GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS Other Works by J. ELLIS BARKER Modern Germany : Her Political and Economic Problems. Her Policy, Her Ambitions, and the Causes of Her Successes and Failures. Fifth edition. 8vo net, $3 oo Great and Greater Britain: The Problems of Motherland and Empire, Political, Naval, Military, Industrial, Financial, Social. 8vo net, 3 oo Rise and Decline of the Nether- lands : A Political and Economic History and a Study in Practical Statesmanship. 8vo net, 3 50 The Foundations of Germany's Strength. New Edition net, 250 E. P. BUTTON & COMPANY New York GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS By S. GRUMBACH TRANSLATED, ABBREVIATED AND INTRODUCED BY J. ELLIS BARKER Author of " MODERN GERMANY," " THE FOUNDATION OF GERMANY," " THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF BRITISH STATESMANSHIP," ETC. NEW YORK E. P. BUTTON & COMPANY 68 1 FIFTH AVENUE COPYRIGHT, 1917 BY E. P. BUTTON & CO CONTENTS CHAPTER I PAGE INTRODUCTION i CHAPTER II GERMANY'S OFFICIAL WAR AIMS .... 7 CHAPTER III THE WAR AIMS OF THE GERMAN BUSINESS MEN . 24 CHAPTER IV THE WAR AIMS OF THE GERMAN INTELLECTUALS . 39 CHAPTER V THE WAR AIMS OF THE GERMAN SOCIALISTS . . 55 CHAPTER VI HOW GERMANY WOULD TREAT THE CONQUERED PEOPLE . 64 CHAPTER VII GERMANY'S GENERAL WAR AIMS .... 69 v 369897 vi CONTENTS CHAPTER VIII PAGE GERMANY'S WAR AIMS REGARDING BELGIUM . . 81 CHAPTER IX GERMANY'S WAR AIMS REGARDING FRANCE . . 90 CHAPTER X GERMANY'S WAR AIMS REGARDING ENGLAND . . 98 CHAPTER XI V^RMANY'S WAR AIMS REGARDING RUSSIA AND POLAND 105 CHAPTER XII GERMANY'S AIMS REGARDING HOLLAND . . . 1 1 1 CHAPTER XIII A GERMAN CENTRAL EUROPE 117 CHAPTER XIV i. GERMANY'S COLONIAL WAR AIMS . . . .126 CHAPTER XV GERMANY'S WAR AIMS IN THE FAR EAST . . .130 CHAPTER XVI A GERMAN WORLD 134 ANALYTICAL INDEX 143 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION AT the beginning of the great struggle people discussed ardently the cause of the war. At present they are discussing almost as ardently Germany's war aims. Opinions on the subject are divided. Some believe that Germany's war aims are exceedingly far-reaching. Others think that they would be reasonable, and they quote in support moderate statements made by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and other Germans. Germany's war aims are not sufficiently known in this country. There are some books on the subject, but these are on the whole not very comprehensive. By far the fullest account of Germany's war aims may be found in Herr S. Grumbach's monumental volume, Das Annexiomstische Deutschland, published by Payot and Co. at Lausanne in 1917. That volume contains on nearly 500 pages a vast number of important documents in favour of annexation and opposed to annexation. By far the larger number of the docu- ments are in favour of annexation. Analysing the evidence which he supplies so abundantly, the author states in his Preface: " No one can deny that the whole non-Socialist Press of Germany belonging to all political parties, 2 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS excepting only a few notes and articles in the Berliner Tageblatt, the Berliner Volkszeitung and the Welt am Montag, unceasingly demands annexations of territory, not by hints but very openly. " Among the hundreds of extracts given by Herr Grumbach are to be found demands for annexations made by the leading German rulers, statesmen, poli- ticians, business men, scientists, publicists, etc., and by the following papers and periodicals: Deutsche Tageszeitung, Preussische Kreuzzeitung , Die Post, Ham- burger Fremdenblatt, Miinchner Neueste Nachrichten, Deutscher Kurier, Magdeburgische Zeitung, Saarbriicker Zeitung, T'dgliche Rundschau, Leipziger Neueste Nach- richten, Rheinische-Westfalische Zeitung, Freiburger Tageblatt, Westfdlische Politische Nachrichten, Han- noverscher Kurier, Kolnische Zeitung, Kolnische Volks- zeitung, Badener Nachrichten, Germania, Hamburger Volksblatt, Dresdner Volkszeitung, Frankfurter Volks- stimme, Chemnitzer Volksstimme, Preussische Jahrbucher, Die Grenzboten, Deutsche Revue, Der Panther, Das Neue Deutschland, Das Grossere Deutschland, Deutsche Politik, Weltwirtschaft, Internationale Monatsschrift fur Wissen- schaft, Kunst und Technik, Die Zukunft, Suddeutsche Monatshefte, Hochland, Die Hilfe, Das Monistische Jahrhundert, Die Glocke, Sozialistische Monatshefte, etc. The list is very imposing. Papers and periodicals of all kinds, from the most conservative organs down to the less important Socialist publications, have been drawn upon. The book is a mine of information. It is invaluable to the historian and the student. Grumbach's book, having been completed in the sum- mer of 1916, does not contain any of the annexationist views expressed in Germany during the last twelve months, during which the demand for annexations has become louder than ever. It is sincerely to be hoped that the author will complete his service to history by giving us another volume. INTRODUCTION 3 A weakness of Grumbach's work is its arrangement. People wish to know Germany's aims towards Bel- gium, France, England, Russia, Holland, Africa, China, Central Europe, etc. Besides they will ask : " What are the annexationist views of the German official classes, of the German intellectuals, of the German business men and of the German Socialists?" In order to make it easy for readers to survey the field, the author should either have arranged his material under topics or he should at least have provided the book with a good analytical index. Unfortunately, his arrangement leaves much to be desired, and his book lacks an index. The British public is reluctant to read lengthy collections of documents. Besides, paper is scarce and printers' costs very high. In order to make Herr Grumbach's excellent book accessible to the English public and to ensure to it that popularity which it deserves, I have, in translating it, abbreviated it considerably. Furthermore, I have rearranged the contents of his book and have provided it with an Analytical Index. Of course, the classification of the contents of a book, such as Herr Grumbach's, is difficult because German annexationists are apt to refer almost at the same time to Belgium and Central Africa, to England and China, etc. Therefore, only a rough division by topics could be effected. For instance, the chapter "Germany's War Aims regarding Belgium, " contains incidentally a good many refer- ences to England, France, and other countries. On the other hand, the chapters dealing with German annexationist aims regarding England, France, etc., contain incidental references to annexations in Belgium. Therefore, I would refer those who wish to find all the references to Belgium, India, China, or some other country, to the Analytical Index at the end of this book. No extracts from the anti-annexationist utterances 4 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS collected by Herr Grumbach have been given, because they are very few and are very unimportant. At the beginning of the war an anti-annexationist league, the Bund Neues Vaterland, was founded by Freiherr von Tepper-Laski, a celebrated Prussian sportsman, who inclines towards republican-democratic views. The league received the attention of the police. It was treated as a dangerous organisation; its meetings were placed under police supervision; its publications were seized; it was prevented answering attacks made upon it, and its secretary was arrested. Not unnaturally, the league disappeared. Its petition opposing annexation, which covers thirty- four pages of Grumbach's book, is the principal anti-annexation document supplied by him. The rest consists chiefly of declarations made by minority Socialists. It is significant and worth pointing out that many of these anti-annexationist utterances were treated as dangerous publications and were confiscated, whereas the most fantastic demands for the annexation of territories were allowed to be circulated. In many in- stances such demands were actually made on behalf of the Government and were distributed at Government expense. The fact that practically all Germany clamoured for the utmost ruthlessness in warfare, and for almost un- limited annexations and monetary exactions, is due to the insane cult of Might which, during the last few decades, has completely obscured the idea of Right. How far this has taken place may best be seen by the utterances of some of the highest German authorities on law who might be expected to place Right high above Might. Professor Zorn, one of the leading German authorities on International Law, who represented the German Government at the Hague Conference, pointed out on one of the opening pages of his well-known hand-book Grundzuge des Volkerrechts, that there was in reality no such thing as International Law, that INTRODUCTION 5 International relations were based, not on Right, but on Might. One of the most eminent teachers of law is Professor Josef Kohler in Berlin. Referring to the present struggle, that authority on International Law and Justice stated in the Berlin newspaper Der Tag, of March 3Oth, 1915 (the quotation will be found in Grumbach's book on page 157) : " The German General Staff, which acts always con- scientiously, recognised that the invasion of Belgium was necessary for the preservation of Germany. No right is so strong and so absolute but it must give way to necessity. And if we act, guided by necessity, we do not violate right, for right must give way to necessity. Owing to the very idea of right, every right is circumscribed. ... In truth, Belgium and the Belgian dynasty have amply deserved their fate. He who abases himself and becomes England's tool in order to fight Germany, deserves no better fate. He who fights Germany fights against culture, and he who goes hand in hand with men of the kind of Grey, de- serves to perish. " According to Professor Kohler and to Professor Zorn, Might is Right. Of course, if Might is Right it follows that weak nations have no right to existence, that the principle of nationality is an absurdity, that the State, which represents power, has all and every right, and that na- tionality, which represents race or language, has none. We get that view in an article, written by Dr. R. Strahl in Die Grenzboten of May 5th, 1915. In that leading political weekly, the learned Doctor stated (Grumbach, p. 200) : ;< The State, as a cultural unit and as a promoter of civilisation, stands in many respects not on the same 6 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS level on which nationality stands, but above it The doctrine embodied in the principle of nationalities, and the doctrine that nations have the right to dispose of themselves, are theories which have been put for- ward to give a scientific cloak to feeble and impotent obstructiveness. " These two extracts serve to show that the criminal methods of warfare and the annexation mania of Germany are due to the exaltation of Might and the contempt for Right which have become national pecu- liarities in Germany. In order to facilitate reference to the original work, every quotation has appended to it the corresponding page number of Grumbach's work. J. ELLIS BARKER. June 1917. CHAPTER II GERMANY'S OFFICIAL WAR AIMS THE most authorised exponents of Germany's policy are, in the order of their importance, the Emperor, the Sovereigns of the individual German States, the Im- perial Chancellor and his Secretaries of State, and the leaders of the parliamentary parties. These are the official spokesmen of Germany. In addition, the views of eminent retired statesmen, such as Prince Biilow, the former Chancellor, and of friends and favourites of the Emperor, such as Herr Albert Ballin, the well- known principal Director of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, are exceedingly valuable. The German Emperor declared in ringing notes in a Proclamation to the German people of July 3ist, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 5) : " In heroic actions and sufferings we shall persevere without wavering until the arrival of the Peace, of a Peace which offers us the necessary military, political, and economic securities, and which fulfils the require- ments of an unhampered development of our creative powers at home and on the free sea. " What are the " necessary military, political, and economic securities " which the Emperor is determined to obtain at the Peace ? That question will be an- swered in the course of the following pages, for the numerous exponents of Germany's war aims continually refer to the " securities " which Germany requires, and describe them in detail. 8 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS Prussia is the largest of the German States. Bavaria is the second largest in territory as well as in popula- tion. The King of Bavaria ranks in importance im- mediately after the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia. He is the foremost of all the minor German sovereigns. Consequently his views as to Germany's war aims are particularly important. The King of Bavaria stated in a public speech delivered on June 7th, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 5) : " Russia's declaration of war was followed by that of France, and when, last of all, the English also fell upon us, I said to myself : ' I am very pleased, and I am very pleased for this reason, because we can now square our accounts with all our enemies, and because we shall now at last be able to obtain a direct outlet from the Rhine to the sea. ' Since then ten months have passed by. Much precious blood has been spilt, but it shall not have been spilt in vain. The fruit of this war shall be an increase of Germany's power and an expansion beyond its present frontiers, as far as such expansion is necessary for our security against future attacks. " It will be noticed that the King of Bavaria explained a little more closely the meaning of the rather vague word " securities " which was employed by the German Emperor. On June 8th, 1915, the day following that on which the King of Bavaria demanded an expansion of the German Empire, the principal Bavarian paper, the Munchner Neueste Nachrichten commented as follows upon the speech of its King (Grumbach, p. 85) : " For our King, who is certainly most reliably and most exactly informed on our military position, there is no longer any doubt that we shall be able to lay OFFICIAL WAR AIMS 9 our hands upon Belgium at the conclusion of the Peace, that we shall certainly do this as far as is necessary for military reasons, and, as regards the mouths of the Rhine, for economic reasons, in order to ensure the future of the German people. . . . " In what form this shall be effected is a matter for discussion later on. However, so much is clear, that if we speak of the German mouths of the Rhine we view only Belgian territory, for neutral Holland, which has acted correctly towards us, should in no way be harmed. . . . The consequence of the present war will be that the German mouths of the Rhine will lead to the German Ocean. And this will be a purely German affair. " The principal Munich paper was no doubt directed by the King and his official advisers to expound the Royal views in so authoritative a tone. While the German Emperor vaguely demanded " securities " for Germany, and while the King of Bavaria stated that the war must lead to an expansion of Germany's territory and particularly to the absorp- tion of part, or the whole, of Belgium, Duke Johann Albrecht of Mecklenburg, who takes a considerable in- terest in Colonial affairs, telegraphed on June 29th, 1915, as follows to the Colonial Society of Ruhrort (Grum- bach, p. 6) : -f " I share your hope and firm confidence that after this gigantic war, in which the German armies wrestle in Europe against the masses of our enemies for our existence, we shall obtain a victorious and honourable Peace. May we obtain in that Peace a powerful' African Colonial Empire and a sufficiently large number of strong bases on the globe for our Navy, and for our Commerce, for coaling stations and wireless telegraphy, j io GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS Then only shall we be able to look far ahead and to expand planfully Germany's Colonial possessions for the benefit of future generations and of the Homeland. " The Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, has repeatedly described Germany's war aims in terms of studied moderation and deliberate obscurity. In his speech of May 28th, 1915, he stated (Grumbach, p. 6): " The greater the danger is, the stronger the love of our country seizes our hearts, the greater must be our care for our children and our children's children, and the more must we persevere until we have, by fighting, obtained all possible real guarantees and securities, that none of our enemies will ever dare again to fight us either singly or combined with others. " On August igth, 1915, the Imperial Chancellor, speak- ing once more with the same diplomatic vagueness with which the German Emperor expounded Germany's war aims, stated (Grumbach, p. 7) : " The circumstances of the buried past will not be revived after this gigantic world war. There must be a change. If we wish that Europe shall have peace, it can be done only by giving Germany a posi- tion of inviolable strength. . . . Germany must enlarge, fortify, and strengthen its position to such an extent that the other Powers will never again think of en- circling us. " On December 9th, 1915, when asked to explain Germany's war aims more fully, the Chancellor stated (Grumbach, p. 7) : " In my former speeches I have explained Germany's general war aims. To-day, also, I cannot discuss these OFFICIAL WAR AIMS n in detail. I cannot tell, for instance, what guarantee the Imperial Government must demand regarding Belgium, what basis of power is considered necessary as a guarantee. But our enemies must say to themselves: The longer and the more bitterly we fight Germany, the greater will be the guarantees which the Germans will have to demand. ' (Storm of applause in the House and hand-clapping on the Tribunes.) If our enemies wish to create an abyss between Germany and the rest of the world, then they cannot be surprised if we make our arrangements for the future accordingly. (Re- newed lively applause and hand-clapping in the House and on the Tribunes.) Neither in the East nor in the West shall our present enemies be allowed to possess sally ports. " At last the Chancellor explained that the mysterious word " guarantees " signified annexations both in the East and in the West. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg explained once more Germany's war aims father vaguely on April 5th, 1916. He told the Reichstag (Grumbach, p. 8) : " Russia must not for a second time be allowed to march her armies across the open frontier of Eastern Prussia. It must never again, in France's pay, invade unprotected Germany. And if anybody believes that we shall give up the territories which we have occupied in the West and upon which the blood of our people has been spilt, unless we have complete security for our future we shall know how to obtain real guar- antees that Belgium will not become an Anglo-French vassal-State, that it will not be employed as a military and economic bulwark against Germany. In Belgium, also, there is no status quo ante. Germany cannot 12 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS allow that the Flemish people, who so long have been oppressed, will again be sacrificed to the French. " Once more the Chancellor spoke rather vaguely of " guarantees " with regard to Belgium. The word sounded perhaps inoffensive to foreign readers of the Chancellor's speech, but its real meaning was imme- diately understood by the Reichstag. Herr Spahn, the leader of the powerful Roman Catholic Centre Party, perhaps the most influential party in the Reich- stag, stated after the Chancellor's speech (Grumbach, P- 93) : " We must demand that the war will increase Ger- many's power. Peace aims must be power aims. The war must end with a tangible benefit. Towards the East the Chancellor has shown us the tangible advantage. However, as regards the West, he has talked more cautiously. Referring to Belgium, he has told us that care would have to be taken that that country should no longer be an English bulwark but should and that is the logical sequel fall into Germany's hands politically, militarily, and econom- ically. " The inner political organisation of Belgium has so far not been discussed. That point will be decided at the conclusion of the Peace. We did not wish for a war of conquest. In this I am of one opinion with the Chancellor. But now we must correct our frontiers in accordance with our own interests. Our enemies' political and military power cannot remain inviolate. Germany's economic basis must be broadened for the preservation of our economic position abroad. We need a larger territory than that supplied by the German Empire. " OFFICIAL WAR AIMS 13 When Herr Spahn thus explained the meaning of the Chancellor's vague declaration, Herr von Bethmann- Hollweg did not immediately rise in order to disavow him, but remained significantly silent. The leaders of the Centre Party had obviously correctly interpreted the Chancellor's intentions. Herr von Bethmann-Holl- weg did not care to use the word " annexation " because he would have destroyed the argument that Germany was ready to conclude a Peace on ' reasonable condi- tions, ' an argument which was useful for employment in foreign countries. While the German Chancellor, as expounded by his most influential supporter, demanded the fullest control of Belgium and a great increase of Germany's territory in the East and in the West, Doctor Solf, the Colonial Secretary, claimed that Germany should derive terri- torial increment from the war, also in the colonial sphere. Doctor Solf stated in a speech on May nth, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 9) : " The Empire intends by no means to give up its valuable Colonies at the Peace. On the contrary, it will endeavour to regain what it has lost and to increase and enlarge the German colonial possessions as much as possible. " The Colonial Secretary wrote in a contribution to the Kolonial Kalendar of 1915 (Grumbach, p. 9) : " Presumably the motto after the war, as far as colonial policy is concerned, will be the acquisition of colonial empires which are as much interconnected and as easily defendable as possible, and which complement the domestic economy. " Doctor Solf stated in his speech at Frankfurt on May 29th, 1916 (Grumbach, p. 10) : 14 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS " Hitherto Germany's colonies were insufficiently productive. We were not able to make ourselves independent of foreign monopolies of production. Things will improve if we should succeed in filling up the gaps of our present colonial empire at the conclu- sion of peace. We must be careful and shape Ger- many's future frontiers in such a manner that we need no longer fear a hostile attack. Similarly, we must not forget to mould Germany's colonial estate in the most appropriate manner. ... In the course of time all European policy has become world policy. The Great Powers endeavour to create for themselves self- sufficing economic areas. Germany must follow this general tendency. | The independent economy of a Great Power requires the possession of land in all climes. It is therefore vitally necessary for Germany to have colonies both in the sub-tropical zone and in the tropics. " Among the most influential personages in Germany is the former Imperial Chancellor, Prince Biilow. He was probably the ablest of Bismarck's successors. He is considered by many Germans to be Germany's fore- most statesman and diplomat, and many believe that he may replace the present Chancellor. It is supposed that he owed his fall, not to inefficiency in the diplomatic and in the political domain, but to personal differences with the Emperor. It is therefore clear that Prince Billow's views regarding Germany's war aims are of the very highest importance, particularly if they are expressed in public print. In his book Deutsche Politik, which was published in Berlin in 1916, he stated (Grum- bach, p. 15) : " We require considerably increased security in the OFFICIAL WAR AIMS 15 East to protect us against further invasion. Naturally we cannot desire that the Russian Empire should once more become strong. However, that will take place in view of the rapid increase of the Russian population and the national and religious homo- geneousness of the Russian people, unless Russia disintegrates politically and socially, or unless she loses the Ukraine, the wealthy corn-growing district and the basis of the national industry. It is an open question whether the loss of Poland would weaken Russia. . . . " Perhaps the French people will in course of time submit to the stipulations of the Peace at Frankfurt, when it recognises that they are unchangeable, and particularly if we should succeed in improving Ger- many's strategical position towards France, which still is unfavourable. As long as France believes it possible to regain Alsace-Lorraine, either through her own strength or through the assistance of others, the settlement would be a provisional, not a permanent, Prince Biilow also demanded large annexations for Germany both in the East and in the West. The views and intentions of the German Emperor may be gauged by his own political pronouncements and by those of his personal friends and favourites. Among these Herr Albert Ballin, the Director of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, occupies a prominent position. He is the head of Germany's largest shipping line, and is considered in Germany as the creator of the modern German merchant marine. The importance of political statements made by Herr Ballin, who very naturally does not wish to lose the Emperor's favour, is enhanced by the fact that he has been frequently employed in 16 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS the past as the Emperor's mouth-piece on important occasions. Herr Ballin wrote in the Frankfurter Zeitung on January 4th, 1915, with regard to Germany's war aims (Grumbach, p. 17) : " The English Fleet has been able to molest us and to bring Germany's oversea trade almost to a standstill because the North Sea can easily be closed by that country. The piratical pressure which England brings to bear at present upon the neutral Scandinavian States and Holland would have been impossible had the Ger- man Fleet possessed a base corresponding to its strength and to the bravery of its officers and men. It follows that we must go forward beyond the area of the North Sea and establish there a naval base. Its possession will secure to Germany in this part of the world the Isame possibilities which England already possesses, and which it ruthlessly exploits. " Herr Ballin stated in a speech delivered at Hamburg on October 2ist, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 18) : "Germany can best provide for its future by striving to acquire, in the first place, naval bases which guar- antee that we can thoroughly make up for the deficiencies which we deplore at present. We require naval bases both at the entrance and at the exit of the Channel. We require strong naval bases oversea." Germany is not a parliamentary governed country. The German Reichstag cannot choose, or get rid of, the Imperial Chancellor, who is solely responsible to the Emperor and who has the power of appointing and of dismissing him. Although the German Reichstag has no direct influence over the Imperial Government, which ought to be called the Emperor's OFFICIAL WAR AIMS 17 Government, it has considerable weight and power because it gives expression to public opinion, or at least is supposed to do so, and because it votes the funds required by the Emperor's Government. As the Reichstag holds the purse-strings of the nation, and as it represents, more or less faithfully, public opinion and the national will, the war aims of the Reichstag and of the leading political parties are of course of very great importance. Although the Reichstag does not occupy a position comparable to the British Parliament, it is, after all, one of the gov- erning factors of Germany, although its authority is not much greater than was that of the English Parlia- ment under the Tudor s. Let us then take note of the war aims which were expressed with a due sense of responsibility by the Reichstag and by the great German parties. On December 5th, 1915, when the Social Democrats expressed their opposition to a policy of annexation, Herr Spahn, the leader of the Roman Catholic Centre Party, made in the name and by the direction of all Parties, the Socialists alone excepted, a statement in the Reichstag which was worded as follows (Grum- bach, p. 33) : " In the name of all the members of this House, the Socialists excepted, I wish to make the following declara- tion. . . . We are looking forward to the peace negotia- tions in which the military, economic, financial, and political interests must be safeguarded in their full extent, and with all means, including those acquisitions of territory which are required for that purpose." The significance of this statement, made on behalf of all the non-Socialist parties, is enhanced if we take note of similar demands for annexations which were made repeatedly by the individual parties as well. The i8 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS Free Conservative Party resolved at a meeting which took place on December 5th and 6th, 1915, in Berlin (Grumbach, p. 39) : " The German nation ... is firmly and unanimously convinced that the heavy sacrifices in blood and treasure which it has brought willingly and enthusi- astically must have not been made in vain. The sacri- fices made demand, as a peace aim, that Germany's power should be strengthened in every direction, that its territories should be considerably enlarged beyond the present frontiers, that, as far as possible, the occupied territories should be retained, and that the country should be indemnified for its monetary expenditure. " These our frontiers must be secured against any attack from the East and the West, and the freedom of the seas must be absolutely guaranteed. Germany's national power must be strengthened in accordance with the greatness of the stakes. Until this peace aim is obtained the German nation, in justified confidence in its military and economic strength, knows only one maxim : to fight on until the decisive victory is won. " The German-Conservative Party resolved in October 1915, according to a report published in the Alldeutsche Blatter of October 9th, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 40) : " Expression was given to the confidence that the glorious successes of Germany's arms will finally break the gigantic power of Russia, and will permanently guarantee Germany's national security in the East. The Committee of the Conservative Party is aware that, among the great tasks of the world-war, the most im- portant is to bring England down on its knees with all OFFICIAL WAR AIMS 19 means, for that country has caused the war and will never cease to threaten Germany's development in the future. The Committee, in accordance with the whole Conservative Party, is resolved not to be deterred by any further sacrifices which may be required to bring the war to an end, and to establish a lasting and honour- able peace which will secure Germany's future. As a matter of course it will support the necessary enlarge- ments of territory required for this purpose. " The German Centre Party resolved, at its meeting on October 24th and 25th, 1915, in Frankfurt (Grumbach, P- 35) : " The outer conditions required for the wholesome development of the German nation consist, as the experience of the world-war has clearly shown, in an increased security against the intention of our enemies to destroy Germany militarily and economically. The terrible sacrifices which the war has demanded from the people call for an increased protection of the coun- try in the East, and in the West, which will deter our enemies from falling upon us once more, and which will permanently guarantee the economic position of Germany's growing population. An increased security is required, not only for Germany, but also for Ger- many's Allies. " At a meeting which took place in the beginning of June 1915 in Berlin, the National Liberal Party stated, summing up its parliamentary activity (Grumbach, P- 36) : " Expression was unanimously given to the demand that the enormous successes of our incomparable army 20 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS and dauntless fleet should politically be exploited to the full. Particularly it was declared to be necessary for the protection and strengthening of Germany's position on land and sea, to attach to the German Empire in the West the necessary territories, politically, militarily, and economically. We should acquire in the East not only better strategical frontiers, but also new land suit- able for settlement. Furthermore, Germany's overseas territories should be enlarged in accordance with our interests as world-traders. " On August I5th, 1915, the National Liberal Party resolved (Grumbach, p. 36) : "The result of the war can only be a peace which enlarges Germany's territories in the East, in the West, and overseas, which secures Germany politically, mili- tarily, and economically against new surprise attacks. " On May 21 st, 1916, the National Liberal Party re- solved (Grumbach, p. 37) : " The Central Committee of the National Liberal Party energetically restates its conviction, which it ex- pressed on August 1 5th, 1915, and which has been con- firmed by the events which have taken place since then, that only an expansion of Germany's land and sea fron- tiers in the East, in the West, and oversea can give Germany the necessary real guarantee for its future military, political, and economic security. The Central Committee declares that such security, which is based not only upon treaty but upon a real expansion of power, is particularly necessary with regard to England, Ger- many's principal enemy. " OFFICIAL WAR AIMS 21 The Progressive People's Party officially declared, according to a report published on August 8th, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 34) : " The Progressive People's Party has carefully studied the tasks which will have to be fulfilled by Parliament in consequence of the course of the historic events of the present. It has carefully examined the demands relating to the establishment of the future frontiers and the new formation of States, demands which have been put forward in discussing Germany's war aim. How- ever, after conscientious consideration, the Party be- lieves that the time is not yet ripe for laying down a definite programme with sharply defined details regard- ing the conditions to be made at the conclusion of the peace. It opposes equally strongly the waiving of ter- ritorial acquisitions on general principle and boundless plans of annexation. The party considers it uncondi- tionally necessary that Germany's future should be safe- guarded by military and economic measures and by the necessary enlargements of territory. Thus, conditions will be created for peaceful international competition which guarantees to the German people the free devel- opment of their entire strength both at home and on the free seas. " In a resolution of December 4th, 1915, the Central Committee of the Progressive People's Party stated (Grumbach, p. 35) : " The Central Committee of the Progressive People's Party is convinced that the German Empire will demand peace conditions which will not re-establish the status quo which obtained at the outbreak of the 22 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS war about which our enemies write at present, but that the peace will yield Germany lasting protection against attacks from without and a permanent increase of its power and its prosperity. Furthermore, the peace should bring Germany also an increase of its territory, as far as this is necessary for the Empire's security. " It will be noticed that all the non-Socialist parties of Germany, Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals the latter call themselves the Progressive People's Party have laid down with deliberate solemnity that they are in favour of a policy of annexation. The German So- cial Democrats alone form an exception to the general rule. However, it would perhaps be an over-statement to say that they are opposed, as a party, to the policy of annexation. Their attitude has been a curious one. Although, for the sake of consistency, they have de- clared from the beginning of the war that, in accord- ance with their settled view, they were opposed to a policy of conquest, they have voted the funds demanded by the Government for the prosecution of the war, al- though they had in the past voted against every Budget because of the military and naval expenditure contained in it. While officially, as a party, opposing the policy of annexation, the German Social Democrats have approved of a policy of conquest not only by their parliamentary attitude and by their votes, but also by their enthusiastic pronouncements in favour of a policy of annexation which many Socialist leaders have made in their in- dividual capacity. Some of these views will be found in Chapter V. of this book entitled, " The War Aims of the German Socialists. " The great majority of the Socialist Party in the Reichstag are led by Herr Scheide- mann, who, while talking Socialism in the abstract, has hitherto acted as a thorough-going supporter of the OFFICIAL WAR AIMS 23 Government, and of the Government's policy. Only a relatively small Socialist minority has consistently acted in accordance with Socialist tradition in condemning the war and condemning unconditionally a policy of conquest. CHAPTER III THE WAR AIMS OF THE GERMAN BUSINESS MEN IN a wealthy country with highly developed industries and an extensive commerce the political views held in business circles are of very great importance. In Ger- many organisation has been most highly developed, not only by the Government, but by private individuals as well. Nowhere in the world have the great economic interests been more firmly united in voluntary associa- tions than in Germany. The war aims of business men in a highly developed industrial State, which possesses a large and influential middle class, such as Germany, are always important. They are particularly important if they are expressed by business men in their corporate capacity. Business men are apt to raise wild political demands when speaking singly, when uttering merely their personal opinions. Powerful associations of business men, on the other hand, put forward demands in writing only with a due sense of responsibility. Hence powerful com- mercial bodies observe, as a rule, considerable caution and restraint in addressing political demands to their Government. On May 2Oth, 1915, the six leading economic associa- tions of Germany addressed a petition to the Imperial Chancellor in which they stated Germany's peace aims from the business men's point of view. That petition was signed by the League of Agriculturists, the Ger- man Peasant League, the Westphalian Peasant Society, the Central Association of German Industrialists, the WAR AIMS OF THE BUSINESS MEN 25 League of Industrialists, and the German Middle-class Association. The importance of the Societies mentioned may be gauged from the fact that the first of the six alone has a membership of a quarter of a million. The petition, which was sent to the Governments of the individual German States as well, has not hitherto been published in full in the English language. That most important document (Grumbach, p. 123) was worded as follows: " PETITION TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR BY THE Six GREAT ECONOMIC 'ASSOCIATIONS " BERLIN, "May 20th, 1915. " YOUR EXCELLENCY, "Together with the whole German people, the German men of business engaged in agriculture, the manufacturing industries, commerce and trade, are firmly determined to persevere in the struggle for life or death which has been forced upon our country. They will persevere to the last, and at whatever cost, so that Germany may issue from the struggle externally stronger, and that it may possess the guarantee of a lasting peace and the guarantee of an assured national economic and cultural development. " In view of this aim and the readiness of the whole nation to make the necessary sacrifices, it is only natural that the people have been alarmed by rumours regarding peace negotiations, and particularly regard- ing the conclusion of a separate peace with England which was to be based upon certain English wishes and demands. " In these circumstances the declaration of the Nord- deutsche Allgemelne Zeltung that nobody endowed with common sense could think of giving up the advantages 26 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS arising from the favourable military position by a pre- mature peace with any one of our enemies has been received everywhere with satisfaction. "That determination should not be affected by a less favourable or a less secure position of the war. Otherwise, the external and internal aims which have been indicated by His Majesty the Emperor would be lost sight of. These aims can be obtained only by the military enforcement of a peace which gives us a greater security for our frontiers in the West and the East, which broadens the basis of Germany's naval power, and which gives us the possibility of a power- ful and unhampered development of our economic forces. Briefly, peace must bring us such an increase of our political, military, maritime, and economic power that it establishes our great strength against the nations without. "A peace which does not yield these results makes inevitable the renewal of the struggle at an early date under materially less favourable conditions for Germany. Therefore, no premature peace must be concluded. From such a premature peace no adequate fruits of victory can be derived. " But there should also be no half-hearted peace, no peace which, through the defects indicated, does not lead to the full political exploitation of the final military success for which we hope! " It must not be overlooked that the full exploita- tion of the favourable military position is necessary not only for securing Germany's future externally and for safeguarding its future, but that the full exploitation of victory is equally necessary during the ensuing years of peace for reasons of internal policy. Only WAR AIMS OF THE BUSINESS MEN 27 then the people will willingly make the necessary sacrifices. The German nation does, of course, not ex- pect the impossible. Notwithstanding its patriotism, it would consider reasonably the existence of insuper- able military difficulties which would make impossible the conclusion of a satisfactory peace. However, the consequences upon the internal position of Germany would be most disastrous if, at the conclusion of peace, Germany should make concessions which are not made necessary by the military situation, if the country should prematurely end the struggle. The result would be that the returning German warriors would believe that the sole result of their bravery was an unbearable load of taxation. That would be fatal for our internal peace. Germany's gains derived from its victories must correspond to the sanguinary sacrifices made by hundreds of thousands! " The detailed demands which must be fulfilled in the opinion of the signatories, should they be militarily obtainable, and which are necessary to strengthen Germany politically, militarily, and economically to such a degree that the country can with confidence look forward into the future, have been given in the petition adjoined which has been placed before your Excellency on March loth of this year by the League of Agriculturists, by the German Peasant League, by the Central Association of German Industrialists, by the League of Industrialists, and by the German Middle-class Association. Since then the Christian German Peasant Associations have joined the associa- tions named. The Petition before mentioned was worded as follows: ' The undersigned associations have considered the 28 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS question how to carry out the demand which has so frequently been made during the last few months, that the present war should be followed by an honourable peace, by a peace which corresponds with the sacrifices made, and which will be secure and lasting. " ' If we wish to answer this question we must never forget that our enemies unceasingly proclaim that Germany must be annihilated and must disappear from among the Great Powers. As these are their aims, Germany cannot find security in treaties which would be trodden underfoot as soon as convenient. On the contrary, we can find security only by weaken- ing our enemies economically and militarily to such a degree that peace will remain secure for an indefinite time. " ' We demand the possession of a Colonial Empire which corresponds with the many-sided economic inter- ests of Germany. We demand security for Germany's colonial policy and for her customs policy in the future. We demand a sufficient war indemnity in a suitable form. We believe that our principal aim should be to secure and improve the European basis of the German Empire, in view of the war which has been forced upon us. Germany's position in Europe should be improved as follows: " ' BELGIUM must be placed under German law in order to secure Germany's naval, military, and economic power in the future, especially as towards England. Besides, we must remember the close connection which exists between the economically so important Belgian territory and the principal industrial districts of Ger- many. For these reasons Belgium must be placed under the German Empire with regard to military affairs, WAR AIMS OF THE BUSINESS MEN 29 Customs matters, the Mint, Bank, and Postal arrange- ments. The Belgian railways and waterways must be- come part of the German transport system. In th$ Government and the administration of Belgium the Walloon and Flemish districts must be kept apart. At the same time, the industrial undertakings and landed properties which are so important for dominating the country must be transferred from Belgian to German hands and arrangements must be made which ensure that the inhabitants of the country will obtain no political influence upon the German Empire. " ' As regards FRANCE. For the reasons given above, with regard to Germany's relations to England, the possession of the French shore and coast districts up to the Somme must be considered as a question of life or death for Germany's future position on the sea, for we must have access to the Atlantic. The Hinterland, which would have to be acquired at the same time, must secure the fullest economic and strategical exploitation of the newly acquired Channel ports. All further acquisitions of French territory must be exclusively based upon military and strategical considerations. The acquisition of the mining district of Briey will, however, form an exception to the principle indicated. In view of the experiences of the present war, it may be considered a matter of course that we can never again expose our frontiers to hostile invasion. We can therefore, in particular, not allow our opponents to retain Verdun and Belfort and the western slopes of the Vosges which lie between these two points. By acquiring the line of the Meuse and the French coast of the Channel, Germany would obtain not only the ore deposits of Briey, which have 30 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS already been mentioned, but also the coal districts of the Department du Nord and of the Department Pas- de-Calais. " ' In view of the experiences made in Alsace-Lor- raine, it may be considered a matter of course that the population of the annexed French territory will not be allowed to obtain political influence in Germany, and that here also the important economic factors, including large and medium-sized properties, will be placed into German hands, while France should undertake to re- ceive and to indemnify the original owners. " ' As REGARDS THE EAST. In the first place, we should be guided by the principle that the vast increase of industrial power which we may expect to receive in the West must be balanced by equivalent acquisitions of agricultural territory in the East. The present eco- nomic structure of Germany has proved so fortunate in the course of the war that the necessity of preserving its happy balance for all time may be described as in- dispensable according to the general conviction of the German people. " ' In view of the necessity of strengthening not only the industrial, but also the agricultural basis of Ger- many, a comprehensive policy of colonisation with German agricultural colonists is indicated. The German peasants living abroad, and particularly those domiciled outside Germany, and especially in Russia, who have been deprived of their rights in consequence of the war, must be enabled to return to Germany. Their return will greatly increase the population and the military strength of the country. In view of the re- quirements mentioned, a considerable expansion of Ger- man territory is needed towards the East. At least WAR AIMS OF THE BUSINESS MEN 31 part of the Baltic Provinces and of the territories to the south of them must be annexed. The aim to make the Eastern frontier of Germany more easily defendable must constantly be kept in mind. "'Recreated Eastern Prussia requires more secure frontiers. The provinces of Western Prussia, Posen and Silesia also must no longer be allowed to remain in their present exposed position. The necessary pro- tection can best be created by acquiring large territories farther east. " ' With regard to the granting of political rights to the inhabitants of the annexed territories and with re- gard to securing within these new districts Germany's economic supremacy, the principles laid down with regard to France should apply. The war indemnity to be demanded from Russia should largely consist of land. " ' Of course these demands depend on the assump- tion that military results will enable us to carry them out. However, in view of the successes obtained so far, we are full of confidence that our armies and their leaders will obtain a victory which guarantees the fulfilment of these our wishes. The aims indi- cated must be striven for, not from love of conquest, but because a lasting peace can be secured only by achieving them. In view of the sacrifices made by them, the German people expect such a peace. Besides, the voluntary surrender of enemy lands which have been drenched with so much German blood, and which contain innumerable graves of the best Germans, would not correspond with the sentiments of the people, and with their ideas of what constitutes an honourable peace. 32 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS " ' Lack of harbours on the Channel would strangle Germany's oversea development, as it has done in the past. An independent Belgium would continue to be an English tete de pont, a hostile base. It would mean a constant threat on the part of our enemies if the natural line of fortresses of France should be allowed to remain in the hands of the French. Russia, on the other hand, would under-estimate Germany's strength for action and power should she experience no loss of territory. Besides, if we should not acquire agricultural territory on our Eastern frontier, we should diminish the possibility of strengthening Germany's military power by an adequate increase of the national popula- tion in case of a war with Russia. " * We have the honour of acquainting your Excel- lency with these our views, which are held by vast numbers of Germans who do not belong to the under- signed Associations, although there may be differences of opinion with regard to certain details. At the same time, we would respectfully point out that we have sent copies of the present document to the Ministries of the individual States of the German Empire. ' " It is necessary to supplement the petition given in the foregoing. It should expressly be pointed out that the political, military, and economic aims which the German nation has in view in order to safeguard its future are closely interconnected, and cannot be treated separately. In the first place, it is clear that success in obtaining our great political aims depends on the efficacy and success of the German armies. However, the experiences of the present war teaches us that in the last resort Germany's military successes WAR AIMS OF THE BUSINESS MEN 33 and the exploitation of our victories to the fullest extent depend on the economic strength and efficiency of the German nation. Had Germany's agriculture not been able to feed the people, despite all the efforts of our enemies to starve us, had not the German manufactur- ing industries, German inventiveness, and German technical skill been able to maintain our independence from foreign countries, we should at last be defeated, notwithstanding the glorious successes of our victorious troops, and possibly we would by now have been van- quished. " It follows that our demands which, at first sight, seem to be dictated by purely economic motives, must be considered from a larger point of view. They spring from the necessity of increasing Germany's national and military power to the utmost. Our demands must therefore be considered from the military point of view. This is particularly the case with regard to the acquisition of agricultural territory upon which stress has been laid in the petition, and with regard to the seizure of the ore-bearing territories of the Meurthe and Moselle, and of the French coal districts of the Departments du Nord and Pas-de-Calais, and the Bel- gian coal districts. ''' The acquisition of adequate lands suitable for agricultural colonisation is indispensable not only with a view to broadening the basis to Germany's national economy. It is necessary not only in order to maintain the happy balance of Germany's national economy, the importance of which the present war has plainly disclosed, but also in order to secure the powerful stream of national strength, and of man-power which is provided by a mighty agriculture. This is partic- 34 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS ularly necessary if we wish to increase the number of the people and thereby Germany's military strength. " Acquisitions in the ore and iron districts mentioned are required not only by our economic interests, but also by military necessity. That will appear clearly from the following details: " Since August 1914, Germany's production of raw iron has increased again to nearly 1,000,000 tons per month, or has approximately doubled, and Germany's steel production has increased to more than 1,000,000 tons per month. Nevertheless, iron and steel are not abundant, but are scarce in Germany, and are still more scarce in neutral countries. The German shell works require quantities of iron and steel, which formerly would have been considered incredible. For cast grey shells alone, which are an inferior substitute for drawn shells and steel shells, at least 4,000 tons of raw iron have been used every day during the last few months. At the moment, the exact figures cannot be given. However, it is certain that the continuation of the war would have been impossible had the Ger- man iron and steel production not been doubled since August 1914. " The basis of the German iron and steel production is minette ore, the preponderant importance of which is constantly increasing. This ore alone can be obtained in rapidly increasing quantities within Germany's frontiers. The production of the other German iron districts is very limited, and the importa- tion of ire ore from overseas, even from Sweden, has become so difficult that at many works, even those outside the Luxemburg-Lorraine district, minette ore furnishes from 60 to 80 per cent, of the iron and steel WAR AIMS OF THE BUSINESS MEN 35 produced. It follows that the war would be as good as lost, should the production of minette ore be inter- fered with. " How does the production of minette ore stand in the present war, and how would it stand in a future war? " If the fortress of Longwy and the numerous French furnaces in the neighbourhood should be given back to the French, France would be able in a new war to destroy from Longwy, the following iron works in Ger- many of Luxemburg in a few hours by means of long- distance gun-fire: Kilometres dis- tance from Longwy. Rodingen 7 Differdingen 10 Esch . . . . 16 to 17 Oettingen 21 Riimelingen 21 Diidelingen 25 Thus, approximately 20 per cent, of the German raw iron and steel production could be eliminated by France acting from Longwy. " A glance at the map shows further that Jarny, the minette mine of the Phoenix Company, is situated at a distance of from 13 to 15 kilometres from Verdun, and that the western ore concessions near Landres and Conflans are no farther than 26 kilometres from Verdun. To-day we bombard Dunkirk from a distance of 38 kilometres. Can any one believe that the French would in the next war abstain from putting long-distance guns into Longwy and Verdun, in order 36 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS not to disturb Germany's ore production and iron in- dustry ? " In passing, it should be said that only the vast production of steel from minette ore enables Germany to provide agriculture with the necessary phosphoric acid since the importation of phosphates has come to an end. " Germany's security in a future war urges us com- pellingly to acquire the whole of the minette territories, including the fortresses of Longwy and Verdun, for without their possession the district described cannot be held. " The possession of vast supplies of coal, and partic- ularly of coal rich in bitumen, such as that which is found in Northern France, is at least as decisive for the issue of the war as is the possession of iron ore. Belgium and Northern France together produce more than 40,000,000 tons of coal per annum. Besides, coal is nowadays one of the determining political factors. That may be seen by the English coal ex- port prohibition of May I5th. The industrial neutral nations must act in accordance with the will of that combatant Power which can guarantee to them the necessary supply of coal. Germany can at present not provide the coal required. Hence we are com- pelled to make use of Belgium's coal production, for otherwise our neutral neighbours would fall entirely under England's control. It is very probable that the deliberate expansion of the Belgian coal production has been of the greatest importance, that it has induced several of Germany's neighbour States to maintain their neutrality. " It is generally known that our most important WAR AIMS OF THE BUSINESS MEN 37 explosives are derived from coal, their constituents being obtained during the coking process, and that coal is important also for the production of ammonia. Coal can provide us with benzol, the only product with which we can replace the benzine which we lack. Lastly, coal furnishes us with tar, which can be con- verted into oil fuel, which is indispensable for naval purposes, and into lubricants. It should be pointed out that the large expansion of our torpedo-boat flotilla and of our submarine arm is impossible unless we have a vast supply of liquid fuel. The course of the present war has demonstrated the superiority of oil fuel over coal in the case of torpedo-boats, and its advantages are so striking that it would be criminal levity to dis- regard the lesson in the future. If our enemies secure for themselves oil-wells abroad, Germany must take care to obtain the necessary gas coal at home. In time of peace she must provide an inexhaustible supply of oil, benzol, toluol, ammonia, and naphthaline, not only in order to increase the national prosperity, but also because their possession is an indispensable part of Ger- many's armament for war. " In summing up, we would say that the war aims indicated will secure permanently Germany's national economy, and at the same time guarantee her military strength and her political independence and power. In addition, they will expand Germany's economic opportunities. They will provide work for the workers, and will therefore be of advantage to labour as a whole. " The importance of the petition of the six great economic Associations can scarcely be overstated. It 38 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS may be said that it expresses the views of German trade, industry, commerce, and agriculture. The petition was widely circulated in Germany as a confidential docu- ment, but the German newspapers were, according to Grumbach, prohibited to reprint it lest its contents should become known abroad. CHAPTER IV THE WAR AIMS OF THE GERMAN INTELLECTUALS . THE most important factors of public opinion in Ger- many are three: the governing circles, the business men, and the intellectuals. The war aims of the governing circles and of the business men have been given in Chapters II and III. In the present chapter the de- liberate war aims of the intellectuals will be rendered. These were authoritatively stated in a petition, similar to the petition of the six great Economic Associations. This petition also was treated as a confidential docu- ment, and sent to the Imperial Chancellor. Appended to it were 1,341 signatures. Among the signatories were 352 University Professors, 158 educationalists and clergymen, 145 high officials, burgomasters, and councillors, 148 judges and lawyers, 40 Parliamen- tarians, 1 8 retired admirals and generals, 182 business men, 52 agriculturists, 252 artists, authors, and pub- lishers. In view of the great prestige enjoyed by the German professors and their vast influence upon public opinion, the importance of the professorial demands is very great. The weight of the professorial petition was vastly increased by the signatures of eminent practical men which also were appended to the document. Among the non-professorial signatories was Herr Kirdorf, the principal director of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerk, Germany's leading coal and iron undertaking. Herr Kirdorf was for many years the President of the power- ful organisation which represents the German coal and iron industry. 39 40 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS Petitions which are intended to be signed by many of the most influential men are drawn up carefully and cautiously. They are as a rule worded with a good deal of reserve and restraint in order to avoid discussion and opposition. Therefore, the petition of the professors must not be treated as if it were a rash statement made by some irresponsible hotheads. The document (p. 132 of Grumbach's book) was worded as follows : "THE PETITION OF THE PROFESSORS TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR " The German nation and its Emperor have kept the peace during forty-four years. They have kept it until its maintenance became incompatible with the demands of national honour and of self-preservation. In spite of the growing strength and number of its population, Germany has never thought of over- stepping the narrow limits of its continental territories as a conqueror. Its genius merely compelled the nation to enter the world's markets in order to secure there its economic existence in peaceful competition with the other nations. " However, Germany's enemies wished to reduce our narrow territories and to hamper our indispensable activities in the world's markets. They made plans which went as far as the destruction of the German Empire. When they recognised their danger, the Germans, from the highest to the lowest, rose like one man, knowing that they had to defend not only their country, but also their individuality, their spiritual and moral treasures, the culture of Germany and that of Europe, against the flood of barbarians comirlg from the East and the desire of vengeance and WAR AIMS OF THE INTELLECTUALS 41 the lust of domination of the nations of the West. Victoriously, with God's help, hand in hand with our faithful Allies, we have been able to defend ourselves against half the world. " Now, when in Italy a new enemy has arisen to Germany, mere defence is no longer sufficient. Our enemies have forced the sword into our hands and have compelled us to make enormous sacrifices in blood and treasure. Now we must protect ourselves against a similar surprise attack from all sides, against a whole succession of wars waged with our enemies when they have regained their strength. To prevent this, we mean to establish ourselves so firmly and so broadly in a secured and enlarged homeland that our independent existence is guaranteed to us for genera- tions. ' The people are unanimous and resolved in pursu- ing this principal aim. The plain truth which we meet wherever we look is this : There is only one fear among all the classes of the people, and that fear is particu- larly broad and deep among the masses of the people. It is the fear that, through the delusive idea of foolish conciliatoriness, or through nervous impatience, a pre- mature, doubtful, and transient peace might be concluded. It is feared that once more the diplomat's pen might give up what the sword victoriously won, as happened a century ago. And that might happen in the most fateful hour of destiny known to German history, when peoples' minds display a greatness and unanimity such as have never been known in the past and may never be known in the future. " Of a truth we do not strive after the domination of the world. However, we mean to possess a share 42 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS of world-power proportionate to the greatness of Germany's cultural, economic, and warlike strength. Perhaps it will not be possible to achieve simultaneously all the aims of national security. This may not be feasible because of the number of our enemies. Still, the utmost limit of the possible should be obtained. Otherwise, the great sacrifices of the nation and our great military efforts during the war will have been vain. This is, we repeat it, the firm determination of the Ger- man nation. " It is the duty and the right of those who, through their learning and position, have become the intellectual leaders and protagonists of public opinion, to give clear expression to the resolution and to the firm will of the nation, and to place the national wishes before the Gov- ernment. It is their duty to give powerful support to the Government in its heavy task of enforcing Ger- many's necessary claims against the faint-hearted in- dividuals within the country and against its tenacious enemies abroad. " We invite all leaders of public opinion to fulfil this duty. " We know full well that one must discriminate be- tween the desirable aims of the war and the final con- ditions obtainable at the peace, that everything depends on the ultimate success of our arms, and that it cannot be our task to discuss the war objects of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Hence we have in the following merely briefly expressed our opinion in giving utterance to our conviction that Germany must have certain guarantees for a lasting peace, and that there are certain aims which must be reached by the blood-sodden road of the present war. WAR AIMS OF THE INTELLECTUALS 43 " (i) France. We wish to abolish for all time the French menace. We have been threatened by France for centuries. We have been assailed with French cries of vengeance from 1815 to 1870 and from 1871 to 1915. All classes of the German people are convinced of this necessity. We cannot abolish this danger through use- less efforts at conciliation, to which France has always replied with the utmost fanaticism. "We would warn all Germans most seriously not to in- dulge in self-deception. Even after the terrible lesson of this disastrous war of revenge, France will con- tinue thirsting for vengeance as long as she possesses the necessary strength. For the sake of our own existence we must enfeeble that land politically and economically, without scruple or compunction, and im- prove Germany's military-strategical position towards France. To achieve this end a thorough-going improve- ment of Germany's western frontier from Belfort to the coast is needed. " In addition we must, if possible, conquer part of the French Channel coast in order to increase our strate- gical security against England and to obtain better access to the ocean. " Special measures will have to be taken so that the German Empire should not be internally weakened by its external acquisitions. In order to avoid a posi- tion similar to that which obtains in Alsace-Lorraine, the undertakings and landed properties in the conquered districts which secure to their owners power and in- fluence should be transferred from hands hostile to Germany to German hands, and the indemnification of the original owners should be left to France. No in- fluence whatever upon the Empire should be allowed 44 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS to that part of the French population which has been taken over by us. " Furthermore, it is necessary that France and France among all our enemies in the first place should have imposed upon it a high war indemnity, and that no mercy should be shown to it, although it has financially been terribly bled through its own folly and British selfishness. Details will be given further on. " We should also remember that France has a dis- proportionately large Colonial Empire, and that England might enrich itself by seizing the French Colonies un- less we seize them ourselves. " (2) Belgium. Belgium, which we have won with so much of the best German blood, we must firmly hold politically, militarily, and economically, whatever rea- sons may be urged against such a step. On no point is the unanimity of popular opinion greater. To the nation it is beyond a doubt a question of honour to hold on to that country. " From the political and military points of view it is clear that an independent Belgium would be nothing but an English base for a very dangerous attack, a shield behind which our enemies would gather anew. Econ- omically the acquisition of Belgium would mean a vast accession of power to Germany. " Nationally also Belgium can become a great gain to Germany. The Flemish population, which is so closely related to the Germans by their culture, may free itself in course of time from its French shackles and may remember its Germanic origin and character. "Of the problems which we have to solve when we have acquired Belgium we mention only this, that the WAR AIMS OF THE INTELLECTUALS 45 inhabitants must be allowed no political influence within the Empire. As in France, the undertakings and landed properties which give power and influence to their owners must be taken out of the hands of persons hostile to Germany and be placed into the possession of German owners. " (3) Russia. On Germany's eastern frontier the population of Russia grows with the greatest rapidity, increasing by from 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 per year. Within a generation Russia's population will come to 250,000,000. As this overwhelming colossus threatens our eastern flank, constituting undoubtedly the greatest danger to Germany and to Europe in the future, Ger- many can maintain its place in the world only by con- structing a firm wall which will protect us both against the stealthy progress of Slavism in peace-time and against menacing inroads in case of war. Besides, the healthy growth of Germany's national strength and man-power must be secured by all means. " A firm wall of protection and a basis for an in- crease of the German race must be created on the land which Russia will have to cede to us. We must have land suitable for agricultural settlement, land where can be reared healthy peasants who are an inexhaustible source of national and racial power. We must have land which will receive part of our surplus popula- tion and which will afford new homes to those Ger- mans abroad who wish to turn their back on the hostile countries to which they had formerly migrated. We must have land which increases Germany's economic independence, which supplies us with food, which affords the necessary counterpoise to the progressive industrialisation and townification of the German 46 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS people, which preserves that balance of economic activities which has proved so valuable during this war and which prevents the dangerous development of a one-sided national economy such as that of England. We must have land which counteracts the reduction in the birth-rate in the towns, which prevents emigra- tion and provides housing for the needy. We must have land, the colonisation and Germanisation of which gives new chances even to the learned proletariat Such land, which is needed for our physical, moral, and in- tellectual welfare, is before all to be found towards the east of Germany. " The military needs, and particularly our strategi- cal requirements, will determine how far Germany's eastern frontier should be pushed forward. Along the eastern limits of Posen and Silesia, and along the southern frontier of East Prussia a belt of terri- tory must be created which, as far as possible, is free from non-German owners of land, which would there- fore be open for settlement to German colonists. This German frontier belt will separate the Prussian Poles from the Russian Poles and protect them against the direct influence of the latter, who may achieve their independence. We do not hesitate to point out that the Baltic provinces of Russia, which Germans have cultivated for 700 years, which possess a fruitful soil and which are thinly populated, are a promising land suitable for colonisation by German settlers. The in- habitants, Lithuanians, Esthonians, and Letts, who are racially not related to the Russians, will become useful as agricultural labourers for temporary work in Germany proper. " We demand colonial land from Russia on which WAR AIMS OF THE INTELLECTUALS 47 we can erect a frontier wall and create conditions for promoting the growth of our population. The colonial land demanded should, however, have a third function. It should be Russia's war indemnity paid to us. After the war it will probably be impossible to obtain from Russia an indemnity paid either in cash or in securi- ties. The disappointment of the Russo-Japanese War, after which no indemnity was paid, might repeat itself. But Russia can very easily pay an indemnity in kind. The country is overburdened with riches in land, and we demand that the territory which is to be ceded to us should to a large part be handed over without their owners. In view of Russia's administrative practice this is by no means a novel development. In Russia the people are not so deeply rooted in the soil as they are in Central and in Western Europe. Over and over again Russia has transplanted large portions of its populations from one district to other districts far away. The possibility of removing a settled population must not be measured with the insufficient standard of German civilisation. If the political acquisition of Russian land is to bring to us the neces- sary increase in power, we must be able to dispose freely of the bulk of it. A peace with Russia which does not bring about the waning of the Russian in- cubus and which fails to supply the land necessary to Germany, would mean that a great opportunity of improving Germany's political, economic, and social health had been thrown away. The final decision between Germany and Russia would then be adjourned to some future date. Another struggle for the exist- ence of Germany and for European culture would then be certain. 48 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS " (4) England, the East, the Colonies, Oversea Mat- ters. Although the struggle with Russia has been par- ticularly grand and exceedingly glorious, and although we must remember how dangerous the enormous bulk of Russia will remain unless we succeed in bringing about its decomposition, we must not forget for a mo- ment that this war has been in the last resort England's war against the industrial, commercial, maritime, and colonial power of Germany. " The cause of England's hostility must determine Germany's war aims with regard to England. This means that we must assert our position in the world's trade and assert Germany's sea power and oversea power as against England. " We must admit that England has taught us a valu- able lesson by blockading Germany during the war, and by forcing us to organise the country so as to make it a self-supporting State. We have learned in the first place and this has particularly been shown in this petition that we require a broader and better secured basis in Europe, so that we shall be independent of other nations from the political, military, and economic points of view. We mean, therefore, to create on the Continent and about our national frontiers a conti- nental economic sphere which should be as large as possible, and which will make us independent of England and of other world empires. In this respect Austria-Hungary and Turkey must be considered in the first place. They will unlock to us the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor. Therefore it is necessary to secure permanently, against Russian and English cupidity, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan Peninsula, Turkey, and Asia Minor as far as the Persian Gulf. WAR AIMS OF THE INTELLECTUALS 49 The commercial relations with our political friends should be made closer with all means in our power. " Henceforward, in spite of England's hostility and notwithstanding the security of our continental position, we must enter again upon the world-trade and become active in the lands across the sea. A substantial part of Germany's international trade will no doubt have to be established in totally different directions. Old- established commercial and maritime relations must be regained. In future we must learn to stand on our own feet. We must eliminate English media- tion in finance and commerce, English arbitrage and English insurance. We have lost confidence in Eng- land. Hence England must lose the profit which she has formerly derived from Germany's commerce. We mean to recreate our colonial empire. It should be more closely jointed and stronger than it has been hitherto. Central Africa would give us large territories, but they are of insufficient value. We must therefore, in addition, acquire colonies elsewhere. Herein lies the importance of Germany's permanent connection with the world of Islam and the necessity of a secure sea-route. Those who, disregarding Germany's security against England's naval tyranny, desire the acquisition of colonies, while being in favour of giving up Bel- gium, under-estimate not merely the importance of se- curing Germany's European basis. They make the more serious political mistake of striving after colonial possessions without securing a safe connection oversea. They would once more place Germany at the mercy of England. " We require the freedom of the sea. We fight England with the object of obtaining that freedom 50 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS for all nations. In order to enforce the freedom of the sea, it is in the first place necessary that Germany should obtain a strong position on the Channel coast. We must, as has previously been stated, have Belgium firmly in our grasp, and we must, if possible, obtain in addition part of the coast of the French Channel. Besides, it is necessary either to break the chain of naval bases which England has created around the world, or to neutralise them by calling into existence corresponding and equivalent German bases. Egypt, which connects England with English Africa, and English Asia on the one hand, and with Australia on the other, and which makes the Pacific Ocean an English lake, Egypt, which, to use Bismarck's words, is to the British Empire what the nerve at the back of the neck is to a man, is at the same time the iron clamp which firmly connects England's Eastern and her Western possessions and the instrument with which England subdues both. In Egypt England's vital nerve can be severed. If we succeed in this, we take the great trade-route which leads through the Suez Canal out of the hands of a single Power. In doing this the rights of Turkey should as far as possible be respected and preserved. " England's power is based in the main upon its over- whelming influence upon Governments and the Press throughout the world. We are in bitter need of elim- inating the English cable and telegram monopoly. Our best ally against England's influence throughout the world is the freedom which w shall bring to all. In fighting for our own deliverance from the English yoke we fight for the liberty of the universe. We do not mean to exploit the nations of the world, as the English WAR AIMS OF THE INTELLECTUALS 51 have been doing, but, while protecting our own inter- ests, to act as the pioneers and leaders of Europe who respect and secure the individuality and the free de- velopment of all nations. " (5) War Indemnity. We desire as far as possible to obtain a war indemnity which compensates us for the cost of the struggle, which enables us to rebuild what has been destroyed in East Prussia and in Alsace- Lorraine, which allows us to form a fund from which pensions will be paid to war invalids, war widows, and orphans, which permits us to make good the losses suffered by private German citizens, and allows us to replace and to improve the national armaments. " We are, of course, aware that the question of war indemnities depends not only upon our military successes, but also upon the financial ability of our enemies. Should we be in the position of exacting an indemnity from England, which has always been so thrifty in devoting English blood to the war, no amount of money that he could be exacted would be sufficiently large. England has raised the world against Germany chiefly with its money. If we wish to strike at the most sensitive part of this nation of hucksterers, we must strike at its purse. Before all, we must hit England as hard as possible by striking at its money-bags, if we have the power. However, it is more probable that France, either alone, or, in the first place, must be counted upon to furnish an indem- nity. We should not hesitate to put upon that country the heaviest financial burden. Philanthropic sentimentalism would be totally out of place. If the French wish to find relief, they may address them- selves to their Allies on the other side of the Channel. 52 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS If these refuse to help their Allies financially, we should obtain at least a political result with which we may be satisfied. [The authors intimate that England's refusal to help France paying the indemnity demanded by Germany would lead to hostility between the two countries.] " Before all, we believe that it is less important to find compensation for the damage suffered than to open to the German nation new roads for its power- ful development in the future. Hence a monetary indemnity which compensates us for the cost of the war is of comparatively inferior importance. On the other hand, it is clear that, should we not be able to obtain an adequate monetary compensation, our de- mands for the surrender of land, of industrial values, and of colonies, stated in the foregoing, would gain both in political and in moral justification. We must not come out of the war, when it has come to a vic- torious end, with a loss. Otherwise posterity will still consider Germany defeated, her victories notwith- standing. " We abstain from deciding how the important prob- lem of compensating Germany for its outlay should be solved, but we would point out that it would be valuable to have part of the monetary indemnity paid in securi- ties, the possession of which would strengthen Germany's economic position in the countries of her political friends and which would deliver these from the undue influence exercised hitherto by England and France. [The sig- natories advocate that England and France should be compelled to hand over to Germany their investments in neutral countries.] " (6) Kultur and Force. If the signatories of this WAR AIMS OF THE INTELLECTUALS 53 petition, and especially the representatives of science, art, and the Church among them, should be reproached that in the present petition they have raised only political and economic demands, relying upon force, and that they have forgotten the spiritual problems of Germany's future, there should be a threefold answer : " The care of the German spirit is no part of Ger- many's war aims or of Germany's peace conditions. " The German spirit is for us the treasure of treasures, the most precious possession of the nation and the root cause of its superiority among the other nations. Still, it is clear that before attending to Germany's spirit we must enable the country to live in political and economic security. Only then can we cultivate our spiritual treasures with the necessary freedom. " Lastly, we would say to those who think of the German spirit as an abstraction divorced from power, to those who wish to pursue what is called a policy of culture pure and simple, that we do not wish for a spirituality which means disintegration and decay, that we do not wish for an unnational cosmopolitan- ism, which everywhere vainly tries to find a home, and which falsifies the national character because it lacks a healthy national body. With our demands we wish to create a healthy body within which the German spirit may dwell. The enlargement of the German body politic which we demand will not harm, but will benefit, the German spirit, provided that the increase is effected under the precautions which we have indicated. " We are aware that we have put forth great aims, and that they are obtainable only if we are de- 54 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS termined to make all the necessary sacrifices, and to negotiate with the utmost energy. We appeal to the Bismarckian principle : ' In political matters faith can indeed remove mountains. In political matters courage and victory do not stand in the relation of cause and effect, for the two are identical/ " It will be noticed that the German intellectuals, like the business men in their petition given in the previous chapter, demand not only far-reaching annexations in the East and in the West, and vast monetary indem- nities designed to enrich Germany, but that they like- wise urge that a large part of the population dwelling within the conquered territories should be expropriated and expelled, and that the owners of land, industrial undertakings, etc., should be compensated at the cost of Germany's victims. CHAPTER V THE WAR AIMS OF THE GERMAN SOCIALISTS IN Chapters II, III, and IV the annexationist aims of the governing classes, of the business men, and of the intellectuals have been described in the words of authorised exponents. In Chapter VI it will be shown that German annexationists, belonging to all classes of society, have formed almost boundless plans of conquest in Europe and on the continents beyond. It is frequently asserted that the German Socialists are opposed to a policy of annexations, a policy which is irreconcilable not only with the democratic idea but also with the tenets of the Social Democratic faith. It has been pointed out in Chapter II that the German Social Democratic t party has pursued a double aim during the war. While doing lip-service to the principles of democracy and of Socialism, the majority of Social Democratic politicians and publicists have unswervingly supported Germany's official policy of conquering imperialism, of aggressiveness and of an- nexation. Some Socialists, feeling keenly the awkwardness of the dilemma of having to preach democracy and at the same time to support a policy of conquest and of annexa- tion, have tried to reconcile their action with their avowed principles by advocating a policy of annexation in which that awkward word "annexation" is replaced by some other term. For instance, Herr Max Schippel wrote in the Socialistische Monatshefte on April I5th, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 261): S3 56 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS " Even if, in case of a decisive Austrian victory, Serbia should not become Austrian, one might well think of strictly limiting that country in its foreign policy, in its right to conclude alliances, and in its railway and commercial policy. This should be done for preserving the vital interests of Austria-Hungary and preventing the progress of Russia's influence. " Without annexing Belgium one can make it im- possible that under the cloak of neutrality that country will ever again become a tool of England's hostility to Germany. One can arrange that, by attaching Belgium to the German body economic and to the German traffic lines, that country grows together with the German interests, and detaches itself from Eng- land." While some Socialists have tried to reconcile their conscience to the policy of annexation by circum- scribing that awkward word, by speaking of " attach- ing " Belgium to Germany and by " limiting " the policy of Serbia in favour of Austria, as Herr Max Schippel did in the extract given above, other Socialists have taken a more honest and a more straightforward course and have recommended annexation for some reason or other. Some Socialists have expressed themselves in favour of annexations for moral reasons. For instance, the editor of the Socialist Chemnitzcr Volksstimme wrote on July 2nd, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 112): " A defensive war does not become a war of con- quest because one has been victorious and gains by one's victory. It would not be policy, but suicidal madness, to give to bandits a charter according to which they may take you by the throat without fear of loss. On WAR AIMS OF THE SOCIALISTS 57 the contrary, we must tell our enemies that they have lost the game, that they must pay dearly for every day they continue fighting. " Other Socialists have not merely defended, but have boldly advocated, the policy of annexation. They have denied the right of nations to govern themselves and to dispose of themselves, and they have recom- mended the forcible creation of large empires for So- cialist reasons and for reasons of material advantage. For instance, Doctor Paul Lensch wrote in the Socialist weekly Die Glocke on January 1st, 1916 (Grumbach, P- 2 59) : " The cry * no annexations ' badly requires Marxian criticism. ... It is really high time to free oneself from these unsocialist phrases which are used by petty middle-class men, especially as they expose the Socialist party to the terrible danger of becoming a helpless derelict in the storm of the present world revolution. . . . The interests of the working class, which are supposed to be in the keeping of Social Democracy, do not demand that every three miles a new ' nation ' should begin. That would, in practice, be the conse- quence of the right of self-determination on the part of nations. On the contrary, the interests of the work- ing class demand the largest possible closed economic area within which capitalism and the proletariat may develop to the full. "' There is practically no difference between the Social Democracy of Doctor Paul Lensch and the views and aims of the German Emperor. The well-known Reichstag Deputy, Doctor Landsberg, demanded, according to a report in the Frankfurter Volksstimme on January 6th, 1916 (Grumbach, p. 113), 5 8 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS while addressing the members of the Social Democratic Party : " Would any German protest if, for the better defence of Germany in the East, the annexation of territory up to the river Narev should be demanded ? " It might be added that, in commenting upon this demand, Herr Ledebour, of the Socialist Minority, pointed out that the annexation demanded by his So- cialist colleague of the Majority Section of the party, would lead to the incorporation of at least 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 non-German people in Germany. He protested against this advocacy of a policy of annexa- tion on the part of men who describe themselves as Social Democrats, and against their duplicity of advo- cating and supporting the policy of annexation while pretending to honour the principles of Socialism and of Democracy. The Socialist Reichstag Deputy, Geek, in a speech delivered on February 2nd, 1916, at Karlsruhe, stated (Grumbach, p. 113): " With regard to the question of annexations, the German Government has adopted a point of view with which we may be contented. It has, under the assent of all parties in the Reichstag, refused to annex entire States. Of course, if frontier regulations should have to take place in order to protect Germany against sur- prise attacks in the future, that policy will find our support. After all, precautions may have to be taken to close the opening in the Vosges Mountains. Besides, measures will have to be taken to prevent Thorn being bombarded from the Russian fortresses by means of long-distance fire. " WAR AIMS OF THE SOCIALISTS 59 On the same day Herr Marum, another Socialist, and a member of the Diet of Baden, said at Karlsruhe in a public speech (Grumbach, p. 114) : " It is a matter of course that we must obtain, after the war, certain securities by means of frontier altera- tions. Otherwise this war will end like a fool's play, notwithstanding the gigantic sacrifices made in blood and treasure. " The editor of the Social Democratic Rheinische Zeitung said in a speech delivered on February 6th, 1916, in Cologne (Grumbach, p. 114) : " I would express a warning against the use of meaningless maxims. For instance, the formula * no j annexations ' is entirely un-Marxian. Poland must no longer be Russian. Macedonia must no longer be Serbian. From both the Socialist and the ethical point of view, our motto should be, ' Resistance against the Violation of Foreign Nations ! ' On the other hand, social democracy must demand conquests under certain Herr Scheidemann, who was originally the leader of the entire Social Democratic Party, and who is now the leader of the Governmental Socialist Majority, stated in a speech in the name of the Majority, which was delivered on April 6th, 1916, in the Reichstag (Grum- bach, p. 114) : "Is it violation if we succeed at the Peace in en- abling the Flemish people to cultivate their own language and their own civilisation? We should determinedly oppose any violation which could take place in this 60 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS respect. The Imperial Chancellor has said : ' The Europe which will arise after the present war will not resemble the old Europe in many respects. After terrible events the re-establishment of the status quo ante is unknown to history. ' Only a child in political things can per- suade itself that when a whole Continent stands in flames, when millions bleed and are destroyed, not a single frontier stone shall be removed because some decayed diplomat has placed it in position. " The Socialist Frankfurter Volksstimme stated on June 22nd, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 117): " Opposition to all demands of annexation is in itself not a sufficient peace-programme. Our social democ- racy must put forward positive demands, and these demands can, and even must, include changes of the map. It is impossible that everything shall remain as In the Socialist Chemnitzer Volksstimme of April I4th, 1916 (Grumbach, p. 117), it was stated: " According to the Leipziger Volkszeitung, Mr. As- quith's last speech may be summarised in a single phrase. He demands the re-establishment of the status quo ante bellum, international disarmament, and inter- national arbitration. . . . We believe that Mr. Asquith's speech has been erroneously summarised in this way. However, in order that there should not be any doubt in the matter, we wish to declare explicitly that any peace proposals based on the principles put forward by Mr. Asquith would appear unacceptable to us as regards the East. We absolutely support Herr Scheide- WAR AIMS OF THE SOCIALISTS 61 mann's declaration in the Reichstag that the re-establish- ment of the status quo after a war like the present one is simply impossible. " Among the Socialist writers may perhaps be counted Herr Richard Calwer. This is a very interesting per- sonage. He is an eminent economist and statistician. He is a great expert on commercial and financial affairs. For many years he was the pride of the German Social Democratic Party. He disagreed with the old Socialist leaders on some points of Marxian doctrine. He recog- nised that certain Socialist teachings were irreconcilable with economic fact. He left the party with regret, but remained in touch with many of its leaders and con- tinued to influence German Socialists. Although he did no longer officially belong to the German Social Demo- cratic Party, he considered himself only semi-detached and was considered so by others. Since the beginning of the war Herr Calwer has used his great talents for converting the German Socialists to Prussian Imperial- ism. He wrote on January 5th, 1915, in the Berlin newspaper Der Tag (Grumbach, p. 161): "If in the present war Germany should be victorious it must, in the interest of the peace of Europe and of Germany's future, protect itself as far as possible against the repetition of such a systematically prepared surprise attack. It must particularly prepare itself against England and Russia. To obtain that security, territorial acquisitions can perhaps not be excluded. It would be fundamentally wrong to leave the door open for the renewal of the war against Germany by excluding annexations, as is done by those Social Democrats who base their ideas upon mistaken theo- retical principles. No party can demand this except one domiciled in Utopia. Happily, we may hope that 62 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS these antiquated views will soon disappear. It is not in the interest of the German workers that a peace should be concluded which re-establishes the former status quo. On the contrary, the welfare of the workers demands a peace which brings the security that Ger- many's enemies will be incapacitated from recommencing the struggle. In order to obtain that security it is nec- essary that we take guarantees regarding England and Russia, which under certain circumstances must take the form of territorial acquisitions. " The opposition to the policy of annexation on the part of Social Democracy is not Social Democratic. It is at best the echo of ancient democratic views which are still heard within the Social Democratic Party of to-day. What, then, is the peace aim which Socialism should pursue? The last few decades have brought about the formation of a few large economic areas which are provided with a centralised political organ- isation. This process has been called Imperialism. Although the object of concentration may be obtained by capitalistic means, it is an aim by way of which humanity can arrive at Socialism. After all, a few great empires are more likely to maintain the peace than numerous politically independent States existing side by side, such as are found in Western Europe. The greater a political organisation is, the greater will be its efficiency, the greater will be the territory within which war will be abolished, and the smaller will be the number of States which can go to war with each other. . . . " Where, after all, has it been written that every nation and every fragment of a nation has a right to political independence? That is a parochial policy. WAR AIMS OF THE SOCIALISTS 63 History indicates that the men of Western Europe must try to achieve- the unification of their political organisation by other means than those adopted by the United States and England. If our military suc- cesses are to benefit Germany permanently, we must not rely upon the soft words and the good-will of our Western opponents, France and Belgium, but we must obtain substantial guarantees which will make impos- sible another attack of the English in Western Europe. That is the minimum which must be demanded. Be- sides, we must obtain frontiers which are as favour- able as possible to Germany as against Russia. This question also is one which must be decided principally from the military point of view. It is clear that it would be treason to our own people if we should retain the Socialist point of view with regard to our peace aims if territorial annexations or additions are required for the protection of the Fatherland. / The peace aim of Socialism is clear. We must secure Germany's ter- ritory against another surprise attack.]: We must elimi- nate English and Russian influence in Western Europe and deliberately aim at unifying the West European States in accordance with their historical development, making use of all the chances for such action yielded by the war. " The extracts given suffice to show that there is a curious discrepancy between the professions of political faith made by the German Social Democrats and their action. CHAPTER VI - HOW GERMANY WOULD TREAT THE CONQUERED PEOPLE IN the weighty petition signed by 1,341 professors, burgomasters, judges, high officials, and other intel- lectuals which has been given in full in Chapter IV, the extraordinary demand was repeatedly made that the annexed territories should be handed over to Germany by its defeated enemies with vacant possession, that the owners of land, industrial undertakings, etc., should be expelled as a condition of the peace and be compen- sated for their losses by Germany's vanquished op- ponents. Besides, it was advocated by the eminent signatories' of the petition that the manual labourers and other men of foreign nationality who chose to re- main in the annexed provinces should be given no political rights, that they should be treated as Helots. These outrageous demands of robbing the owners of their property and of enslaving the propertyless politi- cally, and probably economically too, seem so revolting to the ordinary sense of justice that one would be- lieve that they had rashly been included in the petition, and that these demands would find no support among the German people. Unfortunately, that is not the case. A large number of Germans have enthusi- astically supported them, as the following examples will show: Herr Leopold von Vietinghoff wrote in Die Sicher- heiten der deutschen Zukunft, Leipzig, 1915 (Grumbach, P- 355) : " Lack of land can be cured only by the taking of 64 TREATMENT OF CONQUERED PEOPLE 6^ land. . . . The State which acquires land and gives to the inhabitants the option of remaining or emigrating has the duty of expropriating those who wish to retain their original nationality. These have, of course, to emigrate. The sense of justice, as developed in modern nations, demands that this duty will be taken over by the victors. Besides, such a measure is one of the necessary securities. A State wastes a great deal of strength in struggling with its obstinate alien subjects. It is, therefore, only a wise measure of security to make it as easy as possible for such people to leave the country. . . . " Among the securities required for a truly German future is the thorough improvement of Germany's military position. . . . The frontier must be shaped in such a way that, should the enemy on the other side ever again dare to attack us, we could by a short leap not merely take him by the throat but be able to strike at his heart. In other words, the frontier should so be drawn that we dominate militarily our possible op- ponents. " Herr Arthur Dix, a well-known publicist, wrote in Z wise hen Krieg und Frieden, Leipzig, 1914 (Grumbach, P- 319) : '' The problem how to attach to Germany territories occupied by a non-German and hostile population and to secure for ourselves the riches of the soil which we require for agricultural purposes must be consid- ered. As the idea of ' evacuating ' the native population has been put forward, I would herewith give some proposals which emanate from eminent and experi- enced leaders of the German colonial movement and 66 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS of Germany's economic life. With regard to Belgium such an authority stated: " ' Wherever the population has struck at the Ger- man Army by armed resistance and guerrilla warfare, the people should be expropriated. Compensations, if any, should be paid to the expropriated families from the war indemnity, and the dispossessed people should be compelled to live henceforth outside the German Empire. The land thus freed from ownership should be distributed among the families of those German regi- ments which have suffered from the cowardly hostility of the former population. . . . ' Factories and industrial properties whose owners or directors have participated in the resistance against the German Army should be seized and be given to suit- able German workmen belonging to the Army who should co-operatively manage these properties. They should absolutely possess them. " * All mines should become the State property of the new German Duchy of Belgium. " 'Every Belgian who fails to declare within four weeks from the official incorporation of the former king- dom that he wishes to become a German subject must leave the German Empire with his family. " ' During ten years every former Belgian who breaks the German laws may be expelled from the Empire. " ' In accordance with these principles a broad belt along the whole Belgian frontier should be settled with a purely German population drawn from the war army. ' " Another authority complemented the foregoing pro- posals approximately as follows: " It is not sufficient that in the East and West terri- TREATMENT OF CONQUERED PEOPLE 67 tories should be placed under the authority of the German Empire. The direct acquisition of land by the State is necessary. The great aim is not merely a war indemnity in cash, but particularly a war indemnity ia. men. "The Russian Government transplants year by year, and by force, hundreds of thousands of the rural population, as we know from the history of Siberia. . . . The only thing to be done is to withdraw the German settlers from Russia and to establish them on the territories on our eastern frontier which have been made vacant for them. In any case, we do not wish to expropriate the present owners of the land with German money. On the contrary, we mean to compel our enemies to cede us the land and to impose on them the duty to cede to us landed property with vacant possession and free for German settlement. . . . One of our foremost aims must be a war indemnity in the form of land. Unless we receive it we may consider ourselves defeated! Both in the West and in the East the territories acquired should be placed under the in- fluence of the Empire politically, militarily, and econ- omically; but they should not be represented in the Federal Council and Parliament. " Herr Adolf Bar wrote in Die Entwicklung der grossen osteuropdischen und orientallschen Fragen, Weimar, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 328) : " A successful war must give us free land in the East. We do not want a cash indemnity from the Russians, because we cannot obtain it; but we can get property in land. We see a future Germany arising, a Greater Germany, a firmly knit national State within 68 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS enlarged frontiers, an unselfish leader of a new Central Europe stretching from the Meuse and the Adria to the Bug and the Black Sea. " Herr Wolfgang Eisenhart wrote in Was lehrt uns der Kricg, Naumburg 1915 (Grumbach, p. 329) : " Before all, we must fight for better and more easily defendable frontiers in the East and in the West, and settle the conquered frontier districts with German settlers. It would be recommendable to introduce a system of military colonies which the Romans employed in their conquests. Part of the hostile population should be expropriated at the cost of our present enemies and should be replaced by our German soldiers, j " Furthermore, England's world dominion must be finally broken. We hope to obtain from this war the strengthening and increase of our colonies. " CHAPTER VII GERMANY'S GENERAL WAR AIMS THE Germans have gone to war with the intention, and in the hope, of profiting vastly. That hope and desire was only natural in view of their recent history. The wars of 1864, J 866, and 1870-71 were almost bloodless if compared with the present struggle. They lasted only a very short time, and they yielded truly gigantic results both territorially and economically. Immediately after the opening of hostilities the leaders of German thought, German politicians, German publicists, etc., formed vast plans regarding Germany's future. Every one raised demands according to his bent. Some, whose interests were confined by the limits of Europe, merely demanded large annexations in the East and the West, and a monteary indemnity which would yield a large cash profit to the State. Those who were particularly interested in Germany's naval development and colonial future demanded acquisitions oversea. Some proclaimed that, as the result of the war, Germany should establish a Federal State reach- ing from Antwerp or from Calais to Bagdad and to the Persian Gulf which would dominate Europe. Others, endowed with a still more exuberant imagination, de- manded that, as the result of the war, Germany should become the foremost Power in the world, should rule the world. As those who demanded local, Central European, trans-maritime, and world-wide expansion did not always specialise in the war aims they put forward, it is somewhat difficult to classify their pronounce- 69 70 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS ments according to the aims desired. Special chapters have been devoted to Germany's war aims regarding Belgium, regarding France, regarding Central Europe, etc., because in the extracts given in them the demand for the acquisition of French or Belgian soil or for the creation of a Central European Federation undef Ger- man leadership was particularly emphasised. Owing to the variety of war aims there is, of course, a good deal of overlapping. Many Germans did not specialise in putting forward their war aims, but demanded acquisitions in every direction and if possible in all directions. A number of pronouncements of the kind are given in the follow- ing pages. They will show the comprehensiveness and the universality of Germany's desire for territorial ac- quisitions wherever possible. Herr Paasche, a National Liberal Deputy and the Vice-President of the Reichstag, stated on April i8th, 1915, at Kreuznach (Grumbach, p. 71): "We may not discuss our peace aims, but expres- sion should be given to the desire which lives in the heart of every German : ' We shall not give up the land of our enemies which we have conquered with so much German blood. ' We must get to the English Channel, even if we should have to begin all over again, and if we have to conquer once more all the old strongholds. The German nation also demands that we should be protected against new inroads of the Russian hordes in the East. The pen must not give up what the sword has won. " Herr Basserman, the leader of the National Liberal Party, stated in December 1914 (Grumbach, p. 71): "The victorious German eagle will unfold its wings GENERAL WAR AIMS 71 and rise to higher altitudes than ever before. And we shall know how to retain for all future the lands which have been fertilised with German blood. Ardent love of the Fatherland enables us to make the great- est sacrifices. Let us, then, hold on to that which we have gained and acquire in addition that which we need. " The two eminent parliamentarians mentioned spoke with statesmanlike reserve and self-restraint. Their demands were made in a manner resembling that of the Imperial Chancellor. Of course no similar restraint was observed by other leading Germans who did not attempt to imitate the detachment and the deliberate vagueness of the Imperial Chancellor. For instance, Professor Ernst Haeckel, the celebrated scientist, wrote in Das Monistische Jahrhundert (Grumbach, p. 255) on November i6th, 1914: " In my opinion, the following fruits of victory are desirable for the future of Germany and of allied Central Europe: (i) Liberation from England's tyr- anny. (2) Invasion of the British Pirate State through the German Army and Navy, occupation of London. (3) Partition of Belgium, the larger part west, up to Ostend-Antwerp, to become a German Federal State; North Belgium to fall to Holland and South-East Belgium to Luxemburg, which also should become a German Federal State. (4) Germany to receive a large part of the British Colonies and the Congo State. (5) France to cede part of its north- eastern provinces. (6) Russia to be incapacitated by reconstituting the Kingdom of Poland, which is to be connected with Austria-Hungary. (7) The Baltic Prov- inces of Russia to fall to Germany. (8) Finland to 72 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS be made independent, and to be connected with Sweden. " With an exuberant enthusiasm similar to that dis- played by the aged Professor, but with fuller details, Herr A. Oelzelt-Newin demanded in Welche Strafe soil die treffen, die Schuld am Weltkrieg T rag en? " Leipzig, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 340) : " We should still have to prepare for war unless Russia be deprived of all influence on the Continent. That country wishes to dominate the Balkan Peninsula and through it the Mediterranean. The aim of the peace settlement must be to preserve Russia's Asiatic character and to destroy its position as a European Great Power. That can be done only by cutting off its western parts which culturally and economically are most valuable, and at the same time keep Russia away from all European seas. The latter cannot be achieved merely by treaty. The separating line should be drawn from Kronstadt via Brest-Litovsk and Taganrog to Baku. Finland would, of course, be separated from Russia. All fortresses, especially those on the sea, would have to be destroyed and Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, Poland, Volhynia, Podolia Bessa- rabia, and parts of Little Russia and South Russia, Taurida and Caucasia would have to be ceded. The provinces to be ceded would comprise about one-fifteenth of Russia's territory, and about one-fourth of its in- habitants, and these would be Russia's best and richest citizens. . . . " As regards the Balkans, Serbia and Montenegro should be wiped off the map. . . . " There can be no united and powerful Central GENERAL WAR AIMS 73 Europe as long as France remains a strong Great Power. Its greatness and strength must be destroyed. That must be our aim at the peace. This can be done not only by territorial adjustments, for indemnities and commercial treaties also can destroy a State. ... It is too early to discuss whether the northern harbours of France should be ceded to Germany. Possibly the States of Central Europe require a Mediterranean port such as Toulon. In connection with this, the possession of Nice would probably be indispensable. " It is certain that France would have to lose North Africa, because it would be insufficiently injured by a mere war indemnity. It would also not suffice to insist on the cession of the French Fleet. All the forti- fications, especially the harbour fortifications, would have to be destroyed, and one of the most important conditions of peace would have to be a permanent undertaking of the French not again to have a merchant marine. France should be given a position similar to that occupied by Spain. . . . "It is extremely important for Europe to make England innocuous. This can be done without a naval victory provided the Central Powers are victorious on land. England's hardest punishment would be its complete exclusion from the Mediterranean. That can be done in part by Turkey after it has acquired Egypt and the Suez Canal. Besides, England would be cut off from Malta and the other islands when Gibraltar has been taken and Tangiers has ceased to be neutral. " Professor Doctor Hermann Schumacher demanded in Meistbegiinstigung und Zollunterscheidung, Leipzig, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 346) : 74 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS " The war can compensate us for our huge sacrifices to some extent if we succeed in pushing forward our frontiers in the East, so as to acquire settlement colonies for our agriculture, and if we protect more efficiently the wealthiest and most highly developed portion of the country in the West. " On July 29th, 1915, the Preussiche Kreuzzeitung wrote (Grumbach, p. 60) : " By our heavy and sanguinary sacrifices we have purchased the knowledge of the points where the political, military, and economic power of Germany requires , completion. We have learned to know the spots on our frontiers which require increased protection. The knowledge gained will and must bear fruit. The terri- tories which Germany has conquered with the blood of its best sons cannot be handed back if they are neces- sary for strengthening its position. " Doctor Oppenheimer stated in Das Monistische Jahr- hundert, on December 10, 1914 (Grumbach, p. 256) : " I desire to see a union of States comprising all the civilised nations of Europe. Germany should be the leading State, and the German Emperor the representa- tive head. . . . We should prepare for such an ideal. If, as we hope and believe, we shall be victorious, we must before all completely overthrow England, our most dangerous enemy, and deprive it of its Colonies and Fleet. One might also take the Fleet from France and exact from it ample indemnities. Belgium should be- come part of the German Empire, a second Alsace- Lorraine, and the King be eliminated. " GENERAL WAR AIMS 75 Professor Martin Spahn wrote in the monthly Hoch- in October 1914 (Grumbach, p. 24) : " Germany cannot embark upon world policy on a footing of equality with other nations as long as we are restricted to our present geographical position. We must strive to improve our position towards the coun- tries oversea. England must no longer be allowed to close them to us. The coast of all Continents, except the American, which can protect itself, must henceforth be. dominated by German naval guns. . . . This demand signifies that our conquests made at the dawn of the war must permanently be retained. " Particularly we must get to the Channel. Having suffered so much from Belgium, that country cannot redeem itself by handing over to us the Congo State. However much self -administration the Empire may grant to Belgium, it is indispensable for us to dispose completely of the southern part of the Netherlands. We have occupied Belgium against France, and we require that country against England. The Channel is by far the most important European trade route. As one of its two shores cannot be taken away from England, we must have the other. " Professor Doctor Max von Gruber wrote in October 1915 in the Suddeutsche Monatshefte (Grumbach, p. 242) : " However one - depicts to oneself the future of the German nation, it is clear that even those who think it most desirable that Germany should expand as vastly as possible her world commerce, her world shipping, and her Colonies, it is clear that all these things can 76 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS be obtained and preserved only if we have made Ger- many an unassailable fortress in Europe. Expansion oversea is possible only if we can force Russia to limit its expansion for all time to Asia, and to seek access to the open sea on the Chinese coast and on the Persian Gulf. . . . Only two hundred million Germans will be strong enough to protect German liberty in the year 2000. " Doctor Adolf Grabowsky wrote in Das Neue Deutsch- land of October 28th, 1914 (Grumbach, p. 213) : " At present nothing is more urgent than that the whole German nation should be seized by the will to conquest. " Only then we rise and become an Imperial Power. Then only can we hold our own against England. . . . " We must, at whatever price, enlarge Germany's ter- ritory on the Continent. It does not suffice if we con- nect the new territories merely by a Customs Union, for we must be their master diplomatically and militarily as well. . . . " Csesarism was the principle of ancient Rome. Fed- eralism is the principle of the new world. The best connection is the federal tie. . . . " Look at Belgium. If we should simply annex it, we should have a second Poland in the West, and this new Poland would be much worse than the old, for all the people would be insurgents. Now, should we retain only the strategical line Liege-Namur, take Ant- werp in addition, allow the rest of Belgium to administer itself, and bring the country into a favourable con- nection with Germany, we should have all security for its preservation. The Belgian coast would always be GENERAL WAR AIMS 77 for us a military position and tete de pont against England. At the same time, the Belgians would not feel that they are Germany's subjects. Hence, the danger of insurrections would be avoided. If we re- tain Antwerp, it would be wise to make an exchange with Holland whereby Germany would receive the mouth of the Scheldt while Holland would get the Belgian part of Limburg. . . . "If people should ask whether we intend to become a World-Power which overtops the other World-Powers so greatly that Germany would be the only real World- Power, the reply must be that the will to world-power has no limits. A World-Power has less right ever to consider itself satisfied than has a Great Power. The principle of the balance of power on land and sea is absolutely irreconcilable with the ideal of world- power. ..." Professor Doctor E. Brandenburg demanded in Die Reichsgrundung, Leipzig, 1916 (Grumbach, p. 358) : " May our frontiers be extended as far as is required in the interest of our future security, and as far as we can advance them without diminishing our ability of defending our territories. However, our conquered territories must be given no influence upon the inner structure of the State until they have firmly grown into Germany. " Professor Doctor Heinrich Sieveking wrote in Unsere Aufgaben, Berlin, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 347) : "If we bring the war to a victorious end, it is our good right to demand stronger points for the better 78 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS security of our frontiers. We must attach to Germany the districts necessary for increasing the stock of our raw materials, such as the ore deposits of Lorraine. We must obtain positions on the sea which are of decisive importance for our maritime tasks. . . . Would not an internally independent Belgium and Poland find their greatest advantage by being attached to Germany?" Professor Doctor Conrad Bornhak stated in Die Grenzboten on February 23rd, 1916 (Grumbach, p. 203) : " Germany's peace will presumably not be concluded under the sign of the principle of nationalities. There should be no deception. The States composed of various nationalities, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, have become more strongly consolidated than ever during the war. The attempt to partition them would be hopeless. Germany has only one war aim: security for the future. We must struggle on and create all possible guarantees and securities that none of our enemies, either separately or united with others, will dare ever again to fight Germany. That was declared by the Imperial Chancellor in his speech of May 28th, 1915. If this aim can be supported here and there, for instance, in the Baltic Provinces and in the Flemish lands, by putting forward the principle of nationalities, we can only be pleased. But Germany's only aim is future security. " Doctor Albert Gottlieb, explained in the Grenzboten on December 3Oth, 1914 (Grumbach, p. 193) : " Domination may be founded either on power or GENERAL WAR AIMS 79 on wise calculation. Leadership requires more than mere force. It requires superiority in culture and morality and the ability to understand the peculiarities of others. The world-power of the future must fall into the hands of a nation which has these qualities, and that nation is the German nation. . . . The limits of German vision are expanded. The eye surveys the countries from the North Cape to the Indian Ocean, it surveys an empire which geographically, economically, and politically possesses unlimited possi- bilities. " On May 3Oth, 1916, Herr Wolfgang Eisenhart wrote in the Preussische Kreuzzeitung (Grumbach, p. 164) : " The great question is : Is the basis of power which Bismarck has given us in his time sufficient to secure vigorous development to German culture and to Ger- man morality? If this question should be answered in the negative, and that answer seems dictated by the experiences of the present war, then a policy of force (Machtpolitik) is justified which gives to German culture that secure and broad political foundation without the possession of which Germany and the German nation will be weighed down by the great World-Powers, England, Russia, and North America, notwithstanding our great intellectual position. Herein lies the moral right to a policy of conquest in the present war which has been forced upon us. " It should not be objected that such a policy of violence cannot be carried out except at the cost, and to the injury, of other nations which have as much right to live their own lives as has the German nation. This idea expresses one of the greatest fallacies of the 80 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS present time. It is not true that all nations have an equal right of existence, that all nations have an equal claim to develop their culture and to live their own lives. There is no equality among men, nor is there equality among nations. There are rising and declining nations. There are youthful nations for which it is a blessing if they are tutored and taught by a foreign nation pos- sessed of a higher morality. There are declining nations, nations which are in a state of moral decay, which have lost their right to national existence, and which there- fore must make room for the higher civilisation of the men whom Destiny has made a master nation. " CHAPTER VIII GERMANY'S WAR AIMS REGARDING BELGIUM IN the following pages a number of representative extracts will be given which show Germany's war aims towards Belgium. Many further references to Belgium are of course to be found in other chapters, such as those which deal with Germany's war aims regarding France, regarding England, etc. A full list of references to Belgium will be found in the Analytical Index at the end of this book. Many Germans have demanded the annexation of Belgium for the sake of ensuring Germany's security against another attack. Sometimes this demand is put forward with a show of judicious moderation. For instance, in a speech made by Herr Stresemann, one of the leading members of the National Liberal Party, and delivered in the name of and on behalf of that Party, it was stated (Grumbach, p. 69) on April 6th, 1916: " The Belgium problem has an important political aspect. Unless we wish that that country should once more become a base for a hostile attack on the part of our enemies, the status quo ante with regard to Bel- gium must be ruled out and Germany's supremacy in Belgium must be guaranteed militarily, politically, and economically. " Si 82 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS Another very prominent Liberal politician, Doctor Miiller-Meiningen, the well-known leader of the Radical People's Party, wrote in Belgische Eindrucke und Ausbliche, published in Munich in 1916 (Grumbach, p. 294) : " The complete reconstitution of the old political position in Belgium is in my opinion impossible. No one acquainted with the circumstances doubts that Belgium's independence and liberty are things of the past as far as the Entente Powers are concerned. After the present war, Belgium would be no more and no less than a French or English colony without political independence. . . . " The so-called guarantee of Belgium's independence by the five Great Powers has been that country's misfortune. That arrangement bore in it the germ of continuous conflicts. The security of peaceful internal development of that wealthy country, which is the tete du pont of Europe, can be assured only by the guarantee of a single powerful State. Guarantors who are at the same time opponents and competitors cannot offer any protection to Belgium. On the contrary, they are a constant cause of fear and danger. A country so protected is like a volcano which may erupt at any moment. Protection can be given only by a single neighbour Power of vastly preponderant strength which can guarantee the peaceful develop- ment of the country not merely on paper, but in actual fact. " Many Germans, acting on the maxim divide et impera, wish to divide the Belgians into Flemish and Walloons, to play out the one section against the other, WAR AIMS REGARDING BELGIUM 83 and to attach in some form or other the Walloons to Germany largely because of their supposed racial affinity. Many references to the Walloons will be found in other chapters. Their position can easily be ascertained by reference to the Index at the end of this volume. Advocating the separation of the Flemish Belgians and of the Walloons, Professor Doctor Conrad Borchling wrote in Das Belgische Problem, published in Hamburg in 1914 (Grumbach, p. 286) : "If Germany is able to speak the decisive word at the conclusion of peace with regard to Belgium's future then the disastrous connection between the Walloons and the Flemish should cease. " Guided by similar motives, Doctor Hermann Losch wrote in Der Mitteleuropaische Wirtschaftsblock, Leip- zig, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 286) : " The present war is being fought not only in Belgium but also about Belgium. The precious German blood which has been spilt in huge quantities on Belgian soil must be revenged. No German Chancellor, and not even the German Emperor in person, can to-day con- vince the German nation that Belgium should remain after the war as it would have remained had it fulfilled Germany's first wish, or Germany's second wish, to allow a free passage to the German troops. For reasons of military security the. whole Belgian coast and all for- tresses, particularly the threatening fortress of Liege, must remain in German hands. " The unnatural connection of the Walloons and of the Flemish parts must be ended. 84 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS " The whole territory must be included within the Central European economic union of the future. . . . " All Belgian State railways and the Belgian post, telegraphs, and cables must come into the possession of Germany. " The National Bank of Belgium must be closed and German currency be introduced. . . . " The problem whether Belgium should remain a State, the future of the Congo State, the question what languages may be used, etc., are of comparatively minor importance. It is also a secondary question whether the small and purely German language districts in the east of Belgium should be attached to the Rhenish Province, what the nature of Belgium's future Parlia- ment should be, etc. In view of the mixture of na- tionalities in Belgium, it would be out of the question to put matters to the popular vote. The remarks which in connection with this have been addressed to us by the United States do not apply, as we have not heard that the North American Indians, the population of Panama, and the inhabitants of the Philippines have assented to their incorporation in the United States by means of a plebiscite. " While many Germans wish for the annexation of Belgium because they see in it a powerful bulwark against France, by far the greater number desire its acquisition because the Belgian harbours would increase Germany's sea power and its offensive strength against England. Professor Doctor Max Apt wrote, for in- stance, in Zwischen Krieg und Frieden, published in Leipzig in 1914 (Grumbach, p. 284) : "As Germany, notwithstanding its peacefulness, has WAR AIMS REGARDING BELGIUM 85 not been spared this terrible ordeal, we must with the utmost energy and without compunction exploit the victories of our armies to the full. We must not give up the strong positions which we hope to conquer on the north coast of Belgium and in France, because their possession alone will guarantee Germany's future development as a world and sea Power. The question whether Belgium should be annexed or not should be subordinated to higher considerations. The annexa- tion of Belgium would have to be considered not as an expansion of Germany's territory, but only from the point of view whether annexation is necessary in order to be able to hold the conquered coast districts. If it is strategically necessary, we must annex Belgium even if we do not desire it." The Preussische Kreuzzeitung wrote on March 24th, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 59) : " Belgium's re-establishment would not merely create the same state of affairs which obtained before the war, but would make the position materially worse. At the commencement of a new war the combined armies of the three States would invade the Rhenish Province. . . . " We are of opinion that the possession of the Belgian coasts would place into our hands an instrument of power which we cannot abandon. Without these Ger- many would be considerably weakened in case of a future war with England, with which we ought to reckon with certainty. " Professor Doctor Martin Spahn wrote in Im Kampf 86 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS um unsere Zukunft, M. Gladbach 1915 (Grumbach, P- 350) : " It lies in the nature of the German people to strive beyond the limits of its present power. Rightly con- sidered, it has never fitted into the narrow circumstances of the Western Continent as a State among other States. A thousand years ago the Germans became the bearers of the Empire of the West. . . . " Our frontier towards France was in the Middle Ages farther westward than it is now. . . . However, far more important than the correction of the German- French frontier is the question of the future of the mouths of the Rhine, as far as that territory directly faces the English coast. The corresponding question arises what limits should be put to the Great Serbian aspirations. May Belgium remain an English strong- hold on the Continent? ... If we and England were placed coast against coast, Germany would be England's equal. " In Kontinentalpolitik by "A Large Rhenish Manu- facturer, " published in Bonn in 1915, we read (Grum- bach, p. 330) : " Belgium is in German hands. The treacherous way in which Belgium sold itself to France and England behind Germany's back and gave up its neutrality does not allow compassion for this country. England has created Belgium, and has now become its executioner. One thing is certain: We shall not give up the coast with its valuable harbours which make us England's direct neighbours on the other side of the big ditch. . . . WAR AIMS REGARDING BELGIUM 87 " We shall do a great service to the Russians proper if we confine them after a lost war a lesson which they absolutely required for curing them of their megalomania to districts inhabited by a homo- geneous population with whom all the nations will be at peace. " Some Germans demand the incorporation of Belgium into Germany, not only in order to obtain a position whence France may be invaded and England more easily be attacked, but also because the acquisition of Belgium would bring with it that of the Congo State, which would furnish an admirable basis for striking at the French and British possessions in Africa. Herr Alfred Ruhemann wrote, for instance, on October 7th, 1914, in the well-known weekly Die Grenzboten, which is fre- quently governmentally inspired, under the heading "The Belgian Problem" (Grumbach, p. 187): " In redrawing the map of Europe we must remember that the Belgians do not sufficiently exploit the natural wealth of their country, that we have in England an interested and dangerous rival in the Belgian market, and that in future we must in Belgium not again stumble over the English. ' The demand has been put forward that Germany should act thoroughly and incorporate Belgium with the Empire as a punishment for its breach of neutrality. In that case many Belgians would presumably prefer to emigrate to France or England. That would be an advantage for Germanising the country. I am firmly convinced that the Belgians, both Walloons and Flemish, who remained would soon submit to German organisa- tion, discipline, and civilisation, particularly if they should find out that, owing to the introduction of the 88 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS German coinage, their earnings should be increased by 20 per cent. However, Belgian taxation might have to be raised under German rule. " It would have to be borne in mind that in Bel- gium there is scarcely any room for German emigrants, for Belgium is the most densely populated land in Europe. . . . " I have already pointed out the importance of Antwerp and of the Belgian coast. The acquisition of Belgium would render up to Germany the huge African Congo State. If, at the same time, Morocco was taken away from France, Germany would at last possess a Central African Empire, having access to three seas, an Empire which we ought to have acquired long ago, and which is necessary for us in order to break England's power in Africa. . . . " The desire which has been expressed in Germany that Belgium should under no circumstances be allowed to preserve its present shape is justified. It is a* matter of course that Liege, which has been conquered at such heavy sacrifice, should not be given up. The province of Liege is economically extremely important, and it adjoins directly the industrial districts of the Rhenish Provinces. Militarily, it would constitute an unconquerable bulwark against France, for it domi- nates the whole of the Ardennes. Besides, it may be argued that, as Antwerp owes its prosperity to German intelligence and German industry, it should be incor- porated in Germany as a matter of justice. It cannot be doubted that, under German control, Antwerp would soon become the greatest European harbour. The Bel- gian coast, with Antwerp and Liege, might be taken from Belgium, leaving to the country the coal district WAR AIMS REGARDING BELGIUM 89 as its only resource, and allow that part to survive as a buffer State against France. " On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that Holland and Luxemburg adjoin Belgium, and that both these States have preserved their neutrality although they do not love Germany. " CHAPTER IX GERMANY'S WAR AIMS REGARDING FRANCE EXTRACTS illustrating Germany's war aims regarding France will be found not only in the present chapter, but also in many others. A full list of these extracts is contained in the Analytical Index at the end of this book. Many Germans, animated by a spirit of deep ani- mosity and blind hatred, advocate that France should be humbled to the dust, that it should be treated with the utmost severity, that it should be reduced to a Power of the third or fourth rank. For instance, Doctor Albert Bovenschen wrote in Deutschland an der Zeitenwende, Leipzig, 1916 (Grumbach, p. 357) : " It would be foolish sentimentality did we not do everything in our power to defeat France in such a manner with our armies that that country will never again dare to act as a disturber of the peace. France will never forget that the German Empire has been erected upon the ruins of the French l gloire. ' There- fore it will continue to side with Germany's enemies unless it should decline and become a State of the third \ or fourth rank. " Russia must not be allowed to retain its former frontiers, but must be limited to its true Great Russian kernel. Its face must be turned towards the East. " 90 WAR AIMS REGARDING FRANCE 91 While some Germans passionately advocate that France should be destroyed as a Great Power, that that country should be treated without mercy and without consideration, other Germans, taking a larger view of political matters, desire Germany to conclude a generous peace with that country, ally Germany with France, and employ France as a German vassal against Germany's enemies. For instance, the well- known Liberal leader Herr Friedrich Naumann, the author of the much-discussed book on Central Europe, wrote in Der Deutsche Krieg, Berlin, 1914 (Grumbach, p. 288) : " It is possible let us say no more than this it is possible that France, bending under the material and moral sufferings inflicted upon it, frees itself in the midst of the present war from the disastrous policy of alliances which it has followed hitherto. If this should be the case, then, but only then, we must build for the French bridges of gold. We must act approxi- mately in the same manner in which Bismarck acted in 1866 towards the Austrians. At the time his action was considered to be due to weakness. Yet it was an expression of strength. It was one of the best and greatest of Bismarck's actions. ... At present the French need pay only a war indemnity in respect of their own war, supposing they conclude peace. If they should continue fighting, and if Germany and Austria- Hungary should remain victorious, they would have to pay the Russian war indemnity as well. At the present moment the effect of this additional exaction cannot be expressed in land and territory. However, the fact itself is perfectly clear. " Herr Naumann alludes to the fact that Bismarck 92 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS could conclude an alliance with Austria, having treated that country comparatively leniently after its defeat. The idea of making a comparatively generous peace with France on the condition, or at least under the pre- sumption, that France would consent to ally itself with Germany and against Germany's opponents, was ex- pressed more plainly by the eminent political writer Doctor Paul Rohrbach. He wrote in Zum Weltvolk hindurch, Stuttgart, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 301): -7 > " Russia and England, claiming universal dominion, are necessarily Germany's irreconcilable opponents until their power has been broken. Germany and Austria-Hungary may ally themselves easily with France, but never with England or Russia. Germany and France combined would be able to embark upon a truly great policy in Europe and oversea. Of course, the colonial question would have to be comprehensively regulated, especially with France. The French would have to give up in tropical Africa large districts, but for these they might receive compensation without diffi- culty. . . . " When the French have been defeated we shall be ready to make peace and to co-operate with them politically. Towards England our maxim will be the destruction of the English domination of the sea. To- wards Russia, the destruction of Czarism. " Some Germans are so anxious to detach France from the Alliance and to attach it to Germany that they have spoken of the Franco-German War in tones of anguish and distress. They have praised France for her gallantry, and have expressed regret that she has been misguided enough to attack Germany, although England is the true enemy of that country. For in- WAR AIMS REGARDING FRANCE 93 stance, Professor G. von Schultze-Gaevernitz, a leading German economist, whose name is widely known in France, wrote in La Mer Libre, Stuttgart, 1915 (Grum- bach, p. 307) : " Germany considers it contrary to civilisation that a single Power should freely dispose of the world's trade, be ready to strike at the heart of other nations, and bring starvation and misery into the humblest homes. Germany fights for the liberty of the seas, for mankind in general, and, therefore, also for France. Germany does not aim at supremacy on the sea, but only at a maritime balance of power. . . . Germany, being an industrial and creditor State, demands suffi- cient territory not too far away from the homeland. The Belgian Congo would fulfil this double need with- out compromising the colonial interests either of France or of England. " The Professor's essay, though published in Germany, was printed in French. The reason for this is obvious. Some Germans advocate that Germany should tear away from France the north-eastern districts, whence both Paris and London could be dominated. For in- stance, Herr Konrad von Winterstetten wrote in Der Organische Aufbau Europas, Berlin, 1916 (Grumbach, P- 367) : "If it is our war aim to give Germany permanent security from France and to establish the freedom of the seas, then North-Eastern France up to the mouth of the Somme that is, up to the line Vignacourt- Bapaume- Verdun- St. Mihiel-Pont a Mousson must be annexed to Germany, as a considerable number of eminent politicians have demanded. When this has 94 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS been achieved, Paris and London will be compelled to act as good neighbours to us. There is no other possi- bility to force England to keep the peace honestly. Hence the creation of this frontier and the acquisition of Belfort and surroundings for the protection of South Germany is thoroughly justified. This is by no means an arbitrary conquest. It must be considered as the minimum of security. No words need be lost about the attaching of Belgium to Central Europe. That is a matter of course. Linguistically the majority of the inhabitants belong to Central Europe. " Similarly, the geographical frontier in the south- west must be extended so that Trieste will be safe from hostile attack. Upper Venetia, up to a line from the southern end of the Lago di Garda to the mouth of the Piave is indispensable to Austria. " While some Germans wish to humble France to the dust, or to make it a German vassal, others, who look upon matters rather from the point of view of the economist than from that of the statesman or the soldier, think that Germany's principal war aims with regard to France should consist in acquiring the vast coal and iron ore deposits which occur in North- Eastern France and in neighbouring Belgium. For instance, the well-known economist Professor Schu- macher, following closely the arguments given in great length in the Petition of the Six Great Economic Asso- ciations of Germany, which is printed in full in Chapter III of this book, stated in a lecture delivered on June 2Oth, 1915, which was circulated as a pamphlet (Grum- bach, p. 172) : "The whole western frontier of Germany, from south to north, must be improved as far as circum- WAR AIMS REGARDING FRANCE 95 stances permit. It is no less important to provide for the German war industries upon which successful war- fare must be based. We must protect these against the danger of destruction with all our power. Our frontier must so be drawn that the great iron- works of Lor- raine, which at present are indispensable for producing our war material and which will be still more indis- pensable to us in the future, will be beyond the reach of modern long-distance guns in the French fortresses. Before all, we must secure for Germany the possession of the raw materials necessary for the war industries, and at the same time deprive our enemies of the pos- session of these. " The iron deposits are most important. Without the minette ore of Lorraine we cannot maintain our iron and steel production on a scale sufficiently large for the conduct of the war. Happily, we can boast of the possession of the largest iron deposits in Europe. These we have obtained in consequence of the victori- ous war of 1870-1871. The Peace of Frankfort was to give Germany the entire iron ore deposits of Lorraine. We did not succeed in getting them because the geolo- gists, whom Bismarck consulted at the time when the frontier was delimited, made a mistake. Since the eighties we know that the larger portion of the ore deposits of the plateau of Briey has been left to France, though Bismarck imagined that the bulk of the iron ore had been obtained by Germany. To-day we can rectify that serious error because, happily, Germany seized the French ore district at the beginning of the war, and is holding it firmly in its grasp. " Second in importance for Germany's war industries is coal, especially that kind of coal which can readily 96 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS be converted into coke and which yields the principal explosives. We could not continue the war success- fully if we did not obtain the necessary supply of iron ore from the soil of Lorraine, and we could also not hope to succeed had not nature endowed Germany, and particularly the Rhenish Province and Westphalia, and the neighbouring districts of Belgium and North France, with excellent coke-coal. Similar quantities of that precious raw material do not occur elsewhere in Europe, and their quality is of the best. Now, when we have learned how important the question of munitions is for the issue of the war, and when we are already com- pelled to employ Belgian coal for Germany's own re- quirements, we must declare that the vital needs of the German national in war and in peace make it impossible to render up once more to the enemy these mainsprings of military and economic power. "If we wish to secure the wealth of the soil, the mere political possession of the new territory is not sufficient. On the contrary, we must connect with their political incorporation the entire disposal of the econ- omic factors which can be converted into power. Nowa- days, an increase of territory means a real increase of strength only for the national war industries if the properties acquired are entirely at one's disposal. " In order to obtain the necessary control of the in- dustries established on land which hitherto was French, the indemnification for the properties which must be acquired should be part of the war indemnity which France will have to pay. France, which has so often boasted that it is the banker of the world, will have to employ its financial strength in the first place for repairing the economic damage done. We must not WAR AIMS REGARDING FRANCE 97 hesitate to place upon France a burden which presses the country down to the utmost If it wishes for relief, it may obtain it from its Allies on the other side of the Channel, whose wealth can scarcely be directly touched. As we have to reckon in the first place with France for obtaining a war indemnity in money, we must retain only so much French soil as is absolutely required for our security. " CHAPTER X GERMANY'S WAR AIMS REGARDING ENGLAND GERMANY'S war aims with regard to England are ex- plained, not only in the present chapter, but also in many passages which have necessarily been included in other chapters of this volume. A few principal opinions are given in the next few pages. Those who wish to study the remaining important references to England and the British Empire should turn for guidance to the Index at the end of this book. Germany's war aims with regard to the oversea portions of the British Empire will particularly be found in Chapters XIII, XIV, XV, and XVI, which treat of Germany's colonial war aims, Germany's war aims in the Far East, and of world-conquest. Some Germans, writing with severe self-restraint, advocate merely in a vague and general way that Germany must, in consequence of the war, secure for itself such a powerful position with regard to England that it need no longer fear an English attack and will be able to enforce and maintain the freedom of the sea. For instance, Freiherr von Mackay, a former diplomat, who writes frequently in periodicals and in the Press on matters of statesmanship, stated in the Magdeburgische Zeitung of January 4th, 1916 (Grum- bach, p. 167) : " If Germany wishes to enjoy the right of freedom on the sea, then it must leave the narrow corner where 98 WAR AIMS REGARDING ENGLAND 99 the Elbe falls into the North Sea which prevents its breathing. It must conquer a favourable broad front on the North Sea up to the Channel. There lie the keys of the problem of the freedom of the sea. That territory it must conquer and secure for itself militarily, politically, juridically. " The National Liberal Deputy, Fuhrmann, wrote in the Tagllche Rundschau of August 2ist, 1915 (Grum- bach, p. 79) : " In days of hatred and in days of calm reflection Germany remains convinced that peace is possible between Germany and England only on a base estab- lished by fighting, a base which strengthens so greatly militarily, politically, and economically Germany's position in Europe and in the world, on the free seas and in our future Colonial Empire, that any further English attack would in advance be condemned to failure. " While some Germans declare, with philosophic de- tachment that something must be done to strengthen Germany's position as against England and to make another English attack on Germany impossible, others put forward more definite proposals, and some adopt a truly Napoleonic tone, and demand, in the very words used by the Great Corsican, that Belgium must become a military base for use against England and Antwerp a pistol aimed at England's breast. For instance, the Leipzig er Neueste Nachrichten, one of the most im- portant German dailies, wrote editorially on March 24th, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 80) : " We must obtain the aim which the Imperial ioo GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS Chancellor has indicated in his speech in the Reichstag. We must be protected for all future against attack. We require an increment of power. We require, before all, an outlet from the ' Wet Triangle ' to the sea, we require a pistol aimed at England's breast Antwerp. Otherwise the old trouble will continue. " Many similar demands will be found throughout the present volume. They can be easily located by refer- ring to the title " Belgium " in the Index at the back of the book. While some Germans consider that, with regard to England, it is most important that Germany should dominate the Channel, and that for this purpose the Belgian, and a large portion of the North-French, coast should be annexed to Germany, others believe that the key to the British Empire is to be found not at Calais, but at Suez, that Germany should strive be- fore all to control the Suez Canal and thus control the British Empire. Herr Ernst Jackh wrote in Das Grossere Deutschland on June 26th, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 226) : " Calais lies on the outer circumference of the German Empire. Suez lies in its very centre. From Calais England can be molested and can be fired upon. At Suez it can be vanquished and killed. The seizure of Calais does not affect England. It touches merely the south coast and does not touch in any way the vast Empire itself. It threatens only one of the roads which lead to England. Suez is the only direct con- nection of European England and the African, Asiatic, and Australian portions of the British world-empire. Here the vital nerve can be struck at. Calais is a blow with the fist which stuns. At Suez we can stab England WAR AIMS REGADING:. ^NG^A^P; / 101 through the heart and kill it. Therefore Suez is an aim which is most strongly to be desired. " The world-war is now being fought for securing the territories situated between the Dardanelles and Suez, for organising a wealthy and powerful Turkey, for securing the growing Germany against England's hostility, for threatening permanently the centre of Eng- land's world-power about, or in, Suez. " The distinguished publicist, Doctor Paul Rohrbach, who enjoys great prestige in Germany, wrote in Das Grosser e Deutschland on September nth, 1915 (Grum- bach, p. 225) : " Many people say : ' Of course it is impossible to destroy England's power in a single war. ' That is not impossible, but is quite feasible. That may be done in Egypt. The construction of the Suez Canal was England's misfortune. English statesmanship foresaw the danger. Hence it opposed its building. . . . When the English troops in Egypt capitulate to the Turks the blow will resound from Gibraltar to Singapore. When the keystone is withdrawn the whole vault of English world-power will tumble down. The day on which England recognises its downfall in Egypt and in the world will, unless it asks in time for peace and declares its readiness to pay the price demanded, be the birthday of the new Oversea Germany. On that day we shall write our gratitude to our brave colonial warriors upon the map of the world, and we shall set our border-stones upon territories across the sea wherever we want. " Doctor Paul Rohrbach is not only one of the leading 102 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS German authors and journalists who deal with politics, and especially with world-politics, but he has travelled very largely, and he has been entrusted with Govern- ment missions, etc. At one time he acted as Imperial Commissioner in South-West Africa. His opinion should, therefore, not be treated as that of an ordinary journalist. Some Germans wish not merely that Germany should dominate the Suez Canal and drive the English out of Egypt, but they advocate that English merchant shipping should not be allowed to make use of the Suez Canal in peace time. Doctor Carl Anton Schafer wrote in Das Grosser e Deutschland on November 6th, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 228) : " As soon as we have the Suez Canal in our hands we can say, answering the Morning Post: ' We for- bid you, England, to make use of the Suez Canal with your merchant marine even in peace time. . . . ' We must never allow England to wrest from our hand the Egyptian scourge by diplomatic trickery. Our ceterum censeo must be the maxim : ' We must conquer the Suez Canal. ' " The distinguished economist, Professor Doctor Her- mann Schumacher, who teaches at Bonn University, stated in a lecture delivered on June 2oth, 1916, which was later on circulated in the form of a pamphlet (Grumbach, p. 171) : " We must have Belgium, not only for the protection of the German Homeland, but also for the protection of our world-trade and of our colonies. We cannot deprive England of the geographical advantage of its insular position. It will always be difficult for us to attack it with our armies as long as the English remain WAR AIMS REGARDING ENGLAND 103 on their islands. But we can increase the possibility of attacking it by sea. If we permanently establish ourselves on the coast opposite England which has so often been fought for, if we establish ourselves either at Zeebrugge or farther west, at the opening of the English Channel and of the Atlantic at a spot opposite the mouth of the Thames and of England's capital, and station there entire fleets of torpedo-boats, sub- marines, and flying machines which are always ready for war, then the advantages of England's insular posi- tion will gradually be balanced to an ever-increasing degree by corresponding disadvantages. Thus we can, with one blow, materially improve our position as against the English Fleet. " England's position in the world's trade is based not so much upon her vast colonial possessions as upon the domination of the principal trade-routes of the globe which lead from the English coast to the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, and thence to the Red Sea, to India, to Australia, and to Eastern Asia. On this im- portant route England has placed her sentinels long ago. We shall scarcely be able to drive it out of these positions, but we must follow its wise example. It is not impossible that we may obtain from France and from Italy, and with the assistance of Turkey, harbours by the position of which the English bases on the great trade-route described may be checkmated. I think, for instance, of French Somaliland at the southern opening of the Red Sea, with Djibutil which lies opposite Aden, of a harbour in North Morocco opposite Gibraltar, of a Turkish base in the Eastern Mediterranean situated as near as possible to the Suez Canal. It is a question to be considered whether such positions should forth- 104 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS with be converted into harbours for the use of Germany's merchant marine and into bases for her submarines. However, such positions should be acquired whenever an opportunity offers as long as the English bases are not effectively neutralised. " There are many references to Germany's war aims in the direction of India, Eastern Asia, and the British world-empire as a whole throughout the present book. They will be found particularly in Chapters XIII, XIV, XV, and XVI, but for a full list of the references the Alphabetical Index should be consulted. CHAPTER XI GERMANY'S WAR AIMS REGARDING RUSSIA AND POLAND PRUSSO-GERMANY'S Polish policy and that country's Russian policy are closely interwoven. Since the time of Frederick the Great, Prussia's Polish policy has been part of its Russian policy and the former has been sub- ordinated to the latter. Therefore Germany's war aims towards Russia and towards Poland should not be treated separately but jointly. In Germany, the land of specialisation, some ex- pansionists occupy themselves with the western countries, some with the countries oversea, and some with the Eastern States. Herr Georg Cleinow has specialised in Russian and Polish affairs on which he has written compendiously and more or less pro- foundly. He is supposed to be perhaps the highest authority on Russian, and especially on Polish, affairs. In addition to being a distinguished author and journalist, he is the editor of the famous weekly Die Grenzboten, a periodical which has very frequently been inspired by the German Government both in Bis- marck's time and afterwards. It is no doubt the fore- most political German weekly. Herr Cleinow wrote in Die Vernichtung der englischen Weltmacht und des Russischen Zarismus, published in Berlin in 1915 (Grum- bach, p. 281) : '' The German language frontier must, with the help of Germans, Letts, Esthonians, Jews, Lithuanians, and 105 io6 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS Poles, be pushed several hundred kilometres farther to- wards the East. " The idea of many Germans, especially of those who take an interest in Russian and Polish affairs, is that Germany should not merely push her frontiers " several hundred kilometres farther towards the East, " that it should not merely push Russia towards the wilds of Asia, but that it should, in addition, dominate the Baltic Sea and convert it into a German lake. Herr Axel Ripke, the editor of the well-known periodical Der Panther, wrote in Der Kampf um die Ostsee (Grumbach, p. 281), Berlin, 1915: " Among the political problems which have apparently been solved a long time ago, but which nevertheless demand to be solved in an entirely new manner during the present time of bloodshed, the foremost position is occupied by the question of the domination of the Baltic. ... As a peaceful condominion of the Baltic exercised jointly by the Germans and the Russians is impossible, it is necessary to establish the German Imperium also along the shores of the Baltic Sea. Historical experience indicates the way by which such imperialism will be achieved. " Doctor Gaigalat, a member of the Prussian Diet, who is greatly interested in Russian affairs, wrote in Die Grenzboten of February 24th, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 199): "Lithuania, which has hitherto been Russian, and which has about 3,300,000 inhabitants, of whom at least 2,000,000 employ the Lithuanian language, should form a separate State and should form a wedge, WAR AIMS REGARDING RUSSIA 107 a buffer State, between the Germanic and Slavonic worlds. . . . " The province of East Prussia requires necessarily a hinterland. . . . The fear that the Lithuanians of Prussia would attach themselves to such a Lithuanian State is perfectly unjustified. . . . " The principal thing is that this new Lithuanian State be placed into intimate connection with Germany. Its army must be put under German command and its territory must become part of the German Customs territory. That would be in the greatest interest of Lithuania itself. ' Only then would the Lithuanians have reliable security for their freedom and be able to form a bulwark against the insatiable greed of pan- Slavism. " While Doctor Gaigalat modestly demands the in- corporation in Germany of Lithuania, with 3,300,000 inhabitants, most Germans who have discussed Ger- many's war aims with regard to Russia have demanded that not only the tribes of the Baltic Provinces but the Finns, the Poles, and the Ukrainians as well should be 'detached from Russia, that Russia should be cut off from the sea, that the Black Sea, belonging to the Ukrainian sphere, should become a Ukrainian, that is an Au*stro-German, lake, for the projected State of Ukrainia was intended to become an Austro-German Protectorate. General von Gebsattel raised these demands very interestingly in the periodical Der Panther in October 1915. His article is noteworthy, not only because of the demands with regard to Russia which it contains, but also because the general frankly admits that Germany had gone to war not because the war was " forced upon " the country, as the Government has unceasingly asserted, but because Germany thought the war necessary and opened it, io8 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS selecting the most favourable moment. He wrote (Grum- bach, p. 207) : " We have desired the war because we thought it necessary, and because we were aware that a war is most easily fought and is least sanguinary the earlier and the more determinedly it is waged. There is an advantage in selecting the favourable moment for war. " We must turn the stiff-necked Russian's face to- ward the East even if in the process some of his vertebrae should be broken. We must tear away Russia's frontier wall and convert it into a wall for the protection of Europe. It cannot be doubted that that will be possible when Russia is beaten. We may assume that the non- Russian people of Russia, the Poles, the Ukrainians, the Finns, and even the Lithuanians, will rather live in a State of their own that under the Russian knout. One would have to revise Russia's historical develop- ment during the last two centuries and re-establish the status quo of the Russian Colossus which obtained be- fore the advent of Peter the Great. We must give to Russia that position, and those tasks, which agree with its half-Asiatic character. " The German nation could, of course, not be asked to fight for the freedom or for the political indepen- dence of the Ukrainians, the Poles, and other foreigners. German blood is too precious for that. We have no lives to spare for crusades. If we fight, we fight for our own advantage, and if we fight Russia we do it in order to obtain that which the nation needs. The German people must not be allowed to decay within its narrow boundaries. . . . " It may be objected that the seizure of land on WAR AIMS REGARDING RUSSIA 109 our western frontier will give Germany millions of foreigners whose presence will endanger the national character of the State. Such a development must be avoided at any price. The way how this can be done is happily shown by a number of historic precedents. It is notorious that the Romans, the greatest practical colonisers of antiquity, considered the forcible transference of masses of population a favourite measure. A similar proceeding was success- fully inaugurated later on by Charlemagne and dur- ing the present war by the Hungarians who transferred tens of thousands of Serbians away from their country. " Doctor Adolf Grabowsky wrote in Die Polmsche Frage, published in Berlin 1916 (Grumbach, p. 282) : " The only solution is an Austro-German condominium over Russian Poland. 'The joint dominion of Germany and Austro-Hungary over Poland satisfies the vital needs of the Central Powers. It unifies the Poles in a way which is disadvantageous neither to Germany nor to Austro-Hungary, and converts Poland into a wall of protection which both countries require. " Doctor Paul Rohrbach wrote in Das Grossere Deutschland on July loth, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 224): " I have previously shown that Europe's freedom from the Russian danger will be established only when the historic dividing-line between Muscovy and the Ukraine has been recreated. Apart from this, the re- establishment of Poland is the first necessity. Germany i io GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS need not consider the acquisition of further Polish ter- ritory, for by such acquisition it would cease to be a national State. The matter is quite different with regard to the three Baltic Provinces of Russia and with regard to Lithuania. Colonists for peopling these provinces may in the first place be found in Russia itself. The German peasants living in Russia number about 2,000,000. The lost children of Germany should be called back and be settled on the German land. " CHAPTER XII GERMANY'S AIMS REGARDING HOLLAND THE previous chapters of this book have made it clear that the German official circles, the German business men, the German intellectuals, the majority of the Ger- man Socialists and the bulk of politicians, writers, etc., demand the incorporation of Belgium into Germany. All the references regarding Belgium may easily be found by means of the Alphabetical Index. Some have been collected in Chapter VIII, entitled "Germany's War Aims regarding Belgium. " If Belgium should become part of the German Em- pire, Holland would be completely hemmed in on land by German territory. It would be a German enclave. Its situation would become precarious, for it would be in Germany's power both politically and economically. Germany's conquest and permanent retention of Belgium would obviously menace Holland's independence, even if Germany were at present in- clined to respect it. In course of time Germany might feel tempted to annex Holland as well. Unfortunately, that desire is already very strong in influential German circles. Holland possesses the mouths of the Rhine and of the Scheldt. The Rhine is by far the most important German river. The possession of Belgium would make the Scheldt also a German river and Antwerp a Ger- man port. Many Germans are loth to see the Rhine mouths possessed and the Scheldt mouth dominated in ii2 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS by the Dutch. Moreover, those Germans who desire Germany to become a great colonial Empire, hope that Holland may, in some way or other, be incor- porated into Germany in consequence of the war, because that country would supply Germany not only with excellent harbours but with valuable Colonies as well. Some Germans have advocated the acquisition of Hol- land, and have recommended it on sentimental grounds. They have reminded their compatriots that Holland at one time belonged to the German Empire, and that the German and the Dutch races are closely akin. For instance, Professor Doctor Rachfahl wrote in March 1916 in the Internationale Monatsschrift fur Wissen- schaft, Kunst, und Technik (Grumbach, p. 338) : " Rejuvenated Germany has again drawn into her arms Alsace and part of Lorraine. . . . Will Arndt's demands be fulfilled? Will the Scheldt and the Ardennes become German territory? Will Luxemburg and Flanders go the same way as Alsace-Lorraine? We must not forget that the Netherlands, of which Belgium is only a part, belonged to the Old German Empire, and that they are largely inhabited by a Ger- manic people. Present-day Holland was German since the dawn of time. " While some Germans recommend both to Germans and to the Dutch a reunion in some form or other on the ground of sentiment, others urge it with consid- erable energy for reasons of advantage or of necessity. They state with great emphasis that Germany requires the Dutch harbours, and they threaten Holland, should that country refuse to merge itself into its powerful neighbour. For instance, Herr Alfred Ruhemann wrote in the leading German political weekly Die AIMS REGARDING HOLLAND 113 Grenzboten on December 23rd, 1914 (Grumbach, p. 192): " Holland may learn from the co-operation of the three Scandinavian Kingdoms that she can find a guarantee of security only if it enters into a coalition and abandons its independence. Would it not be wfse and provident of the Dutch to consider already to-day that the German Empire requires additional naval bases on the North Sea, that in some form or the other it must obtain these either on the coast beyond Belgium or on the mouths of the Rhine? Had the Dutch not better reflect that a strong Antwerp directly connected with its industrial hinterland, the Rhenish Province, would be bound to destroy the prosperity of Rotterdam, especially if, in addition to the outlet at Emden, the German industrial districts possessed a second outlet to the sea through Belgium?" Herr Alfred Ruhemann wrote in Die Vernichtung der englischen Weltmacht, Berlin, 1915 (Grumbach, P- 305): "If we should take Antwerp, we should by its possession not obtain free access to the sea. We require guarantees for that free access, and we can obtain it only if Holland is willing to enter into better and closer relations with Germany. Some day we might have an army in Antwerp and a fleet at the mouth of the Scheldt, but could not bring the two together unless we forced a passage through neutral Holland. . . . "If Portgual should really be obliged by treaty to aid England by sea and land, we could make it very 114 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS easy for that country to get rid of Angola very cheaply. We had intended to purchase that colony, but it would be better to obtain it gratis and to get the Azores, the Cape Verde Isles, and Madeira into the bargain. " Many Germans have advocated that Holland should be given an inducement to join the German Federation. They have recommended that a portion of the Belgium territory should be ceded to Holland and Luxemburg, with the understanding that these two aggrandised States should merge themselves into the German Em- pire. Herr Alfred Ruhemann, for instance, pointed out in Die Grenzboten on October 7th, 1914, that Holland and Luxemburg might be attracted into the German union by large territorial and commercial advantages. He wrote (Grumbach, p. 189) : " Holland has suffered materially great damage by preserving its neutrality, for it has suffered from Eng- land's piracy. Before determining Belgium's fate, Holland and Luxemburg should perhaps be asked what attitude they intend to take up towards Germany in the future. We must see clearly, for we have learnt in the case of Belgium that treaties and declarations of neutrality cannot be relied upon. Both Holland and Luxemburg may claim Germany's gratitude in a mate- rial shape. " Our gratitude should be expressed in a manner suitable to the new relations into which these two States may be prepared to enter with Germany after the war. If these two countries are ready to act in accordance with Germany's wishes and to increase our security towards France and England, it would perhaps be judi- cious to increase the territory of Holland and Luxemburg at Belgium's cost. AIMS REGARDING HOLLAND 115 " Luxemburg might be given Belgian Luxemburg, and thus a firm connection would be created with German Liege, the German Eiffel, and the allied Luxemburg State. It might also be judicious to cede Antwerp and the Flemish Provinces of Belgium and the coast-land, including Dunkirk and Calais, to Holland and so com- plete the Flemish-Dutch State. " Then Germany would possess, in the West, the two great harbours, Antwerp and Rotterdam, which hitherto have been rivals and which henceforth might be made to co-operate. Lastly, these arrangements would de- prive us of the worry and the expenditure of admin- istering these territories ourselves. The question now arises: Will Holland and Luxemburg be ready to give Germany the necessary guarantees of security in entering with us into a Federation ? " Employing similar arguments, Herr G. Cleinow, the editor of Die Grenzboten, wrote in that periodical on November nth, 1914 (Grumbach, p. 190): " Germany wants an enlargement of its power. That is shown by the history of the war. We must protect ourselves against similar attacks in the future. As the Germans outside of Germany are exclusively domiciled in friendly countries, we must seek the necessary in- crease of power in territories where the German language is not spoken. . . . " A connection of Holland with Germany can be permanent and beneficial only if both the Dutch and the Germans should find other advantage in such a union. Profit and loss would have to be equally distributed. Hence no German politician will think of inducing Holland to attach itself to the Empire ii6 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS even if Germany should be able to force Holland to do so after the peace. Holland's acquisition would be desirable only if that country wished for it and believed to find its advantage in a connection with Germany. It is obvious that it would be advantageous for Germany if the mouths of the Rhine were German, if a German sea-coast were facing England. However, the politician who looks ahead would not be satisfied if such an ar- rangement were profitable only to Germany. Both countries would have to benefit. That would perhaps be the case if Holland should obtain from Germany a substantial increase of power. If the war should be brought to a victorious end, Germany's relations with Holland might perhaps be developed as follows: " Holland enters with Germany into a customs union and a military and naval union. With regard to all other matters it retains its full independence. In ex- change, it receives Flemish Belgium, inclusive of Ant- werp. " Profit for Germany : The German Rhine mouths, a broader basis for its Fleet, freedom of commerce in Holland and in the Dutch Colonies. " Advantage for Holland : Gain of about 3,500,000 citizens of similar race and language, protection of the Dutch oversea interests by the German Fleet, great in- crease of the Dutch trade. " Many other extracts relating to Holland may be found in this volume by means of the Alphabetical Index. CHAPTER XIII A GERMAN CENTRAL EUROPE GERMANY and the States allied to it form a connected area. Many years ago ambitious Germans had pro- posed that the old German Zollverein, which had united the -States of Germany before its political unification, should be revived and enlarged, that in Europe a great economic federation should be created which gradualry might become a political federation as well. Germany was to be the leader in such a movement. It was to dominate Europe, and eventually the world. ^ The idea of creating a great Central European Federa- tion under German leadership was greatly strengthened during the war, and it found numerous advocates in Germany. Herr Naumann's book on Central Europe has been translated into English, but it is not mentioned by Grumbach. His valuable book contains a good many references to Central Europe beyond those given in this chapter. Reference to the Index at the end of the book will make it easy for the reader to locate them. It should perhaps be mentioned that M. Grum- bach was apparently unacquainted with some very important pronouncements in favour of a Central Euro- pean Federation which appeared before the publication of his volume. Some Germans blandly assert that nature has willed that Germany should dominate Europe. Professor Alfred Weber wrote in Gedanken zur deutschen Sendung, published in 1915 (Grumbach, p. 276) : 117 ii8 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS " Nature has made Germany the Power of Central Europe. The war has taught us that we can with certainty dominate only those States which we can group around us. Without wishing to under-estimate Germany's expansion as an oversea Power, we must, in the first place, make use of our central position on the European Continent. Nature teaches us that a Central European Federation of States should be the basis of our existence and that from thence we should advance into the world, in the first place by land, to- wards the south-east, by way of the Balkan Peninsula into Asia Minor. " Through the Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Turkey the war has produced the outlines of the great body which we shall have to complete and upon which we must found Germany's world position. The accession of the Balkan States, enlarged to their ut- most extent, should strengthen it in Europe. The largest portion possible of Asia should be attached to it by means of traffic lines. In the second place, the largest portion possible of Africa should be similarly connected with it. " Some Germans believe the creation of a German- dominated Central Europe necessary for the political security of Germany, and for economic reasons. Pro- fessor Dr. Conrad Bornhak wrote in Die Grenzboten on March I5th, 1916 (Grumbach, p. 203) : " We are waging at present only the first Punic War with England. No treaties of the past or of the future can guarantee to us the freedom of the seas. Real securities are required, as the German Chancellor has stated. Germany's economic life must be safe- A GERMAN CENTRAL EUROPE 119 guarded for the future. This means that, on the one hand, Germany's industrial territory must be enlarged, and that, on the other hand, the German agricultural territory must be expanded so that the two may be able to satisfy not only the present requirements of the German nation, but also those of the coming German millions. . . . " If we look upon the world-war as an economic war, we must draw from it the logical economic conclusion. The great continental area of the unified political system attached to the German-Austrian Alliance reaches from Antwerp and Hamburg to Libau and Vilna and to Syria and Mesopotamia. It must be politically organised for all time. " Some German writers have pointed out that Germany is entitled to the creation of a great Central European State dominated by Germany, not only because such a State would be advantageous to Germany on political, military, and economic grounds, but also because the German race is far superior to the other races. Accord- ing to them, the Germans are a master race, and their predominance will be to the advantage of the inferior races and of civilisation. Dr. Konrad Olbricht wrote in Die Vernichtung der engllschen Weltmacht, published in 1915 (Grumbach, p. 291): " Not only the fact that the larger part of the minette ore deposits lie in France, but also the posi- tion of the much-discussed fortresses of Liege, Namur, Longwy, Verdun, Toul, and Belfort compels us to push forward the German frontier in the West. The prob- lem of nationalities in the annexed districts will solve itself. Since 1871 the population of France has grown from 36,200,000 to only 39,800,000. In consequence 120 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS of the war there will surely be a serious decrease of the French population. In 1912, France had an excess of births over deaths of 25,000, as compared with 800,000 in Germany. " Holland-Belgium will form a difficult problem in the peace negotiations. The least to be expected is a customs union. However, the march of events will probably induce Holland to effect a closer connection with Germany, with which that country carries on the bulk of its trade. Happily, we are now in a position of playing out Antwerp against Rotterdam. " The map of Europe will undergo great changes. The war, which has been brought about by England's envy, is a struggle of pure Germanism against Slavs and Latins, a struggle of genius against barbarians who only too long have disturbed the peace of Europe. The outlines of a new Europe are appearing in the dawn. We see the lines of a Federal Union which reaches from the Baltic towards the south-east, beyond the Dardanelles. " The advocates of a German-dominated Central Europe desire to create a composite State directed against the Anglo-Saxon nations and against Russia which should comprise about 200,000,000 inhabitants. They wish to detach from Russia the Baltic Provinces, Poland, and Ukrainia, and attach these to Central Europe. As the Black Sea lies within the sphere of the Ukrainians, or Ruthenians, that sea would become a German lake. Dr. Carl Jentsch wrote in Der Weltkrieg und die Zukunft des deutschen Volkes, Berlin, 1915 (Grum- bach, p. 331): " Highly cultivated Finland must either become inde- pendent or fall again to Sweden. . . . " Exactly as in the last century the Zollverein A GERMAN CENTRAL EUROPE 121 abolished our internal customs duties and gradually pushed forward the German customs frontier up to the present political frontiers of Germany, so the present frontiers of Germany should be pushed forward to the limits of the Central European Federation to which probably the Ukrainians also will belong, for these have reason to complain about religious persecution. This federation will then form a connected, well-rounded, self-sufficing and militarily unassailable economic area. Very probably it will be joined by the three northern kingdoms, because Sweden fears Russia and because Norway and Denmark are suffering from English piracy during the present war. Holland and Switzer- land also will come into the union, because the economic position of small States is precarious. We do not re- quire them, and we must by no means press them to join us. ... Combined with these States, the Federa- tion would compromise 4,000,000 square kilometres and about 200,000,000 inhabitants. As the remaining States of the Continent would find it advisable to join it, the way would be opened to the creation of the United States of Europe. " As the Central European Federation was to be very largely an instrument for the subjection of England and of the British Empire, it was considered important that France should join it, for the assistance of that country would be valu^le against England. Therefore, many advocates of the Central European idea have pointed out that it would be to France's advantage to join Germany against England. " Ein Deutscher " wrote in Was uns der Weltkrieg bringen muss, Leipzig, 1914 (Grumbach, p. 313) : "If we should succeed in breaking England's sea- 122 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS power, we should not act with suicidal generosity, but should, notwithstanding our inborn sentimentality, deal with Russia with energy. We should be guided only by our own interests. By a drastic surgical operation we should separate Western Russia from Russia proper and attach the former by an alliance of defence and offence to the Central European Peace Federation. . . . " Unless England has been robbed of all its Colonies, it will remain Germany's powerful enemy. That coun- try can get rid of European competition in a twofold manner, either by destroying the European fleets and merchant marines or by closing to the European trade the British colonies. Europe can defend itself with success against this twofold strangulation only by a union of all the European States, Russia excepted. " To form such a union, it is necessary that Europe should no longer be split up into small independent States. It follows that Belgium should never again be permitted to become an independent State. That State is a purely artificial creation, a product of fear. It has been made chiefly by England, the country which has caused this terrible war. Hence, and because the larger part of Belgium belongs naturally to Holland and the smaller to Luxemburg, it should be united with, these two countries under the condition that both Holland and Luxemburg should voluntarily enter the German Empire. The two States should cede their coast towns and their harbours to Germany and these would be con- verted into fortresses and war harbours. The Dutch and Belgian Colonies should be placed under the German Colonial Office. " France should pay an adequate war indemnity, A GERMAN CENTRAL EUROPE 123 and waive for all time its claim to Alsace-Lorraine. Its present possessions on the Continent should be guaran- teed to it provided it joined the European Federation. It would, however, have to cede part of its African Colonies to Germany and to Italy. " As the old German Customs Federation had been an instrument for giving to Germany predominance in Europe, the Central European Federation was to give to Germany the mastery of Europe and supremacy throughout the world. The purpose of the Central European Federation was world-conquest, and partic- ularly the conquest of the British Empire. Hence many demanded that the Central European State should not be confined to the narrow limits of the European Continent, but should, by way of the Bos- phorus and the Dardanelles, be extended deep into Africa and Asia, so as to threaten India on the one hand and Cape Colony on the other. Herr Franz Kohler wrote in Der Neue Dreibund, Munich, 1915 (Grumbach, P- 333) : " England's destruction stands in the forefront of our wishes. Some have advocated a separate peace with France even on the basis of leaving its frontiers unimpaired, although such action would be open treason to our heroic soldiers in the field. . . . Financially com- pletely exhausted and forced to pay the heaviest possible indemnity, France would be relieved by the loss of a large part of its African Colonies. . . . " The history of the Baltic Provinces and of Finland shows that even countries of a higher civilisation may become victims of Russia's lust of conquest. The freeing of Finland from the Russian yoke would rid Sweden and Norway of their worries. . . . 124 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS " There is no reason why we should induce Sweden to intervene. At the same time, it must be questioned whether that country will be able to look on with folded arms while Russia oppresses the Finns. Although Germany sincerely desires to abolish Finland's servitude, a satisfactory solution of the Finnish problem is scarcely possible without Sweden's intervention. On the other hand, the Baltic Provinces, Esthonia, Livonia, and Cour- land must be considered as valuable German settlement colonies. . . . " As England owes its former superiority to its insular position and to the impossibility of attacking it by land, we must strive to create such frontiers that we can reach England, or rather England's possessions, by land. . . . The distance from Berlin to Bombay is very great. Still, the difficulty of threatening England in this direction would be small compared with attacking England by invasion across the Channel. Besides, the capital laid out on railways from Berlin to Bombay would be more usefully spent than a similar amount devoted to general armaments. Herein lies the true and the only solution of freeing ourselves from the English yoke. We must cut the connection with the richest English colonies, South Africa, and India, and create frontiers which enable us, with the help of our own railways and our Allies, to come in touch with them so that we need no longer take to the sea route or have to proceed by way of foreign territory. . . . From this point of view the creation of a Federation which reaches beyond the Balkans and Turkey up to the gates of India and of Cape Colony becomes significant. That is the necessary and logical solution. . . . A GERMAN CENTRAL EUROPE 125 " By expanding our frontiers, foreign races would have to be acquired. A defeated State has the greatest interest not to lose its population together with the territory which it has to cede. It will be necessary to demand certain securities from that part of the foreign population which wishes to remain on the conquered soil. We must be sure that the denationalisation of the people will not be resisted, that the conquered people agrees to the gradual introduction of the exclusive use of the language of the victor and of his education. . . . The solution of the problem will be facilitated if both combatants undertake a certain exchange. No value will be attached to retaining the Russian elements in the East. Russia, on the other hand, has already en- deavoured to induce the German settlers to emigrate from Russia. " CHAPTER XIV GERMANY'S COLONIAL WAR AIMS GERMANY'S colonial war aims are part of its Central European policy and of its world policy. Therefore numerous extracts illustrating that country's colonial ambitions will be found in Chapters XIII, XV, and XVI, which are entitled " A German Central Europe, " " Germany's War Aims in the Far East, " and " A German World. " A full list of references will be found in the Index at the end of this book. Those Germans who desire their country to become not only a great European State, but also a great Colonial Empire, wish, in the first instance, that Ger- many should dominate the African Continent. They do not wish to possess a colonial Empire, which can be reached only by a sea. They would prefer a colonial Empire connected with Germany by land. Germany's colonial policy is, in their eyes, merely an extension of its Central European policy. Professor Hans Delbriick of Berlin University wrote in Bismarck's Erbe, Berlin, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 299) : " The first and most important of our national de- mands which we must put forward at a future peace congress will be that of a very large colonial Empire, of a German India. " Doctor Paul Leutwein wrote in the important 126 GERMANY'S COLONIAL WAR AIMS 127 periodical Weltwirtschaft in May 1916 (Grumbach, P- 237) : " Only if we remember that nearly three-tenths of Germany's imports are colonial products, we shall be able to gauge how much Germany's economic regenera- tion after the conclusion of peace will depend upon the acquisition of an adequate colonial empire. . . . The world-war has yielded us a twofold lesson from the point of view of colonial economy. In the first place, we must come out of the war with a far larger colonial Empire than was that which we possessed previously. Besides, it must be connected by secure land-routes with the Motherland, in such a way that no future war can interrupt the economic connection. " Many Germans see in the acquisition of the larger part of the African Continent not an end in itself, but merely a means to an end. They see in Africa a gigantic base whence may be dominated the three great seas around, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the Pacific. Dr. Karl Mehrmann wrote in Gross-Deutschland, Dresden, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 340) : :< The wishes formulated by open-minded colonial politicians and the obvious aim of the German Foreign Office can be fulfilled at the conclusion of peace. The final defeat of France and Belgium must bring to the Germans the connection of Cameroon Colony and the East African colony. " A Central African New Germany right across the Black Continent will arise. It will be the connecting link of the sweep of territory from the North Sea to Asia Minor on the one hand, and the connecting link between the Atlantic and the Pacific on the other hand. 128 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS Our political dream of creating a balance of power on the Pacific would thus be fulfilled. " Herr Kuno Waltemath wrote in January 1916 in the Preussische Jahrbucher, the foremost German political monthly (Grumbach, p. 185) : " We must strive to acquire bases for our fleet and our oversea troops. We must remember that we should have achieved far more in fighting our enemies upon the sea had we possessed well-provisioned and well- armed bases which could be employed in a war of con- siderable duration. We have lacked these. We must in future never again try to carry on a world-policy with insufficient means, but reckon with all eventualities and prepare for them. " We must proclaim the national task of becoming a real colonial Power in Africa. There are situated our most promising territories. Our achievements in our African colonies entitle us to the highest hope. " We require territorial acquisitions in Europe. They are necessary to improve Germany's frontiers; but as the same time we require Colonies in Africa. They must be the prize of victory. Can there be a more attractive German national ideal that a homogeneous colonial Empire? . . . " The creation of such an Empire at France's cost would deprive the French of territories where that country can raise numerous recruits who may be drawn by it from Africa in increasing numbers in the future. Thus, France could be materially weakened. " To sum up, we must tell Germany's leaders : ' Con- tinental Power and Colonial Power! Do not forget the one in striving after the other. ' ' GERMANY'S COLONIAL WAR AIMS 129 Professor Dr. Karl Dove wrote in the periodical Weltwirtschaft in November 1915 ( Grumbach, p. 236) : " Africa is the coming continent. Its future is rich and full of hope. A nation, such as the German, which through its ability has gained so pre-eminent a position in trade and industry, cannot possibly stand aside, when other nations which are less industrious endeavour to secure for themselves the lion's share. We mean at last to obtain that which is our due, because we need it and because we require it for the existence of our children. " CHAPTER XV GERMAN WAR AIMS IN THE FAR EAST MANY Germans hope to obtain, in consequence of the present war, not only the predominance in Europe and in Africa, as has been shown by extracts given in the two preceding chapters, but they reckon upon obtaining the predominance in the Far East as well. As Asia Minor is to form part of the projected Central European Federation which is to be created under Germany's direction, it seems only natural to many Germans that, starting from Asia Minor and using that country as a base, the Far East also should be brought under German control. We have learned in previous chapters that India was to be controlled by Germany by means of railway lines which would bring India within easy reach of the German Armies. However, China also should be dominated by Germany. Germany should, in the Far East, take the place to which Japan aspires. The well-known diplomat and publicist, Freiherr von Mackay wrote in Das Grossere Deutschland on April 24th, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 223) : " Although Japan strives mightily to become a military power, the black days of its collapse must come earlier or later in view of the economic, social and moral weakness and backwardness of the country. And when Japan's hour of fate has arrived, then the time will 130 WAR AIMS IN THE FAR EAST 131 have come for Germany to harvest the fruits of its European victories also in the Far East. It will have learnt by its bitter experiences and will re-establish Germany's eminence and Europe's prestige. . . . " Doctor Paul Rohrbach, who has travelled a good deal in Africa and the Far East, believes that China should become a German Protectorate. He wrote in Unsere kolonlale Zukunftsarbeit, Stuttgart, 1915 (Grum- bach, p. 303) : " Of course one should take all land which one can get, for land is always valuable. . . . Should among the conditions of peace be the acquisition of Angola, then the murder of our three South- West Africans by a Portuguese officer would weigh heavily in the balance. The blood of these men would not have been spilled in vain. . . . " China has 400,000,000 inhabitants, one quarter of mankind. Let us ask ourselves: Which of the great civilised nations of Europe will be the architect of the external and internal renovation of that country? It will certainly not be done by the Japanese. . . . Will the English fulfil this task? To-day we may hope that, in consequence of the war, they will be ruled out. Whether Germany will undertake it will depend on our position after the war. If we are victorious, we shall be prominent probably also in East Asia, and even if we should not obtain a greater victory than Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War, our prestige would be enormous. If we are victorious in spite of all difficulties, the Chinese will conclude that they should make the victorious Germans their teachers. We must not imagine that it will be easy to undertake 132 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS the direction in the rebuilding of the Chinese world, but we shall ripen towards that great task. " While some Germans lay stress upon the political, the military, and the cultural effects of a German Protectorate over China, others regard that gigantic country chiefly from the economic point of view, and see in it an unlimited field of exploitation on the part of German financiers, bankers, manufacturers, and traders. Herr Wolf von Dewall wrote in Deutschland und China nach dem Kriege, Berlin, 1916 (Grumbach, p. 309) : " During many years Germany has taken little interest in China. Germany's interest in that country should be stimulated by a good information service. . . . " The iron-ore deposits of China are most promising. The iron wealth of the country is of the first order. Entire provinces form connected iron deposits. Nearly every Chinese province possesses iron, and coal is usually near at hand. Hence, the conditions for the develop- ment of the Chinese iron industry are very favourable. Hitherto, the riches of the soil have scarcely been touched. China should become wealthy by mining. The neglect of that industry is due to lack of capital and of transport, to popular obstructiveness and to unfavour- able laws. That should be altered. " It is necessary to seize opportunities in mining and act in China as we did with regard to the Chinese railway concessions in order to obtain the business. Organisation is necessary in order to be always ready for immediate action. Hongkong must no longer remain the chief emporium of Germany's trade in Southern China. We require a German settlement on the South WAR AIMS IN THE FAR EAST 133 Chinese coast. Hongkong owes its prosperity to the industry and energy of its German inhabitants and of its Chinese population and to the indolence of the Chinese Government. If the German merchants of Hongkong and their Chinese business friends leave that English colony, and if the Chinese Government should create a suitable harbour on the mainland, Hongkong would decline and become another Macao. We do not want to induce China to open an economic war with England, but we shall demand for ourselves a spot on which we can do business with South China inde- pendent of the laws of our enemies." CHAPTER XVI A GERMAN WORLD WE have seen in the three preceding chapters that many Germans desire to make Germany absolutely paramount on the European Continent, to make that country the leader of a Central European Federation of States which would compromise 200,000,000 in- habitants or more, and which would extend across the Narrows into Asia Minor. We have seen that many German enthusiasts hope to extend the German Em- pire far beyond Asia Minor, and to make Asia Minor a great base whence on the one hand the bulk of Africa will be conquered and whence, on the other, India may be threatened and attacked. In addition, many Ger- mans, seeing still farther ahead, hope that their country will dominate the Far East and make China a German Protectorate. The views of German enthusiasts are limitless. Domination over the three continents of the old world should, in their opinion, logically lead to German domination of the world. Diplomats, politicians, pub- licists, and business men share that hope. A former diplomat, Freiherr von Mackay wrote on November 27th, 1915, in Das Grosser e Deutschland (Grumbach, p. 229): " Germany must become the Centre State of Europe, its organising force, which, owing to its political, eco- 134 A GERMAN WORLD 135 nomic, and moral superiority will become the president of the whole world and give the world rest and peace. " Many Germans naturally see in the Turkish Empire the indispensable link and instrument for the achieve- ment of world domination. With the help of Turkey, India and China may be conquered. Having conquered these, Germany should civilise and Germanise the world, and the German language would become the world language. Herr Theodor Springmann, a manu- facturer, wrote in Deutschland und der Orient, Hagen, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 308) : " Germany's connection with Turkey has become so intimate through their brotherhood in arms that after the happy close of the war we should found a friend- ship-colony. We must strengthen Turkey within and without, suppress corruption, improve the administra- tion and the schools, introduce compulsory and universal military service, organise a war-ready army, and con- struct railways up to the frontiers of the Caucasus, as well as towards India and Asia. Enormous uncul- tivated territories await exploitation, and these can produce so much grain and cotton that Germany would never experience want in a future war. Enormous oil- wells, iron-mines, and manganese and copper deposits are awaiting us. All these circumstances combined yield such favourable conditions for an attack in case of future war with Russia or England, and these measures will be such an enormous help to us, that their aid will prove decisive. . . . "If once we have succeeded in making Turkey a strong, faithful and devoted ally, then we can advance towards our aim. India and China will be for Germany 136 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS the perfection of its development. At the moment Ger- many is not ripe for world-embracing greatness. And it is not our misfortune, but a great blessing, that the Hindoos have not yet revolted against England. . . . England's old Colonial Empire must fall to pieces, for it is based on lies and tyranny. . . . We shall tell the awakening nations of the East : ' England has given you the knout, but Germany is presenting you with golden liberty. Come to us, learn our language, and study our achievements. ' We shall close to our enemies the German schools, the mainsprings of our power, but open them to our friends, to India, Islam, and China. Then the German language will become the world language in this new world. " While some Germans, in accordance with the opinions of Herr Springmann, hope to dominate the world by conquering Africa and Asia and by forcibly depriving the British race of its imperial domain, seizing India, Egypt, the African possessions, etc., by an attack over land, others are of opinion that Germany should obtain the mastery of the world and the control of the British Empire by dominating the British Isles themselves. The latter recommend an invasion of England. After its successful accomplishment Dover should be permanently occupied by German troops, and the British Empire should be allowed to lead a shadow existence. It should be nominally independent, but in reality it should be a German possession endowed with the appearances of self-government. A well-known publicist, Konrad von Winterstetten, wrote in Nordkap-Bagdad, Frankfurt, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 363) : " A glance at the map shows that the dyke protecting Germany against Russia must extend from the North A GERMAN WORLD 137 Cape to the Black Sea and thence to the Caucasus and to the Persian Gulf. ... It is of immense importance that Germany should possess lands producing cotton and ore. The third necessity of world-policy is the possession of settlement colonies where the surplus population can find room. . . . " There should be a Federation : Germany, Austria- Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey these States should enjoy full sovereignty in internal affairs. They should be firmly connected by a defensive and offensive alliance and by binding military and political agreements. Gradually a complete customs unity and economic unity would be established. A Central European Empire should arise from the war. An independent Albania; Serbia should be partitioned; the three Northern States and the small States of the West should be invited to join. This Federal Empire would have 185,000,000 in- habitants, and, inclusive of the Colonies, 240,000,000 inhabitants. . . . " If the Central European State desires to be a World- Power it must reach the shores of the Pacific, and it can arrive there by way of Bagdad. If it has obtained a footing on the Pacific Ocean, it can defend the valu- able possessions which Holland has in that sea. These Dutch possessions must be entrusted to the Central European State, for otherwise they may be lost. Holland has no option in this new epoch of world revolution and in the creation of gigantic Empires. It can save its Colonies and independence only by entering the Central European Federation. Otherwise it will lose both. . . . " Germany's territorial booty from France is not a problem of arbitrary geographic rearrangement, but I 3 8 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS one of political and economic necessity. It would be foolish for Germany to burden itself with more French territory than it needs. The ore-beds of Lorraine, the fortress of Belfort, and the rest of the frontier-lands cannot escape us even if our claims are drawn up with the utmost modesty. The appropriation of a belt of territory along the Belgian frontier from Verdun to Boulogne will probably be found necessary in order to obtain an open door for invading France, and a spring- board towards England. That would be the best se- curity of the peace. . . . " More important than the question of correcting the frontiers is the problem of the French Colonies. That subject must be discussed elsewhere. It cannot be doubted that the actual occupation of the French Colo- nies by Germany is possible only after the defeat of the British Fleet. . . . " England must be made incapable of ever again fighting with Germany. . . . This can probably most easily be accomplished by making ourselves the masters of the European head of the British World- Empire. The road from Gravelotte- Verdun to Dunkirk-Boulogne might be continued by the occu- pation of the bridge-head of Dover by means of which England can be dominated. That proposal may seem fantastic, but it is as feasible as a landing in England without which the war would last for years. Only the conquest of London makes peace possible. After its conquest one condition of peace will be as easily enforcible as any other. England, possessing only part of her Fleet the larger part being in our hands England being militarily always in our power, yet administering freely the World-Empire, in which A GERMAN WORLD 139 no customs duties would be allowed to be levied, would henceforth be a most convenient neighbour to Germany. " It is obvious that if Germany should succeed in making itself supreme within the three old continents and should be able to dominate, or at least to over-awe, the British Empire, the United States would become a negligible factor, and little consideration need be paid to their Monroe doctrine. Herr Alfred Hettner wrote in Der Deutsche Krieg, Berlin, 1915 (Grumbach, p. 300) : " We must strive after the enlargement of Germany's colonial possessions, especially in Africa, and must par- ticularly aim at connecting them and rounding them off. It would have been far easier to defend our colonies had they been interconnected. The idea of an expansion and a completion of our African colonies has been de- sired for a long time. . . . " A portion of German public opinion is too modest with regard to America. Because the United States have raised the Monroe doctrine and have, so to speak, told us Europeans to clear out of America, it does not follow that we must bow to that doctrine. If we do it as a rule, this is due to the disunion of Europe, which has made it possible for the United States to fish in troubled waters. The Central and South Ameri- can States have recognised the Monroe doctrine only when it has protected them against Europe. However, the three South American Great Powers have deliber- ately opposed it when the United States^ interfered in Mexico. . . . Territorial conquests in America are out of the question, for there Germany's interests are economic and cultural. , 140 GERMANY'S ANNEXATIONIST AIMS " Germany cannot confine itself to its European area, even if it is enlarged. " If Germany should succeed in dominating Europe, Asia, and Africa, and in crippling or destroying the British power, there would be only two Great Powers left in the world: Germany and the United States. Some Germans believe, with Herr Konrad von Winter- stetten, that the strength of a Germany dominating the three continents of the old world would be so vast if compared with that of the United States, that that coun- try need not seriously be considered. Others think that Germany and the United States might agree to dominate the world jointly. They propose a partition of the world similar to that which Napoleon proposed to the Czar Alexander I on the raft on the river Niemen in 1807. Herr Max Schubert, a manufacturer, wrote in Deutschland am Schicksalswege, published in Leipzig in 1914 (Grumbach, p. 289) : " Belgium, the bulk of whose population is of Ger- manic descent, will, after the disgraceful deeds of the population, probably remain permanently a part of Germany. If we succeed in seizing, in addition to the Belgian coast, part of the Atlantic coast of France, then we should obtain the possibility of breaking England's supremacy in European waters. If we can enforce peace with France and Russia, victory over England will surely follow. We can enforce our will upon ap- parently inviolable England by means of a Continental blockade and similar means. Possibly we may succeed also in throwing England out of the Mediterranean, where it has no business to be. ... " Production in large quantities, which is particularly beneficial to the national economy, is possible only A GERMAN WORLD 141 within large economic areas. Already Germany forms such an area. Together with its friends, and allies, it would form a huge economic area which would be be- yond compare, except in the United States. We could conclude friendship with the United States and then we could lay down the law to the world. " ANALYTICAL INDEX Note The letter " f " following page figure signifies and following page; "ff" and following pages. Africa : " Deutscher, Ein, " on, 123 Dove, Karl, on, 129 Hettner, Alfred, on, 139 Kohler, Franz, on, 123, 124 Mecklenburg, Duke of, on, 9 f. Mehrmann, Doctor K., on, 127 f. Petition of German Intellec- tuals, on, 49 Rohrbach, Doctor P., on, 92, 131 Ruhemann, A., on, 88 Waltemath, Kuno, on, 128 Weber, Professor A., on, 118 America : Hettner, Alfred, on, 139 Losch, Doctor H., on, 84 Schubert, Max, on, 141 Spahn, Professor, on, 75 Angola, 114, 131 Apt, Professor M., 84 f. Asia : Dewall, Wolf von, on, 132 f. Mackay, Freiherr von, on, 130 Mehrmann, Doctor K. f on, 127 f. Rohrbach, Doctor P., on, 131 f. Springmann, Theodor, on, 135 Weber, Professor A., on, 118 Winterstetten, K. von, on, 137 Asia Minor: Bornhak, Professor C, on, 118 f. Olbricht, Doctor K., on, 120 Petition of Intellectuals, on, 48 Asia Minor (continued) : Springmann, Theodore, on, 135 Weber, Professor A., on, 118 Winterstetten, K. von, on, 137 B Balkan Peninsula: Kohler, Franz, on, 124 Oelzelt-Newin, on, 72 Petition of Intellectuals, on, 48 Weber, Professor A., on 118 Winterstetten, K. von, on, 137 Ballin, Albert, War Aims of, 15 f. Bar, Adolf, 67 f. Bases, Naval. See Maritime Aims, Channel, Belgium, England Bassermann, Herr, 70 f. Bavaria, King of, on Belgium, 8 f . Belfort, 29, 43, 138 Belgians, to be' expropriated and disfranchised, 28 f., 45, 66 Belgium : Professor Apt, on, 84 f. Bavaria, King of, on, 8 f. Bethmann-Hollweg, on, n f. " Deutscher, Ein, " on, 122 Grabowsky, Doctor, on, 76 f. Grenzboten, Die, on, 87 f. Haeckel, Professor, on, 71 Kreuzzeitung, 85 Losch, Doctor H., on, 83 f. 143 144 ANALYTICAL INDEX Belgium (continued) : Manufacturer, a large, 86 f. Mehrmann, Doctor K., on, 127 Muller-Meiningen, Doctor, on, 82 Oppenheimer, Doctor, on, 74 Petition on German Business Men, on, 28 f., 32 Petition of German Intellec- tuals, on, 44, 50 Ruhemann, A., on, 88, 113 f. Schubert, Max, on, 140 Schumacher, Professor H., on, 1 02 f. Sieveking, Professor, on, 78 Socialists, German, on, 55 ff., 63 Spahn, the Party Leader, on, 12 Spahn, Professor, on, 75, 85 f. Stresemann, Herr, on, 81 Winsterstetten, K. von, on, 94 Belgium, Partition of, advo- cated by: Bethmann-Hollweg, n f. Borchling, Professor, 83 Cleinow, G., 116 " Deutscher, Ein, " 122 Grabowsky, Doctor, 76 f. Haeckel, Professor, 71 Losch, Doctor H., 83 f. Petition of Business men, 29 Petition of Intellectuals, 44 Ruhemann, Dr. Alfred, 88, "5 Socialists, German, 59 Bethmann-Hollweg, on Belgium, France, and Russia, 10 ff. Bornhak, Professor, 78, 118 Bovenschen, Doctor A., 90 Brandenburg, Professor, 77 Briey, Mining District of, 29, 33 ff-, 77, 94 ff-, 178 Bulow, Prince, on Annexations, 14 f. Business Men, Petition of Ger- man, 24 ff. Calwer, Richard, 61 ff. Central Europe: Bornhak, Doctor C. on, 118 f Central Europe (continued) : Deutscher, ein, on, 121 ff. Jentsch, Doctor C., on, 120 f. Kohler, Franz, on, 123 ff. Mackay, Freiherr von, on, 134 * Olbricht, Doctor K., on, 119 f. Oppenheimer, Doctor, on, 74 Weber, Professor A., on 117 f. Winterstetten, K. von, on, 136 ff. Centre Party, Declarations by the, 12, 17, 19 Chancellor, German, Declara- tions by the, 10 ff. Channel, Control of, demanded by: Apt, Professor, M., 85 Ballin, Herr, 16 Mackay, Freiherr von, 98 f. Paasche, Vice-President, 70 Petition of Business Men, 28, 29 Petition of Intellectuals, 43 Spahn, Professor, 75 Chemnitser Volksstimme, 56, 60 China : Dewall, Wolf von, on, 132 f. Mackay, Freiherr von, on, 130 Rohrbach, Doctor P., on, 131 * Springmann, Theodor, on, 135 f. Cleinow, Herr, 105 f., 115 Coal and Iron Districts of France and Belgium to be seized, 29 f., 33 ff-, 77, 94 ff. US Colonial Aims: See also Africa, Asia, etc. Delbruck, Professor H., on, 126 " Deutscher, Ein, " on, 121 ff. Dove, Professor K., on, 129 Haeckel, Professor, on, 71 Hettner, Alfred, on, 139 Leutwein, Doctor P., on, i26f. Mecklenburg, Duke of, on, 9 f. Mehrmann, Doctor K., on, 127 f. Petition of Business Men, on, 28 Petition of Intellectuals, on, 44. 49 ANALYTICAL INDEX 145 Colonial Aims (continued) : Solf, Doctor, Colonial Secre- tary, on, 13 f. Waltemath, Kuno, on, 128 Winterstetten, K. von, on, 137 Colonies, British : " Deutscher, Ein," on, 121 f. Kohler, Franz, on, 124 Springmann, Theodor, 135 f. Confiscation of Properties, Dis- franchisement and Dena- tionalisation demanded by : Bar, Adolf, 67 f. Dix, Arthur, 65 iff. Eisenhart, W., 68 Petition of Business Men, 28 f., 30, 31 Petition of Intellectuals, 43, 44 ff., 46 f., 52 Schumacher, Professor H., 96 f. Vietinghoff, von, 64 ff. Congo State : Haeckel, Professor, on, 71 Mehrmann, Doctor K., on, 127 Ruhemann, A., on, 88 Schulze-Gaevernitz, Professor von, on, 93 Spahn, Professor, on, 75 Conquests, German, must be re- tained, 17 ff., 31, 70, 71, 74 Conservative Parties, Declara- tions by German, 17, 1 8 Delbruck, Professor H., 126 Denmark, 121 "Deutscher, Ein," 121 ff. Das Grossere Deutschland, 13 Das Neue Deutschland, 75 f. Disfranchisement and Denation- alisation of Conquered Peo- ples, 29, 30, 31, 43, 45 ff., 64 ff., 66, 77, 109, 125 See also Confiscation Dix, Arthur, 65 ff. Dove, Professor K., 129 E Egypt: Jackh, Ernst, on, 100 f. Oelzelt-Newin, on, 73 Petition of German Business Men, on, 50 Rohrbach, Doctor P., on, 101 Schafer, Doctor, G. A. on, 102 Eisenhart, W., 68, 79 f. Emperor, German, on War Aims, 7 England : Apt, Professor, on, 85 Ballin, Herr, on, 16 Bornhak, Professor C, on, 118 Cleinow, G., on, 116 " Deutscher, Ein, " on, 121 f. Dewall, W. von, on, 133 Free Conservative Party, on, 18 f. Fuhrmann, Herr, on, 99 Haeckel, Professor, on, 71 f. Jackh, Ernst, on, 100 f. Kohler, Franz, on, 123, 124 Kreuszeitung, on, 85 Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten, on, 99 f. Mackay, Freiherr von, on, 98 f. Manufacturer, A Large, on, 86 f. Oelzelt-Newin, on, 73 Olbricht, Doctor K., on, 119 f. Oppenheimer, Doctor, on, 74 Paasche, Vice-President, on, 70 Petition of Business Men, on, 28, 32 Petition of Intellectuals, on, 43, 44, 48 ff. Rohrbach, Doctor P., on, 92, 101 Ruhemann, A., on 88 Schubert, Max, on, 140 Schumacher, Professor, H., on, 94, 1 02 ff. Socialists, German, on, 61 ff. Spahn, Professor, on, 75, 85 f. Springmann, Theodor, on, 135 f. 146 ANALYTICAL INDEX England (continued) : Winterstetten, K., von, on, 94, 136 ff. Expropriation. See Confiscation Flemish. See Belgians France : Bethmann-Hollweg, on, u Bovenschen, Doctor A., on, 70 Bulow, Prince, on, 14 f. Centre Party, on, 17, 19 Conservative Parties, on, 17, 18 " Deutscher, Ein, " on, 122 f. Haeckel, Professor, on, 71 Kohler, Franz, on, 123 Liberal Party, on, 17, 20 Naumann, F., on, 91 Oelzelt-Newin, on, 73 Olbricht, Doctor K., on 119 f. Oppenheimer, Doctor, on, 74 Petition of Business Men, on, 2(5, 29 f., 32 Petition of Intellectuals, on, 43 Radical Party, on, 17, 21 f. Rohrbach, Doctor P., on, 92 Ruhemann, A., on, 88 f. Schubert, Max, on, 140 Shulze-Gaevernitz, Professor von, on, 93 Schumacher, Professor H., on, 73, 94 ff. Socialists, German, on, 58, 63 Waltemath, Kuno, on, 128 Winterstetten, K. von, on, 93 f-, 138 Frankfurter Volksstimme, 57 f. Freedom of the Sea. See Mari- time Aims, Channel, Bel- gium, England French, Conquered, to be expro- priated and disfranchised, 43 f-, 309 Fuhrmann, Herr, 99 Gaigalat, Doctor, 106 f. Gebsattel, General von, 107 ff. Geek, Herr, 58 Gibraltar, 73 Glocke, Die, 57 Gottlieb, Doctor A., 78 f. Grabowsky, Doctor, 76 f., 109 Grenzboten, Die, 5, 78 f., 87 f., 105 f., 1 06 f., 114 f., 115, 118 f. Gruber, Professor M. von, 75 f. H Haeckel, Professor Ernst, 71 f. Hettner, Alfred, 139 f. Hochland, Das, 75 Holland : Cleinow, G., on, 115 " Deutscher, Ein, " on, 122 Grabowsky, Doctor, on, 77 Haeckel, Professor, on, 71 Jentsch, Doctor C, on, 121 Olbricht, Doctor K., on, 120 Rachfahl, Professor, on, 112 Ruhemann, Alfred, on, 112 ff., 114 f- Winterstetten, K. von, on, 137 Hongkong, 133 Indemnities demanded by: Bar, Adolf, 67 f. " Deutscher, Ein, " 122 f. Dix, Arthur, 65 ff. Free Conservative Party, 186 Schumacher, Professor H., 96 f. Vietinghoff von, 64 India: K6hler, Franz, on 124 Springmann, Theodor, on, 135 f- Intellectuals, Petition of Ger- man, 39 ff. Iron and Coal Districts of France and Belgium to be seized, 29 f., 33 ff., 77, 94 ff., 138 Italy : " Deutscher, Ein, " on, 123 Winterstetten, K. von, on, 94 Jackh, Ernst, 100 f. ANALYTICAL INDEX 147 Japan : Mackay, Freiherr von, on, 130 f. Rohrbach, Doctor P., on, 131 f- Jentsch, Doctor C, 121 Kohler, Professor, on "Neces- sity stands above Law," 5 Kreuzseitung, 74, 79 f., 85 Kultur, 52 f. Landsberg, Doctor, 57 Law, International, Professor Zorn, on, 5 Ledebour, Herr, 58 Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten, 99 f- Lensch, Doctor Paul, 37 Leutwein, Doctor P., 126 f. Liberal Parties, Declarations by German, 17, 19, 20 Luxemburg : Business Men's Petition, on, 34, 35 "Deutscher, Ein," on, 122 Haeckel, Professor von, on, 71 Ruhemann, Alfred, on, 114 f. Mackay, Freiherr von, 98 f., 130, 134 f. Magdeburgische Zeitung, 98 f. Maritime Aims. See also Channel, Belgium, England Apt, Professor, on, 85 Ballin, Herr, on, 16 "Deutscher, Ein," on, 121 ft". Petition of Business Men, on, 26, 29, 49 f. Spahn, Professor, on, 75 Marum, Herr, 59 Mecklenburg, Duke of, on Colo- nial Aims, 9 f. Mehrmann, Doctor K., 127 f. Monistisches Jahrhundert, Das, 74 Monroe Doctrine, 139 Morocco, 88, 103 Munchner Neueste Nachrichten, on Belgium, 8 f. N Nationalities, Principle of, re- pudiated by: Non-Socialists, 5 f., 79 f. Socialists, 57, 62 f. Naumann, F., 91 Naval Aims. See Maritime, Channel, Belgium, England "Necessity stands above Law," Professor Kohler, on, 5 Nice, 73 Norddeutsche Attgemeine Zeitung, 25 North Sea. See Channel, Mari- time, Belgium, England Norway, 121, 123, 124 Oelzelt-Newin, A., 72 Olbricht, Doctor K., 119 Oppenheimer, Doctor, 74 Paasche, Vice-President of Reich- stag, 70 Panther, Der, 106, 107 ff. Papers, Titles of German, quoted, 2 People, conquered, proposed treatment of. See also Con- fiscation, Disfranchisement, and Denationalisation, 28 f., 30, 31, 43i 4Sff- 64 ff., 66, 109 Poland, 46, 71. 78, 105 f., 108, 109 f. Portugal, 113 f., 131 Professors, Petition of German, 39 ff- Property Owners in conquered districts. See Confiscation Rachfahl, Professor, 112 Radical Party, Declarations by the, 17, 21 f. Rheinische Zeitung, 59 148 ANALYTICAL INDEX Ripke, Axel, 105 Rohrbach, Doctor P., 92, 101, 109 f., 131 f. Ruheman, Alfred, 87 ff., 112 ff., 114 f- Russia : Bethmann-Hollweg, on, n Bovenschen, Doctor A., on, 90 Bulow, Prince, on, 14 f. Centre Party, on, 12, 17, 19 Cleinow, Herr, on, 105 f. Conservative Parties, on, 17, 18 " Deutscher, Ein, " on, 122 Gaigalat, Doctor, on, 106 f. Gebsattel, General von, on, 107 ff. Grabowsky, Doctor, on, 109 Gruber, Professor M. von, on, 75 f- Haeckel, Professor, on, 71 Kohler, Franz, on, 123 f. Liberal Party, on, 17, 20 Manufacturer, A Large, on, 87 Oelzelt-Newin, on, 72 Paasche, Vice-President, on, 70 Petition of Business Men, on, 26, 30 f., 32 Position of Intellectuals, on, 45 ff. Radical Party, on, 17, 21 f. Ripke, Axel, on, 105 Rohrbach, Doctor P., on, 92, 109 f. Schubert, Max, on, 140 Schumacher, Professor H., on, 73 Socialists, German, on, 58 ff. Winterstetten, K. von, on, 136 f. Russia, to hand back German settlers, 45, 47, no, 125 Russians, Conquered, to be ex- propriated and enslaved, 3i, 45 ff- Scheidemann, Philip, 59 f. Schippel, Max, 55 f. Schubert, Max, 139 f. Schulze-Gaevernitz, Professor von, 93 Schumacher, Professor H-, 73 f., 94 ff., 1 02 ff. Sea, Freedom of. See England, Channel, Maritime, Bel- gium. Serbia, 56, 72, 137 Sieveking, Professor H., 77 f. Socialists, German : Advocate Annexation, 56 ff. Repudiate right of nations to dispose of themselves, 57, 62 f. War Aims of the, 55 ff. Solf, Doctor, on Colonial Aims, i f. Sosialistische Monatshefte, 55 f. Spahn, Leader of Centre Party, Declaration by, 12, 17 Spahn, Professor M., 75, 85 f. Springmann, Theodor, 135 f. State stands above Nationality, 5 Stresemann, Herr, 81 Suddeutsche Monatshefte, 57 f. Suez Canal: Jackh, Ernst, on, 100 f. Oelzelt-Newin, on, 73 Petition of Intellectuals, on, 50 Rohrbach, Doctor P., on, 101 Schafer, Doctor G. A., on, 102 Schumacher, Professor H., on, 103 Sweden, 72, 120, 121, 123, 124 Switzerland, 121 Tag, Der, 61 ff. Toulon, 73 Turkey, 73, 101, 103, 118, 124, 135, 137 Ukraine, The, 108, 109, 121 United States: Hettner, Alfred, on, 139 Losch, Dr. H., on, 84 Schubert, Max, on, 141 Spahn, Professor, on, 75 ANALYTICAL INDEX 149 Verdun, 29, 33, 36, 138 Vietinghoff, L. von, 64 f. W See Belgium and Walloons. Belgians Waltemath, Kuno, 128 Weber, Professor A., 117 f. Weltwirtschaft, Die, 126 f., 129 William the Second, on German War Aims, 7 Winterstetten, K. von, 93 f., 136 ff. World-power and World Domi- nation : Gottlieb, Doctor, on, 78 f. Grabowsky, Doctor, on, 77 Mackay, Freiherr von, on, 134 * Petition of Intellectuals, on, 42 Rohrbach, Doctor P., on, 101 Springmann, Theodor, on, 135 f. Winterstetten, K. von, on, 136 ff. Zorn, Professor, tional Law, 5 on Interna- Printed in the United States of America The Inspiration of the German People when they awake from their present Nightmare. 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