policy
looked toward good relations with his Arab subjects.
Accordingly, Arabs were welcomed at Constantinople,
favors were heaped upon Arab chiefs and notables, while
efforts were made to promote the contentment of the
empire's Arab populations. At the same time the con-
struction of strategic railways in Syria and the Hedjaz
gave the Turkish Government a stronger grip over its
Arab provinces than ever before, and conversely ren-
170 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
dered successful Arab revolts a far more remote possi-
bility. Furthermore, Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propa-
ganda was specially directed toward awakening a sense
of Moslem solidarity between Arabs and Turks as against
the Christian West. These efforts achieved a measure
of success. Certainly, every European aggression in the
Near East was an object-lesson to Turks and Arabs to
forget, or at least adjourn, their domestic quarrels in
face of the common foe.
Despite the partial successes of Abdul Hamid's efforts,
a considerable section of his Arab subjects remained
unreconciled, and toward the close of the nineteenth
centmy a fresh Stirling of Arab nationalist discontent
made its appearance. Relentlessly persecuted by the
Turkish authorities, the Arab nation ahst agitators,
mostly Syrians, went into exile. Gathering in near-by
Egypt (now of course under British governance) and in
western Europe, these exiles organized a revolutionary
propaganda. Their formal organization dates from the
year 1895, when the "Arabian National Committee"
was created at Paris. For a decade their propaganda
went on obscurely, but evidently with effect, for in 1905
the Arab provinces of Hedjaz and Yemen burst into
armed insurrection. This insurrection, despite the best
efforts of the Turkish Government, was never wholly
suppressed, but dragged on year after year, draining
Turkey of troops and treasure, and contributing mate-
rially to her Tripolitan and Balkan disasters in 1911-12.
The Arab revolt of 1905 focussed the world's atten-
tion upon "The Arab Question," and the nationalist
exiles made the most of their opportunity by redoubling
their propaganda, not only at home but in the West as
NATIONALISM 171
well. Europe was fully informed of "Young Arabia's"
wrongs and aspirations, notably by an extremely clever
book by one of the nationalist leaders, entitled The
Awakening of the Arab Nation,^ which made a distinct
sensation. The aims of the Arab nationalists are clearly
set forth in the manifesto of the Arabian National
Committee, addressed to the Great Powers and pub-
lished early in 1906. Says this manifesto: "A great
pacific change is on the eve of occurring in Turkey.
The Arabs, whom the Tiu-ks tyrannized over only by
keeping them divided on insignificant questions of ritual
and religion, have become conscious of their national,
historic, and racial homogeneity, and wish to detach
themselves from the worm-eaten Ottoman trunk in order
to form themselves into an independent State. This
new Arab Empire will extend to its natural frontiers,
from the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates to the
Isthmus of Suez, and from the Mediterranean to the Sea
of Oman. It will be governed by the constitutional
and liberal monarchy of an Arabian Sultan. The present
Vilayet of the Hedjaz, together with the territory of
Medina, will form an independent empire whose sover-
eign wiU be at the same time the religious Khalif of all
the Mohammedans. Thus, one great difficulty, the
separation of the civil and the religious powers in Islam,
will have been solved for the greater good of all."
To their fellow Arabs the committee issued the fol-
lowing proclamation: "Dear Compatriots! All of us
know how vile and despicable the glorious and illustrious
title of Arabian Citizen has become in the mouths of
all foreigners, especially Turks. AU of us see to what
^Le ReveU de la Nation arabe, by Negib Azoury (Paris, 1905).
172 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
depths of misery and ignorance we have fallen under the
tyranny of these barbarians sprung from Central Asia.
Our land, the richest and finest on earth, is to-day an
arid waste. When we were free, we conquered the
world in a hundred years; we spread everywhere sci-
ences, arts, and letters; for centuries we led world-civ-
ilization. But, since the spawn of Ertognil^ usmped
the cahphate of Islam, they have brutalized us so as to
exploit us to such a degree that we have become the
poorest people on eai'th." The proclamation then goes
on to declare Ai-abia's independence.^
Of com-se "Young Arabia" did not then attain its
independence. The revolt was kept localized and Tur-
key maintained its hold over most of its Arab dominions.
Nevertheless, there was constant unrest. During the
remainder of Abdul Hamid's reign his Arab provinces
were in a sort of unstable equilibrium, torn between the
forces of nationahst sedition on the one hand and Pan-
Islamic, anti-European feeling on the other.
The Young-Turk revolution of 1908 caused a new
shift in the situation. The Arab provinces, like the
other parts of the empire, rejoiced in the dowiifall of
despotism and hoped great things for the future. In
the Turkish Parliament the Arab provinces were well
represented, and their deputies asked for a measure of
federal autonomy. This the Young-Turks, bent upon
"Ottomanization," curtly refused. The result was pro-
found disillusionment in the Arab provinces and a re-
vival of separatist agitation. It is interesting to note
^ The semi-legendary founder of the Ottoman Empire.
^ The texts of both the above documents can be most conveniently
found in E. Jung, Les Puissa7ices devant la Revolte arabe : La Crise mondiale
de Demain, pp. 23-25 (Paris, 1906).
NATIONALISM 173
that the new independence agitation had a much more
ambitious programme than that of a few years before.
The Arab nation ahsts of Turkey were by this time defi-
nitely linking up with the nationalists of Egypt and
French North Africa — Arabic-spealdng lands where the
populations were at least partly Arab in blood. Arab
nationahsm was beginning to speak aloud what it had
previously whispered — the progranmie of a great "Pan-
Arab" empire stretching right across North Africa and
southern Asia from the Atlantic to the Indian Oceans.
Thus, Arab nationahsm, like Turkish nationalism, was
evolving into the "second," or racial, stage.
Deferring discussion of this broader development, let
us follow a trifle further the course of the more restricted
Arab nationahsm within the Turkish Empire. Despite
the Pan-Islamic sentiment evoked by the European
aggressions of 1911-12, nationahst feeling was contin-
ually aroused by the Ottomanizing measures of the
Yoimg-Turk government, and the independence agita-
tion was presently in full swing once more. In 1913
an Arabian nationahst congress convened in Paris and
revolutionary propaganda was inaugurated on an in-
creased scale. When the Great War broke out next
year, Turkey's Arab pro\4nces were seething with sedi-
tious unrest.^ The Turkish authorities took stern mea-
sures against possible trouble, imprisoning and executing
all prominent nationalists upon whom they could lay
their hands, while the proclamation of the "Holy War"
raUied a certain portion of Arab pubhc opinion to the
1 A good analysis of Arab affairs on the eve of the Great War is that of
the Moslem pubhcist "X," "Les Courants politiques dans le Monde
arabe," Revue du Monde )gf.usulman, December, 1913. Also see G. W.
B\iry, Arabia Infelix, or the Turks in Yemen (London, 1915).
174 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Turkish side, especially since the conquest of Eg;v'pt
was a possibihty. But as the war dragged on the forces
of discontent once more raised their heads. In 1916
the revolt of the Shereef of Mecca gave the signal for
the downfall of Turkish i-ule. This revolt, liberally
backed by England, gaiaed the active or passive sup-
port of the Arab elements throughout the Turkish Em-
pire. Inspired by Allied promises of national indepen-
dence of a most alluring character, the Arabs fought
strenuously against the Turks and were a prime factor
in the debacle of Ottoman mihtary power in the autumn
of 1918.1
Before discussing the momentous events which have
occurred in the Arab provinces of the former Ottoman
Empire since 1918, let us consider nationahst develop-
ments in the Arabized regions of North Africa lying to
the westward. Of these developments the most im-
portant is that of Egypt. The mass of the Egj^tian
people is to-day, as in Pharaoh's time, of the old "Ni-
lotic" stock. A slow, self-contained peasant folk, the
Egyptian "fellaheen" have submitted passively to a
long series of conquerors, albeit this passivity has been
occasionally broken by outbursts of volcanic fury pres-
ently dying away into passivity once more. Above the
Nilotic masses stands a relatively small upper class
descended chiefly from Egj^t's more recent Asiatic con-
querors — Arabs, Kurds, Circassians, Albanians, and
^ For Arab affairs dviring the Great War, see E. Jung, "L'Independance
arabe et la Revolte actuelle," La Revue, 1 August, 1916; I. D. Levine,
"Arabs versus Turks," American Review of Reviews, November, 1916;
A. Musil, Zur Zeitgeschichte von Arabien (Leipzig, 1918); G. W. Bury,
Pan-Islam (London, 1919); S. Mylrea, "The Politico-Rehgious Situation
in Arabia," The Moslem World, July, 1919; L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The
Soul of the Arabian Revolution," Asia, April, May, June, 1920.
NATIONALISM 175
Turks. In addition to this upper class, which until
the EngHsh occupation monopolized all political power,
there are large European "colonies" with "extraterri-
torial" rights, while a further complication is added by
the persistence of a considerable native Christian ele-
ment, the "Copts," who refused to turn Mohammedan
at the Arab conquest and who to-day number fully one-
tenth of the total population.
With such a medley of races, creeds, and cultures,
and with so prolonged a tradition of foreign domination,
Egypt might seem a most unlikely milieu for the growth
of nationalism. On the other hand, Egypt has been
more exposed to Western influences than any other part
of the Near East. Bonaparte's invasion at the close
of the eighteenth century profoimdly affected Egyptian
Hfe, and though the French were soon expelled, European
influences continued to permeate the valley of the Nile.
Mehemet AH, the able Albanian adventurer who made
himself master of Egypt after the downfall of French
rule, realized the superiority of European methods and
fostered a process of Europeanization which, however
superficial, resulted in a wide dissemination of Western
ideas. Mehemet All's policy was continued by his suc-
cessors. That magnificent spendthrift Khedive Ismail,
whose reckless contraction of European loans was the
primary cause of European intervention, prided himself
on his "Europeanism" and surrounded himself with
Europeans.
Indeed, the first stirrings of Egyptian nationalism
took the form of a protest against the noxious, parasiti-
cal "Europeanism" of Khedive Ismail and his courtiers.
Sober-minded Egyptians became increasingly alarmed
176 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
at the way Ismail was mortgaging EgjqDt's independence
by huge European loans and sucking its life-blood by
merciless taxation. Inspired consciously or uncon-
sciously by the Western concepts of "nation" and ''pa-
triotism/' these men desired to stay Ismail's destructive
course and to safeguard Egypt's future. In fact, their
efforts were directed not merely against the motley
crew of European adventurers and concessionaires who
were luring the Khedive into fresh extravagances, but
also against the complaisant Turkish and Circassian
pashas, and the Armenian and Syrian usurers, who were
the instruments of Ismail's will. The nascent move-
ment was thus basically a "patriotic" protest against
all those, both foreigners and native-born, who were
endangering the countiy. This showed clearly in the
motto adopted by the agitators — the hitherto unheard-
of slogan: "Egypt for the Egyptians!"
Into this incipient ferment there was presently in-
jected the dynamic personahty of Djemal-ed-Din. No-
where else did this ex-traordinary man exert so profound
and lasting an influence as in Egypt. It is not too much
to say that he is the father of every shade of Egyptian
nationalism. He influenced not merely violent agitators
like Aral)i ]"*asha but also conservative reformers like
Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, who realized Egypt's weak-
ness and were content to labor patiently by evolutionary
methods for distant goals.
For the moment the apostles of violent action had
the stage. In 1882 a revolutionary agitation broke out
headed by Arabi Pasha, an army officer, who, signifi-
cantly enough, was of fellah origin, the first man of
Nilotic stock to sway Egj^pt's destinies in modern times.
NATIONALISM 177
Raising their slogan, ''Egypt for the Egyptians," the
revokitionists sought to drive all "foreigners," both
Europeans and Asiatics, from the countr}\ Their at-
tempt was of course foredoomed to failure. A massa-
cre of Europeans in the port-city of Alexandria at once
precipitated European intervention. An English army
crushed the revolutionists at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir,
and after this one battle, disorganized, bankiiapt Egypt
submitted to British rule, personified by Evelyn Baring,
Lord Cromer. The khedivial dynasty was, to be sure,
retained, and the native forms of government respected,
but aU real power centred in the hands of the British
"Financial Adviser," the representative of Britain's
imperial will.
For twenty-five years Lord Cromer ruled Egypt, and
the record of this able proconsul will place him forever
in the front rank of the world's great administrators.
His strong hand drew Egypt from hopeless bankruptcy
into abounding prosperity. Material well-being, how-
ever, did not kill Eg}^tian nationalism. Scattered to
the winds before the British bayonet charges, the seeds
of unrest slowly germinated beneath the fertile Nilotic
soil. Almost imperceptible at first under the nimibing
shock of Tel-el-Kebir, nationaHst sentiment grew steadily
as the years wore on, and by the closing decade of the
nineteenth centuiy it had become distinctly perceptible
to keen-sighted European observers. Passing through
Egypt in 1895, the well-known African explorer Schwein-
furth was struck with the psychological change which
had occurred since his earher visits to the valley of the
Nile. "A true national self-consciousness is slowly be-
ginning to awaken," he wrote. "The Eg\^tians are
178 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
still very far from being a true Nationality, but the be-
ginning has been made."^
With the opening years of the twentieth century what
had previously been visible only to discerning eyes burst
into sudden and startlmg bloom. This resurgent Egyp-
tian nationahsni had, to be sure, its moderate wing,
represented by conservative-minded men Hke Moham-
med Abdou, Rector of El Azhar University and respected
friend of Lord Cromer, who sought to teach his fellow
coimtrymen that the surest road to freedom was along
the path of enhghteimient and progr ss. In the main,
however, the movement was an impatient and violent
protest against British rule and an intransigeant demand
for immediate independence. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant point was that virtually all Egyptians were na-
tionahsts at heart, conservatives as well as radicals de-
cHning to consider Egypt as a permanent part of the
British Empire. The nationalists had a sound legal
basis for this attitude, owing to the fact that British
rule rested upon insecure diplomatic foundations. Eng-
land had intervened in Egypt as a self-constituted "Man-
datory" of European financial interests. Its action had
roused much opposition in Europe, particularly in
France, and to allay this opposition the British Gov-
ernment had repeatedly announced that its occupation
of Egypt was of a temporary nature. In fact, Egyptian
discontent was deliberately fanned by France right down-
to the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale in 1904. This
French sympathy for Egyptian aspirations was of capital
importance in the development of the nationaUst move-
' Georg Schweinfurth, Die Wiedergeburl Agypttris im Lichte eines aufge-
kl&rten Islam (Berlin, 1895).
NATIONALISM 179
ment. In Eg}^:)!., France's cultural prestige was pre-
dominant. In Eg3'ptian eyes a European education
was synonymous with a French education, so the rising
generation inevitably sat under French teachers, either
in Egypt or in France, and these French preceptors,
being usually Anglophobes, rarely lost an opportunity
for instilling dislike of England and aversion to British
rule.
The radical nationalists were headed by a young man
named Mustapha Kamel. He was a very prince of
agitators; ardent, magnetic, enthusiastic, and possessed
of a fisrj'- eloquence which fairly swept away both his
hearers and his readers. An indefatigable propagandist,
he edited a whole chain of newspapers and periodicals,
and as fast as one organ was suppressed by the British
authorities he started another. His uncompromising
nationaUsm may be gauged from the following examplc;s
from his writings. Taking for his motto the phrase
"The Egyptians for Egypt; Egypt for the Egyptians,"
he wrote as early as 1896: "Egyptian civiHzation cannot
endure in the future unless it is founded by the people
itself; unless the fellah, the merchant, the teacher, the
pupil, in fine, every single Egyptian, knows that man
has sacred, intangible rights; that he is not created to be
a tool, but to lead an intelligent and worthy hfe; that
love of country is the most beautiful sentiment which
can ennoble a soul; and that a nation without indepen-
dence is a nation without existence ! It is by patriotism
that backward peoples come quickly to civilization, to
greatness, and to power. It is patriotism that forms
the blood which courses in the veins of virile nations,
and it is patriotism that gives life to every living being."
180 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
The English, of course, were bitterly denounced.
Here is a typical editorial from his organ El Lewa:
"We are the despoiled. The Enghsh are the despoilers.
We demand a sacred right. The English are the usurp-
ers of that right. This is why we are sure of success
sooner or later. WTien one is in the right, it is only a
question of time."
Despite his ardent aspirations, Mustapha Kamel had
a sense of realities, and recognized that, for the moment
at least, British power could not be forcibly overthrown.
He did not, therefore, attempt any open \dolence which
he knew would merely ruin liimself and his followers.
Early in 1908 he died, only thirty-four years of age.
His mantle fell upon his leading disciple, Mohammed
Farid Bey. This man, who was not of equal caliber,
tried to make up for his deficiency in true eloquence
by the i-iolence of his invective. The difference between
the two leaders can be gauged by the editorial columns
of El Lewa. Here is an editorial of September, 1909:
"This land was polluted by the Enghsh, putrefied with
their atrocities as they suppressed our beloved dustour
[constitution], tied our tongues, burned our people ahve
and hanged our innocent relatives, and peipetrated
other horrors at which the heavens are about to tremble,
the earth to split, and the mountains to fall down. Let
us take a new step. Let our Hves be cheap while we
seek our independence. Death is far better than life
for you if you remain in your present condition."
Mohammed Farid's fanatical impatience of all opposi-
tion led him into tactical blunders like ahenating the
native Christian Copts, whom Mustapha Kamel had been
careful to conciliate. The following diatribe (which.
NATIONALISM 181
by the way, reveals a grotesque jumble of Western and
Eastern ideas) is an answer to Coptic protests at the
increasing violence of his propaganda: "The Copts
should be kicked to death. They stiU have faces and
bodies similar to those of demons and monkeys, which
is a proof that they hide poisonous spirits within their
souls. The fact that they exist in the world confirms
Darwin's theoiy that human beings are generated from
monkeys. You sons of adulterous women! You de-
scendants of the bearers of trays ! You tails of camels
with your monkey faces! You bones of bodies!"
In this more violent attitude the nationalists were
encouraged by several reasons. For one thing, Lord
Cromer had laid down his proconsulate in 1907 and had
been succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst. The new ruler
represented the ideas of British LiberaHsm, now in
power, which wished to appease Egyptian unrest by con-
ciliation instead of by Lord Cromer's autocratic indiffer-
ence. In the second place, the Young-Turk revolution
of 1908 gave an enormous impetus to the Egyptian cry
for constitutional self-government. Lastly, France's
growing intimacy with England dashed the nationahsts'
cherished hope that Britain would be forced by outside
pressure to redeem her diplomatic pledges and evacuate
the Nile valley, thus driving the nationalists to rely
more on their own exertions.
Given this nationalist temper, concihatory attempt
was foredoomed to failure. For, however concihatoiy
Sir Eldon Gorst might be in details, he could not prom-
ise the one thing which the nationalists supremely de-
sired — independence. This demand England refused
even to consider. Practically all Englislimen had be-
182 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
come convinced that Egj^t with the Suez Canal was a
vital link between the eastern and western halves of the
British Empire^ and that permanent control of Egypt
was thus an absolute necessity. There was thus a fim-
damental deadlock between British imperial and Egyp-
tian national convictions. Accordingly, the British
Liberal policy of conciliation proved a fiasco. Even
Sir Eldon Gorst admitted in his oflScial reports that con-
cessions were simply regarded as signs of weakness.
Before long seditious agitation and attendant violence
grew to such proportions that the British Government
became convinced that only strong measures would
save the situation. Therefore, in 1911, Sir Eldon Gorst
was replaced by Lord Kitchener — a patent warning to
the nationalists that sedition would be given short shiift
by the iron hand which had crushed the Khalifa and
his Dervish hordes at Omdurman. Kitchener arrived
in Egypt with the express mandate to restore order, and
this he did with thoroughness and exactitude. The
Egyptians were told plainly that England neither in-
tended to evacuate the Nile valley nor considered its in-
habitants fit for self-government within any discernible
future. They were admonished to turn their thoughts
from politics, at which they were so bad, to agriculture,
at which they were so good. As for seditious propaganda,
new legislation enabled Lord Kitchener to deal with it
in summary fashion. Practically all the nationalist
papers were suppressed, while the nationalist leaders
were imprisoned, interned, or exiled. In fact, the Brit-
ish Government did its best to distract attention every-
where from Egypt, the British press co-operating loyally
by labelling the subject taboo. The upshot was that
NATIONALISM 183
Egypt became quieter than it had been for a gener-
ation.
However, it was only a surface cakii. Driven under-
ground, Egyptian unrest even attained new virulence
which alarmed close observers. In 1913 the well-known
English publicist Sidney Low, after a careful investiga-
tion of the Egyptian situation, wrote: "We are not
popular in Egypt. Feared we may be by some; re-
spected I doubt not by many others; but really liked,
I am sure, by very few."^ Still more outspoken was
an article significantly entitled "The Darkness over
Egypt," which appeared on the eve of the Great War.^
Its pubKcation in a semiscientific periodical for special-
ists in Oriental problems rendered it worthy of serious
attention. "The long-continued absence of practically
all discussion or even mention of Egyptian internal
affairs from the British press," asserted this article,
"is not indicative of a healthy condition. In Egypt
the superficial quiet is that of suppressed discontent —
of a sullen, hopeless mistrust toward the Government
of the Occupation. Certain recent happenings have
strengthened in Egyptian minds the conviction that the
Government is making preparations for the complete
annexation of the country. . . . We are not concerned
to question how far the motives attributed to the Gov-
ernment are true. The essential fact is that the Govern-
ment of the Occupation has not yet succeeded in endear-
ing, or even recommending, itself to the Egyptian peo-
ple, but is, on the contraiy, an object of suspicion, an
occasion of enmity." The article expresses grave doubt
* Low, Egypt in Transition, p. 260 (London, 1914).
* The Asiatic Review, April, 1914.
184 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
whether Lord Kitchener's repressive measures have
done more than drive discontent imderground, and
shows "how strong is the NationaHst feehng in Eg}^t
to-day in spite of the determined attempts to stamp out
all freedom of poHtical opinion. As might be expected,
this wholesale muzzling of the press has not only re-
duced the Mohammedan majority to a condition of in-
ternal ferment, but has seriously alienated the hitherto
loyal Copts. It may be that the Government can dis-
cover no better means of recommending itself to the
confidence and good-will of the Egyptian people; it may
be that only by the instant repression of every oiitward
sign of discontent can it feel secure in its occupation;
but if such be the case, it is an admission of extreme
weakness, or recognized insecurity of tenure." The
article concludes with the following warning as to the
problem's wider implications: "Egypt, though a sub-
ject of profound indifference to the Enghsh voter, is
being feverishly watched by the Indian Mohammedans,
and by the whole of our West and Central African sub-
jects — themselves strongly Moslem in sjinpathy, and
at the present time jealously suspicious of the political
activities of Christian ImperiaHsm."
Such being the state of Egyptian feeling in 1914, the
outbreak of the Great War was bound to produce inten-
sified unrest. England's position in Egypt was, in truth,
very difficult. Although in fact England exercised comi-
plete control, in law Eg}"pt was still a dependency of
the Ottoman Empire, Britain merely exercising a tem-
porary occupation. Now it soon became evident that
Turkey was going to join England's enemies, the Teu-
tonic empii-es, while it was equally evident that the
NATIONALISM 185
Egyptians sympathized with the Turks, even the Khe-
dive Abbas Hilmi making no secret of his pro-Tm-kish
views. During the first months of the European War,
while Turkey was still nominally neutral, the Egyptian
native press, despite the British censorship, was full of
veiled seditious statements, while the imnily attitude of
the Egyptian populace and the stirrings among the
Egyptian native regiments left no doubt as to how the
wind was blowing. England was seriously alarmed.
Accordingly, when Turkey entered the war in November,
1914, England took the decisive plunge, deposed Abbas
Hilmi, nominated his cousin Hussein Kamel "Sultan,"
and declared Egypt a protectorate of the British Empire.
This stung the nationalists to fury. Anything like
formal rebellion was rendered impossible by the hea\^
masses of British and Colonial troops which had been
poured into the comitry. Nevertheless, there was a
good deal of sporadic violence, suppressed only by a
stern application of the "State of Siege." A French
observer thus vividly describes these critical days: "The
Jehadd is rousing the anti-Chiistian fanaticism which
always stirs in the soul of every good Moslem. Since
the end of October one could read in the eyes of the low-
class Mohammedan natives their hope — the massacre of
the Christians. In the streets of Cairo they stared
insolently at the European passers-by. Some even
danced for joy on learning that the Sultan had declared
the Holy War. Denounced to the police for this, they
were incontinently bastinadoed at the nearest police-
station. The same state of mind reigned at El-Azhar,
and I am told that Europeans who visit the celebrated
Mohammedan Universitv have their ears filled with the
186 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
strongest epithets of the Arab repertory — that best
furnished language in the world." *
The nationalist exiles vehemently expressed abroad
what their fellows could not say at home. Their leader,
Mohammed Farid Bey, issued from Geneva an official
protest against "the new illegal regime proclaimed by
England the 18th of last December. England, which
pretends to make war on Germany to defend Belgium,
ought not to trample under foot the rights of Egypt,
nor consider the treaties relative thereto as 'scraps of
paper/ "" These exiles threw themselves vehemently
into the arms of Germany, as may be gauged from the
following remarks of Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, secretary of
the Nationalist party, in a German periodical: "There
is hardly an Egyptian who does not pray that England
may be beaten and her Empire fall in i-uins. During
the early days of the war, while I was still in Egypt,
I was a witness of this popular feeling. In cities and
villages, from sage to simple peasant, all are convinced
in the Kaiser's love for Islam and friendship for its
cahph, and they are hoping and praying for Germany's
victory." 3
Of course, in face of the overwhelming British garrison
in Egypt, such pronouncements were as idle as the wind.
The hoped-for Turkish attacks were beaten back from
the Suez Canal, the "State of Siege" functioned with
stem efficiency and Egypt, flooded with British troops.
1 "L'Egypte et les Debuts du Protectorat," Revue des Sciences Poli-
tiques, 15 June, 1915.
2 Mohammed Farid Bey, "L'figypte et la Guerre," Revue Politique
Internationale, May, 1915.
'Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, "Die ag3T)tische Frage," Asien, November,
1916.
NATIONALISM 187
lapsed into sullen silence, not to be broken until the end
of the war.
Turning back at this point to consider nationalist
developments in the rest of North Africa, we do not, as
in Eg;y^t; find a well-marked territorial patriotism.
Anti-European hatred there is in plenty, but such ''pa-
triotic" sentiments as exist belong rather to those more
diffused types of nationahst feeling known as "Pan-
Arabism" and "Pan-Islamic Nationalism," which we
shall presently discuss.
The basic reason for this North African lack of na-
tional feeling, in its restricted sense, is that nowhere
outside of Fjgypi is there a land which ever has been,
or wtAvh shows distinct signs of becoming, a true "na-
tion." The mass of the populations inhabiting the vast
band of territory between the Mediterranean Sea and
the Sahara desert are "Berbers" — an ancient stock,
racially European rather than Asiatic or negroid, and
closely akin to the "Latin" peoples across the Mediter-
ranean. The Berbers remind one of the Balkan Albani-
ans: they are extremely tenacious of their language and
customs, and they have an instinctive racial feeling;
but they are inveterate particularists, having always
been spKt up into many tribes, sometimes combining
into partial confederations but never developing true
national patriotism.^
Alongside the Berbers we find everywhere a varying
proportion of Arabs. The Arabs have colonized North
Africa ever since the Moslem conquest twelve centuries
ago. They converted the Berbers to Islam and Arab
1 A good summary of Berber history is H. Weisgerber, Les Blancs
d'Afnque (Paris, 1910).
188 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
culture, but they never made North Africa part of the
Arab world as they did Syria and Mesopotamia, and in
somewhat lesser degree Egypt. The two races have
never really fused. Despite more than a thousand years
of Arab tutelage, the Berbers' manner of life remains
distinct. They have largely kept their language, and
there has been comparatively Httle interman-iage. Pure-
blooded Arabs abound, often in large tribal groups, but
they are still, in a wa}^, foreigners.^
With such elements of discord. North .\frica's political
life has always been troubled. The most stable re-
gion has been Morocco, though even there the Sultan's
authority has never really extended to the mountain
tribes. As for the so-called "Barbaty States" (Algiers,
Tunis, and Tripoli), they were little more than port-
cities along the coast, the hinterland enjoying practi-
cally complete tribal independence. Over this confused
turmoil spread the tide of French conquest, beginning
wdth Algiers in 1830 and ending with Morocco to-day.^
France brought peace, order, and material prosperity,
but here, as in other Eastern lands, these very benefits
of European tutelage created a new sort of unity among
the natives in their common dislike of the European
conqueror and their common aspiration toward inde-
pendence. Accordingly, the past generation has wit-
nessed the appearance of "Young Algerian" and "Young
Tunisian" pohtical groups, led by French-educated men
who have imbibed Western ideas of "self-government"
^ For analyses of differences between Arabs and Berbers, see Caix de
Saint- Aymour, Arabes et Kabyles (Paris, 1891); A. Bel, Coup d'CEil sur
I'ldam en Berberie (Paris, 1917).
2 For short historical summary, see A. C. Coolidge, "The European
Retonquest of North Africa," Ainerican Historical Review, July, 1912.
NATIONALISM 189
and "liberty."^ However, as we have already re-
marked, their goal is not so much the erection of distinct
Algerian and Tunisian "Nations" as it is creation of a
larger North African; perhaps Pf: -Islamic, 'inity. It
must not be forgotten that they are in close touch with
the Sennussi and kindred influences which we have
already examined in the chapter on Pan-Islamism.
So much for "first-stage" nationaHst developments
in the Arab or Ai-abized lands. There is, however, one
more important centre of nationalist sentiment in the
Moslem world to be considered — ^Persia. Persia is, in
fact, the land where a genuine nationaHst movement
would have been most logically expected, because the
Persians have for ages possessed a stronger feeling of
"country" than any other Near Eastern people.
In the nineteenth century Persia had sunk into such
deep decrepitude that its patent weakness excited the
imperiaHstic appetites of Czarist Russia and, in some-
what lesser degree, of England. Persia's decadence and
external perils were, however, appreciated by thinking
Persians, and a series of reformist agitations took place,
beginning with the religious movement of the Bab early
in the nineteenth century and culminating with the
revolution of 1908.^ That revolution was largely pre-
cipitated by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 by
* For these nationalist movements in French North Africa, see A. Ser-
vier, Le N ationalisme musulman (Constantine, Algeria, 1913); P. Lapie,
Les Civilisations tunisiennes (Paris, 1898); P. Millet, "Les Jeunes-Alge-
riens," Revue de Paris, 1 November, 1913.
* A good analysis of the prerevolutionary reformist movements is
found in "X," "La Situation politique de la Perse," Revue du Monde
musulman, June, 1914. See also Vambery, Western Culture in Eastern
Lands; General Sir T. E. Gordon, "The Reform Movement in Persia,"
Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, 13 March, 1907.
190 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
which England and Russia \drtuaUy partitioned Persia;
the countrj^ being divided into a Russian "sphere of
influence" in the north and a British "sphere of influ-
ence " in the south, with a "neutral zone" between. The
revolution was thus in great part a desperate attempt of
the Persian patriots to set their house in order and avert,
at the eleventh hour, the shadow of European domina-
tion which was creeping over the land. But the revolu-
tion was not merely a protest against European aggres-
sion. It was also aimed at the aHen IQiadjar dynasty
which had so long misruled Persia. These Khadjar
sovereigns were of Turkoman origin. They had never
become really Persianized, as shown by the fact that
the intimate court language was Turki, not Persian.
They occupied a position somewhat analogous to that of
the Manchus before the Chinese revolution. The Per-
sian revolution was thus basically an Iranian patriotic
outburst against all alien influences, whether from East
or West.
We have already seen how this patriotic movement
was crushed by the forcible intervention of European
imperialism.^ By 1912 Russia and England were in
full control of the situation, the patriots were proscribed
and persecuted, and Persia sank into despairing silence.
As a British writer then remarked: "For such broken
spirit and shattered hopes, as for the 'anarchy' now
existing in Persia, Russia and Great Britain are directly
responsible, and if there be a Reckoning, will one day be
held to account. It is idle to talk of any improvement
* See W. Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (New York, 1912).
Also, for earlier phase of the revolution, see E. G. Browne, The Revolu-
tion in Persia (London, 1910).
NATIONALISM 191
in the situation, when the only Government in Persia
consists of a Cabinet which does not command the con-
fidence of the people, terrorized by Russia, financially
starved by both Russia and England, allowed only mis-
erable doles of money on usunous terms, and forbidden
to employ honest and efficient foi-eign experts like Mr.
Shuster; when the King is a boy, the Plegent an absentee,
the ParHament permanently suspended, and the best,
bravest, and most honest patriots either killed or driven
into exile, while the wolf-pack of financiers, concession-
hunters and land-grabbers presses ever harder on the
exhausted victim, whose struggles grow fainter and
fainter. Little less than a miracle can now save Persia." ^
So ends our sm-vey of the main "first-stage" nation-
aHst movements in the Moslem world. We should of
course remember that a nationahst movement was
developing concurrently in India, albeit following an
eccentric orbit of its own. We should also remember
that, in addition to the main movements just discussed,
there were minor nationahst stirrings among other
Moslem peoples such as the Russian Tartars, the Chinese
Mohammedans, and even the Javanese of the Dutch
Indies. Lastly, we should remember that these nation-
alist movements were more or less interwoven with the
non-national movement of Pan-Islamism, and with those
"second-stage," "racial" nationahst movements which
we shall now consider.
*E. G. Browne, "The Present Situation in Persia," Contemporary
Review, November, 1912.
192 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
II
Earlier in this chapter we have ah-eady remarked that
the opening years of the twentieth centuiy witnessed
the appearance in Asia of nationalism's second or racial
stage, especially among the Turldsh and Arab peoples.
This wider stage of nationahsm has attained its highest
development among the Turks; where, indeed, it has
gone through two distinct phases, describable respec-
tively by the terms " Pan-Turkism " and "Pan-Turan-
ism." We have described the piimaiy phase of Turkish
nationalism in its restricted "Ottoman" sense down to
the close of the Balkan wars of 1912-13. It is at that
time that the secondary or "racial" aspects of Turkish
nationahsm first come prominently to the fore.
By this time the Ottoman Turks had begim to realize
that the}^ did not stand alone m the world; that they
WTre, in fact, the westernmost branch of a vast band
of peoples extending right across eastern Europe and
Asia, from the Baltic to the Pacific and from the Medi-
terranean to the ^\rctic Ocean, to whom ethnologists
have assigned the name of " Uralo- Altaic race," but who
are more generally termed "Turanians." This group
embraces the most widely scattered folk — the Ottoman
Turks of Constantinople and AnatoHa, the Turkomans
of Persia and Central Asia, the Tartars of South Russia
and Transcaucasia, the Magyars of Himgaiy, the Finns
of Finland and the Baltic provinces, the aboriginal tribes
of Siberia, and even the distant Mongols and IManchus.
Diverse though they are in culture, tradition, and even
personal appearance, these people nevertheless possess
certain well-marked traits in common. Their languages
NATIONALISM 193
are all similar, while their physical and mental make-up
displays undoubted affinities. They are all noted for
great physical vitaHty combined with unusual toughness
of nei've-fibre. Though somewhat deficient in imagina-
tion and creative artistic sense, they are richly endowed
wdth patience, tenacity, and dogged energy. Above all,
they have usually displayed extraordinary mihtary ca-
pacity, together with a no less remarkable aptitude for
the masterful handling of subject peoples. The Tui*a-
nians have certainly been the greatest conquerors that
the world has ever seen. Attila and his Huns, Arpad
and his Mag^^ars, Ispeiich and his Bulgars, Alp Arslan
and his Seljuks, Ertogrul and his Ottomans, Jenghiz
Khan and Tamerlane with their "inflexible" Mongol
hordes, Baber in India, even Kubilai Khan and Nur-
hachu in far-off Cathay : the type is ever the same. The
hoof -print of the Turanian "man on horseback" is
stamped deep all over the pahmpsest of histoiy.
Glorious or sinister according to the point of view,
Turan's is certainly a stirring past. Of course one may
query whether these diverse peoples actually do form
one genuine race. But, as we have already seen, so far
as practical politics go, that makes no difference. Pos-
sessed of kindred tongues and temperaments, and dow-
ered with such a wealth of soul-stirring tradition, it
would suffice for them to think themselves racially one
to form a nationahst dynamic of truly appalling potency.
Until about a generation ago, to be sure, no signs of
such a movement were visible. Not only were distant
stocks hke Finns and Manchus quite unaware of any
conmion Turanian bond, but even obvious kindred like
Ottoman Turks and Central Asian Turkomans regarded
194 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
one another with indifference or contempt. Certainly
the Ottoman Turks were ahnost as devoid of racial as
they were of national feeling. Arminius Vambery tells
hoW; when he first ^dsited Constantinople in 1856, "the
word Turkluk (i. e., 'Turk') was considered an oppro-
brious synonym of grossness and savagery, and when
I used to call people's attention to the racial importance
of the Turkish stock (stretching from Adrianople to the
Pacific) they answered: 'But you are surely not classing
us with Kirghiz and with the gross nomads of Tartary.'
. . . With a few exceptions, I found no one in Con-
stantinople who was seriously interested in the ques-
tions of Turkish nationality or language."^
It was, in fact, the labors of Western ethnologists like
the Hmigarian Vambery and the Frenchman Leon Ca-
hmi that first cleared away the mists which enshrouded
Turan. These labors disclosed the imexpected vastness
of the Turanian world. And this presently acquii-ed a
most unacadeniic significance. The writings of Vambery
and his colleagues spread far and wide through Turan
and were there devom-ed by receptive minds already
stirring to the obscure promptings of a new time. The
normahty of the Turanian movement is shown by its
simultaneous appearance at such widely sundered points
as Turkish Constantinople and the Tartar centres along
the Russian Volga. Indeed, if anything, the leaven
began its working on the Volga sooner than on the Bos-
phorus. This Tartar revival, though little known, is
one of the most extraordinary phenomena in all nation-
ahst histoiy. The Tartars, once masters of Russia,
though long since fallen from their high estate, have
1 Vambery, La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Qvarante Ans, pp. 11-12.
NATIONALISM 195
never vanished in the Slav ocean. Although many of
them have been for four centuries under Russian rule,
they have stubbornly maintained their rehgious, racial,
and cultural identity. Clustered thickly along the
Volga, especially at Kazan and Astrakhan, retaining
much of the Ciimea, and forming a considerable mi-
nority in Transcaucasia, the Tartars remained distinct
"enclaves" in the Slav empire, widely scattered but
indomitable.
The first stirrings of nationalist self-consciousness
among the Russian Tartars appeared as far back as
1895, and from then on the movement grew with aston-
ishing rapidity. The removal of governmental restric-
tions at the time of the Russian revolution of 1904 was
followed by a regular Hterary florescence. Streams of
books and pamphlets, numerous newspapers, and a
sohd periodical press, all attested the vigor and fecun-
dity of the Tartar revival. The high economic level of
the Russian Tartars assured the material sinews of war.
The Tartar oil millionaires of Baku here played a con-
spicuous role, freely opening their capacious purses for
the good of the cause. The Russian Tartars also showed
distinct political abihty and soon gained the confidence
of their Turkoman cousins of Russian Central Asia,
who were also stirring to the breath of nationalism.
The first Russian Duma contained a large Mohammedan
group so enterprising in spirit and so skilfully led that
Russian public opinion became genuinely uneasy and
encouraged the government to diminish Tartar influence
in Russian parliamentary life by summary curtailments
of Mohammedan representation.^
^ For the Tartar revival, see S. Brobovnikov, "Moslems in Russia,,"
The Moslem World, January, 1911; Fevret, "Les Tatars de Crimee,"
196 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Of course the Russian Mohammedans were careful to
proclaim their political loyalty to the Russian Empire.
Nevertheless, many earnest spirits revealed their secret
aspirations by seeking a freer and more fruitful field of
labor in Turkish Stambul; where the Russian Tartars
played a prominent part in the Pan-Turk and Pan-
Turanian movements within the Ottoman Empire. Li
fact, it was a Volga Tartar, Yusuf Bey Akchura Oglu,
who was the real founder of the first Pan-Turanian so-
ciety at Constantinople, and his well-known book,
Three Political Systems, became the text on which most
subsequent Pan-Turanian writings have been based. ^
Down to the Young-Turk revolution of 1908, Pan-
Turanism was somewhat mider a cloud at Stambul.
Sultan Abdul Hamid, as already remarked, was a Pan-
Islamist and had a rooted aversion to all nationalist
movements. Accordingly, the Pan-Turanians, while not
actually persecuted, were never in the Sultan's favor.
With the advent of Young-Turk nationalism to power,
however, all was changed. The " Ottomanizing " leaders
of the new government hstened eagerly to Pan-Turanian
preaching and most of them became affiliated \\dth the
movement. It is interesting to note that Russian Tar-
tars continued to play a prominent part. The chief Pan-
Turanian propagandist was the able publicist Ahmed
Revus du Monde musvlman, August, 1907; A. Le Chatelier, "Les Musul-
mans russes," Revue du Monde mu&ulman, December, 1906; Fr. von
Mackay, "Die Erweckung Russlands asiatischen Volkerschaften," Deutsche
Rundschau, March, 1918; Arminius Vambery, Western Culture in Eastern
Lands; H. Williams, "The Russian Mohammedans," Russian Review,
February, 1914; "X," "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme," Revu^
du Monde musuhrMu, March, 1913.
1 For these activities, see article by "X," quoted above; also Ahmed
Emin, The Development of Modem Turkey as Measured by its Press (New
York, 1914).
NATIONALISM 197
Bey Agayeff, a Volga Tartar. His well-edited organ,
Turk Yurdu {Turkish Home), penetrated to ev^ corner
of the Turko-Tartar world and exercised great influence
on the development of its public opinion.
Although leaders like Ahmed Bey Agayeff clearly
visuaHzed the entire Turanian world from Finland to
Manchuria as a potential whole, and were thus full-
fledged "Pan-Turanians/' their practical efforts were at
first confined to the closely related Turko-Tartar seg-
ment; that is, to the Ottomans of Turkey, the Tartars
of Russia, and the Turkomans of Central Asia and Per-
sia. Since aU these peoples were also Mohammedans,
it follows that this propaganda had a religious as well as
a racial complexion, trending in many respects toward
Pan-Islamism. Indeed, even disregarding the religious
factor, we may say that, though Pan-Turanian in theory,
the movement was at that time in practice little more
than "Pan-Turkism."
It was the Balkan wars of 1912-13 which really pre-
cipitated full-fledged Pan-Turanism. Those wars not
merely expelled the Turks from the Balkans and turned
their eyes increasingly toward Asia, but also roused
such hatred of the victorious Serbs in the breasts of
Hungarians and Bulgarians that both these peoples
proclaimed their "Turanian" origins and toyed with
ideas of "Pan-Turanian" sohdarity against the menace
of Serbo-Russian "Pan-Slavism."^ The Pan-Turanian
thinkers were assuredly evolving a body of doctrine
grandiose enough to satisfy the most ambitious hopes.
' For these Pan-Turanian tendencies in Hungary and Bulgaria, see my
article "Pan-Turanism," American Political Science Review, February,
1917.
198 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Emphasizing the great virihty and ner\^e-force every-
where patent in the Turanian stocks, these thinkers
saw in Turan the dominant race of the morrow. Zeal-
ous students of Western evolutionism and ethnolog}^,
they were evolving their own special theoiy of race
grandem* and decadence. According to Pan-Turanian
teactiing, the historic peoples of southern Asia — Arabs,
Persians, and Hindus — are hopelessly degenerate. As
for the Europeans, they have recently passed theii-
apogee, and, exhausted by the consumuig fires of modern
industriahsm, are already entering upon their decline.
It is the Turanians, with their inherent ^drihty and
steady nerves unspoiled by the wear and tear of Western
civiHzation, who must be the great dynamic of the fu-
ture. Indeed, some Pan-Turanian thinkers go so far
as to proclaim that it is the sacred mission of their race
to re\dtaHze a whole senescent, worn-out world by the
sa\dng infusion of regenerative Turanian blood. ^
Of course the Pan-Turanians recognized that an}"-
thing Hke a reaKzation of their ambitious dreams was
dependent upon the \drtual destruction of the Russian
Empire. In fact, Russia, with its Tartars, Tm'komans,
Kirghiz, Firms, and numerous kindred tribes, was in
Pan-Turanian eyes merely a Slav allu\dum laid with
varjdng thickness over a Turanian subsoil. This tm-n-
ing of Russia into a vast "Turania irredenta" was cer-
tainly an ambitious order. Nevertheless, the Pan-
Turanians comited on powerful Western backing. They
realized that Germany and Austria-Hungary were fast
1 See article by "X," quoted above; also his article "Les Courants
poUtiques dans la Turquie contemporaine," Revue du Monde musulman,
December, 1912.
NATIONALISM 199
drifting toward war with Russia, and they felt that such
a cataclysm, however perilous; would also offer most
glorious possibilities.
These Pan-Turanian aspii*ations imdoubtedly had a
great deal to do with dri\'ing Turkey into the Great
War on the side of the Central Empires. Certainly,
Enver Pasha and most of the other leaders of the gov-
erning group had long been more or less affiliated with
the Pan-Turanian movement. Of course the Turkish
Government had more than one stiing to its bow. It
tried to drive Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism in double
harness, using the "Holy War" agitation for pious
Moslems everywhere, while it redoubled Pan-Turanian
propaganda among the Turko-Tartar peoples. A good
statement of Pan-Turanian ambitions in the early years
of the war is that of the pubHcist Tekin Alp in his
book, The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal, pubhshed
in 1915. Says Tekin Alp: "With the crushing of Rus-
sian despotism by the brave German, Austrian, and
Turldsh armies, 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 Turanians will
receive their independence. With the 10,000,000 Otto-
man Turks, this will form a nation of 50,000,000, ad-
vancing toward a great civilization which may perhaps
be compared with that of Germany, in that it will have
the strength and energy to rise even higher. In some
ways it will be superior to the degenerate French and
Enghsh civilizations."
With the collapse of Russia after the Bolshevik revo-
lution at the end of 1917, Pan-Turanian hopes knew no
bounds. So certain were they of triumph that they
began to flout even their German allies, thus revealing
that hatred of all Europeans which had always lurked
200 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
at the back of their minds. A Gennan staff-officer thus
describes the table-talk of HaHl Pasha, the Turkish com-
mander of the JMesopotamian front and uncle of En-
ver: "First of all, every tribe with a Turkish mother-
tongue must be forged into a single nation. The na-
tional principle was supreme; so it was the design to
conquer Turkestan, the cradle of Turkish power and
glory. That was the first task. From that base con-
nections must be estabhshed with the Yakutes of Si-
beria, who were considered, on account of their lin-
guistic kinship, the remotest outposts of the Turkish
blood to the eastward. The closely related Tartar
tribes of the Caucasus must naturally join this union.
Armenians and Georgians, who form mxinority nation-
ahties in that territorj^, must either submit voluntarily
or be subjugated. . . . Such a great compact Turkish
Empire, exercising hegemony over all the Islamic world,
would exert a powerful attraction upon Afghanistan and
Persia. ... In December, 1917, when the Turkish
front in Mesopotamia threatened to yield, Halil Pasha
said to me, half vexed, half jokingly: 'Supposing we let
the EngUsh have this cm-sed desert hole and go to
Turkestan, where I will erect a new empire for my little
boy.' He had named his youngest son after the great
conqueror and destroyer, Jenghiz Khan." ^
1 Ex-Chief of General Staff (Ottoman) Ernst Paraquin, in the Berliner
Tageblatt, January 24, 1920. For Turkish nationalist activities and atti-
tudes during the war, see further I. D. 1199 — A Manual on the Tura-
nians and Pan-Turanianism. Compiled by the Geographical Section of the
Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty (London, 1919); E. F.
Benson, Crescent and Iron Cross (London, 1918); M. A. Czaplicka, The
Turks of Central Asia : An Inquiry into the Pan-Turanian Problem (Oxford,
1918); H. Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (New York, 1918);
Dr. Harry Stiirmer, Two War-Years in Constantinople (New York, 1917);
A. Mandelstam, "The Turkish Spirit," New Europe, April 22, 1920.
NATIONALISM 201
As a matter of fact, the summer of 1918 saw Transcau-
casia and northern Persia overrun by Turkish armies
headed for Central Asia. Then came the German col-
lapse in the West and the end of the war, apparently
dooming Turkey to destruction. For the moment the
Pan-Turanians were stunned. Nevertheless, their hopes
were soon destined to revive, as we shall presently see.
Before describing the course of events in the Near
East since 1918, which need to be treated as a unit, let
us go back to consider the earlier developments of the
other "second-stage" nationalist movements in the
Moslem world. We have already seen how, concur-
rently with Turkish nationalism, Arab nationahsm was
likewise evolving into the "racial" stage, the ideal being
a great "Pan- Arab" empire, embracing not merely the
ethnically Arab peninsula-homeland, Syria, and Meso-
potamia, but also the Arabized regions of Egypt, Tripoli,
French North Africa, and the Sudan.
Pan-Arabism has not been as intellectually developed
as Pan-Turanisra, though its genei'al trena is so similar
that its doctrines need not be discussed in detail. One
important difference between the two movements is
that. Pan-Arabism is much more religious and Pan-
Islamic in character, the Arabs regarding themselves
as "The Chosen People" divinely predestined to domi-
nate the whole Islamic world. Pan-Arabism also lacks
Pan-Turanism's unity of direction. There have been
two distinct intellectual centres — Syria and Eg3^t. In
fact, it is in Egypt that Pan-Arab schemes have been
most concretely elaborated, the Egyptian programme
looking toward a reunion of the Arab-speaking lands un-
der the Khedive — ^perhaps at first subject to British tute-
202 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
lage, though ultimately throwing off British control by
concerted Pan-Arab action. The late Khedive Abbas
Hilmi; deposed by the British in 1914, is supposed to
have encouraged tliis movement.^
The Great War undoubtedly stimulated Pan-Arabism,
especially by its creation of an independent Arab king-
dom in the Hedjaz v.ith claims on Syria and Mesopo-
tamia. However, the various Arab peoples are so en-
grossed with local independence agitations looking
toward the elimination of British, French, and Itahan
control from specific regions like Egj'pt, Syria, Meso-
potamia, and Tripoli, that the larger concept of Pan-
Arabism, wliile undoubtedly an underlying factor, is
not to-day in the foregromid of Arab nationalist pro-
granMnes.
Furthermore, as I have already said, Pan-Arabism
is interwoven with the non-racial concepts of Pan-
Islamism and "Pan-Islamic NationaHsm." This latter
concept may seem a rather grotesque contradiction of
terms. So it may be to us Westerners. But it is not
necessarily so to Eastern minds. However eagerly the
East may have seized upon our ideas of nationahty and
patriotism, those ideas have entered minds already full
of concepts like Islamic solidarity and the brotherTiood
of all True Behevers. The result has been a subtle col-
oration of the new by the old, so that even when Mos-
lems use our exact words^ "nationality," "race," etc.,
their conception of what those words mean is distinctly
different from ours. These differences in fact extend
^ For Pan-Arab developments, see A. Musil, Zur Zeitgeschichte voh
Arabien (Leipzig, 1918); M. Pickthall, "Turkey, England, and the Present
Crisis," Asiatic Revieiv, October 1, 1914; A. Servier, Le Nationalisme
viusulman ; Sheick Abd-el-Aziz Schauisch, "Das Machtgebiet der arabi-'
schen Sprache," Preussische Jahrbucher, September, 1916.
NATIONALISM ^ 203
to all political concepts. Take the word "State/' for
example. The t}"pieal Mohammedan state is not, like
the t}^ical Western state, a sharply defined unit, with
fixed boundaries and full sovereignty exercised every-
where within its frontiers. It is more or less an amor-
phous mass, with a central nucleus, the seat of an au-
thority which shades off into ill-defined, anarchic inde-
pendence. Of course, in the past half-century, most
Mohammedan states have tried to remodel themselves
on Western lines, but the traditional tendency is typi-
fied by Afghanistan, where the tribes of the Indian
northwest frontier, though nominally Afghan, enjoy
practical independence and have frequently conducted
private wars of their own against the British which the
Ameer has disavowed and for which the British have not
held him responsible.
Similarly with the term "Nationality." In Moslem
eyes, a man need not be born or formally naturaHzed
to be a member of a certain Moslem "Nationality."
Every Moslem is more or less at home in every part of
Islam, so a man may just happen into a particular coun-
tiy and thereby become at once, if he wishes, a national
in good standing. For example: "Egypt for the Egyp-
tians" does not mean precisely what we think. Let a
Mohammedan of Algiers or Damascus settle in Cairo.
Nothing prevents him from acting, and being considered
as, an "Egj^tian Nationalist" in the full sense of the
term. This is because Islam has always had a distinct
idea of territorial as well as spiritual unity. All pre-
dominantly Mohammedan lands are beheved by Mos-
lems to constitute " Dar-ul-Islam," ^ which is in a sense
'Literally "House of Islam." All non-Moslem lands are collectively
known as " Dar-ul-Harb " or "House of War."
204 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
the joint possession of all Moslems and which all Mos-
lems are jointly obligated to defend. That is the reason
why alien encroachments on any Moslem land are in-
stantly resented by Moslems at the opposite end of the
Moslem world, who could have no possible material
interest in the matter.
We are now better able to understand how many
Moslem thinkers, combining the Western concept of
nationaUty with the traditional idea of Dar-ul-Islam,
have evolved a new synthesis of the two, expressed by
the term "Pan-Islamic NationaHsm." This trend of
thought is well set forth by an Indian Moslem, who
writes: "In the West, the whole science of government
rests on the axiom that the essential di^'isions of- hu-
manity are determined by considerations of race and
geography; but for Orientals these ideas are very far
from being axioms. For them, humanity divides ac-
cording to reHgious beliefs. The unitj^ is no longer the
nation or the State, but the 'Millah.'^ Europeans see
in this a counteri^art to their Middle Ages — a stage
which Islam should pass through on its way to mo-
dernity in the Western sense. How badly they under-
stand how rehgion looks to a Mohammedan! They
forget that Islam is not only a rehgion, but also a social
organization, a form of culture, and a nationahty. . . .
The principle of Islamic fraternity — of Pan-Islamism,
if you prefer the word — is analogous to patriotism, but
with this difference: this Islamic fraternity, though re-
sulting in identity of laws and customs, has not (hke
Western Nationahty) been brought about by commimity
^7. e., the organized group of followers of a particular religion.
NATIONALISM 205
of race, country, or history, but has been received, as
we believe, directly from God." ^
Pan-Islamic nationalism is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon and has not been doctrinally worked out.
Nevertheless it is visible throughout the Moslem world
and is gaining in strength, particularly in regions like
North Africa and India, where strong territorial patri-
otism has, for one reason or another, not developed.
As a French writer remarks: "Mohammedan Nation-
alism is not an isolated or sporadic agitation. It is a
broad tide, wliich is flowing over the whole Islamic
world of Asia, India, and Africa. Nationalism is a new
form of the Mohammedan faith, which, far from being
undermined by contact with European civihzation,
seems to have discovered a surplus of rehgious fervor,
and which, in its desire for expansion and proselytism,
tends to realize its unity by rousing the fanaticism of
the masses, by directing the poUtical tendencies of the
ehtes, and by sowing everyvi'^here the seeds of a danger-
ous agitation." 2 Pan-Islamic nationalism may thus,
in the futui'e, become a major factor which will have
to be seriously reckoned wdth".^
1 Mohammed Ali, "Le Mouvement musulman dans I'lnde," Revue
Politique Internationale, January, 1914. He headed the so-called "Khila-
fat Delegation" sent by the Indian Moslems to England in 1919 to pro-
test against the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the peace treaties.
2 A. Servier, Le Nationalisme musulman, p. 181.
5 For Pan-Islamic nationalism, besides Servier and Mohammed Ali,
quoted above, see A. Le Chateher, L' Islam au dix-neuvieme Siecle (Paris,
1888); same author, "Politique musulmane," Revue du Monde Musulman,
September, 1910; Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," Nineteenth Cen-
tury and After, July, 1919; G. D6morgny, La Question Persane, pp. 23-31
(Paris, 1916); W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past and Present," Quar-
terly Review, October, 1920.
206 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
III
So ends our survey of nationalist movements in the
Moslem world. Given such a tangled complex of as-
pirations, enormously stimulated by Armageddon, it was
only natural that the close of the Great War should
have left the Orient a veritable welter of unrest. Ob-
viously, anything like a constructive settlement could
have been effected only by the exercise of tine states-
manship of the highest order. Unfortunately, the Ver-
sailles peace conference was devoid of true statesman-
ship, and the resulting "settlement" not only failed to
give peace to Europe but disclosed an attitude toward
the East inspired by the pre-war spirit of predatory
imperiahsm and cynical Realpolitik. Apparently ob-
livious of the mighty psychological changes which the
war had wrought, and of the consequent changes of
attitude and poHcy required, the victorious Allies pro-
ceeded to treat the Orient as though Armageddon were
a skirmish and Asia the sleeping giant of a centur}^ ago.
In fact, disregarding both the general pronounce-
ments of liberal principles and the specific promises of
self-determination for Near Eastern peoples which they
had made during the war, the Allies now^ paraded a se-
ries of secret treaties (negotiated between themselves
during those same war-years when they had been so
unctuously orating), and these secret treaties clearly
divided up the Ottoman Empire among the victors, in
absolute disregard of the wishes of the inhabitants.
The pui-poses of the Allies were further revealed by the
way in which the Versailles conference refused to receive
the representatives of Persia (theoretically still inde-
NATIONALISM 207
pendent), but kept them cooling their heels in Paris
while British pressure at Teheran forced the Shah's
government to enter into an "agreement" that made
Persia a virtual protectorate of the British Empke. As
for the Egyptians; who had alw^aj^s protested against
the protectorate proclaimed by England solely on its
own initiative in 1914, the conference refused to pay
any attention to their delegates, and they were given to
understand that the conference regarded the British
protectorate over Egypt as a fait accompli. The upshot
was that, as a result of the war, European domination
over the Near and Middle East was riveted rather than
relaxed.
But the strangest feature of this strange business
remains to be told. One might imagine that the Allied
leaders w^ould have realized that they were playing a
dangerous game, which could succeed only by close
team-work and quick action. As a matter of fact, the
very reverse was the case. After showing their hand,
and thereby filling the East with disillusionment, de-
spair, and fury, the AUies proceeded to quarrel over the
spoils. Nearly two years passed before England, France,
and Italy were able to come to an even superficial agree-
ment as to the partition of the Ottoman Empire, and
meanwhile they had been bickering and intriguing
against each other all over the Near East. This was
sheer madness. The destined victims were thereby in-
formed that European domination rested not only on
disregard of the moral "imponderables" but on diplo-
matic bankiiiptcy as well. The obvious reflection was
that a domination resting on such rotten foundations
might well be overthrown.
208 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
That, at any rate, is the way multitudes of Orientals
read the situation, and their rebellious feelings were
stimulated not merely by consciousness of their own
strength and Western disunion, but also by the active
encouragement of a new ally — ^Bolshevik Russia. Rus-
sian Bolshevism had thrown down the gauntlet to West-
ern civiHzation, and in the desperate struggle which was
now on, the Bolshevik leaders saw with terrible glee the
golden opportunities vouchsafed them in the East. The
details of Bolshevik activity in the Orient will be con-
sidered in the chapter on Social Unrest. Suffice it to
remember here that Bolshevik propaganda is an im-
portant element in that profound ferment which ex-
tends over the whole Near and Middle East; a ferment
which has reduced some regions to the verge of chaos
and which threatens to increase rather than diminish
in the immediate future.
To relate all the details of contemporary Eastern un-
rest would fill a book in itself. Let us here content
ourselves with considering the chief centres of this un-
rest, remembering always that it exists throughout
the Moslem world from French North Africa to Central
Asia and the Dutch Indies. The centres to be here sur-
veyed will be Egypt, Persia, and the Turkish and Arab
regions of the former Ottoman Empire. A fifth main
centre of unrest — India — will be discussed in the next
chapter.
The gathering storm first broke in Egj^t. During
the war Egypt, flooded with British troops and sub-
jected to the most stringent martial law, had remained
quiet, but it was the quiet of repression, not of pas-
sivity. We have seen how, with the opening years of
NATIONALISM 209
the twentieth century, virtually all educated Egyptians
had become more or less impregnated with nationahst
ideas, albeit a large proportion of them believed in evo-
lutionary rather than revolutionary methods. The chief
hope of the moderates had been the pro\'isional char-
acter of EngHsh rule. So long as England declared
herself merely m "temporary occupation" of Egypt,
anything was possible. But the proclamation of the
protectorate in 1914, which declared Egypt part of the
British Empire, entirely changed the situation. Even
the most moderate nationahsts felt that the future was
definitely prejudged against them and that the door had
been irrevocably closed upon their ultimate aspirations.
The result was thai the moderates were driven over to
the extremists and were ready to join the latter in vio-
lent action as soon as opportimity might offer.
The extreme nationahsts had of course protested
bitterly against the protectorate from the first, and the
close of the war saw a delegation composed of both na-
tionahst wings proceed to Jr^aris to lay their claims be-
fore the VerRailles confei'ence. Rebuffed by the confer-
ence, which recognized the British protectorate over
Egypt as part of the peace settlement, the Egj-ptian
delegation issued a formal protest warning of trouble.
This protest read:
"We have knocked at door after door, but have re-
ceived no answer. In spite of the definite pledges given
by the statesmen at the head of the nations which won
the war, to the effect that their victory would mean the
triumph of Right over Might and the estabhshment of
the principle of self-determination for small nations, the
British protectorate over Egypt was written into the
210 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
treaties of Versailles and Saiiit Germain without the peo-
ple of Eg^^Dt being consulted as to their political status.
"Tliis crime against our nation, a breach of good
faith on the jDart of the Powers who have declared that
the)' are forming in the same Treaty a Society of Na-
tions, will not be consummated without a solemn warn-
ing that the people of Egj'pt consider the decision taken
at Paris null and void. ... If our voice is not heard,
it will be only because the blood already shed has not
been enough to overthrow the old world-order and give
birth to a new world-order."^
Before these lines had appeared m type, trouble in
Eg}'pt had begun. Simultaneously with the arrival of the
Egyptian delegation at Paris, the nation ahsts in Egypt
laid their demands before the British authorities. The
nationalist programme demanded complete self-govern-
ment for Eg}'pt, leaving Englaiid only a right of super-
^dsion ever the public debt and the Suez Canal. The
nationalists' strength was shoun by the fact that these
proposals were indorsed by the Eg}^3tian cabinet re-
cently appointed by the Khedive at British suggestion.
In fact, the Egyptian Premier, Roushdi Pasha, asked
to be allowed to go to London with some of his col-
leagues for a hearing. This placed the British authori-
ties in Eg}^t in a distinctly trying position. 'However,
they determined to stand firm, and accordingly an-
swered that England could not abandon its responsi-
bihty for the continuance of order and good govern-
ment in Egypt, now a British protectorate and an inte-
gral part of the empire, and that no useful purpose
1 Egyptian White Book : Collection of Official Correspondence of the
Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference (Paris, 1919).
NATIONALISM 211
would be served by allowing the Egyptian leaders to
go to London and there advance unmoderate demands
which could not possibly be entertained.
The Enghsh attitude was firm. The Egyptian atti-
tude was no less firm. The cabinet at once resigned,
no new cabinet could be formed, and the British High
Commissioner, General Allenby, was forced to assume
unveiled control. Meanwhile the nationalists announced
that they were going to hold a plebiscite to determine
the attitude of the Egj^ptian people. Forbidden by
the British authorities, the plebiscite was nevertheless
illegally held, and resulted, according to the nationahsts,
in an overwhelming popular indorsement of their de-
mands. This defiant attitude determined the British
on strong action. Accordingly, in the spring of 1919,
most of the nationahst leaders were seized and deported
to Malta.
Egj^pt's answer was an explosion. From one end of
the country to the other, Eg\']jt flamed into rel^ellion.
Eveiywhere it was the same stoiy. Railways and tele-
graph lines were systematically cut. Trains were stalled
and looted. Isolated British officers and soldiers were
murdered. In Cairo alone, thousands of houses were
sacked by the mob. Soon the danger was rendered
more acute by the irruption out of the desert of swarms
of Bedouin Arabs bent on plunder. For a few days
Egypt trembled on the verge of anarchy, and the British
Government admitted in Parliament that all Egypt
was in a state of insurrection.
The British authorities met the crisis with vigor and
determination. The number of British troops in Egypt
was large, trusty black regiments were hurried up from
212 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
the Sudan; and the well-discipHned Egj^tian native
poHce generally obeyed orders. After several weeks of
sharp fighting and heavy loss of life, Egypt was again
gotten under control.
Order was restored, but the outlook was ominous in
the extreme. Only the presence of massed British and
Sudanese troops enabled order to be maintained. Even
the application of stem martial law could not prevent
continuous nationahst demonstrations, sometimes end-
ing in riots, fighting, and heavy loss of life. The most
serious aspect of the situation was that not only were
the upper classes soHdly nationahst, but they had be-
hind them the hitherto passive fellah millions. The
war-years had borne hard on the fellaheen. Military
exigencies had compelled Britain to conscript fully a
million of them for forced labor in the Near East and
even in Europe, while there had also been wholesale
requisitions of grain, fodder, and other supphes. These
things had caused profound discontent and had roused
among the fellaheen not merely passive dislike but
active hatred of British rule. Authoritative EngHsh
experts on Egypt were seriously alarmed. Shortly after
the riots Sir WilHam Willcocks, the noted engineer,
said in a public statement: "The keystone of the British
occupation of Egypt was the fact that the fellaheen
were for it. The Sheikhs, Omdehs, governing classes,
and liigh reHgious heads might or might not be hostile,
but nothing counted for much while the milHons of
fellaheen were soHd for the occupation. The British
have undoubtedly to-day lost the friendship and confi-
dence of the fellaheen." And Sir Valentine Chirol
stated in the London Times: "We are now admittedly
NATIONALISM 213
face to face with the ominous fact that for the first time
since the British occupation large numbers of the Egyp-
tian fellaheen, who owe far more i'j us than does any
other class of Egyptians, have been worked up into a
fever of bitter discontent and hatred. Very few people
at home, even in responsible quarters, have, I think,
the slightest conception of the very dangerous degree
of tension which has now been reached out here."
All foreign observers were impressed by the national-
ist feehiig winch imited all creeds and classes. Re-
garding the monster demonstrations held duiing the
summer of 1919, an Itahan pubHcist wrote: "For the
first time in history, the banners flown showed the Cres-
cent interwoven with the Cross. Until a short time ago
the two elements were as distinct from each other as
each of them was from the Jews. To-day, precisely as
has happened in India among the Mussulmans and
the Hindus, every trace of reHgious division has de-
parted. All Egyptians are enrolled under a single ban-
ner. Every one behind his mask of silence is burning
with the same faith, and confident that his cause mil
ultimately triumph." ^ And a Frenchwoman, a lifelong
resident of Egypt, wrote: "We have seen surprising
things in this country, so often divided by party and
religious struggles: Coptic priests preaching in mosques;
ulemas preaching in Christian chm^ches; Syrian, Mar-
onite, or Mohammedan students; women, whether of
Turkish or Egyptian blood, miited in the same fervor,
the same ardent desire to see break over their ancient
land the radiant dawn of independence. For those who,
Hke myself, have known the Egypt of Tewfik, the atti-
1 G. Civimini, in the Corriere della Sera, December 30, 1919.
214 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
tude of the women these last few years is the most sur-
prising transformation that has happened in the val-
ley of the Nile. One should have seen the nonchalant
life, the almost complete indifference to an}i;hing savor-
ing of poHticS; to appreciate the enormous steps taken
in the last few months. For example; last summer a
procession of women demonstrators was surromided
by British soldiers with fixed bayonets. One of the
women, threatened by a soldier, turned on him, baring
her breast, and cried: 'Kill me, then, so that there may
be another Miss Cavell.'"^
Faced by this unprecedented nationaHst fervor,
EngHshmen on the spot were of two opinions. Some,
hke Sir Wilham WiUcocks and Sir Valentine Chirol,
stated that extensive concessions must be made.^ Other
qualified observers asserted that concessions would be
weakness and would spell disaster. Said Sir M. Mc-
II wraith: "Five years of a Nationahst regime would
lead to hopeless chaos and disorder. ... If Egypt
is not to fall back into the morass of bankruptcy and
anarchy from w^hich we rescued her in 1882, with the
still greater horrors of Bolshevism, of which there are
already sinister indications, superadded, Britain must
not loosen her control." ^ In England the Egj^tian
situation caused grave disquietude, and in the summer
^ Madame Jehan d'lvray, "En figypte," Revue de Paris, September 15,
1920. Madame d'lvray cites other picturesque incidents of a like charac-
ter. See also Annexes to Egyptian White Book, previously quoted.
These Annexes contain numerous depositions, often accompanied by pho-
tographs, alleging severities and atrocities by the British troops.
2 Contained in the press statements previously mentioned.
3 Sir M. Mcllwraith, "Egyptian Nationahsm," Edinburgh Review,
July, 1919. See also Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, "The Future in Egypt,"
New Europe, November 6, 1919.
NATIONALISM 215
of 1919 the British Government announced the ap-
pointment of a commission of inquiry headed by Lord
Milner to investigate fully into Egyptian affairs.
The appointment was a wise one. Lord Milner was
one of the ablest figures in British pohtical life, a man
of long experience with imperial problems, including
that of Egypt; and possessed of a temperament equally
remote from the doctiinaire Hberal or the hideboimd
conservative. In short. Lord Milner was a realist, in
the true sense of the word, as his action soon proved.
Arriving in Egypt at the begiiming of 1920, Lord Mil-
ner and his colleagues found themselves confronted
with a most difficult situation. In Egypt the word had
gone forth to boycott the commission, and not merely
nationahst poHticians but also reHgious leaders like the
Grand Mufti refused even to discuss matters miless the
commissioners would first agree to Egyptian indepen-
dence. This looked Hke a deadlock. Nevertheless, by
infinite tact and patience. Lord Milner finally got into
free and frank discussion with Zagloul Pasha and the
other responsible nationahst leaders.
His efforts were undoubtedly helped by certain de-
velopments within Eg}^t itseK. In Egypt, as else-
where in the East, there were appearir^r symptoms not
merely of pohtical but also of social unrest. New types
of agitators were springing up, preaching to the popu-
lace the most extreme revolutionary doctrines. These
youthful agitators disquieted the regular nationahst
leaders, who felt themselves threatened both as party
chiefs and as men of social standing and property. The
upshot was that, by the autumn of 1920, Lord Milner
and Zagloul Pasha had agreed upon the basis of what
216 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
looked like a genuine compromise. According to the
intimations then given out to the press, and later con-
firmed by the nature of Lord Mihier's official report,
the lines of the tentative agreement ran as follows:
England was to withdraw her protectorate and was to
declare ^gypt independent. This independence was
qualified to about the same extent that Cuba's is to-
ward the United States. Egypt was to have complete
self-government, both the British garrison and British
civilian officials bemg withdrawn. Egypt was, how-
ever, to make a perpetual treaty of aUiance with Great
Britain, was to agree not to make treaties with other
powers save with Britain's consent, and was to grant
Britain a military and naval station for the protection
of the Suez Canal and of Egypt itself in case of sudden
attack by foreign enemies. The vexed question of the
Sudan was left temporarily open.
These proposals bore the earaiarks of genuinely con-
structive compromise. Unfortunately, they were not
at once acted upon.* Both in England and in Egypt
they roused strong opposition. In England adverse
official influences held up the commission's report till
February, 1921. In Egypt the extreme nationahsts de-
nounced Zagloul Pasha as a traitor, though moderate
opinion seemed substantially satisfied. The commis-
sion's report, as finally published, declared that the
grant of self-government to Egypt could not be safely
postponed; that the nationaHst spirit could not be ex-
tinguished; that an attempt to govern Egypt in the
teeth of a hostile people would be ''a difficult and dis-
1 For unfortunate aspects of this delay, see Sir Valentine Chirol, "Con-
flicting Policies in the East," New Europe, July 1, 1920.
NATIONALISM 217
graceful task"; and that it would be a great misfortune
if the present opportunity for a settlement were lost.
However, the report was not indorsed by the British
Government in its entirety; and Lord Milner forthwith
resigned. As for Zagloul Pasha, he stiU maintains his
position as nationahst leader, but his authority has
been gravely shaken. Such is the situation of Egypt
at this present writing: a situation frankly not so en-
couraging as it was last year.
Meanwhile the storm which had begim in Egypt had
long since spread to other parts of the Near East. In
fact, by the opening months of 1920, the storm-centre
had shifted to the Ottoman Empire. For this the Al-
Hes themselves were largely to blame. Of course a
constructive settlement of these troubled regions would
have been very difficult. Still, it might not have proved
impossible if AUied poHcy had been fair and above-
board. The close of the war foimd the various peoples
of the Ottoman Empire hopeful that the liberal war-
aims professed by the AQied spokesmen would be re-
deemed. The Arab elements were notably hopeful, be-
cause they had been given a whole series of AUied prom-
ises (shortly to be repudiated, as we shall presently see),
while even the beaten Turks were not entirely bereft
of hope in the future. Besides the general pronounce-
ments of liberal treatment as formulated in the "Four-
teen Points" prograrome of President Wilson and indorsed
by the AlHes, the Turks had pledges of a more specific
character, notably by Premier Lloyd George, who, on
January 5, 1918, had said: "Nor are we fighting to de-
prive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned
lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predomi-
218 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
nantly Turkish in race." In other wordS; the Turks
were given unequivocally to understand that, while
their rule over non-Tui'kish regions like the Arab prov-
inces must cease, the Turkish regions of the empire
were not to pass under ahen rule, but were to form a
Turkish national state. The Turks did not know
about a series of secret treaties between the Allies, be-
gun in 1915, which partitioned practically the whole
of Asia Minor between the AUied Powers. These were
to come out a little later. For the moment the Turks
might hope.
In the case of the Arabs there were far brighter
grounds for nationalist hopes — and far darker depths
of Alhed duplicity. We have already mentioned the
Ai'ab revolt of 1916, which, beginning in the Hedjaz
under the leadership of the Shereef of Mecca, presently
spread through all the Arab provinces of the Ottoman
Empire and contributed so largely to the collapse of
Turkish resistance. This revolt was, however, not a
sudden, unpremeditated thing. It had been carefully
planned, and was due largely to Allied backing — and
Allied promises. From the very beginning of the war
Arab nationalist malcontents had been in touch with
the British authorities in Egypt. They were warmly
welcomed and encouraged in their separatist schemes,
because an Arab rebelHon would obviously' be of inval-
uable assistance to the British in safeguarding Egypt
and the Suez Canal, to say nothing of an advance into
Turkish territory.
The Ai'abs, however, asked not merely material aid
but also definite promises that their rebellion should
be rewarded bv the formation of an Arab state embrac-
NATIONALISM 219
ing the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Un-
fortunately for Arab nationalist aspirations, the British
and French Governments had their own ideas as to the
future of Turkey's Arab provinces. Both England
and France had long possessed "spheres of influence"
in those regions. The English sphere was in southern
Mesopotamia at the head of the Persian Gulf. The
French sphere was the Lebanon, a mountainous district
in northern Syria just inland from the Mediterranean
coast, where the population, known as Maronites, were
Roman Catholics, over whom France had long extended
her diplomatic protection. Of course both these dis-
tricts were legally Turkish territory. Also, both were
small in area. But "spheres of influence" are elastic
things. Under favorable circumstances they are capa-
ble of sudden expansion to an extraordinary degree.
Such a cu'cumstance was the Great War. Accordingly,
the British and French foreign oflfices put their heads
together and on March 5, 1915, the two governments
signed a secret treaty by the terms of which France
was given a "predominant position" in Syria and Brit-
ain a predominant position in Mesopotamia. No defi-
nite boundaries were then assigned, but the intent was
to stake out claims which would partition Turkey's
Arab provinces between England and France.
Naturally the existence of this secret treaty was an
embarrassment to the British officials in Egypt in their
negotiations with the Arabs. However, an Arab re-
bellion was too valuable an asset to be lost, and the Brit-
ish negotiators finally evolved a formula which satisfied
the Arab leaders. On October 25, 1915, the Shereef of
Mecca's representative at Cairo was given a clocmnent
220 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
by the Governor-General of Egypt; Sir Henry Mc-
Mahon, in which Great Britain undertook, conditional
upon an Arab revolt, to recognize the independence of
the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire except in southern
Mesopotamia, where British interests required special
measures of administrative control, and also except
areas where Great Britain was "not free to act without
detriment to the interests of France." This last clause
was of course a "joker." However, it achieved its
purpose. The Arabs, knowing nothing about the secret
treaty, supposed it referred merely to the restricted
district of the Lebanon. They went home jubilant,
to prepare the revolt wliich broke out next year.
The revolt began in November, 1916. It might not
have begun at all had the Arabs known what had hap-
pened the preceding May. In that month England and
France signed another secret treaty, the celebrated
Sykes-Picot Agreement. This agreement definitely par-
titioned Turkey's Arab provinces along the lines sug-
gested in the initial secret treaty of the year before.
By the Sykes-Picot Agreement most of Mesopotamia
was to be definitely British, wliile the Syrian coast from
Tyre to Alexandretta was to be definitely French, to-
gether with extensive Armenian and Asia Minor regions
to the northward. Palestine was to be "international,"
albeit its chief seaport, Haifa, was to be British, and
the impHcation was that Palestine fell within the Enghsh
sphere. As to the great hinterland lying between Meso-
potamia and the Syrian coast, it was to be "indepen-
dent Arab under two spheres of influence," British and
French; the French sphere embracing all the rest of
Syria from Aleppo to Damascus, the English sphere
NATIONALISM 221
embracing all the rest of Mesopotamia — the region about
Mosul. In other words, the independence promised
the Arabs by Sir Henry McMahon had vanished into
thin air.
This Httle shift behind the scenes was of course not
communicated to the Arabs. On the contrary, the
British did eveiything possible to stimulate Arab na-
tionaHst hopes — this bemg the best way to extract their
fighting zeal against the Turks. The British Govern-
ment sent the Arabs a number of picked intelligence
officers, notably a certain Colonel Lawrence, an extraor-
dinary 3^oung man who soon gained unbounded in-
fluence over the Arab chiefs and became known as "The
Soul of the Arabian Revolution." ^ These men, chosen
for their knowledge of, and sympathy for, the Arabs,
were not informed about the secret treaties, so that
their encouragement of Arab zeal might not be marred
by any lack of sincerity. Similarly, the British generals
were prodigal of promises in their proclamations.^ The
climax of this blessed comedy occurred at the very close
of the war, when the British and French Governments
issued the following joint declaration which was posted
throughout the Arab provinces: "The aim which France
and Great Britain have in view in waging in the East
the war let loose upon the world by German ambition,
is to insure the complete and final emancipation of all
those peoples, so long oppressed by Turks, and to es-
tabhsh national governments and administrations which
^ For a good account of Lawrence and his work, see series of articles
by L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution," Asia,
April, May, June, July, 1920.
^ A notable example is General Maude's proclamation to the Meso-
potamian Arabs in March, 1917.
222 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
shall derive their authority from the initiative and free
will of the people themselves."
This climax was, however, followed by a swift de-
nouement. The war was over, the enemy was beaten,
the comedy was ended, the curtain was rung down,
and on that curtain the Arabs read — the inner truth of
things. French troops appeared to occupy the Syrian
coast, the secret treaties came out, and the Arabs learned
how they had been tricked. Black and bitter was their
wrath. Probably they would have exploded at once
had it not been for their cool-headed chiefs, especially
Prince Feisal, the son of the Shereef of Mecca, who
had proved himself a real leader of men during the war
and who had now attained a position of unquestioned
authority. Feisal knew the Allies' military strength
and realized how hazardous war would be, especially
at that time. Feeling the moral strength of the Arab
position, he besought his countrymen to let him plead
Arabia's cause before the impending peace conference,
and he had his way. During the year 1919 the Arab
lands were quiet, though it was the quiet of suspense.
Prince Feisal pleaded his case before the peace con-
ference with eloquence and dignity. But Feisal failed.
The covenant of the League of Nations might contain
the benevolent statement that "certain communities
formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached
a stage of development where their existence as inde-
pendent nations can be provisionally recognized subject
to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance
by a mandatory until such time as they are able to
stand alone." ^ The Arabs knew what "mandatories"
1 Article xxii.
NATIONALISM 223
meant. Lloyd George might utter felicitous phrases
such as "Ai-ab forces have redeemed the pledges given
to Great Britain, and we should redeem our pledges." ^
The Ai'abs had read the secret treaties. "In vain is
the net spread in the sight of any bird." The game no
longer worked. The Arabs knew that they must rely
on their own efforts, either in diplomacy or war.
Feisal still counselled peace. He was probably in-
fluenced to tliis not merely by the risks of armed resis-
tance but also by the fact that the AUies were now quar-
relling among themselves. These quarrels of course
extended all over the Near East, but there was none
more bitter than the quarrel which had broken out
between England and France over the division of the
Ai-ab spoils. This dispute originated in French dissat-
isfaction with the secret treaties. No sooner had the
Sykes-Picot Agreement been published than large and
influential sections of French opinion began shouting
that they had been duped. For generations French
imperiahsts had had their eye on Syria,^ and since the
beginning of the war the imperialist press had been con-
ducting an ardent propaganda for wholesale annexa-
tions in the Near East. "La Syne integrale!" "All
Syria!" was the cry. And this "all" included not
merely the coast-strip assigned France by the Sykes-
^ From a speech delivered September 19, 1919.
^ For examples of this pre-war imperiaUst propaganda, see G. Poignant,
"Les Int^r^ts frangais en Syrie," Questions diplomatiques el coloniales,
March 1-16, 1913. Among other interesting facts, the author cites
Premier Poincare's declaration before the Chamber of Deputies, December
21, 1912: "I. need not remark that in the Lebanon and Syria particu-
larly we have traditional interests and that we intend to make them re-
spected." See also J. Atalla, "Les Trois Solutions de la Question ey-
rienne," Qitestions diplomatiques et coloniales, October 16, 1913; L. Le Fur,
Le Protedorat de la France sur les Catholiques d' Orient (Paris, 1914).
224 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Picot Agreement, but also Palestine and the vast Aleppo-
Damascus hinterland right across to the rich oil-fields
of Mosul. To this entire region, often termed in French
expansionist circles "La France du Levant," the impe-
riahsts asserted that France had "imprescriptible his-
toric rights runnmg back to the Crusades and even to
Charlemagne." Syria was a "second Alsace," which
held out its arms to France and would not be denied.
It was also the indispensable fulcrum of French world-
poHcy. These imperiahst aspirations had powerful
backing in French Government circles. For example,
early in 1915, M. Leygues had said in the Chamber of
Deputies: "The axis of French pohcy is in the Medi-
terranean. One of its poles is in the West, at Algiers,
Tunis, and Morocco. The other must lie in the East,
with Syria, Lebanon, Palestine." ^
After such high hopes, the effect of the Sykes-Picot
Agreement on French imperiahsts can be imagined.
Their anger turned naturally upon the EngKsh, who
were romidly denounced and blamed for everything
that was happening in the East, Arab nationahst aspi-
rations being stigmatized as nothing but British propa-
ganda. Cried one French writer: "Some psychiatrist
ought to write a study of these British colonial officials,
implacable imperiahsts, megalomaniacs, who, night and
day, work for their country without even asking counsel
from London, and whose constant care is to annihilate
1 Quoted by Senator E. Flandrin in his article "Nos Droits en Syrie
et en Palestine," Revue Hehdomadaire, June 5, 1915. For other examples
of French imperialist propaganda, see, besides above article, C. G. Bassim,
La Question du Ldban (Paris, 1915); H. Baudouin, "La Syrie: Champ de
Bataille poUtique," La Revue Mondiale, February 1-15, 1920; Comte
Cressaty, La Syrie frangaise (Paris, 1916); F. Laudet, "La France du
Levant," Revue Hehdomadaire, March 1, 1919.
NATIONALISM 225
in Syria, as they once annihilated in Egypt, the su-
premacy of France." ^ In answer to such fulminations,
Enghsh writers scored French "greed" and "folly"
which was compromising England's prestige and threat-
ening to set the whole East on fire.^ In fine, there was
a very pretty row on between people who, less than a
year before, had been pledging their "sacred union"
for all eternity. The Arabs were certainly much edi-
fied, and the other Eastern peoples as well.
Largely owing to these bickerings, AUied action in
the Near East was delayed through 1919. But by the
spring of 1920 the Allies came to a measure of agree-
ment. The meeting of the AUied Premiers at San
Remo elaborated the terms of the treaty to be imposed
on Turkey, dividing Asia Minor into spheres of influ-
ence and exploitation, while the Arab provinces were
assigned England and France according to the terms of
the Sykes-Picot Agreement — ^properly camouflaged, of
course, as "mandates" of the League of Nations. Eng-
land, France, and their satellite, Greece, prepared for
action. British reinforcements were sent to Mesopo-
tamia and Palestine; French reinforcements were sent
to Syria; an Anglo-Franco-Greek force prepared to oc-
cupy Constantinople, and Premier Venizelos promised
a Greek army for Asia Minor contingencies. The one
rift in the lute was Italy. Italy saw big trouble brew-
^ Baudouin, supra. For other violent anti-Briti^ comment, see Lau-
det, supra.
2 For sharp British criticisms of the French attitude in Syria, see Beckles
Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure," National Review, September,
1920; W. Urinowski, "The Arab Cause," Balkan Review, September, 1920.
Both of these writers were officers in the British forces in the Arab area.
See also strong articles by "Taira" in the Balkan Review, August and
October, 1920.
226 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
ing and determined not to be directly involved. Said
Premier Nitti to an English journalist after the San
Remo conference: "You will have war in Asia Minor,
and Italy will not send a single soldier nor pay a single
Hra. You have taken from the Turks their sacred city
of Adrianople; you have placed their capital city under
foreign control; you have taken from them every port
and the larger part of their territory; and the five Turk-
ish delegates whom you will select will sign a treaty
which will not have the sanction of the Turkish people
or the Turkish Parliament."
Premier Nitti was a true prophet. For months past
the Turkish nationalists, knowing what was in store
for them, had been building up a centre of resistance
in the interior of Asia Minor. Of course the former
nationalist leaders such as Enver Pasha had long since
fled to distant havens Hke Transcaucasia or Bolshevik
Russia, but new leaders appeared, notably a young
ofiicer of marked military talent, Mustapha Kemal
Pasha. With great energy Mustapha Kemal built up
a really creditable army, and from liis "capital," the
city of Angora in the heart of Asia Minor, he now defied
the AlHes, emphasizing his defiance by attacking the
French garrisons in Cilicia (a coast district in Asia
Minor just north of Syria), inflicting heavy losses.
The Arabs also were preparing for action. In March
a "Pan-Syrian Congress" met at Damascus, unani-
mously declared the independence of Syria, and elected
Feisal king. This announcement electrified all the
Arab provinces. In the French-occupied coastal zone
riots broke out against the French; in Palestine there
were "pogroms" against the Jews, whom the Arabs,
NATIONALISM 227
both Moslem and Christian, hated for their "Zionist"
plans; while in Mesopotamia there were sporadic up-
risings of tribesmen.
Faced by this ominous situation, the "mandatories"
took mihtary counter-measures. The French took espe-
cially vigorous action. France now had nearly 100,000
men in Syria and Cilicia, headed by General Gouraud, a
veteran of many colonial wars and a believer in "strong-
arm" methods. On July 15 Gouraud sent Feisal an
ultimatum requiring complete submission. Feisal, dip-
lomatic to the last, actually accepted the ultimatum,
but Gouraud ignored this acceptance on a technicality
and struck for Damascus with 60,000 men. Feisal at-
tempted no real resistance, fighting only a rear-guard
action and withdrawing into the desert. On July 25
the French entered Damascus, the Arab capital, deposed
Feisal, and set up thoroughgoing French rule. Oppo-
sition was punished with the greatest severity. Da-
mascus was mulcted of a war-contribution of 10,000,000
francs, after the German fashion in Belgium, many
nationahst leaders were imprisoned or shot, while Gou-
raud announced that the death of "one French subject
or one Christian" would be followed by wholesale "most
terrible reprisals" by bombing aeroplanes.^
Before this Napoleonic "thunder-stroke" Syria bent
for the moment, apparently terrorized. In Mesopo-
tamia, however, the British were not so fortunate. For
some months trouble had patently been brewing, and
in March the British commander had expressed him-
self as "much struck with the volcanic possibihties of
the country." In July all Mesopotamia flamed into
^ For accounts of French severities, see articles just quoted.
228 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
insurrection, and though Britain had fully 100,000
troops in the province, they were hard put to it to stem
the rebellion.
Meanwhile, the Allies had occupied Constantinople,
to force acceptance of the draft treaty of peace. Nat-
urally, there was no resistance, Constantinople being
entirely at the mercy of the Allied fleet. But the si-
lence of the vast throngs gathered to watch the incom-
ing troops filled some AUied observers with disquietude.
A French journaHst wrote: "The silence of the multi-
tude was more impressive than boisterous protests.
Their eyes glowed with sullen hatred. Scattered through
this throng of mute, prostrated, hopeless people circu-
lated watchful and sinuous emissaries, who were to
carry word of this misfortune to the remotest confines
of Islam. In a few hours they would be in Anatolia.
A couple of days later the news would have spread to
Konia, Angora, and Sivas. In a brief space of time it
would be heralded throughout the regions of Bolshevist
influence, extending to the Caucasus and beyond. In
a few weeks aU these centres of agitation will be prepar-
ing their counter-attack. Asia and Africa will again
cement their union of faith. Intelligent agents will
record in the retentive minds of people who do not
read, the history of our blunders. These missionaries
of insurrection and fanaticism come from every race
and class of society. Educated and refined men dis-
guise themselves as beggars and outcasts, in order to
spread the news apace and to prepare for bitter ven-
geance." ^
Events in Turkey now proceeded precisely as the
1 B. G. Gaulis in U Opinion, April 24, 1920.
NATIONALISM 229
Italian Premier Nitti had foretold. The Allied masters
of Constantinople compelled the Sultan to appoint a
"friendly" cabinet which solemnly denomiced Mustapha
Kemal and his "rebels," and sent a hand-picked delega-
tion to Sevres, France, where they dutifully "signed on
the dotted Kne" the treaty that the Allies had pre-
pared. The Allies had thus "imposed their v^dll" — on
paper. For e\'er}^ sensible man knew that the whole
business was a roaring farce; knew that the "friendly"
government, from Sultan to meanest clerk, was as na-
tionalist as Mustapha Kemal himself; knew that the
real Turkish capital was not Constantinople but Angora,
and that the Allies' power was measured by the range
of their guns. As for Mustapha Kemal, his comment
on the Sevres Treaty was: "I will fight to the end of
the world."
The AlHes were thus in a decidedly embarrassing
situation, especially since "The Allies" now meant only
England and France. Italy was out of the game. As
Nitti had warned at San Remo, she would "not send a
single soldier nor pay a single lira." With 200,000
soldiers holding down the Arabs, and plenty of trouble
elsewhere, neither France nor Biitain had the troops to
crush Mustapha Kemal — a job which the French staff
estimated would take 300,000 men. One weapon, how-
ever, they still possessed — Greece. In return for large
territorial concessions. Premier Venizelos offered to bring
the Turks to reason. His offer was accepted, and 100,-
000 Greek troops landed at Smyrna. But the Greek
campaign was not a success. Even 100,000 men soon
wore thin when spread out over the vast Asia Minor
plateau. Mustapha Kemal avoided decisive battle,
230 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
harassing the Greeks by guerilla warfare just as he was
harassing the French in Cihcia at the other end of the
line. The Greeks "dug in/' and a deadlock ensued
which threatened to continue indefinitely. This soon
caused a new complication. Venizelos might be willing
to "carr}^ on" as the Allies' submandatory, but the
Greek people were not. Kept \artually on a war-footing
since 1912, the Greeks kicked over the traces. In the
November elections they repudiated Venizelos by a vote
of 990,000 to 10,000, and recalled King Constantine, who
had been deposed by the AUies three years before. This
meant that Greece, like Italy, was out of the game. To
be sure. King Constantine presently started hostilities
with the Turks on his own account. This was, however,
something very different from Greece's attitude under
the VenizeHst regime. The Allies' weapon had thus
broken in their hands.
Meanwhile Mustapha Kemal was not merely consoli-
dating his authority in Asia Minor but was gaining
aUies of his own. Li the first place, he was estabUsh-
ing close relations with the Arabs. It may appear
strange to find such bitter foes become friends; never-
theless, Franco-British poHcy had achieved even this
seeming miracle. The reason was clearly explained by no
less a person than Lawrence ("The Soul of the Arab
Revolution") who had returned to civil life and was
thus free to speak his mind on the Eastern situation,
which he did in no uncertain fashion. In one of sev-
eral statements given to the British press, Lawrence
said: "The Arabs rebelled against the Turks during the
war, not because the Turkish Government was notably
bad, but because they wanted- independence. They
NATIONALISM 231
did not risk their lives in battle to change masters, to
become British subjects or French citizens, but to win a
State of their own." The matter was put even more
pointedly by an Arab nationalist leader in the columns
of a French radical paper opposed to the Syrian adven-
ture. Said this leader: "Both the French and the Eng-
Hsh should know once for all that the Arabs are joined
by a common rehgion with the Turks, and have been
poKticaUy identified with them for centuries, and there-
fore do not wish to separate themselves from their fel-
low believers and brothers-in-arms merely to submit to
the domination of a Eiu-opean nation, no matter what
form the latter's suzerainty may assume. ... It is no
use for M. Millerand to say: 'We have never thought
of trespassing in any respect upon the independence
of these people.' No one is deceived by such state-
ments as that. The armistice was signed in accordance
with the conditions proclaimed by Mr. Wilson, but as
soon as Germany and its alHes were helpless, the prom-
ises of the armistice were trodden under foot, as well
as the Fourteen Points. Such a violation of the prom-
ises of complete independence, so prodigally made to
the Aiahs on so many occasions, has resulted in reunit-
ing closer than ever the Arabs and the Turks. It has
taken but a few months to restore that intimacy. . . .
It is probable that France, by maintaining an army of
150,000 men in Syria, and by spending billions of francs,
will be able to subdue the Syrian Arabs. But that will
not finish the task. The interior of that country borders
upon other lands inhabited by Arabs, Kurds, and Turks,
and by the immense desert. In starting a conflict with
4,000,000 Syrians, France will be making enemies of
232 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
15,000,000 Arabs in the Levant, most of whom are
armed tribes, without including the other Mohammedan
peoples, who are speedily acquiring soHdarity and or-
ganization under the blows that are being dealt them
by the Entente. If you beheve I am exaggerating, all
you have to do is to investigate the facts yourself. But
what good will it do to confirm the truth too late, and
after floods of blood have flowed ? " ^
In fact, signs of Turco-Arab co-operation became
everywhere apparent. To be sure, tliis co-operation
was not openly avowed either by Mustapha Kemal or
by the deposed King Feisal who, fleeing to Italy, con-
tinued his diplomatic manoeuvres. But Arabs fought
beside Turks against the French in CiHcia; Turks and
Kurds joined the Syrian Arabs in their continual local
risings; while Kemal's hand was clearly apparent in
the rebelHon against the British in Mesopotamia.
This Arab entente was not the whole of IMustapha
Kemal's foreign poHc)^ He was also reaching out
northeastward to the Tartars of Transcauca&ia and the
Turkomans of Persian Azerbaidjan. The Caucasus was
by tliis time the scene of a highly compHcated struggle
between Moslem Tartars and Turkomans, Christian
Armenians and Georgians, and various Russian fac-
tions, which was fast reducing that unhappy region to
chaos. Among the Tartar-Turkomans, long leavened
by Pan-Turanian propaganda, Mustapha Kemal found
enthusiastic adherents; and his efforts were supported
by a third ally — Bolshevik Russia. Bolsho^^k policy,
Vv'hich, as we have already stated, was seeking to stir
up trouble against the Western Powers throughout the
* Le Populaire, February 16, 1920.
NATIONALISM 233
East, had watched KemaFs rise with great satisfaction.
At first the Bolshe\dki could do very Httle for the Turk-
ish nationahsts because they were not in direct touch,
but the collapse of Wrangel's "White" army in Novem-
ber, 1920, and the consequent overrunning of all south
Russia by the Red armies, opened a direct Hne from
Moscow to Angora via the Caucasus, and henceforth
Mustapha Kemal was suppHed \vath money, arms, and a
few men.
Furthermore, Kemal and the Bolsheviki were start-
ing trouble in Persia. That country was in a most de-
plorable condition. During the war Persia, despite her
technical neutrahty, had been a battle-groimd between
the Anglo-Russians on the one hand and the Turco-
Germans on the other. Russia's collapse in 1917 had
led to her military withdrawal from Persia, and Eng-
land, profiting by the situation, had made herseK su-
preme, legalizing her position by the famous "Agree-
ment" "negotiated" with the Shah's government in
August, 1919.^ This treaty, though signed and sealed
in due form, was bitterly resented by the Persian peo-
ple. Here was obviously another ripe field for Bolshe-
vik propaganda. Accordingly, the Bolshevik govern-
ment renoimced all rights in Persia acquired by the
Czarist regime and proclaimed themselves the friends
of the Persian people against Western imperiahsm.
Naturally, the game worked, and Persia soon became
honeycombed wdth militant unrest. In the early sum-
mer of 1920 a Bolshevist force actually crossed the
Caspian Sea and landed on the Persian shore. They
1 For the details of these events, see my article on Persia in The Cen-
tury, January, 1920.
234 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
did not penetrate far into the countiy. They did not
need tO; for the country simply effervesced in a way
which made the British position increasingly untenable.
For many months a confused situation ensued. In
fact, at this writing the situation is still obscure. But
there can be no doubt that Britain's hold on Persia is
gravely shaken, and she m_ay soon be compelled to
evacuate the country, with the possible exception of
the extreme south.
Turning back to the autumn of 1920: the position of
England and France in the Near East had become far
from bright. Deserted by Italy and Greece, defied by
the Turks, harried by the Arabs, worried by the Eg}qv
tians and Persians, and everj'w^here menaced by the
subtle workings of Bolshe\dsm, the situation was not a
happy one. The burden of empire was proving heavy.
In Mesopotamia alone the biU was already 100,000,000
sterling, with no rehef in sight.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that
in both England and France Near Eastern policies
were subjected to a growing flood of criticism. In Eng-
land especially the tide ran veiy strong. The Meso-
potamian imbrogho was denounced as both a crime and
a blunder. For example. Colonel LawTence stated:
"We are to-day not far from disaster. Our govern-
ment is worse than the old Turkish system. They
kept 14,000 local conscripts in the ranks and killed
yearly an average of 200 Arabs in niaintaining peace.
We keep 90,000 men, with aeroplanes, armored cars,
gunboats, and armored trains. We have killed about
10,000 Arabs in the rising this summer." ^ Influenced
* Statement given to the press in August, 1920.
NATIONALISM 235
by such criticisms and by the general trend of events,
the British Government modified its attitude, sending
out Sir Percy Cox to negotiate with the Arabs. Sir
Percy Cox was a man of the Mihier type, with a firm
grip on realities and an intimate experience with Eastern
affairs. Authorized to discuss large concessions, he met
the nationaHst leaders frankly and made a good impres-
sion upon them. At this writing matters have not
been definitely settled, but it looks as though England
was planning to limit her direct control to the extreme
south of Mesopotamia at the head of the Persian Gulf —
practically her old sphere of influence before 1914.
Meanwhile, in Syria, France has thus far succeeded
in maintaining relative order by strong-arm methods.
But the situation is highly unstable. All classes of the
population have been alienated. Even the Catholic
Maronites, traditionally pro-French, have begun agitat-
ing. General Gouraud promptly squelched the agita-
tion by deporting the leaders to Corsica; nevertheless,
the fact remains that France's only real friends in Syria
are dissatisfied. Up to the present these things have
not changed France's attitude. A short time ago ex-
Premier Leygues remarked of Syria, "France will oc-
cupy aU of it, and always"; while still more recently
General Gouraud stated: "France must remain in Syria,
both for pohtical and economic reasons. The pohtical
consequences of our abandonment of the coimtry would
be disastrous. Our prestige and influence in the Levant
and the Mediterranean would be doomed. The eco-
nomic interests of France also compel us to remain
there. When fully developed, Syria and CiHcia will
have an economic value fully equal to that of Egypt."
236 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
However, despite the French Government's firmness,
there is an increasing pubhc criticism of the "Syrian
adventure/' not merely from radical anti-imperialist
quarters, but from unimpeachably conser\'ative circles
as well. The editor of one of the most conservative
French political periodicals has stated: "Jealous of its
autonomy, the Arab people, liberated from the Otto-
man yoke, do not desire a new foreign domination.
To say that Syria demands our protection is a lie. Syria
wishes to be entirely independent." ^ And recently
Senator Victor Berard, one of France's recognized au-
thorities on Eastern affaii'S, made a speech in the French
Senate strongly criticising the Government's Syrian
poHcy from the very start and declaring that a "free
Syria" was "a question of both interest and honor."
Certainly, the French Government, still so mipeld-
ing toward the Arabs, has reversed its attitude toward
the Turks. Sidestepping the Sevres Treaty, it has
lately agreed on provisional peace terms with the Turkish
nationahsts, actually agreeing to evacuate Cilicia. In
fact, both France and England know that the Sevres
Treaty is unworkable and that Turkish possession of
virtually the whole of Asia Minor will have to be rec-
ognized.
In negotiating with Mustapha Kemal, France un-
doubtedly hopes to get him to throw over the Arabs.
But this is scarcely thinkable. The whole trend of
events betokens an increasing sohdaiity of the Near
Eastern peoples against Western political control. A
^ Henri de Chanibon, editor of La Revue Parlementaire. Quoted by
Beckles Wilson, "Our Amazing S5Tian Adventure," National Review,
September, 1920.
NATIONALISM 237
most remarkable portent in this direction is the Pan-
Islamic conference held at Sivas early in 1921. This
conference, called to draw up a definite scheme for effec-
tive Moslem co-operation the world over, was attended
not merely by the high orthodox Moslem dignitaries
and political leaders, but also l^y heterodox chiefs like
the Shiah Emir of Kerbela, the Imam Yahya, and the
Zaidite Emir of Yemen — leaders of heretical sects be-
tween whom and the orthodox Sunnis co-operation had
previously been impossible. Most notable of all, the
press reports state that the conference was presided
over by no less a personage than El Sennussi. This
may well be so, for we have already seen how the Sen-
nussi have always worked for a close union of aU Islam
against Western domination.
Such is the situation in the Near East — a situation
veiy grave and fuU of trouble. The most hopeful por-
tent is the apparent awakening of the British Govern-
ment to the growing perils of the hour, and its conse-
quent modifications of attitude. The labors of men
like Lord Mikier and Sir Percy Cox, however hampered
by purblind influences, can scarcely be wholly barren
of results. Such men are the diplomatic descendants
of Chatham and of Durham; the upholders of that great
pohtical tradition which has steered the British Empire
safely through crises that appeared hopeless.
On the other hand, the darkest portent in the Near
East is the continued intransigeance of France. Steeped
in its old traditions, French poHcy apparently refuses
to face reaHties. If an ex-plosion comes, as come it
must miless France modifies her attitude; if, some dark
day, thirty or forty French battalions are caught in a
238 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
simoom of Arab fury blowing out of the desert and are
annihilated in a new Adowa; the regretful verdict of
many versed in Eastern a^airs can only be: "French
policy has deserved it."
Leaving the Near Eastern problem at this critical
juncture to the inscrutable solution of the future, let us
now turn to the great political problem of the Middle
East — the nationalist movement in India.
CHAPTER VI
NATIONALISM IN INDIA
India is a land of paradox. Possessing a fundamental
geographical unity, India has never known real political
union save that recently imposed externally by the
British "Raj." Full of warlike stocks, India has never
been able to repel invaders. Occupied by many races,
these races have never really fused, but have remained
distinct and mutually hostile, sundered by barriers of
blood, speech, culture, and creed. Thus India, large
and populous as Europe or China, has neither, like
China, evolved a generalized national unity; nor, Hke
Europe, has developed a specialized national diversity;
but has remained an amorphous, unstable indetermi-
nate, with tendencies in both directions which were
never carried to their logical conclusion.
India's history has been influenced mainly by three
great invasions: the Aryan invasion, commencing about
1500 B. C; the Mohammedan invasion, extending
roughly from 1000 to 1700 A. D., and the Enghsh inva-
sion, begiiming about 1750 A. D. and culminating a
century later in a complete conquest which has lasted
to the present day.
The Aiyans were a fair-skinned people, unquestion-
ably of the same general stock as ourselves. Press-
ing down from Central Asia through those northwestern
passes where alone land-access is possible to India, else-
239
240 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
where impregnably guarded by the mountain wall of
the Himalayas, the Aryans subdued the dark-skiimed
Dra\ddian aborigines and settled down as masters.
This conquest was, however, superficial and partial.
The bulk of the Aryans remained in the northwest,
the more adventurous spirits scattering thinly over the
rest of the vast peninsula. Even in the north large
areas of hill-countiy and jungle remained in the exclu-
sive possession of the aborigines, while veiy few Aryans
ever penetrated the south. Over most of India, there-
fore, the Aryans were merely a small i-uHng class super-
imposed upon a much more numerous subject popula-
tion. Fearing to be swallowed up in the Dravidian
ocean, the Aiyans attempted to preserve their politi-
cal ascendancy and racial purity by the institution of
"caste," which has ever since remained the basis of
Indian social Hfe. Caste was originally a "color hne."
But it was enforced not so much by ci\dl law as by re-
hgion. Society was divided into three castes: Brah-
mins, or priests; Kshatriyas, or warriors; and Sudras,
or workers. The Aryans monopoHzed the two upper
castes, the Sudras being the Dravidian subject popula-
tion. These castes were kept apart, by a rigorous series
of rehgious taboos. Intermarriage, partaking of food
and drink, even physical propinquity, entailed cere-
monial defilement sometimes inexpiable. Disobedience
to these taboos was punished with the terrible penalty
of "outcasting," whereby the offender did not merely
fall to a lower rank in the caste hierarchy but sank even
below the Sudra and became a "Pariah," or man of no-
caste, condemned to the most menial and revolting oc-
cupations, and with no rights which even the Sudra was
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 241
bound to respect. Thus Indian society was governed,
not by civil; but by ceremonially religious law; while,
conversely, the nascent Indian reHgion ("Brahminism")
became not ethical but social in character.
These things produced the most momentous conse-
quences. As a "color line," caste worked very imper-
fectly. Despite its prohibitions, even the Brahmins
became more or less impregnated with Dravidian blood.*
But as a social system caste continued to fimction in
ways pecuhar to itself. The three original castes gradu-
ally subdivided into hundreds and even thousands of
sub-castes. These sub-castes had little or nothing of
the original racial significance. But they were aU just
as exclusive as the primal trio, and the outcome was a
shattering of Indian society into a chaos of rigid sociiil
atoms, between which co-operation or even understand-
ing-was impossible. The results upon Indian histoiy are
obvious. Says a British authority: "The effect of this
permanent maintenance of human types is that the popu-
lation is heterogeneous to the last degree. It is no ques-
tion of rich and poor, of town and country, of employer
and employed : the differences lie far deeper. The popu-
lation of a district or a town is a collection of different
nationalities — almost different species — of mankind that
will not eat or drink or intermarry with one another, and
that are governed in the more important affaire of life by
committees of their own. It is hardly too much to say
^ According to some historians, this race-mixture occurred ahnost at
once. The theory is that the Aryan conquerors, who outside the north-
western region had very few of their own women with them, took Dra-
vidian women as wives or concubines, and legitimatized their half-breed
children, the offspring of the conquerors, both pure-bloods and mixed-
bloods, coalescing into a closed caste. Further infiltration of Dravidian
blood was thus prevented, but Aryan race-purity had been destroyed.
242 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
that by the caste system the inhabitants of India are
differentiated into over two thousand species, which, in
the intimate physical relations of life, have as Httle in
common as the inmates of a zoological garden." ^
Obviously, a land socially atomized and poHtically
spht into many principahties was destined to fall before
the first strong invader. This invader was Islam. The
Mohanmaedans attacked India soon after their con-
quest of Persia, but these early attacks were mere bor-
der raids without lasting significance. The first real
Mohammedan invasion was that of Mahmud of Ghazni,
an Afghan piince, in the year 1001 A. D. FoUowdng
the road taken by the Aiyans ages before, Mahmud
conquered northwestern India, the region known as
the Punjab. Islam had thus obtamed a firm foothold
in India, and subsequent IVioslem leaders spread grad-
ually eastward until most of northern India was under
Moslem rule. The invaders had two notable advan-
tages: they were fanatically united against the despised
"Idolaters," and they drew many converts from the
native population. The very antithesis of Brahmanism,
Islam, mth its doctiine that aU Believers are brothers,
could not fail to attract multitudes of low-castes and
out-castes, who by conversion might rise to the status
of the conquerors. This is the main reason why the
Mohammedans in India to-day number more than
' Sir Bampfylde Fuller, Studies of Indian Life and Sentiment, p. 40
(London, 1910). For other discussions of caste and its effects, see W.
Archer, hidia and the Future (London, 1918); Sir V. Chirol, Indian Un-
rest (London, 1910); Rev. J. Morrison, New Ideas in India: A Study of
Social, Political, and Religious Developments (Edinburgh, 1906); Sir H.
Risley, The People of India (London, 1908); also writings of the "Namasu-
dra" leader. Dr. Nair, previously quoted, and S. Nihal Singh, "India's
Untouchables," Contemporary Review, March, 1913.
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 243
70,000,000 — over one-fifth of the total population.
These Indian Moslems are descended, not merely from
Afghan, Turkish, Arab, and Persian invaders, but even
more from the millions of Hindu converts who embraced
Islam.
For many generations the Moslem hold on India was
confined to the north. Then, early in the sixteenth
century, the great Turko-Mongol leader Baber entered
India and founded the "Mogul" Empire. Baber and
his successors overran even the south and united India
poHtically as it had never been miited before. But
even this concjuest was superficial. The Brahmins,
threatened with destruction, preached a Hindu revival;
the Mogul dynasty petered out; and at the begiiming
of the eighteenth centur}^ the Mogul Empire collapsed,
lea\dng India a welter of warring principalities, Mo-
hammedan and Hindu, fighting each other for rehgion,
for politics, or for sheer Itist of plunder.
Out of this anarchy the British rose to power. The
British were at first merely one of several other Euro-
pean elements — Portuguese, Dutch, and French — who
established small settlements along the Indian coasts.
The Europeans never dreamed of conquering India
while the Mogul power endured. In fact, the British
connection \vdth India began as a purely trading ven-
ture — the East India Company. But when India col-
lapsed into anarchy the Europeans were first obliged to
acquire local authority to protect their "factories,"
and later were lured into more ambitious schemes by
the impotence of petty rulers. Gradually the British
ousted their European rivals and estabHshed a solid
political foothold in India. The one stable element
244 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
in a seething chaos, the British inevitably extended
their authority. At first they did so reluctantly. The
East India Company long remained piimarily a trad-
ing venture, aiming at dividends rather than dominion.
However, it later evolved into a real government with
an ambitious policy of annexation. This in tiu-n awak-
ened the fears of many Indians and brought on the
"Mutiny" of 1857. The mutiny was queUed, the East
India Company aboHshed, and India came directly
under the British Crown, Queen Victoria being later
proclaimed Empress of India. These events in turn
resulted not only in a strengthening of British poHtical
authority but also in an increased penetration of West-
ern uifluences of every description. Roads, railways,
and canals opened up and unified India as never before;
the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez facilitated communi-
cation with Europe; while education on European fines
spread Western ideas.
Over this rapidly changing India stood the British
"Raj" — a system of government miique iri the world's
history. It was the government of a few hundred
liighly skilled administrative experts backed by a small
professional army, rufing a vast agglomeration of sub-
ject peoples. It was frankly an absolute paternalism,
governing as it saw fit, with no more responsibihty to
the governed than the native despots whom it had dis-
placed. But it governed well. In efficiency, honesty,
and sense of duty, the government of India is probably
the best example of benevolent absolutism that the
world has ever seen. It gave India profound peace.
It played no favorites, holding the scales even between
rival races, creeds, and castes. Lastly, it made India
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 245
a real political entity — something which India had never
been before. For the first time in its histoiy, India
was firmly united under one rule — the rule of the Pax
Britannica.
Yet the very virtues of British rule sowed the seeds of
future trouble. Generations grew up, peacefully united
in unprecedented acquaintanceship, forgetful of past
ills, seeing only European shortcomings, and, above all,
familiar with Western ideas of self-government, liberty,
and nationahty. In India, as elsewhere in the East,
there was bomid to aiise a growing movement of dis-
content against Western rule — a discontent varying
from moderate demands for increasing autonomy to
radical demands for immediate independence.
Down to the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
organized poHtical agitation against the British "Raj"
was virtually unknown. Here and there isolated in-
dividuals uttered half-audible protests, but these voices
found no popular echo. The Indian masses, preoccu-
pied with the ever-present problem of getting a Hving,
accepted passively a government no more absolute,
and infinitely more efficient, than its predecessors. Of
an3^hing like self-conscious Indian "Nationahsm" there
was virtually no trace.
The first symptom of organized discontent was the
formation of the "Indian National Congress" in the
year 1885. The very name showed that the British
Raj, covering all India, was itself evoking among India's
diverse elements a certain common point of view and
aspiration. However, the early congresses were very-
far from representing Indian pubhc opinion, in the
general sense of the term. On the contrary, these con-
246 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
gresses represented merely a small class of professional
men, journalists, and politicians, all of them trained
in Western ideas. The European methods of educa-
tion which the British had introduced had turned out
an Indian intelligentsia, conversant with the English
language and saturated with Westernism.
This new intelligentsia, convinced as it was of the
value of Western ideals and achievements, could not
fail to be dissatisfied with many aspects of Indian hfe.
In fact, its fu'st efforts were directed, not so much to
poHtics, as to social and economic reforms like the sup-
pression of child-marriage, the remarriage of widows,
and wider education. But, as time passed, matters of
political reform came steadily to the fore. Saturated
with English histoiy and pohtical philosophy as they
were, the Indian mtellectuals felt more and more keenly
their total lack of self-government, and aspired to en-
dow India with those blessings of Hberty so highly prized
by their Enghsh mlers. Soon a vigorous native press
developed, preaching the new gospel, welding the in-
tellectuals into a self-conscious unity, and moulding a
genuine public opinion. By the close of the nmeteenth
centuiy the Indian intelligentsia was frankly agitating
for sweeping political innovations like representative
councils, increasing control over taxation and the execu-
tive, and the opening of the pubHc services to Indians
all the way up the scale.
Down to the closing years of the nineteenth century
Indian discontent was, as already said, confuied to a
small class of more or less Europeanized intellectuals
who, despite their assumption of the title, could hardly
be teiTQed "NationaUsts" in the ordinary sense of the
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 247
word. With a few exceptions, their goal was neither
independence nor the elimination of effective British
oversight, but rather the reforming of Indian Hfe along
Western lines, including a growing degree of self-gov-
ernment under British paramount authority.
But by the close of the nineteenth century there
came a change in the situation. India, like the rest of-
the Orient, was stirring to a new spirit of pohtical and
racial self-consciousness. True nationahst symptoms be-
gan to appear. Indian scholars delved into their musty
chronicles and sacred texts, and proclaimed the glories
of India's historic past. Reformed Hindu sects like
the Aiya Somaj lent reHgious sanctions. The Httle
band of Europeanized intellectuals was joined by other
elements, thinking, not in terms of piecemeal reforms
on Western models, but of a new India, rejuvenated
from its own vital forces, and free to work out its own
destiny in its own way. From the nationalist ranks
now arose the challenging slogan: "Bandemataram !'"
("Hail, Motherland!")^
The outstanding feature about this early Indian na-
tionahsm was that it was a distinctively Hindu move-
ment. The Mohanmiedans regarded it with suspicion
or hostility. And for this they had good reasons. The
1 For the nationalist movement, see Archer, Chirol, and Morrison,
supra. Also Sir H. J. S. Cotton, India in Transition (London, 1904);
J. N. Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements in India (New York, 1915);
Sir W. W. Hunter, The India of the Queen and Other Essays (London,
1903); W. S. Lilly, India and Its Problems (London, 1902); Sir V. Lovett,
A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement (London, 1920) ; J. Ramsay
Macdonald, The Government of India (London, 1920); Sir T. Morison,
Imperial Rule in India (London, 1899) ; J. D. Rees, The Real India (Lon-
don, 1908) ; Sir J. Strachey, India : Its Adyninistration and Progress (Fourth
Edition — London, 1911); K. Vyasa Rao, The Future Government of India
(London, 1918).
248 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
ideal of the new nationalists was Aryan India, the India
of the "Golden Age." "Back to the Vedas!" was a
nationahst watchword, and this implied a veneration
for the past, including a revival of aggressive Brahmin-
ism. An extraordinary change came over the intelli-
gentsia. Men who, a few years before, had proclaimed
the superiority of Western ideas and had openly flouted
"superstitions" like idol-worship, now denounced every-
thing Western and reverently sacrificed to the Hindu
gods. The "sacred soil" of India must be purged of the
foreigner. 1 But the "foreigner," as these nationalists
conceived him, was not merely the EngHshman; he was
the Mohammedan as well. This was stirring up the
past with a vengeance. For centuries the great Hindu-
Mohammedan division had run like a chasm athwart
India. It had never been closed, but it had been some-
what veiled by the neutral overlordship of the British
Raj. Now the veil was torn aside, and the Moham-
medans saw themselves menaced by a recmdescence of
militant Hinduism like that which had shattered the
Mogul Empire after the death of the Emperor Aurangzeb
two hundred years before. The Mohammedans were not
merely alarmed; they were infuriated as well. Remem-
bering the glories of the Mogul Empire just as the Hin-
dus did the glories of Aryan India, they considered them-
selves the rightful lords of the land, and had no mind
to fall under the sway of despised "Idolaters." The
*I have already discussed this "Golden Age" tendency in Chapter III.
For more or less Extremist Indian view-points, see A. Coomaraswamy,
The Dance of Siva (New York, 1918) ; H. Maitra, Hinduism : The World-
Ideal (London, 1916); Bipin Chandra Pal, "The Forces Behind the Un-
rest in India," Contemporary Review, February, 1910; also various writ-
ings of Lajpat Rai, especially The Arya Saniaj (London, 1915) and Young
India (New York, 1916).
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 249
Mohammedans had no love for the British, but they
hated the Hindus, and they saw in the British Raj a
bulwark against the potential menace of hereditary
enemies who outnumbered them nearly five to one.
Thus the Mohammedans denounced Hindu nationahsm
and proclaimed their loyalty to the Raj. To be sure, the
Indian Moslems were also affected by the genei-al spirit
of unrest which was sweeping over the East. They too
felt a quickened sense of self-consciousness. But, being
a minority in India, their feelings took the form, not of
territorial "patriotism," but of those more diffused senti-
ments, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Islamic nationahsm, which
we have already discussed.^
Early Indian nationalism was not merely Hindu in
character; it was distinctly "Brahminicar' as well.
More and more the Brahmins became the driving power
of the movement, seeking to perpetuate their supremacy
in the India of the morrow as they had enjoyed it in
the India of the past. But this aroused apprehension
in certain sections of Hindu society. Many low-castes
and Pariahs began to fear that an independent or even
autonomous India might be ruled by a tyrannical Brah-
min oligarchy which would deny them the benefits they
now enjoyed under British rule.^ Also, many of the
Hindu princes dishked the thought of a theocratic re-
* For Indian Mohammedan points of view, mostly anti-Hindu, see
H. H. The Aga Khan, India in Transition (London, 1918); S. Khuda
Bukhsh, Essays: Indian and Islamic (London, 1912); Sir Syed Ahmed,
The Present State of Indian Politics (Allahabad, 1888); Syed Sirdar Ali
Khan, The Unrest in India (Bombay, 1907); also his India of Today
(Bombay, 1908).
2 This attitude of the "Depressed Classes," especially as revealed in
the "Namasudra Association," has already been discussed in Chapter
III, and will be further touched upon later in this present chapter.
250 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
gime which might reduce them to shadows.^ Thus the
nationahst movement stood out as an aUiance between
the Brahmins and the Western-educated intelligentsia,
who had pooled their ambitions in a programme for
jointly ruling India.
Quickened by this ambition and fired by rehgious
zeal, the nationalist movement rapidly acquired a fanat-
ical temper characterized by a mystical abhorrence of
everything Western and a ferocious hatred of all Euro-
peans. The Russo-Japanese War greatly inflamed this
spirit, and the veiy next year (1905) an act of the In-
dian Government precipitated the gathering storm.
This act was the famous Partition of Bengal. The par-
tition was a mere administrative measure, with no po-
litical intent. But the nationalists made it a "vital
issue," and about this grievance they started an intense
propaganda that soon filled India with seditious unrest.
The leading spirit in this agitation was Bal Gangadhar
Tilak, who has been called "the father of Indian un-
rest." Tilak typified the nationalist movement. A
Brahmin with an excellent Western education, he was
the sworn foe of English rule and Western civilization.
An able propagandist, his speeches roused his hearers
to frenzy, while his newspaper, the Yugantar, of Cal-
cutta, preached a campaign of hate, assassination, and
rebelhon. Tilak's incitements soon produced tangible
results, numerous riots, "dacoities," and murders of
Englishmen taking place. And of course the Yugantar
^ Regarding the Indian native princes, see Archer and Chirol, supra.
Also J. Pollen, "Native States and Indian Home Rule," Asiatic Review,
January 1, 1917; The Maharajah of Bobbili, Advice to the Indian Aris-
tocracy (Madras, 1905) ; articles by Sir D. Barr and Sir F. Younghusband
in The Empire and the Century (London, 1905).
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 251
was merely one of a large number of nationalist organs,
some printed in the vernacular and others in English,
which vied with one another in seditious invective.
The violence of the nationalist press may be judged
by a few quotations. "Revolution," asserted the Yu-
gantar, "is the only way in which a slavish society can
save itself. If you cannot prove yourself a man in hfe,
play the man in death. Foreigners have come and de-
cided how you are to live. But how you are to die de-
pends entirely upon yourself." "Let preparations be
made for a general revolution in every household ! The
handful of police and soldiers will never be able to with-
stand this ocean of revolutionists. Revolutionists may
be made prisoners and may die, but thousands of others
will spring into their places. Do not be afraid! With
the blood of heroes the soil of Hindustan is ever fertile.
Do uot be downhearted. There is no dearth of heroes.
There is no dearth of money; glory awaits you! A sin-
gle frown (a few bombs) from your eyes has struck
terror into the heart of the foe! The uproar of panic
has fiUed the sky. Swim with renewed energy in the
ocean of bloodshed!" The assassination note was ve-
hemently stressed. Said S. Krishnavarma in The In-
dian Sociologist: "PoHtical assassination is not murder,
and the rightful employment of physical force connotes
'force used defensively against force used aggressively.'"
"The only subscription required," stated the Yugantar,
"is that every reader shall bring the head of a Euro-
pean." Not even women and children were spared.
Commenting on the murder of an EngHsh lady and her
daughter, the Yugantar exclaimed exultantly: "Many
a female demon must be killed in course of time, in
252 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
order to extiipate the race of Asuras from the breast
of the earth." The fanaticism of the men (usually
veiy young men) who committed these assassinations
may be judged by the statement of the murderer of a
'high English official, Sir Curzon-Wyllie, made shortly
before his execution: "I believe that a nation held down
b}' foreign bayonets is in a perpetual state of war. Since
open battle is rendered impossible to a disarmed race,
I attacked by surprise; since guns were denied to me, I
drew my pistol and fired. As a Hindu I feel that wrong
to my countr}^ is an insult to the gods. Her cause is
the cause of Shri Ram; her service is the service of Shri
Knshna. Poor in wealth and intellect, a son Hke my-
self has notliing else to offer the Mother but his own
blood, and so I have sacrificed the same on Her altar.
The only lesson required in India at present is to learn
how to die, and the only way to teach it is to die our-
selves; therefore I die and glory in my martyrdom.
This war will continue between England and India so
long as the Hindee and English races last, if the present
unnatural relation does not cease." ^
The goverimaent's answer to this campaign of sedi-
tion and assassination w^as of course stern repression.
The native press was muzzled, the agitators imprisoned or
executed, and the hands of the authorities were strength-
ened by pimitive legislation. In fact, so infuriated was
the European community by the murders and outrages
committed by the nationaHsts that many Englishmen
1 A good symposium of extremist comment is contained in Chirol,
supra. Also see J. D. Rees, The Real India (London, 1908); series of
extremist articles in The Open Court, March, 1917. A good sample of
extremist literature is the fairly well-known pamphlet India's "Loyalty"
to England (1915).
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 253
urged the withdrawal of such political privileges as did
exist, the limiting of Western education, and the estab-
lishment of extreme autocratic rule. These angry
counsels were at once caught up by the nationalists,
resulted in fresh outrages, and were answered by more
punishment and fresh menaces. Thus the extremists on
both sides lashed each other to hotter fuiy and worsened
the situation. For several years India seethed with an
unrest which jaiHngs, hangings, and deportations did
little to allay.
Presently, however, things took at least a temporary
turn for the better. The extremists were, after all, a
small minority, and cool heads, both British and Indian,
were seeking a way out of the impasse. Conservative
Indian leaders like Mr. Gokhale condemned terrorism
and besought their countrjmien to seek the realization
of their aspirations by peaceful means. On the other
hand, Hberal-minded Englishmen, while refusing to be
stampeded, sought a progranmie of conciliation. Indian
affairs were then in the hands of the eminent Liberal
statesman Jotm Morley, and the fruit of his labors was
the Indian Coimcils Act of 1909. The act was a dis-
tinct departure from the hitherto almost unlimited
absolutism of British rule in India. It gave the Indian
opposition greatly increased opportunities for advice,
criticism, and debate, and it initiated a restricted scheme
of elections to the legislative bodies which it estabhshed.
The salutary effect of these concessions was soon ap-
parent. The moderate nationahst elements, while not
wholly satisfied, accepted the act as an earnest of sub-
sequent concessions and as a proof of British good-will.
The terrorism and seditious plottings of the extremists.
254 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
while not stamped out, were held in check and driven
underground. King George's visit to India in 1911
evoked a wave of loyal enthusiasm which swept the
peninsula and augured well for the future.
The year 1911 was the high- water mark of this era
of appeasement following the storms of 1905-9. The
years after 1911 witnessed a gradual recrudescence of
discontent as the first effect of the Councils Act wore
off and the sense of unfulfilled aspiration sharpened the
appetite for more. In fact, during these years, Indian
nationalism was steadily broadening its base. In one
sense this made for stability, for the nationahst move-
ment ceased to be a small minority of extremists and
came more under the influence of moderate leaders like
Mr. Gokhale, who were content to work for distant
goals by evolutionary methods. It did, however, mean
an increasing pressure on the government for fresh devo-
lutions of authority. The most noteworthy symptom
of nationalist growth was the rallying of a certain sec-
tion of Mohammedan opinion to the nationalist cause.
The. Mohammedans had by this time formed their own
orpianization, the "All-India Moslem League." The
league was the reverse of nationalist in complexion,
having been formed primarily to protect Moslem inter-
ests against possible Hindu ascendancy. Nevertheless,
as time passed, some Mohammedans, reassured by the
fric^ndly attitude and promises of the Hindu moderates,
abandoned the league's anti-Hindu attitude and joined
the moderate nationalists, though refraining from sedi-
tious agitation. Indeed, the nationalists presently split
into two distinct groups, moderates and extremists. The
extremists, condemned by their fellows, kept up a desul-
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 255
tory campaign of violence, largely directed by exiled
leaders who from the shelter of foreign countries incited
their followers at home to seditious agitation and violent
action.
Such was the situation in India on the outbreak of
the Great War; a situation by no means free from diffi-
culty, yet far less troubled than it had been a few years
before. Of course, the war produced an increase of un-
rest and a certain amount of terrorism. Yet India, as
a whole, remained quiet. Throughout the war India
contributed men and money unstintedly to the imperial
cause, and Indian troops figured notably on European,
Asiatic, and African battle-fields.
However, though the war-years passed without any
serious outbreak of revolutionary ^aolence, it must not
be thought that the far more wide-spread movement for
increasing self-government had been either quenched or
stilled. On the contrary, the war gave this movement
fresh impetus. Louder and louder swelled the cry for
not merely good government but government accepta-
ble to Indian patriots because responsible to them.
The very fact that India had proved her loyalty to the
Empire and had given generously of her blood and trea-
sure were so many fresh arguments adduced for the
grant of a larger measure of self-direction. Numerous
were the memoranda presented to the British authori-
ties by various sections of Indian public opinion. These
memoranda were an accurate reflection of the different
shades of Indian nationalism. The ultimate goal of all
was emancipation from British tutelage, but they dif-
fered widely among themselves as to how and when this
emancipation was to be attained. The most conserva-
256 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
tive contented themselves with asking for modified self-
government under British guidance, while the more
ambitious asked for the full status of a dominion of
the British Empire like Australia and Canada. The
revolutionary element naturall}^ held aloof, recognizing
that only violence could serve their aim — immediate
and unqualified independence.
Of course even the more moderate nationahst de-
mands implied great changes in the existing govern-
mental system and a diminution of British control such
as the Government of India was not prepared at present
to concede. Nevertheless, the Government met these
demands by a conciliatory attitude foreshadowing fresh
concessions in the near future. In 1916 the Viceroy,
Lord Harding, said: "I do not for a moment wish to
discountenance self-go^^ernment for India as a national
ideal. It is a perfectly legitimate aspiration and has the
sympathy of all moderate men, but in the present posi-
tion of India it is not idealism that is needed but practi-
cal politics. We should do our utmost to grapple with
realities, and lightly to raise extravagant hopes and en-
courage unreaHzable demands can only tend to delay
and will not accelerate political progress. I know this
is the sentiment of wise and thoughtful Indians. No-
body is .more anxious than I am to see the early realiza-
tion of the legitimate aspirations of India, but I am
equally desirous of avoiding all danger of reaction from
the birth of institutions which ex'perience might prove
to be premature."
As a matter of fact, toward the close of 1917, Mr.
Montagu, Secretary of State for India, came out from
England with the object of thoroughly canvassing In-
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 257
dian public opinion on the question of constitutional
reform. For months the problem was carefully weighed,
conferences being held with the representatives of all
races, classes, and creeds. The result of these researches
was a monumental report signed by Mr. Montagu and
by the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, and pubhshed in
July, 1918.
The report recommended concessions far beyond any
which Great Britain had hitherto made. It frankly
envisaged the gift of home rule for India "as soon as
possible," and went on to state that the gift was to be
conferred not because of Indian agitation, but because
of "the faith that is in us." There followed these mem-
orable words: "We beheve profoundly that the time
has come when the sheltered existence which we have
given India cannot be prolonged without damage to her
national hfe; that we have a richer gift for her people
than any that we have yet bestowed on them; that na-
tionhood within the Empire represents something bet-
ter than anything India has hitherto attained; that the
placid, pathetic contentment of the masses is not the
soil on which such Indian nationhood will grow, and
that in dehberately disturbing it we are working for her
highest good."
The essence of the report was its recommendation of
the principle of "diarchy," or division of governmental
responsibility between coimciUors nominated by the
British executive and ministers chosen from elective
legislative bodies. This diarchy was to hold for both
the central and provincial governments. The legisla-
tures were to be elected by a much more extensive fran-
chise than had previously prevailed and were to have
258 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
greatly enlarged powers. Previously they had been
little more than advisory bodies; now they were to be-
come "legislatures" in the Western sense, though their
powers were still limited, many powers, particularly
that of the purse, being still " reserv^ed " . to the execu-
tive. The British executive thus retained ultimate con-
trol and had the last word; thus no true "balance of
power" was to exist, the scales being frankly weighted
in favor of the British Raj. But the report went on to
state that this scheme of government was not intended
to be permanent; that it was frankly a transitional
measure, a school in which the Indian people was to
serve its apprenticeship, and that when these first les-
sons in self-government had been learned, India would
be given a thoroughly representative government which
would not only initiate and legislate, but which would
also control the executive officials.
The Montagu-Chelmsford Report was exhaustively
discussed both in India and in England, and from these
frank discussions an excellent idea of the Indian prob-
lem in all its challenging complexity can be obtained.
The nationalists split shatply on the issue, the moder-
ates welcoming the report and agreeing to give the pro-
posed scheme of government their loyal co-operation,
the extremists condemning the proposals as a snare and
a sham. The moderate attitude was stated in a mani-
festo signed by their leaders, headed by the eminent
Indian economist Sir Dinshaw Wacha, which stated:
"The proposed scheme forms a complicated structure
capable of improvement in some particulars, especially
at the top, but is nevertheless a progressive measure.
The reforms are calculated to make the provinces of
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 259
India reach the goal of complete responsible govern-
ment. On the whole, the proposals are evolved with
great foresight and conceived in a spirit of genm'ne sym-
pathy with Indian political aspirations, for which the
distinguished authors are entitled to the country's
gratitude." The condemnation of the radicals was
voiced by leaders like Mr. Tilak, who urged "standing
fast by the Indian National Congress ideal," and Mr.
Bepin Chander Pal, who asserted: "It is my deliberate
opinion that if the scheme is accepted, the Government
will be more powerful and more autocratic than it is to-
day."
Extremely interesting was the protest of the anti-
nationalist groups, particularly the Mohammedans and
the low-caste Hindus. For it is a fact significant of
the complexity of the Indian problem that many mil-
lions of Indians fear the nationalist movement and
look upon the autocracy of the British Raj as a shield
against nationalist oppression and discrimination. The
Mohammedans of India are, on the question of self-
government for India, sharply divided among them-
selves. The majority still dislike and fear the nation-
alist movement, owing to its "Hindu" character. A
minority, however, as already stated, have rallied to
the nationalist cause. This minority grew greatly in
numbers during the war-years, their increased friendU-
ness being due not merely to desire for self-government
but also to anger at the Allies' policy of dismemberment
of the Ottoman Empire and kindred policies in the
Near and Middle East.^ The Hindu nationaHsts were
quick to s}Tnpathize with the Mohammedans on these
^ Discussed in the preceding chapter.
260 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
external matters, and the result was a cordiality be-
tween the two elements never knowTi before.
The predominance of high-caste Brahmins in the na-
tionalist movement explains the opposition of many low-
caste Hindus to Indian home rule. So great is the low-
caste fear of losing their present protection under the
British Raj and of being subjected to the domination
of a high-caste Brahmin oligarchy that in recent years
they have formed an association known as the "Namasu-
dra," led by well-known persons like Doctor Nair.^
The Namasudra points out what might happen by
citing the Brahminic pressure which occurs even in such
poHtical activity as already exists. For example: in
many elections the Brahmins have terrorized low-caste
voters by threatening to "out-caste" all who should not
vote the Brahmin ticket, thus making them "Pariahs"
— untouchables, with no rights in Hindu society.
Such protests against home rule from large sections
of the Indian population gave pause even to many Eng-
Hsh students of the problem who had become convinced
of home rule's theoretical desirability. And of course
they greatly strengthened the arguments of those nu-
merous Englishmen, particularly Anglo-Indians, who as-
serted that India was as yet unfit for self-government.
Said one of these objectors in The Round Table: "The
masses care not one whit for poHtics; Home Rule they
do not understand. They prefer the English District
Magistrate. They only ask to remain in eternal and
bovine quiescence. They feel confidence in the Eng-
hshman because he has always shown himself the 'Pro-
tector of the Poor,' and because he is neither Hindu
^ Quoted in Chapter IV.
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 261
nor Mussulman, and has a reputation for honesty."
And Lord Sydenham, in a detailed criticism of the Mon-
tagu-Chelmsford proposals, stated: "There are many
defects in our system of government in India. Re-
forms are needed; but they must be based solely upon
considerations of the welfare of the masses of India as
a whole. If the policy of 'deliberately' disturbing their
'contentment' which the Viceroy and the Secretary of
State have announced is carried out; if, through the
Whispering galleries of the East,' the word is passed
that the only authority that can maintain law and order
and secure the gradual building-up of an Indian na-
tion is weakening; if, as is proposed, the great pubHc
services are emasculated; then the fierce old animosi-
ties will break out afresh, and, assisted by a recrudes-
cence of the reactionary forces of Brahminism, they will
within a few years bring to nought the noblest work
which the British race has ever accomplished." ^
Yet, other English authorities on Indian affairs as-
serted that the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals were
sound and must be enacted into law if the gravest perils
were to be averted. Such were the opinions of men
like Lionel Curtis^ and Sir Valentine Chirol, who stated:
"It is of the utmost importance that there should be
no unnecessary delay. We have had object-lessons
enough as to the danger of procrastination, and in In-
dia as elsewhere time is on the side of the trouble-mak-
^ Lord Sydenham, "India," Contemporary Revieio, November, 1918.
For similar criticisms of the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals, see G. M.
Chesney, India under Experiment (London, 1918); "The First Stage
towards Indian Anarchy," Spectator, December 20, 1919.
^ Lionel Curtis, Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government,
already quoted at the end of Chapter IV.
262 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
ers. ... We cannot hope to reconcile Indian Extrem-
ism. What we can hope to do is to free from its insidi-
ous influence all that is best in Indian public Hfe by
opening up a larger field of useful activity." ^
As a matter of fact, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report
was accepted as the basis of discussion by the British
Parhament, and at the close of the year 1919 its recom-
mendations were formally embodied in law. Unfortu-
nately, during the eighteen months which elapsed be-
tween the publication of the report and its legal enact-
ment, the situation in India had darkened. MiHtant
imrest had again raised its head, and India was more
disturbed than it had been since 1909.
For this there were several reasons. In the first
place, all those nationalist elements who were dissatis-
fied with the report began coquetting with the revolu-
tionary irreconcilables and encouraging them to fresh
terrorism, perhaps in the hope of stampeding the British
Parliament into wider concessions than the report had
contemplated. But there were other causes of a more
general nature. The year 1918 was a black one for In-
dia. The world-wide influenza epidemic hit India par-
ticularly hard, nearly 7,000,000 persons being carried
off by the grim plague. Furthermore, India was cursed
with drought, the crops failed, and the spectre of famine
stalked through the land. The j^ear 1919 saw an even
worse drought, involving an almost record famine. By
the late summer it was estimated that 32,000,000 per-
sons had died of hunger, with 150,000,000 more on the
verge of starvation. And on top of all came an Afghan
war, throwing the northwest border into tumult and
^Sir V. Chirol, "India in Travail," Edinburgh Revieio, July, 1918.
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 263
further unsettling the already restless Mohammedan
element.
The upshot was a wave of unrest revealing itself in
an epidemic of riots, terrorism, and seditious activity
which gave the British authorities serious concern. So
critical appeared the situation that a special commission
was appointed to investigate concUtionS; and the report
handed in by its chairman, Justice Rowlatt, painted a
depressing picture of the strength of revolutionary un-
rest. The report stated that not only had a considera-
ble number of young men of the educated upper classes
become involved in the promotion of anarchical move-
ments, but that the ranks were filled with men belonging
to other social orders, including the military, and that
there was clear evidence of successful tampering with
the loj^alty of the native troops. To combat this grow-
ing disaffection, the Rowlatt committee recommended
fresh repressive legislation.
Impressed with the gravity of the committee's report,
the Government of India formulated a project of law
officially known as the Anarcliical and Revolutionary
Crimes Act, though generally known as the Rowlatt
Bill. By its provisions the authorities were endowed
with greatly increased powers, such as the right to
search premises and arrest persons on mere suspicion
of seditious activity, without definite evidence of the
same.
The Rowlatt Bill at once aroused bitter nationalist
opposition. Not merely extrepaists, but many moder-
ates, condemned it as a backward step and as a provoker
of fresh trouble. When the bill came up for debate in
the Indian legislative body, the Imperial Legislative
264 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Council, all the native members save one opposed it,
and the bill was finally passed on strictly racial lines by
the -votes of the appointed English majority. However,
the government considered the bill an absolute pre-
requisite to the successful maintenance of order, and it
was passed into law in the spring of 1919.
This brought matters to a head. The nationalists,
stigmatizing the Rowlatt law as the "Black Cobra Act,"
were unmeasured in their condeimiation. The extrem-
ists engineered a campaign of mihtant protest and de-
creed the date of the bill's enactment, April 6, 1919, as
a national "Humiliation Day." On that day monster
mass-meetings were held, at which nationalist orators
made seditious speeches and inflamed the passions of
the multitude. "Humiliation Day" was in fact the
beginning of the worst wave of unrest since the mutiny.
For the next three months a veritable epidemic of riot-
ing and terrorism swept India, particularly the northern
provinces. Officials were assassinated, English civihans
were murdered, and there was wholesale destruction of
property. At some moments it looked as though India
were on the verge of revolution and anarchy.
However, the government stood firm. Violence was
countered with stern repression. Riotous mobs were
mowed down wholesale by rifle and machine-gim fire
or were scattered by bombs dropped from low-flying
aeroplanes. The most noted of these occurrences was
the so-called "Amritsar Massacre," where British troops
fired into a seditious mass-meeting, killing 500 and
wounding 1,500 persons. In the end the government
mastered the situation. Order was restored, the sedi-
tious leaders were swept into custody, and the revolu-
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 265
tionary agitation was once more driven underground.
The enactment of the Montagu-Chehnsford reform bill
by the British Parliament toward the close of the year
did much to relax the tension and assuage discontent,
though the situation of India was still far from normal.
The deplorable events of the earHer part of 1919 had
roused animosities which were by no means allayed.
The revolutionary elements, though driven underground,
were more bitter and uncompromising than ever, while
opponents of home rule were confirmed in their convic-
tion that India could not be trusted and that any re-
laxation of autocracy must spell anarchy.
This was obviously not the best mental atmosphere
in which to apply the compromises of the Montagu-
Chelmsford reforms. In fact, the extremists were de-
termined that they should not be given a fair trial, re-
garding the reforms as a snare which must be avoided
at all costs. Recognizing that armed rebelhon was still
impossible, at least for the present, the extremists evolved
the idea known as "non-co-operation." This was, in
fact, a gigantic boycott of everything British. Not
merely were the new voters urged to stay away from the
poUs and thus elect no members to the proposed legis-
lative bodies, but lawyers and litigants were to avoid
the courts, taxpayers refuse to pay imposts, workmen
to go on strike, shopkeepers to refuse to buy or sell
British-made goods, and even pupils to leave the schools
and colleges. This wholesale "out-casting" of every-
thing British would make the English in India a new
sort of Pariah — "untouchables"; the British Govern-
ment and the British commmiity in India would be
left in absolute isolation, and the Raj, rendered unworka-
266 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
ble, would have to capitulate to the extremist demands
for complete self-government.
Such was the non-co-operation idea. And the idea
soon found an able exponent: a certain M. K. Gandhi,
who had long possessed a reputation for personal sanc-
tity and thus inspired the Hindu masses with that pe-
culiar rehgious fervor which certain types of Indian
ascetics have always known how to arouse. Gandhi's
propaganda can be judged by the following extract from
one of his speeches: "It is as amazing as it is humiliat-
ing that less than 100,000 white men should be able to
rnle 315;000,000 Indians. They do so somewhat, un-
doubtedly, by force, but more by securing our co-opera-
tion in a thousand ways and making us more and more
helpless and dependent on them, as time goes forward.
Let us not mistake reformed councils (legislatures),
more law-courts, and even governorships for real freedom
or power. They are but subtler methods of emascu-
lation. The British cannot rule us by mere force. And
so they resort to all means, honorable and dishonorable,
in order to retain their hold on India. They want In-
dia's billions and they want India's man-power for their
imperialistic greed. If we refuse to supply them with
men and money, we achieve our goal: namely, Swaraj,^
-equaHty, manliness."
The extreme hopes of the non-co-operation movement
have not been reahzed. The Montagu-Chelmsford re-
forms have been put in operation, and the first elections
under them were held at the beginning of 192L But
the outlook is far from bright. The very light vote
cast at the elections revealed the effect of the non-co-
1 /. e., seK-govemment, in the extremist sense — practically independence.
NATIONALISM IN INDIA 267
operation movement; which showed itself in countless
other ways, from strikes in factories to strikes of school-
children. India to-day is in a turmoil of unrest. And
this unrest is not merely political; it is social as well.
The vast economic changes which have been going on in
India for the past half-century have profoundly dis-
organized Indian society. These changes will be dis-
cussed in later chapters. The point to be here noted
is that the extremist leaders are capitalizing social dis-
content and are unquestionably in touch with Bolshevik
Russia. Meanwhile the older factors of disturbance
are by no means eliminated. The recent ati;ocious
massacre of dissident Sikh pilgrims by orthodox Sikh
fanaticS; and the three-cornered riots between Hindus,
Mohammedans, and native Christians which broke out
about the same time in southern India, reveal the hid-
den fires of religious and racial fanaticism that smoulder
beneath the surface of Indian life.
The truth of the matter is that India is to-day a bat-
tle-ground between the forces of evolutionary and revolu-
tionary change. It is an anxious and a troubled time.
The old order is obviously passing, and the new order
is not yet fairly in sight. The hour is big with possi-
bihties of both good and evil, and no one can confidently
predict the outcome.
CHAPTER VII
ECONOMIC CHANGE
One of the most interesting phenomena of modern
world-history is the twofold conquest of the East by
the West. The word "conquest" is usually employed
in a political sense, and calls up visions of embattled
armies subduing foreign lands and lording it over distant
peoples. Such political conquests in the Orient did of
course occur, and we have already seen how, during the
past century, the decrepit states of the Near and Middle
East fell an easy prey to the armed might of the Euro-
pean Powers.
But what is not so generally realized is the fact that
this political conquest was paralleled by an economic
conquest perhaps even more complete and probably
destined to produce changes of an even more profound
and enduring character.
The root-cause of this economic conquest was the
Industrial Revolution. Just as the voyages of Colum-
bus and Da Gama gave Europe the strategic mastery
of the ocean and thereby the political mastery of the
world, so the technical inventions of the later eighteenth
century which inaugurated the Industrial Revolution
gave Europe the economic mastery of the world. These
inventions in fact heralded a new Age of Discovery, this
time into the realms of science. The results were, if
possible, more momentous even than those of the age
of geographical discovery three centuries before. They
268
ECONOMIC CHANGE 269
gave our race such increased mastery over the resources
of nature that the ensuing transformation of economic
Hfe swiftly and utterly transformed the face of things.
This transformation was, indeed, unprecedented in
the world's history. Hitherto man's material progress
had been a gradual evolution. With the exception of
gunpowder, he had tapped no new sources of material
energy since very ancient times. The horse-drawn mail-
coach of our great-grandfathers was merely a logical
elaboration of the horse-drawn Egyptian chariot; the
wind-driven cHpper-ship traced its line unbroken to
Ulysses's lateen bark before Troy; while industry still
rehed on the brawn of man and beast or upon the sim-
ple action of wind and waterfall. Suddenly all was
changed. Steam, electricity, petrol, the Hertzian wave,
harnessed nature's hidden powers, conquered distance,
and shrunk the terrestrial globe to the measure of hu-
man hands. Man entered a new material world, differ-
ing not merely in degree but in kind from that of pre-
vious generations.
When I say "Man," I mean, so far as the nineteenth
century was concerned, the white man of Europe and
its racial settlements overseas. It was the white man's
brain which had conceived all this, and it was the white
man alone who at first reaped the benefits. The two
outstanding features of the new order were the rise of
machine-industry with its incalculable acceleration of
mass-production, and the correlative development of
cheap and rapid transportation. Both these factors
favored a prodigious increase in economic power and
wealth in Europe, since Europe became the workshop
of the world. In fact, during the nineteenth century,
270 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Europe was transformed from a semirural continent into
a swarming hive of industry, gorged with goods, capital,
and men, pouring forth its wares to the remotest corners
of the earth, and drawing thence fresh stores of raw
material for new fabrication and exchange.
Such was the industrially revolutionized West which
confronted an East as backward and stagnant in eco-
nomics as it was in politics and the art of war. In fact,
the East was virtually devoid of either industry or busi-
ness, as we understand these terms to-day. Economi-
cally, the East was on an agricultural basis, the eco-
nomic unit being the self-supporting, semi-isolated
village. Oriental "industries" were handicrafts, car-
ried on by relatively small numbers of artisans, usually
working by and for themselves. Their products, while
often exquisite in quality, were largely luxuries, and were
always produced by such slow, antiquated methods
that their quantity was limited and their market price
relatively high. Despite very low wages, therefore,
Asiatic products not only could not compete in the
world-market with European and American machine-
made, mass-produced articles, but were hard hit in their
home-markets as well.
This Oriental inability to compete with Western in-
dustry arose not merely from methods of production
but also from other factors such as the mentality of the
workers and the scarcity of capital. Throughout the
Near and Middle East economic life rested on the princi-
ple of status. The Western economic principles of con-
tract and competition were virtually unknown. Agri-
culturists and artisans followed blindly in the footsteps
of their fathers. There was no competition, no stimu-
ECONOMIC CHANGE 271
lus for improvement, no change in customary wages,
no desire for a better and more comfortable living. The
industries were stereotyped; the apprentice merely imi-
tated his master, and rarely thought of introducing new
implements or new methods of manufacture. Instead
of working for profit and advancement, men followed
an hereditary "calling," usually hallowed by rehgious
sanctions, handed down from father to son through
many generations, each calhng possessing its own un-
changing ideals, its zealously guarded craft-secrets.
The few bolder, more enterprising spirits who might
have ventured to break the iron bands of custom and
tradition were estopped by lack of capital. Fluid "in-
vestment" capital, easily mobilized and ready to pour
into an enterprise of demonstrable utihty and profit,
simply did not exist. To the Oriental, whether prince
or peasant, money was regarded, not as a source of profit
or a medium of exchange, but as a store of value, to be
hoarded intact against a "rainy day." The East has
been known for ages as a "sink of the precious metals."
In India alone the value of the gold, silver, and jewels
hidden in strong-boxes, buried in the earth, or hanging
about the necks of women must run into billions. Says
a recent writer on India: "I had the privilege of being
taken through the treasure-vaults of one of the wealth-
iest Maharajahs. I could have plunged my arm to the
shoulder in great silver caskets filled with diamonds,
pearls, emeralds, rubies. The walls were studded with
hooks and on each pair of hooks rested gold bars three
to four feet long and two inches across. I stood by a
great cask of diamonds, and picking up a handful let them
drop slowly from between my fingers, sparkling and ghs-
272 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
tening like drops of water in sunlight. There are some
seven hundred native states, and the rulers of every one
has his treasure-vaults on a more or less elaborate scale.
Besides these, every zamindar and every Indian of high
or low degree who can save anything, wants to have it
by him in actual metal; he distrusts this new-fangled
paper currency that they try to pass off on him. Some-
times he beats his coins into bangles for his wives, and
sometimes he hides money behind a loose brick or under
a flat stone in the bottom of the oven, or he goes out
and digs a little hole and buries it." ^
Remember that this description is of present-day
India, after more than a century of British rule and not-
withstanding a permeation of Western ideas which, as
we shall presently see, has produced momentous modi-
fications in the native point of view. Remember also
that this hoarding propensity is not peculiar to India
but is shared by the entire Orient. We can then realize
the utter lack of capital for investment purposes in the
East of a hmidred years ago, especially when we remem-
ber that political insecurity and religious prohibitions
of the lending of money at interest stood in the way of
such far-sighted individuals as might have been inclined
to employ their hoarded wealth for productive pur-
poses. There was, indeed, one outlet for financial ac-
tivity — usury, and therein virtually all the scant fluid
capital of the old Orient was employed. But such cap-
ital, lent not for productive enterprise but for luxury,
profligacy, or incompetence, was a destructive rather
than a creative force and merely intensified the preju-
dice against capital of any kind.
* F. B. Fisher, India's Silent Revolution, p. 53 (New York, 1920).
ECONOMIC CHANGE 273
Such was the economic hfe of the Orient a hundred
years ago. It is obvious that this archaic order was
utterly unable to face the tremendous competition of
the industrialized West. Everywhere the flood of cheap
Western machine-made, mass-produced goods began
invading Eastern lands, driving the native wares be-
fore them. The way in which an ancient Oriental
handicraft like the Indian textiles was literally annihi-
lated by the destructive competition of Lancashire cot-
tons is only one of many similar instances. To be sure,
some Oriental writers contend that this triumph of
Western manufactures was due to political rather than
economic reasons, and Indian nationalists cite British
governmental activity in favor of the Lancashire cot-
tons above mentioned as the sole cause for the destruc-
tion of the Indian textile handicrafts. But such argu-
ments appear to be fallacious. British official action
may have hastened the triumph of British industry in
India, but that triumph was inevitable in the long run.
The best proof is the way in which the textile crafts of
independent Oriental countries like Turkey and Persia
were similarly ruined by Western competition.
A further proof is the undoubted fact that Oriental
peoples, taken as a whole, have bought Western-manu-
factured products in preference to their own hand-made
wares. To many Westerners this has been a mystery.
Such persons cannot understand how the Orientals
could buy the cheap, shoddy products of the West,
manufactured especially for the Eastern market, in
preference to their native wares of better quality and
vastly greater beauty. The answer, however, is that
the average Oriental is not an art connoisseur but a
274 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
poor man living perilously close to the margin of star-
vation. He not only wants but must buy things cheap,
and the wide price-margin is the deciding factor. Of
course there is also the element of novelty. Besides
goods which merely replace articles he has always used,
the West has introduced many new articles whose utility
or charm are irresistible. I have already mentioned
the way in which the sewing-machine and the kerosene-
lamp have swept the Orient from end to end, and there
are many other instances of a similar nature. The
permeation of Western industry has, in fact, profoundly
modified eveiy phase of Oriental economic hfe. New
economic wants have been created; standards of living
have been raised; canons of taste have been altered.
Says a lifelong American student of the Orient: "The
knowledge of modern inventions and of other foods and
articles has created new wants. The Chinese peasant
is no longer content to burn bean-oil; he wants kerosene.
The desire of the Asiatic to possess foreign lamps is
equalled only by his passion for foreign clocks. The
ambitious Syrian scorns the mud roof of his ancestors,
and will be satisfied only with the bright red tiles im-
ported from France. Ever_y^where articles of foreign
manufacture are in demand. . . . Knowledge increases
wants, and the Oriental is acquiring knowledge. He
demands a hmidred things to-day that his grandfather
never heard of." ^
Everywhere it is the same story. An Indian eco-
nomic writer, though a bitter enemy of Western indus-
trialism, bemoans the fact that "the artisans are losing
* Rev. A. J. Brown, "Economic Changes in Asia," The Century, March,
1904.
ECONOMIC CHANGE 275
their occupations and are turning to agricultuie. The
cheap kerosene-oil from Baku or New York threatens
the oilman's^ existence. Brass and copper which have
been used for vessels from time immemorial are threat-
ened by cheap enamelled ironware imported from Eu-
rope. . . . There is also, pari passu, a transformation
of the tastes of the consumers. They abandon gur for
crystal sugar. Home-woven cloths are now replaced
by manufactured cloths for being too coarse. All local
industries are attacked and many have been destroyed.
Villages that for centuries followed customary practices
are brought into contact with the world's markets all
on a sudden. For steamships and railways which have
established the connection have been built in so short
an interval as hardly to allow breathing-time to the
village which slumbered so long under the dominion of
custom. Thus the sudden introduction of competition
into an economic unit which had from time immemorial
followed custom has wrought a mighty change." ^
This "mighty change" was due not merely to the in-
flux of Western goods but also to an equally momentous
influx of Western capital. The opportunities for profita-
ble investment were so numerous that Western capital
soon poured in streams into Eastern lands. Virtually
devoid of fluid capital of its own, the Orient was bound
to have recourse to Western capital for the initiation
of all economic activity in the modern sense. Rail-
ways, mines, large-scale agriculture of the "plantation"
type, and many other undertakings thus came into be-
ing. Most notable of all was the founding of numerous
^ I. e., the purveyor of the native vegetable-oils.
^ R. Mukerjee, The Foundations of Indian Economics, p. 5 (London, 1916).
276 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
manufacturing establishments from North Africa to
China and the consequent growth of genuine "factory-
towns" where the whir of machinery and the smoke of
tall chimneys proclaimed that the East was adopting
the industrial hfe of the West.
The momentous social consequences of this industriali-
zation of the Orient will be treated in subsequent chap-
ters. In the present chapter we will confine ourselves
to a consideration of its economic side. Furthermore,
this book, limited as it is to the Near and Middle East,
cannot deal with industrial developments in China and
Japan. The reader should, however, always bear in
mind Far Eastern developments, which, in the main,
run parallel to those which we shall here discuss.
These industrial innovations were at first pure West-
ern transplantings set in Eastern soil. Initiated by
Western capital, they were wholly controlled and man-
aged by Western brains. Western capital could not
venture to intrust itself to Orientals, with their lack of
the modern industrial spirit, their habits of "squeeze"
and nepotism, their lust for quick returns, and their
incapacity for sustained business team-play. As time
passed, however, the success of Western undertakings
so impressed Orientals that the more forward-looking
among them were ready to risk their money and to ac-
quire the technic necessary for success. At the close
of Chapter II, I described the development of modern
business types in the Moslem world, and the same is
true of the non-Moslem populations of India. In India
there were several elements such as the Parsis and the
Hindu "banyas," or money-lenders, whose previous
activities in commerce or usury predisposed them to
ECONOMIC CHANGE 277
financial and industrial activity in the modern sense.
From their ranks have chiefly sprung the present-day
native business communities of India, exemplified by
the jute and textile factories of Calcutta and Bombay,
and the great Tata iron-works of Bengal — undertakings
financed by native capital and wholly under native con-
trol. Of course, beside these successes there have been
many lamentable failures. Nevertheless, there seems
to be no doubt that Western industrialism is ceasing to
be an exotic and is rooting itself firmly in Eastern soil.^
The combined result of Western and Eastern enter-
prise has been, as already stated, the rise of important
industrial centres at various points in the Orient. In
Egypt a French writer remarks: "Both banks of the
Nile are lined with factories, sugar-refineries and cotton-
mills, whose belching chimneys tower above the mud
huts of the fellahs." ^ And Sir Theodore Morison says
of India: "In the city of Bombay the industrial revolu-
tion has already been accomplished. Bombay is a
modern manufacturing city, where both the dark and
the bright side of modern industrialism strike the eye.
Bombay has insanitary slums where overcrowding is as
great an evil as in any European city; she has a prole-
tariat which works long hours amid the din and whir of
machinery; she also has her millionaires, whose princely
charities have adorned her streets with beautiful build-
ings. Signs of lavish wealth and, let me add, culture and
^On these points, see Fisher, op. dt.; Sir T. Morison, The Economic
Transition in India (London, 1911); Sir Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest
(London, 1910); D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition in India," Eco-
nomic Journal, December, 1910; J. P. Jones, "The Present Situation in
India," Journal oj Race Development, July, 1910.
* L. Bertrand, Le Mirage oriental, pp. 20-21 (Paris, 1910).
278 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
taste in Bombay astonish the visitor from the inland
districts. The brown villages and never-ending fields
with which he has hitherto been familiar are the India
which is passing away; Bombay is the presage of the
future." 1
The juxtaposition of vast natural resources and a
limitless supply of cheap labor has encouraged the most
ambitious hopes in Oriental minds. Some Orientals
look to a combination of Western money and Eastern
man-power, expressed by an Indian economic writer in
the formula: "English money and Indian labor are the
two cheapest things in the world." - Others more am-
bitiously di'eam of industrializing the East entirely by
native effort, to the exclusion and even to the detriment
of the West. This view was well set forth some years
ago by a Hindu, who wrote in a leading Indian periodi-
cal:^ "In one sense the Orient is really menacing the
West, and so earnest and open-minded is Asia that no
pretense or apology whatever is made about it. The
Easterner has thrown down the industrial gauntlet, and
from now on Asia is destined to witness a progressively
mtense trade warfare, the Occidental scrambling to re-
tain his hold on the markets of the East, and the Ori-
ental endeavoring to beat him in a battle in which here-
tofore he has been an easy victor. ... In competing
with the Occidental conm:iercialists, the Oriental has
awakened to a dynamic realization of the futility of
pitting unimproved machinery and methods against
modem methods and appliances. Casting aside his
^ Sir T. Morison, The Economic Transition in India, p. 181.
2 Quoted by Jones, supra.
3 The Indian Review (Madras), 1910.
ECONOMIC CHANGE 279
former sense of self-complacency, he is studying the sci-
ences and arts that have given the West its material
prosperity. He is putting the results of his investiga-
tions to practical use, as a rule, recasting the Occidental
methods to suit his pecuUar needs, and in some instances
improving upon them."
This statement of the spirit of the Orient's industrial
awakening is confirmed by many white observers. At
the very moment when the above article was penned,
an American economic writer was making a study tour
of the Orient, of which he reported: "The real cause of
Asia's poverty lies in just two things: the failure of Asi-
atic governments to educate their people, and the failure
of the people to increase their productive capacity by
the use of machinery. Ignorance and lack of machinery
are responsible for Asia's poverty; knowledge and mod-
ern tools are responsible for America's prosperity."
But, continues this writer, we must watch out. Asia
now realizes these facts and is doing much to remedy
the situation. Hence, "we must face in ever-increas-
ing degree the rivalry of awakening peoples who are
strong with the strength that comes from struggle with
poverty and hardship, and who have set themselves to
master and apply all our secrets in the coming world-
struggle for industrial supremacy and for racial read-
justment." ^ Another American observer of Asiatic
economic conditions reports: "All Asia is being per-
meated with modern industry and present-day mechani-
cal progress." ^ And Sir Theodore Morison concludes
^Clarence Poe, "What the Orient can Teach Us," World's Work, July,
1911.
2 C. S. Cooper, The Modernizing of the Orient, p. 5 (New York, 1914).
280 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
regarding India's economic future: "India's industrial
transformation is near at hand; the obstacles which have
hitherto prevented the adoption of modern methods of
manufacture have been removed; means of transport
have been spread over the face of the whole country,
capital for the purchase of machinery and erection of
factories may now be borrowed on easy terms; me-
chanics, engineers, and business managers may be hired
from Europe to train the future captains of Indian in-
dustry; in English a common language has been found
in which to transact business with all the pro\'inces of
India and with a great part of the Western world; se-
curity from foreign invasion and internal commotion
justifies the inception of large enterprises. All the
conditions are favorable for a great reorganization of
industiy which, when successfully accomplished, will
bring about an increase hitherto undreamed of in In-
dia's annual output of wealth." ^
The factor usually rehed upon to overcome the Ori-
ent's handicaps of mexperience and inexpertness in in-
dustrialism is its cheap labor. To Western observers
the low wages and long hours of Eastern industry are
literally astounding. Take Egypt and India as exam-
ples of industrial conditions in the Near and Middle
East. Writing of Egypt in 1908, the English economist
H. N. Brailsford says: "There was then no Factory Act
in Egypt. There are all over the country ginning-mills,
which employ casual labor to prepare raw cotton for
export, during four or five months of the year. The
wages were low, from 73^d. to lOd. (15 to 20 cents) a
day for an adult, and 6d. (12 cents) for a child, Chil-
* Moridon, op. cit., p. 242.
ECONOMIC CHANGE 281
dren and adults alike worked sometimes for twelve,
usually for fifteen, and on occasion even for sixteen or
eighteen hours a day. In the height of the season even
the children were put on night shifts of twelve hours." ^
In India conditions are about the same. The first
thorough investigation of Indian industry was made in
1907 by a factory labor commission, and the follow-
ing are some of the data published in its report: In the
cotton-mills of Bombay the hours regularly worked ran
from 13 to 14 hours. In the jute-mills of Calcutta the
operatives usually worked 15 hours. Cotton-ginning
factories required their employees to work 17 and 18
hours a day, rice and flour mills 20 to 22 hours, and an
extreme case was found in a printing works where the
men had to work 22 hours a day for seven consecutive
days. As to wages, an adult male operative, working
from 13 to 15 hours a day, received from 15 to 20 rupees
a month ($5 to $6.35). Child labor was very prevalent,
children six and seven years old working "half-time" —
in many cases 8 hours a day. As a result of this report
legislation was passed by the Indian Government better-
ing working conditions somewhat, especially for women
and children. But in 1914 the French economist Albert
Metin, after a careful study, reported factory conditions
not greatly changed, the Factory Acts systematically
evaded, hours very long, and wages extremely low. In
Bombay men were earning from 10 cents to 20 cents per
day, the highest wages being 30 cents. For women and
children the maximum was 10 cents per day.^
With such extraordinarily low wages and long hours
^H. N. Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, p. 114 (London, 1915).
* A. Metin, L'Inde d'aujourd'huil>: Stude sociale, p. 336 (Paris, 1918).
282 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
of labor it might at first sight seem as though, given
adequate capital and up-to-date machinery; the Orient
could not only drive Occidental products from Eastern
markets but might invade Western markets as well.
This, indeed, has been the fear of many Western writ-
ers. Nearly three-quarters of a century ago Gobineau
prophesied an industrial invasion of Europe from Asia,^
and of late years economists like H. N. Brailsford have
warned against an emigration of Western capital to the
tempting lure of factory conditions in Eastern lands.^
Nevertheless, so far as the Near and Middle East is
concerned, nothing like this has as 3'et materialized.
China, to be sure, may yet have unpleasant surprises
in store for the West,^ but neither the Moslem world nor
India have developed factory labor with the skill, stam-
ina, and assiduity sufficient to undercut the industrial
workers of Europe and America. In India, for exam-
ple, despite a swarming and poverty-stricken popula-
tion, the factories are unable to recruit an adequate or
dependable labor-supply. Says M. Metin: "With such
long hours and low wages it might be thought that In-
dian industrj^ would be a formidable competitor of the
West. This is not so. The reason is the bad quality
of the work. The poorly paid coolies are so badly fed
and so weak that it takes at least three of them to do the
work of one European. Also, the Indian workers lack
not only strength but also skill, attention, and liking
for their work. ... An Indian of the people will do
* In his book, Trois Ans en Perse (Paris, 1S58).
2 Brailsford, op. cit., pp. 83, 114-115.
' Regarding conditions in China, especially the extraordinary disci-
pline and working ability of the Chinaman, see my Rising Tide of Color
against White World-Supremacy, pp. 28-30, 243-251.
ECONOMIC CHANGE 283
anything else in preference to becoming a factory opera-
tive. The factories thus get only the dregs of the work-
ing class. The workers come to the factories and mines
as a last resort; they leave as soon as they can return
to their prior occupations or find a more remunerative
employment. Thus the factories can never count on
a regular labor-supply. Would higher wages remedy
this? Many employers say no — as soon as the workers
got a little ahead they would quit, either temporarily
till their money was spent, or permanently for some
more congenial calling." ^ These statements are fully
confirmed by an Indian economic writer, who says:
"One of the greatest drawbacks to the establishment of
large industries in India is the scarcity and inefficiency
of labor. Cheap labor, where there is no physical stam-
ina, mental discipline, and skill behind it, tends to be
costly in the end. The Indian laborer is mostly unedu-
cated. He is not in touch with his employers or with
his work. The laboring population of the towns is a
flitting, dilettante population." ^
Thus Indian industry, despite its very considerable
growth, has not come up to early expectations. As the
official Year-Book very frankly states: "India, in short,
is a country rich in raw materials and in industrial pos-
sibilities, but poor in manufacturing accomplishments." ^
In fact, to some observers, India's industrial future
seems far from bright. As a competent Enghsh student
of Indian conditions recently wrote: "Some years ago
it seemed possible that India might, by a rapid assimila-
> M^tin, op. cit., p. 337.
^ A. Yusuf All, Life and Labor in India, p. 183 (London, 1907).
» "India in the Years 1917-1918" (official publication — Calcutta).
284 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
tion of Western knowledge and technical skill; adapt
for her own conditions the methods of modem industry,
and so reach an approximate economic level. Some
even now threaten the Western world with a vision of
the vast populations of China and India rising up with
skilled organization, vast resources, and comparatively
cheap labor to impoverish the West. To the present
writer this is a mere bogey. The peril is of a very dif-
ferent kind. Instead of a growing approximation, he
sees a growing disparity. For every step India takes
toward mechanical efficiency, the West takes two.
WTien India is beginning to use bicycles and motor-cars
(not to make them), the West is perfecting the aero-
plane. That is merely symbohc. The war, as we know,
has speeded up mechanical invention and produced a
population of mechanics; but India has stood compara-
tively still. It is, up to now, overwhelmingly mediaeval,
a country of domestic industry and handicrafts. Me-
chanical power, even of the simplest, has not yet been
applied to its chief industry — agriculture. Yet the
period of age-long isolation is over, and India can never
go back to it; nevertheless, the gap between East and
West is widening. What is to be the outcome for her
300 millions? We are in danger in the East of seeing
the worst e^dls of commercialism developed on an enor-
mous scale, with the vast population of India the vic-
tims — of seeing the East become a world slum." ^
Whether or not this pessimistic outlook is justified,
certain it is that not merely India but the entire Orient
is in a stage of profound transition; and transition pe-
riods are always painful times. We have been consider-
^ Young & Ferrers, India in Conflict, pp. 15-17 (London, 1920).
ECONOMIC CHANGE 285
ing the new industrial proletariat of the towns. But
the older social classes are affected in very similar fash-
ion. The old-type handicraftsman and small merchant
are obviously menaced by modern industrial and busi-
ness methods, and the peasant masses are in little better
shape. It is not merely a change in technic but a
fundamental difference in. outlook on life that is in-
volved. The life of the old Orient, while there was
much want and hardship, was an easy-going life, with
virtually no thought of such matters as time, efficiency,
output, and "turnover." The merchant sat cross-
legged in his little booth amid his small stock of wares,
passively waiting for trade, chaffering interminably with
his customers, annoyed rather than pleased if brisk
business came his way. The artisan usually worked
by and for himself, keeping his own hours and knock-
ing off whenever he chose. The peasant arose with the
dawn, but around noon he and his animals lay down for
a long nap and slept until, in the cool of afternoon, they
awoke, stretched themselves, and, comfortably and cas-
ually, went to work again.
To such people the speed, system, and discipline of
our economic life are painfully repugnant, and adapta-
tion can at best be effected only very slowly and under
the compulsion of the direst necessity. Meanwhile
they suffer from the competition of those better equipped
In the economic battle. Sir William Ramsay paints a
striking picture of the way in which the Turkish popu-
lation of Asia Minor, from landlords and merchants to
simple peasants, have been going down-hill for the last
half-century under the economic pressure not merely
of Westerners but of the native Christian elements,
286 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
Armenians and Greeks, who had partially assimilated
Western business ideas and methods. Under the old
state of things, he says, there was in Asia Minor "no
economic progress and no mercantile development;
things went on in the old fashion, year after year. Such
simple business as was carried on was inconsistent with
the highly developed Western business system and West-
ern civilization; but it was not oppressive to the people.
There were no large fortunes; there was no opportunity
for making a great fortune; it was impossible for one
man to force into his service the minds and the work
of a large number of people, and so to create a great
organization out of which he might make big profits.
There was a very large number of small men doing busi-
ness on a small scale." ^ Sir William Ramsay then goes
on to describe the shattering of this archaic economic
life by modern business methods, to the consequent
impoverishment of all classes of the unadaptable Turkish
population.
How the agricultural classes, peasants and landlords
alike, are suffering from changing economic conditions
is well exemplified by the recent history of India. Says
the French writer Chailley, an authoritative student
of Indian problems: "For the last half-centur}'' large
fractions of the agricultural classes are being entirely
despoiled of their lands or reduced to onerous tenancies.
On the other hand, new classes are rising and taking
their place. . . . Both ryots and zamindars^ are in-
volved. The old-type nobiHty has not advanced with
^Sir W. M. Ramsay, "The Turkish Peasantry of Anatolia," Quarterly
Review, January, 1918.
2 /. e., peasants and landlords.
ECONOMIC CHANGE 287
the times. It remains idle and prodigal, while the
peasant proprietors, burdened by the traditions of many
centuries, are likewise improvident and ignorant. On
the other hand, the economic conditions of British In-
dia are producing capitalists who seek employment for
their wealth. A conflict between them and the old
landholders was predestined, and the result was inevita-
ble. Wealth goes to the cleverest, and the land must
pass into the hands of new masters, to the great indig-
nation of the agricultural classes, a portion of whom will
be reduced to the position of farm-laborers." ^
The Hindu economist Mukerjee thus depicts the dis-
integration and decay of the Indian village: "New eco-
nomic ideas have now begun to influence the minds of
the villagers. Some are compelled to leave their occu-
pations on account of foreign competition, but more
are leaving their hereditary occupations of their own
accord. The Brahmins go to the cities to seek govern-
ment posts or professional careers. The middle classes
also leave their villages and get scattered all over the
country to earn a living. The peasants also leave their
ancestral acres and form a class of landless agricultural
laborers. The villages, drained of their best blood,
stagnate and decay. The movement from the village
to the city is in fact not only working a complete revolu-
tion in the habits and ideals of our people, but its eco-
nomic consequences are far more serious than are ordi-
narily supposed. It has made our middle classes help-
lessly subservient to employment and service, and has
also killed the independence of our peasant proprietors.
* J. Chailley, Administrative Problems of British India, p. 339 (London^
1910 — English translation).
288 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
It has jeopardized our food-supply, and is fraught with
the gravest peril not only to our handicrafts but also to
our national industry — agriculture." ^
Happily there are signs that, in Indian agriculture
at least, the transition period is working itself out and
that conditions may soon be on the mend. Both the
British Government and the native princes have vied
with one another in spreading Western agricultural ideas
and methods, and since the Indian peasant has proved
much more receptive than has the Indian artisan, a more
intelligent type of farmer is developing, better able to
keep step with the times. A good instance is the growth
of rural co-operative credit societies. First iii"troduced
by the British Government in 1904, there were in 1915
more than 17,000 such associations, with a total of 825,-
000 members and a working capital of nearly $30,000,-
000. These agricultural societies make loans for the
purchase of stock, fodder, seed, manure, sinking of wells,
purchase of Western agricultural machineiy, and, in
emergencies, personal maintenance. In the districts
where they have established themselves they have
greatly diminished the plague of usury practised by the
"banyas," or village money-lenders, lowering the rate of
interest from its former crushing range of 20 to 75 per
cent to a range averaging from 9 to 18 per cent. Of
course such phenomena are as yet merely exceptions to
a very dreary rule. Nevertheless, they all point toward
a brighter morrow.^
* Mukerjee, op. oil., p. 9.
2 On the co-operative movement in India, aee Fisher, India's Silent
Revolution, pp. 54-58; R. B. Ewebank, "The Co-operative Movement in
India," Quarterly Review, April, 1916. India's economic problems, both
agricultural and industrial, have been carefully studied by a large number
ECONOMIC CHANGE 289
But this brighter agricultural morrow is obviously
far off, and in industry it seems to be farther still. Mean-
while the changing Orient is full of suffering and dis-
content. What wonder that many Orientals ascribe
their troubles, not to the process of economic transition,
but to the political control of European governments
and the economic exploitation of Western capital.
The result is agitation for emancipation from Western
economic as well as Western political control. At the
end of Chapter II we examined the movement among
the Mohammedan peoples known as "Economic Pan-
Islamism." A similar movement has arisen among the
Hindus of India — the so-called "Swadeshi" movement.
The Swadeshists declare that India's economic iUs are
almost entirely due to the "drain" of India's wealth to
England and other Western lands. They therefore
advocate a boycott of English goods until Britain grants
India self-government, whereupon they propose to erect
protective tariffs for Indian products, curb the activi-
ties of British capital, replace high-salaried Enghsh
officials by natives, and thereby keep India's wealth
at home.^
of Indian economists, some of whose writings are extremely interesting.
Some of the most noteworthy books, besides those of Mukerjee and Yusuf
AU, already quoted, are: Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule
in India (London, 1901); Romesh Dutt, The Economic History of India
in the Victorian Age (London, 1906); H. H. Gosh, The Advancement of
Industry (Calcutta, 1910) ; P. C. Ray, The Poverty Problem in India (Cal-
cutta, 1895); M. G. Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics (Madras, 1920);
Jadunath Sarkar, Economics of British India (Calcutta, 1911).
^ The best compendiimi of Swadeshist opinion is the volume contain-
ing pronouncements from all the Swadeshi leaders, entitled. The Swa-
deshi Movement : A Symposium (Madras, 1910). See also writings of the
economists Gosh, Mukerjee, Ray, and Sarkar, above quoted, as well as the
various writings of the nationahst agitator Lajpat Rai. A good summary
interpretation is found in M. Glotz, "Le Mouvement 'Swadeshi' dans
rinde," Revue du Mois, July, 1913.
290 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
All analysis of these Swadeshist arguments, however,
reveals them as inadequate to account for India's ills,
which are due far more to the general economic trend of
the times than to any specific defects of the British con-
nection. British governance and British capital do cost
money, but their undoubted efficiency in producing
peace, order, security, and development must be con-
sidered as offsets to the higher costs which native rule
and native capital would impose. As Sir Theodore
Morison well says: "The advantages which the British
Navy and British credit confer on India are a liberal
offset to her expenditure on pensions and gratuities to
her English sei'vants. . . . India derives a pecuniary
advantage from her connection with the British Empire.
The answer, then, which I give to the question 'What
economic equivalent does India get for foreign pay-
ments?' is this: India gets the equipment of modern
industiy, and she gets an administration favorable to
economic evolution cheaper than she could provide it
herself." ^ A comparison with Japan's much more
costly defense budgets, inferior credit, and higher in-
terest charges on both public and private loans is en-
lightening on this point.
In fact, some Indians themselves admit the fallacy of
Swadesliist arguments. As one of them remarks: "The
so-called economic 'drain' is nonsense. Most of the
misery of late years is due to the rising cost of living — a
world-wide phenomenon." And in proof of this he cites
conditions in other Oriental countries, especially Japan.-
^ Sir T. Morison, The Economic Transition in India, pp. 240-241. Also
Bee Sir Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest, pp. 255-279; William Archer,
India and the Future, pp. 131-157.
2 Syed Sirdar Ali Khan, hidia oj Today, p. 19 (Bombay, 1908).
ECONOMIC CHANGE 291
As warm a friend of the Indian people as the British
labor leader, Ramsay Macdonald, states: "One thing
is quite evident: a tariff wiU not re-estabhsh the old
hand-industry of India nor help to revive village handi-
crafts. Factory and machine production, native to
India itself, will throttle them as effectively as that of
Lancashire and Birmingham has done in the past." ^
Even more trenchant are the criticisms fomiulated by
the Hindu writer Pramatha Nath Bose." The "drain,"
says Mr. Bose, is ruining India. But would the Home
Rule programme, as envisaged by most Swadeshists,
cure India's economic ills? Under Home Rule these
people would do the following things: (1) Substitute
Englishmen for Indians in the Administration; (2) levy
protective duties on Indian products; (3) grant state
encouragement to Indian industries; (4) disseminate
technical education. Now, how would these matters
work out? The substitution of Indian for British offi-
cials would not lessen the "drain " as much as most
Home Rulers think. The high-placed Indian officials
who already exist have acquired European standards
of hving, so the new official corps would cost almost
as much as the old. Also, "the influence of the ex-
ample set by the well-to-do Indian officials would per-
meate Indian society more largely than at present, and
the demand for Western articles would rise in propor-
tion. So commercial exploitation by foreigners would
not only continue almost as if they were Europeans, but
might even increase." As to a protective tariff, it would
attract European capital to India which would ex-ploit
* J. Ramsay Macdonald, The Government of India, p. 133 (London, 1920).
'In The Hindustan Review (Calcutta), 1917.
292 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
labor and skim the profits. India has shown relatively
little capacity for indigenous industrial development. Of
course, even at low wages, many Indians might benefit,
yet such persons would form only a tithe of the millions
now starving — ^besides the fact that this industrialization
would bring in many new social evils. As to state en-
couragement of industries, this would bring in Western
capital even more than a protective tariff, with the re-
sults already stated. As for technical education, it is a
worthy project, but, says Mr. Bose, "I am afraid the
movement is too late, now. Within the last thirty years
the Westerners and the Japanese have gone so far ahead
of us industrially that it has been yearly becoming
more and more difficult to compete with them."
In fact, Mr. Bose goes on to criticise the whole system
of Western education, as applied to India. Neither
higher nor lower education have proven panaceas.
"Higher education has led to the material prosperity of
a small section of our community, comprising a few
thousands of well-to-do lawyers, doctors, and State
servants. But their occupations being of a more or
less unproductive or parasitic character, their well-
being does not solve the problem of the improvement
of India as a whole. On the contrary, as their taste
for imported articles develops in proportion to their
prosperity, they help to swell rather than diminish the
economic drain from the country which is one of the
chief causes of our impoverishment." Neither has ele-
mentary education "on the whole furthered the well-
being of the multitude. It has not enabled the culti-
vators to ^grow two blades where one grew before.'
On the contrary, it has distinctly diminished their effi-
ECONOMIC CHANGE 293
ciency by inculcating in the literate proletariat; who
constitute the cream of their class, a strong distaste for
their hereditary mode of living and their hereditary call-
ings, and an equally strong taste for shoddy superflui-
ties and brummagem fineries, and for occupations of a
more or less parasitic character. They have, directly
or indirectly, accelerated rather than retarded the de-
cadence of indigenous industries, and have thus helped
to aggravate their own economic difficulties and those
of the entire community. \Yha,t they want is more
food — and New India vies with the Government in giv-
ing them what is called 'education' that does not in-
crease their food-earning capacity, but on the contrary
fosters in them tastes and habits which make them de-
spise indigenous products and render them fit subjects
for the exploitation of scheming capitalists, mostly
foreign. Political and economic causes could not have
led to the extinction of indigenous industry if they had
not been aided by change of taste fostered by the West-
ern environment of which the so-called 'education' is
a powerful factor."
From all this Mr. Bose concludes that none of the
reforms advocated by the Home Rulers would cure
India's ills. "In fact, the chances are, she would be
more inextricably entangled in the toils of Western civi-
lization, without any adequate compensating advantage,
and the grip of the West would close on her to crush
her more effectively." Therefore, according to Mr.
Bose, the only thing for India to do is to turn her back
on everything Western and plunge resolutely into the
traditional past. As he expresses it: "India's salvation
hes, not in the region of poHtics, but outside it; not in
294 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
aspiring to be one of the 'great' nations of the present
day, but in retiring to her humble position — a position,
to my mind; of solitary grandeur and glory; not in going
forward on the path of Western civihzation, but in going
back from it so far as practicable; not in getting more
and more entangled in the silken meshes of its finely
knit, wide-spread net, but in escaping from it as far as
possible."
Such are the drastic conclusions of Mr. Bose; conclu-
sions shared to a certain extent by other Indian idealists
like Rabindranath Tagore. But surely such projects,
however idealistic, are the vainest fantasies. "Whole
peoples cannot arbitrarily cut themselves off from the
rest of the world, like isolated individuals forswearing
society and setting up as anchorites in the jungle. The
time for "hermit nations" has passed, especially for a
vast countiy like India, set at the crossroads of the
East, open to the sea, and already profoundly penetrated
by Western ideas.
Nevertheless, such criticisms, appealing as they do to
the strong strain of asceticism latent in the Indian na-
ture, have affected many Indians who, while unable to
concur in the conclusions, still try to evolve a "middle
term," retaining everything congenial in the old system
and grafting on a select set of Western innovations.
Accordingly, these persons have elaborated programmes
for a "new order" built on a blend of Hindu mysticism,
caste. Western industry, and socialism.^
Now these schemes are highly ingenious. But they
are not convincing. Their authors should remember
* Good examples are found in the writings of Mukerjee and Lajpat Rai,
already quoted.
ECONOMIC CHANGE 295
the old adage that you cannot eat your cake and have it
too. When we realize the abysmal antithesis between
the economic systems of the old East and the modern
West; any attempt to combine the most congenial points
of both while eschewing their defects seems an attempt
to reconcile irreconcilables and about as profitable as
trying to square the circle. As Lowes Dickinson wisely
observes: "CiviHzation is a whole. Its art, its rehgion,
its way of life, all hang together with its economic and
technical development. I doubt whether a nation can
pick and choose; whether, for instance, the East can
say, 'We will take from the West its battle-ships, its
factories, its medical science; we will not take its social
confusion, its hurry and fatigue, its ugliness, its over-
emphasis on activity.' ... So I expect the East to
follow us, whether it like it or no, into all these excesses,
and to go right through, not round, all that we have
been through on its way to a higher phase of civiliza-
tion." 1
This seems to be substantially true. Judged by the
overwhelming body of evidence, the East, in its contem-
porary process of transformation, will follow the West —
avoiding some of our more patent mistakes, perhaps,
but, in the main, proceeding along similar lines. And,
as already stated, this transformation is modifying
every phase of Eastern life. We have already examined
the process at work in the religious, political, and eco-
nomic phases. To the social phase let us now turn.
1 G. Lowes Dickinson, An Essay on the Civilizations of India, China,
and Japan, pp. 84-85 (London, 1914).
CHAPTER VIII
SOCIAL CHANGE
The momentous nature of the contemporary trans-
formation of the Orient is nowhere better attested than
by the changes effected in the Hves of its peoples. That
dynamic influence of the West which is modifying gov-
ernmental formS; political concepts, religious beliefs, and
economic processes is proving equally potent in the range
of social phenomena. In the third chapter of this vol-
ume we attempted a general survey of Western influence
along all the above lines. In the present chapter w^e
shall attempt a detailed consideration of the social
changes which are to-day taking place.
These social changes are very great, albeit many of
them may not be so apparent as the changes in other
fields. So firm is the hold of custom and tradition on
individual, family, and group life in the Orient that
superficial observers of the East are prone to assert
that these matters are still substantially unaltered, how-
ever pronounced may have been the changes on the ex-
ternal, material side. Yet such is not the opinion of
the closest students of the Orient, and it is most em-
phatically not the opinion of Orientals themselves.
These generally stress the profoimd social changes which
are going on.
And it is their judgments which seem to be the more
correct. To say that the East is advancing "materi-
296
SOCIAL CHANGE 297
ally" but standing still "socially" is to ignore the ele-
mental truth that social systems are altered quite as
much by material things as by abstract ideas. Who
that looks below the surface can deny the social, moral,
and civiHzing power of railroads, post-offices, and tele-
graph lines? Does it mean nothing socially as well as
materially that the East is adopting from the West a
myriad innovations, weighty and trivial, important
and frivolous, useful and baneful? Does it mean noth-
ing socially as well as materially that the Prophet's
tomb at Medina is ht by electricity and that picture
post-cards are sold outside the Holy Kaaba at Mecca?
It may seem mere grotesque piquancy that the muezzin
should ride to the mosque in a tram-car, or that the
Moslem business man should emerge from his harem,
read his morning paper, motor to an office equipped with
a prayer-rug, and turn from his devotions to dictaphone
and telephone. Yet why assume that his life is moulded
by mosque, harem, and prayer-rug, and yet deny the
things of the West a commensurate share in the shaping
of his social existence ? Now add to these tangible inno-
vations intangible novelties like scientific education,
Occidental amusements, and the partial emancipation
of women, and we begin to get some idea of the depth
and scope of the social transformation which is going
on.
In those parts of the Orient most open to Western
influences this social transformation has attained nota-
ble proportions for more than a generation. When the
Hungarian Orientalist Vambery returned to Constanti-
nople in 1896 after forty years' absence, he stood amazed
at the changes which had taken place, albeit Constan-
298 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
tinople was then subjected to the worst repression of
the Hamidian regime. "I had/' he writes, "continually
to ask myself this question: Is it possible that these are
my Turks of 1856; and how can all these transformations
have taken place? I was astonished at the aspect of
the city; at the stone buildings which had replaced the
old wooden ones; at the animation of the streets, in
which carriages and tram-cars abounded, whereas forty
years before only saddle-animals were used; and when
the strident shriek of the locomotive mingled with the
melancholy calls from the minarets, all that I saw and
heard seemed to me a living protest against the old
adage: 'la bidaat fil Islam' — 'there is nothing to reform
in Islam.' My astonishment became still greater when
I entered the houses and was able to appreciate the
people, not only by their exteriors but still more by their
manner of thought. The effendi class^ of Constanti-
nople seemed to me completely transformed in its con-
duct, outlook, and attitude toward foreigners." ^
Vambery stresses the inward as well as outward evolu-
tion of the Turkish educated classes, for he says: "Not
only in his outward aspect, but also in his home-life,
the present-day Turk shows a strong inclination to the
manners and habits of the West, in such varied matters
as furniture, table-manners, sex-relations, and so forth.
This is of the very greatest significance. For a people
may, to be sure, assimilate foreign influences in the
intellectual field, if it be persuaded of their utility and
advantage; but it gives up with more difficulty customs
and habits which are in the blood. One cannot over-
^ /. e., the educated upper class.
' Vambery, La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et diavard Quarante Ans, p. 13.
SOCIAL CHANGE 299
estimate the numerous sacrifices which, despite every-
thing, the Turks have made in this line. I find all Turk-
ish society, even the Mollahs,^ penetrated with the
necessity of a union with Western civilization. Opin-
ions may differ as to the method of assimilation: some
wish to impress on the foreign civilization a national
character; others, on the contrary, are partisans of our
intellectual culture, such as it is, and reprobate any kind
of modification." ^
Most significant of all, Vambery found even the se-
cluded women of the harems, "those bulwarks of obscur-
antism," notably changed. "Yes, I repeat, the life of
women in Tiu-key seems to me to have been radically
transformed in the last forty years, and it cannot be de-
nied that this transformation has been produced by in-
ternal conviction as much as by external pressure."
Noting the spread of female education, and the in-
creasing share of women in reform movements, Vambery
remarks: "This is of vital importance, for when women
shall begin to act in the family as a factor of modem
progress, real reforms, in society as well as in the state,
cannot fail to appear." ^
In India a similar permeation of social life by West-
ernism is depicted by the Moslem hberal, S. Khuda
Bukhsh, albeit Mr. Bukhsh, being an insider, lays greater
emphasis upon the painful aspects of the inevitable
transition process from old to new. He is not unduly
pessimistic, for he recognizes that "the age of transition
is necessarily to a certain extent an age of laxity of mor-
als, indifference to rehgion, superficial culture, and gos-
siping levity. These are passing ills which time itself
^ /. e., the priestly class. ' Ibid., p. 15. ' Ibid., p. 51.
300 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
will cure." Nevertheless^ he does not minimize the
critical aspects of the present situation, which implies
nothing less than the breakdown of the old social sys-
tem. "The clearest result of this breakdown of our
old system of domestic life and social customs under
the assault of European ideas/' he says, "is to be found
in two directions — in our religious behefs and in our so-
cial Hfe. The old system, with all its faults, had many
redeeming virtues." To-day this old system, narrow-
minded but God-fearing, has been replaced by a "strange
independence of thought and action. Reverence for
age, respect for our elders, deference to the opinions of
others, are fast disappearing. . . . Under the older
system the head of the family was the sole guide and
friend of its members. His word had the force of law.
He was, so to speak, the custodian of the honor and
prestige of the family. From this exalted position he
is now dislodged, and the most junior member now
claims equality with him." ^
Mr. Bukhsh deplores the current wave of extrava-
gance, due to the wholesale adoption of European cus-
toms and modes of Hving. "What," he asks, "has
happened here in India? We have adopted European
costume, European ways of living, even the European
vices of drinking and gambling, but none of their vir-
tues. This must be remedied. We must learn at the
feet of Europe, but not at the sacrifice of our Eastern
individuality. But this is precisely what we have not
done. We have dabbled a Httle in Enghsh and Euro-
pean history, and we have commenced to despise our
religion, our literature, our history, our traditions. We
» Bukhsh, Essays: Indian and Islamic, pp. 221-226.
SOCIAL CHANGE 301
have unlearned the lessons of our history and our civili-
zation, and in their place we have secured nothing solid
and substantial to hold society fast in the midst of end-
less changes." In fine: "Destruction has done its work,
but the work of construction has not yet begun." ^
Like Vamb^ry, Bukhsh lays strong emphasis on the
increasing emancipation of women. No longer regarded
as mere "child-bearing machines," the Mohammedan
women of India "are getting educated day by day, and
now assert their rights. Though the purdah system ^
still prevails, it is no longer that severe, stringent, and
unreasonable seclusion of women which existed fifty
years ago. It is gradually relaxing, and women are
getting, step by step, rights and liberties which must in
course of time end in the complete emancipation of
Eastern womanhood. Forty years ago women meekly
submitted to neglect, indifference, and even harsh treat-
ment from their husbands, but such is the case no
longer." ^
These two descriptions of social conditions in the Near
and Middle East respectively enable one to get a fair
idea of the process of change which is going on. Of
course it must not be forgotten that both writers deal
primarily with the educated upper classes of the large
towns. Nevertheless, the leaven is working steadily
downward, and with every decade is affecting wider
strata of the native populations.
The spread of Western education in the East during
the past few decades has been truly astonishing, because
1 Ibid., p. 240.
2 The purdah is the curtain separating the women's apartments from
the rest of the house.
« Ibid., pp. 254-255.
302 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
it is the exact antithesis of the Oriental educational sys-
tem. The traditional "education" of the entire Orient,
from Morocco to China, was a mere memorizing of sa-
cred texts combined with exercises of rehgious devotion.
The Mohammedan or Hindu student spent long years
reciting to his master (a "holy man") interminable
passages from books which, being written in classic
Arabic or Sanskrit, were unintelligible to him, so that
he usually did not understand a word of what he was
saying. No more deadening system for the intellect
could possibly have been devised. Every part of the
brain except the memory atrophied, and the wonder is
that any intellectual initiative or original thinking ever
appeared.
Even to-day the old system persists, and miUions of
young Orientals are still wasting their time at this mind-
petrifjdng nonsense. But alongside the old there has
arisen a new system, running the whole educational
gamut from kindergartens to universities, where Orien-
tal youth is being educated along Western lines. These
new-t}"pe educational establishments are of every kind.
Besides schools and universities giving a liberal educa-
tion and fitting students for government service or the
professions, there are numerous technical schools turn-
ing out skilled agriculturists or engineers, while good
normal schools assure a supply of teachers qualified to
instruct coming student-generations. Both public and
private effort furthers Western education in the East.
All the European governments have favored Western
education in the lands under their control, particularly
the British in India and Egj^t, while various Christian
missionary bodies have covered the East with a net-
Social change 303
work of schools and colleges. Also many Oriental gov-
ernments like Turkey and the native states of India
have made sincere efforts to spread Western education
among their peoples.^
Of course, as in any new development, the results so
far obtained are far from ideal. The vicious traditions
of the past handicap or partially pervert the efforts of
the present. Eastern students are prone to use their
memories rather than their intellects, and seek to cram
their way quickly through examinations to coveted posts
rather than acquire knowledge and thus really fit them-
selves for their careers. The result is that many fail,
and these unfortunates, half-educated and spoiled for
any sort of useful occupation, vegetate miserably, come
to hate that Westernism which they do not understand,
and give themselves up to anarchistic revolutionary
agitation. Sir Alfred Lyall well describes the dark side
of Western education in the East when he says of India:
"Ignorance is unquestionably the root of many evils;
and it was natural that in the last century certain phi-
losophers should have assumed education to be a certain
cure for human delusions; and that statesmen Hke Ma-
caulay should have declared education to be the best and
surest remedy for political discontent and for law-break-
ing. In any case, it was the clear and imperative duty
of the British Government to attempt the intellectual
emancipation of India as the best justification of British
rule. We have since discovered by experience, that,
although education is a sovereign remedy for many ills — •
' For progress in Western education in the Orient, under both European
and native auspices, see L. Bertrand, Le Mirage oriental, pp. 291- -392;
C. S. Cooper, The Modernizing of the Orient, pp. 3-13; 24-64.
304 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
is indeed indispensable to healthy progress — yet an in-
discriminate or superficial administration of this potent
medicine may engender other disorders. It acts upon
the frame of an antique society as a powerful dissolvent,
heating weak brains, stimulating rash ambitions, rais-
ing inordinate expectations of which the disappointment
is bitterly resented." ^
Indeed, some Western observers of the Orient, particu-
larly colonial officials, have been so much impressed by
the political and social dangers arising from the existence
of this "Hterate proletariat" of semieducated failures
that they are tempted to condemn the whole venture
of Western education in the East as a mistake. Lord
Cromer, for example, was decidedly sceptical of the
worth of the Western-educated Egyptian,^ while a
prominent Anglo-Indian official names as the chief
cause of Indian unrest, "the system of education, which
we ourselves introduced — advisedly so far as the limited
vision went of those responsible; blindly in view of the
inevitable consequences." ^
Yet these pessimistic judgments do not seem to make
due allowance for the inescapable evils attendant on
any transition stage. Other observers of the Orient
have made due allowance for this factor. Vambery,
for instance, notes the high percentage of honest and
capable native officials in the British Indian and French
North African civil service (the bulk of these officials, of
course, Western-educated men), and concludes: "Strictly
conservative Orientals, and also fanatically inclined
* In his Introduction to Sir Valentine Chirol's Indian Unrest, p. xii.
2 Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. II, pp. 228-243.
3 J. D. Rees, The Real India, p. 162 (London, 1908).
SOCIAL CHANGE 305
Europeans, think that with the entrance of our culture
the primitive virtues of the Asiatics have been destroyed,
and that the uncivihzed Oriental was more faithful,
more honest, and more rehable than the Asiatic edu-
cated on European principles. This is a gross error. It
may be true of the half-educated, but not of the Asiatic
in whose case the intellectual evolution is founded on
the solid basis of a thorough, systematic education." ^
And, whatever may be the ills attendant upon West-
em education in the East, is it not the only practicable
course to pursue? The impact of Westernism upon the
Orient is too ubiquitous to be confined to books. Grant-
ing, therefore, for the sake of argument, that colonial
governments could have prevented Western education
in the formal sense, would not the Oriental have learned
in other ways? Surely it is better that he should learn
through good texts under the supervision of qualified
teachers, rather than tortuously in perverted — and more
dangerous — fashion .
The importance of Western education in the East is
nowhere better illustrated than in the effects it is pro-
ducing in ameliorating the status of women. The de-
pressed condition of women throughout the Orient is
too well known to need elaboration. Bad enough in
Mohammedan countries, it is perhaps at its worst among
the Hindus of India, with child-marriage, the virtual'
enslavement of widows (burned alive till prohibited by
English law), and a seclusion more strict" even than that
of the "harem" of Moslem lands. As an English writer
weU puts it: "'Ladies first,' we say in the West; in the
East it is 'ladies last.' That sums up succinctly the dif-
1 Vamb^ry, Western Culture in Eastern Lands, pp. 203-204.
306 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
ference in the domestic ideas of the two civihzations." ^
Under these circumstances it might seem as though
no breath of the West could yet have reached these jeal-
ously secluded creatures. Yet, as a matter of fact.
Western influences have already profoundly affected
the women of the upper classes, and female education,
while far behind that of the males, has attained con-
siderable proportions. In the more advanced parts of
the Orient Hke Constantinople, Cairo, and the cities
of India, distinctly "modern" types of women have
appeared, the self-supporting, self-respecting — and re-
spected — woman school-teacher being especially in evi-
dence.
The social consequences of this rising status of women,
not only to women themselves but also to the com-
munity at large, are very important. In the East the
harem is, as Vambery well says, the "bulwark of ob-
scurantism." ^ Ignorant and fanatical herself, the ha-
rem woman implants her ignorance and fanaticism in
her sons as well as in her daughters. What could be a
worse handicap for the Eastern "intellectual" than his
boyhood years spent "behind the veil"? No wonder
that enlightened Oriental fathers have been in the
habit of sending their boys to school at the earliest pos-
sible age in order to get them as soon as possible out of
the stultif5dng atmosphere of harem life. Yet even this
has proved merely a palliative. Childhood impressions
are ever the most lasting, and so long as one-half of the
Orient remained untouched by progressive influences.
^ H. E. Compton, Indian Life in Tovm and Country, p. 98 (London,
1904).
2 Vambery, La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante A7is, p. 32.
SOCIAL CHANGE 307
Oriental progress had to be begun again de novo with
eveTj succeeding generation.
The increasing number of enlightened Oriental women
is remedying this fatal defect. As a Western writer
well says: "Give the mothers education and the whole
situation is transformed. Girls who are learning other
things than the unintelligible phrases of the Koran are
certain to impart such knowledge, as daughters, sisters,
and mothers, to their respective households. Women
who learn housewifery, methods of modern cooking,
sewing, and sanitation in the domestic-economy schools,
are bound to cast about the home upon their return the
atmosphere of a civilized community. The old-time
picture of the Oriental woman spending her hours upon
divans, eating sweetmeats, and indulging in petty and
degrading gossip with the servants or with women as
ignorant as herself, \^dll be changed. The new woman
will be a companion rather than a slave or a toy of her
husband. Marriage will advance from the stage of a
paltiy trade in bodies to something Hke a real union,
involving respect toward the woman by both sons and
fathers, while in a new pride of relationship the woman
herself will be discovered." ^
These men and women of the newer Orient reflect
their changing ideas in their changing standards of Hv-
ing. Although this is most evident among the wealthier
elements of the towns, it is perceptible in all classes of
the population. Rich and poor, urban and rural, the
Orientals are altering their living standards toward those
of the West. And this involves social changes of the
most far-reaching character, because few antitheses
* Cooper, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
308 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
could be sharper than the Uving conditions prevaiHng
respectively in the traditional East and in the modern
Western world. This basic difference lies, not in wealth
(the East; like the West, knows great riches as well as
great poverty), but rather in comfort — using the word in
its broad sense. The wealthy Oriental of the old school
spends most of his money on Oriental luxuries, like fine
raiment, jewels, women, horses, and a great retinue of
attendants, and then hoards the rest. But of "comfort,"
in the Western sense, he knows virtually nothing, and
it is safe to say that he lives under domestic conditions
which a Western artisan would despise.^
To-day, however, the Oriental is discovering "com-
fort." And, high or low, he likes it very well. All the
myriad things which make our lives easier and more
agreeable — ^lamps, electric lights, sewing-machines, clocks,
whiskey, umbrellas, sanitary plumbing, and a thousand
others; all these things, which to us are more or less
matters of course, are to the Oriental so many delightful
discoveries, of irresistible appeal. He wants them, and
he gets them in ever-increasing quantities. But this
produces some rather serious compHcations. His pri-
vate economy is more or less thrown out of gear. This
opening of a whole vista of new wants means a porten-
tous rise in his standard of living. And where is he
going to find the money to pay for it? If he be poor,
he has to skimp on his bare necessities. If he be rich,
he hates to forego his traditional luxuries. The upshot
is a universal growth of extravagance. And, in this
'On this point of comfort vs. luxury, see especially Sir Bampfylde
Fuller, "East and West: A Study of Differences," Nineteenth Century and
After, November, 1911.
SOCIAL CHANGE 309
connection; it is well to bear in mind that the peoples of
the Near and Middle East, taken as a whole, have never
been really thrifty. Poor the masses may have been,
and thus obliged to live frugally, but they have always
proved themselves "good spenders" when opportunity
offers. The way in which a Turkish peasant or a Hindu
ryot will squander his savings and run into debt over
festivals, marriages, funerals, and other social events is
astounding to Western observers.^ Now add to all
this the fact that in the Orient, as in the rest of the
world, the cost of the basic necessaries of life — food,
clothing, fuel, and shelter, has risen greatly during the
past two decades, and we can realize the gravity of the
problem which higher Oriental living-standards involves.^
Certain it is that the struggle for existence is grow-
ing keener and that the pressure of poverty is getting
more severe. With the basic necessaries rising in price,
and with many things considered necessities which were
considered luxuries or entirely unheard of a generation
ago, the Oriental peasant or town working man is finding
it harder and harder to make both ends meet. As one
writer well phrases it: "These altered economic condi-
tions have not as yet brought the ability to meet them.
The cost of living has increased faster than the resources
of the people." ^
' L. Bertrand, op. cit., 145-147; J. Chailley, Administrative Problems of
British India, pp. 138-139. For increased expenditure on Western prod-
ucts, see A. J. Brovra, "Economic Changes in Asia," The Century, March,
1904; J. P. Jones, "The Present Situation in India," Journal of Race
Development, July, 1910; R. Mukerjee, The Foundations of Indian Eco-
nojnics, p. 5.
^ For higher cost of living in the East, see Chirol, Indian Unrest, pp. 2-3;
Fisher, India's Silent Revolution, pp. 46-60; Jones, op. cit.; T. T. Williams,
"Inquiry into the Rise of Prices in India," Economic Journal, December,
1915.
' Brown, op. cit.
310 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
One of the main (though not sufficiently recognized)
causes of the economico-social crisis through which the
Orient is to-day passing is overpopulation. The quick
breeding tendencies of Oriental peoples have always
been proverbial, and have been due not merely to strong
sexual appetites but also to economic reasons like the
harsh exploitation of women and children, and perhaps
even more to religious doctrines enjoining early marriage
and the begetting of numerous sons. As a result, Ori-
ental populations have always pressed close upon the
limits of subsistence. In the past, however, this pres-
sure was automatically lightened by factors lil^e war,
misgovernment, pestilence, and famine, which swept
off such multitudes of people that, despite high birth-
rates, populations remained at substantially a fixed level.
But here, as in every other phase of Eastern life, West-
ern influences have radically altered the situation. The
extension of European political control over Eastern
lands has meant the putting down of internal strife,
the diminution of governmental abuses, the decrease of
disease, and the lessening of the blight of famine. In
other words, those "natural" checks which previously
kept down the population have been diminished or abol-
ished, and in response to the life-saving activities of the
West, the enormous death-rate which in the past has
kept Oriental populations from excessive multiplication
is falling to proportions comparable with the low death-
rate of Western nations. But to lower the Orient's
prodigious birth-rate is quite another matter. As a
matter of fact, that birth-rate keeps up with undimin-
ished vigor, and the consequence has been a portentous
increase of population in nearly eveiy portion of the
SOCIAL CHANGE 311
Orient under Western political control. In fact, even
those Oriental countries which have maintained their
independence have more or less adopted Western life-
conserving methods, and have experienced in greater or
less degree an accelerated increase of population.
The phenomena of overpopulation are best seen in
India. Most of India has been under British control
for the greater part of a century. Even a centuiy ago,
India was densely populated, yet in the intervening
hundred years the population has increased between
two and three fold.^ Of course, factors Hke improved
agriculture, irrigation, railways, and the introduction
of modern industry enable India to support a much
larger population than it could have done at the time of
the British conquest. Nevertheless, the evidence is
clear that excessive multiplication has taken place.
Nearly aU qualified students of the problem concur on
this point. Forty years ago the Duke of Argyll stated:
"Where there is no store, no accumulation, no wealth;
where the people hve from hand to mouth from season
to season on a low diet; and where, nevertheless, they
breed and multiply at such a rate; there we can at least
see that this power and force of multiplication is no
evidence even of safety, far less of comfort." Toward
the close of the last century, Sir William Hunter termed
population India's "fundamental problem," and con-
tinued: "The result of civiHzed rule in India has been
to produce a strain on the food-producing powers of the
country such as it had never before to bear. It has be-
^ At the beginning of the nineteenth century the population of India
is roughly estimated to have been about 100,000,000. According to the
census of 1911 the population was 315,000,000.
312 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
come a truism of Indian statistics that the removal of
the old cruel checks on population in an Asiatic country
is by no means an unmixed blessing to an Asiatic peo-
ple." ^ Lord Cromer remarks of India's poverty: "Not
only cannot it be remedied by mere philanthropy, but
it is absolutely certain — cruel and paradoxical though it
may appear to say so — that philanthropy enhances the
evil. In the days of Akhbar or Shah Jehan, cholera,
famine, and internal strife kept down the population.
Only the fittest survived. Now internal strife is forbid-
den, and philanthropy steps in and says that no single
life shall be sacrificed if science and Western energy or
skill can save it. Hence the growth of a highly con-
gested population, vast numbers of whom are Hving on a
bare margin of subsistence. The fact that one of the
greatest difficulties of governing the teeming masses of
the East is caused by good and humane government
should be recognized. It is too often ignored." ^
WiUiam Archer well states the matter when, in answer
'to the query why improved ex-temal conditions have not
brought India prosperity, he says: "The reason, in my
view, is simple: namely, that the benefit of good govern-
ment is, in part at any rate, nullified, when the people
take advantage of it, not to save and raise their stand-
ard of h\dng, but to breed to the ver}^ margin of sub-
sistence. Henr}^ George used to point out that every
mouth that came into the world brought two hands
along with it; but though the physiological fact is unde-
niable, the economic deduction suggested will not hold
1 Sir W. W. Hunter, The India of the Queen and Other Essays, p. 42 (Lon-.
don, 1903).
^ Cromer, "Some Problems of Government in Em-ope and Asia," Nine^
teenth Century and After, May, 1913.
SOCIAL CHANGE 313
good except in conditions that permit of the profitable
employment of the two hands. ... If mouths increase
in a greater ratio than food, the tendency must be to-
ward greater poverty." ^
It is one of the most unfortunate aspects of the situa-
tion that very few Oriental thinkers yet realize that
overpopulation is a prime cause of Oriental poverty.
Almost without exception they lay the blame to politi-
cal factors, especially to Western poHtical control. In
fact, the only case that I know of where an Eastern
thinker has boldly faced the problem and has coura-
geously advocated birth-control is in the book published
five years ago by P. K. Wattal, a native official of the
Indian Finance Department, entitled. The Population
Problem of India} This pioneer volume is written with
such ability and is of such apparent significance as an
indication of the awakening of Orientals to a more ra-
tional attitude, that it merits special attention.
Mr. Wattal begins his book by a plea to his fellow
countrjmien to look at the problem rationally and with-
out prejudice. "This essay," he says, "should not be
construed into an attack on the spiritual civilization of
our country, or even indirectly into a glorification of
the materialism of the West. The object in view is
that we should take a somewhat more matter-of-fact
view of the main problem of Hfe, viz., how to live in this
world. We are a poor people; the fact is indisputable.
Our poverty is, perhaps, due to a great many causes.
But I put it to every one of us whether he has not at
* Archer, India, and the Future, pp. 157, 162 (London, 1918).
' P. K. Wattal, of the Indian Finance Department, Assistant Account-
ant-General. The book was published at Bombay, 1916.
314 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
some of the most momentous periods of his Hfe been
handicapped by having to support a large family, and
whether this encumbrance has not seriously affected
the chances of advancement warranted by early promise
and exceptional endowment. This question should be
viewed by itself. It is a physical fact, and has nothing
to do with political environment or religious obligation.
If we have suffered from the consequences of that mis-
take, is it not a duty that we owe to ourselves and to
our progeny that its evil effects shall be mitigated as
far as possible? There is no greater cm'se than pov-
erty — ^I say this with due respect to our spiritualism.
It is not in a spirit of reproach that restraint in married
life is urged in these pages. It is solely from a vivid
realization of the hardships caused b}^ large families and
a profound sympathy with the difficulties under which
large numbers of respectable persons struggle through
life in this country that I have made bold to speak in
plain terms w^hat comes to every young man, but which
he does not care to give utterance to in a manner that
would prevent the recurrence of the evil." ^
After this appeal to reason in his readers, Mr. Wattal
develops his thesis. The first prime cause of over-
population in India, he asserts, is early marriage. Con-
trary to Western lands, where population is kept down
by prudential marriages and by birth-control, "for the
Hindus marriage is a sacrament which must be per-
formed, regardless of the fitness of the parties to bear
the responsibilities of a mated existence. A Hindu male
must marry and beget children — sons, if you please — to
perform his funeral rites lest his spirit wander uneasily
^ Wattal, pp. i-iii.
SOCIAL CHANGE 315
in the waste places of the earth. The very name of son,
'putra/ means one who saves his father's soul from the
hell called Puta. A Hindu maiden unmarried at puberty
is a source of social obloquy to her family and of damna-
tion to her ancestors. Among the Mohammedans, who
are not handicapped by such penalties, the married
state is equally common, partly owing to Hindu example
and partly to the general conditions of primitive society,
where a wife is almost a necessity both as a domestic
drudge and as a helpmate in field work." ^ The worst
of the matter is that, despite the efforts of social re-
formers, child-marriage seems to be increasing. The
census of 1911 showed that during the decade 1901-10
the numbers of married females per 1,000 of ages
0-5 years rose from 13 to 14; of ages 5-10 from 102 to
105; of 10-15 from 423 to 430, and of 15-20 from 770
to 800. In other words, in the year 1911, out of every
1,000 Indian girls, over one-tenth were married before
they were 10 years old, nearly one-half before they were
15, and four-fifths before they were 20.^
The result of all this is a tremendous birth-rate, but
this is "no matter for congratulation. We have heard
so often of our high death-rate and the means for com-
bating it, but can it be seriously believed that with a
birth-rate of 30 per 1,000 it is possible to go on as we are
doing with the death-rate brought down to the level of
England or Scotland? Is there room enough in the
country for the population to increase so fast as 20 per
1,000 every year? We are paying the inevitable penalty
of bringing into this world more persons than can be
properly cared for, and therefore if we wish fewer deaths
1 Ibid., p. 3. 2 jiyid,^ p. 12,
316 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
to occur in this country the births must be reduced to
the level of the countries where the death-rate is low.
It is, therefore, our high birth-rate that is the social
danger; the high death-rate, however regrettable, is
merely an incident of our high birth-rate." ^
Mr. Wattal then describes the cruel items in India's
death-rate: the tremendous female mortality, due largely
to too early childbirth, and the equally terrible infant
mortality, nearly 50 per cent of infant deaths being due
to premature birth or debihty at birth. These are the
inevitable penalties of early and universal marriage.
For, in India, "eveiybody marries, fit or unfit, and is a
parent at the earHest possible age permitted by nature."
This process is highly disgenic; it is plainly lowering
the quality and sapping the vigor of the race. It is the
lower elements of the population, the negroid aboriginal
tribes and the Pariahs or Outcastes, who are gaining the
fastest. Also the vitahty of the whole population seems
to be lowering. The census figures show that the num-
ber of elderly persons is decreasing, and that the average
statistical expectation of fife is falling. "The coming
generation is severely handicapped at start in life. And
the chances of Hving to a good old age are considerably
smaller than they were, say thirty or forty years ago.
Have we ever paused to consider what it means to us in
the life of the nation as a whole? It means that the
people who alone by weight of experience and wisdom
are fitted for the posts of command in the various pub-
lic activities of the country are snatched away by death ;
and that the guidance and leadership which belongs to
age and matm'e judgment in the countries of the West
1 Ibid., p. 14.
SOCIAL CHANGE 317
fall in India to younger and consequently to less trust-
worthy persons." ^
After warning his fellow countiymen that neither
improved methods of agriculture, the growth of indus-
try, nor emigration can afford any real relief to the
growing pressure of population on means of subsistence,
he notes a few hopeful signs that, despite the hold of
religion and custom, the people are beginning to realize
the situation and that in certain parts of India there are
foreshadowings of birth-control. For example, he quotes
from the census report for 1901 this oflficial explanation
of a slight drop in the birth-rate of Bengal: "The post-
ponement of the age of marriage cannot wholly account
for the diminished rate of reproduction. The deliber-
ate avoidance of child-bearing must also be partly re-
sponsible. ... It is a matter of common belief that
among the tea-garden coolies of Assam means are fre-
quently taken to prevent conception, or to procure
abortion." And the report of the Sanitary Commis-
sioner of Assam for 1913 states: "An important factor
in producing the defective birth-rate appears to be due
to voluntary limitation of births." ^
However, these beginnings of birth-control are too
local and partial to afford any immediate relief to In-
dia's growing overpopulation. Wider appreciation of
the situation and prompt action are needed. "The
conclusion is irresistible. We can no longer afford to
shut our eyes to the social canker in oiu- midst. In the
land of the bullock-cart, the motor has come to stay.
The competition is now with the more advanced races of
the West, and we cannot tell them what Diogenes said
1 Ibid., pp. 19-21. 2 jii^^^ p, 28.
318 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
to Alexander — 'Stand out of my sunshine.' After the
close of this gigantic World War theories of population
will perhaps be re\dsed and a reversion in favor of early
marriage and larger families may be counted upon.
But, (1) that will be no solution to our own population
problem, and (2) this reaction will be only for a time. , . .
The law of population may be arrested in its operation,
but there is no way of escaping it." ^
So concludes this striking little book. Furthermore,
we must remember that, although India may be the
acutest sufferer from overpopulation^ conditions in the
entire Orient are basically the same, prudential checks
and rational birth-control being everywhere virtually
absent.^ Remembering also that, besides overpopula-
tion, there are other economic and social evils previously
discussed, we cannot be sui-prised to find in all Eastern
lands much acute poverty and social degradation.
Both the rural and urban masses usually Hve on the
bare margin of subsistence. The English economist
Brailsford thus describes the condition of the Egj^tian
peasantry: "The villages exhibited a poverty such as I
have never seen even in the mountams of anarchical
Macedonia or among the bogs of Donegal. . . . The
villages are crowded slums of mud hovels, without a
tree, a flower, or a garden. The huts, often without a
window or a levelled floor, are minute dungeons of baked
mud, usually of two small rooms neither whitewashed
nor carpeted. Those which I entered were bare of any
visible property, save a few cooking utensils, a mat to
serve as a bed, and a jar which held the staple food of
1 Ibid., p. 82.
*For conditions in the Near East, see Bertrand, pp. 110; 124; 125-128.
SOCIAL CHANGE 319
maize." ^ As for the poorer Indian peasants, a British
sanitary official thus depicts their mode of hfe: "One
has actually to see the interior of the houses, in which
each family is often compelled to live in a single small
cell, made of mud walls and with a mud floor; contain-
ing small yards littered with rubbish, often crowded
with cattle; possessing wells permeated by rain soaking
through this filthy surface; and frequently jumbled to-
gether in inchoate masses called towns and cities." ^
In the cities, indeed, conditions are even worse than
in the country, the slums of the Orient surpassing the
slums of the West. The French publicist Louis Ber-
trand paints positively nauseating pictures of the poorer
quarters of the great Levantine towns like Cairo, Con-
stantinople, and Jerusalem. Omitting his more poign-
ant details, here is his description of a Cairo tenement:
"In Cairo, as elsewhere in Egypt, the wretchedness and
grossness of the poorer-class dwellings are perhaps even
more shocking than in the other Eastern lands. Two
or three dark, airless rooms usually open on a hallway
not less obscure. The plaster, peeling off from the
ceilings and the worm-eaten laths of the walls, falls con-
stantly to the filthy floors. The straw mats and bed-
ding are infested by innumerable vermin." ^
In India it is the same story. Says Fisher: "Even
before the growth of her industries had begun, the cities
of India presented a baffling housing problem. Into the
1 H. N. Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, pp. 112-113. See also
T. Rothstein, Egypt's Ruin, pp. 298-300 (London, 1910), Sir W. W.
Ramsay, "The Turkish Peasantry of AnatoUa," Quarterly Review, January,
1918.
^ Dr. D. Ross, "Wretchedness a Cause of PoUtical Unrest," The Survey,
February 18, 1911.
' Bertrand, op. dt., pp. 111-112.
320 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
welter of crooked streets and unsanitary habits of an
Oriental city these great industrial plants are wedging
their thousands of employees. Working from before
dawn until after dark, men and women are too exhausted
to go far from the plant to sleep, if they can help it.
When near-by houses are jammed to suffocation, they
hve and sleep in the streets. In Calcutta, twenty years
ago,^ land had reached $200,000 an acre in the over-
crowded tenement districts." ^ Of Calcutta, a Western
writer remarks: "Calcutta is a shame even in the East.
In its slums, mill hands and dock coolies do not hve;
they pig. Houses choke with unwholesome breath;
drains and compounds fester in filth. WTieels com-
press decaying refuse in the roads; cows drink from
wells soaked with sewage, and the floors of bakeries
are washed in the same pollution." ^ In the other in-
dustrial centres of India, conditions are practically the
same. A Bombay native sanitary official stated in a
report on the state of the tenement district, drawn up
in 1904: "In such houses — the breeders of germs and
bacilli, the centres of disease and poverty, vice, and
crime — ^have people of all kinds, the diseased, the disso-
lute, the drunken, the improvident, been indiscrimi-
nately herded and tightly packed in vast hordes to dwell
in close association with each other." ^
Furthermore, urban conditions seem to be getting
worse rather than better. The problem of congestion,
in particular, is assuming ever graver proportions. Al-
ready in the opening years of the present century the
1 1, e., in 1900. ^ Fisher, Indians Silent Revolution, p. 51.
5 G. W. Stevens, In India. Quoted by Fisher, p. 51.
* Dr. Bhalchandra Krishna. Quoted by A. Yusuf Ali, Life and Labor
in India, p. 35 (London, 1907).
SOCIAL CHANGE 321
congestion in the great industrial centres of India like
Calcutta, Bombay, and Lucknow averaged three or four
times the congestion of London. And the late war has
rendered the housing crisis even more acute. In the
East, as in the West, the war caused a rapid drift of
population to the cities and at the same time stopped
building owing to the proliibitive cost of construction.
Hence, a prodigious rise in rents and a plague of land-
lord profiteering. Says Fisher: "Rents were raised as
much as 300 per cent, enforced by eviction. Mass-meet-
ings of protest in Bombay resulted in government ac-
tion, fixing maximum rents for some of the tenements
occupied by artisans and laborers. Setting maximum
rental does not, however, make more room." ^
And, of course, it must not be forgotten that higher
rents are only one phase in a general rise in the cost of
living that has been going on in the East for a genera-
tion and which has been particularly pronounced since
1914. More than a decade ago Bertrand wrote of the
Near East: "From one end of the Levant to the other,
at Constantinople as at Smyrna, Damascus, Beyrout,
and Cairo, I heard the same complaints about the in-
creasing cost of Hving; and these complaints were uttered
by Europeans as well as by the natives." ^ To-day the
situation is even more difficult. Says Sir Valentine
Chirol of conditions in Egypt since the war: "The rise
in wages, considerable as it has been, has ceased to keep
pace with the inordinate rise in prices for the very neces-
sities of hfe. This is particularly the case in the urban
centres, where the lower classes — workmen, carters, cab-
drivers, shopkeepers, and a host of minor employees —
1 Fisher, pp. 51-52. 2 Bertrand, p. 141.
322 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
are hard put to it nowadays to make both ends meet." *
As a result of all these hard conditions various phe-
nomena of social degradation such as alcoholism, vice,
and crime, are becoming increasingly common. ^ Last —
but not least — there are growing symptoms of social
unrest and revolutionary agitation, which we will ex-
amine in the next chapter.
^Sir V. Chirol, "England's Peril in Egypt," from the London Times,
1919.
^ See Bertrand and Fisher, supra.
CHAPTER IX
SOCIAL UNREST AND BOLSHEVISM
Uneest is the natural concomitant of change — particu-
larly of sudden change. Every break with past; how-
ever normal and inevitable, implies a necessity for read-
justment to altered conditions which causes a temporary
sense of restless disharmony until the required adjust-
ment has been made. Unrest is not an exceptional
phenomenon; it is always latent in every human society
which has not fallen into complete stagnation, and a
slight amount of unrest should be considered a sign of
healthy growth rather than a symptom of disease. In
fact, the minimum degrees of unrest are usually not
called by that name, but are considered mere incidents
of normal development. Under normal circumstances,
indeed, the social organism functions like the human
organism: it is being incessantly destroyed and as in-
cessantly renewed in conformity with the changing con-
ditions of life. These changes are sometimes very con-
siderable, but they are so gradual that they are effected
almost without being perceived. A healthy organism
well attuned to its environment is always plastic. It
instinctively senses environmental changes and adapts
itself so rapidly that it escapes the injurious conse-
quences of disharmony.
Far different is the character of unrest's acuter mani-
festations. These are infallible symptoms of sweeping
changes, sudden breaks with the past, and profound
maladjustments which are not being rapidly rectified.
323
324 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
In other words, acute unrest denotes social ill health
and portends the possibility of one of those violent
crises known as "revolutions."
The history of the Moslem East well exemplifies the
above generahzations. The formative period of Sara-
cenic civilization was characterized by rapid change and
an intense idealistic ferment. The great "Motazehte"
movement embraced many shades of thought; its radi-
cal wing professing religious, political, and social doc-
trines of a violent, revolutionary nature. But this
changeful period was superficial and brief. Arab vigor
and the Islamic spirit proved unable permanently to
leaven the vast inertia of the ancient East. Soon the
old traditions reasserted themselves — somewhat modi-
fied, to be sure, yet basically the same. Saracenic civi-
lization became stereotyped, ossified, and with this ossi-
fication changeful unrest died away. Here and there
the radical tradition was preserved and secretly handed
down by a few obscure sects like the Kharidjites of Inner
Arabia and the Bektashi dervishes; but these were mere
crj^tic episodes, of no general significance.
With the Mohammedan Revival at the beginning of
the nineteenth century, however, sjnnptoms of social
unrest appeared once more. Wahabism aimed not
merely at a reform of religious abuses but was also a
general protest against the contemporary decadence of
Moslem society. In many cases it took the form of a
popular revolt against established governments. The
same was true of the correlative Babbist movement in
Persia, which took place about the same time.^
1 For these early fonns of unrest, see A. Le Ghatelier, L'Islam au dix-
neuvihme Sibde, pp. 22-44 (Paris, 1888).
SOCIAL UNREST 325
And of course these nascent stirrings were greatly
stimulated by the flood of Western ideas and methods
which, as the nineteenth century wore on, increasingly
permeated the East. What, indeed, could be more pro-
vocative of unrest of every description than the result-
ing transformation of the Orient — a transformation so
sudden, so intense, and necessitating so concentrated a
process of adaptation that it was basically revolutionary
rather than evolutionary in its nature? The details of
these profomid changes — political, religious, economic,
social — ^we have already studied, together with the
equally profound disturbance, bewilderment, and suffer-
ing afflicting all classes in this eminently transition
period.
The essentially revolutionary nature of this transition
period, as exemplified by India, is well described by
a British economist.^ What, he asks, could be more
anachronistic than the contrast between rural and urban
India? "Rural India is primitive or mediseval; city
India is modern." In city India you wfll find every
symbol of Western life, from banks and factories down
to the very "sandwichmen that you left in the London
gutters." Now all this coexists beside rural India.
"And it is surely a fact unique in economic history that
they should thus exist side by side. The present condi-
tion of India does not correspond with any period of
European economic history." Imagine the effect in
Europe of setting down modem and mediseval men to-
gether, with utterly disparate ideas. That has not hap-
pened in Europe because "European progress in the
^ D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition in India," Economic Journal,
December, 1910.
326 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
economic world has been evolutionary "; a process spread
over centuries. In India, on the other hand, this eco-
nomic transformation has been "revolutionary" in
character.
How unevolutionary is India's economic transforma-
tion is seen by the condition of rural India.
"Rural India, though chiefly characterized by primitive
usage, has been invaded by ideas that are intensely hos-
tile to the old state of things. It is primitive, but not con-
sistently primitive. Competitive wages are paid side by
side with customary wages. Prices are sometimes fixed
by custom, but sometimes, too, by free economic causes.
From the midst of a population deeply rooted in the
soil, men are being carried away by the desire of better
wages. In short, economic motives have suddenly and
partially intiiided themselves in the realm of primitive
morality. And, if we turn to city India, we see a simi-
lar, though inverted, state of things. ... In neither
case has the mixture been harmonious or the fusion
complete. Indeed, the two orders are too unrelated,
too far apart, to coalesce with ease. . . .
"India, then, is in a state of economic revolution
throughout all the classes of an enormous and complex so-
ciety. The only period in which Europe offered even faint
analogies to modern India was the Industrial Revolution,
from which even now we have not settled down into
comparative stability. We may reckon it as a fortimate
circumstance for Europe that the intellectual movement
which culminated in the French Revolution did not coin-
cide with the Industrial Revolution. If it had, it is
possible that European society might have been hope-
lessly wrecked. But, as it was, even when the French
SOCIAL UNREST 327
Revolution had spent its force in the conquests of Na-
poleon^ the Industrial Revolution stirred up enough so-
cial and political discontent. When whole classes of
people are obliged by economic revolution to change
their mode of life, it is inevitable that many should suf-
fer. Discontent is roused. Political and destructive
movements are certain to ensue. Not only the revolu-
tions of '48, but also the birth of the Socialist Party
sprang from the Industrial Revolution.
"But that revolution was not nearly so sweeping as
that which is now in operation in India. The inven-
tion of machinery and steam-power was, in Europe, but
the crowning event of a long series of years in which
commerce and industry had been constantly expanding,
in which capital had been largely accumulated, in which
economic principles had been gradually spreading. . . .
No, the Indian economic revolution is vastly greater
and more fundamental than our Industrial Revolu-
tion, great as that was. Railways have been built
through districts where travel was almost impossible,
and even roads are unknown. Factories have been
built, and filled by men unused to industrial labor.
Capital has been poured into the country, which was
unprepared for any such development. And what are
the consequences? India's social organization is being
dissolved. The Brahmins are no longer priests. The
ryot is no longer bound to the soil. The banya is no
longer the sole purveyor of capital. The hand- weaver
is threatened with extinction, and the brass-worker can
no longer ply his craft. Think of the dislocation which
this sudden change has brought about, of the many who
can no longer follow their ancestral vocations, of the
328 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
commotion which a less profound change produced in
Europe, and you will understand what is the chief mo-
tive-power of the pohtical unrest. It is small wonder.
The wonder is that the unrest has been no greater than
it is. Had India not been an Asiatic country, she would
have been in fierce revolution long ago."
The above lines were of course written in the opening
years of the twentieth centuiy, before the world had
been shattered by Armageddon and aggressive social
revolution had established itself in semi- Asiatic Russia.
But even during those pre-war years, other students of
the Orient were predicting social disturbances of increas-
ing gravity. Said the Hindu nationalist leader, Bipin
Chandra Pal: "This so-called unrest is not really politi-
cal. It is essentially an intellectual and spiritual up-
heaval, the forerunner of a mighty social revolution, with
a new organ on and a new philosophy of life behind it." ^
And the French publicist Chailley wrote of India: "There
will be a series of economic revolutions, which must
necessarily produce suffering and struggle." ^
During this pre-war period the increased difficulty of
living conditions, together with the adoption of West-
em ideas of comfort and kindred higher standards,
seem to have been engendering friction between the dif-
ferent strata of the Oriental population. In 1911 a
British sanitary expert assigned "wretchedness" as the
root-cause of India's political unrest. After describing
the deplorable li\dng conditions of the Indian masses,
he wrote: "It will of course be said at once that these
* Bipin Chandra Pal, "The Forces Behind the Unrest in India," Con-
temporary Review, February, 1910.
^ J. Chailley, Administrative Problems of British India, p. 339 (London,
1910 — English translation).
SOCIAL UNREST 329
conditions have existed in India from time immemorial,
and are no more likely to cause unrest now than pre-
viously; but in my opinion unrest has always existed
there in a subterranean form. Moreover, in the old
days, the populace could make scarcely any comparison
between their own condition and that of more fortunate
people; now they can compare their own slums and
terrible ^native quarters' with the much better ordered
cantonments, stations, and houses of the British offi-
cials and even of their own wealthier brethren. So far
as I can see, such misery is always the fundamental
cause of all popular unrest. . . . Seditious meetings,
political chatter, and 'aspirations' of babus and dema-
gogues are only the superficial manifestations of the
deeper disturbance." ^
This growing social friction was indubitably height-
ened by the lack of interest of Orientals in' the suffer-
ings 'of all persons not boimd to them by family, caste,
or customary ties. Throughout the East, "social ser-
vice," in the Western sense, is practically unknown.
This fact is noted by a few Orientals themselves. Says
an Indian writer, speaking of Indian town life: "There
is no common measure of social conduct. . . . Hith-
erto, social reform in India has taken account only of
individual or family life. As applied to mankind in the
mass, and especially to those soulless agglomerations of
seething humanity which we call cities, it is a gospel
yet to be preached." ^ As an American sociologist re-
marked of the growing slum evil throughout the indus-
' Dr. Ronald Ross, "Wretchedness a Cause of Political Unrest," The
Survey, 18 February, 1911.
2 A. Yusuf Ali, Life and Labor in India, pp. 3, 32 (London, 1907).
330 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
trialized Orient: "The greatest danger is due to the fact
that Orientals do not have the high Western sense of
the value of the life of the individual^ and are, compara-
tively speaking, without any restraining influence simi-
lar to our own enlightened public opinion, which has
been roused by the struggles of a century of industrial
strife. Unless these elements can be suppHed, there is
danger of suffering and of abuses worse than any the
West has known." ^
All this diffused social unrest was centring about
two recently emerged elements: the Western-educated
intelligentsia and the industrial proletariat of the fac-
tory towns. The revolutionary tendencies of the in-
telligentsia, particularly of its half-educated failures,
have been already noted, and these latter have undoubt-
edly played a leading part in all the revolutionary dis-
turbances of the modern Orient, from North Africa
to China.^ Regarding the industrial proletariat, some
writers think that there is little immediate likelihood
of their becoming a major revolutionary factor, be-
cause of their traditionalism, ignorance, and apathy,
and also because there is no real connection between
them and the intelligentsia, the other centre of social
discontent.
The French economist M^tin states this view-point
very well. Speaking primarily of India, he writes:
" The Nationalist movement rises from the middle classes
and manifests no systematic hostility toward the capi-
1 E. W. Capen, "A Sociological Appraisal of Western Influence in the
Orient," American Journal of Sociology, May, 1911.
^ P. Khorat, "Psychologic de la Revolution chinoise," Revue des Deux
Mondes, 15 March, 1912; L. Bertrand, Le Mirage orientale, pp. 164-166;
J. D. Rees, The Real India, pp. 162-163.
SOCIAL UNREST 331
talists and great proprietors; in economic matters it is
on their side." ^ As for the proletariat: "The cooHes
do not imagine that their lot can be bettered. Like the
ryots and the agricultural laborers, they do not show
the least sign of revolt. To whom should they turn?
The ranks of traditional society are closed to them.
People without caste, the coolies are despised even by
the old-style artisan, proud of his caste-status, humble
though that be. To fall to the job of a coohe is, for the
Hindu, the worst declassment. The factory workers
are not yet numerous enough to form a compact and
powerful proletariat, able to exert pressure on the old
society. Even if they do occasionally strike, they are
as far from the modern trade-union as they are from the
traditional working-caste. Neither can they look for
leadership to the 'intellectual proletariat'; for the Na-
tionalist movement has not emerged from the 'bour-
geois' phase, and always leans on the capitalists. . . .
"Thus Indian industry is still in its embryonic stages.
In truth, the material evolution which translates itself
by the construction of factories, and the social evolu-
tion which creates a proletariat, have only begmi to
emerge; while the intellectual evolution from which arise
the programmes of social demands has not even begun." ^
Other observers of Indian industrial conditions, how-
ever, do not share M. Metin's opinion. Says the British
labor leader, J. Ramsay Macdonald: "To imagine the
backward Indian laborers becoming a conscious regiment
in the class war, seems to be one of the vainest dreams
in which a Western mind can indulge. But I some-
1 Albert M6tin, L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Mude sodale, p. 276 (Paris, 1918).
2 Ibid., DP. 339-345.
332 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
times wonder if it be so very vain after all. In the first
place, the development of factoiy industry in India has
created a landless and homeless proletariat unmatched
by the same economic class in any other capitalist com-
munity; and to imagine that this class is to be kept
out, or can be kept out, of Indian politics is far more
vain than to dream of its developing a politics on West-
ern lines. Further than that, the wage-earners have
shown a wilhngness to respond to Trades-Union meth-
ods; they are forming industrial associations and have
engaged in strikes; some of the social reform movements
conducted by Indian intellectuals definitely try to es-
tablish Trades-Unions and preach ideas familiar to us
in connection with Trades-Union propaganda. A capi-
talist fiscal policy will not only give this movement a
great impetus as it did in Japan, but in India will not be
able to suppress the movement, as was done in Japan,
by legislation. As yet, the tme proletarian wage-earner,
uprooted from his native village and broken away from
the organization of Indian society, is but insignificant.
It is growing, however, and I believe that it will organ-
ize itself rapidly on the general lines of the proletarian
classes of other capitalist countries. So soon as it be-
comes politically conscious, there are no other fines upon
which it can organize itself." ^
Turning to the Near East — more than a decade ago
a French Socialist writer, observing the hard living con-
ditions of the Egyptian masses, noted signs of social
unrest and predicted grave disturbances. "A genuine
proletariat," he wrote, "has been created by the multi-
1 J. Ramsay Macdonald, The Government of India, pp. 133-134 (London,
1920).
SOCIAL UNREST 333
plication of industries and the sudden^ almost abrupt,
progress which has followed. The cost of living has
risen to a scale hitherto unknown in Egypt, while wages
have risen but slightly. Poverty and want abound.
Some day suffering will provoke the people to com-
plaints, perhaps to angry outbursts, throughout this
apparently prosperous Delta. It is true that the influx
of foreigners and of money may put off the hour when
the city or country laborer of Egyptian race comes
clearly to perceive the wrongs that are being done to
him. He may miss the educational influence of Social-
ism. Yet such an awakening may come sooner than
people expect. It is not only among the successful and
prosperous Egyptians that intelhgence is to be found.
Those whose wages are growing gradually smaller and
smaller have intelligence of equal keenness, and it has
become a real question as to the hour when for the first
time in the land of Islam the flame of Mohammedan
Socialism shall burst forth." ^ In Algeria, likewise, a
Belgian traveller noted the dawning of a proletarian
consciousness among the town working men just before
the Great War. Speaking of the rapid spread of West-
em ideas, he wrote: "Islam tears asunder like rotten
cloth on the quays of Algiers: the dockers, coal-passers,
and engine-tenders, to whatever race they belong, leave
their Islam and acquire a genuine proletarian morality,
that of the proletarians of Europe, and they make com-
mon cause with their European colleagues on the basis
of a strictly economic struggle. If there were many big
factories in Algeria, orthodox Islam would soon disap-
* Georges Foucart. Quoted in The Literary Digest, 17 August, 1907,
pp. 225-226.
334 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
pear there, as old-fashioned CathoHcism has disappeared
with us under the shock of great industry." ^
AVhatever may be the prospects as to the rapid emer-
gence of organized labor movements in the Orient, one
thing seems certain: the unrest which afflicted so many
parts of the East in the years preceding the Great War,
though mainly political, had also its social side. To-
ward the end of 1913, a leading Anglo-Indian journal
remarked pessimistically: "We have already gone so
far on the downward path that leads to destruction that
there are districts in what were once regarded as the
most settled parts of India which are being abandoned
by the rich because their property is not safe. So great
is the contempt for the law that it is employed by the
unscrupulous as a means of offense against the innocent.
Frontier Pathans commit outrages almost imbelievable
in their daring. Mass-meetings are held and agitation
spreads in regard to topics quite outside the business
of orderly people. There is no matter of domestic or
foreign politics in which crowds of irresponsible people
do not want to have their passionate way. Great griev-
ances are made of little, far-off things. What ought to
be the ordered, spacious life of the District Officer is
intruded upon and disturbed by a hundred distracting
influences due to the want of discipline of the people.
In the subordinate ranks of the great services them-
selves, trades-unions have been formed. Militar}^ and
police officers have to regret that the new class of re-
cruits is less subordinate than the old, harder to dis-
ciphne, more full of complaints." ^
1 A. Van Gennep, En Algerie, p. 182 (Paris, 1914).
^ The Englishman (Calcutta). Quoted in The Literary Digest, Febru-
ary 21, 1914, p. 369.
SOCIAL UNREST 335
The Great War of course enormously aggravated
Oriental unrest. In many parts of the Near East,
especially, acute suffering, balked ambitions, and furi-
ous hates combined to reduce society to the verge of
chaos. Into this ominous turmoil there now came the
sinister influence of Russian Bolshevism, marshalling all
this diffused unrest by systematic methods for definite
ends. Bolshevism was frankly out for a world-revolu-
tion and the destruction of Western civilization. To
attain this objective the Bolshevist leaders not only
launched direct assaults on the West, but also planned
flank attacks in Asia and Africa. They believed that
if the East could be set on fire, not only would Russian
Bolshevism gain vast additional strength but also the
economic repercussion on the West, already shaken by
the war, would be so terrific that industrial collapse
would ensue, thereby throwing Europe open to revolu-
tion.
Bolshevism's propagandist efforts were nothing short
of universal, both in area and in scope. No part of the
world was free from the plottings of its agents; no possi-
ble source of discontent was overlooked. Strictly "Red"
doctrines like the dictatorship of the proletariat were
very far from being the only weapons in Bolshevism's
armory. Since what was first wanted was the over-
throw of the existing world-order, any kind of opposition
to that order, no matter how remote doctrinaUy from
Bolshevism, was grist to the Bolshevist mill. Accord-
ingly, in eveiy quarter of the globe, in Asia, Africa,
Australia, and the Americas, as in Europe, Bolshevik
agitators whispered in the ears of the discontented their
gospel of hatred and revenge. Every nationalist aspira-
336 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
tion, every political grievance, every social injustice,
eveiy racial discrimination, was fuel for Bolshevism's
incitement to violence and war.^
Particularly promising fields for Bolshevist activity
were the Near and Middle East. Besides being a prey
to profound disturbances of every description, those
regions, as traditional objectives of the old Czarist im-
perialism, had long been carefully studied by Russian
agents who had evolved a technic of "pacific penetra-
tion" that might be easily adjusted to Bolshevist ends.
To stir up jDolitical, religious, and racial passions in Tur-
key, Persia, Afghanistan, and India, especially against
England, required no original planning by Trotzky or
Lenine. Czarism had already done these things for
generations, and full information lay both in the Petro-
grad archives and in the brains of surviving Czarist
agents ready to turn their hands as easily to the new
work as the old.
In all the elaborate network of Bolshevist propaganda
which to-day enmeshes the East we must discriminate
between Bolshevism's two objectives: one immediate —
the destruction of Western political and economic su-
premacy; the other ultimate — the Bolshe\azing of the
Oriental masses and the consequent extirpation of the
native upper and middle classes, precisely as has been
done in Russia and as is planned for the countries of the
West. In the first stage, Bolshevism is quite ready to
respect Oriental faiths and customs and to back Orien-
^ For these larger world-aspects of Bolshevik propaganda, see Paul
Miliukov, Bolshevism : An International Danger (London, 1920) ; also,
my Rising Tide of Color against White World-Swpremacy, pp. 218-221,
and my article, "Bolshevism: The Heresy of the Under-Man," The
Century, June, 1919.
SOCIAL UNREST 337
tal nationalist movements. In the second stage, re-
ligions like Islam and nationalists like Mustapha Kemal
are to be branded as "bourgeois" and relentlessly de-
stroyed. How Bolshevik diplomacy endeavors to work
these two schemes in double harness, we shall presently
see.
Russian Bolshevism's Oriental policy was formulated
soon after its accession to power at the close of 1917.
The year 1918 was a time of busy preparation. An
elaborate propaganda organization was built up from
various sources. A number of old Czarist agents and
diplomats versed in Eastern affairs were cajoled or con-
scripted into the service. The Russian Mohammedan
populations such as the Tartars of South Russia and
the Turkomans of Central Asia furnished many recruits.
Even more valuable were the exiles who flocked to Rus-
sia from Turkey, Persia, India, and elsewhere at the
close of the Great War. Practically all the leaders of the
Turkish war-government — ^Enver, Djemal, Talaat, and
many more, fled to Russia for refuge from the vengeance
of the victorious Entente Powers. The same was true of
the Hindu terrorist leaders who had been in German
pay during the war and who now sought service under
Lenine. By the end of 1918 Bolshevism's Oriental
propaganda department was well organized, divided
into three bureaiLx, for the Islamic countries, India,
and the Far East respectively. With Bolshevism's
i Far Eastern activities this book is not concerned, though
the reader should bear them in mind and should remem-
ber the important part played by the Chinese in recent
Russian history. As for the Islamic and Indian bu-
reaux, they displayed great zeal, translating tons of Bol-
338 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
shevik literature into the various Oriental languages,
training numerous secret agents and propagandists for
"field-work," and getting in touch mth all disaffected
or revolutionary elements.
With the opening months of 1919 Bolshevist activity
throughout the Near and Middle East became increas-
ingly apparent. The wave of rage and despair caused
by the Entente's denial of Near Eastern nationalist
aspirations^ played splendidly into the Bolshevists'
hands, and we have already seen how Moscow sup-
ported Mustapha Kemal and other nationalist leaders
in Turkey, Persia, Egypt, and elsewhere. In the Mid-
dle East, also^ Bolshevism gained important successes.
Not merely was Moscow's hand visible in the epidemic
of rioting and seditious violence which swept northern
India in the spring of 19 19,^ but an even shrewder blow
was struck at Britain in Afghanistan. This land of
turbulent mountaineers, which lay like a perpetual
thunder-cloud on India's northwest frontier, had kept
quiet during the Great War, mainly owing to the Anglo-
phile attitude of its ruler, the Ameer Habibullah Khan.
But early in 1919 Habibullah was murdered. "WTiether
the Bolsheviki had a hand in the matter is not known,
but they certainly reaped the benefit, for power passed
to one of Habibullah's sons, Amanullah Khan, who was
an avowed enemy of England and who had had dealings
with Turco-German agents during the late war. Ama-
nullah at once got in touch with Moscow, and a little
later, just when the Punjab was seething with unrest,
he declared war on England, and his wild tribesmen,
pouring across the border, set the northwest frontier
1 See Chapter V. * See Chapter VI.
SOCIAL UNREST 339
on fire. After some hard fighting the British succeeded
in repelHng the Afghan invasion, and Amanullah was
constrained to make peace. But Britain obviously
dared not press Amanullah too hard, for in the peace
treaty the Ameer was released from his previous obliga-
tion not to maintain diplomatic relations with other
nations than British India. Amanullah promptly aired
his independence by maintaining ostentatious relations
with Moscow. As a matter of fact, the Bolsheviki had
by this time established an important propagandist
subcentre in Russian Turkestan, not far from the Af-
ghan border, and this bureau's activities of course en-
visaged not merely Afghanistan but the wider field of
India as well.^
During 1920 Bolshevik activities became still more
pronounced throughout the Near and Middle East.
We have already seen how powerfully Bolshevik Russia
supported the Turkish and Persian nationalist move-
1 For events in Afghanistan and Central Asia, see Sir T. H. Holdich,
"The Influence of Bolshevism in Afghanistan," New Europe, December 4,
1919; Ikbal AU Shah, "The Fall of Bokhara," The Near East, October 28,
1920, and his "The Central Asian Tangle," Asiatic Review, October,
1920. For Bolshevist activity in the Near and Middle East generally,
see Mihukov, op. cit., pp. 243-260; 295-297; Major-General Sir George
Aston, "Bolshevik Propaganda in the East," Fortnightly Review, August,
1920; W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past and Present," Quarterly Re-
view, October, 1920; Sir Valentine Chirol, "Conflicting PoUcies in the
Near East," Neio Europe, July 1, 1920; L. Dumont-Wilden, "Awakening
Asia," The Living Age, August 7, 1920 (translated from the French);
Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen, "Moslems and the Tangle in the
Middle East," National Review, December, 1919; Paxton Hibben, "Russia
at Peace," The Nation (New York), January 26, 1921; H. von Hoff, "Die
nationale Erhebung in der Tiirkei," Deutsche Revue, December, 1919;
R. G. Hunter, " Entente— Oil— Islam," Netv Europe, August 26, 1920;
"Taira," "The Story of the Arab Revolt," Balkan Review, August,
1920; "Voyageur," "Lenin's Attempt to Capture Islam," New Europe,
June 10, 1920; Hans Wendt, "Ex Oriente Lux," Nord und Slid, May,
1920; George Young, "Russian Foreign PoUcy," New Europe, July 1,
1920.
340 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
ments. In fact^ the reckless short-sightedness of Entente
policy was driving into Lenine's arms multitudes of na-
tionalists to whom the internationalist theories of Mos-
cow were personally abhorrent. For example, the head
of the Afghan mission to Moscow thus frankly expressed
his reasons for friendship with Soviet Russia, in an inter-
view printed by the official Soviet organ, Izvcstia: "1 am
neither Communist nor Socialist, but my political pro-
gramme so far is the ex-pulsion of the English from Asia.
I am an irreconcilable enemy of European capitalism
in Asia, the chief representatives of which are the Eng-
lish. On this point I coincide with the Communists,
and in this respect we are your natural alHes. . . .
Afghanistan, like India, does not represent a capitalist
state, and it is very unlikely that even a parliamentary
regime will take deep root in these countries. It is so
far difficult to say how subsequent events will develop.
I only know that the renowned address of the Soviet
Government to all nations, with its appeal to them to
combat capitalists (and for us a capitalist is synonymous
with the word foreigner, or, to be more exact, an English-
man), had an enormous effect on us. A still greater
effect was produced by Russia's annulment of all the
secret treaties enforced by the imperialistic governments,
and by the proclaiming of the right of all nations, no
matter how small, to determine their own destiny. This
act rallied around Soviet Russia all the exploited nation-
alities of Asia, and all parties, even those very remote
from SociaHsm." Of course, knowing what we do of
Bolshevik propagandist tactics, we cannot be sure that
the Afghan diplomat ever said the things which the Iz-
vestia relates. But, even if the interview be a fake.
SOCIAL UNREST 341
the words put into his mouth express the feelings of vast
numbers of Orientals and explain a prime cause of Bol-
shevik propagandist successes in Eastern lands.
So successful, indeed, had been the progress of Bol-
shevik propaganda that the Soviet leaders now began
to work openly for their ultimate ends. At first Moscow
had posed as the champion of Oriental "peoples" against
Western "imperialism"; its appeals had been to "peo-
ples," irrespective of class; and it had promised "self-
determination," with full respect for native ideas and
institutions. For instance: a Bolshevist manifesto to
the Turks signed by Lenine and issued toward the close
of 1919 read: "Mussulmans of the world, victims of the
capitalists, awake! Russia has abandoned the Czar's
pernicious policy toward you and offers to help you over-
throw English tyranny. She will allow you freedom of
religion and self-government. The frontiers existing
before the war will be respected, no Turkish territory
will be given Armenia, the Dardanelles Straits will re-
main yours, and Constantinople will remain the capital
of the Mussulman world. The Mussulmans in Russia
will be given self-government. All we ask in exchange
is that you fight the reckless capitalists, who would
exploit your country and make it a colony." Even
when addressing its own people, the Soviet Government
maintained the same general tone. An "Order of the
Day" to the Russian troops stationed on the borders
of India stated: "Comrades of the Pamir division, you
have been given a responsible task. The Soviet Repub-
lic sends you to garrison the posts on the Pamir, on the
frontiers of the friendly countries of Afghanistan and
India. The Pamir table-land divides revolutionary Rus-
342 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
sia from India, which, with its 300,000,000 inhabitants,
is enslaved by a handful of Englishmen. On this table-
land the signallers of revolution must hoist the red flag
of the army of liberation. May the peoples of India,
who fight against their English oppressors, soon know
that friendly help is not far off. Make j^ourselves at
home with the hberty-loving tribes of northern India,
promote by word and deed their revolutionaiy progress,
refute the mass of calumnies spread about Soviet Russia
by agents of the British pruices, lords, and bankers.
Long live the alliance of the revolutionary peoples of
Europe and Asia!"
Such was the nature of first-stage Bolshevik propa-
ganda. Presently, however, propaganda of quite a
different character began to appear. This second-stage
propaganda of course continued to assail Western "capi-
talist imperialism." But alongside, or rather inter-
mingled with, these anti-Western fulminations, there
now appeared special appeals to the Oriental masses,
inciting them against all "capitalists" and "bourgeois,"
native as well as foreign, and promising the "proleta-
rians" remedies for all their ills. Here is a Bolshevist
manifesto to the Turkish masses, pubHshed in the sum-
mer of 1920. It is ver}" different from the manifestoes
of a year before. "The men of toil," says this interest-
ing document, "are now struggling everjnvhere against
the rich people. These people, with the assistance of
the aristocracy and their hirelings, are now trjdng to^
hold Turkish toilers in their chains. It is the rich peo-
ple of Europe who have brought suffering to Turkey.
Comrades, let us make common cause with the world's
toilers. If we do not do so we shall never rise again.
SOCIAL UNREST 343
Let the heroes of Turkey's revolution join Bolshevism.
Long live the Third International ! Praise be to Allah !"
And in these new efforts Moscow was not content
with words; it was passing to deeds as well. The first
application of Bolshevism to an Eastern people was in
Russian Turkestan. When the Bolsheviki first came to
power at the end of 1917 they had granted Turkestan
full "self-determination/' and the inhabitants had ac-
claimed their native princes and re-established their old
state-unitS; subject to a loose federative tie with Russia.
Early in 1920, however, the Soviet Government con-
sidered Turkestan ripe for the "Social Revolution."
Accordingly, the native princes were deposed, all politi-
cal power was transferred to local Soviets (controlled
by Russians), the native upper and middle classes were
despoiled of their property, and sporadic resistance was
crushed by mass-executions, torture, and other familiar
forms of Bolshevist terrorism.^ In the Caucasus, also,
the social revolution had begun with the Sovietization
of Azerbaidjan. The Tartar republic of Azerbaidjan was
one of the fragments of the former Russian province
of Transcaucasia which had declared its independence
on the collapse of the Czarist Empire in 1917. Located
in eastern Transcaucasia, about the Caspian Sea, Azer-
baidjan's capital was the city of Baku, famous for its oil-
fields. Oil had transformed Baku into an industrial
centre on Western lines, with a large working popula-
tion of mixed Asiatic and Russian origin. Playing upon
the nascent class-consciousness of this urban proletariat,
the Bolshevik agents made a cowp d'etat in the spring of
1920, overthrew the nationalist government, and, with
^ Ikbal Ali Shah, op. cit.
344 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
prompt Russian backing, made Azerbaidjan a Soviet
republic. The usual accompaniments of the social rev-
olution followed: despoihng and massacring of the
upper and middle classes, confiscation of property in
favor of the town proletarians and agricultural laborers,
and ruthless terrorism. With the opening months of
1920, Bolshevism was thus in actual operation in both
the Near and Middle East.^
Having acquired strong footholds in the Orient, Bol-
she\asm now felt strong enough to throw off the mask.
In the autumn of 1920, the Soviet Government of Rus-
sia held a "Congress of Eastern Peoples" at Baku, the
aim of which was not merely the liberation of the Orient
from Western control but its Bolshevizing as well.
No attempt at concealment of this larger objective was
made, and so striking was the language employed that
it may well merit our close attention.
In the first place, the call to the congress, issued by
the Third (Moscow) International, was addressed to
the "peasants and workers" of the East. The summons
read :
"Peasants and workers of Persia! The Teheran
Government of the Khadjars and its retinue of provin-
cial Khans have plundered and exploited you through
many centuries. The land, which, according to the laws
of the Sheriat, was your common property, has been
taken possession of more and more by the lackej^s of
* For events in the Caucasus, see W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past
and Present," Quarterly Review, October, 1920; C. E. Bechhofer, "The
Situation in the Transcaucasus," New Europe, September 2, 1920; "D.
Z. T.," "L' Azerbaidjan: La Premiere R6publique musulmane," Revue du
Monde musulman, 1919; Paxton Hibben, "Exit Georgia," The Nation
(New York), March 30, 1921.
SOCIAL UNREST 345
the Teheran Government; they trade it away at their
pleasure; they lay what taxes please them upon you;
and when, through their mismanagement; they got the
country into such a condition that they were unable to
squeeze enough juice out of it themselves, they sold
Persia last year to English capitalists for 2,000,000
pomids, so that the latter will organize an army in Per-
sia that will oppress you still more than formerly, and
so the latter can collect taxes for the Khans and the
Teheran Government. They have sold the oil-wells in
South Persia and thus helped plunder the country.
"Peasants of Mesopotamia! The English have de-
clared your country to be independent; but 80,000 Eng-
lish soldiers are stationed in your country, are robbing
and plundering, are killing you and are violating your
women.
"Peasants of AnatoHa! The English, French, and
Italian Governments hold Constantinople under the
mouths of their cannon. They have made the Sultan
their prisoner, they are obliging him to consent to the
dismemberment of what is purely Turkish territory,
they are forcing him to turn the country's finances over
to foreign capitalists in order to make it possible for
them better to exploit the Turkish people, already re-
duced to a state of beggary by the six-year war. They
have occupied the coal-mines of Heraclea, they are hold-
ing your ports, they are sending their troops into your
country and are trampling down your fields.
"Peasants and workers of Armenia! Decades ago
you became the victims of the intrigues of foreign capi-
tal, which launched heavy verbal attacks against the
massacres of the Armenians by the Kurds and incited
346 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
you to fight against the Sultan in order to obtain through
your blood new concessions and fresh profits daily from
the bloody Sultan. During the war they not only prom-
ised you independence, but they incited your merchants,
your teachers, and your priests to demand the land of
the Turkish peasants in order to keep up an eternal con-
flict between the Armenian and Turkish peoples, so that
they could eternally derive profits out of this conflict,
for as long as strife prevails between you and the Turks,
just so long will the English, French, and American
capitalists be able to hold Turkey in check through the
menace of an Armenian uprising and to use the Arme-
nians as cannon-fodder through the menace of a pogrom
by Kurds.
"Peasants of Syria and Arabia! Independence was
promised to you by the English and the French, and
now they hold your country occupied by their armies,
now the English and the French dictate your laws,
and you, who have freed yourselves from the Turkish
Sultan, from the Constantinople Government, are now
slaves of the Paris and London Governments, which
merely differ from the Sultan's Government in being
stronger and better able to exploit you.
"You all understand this yourselves. The Persian
peasants and workers have risen against their traitorous
Teheran Government. The peasants in Mesopotamia
are in revolt against the English troops. You peasants
in Anatolia have rushed to the banner of Kemal Pasha
in order to fight against the foreign invasion, but at the
same time we hear that you are trying to organize your
own party, a genuine peasants' party that will be willing
to fight even if the Pashas are to make their peace with
SOCIAL UNREST 347
the Entente exploiters. Syria has no peace, and you,
Armenian peasants, whom the Entente, despite its
promises, allows to die from hunger in order to keep you
under better control, you are understanding more and
more that it is silly to hope for salvation by the Entente
capitalists. Even your bourgeois Government of the
Dashnakists, the lackeys of the Entente, is compelled
to turn to the Workers' and Peasants' Government of
Russia with an appeal for peace and help.
"Peasants and workers of the Near East! If you
organize yourselves, if you form your own Workers'
and Peasants' Government, if you arm yourselves, if
you unite with the Red Russian Workers' and Peasants'
Army, then you will be able to defy the English, French,
and American capitalists, then you will settle accounts
with your own native exploiters, then you will find it
possible, in a free alliance with the workers' republics
of the world, to look after your own interests; then you
will know how to exploit the resources of your countiy
in your own interest and in the interest of the working
people of the whole world, that will honestly exchange
the products of their labor and mutually help each other.
"We want to talk over all these questions with you at
the Congress in Baku. Spare no effort to appear in
Baku on September 1 in as large numbers as possible.
You march, year in and year out, through the deserts
to the holy places where you show your respect for your
past and for your God — now march through deserts,
over mountains, and across rivers in order to come to-
gether to discuss how you can escape from the bonds of
slavery, how you can unite as brothers so as to live as
men, free and equal."
348 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
From this summons the nature of the Baku congress
can be imagined. It was, in fact, a social revolution-
ist far more than a nationalist assembly. Of its 1,900
delegates, nearly 1,300 were professed communists.
Turkey, Persia, Armenia, and the Caucasus countries
sent the largest delegations, though there were also
delegations from Arabia, India, and even the Far East.
The Russian So\det Government was of course in con-
trol and kept a tight hand on the proceedings. The
character of these proceedings was well summarized by
the address of the noted Bolshevik leader Zinoviev, presi-
dent of the Executive Committee of the Third (Moscow)
International, who presided.
Zinoviev said:
"We believe this Congress to be one of the greatest
events in histor}^, for it proves not only that the pro-
gressive workers and working peasants of Europe and
America are awakened, but that we have at last seen the
day of the awakening, not of a few, but of tens of thou-
sands, of hundreds of thousands, of millions of the labor-
ing class of the peoples of the East. These peoples form
the majority of the world's whole population, and they
alone, therefore, are able to bring the war between
capital and labor to a conclusive decision. . . .
"The Communist International said from the very
first day of its existence: 'There are four times as many
people living in Asia as Hve in Europe. We will free all
peoples, all who labor.' . . . We know that the labor-
ing masses of the East are in part retrograde, though
not by their own fault; they cannot read or write, are
ignorant, are bound in superstition, believe in the evil
spirit, are unable to read any newspapers, do not know
SOCIAL UNREST 349
what is happening in the world, have not the sHght-
est idea of the most elementary laws of hygiene. Com-
rades; our Moscow International discussed the ques-
tion whether a socialist revolution could take place in
the countries of the East before those countries had
passed through the capitalist stage. You know that
the view which long prevailed was that every country
must first go through the period of capitalism . . . be-
fore socialism could become a live question. We now
beheve that this is no longer true. Russia has done
thiS; and from that moment we are able to say that
China, India, Turkey, Persia, Armenia also can, and
must, make a direct fight to get the Soviet System.
These countries can, and must, prepare themselves to
be Soviet republics.
"I say that we give patient aid to groups of persons
who do not beheve in our ideas, who are even opposed
to us on some points. In this way, the Soviet Govern-
ment supports Kemal in Turkey. Never for one mo-
ment do we forget that the movement headed by Kemal
is not a communist movement. We know it. I have
here extracts from the verbatim reports of the first ses-
sion of the Turkish people's Government at Angora.
Kemal himself says that Hhe Caliph's person is sacred
and inviolable.' The movement headed by Kemal
wants to rescue the Caliph's 'sacred' person from the
hands of the foe. That is the Turkish Nationalist's
point of view. But is it a communist point of view?
No. We respect the religious convictions of the masses;
we know how to re-educate the masses. It will be the
work of years.
"We use great caution in approaching the religious
350 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
convictions of the laboring masses in the East and else-
where. But at this Congress we are bound to tell you
that you must not do what the Kemal Government is
doing in Turkey; you must not support the power of
the Sultan, not even if religious considerations urge you
to do so. You must press on, and must not allow your-
selves to be pulled back. We believe the Sultan's hour
has struck. You must not allow any form of autocratic
power to continue; you must destroy, you must annihi-
late, faith in the Sultan; you must struggle to obtain
real Soviet organizations. The Russian peasants also
were strong believers in the Czar; but when a true peo-
ple's revolution broke out there was practically nothing
left of this faith in the Czar. The same thing will hap-
pen in Turkey and all over the East as soon as a true
peasants' revolution shall burst forth over the surface
of the black earth. The people will veiy soon lose faith
in their Sultan and in their masters. We say once more,
the pohcy pursued by the present people's Government
in Turkey is not the policy of the Communist Inter-
national, it is not our policy; nevertheless, we declare
that we are prepared to support any revolutionary fight
against the English Government.
"Yes, we array ourselves against the EngHsh bour-
geoisie; we seize the English imperialist by the throat
and tread him under foot. It is against English capi-
talism that the worst, the most fatal blow must be dealt.
That is so. But at the same time we must educate the
laboring masses of the East to hatred, to the will to fight
the whole of the rich classes indifferently, whoever they
be. The great significance of the revolution now start-
ing in the East does not consist in begging the English
SOCIAL UNREST 351
imperialist to take his feet off the table, for the purpose
of then permitting the wealthy Turk to place his feet
on it all the more comfortably; no, we will very politely
ask all the rich to remove their dirty feet from the table,
so that there may be no luxuriousness among us, no
boasting, no contempt of the people, no idleness, but
that the world may be ruled by the worker's horny
hand."
The Baku Congress was the opening gun in Bolshe-
vism's avowed campaign for the immediate Bolshevizing
of the East. It was followed by increased Soviet ac-
tivity and by substantial Soviet successes, especially
in the Caucasus, where both Georgia and Armenia were
Bolshevized in the spring of 1921.
These very successes, however, awakened growing
uneasiness among Soviet Russia's nationalist proteges.
The various Oriental nationalist parties, which had at
first welcomed Moscow's aid so enthusiastically against
the Entente Powers, now began to realize that Russian
Bolshevism might prove as great a peril as Western
imperialism to their patriotic aspirations. Of course
the nationalist leaders had always realized Moscow's
ultimate goal, but hitherto they had felt themselves
strong enough to control the situation and to take Rus-
sian aid without paying Moscow's price. Now they
no longer felt so sure. The numbers of class-conscious
''proletarians" in the East might be very small. The
communist philosophy might be virtually unintelligible
to the Oriental masses. Nevertheless, the very exist-
ence of Soviet Russia was a warning not to be disre-
garded. In Russia an infinitesimal commmiist minority,
numbering, by its own admission, not much over 600,-
352 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
000; was maintaining an unlimited despotism over
170;000;000 people. Western countries might rely on
their popular education and their stanch traditions of
ordered Hberty; the East possessed no such bulwarks
against Bolshevism. The East was, in fact, much hke
Russia. There was the same dense ignorance of the
masses; the same absence of a large and powerful mid-
dle class; the same tradition of despotism; the same
popular acquiescence in the rule of ruthless minorities.
Finally, there were the ominous examples of Sovietized
Turkestan and Azerbaidjan. In fine, Oriental nation-
alists bethought them of the old adage that he who sups
with the devil needs a long spoon.
Everywhere it has been the same stor}^ In Asia
Minor, Mustapha Kemal has arrested Bolshevist propa-
ganda agents, while Turkish and Russian troops have
more than once clashed on the disputed Caucasus fron-
tiers. In Egypt we have already seen how an amicable
arrangement between Lord Milner and the Egyptian
nationalist leaders was facilitated by the latter's fear
of the social revolutionary agitators who were inflam-
ing the fellaheen. In India, Sir Valentine Chirol noted
as far back as the spring of 1918 how Russia's collapse
into Bolshevism had had a "sobering effect" on Indian
public opinion. "The more thoughtful Indians," he
wrote, "now see how helpless even the Russian intel-
ligentsia (relatively far more numerous and matured
than the Indian intelligentsia) has proved to control the
great ignorant masses as soon as the whole fabric of
government has been hastily shattered." ^ In Afghani-
^ Sir V. Chirol, "India in Travail," Edinburgh Review, July, 1918.
Also see H. H. The Aga Khan, India in Transition, p. 17 (Loudon, 1918).
SOCIAL UNREST 353
stan, likewise, the Ameer was losing his love for his Bol-
shevist allies. The streams of refugees from Sovietized
Turkestan that flowed across his borders for protection,
headed by his kinsman the Ameer of Bokhara, made
Amanullah Khan do some hard thinking, intensified by
a serious mutiny of Afghan troops on the Russian bor-
der, the mutineers demanding the right to form Soldiers'
Councils quite on the Russian pattern. Bolshevist
agents might tempt him by the loot of India, but the
Ameer could also see that that would do him little good
if he himself were to be looted and killed by his own
rebellious subjects.^ Thus, as time went on. Oriental
nationalists and conservatives generally tended to close
ranks in dislike and apprehension of Bolshevism. Had
there been no other issue involved, there can be little
doubt that Moscow's advances would have been repelled
and Bolshevist agents given short shrift.
Unfortmiately, the Eastern nationalists feel them-
selves between the Bolshevist devil and the Western
imperialist deep sea. The upshot has been that they
have been trying to play off the one against the other —
driven toward Moscow by every Entente aggression;
driven toward the West by every Soviet coup of Lenine.
Western statesmen should realize this, and should re-
member that Bolshevism's best propagandist agent is,
not Zinoviev orating at Baku, but General Gouraud,
with his Senegalese battalions and "strong-arm" meth-
ods in Syria and the Arab hinterland.
Certainly, any extensive spread of Bolshevism in the
East would be a terrible misfortune both for the Orient
and for the world at large. If the triumph of Bolshe-
1 Ikbal All Shah, op. cit.
354 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM
vism would mean barbarism in the West, in the East it
would spell downright .savager}\ The sudden release
of the ignorant, brutal Oriental masses from their tra-
ditional restraints of religion and custom, and the sub-
mergence of the relatively small upper and middle
classes by the flood of social revolution would mean the
destruction of all Oriental ci\ihzation and culture, and
a plunge into an abyss of anarchy from which the East
could emerge only after generations, perhaps centuries.
CONCLUSION
Our survey of the Near and Middle East is at an end.
What is the outstanding feature of that survey? It is:
Change. The "Immovable East" has been moved at
last — moved to its very depths. The Orient is to-day
in full transition, flux, ferment, more sudden and pro-
found than any it has hitherto known. The world of
Islam, mentally and spiritually quiescent for almost a
thousand years, is once more astir, once more on the
march.
Whither? We do not know. Who would be bold
enough to prophesy the outcome of this vast ferment —
political, economic, social, religious, and much more
besides? All that we may wisely venture is to observe,
describe, and analyze the various elements in the great
transition.
Yet surely this is much. To view, however empiri-
cally, the mighty transformation at work; to group its
multitudinous aspects in some sort of relativity; to fol-
low the red threads of tendency running through the
tangled skein, is to gain at least provisional knowledge
and acquire capacity to grasp the significance of future
developments as they shall successively arise.
"To know is to understand" — and to hope: to hope
that this present travail, vast and ill understood, may
be but the birth-pangs of a truly renascent East taking
its place in a renascent world.
355
THE WORLD OF ISLAM.
INDEX
Aali Pasha, Pan-Islam agitation of, 65
Abbas Hilmi, Khedive, pro-Turkish
views of, 185; deposition of, 185;
Pan-Arabianism supported by, 202
Abd-el-Kader, French resisted Ijy, 49
Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, Pro-Germanism
of, 186
Abd-el-Wahab, Mohammedan revival
begun by, 26, 48; birth of, 26; early
life of, 27 ff.; influence of, 28; death
of, 28
Abdul Hamid, despotism of, 39; as
caliph, 48; Senussi's opposition to,
48, 56; Djemal-ed-Din protected by,
63 ff.; Pan-Islam policy of, 65 ff.;
character of, 65 ff.; government of.
66; deposition of, 67, 142; tyrannical
policy of, 138; nationalism opposed
by, 166, 196; Arabs conciliated by,
169 #.
Abu Bekr, 28; policy of, 135 ff.
Abyssinian Church, Mohammedan
threat against, 60
Afghanistan, religious uprisings in, 50;
nineteenth-century independence of,
140; Bolshevism in, 338 #. ; rebellion
of, 339 ff.
Africa-Mohammedan missionary work
in, 59 ff. See also North Africa
Agadir crisis, 69
Ahmed Bey Agayeflf, Pan-Turanism
aided by, 197
Alexandria, massacre of Europeans in,
177
Algeria, French conquest of, 49, 188;
Kabyle insurrection in, 50; compul-
sory vaccination in, 113; liberal politi-
cal aspirations in, 140 ff.; need for
European government in, 145
Allenby, General, Egypt in control of,
211
Amanullah Khan, Bolshevism of, 338;
war on England declared by, 339;
present policy of, 353
Anatolia, Bolshevist manifesto to, 345
Anglo-Russian Agreement, terms of,
189 #.
Arabi Pasha, Djemal-«d-Din's influ-
ence on, 176; revolution in Egypt
headed by, 176
Arabia, description of natives of, 27;
Turks fought by, 28; defeat of, 29;
political freedom of, 135; democracy
in, 151; nationalist spirit in, 167 ff.;
Turkish rulers opposed by, 167 #.;
suppression of, 170; 1905 rebellion of,
170; effect of Yoimg-Turk revolu-
tion on, 172 Jf.; 1916 revolt of, 174;
Pan-Arabism in, 172; religious char-
acter of Pan- Arab movement in,
201 ff. ; effect of Great War on, 202,
218 #.; Allied encouragement of, 218;
peace terms and, 219; English agree-
ment with, 219 ff.; revolt against
Turks of, 220; secret partition of,
220 ff.; Colonel Lawrence's influence
in, 221; secret treaties revealed to
222; France and England in, 222 ff.
Mustapha Kemal aided by, 230 ff.
English negotiations with, 235; Bol-
shevist manifesto to, 345
Arabian National Committee, creation
of. 170
Archer. William, on overpopulation in
India, 312
Argyll, Duke of, overpopulation in
India, 311
Armenia. Bolshevist manifesto to, 345
Arya Somaj. 247
Atchin War, 50
Azerbaidjan, Bolshevist revolution in,
343 #.
Babbist movement in Persia. 324
Baber, Mogul Empire fovmded by, 243
Baku, Congress of Eastern Peoples at,
344, 351
Balkan War, 68; Mohammedans roused
by, 70
Barbary States, French conquest of, 188
Berard, Victor, on the enmity of Turks
and Arabs, 167 ff.; France's Syrian
policy criticised by, 236
Bertrand, Louis, anti-Western feeling
in Orient described by, 114 ff.; on
social conditions in the Levant, 319,
321
Bevan, Edwyn, nationalist views of.
149 #.
Bin Saud, Ikhwan movement led by, 86
Bolshevism, effects on Orient of, 208;
Mustapha Kemal aided by, 232 ff.;
the East a field for, 335 ff; propa-
ganda of, 336 ff., 341 ff.; Oriental
policy of, 337; in Afghanistan, 338^.;
manifesto to Mohammedans issued
by, 341 ^. ; manifesto to Turks issued
357
358
INDEX
by, 342 ff.: "Congress of Eastern
Peoples" held by, 344 ff.
Bombay, English character of, 120;
social conditions in, 320 ff.
Bose, Pramatha Nath, on economic
conditions in India, 291 ff.
Brahminism, illiberalism of, 143
BraUsford, H. N., on modern industry
in Egypt, 280 ff. ; on social conditions
in Egypt, 318 if.
British East India Company, 244
Bukhsh, S. Khuda, reform work of,
38 ff.; nationalism in India opposed
by, 148 #.; OQ Indian social condi-
tions, 299 ff.
Caetani, Leone, 76
Cahan, L6on, Turanism and, 194
Cairo, revolt in, 211; modern women in;
306
Calcutta, English character of, 120;
social conditions in, 320
Caliphate, Islam strengthened by, 46
ff.\ history of, 47; Turkey the head
of. 47 ff.
Chelmsford, Lord, report of, 257 ff.
China, Mohammedan insurrection in,
50, 61 ff.; Mohammedan missionary
work in, 61; number of Moham-
medans in, 62; Mohammedan agita-
tion in, 73
Chirol, Valentine, Western influence in
Orient described by, 94 ff. ; on Egyp-
tian situation, 212 ff.; Montagu-
Chelmsford Report approved by,
261; on Egyptian conditions since
the war, 321 ff.; on Bolshevism in
India, 352
Congress of Eastern Peoples, 344 ff.
Constantine, King, recalled, 230
Constantmople, AUied occupation of,
228 ff. ; changes since 1896 in, 297 ff. ;
status of women in, 306
Cox, Sir Percy, English-Arabian nego-
tiations made by, 235; influence of,
237
Cromer, Lord, on Islam, 36, 39; West-
ern influence in Orient described by,
96; ethics of imperialism formulated
by, 101, 122, 143 ff.; Egyptian ad-
ministration of, 177; resignation of,
181; on western-educated Egypt,
304; on overpopulation in India, 312
Curtis, Lionel, nationalism in India
supported by, 154 ff.; Montagu-
Chelmsford Report approved by, 261
Curzon-Wyllie, Sir, assassination of,
252
Damascus, French in, 226 ff.
Dar-ul-Islam, 203 ff.
Dickinson, G. Lowes, on Eastern eco-
nomics, 295
Djemal-ed-Din, birth of, 63; character
of, 63; anti-European work of, 63;
in India, 63; in Egypt, 63; Abdul
Hamid's protection of, 63 ff.; death
of, 64 ; teachings of, 64 ff. ; national-
ism taught by, 164; Egypt influenced
by, 176; in Russia, 337
Dutch East Indies, Mohammedan up-
risings in, 50; Mohammedan mis-
sionary work in, 62
Egypt, nationalism in, 39, 140 ff.;
Mahdist insurrection in, SO; 1914
insm-rection of, 73; exiled Arabs in,
170; characteristics of people of, 174
ff. ; early European influences in, 175;
nationalist agitation in, 176 ff.; in-
fluence of Djemal-ed-Din in, 176;
1882 revolution in, 176 ff.; Lord
Cromer's rule of, 177; France's in-
fluence in, ns ff.; failure of English
liberal policy in, 181 ff. ; Lord Kitch-
ener's rvile in, 182 ff.; effect of out-
break of World War on, 185 #. ; made
English protectorate, 185 ff.; Pan-
Arabism in, 201; Versailles confer-
ence's treatment of, 207; nationalist
demands of, 210; Allenby in control
of, 211; rebellion of, 211 ff.; martial
law in, 212; situation after rebellion
in, 213 ff.; English commission of
inquiry in, 215; English compromise
with, 216; opposition to compromise
in, 216 ff. ; modern factories in, 277,
280; industrial conditions in, 280 ff.;
social conditions in, 319; social revo-
lution in, 332 ff.
El-Gharami, 36
El Mahdi, 51
England, Egypt's rebellion against^
208 ff.; Commission of Inquiry into
Egyptian affairs appointed by, 215;
Egyptian compromise with, 216;
opposition to compromise in, 216;
Arabia and, 219 Jf.; in Mesopotamia,
219 #.; in Palestine, 220; French dis-
agreement with, 223 ff. ; at San Remo
conference, 225; Mesopotamian re-
bellion against, 227 ff. ; Sevres Treaty
and, 229; Greek agreement with, 229;
Arabian negotiations with, 235; in
India, 243 ff.
Enver Pasha, Pan-Turanism and, 199;
in Russia, 337
Feisal, Prince, at peace conference^
222 ff. ; peace coimsels of, 223 ; made
king of Syria, 226
Fisher, on social conditions in IndiaJ
319 #.
France, Morocco seized by, 69; anti-
British propaganda of, 178 #.; Arabia
and, 219; Syrian aspirations of, 219
INDEX
359
ff.: at San Remo conference, 225;
SjTian rebellion and, 226 ff.\ S6vres
Treaty and. 229; Greek agreement
with, 229; present Syrian situation
of, 235 ff.
Gandhi, M. K., boycott of England ad-
vocated by, 266
Gorst, Sir Eldon, Lord Cromer suc-
ceeded by, 181; failure of policy of,
181 #.
Gouraud, General, Feisal subdued by,
227; danger in methods of, 353
Greece, anti-Tiu"k campaign of, 229;
Venizelos repudiated by, 230; Con-
stantino supported by, 230
HabibuUah Khan, Ameer, England sup-
ported by, 338; death of, 338
Haifa, to be British, 220
Hajj, Islam strengthened by, 46 ff.
Halil Pasha, Pan-Tiiranism and, 200
Hanotaux, Gabriel, 69
Harding, Lord, Indian nationalist
movement supported by, 256
Hedjaz, Turkish dominion of, 167
Hindustan, Islam's appeal to, 72; anti-
Western feeling in, 118 ff.; illiberal
tradition of, 143
Hunter, Sir William, on overpopulation
in India, 311 jf.
Hussein Kamel, made Sultan of Egypt,
185
Ikhwan, beginning of, 86; progress of,
86
Imam Yahya, 237
India, reform of Islamism in, 37; Eng-
lish mastery of, 49; Islam's mission-
ary work in, 62; 1914 insurrection in,
73; English towns and customs in,
120; effect of Russo-Japanese War
in, 126, 250 #. ; liberal political aspira-
tions in, 140 ff.; democracy intro-
duced by England in, 146 ff.; opposi-
^ tion to nationalism in, 147 ff., 259 ff. ;
support of nationalism in, 154 ff.,
162 ff. ; history of. 239 ; Aryan inva-
sion of, 239 ff.; beginning of caste
system in, 240 ff. ; Mohammedan in-
vasion of, 242 iff.; Mogul Empire
founded in, 243 ; British conquest of,
244 ff.; beginning of discontent in,
245 ff. ; Hindu nationalist movement
in, 247 ff., 252 ff.; English liberal
policy in, 253 ff. ; result of outbreak
of war in, 255 ; Montagu-Chelmsford
Report in, 257 ff.; militant imrest in,
262 ff.; effect of Rowlatt Bill in, 263
ff.; English boycotted by, 265 ff.;
present tiu-moil in, 267; industries in,
276 ff.; industrial conditions in, 281
ff. ; industrial future of, 283 ff. ; agri-
culture in, 288 ff.; Swadeshi move-
ment in, 289 ff.; social conditions in,
299 ff.; status of women in, 301,
305 ff.; education in, 302 ff.; over-
population in, 311 ff.; condition of
peasants in, 319; city and riu-al life
in, 325 ff.; economic revolution in,
327 ff.; attitude of Bolshevists
toward, 341 ff.
Indian Couhcils Act, terms of, 253;
effect of, 254
Indian National Congress, 245
Islam, eighteenth-century decadence of,
25#.; revival of, 26; Cliristian opin-
ions of, 32 ff. ; present situation of, 33
ff.; agnosticism in, 39 ff.; fanatics in,
40 ff. ; solidarity of, 45 ff. ; Hajj an aid
to, 46 ff. ; caliphate an aid to, 46 ff. ;
Western successes against, 49; prose-
lytism of, 58 ff. ; effect of Balkan War
on, 70 ff.; effect of Russo-Japanese
War on, 71, 126 ff.; Western influ-
ence on, 90 ff. ; anti-Western reaction
of, 105 ff. ; race mixture in, 122 ff. ;
tyranny in, 132 ff. ; early equality in,
135 ff.; political reformation in, 137
ff.; birth of nationalism in, 163 ff.;
Bolshevist propaganda in, 336 ff.
See also Pan-Islam
Ismael Hamet, on scepticism among
Moslems, 40
Ismael, Khedive, tyrannical policy of,
139; Egypt Europeanized by, 175 Jf.
Italy, Tripoli attacked by, 68; San
Remo Treaty opposed by, 226, 229
Japan, Mohammedan missionary work
in, 71 ff.
Jowf , Sennussi stronghold, 55 i
Kabyle insiirrection, 50
Khadjar dj-nasty, Persian revolution
against, 190
Kharadjites, Islamic spirit preserved
by, 324
Khartum, capture of, 50
Kheir-ed-Din, attempt to regenerate
Timis made by, 107
Kitchener, Lord, Mahdist insurrection
suppressed by, 50; antinationalist be-
liefs of, 146; nationalism in Egypt
suppressed by, 182 ff.
Krishna varma, S., a-ssassination com-
mended by, 251
Lawrence, Colonel, infiuence of, 221;
Arab-Turk agreement views of,
230 ff. ; Mesopotamia views of, 234
Lebanon, France's control of, 219
Lenine, manifesto to Mohammedans
issued by, 341;^.
360
INDEX
Low, Sidney,' modem Imperialism de-
scribed by, 103 ff. ; on Egyptian situa-
tion, 183
Lyall, Sir Alfred, on Western education
in India, 303 ff.
Lybyer, Professor A. H., democracy in
Islam described by, 136, 151
Macdonald, J. Eamsay, on economic
conditions in India, 291; on social
revolution in India, 331 ff.
Mcllwraith, Sir M., on Egjptian situa-
tion, 214
McMalion, Sir Henry, agreement with
Arabs made by, 220 ff.
Madras, English character of, 120
Mahdism, definition of, 50 ff.
Mahdist insurrection, 50
Mahmud II, Sultan, liberal policy of,
137
Mahmud of Ghazni, India invaded by,
242
Mecca, decadence of, 26; Abd-el-
Wahab's pilgrimage to, 27; Saud's
subjugation of, 28; Turkish recon-
quest of, 29; aid to strength of Islam,
46 ff. ; post-cards sold at, 297
Medina, decadence of, 26; Abd-el-
Wahab's studies at, 27 ; Saud's subju-
gation of, 28; Turkish reconquest of,
29; electricity at, 297
Mehemet All, army of, 29; Turks aided
by, 29; Wahabi defeated by, 29;
liberal policy of, 137; Egypt Eu-
ropeanized by, 175
Mesopotamia, Turkish dominion of,
167; England in, 219 ff.\ rebellion
against England of, 227 ff. ; denuncia-
tion of English policy in, 234; Bol-
shevists' manifesto issued to, 345
M6tin, Albert, on nationalist move-
ment in India, 330 ff.
Midhat Pa/Sha, liberal movement aided
by, 39
Milner, Lord, Egj^ptian inquiry com-
mission headed by, 215; character of,
215; compromise agreed on by, 216
ff.; resignation of, 217; influence of,
237
Mogul Empire, foimdation of, 243
Mohammed Abdou, Sheikh, liberal
movement aided by, 39; Djemal-ed-
Din's influence on, 176; conservative
teachings of, 178
Mohammed Ahmed, Sennussi's scorn of,
56
Mohammed Farid Bey, anti-English
policy of, 180; mistakes of, 180 ff.;
pro-German policy of, 186
Mohammedan Revival. See Pan-
Islam
MoUahs, antiliberalism of, 37
Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 258 ff.
Montagu, liberal policy of, 256 ff.
Morison, Sir Theodore, on Moslem
situation, 81, 84#.; on modern indus-
try in India, 277 ff. ; 290
Morley, John, liberal policy of, 253
Morocco, French seizure of, 69, 188;
in nineteenth centiiry, 140
Motazelism, rediscovery of, 32; influ-
ence of, 36
Moulvie Cheragh All, reform work of,
38
Muhammed Ali, Shah, revolt in Persia
against, 142
Muir, Ramsay, European imperialism
described by, 100
Mustapha Kemal, character of, 179;
beliefs of, 179 ff.\ death of, 180;
Allies defied by, 226; Turkish de-
nimciation of, 229; Greek campaign
against, 229 ff.\ Arab aid given to,
230 ff.\ policy of, 232; Bolshevists
allied with, 232 ff.; French negotia-
tions with, 236; Bolshevist support
of. 338, 349
Mutiny of 1857. 244
Nair, Doctor T. MadavanJ anti-
nationalist opinions of, 148, 260
Nakechabendiya fraternity, 50
Namasudra, antinationalist organiza-
tion, 147, 260
Nejd, birth of Abd-el-Wahab hi, 26 ff.\
description of, 26 ff. ; return of Abd-
el-Wahab to, 27; conversion of, 28;
consolidation of, 28
Nitti, Premier, San Remo Treaty op-
posed by, 225 ff.
North Africa, "Holy Men" insurrec-
tion in, 50; lack of nationalism in,
187 ff.; races in, 187 ff.
Nyassaland, Mohammedanism in, 59 ff.
Orient. See Islam
Pal, Bepin Chander, on Montagu-
Chelmsford Report, 259; on social
revolution in India, 328
Palestine, Sykes-Picot Agreement and,
220; England in, 220
Pan-Islam, fanatics' schemes for, 40 ff. ;
definition of, 45 ff. ; Hajj an aid to,
46 ff.; caliphate an aid to, 47 ff.;
anti-Western character of, 49 ff.;
fraternities in, 52 ff.; Abdul Hamid's
support of, 65 ff. ; Young-Turk inter-
ruption of, 68; renewal of, 68 ff.;
effect of Balkan War on, 70if.; Great
War and, 73 ff.; Versailles Treaty
and, 74 ff.; press strength of, 80;
propaganda of, 80; menacing temper
of, 84 ff. ; economic evolution in, S&ff.
Pan-Syrian Congress, 226
Pan-Turanism. See Turanians
INDEX
361
Pan-Turkism. See Turkey, rise of
nationalism in
Persia, 1914 insiirrection in, 73; an
English protectorate, 75; tyranny in,
139; independence of, 140; liberal
movement in, 140; 1908 revolution
in, 142, 189 ff.; need for European
government in, 145; nineteen tli-cen-
tury conditions in, 189; Versailles
conference's treatment of, 206 ff. ; war
conditions in, 233; Bolshevism in,
233 ff., 339 ff.; Bolshevist manifesto
issued to, 344
Population Problem of India, The, 313
Ramsay, Sir William, on economic
conditions in Asia Minor, 285 ff.
Realpolitik, treatment of Orient.by, 103,
127
Reshid Pasha, liberal movement aided
by, 39
Roushdi Pasha, nationalist demands
of, 210 ff.
Rowlatt BiU, nationalist opposition to,
263 #.
Russia, Turanian antagonism for, 198
ff. See also Bolshevism and Soviet
Russia
Russo-Japanese War, Islam roused by,
71. 126
Salafl, rise and growth of, 86 ; spirit of,
86
San Remo, conference at, 225 ff.
Saud, Abd-el-Wahab succeeded by, 28;
power and character of, 28; govern-
ment of, 28, 49; holy cities subdued
by, 28; death of, 28
Saud, clan of, converted, 29
Schweinfurth, Georg, Egyptian na-
tionalism described by, 177 ff.
Sennussi-el-Mahdi, leadership won by,
54; power of, 54
Sennussiya, foundation of, 52 ff. ; lead-
ership of, 54 ; present power of, 54 ff. ;
government of, 55; policy of, 55 ff.;
proselytism of, 58 ff.
Sevres Treaty, 229, 236
Seyid Ahmed, state in India foimded
by, 30; conquest of, 30
Seyid Ahmed Khan, Sir, reforms of, 37
Seyid Amir Ali, reform work of, 38
Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi, in
Mecca, 30, 47 ; Abdul Hamid opposed
by, 48, 53; birth of, 53; education of,
53; "Zawias" built by, 53; power of,
53 ff.
Shamyl, Russia opposed by, 49
Shiah Emir, 237
Shuster, W. Morgan, Persia's political
capacity described by, 152 ff.
South Africa, Mohammedan threat
against, 60
Soviet Russia, Afghanistan allied with,
340 ff.; Kemal supported by, 349;
success of, 351 ff.
Sun-Yat-Sen, Doctor, 73
Sydenham, Lord, Montagu-Chelmsford
Report criticised by, 261
Swadeshi movement, 289 ff.
Sykes-Picot Agreement, terms of, 220
ff.; French opposition to, 225 ff.;
fulfilment of, 225
Syria, Turkish dominion of, 167; na-
tionalist agitation in, 169 ff.; France
in, 219 ff.; declaration of indepen-
dence of, 226; French suppression of,
227; present situation in, 235 ff.;
Bolshevist manifesto issued to, 346
Tagore, Rablndranath, on economic
conditions in India, 294
Talaat, in Russia, 337
Tartars, liberal movement among, 39;
Mohammedan missionary work
among, 60 ff. ; nationalist revival of,
194 ff. ; Bolshevism among, 337
Tekin Alp, on Pan-Turanism, 199
Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 177
Tewflk Pasha, anti-English feeling of,
110
Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, nationalist
work of, 250, 259
Townsend, Meredith, anti-Western feel-
ing in Orient explained by, 122, 125
Transcaucasia, Russian conquest of,
49; after-the-war situation in, 232;
Mustapha Kemal supported by, 232
Tripoli, Italy's raid on, 68; Moham-
medan resistance in, 69; 1914 insur-
rection in, 73
Tunis, Kheir-ed-Din's reforms in, 10G#.
Turanians, peoples composing, 192 ff.;
nationalist movement among, 193#.;
effect of Young-Turk Revolution on,
196 ; effect of Balkan Wars on, 197 #. ;
effect of Great War on, 199 ff.
Turkestan, Bolshevism in, 339; social
revolution in, 343
Turkestan, Chinese, Mohammedans in,
61 ; revolt of, 62
Turkey, Islam conquered by, 28;
Arabs war against, 28 ff.; Mehemet
All's aid of, 29; liberal movement in,
38 ff.; 1908 revolution in, 39, 142;
Balkan attack on, 68 #. ; anti- Western
feeling in, 108 ff.; effect of Russo-
Japanese War in, 126; independence
of, 140; liberal movement in, 140;
democracy in, 151 ; birth of national-
ism in, 164; language of, 165; Pan-
Turanism m, 166 ff., 192 ff., 217 ff.;
Arabian rebellion against, 168 ff.;
Allied treaty with, 229; Arab aid
given to, 230 ff. ; Western educational
362
INDEX
methods in, 303; status of women in,
306; Bolshevists' manifesto to, 342 ff.
Turkish and Pan-TuTkish Ideal, The,
199
VambSry, Arminius, warning against
Mohammedans uttered by, 78 ff..
127; Moslem politics described by,
136, 150; Yoimg-Turk party de-
scribed by, 140; Turanism and, 194;
on changes at Constantinople, 297 ff. ;
on native officials in East, 304 ff. ; on
status of woman in East, 306
Venizelos, Allied agreement with, 229;
Greek repudiation of, 230
Versailles Peace, Islam affected by,
128 ff., 206; secret treaties revealed
by, 206 ff.
Victoria, Queen, made Empress of
India, 244
Wacha, Sir Dinshaw, on Montagu-
Chelmsford Report, 258 ff.
Wahabi, formation of state of, 28, 48;
government of, 28, 49; successful
fighting of, 28; defeat of, 29; end of
political power of, 29; spiritual power
of, 29; in India, 30; English conquest
of in India, 30; influence of. 30;
characteristics of, 31 if.
Wattal, P. K., on overpopulation in
India, 313 ff.
Willcocks, Sir William, on Egyptian
situation, 212
Yahya Siddyk, on pre-war Moham-
medan situation, 81 ff.
Yakub Beg, Turkestan insurrection led
by, 62
Young Arabia, 171 ff.
Young-Turk party, rise of, 139 ff. ; na-
tionalist policy of, 166; Arabian
nationalism and, 172 ff.
Young-Tiu-k revolution, 68, 142
Yugantar, anti-English organ, 250 ff.
Yunnan, Mohammedan insurrection
in, 50, 61 ff. ; Chinese Mohammedans
in, 61
Yusuf Bey Akchura Oglu, Pan-Tura-
nian society founded by, 196
Zagloul Pasha, Milner's discussions
with, 215; Milner's compromise with,
216; opposition to, 216 Jf.
Zaidite Emir, 237
Zawia Baida, Sennussi's founding of, 53
Zinoviev, on Third International, 348 if.
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