ilBliliiiii 
 
 
 mm 
 
 |i!|! 
 
 m 

 
 THE 
 
 PRESENT STATE 
 
 OF 
 IN HF.GAUD TO 
 
 AGRICULTURE, TRADE, AND 
 FINANCE; 
 
 WITH 
 
 A COMPARISON OF THE PROSPECTS OF 
 ENGLAND AND FRANCE. 
 
 By JOSEPH LOWE, Esq. 
 
 S^cconU ([Edition, 
 
 WITH VARIOUS ADDITIONS AND EMENDATIONS. 
 
 LONDON: 
 PRINTED FOR LONGMAN, HURST, RKKS, ORME, AND BROWN, 
 
 PATERNOSTKR-nOW } 
 
 .1. RICHARDSON, 91. ROYAL EXCHANGE; 
 AND MESSRS. CONSTABLE AND CO., EDINBURGH. 
 
 1823.
 
 London : 
 
 Priiiteil liy A. & R. Spottiswoode. 
 
 New - Si I cci-S<jiiare.
 
 ^5- 
 
 
 TO 
 
 WILLIAM MANNING, Esg.M.P. 
 
 AND A DIRECTOR OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND, 
 THIS VOLUME, 
 
 APPROPRIATED TO 
 
 OBJECTS INTIMATELY CONNECTED WITH 
 
 THOSE OF HIS PUBLIC LIFE, 
 
 IS INSCRIBED, 
 WITH SENTIMENTS OF THE GREATEST REGARD, 
 
 BY 
 
 THE AUTHOR. 
 
 A '2 
 
 33533?
 
 ADVERTISEMENT 
 
 TO 
 
 THE SECOND EDITION, 
 
 In preparing this Edition, the whole volume has 
 been revised with a care proportioned to the 
 importance of the subjects, and a consider- 
 able portion of additional matter has been in- 
 serted. The result of this will be apparent in 
 several of the tables, as well as in the reasoning on 
 the following topics : — 
 
 The Sources of our Financial Supplies during 
 the War. 
 
 The Causes of the general rise of Prices in 
 that Period. 
 
 The Question of Depreciation and Over-issue. 
 
 The Effect of the War on Property, individual 
 and national. 
 
 The Connexion between Increase of Po])ulation, 
 and Increase of Wealth ; and 
 
 The Views of Finance adapted to our present 
 Situation. 
 
 A .3
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 JN' o subject can present a higher interest than an 
 enquiry into the state and prospects of the pro- 
 ductive industry of England. Whatever tends to 
 correct error, or introduce improvement into the 
 operation of that industry, must affect the comfort 
 of so large a population, that no research, bestowed 
 on such a subject, can be accounted too minute, 
 no labour too long. 
 
 Fruitful as has been the present age in changes, 
 military and political, there has occurred an almost 
 equal degree of revolution in the value of money 
 and the productive power of labour and capital, de- 
 partments in general so tranquil as hardly to attract 
 the notice of the historian. Those of our readers 
 who are of an age to recollect the peace of 1783, 
 cannot have forgotten tlie general discouragement 
 caused by the relinquishment of our American 
 Colonies, followed as it was by a season of great 
 financial difficulty. They will remember with more 
 satisfaction the revival of our commercial activity 
 in the years preceding the French Revolution, 
 and the discussions whetlicr we were indebted for 
 
 A 1-
 
 VUl INTRODUCTION. 
 
 SO beneficial a change to the natural course of cir- 
 cumstances or the conduct of Mr. Pitt. This was 
 iollowcd by the war witli France — a period sub- 
 versive of all j)revious calculation in finance, since, 
 after experiencing j)ecuniary difficulty during a 
 lew years, our resources aj)peared to expand with 
 our wants, and continued so long abundant, that 
 we had no little difficulty in anticipating the possi- 
 bility of a recurrence of embarrassment. 
 
 That which took place at the close of the war 
 (1815 and 1816) was altogether unexpected, and 
 the public, accounting pecuniary straits incom- 
 patible with our brilliant success in the field, clung 
 to the expectation that their distress would disap- 
 pear as soon as peace should be firmly established. 
 This hope was confirmed by the revival of our 
 commercial activity in I8I7 and 1818, but the 
 succeeding years dispelled the illusion, and taught 
 us that the evils of transition were not yet at an 
 end. 
 
 During the last and present year circumstances 
 have become more favourable, and our lower orders, 
 in particular, enjoy a larger share of comfort than 
 they have known for a long period. Still it might 
 be going too far, were we to flatter ourselves that 
 our embarrassments had reached their close. The 
 unfortunate coincidence between the relief of 
 the consumer and the distress of the producer of 
 corn, joined to the portion of uncertainty always 
 attendant on a conunerce of export, convey a warn- 
 ing that a season of difficulty must yet elapse, ere 
 our circumstances become thoroughly adapted to 
 our new and more natural state. There exists in
 
 INTRODUCTION. IX 
 
 some branches a want of employment ; in others, a 
 remarkable dispro})ortion in the rate of wages and 
 salaries to the earnings of the employer; — the whole 
 affording a painful lesson how little either the 
 public or our rulers foresaw the consequence of 
 lavish expenditure, and how few among those who 
 undertook to enlighten them, either in parliament, 
 or through the medium of the press, were ac- 
 quainted with tlie circumstances of former periods 
 of transition from war to peace. 
 
 To elucidate, by a careful survey of facts and 
 documents, tlie obscurities of the past, and to offer 
 suggestions \vlnch may perhaps tend to facilitate 
 our transition to a more safe and steady state of 
 things, is the object of this volume. We shall 
 begin by endeavouring to account for our financial 
 prosperity during the war, and to explain tlie 
 causes of the reverse tliat followed the peace. No 
 one has yet attempted to show how far our increase 
 of wealth during the war was real, and how far 
 nominal — a distinction, which, if subversive of a part 
 of the flattering picture with which we gratified our 
 imagination during our long contest, has the con- 
 soling accom})animent, that the decrease of our 
 wealth since the peace will be found, by following 
 up a similar reasoning, to be far less than is com- 
 monly apprehended. 
 
 This enquiry will be necessarily connected with 
 researches into the intricate to])ics of iMoney and 
 Exchange. How far did the substitution of ])a])er 
 for metallic currency prove an addition to our 
 resources? At what period did tiuit hazardous
 
 I\ THOnnf.'TKJV. 
 
 expeiiment cease to afibrd relief, or become ))r()- 
 diictivc of loss? And do not the public at ])resent 
 labour under a general misapprehension in regard 
 to the effect of the resumption of cash payments, 
 attributing to the act of 1819, commonly called 
 Mr. Peers IJill, tliat fall of prices, that recovery 
 of the value of money vvhicli ought to be traced to 
 a more powerful cause ? 
 
 Our next topic shall be the state of our Agri- 
 culture, and the causes of the distress that has 
 assailed this, the most flourishing during the wai- 
 of all the branches of our industry. Here also, the 
 attentive observer will find much miscalculation to 
 correct and misapprehension to remove. In at- 
 tempting this we shall draw a comparison of the 
 charges attendant on British and Continental agri- 
 culture, and venture on the more difficult enquiry 
 how far our produce is likely to continue at its 
 present rate ; also how far a low price of corn is or 
 is not conducive to the extension of our productive 
 industry. 
 
 A more cheering theme will be opened to us by 
 the increase of our population, the adequacy of our 
 produce to its support, and the refutation of the 
 discouraging theories circulated on this subject 
 during the war. An intimate connexion evidently 
 prevails between increase of numbers and increase 
 of wealth ; particularly in a town population, 
 among whom labour is subdivided, and the pos- 
 session of capital gives assurance of profitable em- 
 ployment. 
 
 These and similar topics will occupy the greater 
 part of our volume : the remainder sliall be appro-
 
 INTRODUCTION. \1 
 
 priated to the discussion of propositions for the 
 reUef of our suffering chisses, founded on tlie 
 evident tendency of our resources to increase. 
 
 To objects such as these any attachment to party 
 poHtics would evidently be unsuited. A writer 
 thoroughly impressed with the importance of his 
 subject, and animated by the hope of rendering 
 service to his countrymen, will consider as a 
 secondary object the notice either of men in office 
 or their opponents. While he speaks with com- 
 mendation of measures, which bear the stamp of 
 good intention or laborious exertion, he will ani- 
 madvert without reserve on such as are indicative 
 of hasty or imperfect views. It is on this groinid, 
 far more than on deficiency of zeal for the general 
 good, that our public men are vulnerable. " In 
 retirement," said an eminent public character, 
 *' I became sensible, that, when in place, I had been 
 deficient in almost every thing but diligence." * 
 The functions of our heads of office are ofiten ill 
 distributed : the assistance afforded to them in the 
 higher and more difficult departments is apparently 
 very imperfect ; and their minds, engaged from 
 day to day in devising expedients to meet a tem- 
 porary urgency, become less and less accustomed 
 to long-continued reflection on one subject, and to 
 the conclusions for which such reflection is indis- 
 pensable. Without an admission of this nature, 
 how can we account for their delaying so long the 
 adoption of a decisive course in regard to Ireland ; 
 
 • Huskisson on the Hiillioit Question, IS 10.
 
 XU INTRODUCTION. 
 
 or, their postponing in this country, till the eightli 
 year after the war, the financial measures which 
 were called for by a state of peace ? 
 
 An equal disposition to impartiality will, it is 
 lioped, be traced when we carry our views abroad, 
 and speak either of that nation which hereditary 
 feeling still represents as our rival in Europe, or of 
 that which contests of recent date have brought 
 forward as our opponent on the farther shore of 
 the Atlantic. A personal residence of several 
 years in France has given the author occasion to 
 mark the national character, to study the politi- 
 cal resources, to calculate the prospective power 
 of our once-dreaded neighbour. It has satisfied 
 him that though France is still the greatest of con- 
 tinental states, yet that England may soon dismiss 
 the apprehensions entertained by our forefathers, 
 and rest tranquil in the assurance of the more rapid 
 increase of her population, wealth, and power. 
 May we not add, that these views receive confirm- 
 ation from the conduct of our rulers, who, when 
 France was in a manner at the disposal of this 
 country and of allies ready to join in any project 
 of partition, accounted it impolitic either to weaken 
 her frontiers by the retention of fortresses, or to 
 cripple her trade by the imposition of restrictions ? 
 How different then our present situation, from that 
 of former years, when we were obliged to seek 
 security in foreign alliances, and to postpone the 
 correction of domestic abuses from a dread of ex- 
 citing discontent ! The most sincere well-wisher 
 to his country may now speak with freedom of 
 past transactions, viewing them merely as historical
 
 INTRODUCTION. XllI 
 
 facts, — as events whicli, though not remote in 
 date, may be boldly scrutinized witliout any pre- 
 judicial effect on our present situation. 
 
 The disposition of the public is fortunately in 
 coincidence with this state of things. During the 
 war events followed in too quick succession to 
 admit of deliberate reflection, or to afford a basis 
 for instructive conclusions : — all was absorbed in 
 the bustle of action, in an expectation of change. 
 At present the public may be compared to those 
 who, retired from active life, pass their transac- 
 tions in review with the advantage of leisure and 
 experience, — a situation far more favourable than 
 the ardour of a contest, for appreciating both the 
 extent of our sacrifices, and the results of which 
 they have been productive. 
 
 In attempting to elucidate these, we shall pro- 
 ceed with a scrupulous reference to facts and do- 
 cuments : but though such details must necessa- 
 rily form the body of the book, we shall hope to 
 introduce, occasionally, considerations of a higher 
 kind. Those who, from their time of life, have 
 been enabled to follow the course of occurrences 
 since the early part of the French revolution, have 
 witnessed an age of vicissitude, a succession of 
 events which, whether military or political, were 
 often ill calculated to favour the belief that justice 
 and moderation form the true basis of national 
 prosperity. But time alone was wanting to com- 
 plete the evidence and assert the truth of that doc- 
 trine. The triumph of military usurpation was 
 arrested in the wilds of Russia, and received its 
 overthrow in the plains of Flanders. Since then
 
 XIV IN rilODUCTION. 
 
 our soiitlicni neighbours have been awakened i'roin 
 tlicir dream of continental dominion. We, witliout 
 having trespassed equally in point of aggression, 
 had also our exclusive creed; — our system of 
 vigour ; our jealousy of neutrals ; our notion that 
 war was a source of national wealth. How far these 
 impressions have been corrected by recent events, 
 by our experience during the years that have 
 elapsed since the peace, will remain to be explain- 
 ed in the following pages.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Events of the War viewed in Cofinexion with our National 
 Resmirces. 
 
 Page 
 
 Sketch of military events from 1793 to 1801 - 1 
 
 Our situation at the peace of Amiens - - 10 
 
 War of 1 803 - - - - - 11 
 
 Alternations of success - - - - 16 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Maiftiitiah' of our ILxpenditiirc and Sources of our Financial 
 Supplies. 
 
 Expenditure during the war ; its progressive increase 22 
 
 How far defrayed by loans, how far by taxes - 24- 
 
 Comparison with former wars - - - 25 
 
 What were the sources of these great supplies ? - 26 
 
 Was it our foreign trade ? - - - - 27 
 Was it our colonial acquisitions, or the suspension of 
 
 foreign competition ? - - - - 21) 
 Ail these means over-rated; the chief source of our 
 
 supplies were the 
 
 Increase of employment during the war - - 31 
 
 Consequent increase of our revenue - - - \.V.\ 
 
 Increase of our population . - - - ;5 1 
 
 Increased productiveness of our excise duties - ib. 
 Estimate of our taxable income a( difl'crenl periods, 
 
 from 1792 to 1814 - - - - 35 
 
 Proportion of our burdens to oui resourccf? - - 3fi
 
 XVI CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 Farther causes of increase of revenue during the war: 
 Our taxes, in a great measure, a circulation of 
 money, a repayment of government expenditure - 38 
 Absence of foreign competition - - - 41 
 
 Exemption from cash payments - - - 43 
 
 The public not aware of the re-action to be appre- 
 hended at a peace - - - - - ib. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 General Rise of Prices during the War. 
 
 The causes specified - - - - - 45 
 
 The demand of men for government service - • 46 
 
 Proportion of the force in arms, to the population at 
 
 large . . » . . - ib. 
 
 Annual expence of our army, navy and ordnance, from 
 
 1791 to 1815 ..... 49 
 
 EflFect of this expenditure on the price of commodities ib. 
 
 Taxation, its effect on house-keeping . - - 50 
 
 Comparative expence of house-keeping in 1792 and 
 
 1813 ..-..- 54, 
 
 How far affected by the rise in the price of labour - 57 
 
 How far by the rise of corn . - - - 58 
 
 Combined result of all these causes - - - - 59 
 Exemplified by the rise of lands, houses, and other 
 
 real property - - - - - ib. 
 How far was this rise nominal ? - - - 60 
 The case of money property, such as loans on mort- 
 gage - - - ' . ■ . ' - 61 
 " Change in the value of Money;" this expression defined 63 
 Prices on the Continent since 1792 - - - 64 
 Rise of prices apparently indicative of prosperity - 67 
 Evil of high prices when peculiar to a country ; opinions 
 
 of Mr. S. Gray, and of Mr. Ricardo - - - 69 
 
 Effect of a rise of prices on our public burdens - - 72
 
 CONSENTS. XVU 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Ow Currency and ExchaJiges since 1792. 
 
 Page 
 Historical sketch of our Exchanges since 1792; and of 
 
 the effects of our corn imports and subsidies - 73 
 
 Tabular statement of these imports and subsidies - 8!J 
 Our inconvertible bank paper; contradictory opinions 
 
 on that subject - - - - - 87 
 
 Our money system previous to 1797 - - - 89 
 
 The Bank Restriction Act - - - - 91 
 
 Opinion of the Bullion Committee on that Act - - 92 
 Effects of that Act in augmenting the disposable funds 
 
 of bankers, facilitating discounts, and preventing the 
 
 rise of interest - - - - - 9f? 
 
 The questions of Depreciation and Over-issue : 
 Difference betvi^een an addition to the stock of bank 
 
 paper, and an increase of metallic currency - - 96 
 
 Discounts ; their increase during the war - - 9S 
 
 • — tended in some respects, to retard the rise of 
 
 prices ---... 99 
 
 greatly facilitated by the exemption from 
 
 cash payments - - - - -101 
 
 Effect, in a political sense, of that exemption - - 102 
 Depreciation; distinction between depreciation of Bank 
 
 paper, and a diminution in the value of money generally \0'S 
 Mode in which depreciation was incurred abroad - ibid. 
 The degree of such depreciation ... 104> 
 Effect of a rise of prices abroad on prices at home - 10.> 
 Extent of such effect previous to 1809 - - - 10(1 
 The same after 1809 - - - - - ibid. 
 Summary of the preceding - - - - 107 
 Considerations addressed to the advocates of the Bank 108 
 ■ to the supporters of the Bul- 
 lion Committee - - - - - 110 
 
 The Exemption Act viewed in connection with the 
 
 events of the war - - - - - 11:^ 
 
 Would the exemption from each payments, if not re- 
 sorted to in 1797, have been adopted at a subse- 
 quent period ?----- ibid. 
 
 How far was it a source of financial aid ? - - 11(> 
 
 Mr. Peel's bill ; its effect over-rated - - - 117 
 
 a
 
 Xviii CONTENTS, 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Our Agiiadlrirc. 
 
 Section I. 
 
 Historical Skclch. 
 
 Page 
 
 Our Corn trade previous to the Revolution of 1688 - 119 
 
 Bounty on export in 1689 ... - 120 
 Prices stationary during the reign of George II.; rise 
 
 after 1764 - - - - - - 122 
 
 Act of 1773 123 
 
 The late Wars - - - - - - 124- 
 
 The peace of 1814 .... - 125 
 
 Fluctuations since 1792, divided into periods: from 
 
 1793 to 1800 ; from 1800 to 1809 ; from 1809 to 1814 126 
 
 From 1814 to 1819; from 1819 to the present year - 129 
 Tabular statement of our crops, and average prices 
 
 since 1790 - - - - - 131 
 Causes of these fluctuations: the effect of our Corn 
 
 laws greatly over-rated - - - - 132 
 
 Causes of rise after 1763 - - - - 133 
 
 during the war - - - 134 
 
 Causes of fall since the peace - - - 135 
 
 Additional hands employed in tillage - 136 
 
 Section II. 
 Situatiott and Prospects of our Agriadturists. 
 
 Annual produce and rental of Great Britain and Ireland 140 
 
 Magnitude of the depression since the peace - 141 
 
 Present situation of our landlords and farmers - 143 
 
 Consequence of a general reduction of farming charges 145 
 Comparison of our present prices with those prior to 
 
 1793 147 
 
 Effect on the price of corn of increasing population - 148 
 
 Consumers may increase without raising prices - 150 
 
 Effect of a bad season - - . - I'Jl 
 
 Less felt in peace than in war - - - 153 
 Reaction of the market price of corn on the cost of its 
 
 production - - - - _ 254 
 
 Mode of such reaction in war - - _ 155 
 
 ■ in peace - - . 156
 
 CONTENTn. XIX 
 
 rage- 
 How far understood by land-surveyors; by farmers; by 
 
 the Agricultural Committee of 1821 - - 157 
 
 Prospect of prices ; — Circumstances conducive to a rise 1 58 
 
 Circumstances which render a low price probable - HU 
 
 Prospect of relief to farmers; tithe; poor-rate - 163 
 
 Section III. 
 A protecting Dtiti/. 
 
 A populous country not necessarily expensive - 1(56 
 
 Comparative burdens on French and British agriculture 168 
 
 Comparative rental of the two countries - - 173 
 
 Are our manufactures benefited by protecting duties? 174? 
 
 Danger of an over-extension of tillage - - 17G 
 
 The Corn Committee of 1813; fallacyof their arguments 178 
 
 Objections to a high import duty _ . - ibid. 
 
 Tendency of our legislation to ultimate freedom of trade 180 
 
 Physical advantages of particular countries - 181 
 
 -~— — • of England - - - J 82 
 
 A free import of corn; arguments for and against it - 183 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Poor-rate. 
 
 Origin of our Poor-law- system - - - 186 
 
 Its progressive extension - - - - 188 
 
 The late Wars - - - - - 190 
 Amount of poor-rate in the different years from 1813 to 
 
 1822 ..--.- 191 
 
 Reduction since 1818 .... 192 
 
 Workhouses - - - - - 193 
 
 Management of the poor in Scotland and France - 191. 
 
 Poor-rate considered as a tax - - - 197 
 
 Its amount estimated in corn - - - 198 
 
 Comparative number of paupers since 1688 - - 199 
 
 Wages paid by poor-rate .... /^/^/, 
 
 Particularly in Agricultural districts - - 201 
 Computed amount of the rental of land and houses 
 
 assessed to poor-rate .... 202 
 
 Comparative comfort of the labouring classes at different 
 
 periods ..... oqS 
 
 Is our poor-law system beneficial to the lower orders ? 2(X> 
 
 Repeal of taxes on the necessaries of life - - ibid. 
 
 a 2
 
 XX COMTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Popnlalion. 
 
 Pag*- 
 
 Penury of early ages .... 212 
 
 EIFcct of increasing population ... 213 
 
 (iradual transition from penury to comfort - - ibid. 
 
 Is the amount of subsistence limitetl by physical causes? 216 
 
 Average increase of population ... 217 
 
 Comparison of the present with former periods in history 219 
 
 Leading ideas of Mr. Malthus and Mr. S. Gray - 220 
 Progressive increase of population in Europe; — effects 
 
 of climate and soil - - - - 224 
 
 Effect of easy communication ... 225 
 
 Effect of the Protestant Religion - - - 226 
 
 Population per square mile; Holland and England - 227 
 
 Austria, Prussia, and Poland ; France - - 229 
 Chief towns of France and England; their comparative 
 
 population - - - - - 231 
 
 Ireland; Italy; Spain .... ibid. 
 
 Connexion between the increase of population and in- 
 crease of national wealth .... 233 
 
 Effect of increasing population on the wealth of indivi- 
 duals ...... 234 
 
 Comparison of public burdens in different parts of Eu- 
 rope ...... 237 
 
 Rural population ; its stationary condition - - 238 
 
 Wealth of town population .... 239 
 
 Subsistence more easy of acquisition as society advances 24'2 
 Cultivation becomes extended throughout a diversity of 
 
 soil and climate .... 2-t4 
 
 Progress of Agricultural improvements - - 245 
 The comforts of the lower orders increase as society ad- 
 vances ...... 246 
 
 Population ought to be left to its natural course - ib\d. 
 Statistical table of Europe in 1823; viz. the comparative 
 
 taxation and population of different countries - 248 
 
 Their surprising increase since the 16th century - 251 
 
 Prospect of continued increase on the Continent - 252 
 
 In England a still greater prospect ... 253
 
 CONTENTS. XXI 
 
 CHAPTER VIIT. 
 On the National llevemie and Capital. 
 
 Page 
 
 Property annually created in Great Britain and Ireland 255 
 
 Tabic of our i)resent taxable income ... 257 
 
 Its increase since 1792 ... - - 259 
 Connexion between the increase of our numbers, and 
 
 that of our national income . . - - 260 
 How far is the former a basis for the computation of the 
 
 latter? ....-- 262 
 
 Fluctuations of income since 1792 ... 263 
 
 An estimate of them attempted ... 264? 
 
 Tabular statements of our national revenue since 1792 - 267 
 Our public burdens ; their proportion to our resources 
 
 since 1792 . - - . - - 269 
 France; her national income compared with that of 
 
 England 270 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ItJJ'ccl oj' the War on Ptopciiij^ Individual and National. 
 
 Difference of opinion among political economists - 274? 
 
 Mr. J. B. Say, ]\Ir. S. (iray, Mr. Ilicardo - - ibid. 
 Losses to our productive industry in the beginning of 
 
 the war -....- 277 
 
 Burdens incurred during the war . . - 279 
 
 Deduction from the apparent amount of these burdens 280 
 
 Taxation of other countries - - - - ibid. 
 
 Our War taxes ; Tithe ; Poor-rate . - . 281 
 
 The National Debt . . - . . 283 
 
 Effect of a state of war on the habits of individuals - 284- 
 
 Losses on the Transition from War to Peace - - ibid. 
 
 Magnitude of the change ... - 285 
 
 Similar distress in foreign countries ... 287 
 
 Temporary revival of activity in 1818 . - - 288 
 
 Our probable situation had peace been preserved - 289 
 
 The late wars examined by moral considerations - 290 
 
 Comparative estimate of our taxable income in 1813 
 
 and 1823 - - - - - - 295 
 
 Exphmatory Remarks on this estimate - . - 296 
 
 Reduction of income since the peace . - - 290
 
 XXII 4;oNTENTH. 
 
 rage 
 
 Comparative pressure of our burdens in war and peace 299 
 Effect oil our public I)(>bt of tlie rise in tlie value of 
 
 money ■..-.. 'M)0 
 
 Have our public men, since 179'}, understood our finan- 
 cial situation ?.---- 302 
 
 Mr. Pitt - - - - - - 303 
 
 The successors of Mr. Pitt .... 305 
 
 Tlic Opposition ..... 308 
 
 Strictures on the education of our public men - - 309 
 
 Their conduct of the late Wars - - - 311 
 
 . ■ ■ of our internal affairs ... 313 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 I'aliu: of Money. 
 
 Section I. 
 Fluctuations i7i the Value of Money. 
 
 Tracts published on this subject - - - 316 
 
 Historical sketch of such fluctuations ... 317 
 
 Effects of a state of War - - - - 318 
 
 Can fluctuations be prevented in future? - - 320 
 
 Causes which affect the value of money - - 321 
 
 Supply of specie from the mines - _ . Hid. 
 
 Circulation of bank paper - - - . 323 
 
 Supply of agricultural produce ... 324? 
 
 Probable effects of a state of war ... 326 
 
 Injurious consequences of these fluctuations - - 327 
 
 Particularly on annuitants - - . - - 328 
 
 Section 11. 
 
 Plan for lessening the Injurij from Fluctiuition^ and giving 
 a uniform J'alue to Money Incomes. 
 
 A table of reference for time contracts - - 333 
 
 Effect of the proposed plan on the labouring classes - 336 
 
 Effcet of such a plan on agriculture ... 338 
 
 on tithe ... - 339 
 
 ■ on the public funds and govern- 
 ment annuitants ..... 341 
 Objections ant^wercd .... - 343 
 Concludimr remarks .... - 344.
 
 CONTENTS. XXIII 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 Our Finances. 
 
 Page 
 The National Debt - - - - - 347 
 Fluctuations in the price of stock since 1720 - - 34-9 
 Mr. Pitt's administration .... 250 
 Reduction of the Five per cents. ... 352 
 Our other financial measures since 1815 - - 353 
 The Sinking Fund ; its limited operation - - 355 
 Compound interest a delusion - - - . 357 
 Advantages of a low rate of interest of money - - 359 
 Objections to a large Sinking Fund - - . 350 
 Estimate of our annual expenditure - . . 352 
 Stockholders ; distinction between permanent and tem- 
 porary depositors ----- 364- 
 Comparative Taxation of England and France - - 368 
 
 Section" II. 
 
 Our Prospects in Commerce and Finance. 
 
 Probability of continued peace - - - 371 
 
 Causes of war that no longer exist - - - 373 
 
 Our prospect of augmented resources - - 37'!- 
 
 Computed increase of our national income - 378 
 
 Its surprising increase in the course of last century - 379 
 
 Parallel of the resources of England and France - 381 
 
 Section III. 
 Vieias of Finance suggested by our Situation and Prusj)(rts. 
 
 How far is taxation a cause of embarrassment ? - 387 
 
 Tabular statement of our taxes - . - - 389 
 Examples of injury from taxation ; in the distillery ; 
 
 insurance ; shipbuilding . - - - 390 
 
 Relief that would arise from u reduction of taxes - 392 
 
 Objections answered ----- 395 
 
 M. Nccker ; his plan of fnumcc - - - ^^7
 
 t.ONTINTH. 
 
 Pagr 
 
 The Qufslion ol'a hnuill Annual Loan in lieu (»lTaxcfc 
 
 State of the nionied interest - - - - 4CX) 
 
 Transmission of capital to foreign countries - - 401 
 
 Would the proposed loan affect the rate of interest? 'K)4- 
 
 Would it attcct the price of stocks ? - - 4-^^ 
 
 Limitation to borrowing - - - " ^^^ 
 The bill for transferring half-pay and pensions into 
 
 long annuities ----- ''"■^ 
 
 Mr. Pitt; his ability in finance - - - 4-11 
 
 The period from 178 !• to 1793 - - - 4-1'^ 
 
 Conclusion ; summary of the work - - - ^^^ 
 
 Subjects which remain to be treated - - - 415 
 
 CONTENTS OF THE APPENDIX. 
 
 CHAPTER IL 
 
 T^e late Wars. 
 
 Our war expenditure in the form of tabular statements [1 J 
 
 The war of 1793, distinguished from that of 1803 [3] 
 A siniilar statement of our exports, and an explanation 
 
 of the custom-house term, " official value" - [4] 
 
 Our exports greater since 1814< than during the war [5] 
 
 Decline in the price of manufactures since 1818 - [7] 
 The present prices of manufactures compared to those 
 
 of the reign of King William - - - iltid. 
 
 Taxation ; its effect on trade _ _ - [8] 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Hise of Prices during the War. 
 
 Lower orders : Table of their family expenditure since 
 
 1792; — the country labourer - - - [9] 
 
 The town mechanic - . - - ibid.
 
 rONTEVTS. \xv 
 
 ■The niidtlle and higher classes: similar fluctuations in 
 
 their fiimily expenditure ... ["10] 
 
 Proportion borne by each Jiead of expence, (food, 
 clothing, and lodging,) to the total of family expen- 
 diture - - - - - - [11] 
 
 Comparative situation of the lower orders in war and 
 
 peace - - - - - -[12] 
 
 Effect on housekeeping, of a rise in the price of corn [12] 
 
 .. — in the rate of labour [IS] 
 
 . of a depreciation in 
 
 our paper currency - - - " [l-"^] 
 
 Annuitants on mortgage - - - - [I'^l 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Currency atid Exchange. 
 
 On the amount of Bank of England notes in circulation [15] 
 Uncertainty of inferences from such amount - [16] 
 Fluctuations in the circulation of Bank of England Notes [17] 
 Circulation of country banks ... f/;/V/. 
 The exemption from cash payments: its effects -. [IS] 
 The time of its operation .... [19] 
 Discounts: their increase explained - - - [19] 
 The rate of interest ; its rise prevented by the exemp- 
 tion act ..... ['20] 
 This act considered as an economizing expedient - ibid. 
 Remarks on the Bullion Committee - - [21] 
 Questions at issue between their supporters and op- 
 ponents .-.--- [23] 
 Connection between the circumstances of our agricul- 
 turists and the circulation of country banks - [24] 
 The power of banks over-rated ... [25] 
 Inefficacy of an exemption from cash payments in 
 
 peace ..--.. ibid. 
 
 Mr. Peel's Bill ..... [2(j] 
 Publications on the subject of exchange; INIr. J. R. 
 
 M'CuUoch ...... ibid. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Our Agriculture. 
 
 Effect of increasing population on the price of corn - [29] 
 Not understood by the Agricultural Committee of 1821 [30] 
 National disadvantage of a high price of corn - ibid.
 
 XXV i CONTENTS. 
 
 I'age 
 
 Subsistence not enhanced by increase of population - [32 J 
 
 Uncertainty of speculative opinions - - ibid. 
 Arguments in favour of a free trade in corn, by Mr. 
 
 Bannatyne, Colonel Torrens, and Mr. M'Culloch - [33] 
 
 Computation of Poor-rate and Tithe - - [3.5] 
 Connection between increase of population and increase 
 
 of tithe - - - - - - [36] 
 
 The same in regard to the rent of land - - [36] 
 
 Comparative burdens on British and foreign agriculture [39 J 
 
 A protecting duty ; evidence of Mr. Tooke - ibid. 
 
 Reasons in support of that evidence - - [^O] 
 
 Competition of Continental agriculturists - - [4-1] 
 
 Probable limitation of our corn imports in peace - ibid. 
 
 Opinion of Mr. llicardo . - _ _ [43] 
 A protecting duty; ought it to be suspended in a dear 
 
 season? ..---- [44] 
 
 Observations of Mr. S. Gray on the Corn Trade - [45] 
 The case of Tenants on lease, and of Debtors on mort- 
 gage -..-.. [45] 
 The question of interference by courts of justice - [46] 
 Dr, Smith on agricultural improvers . - - [47] 
 Value of land during last century ... ibid. 
 Price of wheat on the continent and in England pre- 
 vious to 1793 - - - - - [48] 
 
 Average prices of our corn in 1822 - - - [49] 
 Exports and imports of Coi*n since 1697 - - ihid. 
 The Agricultural Report of 1821; abstract of its con- 
 tents -..--- ibid. 
 Remarks on that Report - - - - [51] 
 
 Corn law of 1822; abstract of its provisions - - [53] 
 
 Additional labour bestowed on tillage since 1814 - \.5o\ 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Our Poor-rate. 
 
 Tabular statements of poor-rate for England and Wales [57] 
 
 The same for the metropolis - . - . [58] 
 
 Highway, church and county rate - - - [59] 
 
 Report of 15th July 1822, on the poor-rate returns - ibid- 
 
 10
 
 CONTENTS. XXVll 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Popidatioii. 
 
 Page 
 
 Employment ; its subdivision as society advances - [60] 
 
 Its minute division in a great city - - - [51] 
 
 National income apportioned among different classes - [62] 
 Population ; ratio of its increase in different stages, as 
 
 society advances ... - - [63] 
 
 The mercantile or manufacturing stage - - [64'] 
 
 Effect of the enlargement of farms . - . [65] 
 
 Effect of machinery . - - . - ibid. 
 
 Great increase of population in the present age - [66] 
 
 Proportion of marriages to the whole population - [67] 
 
 Deaths : decrease in their proportion - - [67] 
 Counties of England and Wales ; their comparative 
 
 extent ..-.-. [68] 
 
 ^— — — — productive power [69] 
 
 ■ — their rank in den- 
 sity of population . . . _ [70] 
 Census of 1821 ; the increase since 1811, exhibited by 
 
 counties . - - . . [71] 
 Increase of our principal towns ... [72] 
 Distribution of our population into classes, and com- 
 parative numbers of each . - . - ibid. 
 Superior increase of town population - - [733 
 In what manner do population returns indicate an in- 
 crease of national wealth ? - - - - [74-] 
 Census of England in 1377 - . - ibid. 
 
 CHAPTER Vin. 
 Otir National Revenue. 
 
 Is our consumption equal to our production, or how far 
 
 is there an annual addition to national income ? - [75] 
 
 A table of our annual consumption - - - [77] 
 
 Proportion of national income exempt from taxation - [78] 
 
 Case of Ireland . - - - • ibid. 
 
 of France ----- [79] 
 
 National capital ; estimate of it in 1792, 1812, 1.S22 - [82] 
 Public burdens in the present year (1823) discriminated 
 
 into taxes, poor-rate, and tithe - - - [85]
 
 rovTrvTs. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Fbictuatiojis in Mo7icy. 
 
 Page 
 
 Abstract of Sir G. Shuckburgh's table - - [85] 
 Comparison by Arthur Young, of prices in the 17th and 
 
 18th centuries - - - - [86] 
 Progressive prices of several articles of manufacture ; of 
 
 horses and cattle ... - [87] 
 
 General progression of prices since the 13th century - [88] 
 
 Annual consumption of gold and silver computed - [89] 
 
 Comparative rate of prices in France and England - [90] 
 M'Culloch (Mr. J. R.) on the price of corn throughout 
 
 Europe [92] 
 
 Expense of a country labourer's family, and of one of 
 
 the middle classes ----- [93] 
 
 Constituents of a table of national consumption - [94-] 
 
 Farther remarks on a table of consumption - - [95] 
 
 The table adapted to farmers on lease - - [97] 
 
 ' ■ ' to the lessees of mines - - ibid. 
 
 • to clergymen . . - [98] 
 
 Objections answered - . - - ibid. 
 
 Letter from a Hampshire farmer - _ - [99] 
 
 Mr. Tooke on " high and low prices since 1792" - [100] 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Sinking fund ; the supplies which constitute it - [101] 
 
 The nominal Sinking fund - . . - [102] 
 
 Comparison of our present burdens with those of 1792 [103] 
 
 The Malt Tax - - - - - [104] 
 
 Price of commodities a century ago - - ibid. 
 
 Backward state of France as described by Mr. S. Gray [105]
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Events of the War vietved in Connection 'doith oiir National 
 Resources. 
 
 In appropriating a portion of our volume to mili- 
 tary events, our object is to direct the reader's 
 attention to the effects produced by them on our 
 finances and national industry: — to enlarge on the 
 occurrences of a campaign or on the policy of cabi- 
 nets, would be, in a great measure, foreign to our 
 pur})ose. In some respects, however, the two de- 
 partments of enquiry are connected, the effect of 
 our military operations having been repeatedly felt 
 by our exchequer, and requiring of course frequent 
 notice in the subsequent pages. It seems advise- 
 able, consequently, that our reasoning should be 
 preceded by a brief sketch of the events of the 
 war ; an outline to which reference may be made 
 from the subsequent chapters, whenever we shall 
 have occasion to allude to the connexion between the 
 state of our finances and the aspect of a campaign. 
 Such a narrative, however cursory, will necessarily 
 lead us over beaten ground ; but we are not with- 
 out ho])es of introducing, particularly in regard to 
 France, occasional remarks that are not altogether 
 familiar to the public. 
 
 War o/" 1793. — Nothing wonUl have induced 
 Mr. Pitt to take part in tiie coahtion against France, 
 
 u
 
 2 Jf'nr of179S. 
 
 except a Iiopi' llmt the contest would have l)een 
 hroui^ht to an early conclusion, and himself" left 
 at liberty to pursue those measures of finance 
 which had begun to wear so promising an aspect. 
 His apprehension of France could be only of a 
 j)olitical nature ; a dread of the example of insub- 
 ordination gaining ground, and of rank and j)r()- 
 perty becoming endangered. In a military sense, 
 France was far from formidable ; her army, in 
 1792*, did not exceed the usual peace establish- 
 ment of 130,000 men, and its strength was greatly 
 impaired by the emigration of its principal officers, 
 as well as by the general relaxation attendant on a 
 continental peace of thirty years. Her navy ha\- 
 ing occupied the attention of government during 
 and after the American war, was in a better state 
 than usual ; but its efficiency was impaired by the 
 general disorder of the country, and its aspect was 
 certainly far from offensive. 
 
 Under these circumstances our government, 
 though in intimate communication with the powers 
 that had taken up arms against France, delayed for 
 some time joining the coalition. The recall of our 
 ambassador from Paris was postponed till the insur- 
 rections of autumn 1792, and the subversion of the 
 royal authority ; nor did our preparations for war 
 commence till towards the end of the year. This 
 caution on our part, and the impetuosity of the 
 ruling faction in France, caused the declaration of 
 war to proceed in the first instance from Paris, and 
 created a general belief in this country that the 
 French were the aggi'essors. A speedy termination 
 in favour of the allied powers was promised as well 
 by general appearances as by the early events of 
 
 • Joraini sur les grandes Operations Militaires, Vol. Y.
 
 IVar of 179.3. 3 
 
 tlie war, the Frencii being soon repulsed from tlie 
 Dutch frontier, and some time alter from the 
 Netherlands, wliile tlieir intestine divisions rose to 
 a height that tlu-catened the downfall of the repub- 
 lican system. A short time, however, sufficed to 
 show the fallacy of judging from appearances, and 
 of listening to representations so partial as those of 
 the emigrants. The great majority of the nation, 
 without cherishing either personal hostility to the 
 Bourbons or schemes of foreign conquest, were 
 strongly attached to the Revolution. They had 
 long felt the want of a representative assembly, 
 and regarded themselves as checked in the career 
 of honourable ambition by the preference shown to 
 the privileged classes. Without any distinct concep- 
 tion of the checks requisite to good government, 
 they entertained a sanguine hope that the revolu- 
 tion was about to prove a remedy for all their 
 grievances. 
 
 In such a state of national feeling, the resistance 
 to invasion would probably have been equal, what- 
 ever had been the result of the intestine divisions 
 of France. Had the Jacobui party been kept under 
 by the Girondists, the strength of the country 
 would still have been called forth ; the property of 
 emigrants confiscated ; circulation given to the 
 assignats, and military levies enforced on a large 
 scale. It was in the autumn of 1/93, and in tlie 
 early part of 179f^, that these potent leveis weie 
 made to display all their energy. They sent forth 
 armies, which, without being so numerous in the 
 field as was generally imagined, were assined of 
 an ample suj^ply of recruits ; an assurance that 
 justified the new plan of rendering a campaign a 
 reiteration of attacks, on the calculation, that, whe- 
 ther successful or Jiot, the coinilry which shonhl he 
 
 B 'Z 
 ft
 
 4. //7//o/17f)3. 
 
 able to call the greatest mimbers into the field, 
 would eventually triumph. Such, with a few qua- 
 lifications, were the operations of lyo^ and 1791 : 
 o})erations in which the national im])etuosity M'as 
 called into full display; but the command being 
 fi'cquently placed in unskilful hands, the lives of 
 men were exposed with unexampled rashness. The 
 result of continued sacrifices on the one side, and 
 of feeble generalship, of deficient concert, on the 
 other, was that, in the early ])art of 1795, a total 
 change took place in the as})ect of the war. By 
 that time, France had acquired both the Austrian 
 Netherlands and the Dutch provinces, was on the 
 point of concluding peace with Prussia and Spain, 
 and reckoned only Austria and England as her 
 opponents. 
 
 From this time forward, we may believe with 
 confidence, that Mr. Pitt deeply regretted that 
 France had been attacked, and the nation driven 
 to exertions so pernicious to its assailants. He 
 saw that revolutionary contagion was no longer 
 to be dreaded, the credulity of the French, their 
 absurd extremes, their repeated changes, their sacri- 
 fice of one party to the other, having brought com- 
 plete discredit on their politics. His objections to 
 peace, very different from those in 179'2, were now 
 of a military character : — to negotiate with France 
 would have been to acknowledge inabihty to resist 
 her ; to leave the Netherlands in her hands, would 
 have been to concede that against which we had 
 contended for a century. He determined, there- 
 fore, to continue the war, with the aid of Austria ; 
 and the exertions of France might have been 
 equalled, perhaps surpassed, by the two allied go- 
 vernments, had they possessed the knowledge which 
 they afterwards acquired ; — had England directed 
 • ' 9
 
 IVar of 1703. 5 
 
 her chief resources to continental warfare, and had 
 tlie Austrians opened their eyes to their errors in 
 tactics. The numbers of the French were now less 
 overwhehiiijig than in the time of the assignats ; 
 but their efficiency was greatly increased, tlieir sol- 
 diers had become well disciplined, and a number 
 of intelligent officers had been formed. Their sys- 
 tem of reiterated attack was continued; the national 
 ardour was kept in full exercise ; and to the auda- 
 city of the first years of the revolution was added, 
 under the command of such men as Bonaparte, 
 Moreau, Kleber, Hoche, Desaix, the advantage of 
 scientific combination. It is to superiority of ge- 
 neralship more than to superiority of numbers, that 
 we should attribute the reverses of the Austrians 
 in 1796 and 1797, followed by a peace (Campo 
 Formio) of which the preliminaries were signed 
 when three armies were in march to their capital. 
 
 What in these early years of the war was our 
 situation in regard to financial supplies ? A state 
 of war creates a sudden demand for money, by 
 su})eradding what may be termed the mercantile 
 operations of government to those of individuals. 
 The call for arms, clothing, and military stores, 
 forms a new demand on the manufacturing in- 
 dustry of the country, while tiie drain of men 
 for the public service, enhances both wages and 
 salaries. On the part of individuals, there takes 
 place a decrease in certain branches of industry, 
 a relinquishment of undertakings which can be 
 carried on only by cheaj) labour, or a low interest 
 of money ; but the diminution, in one sense, is by 
 no means {)roj)ortioned to the increase in tiie other. 
 Hence, a rise in the rate of interest, and a difficulty 
 in borrowing, even at an advanced premium. Of 
 
 B 3
 
 6 War (>/' 171'3- 
 
 siic'li (liHiciiltics, anil ol" tlic expedients ad()])tctl to 
 meet thein, we liave had repeated examples, in our 
 history, (hiring the hist century and a half. It was 
 in the reign of king VVilliani that England first 
 took a })art in continental war, on a scale of great 
 and contiinied expcnce ; and that reign was ac- 
 cordingly the icraof tile ini])osition of the land-tax, 
 of the establishment of the bank of England, and 
 of the first currency of its jyaper. 
 
 It unfortunately happened that the demand for 
 money in the early years of tlie wars of the present 
 age, was coincident with unfavourable seasons, 
 our crops, both in 1794 and 179«5, being insuffi- 
 cient for our consumption. Hence, a necessity to 
 export coin lor the purchase of subsistence, as well 
 as for military pui'poses ; and hence those embar- 
 rassments so severely felt in the mercantile world 
 during 1793, 4, 5, 6, and from which we were not 
 effectually relieved until 1797* when there occurred 
 both a diminution of oiu' continental expenditure, 
 and a general acceptance, at home, of bank paper 
 for coin. 
 
 At this time, England stood alone in the conflict, 
 and the state of our finances was far from satisfactory ; 
 but our navy had in the course of the year (1797) 
 achieved a double triumph, and the war becoming 
 strictly maritime, our attitude, like that of France 
 in 1794, showed all the advantage possessed by a 
 nation, when combining its resources on its proper 
 element. The confidence thus inspired, and the 
 spirit roused by tlie extravagant ambition of the 
 French government, enabled i\Ir. Pitt to meet our 
 pecuniary difficulties, by a recourse to the plan 
 which we shall developc presently, — that of raising 
 supplies within the year ; a })lan to which, still 
 more than to the substitution of paper for coin, 
 
 11
 
 IVar o/'iyOo. 7 
 
 was owing tlie surprizing increase that took place 
 in our financial receipts. 
 
 Tiie year 171)^ will long be remembered bv 
 those who distinguish particular e})oclis in a great 
 contest, as one of favourable commerce, of improved 
 exchanges, of an abundant harvest, anil of relief 
 liom tlie dread of invasion. The Frencli, discou- 
 raged by our naval array, and by the failure of 
 I heir expedition against Ireland, made a tacit ac- 
 knowledgment of the ho])elessness of an attack 
 on England, by directing their disposable force to 
 Egypt. The absence of this army, and our vic- 
 tory at Aboukir, revived the hopes of the Aus- 
 trians, who regarded the existing peace as a truce, 
 and who have, throughout the present age, shown 
 themselves so prompt to second our efforts, and to 
 take up arms against France. 
 
 The year 1799. — We come now to what is termed 
 the third coalition, or the third time that the allied 
 ])owers commenced operations by land in the hope 
 of either changing the French government, or re- 
 covering a portion of lost territory. In adverting 
 to these remarkable aeras in the contest, it is fit to 
 recollect that the aggressions were not on the part 
 of France, and that, with the exception of 179'<?, 
 England was the author and main-spring of every 
 successive coalition. Had this been openly avowed, 
 it is probable, that in those days of alarm the 
 majority of the public would have approved of an 
 offensive system of war; but it is the well-known 
 rule of cabinets, and, of" course, of their sup- 
 porters, whether in parliament or connected with 
 the press, to avoid such admissions, and to throw, 
 as ijiuch as possible, the odium of attack on the 
 enemy. At present, such reserve is needless j the
 
 8 mir(fl793. 
 
 question is to be viewed historically, uiul tlie point 
 is merely, whether there existed, on the ground of 
 justice iuid policy, sufKciciit reasons for calling 
 the continent to arms, and for encountering the 
 hazards of a conflict by land ? As usual in such 
 discussions, we shall find much to advance on 
 either side. The dread of revolutionary infection 
 had by this time disaj)peared ; the French them- 
 selves had suffered cruelly from their experiments in 
 government, having felt all the instability, all the 
 division and i)arty violence attached to the repub- 
 lican form. But while the majority of our coun- 
 trymen had dismissed the apprehension of political 
 contagion, they had, in a military view, urgent 
 motives for hazarding an appeal to arms ; they 
 entertained the hope, that, with the co-operation 
 of Austria and Russia, we should succeed in ex- 
 pelling the French from Italy, and in recovering 
 the Netherlands. 
 
 These hopes, whether on the whole justified or 
 not, received confirmation from the events of the 
 first part of the campaign of 1799 *• the Austrians 
 took the field with augmented numbers and an im- 
 proved system ; the repulse of the French in every 
 direction, in Germany, as in Italy, proved the 
 danger of neglecting their military establishment, 
 and of the practice which had begun to show itself 
 for the first time since the revolution, of appointing 
 generals by favour. But in the autumn of the 
 year new levies took the field, and abler chiefs 
 commanded ; the war changed its aspect ; a few 
 months produced the defection of the fickle ca- 
 binet of Russia from the coalition, and consolidated 
 the executive power of France in the hands of 
 Bonaparte. The campaign of 1800, though open- 
 ed by the Austrians with confidence, soon showed
 
 War of 179s. 9 
 
 their inability to contend with their antiigonists ; 
 and on the conchision of tlie second continental 
 peace, (Linieville,) England was once more left 
 alone in the conflict. 
 
 Few periods of the war presented a more gloomy 
 combination of circumstances than the early part 
 of 1801. — Austria humbled, Russia hostile, Den- 
 mark and Sweden following her example, and re- 
 viving the menace of the armed neutrality : while 
 at home a double failure of harvest had produced 
 a scarcity and rise of prices, which, in some parts 
 of the country, resembled the privations of our 
 ancestors in the latter years of Elizabeth, or the 
 sufferings of France after the dreadful winter of 
 1709. On the other hand, the value of our paper 
 currency was but slightly affected, our navy pos- 
 sessed the undisputed command of the sea, while 
 our army had improved equally in strength and 
 numbers : hence, the success of our attack on Co- 
 penhagen, and our brilliant exploits in Egypt. Still 
 the ex})ediency of peace was apparent ; our finan- 
 cial resources had been stretched to the utmost; 
 there remaineil no deflnite object of warfare, and 
 no co-o])eration could be expected from the con- 
 tinent. Tliese considerations were felt by our 
 leading ministers ; and, in concurrence with an 
 apprehended division in the cabinet, or a sense 
 tliat the same ministry could not suitably negociate 
 with a government so long the object of its invec- 
 tive, led to that retirement of Mr. Pitt from office, 
 which many persons still good-naturedly ascribe to 
 his difference with the king on the C'atiiolic 
 question. 
 
 Thus ended the first great contest of our age, a 
 contest, of which the most remarkable feature was, 
 its placing the two leading powers successively
 
 10 (hir S'ltualion at lite Peace (>f Amiais. 
 
 ill oj)j)osition to a confederacy, and bafiling, in the 
 case of each, tlie confident calculation of politicians. 
 France, in 171i3, could not, in the 0})inion (jf these 
 persons, avoid sinking imder the coalition ; Eng- 
 land, wlien left alone, in 1797> had, in their view, 
 no alternative but a speedy ])eace. They were 
 more correct in asserting that no war had aflbrded 
 an example of such sacrifices ; of men on the part 
 of France, of money on the part of England. The 
 losses of each seemed of a nature to produce ex- 
 liaustion, yet each continued capable of prolonging 
 or renewing the conflict. Each had obtained bril- 
 liant success, and added largely to its territorial 
 possessions ; but the acquisitions of France, at 
 least in the Netherlands, were more compact, 
 and more calculated to add strength to the state, 
 than our dazzling but insecure conquests in the 
 East and West Indies. 
 
 Our Situation at the Peace of Amiens. — What, 
 it may be asked, were the chief difl'erences, in our 
 condition at the peace of 1802 and that of 1814? 
 The financial and commercial evils that have since 
 pressed so heavily on us, existed in 1802, but in a 
 very mitigated form. The interest of our public 
 debt, (18,000,000/.) was great, but not enormous; 
 our total expenditure, had peace been confirmed, 
 woidd not have much exceeded 30,000,000/. a year. 
 The value of our currency, though shaken at a 
 particular period, (1800 and 1801,) had been rein- 
 stated without much injury to the public ; and 
 our customers on the opposite shore of the Atlan- 
 tic, though affected by the transition of Europe 
 from war to peace, were by no means so disabled 
 from paying for our exports as at the peace of 1814. 
 Still our agriculturists felt the budden change from
 
 War of 1803, 11 
 
 high to low prices ; our merchants were embar- 
 rassed by the surrender of the conquered colonies, 
 and had the reduction of our military establishment 
 been permanent, we should have exj)erienced, in 
 1802, no small share of the embarrassment of late 
 years : it would have been similar at least to that 
 so laith fully described by Sir W. Temple, as affect- 
 ing the productive industry of Holland, after the 
 peace of 1648. 
 
 These complaints, however, had hardly assumed 
 consistency, when the })ublic were roused to new 
 alarms : in France, a ruler whom no power could 
 satisfy; in England, a ministry who followed, in- 
 stead of leading the public voice, were respectively 
 the authors of an abruj)t renewal of war. Seldom 
 has an appeal to arms been made with less of a 
 direct motive or definite object : Malta was too 
 insignificant to form a ground of war; the real 
 cause was of a general nature, and to be sought 
 in the encroachments of Bonaparte during the 
 interval of peace, in the resentment roused by his 
 aggression on Switzerland, and the obstacles op- 
 posed to our trade with France. Our ministers 
 could not consider the moment favourable for at- 
 tempting to recover the independence of the con- 
 tinent ; they acted in concert with none of the 
 great powers, and the experience of the past was 
 altogether adverse to hopes founded on a coalition. 
 They knew, however, that our financial resources 
 were large, that the chances of a naval contest 
 were in our favour, and that we should in any 
 event prevent the increase of the enemy's marine. 
 
 War ()/' ISO'S. — During two years the contest 
 was strictly maritime, and the demand on our cir- 
 culating mediinn, for subsidies or the purchase of
 
 12 Jn/r of 180.1. 
 
 com l)('in«j^ slight, our ])a|)er currency maintaiiictl 
 its credit. The ])ubnc attention was closely fixed 
 on the project or ])retended j)roject of invasion. 
 But in IHO.*}, the growing discontent of the Russian 
 cabinet with I3ona])arte, and the well-known hos- 
 tility of Austria, induced our government to form a 
 new coalition. Our allies began the war with san- 
 guine hopes, but found it vain to attack a great 
 military state, conducted by a single liead. The 
 result would have been alarming even to this coun- 
 try, had it not, by a remarkable counterpoise of 
 fortune, been coincident with a naval victory, which 
 fairly put at rest the question of invasion. 
 
 It was under these circumstances of alternate 
 disappointment and success, that Mr. Fox began 
 at Paris the negociation of 1806, a measure by no 
 means sanctioned by tlie majority of our country- 
 men. The offers of Bonaparte, towards the close 
 of the conferences, would perhaps have been satis- 
 factory on tlie score of territorial cession, had they 
 not, when viewed in concurrence with his other 
 })rojects, appeared to our ministers little else than 
 a link in the chain of aggression ; an expedient to 
 procure not a peace, but a truce. 
 
 War was accordingly renewed, and by land, vic- 
 tory continued faithfid to France : the events of 
 the campaigns of 1806 and 1807, were subversive 
 of the remaining independence of Germany, and 
 by giving France the co-operation of Russia, 
 seemed to leave her without a riv al on the conti- 
 nent. Under these circumstances, our only safety 
 lay in our naval superiority, and the war Mas pro- 
 ceeding without any definite prospect or favour- 
 able opening, when Bonaparte committed his first 
 great ])o]itical error. Hitherto, in liis successes, 
 he had shown more moderation, at least apparent
 
 War of 1803. 13 
 
 moderation, than miglit have been expected from 
 one so little advanced in years, and so confident in 
 his general calculations. He now, however, forgot 
 the dictates of caution, turned his aggression to an 
 unoffending quarter, and by his manner of inveigling 
 the royal family of S})ain, excited not only the in- 
 dignation of foreigners, but general suiprise and 
 dissatisfaction among the French, who were heartily 
 sick of war, and coveted no })ossessions beyond 
 the Pyrenees or the Al])s. It is a truth, by no 
 means sufficiently understood in this country, that 
 the French people at no time participated in the 
 restless ambition of their ruler : their views in 
 regard to territory were limited to the Belgic 
 provinces, and those they desired not on politi- 
 cal grounds, not from a wish to overawe Hol- 
 land or threaten Germany, but from considerations 
 chiefly commercial, from similarity of language 
 and habits, vicinity of position, and the non-exist- 
 ence of physical barriers. So far from being 
 animated by that eagerness for war which so many 
 on our side of the Channel ascribe to them, the 
 French regarded themselves as the greatest suf- 
 ferers by the sanguinary contest, and were taught 
 to ascribe its prolongation to the ambitious views of 
 our cabinet. 
 
 The war in Spain, varied as was its success 
 during several years, proved the first great scene 
 on which the hitherto victorious armies of France 
 were effectually resisted. That power of combin- 
 ation, that skill in generalship, which, in the pre- 
 sent age, has been so little cons})icuous in the mili- 
 tary opponents of France, wiiich, in the long 
 struggle of the Austrians, was remarked in only 
 two campaigns, (179'^ and 17i^{^) ^^'^^^ 'i^'''c> called 
 into action, and directed against the enemy both
 
 14 intr (flHOS. 
 
 the discipline of tlic British, and the national anti- 
 pathy of the Spaniards. This war was remarkahk' 
 as the first in which Bonaparte did not, on the 
 appearance of serious resistance, forsake his capital, 
 and bring tlie contest to a decisive issue. In 1810, 
 the humiliation of Austria and Prussia lefl him at 
 liberty to recross the Pyrenees, but to the surprise 
 of France, as of the continent in general, he allowed 
 his army to remain long in an indecisive })Osition 
 before our lines at Torres Vedras, and eventually 
 to retreat. 
 
 This signal repulse was followed by symptoms of 
 resistance in a new quarter. Russia, alarmed for 
 her independence, and taught, by the success of 
 our Portuguese campaign, the means of bafHing by 
 defensive operations, an enemy hitherto accounted 
 irresistible, no longer concealed her hostility to 
 France. Bonaparte passed a year in forming his 
 gigantic plan of invasion : it failed, as is well 
 kno\vn, less from direct opposition than from phy- 
 sical causes ; and that over-confidence on his part, 
 w^hich w^e trace on so many occasions, and at such 
 different periods of his career — at Arcole, at Acre, 
 at Aspern, and finally, at Waterloo. 
 
 The loss of the Russian campaign and of tlie 
 flower of the army, however disastrous in a mili- 
 tary sense, did not give so great a shock as the 
 public in England anticipated to the power of 
 Bonaparte in the interior of France. The nation 
 was in affliction at the extent of the bloodshed ; but 
 this feeling was overborne, at least in the middle 
 classes, by the dread of a counter-revolution, and 
 the return of the old abuses — the prixileges of the 
 nohlesscy the ascendancy of the clergy. During 
 1813, the general wash was, not for a change of 
 dynasty, but for a change of system under the
 
 jrar of \80S. 15 
 
 existing ruler. No insurrection took place, no 
 resistance was made, or even attenij)ted, to the 
 enormous levies of men and money, during that 
 year ; nor was it till renewed disasters, and the loss 
 of all Germany, that the public began to contem- 
 plate the possibility of tlie return of the Bourbons. 
 Even in 1814, the operations continued without 
 any rising in favour of that family, or any defection 
 of the military from their leader, till after the sur- 
 render of Paris, the possession of which has, through- 
 out the whole of the French revolution, enabled 
 one party to give law to another. 
 
 This unconsciousness of tlie real character of 
 Bonaparte, this credulity in hoping a pacific sys- 
 tem from one so long accustomed to war and 
 usurpation, must appear not a little singular to the 
 untravelled part of our countrymen. But those 
 among them who visited France in 1814, had ample 
 opportunity of observing that the name of the late 
 ruler was seldom mentioned with reprobation, and 
 that when, from the decided royalists, tliey haj)- 
 pened to hear language to that effect, it was unac- 
 companied by any knowledge of the secret springs 
 of his pohcy, or, indeed, by any attempt to deve- 
 lope his character. 
 
 This was, in fact, a task too complicated for the 
 reasoning habits of our southern neighbours : they 
 knew and lamented his propensity to war ; but his 
 diplomatic art, his Machiavelian pohcy, surpasseil 
 their analysing powers, unaided as they were by 
 the light of a free press. Nor was it until his 
 sudden return from Elba, when the peace so long 
 desired and so recently obtained, was wrested from 
 them, that the French (we speak here not of the 
 military nor of the party leaders, but of the bulk of 
 the nation,) gave a loose to resentment, and con-
 
 16 If'ir uf ISO'}. 
 
 ncclcd with Ins iiamr lli:i1 clKir^c of liiitlilcssncss, 
 that suspicion of" criminality vvliicli wc, during so 
 iiianv years, had accounted inseparable fioni it. 
 
 Tlie reverses of the French arms occurred most 
 oj)portunely for our finances, as shall he shown 
 when we treat of the de])icciation of our currency; 
 but before proceeding to that, the proper object of 
 our researcli, we shall bestow a few sentences on 
 the eventful character of the military history of the 
 ])eriod. 
 
 Alternations of success. — No contest was ever 
 marked by greater variety of fortune, or more 
 chequered by vicissitudes, the effect of which was, 
 at one time, to check sanguine expectation, at an- 
 other, to prevent despair. The Netherlands reco- 
 vered in 1793, were again lost in lyUl-; the suc- 
 cesses of the Austrians in 1795 were more than 
 balanced by their disasters in the two following 
 years. In 1799 the revived strength of that power 
 and the co-operation of Russia, led to a brilliant 
 campaign, producing the recovery of Italy, and in- 
 flicting severe losses on the French ; but fortune 
 once more forsook the allies, and obHged them to 
 conclude at Luneville a treaty on conditions which 
 left France the leading power on the continent. 
 
 In our second appeal to arms, our hopes were 
 raised in 180.5 by the co-operation of the great con- 
 tinental })owers ; these hopes were blasted at Ulm 
 and Austerlitz, but despondency was prevented by 
 our victory at Trafalgar. Next year, the fatal day 
 of Jena, and the conquest, rapid beyond example, 
 of the Prussian dominions, would have excited 
 great alarm, had not our courage been sustained by 
 a successful resistance at Eylau, and by a confident 
 estimate of the power of Russia. These favourable 
 expectations were shaken by tlie events of the cam-
 
 JFar of 1803, 17 
 
 }3aign, the treaty of Tilsit, and more than all, by 
 the increasing connection and community of pur- 
 pose between the French and Russian cabinets. 
 The close of I8O7 was consequently a period of 
 gloom, for the capture of the Danish navy, and the 
 issuing of our Orders in council, could afford satis- 
 faction to those only who were incapable of appre- 
 ciating the odium inspired by the one, and the dis- 
 astrous effects likely to residt from the other. 
 
 A more substantial ground of liope was afforded 
 in the ensuing year by the attack on Spain, the 
 general resistance which it provoked, the still more 
 general hatred which it roused. The repulse of 
 the French from the southern and central parts 
 of Spain, and the success of our troops at Vimeira, 
 the lirst general action on land that we had fought 
 during the war, confirmed these flattering impres- 
 sions ; but they were unfortunately clouded by the 
 repeated defeats of the Spaniards in the winter, 
 and the retreat of our army to Corunna. Next 
 year opened with the arming of Austria, and with 
 some successful operations in the Peninsula, but 
 the battles of Eckmuhl and Wao-ram, the failure of 
 our Antwerp expedition, the second retreat of our 
 army from Spain, cast a gloom over the aspect of 
 affairs, which continued during the whole of 1810. 
 
 At that time the contest presented no expecta- 
 tion of a favourable issue ; the Spaniards were 
 inefficient and divided; the northern courts, if 
 not unfriendly, were unable to hazard co-operation 
 with us ; and our bank ])aper, after having diu'ing 
 tiie preceding seven years maintained its \alue 
 with almost all the stability of a regular currency, 
 now gave way before the triple pressure of corn 
 imports, foreign subsidies, and a suspension of our 
 accustomed receipts from the Continent of Europe 
 
 c
 
 18 ff^^if of 180S. 
 
 on account of Ami'iicaii merchants. Our exports to 
 the United States had been, for the most part, paid 
 by remittances in money from the Continent of 
 Kin'ope, and woukl, had we allowed their na\ iga- 
 tion to continue, have formed a finid capable, in a 
 great measure, of balancing our demands, whether 
 for military expenditure in the south of Europe, or 
 for the purchases of corn in the north. But this 
 truth was unfortunately unknown to the public, 
 and imperfectly felt by ministers. We persevered 
 in stopping the American trade, and thus deprived 
 ourselves of a powerful counterpoise to the irre- 
 gularity of our circulating medium. Our situation 
 thus became replete with anxiety : from invasion we 
 were secured by our fleet, but we dreaded to 
 make peace, lest an interval, turned assiduously 
 to account by our artful enemy, might shake even 
 this last stay of our independence. On other 
 grounds also, peace seemed unadvisable, for by 
 this time Bonaparte had incorporated a farther 
 part of Germany with France, and shown himself 
 equally blind to the lesson given by the resistance 
 of Spahi, and to the hazard of alarming Russia. 
 
 It was under these disquieting circumstances 
 that we passed the latter months of 1810 and the 
 beginning of 1811. The necessity of abandoning 
 the Peninsula Avas declared by many, and silently 
 anticipated by more, when the scene was unex- 
 pectedly changed by the retreat of the French 
 army from Portugal, and by conflicts, which, ii* 
 not altogether decisive in our favour, w^ere indi- 
 cative of great improvement in our army. An 
 intimation of a growing hostility on the part of 
 Uussia to France, now raised hopes of a higher 
 kind — hopes which, after an interval, were con- 
 flrmed by the memorable campaign of 1812. StUl
 
 JFar 0/1803. . 19 
 
 the period of vicissitude was not passed ; the ex- 
 pectation excited by the advance of the Russians, 
 and the zeal of their Prussian allies, were dis- 
 appointed at Lutzen, Bautzen, and Hambui-gh ; 
 while our bank paper had fallen above 20 per 
 cent., a fall involving the certainty of a loss to that 
 amount on all the contributions we might make 
 to the cause of the continent, whether in Spain or 
 Germany. It was, however, no time to pause ; 
 circumstances had produced an opportunity, such 
 as had not occurred during the whole war, of re- 
 storing the equilibrium of the Continent : Austria 
 had joined the alliance, and the inefficiency of the 
 French levies was shown in their actions with the 
 Prussians in Silesia. Germany was now delivered, 
 and the French territory invaded, yet even then 
 there occurred an interval of suspended hope : the 
 imprudence of Blucher, and the prompt decision 
 of Bonaparte, led to a check and partial retreat, 
 which, to the public, assumed a serious aspect, 
 when viewed in connection with a negotiation 
 at Chatillon ; but the apprehension inspii'ed by 
 that real or ostensible negotiation, was soon dis- 
 jielled by the evident superiority of the allies, 
 and by the result of a movement, remarkable as 
 indicative of the over-confident calculation of Bo- 
 naparte even under disaster ; we mean his march 
 to gain the rear, and cut off the retreat of his ene- 
 mies — a manoeuvre that might have been followed 
 by success if at the head of such armies, as he com- 
 manded at Ulm and Jena, but which, with the 
 feeble means at his disposal in 1814, served only 
 to embolden his opponents and accelerate the loss 
 of his capital. 
 
 c 2
 
 '20 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Magnitude of mir Expenditure. — The Sources of our 
 Financial Supplies. 
 
 After this brief sketch of military events, we pro- 
 ceed to the proper object of our enquiry, the ex- 
 pence incurred by the war, the resources by which 
 it was supported, and the cause of our financial 
 embarrassments since the peace. In this we are 
 aware that we venture on difficult ground, and at- 
 tempt a question of more than usual complexity. 
 War, accounted in former days a season of embar- 
 rassment and povert}', assumed in tlie present age 
 the appearance of a period of prosperity. It closed, 
 indeed, with a great addition to our permanent 
 burdens, but with an increase of national income, 
 whicli seemed fully to counterbalance it, and to 
 confine our loss to that of our brave countrymen 
 who had fallen in the struggle. Peace, we thought, 
 was about to bring a consolidation of the advan- 
 tages earned in battle and sanctioned by treaty, 
 but the residt has been widely different : every 
 succeeding year has discovered some financial dif- 
 ficulty, some fresh defalcation in our national re- 
 sources. The causes have as yet been by no means 
 satisfactorily explained, either in or out of Parlia- 
 ment, and the contradiction between what was ex- 
 pected, and what has actually taken place, implies 
 the prevalence of inurh popidar error, as well as 
 the necessity of an attentive and anxiously-balanced 
 enquiry.
 
 Magnitude of our Expenditure. 21 
 
 This enquiry we may liope to divest, in some 
 measure, of its complexity, by proceeding step by 
 step, and dividing our subject into separate heads. 
 The first point is to form a distinct idea of our 
 war expences, as well the annual charge as the 
 aggregate for the whole contest ; a calculation as 
 yet famihar to few persons on account of tlie mag- 
 nitude of the sums, the detached manner in which 
 they are generally brought before the public, and 
 tlie complexity of our finance accounts, which have 
 hitherto presented, in the sinking fund, an ap- 
 parent surplus, and, under the head of supply, an 
 apparent deficiency. 
 
 In the early years of this memorable contest, 
 ministers were almost as little avv^are as the public 
 of the extent to which the national contributions 
 could be carried, and the increase of our expendi- 
 ture was, consequently, gradual. Taking the total 
 money raised by loans and taxes, but deducting 
 from it 18,000,000/. annually, as the probable ex- 
 penditure of Great Britain and Ireland, had peace 
 been preserved, we find tlie following result : — 
 
 Su7ns annually raised for the War of 1793. 
 
 179S. 
 
 - £ 1-,000,(X)() 
 
 1798. 
 
 - ^29,000,000 
 
 i 794-. 
 
 10,000,000 
 
 1799. 
 
 36,000,0(K) 
 
 1795. 
 
 18,000,000 
 
 1800. 
 
 36,000,000 
 
 1796. 
 
 26,000,000 
 
 1801. 
 
 45,000,000 
 
 1797. 
 
 35,000,000 
 
 1802. 
 
 44-,000,000 
 
 These sums are properly the amount raised, not 
 the amount expended in each year : still they con- 
 vey a fair idea of the annual cost of the war. Their 
 great increase, in the latter years, was owing to 
 several causes ; the augmentation of our establish- 
 ments, the depreciation of money, and consequent 
 rise of pay, stores, &c. ; and, finally, to the nc-
 
 fS Magnitude of our Expenditure. 
 
 cumulation of interest on the expenditure of all 
 the preceding- years. 
 
 Such was the war of 1793, a war exhibiting an 
 average expenditure of ?7>000,000/., which, though 
 nearly double that of any preceding contest, was 
 destined to be surpassed both soon and in a very 
 great degree. 
 
 ^ums raised by loans and taxes for the ivar of 1803, after de- 
 ducting the portion appropriated to Ireland, and allowing 
 ^2,000,fXX)/. as the total (f our prnhahle expenditure, had peace 
 been preserved in 1793. 
 
 1803. ..... ^29,000,000 
 
 1804. .--... 1-0,000,000 
 
 1805. ..... 52,000,000 
 
 1806. ...... 50,000,000 
 
 1807. .... - 56,000,000 
 
 1808. - - - ... 57,000,000 
 
 1809. (War in Spain) - ... 61,000,000 
 
 1810. (Ditto) .... 62,000,000 
 
 1811. (DiUo) ..... 66,000,000 
 
 1812. (War in Spain and Russia) - - 80,000,000 
 
 1813. (War in Spain and Germany) - - 98,000,000 
 1814-. (War on the French territory) - - 89,000,000 
 1815. - - - ' - - 86,000,000 
 
 Here also the increase was progressive ; so ne- 
 cessary was it, even in our day of enthusiasm, to 
 wait until the machine of circulation became 
 adapted to this new impulse. At last, our expen- 
 diture reached a sum unexampled in the history of 
 any country, ancient or modern. It is fit, however, 
 to keep in mind two very material qualifications ; 
 first, that the sums in the latter years are greatly 
 swelled by the accumulation of interest on the pre- 
 vious expenditure ; next, that after 1810, a large 
 sum, fully 20 per cent, on our foreign disburse, is 
 to be put to the account of the depreciation of our 
 bank paper. With these deductions, the expence 
 of the unparalleled year of 1813 may be stated at
 
 Magnitude of otir Expenditure. 23 
 
 70,000,000/., and the other years reduced in a cor- 
 responding proportion. But after every subtract 
 tion, the amount of our expentliture was sui'prising: 
 for the whole contest it may be thus stated. 
 
 Total money raised in Great Britain by 
 loans and taxes, during the 23 years that 
 elapsed, between the beginning of 1793 
 and that of 1816 ; (see Appendix) about -^1,564,000,000 
 
 Deduct for the amount of our peace es- 
 tablishment and charges unconnected with 
 the war, a sum, which, from the increase of 
 our population and the necessity of enforc- 
 ing the collection of the revenue in Ireland, 
 we reckon at somewhat more than the aver- 
 age expenditure of Great Britain and Ireland 
 previous to 1793; making (see Appendix) 
 an amount of about - - - ^^4.64,000,000 
 
 Remainder, constituting the charge of 7 ,,, . „ „ „ „ ^^^ 
 the war - - - - J ' ' ' 
 
 The next question is, in what manner did go- 
 vernment find it practicable to raise these unex- 
 ampled sums ? Loans, the great resource in former 
 wars, were resorted to during the early years of 
 the contest ; thus — 
 
 Money raised by loans. 
 
 1794-. - c^' 11,000,000 1796. - ^^2.5,500,000 
 
 1795. - 18,000,000 1797. - 32,500,000 
 
 Tlie last of these sums being great beyond ex- 
 ample in the history of our loans, had the effect of 
 lowering stocks in an alanning degree, reducing the 
 3 per cents, in 1797, below kS. '^ Mr. Pitt now- 
 felt the necessity of altering his j)lan of finance, and 
 was led, as well by his cliaracteristic confidenci?, 
 as by the general increase of individual income 
 attendant on the war, to adoj)! ihe very bold expe- 
 
 ♦ Dr. Hamilton on the National Dcbi, p, 252. 
 C i
 
 iil' M(i}j:nihi(lc of our Espcnditnrc. 
 
 (liriil ol" war taxes, or, as it was officially termed, 
 *' raisiiiL;- a Jari;v ))roj)ortion of the sii])])lies witlun 
 the year." i'iie success of" this plan forms tiie 
 ^raml feature of tlie financial history of our age : 
 attem})ted at first on a liinited scale, it was carried 
 by the imposition of the income tax, to a large 
 amount, and before the close of the war attained a 
 magnitude almost incredible. 
 
 Supplies raised tvitkin the year, being the vet produce of our 
 taxes, after deducting 1 8,000,000/., as the computed average of 
 a peace establislnnent, and excluding all loans. 
 
 War 0/179S. — During the first four years 
 the war taxes were in considerable, and in 1797, 
 
 tliey were carried to only - - - d^ 3,000,000 
 
 But in 1798. they were carried to - 12,000,000 
 
 1799. - . - - 17,000,000 
 
 1800. .... 16,000,000 
 
 1801. - - -■ - 17,000,000 
 
 1802. ... - 19,000,000 
 
 War o/" 1803. — The produce of our annual 
 supplies computed as above, with the exclu- 
 sion ,of loans, but after deduction of a larger 
 sum (22,000,000/., see Appendix,) as the pro- 
 bable peace establishment : 
 
 1803. 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 1810. . 
 
 45,000,000 
 
 1804. 
 
 23,000,000 
 
 1811. 
 
 43,000,000 
 
 180.5. 
 
 28,000,000 
 
 1812. 
 
 41,000,000 
 
 1806. 
 
 31,000,000 
 
 1813. 
 
 45,000.000 
 
 1807. 
 
 36,000,000 
 
 1814. 
 
 48,000.000 
 
 1808. 
 
 40,000,000 
 
 1815. 
 
 48,000,000 
 
 1809. 
 
 4-1,000,000 
 
 
 
 Respective Propoi^tion of Loans and Taj:es, 
 Of the total sum of 1,100,000,000/. expended 
 during the war, the amount added to our perma- 
 nent debt w^as 160,000,000/., so that the aggregate 
 of the supplies raised within the year, amounted 
 for the whole war to 640,000,000/. a surprising 
 sum to be obtained by a mode of taxation almost
 
 Magnitude ofoitr Expendihn^e. 2.5 
 
 unknown in foreign countries, and carried in former 
 wars to a very limited extent among ourselves. 
 
 The financial history of the war may l)e divided 
 into three periods : 
 
 First, the tbiu' years previous to 1797, in which 
 our treasury was conducted as in former wars, with- 
 out any innovation in regard to war taxes or pa])er 
 money. 
 
 Secondly, the interval from 1797 to 1805, in which 
 we had hoth war taxes and non-convertible paper, 
 but M ithout greatly depreciating the one, or carry- 
 ing the other to an extreme. 
 
 Thirdly, the period from 1805 to 1815, in which 
 the amount of the sujoplies raised within the year 
 became enormous, and the depreciation of our 
 paper, particularly after 1810, formed a very serious 
 addition to our difficulties. 
 
 We have thus exhibited a statement of our 
 expenditure, which, though brief) is, we trust, 
 perspicuous, all complexities of redeemed and 
 uiu'edeemed stock, all distinctions of funded and 
 unfunded debt, being excluded from our calcuhi- 
 tion, and the charge of the war considered only 
 under the two great divisions of debt contracted 
 and expenditure defrayed in the current year. 
 Compared with these sums, how insignificant were 
 the additions made to our public burdens by former 
 wars. That of 1689, under King Wilham, cost 
 annually between 3 and 4,000,000/. and addetl in 
 all 20,000,000/. to the national debt. Under Queen 
 Anne, the flattering hopes inspired by repeated 
 victories, led to a longer contest and hu-gor outlav, 
 carrying our annual ex])enditure to 5 or (),000,000/. ; 
 the addition to the public debt during the war to 
 somewhat more than 30,000,000/. In the less suc- 
 cessful contest of 1710, our ex})enditure differed
 
 ^6 The Sources of our Financial Supplies. 
 
 from year to year; the addition to our j)ublic debt 
 aiiiomitcMl lo nearly .'3(),()()0,()00/. In that of 17^6, 
 the angnientcd resources of the country, and the 
 bold system of Lord Chatham, raised our annual 
 expenditure to an average of 10,(KK),()()(J/., the ad- 
 dition to our debt to fully r)(),(K)(),000/. The un- 
 ibrtunate contest with our colonies, and the war 
 that ensued after 1778 with European powers, was 
 attended with an average charge of 17,000,000/., 
 and an addition to our debt of somewhat more 
 than 100,000,000/. The total of public debt in- 
 curred in the course of a century was thus 
 2^0,000,000/., a sum which, however large, formed 
 only the half of that which we have contracted in 
 the present age. 
 
 The Sources of our Financial Supplies. — The 
 next and by far the most im})ortant step in the 
 progress of our enquiry is, by what means and from 
 what sources the nation was enabled to meet such 
 unprecedented demands ? In the opinion of many, 
 the means were derived from the extension, or as 
 it is commonly termed, our monopoly of foreign 
 commerce. " The French revolution," said the 
 late Arthur Young*, " burst forth like a volcano, 
 *' and laid the mdustry, manufactures, and com- 
 *' merce of France, and eventually those of the 
 *' whole Continent, hi the dust; Britain became the 
 " emporium of the world, and such a scene of wealth 
 " and prosperity tilled every eye in this happy 
 " country, as the sun before had never shone 
 " upon." The belief of such a monopoly has, on 
 the part of a merely practical man, or in the pages 
 of a pamphleteer, nothing surprising, but we were 
 little prepared to find it in a publication of large cir- 
 
 * Enquirv into the Value of Money in England, 1812 ; p. 77-
 
 The Sources of our Financial Supplies. 27 
 
 culation and acknowledged ability. * The fact is, 
 that the amount of our foreign commerce was not 
 greater, nor so great at any time during the war as 
 since the peace ; a point wliich may at once be as- 
 certained by a reference to our custom-house re- 
 turn of exports and imports. These documents, 
 however unfit to represent the balance of mer- 
 cantile payments from one country to another, 
 form good authorities for ascertaining the com- 
 parative extent of our business from year to year. 
 
 Our Exports according to the official value. — We 
 shall give the result of our custom-house return of 
 exports in two modes ; first, by the official value, 
 which means (see Appendix,) the value computed 
 by the weight or dimensions of inerchandize, and 
 at a uniform rate of price, without reference to the 
 fluctuations of the market. 
 
 Total Exports from Great Britain, computed according to thejixed 
 official standard of the Custom-house. 
 
 Average of the nine years of the first 
 war, viz. from the beginning of 1793 to 
 that of 1802 - - - a^3O,760,0OO 
 
 Average of ten years of the second 
 war, from 1803 to 1812, both inclusive, 
 leaving out 1813, the records of which 
 were destroyed by fire, and considering 
 1802 as a year of peace - - 42,145,000 
 
 But if we compare this with the eight years of 
 peace, of which the returns have been made to Par- 
 liament, we shall find a considerable increase since 
 1814. 
 
 Average of the total exports from 
 Great Britain computed officially for the 
 eight years, from 1814 to 1821, both in- 
 clusive. (See Appendix.) - - 54,200,000 
 
 '■ Edinburgh Review, No. Ixv. p. 170-, and again in No. Ixxii. 
 p. 458.
 
 i28 The Sources <>[' otn- Fhinneidl Supplies. 
 
 TUvsc ciistoni-lioiisc rcliiriis, l)ciiiL,^ made on a 
 uniform plan, and calculated by the weight or 
 dimensions of the package, are conchisive as to the 
 (juantitii of our exports. It may be said, however, 
 ihaf, ill otlicr respects, tliey are less satisfactory; 
 and that although the bulk ex])ortcd at present be 
 greater, the value is less in consequence of the 
 general reduction of prices. That prices were 
 much higher during the war, particularly in the 
 latter years, admits of no doubt, but in whatever 
 way the calculation be made, the advantage is on 
 the side of peace, thus: — 
 
 Exports from Great Britain (luring the tvar, computed chiefly 
 from the declaration of the exporting merchants ; or, tvhen 
 there rvas no declaration, by a suitable addition to the official 
 value. 
 
 Average of the ten years from 1791 
 to 1801, both inclusive - - ^48,890,000 
 
 Average of the ten years from 1801 
 to 1810 - - - - 52,84-7,000 
 
 In peace, our exports afford an average consi- 
 derably larger, after making (see Appendix,) 
 an allowance for the reduced value of merchan- 
 dize. 
 
 Average of our annual exports during 
 eight years from ISH to 18'21, both inclu- 
 sive, computed chiefly from the declara- 
 tion of the exporting merchants. (See 
 Appendix.) - - - ^63,787,000 
 
 In both points of view, therefore, our foreign 
 connnerce is found to have been less considerable 
 in war than in peace : it is equally easy to sho\v, 
 that its profits were wholly inadequate to the sup- 
 port of any great share of our expenditure. Mr. 
 Pitt, on proposing the income-tax in 1798, com- 
 puted our foreign commerce to yield to the various
 
 The Sources of our Financial Supplies. -29 
 
 persons, merchants and others, engaged in it, an 
 annual income of 12,000,000/., a sum, ])robably 
 not under-rated at the time, but which, for the sake 
 of giving those who diifer from us, tlie full benefit 
 Q^ argument, ought, we shall suppose, to ha\e been 
 doubled and taken during the war, at an anmial 
 amount of !ii4,000,000/. This, be it observed, is 
 not saving, but income, out of which are to be sup- 
 ported all the persons engaged in the business j and 
 if we compute the clear saving in a proportion, 
 which, in regard to most other branches of indus- 
 try, would be more than sufficiently liberal, the re- 
 sult will be a clear yearly gain of three millions 
 sterling. But what would be thought of that sum, 
 or of double or triple its amount, as a countei- 
 poise to such expenditure as ours during the late 
 wars ? 
 
 Of all the branches of our foreign commerce, 
 the greatest extension took place in that with tlie 
 United States : but that outlet was closed several 
 years before the end of the war ; and, however pro- 
 ductive of work to oiu' mamifactui'ers, lias never 
 been considered a source of pecuniary aid, accom- 
 panied as it necessarily is, by long credits and debts 
 (hfficult of recovery. 
 
 Our Colonial Acquisitions. — Our other sources 
 of imagined supply were the occupation of new colo- 
 nies, the suspension of the navigation of hostile 
 states, and a supposed reduction of their rival 
 manufactures. — Of the conquered colonies, the 
 princi])al were Trinidad, Demerara, Esseciuebo, 
 Tobago, each little advanced in culti\ati()n, each 
 recpiiring a large transfer of capital from this 
 country, and each yielduig little present reveiiiu-. 
 Similar disadvantages characterised, though, ni a
 
 30 The Sources (if'ttiir Financial Supplies. 
 
 less degree, St. Lucia, Guadaloupe, Martinique. 
 As to the East Indies, our acquisitions, vast in point 
 of* territory, and considerable in regard to internal 
 reveiHie, have been as yet of very secondary im- 
 portance in respect to commerce, though, on the 
 continent of Europe, there prevails an opinion 
 that India is the grand source of our uational 
 wealth. 
 
 Suspension of Foreign Competition . — We come 
 next to a very plausible argument, the benefit sup- 
 posed to arise to us from the suspension that took 
 place during the war, of the navigation of France, 
 Holland, and the other states dependent on 
 France. The fact doubtless was, that the flag of 
 these countries could not appear on the ocean, 
 because they had not men of war to protect their 
 convoys ; but the transfer of navigation was made 
 less to British vessels than to neutrals, — Americans, 
 Danes, Swedes, Prussians, and to Dutch shipping, 
 bearing the flag of the petty ports in the north-west 
 of Germany. — Lastly, in regard to manufactures, 
 those of France have undergone no reduction since 
 the Revolution, and much less fluctuation than is 
 commonly supposed : during the last thirty vears 
 they have been on the same scale of gradual in- 
 crease as before ; that is, they have all along kept 
 pace with the wants of a country, increasing pro- 
 gressively, though not quickly, in population. 
 
 Compelled to quit their favourite ground of 
 foreign commerce, to what do these calculators 
 resort for the purpose of explaining our prosperity 
 during the war ? Government loans and contracts, 
 however profitable in vulgar estimate, are obviously 
 out of the question as a source of national supply. 
 The conunand of money, given by the adoption of
 
 The Sources of our Financial Supplies. 31 
 
 a paper currency, is ii theme confidently urged, to 
 use a parliamentary phrase, both " in and out of 
 doors:" it was certainly of great importance, but 
 enough, we trust, will be advanced in a succeed- 
 ing chapter to show that the extent of supply, de- 
 rived from that source, has not yet been distinctly 
 comprehended. We dwell, therefore, no longer 
 on delusive suppositions, but proceed to what ap- 
 pears to us the true solution of this financial 
 enigma, seeking it in the increase less of our trans- 
 actions M'ith foreign countries, than of our pro- 
 ductive industry at home. 
 
 Increase of Employment during the War. — We 
 begin by requesting those of our readers who are 
 of an age to recollect the period of peace prior to 
 179s, to recall to mind the circumstances of that 
 time in as far as regarded the employment of indi- 
 viduals, the chance of favourable openings in tlie 
 different walks of industry. They will not fail to re- 
 member, that, though by no means an unprosperous 
 season, it was marked by the symptoms common in 
 an aara of political tranquillity, — complaints of 
 overstock in the genteel professions, and of inade- 
 quate payment in almost all of a humbler descrip- 
 tion. In a season of peace, salaries or wages are 
 adapted with scrupulous nicety to tlie sum neces- 
 sary for personal support, and, except in tlie case 
 of the inheritors of patrimony, the ])ortion of in- 
 come disposable for purposes of indulgence, is far 
 from large. Sucli has long been the case in France, 
 and most countries of the Continent; such, at 
 various intervals of the last century, was the case 
 in our own — a state by no means unsound or 
 likely to engender future embarrassment, but lead- 
 ing by very slow degrees to the attaiinnent of pro- 
 fes«?ional rank, or the acquisition of property. This
 
 ;j'2 7'//r Soinrcs of our Fnidncial Supplits. 
 
 tiun(|iiil condition, this nicdium between activity 
 and stagnation, was entirely altered by the war ; 
 the army, the navy, the pubHc offices of govern- 
 ment opened a career to mmnbers of every class, 
 and by absorbing a very large ])roportion of the 
 candidates for em])]oynient, created a corres})ond- 
 ing briskness in agriculture, trade, and professions ; 
 increasing the wages of the lower, and the salaries 
 of the higher ranks. 
 
 Capitalists also, a class retired for the most part 
 from active pursuits, partook of the general im- 
 pulse ; the pecuniary demands of government were 
 large, and the rate of interest experienced a gene- 
 ral and permanent rise. Occupation was thus 
 afforded to individuals of every age and of almost 
 every degree of capacity ; many, who from defi- 
 cient activity or mediocrity of parts, would, in a 
 state of peace, have necessarily remained unem- 
 ])loyed, were brought by the war into situations 
 attended with income ; some in the pubUc serxice, 
 others in private employment, but ail in conse- 
 (pience of the extra demand created by govern- 
 ment. Several departments of business, such as 
 our fisheries, our trade with the Continent of 
 Europe, and that with our AVest India colonies, 
 were exposed to heavy losses, and the whole body 
 of fixed annuitants felt severely the increased ex- 
 pence of living. But these classes formed the 
 minority of the public : and even they felt, more 
 or less directly, through the medium of their con- 
 nections, the benefit of that impulse which for a 
 time improved the income of almost all persons in 
 active life, raising to the monied men the rate of 
 interest ; to the labouring class, the rate of wages ; 
 to the manufacturer, the merchant, and, in parti- 
 cular, to the farmer, the profits of stock.
 
 The Sources of our Financial Supplies. 3"5 
 
 Such was the activity attendant on a state of war, 
 and on tlie facihty with which extended trans- 
 actions were managed by means of bank pajjer. 
 If to some our sketch appear too highly coloured, 
 we have merely to refer them to a comparison of 
 the average rate of wages and salaries in particular 
 periods, such as 179^ and 181^; to the increased 
 sales of our manufacturers and merchants ; the 
 rise of rent to the landlord ; the increase of profit 
 to his tenant. 
 
 Consequent Increase of Revenue. — All these cir- 
 cumstances, in particular the increased call for per- 
 sonal labour, had a powerful tendency to augment 
 the relative population of towns, as well by pro- 
 moting mai'riage as by drawing to them an extra 
 share of the country population. Now what is the 
 effect of an increase of town population on the 
 productive powers, or, in other words, on the tax- 
 able income of a country ? To form a due esti- 
 mate of this, we must point the reader's attention 
 to the passages hi our cliapter on Population, where, 
 in treating of the comparative revenue of chflerent 
 classes, we contrast the dexterity and dispatch 
 of towns, witli the slow, inefficient labour of the 
 country. A transfer of residence from country to 
 town leads to augmented ability in the individual, 
 to the increase of the quantity, the amelioration of 
 the quality, of liis work ; it raises his wages, and, by 
 enabling him to live better, extends the consumj)- 
 tion of articles productive to the exchequer. Of 
 tlie magnitude of the amount paid by the lowej- 
 orders, and the increase of public re\enue at- 
 tendant on increase of wages, whether in war or 
 peace, some idea may be formed from the follow- 
 
 ing table. 
 
 »
 
 .11. The Sm/rrrs o/'ni/r Financial St/pplies. 
 
 AhstrnrI nf Kxrisr n»/l Ct/sfotn Hvlica in 
 
 1820, nffectitig ihe cnn 
 
 .sumption nf l/ic labouring 
 
 classes. 
 
 Malt ... - 
 
 - -i£'5,000,000 
 
 Ik-er 
 
 - 2,500,000 
 
 British spirits ... 
 
 fl,0()0,(XK) 
 
 Salt .... 
 
 1 ,.500,{XK) 
 
 Tobacco and Snuff 
 
 3,000,000 
 
 Soap - . . - 
 
 9(H),()00 
 
 Leather 
 
 600,000 
 
 Candles ... 
 
 300,000 
 
 Tea 
 
 3,000,000 
 
 Hemp . - - 
 
 200,000 
 
 
 20,000,000 
 
 To which may be added, Timber 
 
 1,000,000 
 
 Coals carried coastwise nearly - 
 
 1,000,000 
 
 Total ^'22,000,000 
 
 Tlie progressive increase in the productiveness 
 of our taxes was owing partly to higher wages, 
 partly to augmented population. 
 
 Increase of our Population. — We shall have 
 occasion, in a subsequent chapter, to show the 
 close connection that exists between the increase 
 of our numbers and the productiveness of our 
 taxes : at present, our statement shall be brief 
 Our population returns for the last twenty years 
 indicate an increase of no less than one and a half 
 per cent, annually; but to avoid the hazard of over- 
 rating, we shall suppose that previous to these 
 returns, and to the general introduction of \accin- 
 ation, the augmentation was less rapid, and shall 
 assume eighteen per cent, on the po})ulation of 
 1792 as the total increase during the fourteen years 
 that followed that date. 
 
 After these preliminary remarks, we proceed to 
 state arithmetically, the increase of our resources, 
 beginning by a table of the amount of our excisB
 
 T)ie Sources of our Financial Sujyp/ics. 35 
 
 Juties, the operation of winch affects, as is well 
 known, a great variety of articles, inchiding as 
 w^ell the wine of the higher orders, as the malt 
 liquor, the s})irits, the tobacco, consumed by their 
 humbler countrymen. 
 
 Revenue arising J)'om the Excise during the Jbllffwing years oj' 
 xmr, being the gross Income, before deducting 0ie charges of 
 collection. 
 
 1805. .... ^23,194-,0OO 
 
 1806. .... - 24.,08 1,000 
 
 1807. ..... 24,681,000 
 
 1808. ..... 25,593,000 
 
 1809. (Orders in Council) - - - 23,471,000 
 1810. 25,796,000 
 
 1811. - - - - - 26,078,000 
 
 1812. (War with America) - - 23,532,000 
 
 1813. .... - 25,272,000 
 
 1814. ..... 26,471,000 
 
 1815. - - - - - 27,207,000 
 
 i^onjectural estimate of the total taxable Income of Great Britain, 
 at different periods, from 1792 to 1814. 
 
 Money of the 
 same value as 
 in 1792, 
 (Great Britain distinct from Ireland.) 
 In 1792 our taxable income may be com- 
 puted to have been .... ^125,000,000 
 
 In 1806; increase calculated in the ratio of 
 the increase of tlie population, viz. 18 per cent., 22,500,000 
 
 147,500,CX)0 
 
 Probable addition to national income from 
 the higher wages and higher profits of capital 
 in a state of war, . - . . 22,500,000 
 
 Total of taxable income in 1806, - 1 70,0(X),0()0 
 
 We shall now apply this mode of calculation 
 to the last year of the war. 
 
 In 1813 or 1814: Increase of national income 
 since 1806, calculated in the ratio of the in- 
 crease of population, 1 1 per cent. 
 
 D "i?
 
 SC) J*/'()j)(>rii()?i (>!' our 
 
 National iiKomc ill I H(Mj us above, - i"147,500,(X)0 
 
 Add 1 I pirioiit. .... Jf;,5(X),(KX) 
 
 1 f)1-,()00,(KX) 
 
 Probable addition to national income, from 
 the higher wages and higher profits of capital 
 in a state of war, .... 24,000,000 
 
 Total of taxable income in 1813 or IHl^, in 
 money of 1792, .... 188,000,000 
 
 By taxable income, we understand the aggregate 
 income of the individuals accustomed to consume 
 taxed articles; and our estimate is founded chiefly 
 on the returns made under the property, tax, with 
 the addition of the computed amount of wages 
 and other incomes, which, though exempt from 
 that charge, are subject to taxes on consumption. 
 
 (See the chapter on National Capital and Re- 
 venue.) 
 
 We shall explain in the next chapter the fluctu- 
 ation in the value of money since 1792; meantime 
 by exhibiting our income at different dates in 
 money of uniform value, we simplify the estimate, 
 and enable the reader to mark its increase, without 
 the perplexity attendant on a difference in the value 
 of our currency. 
 
 A comparative Statement of our Public Burdens, and Taxabh 
 Income. 
 The public burdens include taxes, {tvith the expence of collec- 
 tion) poor-rate, and tithe. , 
 
 Tlie same re- Our taxable in- 
 duced to a come comput- 
 Annual burdens uniform stan- ed b}' a uni- 
 Years. in the money dard ; viz. form standard; 
 of the parti- money of the viz. money of 
 cular year. same value as the value of 
 ia 1792. 1792. 
 1792. - a£'22,000,000 22,000,000 125,000,000 
 1806. - 60,000.0(X) 46,000,000 170,000,000 
 1814. - 80,000,000 50,000,000 188,000,000
 
 Burdens /o our Resoicrces. SJ 
 
 The advantage of making our computation in 
 money of uniform value is here very a})parent. To 
 judge from the numerical amount, our public bur- 
 dens would seem to have more than tripled in the 
 course of the twenty -three years of war, but when 
 reduced to the money of 179^, the increase is 
 ibund to be little more than double. 
 
 It remains that we bring our reasoning to a 
 point, by ascertaining "the proportion borne at 
 different periods by our burdens to our means."^ 
 This we accomplish by a calculation founded on 
 the preceding tables, but modified by some consi- 
 derations which shall be explained in our chaj)ter 
 on National Revenue and Capital. The result is 
 that our burdens bore to our resources, 
 
 (Great Britain distinct from Ireland.) 
 
 In 1792. a proportion of nearly - 18 to 100 
 
 1806. - of - - 27 to 100 
 
 1813. or 1814. of - 27 to 100 
 
 (See Chap. VIII. p. 269.). 
 
 Such was the proportion of our burdens to our 
 resources, afler including in the latter the increase 
 arising from the augmentation dining the war, both 
 of our numbers and our pecuniary means. The 
 additional pressure stated arithmetically, was about 
 nine per cent, on our national income, a charge less 
 great than is commonl}^ attributed to our taxes, 
 but sufficiently large to call for some farther ex- 
 planation of the remarkable circumstances that 
 enabled us to defray it. 
 
 Our War Taxes.— Thii amoinit of our loans, 
 though very dififercnt in different years, averaged, 
 on the whole of the war, the annual sum of 
 20,()(X),000/. This bold use of our credit, this free 
 
 D 3 
 
 335337
 
 38 rrvporlioji of our 
 
 iliHuglit oil (Hir tiitmc resources, was ulniost all 
 expended in tlie extension of our domestic indus- 
 try. It may be termed a premium given to the 
 existing generation at the charge of posterity : it 
 may be comi)ared to a stream, which, though 
 proceeding from an unnatural and temporary 
 source, diffused a fertility a})proaching to luxu- 
 riance, so long as it continued to flow. Our 
 reailers have probably little difficulty in conceiving 
 the operation of borrowed money; — in compre- 
 hending how individual, and consequently public 
 income may be increased by giving activity to the 
 present age at the expence of the next. The intri- 
 cacy lies in a different question ; in the mode of 
 accountino- for our taa:es. and for the ease with 
 which sums of unprecedented magnitude w^ere 
 raised in that manner during the war. To solve 
 til is difficidty, some writers adopt the convenient 
 theory, that taxation may be made an engine for in- 
 creasing national wealth, as if the money expended 
 on an indecisive campaign were ultimately as pro- 
 fitable as a rate imposed for the improvement of 
 our streets, roads, and canals. Without becomino* 
 converts to this singular opinion, we have no diffi- 
 culty in regarding taxation, when expended at home,. 
 less as a privation of wealth than as an instrument 
 of circulation. It is evidently applied to the ex- 
 tension of employment, and, by increasing the in- 
 comes of inchviduals, enables them to find a liuid 
 lor answering its own demand, — the subsequent 
 visits of the collector. 
 
 Ta.vation considered as Circidation. — Imat^ine 
 the case of a contractor receiving annually 100,000/. 
 from the Treasury, and distributing it in an addition 
 to the wages, salaries, and profits of two or three 
 thousand persons. AVithout the war, these indivi-
 
 Burdens to our Resources. 39 
 
 duals iiiight, and probably Avould, have had employ- 
 ment, but not to an equal extent, receiving perhaps 
 60/. annually instead of* the 70/. or 80/. given them 
 by the war, an addition which fully enabled them 
 to pay the extra charge imposed in the shape of 
 taxes. Or suppose the whole expenditure of the 
 nation, in other words, the amount disbursed on 
 articles, which directly or indirectly })ay taxes, to 
 be 200,000,000/. a year, and that in addition to 
 former burdens new taxes are imposed to the extent 
 of '20,000,000/. The effect of this heavy impost 
 is a correspondent rise in the price of the articles 
 consumed ; but as the amount received by the 
 Treasury is forthwith circulated among the payers 
 of the taxes, and applied to remunerate their exer- 
 tions, the latter are enabled to indemnify themselves 
 by an addition to the charges constituting their 
 respective incomes, whether in the shape of wages, 
 salary, or profit of stock. Possessed of this power, 
 the higher price paid for iirticles of consumption 
 becomes a matter of indifference, particularly when, 
 in consequence of the government demand for men 
 and money, the increase of their incomes exceeds 
 the increase of their expence. The result accord- 
 ingly is, that they pay 10 per cent, additional on 
 their consumption, and add as much, or more, to 
 the charges constituting their incomes. 
 
 To what amount, it may be asked, did the circu- 
 lation in question take place, in consequence of 
 taxes? To a sum very different in different years, 
 and increasing largely after ISOG, but forming, on 
 an average of the whole period of war, more than 
 40,000,000/. a year. In what particular mode did 
 file annual expenditure of that sum, and of the far- 
 ther 20,000,000/. supplied by loans, chiefly take 
 place ? In recruiting, clothing, and victualling our 
 
 D !<
 
 40 J'ritpo/ //<)/> o/ our 
 
 militia, iirmy, and navy; in the purchase of stores, 
 the hiiiiditiiT of" ships of" war, the repair of" fortifica- 
 tions ; in contracts, pay, salaries, pensions. Even 
 ill tliat whicli scented strictly foreign expenditure, 
 our subsidies to tiie continent, luid tiie mainte- 
 nance of our garrisons abroad, the remittances 
 took place less in money than in articles of British 
 manufacture. 
 
 It remains to add a few remarks on tiie manner 
 in which these large sums were repaid to the Trea- 
 sury. Of our taxation, the far greater proportion 
 (40,000,000/.) is on articles of consumption, a 
 mode in which the tax, blending itself with the 
 price of the article, escapes, in a great measure, 
 the observation of the consiuner. No wonder, 
 therefore, that such imposts were, in a manner, 
 overlooked in the general rise of wages, salaries, 
 and profits. In like manner, the increase of stamps, 
 heavy as it became, was accounted a secondary 
 object after the great augmentation of price ob- 
 tained, as the war proceeded, by the venders 
 of property. The assessed taxes and poor-rate 
 being undisguised burdens, excited more animad- 
 version, but they w*ere submitted to as well from a 
 conviction of their necessity, as from the genera] 
 ardour in the contest with France, and her dreaded 
 ruler. 
 
 Computed Amount thus repaid to the Treasury. — 
 If we go a step farther, and endeavour to define 
 the amount repaid, during the war, to the public 
 Treasury, the plan is to revert to the estimate we 
 have already made of the proportion of our burdens 
 to our national income. Tliat proportion, (27 per 
 cent. f"or the country at large,) was greater in 
 towns, on account of the more general consump- 
 
 14.
 
 Burdens to our Resowxes. 41 
 
 tion of exciseable articles. Now as the expend- 
 iture of government for the war, or, to speak more 
 correctly, the increased expenditure of individuals 
 consequent on government disburse, took place 
 almost entirely in towns, we shall probably not 
 exceed in calculating that it returned into the 
 Exchequer a proportion approaching to 33 per 
 cent., or a third of the amount that had issued 
 from it. This estimate justifies the following in- 
 ference : 
 
 Total of expenditure for the war - ^1100,000,000 
 
 Of which a third, or 33 per cent., paid back 
 
 in taxes, formed a sum of about - 3GO,000,000 
 
 a sum which goes far towards accounting for the 
 payment of our w ar taxes, enormous as they were ; 
 or, in other words, towards proving that those 
 pecuniary sacrifices on which tlie public received 
 such eloquent compliments from ministerial orators 
 and newspaper writers, were often little more than 
 a repayment of money issued from the Treasury. 
 
 The power of paying taxes during the late war 
 is thus to be sought, not in retrenchment on the 
 part of the public, but in an increase of the general 
 activity, and still more in that which a writer of 
 the present age, (as yet little known to the public, 
 but to whose works we shall frequently have occa- 
 sion to refer, Mr. 8. Gray) terms the power of 
 " charging and counter-charging ;" the j)ower of 
 individuals to augment tliose demands whicli con- 
 stitute their respective incomes; and thus to transfer 
 from one hand to another the burden of a new tax. 
 
 Absence of Foreign Co7npetition. — This aug- 
 mentation of charjre, tliis transfer of burden, was
 
 ^^ Proportion of our 
 
 liiciliLatod during the war by various causes, among 
 which is to be included the existence of similar, 
 though not equal demands iiom continental go- 
 vernments on their subjects. These demands, in 
 conjunction with the obstructions to intercourse 
 attendant on a state of war, had the effect of pre- 
 venting the high prices in England from being 
 lowered by foreign competition. Had the war 
 affected only France and England, had the rest of 
 Euro})e been exempted from the burdens of great 
 military establishments, such a system of increased 
 taxation, or, in other words, such a rapid augment- 
 ation of prices would have been impracticable : 
 our countrymen woidd have emigrated ; capital 
 would have been sent abroad ; foreign manu- 
 factiu'es would have been smuggled among us ; the 
 supplies for the United States and other dis- 
 tant markets would have been prepared on the 
 continent. But Holland, the only continental 
 country possessed of disposable capital, was sub- 
 jected to great oppression ; while Germany, and in 
 the latter years of the war, Denmark and Sweden, 
 were burdened with heavy military charges. Bri- 
 tish capital was prevented from finding its way 
 abroad, as well by dread of Bonaparte's despotism, 
 as by the profitable employment afforded it at 
 home. Smuggling was continued, but only in 
 articles (such as spirits, tea, laces,) in which it had 
 been carried on in peace : the number and activity 
 of our cruisers prevented its extension, notwith- 
 standing the additional temptation arising from 
 our augmented duties. 
 
 Our country was thus insulated commercially as 
 well as physically, and an amount of taxation, a 
 rise of prices, which at other times woidd ha\e 
 been ruinous, were comparatively innoxious when
 
 Burdens to our Resources. 43 
 
 our neighbours were subjected to heavy burdens. 
 As soon as this point is clearly comprehended by 
 the enquirer ; as soon as he becomes satisfied of 
 the ' 7ion-ea:istence of foreign competition ; he will 
 find much less difficulty in the solution of our 
 financial problem. 
 
 Substitution of Bank Notes for Coin. — To 
 all those causes there remains to add the ex- 
 emption of our banks from cash payments ; the 
 effect of which, though less great than is vulgarly 
 supposed, was to make money almost as plenty in 
 war as in peace; and to increase the amount of our 
 circulating medium in proportion as other circum- 
 stances led to a rise in prices. 
 
 Thus was carried on, from year to year, a most 
 expensive contest, without much pressure on any 
 part of the public, unless the fixed annuitant, and 
 without a depreciation of our national capital, ex- 
 cept of that portion (such as the funds, or loans on 
 mortgage,) of which the value is permanently re- 
 presented by money. To many persons, and in 
 particular to those interested in the expenditure, 
 this state of things bore a favourable appearance ; 
 conveying to some the idea of an accumulation of 
 national Avealth, to others the belief that we de- 
 frayed all our burdens from funds arising fiom 
 the war. The general enhancement of commotlities 
 was ascribed to an abundance of money, and 
 deemed a symptom, or rather a proof^ of the 
 increase of our national wealth. 
 
 These explanations enable us to account in some 
 measure for a notion very })revalent on the conti- 
 nent, and which, in the latitude in which it is oi- 
 tertained, strikes every Englishman with surprise, —
 
 44i /*r(>/)(>r/i(>f/ of oiir Bilrdens, S^r. 
 
 That we prolonged the war with a view to our pecu- 
 niary ailvaiitage — as if a charge, which may 1)C 
 true in regartl to ])articuhir classes, could, with any 
 degree of justice, be ajjplied to our countrymen at 
 huge. 
 
 The temporary stimulus afforded to productive 
 industry by the funding system, though never so 
 strikingly exemplified before, might have been 
 traced in various periods of the history of Europe 
 during the last two centuries. Was it not conspi- 
 cuous in the long contests of the Dutch, first with 
 Spain and subsequently with France, as well as in 
 every war that has been carried on by England 
 since the revolution ? In none of these, it is true, 
 did the amount of loans, and still less the amount 
 of war taxes, bear any proportion to those of the 
 present age ; but they supplied facts of a nature to 
 suffscest serious conclusions, had studies of that 
 description entered into the habits of our legisla- 
 tors. To the more cautious among them, it seem- 
 ed to occur that our situation w^as, in some degree, 
 unnatural ; that the great expenditure of govern- 
 ment was not compensated, on the part of the pub- 
 lic, by economy, or by any great share of extra 
 exertion. Hence an apprehension, on the part of 
 some, that the war must entail a burdensome in- 
 heritance, but at what time, or to what degree, they 
 did not attempt to calculate. Of the reaction to 
 be expected at a peace, no one appears to have had a 
 distinct conception. To foresee its extent was, we 
 admit, impossible ; but few of our public men be- 
 stowed a serious thought on its nature, while some 
 of them seemed hardly aware of the possibility of 
 its occurring ; so limited had been their study of 
 political economy as a science, so cursory their ex- 
 amination of corresponding periods of our history.
 
 45 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Effect of the War on the Price of Commodities. 
 
 We sliall now fix our attention on that general 
 rise of prices whicli took place during the war, and 
 continued ahnost without interruption from 1793 
 to 1814. As this formed one of the principal 
 changes in our situation, both individually and 
 nationally, it is fit we should investigate it with 
 minute attention. 
 
 Of the causes of rise during the war, tlie prin- 
 cipal were : — 
 
 1. Tlie great demand of men for government 
 service, and the consequent increase of wages and 
 salaries. 
 
 2. The insufficiency of our agricultiu-al produce, 
 caused partly by bad seasons, partly by the drain of 
 labour and capital for the public service. 
 
 3. The increase of taxation. 
 
 4. The addition to the cost of imported articles, 
 arising from the greater expence of freight, in- 
 surance, and other charges of transport ; and still 
 more from, 
 
 5. The depreciation of our bank paper after the 
 year 1809. 
 
 Of these different causes, the insufficiency of our 
 agricultural produce, and the non-convertibility of 
 our bank paper, are reserved for separate discus- 
 sion : at present, we proceed to the eflect of the 
 demand of men for government service.
 
 46 Crnisci of the Rise of Prices 
 
 Proporlion nfotir Population engaged in thePvMic 
 Serxice. — In 1792, and tlie preceding years of peace, 
 llie demanil made on onr j)0})uIation for military })ur- 
 poses \vas ^•ery limited. \\\ 179'3, our le\ies took 
 place on a large scale, and in 179'5, tlie numbers 
 raised in three successive years were such as to 
 form a \'ery large establishment. Recruiting, how- 
 ever, continued with activity during the whole 
 war, until the signature of the preliminaries of peace, 
 in tlie autumn of 1801. — In 1803, the renewal of 
 hostilities was attended by a call on our population, 
 which led, in little more than a year, to a more 
 numerous establishment than we had e\er had on 
 foot. The decisi^•e victory of Trafalgar remo\ed 
 the dread of invasion ; but the continental suc- 
 cesses of the French, the aggrandizing projects of 
 Bonaoarte, were such as to admit of no reduction 
 on our part; and after 1808, all hearts were united 
 in the cause of Spanish independence. Hence a 
 continued demand for recruits, an increase of levy 
 money, and a progressive addition to the numbers 
 on foot, during the rest of the war. 
 
 The proportion of our population under arms 
 was larger in this country than in any other state 
 in Euroi)e. In March 1804, Lord Liverpool, then 
 Lord Hawkesbury, declared in Parliament, that 
 our army and na\y, including militia, but exclusive 
 of volunteers, approached to the number of 400,000, 
 being more than one in ten of the able-bodied po- 
 pulation (then computed at 3,800,000) of Great 
 Britain and Ireland. France, he added, had at 
 that time in arms about 560,000 men, or one in 
 fourteen of her able-bodied population. Austria 
 had on foot also one man in fourteen ; and Russia, 
 if any dependence was to be placed in the loose 
 returns of her population, nearly the same propor-
 
 during the War. ly 
 
 tion. Prussia was tlic only j)o\ver whose military 
 force (about 240,000) bore, like ours, tlie propor- 
 tion of one in ten to her able-bodied males : but it 
 was with her a season of peace, and a number of 
 her soldiers were permitted, by furlough, or other- 
 wise, to give a part of the year to productive 
 labour. 
 
 It is usual to compute the proportion of able- 
 bodied men in a country at a fourth of the total 
 population. The war of 1793 lasted nine years, 
 and in the middle of that period (the year I797 or 
 1798), the po})ulation of Great Britain and Ire- 
 land was probably about 14,000,000, giving for the 
 able-bodied 3,500,000. 
 
 The war of 1803 lasted twelve years, and in 
 1809, the medium year, our numbers appear to 
 have been somewhat less than 17,000,000, trivino' 
 for the able-bodied a proportion of 4,200,000. The 
 year 1804 was in the middle of our great contest, 
 and his Lordship's computation may accordingly 
 be taken as a fair average of the numbers under 
 arms during the war. 
 
 It would be a task of no great difficulty to com- 
 pute and place in one column the number of our 
 able-bodied population for each year, and in an- 
 other the number of soldiers, seamen, and militia- 
 men in the ])ublic service. But the demand of 
 war on population goes considerably farther, and 
 extends into a field admitting of less accurate cal- 
 culation, comprising not only persons in j)ublic 
 offices, dock-yards, &c., but a number of indivi- 
 duals unconnected with government, such as manu- 
 facturers of arms, clothing, naval stores, builders 
 of barracks, contractors, and others, the list of 
 whom is too diversified and too mixed with the 
 occupations of private life to admit of any otliei-
 
 than a t^eneral estimate. Tliis estimate we are 
 inclined to make, in the proportion of one lialf of 
 the mihtary servants of tlie jiiibhc, taking the aver- 
 age of the army, navy, and mihtia, at 400,000 
 during our twenty-three years of war, and at 
 ^J00,000 the })ersons deriving an indirect emi)lo} - 
 ment from tlie war. 
 
 The number of men thus withdrawn from the pur- 
 suits of private industry appears toliave been on an 
 average (i00,000, or 15 per cent of our able-bodied 
 population. It is of importance to remark, that 
 they consisted of individuals born chiefly between 
 the years 177^ ^"^1 1790, a time when our popula- 
 tion was very considerably inferior* to our numbers 
 in 1800. We mention the year 1800, because in 
 the event of any contest occurring at present, our 
 recruits would, in general, consist of individuals 
 born about that period, and the abstraction of an 
 equal niunber of men from productive industry 
 would, of course, be less felt than during the late 
 war. The magnitude of the change which it at 
 that time produced will be put in a striking light 
 by a reference to our annual expenditure, keeping 
 out of view^ our payments for interest of debt, or 
 the civil service of go\ernment, and fixing our at- 
 tention on a 
 
 Statement 
 
 * Ricknian's Preliniiuary Observations on the Population 
 Return of 1821.
 
 diiriiig the War. 49 
 
 Statement of the conjunct expense of our army, navy, and ord- 
 nance, from the beginning to the close of the xvar, taken from 
 the accounts laid before Parliament. 
 
 1791. 
 
 - £ 4,226,000 
 
 Brouglit up 
 
 ^£'287,333,000 
 
 1792. 
 
 8,750,000 
 
 1804. 
 
 30,854,000 
 
 1793. 
 
 13,5I1,(X)0 
 
 1805. 
 
 36,219,000 
 
 1794. 
 
 20,247,(X)0 
 
 1806. 
 
 37,706,000 
 
 1795. 
 
 28,751,000 
 
 1807. 
 
 36,176,000 
 
 1796. 
 
 fiO, 165,000 
 
 1808. 
 
 39,778,000 
 
 1797. 
 
 27,606,000 
 
 1809. 
 
 42,073,000 
 
 1798. 
 
 25,982,000 
 
 1810. 
 
 43,246,000 
 
 1799. 
 
 27,257,000 
 
 1811. 
 
 47,968,000 
 
 1800. 
 
 29,613,000 
 
 1812. 
 
 49,739,000 
 
 1801. 
 
 26,998,000 
 
 1813. 
 
 54,872,000 
 
 1802. 
 
 23,121,000 
 
 1814. 
 
 60,239,000 
 
 1803. 
 
 21,106,000 
 
 1815. 
 
 43,282,000 
 
 
 £287,333,000 
 
 £809,485,000 
 
 Total exceeding 800,000,000. 
 
 To these sums there remains to add a proportion 
 of our subsidies ; we mean the part suppHed to our 
 alhes, not in money, but in stores, the manufac- 
 ture of which formed, of course, a farther demand 
 on our national labour. Combining these into one 
 sum, and dividing it by tlie number of years of 
 military expenditure, (in all twenty- three,) we find 
 the average annual charge for the army, navy, and 
 ordnance, to have been thirty -six millions, instead 
 of the four or five millions a year prior to 1792. 
 
 Observe next, the difference of effect on prices 
 in a sum raised for a military purpose, and that 
 which is levied for the interest of the national debt. 
 The latter bore, like all taxation, on the prices of 
 commodities ; but our military expenditure had a 
 double, or rather triple effect of that nature ; first, 
 by a drain of money ; next, by a drain of liands ; 
 and, thirdly, by obliging other hands to work for 
 those so withdrawn. It is only thus that we find it 
 })()ssible to explain cither the extraordinary rise of 
 
 i:
 
 50 Cavsex of I lie liisc of Prices 
 
 i)rices ill llic w;ir, oi" llu'ir no less extraordinary fall 
 since the peace. 
 
 EJfcct of Taxal'um on House-keeping. — I'he 
 result, or, to sj)eak more })roperly, the avowed ten- 
 dency of most taxes, is an augmentation of })rice. 
 Taxes on commodities are always imposed on the 
 calculation of being paid by the consumer; the 
 supply of any article, whether a luxury, such as 
 wine and sugar, or a necessary of life, like corn, 
 salt, leather, being presumed to be in proportion to 
 the effectual demand, and the tax intended not as 
 a burden on the })roducer or v^ender, but as an ad- 
 dition to the price paid by the consumer. This was 
 strikingly exemplified in the enhancement during 
 the war of several articles of daily use. The su- 
 gar which the planter, on paying a moderate duty, 
 could have afforded to sell in England at (JOs. the 
 cwt., was raised by the effect of new taxes and war 
 charges to ^Os. or 7^*'. Tea which, after paying 
 half its original cost to the custom-house, might 
 have been sold at 5s. or iSs. the lb., was raised, in 
 consequence of being taxed 100 per cent., to 'Js. or 
 8*., and the salt which (see Sir T. Bernard's pam- 
 phlet on the employment of the labouring classes 
 in 1817) might, if unburdened, have been afforded 
 at 1/. a ton, was made, in consequence of the duty, 
 to cost more than twenty times that price. 
 
 Holland was the first country in Europe that 
 afforded a striking example of the enhancement 
 arising from taxation, her long and expensive strug- 
 gle against Spain having necessitated very hea\T im- 
 posts so far back as two centuries ago. Sir William 
 Temple, among other interesting particulars with 
 which he has diversified the graver matter of his 
 Memoirs, takes occasion (Vol. I. Chapter VH.) 
 to insert the following remark : " The excise in
 
 iluring I he J far. 
 
 .5i 
 
 Holland is great, and so general, that I have heard 
 it observed at Amsterdam, that when, in a tavern, 
 a certain dish offish is eaten with the usual sauce, 
 thirty several excises are paid, for what is necessary 
 to that small service.'* — In England taxation was 
 comparatively light, until we became ardent par- 
 ticipators in continental war, at first under King 
 William, afterwards under Queen Anne. A long 
 peace, and the prudent administration of Walpole, 
 lessened for a time the pressure of the burden ; but 
 it was very sensibly increased by the wars of 17'1'^» 
 17«56, lyy-S*, and, above all, by those of the present 
 age. This is sufficiently apparent from the follow- 
 ing table of taxes which affect house-keeping. 
 
 Taxes on Luxuries. - 
 
 Foreign spirits, chiefly 
 
 brandy - a£'2,300,000 
 
 British spirits - 3,()00,(X)() 
 Wine - 1,600,0(X) 
 
 Rum - 200,000 
 
 Coffee and Cocoa 300,000 
 
 Raisins and other fruits iGO.GOO 
 Silk, raw and thrown 5W.000 
 
 Taxes on tlie necessaries or 
 comforts of life. 
 
 Assessed taxes (pre- 
 vious to the late 
 reduction) £6,500,000 
 
 Malt and Beer, 
 (since the reduc- 
 tion in 1822) 6,500,000 
 
 Sugar - 3,000,000 
 
 Tea - 3,000,000 
 
 Coals carried coast- 
 ways - 900,000 
 
 Soap - 900,000 
 
 Candles and Tallow 400,000 
 
 Cotton, Wool 500,000 
 
 Leather (since the 
 
 reduction in 1822) 300,000 
 
 Foreign timber 1,000,000 
 
 Bricks, tiles, stone, 
 
 slate - 400,000 
 
 Glass - 400,000 
 
 Hemp - 200,000 
 
 In all, above 3^2,000,000/., exclusive of stani]) 
 duties and postage j also of taxes on foreign articles, 
 
 E 2
 
 52 Cauxes uf'flif Rise af Prices 
 
 such as wool, butter, cheese, linens, drugs, all of 
 which have an effect more or less direct on house- 
 kee})ing, and were, like those enumerated above, 
 considerably increased during the war. 
 
 It occasionally happens, tliat, in consequence of 
 over supply, the market price of an article does 
 not rise in })roportion to the duty, but continues as 
 low, or nearly as low, as previous to its imposition ; 
 the consequence of which is to throw the new bur- 
 den on the producer. Such was long the case 
 of our West India sugar planters during the 
 war ; such is, in a great measure, their case at 
 present : it is the case, also, of a far more nu- 
 merous cla.ss, our farmers, who, in 1823 as in 181.5, 
 arc to be considered as paying a large share of 
 their taxes out of their capital. In general, how- 
 ever, there is made an addition to the price of an 
 article, not merely to the amount of the tax, but in a 
 somewhat increased proportion. Suppose a custom 
 duty paid on an article w^hich, on importation, is 
 sold to a wholesale dealer of the first class, next to 
 one of the second class, and, lastly, to a retailer : 
 the demand of a profit on, or rather of an indem- 
 nity for the tax, is repeated three times ; and al- 
 thouirh these demands are far smaller in degree 
 than has been asserted by the advocates for the re- 
 peal of taxes, they form, eventually and collec- 
 tively, a serious addition to the national burdens j 
 an addition which, joined to the charge of collect- 
 ing our taxes, constitutes, we believe, a dead loss 
 of from six to seven millions sterling, on the total 
 amount paid by the public. This loss will be 
 effectually lessened only by the introduction of a 
 double improvement ; a farther simplification, on 
 the part of government, of the process of collec- 
 tion, and, on the part of the public, the adoption of
 
 duriiijx the War. 53 
 
 '© 
 
 the practice of ready money payments, so general 
 in Holland, in its day of prosperity. 
 
 Next, as to taxation in a more direct and undis- 
 guised form, such as the assessed or the property 
 taxes. In what manner, it may be asked, do indi- 
 viduals in general meet burdens of that description ? 
 Is it by self-denial and economy, by increased in- 
 dustry, or by adding the amount of the tax to the 
 charge which, in their respective lines of business, 
 they make on the public ? Economy is practised, 
 we may be assured, by those only wliose income 
 admits of no increase : augmented exertion is more 
 natural to our countrymen, and was, doubtless, 
 made to bear a considerable part in defraying our 
 war burdens ; but the latter, whenever it was at 
 all practicable, were charged by the payer on his 
 customers or connections ; and the result, as ex- 
 plained in the last chapter, was a progressive 
 enhancement not only of commodities, but of 
 salaries, professional fees, and labour of every 
 kind. 
 
 Collective Ejfect of' the various Causes of Knhance- 
 ment. — The total rise in prices during the war, 
 appears to have been between 60 and 70 per cent., 
 IGO or 170/. being required in 1813 to make the 
 purchases, whether for the necessaries, comforts, 
 or luxuries of life, which were made in 179^2 for 
 100/. Tlie degree of rise was, doubtless, different 
 in different situations, but in regard to the public 
 at large, tliat pro})ortion will, we believe, be found 
 to hold. To facilitate the compreliension of this 
 somewhat intricate enquiry, it may be useful to 
 descend into the details of domestic life, and to 
 refer the reader to the subjoined table of family 
 expenditure. 
 
 E 3
 
 54 Cduscs of I he Rise (J' Prices 
 
 Comparative expenditure oj' a Family of the middle class in 
 Enf;land in the years 1792 and 1813; — discriminating the 
 heads of cxpcnce {by Nos. 1, 2, 3, 1.) so as to shpw the rise 
 produced respectively by each cause of enhancement. 
 
 1792. 
 
 1813, 
 
 £18 
 
 47 
 
 16 
 
 35 
 
 22 
 
 38 
 
 1. Taxation was evidently the ciiief caose of rise in the follow- 
 
 ing heads of expence : 
 
 Assessed taxes and poor rate 
 
 Wine and spirits 
 
 Tea, sugar, and other groceries 
 
 Beer (partly from taxation, partly from 
 
 enhancement of corn) - - - 7 11 
 
 2. The advance of labour, the occurrence of 
 
 indifferent seasons, and the difficulty of 
 import (from the rise of freight, and 
 depreciation of our bank paper after 
 1809,) were the principal causes of 
 enhancing 
 
 Bread - . . 
 
 25 
 
 50 
 
 Butcher meat 
 
 25 
 
 45 
 
 Milk, butter, cheese, vegetables 
 
 50 
 
 85 
 
 3. The advance of labour was chiefly in- 
 strumental in raising 
 
 Servants' wages - - - 18 22 
 
 House rent, the rent of houses in occu- 
 pancy being determined by the ex- 
 pence of building new houses, and the 
 latter by the price of labour - 60 100 
 
 Clothes ... . 60 85 
 
 Fuel .... 24 35 
 
 Furniture; whether wc consider the in- 
 terest on the money vested in its 
 purchase; which we calculate at - 42 63 
 
 Or annual repairs and purcha!>es, esti- 
 mated at . . - 14 24
 
 durifiii the TFar, 55 
 
 4. The rise of the following can hardly be 
 referred to any particular head, but ap- 
 pear the mixed result of taxation, en- 
 hanced labour, and depreciated currency. 
 
 Articles of leather manufacture, chiefly 
 
 
 
 boots and shoes ... 
 
 9 
 
 18 
 
 Candles and oil 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 Washing ... 
 
 16 
 
 25 
 
 Education - - 
 
 14. 
 
 22 
 
 Medical attendance 
 
 U 
 
 20 
 
 Incidents, such as postage, stationery, 
 
 
 
 charity, pocket disburse 
 
 35 
 
 55 
 
 Expences of a less necessary character, 
 
 
 
 viz. travelling, and temporary residence 
 
 
 
 in the country 
 
 30 
 
 50 
 
 Expence of company 
 
 35 
 
 60 
 
 Total 
 
 JL'54-0 
 
 900 
 
 A table of this kind, useful as it in some degree 
 is, will hardly enable us to ascertain with precision 
 the rise proceeding from each of the great causes of 
 enhancement. But as on so interesting a topic no 
 enquiry can be too minute, we shall endeavour, by 
 \ arying our plan and resorting to other grounds of 
 calculation, to attain the desired result. 
 
 EJfecl of Taxatio7i. — For an estimate of the 
 effect of taxes on house-keeping, we are in some 
 measure prepared, by the tables in our second 
 chapter. These, as well as our subsequent calcu- 
 lations, (see the chapter on National Revenue anil 
 Expenditure,) exhibit tlie proportion borne at dif- 
 ferent periods (179^, 1806, and 1813), by our bur- 
 dens to our resources. And the result is, that the 
 increase of our taxes, during the war, amounted 
 to a charge oi'?imej)C)^ cent, on our national capital. 
 This, the arithmetical result, is greatly below the ge- 
 
 E 4
 
 56 Causes ()f the Rise of Pt'iccs 
 
 neral estimate of the taxes imposed during the war. 
 It is also l)clow the addition whicli they will be 
 found to liave causctl to our j)rices, when we take 
 into account the obstacles they create to improve- 
 ment in our agriculture and manufactures. These 
 various impediments, unknown to the public, but 
 severely felt by the persons on whose diffl'rent 
 lines of occupation they bear, all tend to keep up 
 or augment prices, and their collective effect was, 
 we believe, such as amply to justify our computing 
 the addition to our prices, from our war taxation, 
 at twelve instead of nine per cent. Of this we 
 shall treat more fully in our concluding cha})ter, 
 when we come to urge the expediency of a farther 
 reduction in our public burdens. 
 
 Substitution of Bank Paper for Coin. — Here 
 we introduce a cause to which, in the opinion of 
 the great majority of the public, we ought to 
 ascribe the chief part of the rise of prices during 
 the war. This, however, is a very complicated 
 question, and one which wdll require all the eluci- 
 dation that a separate discussion can confer on it. 
 At present we shall merely observe, that the addi- 
 tion to our prices, arising from the fall of our cur- 
 rency, from the inferiority in value of our paper 
 to coin, appears to have been about 15 per cent, 
 during the latter years of the war. 
 
 Rise in the Price of Labour, — To what are we 
 to attribute the remarkable rise in the rate of la- 
 bour during the late wars ? — To two main causes : 
 the demand of men for the public service, and the 
 increased expence of provisions. In the first years 
 of the war, the rise w-as caused only bv the demand
 
 durim the War. 57 
 
 "& 
 
 of men for the public service, and provisions had 
 very httle share in the enhancement during 1793 
 and 1794. But after 1795, and still more after 
 1799, the additional cost of provisions became 
 such as to oblige the labourer and mechanic, in 
 self-defence, to stipulate a higher money payment 
 for his services. 
 
 A rise of wages may be either real or nomina). 
 That which was consequent on the demand for 
 the militia, army, and navy, proved a real and 
 hondjide addition, the mechanic or manufacturer 
 who remained at home being in greater request, 
 and receiving larger pay from his employer, with- 
 out reference to an increase in his expenditure. 
 But a rise of wages proceeding from a rise of pro- 
 visions is very different : the addition, in one sense, 
 is merely a balance to the addition in another, and 
 the augmentation is consequently nominal. To 
 such an extent did this hold in the case of our 
 labouring classes during the war, that the 286\ or 
 .305. paid them weekly in our provincial towns in 
 1812, were hardly more available in the purciiasc 
 of the necessaries or comforts of life, than \os. \\\ 
 1792. 
 
 Effect of a Rise in the Price of Labour on House- 
 keeping Exycnces. — The direct effect of s>uch a 
 rise is readily seen in the increase of servants' 
 wages ; but its indirect operation, its enhancement* 
 of work performed out of doors, is of much more 
 consequence. This will be at once a})parcnt on 
 our analyzing the component })arts of the cost of 
 manufactures. In cotton goods, after all the aid 
 derived from machinery, labour still constitutes 
 nearly a third of the price ; while in woollens, lea-
 
 .'JS Cai/sci (>fflic Rise (if Prices 
 
 ihcr, liartlvvare, linen, anil })frhaps in silk, its pro- 
 portion is more nearly a lialfl Next, as to a very 
 clillercnt lieacl in family expenditure, that of house- 
 rent, the chief constituent of charge is laboin*, 
 since in a country of increasing population, the 
 rent of houses in occupancy is regulated by the 
 cost of new buildings ; and in regard to these, the 
 command of materials being unlimited, the ques- 
 tion resolves itself into a calculation of theexpence 
 of the requisite labour. In the case of furniture, 
 ii similar remark is applicable ; and even in ser- 
 vices of a higher class, such as teaching or medical 
 attendance, the influence of this cause (rise of 
 labour) is not excluded. 
 
 To the lower orders the rate of labour, in a 
 direct sense, is of little consequence, as they are 
 accustomed to serve themselves j but, in an in- 
 direct sense, by enhancing corn, it proves of the 
 greatest importance. 
 
 EJfect of an Enhancement oJCorn on House-keep- 
 ing. — A return of the ten years of peace preceding 
 1793, gave as the average of the quarter of wheat in 
 the Windsor market, 2/. 10^. ^d. But thirteen years 
 of war, from 1793 to 1805 (both inclusive), gave 
 lor the quarter of wheat an average of 3/. I'^s. 2d.', 
 in other words, 152/. were required to purchase 
 the same quantity as 100/. previous to the war. 
 And the succeeding eight years, from ISO6 to 
 1813, gave the still higher average of 5/. 1*. Sd. 
 for the quarter of wheat, denoting that no less than 
 '200/. were, during that period, required to purchase 
 what, previous to the war, had been obtained for 
 100/. Such was the rise in wheat : in butcher 
 meat, and agricultural produce generally, the en- 
 U
 
 during the War. 59 
 
 hancement appears to liave been nearly equal ; 
 but for these and other details, we refer to the 
 Appendix, and proceed to lay before our readers 
 a statement of the general result. 
 
 Summary of the Rise in House-keeping at the dose of the late 
 f'Vars, making the Cnlctdation in the most comprehensive Form, 
 so as to be applicable, not to particular classes, but to the 
 public at large. 
 
 Proportion of rise proceeding from increase of 
 
 Taxation 12 per cent. 
 
 from rise of wages and 
 
 labour generally ... 20 ditto 
 from the enhancement 
 
 of provisions, (see Appendix) - - 30 ditto 
 
 Of this rise in provisions, we may ascribe per- 
 haps the half (or 15 per cent.) to the rise of 
 labour, and other farming charges consequent 
 on the demand of men for the public service : 
 the other 15 per cent, to the depreciation of 
 our bank paper, enhancement of freight, and 
 other charges attendant on import. 
 Proportion of rise from extra charges on the 
 purchase and import of other articles than 
 corn ; such as wool, cotton, tobacco - 5 ditto 
 
 Total - 67 per cent. 
 
 Such appears to have been the operation of the 
 different causes of enhancement diu'ing the war. 
 We proceed to exemplify that rise by a reference 
 to real property. 
 
 Land. — The farm which, in 179^, let for I70/. ; 
 and which, in 1803, (see the tabular return of 
 cliarges of cultivation in the cha})ter ou Agri- 
 culture,) afforded a rental of ^24.0/., lot in 1813, 
 for S201. 
 
 Houses. — The house which, in 179-» let for .50/., 
 and in 180(), for ().5/., might be consiilered in ihc
 
 60 Cicncnd Kisc <>/' Prices 
 
 latter years of the war, as worth 70/., tlie rise being 
 less <rr(>at in lionses than in land. Its value, as a 
 j)urchase, originally 1000/., was raised towards 
 the middle of our long contest to 1300/., and 
 eventually to 1400/. or 1500/. 
 
 To deline the amount of the rise of prices in 
 particular connnodities, would be a task of great 
 labour and nicety : the only person who attempted 
 it was the late Mr. Arthur Young, of whose calcu- 
 lations we shall treat afterwards. If, for the sake 
 of conferring some degree of precision on an ob- 
 scure subject, an attempt be made to divide the 
 progress of enhancement into periods, we may 
 consider the war as having produced half its effect 
 towards the year 1806, viz. that the rise of prices 
 taken in the most comprehensive sense, whether of 
 provisions, clothing, labour, or professional charges, 
 was in that year somewhat more than 30 per cent, 
 above the prices of 1792. From I8O6 to 1813 the 
 rise was more rapid, in consequence of the double 
 effect of a non-convertible currency, and extended 
 military operations, so that in 1813 and 1814 the 
 enhancement was 30 or 35 per cent, on the prices 
 of 1806, or about 67 per cent, on those of 179^. 
 
 Hoxcfar xvas this rise of prices 7iominal? — It is 
 incumbent on the attentive enquirer, to guard 
 against the error so frequent in former years, and 
 at present by no means exploded, of considering a 
 rise of prices in the light of a bondjide addition to 
 our public wealth. The reader, on referring to the 
 preceding table of house-keeping expence, and 
 considering how different trades and professions 
 are linked together, v.ill readily perceive the man- 
 ner in which an individual, on the occurrence of a 
 rise of prices in his particular de})artment, indeni-
 
 during the War. 61 
 
 nifies himself by a charge on the community. If, 
 for the sake of ilUistration, we advert to articles of 
 daily consumption, and to the tradesmen who are 
 most familiar to us, we find the baker and butcher 
 raise, of course, their demands on their customers, 
 in proportion as the prices of their articles are 
 raised to them by the farmer or grazier. In a 
 similar, though not equally direct manner, the 
 teacher augments his charge for board and instruc- 
 tion ; the upholsterer, the price of his furniture ; 
 the landlord, the rent of his houses. — The whole 
 partakes of the nature of circulation ; or, to borrow 
 an expression from Mr. S. Gray, of " charge and 
 counter-charge.'* 
 
 But a rise which is common to all can be little 
 else than nominal. The owner of a house or land 
 was hardly able to purchase more commodities with 
 the increased rent, during the war, than with the 
 limited sum paid to him in 1792. He found 130/. 
 in 180G, or 160/. in 1813, of no greater value than 
 100/. at the beginning of the French Revolution ; 
 and the correct mode of speaking is, — that land and 
 houses rose in money rent in proportion as money de- 
 clined in value, that is, they maintained a nearly uni- 
 form \'alue, though the sum paid was very different. 
 The same is applicable, as we shall see presently, 
 to the far greater part of income, whether arising 
 from ])roperty or labour ; from capital vested in 
 trade, manufacture, or agriculture ; from wages, 
 salaries, or professional charges, the sum paid hav- 
 ing regularly increased as its value diminished. 
 
 Money Property^ such as a Ijoan on Mortgage. — 
 We here advert to a descrij)tion of property ma- 
 terially different from lantl or houses, a property 
 which cx])ericnces neitiier rise or fall, whatever be 
 the fluctuations in the value of money. Sup])0se
 
 (32 (icniral Rise ufVriccs 
 
 \\ sum (.3,200/.) to have been advanced on 
 morti^age in 179*^, ^ind to liave remained on tliat 
 security dnrini^ the war, it will hardly be denied 
 that in sncii years as 1811 or 1812, it was con- 
 sidered a proi)erty of" less value than ])revious to 
 the war. The ICIO/. which tlie owner continued 
 to draw as interest, was in these years worth to 
 liini little more than 100/. in 1792. 
 
 Proportion of national Income affected i?i this 
 Marnier. — The reader on referring to our estimate 
 of taxable income, in the chapter on National 
 Revenue, will find the sums paid to annuitants, 
 whether creditors of the public or of individuals, 
 computed at 50,000,000/. a year, or one-fitth of 
 the total national income. The receivers of the 
 other fbur-fifUis, whether landholders, farmers, 
 merchants, or manufacturers ; whether clerks, me- 
 chanics, or country labourers, obtained in their 
 annual income, (in the form of rent, salary, wages, 
 he.) an addition corresponding, or nearly corre- 
 sponding to the decline in the value of money. 
 From this benefit were excluded the annuitants, 
 to the extent we have mentioned ; and many of 
 them would have felt more severely the dimi- 
 nished value of their receipts, had it not been in- 
 directly counterpoised by tlie activity arising from 
 the war, and the consequent facility in providing 
 for their connections in the public service. 
 
 Since the peace, the relative situation of these 
 great portions of the community has, as is well 
 known, been reversed. Annuitants have found 
 their incomes recover their \alue ; while the other 
 classes, above all, the agriculturists, have expe- 
 rienced the most distressing effects from the fall 
 of prices.
 
 during the War, 63 
 
 Change in the Value of Money. — Our readers 
 will now be able to form a definite idea of what is 
 meant when we speak of a fall or rise in the value 
 of money. The fall of prices since the peace has 
 been very different in different articles ; for while 
 in the produce in the soil it is above GO, and in 
 several branches of manufacture above 50 per cent., 
 in the case of house-rent, or the wages of me- 
 chanics, it probably does not exceed 15 per cent. 
 But the business of the statistical enquirer is with 
 the average^ which is, doubtless, not less than 30 
 per cent, on all payments determined by free com- 
 petition ; in other words, in all articles brought to 
 open market. In payments of a different natiu-e, 
 such as professional fees, salaries, servants' wages, 
 the decrease is as yet inconsiderable ; because in 
 these there exists no ready appeal to competition, 
 no prompt means of overcoming the opposition to 
 reduction. In London, journeymen in various 
 trades are, in consequence of their system of com- 
 bining, still in the receipt of 5,y. or iSs. a day, as in 
 the season of war and expensive living; but such 
 a state of things can hardly be of long duration. 
 The fall of provisions, the example of other coun- 
 tries, the diminished profit of capital, all point to 
 the necessity of a change, and will eventually over- 
 come resistance, whether on the part of tl\e lower 
 orders, or of the receivers of pensions and salaries, 
 in whom, possessing as they do better means of 
 information and comparison, pertinacity in reten- 
 tion would be more reprehensible. As such re- 
 duction, therefore, will, in all probability, become 
 general, and the words, " fall of })rice," are too 
 limited to express a decrease of such incomes as 
 arise from personal exertion, we adopt the more 
 comprehensive phrase of a "rise or lull in the ^•alue 
 of money."
 
 (j4 (iencral Rise of Prica* 
 
 Prices nn the Covlineiif since 1792. — In liow far, 
 in tlie present age, have the other countries of 
 Knroj)e participated in those fluctuations of money 
 wliich among us have reached so extraordinary a 
 lengtli ? Tliis question is of no easy solution, as 
 well from want of documents in countries which 
 liad then no representative assembly, as from a 
 depreciated paper having been current in almost 
 every part of Europe. France, the only state that 
 has equalled us in the duration of her wars, ex- 
 hibits a remarkable contrast to us in the extent of 
 her financial burdens. Her taxation, amounting 
 in the beginning of the revolution, to about twenty- 
 two millions sterling, (see the Report of Camus to 
 the National Assembly, in July 1790), was never 
 increased by more than the half of that sum ; while 
 our sixteen millions of 1792, became forty-five 
 millions in 1804; sixty millions in 1808, and nearly 
 seventy millions in 1814. In fact, in the early 
 part of the revolutionary war, the collection of 
 revenue in France was (see the Due cle Gaete on 
 French Finance), considerably under twenty mil- 
 lions ; the wants of government having been sup- 
 plied by the emission of assignats during four yeai's 
 of emergency, (1792-3-4-5) and afterwards, in a 
 considerable degree, by contributions from con- 
 quered territories. After the fervour of the first 
 years of the revolution, there was in France no 
 legislative body capable of conferring credit on 
 government stock : no exemption from cash pay- 
 ments to facilitate to the payers of taxes, the means 
 of reimbursing themsehes by a ready addition to 
 wages, salaries, or professional fees. The amount 
 emitted in the form of assignats admits of no defi- 
 nite calculation, the value of that government 
 paper having fallen rapidly, and having been at 
 
 21 '
 
 during the TVar, iS5 
 
 last, ill 1796, reduced to a nullity. But if we 
 compute at two liundred millions sterling the 
 amount of public sacritice from the assignats, and 
 if we add for the bankruptcy committed in regard 
 to two-thirds of the public debt, the forced loan of 
 1797> i^"d the augmented taxation of the latter 
 years of Bonaparte, two hundred millions more ; 
 and, finally, if we add a national loss of one hun- 
 dred millions, consequent on his inauspicious return 
 from Elba, and the invasion of 1815, we make in 
 all, a pecuniary sacrifice on the part of France, of 
 five hundred millions sterling, over and above the 
 twenty-two millions of annual expenditure neces- 
 sary under a peace establishment. 
 
 But the political strength of our southern neigh- 
 bour lies less in money than in men, and that 
 forced annual levy which would be so indignantly 
 received among us, and so subversive of the 
 resources of a commercial and manufacturine: 
 country, proved the most effectual means of draw- 
 ing forth the power of France. In this respect 
 accordingly, her sacrifices have been very great, 
 the number of men who fell in the long struggle 
 from 1792 to 1815, estimated, on a moderate com- 
 putation, at a million and a halfj being probably 
 more than three times the number lost by our 
 country, after every allowance for the destructive 
 effect of tropical climates. In another respect, 
 also, the neglect of education and postponement 
 of the choice of a profession attendant on the 
 Conscription, as well as the loss of time to those 
 who escaped the sword and resumed a })acific 
 occupation, form an amount of national detriment 
 which may very fairly be put in the balance against 
 the vast loss sustained in this country by the transi- 
 tion from war to peace.
 
 C)6 General Rise af Pricea 
 
 The Netherlands, siihjecteil iluriiifr twenty years 
 to the sway of France, and (liirin*;- a part of the 
 time to the Conscri})ti()n, were also ex})osed to 
 heavy losses from the war. If less great than those 
 of France in men, they were larger in a financial and 
 commercial sense, as well from angmented taxation 
 as from intern ij)ted intercourse, and the many, 
 abortive attempts made, during the enforcement 
 of the prohibitory decrees, to produce substitutes 
 for coflf'ee and other articles, the growth of a tro})i- 
 cal climate. 
 
 Of the other European powers, the chief belli- 
 gerent was Austria, whose pecuniary sacrifice was 
 lessened by our subsidies, but whose loss in men 
 amounted perhaps to the half of that of France. 
 Next came Prussia, Spain, Russia, Sweden, in 
 whose case the duration of suffering was less, but 
 who were all doomed to feel the destructive ravag-e 
 of war and invasion. A pressure of a more lasting 
 kind, we mean that which is attendant on the 
 maintenance of a large standing force, extended to 
 every state, great and small, on the Continent, from 
 179'^ to 1814. Their taxation consequently in- 
 creased, and the general demand for men was fol- 
 lowed by a general rise in the price of labour. The 
 impracticability of effecting loans prevented that 
 stimulus to productive industry, that diain on the 
 future in favour of the present which took place 
 among us to so great an extent : nor was there in 
 any part of the Continent a continued inadequacy of 
 agricultural produce. Accordingly, though prices 
 on the Continent became higher in war than they 
 had been in peace, though during the one period 
 the demand for labour was brisk, in the other lan- 
 guid, the degree of difference was much smaller 
 than with us. This topic shall be more fully treated 
 1?
 
 during the War. Cfjf 
 
 in a subsequent part of our volume, (Appendix to 
 Chap, ix.) but were we, for the sake of arriving at a 
 definite estimate, to hazard a conjecture of the differ- 
 ence between the present ])rices on tlie Continent 
 and those of 17f)^-^, we shoukl pronounce the former 
 about 15 per cent, higlier, being half the enhance- 
 ment that we find in Enghmd, comparing our pre- 
 sent prices to tiiose of 179^. 
 
 This excess on our part in tiie ratio of enhance- 
 ment, added to a nearly similar excess in prices 
 previous to 1792, makes a total difference between 
 this country and the Continent of from 20 to 30 
 per cent. The leading causes of this are our lieavy 
 excise duties, the larger size of our towns, and the 
 occasional operation of our corn laws. The balance 
 against us would be still greater, were it not in a 
 considerable degree counteracted by the cheapness 
 of fuel and of several articles of manufacture, in 
 particular hardware, in which our connnand of 
 capital, our inland navigation, and our machinery, 
 afford us a considerable advantage over the Con- 
 tinent. 
 
 Rise of Prices apparently indicative of Prosperity. 
 — An increase in the money value of commodities, 
 of land, houses, and stock in trade, accom})anied 
 by a general augmentation of salaries and wages, 
 suggested during the war the idea of a general 
 increase of wealth in correspondence, as was com- 
 monly believed, to the increase in our circulating 
 medium. 
 
 We have already shown that this was, in a great 
 measure, nominal: the augmented })rice of com- 
 modities, of" land, houses, merchandise, re(juii"ed, 
 to represent it, a larger sum of money, but that 
 such money was of less value. Or, if we admit 
 
 F '2
 
 f,H General Bhc of Prices 
 
 thai there was in several respects an inciease of 
 i)roperty, tliat the general briskness caused by the 
 (liMnands of government led to an actual rise of 
 ])rices, a rise over and above that Avliich was recjni- 
 site to meet the alteration in the value of the cur- 
 rency, it is fit, on the other hand, to recollect that 
 the fixed money property of the country, such as 
 the stocks and loans on mortgage, all underwent 
 depreciation, because in these the same sums repre- 
 sented a reduced value. What then was the real 
 result? That, on the one hand, the national pro- 
 })erty was lessened by the great additional charge 
 arising from the war : on the other, it was aug- 
 mented in proportion, not to the rise of prices, but 
 to the progress of national improvement and in- 
 crease of population. No such limitations, how- 
 ever, were admitted in the estimate of the public, 
 or, as far as we can perceive, in that of ministers : 
 both confidently inferred prosperity from rise of 
 prices, and appear never to have suspected that 
 such a rise was deceptive, and might take its origin, 
 in great part, from an increase of burden. 
 
 What a train of misconception, w^hat a series of 
 sanguine and fallacious notions would have been 
 prevented, had the public been earlier aware of 
 these simple truths ! During the Avar, the rise of 
 price was so regular, and of such long continuance, 
 (from 1793 to 181 i), that the majority of the pre- 
 sent generation took for granted that it would be 
 permanent, ascribing it less to the war and the de- 
 mands of government, than to causes likely to be per- 
 manent, — such as the unknown gains of our foreign 
 commerce, or the influx of the precious metals of 
 America. But in this, as in other points, the return of 
 peace has undeceived us ; it has shown that the 
 amount of our commercial gains, and the influx of 
 
 14 "
 
 during the War. Cf) 
 
 't> 
 
 specie, were botli over-rated ; ami tliat the origin of 
 Iiii;Ii prices is to be sought in less welcome causes. 
 Of these, the demand for men for the public service, 
 the insufficiency of our growth of corn, and the de- 
 preciation of our bank paper, have all, for some time,^ 
 ceased to operate, but their effects have by no means 
 ceased ; while the fburtli cause, we mean taxation, 
 continues to press on us with almost undiminished 
 rii>'our. 
 
 ILvll of high Prices wheii peculiar to a Country. — 
 The pernicious tendency of fluctuation in the value 
 of money is generally admitted, but that of a ge- 
 neral rise of prices is less understood : it is even 
 the notion of a number of writers, and of a still 
 greater number of practical men, that taxation, 
 though a great cause of enhancement, is productive 
 of no injury in a public sense, because the money 
 thus collected is almost all expended at home. 
 This idea has induced the writer already men- 
 tioned (Mr. S. Gray), whose views, sound and 
 liberal in several respects, are in others greatly im- 
 paired by over-confidence, to give our national 
 debt the convenient name of " public service ca- 
 ])ital." " The payment of the interest is,** says 
 Mr. Gray, in the work entitled, * All Classes pro- 
 ductive of National Wealth,* (p. 13G.) " no dis- 
 advantage : the public is just where it was before : 
 they have had thirty millions charged on them, for 
 the interest of the national debt, and they have 
 charged thirty millions in return.'* — All this might 
 be true were the British Islands a distinct })lanet, 
 or were they separated from the rest of the world 
 by a " wall of brass ten thousand cubits high : '* 
 l)ut, doomed as we are to intercourse with our con- 
 tinental brethren, does not an excess of taxation 
 place us under a great relati\e tlisad\antage in a 
 
 1-^ 3
 
 JO General Rise uf Prices 
 
 competition witli foreign nuinufacturers ? And, 
 before the liill in our corn market, was it not to 
 be apprehended, tliat our capitalists might transfer 
 to less burdened countries, tliat money, that ma- 
 chinery, and, in part, those hands, which have so 
 eflTectually conduced to make us support our finan- 
 cial pressure? 
 
 A writer of great notoriety, without carrying 
 his doctrine so far as Mr. Gray, expresses, in more 
 places than one, an opinion that high taxation im- 
 poses on us no disadvantage relatively to our neigh- 
 bours, or, to use his own words, that *' a generally 
 high })rice of commodities in consequence of tax- 
 ation would be of no disadvantage to a state." * 
 This opinion Mr. Ilicardo repeats in another pas- 
 sage (p. 305.) where he says, that the " amount of 
 taxes and the increased price of labour in a coun- 
 try does not, according to his ideas, place it under 
 any other disadvantage with respect to foreign 
 countries, except the unavoidable one of paying 
 these taxes.'* But he soon after makes a highly 
 important qualification, by admitting that these 
 charges render it the interest of every contributor 
 to " withdraw his shoulder from the burden, and, 
 in many cases, to remove himself and liis capital to 
 another country ;" a course replete with the most 
 injurious results. 
 
 Were we to suppose, for the sake of illustration, 
 that the whole of the civihzed world, the whole of 
 the states who carry on a commercial intercourse 
 with each other, were simultaneously involved in 
 war, and obliged to impose on themselves burdens 
 which bear the same proportion to the taxable 
 income of each : — the consequence would be a 
 
 * Ilicardo on Political Econoiuy, 2d edition, p. 283.
 
 during the War. 71 
 
 concurrent and uniform rise of prices ; and a con- 
 test, after lasting twenty years, miglit terminate 
 without any relative disadvantage to any of the 
 belligerents, as far as regarded thek finances, or 
 the state of their productive labour. But in every 
 war there are certain states, whose rulers have the 
 prudence to avoid participating in the unprofitable 
 struggle, and who secure to their subjects the ad- 
 vantages of neutrality, along with an exemption 
 from the burdens entailed on their neighbours. 
 Such, in the present age, was the case of Denmark 
 until I8O7 : such also was, for a time, the case of 
 Sweden, Prussia, and, above all, of the United States 
 of America. 
 
 Holland, a country particularly inclined to a 
 pacific policy, has, firom her geographical position, 
 been unavoidably involved in most of the great 
 contests which have taken place since she became 
 a power, so that, during the last two centuries, her 
 history exhibits hardly any period of exemption 
 from them, except in the war of 1756. We, whe- 
 ther from the necessity or belligerent ardour, have 
 so seldom enjoyed the blessing of neutrality, that 
 to trace it in our history, we are obliged to reciu" 
 to the reign of James I., who, whatever might be 
 his weakness in other respects, stedfastly maintained 
 peace amidst the convulsions of Germany, the dis- 
 sensions of France, the prolonged hostilities of 
 Spain and Holland. A striking illustration, not 
 indeed of neutrality, but of that prudent mode of 
 warfare which secures national independence, with- 
 out aiming at foreign acquisitions, is to be found 
 in the troubled reign of Elizabeth, and the wise 
 administration of Cecil. How different would have 
 been our situation in regard to pubUc burdens, had 
 
 1- 4
 
 7'i (itiural Rise ()f' Prices (luring I lie War. 
 
 tlie reins of «;ovcrnmcnt \\\ the ])rcsent age been 
 held by such experienced hands ! 
 
 Elfi'cl of the Rise of Prices on our Finances. 
 — This rise, hke all artificial clianges, was pro- 
 iluctive of little j)ermanent eHect : it increased 
 the numerical amount of the revenue, but it was 
 ultimately followed by an equivalent loss in aug- 
 mented expenditure ; enhancing stores, salaries, 
 the pay of the army and navy, in short, almost every 
 object of government disburse. Unluckily, the 
 amount of our loans was greatest at the time that 
 money was of the least value. If we calculate 
 the debt contracted since 1792 at 460,000,000/., 
 and divide the period with reference to the value 
 of money, we shall find that the smaller part of this 
 debt was incurred when money was more valuable 
 than at present, the larger when money was more 
 depreciated. Since the cessation of war, money has 
 risen progressively in value, and the interest of our 
 debt, without augmenting in amount, has increased 
 in pressure to a degree which, coupled with the 
 evils of sudden transition, has unfortunately borne 
 hard on the majority of the public.
 
 73 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Our Currcnc}) and Exchanges since 1 792. 
 
 Having now traced the fluctuation in the price 
 of commodities during the last thirty years, we 
 proceed to a topic closely connected with it, the 
 variations in our continental exchanges. In this, 
 one of our chief objects will be to describe the 
 operation of our subsidies, and of our purchases, 
 occasionally to a great amount, of foreign corn; 
 these being the causes which mainly affect our 
 exchanges, and are productive of great and rapid 
 fluctuation. They are, in general, demands both 
 of large amount, and of sudden occurrence, super- 
 added to our customary disburse, and requiring to 
 be paid before time can be given to our merchants 
 and manufacturers to prepare and send abroad 
 an equivalent amount in commodities. This chap- 
 ter will accordingly comprise, 
 
 A historical sketch of our continental ex- 
 changes ; 
 
 The eflects of the exemption of the Bank from 
 cash payments ; and 
 
 The questions of depreciation and over-issue. 
 
 Historical Sketch of our Excf/angoi. 
 
 From 17D'2 /o 1707.— In the lir^t year of the 
 war, our participation iu the contest produced 
 little eliect ou the exchange, in consequence ot
 
 74 Our Currcncjj and Exchanges. 
 
 our aitl hein*^ liirnished less in money tlian in 
 troops iuul military stores. Next siimmei- (I7fjl') 
 a sudden depression was produced Ijy the remit- 
 tances commenced for the Prussian sul)sidy; but 
 it ceased as soon as it became known that that 
 ])ower, a far less zealous ally in those days than 
 subsequently, was not likely to fulfil its engage- 
 ments. In 1795, circumstances became very 
 different : oiu- troops had been withdrawn from 
 the Continent, our contribution to the allied cause 
 was made, in a great measure, in money, and an 
 unfortunate deficiency in our harvest, forced us 
 to make large importations of corn. A balance 
 from commercial payments began thus to be added 
 to the remittances of government, and the result 
 was a considerable fall in the exchange ; money 
 in England becoming inferior in value by five per 
 cent, to the money of the Continent. This dif- 
 ference was of serious moment to the Bank, and 
 obliged them to limit greatly the discount of 
 mercantile bills, under an apprehension that the 
 notes issued for such discount would be presented 
 at the Bank for specie, and the latter exported to 
 the Continent. Of the distress caused to mer- 
 chants by this limitation, those only can judge 
 who witnessed the pecuniary difficulties of 1795 
 an4 179^^ or who have had access to read in the 
 parliamentary papers the anxious correspondence 
 of that date between Mr. Pitt and the Bank di- 
 rectors. At one time (November, 1795) the price 
 of gold, when purchased with Bank notes, had 
 risen to eight per cent, above its value in coin, 
 and necessitated a farther and most distressing 
 reduction of Bank paper. In the autumn of 1796, 
 a better harvest delivered us from one cause of 
 drain ; but towards the end of that year, and the
 
 Our Currencij and Exchanges. 75 
 
 beginning of 1797» distrust and alarm were re- 
 newed by a threatened invasion from France. The 
 failure of several country banks having unluckily 
 occurred at that critical moment, tlie consequence 
 was a run on other country banks, and a great de- 
 mand for gold from the Bank of England. In vain 
 did the Directors resort to their hitherto unfailing 
 expedient, a reduction of the quantity of their notes: 
 the evil was new and peculiar ; the drain conti- 
 nued without a prospect of abatement, when, after 
 bringing down their circulation to nearly 8, (iOO, 000/. 
 and communicating their situation to ministers, the 
 Directors received, on the 25th February, 1797, 
 the well-known injunction from the Privy Council, 
 to suspend all farther payments in cash. 
 
 This order, limited at first to a few weeks, was 
 soon after prolonged to the end ofthe current session 
 of parliament, and eventually to the opening of the 
 succeeding session. In the interval, circumstances 
 became more favourable, corn was abundant, our 
 continental subsidies drew to a close, our exports 
 of merchandize were large, the exchange rose, and 
 specie flowed into the country from causes very 
 similar to those which had lately made it flow out. 
 The bank was now in a state to resume cash })ay- 
 ments; but parliament, finding that no >incon- 
 venience had resulted from the suspension, deter- 
 mined to adhere to it, and passed resolutions 
 which made exemption from cash payments be con- 
 sidered our settled policy during the remainder of 
 the war. 
 
 From \l^.)'-i to 1802. — The year 1708 was more 
 than usually pros})erous, l)eing marked by a favour- 
 able season at home, an exemption from the bur- 
 den of subsidies abroad, and distinguished success
 
 70 Our Cunrnci/ and E^rclum^cs. 
 
 in our n:i\ al operations. Confidence bein*^ now re- 
 stored, money became more rapid of circulation 
 and comparatively plentiful, while our exclian^es 
 with the Continent experienced no full, althou<;h 
 our bank pai)er was no longer convertible into cash, 
 ■^riie succeeding year, however, ])resented a very 
 iliflerent spectacle : Austria, encouraged by a Bri- 
 tish subsidy and the co-operation of Russia, took 
 the field against France, and hardly did intelligence 
 arrive of the formation of this second coalition, and 
 of an engagement for a double subsidy, when our 
 exchanges began to bear the mark of rapid declen- 
 sion. The summer of 1799 was wet, and it unfor- 
 tunately happened, as in 1796, that large purchases 
 of corn were necessary at the time of the greatest 
 pressure of foreign expenditure. Such continued 
 our situation during the summer and autumn of 
 
 1800, when the successes of Bonaparte in Italy, 
 and of Moreau in Germany, brought our subsidies 
 to a close. Relief would now have been felt, had 
 not the calamity of a deficient harvest taken place 
 in 1800, and raised the price of corn during that 
 and the following year to an unexampled height. 
 The total value of our corn imports during 1800, 
 
 1801, and part of 1802, was declared in evidence 
 before a parliamentary committee to be no less than 
 15,000,000/. sterling. 
 
 Of all the trials our money system had yet expe- 
 rienced, this was the most severe ; and it was ac- 
 cordingly in 1800, that the effects of the non-con- 
 vertibility of our bank paper became distinctly 
 visible in the state of our exchanges. The wants 
 of the merchants drove them to the bank for dis- 
 counts, and their demands were supplied with a 
 confidence which the Directors would not have ven- 
 tured to exercise, had they been liable to pay in
 
 Our Currency and Edrlianges. 77 
 
 specie. This accommodation, thougli far from be- 
 neficial in its remote consequences, served at the 
 time to lessen to the public the evils arising from 
 the fall of the exchange, and the subsequent depre- 
 ciation of our paper (between three and five j)ei 
 cent.) was hardly perceived, either by us or by 
 foreigners. The charge most open to observation 
 was in the materials of our currency : our guineas 
 had now, for the most part, gone abroad, and our 
 small-note circulation, insignificant during 1797, 
 179s, and part of 1799, became augmented in 
 1800, 1801, and 1802, to four millions, exclusive of 
 the small notes of our provincial banks. 
 
 From 1803 to 1808. — The peace of Amiens was 
 too short to admit of the repeal of the Restriction 
 Act, and on the renewal of war, all idea of re))eal 
 was relinquished, a continuance of the sus})ension 
 being considered an essential part of our })()hcy. 
 Unattended by continental subsidies, or by the ne- 
 cessity of corn imports, the years 1803, 1801<, and 
 part of 1805, passed over without pecuniary pres- 
 sure ; and when, in the hitter part of 1805, the 
 formation of a new coalition produced a sudden 
 revolution in the exchange, its duration was mo- 
 mentary, for the day of Austerlitz, so disastrous in 
 other respects, dispelled the cloud that was gatlier- 
 ing over our financial horizon, and showed in the 
 distance the suspension of our continental remit- 
 tances. Next year, war ensued between Prussia 
 and France, but that contest took place at a time 
 when we had a ministry (the Whigs and Grcnvilles) 
 sparing in their advances to our continental allies : 
 the exchange was not seriously affected, and after 
 the peace of Tilsit (July I8O7) began \isibly to re- 
 cover.
 
 78 0//r CinTcncij (nid Karliangcs. 
 
 Four years of the war luul tliiis ])assc(l without 
 any material inconvenience from the non-converti- 
 bihty of our bank })aj)er, ami its depreciation, still 
 unknown to the j)ublic, had been but partially in- 
 jurious. We are now, liowever, arrived at a difl'er- 
 ent iura ; a period when our hatred of Bonaparte, 
 the confidence inspired by our decisive superiority 
 at sea, and the influence of enthusiastic counsellors 
 at home, made us forget calmer considerations, and 
 join in a general call for a " system of vigour." 
 The sufferings of several great branches of our 
 commerce; the stagnation of our East India trade; 
 the progressive sinking of West India property ; 
 the diminished profit of ship owning; — misfortunes 
 arising chiefly from heavy taxes and increased 
 charges, were ascribed by many of the distressed 
 parties to the competition of the Americans. Com- 
 mercial jealousies have never been inactive : the 
 American navigators had become in our eyes, what 
 the Dutch had been in those of our ancestors un- 
 der Cromwell and Charles II. ; and our merchants 
 liad no great difficulty in persuading a ministry, 
 elated with our success at Copenhagen, and little 
 versed in the sources of national w ealth, that when 
 neutral navigation should be controlled, the Conti- 
 nent must di'aw its supplies through the mediimi of 
 Eniiland. Hence our Orders in council of Novem- 
 ber, 1807, orders issued with so much ardour, with 
 such confidence of a fa\ourable residt, that our 
 government paid no attention to the singular fact, 
 that the intercourse they were so anxious to control, 
 was, in the opinion of our enemies, highly advan- 
 tageous to us ; for Bonaparte had, almost at the 
 same moment, intimated to the American ambassa- 
 dor at Paris, his intention to prohibit it, declaring 
 that " all maritime commerce tolerated on the Con-
 
 Our Currency and Exchanges. 79 
 
 tinent, whether through Americans or others, must 
 turn to the advantaoe of" England." These re- 
 markable measures, joined to an embargo adopted 
 by the American government, produced an almost 
 complete suspension of intercourse between the 
 United States and Europe, during 1808; the first 
 time that such had been the case during twenty- 
 five years. 
 
 Our stoppage of the American navigation is, 
 we believe, the greatest error on record in mercan- 
 tile history. Our trade with that country which, 
 on the acknowledgment of its independence in 
 1783, we considered as wrested from our grasp, 
 had proceeded in a i^atio of continued increase, 
 affording both advantage to the parties engaged, 
 and the most gratifying lessons to those who, 
 studying in the closet the sources of national pros- 
 perity, are enabled to discover how often the real are 
 at variance with the apparent causes. This increase 
 showed first that political and even national antipa- 
 thies do not impede commerce between indi\ iduals, 
 and that it is perfectly practicable to reap benefit 
 from countries that were once our colonies, without 
 the charge of defending them. It showed further 
 the still more important truth, that *' the greater 
 the freedom of the trade of the Americans, the 
 more active their intercourse with France, Holland, 
 and other countries, the greater was the advantage 
 arising to us." 
 
 In what manner, it may be asked, did it produce 
 that result; a result so contrary to the tenets of 
 the mercantile theory and of the colonial system, 
 not of this country only, but of all Europe ? From 
 a cause of which the explanation, at first somewhat 
 complicated, becomes, when examineil, sufficicntiv 
 easy and convincing — the iucreasc of American
 
 so Oi/r Ciirroicij and Ka:ch(mges. 
 
 capital consequent on unfettered trade, and the 
 ilireclion of a larger sliare of it to the purchase of 
 our manufactures. Our exports to tlic United 
 States amounted in 1805, 180fi, and I8O7, to the 
 very large sum of 11 or 12,000,000/. sterling, 
 while our im])orts from that country (Seybert's 
 Statistical Annals, pp. 137. 1-55.) did not exceed 
 7 or 8,000,000/. : the remainder (Baring on the 
 Orders in Council, p. 155.) was remitted to us in 
 money, or, what is the same thing, in bills of ex- 
 change from the Continent of Europe, being the 
 proceeds of tobacco, cotton, rice, and otlicr 
 American products sold there. The Continent, 
 feeble at that time in its stock of manufacture and 
 means of giving credit, could not supply the 
 Americans with merchandize equal to more than 
 half the articles which it imported from them ; 
 and the result was the transmission of the proceeds 
 to this country, a course which supplied us with 
 funds for our continental expenditure as regularly 
 as the packets crossed the narrow seas. Such was 
 the trade stopped by our Orders in Council; a 
 measure which, persisted in with blind pertinacity 
 from year to year, drove the Americans first to the 
 temporary expedient of an embargo, afterwards to 
 the establishment of manufactures in their own 
 country, and, eventually, to a declaration of war. 
 
 JP/ WW 1808 to 1814. — This stoppage, sufficient 
 of itself to produce a rapid fall in the exchange, 
 was unluckily coincident in point of time with a 
 heavy drain of money to Portugal and Spain, in 
 support of the contest with France. From the 
 Appendix to the Report of the Bullion Committee, 
 (p. 23^2.) it appears that nearl}- three millions ster- 
 ling were sent in specie to the Peninsula in 1808.
 
 Our Currencij and Ejrlicuige.s. 81 
 
 Next year neutral intercourse was, in a great 
 measure, resinned, and the hazard of pecuniary 
 embarrassment would have been less serious, had 
 we not unfortunately been visited by the other 
 great cause of pressure on our foreign exchanges, 
 a deficient harvest. It became intUspensable, 
 therefore, to import corn at an unfortunate mo- 
 ment; at a time when, from other causes, our 
 bank notes were at a depreciation of twelve or 
 fifteen ])er cent. And the sum paid to foreigners 
 for corn in 1810 being very large, cxceedhig (see 
 the return to Parhament in the following year) 
 seven millions sterling, our exchanges fell so as to 
 bring our bank paper more than twenty per cent, 
 below bullion. This fall took })lace some time 
 after the public attention had been drawn to the 
 subject by the Report of the Bullion Connniftee ; 
 and, great as it was, it would have been still 
 greater, had not the abundant harvest of 1810 
 come most oj)portunely to our relief. 
 
 The autumn of 1810 was the first season in which 
 the decrees of Bonaparte against our intercourse 
 with the Continent were actually carried into 
 effect. He had then brought his w^ar with Austria 
 to a close, secured himself by an alliance with 
 that power, and concei\ed, from the fall of our 
 bank paper and the multitude of our mercantile 
 failures, the hope that a vigorous enforcement of 
 his decrees would complete the measure of our 
 embarrassment. Hence, in the winter of 1810, 
 the general seizure of British shipping Id the 
 Prussian harbours ; hence also the ridiculous mea- 
 sure of burning quantities of our merchandize in 
 his sea-ports. 
 
 In 1811 our corn im])orts were inconsider- 
 able; but the operations of neutral conmioice 
 
 (i
 
 82 Our Cunenctf and EocchanffOi. 
 
 were much cramped, our remittances to the Penin- 
 sula were large, and our exchanges extremely 
 low. The same causes operated with increased 
 effect in 181^, the year that our discussions 
 with the United States unfortunately terminated in 
 war. Happily, towards the end of" tliat year, the 
 result of the Russian campaign opened a cheering 
 prospect in the political horizon ; but the result 
 was remote ; a great struggle was still necessary, 
 and the campaign of 1813 required exertions in 
 Spain, and aid to our allies in Germany, on a scale 
 of unparalleled magnitude. By this time our me- 
 tallic currency was exhausted, and the specie 
 bought up for the cause of the Continent, was 
 paid for by government in bank notes, at the 
 enormous premium of twenty-five or thirty per 
 cent. Such continued to be the difference between 
 paper and coin, until the overthrow of Bonaparte 
 in April, 1814,*after which the difference diminished 
 to ten, and even to eight per cent. His return 
 from Elba in 1815, and the vast preparations forth- 
 with made on the Continent by us and our allies, 
 again lowered the exchange to twenty, and even 
 twenty-five per cent. — a fall which, after his second 
 overthrow, disappeared with a rapidity that seemed 
 destined to exemplify the arguments of the anti- 
 bullionists ; of tliose who maintained that the de- 
 preciation of our notes arose not from over-issue, 
 but from continental demands.
 
 Oicr Currenaf and Exchanges. 
 
 83 
 
 Tabular Sketch of the principal Demands on our Currency for 
 Continental Subsidies ana Purchases of Corn since 1792. 
 
 Years. 
 
 1792. 
 1793. 
 
 1794. 
 
 Events Political and 
 Commercial. 
 
 Peace. 
 
 Great mercantile fail- 
 ures: limitation of our 
 paper currency. 
 
 Confidence reinstated. 
 
 1795. Subsidy to Austria. 
 
 1796. Subsidy continued, & an 
 
 importation of corn. 
 
 1797. Reduction of our paper 
 
 currency; great scar- 
 city of money. 
 
 (The Bank was exempted from cash 
 
 1798. Neither subsidy nor corn 
 
 import. 
 
 1799. Renewed subsidies fol- 
 
 lowed by a deficient 
 harvest. 
 
 1800. Continuation of subsidy 
 
 to Austria; great im- 
 portation of corn. 
 
 1801. Subsidy suspended, but 
 
 cornimport continued. 
 
 1802. Peace. 
 
 From 1802 No large importation of 
 to 1808. corn, except in the 
 
 summer of 1805; nor 
 any subsidy of mag- 
 nitude, except in the 
 autumn of that year. 
 From 1808 War in Portugal and 
 to 1814. Spain throughout the 
 
 whole period ; war in 
 Germany in 1809 ; 
 G ^ 
 
 State of our Exdumge 
 with the Continent. 
 
 A little above par. 
 A considerable rise in the 
 Exchange. 
 
 Exchange nearly as in 
 1792. 
 
 A fall at first small, after- 
 wards considerable. 
 
 Exchange continues very 
 low. 
 
 A considerable rise in the 
 exchange ; large im- 
 ports of specie. 
 
 payments in Feb. 1797.) 
 
 Exchange continues in 
 
 our favour. 
 Fall of the exchange 
 
 after Midsummer. 
 
 Continued depression. 
 
 Continued depression. 
 
 Exchange reinstated. 
 
 The exchange little af- 
 fected during these six 
 years, except in the 
 autumn and winter of 
 1805. 
 
 The fall in the exchange 
 great and permanent, 
 beginning at eight or 
 ten percent-increasing
 
 84. 
 
 Our ('uvrcnc}! and Eachamxcs. 
 
 Years. 
 
 1814. 
 
 1815. 
 
 Evt'iifs Poliliccal arnl 
 Commercial. 
 
 in Russia in 1812, and 
 in Germany & France 
 in 1813 and 1814. 
 Corn purchases to a 
 great amount in 1810. 
 The Americans ex- 
 cluded from inter- 
 course with the Con- 
 tinent after 1808, but 
 more particularly af- 
 ter 1810. 
 
 Peace after 1st April, 
 and a great increase in 
 the export of our mer- 
 chandize, but a con- 
 tinuance of remit- 
 tances for subsidies 
 and corn imports. 
 
 In April, May, June, 
 renewal of war. 
 
 In August and Septem- 
 ber, peace; cessation 
 of corn imports; re- 
 newal of American 
 intercourse. 
 1816. No subsidy or import of 
 corn. 
 1817. 1818. Large imports of corn. 
 
 From 1819 No import of corn or 
 to 1823. heavy continental 
 
 charge. 
 
 Stntc of our Excltange 
 with thf Continent. 
 
 to twelve, fifteen, twen- 
 ty-five, and eventually 
 to nearly thirty per 
 cent. 
 
 A considerable reinstate- 
 ment of the exchange, 
 leaving it from only 
 eight to ten per cent, 
 against England. 
 
 Fall of the exchange 
 twenty and twenty -five 
 per cent. 
 
 The exchange recovered 
 and brought first within 
 twelve per cent., after- 
 wards within five per 
 cent, of par. 
 
 Exchange nearly at par. 
 
 Exchange again lowered 
 three, four, five, and 
 eventually six percent. 
 
 Exchange recovers; rises 
 to par in 1820, and 
 has since continued 
 somewhat above par. 
 
 Distribution into Periods during the War. — The 
 years in the preceding table may be classed into 
 periods, each marked by distmct features. The 
 first, from 1793 to 1797, preceded the exemption
 
 Our Currency and Exchanges. 85 
 
 act : after that act came an interval of two years, 
 during which, from a concurrence of favourable 
 circumstances, the non-convertibility of our bank 
 paper was not productive of depreciation. A very 
 different scene was opened by the transactions of 
 the three years between the summer of 1799 and 
 that of 180^2; years of heavy continental demand 
 and of great pressure on the exchange. It was, 
 however, reinstated by the peace ; nor did it ex- 
 perience any pressure of magnitude or long con- 
 tinuance during the long interval tliat elapsed 
 from the autumn of 1802 to that of 1808. This 
 period of six years is perhaps the most remarkable 
 of the whole, exliibiting tlie possibility of carr}ing 
 on a war of great expence, without a material de- 
 rangement of our currency, so long as we left to 
 trade its free course, and abstained from great con- 
 tinental advances. It was, doubtless, this long 
 enjoyment of financial ease, this apparent stability 
 of our money system, that inspired our ministers 
 and bank directors witli over confidence, leading 
 tlie former to their unfortunate measures against 
 the American trade, and impressing the latter 
 (Evidence, Bulhon Report, pp. 89. 9(). 1 14.) with 
 tlie notion that their issues of paper had no effect 
 on the exchange. To the measures founded on 
 these views, and to the events noticed in the pre- 
 ceding table, is to be ascribed the depreciation 
 that prevailed during the last period of the war 
 — the five years from 1809 to 1814. 
 
 Total of our Corn Imports and Si//)sidics. — In 
 computing the former, it is lit to bear in mind that 
 we had become previously to 179i^, a corn import- 
 ing country, and that a certain quantity might be 
 termed our habitual supply; an import not affecting
 
 86 Our Currenci/ and Exchanges. 
 
 the exchaiii^e, but })iii(i hy a correspond ini^ export 
 of our produce or manufactures; our coals, our tin, 
 our hardware, our cottons. We dwell, therefore, 
 only on the years of scarcity and extra import, 
 which, during the war, were 179^, 1800, 1801, 
 180'-2, 1805, 1810. After deducting from our total 
 supply in these years our average annual im})ort, 
 there remains, as extra import, a quantity of which 
 the cost, in the six years collectively, was not short 
 of 25,000,000/. 
 
 Next as to the amount of our subsidies : 
 the total during twenty-one years, from 1793 
 to 1814, was between 50 and 60,000,000/., form- 
 ing with the corn purchases, an aggregate of 
 80,000,000/. Of this great sum, what proportion 
 was sent abroad in the shape of specie ? Of the 
 subsidies, the chief part was supplied in clothing, 
 arms, stores ; of our corn purchases, the larger 
 share was necessarily paid in money. If, without 
 attempting nicety of calculation, we assume the 
 export of specie for these purposes during the 
 whole war at 30,000,000/., we shall be at no loss 
 to account for the disappearance of our metallic 
 currency, and of such supplies of bullion as found 
 their way to this country. 
 
 Our E.Tchajiges since the Peace. — Since the 
 peace, the different periods, though less mark- 
 ed by extremes, have been equally deserving 
 of attention, as illustrative of our view^ of the 
 causes of fluctuation. In the autumn of 1814 
 our war charges ceased, our exports had free ac- 
 cess to the Continent, and the exchange altered 
 from twenty-five to ten, and even eight per cent, 
 only, against us : it would have risen farther, had 
 not our corn imports been large. But no sooner
 
 Our Currency and Exchanges. 87 
 
 did the return of Bonaparte from Elba revive 
 tlie alarm of war and subsidies, than the exchange 
 fell to eighteen, twenty, and twenty-tive per cent. ; 
 a depression from which it recovered as suddenly 
 after the battle of Waterloo, and the prospect of a 
 speedy })eace. During 181(i there was neither 
 corn import nor subsidy; the American trade with 
 the Continent was open, and the exchange returned 
 to par, at which it for some time remained ; but 
 the deficient harvest of that year necessitated in 
 181 7 corn imports on a very large scale, reduced 
 the exchange, and would have completely overset 
 it, had not all the coimteracting causes of free 
 trade been in operation. By their aid we were 
 enabled, during 1817, 1818, and tlie early part 
 of 1819, to pay for an unexampled amount of 
 foreign corn, (above 20,000,000/. as appears by 
 the Appendix to the Agricultural Report of 1821, 
 p. 396.) without a greater depreciation than four, 
 five, or six per cent. Since 1819, these drains 
 have ceased, and the exchange has been steadily 
 in our favour. 
 
 Our Bank Paper: — Contradictor}! Opinions on the 
 Subject. 
 
 We have now brought to a close our historical 
 sketch, and shall proceed to make some remarks 
 on the very opposite doctrines held in regard to 
 our* paper currency, by the adherents of ministry 
 and o])position ; or, to speak more correctly, by 
 the adversaries and supporters of the Bullion 
 Committee of 1810. The former are still un- 
 willing to admit the existence of depreciation in 
 our bank paper, even in the latter years of the 
 war : the latter equally unreasonable, refuse to 
 trace such depreciation to tiie extra demands made 
 
 G 4
 
 88 Our ( tirrcurij and Kdcliaji^u;cs. 
 
 on lis [\)\ siibsidii's and corn purcliast's, and insist 
 that it originatcil in over issue on the part otour 
 banks. A singular discre])ancy this, in a country 
 of free discussion, after the direction of so much 
 reasoning to the subject, and the hi})se of so many 
 years re})lete with commercial and political inform- 
 ation. 'J'his discrepancy implies, we apprehend, 
 more than the absence of impartiality : it gives 
 cause to suspect in one party, an inadequate know- 
 ledge of the })rinciples of productive industry ; in 
 the other, an insufficient attention to the evidence 
 of facts. 
 
 In attempting to point out the manner in which 
 both have deviated from impartial inquiry, and 
 exceeded the limits of fair inference, we shall 
 proceed as much as possible by a reference to 
 documents. We shall have little difficulty in de- 
 scribing the nature of our currency previous to 
 1797» initl the effect produced on it by sudden 
 drains for continental disburse: our more intricate 
 task will be to define the results of the exemption 
 act, the operation of which, has, from very dif- 
 ferent views, been considerably over-rated by each 
 party. The buUionists attribute to it the whole, 
 or nearly the whole, of the enhancement of com- 
 modities during the war ; while their opponents, 
 regarding it as no less potent in good, than theii' 
 antagonists in evil, are accustomed to speak of it 
 as almost the sole engine of our financial support. 
 Both sides forget that these effects are too great 
 for the cause, and that the exemption act was 
 coincident in point of time with a change in our 
 financial system, of still more powerful operation ; 
 we mean the increase of our war taxes and the 
 reduction of our loans.
 
 Our Cuvrencij and Ej:clianges. 81) 
 
 Our Money Sijutem jyrevious to 1797- — Tlie nature 
 of our money system will be best understood bv a 
 comparison with that of the neiglibouring coun- 
 tries. The amount of money circulating in France 
 was com])uted, or rather guessed by Necker at 
 80,000,000/. sterling ; the amount in England anil 
 Scotland, not ascertained with more certainty than 
 that of France, is supposed (Bank Committee Re- 
 port, May, 1819,) to be between 50 and 60,000,000/. 
 The currency of France is almost entirely metallic : 
 there are in that country no banks of ckcuhition, 
 except the bank of Paris, and none of its notes 
 being below 20/., paper forms a very small part of 
 the circulating medium. A foreigner may reside 
 many years in a provincial town in France without 
 seeing a bank note, and may occasionally hear the 
 natives speak of having seen them as of a cir<;um- 
 stance somewhat unusual and remarkable. France 
 is consequently prevented from saving interest on 
 40 or 50,000,000/. of metallic currency, the ])lace 
 of which, were the banking system general, might 
 be suj)plied by paper. The case of France is, in 
 a jrreat measure, that of the Continent at larire ; 
 while in this country, on the other hand, the saving 
 arising from bank paper has been enjoyed, in a 
 greater or less degree, for more than a century. 
 
 In what maimer was this saving accomplished 
 before the exemption from cash })ayments in 1797? 
 A bank of good character issued notes to an ex- 
 tent of four or five times the amount of the gold 
 kept in its coffers, a circulation of 100,000/. being 
 maintained in ordinary times without a greater re- 
 serve or dead fund than between 20, and 30,000/. 
 leaving above 7^,000/. to be vested in })roductive 
 securities, such as short-dated acceptances, ex- 
 chequer bills, or the public lunds, all possessing a
 
 90 Our Currenci) and Exchanges. 
 
 characfcristic indispensable to a banker, that of 
 speedy convertibibty into cash. Hence an income 
 to tlie banking-house of 2 or 3,000/. a-year arising 
 from perfectly fair sources ; its credit and the su- 
 perior convenience of paper to metallic currency. 
 This saving, considered in a general sense, was such 
 as to form a national object, England having, even 
 previous to the exemption act, economised the 
 interest on a sum probably exceeding 20,000,000/. 
 of its currency. 
 
 Such was the state of our money system in the 
 early years of the revohitionary war, when the con- 
 fident character of our ministers and the surpris- 
 ing exeiiions of France led to an unexampled 
 extension of our continental expenditure. It be- 
 came particularly heavy in 1795, and unfortunately 
 a deficient harvest in that year necessitated in 1796 
 large purchases of foreign corn, augmenting greatly 
 the demand on the bank for metallic currency : 
 hence a reduction of its chscounts to merchants, a 
 reluctance or rather inability to make the advances 
 required by government, and a general embarrass- 
 ment in the money-market. Under such circum- 
 stances, nothing could be more natural to all parties 
 than to look for relief in exempting the bank from 
 the necessity of paying cash for its notes ; a measure 
 that would enable it to continue its customary ac- 
 commodation to trade, while government should 
 meet the wants of our allies with our spare coin and 
 bullion. The experiment, however, was too bold 
 and noA-el to be adopted as a matter of choice ; it 
 was delayed imtil the continued call for guineas 
 in February 1797 left no other alternative. Its 
 adoption excited both surprise and distrust, but 
 was divested of a part of its alarming character by 
 the known solvency of the bank ; and the acknow-
 
 Our Currencij and Exchanges. |jl 
 
 ledged discretion of those to whom the new pri- 
 vilege was to be entrusted. A farther source 
 of" confidence was afforded to the few who knew 
 the regukitions of the bank, by tlie fact that the 
 personal interest of a director is very slightly 
 promoted by an increase of the income of the 
 establishment. 
 
 Effects of tlie Restriction Act. — This decisive 
 measure, which ought rather to be called an ex- 
 emption than a restriction act, was limited at first 
 to a few months, and the exchange being favourable 
 during 1797> the bank made ample provision by the 
 autumn of that year for the resumption of cash 
 payments. But that step being deemed unneces- 
 sary by government, the exemption assumed the 
 character of a permanent war measure, and enabled 
 the bank to give a greater latitude to its accom- 
 modation both to merchants and the treasury. 
 What were the chief characteristics of our money 
 system in the succeeding years ? A relief from such 
 pecuniary difficulties as those of 1796 ; an increase 
 of our paper circulation, at first small, afterwards 
 considerable, and eventually very large. Next, in 
 regard to the value of our notes compared to coin 
 or bullion, there was, after 1799, a fall (about four 
 per cent.) in the value of our notes, whicli long- 
 remained uniform, but was followed, after 1809, by 
 a new and much greater fall. Lastly, the general 
 rise in prices, though it in part preceded the exemp- 
 tion act, and originated consequently in other causes, 
 continued during the whole period of the non-con- 
 vertibility of our bank notes, and became greatest 
 during their greatest depreciation. 
 
 These facts are admitted by all parties ; the 
 difficulty is in tracing them to theij- origin, and in
 
 92 Our Currency and Eixkanij^c'.s. 
 
 disrrimiiiatiMi,^ liow far the exemption act was or 
 was not instrumental in ))roducin^ tliem. 
 
 Opinion of the Bullion Committee. — TJie writers 
 of the BulHon Report, aware that the amount of 
 hank notes in circulation had been materially 
 increased, as well as that the scale of discounts 
 (Report, p. 26.) had been greatly enlarged, na- 
 turally became impressed with the idea of over- 
 issue, and ascribed to it almost exclusively the 
 great rise in our prices during the war. But this 
 opinion, when given in the unqualified terms 
 adopted by them and their supporters, is liable to 
 serious objections. First, the amount of Bank of 
 England notes in circulation affords, as we have 
 more fully shown in the Appendix, no satisfactory 
 criterion for estimating the increase of our whole 
 circulating mediimi, as part of the bank paper may 
 be a substitute for coin sent abroad. In the next 
 place, the means possessed by the Bullion Com- 
 mittee of appreciating the effect of the various 
 other causes of enhancement were very limited : 
 no evidence W'as given as to the rise of prices prior 
 to the exemption act ; no reasoning attempted in 
 retrard to the effect of war in this auo-mentatiori. 
 Neither the framers of the Report, nor those who 
 wrote and s])oke most confidently on the subject, 
 possessed an accurate knowledge of the increase of 
 our productive industry consequent on the w^ar, or 
 even of the increase of our population. Had Mr. 
 Horner or Mr. Huskisson been aware of these vital 
 truths, — had they know n how^ materially prices 
 were affected by causes altogether distinct from 
 our paper currency, such as the demand for men 
 for the public service, and the insufficiency of our 
 growth of corn to our consumption, the conclu-
 
 Our Currenci/ and luvchangcs. \}S 
 
 sions of the Report would have l)een materially 
 different. The various facts and arguments ad- 
 duced in our ])reeeding ciiapters, show liow large 
 an addition to our currency was indispensable to 
 transact our extended business, to correspond 
 with our augmented prices. And when to this is 
 added a reason, different in its nature, but equal in 
 its operation — the inducement after 1799 to export 
 our metallic currency to the Continent, we shall 
 find ample means of accounting for a fact which 
 we admit to be at first calculated to excite surprise, 
 the increase of our bank paper. 
 
 What then were the results distinctly attribut- 
 able to the exemption act ; and, in the first place, 
 what was its effect on the rules followed by the 
 Bank of England in regard to discounts ? Its effect 
 was highly beneficial to that Corporation : the 
 Directors were relieved by it from the necessity of 
 watching continental exchanges, from the appre- 
 hension of a drain of metallic currency on the 
 a])proach of a subsidy, or a large import of corn ; 
 the rules of discount became greatly simplified, 
 and, after some years, the Directors considered 
 themselves at liberty to issue notes to whoever 
 tendered bills possessing the requisite of solidity, 
 and the less easily ascertained characteristic of 
 being for a bondjide transaction. 
 
 Countrij Banks. — In regard to these, the })rovi- 
 sion made by the act, if not properly an exemption, 
 was an accommodation of great importance. They 
 were relieved fi-om the necessity of paying cash if 
 they tendered Bank of Kngland notes, a supply of 
 which was attainable (Evick^nce of Mr. Baring before 
 the Committees on Cash Payments) without the 
 uncertainty and loss so frequently attendant on the
 
 94 Our Currency/ (tnd Kacluai^cs. 
 
 acquisition of coin. A stock of notes could be 
 procured at very short notice in exchange for the 
 mercantile acceptances or other securities in which 
 the funds of country banks are generally vested ; 
 and the latter, thus relieved from much expense 
 and anxiety, were enabled to lessen greatly tlieir 
 reserve fund, and consequently to extend their 
 discounts. 
 
 Such were the effects of the act in regard to 
 banks : to the public the principal result was a re- 
 lief from scarcity of money. 
 
 \i\ for the sake of calculation, we assume that 
 in 179^^ the total bank paper in circulation in the 
 kingdom was 2.5,000,000/., and that 7,000,000/. of 
 coin were kept in depot, we may safely infer that 
 _of those 7>CKX),000/. two-thirds became in the 
 course of a few years, disposable for the purpose 
 of discount. Now, if from the rapidity of our 
 transfers, a million of money suffice to circidate 
 merchandize to the value of twenty or thirty mil- 
 lions, the change, arising from the addition of four 
 or five millions to our currency, could not be 
 other\vise than great in its degree, and extensive in 
 its operation. Continental demands arose in 1799, 
 and were carried during three years to an unex- 
 ampled height : these the exemption act enabled 
 us to meet by sending abroad our coin, exempting 
 us, not indeed from a depreciation of our currency, 
 but from pecuniary sti^aits. 
 
 The act had another, though as yet unnoticed 
 result — that of counteracthig the tendency of our 
 public loans to raise the rate of interest. What, 
 it may be asked, was the current or average rate of 
 interest previous to 1793 ? If we form our comput- 
 ation, not on the price of stocks, which from arti- 
 
 9
 
 Our Currency and Eo'changes. \)5 
 
 ficial causes fluctuated greatly, but on the general 
 transactions of merchants, bankers, and capitalists, 
 we shall find it to have been between four and five 
 per cent. ; and if we apply a similar mode of cal- 
 culation to the war, we shall have reason to fix the 
 average rate of interest between five and six per 
 cent., the charge of commission, and other small 
 additions familiar to persons in business (Evidence 
 to the Bullion Repoit, p. 124.) accounting for the 
 excess above the statutory limit. The effect of a 
 war, the most expensive ever waged, was therefore 
 to raise interest only one per cent. ; an effect evi- 
 dently disproportioned to the unexampled calls 
 made on oiu' national capital, and the cause of 
 which is, doubtless, in a great measure to be sought 
 in the reduction of the charge of banking conse- 
 quent on the exemption act. 
 
 The Question of Depreciation and Over -issue. — 
 We are now arrived at the most important ques- 
 tion in the history of our currency ; a question 
 in which the advocates of the Bank and those of 
 the Bullion Committee are directly at variance. 
 The former maintain that the public possessed, 
 after 1797? the same power of limitation as before, 
 Both in withholding bills for discount, and in pay- 
 ing over their notes to the Treasury, an absorbent 
 to the extent of 1 or 2,000,000/. a week. Their 
 antagonists, without denying this, which in fact 
 cannot be controverted, appeal to the state of the 
 bullion market in the latter years of the war ; to 
 the acknowledged inferiority of bank notes ; and 
 to the formidable argument, that a contraction of 
 the amount in circulation would, at any time, have 
 raised their value, and, if" carried sufficiently far, 
 have brought them on a par with coin.
 
 96 '-i'lfc Question uj 
 
 Such was the substance of tlie reasoiiiiii^ ad- 
 duced in the various speeches and publications on 
 tliis subject in 1810 and 1811 : such are still, in a 
 great measure, the tenets of the adverse parties ; 
 each interpreting, in conformity with their own 
 theory, the fluctuations that have occurred since 
 the peace. No si)eaker in parliament, no writer 
 on trade or finance has, as far as we are aware, 
 endeavoured to reconcile arguments at present so 
 strongly in contradiction, or sougiit a solution of 
 the problem, while he admitted the substance of 
 the allegations on either side. Tliis we shall now 
 attempt, and as we enter on the discussion with an 
 advantage unknown to our predecessors, — the evi- 
 dence supplied by several years of peace, — we are 
 not without hopes of conducting our readers to a 
 satisfactory conclusion, if they will summon patience 
 to accompany us thiough an enquiry which can 
 hardly fail to be both long and intricate. If the 
 narrators of military events, wlien entering on the 
 relation of complicated movements, deem it neces- 
 sary to make a demand of patient attention on the 
 part of their readers, much more is such a warning 
 required when we venture on a question which has 
 been a source of perplexity to the public for a 
 number of years. 
 
 Difference bctxveen an Increase of Bank Paper and 
 an Increase of Metallic Currency. — The ease with 
 which bank notes are struck ofl| and tlie apparent 
 ease with which they are circulated, impressed the 
 public, long before the late wars, with a notion, 
 that banking operated like mining; and the ge- 
 neral rise of prices that took place atler 17<34, was, 
 by many, ascribed to that cause. Fortunately, 
 Dr. Smith was then alive to combat prejudice in
 
 Depreciation and Ovcr-issne. 97 
 
 the people, or error in their rulers : he undeceived 
 the puhhc in this important j)oint, and showed 
 (Wealth of Nations, Book II. Chap. II.) tluit bank 
 notes formed not an addition to the circnlatino' 
 medium of a country, but a substitution for coin 
 sent abroad. An increase of coin and an increase 
 of bank paper have this radical difference ; the 
 former tends to lower the value of money through- 
 out the world at large, by bringing forward gold 
 and silver, conniiodities of undoubted acceptance 
 and universal circulation, while a bank produces 
 an article current only in a particular country. 
 These countries are, as yet, of very limited extent, 
 paper money being hardly known in France or 
 Holland ; while in the rest of Europe the expe- 
 rience of its effects during the present age is not 
 at all of a nature to extend its circulation. 
 
 Wliat, it may be asked, are the causes which 
 limit the supply of gold and silver from the mines? 
 Is it a monopolizing spirit on the part of any 
 government or association, a deficiency of metallic 
 ore, or a limitation in the demand of the public 
 for either plate or currency ? To this we answer, 
 that the mines are open to undertakers of any 
 nation ; that the demand, whether for plate or cur- 
 rency, is unlimited ; and that as to the quantity of 
 ore, it is not probable that one hundredth part of 
 that which is in existence has yet been ex])lored. 
 The difficulty lies in the expence of mining; for 
 were the machinery and labour thus employed, to 
 be rendered more effectual or less expensive, we 
 should soon see an increase in the quantity of the 
 precious metals extracted and brought to market. 
 How far does a similar reasoning apply to banks ? 
 They, like mines, are subjected to a limitation 
 arising from expence (in salaries, rent, stamps, and 
 
 II
 
 5)8 The (Question of 
 
 the other cliargcs of an establishment); but they 
 have a more formidable Hmitation in the hazard at- 
 tendant on over-issue, a hazard which may consist 
 either in the discount of doubtful bills, or in the 
 losses, less sudden, but eventually as serious, which 
 are inseparable from an attempt to force paper on 
 the public. How imperiously tliese obstacles impede 
 circulation, — liow effectually they confine a new 
 establishment within narrow limits, is well known 
 to all who have endeavoured to overcome them. 
 
 So far we are likely to have the assent of our 
 readers, whether bullionists or advocates of the 
 bank; uor need we enter on any argument to show 
 that the issue of bank paper adds but slightly to the 
 general stock of currency, so long as such paper is 
 demandable in cash. But when exemption prevails, 
 the case appears very diflerent, and requires a close 
 and attentive investigation. 
 
 Discounts — Increase of their Amount during the 
 War. — Of the great increase during the war in the 
 issues of bank paper for discounts, there can be 
 no doubt, recorded as it is in the books of the 
 Bank of England, and, we might add, in those of 
 almost every provincial bank in tlie kingdom. On 
 this the supporters of the Bullion Committee found 
 their grand argument for the charge of over-issue, 
 but in their eagerness to attain a favourite result, 
 they overlook several material considerations. 
 
 1. The increase of our population between the 
 years 1797 and 1810 (15 per cent.), was necessa- 
 rily productive of a certain addition to the quantity 
 of our bank paper ; an addition sufficient to balance 
 the saving arising from economy in the use of notes. 
 
 2. A farther and more powerfid cause is to be 
 sought in the activity arising out of a state of war, 
 a state which, by holding forth the prospect of large 
 eventual profits, naturally induced individuals to
 
 Deprecialinn and (hrr-issue. 99 
 
 trade beyond their capital. Hence that multipli- 
 cation of bills, promissory notes, and other expe- 
 dients for raising money, so well known to those 
 who have marked the course of mercantile affairs 
 during the present age, and so clearly described in 
 the evidence (p. 1^24.) appended to the Bullion 
 Report. At that time tiie great object of a man 
 engaged in business, whether as merchant, manu- 
 iactiu'er, or farmer, was to gain time by putting off 
 a payment until he had accomplished a sale, or 
 otherwise realised an advantage in prospect. But 
 in a season of peace, business is comparatively 
 stationary. Our currency is adequate to our trans- 
 actions ; bills are less numerous, and })ayments in 
 ready money or at short dates far more frequent. * 
 
 3. Add, farther, that in a state of war, the rise 
 of price proceeding from the various circumstances 
 enumerated in tlie j)receding chapter, (augmented 
 taxation, enhancement of labour, insufficiency of 
 our growth of corn), made a larger sum requi- 
 site to circulate the same commodities. 
 
 Yet here we must add a remark which we 
 do not recollect to have seen advanced by any 
 writer or speaker on the subject, \\z. that an 
 increase of discounts is likely to tend as much to 
 lower as to raise prices. The advances of that 
 nature during the war were made to classes strictly 
 ])roductive, and were evidently instrumental in 
 increasing the (piantity of our farming produce and 
 manufactures. If the dearness of our fanning pro- 
 duce was owing to the insufficiency of our growth, 
 what could conduce more to retard the progress of 
 enhancement, tlum to give our agriculturists the 
 means of increasing their supply ? 
 
 * Tooke on High and Low Prices. Part I. pp. 87. d sey. 
 H J2
 
 HH) "Flic Question uf 
 
 All tliis may be readily aclmittcd, but it will be 
 urged that bankers were led by the exemption ac^t, 
 and by the flattering prospects of their customers 
 during the war, to make advances which, under 
 other circumstances, they would have withheld. 
 They were, we believe, very often persuaded to 
 discount bills which were never paid, and occasion- 
 ally to depart from their proper province by making 
 advances on such securities as land or houses. The 
 Bank of England, in like manner, dispensed on 
 various occasions with a rule to which they would 
 otherwise have strictly adhered ; we mean the con- 
 viction that the bills tendered for discount had been 
 drawn for real or Inmd Jide transactions. Such 
 relaxation probably proceeded from commendable 
 motives : from a wish to prevent the extension of 
 bankruptcies in manufacturing towns, in particular 
 Glasgow or Manchester, at seasons when a fall of 
 prices, or the failure of some eminent house 
 threatened to involve in insolvency hundreds of 
 persons engaged in trade with inadequate capital. 
 We admit, however, that on such occasions the 
 bank directors went beyond their province, and 
 that the results were, in general, either unavailing 
 or unfortunate, consisting in a loss to the Bank, or 
 in a fruitless postponement of bankruptcy to the 
 trader. But these advances could have very little 
 tendency either to overcharge currency, or raise 
 prices. The notes issued, whether in town or 
 country, whether on good or bad security, soon 
 found their way into hands whose interest it was 
 to keep them as little time as possible ; and any 
 temporary over-issue was of short continuance. 
 
 Effect of the Eaemption Act on ow^ Currency. — 
 We must thus dissent from the assertion so often 
 urged since 1810, that the exemption from cash
 
 Depreciation and Ocer -issue. 101 
 
 payments gave bankers the power of overcharging 
 the currency, or, in other words, of causing a 
 direct rise of prices. But in regard to their power 
 in an indirect sense, we mean tlie power of issuing 
 money to meet a rise of prices proceeding from 
 other causes, such as increase of taxes or insuffi- 
 ciency in tlie supply of corn, we consitler the 
 question as very different, and are ready to make 
 a very ample admission. 
 
 So long as the currency of a country consists of 
 coin or of bank notes for which cash may be de- 
 manded of the issuer, the export of a large sum, 
 whether for military piu'poses, for a subsidy, or the 
 purchase of corn, is necessarily productive of a 
 scarcity of money at home. This was strikingly 
 exemplified in 1795 and \1[)i), and in such a case 
 the money price of commodities, far from rising, 
 is likely to be reduced in correspondence with the 
 reduction of the circulating medium. Had such 
 continued the case, the war, we may be assured, 
 would never have been popular. ]3ut under the 
 o])eration of the exemption act, circumstances were 
 altogether different ; the check of scarcity was re- 
 moved, money was to be obtained, as in peace, by 
 whoever was able to offer good bills payable at 
 short dates, and the amount of these was in a state 
 of progressive increase from the various causes re- 
 ca])itulated in the j)receding paragraph. 
 
 Having thus admitted the principle, the next 
 point is to estimate the extent of its operation. 
 And here, if we cannot agree with the Bulhonists 
 as to the nature of the power conferred on bankers 
 by the act of 1797» we shall, we doubt not, give 
 tiiem full satisfaction by our view of its results. 
 
 All ])arties admit the fact of an increase of cur- 
 rency during the war, but the bidlionists ascribe it 
 
 H 3
 
 lO'J The Qucalion of 
 
 to ;i direct ])ower on tlic ]);irt of bankers to over- 
 issue*, while we account that power strictly passive 
 and restricted in its duration to a state of war. 
 We consider it, liowe\'er, to liave been of very 
 coni])rehensive operation so long as it lasted, and 
 if wc arc asked in what manner its operation, if 
 temporary, proved so extensive; we answer, be- 
 cause it seems to have enabled bankers to meet a 
 rise of price by an increase of issue, ^from whatever 
 cause thai rise proceeded. What then was the re- 
 sult during the war? An increase of currency 
 in proportion to rise of price, whatever was the 
 cause that produced the rise ; whether taxes, scar- 
 city of corn, demand of men for government, or 
 the additional cost of articles purchased abroad. 
 
 Effect i in a political sense, of the Exemption from 
 Cash Payments. — The exemption act was in part 
 productive of, in part coincident wdth, a great 
 change in our financial situation — a change from 
 embarrassment to abundance, from a state of dis- 
 quietude to a state of confidence. The continuance 
 of the war, the subsidizing of foreign poAvers, was 
 no longer checked by pecuniary difficulties, and 
 our rulers w^ere induced to take several measures 
 less necessary for self-defence, and partaking more 
 of an aggressive character, than our countrymen in 
 general are aware of. Is it likely that, without 
 the confidence thus inspired, we should have formed 
 against France the coalitions of 1799 or 1805, or 
 that we should have commenced our second war 
 so early as 1803 ? If, on the one hand, the pos- 
 session of the Netherlands by France, and the rest- 
 less spirit of Bonaparte would, under any circimi- 
 stances, have prevented the enjoyment of tranquil- 
 lity, it is tit to add, on the other, that the scale of
 
 Depreciatioti and Over-issue. 103 
 
 expence on wliich the war was conducted, was 
 our own act, and attributable in a great degree, 
 to the exemption of our banks from cash pay- 
 ments. 
 
 Distinction between Depreciation of Batik Papery 
 
 and Diminution in the Value of Moneij generallij. 
 
 It is of importance to make a distinction in re- 
 gard to the operation of the exemption act before 
 and after I8O9. During the twelve years that fol- 
 lowed the suspension of cash payments in 1797, 
 our bank paper had given the greatest facilities to 
 government expenditure, without incurring any 
 depreciation of consequence, relatively to coin. 
 The average price of commodities had in this inter- 
 val experienced a great rise, (not less than -1-0 per 
 cent.), compared to their average price in 1792. 
 But as the causes of rise, (taxation, insufficiency of 
 provisions of home growth, demand of men for go- 
 vernment, &c.) were distinct or nearly distinct from 
 an inferiority of paper to coin, the proper term for 
 such rise of prices is not " depreciation of bank 
 paper," but " a diminution in the value of money.** 
 In 1809 began a rise of prices from an altogether 
 different cause ; a rise proceeding from our bank 
 paper not being j)ayable in coin, and from its being 
 ex})osed to a trial it was unable to bear. This 
 trial consisted in the concurrence of three remark- 
 able circumstances; the expence of the war in 
 Spain ; the necessity of purchases of corn ; and the 
 privation of remittances consequent on our unfor- 
 tunate stoppage of the American trade with the 
 continent of Europe. 
 
 Mode in rcliich Depreciation n-as incurred abroad. 
 — If we take, as an example, a campaign inthepeiiin- 
 sular war, and suppose that in a year, such as ISli 
 
 H 1-
 
 1(H 'I'hc (^iK'sdoti uj' 
 
 or LSI '2, ill which our c'X))t'mlitme tliere cxcet'detl 
 1 (),()()(),()()()/. there was suppUed to the extent of 
 nine-tenths in clothing, arms, stores, and specie, 
 exported from I'^ngland, leaving 1,000,000/. to be 
 defrayed by bills in our public offices ; in what 
 manner, we ask, could the receivers of these bills 
 in the Peninsula turn them to account? There 
 was not there, as in this country, an excise-office, 
 a custom-house, a receiver for the county, nor, 
 after the stoppage of the American trade, were 
 there merchants, to whom they could be trans- 
 ferred at par or at a slight discount. If remitted 
 to England, those bills could not purchase bullion ; 
 and if they procured English merchandize without 
 a perceptible loss, the quantity of such was beyond 
 the demand of the peninsular or any continental 
 market, limited as it was in these years by Bona- 
 parte*s anti-commercial decrees. The unavoidable 
 consequence w as a fall in the value of our bills, in 
 other words, of the bank notes in which these bills 
 were paid, exemplifying the doctrine of Dr. Smitli, 
 or rather the self-evident truth, that " whatever 
 causes delay the payment, or restrict the circulation 
 of a currency, necessarily produce depreciation, 
 the ratio of which must increase with the pressure 
 of these causes." 
 
 A similar reasoning was evidently applicable to 
 our continental subsidies as far as paid in monev. 
 It held also as to the purchase of foreign corn 
 whenever such purchases were of an amount to 
 surpass our export of merchandize. 
 
 The degree of such Depreciation. — Of the degree 
 of inferiority in our paper to the metallic currency 
 of the Continent, the only fit index was the rate of 
 cxcharigc ; and on referring to that impartial mo- 
 nitor, we shall find an ample confirmation of the
 
 Dejyreciation and Over-hsue. 105 
 
 preceding reasoning. The extent of fall during 
 the war differed regularly in different years accord- 
 ing to the amount of the demands of the Continent 
 on this country. Slight in years such as 1S03 and 
 1801<, when the war was merely maritime, it was 
 more considerable in the case of continental oper- 
 ations, as in 1805 and 1806 ; — serious, when to these 
 operations was joined, as in ISOO, the necessity of 
 corn purchases ; and greatest of all when, as in the 
 years following 1809, there existed the double drain 
 of subsidy and corn import, without either a me- 
 tallic currency, or a free neutral traffic to interpose 
 their countervailing effects. 
 
 Effect of high Prices abroad on Prices at home. — 
 Whatever enhances corn enhances labour, and 
 makes itself felt in almost every department of our 
 ])roductive industry. Now, after 1809 the quarter 
 of wheat rose from 80i\ to 100^. in consequence 
 chiefly of the fall of the exchange, of the necessity 
 of pa}ing in paper a fourth or a fifth more than 
 woidd have been required had not that paper been 
 depreciated. This rise, unfortunately so great in 
 corn, pre\^ailcd in other foreign connnodities ; in 
 timber, hem]), tallow, to which may be added a few 
 articles insignificant in amount, but illustrative of 
 our proposition, because they were wholly sup})lied 
 by the Continent, such as cork, antimony, and others, 
 the price of which rose rapidly after 1809. 
 
 How far were the effects of this enhancement 
 apparent in our hardware, cotton, antl woollens, 
 the cost of which was less directly affected by the 
 price of our imports ? The cost in English money 
 of Spanish wool and American cotton, doubtless, 
 rose in consequence of the fall of our pa|)er ; the 
 wages of our workmen had, likewisL', a tendency 
 to rise with liie price of corn. The finishetl
 
 10() The Question of 
 
 article was consequently enhanced, but as the 
 chan''es we have mentioned formed only a j)art of 
 tlic cost, the proportion of rise attributable to our 
 bank paper was not great in the case of our manu- 
 factures. 
 
 Extent of such Effect previous to 1809- — Having 
 now explained the mode in which our bank paper 
 affected the price of commodities, it remains to 
 ascertain the quantum of the enhancement thus 
 caused. And here when computing such by the rate 
 of exchange, it would evidently be unfair to draw 
 our inferences from a short interval, such as the 
 latter months of 180.5, when our exchanges were 
 depressed by a sudden continental demand : the 
 correct and impartial mode is to class the years of 
 the exemption by periods. If w^e begin with the 
 twelve years that elapsed from the earJy part of 
 1797 to that of 1809, we shall find that the infe- 
 riority of our bank notes to coin (see Mr. Mushet's 
 Tables and Mr. M'CuUoch's article on Moneij, in 
 Napier's Supplement to the Encyclop. Brit.) may 
 be reckoned, at an average of the whole period, 
 between three and five per cent. But as this infe- 
 riority refers to continental purposes, and as a 
 considerable interval elapsed before the depreci- 
 ation became so great in regard to payments at 
 home, it will suffice that we assume three per cent. 
 as the average rise in our prices, consequent on the 
 exemption act, until 1809. 
 
 The same after 1809. — After 1809 we enter 
 on a new a?ra ; our fin.ancial horizon became ob- 
 scured, and the tone of the calculator must be 
 altered. If after that year twenty-five per cent, 
 was the average depreciation of our bank notes 
 abroad, and if at home we make the same al-
 
 Depreciation and Over-issue. 107 
 
 lowance as before, an allowance founded on the 
 time which it takes to adjust prices generally to 
 an alteration in the value of a currency, particu- 
 larly where that alteration is not apparent, we shall 
 probably find Jifteen per cent, a fair representation 
 of the rise of prices, as far as caused by the non- 
 convertibility of our paper, during the five last years 
 of the war ; in other words, that llo/. of our bank 
 paper was required to make those purchases, or 
 transact that business for which 100^. of it would 
 have been sufficient, had there been no exemption 
 from cash payments. 
 
 Summary of the preceding. — If we proceed to 
 make a summary of the various facts connected 
 with our paper currency, and of the conclusions 
 they suggest, we shall find them nearly as follows : 
 
 In regard to Diminution in the Value of Money 
 generally ^distinct from the Fall of our Bank Paper. — 
 
 1. The exemption from cash payments was pro- 
 ductive of a sa\ ing to our banks peculiar to this 
 coinitry, and enabled them to make ad\ances at a 
 rate of interest lower than that of any other country 
 during the war. This had, in some measure, a 
 tendency to retard a rise of prices ; but 
 
 2. The exemption caused a very different result, in 
 as far as it relieved bankers from the necessity of 
 regulating their issues by the state of the exchange. 
 It may even be said to have given free sco])e to the 
 various causes of enhancement attendant on a state 
 of war. 
 
 Depreciation or inferiority of our Paper to Coi/i. 
 
 1. Our dependence on the Continent, and the 
 non-convertibility of our bank ])aper, were produc- 
 tive of its depreciation, particularly after 180'J; 
 but,
 
 108 '/'^"' (^ic'^liox '.'/' 
 
 <2. The c'flect of that depreciation on the |>rice of 
 coinnioditics, in other words, tlic rise of prices cou- 
 seciiient on tiie fall of our bank pa})er, does not 
 a])pear to have exceeded 15 per cent. 
 
 These conchisions will, we trust, be found to 
 give the question a definite form ; yet moderate as 
 our statement may a])pear to the reader, we liardly 
 expect it to receive a ready assent from either 
 ])arty, so perplexing is this enquiry, and so nuich 
 lias it been involved with other topics of discus- 
 sion. We shall accordingly proceed to make a few 
 animadversions on the favourite tenets of each. 
 
 Arguments of the Advocates of the Bank. — These 
 gentlemen, with all their ardour in the cause of 
 nn'nisters, will hardly refuse to allow that the com- 
 mand of" money, to which the exemption from cash 
 payments was so instrumental, increased our scale 
 of expenditure during the war. In admitting 
 this, they can make no great objection to the infer- 
 ence that the exemption act was a powerful, though 
 indirect, cause of the rise of prices previous to 
 1809. They will be more reluctant to admit our 
 second position, that which assumes deprecia- 
 tion of our bank paper ; for though they allow a 
 great fall to have taken place in the exchange 
 after 1809, they are ill prepared to admit tliat 
 from the moment we declared our paper not con- 
 vertible into the currency of the rest of the civi- 
 lised world, we rendered depreciation possible, and 
 that a postponement of the evil, or a mitigation of 
 its extent, would necessaVily dojiend on the natiu'e 
 of our coiniection with the Continent, on the 
 degree to which our paper should be put to tlie 
 test.
 
 Depreciation and Over-issue. 109 
 
 But those wlio still feel a difficulty in believing 
 depreciation to have existed at home, should ben-in 
 by asking themselves whether, \vithout the non- 
 convertibility of our paper, depreciation would 
 have existed abroad ; or, if it had begun, whether 
 it would have continued. If they refer to the 
 evidence of Mr. Goldsmid, and others, before the 
 Bullion Committee, they will find, that had our 
 currency been of coin, or convertible into coin, 
 7 or 8 per cent, would have been the greatest dif- 
 ference that could possibly have taken place in the 
 exchange even at the time of the anti-commercial 
 
 o 
 
 decrees. Let them ask, in the next place, whether 
 a reduction of the quantity of oin* bank pa})er 
 would not at any time have raised its value, and, if 
 carried a sufficient length, have brought it to a par 
 with coin ? 
 
 Supposing the advocates of the Bank to assent 
 to this reasoning, and to admit the existence of 
 depreciation, our next object is to satisfy them that 
 our estimate of it is not exaggerated. This will 
 best be done by a comparison of the rise of prices 
 in England, and on the Continent. If in this coun- 
 try 160/. were necessary towards the close of the 
 war to make the purchases which 100/. made in 
 1792, or if, in other words, our prices experienced 
 a rise of HO per cent., the rise on the Continent 
 will probably have been found to have been about 
 30 per cent. This difference was too great to be 
 explained by any difference in the com})arative 
 charges of war ; for taxation, the demand of men 
 for the public service, and the enlianccment of 
 corn, were all operative in a considerable ilegree 
 on the Continent. Farthei-, since the reinstate- 
 ment of our currency, the decline in prices has 
 been about 15 per cent, greater in England than on
 
 110 The Quest toll ()f 
 
 the Continent, a coincidence which seems iiilly to 
 justify our computation, that that proportion of the 
 rise in war was produced by the fall of our bank paper. 
 
 The Supporters of the Bullion Committee. — We 
 are next to address ourselves to the adherents of 
 a dirterent doctrine, to men who take a bolder 
 tone, and do not scruple to tax their antagonists 
 with ic'iiorance of the principles of productive indus- 
 try. Nor need we, in truth, be surprised at the con- 
 fidence of their language in regard to the question 
 under discussion. The rise of our prices during 
 the war was so progressive, and so coincident in 
 point of time with the increase of bank paper, that 
 the connexion of cause and effect was generally 
 asserted, long before it received a kind of official 
 sanction from the Bullion Report. To ascribe en- 
 hancement to over-issue, was easy ; to trace it to 
 other causes and to define the limited operation 
 of the exemption act, would have been a tedious 
 and intricate task. Yet the difference between 
 us and the Bullionists consists less in the extent 
 of enhancement, attributed to our bank paper, 
 than in the mode by which that enhancement 
 was produced. While tlieij hardly notice the effect 
 of taxation, demand of men for government, or the 
 insufficient growth of corn, as causes of rise of price, 
 and ascribe almost all to bank paper, 5x'^ consider 
 these as the direct causes, and our paper as opera- 
 tive only in a passive sense, by giving scope to these 
 causes, and consequently facilitating the continu- 
 ance of the war. We can trace no direct power in 
 banks to over-issue ; and those who insist on it, will 
 find themselves involved in all the difficulty attend- 
 ant on an attack ol' the strong hold of their oppo-
 
 Depreciation and Over-issue. Ill 
 
 nents, viz. the power possessed by the piibHc of 
 reheving themselves of a surcharge, by paying bank 
 notes into tlie Treasury. 
 
 The Bulhonists, being 4n general political eco- 
 nomists, will readily assent to the arguments of Dr. 
 Smith, that banks, while subject to cash payments, 
 possess no power of increasing the amount of cur- 
 rency ; a power which many projectors, about the 
 middle of last century, fondly imagined to reside 
 in banks, and the non-existence of which is so clearly 
 explained by Dr. Smith, in his account of the un- 
 successful career of the Ayr Bank. When satisfied 
 of this, let them next endeavour to show in what 
 manner it was possible that such power could have 
 been conferred by the exemption act. That act 
 was evidently incapable of giving solidity to bills or 
 other securities, which, without it, would liave been 
 bad or doubtful ; nor did any of its provisions either 
 oblige or induce the public to pay interest on more 
 currency than they required. During its operation 
 as before, our notes were nothing more than an 
 instrument of circulation, and one which continued 
 to cost the holders fully as much as prior to the 
 war. Obtained by a sacrifice of interest, it was 
 important to every indi\idual, whether a speculative 
 or a regular dealer, to circulate them as quickly as 
 possible, to retain them no longer than was neces- 
 sary to accomplish a specific purpose. From this 
 reasoning we infer that bank paper, whether pay- 
 able or not in cash, must await the call of the cus- 
 tomer, and that its circulation can be augmented 
 only to meet a rise proceeding from other causes. 
 Farther, this extended circulation can continue 
 only so long as the causes of high prices remain 
 in force; for bank paper lias neither the power 
 of raising prices in the first instance, or of main-
 
 112 The (liics/ioti o/ 
 
 tainini^ llioin wlieii tlic causes of" enlianccincnt 
 cuasc to opcMate. 
 
 If tliis doctrine appear somewhat ])oId, \ve ap- 
 peal to the evidence of facts, and invite our readers 
 to consider how remarkably our conclusions are 
 su])ported by the course of circumstances since the 
 peace. During the years 181.5 and 1810 no com- 
 pulsion was exercised in regard to a return to cash 
 payments, nor were the advantages arising to bank- 
 ers fiom the exem})tion act, restricted in a single 
 instance ; yet country bankers were forced greatly 
 to curtail their circulation, a measure which, had 
 they possessed the power commonly attributed to 
 them, would, doubtless, have been postponed till 
 the act had been repealed. Further, had our banks 
 possessed this })ower, the latitude given to circula- 
 tion during the war, would, we may be assLU'ed, 
 have been much greater. Mr. Huskisson, when 
 writing on this subject in 1810, and viewing the 
 question in the light of the Bullion Committee, ac- 
 knowledged his surprise that the issues of the Bank 
 had not been far greater. Is it going too far to ask 
 whether this does not justify the suspicion of a 
 latent error in the reasoning of bulHonists ; of the 
 existence of circumstances of which their arguments 
 take no account ? Without pressing this point in 
 the abstract, we shall adduce a fact entitled to the 
 most attentive consideration of those who invest 
 the exemption act with so formidable an attribute 
 as that of enabling bankers to make a direct increase 
 of their issues. Our growth of corn, inadequate 
 during the whole war, became so, in a high degree, 
 soon after the exemption act : our farmers had 
 then a powerful motive to extend their tillage, and, 
 in fact, did extend it as far as their means admitted. 
 It was a general notion on the part of the public,
 
 Depreciation and Over-issue. 113 
 
 and we believe of ministers, that this extension was 
 limited, not by want of funds, but by the nature of 
 the soil ; an opinion, however, wlioUjj disproved by 
 the experience of the last seven years, in which the 
 amount produced from our soil has been so greatly 
 augmented. To what has this augmentation been 
 owing, except to the application of additional capi- 
 tal and labour ? Observe the importance of the 
 conclusion to which this leads : our soil having 
 been, as far as regarded natural fertility, equally 
 capable of increased production, ten or twelve years 
 ago, would not our farmers, had our banks possessed 
 the power ascribed to them, have obtained such an 
 issue of notes as would have enabled them to ex- 
 tend their tillage, and bring our growth of corn on 
 a level with our consumption ? If want of hands 
 be alleged as the obstacle, we answer, that in Ire- 
 land and in Germany there were many thousand 
 labourers unemployed, and that a command of ca- 
 pital, such as is vulgarly ascribed to our banks, 
 would soon have transported them to our shores. 
 
 Historical Enquiries. 
 
 I. The Exemption Act, viexved in connection with 
 the events of the War. — We shall now bestow a 
 few paragraphs on an interesting, but hitherto un- 
 noticed topic, in the history of our paper currency ; 
 we mean the question, " whether the exemption 
 act, had it not taken place when it did, would 
 have been resorted to at any subsequent ajra in 
 the war?" This enquiry, brief as we shall make 
 it, requires an attentive notice of our situation 
 relatively to the Continent at particular periods. 
 
 The preliminaiies of peace between France 
 and Austria were signed at Leoben in April 1 797,
 
 1 1 i. The K.reinpHnn Act vie7vefi 
 
 a frw wooks af'fer the exemption act, and thoii<rh 
 the (leHnitive treaty (that of Campo Formio) was 
 not concluded till the antunm, there existed little 
 doubt of its taking place, and it is a well-known 
 fhct, that, in the course of the summer, our pecu- 
 niary resir)urces became more abundant. This 
 was also a time of naval success, and though the 
 dfead of invasion continued, we have the autho- 
 rity of the Bullion Committee (Report, page ^7.) 
 that the Bank ought to liave met an alarm of that 
 nature by a liberal issue of their notes. Be this as 
 it may, it seemrs extremely imHkely that at anytime 
 in 1797» after the preliminaries of Leoben, minis- 
 ters would have adopted a measure so new and 
 questionable as the suspension of cash payments. 
 
 The Succeeding year was one of peace on the 
 Continent, and of prosperity in tliis country. But 
 in what manner did the renewal of operations by 
 land in 1799, affect the state of our circulating 
 medium ? The effect, for some time inconsider- 
 able, became very different after the failure of the 
 harvest ; the long interval of two years that elapsed 
 from that failure, until the certainty of a favour- 
 able crop in 1801, would, had cash payments been 
 enforced, have recalled all the difficulties of 1796 ; 
 so that we by no means \enture to assert that 
 ministers would have forborne a recourse to the 
 measure in question. 
 
 The prelimin:u-ies of peace with France were 
 signed in the autumn of 1801, and there ensued a 
 long interval of ease in regard to financial and 
 commercial affairs. E^'en in 180.5, wlien we again 
 roused the Continent to arms, and subsidized not 
 only Austria, but Russia, the pressure on our ex- 
 change was temporary ; for this was no season of 
 indecisive warfare, of protracted operations : our 
 allies had now an antagonist who brought a cam-
 
 i?i co7inection with the Events of the War. 115 
 
 paign speedily to issue ; and who, at Ulm and 
 Austerlitz, effectually relieved us from the pressure 
 of subsidies. In 180f) and I8O7, part of our aUies 
 continued in arms, but they were not supported 
 by ministers on a scale productive of pecuniaiy 
 embarrassment, and our corn imports were fortu- 
 nately not of a magnitude to press on the ex- 
 change. 
 
 There thus elapsed a period of not less than seven 
 years without any great or continued derangement 
 in oiu' continental exchanges. However, a very 
 different prospect was opened by the events of 
 1809, by our augmented expenditure in the Pe- 
 ninsula, and the necessity of large purchases of 
 corn. Had oiu' bank-paper been at that time de- 
 man dable in cash, we should, doubtless, have ex- 
 perienced great difficulties, nor would the public, 
 ardent in the cause of vSpain, have hesitated to 
 support ministers in any measure that promised an 
 addition to oui' pecuniary means. There is, on 
 the other hand, equally little doubt, that withoirt 
 the ])revious existence of the exemption act, and 
 the confidence inspired by its till then successflil 
 operation, we should not have interfere! with the 
 freedom of American navigation: we would have 
 studied more carefully the effect of that navigation 
 on oui' resources, and have cherished it as a fund 
 for our continental expences. Our ship-owners 
 might have clamoured, and individual members of 
 the cabinet might have been rendered couM-rts to 
 their views, bnt the opinion of the bank directors 
 would have been hostile to such a measure ; and 
 the danger pointed out by the solitary voice of 
 Mr. Baring (Inquiry into onr Orders in Council) 
 ^ould have been brought before governnient with 
 all the weight of that powertiil body. 
 
 I ^2
 
 116 The Ejccmptum Act viewed 
 
 II. The next and concluding object of our inquiry 
 is, ** to what depjree did tiie exemption from cash 
 payments increase to government the means of 
 exertion on the Continent?'* By substituting at 
 home paper for metalhc currency, it enabled us to 
 send abroad our gold coin, the amount of which, 
 very dift'erently as it has been computed, (Bank 
 Committee Report, May 1819,) was, probably, not 
 far short of 20,000,000/. sterling ; — a most sub- 
 stantial aid, doubtless, but one w^hich was, in a 
 great measure, exhauarted in the first three years 
 of trial, 1799, 1800, 1801. From that time for- 
 ward, the portion of gold coin in the country 
 appears to have been comparatively small : at all 
 events, it was found quite inadequate to the de- 
 mand in the second period of trial, 1809 and 1810, 
 the exchange having fallen rapidly as soon as the 
 pressure on it became considerable. 
 
 The extent of direct aid arising from the ex- 
 emption act, seems thus to have been limited to 
 the amount of our gold coin ; but w^e should enter 
 into a much wider field, were we to calcidate the 
 augmentation of our financial means by the other 
 results of the act ; the increased facility of dis- 
 count, the comparatively moderate rate of interest, 
 above all, the practicability of increasing our stock 
 of currency in proportion to the rise of our prices. 
 After every deduction for exaggeration, and after 
 ascribing the larger share of our financial abun- 
 dance to the bold plan of raising the supplies 
 within the year, there still remains a great amount 
 referable to the effects of the exemption from cash- 
 payments. Of the extent of aid arising from a 
 moderate rate of interest, some idea may be formed 
 by those who have visited the Continent, and 
 observed how slowly productive industry advances
 
 in connection xvith the Events of the War, II7 
 
 in a country like France, where, even in peace, 
 6 or 7 per cent, is the current interest of money. 
 
 This benefit we experienced without much alloy, 
 until the five last years of the war, when the de- 
 preciation of our paper on the Continent caused 
 a sudden increase of our foreign disburse, and 
 some time after, an increase less sudden, but of 
 greater amount and permanency, in our expen- 
 diture at home. The losses hence arising may, we 
 believe, without pressing the point to an extreme, 
 be carried to 100,000,000/., in addition to which 
 we have to charge on the exemption act a large 
 proportion of the distress of our agriculturists, 
 conducive as that act certainly was, to the enor- 
 mous rise of prices during war, the fall of which 
 has been, and will be productive of great embar- 
 rassment, until wages, salaries, and other charges, 
 shall be accommodated to the new scale. It thus 
 becomes a question, whether the amount of benefit 
 derived from the exemption in the period preced- 
 ing I8O9 has not been balanced, perhaps more 
 than balanced, by the loss and pressure of the sub- 
 sequent years. This point, however, we have no 
 wish to urge, and still less the speculative question 
 already alluded to, whether, without the aid derived 
 from this act, our government would have renewed 
 the war in 1803, or have conducted it on so expensive 
 a scale. Our object is statistical, not political ; 
 and in calculating the advantage or disadvantage 
 of a great financial measure, we confine ourselves 
 to reasoning on events as they actually occurred. 
 
 Mr. Peel's Bill. — The majority of the public, 
 yielding to first impressions and unable to follow 
 up an intricate course of reasoning, have ascribed 
 to Mr. Peel's bill that re-action which arose from a 
 
 I S
 
 Xm Th/i FjJ-cmplion Act vieuedy <SfC. 
 
 i'ar more coinprehunsive cause. As to the p'escnl 
 effects of* that bill, we can trace none of conse- 
 quence, except a partial rise in the value of gold 
 throughout Europe, consequent on the large pur- 
 cliases of the Bank of England ; while, as to its 
 permanent effects, we can perceive, so long as peace 
 lasts, hardly any worth notice, except an obligation 
 on that establishment to keep a large reserve in 
 cash, and consequently to reduce its annual profits 
 by 400,000/. or whatever may be the charge of 
 providing and keeping that deposit. Country 
 bankers, on the other hand, are subjected to little 
 additioniU expence, since by a clause in the act of 
 1819, recently prolonged, they continue exempt 
 from the necessity of paying in cash, if they tender 
 Bank of England notes. 
 
 But innoxious as this law in a great measure 
 was, we consider its enactment matter of great 
 regret, partly as subjecting to undue censure the 
 individuals instrumental in passing it, more as 
 tending to make the public mistake the real cause 
 of the distress that has since taken place. Had no 
 such act been passed, and had the Bank been left 
 to pay in cash or not at its option, the public 
 would, as in 1815 and 1816, have fixed their at- 
 tention on the transition from peace to war as 
 the real cause of the fall of prices, and have been 
 better prepared to comprehend and second the 
 financial measures which such a transition required.
 
 119 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Agriculture. 
 
 Wi: propose dividing this very important branch 
 of our subject into three parts : 
 
 I. A historical sketch of our corn-trade, parti- 
 cularly since 1792 ; and the causes of the remark- 
 able fluctuations of price. 
 
 II. Tlie present situation and prospects of our 
 agriculturists. 
 
 III. The question of a protecting duty. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Historical Sketch ojour Corn Trade. 
 
 The interference of our legislature with the 
 export of corn dates from a ver}- remote yiMa ; but 
 our notice shall not be carried beyond the reign 
 of Elizabeth, a reign which, in its early years, ex- 
 hibited corn at as low a price as at any period of 
 our history, but became in its progress as remark- 
 able for enhancement as the reign of George III. 
 England was in those days, a corn-ex])orting coun- 
 tr> , if the name of export can be said to belong to 
 a surplus produce hardly greater than that of j^ 
 single county in the present age. In the early 
 part of the reign of Elizabeth (\5iH)y export was 
 permitted by act of Parliament, whcne\er our 
 prices fell to lOs. the quarter for wheat, and Qs. 8d. 
 for barley and malt ; prices remarkably low, when 
 
 I 4
 
 120 Historical Sketch of our Com Trade. 
 
 wc consider that our coin was, in point of metallic 
 weight and fineness, the same as at present. At 
 that rate, however, they did not long continue ; a 
 considerable rise took phice before I.CI70 ; and in 
 1.593 the export limit was extended by act of par- 
 liament to 9,0s. for the quarter of wheat, and lisJ^. 
 for barley and malt. 
 
 This doubling of price in the course of thirty 
 years, has not a little embarrassed political arith- 
 meticians : it is commonly attributed to the influx 
 of metallic currency from the American mines 
 before an outlet was found for it in India and 
 China, but from our experience of the limited 
 effect of such a cause in subsequent times, par- 
 ticularly since the late peace, we are inclined to 
 lay no little stress on the general prevalence of 
 war throughout Europe, from the middle of the 
 sixteenth to that of the seventeenth century. Be 
 this as it may, the enhancement continued progres- 
 sive; for in 1623 the export limit was raised to 
 325. the quarter for wheat, and \Qs. for barley and 
 malt. In the succeeding age, particularly under 
 Cromwell, our markets were considerably higher, 
 but the rise was in some degree nominal, our coin, 
 though no longer debased by government, being 
 deteriorated by clipping and filing, and brought, at 
 times, no less than 20 per cent, below its legal value, 
 — an abuse not completely remedied till 1717' 
 
 Bounti/ o?i E.rport. — In the reign of Charles II. 
 the prices of corn declined, and though several 
 acts were passed (in I66O, 1663, I67O), imposing 
 a duty on foreign corn, their effect in our market 
 was inconsiderable, because our growth equalled, 
 or more than equalled our consumption. Prices 
 accordingly did not rise, the agriculturists com-
 
 Historical Sketch of our Com Trade. 121 
 
 plained, and the epoch of the Revolution was 
 marked by a new refinement of legislation in their 
 favour. The necessity of providing^ supplies for 
 the formidable contest with Louis XIV., led go- 
 vernment to contemplate a land-tax, and to offer 
 as a douceur to the landed interest, a premium on 
 export, which, accompanied by a prohibition of the 
 import of foreign corn, implied a certainty of 
 increase of price, and consequently of rent. The 
 chief provisions of the act were the payment of a 
 bounty of 5s. for every quarter of wheat exported, 
 so long as our price continued at or below 485., 
 and Qs. 6d. for every quarter of barley or malt, so 
 long as our home currency for that grain did not 
 exceed 2is. 
 
 A deficiency of documents in regard to the ex- 
 tent of our tillage, prevents our tracing the effects 
 of the bounty act : it doubtless stinmlated produc- 
 tion, and, under ordinary political circumstances, 
 might, after creating a temporary superiority of 
 demand to supply, have in some degree lowered 
 prices ; but the market was, during many years, 
 kept up by causes not unlike those which followed 
 in our day the French revolution, — war, and a 
 more than usual prevalence of bad seasons. The 
 proportion of the latter in the twenty years between 
 1692 and 1712, was not inferior to that of the 
 twenty years between 1792 and 1812; and as our 
 drain of men and capital for the war in these days, 
 made no slight approximation to that of our late 
 contest, there were wanting to complete the ana- 
 logy of high price only two of the characteristics of 
 our age, — a depreciated currency, and an annual 
 insufficiency of growth. 
 
 After the treaty of Utrecht, we enter on a paci- 
 fic aera, on the age of Fleury and Walpole. The
 
 £ s. 
 
 ci. 
 
 1 15 
 
 5 
 
 I 15 
 
 2 
 
 1 12 
 
 1 
 
 1 13 
 
 3 
 
 1 19 
 
 3 
 
 mQ llislorical Sketch uf our Corn Trade. 
 
 causes of fiuctuation in our corn-market were now 
 nuicli siniplifiecl, and the half-centiiry that suc- 
 ceeded presented the Ibllowing residts : 
 
 Average Price of Wheal computed by the Winchester quarter^ 
 from Purchases made at Windsor J'or Eton College. 
 
 For ten years ending with 1725 
 Do. - ending with 1735 
 
 Do. - ending with 1745 
 
 Do. - ending with 1755 
 
 Do. - ending with 17(i5 
 
 In what manner are we to explain so near an 
 approach to uniformity of price during so long a 
 period? By the maintenance of peace during 
 thirty-fiye years out of fifty, and by an exemption, 
 in general, liom bad seasons. The case was the 
 same with our neighbours, as appears from the 
 returns (see Appendix) of the prices of corn in 
 France. In that country, as in England, the 
 market during the fifty years in question, presented 
 an average considerably lower than that of either 
 the preceding or succeeding half-century. 
 
 During the whole of this period, we were ex- 
 porters of corn ; the quantity varied, of course, 
 from year to year, but w^as almost always sufficient 
 to establish the fact, that the market price in Eng- 
 land was little higher than throughout the mari- 
 time part of the west of Europe ; we mean the 
 Netherlands, Denmark, the North of France, and 
 the north-west of Germany. The cheapness was 
 materially greater only in inland cUstricts of the 
 Continent, where, as at present in Lorraine, the 
 south of Poland, or south-west of Russia, the want 
 of water conveyance kept down the market. 
 
 During this half-century of stiitionaiy price, and
 
 Historical Sketch of our Corn Trade. l'2o 
 
 -of scanty agricultural profits, — this period, when 
 inclosure bills were so rare, and lease afler lease 
 was signed in long succession, without any idea of 
 increase of rent, it must not be inferred ihat our 
 tillage was on the decrease : it evidently received 
 an extension, but somewhat more slowly, as ap- 
 pears by the ultimate result, than the increase of 
 our population. 
 
 After 1764, began a new aera ; our consumption 
 equalled, and somewhat surpassed our growth, so 
 that our import predominated over export. This 
 change, so unsuitable to a season of peace, so con- 
 trary to calculation, at a time when additional 
 labour and capital became applicable to agricul- 
 ture, was owing to several reasons, — an unusual 
 proportion of bad seasons ; the increase of con- 
 sumers from the extension of our manufactures, 
 particularly cotton ; and in })art, doubtless, to the 
 general disposition to withhold surplus capital from 
 the so long unprofitable investment of agriculture. 
 
 Act o/"1773. — The rise in our market, whatever 
 may have been its causes, was such in the ten 
 years preceding 1773, as to lead to an act of a new 
 kind; an act implying that, in regard to corn, Eng- 
 land was to be considered rather an importing than 
 an exporting country. It ])ermitted the import of 
 foreign wheat whenever our own reached or ex- 
 ceeded 48.y. the quarter ; a hmit just and moderate, 
 which, while it relieved the consume)- from an ex- 
 orbitant rise on the occurrence of a bad harvest, 
 was productive of" no injury to our agriculture, the 
 prices of corn continuing to afford a steady retiuu 
 for the labour and capital employed. Om* marker 
 now exhibited all the ailvantages of snjjpiy duly 
 proportioned to demand : in some years a partial
 
 124 Historical Sketch of our Corn Trade. 
 
 import was necessary; in others, the nature of our 
 crops enabled lis to export ; but after I788, a time 
 of extension and prosperity to most of our manu- 
 factures, import decidedly predominated. 
 
 In I71U, the landed interest, not satisfied with 
 the advantage secured to them by the act of 1773, 
 carried it a step farther, and obtained a law pre- 
 venting import, except when our wheat should 
 reach or exceed the price of 54.9. the quarter. 
 Whether this measure would have operated to 
 raise prices, or by directing an extra share of ca- 
 pital to tillage, would have, in some degree, lower- 
 ed them, we had no opportunity of ascertaining, so 
 soon was it followed by the war of 1793. 
 
 The late Wars. — The wars of the present age, 
 attended by an unparalleled drain of both labourers 
 and capital, could not fail to raise the price of corn. 
 For some time, however, the rise was gradual, the 
 average price of our wheat, during the first seven 
 years of the war, not exceeding iSSs. ; but two bad 
 harvests in succession, (1799 and 1800) altered 
 entirely the state of the market, and carried prices 
 to a rate (6/. and upwards) till then unprecedented 
 in our history. The seasons of ISOI, 180^2, and 
 1803, were favourable, and produced a fall to 
 nearly 3/., a fall which, in concurrence with the 
 demands of the Treasury on the land-holders for 
 our renewed contest with France, led to the corn 
 law of 1804-, by which the import of foreign wheat 
 was in a manner prohibited, until our own should 
 be at or above 63.s., and taxed till our own readied 
 665. These prices, high as they then seemed, were 
 soon surpassed by the currency of our market, in 
 consequence, partly of an unfavourable season 
 (1804), partly of the continued drain of hands and
 
 Historical Sketch of our Com Trade. 125 
 
 capital for the war. These causes operated in a 
 greater or less degree over the rest of Europe, and 
 greatly lessened the relief which importation would 
 otherwise have afforded us. 
 
 The non-convertibility of our paper currency 
 had existed since 1797. and passed, in vulgar es- 
 timate, for the principal cause of this progressive 
 rise ; but the degree of enhancement proceeding 
 from it was slight (not exceeding 3 or 4 per cent.) 
 until 1809. Ill that year it was suddenly accele- 
 rated by an unfortunate concurrence of circum- 
 stances ; expenditure in Spain, the stoppage of 
 neutral traffic, and, above all, a deficient harvest. 
 From this time forward, our purchases of foreign 
 corn were made at a sacrifice of 18, 20, or 25 per 
 cent, a loss incurred on the whole of the very large 
 sum of 7,000,000/. expended on the purchase of 
 corn in 1810. The currency of our market was 
 now between 51. and 6/., and though, for one year, 
 a rise was prevented by the abundant harvest of 
 
 1810, the case became very difl'erent after that of 
 
 1811, although only partially deficient. A supply 
 from abroad was now, in a manner, out of the 
 question, partly from the anti-cominercial edicts 
 of the time, more from our want of specie and 
 the fall of our bank paper. Accordingly, during 
 1812 and 1813, our prices averaged above 6/., 
 a rate ill calculated to prepare our farmers for 
 the great and general fall to be expected from 
 the approaching change in the state of Europe. 
 
 The Peace of 1814. — Never were the effects of 
 peace more promptly or generally felt, than in 
 1814. Import co-operated with favourable seasons ; 
 tlie price of corn fell rapidly, and it was in vain 
 that parliament passed, early in 1815, a new act.
 
 l^f) Fhi<fU(ilio7is iu the Prict ofCoj^n. 
 
 foH)i(l(liti^ import till tlic home-price of our wheat 
 exceeded 80.9. : the market continued low, and for 
 a time exposed both the farmers and the public to 
 all the evils of sudden transition. In ISU) a defi- 
 ciency of ciop, more serious both in England and 
 the Continent, tlian any in tlie present age, re- 
 versed this state of things, raised prices, and led, 
 during I8I7 and 1818, to an import of unexam- 
 pled magnitude. But when in the early part of 
 1819, the effect of scarcity was past, our market 
 fell, and in the autumn of 1820, an abundant 
 harvest brought it to the state of depression under 
 which it so long remained. 
 
 Effect of the Fluctuations in the price of Com, 
 si7ice 1792. — We are next to examine the state of 
 our market during the last thirty years, with a view 
 to its effect on the situation of farmers. The war 
 commenced at a time when corn was abundant, and 
 prices moderate, wheat averaging about 5Ss. a 
 quarter. The immediate effect of the assumption 
 of a military attitude, was to withdraw from agri- 
 culture a portion of labour and capital, to produce 
 a rise in the ote of interest, and to necessitate the 
 abandonment of many projects of improvement, 
 such as drainages, canals, and other undertakings, 
 dependent for success on a low rate of interest. 
 This was productive of very general distress, but 
 had little eflrect on the corn niarket, tlie stock in 
 hand being abundant. In 1794 and 179-5, a partial 
 deficiency in the crops, joined to the continued 
 operation of the war, produced a considerable rise, 
 and carried wheat, notwithstanding a large pre- 
 mium on import paid by government, to 1/. and 
 upwards. This, however, was of short duration '. 
 in 1796, the amount of import, followed by a favour^
 
 Fhwtuations in the Price of Corn. 1^7 
 
 able season, reduced our market ; in 1797» wheat 
 did not, on average, exceed 31. ^s. and its furtlier 
 fall in 1798 (to '2/. lU.), showed how effectually a 
 favourable season could, even in the midst of war, 
 counteract the charges attendant on the culture of 
 corn. These cliarges without being at all on a par 
 w'ith the burdens of an atler-period, were such as 
 to make many of our farmers hold the language of 
 complaint, and consider the increase of expence 
 from the war as materially exceeding the increase 
 of price. 
 
 This may be termed the first a^ra in the war, 
 which had lasted six years without })roducing a 
 material rise, either in rents or in the average price 
 of corn. The case, however, now underwent a 
 complete change, the occurrence of two bad sea- 
 sons in succession (1799 iuid 1800) raising prices 
 to a rate (.5/. and 61.) wholly unknown in our his- 
 torv. What was the effect of these seasons on 
 the situation of our farmers ? At iirst unfavour- 
 able, because a rise in ])rice (Evidence, Agricul- 
 tural Committee, p. 36.) forms no equivalent to 
 a deficiency of crop ; but prospectively, it was 
 advantageous, the stock on hand being so reduced 
 as to open a prospect of high prices for some time 
 to come. Accordingly, in s})ite of tlie additional 
 burdens of the period, among others the income 
 tax, farmers and speculators in land were induced 
 to contract for rents at an advanced rate. This 
 spirit showed itself strongly in 1800 and 1801, 
 but received a sudden check from tlie favonrabk' 
 harvest of the latter year, and the unexpected con- 
 clusion of peace with France. 
 
 Our wlieat now (1802) fell to nearly 31. : the 
 eflTect of high prices was pronounced not only tem- 
 porary but fallacious ; land was almost every where
 
 1^8 FluctuatwJis in the Price oJ'Com. 
 
 declared to be over-let, and the consequent stagna- 
 tion was on the eve of" leading to a general reduc- 
 tion of" rents, when the scene was once more chang- 
 ed by war. This was followed by the deficient 
 harvest of 1804; markets now rose, rents were 
 maintained and augmented, the import of corn was 
 subjected to additional restrictions, and at home, 
 all the causes which swell the cost of production, 
 rise of labour, taxation, interest of money, operated 
 in conjunction. The effect of all these, was to 
 carry wheat during 1805, 6, 7» and 8, to an average 
 of somewhat more than 4/., although the seasons 
 were not unfavourable. 
 
 This may be termed the middle epoch in the 
 period of war: agriculture had become profitable, 
 and the style of living of our farmers was consider- 
 ably altered, but their charges being greatly aug- 
 mented, their profits were far from unreasonable. 
 Of this the best proof is, that all the motives 
 to extension of culture, did not produce a suf- 
 ficiency of growth for consumption. There pre- 
 vailed among farmers a general confidence, an 
 extension of outlay ; but their pecuniary ad- 
 vantage was limited to increase of income, to the 
 more comfortable support of their families ; a 
 substantial addition to property was, as yet, expe- 
 rienced by very few-. 
 
 We now come to a new^ aera, — the five last years 
 of the war, — a time when farming profit, notvvith- 
 standing an increase of charges, materially ex- 
 ceeded the preceding ratio. In 1809, a deficient 
 harvest raised prices, and the imports from the 
 Continent in 1810, though uncommonly large, 
 could not bring them below an average of 51. or 6/. 
 because our currency was now greatly depreciated. 
 No claiis derived such benefit from tiie fall of our
 
 Fluctuations ?n the Price of Corn. 129 
 
 Bank paper as our agriculturists, theii* rent and 
 taxes being paid in it without any addition, while 
 in their sales they received a full allowance for it^ 
 depreciation, not only in their corn and cattle, 
 but in their butter, poultry and other articles. It 
 was at this time that full execution was given to 
 the anti-conunercial decrees of Bonaparte, and to 
 our Orders in Council, measures which, without ab- 
 solutely stopping neutral navigation, added greatly 
 to its cost, and left us more and more to our own 
 resources. This was the season also of extended 
 military operations in Spain, and of the appropria- 
 tion, in that country and in Portugal, of supplies 
 of flour from the United States, which might other- 
 wise have found their way to England. In 1811 
 our crop was not equal to our consumption, and in 
 consequence of the want of import fi'om the Con- 
 tinent, our markets experienced a great ad\ance. 
 Rents were now raised rapidly and generally : poor- 
 rate, tithe, and labour received a great increase, 
 and the collection of the property-tax from farmers 
 became more rigorous ; drawbacks which were 
 serious, certainly, but more than outweighed by 
 the benefit of high price. In 1HV2 and 181.3 the 
 harvests were, on the whole, favourable; while the 
 augmented depreciation of our Bank paper (now 
 between 20 and 30 per cent.) discouraged im- 
 port, and kept our prices of wheat at the exor- 
 bitant price of 6/. and upwards. 
 
 At last came peace, followed by the cessation 
 of so many of the causes that had produced the 
 enormous rise of prices ; our Bank j)aper reco- 
 vered : corn had fallen on the Continent : the 
 expence of freight was greatly reduced, and con- 
 siderable imports took place. Our market ex- 
 perienced a rapid fall in the summer and autumn 
 
 K
 
 180 Fhicludl'ums in the Price of Corn. 
 
 of 1814 ; a fail coiifiniied by other causes, — a re- 
 (liiclioM in the ])ric'e of lal)Our ; in the interest of 
 money; in taxatioji ; — while the whoJe was neces- 
 sarily accompanied by a diminution of such charges, 
 (seed, iiorses, manure, tithe,) as follow, or rather 
 are identified with the })rice of grain. A new 
 corn-bill was loudly called for; that of 181.5 was 
 passed, and our j)orts shut to import : but the 
 amount of the stock on hand, and a crop fully 
 adequate to our consumption, kept prices at a low 
 rate, wheat fetching only 55s. or 58.9. a quarter. Our 
 agriculturists now experienced all the evils of a 
 sudden fall : rents though lowered, remained un- 
 paid ; fiU'ming-stock was sold at a ruinous depre- 
 ciation ; tithe fell rapidly ; and poor-rate, though 
 not increased in amount, proved, under such 
 altered circumstances, a ruinous burden. In this 
 state of things, the want of warmth and continued 
 wet of the summer of 1816, were viewed by many 
 of our agriculturists as benefits, as the means of 
 clearing the market of the over-stock of corn, of 
 giving efficiency to the recently-enacted bill, and 
 of bringing back better prices. Such, in fiact, 
 wTre its results : the crop, though at one time 
 promising, never ripened in the colder situations ; 
 our markets rose, and when, after a time, they 
 reached the limit that allowed of import, the sup- 
 plies from the Continent were, in consequence of 
 an almost equally bad season there, paid for at 
 such a price that our currency for the year 1817 
 exceeded ^U- a quarter. 
 
 We are now^ arrived at another epoch in the 
 fluctuating history of our agriculture. Though 
 the import of foreign corn continued during 1818, 
 the average price of wheat in that year exceeded 
 80a". The steadiness of this price, the revival of 
 15
 
 Fluctuations in the Price of Corn. 1'31 
 
 our manufacturing industry, the moderate interest 
 of money, renewed the hopes of our farmers, and 
 created, if not a rise in the amount of rent, a 
 general briskness in making offers. But our im- 
 ports had been over-done, and our crop in 1819 
 being an average one, the market experienced a 
 dulhiess and progressive decHne. It was m vain 
 that fartlier import was suspended ; our market 
 continued depressed, and all eyes were fixed on 
 the harvest of 1S20, witli the singular view of 
 discovering wliether its abundance would prove 
 a source o^ embarrassment to the landed interest. 
 The crop, without being particularly favoured by 
 the season, was found equal to our consumption, 
 which, joined to the magnitude of the stock on 
 hand, produced a great fall of prices ; and the 
 crops of 1821 and 1822 being in like manner ade- 
 quate, our markets continued in a very depressed 
 state. 
 
 Tabular Statement of the Nature of the Crops atul Average 
 Prices since 1790. 
 
 Average price 
 Years. of wheat- 
 
 £. s. d. 
 
 1790, 1, 2. Peace and favourable sea-") 2 13 
 
 sons - - - J 
 1793. War, but season favour- 1 9 1 1" 8 
 
 able - - - J 
 1794', 5. A deficiency of crop in /Average of) 4. i o 
 
 each year - - 1 1 795 & 1796/ 
 
 1796, 7, 8. Seasons more favourable -j .^(L ^ q \ '^ '^' ^ 
 
 1799, 1800. Bad seasons - - {fsCwTlSOlj ^ " ^ 
 
 1801. A good crop followed by"] 
 
 peace; also by favour- I Average of) „ - g 
 able seasons in 1802 and f 1802, 3, 4. / 
 1803 ... J
 
 152 FluctULitions in ihr Price oJ'Cum. 
 
 Average 
 > during the J. ^ jj 
 years 1814, 
 15, 16. 
 
 \ 
 
 Average price 
 Ycu^^. of *f"^^a' 
 
 180K A deficient crop, followed^ Average ofl £', s. d. 
 
 however by average r the years >■ 4 ^l 
 crops in 1805, 6, 7. J 1805, f3, 7, 8. J 
 
 1808. A partial deficiency - 1 Average of) 
 
 1809. A great deficiency - r the years > 5 9 
 
 1810. A good crop - - )1809&1810.) 
 
 1811. A deficiency - - ^Average ofl 
 
 1812. IS. Crops favourable, but cur- /- the 3 years > 5 18 S 
 
 rency depreciated - ) 1811,12,13.3 
 
 1814. A crop not exceeding the " 
 
 average, but a consider- 
 able import, and a de- 
 crease both of demand 
 and of farming charges 
 consequent on the peace 
 
 1815. A full average crop 
 
 1816. A great and general de- 
 
 ficiency - - J 
 
 1817. A crop somewhat below") Average of) 
 
 an average - - ■ the years J- 4 9 5 
 
 1818. An average crop - j 
 
 1819. A crop somewhat below 1 S 13 O 
 
 the average - - j 
 
 1820. A crop exceeding thel „ „ - 
 
 average - - j 
 
 1821. An average crop - — — 2 14 2 
 
 1822. An average crop - — — 2 3 3 
 
 The deficiency of a particular year is felt little on the average 
 price of that year, but greatly in that of the succeeding year, 
 being seldom ascertained till late in autumn. 
 
 The prices in the above table are taken from the Windsor 
 market to 1813 inclusive; afterwards from the average return 
 for England and Wales, which is somewhat lower than the 
 price at Windsor. 
 
 Causes of' Fluctuation in the Price of Coivi. 
 
 It is common to ascribe a great share of these 
 fluctuations to the corn laws; but those who have 
 written and spoken on that subject, whether in 
 favour of or against these laws, would have per- 
 formed a useful service had they been more sparing 
 of argument and more attentive to the facts con- 
 aected with our corn trade. The result would, 
 
 9
 
 Fhictuaiiom in the Price of Corn. 133 
 
 we believe, have been a discovery, that the effects 
 attributed to our corn laws, whether by their sup- 
 porters or opponents, have been greatly over-rated, 
 and that })arliament, in attempting to regulate the 
 currency of oiu- markets, might, as was remarked 
 by the late Mr. Whitbread, be compared to the phi- 
 losopher in Rasselas, who regarded the sun, wind, 
 and rain, as under his control. The bounty act of 
 1689 had, doubtless, for some time, an operation 
 favourable to landlords, enabling them to let their 
 lands more readily, perhaps on somewhat higher 
 terms ; but after the stimulus of war was removed, 
 the bounty proved altogether unequal to the mainte- 
 nance of prices, and certainly caused to our coun- 
 try gentlemen, as members of the community at 
 large, a loss greater than the benefit it brought 
 them in the capacity of landlords. Their prosper- 
 ous day did not arrive until afler lyS^, when their 
 boasted aids, export and bounty, disappeared to- 
 gether. From that time corn maintained a steady 
 price, or rather experienced a gradual rise, the 
 causes of which, as the bounty was now inopera- 
 tive, will, we believe, be readily admitted to have 
 been. 
 
 First, and principally, an unusual proportion of 
 unfavourable seasons between I7641 and 1773. 
 
 Secondly, that the increase of capital and labour 
 applied to our agriculture was not in proportion to 
 the increase of our population. This arose fiom 
 various causes : the wars of 17o() and 177/3 : the 
 extension of certain manufactures, particularly 
 cotton ; and an impression, founded on the expe- 
 rience of the preceding half century, lliat agricul- 
 ture was an unprofitable })ursuit. 
 
 We now come to the act of 1773, the only act 
 K 3
 
 LSI- Fl urinal ions in llw Price of Cum. 
 
 wliicli seems to liave had an operation steadily ad- 
 vaiilaf^eoiis to landlords ; our averaf^e ])rice of 
 wlicat from 1773 to I788 being about ¥.)s. a ([uar- 
 ter, while hi France it did not (see Appendix) 
 exceed 385. or 39*., and at Dantzic 41.9. a quarter. 
 Here was a real and steady superiority of price, 
 the maintenance of wliicli was owing in part to the 
 American war, but in part also to the moderate 
 nature of the act, the price of 48a., pointed out by 
 it as a kind of limit, offering no temptation to 
 capitalists to transfer their funds from trade or 
 manufacture to land. Had the import limit been 
 545. there seems little doubt, after the proofs we 
 have had of the practicability of extending our 
 tillage, that it would, ere long, have been ov^er- 
 done, and our growth rendered not only equal 
 but superior to our consumption. By asking little 
 the landholders obtained a certainty, and this ex- 
 ample of the success of interference, when inter- 
 ference is very slight, has a claim to their serious 
 attention at the present moment. 
 
 TJie late Wars. — In the period from 1793 to 
 1814, the Corn laws were in general inoperative, 
 the currency of our market being usually above 
 the import limit, and our ports consequently open. 
 No difference appears to have resulted from the 
 restraint on import imposed by the act of 1804 ; an 
 act which had, we believe, the effect of enabling 
 landlords to make a rise of rent more general and 
 more approaching to uniformity over the kingdom 
 in point of time than would otherwise have been 
 practicable, but which had certainly no effect iu 
 raising markets, its tendency to extend tillage 
 balancing, or more than balancing, any tendency ta 
 keep up prices by an occasional and short exclusion 
 of foreign Corn.
 
 Fluctuations i/i the Price of Corn. 135 
 
 What then were the causes of the unexampled 
 rise of prices between 1793 and 181 1 ? 
 
 The unusual number of bad or indifferent sea- 
 sons, not less than seven (1791-, 1795, 1799, 1800, 
 1804, 1809, 1811,) in the course of eighteen years. 
 
 The great demand of men for military service, 
 in consequence of which tlie increase of the pro- 
 ducers of corn failed to keep pace with the increase 
 of the consumers. 
 
 The consequent rise in the price of labour, and 
 in farming charges generally. 
 
 The increase of taxation. 
 
 The prevalence of similar causes on the Conti- 
 nent, and consequent limitation of imj)ort. 
 
 The depreciation of our currency, particularly 
 after 1809. 
 
 Of all the departments of our national industry, 
 none received so continued a stinmlus from the 
 war as agriculture. Our manufactures, particu- 
 larly those of cotton and hardware, experienced at 
 times a greater impulse ; but the nature of manu- 
 facture admitting of more speedily increasing 
 supply in proportion to demand, the briskness was 
 often temporary, and followed by seasons of dis- 
 couragement. Our tillage, on the other hand, 
 was hardly at any time brought on a par with our 
 increasing population, so that the stimulant of a 
 demand, equal to or'greater than the internal sup})ly, 
 prevailed throughout almost the whole })eriotl. 
 
 Causes of the Fall of Prices si?ice the Peace. — 
 These have been partly peculiar to this country, 
 partly common to it with the Continent of Europe. 
 Of the latter description were 
 
 The application of additional capital, and, in a 
 K 1.
 
 1.1() Fluctuations in fhf Prtcf of Corn. 
 
 greater degree, of labour, to tillage, since the re- 
 duction of military establishments. 
 
 A succession of seasons more favourable than 
 during the war ; the Continent, like England, 
 having had, since the peace, only one bad summer, 
 181(3. Though, from the extent of the failure on 
 that occasion, we may consider it equivalent to 
 two seasons of ordinary deficiency, the proportion 
 of favourable seasons since the peace is still con- 
 siderably greater than diu'ing the war. 
 
 Next, as to the causes of decline peculiar to this 
 country, we have 
 
 The re-instatement of our paper currency; and. 
 
 The great reduction of freight and other charges 
 of transport ; a principal cause of the magnitude 
 of the import in I8I7 and 1818. 
 
 lAibour applied to Tillage since the Peace. — 
 The operation of several of these causes is suffi- 
 cientlv obvious, but the extent of one which to us 
 appears of considerable importance, maybe doubted 
 by many persons, particularly by those who com- 
 pute the extension of our growth by the number of 
 inclosure bills, and w^ho have remarked (see Ap- 
 pendix) the great decrease in such acts since the 
 peace. To those persons we would submit an 
 observation which, however plain, is of the highest 
 importance, viz. that " the most productive hus- 
 bandry is that which is practised on land already 
 under cultivation." This truth escaped the atten- 
 tion of the Agricultural Committee of 1821, but is 
 well known to intelligent farmers and land-survey- 
 ors. In support of our opinion, we refer our readers 
 to the evidence of a practical farmer, Mr.Becher, 
 of Suffolk, given before the Corn Committee of 1810. 
 When asked whether he considered the import limit 
 of that time (63*.) as too low, Mr. B. answered, 
 (Evidence, p. 5.5.)
 
 Flucluationii in tht Price of Corn. 137 
 
 " I look upon the price at which wheat is now imported not 
 sufficient to encourage the culture of wheat to the extent that 
 is necessary for the kingdom ; but I believe there is not the 
 least doubt, if the import price was at 845. instead of 63^., or 
 even higher, that the effect would be, upon a notice given that 
 that would be the import price after the 30th September in any 
 year, that the consumption of the country would be fully pro- 
 vided for at home, even in the first year after such notice." 
 
 Could it be provided for in the first year without 
 cross-cropping ? 
 
 " I believe that the lands now sown with wheat are not in 
 the high state generally that they might be ; and this I am 
 aware of, that every additional hoeing of the wheat crop will 
 give, upon an average, at least two bushels an acre. I have 
 tried the experiment more than once in the same fields, by not 
 hoeing, hoeing once, and hoeing twice : the difference has 
 been — with one hoeing two bushels an acre more and upwards, 
 and in that hoed twice four bushels more." 
 
 This opinion may be followed up by asking 
 what amount of additional labour is at the dispo- 
 sal of our farmers, since the peace ? A compari- 
 son of the population returns of 1811 and 18^-21, 
 appears at first to operate against our argument, 
 and to imply that the increase of the growers of 
 corn was, in the course of these ten years, consi- 
 derably below the increase of the consumers, tlie 
 former being in the ratio of only 9, the latter of 19 
 per cent, of our population. But this comparison 
 is made by a number of fkmiHes, and the effectual 
 plan is to calculate the able-bodied labourers. Now, 
 of these peace restored a number to agricultural 
 labour, and what was of at least equal importance, 
 suspended the drain of others as recruits for the 
 pubHc service. Is it practicable to reduce the 
 numbers in question to the form of specific calcu- 
 lation ? The proi)ortion of the population of 
 Great Britain and Ireland employed m agricul-
 
 ins F/i/rn/a/io/is in I he l*ricc of Corn. 
 
 liiro in llie latter years of the war, could not (see 
 the Population Return of 1811) be less than 
 7,0()(),(K)0, of whom the able-bodied exceeded 
 1,700,000. Of these in war there were withdrawn 
 tor the army, navy, and militia (exclusive of local 
 ^nilitia) nearly one-tenth, say - - 170,000 
 
 Whereas in peace the number of the 
 agricultural class so withdrawn is not - 30,000 
 
 Leaving a difference of - - M-0,000 
 or one-twelfth of the whole. 
 
 Now if we calculate the produce of their laboui- 
 on the most moderate scale, not at a twelfth but 
 at a twenty-fourth of our crop, the result is an ad- 
 dition to our supply of more than a fortnight's con- 
 sumption of our whole population, a quantity 
 which, small as it may seem, was constderablij 
 larger than our average import during the war. 
 And as no article is so much influenced as corn, 
 (Evidence, Agricultural Committee, pp. 229 — 
 240.) by a slight addition to or subtraction from 
 the usual supply, an increase, such as we have 
 mentioned, is sufficient to cause a material change 
 in the market. Viewed in connexion with the con- 
 version of pasture lands in Ireland to tillage, it 
 will, we believe, be found to afford a more ade- 
 quate explanation of the low price of corn, than any 
 other cause except the continuance of favourable 
 seasons.* 
 
 * See the close of the Appendix to this Chapter; also the 
 close of the Appendix to the Chapter on Population.
 
 139 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Situation and Prospects of our Agriadturists. 
 
 VVi: have now explained the causes of the great 
 change tliat has taken place since the peace, of the 
 remarkable increase in the quantity and reduction 
 in the price of our produce. Our next object is 
 to exiiibit the result of this change, and to convey 
 an idea of the actual situation of our landlords and 
 farmers. 
 
 Estimate of our Agricultural Produce and Rental. 
 
 Produce. — Annual value of agricultural pro- 
 duce, (not only corn but wool, hemp, flax, timber, 
 &c.) raised in Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
 In 1812, our produce, exclusive of seed, was 
 computed by Mr. Colquhoun, in his well-known 
 work on the " Resources of the British Empire," 
 (pp. 06—89.) at . _ - ji^217,000,00() 
 
 Deduct pasture and all produce 
 used for the food of horses, 
 horned cattle, and the lesser 
 animals, about - - - 100,000,000 
 
 Value of annual produce for the 
 food of man, or for the purposes 
 of manufacture - - - j^ 11 7,000,000 
 
 Since 1812, prices have fallen above (iO pcM- 
 cent. ; but as Mr. C.'s estimate was made greatly 
 below the currency of the time, the deduction 
 applicable to his results does not exceed 25 or 30 
 ])er cent. This deduction in prices, large as it is.
 
 140 Situation and Prospects 
 
 appears to be balanced, or nearly balanced, by the 
 increase in the quantity of our produce. To as- 
 certain the extent of such increase is a matter of 
 great difficulty, but the probability of its being 
 very large is supported by several powerful con- 
 siderations ; viz. 
 
 The diffusion of improvements in husbandry. 
 
 The addition to our population, and the cessa- 
 tion of a drain of the able-bodied men for the 
 public service. 
 
 The excess of the population and produce of 
 Ireland over Mr. Colquhoun's estimate. 
 
 The conjunct effect of these causes may, we be- 
 lieve, safely be computed to form an addition of 
 25 per cent, to the quantity of our produce, and to 
 leave the value of the whole not far short of Mr. 
 Colquhoun's estimate. 
 
 Rental. — In 1814 the rental of England, Wales, 
 and Scotland was carried, as appears by the property- 
 tax returns, to nearly ^£^43,000,000 
 Add for Ireland, (con- 
 
 jecturally estimated) 10,000,000 
 
 Together ^^53,000,000 
 
 Add for all omissions and allowances 
 on the property-tax returns, a sup- 
 posed amount of - - - . 5,000,000 
 
 The great increase tliat has of late 
 taken place in our produce having 
 been chiefly on lands already under 
 tillage, we add for new land brought 
 into culture since the peace only - 2,000,000 
 
 Making in all . ^^60,000,000
 
 of our Agriculturists. 141 
 
 Deduct for all abatements of rent since 1814. 
 made, making, or which must, ere long, be made, one- 
 third, or 33 per cent, of the war rents, <^^ ^20, 000, 000 
 
 Remainder ^'1-0,000,000 
 
 a sum which will probably form the rental of Great 
 Britain and Ireland, when the price of wheat shall 
 be steadily between .50.9. and (iO.^. a quarter, and 
 when farming charges shall be brought down to 
 the peace standard. Large as is this abatement of 
 rent, it is less great than the fidl in the price of 
 produce, but the improved husbandry has of late 
 made considerable progress, and the cheapness of 
 provisions has caused a great decrease of poor rate. 
 
 In no class of the community has the effect of 
 transition been either so severe or so long con- 
 tinued as among the agriculturists. 
 
 If to the rental of landlords in the latter years 
 of the war, we add the income of our farmers, we 
 shall find, (see Property- tax returns for 1812, 
 printed in 181(),) including Ireland, an aggregate 
 of more than 100,000,000/. This, it must be 
 allowed, exceeded all due bounds, and a reduction 
 to 75 or even to 70,000,000/., for the total of 
 rental and farming income, would have been 
 nothing more than a fair participation in the ge- 
 neral abatement attendant on peace ; a relinquish- 
 ment of a monopoly for a fair average profit. But 
 of late years the income of farmers is, in a mamier, 
 suspended, and of the rents they at present pay, a 
 large proportion is drawn from their capitiil. 
 
 Of the extent of national injury arising from 
 this state of things, some idea may be formed from
 
 I'J.2 Siliialion and Prospects 
 
 the following estimate of the proportion borne by 
 Uirriniltiire to the productive industry of the 
 country at large. 
 
 Proportions 
 in 100. 
 
 IVoportion <tf the national revenue arising from agricul- 
 ture at the reduced prices of peace, about - - 30 
 
 Proportion of our population dependent for employ- 
 ment on agriculture (see the Population Return of 
 1821) in Great Britain, distinct from Ireland - 33 
 
 Proportion of national jjroperty annually created, being 
 the amount of corn, grass, wool, hemp, flax, timber, 
 &c. after a suitable deduction from Mr. Colquhoun's 
 estimate - - - - - - 45 
 
 Proportion of national capital affected by the pros- 
 perity or decline of agriculture, being the value of 
 our land, farming stock, and houses on farms and 
 estates, adopting Mr. Colquhoun's mode of estimat- 
 ing, but making a great abatement on the prices of 
 1812, (see Appendix to the chapter on National 
 Revenue and Capital) above - - - - 60 
 
 After this statement, it is needless to expatiate 
 on the magnitude of the injuiy arising to our ma- 
 nufacturers, our shop-keepers, or the Treasury, 
 from the distress of agriculture : nor need we go 
 farther to account for the chief part of the national 
 embarrassment in 1816, or of our revived pro- 
 sperity in 1818. It is almost equally idle to discuss 
 the question, whether the agriculturists are en- 
 titled to our sympathy, or whether their profits, 
 towaids the close of the war, were not such as to 
 exceed all legitimate proportion. Their case in- 
 volves a question of poUcy fully as much as of 
 justice, — the losses of any great part of the nation 
 forming the losses of the whole, and any deficiency 
 in their contributions to the exchequer falling ne- 
 cessarily on the other classes.
 
 irf'our A<i;ricidturt6ls. i^S 
 
 Present Situation of our lAindlords and Farmers. 
 — A reduction in the circumstances of farmers 
 was unavoidable, their profits liaving consisted less 
 in acquisition of capital tlian in additions to in- 
 come — additions which were great only in the 
 latter years of the war, and arose chiefly from the 
 depreciation of om- currency. With landlords the 
 case was somewhat different : their increased 
 receipts had been less connected with depreciation, 
 while their possession of capital exempted them 
 from any immediate necessity of altering tlieir 
 scale of expence. Time has been afforded tiiem 
 to make a deliberate distinction between nominal 
 and real income ; between that decrease which 
 actually deducts from the power of expenditure, 
 and that which, in consequence of the rise in the 
 value of money, does so only in appearance. 
 During the war they had an opportunity of ob- 
 serving how closely augmented expenditure fol- 
 lowed augmented income ; it now remains for 
 them to try reduction, and to carry it to the length 
 pointed out by the fall in the price of commodities. 
 That fall does not, we allow, apply to them so 
 largely as to the lower and middling classes : it has 
 taken place chiefly in the necessaries of life, and, 
 as yet at least, holds much less in regard to the 
 expence of the higher ranks, such as the bills 
 of tradesmen, salaries, wages of servants, pro- 
 fessional fees, to which we may add education at 
 our public schools or universities, along with the 
 cost of articles of luxury, such as wines, plate, and 
 ornamental furniture. Yet even in these reiluction 
 has commenced, and may be carried much fiuther 
 when the upper classes think proper to hold a
 
 144. Sihtatioji and Prospect a 
 
 decided tone, and retrench abuses engendered in 
 days of al)iindance. 
 
 On com))anng the present situation of our land- 
 lords with what it was in tlie latter years of the 
 war, we are led to compute the apparent or nomi- 
 nal decrease of their income at forty per cent., the 
 real decrease at twenty per cent. ; assuming that 
 the remaining twenty' per cent, are counterj)oised 
 by reduction in their expenditure either already 
 made or perfectly practicable. We go, perhaps, 
 too far in supposing an actual loss to the extent of 
 twenty per cent. : if we make allowance for the 
 repeal of the property-tax, and reduction of the 
 assessed taxes, the loss should, doubtless, be less ; 
 but, without pressing that point, we proceed to 
 ask from what source the extra income arose 
 durincr the w^ar? Partly from the general rise of 
 profit at tliat period, more from an advantage pecu- 
 liar to agriculturists, the monopoly of the market in 
 consequence of the continued insufficiency of our 
 growth. Advantages such as these are necessarily 
 temporary, and, could the nature of our situation 
 have been foreseen, would have been considered 
 by landlords as at a close, as soon as our political 
 circumstances were changed, and the country be- 
 came assured of peace. 
 
 But rents, even on this reduced scale, are not, 
 it may be said, paid at present, nor are our prices 
 equal to the cost of production, leaving rent wholly 
 out of the question. We answer that no calcula- 
 tion can be founded on the circumstances of this 
 season of transition and over-stock ; but as a great 
 part of the distress arises from temporary causes, 
 such as the tardy reduction of farming charges, the 
 better plan is to calculate probabilities, and to 
 reason on a rate of rent, which though not yet ge-
 
 ujoiir Agriculturists, 145 
 
 nerally established, is rendered likely by ji concur- 
 rence of circumstances. 
 
 What, it may be asked, is tliis probable rate of 
 rent ? Several of our principal • landlords, con- 
 vinced of the inefficacy of corn laws to keep up 
 the market, have given examples of successive re- 
 duction, carrying the wliole, since 1814, to SO 
 or S5 per cent, on their war rents. Our hope is, 
 that such examples may be imitated in all their 
 extent. Supposing, for the sake of illustration, 
 that of this deduction 10 or \5 per cent, had been 
 in general made between the year 1814 and the 
 date of the examination of the witnesses, before 
 the Agricultural Committee of 18!21 ; there then 
 remained to make a farther abatement of 20 or 25 
 per cent., an abatement repeatedly alluded to in 
 the evidence as necessary, acceded to by many 
 individuals since that time, and which, as far as we 
 are enabled to judge, is imperiously required by the 
 exigency of the case. We shall suppose, therefore, 
 that what is as yet partial, has become general, and 
 tliat our landlords, throughout the kingdom, aware, 
 on the one hand, of the increased value of money, on 
 the other, of the necessity of sacrificing a part to save 
 the remainder, have consented to this reduction ; 
 also, that the farmers succeed in the arduous task 
 of accomplisiiing a corresponding diminution in 
 labour and the other charges of culture. Were 
 tiiese grand points adjusted, the j)rospect of our 
 agriculturists would be cleared of a part of its 
 gloom ; their horizon would brighten, and it would, 
 we might hope, be no longer doubtful whether ruin 
 or recovery is to be their lot. 
 
 Supposing this reduction effected, what price, it 
 may be inquired, would enable tlie farmer to dis- 
 charge his engagements, and to earn a fair sup- 
 
 L
 
 14G Situation and Prospects 
 
 port? 3i^Tty shillinfrs for a quarter of wheat in 
 the counties adjacent to the metropoHs, and be- 
 tween Jifty-Jive and sixty shillings in those where 
 labour is cheaper. This estimate is supported di- 
 rectly by the opinion of Mr. Rodwell, (Evidence, 
 Report of 1821, p. 66.)>and of Mr. Brodie, (p. 335.) 
 while indirectly it is confirmed by all who, when 
 desired to say the cost of raising wheat without 
 rent, fixed it at the charges of 1821, betw^een 55s. 
 and 60^. A deduction of 25 per cent, would 
 bring the cost to 4<5s., and a market price between 
 55s. and 60^. would obviously sui)ply the fund re- 
 quisite for the payment of the rent, which is in ge- 
 neral a fourth or a fiflh of the produce. 
 
 How far is the probabihty of 55s. or 605., as a 
 medium price in peace, confirmed by other cir- 
 cumstances, in particular by the average price of 
 other countries ? Wheat at Dantzic has avera- 
 ged, (Evidence, Agricultural Committee, p. 366.) 
 during the last half century about 4f5s. a quarter ; 
 while in the parts of the Continent, adjacent to 
 England, we mean the Netherlands, and the north 
 of France, 45^. a quarter are generally considered 
 sufficient for the indemnity of the farmer. This 
 difference supposes an advance of 20 per cent, to 
 our farmers in consideration of their higher rents 
 and somewhat heavier burdens in other respects. 
 After the high prices of the war, an average of 55s. 
 or 60^. appears low : but in the payment of labour, in 
 the power of purchase generally, it at present is, or 
 ought to be equal to 80s. in the latter part of the 
 war, and the point is not that which may be ex- 
 pected, but that which it is practicable to attain. 
 Add to this, that under such a price our manufac- 
 turers would probably acquiesce without complaint, 
 considering our national superiority in fuel, navi-
 
 uj' our As^ricidturists. 147 
 
 gatioii, and command of capital, such as to admit, 
 without much hazard, of a relative disadvantage 
 in the cost of subsistence. 
 
 How tar is the probability of such an average 
 confirmed b}- a retrospect to history, to peiiods in 
 which our agriculture was prosperous? In 1804, 
 a price varying from 63s. to 6Qs. was accounted 
 sufficient by Parliament, under charges heavier than 
 those we have now in prospect. During the thirty 
 years between 17^)3 and 1793, our farmers made 
 few complaints, though the average price of wheat 
 was 49^. a quarter, or about 15 per cent, less tlian 
 we consider necessary tor the present time. And 
 if we compare the farming charges on the reduced 
 scale we have anticipated, with those previous to 
 1793, we shall find that tiie excess of the former, 
 is, or ought to continue great in one })oint onlv, 
 — taxation. 
 
 This leads naturally to the inquiry, '* how tar 
 ** the public burdens, at present defrayed by agri- 
 " culture, exceed those of 1792." In treating this 
 subject in a preceding chapter, we have had occasion 
 (p. 59.) to estimate the increase of burden to the 
 public at large at 12 percent, on their income: in 
 tlie case of the farmers, we shall make a liberal al- 
 lowance, and suppose that from the pressure of 
 poor rate, the additional burden since 1792, is 
 nearly 20 per cent. This, be it observed, is burden 
 on mcome, but tlie produce, of a farm being com- 
 puted by SLUveyors at three or four times the 
 tenant's income, (see the Property-tax return, 
 1810), it follows that 20 per cent, on income will 
 be defrayed by an addition of .5 or () per cent, to 
 the price of ithe produce. Now could the farniers 
 obtain the 55s. or dO^. which we have termed a fair 
 average, the result would be their having a snrphis 
 
 I. 2
 
 14,8 Situation and Prospects 
 
 above the prices of 1792 sufficient to serve as a 
 counterpoise to labour and tlie other charges (dis- 
 tinct from taxation), which are higher at present 
 than in 1792, and which it will be a task of 
 great time and difficulty to reduce. 
 
 The reasoning in the preceding pages, fair as it 
 may seem to some, and sanctioned as it is by the 
 example of such men as Earl Fitzwilliam and 
 Mr, Coke, may appear in a very different light to 
 others, who, whether landlords or farmers, are ill 
 prepared to relinquish the hope of high price. Of 
 these persons, some may still cling to the imagined 
 effect of a protecting duty, others, with more plausi- 
 bility, may build their expectations of an impro\'ed 
 market on the progressive increase of population 
 and on the contingency of a deficient harvest. It 
 is of consequence, therefore, to enter at some 
 length into a consideration of these arguments, 
 and to attempt to bring into the form of an esti- 
 mate, results, which, at present, are vague and un- 
 defined. 
 
 Effect of increasing Population on the Price of 
 Corn, — The returns in the present age have shown 
 an increase m our population to an extent which 
 we had, for some time, difficulty in considering 
 correct, and which when put beyond doubt, was 
 ascribed by many to the temporary stimulus arising 
 from the war. It bids fair, however, to be pro- 
 gressive, arising, as it apparently does, from 
 causes of a permanent nature ; from an improve- 
 ment in the condition of the lower orders, in diet, 
 clothing, and lodging, as well as from the preserv- 
 ation of the lives of children by vaccination. But 
 those who found on this an expectation of rehef 
 to our agriculturists, overlook one verv material
 
 of our Agriculturists. 149 
 
 point ; " that the productive powers of our better 
 soils, far from having reached their te?yni?ius, may 
 be made to yield a far larger produce by additional 
 labour and the adoption of the improved methods 
 of husbandry.*' 
 
 In support of this apparently bold assertion, we 
 refer, as well to the already quoted arguments of 
 a practical agriculturist, (Mr. Becher,) as to our 
 experience, as a nation, during the last nine years. 
 No period was more calculated to suggest the in- 
 ference of a limitation of the productive powers of 
 our soil than the twenty years preceding 1814, yet 
 this opinion (sec the preceding section, page l-'i?*) 
 has been completely disproved by the result of our 
 agriculture since the peace. If we take a wider 
 range than the experience of the present age, and 
 refer to the history of this and other countries, 
 we find France as capable at present of main- 
 taining a population of 30,000,000, as of supporting 
 20,000,000 in the beginning of the 18th century, 
 or 15,000,000 in the beginning of the lyth. And 
 France may be termed an example altogether in 
 pointof increase of produce from increase of hands, 
 manual labour forming the basis of her agriculture, 
 to the exclusion, in a great degree, of machinery. 
 
 England furnislies a case apparently stronger 
 than France, the increase of our population, during 
 the last century, having been considerably more 
 rapid, and our soil beuig still equal to their sub- 
 sistence. But we forbear dwelling on this, because 
 it may be argued that the productive power of our 
 agriculture lias, particularly in the present age, 
 been much promoted by means distinct from in- 
 crease of popidation, we mean machiner), and 
 other aids arising from the connnand of capital. 
 We cannot, however, but express a belief) that the
 
 J. 10 Situation cmd Prospects 
 
 next gencratioij of our countrymen will, in aU 
 j)rol)al)ility, raise a supply of subsistence as far 
 beyond ours, as ours is beyond tliat of the last a^^e; 
 and that our descendants, on comparing the two 
 periods, will feel no little surprise at the negative 
 predictions of several of our political economist*;. 
 Without contesting in the abstract the principles 
 of the latter, we must add that nothing is more 
 likely to mislead than the assertions of those who 
 assign limits to the extension of the productive 
 powers of our soil, imperfectly acquainted as they 
 are with its capabilities, and still more unable to 
 foresee the successive improvements that may, and 
 in all probability will, be made in husbandry. How 
 greatly does our prospect of supply exceed their 
 anticipation : how large, for instance, would be the 
 addition to the produce of the West of England, and 
 of Ireland, were these countries merely to adopt the 
 improved plan now generally followed in our eastern 
 and northern counties. (See Appendix, p. [37].) 
 Consumers may increase xdthout raising Prices. — 
 Our next argument, similar in its object, is some- 
 what different in its nature. There exists a per- 
 petual tendency to removal from country to town, 
 and, on com])aring our population lists at different 
 periods, we iind the inhabitants of towns, in other 
 words, the consumers of corn, gradually augment 
 their proportion relatively to the producers. Both 
 classes increase their numbers, but in towns the 
 ratio is larger. We nuist be cautious, however, of 
 drawins; from this fact anv conclusion as to rise of 
 price; it merely marks the natural progress of society 
 in an enhghtened country ; a progress easily traced 
 in our history for more than two centuries, the 
 agriculturists of England, who now form only 33 
 'per cent, of our population, having, we believe.
 
 of our Agricultuiists. 151 
 
 formed upwards of 50 or GO per cent, of it in the 
 reigns of Elizabeth and James I. Still the supply 
 of produce has continued equal to our increased 
 numbers, and the cause is obvious, the use of ma- 
 chinery, and the adoption of various improvements, 
 enabling the same number of hands to raise a much 
 larger quantity of subsistence. 
 
 Is then no rise of prices to be expected from the 
 increase of our population ? It certainly may be 
 expected under circumstances which giv^e a new or 
 different employment to a portion of our numbers 
 -—such as appear to have prevailed on the extension 
 of our cotton manufactures afiter 1780, and such as 
 evidently characterise the present emigration to 
 Upper Canada, and the Western States of America, 
 the larger proportion of the emigrants being agri- 
 culturists. To this we add, that the increase of 
 our numbers has in it something encouraging and 
 cheering : // assures, in a great measurey the conti- 
 nuance of tillage on our inferior soils: and, taken in 
 a more general view, it keeps alive the expectation 
 of national improvement so fully described by 
 Mr. S. Gray, and which shall be noticed at greater 
 length when we come to treat of the subject of 
 popidation. 
 
 Kffccts of a had Season on the Price of Corn. — 
 The rise in our corn market, produced by a bad 
 or even an indifferent season, is in time qf^^ivar very 
 considerable. The difference between the crop of 
 one year and that of another will be found, without 
 resorting to an extreme case, such as 1816, to be 
 frequently (Evidence, Agricultural Committee of 
 1821, p. 264.) between 10 and 20 per cent. Add 
 to this that on such occasions our purchases abroad 
 are generally enhanced by the causes which pro- 
 
 T '4
 
 1,^2 Situdlion and Prospects 
 
 duce enhancement in this country. The public, par- 
 ticularly the untra veiled part of the public, are 
 hardly aware of" the similarity of tem])erature 
 prevailing throughout what may be called the corn- 
 country of Europe, we mean Great Britain, Ireland, 
 the north of France, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
 the north-west of (jermany, and, in some measure, 
 Poland, and tiic nortli-east of Germany. All this 
 tract is situated between the 45th and 55th degrees 
 of latitude, and subject, in a considerable degree, 
 to the prevalence of similar wands. Neither the 
 superabundance of rain which we experience in 
 one summer, or its deficiency in another, are by 
 any means confined to Britain and Ireland ; while 
 in winter, both the intensity and duration of frost 
 are always greater on the Continent. Exceptions 
 certainly exist in particular tracts, but in support 
 of our general argument, we have merely to recall 
 to those of our readers who are of an age to recol- 
 lect the early part of the war, or who have attended 
 to registers of temperature, the more remarkable 
 seasons of the present age. Thus, in 179 1-, the 
 spring was prematurely warm on the Continent as 
 in England : there, as with us, the summer of 
 1798 w^as dry, and that of 1799 wet: again, in 
 1811 the harvest was deficient throughout the 
 north-west of Europe generally, from one and the 
 same cause, blight; while that of 1816 was still 
 more generally deficient from rain and want of 
 warmth. In regard to a more remote period, we 
 mean the 17th and 18th centuries generally, if the 
 temperature has not been so accurately noted, we 
 find, from the coincidence in prices, that it is 
 highlyprobable that there prevailed a great similarity 
 between our weather and that of the Continent : 
 thus, in France the latter years of the 17tli century.
 
 of ow Agriculturists. 1.53 
 
 the seasons of I7O8 and I709, as well as several of 
 the seasons between 1764 and 1773, were as un- 
 propitious and attended with as great an advance 
 of price as in England. 
 
 Another observation as yet little attended to, 
 but whicli has found a place in the Agricultural 
 Report of 1821, is, that an indifferent season is 
 not always followed by a favourable one, but that 
 two, and even more than t^vo deficiencies of crop 
 occur sometimes in succession. Such was the case 
 in the latter years of Elizabeth, in the reign of 
 William III., and in our own time, in 1799 and 
 1 800. On each of these occasions the consequences 
 were very serious, leading to a distressing rise of 
 price, and showing all the importance of making the 
 plenty of one year conduce to the relief of another. 
 
 Less felt in peace than in xvar. — But while in 
 war, the effect of a bad or indifferent season is 
 thus severe, its pressure is greatl}' alleviated by the 
 cheap freight and open communication of a state 
 of peace. On referring to the record of our ])rices 
 during a century and a lialf prior to 1/93, we find 
 that throughout that long period the effect of an 
 unfavourable season was to carry wheat from 40*. 
 to 50s. or 55s., rarely to ()0s. Now 55s. or 60s. 
 in these days were nearly equal to 70.!>'. at the present 
 value of money, and the latter would probably be 
 the ciuTcncy of our market in the event of a partial 
 deficiency like that of 179.5, 1801-, 1809. To carry 
 our peace prices higher would require a fiiihue as 
 general as that of 181(), or two partial deficiencies 
 in succession as in 1799 and 1800. To tliose who 
 think otherwise, we submit two considerations ; 
 first, that the increase of our numbers does not much 
 increase the difficulty of supplying our consump- 
 tion at home; and next, that the range of foreign
 
 154 Situation and Prospects 
 
 territory from which our corn imports may now 
 be derived is much wider than during last century. 
 Add to this, that a continuance of peace tends 
 in many ways to an equalization of price between 
 difierent countries. The obstacles to emigration 
 ai'e then removed : the tempting jjrotit attendant 
 on government contracts and other war specula- 
 tions no longer detain at home either the individual 
 or his capital : the charges of farming as of pro- 
 ductive industry generally, are calculated closely, 
 and a decided preference is given to the country 
 where those charges are most moderate. Another, 
 and a stiJl more substantial cause of equalization of 
 price is the increased command of capital in peace, 
 the augmented means of buying up the superabun- 
 dance of one year as a supply for the demands of 
 the next. Among other structures of recent date 
 in the vicinity of the Thames, arc warehouses in 
 which corn may be preserved during six or seven 
 years without injury : the expence, which in the 
 case of wheat was, till lately, '^s. a quarter, would 
 be materially lessened in purchases made at the 
 present low prices, as a portion of it arises from 
 interest on the purchase-money. (See Appendix, 
 p. [42].) 
 
 Re-action of the Market Price of Corn on the Cost 
 of its Production. — If the influence of the seasons 
 has not yet been duly appreciated, much less is that 
 tiie case in regard to another cause of rise and fall 
 which we admit to be somewhat complicated in its 
 nature, and tardy in its operation ; we mean the 
 re-action of tlie market price of corn on the cost of 
 its production. Our object will be best understood 
 • by an analysis of the charges of cultivation, as ex- 
 hibited in tlie subjoined table.
 
 of our Agriculturists. 
 
 155 
 
 Expence of cultivating 100 acres of Arable Land in England, 
 at three distinct periods, calculated on an average of the re- 
 turns made to circular letters from the Board of Agriculture 
 to farmers in different parts of the kingdom. 
 
 
 1790. 1 
 
 1803. 
 
 1813. 
 
 £ s. d. 
 
 £ 
 
 s. d. 
 
 £ s. d. 
 
 Rent 
 
 88 6 3J 
 
 121 
 
 2 7i 
 
 161 12 7i 
 
 Tithe - 
 
 20 14. If 
 
 26 
 
 8 Oi 
 
 38 17 3i 
 
 Rates 
 
 17 13 10 
 
 31 
 
 7 7| 
 
 38 19 2f 
 
 Wear and tear 
 
 15 13 5\ 
 
 22 
 
 11 lOi 
 
 31 2 101 
 
 Labour - 
 
 85 5 4.f 
 
 118 
 
 4 
 
 161 12 \\\ 
 
 Seed 
 
 46 4 104 
 
 49 
 
 2 7 
 
 98 17 10 
 
 Manure - 
 
 48 3 
 
 68 
 
 6 2 
 
 37 7 Oi 
 
 Team 
 
 67 4 10 
 
 80 
 
 8 0^ 
 
 134 19 8;^ 
 
 Interest - 
 
 22 11 lU 
 
 30 
 
 3 8^ 
 
 50 5 6 
 
 Taxes - 
 
 Total - 
 
 — 
 
 
 — 
 
 18 1 4 
 
 411 15 IVf 
 
 547 
 
 10 IH 
 
 771 16 4i 
 
 Note. The article manure is underrated in the last column ; 
 were it fully stated, the aggregate of 1813 would have ex- 
 ceeded 800/. 
 
 This document presents materials for reasoning 
 of equal importance to the agriculturist and politi- 
 cal economist, exhibiting all the constituent parts 
 of the cost of corn, and enabling us to explain both 
 the high prices of a state of war, and the fall 
 attendant on peace. 
 
 War. — The effects of war are first felt in the 
 price of labour, the interest of money, and the 
 direct taxes. These all operate to enhance corn : 
 the price of seed is necessarily augmented by such 
 a rise : an increase of tithe, as expressed in money, 
 is a consequence almost equally direct : the ex- 
 pence of team and manure cannot, under such cir- 
 cumstances, be long stationary ; and an advance of 
 poor-rate has, ever since the days of Queen Eliza-
 
 |j(i SiiiKtlion and Prospects 
 
 bc'tli, followed, at no distant date, an augmented 
 price of bread. 
 
 Such was the progress of farming cliarges during 
 the late wars. The early part of the period was 
 with our farmers a season of complaint, and with 
 the exception of tenants on lease, the partial rise 
 in price, accompanied as it was by high charges, 
 was accounted a disadvantage to agriculturists. 
 After 1804, their situation improved, but it was not 
 till 1809 that the advantage of war to the farmer 
 became great and general. 
 
 Peace. — Next, as to the reverse of the picture, 
 — the unweaving of that web wliicli owed its tex- 
 tiu'c to a double war and a depreciated currency. 
 Wages, interest of money, the cost of horses, and, 
 in some degree, direct taxes, have all undergone 
 reduction since the peace, in particular since 1820: 
 a fall in the price of seed is a matter of course, 
 while a diminution of tithe and a reduced charge 
 in the bills of tradesmen, are the eventual though 
 less direct results of a decline in the corn market. 
 The remaining charges are rent and poor-rate, both 
 very difficult of reduction, because in the case of land- 
 lords the diminution of expenditure is not equal to 
 the fall of corn, while in that of the poor a decrease 
 in employment retards that reduction of parochial 
 charge, which would otherwise follow the cheap- 
 ness of the necessaries of life. These, however, 
 are only postponements of an unavoidable residt : 
 landlords must resign in peace the monopoly attend- 
 ant on war, while to our labouring classes the ex- 
 tension of manufactures consequent on the fall of 
 provisions, affords relief, not speedv, perhaps, but 
 eventually certain. 
 
 Wliat then ouscht to bo our inference from the
 
 ojour Agricullurhts. L57 
 
 preceding reasoning ? That farming charges neces- 
 sarily rise with tlie niarket-j)rice of corn, and as 
 necessarily become reduced by its decline. Now 
 as the reduction of charge is as yet by no means 
 proportioned to the fall of })rice, we are justified in 
 anticipating that the former will become general, 
 and afford, in any event, considerable rehef to the 
 farmers. 
 
 Evidence before the Agricultural Committee. — 
 Our reasoning may be somewhat elucidated by a 
 reference to the answers of the witnesses examined 
 by the Agricultural Committee of 1821, about the 
 cost of raising a quarter of wheat. They declared 
 55s. or QOs. (Evidence, pp.37. 55. 72.) to be indis- 
 pensable to meet the charges exclusive of rent ; 
 but that price will be found to supply a fund tor 
 rent also, if we suppose a general diminution of 
 twenty -Jive per cent, on farming charges. An 
 abatement of this nature was, as we have already 
 remarked, evidently in the view of several of the 
 witnesses. One of them, a landsurveyor, declared, 
 (p. 191.) that a price of Gl.v., with 'a proportional 
 reduction of charges^ would afford a fair rent : 
 while another, a farmer residing in Suffolk, ad- 
 verted (p. sn.) to the remarkable fact that 2,000/. 
 forms as efficient a capital at present as 3,000/. in 
 1817, iind considered that in the event of an abate- 
 ment of one-fourth of rent, poor-rate, labour, tithe, 
 and taxes, 60*. a quarter would afford a fair ))rofit 
 in his county. The answer of a third witness 
 (p. 33.5.) is still more remarkable, for it declares a 
 much lower price to be sufficient in a quarter (East 
 Lothian) where labour is somewhat cheaper, imd 
 tithe happily unknown. 
 
 How fai- do these conclusions appear to be fami-
 
 1.58 Situation and Prvapccts 
 
 liar to the majority of those who have written or 
 given evidence on tlie state of our agriculture? 
 Landsurveyors, accustomed to arithmetical calcu- 
 lation, are aware of these truths in a general sense; 
 but the majority of them, like the majority of our 
 farmers, long accustomed to a state of war, have 
 still difficulty in considering as permanent the low 
 prices and low charges of peace. Next as to the 
 Agricultural Report of 1821 ; — that valuable docu- 
 ment seems to have been composed under a con- 
 viction similar to that which we entertain, but un- 
 fortunately it nowhere exhibits a clear and pointed 
 affirmation of the connexion between the price of 
 corn and the cost of raising it. 
 
 Are loxv Prices likely to continue ? 
 
 We are now to follo\v up the arguments on the 
 \ery interesting question of a rise or fall in the 
 market price of corn. Those in favour of a rise 
 are — 
 
 1st. The expence of bringing into culture new^ 
 soils of inferior quality to meet the wants of our 
 increasing numbers. This, the chief argument of 
 theoretical writers, is already in a great measure 
 answered by the result of the last nine years ; by 
 the evidence that the largest additional produce is 
 obtained from soils already under tillage ; and that 
 the grand means of increase consist in the appli- 
 cation of additional labour to such soils. Our in- 
 closure bills in tlie six years previous to 1815 
 averaged 11.5 annually ; in the six following years, 
 during which our produce has increased so largely, 
 they averaged only -18 ; a decisive proof tliat the 
 quantity of produce may be kept up and augmented 
 without bringing much new soil under culture.
 
 of our Agriculturists. 159 
 
 2d. The expence of keeping inferior soils in cul- 
 tivation, and the necessity of abandoning them if 
 low prices continue. This argument carries much 
 more w'eiglit than the preceding, and might pro- 
 duce a kind of revolution in prices were it not 
 counteracted by a cause of most powerful oper- 
 ation, — the decrease in farming charges conse- 
 quent on a decrease in the price of corn. This 
 fact, joined to the increase of our population, will 
 probably prevent the abandonment, to any great 
 extent, of inferior soils. No inference can be 
 drawn from the present situation of our agricul- 
 turists who labour under all the evils of transition 
 and disproportion ; subject at once to heavy charges 
 and low prices. At a time when we are told from 
 so many quarters of over-cropping, of decay of 
 farming stock, and of multiplied bankruptcies, we 
 must necessarily take tor granted that the plough 
 will, to some extent, at least, be withdrawn from 
 the less productive lands. In the parts of Scotland 
 where tillage was carried farthest, this painful 
 alternative seems hardly to be avoided : in J^ng- 
 land, at least in various parts of England, the case 
 is somewhat different : tillage was not so often car- 
 ried to an extreme, and tlie solicitude of the land- 
 lords (Evidence, p. 43.) to prevent the degradation 
 of their estates by paying for lime and other requi- 
 sites to the maintenance of good husbandry, will 
 operate to lessen this and other evils. Add to this 
 the remarkable fact, that after all the extension 
 given to our tillage in the present age, the propor- 
 tion of ground under the plough and spade is 
 (Napier*s Supplement to the Encyclopjvdia, head 
 of France, p. 373.) considerably smaller in Eng- 
 land than in France. Add also another fact hardly 
 less important, that the practice of drilling corn, so
 
 KJO Si hid hi) II (I IK J rrospects 
 
 lately introduced, is particidarly suitable to second- 
 rate soils. 
 
 But su])posing that the tillage of inferior soils 
 were relinquished to a ceitain extent both in Eng- 
 land and Scotland, it does not necessarily follow 
 tiiat the amount of our produce would decrease : 
 our labour must be employed somehow, and would 
 be transferred to the riclier soils. A diminution of 
 production is altogether contrary to the disposition 
 of our countrymen : an increase of quantity, even 
 when an article sells for a low price, is more in 
 correspondence with their active and enterprizing 
 habits. No decrease of our agricultural produce 
 took place during the long stagnation of last cen- 
 tury ; durhig the fifty years that elapsed between 
 1713 and 17()o. And if we advert to a parallel 
 case in the present age, that of our West India 
 Sugar planters, we shall find that during a number 
 of years, (180^. 1805, 6, 7,) their produce as little 
 paid the expence of raising it, as corn does at 
 present. A number of estates were abandoned; in 
 others, the cultivation was reduced ; but this was 
 so effectually balanced by the increased produc- 
 tiveness of the richer soils, that very little, if 
 any, diminution took place in the total quantity 
 raised. 
 
 3d. A protecting Duty on Foreign Cor?i. — The 
 efficacy or non-efficacy of such a measure is, in a 
 great degree, matter of opinion. Without as- 
 suming a decisive tone on either side, we shall 
 have occasion to show in the next section that a 
 high duty would by no means cause a permanent 
 rise in our corn market, and that the only safe 
 course is to regard the last thirty years as a period 
 peculiar in its circumstances, and altogether dif-
 
 oJ'oLir Agriculturists. 161 
 
 i'erent from a season of j)eace. We ought in tlie 
 next place, to cany l^ack our view to the period 
 preceding IJOS, and ascertain whether tiie increase 
 of the charge of raising corn arising from taxes or 
 otherwise, exceeds the saving attendant on the im- 
 provements adopted in our luisbandry. In that pro- 
 portion only would it be j)racticable to maintain an 
 increase of price : any attempt to carry it higher 
 would be defeated by the extension of our home 
 growth. Agriculture, like trade, has its projectors ; 
 men ready to transfer to it capital from other 
 pursuits, and wlio would find, })articularly in Ire- 
 land, many rich tracts open to tlieir speculations, 
 now tiiat there remains so little inducement to keep 
 them in pasture. The only method, therefore, of 
 giving the established farmer a fair chance is, to 
 be very s})aring of bounties, protecting duties, and 
 other stinudants ; the effect of which is unnatural, 
 temporary, and eventually pernicious to those who 
 receive them. 
 
 4th. Conti/igciic// (>/' a bad Season. — On this 
 bead we liave already attempted a calculation, 
 showing that in former })eriods of peace the extent 
 of rise varied from 10.y. to "^O.y. on the (juarter of 
 wheat, according to the degree of failure in the 
 harvest. Under present circumstances, this limited 
 advance is much more likely to characterise our 
 markets than the greater fluctuation that took place 
 in the late wars. 
 
 That our prices of wheat are not likely to exceed 
 55 or ()0.y., is confirmed bv some arguments of a 
 more consolatory nature ; viz. 
 
 IVie increase of our groxi'lli from the di/fhsiofi of 
 the improved ITushandrj/. Under this head we 
 are disposed to class the more general introduction 
 of drilling ; the farther consolidation of small farms ; 
 
 M
 
 H')''2 Situation and Proapects 
 
 and the more frequent a(loj)tioii of leases when 
 the changes in our money system shall have reach- 
 ed their termination. For her pasturage England 
 is deservedly celebrated, but her tillage is only par- 
 tially good. In no branch of our national industrv 
 has improving exam])le been as yet less generally 
 followed : in none has it a wider field to occupy. 
 
 The reduced Interest of Moneij The fall of 
 
 interest on public securities since the peace is 
 about one per cent., and the prospect is in favour 
 of some farther decrease ; or rather, that the reduc- 
 tion, at present partial, will become general, and be 
 communicated to private as well as public securi- 
 ties. No line of business oilers at present a tempt- 
 ing return ; nor is any likely to withdraw money 
 investments from agriculture. Add to this, that 
 from the reduced price of all farming stock, the 
 appropriation of 1000/. to farming (Evidence, Agri- 
 cultural Committee, p. 86.) is likely soon to be equi- 
 valent to that of SOOO/. in the time of high prices. 
 
 Such are the principal arguments against any 
 material rise in our corn market ; and if their 
 conjunct effect be merely to give us the supply of 
 a three weeks' consumption above the average of 
 our crops in war, the result will be a prevention 
 of high prices, so nearly did our growth approach 
 even in former years to our consumption. 
 
 Contingency of War. — In the event of war, all 
 these anticipations would be overturned : our ca- 
 pital would no longer be abundant ; our naviga- 
 tion no longer cheap ; while fiom no branch of 
 our industry would labourers be more generally 
 withdrawn for cjovernment service than from as-ri- 
 culture. At present, however, we leave this for- 
 midable contingency out of the question: in France,
 
 of our Agriculturists, Ifi^ 
 
 the only country which immediately affects our 
 foreign politics, there exist the strongest reasons 
 for adhering to a j)acific course ; and if that govern- 
 ment be induced for a time to deviate from it, the 
 recurrence of a state of war so general as that 
 which followed the French Revolution, is certainly 
 not to be expected in the life-time of the })resent 
 generation. Or, if we admit it to be impracticable 
 to reason with confidence on so wide a question, 
 there is at least one point which we may safely take 
 for granted, viz. that our public men, in the event 
 of a new appeal to arms, will abstain from two of 
 the measures, which, more than any other, contri- 
 buted to raise our corn market, — interference 
 with our currency, and the stoppage of neutral 
 navigation. 
 
 " These they will shun through all the dire debate, 
 And' dread those arms whose force they felt so late."' 
 
 Prospect of Relief to Fanners. — This question, 
 though a]:)parently identified with that of lise of 
 ])rice, will be ibund on examination to rest on very 
 different grounds, and to present, happily, a less 
 imfavourable prospect. Tlu' reasons for this opi- 
 nion are, — 
 
 1. The interest of all farmers wlio are not tenants 
 on lease (Evidence, Agricultural Committee, pp. 
 49. 1*^0.) is to ha\e not a hii;'h, hut a stead ij price. 
 Taken in a ])ermanent view, that ])rice is most 
 desirable which gives stability to our manufactures, 
 and prevents our continental rivals from Inning 
 too great a superioHty over us in the nuiiii point 
 of subsistence. 
 
 2. Our growth, if it equal, does not, in ordinary 
 seasons, exceed our consumption ; a situation a 
 good deal different from that of our agriculturists
 
 I(j4 Situation and Prospects 
 
 after the peace of Utrecht. This fact, it" it does 
 not justify the expectation of a rise of price, affords, 
 when considered along with our increasing num- 
 bers, a kind of guarantee of the past ; a security 
 against the abandonment, to any great extent, of 
 the inferior soils. 
 
 3. The tendency of agricultural charges to de- 
 crease with the market-price of corn, and of the 
 rate of profit in every line to approach to a common 
 standard. 
 
 4 Tithe. — Since war and high prices can no 
 longer enter into the calculation of our agricul- 
 turists, it becomes indispensable for them, as for 
 the equally unfortunate sugar planter, to seek relief 
 in a reduction of expence. In this by far the 
 most effectual step would be a commutation of tithe, 
 an exchange of a crude, unequal, and at present 
 oppressive, mode of providing for the clergy, for a 
 contribution from the public generally ; a change 
 which would be facilitated by the growing nature 
 of our financial resources, and for which, as shall 
 be showni in a subsequent passage (p. 185), the 
 landed interest would be able to make an adequate 
 return to the public. 
 
 5. Poor-rate. — To this subject we shall shortly 
 appropriate a chapter, and take occasion to show 
 how little information is as yet possessed either by 
 government or individuals, in regard to various 
 essential points, such as the different modes of 
 distributing relief, the number of poor in work- 
 houses, the allowance granted for children, and 
 finally, the proportion of disburse for law charges, 
 removals, and other outlay, distinct from the relief 
 of the poor. With such evidence of imperfect 
 information, (acknowledged in the Report on Poor- 
 rate, July 15. 182^,) is it too much to question, whe- 
 ther we act an equitable part in continuing the pre-
 
 of our Agriculturists. 165 
 
 sent mode of assessment ? Without at all entertain- 
 ing the proposition of rendering poor-rate national, 
 we may claim attention to the arguments for a 
 more limited change, for rendering it an equal 
 tax on the parish or district, the levy being made 
 not on rent but on income generally, and extending 
 to other classes besides the farmer and householder. 
 These considerations confirm the hope that, 
 eventually, the situation of our agriculturists will 
 alter, and our tillage be carried on without the im- 
 poverishment of a most useful and respectable body 
 of men. Still tlieir distress must, under any circum- 
 stances, continue some time longer, and be shared 
 by the numerous persons resident in towns whose 
 livelihood depends on ministering either to the 
 wants of tlie farmer or the luxury of the landlord. 
 Every feeling mind must sympathize with those 
 industrious classes, whether in town or country, 
 whose ])rivations, very different fiom those of their 
 superiors, too often imply the renunciation of real 
 comfort. They have, however, already experienced 
 considerable relief from reduction in their expen- 
 diture ; and a cheering, though somewhat indirect 
 prospect, is opened to them from the improved 
 condition of other classes. All must allow that the 
 sum withdrawn from agricultural income has been 
 far too great in its amoiuit and too sudden in its 
 deduction ; but it is a consolation that it does not, 
 like shi})Wrecked merchandize, or the expence of 
 an indecisive cainj)aign, form a total and absolute 
 loss to the community : it is compensated, as tar 
 as the evil of sudden transition admits of compen- 
 sation, by the cheaper maintenance of our manu- 
 facturers, the prevention of their emigration, and 
 the ultimate benefit arising to our agriculturists 
 from their consumption on a more liberal scale. 
 
 M 3
 
 lOCi 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 A Protecting Didy. 
 
 We come now to the portion of our subject which 
 caused so much discussion in tlie session of 1822 — 
 the imposition of such a duty on fbreifj^n corn as 
 shall afford protection to our agriculturists. Our 
 reasoning on this head will be found materially 
 different from that of the majority of parliamentary 
 speakers, the amount of duty appearing to us a 
 secondary object to the public at large ; while to 
 our agriculturists, it would, if raised to an undue 
 height, be replete with as pernicious consequences 
 as the bounty act of last century. Without further 
 preamble, we proceed to examhie the following 
 points : — 
 
 The comparative burdens on agricidture in 
 France and England. 
 
 How far our manufactures receive protection 
 from our custom duties. 
 
 The danger of over-extending our tillage. 
 
 The tendency of oiu' commercial legislation to 
 the abolition of all restrictions. 
 
 A populous Country not necessarily ejrpensive. 
 
 England is, after tlie Netherlands, the portion of 
 Europe in which population is both most dense as 
 to numbers, and most closely connected by roads 
 and canals. Compared to us, the inhabitants of
 
 Duty on Foreign Conu I67 
 
 France, on an equal surface, are in the proportion 
 of only two to three ; and the degree of separation 
 is very materially increased by another cause — the 
 inferiority of the roads and the want of water com- 
 munication. Germany is still more interior to 
 England, both in numbers and in frequency of inter- 
 course ; and it is needless to show how much more 
 the deficiency prevails in the other parts of Europe, 
 in Spain, Sweden, Poland, Russia. The point at 
 issue is, to ascertain whether density of population 
 necessarily tends to raise prices, to render a coun- 
 try dearer than its scantily peopled neighbour? 
 
 That it has in an eminent degree that tendency 
 is the general impression and report of those among 
 our travelling countrymen, who found their in- 
 ferences on a few points most obvious to common 
 observation, such as the moderate price of labour 
 on the Continent, and the no less moderate rate of 
 excise duties ; but they overlook the various con- 
 siderations on the opposite side of the question, 
 such as the general inferiority of machinery and 
 workmanship, the loss of time caused by distance 
 from towns, and by the necessity of doing })ersonallv 
 that which, in a busy, commercial coinmunity, is 
 prepared by others, and obtained by purchase. In 
 a subsequent publication, when treating of '* Eco- 
 nomy and lletrencinnent," we shall take occasion 
 to explain the distinction between real and ap])arent 
 saving, and describe the habitual waste of time in 
 j)etty occu})ations by the inhabitants of ])rovincial 
 towns on the Continent : at present our wish is 
 merely to lay down the general rule, that a popu- 
 lation dense, improved, affluent, does not neceS' 
 sarih/ render a country more expensix e than one 
 that is poor and thinly inhabited. The diflerence is 
 tit ilie mode of living, not in the price of the articles. 
 
 M 4
 
 lC)H ()i(y Afiricultutr ; 
 
 An increase of population, by leading to an abridg- 
 ment of" labour, and to the transaction of business 
 en masscy brings with it a dispatch and an extent of 
 accommodation ; the saving from which is equal, 
 we believe more than equal, to the enhancement 
 in provisions attendant on augmented numbers. 
 
 It is not in towns of moderate size, however near 
 each other, but only in the case of an overgrown 
 capital, such as London, Paris, or Constantinople, 
 that the real and unavoidable difterence of expence 
 becomes considerable. Holland and England are, 
 it is true, dearer throughout all their provincial 
 towns than the rest of Europe ; but that is owing 
 partly to style of living, partly to high taxation, — to 
 the price paid by either country for the rank which 
 it has maintained in the scale of European })olitics. 
 Were we to subject individual expenditure to an 
 analysis, and to keep separate the portion of it 
 which results from these causes, we should find 
 that our actual prices, the purchase money of com- 
 modities at market, are not, on the whole, much 
 greater than in other countries. 
 
 o 
 
 These remarks are general, and apply to all 
 classes of society. We now proceed to the point 
 more immediately in question, the situation of our 
 agriculturists. 
 
 Comparative Burdens on French and British 
 Agriculture. 
 
 That the pressure on our agricidture is greater 
 than on that of our neighbours is sufficiently known, 
 or rather, sufficiently believed ; for very few per- 
 sons have been at pains to analyze the burdens on 
 either. On our side, they consist of tithe, poor- 
 xatii, land-tax, along with a participation in the
 
 Dutfi on Foreign Corn. 1()9 
 
 assessed taxes, tlie excise duties, and the customs. 
 To begin with the burdens directly apphcable to 
 agriculture — tithe and poor-rate — we are inclined, 
 in consequence of tlie tall of corn, to anticipate that 
 these charges, as Jar as paid by the landed interest^ 
 and as far poor-rale is dislinct from xcages, will, ere 
 long, be reduced to a sum of about 7»00(),()0()/. for 
 both. The amount of the land-tax, adding the 
 redeemed to tiie unredeemed, is about 2,000,000/. ; 
 making together a sum of somewhat more than 
 9,000,000/. To this formidable burden the French 
 may, with a qualification to be mentioned pre- 
 sently, oppose their ^owc/er, or assessment on real 
 property; which, after the ])artial reduction of late 
 years, still forms a charge of 17 or 18 per cent., 
 not on the rent merely, but on the rent and 
 farmer's profit together. Next come our assessed 
 taxes, which, in their present reduced state, are ]n-o- 
 bably balanced by the porles et Jenetres of our 
 southern neighbours, when added to the mohi^ 
 lierj or tax on the reputed value of furniture. Our 
 stamps, swelled as they have been during the late 
 wars, are considered by our landlords as a very 
 serious charge, whether on leases, sales, or loans ; 
 and a member of Parliament, remarked for his 
 acquaintance with such subjects *, went lately 
 the length of asserting that this charge was the 
 most heavily felt of any by our agriculturists. 
 Heavy, however, as it is, even after the modification 
 granted in 1822, its pressure is equalled, in respect 
 to sales at least, by the French enregisti-ement, a 
 duty of no less than 5 per cent, on the })urchase 
 money, which, added to the other departments of 
 the stamps, produces an amount of .3,()0(),000/. ; a 
 
 * Mr. Frankland Lewis.
 
 170 Otir Agriculture ; 
 
 Kun)risiii^ sum to collect from a country never 
 renmrkiible for its wealth. 
 
 So far we may be said to have preserved ecjuaHty 
 in our com})arisons : we now come to j)oints in 
 which there necessarily prevails a difference, though 
 less great than is commonly imagined. Thus, in 
 regard to the charges incurred in the course of cul- 
 tixation, \iz. seed, manure, wear and tear, working 
 cattle, — the difference, very great during the war, 
 has lost, or is now losing, much of its amount. The 
 cost, as expressed in money, is still, we admit, 
 smaller in France ; but in the case of implements, 
 and, in some measure, in that of working cattle, 
 the difference means little more than inferiority of 
 quality ; an inferiority not unlike that whicli would 
 be exhibited by a parallel between our agriculture 
 of the present age and that of the beginning or 
 middle of the last century. A similar remark ap- 
 plies to the domestic expences of a farmer. The 
 difference lies in the style of living more than in 
 the price of the articles ; for in two material points, 
 clothing and fuel, the cost is not higher in England 
 than on the opposite side of the Channel. The fuel 
 of the rural districts of France is generally wood ; 
 sometimes, though rarely, it consists, as in Ireland, 
 of turf or peat. 
 
 We come next to a highly important part of 
 agricultural disburse, the price of labour ; a point 
 in which the balance is greatly in favour of France, 
 the wages of an able-bodied labourer not exceed- 
 ing (Chaptal sur ITndustrie Fran^aise, vol. i. 
 p. 245.) six shillings a week without victuals, a 
 rate considerabl}' below any reduction that we 
 can reasonably expect from the lall in the price of 
 provisions. Nor is this advantage lessened, as 
 some of our countrymen may imagine, by any
 
 DuU) on Foreign Corn. I7I 
 
 personal inferiority on the part of the French pea- 
 santry, who repair to their work at as early hours, 
 and continue enn-aged in it with as much steadi- 
 ness and activity as our own labourers. Add to 
 this, that the saving we have mentioned is en- 
 joyed by the French farmer equally in the case of 
 domestic servants, whose diet is plain and whose 
 habits are sober. In what, then, shall we be able 
 to find on our side of the Channel a counterpoise 
 to this essential advantage? — First, our imple- 
 ments, particularly those of iron, being much 
 superior, enable men of the same bodily power to 
 do more work, or to do it better. Secondly, the 
 use of machinery, such as thresliing-mills or drill- 
 ing-implements, is almost totally unknown in 
 France. Thirdly, our farms are of appropriate 
 size ; while those of our neighbours, limited often 
 to such petty occupancies as those of our an- 
 cestors of the l()th and 17th centuries, aiibrd no 
 field for the beneficial employment of either capital 
 or machinery. Lastly, our farmers, in borrowing 
 money, pay an interest less by one or two per 
 cent, than is required in France, six or seven per 
 cent, being still a very common rate in that 
 country. 
 
 A long list of tiie agricultural disl)ursements of 
 the two countries is thus made to balance, and tlie 
 remainder of tlie parallel is brought within a com- 
 paratively narrow coiiqiass. It may, in fact, be 
 considered as reduced to two points : on the one 
 hand, the contingency of beueHt to the English 
 agriculturist from a protecting duty; on the other, 
 the heavier excise and customs to which he is sub- 
 jected. A protecting duty is not unknown in 
 France ; and, under the provisions of the late 
 acts of 1819 and 18^21, the price of l(i.y. or I7.V.
 
 172 Our A<:rkiiliurc ; 
 
 lor llio Winchester quarter of wheat is apparently 
 secured to the farmer; but, in a country which 
 i>e?ierally i!;rows its full consuni})tion, regulations 
 affecting import must be of rare and temporary 
 oj)eration. 
 
 We pass over, therefore, this frail su})port, and 
 proceed to the permanent and substantial points 
 of difference in the condition of the British and 
 French farmer. These will be found in the mag- 
 nitude of our taxes on consumption. Our custom 
 duties, being chiefly on luxuries, do not very 
 greatly affect our agriculturists ; but, among our 
 excise duties, the tax on leather, which, after the 
 late reduction, still forms a burden of nearly 
 1. '50,000/. on our peasantry, is unknown in France; 
 while our duties on malt, beer, and corn-spirits, 
 amounting, after the abatement made in 182'2, to 
 the surprising sum of 9,000,000/. sterling, are 
 feebly met by the French taxes on wine, cider, 
 and malt. In years of over-stock of corn, as since 
 1820, the whole of the very large sum w^e have 
 mentioned may be said to form a charge on our 
 agriculturists, exactly as the tax on sugar, in a 
 season of over-growth, falls on the West India 
 planter. These, however, are happily extreme 
 cases ; and we shall at present suppose them out of 
 the question, calculating that of such duties no 
 more usually falls on our agriculture than the 
 portion paid for the consumption of the farmers 
 and peasantry. Even then, it will exhibit a sum 
 of 8 or 4,000,000/. sterling ; a sum which, added 
 to the 1,000,000/. by which our tithe and poor-rate 
 exceed the French, /o//r/V'r, may be said to represent 
 the greater share of public burdens (1 or o, 000,000) 
 borne by the British agriculturist. 
 
 If we brino- these charo-es into the fonn of a
 
 Dutij on Foreign Corn, I73 
 
 comparative per centage, we shall find that the 
 Jbncier in France nia\, after making allowance lor 
 all abatements and omissions, be computed at 18 
 per cent, of the rent and tanning profit ; while in 
 England, tlie amount t)f Umd-tax, tithe, poor-rate, 
 and additional excise-duties, tbrm a tax on rent 
 and farming income to tlie extent of ^Z5 })er cent. 
 The result is, a heavier burden on the English agri- 
 culturists, to the extent of 7 or 8 per cent., except 
 in as far as it receives an occasional counterpoise 
 from the duty on tlie import of tbreign corn.* 
 
 What then, it may be asked, has been, during 
 the present age, the respective situations of the 
 agriculturists in France and this country? The 
 war was productive of a rise of rent in both ; but 
 w^hile in France that rise was comparatively slen- 
 der, in this country it doubled, and in many "cases 
 more than doubled, the payments of 179- ; so that 
 in 181-i the landed rental of Great Britain and Ire- 
 land considerably exceeded that of their southern 
 neigh])our. The rental of Fiance, however, was 
 much jnore secure : the price of corn in that coun- 
 try is little lower in peace than in war ; and the 
 travellers who passed o\er her departments did 
 not, until last year, hear nnich of those reductions 
 of rent and wages which among us have been re- 
 quired on so large a scale since the peace. 
 
 The price accounted sufficient to enable French 
 farmers to make a livelihood and ])ay taxes is 
 about IJ.v. the Winchester quarter, in j)eace. 
 
 We shall now suspend oiii- continental parallel, 
 and bestow a few paragraphs on one of a tlifierent 
 
 • In Scotland tlic burden is much k-ss, tin- iigriculturist-; of 
 that part of the kingdom being comparatively exempt from 
 tithe, poor-rate, and land-tax.
 
 171 Our Aixriculturc ; 
 
 l<iii(l — on the comparative situation of our agricul- 
 turists aiul niamifactiu-ers. 
 
 jlrc our tnanuj'acturer.s actually benefited by pro- 
 tecting duties? — That such is the case, and in a 
 very considerable degree too, is the opinion of 
 the majority of our agriculturists. It is true, how- 
 ever, only in a sliglit degree, as will soon be ap- 
 parent from the following facts. — The total value 
 of British manufacture annually prepared, whether 
 for home consumption or export, was computed 
 in 1812 by Mr. Colquhoun, at 123,000,000/. 
 Since then their quantity has greatly increased ; 
 but as tlieir price has experienced a material re- 
 duction, we shall probably deviate little from the 
 truth, in assuming that sum as a fair representation 
 of their present aggregate value. But of this xQiy 
 large amount, more than 80,000,000/. consist of 
 the three gieat articles of cotton, woollens, and 
 hardware ; none of which receive protection from 
 custom-duties, our manufacturers being enabled, 
 by inherent advantages, to repel foreign compe- 
 tition, and even to meet our rivals in their own 
 markets. Thus oiu' cottons are cheaper than those 
 of France, Germanv, or the Netherlands, from 
 various causes-— the import of the raw material i^ 
 somewhat less expensive, our machinery is superior, 
 our supply of fuel more abundant, and the capital 
 employed subject to a less heavy charge of in- 
 terest. In hardware, we possess a sinnlar ad\an- 
 tage in point of fuel and capital, with farther aids 
 in the carriage of the ore by water, and in a subdi- 
 vision of labour, to which the Continent in no de- 
 gree approaches. If in woollens our su})eriority 
 be less decisive, and if the quality of French cloth 
 be more substantial, the fact is, that from our 
 power of giving long credit to Americans and
 
 Duly on Foreign Corn, I75 
 
 others, we, as yet, retain possession of most of the 
 foreign markets. 
 
 We have tlius narrowed, very considerably, the 
 extent of manufacture supposed to be benefited 
 by protectino- duties. We miglit go a stej) farther, 
 and enumerate various articles (such as refined 
 sugar or pottery ware), in which protection is out 
 of the question; while the remainder that are more 
 or less ])rotected by oiu' custom-duties do not, ])er- 
 haps, surpass the value of the agricultural produce 
 to which favour is extended from the same quar- 
 ter; our duties on foreign timber, flax, hemp, tal- 
 low, seeds, madder, butter, cheese, and rice, all 
 operating, or being intended to operate, in fii\ our 
 of our agriculturists. 
 
 We add a few words in regard to our taxes 
 on consumption generally. Of these, it does not 
 appear that the agricidturist has greater reason to 
 complain than his mercantile or manufacturing 
 neighbour. Those most severely felt are on leather, 
 soap, candles, and glass ; also those on tea and 
 «ugai-, since they were raised in the course of the 
 last war to an immoderate rate. But these, as w ell 
 as tile farther imposts that form the long list of 
 our excise duties, are paid in connnon by residents 
 in towns ; and if the pressure of the malt-tax 
 be more heavily felt in the country, a kind of 
 balance is afforded by the untaxed substitutes for 
 groceries, which the country supplies to its inhabi- 
 tants. 
 
 If against the payment of land-tax, we i)iace the 
 heavier assessed taxes of towns, we find the amount 
 of ])ublic burdens balanced, with the exception of 
 tithe and poor rate. These forming an extra bur- 
 den on agriculture, and one of gieat amount, ])ar. 
 liament have endeavoured to countervail by our
 
 17() Ottr /l^ricu/tnrc ; 
 
 (•(>ni-I:ivvs : at one time hy a bounty on export, at 
 allot her by a restriction on import. 
 
 ^^'hat, it may l)e asketl, was the real motive on 
 the j)art of oovernment for these multitbrm regu- 
 lations — this long list of duties, drawbacks, boun- 
 ties ? Not to confer on any of the parties, whether 
 agriculturist or manufacturer, an absolute advan- 
 tage ; but to reconcile them to the taxes imposed 
 on the respective articles of their produce, and to 
 prevent foreigners from underselling them in the 
 home market. Under this impressio!i, and con- 
 sidering the amount of tithe and poor-rate at 
 present a dead loss to the landed interest, we 
 can hardly coincide with the argument in the Agri- 
 cultural Report of 18^21 (pp. '23, ^24.), that our 
 landholders have not a right to custom-house pro- 
 tection. Our hesitation would arise from a very 
 different cause : first, from a doubt of the efficacy 
 of a protecting duty ; and, next, from a dread 
 that the expectation which it would so generally 
 excite, might, as in the case of the bounty, lead to 
 excess of home growth. 
 
 Danger of an over-crtension of our Tillage. 
 
 This danger, which some years ago would have 
 been treated as chimerical, we now find to have 
 as strong a claim to attention and to precautionary 
 measures, as the hazard of an over-extension of* 
 manufacture. Of the truth of this our readers 
 will be satisfied on referring to our arguments in 
 the preceding section ; and, above all, to the fact, 
 that with so small a number of enclosure acts 
 (forty-eight annually), we ha\ e found the means 
 of meeting every year, since the peace, the demand 
 of the -^00,000 consumers annually added to oiu:
 
 Duty on Foreign Corn. 177 
 
 population. To what can this be mainly owing, 
 except to tlie diffusion of improved methods, to 
 the application of additional labour and capital to 
 soils already under tillage ? And who, in this age 
 of agricultural discovery, in this season of abun- 
 dant supply, both as to labour and capital, can 
 with confidence predict either the limit or the 
 result of such application ? 
 
 In prosecuting this incpiiry, our readers may, 
 we believe, leave at once out of consideration all 
 arguments against the increase of our growth, 
 fbnnded on the expence of reclaiming poor soils ; 
 not that such expence is over-rated by Mr. Ri- 
 cardo and others, but because it is unnecessary, a 
 larger produce being obtained by bestowhig addi- 
 tional culture on the better soils. If in regard to 
 England and Scotland, our conclusions are called 
 in question, and it is maintained that recourse to 
 inferior soils must ere long follow an increase of 
 our numbers, our reasoning can hardly be contested 
 in respect to the sister island, where such extensive 
 tracts of fertile land await the application of a 
 better system. Under such circumstances, what 
 security have our established farmers against the 
 agricultural speculator, except in a measure at 
 first apparently disadvantageous to them, we mean 
 the removal of a tempting contingency, and an 
 assurance, as far as can be conveyed by legislative 
 regulation, that the j)rospects of agriculture are 
 not of a nature to justify the transfer of ca})ital 
 from other lines of business? The true interest of 
 both farmer and landlord is to beware of extending 
 tillage, to ada))t our growth, as nearly as they can, 
 to our consumption ; and to keep tlie former, were 
 it practicable, somewhat below the latter, sub- 
 mitting, asafiter 177^, to a small hut regular import. 
 
 N
 
 V/fi Our Agriculture. 
 
 It is that course alone wliich can give assurance 
 oi' a steady demand, of a generally brisk market. 
 
 The Corn committee of 1813. — This Committee, 
 actuated by a mixture of" ignorance and selfislmess, 
 liardly to be credited in men of tlieir station in 
 society, ventured to recommend the prohil)ition 
 of import, except when our own wheat shouhl be 
 at or above 105.y. tlie quarter. Now, if with the 
 compaiatively small encouragement held out by 80*. 
 our tillage has so mucli increased, how much 
 greater would have been the augmentation had the 
 extravagant proposition of the committee been 
 adopted by parliament ? What an extent of inferior 
 soil would have been brought under the plough in 
 the course of two years ! What an overstock on 
 tile market before discovering the inefficiency of a 
 corn-law to keep up prices ! — an overstock ad- 
 mitting not of remedy, like excess of import, by 
 shutting our harbours, but remaining in force for 
 years, perhaps requiring the ruinous alternative of 
 abandoning land under tillage. 
 
 The ^weekly Averages. — Among the various ex- 
 pedients suggested by the distress of late years, 
 was that of comprehending in the returns, which 
 form our weekly averages, such Irish wheat as is 
 sold in England : the result of this, in consequence 
 of the inferiority of Irish wheat, is to render a return 
 of 60,$. equivalent as a representative of price, to 
 625. or 63i'. on the former plan of taking the aver- 
 ages. Under present circumstances this has no 
 practical effect ; but were our market to rise, we 
 should soon see that all expedients of this nature 
 tended to stimulate production to a hazardous 
 extent. 
 
 Objections to a high import duty. — After 
 these arguments, we may venture to hazard an
 
 Duly on Foreign Corn. 179 
 
 opinion, which would otherwise have appeared 
 not a Uttle paradoxical, \iz. that in peace the 
 injury resulting from a high duty on foreign corn 
 would in all })rol)ability be greater to the producers 
 than to the consumers of provisions. Were a high 
 duty imposed, the rise of price would be temporary: 
 extremes soon produce their own cure, and con- 
 sumers might safely trust to the extension of home 
 culture. The evil, however, would not stop there: 
 the agricultiuist would be sunk in distress by 
 overproduction, and the merchants and manufac- 
 turers would consequently be subjected to an extra 
 share of the public burdens. Hence the impor- 
 tance of maturely weighing, not the demands of a 
 particular class, but the interest of the public in 
 the most comprehensive sense. 
 
 Farther, the misfortune of the present day is 
 less, the reduction of income than the existence 
 of inequality, the evil of transition; and the public 
 are entitled to expect such measures as shall set 
 at rest this ruinous fluctuation. If our present 
 desideratum be a general reduction of wages, sala- 
 ries, and other money payments, not yet brought 
 to their level, nothing, it is clear, can so effectually 
 j)romote that object as a moderate rate of duty on 
 foreign corn ; an assurance, as far as assurance can 
 be given, of our market being kept at a steady 
 ])rice. How satisfactory to merchants, manufac- 
 turers, annuitants, and, above all, to farmers, to 
 know on what })robable price of corn the}- are to 
 found their future calculations, to fix wages and 
 salaries, to regulate their domestic ex})enditure ! 
 
 In what manner, it maybe asked, can a reference 
 to the past be jnade instrumental in guiding us to 
 a knowledge of the rate which forms a! fit protecting 
 diitv? B\' fixing our attention on the cost of 
 
 .N 'I
 
 180 Our Agriculture. 
 
 raising wheal, nol in a period such as that of the 
 last thirtyyears, a period as anomalous in productive 
 industry as in })()litics ; but at a time when Europe 
 enjoyed that tranquillity which she has ha})pily 
 now in prospect. Comparing the present and the 
 former charges on our tillage, we shall find that 
 labour, team, manure, may and ought soon to be 
 brought back to a rate not much exceeding that 
 of 1792 : that tithe is necessarily proportioned to 
 the market price of corn, and must follow its fall ; 
 while poor-rate, though more difficult of reduction, 
 ought to yield to the substantial advantage of 
 cheap provisions, and the opportunity of work 
 afforded by our manufactures. 
 
 All those considerations are of a nature to show 
 that the late Corn bill, which admits foreign wheat 
 when our own attains the average of 7O5. has not 
 brought our import limit too low, 
 
 Tendency of our Legislation to ultimate Freedom of 
 
 Trade. 
 
 We shall now suspend, for a few moments, the 
 consideration of temporizing measures, of the ex- 
 pedients devised to meet the pressure of the day, 
 and carry our speculations to a more distant object ; 
 to the probable situation of our agriculturists and 
 manufacturers of the next generation. In their time, 
 our financial circumstances will probably by more 
 favourable ; and parliament, relieved from imme-» 
 diate urgency, may legislate vdih no other view than 
 that of the permanent advantage of the public. 
 
 It was long an opinion among our countrymen, 
 that the landed and commercial bodies had opposite 
 interests ; that a tax imposed on the land was of 
 no particular detriment to trade ; and that the
 
 Duty on Foreign Corn. 181 
 
 gains of our merchants were of little consequence 
 to agriculture. In tlie ])resent age a more ample 
 experience, a community of suffering on the part 
 of these great portions of the community, have 
 taught them a more liberal doctrine. It is no 
 where more emphatically urged than in the passage 
 (p. ^0.) of the Agricultural Report of 18^21, where 
 the intimate connexion, the strict dependence of 
 agriculture and trade on each other, are proved by 
 the evidence of the last hundred years of our history. 
 Assuming, therefore, that such will be the ultimate 
 basis of our legislative measures, we are naturally 
 led to take a view of our productive industry some- 
 what more comprehensive than in the preceding 
 paragraphs, and to inquire on what particular advan* 
 tages our national prosperity has been and is likely 
 to be established. 
 
 Advantages ofyarticular Countries. — Every conn - 
 try possesses its physical characteristics, its peculiar 
 and distinctive aptitudes. If, adverting to the 
 early history of civilization, we cast our eyes over 
 a map of Greece, and observe how much interi- 
 course was there facilitated by maritime inlets, 
 and by insular positions in a sea of easy navigation, 
 we shall find it easy to account for the early im- 
 provement of that country, without ascribing any 
 great share of influence to fortunate accidents, to 
 the exploits of warriors, or the coimsels of legis- 
 lators. If we take a wider range, and inquire by 
 what features the physical structure of Europe is 
 discriminated from that of Asia or Africa, we shall 
 find its advantages consist partly in a climate 
 exempt from extremes, but more ijii the ample 
 means of navigation afforded by the Mediterranean 
 and the Baltic. Lastly, if^ drawing nearer home, 
 
 N .3
 
 182 Old- AfrrkuUiuc. 
 
 we endeavour to ascertain how it happened thai 
 Flanders was flourisliini; amidst the barbarism of* 
 tlie thirteentli and fourteenth centuries, we shall 
 trace it principally to two causes ; fertility of soil 
 and ease of water communication. The latter, 
 joined to the advantage of a free government, 
 explains the still more remarkable growth of the 
 Dutch provinces in the seventeenth century. 
 
 Of England. — By what peculiar advantages has 
 England been distinguished, and enabled to take 
 the lead of France and Germany, countries equally 
 favoured in soil and climate ? In a religious and 
 political sense, our superiority has consisted in the 
 enjoyment of the reformed faith and a represen- 
 tative government ; in a physical sense, in our 
 extent of coast, and in the productiveness of our 
 coal mines. Natural superiority of another kind 
 we can hardly boast : our pasture is, indeed, richer 
 than that of continental countries, and we conse- 
 quently take the lead in horses, cattle, and, in some 
 degree, in the woollen manufacture ; but whatever 
 comes under the description of agricultural advan- 
 tages, ought, we believe, to be left out of the 
 question, and to be considered as balanced by the 
 less variable temperature, the greater warmth of 
 the continent. Our farming is, indeed, much more 
 advanced ; but is not that the result of indirect 
 causes, of the reaction of our trade and manu- 
 factures, of the application of capital to tillage 
 and pasturage, and of our tenantry being thus en- 
 abled to occupy farms of suitable size, instead of 
 the insignificant tenures still so common among 
 tmr neighbours ? 
 
 In what manner, it may be asked, is this reason- 
 ing applicable to the present discussion, the question 
 of a protecting duty on corn ? Our answer is, that
 
 Duty on Foreign Corn. 183 
 
 we should greatly mistake our uatioual prospects 
 were we to suppose that we liave as yet received 
 all the benefit attainable from our superiority in the 
 grand points of fuel and navigation ; — on the con- 
 trary, it may safely be asserted, that we are not yet 
 in the midst of oiu' career, not half-advanced in 
 the task of turning these advantages to account. 
 Continental countries are making a very slow pro- 
 gress, either in navigating the ocean, in forming 
 canals, or in working coal mines : in each of these 
 our superiority still offers an ample basis for the 
 superstructure of national wealth. It woidd pro- 
 bably be such as to enable our manufacturers, 
 though taxed in regard to provisions, to maintain 
 a competition with their continental rivals ; but it 
 is perfectly clear that they never will be able to do 
 JuU justice to our national advantages until placed 
 on a footing of equality in that very essential point. 
 A reference to our custom-house returns would 
 soon show how small our export of articles, such as 
 hardware, glass, and even woollens, is, in compari- 
 son with what it might be, were equahty in the price 
 of provisions added to our otiier advantages. 
 
 A free Import of Corn. — This opens to our view 
 all the advantage that woukl arise from a free 
 trade in corn, or from the reduction of the protect- 
 ing duty to a lower scale than has as yet been con- 
 tem])iated, eitlier by ministers or by the most tem- 
 perate of their opponents. * In another place (see 
 Appendix) we have appropriated a few paragra})hs 
 to this topic ; and these, under present circum- 
 stances, arc, perhaps, all that it is advisable to urge 
 in regard to it. The landed interest are as yet but 
 imperfectly apprised of the'extenl of its ultimate 
 
 * Ricardo on Agriculture, pp. ^2, 83. 
 N 4
 
 184 Our Ai<:riculture. 
 
 is' 
 
 advantage to them ; nor can we expect that their 
 attention will, for some time, be weaned from the 
 hi^h prices, the great nominal rents of the years of 
 war. If our ministers are more deeply read in the 
 science of national wealth, more fully convinced of 
 the reaction of the ])rosperity of trade and maim- 
 facture on agriculture, they have objections of 
 another kind ; they cannot but regard a fall of 
 prices as a virtual augmentation of the public debt. 
 They are aware, likewise, of tlie evils of transition ^ 
 and must, to use the language of the Agricultural 
 Report, be anxious " to spare vested interests, 
 and to deal tenderly even with obstacles to im- 
 provement, when long implanted in our system/' 
 
 To all these difficulties we have to add, that the 
 exemption of our agriculture from its extra share 
 of poor-rate, and from tithe in England as well as 
 Ireland, would be an indispensable preliminary to a 
 measure which would bring our corn market almost as 
 tow as that of the Continent. Now government, how- 
 ever convinced of the impolicy of these burdens in 
 theirpresent shape, could hardly fail to consider a 
 change in long-established assessments, above aU, a 
 new demand on our exchequer, as replete with 
 embaiTassment. Several of the late measures of 
 ministers, such as the limitation of the Sinking 
 fund, the remission of the most injurious of our 
 taxes, tlie extended freedom of navigation, the 
 transfer of the half pay and pension list into Long 
 Annuities, evidently proceed on sound calculation. 
 They seem to indicate an adequate estimate of our 
 resources on the part of our ])olitical guides ; bufe 
 the free import of corn would be so gyeat a de- 
 parture from our past policy, and would involve so 
 many accompanying changes, that we can contem- 
 plate it only as a remote Jesuit, as less likely to be
 
 Duty on Foreign Corn. 185 
 
 the consequence of any arguments that can possibly 
 be urged, than of a continuation of lo\v])rices; which, 
 by reducing the cost of production, and replacing 
 our tenantry in nearly the same situation as in 1792, 
 may cause our corn laws to expire by a natural 
 death. 
 
 Such were our views of this interesting subject last year, on 
 sending to press the first edition. Since then, there have oc- 
 curred several circumstances favourable to an approximation 
 to a system of" freedom, and to the hope of that advantage 
 which always arises from the removal of restraints from pro- 
 ductive industry. The lapse of time, the reduction of charges, 
 and the prospect of continued peace, have gradually accus- 
 tomed both landlord and farmer to regard 60*. for a quarter 
 of wheat in the light of a remunerating price : the next step 
 may be to consider it as a kind of standard for the duty on the 
 import of foreign corn. Now, so soon as the landed mterest 
 shall be willing to permit import on the average price of our 
 wheat exceeding 60*., they will be entitled to call on the 
 public for decisive concessions in regard to tithe and poor-rate, 
 — in other words, by giving an assurance of a permanently 
 moderate price to the consumer, they will have a right to 
 demand that these burdens (tithe and poor-rate) shall be shared 
 by the public at large. 
 
 Are the recent measures of nn'nisters of a nature to promise 
 a concurrence in this plan of mutual concession? To this we 
 are inclined to answer in the affirmative, and, with confidence, 
 whether we look to the personal change in the Chancellorship 
 of the Exchequer; to the reduction so promptly made in the 
 assessed taxes ; to the limits which, as far as we can judge, 
 men in office think it fit to affix to the Sinking Fund; and, above 
 all, to the introduction of the too long delayed measure for 
 the commutation of tithe in Ireland. 
 
 Of the power of the monied interest to come to the relief of 
 their countrymen engaged in agriculture, we shall treat in our 
 Goncluding chapter.
 
 186 
 CHAP, VI. 
 
 Poor- Rate. 
 
 1 HE subject of poor-rate has already engaged so 
 much attention both in parUamentary investigations 
 and pubHshed works, that we shall avoid all ge- 
 neral discussion, and confine ourselves to what may 
 be termed plain, practical topics, such as the com- 
 parative amount of money distributed at different 
 dates to the poor, and the degree of pressure on 
 the contributors. We take up the subject less as 
 a national question, than as an appendage to our 
 observations on agriculture : but oiu* summary, 
 brief as it may be, will, we trust, explain two 
 points, at present little understood ; — the great 
 increase of parochial charge during the war, when 
 labour in general was so liberally paid, and the 
 very considerable reduction that is now taking 
 place, notwithstanding the apparently less favour- 
 able state of our productive industry. 
 
 We propose to treat successively of the — 
 Origin and progress of our poor-law system j 
 Its degree of pressure considered as a tax ; 
 Its effect on the condition of the lower orders. 
 
 Origm of our Poor Laws. — The origin of the 
 English poor laws, a system so chfferent from that 
 of neighbouring countries, is to be traced to two 
 causes, — the call, at the time of the Reformation, 
 for a provision for the poor, when depri\ed of 
 charitable aid from monasteries ; and the enhance- 
 ment, both progressive and rapid, which, as ex- 
 plained in the preceding chapter, took place in
 
 Our Poor Law System. 187 
 
 provisions during the l6th century. If the former 
 offered a fair j)lca for the new system, the latter 
 presented the moie substantial grounds, since the 
 rise of wages seldom keeps pace with a rise in pro- 
 visions. The conjunct operation of these causes 
 led to various enactments in favour of the poor, 
 which were definitively consolidated in the act of 
 1601, — an act prepared with all the care and de- 
 liberation characteristic of the ministers of Eliza- 
 beth, and which would never have received a per- 
 nicious extension had its execution fallen into 
 proper hands. Its provisions were intended at first 
 for the relief of merely the aged and infiim, and 
 led to little beyond the degree of aid afforded at 
 present to the poor in Scotland or in France ; but, 
 from unfitness on the part of annually changed 
 overseers, and from the remissness always attendant 
 on the disposal of pubHc property, when unchecked, 
 the act received, in time, a wider construction. 
 It was interpreted into an obligation to find work 
 for the unemployed generally, as well as to make 
 up to those who had children the disproportion 
 which in dear seasons took })lace between the price 
 of bread and the I'ate of wages. 
 
 Our poor-rate became thus a fund, not merelv 
 for charitable ])urposes, but for the equalization 
 of wages ; a counteqjoise to the fluctuations arising 
 from inclement seasons, or from any cause ])ro- 
 ducti\e of a rapid fall in the \alue of moneA. 
 This result, certainly well intended, and which at 
 first sight seems of beneficial operation, is found, 
 on trial, to be replete with all that irregidarity and 
 abuse vvliich it is so difficult to avoid in any int(^r- 
 ference with the natural course of productixc 
 industry. Of tiiis, a striking jirnof is given, not 
 only hi this countiT, but in the New England
 
 188 Our Poor Law System; 
 
 states, and in the state of New York ; for even in 
 these, the countries of tlie world in which the pay 
 of the hiboiirer is most Hberal, the number of 
 paupers has become large. They are, happily, the 
 only foreign coimtries in which our example has 
 been imitated. On the continent of Europe, the 
 public institutions afford j)rotection only against in- 
 firmity and extreme penury : even Holland, so long 
 noted for its hospitals and charities, has not a poor- 
 rate on the comprehensive plan of England. 
 
 Its Progressive Extension. — Our records of the 
 distribution of relief to tlie poor during the seven- 
 teenth century are very imperfect : its amount, 
 however, must have been considerable in the first 
 half of the century, in consequence of the con- 
 tinued rise of corn during the reign of James I., 
 and part of that of Charles I. But during the 
 thirty years that intervened from I66O to I69O, 
 the price of corn w^as on the decline, and the 
 country experienced in no great degree either the 
 visitation of inclement seasons or the burden of 
 military expenditure. In the reigns of William and 
 Anne the case was far different; an enhancement of 
 corn consequent on bad seasons, on war, and in- 
 terrupted navigation, concurred with the disorder 
 in our currency to render a state of suffering 
 general among the lower orders, and to give a 
 melancholy corroboration to their claims for paro- 
 chial relief The number of persons receiving 
 such aid is said (Clarkson on Pauperism), to have 
 amounted, towards the close of the seventeenth 
 century, to as large a portion of our popidation 
 as at present, viz. a tenth part of the inhabitants 
 of England and Wales. The amount of money 
 •collected ibr this purpose has not been put on
 
 its Origin and Progress. 189 
 
 record : it is said, somewhat loosely, but without 
 much appearance of exaggeration *, to have ap- 
 proached at the period in question to a million 
 sterling ; a burden heavily felt in these days of 
 limited rental, and productive consequently of great 
 complaints. 
 
 The long peace and reduced price of provisions 
 which followed the treaty of Utrecht, were both 
 conducive to the decrease of poor-rate, and, not' 
 withstanding an increase in our population, we find 
 that, in tlie middle of tlie century, viz. in the three 
 years ending with 17''50, its amount did not (Reports 
 on the Poor Laws in 1817 and 1821) exceed an 
 average of - - - - 700,000/, 
 
 After 1760, the charge for the poor participated 
 in the general charge which took place in the state 
 of prices, and amounted in that year to 96.5,000/., 
 while at a subsequent date, in 1770, it was car. 
 
 ried to 1,306,000/. ; 
 
 so much did the effect of indifferent seasons and 
 the enhancement of corn counterbalance the othei-- 
 
 wise favourable circumstances of the latter period . 
 
 the enjoyment of peace, the extension of our 
 manufactures. Next came the contest with our 
 colonies, along with the various losses attendant 
 on interrupted export, and the suspension of un- 
 dertakings dependent on a low interest of money, 
 the result of which, in concurrence with other 
 causes, carried the charge of poor-rate in I78O 
 to 1,774,000/. 
 
 The peace of 1783, though favourable in tlie 
 main, was not unaccom})anied by the evils of 
 transition. Our protluctive industry partook at 
 first of the discouragement excited In the loss 
 of oyr colonies ; and though it soon exhibited 
 
 Sir F. Eden on the State of the Poor.
 
 190 Our Poor Law System; 
 
 symptoms of vigour, and even of prosperity, the 
 price of bread was kept up by the incHtterent har- 
 vests of 17<S8 and 1789. When to this we add 
 the increase of our population, and make allowance 
 for the progressive introduction of abuse into a 
 system subject to so little check or control, we 
 need not be surprised that in 1790, the sum col- 
 lected for the poor amounted, when joined to the 
 minor rates for highways, church, and county 
 charges, to 2,567,000/. 
 
 2Vie late Wars. — Such was the state of our 
 poor-rate at the beginning of the French Revo- 
 lution, the time when we entered on a course of 
 circumstances productive of a contiiuied fall in the 
 value of money. As wages seldom rise in propor- 
 tion to a rise in provisions, an increase of poor- 
 rate is the necessary consequence. Previously to the 
 war of 1793, the augmentation of our rates had 
 been gradual, a century elapsing before they 
 doubled, a ratio of increase little greater than that 
 of our population. But after 1793, the concurrent 
 efiect of war, and indifferent seasons, rendered the 
 price of bread so disproportionate to the wages of 
 country labour, that in 1800, the poor rate, ex- 
 clusive of the highway, church, and county-rate, 
 amounted to - - - 3,861,000/. 
 
 In 1810 to - - - 5,407,000/. 
 
 And in 1812 to - - - 6,680,000/. 
 
 The peace of 1814 opened, in some respects, a 
 new aera. It was followed, as is well known, bv a 
 rapid fall in the price of corn, which continued 
 during two years ; and had, notwithstanding the 
 many new claims for parish i-elief arising from want 
 of work, the effect, on the whole, of a partial reduc- 
 tion of the poor-rate. This is apparent from the 
 subjoined table.
 
 its Oris^in and Pros:ress. 
 
 191 
 
 RETURNS FOR ENGLAND AND WALES. 
 
 
 YEAR 
 
 ending Easter, 
 
 ]813. 
 
 Easter, 1814. 
 
 25th March, 
 
 181.5. 
 
 £. 
 
 £. 
 
 £. 
 
 Total money received 
 
 
 
 
 by poor-rate, and in 
 
 
 
 
 a smaller degree by 
 
 
 
 
 church-rate,high\vay- 
 
 
 
 
 rate, county-rate, &c. 
 
 
 
 
 in England and Wales 
 
 8,651,438 
 
 8,392,728 
 
 7,460,855 
 
 To these sums are to be 
 
 
 
 
 added charitable do- 
 
 
 
 
 nations, whether aris- 
 
 
 
 
 ing from land or 
 
 
 
 
 money, managed by 
 
 
 
 
 the clergy, church- 
 
 
 
 
 wardens, or overseers : 
 
 
 
 
 Annual average 
 Expenditure. 
 
 238,310 
 
 238,310 
 
 238,310 
 
 
 
 For the maintenance 
 
 
 
 
 and relief of the poor 
 
 6,679,658 
 
 6,297,331 
 
 5,421,168 
 
 Law-suits, removal of 
 
 
 
 
 paupers andexpences 
 
 
 
 
 of overseers or other 
 
 
 
 
 officers - - - 
 
 325,107 
 
 332,966 
 
 324,665 
 
 Families of miJitia-men 
 
 
 
 
 and other militia 
 
 
 
 
 charges - 
 
 24^,202 
 
 188,576 
 
 105,394 
 
 Church-rate, county- 
 
 
 
 
 rate, highway-rate, 
 
 
 
 
 &c. 
 
 £. 
 
 1, 61 4,87 1 
 
 1,692,990 
 
 1,657,627 
 
 8,865,838 
 
 8,511,863 
 
 7,508,854 
 
 The average of the two years 1815 and 1816 was. 
 Church, county, and highway-rate - - e^; 1,212,918 
 Maintenance and relief of the poor, including law- 
 suits, removal of pauper*, aad expence of overseers 5,714,506 
 
 In all - - ^6,937,425
 
 lO-^ 
 
 Our Poor X.niio Si/stem ; 
 
 Increase afler 1816. — 'J'lic poor-rate was thus 
 in progress of reduction, both as to the amount 
 levied, and the number relieved, when a general 
 re-action took place, in consequence of the high 
 price of provisions that followed the bad harvest 
 of X816, 
 
 
 Relief and 
 
 
 
 AVERAGE 
 
 Maintenance of 
 
 Church-rates. 
 
 
 
 the Poor ; also 
 
 County-rates, 
 
 
 OF 
 
 Law Suits, Re- 
 
 Highway-rates, 
 
 TOTAL. 
 
 
 moval of Paupers 
 
 and Militia- 
 
 
 TWO YEARS. 
 
 and Expence of 
 Officers. 
 
 charges. 
 
 
 
 .4'. 
 
 €. 
 
 £. 
 
 1816 and 1817 
 
 6,918,217 
 
 1,210,200 
 
 8,128,417 
 
 1817 and 1818 
 
 7,890,148 
 
 1,4-30,292 
 
 9,320,440 
 
 1818 and 1819 
 
 7,531,650 
 
 1,300,534 
 
 8,932,185 
 
 1819 and 1820 
 
 7,329,594- 
 
 1,342,658 
 
 8,719,655 
 
 Year ending 1 
 Easter 1821 j 
 
 6,94-7,660 
 
 
 
 Do. 1822 
 
 6,335,820 
 
 
 
 The amount of our payments was highest during 
 the interval (1817, 1818, 1819,) when a high 
 price of corn unfortunately concurred with the 
 derangement of productive industry arising from 
 our great national transition. 
 
 Since 1819 the amount of this formidable charge 
 has experienced a progressive, though very gra- 
 dual reduction. 
 The year ending Easter 1819, was less than the 
 
 year ending Easter 1818, by - 5 per cent. 
 Do. ending 18^20, less than 1819, by 3 
 Do. ending 1821, less than 1820, by 5 
 Do. ending 1822, less than 1821, by 9 
 
 Total reduction since 1818, 
 
 QQ
 
 its Origin and Progress. 
 
 193 
 
 For the year ending 2oth March, 1823, 
 the returns as yet received exliibit 
 a diminution, which, joined to a 
 further reduction in the year now 
 in progress, justifies our assuming 
 the total of" our j)resent expenditure 
 for the poor, at less than 
 
 jf6,000,000 
 
 NUMBER OF PERSONS RELIEVED. 
 
 Poor permanently re- 
 lieved in workhouses 
 
 Ditto, ditto, out of work- 
 houses (without reck- 
 oning children) 
 
 Parishioners relieved oc- 
 casionally 
 
 Total of paupers 7 
 relieved - - J 
 
 YEAR 
 
 endinr; Easter, 
 
 1813. 
 
 Easter, 1814. 
 
 March 25tb, 
 181.5. 
 
 97,223 
 
 434,441 
 440,249 
 971,913 
 
 94,085 
 
 430,140 
 429,770 
 
 88,115 
 
 406,887 
 400,971 
 
 953,995 
 
 895,973 
 
 Workhouses. — The preceding return exhibits in 
 a se])arate line the nimiber of poor living in work- 
 houses. This plan is, in a manner, })eculiar to 
 England; the pubhc establishments in other coun- 
 tries being confined to hospitals or houses of cor- 
 rection. Tlie workhouse plan, originally adopted 
 above a century ago, received a great extension 
 from an act passed in 1782, commonly called Gil- 
 bert's Act, from the name of the member of parlia- 
 ment by whom it was framed. This act, aiming 
 to combine the advantages of an assemblage of a
 
 101- Our Poor Law Systetn ; 
 
 number of poor on one spot, of a minute division 
 of labour, and a joint management of disburse, em- 
 powered all magistrates to consider any large work- 
 house as a common receptacle for the poor tlirough- 
 out a diameter of twenty miles. Sound as these 
 reasons apparently were, the plan has as yet been 
 by no means successful : proper care has seldom 
 been taken to separate the inmates of the work- 
 houses according to their age or their habits ; nor 
 has the division of employment been at all carried 
 to the necessary length. Their earnings have con- 
 sequently been insignificant, and the charge to the 
 parish amounts, in general, to 9/., 10/., or even 12/. 
 per head, while half the sum would suffice, if paid 
 to the poor at their own habitation's. It is thus in 
 some measure fortunate that the limited extent of 
 our workhouses hardly admits above 100,000 indi* 
 viduals, 
 
 Scotland and France. — It is a general notion in 
 England, that Scotland has no poor laws, — a notion 
 originating in the very satisfactory circumstance of 
 the lightness of her poor rate. But there are and 
 have long been in that country statutes enacting that 
 certain funds shall be faithfully applied to the relief 
 of the poor. These funds, however, are levied by a 
 very easy process: first, from collections made at the 
 parish church ; next, from the interest of money or 
 rent of land bequeathed by individuals for the use 
 of the poor; and, lastly, from a moderate assessment, 
 paid in general half by the landlords, the other half 
 by the rest of the parish. In 1817, a year of scarcity 
 and distress, the total poor-rate collected in Scot- 
 land was 119,000/., of which nearly 70,000/. pro- 
 ceeded from charitable collections and donations ; 
 the remainder from assessment. The latter, how-
 
 it.f Origin and Progress, 1 95 
 
 ever, did not extend over the whole of Scotland, 
 being levied only in the low country, particularly 
 in the districts containing manufacturers ; while 
 the mountainous counties of" the nortli remained, 
 &s they have always been, exempt from assessment. 
 
 The paupers in Scotland are in the proportion of 
 only one injhrti/, a proportion which would doubt- 
 less have been increased, had the price of com, 
 and the attendant operation of the English poor- 
 laws, continued as in I8I7 and 1818; for it is a 
 remarkable fact, that the distribution of a parish 
 allowance to manufacturers in England operates 
 as a serious compai*ative disadvantage to their 
 humble brethren in the north. Thus, when in a 
 depressed branch the wages are equal to oidy 85. 
 or 9*. a week, the allowance of poor-rate to the 
 English manufacturer may, and generally does, 
 carry his receipt to 10.y. or 12.s. ; a difference which 
 has had the eflbct of inducing a number of the 
 Scottish workmen to forsake their homes. 
 
 What, it may be asked, have been the causes 
 of so material a difference in the management of 
 the poor in Scotland and in England ? The two 
 countries embracing the Reformation in the same 
 period, and falling under the sway of the same 
 sovereign soon after the enactment of the poor- 
 law of 1601, the jegulations were originally similar; 
 but in Scotland their execution was vested, not in 
 temporary officers, such as churchwardens and 
 overseers, but in the landholders, clergymen, and 
 elders or deacons, whose functions were })erma- 
 xient, and whose personal accpiaintance with the 
 poor enabled them to act with discrimination. The 
 good effects of tiiis plan, evinced as tlicy have been 
 by the practice of two centuries, induced the 
 Committee on the Poor Laws in 181 7, to recom- 
 
 o i
 
 196 (^lif 1*001^ J-'d'i^' System ; 
 
 mend, that in England the overseer should be a 
 permanent officer with a salary, and should act, if 
 necessary, for several districts ; a practice that has 
 since been adopted with a beneficial result in a 
 number of the parishes and townships of England. 
 
 In France, before the Revolution, the poor were 
 supported, as in Spain, Italy, and other Catholic 
 countries, chiefly by the abbeys, priories, and other 
 beneficial establishments. These sources of income 
 being absorbed in the sweeping changes of the 
 Revolution, there took place in the Assemblee 
 Legislative y in 1791, a long discussion on the fittest 
 mode of providing for the poor : the result was a 
 decided determination to avoid the English plan, 
 but to provide at the public charge a fund of about 
 2,000,000/. a year, for the relief of the aged and 
 infirm throughout the whole of France. In the 
 disorders of succeeding years, great defalcations 
 took place in regard to this fund ; but in the reign 
 of Bonaparte there were imposed, or rather revived, 
 octrois^ or dues on wines, cider, spirits, and other 
 articles of consumption, paid on the introduction 
 of these articles into towns. The imposition of a 
 tax was in these davs a matter of far greater dif- 
 ficulty in France than in this country ; and the 
 revival of the octrois was for a time attempted 
 only as a fund for charitable purposes ; but when 
 the public became accustomed to this mode of con- 
 tribution, its rate was augmented, and the proceeds 
 rendered available to a variety of local purposes. 
 
 In addition to the aid arising to the poor from 
 these dues, collections are made in France by 
 subscription in the depth of winter, or on the 
 occurrence of extraordinary distress ; and, finally, 
 in a season of general hardship, such as the \nnter 
 that followed the bad harvest of ISlfi, occasional
 
 its Origin and Progress. 197 
 
 issues are made from the public treasury, on the 
 appHcation of mayors or local magistrates. In 
 Paris there are a number of hospitals : in the large 
 provincial towns there are, in general, two ; one 
 for the sick, the other for the aged. These insti- 
 tutions, however, are managed with all the laxity 
 and want of method so common among our southern 
 neighbours: mendicity is unrestricted, and prevails 
 in many places to a reprehensible degree. In fact, 
 the dweUings of the lower orders throughout France 
 generally, whether in the country or in the suburbs 
 of a town, exhibit to an English eye a very bare 
 and denuded appearance. But to account for this 
 general aspect of poverty by the want of parochial 
 aid, would be as erroneous as to ascribe the comfort 
 of the lower orders in Holland, to the aid afforded 
 by charitable contributions. In that country, as in 
 England, the better lodging and better furniture 
 of the poor are the result of long-continued com- 
 mercial activity ; of that ample supply of work, of 
 those habits of care, cleanliness, and order, which, 
 in the course of time, it imparts to the agricultural 
 portion of the conununity. 
 
 Poor Rate considered as a Tad\ — Our next, and 
 equally interesting object of inquiry, regards the 
 contributors to the poor-rate, and the comparative 
 degree of pressure imposed on them at different 
 periods. And here our readers must be prepared 
 for our making a large deduction from the increase 
 of burden indicated by the mmierical returns of 
 poor-rate during the lat^ wars ; a deduction justi* 
 fied on two grounds, — the depreciation of the 
 money in which it was paid, and the increase in 
 the number of the contributors. In what manner, 
 it may be asked, do the latter receive an increase ? 
 
 o S
 
 \9» 
 
 Poor Rale cwisidered as a Tax. 
 
 Of those who pay poor-rate it may be safely as- 
 sumed, that the augmentation, in point of number, 
 is on a par with the general augmentation of their 
 countrymen ; and we shall probably not err by 
 assuming, that our national resources increase in 
 proportion to oiu' numbers. This opinion, already 
 advanced in our pages, and about to be more fully 
 developed in the sequel, we shall for the present 
 consider as admitted, and extract from the work 
 of a diligent and benevolent enquirer into such 
 subjects, (Barton on the Labouring Classes, I8I7,) 
 a table in which these different considerations are 
 taken into account. 
 
 Table of the Annual Expenditure for the Poor, comfuted tukh 
 rejerence to the Price of' Corn, and the general Increase of our 
 Population. 
 
 Periods. 
 
 Average 
 Price of 
 Wheat. 
 
 Average of 
 
 Annual 
 Expenditure 
 on the Poor. 
 
 Forming a Charge per 
 
 Head on the whole 
 
 Population of the 
 
 Kingdom. 
 
 From 1772 to 1776 
 1781 to 1785 
 1799 to 1803 
 1811 to 1815 
 
 s. d. 
 
 48 2 
 
 49 2 
 84 8 
 93 2 
 
 £. 
 1,556,804 
 2,004,238 
 4,267,965 
 5,072,028 
 
 44 pints of wheat. 
 53 Do. 
 5U Do. 
 50* Do. 
 
 To judge from this sketch, the burden of the 
 poor-rate, estimated not by the price, but by the 
 quantity of subsistence, had actually begun to de- 
 cline before the close of the war ; but instead of 
 pressing any inference on this head, we point the 
 attention of our readers to tlie near approach to 
 uniformity in the real charge at the time of the 
 greatest apparent variation. This inference is 
 farther confirmed by the following extract from a
 
 Poor Rate considered as a Tax. 
 
 199 
 
 pamphlet on Pauperism, by Mr. W. Clarkson, pub- 
 lished in 1815. 
 
 Year. 
 
 Population oi England 
 and Wales, about 
 
 Total of Rates, 
 
 including Highway, 
 
 Churcli, and 
 
 County-rates. 
 
 Nunaber of 
 Paupers relieTed. 
 
 1688 
 
 1766 
 
 17831 
 
 1785J 
 
 1792 
 
 1803 
 
 5,300,000 
 7,728,000 
 
 8,016,000 
 
 8,675,000 
 9,168,000 
 
 £.665,362 
 1,530,804 
 
 2,004,238 
 
 2,645,520 
 4,267,965 
 
 563,964 
 695,177 
 
 818,851 
 
 955,326 
 1,040,716 
 
 In the fifty years that elapsed between I764 and 
 1814, the increase ot" our population was as 7 to 
 11, and the rise in the price of provisions exceeded 
 the proportion of 7 to 13. Here, accordingly, the 
 two great causes of increase of poor-rate operated 
 in concurrence; and in 1814 it was incumbent on 
 us to be prepared, not only for an augmentation of 
 claimants in the proportion of 11 to 7> but for an 
 increase of expcnce in their maintenance, in that 
 of 13 to 7 ; the two together forming, when com- 
 pared to the return of 1764, a sum (^4 to 7) more 
 than triple the responsibility of that year. Is it 
 then matter of surprize, that 5,000,000/. should go 
 no further in its discharge in 1814, than 1,500,000/. 
 in the beginning of the reign of George III. 
 
 Wages paid by Poor Rate. — It is a great, tliough 
 very common error, to account poor-rate a hondjide 
 tax, an actual sacrifice to its apparent extent But 
 the leading rule of our system, particularly in the 
 west of England, is, to afford relief to tlie lower 
 orders on a conjunct calculation of the price of 
 bread, arid the number of children in a family. An 
 
 o 4
 
 ^00 Poor Halt considered as a Tad'. 
 
 allowance made on this plan represents less the de- 
 gree of distress prevalent in the country, than the 
 difference between the market price of provisions, 
 and the existing rate of wages ; a rate, perhaps, 
 transmitted with little variation from years of 
 greater cheapness. It is thus that our poor-law 
 system was rendered, during the late wars, an ex- 
 pedient for preventing a rise of ivages, as far at 
 least as regarded country labour, on the avowed 
 ground, that wages once raised cannot be reduced 
 without the greatest difficulty. 
 
 What, it may be asked, was the effect of the 
 war on the price of labour generally ? To increase 
 the demand, and to place a number of the lower 
 orders in towns, whether manufacturers or me- 
 chanics, in a better situation tlian before, notwith- 
 standing the rise in provisions. In no department 
 did it render the demand greater than in agricul- 
 ture, and in none did the wages of the labourer 
 experience a greater rise in Scotland ; but in Eng- 
 land, at least in most parts of England, from the 
 effects of an artificial system, the case was very 
 different. Wages were subjected to regulation ; 
 and their rise, though considerable, being inade- 
 quate to the rise of corn, the unavoidable result 
 w^as a great increase of poor-rate. It is only thus 
 that we find it possible to explain the remarkable 
 anomaly, that in a period when farming was flou- 
 rishing beyond example, the number of agricul- 
 tural paupers should increase in a proportion fully 
 equal to that of our trading and manufacturing 
 districts. This was exemplified in Bedfordshire 
 and Herefordshire, the two counties which em- 
 ploy the largest proportion of their inhabitants in 
 agriculture.
 
 Poor Rale considered as a Tad\ 201 
 
 Extract from the Report on the Poor Laws, 1817, p. 8, 
 
 
 Expended 
 
 on Paupers in 
 
 1776. 
 
 Average expen- 
 diture of 1783, 
 84, 85, 
 
 £16,728 
 20,977 
 
 In 1803. 
 
 In 1815. 
 
 Herefordshire 
 Bedfordshire 
 
 £10,.592 
 
 16,663 
 
 £48,067 
 38,070 
 
 £59,256 
 50,371 
 
 There is thus no doubt, tliat a part of the poor- 
 rate ought to be deducted from our estimate of it as 
 a tax, and considered in the Hght of an equivalent 
 for wages. If it be asked, what proportion should 
 thus be deducted, we must answer, by admitting, 
 that the enquiry is complicated, involving a refer- 
 ence to the rate of wages in Scotland and the 
 counties in the north of England, where poor-rate 
 is comparatively light. The proportion, besides, 
 must differ materially under different circum- 
 stances, in consequence of the greater or less de- 
 mand for labour. In this uncertainty, and in the 
 absence of tlie necessary documents, we are con- 
 fined to a conjectural estimate ; but if a third of 
 our poor-rate is to be thus accounted for, we ex- 
 clude the idea of a tax or sacrifice to the extent 
 of nearly :2,000,0()0/. annually, during the last ten 
 years. 
 
 Mode of Assessment. — Amidst the various sug- 
 gestions entertained during the agricultural di.s- 
 tress of LSlG) was that of rendering the burden of 
 poor-rate national, instead of parochial ; of paying 
 it out of a general, instead of a local fund. This 
 proposition is noticed here, merely to show its ab- 
 solute inexpediency. Under our ])resent system, 
 it could be accompanied by no adc(iuate checks, — 
 by no satisfactory rule lor restricting either the
 
 202 Poor Rate considered as a Tax. 
 
 number or the allowance of the pensioners, fn 
 Scotland, in France, in short, in all countries with 
 which we are acquainted, the relief" of the poor is 
 defrayed by a local contribution. But whiJe we 
 determine to keep up the distinction of parishes 
 and townships, and to obhge each to provide for 
 its poor, there apj)ear to be strong reasons for a 
 change that would be perfectly compatible with 
 the maintenance of local distinction : we mean 
 new-modelling the assessment of property. At 
 present the whole falls on land and houses ; but 
 would not, we may ask, the income of the inhabi- 
 tants of the parish generally, returned on a plan 
 somewhat similar to that of the property tax, form 
 a much more equitable basis of repartition ; parti- 
 cularly since the landed interest appear to have 
 lost their principal stay — the counterpoise af- 
 forded by the corn laws. 
 
 The yearly rental of the land and houses of 
 England and Wales, on which poor-rate was 
 collected in 1803, was not (Clarkson on Pau- 
 perism) returned at more than £24',00O,00O 
 
 The latter years of the war exhibited both a large 
 increase of rental and a more correct return, 
 the amount assessed being (Report on the 
 Poor Laws, 1817) not less than 51,898,000 
 
 But increase of demand followed, or rather ac- 
 companied, increase of means : the rate, 3*. T^cf. 
 in the pound in 1803, was not below Si. 4rf. on 
 the far larger sum assessed in the years 1812, 
 1813, 1814-. At present, whatever be the offi- 
 cial allotment, the burden bears an equal pro- 
 portion to our resources, because, since the 
 fall of corn, the rental of land and houses in 
 England and Wales can hardly exceed . . . •i5,000,000 
 
 In 1805, the sum collected for the use of the 
 poor was below 4,000,000/. ; and if, in some years
 
 Our Poor Law System^ S^c. 
 
 ^3 
 
 hence, it be reduced, as we anticipate, (see Appen- 
 dix to tlie chapter on Agriculture, p. [35]) to a sum 
 (4,. 500,000/.) not greatly exceeding that amount, 
 it would form a charge of from two shillings in 
 the pound on the actual rent of our land and 
 houses, (4,5,000,000/.) ; but, if levied on the in- 
 come of ' tlie parishioners generally, 4,500,000/. 
 would form a rate of less than one shilling in 
 the pound. 
 
 Did Increase qf Wages and Poor-rate counter- 
 balance the Enhancement of Provisions ? — It would, 
 we believe, be a mistake, to imagine that the in- 
 crease of wages and parochial aid dining the war, 
 counterbalanced to the country labourer the en- 
 hancement of produce, and had the effect of ren- 
 dering his situation more comfortable than in the 
 preceding period. A very different conclusion is 
 suggested by the following calculation made by 
 Mr. Barton, who, in his pamphlet on the '• State of 
 the Labouring Classes," pubhshed in I8I7, shows, 
 that whatever may have been the case in towns, 
 wages in the country, estimated by their power of 
 procuring subsistence, experienced a considerable 
 diminution in the sixty years between I76O and 
 1820. 
 
 Statement shoxving the Proportion of the Wages of the Country 
 Labourer to the Price qf Com. 
 
 Periods. 
 
 Weekly Pny. 
 
 Wheat per , Wages in Pints 
 Quarter. of Wheat. 
 
 174-2 to 1752 
 
 1761 to 1770 
 
 1780 to 1790 
 
 1795 to 1799 
 
 1800 to 1808 
 
 s. d. 
 
 6 
 
 7 6 
 
 8 
 
 9 
 11 
 
 s. d. 
 30 
 42 6 
 51 2 
 70 8 
 86 8 
 
 102 
 90 
 80 
 65 
 60
 
 204 
 
 Old- Poor Law Sj/slem ; 
 
 Happily the other articles of the expenditure of 
 the lower orders, in particular clothing, were en- 
 hanced in a far less degree than bread. Without 
 that advantage, their situation, favourable as was 
 the period to our agriculture, would have been 
 deteriorated, as will at once appear by a reference 
 (see Appendix) to the table of the constituents of 
 family expence in the middle and lower classes. 
 We there find, that while provisions of home growth 
 form hardly 30 per cent, of the disburse of the 
 middle classes, they amount to 50 per cent, of 
 the more rigorously calculated out-lay of the lower 
 orders. 
 
 A still more serious confirmation of the import- 
 ance of the price of corn to the poor, will be 
 found in another short extract from Mr. Barton's 
 tables. Inefficacy in point of relief has seldom 
 been urged against our poor-law system, but the 
 following return shows that it is far from being 
 completely successful in preventing an increase of 
 suffering, and even increase of mortality, among 
 the poor and their children, in times of scarcity. 
 The return comprises seven manufacturing dis- 
 tricts in England, distinct from each other. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Average Price of Wheat 
 per Quarter. 
 
 Deaths. 
 
 1801. 
 1804. 
 1807. 
 1810. 
 
 ,v. d. 
 
 118 3 
 60 1 
 73 3 
 
 106 2 
 
 55y965 
 
 44,794 
 48,108 
 54.864 
 
 It was thus equally desirable, on grounds of lui- 
 manity and of policy, that the price of provisions 
 should experience a reduction. It was in 18^20
 
 its Effect on the Condition oj'tlie Lower Orders. 205 
 
 that this took place on a large scale ; and the fall 
 of wages, though considerable, being still far from 
 proportioned to it, the condition of the lower 
 orders, at least of all who can find employment, has 
 experienced a favourable change, ^^'ere we in 
 possession of returns to a late date, Mr. Barton's 
 parallel of weekly pay and price of wheat, given in 
 our preceding page, might be continued to the 
 present year, and would exhibit an approximation 
 to the wages of the middle of last century ; in 
 some measure in the smallness of tlie money 
 amount, more in its efficiency in the purchase of 
 provisions. 
 
 But without such a return, enough appears to 
 establish the important fact, that notwithstanding 
 the relief afforded by an increase of poor-rate, the 
 condition of the labouring classes experiences a 
 veiy unfavourable change on the enhancement of 
 corn ; while, in return, it is greatly to their advan- 
 tage, that the provisions sliould fall, and rates be 
 reduced. Need we then wonder, tliat in 1810 the 
 framers of the Bullion Ue})ort should have consi- 
 dered the situation of the country labourer dete- 
 riorated by a continuance of high j)rices, notwith- 
 standing the increase of parochial aid ; or, that 
 after 18^20, ministers shouhl have accounted the 
 })ul)hc tranquillity so firmly secured, as to admit of 
 a large reduction in our army. 
 
 Objections to our Poor Lan's. — We come next 
 to the objections urged against our ])()()r-laws, \ iz. 
 that tliey induce the labouring class to contract 
 premature marriages, depress their circumstances 
 by an undue increase of their numbers, and ac- 
 custom them to a state of humiliating dependance. 
 Admitting that these charges are considerably ex-
 
 g06 Our Poor Law Sijtem ; 
 
 aggeratecl, (since the poor increase their numberR 
 ahnost as quickly in Scotland, wliere there is so 
 little ])arochiji] aid,) a sufficient ])roof()f the radical 
 defects or absurd misapplication of our system is 
 afforded by the fact, that aid, originally restricted 
 to the aged and infirm, should be extended to more 
 than a twelfth part of our })opulation ; for the per- 
 sons receiving parish relief in England and Wales, 
 amount, without reckoning children, to nearly a 
 million. But, unluckily, we cannot speak with ap- 
 probation of the course as yet pursued, in regard 
 to the poor in almost any other country. That 
 which is followed in Scotland is charged with a degree 
 of indifference to their sufferings in dear seasons; 
 a time when (Evidence of P. Milne, Esq. M. P., 
 before the Poor Law Committee) necessity prompts 
 labourers to undertake taskwork at reduced rates, 
 and frequently to exceed their strength. A similar 
 feeling must have occurred to most of our country- 
 men who have lived in France, or other countries 
 of the Continent, and witnessed the habitual pri\a- 
 tions of even the sober and industrious, among 
 those of the lower orders who happen to have fa- 
 milies. Hence, a reluctance on the part of many 
 benevolent minds to relinquish our poor-law sys- 
 tem, defective as it is, or to forego the hope of 
 solving that most interesting problem, the means 
 of lessening to them the difficulty of rearing a 
 family. 
 
 Reduction ofTcuces on the Necessaries of Life. — 
 To attain this humane object, the . better plan, we 
 believe, is to abandon our attachment to system, 
 and to relinquish, as soon as in our power, whatever 
 is artificial in our regulations. No contrivance, how- 
 ever ingenious, no combination, however plausible,
 
 its Effect on the Condition of the Jjoxver Order's. 207 
 
 can be so advantageous as the plain rule of enabling 
 the poor to provide for themselves. Much has 
 been lately done to this effect, by the reduction of 
 the duties on salt and leather : let our grand object 
 be, the removal of the remaining obstacles, whether 
 existing in the shape of taxes on the necessaries of 
 life, or of restrictions on employment, such, for 
 example, as arise from our duties on coals carried 
 coastwise or by canal. 
 
 A tax on a necessary of life has, in regard to the 
 poor, the same operation as the enhancement of 
 corn : wages do not become proportionally aug- 
 mented, and a new pressure falls on those who are 
 least able to bear it. The great addition to the 
 tax on leather imposed in 1813, was, doubtless, for 
 a time, an absolute sacrifice on the part of the lower 
 orders. That they are indemnified, or partly in- 
 demnified, in the rate of wages, at times when their 
 services are in demand, we do not deny ; but the 
 equivalent is uncertain, the sacrifice immediate and 
 unavoidable. 
 
 From this painful consideration, we turn to the 
 consolatory reflection, that *' any reduction of the 
 taxes on the necessaries of life, may, with con- 
 fidence, be considered the foreruinier of a reduc- 
 tion of poor-rate." The more the charges on the 
 necessaries of life, in this country, are approxi- 
 mated to those of the Continent, the more we 
 perform towards confirming the superiority of our 
 manufacturers ; resting the su})port of our lower 
 orders on the basis of the wide xvorldy instead of 
 Kngtand, and substituting for an eleemosynary 
 grant, the earnings of independent labour. Is it 
 necessary that we should specify the advantages 
 with which our countrymen enter on the field of 
 competition with their continental neighbours :-*
 
 ^208 Our I'oor Laxi' Si/slem ; 
 
 Tliey have tfi^ aid of" productive mines, of'extensive 
 water cominunication, of a minute subdivision of 
 labour, of habits formed during successive ages to 
 industrious pursuits. These grounds of superiority, 
 imperfectly perceived by P^ngUslimen who have 
 remained at home, are amply appreciated by all 
 who have witnessed tlie slow progress, the deficient 
 resources, the general backwardness of most coun- 
 tries on the Continent. 
 
 But while the benefit arising from this reduction 
 is admitted, the pi'acticability of carrying it to any 
 considerable extent may be questioned by those 
 who look to the magnitude of the wants of govern- 
 ment. These persons, however, would soon modify 
 their objections, and extend their hopes, were they 
 to give due attention to a few fundamental truths ; 
 such as, '* that the proceeds of a tax by no means 
 decrease in proportion to the reduction of its rate ;'* 
 and " that new and unforeseen resources are 
 opened by the extended activity consequent on 
 such reduction." Whenever circumstances shall 
 admit of giving a complete latitude to the course 
 we recommend, the public may safely take for 
 granted, that England will have, if not fewer pau- 
 pers, at least few^er real sufferers from po\erty 
 than any country in Europe. 
 
 Could this highly desirable result be attained, 
 our upper classes would find their duties towards 
 the poor greatly simplified. They would be justi- 
 fied in confining their interference and aid to 
 cases of urgency ; such as an inclement season, a 
 great and general transition like that from war to 
 peace, or from peace to war ; or, finally, to a time 
 when, as is at present the case of the lace-manu- 
 facturers on the Continent, a midtitude of persons, 
 habituated to work of a particular kind only, find
 
 its Effect on the Condition of the Loiver Orders. ^201) 
 
 their earnings suddenly reduced by the introduc- 
 tion of machinery. Assistance tluis conferred 
 would be substantial charity ; exempt in its conse- 
 quences from the hazard and mischief attendant on 
 our poor-law system, and, on that account, doubly 
 gratifying to benevolent minds — to those who, 
 eager to bestow, are M'ithheld only by a doubt of 
 their donations producing a beneficial residt.
 
 ^10 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 PopuIatio7i. 
 
 Few subjects in the range of political science have 
 given rise to more opposite theories than that of 
 Population. It is now fully a century and a half 
 since our venerable countryman, Judge Hale, 
 taking doubtless for granted, like a number of rea- 
 soners in a more advanced age, that the quantity 
 of food in a country is limited by physical causes, 
 declared gravely from the bench, that " the more 
 populous we are, the poorer we are.'* And the 
 present age has witnessed the promulgation of a 
 doctrine of kindred import, though somewhat 
 more elaborately expressed, viz. " that population 
 is imperatively limited by subsistence." This 
 opinion, proceeding from a writer of extensive re- 
 search and professorial rank, has been very gene- 
 rally received, not only in England, but in the 
 country of Dr. Smith ; a quarter where political 
 economy forming more particularly a study, a 
 rigid scrutiny of its merits might naturally have 
 been expected. 
 
 Of the various answers to Mr. Malthus, the 
 most substantial in argument, though far from the 
 most attractive in style, is the work entitled the 
 ** Happiness of States," pubhshed in 1815, by 
 Mr. S. Gray ; a work of which the leading prin- 
 ciples were, some time after, developed in a more
 
 Population J S;c. 211 
 
 condensed and popular form.* Far from coin- 
 ciding with the uncomfortable doctrine, that in- 
 crease of numbers leads to increase of poverty, 
 Mr. G. maintains, that augmented population forms 
 the basis of individual as well as of national wealth. 
 He has been, on the whole, fortunate in the events 
 that have followed the publication of his opinion, 
 the present abundance of subsistence being parti- 
 cularly calculated to relieve the alarm of those 
 who considered our numbers likely to outrun our 
 means of support. Still the public mind is far 
 from being completely satisfied in regard to the 
 benefit arising from augmented population : the 
 reasoning in its favour is not yet clear and con- 
 vincing; while the occasional want of work among 
 our lower orders is attributed by many to a popu- 
 lation increasing too rapidly for employment, if 
 not for subsistence. In this view of the subject, 
 we are far from joining, and proceed to investigate 
 it at some length, in the hope of finding not only 
 a confirmation of the consdlotary and cheering 
 doctrine of Mr. Gray, but of being enabled to 
 found on it a practical measure ; to discover in 
 the increase of our numbers, the means of lessen- 
 ing our financial pressure. 
 
 Our principal topics of enquiry shall be — 
 
 The condition of society in an early age ; 
 
 The change effected by increase of ])0})ulation ; 
 
 How far subsistence is limited by physical causes; 
 
 The state of Europe in regard to increase of 
 numbers and wealth. 
 
 • In two lesser works, entitled, respectively, " All Classes 
 productive of National Wealth," 8vo. 1S17 ; "Gray v. Malthas, 
 the Principles of Population ami Protluction Investigated," 
 8vo. 1818. 
 
 ■> o
 
 0]« 
 
 SECTIOX I. 
 Increase of Population. 
 
 Penury of an early Age. — The predilection with 
 which the popular writers of almost every country 
 have contemplated a primitive age, and the colour- 
 ing cast over it by romantic imaginations, have 
 had the effect of misleading the majority of readers, 
 and rendering them strangers to the privations ex- 
 perienced by their ancestors. These, however, 
 were multiform and grievous ; such, in short, as 
 to form a most striking contrast to the comfort of 
 an advanced state of society ; and if in England 
 we are happily unable to find an existing likeness 
 to a rude age, the sister island will amply supply it. 
 The Irish peasant, occupying a hovel without 
 furniture, and carrying on his cultivation with 
 wretched implements, may convey to us an idea of 
 the state of England five or six centuries ago, as 
 well as of the present state of a great part of the 
 east of Europe, of Poland, Russia, Hungary, and 
 tlie inland provinces of Turkey. The improve- 
 ment of these countries at present, appears to an 
 English traveller extremely slow ; but, aided as it 
 is by the introduction of settlers from Germany 
 and other parts, it is, of course, far less tardy than 
 the advancement of Euro})e in the Gothic ages, 
 when all were equally backward. In those days, 
 a few cottages formed a hamlet, and many cen- 
 turies elapsed ere the hamlet became a village. In 
 
 15
 
 Increase of Population. SJ13 
 
 point of property, extremes predominated : on the 
 one side was tlie lord, on the other his vassals ; 
 while the middle class were few in number, and 
 uncomfortable in circumstances. 
 
 Fjffect of increasing Populadon. — What a different 
 aspect of society is exhibited after a progress m 
 the useful arts, accompanied as it is by the rise of 
 towns and general mcrease of population ! If we 
 compare sucli countries as Russia, Pohuid, Hungary, 
 or the Highlands of Scotland, witli the more tiiickly- 
 peopled districts of the Continent, such as the 
 provinces of Holland, Zealand, Flanders, Nor- 
 mandy, or, on our own side of the Channel, with 
 such counties as Lancashire, Warwickshire, the 
 West Riding of York (to say nothing of Middle- 
 sex), we find a surprising difference in the number 
 and comfort of the middle class. A return of an- 
 nual income, from the first-mentioned countries, 
 would exhibit a few princely fortunes, with a long 
 succession of names below the limit of taxation : 
 in the otiier, it would show a mmiber of gradations 
 ]ising above each other in a manner almost imper- 
 ceptible. How different is the England of the 
 present age, from the Enghuul of feudal times, 
 when we could not (see the Appendix, j). [7''5].) boast 
 twenty towns of 3,000 inhabitants each, and when 
 the Commons or middle class were too unim])()rt- 
 ant to hold a share in the representation, until 
 brought forward by the crown as a counterpoise 
 to the aristocracy. , 
 
 Gradual Transition J'rom Penurij to C\nnJort. — In 
 what manner does the transition from penury to 
 comfort, in general take place? If not ahogether 
 caused by density of jjopulation, it must be al- 
 
 V S
 
 ^21^ Population: — 
 
 lowctl to have very close connexion with it; the con- 
 junction of individuals in villages and towns being 
 productive of a degree of accommodation, comfort, 
 and finally, of refinement, which would be alto- 
 gether beyond their reach in an insulated position. 
 In these assemblages the acqidsition of one comfort 
 creates a desire for another, until society eventually 
 attains the high state of polish Avhich we at present 
 witness in several countries of Europe. All this, 
 says Mr. Gray, leads the consumer to make fresh 
 demands on the producer ; demands reciprocated 
 by the latter on the former, in a different line of 
 business. Hence, the dependence of one class on 
 another ; hence, the prosperity caused to agricul- 
 ture by the success of trade, and to trade by the 
 success of agriculture. It is of no great conse- 
 quence to our argument, whether these wants are 
 of first or of second necessity, that which is deemed 
 a superfluity in one country, being often accounted 
 no more than a comfort, a requisite in another. 
 
 What, it may be asked, is the criterion of the 
 difference in wealth and general improvement be- 
 tween different countries ? The relative density, 
 not of population generally, but oi town population. 
 This is apparent in almost every link in the chain 
 of European civilization, Holland having in the 
 seventeenth century taken the lead of England, 
 exactly as England at present takes the lead of 
 France ; France of most parts of Germany, and 
 Germany of Spain and Poland. The distinc- 
 tion of town population from population gene- 
 rally, is important, for were the same advantage 
 to belong to districts strictly rural, Ireland would 
 claim an equal rank with England, and Flanders 
 take precedence of Holland. It is in towns only 
 that we reap the advantage of collective over
 
 Its Subsistence limited by Physical Causes. 0,15 
 
 scattered population ; — an advantage consisting 
 in extensive markets ; a minute subdivision of 
 employment ; the greater dispatch and finish of 
 workmanship, and a supply of occupation to indi- 
 duals of every age and every degree of capacity. 
 
 Nexo Settlers. — It is but too common among 
 unthinking persons to consider new-comers as un- 
 profitable intruders, — as dealers, not customers, — 
 as sellers, not buyers. This, however, is but a 
 superfcial view, a first impression, for there is 
 very little reason to doubt that in one way or an- 
 other these persons will disburse in proportion to 
 their earnings. When it happens that they or any 
 other part of the community do not make such 
 disburse, the only source of detriment to the 
 public is the practice (now very rare) of hoard- 
 ing ; for money saved and lent at interest becomes 
 of service to the community, increasing the capital 
 of the country, and lowering, or contributing to 
 lower, the premium paid for its use. We may 
 safely take for granted, that much public advan- 
 tage arises from the arrival of new settlers, whether 
 manufacturers, such as England and Prussia ac- 
 quired from France on the repeal oi' the edict of 
 Nantes, or agriculturists, such as Canada and the 
 United States are now receiving fi:om us. 
 
 Population, however, is generally augmented 
 less by settlers from a distance, than by a local 
 increase ; by an excess of births over deaths : a 
 mode, which, very different from the easy acqui- 
 sition of foreigners of mature age, implies a long 
 and often a heavy charge, until the ^outli ol' cither 
 sex acquire the strength or knowledge requisite 
 to their support; requisite, in tlie language of the 
 
 p 1.
 
 '216 Population : — 
 
 economist, to constitute tliem " producers as well 
 as consumers.*' Though in such a case the acqui- 
 sition of new meml)crs is mucli more dearly pur- 
 chased, the effect in a statistical sense is the same 
 as in the case of arrivals from abroad. 
 
 Is the amount of Subsistence limited hij Physical 
 Causes? — We now approach the much-disputed 
 point of the physical limits to increase of popu- 
 lation ; to the question, whether it is imperiously 
 limited by subsistence, or possesses the pow^r of 
 augmenting subsistence in proportion to its own 
 increase. The well-known argument of Mr. Mal- 
 thus is, that population, if unchecked, would 
 proceed in a geometrical ratio (1, ^, 4, 8, If), 32, 
 &c.), while the supply of food cannot, he thinks, 
 be brought, by the greatest efforts of human skill 
 and industry, to increase otherwise than in the 
 arithmetical ratio of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, &c. This 
 position he illustrates by a reference to the 
 United States of America ; a coinitry where the 
 abundance of food is so great as to admit of the 
 inhabitants doubling their number each succeeding 
 generation, the 3,000,000 of 1775 having become 
 6,000,000 in 1800, with a probability of increasing 
 to 12,000,000 in 1825, and so on progressively. 
 
 That, as far as regards physical considerations, 
 there is both an ability and a tendency in mankind 
 to double their numbers in every generation, we 
 readily admit ; also, that wherever sucli redupli- 
 cation does not take place, the causes are to be 
 sought in checks, such as the poverty that deters 
 from marriage, the occurrence of pestilential dis- 
 ease, or some other preventive of the increase of 
 numbers. So far we agree with Mr. Malthus ; but 
 in regard to his second proposition, the causes that
 
 75 Subsistence limited by Vhysical Causes ? -^ly 
 
 limit the increase of food, we must observe that 
 the subject has as yet been by no means satisfac- 
 torily ilhistrated, tlie attention of the different 
 writers on the subject, whether liimself^ Mr. Ri- 
 cardo, or others, iiaving been fixed too nnich on 
 the necessity of having additional land to afford the 
 produce required, and too little on the increase 
 derived from bestowing additional labour on the 
 same soil. What wxm'c the circumstances of the 
 period when Mr. Malthus' book was composed? It 
 was a period of war, of deficient croj)s, of continued 
 enhancement of agricultural produce ; and the 
 author, like the public at large, was necessarily 
 unacquainted with our power of augmenting the 
 supply, a powder so remarkably displayed since 
 our seasons have become more favourable, and 
 peace has restored to agriculture a sufficiency of 
 labourers. 
 
 Average Increase of Population. — In attempting 
 a com})utation of the average increase of our mun- 
 bers, we begin by making an exce})tion of the 
 United States, peculiar as are the advantages pos- 
 sessed by that country. They consist in a territory 
 of vast extent ; a river navigation of great im- 
 portance ; a people enjoying unrestricted inter- 
 course with the civilized world, and closely con- 
 nected in language and habits with the most 
 commercial and colonizing country of Euro])e. 
 Such an example is necessarily rare, and ought to 
 be considered an extreme case : a more satisfactory 
 result as to the average increase of })oj)ulation 
 would be obtained from a combination of cases, 
 among which, assuming the United States as the 
 example of the most rapid augmentation, we may 
 take, as the second, England, in which, under 
 circumstances more favourable than on the C'on-
 
 « 1 8 Population : — 
 
 tincnt of Europe, but less so than on tlie other side 
 of'tlie Atlantic, population has doubled within the 
 last century, and bids fair to double again in sixty 
 or seventy years. As a farther exanij)le, we may 
 take France, where, though the records are far 
 from accurate, the doubling of the population has 
 as yet required a term of from 100 to 120 years. 
 Other countries exhibit a greater or less degree of 
 slowness in the ratio of increase, and as these 
 returns apply to them when exempt from the 
 visitation of war, pestilence, or any violent check 
 to increase of numbers, Mr. Gray's inference is, 
 that the average furnished by the whole may be 
 assumed as indicative of the natural progress of 
 population. 
 
 After thus endeavouring to establish the natural 
 ratio of increase, Mr. Gray proceeds to argue that 
 such increase is no farther limited by the difficulty 
 of obtaining food, than by the difficulty of obtain- 
 ing clothing or lodging, because the supply of food, 
 though apparently restricted by a physical cause, 
 is, on a closer examination, found to depend on 
 the amount of capital and labour applied to raising 
 it. In arguing this very interesting question, Mr. 
 Gray and the other opponents of Mr. Malthus, 
 woidd do well to guard against the charge of over- 
 confidence, and to begin by making a distinct ad- 
 mission of the difficulty of raising a family, a task 
 which to the middle classes is one of laboiu" and 
 anxiety ; to the lower, of toil, privation, and often 
 of distress. Of this heavy burden, what portion is 
 to be ascribed to the charge of food ? In the mid- 
 dle classes, food forms (see Appendix, p. [11].) be- 
 tween SO and 40 per cent, of the whole expence of 
 a family ; but in the lower above 50 per cent., con- 
 stituting thus, the grand article of charge in that 
 13
 
 Is Subsistence limited by Physical Caitses ? '210 
 
 class in which the pressure of a family is most 
 severely felt. 
 
 After this precautionary statement, we may 
 safely allow Mr. Gray and his followers to give a 
 latitude to their inferences, comprehensive as they 
 are, viz. : — 
 
 That the quantity of subsistence in the world 
 may be augmented in the same manner, and by the 
 same means, as the quantity of our clothing, or the 
 size of our dwellings ; and, 
 
 That an addition to our numbers implies no 
 diminution of individual income or property. 
 
 Such assertions would have appeared not a little 
 extraordinary during the greatest part of the war, 
 when a continued insufficiency in our agricultural 
 produce favoured so strongly the negative doctrine 
 of Mr. Malthus : they would have been received 
 also with no small surprise during I8I7 and 1818, 
 when a scarcity of provisions, a general irregu- 
 larity in the state of our productive industry, 
 concurred to produce apprehension in regard to 
 our increasing numbers. But a different lesson 
 has since been taught us: we have now evidence that 
 numbers, increased greatly beyond anticipation, 
 may draw their subsistence from the same terri- 
 torial surface ; that the amount of produce may be 
 greatly augmented without bringing new soil into 
 cultivation. A similar result from a similar cause 
 is at present exhibited on the Continent of Europe. 
 
 Comparison of the present ivith former Periods.^ 
 How far does the preceding opinion appear to be 
 confirmed by a general retrospect to the past? 
 During the twenty years that elapsed between 
 169*2 and 1712, the average price of wheat (about 
 \'U. per quarter,) had been such as to aflbrd, in
 
 ^20 Population : — 
 
 these days of low rent and cheap labour, an ample 
 inducement to the extension of tillage. It was 
 consequently considered as having reached its 
 tenni?ius, and no idea was entertained of the prac- 
 ticability of any considerable addition to our pro- 
 duce. The result, however, ])roved very different, 
 for though during the half century that followed 
 the treaty of Utrecht, our population received (see 
 Preliminary Observations on the Po])ulation Return 
 of 18'^!, p. 29.) an augmentation, including Ireland, 
 of fully 3,000,000, the increase of our agricultural 
 produce was such as more than counterbalanced 
 that new demand. This was apparent from the aver- 
 age price of wheat, which during that long period did 
 not exceed 35s. the quarter. — Were it true that 
 the acquisition of subsistence becomes more dif- 
 ficult as our numbers increase, we should naturally 
 expect to find the greatest abundance in a remote 
 ao-e ; in times when the number of consumers was 
 small, relatively to the extent of territory. But 
 if we look back to the earliest periods of authentic 
 history, to the ages \vhen Greece and Italy were 
 most thinly peopled, we find neighbouring tribes 
 maintaining sanguinary struggles with each other, 
 the motive of which, as far as regarded the lower 
 orders, was the hope of acquiring additional ter- 
 ritory, and increased means of subsistence. It is 
 thus that we are to explain the obstinate warfare 
 for small but fertile districts, such as the plain 
 of Thyria, the plain of Tanagra, the Colles Tuscu- 
 lani ;. — to say nothing of contests, in a record of 
 higher authority, for the valleys of Palestine, or 
 the banks of the Jordan. Had siibsistence been 
 abundant in these days, the inhabitants of the 
 towns of Greece would have shown less eagerness 
 in emigrating to new colonies ; while at Rome,
 
 Is Siibs'istencc I'lmitcd hi/ P/n/sica/ Causes ? oo\ 
 
 the demand of an Agrarian law would have been 
 a less powerful le\er in the hand of deniagonues. 
 But to confine our examination to our own country, 
 and to times comparatively recent, how diflerent 
 is the present situation of our lower orders from 
 that of their forefathers luider Henry A'^III., or 
 under our admired Elizabeth, when, without any 
 disposition to sexerity on the part of the sovereign 
 or her ministers, the number of capital punishments 
 (Speech of Mr. Fowel Buxton on our criminal 
 code, May, 18'21), averaged no less than five hun- 
 dred annually ! Various causes, in particular the 
 ■want of education, must have contributed to this 
 unfortunate prevalence of oflfences ; but can any 
 be supposed to have operated so largely on the 
 part of the commonalty, as the difficulty of ob- 
 taining subsistence, although in that age our popu- 
 lation did not exceed a third of its present number? 
 But what, it may be asked, was the cause of 
 this difficulty, — of the sup])ly of subsistence being 
 so scanty, when the number of consumers was so 
 small? Of this problem the solution is to be 
 sought in the unproductiveness of even the fairest 
 tracts so long as they remain in a state of nature. 
 Whatever be the serenity of the climate or the 
 richness of the soil, they continue unavailing to 
 any useful purpose, until the a])plication of labour. 
 By labour only can over-luxuriance be corrected, 
 the forest cleared, a superabundance of watei- 
 removed from one spot, a deficiency of it supplied 
 in another. It is to the performance of tasks Hke 
 these, the most acceptable of any in an early age, 
 that we trace the honours so liberally bestowed '\\\ 
 ancient mythology, — tlie apotheosis of the warrior 
 who drained the Lcrn;ean marsh, and combati-d
 
 222 Popvlalioji : — 
 
 the savage occupants ol" the woods. But we arc 
 under no necessity of dwelhng on an age of tra^ 
 dition, on a scene embelhslied hy fiction : if we 
 turn to plain reahty, — to the times in which we hve, 
 and to a people noted for their adherence to the 
 pursuit of substantial profit ; ifi in short, we fix 
 our attention on the western states of America, 
 or on Upper Canada, we shall find an example 
 abundantly convincing of the unproductiveness of" 
 the finest tracts until improved by labour and 
 capital. 
 
 It would be easy to multiply illustrations from 
 history, but as our limits hardly admit of detail, 
 we extract from one of the works already men- 
 tioned (Gray versus Malthus), a summary of the 
 leading ideas in the opposite systems of population. 
 
 Mr, Malthus' s leading Ideas. Mr. Grays leading Ideas. 
 
 The increase of population has The increase of population 
 
 a tendency to overstock, and tends to increase the average 
 
 to lessen the average amount amount of employment to 
 
 of employment to indivi- individuals, 
 duals. 
 
 The increase of population has The increase of population has 
 
 a natural tendency to pro- a tendency to increase 
 
 mote poverty. wealth, not collectively only, 
 
 but individually. 
 
 From the conclusions of Mr. Malthus we dissent 
 almost entirely ; to those of Mr. Gray, we would 
 suggest the following modification : 
 
 Increase of population, when acco77ipa?iied hy 
 improvement in agriculture^ manufacture, and the 
 useful arts generally^ has a tendency to augment 
 both the 
 
 Average amount of employment ; and 
 
 Our wealth, not collectively only, but individually.
 
 Is Subsistence limited by Physical Causes ? 223 
 
 Mr. Mai thus. Mr. Gray. 
 
 The amount of subsistence The amount of population re- 
 regulates the amount of gulates the amount of sub- 
 population, sistencc, in the same way as 
 
 it regulates the supply of 
 clothing and housing, be- 
 cause with the exception of 
 occasional famines, the quan- 
 tity of subsistence raised 
 depends on the amount of 
 labour bestowed on it. 
 Population has a natural tend- Population has a tendency to 
 ency to increase faster than increase, but this increase 
 subsistence. carries in itself the power of 
 
 supplying its wants. 
 
 Here, also, we are desirous to introduce a re- 
 ference to the progress of improvement, since, 
 although the application of labour on the part of 
 an increasing and iuiim})roving society, like the 
 peasantry of Ireland and Brittany, augment the 
 quantity of the mere necessaries of life, the hazard 
 of famine can be prevented only by improvement 
 in agriculture, or in those arts of which the pro- 
 ducts enable a people to purchase subsistence 
 from their nciglibours. The early marriages of 
 the Irish without the certainty of wages, or a 
 stock of implements and furniture, are productive 
 of incalculable suffering. 
 
 That the supply of food may be extended, by 
 labour and capital, in the same manner as the su])- 
 ply of manufactures and buildings, we readily ad- 
 mit ; but, as in the case of four-htths of mankind, 
 food forms by fiir the greatest article of cliarge, 
 and is, consequently, the most difficult of acqui- 
 sition, we are fully prepared to excuse tliose who, 
 in their writings, have over- rated the lal)our ol' 
 procuring it. From the unquahfied, imd some- 
 times confident tone of Mr. Crray, an inhabitant o)
 
 0^21, PopuldUuii : — 
 
 Canada or tlie United States mi^lit fiill into the 
 i^rievous miscalculation, that to procure food for a 
 faniily in Europe, was a task of no greater diffi- 
 culty than in his own country, where a grant of* 
 land may be had on such easy terms. 
 
 Progressive Increase of Population in Europe. 
 
 Tiie arguments in the preceding table are of ge- 
 neral application, referring to the state of mankind 
 in every age and country. To give the question 
 a more specific form, we shall now introduce a few 
 statistical results, and explain in what manner are 
 effected tliose improvements in agriculture and the 
 useful arts, which we consider as conferring the 
 ability to support an augmented population. 
 
 Effects of Soil and Climate. — Fertility of soil is 
 too directly conducive to increase of numbers, to 
 require illustration ; but in point of climate, we 
 cannot avoid remarking that the superiority of one 
 part of Europe over another, is, as far at least as 
 regards the productive pow er of the soil, much less 
 than is commonly imagined. The great art of the 
 husbandman consists in adapting the object of cul- 
 ture to the peculiarity of the temperature. In 
 various parts of Scotland, accounted half a century 
 ago unfit tor wheat culture, the progress of im- 
 provement has led to raising that grain not only in 
 abundance, but of a quality fit for the London 
 market ; while in the boasted climate of the south 
 of France, the season is often too dry for wheat, 
 and the frequent failure of that crop seems to point 
 out maize as a more appropriate object of tillage. 
 In regard to potatoes, the culture of. which is so 
 directly connected with density of population, the
 
 Causes of il^ Increase in Europe. ^25 
 
 warmest and finest climate of tlie Continent has no 
 superiority over our own. It is tlius only, when in 
 extremes, as in the bleak tracts of Russia, Sweden, 
 and Norway, that climate has operated materially 
 to restrict })roduce and population : the physical 
 superiority of the south of Euro})e, whate\er may 
 be its eventual eftect, has not, as yet, been such as 
 to outweigh the political advantages of the north. 
 
 Effect of Communication by Sea, Rivers, Canals, 
 Roads. — The effect of prompt communication in 
 promoting commercial intercourse is sufficiently 
 ap])ai-ent, but its tendency to increase the popula- 
 tion oi' towns may require some explanation. What, 
 in the first place, are the advantages enjoyed by the 
 inhabitants of towns over those of the country; by 
 a collected over a scattereil population ? TJiey 
 consist in a more ample field for sale or purchase ; 
 a better division of employment ; greater dispatch 
 and finish of workmanship ; — a more varied supply 
 of occupation, so as to suit individuals of almost 
 any degree of strength or capacity. Now these 
 advantages, arising, in a large town, from concen- 
 tration of numbers, may, in a great degree, be en- 
 joyed by places comparatively small and distant 
 from each other, when connected by rivers, canals, 
 <)r a line of sea-coast. Such was the origin of the 
 prosperity of Greece ; such, at present, is the cause 
 that the maritime part of her population make in 
 their contest with the Turks a figure not unworthy 
 «f their ancestors. It is thus that the several towns 
 of Holland, Zealand, and Flanders, have for many 
 centuries nuiintained an active intercourse with 
 each other ; that Paris is so closely connected with 
 Rouen and Havre de Grace ; that Switzerland 
 maintains by the Rhine an intercourse with Hol- 
 
 Q
 
 i220 Population : — 
 
 land ; and that in England, particularly since the 
 multiplication of canals within the last seventy 
 years, the conveyance of coal, iron, salt, and other 
 bulky commodities, is so much facilitated. On the 
 other hand, the want of such intercourse is, as we 
 shall see presently, the principal cause of the 
 backwardness of Spain, Poland, the south of 
 Germany, and, in no inconsiderable degree, of 
 France. 
 
 Effect of the Protestant Religion. — The adop- 
 tion of the reformed faith has been found conducive 
 to the increase, not only of individual comfort, but 
 of the population of tow^ns in the countries into 
 which it has been introduced. Among its other 
 effects, are a more general diffiision of education, 
 and an exemption, in the case of the labouring 
 classes, from the loss of time attendant on the end- 
 less holydays of the catholic church. In agricul- 
 ture, the operation of these advantages is less 
 apparent, most countries sufficing wholly, or nearly, 
 to their own consumption, while the insulated po- 
 sition of the husbandman prevents, in a great 
 measure, the benefit arising from competition and 
 frequent personal conmiunication. But in manu- 
 factures, particularly in those prepared for foreign 
 sale, the case is very different ; the ease of tran- 
 sporting them to a distant market, and of comparing 
 their respective quality and price, opens a wide 
 field of competition, and awards the preference to 
 superior skill and ingenuity. Accordingly, though 
 the catholics of Europe are, collectively, much 
 more numerous than the protestants, the far larger 
 share of exported merchandize proceeds from pro- 
 testant countries, the labour of the !• lemings, the 
 French, and the northern Italians, forming a feeble
 
 Causes of its Increase in Europe. 22? 
 
 counterpoise to those of the Silesians, the Saxons, 
 the Prussians, and, abo\ e all, of" our countrymen. 
 In Ireland, linen weaving, the only great branch 
 of manufacture, is almost wholly in the hands of 
 protestants. 
 
 We proceed to apply this reasoning to the pro- 
 gress of population in Europe, avaiUng ourselves of 
 the official returns which have been made in most 
 countries in the course of the present age, and 
 which supply the following abstract : — 
 
 Inhabitants 
 per square Mile. 
 East Flanders - - - 55^ 
 West Flanders .... 420 
 Holland (Province of) .... 362 
 Ireland ----- 237 
 England distinct from Wales - - 232 
 Austrian Italy, viz, the Milanese and the Ve- 
 netian States - - - 219 
 The Netherlands, viz. the Dutch and Belgic 
 
 Provinces, collectively ... 214 
 
 Italy - - - . 179 
 
 France - ... 150 
 
 The Austrian dominions - - - 112 
 
 The Prussian dominions - - 100 
 
 Denmark .... - 73 
 
 Poland .... - 60 
 
 Spain ..... 58 
 
 Turkey in Europe (conjectural) - - 50 
 
 I Sweden (distinct from Norway and Lapland) - 25 
 
 ' Russia in Europe - - - 23 
 
 Here are, indeed, some very remarkable diifer- 
 ences in po})ulation, and to trace this diversity to 
 its source, is uii object of no slight interest. 
 f Flanders possesses, in a high degree, the main 
 causes of dense ))opulation, fertility of soil, and 
 ease of communication, having on the uortli the 
 ,sea and the Scheldt, while the flatness of its sur- 
 
 Q 2
 
 228 I'opu/alion .• — 
 
 face admits of easy intersection by canals. Acconl- 
 inf^Iy, so early as the IStli century, when ])r()duc- 
 tive industry was in its infancy in every jiart of 
 Europe, except Pisa, Venice, Genoa, and a few 
 other towns of Italy, Bruges was a phice of com- 
 mercial eminence, a kind of centre for the inter- 
 course of the north-west of Europe. In this it was 
 succeeded by Antwerp and Amsterdam ; but 
 though Flanders has long ceased to have much 
 foreign trade, its population and manufacturing 
 industry have not declined. The great articles of 
 its produce are, corn, hemp, and flax ; of its ma- 
 nufactures, linen, lace, leather, and, in later times, 
 cotton. Of cities, it contains only two, Ghent and 
 Bruges, and their conjunct population does not ex- 
 ceed 9(),0()(). But it abounds in towns and vil- 
 lages which are populous, though not noticed in 
 history, and hardly in geography. 
 
 Of the Dutch provinces, tha most remarkable 
 for population, as for other characteristics, are Hol- 
 land and Zealand. On the ground of fertility they 
 have little claim, to density of numbers, the soil 
 being, in general, ill adapted to tillage ; but in 
 ease of water communication, they surpass every 
 other part of Europe. The mouths of the Rhine, 
 Maese, and Scheldt, aflbrd capacious inlets for 
 foreign commerce, while the level surface of the 
 territory admits of easy intersection by canals. 
 These provinces possessed, consequently, consider- 
 able population and trade before the l6th century, 
 when their })rosperity was confirmed by the adop- 
 tion of tlie protestant religion, and by the establish- 
 ment, after a long struggle, of an independent 
 government. 
 
 How far does fertility of soil account for the in- 
 crease of population in England ? Inferior to se-
 
 Causes of its Increase in Europe. ^29 
 
 veral tracts on tlie Continent, such as Flanders oi* 
 the Milanese, but more fertile than the mountains 
 of S])aui or the sandy levels of the north of Ger- 
 many, the soil of England may be said to hold a 
 medium, and to have a claim to rank with the 
 average of the French and Austrian territory. This 
 degree of fertility would have determined a popu- 
 lation in the })resent age of perhaps 150 to the 
 square mile : the additional inunber is, as far as 
 regards phijsical causes, to be attributed to our in- 
 sular position, and the productiveness of our mines, 
 particularly of coal ; advantages which lead so 
 directly to the increase of our manufacturers, sea- 
 men, and traders. In ease of inland navigation, 
 England is second only to the Dutch provinces. 
 
 Inland Countries : Austria a?id Prussia. — From 
 these examples of maritime prosperity, we pass to 
 inland countries, and begin by the dominions of 
 Austria, which, with a slight exception, are at a 
 distance from the sea, traversed by few navigable 
 rivers, and by hardly any canals. Though equal 
 to France or England in fertility, the communi- 
 cation between the different pi'ovinces is difficult, 
 the ])rogress of improvement extremely slow, ma- 
 initactures backward, and the town population very 
 limited. Prussia, in like manner, has few harbours 
 or navigable rivers, indifferent roads, and canals 
 that are only in their infancy: the majoritv of her 
 subjects enjoy the atlvantage of the protestant reli- 
 gion, and of an education less imperfect than that 
 of their southern neiglfoours ; but her j)()piilati()n 
 is thin, in conse([uence of a great part of her ter- 
 ritory being sandy or marshy. 
 
 A still stronger example of the disadvantage of 
 an inland position is afforded by Poland. That 
 
 Q 3
 
 S.'JO Population : — 
 
 country, without possessing all the fertility vul- 
 garly ascribed to those which export corn, is not 
 naturally below the average productiveness of Eu- 
 rope. Its climate, if in winter it ))artake of the 
 rigour of Russia, is in summer favoural)le to corn 
 culture, and the great impediment to the increase 
 of its produce is not a mountainous surface, but a 
 cause more within the remedying power of indus- 
 try — extensive marshes. Still, its town population 
 is scanty and wretched, the causes of which, in a 
 political sense, are, long continued niisgovernment, 
 a bigotted creed, the almost total neglect of edu- 
 cation ; in a physical, the difficulty of transporting 
 commodities, the extent of sea-coast being small, 
 the roads proverbially wretched, and the access to 
 the interior by the Vistula, circuitous, and too 
 confined for so large a tract of country. 
 
 France. — Between these extremes, our ancient 
 rival forms a medium, possessing a considerable ex- 
 tent of coast, but labouring also under the disadvan- 
 tage of an inland territory, square in its form, slightly 
 penetrated by navigable rivers, having, as yet, very 
 few canals, and roads good only in particular di- 
 rections. Compared to the Austrian or Prussian 
 states, France is an improved country, but the 
 case is far otherwise when put in competition with 
 the Netherlands or England. Superior to our island 
 in climate, and equal to it in soil, she is greatly in- 
 ferior in density of population, and still more in the 
 average income of individuals. Of her population, 
 two-thirds (above twenty millions) live in the coun- 
 try, and her peasantry partake, in many provinces, 
 of the poverty of those of Ireland. In the size of 
 her towns, this great kingdom, so long the dread 
 of our forefathers, and of Europe, has, in the last 
 and present age, been altogether surpassed by
 
 Causes of its Increase in Europe. 231 
 
 England and Scotland; for though our island 
 boast only half her population, the distribution of 
 it is made, in a manner, far more conducive to 
 efficiency in a commercial and financial sense. 
 This is, at once, apparent from a comparison of the 
 twelve principal towns in each. 
 
 Population Return o/^1821. 
 
 ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND. 
 
 FRANCE. 
 
 
 London, Westminster, 
 
 
 
 
 
 Soutlnvark, and the 
 
 
 
 
 
 adjoining parishes - 
 
 1,225,694 
 
 Paris - 
 
 - 
 
 - 720,000 
 
 Glasgow with suburbs 
 
 147,043 
 
 Lyons 
 
 . 
 
 - 1 1 5,000 
 
 Edinburgh with Leith 
 
 
 
 
 
 and their suburbs - 
 
 158,23.5 
 
 Marseilles 
 
 . 
 
 - 102,000 
 
 Manchester, with Sal- 
 
 
 
 
 
 ford 
 
 133,788 
 
 Bordeaux 
 
 - 
 
 92,000 
 
 Liverpool - 
 
 118,972 
 
 Rouen 
 
 . 
 
 86,000 
 
 Birmingham with Aston 
 
 106,722 
 
 Nantes 
 
 - 
 
 77,000 
 
 Bristol and suburbs 
 
 87,779 
 
 Lille 
 
 - 
 
 60,000 
 
 Leeds and suburbs 
 
 83,796 
 
 Strasburg 
 
 - 
 
 50,000 
 
 Plymouth, with Dock 
 
 
 
 
 
 and suburbs 
 
 61,212 
 
 Toulouse 
 
 - 
 
 50,000 
 
 Norwich - - - 
 
 50,288 
 
 Orleans 
 
 . 
 
 42,000 
 
 NewcastleonTync,with 
 
 
 
 
 
 Gateshead 
 
 46,948 
 
 Metz 
 
 . 
 
 42,000 
 
 Portsmouth with Port- 
 
 
 
 
 
 sea ... 
 
 45,648 
 
 Nimes 
 
 - 
 
 40,000 
 
 Ireland. — In our enumeration of towns we have 
 omitted those of Ireland, because the situation of 
 that country is })eculiar. Possessing, in point of 
 navigation, maritime and inland, advantages equal 
 to those of England, her towns are comparatively 
 small, her manufactures considerable in one pro- 
 vince only. To what, then, is owing the remark- 
 able density of her population ? To two causes, 
 fertility of soil, and the habit on the part of 
 the peasantry, of subsisting on a food, the pro- 
 duce of which, on a given spot, is miicii larger 
 tlian that of the wheat, the rye, or the oats, which, 
 in other parts of Europe, form the basis of na- 
 tional subsistence. 
 
 Q 4
 
 '23^2 Population : — Connection between its 
 
 //<7///. — Few countries surpass Italy in natural 
 ;ul\;uitages j in soil, in (•liniate, extent of sea 
 coast, and, in her nortliern part, in the means 
 of inland navigation. But a higotted creed has 
 confirmed the indolence inspired by the climate, 
 and her unfortunate division into petty states, has 
 prevented measures for the advancement of her 
 productive industry. Thougli more populous 
 than France, her inhabitants have a smaller aver- 
 age income : the want of a concentrated govern- 
 ment may be considered the cause of lighter 
 financial burdens, but the advantage is balanced 
 or more than balanced by the loss of that rank 
 among the states of Europe, to which this coun- 
 try is entitled by her population and geographical 
 position. 
 
 Spain has a climate on the whole, favourable, 
 but in respect to territorial surface, it is, after 
 Switzerland, the most mountainous country in 
 Europe. Having been all along deprived of the 
 blessings of good government and enlightened 
 religion, the physical obstacles to communication 
 between one district and another, have been very 
 little lessened by exertion on the part of the 
 inhabitants ; the roads are few and indiHerent, 
 while of canals there are hardly any. Her great 
 extent of sea coast, ought, it may be thought, to 
 have remedied these disadvantages, but the small 
 number of her navigable rivers has confined this 
 benefit to the outskirts of her territory, leaving the 
 interior untraversed and almost unopened. Thus, 
 Avith the exception of Catalonia, Biscay, and part 
 of Andalusia, Spain exhibits all the backwardness 
 of a country deprived of water communication; 
 Portugal is more favourably circumstanced ; she 
 has two great inlets from the ocean, the Tagus
 
 Increase and the Increase of IVealth. 'Zoo 
 
 and Doiiro ; her towns are less thinly scattered, 
 and without siirpassinii; S])ain in climate or soil, slie 
 is enabled to pay a larger revenue in proportion to 
 her population. 
 
 Russia and the north of Sweden, form an ex- 
 ample of" extreme thinness of" popuhition, conse- 
 quent, partly on rigour of" climate, i)artiy also on 
 difficulty of intercourse. 
 
 Co7inection heticeen Increase of Numbers and In- 
 crease of Wealth. — Having thus ex})lained the 
 increase of popuhition in Europe, Me are, in the 
 next place, to examine the circumstances con- 
 nected with the increase oj' licallh. 
 
 Qui- experience since the peace, unfortunate 
 as it has been to particular classes of the commu- 
 nity, has put beyond doubt one material 'point, 
 we mean our ])ower of sul)sisting an increased po- 
 pulation. Tlie case of England is that of Eiuope 
 at large, and even anti-popuhitionists can Iiardlv 
 apprehend that such abundance is tcm])orary, or 
 tJiat the civilized world is at all in hazard from in- 
 sufficiency of subsistence. Equally little can they 
 deny that increase of national wealth, has, for a 
 long time, accompanied increase of munbers. 
 Such has evidently been the case in France, in 
 Germany, in the countries along the Baltic, and, 
 above all, among ourseKes. 
 
 ]5ut while the facts are undoubted, the inteience 
 that the increase of wealth is closely connected 
 with increase of numbers, will not be so reatlily 
 granted. From the adherents of Mr. Malthus, it 
 is not to be looked for, nor do we expect it for 
 some time from the majority of our ])ul)lic men. 
 
 Their objections to it however will, we l)elie\e, be 
 lessened by a qualification similar to what we have
 
 !234< Populalion : — Omncction between its 
 
 already suggested, viz. that our arguments for 
 *♦ an increase of wealth from increase of nujubers 
 are urged only in regard to a society advancing 
 in a knowledge of agriculture, manufacture, and 
 the useful arts generally." 
 
 After inserting this important condition, we may 
 with confidence propose some interesting questions, 
 such as '• whether, when the same portion of public 
 burdens is distributed over a greater number of per- 
 sons, the pressure on the individual is not neces- 
 sarily lightened?" Our revenue arises chiefly from 
 consumption : each individual bears his part, and 
 the 50,000,000/, at present paid by somewhat less 
 than 1.5,000,000 of inhabitants in Great Britain, 
 will obviously give a smaller average per head 
 when they shall come to be shared among a popu- 
 lation of 16,000,000. Our next question is, "whe- 
 ther the effect of augmented numbers, in adding 
 to the revenue, has not been remarkably exemplified 
 in the present age : whether it had not an impor- 
 tant share in swelling the product of our taxes 
 during the war, and in preventing their diminution 
 since the peace ?" If these preliminary points 
 are admitted, we may proceed to put the more 
 general question, whether " when a greater popu- 
 lation is maintained in equal comfort on the same 
 territory, the wealth and power of the community 
 are not increased?" This approaches so nearly to 
 a self-evident proposition, that we shall not hesitate 
 to take for granted, that as to national income and 
 power, no doubt can be entertained of an increase 
 attendant on the increase of our numbers. It re- 
 mains that we investigate its etiects in another sense. 
 
 Increase of Income to the Indhi dual. — Hasan 
 augmented population a tendency to expand or
 
 Increase and the Increase of Wealth. 'iS5 
 
 contract tlie separate earnings of its members? 
 The present may be termed tlie age of statistical 
 returns, the first period in history in which the 
 governments of the civilized part of the workl 
 have called periodically for returns of population. 
 It has also been an aera of great fluctuation in the 
 property of individuals ; yet amidst all the com- 
 plaints of losses arising at one time from the ex- 
 penditure of war, at another from want of employ- 
 ment or superabundance of produce, we have no- 
 where seen it argued that the circumstances of our 
 population have undergone deterioration from the 
 increase of their numbers. Of this one main cause 
 is, that the necessity of providing for a family is 
 the strongest of all stimidants to the reniuiciation 
 of indolent habits, to the productive employment 
 of time and capital. What a contrast in the result 
 of the labour of the parent who necessarily adheres 
 to a uniform pursuit, and of him who, exempt 
 from the calls of a family, is at liberty to pass his 
 time in speculation, indecision, and change ! In 
 nothing is the advantage of a mercantile conunu- 
 nity, like England, Holland, or the United States 
 of America, more conspicuous over most countries 
 of the Continent of Euroj)e; where fanciful changes 
 and visionary pursuits are so common, and where the 
 upper classes, or, as they are styled, the noblesse, 
 so frequently pass their lives without a definite 
 object, and seek to escape trouble by aNoidiug \\\v 
 responsibility of a family. 
 
 Let us not, however, be understood as asserting 
 that the increase of our population cannot be too 
 rapid, or as making light oi" the pressure on the 
 parents of a numerous family ; a pres.sure whicii 
 in general implies the necessity of renouncing the 
 gratifications of leisure, and ofnhnost " sacrifjciwg
 
 '2:H') J *()/)// /a //(>// : — Conncc/ion belwccn its 
 
 cnjoynicMit (()r tlif means of living." That tliis is 
 applicabk' to the middle as well as to the lower 
 classes, we are fully convinced ; and if we do not 
 dwell on it more largely, it is because we have 
 already adverted to it, and our ])resent enquiry 
 regards the effect of" increasing numbers in a sense 
 strictly statistical. 
 
 Mr, Gray, not content with stipulating for an 
 e(iuality of circumstances to the rising generation, 
 goes a step farther, it being one of the fundamental 
 articles of his creed, that an increase in the num- 
 bers of a nation or society, tends, not only to 
 keep up, but to improve the income of its mem- 
 bers : that the 80/. forming the average income of 
 indi\idual workmen in one age, may, and, in fact, 
 is likely to become SlUin the next; or to express 
 it in a comprehensive form, that " the more varied 
 the classes of a community, the more they con- 
 duce to the welfare of each other," To this inter- 
 esting and important conclusion we are ready to 
 assent, provided the increase of income be con- 
 sidered as dependent less on increase of numbers, 
 than on the circumstances under which (see p. 9.9^2.') 
 such increase takes place. 
 
 Hoii: far exemplified in the State of Europe. — 
 We proceed to put this doctrine to the test, by a 
 reference to the returns of taxation and other 
 public biu'dens, in different countries of Europe. 
 These, we are aware, do not furnish an unexcep- 
 tionable criterion of national wealth, as the pro- 
 j)ortion of public burdens may differ from circum- 
 stances imconnected with the state of })roductive 
 industry, such as the greater or less participation 
 of a particular country in war, since the adoption 
 of the funding system. They form, however, the 
 least defective basis, the nearest approximation to
 
 232 
 
 - 
 
 3 2 
 
 
 
 165 
 
 - 
 
 2 15 
 
 
 
 214 
 
 - 
 
 1 10 
 
 
 
 150 
 
 - 
 
 1 4- 
 
 
 
 112 
 
 - 
 
 12 
 
 4. 
 
 100 
 
 - 
 
 13 
 
 4. 
 
 73 
 
 - 
 
 16 
 
 3 
 
 58 
 
 - 
 
 11 
 
 G 
 
 25 
 
 - 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 23 
 
 - 
 
 9 
 
 9 
 
 Increase and lite Jiiorasc uj' J Teal lit. ^SJ 
 
 the truth hi the })ieseiit imperfect state of pubhe 
 surveys ; for few countries liave been the object of 
 an assessment so directly calculated to convey an 
 estimate of national wealth, as the property-tax 
 of England or \\\e fancier of France. 
 
 I'opulatioii I'roportion of Public Burdsns 
 per square ^lile. paid by eacli IndiviiUial. 
 
 Englanddistinct from Scot-) ' " 
 
 land and Wales - j 
 
 England, Scotland, and \ 
 
 Wales, collectively - j 
 The Netherlands * 
 France - - - 
 
 The Austrian Empire 
 The Prussian Dominions 
 Denmark - - - 
 
 Spain ... 
 
 Sweden 
 Russia in Europe 
 
 The maritime provinces of Holland and Zea- 
 land, are perhaps as heavily taxed as England, the 
 charge of defence against the sea, added to the 
 interest of a heavy debt, contracted during two 
 centuries, rendering the total assessment probablv 
 equal to our 31. ^.s'. per head. France exliil)its a 
 medium in her taxes as in her population : while 
 in our case, the increase of taxation since 179v? has 
 been more than double the increase of our popu- 
 lation, in France the proportion of the former lias 
 outstripped that of the latter only by a fourth, or 
 ^5 per cent. 8till the axerage payment ])er head 
 is much greater in France than in the Austrian 
 empire, a country fully ecpial to France in fer- 
 tility, but more thinly peopled, because it is dexoid 
 of the means of communication afibrded to France 
 by a consideraI)Ie extent of coast. 
 
 * The repartition of taxes is here very unequal, the Dutch 
 provinces, particularly those of Holland and Zealand, paying 
 nmch more than 1/. 10.?. a head, the Belgic considerably less.
 
 <i3H ropidation . — 
 
 The population of DtMiinark, though more thinly 
 spread tluu) tluit of Austriu or Prussia, pays a larger 
 average contribution, the chief cause of which must 
 hi' the extent of water-communication. 
 
 Rural Fopu/almi ; ita slationarij Condition. — 
 Of the poverty of rural population, examples are but 
 too abundant in every part of Europe, with the ex- 
 ception of England and Holland : we confine our 
 notice, however, to those quarters that are popu- 
 lous, and which ought to be comparatively exempt 
 from poverty, did the same rule hold, as in the case 
 of town population. That such is far from being 
 the case is apparent from the following return : 
 
 Population Payment per Head, 
 
 per square Mile. only. 
 
 £ s. d. 
 
 Ireland - - - 237 - 11 
 
 The Milanese and Venetian ) ^iq . () 10 
 
 territory " - j 
 
 The Neapolitan Dominions 15i - 8 
 
 AVhat, it ma}' be asked, are the causes of the 
 stationary condition, we may almost say the here- 
 ditaiy poverty of cottagers ? Their insulated po- 
 sition ; their want of ready co-operation with their 
 neighbours, for purposes of labour ; and the im- 
 perfect subdivision of employment even in their 
 own families. For most kinds of manufacturing 
 and mechanical labour, such a situation is decidedlv 
 unfavourable, since it offers neither stimuLiting ex- 
 ample, nor the means of directing the exertion of 
 others. In a state of society like that of the Irish 
 peasantry, the acquisition of food is almost the 
 only consideration ; the son subsists liimself and 
 his family on the potatoes raised on a patch of 
 land, separated from the occupancy of his father.
 
 its stationary/ Condition. 239 
 
 and regards lodfring, clothing, and still more, fur- 
 niture, as secondary objects. In such a situation, 
 what connection can there be between increase 
 of numbers, and increase of individual income ? 
 Mr. Gray coukl here trace liardly a single feature 
 of the animating picture he lias drawn of a country 
 with augmenting numbers : yet it seems to form 
 rather a qualification than a contradiction of his 
 doctrine ; and to prove nothing at variance with 
 his creed in regard to a population differently cir- 
 cumstanced ; we mean so placed as to be near to, 
 and in a state of co-operation with each other. 
 
 Town Population. — What a contrast to this sta- 
 tionary condition is exhibited by the progress of 
 towns, whether we go back to the days of antiquity, 
 or fix our attention on modern history : whether 
 we contemplate Tyre, Carthage, Athens, Syracuse, 
 in the former ; or Pisa, Genoa, Venice, Bruges, 
 Antwerp, Amsterdam, in the latter; or, finallv, 
 look to tlie growth of the towns of our own coun- 
 try in the present age. Widely different as is this 
 })rogress, according to difference of situation, we 
 can hardly trace in any country an example of 
 numbers collected in one spot, without an accom- 
 panying increase of wealth. Even such a place as 
 Debreczin, in Hungary, an assemblage of 1<0,UOO 
 souls in a succession of cottages, fiords relief from 
 the poverty that reigns throughout the greatest 
 part of that backward and thinly-])eopled region. 
 
 In what consist the advantai>-es of a concentrated 
 population? In the subtlivision of labour; in 
 the power of making the exertions of nuniy con- 
 cur to one object; in the means otgi\ing em- 
 ployment, of some kind or other, to persons the 
 most difierent in education and attainments, lu
 
 ))r()|)()rti()ii as employment becomes subdivided, 
 the eflicieiicy ofihe individual is increased, and the 
 same labour enables him to furnish commodities, 
 superior, either in quantity or quality, generally in 
 l)Oth. Iksides, an assemblage of numbers is highly 
 favourable to those discoveries and inventions, the 
 effect of which, whether in agricultin-e, manufacture, 
 or mechanics, is to increase so remarkably the pro- 
 ductive })0wers of a country, to render the articles 
 produced so much chea])er and better. It admits, 
 we believe, of no doubt that the rate of wages in a 
 capital, such as London or Paris, or in a large 
 town," such as Manchester, Birmingham, or Rouen, 
 exceeds those of a small town in a degree greater 
 than the difference in the expence of living. 
 
 The resources of collected })oj)ulation have been 
 exemplified in the Dutch provinces of Holland and 
 Zealand, during two centuries, by the payment of 
 an amount of taxation almost unparalleled in the 
 annals of finance. At a time when in England, 
 the majority of the inhabitants lived, as at present 
 in France, in the open country, Holland had accu- 
 mulated the larger part of her population in towns; 
 and though their numbers have now experienced a 
 decrease, Amsterdam and the eight cities situated 
 within a circuit smaller than one of our middle 
 sized counties, still contain a population of more 
 than 400,000, a density exceeded only by London 
 and Paris, and which, rapidly as the numbers of 
 our manufacturers increase, will hardly be sur- 
 passed in the present age by the poj)uIation of 
 either our cotton, our woollen, or our hardware 
 districts. 
 
 These districts, however, aiul the parts of our 
 island rendered populous by navigation, already 
 confirm the result exhibited bv Holland, the aver-
 
 its stationary Cotiditiun. 241 
 
 age income of individuals being considerably greater 
 in these than in tlie less populous parts of our 
 island. This was a|)parent from the returns made 
 under the Property-tax Act. In like manner in 
 France, the returns made to government under the 
 J()ncier, or tax on the income of landlords, farmers, 
 and house pro})rietors, show that the revenue not 
 only of the public, but of tlie individual, is smaller 
 where the numbers are thinly scattered, — smaller 
 in the mountainous departments of the south, than 
 in the more fertile and populous districts of the 
 north. In the main articles of food and fuel, the 
 peasantry are often better provided than the lower 
 orders in towns, but in other respects, there are on 
 the Continent the same reasons as in England for 
 allotting the superiority in property to the latter. 
 It is in a large association only that activity and 
 talent find an adequate field ; that the command 
 of capital, the co-operation of assistants, can be 
 turned to account : there is, hence, no comparison 
 between town and country in the proportion of 
 those who from poverty attain the comfort of a 
 middle station ; to say nothing of those who reach 
 a high rank in the scale of property. 
 
 Farther, as every country raises food for the far 
 greater ])art of its consum])tion, density of town- 
 population implies, in general, an advanced state 
 of agriculture : it is along with such density that 
 we find extensive farms, a general ap})lication of 
 machinery, and a variety of improvements which 
 enable cultivators to send to market a much larger 
 proportion of produce than can be spared in a 
 country like the centre and south of France, where 
 all work being done by manual labour, the larger 
 share of the produce is necessarily consumed by 
 those who raise it. In all respects, therefore, a 
 
 R
 
 JJ42 Population : — 
 
 Dumerous town-population seems to us a proof of 
 wealth ; an evidence of the tendency of individual 
 as well as national income, to increase as society 
 advances in improvement. (See Appendix, p. [7^].) 
 
 Subsistence more easy of Acquisition as Society 
 advances. — The late wars, remarkable as they were 
 ibr the fi-equent recurrence of bad seasons, ex- 
 hibited no examples of local suffering equal to 
 those which marked the latter yciU's of the lOth 
 and 17th centuries ; the scarcities in the reigns of 
 Elizabeth and William. The cause is to be sought 
 in the general ease of communication arising ti'om 
 the improvement of our roads, canals, and maritime 
 navigation ; also in the more ample means of pur- 
 chase afforded to the lower orders by the diffusion 
 of employment, chiefly mechanical and manufac- 
 turing, throughout almost every corner of the 
 island. One part of the kingdom is thus enabled 
 to come to the rehef of the other, and prices are 
 kept nearly on an equality throughout. To this 
 source of relief at home, is added, particularly since 
 the peace, a supply from abroad, arising from the 
 extension of tillage over countries in a manner un- 
 known to our ancestors. In our chapter on Agri- 
 culture, (p. 152.) we took occasion to remark tliat 
 that which formerly constituted the corn country 
 of Europe, meaning the country producing corn in 
 sufficiency for export, is comprised between the 
 45th and 55th degree of latitude, and has a simi- 
 larity df climate greater than is supposed by those 
 of our countrymen who have not travelled or 
 studied the temperature of the Continent. This 
 remark applies to the Netherlands, the north of 
 France, the north of Germany, Denmark, and even 
 to part of Poland, all too similar to our country in
 
 Acquisition of Subsistence. ^-iS 
 
 latitude and vicinity to the sea, to escape a par- 
 ticipation in those causes of deficiency, whether 
 arising from want or excess of rain, which, from 
 time to time, affect our harvests. But the exten- 
 sion of tillage along the shores of the Kuxine, and 
 the increased cultivation of the United States, af- 
 ford new sources of supply : these countries are 
 distant, indeed, and the amount of import from 
 them, must, from the cost of conveyance, neces- 
 Barily be limited ; but as it will proceed from cli- 
 mates not likely to be affected by the causes which 
 lead to deficient crops in the north-west of Europe, 
 it will of course be available in the day of need. 
 
 These different inferences, whether deduced 
 from historical or geographical authority, may be 
 admitted by the adherents of Mr. Malthus, and 
 when viewed in connection with our present 
 abundance of subsistence, may be allowed to be of 
 a nature to relieve a few generations from the ap- 
 prehension of scarcity ; but the anti-populationists 
 will still contend that their principle is correct, 
 and that a time must come when the world will 
 be exposed to the misery of over population. The 
 argument is thus brought to a kind of ne phis ultra, 
 but even on this final and decisive ground we are 
 not afraid to meet our antagonists. Without de- 
 nying that there is in the womb of time, a period 
 when population will attain its complement, we 
 contend that such a period is far more distant, 
 and the intermediate increase of our numbers 
 likely to be far greater than enters into the con- 
 ception of either our opponents, or the ])ublic at 
 large. Nor does it follow that when such a period 
 shall arrive, it must be necessarily a })eriod of 
 misery: — but to waive all speculation on this 
 mysterious point, and to confine ourselves to that 
 
 R ^Z
 
 2 1' 1' ropulalion : — 
 
 ■which is of" nearer interest, we sliall briefly ;i;ive our 
 reasons for the opinion that our ])osterity, f()r many 
 generations at least, are hkcly to increase their 
 numbers with less difficnlty than has been expe- 
 rienced by us or our ancestors. 
 
 1. Our fundamental doctrine, that increase of 
 produce depends less on the extent of newly-culti- 
 vated soil, than on the number of hands employed 
 on the old, will be found proof against tiie scAcrest 
 analysis. It is supported equally by the experience 
 of the present age, and the general evidence of 
 history : it supposes besides, a proportion between 
 demand and supply, — that ability on the part of 
 labour to obtain its reward, which corresponds so 
 clearly with the benevolent ordinations of Provi- 
 dence. 
 
 2. From the great diversity of soil and climate in 
 tlie cultivated portion of the globe, scarcity is never 
 general : " when famine was in other lands, in the 
 land of Egypt there was bread." If this applied to 
 an age when civilization extended over hardly ten 
 degrees of latitude, how much more does it hold 
 at present, and how greatly do the advantages aris- 
 ing from improvements perpetually in progress, 
 increase the power of mankind to turn to account 
 the bounty of nature ? Extended communication 
 by water enables even distant countries to supply 
 the deficiency of each other ; while in the same 
 territory improved methods of preserving corn, 
 additional gianaries, augmented capital, all concur 
 to enable tlie inliabitants to kee}) over the surplus 
 of one year, as a pro\ ision tor the possible failure 
 of the next. 
 
 3. The labour employed in raising subsistence, 
 becomes progressively more effectual, the source of 
 a larger prodiice, as society advances. This is
 
 Acquisitmn of Subsistence. 245 
 
 evinced in two ways ; one, the use of improved 
 implements, is obvious to the common observer ; 
 the other the supply of the requisite produce by a 
 smaller number of agriculturists compared to other 
 classes, is less obvious and requires the evidence 
 of statistical documents. A census of our ances- 
 tors, taken a century and a half ago, would have 
 given, under the head of agriculturists, above 50 
 persons in 100, instead of the 33 of tlie ])resent 
 day. The majori^r of our present po})ulation are 
 tluis enabled to reside in towns and villages, and 
 are rendered disj)osable for other purposes : the 
 himibler orders employ themselves in supplying 
 clothing or lodging; a higher class minister to 
 the amusements, the education, or the luxury 
 of the rich ; while the highest of all are exempt 
 from the necessity of following any occupation 
 whatever. Confining our view to the topic at pre- 
 sent under discussion, in what light may we con- 
 sider the persons who minister to our luxuries? 
 They may be said to fbi'm a reserve of caj)ital and 
 labour a])plicable to the increase of subsistence, in 
 a case of imperious necessity. 
 
 A population return in France, or almost any 
 ])art of the Continent, exhibits, it is true, a larger 
 number of residents in country than in town, but 
 many of the former are producers of other articles 
 than food: the flax, the hemp, the madder of their 
 fields, the wool of their flocks, the timber of their 
 forests, the hides of their cattle, are all constituents 
 of supply or ingredients of consumption, quite 
 distinct from the raising of provisions. 
 
 4. As society advances, and a i)art of the lower 
 orders })artici})ate in the comfort of the middle 
 classes, food forms ])rogressively a less considei'- 
 able proportion of their expenditure. In a })opu- 
 
 R 3
 
 24G Popidalion : — 
 
 lation like that of" Irelaiul, tlie chief part of France, 
 and the |)o{)rer counties of P^nghuul, food constitutes 
 above (iO per cent, of the total family charge ; but 
 in our more populous rural districts, in our larger vil- 
 lages, and in our towns generally, the proportion (see 
 the Appendix, p. [11],) is little above .50 per cent. 
 What does this im})ly, but the enjoyment of greater 
 comfort on the part of our lower orders, the pos- 
 session of a fund with which to ])urchase clothes 
 and furnitiu-e in years of plenty. /-^nd to pay, in years 
 of scarcity, the extra price required for provisions ? 
 Hence, the less severe pressure of high prices of 
 food on a po{)ulation, such as that of Holland and 
 England, than on one devoid, in a manner, of ex- 
 changeable commodities, such as the peasantry of 
 Poland, Russia, or the inland districts of the High- 
 lands of Scotland. 
 
 Ought Government to take Measures for promote 
 hig Population. — " The maxim of the politician,*'* 
 says Mr. Gray, '* ought to be to take care of popu- 
 lation, as population will take care of subsistence 
 and of every other species of supply." Though con- 
 vinced that there is much more truth in this than 
 in most political apophthegms, we do not go quite 
 so far as Mr. G., and have no wish to keep in the 
 back giound the case of a population like that of 
 Ireland, Brittany, and Poland, in which increase 
 of numbers is attended by a verv slight increase of 
 comfort to the individual, or of strength to the 
 public. Nor do we assert that even in a country 
 the most fortunately constituted, increase of popu- 
 lation can bring with it a speedy cure to a dis- 
 ordered state of productive industry, such as has 
 existed among us since the peace. In the case> 
 for example, of agriculturists, distressed by a su*
 
 Prospect of its Increase. 247 
 
 perabundance of liome growth, little relief is to be 
 anticipated from increase of consumers, because 
 the producers can hardly fail to augment their 
 numbers in ail equal proportion, leaving relief to 
 arise from the extension of home manufacture, thfe 
 removal of hands from country to town, or other 
 causes uncertain in the tiiiie of their occurrence, 
 and distinct, in a great measure, from the general 
 increase of our numbers. 
 
 Next, as to men in office, on whom Mr. G. seems 
 to think it incumbent to take measures, more or 
 less direct, to i)romote population, we confine our 
 exhortation to a passive course, satisfied if they 
 do nothing to obstruct the natural increase of 
 numbers. Let them carefully guard their minds 
 against the notion which so naturally follows the 
 creed of limited subsistence ; viz. that the discou- 
 ragement of marriage, or the loss of lives in the 
 field, and in unhealthy colonies, are not, in a sta- 
 tistical sense, a great misfortune, because they 
 operate, forsooth, as checks to superabundant 
 luniibers. — In regard to population, as to national 
 wealth, the plain rule is to avoid interf6rdhce, to 
 take no step for the })urj)ose of giving a new di- 
 rection to the course of events, but to remove ob- 
 stacles wherever such hav6 been interposed by the 
 mistaken, though well intended intervention of 
 preceding legislators. As to town population, 
 with all our conviction of its advantage, both to 
 the individual and the community, we should in- 
 finitely regret the adoption of any measure to in- 
 crease its relative amount. Let the tide flow in 
 its natural course : the duties of government evi- 
 dently extend no farther tlian keeping open the 
 channel. 
 
 K 4<
 
 ^^48 
 
 J'ojjulalion : ■ 
 
 \Vc sliiill now turn aside from general reasoning 
 and direct the attention of the reader to data of" a 
 more specific character, to an estimate of the ])0- 
 pulation and resources of the different states of 
 Europe : 
 
 STATISTICAL TABLE OF EUROPE, IN 1823. 
 
 
 
 Persons 
 
 Taxes 
 
 Proportion 
 
 
 Total 
 
 to a 
 
 and public 
 
 of such 
 
 
 Population. 
 
 square 
 
 burdens 
 
 burdens 
 
 
 
 mile. 
 
 generally. 
 
 per head. 
 
 Norway, including Fin- 
 
 
 
 
 £. s. d. 
 
 mark - . . 
 
 950,000 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 Sweden, Norway, and 
 
 
 
 
 
 Swedish Lapland 
 
 3,600,000 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 Sweden, distinct from 
 
 
 
 
 
 Norway and Swedish 
 
 
 
 
 
 Lapland - - - 
 
 2,600,000 
 
 25 
 
 1,300,000 
 
 10 
 
 Russia in Europe - 
 
 37,000,000 
 
 23 
 
 1 8,000,000 
 
 9 9 
 
 Scotland ; viz. the High- 
 
 
 
 
 
 lands distinct from the 
 
 
 
 
 
 low country 
 
 
 30 
 
 
 
 Turkey in Europe, not 
 
 
 
 
 
 ascertained, but proba- 
 
 
 
 
 
 bly not above 
 
 8,000,000 
 
 50 
 
 5,000,000 
 
 12 6 
 
 Poland, before the parti- 
 
 
 
 
 
 tion - - - 
 
 15,000,000 
 
 53 
 
 
 
 Poland, the present king- 
 dom of, distinct from 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 the provinces incorpo- 
 
 
 
 
 
 rated with the Austrian, 
 
 
 
 
 
 Russian, and Prussian 
 
 
 
 
 
 dominions 
 
 2,850,000 
 
 60 
 
 1,200,000 
 
 8 8 
 
 Sardinia, island of 
 
 520,000 
 
 57 
 
 
 
 Spain - - - . 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 6,000,000 
 
 11 
 
 Denmark, exclusive of 
 
 
 
 
 
 Faroe and Iceland 
 
 1,600,000 
 
 73 
 
 1,300,000 
 
 16 3 
 
 Hanover - - . 
 
 1,300,000 
 
 90 
 
 900,000 
 
 14 
 
 Portugal - - . 
 
 3,700,000 
 
 90 
 
 3,000,000 
 
 16 3 
 
 Switzerland, the twenty- 
 
 
 
 
 
 two cantons 
 
 1,750,000 
 
 91 
 
 430,000 
 
 5 
 
 (The pecuniary burden 
 
 
 
 
 
 is very small, but the 
 
 
 
 
 
 Swiss are liable to 
 
 
 
 
 
 military service.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Wales - - - - 
 
 740,000 
 
 96 
 
 
 
 The Austrian empire, in- 
 
 
 
 
 
 cluding Lombardy, and 
 
 
 
 
 
 Austrian Poland 
 
 29,000,000 
 
 112 
 
 18,000,000 
 
 12 4 
 
 The Prussian dominions 
 
 10,500,000 
 
 100 
 
 7,000,000 
 
 13 4
 
 Europe taken vullectivelij. 
 
 ^249 
 
 
 
 Persons 
 
 Taxes 
 
 Proportion 
 
 
 Toul 
 
 to a 
 
 and public 
 
 of such 
 
 
 Population. 
 
 square 
 
 burdens 
 
 burdens 
 
 
 
 mile. 
 
 generally. 
 
 per head. 
 
 
 
 
 
 £. 5. d. 
 
 Bavaria - _ . 
 
 3,600,000 
 
 120 
 
 2,500,000 
 
 14 
 
 Sicily, isliind of 
 
 1,655,000 
 
 1.32 
 
 
 
 Dominions of the king of 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sardinia, viz. Piedmont, 
 
 
 
 
 
 part of the Milanese, 
 
 
 
 
 
 the Genoese territory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Savoy, and the island 
 
 
 
 
 
 of Sanlinia 
 
 4,000,000 
 
 148 
 
 2,200,000 
 
 110 
 
 States of the Church 
 
 2,450,000 
 
 150 
 
 900,000 
 
 7 6 
 
 The Neapolitan domi- 
 
 
 
 
 
 nions, inchidins Sicily 
 
 6,700,000 
 
 154 
 
 2,700,000 
 
 8 
 
 France, including Corsica 
 
 30,700,000 
 
 150 
 
 37,000,000 
 
 1 4 
 
 Scotland ; the low coun- 
 
 
 
 
 
 try distinct from the 
 
 
 
 
 
 Highlands 
 
 
 150 
 
 
 2 
 
 Great Britain exclusive 
 
 
 
 
 
 of Irelxind (the taxes 
 
 
 
 
 
 coniputed according to 
 
 
 
 
 
 the value of money on 
 
 
 
 
 
 the Continent 
 
 14,500,000 
 
 165 
 
 40,000,000 
 
 2 15 
 
 Wirtemberg - _ . 
 
 1,400,000 
 
 170 
 
 1 ,000,000 
 
 14 4 
 
 Saxony ... 
 
 1,200,000 
 
 170 
 
 900,000 
 
 15 
 
 Jtaly, exclusive of Sicily 
 
 1 7,000,000 
 
 179 
 
 
 
 Great Britain and Ireland 
 
 
 
 
 
 collectively 
 
 21,500,000 
 
 182 
 
 44,000,000 
 
 2 
 
 The Netherlands* 
 
 5,300,000 
 
 214 
 
 8,000,000 
 
 1 10 
 
 Austrian, Italy, or the 
 
 
 
 
 
 Lombardo - Venetian 
 
 
 
 
 
 kingdom 
 
 4,000,000 
 
 219 
 
 2,000,000 
 
 10 
 
 Ionian islands, republic - 
 
 230,000 
 
 230 
 
 J 00,000 
 
 8 9 
 
 England, distinct from 
 
 
 
 
 
 Wales 
 
 11,600,000 
 
 232 
 
 56,000,000 
 
 3 2 
 
 Ireland ... 
 
 7,000,000 
 
 237 
 
 4,000,000 
 
 11 
 
 Holland, province of - 
 
 760,000 
 
 362 
 
 
 
 West Flanders 
 
 630,000 
 
 420 
 
 
 
 East Flanders 
 
 610,000 
 
 554 
 
 
 
 P^urope collectively, a- 
 
 
 
 
 
 bout ... 
 
 200,000,000 
 
 58 
 
 180,000,000 
 
 IS 
 
 * The repartition of taxation is here very unequ.al, tlic Dutch provinces, 
 particularly those of Holland and Zealand, paying inucli more tlian \l. lO.v. a 
 head ; the Belgic much less. 
 
 Tliese returns, both as to population and j)ul)lic 
 burdens, are, in general, taken iioni ollieial docu- 
 ments : they require, liovvever, a tew e.\j)lanations; 
 thus.
 
 *i5() Population : -^ 
 
 Extent in squaYe Miles. — The amount assigned 
 to England, Scotland, and Wales is taken from 
 official returns, but in regard to Ireland and most 
 j)arts of the Continent, the statements are, in some 
 measure, conjectural, and to be considered only as 
 approximations. 
 
 Our Public Burdens. — ThQ sum of 44,000,000/. 
 as the aggregate of our public burdens, may appear 
 greatly below the mark, but it is formed by two 
 important deductions firom our present payments ; 
 first, by taking credit for a farther reduction of 
 our taxes, and, in the next place, by making an 
 abatement (of 20 per cent.) from the numerical 
 amount of our burdens, to bring their value on a 
 par with those of the Continent, with which they 
 are here compared. 
 
 Taa:ation of Rural Districts. — It may be ob- 
 jected to the preceding table, that an estimate 
 founded on taxation does not do justice to the 
 property of a rural population, who, in many parts 
 of the Continent, seem almost to escape the grasp 
 of the exchequer. This exemption, however, is 
 limited chiefly to excise dues, and is, in a great 
 measure, balanced by a heavy land-tax, which, 
 under different names in different countries, forms 
 the basis of continental taxation, and is included 
 in the column of public burdens. 
 
 Population per Square Mile. — Mr* S. Cifray as^ 
 sumes, (Happiness of States, p. 421.) that an indi- 
 vidual for every two acres, or 320 persons for a 
 square mile, would be a fair complement of popu- 
 lation for the soil and climate of Europe. From 
 this rate, however, we are still at a great distance.
 
 Europe taken collectively, 251 
 
 having attained it only in Flanders and Holland : 
 in England and Ireland we are likely, if we pro- 
 ceed as in the present age, to reach it in somewhat 
 less than twenty years. 
 
 In Iceland the proportion is little more than one 
 person to a square mile, but the lowest extreme 
 of European population is exhibited in Lapland, 
 where tliere is not more than one inhabitant to 
 two or three square miles. 
 
 Europe taken collectively. — Our estimate is 
 greater in regard to population, and smaller in 
 respect to public burdens than that which is at 
 present current on the authority of German statis- 
 ticians ; but the latter made their computation in 
 or before the year I8I7, since which, population 
 has increased, and taxation has experienced a 
 partial reduction. 
 
 If those of our readers who are familiar with 
 history, will compare tiie present state of Europe 
 in population and revenue, with what it was two 
 or three centuries ago, they will })erceive a degree 
 of extension that is hardly credible. How feeble 
 do we find tiie establishments of France, even when 
 administered by Sully ; of England, when guided 
 by liurleigh ; of Aus.tria, when stinudated by tlie 
 vigour of Charles V., if we compare them to those 
 of the same powers at the present day ! The army 
 of Henry IV. of France, was, when at the highest, 
 only 40,000 men : the revenue of queen Elizabeth 
 was 600,000/. * Even the Spain of Phihp II., aided 
 by the mines of America, is found, when her re- 
 venue and her army are brouglit to the test of 
 
 • Napier's Supplement to tlie Kiuvcloi>. F^rit. uiuk'r the 
 heads of Englaiul and France.
 
 •^.O^ ropidalioii : — 
 
 acc'iiniLc coini)iitati()ii, to have been on a j»a) with 
 onlv tlio second-rate powers of our a^e. 
 
 \V'hat a striking example is here afibrcleil of the 
 tendency to rapid improvement in those connnu- 
 nities which have overcome the difficulties of pri- 
 mitive ignora)ice, and in which safety is afforded 
 to persons and property ! More than that tiie 
 inhabitants of the Continent can hardly be said 
 to have received at the hands of their respective, 
 go\'ernors, since if some sovereigns have been dis- 
 anguished by active measures for promoting im- 
 provement, the beneficial result of their labours 
 has been balanced or more than balanced by am- 
 bition and unnecessary warfare on the part of their 
 brethren. How much more effectually would the 
 latter have consulted, not merely the happiness of 
 their subjects, but the increase of their political 
 power, had they never unsheathed the sword, but 
 been content to allow individual industry to work 
 its way, augmenting the number and wealth of the 
 community by a silent but sure increase ! 
 
 It would be idle to lament what cannot be re- 
 called ; but in regard to the future, we may be 
 allowed to indulge a hope that the sovereigns of the 
 Continent will pursue a more enlightened course ! 
 How wide a field of improvement is open to them, 
 if they will merely labour to transfer to their 
 respective territories the degree of agricultural 
 knowledge introduced into this country ! No En- 
 o'lishman who has not travelled can form an idea 
 of the general backwardness of the Continent, of 
 the poverty of the farmers, the awkwardness of 
 their implements, the deficiency of their buildings. 
 If we cross the narrow seas and fix our attention 
 on the districts of the Continent said to be farthest 
 advanced, such as Flanders, Nojinandy, or the 
 Paj/s de JScauce, we shall find their machinery so
 
 Prosjjcct ()/' I he Continent and of England. Q5S 
 
 rude, and their work ])erfbrmed in so great a de- 
 gree by manual labour, that the productive pow- 
 ers of their soil might be doubled by the mere 
 application of the discoveries and inventions that 
 have taken place in our eastern and northern coun- 
 ties. If we carry our observation farther, and 
 calculate how nnich i-emains to be done in the 
 neglected plains of Hungary and Poland, in the 
 half-irrigated 'provinces of S])ain, Italy, and even 
 the south of France, the inference is, that Europe, 
 that boasted seat of cultivation, is not peopled to 
 the extent of a fiftli of the numbers it may be ren- 
 dered capable of supporting. 
 
 The prospect of England. — Let us not, how- 
 ever, imagine, that the advancement of the Conti- 
 nent would have the effect of lessening the relative 
 superiority of this coimtry ; on the contrary, those 
 advantages which have enabled us to take the lead 
 — extent of water communication, richness of 
 mines, command of capital, superiority of civil in- 
 stitutions, formed habits of business, — are all calcu- 
 lated to confirm our ])re-eminence, and even to 
 lead us forward in a (juicker ralio than our neigh- 
 bours. To comprehend this fully, the reader 
 ought first to acquire the conviction, that national 
 improvement is hkely to be ])rogressive, and hns 
 at })iesent no more reached a limit, than it had 
 thirty, fifty, or one hunflred years ago. To accpii- 
 esce in the notion, tliat tiie present mode of tilling 
 the ground, of navigating the ocean, or ])erfbrniing 
 mechanical laboiu-, is the best thai can he (l(>\isi'(l, 
 is the ])art of the indolent and unthinking; such is 
 the creed of the spiritless Asiatic, of the unenlight- 
 ened peasant, and the almost e(|nallv unenlightened 
 manufacturer in mauv parts of the Continent of"
 
 I254< Population. 
 
 Europe. In this country, happily the discoveriea 
 that MO rapidly succeed each other, afford a proof 
 that we have not yet advanced half way in the 
 extension of our national resources. Of this, a 
 more ample developement shall be given in our 
 concluding chapter, when we shall shew how 
 surprisingly we have gained on our political rivals, 
 in the course of the last century, and how little we 
 have at present to dread at their hands — consi, 
 derations calculated to confirm the public, in an 
 approval of the pacific system which we have now 
 so fortunately adopted, and to satisfy the appre- 
 hensive among our countrymen, that with a steady 
 adherence to such a course, the day of trial in the 
 finances of England will ere long be surmounted.
 
 Q65 
 
 CHAP. VIIL 
 
 National Revenue and Capital. 
 
 JriAviNG appro])nated several chapters to an ex- 
 amination of tlie condition of the country, under 
 the separate heads of Agriculture, Population, 
 and Poor-rate, we are now to make an attempt of 
 a more comprehensive nature, and to bestow a 
 chapter on our National Revenue and Capital 
 generally. This will lead us to discuss 
 
 The amount of our taxable income. 
 
 The connection between its increase and the 
 increase of our population ; and lastly, 
 
 The fluctuations it has experienced in the thirty 
 years that have elapsed since the French Revolution. 
 
 Estimate, by tfte late Mr. Colquhoun, of Pro-perty created in 
 Great Britain and Ireland, in the Year 1812. 
 
 Agriculture in all its branches, (including pas- 
 ture) ..... €217,000,000 
 
 Mines and minerals, including coals - - 9,000,000 
 
 Manufactures in every branch - - 1 1 4',0(K),000 
 
 Inland trade and banking ... ;i-5,(K)0,000 
 
 Foreign commerce and shipping - - 4(),(XX),000 
 
 Coasting trade .... 2,000,000 
 Fisheries, exclusive of the colonial fisheries of 
 
 Newfoundland ... - 2,000,000 
 
 Foreign income remitted - - - .'5,000,000 
 
 Total - - 480,000,000
 
 ^56 Ndlional Revenue. 
 
 Siicli WHS the amount of the property created 
 in Great Britain and Ireland in 181^ ; since which 
 there have occurred two very material clian^^es, — 
 a great increase in the quantity, and a still greater 
 decrease in the prices. The latter, in the case of 
 agriculture amounts to 60 per cent; in that of 
 manufactures to 40 or 50 per cent. ; but as Mr. 
 Colquhouu's estimate was made greatly below the 
 currency of the time, 20, or at the utmost, 2.5 per 
 cent., will form a sufficient deduction from its 
 amount. To this we find an ample counterpoise 
 iji the increase of quantity arising from 
 
 The additional produce on the part of the hands 
 restored to labour by the peace ; 
 
 The increase of our population since 1812; and 
 
 The progress of improvement in agriculture 
 
 and manufactures, by which the same number of 
 
 liands are enabled to produce a considerably larger 
 
 quantity. 
 
 The result, therefore, is, that even at reduced 
 prices, the value of the produce of the present 
 year, equals or exceeds that of 1812 ; but as ^\y. 
 Colquhouu's calculation included, under the head 
 of agriculture, a very large sum for produce, such 
 as oats, hay, grass, &c. appropriated to the food of 
 liorses and cattle, and as our object is to confine 
 our table to articles for the consumption of man, 
 or for the purposes of manufacture, we assume the 
 total at 3.50,000,000/. That sum, then, we con- 
 sider as representing the amount "of the property 
 annually created in Great Britain and Ireland ; in 
 other words, the amount of our animal production. 
 Of this large sum, what pr()])ortion, in this 
 land of taxes, can be considered as exempt from 
 the visit of the assessor ? About 2.5 per cent., as 
 appears trom the calculations in the Appendix,
 
 National Revomc, 257. 
 
 leaving for our taxal)le income, somewhat more 
 tlian 260,000,000. Thus, 
 
 Estimate (four Taxable Income, in 1823^ 
 
 (Great Britain distinct from Ireland.) t 
 
 Rent ol" laiul returned in 
 18 14-, at 4-:},0{X),000/., and 
 probably amounting, after 
 allowing for all deduc- 
 tions, omissions, and eva- 
 sions in the returns, to - £4'8,000,000 
 
 Add for land brought into 
 
 culture since the peace - 2,000,000 
 
 Together - 50,000,000 
 
 Deduct for all abatements 
 of rent since the peace^ 
 made, making, or which 
 must ere long be made, 
 one third, or 33 per cent. 17,000,000 
 
 Probable rental in peace - 33,000,000 
 
 Deduct furtlicr for tempo- 
 rary deficiencies on the 
 part of farmers, at this 
 time of peculiar pressure 3,000,000 
 
 " €30,000,000 
 
 Tithe; amount in 1812 (see Returns of Property 
 Tax) 4-,700,000/. ; at present computed, after 
 making an addition for the increase of pro- 
 duce, and an abatement for the great fall of 
 prices .... - 4,000,0001 
 
 Rental of houses, returned at nearly 16,000,000/. 
 in 1814; since wliicli, the houses are aug- 
 mented in number by 15 per cent., and as 
 rents have fallen only partially, we compute 
 the amount at - - 17,(XX),000 
 
 Farming income, which, during the latter years 
 of the war, was sO large as to equal the rental 
 of our land, but which is at present so greatly 
 
 Carried forward - 51,000,000
 
 258 Natio7ial Revenue. 
 
 lirought forward - 51,(XX),000 
 reduced, we estimate, with a view to the 
 future, at the medium rate of 6 per cent, on 
 200,000,000/, the supposed amount of capital 
 invested in agriculture - - - 12,000,(XK) 
 
 Income from trade and professions, comprising not 
 only manufacturing and mercantile profits, but 
 income from mines, docks, canals, tolls, iron- 
 works ; likewise salaries, as far as derived from 
 the concerns of individuals ; to the exclusion, 
 however, of all incomes below 50/. a year, 
 This portion of our national revenue, returned 
 during the war at 30,000,000/., and which, 
 if augmented in proportion to the increase of 
 our numbers, should at present be 35,000,000/., 
 we compute, in consequence of the change in 
 the value of money, and the decrease of bu- 
 siness, at a great reduction, say . . - 22,000,000 
 Wages and all incomes below 50/. a year, com- 
 puted on a population, which, (exclusive of 
 Ireland) is now nearly 15,000,000, but from 
 which somewhat more than a third is deducted 
 for persons either above or below the station of 
 those receiving wages. This large deduction 
 comprizes not merel}^ paupers, but cottagers 
 and all others whose mode of life is such as to 
 lead, in a very slight degree, to the consump- 
 tion of taxed articles. The result, estimated 
 on a population of 9,000,000 working at the re- 
 duced wages of peace, but adding the earnings 
 of women and children to those of the men, is 90,000,000 
 Interest of our debt, funded and unfunded, since 
 
 the reduction of the 5 per cents. - - 30,000,000 
 
 Conjectural amount of interest from other money 
 securities ; viz. mortgages, private securities 
 generally ; also public securities, such as bank 
 stock, East India stock, foreign stock, in short, 
 all securities distinct from those of our govern- 
 ment ..... 20,000,000 
 Income of the army, navy, civil list, and public 
 offices, after allowing for the late retrenchments. 
 
 Carried forward - 225,000,000
 
 Natiofial Revenue. 259 
 
 Brought forward - 225,000,000 
 and leaving out the proportion expended in 
 
 Ireland .... 15,000,000 
 
 Total of Great Britain 24-0,000,000 
 
 Ireland : taxable income computed during the 
 
 war at 35,000,000/.; at present at - - 25,000,000 
 
 (See Appendix, p. [79].) ■ 
 
 Total of Great Britain and Ireland 265,000,000 
 
 Of which, lost to taxation, being expended abroad 
 
 by travellers and emigrants - 4,000,000 
 
 Remainder - 261,000,000 
 
 Ireland. -^The total produce of land and labour 
 in Ireland cannot, from the magnitude of the 
 population, be below 7t>,000,000/. a year, but the 
 cottagers are so numerous and their mode of living 
 so inferior to that of the inhabitants of towns, that 
 the portion of national income expended on taxed 
 articles can hardly, (})articularly since the fall of 
 rents, and the general decline of incomes,) exceed 
 the 25,000,000/. whicli we Iiave introduced into 
 the table. 
 
 Increase of National Income since 1792. — The 
 last thirty years have been a j)eriod equally re- 
 markable for financial as for political revolutions. 
 Do we, it maybe asked, possess the means of form- 
 ing, with any degree of accuracy, an estimate 
 of the increase of national income since 179'^? 
 Such an estimate, wliether in peace or war, is a 
 matter of great difficulty : the improvements in 
 our land, our houses, our furniture ; the additions 
 to our towns, our harbours, our manufacturing 
 establishments, in the present age, arc obvious, 
 and have been great beyond example j but as no 
 record can express the amount of expenditure in- 
 
 s 2
 
 ^60 National Revenue, 
 
 curred, or the success, necessarily very various, of 
 sucli investments of capital, it remains with the 
 inquirer to seek a standard of com])utation. For 
 this we are in some measure prepared by the re- 
 searches in the preceding chapters ; and by fol- 
 lowing up that course of reasoning we shall probably 
 be enabled to reduce to a systematic form that 
 which seems at present involved in contradiction. 
 The cause of the changes since 1792, we are dis- 
 posed to seek in — 
 
 Fluctuations in the activity of our productive 
 industry ; 
 
 Fluctuations in the value of money ; 
 
 The increase of population. 
 
 Of these different causes the first and second 
 have already been illustrated (Chap. II. and III.) 
 at considerable length ; and whatever may be 
 wanting in regard to them shall be supplied in a 
 subsequent part of our volume. At present, there- 
 fore, we confine our attention to the etiect of the 
 third cause, — increase of numbers ; — adopting the 
 principles laid dowm in our chapter on Popidation, 
 and applying, or endeavouring to apply them, to 
 the circumstances of the present age. 
 
 Connexion between the increase of Numbers and 
 increase of National Income. — We have already re- 
 marked tliat no adherent of Mr. IMalthus, whatever 
 might be his objection to increase of numbers, has 
 alleged that our lower orders have made a descent 
 in the scale of comfort ; nor does the surprising 
 increase of our population in the present age ap- 
 pear (Chapter on Poor Rate, p. 199.) to have carried 
 the proportion of our paupers to our total numbers, 
 much beyond what it was a century ago. We are 
 far from maintaining that marriages in humble life
 
 National Revenue. 261 
 
 are contracted with the requisite prudence, or that 
 the parents of a numerous family can avoid a long 
 and serious struggle : our argument merely is, that 
 the situation of tlie lower classes generally, is not 
 altered for the worse. It is the characteristic of a 
 civilized and industrious society, like the inhabitants 
 of Holhmd, England, or Scotland, to make suc- 
 cessive discoveries in the means both of augmenting 
 produce and diminishing expense ; improvements 
 by whicli, whether effected in agriculture, maiui- 
 facture, navigation, or trade, a country is enabled 
 to support many more inhabitants in equal comfort. 
 Increase of numbers therefore is, even in the case 
 of the lower orders, conduciv^e to increase of tax- 
 able income ; for w^e have already had occasion to- 
 show what large sums are annually brought into 
 the exchequer by the duties on beer, spirits, to- 
 bacco, groceries ; all of which enter into the con- 
 sumption of the classes in question, particularly 
 when resident in towns. 
 
 The lo-west class of Poor, — How, it may be 
 asked, stands the question of increase (^f income, 
 in regard to a po})nlation of such primitive habits 
 as the cottagers of Ireland, or the mountaineers of 
 Scotland, accustomed to confine their demands to 
 mere subsistence? In such a case, an increase of 
 numbers implies a correspondent increase, not of 
 taxable income, but of the produce which, like 
 potatoes or ])read, constitutes the mere necessaries 
 of life ; and the result is an addition to our })opu- 
 lation of individuals, who, though able to earn their 
 subsistence, can be said to add to our 'political 
 strengtli in hardly any other sense than as recruits 
 for the public service, or as mere manual labourt'rs, 
 being unable to make the- sacrifice requisite tbr 
 Jearning the buf^iness of an aitisan. 
 
 s 8
 
 'i6'i Nalional Revenue. 
 
 The connexion between increase of numbers, 
 and increase of wealth, will appear more clearly, 
 if we liave recourse to arithmetical statement, and 
 if we subject to an analysis the 250,0()0,0(X)^. con- 
 stituting the taxable income of the nation. This 
 will exhibit the following proportions : 
 
 Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
 (Taxable Income, exclusive of the pay of the Army 
 and Navy.) 
 
 Arising from wages and salaries, and of course, 
 
 directly affected by increase of population - £100,000,000 
 
 From capital and labour combined, a portion 
 of national income, which also is much in- 
 creased by increase of population - - 50,000,000 
 
 From rent of land, houses, or interest of 
 money, which are influenced, though in- 
 directly, and in an inferior degree, by the 
 increase of numbers ... . 100,000,000 
 
 Total - '250,000,000 
 
 That the increase of taxable income, as far as 
 such arises from wages and salaries, is in corre- 
 spondence with the increase of our numbers, re- 
 quires no demonstration : the same holds in regard 
 to professional men, to merchants, to master manu- 
 facturers, in short, in respect to every line in which 
 income depends on personal ei'ertion. Thus, land 
 in the hands of the farmer, like money in those of 
 the merchant, is productive in proportion to the 
 labour w^hich it is made to put in motion. So far 
 the connexion is clear and undoubted ; the case, it 
 may be said, is somewhat different in regard to a 
 Jixed income^ whether derived from real or per- 
 sonal property ; but even in that, the effect of in- 
 creasing numbers is great, producing, as is w^ell 
 known, an increasing demand for both land and 
 money capital. In proof of this, we have merely 
 to take, as an example, the almost daily case of a
 
 National Revenue. ^QS 
 
 family becoming numerous ; the consequent repar- 
 tition of the paternal property, and the increase of 
 productive power given to the portion that is put 
 in a state of activity. 
 
 Fluctuations, of Income since lyf)^. — These ar- 
 guments will readily be accounted applicable in a 
 general sense, and for ordinary times ; but what 
 shall furnish a rule for computing national income 
 in so fluctuating a ])eriod as that through which 
 we have passed since 179- ■'' The question is cer- 
 tainly very complicated, and seems at first to 
 admit of no clear solution ; for while a calculator, 
 in forming an estimate twelve or fifteen years ago, 
 could hardly have failed to pronounce the war 
 liighly favourable to the increase of our wealth 
 (our debt forming apparently no counterpoise to 
 the increase of our resoiuces), a statement pre- 
 pared since our years of distress would convey a 
 very different result. In France, the Revolution 
 has been styled, the " queen of all earthly re- 
 \'erses ;" but we might almost hazard an opinion 
 that the effect of that convulsion, viewed in regard 
 to change of property and in all the extent of its 
 duration (now aho\e thirty years), has been as 
 great in this country as in tliat which gave it 
 birth. Among our neighbours, the change was 
 more sudden, directed more against a particular 
 class, and bringing with it, too often, the melan- 
 choly consequence of loss of lite; but with us it 
 has been more comprehensive, tor the alteration 
 in the value of money has come home to every 
 class and condition. If in France, government an- 
 nuitants suffered during the war a much greater 
 reduction tlian heie, (here is no comparison be- 
 tween the two countries in the extent of fiuctua- 
 
 s 4
 
 9(54 National Revenue ; 
 
 tion in the circumstances of a far more numerous 
 class — the farmers. Their j)rosperity during tlie 
 war and their decline since the peace, have both 
 been much more in extremes among us, than on 
 the Continent. 
 
 An Estimate of them attempted. — Amidst all 
 these changes in indiv^idual property, is it practi- 
 cable to discover any rules of general application, 
 any data on wliich to found a comparison of the 
 circumstances of the public of the present day 
 with those of the public of 1806 or 1792? This 
 task may, perhaps, be found less difficult than it 
 appears. In a community so great and so varied 
 as the population of these kingdoms, the ease of 
 one part is often cotemporary with the em])arrass- 
 ment of another ; and there prevails, in the gene- 
 ral result, a tendency to a balance, an approacli to 
 Tiniformity which would hardly be credited by 
 those who, in drawing their inferences, allow tliem- 
 selves to be forcibly struck by the fluctuation of 
 particular classes. It was tluis that our revenue 
 stood its ground during all the trials of the war 
 and the no less trying interval that has followed : 
 it is thus, also, that the amount of our exports and 
 imports has continued to bear a proportion to two 
 regulating circumstances (the value of money and- 
 the increase of our population), amid all the ano- 
 malies, introduced by restrictions, prohibitions, li- 
 cences ; it is thiis that at present, the distress of 
 the producer of corn, is accompanied by a tempo- 
 rary advantage to the consumer. The ])olitical 
 arithmetician is, therefore, in some measure, justi- 
 fied in forming a conclusion, which, without this 
 collateral support, might appear vague and unten- 
 able; viz. " That though the circumstances of
 
 its Increase since 179^. ^2iS5 
 
 individuals, separately, are so much altered since 
 1792, those of any given number, whether 100, 
 1000, or 10,000, are more nearly on a par than is 
 generally supposed." 
 
 This reasoning is calculated to lead to the infer- 
 ence, that our national income, (at least that of 
 Great Britain distinct from Irehmd), has increased 
 since 179~ in the ratio of the increase of our 
 population. We have, however, no wish to press 
 this point, it being of little consequence to our 
 argmnent, whether the proportion of the one, has 
 been greater or less than that of the other. It is 
 enough that we obtain assent to one leading con- 
 sideration, viz. that the surprising addition to our 
 numbers, since 1792 (50 per cent.) is, as far as can 
 be ascertained, unaccompanied by any general de- 
 terioration of ))rivate circumstances. The changes 
 in such circumstances have been almost infinite, 
 but there seems no reason to imagine that the 
 number of families or individuals, who have experi- 
 enced a decHne, exceeds that of those who have 
 improved their circumstances. 
 
 But are we, it may be said, authorized to assume 
 an equality in tiie individual income of this coun- 
 try between 179'^, a season of tranquillity, and the 
 present, which is one of general embarrassment? 
 To this argument, unluckily of great weight, we 
 oppose one of equal, or almost equal power; viz. 
 the great comparative increase of our tovvn-j)oj)u- 
 lation, the extent of which, as income inc?'cases so 
 much more in town than in the comilri/ (C'lia])ter on 
 Population, p. 240.) would ha\ e justified us, luul 
 our present circumstances been as tranquil and 
 secure as in 1792, in assuming an increase* of na- 
 tional property considerably beyond that of the 
 50 per cent, indicated by oiu- numbers.
 
 266 National Ravenue ; 
 
 Without, therefore, affecting precision in a calcu- 
 lation where it is evidently unattainable, we shall 
 adopt the increase of our numbers, as an approx- 
 imation to a basis for calculating the increase of 
 our national revenue. Proceeding on this ground, 
 we shall exhibit in the tabular form, the aug- 
 mentation that has taken place since 1792, pre- 
 mising that our chief materials are the population 
 and property-tax returns, and that for the period of 
 war, we make a considerable addition on tlic score 
 of extra wages and profits.
 
 its Increase since 179^. 2(J7 
 
 Conjectural Amount of our National Revenue or Taxable Income 
 at different Periods, from 1792 to 1822. 
 
 Great Britain distinct from -^ ^ ,„„„ Totals, also in 
 
 Ireland. Money of 1,92. M^ney of 1792. 
 
 In 1792, our taxable income 
 
 appears to have been as 
 
 stated in p. 35. about - £125,000,000 
 
 In 1806: increase calculated 
 
 in the ratio of the increase 
 
 of our population, 18 per 
 
 <;ent. in 14 years - - 22,-500,000 
 
 Together - - 1477500,600 
 
 Probable addition from the 
 
 higher wages and higher 
 
 profits of a sate of war - 22,500,000 
 
 Total of taxable income in 
 
 1806 . - - . 170,000,000 
 
 In 1813 or 1814: Increase 
 
 of national income since 
 
 1806, calculated in the 
 
 ratio of the increase of 
 
 population, 1 1 per cent. ; 
 
 thus : — 
 National income in 1806, as 
 
 above .... _14.7,500,000 
 
 Add 1 1 per cent. - - ~ 16,500,000 
 
 Together - - 16t,(XX),(X)0 
 
 Probable addition from the 
 
 higher wages and higher 
 
 profits of a state of war - 24,(KK),000 
 
 Total of taxable income in 
 
 18L'J or 1814 - * 188,000,000 
 
 Great lirilain and Irciand. 
 
 1823. Increase of taxable 
 
 income in the ratio of the 
 
 population, 15 per cent. 
 
 since 1814; thus: — 
 Amount in 1814 - - 164,(K)0,01K) 
 
 Add 15 per cent - - 24,(XX),000 
 
 Add farther the taxable 
 
 income of Ireland 
 
 25,000,000/. equal in money 
 
 of 1792 to - - - 21,000,000 
 
 Total of our taxable income in 
 
 1823, (in money of 1792) 209,000,(XK)
 
 ^)S Nation'nt Revenue ; 
 
 These results, which, we repeat, are only ap- 
 proximations, convey a clear- idea of the effect of 
 increasing- population on national income. The 
 next point is, the diffei'ence of numerical amount 
 produced by the rise or fall in the value of money. 
 
 Great Britain distinct from ^ ^ TJctQ ' ,Money of subse- 
 
 Irelt^iul. ^ . ' quent years. 
 
 1792: Taxable income as per 
 
 preceding table - - £125,000,000 
 
 1806: Do. per do. - - 170,000,000 
 
 After the general rise of 
 prices that took place be- 
 tween 1792 and 1806, 
 170,000,000/. in money of 
 1792, was in the transac- 
 tions of 1806, equivalent to 220,000,000 
 
 And an actual return of our 
 national revenue or taxable 
 income in the currency of 
 1806, would probably have 
 given a sum of 220,000,000/. 
 
 1813 or 1814: Taxable income 
 
 as in last page - - 188,000,000 
 
 The rise of prices, in all 60 
 per cent, since 1792, render- 
 ed this sum equal in all 
 money transactions in 1813 
 and 1814, to nearly - 300,000,000 
 
 Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
 1823. Taxable income as in 
 
 last page - - - - 209,000,000 
 The calculation in regard to 
 
 the A'alue of money is now 
 
 reversed, prices having 
 
 fallen, or, in other words 
 
 money having risen in value 
 
 between 1814 and 1823, 
 
 nearly 30 per cent. Still 
 
 it is about 30 per cent. 
 
 lower than in 1792, so that 
 
 the last mentioned sum 
 
 209,000,000/. money of 
 
 1792), is equal in the cur- 
 rency of 1822, to about 270,000,000 
 A sum not materially different 
 
 from the amount of the 
 
 table • of taxable income 
 
 contained in p. 258.
 
 its Increase since 17 9^^' 
 
 2C9 
 
 Our next object is to inti'oduce our burdens 
 into this comparative table, and to calculate their 
 proportion at ditierent periods to our revenue. 
 
 Statement of our Public Burdens and National 
 Revenue, calculated for distinct Periods. The 
 Public Burdens include Taxes {before deducting 
 the Ed'pence (f Collection), Poor-rate, and Tithe. 
 
 Great Britain distinct from Ireland. 
 
 Years. 
 
 1792 
 1806 
 1814 
 
 Public Burdens. 
 
 £22,000,000 
 60,000,000 
 80,000,000 
 
 Our National Re- 
 venue or Taxable 
 
 IllCOUK'. 
 
 £125,000,000 
 220,000,000 
 300,000,000 
 
 Proportion of Bur- 
 den to Revenue. 
 
 nearly 18 to 100 
 27 to 100 
 27 to 100 
 
 Great Britain and Ireland, {see Appendix, p. [85].) 
 1823 I 64,000,000 | 260,000,000 | 25 to 100 
 
 That we may divest tins statement of the in- 
 tricacies attendant on the difference in the value 
 of money at different periods, we subjoin a table, 
 in winch the sums on both sides are reduced to a 
 common standard, viz. the money of 1792. 
 
 Great Britain distinct lioni Ireland. 
 
 Years. 
 
 1792 
 1806 
 1814 
 
 Public Bur- 
 dens, in I^Ioney 
 of 1792. 
 
 £22,000,000 
 46,000,000 
 50,000,000 
 
 Our National Re- 
 venue or Taxable 
 Income in Money 
 of 1792. 
 
 ^125,000,000 
 170,000,000 
 188,000,000 
 
 Proportion of Bur- 
 dens to Revenue. 
 
 nearly 18 to 100 
 27 to 100 
 27 to 100 
 
 Great Britain and Ireland, [see Appendix, p. [85].) 
 1823 I 50,000,000 1 200,000,000 1 25 to 100 
 
 The reduction to a common standard is useliil 
 in several respects, particularly in correcting the 
 exaggerated estimate, which, during the wai-, we
 
 *270 
 
 National Rcve7iuc 
 
 were iiccustomed to make of botli our burdens and 
 our resources. 
 
 France; her National Income. — We conclude 
 our chapter by a brief" parallel between this country 
 and her most powerful neighbour. The national 
 income, by which we mean the aggregate of indi- 
 vidual income, is, in one sense, somewhat greater 
 in France than in this country ; but in regard to 
 the portion of it that is taxable, the advantage 
 will be found on our side, in consequence, chiefly, 
 of our greater town-population : thus, 
 
 Comparative Sketch oj' National Income expended 
 on taxed Articles, 
 
 Great Britain 
 
 and 
 
 Ireland. 
 
 France, after 
 
 adding to the 
 
 actual receipts 
 
 20 per cent, for 
 
 the greater value 
 
 of money. 
 
 Rent of land and farmer's profit at 
 
 peace prices. 
 Tithe 
 
 Rent of houses . - - - 
 Income arising from commerce, 
 manufactures, and professions, 
 as far as such are of 50/. and up- 
 wards; also income from mines, 
 docks, canals, tolls, &c. 
 Small incomes (below 50/.) and 
 wages of all accustomed to con- 
 sume taxed articles, as beer, 
 tea, sugar, tobacco, in England ; 
 or wine, cyder, tobacco, sugar, 
 coffee, in France. 
 
 50,000,000 
 
 5,000,000 
 
 18,000,000 
 
 24,000,000 
 
 60,000,000 
 18,000,000 
 
 18,000,000 
 
 -100,000,000 
 
 110,000,000 
 
 Together -197,000,000 206,000,000 
 Such is the amount of income' \ 
 
 arising from the land and labour of| 
 either country. To this we now 
 make an addition of great import- 
 ance as a source of taxation, what-]
 
 Parallel wit// France. 
 
 271 
 
 
 1 France, after 
 
 _, . . adding to the 
 Great Britain ^^^^^^ ^^^-^^^^ 
 
 and 2Q p^^ ^.^^^^ f^^ 
 Ireland. ^^^^ greater value 
 of money. 
 
 Brought forward 
 ever may be thought of it as a 
 constituent of national wealth. 
 Income from money in the public 
 funds, or lent on private secu- 
 rities 
 
 Received from government, dis- 
 tinct from the interest of the 
 public debt ; viz. the pay of 
 the army, the navy, the public 
 offices, the civil list, the miscel- 
 laneous services, after allowing 
 for the late reductions 
 
 Total taxable income * - - 
 
 £ 
 197,000,000 
 
 50,000,000 
 18,000,000 
 
 £ 
 206,000,000 
 
 25,000,000 
 19,000,000 
 
 265,000,000 250,000,000 
 
 * Any discrepancies between this column and that in page 25, arise from 
 the latter exhibiting the returns of Great Britain distinct from Ireland. 
 
 Wages. — To put the two countries so nearly on 
 a par in regard to wages, may seem hardly fair 
 towards France, su])eric)r as that country is in po- 
 pulation, and reduced as wages in some measiu'e 
 have been, and are likely to be among us. But in 
 a calculation of national revenue, the magnitude 
 of the po})ulation of France ought, in a great 
 measure, to be kept in the back ground, many 
 millions being cottagers, who, as in Ireland, do 
 little more than maintain themselves on their })etty 
 occupancies, consuming few articles productive to 
 the exchequer, and adding little to the national 
 strength, otherwise than by recruits foi- the mi- 
 litary service. Wages are highest among a town- 
 })opulation, in which England takes greatly the 
 lead. Add to this, that in all Catholic countries 
 there is a considerable loss of wages from holidays.
 
 '27^ National Revenue ; — Parallel mlli France. 
 
 Rent of Houses. — In this respect, France was 
 formerly entitled to rank before us ; but houses in 
 a riual district yield very Httle rent ; and while 
 French towns arc comparatively stationary, ours 
 have been and continue in a. state of rapid in- 
 crease. 
 
 Comparative Prospects ofEnglnnd and France. — 
 This interesting question shall be discussed at 
 considerable length in our chapter on Finance,
 
 ^7' 
 
 CHAP. rx. 
 
 Effect of the late Wars on Propertt/, individual 
 and national. 
 
 1 HE researches we have already had occasion to 
 make in regard to our agriculture and national 
 revenue, prepare us, in a considerable degree, for 
 the farther and more comprehensive enquiry to 
 which this chapter is appropriated. In the invest- 
 igations connected with it, we shall studiously 
 avoid discussing the policy or impolicy of our great 
 contest ; the practicability of avoiding it in the 
 outset, or of terminating it in an earlier stage. We 
 shall avoid, in like manner, any parallel between 
 the magnitude of our sacrifices on one hand, and 
 the benefit resultin<>; on the other from restorino 
 the equilibrium of the Continent. Nothing, in- 
 deed, would be more hopeless than an attempt to 
 produce any thing like uniformity of opinion on 
 such a subject. The oppositionist, in his review 
 of the events of the last thirty years, takes littft* 
 account of the danger that arose afler 1795, from 
 the aggrandizing spirit of the French govern 
 ment; nor, while urging, and urging jusUy, tiie 
 insignificance to us of most causes of continental 
 quarrel, does he make due allowance lor the im- 
 portance of the Netherlands, and the alarming ad- 
 dition whicii their possession made to the power 
 of France. The ministerialist, on the other hand, 
 is equally confident and indiscriminating, making 
 
 T
 
 '^7'!' E(](rl of fhr Idle IVars oji Propcrl/f, 
 
 no ailmissioM of the occasions on wliicli (as in 179^^^ 
 iind I8O7) onr government acted an aggressive 
 part, and justifying the attack on Copenhagen as 
 he wonhl the defence ol" Spain. From tiie delu- 
 sion that the war was a source of permanent wealth, 
 we now begin to be awakened ; but, in otiier re- 
 spects, we are yet far distant from the time when 
 the public shall be enabled to view the transactions 
 of this eventful age with the calmness of historical 
 enquiry. It will be for a succeeding generation to 
 appreciate, on the one hand, the ferment produced 
 by the French Revolution ; on the other, the 
 course by which our political guides, had they 
 been aware of the little dependence to be placed 
 on foreign allies, and of the aid to be derived for 
 the maintenance of order from the upper and mid- 
 dle classes at home, might have endeavoured to 
 conduct our affairs during the period of alarm. 
 The hazardous alternati\'e of an appeal to arms 
 would probably have been avoided, had our coun- 
 cils been guided by a Burleigh or a Walpole ; or 
 had he who was placed at our helm in those critical 
 times, been of an age to derive from personal re- 
 flection and experience that knowledge in which 
 he was necessarily deficient, and the want of whicli 
 was so feebly supplied by the coadjutors witli 
 whom our system of parliamentary influence 
 obliges a minister to become connected. 
 
 Political Economists, — The discrepancy that 
 prevails among politicians is equally remarkable 
 among political economists. To the follower of 
 Smith and Say, all war seems impolitic and unne- 
 cessary ; in his eyes, the whole of military array, 
 the training, equipping, and maintaining of fleets 
 and armies, is an absolute sacrifice, the loss of the
 
 Individual and National. QJ5 
 
 labour of the most valuable part of our population. 
 It is with great diHiculty that he can be brought to 
 allow that war brings with it even a temporary 
 aliment to its consuming powers. Mr. Say, the 
 political economist of France, after visiting this 
 country in the first year of peace, published the 
 following remarks. 
 
 " Ministers and public men in England are as 
 yet, (he wrote with reference to our ministry of 
 I8O7), far from having a just sense of the folly 
 and ruinous tendency of war : their progress 
 has not kept pace with the progress of the nation. 
 The misfortunes of England take their rise in the 
 higher regions, like the hail and the tempest : her 
 blessings spring from beneath, like the fruits of an 
 inexhaustible soil. The taxes have not only 
 doubled, but tripled since 1792 j and still the war 
 expenditure greatly exceeded their amount. The 
 consequence is, an enormous enhancement of 
 prices ; mercantile men are obliged to do business 
 on very slender profits, and what is still worse, 
 many of the manufactured articles aj*e sadly fallen 
 from their former reputation. My French readers,** 
 he adds, " will be surprized to find in my pages 
 an opinion so much at variance with the current 
 notion that England is the land for the easy and 
 ra])id attainment of fortune ; but the reality is 
 widely different from the appearance." 
 
 A very different picture of the effect of war is 
 given by Mr. 8. Gray, to whom we have so fre- 
 quently referred in our chapter on population, and 
 who came several years ago before the public, as the 
 author of a system bearing the emphatic name of 
 " productive." The pages in which that doctrine 
 is recommended to the world, contain a number 
 of arguments on tlic connexion between govern-
 
 276 Fifjict of flic late IVars on ProjK-rti/, 
 
 mcMit expenditure and the increase of individual 
 income, taxes being considered hy Mr. Gray in 
 the Hght of useful stimulants to our national in- 
 dustry. He has the merit of detecting several 
 imperfections in Dr. Smith's definition of product- 
 ive and unproductive labour; but in reasoning on 
 our war expenditure, he evidently fails to distin- 
 guish between a temporary and a lasting excite- 
 ment, and assumes, from the circulation of money 
 raised by loans and taxes, as much advantage as 
 if war prices were necessarily permanent, and as 
 if, on concluding peace, we could consider our- 
 selves exempt from the frightful reaction experi- 
 enced during the last nine years. 
 
 To these opposite authorities, each tending in 
 some degree to an extreme, we add the observ- 
 ations of a third writer. 
 
 " Notwithstanding the immense expenditure of the Enghsh 
 government during the late wars, there can be Httle doubt but 
 that the increased production on the part of the people has 
 more than compensated for it. The national capital has not 
 merely been unimpaired, it has been greatly increased ; and 
 the annual revenue of the people, even after the payment of 
 their taxes, is probably greater at the present time than at 
 any former period of our history. For the proof of this, we 
 might refer to the increase of population, — to the extension 
 of agriculture, — to the increase of shipping and manufactures, 
 — to the building of docks, — to the opening of numerous 
 canals, as well as to many other expensive undertakings; — 
 all denoting an increase both of capital and of annual produc- 
 tion." {Ricardo on Political Economi/, second Edition, p. 170.) 
 
 This passage presents, perhaps, too favourable a 
 a view of our situation ; and ought, before we can 
 receive it as a true picture, to be accompanied 
 by two admissions. First, that though our na- 
 tional income has increased, our burdens have aug- 
 mented in a still greater ratio ; and, secondly, that 
 in any estimate of our wealth expressed in money
 
 Individual and National. '^77 
 
 in the present day, a considerable deduction is to 
 be made from an estimate in 179^, on account of 
 the inferior \a\\\q of money. It is fair, however, 
 to add, that this passage was written at a time 
 (1816) when the fall of prices was only beginning, 
 and w^hen we were unable to calculate the extent 
 of fluctuation and loss arising from the war. 
 Since then, seven eventful years have elapsed, 
 and have disclosed a succession of circumstances 
 beyond the reach of foresight, but replete with in- 
 struction when examined in the order of their oc- 
 currence. With this advantage, we now follow 
 up the enquiry, and instead of reasoning in general 
 terms, like the writers we have quoted, we shall 
 endeavour to build on a secure foundation, and 
 proceed, as in our preceding chapters, by a series 
 of calculations and specific results. Our arrange- 
 ment shall be as follows : 
 
 Losses incurred during the prosecution of the 
 war. 
 
 Losses attendant on the transition from war to 
 peace. 
 
 Comparative amount of our national income 
 in war and peace. 
 
 Have our public men understood our financial 
 situation ? 
 
 Losses io our produclivc Indus/ny on a Trans- 
 ttionfrom Peace to JVar. — Tliese losses, unknown 
 in a great measure to the younger part of the pre- 
 sent generation, will long live in the recollection 
 of those who are of an as:e to remember the bank- 
 ruptcies of 1793. These pervaded eciiially our 
 commercial, manufacturing, and agricultural inte- 
 rests, and affected almost all whose undertakings 
 
 T S
 
 278 EtP^c^ '.'/ '^'^ '^'^^ IVars on Properlj/, 
 
 were not supported by snl)stantial capital. To 
 frhat was a pressure so general to be ascribed ? To 
 the sudden and extensive change that took place ; 
 to a demand on the part of government for men 
 and money ; and to the consequent necessity of 
 abandoning various undertakings, the profit of 
 which, ahnost always less than is vulgarly imag- 
 ined, could be made to answer only by the aid of 
 a low rate of interest and moderate price of labour. 
 Ih these days, as at present, our countrymen were 
 speculative, eager to embark on new enterprises, 
 and apt to trust to prospective advantages for those 
 means of providing for payments which their 
 limited capital did not afibrd. This sanguine dis- 
 position may be termed the great feature that dis- 
 tinguishes our countrymen and the North Ameri- 
 cans from the traders and agriculturists of the 
 continent of Europe, among whom the same oc- 
 cupation is so often followed from father to son, 
 with little idea of change or attempt at extension. 
 But our spirit of enterprise, however favourable 
 to discovery and improvement, is necessarily at- 
 tended by a revolution in the circumstances of 
 individuals on the occurrence of any political 
 change. The blow first strikes establishments of 
 the most adventurous character, and goes on to 
 involve others injured by the failure of the first, 
 and possessing, like them, few resoiu"ces against an 
 unforeseen demand. Embarrassments of this de- 
 scription were felt chiefly in the first and second 
 years of the war, during the interval that luiavoid- 
 ably elapsed before the capital and labour dis- 
 turbed in their employment by the war, could 
 receive a new direction, and be invested anew in a 
 productive form.
 
 Individual and National. 279 
 
 From this almost tbrgottcii tlieme, we proceed 
 to a part of the subject much more familiar to the 
 majority of our readers; to au 
 
 Estimate of the Burden arising from Government Expenditure 
 during the War. 
 
 Interest of the debt contracted during the war, 
 after allowing for the reduction of the 5 per 
 cents. - . - . . €22,000,000 
 
 The annual amount of half-pay and pensions in 
 the army, navj', and civil service, arising from 
 the war, is at present (1823), about 4-,5()0,0(K)/. ; 
 but consisting almost all of life annuities, may 
 be computed equal to a permanent burden of - 2,000,000 
 
 Exclusive of this, the expence of our army and 
 navy is very greatly augmented since 1792, 
 partly from the extension of our foreign pos- 
 sessions, partly from causes unconnected with 
 the war, such as the increase of our population, 
 and the necessity of enforcing the collection of 
 the revenue in Ireland. As yet the charge of 
 our army and navy (distinct from half-pay and 
 pensions), exceeds that of 1792 by 6,000,000/., 
 but from the prospect of continued peace, and 
 the general fall of prices, we may anticipate a 
 farther eventual reduction of 1,000,000/. Of 
 the remaining 5,000,000/., we put to the ac- 
 count of the war, somewhat more than half, 
 viz. . . . - - 3,000,000 
 
 Add, for increase of the civil list, salaries, pen- 
 sions in consequence of the war and of the rise 
 caused by it in prices - - - 2,()()0,()00 
 
 Other war charges not enumerated - - 1,000,000 
 
 Total . - C 30,000,000 
 
 Such is the amount of burden arisini:; from our 
 war expenditure; lui})pily, however, there are al- 
 leviating considerations. 
 
 r 4
 
 li.SO iljfci/ of I he lalv H'cirs on l*roprr/i/. 
 
 Deductions from our apparent Burdens. 
 
 Tadation of other Countries. — It is in some re- 
 spects a matter of little difficulty to understand 
 the financial relief \vhicl» we have in prospect ; 
 such, for example, as the decrease in our half-pay 
 and pensions, ejther by the occurrence of deaths, 
 or a transfer for long annuities ; but the case may 
 not be quite so clear in regard to a deduction of 
 another kind, we mean that which arises from a 
 ** community of the pressure of taxation on the civi- 
 lized world at large.'* Yet, however real our Idsses 
 from the war, however inferior our national wealth 
 to what it would have been, had peace been unin- 
 terrupted, we cannot be said to have incurretl ab- 
 solute injury, or to labour under any permanent 
 disadvantage, in as far as similar burdens have 
 been imposed on those who are our competitors 
 in the career of productive industry. This, we 
 say, though perfectly aware of the folly of the doc- 
 trine that one nation gains by impoverishing an- 
 other. Our argument, when attentively examined, 
 will be found to rest on a very different basis : 
 war, at all times a losing game, would be doubly 
 so, w^ere our opponents to escape a participation 
 in the pecuniary pressure ; our productive labour- 
 ers would soon emigrate, and pursue their industry 
 in untaxed countries. To brinsf our ars^ument to 
 a point : if in England tlie late wars ha\'e increased 
 the proportion of burden to income by twelve 
 per cent., and if in France, Germany, or the 
 Netherlands, the comparative increase be five or 
 six per cent., our loss, serious as it is, can hardJy 
 be considered as exceeding the difierence *, we 
 
 ^0
 
 Individual and Naliunal. t^81 
 
 mean that in whatever regards tiie liazard of rival- 
 ship, or the injury from foreign] competition, our 
 disadvantage is limited to the extra six or seven 
 per cent. 
 
 Ou7^ War Todies. — Our next modification of our 
 losses is also of a very extensive character, though 
 it does not happen to form a deduction from the 
 preceding table. It comprises no less than the 
 lurger portion of the mm raised bij "jcar tojces^ which, 
 though (see Chapter II. p. 24.) of very great 
 amount, we are disposed to consider as defrayed 
 out of the extra profits of a state of war ; so largely 
 were the gains of the public, whether in the shape 
 of interest, salary, wages, or profit of stock, in- 
 creased by the circulation of the money raised by 
 our loans. In making this great allowance, we are 
 perfectly aware that in many cases, particularly after 
 oiu' unfortunate Orders in Council, our merchants 
 and manufacturers paid their taxes, as our farmers 
 at present pay their rent, not from income but f ironi 
 capital. We are aware, also, that the resources 
 which supplied our war taxes were, in a great mea- 
 sure, temporary, and of a natiue to disap})ear with 
 the stimulus that excited them : but our estimate 
 is confined to the years of war ; and we arc pro- 
 bably justified, on considering all circumstances, in 
 making the preceding deduction, important as it is. 
 
 Public Works, such as Canals, Roads, and Bridges, 
 — These, however commendable in the intention, 
 are expedient as undertakings only when the 
 returns are such as to afford a fair interest for the 
 capital invested. From the high price of labour 
 and materials in the latter })art of the war, most 
 speculations of the kind, such tor example as the 
 new bridges of the metro))olis, wcic attended with
 
 '282 I']lF'cf o/'t^ii' ^(if^- IVars on V roper tij, 
 
 a far greater cliarge than if they had been post- 
 poned and executed in peace. The same holds in 
 regard to our agriculture, in which a large share of 
 the outlay was incurred on the assumption of high 
 prices. Even in the case of our manufacturing 
 machinery, a part erected when labour was high, is 
 no longer necessary or profitable, now that labour 
 is reduced. Still, a great part of such loss is merely 
 in appearance, and resolves itself into the different 
 value of money: the canal share, which, in 1813, 
 cost 100/., may be said to indemnify its owner, if it 
 at present fetches y^/., because that sum is at pre- 
 sent equal in the power of purchase to the 100/. of 
 1813. Such investments of property involve an 
 absolute loss only, in as far as they fall below tliat 
 proportion, a case at present unfortunately loo 
 frequent. 
 
 Tithe. — This portion of our burdens is difJerent, 
 in several respects, from general taxation. Its 
 amount, as expressed in money, increased sur- 
 prisingly during the war, in consequence of two 
 causes, — the enhancement of produce, and tlie 
 extended cultivation attendant on the increase of 
 our numbers. How far did the payment of this 
 increased amount prove of detriment to our re- 
 sources ? It was defrayed by that portion of the 
 community, who, so long as the war lasted, were 
 most able to defray their burdens. On the public 
 at large, its pressure was not apparent ; in an indi- 
 rect sense, however, that pressure was great, for 
 tithe operated as an obstacle to ctdiiration^ and 
 greatly restricted the amount of our produce, at a 
 time when it would have been most desirable to 
 increase it. 
 
 Poor-Rate. — In tliis respect, the estimate of
 
 Individual ami National, 283 
 
 burden during the late wars is subject to consider- 
 able qualification. The increase of the rate having 
 been as great in agricultural as in manufacturing 
 districts, although in the former, work was, all 
 along, abundant, the inference is, that the rise 
 was, in a great measure, iiominaly and would other- 
 wise have been paid in the shape of wages. Add 
 to this the decrease of rates in tlie last and present 
 year, with the probability of a progressive diminu- 
 tion, and we shall find that the portion of burden 
 attributable to the war is by no means so great as 
 might be inferred from the numerical statements 
 of the poor-rate. 
 
 The National Debt. — After all these allowances, 
 it may be incumbent on us to answer the question, 
 whether we *' consider our national debt as forming 
 an actual loss, an absolute addition to our public 
 burdens?'* This question, idle in the view of the 
 attentive enquirer, is by no means superfluous in 
 regard to the cursory observer, to those who im- 
 agine our debt a property which, without the war, 
 would have had no existence, a responsibility of 
 little importance because due among ourselves. 
 All such notions we entreat our readers to dismiss 
 from their minds, and to consider our debt as not 
 less real for being due to our countrymen. It is the 
 record of money expended, gone for ever; and 
 involving, as far as our burdens exceed those of 
 other countries, a series of disadvantages. Had 
 we had no war, the capital and labour that has led 
 to the formation of our debt would not have been 
 unemployed ; it would have been put in activity 
 by other causes, and received its increase in a dif- 
 ferent form. The product, we allow, would, j)r{). 
 bably, have been smaller, because the ratio of in-
 
 284 J\ff'^^^ uflhc Idtc IVars on. Propcrtij, 
 
 crease, whether iiom interest, profit of stock, or 
 personal exertion, would, in a state of continued 
 peace, have been much less considerable. 
 
 Effect of the War on the Habits of Individuals. 
 — The increase of wealth arising from the war 
 was much more an increase of income than of 
 property. In the latter sense the war was bene- 
 ficial to those only who had formed their habits in 
 a season of tranquil occupation, of moderate profit, 
 and who, from their experience and time of life, 
 were capable of reaping the new harvest without 
 abusing it. The case was very different with those 
 who, entering on business during the war, took for 
 granted that circumstances would continue as they 
 found them, and made no provision for a reverse. 
 The characteristics of this youthful generation may 
 be said to have been a general confidence, a habit 
 of early expence, a repugnance to the cautious 
 perseverance of former days. The extent of evil 
 arising from such a source can be computed by 
 those only whose observation has embraced a wide 
 range, who have marked throughout the present 
 age the frequent substitution of adventure for 
 industry, and the reiterated loss of capital when 
 entrusted to the young and inexperienced. 
 
 Losses on ttie Transition from War to Peace. 
 
 No period of our history affords an example of a 
 change so sudden and so extensive as that which 
 took place in the state of our productive industry 
 after the peace of 1814. For the relinquishment 
 of foreign colonies, and for an active rivalship in 
 manufacture, on the part of the continent of 
 Europe, the public were prepared ; but they had, 
 in a manner, lost sight of the great diflference be- 
 tween government expenditure in peace and war ;
 
 Individual and National. ^85 
 
 and the few who took this difference into account, 
 imagined that the diminution of demand at home 
 would be balanced by our exports to newly 
 opened markets in America and Asia. These 
 persons were by no means aware either of the mag- 
 nitude of our circulation at home arising from war 
 expenditure, or of the substantial difference be- 
 tween an assiu'ed payment in England, and the 
 hazard attendant on transactions with distant coun- 
 tries. Many anticipated a partial reduction of 
 wages, but not a general want of work ; a dimi- 
 nution of mercantile and manufacturing profit to 
 a certain extent, but in no degree proportioned to 
 that which took place. Yet the years of peace 
 have been marked by no calamity of a general 
 nature ; by no such bankruptcy as the South Sea 
 or Mississippi scheme ; by no territorial cessions, 
 like the relinquishment, at the peace of 1783, of 
 our North American provinces; by no insuruection 
 in our colonies ; no successful rivalship on the part 
 of competitors either in manufacture or navigation. 
 Magnitude of the Change. — ^\'hat, tlien, were 
 the causes of our great and unexpected embar- 
 rassments? Not a reduction of our means con- 
 sidered physically or intrinsically, but a general 
 change in the mode of rendering them productive ; 
 a sudden removal of the stimulus arising from tlie 
 war. In no former contest had our military esta- 
 blishments been carried to such a height : the 
 number of our militiamen, soldiers, and sailors, dis- 
 charged, amounted to between two and three hun- 
 dred thousand, while the individuals em])I()yed in 
 the manufacture of clothes, arms, stores, in the 
 supply of provisions, tlie navigation of transports, 
 amounted, perhaps, to two hundred thousand more. 
 The macfnitude of the transition will be best shown
 
 28(i mH'f'f <}flli<^' Ifitc IVars on Propcr/i/, 
 
 by a brief comparison of the sums expended by 
 oineninient in tlie iivc last years of the war, and 
 the ti\ e first years of peace : 
 
 YEAUS OF WAR. 
 
 1811. - £ 92,200,000 181 4-. - i^l 17,000,000 
 
 1812. - 103,400,000 1815. - 110,0()0,(KK) 
 
 1813. - 121,000'000 Average - 108,720,000 
 
 YEARS OF PEACE. 
 
 1816. - 72,000,000 1819 - 59,000,000 
 
 1817. - 66,300,000 1820 - 61,000,0(X) 
 1818 - 67,000,000 Average - 64-,660,00G 
 
 Peace thns caused an immediate reduction of 
 more than forty millions in the amoinit of the 
 money distributed by government to pay cm})loy- 
 ment, or, in other words, to stimulate productive 
 industry. Add to this that during the war most of 
 our establishments had been formed on a large 
 scale, a scale that supposed a power of demand, a 
 ca])acity of payment much greater than was found 
 to exist after the peace. This w-as the case in 
 regard not only to great offices, but private esta- 
 blishments of the most dissimilar character j manu- 
 factures, mercantile houses, seminaries of education, 
 and a variety of undertakings, almost all of which, 
 w^hether in the metropolis or provincial towns, were 
 adapted to a community increasing not only in its 
 numbers, but in its power of expenditure. 
 
 The means by w^hich we were enabled to pay 
 such heavy contributions during the war have been 
 already explained. Exempt from continental com- 
 petition, the public, or at least four-fifths of the 
 public, had at that time the power of indenniitying 
 tbemselves for their taxes by an increased rate of 
 charge. This was the case of the land-holder, the 
 farmer, the owner of houses, the receiver of tithe :
 
 Individual and National. 287 
 
 it was the case, likewise, of persons cxercisiiii^ pro- 
 fessions, of those receiving sahiries, and of the very 
 mnneroiis class, whose dependence is on wages. At 
 the peace, all or almost all was reversed : agricnl- 
 turists, merchants, manufacturers, fell from their 
 'vantage ground, and prosperity was, during several 
 years, confined to aimuitants, to whom, since 1S20 
 or 1821, we are enabled to add the majority of the 
 labouring classes. It must not be interred ti-om 
 this that our consumption, whether of agricultuial 
 or manufactured produce, experienced an absolute 
 diminution ; for our numbers, as was shown at the 
 time by the extent of new buildings, and subse- 
 (piently by the population returns, were annually 
 on the increase j but partly from the economy in- 
 troduced by altered circumstances, more from an 
 augmentation of supply, the increase of buyers did 
 not equal the increase of sellers, and a general fall 
 of prices became unavoidable. Finally, our dis- 
 tress was aggravated in no slight degree by the ab- 
 sence of many of our countrymen of the upper and 
 middling classes, who, whether as travellers or as 
 residents on the Continent, incurred an expendi- 
 ture of several millions annually abroad, at the time 
 it was most wanted at home. 
 
 Distress of Foreign Countries. — Similar causes 
 of embarrassment were unfortunately in operation 
 on the Continent of Europe. In former wars the 
 evils of transition had been felt in few countries, 
 and to a comparatively small extent; but in IS 13 
 and 181 1<, almost all Europe had been in military 
 array, and every country felt the sudden change 
 from disembodying of armies, cessation of go\ern. 
 ment purchases, and an overstock of productive 
 labourers. Add to this, tiiat our greatest cus-
 
 ^8S E[Jrct of I he late IVars on Proper! jj, 
 
 tomers, tlie United States of America, had siift'ered 
 so severely, Hist from the stoppage of their naviga- 
 tion, and afterwards from the return of peace, as 
 to be far less able to pay for our goods than during 
 the continuance of tiie war. The consequence 
 was that our foreign trade, though not diminisiied, 
 and even partially increased in amount, failed, 
 from irregularity in the payments, to prove an 
 efficient source of relief. 
 
 Temporary Revival of Activity in 1818. — The 
 extent of our suffering might have been in some 
 degree lessened, had our real situation been earlier 
 known, or had it not undergone considerable fluc- 
 tuation in the years that have elapsed since the 
 peace. The year 1811- produced two great re- 
 sults; a fall of corn, and a reinstatement of the 
 value of bank paper. Both continued during 1815 
 and 1816, but the bad harvest of the latter year 
 renewed the operation of our corn laws, and being 
 followed by a revival of trade and manufacture, 
 accustomed us anew to high prices, gave a tempo- 
 rary increase to the revenue, and suspended the 
 measures that might otherwise have been taken for 
 a general adaptation of our burdens to oiu* means ; 
 we mean a reduction of salaries and those other 
 incomes in regard to which, from the sums being 
 previously fixed, the course of circumstances has 
 not had free operation. Our second period of dis- 
 tress (beginning in 1819) thus came on us as un- 
 expectedly as the first, and we are now, in the 
 ninth year of peace, discussing those points which 
 it had been of infinite importance to us to have 
 understood from the moment that the overthrow 
 of Buonaparte opened the prospect of a general 
 change.
 
 Individual and National 289 
 
 Our probable Situation had the War been avoided, 
 — We shall close these remarks by a brief calcula- 
 tion of what would probably have been our finan* 
 cial situation, supposing political science to have 
 been as well understood at the time of the Freilch 
 revolution as at present, and our statesmen equally 
 convinced of the close connexion between the pre- 
 servation of peace, and the increase of national 
 prosperity. Had such been the case, we may 
 fairly assume that our cabinet would either not 
 have interfered in the war at all, or would have 
 made peace in 1793, as soon as the French were 
 driven within their frontiers. For tranquillity at 
 home they would probably have trusted to mea- 
 sures of police, to the aid of an armed force, and to 
 the support of the middle and upper classes of 
 society. The troubled aspect of the times, and 
 the necessity of arming the executive branch with 
 power both to repress sedition, and to effect such 
 measures as the union with Ireland, and the equal 
 collection of taxes throughout the kingdom, would 
 doubtless have obliged us to increase our army and 
 carry our expenditure considerably beyond that of 
 179^» The result might have been that our taxes 
 and poor-rate which in 179^, amounted (including 
 Ireland) to about 20,000,000/., might by this time 
 have been carried by a gradual increase to 28 or 
 30,000,000/. In other respects also, our situation 
 would have been exempt from the extraordinary 
 fluctuations we have witnessed. Thus the price of 
 wheat would, even after the double failure of crop 
 in 1799 and 1800, hardly have exceeded .SOj;. mo- 
 derate as would have been the charges on import. 
 
 In a state of peace the attention of our ministers 
 miglit Uave been bestowed on measures of internal 
 
 u
 
 f290 Kf]Wl of (hi' laic J Tars on Proper/ 1/, 
 
 improvement, sucli as cominutation of tithe, e(|iial- 
 ization of poor-rate, or the removal of commercial 
 restrictions, all necessarily })ostponed during a 
 contest, which not only absorbed their time, but 
 obliged them, from their dependence on the support 
 of particular interests, to submit to a tacit continu- 
 ance of abuses. If we are told that the average 
 rate of profits and wages being smaller in peace 
 than in war, our national income would not in the 
 former alternative have been so large, our answer 
 is, that while we admit the quicker increase of in- 
 vidual income during war, we have to bring against 
 it a formidable deduction in the losses attendant 
 on the transition to peace. Or if, to avoid argu- 
 ment, we limit our estimate of loss arising from 
 the war to a sum of which the interest is 15 or 
 18,000,000/. a year, we allow even then that we 
 have incurred a burden equal to the revenue of 
 the Austrian or Russian empire. 
 
 The late Wars examined hy moral Considerations. 
 — We proceed to bestow a few sentences on the 
 events of the late war, considered on higher 
 grounds than those of mere calculation. The ap- 
 parent triumph of injustice, in national as well as 
 individual transactions, has, as is well known, often 
 embarrassed candid inquirers, and reduced them 
 almost to question the interference of Providence 
 in the course of human affliirs. Among our neigh- 
 boLU'S on the southern shore of the Channel, scepti- 
 cism received an unfortiniate extension at the time 
 of the revolution ; an extension to be attributed 
 partly to the youth and unthinking character of 
 many of the reformers, partly to the odium to 
 which the Catholic clergy exposed themselves by
 
 Individual and National, f291 
 
 their o))po.sition to the new cause. During many 
 years the success of a restless despot seemed to 
 confirm the doubts of the intervention of a higher 
 power, since it was not till the Continent luid been 
 overrun, that political justice resumed its course. 
 
 But if such impressions may be expected in a 
 country where religion wears a form ill calculated 
 to obtain the conviction of a reflecting mind, ought 
 M^e to have expected in England a favourable re- 
 ception to such a doctrine as that of our national 
 wealth being augmented by war? Hap])ily no 
 such conclusions are suggested by the writings of 
 those who have most successfully investigated the 
 sources of national prosperity; by the labours of 
 Turgot, Smith, or Say. If to describe the structure 
 of the human frame ; to explain the connexion and 
 the subserviency of its various parts, has been 
 declared ecpiivalent to a hynm in praise of its divine 
 Author, not less is that testimony due to the study 
 of the causes of the success of productive industry. 
 Researches into that subject, when prosecuted in 
 the spirit of im})artiality, tend more and more to 
 establish the connexion between equity and j)ros- 
 perity, between fairness in principle and success in 
 practice. 
 
 This connexion, we can safely assure t)ur readers, 
 is no philanthropic dream, but is practically recog- 
 nized by the directors of our mercantile policy. 
 The system of prohibition and high duties, so long- 
 in favour with our ancestors, is now renounced, and 
 our Board of Trade has, during the last eight years, 
 acted on the conviction that the increase of our 
 wealth is, in a great measure, dependent on the 
 increase of that of our neighbours. Further, if we 
 pass in review our mercantile history during the 
 wai-, and discriminate the gain and loss of particular 
 
 V 2
 
 929^ Effect of the late Wars on PropctHi/, , 
 
 classes, we shall find that the change of circum- 
 stances since the peace has, in general, been sucli 
 as to constitute a fair retribution to those who had 
 either benefited or suffered by fluctuation. Annui- 
 tants have been relieved from their long depression, 
 and now find their income restored, or nearly re- 
 stored, to its former value. Of our countrymen at 
 present in a state of suffering, we may be permitted 
 to remark that they belong in general to the classes 
 whose gains were greatest during the war ; a re- 
 mark made without the slightest intention of weak- 
 ening their claim to relief j since not humanity only, 
 but the public interest (see the chapter on Agri- 
 culture, p. 142.) calls on us to prevent their farther 
 depression. And we have adverted to their case 
 merely to show the transient and unsubstantial 
 nature of gains derived from a state of war ; — the 
 frightful recoil to be apprehended by those who 
 imagine that in them they have found a source of 
 permanent advantage. 
 
 The result, therefore, is, that the late war, so 
 long accounted a source of national wealth, in\'olv- 
 ed a sacrifice of property not inferior to the sacri- 
 fice of lives. To this double drain in our resources, 
 what has been the grand counterpoise ? Our pro- 
 gress in the arts of peace : the power of extracting 
 a larger supply of subsistence from our soil ; a 
 larger revenue from our labour and capital. By 
 what criterion are we enabled to compute the 
 amount of the addition thus obtained ? We know 
 of none more satisfactory than a return of the num- 
 bers added to our population and supported by our 
 resources; a subject replete with satisfactory conclu- 
 sions, and which we have already discussed at con- 
 siderable length. At present, without recurring to 
 our arguments on that head, we shall merely ad-
 
 Individual and National. 593 
 
 vert to a very common, but a very erroneous notion, 
 that " the rapid increase of our numbers in the pre- 
 sent age is to be attributed to the war.*' Whatever 
 may have been the case in regard to the middle 
 classes, the wages of many of the lower orders, 
 particularly those of the country labourer, bore, even 
 when added to tlie poor-rate (see the chapter on 
 Poor-rate, p. ^03.), a smaller proportion to the ex- 
 pense of rearing a family than in peace. Now, as the 
 lower orders form by far the most numerous portion 
 of the nation, and tlie circumstances affecting them 
 are decisive of the general increase of our numbers^ 
 we can by no means join in ascribing the surprising 
 augmentation in the present age to the excitement 
 arising from the w^ar, although that opinion may 
 have (Lord Liverpool's speech, Mai'ch 1822-) the 
 sanction of ministerial authority. It has continued 
 with equal rapidity since the peace, and our rulers 
 may, we believe, trace it with confidence to 
 causes of a cheering and permanent character ; to 
 the effect of vaccination, to the improvement in the 
 lodging, cleanliness, and sobriety of the lower 
 classes. 
 
 In thus dwelling on the evils of war, our object 
 is not to join with the decided Oppositionists, in 
 lamenting wliat cannot be recalled, or in affixing 
 a general censiu'e on a course of policy, whicJi 
 though reprehensible in some respects, admitted in 
 many others of vindication from the conduct of our 
 enemies ; or of defence, from tlie limited Ibrcsight 
 of hiunan nature. Our purpose is strictly statistical, 
 and our wish is merely to impress on the pubhc a 
 consideration of great im])ortance to tlieir future 
 welfare, viz. that the injury to national j)rosperity 
 resulting from war, however it may be palliated or 
 j)ostponed, is eventually of most serious magnitude, 
 
 r 3
 
 29 1 mf(^(^t of the lale Wars on Proper! i/. 
 
 even when, in a military sense, tlie issue oi' the 
 contest lias j)rove(l triumphant. 
 
 We now proceed to a more enlivening theme, — 
 to a survey of the present state of our pi'oduetive 
 industry, and of the prospect opened to us by a 
 continuance of peace. To our reasoning on this 
 head we shall endeavour to give a definite form by 
 bringing it before the eye of the reader in the 
 shape of arithmetical calculation. We begin our 
 table \yith the year 1813, as the last in which our 
 prices bore the stamp of a state of war. In com- 
 paring this with the present year, we keep in view 
 two important facts. 
 
 1. The increase of our population, which, since 
 1813, is about 15 per cent. 
 
 2. The fall in the price of commodities, in other 
 words the reduction of expence, w^iich to most 
 classes w^e compute at 2.5 and to some at 35 per 
 cent. 
 
 An attention to these facts is indispensable to a 
 correct estimate of our situation : we should other- 
 wise fall into the common error of considering our- 
 selves rich or poor, merely as prices happened to 
 be high or low. The complexity of the following 
 table will, w^e trust, disappear after an attentive 
 examination.
 
 s >
 
 596 Effect of the late Wars on Vropert^, 
 
 The reader, who shall bestow a little time on 
 studying this table, will not, we trust, be lojig in 
 finding his labour repaid, and in making the satis- 
 factory discovery that the decrease of our financial 
 means since the peace is by no means so great as 
 is commonly supposed. 
 
 Remarks on Col. II. — Interest of Money. — The 
 surplus in the receipts of our monied liffen above 
 their expenditure supplies, is, as is well known, an 
 annual fund for investment, and as there has been 
 of late no opportunity of making loans to our ex- 
 chequer, this surplus has sought a vent in advances 
 to private individuals, or to the French, American, 
 and other foreign governments. We have accord- 
 ingly made in our table a large addition to the 
 estimated amount of interest arising since the peace 
 from such investments. 
 
 Agriculturists. — Though the increase of number 
 in this class since 1813 has been considerable, and 
 has evidently been accompanied by a corresponding 
 increase of produce, we have declined, for ob- 
 vious reasons, to suppose it productive of increase 
 of income. 
 
 Tithe. — Here the same objection does not alto- 
 gether hold, tithe not having experienced either so 
 great a rise in war or so great a decline since the 
 peace. 
 
 Wages. — Under the head of wages, -we have 
 supposed between 200 and -300,000 men with- 
 drawn at the peace from the militia, army, and 
 navy, and have added the amount of their proba- 
 ble earnings, (6,000,000/.), to the head of wages.
 
 Individual and National. 297 
 
 A corresponding deduction is made under the 
 head of income to individuals in the pubhc ser- 
 vice. The great diminution in tliis branch puts 
 in a striking hght the stagnation attendant on the 
 transition iiom war to peace. 
 
 Ireland. — The untaxed income of Ireland rests 
 (see Appendix p. 78.) on a very different cal- 
 culation from her taxed income, and must, from 
 the increase in the number of her peasantry, have 
 received a very large augmentation since 1813. 
 
 Remarks o?i Col. IV. — Reduction of Expence. — 
 We may, perhaps, be charged with making a some- 
 what too large allowance in this respect, the saving 
 compared to 1813 being, in various situations, not 
 yet carried to the extent of 25 per cent. Our 
 answer is, that peace being evidently the policy of 
 our government, tliere is a probability of reduction 
 continuing, and of that which has not taken place 
 in the ])resent year, being accomplished in the 
 next. 
 
 Farmers, — Amidst all the distress of this re- 
 spectable part of the nation, it is some satisfaction 
 to perceive the large reduction in their disburse for 
 labour and other farming charges. 
 
 The Lower Orders. — These form so great a por- 
 tion of the connnunity, that we can hardly ad\ert 
 too often or too attentively to their situation. The 
 transition from war to peace bore, doubtless, veiy 
 heavy on ])articular classes, j)rincipally manufac- 
 turers, whose wages were very low at a time when 
 provisions were by no means cheap. Since 1820, 
 however, circumstances have altered greatly in their
 
 298 VS'c^ ofllic late IVars on Propoiij, 
 
 fiivoiii', tlit3 fall of i)rovi.sions having rendered 22^. 
 a week equivalent, in the j)Owei' of'purcliase, to Si)s. 
 during the war. If this fall was too <rieat and too 
 rapid, it is at least a satisfaction that tlic advantage 
 of it sliould have accrued to the most necessitous 
 })art of the community. Viewing this very nu- 
 merous body collectively, we find their situation, 
 whether in town or country, more comfortable at 
 present than at almost any period within our 
 recollection. 
 
 Remarks on the Table generally. — In comparing 
 the amount of national revenue at different periods, 
 it is fit to keep in view the increasing number of 
 consumers, in other words, of individuals to be sup- 
 ported from that revenue. This increase, including 
 Ireland, amounts to nearly 3,000,000 for the ten 
 years that have elapsed since 1813. For this sur- 
 prising addition to our numbers, allowance is made 
 in Col. II., but as it may be thought from the esti- 
 mate in Col. III., that our means are not adequate 
 to the support of this new charge, v,e must remind 
 the reader, that increased po])ulation happily brings 
 with it the means of supporting itself, and that on 
 comparing Cols. II. and V., he will discover that, 
 even after makins; a deduction from the favour- 
 able part of our statement, our present means of 
 affording wages, salaries, and income of different 
 kinds, are not inferior to our means during the 
 war, by more than 10 per cent. Now a reduction 
 of the income of the community to the extent of 
 10 per cent, would not, had it been equal and 
 general, have proved disastrous : it wouhl liave 
 necessitated a diminution of expense, and have 
 given a general check to sanguuie expectation, but 
 could never have been the cause of severe distress.
 
 Individval and National. 299 
 
 But the transition unfortunately took place in a 
 very unequal manner, for while in the case of the 
 landholders, tlie decrease of income appears to be 
 20 per cent., and in that of farmers not less than 
 (30 per cent., annuitants on the ])ublic funds have 
 benefited or will soon benefit to an extent of 20 or 
 2.5 per cent. 
 
 In what order or succession did these reductions 
 of income take place ? First, in the army, the 
 navy, and the classes, such as contractors and ma- 
 nufacturers, who derived their support from go\ern- 
 ment : the agriculturists followed almost imme- 
 diately, in consequence of the unchecked import of 
 \'oYe\<m corn durinc; 1814. Trade and manufac- 
 tures, though luuliminished as far as regarded ex- 
 port, experienced, during several years, a great de- 
 crease at home, from the cessation of government 
 purchases, and an overstock of hands from the dis- 
 charge and non-enlistment of men for the armv 
 and militia. Among the liberal professions, the 
 medical suffered a direct surcharge from an obvious 
 cause : the same held in regard to the civil service 
 of government, and if in the law and the church, 
 the overstock has been less rapid, it has not been 
 the less certain, so nuich does stagnation of demand 
 in any of the great departments affect the com- 
 munity at large. 
 
 Oitr pahi/c Burdens ; their caviparatire Pressure 
 in War and Peace. — Since the peace, the numeri- 
 cal amount of our burdens has been considerably 
 diminished, the repeal of the property-tax, along 
 with the reduction of the duties on malt, salt, and 
 leather, ha\ ing formed (previously to the reduction 
 of the assessed taxes) a dimiiiulion of nearly 
 2(),000,()(K)/. This sum, howevi-r, large as it is, 
 has been balanced, or nearly balanced, by the ri>e
 
 300 IW^ct (ftfie late Wars on Projyertt/y 
 
 in the value of money; the 65,000,0(XJ/. which we 
 have paid annually since the peace, having formed 
 an amount of equal value with the 80 or 85,000,000/. 
 paid at the close of the war. There was thus no real 
 reduction of our burdens until the present year, 
 and, unfortunately, from the evils of transition, 
 from the sudden diminution in the income of par- 
 ticular classes, our taxes have been found a burden 
 of greater pressure since the peace, than during the 
 'vvar. 
 
 Effect on our Public Debt of the Rise in the Value 
 of Money. — We come now to the circumstance in 
 the series of our transitions, whicli, more than any 
 other, has contributed to increase the burden of 
 our taxes. To comprehend this fully, the reader 
 should bear in mind, that government stands per- 
 manently in the capacity of a debtor; that its respon- 
 sibility is represented not in land, houses, or what 
 is technically termed real property, but in money ; 
 and that whatever raises the value of money, 
 increases the pressure of its debt. During the 
 long depreciation of money attendant on the war, 
 the payment of 9 or 10,000,000/. of interest, at the 
 Treasury, required no gi'eater drain on the national 
 resources, than the payment of 7 or 8,000,000/. 
 previous to 1793. This fact, long known to our 
 finance ministers, formed during a time the basis 
 of very confident calculations ; so long as high 
 prices were kept up, so long did our leading men 
 at tlie Treasury and in Parliament imagine, that 
 the pressure of the debt contracted during the 
 war, would be alleviated by the continued deprecia- 
 tion of money. At the peace, indeed, a degree 
 of re-action or rise in the value of money was 
 anticipated; but in the opinion of the public, 
 as of go%^erament, that re-action was likely to
 
 Individual and National. ,'301 
 
 be slight. Had such proved the case ; had the 
 price of com been kept up both liere and on 
 the Continent, the evils of transition would have 
 been comparatively slight, and our national bur- 
 dens would have been less severely felt. Their 
 pressure would ha\'e gradually decreased as our 
 numbers augmented, and we might have con- 
 sidered the expence of the contest as in a great 
 measure liquidated from two sources, — the extra 
 profits of labour and capital which had supplied 
 our war taxes, and the depreciation of that money 
 debt, which represented the undischarged burden. 
 But all such calculations were disappointed : re- 
 action took place on a large scale ; and without 
 experiencing any direct increase of charge, the 
 public were subjected to serious embarrassment 
 from the general diminution of the sums paid for 
 rent, salaries, wages, in short, for almost every 
 thing except the income of annuitants. 
 
 Has this increase of burden been accompanied 
 by any circumstances of alleviation ? In })rivate 
 life we have for some time experienced relief from 
 the reduction of our exi)enditure ; but what is tiie 
 situation of government ? It feels the pressure on 
 more than two-thirds of its disburse ; the benefit 
 on less than one-third. The former consist of 
 interest of debt, military and naval pay, pensions, 
 half-pay, sahiries, and retirement allowances, all of 
 a fixed amount in money, and all virtually iiicreascd 
 as the price of commodities has fallen. On the 
 other hand, a reduction of government charge 
 from the fall of prices, was, till very latel}', ex))e- 
 rienced only in the victualling of our navy, the 
 purchase of stores, and in a portion of the miscel- 
 laneous services. 
 
 These discoveries may be said to c:onstiUite the
 
 30^^ yV/r- lali' Jl'ars ; 
 
 denoiiemcnl of the iiiyst(M*ioiis financial drama that 
 has been actinp,- chning- the last thirty years. Our 
 power of ])ccuniary contribution, so often and so 
 Joudly ascribed to generosity in the sacrifice of 
 our wealtli, may now be, in a great measure, 
 traced to causes of a huml)ler cliaractcr ; to an 
 increase of our productive industry, founded on 
 loans, and to a great, but temporary rise of prices. 
 Both of these remarkable features in our situation 
 were expected to be permanent ; but the I'ise of 
 prices lias disappeared, and to the extension of our 
 productive industry, circumstances were long un- 
 favourable. Add to this, that though from the 
 time of the overthrow of Bonaparte, the prospect of 
 continued peace produced a radical change in our 
 situation, our ministers w ere tardy in bringing for- 
 ward any measure of finance founded on that 
 change, or on the confidence with which we may 
 anticipate an increase of our wealth and numbers. 
 In fact, until the present year, we made little pro- 
 gress towards relief, unless we account as such a 
 more correct knowledge of our situation ; a dis- 
 covery of certain errors ; a perception of the tran- 
 sient nature of the aids on which we relied during 
 the first years of peace. 
 
 Have our public men, since 1793, undei'stood 
 our financial situation ? — After ascertaining the 
 existence of such general misapprehension, it is 
 impossible to avoid asking M'hether several impor- 
 tant circumstances in our situation and prospects 
 have not been unknown to our political guides. 
 Were they aware during the war, that the extension 
 of our productive industry was, in a great degree,
 
 Conduct of our Public Men since 179o. 303 
 
 artificial, and must tlccline witli that government 
 expenditure whicli called it forth ? Looking to 
 the amount of the interest of our ])ublic debt, of 
 our pensions and othei* fixed payments, did they 
 or did they not foresee that, on the cessation of this 
 artificial stimulus, the natural course of circum- 
 stances would cause a rise in the value of money, 
 and a consequent increase of pressure ? To what 
 degree do these considerations affect the reputation 
 of Mr. Pitt, the leader in that course of j)olicy, 
 which, in a military sense, produced so brilliant a 
 result, — in a financial, so nnich embarrassment? 
 That Mr. Pitt was at first averse from the war 
 with France, is apparent, from several circum- 
 stances, whether we refer to the declaration of 
 respectable Avriters*, or to the undeniable fact, 
 that a state of war was altOi>'ether contrarv to his 
 ])lans, for the reduction of our ])ublic burdens. 
 That, after the campaign of 1791' had disclosed 
 the weakness of our allies, and the strenj^th of 
 France, he lamented oiu- involving ourselves in the 
 contest, there seems little rcason to doubt : but 
 when the country was fairly engaged in it, and our 
 resources were called into full activity, it accorded 
 with his confident, and persevering character, to 
 maintain the struggle, in the hope of recovering 
 the Netherlands so unfortunately lost. Hence a 
 continuance of the contest, notwithstanding the 
 defection of our allies and the financial diflicnities 
 of 1797; hence those war taxes, which no odier 
 minister would have ventured to ])roj)ose, and 
 certainly no other would have succeeded in 
 
 * Nichols' Recollections of George HI. and .1. Allan's Bio- 
 graphical Sketch of Fox, in Napier's Supplement to the Ency- 
 clopaedia Hritannica. page ;J61.
 
 3(H The late IVars ; 
 
 raising : hence also, our second attack on France 
 by the coalition of 1799. 
 
 But the perseverance of Mr. Pitt was not blind 
 persistency : on a renewed experience of the weak- 
 ness of our allies, on a proof of the sufferings of 
 the country from heavy taxation and deficient 
 harvests, he felt the expediency of peace, retired 
 from office to facilitate its conclusion, and gave it, 
 when not responsible for its conditions, a sanction 
 imequivocal and sincere. His ardour in 1803 for 
 the recommencement of war, admits of a less satis- 
 factory solution : it discovered much more the zeal 
 of a combatant, than the discretion of a senator ; 
 a disposition to sink the admonitory recollections of 
 our late struggle in ardour for a new contest. He 
 warned us once in Parliament of the magnitude of 
 the expense, and of the necessity of ])reparing our- 
 selves for sacrifices greater than before ; but his 
 caution was general and cursory, unaccompanied 
 by any private admonition to the inexperienced 
 ministry of the day, or any advice to delay hosti- 
 lities, until circumstances should give us an assu- 
 rance of co-operation on the part of the great 
 powers of the Continent. His last great measure, 
 the attack on France by the coalition of 1805, 
 was, doubtless, on the whole, injudicious, prepon- 
 derant as France then was in military strength, the 
 whole under the guidance of a single head. Still 
 it may be added t]iat it is by no means uncommon 
 with men of ability to fall into the miscalculation 
 made by Mr. Pitt on that occasion ; and to anti- 
 cipate, as a matter of course, judicious conduct on 
 the part of their coadjutors. Every impartial man 
 must allow, that it would have been carrying 
 mistrust to an extreme, to have apprehended the 
 commission of faults so gross as those which led to
 
 Conduct ofourjmblic Men since 1793. 305 
 
 the disasters of" Ulm and Aiisterlitz. And those 
 who are surprised that a man of talent should 
 misplace his confidence, or should calculate on 
 others acting with the discrimination natural to 
 himself, will be at no loss to find similar examples 
 in the conduct of the most eminent men of the age: 
 in that of Lord Wellington, when he expected dis- 
 cretion from Blucher ; and in that of Bonaparte, 
 when he allowed the command of Spain to remain 
 in the hands of Jourdan ; or when, at a subsequent 
 date, he committed that of his main body at 
 AVaterloo, to Ney. 
 
 Since the distress that has followed the peace of 
 1814, it has been publicly said, that the embarrass- 
 ment likely to ensue to our productive industry 
 on the cessation of the war expenditure of govern- 
 ment, had not escaped the foresight of Mr. Pitt. 
 Such assertions are often made loosely and in- 
 accurately ; but the one in question seems to rest 
 on probable grounds. Mr. Pitt was no stranger 
 to the limited produce of our revenue in peace; he 
 had felt the financial difficulties of the first years 
 of the contest, and the surprising relief afforded 
 to the Treasury by the imposition of war taxes. 
 He could thus hardly fail to be aware that the 
 spring given to our national industry was, in a 
 great measure, artificial ; still less could he be un- 
 conscious of the ultimately injurious operation of 
 loans and taxes when carried to an extreme. Nor 
 is it incompatible with such impressions, that he 
 should for a time have overlooked the inferences 
 which they seem so naturally to suggest, and have 
 been hurried along by ardour in the contest, by an 
 earnestness to obtain a present advantige at the 
 hazard of a future burden. It is not when en- 
 gaged in the bustle of business, that the mind is
 
 30C) The Uitc Wars ; 
 
 capable of reposing on itself, of meditating, pa- 
 tiently and impartially, the result of iavourite 
 measures. How few plans of remote operation, 
 of a nature that requires continued thought in the 
 combination or length of time in the execution, 
 originate with men in office ! Add to this that the 
 great evils of our financial system, the depreciation 
 of our bank paper, the extreme pressure of taxa- 
 tion took place not only after Mr. Pitt's death, 
 but, in some measure, in consequence of a devia- 
 tion from his principles. Never would he have 
 given his sanction to such a measure as our Orders 
 in council ; or if, for the sake of argument, we 
 suppose him to have been led, by urgency or by 
 plausible argument, to their adoption, will any one 
 maintain that he would have been likely to persist 
 in so absurd a course during four years, until it, 
 in a manner, drove the Americans to the alterna- 
 tive of war — a war carried on between us and 
 our best customers — a war in which it was appa- 
 rent that injury to our opponents must be almost 
 as pernicious to our national industry, as injury to 
 ourselves. 
 
 The responsibility of a great part of our exist- 
 ing biu'den, is thus transferred from j\Ir. Pitt to 
 his successors, of whose measures, in regard to 
 neutrals, from September, I8O7, to May, 181 !2, it 
 would be difficult to give a satisfactory explanation. 
 They imphed a total unconsciousness of the pre- 
 carious state of our paper currency, and, in regard 
 to trade, either a disavowal of principles generally , 
 admitted, or a readiness to infringe those princi- 
 ples for temporary purposes — purposes that could 
 have no decisive effect on the result of the grand 
 struggle with France. In 1812 began a different 
 aera : our Orders in council were withdiawn ; peace 
 
 10
 
 Conduct of our jmhlic Men since 1793. 307 
 
 was repeatedly offered to the United States of 
 America ; and, at a subsequent date, no harsh 
 treaty of commerce was imposed on France in the 
 day of her adversity. Add to this, that since the 
 peace, no attempt has been made to give a falla- 
 cious prop, ])y bounties or prohibitions, to any of 
 our suffering interests. Admirable rules of con- 
 duct these, and yet in regard to our finances, we 
 must repeat, that ministers have not been prompt 
 in rendering the national resources instrumental to 
 the national relief! Their fault appears to have 
 lain, not as is usual with governments, in inter- 
 fering with the course of productive industry, but 
 either in deficient foresight in regard to the changes 
 occurring in our situation, or in deficient vi- 
 gour in acting on such changes. Take for ex- 
 ample the rise in the value of money, a natural 
 consequence of a return to a pacific system, 
 and one which, with some temporary exceptions, 
 has been regularly gaining ground since 1814. 
 Would Mr. Pitt, had his life been prolonged, have 
 delayed until the ninth year of peace a reduction 
 of public salaries, an ada])tation of government 
 payments to the augmented value of the money 
 in which these payments were made ? Is it not more 
 likely that he would have long shice anticipated 
 the result of the general change, and have given, 
 in his own case, a decided example of what he 
 would have exacted from others? Farthcj-, is 
 it probable that in peace he would have adheied 
 blindly to the financial routine pursued during the 
 war, without attempting some measure, ibunded 
 on the circumstances that have predominated in 
 our situation since 1814, — the reducetl interest 
 of money, and the prospect of long continued peace, 
 in consequence of the conviction amuially gaining 
 
 X -2
 
 .■^OS The Idle Wars ; 
 
 ground that a state of" war is as contrary to policy 
 as to humanity, and, from our growing power, far 
 less necessary for defence than when France was 
 so preponderant? 
 
 If ministers are open to the charge of deficient 
 vigour in finance, in what manner can tlie im])ar- 
 tial reasoner characterize the conduct of their })ar- 
 liamentary opponents ? On their part there existed 
 no motive for reserve, in regard to pubhc distress; 
 no dread of disseminating alarm, by the proposi- 
 tion of change ; yet the investigations of most of 
 the Opposition members have been confined to in- 
 sulated points, their objections to specific grants. 
 Where, in the long list of those who opposed the 
 war, did we find a speaker capable of giving the 
 House or the country a distinct conception of the 
 operation of our augmented expenditure ; of the 
 temporary nature of the activity caused by it dur- 
 ing war ; of the unfortunate re-action to be appre- 
 hended at a peace ? Where, on the part of those 
 who have combated the measures of ministers 
 since the peace, do we find a comprehensive view 
 of our national means, the suggestion of any mea- 
 sure of a new or of a general character, adapted 
 to our present circumstances ? To what shall we 
 ascribe this deficiency of resource, this scanty 
 measure of statistical knowledge on both sides of 
 the House ? To a cause to which we have owed 
 no small share of our political disappointments in 
 the present age — an education on the part of our 
 representatives very little suited to their functions 
 as men of business. This topic has a claim to our 
 attentive examination, for by nothing has the situ- 
 ation of the public during the present age, been 
 more materially affected.
 
 Educalion of our public Men. 309 
 
 Education of our public iVf^w.— The course of 
 study followed m this country, in the case of young 
 men destined for public life, is remarkable as in- 
 dicative of the tenacity with whicli established 
 usages maintain their ground. Previous to the 
 17th century, the acquisition of Latin was indis- 
 pensable to a polite education, no modern language 
 being in these days a depository of elegant learn- 
 ing, or a received medium for the correspondence 
 of either men of letters or diplomatists. It is 
 thus tliat we are to account for the interchange of 
 voluminous epistles in Latin, between the scholars 
 of Italy, Germany, France, and England, as well 
 as for the study of the classical languages by fe- 
 males of rank, as was exemplified in the case of 
 Queen Elizabeth, of Lady Jane Grey, and of the 
 daughters of Sir Thomas More. The colleges 
 added in these days to our universities, were natu- 
 rally confined to the branches of literature famihar 
 to the founders ; and in no part of Euroj)e has this 
 limitation been more strictly maintained, or the 
 changes suggested by modern discoveries been 
 less adopted, tlian at Oxford and Cambridge, ii' 
 academical cliairs have been provided for cliemis- 
 try, for moral oj- for natural philosopliy, an ad- 
 herence to the established usage of these seminaries 
 has prevented their being generally attended, and 
 continues to confine the labours of our youth (o 
 mathematical and classical ])ursuits, to which alone, 
 are awarded honours at the public examinations. 
 
 The study of mathematics has obviously little 
 connexion with the business of life, or with tin- 
 intended profession of nine-tenths of those who 
 pursue it. The evidence by which the inferences 
 of the student are there guided, is of a nature al- 
 together different iVom that which he will be ealleil 
 
 X S
 
 .':{1() The late Wars ; 
 
 on to wcigli in iiis intercourse with the worki, in 
 the transaction of business, in the discrimination of 
 character. On this we shall not enlarge, as it will, 
 of course, be readily admitted, and the defence of 
 the study made to rest on its *' tendency to improve 
 the reasoning powers of youth :'* but would it not, 
 we may ask, be practicable to attain equal im- 
 provement in that respect by directing their la- 
 bours to subjects connected with their future 
 occupation ? Taking for example young men in- 
 tended for public life, would it not be preferable 
 to seek an exercise for their intellect in the history 
 of our country as related by Hume, or in the con- 
 clusions of political economy as exhibited in the 
 writings of Smith or Say ? By liistory they woidd 
 be introduced to a knowledge of characters, such as 
 they are likely to meet on the stage of life ; while 
 political economy would lead them to the examin- 
 ation of subjects which they wdll be called on to 
 discuss, and which they will find as yet very im- 
 perfectly understood. In regard to impressions 
 of a higher kind, the tendency of these studies to 
 convey liberal views, to prove the connection be- 
 tween the justice of a government and the wel- 
 fare of its subjects, between the course of public 
 events and the ordination of Providence, we have, 
 we trust, said enough in a prececUng paragraph of 
 this chapter. 
 
 Classical erudition, says an elegant wTiter*, is 
 by the custom of England more pecidiarly called 
 learning ; and we admit that in education, its claim 
 to attention is powerful, even when we keep out of 
 view its fascinating appeals to the imagination, and 
 
 * Sir James Mackintosh on the character of Fox, in tjie 
 collection by Dr. Parr, under the name of Philopatris Varvi- 
 censis.
 
 Education of our public Men. 311 
 
 are content to contemplate it with a mere reference 
 to utility. The record of instructive facts, the 
 delineation of character, the illustration of the 
 rides of composition, the exemplification of the 
 finest precepts, all belong to the writers of Greece 
 and Rome, and warn us to beware of neglecting to 
 cultivate that grateful soil. Of this we are so fully 
 satisfied, that our doubts are confined to the time 
 requisite to acquire a knowledge of the critical 
 niceties of the languages, and to the question 
 whether we ought not, in most cases, to be satisfied 
 with that progress which enables us to comprehend, 
 with tolerable accuracy, the sense of a writer. 
 And here, fortunately, the line of chstinction seems 
 to admit of being traced with considerable confi- 
 dence. By the youth intended for an active pursuit, 
 for the bar, the pulpit, or the senate, philological 
 researches need hardly be carried furtlier than is 
 necessary to enable him to understand the meaning 
 of an author, while a more minute and scrupulous 
 investigation is incumbent on him who directs his 
 labours to the instruction of others, or cultivates 
 literature in retirement with all the advantaixe of 
 the command of time. But why, it may be said, 
 cannot the two be combined by persons intended for 
 active professions ? To do so would, we apprehend, 
 be to underrate the sacrifice of time indispensable to 
 the attainment of thorough knowledge, and to lose 
 sight of the scrupulous care with which the eight 
 or ten years, in general allow'cd for education, nuist 
 be appropriated, if we mean to avoid the frequent 
 error of misapplying our labour, of undertaking 
 studies which we may be unable to follow up. 
 
 Condiicl of public AJJairs since 179-'>. — Let iis 
 proceed to make a brief application of these re- 
 marks to the statesmen of the present age ; to the 
 
 X 4
 
 312 "The late Wars ; 
 
 men who guided our councils in tiic stormy j)eriod 
 of the French revolution. How different, in all 
 probability, would have been the course of their 
 policy had their early impressions partaken more 
 of the light to be derived from the study of recent 
 periods of history, from an attentive observation of 
 foreign countries. Had they possessed a more 
 accurate knowledge of the national character of the 
 French, of the degree in which the invidious distinc- 
 tion between the titled and untitled classes was kept 
 up,of the circumstances which rendered a revolution 
 as much the wish of the majority of the nation as it 
 was in this country in 1688, our ministers would 
 have known with how much qualification the decla- 
 mations of Burke, and the assertions of the emigrants 
 were to be received. In regard to this country, they 
 would probably have discovered that the support 
 of the middle and upper classes afforded a sufficient 
 safeguard against the danger of innovation without 
 resorting to the alternative of war. Or, supposing 
 that after the loss of the Netherlands in 1792, and 
 the alarm given to our sovereign and our nobility 
 by the violence of the Jacobins, it became impos- 
 sible to avoid an appeal to arms, how different, with 
 the know^ledge we have supposed in our political 
 guides, Avould have been the conduct of the war? 
 Had they been aware of the backward state of tlie 
 countries, in particular Austria, on which we relied 
 for military co-operation, of that blind adherence 
 to old usage, that deference to family rank and 
 court influence, which clogged the wheels of go- 
 vernment and restrained the energy of the people, 
 is it likely that our ministers would ha\e counselled 
 an offensive course against a nation emancipated 
 from those fetters, and which conferred its appoint-
 
 Educal'wn of our public Men. 313 
 
 merits, whether civil or iniHtary, by very different 
 rules ? 
 
 If from foreign affairs we turn to our interior 
 situation, is it likely, we may ask, that, with a 
 thorough knowledge of the principles of productive 
 industry, our ministers would have been so deluded 
 by appearances as to mistake a rise in the })rice of 
 commodities for. an increase of national wealth, or 
 to imagine that war could, under any circumstances, 
 be conducive to commercial prosperity ? Had they 
 studied the lesson to be learned in the history of 
 Holland, and, in some degree, in our own, (since 
 intervals of stagnation have followed almost every 
 war since the revolution,) our public men Mould 
 have anticipated a reaction at a peace, and have 
 carefully circumscribed their expenditure during 
 the war. If we examine the discussions that have 
 from time to time taken place on one very material 
 question, — the state of our currency, — we shall hnd 
 the speeches of our leading men indicate little more 
 than an elementary knowledge of the subject. 
 These discussions began in 1810, when if we could 
 not resume cash payments, we miglit ha\ e desisted 
 from our measures against neutral navigation ; but 
 the degree to which the restraint imposed on that 
 navigation affected the credit of our bank paper was 
 unknown to parliament-, and inadequately felt by 
 the Cabinet. Nothing consequently was done ; 
 and, when at a subsequent date, and under \qv\ 
 different circumstances, we mean in ISl'J, parlia- 
 ment did interfere with the currency, the measure 
 was ill-timed, and tended, if not to aggra\ate 
 the evil, to mislead tiie public in regard to its 
 cause. 
 
 After all these examples of error, does it seem 
 necessary to add that the labours of our ])ubhi
 
 3li< Tlic Idle Wars. 
 
 men ought to be modelled on a new plan ? To gi\ c 
 a cursory attention to a multiplicity of topics, leads 
 to a knowledge very little beyond that of first im- 
 pressions : to obtain a satisfactory conviction, to 
 place our opinions on a firm basis, it is indispensable 
 to make a selection, to restrict the objects of en- 
 quiry, and to give a long continuance to our 
 research and reflection on the prescribed themes. 
 Looking round in private life, and extending our 
 view to men of eminence generally, commercial as 
 well as professional, what else tlian this limitation 
 of object and perseverance in pursuit, do we find to 
 form the basis of such characters, and to distinguish 
 them from the credulous multitude, from those who 
 listen with ready acquiescence to every plausible 
 assertion ? If the habits of our representatives are 
 different, if they unfortunately betray the absence 
 of such discrimination and perseverance, ought it 
 to be matter of surprise, that delusion should have 
 prevailed among them during so many years : that 
 a temporary rise of prices and increase of activity, 
 should have been mistaken for a permanent aug- 
 mentation of national wealth ; and that the unwel- 
 come discoveries of late years, the Jinale of which is 
 no less than a suspension of their incomes, should 
 have come on them by surprise ?
 
 315 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Value of Moneij. 
 
 iSPXTION I. 
 
 Fliutuatiun in the Value of Moniy or in the Price of 
 Commodities. 
 
 1 HE fluctuation in prices consequent on the great 
 political transitions of the age, has been already 
 discussed in our second chapter : at present our 
 object is to pursue the same inquiry on a more 
 comprehensive plan, and to carry back our views 
 to changes that have taken place in former ages. 
 Changes of this nature rank among the most in- 
 teresting subjects of inquiry in political economy. 
 To the reader of history, a knowledge of them 
 is indispensable to the formation of a correct es- 
 timate of the price of labour, of" tlie public revenue, 
 and of the comparative wealth of a nation at dif- 
 ferent periods ; while, in a practical view, an ac- 
 quaintance with this subject is of very serious 
 interest, as connected with the future value of 
 bequests, leases, and time-contracts generally. The 
 discussion naturally divides itself into the ibllowing 
 heads : — 
 
 The tendency of prices to fluctuate. 
 
 The impracticability of foreseeing or })reventing 
 such fluctuation. 
 
 A plan for lessening its injurious operation.
 
 316 Fliichcatioii in llw Value (jf Moiiey. 
 
 Fuhlications on the Flucliialion of Prices. — The 
 tlocuments for forming an estimate of these changes, 
 have as yet been given to us scantily and im})er- 
 fectly, the subject never having engaged the atten- 
 tion of government, and but lately that of any of 
 our public bodies. In France, a country little 
 remarked for statistical research, the attempts 
 hitherto made to compare the rate of prices at dif- 
 ferent periods have been confined to a few literary 
 men : in England, one of the earliest was that of 
 Bishop Fleetwood, who collected prices of wheat 
 during a number of years from the 13th to the 
 17th century, and reduced them to money of our 
 present standard. His labours, published in I707, 
 formed the chief materials for the reasonings of 
 Dr. Smith, whose life was not prolonged until the 
 publication (in 1797) of a very valuable addition 
 to such collections by Sir Frederick Eden, in his 
 work on the " State of the Poor," the copious ma- 
 terials of which have been termed iijb?is perennis 
 for succeeding inquirers. 
 
 In 1798 there appeared in the Transactions of the 
 Royal Society, a tabular statement by Sir George 
 Shuckburgh, which, from the clearness of its form 
 (See Appendix), and the confidence of its deduc- 
 tions, obtained much more credit than it deserved, 
 being far from correct, even in the fundamental 
 points. In 1811, the late Arthur Young, alarmed 
 at the impression made on the public by the Report 
 of the Bullion Committee, and dreading a con- 
 traction of paper currency attended by a fall in the 
 price of agricultural produce, entered into re- 
 searches of great extent, both as to the past and 
 current prices of commodities, and published tlie 
 whole in a pamphlet, entitled " An Inquiry into 
 the Progressive Value of Money in England.*' 
 
 9
 
 Fluctuation in the Value of Money. 81 7 
 
 This tract, however inaccurate in a theoretical 
 sense, has a claim to attention, as well for the 
 value of its materials, as for a correction of the 
 mistakes of Sir George Shuckhurgh. Since 1811, 
 serious beyond example as has been the fluctuation 
 of our prices, there has appeared no treatise of con- 
 sequence on the su])ject until Mr. Tooke's valuable 
 publication on " High and Low Prices since 1792.'* 
 
 Historical Skctcli of the Fluctuation of Prices. — 
 It is a prevalent notion that the money prices of 
 commodities have been progressively rising since 
 the Norman conquest, or even since the earliei* 
 period, when the luxury of Rome, and the revenue 
 paid to it by tributary provinces, disappeared be- 
 fore its rude invaders from the north and east. 
 To this opinion, however, there are several strong 
 objections. Tiie supply of gold and silver from 
 the mines, was, during the middle ages, scanty and 
 precarious ; while the numbers of the society re- 
 quiring the use of the precious metals, in other 
 words, the population of the west and central part 
 of Europe, were, in some degree, in a state of 
 increase. Dr. Smith, reasoning on the i)rice ol' 
 commodities generally, from the price of corn, and 
 foundinjr his view of the latter on the collections 
 of Bishop Fleetwood, assumes, that from the year 
 1200 to 1550, there was no considerable rise of 
 prices ; and that such rise did not begin till the 
 reign of Elizabeth, the time when the American 
 mines became productive on a large scale. The 
 import from that quarter, small as it would a})pear 
 in the present age, was sensibly telt at a time when 
 silver was very little used in manufiictuio, and not 
 largely in plate : its amount was, uniler such cir- 
 cumstances, almost wholly added to the circulating
 
 ;>18 Ftuctuat'ion in the Value of Moneij. 
 
 medium of Europe. This addition was considered 
 by Dr. Sniitli the main cause of* the rise of ])rices 
 which continued until towards the year 1(3,50, wlien, 
 from circumstances on which we shall enlarge pre- 
 sently, prices ceased to rise, and became either 
 stationary or declining. This state of things lasted 
 until ly^'i'j when, as is well known, a new ajra 
 commenced and continued until 1814. 
 
 Effect of a State of War. — Dr. Smith's view 
 of the progressive value of money is admitted 
 by Mr. Young, but neither of these writers has 
 thought of tracing a correspondence between the 
 fluctuations in the precious metals in the l6th and 
 17th centuries, and the political transactions of 
 Europe. A state of war tends, as we have showni 
 in a preceding chapter, greatly to advance prices, 
 and the rise in the reign of Elizabetli may, in no 
 inconsiderable degree, be ascribed to the increase 
 of military establishments in that age, to our de- 
 fensive attitude against Philip II., to the obstinate 
 contest carried on between him and his insurgent 
 subjects in the Netherlands, to the ci\dl wars of 
 France, and to the troubled state of Germany. On 
 the other hand, after the treaty of Westphalia, the 
 chief part of Europe enjoyed tranquillity, and the 
 effect on trade and agriculture, of reduced armies 
 and diminished taxes, is described by Sir W. Temple, 
 in a manner that strikingly resembles the state of 
 this country and the Continent since the late peace. 
 
 This political change accounts for the decline of 
 prices that prevailed after 16.50, but the applica- 
 tion of our theory is, it must be allowed, less clear 
 after 167^, when war was renewed on a great 
 scale, and continued, with comparatively little in- 
 termission, during forty years. Add to this, that
 
 Fluctuation in t)ie lvalue of Money. 319 
 
 there took place, during all that time, an import of 
 specie from America, to an extent somewhat in- 
 creased ; viz. to the amount of three, four, or five 
 millions, annually. In what manner, under the 
 operation of this double cause of enhancement, are 
 we to account for prices experiencing no great 
 or permanent rise? Perhaps by the following 
 considerations : — 
 
 1. An increased use of the precious metals, in 
 plate, manufactures, and ornaments, in conse- 
 quence of the general increase of wealth. 
 
 2. An augmented export of them to the eastern 
 w^orld, chiefly through the means of the Dutch 
 East India Company. 
 
 3. The fact, that previous to I672, the supply 
 of agricultural produce in England, as in the north- 
 west of Europe generally, had become somewhat 
 more than equal to the consumption ; an excess of 
 which the effects are generally felt for a long 
 series of years. 
 
 The peace of Utrecht was the commencement 
 of a period of general tranquillity ; government 
 expenditure was reduced, labourers were restored 
 to agriculture, and the decline of prices became 
 general and progressive. In vain did our land- 
 holders look to the bounty on the export of corn, 
 for a counteraction of the fall in the market: they 
 exported largel}', and received premiums on a 
 liberal scale, but their abundant growth kept down 
 the home market, and the excess of sup})ly over 
 consumption continued during half a century, ter- 
 minating only in 176k Nor is it at all j)iobable 
 that it would have ceased at that time, peace hav- 
 ing been but lately concluded, had we not had a 
 succession of indifferent seasons : these raised
 
 320 Fliicluation in the Value oj Money. 
 
 prices, ami the contest that ensued with our colo- 
 nies, prevented their fall. 
 
 After 1783, the restoration oi' peace tended, 
 naturally, to reduce prices, hut its effect was 
 retarded hy several causes, in particular, the de- 
 mand of hands for our manufactures, and the 
 occasional occurrence of indifferent seasons. After 
 1792, the progress of enhancement was accelerated 
 in an unexampled degree hy the general state of 
 war consequent on the French revolution. A rise 
 of prices progressive during twenty years, and 
 amounting at last to more than fiO per cent, ahove 
 those of 1792, overturned time-contracts through- 
 out the kingdom, depressing annuitants while it 
 raised tenants on lease, with various other classes, 
 above their former station, — an elevation, unfor- 
 tunately, of short duration, since they ha\e been 
 made to descend from it with still more rapidity in 
 the years that have followed the peace. 
 
 Can such Fluctuations be foreseen or prevented ? — 
 After this summary of facts in regard to the past, 
 the next and still more important point is to 
 ascertain how far such fluctuations are likely to 
 continue. But here the most indefatigable in- 
 quirer will find the result uncertain, and be obliged 
 to admit, that in so complicated a question, all 
 that we can do with confidence, is to state the 
 arguments on either side. Those in favour of the 
 rise of prices, are, 
 
 The contingency of war. 
 
 The probable increase of the produce of the 
 mines, from the application of steam-engines and 
 other improved machinery. 
 
 The farther substitution of bank paper for me- 
 tallic (Murencv ; a substitution, which, in its ge-
 
 Fluchiat'nm in the Value of Money. .1^1 
 
 Hcral (though not in its local) effect, operates like 
 the increased productiveness of a mine.* 
 
 On the other hand, the arguments for the fall 
 of prices are equally substantial ; viz. 
 
 The tendency of all improvements in productive 
 industry, whether in agriculture, maiuiiacture, 
 mechanics, or navigation, to produce cheaj)ness. 
 
 The increasing demand for the precious metals, 
 ti'om the increasing population of the civihzcd 
 world. 
 
 As to England in particular, tlie tendency of a 
 country where prices are higher than in the neigh- 
 bouring states, to approximate (see p. 32.5), by 
 commercial intercourse, to the standard of other 
 countries. 
 
 Supplij of Specie from the Mines. — The amount 
 of specie extracted annually from American mines, 
 was computed in 17(^>0, at (),000,UUU/. sterling : in 
 the course of the succeeding twenty years, it hail 
 increased to fully 7,000,000/., and some time after 
 (Appendix to the Bullion Report of 1810) to 
 8,000,000/. In this, as in other res))ects, Mexico 
 is by far the foremost of the Spanish colonies, the 
 yearly ])roduce of lier mines being nearly hve mil- 
 lions sterling, while that of the rest of Sj)anish 
 America may be estimated at three millions more. 
 Adding to these, somewhat less than a million 
 sterlino- for Portucfucse America, and somewhat 
 more than another million for the mines of our 
 own hemisphere, we make a total of neaily li-n 
 millions annually added to the stock of the piccions 
 
 • Our niLMition of bank paper must always be understoocl as 
 o'C bank notes payable in cash : a resort to non-convertible paper 
 will, we take lor granted, be henceforth excluded from our 
 finnncja! creed.
 
 322 Fluctuatiun in the Value of Money. 
 
 metals tlirougliout the world. From this, however, 
 is to be made, both at present and for some time 
 back, a deduction on account of the political 
 troubles of Spanish America: still the importation 
 is on a large scale, and would speedily produce 
 depreciation, were not the demands of the civilized 
 world on the increase. 
 
 Consumption of Specie. — The demands for the 
 produce of the mines, arise from various causes, 
 of which the greatest, by far, is the annual con- 
 sumption of it for plate, watches, gilding, and 
 ornamental manufacture, generally. The amount 
 of this admits of no satisfactory calculation, but is 
 probably (Appendix, p. [89]) not far short of two- 
 thirds of the total produce of the mines. Next 
 comes the demand for coin : the currency of al- 
 most all the Continent of Europe is metallic, and 
 an annual supply is requisite, partly to make good 
 accidental loss or the effect of wear, partly to meet 
 the increase of population. This, though not 
 large, may, when joined to the annual export of 
 specie to India and China, (to say little of losses 
 arising from shipwreck or hoarding), account for 
 the absorption of the remaining third of the pro- 
 duce of the mines. What then appears to be the 
 general result ? That in ordinary times these va- 
 rious sources of demand are equal, or nearly equal, 
 to the amount supplied from the mines ; but that 
 for some years back (since 1818), they appear to 
 have been more than equal, in consequence of the 
 extra-demand for gold on the part of the banks of 
 this country, Russia, and Austria, for the purpose 
 of substituting a metallic for a paper currency. 
 
 Dr. Smith, in adverting to the future supply of 
 specie from the mines, considered it an equal 
 chance that old mines may become exhausted, as 
 that new mines may be discovered, or the produce
 
 Fluctuation in the Value of Money. SQS 
 
 of the old increased. Without contesting the ac- 
 curacy of this opinion in his age, it mW hardly be 
 doubted, that since the discovery of the powers of 
 steam, the a])plication of improved machinery to 
 the existing mines, would be productive of a very 
 considerable extension of produce ; but whether, 
 or in what time, it will be carried so far as to lower 
 materially the value of specie, it appears in xain to 
 conjecturc. 
 
 Circulation of Bank Paper. — -Our countrymen, 
 accustomed during more than half a century to 
 the use of bank notes, hav^e observed, with some 
 surprise, that a currency so cheap, and apparently 
 so easy of introduction, should, as yet, be hardly 
 known on the Continent. The bank of France, 
 though of undoubted stability, has found it prac- 
 ticable to establish branches in very few of the 
 provincial towns : several, containing a popula- 
 tion of 40,000 and upwards, are still without such 
 branches ; and there is not a private bank of circu- 
 lation in the whole country. The causes are, the 
 distrust excited by the recollection of the assignats, 
 the want of confidence in government, the absence 
 of commercial enterprise, as well as of the habits 
 of care and arrangement, which are indispensable 
 to success in a line of itself less profitable than is 
 commonly imagined. Holland, with all her com- 
 mercial improvements, has never adopted the bank- 
 note system, while in Austria, Russia, and Sweden, 
 the paper circulated is a forced government cur- 
 rency, not convertible into cash. 
 
 The obstacles to the circulation of bank 
 paper on the Continent, might })crliaps have 
 yielded to the effects of peace and augmented 
 trade, but they have been strengthened of late 
 
 Y 2
 
 :^Q4> Find uati 011 in the Value of Money, 
 
 years, by tlie increased facility of ibrgery. It 
 would thus be vain to calculate on the extended 
 use of bank paper, or on any effect likely to arise 
 from it in regard to the value of the precious 
 metals. 
 
 Supply of Agricultural Produce. — Though corn 
 is so liable to fluctuation, as well from difference 
 of seasons, as from the occurrence of peace or 
 war, it is remarkable that a character of rise or fall 
 when once stamped on a period, is found to pre- 
 vail during a considerable time. Thus, the rise of 
 price begun in the early part of the reign of Eliza- 
 beth, continued, with only occasional intermissions 
 to lG50, not far short of a hundred years. At that 
 time began an a^ra of stationary, and, in some de- 
 gree, of decreasing prices, which, with temporary 
 suspensions during the indifferent seasons and ex- 
 pensive wars of the reigns of William and Anne, 
 continued until 1764. From that year until 1814, 
 we had no less than fifty years of brisk demand and 
 high prices ; while at present, as far as can be 
 judged from appearances, either in England or on 
 the Continent, we are entering on a period similar 
 to that which followed 1650 or 1713, — a period 
 when our growth being somewhat more than ade- 
 quate to the demand, the market long continued 
 heavy, and prices, in a great measure, stationary. 
 
 In what circumstances are we to look for the 
 cause of a stagnation continuing during so long a 
 period as half a century? In the investment of 
 capital and labour in agriculture, to an extent pro- 
 ductive of a surplus growth ; and in the fact, that, 
 as in the natural course of things, the producers 
 increase in the same proportion as the consumers, 
 the disproportion continues, year after year, until
 
 FhictiuU'ton in I he Value ojMonei/. 3^5 
 
 the occurrence of some great national change, such- 
 as a war, or the direction of an extra portion of 
 labour to nnuuii'acturcs. 
 
 To return to the more immediate object oi" our 
 enquiry — the effect of the cost of corn on prices 
 generally. This effect is of the greatest import- 
 ance, botii as corn is the chief object of family 
 consinnption, and as it regulates, in a great mea- 
 sure, that other main constituent of prices, the rate 
 of labour. Since 18M<, and more particularly since 
 18iy, the operation of the corn market has tended 
 to reduce prices, by gradually extending to other 
 articles the reduction that has taken place in agri- 
 cultural produce. Nor does this tendency seem 
 likely to alter : part of our taxes on agriculture are 
 reduced ; the effect of the remainder is, as we have 
 shewn in a preceding chapter, considerably over- 
 rated ; and the charges of tillage bid fair to return 
 to a standard little higher than that of 179'2. Such 
 is also the prospect in France and the Continent 
 at large ; a state of peace reducing the cost of 
 labour, and preventing, in consecpience, any per- 
 manent rise of prices in the corn market. 
 
 Effect of Conthwnlal Prices on those of England, 
 — In the case of two countries enjoying peace and 
 the benefit of commercial intercourse, there is a 
 perpetual tendency to equality of price. The rea- 
 sons are obvious ; there exists a direct motive for 
 emigrating from the dearer country, ami for making 
 in the cheaper, articles for importation, whether 
 open or clandestine, into the dearer. In the latter, 
 the rate of interest is generally lower, and allbrds a 
 temptation to send out of it funded and other mo- 
 nied property. The operation oi" these causes,.
 
 3'l(j Fluctuation in the Value of Monctj. 
 
 steady, though almost unseen, has been a main 
 reason of the fall in our prices since ISII-. 
 
 War; Mode of its Operation, — Of the effect 
 of war there can be no doubt ; it enhances com- 
 modities in various ways : — First, by the addition 
 of a tax to the price of an article ; next by a gene- 
 ral rise in labour from the demand for men for 
 government service, whether in the field or in the 
 preparation of clothing, arms, and other M^arlike 
 stores ; and, lastly, by the interruption of interna- 
 tional intercourse, and the increased charge of 
 transport. If in the l6th and lyth centuries these 
 causes had a serious operation on prices, their 
 effect was greatly increased by the adoption of the 
 funding system, since which, the scale of military 
 expenditure has been enlarged in every country of 
 Europe. 
 
 What, in this respect, was the situation of France 
 during the reign of Bonaparte ? His unsettled 
 government and personal want of credit, dis- 
 couraged loans, and diminished one great source 
 of expenditure ; nor was his power displayed with 
 much effect in the imposition of additional taxes. 
 But the demand of men for his service, was on a 
 large scale, and, without the operation of either 
 paper-currency or war taxes, prices in France rose 
 between 1792 and 1814, about 30 per cent. From 
 this important fact we may form some idea of the 
 effect of a new war on the price of commodities in 
 England, without supposing a repetition of extreme 
 measures, such as an exemption from cash pay- 
 ments, or the stoppage of neutral navigation. 
 Even in a mitigated form, the effect of war on 
 prices would be so decisive as to counteract, in 
 the coiurse of a few years, the operation of almost 
 
 20
 
 Fluctuation in the Value of Money, STf 
 
 all the causes of reduction. On this, however, we 
 forbear to dwell, because the advantages of peace 
 are now better understood, and a recurrence to a 
 state of hostihty, to that state which subverts tlie 
 calcidations of the governor, as it destroys the hap- 
 piness of the governed, will be less and less fre- 
 quent, as sovereigns become aware that the field 
 of combat presents only barren glories. 
 
 The arguments for the rise, as for the fall of 
 prices, are thus of great weiglit, antl no question, 
 it is evident, can be more complicated, or present 
 a longer catalogue of opposing causes. On the one 
 hand, what a prospect of fall is held out by the 
 application of improved machinery to the American 
 mines, and the introduction of bank paper on the 
 Continent of Europe ! On the other, what a 
 counterpoise from the prospect of increased popu- 
 lation or the recurrence of a state of war 1 To 
 attempt to strike a balance between these contend- 
 ing causes, to advance an opinion in regard to 
 future probability, would be vain : all wc can pro- 
 nounce, is, \\\2i\. jluctuation in the value of money 
 cannot he 'prevented ; that it can hardly fail to re- 
 cur on any great political transition ; and that a 
 measure which should put an end to uncertainty 
 in time contracts, woidd relieve us from a great 
 national evil. 
 
 Injurious Effect of Fluctuatio7i in the Value of 
 Money. — Money, as Dr. Smith remarks, (Book I. 
 Chap. V.) is, in buying and selhng, an unexception- 
 able measure of value j and in a contract from year 
 to year, it is, in general, a safe measure ; but in a 
 contract of long duration it is far otherwise. How 
 great was the depreciation of money during the late
 
 .'^-28 FIkcI nation in (he Value of M one if. 
 
 wars; and notvvitiistandiiig the various disadvan- 
 ta£i;c.s attendant on landed property, liow <reneral 
 was the preference given to it in tlie case ot" a })ro- 
 vision for a young family, for grand-children, or for 
 any remote object. Is it not in the unfortunate 
 tendency of money property to fluctuate, rather 
 than in any distrust of the stability of the public 
 i'unds, that we are to look for the cause of stock 
 selling for f), 7* oi* 8 years' purcliase less than land? 
 Then, as to land itselfj and the mode of letting it, 
 can we trace among the various objection^ to long 
 leases any so powerful as the inicertainty of the 
 value of money ? Lastly, amidst all the difficulties 
 in the question of a commutation for tithe, what 
 operates so greatly as this uncertainty to prevent 
 the church from acceding to a fixed income, fi'om 
 reducing to a determinate form those collections 
 which, in their present unsettled state, leave open 
 so wide a field for contention ? 
 
 Situation of Annuitants. — We have already ex- 
 plained in our second chapter, that as to land and 
 houses the fluctuations in price during the war, 
 were, in a great measure, nominal ; that it was, in 
 general, money that changed, and commodities 
 that maintained their Vidue. This maintenance of 
 value was exemplified in many other respects ; in 
 income derived from personal exertion, whether in 
 the shape of wages, salaries, or professional fees ; 
 in each, the money received was increased in pro- 
 portion, or nearly in proportion, to the decrease of 
 its, value, the whole exhibiting a tendency in the 
 transactions of life, to And their level, and to coun-- 
 terbalance all artificial changes, whether arising 
 from additional taxes, the non-convertibility of 
 paper-currency, or the restriction of )iationai inter-
 
 Fluctuation in the Value of Money. 3^29 
 
 course. But " from tlie benefit of this tendency to 
 equality, of this antidote to enliancement, the fixed 
 annuitants are exciutled ;" they are luiable to guartl 
 against a progressive decHne of income during a 
 war ; and the recovery of income which may indi- 
 rectly take place at a peace, will hardly j)rove an 
 indenniity to tliem if it arise, as at present, from 
 circumstances which bear hard on the solvency of 
 other classes. Are we not, therefore, justified in 
 inferring, that the case of the aniuiitant, as it 
 stands at j)resent, is luniatural, and at variance 
 with the rules of equity ; and may we not con- 
 clude that, by conferring on money income the 
 stability attendant on income derived from laboiu' 
 or real property, we shall correct an essential de- 
 fect in our institutions ? 
 
 Money -'pro'pertij in the Kingdom — Magnitude of 
 its Amount. — We proceed to calculate the amount 
 of money-property in the kingdom, — the property 
 that would be beneficially aliected, or relieved 
 from uncertainty ol"\ahie, by the adoption of such 
 a measure. In former ages, when the funding 
 system was unknown, and loans of money from 
 one individual to another were of very limited ex- 
 tent, land, houses, furniture, implements and cloth- 
 ing, comprised almost every description of pro- 
 perty : they constituted " the moveables and 
 immoveables" of our ancient statutes. But uithin 
 the last century, there has arisen in the public 
 funds, in canals, docks, and otiier undertakings, 
 held in shares, as well as in private loans, (on 
 mortgages and otherwise), a j)roj)erty represented 
 solely in money , of which the aggregate approaches 
 10 two-fifths of the total wealth of th.- kingdom. 
 
 Thus, were we lo cojuputc ihe land, the houses,
 
 330 Fluctuation in the Value of Money, 
 
 the farming, the manufacturing, the mercantile 
 stock of Great Britain and Ireland at 2,000,000,000/. 
 (see Appendix, p. [82]), we should not be disposed 
 to rate our public funds, the amount of loans ex- 
 isting between individuals, the value of shares in 
 public w^orks, in short, all property of which the va- 
 lue is directly affected by the rise or fall of money, 
 at less than 1,200,000,000/. Though of this sum 
 the greater part can hardly be called an addition 
 to the national property, the whole is evidently 
 individual property; and its amount is demon- 
 strative of the magnitude of that income, which 
 is most exposed to suffer by fluctuation of prices.
 
 331 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Plan for lessening the Injury arising from the Flucttuition 
 of Prices. 
 
 If we proceed to analyze the use of money, whe- 
 ther for national or individual purposes, we shall 
 find it resolve itself into " the power of purchase," 
 or, in other words, into the power of procuring arti- 
 cles for consumption. It is consequently of much 
 more importance in all contracts of duration to 
 look to the value than to the numerical amount of 
 a given sum. The expecHency of this has long 
 been felt, and the price of corn has been recom- 
 mended as a standard of regulation in regard to 
 leases and other time contracts. Such it, in some 
 measure, may be in a country like France, where 
 the majority of the lower orders are strangers to 
 the use of foreign articles, such as groceries, and 
 expend literally three-fourths of their wages on 
 bread. The price of corn is farther of importance 
 in that country in an indirect sense, from its influ- 
 ence on the price of labour, as manual labour is 
 there made to perform much more in agriculture, 
 and even in manufactures, than with us : the whole 
 exemplifying the doctrine of Dr. Smith, who as- 
 sumed labour as the measure of value, and corn as 
 the measure of labour. 
 
 The case of France is that of the Continent at
 
 :V3'2 PIdnJhr i^irin^- a permamnf Value In 
 
 large, Hiul was that of our ancestors a cciiliiiy 
 aijjo; our situation, however, is now materially 
 altered, our consumption of corn havinf^ under- 
 gone a comparative reduction, while manual labour 
 enters in a proportion far smaller than formerly 
 into the cost of our manufactures. 
 
 That corn occupies a very different proportion 
 in the expenditure of different classes, will be ap- 
 parent from a short comparative table. 
 
 
 
 Family of the mid- 
 
 
 Family of a Cotta- 
 
 dle Class, residing 
 
 Heads of Expenditure. 
 
 ger; Expence 
 
 in a Provincial 
 
 (Sec Appendix, p. [11].) 
 
 about .£'57 a Year. 
 
 Town, Expentc 
 
 
 Proportions in 100. 
 
 £6~iO a Year. 
 Proportions in lOO. 
 
 Provisions - - . 
 
 60 
 
 33 
 
 Clothing and Washing 
 
 20 
 
 18 
 
 House-rent 
 
 ^-k 
 
 10 
 
 Fuel and Liglit 
 
 10 
 
 (i 
 
 Other charges, namely, 
 
 
 
 Wages, Assessed Taxes, 
 
 
 
 Education, Medical At- 
 
 
 
 tendance, &c. 
 
 3^ 
 100 
 
 33 
 
 100 
 
 This sketch, brief as it is, puts in a very clear 
 light the difference between the wants of the lower 
 and those of the middle and upper classes. To the 
 latter, corn is evidently ineligible as a standard of 
 value. In a direct sense, it forms hardly a third 
 of their expenditure, and though, on making al- 
 lowance tor its indirect operation, in particular 
 for its effect on wages, we become more aware of 
 its importance, it will hardly be denied, that in 
 an age of such varied and refined expenditure, 
 a standard of a more comprehensive character, 
 ought if possible to be adopted. Now, the pro-
 
 Money Contracts. .3,3,5 
 
 gress of statistics, and the multiplication of official 
 returns within the last half-century, have supj)lie(l 
 data which, in the time of Dr. Smith, were not ac- 
 counted reducible to a definite form. Of this, 
 some idea may be formed from a table in the Ap- 
 pendix (p. [95]) comprising- a list of articles of 
 general consumption, corn, butcher-meat, 'manu- 
 factures, tropical products, &c. and containing the 
 probable amount of money expended on each by 
 the public. This table is followed by ex})lanatorv 
 remarks, of which the object is to show that con- 
 tracts for a series of years ought to be made with 
 a reference to the power of money in purchasing 
 the necessaries and comforts of life ; that after 
 fixing a given sum, say 100/. as the amount of an 
 annual salary, the payment in subsequent years 
 should be not necessarily 100/., but either <J.'5/., 
 100/., or 105/., according to the varying power ol 
 money in making purchases. 
 
 Being aware of the uncertainty of calculations, 
 when unsupported by official returns; as well as 
 that to give to a table the autiiority re([uisite to 
 constitute it a regulator of the value of money, 
 must be a work of nuich time and labour, we 
 decline inserting our list in the text, and confine 
 ourselves to an enquiry in regard to the means ol 
 obtaining the 
 
 Documents for tJtc Formation of a Tabic of Refer- 
 ence. — As yet our official returns are scanty, or 
 rather the use made of them has been on a con- 
 fined scale : enough, however, has been done 
 to show the practicability of obtaining the in- 
 formation we desire. Thus, in regard to corn, 
 the registers, both as to price and quantity, 
 are now on a more satisfactory tooting than in
 
 .334 Plan for giving a permanent Value to 
 
 former years : of sugar, a similar record has 
 loni^ been kept, and there are also registers, 
 whicli might easily be rendered more complete, of 
 our woollen and linen manufactures. Of the con- 
 sumption of all excised articles, estimates approach- 
 ing to correctness may be formed from documents 
 in possession of that Board ; while in regard to 
 foreign commodities, the custom-house would sup- 
 ply similar results. Then, as to average prices, 
 there are the Books of the Victualling Office, of 
 the Commissariat department, and of public hos- 
 pitals, such as Greenwich. The Board of Agricul- 
 ture has at various times obtained information, not 
 strictly official, but substantially correct, by sending 
 circular letters to their correspondents throughout 
 the kingdom ; a plan acted on to a great extent by 
 the late Arthur Young, in 1811. 
 
 Returns of this nature, when obtained, might 
 easily be reduced into the tabular form on the plan 
 of the late Mr. Colquhoun, but wdth more selection 
 and discrimination. Since the date of his calcu- 
 lations (1812), great changes have occurred in 
 respect both to price and quantity, and to complete 
 the collections with the accuracy requisite to form 
 a document of authority would require an extent 
 of labour beyond the means of an individual. A 
 task of such length, and of such general utility, 
 should be defrayed from a common fund, and 
 government, if unwilling to give so direct a sanc- 
 tion to a new project, as would be implied by the 
 appointment of persons for collecting and com- 
 paring materials, would, doubtless, on the demand 
 of any respectable association, communicate from 
 the public offices all returns applicable to the 
 subject.
 
 Money Contracts, 335 
 
 For the details of the table, and the calculations 
 connected with it, we refer to tlie Appendix : at 
 present we shall, for the sake of illustration, suppose 
 it in operation, and bestow a few paragraphs on the 
 effects that the adoption of such a measure would 
 have on the "Teat interests of the country. 
 
 In what, it may be asked, would the benefits of 
 it consist ? In ascertaining on grounds that would 
 admit of no doubt or dispute, the power in pur- 
 chase of any given sum in one year, compared to 
 its power of purchase in another. And wliat 
 would be the practical application of this know- 
 ledge ? The correction of a long list of anomalies 
 in regard to rents, salaries, wages, &c., arising out 
 of unforeseen fluctuations in our currency. In 
 the present undefined form of leases, annuities, 
 and other time contracts, the 100/. of this year may, 
 three years hence, be equivalent in power of pur- 
 chase, either to 110/. or to 90/., the former being- 
 probable, if peace continue, while the latter is a 
 moderate estimate of the change that would follow 
 the first year of a war. So much are the chances 
 on the side of fluctuation, in the value of money, 
 that it may almost be said, that, " in a contract of 
 duration, an adherence to a fixed sum of money 
 implies an acquiescence under a change of value.** 
 But a table exhibiting from year to year the power 
 of money in purchase, would give to annuitants 
 and other contracting parties, the means of main- 
 taining an agreement, not in its letter only, but in 
 its spirit ; of conferring on a sj)ecified sum a uni- 
 formity and permanency of value, by chajigin<x the 
 numerical ajiiount in j^roporlion to the chuitgc in its 
 porcer ofpwxhase. 
 
 It does not follow from this, that a change of
 
 :^fi() Plan for giving a permaneiU I'alue to 
 
 numerical amount oiif^lit to he unnnal : it would, 
 in o-eneral, be sufficient that it took ))lace at periods 
 of three, four, or five years, takinir as the ciite- 
 rion the average value of money in purchases 
 throughout the whole period. 
 
 Elfcct 071 the labouring Classes of the adoption of 
 such a Standard. — The use of money to the country 
 labourer is very simple, extending to little beyond 
 the purchase of the articles mentioned in the pre- 
 ceding skctcli of his annual expenditure. In the ' 
 case of tlie inhabitants of towns, tlie proportion 
 required for house-rent, fuel and clothing is some- 
 what larger, while that for provisions is somewhat 
 smaller than in tlie family of the cottager. To 
 both, the chief object of expence is corn, the 
 average price of which is already ascertained pe- 
 riodically ; but to render the table complete, our • 
 wish would be that the average of the other articles 
 consumed by the labouring classes, such as beer, 
 coarse clothing, fuel, were in like manner put on 
 record. If to such returns were added a few plain 
 tables of the average consumption of the lower class 
 in various situations, one for an unmarried labourer, 
 others for a labourer married, and having two, 
 three, or four children, it would be an easy process 
 to calculate how far a given sum of wages (for ex- ■ 
 ample 45/. annually) was more or less adequate than 
 in former years to the supply of such wants. We ' 
 should then possess completely the means of judging 
 of the comparative comfort of the working classes ; 
 of making, in a manner satisfactory and conclusive, 
 the calculations hitherto prepared with nuich la- - 
 hour, and an unavoidable share ot' error, by iSir F. 
 Eden, Mr. Barton, and others. 
 
 How important would such a standard of refei-
 
 Moiwy Contracts. 337 
 
 ence have been throughout the last thirty years, a 
 period of such frequent contention between the 
 employer and the employed ! During the war, 
 workmen in towns were repeatedly obliged to com- 
 bine for tlie pui-pose of raising their wages to the 
 level of ])rovisions, and in rural districts, where 
 combination was im])racticable, the poor-rate was 
 called in to supply the deficiency. At present the 
 case is reversed ; the employer, particularly wlien 
 resident in a town, has found, and will long find it a 
 matter of great difficulty to reduce wages to the 
 standard justified by the fall of provisions. 
 
 What a scene of inequality is exhibited at pre- 
 sent by tlie current payments of the metropolis ! 
 Wages, salaries, professional fees, are almost all on 
 as high a scale as during the war, notwithstanding 
 the diminution of the two great causes of rise,— the 
 expence of living and the extra demand for labour. 
 The persons, whether of high or low station, who 
 are in receipt of the established allowances, if called 
 on for an abatement, would naturally plead the 
 uncertainty of j)rovisions continuing at a reduced 
 rate : and nothing, it is evident, will induce them 
 willingly to assent to a reduction, excej)t a guarantee 
 against a recurrence of the grand evil — a rise of 
 prices without a correspondent rise in wages. 
 Such a guarantee we should hope to afford, not by 
 an interference between the payer and reci'i\er, 
 but by an alternative offered to their \oluntary 
 adoption ; by putting it in their power, when mak- 
 ing a time contract, to affix a permanent value to a 
 money stipulation ; or to have access, when no such 
 precaution was taken, to an ecpiitable standanl of 
 reference. 
 
 What would be the probable effect of liaving 
 this authenticated record of the price of commo- 
 
 z
 
 S3H Plan Jbr giving a pcmiancnl I'alue to 
 
 (dities, this monitor to declare the rise or fall in the 
 value of money ? It could hardly fail to operate 
 greatly in abridging altercations. At a time when a 
 reduction of wages became expedient, it would 
 relieve the inferior from the humiliation attendant 
 on such a step ; and, in tlie case of a rise of prices, 
 it would guide the employer to a fair advance of 
 wages, the distributor of charitable aid to a fair 
 apportionment of relief. 
 
 Effect of such a Measure on Agriculture. — In no 
 department of our productive industry has our 
 progress as a nation been less conspicuous than in 
 tillage ; our superiority over olu- continental neigh- 
 bours being in a great degree limited to our live- 
 stock and our machinery. On computing the 
 annual amount of property created in the kingtlom, 
 we find, after making a great deduction from the 
 prices (moderate as they were, considering the state 
 of markets at the time) assumed by Mr. Colquhoun, 
 that the annual produce of the agriculture of Great 
 Britain and Ireland still amounts to 1 20,000,000/. 
 What a field is there here for the application of 
 skill and judgment, and how great the call for both 
 in the present situation of oiu' agriculturists ! 
 
 Leases. — It is not a little remarkable, that several 
 of the counties, such as Norfolk and Northumber- 
 land, in which our husbandry is most improved, 
 are by no means our most fertile districts naturally. 
 To what, then, are they indebted for their supe- 
 riority ? To a cause wliicli Mr. Coke has repeatedly 
 pressed on his brother land-holders, both in and 
 out of parliament, — that there is no good agricul- 
 ture xvithout leases. In what other way can we ex- 
 plain the high rents paid in a comitrv in general so 
 little favoured in soil and chmate as Scotland ? The
 
 Money Contracts. 339 
 
 objections of our landlords to long leases, are va- 
 rious, arising partly from the habits of their pre- 
 decessors ; partly from a reluctance to ])art with 
 the command of their pro])crty for a mnnber of 
 years ; but, more than all, from the uncertainty of 
 the value of money. During the war this uncer- 
 tainty was of very serious import : at present it is 
 removed, as far as regards landlords, by the return 
 to cash payments, and the difficulty now is to in- 
 duce a solvent tenant to take a lease. To both 
 parties, therefore, the fluctuation of our currency, 
 even when metallic, is replete with anxiety. 
 
 Corn-rents. — Of late, the great fall of price has 
 induced several of our principal land-holders to 
 regulate their rents by the price of corn ; a plan 
 open to many objections, when varied from year to 
 year, because, a season of high price may be, and 
 generally is, a season of deficient produce. When 
 calculated on the price of a series of years, this 
 course is less exceptionable : in any form, how- 
 ever, it seems less eligible than the plan which 
 (Appendix, }). [98]) we are desirous to propose, of 
 combining the price of corn with that of other arti- 
 cles of consumption. 
 
 Tithe. — Referring to the remarks under this 
 head in the Appendix, we shall at ])resent merely 
 observe, how great would be the benefit accruing 
 from a regulating standard, applied to clerical in- 
 come, and cnlculated, as far as regards j)erniaiu'ney 
 of value, to justify the church in eonnntiting tithe 
 for a money stipend. A change of that nature 
 would, on the one hand, put an end to altercations 
 unfortunately too freciuent ; while, on the other, it 
 would ])revent tithe liom oj)erating as an impedi- 
 ment to agricultural improvement. The great, and, 
 at present, well-founded objection of the clergy to 
 
 z '2
 
 f^lO Plan ftn- giving a permanent J'dhic to 
 
 a permanent commutation of tithe, is a dread, not 
 of the faitli of ])arliament, but of the uncertain 
 vahie of money : removx' that a])prehension, and you 
 give them substantial motiv^es to prefer a fixed sum, 
 whether they look to the interest of themsehes oi' 
 their successors. In the Protestant church of Hol- 
 land, they have an example of stipends paid during 
 more than two centuries, by local magistrates or by 
 government, without any derogation from the 
 respectability of those who received them : and if in 
 France the amount of clerical income be too small 
 to be dwelt on when we are treating of a Protes- 
 tant establishment, the regularity of its payment 
 during twenty years, under circumstances of great 
 financial embarrassment, is calculated to lessen one 
 material ground of apprehension. 
 
 The commutation to which we allude does not, 
 of course, imply any reduction of the existing in- 
 come of the clerical body, nor a relinquishment of 
 any security arising from the tenure by which they 
 are at present invested with tithe. A change from 
 an unfixed to a fixed money income, may evidently 
 take place without interfering either with such 
 security, or with the patronage of the church as at 
 present established. It might be proposed as a 
 temporary arrangement, to last only during the 
 interval required to carry into effect a plan that has 
 been more than once proposed, and which has 
 lately received a kind of legislative recommenda- 
 tion — the purchase of land for the purpose of 
 affording the church a revenue from rent instead of 
 tithe. But on this we will not enlarge, our subject 
 naturally confining us to the operation of the mea- 
 sure with a view to the relief of the agriculturists ; 
 a view in which it would soon disclose satisfactory 
 results.
 
 Money Contracts. 341 
 
 Under our present system, the church is entitled 
 to an increase of revenue in proportion to the in- 
 crease of produce ; such, we may safely take for 
 granted, would form no part of its demand under 
 a different arrangement. All tiiat its representa- 
 tives would be likely to desire, would be an 
 assurance that the contract should be maintained 
 bojidjide, that the sum once fixed sliould be maiie 
 good, whatever be the fluctuations of our currency. 
 And what would be the result to the agriculturists 
 of tithe being thus limited ? That all, whether laiul- 
 lords or farmers, might extend their tillage as they 
 chose, without being annually taxed in a portion 
 of the produce. Our numbers are on the increase ; 
 our production increases with them, and it is, 
 above all, in a case of such increase, that the j)res- 
 sure of tithe is felt. An exemj)tion from such 
 pressure is most strongly called for by our situ- 
 ation, present and prosj)ective ; and may we not 
 add, that when viewed in connexion with the 
 various circumstances stated in our chapter on 
 Agriculture, it would render probable a result, 
 on which, at present, it seems somewhat bokl to 
 sj)eculate? we mean Mr. Tooke's idea of the prac- 
 ticability of our competing with foreigners in the 
 export of corn, as was done by our countrymen 
 previous to I'^Crl. 
 
 Application of the pro}H)sed Plan lo the Puhlic 
 Funds. — To offer any suggestion connected with 
 the public funds is, we are aware, to tread on dvW- 
 cate ground, men in office being \erv j)r()j)cijy 
 backward to interfere, in even a slight degree, witli 
 the existing contract with the fund-iioUler. W'v 
 shall, however, satisfy the most cautions, by pre- 
 mising that the acceptance of the |)lan i.iiould be 
 
 z 3
 
 342 Planjbr giving a permanent Value to 
 
 optional on the pari (}/' each stock-holder , although 
 we can have little doubt of the beneficial tendency 
 of :i measure, the effect of which would be to en- 
 sure to the stock-holder and his posterity, the same 
 income, whether the country was at peace or war ; 
 whether its currency were sound or depreciated ; 
 M'hether the mines of gold and silver throughout 
 the world, became more or less productive. The 
 100/. of 1792, which in I8O6 was equivalent to 
 80/., and seven years after, to less than 70/., would 
 thus remain 100/. throughout. The apprehensions 
 which at present not unfrequently lead to sales of 
 stock against the wish of the holders, would cease 
 or be materially diminished, and funded, like land- 
 ed property, would be seldom disposed oi\ except 
 on particular occasions, such as when a division of 
 property became expedient on the demise of a tes- 
 tator, on legatees attaining majority, or on their 
 entering on mercantile business. In fact, after the 
 adoption of such a measure, the chief features of 
 distinction between land and stock, would be, that 
 while the one possessed the attraction of local in- 
 fluence, the other would have the more direct ad- 
 vantage of dispatch and certainty in regard to re- 
 ceipt of income. 
 
 The present is, we believe, the flrst proposition 
 of a measure for giving a permanent value to our 
 funded property. Our public men, or rather the 
 few anions: them who are accustomed to take com- 
 prehensive views of finance, have hitherto contem- 
 plated a very different course. Money, they saw, 
 was declining in value during half a century, and 
 funded property declined with it ; a fall carefully 
 kept by them in the back ground, and consequently 
 in a great measure unknown to the public. Our 
 successive chancellors of the exchequer antici-
 
 Money Contracts. 34^ 
 
 pated (see p. 300.) a continuance of this decline, and 
 silently calculated on its producing a diminution 
 in the pressure of our debt. But the re-action of 
 the last eight years has greatly shaken this calcu- 
 lation : money has recovered, and along with that 
 recovery, the pressiu'e of our debt has greatly in- 
 creased. It is time, therefore, to seek relief in a 
 measure of a difterent character. 
 
 Its Effect on the Price of Stocks. — Nothing can 
 be more different than a rise of stock caused by 
 the adoption of a plan such as we propose, and a 
 rise that might be consequent on the operation of a 
 large sinking timd. The latter would be liable, as 
 we shall show in our cha])ter on Finance, (]). .'3()0.) to 
 various objections : in particular, it would afford 
 a strong inducement to sell out and to vest capitiil 
 in other securities, probably in foreign stock. But 
 a rise proceeding from a course such as we are 
 anxious to reconmnend, would prove an induce- 
 ment to keep capitiil in our funds, the \alue 
 conferred by the measure being, in its nature, })er- 
 manent and hkely to increase. 
 
 Cojisequcnl /Idrantatie to the Piihlic. — This brings 
 us to a question, which, untlei- present circum- 
 ><tances, may very naturally be asked by our 
 readers, — why confer addition^ value on the funds, 
 at a time when they ha\e risen so considerably in 
 the scale of comparison with land, houses, and 
 merchandize ? Oiu' answer is, that we contemplate 
 no undue favour to the stock-holder ; we merely 
 point out a measure, which, by benefiting him in 
 the first instance, may gi\ e go\'ermnent a fair plea 
 to demand lioni him a return calculated to afford 
 relief to other classes of the coiuuuuiify. 'I'o re- 
 
 z 4
 
 S44 Pl((n for giving a permanent Value to 
 
 quire such from the fund-holder witliout a con- 
 sideration, wouki, of course, imply a sacrifice on 
 his ])art, but the results which we antici})ate froi7i 
 the proposed measure, will, if they be well founded, 
 confer on him in one way as much as he may be 
 called on to relinquish in the other. Thus, if it 
 continue a favourite object with ministers to reduce 
 the interest on the old four per cents., nothing is 
 so likely to promote that measure, as conferring 
 an additional value on funded property. Atid if 
 it be said that such would be a return partial and 
 inadequate to the advantage conferred, the dis- 
 cussion may be cut short by the general argimient, 
 that if the legislature improve materially the cir- 
 •cumstances of the fund-holder, or of any great 
 class in the community, there can be no great dif- 
 rficulty in rendering that prosperity conducive ta 
 the relief of the public at large. 
 
 All this may be admitted, but the plan, it will 
 be said, can be adopted by the governments of 
 iother countries, and our stocks soon deprived of 
 any relative superiority which it might confer. 
 Our answer is, that the success of such a plan, 
 and the extent of rise attendant on its adoption, 
 will depend chiefly on the degree of confidence 
 that each nation has in its government ; a point in 
 which we possess a great and undoubted supe- 
 riority over the rest of Europe. 
 
 General Remarks. — We conclude this chapter 
 by a few remarks on the general characteristics of 
 the proposed plan. Does it, it may be asked, 
 contain any thing compulsory or unfair, and in 
 particular, does it imply the imposition of any 
 burden on posterity? Our posterity will, in all 
 probability, be in a far easier condition than our-
 
 Money Contracts. 345, 
 
 selves, and would incur no loss from our conferrino- 
 the character of })ernianent value on our dividends : 
 on the contrary, they will (see ]). 401.) be benefited 
 by whatever shall be found conducive to the rehef 
 of the ])resent generation. Our proposition may 
 ])e considered an attempt to fill up a bhuik in the 
 mode of regulating our pi{)ducti\e industry, and 
 to do it in a way not fancifid or artificial, but on 
 the principles of unreserved freedom so strongly 
 recommended by Dr. Smith and other eminent 
 authorities. But the use to be made of it would 
 be perfectly optional. It would be in itself merely 
 a table of reference, and all contracts, whether 
 relative to loans, leases, or bequests, might, at the 
 will of the parties, be made payable, either accord- 
 ing to the proposed standard, or, as at present, in 
 money of undefined value. 
 
 Our preceding pages ex])lain the operation of 
 the proposed plan in respect to individuals. In 
 regard to its result in a national sense, we may be 
 allowed to anticipate that the removal of uncer- 
 tainty from time contracts woidd contribute very 
 effectually to the extension of our national industry. 
 That industry and its results ha\e been carried 
 farther by us than by almost any of our neighbours, 
 but they are still far from having reached a limit. 
 Circumstances have of late become more favoiuable 
 and the pressure of taxation less heavy ; but great 
 exertions will still be requisite to carry our national 
 income to an amount corresponding with our bur- 
 dens ; that is, to increase it so that the jiroportion 
 of our taxation to our resources shall not bo greater 
 than in other countries. 
 
 How far, it may be asked, has the proposition 
 brought forward in this chapter the sanction of 
 precedent.-^ That sanction, though it cannot he
 
 .34<6 Plan for giving a jyermanent VaJne^ 8^c. 
 
 cited as of frequent occurrence, is not altoi^ether 
 wanting. The course now suggested, is analogous 
 to the plan of corn rents lately adopted by several 
 of our great proprietors, and wliich, for many years 
 has been exemplified in the proceedings of the 
 CourtofTeinds, or tithe, inScotland. Thedecisions 
 of that court j)ui'port that clerical income shall be 
 regulated by the price of corn in the public markets 
 during a series of years. But were precedent 
 wholly wanting, the rule, " that prospective en- 
 sraafements should be framed so as to maintain 
 their bond Jide value, whatever be the value of 
 money,'* is so equitable, and apparently so easy of 
 execution, that there seems no little difficulty in 
 accounting for its not yet having found its way 
 into practice. This has, we believe, been owing 
 to two causes ; the unfortunate neglect of political 
 economy in the education of our public men ; and 
 the interest of government, the greatest of all 
 debtors, to prevent the public from fixing its atten- 
 tion on the gradual depreciation of money that 
 went on during the half century previous to the 
 late peace.
 
 847 
 
 CHAP. XL 
 
 Our Finances. 
 
 We now approacli the end of our volume, and have 
 arrived at the dejKirtmcnt which forms at present 
 the cliief object ofpubHc attention. In tliis, as in 
 the former chapters, we shall begin by a statement 
 of facts, a retrospect to past events, and after remov- 
 ing, or endeavouring to remove, several popular 
 errors, we shall proceed to develope the measures 
 apparently best ada})ted to our present situation, 
 greatly altered, as it has been, by the events con- 
 sequent on peace. 
 
 We propose dividing our discussion into the 
 following heads : — 
 
 A historical sketcii of finance operations ; 
 
 Our prospects in regard to trade and national 
 income ; 
 
 The views of finance suggested by such prospects. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Our National Debt. 
 
 A public debt in one form or other, has been, in 
 almost every country, an appendage of estabhshed 
 government. Its amount, however, seklom ex- 
 ceeded an anticipation of one or two years' 
 revenue, until the ado))ti()n <»f tlir funding system,
 
 348 ^^'^^' Finances ; 
 
 or plan of rendering public obligations transferable 
 from band to band, gave governments a surprising 
 facility in borrowing. Tins, like many otiier inge- 
 nious schemes, both in civil and military affairs, 
 originated with the Italians, and was adopted early 
 in Venice, Genoa, and Holland. In England, it 
 Avas not introduced until our participation in the 
 great struggle made by King William against the 
 aggrandizement of Louis XIV.; but if we were 
 somew^hat late in following the example, in our 
 ultimate progress we have far surpassed our neigh- 
 bours. Our debt amounted, 
 
 At the peace of Ryswick - in 1697 to -£'21,500,000 
 
 of Utrecht - - 1713 - 54,000,000 
 
 of Aix la Chapelle - 1748 - 78,000,000 
 
 of Paris - - 1763 - 134,000,000 
 
 of Versailles - - 1783 - 238,000,000 
 
 of Amiens - - 1802 - 452,000,000 
 
 of Paris - - 1815 nearly 700,000,000 
 
 To which, adding the debt of Ireland, somewhat 
 
 more than ... - 100,000,000 
 
 Total present debt about - 800,000,000 
 
 These sums represent the total of our debt at 
 each period, without the perplexing distinctions of 
 funded and unfunded, redeemed and unredeemed. 
 Though the figures express an amount, not of 
 money but of stock, the difference at peace prices 
 is not much more than nominal : thus, our pre- 
 sent debt, w^ere it practicable to pay it off" at the 
 market price, would require an amount in money, 
 not greatly below the 800,000,000/. of stock. But 
 as there is no more reason to anticipate the liqui- 
 dation of the debt of this than of other countries, 
 the more correct course, and that which conveys
 
 Fluctuations of Stock. 349 
 
 the more distinct idea of the extent of tlie burden, 
 is to follow the French nietliod of computing, not 
 by the principal, but by the sum re([uired to pay 
 the interest ; a sum which, since the reduction of 
 the Five per cents., may be calh'd, in round 
 numbers, .^30,000,000/. 
 
 Fluctuations in the Price of Stock. — By fluctu- 
 ations in stock, we must be understood to mean 
 changes proceeding, not fiom the rumours per- 
 petually in circulation on the Stock Exchange, 
 which are too absurd for notice, and operate only 
 for a few days, but from causes of a more com- 
 prehensive and permanent character ; — the credit 
 or discredit of government ; scarcity or abund- 
 ance of capital ; the adecjuacy or inadequacy of our 
 resources to our burdens. The extent of fluctu- 
 ation, has, of course, been very great at diflferent 
 ])eriods of our history. During the long peace 
 that followed the treaty of Utrecht, and under the 
 prudent administration of Wal})ole, stocks rose 
 greatly, the three ])er cents, having attained par 
 in 173^, and being, in 17.'3{), the time when that 
 minister was forced by j)()pular clamour to declare 
 war against Spain, at the very high rate of I07/. in 
 cash for 100/. in stock. They continued high 
 during several years of the war ; and it was not 
 until the range of hostilities widened, and assumed 
 a serious as})ect, that their fall became great. 
 The same may be said to have applied to the more 
 successful contest begun in 17'^^N the three per 
 cents continuing between 70/. and SO/., until IJdO, 
 when our loans, in consequence of the national ar- 
 dour and the confldent character of Lord Chat- 
 ham, were carried to an amount at that time un- 
 precedented. In the American war the fall was
 
 350 Our Finances; 
 
 more serious : it was great from the time that France 
 took part against us, and tlie pubhc became aware 
 of" the inabiUty of our ministers to conduct the 
 contest with success. 
 
 Mr. Pitt's Administration. — It was in 1784 that 
 Mr. Pitt succeeded to his financial charge, and 
 found it during several years productive of great 
 contention and embarrassment. Our prospects, 
 however, gradually brightened, and ere the expir- 
 ation of the ten years of peace that preceded the 
 war of 1793, the nation had risen superior to its 
 difficulties. This w^as the aera of the so-mucli ap- 
 plauded revival of the sinking fund. Partly by 
 the effect of that measure, more by the general 
 prosperity of the country, our 3 per cents were 
 carried in 1792 to tiie high price of 97; a price 
 from wliich they fell as soon as the public became 
 aware that our government had determined to take 
 part in the coalition against France. But as during 
 the first two years of the war our expences were 
 comparatively limited, the great decline did not 
 take place until 1796, or rather 1797> ^vhen the 
 3 per cents, sunk to the unexampled low rate of 
 47. It was then that our minister felt the neces- 
 sity of altering his financial plan, of lessening loans 
 and augmenting taxes : he came forward accord- 
 ingly witli the bold proposition of raising a large 
 proportion of the supplies within the year ; a course 
 which, alarmed as the nation was at the aggran- 
 dizement of France, obtained general concurrence, 
 and soon received a consolidated form by the im- 
 position of the income or property-tax. 
 
 In consequence of this decided measure, and of 
 the splendid success of our continental allies in 
 1799, our stocks revived, hut they fell towai'ds the 
 close of the year, when the fickle Paul forsook the
 
 Measures since 1815. 351 
 
 coalition, and Bonaparte, arriving from Egypt, gave 
 new vigour to the resources of France. Large 
 loans became again indispensable, and our funds 
 continued comparatively low, until the signature 
 of the preliminaries in October 1801. That event 
 had a tendency to reinstate them, but the peace 
 was too short and too doubtful to admit of any 
 great rise. 
 
 JVarqf 1803. — On the renewal of war in 1803, 
 the 3 per cents, fell from "JO to 57, and during 
 some time, the general dread of invasion kept 
 them at a very low rate. War taxes, however, 
 were cheerfully submitted to, and in the succeed- 
 ing years (1805, (i, 70' these potent auxiliaries 
 enabled government to lessen the loans, and to 
 raise the three per cents, to ()0 and upwards. The 
 same cause explains their continued higli price in 
 1808, a year of commercial distress, anil in 1809, 
 a season of general over-trading. Nor was it till 
 the multi])lied bankruptcies of 1810, and the heavy 
 drain of monoy ibr the peninsular war, that the 
 fall became considerable. Large loans were now 
 unavoidable, and stocks were lowered not only in 
 181'2, a year of chequered i(:)rtune to our arms, 
 but during part of 1813, when our prospects were 
 equally cheering in Spain and (iermany. At last 
 the balance inclined to the lavourable side : the 
 victory of Leipsic, and the evident superiority of 
 the allies, outweighed the demands of our Treasiny, 
 enormous as they had become. 
 
 From 1815 to 18^^2. — In the early part of 1815 
 the 3 per cents were fluctuating Irom &1 to (»."), 
 when the retiu'ii of Bonaparte from Klba, \no- 
 duced a very sudden reduction. In llii- contest 
 that ensued, government were unluckily obliged 
 to contract for a loan early in June, and were thus
 
 352 Our Finances ; 
 
 (U'j)rivo(l of" tho benefit of tlie rise which imme- 
 diately ioUowcd the success of" our arms, lii 1816, 
 peace was consolidated, but the price of commodi- 
 ties experienced a great fall, and mucli distress 
 prevailing in both trade and agriculture, tlie funds 
 recovered very slowly. In I8I7, appearances im- 
 proved, and in the early part of 1818 the 3 per 
 cents, having risen above 80, our prospect became 
 very encouraging. Unfortunately the rise was not 
 of long duration : the mismanagement of the 
 French loan, the over-trading in this country, the 
 distress of the United States of America, all con- 
 curred to depress the funds. They continued low 
 during the two years from the summer of 1819 to 
 that of 1821, after wliich, they gradually im- 
 proved so as to enable ministers to carry into 
 effect an important and long contemplated oper- 
 ation. * 
 
 Reduction of the Five per Cents. — The five per 
 cents, comprised a sum, which in round numbers 
 we shall call 140,000,000/., and which government 
 were at any time at liberty to pay off, by giving 
 100/. in cash for 100/. in stock. How then, it may 
 be asked, did it happen that the discharge was 
 delayed so long after the peace ? Because the 
 
 * Average Prices of the 3 per Cent. Consols during the fol- 
 lowing years ; — 
 
 1803 70,57,53. 1813 58, 57, GO, 61. 
 
 1804- 55,56,5S. 1814 64-, 66, 64. 
 
 1805 56,58,60. 1815 65, after Mar. 58, 60. 
 
 1806 60,62,6+. 1 1816 60,62,63. 
 
 1807 61,62,64-. j 1817 63,70,75,83. 
 
 1808 62, 64, 66, 68. 1818 80, 82, 79. 
 
 1809 67, 6S, 70. ' 1819 77, 74, 65, 70, 68. 
 
 1810 70, 71, 69, 66. \ 1820 68, 69, 70. 
 
 1811 65,64,63. 1821 69,72,75,77. 
 
 1812 62, 61, 59, 5S. 1822(toAug.)76. 77, 78, 80.
 
 Measures since 181.5. 553 
 
 discliargc of so large a sum could take place only 
 by the substitution of one security for another ; 
 and as the new fund to be created, would, in most 
 of the years that have elapsed since the peace, 
 have fetched an indiffercni, price, ministers were 
 from time to time obliged to ))ostpone the measure. 
 In the early part of IS 18, circumstances becom- 
 ing favourable, a new stock bearing 3^ per cent, 
 interest, and not reducible below that rate during 
 ten years, was created e\idently for the purpose 
 of supplying the desired substitute. The i)roject, 
 however, failed, in consequence of the general fall 
 of funded property, and there afterwards occurred 
 no favourable opportunity until the beginning of 
 the present year, when, as is well known, the re- 
 duction was very successfully accomplished. 
 
 There remains open to leduction a farther por- 
 tion of our stock, viz. the old four per cents, 
 which distinguished from the four per cents 
 created in the present year, amount to about 
 70,000,000/. This sum *^is considerable, but in 
 other respects the question of reduction stands on 
 very doubtful grounds. The saving of a half per 
 cent, in the interest would give only about 300,000/. 
 clear, and it seems very doul)tful at what period 
 tlie course of circumstances will admit of even that 
 diminution. 
 
 Our otJicr Financial Measures. — The course 
 contemplated by government at the close of the 
 war, was to kee}) up an eHicient sinking fund, and 
 to continue during several years the |)r()j)iMty-ta>L 
 on the reduced scale of 5 \)cv cent. This plan 
 fell to the ground on the rejection of that tax by 
 the House of Commons on the ISth March, 1810; 
 a rejection altogether unexpected by ministers, 
 
 A A
 
 .J^^ Our Fhumccs : 
 
 and wliicli was afterwards declared hy theiii to have 
 been })rodiictive of" great puljlic injury. To this 
 opinion though expressed dehijerately, and h)ng 
 after the first impression of disappointment, we can 
 by no means subscribe. Had the burden been 
 inevitable, and had the question been merely a 
 commutation of one payment for another, a pro- 
 perty-tax might have been somewhat less oppressive 
 than several of the existing imposts ; but, under 
 all the circumstances of the case, the rejection of 
 the bill was, we are satisfied, productive of public 
 good. Men in office, immersed in a routine of 
 business, are often very imperfectly apprized of the 
 circumstances of particular portions of the commu- 
 nity. In the session immediately preceding, they 
 had, by the magnitude of their grants, shown them- 
 selves unconscious of the extent of the loss atten- 
 dant on the transition from war to peace ; of the 
 approaching fall of prices, the increasing pressure 
 of taxation. To all this they were awakened by 
 the loss of the bill, and taught, for the first time in 
 twenty years, the necessity of negativing the im- 
 portunate demands to which the holders of office 
 are perpetually exposed. Besides, a property-tax, 
 had it been imposed in 1816, would have been pro- 
 ductive, distressing as was the time that followed, 
 of loud complaint, perhaps of serious and general 
 injiuy. 
 
 The next financid measure of importance took 
 place in 1819, when ministers having called on 
 parliament to give efficiency to the sinking fund, 
 proposed and carried a measure little expected in 
 the midst of peace, — the imposition of new tiixes to 
 the amount of 3,000,000/. These were imposed 
 chiefly on malt, spirits, and tobacco, and paid with 
 great reluctance during the interval of doubt and
 
 tJie Sinking Fund. 355 
 
 embarrassment which ensued. Ol' late, liowever, 
 brighter prospects liave opened, and a diminution 
 of ex])enditure has been promoted by a concuiTcnce 
 of causes, — tranquiihty among our lower orders ; 
 the reduction of the 5 per cents ; and the transfer 
 of a portion of our half-pay and pension list to the 
 next generation. The consequence has been im- 
 ])ortant and gratifying — a reduction of taxes in 
 tlie last two years to the amount of G,000,000/. 
 
 The Sinking Fund, 
 The idea of a Sinking Fund is of old date, 
 having been conceived more than a century ago, 
 by Sir R. Walpole, the only public man of his age 
 wiio appears to have been conversant with finance. 
 Its plan was simple, the fund being formed in the 
 first instance of a small sum of surplus revenue, and 
 augmented progressively by the interest of such 
 part of the debt as w^as paid off by its operation. 
 Here was no dis})lay of the wojiders of" compound 
 interest, but the long peace that ensued favoured 
 the reduction of debt, and the fund, though small, 
 was progressively increasing. Such continued the 
 course of circumstances until 1733, when the 
 troubled aspect of the Continent, and the difficulty 
 of imposing new taxes, necessitated an interference 
 with some disjiosable resource, and the sinking 
 fund was encroached on. A precedent once given, 
 trespasses became fi'cquent, and this fund, thongii 
 never abolished, ])roved of so slender oj)erati()n, 
 that in the course of ludja century it had not dis- 
 charged above 15,000,000/. of our debt. At lasl, 
 in 178(), the scheme was revivetl with augmented 
 energy, aided on the one hand l)y Dr. Price's 
 flattering calculations of the effect of compound 
 interest, on the other by Mr. I'itt's decl:iri'd dctir- 
 
 A A L>
 
 il'iG Our Fhumccs ; 
 
 mination to consider its funds inviolable. 'J'he new 
 plan was in substance the same as that of Sir K. 
 Walpole, but the reserve was invested with many 
 additional safeguards, being committed to a special 
 board of commissioners who were independent, not 
 merely of the Treasury, but in some respects of 
 Parliament. 
 
 It was at this time that the public first became 
 familiar with the term «* Consolidated Fund," which 
 meant, however, nothing more than our taxes 
 formed into an aggregate, out of which govern- 
 ment pledged itself, whatever might be the pro- 
 portion of our revenue to our expenditure, to pay 
 a million annually to the new commissioners. 
 
 The sinking fund consisted consequently of 
 
 1. An annual million, to which were added : 
 
 2. The amount of government annuities as they 
 successively expired ; and 
 
 3. The interest of such stock as w^as annually 
 redeemed. 
 
 The measure now brought into operation, paid 
 off the following sums : 
 
 In 1787 £ 662,750 Stock. 
 
 1788 1,456,900 
 
 1789 1,506,350 
 
 In 1790 .^1,558,850 Stock. 
 
 1791 1,587,500 
 
 1792 1,507,110 
 
 These sums, small as they were, could hardly be 
 considered bondjide reductions of the public debt, 
 since the Spanish armament in I79O necessitated 
 an addition to our burdens of nearly half their 
 amount. In an arithmetical sense, accordinq-ly, 
 the effect w^as inconsiderable ; in a political sense it 
 was otherwise, as it excited the expectation of great 
 subsequent deductions.^ To strengthen this ex- 
 pectation, and to remove an apprehension that a 
 renewal of war, by necessitating new loans, might 
 cast these annual liquidations into the shade, Mr.
 
 Uic Sinking Fund. S5J 
 
 Pitt obtained, in Vi^M, an act of "parliament declar- 
 ing that all future loans should carry in themselves 
 the means of tiieir progressive extinction, ministers, 
 on contracting a loan, being pledgeil to " ])rovide 
 taxes, not only for the interest but lor an adtlition 
 to the sinking fund." This provision, whether in 
 reality judicious or not, was very favourably re- 
 ceived by the public, and had, in concurrence with 
 the commercial prosperity of the year, the effect of 
 producing a very considerable rise in the funds. 
 
 But this flattering prospect was forthwith over- 
 cast by our participation in the war against France, 
 and the unparalleled magnitude of our expence. 
 The sinking fund was maintained, and operated a 
 large ajjparent reduction, but the result, in a defi- 
 nitive sense, was null, our debt being augmented 
 by our annual loans in a far greater ratio. After 
 all that we have been told of the operation of the 
 sinking fund ; after the pompous statements of 
 hundreds of millions redeemed by it; after all the 
 eloquent effusions in its praise by both sides of the 
 House, the public will learn with some surprise, 
 that since I786, this fund has had a real o])eration 
 during twelve years only, and that the actual re- 
 duction effected by it, has not averaged a single 
 million a year! In this we are to be understood, as 
 leaving the twenty-three years of war wholly out of 
 the question, and coniining our calculation to the 
 six yeai's })receding 171)3, and tlie six years subse- 
 quent to 181.5. 
 
 Compound Interest. — The surj)rising results 
 ascribed in our time to compound interesi will be 
 cited by the future historian, :us alfbrding a striking 
 example of tiie ))ower of enthusiasm in the original 
 calculator, and of the exteni of credulity on the 
 ])art of tlie jniblic, in Nvar, llir ^inking linid i5 
 
 A A J
 
 ,'^58 Our Finances ; 
 
 supported by loans, and is it not apparent, tfiat 
 whatever may be the beneficial result of accinnu- 
 lation in the hands of the commissioners of the 
 sinking fund, tlie loss to the public from the addi- 
 tional loans required by it must be in the same 
 compound ratio ? We might even add, that in all 
 cases of taxation, where the impost has not (and it 
 very rarely has) the effect of inducing economy in 
 the individual, the loss is to be reckoned by com- 
 pound interest, since, had the money been lefl in 
 the hands of the subject, tlie increase would have 
 been in the compound form. 
 
 Without entering into any arithmetical statement, 
 or even pressing the argument in an abstract form, 
 we may safely make the general assertion, tliat the 
 power of the sinking fund, whatever it may have 
 been, has arisen " not from actual payments, but 
 from its influence on the public mind;** — from its 
 presenting ^possibility of an ultimate repayment of 
 the debt; — a possibility transformed into confident 
 expectation by the ardour of the public and our 
 natural inclination to belie^'e what we wish. 
 
 Present State of the Sinking Fund. — Such was 
 the state of our financial concerns until the begin- 
 ning of 1322, when, by the double effect of reduc- 
 tion of expenditure and increase of revenue, an 
 actual surplus was produced, and the sinking fund 
 was likely to become efficient to the extent of 4 or 
 5,000,000/. a year. We seemed now on the eve of 
 attaining the result so long represented as desirable 
 by ministers ; the possession of an engine for raising 
 the price of stocks, or, in other words, for reducing 
 the rate of interest on private securities. In wliat 
 manner, it may be asked, would the latter prove a 
 consequence of the former ? In France, where the 
 14.
 
 the Smhin<>: Fund. 3.59 
 
 interest of the public debt does not Ibrni 10 per 
 cent, of the income arising from ])ro])erly, and 
 government securities do not connnand general 
 confidence, the interest of money vested in land, 
 iiouses, and trade, is not materially affected by the 
 j)rice of the public fimds. Land continues to be 
 bought with eagerness, though yiekling only .'3, 
 3^7, or i per cent, on the })urchase money, at a 
 time when the same capital would yield between 
 5 and (') per cent, in the funds. In this country 
 the case is otherwise. Our })ublic divitlends iorm 
 a considerable propoition of the income arising 
 fi'om property ; they are held by individuals in all 
 [)arts of the country ; and their value naturally 
 uifluences that of other investments of capital. It 
 follows that a rise in the price of stock, in other 
 words, our obtaining less interest from purchasing 
 in the funds, has a chrect tendency to lower the 
 interest on private securities, as has been exempli- 
 fied by the general diminution of the interest on 
 mortgages diu'ing the last and })resent year. 
 
 What, in a statistical sense, are the ciuuacteristics 
 or accompaniments of a low rate of interest ? It is 
 indicative of abundant ca})ital, and of a very ad- 
 vanced state of productive industry. It was this 
 which formed the great featiue in the situation of 
 Holland during the chief part of the 17th and 18th 
 centuries, and enabled her government to lower 
 her dividends at a time (l651) when Fnuice and 
 other states borrowed at very high interest. It was 
 this which, under Sir R. Walpole, afforded the 
 strongest proof of the revival of our financial credit, 
 and which in I7ID enableil Mr. IVlham to ctlect 
 a well-known and highly beneficial reductii)n. But, 
 neither hi these cases, or in any otiier of whicli 
 history has preserved the recoril, did the I'all of 
 
 A A 1'
 
 ;3(J0 O/cr FiiKuire.s ; 
 
 interest proceed from tlie operation of a sinking 
 fund. It rested on a much broader ])asis : it was 
 the natural consequence of confirmed peace ; of 
 the diminished demand for capital ; of a fall, or 
 tendency to fall, in the rate of interest on all secu- 
 rities whether public or private ; it was to a con- 
 currence of these circumstances, much more than 
 to any surplus in the revenue, tliat we attributed 
 the fortunate accomplishment of that great oper- 
 ation, the reduction of the five per cents. 
 
 If our readers see with some surprise these de- 
 ductions from the efficiency of a measure so much 
 vaunted, they will be no less struck with the farther 
 part of our argument ; viz., tliat a large sinking 
 fund, or, to describe it in the most simple terms, a 
 large surplus revenue applied to the redemption of 
 stock, would be productive of public injury. By 
 lowering unnaturally the rate of interest, it would 
 send capital abroad, and operate as a fund to raise 
 the stocks of France or America. This result is 
 too obvious to have escaped the observation of 
 either the Bank directors or ministers : in fact, the 
 readiness wdth which ministers consented both in 
 the last and present year to relinquish their surplus 
 revenue by remitting taxes, seems to indicate a 
 conviction, that a rise in the value of stock, pro- 
 duced artificially, would be replete with injury to 
 the public. They cannot fail to be aware, that 
 since the reduction of the 5 per cents., there 
 remains no adequate motive for interfering with the 
 current rate of interest, or for discovering a soli- 
 citude on the part of government, to raise the value 
 of the funds more than of land, or au}^ other de- 
 scription of property. If, in commercial affairs, 
 ministers have, during the last ten years, evinced a 
 prudent forbearance, and abstained from the inter- 
 17
 
 the Sinking Fund. 36l 
 
 vention so unfortunately exercised by tlieir prede- 
 cessors, is it likely that in finance tliey ^vill follow 
 a different course ? Our debt will hardly admit 
 of direct reduction : our hope of relief is in that 
 diminution of pressure which will follow the in- 
 crease of our means; — the augmentation of na- 
 tional income; — a result most likely to be ])romoted, 
 by strict impartiality as to property, whether vested 
 in land or the public funds. 
 
 But, if such be the conviction of our rulers, 
 why, it may be asked, do tliey still cling to a name, 
 and hold forth the sinking fund to parliament and 
 the country, as an institution entitled to such 
 zealous support ? Partly, we believe, from a wish 
 to retain a surplus of revenue at their disposal, 
 for the relief of suffering interests, or to facilitate 
 measures of evident utility, such as the commu- 
 tation of tithe in Ireland : partly perhajis, from 
 a deficient acquaintance with the backwardness of 
 other countries, and a consequent difh'dence in cal- 
 culating the relative progress of our own. Our 
 true sinking fund is to be sought in the more rapid 
 increase of our national i?iconie, an increase that 
 rests on no visionary basis, but on our mines, our 
 navigation, our capital. Yet no speaker in parlia- 
 ment, whether ministerialist or oppositionist, ap- 
 pears to have as yet studied the comparati\e 
 prospects of England and her neighbours, oi- lo be 
 sufficiently aware of the inferences whicii they 
 justify. 
 
 The admissions successively nv.xdv by the siip- 
 ])orters of the sinking fund (Aj)j)endi\, j). [1().'3].) 
 liave removed part of the mystery which, by the aid 
 of such phrases as " inviolability of de])osit" and 
 *' operation of compound interest," luul so long 
 encircled it. Our present Chancellor of the Exclie-
 
 ;if)2 Our l^'uianccs ; 
 
 (iiicr lias liad tlie good sense to reliiHiuisli the 
 nominal part of" tlie sinking fund, and to describe 
 the remainder merely as a surplus revenue ap[)ro- 
 priated to tlie redemption of stock. As such we 
 request our readers to consider it, and to enable 
 them to compute its amount without unravelling 
 a long list of finance papers, we subjoin an 
 
 Estimate of our Annual Expenditure for 1823 and 1824'. 
 
 Half pay and pensions for tlic Army, 
 
 Navy, and Ordnance, about - £ 4,800,000 
 Ofwhich advanced by the Bank, nearly - 2,0(X),000 
 
 Remainder to be paid out of the ■■ 
 
 current revenue - - - 2,800,000 
 
 Army, exclusive of half pay and 
 
 pensions - - - 7,000,000 
 
 Navy - - - - .5,5(X),0(K) 
 
 Ordnance - . » . 1,200,000 
 
 Miscellaneous - ... 1,500,000 
 
 C-'ivil list ; pensions for Civil Services ; Courts of 
 Justice ; civil Government of Scotland, and 
 some lesser heads, all charged on the Consoli- 
 dated Fund. ... . 2,000,000 
 
 Amount of expenditure distinct from the interest 
 
 of the debt 20,000,000 
 
 Interest of the public debt - ... 30,000,000 
 
 Total - € 50,000,000 
 
 Such is our present expenditure ; and our bo7id 
 fide sinking fund can, of course, be nothing else 
 than the siu'plus of our income above it : it will 
 be found to amount to three, four or more mil- 
 lions, according to the productiveness of tlie 
 revenue. 
 
 The next and equally important question is, 
 whether a surplus when found to exist, '* ought to 
 be applied to the redemption of stock, or made a 
 ground lor the further remission oi' taxes." We
 
 the Sinking Fund. 363 
 
 subscribe, without hesitation, to the hitter, not 
 merely for tJie sake of" rehefto tlie j)ubhc, but on 
 the less-understood ground ol" the injurious con- 
 sequences of interfering with the price of stocks. 
 Against this, liowever, it may be urged, that men 
 of the most opposite views in politics have con- 
 curred in eulogising the sinking limd — that Mr. 
 Fox, was, in this respect, no less zealous than his 
 great antagonist. Mr. Fox, it is well known, 
 never made a study of finance, still less of political 
 economy ; his conclusions in these, as in many 
 other respects, when well founded, owed their 
 justness less to continued research or careful com- 
 parison, than to rectitude of feeling, to a manliness 
 of character, which, in a question like the present, 
 woidd prompt him to adopt without much inves- 
 tigation that course, which should place the burden 
 on the shoulders of ourselves, instead of our pos- 
 terity. Again, Mr. Pitt, when he introduced the 
 sinking fund, was only in his twenty-seventh year, 
 and could not, from the pressure of other a\ oca- 
 tions, have been able to study very closely the 
 operation of a surplus revenue, ap])lied to the pur- 
 chase of stock. He was necessarily unacquainted 
 with the statistical returns which we ])ossess, 
 and which shall be more fiilly noticed in the 
 tbllowdng pages. He had before him no example 
 of a measure tending, by mniatural interference 
 with the rate of interest, to send capital out of the 
 country: still less could he foresee the raj)id increase 
 of our numbers, the sur})rising extension of our 
 productive industry, and the consequent motives 
 for pursuing a system, the reverse of that wliich 
 maintains a sinking fund — we mean, heaiing light 
 on the present generation, and transferring a por- 
 tion of taxation to then' les^ burdeneil successors.
 
 ,'30 J< (hir Finances ; Dis/'nir/ion iif 
 
 If these remarks are at all useful in correcting 
 ])()])ular niisa|)i)re]iension, we shall hope somewhat 
 of a similar result from the following paragra})hs, 
 ralating to the situation of difterent classes of 
 stockholders. 
 
 StockJioldcrs : Disli/iclioti helxveen Permanent and 
 Temporari/ Depositors. — Those of our country- 
 men who have travelled and paid attention to topics 
 of this nature, must have remarked that in France, 
 Germany, Spain, in short, in every country on the 
 Continent, except Holland, the public funds are 
 comparatively little resorted to as a deposit for 
 private property. The governments of these coun- 
 tries have not as yet acquired the confidence at- 
 tached to a representative assembly, and the inha- 
 bitants are little acquainted with the security con- 
 ferred on property by public register, the power of 
 transfer, the steady observance of good faith to- 
 wards the public creditor. Continental lenders 
 require the visible, and, as they account it, solitl 
 security of land and houses. Such, a century and 
 a half ago, was the case throughout England 
 generally, and such, in no small degree, was the 
 case in the provincial part of the kingdom at the 
 beginning of the late war. The general ardour of 
 our countrymen in the contest, their confidence in 
 government, and the comparatively high interest 
 then given by the Treasury, led to the deposit in 
 that ready absorbent, of sums of which the magni- 
 tude would have startled the caution of our fore- 
 fathers. The result of the whole is, that funded 
 property so insignificant in a former age, when 
 compared to the general wealth of the kingdom, is 
 now of an amount approaching to the value of our 
 land, ])articularly if we estimate it not by capital, 
 but (seo p. '258.) by income.
 
 Permanent and Tempnrarif SloclJiolders. 80.5 
 
 Annuitants on our public funds, instead of 
 being confined, as in the last age, to London, 
 Bristol, and a few of our principal towns, are now 
 found in every district, and in every variety of 
 occupation. The great majority of them are })er- 
 manent depositors, strangers to tlie manani\)-c's of 
 the stock exchange, speculating neither on buy- 
 ing or selling, and attentive merely to the lialfl 
 yearly receipt of their dividends. These persons 
 consider the stocks as a fund ])ermanently eligible 
 for themselves and their families, confiding, on 
 the one hand, in the good faith of Parliament, and 
 aware, on the other, of the serious drawbacks at- 
 tendant on property in land and houses, — the dif- 
 ficidty of collecting rents, the heavy charge at- 
 tendant on transfers. The funds, they are aware, 
 involve neither delays nor lawsuits, while, with a 
 view to bequest, they admit of an easy and direct 
 repartition. It is in results such as these, that 
 we recognize all the advantage of established in- 
 stitutions, of the steady observance of good faith 
 on the part of government. Viewed in a national 
 sense, they render a people capable of efforts such 
 as those which maintained the independence, of 
 Holland against the successive attacks of Spain, 
 England, and France: — Viewed in regard to the 
 individual, they ofler a mode of investment almost 
 as much superior to that of the circle of pri\ate 
 connexion, as is afforded by Saving Banks, when 
 compared with the precarious deposits to which 
 the lower orders were formerly accustomed to trust 
 their petty savings. 
 
 What proportion do these persons, the perma- 
 nent depositors in our funds, bear to the body of 
 stockholders at large ? Not less, we believe, than 
 fonr-Jifths of the xv/iok% whether we look to number
 
 3(]G Our Finmiccs ; JYis tine lion of 
 
 or piopcrty. The temporary depositors, liowcvor, 
 few IIS tliey are, fill a more conspicuous ])iact! in 
 the public eye : it is they who bustle on the Slock 
 Exchange, who confer with tlie Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer, and who come conspicuously forward 
 to bear a part in loan contracts. But these persons 
 consider the funds merely as a transient property, 
 a security in which, as in Exchequer bills or mer- 
 cantile acceptances, they may vest a floating sum 
 until the occurrence of a more eligible mode of 
 appropriation. Their calculations as to the price 
 of stocks go no farther than the month or the 
 quarter which may elapse ere it suit them to with- 
 draw their money, for the purpose, perhaps, of 
 transferring it to the funds of the United States of 
 America, France, or the lesser Continental powers. 
 Merchants, it has long been said, are citizens of the 
 world, but of all mercantile men, that is particu- 
 larly the case with temporary stockholders, to whom 
 London, Amsterdam, and Paris, present but one 
 vast exchange. How different this from the jier- 
 manent depositor who exhibits so many character- 
 istics of the retired capitalist, of the inheritor of 
 real property, preferring British security, even at a 
 reduced interest, and not seeking to escape his 
 portion of sacrifice, when satisfied that it is con- 
 ducive to the general relief ! These persons are 
 much more interested in preserving than in ac- 
 quiring ; their object is not a rise of price for the 
 purpose of sale, but secuiity in regard to their 
 capital and strict punctuality in the payment of 
 the interest. 
 
 This disposition has been strikingly exemplified 
 in the late reduction of the five per cents., of which 
 not a jifticth part was sent out of the country y not- 
 withstanding the great temptation offered by foreign
 
 Permanent and Tcmporarii Stockholders. 307 
 
 funds. And if in the three per cents, the perma- 
 nent depositors do not sur})ass the teni})orary in so 
 great a proportion, they form, even in these, beyond 
 all comparison, the majority. 
 
 With what view, it may be asked, do we enter 
 into this discrimination of tem])orary antl peinia- 
 nent depositors ? Partly because it is little under- 
 stood, but more for the purpose of showing the 
 unimportance in a national sense, of the class who 
 come forward as the representatives of the fund- 
 holders at large. It follows, that any measures 
 that may be taken in regard to the funds, should 
 be adapted to the unobtrusive, we may almost say, 
 the silent majority of stockholders. Persons cir- 
 cumstanced as they are, can desire no aid at the 
 expence of the community ; no addition to the 
 market price of stock, except such as shall natu- 
 rally arise from the continuance of peace, the 
 growing abundance of capital. — An artificial proj), 
 such as the sinking fund, they will not hesitate to 
 forego, when a])prized, that in peace it is of inju- 
 rious tendency, and should be considered only as 
 an ingenious scheme by which the financier, in a 
 season of difficulty, seeks to stimulate the avidity of 
 capitalists, and to })rovide lor the calls of the 
 Treasury, without an extravagant sacrifice. 
 
 After these preliminary explanations and (he 
 removal from the mind of the reader of certain po- 
 pular impressions, we shall proceed with ad\ autage 
 to our farther illustrations.
 
 3()S Coinpdralivc Taocufum of 
 
 Comparative Taxation of Hits Cnuntrij and France. 
 
 GREAT BlllTAIN AND IRELAND. 
 
 Computed fur 182;i, after dcdnclin^ llie taxes on salt, leather., and 
 vialt lately reduced : also a portion of the Assessed Taxes. 
 
 Gross amount, inclusive of the expence of collection. 
 
 Assessed taxes - - - £5,000,000 
 
 Customs .... 11,000,000 
 
 Excise .... 27,00O,fXK) 
 
 Stamps .... 6,800,000 
 
 Land-tax .... 1,200,000 
 
 Post-office (nett amount) - - 1;400,000 
 
 Crown lands - - - 200,000 
 
 All other government receipts - - 1,400.000 
 
 i54-,0(X),(XK) 
 Tithe (including Ireland) - . 5,000,000 
 
 Poor-rate, after deducting the portion 
 
 paid (see page 199.) in lieu of wages - 5,000,000 
 
 Total - ^G4-,000,0()0 
 
 being 25 per cent, on our national income 
 as computed in page 257. 
 
 FRANCE. 
 
 Gross amount, inclusive of expence of collection. 
 Fancier, or land and house tax - - 9,000,000 
 
 Mobilier a farther house tax; also the window 
 
 tax ?Lwi\.patentes, or tax on professions - 3,000,000 
 
 Customs .... 2,300,000 
 
 Excise, viz. duties on salt, tobacco, snuff, wine, 
 spirits, beer, and some lesser articles, the 
 whole comprised under the name of droits 
 remiis ... . 9,000,000 
 
 Stamps, viz. enregistremcnt, doinaine ct timbre - 6,000,000 
 Post-office (nett receipt) - - - 600,000 
 
 Sale of wood from the public forests - - 800,000 
 
 All other receipts and contingencies, including 
 a large municipal revenue collected from 
 octrois and other charges borne by the inha- 
 bitants of towns -^ - " - .- 6,300,000 
 
 37,000,000
 
 Enf>;Jan(l and France. 369 
 
 Kqual, alter adding a Htth for the greater value 
 
 of money, in France than in England, to - 45,000,000 
 
 This forms nearly 18 per cent, on the national 
 income of France, as computed in page 270. 
 
 In this table of comparative taxation, the chief 
 distinctive feature is tiie magnitude of our excise, 
 customs, and assessed taxes, tlie proportion of 
 which to the same taxes in France, is as forty to 
 twenty milhons. This puts in a striking' Hght the 
 greater ability to pay on tlie part of a connnercial 
 community, of whicli so large a proportion are re- 
 sident in towns, a circumstance conducive equally 
 to ease of collection on the part of government, 
 and to free consumption on that of the public. 
 Hence, the magnitude of our receipts on spirits, 
 beer, tea, sugar, wine, fruit ; on certain articles of 
 dress, as silk ; or on that which more immediately 
 marks a mercantile society, postage. It lessens, at 
 the same time, the weight of an argument, fre- 
 quently brought against our taxation, but which 
 we are far from adopting in a literal sense, viz. that 
 when computed at so much a head, it amounts to 
 more than twice the average capitation of our 
 neighbours. 
 
 Com Larvs. — These laws may be termed an in- 
 direct impost on the public, payable to landholders 
 as an indemnity for the huul-tax, tithe, and j)oor- 
 rate. They have in particidar years foinied an 
 addition to our j)ayments greatly beyond the 
 amount expended by the landed interest for these 
 burdens ; l)ut at })resent the case is so different, 
 that our corn laws may, in some measure, be con- 
 sidered a dead letter. In oiu- table accordingly we 
 have avoided noticing their operation, and have 
 preferred introducing the amount of the charges 
 
 R B
 
 370 Comparative Taxation. 
 
 which they are intended to counterbalance. In 
 France also there exist restrictions on the import 
 of foreign corn, but they are of little consequence 
 in a country where the growth is, in general, fully 
 equal to the consumption, particularly as import 
 becomes free whenever the average of wheat of 
 home growth approaches to 50^. the Winchester 
 quarter. 
 
 What, it may be asked, is the object of the pre- 
 ceding tables? To draw with distinctness and 
 precision, that which is so often attempted in a 
 loose and exaggerating manner, — a comparison 
 between the burdens of this and other countries, 
 our competitors in the sale of manufactures. The 
 Agricultural Committee of 1821 advanced an opi- 
 nion (Report, p. 22.), that the taxation of other 
 countries compared to their resources is as high as 
 our own. This conclusion our statement does not 
 confirm, but it will probably be instrumental in 
 modifying a very general impression of an opposite 
 nature ; viz. that oui' burdens exceed those of our 
 neighbours, to a degree which, in a manner, baffles 
 all hope of approaching to an equality. Far from 
 joining in this discouraging view of our situation, 
 we are inclined to augur very favourable results 
 from a perseverance in the course of reduction 
 lately adopted by ministers.
 
 371 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Our Prospects in Commerce and Finance, 
 
 Jtrobability of continued Peace. — The events 
 that liave recently occurred on the Continent, 
 unsatisfactory as they are to the friends of con- 
 stitutional freedom, have had at least one i^ood 
 effect, that of putting beyond doubt the determin- 
 ation of our ministers to maintain peace. The 
 debates of 29th and 30th April last, will be me- 
 morable for the declarations to that eflf'ect, made 
 by Mr. Canning and Mr. Robinson, and confirmed 
 by the votes of an overpowering majority. But 
 this, we may be assured, was no new determination 
 on the part of our rulers, the course of circum- 
 stances having long since shown to the reflecting 
 part of our public men, tiiat the only eflectual 
 remedy for the national embarrassment was to be 
 sought in a steady adherence to a pacific system. 
 It will be in the recollection of many of our 
 readers, that the late Lord Lonilonderry, in his 
 speech of 29th April (1822), dwelt strongly on the 
 improbability of our being again called on to bear 
 a part in war, on a scale at all similar to that ot" our 
 late contest. Had the reserve of office permitted 
 his lordship to express himself at large, he might, 
 we believe, have gi/ven the most conc/usit'c argu- 
 ments for this opinion, avowing that the magnitude 
 of our loss, by the war, was unperceived at the 
 time it was incurred ; that ministers, had they com- 
 prehended its extent, would have followed a much 
 
 B B 2
 
 872 Pruhahilih/ if/' 
 
 more cautious course, aiul that no consideration 
 should again prompt tlieni to the once popuhu" sys- 
 tem of vigour. Never, we may add, chd a contest 
 close with more success in its main objects — the 
 change of government in France, and the restoration 
 of independence to Europe; while, as to territorial 
 acquisitions, it rested with us to retain or give back 
 whatever suited our policy. Would it be easy to 
 imagine circumstances more calculated to heal the 
 wounds of protracted warfare, or to prevent that 
 distress in which we have, notwithstanding, been 
 so deeply involved? After such dear-bought 
 experience, is it probable that our government 
 will be easily led to act an aggressive part ; or is 
 it not more likely, that its conduct will, in future, 
 be stamped with a prudence similar to that of a 
 Cecil or a Walpole, — to that which the unambi- 
 tious government of Holland has for ages studied to 
 exemplify ? 
 
 How far is this pacific prospect confirmed by 
 the situation of foreign powers ? The United 
 States of America passed, in February 1821, an 
 Act for reducing to one half, an army which 
 already was far from munerous j and the building 
 of ships of war, prosecuted only in compliance 
 with a temporary enthusiasm, is now also relaxed. 
 Next, as to our great European rival, France is no 
 longer to us the France of Louis XIV. or of Bona- 
 parte : not only is her national power comparati^•ely 
 very different, but the s})rings of court intrigue, 
 the hazard of secret influence on the executive 
 branch, are checked, as in this country, by the 
 freedom of parliamentary discussion. If it be 
 urged, however, that though the nation be inclined 
 to peace, the cabinet may be misled by foreign 
 influence or ministerial prejudices, and that in the
 
 conti7uie(l Peace. 373 
 
 varying scene of European politics, there may 
 arise contingencies calculated to draw France into 
 war, let it be remembered, that her internal situ- 
 ation affords the strongest motives for a return to 
 peace. Her ministers cannot long be blind to her 
 real situation, — to the fact, that her })0])ulation is 
 in a more divided state, the ])reservation of her }n-e- 
 sent government less assured than was the case in 
 England a century ago, when, the Hanoverian 
 family being recently settled on tiie throne, it 
 rcxjuired a steady adherence to pacific ])olicy to 
 prevent a ru})ture, of which the result might have 
 been, that the regal prize Mould have been fought 
 for on British c^round. 
 
 Causes qJ'JVar that no longer eiist. — On taking 
 a retrospect of our history, we shall Hnd that 
 several of the most populai", as well as most sub- 
 stantial grounds of continental war, have ceasetl to 
 exist. This country began to take an active part 
 in foreign politics nearly a century and a half ago, 
 a time when France was so prejwnderant, that 
 during the reigns of William and Anne, continued 
 exertion was necessary to preserve the independ- 
 ence of Europe. The wars of 171-0 and I756 
 owed their origin chiefly to peculiarities in the 
 situation of Austria and Prussia, li' these no longer 
 iurnish a probable ground of war, it is still less 
 likely that we shall be involved in any contest for 
 colonies such as that of 177''^> o^' i" 'i" attempt to 
 regulate the government of our neiglihours, such 
 as that which called Europe to arms in 179^3. 
 Those liberal views in jjolitics, tliat conviction 
 of tlie barren nature of military troj)hies, anil of 
 the substantial fruits of })eace, which were so long 
 confined to the philosophic reader of history, have 
 at last reached our cabinet, and have influenced 
 
 B B S
 
 37 4> Pro ba hilt t if of 
 
 it since 1812, to a degree greater than is generally 
 known. Neither the troubles of (rrecce or of 
 Spain have, for a moment, shaken the pacific 
 determination of our ministers. Add to this, that 
 the restrictive laws, so long connected with our 
 colonial system, have now ceased to fascinate our 
 rulers, and will soon cease to fascinate our mer- 
 chants. Our Board of Trade has expunged from 
 our commercial code, the acts most offensive to 
 foreigners : it no longer listens to scliemes of mo- 
 nopoly, or seeks to found our connnercial pros- 
 perity otherwise than in concurrence with that of 
 our neighbours. The discovery of the real sources 
 of national wealth, has show^n the folly of wasting 
 lives and treasure for those colonial possessions, 
 which, during the last century, in the reign of the 
 mercantile theory, were accounted the chief basis 
 of commercial prosperity. It is now above forty 
 years since the United States of America were 
 definitively separated from us, and since their situ- 
 ation has afforded a proof, that the benefit of mer- 
 cantile intercourse may be retained in all its 
 extent, without the care of governing, or the ex- 
 pence of defending these once-regretted provinces. 
 Mexico, Peru, Chili, Brazil, tiie regions so much 
 coveted by our forefathers, are now open to every 
 flag, and never likely to become, on commercial 
 grounds at least, a cause of wan 
 
 Is it necessary to add arguments to show the 
 fallacy of expecting any national advantage from 
 war ? If we cast our eyes on France, we find her, 
 after considering herself, during many years, the 
 mistress of the Continent, brought back, in 1814, 
 to her ancient limits : if we look at home, we find 
 our countrymen, after believing that our naval 
 superiority, our coiiquests in the east and west, had
 
 continued Peace. S'JS 
 
 brought us unparalleled wealtli, have made the 
 mortifying discovery that our l)urdens far exceed 
 our acquisitions, and that the only substantial ad- 
 dition to our resources, arises from domestic im- 
 provement and augmentation of numbers ; cir- 
 cumstances that had little or no connexion with 
 a state of hostility. Frederic II. of Prussia af- 
 forded, perhaps, the most striking example of suc- 
 cess arising from keeping up a large standing army, 
 having acquired by it, in the first instance, »Silesia, 
 and eventually part of Poland : yet, whoever will 
 calculate, on the one hand, the amount of his 
 sacrifices, on the other, the natural progress of 
 population and wealth during so long a period as 
 his reign (Ibrty-five years), will find that the in- 
 crease of his power would have been fully equal, 
 had he confined himself to the plain and direct 
 course of remaining in peace and improving his 
 hereditary dominions. 
 
 To follow up such a course, to surmount our 
 financial difficulties, and to lieal the woinuls of 
 Ireland, are, doubtless, the chief objects of govern- 
 ment. When these grand points shall be attained, 
 the magnitude of our resources will be so evident 
 as to dispel all apprehension of attack, not only on 
 this country, but on the independeiice of the Ne- 
 therlands, the maintenance of which seems now to 
 form the only sufficient ground for our interfering 
 in a continental contest. 
 
 Our Prospect of ina^ased Resources. — We have 
 already expressed (p. 2,54.) a belief that if we can 
 so conduct our affairs as to get over a few years 
 of difficulty, our financial prospects would brighten 
 beyond those of any other country. The more 
 we examine our situation, the more we .shall find 
 B B 4
 
 S7(') Our Prospect of 
 
 ourselves enal)le(l to trace its evils to transition, 
 derangement, and other causes of" a temporary cha- 
 racter. Our recent experience has shown, that a 
 season of peace will not always be a season of 
 stagnation, and that an increase of ])opulation, pro- 
 ducing consumers as well as producers, has no 
 tendency to over-stock. The order of Providence 
 evidently is, that the industrious should be at no 
 loss for employment. And the old adage, that 
 " England is England's best customer," will be 
 exemplified with ample effect whenever the course 
 of circumstances shall restore things to their level, 
 and whenever the unnatural effect of war and 
 taxation shall be removed. 
 
 In the belief of several of our countrymen, we 
 have arrived at that point beyond w^hich we can 
 hardly expect to carry either our numbers or our 
 wealth. Their apprehension, however, will be 
 found to require no lengthened refutation, and is 
 noticed here chiefly to satisfy those persons, neces- 
 sarily numerous in a commercial country, w^ho, 
 immersed in their respective occupations, have 
 little means of generalizing or of reasoning from 
 the past to the future. The fact is, that our im- 
 provements, whether in agriculture, manufacture, 
 or navigation, are at present no more arrive 1 at a 
 limit, no more threatened with obstacles to their 
 farther progress, than they were a century ago. 
 A negative impression of this nature w^as general 
 thirty years since, yet no age has been so fertile in 
 discovery, in invention, in increase of productive 
 powder j and happily no country possesses, in its 
 resources, whether physical or political, greater 
 means of continuing the career of advancement. 
 Our capital and labour, of which so large a portion 
 was long directed to military purposes, are nov/
 
 increased Resources. .377 
 
 applied to objects of permanent utility. The two 
 great anomalies of our inland situation, ])oor-rate 
 andtitlic, can hardly fail to yield to the intelli*^ence 
 of the age ; and their removal Mould go far to- 
 wards healing the wounds of the suffering portion 
 of the connn unity. 
 
 To bring our calculation to a point, — what an- 
 nual sum may we consider as likely to be added to 
 our national revenue, in a season of peace ? This it 
 is no easy matter to reduce to a s})ecific form, but 
 after establishing (p. 262.), the intimate connection 
 between population and wealth, we may, we trust, on 
 very safe grounds, as far as regards England and Scot- 
 land (leaving Ireland, at least the cottagers of Ire- 
 land, out of the question), assume the increase of 
 numbers as the ratio of the increase of our taxable 
 income. Such certainly may be taken for graiited, 
 when the reduction of our taxation shall have 
 been carried somewhat farther, removing the chief 
 })art of the extra pressure on our national industrv, 
 and placing it, in regard to pul)lic burdens, more 
 nearly on a level with that of our continental com- 
 petitors. 
 
 We proceed to exhibit the result in the form of 
 arithmetical computation. First, as to our num- 
 bers: — instead of requiring our readers to assent 
 to the probability of an addition ainiualh angincMit- 
 ing, we shall confine ourselves to that wliieh is 
 past and ascertained ; viz. the individuals boni in 
 the early part of the century (1S02, S, 1.), who 
 are now entering, year after year, on flie age of 
 productive labour. Next, as to the fiiiits of iheii" 
 labour, represented in the Ibrm of money, we ha\ e 
 already (Ap])endix, j). 77-) calculated the animal 
 addition to our national income from that source 
 at .S,01X),()00/., and as our taxation, even on a
 
 S7S 
 
 Oin^ Pros-peel of 
 
 reduced scale, will be iiilly ^0 per cent, on our 
 income, the consequent addition to our revenue is 
 aboNC 000,000/. Hut here also we shall make a 
 large abatement, and shall call the addition in 
 question only 400,000/. 
 
 Computated Increase of National Incomefrovi the Progress of 
 prodnctivi' Industiij and Population^ assuming such Increase 
 at 400,000/. a-ycar. 
 
 
 Annual Increase 
 
 
 Annual Increase 
 
 Years. 
 
 of the I'roduce 
 
 Years. 
 
 of the Produce 
 
 
 of Taxes. 
 
 
 of Taxes. 
 
 1823 
 
 £ 400,000 
 
 1837 
 
 £ 6,000,000 
 
 1824 
 
 800,000 
 
 1838 
 
 6,400,000 
 
 1825 
 
 1,200,000 
 
 1839 
 
 6,800,000 
 
 1826 
 
 1,600,000 
 
 1840 
 
 7,200,000 
 
 1827 
 
 2,000,000 
 
 1841 
 
 7,600,000 
 
 1828 
 
 2,400,000 
 
 1842 
 
 8,000,000 
 
 1829 
 
 2,800,000 
 
 1S43 
 
 8,400,000 
 
 1830 
 
 3,200,000 
 
 1844 
 
 8,800,000 
 
 1831 
 
 3,600,000 
 
 1845 
 
 9,200,000 
 
 1832 
 
 4,000,000 
 
 1846 
 
 9,600,000 
 
 1833 
 
 4,400,000 
 
 1847 
 
 10,000,000 
 
 1834 
 
 4,800,000 
 
 1848 
 
 10,400,000 
 
 1835 
 
 5,200,000 
 
 1849 
 
 10,800,000 
 
 1836 
 
 5,600,000 
 
 1850 
 
 11,200,000 
 
 This increase supposes neither new taxes or im- 
 pro'sed circumstances on the part of those who 
 pay them : if the latter merely escape deterior- 
 ation, the increase of numbers, the acquisition of 
 the additional labourers in the productive field, will, 
 by the augmented consum])tion of taxed articles, 
 make the computed addition to the revenue. 
 
 Diminution of public Eapenditiu^e. — If it be 
 accounted somewhat confident to anticipate so 
 regular an increase of national income from the 
 mere augmentation of our numbers, we shall call
 
 increased Resources. 879 
 
 in an auxiliary of another kind, — the effect of 
 diminishing expenditure. Economy is evidently 
 tlie wish of ministers, and the rising value of 
 money bids fair to enable them to carry reduction 
 considerably farther, witliout injury to the indi- 
 viduals reduced. Wliat is, in this respect, the 
 effect of the repeal ot« 6,000,000/. of taxes in the 
 last two years ? To lower prices ; to bring money 
 more nearly to the value it bore in 179'2; to render 
 <Jo/. in the present year equivalent to 100/. two 
 years ago. Much, it nuist be allowed, remains to 
 be done ere the long list of charges, rent, wages, 
 i)rofessional attendance, kc, which constitute 
 domestic expenditure, can be brought to their due 
 level ; but the course of circumstances cannot be 
 resisted ; a continuance of peace must be followed 
 by a reduction of these charges in correspondence 
 with that which has already taken ])lace in regartl to 
 provisions ; and when that is accomplished, a tlimi- 
 nution of payment to the servants of the public 
 may be effected without injury to the individuals 
 reduced. 
 
 Comparison of our Nafional Income at prescjify 
 with its Amount a Centurtj a^o. — How far do these 
 encouraging anticipations receive support from the 
 evidence of the ])ast, from a parallel between the 
 England of the ])resent age, and the Englatid 
 of the early part of last century, of the reign of 
 George I.? Since that aara, the produce of our 
 revenue has increased in the ])roportion of more 
 than five to one; but we disclaim /// tofo this mode 
 of computhig our national wealth, and shall build 
 our inferences on a surer Ibundatioii. Our ])()])u- 
 lation in the reign of George 1. ajjpears (see Pre- 
 liminary 0])servation5 to t!ie Population Return
 
 380 Comparadre Resources o/' 
 
 of 18^il) to have been, inchidiiig Ireland, about 
 9,()()(),()()() ; at ])resent it is ^Z%()()(), ()(){), or more than 
 cloiibJe. But tliat is not all : ^hen treating ( A})pen- 
 dix, p. [75]) of the increase of national revenue, 
 we enumerated among the indications of an im- 
 proving society — 
 
 An increase in the propor{ion of persons deriving 
 their income from property distinct from labour. 
 
 An increase in the comparative amount of town 
 population. 
 
 A decrease in that of agriculturists, in conse- 
 quence of the improvements in husbandry, supply- 
 ing the requisite produce with less manual labour, 
 and enabling the country to send a portion of its 
 youth to follow manufacturing and mechanical 
 pursuits in towns. 
 
 Without professing to define the amount of our 
 national income a century ago, no one will doubt 
 that the proportion of *' persons living on income 
 derived from property," has, in that period, greatlv 
 increased. Still less will they question the effect 
 of improvement in agriculture, and the probability 
 that in the reign of George I. above 40 persons in 
 100 were required to raise the national subsistence, 
 which we now find to be produced (see Appendix, 
 p. [72]) by 33 persons in 100. In estimating 
 the whole of our national income, we should pro- 
 bably not exceed the mark by assuming it to be 
 at present three times its amount in the time of 
 George!., but as it is quite unnecessary to press our 
 calculation to its extent, we shall consider it only 
 to have doubled. The next question is, what 
 prospect is before us for the ensuing age or cen- 
 tury ? How far useful discovery and invention 
 may or may not be carried, we cannot venture to 
 calculate, but in other points, there is. fortunately,
 
 England and France, 381 
 
 less uncertainty. Can it be doul)ted tiiat our public 
 men are more enliglitened than their })redecessors 
 a century ago ; that our ])ro(hictive labourers, 
 whether merchants, manufacturers, or farmers, 
 are better provided with capital ; that the ])ubhc 
 in general are more experienced ; and the liope 
 of long periods of peace established on a better 
 foundation ? — This reasoning will be put in a 
 clearer light by a parallel of the resources of our 
 country and those of her hereditary rival. 
 
 Comparison of the Resources of England and 
 France. — The reader, on referring to a statistical 
 return of very remote date, (Appendix, p. [T-^]) 
 will find, that five centuries ago, the town-po})u- 
 lation of England was so insigni6cant that the 
 number of places containing above J,000 inhabi- 
 tants, did not exceed eighteen. In these days, 
 France took a decided lead in population, as in 
 })olitical power : and the subsc(iuent accessions to 
 her territory, by the incor])oration of extensi\e 
 provinces (Brittany, Dau})hiiie, Burgundy), ren- 
 dered her for a long period an over-match for 
 England. In an age of timid navigation, our an- 
 cestors could derive little advantage from their 
 extent of coast, or from the richness of their coal 
 mines, which are valuable only in as far as their 
 bulky products, or the almost equally bulky manu- 
 factiu-es promoted by them, can be conveyed by 
 water. A better prospect was opened by tlu- im- 
 provements that followed the a'ra of the relorma- 
 tion, and the wise government of Elizabeth — the 
 period from which we date, the eflectual cultiva- 
 tion of our national resources. Still our continental 
 rival continued preponderant, and the revenue of 
 Louis XIV. was computed at nearly three times
 
 S8^2 Comparative Resources of 
 
 thai of Charles II. The alliance against France, 
 cemented by the perseverance of William, and 
 rendered victorious by the talents of Marlborough, 
 relieved us from the dreaded overthrow of the 
 political equilibrium ; but even afler our splendid 
 successes, it continued a common opinion amon^ 
 foreigners as among ourselves, that the resources 
 of the French were more solid, and that they 
 would soon equal or surpass us in those arts which 
 form the constituents of national wealth. But so 
 different has been the result, that in no ])eriod of 
 our history have we out-run so decidedly the 
 competition of other countries. In the reign of 
 George I., England, Scotland, and Ireland bore 
 to France, in point of population, the proportion 
 of only 45 to 100 (See Napier's Supplement, heads 
 of " England and France ") ; nor was that of tax- 
 able income much more considerable : at present, 
 in point of numbers, we hold the proportion of 
 70 to 100, and in taxable income of 100 to 100. 
 
 Such has been our comparative progress during 
 the last hundred years; but what, it may be asked, 
 is our prospect for the future ? This may be in 
 part answered by observing the principal discove- 
 ries of late date, and marking the connection that 
 happily prevails between them and the physical 
 advantages which belong to our country. Steam 
 navigation, for instance, is evidently of greatest 
 avail to the country which possesses coals, iron, 
 and extent of coast. But even in branches totally 
 different, such as the manufacture of silk, a branch 
 in which we long despaired of success, we have of 
 late years gained ground on our continental rivals: 
 nor need we, since with the aid of Ireland we are 
 assured of an adequate supply of agricultural pro^ 
 duce, apprehend the recurrence of a high price of
 
 England and France. 3^3 
 
 labour, or the emigration of our master manufac- 
 turers. 
 
 We proceed to bring our statement to the test 
 of arithmetical calculation, talking as our basis, 
 the comparative increase of nunil)ers in France 
 and tliis country. To those who do not clearly 
 understand in what maimer increase of niunbers 
 conduces so directly to increase of national re- 
 sources, we would recommend to leave out of the 
 question the infantine part of society, and to con- 
 tine their attention to those approaching to tlie age 
 of twenty, the age of producti\e labour. Om- 
 population returns have, ever since 1801, exhi- 
 bited an increase of 1^ percent, a year; these 
 persons are now attaining maturity, and entering 
 the field as new contribiitois to our national in- 
 come, while in France the proportion of such new 
 contributors is, and has been ever since 1801, not 
 quite one per cent, annually. Assuming a similar 
 proportion for the future, the inference is, that 
 in France the augmentation of national income, 
 reckoned at 10 })er cent, in ten years, will be 
 hardly - ... ^21,000,000 
 
 But in this country, the increase, 
 computed by the same rule, viz. the 
 ralio of the addition to ])Opulation 
 (1.5 per cent, in ten years) will pio- 
 duce nearly - - - 30,(K)0,()00 
 
 The increase of numbers in this country takes 
 place chieHy among mechanics, manufiicturers, 
 merchants, and others, whose exertion is directly 
 conducive to increase of \Neaith; bul in France, tiie 
 increase of numbers is as slow in toxvns as in ninil 
 districts ; m consequence of which, the augmenta- 
 tion of property seems mciely to kee}) pace with 
 that of popidatiou. Hence, the tardy increase of
 
 UHl ( 'omparative Resourcci oj 
 
 the ))iil)lic revenue, and the stationary condition 
 of the inhabitants, many of whom foHow no other 
 occupation, and liold no liiglier rank in society 
 than tlieir forefathers two centuries ago. 
 
 Were we inclined to continue the })arallel, we 
 should find that even as to population, we shall pro- 
 bably overtake our ancient rival, ere another ge- 
 neration pass away. Meantime, those who know 
 that the issue of a military struggle de})ends not so 
 much on population as on disposable revenue, will 
 be satisfied that at present we should ha\e no 
 cause to dread a contest, single-handed, with that 
 power against which our forefathers were obliged 
 to seek safety in continental alliances. Or, sup- 
 posing that from any unforeseen cause, our mari- 
 time force should become less predominant, and 
 that a war betw^een the two countries were to be 
 decided on shore, we should have no great reason 
 to dread the result, or to regard invasion with the 
 alarm which it excited during the last century. 
 
 This course of reasoning applies in a consider- 
 able degree to Russia, Austria, and other conti- 
 nental powers : in none is the degree of increase 
 in population, and certainly not in national wealth, 
 on a par with this country. We have, therefore, 
 little to dread from attack ; and as we shall as- 
 suredly not make our superiority a source of aggres- 
 sion, the conclusion is, that our situation presents 
 a solid hope of continued peace, and of all the 
 advantages arising from the undisturbed extension 
 of our productive industry.* 
 
 * Those among our readers who imagine that there is still 
 somewhat of over-confidence in the preceding reasoning, will 
 do well to consult the following sketch of '• the public re- 
 venue" of the two countries, which is, we believe, sufficiently
 
 England and France. 
 
 385 
 
 accurate, and puts in a striking light the progress of this country 
 during the last two centuries. 
 
 
 Public Revenue. 
 
 Englan'i, after de- 
 
 Ypar<: 
 
 
 
 ducting for differ- 
 
 
 France. 
 
 England. 
 
 ence ill the value ol 
 money. 
 
 1550 
 
 a£l,500,000 
 
 ^600,000 
 
 ^600,000 
 
 1600 
 
 2,500,000 
 
 900,(X)0 
 
 900,000 
 
 '1660 
 
 4,000,000 
 
 1,2(X),000 
 
 1,200„000 
 
 1700 
 
 8,000,000 
 
 4,000,000 
 
 4,000,000 
 
 1750 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 7,000,000 
 
 7,0(X),000 
 
 1790 
 
 22,000,000 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 13,000,000 
 
 1823 
 
 33,000,000 
 
 52,000,000 
 
 42,000,000 
 
 c c
 
 38G 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Views of Finance suggested by our Situation and Prospects, 
 
 Difference in the Nature of our Resources since 
 the Peace, — The radical difference in the sources of* 
 our financial supplies, in peace and in war, is, as yet, 
 very imperfectly understood by the public : it may, 
 however, receive some illustration, from a reference 
 to the measures adopted during our great contest. 
 It was in 1797> in the fourth year of the war, that 
 circumstances pointed out to Mr. Pitt, the neces- 
 sity of a radical change in his financial plans — the 
 substitution of war taxes for loans. The length to 
 which the latter had been carried, exceeded the 
 disposable funds of the monied interest ; while, on 
 the other hand, the increase of productive industry, 
 the rise of wages, salaries, rents, all concurred to 
 strengthen the hope of a liberal supply from tax- 
 ation. Mr. Pitt seized the distinction with his 
 usual promptitude, and erected on it a structure, 
 the eventual magnitude of which, proved one of the 
 wonders of the age. What concurrence of circum- 
 stances enabled him and his successors to carry 
 taxation so far ? During the war, our capital and 
 labour had ample employment : competition from 
 abroad on the part of foreigners, or what might 
 have proved far more formidable, our emigrating 
 countrymen, w^as wholly out of the question. The 
 transfer of English capital to the continent was 
 prevented, as well by a dread of lawless conduct on
 
 Taxation, a Cause ofEmharrassment . 387 
 
 the part of the French government, as by a more 
 gratifying consideration, the profits reaUzed at 
 home. .Since the peace, circumstances are entirely 
 altered ; the competition of foreigners is to be 
 dreaded ; capital has been placed in foreign funds, 
 and emigration, had not the price of provisions 
 fallen among us, might have been carried to a ruin- 
 ous length. The profit of stock, the wages of part 
 of the lower classes, the emoluments of the higher, 
 most incomes, in short, except those of the annuitant 
 on the public funds, have undergone diminution, 
 the wiiole pointing as much to the necessity of re- 
 ducing taxation in peace, as our situation during 
 war indicated the practicability of its increase. 
 
 How far is Taxation a Cause of Embay^rassment ? 
 — What, it may be asked, have been the most pro- 
 minent characteristics of our national embarrass- 
 ment since 1814? A deficiency of employment, 
 among part of the lower orders, and distress, from 
 insufficiency of wages, at those intervals when pro- 
 visions were high priced. In the middle classes, 
 whether merchants, manufacturers, or agriculturists, 
 the general ground of complaint has been an inade- 
 quacy of profit ; a disproportion of prices to the 
 cost of production. The principal cause of these 
 and other difficulties was, doubtless, as explained 
 in the preceding chapters, the magnitude of^ the 
 transition, the suspension of government expendi- 
 ture, and the consequent over-stock of hands. That 
 such would have been severely felt under a taxation 
 as light as that of Switzerland or the United States 
 of America, admits of no doubt ; but it never would 
 have reaJicd such an extent, or coiitinuetl until the 
 ninth year of peace, had not our public burdens, 
 and consequently the expence of Uving, been higher 
 
 c c 2
 
 .'■tSS Injvrii arising 
 
 than among our neighbours. Emigration and the 
 export of capital would, in a different case, have 
 been comparatively inconsiderable ; and additional 
 means of promoting j/roductive industry would 
 have been possessed at home. 
 
 Having no wish to press our arguments to an 
 extreme, we disclaim, without hesitation, the aid of 
 certain popular notions, such as that " a taxed 
 commodity after passing through three or four dif- 
 ferent hands, is enhanced by 20 or 30 per cent, 
 charged by the dealers for their advance on the 
 tax.'* We know too well the slender profit of either 
 wholesale or retail business, to give credit to such 
 loose assertions ; a dealer is in general satisfied 
 with a charge of 2 or 3 per cent, on his ad\ance, 
 so that this argument, though not undeserving of 
 attention, has no claim to a prominent rank in the 
 objections to taxation. These will be found suffi- 
 ciently serious without the aid of exaggeration : it 
 can hardly be disputed that our high duties tend, 
 to raise our prices above the currency of our neigh- 
 bours, and we have the sanction of Dr. Smith 
 for saying that " a rise in the money price of com- 
 modities, "when peculiar to a country, tends to dis- 
 courage more or less every department of industry 
 carried on within it, enabling other nations to 
 undersell it, not only in the foreign but in the home 
 market;" — an opinion to which we subscribe in the 
 words of its illustrious author, notwithstanding all 
 tbe qualifications of it which we have read in the 
 publications of the political economists of the day. 
 To bring this question into a more definite form, 
 we subjoin a table of the
 
 from Taxation. 
 
 .389 
 
 Taxes uihich bear, more or less directly, on the comjorit qflifCy 
 <or interfere, more or less directly, ivil/i the extension of productive 
 industry. 
 
 Assessed Taxes 
 
 since the 1 
 
 reduction 
 Malt and Beer"! 
 
 since the re- > 
 
 ductionin 1822 J 
 Stamps 
 
 Sugar - - - 
 
 Tea . . - 
 Foreign Timber - 
 Coals carried 7 
 
 coastways J 
 Soap - - - 
 
 xesl 
 
 ate S- €4,500,000 
 
 6,500,000 
 
 6,500,000 
 3,000,000 
 3,000,000 
 1,000,000 
 
 900,000 
 
 900,000 
 
 Leather since the! 
 
 
 reduction in > 
 
 €300,000 
 
 1 .SL^'J J 
 
 
 roreign Wool 
 
 3(X),000 
 
 Cotton 
 
 5(X),(KK) 
 
 Paper - 
 
 •100,000 
 
 Glass 
 
 400,tKK) 
 
 Candles and Tallow- 
 
 40(),(XK) 
 
 Bricks and Tiles 
 
 3(X),0{K) 
 
 Auction Duties 
 
 240,000 
 
 Hemp 
 
 200,(K)0 
 
 Starch 
 
 50,000 
 
 The whole forming a sum of nearly 30,000,000/,* 
 
 To draw the line of distinction between the ne- 
 cessaries and superfluities of life, between the 
 greater or less injury arising from taxation to pro- 
 ductive labour, is a task of great nicety. There 
 can, it is true, be little doubt that such imposts as 
 those on leather, candles, green ghiss, bricks, tiles, 
 soap, starch, coal, are direct burdens on industry ; 
 charges which must have many bad effects, such as 
 
 * To give the reader a complete view of our fiscal burdens, 
 we subjoin the following, which are left out of the text, as 
 
 Taxes ■which appear to interfere less tvith our productive in- 
 dustry. 
 
 Post-office - £1,400,000 
 
 Foreign spirits, ) 
 
 chielly brandy/ 
 British spirits 
 Licences for pub- ) 
 
 licans, &c. J 
 Wine 
 Tobacco andsnuff) 
 
 (Excise) f 
 
 Tobacco (Customs) 
 Coffee and cocoa 
 Rum 
 
 Silk, raw and thrown 
 East India piece) 
 
 goods i 
 
 2,300,000 
 3,000,000 
 700,000 
 1,600,000 
 2,400,000 
 
 500,000 
 100,000 
 
 )ds'l 
 
 '"■{ 
 
 s - 
 2ign butter ) 
 id cheese J 
 
 Printed goods 
 
 (home niant 
 
 iacture) 
 Foreign linens 
 Foreij 
 
 and 
 Tallow 
 Raisins and other |^ 
 
 Iruits I 
 
 600.000 Barilla and other | 
 
 300.0001 tlrugs / 
 200,000! I'cpper 
 
 Skins and furs 
 Mahogany 
 Varion- other diiticf> 
 
 c c 3 
 
 €570,000 
 
 80,000 
 100,000 
 100.000 
 100,000 
 
 150,000 
 
 150,(X)0 
 
 50.000 
 
 50,000 
 
 1. 000.000
 
 impairing personal comfort, raising the nominal rate 
 of wages, or lessening our exports. On the other 
 liand, it may happen that imposts, the least excep- 
 tionable in the view of individuals, may, on the 
 ground of fiscal calculation, have the earliest claim 
 to diminution. Thus, wine, spirituous liquors, and 
 lace, appear fair objects of high taxation, but if the 
 duty be so great as to hold forth to smugglers a 
 premium such as enables them to prosecute their 
 business in spite of all the vigilance of our cruisers, 
 an abatement of duty may be found an indis- 
 pensable alternative. In the case of sugar, the 
 question of abatement stands on different groimds. 
 In an article so acceptable to general taste, and so 
 innocent in its effects, we are justified in expecting 
 a regular extension of sale, in proportio?i to the 
 diminution of price. This has been in a consider- 
 able degree exemplified at different intervals of de- 
 pression in the market, and seems to authorize the 
 inference, (and a very important one it is,) that a 
 reduction of the duty Avould have the effect of ex- 
 tending the consumption, and of gratifying the 
 lower orders without much injury to the revenue. 
 
 On these different claims to priority in the re- 
 duction of taxes we acknowledge our inability to 
 decide. The records of the Treasury, doubtless, 
 contain materials calculated to throw light on these 
 intricate enquiries, although even with such an aid 
 the result of reduction will, at times, be found to 
 differ considerably from previous expectation. "We 
 decline accordingly to enter on this uncertain field, 
 and confine ourselves to the general question of the 
 pressure of taxation. 
 
 Examples of Injury from Taxation. — The un- 
 seen injury arising from taxation, its interference
 
 from Taxation. 391 
 
 with the free course of manufacture, is much 
 greater than is suspected by the pubHc. To form 
 a correct idea of this, would require an investiga- 
 tion into all the branches in which the activity and 
 invention of individuals are repressed by the regu- 
 lations of the excise. Of their effect in the case of 
 distillers, some idea may be formed from the evi- 
 dence given before the Sugar Distillery Connnittee 
 in 1808. To advert to a very different case, we shall 
 take an illustration familiar to those who transact 
 business as underwriters, and who know the extent 
 of the reduction produced by peace in the terms of 
 insurance. To a war premium of 6, 8, or 10 per 
 cent., a policy duty of one-fourth per cent, on the 
 sum insured formed an addition of little conse- 
 quence, but when premiums were lowered to .2 or 
 3 per cent., it was found a heavy proportional 
 chariie, and afforded an inducement to fbrcifrn 
 merchants to effect their insurances at llamburuii 
 and other ports, where the duty is comparatively 
 light. The consequence is, that the recent reduc- 
 tion of our policy duty has, in some degree, come 
 too late. 
 
 Ship-owning, often a losing investment of capital 
 during the war, has been doubly so since the j)eace, 
 and can hardly prove otherwise, until by reducing 
 the attendant charges, we shall enable our buiklers, 
 our rope-makers, and others, to meet foreign com- 
 petitors on equal terms. Navigation does not, like 
 iiome trade, admit of controul by interior regula- 
 tion : its scene of competition is the ocean, and 
 success in it can be attained only by a clear supe- 
 riority over foreigners. Countries j)ossessing forests 
 of timber in the vicinity of a navigable river, enjoy 
 already one great advantage over our shij)-builders: 
 to increase that by an impost on the foreign timber 
 
 c c 4-
 
 392 Reduction of 
 
 used by our countrymen, is to place them on a foot- 
 ing of inferiority inadequately balanced by our 
 extra duties on goods im])orted in foreign vessels. 
 A reduction of the duty on foreign timber and 
 hemp, seems an indispensable preliminary to our 
 successful competition with foreign ship-builders, 
 — a competition which would not then be hopeless, 
 when we consider the superiority of our workmen, 
 and the recent fall in the cost both of their mainte- 
 nance, and of the conveyance of foreign materials 
 to our shores. 
 
 It would be easy to multiply examples of pres- 
 sure from taxation, but there can, we believe, be 
 little doubt on several essential points, as 
 
 That it forms a main obstacle, to the general free- 
 dom of trade which government seem so desirous 
 to introduce ; 
 
 That on a considerable part of the public it bears 
 harder now than during the war ; and 
 
 That in general its pressure is greater in Eng^ 
 land than on the Continent. 
 
 After all the additional means conferred by our 
 navigation, our extent of town-population, and our 
 superior agriculture, the payment of 64,000,000/. a 
 year, must bear harder on the national income of 
 this country than that of 45,000,000/. (see p. 369. 
 of this chapter) on that of France. On the Conti- 
 nent, the evils of transition from war to peace have 
 not been altogether so serious ; the failures among 
 merchants and manufacturers have been less numer- 
 ous ; while among their agriculturists the decline 
 of price, much as it is complained of, has been less 
 ruinous than in this country. 
 
 How far 'would a Reduction of Taxation be pro- 
 ductive of Relief ? — We shall suppose, for the sake
 
 Taxation. 393 
 
 of giving our argument a definite form, that it is 
 proposed to discuss the expediency of making a 
 farther reduction of our taxes to the extent in all 
 of 6,000,000/. Were that abatement directed in 
 ioto to some specific branches of industry, for ex- 
 ample, those connectetl with the use of such articles 
 as leather, coals, timber, there seems little doubt 
 that, though like all other changes, it would for 
 some time be productive of a derangement of work, 
 the stock of em])loymcnt eventually created would 
 supply that which in }'ears of distress was our 
 principal desideratum^ — a sufiicient demand for 
 labour. We shall take, however, the least favour- 
 able supposition, assuming that our public men are 
 not agreed in regard to the farther taxes to be re- 
 pealed, and that the 6,000,000/. of which we con- 
 template the reduction, must be abated in the form 
 of a per centage on the revenue at large. What, 
 it may be asked in the next place, would be the 
 result of such abatement to the individual? A 
 diminution of charge to the extent of two or three 
 per cent, on his expenditure, — an object of no 
 great consequence, it is true, to the land-holder, 
 the retired capitalist, or any person out of business j 
 but one which in the hands of the merchant, the 
 manufacturer, or the farmer, woukl form an engine 
 of great efficiency. In the case of an individual 
 out of business, the amount of annual disburse re- 
 presents only the expenditure of himself "and family; 
 in business, on the other hand, it comprizes wages, 
 salaries, and other outlay to an amount frequently 
 of three, four, or five times the house-keeping ex- 
 pence. That which in the one case would j)rove a 
 saving of only 20/. a year might, and generally 
 would amount in the other to 100/. Now j)ersons 
 m business form evidently the stay of a commer-
 
 39'if Reduction of 
 
 cial country, the class whose prosperity is decisive 
 oftliiit of" the community at large. 
 
 Tiiis will be apparent on our pursuing our rea- 
 soning a step farther, and examining the effect of 
 a reduction on our means of maintaining a compe- 
 tition with foreigners. The consequence would be 
 that our w'oollens, our cottons, our hardware, might 
 be sent to foreign markets two or three per cent. 
 chea})er than at present. To those who have a due 
 sense of the smallness of mercantile profit, (Speech 
 of Mr. Baring, loth July 1822,) even this limited 
 reduction will appear of great importance, enabling 
 us to compete with our foreign rivals, the manu- 
 facturers of France, Germany, and the Nether- 
 lands. To these, since the inauspicious aera of our 
 Orders in Council, we must add the inhabitants of 
 the Northern States of the American Union, the 
 return of the State of New York for 1821, exhibit- 
 ing a value of 8 or 10,000,000/. sterling, (chiefly 
 woollens and cottons,) manufactured among a po- 
 pulation of little more than a million. 
 
 But our national industry is, it may be said, 
 already amply productive, whether in agriculture 
 or manufacture ; — the evil lies in a want, not of 
 produce, but of vent, and our neighbours, whether 
 Germans or Belgians, have long complained of the 
 free admission of our fabrics. This, however, 
 proves little more than that in certain branches 
 foreigners kre unable to compete with us, and that 
 our rivalship, if continued, may induce them to 
 give a different direction to a part of their labour 
 and capital, manufacturing commodities of which 
 we should probably become the purchasers, in con- 
 sequence of changes that would follow the increased 
 freedom of trade. A state of continued peace im- 
 plies a reduced scale of profits, a limited return for 
 
 li
 
 Ta^vaUoii. 395 
 
 capital, but not necessarily an overstock of mer- 
 chandize or deficiency of employment. In harvest 
 we generally have an opportunity of observing, 
 that the su])])ly of labourers is not superabiuidant, 
 and since the beginning of last year, :here has 
 existed no over-stock but in agriculture. Even in 
 a dull season the surcharge of hands is less great 
 than is commonly supposed. To add a twentieth or 
 even a thirtieth to the existing demand for labour, 
 in other words to find employment for 100,000 in- 
 dividuals of the lower order, would, on most occa- 
 sions, prove a change completely satisfactory. 
 
 If we proceed to make an analysis of the causes 
 which determine the quantity of produce prepared 
 among us, either by the loom or the plough, we 
 shall find it to depend mainly on the " amount of 
 capital and number of workmen in the coimtry,'* 
 points in which, of course, no legislative j)rovision 
 can effect any speedy change. It is a fact, that 
 for a series of years the quantity jirepared for a 
 losing market is nearly as large as for a profitable 
 one ; so great is the power of habit, the necessity 
 of following up an ^stablislied trade or profession. 
 This result, so difierent fiom the inferences of 
 some political economists, is, doubtless, promoted 
 by our poor-law system : it was exemplified on the 
 part of our manuflicturers amid the continued dis- 
 tresses of 1819 and 1820 ; and experiences at pre- 
 sent a confirmation in the case of our farmers. 
 
 From all these facts what inference do we make, 
 and what are we to consider the probable result of 
 a reduction of taxation? Not overstock in atii/ branch 
 of manufacture, butsecur'iti/fromforcii^n competition ? 
 
 Oljections ansxverccL — Various arguineiUs may, 
 we are aware, be advanced as well by men in office 
 as others, against any considerable change ni our
 
 .^96 Taa^ation ; 
 
 fiscal arrangements. Taxes repealed or modified, 
 cannot, they will say, be re-imposed. Charges 
 that have interwoven themselves with our habits 
 ought not to be abruptly removed. To this we 
 answer, that several of our taxes are such as ought 
 never to have been im})osed, indicating, as they do, 
 the rudest state of financial science, and betraying 
 an almost total unconsciousness of the check given 
 by these burdens to productive industry. As to 
 the question of re-imposition, we have, happily, 
 good ground for dismissing the apprehension of 
 retracing our steps ; but, supposing, for the sake of 
 argument, tliat such were to become in some de- 
 gree necessary, the new taxes would be of an alto- 
 gether different nature. A property-tax to the 
 extent of 2^, perhaps 5 per cent., would, doubtless, 
 receive the sanction of parliament, in preference to 
 a revival of such duties as those on malt, salt, 
 leather, coals, or the house and window-tax. 
 
 Next, as to the evils apprehended from transi- 
 tion, — from that state of change, which, to a nation 
 as to an individual, is always unprofitable and fi:e- 
 quently pernicious. Evils of that nature, would, 
 even on a diminution of our burdens, occur in a 
 variety of modes not anticipated by the public, but 
 their duration would necessarily be temporary, and 
 their amount might be lessened by various arrange- 
 ments, such, perhaps, as making our future reduc- 
 tions consist less in an absolute repeal of a few 
 particular taxes than in a modification, a partial 
 diminution of a number ; — a course which might, 
 besides, have the effect oi relieving government 
 from much importunate solicitation. 
 
 Such are the arguments for a reduction of taxa- 
 tion. Inconsiderable as the proposed abatement
 
 Plan o/M. Xecker. Sgj 
 
 may appear, no one can say liow materially our pro- 
 ductive industry may be promoted by it : but were 
 immediate relief not to prove the consequence, we 
 should have at least the satisfaction of entering on 
 that path, which must eventually lead to a favour- 
 able issue. The modifications made last session in 
 our navigation and corn laws have a title to general 
 approbation, yet no one expects from them imme- 
 diate relief, or regards '!iem in other li^lit than as 
 an approximation to a better system. In like man- 
 ner a diminution of taxes would bring us more 
 nearly to a level with the rest of the civilized 
 world, giving our manufacturers a fair chance in 
 the field of competition, relieving our aniuiitants 
 from the necessity of emigrating, and placing us 
 nearer to that equality of prices which would admit 
 of unrestricted trade, and estabhsh our prosperity 
 on a solid basis. 
 
 Pla?i of Finance pursued by M. Necker. — The 
 financial concerns of France have been, in gene- 
 ral, badly conducted, and taxation has, time im- 
 memorial, been a subject of complaint among a 
 people whose national character is far from que- 
 rulous. This was more particularly the case in 
 the latter years of Louis XV., after winding up the 
 arrears of the expensive and inglorious war con- 
 cluded in 1763. The 18,000,000/. constituting, at 
 that time, the clear produce of the taxes of" France, 
 were levied in so aukward and circuitous a mode 
 as to cost 4 or 5,000,000/. in the collection, and a 
 sum perhaps equally large in the injury arising 
 from the obstructions which it caused to the free 
 course of industry. Different provinces in France 
 were subject, in these days, to different imposts ; 
 the frontier lines were discriminated from each
 
 39^ Taxation ; 
 
 other by custom-houses Hke the boundaries of 
 distinct kingdoms; the transit of merchandize was 
 taxed ; the douaniers or custom-house officers 
 multiplied beyond all due proportion. At that 
 time, as at present, the imposts on consumption 
 were comparatively small, and a great part of the 
 revenue arose from a land tax similar in its nature, 
 but more unequal in its collection than the present 
 Fonder. 
 
 M. Necker, the first real financier whom France 
 had seen for a century, received his official ap- 
 pointment in I77G, and had hardly begun to intro- 
 duce order into this chaotic mass, when, in 1778, 
 the course of circumstances caused the French 
 court to depart from its pacific policy. The humane 
 character of Louis XVI., and the necessity of con- 
 tinued economy, were strong arguments for the 
 preservation of peace, but the cause of the Ameri- 
 can colonists, when opposed to England, could 
 not be otherwise than popular while the French 
 had fresh in recollection, a war in which we had 
 struck such fatal blows at their nav}% and deprived 
 them of so many Trans- Atlantic possessions. Louis 
 and his ministers were thus obliged to yield to the 
 public voice ; fleets were to be equipped, and con- 
 siderable expence to be incurred. M. Necker, on 
 whom the task of providing the pecuniary supplies 
 devolved, was aware of two things ; first, that at 
 that time the imposition of fresh taxes would be 
 wholly unadvisable ; and next, that eventually the 
 resources of France would be more tlian equal to 
 her burdens. He conceived accordingly the plan 
 of meeting the new demands by annual loans, for 
 the interest of which, he made provision, not by 
 taxes, but by the abolition or reduction of pen- 
 sions, and of many unnecessary appendages of the
 
 Plan ofM. Necker. 399 
 
 court. At that time, as at present, France cxlii- 
 bited few sinecures of the first magnitude, but an 
 endless list of unmerited grants, of supernumerary 
 offices, of unauthorized appropriations of the public 
 money. The confidence inspired by the i)ersonal 
 respectability of the minister, and the prospect of 
 great improvements in the fiscal administration of 
 France, induced the monied interest on the con- 
 tinent to subscribe to the loans of M. Necker, 
 without the guarantee of a parliament, or the al- 
 lotment of specific funds for the payment of the 
 interest. In this manner, he succeeded (Flennet 
 on French Finance) in borrowing 15,UUU,0UU/. 
 sterling, in three years, at moderate interest, and 
 would, doubtless, have conducted the war to its 
 close, without a single impost, had not circum- 
 stances led to his abrupt retirement from ofHce in 
 1781. 
 
 Does this example supply any inference ap})li- 
 cable to our present situation ? If the amount 
 borrowed by M. Necker, appear small, it was far 
 from small when we consider the limited resources 
 of France. Then, as at present, her towns were 
 neither numerous nor large : the majority of her 
 inhabitants were scattered over rural districts ; her 
 manufacturers were adequate only to home con- 
 sumption ; the increase of her population was slow. 
 How different the present state and prospect of 
 productive industry in this country, possessed as it 
 is, of rich mines, extensive water communication, 
 abundant capital, — the whole with a j)o])ulation 
 rapid in its increase, and formed to habits of busi- 
 ness. With such auxiliaries, is it going too far, to 
 ask, whether we are not justified in looking to the 
 future with the favourable expectation entertained 
 by M. Neckei", especially as in one material point
 
 400 The Question uj 
 
 wc may reason witli a confidence greater than lie 
 could feel, — we mean the hope of continued peace ? 
 Nothing indeed can be more flattering than our 
 prospects, provided we are enabled to give relief to 
 the suffering part of the public. This, it is evident, 
 could be best accomplished by cancelling or reduc- 
 ing the more injurious of our fiscal burdens; and 
 we now proceed to enquire whether circumstances 
 justify our imitating the example of the French 
 minister, and substituting a small annual loan for 
 a portion of the taxes repealed. We say a portion, 
 because there seems little doubt, that the produc- 
 tiveness of the remaining imposts would be so much 
 increased, as to enable government, if they deter- 
 mined on borrowing i;f 4,000,000 annually, to repeal 
 taxes to the extent of 5 or ^6,000,000. 
 
 The Question of a small Annual Loan in lieu of 
 Taj^es. 
 
 State of the Monied Interest. — Amidst all the 
 losses and complaints of late years, the monied in- 
 terest, that mixed body of bankers, retired mer- 
 chants and capitalists, have, in a great measure, 
 escaped the general distress. Their situation has 
 exempted them from the fluctuations experienced 
 by many other classes ; by our agricultuiists, our 
 manufacturers, our exporters of merchandize to 
 the West Indies and America. The monied in- 
 terest comprises a number of old estabUshments, 
 who conduct their business more conformably to 
 rule and calculation than several other portions of 
 the mercantile community : they are strangers to 
 the hazard of credit, and the still greater hazard 
 of distant markets. The cloud, which, from the 
 depreciation of our currency, overhung them in
 
 a .swr/// Annual Loan. \0\ 
 
 tlie latter years of the war, has disappeared, and 
 the late reduction of" the rate of interest, consider- 
 able as it is, may be considered as innoxious to 
 them, their incomes having gained, or being likely 
 to gain, in value what they have lost in amount. 
 The fact is, that they have periodically at their 
 disposal, particularly after receipt of the public 
 ■dividends, a fund of ready money, which has 
 caused the rise in our stocks, so idly ascribed to a 
 sinking fund, and M'hich has also afforded large 
 supplies to the exchequers of our neighbours. 
 
 Transmission of Capital to Foreign Countries. — 
 The interest of money is always highest in the least 
 advanced communities, and capital has conse- 
 quently a tendency to move thither, not rapidly, 
 we allow, but progressively. It is thus that at pie- 
 sent it begins to be withdrawn from England, ex- 
 actly as in the 17th and 18th centuries it was with- 
 drawn from Holland. Last year was remarkable 
 for the extent of such transfers, and by writers who 
 do not scruple to take an extra latitude in a popu- 
 lar argument, the imprudence with which these 
 advances were made, and the losses of which they 
 were productive, might be made the ground of 
 a vehement ap})eal in siip})ort oi" oiu- })lan of ex- 
 changing a ])art of our taxation for an annual loan. 
 We are desirous, however, to avoid all such ap- 
 peals, and to state deliberately and impartially, the 
 arguments on either side. ii\ on the one hand, it 
 be asked ** Why should we not render subser\ ic-nt 
 to a reduction of taxes that periodical surplus of 
 capital which has for some years been transtcrreti 
 to foreigners ? " the advocate of conunercial free- 
 ilom may say on the other, *' You are not at 
 liberty to exercise any interference, or to divert 
 
 D D
 
 1'0'J 'J'hti Question o/' 
 
 ca))itnl from tlio direction wliicli it naturally takes: 
 its transfer to foreign countries may be, for au<^ht 
 yon know, tlic most profitable means of employing 
 it in a national as in an individual sense. The 
 capitalist who, living in England, draws a large in- 
 come fi'oin the Freiich or American funds, is en- 
 abled to make a larger expenditure, to be a more 
 liberal contributor to the productive industry of his 
 own Country." 
 
 Between these contending opinions what course 
 ought we to hold ? The last mentioned argument 
 would be excellent against any legal restraint which 
 might exist, in the shape of a tax or otherwise, on 
 the transmission of capital abroad ; a restraint 
 which would be quite as absurd as the lately re- 
 pealed prohibition to export specie. Farther, were 
 our burdens no greater than those of our neighbours, 
 or were the doctrine of freedom of trade generally 
 adopted, we should be inclined to look with a fa- 
 vourable eye on the most unreserved transmission 
 of capital. But at present we are obliged to reason 
 in a more narrow circle, and to calculate what 
 peculiar aid we can oppose to peculiar pressure. 
 Our situation is unfortunately anomalous; our 
 taxation higher than that of any other country ; 
 and if, as we have reason to apprehend, its magni- 
 tude be such as to reduce the profit of stock, and 
 in that manner to cause, or to be likely to cause, 
 capital to leave us, the objection of the political 
 economist, however true in the abstract, ceases to 
 apply, or becomes in a manner, lost in the urgency 
 of circumstances. 
 
 Though we are thus hardly called on to combat 
 objections, it may be useful, in this day of theoriz- 
 ing, to remark that the application of general prin- 
 ciples in regard to money transactions is found to
 
 u small Annudl Loan. 403 
 
 require no sliglit share of the caution that lias 
 proved necessary in otiier de))artnients — our corn 
 trade, our navigation, our custom duties. To 
 explain our meaning by example. In 1815, 
 Mr. llobinson, at that time President of the Board 
 of Trade, was as fully convinced as Mr. Horner, 
 or any member of the House, of the radical im- 
 })olicy of our corn laws ; but while he regretted 
 that they should ever have been enacted, or that 
 agriculturists should ever have relied on so un- 
 natural a support, he felt that any change nuist be 
 gradual, that the advantage from a return to sound 
 principle would be remote, and the evils of transi- 
 tion immediate. The Agricultural Conunittee of 
 18^1 acknowledged, in like manner, the benefit of 
 iiee trade, but felt the inexpediency of its early 
 ado})tion : while in regard to our navigation, the 
 bills brought forward during the session of 18*;^^, 
 for repealing the obnoxious part of our statutes, 
 experienced, as is well known, nuich opposition 
 and curtailment from the same cause. 
 
 A\ e must not, howe\ er, be understood as ])ro- 
 posing any obstacles to the transmission of capiUil 
 abroad, except that of giving an additional open- 
 ing for its investment at home. 
 
 We are perfectly aware, that the ])rinciples of 
 ])roductive industry prescribe, in the words of 
 V^auban, (jtie raf^gtiil Ic viieiw nnplotje est ccliii que 
 le roi laissc tnitrc ks mains dc ses sujcts — that 
 government should, if j)ossible, avoid draining it 
 from the pocket of the individual in the shape of 
 either a loan or tax. Were it practicable to avoid 
 both, we should be reluctant to urge, or even to 
 listen to the project of an annual loau, however 
 justified by our prospect of increasing wealth. 
 The question, however, has no such scope, being 
 
 u u 'J
 
 404 The Qffes/ion of 
 
 unluckily confined to the alternative of taxins^ or 
 borrowing ; and we a])peal to those wiio have 
 studied the nature of our resources, wliether we 
 cannot at present raise a given sum, for example 
 .^4,000,000, with less injury as a loan than as a 
 tax. 
 
 Probabililj/ of Financial Relief — We should on 
 on account suggest a transfer of a portion of our 
 burdens to the next generation, were it probable 
 that their situation would partake of that embarrass- 
 ment which, since 1814, has borne so heavily on us. 
 But whether we look to the increasing caution of 
 our rulers, the resources arising from improvements 
 in our national industry, or the diminution of oiu' 
 burden by its repartition among augmenting num- 
 bers, we find reason to consider the prospects of our 
 successors far superior to our own. And though 
 the assertion may excite a smile, it is, notwith- 
 standing, true, that to relieve ourselves from a por- 
 tion of our taxes, is an effectual method of prevent- 
 ing loss to our posterity, inasmuch as the present 
 pressure, if continued, would, by sending abroad 
 the family of the annuitant, and, as we fear, the 
 money of the capitalist, operate to curtail the fund 
 destined to become in the hands of the next gene- 
 ration the basis of national wealth. 
 
 Would the proposed Loan affect the Rate of 
 Interest ? — One of the chief features in the great 
 transition from war to peace, was an increase of dis- 
 posable capital, and considering the magnitude of 
 this increase, we may well question, whether govern- 
 ment ought not, several years ago, to ha\e made a 
 demand on the monied interest for a loan, rather 
 than on the public for taxes. If such would have 
 
 15
 
 a amall Annual l.onn. 405 
 
 been at that time a Ht application to the national 
 wound, there seems still less doubt of its being so at 
 present. To take a few millions aniuially out of the 
 money market would, doubtless, o])erate in some 
 measure to retard the fall of interest, and the ad- 
 vantage slow, but sure, which follows that fall ; but 
 that it would do so in a slight degree seems proba- 
 ble, whether we consider our present abundance, 
 or our satisfactory prospects in regard to disposa- 
 ble capital. The dread of scarcity of currency from 
 the resumption of casii payments has j)roved ground- 
 less; and there seems, assuredly, no reason to appre- 
 hend an early demand for money for the payment 
 of corn imports, still less for subsidies or military 
 charges on the continent. 
 
 The power of habit is in nothing more strongly 
 exemplified than in the ap})ropriatiou of the disposa- 
 ble funds of our monied men. Accustomed to a 
 few simple securities, they have no idea of changing 
 their investments, even under an alteration of cir- 
 cumstances. Our bankers and city capitalists con- 
 fine themselves to stocks, excliequer bills, or mer- 
 cantile acceptances, (all convertible into money at 
 short notice,) and have no idea of investing money 
 on mortgage, still less of adventuring in trade, or 
 making a permanent loan to a mercantile house. 
 They look more naturally to foreign stocks, parti- 
 cularly since business of that kind is transacted so 
 largely on our own exchange. In what manner does 
 this reasoning apply to the present question? It 
 implies that government by giving a new opening to 
 our capitalists in the form of a small annual loan, 
 would withdraw comparatively little from the ac- 
 commodation of our merchants and landed interest : 
 the diminution, we believe, would hardly be felt, 
 except in the demand for i'oreign stock. 
 
 1) D 3
 
 1()() The Question of 
 
 IVouId it affect the Price of Stocks ? — Tliis (lues- 
 tion we shall answer first as it regards the public, 
 and next in respect to the stockholders. Since the 
 reduction of the five per cents, government aj)pcars 
 to have hardly any greater interest in keeping u}) 
 the funds than in maintaining the price of land, 
 merchandize, or any other description of national 
 property. The only direct advantage from a rise 
 in the funds, would be the power of reducing the 
 old four per cents, and the farther power of reduc- 
 ing the new four j)er cents, five or six years hence. 
 Any diminution of interest in the great mass of our 
 debt, the three per cents, is a very doubtful and 
 remote object : a result not likely to ensue, until 
 after a long continuance of peace, and a conciu'rence 
 of circumstances, which of themselves would mate- 
 rially improve our financial condition. But, what- 
 ever may be the probable time of the occurrence of 
 such a power, there can be no doubt that to endea- 
 vour to accelerate its arrival, in regard to either the 
 three or the four per cents, by artificial means, w^ould 
 be highly impolitic. The reasons against such a 
 course are, even when briefly stated, (p. 360.) so 
 direct and substantial, as to render it incumbent on 
 every well-wisher to his country to dissuade it ; and 
 nothing prevents our enlarging on the evils that 
 would attend it, except a conviction that it can form 
 no part of the plans of the present Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer. 
 
 Next, as to the effect of a loan on the interest of 
 stockholders. Dividing these into the two classes 
 of temporary and permanent depositors, and consi- 
 dering the former as loan contractors, we shall soon 
 find that they may safely venture on such a loan 
 without the pledge of taxes. Four millions, bor- 
 rowed at an interest of four per cent., would involve 
 
 17
 
 a small Annual Loan. 407 
 
 an annual burden of 1G0,{XK)/. wliicli, if the plan of 
 a sinking fund provision for eacii loan were retained, 
 might be carried to 'iOO,000/., a sum not insignifi- 
 cant certainly, but not equal to /la/f the addition 
 that is annually making to our revenue by the in- 
 creasing consumption of taxed articles. Mas such 
 security, we may be allowed to ask, e\ er oficred on 
 a war loan in the most brilliant days of our finance ? 
 
 Lastly, as to permanent depositors and the j)ro- 
 bable price of stocks for a scries of years. What 
 have been the causes of the slow rise of stocks since 
 the peace? The years 1811< and 1815 required 
 heavy loans; 1815 was a season of general distress, 
 but no sooner did our prosperity return in I8I7, 
 than stocks rose and continued high during 1818, 
 when the mismanagement of the French loan, and, 
 soon after, the effect of overtrading in this country, 
 produced a fall. These causes, joined to the general 
 disquietude dining a trial (in 18'20) of unfortunate 
 notoriety, delayed the rise of stocks ; and a farther 
 delay took place from an ap})rehcnsion in that and 
 the succeeding year that tiie magnitude of the agri- 
 cultural distress would necessitate a reduction of 
 the public dividends. Since then, however, the 
 circumstances of the })ul)hc, and the amount of the 
 revenue have both materially impro\ed. 
 
 Two points will be readily admitted by the pei- 
 manent de})Ositor in our fimds ; first, that wliatever 
 conduces to the relief of the suffering classes has a 
 tendency to raise stocks; and next, that a loan for 
 the purpose of reducing taxes is altogether ihflerent 
 in its operation on his pro})erty from a loan for the 
 purpose of expenditure. I3y augmenting the value 
 of money it augments /lis incomcy and aflbrds him a 
 substantial return for any delay of rise in the mar- 
 
 u D 1'
 
 'U)8 The Question of 
 
 ket price of stock, which may be attributable to the 
 act of borrowing. 
 
 Liviitation to borroxvhig. — Were tlie j)lan of an 
 annual loan to be adopted, and found to answer, 
 what limit, it may be asked, ought there to be to 
 our borrowing ; at what time ought we to suspend 
 our demand on our future resources ? Our answer 
 is — " at the time when our taxation shall havebeen 
 brought to a level with that of France and other 
 countries, our rivals in manufacture." If in these 
 countries the public biu'dens form 18 or 20 per cent, 
 of the national revenue, let the same be considered 
 the limit of taxation in England ; the point below 
 which we make no attempt to reduce it, satisfied 
 with the superiority given to our })roductive labour 
 by our physical advantages, — our mines, and our 
 command of water communication. 
 
 RetreiicJiment. — Nor ought the adoption of the 
 loan system, though productive of financial relief, 
 by any means to lessen the demand on the part of 
 the public for retrenchment : on the contrary, it 
 would bring with it a direct motive for reduction, 
 the effect of all abatement of taxation being to in- 
 crease the value of money ; to add to the emolu- 
 ments of the servants of the public. The allowance 
 to Prince Leopold, for example, has been impercep- 
 tibly, but substantially increased fi'om 50,000/. to 
 60,000/. by the fall in prices since passing the 
 grant ; and if taxes are further reduced, it will, 
 ere long, attain the value of 65,000/. It follows, 
 that a reduction to a sum representing the value of 
 50,000/. at the date of the grant, niiglit take place 
 without injury to the Prince, and without deviating 
 from the spuit of the act of parliament. 
 
 Have LoanSy in time of PeacCj been sanctioned 
 by example ? — As yet, only by that of the United
 
 a small Annual Loan. U)[) 
 
 States and some continental powers who, seekin<; 
 their supplies fioni ahen capitalists, have no title 
 to be held forth as an example to England. But, 
 had Holland in former ages possessed that evi- 
 dence of progressive increase of population and 
 income, which at present ha})pily belongs to our 
 country, her course would probably have been that 
 which we recommend, and without any departure 
 irom her habitual caution ; for it" in peace, wages, 
 salaries, and profits are lower, and tlie poMer of 
 present payment less, the labourers in tlie produc- 
 tive field iu*e more numerous, the results of their 
 exertion far more conducive to eventual pros- 
 perity. During the late war, our national income 
 was large but of uncertain duration : at present, 
 it is reduced in amount, but much improved in 
 prospect. If, in the former case, it was politic in 
 govermnent to defray a large share of tlie current 
 expence out of our passing gains, a different course 
 is obviously suited to a state of ])eace. 
 
 The Annu'Uij Bill. — These truths luue at last 
 been felt, and the proceedings of Parliament in 
 the last and preceding session, have evinced a 
 considerable change in the measures of ministers. 
 Till then, whatever might be their merits in regard 
 to foreign "politics or commercial regulations, their 
 financial arrangements were unsatisfactory to the 
 attentive enquirer, discovering, apparently, little 
 discrimination between a. state of war and ])eace, 
 in regard to the power of bearing tiixes, and a very 
 inadequate impression of the superiority of our 
 progress to that of our neighbours. The mea- 
 sures adopted previously to last year, seemed to 
 proceed from the suggestions of merely practical 
 inen — of men accustomed to estimate a finaneial 
 j)roceeiling by its effect on the Stock KxcJiange,
 
 MO The Qucslion uf 
 
 oil the mere monied interest, rather tliaii on the 
 pnxhictive in(histry of the country at large. At 
 las^ was brought forward, unexpectedly, the ])lan 
 for exchanging life-interests in half pay and pen- 
 sions for long annuities ; a jilan, which, since the 
 moment of its announcement, we liave considered 
 indicative of consequences considerably beyond the 
 anticipation of the public. Its temporary failure, 
 or, as we may now say, the delay of its success, 
 was owing to the engagement being brought 
 before the public on too extended a scale : the 
 duration of the contract being such as naturally 
 to startle men not then apprised of all the reasons 
 which determine our rulers to adhere to a pacific 
 course. But our confidence in it was unshaken, 
 connected as it is with considerations on which we 
 build the hope of farther and extensive relief. 
 The adoption of such a measure confers a kind of 
 official saiiction on views such as those we have 
 endeavoured to take, and shows that in the highest 
 quarter there prevails a conviction of the pro- 
 mising nature of our prospects ; an assurance that 
 our only desideratum is present relief. 
 
 Of our suggestions in this, as in a previous 
 chapter (p. 3il<.) it may, we trust, be said, that 
 we propose to do nothing by surprise, by contri- 
 vance, or by plausible calculation ; all may be 
 gradual, voluntary, and open, where necessary, to 
 recall. From cii'cumstances beyond the power 
 of foresight, a great pressure has fallen on the 
 present generation : it is proposed to transfer a 
 part of it to future years, but on a plan that will 
 leave those on whom it may devolve, whether of 
 the present or of the next age, far less burdened 
 than we now find ourselves. How singular, that
 
 a small Annual Loan. 411 
 
 ill all our distress since the peace, amid all the 
 schemes for our relief^ none of this natiue should 
 have been brought forward until the recent trans- 
 fer of life interests into long annuities. Had our 
 finances been administered by a statesman of the 
 bold, inventive mind of Pitt, the increase of our 
 population and the connection l)et\veen it and the in- 
 crease of taxable income, would, ere this, have been 
 made the ground-work of some decisive measure. 
 Let it not be objected tiiat such was not his course 
 during the period of his administration that passed 
 in peace, and that the plan pursued for the supj)()rt 
 of our credit after the American war, was the im- 
 position of additional taxes. At that time the 
 increase of our lumibers was less rapid, and for 
 want of regular returns, was unperceived. The 
 recent loss of our colonies forbade the expectation 
 of a progressive extension of trade, and there were 
 few examples in our history, of taxes repealed 
 in the hope of stimulating })roductive industry. 
 Mr. Pitt ])ursued, therefore, the only expedient 
 within his knowledge, but had })eace been ])re- 
 served after 1792, there can be little doubt that 
 the result of the favourable state to which cir- 
 cumstances had brought our finances, would have 
 borne the stamp of his discriminating mind, and of 
 the example given, under circumstances somewhat 
 similar, by Sir R. Walpole : it would have been, 
 not the support of the sinking fund, to an extent 
 that would have afforded an inducement to send 
 capital out of the country, but the repeal or reduc- 
 tion of the taxes which interlered most directly 
 with productive industry, in coufoiinity to the 
 course recommended many years before by Dr. 
 Smith.* 
 
 * Wealth of Nations, vol. iii.
 
 41 '2 I'lic Qucsliun <(J' an Aninidl Loan. 
 
 The Period from lySt to 1798. — To niontion 
 llie name of Pitt, is to recall the attention of 
 tlie financial inquirer to the time, unluckily too 
 short, when the plans of that minister were 
 undisturbed by the expenditure of war ; we 
 mean the interval from 1781< to 1793. No period 
 of our history is, as far as regards our productive 
 industry, entitled to an equal share of our atten- 
 tion. The circumstances of that interval of peace 
 were in many respects similar to those of the 
 present time. Beginning in financial embarrass- 
 ment, our prospects gradually brightened, and our 
 trade flourished without the aid, as in a period of 
 war, of artificial causes : all was the legitimate 
 result of the application of capital and industry 
 to the improvement of our national advantages. 
 Agriculture prospered w^ithout a rise of prices : 
 the revenue increased without new taxes : labour 
 was paid not largely but satisfactorily, and the 
 addition to the poor-rate was very gradual. Let 
 us not imagine that the period in question pos- 
 sessed peculiar advantages ; or that the progress 
 of our cotton manufacture, and the troubles of 
 France, placed our countrymen in those days on 
 commanding ground : they felt severely the pres- 
 sure of taxation, and were not altogether exempt 
 from the pernicious operation of corn-laws. With 
 confidence, therefore, may we conclude, that could 
 but a part of our present burdens be removed, we 
 should follow the career of productive industry 
 with equal or superior advantage.
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 We have now broui^ht our labour to a close, after 
 endeavourinji; to exhibit a j)icture of our national 
 situation, and enunieratini>' its various advantages 
 and drawbacks, in a manner wliieli, wliatever may 
 be thought of the degree of ability, will hardlv be 
 arraigned on the score of partiality. Political 
 allusions have been avoided as much as was at all 
 practicable, in an inquiry in which statistical results 
 were frequently aflfected by the decisions of the 
 cabinet. If we have ventured on questions of great 
 difficulty, and occasionally expressed opinions with 
 a degree of confidence, it has proceeded from no 
 other feeling than a consciousness of the advan- 
 tage arising from command of time, and the 
 opportunity of giving long-continued attention to 
 a few select subjects. 
 
 Summarij. — Our first chapter was appropriated 
 to a much dis})uted question, the causes of the 
 unexpected abundance of our h'nancial resources 
 during the war, and their still more unexpected ilefi- 
 ciency since the peace. This was followed by an in- 
 quiry into the subject of " currency and exchange,*' 
 which, uninviting and intricate as it is, could not 
 with propriety be omitted in a work recjui ring- 
 such frequent reference to changes in the value of 
 money. The state of agriculture claimed a longer 
 chapter and more ample details, as well from sym-
 
 Ml, Conclusion. 
 
 patliy for a very numerous aiul respecta])lL' class, 
 as iiom the importance of the sul)ject to the nation 
 at large. The price of produce influencing so di- 
 lectly the price of labour, it became an object 
 of great solicitude to arrive at an opinion as little 
 doubtful as possible in regard to our })ros})ect of 
 the su])ply of corn both as to quantity and price. 
 On that must, in all probal)ility, depend a variety 
 of future measures : the regulation of wages, sala- 
 ries, and money incomes, generally ; the degree of 
 equality in the means of competition between our 
 manufacturers and those of the continent ; and the 
 latitude which may consequently be taken by 
 government in removing the restrictions on our 
 commercial intercourse. 
 
 From these doubtful and anxious points we turned 
 with satisfaction to the evidence of our progressive 
 advance in agriculture, manufacture, . and the use- 
 ful arts generally, accompanied, as it is, by a large 
 increase in our population. Augmentation of na- 
 tional power ; the prospect of continued peace ; 
 the means of reducing taxes — are all consequences 
 of our decided superiority to other nations in the 
 progress of national improvement. 
 
 The examination, in a subsequent chapter, of 
 the fluctuations in the value of gold and silver, 
 was prompted by a double cause — the revolutions 
 in the value of money during the last thirty years ; 
 and the evident disproportion existing at present, 
 particularly in the metropolis, between the rate of 
 wages and the cost of the maintenance of the in- 
 dividual. A hope of being instrumental in cor- 
 rectins these anomalies led to researches of which 
 the object is to give a permanent and uniform value 
 to money contracts ; to lessen the prevailing objec- 
 tion to leases ; to give facilities to the commut-
 
 Conclusion. 415 
 
 ation of tithe ; and finally, to show annuitants that 
 it is possible for them to make an abatement in the 
 numeiical amount of money income without in- 
 curring a sacrifice. 
 
 In our concluding chapter we liave conveyed 
 our ideas in regard to the operation of a sinking 
 fund; the comparative weight of English and 
 French taxation ; the growing nature ol' our re- 
 sources ; and the prospect of a farther and con- 
 siderable reduction of our burdens. 
 
 It may appear somewhat singular to our readers 
 that subjects of such general interest should not 
 long ere this have been fully discussed ; that ques- 
 tions of such importance to our welfare should not 
 have been decisively answered. But in such re- 
 searches the magnitude of the labour is found to 
 exceed all previous calculation : the number of 
 persons fitted for it by situation or habits is not 
 great ; and, immersed as they generally are in 
 official or professional pursuits, a long period 
 elapses in this, as in the province of general his- 
 tory, before an individual is enabled to bestow on 
 such topics the time and attention they require. 
 
 Comprehensive as the preceding investigations 
 may appear, there still remain for discussion se\e- 
 ral subjects of great interest. 
 
 Our Trade. — Of our commercial history during 
 the last thirty years, we propose a sketch as cir- 
 cumstantial, and as carefully grounded on official 
 documents as that which has been given of our 
 Finances and our Aj^riculture. The fluctuations 
 in our trade, the over-rating of our protits during
 
 M(') Cunrln.sion. 
 
 the war, tlie tlistinctioii hetwcoi real aiitl nominal 
 acltlitions to projjerty, are all suhjects which re(}iiire 
 examination and perspicuous statement. 
 
 Emigration, — Though the recent improvement 
 in the state of" our productive industry has lessened 
 the necessity of emigration, a disquisition into 
 that subject would open views connected with 
 the diffusion of civilization, not only in our colo- 
 nies, but in many districts in Europe. The state 
 of these is more backward than can well be con- 
 ceived by the untravelled part of our countrymen. 
 Though to send settlers to these neglected tracts 
 would form no part of our policy, their improve- 
 ment would be of interest to us, both as opening 
 markets for our manufactures, and as proving to 
 continental powers how much it is their policy to 
 maintain peace, and to seek in the diffusion of civi- 
 lization that increase of population and revenue 
 which they have hitherto so fruitlessly attempted 
 from conquest. 
 
 Public Retrenchment. — This question, much as 
 it has been discussed, still stands in need of an ex- 
 position unconnected with party views, and found- 
 ed on considerations strictly statistical, in parti- 
 cidar the power of money in the purchase of 
 commodities, and the extent of the change attend- 
 ant on the transition from war to peace. 
 
 Finance. — On this head we have communicated 
 in the present Aolume only a part of our materials : 
 to arrange and condense the remainder might 
 tend to give clearness to official statements, and 
 to support the arguments for a farther reduction of 
 our burdens.
 
 Concluaiufu 117 
 
 Parallel between England and France. — We 
 liave exhibited a comparison of the charges on 
 agriculture, and of the general taxation of the two 
 countries : but there remains much to com})are in 
 regard to the sUite of trade and manufactujes ; of 
 military and other public establishments j of educa- 
 tion, science, and national usages. 
 
 Tithe and Poor-rate. — These subjects acquire 
 an increased interest from tiie course of recent cir- 
 cumstances : — the im])robabihty of any great or 
 permanent rise in agricultural produce : tlie higlily 
 beneficial measure about to be carried into effect in 
 Ireland ; and the evident ability of our monied in- 
 terest to afford relief to their landed brethren, 
 whenever an eligible plan shall be biought forward 
 by government. Of this plan the main features 
 would, })erhaps, be as to tithe, redemption at a 
 moderate \aluation; and as to poor-rate, the ecjua- 
 hzation of the burden throughout a parish or dis- 
 trict, by assessing (see page 18.5,) the income of all 
 instead of that of the farmer or householder only. 
 
 What is the present ])rosj)ect in regard to the 
 price of conmiodities generally? That a rise is 
 very unlikely, and that in all ])robability no injury 
 would accrue to the clergy from their accejMing a 
 money income in lieu of tithe for a few years, 
 until, by the purchase of land or otherwise, 
 arrangements should be made for a permanent 
 commutation. 
 
 Our West India Colonies. — The attention of the 
 ])ublic has lately been directetl to two (juestions, — 
 a reduction of the duly on East Iiulia sugar, and 
 the gradual abolition of slavery in our West India 
 colonies. The discussions in both lia\e liitlierlo
 
 418 Ciynclu.sioii. 
 
 been coiiclucted in ii manner of wliicli, to l)oir()W 
 the expression of a foreign historian, la moderation 
 7i\'st nullcment h caractcre. Neither party has 
 shown much sohcitude to observe a medium, or to 
 ascertain decisively a few fundamental points ; 
 such as, whether the purchase of sugar in India at 
 a low price is or is not practicable to a large 
 extent; or, whether, in regard to the West 
 Indies, it is not the interest of the planter to co- 
 operate cordially in the accomplishment of the pro- 
 posed change, afiter the principle of compensation 
 shall be distinctly admitted. 
 
 These several topics it is our intention to discuss, 
 in an additional volume, whenever circumstances 
 shall afford the time requisite for such laborious re- 
 g,earches.
 
 APPENDIX.
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 (Page 20.) Expence of the late WarSy rccJconing from the 
 begin7ii72g of 1793 to the beginnmg of\8l6. 
 
 MONEY RAISED. 
 
 War of 1793. 
 
 Years. 
 
 j By Taxes. 
 
 By Loans. 
 
 Total. 
 
 
 £ 
 
 £ 
 
 ,£ 
 
 1793 
 
 17,170,4-00 
 
 4,500,000 
 
 21,670,400 
 
 1794. 
 
 17,308,811 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 28,308,811 
 
 1795 
 
 1 17,858,454 
 
 18,000,000 
 
 35,858,454 
 
 1796 
 
 18,737,760 
 
 25,500,000 
 
 44,237,760 
 
 1797 
 
 20,654,650 
 
 32,500,000 
 
 53,154,650 
 
 1798 
 
 30,202,915 
 
 1 7,000,000 
 
 47,202,915 
 
 1799 
 
 35,229,968 
 
 18,500,000 
 
 53,729,968 
 
 1800 
 
 33,896,464 
 
 20,500,000 
 
 54,396,464 
 
 1801 
 
 35,415,096 
 
 28,000,000 
 
 63,415,096 
 
 1802 
 
 37,240,213 
 
 25,000,000 
 
 62,240,213 
 
 *263,714,731 
 
 200,500,000 
 
 464,214,731 
 
 Deduct 
 
 sums for the ser- 
 
 
 
 vice c 
 
 )f Ireland - - 
 
 13,000,000 
 
 13,000,000 
 
 
 
 187,500,000 
 
 451,214,731 
 
 Dr. Hamilton on the National Debt, pp. 157. 289. 
 [A]
 
 [2] 
 
 The late Wars ,■ 
 War of 1803. 
 
 [App. 
 
 Years. 
 
 By Taxes. 
 
 By Loans. 
 
 Total. 
 
 
 £ 
 
 £ 
 
 £ 
 
 1803 
 
 37,677,063 
 
 15,202,931 
 
 52,879,994 
 
 1804. 
 
 45,359,4-42 
 
 20,104,221 
 
 65,463,663 
 
 1805 
 
 49,659,281 
 
 27,931,482 
 
 77,590,763 
 
 1806 
 
 53,304,254 
 
 20,486,155 
 
 73,790,409 
 
 1807 
 
 58,390,225 
 
 23,889,257 
 
 82,279,482 
 
 1808 
 
 61,538,207 
 
 20,476,765 
 
 82,014,972 
 
 1809 
 
 63,405,294 
 
 23,304,691 
 
 86,709,985 
 
 1810 
 
 66,681,366 
 
 22,428,788 
 
 89,110,154 
 
 1811 
 
 64,763,870 
 
 27,416,829 
 
 92,180,699 
 
 1812 
 
 63,169,854 
 
 40,251,684 
 
 103,421,538 
 
 1813 
 
 66,925,835 
 
 54,026,822 
 
 120,952,657 
 
 1814 
 
 69,684,192 
 
 47,159,697 
 
 116,843,889 
 
 1815 
 
 70,403,448 
 
 46,087,603 
 
 116,491,051 
 
 770,962,331 
 
 388,766,925 
 
 1,159,729,256 
 
 Deduc 
 
 t the proportio 
 
 n of the above 
 
 
 rais 
 
 ed for the servi 
 
 ce of Ireland - 
 
 - 46,612,106 
 
 1,113,117,150 
 
 Note. — See a very short but clear summary, entitled, " Statement 
 of the Revenue and Expenditure of Great Britain, in each year, from 
 1803 to 1814, by C. Stokes." 
 
 Summary. — Instead of dwelling on these complicated 
 statements, we invite the reader to fix his attention on the 
 following abstract in round numbers : 
 
 War of 1793. 
 
 Total money raised by loans and taxes, ex- 
 clusive of the loans for the service of 
 Ireland, about - - jf 450,000,000 
 
 Deduct the probable charge in Great Bri- 
 tain and Ireland, had peace been pre- 
 served, 18,000,000/. a-year. - 180,000,000 
 
 Balance constituting the war expenditure - 270,000,000
 
 A pp.] Amount of our Expenditure. [3] 
 
 War of 1803. 
 
 Total money raised, exclusive of the sums 
 
 for the service of Ireland, about - .^1,113,000,000 
 The deduction for the probable expence 
 
 of a peace establishment, may, after 
 
 1803, be called 22,000,000/. *a-year, 
 
 ;is well on account of our augmented 
 
 population, as because in the table of 
 
 the war of 1803, the charge of collect- 
 
 mg the revenue is not deducted ; say 
 
 22,000,000/. for 1 3 years - - 286,000,000 
 
 Balance constituting the war expenditure 827,000,000 
 
 Average war expenditure from 1793 to 
 
 1802, both inclusive . _ _ 27,000,000 
 
 Average war expenditure from 1803 to 
 
 1815, both inclusive - - .. 63,500,000 
 
 Total charge of the two wars, exclusive 
 
 of an ample allowance for a supposed 
 
 peace estabhshment, nearly - - 1,100,000,000 
 
 Explanatory Remark. — This amount, adopted in the 
 text, as representing the total of our war expenditure, may 
 require some explanation. It is exclusive of the sums 
 raised for the service of Ireland during the twenty-three 
 years in question, whether by taxes in that country, or by 
 loans in England ; on the other hand, it comprizes a large 
 sum appro|)riated in England not to the war, but to the re- 
 duction of the national debt. Still, as the amount of 
 money thus applied did not materially exceed the sums 
 raised for the service of Ireland, and as it forms no part of 
 our object to aim at fractional accuracy, we may safely con- 
 sider the sums thus left out as balancing each other, and 
 assume the 1,100,000,000/. as a representation of our total 
 war expenditure. 
 
 Addition to the Public Debt. — Though the expenditure of 
 the war of 1803 exceeded that of the war of 1793, in the 
 ratio of more than three to one, the addition made to 
 our public debt was not at all in that proportion ; the war 
 of 1793 having added to it fully 200,000,000/., that of 
 
 r,A] 2 '
 
 [4] Compnris(m of Exports in fVar unci in Peace. [App 
 
 1803 about 260,000,000/. In the war of 180S, tlie far 
 rrieattr part of the expence was defrayeil by the property- 
 tax and other supplies raised within the year. 
 
 Such were the total sums raised for our war expenditure: 
 but it is fit to recollect that they do not indicate with ac- 
 curacy the extent of sacrifice connected with the war. 
 There remain, as we shall see presently, considerations of 
 great importance on either side of the account ; such, on 
 the one hand, as the loss arising from the transition to 
 peace ; on the other, the amount of supply derived from 
 the extra profits attendant on a state of war. 
 
 (Page 25.) — Explanation of the ^^ official Falue of 
 Goods." — The " official value of goods" means a comput- 
 ation of value formed with reference, not to the prices of 
 the current year, but to a standard fixed so long ago as 
 1696, the time when * the office of Inspector-general of the 
 Imports and Exports was established, and a Custom-house 
 Ledger opened to record the weight, dimensions, and value 
 of the merchandize that passed through the hands of the 
 officers. One uniform rule is followed year after year in 
 the valuation, some goods being estimated by weight, others 
 by their dimensions ; the whole without reference to the 
 current or market price. This course has the advantage 
 of exhibiting with strict accuracy any increase or decrease 
 in the quantity of our exports. 
 
 Next, as to the value of these exports in the market. 
 In 1798, there was imposed a duty of two per cent, on our 
 exports, the value of which was taken, not by the official 
 standard, but by the declaration of the exporting mer- 
 chants. Such a declaration may be assumed as a repre- 
 sentation of, or at least an approximation to, the current 
 or market price of merchandize ; there being, on the one 
 hand, no reason to apprehend that merchants would pay a 
 per centage on an amount beyond the market value; while, 
 on the other, the liability to seizure affiarded a security 
 against under-valuation. 
 
 These two scales of valuation, we mean the official regis- 
 ter and the current price, affiDrd the means of solving a 
 question of no slight importance, viz. the comparative 
 value of merchandize in the present age and at the re- 
 mote date of 1696. Some articles, in particular coffee, 
 
 • Chalmers' Historical View of the Domestic Economy of Great 
 Britain and Ireland. 1812.
 
 Ai'P.J Comparison of E.iporls in War and in Peace. [5] 
 
 cottons, hardware, are cheaper than in the rei^n of King 
 Wilham ; but the great majority were, during the late war, 
 so much dearer, that it was usual to calculate the real or 
 market value at 50 per cent, above the oflicial value. Since 
 the peace the case is greatly altered, the market price of 
 goods having, as we shall perceive from the following state- 
 ment, been greatly reduced. 
 
 1814. 
 
 - - J^.>6,59 1,000 
 
 1815. 
 
 - - 60,984,000 
 
 1816. 
 
 - - 51,260,000 
 
 1817. 
 
 - - 53,125,000 
 
 Comparison of Exports in Jl'ar mid in Peace. 
 
 1. Total Exports from Great Britain, conjjnisinghome pro- 
 duce and manufacture, as well as foreign and colonial 
 goods, the whole according to the official value. 
 
 1818. - - .€56,851,000 
 
 1819. - - 46,912,000 
 
 1820. - - 51,731,000 
 
 1821. - - 56,445,000 
 
 Annual average of the eight years of peace, 
 
 above ._-_-- .€'54,200,000 
 
 This is the average referred to in the text, p. 27. 
 
 We subjoin, in the nex^place, the declared value of our 
 exports since the peace ; in other words, their value ac- 
 cordins: to the state of the markets in each year. 
 
 Exports from Great Britain, taking home produce and 
 manufactures at the value declared by the merchants, 
 and adding in the case of foreign or colonial goods 25 
 per cent, to the official value, an addition considerably 
 less than that which was made in war. 
 
 1814. 
 1815. 
 1816. 
 1817. 
 
 .€73,489,000 
 74,372,000 
 61,138,000 
 58,032,000 
 
 1818. - - €'64,263,000 
 
 1819. - - 52,031.000 
 
 1820. - - 52,982,000 
 
 1821. about 54,000,000 
 
 Annual average of the eight years of peace 
 from 1814 to 1821, both inclusive, men- 
 tioned in the text, p. 28. - - - j^63,787,500 
 
 In either way, the value of our exports is greater since 
 the peace than during the war. 
 
 II. For those who may wish to carry farther these calcu- 
 lations of our exports, and of their effect on our productive 
 indusUy, we add a return of that part of our exports which 
 is illustrative of the extent of our home trade. 
 
 [A] :J
 
 [6] Comparison of Exports in War and in Peace, [^rr. 
 
 War. Exports of Home Produce and Manufacture from 
 Great Britain, previous to and during the late wars. 
 
 Average of six years ending with 1792 
 
 Ditto 1798 
 
 Ditto 1804 
 
 Ditto 1810 
 
 In Money of 
 
 the particular 
 
 year. 
 
 £22,131,000 
 25,658,000 
 36,817,000 
 43,575,000 
 
 Supposed to be 
 
 equivalent at 
 
 the prices of 
 
 1792 to 
 
 £22,131,000 
 23,325,000 
 30,681,000 
 33,519,000 
 
 These sums are calculated by adding 50 per cent, to the 
 official value, so that ample prices are allowed for the period 
 of war. 
 
 Exports of Home Produce and Manufacture from Great 
 Britain sijicc the 2)eace, according to the value declared 
 by the exporting merchants. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Money of the parti- 
 cular year. 
 
 Supposed to be equiva- 
 lent at the prices of 
 1792 to 
 
 1814 
 
 1815 - - 
 
 1816 - - 
 
 1817 - - 
 
 1818 - - 
 
 1819 - - 
 
 1820 - - 
 1821. about 
 
 ^€47,851,453 
 53,217,445 
 42,955,256 
 43,626,253 
 48,903,760 
 37,940,000 
 38,620,000 
 40,000,000 
 
 ^f'37,000,000 
 42,000,000 
 34,000,000 
 35,000,000 
 39,000,000 
 35,000,000 
 38,000,000 
 40,000,000 
 
 The returns for these years of peace, when compared 
 with years of war, sufficiently establish the g)-eater value of 
 our exports since the peace. They may appear at variance 
 with a statement published in a work of very wide circu- 
 lation, (Quarterly Review, No. LII., p. 534.) in which the 
 exports of three years of war, 1811, 1812, 1813, are con- 
 trasted with three years of peace, 1819, 1820, 1821, and 
 the amount of the former found to be considerably greater. 
 This, however, is to be understood of foreign merchandize, 
 and was owing to the extent of our transit trade during the 
 
 9
 
 App.] Comparison of Exports m War and in Peace. [7] 
 
 years when neutrals had very little direct navigation, and 
 were obliged to carry almost every article through the me- 
 dium of this country. But a transit trade may be very 
 large, without making any great addition to the productive 
 powers of a country, and our object being to show the con- 
 nexion between the amount of our exports and the degree 
 of activity existing among our population, our tables are 
 confined to returns of our home produce and manufac- 
 tures. 
 
 The reduction to money of a uniform value (that of 1 792) 
 is expedient for a period in which money lias varied so 
 greatly : it removes a part of the exaggeration to which we 
 habituated ourselves during the war, and simplifies the com- 
 parison with years of peace. 
 
 Decline in the Price of Goods. — We subjoin a farther 
 extract illustrative of the general fall in the price of mer- 
 chandize since 1818. 
 
 Exports from Great Britain, of Home Produce and 
 Manufactures. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Official value. 
 
 The declared or mar- 
 ket value. 
 
 1818 - 
 
 1819 - 
 
 1820 - 
 
 1821, exclusive of 
 our export to Ireland 
 
 ^44,564,000 
 
 35,634,000 
 40,240,000 
 
 1 40,195,000 
 
 ^48,904,000 
 37,940,000 
 38,620,000 
 
 35,826,000 
 
 Prices, as our readers may remember, began to fall 
 very soon after the peace: yet in 1818 they were still 
 from 10 to 12 per cent, above the official value. In 
 1819, a year of stagnant trade, the market value fell to 
 within 7 per cent, of the olTicial value, and since 1820 
 it has been below it. By this we are to understand, not 
 that all merchandize is cheaper than in the reign of King 
 William, when the standard of official value was formed ; 
 but that cottons and hardware, (in particular cottons) form 
 so very large a proportion of our exports as to counter- 
 balance the rise in woollens, leather, and other articles, 
 which are still somewhat dearer tiian they were a century 
 ago. — Returns such as these are of the highest interest to 
 the political arithmetician. 
 
 r.Ai +
 
 [8] C'uiiufxioii between Expenditure inul Jtcvtiiue. [ArF. 
 
 Effect of Taxation. — Taxation is injurious chiefly in two 
 ways: in an individual sense, when the parties assessed 
 have not the means of indemnifying themselves ; and in a 
 national sense, when the magnitude of the burden is such 
 as to reduce the profits of labour and capital materially 
 below those of other countries. The former receives at pre- 
 sent a distressing exemplification in the case of our agricul- 
 turists ; the latter has long prevailed in the Dutch pro- 
 vinces, at least in the maritime provinces of Holland and 
 Zealand, in which the charge of defence against the sea is 
 superadded to heavy demands of a political nature. Such 
 also has been, in a considerable degree, our own situation 
 since the peace ; that it was by no means so during the 
 war, has, we trust, been satisfactorily shown in the text. 
 
 We consider, therefore, our taxes during the war in the 
 light of circulation, without ascribing to them all the de- 
 trimental effects alleged by the majority of political econo- 
 mists, and still less the beneficial operation attributed to 
 them by others. The latter opinion, singular as it may 
 seem, is nearly a century old, and was supported by re- 
 peated references to the case of Holland before her decline. 
 In this country it seemed to receive a striking confirmation 
 from the stagnation that followed the peace, as the public 
 did not take sufficiently into account how much the circu- 
 lation of ^onotcer/ money had been the cause of the general 
 activity during the war.
 
 [9] 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 TO 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Rise of Prices during the War. 
 
 Ccnmtry Labourer. — Computation of tlie annual expence 
 of the family of an agricultural labourer, supposed to con- 
 sist of 5- persons ; calculated chiefly from a table of the 
 expence of 66 families of labourers, in different parts of 
 England, collected by Sir F. Eden. 
 
 In the year 1792. In 1813. In 182S. 
 
 Bread, butcher meat, beer, and 1 £ s. ^' s. ^' s. 
 
 other provisions of home > 16 32 17 
 
 growth ~ " " J 
 
 Tea, sugar, and foreign articles 2 3 3 
 
 Rent - - - 1 13 2 2 
 
 Fuel and candles - - 2 10 3 10 3 
 
 Clothes and washing - -4-7 6 10 6 
 
 Contingencies - - 10 10 10 
 
 •i^T b J^ b .£S2 b 
 
 To'wn Mechanic, — Computed cxjiencc at diflferent dates, 
 of the family of a mechanic living in a provincial town, and 
 supposed to consist, as in the case of the agriculturist, of 
 5* persons. 
 
 In the year I79'i. In 18i;{. In 1823. 
 Bread, butcher meat, beer, and S ,ii' s. st' s. .=€' s. 
 
 other provisions of home V20 3S 21 
 
 growth - - -J 
 
 (Iroceries and other provisions ) , ,^ - /, *.■ ,. 
 * ^ !• 10 I (i o 
 
 -} 
 
 imported 
 Rent of cottage or rooms 
 Fuel and light 
 Clothes and washing 
 Scliool fees, apothecary's bill, } 
 
 and other contingencies - S 
 
 2 
 
 10 
 
 
 \ 
 
 
 
 
 '1- 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 f) 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 i-' 
 
 
 
 
 s 
 
 
 
 ji 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 .J.\'l 
 
 
 
 L 
 
 t:? 
 
 
 
 r>'2 
 

 
 [10] liise uj Prices during the War. [Apr. 
 
 The Middle Classes. — Comparative estimate of tlie ex- 
 pellee ill (liflercnt years of house-keeping in a family of the 
 middle class, supposed to reside in London. 
 
 In the year 1792. In 1813. In 1823. 
 
 ^ S. £ S. £ s. 
 
 House rent - - 60 100 90 
 
 Assessed taxes and poor rate 18 4-7 4-0 
 
 Wages; two women servants 18 22 22 
 
 Clothes - - - 60 85 70 
 
 Boots and shoes - - 9 18 16 
 
 Wine, spirits and strong beer 16 35 30 
 
 Table beer - - - 7 11 9 
 
 Tea, sugar, and other groceries 22 38 35 
 
 Fuel - - - 24 35 30 
 
 Light, viz. candles and oil- 60 100 80 
 
 Washing - - - 16 25 22 
 
 Bread - - - 25 50 25 
 
 Butcher meat - - - 25 4-5 30 
 
 Milk, butter, fish, cheese - SO 85 70 
 
 Education - - -14-0 22 20 
 
 Medical attendance - -14-0 20 20 
 
 Furniture; annual repairs, and) j^ ^ 24 20 
 
 purchases ~ " "/ 
 
 Incidents, such as postage, sta- k 
 
 tionery, charity, pocket dis- >35 55 50 
 
 bursements - - J 
 
 Expences of a less necessary-N 
 
 character, such as excursion I __ _ rr. r» ^<^ « 
 
 . -J ^, >30 50 40 
 to the sea side, or the ( 
 
 country - - -J 
 
 Expence of company - - 35 60 50 
 Furniture ; interest on the mo- 1 
 
 ney invested in its purchase; > 42 63 53 
 
 also its insurance against fire \ 
 
 ^^540 0^900 0£750 
 
 We are next to exhibit these charges in a more concise 
 form, classing them under specific heads, and showing the 
 per-centage, or proportion borne by each head ; thus : —
 
 Ari'O 
 
 Rise of Prices during the War. 
 
 [H] 
 
 Bread, butcher meat, beer, "^ 
 and other provisions of home > 
 growth or manufacture - -j 
 
 Provisions, such as groceries, 1 
 of foreign produce -J 
 
 Clothes and washing 
 
 Rent _ _ _ 
 
 Fuel and light 
 
 Contingencies 
 
 Expence of the 
 familyof acoun- 
 try labourer. 
 Parts in 100. 
 
 55 
 
 20 
 10 
 
 _H 
 
 100 
 
 Expence of 
 tilt" town me- 
 chanic. 
 I'arts ia 100. 
 
 42 
 
 10 
 
 19 
 8 
 8 
 
 13 
 
 100 
 
 A family of the 
 middle class ex- 
 pending between 
 500 and 800/. 
 a-year in Lon- 
 don, or nearly 
 500 in a pro- 
 vincial town. 
 Parts in 100. 
 
 Bread, butcher meat, beer, and "1 
 other provisions of home > 
 growth - ~ 'J 
 
 Provisions, such as groceries of 
 foreign growth 
 
 Clothes and washing 
 
 House rent 
 
 Assessed taxes and poor rate - 
 
 Fuel and light 
 
 Education, medical attendance, 
 repairs, and occasional pur 
 chases of furniture 
 
 Travelling, entertaining compa-^ 
 ny, and other less necessary > 
 expences - - -J 
 
 Servants' wages - - - 
 
 Incidents _ - - 
 
 1 
 
 *} 
 
 25 
 
 A family of 
 larger income, 
 expending 
 1000/. and up- 
 wards. 
 
 Parts in 100, 
 20 
 
 18 
 
 14^ 
 
 10 
 
 10 
 
 7 
 
 4i 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 100 
 
 13 
 
 14 
 
 5i 
 lOi 
 
 100 
 
 In calculating these proportions, we have taken the re- 
 sults, not of any particular year, but of a number of 
 years.
 
 [12] Hisr (>/ rriccs i/uri/i^ the War. [A PP. 
 
 Com para live Comfort o/' the labour iu<^ (.'lasses in War and 
 Peace. — 'J'hc expcnce of the lahouriiip^ classes is, of course, 
 confined to the necessaries ot life, and the above sunnnary 
 shows clearly the greater proportion of their income that is 
 appropriated to the purchase of food. Now as food rose 
 (luring the war more than any other head of exjience, it 
 follows that the ratio of enhancement was greater in the 
 case of the working classes, than in that of their superiors. 
 On the part of the middle and iipj)er ranks, IGO/. or 170/. 
 were recjuired to make those purchases for which 100/. 
 sufficed in 1792; but on the part of tlie lower orders 180/. 
 were probably not more than adequate. It thus becomes 
 a question whether, after all the rise that took place in 
 wages, the condition of the labouring classes during the 
 war was more comfortable than in 1792. That at j)resent 
 it is much better, will at once a})pear from an inspection 
 of the preceding tables, for while wages have been but little 
 lowered, provisions have fallen greatly, and the reduction 
 of housekeeping since 1814, which to the middle classes 
 has been only about 20 per cent., is nearly twice as much 
 to their inferiors. 
 
 Rise iji the Price of Corn. — Towards the close of the 
 war the price of corn, butclier meat, and most articles of 
 country produce, became double that of the year 1792, 
 which, considering the proportion borne by provisions to 
 our total consumption, might have justified our computing 
 at 33 per cent., the addition thus made to our national ex- 
 penditure. But as this extreme rise lasted only a few years, 
 we have called it in the text 30 per cent. 
 
 Causes of this Rise in Corn. — These shall be fully ex- 
 plained in our chapter on agriculture: at present we state 
 them very briefly ; viz. 
 
 1. The rise in labour and other farming charges attend- 
 ant on the war. 
 
 2. The occurrence of a series of bad or indiffei-ent sea- 
 sons, 179I-, 1795, 1799, 1800, 1811. 
 
 These two causes raised the quarter of wheat from 50s. 
 to 80a'., where, in all probability, it would have stopped, 
 had not, 
 
 3. The depreciation of our currency after 1809 sub- 
 jected our import of corn to an enhancement so great, as 
 to cany our average, fiom SO^'. to lOOy.
 
 App.] Rise of Prices durmg the War. [13] 
 
 Are such Causes likely to he operative in future ? — Inter- 
 ference with our currency is, in all probability, excluded 
 from the creed of our rulers, and a rise in the price of 
 labour seems out of the question in a season of peace. 
 Of the remaining cause of enhancement, the occurrence of 
 bad or indifferent seasons, nothing can be said, except that 
 so long as peace shall continue, the degree of rise j)roceeding 
 from it, will be greatly checked by the facility of import. 
 
 Enhancement of Labour. — The proportion of rise at- 
 tributed in the text to " Labour," may apjiear somewhat 
 below the mark, since the rate of wages and salaries was 
 doubled, or nearly doubled, in the course of the war, while 
 our table of housekeeping expenditure is found, on com- 
 paring the years 1792 and 1813, to exhibit a large addi- 
 tion under the different heads, (clothes, furniture, house- 
 rent, &c.) affected by rise of labour. These considerations, 
 however, are subject to material qualifications. They apply 
 only to the upper classes, since our humbler countrymen per- 
 form service for themselves, and exclude wages from the list 
 of their charges. Next, in regard to one very extensive de- 
 partment, agriculture, the rise proceeding from "Labour" is 
 comprized in the 30 per cent, attributed, in our sununary, to 
 the enhancement arising from " Provisions." Add to this, in 
 the third place, that in various manufactures, such as cot- 
 ton and hardware, the additional cost proceeding from rise 
 of wages, was balanced by improved methods of working, 
 and by the application of machinery. On the whole, 
 therefore, it seems that we may account an addition of 20 
 per cent, to our general expenditure, a fair representation 
 of the rise of prices during the war, as far as such rise is 
 attributable to enhancement of labour. 
 
 Paper Curreyicy — its Depreciation. — It may occur to 
 our readers, that in the summary of the causes of enhance- 
 ment in the text, paper currency ought to have found a 
 place along with taxation, rise of labour, &.c. Allowance, 
 however, is made for its operation in our estimate of the 
 enhancement of corn, and of the other imported articles, 
 cotton, wool, tobacco, the cost of which was so greatly 
 increased towards the close of the war by the decline of 
 our paper. 
 
 Annuitajits on Mortgage. — After explaining in the text 
 the loss sustained by sucli annuitants in one point of view,
 
 [l-t] Rise oj Prict'a f/nrt'?i^ ike War. [Api». 
 
 il is fit to add tliiit in anotlier, vi/. keeping up the nitc of 
 interest, the eliect of the war proved fa vou ruble to them. 
 Had i)eace continned after 1792 their debtors, instead of 
 contimiiiig to ])ay them 5 per cent, interest, would have 
 obtained loans at -l-j or 4 per cent., and would, doubtless, 
 liave availed themselves of the power of paying off or re- 
 ducing the interest on their mortgages, in the manner so 
 generally practised during the last and present year.
 
 D5J 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 TO 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Oil)' Currency mid Exchanges. 
 
 On the Amount of Dank of England Notes in Circidation. 
 — The circulation of money is generally considered under 
 two heads ; that of the larger sums, which takes place between 
 wholesale dealers ; and that of tiie smaller, which ap})lies to 
 retail, the payment of wages, and otlier petty transactions. 
 Between wholesale dealers money circulates with rapidity : 
 bank notes, lUce coin, being wholly unproductive, any su- 
 pei'fluous stock of them is exchanged as quickly as possible 
 for mercantile acceptances, the purchase of government 
 stock, or other securities readily convertible into cash. In 
 London, the vicinity of bankers to each other, and the 
 power of receiving an immediate supj)ly on a deposit of 
 securities, enable banking-houses (Bullion Report, p. 26. 
 and Evidence, p. 123.) to lessen greatly the amount kept by 
 them as a reserve or unproductive fund. Add to this, that 
 whatever renders money abundant in the metropolis has a 
 speedy effect on the kingdom at large ; so intimate is the 
 connexion between town and country, so extensive the cor- 
 respondence (Evidence Bullion Report, pp. 123, 124-, 125.) 
 of bill and money agents. If we assume six weeks as the 
 medium term of bills discounted at tlie bank, and suppose 
 the money to change hands once in two tlays, the result is 
 that 100,000/. thus obtained will, in the course of tlie six 
 weeks that the bill remains uncalled for, circulate about 
 2,000,000/. of merchandize. How great, then, must have 
 been the distress of trade in the latter months of 1796, and 
 the early part of 1797, when our circulating medium was 
 contracted by two or three millions : how seasonable the
 
 f I G] Our Currenn) and Errhan{res. 
 
 lelicraflbrJcil in the course of 1797, by the resumption of 
 discounts on their former scale ! 
 
 An hirrraxe of Batik of England notes is not condush^ 
 •proof of an increase of our circulating medium at large. — If 
 our readers are reluctant to admit this, we must remind 
 them of a point in which the public opinion was long 
 equally positive, viz. that we received an annual sum of 
 money from foreign countries, in payment of our profits or 
 balance of trade. This was a favourite notion with our 
 ancestors, and is still a prevalent impression among our 
 practical men. The balance was even reduced to specific 
 computation, the received mode of calculating it having 
 been to deduct the amount of our imports from tliat of our 
 exports, and assume that the difference must be profit, pay- 
 able to us in hard cash : a comfortable doctrine certainly, 
 and one which, had it been well founded, would have 
 brought among us, in the course of the last century, a sum 
 httle short of 400,000,000/. sterling. This is mentioned 
 merely as an example of the hazard of deducing an infer- 
 ence from appearances : in regard to the present question, 
 the increase of Bank of England paper, the doubt arises 
 from our having no power to discriminate how far such 
 increase forms an addition to our circulation, or is merely 
 a substitution of paper for coin sent abroad. Or, if the 
 state of exchange be considered as affording, in some mea- 
 sure, an index in that respect, what means have we of 
 ascertaining another material point ; viz. how far an extra 
 issue of Bank of England notes may not be a substitution 
 for a corresponding amount of country bank paper with- 
 drawn from circulation ? This was, doubtless, the case in 
 1810 and 1811, a time when a number of country banks 
 became either insolvent or discredited by the insolvency of 
 their neighbours. Again, on the fall of prices in 1815 and 
 1816, there took place in our paper currency a reduction of 
 several millions ; but as the Bank of England experienced 
 no variation of consequence, the inference is, that its paper 
 must have been substituted in various districts for the 
 diminished circulation of the country banks. Finally, we 
 have the authority of both the Bullion Report, (p. 26.) and 
 of that of the Bank Committee of 1819, that no satisfactory 
 conclusions are to be drawn from the amount of Bank of 
 England paper in circulation : a declaration of great im- 
 portance, since the increase of that circulation formed, all 
 along, to the antagonists of the bank, the fundamental 
 argument for the charge of over issue. 
 
 21
 
 App.] Our Cmrenn/ and Exchanges, [17] 
 
 Fluctuations in the Circulation of Bank of England Notes. 
 — Were we to attempt calculation on u subject necessarily 
 conjectural, we mean how far additions to the circulation of 
 the Bank of England formed an increase of our currency, 
 or were merely a substitution for coin sent abroad, we 
 should begin by considering in tlie latter sense all notes of 
 1^. and 2/., and confine our attention to the fluctuations in 
 notes of 51. and upwards. The addition made to the latter, 
 in the years 1797 and 1798, appears to have done little 
 more than replace the contraction caused by the general 
 embarrassment and distrust of the early years of tlie war. 
 In 1799, 1800, and 1801, there took place an increase of 
 nearly two millions, proceeding from several causes, par- 
 ticularly the export of coin, and the general rise in the price 
 of commodities. From the end of 1802 to that of 1808 
 there was hardly any increase; a circumstiuice in a high 
 degi-ee remarkable, when we consider the extension of our 
 productive industry, the farther rise of prices, and the con- 
 tinued exemption of the Bank from cash payments. From 
 1809 to 1814 the case was altogether different, the circu- 
 lation increasing four, five, six, and even seven millions 
 above its amount in the preceding period. Of this the 
 causes were various ; first, the almost complete expori; of 
 our metallic currency ; next, the discredit of country banks 
 after the insolvencies of 1810; but, above all, the rise of 
 prices which, at this period of the war, was owing chiefly 
 to the depreciation of our bank paper. 
 
 The next asra of fluctuation (1815 and 1816) was of a 
 very different character : it alFected chiefly the country 
 banks, and was evidently a consequence of the general fall 
 of prices, multiplied failures, and stagnation of business. 
 The amount of this contraction has not been ascertained 
 with any accuracy ; but from the returns inserted towards 
 the close of the Report of the Bank Committee of 1819, 
 it seems to have exceeded 8,000,000/.; a sum which, large 
 as it was, appears to have been nearly counterpoised by the 
 re-extension of country-bank circulation on the rise of prices 
 in 1817 and 1818. 
 
 Since the peace, what have been the causes affecting the 
 circulation of the Bank of England? The substitution, on 
 a greater or less scale, of coin for paper ; the rise or lull ot 
 prices; and, what is closely connected with that rise or fall, 
 the credit or discredit of our provincial banks. 
 
 Circulation of Pramiicial Banks. — To nscbrUiin the 
 amount of country-bank paper in circulation, would be aii
 
 [*18] O'lr Cinrrnry and Escchfnu/^f<i. [Apt. 
 
 object of <,'rcai interest and importiincc; at present onr 
 means ofealculatinf^ it are very ina{le(|uate, and must coii- 
 liruie so while private banks are so mnnerous anci on so 
 small a scale. The Bank of England, placed al)ove the 
 hazard of discredit, declares openly its circulation : private 
 bankers require, or conceive that they require, the aid of 
 secrecy. This will, in all probability, continue until 
 the arrival of the much-desired period, when the coun- 
 try at large shall be admitted to the advantage at present 
 enjoyed by Scotland alone, we mean that of having an un- 
 limited number of partners in country banks. The con- 
 sequence would be, a stability beyond all doubt ; and the 
 accumulation in a limited number of great establishments 
 (chartered banks) of that business which is at present 
 broken into small, and frequendy insecure fragments. (See 
 the evidence of E. Gilchrist before the Bullion Commit- 
 tee, 1810. ; also Mr. Joplin's pamphlet on Country Banks. 
 
 The Exemptionfrom Cash Payments. — To exempt banks 
 from cash payments was a measure altogether new in the 
 history of finance, and the necessity for it is to be sought 
 in difficulties that were peculiar to ourselves. France, 
 Austria, and most other countries, know no mode of carry- 
 ing on war but by furnishing men and military stores ; but 
 after 1795, England, in a great measure, exchanged this 
 plan for the payment of subsidies. Then as to an occasional 
 demand for a very different purpose, the supply of corn, 
 the lower classes in most countries of the Continent, on the 
 occurrence of scarcity, have recourse to coarse substitutes, 
 or, being immersed in a poverty of which we have no 
 idea, often fall victims to unhealthy food, sometimes to ab- 
 solute want ; while, in a wealthy community like England, 
 an export of the circulating medium is made the means of 
 obtaining relief. Now, though the sums sent abroad are 
 in either case less great than they appear, our subsidies 
 being furnished, in a great degree, in stores, and our com 
 paid, in some measure, by manufactures, the drain takes 
 place from a stream already sufficiently small for its channel ; 
 for in no country is there more of circulating medium than 
 is indispensable for the transaction of business. This is ap- 
 parent from various circumstances; from the rapidity with 
 which money is made to circulate from dealer to dealer ; 
 also, from a recent and striking fact, the distress that oc- 
 curred in France in the autumn of 1818, when, notwith- 
 standing the enjoyment of peace and free trade, the abstrac- 
 tion of a part of the metallic currency led to the most
 
 A pp.] Oitr Currennj avd Exchanges. [19] 
 
 distressinpf results; an imiiietliate reduction of discounts, a 
 general fall of j)rices, and a long list of bankruptcies. 
 
 From dilFiculties of this nature we were relieved by that 
 decisive measure, the exemption of our banks from cash pay- 
 ments : after its adoption no scarcity of money was expe- 
 rienced in the years of our heaviest continental demands : its 
 effect, in fact, was to remove present pressure by incurring 
 the hazard of depreciation, and of a great ultimate addition 
 to our debt. 
 
 The Time of its Operation. — A considerable time elapsed 
 before the operation of the act was fairly tried. In 1797 
 and 1798, our financial affliirs were prosperous; our con- 
 tinental exchanges were favourable ; and the susi)ension of 
 subsidies and corn imports would, without the exemption, 
 have restored confidence in our money market : when 
 concurrent with it and with a vigorous increase of tiix- 
 ation, they raised the funds and added largely to the 
 command of money on the part of our merchants, our 
 manufacturers, our agriculturists. It was not till the 
 autumn of 1799, that the aid expected from the act was 
 put fairly to the test: our allies re(|uired large payments; 
 our deficient harvest necessitated a great import; and both 
 were supplied without the pecuniary embarrassment expe- 
 rienced before the exemption. The means now adopted 
 were, the export of our coin to the Continent, and the 
 substitution of bank paper: the result a {lartial depreci- 
 ation (between 3 and 5 per cent.) of bank notes relatively 
 to coin. 
 
 In 1800, notwithstanding the continuance of continental 
 demands both for subsidies and the purchase of corn, 
 both government and the mercantile world still escaped 
 pressure from scarcity of money, and thus got over an 
 interval of greater })ressure than any in the early years of 
 the war. The experiment had not, indeed, been made 
 with impunity: we had exhausted our coin, and could not 
 have undergone such another trial without a great depre- 
 ciation of our paper. This was, doubtless, felt by Mr Pitt, 
 and may be ranked among his principal motives for 
 resigning and advising peace ; but the shock was not per- 
 ceived by the public, and was evidently of a nature to be 
 repaired in a season of tranquillity. 
 
 Increase of Discoiwts explained. — The Bullion Committee 
 in their Report (p. 2G.) animadverted emphatically on the 
 great increase that had taken ])lace in the aniount of dis- 
 
 [15] 'J
 
 j'JUJ (iiir ('Kirninj mnl Krchav^ea. [A PP. 
 
 counts hy llir l>:iMk ol" Kiiirlnnd, hdwocii 17J>7 and Islo. 
 'I'liis llicy ascribed lo over issue, but tlicy omitted to niakt* 
 allowance for tlie operation of several causes of a wholly dil- 
 fneiit nature. Thus, after the Exemjition Act, the notes 
 of the Bank of England were made to replace the cash 
 reserve of every banker in the kingdom, and supplies of 
 these notes could be obtained only by discount. Hence, 
 the adoption of a practice, which, in the last age, would 
 have been deemed not a little extraordinary by the cautious 
 veterans of Lombard Street, — that of London bankers 
 opening, like merchants, accounts with the Bank of Eng- 
 land ; and, when in want of money, sending thither bills 
 for discount, in preference to a sale of Exchequer bills or 
 stock. If the reserve fund of all the country banks of the 
 kingdom, previous to the Exemption Act, be calculated 
 at 4,000,000/., we need be at no loss to account for a very 
 large addition to the demands for discount on the Bank of 
 England. 
 
 The Rate of Interest. — Our last reference to facts, or, 
 as the French express it, to le& choses positives^ regards the 
 rate of intei'est which, notwithstanding the magnitude of 
 our war expense, rose only one per cent, above its average 
 rate in peace. This was certainly a very moderate differ- 
 ence, and owing, in a great measure, to the substitution of 
 war taxes for loans ; to our raising so large a portion of 
 our supplies within the year. It was owing, also, in a very 
 considerable degree, to the advantage arising to bankers, 
 from the Exemption Act ; an advantage founded, in the 
 case of provincial banks, on the saving of their reserve 
 or dead fund, and wholly distinct from a power to in- 
 crease their issues ad libitum. Had the latter been prac- 
 ticable, would not so gainful a business have been followed 
 more extensively, and would not interest soon have been 
 reduced by an eager competition, from five to four per 
 cent? * 
 
 The Exemption Act considered as an ccotiomising Expe- 
 pedient. — The use of bank paper is a refinement enabling 
 a community to turn to account a large proportion, sup- 
 pose the half, of a currency which would otherwise be 
 wholly unproductive. The exemption from cash payments 
 
 * For further arguments on the limited power of banks, see a pam- 
 phlet entitled " Observations on the Depreciation of Money; " also a 
 second pamphlet, entitled " Farther Obsenations ; " both published in 
 1811, by Robert Wilson, Esq. Accountant, and one of the Directors of 
 the Bank of Scotland. 
 
 14
 
 Apr.] Our Cunenaj and Exchanges. [21} 
 
 is a farther refinement, enabling bankers to hold, at the 
 disposal of their customers, the chief part of their reserve 
 tiind ; which, for the sake of precision, we shall consider a 
 fourth of the paper currency in the country. Now, to keep 
 the reserve fund as low as is compatible with security, has 
 long been the wish of our bankers, and the oi>ject of a 
 variety of arrangements : of these, by lar the most ellectual 
 is that by which they settle their daily balances against 
 each other, amounting (Evidence to the Bullion Ueporl, 
 p. 151.) to the very large sum of 5,000,000/. daily, by an 
 exchange of cheques, without having occasion to use more 
 than a tenth of the sum in bank notes. Of the same 
 nature, are certain facilities given at the Bank of Erigland, 
 in regard to the hour at which a banking house makes its 
 payment for tiie day; as well as the employment of money 
 agents or middle-men (Evidence, Bullion Report, p. 12 1.) 
 in obtaining sums from one banker for another, at very 
 short notice. These various modes of lessening the amount 
 of a dead stock are both ingenious and legitLn:ntc, aflbrdhig 
 a striking proof of the advantages attendant on a great com- 
 mercial connnunity, on mutual confidence, and vicinity of 
 position. A farther saving of this nature would luive 
 tbrmed one of the leading features of Mr. Ricardo's " plan 
 for an economical and secure currency." Now, the result, 
 which, on a comparative snudl scale, was attained by these 
 arrangements, was accomplished, en strand, by the Exemp- 
 tion Act; which, by one decisive provision, cnableil bankers 
 to dispense with the most expensive and anxious part of 
 their business. So flir as regarded circulation at home, its 
 effect partook of the beneficial character of the economising 
 expedients ; its weak side was towards the Continent, and 
 there accordingly was received the wound which proved 
 the source of so much pain and disquietude after 1809. 
 
 Report of the Bullion Committee. — This document, the 
 merits of which liave been so diftlsrently estimated, may be 
 read with interest even at present, when the subject has re- 
 ceived so much additional elucidation, both from research 
 and from events that have intervened. The passages in the 
 Report which treat of the regulation of money and ex- 
 change, whatever, in short, can be termed an exposition of 
 general principles, are remarkable for accuiacy and clear- 
 ness : those of a different character are to be Ibund in the 
 latter part (pp. 23, 24-.), and are open to censure, chiefly 
 as implying a beUef that the Bank had the means of in- 
 
 [H] S
 
 [22'] Oiiidntroinj (1)1(1 Exchanges. [Al'P. 
 
 crrasiii'^ its issfws at (liscrelion, as ii' the pul)lic were wholly 
 without the power of chcckiiip^ the circulation, u power so 
 clearly illustrated by Mr. Bosanquet, in liis " Practical 
 Observations on the Report." 
 
 Of the extent ol" misconception conveyed by disseminat- 
 ing the opinion that " the rise of prices was owinjr chiefly to 
 our bank pajier," some idea nmy be formed from one simple 
 fact. The total rise of prices between 1797 and 1810 was 
 above 30 per cent. ; and of that not more than 5 or 
 6 per cent, was at that time attributable to the non-con- 
 vertibility of our paper. (See the Essay on M(jn(y in Na- 
 pier's Supplement, p. 526.) In this, Ave refer to the declar- 
 ation of an eminent buUionist, (Mr. M'Culloch,) and cite 
 his authority in contradiction to that of the Bullion Com- 
 mittee itself. 
 
 Another serious error, or rather omission in the Report, 
 is an inattention to the " effect on the exchange of our sul>- 
 sidies and corn purchases." An admission is, indeed, made 
 (p. 16.) in general terms, of the effect of political and mer- 
 cantile transactions ; but the impression conveyed by it is 
 lessened by other passages (p. 21, &c.) in which the effects 
 in question are treated as slight, and the result of the stop- 
 page of American intercourse with the Continent is wholly 
 passed over. 
 
 That the authors of the Report had deferred for a season 
 the formation of their conclusions on a subject so new and 
 ^complex, had certainly been desirable; but there seems no 
 ground for the suspicion of their being actuated by party 
 leeling. Their labours give evidence of great research and 
 solicitude for truth ; while the imperfections in their rea- 
 soning admit of explanation from circumstances similar to 
 those to which we have alluded in the text ; in particular, 
 the fact, that so much of the information now before the 
 public was either unknown or very imperfectly disclosed to 
 them. Thus, a witness of evident ability, and in the habit 
 of very extensive discount transactions, gave (p. 124'.) the 
 following evidence : 
 
 " Do you know, in point of fact, whether such transac- 
 tions as you have now described, were in practice previous 
 to the suspension of the cash payments of the Bank ? — 
 Yes ; they were. 
 
 " Do you know whether they were practised to a similar 
 extent ? — No ; they were not. 
 
 " In what proportion, compared with the present time ? 
 -»— 1 cannot form any exact criterion.
 
 A pp.] Our Cmrencjj and Exchanges. [25} 
 
 " Can you stale to the Committee, the cause of such thf- 
 ference? — I beheve it to be on account of the increase of 
 country paper, and also Bank of Enghmd paper." 
 
 Wlien a witness of such inteHifjence, in accouiittu'; for 
 the augmentation of discounts, leaves out of consicleratiou 
 the effects of the increase of our population anil productive 
 industry from 1797 to 1810, we need hardly wonder that 
 they should have escaped the attention of the Committee. 
 Jn fact, the errors of the latter may be easily accounted for. 
 The chief writer of the Report, however temperate, impar- 
 tial, and likely to rise in reputation, had his life been pro- 
 longed, was a stranger to the practice of business ; antl 
 could not, from his youth, have had nmch acquaintance 
 with the state of our money transactions previous to 1797. 
 Of his coadjutors, one was a banker, never remarkable for 
 clearness or accuracy; another, a man of undoubted ability^ 
 l)ut at that time new, as he has himself admitted *, to ques- 
 tions of this nature. Accordingly, in historical and com- 
 mercial matter the Report is very defective ; no notice is 
 taken in it of the pecuniary embarrassments of 1795 and 
 1 79G, arising from the double drain of specie for subsidies 
 and corn; nor is the recurrence of these causes in 1799 or 
 1809 adverted to, although it was to them that we owed the 
 chief increase of our bank notes. Nothing would have con- 
 tributed so much to obtain the conviction of the mercantile 
 body, we may say of the public at large, as a course of rea- 
 soning supported by facts. Such an inquiry, conducted 
 with the candour that marks the Rej)ort, and was so con- 
 spicuous in the general parliamentary conduct of Mr. Hor- 
 ner, would have led to several very important conclusions; 
 — to an estimate of the share in depreciation to be ascribed 
 in the first place to the expenditure then making in Spain; 
 next, to the corn imports then in progress from the Conti- 
 nent; and, lastly, to the interruption of the trade of the 
 United States. Ilad the effect of the last been proved to 
 be considerable, the iucjuiry might perhaps have led to a 
 most desirable measure — the repeal of our Orders in 
 Council before the United States resorted to the alter- 
 native of war. 
 
 Qiiestions at issue beiMoeen the Opponents <intl Supporters oj 
 the Bullion lieport. — The points most strongly contested 
 between the opposite parties in the bullion (juestion were 
 
 * llubkisson on the Depreciation ol oiu" Currency, 1810. 
 [Bj 4.
 
 [_2i'] Our Currcncij and Exchanges. [Ai'P. 
 
 two; — first, the cause ot" the fall of our exchanges; and, 
 next, the cause of the progressive enhancement of commo- 
 dities. As to the former, the events of 1815 showed, be- 
 yond doubt, that the 7;rmrt?;y cause of fluctuations in the 
 exchange was to be sought in continental transactions, how- 
 ever much the non-convertibility of our paper miglit affect 
 the degree and duration of the full. Tlie second cjuestion 
 is more complicated, and tliere is still no small difficulty in 
 convincing the buUionists that the operation of our non- 
 convertible paper was passive, and necessarily posterior to 
 the rise of prices. They will not, however, refuse their 
 attention to facts, or deny that a very general rise of prices 
 took place prior to 1797; nor will they object to admit in- 
 ferences from the case of the agriculturists, the class whose 
 circumstances operate most directly on the circulation of 
 country banks. 
 
 Connexum between the Circumstances of our Agriculturists 
 and the Circidation of Country Banks. — The continued 
 inadequacy of our growth of corn rendered the war a 
 period of activity in regard to inclosures, drainages, and 
 other agricultural improvements : prices were carried to 30, 
 50, and in the latter years of the war to 100 j^r cent, be- 
 yond those of peace, requiring thus twice the sura to pur- 
 chase the same commodities. Wages rose progressively ; 
 the style of living of the farmers, and even of their labourers, 
 was visibly improved. Observe the reverse of the picture 
 as exhibited in 1815 and 1816: prices and wages had fallen 
 surprisingly ; inclosures, drainages, and other improve- 
 ments, were discouraged ; the style of house-keeping on the 
 part of the farmers was lowered, and a far smaller sum of 
 currency was found sufficient for their transactions. In 
 1817 the high prices of corn brought back activity in agi'i- 
 cultural improvements, and (see the Report of the Bank 
 Committee of 1 8 1 9) a renewed increase of paper currency. 
 During the last four years the picture has been for the 
 fourth time reversed ; prices have fallen greatly, and with 
 them the circulation of bank paper. 
 
 Prices of Merchandize. — In regard to these also, a similar 
 course of reasoning will be found to hold : the adoption of 
 a paper currency tended, doubtless, to promote enhance- 
 ment ; but the primary causes of it are to be sought in the 
 war demand, or (see Tooke and High and Low Prices) in 
 unfavourable seasons and obstructions to mercantile inter- 
 course. It is a foct that almost all articles experienced a 
 fall at the peace before the reduction of bank paitcr.
 
 Ai'i'.] Our Ciirroirij (uui Exchanges. [25] 
 
 The Poxver of BanLs vver-rafal. — We thus consltler our 
 banks as following the course of circumstances, and as 
 iakin<^ no A'ac/, either in extending or contracting their issues. 
 Those who think otherwise, and who regard our banks as 
 both possessing and exercising the power of over-issue, are 
 pledged to show how it happened that these potent associ- 
 ations did not thus act at a much earlier period. Why did 
 our banks defer until 1S09, that which they might have done 
 in 1797, at all events in 1803? On referring to the Bullion 
 Report we shall find (p. 25.) that this difficulty is noticed, 
 but not explained ; and that the Committee, in pointing 
 out two periods of extended issue, at the distance of more 
 than seven years from each other (1801 and 1809), were 
 wholly unable to give reasons for the circulation remaining 
 stationary during that long interval. Farther, if our banks 
 possessed this lucrative power, why suspend its exercise at 
 the peace of 1814, so long before the act for the resump- 
 tion of cash payments ? 
 
 Jnefficacx) of an Exemption from Cash Payments in Peace. 
 — We proceed to address a few sentences in the same style 
 to a very different class of persons ; to those who, snficring 
 under the depressed price of merchandize or agricultural 
 produce, regret that the exemption from cash jiaynients 
 siiould not have been made a permanent part of our policy. 
 These persons cannot be aware that in peace this exemp- 
 tion would be of very rare and limited operation: it was in 
 existence during 1819 and 1820, yet our prices contiimed 
 progressively falling; in other words, the value of money 
 progressively rose. The exemjnion from cash payments 
 was, then, in one point of view, unnecessary; in another, it 
 was inoperative. That it was unnecessary, was shown by the 
 case with which discounts were obtained ; that it was inoper- 
 ative, ajipeared from our exchanges keeping at or above 
 par. Yet so little is this understood, that in the various de- 
 bates on the subject in the House of Conunons {e. g. 9tli 
 April, 1821,) the majority of our jiarliamentary guides 
 attribute the great fall in prices to the return to a metallic 
 standard; as if a state of peace and a favourable harvest 
 were of little account, and the power of keeping up prices 
 were actually vested in our banks. 
 
 Is it not apparent that in peace, wlien our exchanges 
 are brought down by ojily one great cause, an occasional 
 necessity lor imi)orting corn, the e\em|)tion from ca.sli pay- 
 nienls would be available only in a year like IbiT, when
 
 [26] Our ('.iiyrciicij cmd Kahunges. [Al»P. 
 
 tlic (Ic'fiiit'Mcy ol'tlic prcccdin;^ ciop h.'cl to ji sudden dc- 
 luaml oil our nci<^lil)<)iirs, and when the exemption from 
 cash payments won Id enable us to send abroad several mil- 
 lions of our metallic currency ? 
 
 Mr. PccVs Bill. — Those who ascribe our present embar- 
 rassments to Mr. Peel's Bill, and the resumption of casli- 
 paymcnts, would do well to consider that no legislative 
 arrangement has the power of converting a banker into a 
 capitalist. The object of the latter is to obtain interest for 
 liis money, without the trouble or hazard of active business ; 
 while a banker is necessarily a man of business, and sel- 
 dom a man of large capital. His funds, arising chiefly 
 from deposit, and being subject to sudden demands, nmst 
 be vested in securities easily vendible, such as mercantile 
 acceptances, exchequer bills, or government stock. Any 
 deviation from this course, any advance of money made on 
 land, houses, or property of doubtful sale, is at variance 
 with the rules of his business, and never fails to be attended 
 with embarrassment or loss. 
 
 Publications on the Subject ()f Exchange. — The present 
 age has been fertile in essays on the principles of exchange, 
 umonij which the most entitled to attention are ; the remarks 
 in the Bullion Report, (pp. 10, 11.); Mr.W. Blake's pam- 
 phlet, entitled " Observations on Exchange," jniblished 
 in 1810 ; and an essay by Mr. J. R. M'Culloch, under the 
 head of " Exchange," in the Supplement to the Encyclo- 
 paedia Britannica. The last claims our attention, not only 
 as an able and comprehensive treatise, but as differing in its 
 general tone from the arguments advanced in the text ; a 
 diflference, however, which, on an attentive examination, 
 will be found less considerable than it appears. 
 
 Correspondence bctivce7i our reasoning and that of Mr. 
 M'Culloch. — Mr. M., in maintaining (Essay on Exchange, 
 p. 220.) that corn purchases or expenditure abroad have 
 no permanent effect on the exchange, does not deny that 
 their temporary effect is great. Such is also our doctrine, 
 as exemplified in the tabular statement in the text : the fall 
 in our exchange was not permanent at all till 1800, nor 
 permanent, in a high degree, till 1809; and in both cases 
 it became, after a certain time, nominal. 
 
 Farther, a tall in the computed exchange, wlien there is 
 no exemption from cash payments, is recovered during the 
 continuance of the pressure, but when such exemption sub-
 
 Arp.] Our Cinrcticij and Exc/iarigcs. [27] 
 
 sists, the currency loses its reinstating puv:er, antl becoming 
 depreciated, the exchange continues depressed until the re- 
 action of causes, mercantile or poHtical, restore the vahie 
 ot" the currency. Of both we have had striking examples 
 ill the present age: the fall of our exchange in 1795 and 
 
 1796, was redressed in the end of 179G, and beginning of 
 
 1797, before the termination of our subsidy to Austria; 
 whereas the fall in 1800, and still more that in 1809, and 
 continued, until the conclusion of peace entirely altered the 
 nature of our connexion with the Continent. 
 
 Fluctuatio7is in the Exchange in 1815. — We have dwelt 
 in the text on the fluctuations of the exchange in 1815, 
 viz. on its sudden fall on the renewal of continental hos- 
 tilities, and its no less sudden rise on the prospect of their 
 termination. Both are evidently accordant with the gene- 
 ral admission in the Essay in question (p. 220.), of the 
 great temporary effects of foreign demand. They require, 
 therefore, no farther notice, except as to the extent of the 
 fall in April and May, 1815, which (nearly 20 per 
 cent.) was very great, open as the Continent then was to 
 our exports. 
 
 But does not this extent of fall furnish a strong presmnp- 
 tion in favour of another part of our reasoning on this in- 
 tricate subject, viz. our mode of accounting for the great 
 and continued depression of the exchange during the years 
 1811, 1812, and 1313? The demands on us from the 
 Continent, say the buUionists, were not great in these years; 
 but admitting the correctness of ISIr. M'Culloch's statement 
 (Essiiy on Exchange, p. 222.), that our remittances to the 
 Continent for corn and subsidies did not much exceed 
 2,000,000/. sterling, in each of these years, we consider 
 even that sum sullicient to continue the depression, England 
 being then wholly exhausted of the precious metals, the 
 counterpoising effect of the American trade removed, and 
 our exports to the Continent greatly cramped. 
 
 Reduction ofCountnj-BankPajyer. — In regaril to the ili- 
 minution of country-bank, paper, which took place in IS 15 
 and 1816, we agree with Mr. M'Culloch as to the I'act, and 
 are not disposed to dissent from his estimate of the extent 
 of the reduction : the diflereuce lies in our considering this 
 reduction as posterior to a lall of prices, exactly as we con- 
 sider the augmented issue iluring the war anil in 1817 as 
 posterior to their rise.
 
 [28] Our C.nncnai (ind Hvchan<its. [Al'P. 
 
 Depict idl toil. — Lastly, as to the extent ol" dcprcc iatiori 
 urisiiig Iroiii tlie Exemption Act. Tliat the unliivoiiral)!*.- 
 balance of excliange from 1809 to 181 4- was chiefly nomi- 
 nal, and that in regard to continental payments our hank 
 paper was depreciated to the extent denoted by the course 
 t)f exchange, we readily admit. But as the use of our 
 bank paper was to circulate commodities at home, and as 
 the rise of prices consecjuent on its continental deprecia- 
 tion was by no means immediate, we have, we conceive, 
 made a fair allowance in takinij the averajje of home de- 
 preciation at somewhat more than the half of the foreign ; 
 meaning, that if in Spain or Germany 125/. in notes were 
 re(|uired in 1812, to pay for that which might have been 
 purchased for 100/. in metallic currency, the proportion at 
 home was probably 10 per cent. less; 115/. in notes pur- 
 chasing what, without the exemption from cash payments, 
 jnight have been had for 100/.
 
 r-M] 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 TO 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 J^FFECT of increasing Population on the Price of Corn. — 
 The reasoning in the text enables us to con-ect a veiy ma- 
 terial part of the Report of the Agricultural Connnittee. 
 The writers of that Report, in adverting (p. 11.) to the 
 chance of a future deficiency of harvest, advance an opinion 
 that the magnitude of our consumption, as compared with 
 that of former periods, must render the pressure of defi- 
 ciency more severe, and the means of jiroviding against it 
 more diilicult. 
 
 " A liarvest," they add, " which should be one-third 
 below an average in wheat, would bring on this country a 
 very different degree of suffering, and would require a very 
 dif!erent degree of exertion and sacrifice, to supi)lv llie 
 deficiency, from what would have been recjuireil uiulur a 
 similar failure fifty years ago." But to this opinion olllu- 
 Committee we must oppose a recent and highly important 
 fact; viz. that though the harvest of 1816 was (Evidence of 
 Mr. Hodgson, p. 2(it.) a full third below the average of our 
 wheat-crop, yet the degree of public suffering was less in/oisc 
 than would have been experienced under a similar failure 
 fifty years before. For this tiiere are several reasons : — 
 
 1st. If the agricultural part of our countrymen incrujuse 
 their numbers in proportion to the consumers ; if the 
 amoimt of produce depend on the extent of labour and 
 cai)ital applied to cultivation ; and if a recourse to the in- 
 ferior soils mentioned repeatedly in the lleport (and in 
 Mr. Ricardo's well-known work on Political Kconoiny and 
 Taxation) be far less neeessary than an improved cultivation 
 of the better soils; we stand nearly in the situation of our 
 forefathers, and find the prospect of adequacy of supply 
 very little affected by the increase of our numbers ; because
 
 [301 On AgnaiUuye. '\'\PT'» 
 
 that increase hrini^s with it llic power of auirmcmiiiL^ our 
 labour, and, coiisecjuently, oxiv produce. 
 
 *2(llv. li !iucli be the case at home, tlie cliance of relief 
 from abroad is decidedly inijiroved, since the extension oi 
 tillage in the course of the last and present age. The sur- 
 face of corn country in Europe, we mean of country j)ro- 
 ducing corn in sufliciency for export, was formerly far 
 from large; comprising only Great Britain, Ireland, the 
 North of France, and North of Germany, with part oi" 
 Denmark and Poland. We have explained in the text 
 (p. 119.) the similarity of temperature prevalent throughout 
 this tract, which is almost all maritime, and presents no 
 very material difference of latitude. Hence a deficiency of 
 crop, whether arising from blight as in 1811, or from ex- 
 cess of rain as in 1809 and 1816, was more or less ccnn- 
 mon to the whole. But in the last and present age, tillage 
 has been extended in the interior of Poland, and on the 
 shores of the Euxine ; countries differing considerably from 
 ours in climate, and not likely to be affected by the causes 
 which create disappointment in the north-west of Europe. 
 As vet, the produce in these countries is far from large, but 
 the improvements now taking place in river navigation bid 
 fair to facilitate the access to several fertile tracts hithertc 
 in a manner excluded from communication with the sea. 
 Add to this, that a similar prospect is presented by the 
 increased cultivation of the United States of America. To 
 expect a very extensive supply from either would, on account 
 of the distance, be absui'd; but in a year of scarcity, an im- 
 port to the extent of only a week or a fortnight's consump- 
 tion has a very sensible effect on our corn market. 
 
 It follows that the result, in the present age at least, is 
 very different from the anticipation of the Committee. The 
 progress of improvement, and the extension of communi- 
 cation between different countries, which are the accom- 
 jianimcnts of augmented population, have a very beneficial 
 effect on the supply of corn : they widen the range of pur- 
 chase, enable one nation to come to the relief of another, 
 and convert into the mitigated form of scarcity those failures 
 of harvest, which, in remote ages, were followed by all the 
 liorrors of famine. 
 
 ISational Disadvantage of a high Price of Corn. — After 
 all that we have urged on the vital importance to the 
 country of the prosperity of agriculture, we may, without 
 suspicion of under-rating that importance, sulyoin a few- 
 remarks on a subject at present very seldom mentioned; —
 
 App.] Qucsh'oii of a free Trade in Corn. [31] 
 
 the evils tliat would attend a j)rice of corn materially hitrlier 
 than that ot" our neighbours; we mean a price between 
 10s. and 8()5. a quarter, while that of France, the Nether- 
 lands, or Germany, was at 45.?. or 50.?. The war closed, in 
 .1 political sense, with so much success, with so great an 
 appearance of national triumph, as to blind us ibr a season 
 to the evils of transition, aiul to the emb.-irrassment conse- 
 (juent on hiirh prices. The injurious effect of the latter 
 was, indeed, sliown in part by the emigration of half-pay 
 officers, annuitants, and persons with large families, who 
 drew their income from this country and expended it abroad, 
 giving to our neighbours the stimulus arising from rej)ro- 
 duction, and subjecting England to an injury of the kind so 
 long inflicted on Ireland by her absentee proprietors. 'I'he 
 amount thus drawn by emigrants and travellers has been, 
 we believe, moderately computed, for some time, at 
 5,000,000/., at present at 4,000,000/. a year; but how 
 much greater would have been the evil had a continuance 
 of high prices induced master manufacturers, or their work- 
 men, to seek an establishment on the Continent? Those 
 of our countrymen, who have travelled since the peace, 
 remark, and apparently with justice, that continental ma- 
 nufacturers are as yet far from formitlable; but they fail to 
 take into account the surprising change that might have 
 been effected by a transfer of British capital anil master 
 workmen. W'ith these potent aids the inhabitants of Nor- 
 mandy, the Netherlands, or the banks of the Rhine, would 
 soon become dangerous rivals, for we ought steadily to keep 
 in mind that our superiority, as a nation, lies not in the 
 individual, bid in our establishments ; in the operation of eol- 
 lective bodies: as workmen, our neighbours would sooi; 
 attain an equality, were they placed on a par with us in 
 regard to machinery, and the division of emj)loyment. 
 Their merchants have not, it is true, the capital necessary 
 to give long credit to customers, such as the Americans ; 
 but that want would have been supplied by our exporters, 
 who, whether they emigrated personally or not, would have 
 made a point of purchasing goods in those towns or ilistricts 
 of the Continent, where they could have been most cheaply 
 manufactured. 
 
 Would our government have possessed any means of 
 counteracting the tide of emigration ? None ; if our corn- 
 market had been kept at an exorbitant lieigiit, the tide 
 would have flowed in various directions, according to the 
 respective advantages of particular situations. One part of 
 the Continent possesses mines of iron, another mines of
 
 [32] On A<^rirullinr. [Apt*. 
 
 coal, alliini abounds in timber, while several tracts olcoa.st 
 approndi to ours in the nuniber and ca))acity ol'tht-ir sen- 
 ports. Happily no part of the Continent could oiler these 
 advantages collectively, so that although incjuiries were made 
 and calculations Ibnned by many of our sj)eculative men, 
 no emigration of consequence took place among our labotn- 
 ing classes, and the i)resent prices of the necessaries of lid; 
 among us seem to remove such unwelcome enterprizes to 
 an indefinite date. 
 
 Subsistaice of i he lower Orders. — In reasoning on the 
 means of supporting the lower orders, we have not laid 
 stress on the effects of spade husbandry, of deep ploughing, 
 or other agricultural experiments described in late publica- 
 tions. Nor do we dwell on the practicability of subsisting 
 an increased po])ulation by the more general use of pota- 
 toes, although, in 1817, a case in point was established by 
 the French government, wlio recommended in public orders 
 the more general cultivation of that I'oot ; and, in regard to 
 Ireland, it is a curious fact, that the export of corn has be- 
 come large since the great increase of the population. Our 
 object, however, is not to dwell on the means of reducing 
 the expense of subsistence ; it is merely to show that in- 
 crease of population has no necessary tendency to raise it. 
 
 Uncertainty of speculative Opinions. — In treating of the 
 prospects of our agriculturists, our wish is less to press a 
 particular opinion, than to show the uncertainty of many 
 of the allegations advanced of late years with so much con- 
 fidence. After the revolutions we have witnessed in statis- 
 tics as in politics, it would be idle to attempt predictions as 
 to what is likely to be either the amount or the price of our 
 produce. In this season of profoinid peace, agriculture 
 occupies a very large share of the national capital and in- 
 genuit}' ; discoveries and inventions are successively occur- 
 ring to modify established methods and alter received opi- 
 nions. Take, for example, the subject on which so much 
 was in'ged in parliament lately, — a high protecting duty. 
 If during peace our growth continue adequate to our 
 consumption, what will have been the use of these pro- 
 tracted discussions, and where would be the advantage so 
 confidently promised to our farmers from the protection in 
 question ? . From these various considerations, ought we 
 not to conclude, tliat the only safe course is to be guided, 
 as far as circumstances at all permit, by general principles, 
 expecting little from any deviation, however plausible, and 
 calculating that in the price of our produce, as in other
 
 A pp.] Question of a free Trade in Com. [33] 
 
 results, this country cannot long differ from the civilized 
 world at large? This naturally leads to a brief notice of 
 the 
 
 Arguments in favour of a free Trade in Corn. — Without 
 any wish to discuss this question at length, we lay before 
 our readers the opinion of several well-inibrmed writers. 
 
 Extract from a pamphlet entitled " Observations on the 
 Commerce of Grain, by Dugald Bannatyne, Esq., Secretary 
 to the Chamber of Commerce of Glasgow," 18 J 6. 
 
 " All great authorities" (says Mr. B., p. 10.) " were in 
 favour of a free trade in corn, initil Mr. Malthus demanded 
 the same protection lor the iiome grower of corn, as for 
 the home manufacturer of particular commodities : but 
 these manufactures (such as lace and silk) are protluctive 
 of no benefit to the public, being all carried on in contra- 
 diction to natural and inherent obstacles, while our labour 
 and capital would find a more beneficial direction, if 
 transferred to the woollen, cotton, hardware, or other 
 branches ; in which, particularly in the latter, we possess 
 local and permanent advanUiges over our continental 
 neighbours. 
 
 " It seems extraordinary, that we should be so muchi 
 alive to the advantages we gain from the division of employ- 
 ment in the prosecution of our houie industry, and not see 
 the benefit to be obtained from the more extended ili vision 
 of employment in the case of nations : a division pointed 
 out by the separate facilities for carrying them on, which, 
 from climate, soil, or natural j)roductions, different coun- 
 tries possess. By keeping up the price of corn, we oblige 
 ourselves to labour in our manufactures at a great disad- 
 vantage, when compared with other nations." 
 
 Extract from a |>amphlet, by Major (now Colonel) 
 Torrens, published also in 181G, and entitled " Letter tv 
 Lord Liverpool on the Slate of Agriculture:" — 
 
 " To any persons who will either investigate first princi- 
 ples, or recur to the experience of countries which, like 
 Holland, have given freedom to tratle, it must be evitient, 
 that this natural stiite of things is greatly preferable to any 
 artificial system which can be substituted in its stejid. As 
 we extend the area from which subsistence is drawn, the 
 inequality in the productivetiess of the seasons diminishes. 
 Hence when, under a free intercourse, a deficient harvest 
 required an unusual import, abuii(l:nii harvests in some
 
 [34 J On /l^riculiure. [App. 
 
 otlior country of the world would supply the deficiency by 
 an extraordinary export. On the other hand, a succession 
 of unusually abundant years could occasion no deep de- 
 pression in our markets, because this extraordinary (juantity 
 of corn of liome growth could not (as when abundant har- 
 vests occur in the case of a country forcin*;^ in averaj^e years 
 an inde))endent supply) much exceed the consumption of 
 the season." 
 
 To these opinions we add that of Mr. M'Culloch, who 
 has inserted an Essay on the Corn Laws, in the same work 
 as his Essay on Exchange, viz. the Supplement to the En- 
 cyclopaedia Britannica. After regretting that the corn trade 
 was not definitively laid open in 1815, a time when, as at 
 present, our prices were so low that our agriculture had, in 
 a manner, felt all the evils of transition, and the public 
 would have reaped the greatest advantage from a return to 
 unrestricted freedom, Mr. M. adds, — 
 
 " M^hen this happy event" (a free trade in corn) " shall 
 have taken place, it will be no longer necessary to force 
 nature. The capital and enterprise of the country will be 
 turned into those departments of industry in which our 
 physical situation, national character, or political institutions, 
 fit us to excel. The corn of Poland, and the raw cotton 
 of Carolina, will be exclianged for the wares of Birmingham 
 and the muslins of Glasgow'. The genuine commercial 
 spirit, that which permanently secures the prosperity of 
 nations, is altogether inconsistent with the dark and shallow- 
 policy of monopoly. The nations of the earth are like 
 provinces of the same kingdom — a free and unfettered 
 intercourse is alike productive of general and of local 
 advantage." 
 
 Political economists are more accustomed to deal in 
 general reasoning, than to analyse the circumstances of a 
 case, or to go through the details necessary to the sug- 
 gestion of a specific remedy. This blank we shall now 
 endeavour to supply, and, by way of supplement to the 
 preceding arguments, add u sketch of the preliminaries 
 indispensable to freedom in our corn trade. By these we 
 mean the exemption of our agriculturists from such burdens 
 as press on them either exclusively, or in a greater degree 
 than on the rest of the public. Thus : — 
 
 Computation of Poor Bate and Tithe. — Of the sums 
 levied for rates in England and \\'ales, the averaije annual 
 amount will probably be, ere long, reduced to —
 
 App.] Qitestion of' a free Trade in Corn. [85^ 
 
 Highway rate, county rate, church rate - j61, 200,000 
 Law suits, removal of paupers, and expence 
 
 of parish officers 300,000 
 
 Maintenance and relief of the poor, after as- 
 suming a reduction from the present charge 
 of somewhat more than 1,000,000/. - t,500,000 
 
 In all - .t 6,000,000 
 
 Of this amount what \xirt bears exclusively on agricul- 
 ture ? To calculate that we begin by excluding 
 
 1. The proportion that appears to be raised in 
 towns, includinj; smaller towns than those 
 mentioned in the Poor-rale Report of 
 1821, p. 13., and referring to the assessment 
 of 181. -5, in which a distinction is made be- 
 tween the contribution of landholders and 
 householders ----- .::^1, 500,000 
 
 2. A large sum which in fact is but vominalli/ 
 paid by agriculturists, the wages of country 
 labour being lower than they would be with- 
 out the rates : this sum we estimate conjec- 
 
 turally, in war at 2,000,000/. ; in peace at 1,000,000 
 Remainder, being the actual burden on agricul- 
 ture arising from rates, supposing the whole 
 on a reduced scale - - - . 3,500,000 
 
 Total (agreeing with the preceding) i'6,000,000 
 
 Now, were all classes equal contributors to 
 the rates, the quota of the land would be 
 only a third, or 2,00(),0()()/. making a de- 
 duction from the 3,500,000/. of - - i£'l,500,«00 
 
 Next, as to Tif/w. — Amount of tithe of Eng- 
 land, Wales, and Ireland, computed at the 
 reduced price of produce, l)ut including tithe 
 paid to laymen, about - 5,000,000/. 
 
 If tithe also were rendered a national burthen, 
 thelandoughttopayonlyatliird( 1,700,000/.) 
 which would form a deduction from its pre- 
 sent burden of 3,300,000 
 
 Total deduction that would then be made fr<Mn 
 
 the burdens on agriculture - - .i4-,800,000 
 
 It is a remarkabh- coincidence that this »Jiun (4,800,000/.^ 
 
 [c] 2
 
 [36] 071 Agriculture. [App. 
 
 is little more than the excess of the burdens on British 
 over those on French agriculture. Sec the text, p. 1 72. 
 
 As our allowance of 4,500,000/. for the poor may ap- 
 pear below the mark, we shall compare it with the rate as 
 it stood before the late wars : — 
 
 In 1792 our poor-rate, exclusive of law ex- 
 pences, and of highway or county rate, 
 amounted to about - - . - j£ '2,000,000 
 
 Add an increase of 50 per cent, proportion- 
 ed to the increase of population - 1,000,000 
 
 Remains to add, as a kind of allowance for the 
 greater embarrassment of the present time, 
 and for abuses introduced into the system 1,500,000 
 
 Total - j£4,500,000 
 
 Tithe: Mode of computing its present Aj)wunt. — Our 
 estimate in the preceding page is founded on the property 
 tax returns for the year 1812, (Nos. 248. and 250. for 
 1814-15). Viewing the question historically, we find a 
 very close connection between the increase of our popula- 
 tion and the increase of our tithe. As there are no means 
 of ascertaining the amount of our agricultural produce, 
 our reference must be to the increase of consumers ; and 
 though our population returns go no farther back than 
 1801, we may with tolerable certainty compute the total 
 addition to have been nearly 50 per cent, on our numbers 
 as they stood in 1792. In fact, were we possessed of a 
 correct return of tithe for that year, we should calculate its 
 present amount by merely adding 50 per cent, to such re- 
 turn; for the prices of produce being now similar to those 
 of 1792, the comparative estimate becomes narrowed to a 
 calculation of quantity. 
 
 Rent of Land. — Can we with any confidence observe a 
 similar rule when calculating the progressive increase of 
 rent ? In that the connection between augmented produce 
 and augmented payment is less apparent than in the case 
 of tithe : yet it would be obviously vain to attempt a mode 
 of computation, which may at first claim attention, we mean 
 one founded on the extent of additional surface brought 
 into tillage. In proof of this we have merely to consi- 
 der that the 50 per cent, added to our produce in the 
 last thirty years has been raised with an addition of pro-
 
 App.] Question of a free Trade in Corn. [37] 
 
 bably less than fifteen per cent, to the number of acres 
 under corn culture, and has been chiefly the fruit of the 
 additional labour and improved methods applied to the 
 surface previously under the i)louf;h. The extension of 
 tillage over mferior soils is rather an index of augmented 
 rent, than a basis for its calculation : the latter we should 
 seek by preference in the new methods that have been 
 discovered, the old that are improvtti, the consequent 
 abridgment of labour, and the additional quantity of corn 
 produced at the same expence; for the eflectof all improve- 
 ments, whether they anieliorate quality or augment quan- 
 tity, is to cheapen jiroduction : they are otherwise not 
 entitled to the name of improvements. 
 
 What, it may be asked, is the benefit to the nation from 
 such improvements ? The power of supporting an addi- 
 tional population on the same territorial surface. — And 
 what is tlie advantage to the proprietors of that surface? 
 An increase of rent which there are, it seems to us, various 
 reasons for calculating in proportion to increase of popu- 
 lation. Were the number of consumers stationary, the 
 result of agricultural improvements would be a fail of mar- 
 ket price: with an increase of consumers, the results are the 
 maintenance of price and the rise of rent. If the surface 
 which, a century ago, produced wheat for the support of 
 two millions of inhabitants, be now sufficient to maintain 
 twice the number, the price of wheat being the same, we 
 shall probably deviate little from the truth in assuming that, 
 in the natural course of things, the rent also oui^/ii to be 
 doubled ; and that any excess or deficiency in this propor- 
 tion of increase is to be sought in causes temporary, pecu- 
 liar, or in some cases, little more than apparent. 
 
 How far is this confirmed by historical evidence ? It 
 seems to have long been the case in France, a country where 
 corn still sells for the price it bore a century and a /i(dfa<io, 
 and the agricultural history of which is more simple and 
 regular than that of England, being unembarrassed by 
 fluctuations in the value of the currency, or by insufficiency 
 in the average growth for the average consumption. But 
 even in England, the proportion between increase of popu- 
 lation and rise of rent will be found to hold in u consider- 
 able degree. It might, j)erhaps, be traced, were our docu- 
 ments complete, during the long period from 1G50 to 1792; 
 in which the price of corn bore, with casual and temporary 
 exceptions, a character of uniformity. Even in the present 
 age, we should not despair of finding a confirmation of our 
 rule, could we succeed in clearing our calculation of the 
 
 [c] $
 
 [38] On Agriculture. [ApP. 
 
 temporary effect of bank paper and of seasons unusually ad- 
 verse. Such an attempt mi<fht, some years ago, have been 
 ridiculed; but at present the temporary part oftlie increase 
 has disappeared, and left us with the prices of 1792, along 
 with a discovery in regard to rent not a little at variance 
 with the high-flown language of those who saw in the war 
 a source of unparalleled wealth; — that the present rental 
 of the United Kingdom is, as far as we can judge, little 
 more than 50 per cent, above that of 1792, or 36,000,000/., 
 instead of 24,000,000/., its supposed amount before our 
 rupture with France. 
 
 This sober result, if it fall below the sanguine expect- 
 ation of those who still cling to high prices, and still put 
 faith in the efficacy of corn laws, leaves, on the other hand, 
 a rise fair and legitimate. We have no argument to found 
 on the principle of calculating the future rise of rent by the 
 increase of our numbers, but it seems to be just towards both 
 parties. Our landlords certainly would have no reason to 
 complain of it ; for it presents to them the cheering pros- 
 pect of being not only permanent but progressive. 
 
 Use of Salt in Agriculture. — We cannot forbear adding 
 a few words on a topic closely connected with the freedom 
 of productive industry, we mean the 2?icreased use of salt in 
 agriadttirc. If there be any accuracy in the arguments of 
 the late Sir Thomas Bernard, and of several others who 
 have written on the subject, how sensible must be the be- 
 nefit to our farmers and graziers, now that government has 
 given the means of so decided an extension to the use of 
 salt, either as a manure or for feeding cattle. Our inland 
 •navigation will enable almost every district to profit by the 
 relaxation ; and the injury to the revenue in one sense will, 
 we trust, soon be compensated by benefit in another, since 
 the only solid basis of taxation is the extension of the 
 national industry. 
 
 There is thus little or no doubt, that, were our farmers 
 relieved from their extra burdens, they would be enabled 
 to raise produce on as low terms as our continental neigh- 
 bours, and might, ere long, allow the public to reap all the 
 benefit arising from unrestricted freedom in the corn trade. 
 For the present, however, we consider " unrestricted free- 
 dom" as wholly out of the question, and shall confine our 
 speculations to the effect of relaxation : of a protecting duty 
 on a reduced scale.
 
 A pp.] On AgricuUure. [39 J 
 
 Comparative Burdens on British and Foreign Agriculture. 
 — Abstract of the Evidence before the Agricultural Com- 
 mittee (April and May, 1821) of Mr. Tooke, i)artner in a 
 mercantile house extensively connected witii the Baltic: — 
 Mr. T., aware how <rreatly the untravelled part of our 
 countrymen overrate the cheapness of foreign countries, 
 laid before the Agricultural C'onniiittee (Evidence, p. 224(.) 
 tables of the prices of wheat from 18 H to 1820, at Peters- 
 burgh, Riga, and Archangel; the result of which is, that 
 it coukl seldom, in these years of peace, have been deli- 
 vered in an English port for loss than from 50s. to iiOs. a 
 quarter. At Odessa the price is occasionally very low, but 
 the freight to England is high; and the hazard of damage 
 on so long a voyage is such as to put that port almost out 
 of the question for the Britir>h market. And as to another 
 point, the amount of supply to be expected from the Con- 
 tinent at large, Mr. T. concurs with I\Ir. Jacob, (Evidence, 
 pp. 232. 260.) that it is in general overrated. 
 
 la regard to our own agriculture, Mr. T. differs mate- 
 rially from those who imagine that a continuance of the 
 present low prices would throw much land out of cultiva- 
 tion. As a fall in the price of corn necessarily reduces the 
 cost of production, he sees no great reason (pp. 232. 288.) 
 why we should not, as half a century ago, raise corn as 
 cheaply^ or almost as c/icapli/, as on the Continent, particu- 
 larly now that the agriculture of Ireland is relieved from 
 restraint. 
 
 Mr. T. is also the oidy witness who brings forward 
 (p. 288.) an argument which we have been at |)ains to 
 enforce in tlie text, viz. that an inijiort limit, if high, would 
 induce extended cultivation, and prove injurious to our 
 fiirmers. We have his concmrence, likewise, in another 
 important point, in accounting (p. 3 tt.) for the ";reat fall 
 in the price of commodities since the peace, less hy a re- 
 currence to cash payments;, than by the application of a 
 great addition of labour and capital to productive purposes. 
 Lastly, he is favourable to a protecting duty on corn, pro- 
 vided" (Evidence, p. 297.) it be no greater than the direct 
 taxes that operate on our own production. 
 
 The opinion, that our corn is likely to be raised at a rate 
 (between 50s. and GOi'. the (juarter) nearly as cheap as on 
 the Continent, has a claim to {)ariicuhir alleiilion ; and we 
 jnoceed to enquire how far it is conliniieil by a consider- 
 ation of either our past or present circumstances. 
 
 [c] 4
 
 [40] On Agriculture. [App. 
 
 Prices dnrinp^ last Centurtj. — If in the history of our corn 
 trade we go back sufficiently far to reach a period of pro- 
 found peace, we shall find little reason to expect tliat in such 
 a season our prices can be kept much above those of the 
 Continent. Throughout the hundred years that elapsed 
 between the accession of Charles II. and of George III., 
 corn was as low, or nearly as low, in England as in France, 
 the Netherlands, or other adjacent parts of the Continent. 
 After 1764, the case was different; but of the 85. or IO5. 
 per quarter of additional price obtained in this country, the 
 half may safely be ascribed to temporary causes ; we mean 
 the American war, the extension of our manufactures, and 
 the general aversion to vest capital in farming, after the 
 discouraging experience of the preceding age. But our 
 taxation, it may be said, is greater, compared to that of 
 continental countries, than it was in the last century, and 
 France is now exempt from tithe ; — important consider- 
 ations certainly, but balanced by others of great weight on 
 our side ; by the fact that the tillage of Ireland is no longer 
 in fetters, that our machinery and implements have received 
 much more improvement, our inland navigation a much 
 greater extension than that of our neighbours. The ad- 
 vantage of all these to agriculture can be appreciated by 
 those only who have seen the wretched roads, the clumsy 
 implements and vehicles of the Continent, or who have 
 duly weighed the cheapness of our canal carriage; by which 
 salt, manure, or bulky commodities generally, can, in 
 many parts, be transported ten or fifteen miles at the insig- 
 nificant charge of a shilling a ton. 
 
 Our jnrsevt Prospect. — The arguments in favour of 
 Mr. Tooke's opinion derived from our present situation 
 are as follow : — 
 
 1. During the war, rents rose without care or exertion 
 on the part of our landlords; at present land affords a rent 
 of consequence only when cultivated with skill — the most 
 substantial of all arguments for the diffusion of the improved 
 husbandry. 
 
 2. The evils that now bear so hard on our agriculture 
 are evils of transition ; the degree of pressure w ill be ma- 
 terially different when farming charges shall have been 
 reduced (as reduced they must be) in proportion to the 
 market price of corn. 
 
 3. As to the comparative burdens on our agriculture and 
 that of other countries, we have in the text taken France
 
 App.] A Protecting DiUy. [4 1 ] 
 
 as a fair specimen of the Continent generally: if in Poland 
 and Russia the burdens are less heavy than in France, hus- 
 bandry, as an art, is far more backward, and the charge 
 of freight to England is heavier. A reference to the pas- 
 sage (p. 168.) containing the comparison with France, will 
 much simplify the present statement, enabling us to leave 
 out of the question the advantage of cheaper labour on 
 the part of the French, and on ours of better machinery, 
 lower interest of money, a more advantageous size of farms, 
 &c. After enumerating the respective burdens, we found 
 the difference confined to a portion of our excise duty on 
 malt, beer, and corn spirits ; a difference which, when, as 
 at present, the corn laws are in a manner inoj)erative, left 
 a sum of 4- or 5,000,000/. to the disadvantage of our 
 countrymen. This difference forms a charge of 7 or 8 per 
 cent, on the rental of our landlortls, and the income of our 
 farmers taken collectively. 
 
 Competition of continental Agriadturists. — Supposing 
 that the effect of a protecting duty is merely to keep our 
 market from 6s. to 85. a quarter above that of France, or 
 the Netherlands, would there be reason to a})prehend that 
 English capital would find its way abroad, and be applied 
 to the extension of culture on the Continent, with a view to 
 import into this country ? To such a question our answer 
 three years ago might have been in the affirmative ; but our 
 charges are now so much reduced, and the advantages of 
 Ireland in regard to chea}) labour, conunaiul of water 
 communication, and fertility of soil, are ibund to approach 
 so nearly to those of the most favoured tracts of the Conti- 
 nent, that we much d<njbt whether any traubfer of capital 
 would take jilace to the latter, particularly as, on referring 
 to the evidence annexed to the Agricultural Report, we 
 find (p. 364-.) that the cost of raising a (juarter of wheat in 
 Prussia or Poland, including the conveyance to Dantzic, 
 but exclusive of rent, is about iiGs. the quarter, an expence 
 little greater than the cost of raising it (p. ^'iS.) free of 
 rent, in East Lothian. 
 
 Next, as to the storing or warehousing of foreign corn, 
 with a view to import. — The interest of the money vestetl 
 in the purchase of corn forms so consideral)Ie a part ol the 
 annual charge of keeping it in granary, thai were our prices 
 to rise materially, it might entur into the views of our corn 
 merchants to purchase in remote countries, like the interior 
 ol" Poland or the south-west of Russia, where the average
 
 [42] Our Agriculture. [Apf. 
 
 price of wheat is not above 305., and in some years (Evi- 
 dence, j). o(i\.), lower. At present sucli a course is out of 
 the (|ueslion, the inland provinces in these countries being 
 unj)rovi(.Ied either witii proper warehouses, or with the 
 means of j^iving security to deposited jiroperty. Were 
 these defects supplied by the erection of suitable build- 
 ings in a town adjacent to a navigable river, and by the 
 protection of a military guard, a large supply of corn 
 might be warehoused in cheap years, and on the occur- 
 rence of a rise, sent to a market in this country or else- 
 where. The transport to Dantzic or Odessa, added to the 
 freight from Dantzic to England, or from Odessa to the 
 south of France, miglit be averaged at 20s. the quarter, 
 carrying the total cost, when brought to market, to some- 
 what more than 50s., exclusive of our protecting duty ; a 
 price which, if not high, is greatly above that which is 
 assigned by vague rumour (see Mr. Curwen's speeches in 
 the session of 1821,) to the Polish market. 
 
 TheUnitcd States (>f America. The great distance of that 
 country from Euro})e has long led to the practice of ship- 
 ping its produce in the form of flour, rather than of grain; 
 thus accomplishing a saving in freight, and avoiding the 
 shifting and heating to be apprehended in a long and tem- 
 pestuous passage. Among other recent discoveries, we are 
 apprised (p. 437. Revue E?icyclopedique, for August, 1821, 
 printed at Paris,) of a method of preserving flour during 
 several years in perfect condition, by means of air-tight 
 casks ; but whether theexpence of this or oiher methods of 
 the kind be not too great for the chance of profit, remains 
 to be ascertained. 
 
 Compared to these, what means are possessed by our own 
 agriculturists in regard to keeping corn in the granary, and 
 making the plenty of one season conducive to the supply 
 of the next ? They have the connnand of better buildings ; 
 they pay a lower interest on capital ; and are exempt, in 
 a great measure, from the charge of conveyance to mar- 
 ket : their chief disadvantage lies in the prime cost of their 
 produce. 
 
 Iniprovcme?ifs in Husbandrij. — Those who are inclined 
 to subscribe to the efficacy of some lately-promulgated 
 methods of penetrating more deeply into the soil, whether 
 by the plough or spade, may consider the Continent 
 likely to benefit more largely from them in consequence of 
 its cheaper labour, its greater agricultural population. But
 
 App.] Our Agriculture. [43] 
 
 in any improvement arising from such a process, this coun- 
 try can hardly tail to share equally, superior as we are in 
 horses, ploughs, and iron-work generally : while, in regard 
 to labour, Ireland is as cheaply and iihundantlv supplied 
 as any part ot" the Continent. 
 
 Probable Amount of hnport. — A low rate of duty on 
 foreign corn would doubtless prevent any considerable rise 
 in our market; but it by no means follows that our tillage 
 would be materially circumscribed, or that the amount of our 
 import would be large. Of barley, our growth is in general 
 equal to our consumption : a considerable iuij)ort takes place 
 only in particular years, and after seasons unfavourable to 
 this kind of grain, such as the sununers of 181(j aiul 1817. 
 In oats the case has hitherto been different, our growth being 
 habitually below our consiunjition, and large imports being 
 required both from Irelanil antl the Continent: the amount 
 has varied, of course, in different years, Init has not for a 
 long time averaged so little as half a million of cjuarters 
 from either. In future our import of oats, at least in 
 peace, is likely to be confined to Ireland. Of beans, pease, 
 and rye, our growth is in general adequate, and our im- 
 ports insignificant: in regard to wheat, our inijiorts, for- 
 merly on su large a scale, are at ])resent suspended ; nor 
 are they likely to be renewed during peace, except on the 
 accidental occurrence of an indifferent season. 
 
 What appears to be the average growth of corg of all 
 kinds in Great Britain and Ireland? According to Mr. 
 Colquhoun, it seems in 1812 to have been, inchuling the 
 corn used as seed, al)out 4(), 000,000 of (|uarters, to which 
 may be added for increase in the perioil tliat has intervened 
 about 20 per cent., or 8,000,000 of (juarters. In reasoning 
 on years to come, with the prospect of a progressive in- 
 crease, we shall not greatly err in taking our growth at an 
 average of nearly 50,000,000 of (juarters, of corn of all 
 kinds. Then, as to import — now that we are in the enjoy- 
 ment of peace, and possess so ample a connnand of capital 
 and labour, we may calculate our average liemand ti)r 
 foreign corn at a very moderate amount. It nuist necessa- 
 rily vary greatly, according to the seasons ; but the aver- 
 age of a spries of years of peace will perhaps not exceed a 
 million of (juarters of grain of sill kinds, or 2 per cent, on 
 the total of our antuial growth. 
 
 "■' All undue protection to agriculture," says Mr.Ilicartio 
 in his pamphlet on. Agvicuiture, (p. 81.'^ " shoulil b<;
 
 [44] Oiir Agriculiiirc. [App. 
 
 gradually withdrawn. The policy which we ought, at this 
 moment of distress to adopt, is to give the monopoly of" the 
 home market to the British grower till corn reaches 70s. 
 per quarter. When it has reached 705., a duty of 205. per 
 quarter on the importation of wheat, and other grain in 
 proportion, might be imposed. 
 
 " I should further propose, that the duty of 205. should 
 every year be reduced one shilling, until it reached ten 
 shillings. A duty of ten shillings per quarter, on im- 
 portation, to which I wish to approach, is, I am sure, 
 rather too liigh as a countervailing duty for the peculiar 
 taxes which are imposed on the corn grower, over and 
 above those which are imposed on the other classes of 
 production in the country ; but I would rather err on the 
 side of a liberal allowance than of a scanty one." 
 
 Ought a Ptotc'cihig Duty to be snspe7ided in a dear Season ? 
 — However adverse in general to high prices, we are by 
 no means inclined to give this question an affirmative 
 answer. The temperature which causes a partial failure 
 in England being likely to prevail throughout the north- 
 west of Europe, can hardly fail to raise the corn maiket 
 in the Netherlands, the Danish dominions, and the north 
 of Germany, in the same manner, though not in an equal 
 degree, as in this country. Prices may thus be brought, 
 by a natural course, to the limit at which the protecting 
 duty ceases: if not, a suspension of it woidd be impolitic, 
 as well from the general inexpediency of tampering with 
 an established law, as for another reason, viz. that a rise of 
 price does not (Evidence, p. 36.) in a year of deficiency form 
 an equivalent to a farmer for short quantity ; hvi can be 
 indemnified only by the continuance of the advanced price 
 during the succeeding year. To that he is fairly entitled : 
 to deprive him of it by a suspension of the protecting duty, 
 
 would be to cast on tilla<re a discouragement similar to what 
 
 ... 
 it has experienced from unlimited import under the corn 
 
 law of 1815. 
 
 But in what manner, it may be asked, should we then 
 
 lessen to the poor the pressure of a dear season ? By 
 
 charitable contributions ; which, when limited to an interval 
 
 of real want, have few or none of the bad consequences of 
 
 an established poor-rate. And in what way are the public 
 
 indemnified for taking this burden on themselves instead of 
 
 suspending the protecting duty? By the moderate rate at 
 
 which that duty is fixed.
 
 App.] Our Agriculture. [45] 
 
 To these observations we subjoin the opinion of a writer 
 who differs in many points from the political economists of 
 the school of Smith : — 
 
 Observations of Mr. S. Gray on the Corri Trade. — Mr. G. 
 has given, in the papers added in 1819 to his work en- 
 titled " The Happiness of States," an ojiinion (})p. 34, 
 35.) on the corn trade, similar in most points to that of the 
 Agricultural Committee of 1821. He always considered 
 our late corn law as likely to make importation affect the 
 home price suddenly or violently ; while a protecting duty 
 would make it flow in a gentle stream, tending to keep 
 prices fair, and inducing the foreign cultivator to look to 
 England as a market, on certain conditions ; according to 
 which he would regulate his purchase of our colonial goods 
 and manufactures. This opinion p!-oceeds from a writer 
 by no means inclined to regard low prices as a public ad- 
 vantage, but who considers (Happiness of States, p. 6()5.) 
 fluctuating gains as highly pernicious, tending to raise 
 rents and labour extravagantly, and to produce a pren)a- 
 ture change in the style of living. Tiie true interest of the 
 farmer is in a steady price, tending to rise gradually, with 
 the national improvement, and })roportioned consequently 
 to the prices of other connnodities. 
 
 Tenants on Lease, and Debtors oti Mortgage. — The case 
 of a tenant on lease, on the occurrence of a rapid fall of 
 prices, is peculiarly hard ; the evil overtakes him in all its 
 extent, while the relief is but partial, the grand charge of 
 rent remaining unadapted to the altered state of things. 
 He must in the first instance lay his account with a sacn- 
 fice of part of his capital, with refunding the gains arising 
 from the previous depreciation of money. I'his, it must 
 be confessed, is but fair, since the profit arising during 
 tlie war from depreciation was reaped chiefly by the tenant. 
 But after a certain period of suffering, a liberal landlord 
 will consider what is due to ecjuity, and what in many 
 cases, where the covenants of the lease are not drawn in 
 the anticipation of such a change, is necessary to prevent 
 injury to his land. 
 
 Debtors on mortgage are, in like n)antier, heavy suf- 
 ferers, their means of payment generally diminishing as the 
 value of their money debt increases, 'riiey have, however, 
 in one respect a substantial ground of iiope ; the prospect
 
 [^•G] Our Agriculture. [App. 
 
 of reducin*^' their interest to 4A, ami some time lieiice to 4 
 pcv cent. 
 
 Interference by Courls of Justice. — During tlie half cen- 
 tury from 1764' to IH14, the chiin^e in the value of money 
 was all on the opjiosite side, eomniodities tendinis to a rise: 
 gradual, and almost imperceptible during tliirty years, it 
 was after 1 794 so regularly progressive, that in the course 
 of twenty years 160/. became e(]uivalent to only 100/. of 
 1794. During the latter years of the war, annuitants, and 
 the landlords who had granted long leases, received hardly 
 two-thirds of the original value; yet no appeal on the 
 ground of depreciated currency was brought before parlia- 
 ment or our courts of justice. Any attempt of that kind 
 in parliament would have been resisted by government, 
 partly from an aversion to interfere with private contracts; 
 more from a solicitude to prevent the })ublic attention 
 being fixed on the depreciation then going on in the 
 greatest of all debts, that of the nation. 
 
 Since 1811 we have had a reaction, and of so rapid a 
 nature, that in trade 100/. are equal to 130/. at the close 
 of the war ; in farming to much more. How, it may be 
 asked, does this sudden change affect the question of judi- 
 cial interference ? In equity, there can be little doubt that 
 all engagements ought to continue payable in money (jf the 
 value at which they were contracted : the objections to inter- 
 ference arise, therefore, from considerations of expediency ; 
 from a dread of excitinir litijjation aaiono- individuals, and 
 a still greater dread of shakinii indirectlv the credit of our 
 funds, open as are the exchequers of other countries to our 
 capitalists. Some time hence it may, perhaps, be found 
 practicable to combine two very nice points — rf farther re- 
 duction of our burdens with the preservation of the divi- 
 dends at their present value. But on this we cannot now 
 enter; and any intervention on the part of our courts of 
 justice seems at present out of the question. It could be 
 seriously expected only in the case of our corn trade being 
 thrown open, and the continuance of low prices being thus 
 put beyond all doubt. In any event, it would probably not 
 go beyond the suspension ot legal process for a given period 
 of years, against a debtor who should have paid or tendered 
 in money the chief part (perhaps three-fourths^ of his pre- 
 viousU- contracted debt : a sacrifice apparently large on 
 the part of creditors, but which, in very many cases, may 
 be unavoidable without such intervention, since a continu-
 
 App.] Our Agriailture. [47] 
 
 ance of low prices would involve the majority of agricultu- 
 ral debtors in insolvency. 
 
 Dr. Smith on Aariculfural I»ip7rnH'rs. — In tlie Wealth of 
 Nations (Book V. ('hai)t(:r II.) Dr. Smith discusses the ex- 
 pediency of inducinij hnuliords to cultivate for their own 
 account a portitni of their lands, with a view to the disco- 
 very and diffusion of improvements in husbandry. He 
 remarks, in another part, that men of mercantile habits 
 frecjucntly become successful ai>;riculturists, beinfj more ac- 
 customed than the hereditary ihrnu'r to calculate eventual 
 advantages, and to hazard an outlay for a remote return. 
 Had his life been prolt)n<^cd, he would have seen, during 
 the war, an am|)le addition to the list of gentlemen farmers, 
 and have had occasion, since the peiice, to qualify very 
 materially his favourable opinion of agricultural under- 
 takings when in tlie hands of men of otlier })rofcssions. 
 In his time the practical farmers were compai'atively poor 
 and uneducated ; the hope of improvement in husbanchy 
 seemed to rest in the occasional adoption of a country life 
 by men of diffljrent habits. Had the case been otherwise, 
 and had our northern and eastern counties possessed, half 
 a century ago a tenantry ccjual to the present. Dr. .Smith 
 would probably have taken a different \'w\y of the subject, 
 recommending that agriculture, liki: otiier pursuits, should 
 be confined to those who had made it their business for 
 life, and accounting for the success of gentlemen farmers 
 during the twelve or thirteen years previous to the pub- 
 lication of his book (1776) by a cause unforeseen, and, in 
 sonic measure, accidental, — we mean the progi-essive rise 
 of the {)rice of corn. 
 
 Value uf Lund during last Centurij. — In Heating histori- 
 cally of the value of land, Mr. Arthur Young, in his " In- 
 (juiry into the Progressive Value of Money," ISl'i, ex- 
 presses an opinion, that about the year 1770, estates sold 
 at thirty-two years' purchase ; a rate higher, compared to 
 the rent, than they bore during the preceding forty years. 
 The reason, iloiibtless, was, that during that long period 
 we had not an interval of peace of sullicient length to re- 
 duce the interest of money. Next, as to rents, it is a re- 
 markable fact, that from the beginning of last centiu'y until 
 towards 1770, they had experienced hardly any rise. *' A 
 neighbour ol' mine in Suffolk," says Mr. Young, (Inquiry, 
 p. \0'2,.) " who inherited a considerable laniled propi-rty, 
 informed me, that in various conversations which he hud,
 
 [48] Oitr Agriadlure. [App. 
 
 between thirty and forty years ago, (between 1770 and 1780) 
 with a relation fi\r advanced in years, and from whom much 
 of that property was derived, tliat much surprise was ex- 
 pressed at the rise of rents, wfiich then began to t^ike place. 
 Through the long period of his relation's experience, no 
 rise was ever thought of; and lease after lease, in long 
 succession, was signed, without a word passing on the 
 question of rent : that was an object considered as fixed ; 
 and grandfather, father, and son, succeeded without a 
 thought of any rise: in many cases landlords were much 
 more apprehensive of losing a tenant at the old rent, 
 than having the smallest conception of raising it to a new 
 one. 
 
 Comparative Price of Wheat on the Continent^ and in Eng" 
 landf previous to the French Revolution. 
 
 Official Return of the price of Wheat at the Rosoy, or 
 Paris Market, by the Septier of 24-Olbs. French. 
 
 Average of the 10 yeai's preceding 1776 
 Average of the 10 years preceding 1786 
 The year 1786 
 
 1787 
 
 1788 
 
 Average per septier, during the 23 years pre- 
 ceding 1789 - - - 24 18 2 
 
 vres 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 28 
 
 7 
 
 9 
 
 22 
 
 4 
 
 7 
 
 20 
 
 12 
 
 6 
 
 22 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 Reducing this to English measure aiid money, the ex- 
 change being then twenty-four livres for the pound sterling, 
 the result is an average for these twenty-three years, per 
 Winchester quarter, of 38s. Qd. sterling. 
 
 At Dantzic the average price of wheat in the twenty 
 years from 1770 to 1789, both inclusive, after adding Is. 
 per quarter for freight and charge to England, was (Evi- 
 dence, Agricultural Report, p. 366.) about 4 Is. 
 
 But in England, the annual returns of purchase at Eton 
 market, during the same period, give an average of 49s. : 
 the whole computed by the \\'inchester quarter. 
 
 This difference was not a little remarkable at a time 
 when our taxation was hardly greater than that of our 
 neighbours. Arising, in the first instance, from bad sea- 
 sons, it owed its continuance partly to our corn law ; more 
 to the extension of our manufactures, and to our war with 
 our American colonies while the continent of Europe re- 
 mained in peace.
 
 App.] Ow- Agriadturc. [4-9] 
 
 Average Prices of Grain in Eni^ia?id in the year 1822, takeJi 
 from the Official Jirlnrn. 
 
 Wheat 
 
 43s. 
 
 3(i. 
 
 Rye 
 
 205. 
 
 3d. 
 
 Barley 
 
 2l5. 
 
 3r/. 
 
 Beans 
 
 23s. 
 
 9d. 
 
 Oats 
 
 17^. 
 
 7d. 
 
 Pease 
 
 25s. 
 
 Id. 
 
 Export and Import of Corn. 
 (From the Agricultural Report of June, 1821.) 
 
 Quarters. 
 
 Exporting period. — In the seventy-six years 
 between 1697 and 1773, the amount of our 
 export of corn of all kinds above our im- 
 port was - _ _ . 30,968,000 
 
 Importing period. — During the forty-two years 
 from 1 773 to 1815, the amount of our import 
 above our export was about - - 24,630,000 
 
 Ireland. — The import of corn of all kinds 
 from Ireland to Great Britain, in the thirty- 
 two years prior to 1806, was only - - 7,531,000 
 
 But after the act of 1806 had rendered sucli 
 import free, it amounted in fifteen years (to 
 1821) to - - - - 12,304,000 
 
 REMARKS 
 
 ON 
 
 The Agrirullitnd Rrpoy/ of\HQ\. 
 
 INo public document was ever more eagerly expected, or 
 more generally perused, than the Agricultmal Iteport of 
 1821, How far, it may be asked, did it fid/il the public 
 expectation ? On the ground of impartiality and liberality 
 of view, no reasonable disappointment ct)uld have been 
 experienced, but the comi^osition of the Report was by no 
 means of equal merit with its substance, ^^'e do not 
 allude to a deficiency of those graces of style which custom 
 does not reijuire in a parliamentary paper, and wliicli 
 wcTuld i)robably be mis})luciil there, but to a want of that 
 
 [i>J
 
 [50] AgticuUural lUport oj \H'l\. [App. 
 
 Ijrevity ntul arrangement which in any composition ar<; In- 
 (lis})ensable to a (Ustinct conception of the hiti<rii;iM;c ol 
 business. The Report hef^ins without any sketch or out- 
 line of its objects, and terminates with a very hmited 
 summary of its conclusions. The consecjuence has been 
 that many have read, while few have understood it ; for 
 he who aims at understanding it thoroughly, or at viewing 
 it in its ensemble, must go over the whole, not as a reader, 
 but as an analyzer; forming an arrangement for himself, 
 frequently altering the succession of the arguments, and 
 collecting them under general heads. 
 
 The object of the Committee was, to express ourselves 
 in official language, " to consider the various petitions 
 complaining of the depressed state of our agriculture, 
 to inquire into the allegations of the petitioners, and to 
 report their observations thereupon." In pursuance of 
 this authority, they examined a number of witnesses, 
 and composed the Report partly from the evidence, 
 but, in a far greater proportion, from their own views and 
 conclusions on the corn-trade, considered as a general 
 question. The whole may be said to embrace the follow- 
 ing topics. 
 
 Admission of the distress of the Agricidturists ,- Attempt 
 to ascertain its course, and to define its extent ; Reference to 
 formei' periods of distress. 
 
 Principiles of our corn-trade : Historical retrospect : its 
 prosperous state from 1773 to 1814, a period comparatively 
 exempt from legislative interference. Various disadvajitages 
 of our present corn-law ; Modifications suggested, particularly 
 a moderate fixed duty on foreign corn. 
 
 Examination of the petitions of the Agriadturists with 
 regard to taxes ; of the high duty (405. per quarter') "which 
 they propose on foi'eign wheat ; and, lastly, their objections 
 to the unlimited warehousing of foreign corn. 
 
 Such are the topics discussed in this long and interesting 
 Report : the principal inferences from the reasoning are. 
 
 That the bounty-system, whatever might be its early 
 operation, was accompanied by a torpid state of agriculture 
 for the half century previous to 1 773 : 
 
 That one cause of the prosperity of our agriculture from 
 1773 to 1814, was its comparative exemption from legisla- 
 tive interference. 
 
 That the high import-limit established in 1815 tended in 
 some degree to excess of home-growth. 
 
 The aiivice of the Committee was to return, by cautious
 
 A pp.] A(frimltural Rqwrf of 1821. [51] 
 
 steps, to an unrestricted state oi' intercourse ; reducing our 
 import limit; and substituting a duty of sucli an amount as 
 should aiFord jirotcction to the present cultivators oi" our 
 inferior soils, but holding out no encouragement for the 
 farther appropriation of these ungrateful occupancies. 
 After this return to sound princijile, the Committee hope 
 that our increasing population, and the general improve- 
 ment of circumstances attendant on confirmed peace, will 
 relieve the distress of our agricultuiists : but they anticipate 
 no relief from such measures as the proposed high duty 
 (40s. per quarter) on foreign wheat, or from a restriction on 
 the warehousing of foreign corn in our sea-ports. The 
 former would lead to an excess of home-growth ; and the 
 latter would merely transfer the deposits of the corn-ujcr- 
 chants from our warehouses to those of Holland, rianders, 
 and other parts of the Continent which are convenient for 
 shipping it to London. 
 
 To the general spirit of the Report we subscribe, in 
 common with all who acknowledge the principles of free 
 trade, and who lament that our legislature deviated from 
 them so materially in the case of our corn-laws. Next as 
 to the L'uiguage, the manner of expressing an opinion is 
 a consideration of great nicety in an oilicial rc})ort; ni 
 which, far dilierent from the unauthorized publication of 
 an individual, confidence of tone may lead to serious 
 results. In the present case, it was of great importance to 
 avoid all assertions which migiit be construeil into inter- 
 ference between landlord and tenant; into a discourage- 
 ment of the continuance of tillage at its present extent ; or, 
 finally, into a protection of the consumer at the expence of 
 the agriculturist. Against all this the Committee carefully 
 guarded; enjoining nothing with respect to a j)oint so tleli- 
 cate as the adjustinent of wages or rent to the retluced price 
 of corn, but leaving the change to the natural operation of 
 circumstances. In like nuumer, with regard to our import- 
 limit for foreifjn corn, while a modification of its amount 
 and the introduction of a fixed duty were suggested, no 
 confident calculation or authoritative prescription wt-re 
 given as to the rate of either. In short, tlu- lle|K)rt was 
 calculated to awaken tlie landed interest to the i'olly of llu- 
 late system ; and to the injiuious tendency of those inter- 
 ferences, to which, formerly in the shape of bounty, and 
 lately in duit of discouragement to import, they have 
 clung. 
 
 If, on the whole, however, wc think thus favourably of 
 die Report of die Agricultural Committee, we are bv no 
 
 [D] 2
 
 [52] Agrinil/iDol Tirpor/ of IS2\. [App. 
 
 means blind to its defects; — to the omission of several 
 topics, and to the imperfect illustration of others. 
 We have already noticed in the text (j). 158.) 
 The omission by the Conmiittee of the grand argument, 
 that the cost of raising corn has a tendency to fall with the 
 fidl of the market ; and we have mentioned (App. p. [29]). 
 Our dissent from the opinion of the Committee, that in- 
 crease of population augmented the difTiculty of providing 
 subsistence. In fact, the chief defect of tlie Report arises 
 from the belief that the cultivation of an additional surface 
 becomes necessary in proportion to the increase of our 
 numbers. So much do the Committee appear to have 
 taken this for granted, that they addressed very few ques- 
 tions to the witnesses on the practicability of augmenting 
 crops by bestowing additional labour on the same soil. We, 
 on the other hand, account the effect of labour in augment- 
 ing jiroduce so great, the connection between the hands 
 vs^hich raise and the mouths which consume, so direct, that 
 in an attempt to calculate the relative productiveness of 
 diflerent countries, we should be guided chiefly by the re- 
 turns of population. Almost every part of Europe raises 
 subsistence enough for its inhabitants, with the exception 
 of the maritime tracts of the Dutch provinces, or rather of 
 the single province of Holland, which happens to have both 
 an unusually large population, and a soil less adapted to 
 tillage than pasture. 
 
 The Committee have allowed this theory to influence 
 their reasoning in several points, such as (Report, p. 10.) 
 the (}uestion of a remunerating price; the extent (p. 11.) of 
 our probable suffering after a deficient harvest ; the argu- 
 ment (p. 24.) against a high protecting duty. It may, in 
 short, be said, that the effect of this impression is almost as 
 perceptible in their labours, as was in those of the Bullion 
 Committee the notion that the bank possessed the power of 
 keeping an undue quantity of paper in circulation. — These 
 drawbacks on the merit of the Report are neither few nor 
 inconsiderable : they do not, however, prevent us from rank- 
 ing it among the most important and instructive documents 
 of the kind that have appeai'ed for many years. 
 
 Coni-LWii) of IS 1 5. — The Committee very properly 
 stigmatised the corn-law of 1815 as adverse to the con- 
 nection which it is our interest to keep up with the Continent, 
 for the purpose of meeting our occasional deficiencies. Far 
 from inducing our capitalists to purchase foreign corn, when 
 it was cheap and abundant, that law discouraged all inter- 
 17
 
 A pp.] 
 
 A<^r'uullural Rrpvrl r)/'1821. 
 
 [53] 
 
 course willi ourneij:;lil)ouis, exccjH in years wliitli, in con- 
 sequence of tlie similarity of latitude and climate, wme likely 
 to be seasons of dearth with them as witii us. 'i'he foreigner 
 was thus prevented from buying our mamifactures, at least 
 from reckoning with any confidence on his means of pay- 
 ment. Hence the advantage of the Act of the present year, 
 which, imperfect as it is, opens a jirospect of eventual iiitei- 
 course witii our neighbours, and of lessening the extremes 
 of rise and lall in our market. 
 
 CornLa-v: ry 1S22, untcted to be printed lOth Jane. 
 
 Abstract. — The Corn-Law of 1815 permitted import 
 free of duty, whenever our own corn, as returned by the 
 averages, was at or above 
 
 I'cr Quarter. IVr (iuaitiT. 
 
 Wheat - - - sOi-. Barley - - - 405. 
 
 Rye, Pease, and Beans 535. Oats - _ _ oQs. 
 
 When our currency was below these prices, the import 
 was prohibited. 
 
 The present Act repeals that of 1815, and permits- the 
 import for home consmni)tiou of foreign ct)rn, wiiencver 
 our own corn shall be at or above 
 
 35s. 
 9^ 
 
 Wheat - - - 70.t. I Barley - 
 
 Rye, Pease, and Beans 465. | Oats _ _ _ v^^. 
 
 subject to certain duties, the amount of which is regulated 
 not by these prices, but by the following table : 
 
 
 SCHEDULE (A.) 
 
 
 
 
 OwA 
 
 
 Wheat. 
 
 Rye, Pease, 
 and Beans. 
 
 Barley, 
 BearorBigg. 
 
 Oats. 
 
 If the average of British 
 
 
 
 
 
 Corn be under, per 
 
 
 
 
 
 Quarter 
 
 8O5. - - 
 
 53i. - - 
 
 ■10.«. - - 
 
 'J8a. 
 
 Higli Duty 
 
 - V2s. 
 
 - - 8i. 
 
 - - (is. 
 
 - - -it. 
 
 If at or above, per Quar- 
 
 
 
 
 
 ter 
 
 80a. - - 
 
 RSs. - - 
 
 40s. - - 
 
 2Hs. 
 
 Hut under, - do. 
 
 85a. - - 
 
 5(is. - - 
 
 42*. 6d. - 
 
 305. 
 
 First Low Duty 
 
 - - 5.S-. 
 
 - ;u. Gil. 
 
 'JS. i'ul. 
 
 - - 'Js. 
 
 If at or above, per Quar- 
 
 
 
 
 
 ter 
 
 85.S-. - - 
 
 .'i.-is. - - 
 
 ■\'2s. (id. - 
 
 .}0w. 
 
 Second Low Duly - - - U. - Srf. 
 
 - - 6d. 
 
 ■ ■ "• . 
 
 [o]
 
 [54] 
 
 Corn Lav: of June 1822. 
 
 [A pp. 
 
 Colonial Coiii. — Corn from Quebec, or our otlier North 
 American Colonies, is adniilted to consiniiption in tliis 
 country whenever our own averai^cs arc at or above 
 
 Wheat - - - .5.9.9. 
 llyc, Pease, and Beans 39.s-. 
 .A.t the foUowinir duties : 
 
 Barley 
 Oats 
 
 .30.9. 
 205-. 
 
 SCHEDULE (B.) 
 
 
 Wheat. 
 
 Rye, Pease, 
 and Beans. 
 
 Barley, 
 BearorBigg 
 
 Oats. 
 
 If British Corn be under, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 per Quarter 
 
 67.9. 
 
 . - 
 
 44.% - - 
 
 3.3s. - - 
 
 22s. Gd. 
 
 High Duty 
 
 - ■ 
 
 12s. 
 
 - - 8s. 
 
 - - Gs. 
 
 - - 4s. 
 
 If at or above, per Quar- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ter - . - 
 
 67s. 
 
 _ 
 
 44s. - - 
 
 3.3s. - - 
 
 22s. Gd. 
 
 But under, per Quarter 
 
 71s. 
 
 . .. 
 
 46s. - - 
 
 35s. 6rf. - 
 
 24s. 
 
 First Low Duty - 
 
 - - 
 
 5s. 
 
 - 3s. 6d. 
 
 2s. Gd. 
 
 - - 2s. 
 
 If at or above, per Quar- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ter - - - 
 
 l\s. 
 
 - - 
 
 46s. - - 
 
 35s. - - 
 
 24s. 
 
 Second Low Duty 
 
 ~ 
 
 1.9. 
 
 - - M. 
 
 
 - - 4d. 
 
 Additional Duty for thejirst three Months after Admission 
 to Salcjor Home Consumption. — To prevent an abruj)! im- 
 port, or lowering of the market, it has been judged advise- 
 able to impose by the present act an additional duty on 
 
 Wheat - - - 5s. Or/. Barley - - -2s. Gd. 
 Rye, Pease, and Beans 35. 6d. Oats - - -2s. Od. 
 
 On all corn, colonial as well as foreign, payable in addition 
 to those in the Schedules, during the first three months of 
 ju'-nission to home consumption, whether the corn be taken 
 from the warehouse or from on boai'd of ship. 
 
 Cor}i in Warehouse. — Foreign or colonial corn at present 
 in warehouse may be taken out and sold for home con- 
 sumption, as soon as our averages shall be at or above the 
 preceding rates respectively, of 705. for foreign, 595. for 
 colonial wheat, &c., but subject to the highest duty in the 
 Schedules A. and B. And 
 
 Corn at present in warehouse may be admitted to home 
 consumption in conformity with the Act of 1815, that is 
 free of duty, whenever our averages rise to the rates fixed 
 in that Act, viz. 
 
 Wheat - - - 805. 
 
 Rye, Pease, and Beans 535. 
 
 Barley 
 Oats 
 
 - 405. 
 
 - 26.V.
 
 A pp.] Corn Laxc (>/' June \H22. [55] 
 
 Flour, whether of wheal or oiiti>, is subject to dut'es 
 proportioned to the above-mentioned duties on grain. In 
 this respect also our North American colonies have a pre- 
 ference, which to them is a point of considerable import- 
 ance, since the shipments on the opposite shore of the 
 Atlantic take i)lace more frequently in the shaj)e of flour 
 than of grain. 
 
 Flour made from wheat, 
 
 IVr cwt. IVr twi. 
 
 Additional during the 
 
 first three months l.v. 1<L 
 
 The high tluty - Ss. 3d. 
 V\vsi low duty - \s. Id. 
 
 JSecond low duty Ox. A-d. 
 
 Oatmeal per boll : 
 
 High duty - - 4-i-. \0d. 
 First low duly - 2s. 2d. 
 
 Additional for first 
 
 three months - 2.v. 2d. 
 Second low duty - O5. (Sd. 
 
 Additional labour hcsto-jocd on Tillage since 1 8 1 4'. — To 
 our arguments in the text on this head it is objected in a 
 respectable quarter, (Farmer's Magazine, published at 
 Fdinburgh, November 1822,) that the years since the peace 
 have been in general a period of discouragement to farmers, 
 and that the " amount of labour appiieil to tillage is more 
 likely to have been reduced than augmented." To this, 
 however, we cannot assent, and must observe in answer, 
 
 1. That several years since the peace, in {)articular 1817, 
 1818, and 1819, were years either of high jirice, or of 
 favourable expectation on the part of our larmers, who at 
 that lime experienced no ijuidecjuacy of means for the pay- 
 ment of labour. 
 
 2. That throughout England, the produce of which 
 forms fully thrtv'- fourths of the corn brouglit to market in 
 the United Kingdom, fanners frequently employ labourers 
 at a loss, to avoid an increase of poor-rate. Declarations 
 to this effect are found in vari. ..■> parts of the Fvidence 
 before the Agricultural Committee of 1821, whciv also, we 
 iiiid that it is not unusual for laiullords in England to pay 
 a portion of the farming charges, on condition of the tenant 
 keeping up the productiveness of the land, by :ip|>lying 
 lime, manure, &c. 
 
 ,'}. A powerful circumstance of the same tendency is the 
 difficulty of withdrawing labour and tapiuil liom tillage; 
 a truth so strongly urged by Mr. Clcghorn, in his lately 
 
 [D] 4
 
 [56] (\)rn Imu- 1)/ June IH22. [App. 
 
 piihlislu'd " Essay on the Causes of" the I)ej)rcssion of 
 At^riculturc," (pp. 51, 52,) and proved by the experience of 
 half a century (from 1714- to 17^)4-,) (hiring which th(; 
 quantity produced was kept up, although prices continueil 
 very low. 
 
 4. Population returns 1811 and 1821. 7'hese, it is true, 
 appear to favour the opinion that the luimber of labourers 
 engaged in agriculture has not kept pace with the increase 
 of consumers ; for wliile the latter were augmented in the 
 course of the ten years in question 15 per cent., tlie former 
 appear to have increased hardly 10 per cent. It is, how- 
 ever, to be remembered, that 
 
 5. The distinction in the Population returns is made, not 
 by individuals, but by families, and that the discharges 
 from the army and militia, or rather, the suspension of 
 drain by enlistment, by leaving the able-bodied at home, 
 gives greater efficiency to the same number of families. 
 Also, that 
 
 6. From the progress of improvement in husbandry the 
 same number of labourers raise a considerably larger share 
 of produce than they did ten or twelve years ago.
 
 App.] 
 
 [57] 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 TO 
 
 CHAPTEK VI. 
 
 On Poor Hate. 
 
 (From the Reports on the Poor Laws in 1817 and 1821.) 
 
 Table of the Amowit expended at different dates on the Poor 
 of England and IVales^ making the year close at Easter^ 
 and adding the eorrcsjumding average Price of the Bushel 
 oflVlieat. — These sums are distinct from churchy count ly, 
 or highway rates. 
 
 
 
 
 IVicc of 
 
 
 
 
 Wheat jxT 
 
 
 
 
 Ikshel. 
 
 
 
 £ 
 
 .V. d. 
 
 1748-4-9-50 - - 
 
 - avcra<^e 
 
 689,971 
 
 4 5 
 
 1776 - - - - 
 
 — 
 
 1,521,732 
 
 6 9 
 
 1783-84-85 - - 
 
 — 
 
 1,912,241 
 
 7 7 
 
 1803 - - - - 
 
 — 
 
 4,077,891 
 
 H 1 
 
 1813-14-15 - - 
 
 — 
 
 6,129,Slt 
 
 12 H 
 
 1816-17-18 - - 
 
 — 
 
 (;,S4i,290 
 
 10 
 
 1819-20 - - - 
 
 — 
 
 7,430,627 
 
 9 a 
 
 1821 - - - - 
 
 — 
 
 6,917,660 
 
 7 10
 
 [58] 
 
 On Poor Hale 
 
 [Apr 
 
 Amoiinf of Expenditure in each Tenth Year since the middle 
 of last Ceiiturjj, together laith the Price of Wheat. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Expenditure. 
 
 Wheat per Bushel. 
 
 
 Ji 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1750 
 
 713,000 
 
 4. 2 
 
 1760 
 
 .065,000 
 
 4- 10 
 
 1770 
 
 1,306,000 
 
 6 5 
 
 1780 
 
 1,774,000 
 
 5 11 
 
 1790 
 
 2,567,000 
 
 6 4 
 
 1800 
 
 3,861,000 
 
 10 2 
 
 1810 
 
 5,407,000 
 
 12 4 
 
 The following are given in successive Years. 
 Expended on the Maintenance of the Poor. 
 
 
 
 
 Wheat per 
 
 
 
 
 Bushel. 
 S. d. 
 
 
 
 .€ 
 
 Year ending 25th March, 
 
 1813 
 
 6,656,105 
 
 u; 8 
 
 - 
 
 1814 
 
 6,294,584 
 
 12 3 
 
 _ _ - - 
 
 1815 
 
 5,418,84-6 
 
 8 10 
 
 _ - - - 
 
 1816 
 
 5,724,507 
 
 7 9 
 
 _ _ - - 
 
 1817 
 
 6,918,247 
 
 10 11 
 
 - - - 
 
 1818 
 
 7,890,148 
 
 11 3 
 
 _ - - - 
 
 1819 
 
 7,531,651 
 
 10 4 
 
 . 
 
 1820 
 
 7,329,594 
 
 8 8 
 
 - - - - 
 
 1821 
 
 6,947,666 
 
 7 10 
 
 r .. J .. iir ..±..- 
 
 
 -J O . / 7 7 
 
 
 London, Westminster, and Southisark. 
 
 
 Year ending 
 
 Easter, 1814. 
 
 2otli March, 
 
 EXPENDITURE. 
 
 Easter, 1813. 
 
 
 1815. 
 
 £ 
 
 £ 
 
 £ 
 
 Number of poor relieved per- 
 
 
 
 
 manently in work-houses - 
 
 13,389 
 
 13,373 
 
 12,341 
 
 Out of work-houses, without 
 
 
 
 
 reckoning the children - - 
 
 12,654 
 
 13,76'J 
 
 13,341 
 
 Parishioners relieved occasion- 
 
 
 
 
 ally cither in or out of work- 
 
 
 
 
 houses - - - - 
 Total - 
 
 40,993 
 
 69,332 
 
 70,322 
 
 67,036 
 
 96,467 
 
 96,004
 
 App.] On Poor Rate. [59] 
 
 Highxvay, Churchy cnid Coiinly rale. — These minor 
 charges form collectively somewhat more than a fii'th ot" the 
 large sum which passes currently under the name of poor- 
 rate. Are they, it may be asketl, likely to experience a 
 reduction corresjionding to that of the iiuid applied to the 
 relief of the poor? As the chief constituent ot" charge in 
 these lesser rates is the price of labour, it is evident thai 
 at the reduced wages of the present day, a smaller sum will 
 suffice for an equal extent of work : on tlie other hand, it is 
 very probable that from a sense of the necessity of provid- 
 ing employment lor the lower orders, and of the advantage 
 of carrying farther the improvement of our roads, a con- 
 siderable extension may be given to such undertakings ; 
 none, it is evident, can be more advantageous to the pubhc, 
 if conducted with judgment and economy. 
 
 Repm-t of 15/// July 1822, on the Poor-rate Returns. — 
 This, the latest labour of the Committee on the manage- 
 ment of the poor, puts in a striking light both the difier- 
 ence of plan followed in different pai'ts of the kingdom, and 
 our imperfect acquaintance with the system as u whole. 
 There continues, says the Report, an evident connexion 
 between the rise or fall of the }irice of wheat, and the rise 
 or fall of expenditure for the poor; the total decrease in the 
 latter since 1818 being 22 per cent. 'J'he apiiointmcnl of 
 select vestries and assistant overseers goes on in different 
 parts of the kingdom, but more slowly than might have 
 been expected after the recommendation of the l*oor-law 
 Committee of 1817. But the present mode of keeping 
 parish accounts presents a very imperfect check on the ex- 
 penditure, and ought, in the opinion of the Conunittee, to 
 be rendered nuich more specific. All charges either for 
 law, or for such purposes as building or repairing work- 
 houses, ought to be discriminated from the great head of 
 " money exjiended for the relief and maintenance of the 
 poor : " — while in regard to the latter the return ought to 
 l)e-very explicit, when aid is alTorded according to the lunn- 
 ber of children, or, in particular ciwes, to able-bodied 
 persons.
 
 [60] [Apr. 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 TO 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 On Population. 
 
 il<MPLOYMENT : its Subdivision as Society advances. — We 
 follow up the reasoning in the text (page 213.) by a few 
 familiar illustrations, for several of M'hich we are indebted 
 to Mr. Gray's Remarks on Population. — In a primitive 
 state of society, like that of England in the days of the 
 Britons and Anglo-Saxons, or like that of the interior of 
 Norway in the present day, we find the inhabitants dis- 
 tributed into detached cottages or petty hamlets, each 
 family being obliged to provide almost every thing for 
 itself. To cultivate a lot of ground is, in such a state of 
 things, indispensable ; since no employment, not even those 
 of first necessity, such as the business of the baker, the 
 tailor, or the mason, would occupy the whole of their time, 
 or prove adequate to their support. Each household is 
 therefore obliged to build, to bake, to brew, to make and 
 to mend for itself; how awkwardly and how imperfectly it 
 is needless to say. To rear a family is to them, whatever 
 the imagination of poets may figure of these days of suji- 
 posed enjoyment, a task of greater difficulty than in this 
 iron age of rents and taxes. Let us beware of forming our 
 ideas of the condition of our ancestors from the ease of 
 acquiring subsistence in countries such as the Cape of 
 Good Hope, Upper Canada, or the United States of Ame- 
 rica. These enjoy all the advantages of colonies; they 
 pi'ofitby the capital, the activity, the knowledge of Europe, 
 exhibiting the application of the skill and formed habits of 
 the old world to the improvement of vast tracts of unoccu- 
 pied land, Tiiey exemplify, in short, almost all the circum-
 
 A pp.] Population, Sfc. [61] 
 
 stances which, in ancient days, led to the rapid growth of 
 the Grecian colonies in Italy and Asia Minor. 
 
 To revert to the characteristics of a primitive state of 
 society. In the course of ages the hamlet becomes a vil- 
 lage, and as its population increases, a separation of enijiloy- 
 ment gradually takes j)lace ; a jirocess which goes on in an 
 augmented ratio as the village becomes a small town, a 
 large town, and eventually a city. How far is this sub- 
 division carried in the case of a population of between 1 .500 
 and 3000 ? The more common species of labour, such as 
 that of the builder, the baker, the butcher, the tailor, the 
 shoemaker, are separated ; but in other lines the division 
 is not complete, the shopkeeper is a linen and a woollen- 
 draper, a grocer, a druggist, a stationer ; the doctor is 
 apothecary, surgeon, physician ; the lawyer unites the func- 
 tions of conveyancer, land-steward, and general agent. This 
 mixture undergoes a decomposition as the inhabitants in- 
 crease from 5 to 10,000; and in a population of from 10 to 
 15, 000, the various classes, whether of mechanics or dealers, 
 are tolerably subdivided, at least in our country ; for in 
 France and most parts of the Continent, the subdivision, 
 even in large towns, is far less complete. 
 
 Subdivision of Employmcyit in great Cities. — To mark this 
 subdivision in all its extent, the observer nuist repair to the 
 French, or rather to the English capital, where the mercan- 
 tile, the manufacturing, the mechanical professions, all as- 
 sume the most simple form. A London banker, diflerent 
 from his provincial brethren, issues no notes, and keeps no 
 interest account with his customers : a merchant confines 
 his connexions to a few foreign sea-ports, perhajis to a parti- 
 cular colony or town ; and the name of general merchant, 
 though not yet disused, is hardly applicable even to our 
 greatest houses. But it is in the mechanical arts that tlie 
 subdivision of enijiloymcnt takes a form the most familiar 
 and most intelligible to ordinary observation. In London 
 the class of shoemakers is divided, says Mr. dray, iuto 
 makers of shoes for men, shoes for women, shoes tor chil- 
 dren: also into boot-cutters, boot-closers, boot-makers. 
 Even tailors, though to the public each appears to do the 
 whole of his business, are divided among themselves into 
 makers of coats, waistcoats, breeches, gaiters. In other 
 lines an equally minute repartition takes place : and as to 
 the ornamental or elegant arts, such as those of jeweller, 
 painter, engraver, nothing would be more easy than to ex-
 
 [62] Pnjnilation ,- [A pp. 
 
 liihit a loiii,' list of professions limited to large towns, and 
 wliolly unknown in a tliinly-pcopleil district. 
 
 r.[J'cct. of this SuhdivisioJi. — What, it may be asked, is tlie 
 practical result of tliis miimte subdivision, this nice distinc- 
 tion of employment ? By fixinf^ the attention of the work- 
 man on a single part of his business, it renders him sur- 
 prisingly correct and expeditious : his performance gains 
 equally in quality and in dispatch. This is the result of a 
 mechanical dexterity, ac(juired without any particular effort 
 of the mind; for we must by no means infer that the 
 quickness characteristic of the inhabitants of a large town, 
 that promptitude which distinguishes the Londoner and 
 the Parisian from the hesitation and circumlocution of the 
 countryman, is the consequence of any innate superiority : 
 those who walk in a crowd must adopt the step of others, 
 and advance with the rapidity of the moving mass. The 
 attainments of these persons, meaning such attainments as 
 they possess acciu'ately and thoroughly, are often confined 
 to a few branches ; but these are the objects of their profes- 
 sion or business ; and the result is, that their work proceeds 
 straight forward, very little time being lost by them in plan- 
 ning, altering, or correcting. 
 
 Propoi'tioji borJie hi) different Classes in our Natiojial 
 Income. — In consequence of our insular position, our canals, 
 and our mines, the proportion of our national income, de- 
 rived from manufacture and trade, is greater than in most 
 other countries. The following table is taken, as far as 
 regards its plan, from a publication by Mr. Gray ; but it is 
 subjected to several modifications, arising in one resj^ect 
 from the late population return, in another from the fall in 
 the price of commodities. It is founded partly on conjec- 
 ture, partly on official documents.
 
 App.] 
 
 Ratio of its Prog:ressive Increase. 
 
 [63] 
 
 Great Britain distinct from Ireland. 
 
 Proportion of tla- 
 income of the c1;lss 
 to tliu national in- 
 come at large. 
 
 Agriculturists and all ciigagctl in tlif sujjply 
 oT subsistence, whether i'arniers, labourers 
 or dealers - ... 
 
 Manufacturers and all persons occupied in 
 making clothing, hardware, and other arti- 
 cles for home consumption 
 
 Mechanics, masons, and all engaged in sup- 
 plying houses with furniture 
 
 The professional classes, viz. lawyers, clergy, 
 medical men, artists and teachers, to whom 
 is added a very numerous, though not an 
 affluent class, that of domestic servants 
 
 The army, the nav)^ the civil servants of 
 government, the annuitants drawing an in- 
 come from our dividends ; all, in short, 
 who arc paid through the medium of taxes 
 
 The classes receiving parish support and 
 
 other charitable aid ... 
 
 Total - 
 
 30 per cent. 
 
 '20 do. 
 Id do. 
 
 17 do. 
 
 20 do. 
 
 ;5 ill). 
 
 100 
 
 The proportion allotted to the agricidtural classes has 
 unfortunately not been earned by them in the depression 
 that has prevailed since 1820; but the case must ere loii"- 
 alter; and in a table intended to be referred to for years, it 
 is fit to keep temporary irrei^ularities out of si<;ht. 
 
 In Ireland the distribution of productive iiulustry is very 
 different from that of iMii^land : were it added to our esti- 
 mate, there would be a great aug;menUition of the ay-ricui- 
 tural proportion. 
 
 Population ,- its different Degrees of Increase. 
 
 In a primitive stage of society the rate of incrcjise is, 
 doubtless, very slow, since no atlvantage arising from the 
 boundless command of territory, can counterbalance tlie 
 anti-i)oi)ulation habits oi' the hunter state. This is suffi- 
 ciently exemplified among tin; North American Indians, 
 and proves that in the early jieopled regions ol" Asia, the 
 increase, even with the aid of a fine climate, could not
 
 [G4-] PopitlalioH: [App, 
 
 have been considerable nntil tlie adoption of pastoral ha- 
 bits; nor great, until these gave way to the agricultural 
 state, in which the augmentation of subsistence concurs 
 so directly with health of occupation to augment our 
 numbers. 
 
 The Mercantile 07' Mamifacturijig Stage. — The last stage 
 in the progress of society may be termed the mercantile; 
 the stage in which a large proportion of the inhabitants of 
 a country are assembled in sea-ports and manufacturing 
 towns. Manufactures and trade are by many accounted 
 adverse to population, the former leading to sedentary 
 habits, the latter occasionally prompting a resort to dan- 
 gerous climates. These, we admit, are serious objections; 
 but, on the other hand, the commercial state is favourable 
 to early marriage, as will be readily allowed by all who 
 have resided in an agricultural country like France, and 
 marked how slowly population increases amidst the pe- 
 nury, the ignorance, and unenterj^rising habits of the 
 tenants of the soil. Add to this, that many of the irregu- 
 larities of the manufacturing state have arisen, not from 
 permanent causes, but from the fluctuation of wages inci- 
 dent to a state of war, or from the insalubrity of antiquated 
 and ill-planned structures. Evils such as these are in a 
 state of progressive cure from various causes, and from 
 none more than that distribution of population throughout 
 provincial towns which canal communication so directly 
 promotes, by enabling a particular place to confine itself 
 to a particular manufacture, instead of accumulating, as on 
 the Continent, a multitude of workmen in a crowded and 
 overgrown city. Paris and Vienna are, far more than 
 London, the centre of manufacture for their respective 
 countries; for France, Germany, and the Netherlands, 
 united, do not exhibit provincial towns to be compared 
 to Manchester, Glasgow, Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield. 
 These, and other places of the kind in England, while 
 exempt, in a great measure, from the drawbacks of a me- 
 tropolis, in regard to health and expence, possess advan- 
 tages nearly equal, in access to markets and division of 
 employment. The district of Birmingham in particular, 
 inhabited as it is by several hundred thousand persons, 
 affords a striking proof that a numerous population may 
 prosecute manufacture without crowding themselves into 
 narrow streets or lanes.
 
 App.] Ratio of its ^progressive Inaease. {35"^ 
 
 Effect of the Enlargement of Farms. — Increase of popu- 
 lation is conducive to increase of employment in many 
 respects, rjn which, at first, we should hardly suppose it to 
 exert such an influence. Thus the common notion of 
 small farms being conducive to increase of numbers, is far 
 from correct ; it being, in the first place, impracticable in 
 these petty occupancies to do justice to the productive 
 powers of the soil, while farms of larger size (from 300 to 
 500 acres) have many advantages, admitting of the appli- 
 cation of machinery and the beneficial employment of 
 capital. In the next place, it is a remarkable fact, that 
 while the (juantity of subsistence disposable lor die market 
 is augmented beyond comparison, the number of persons 
 supported on the spot is (as we find from the population 
 returns of counties so highly cultivated as Norfolk and 
 East Lothian) greater than it was in the age of small 
 farms. 
 
 Effect of Machinei-y on the Conditioji of the working Classes, 
 — The effect of mechanical improvement in adding to the 
 income of a community admits of no doubt, its result being 
 to afford a commodity frequently of better quality, . and 
 always at a cheaper rate. To be satisfied of the latter, we 
 have merely to compare the prices of either our cottons or 
 hardware of the present day with those of similar articles 
 made by us thirty years ago, or with those made at j)resent 
 on the Continent, where machinery is as yet but partially 
 adojited. But what, it will be asked, is the effect of ma- 
 chinery on the income and comfort of the workman ? At 
 first injurious, bringing with it the evils t)f transition, which 
 are very serious in a time marked, like that which lollowed 
 the peace of 18 14, by a great reduction in tiie demand lor 
 liands for the public service. To take an instance familiar 
 to those of our countrymen who have resided in France : in 
 that country coal is very little used, and the general fiiel, 
 whether in town or country, is wood : the trees, after being 
 felled, are cut into short but thick blocks, carted into the 
 towns, sold in the public markets, and broken up by men 
 who make a business of it, but whose labour, aided only 
 by the wedge and saw, is tedious and fatiguing, adding 
 nearly ten per cent, to the cost of the article. To break 
 these solid blocks by machinery woulil cause a consider- 
 able saving of both time and expence, but in the j)resent 
 stagnation of the demand for labour, it would be harsh, and 
 indeed unsafe to resort to such an alternative, without pro-
 
 166'] Prqyidation: — [App. 
 
 vidina for the thousands who would thus be deprived of 
 employment. 
 
 yuci), in a greater or less degree, is the case m almost 
 every transition of importance. Eventually, however, the 
 hardship is overcome, and the use of machinery becomes 
 productive of great additional comfort to the lower orders. 
 To prove that its beneficial effects are general, it is not 
 enough to cite the prosperity of a few manulacturing dis- 
 tricts, as the success of these may be accompanied by 
 distress in other parts; the prosperity of Lancashire may 
 cause embarrassment in Saxony, Flanders, or the banks of 
 the Rhine. The advantage, then, arising from the use of 
 machinery, rests on a broader basis ; on that law in pro- 
 ductive industry which makes every real reduction of cost 
 an addition to individual income, or, what is the same 
 thing, to the comforts procured by that income. The 
 benefit of such reduction is enjoyed by the public at large: 
 the evil, on the other hand, is partial, being confined to 
 the manufacturer. He, however, is benefited in his capa- 
 city of consumer, and experiences relief from his distress 
 as soon as it is found practicable to transfer to a new- 
 branch a portion of the capital and industry hitherto em- 
 ployed on his own. Such transfers are, it is true, tasks of 
 great time and difficulty : we have felt them to be so in our 
 own country, while in others less advanced, they can hardly 
 be accomplished in the lifetime of a generation. 
 
 Increase of Popidation in the jn'cscnt Age. — The recent 
 increase of our numbers, so greatly beyond that of any 
 former age, is ascribed by many persons to the excitement 
 attendant on the war, and to the encouragement it afforded 
 to early marriage in the case of so many classes, the agri- 
 cultural, the manufacturing, the mercantile. This, how- 
 ever, applied chiefly to the mechanical ; all, in short, except 
 the fixed annuitants, the middle classes : among the lower 
 the advantage in wages was balanced, or nearly balanced, by 
 the rise of provisions. We must also put in the opposite 
 scale the serious injury to population arising from war, as 
 well by the loss of lives in the field and in tropical cli- 
 mates, as by the removal from home of many who would 
 otherwise have become fathers of families. When to this 
 we add, that since the peace the 7-atio of increase is not less 
 great than during the war, we are led to attribute the aug- 
 mentation of our numbers to causes more permanent and 
 satisfactory; to the preservation of the lives of children by
 
 A pp.] Ratio of its progressive Increase. [67] 
 
 vaccination; to the better lodging, the greater cleanhness 
 and sobriety of our lower classes. This result, already ex- 
 emplified in the return of deaths inserted in a subsequent 
 page, will, we believe, be found to rest on a broad biisis, 
 whenever our official documents shall become more ample. 
 Jiimilar causes prevail, though in a less degree, on the 
 Continent: in France the increase of population, ibrmerly 
 so slow as hardly to yield an addition of 30 per cent, in a 
 century, may now be computed at somewhat more than 
 twice that proportion. In that country sobriety was always 
 prevalent; but the abolition of monasteries, the improve- 
 ment of medical practice, the ameliorated condition of the 
 peasantry, are all peculiar to the present age. In Ger- 
 many the degree of increase is probably not very different 
 from that of France. Of Russia we have as yet no accu- 
 rate returns: Spain, Italy, and the south of Europe 
 generally, are also on the increase, but in a ratio, which, 
 when we consider the general indolence and povert}' of the 
 lower orders, is, doubtless, slower than that of France. 
 And in the countries subject to the Turks, the frequency 
 of the plague, and all the pernicious efi'ects of bad govern- 
 ment, are likely still to counteract the natural tendency of 
 population to increase. 
 
 Marriages. — The proportion of marriages to that of our 
 population does not appear to have increaseil during the 
 late wars : 
 
 From 1780 to 1789, marriages, compared to the whole 
 population, were as 1 in 117 
 1790 to 1799 - - - - 1 in 11 9i 
 
 1800 to 1809 - - - - 1 in U9i 
 
 {Barton on the iMboicring Classes.) 
 
 We shall be more succssful in searching for an expla- 
 nation of the rapid increase of our numbers in other causes: 
 none can be more gratifying than the decrease of mortality 
 in conse(]uence partly of the introduction of vaccination, 
 but partly too of the greater sobriety and comlbrt ol the 
 poor. 
 
 Progressive Decrease of Deaths in Great Britain. 
 
 From 1785 to 1789 - - - 1 in 4-86 
 
 1790 to 1794. - - - 1 in 1-47 
 
 1795 to 1799 - - - 1 in 465 
 
 liiOO to 1804 - - . 1 in 474 
 
 [Barton, ut sutpra.) 
 [E] 2
 
 [68] 
 
 Pnpulalion. 
 
 [Ai'P. 
 
 To Mr. Hickman, Clerk-Assistant of tlie House of 
 Commons, who has prepared the successive Population 
 Abstracts of 1801, 1811, 1821,) I am indebted for much 
 useful information, in particular for 
 
 A Comparative Vie-jo of the Area arid Productive Power of 
 the several Counties of England and Wales. 
 
 COUNTIES ACCORDING TO THEIR AREA. 
 
 
 Square 
 
 
 Square 
 
 Counties. 
 
 Statute 
 
 Counties, 
 
 Statute 
 
 
 Miles. 
 
 
 Miles. 
 
 1. York 
 
 5,961 
 
 50. Surrey 
 
 758 
 
 2. Lincoln 
 
 2,748 
 
 51. Berks 
 
 756 
 
 5. Devon 
 
 2,579 
 
 32. Oxford 
 
 752 
 
 4. Norfolk 
 
 2,092 
 
 33. Bucks 
 
 740 
 
 5. Northumberland 
 
 1,871 
 
 34. Worcester - 
 
 729 
 
 C. Lancaster - 
 
 1,831 
 
 35. Hertford - 
 
 528 
 
 7. Somerset - 
 
 1,642 
 
 36. Monmouth 
 
 498 
 
 8. Hampshire - 
 
 1,628 
 
 37. Bedford 
 
 468 
 
 9. Kent - 
 
 1,537 
 
 38. Huntingdon 
 
 370 
 
 10. Essex 
 
 1,532 
 
 59. Middlesex - 
 
 282 
 
 11. Suffolk 
 
 1,512 
 
 40. Rutland 
 
 149 
 
 12. Cumberland 
 
 1,478 
 
 
 
 
 15. Sussex 
 
 1,463 
 
 England - 
 
 50,535 
 
 14. Wilts 
 
 15. Salop 
 
 1,379 
 1,341 
 
 
 
 
 
 16. Cornwall - 
 
 1,527 
 
 1. Carmarthen 
 
 974 
 
 17. Gloucester - 
 
 1,256 
 
 2. Montgomery 
 
 839 
 
 18. Stafford 
 
 1,148 
 
 3. Glamorgan - 
 
 792 
 
 19. Durham 
 
 1,061 
 
 4. Brecon 
 
 7S4 
 
 20. Chester 
 
 1,052 
 
 5. Cardigan - 
 
 675 
 
 21. Derby 
 
 1,026 
 
 6. Merioneth - 
 
 663 
 
 22. Northampton 
 
 1,017 
 
 7. Denbigh 
 
 633 
 
 23. Dorset 
 
 1,005 
 
 8. Pembroke - 
 
 610 
 
 24. Warwick - 
 
 902 
 
 9. Carnarvon - 
 
 544 
 
 25. Hereford - 
 
 860 
 
 10. Radnor 
 
 426 
 
 26. Cambridge - 
 
 858 
 
 11. Anglesey - 
 
 271 
 
 27. Nottingham 
 
 837 
 
 12. Flint - 
 
 244 
 
 28. Leicester - 
 
 804 
 
 
 
 29. Westmorland 
 
 763 
 
 Wales . 
 Total - 
 
 7,425 
 
 57,960 
 
 Scotland and Ireland are nearly equal to each other in area, and to- 
 gether are equal to or somewhat larger than England and Wales. Th« 
 Assessed Rental of Scotland in 1811 was ^£3,899,364.
 
 App.] 
 
 Pojnilation. 
 
 [69] 
 
 COUNTIES ACCORDING TO THEIR PRODUCTIVE 
 POWER. 
 
 Re7i( and Tithe paid in each Coitritij in 1810, per square 
 Mile of (JtO Acres. 
 
 Merioneth 
 
 - ^'137 
 
 Cambridge 
 
 - £-^l\ 
 
 Brecon 
 
 154. , 
 
 Huntingdon - 
 
 574 
 
 Cardigan 
 
 173 
 
 Hereford 
 
 585 
 
 Carnarvon 
 
 192 
 
 Lincoln 
 
 594 
 
 Montgomery 
 
 198 ! 
 
 Salop - 
 
 610 
 
 Radnor 
 
 229 
 
 Ik-rks - 
 
 611 
 
 Carmarthen 
 
 21-}. 
 
 Bedford 
 
 619 
 
 Ghimorgan - 
 
 284- 
 
 Derby 
 
 624 
 
 Pembroke 
 
 281. 
 
 Kent 
 
 651 
 
 Anglesey 
 
 288 
 
 Wilts - 
 
 652 
 
 Westmorland 
 
 299 
 
 Nottingham - 
 
 659 
 
 Durham 
 
 300 
 
 (iloucester 
 
 680 
 
 Cumberland - 
 
 327 
 
 Cheshire 
 
 684 
 
 Denbigli 
 
 331 
 
 Essex - 
 
 692 
 
 Hampshire - 
 
 435 
 
 Rutland 
 
 692 
 
 Monmouth - 
 
 436 
 
 Stafford 
 
 693 
 
 Sussex 
 
 44-5 
 
 Northampton 
 
 702 
 
 Cornwall 
 
 470 
 
 Oxford 
 
 709 
 
 Norfolk 
 
 509 
 
 Bucks 
 
 713 
 
 Devon 
 
 516 
 
 Lancaster 
 
 718 
 
 Northumberland 
 
 520 
 
 Hertford 
 
 734 
 
 Flint - 
 
 536 
 
 Warwick 
 
 744 
 
 Suffolk 
 
 537 
 
 Worcester 
 
 772 
 
 Dorset 
 
 538 
 
 Somerset 
 
 876 
 
 York - 
 
 541 
 
 Leicester 
 
 891 
 
 Surrey 
 
 550 
 
 Middlesex 
 
 - 1,325 
 
 The area of the counties vas measured on Arrowsniith's 
 last map (date 1815 — 1816), wliicli wasformed on the trigo- 
 nometrical survey. The process of s(|uarinir and computing 
 the miles, as well as of cbtimating the parts of miles on 
 the borders of each county, having been performed with 
 much care and labour, the inacccuracies are few and in- 
 considerable. 
 
 Anmud Value of Land hi the square mile of 640 .?/a- 
 tiite acres. — This is computed from the "rent and tithe 
 collectively," and the average of England and M'ales in 
 1811 was 17s. 2r/. per acre: the counties which take the 
 lead are Leicester and Somerset, and the chief cause of 
 superiority is the extent of good jjasture ground, which, of 
 course, yields a return at little expcncc. 
 
 [F.J :^
 
 C70] 
 
 Population. 
 
 [A PP. 
 
 The Rental is taken from the Property-lax return for 
 the year ending April, 1811, (see p. 6'6. of the Property- 
 tax Accounts, printed 2G Feb. 1813.) The fall of rent on 
 the one hand, and extension of culture on the other, proba- 
 bly render this return, tiiough comparatively of old date, 
 a tolerably accurate representation of the present rental of 
 the kingdom. 
 
 One method of computing the productiveness of land 
 under tillage is to " take for each county the number of 
 families employed in husbandr}-, and to divide by it the 
 amount of rent and tithe." The result may be said to ex- 
 hibit the " average net produce of the labour and capital of 
 each family thus engaged," and indicates, we believe with 
 tolerable accuracy, the progress of the improved husbandry. 
 For England and Wales the average, in 1811, was 41/. 
 per family of agriculturists. The proportion was by no 
 means greatest in the counties adjacent to the metropolis ; 
 for while in Hertfordshire and Surrey it varied from SO/, to 
 40/. per family of agriculturists, in Lincoln and Durham it 
 exceeded 50/., and in Northumberland went considerably 
 beyond that amount. A return of this nature, made after 
 rents assume a settled form, would be a very interesting 
 document, particularly if combined with a similar return 
 from Scotland, where tithe and poor-rate happily form so 
 slight a deduction from the income of the landlord. 
 
 Jtank (^ our different Counties i?i j^oint of Density of 
 Popdation. 
 
 19 Berks 
 
 20 Norfolk 
 
 21 Oxford 
 
 22 Bedford 
 
 23 Flint 
 
 1 Middlesex 
 
 2 Lancaster 
 
 3 Surrey 
 
 4 York, W. Rid. 
 
 5 Kent 
 
 6 Warwick 
 
 7 Gloucester 
 
 8 Nottingham 
 
 9 Chester 
 
 10 Worcester 
 
 11 Durham 
 
 12 Somerset 
 
 13 Suffolk 
 
 14 Derby 
 
 15 Cornwall 
 
 16 Leicester 
 
 17 Northampton 
 
 18 Essex 
 
 24 Buckingham 
 
 25 Hertford 
 
 26 Wilts 
 
 27 Southampton 
 
 28 Cambridge 
 
 29 Anglesea 
 
 30 Huntingdon 
 
 31 Stafford 
 
 32 Salop 
 
 33 Devon 
 
 34 Sussex 
 
 35 Rudand 
 
 36 York, E. Rid. 
 
 137 Denbigh 
 
 38 Dorset 
 
 39 Glamorgan 
 
 140 Hereford 
 
 41 Pembroke 
 
 142 Caernarvon 
 
 43 Monmouth 
 
 144 Northumberl. 
 
 145 York, N. Rid. 
 i46 Lincoln 
 
 47 Cumberland 
 
 48 Caermarthen 
 i49 Montgomery 
 [50 Cardigan 
 
 J51 Westnivireland 
 152 Merioneth 
 '53 Radnor 
 54 Brecon
 
 A pp.] 
 
 Population. 
 
 C71] 
 
 CENSUS OF ISf^l. 
 
 England, Scotla)id a?id Wales ; Licrease of the Population 
 since 1811, exhibited by Coimtics. 
 
 
 1 
 Increase 
 
 
 Increase; 
 
 
 Increase 
 
 
 per cent, i 
 
 
 percent. 
 
 
 percent. 
 
 Counties. 
 
 from j 
 
 Counties. 
 
 from 
 
 Counties. 
 
 from 
 
 
 1811 to I 
 
 
 1811 to 
 
 
 1811 to 
 
 
 1821. 1 
 
 
 1821. 1 
 
 1 
 
 
 18'.>1. 
 
 - 1 
 Peebles 
 
 i 
 1 
 
 York, E. Rid- 
 
 
 Durham - - 
 
 IT 
 
 Sutherland - ; 
 
 1 ; 
 
 ing - 
 
 14 
 
 Linlithgow - 
 
 17 
 
 Perth - - 
 
 5 
 
 Aberdeen 
 
 15 
 
 Somerset 
 
 17 
 
 Forfar - 
 
 6 
 
 Bute - 
 
 15 
 
 Banff - 
 
 18 
 
 Kincardine - 
 
 1 
 6 ; 
 
 Derby - - 
 
 15 
 
 Gloucester - 
 
 18 
 
 Salop 
 
 6 j 
 
 Devon - 
 
 15 
 
 Norfolk - - 
 
 IR 
 
 Kinross - - 
 
 7 iKssex - 
 
 15 
 
 Bedford - - 
 
 19 
 
 Berwick - - 
 
 8 
 9 
 
 Inverness 
 
 15 
 
 Chester - - 
 
 19 
 
 Nairn - 
 
 Kirkcudbright 
 
 15 
 
 Cornwall - - 
 
 19 
 
 Clackmannan 
 
 10 
 
 Montgomery - 
 
 15 
 
 Denbigh - - 
 
 19 
 
 Merioneth - 
 
 10 
 
 Northampton 
 
 15 
 
 Lincoln - - 
 
 19 
 
 Hereford 
 
 10 
 
 Nottingham - 
 
 15 
 
 Glamorgan - 
 
 20 
 
 Radnor - - 
 
 10 
 
 Orkney and 
 
 
 Middlesex - 
 
 JO 
 
 Roxburgh 
 
 10 1 
 
 Shetland - 
 
 15 
 
 Warwick 
 
 20 
 
 Elgin - - 
 
 11 i 
 
 Hampshire - 
 
 15 
 
 York, N. Rid- 
 
 
 Argyle - - 
 
 12 
 
 Wilts - - 
 
 15 
 
 ing - - 
 
 -20 
 
 13erks - - 
 
 1- \ 
 
 Worcester - 
 
 15 
 
 Cambridge - 
 
 21 
 
 Stirling - - 
 
 12 
 
 Brecon - - 
 
 IC 
 
 Renfrew 
 
 21 
 
 Westmorland 
 
 12 
 
 Dorset - - 
 
 16 
 
 Anglcscu 
 
 22 
 
 Dumbarton - 
 
 13 
 
 Flint - - 
 
 16 
 
 Ayr 
 
 22 
 
 Dumfries 
 
 13 
 
 .Hertford 
 
 1 Huntingdon - 
 
 16 
 
 jPembroke 
 
 22 
 
 Fife - 
 
 15 
 
 16 
 
 Surrey - 
 
 83 
 
 Haddington - 
 
 15 
 
 Leicester 
 
 16 
 
 Sussex - 
 
 25 
 
 Ross and Cro- 
 
 
 i Monmouth - 
 
 16 
 
 lYork.W.Rid- 
 
 
 marty 
 
 15 
 
 Northumbcr- 
 
 
 1 ing - - 
 
 23 
 
 Oxford - - 
 
 15 
 
 i land - 
 
 16 
 
 jWigton - - 
 
 34 
 
 Rutland - - 
 
 13 
 
 Staflbrd - - 
 
 16 
 
 {Lanark - - 
 
 27 
 
 Selkirk - - 
 
 15 
 
 Suffolk - - 
 
 16 
 
 'Lancaster 
 
 1 -^ 
 
 Buckingham - 
 
 14 
 
 jCumbcrland - 
 
 17 
 
 'Caithness 
 
 : 29 
 
 Cardigan - - 
 
 14 
 
 Cannarthcn - 
 
 J7 
 
 Edinburgh - 
 
 1 29 
 
 Kent" - 
 
 14 
 
 Carnarvon - 
 i 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 The ratio of most frequent occurrence is J. 5 per cent., or 
 an average between 13 and 17 per cent. In several conn- 
 ties the augmentation is to be ascribed tollu- incrcasf of the 
 principal towns; thus the increase of Middlesex is ilic 
 increase of London, Surrey of Southwark, Warwickshire 
 of Birmingham, Lanarkshire of Glasgow, and Lancashire 
 of Manchester, Liverpool, Preston, &c. In the remote 
 county of Caithness, the increase is owing to the extension 
 of the herring fishery; while the almost sl;tiionary condition 
 of the adjoining county of Sutherland is owing to the emi-
 
 [72] 
 
 l^opidation. 
 
 [App. 
 
 frration ofcottagers, and the conversion of their petty occu- 
 pancies into pasture ground. 
 Englcmd and Wales: Progressive Increase of our Pojndation. 
 
 Its amount in 1801 - - - 9,343,578 
 
 Ditto 1811 - - - 10,791,115 
 
 Ditto 1821 - - - 11,977,665 
 
 Fy 
 
 ogressive Increase in the Ten Principal Towns of England. 
 
 
 Year 1801. 
 
 Year 1811. 
 
 Year 1821. 
 
 London - - - 
 
 900,000 
 
 1,050,000 
 
 1,225,964 
 
 Manchester 
 
 81,020 
 
 98,573 
 
 153,788 
 
 Liverpool 
 
 77,655 
 
 94,.»76 
 
 118,972 
 
 Birmingham 
 
 73,670 
 
 85,755 
 
 106,722 
 
 Bristol 
 
 63,645 
 
 76,433 
 
 87,779 
 
 Leeds _ _ . 
 
 53,062 
 
 62,534 
 
 83,796 
 
 Plymouth 
 
 45,454 
 
 56,060 
 
 61,212 
 
 Portsmouth 
 
 32,166 
 
 40,567 
 
 45,648 
 
 Norwich - - - 
 
 36,852 
 
 57,256 
 
 50,288 
 
 Newcastle-on-Tyne 
 
 28,365 
 
 37,587 
 
 46,948 
 
 Scotland. — Here the rafio of increase in the towns, par- 
 ticularly Edinburgh and Glasgow, has been equally great. 
 
 Irelaiid. — The returns previous to 1811 were too im- 
 perfect to afford the means of calculating the progressive 
 increase of population, nor have those of 1821 as yet been 
 given to the public in a satisfactory form : the general re- 
 sult is, that the population of all Ireland amounts in round 
 
 numbers to 
 
 That of the principal towns, 
 Dublin 
 Cork 
 Limerick - - - 
 
 • 7,000,000 
 
 186,276 
 
 100,535 
 
 66,042 
 
 Great Britai7i: Return o/'1821. 
 
 Distribution into Classes, 
 
 Families. 
 
 Proportions to 
 the whole popu- 
 lation in parts 
 of 100. 
 
 Employed chiefly in agriculture 
 Do. in trade, manufactures, me- 
 chanical employment, &c. - 
 In all other situations 
 
 978,656 
 
 1,350,293 
 612,488 
 
 53 
 
 46 
 21 
 
 100 
 
 1
 
 App.] 
 
 Population. 
 
 [73] 
 
 Proportion of Agricitlfwnl Population. — This varies 
 greatly, according to tlie particular county. In a highly 
 manufacturing county, such as Lancashire, it is not halt' the 
 average of33 in 100; inYorkshire, which in the West Riding 
 is manufacturing, and in other parts agricultural, the return 
 approaches to the average, but is still somewhat below it; 
 while in Sussex, Essex, Suffolk, where there are so tew 
 manufactures, it greatly exceeds it, being above 50 in 100; 
 in Cambridgeshire, Bedfordshire, and Herefordshire, the 
 proportion is the largest of all, being above GO in 100. 
 
 Comparison of the Population Returns of 1S\ I and 1821. 
 
 
 England. 
 
 Wales. 
 
 Scotland. 
 
 Totals. 
 
 Increase 
 per 
 cent. 
 
 Families chiefly employed ) 
 in agriculture, 1811 J 
 
 697,353 
 
 72,846 
 
 125,799 
 
 895,998 
 
 
 1821 
 Do. in trade, manufac- y 
 
 773,732 74,225 
 
 130,699 
 
 978,656 
 
 9V 
 
 tures, and mechanical > 
 employment - 1 8 1 1 j 
 
 923,588 36,044 
 
 169,417 
 
 1,129,049 
 
 
 1821 
 In all other situations, 1811 
 1821 
 
 1,118,295 41,680 
 391,450 20,866 
 454,690 30,801 
 
 i 
 
 190,264 
 106,852 
 126,997 
 
 1,350,239 
 519,168 
 612,488 
 
 19J 
 
 18 
 
 The most important reflection suggested by these returns, 
 is the great superiority of increase in our town population 
 over that of tiie agriculturists. This is remarkable on two 
 accounts; first, as indicating a rapid increase of" productive 
 power, and next as jieculiar to our island ; the augment- 
 ation in France and the Continent generally being no greater 
 in town than in the country. 
 
 Wales. — Here agricultural employiueiit predominates. 
 Among persons out of business there apjxars a remarkable 
 increase; the consequence, probably, of Wales being found a 
 comparatively cheap residence by half-pay oflicers and other 
 annuitants.
 
 [7*] 
 
 PopuLalioii. 
 
 [A pp. 
 
 Indications of an Increase of National Wealthy taken from 
 Population J let urns. — These are, 
 
 1. An increase in the proportion of persons who are 
 independent of labour; we mean of those who derive their 
 income from property, whether land, houses, or money 
 lent. 
 
 2. A greater comparative increase of town population. 
 
 3. It follows that under such circumstances afrriculturists 
 will increase in a ratio inferior to that of tiie other classes : 
 still the augmentation of produce may, and probably will, 
 keep pace with the augmentation of the consumers, the 
 improvements in husbandry and the increased use of ma- 
 chinery (such as threshing mills) contributing greatly to 
 lessen the manual labour employed in raising corn. 
 
 Census of 1377- — As a matter of historical curiosity, we 
 subjoin the population of the principal towns of England in 
 the year 1377, Avhen an enumeration was made on account 
 of a poll-tax : 
 
 London 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 35,000 
 
 York - - 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 11,000 
 
 Bristol 
 
 ■- 
 
 - 
 
 9,000 
 
 Plymouth - 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 7,000 
 
 Coventry - 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 7,000 
 
 Norwich - 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 6,000 
 
 Lincoln 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 5,000 
 
 Sarum, Wiltshii 
 
 'e 
 
 5,000 
 
 Lynn - - 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
 5,000 
 
 Colchester - - - 
 
 Canterbury - - - 
 
 Beverley - - _ 
 Newcastle-on-Tyne 
 
 Oxford - - - 
 
 Bury, Suffolk - - 
 
 Gloucester C Ea^h 
 
 Leicester < somewhat 
 
 Shrewsbury/ "'°'*'^*" 
 
 4,500 
 
 4,000 
 4,000 
 4,000 
 3,500 
 3,500 
 
 3,000 
 
 In that remote age the total population of England was 
 2,300,000 ; but the proportion of town population was far 
 smaller than at present, since the number of towns contain- 
 ing above 3000 inhabitants was only 18.
 
 [75] 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 TO 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 National Revenue and Capital. 
 
 J S our animal Consumption cqtud to onr aivmal Production ? — 
 \xi advertincf to this subject, our limits prevent our enlarg- 
 ing on the distinction between productive and un|ir()ductive 
 consumption, as explained by M. Say and Mr. ^till, or 
 the much greater latitude given to the term jiroductive by 
 Mr. Gray. We have, in tact, room for little more than 
 answering the plain practical question, " What part of our 
 national income appears to be saved or invested, so as to 
 form a permanent addition to the national property ?" 
 
 The part of our income thus appropriated will be found 
 very small, if considered in the limited sense of investments 
 in money securities, such as the funds or mortgage, trans- 
 actions of that nature being confined in a great measure 
 to annuitants, or rather to tlic comparatively small portion 
 of them that are opulent. If to these we add the invest- 
 ments in the form of money in the part of all other classes, 
 including the saving banks of the lower orders, we shall 
 probably find for the kingdom at large, an annual appropri- 
 ation of 9 or 10,000,000/., the interest of which, at the pre- 
 sent reduced rate, affords an addition of only .3 or 400,000/. 
 to our national income. 
 
 But if we take in a more liberal sense the difference be- 
 tween the revenue and expenditure of the nation, if we 
 consider as saving or as increase of our stock, all that is 
 laid out on the improvement of land, the building or re- 
 pair of houses, the increase of furniture, and if to these we 
 add interest of money saved, we shall find on the whole, an
 
 [76] National Revenue and CapiUil : C'o)Tes])ondcnctJ [A pp. 
 
 addition to our national capital of 50 or 60,000,000, mak- 
 ing an increase in otn- taxable income of nearly 3,000,000/. 
 a-ycar, and renderin*^ it probable tliat the 260,000,000/. 
 of this year will in 182i become 263,.000,000/.; in 1825 
 266,000,000/., &c. This result will be confirmed, if we 
 take as a criterion the increase of our population, confining 
 our estimate to those who annually attain the age of 
 twenty, the age of efficient labour, and whose number we 
 calculate as follows : 
 
 In 1802 the population of Great Britain and Ireland 
 was about 16,000,000, the annual increase by births over 
 deaths, Ih per cent, or 24-0,000. The individuals then 
 born, whether male or female, have now attained the age 
 of useful labour, and must be considered as bearing the 
 same share as the rest of the population, in augmenting the 
 national income. In what manner ought the result of their 
 exertions to be calculated? Our national income, taken in 
 the largest sense, is (see p. 256) 350,000,000/. a-year, and 
 the average contribution to it, reckoned per head of popu- 
 tation, is nearly 17/. Estimated in that proportion, the ad- 
 dition from our new cultivators of the field of national in- 
 dustry would be little short of 4,000,000/. a year ; but we 
 prefer the safer course, and reckon as a bo7id fide addition 
 to our resources only that income which is subject to taxes. 
 Now, on dividing the taxable income of the nation by the 
 number of our population, the result is about 12/. a head 
 as the product of each individual, and the quota of our new 
 contributors, reckoned by that scale, approaches to the 
 3,000,000/. mentioned above. 
 
 This will be found a fair and moderate estimate of the 
 annual addition to our national income. If it be objected, 
 that a deduction ought to be made from our assumed 
 number of 240,000, on account of the deaths occurring 
 ere our new contributors attain the age of labour, we 
 answer that that is amply balanced by the following con- 
 siderations : 
 
 1. The growing increase of our numbers, which, follow- 
 ing the scale of our population returns for 1803, 4, &c. 
 will be next year 244,000; the year after 250,000, and 
 seven years hence, 270,000. 
 
 2. The fact that our new labourers living chiefly in towns 
 where wages are higher than in the country, their contri- 
 butions might fairly be estimated at somewhat more than 
 12/. ahead. 
 
 3. Particularly as that sum forms the average contri-
 
 App.] between Production and Cu7isumj)t ion. [77I 
 
 bution of our population including all a<rcs^ wliereas the 
 240,000 on whom we calculiUc iuive attained the a^-c of 
 labour. 
 
 A Table of annual Consumption substituted /'(n- a Table of 
 Production. — Since all, or nearly all, that is })roduced, 
 is consumed in one form or other, whether productively 
 or otherwise, and since the taxes of this country are 
 imposed chiefly on consumption, it will be more suitable 
 to our reasoning to exhibit the amount in the form of con- 
 sumption. 
 
 National Expenditure or Consumption of Great Britain and 
 Ireland for 1823. 
 
 Expended on the produce of the soil for the 
 food of }nan, or for purposes of manufac- 
 ture _ - _ .€120,000,000 
 
 On the produce of the mines - - 10.000,000 
 
 On manufactures for liome consumption - 70,000,000 
 
 On houses built or re})aired; on furniture; 
 and on improvement of land on whatever 
 is termed in law real jjrojK-rty - - 30,000,000 
 
 On all goods imported, whether for consump- 
 tion, such as tea, sugar, coflee ; or for 
 manufacture, as wool, hemp, iron - 70,000,000 
 
 On all commodities or jModucts not com- 
 prized in the preceding - - .j(),000,0()0 
 
 Total consumption - .1 350,000,000 
 
 Correspondence of this Sketch xvith the Calculation of other 
 
 Writers. 
 
 Mr. S. Gray, in his addition to the Happiness of States, 
 (p. 636.) computes the total expenditure or consumption of 
 the population of Great Britain in 1818 at i 280,000,000 
 To which, if we add for Ireland - 70,000,000 
 
 The result is as above - .£\350,0()(),{)00 
 
 Mr. Colquhoun's table of proj)erty amuially created, will 
 be found to differ in a few particulars only frt)m our sketch 
 of consumption. We leave out in the latter 
 
 The produce raised for the food of iiorses, cattle, and 
 the lesser animals ; also
 
 [78] National Reveyuu! and Capital : Correapondnicc [App. 
 
 The amount of niaiiufacturcs exported ; wliile in lieu of 
 of the latter, and of some other heads in Mr. C's table, we 
 insert tlie value of our imports. 
 
 Our next inquiry relates to a topic of considerable in- 
 tricacy. 
 
 Pruportion of National Expenditure exempt from Taxation. 
 — In France and other countries of limited trade, the 
 governments are obliged to impose their taxes chiefly on 
 production, exacting from the landlord and farmer a piiy- 
 ment equivalent in general to 20 percent, of their incomes. 
 With us the form of impost is different : the direct taxes 
 since the peace are not considerable, but those on com- 
 suniption have long been, and still are so multiplied, that 
 many persons imagine that hardly any portion of our ex- 
 penditure escapes the visitation, dii"ect or indirect, of the 
 exchequer. In various cases, however, the transit from 
 production to consumption is too direct to admit of assess- 
 ment, particularly in regard to the lower orders. The 
 oats, the potatoes, the kitchen vegetables reared by the 
 cottager for his family, or by the farmer for his labourers, 
 though all comprised in our estimate of r::Llonal consump- 
 tion, are subject to very slight demands on the score of 
 taxation. 
 
 Case of Ireland. — This is strikingly exemplified in the 
 sister island, where the taxed expenditure, limited as it is 
 to the disburse of the gentry, the merchants, professional 
 men, and the comparatively small portion of the lower 
 classes residing in towns, cannot with confidence be com- 
 puted at more than 25,000,000/. But a population of 
 7,000,000, supposing their average rate of subsistence not 
 to exceed that of the English cottagers, as calculated by Sir 
 F. Eden, (between 6 and 7/. a head,) could not exist with- 
 out an annual produce of nearly 50,000,0000/. ; and if 
 in forming a calculation for Ireland, we make allowance 
 for the better circumstances of her town population, and 
 for the comparative comfort of her linen manufacturers, 
 we may, perhaps without exaggeration, carry the total 
 property created in that island to 70,000,000/. a year, which 
 is in the proportion of nearly 3 to 1 to the sum we have 
 assumed as representing her taxable income. 
 
 That the supposed amount of the latter cannot be much 
 above 25,000,000/- is unfortunately too clear from the 
 state of the revenue, the amount of which, before making 
 any deduction for collection, hardly exceeds 5,000,000/.,
 
 App.j lettsoeen Production ayid Cwistmptimi. [79] 
 
 or 20 per cent, on 25,000,000/., although levied of late 
 years on nearly the same stale of duties as in England, 
 where taxation, distinct from j)oor rate, exceeds 20 per 
 cent, of the national income. How, it may be asked, does 
 it happen that the two countries differ so greatly in the 
 proportion of their taxed ami untaxed consumption ? Be- 
 cause thre?:-fourths of the population of Ireland are cot- 
 tagers, whose consumption eludes the visit of the tax- 
 gatherer, their clothing being of home manufacture, their 
 food the patatoes of the neighbouring field, their fuel the 
 turf of the common bog. One generation thus succeeds 
 to the poverty of another; and in the eye of the political 
 arithmetician, Ireland is rich only in recruits. 
 
 France. — This country bears a considerable resem- 
 blance to Ireland in the density as in the poverty of her 
 agriculturists; their total consujnption (exclusive of the food 
 of horses and cattle) is not over- rated at 180,000,000/., 
 but as in the rural districts of France the excise duties are 
 very light, taxation in these districts is in a manner confined 
 to the 45,000,000/. of rent and farmer's income returned 
 as subject io Jbncicr. The assessment under that head, 
 heavy as it is, would not, if calculated on the produce of 
 agriculture, exceed 5 or 6 per cent.; yet to increase the 
 amount of this tax is a matter of great difficulty, and the 
 contribution of French agriculturists to their govcrmnent 
 takes i)lace much more in men than in money. Thus in 
 1793, when the cause of the revolution was highly j)opular, 
 and the greatest efforts weie necessary to repel invasion, the 
 demand of the government was directed not to pecmiiary 
 aid, but to levies. And after the discredit of the .issi^^udts, 
 the finances of France owed, in a ^reat measure, their sup- 
 port to the resources of the Netherlands. 
 
 Such is the state of taxation in regard to agriculturists; 
 the next question respects the situation of manufacturers. 
 Among them the projiortion of exjienditure subject to tax- 
 ation may at first appear large, the majority of the work- 
 men residing in towns ; however, a great j^art of them arc 
 
 indiiient, and thourjh the wajjes of the unmarried are ex- 
 
 I • 1 II 
 
 pended in a great measure on taxecf articles, such as beer, 
 
 spirits, and tobacco, those of women, children, or tiie 
 fathers of families, are more strictly confined to the pur- 
 chase of the necessaries of life. 
 
 Lastly, in rcnard to the cxjieiuiiture of merchants, pro- 
 fessional men and traders, foreign commerce, transacted as 
 it is in sea-ports, and by persons in the command of capital.
 
 [80] Natio7ial lievenuc and (Japilal: C'onesj)0?i(lenre [App. 
 
 creates, lor tlic limited luunber employed hy it, a f^reat 
 consiiinptioi) of taxed articles. Of prolessioiuil income 
 tile iippropriation, from tlie respectable station of the indi- 
 viduals, is similar, but inland traffic comprises many per- 
 sons of a very bumble rank, mechanics, labourers, and 
 others, of wliose consumption a considerable part is but 
 sli^i^htly productive to the exchequer. ^ 
 
 It would, we believe, answer no useful purpose to enter 
 on a more minute distinction of the expenditure of parti- 
 cular classes. Speaking generally, we may assume that 
 about 25 per cent, of our national exjienditure seems ex- 
 empt from taxation, and that if the wliole be computed at 
 350,000,000/., the taxable part may, agreeably to the 
 table in the text, be put down at somewhat more than 
 260,000,000/. 
 
 We may perhaps throw some light on this intricate topic 
 by adding a few sentences containing the amount of national 
 income in several of our great departments, with some re- 
 marks on its appropriation. 
 
 Income from the Produce of the Soil, 120,000,000/. — Of 
 this very large sura, the portion constituting the income of 
 the landlord and of the higher class of farmers, is evidently 
 expended in articles subject to taxation ; in regard to the 
 smaller farmers or labourers the case is otherwise, their 
 principal consmnption of taxed articles being confined to 
 malt liquor. 
 
 Produce of the Mines, 10,000,000/. — Here similar re- 
 marks apply in regard to the rent of the proprietor, the 
 salary of the superintendant, or the wages of the workmen. 
 As to the raw material, a considerable duty is raised from 
 coal, but this charge is avoided on all that is not carried 
 coastways, or in a particular direction by canal. 
 
 Maimfactnres for home Consumption, 70,000,000/. — The 
 expenditure on taxed articles in this case arises from the 
 income of master manufacturers, the salaries of clerks, 
 and the wages of the less indigent workmen. The same 
 may be said to apply to the expenditure (computed at 
 30,000,000/.) on buildings, furniture, and agricultural im- 
 provements. 
 
 Income from Trade, Professions, and all other Sources, 
 100,000,000/. — Under this very comprehensive head, the 
 expenditure more particularly subject to taxation consists
 
 A pp.] Estimate of National Capital. [8 1 ] 
 
 of the profit of merchants ami bankers ; of the income of 
 professional men; salaries ofclerks; income of shop-keep- 
 ers ; wages of ship-builders, seamen, &c. 
 
 National Capital. — Calculations of national capital are 
 not, perhaj)s, of great imporUuice in a direct sense, since 
 taxation has seldom been imposed with reference to the 
 amount of capital. A table of this nature is, however, of 
 interest when viewed in connexion with a return of our 
 national income, and rendered subservient to establishing 
 the accuracy of the latter ; this will, we believe, be the 
 effect of the subjoined sketch. 
 
 The fall of prices attendant on a state of peace is, from 
 causes which shall be explained presently, productive of 
 much less diminution in regard to our capital than our in- 
 come ; and Mr. Colquhoun's calculation having been made 
 on an estimate extremely moderate for a state of war, the 
 difi'erence between the present year and the year 181 '2, as 
 calculated by him, is not considerable. Our table for the 
 present year is consequently little more than a re-statement 
 of i)is results, with a few modifications. 
 
 [F]
 
 [82] 
 
 J'jSli/iiate oj Nutional (!u})ilut. 
 
 [Apr. 
 
 Calculation of National Property. 
 
 Great Biitaiii and Ireland. 
 
 Lantl under cultivation, whether in 
 ]jasture, tillage, or gardens 
 
 Farming capital, whether vested in 
 implements of husbandry and 
 farming stock, or in corn and 
 other produce - - - - 
 
 Dwelling houses, warehouses, and 
 manufactories - - 
 
 Manufactured goods in progress or 
 ready for sale, whether in manu- 
 factories, warehouses, or shops : 
 also foreign merchandize on 
 hand . - _ . . 
 
 British shipping of every descrip- 
 tion ----- 
 
 Here it seems fit to make an ad- 
 dition to Mr. Colquhoun's state- 
 ments on account of 
 
 Mercantile and manufacturing ca- 
 pital not specified by him, viz. 
 money in hand; advances to cor- 
 respondents abroad ; manufactur- 
 ing machinery ; tools and imple- 
 ments of mechanics - - - 
 
 This carries to nearly500,000,000/. 
 our mercantile and manufacturing 
 capital employed in current business, 
 and exclusive of whatever capital 
 our merchants may have in fixed 
 property, such as the funds, land or 
 houses. 
 
 Such arc the great heads of our 
 national property ; the lesser as 
 given by Mr. Colquhoun, are 
 Mines and minerals - . . 
 Canals, tolls, and timber 
 
 Total 
 
 Com|)utation for 
 1812, nearly in 
 the form adopted 
 by Mr. Colqu- 
 lioun. 
 
 A similar com- 
 putation for 
 1823. 
 
 £1,280,000,000 
 
 228,000,000 
 400,000,000 
 
 160,000,000 
 27,000,000 
 
 75,000,000 
 50,000,000 
 
 £1,200,000,000 
 
 200,000,000 
 
 4 00,000,000 
 
 140,000,000 
 20,000,000 
 
 1 30,000,000 1 30,000,000 
 
 65,000,000 
 45,000,000 
 
 I £2,350,000,000 £2,200,000,000 
 
 This table is to be understood as representing private 
 property, and exclusive of 
 
 1. All public property, such as militiiry stores, churches, 
 hospitals ; also of
 
 App.] Estimate of National Capital. [83] 
 
 2. Such private property as is unproductive ; viz. waste 
 lands, furniture, or wearing apparel; and, finally, of 
 
 3. Whatever is exjiressive of a debt from one part of 
 the community to another, such as the stocks, mortgages, 
 or mercantile accej)tances. 
 
 How, it may waw be asked, does it happen that the 
 decrease of our national property since the i)eace is so much 
 less than is commonly supposed ? 'Ihe reasons are — 
 
 Land, as a property, is vv'orth in peace from thirty -two 
 to thirty-five years' purchase ; in war, only twenty-seven or 
 twenty-eight years' j^urchase ; so that though on our rental 
 we reckon a fall of fully 30 per cent., the principal has not 
 sunk above 1.5 or 20 jier cent. 
 
 Farming capital experiences at present a depression 
 of value far beyond the reduction iu our table; but its 
 amount in 1812 was, we believe, under-rated by Mr. Col- 
 quhoun, while, in point of cjuantity, whether of imi)lements, 
 cattle, or corn on hand, it has increased probably 20 per 
 cent, since that year. 
 
 As to buildings, whether warehouses, manufactories, or 
 dwellings, the suqirising increase in the number appears 
 fully to have balanced the decrease of rent, particularly as 
 such decrease appears to have been much smaller in this 
 kind of property than in land. 
 
 In our niamdactured and foreign goods on hand the fall 
 of price, great as it has been, is nearly equalleil by the in- 
 crease of (juantity. In our shipping the case is otherwise, 
 and we have accordingly made a large deduction. 
 
 Such is the conijiarative amount of our niuional projjcrty 
 in 1812 and 1822, when represented in money of the re- 
 spective years. But were the calculation for both made in 
 money of equal value, the balance would be in liivour ot 
 the present year ; we mean, that the valuations for the pre- 
 sent year, if made in the money of 1812, would not be sliort 
 of 2,500,000,000/. 
 
 Were we to take a retrospective view of the value ot <jur 
 national property since 1792, we should, in the absence ot 
 satisfactory returns lor the earlier years, estimatt; it at /«v>- 
 /hirds of the present amount. 
 
 [F] 2
 
 [84] Estimate of National Capital. [Api*. 
 
 Public Burdenaiii. the present Year{\H2^). — Particulars 
 of the 64,000,000/. assumed in the text, p. 269. 
 
 Taxes, gross amount, including both the 
 charge of collecting and the repayments 
 in the form of drawbacks, discounts, and 
 allowances ^£^58,000,000 
 
 Deduct, not the charge of collection, but the 
 repayments, which form in fact no part of 
 our burdens 4,000,000 
 
 Remain - - 54,000,000 
 
 This is after a full deduction for the dimi- 
 nution in the duties on malt, salt, leather; 
 also in the assessed taxes. 
 
 Add for tithe, including Ireland * - - 5,000,000 
 Poor-rate, after deducting such portion as be- 
 longs properly to wages (see text, p. 201 .) 5,000,000 
 
 In all - jf 64,000,000 
 
 This amount, reduced to money of 1792 in 
 the proportion of nearly 130/. to 100/., 
 gives the sum expressed in the text, viz. ^50,000,000 
 Or, compared to our national income, 
 a proportion of 25 to 100. 
 
 * TiTHB, All our tables include the tithe paid to lay impropriators.
 
 [85] 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 On Flucfiuiiiati of Prices. 
 
 ^From Mr. Arthur Young's Inquiry into the Value of 
 Money, 1812.) 
 
 Abstract of part of Sir G. ShiickburgVs Table. 
 The Prices of the Year 1550 are taken for the Integer; viz. 100. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Wheat. 
 
 1550 
 
 100 
 
 1600 
 
 — 
 
 1650 
 
 
 
 1675 
 
 246 
 
 1700 
 
 — 
 
 1720 
 
 
 
 1740 
 
 197 
 
 1760 
 
 203 
 
 1780 
 
 — 
 
 1790 
 
 ~— 
 
 1795 
 
 426 
 
 1800 
 
 — 
 
 Twelve 
 Miscellaneous 
 Articles, viz. 
 an Ox, Cow, 
 Poultry, &c. 
 
 100 
 
 239 
 
 434 
 492 
 
 752 
 
 Ihitchcr 
 IMeat. 
 
 Day 
 Labour. 
 
 100 
 
 1(K) 
 
 \m 
 
 118 
 
 266 
 
 250 
 
 400 
 
 275 
 
 511 
 
 \'M\ 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 Mean of all. 
 
 KM) 
 U4 
 188 
 210 
 
 257 
 2S7 
 312 
 1-27 
 11(6 
 53 1 
 ■AVI 
 
 This table presents a very great rise in j-irices, but the 
 grounds of calculation are liir from aiciuato. Butcher 
 meat is put on a par with wheat, although with the niast. of 
 
 [Fj 3
 
 [8G] 
 
 fltictuatioii in Ihc Value of Muncij. 
 
 [Aim'. 
 
 the population it docs not form a fifth j);irt of the con- 
 snni]>tion. Kach of the twelve miscellaneous articles, 
 whether poultry or cattle, are considered of equal import- 
 ance, and manufactures of every sort are omitted. There 
 are, besides, a number of inaccuracies in the authorities 
 from which the table is compiled. 
 
 Com'parhon of the 11 Ik and iSth Centuries. — Bishop 
 Fleetwood, whose inquiries, in regard to the particular 
 period to which he confined them, were very accurate ; and 
 Dr. Heni'y, the author of the History of Englantl, both 
 exhibit results very different from Sir George Shuckburgh. 
 From these Mi'. Young attempted an estimate on tlie fol- 
 lowing plan. 
 
 
 
 ITth 
 
 18th 
 
 
 Rise per 
 
 
 C 
 
 entiiry. 
 
 Centu 
 
 ■y- 
 
 Cent. 
 
 
 £ 
 
 s. d. 
 
 S^ s. 
 
 d. 
 
 
 Wheat 
 
 1 
 
 18 2 
 
 1 18 
 
 7 
 
 Par. 
 
 Barley and oats - 
 
 1 
 
 y 5h 
 
 2 
 
 Oh 
 
 33 
 
 Butcher meat, butter, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 cheese, or whatever 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 is the produce of grass 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 land _ - - 
 
 
 
 1 9 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 28^ 
 
 Labour - - - 
 
 
 
 10? 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 461: 
 
 Wool 
 
 1 
 
 9 li 
 
 17 
 
 8^ 
 
 39A fall. 
 
 Iron - - -' 
 
 u 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 16l rise. 
 
 Coals - - -1 
 
 5 lOi 
 
 1 13 
 
 
 
 39 \ 
 
 Repeating wheat five times, on account of its import- 
 ance, bai-ley and oats twice, the produce of grass land four 
 times, labour five times, and reckoning wool, coals, and 
 iron, each but once, while iron is considered the repre- 
 sentative of all manufactures, the rise from the prices of ojie 
 century to those of the other will amount to no more than 
 '22^ per cent. ; or only th.e tenth part of the rise stated by 
 Sir George Shuckburgh. 
 
 Manufactures. — Under the impoi-tant head of metals, 
 and particularly of iron, Mr. Y. found that the rise for 
 several centuries had been inconsiderable, the improve- 
 ments in the process of preparing them sufficing, in a great 
 measure, to counterbalance the enhancement of labour. 
 But the great argument against Sir G. Shuckburgh's alle-
 
 A pp.] 
 
 Fluctuation in the Valxic of Mmieij. 
 
 [87] 
 
 gation ol" general depreciation is to be found in the pric«! of 
 manufactures, in the production ol" which, far more than 
 in agriculture, free scope is given to the application of all 
 the auxiliaries called forth by the progress of society ; we 
 mean increase of capital, division of labour, and aid from 
 machinery. The following siiort list is tiiken irom the 
 books of Greenwich IIos[)ilai. 
 
 Average of the Years from 
 
 Shoes. 
 
 Stockings. 
 
 Ilau. 
 
 I'roportions 
 in twenty, 
 when taki'M 
 i-olki'iivtly. 
 
 1729 to 176.3 
 1770 to 17S5 - 
 1770 to ISOO - 
 1790tolS(X) - 
 1805 to 1810 - 
 
 s. d. s. d. 
 3 11 i 1 7 
 3 10 ' 1 S\ 
 \ 7il 1 h\ 
 4. 6ri 1 6 
 5 5 2 2 
 
 s. d. 
 2 2i 
 2 3* 
 2 4- 
 
 2 4. 
 
 3 
 
 Hi 
 
 1+ ■ 
 
 1.34 
 20 
 
 These are articles of subordinate importance; but the 
 fact i.^, that in almost all manufactured connnodities,"we are 
 supplied cheaper than our ancestors, and that u lisc, when 
 it has taken place, is to be ascribed cithtr to a tax on the 
 raw commodity, or to some cause whicii may be termed 
 particular or incidental. In regard to the qiuiiitij of our 
 manuiacture.s, we nmst speak with more hesitation, and can 
 hardly decide whetiier the balance be in favour of ihc pre- 
 sent, or of a former age; for if our i'abrics are now much 
 more neat alid convenient, they are in a considerable de- 
 gree less durable. 
 
 Horses and Cattle. — In these the improvement in point 
 of quality admits of no doubt. In comparing the present 
 jirice of sheep and oxen with those of a century :igo, a great 
 part of the diflerence is to be ascribed to the inferior .si/u ol' 
 the animal, at a time when the art of gra/ing was not under- 
 stood ; the same will be found to hold in ngaril to horses, 
 and at a later date than is connnonly imagined. The only 
 quarter aflbrding authentic information in regard to the 
 price of horses is the War Olfice, from the record^ of uhu h 
 Mr. Young extracted the following averages. 
 
 [i-J I
 
 [88] 
 
 Mucliiatio7i in the Value ofMona). 
 
 [Arp. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Price. 
 
 
 £ s. d. 
 
 1766 and 1767 
 
 21 
 
 From 1768 to 1792, both inclusive 
 
 23 2 
 
 1793 to 1802 - - - 
 
 26 .5 
 
 1803 to 1812 - 
 
 26 5 
 
 The rise of price in this period of forty-six years was 
 much less than might have been supposed from the rate 
 paid by individuals. But the War Office, looking chiefly 
 to strength and the power of standing fatigue, bought, 
 throughout the whole period, horses of nearly equal value. 
 Private purchasers were not so easily satisfied ; and of the 
 higher prices so generally paid by them, a considerable 
 part is to be ascribed to a size and beauty in the animal 
 which half a century before was comparatively rare. 
 
 Sketch of the progressive Rise of Prices since the Thirteenth 
 Century^ taking 20 for the Integer or highest Sum^ and 
 exhibiting the other Parts by their proj^m-tion to it. [Ab- 
 stractedfrom a Table of Arthur Young.) 
 
 
 
 Beef and 
 
 
 Manufac- 
 
 
 Trade, 
 
 Periods. 
 
 Wheat. 
 
 Poik, from 
 the Books 
 
 of the 
 Victualling 
 
 Labour. 
 
 tures at 
 Green- 
 wich 
 Hospital. 
 
 Popula- 
 tion. 
 
 calcu- 
 
 laied 
 
 from 
 
 our Ex- 
 
 
 
 Office. 
 
 
 
 jions. 
 
 13th Century 
 
 5\ 
 
 
 3^ 
 
 _ 
 
 __ 
 
 _ 
 
 14th ditto - 
 
 6i 
 
 
 
 44 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 15th ditto - 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 5} 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 IGth ditto - 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 5^ 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 17th ditto - 
 
 9t 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 , — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 18th ditto - 
 
 H 
 
 — 
 
 12^ 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 66 years from 1701 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 to 1766 - 
 
 H 
 
 H 
 
 10 
 
 14^ 
 
 11 
 
 5^ 
 
 25 ditto from 1767 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 to 1789 - 
 
 11 
 
 11 
 
 12i 
 
 14 
 
 13^. 
 
 H 
 
 54 ditto from 1767 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 to 1800 - - 
 
 12 
 
 12^ 
 
 14 
 
 15J 
 
 15J 
 
 11 
 
 14 ditto from 1790 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 to 1803 - 
 
 15 
 
 17 
 
 16| 
 
 15* 
 
 184 
 
 15^ 
 
 7 ditto from 1804 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 to 1810 - 
 
 20 
 
 20 
 
 £0 
 
 20 
 
 20 
 
 20
 
 App.] Fluctuation in the Value of Moncij. [89] 
 
 Annual Coyisumption of Gold and Sili'e?' Jbr Plate, orna- 
 mental Ma7iufacture, and Furniture. — Calculations of tliiv 
 nature have hitherto been founded on rtturns i'vom towns 
 which, like Geneva, were remarkable Ibr the manufacture 
 of watches, or like Paris and Hirmin<rliam, tor uildiixr, 
 trinkets, and other ornamental fabrics. At present, liow- 
 €ver, we are inclined to draw our inferences from a wider 
 field, from a calculation of the probable amount of indi- 
 vidual income founded on the public burdens of this and 
 other countries. If we refer to our projKrty-tiix returns 
 during the war, and make allowance, on the one hand, for 
 the reduction of income, on the other, for the incretiic of 
 numbers that have since tiiken place, we shall find reason 
 to estimate the number of 
 
 Families in England, Scotland, and Wales, pos- 
 sessing 200/. a year and upwards, at - - - 100,000 
 
 And taking our island as representing, in point 
 of such incomes, a fourth of the civilized world, 
 we add for the latter, that is, for the rest of 
 Europe and the United Stiites of America - 300,000 
 
 Together - - - l-OOjOOO 
 
 Families whose incomes are between 
 60/. and '200/. a year amount in 
 Great Britain to nearly - - - 100,000 
 
 Add for the rest of Europe and the 
 
 United States of America - - 1,200,000 
 
 Together - - - - l,no(>,000 
 
 Now a consumption on the part of the former 
 class at the conjectural average of 10/. a 
 family amuially, would give - - - - ^i,000,000 
 
 The same for the second class at the rate of 
 
 somewhat less than 2/. per family - - - 3,000,000 
 
 Add for the consumption of the lower orders 
 
 in watches, ear-rings, buckles, &c. - - - 1,<»(H),()00 
 
 Total - - - - .£8,000,000 
 
 These large sums include loss by accident and 
 wear; but, as a considerable amount of t)Id 
 plate or old manufacture is amuially naltcd 
 and wrought up, we deduct as not forming 
 a demand on the minc^ 2,()()0,()<)O
 
 [90] Tbirhudion in the faluc of Money. [ App. 
 
 llcniaiiulcr, being the conjectural amount of 
 specie from the mines annually required for 
 jilate and ornarnenUil manufacture or fur- 
 niture ,€'6,000,000 
 
 Comparative Expencc of France and England. — Not- 
 witlistandinij our m-eat intercourse with the Continent of 
 late years, the jiublic are not yet in possession of a correct 
 com})arison of the expence of living in France and England. 
 Nothing is more vague and unsatisfactory than the notices 
 on this subject in books of travels, proceeding, as they ge- 
 nerally do, from persons who have little idea of compre- 
 hensive calculation, and who allow themselves to dwell with 
 undue emphasis on a few particular points in which France 
 happens to differ materially from England. Such persons 
 seldom make allowance for a countervailing tendency in 
 other items of the account. The proper mode is to frame 
 a general table, including not only provisions, house-rent, 
 iViel, wages, but manufactures, and professional charges. 
 Alter ascertaining these material points, there will remain 
 to be made a distinction betw^een different periods : thus, 
 during the war, particularly in the latter years, the dilTerence 
 between the two countries was very great, lOOZ. in France 
 being equivalent to 140/. or 150/. in England. Since the 
 peace, this difference has progressivel}' decreased, the fall 
 of prices in France, though not inconsiderable, being much 
 inferior to that which has taken place in England. A com- 
 jxirison made in 1819 would have exhibited 100/. in France 
 as equal to fully \30l. in England; at present (1823) it 
 would not exceed the proportion of 100/. to 120/. 
 
 After attending to these prelimhiaries, the progress of 
 comparison becomes less difficult, and, by balancing one 
 point against another, is made to assume, at last, a clear 
 and simple form. Thus, as to the respective capitals, Paris 
 being inferior in water communication incurs a greater 
 enhancement than London in the conveyance of bulky 
 commodities, such as corn, coal, wood ; while, in respect to 
 number of consumers^ the cause of enhancement is consi- 
 derably less, the population of the French metropolis being 
 less than two -thirds of that of ours. These causes may be 
 said to neutralize each other : and the inferences are, — 
 
 First, that Paris is as much dearer than the provincial 
 part of France, as London is dearer than the provincial part 
 of England. - - • 
 
 Secondly, that the proportion mentioned above as con- 
 14.
 
 App.] Fluctuation in l/ic Vahic of Money. [91] 
 
 stituting the difference with England, viz. 30 per cent, in 
 1819, and 20 pur cent, at present, is apjilicable to the two 
 countries throughout, provided we confine our [jurallel to 
 places similarly circumstanced, comi)aring Paris with Lon- 
 don, and Touraine or Lower Normandy, each about 150 
 miles from Paris, with Shropshire, Derbyshire, or other 
 counties, at a similar distance from London. 
 
 Another point to which travellers are seldom sufficiently 
 attentive is, that the degree of diflL-rence between one pro- 
 vince and another, and even between one country on the 
 Continent and another, is much smaller than it at first ap- 
 pears. Take, for exam})le, the north and south of I-'rance, 
 countries very diflerent in climate, produce, and habits. 
 At first the south appears nmch cheaper, aflbrding in abun- 
 dance wine, fruit, and other articles, lor which we are Uiade 
 to pay so extravagantly in Kngland ; but these, on a closer 
 examination, are found to be counterbalanced by the jiricc 
 of corn always higher there than in the northern districts 
 of France. Again, the lower wages of labour, in a backward 
 province like lirittany, make a very slight difference ulti- 
 mately, when we take into account the inferiority of the 
 labourers. Similar remarks are applicable to Germany, 
 Italy, Switzerland : in none of these countries are the 
 amount of taxation, the interest of money, the state of hus- 
 bandry, or any of the main constituents of price so mate- 
 rially different as to cause any great difference in tlie expence 
 of living. Accordingly, after all the assertions and exag- 
 gerations of travellers, the distinctioris on the Continent are 
 little more than 
 
 1. That provincial towns are considerably less expensive 
 than capitals. 
 
 2. That by living in a petty town, or in the country, a 
 
 farther reduction of expence may be accomplished, but with 
 
 a jrreater sacrifice of comfort, a «ireater removal from busi- 
 es ..,.." . 1 . 
 ness and society, than is implied by a country residence in 
 
 England. 
 
 3. That in consequence of the want of water communi- 
 cation, the price of bulky commodities, such as corn or 
 wood, varies more in the provinces of the Continent llian 
 in the counties of England; still the difference is less great 
 than is often asserted, (Etlinburgh Keview, \'ol. LXIV. 
 p. 362.) land carriage on the Continent being moderate 
 in consecjuence of the insignificanc' of i.«!l^ mm,! tnmDlKi- 
 dues. 
 
 i. That taking France as the rijnt m ;r.;i;i\r m ,ii> v ..ii- 
 tinent at large in point of expence, the difference with
 
 [92] Fluctuation in the Value of Maueij. [App. 
 
 Kn^lanil, great during tlie war, (particularly from 1809 to 
 1811), is at present not more than 20 per cent. ; any dis- 
 burse beyond that proportion being attributable, not to 
 dillercnce of prices, but to additional comfort or luxury on 
 our side. 
 
 To what degree did a difference of prices exist between 
 France and England prior to the French Revolution ? 
 Our materials for such a comparison are far from complete: 
 the tables collected by the late Arthur Young in 1789 in- 
 dicate a considerable inferiority of price, but the articles 
 quoted are chiefly agricultural ; and had manufactures 
 been included, the general result would have been less un- 
 favourable to England. If we revert to a prior date, such 
 as the middle of the last century, we shall find reason to 
 consider the two countries nearly on a par. At that time 
 England was not much more heavily taxed than France, 
 nor were our manufactures or corn dearer, for both were 
 articles of export. The result accordingly is, that prior to 
 1760 the only material distinction between the two coun- 
 tries consisted in the style of living; the proportion of 
 English population in towns being even then considerably 
 greater, and the inhabitants consequently requiring com- 
 forts little known or thought of in the provincial part of 
 France. 
 
 Mr. M'Culloch, in his " Essay on reducing the Interest 
 on our National Debt," published in 1816, maintains, in 
 contradiction to common opinion, that the rise in the price 
 of corn on the Continent during the last half century has, 
 on the whole, been inconsiderable. He goes into the ques- 
 tion at great length, treating in succession of France, Spain, 
 Italy, and the countries on the Baltic, and adducing several 
 cogent arguments in opposition to those who maintain, 
 that there took place on the Continent a rise of prices 
 nearly correspondent to the rise in this country. His con- 
 clusions are, that in France there was no rise in the price 
 of corn : that in Italy the rise was a consequence of the ex- 
 tension given to the freedom of trade ; and that the partial 
 advance which he admits to have taken place in Russia 
 and Poland was a necessary result of the degree of im- 
 provement introduced in the present age into these very 
 backward countries. To this statement we have merely 
 to offer the qualifications naturally arising from a state of 
 war. In the long period from 1793 to 18 14 every state on 
 the Continent was either engaged in hostilities, or obliged 
 to increase its taxes and military establishment. In all these 
 
 13
 
 App.] Fluctuation in the Value of Money. [95] 
 
 was felt a portion of tlie activity or excitement so conspi- 
 cuous in England during the war, followed in all by a sUig- 
 nation similar, though not ecjual in degree, to that which 
 we have experienced since the peace. The consequence 
 was, that prices rose during one period and fell in the other ; 
 but to ascertain the extent of change is a matter of great 
 difficulty, there being few official returns in any j)art d? the 
 Continent, and the question being somewhat jierplexed by 
 the circulation of government pajier so general duriu" the 
 war. On the whole, however, there took place, in family 
 expenditure, calculated on a comprehensive plan, and in- 
 cluding along with corn and butcher meat, wages, hou.^e- 
 rent, fuel, &c. a rise of from 25 to 30 per cent, on the 
 prices of 1792 ; a rise which has, in a great measure, ills- 
 appeared in the continued reduction since the peace. 
 
 In forming conclusions on the jirice of corn, allowance 
 ought evidently to be made for particular causes operating 
 in particular countries: — thus, in France, the abolition of 
 tithe, and the sale of the church lands, promoted tillage to 
 a degree which nearly counteracted the rise of labour at- 
 tendant on the war. 
 
 Annjial Expence of the familij (f an jh^ricultural Labourer., 
 supposed to C07isist of S\ persons ,- beini:^ an avrra<^c if the 
 expence of (SS families of labourers^ in (lijf'ercnt parts of 
 England, collected by Sir F. Eden, in 1796. 
 
 Provisions (as dear then as in 1823) - 
 Rent ------ 
 
 Fuel and candles - - - - 
 
 Clothes and wasliing . _ - 
 
 Contingencies - - - - - 
 
 The same table, adapted to the present time by an ad- 
 dition of 25 per cent, to the respective heads of expence, 
 with the exception of provisions. 
 Provisions - _ - - - 
 Rent ------ 
 
 Fuel and candles - - - - 
 
 Clothes and light _ - - - 
 Contingencies ----- 
 
 ,i27 
 
 1 
 
 8 
 
 1 
 
 13 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 10 
 
 7 
 
 4 
 
 IS 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 10 
 
 .VS6 
 
 11 
 
 J 
 
 £"11 
 
 1 
 
 S 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 fi 
 
 2 
 
 (i 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 7 
 
 .^'39 
 
 '-' 
 
 7
 
 [91] 
 
 Plan for ^^iving a steady F/due to 
 
 [A PP. 
 
 Table cnmprisin;^ articles of frr.Jieral conmmjttion^ to each of 
 which is qjfixcd the probable amount ()f money expended on 
 on it by the jniblic, referred to in the text^ p. 333. 
 
 
 
 Expcndci! by 
 
 Articles 
 
 Quantity 
 
 Average 
 
 tlie public 
 
 
 consumed. 
 
 price. 
 
 oil cacli 
 article. 
 
 Produce of the Soil. 
 
 Qrs. 
 
 .V. 
 
 £ 
 
 Wheat - - - - 
 
 1 2,000,000 
 
 50 
 
 30,000,000 
 
 Barley (used chiefly in the brewery 
 
 
 
 
 and distillery) 
 
 7,200,000 
 
 25 
 
 9,000,000 
 
 Oats (the portion appropriated to 
 
 
 
 
 human food) . _ - 
 
 10,000,000 
 
 20 
 
 10,000,000 
 
 Butcher meat and animal food 
 
 
 
 
 generally 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 5 5,000,000 
 
 Manufactures. 
 
 
 
 
 The following sums representing 
 
 
 
 
 the value, exctusivc of exports, 
 
 
 
 
 are, of course, considerably be- 
 
 
 
 
 low the total of the value an- 
 
 
 
 
 nually prepared 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 Woollens . - - 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 22,000,000 
 
 Cottons, (the exports exceed 
 
 
 
 
 20,000,000/.) . - - 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 20,000,000 
 
 Linen - - 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1 5,000,000 
 
 Silk 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 8,000,000 
 
 Leather _ . - 
 
 
 — 
 
 1 5,000,000 
 
 Hardware - - - 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 9,000,000 
 
 Foreign Articles, such as 
 
 
 
 
 Sugar - - - 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 9,000,000 
 
 Tea - _ - - 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 8,000,000 
 
 Various other articles of sufficient 
 
 
 
 
 importance to be specified, and 
 
 
 
 
 the amount of which it would 
 
 
 
 
 probably be practicable to ascer- 
 
 
 
 
 tain from official documents - 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 100,000,000 
 
 A multiplicity of articles of less 
 
 
 
 
 importance, which being in a 
 
 
 
 
 great measure superfluities, and 
 
 
 
 
 dependent for their consump- 
 
 
 
 
 tion on the taste of individuals, 
 
 
 
 
 require to be noticed no far- 
 
 
 
 
 ther than by assigning to them 
 
 
 
 
 collectively their proportion to 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 the aggregate: this proportion 
 
 
 
 
 we shall at present suppose to 
 
 
 
 
 be about 17 per cent., or - - 
 Total annual consumption - - 
 
 — 
 
 — • 
 
 ^0,000,000 
 
 .350,000,000 
 
 Sucli is, or rather would be when conipleteJ, a table of 
 our annual consumption at tiie present time. In iVamiug
 
 App.] 
 
 Monty CutUracts. 
 
 [95] 
 
 or correcting such a table, we have evidently to consider 
 two main points ; the (juantities consumed, and the pricL-. 
 As to quantity, a variation can take place only with in- 
 crease ol population or change of habits, anil any alteration 
 of that kind must be so gradual, that we run very little 
 hazard in assuming a similarity of amount during a given 
 period, which, for the sake of precision, we shall suppose 
 to be five years. As to price, the case is different; the 
 produce of the soil may, from casualty in the season, rise 
 10 or 20 per cent., while our manufactures may exj)eri- 
 ence a fall. The result, as far as founded on prices, must 
 therefore undergo some change annually : for the sake of 
 illustration we shall suppose in one )'ear a change differing 
 in different articles, but ending in an average rise of '> per 
 cent.: thus, — 
 
 
 
 
 Expended hy 
 
 Articles. 
 
 Quantity 
 
 Average 
 
 the public 
 
 
 consumed. 
 
 price. 
 
 on each 
 article. 
 
 Produce of the xoU covipult'il on the 
 
 Qrs. 
 
 .T. 
 
 £ 
 
 same quantities ; but with an ad- 
 
 
 
 
 dition of 10 per cent, to the 
 
 
 
 
 prices. 
 
 
 
 
 Wheat 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 5j 
 
 .3.-,000,000 
 
 Barley - - - 
 
 7,200,000 
 
 '21 
 
 9,000,000 
 
 Oats - ... 
 
 10,000,000 
 
 22 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 Butcher meat and aniinal food 
 
 
 
 
 enhanced in the same propor- 
 
 
 
 
 tion ... 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 -8,500,000 
 
 Manufactures ; here we suppose 
 
 
 
 
 a decrease of '> per cent. : thus, 
 
 
 
 
 Woollens 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1 9,000,000 
 
 Cottons 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1 1,4(H'»,000 
 
 Linen - . . - 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 IJ.'.'.IO.IXK) 
 
 Silk . . - - 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 7,(;oo,oo(> 
 
 Leather - ... 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 14,250,000 
 
 Hardware ... 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 8,500,0()0 
 
 Foreign arliclct. 
 
 
 
 
 Sugar the same ... 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 !»,000,000 
 
 Tea the same - - 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 8,000,000 
 
 In the other component parts of 
 
 
 
 
 the table the fluctuations are 
 
 
 
 
 supposed to change the amount 
 
 
 
 
 of 170,000,000/. to 
 
 Total - 
 
 
 
 \^ 1 ,1 1«',< >*)0 
 
 367,500/X)0 
 
 The final change supjiosed in this statement is that XO'd. 
 are required to effect the jnnch:isi's lor which 100/. siifliced 
 in the preceding year. We proceed next to the
 
 C96] 
 
 Plan for i!,hn7in a slcudij Valur lo 
 
 [Apf, 
 
 Apportionment of the respective Articles iii the former Table. 
 
 Articles consumed. 
 
 Expenditure 
 on eacli 
 Article. 
 
 Proportion of 
 the expendituii- 
 on each article 
 
 to the total 
 
 expenditure of 
 
 tlic public, 
 
 calculated in 
 
 parts of 100. 
 
 Wheat .... 
 Barley ... 
 Oats .... 
 Butcher meat and all animal food . - 
 Woollens - - . . 
 Linen - - - . 
 Leather - - - - 
 Cottons - - - 
 Silk - ... 
 Hardware - - - - 
 Sugar - ... 
 Tea . . - 
 All otherheads of national consumption 
 
 Total - 
 
 £ 
 
 30,000,000 
 
 9,000,000 
 
 10,000,000 
 
 .55,000,000 
 
 20,000,000 
 
 1 5,000,000 
 
 1 5,000,000 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 8,000,000 
 
 9,000,000 
 
 9,000,000 
 
 8,000,000 
 
 1 70,000,000 
 
 8.57 
 2.57 
 2.85 
 
 10. 
 5.71 
 4.28 
 4.28 
 3.42 
 2.28 
 2.57 
 2.57 
 2.28 
 
 48.62 
 
 350,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 To those who apprehend complexity in such calculations, 
 we would observe, that the details would rest with persons 
 employed for the purpose; and that the public would re- 
 quire to know only the result, which, as in the present 
 returns of the averages of sugar and corn, might be com« 
 municated in a few sentences. 
 
 Ought a Table of National Coiisumption to comprise the 
 smaller Heads of Expenditure ? — To calculate the smaller 
 items of expenditure would be a task of great difficulty, and, 
 as far as we can judge, of little utility, since it is easy to 
 make an allowance for the proportion omitted. Besides, 
 we ought to introduce into the table no sum of which the 
 accuracy is not ascertained with considerable confidence 
 from official documents, and of which the importance is 
 not such as to reward the labour of enquiry and comparison. 
 Were the articles enumerated to form only 50 per cent, of 
 the total national consumption, the result, supposing them 
 to be articles of general use, would afford a very fair scale 
 for comparing the prices of different years. A tiible com- 
 plete in all its parts would, doubtless, be preferable ; but 
 as the heads of our public offices, like our individual en- 
 quirers, are as yet in only an early stage of statistical
 
 App.] MuiK'u Cuntrach. [y7] 
 
 researcli, a consiJerahle time must elapse ere their irmte- 
 rials acquire a finished Ibrm. 
 
 In the case of the lower orders, a knowledge of the cost 
 of a few great lieads of expenditure, such as corn, course 
 clothiqg, beer, fuel, would be found suflicient. There ought 
 evidently to be a material diireruiice in the plan of a table 
 for them and of one lor their superiors, a consideration 
 which leads us to another (juery in this interesting but 
 somewhat intricate tliscussion. 
 
 Hem far are i)articidm- Tables required for partieuhir 
 Classes P — A scale formed on the table in the text is 
 adapted to very many persons in the middle and up|>er 
 classes, — to the receivers of annuities, wlnther fi(Mn the 
 public funds or mortgages, — the hmdlord who depends on 
 his rent, — the clerk who depends on his s;ilary. Hut in 
 regard to several of the classes currently termed productive, 
 the question is different, as will apjHsar from a reference to 
 a specific case, such as that of 
 
 Farmers on Lease. — The situation of the farmer on lease, 
 though materially affected by the value of money in pur- 
 chases generally, depends still more on the})iice oitlie j)ro- 
 duce he raises; — of corn, if his occupancy be chiefly uiicicr 
 the plough; of butcher meat, butter, cheese, if it be'chiefly 
 grass land. Leases oufdit thus to be drawn with a reference 
 to the market price of produce, comi)uletl on the average 
 of a scries of years. (3r, if a regulator of a more com- 
 prehensive character be desired, the price of the produce 
 might be combined with a table of the price of couimo- 
 <lities generally, (Appendix, p. [95]) taking the latter as the 
 basis ; but motlilying its result by repeating the price of 
 corn or of butcher meaf. a certain niunber of limes, so as 
 to give due weight to these main constituents of the income 
 of the lessee. 
 
 The average rate of labour, an object of the first iujport- 
 ancc in farming, might, in like maimer, be addetl to tin- 
 table, and repeated several times. 
 
 Mines. — In an undertaking of this nature, the profit 
 evidently depends on two points: the- market price of the 
 articles produced (whether coal, iron, tin, or copju'r) ; and 
 the average rate of the labour by means of which it is 
 rendered saleable. There are thus two ways of stipulating 
 the conditional amount of the rent: by a table confined to 
 the rate of labour and the price of the article pro<luccd ; 
 or by a table of the price of connnoditics generally, (as in 
 p. [95]) with sucli repetitions of the rate of labour, or price
 
 [08] J*/a7i/(»!t^iviu_u, a ileadj/ I'dlur /o [A PP. 
 
 of the article produced, as the contractirifr parties niif,'lit 
 think expedient. 
 
 Titlir. — The case of tithe is (hfferent from that of rent. 
 It is evidently more convenient to clergymen that the 
 price of commodities f^enerally should he the standard, 
 than the price of agricultural produce. The latter deter- 
 mines, it is true, the ability of the payers of tithe ; but as 
 the payers are many, and the receivers comparatively few, 
 as that which to the latter forms the whole of income is to 
 the former only a portion of their disburse, the circumstance-; 
 of the clergy have a claim to prior consideration : that is, 
 ■witl)out showing the slightest partiality to either party, equity 
 suggests that the regulation of clerical income should be 
 made with a view to the value of money in the purchase of 
 commodities generally, and not exclusively in the purchase 
 of corn, which can form hardly a fifth of their expenditure. 
 
 It would be no difficult task to suggest farther modifica- 
 tions for different lines of business; but to enter into detail 
 seems wholly unnecessary, since CA'ery thing in the pro- 
 posed plan is voluntary, and may be adopted or omitted 
 as may suit the interest, or imagined interest, of the con- 
 tracting parties. We shall, therefore, take leave of the 
 question, after answering, by anticipation, a few objections, 
 as follows : — 
 
 1 . ISIeed there be any apprehension of a combination to 
 produce undue returns of prices for the purpose of affecting 
 the standard of particular contracts? — Attempts of that 
 nature are very little to be dreaded in so extensive a country 
 as this : they could be effectual only if undertaken through- 
 out the whole kingdom, and persevered in during a series 
 of years; a course which would suppose a command of 
 capital, and a degree of concealment, wholly at variance 
 with probability. 
 
 2. Would a measure of this nature be likely to affect the 
 sale p'ice of other property, i7i particular of lands and 
 houses ? — The majority of fund-holders are, as we shall 
 explain subsequently, permanent depositors ; strangers to 
 the manoeuvres of the Stock Exchange, and almost as little 
 inclined as our landholders to engage in speculative sales 
 and purchases. But there is another class, persons retir- 
 ing from business, succeeding to property, or having, fi-om 
 any other cause, funds of which they are desirous to make the 
 investment. To these persons stock would, by the measure 
 in contemplation, be rendered more eligible as a permanent
 
 Ai'i'.] Money Contracts, [99] 
 
 deposit, and the motives for purcliasin^ landed property 
 would in some degree be lessened. Rut the complaint ol" 
 the country gentlemen does not regard inadequacv of sale 
 price: instead of the 'iG or 'J7 years' purchase to which 
 they were accustomed during the war, land will now sell for 
 34 or 35 years' purchase: their (tesidiruliau is an assured 
 income, — relief from })resent pressure; and such, to a cer- 
 tain extent, would be the result of the proposed measure. 
 
 3. It may be objected to our tabic, that " it does not 
 comprise any heads of expenditure, except those repre- 
 sented by commodities;" while a considerable part of the 
 disburse of the middle classes (not less than a ihinO, is of 
 another descrijjtion, as appears from the concluding line in 
 the following sketch : 
 
 I'roportions in lUO of 
 eadi licail of <■» j.'i"' ■• 
 
 Provisions - - - 33 
 
 Clothing and washing - - LS 
 
 Fuel ami light - - - - (j 
 
 House rent - - - 10 
 Other charges, namely, wages, as- \ 
 
 sesscd taxes, education, medical J- 33 
 
 attendance, &c. ~ - J 
 
 100 
 
 To the objection that might be founded on a statement 
 like this, our answer wouUl be, that the money paid for 
 waf^es, education, professional aid, i?cc. is ultiuuUely ex- 
 pended on commodities; and were the case otherwise, 
 there seems no necessity that a scale should couiprise nil 
 the items of expenditure. 
 
 Extract of a Letter to the Author from a respectable Farvin- 
 ill Hampshire, dated June 1 . 1 823. 
 " During the low prices of last autumn, I was led to 
 consider of the plan suggested in your book for regulating 
 the wages of my labourers, by a reference to the price ot" 
 their subsistence, in other words, to the market price of 
 corn. This plan met, at first, wid» considerable oppo- 
 sition, but the ecjuity of it became, in the course o\' a few 
 weeks, so apparent, as to remove all objections. My rule 
 was to take the rate of wages (7.v. a week^ currently given 
 in my neighbourhood, to explain to how much wheat this 
 was equivalent, and to pay my people in wlieat or in 
 money, at their option. 'I'hey sotin preferred the former, 
 to the extent of their consumption, ami took in nu)nev
 
 [ 100] Plan J'oi f!^ivnn[ a ^Iraihj J'alui; S^c. [A PP. 
 
 only what tlioy required for tlieir lesser purcluises. On 
 taking an average (jI tlieir weekly receij)ts, during the 
 winter, and reckoning them in wheat, on the plan adopted 
 by Mr. Barton, and stated in your book, (in the chapter 
 on Poor Laws), I find it to have been about 80 pints of 
 wheat, which lornis a kind of medium of the wages of the 
 country labourer, computed in wheat for the last seventy 
 years. 
 
 " This was found suflicient for the maintenance of the fa- 
 milies of my labourers, which averaged five persons: viz, 
 the man, his wife and three children. During the whole 
 winter none of my labourers, who were from IC to 18 in 
 number, hod recourse to the parisli. 
 
 " My inference is that 80 pints of wheat, or its value in 
 money, would form a fair permanent rate of wages for the 
 country labourers throughout all that part of England in 
 which wheat is the usual food of the country people." 
 
 On high and low Prices since 1792. By Thomas Toohe^Esq. 
 Parti. — It was afterwriting our chapter on the Rise of Prices 
 during the War, that Mr. Tooke's Treatise fell intoour hands. 
 This First Part relates chiefly to the effect of the currency, 
 and Mr. T. maintains that the bullionists over-rate greatly 
 the effect on prices of the substitution of bank paper for 
 coin; while their opponents are almost equally erroneous in 
 refusing to admit a partial enhancement (about 20 per cent, 
 in the latter years of the war) arising from that cause. He 
 is not disposed to allow that the war had so great or general 
 an effect on prices as has been supposed : the rise of corn 
 he attributes chiefly to an extra-proportion of indifferent 
 seasons ; and after recapitulating the events affecting other 
 commodities of consequence, such as cotton, sugar or wool, 
 his inference is, that the fluctuation in the price of each de- 
 pended less on any general cause than on circumstances of 
 demajid and supply peculiar to the ixirticular article. He 
 steers a middle course throughout, and concludes (p. 201.) 
 b}' reminding the bullionists of the remarkable fact, that 
 money was less abundant during the bank restriction than 
 at present, when prices are so much lower ; while, on the 
 other hand, he assures the agi'iculturists that as the fall of 
 prices since 1819 may be explained by favourable seasons, 
 they may safely forbear their complaints against Mr. Peel's 
 Bill. 
 
 This publication is valuable as a collection of materials, 
 as a specimen of reasoning founded on specific documents, 
 instead of the mania for generalizing, so common in the 
 present age.
 
 [lOlJ 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 TO 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Oft Fifiance. 
 
 Linking Fu?id. — On this subject a lew explanatory jia- 
 ragraphs may be .'icceptable to those of our readers who 
 are not initiated in the mysteries of the Treasury or Stock 
 Exchange. 
 
 T/ie SujypUes constituting our Sinkiu}j^ Fund. — Tiic com- 
 plex form of our budget, and the appearance of inviolability 
 given to the sinking fund, may induce pcisons in common 
 life to imagine that ihnt fund derived part of its income 
 from taxes vested in tlie connnissioners, antl managed by 
 them without reference to the rest of the revenue. 'J jjc 
 appropriation, however, never went so far : the income of 
 the sinking fund, jxiid to the connnissioners at the bank, 
 arose chiefly from — 
 
 Ibt. The' 1,000,000/. (increased hi 1792 to l,l.'0O,O00/.) 
 annually payable out of tlie general revenue. 
 
 2d. The dividends of redeemed stock, which, standing 
 in the name of the Sinking Fund Conunisiicjiiers, were 
 considered as entitled to interest at the ijuaiierly payments 
 at the Bank, in the same manner as the re.^t ul the })ublic 
 debt. 
 
 Sd. The sur|)lus interest provided on contracting each 
 loan since 1793. This provision, adopted by Mr. I'itt on 
 the suggestion of Dr. Price, will be unilcr.-,tood by sup- 
 posing that the loan for a [)articular year is 10,000,000/., 
 at 5 per cent., for which stock given in tlie 5 jier cents. ;it 
 par involves anamuial charge of .000,000/. Now the plan 
 was, to provide taxes yieUling, not 000,000/., but tiOO,000/.
 
 [102] On Finance: flic SinLing I'nnd. [App. 
 
 :i year, the 1()(),()()0/. fbruiinpr a fund lor tlie gradual ex- 
 tinction of the principal — a purpose wliicli in the case in 
 (jiicstion would be accomplished in 37 years. 
 
 The merits or demerits of this plan of surplus interest 
 are now ordy matters of historical curiosity, the season of 
 Joans heino- })ast, or at least suspended. Tiie question, 
 however, is not merely arithmetical ; it is in a threat mea- 
 sure similar to that of the expediency or inexpediency of 
 war taxes; and if the war was a season of large profits, 
 it was evidently politic to make it bear as large a portion as 
 possible of our burdens. It is in a consideration of this 
 nature, and not in the imaginary advantage of compound 
 interest, that we are to seek for a justification of the mea- 
 sure of providing a surplus revenue ; we mean for a coun- 
 terpoise to the sacrifice with which it may easily be shewn 
 to have been attended. 
 
 The nomiyial Sinking Fund. — Our sinking fund exhibit- 
 ed until the late change a surplus, which, for illustration, 
 we shall call 17,000,000/., and the revenue at the same 
 time a deficiency which we shall term 12,000,000/. It 
 M'as for some time a question whether the better plan was 
 to leave the 17,000,000/. to operate in weekly purchases 
 for the redemption of stock, and supply the revenue defi- 
 ciency by a loan, or to adopt the more simple course of 
 receiving from the sinking fund the 12,000,000/., and con- 
 fining the redemption purchases of the commissioners to 
 5,000,000/. This gave rise to considerable discussion 
 after 1815, the former plan being maintained by the con- 
 verts to the doctrine of compound interest, the believers 
 in the arithmetical wonders of Dr. Price. But in 1819 
 ministers consented to adopt the latter course, and found in 
 it (see Ricardo on the Funding System, in Napier's Supple- 
 ment to the Encyclopaedia Britannica,) a degree of advan- 
 tage which may be said to have given the first blow to the 
 complex plan of paying with one hand, while we borrowed 
 with the other. 
 
 The topic was again brought under discussion in the ses- 
 sion of 1822, in the debates on the plan for converting our 
 half-pay and pensions into long annuities. On that occa- 
 sion Mr. Vansittart, unwilling to part with the semblance 
 after he had relinquished the substance of the sinking fund, 
 urged for a time the expediency of making the requisite 
 loans from the public, but was at last persuaded to follow 
 the direct course, and to admit of the loans being made
 
 App.] On Finance. [103] 
 
 from the portion of revenue at his clisj)osaI. This plan has 
 been confirmed by ISIr. Robinson ; so that tiie sinkinp; fand 
 is now divested of its complexity, and brou<:ht back to n 
 form from which, as far as we can jiid^e, it ouf^ht never to 
 have been made to deviate, — that of the balance of cur- 
 rent revenue applied to the redemption of stock. 
 
 Companion of our pracnt Bnrdcm with those ofl'9(i. 
 
 Amount of taxation, tithe, and poor-rate, in 
 
 Great Britain and Ireland in 179'J - J. 'J3,0()(),0()0 
 
 The increase of our population since then 
 (nearly 50 per cent.) enables us, without 
 additional pressure on the individual, to 
 bear a farther burden oi" - - - 1 1 ,()U(),000 
 
 Continental countries, our competitors in 
 productive industry, haviuir, in general, 
 increased their burdens in a ratio some- 
 what greater than their population, we are 
 justified (see Chap. IX. p. 280.) in re- 
 garding a corresponding increase on our 
 part as not detrimental to our foreign trade. 
 We add, on this account, a smn of - .'5, 000,000 
 
 The money in which taxes were {)aid in 1 7^^ 
 being, when compared with our present 
 currency, as 100 to 130 in value, winiake 
 a corresponding insertion ol' - - 10,000,000 
 
 on the ground that, to that cxttiit, tliu ex- 
 cess of our |)resent taxatitju over that of 
 1792, /5 nominal. 
 
 Amount of burden which can be borne by 
 us at presentjwithout greater disadvantage, 
 
 in comparison with other countries, than ■ 
 
 we experienced in 1792 - - - Z t8,000,()()0 
 
 Our actual burdens arc (see Aj)p. p. [Si]) r)4-,000,0()o/. 
 
 We have here assumed the increase of population 
 as the measure of the increase of national wealth, arising 
 from our various improvements in agiiciillnre. manufacture, 
 navigation, &c. Tliis projiorlioM will be deemed consider- 
 ably below the mark by the majority ol" those who writ*- or 
 fliink on such subjects, wlietlier it be the convert to Mr.
 
 [10+] On I'inaiKe. [Afp. 
 
 Gray's doctrine, (p. 23G.) tliat in the prof^ress of" society 
 individual income increases in a larrrer ratio than population, 
 or the practical observer, who founds his calculation on the 
 surprising improvements in agriculture, manufacture, and 
 productive industry generally, during the last thirty years. 
 These arguments rest, doul>tless, on a very substantial 
 basis, and nothing but the unfortunate fluctuations in indi- 
 vidual property, attendant on our rapid transitions, would 
 have prcventetl us from inserting a larger sum (probably 
 16 or 18,000,000, instead of 11,000,000/.) as the mea- 
 sure of the increase of national wealth, arising from our 
 improvements. 
 
 The Malt Tax. — The hopes of the agriculturists were at 
 one time excited by the expected repeal of a large share 
 of the duty on malt; but, while we sympathize with their 
 sufferings and anxiously desire a diminution of their tithe 
 and j)oor-rate, we cannot help expressing a doubt of the 
 expediency of any great reduction of taxation on an article 
 already so much cheapened b}- the fall of the materials. 
 Sudden changes are to be avoided ; malt liquor conies only 
 in some respects under the description of a necessary of lil'e; 
 and the extended cultivation of barley that might have been 
 prompted by a reduction of duty, would probably have pre- 
 vented any material rise in the price. 
 
 Prices of Cojnmoditics a Century ago. Text, p. 379. — In 
 comparing our present national income with that of the last 
 century, we have assumed the power of money in the pur- 
 chase of commodities as less at present by 30 per cent, than 
 in the reign of George I., or in any period of last century 
 prior to 1792. This allowance is ample when we take into 
 account that prices have fallen since 1820, and that the 
 prospect of war, at least of such a war as would be pro- 
 ductive of general enhancement, seems very remote. On 
 this interesting topic we have given a short table in page [7] 
 of the Appendix. Those who dissent from this opinion, 
 and who imagine money to have been formerly of much 
 greater value, will do well to recollect that many manu- 
 factures are now cheaper than in that age, and that roi-7i is 
 very little dearer. The chief difference, in fact, is in pro- 
 fessional fees, salaries, and wages, all raised during the war, 
 and not yet brought to a level like the price of jiroduce, 
 manufactures, or whatever is regulated at aii open market.
 
 A pp.] On Finance. [105] 
 
 Then as to the charges of house-keeping in a compre- 
 hensive sense, the difference between the present time and 
 a century ago, resolves itself chiefly into a difference in ihf 
 style of living; not unlike the existing difference between 
 France and England, in which, though the prices of a 
 number of articles are on a par, the total outlay is less 
 in France, in consequence of the plainer habits of the 
 country. 
 
 Historical Parallel of the Revenue of England and France 
 in\x 385. of the Text. — These sums exhibit the net produce 
 of the taxes, after deducting the expence of collecting ; ami 
 the latter years of the column of England include ScotLuid 
 and Ireland. 
 
 Back-ward State of France. 
 Extract of a letter from ISIr. S. Gray to Monsieur J. B. Say, 
 
 printed in 1817 in the Apj>endix lo the volume, entitled 
 
 " All Classes productive." 
 
 " In a visit which I made to your country last year, I 
 confess I did not find such striking or brilliant results. 
 Travelling partly with a view to ascertain how far the doc- 
 trines, which I had deduced from the facts around me in 
 our island, as well as from information, agreed with the 
 facts found in so populous a state as France-, I scrutiui/cil 
 as narrowly as I could the circumstances of the j)opulation. 
 Considering the extension of buildings, and an improvement 
 in their style, which show the increase of ])opulation com- 
 bined with the concomitant increase of wealth, as the surest 
 symptoms of a thriving country, I paid particular attention 
 to your towns and villages in these points, and am sorry to 
 say, I saw no progress whatever. I have no recollection 
 of any strictly additional buildings : the only new buildings 
 which I perceived were in some villages that had been partly 
 destroyed in tiie conflicts with the invading armies. Jn 
 truth, though we alM) are sufllring from an unusual stag- 
 nation, I found, at my return, more new houses going on 
 in the petty suburb of London, Camden Town, and its 
 neighbourhood, than I had seen in the whole of my route 
 through France. Every town and every village -H-emcd 
 stationary. I own, however, I found nnich of what I ex- 
 pected, on my principles, from a state so long well peopled. 
 There was an appearance of wealth, though, in genernl, it 
 is true, but of little cajiital. ^'ollr soil is almoM univcr?ally 
 under cultivation, but, with some exception*, in a very in- 
 ferior style. Your people arc generally employed and busy, 
 
 [Hj
 
 [106] On Finance. (Ai*P. 
 
 vet iiol very cncctively. Though the population of Frande 
 i)e to tliat of Eufrlnnd only as about 1.50 to 230 per square 
 niilo, France seems to be at a still more considerable rate 
 behind our island in capital, and the results of active capital. 
 In several statistical points we have got the start of a full 
 century before you." 
 
 THE LND. 
 
 London : 
 
 Printed by A. & R. Spottiswoode, 
 
 New-Street-Square.
 
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